The Jacobite Movement in Scotland and in Exile, 1749-1759 (Studies in Modern History)

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The Jacobite Movement in Scotland and in Exile, 1746–1759 Doron Zimmermann

Studies in Modern History General Editor: J. C. D. Clark, Joyce and Elizabeth Hall Distinguished Professor of British History, University of Kansas Titles include: Jonathan Clark and Howard Erskine-Hill (editors) SAMUEL JOHNSON IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT Bernard Cottret (editor) BOLINGBROKE’S POLITICAL WRITINGS The Conservative Enlightenment Richard R. Follett EVANGELICALISM, PENAL THEORY AND THE POLITICS OF CRIMINAL LAW REFORM IN ENGLAND, 1808–30 Andrew Godley JEWISH IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN NEW YORK AND LONDON 1880–1914 Philip Hicks NEOCLASSICAL HISTORY AND ENGLISH CULTURE From Clarendon to Hume Mark Keay WILLIAM WORDSWORTH’S GOLDEN AGE THEORIES DURING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN ENGLAND, 1750–1850 William M. Kuhn DEMOCRATIC ROYALISM The Transformation of the British Monarchy, 1861–1914 Kim Lawes PATERNALISM AND POLITICS The Revival of Paternalism in Early Nineteenth-Century Britain Marisa Linton THE POLITICS OF VIRTUE IN ENLIGHTENMENT FRANCE Nancy D. LoPatin POLITICAL UNIONS, POPULAR POLITICS AND THE GREAT REFORM ACT OF 1832 Karin J. MacHardy WAR, RELIGION AND COURT PATRONAGE IN HABSBURG AUSTRIA The Social and Cultural Dimensions of Political Interaction, 1521–1622 Marjorie Morgan NATIONAL IDENTITIES AND TRAVEL IN VICTORIAN BRITAIN James Muldoon EMPIRE AND ORDER The Concept of Empire, 800–1800

W. D. Rubinstein and Hilary Rubinstein PHILOSEMITISM Admiration and Support for Jews in the English-Speaking World, 1840–1939 Julia Rudolph WHIG POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION James Tyrrell and the Theory of Resistance Lisa Steffen TREASON AND NATIONAL IDENTITY Defining a British State, 1608–1820 Lynne Taylor BETWEEN RESISTANCE AND COLLABORATION Popular Protest in Northern France, 1940–45 Doron Zimmermann THE JACOBITE MOVEMENT IN SCOTLAND AND IN EXILE, 1746–1759

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The Jacobite Movement in Scotland and in Exile, 1746–1759 Doron Zimmermann

Q Doron Zimmermann 2003 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2003 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. MacmillanT is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN 1–4039–1291–2 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Zimmermann, Doron, 1970The Jacobite movement in Scotland and in exile, 1746–1759 / Doron Zimmermann. p. cm. – (Studies in modern history) Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. ISBN 1-4039-1291-2 1. Jacobites. 2. Scotland–History–18th century. 3. Scots–Foreign countries–History–18th century. 4. British–Foreign countries–History–18th century. I. Title. II. Studies in modern history (Palgrave (Firm) ) DA813.Z56 2003 941.107’2–dc21 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 12 11 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham and Eastbourne

2003040549

To my father, Erich Zimmermann, sine qua non

When everything has been said, if we have not understanding, the history of all the ages may bring us no benefit; for it may only give us a larger canvas for our smudging, a wider world for our wilfulness. History is all things to all men. She is at the service of good causes and bad. In other words she is a harlot and a hireling, and for this reason she best serves those who suspect her most. Therefore, we must beware even of saying, ‘History says . . . ’ or ‘History proves . . . ,’ as though she herself were the oracle; as though indeed history, once she had spoken, had put the matter beyond the range of mere human enquiry. Rather we must say to ourselves: ‘She will lie to us till the very end of the last crossexamination.’ This is the goddess the whig worships when he claims to make her the arbiter of controversy. She cheats us with optical illusions, sleight-of-hand, equivocal phraseology. If we must confuse counsel by personifying history at all, it is best to treat her as an old reprobate, whose tricks and juggleries are things to be guarded against. In other words the truth of history is no simple matter, all packed and parcelled ready for handling in the market-place. And the understanding of the past is not so easy as it is sometimes made to appear. Herbert Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History

Contents Acknowledgements

ix

List of Abbreviations

xi

Notes on Dates and Spelling 1

2

3

4

xii

The Historians and the Last Phase of Jacobitism: From Culloden to Quiberon Bay, 1746–1759 Introduction The Modern Historiographical Debate on Jacobitism Methodology and Structure The Manuscript Sources The Main Body of the Book Suppression and Resistance: Hanoverians and Jacobites in 1746–1747 Introduction Jacobite Resistance after Culloden: Ruthven, the Muirlaggan Resolution and Lochiel’s Last Stand, 1746 The Changing Nature of Jacobite Resistance in the Scottish Highlands, 1746 The Jacobite Recovery in Britain, 1747 Conclusion The Jacobite Movement in Exile after Culloden, 1746–1748 Introduction: The Last Jacobite Exile Return to France, 1746 The Jacobite Diaspora, 1746–1747 The Jacobite Schism, the Scots’ Resurgence and Charles’ Expulsion, 1747–1748 Conclusion The Plot that Almost Happened: The Jacobite Movement, the British Government and the Elibank Conspiracy, 1749–1754 Introduction The Locharkaig Treasure: Asset or Setback? The Elibank Plot: The First Phase, 1749–1750 The Elibank Plot: The Second Phase, 1750–1751 The Elibank Plot: The Last Phase, 1752–1753 vii

1 1 3 13 16 19

21 21 23 31 38 44 48 48 50 52 61 71

75 75 76 81 84 97

viii Contents

5

6

The Plot that Almost Happened The Aftermath Conclusion

102 110 114

The Last Attempt: The Jacobites and the ’Fifty-Nine, 1756–1759

120

Introduction: The Context of the Seven Years’ War The State of the Jacobite Movement at the Beginning of the Seven Years’ War A Genealogy of Jacobite Plans, 1754–1759 The Franco-Jacobite Negotiations, 1757–1759 Britain and the Jacobite Factor, 1755–1759 Conclusion: The Invasion Attempt of 1759 and the End of the Jacobite Threat

120 122 126 132 146

A Jacobite Renaissance or Epitaph, 1746–1759?

159

154

Addendum: University of Nottingham Letters

170

Notes

174

Bibliography

287

Index

299

Acknowledgements I would like to thank my father Erich Zimmermann, and my grandmother Anna Zimmermann-Pfeiffer, for their unfaltering loyalty and support. For his caring guidance, sagacity, patience, and kindness, I owe a major debt of gratitude to my supervisor and mentor at Cambridge, Dr Mark A. Goldie. Most people attempting to research and write a book are bound to develop a few introverted traits and annoying habits in the course of their work; this may mystify the people closest to them. In this sense, I would like to express my deep appreciation for the love, generosity, humour and patience of my wife, Petra Buchta Zimmermann. All people writing and finishing a book based on a doctoral dissertation end up owing a considerable debt to many individuals and institutions. Above all, many thanks are due to my parents, siblings, friends and colleagues who, in assisting me, have gone beyond the call of duty: Donatella Richtman-Cinquini, Daniel Richtman, Imanuel Omar Richtman, Michal Ose´ ´ ’Ciardha, Dr Alan Orr, Dr Ariel Richtman, Monika Andraska, Dr Eámonn O Hessayon, Dr Thomas Biskup, August Zemo, Anton Xavier Demian, Michael Doujak, Steven Loesche, Philip Baker, Christine Schmidt, Carlo Bertoli, Dr Thomas Ahnert, Professor Laura C. Stevenson, Toni Nuspl, Professor Thomas Redden, Matthew and Jessica O’Pray-Lefkowicz, Professor Timothy F. Little, Professor Dana Howell, Dr William Acres, Mr Jon Stuart, Michael ‘Jim-Bob’ Gallmann and David King. For the many challenging and interesting conversations about the Monde Jacobitian, the intellectual fruits of rigorous research, and kind encouragement, I would like to acknowledge a debt to Dr Eveline Cruickshanks, Professor Howard Erskine-Hill, Professor J. C. D. Clark, Professor Daniel Szechi, Professor Paul Kle´ber Monod, Dr Paul A. Hopkins, Dr John Morill, ´ Buachalla, John Sibbald Professor Allan I. Macinnes, Professor Breandn O Gibson, and especially to an outstanding historian I have not yet had the pleasure to meet, but whose work I have admired since before my days as an undergraduate: Dr Frank J. McLynn. None of the above are responsible for the mistakes, imprecision and the Germanisms that follow. My sincere thanks and acknowledgment are also due to Godfrey Waller, Mrs Ann Toseland, the staff and librarians in the manuscript and rare books departments at the Cambridge University Library; the staff and librarians at the Scottish Record Office; Sir Donald Cameron of Lochiel, KT, CVO, TD, 26th Chief of Clan Cameron (and 9th Baron Lochiel in the Jacobite peerage), and Lady Margaret Cameron; Dr Louise Yeoman, Dr John Scally and the Trustees of the National Library of Scotland; Her Majesty the Queen for Her permission to make use of the microfilms of the original manuscripts lodged ix

x Acknowledgements

at the Royal Archives; His Grace the Duke of Devonshire, and Mr Peter Day, Keeper of Collections at Chatsworth, Mrs Fiona Marwick and the Trustees of the West Highland Museum; Dr Mary Robertson, Kelli Ann Bronson and the Trustees of the Huntington Library in San Marino, California; the staff and librarians at the Manuscripts Students’ Room of the British Library; the Keeper and her staff at the Department of Manuscripts and Special Collections, Hallward Library, University of Nottingham; Mrs Cećile Franc at the Bibliothe`que Municipale d’Avignon; and Myrtle I. Anderson-Smith at the Department for Special Collections, University of Aberdeen; Matthai Kurian for typesetting the book. Crown copyright material in the Public Record Office is reproduced by permission of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. ¨ rich, Abteilung Stipendien, has The Erziehungsdirektion des Kantons Zu contributed generously towards the completion of the thesis on which this book is based. I especially wish to thank Mrs Sabeth Tobler, Mrs Rosemarie ¨ chi for their kind support. Vella and Mrs Doris Bu I would also like to thank the Master and the Fellows of Emmanuel College for their kind support. I am much obliged to Mrs Betty Wisbey and Mrs Freida Stewart for their help. Do r o n Zi m m e r m a n n

List of Abbreviations BL Add. Ms British Library, Additional Manuscripts BL Eg. Ms British Library, Egerton Manuscripts Cumberland Mss Royal Archives, Cumberland papers HEH Henry E. Huntington Library LO Huntington Library, Loudon Scottish Collection NeC Newcastle of Clumber Collection, Pelham papers NLS Ms National Library of Scotland Manuscript SP 36 State Papers Domestic, George II SP 54 State Papers for Scotland SP 78 State Papers for France SP 88 State Papers for Saxony-Poland SP 90 State Papers for Prussia SP 98 State Papers for Tuscany SRO GD Scottish Record Office, Gifts & Deposits Stuart Mss Royal Archives, Stuart papers WHM West Highland Museum

xi

Note on Dates and Spelling Until 1752, Britain used the Julian calendar (Old Style), which was ten days behind the Continental Gregorian calendar to 1700, and subsequently, eleven days behind; the Julian calendar marked the New Year on Lady’s Day, 25 March, not 1 January. By the Act of 24 Geo. II, cap. 23 (‘An Act for regulating the commencement of the year and for correcting the Calendar now in use’), Britain adopted the Gregorian Calendar (New Style) on 3/14 September 1752. The convention by which the English New Year began on 25 March has been ignored; the dates given are those found on the documents cited, except that the year is assumed to have started on 1 January. Until the year 1752, the new calendar was ordinarily used by correspondents writing on the Continent, and the old calendar by those writing in the British Isles. All dates of letters written in the British Isles after 14 September 1752 are assumed to conform to the Gregorian calendar. The authors of diplomatic correspondence sent to Britain from abroad at times used both calendars, in which case the date is given in both OS and NS styles. Anglicized spelling conventions have been applied throughout this book, except in quotations from a primary or secondary source in which another, or no grammatical norm applies; with the exception of letters or words in square brackets, the text is reproduced without any alterations. No attempt has been made to modernize the spelling in quotations; a standardized spelling of real names has been used throughout. Note: The names ‘Alasdair Ruadh MacDonell of Glengarry’, ‘Young Glengarry’, ‘Glengarry’, and ‘Pickle’ will be used throughout the main body of this book to identify the same person.

xii

1 The Historians and the Last Phase of Jacobitism: From Culloden to Quiberon Bay, 1746–1759

Der Niederlage von Culloden folgten keine weiteren Aufsta¨nde.1 Historical study is not the study of the past but the study of present traces of the past.2

Introduction For thirteen years following the defeat of Charles Edward Stuart’s army at the battle of Culloden (16 April 1746 OS), the Jacobite movement persisted as a viable threat to the Hanoverian dynasty and the British state. The possibility of a Stuart restoration by foreign military intervention on behalf of the exiled dynasty was finally eliminated on 25 November 1759 by the decisive victory of the Royal Navy in the bay of Quiberon over a French fleet poised to invade Britain. This book is concerned with the Jacobite movement in Scotland and in exile in the intervening years, 1746–59. Beginning with the immediate aftermath of the ’Forty-five, the subsequent chapters set out to illustrate the last Jacobite exile in France, and Prince Charles’ efforts to gain the French ministers’ support for a second expedition to Britain. Following the Prince’s expulsion from the French dominions in 1748, the main body of this book concentrates on the genesis and development of the various schemes culminating in the Elibank plot, but also on the extent of Prussian involvement in this conspiracy during the early 1750s. The resumption of Charles’ negotiations with the French in the aftermath of the Diplomatic Revolution, and the resulting Franco-Jacobite attempt at invading Britain during the first phase of the Seven Years’ War, conclude the narrative section. The final chapter seeks to bring together the conclusions reached in those preceding it, and to lend a broader perspective to the detailed narrative.

1

2 The Jacobite Movement in Scotland and in Exile

Special attention has been paid to Scotland and the Continent: the North of Britain, France, Italy and Spain set the geographic stage upon which most of the events covered by this book occurred. In the period between 1746 and 1759, the role of the Jacobites in England, Wales and Ireland was more of a reluctant or even passive nature, than that of their banished partisans. Understandably so, as the Jacobites resident in the Three Kingdoms faced serious risks of being detected by, or betrayed to, the British government. The principal aim of my book is to answer the question, whether the suppression of the ’Forty-five, as represented by a long-standing historiographical consensus, spelled the sudden end of Jacobite hopes, and British fears, of another rising. The argument and conclusions presented here are the result of my attempt to provide an answer to this question by exploring the period between the immediate aftermath of Culloden and the abortive Franco-Jacobite invasion of November 1759. To this degree, I have tried to document the last phase of active Jacobitism, and to evaluate both Jacobite activity and the British response during the pertinent period. Flatly contradictory to an established opinion in the field, the careful piecing together of archival evidence lends itself to the conclusion that the Jacobites after Culloden were, indeed, active, and the rulers of Hanoverian Britain apprehended a recrudescence of Jacobitical agitation for over a decade after 1746. Although no other major rising in the Three Kingdoms occurred, the Jacobite movement was very much alive after the ’Forty-five, and the political establishment of the British state continued to fear it as a threat to its security. But what of the sceptics’ historiographical verdict – the perceived fait accompli of an impotent Jacobite movement in the post-Culloden period – agreed on by a not insignificant portion of scholars in the field? How are we to let the diametrically opposed view of Jacobitism as a marginal non-event in British history stand vis-a`-vis the present argument proposing a resurgent Jacobite movement after 1746? The answer is that the two theses are based on divergent assumptions – that of an enfeebled and ineffectual Jacobite party, as opposed to that of a thriving and resilient royalist movement; they are situated on the opposite ends of the existing historiographical spectrum. There is another significant difference between these two contending theses within the modern debate on Jacobitism. While the former constitutes an established view among sceptical scholars, and more generally within the field of eighteenth-century political history, the latter has only been marginally touched upon, alternately ignored or implicitly precluded by a categorical refusal to see in early eighteenth-century Jacobitism anything but a Robinocratic bogey, a convenient tool of Walpolean statecraft. Seen from such a sceptical angle, Jacobitism constituted a superannuated, waning threat in Walpole’s time; hence, it should not have been able to retain its appeal, or even to gain in substance, thereafter. According to this

Last Phase of Jacobitism 3

manner of argument, the ’Forty-five would consequently have to be classed as an historical ‘freak’, and the survival of a Jacobite threat after 1746 would implicitly find itself well beyond the pale of the sceptical canon. The proposition put forward in this chapter is that the sceptical interpretation of mideighteenth century Jacobitism within the modern debate is in need of scrutiny. In order to posit the present argument in the context of the wider debate, a brief identification and exploration of recent, established positions therein merit some attention.

The Modern Historiographical Debate on Jacobitism A few common denominators bounding the parameters of the modern debate on Jacobitism can be identified, though caution should govern any typology attempting to categorize historians. Dr Daniel Szechi has attempted to construct such a typology, which may here serve as a positive example. He distinguishes optimists from pessimists and rejectionists. The principal difference separating the historiographical schools in the field lies in the significance the optimists accord to the Jacobite threat. While different levels of optimism and outright rejectionism can be detected in most published works on the topic, a rough distinction between optimists, who look upon the Jacobite movement as a significant theme in British history, and pessimists and rejectionists, whose view tends to confine Jacobitism to the margins, can be readily discerned.3 External influences in the present can also be seen at work. Murray Pittock has recently pointed out the correlation between the impact of the revival of modern political nationalism in the British Isles, and a new, vigorous tendency of revisionism among Jacobite scholars dissatisfied with the historiographical status quo.4 More generally, Lawrence Stone observed that historical debates are driven by ‘current ideological concerns.’5 Daniel Szechi proposes a subdivision of the sceptical historians into pessimists and rejectionists.6 In the light of the present inquiry, the distinction between pessimists and rejectionists is of little import, as the exponents of both tendencies uphold as a central tenet of their thesis the idea of the sudden demise and utter insignificance of Jacobitism after 1746, if not, as is true in most cases of representatives of the rejectionist school, long before that date.7 In the broadest sense, the ‘Jacosceptics’ – that is, historians of the pessimist and rejectionist schools of thought – may be understood to hold the incumbent position within the confines of the modern debate. Even though Szechi classes him among the moderate pessimists, Edward Gregg, for example, is quick to assert that ‘[w]ithin 30 minutes of Cumberland’s initial charge, Jacobitism was mortally wounded as a political force in Scottish life’.8 The implication that Jacobitism could not possibly have been anything but a moribund force in England cannot have been far from his mind.9


The thrust of Gregg’s contention exemplifies the essence of the ‘lost cause model’ frequently employed by Jacosceptics: a representation of events which, in its relevance to the present book, precludes the possibility that Jacobitism, as a potent political movement working towards the restoration of the exiled dynasty, could have survived the disaster of Culloden, or thereafter have maintained any hope of achieving its principal goal of a second Stuart restoration. By extension, William Speck’s dictum that ‘[a]s every schoolboy knows, the Jacobite rebellion of 1745 was a failure’, typifies the oversimplification germane to the sceptics’ ex post facto dismissals of the Jacobite movement after Culloden.10 The problem here is not so much the evident truth of the culmination of events in retrospect, as the implicit foreclosure of any option left open to the Jacobites at that time, and Speck’s omission of the circumstance that nobody in 1746 knew that Culloden was the last battle fought on British soil. Hindsight does confirm Speck’s verdict. But the use of hindsight is not without its dangers. The sceptics’ offensive against a positive portrayal of Jacobitism has been characterized by a pronounced severity. Linda Colley recently claimed that Jacobitism had been overrepresented in the context of British history at the expense of ‘the other, apparently more conventional voices’, and solved the problem by confining this beˆte noire of British historiography to the margin of her own work, or by attempting to demonstrate that the Tory party predominantly consisted of His Majesty’s most loyal opposition in Parliament, not subversive Jacobites.11 Furthermore, Colley insinuated that the judgement of optimistic scholars in the field had been clouded by their partisanship, preventing them from seeing the detrimental effects of a potential, second Stuart restoration on the burgeoning trade and political empire of an ascendant Britain: ‘A cynic might argue that this is because a disproportionate number of those who write about Jacobitism are themselves Jacobites.’12 Taking this line of argument into the realm of vitriol, David Cannadine not so long ago vituperated that ‘the new Jacobite view of history, a wilfully perverse celebration of such obscurantist troglodytes as the Young Pretender . . . makes even the embittered splutterings of Hilaire Belloc seem models of fair-mindedness and tolerance by comparison’.13 Even if measured by a liberal standard, the modern historical debate dealing with Jacobitism stands out as having been emotionally charged, and somewhat muddled. The most visible, historiographical common denominator of Colley and Speck is the inimical nature of their respective positions in relation to Jacobitism.14 Moreover, the view of Jacobitism as an overrated topic tends to support another historical paradigm upheld by the sceptics: that of political stability in eighteenth-century Britain. In Colley’s case, the Protestant identity as a unifying factor and the successful superimposition of Parliamentary politics over open conflict following the ’Fifteen, and in that of Speck, a broad politico-religious concordance based on the Revolution Settlement culmin-


ating in the stable rule of the Whig oligarchy after the Rage of Party during Queen Anne’s last years had quieted down, would both stand to lose some credibility as historical concepts if the Jacobites proved to be a more tenacious, disruptive force than hitherto admitted by the sceptics.15 In its implications, there is more at stake in the debate concerning Jacobitism than the historical significance of the Stuart cause’s threat to the Hanoverian dynasty. The ‘more agnostic, but overall still pessimist’ Bruce Lenman, working on Scottish Jacobitism, seems to favour the principles of the pessimist tendency over that of the agnostic when he asserts that ‘[a]fter 1716 the real problem of Jacobite history is why there ever was another major rebellion’.16 In regard to the consequences of a second Stuart restoration, Lenman believes that the new government, reinstated with the support of France, would be unable to act with initiative in regard to its benefactor.17 His stance concerning the post-Culloden period is also clear: ‘After 1746 the antics of the exiled Stewarts were seen to be increasingly irrelevant.’18 Lenman does, however, attempt to bridge the gap between 1746 and 1759 by an explanation of what happened to those who staked their lives and fortunes on the successful outcome of the ’Forty-five. For into this period, and well beyond to 1784, the year in which the Disannexing Act was passed, he proposes his thesis of a Jacobite rehabilitation and reconciliation to the Hanoverian establishment through the back door of the British army.19 Lenman’s pointed omission of those Scots Jacobites remaining at large in the Highlands, and of those exiled families established at the safe haven of diverse European courts, is somewhat dissatisfying, and detracts from the credibility of his thesis for the decade following Culloden – at least in proportion to the number of those it does not include. This last group may not have constituted a clear majority of Charles Edward’s army, but if not, then the prominent Scots Jacobites in exile from 1746 to 1759 can be said to have represented a majority of the army’s elite. Though critical of the prospects of Jacobitism after the ’Fifteen, Paul Fritz’s seminal study on Sir Robert Walpole’s manipulation of the Jacobite scare for political reasons between the ’Fifteen and the ’Forty-five has also shown that: [t]he reaction of the English ministers to Jacobite projects in these years demonstrates clearly their dread of Jacobitism, and the harsh retaliatory measures they took appear as but external expressions of their genuine fear of a Stuart restoration.20 In at least one instance, that of English ministerial intervention in the Swedish plot of 1717, Fritz has demonstrated the distorting effects of hindsight – the fickle yardstick by which so many Jacosceptics measure the import´ ’Ciardha ‘is the ance of Jacobitism.21 But then ‘hindsight’, to quote Eámonn O


worst enemy of Jacobitism’.22 Fritz concluded that Jacobite conspiracies during the hiatus between the risings of 1715 and 1745 were not Whiggish figments of imagination. He concluded that the ‘English ministers did not raise the bogy of Jacobitism and there is no evidence to suggest that they even considered it as a remote possibility’.23 Walpole and his cohorts were dealing with a double-edged sword that, as we shall see, was inherited by his Pelhamite successors: on the one hand, the Jacobite threat could be, and certainly was, used as a means to control the British polity with fear, but on the other, its role as an instrument of ministerial statecraft depended on the fact that its edge was not too blunt. Nevertheless, a note of warning ironically issued by Gregg, a strident sceptic, should also be heeded: ‘what actually happened is frequently not as important as what people believed had happened or feared might happen’.24 In this sense, fear of Jacobitism, whatever the substance of the threat, certainly existed. Overall, the sceptics have amassed an impressive arsenal of arguments against a favourable interpretation of Jacobitism. Essentially, the crucial point on which representatives of this school rest their case of the weakness of the Jacobite movement is that it ultimately failed to overturn the establishment of Revolutionary Britain by effecting a successful restoration of the Stuarts. On the basis of this argumentative framework, consisting of facts available to us now, most, if not all, exponents of this school reject the Jacobite movement, from its inception in 1688 to the suppression of the ’Forty-five in 1746, as an important phenomenon in British history. By extension, it follows that the mere notion of active Jacobitism in the postCulloden period must be unacceptable to the sceptics. There are problems with such a position. The very basis for any interpretation of Jacobitism is a dangerous ground.25 Colley’s accusation of partisanship against optimistic revisionists could just as well be turned against sceptics. Gregg, for instance, has stressed the ambivalent nature of the archival evidence in the Stuart papers, and the State papers domestic and foreign, which in his opinion constitute ‘unpredictable mixtures of solid fact, idle speculation and deliberate or inadvertent distortion’.26 It is one thing to point out the dangers of sources, but obviously quite another to completely discredit their integrity. The doyenne of modern Jacobite studies, Eveline Cruickshanks, has reached a similar conclusion: ‘Because of the difficulties presented by sources dealing with Jacobitism . . . many historians have ignored the subject completely or have dismissed all evidence as unreliable, even when that evidence is confirmed by other contemporary testimony’.27 According to Cruickshanks: [t]he less historians know about the Stuart papers, the more convinced they seem to be that Jacobite agents were unreliable and invariably optimistic. It has become an easy way for Whig historians to disregard inconvenient evidence.28


More generally, any attentive reader may discern a sense of continuity in the intellectual orientation linking the Scottish Whig historians’ attempts in the eighteenth century to reconstruct their country’s past in order to force it into a British mould, to the architects of the Protestant, progressivist Whig interpretation a century later, and the presentday sceptics, whose marginalization of Jacobitism, albeit for different reasons, does much to recall the heyday of Macaulay and Trevelyan.29 It is telling that Allan Macinnes recently felt the need to comment that in regard to indigenous Scottish factors supportive of Jacobitism ‘historiographical appreciation . . . has rarely cut free from the polemical and ideological constraints of Whig propaganda’.30 The connection between a past historical bias and modern scepticism may seem threadbare, but Pittock reminds us that the former ‘is a powerful survivor in our consciousness of the general shape of history’.31 While progressivism and teleology may not constitute the typical problems of modern sceptics, another member of the family of determinisms, in this case retrospectivism, which entails taking full advantage of hindsight, clearly is. The potential for distortion of the past through hindsight cannot be stressed enough. The problem at the core of the Jacosceptic position is the ex post facto nature of the conclusions this school’s exponents tend to arrive at, the consequence of which is that no allowance is made for the shades of grey in the discovered or unknown recesses of the past – a general sense of contingency. In reference to the pitfalls of hindsight, Niall Ferguson recently commented that ‘historians should never lose sight of their own ‘‘uncertainty principle’’ – that any observation of historical evidence inevitably distorts its significance by the very fact of its selection through the prism of hindsight’.32 The use of hindsight in order to construct an historical framework is deceptive because it only allows us to see the tip of the iceberg, that is visibly documented, ‘factual’ history. Such an explanation of the past may be based on unimpeachable documentary evidence, but it is the historian who decides which documents are pertinent. The conclusion, that any historical exposition must therefore be an entirely subjective, editorial process, is tempting, but not necessarily, and altogether wrong. The avoidance of retrospectivist criteria in the choice of evidence, would, if not eliminate the subjective character of the process, then at least work as a corrective to the ahistoricity of a determinist lens. Scholars who have given Jacobitism a favourable reading have generally displayed more sensitivity to the nature of the problem of contingency than their colleagues in the sceptical camp. This has led some of them, as we shall see, to embark upon different, but no less challenging and productive inquiries, reaching beyond the inflexible maxims of retrospectivist determinism, into the realm of counterfactuals. This, too, is a route fraught with perils, but the risks may be worth taking. J. G. A. Pocock believes that there is a legitimate use of counterfactuals in serious history: ‘the case for


considering outcomes which did not occur . . . is that it enables us to understand better the problematics in which the actors were entangled’.33 Ferguson further elaborates on the nature of this problem within the context of historical debates: Whether by posing implausible questions or by providing implausible answers, counterfactual history has tended to discredit itself. Yet there are clearly other reasons why so few historians have attempted to argue in this way – or, when they have acknowledged the possibility of alternative outcomes, have left the counterfactual implicit, as a kind of subtext. Such veiled counterfactualism has been a striking feature of a great many ‘revisionist’ works of history – not altogether surprisingly, in that most revisionists tend to be challenging some form of deterministic interpretation.34 More specifically, Jeremy Black reasoned that: Speculation on this theme can be, and has been, dismissed as pointless hypotheses or the revisionist obscurantism and nostalgia that interest in Jacobitism has been held to display, but such arguments are of value only if the options facing individuals in the past are ignored and it is assumed not only that the path of history is pre-ordained and obvious but that the past belongs to the victors.35 Frank McLynn observed that to deny the counterfactual option, which is raised as a consequence of a rejection of rigid retrospectivism, would ‘make the quest for causality otiose, and history would then simply be what the young Jane Austen imagined it was – a crude recital of events and dates’.36 He challenged the lost cause model by spearheading the attack on retrospectivist explanations of Jacobitism in the post-Culloden period, and thereby postulated the proposition on which the present book is based. According to McLynn, and closely echoed by Pittock, Culloden was a decisive battle, but contemporaries did not necessarily see it that way.37 Moreover, there is nothing inevitable about the outcome of the rising in his mind; on the contrary: When one considers what Charles Edward achieved at Prestonpans with 2,500, in England with 5,000 and at Falkirk with 8,000 men, who can doubt that a Jacobite army of 30,000 would have swept all before it, especially since the probability of a rising in England or an invasion from France would then increase as a multiplier effect.38 We will, of course, never know. Nevertheless, McLynn’s foray into the contingent and counterfactual adds, as opposed to most deterministic models of


explanation enjoying widespread acceptance in the historical profession, a useful perspective to the study of Jacobitism. More important are the consequences of McLynn’s rejection of a predetermined, inevitable culmination of the ’Forty-five. Although McLynn treats the subject with an awareness of contingency, that is not to say that his thesis is not grounded in the solid tradition of archival research. Approximating Leopold von Ranke’s archivist maxim (as opposed to its positivist pendant) to write history as it happened (by reconstructing the minutiae of the past), and by combining it with both psychoanalytical and psychohistorical methodologies, and a variant of Quentin Skinner’s historical pragmatics, McLynn’s approach has come closest to what could be called historical contextualism – a manner of understanding historical phenomena within the constraints and mores of their temporal environment.39 Ferguson’s objection to the determinism inherent in the Monde Braudelian exemplifies the essence of such an approach. He faulted Braudel for the dismissal of history as received and documented by contemporaries.40 The distillation of McLynn’s conclusion in relation to the historical context after Culloden is that: [f]urther evidence for the gravity of the rebellion [of 1745] can be discovered in the seriousness with which, right up to 1759 and despite the ferocious Whig backlash of 1746–47, it was feared that the Jacobites would rise again. Until Hawke’s victory at Quiberon Bay, no one could be certain that Charles Edward would not come again to Scotland for another trial of strength.41 It is exactly the evident fear of the Whig oligarchs in power after 1746 which does at least as much to justify the present inquiry as the post-Culloden Jacobites’ ignorance of their ultimate failure. The Jacobite threat in that period was tangible to the British government officials who had to confront it without the secure knowledge of the presentday historians that it was they, and the sediment of their political power, namely the Revolutionary Settlement and Protestant Succession, who would finally triumph. The hallmark of retrospectivism is recognizable in the ahistorical verdicts of those modern British historians who presume to hold a superior knowledge to that of a Newcastle, Pelham, or an elder Pitt in their own time. After all, the statesmen of mid-eighteenth-century Britain would have had a more contemporaneous and, hence, palpable sense of the politics of their day, and accordingly would have been in a better position to evaluate the authenticity, or at least the perceived truth, of a Jacobite threat – especially because they could not seize upon the advantage of hindsight. As they experienced the reality which created the evidence upon which our historical exegesis rests, the political helmsmen’s picture of their own reality was infinitely more, to use a Geertzian term, ‘thick’ than ours is in the present.42 As John Brooke so eloquently explained:


[l]ooking back from the distance of two hundred and fifty years it seems that King George I and his ministers exaggerated the danger of Jacobitism. But at the time no one could be sure. The long vista of history is deceptive. Nor are timely precautions to be despised because the danger they guard against never materializes.43 The fundamental conclusion of this book is that Brooke’s template can also be applied to the later reign of George II. The interpretative parochialism of Jacoscepticism has also made itself felt in the sphere of most studies’ geographic scope, as many of the historians who have given Jacobitism a negative reading have confined their research to the pale of one, or at times two, of the three British kingdoms. That such a tight focus is inherently inimical to any just evaluation of Jacobitism, can be gauged from the circumstance that such a view more often than not tends to disparage, or even ignore, the apparent international dimension of the movement. This is especially true for the European political situation of 1745. Cruickshanks stated this clearly in 1979, when she wrote that many accounts of the last Jacobite rising: have largely ignored the European context out of which the ’45 arose and in which alone it could succeed. Historians on this side of the Channel have assumed that for the French the rebellion [of 1745] was a useful ‘diversion’ from the war in Flanders, without taking any systematic look at French sources. French historians, who knew that Louis XV was in earnest in seeking to restore the Stuarts, did not appreciate that conditions in eighteenth-century England made open expression of Jacobitism impossible . . . At any rate . . . European history seen in purely national terms will not do.44 In the event of an invasion, as opposed to a purely domestic rising, French support for the Jacobites constituted a sine qua non; the Stuarts’ fate was closely tied to the goodwill of their Bourbon cousins. The crucial nature of this relationship is as evident in a positive, as in a negative sense. If, as some embittered American veterans of the twentieth century have argued with some merit, the war in Vietnam was lost in Washington, the Jacobites, heavily dependent on their French sponsors by 1746, could, as they indeed did, with some justification blame ministerial vacillations at Versailles and the consequent lack of substantial reinforcements for the events leading up to, and culminating at, Culloden. In his seminal study of the French connection with the Jacobite rising of 1745, McLynn not only reiterates, but corroborates Cruickshanks’ point. Indeed, McLynn believes that a supportive role of France had in fact become still more important by that time:


What is clear is that the nature of the Jacobite movement in Britain had changed in the thirty years since 1715 so that whereas French assistance for the Stuarts in the ’15 looked very much like aid for one side in a civil war, by 1745, with Jacobite sentiment powerful only in Scotland, France seemed cast more in the role of abettor of invasion of England from Scotland . . . In fact Jacobite chances of success in the ’45, given French assistance, were rather higher than the prevailing consensus would have us believe . . . if France had seized all the opportunities presented in 1745–6, success would surely have been assured.45 Ultimately, McLynn has argued, the French, by withholding immediate support for Charles’ army, were responsible for the suppression of the ’Fortyfive.46 Even so, the Jacobite threat persisted, for after the extended incommunicado following the nadir of Franco-Jacobite relations in 1748, France resumed its share in Jacobite planning shortly before the Diplomatic Revolution. Although Paul Kle´ber Monod has recently postulated that ‘the last great Jacobite gambit took place in 1750, not 1745’, the pioneering work of Claude Nordmann has shed light on the Jacobite dimension in French plans to invade Britain during the Seven Years’ War.47 Temporally speaking, his is the furthest extension of the Jacobite threat along the timeline, renewing its lease on life for more than a decade beyond the presumed graveyard of Culloden, and thus constitutes the argument least amenable to the lost cause model. Nordmann’s research points to Franco-Jacobite cooperation in 1758–59, an argument which my research has corroborated. The relevance of a renewed Franco-Jacobite collaboration in 1758–59 to British internal security is momentous. According to Nordmann, the domestic potential for a resuscitation of Jacobitism in the British Isles in these years still existed: Jacobitism could still revive and even rally some of the Tories, in as much as it represented a kind of nationalism or regionalism . . . Ireland, ‘the frontier of Catholicism’, might be expected to take up arms again, the Scottish Highlands remained a threat and there were still supporters of the Stuart cause in Wales.48 My own research has tended to support this picture for Scotland, where the potential for a Jacobite fifth column remained extant.49 Apart from the French, Swedes and Spaniards, the emergent first-rate power in European politics, Prussia, played a murky, if not quite undistinguished role as potential ally of Jacobitism. In the context of the historiographical debate on Jacobitism, the seriousness of the Prussian conspiracy, better known by the name of the Elibank plot, has remained highly controversial. Even exponents of the optimist school have been reluctant to give too much credit to the clandestine Prusso-Jacobite proceedings. Though Andrew Lang indicated that Frederick II, for reasons of political expediency,


was peripherally involved in the conspiracy, the otherwise enthusiastic Sir Charles Petrie contended that ‘it is in the highest degree unlikely that he ever intended to do anything more for the Stuarts than give them a little underhand encouragement for the furthering of his own ends’.50 McLynn and Cruickshanks concur in that both set Prussian expedient politics of brandishing the Jacobite bogy before Frederick II’s inveterate, personal hatred of George II, and his disputes with Britain over the Friesian succession and the Silesian Loan.51 My own investigation, however, points to a British policy of silence regarding Frederick’s dealings with the Jacobites for fear of provoking an open rupture with the Hohenzollern monarch, and suggests further Prussian involvement in the Elibank plot. At the heart of the international aspect of the debate, however, remains the question regarding the significance of the threat which the ’Forty-five posed for the British state. Again, the optimists differ substantially from the view taken by their more pessimistic colleagues. While the deep impact of the last Jacobite rising in Scotland has generally been accepted, the English situation is not as clear cut. But, as Cruickshanks has shown, the ’Forty-five also left its imprint on the South. Before early December 1745, Henry Pelham did not believe that a successful defence of the capital could be mounted with only the thin line of Guards stationed at Finchley, and the French attempting a junction with Charles’ advancing army.52 The Hanoverian response to the rising may also serve as an indicator. ‘The Whig reaction to the ’45’, McLynn notes, ‘was as severe as their shock and fear had been when the rising came so close to success.’53 Taking his inquiry still further, Jeremy Black has considered the possibility of a Jacobite victory, concluding that though the capture of London would not have been an easy task for Charles’ army, ‘[h]ad the French landed in 1745–46 they would have been able to defeat whatever irregular forces the local authorities had raised and they would have outnumbered the regular troops in and around London’.54 Black thus indirectly confirms McLynn’s point on the crucial role of French reinforcements, and, by implication, of French culpability for the eventual failure of the rising; the Jacobite effort to raise an effective, and highly mobile, army was a full success, as was Charles’ campaign of 1745 in Scotland. Black therefore concludes that though some historians have seen the ’Forty-five as an undertaking destined to fail, ‘it is too easy to overlook the seriousness of what was the biggest crisis to affect the eighteenth-century British state’.55 By extension, historical arguments which advance the thesis of an authentic Jacobite threat imply that, in the face of the Stuarts’ unresolved dynastic claim and the several attempts to enforce it, early- to mid-eighteenth-century Britain was not the stable political system it has been represented to be by the sceptics. The pivotal point, then, on which the optimists base their revisionist offensive is that up to 1746, and beyond, Jacobitism repeatedly posed a serious challenge to the post-Revolutionary British state.


The above treatment of the existing polarities within the modern debate on Jacobitism indicates that the very nature of the present book determines its position on the historiographical map. The main thrust of the research presented here is based on the optimists’ conclusion of the general significance of the Jacobite movement in the context of eighteenth-century British political history up to the ’Forty-five. What distinguishes this book from the work of other like-minded historians, with the notable exception of Claude Nordmann and Frank McLynn, are its temporal boundaries, attempting to explore the last phase of active Jacobitism to 1759. The two premises on which these temporal bounds are based are that, first, no sudden expiry of Jacobitism occurred after Culloden, and, second, that the movement continued with its activities under the auspices of Charles, until the Stuarts’ last, realistic prospect of restoration by military intervention was dashed by the British naval victory at Quiberon Bay in November 1759. In this thirteenyear period, there was a demonstrable continuity of active Jacobitism: there were, for example, several attempts to advance the Stuarts’ claim by lobbying foreign potentates for military support; the vigour and ingenuity exhibited by Jacobite plotting against Britain and its Hanoverian monarch; the maintenance of cross-Channel communications in the face of the grisly penalties prescribed by the British law of treason; the illicit recruiting of troops in the Three Kingdoms and the pro-British United Provinces for service in expatriate regiments in foreign military establishments, owing their loyalty to their exiled King, James III and VIII; the subsisting and sheltering of attainted clan-gentry in the Highlands by relations and the loyal tenantry, who in several cases also abetted their escape, and, through the subversive practice of double-remitting, contributed to the upkeep of exiled chiefs and their families. Following Culloden, the strength of the Jacobite movement may have gradually declined, but it certainly did not cease to exist in a single day.

Methodology and Structure Some of the more particular, methodological and structural aspects of my work merit some explanation. Structures and methodologies tend to be traditionally linked with certain types of historical genre, as is the case with high political history, which has often been presented as a narrative. In the past, Jacobitism, as a subject, has traditionally been treated as high political history, and, more often than not, been represented as a narrative. But Jacobitism and narrative history cannot be said to have been in great demand among writing historians in the post-Second World War period; only in the past two decades have both witnessed a limited comeback to the centre stage of the historical profession. To a certain extent, political history still remains a marginalized genre on account of new trends in the field. Conversely, the proliferation of the new approaches to history has not only attracted acclamation. Peter Burke recently commented that:


‘[l]ike scientific revolutions, historical revolutions are constantly being discovered these days, and our conceptual currency is in serious danger of debasement.’56 The question of which literary representation is best suited to the task of communicating written history has been, and remains, a matter of great concern to practising historians. This question has also fuelled a lively debate. At least one sage of the Annales school proclaimed the death of narrative history in 1972 – prematurely, as it turned out. Indeed, after the Second World War, historical inquiry, and its literary representation, markedly diverged from the path trodden by the narrative historians of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.57 New histories have since risen on the ashes of the old: statistical, quantitative, intellectual, cultural, social, psychological, and other interdisciplinary hybrids, to name but a few. In the light of the nascent plethora of possibilities, the present attempt to write on not only an exclusive, aristocratic elite at the expense of Colley’s ‘other, apparently more conventional voices’, but to do so in the most classical form, that of a high political narrative based on the principle of constructing the story mainly from archival elements, may seem antediluvian.58 To the dismay of gainsayers and critics of narrative history alike, the historiographical, or to use Mark Phillips’ term, the historiological, debate has received a new impetus because of novel phenomena introduced to the field, but also because of the critical attention they attract. The issues in the debate on the written expression of history range from the increasingly fragmented and interdisciplinary nature of historical inquiry, and the concomitant surge of the discourse-spawned jargon, to a search for a holistic literary medium. This quest for a broadly applicable literary representation of history has also led to a reappraisal of narrative.59 Lawrence Stone’s seminal article of 1979 on the revival of narrative can claim some responsibility for the spirited character of this debate. Stone argued that ‘a widespread disillusionment with the economic determinist model of historical explanation’, had caused practising historians to cast a vote of no confidence in the direction of the erstwhile promising potential of the new, or scientific historians.60 According to Burke, the criticism levelled against the proponents of the new histories is ‘that the analysis of structures is static and so in a sense unhistorical’.61 In a similar vein Bernard Bailyn asserted that: historians must be, not analysts of isolated technical problems abstracted from the past, but narrators of worlds in motion . . . The historian must re-tell, with a new richness, the story of what some one of the worlds of the past was, how it ceased to be what it was, how it faded and blended into new configurations, how at every stage what was, was the product of what had been, and developed into what no one could have anticipated.62


By contrast, narrative history is generally accessible, that is, user-friendly, and is thus better suited to act as a conduit with an interested lay audience. Nevertheless, Stone, Burke and Phillips agree that a resurrected narrative history should not, and cannot, simply manifest itself in its original shape, as it would have to accommodate the intellectual fruits of the post-Second World War revisionists’ rebellion against the narrative historians of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.63 Whatever the final literary innovation will turn out to be, more comprehensive, detailed, impressionistic, or eclectic, there can be no doubt that the concept of narrative history has its uses in modern historical writing. A more important issue within the context of this debate, it seems to me, is the application of a mode of writing to a specific historical genre. Even more than generic narrative history, political narrative has been specifically targeted and ostracized by the new historians of the past generation; compared to its former position of primacy in the historical profession, it has almost fallen into abeyance. Stone noted that it was ‘a belated recognition of the importance of power, of personal political decisions by individuals, of the chances of battle’, which, in his opinion, ‘have forced historians back to the narrative mode, whether they like it or not’.64 Because of the individualistic character of the Jacobite movement, almost any historical inquiry concerned with Jacobitism is bound to be oriented by the maxim of emphasizing the historical actor in circumstances, rather than the circumstances surrounding man. The descriptive quality of a narrative account may be better suited to capture the story of actors on the historical stage than an approach based on quantification and category. In dealing with the highly politicized, volatile and disparate Jacobite elite, I have found Stone’s observation to be correct. For the present study, the marriage of narrative with political history has yielded productive results. The decision to employ narrative also implies a few considerations intricately linked with the source material at hand. The amount of archival evidence, at times fragmentary, ambivalent, and diverse, outweighs secondary material in the present book. In such a case, the danger of subordinating the evidence to structural and conceptual devices cannot be stressed enough. Therefore, narrative, and its implicit emphasis on explanation rather than analysis, here again presents itself as the more flexible, and accommodating alternative to the application of a rigid methodological template. After all, the Jacobites were a heterogeneous, and often conflicting, lot, and historians have struggled to define Jacobitism in ideological, religious, political, and even social terms.65 At one point or another, we must come to recognize the multifaceted nature of Jacobitism which defies a strong definition but not a close description. In reaching conclusions, the intemperate use of forceful analysis as a passe partout is not without its drawbacks: we may risk overstraining the actual content of existing evidence by interpreting it according to demands imposed by conceptual criteria. The


method of descriptive explication, a less rigid analytical variant, seems better suited to the illustration of a history only partially reconstructible because of the gaps and ambiguities of its sources. The methodological idea underlying this book was to guard against the temptation of making the content and extent of the evidence meet requirements set by a conceptual agenda; in accordance with the maxim that the past is dead and incomplete, no attempt has been made to establish an academically conceived ‘truth’.66 At the same time, the critical examination of the sources, and the achievement of a better sense of the historical context by an intense study of the primary material, have remained an integral part of my approach. The criterion set for the present selection of an appropriate literary mode and methodology is that both must accommodate the disparate and problematic nature of the primary sources involved. With these goals in mind, and difficulties at hand, a narrative of the last phase of Jacobitism, in which descriptive explication somewhat balances definitive analysis, has been a sensible choice.

The Manuscript Sources As the recent secondary sources have received ample treatment in the first section of this chapter, and because this book is predominantly based on primary evidence, the present section is concerned with the archives consulted in the course of this project. The Stuart papers at the Royal Archives are the most important source for the Jacobite movement, and though problematic, both the collections’ documentary wealth and vast extent indubitably make it an indispensable asset for any historian of Jacobitism. With the notable exception of Frank McLynn and Claude Nordmann, no recently published work in the field has drawn upon the section concerned with the years 1746–59.67 Understandably so, as it has been widely held in the field that the Jacobite movement had become obsolete after 1746. The Stuart papers for this period tell us much about, among other points of interest, the inner trappings of the Jacobite movement in exile, its contacts with other powers and its agents in Britain. The much smaller holdings of the West Highland Museum at Inverness also include Jacobite correspondence, but of no lesser interest. The museum’s repository holds some letters relating to the immediate postCulloden period written in the field by the Jacobite regimental commanders, Donald Cameron of Lochiel and Ewan MacPherson of Cluny. These are illustrative of Lochiel’s last attempt at rallying the western clans in an effort to resist government troops in the late spring of 1746.68 Of equal value for the aftermath of the ’Forty-five in Scotland, albeit from the Hanoverian side, are the Loudon papers held at the Huntington Library in San Marino. The military correspondence of John Campbell, 4th Earl of Loudon, a general officer serving under the Duke of Cumberland, who played a key role in the


suppression of the rising after Culloden, clearly documents a situation of prolonged strife in the Highlands throughout the remainder of the year 1746. Furthermore, the Earl’s letters are illustrative of the government forces’ movements, especially those of the native auxiliary troops in western and northern Scotland. The Loudon papers represent an under-used source for early modern and eighteenth-century Highland history.69 The two most significant Scottish archives from which I have drawn heavily to document the situation in the Highlands, and affairs connected with Jacobite activity in the West of Scotland for this period are the National Library of Scotland and the Scottish Record Office. From among the rich holdings of the National Library, the correspondence of Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun, Lord Justice Clerk Milton in his judicial capacity as a Lord of Session, and that of his successor, Charles Erskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald, have proven invaluable, as the incumbents of this office also served as the Scottish liaison with the English ministers.70 Overall, the holdings of this archive have presented me with a treasure of relevant evidence. Among the Gifts and Deposits lodged at the Scottish Record Office, fewer, but no less substantial, collections relating to the post-Culloden period may be found. Though the political correspondence of those involved in the last rising, or its suppression, and the following decade, is sparse, the Campbell of Stonefield papers, among others, proved helpful indeed.71 Last, but not least, the MacBean Special Collection housed at the University of Aberdeen holds a rich assortment of printed primary and secondary Jacobitiana. Although kept in England, at the Royal Archives, the Cumberland papers also relate to the aftermath of the ’Forty-five in Scotland. Combined, and contrasted with the other pertinent collections of the Scottish archives, and the Stuart and the Loudon papers, the manuscripts in the Duke of Cumberland’s papers complete a picture not easily seen if used on their own.72 Not only Scottish, but also English archival resources feature prominently in this monograph. The most significant individual discovery I made in the course of my research was a series of documents belonging to the Pelham papers lodged at Nottingham University’s Hallward Library, which have conclusively established the identity of the most successful Hanoverian mole, ‘Pickle’, alias Alasdair Ruadh MacDonell of Glengarry. Though Andrew Lang’s brilliant case against Glengarry, based on a staggering amount of circumstantial evidence, is convincing, and has been accepted by many historians, it hitherto lacked an irrefutable character, which my investigation has been able to provide just over one century after the publication of Pickle the Spy.73 Again, McLynn has been the only other historian on Jacobitism to date who has made use of Henry Pelham’s correspondence for this period.74 As with most projects dealing with the British institutional apparatus, the present book is no different in that it draws on the vast amount of State papers kept at the Public Record Office. The domestic papers can be


subdivided into two groups: those pertaining to England, and those relating to Scotland. Whereas the former constitute a well-known body of evidence, the latter, classed as SP 54, have remained an under-used, but extremely rich, resource on the nature and proceedings of the British military administration in Scotland for the period under scrutiny here. The State Papers Foreign made use of are those containing the diplomatic dispatches of the British envoys and residents of France, Prussia, Saxony-Poland and Tuscany. With France officially or clandestinely linked to the Jacobite cause over a long period of time, the importance of the diplomatic correspondence sent by the British mission in Paris is self-explanatory. Intelligence reports transmitted through British diplomatic channels from Saxony-Poland and Prussia are relevant because of the Stuarts’ close relation to the Sobieskis, the former king-elects of the Polish Diet who had been driven from their throne by the Saxon ruler August III; and also because of Frederick II’s flirt with the Jacobites; and more generally, with the peripatetic Charles, whose closely guarded incognito, at least in the eyes of his Hanoverian pursuers, turned him into an evanescent phantom roaming the Continent.75 The voluminous correspondence of Horace Mann, the British resident in Florence, includes detailed reports on the Jacobite court in exile at Rome, and information relating to Jacobite activities in general. Mann’s proximity to the Palazzo Muti allowed him to establish a stable communications network with correspondents in Rome sending him intelligence, which he, in turn relayed back to Whitehall.76 Finally, the archival staple diet of the eighteenth-century political historian, the various, well-known collections in the British Library, have allowed me to gain insight into the trappings and proceedings of the English ministry. The papers of Philip Yorke, 1st Earl of Hardwicke, Chief Justice of the Court of King’s Bench, Attorney-General and later Lord Chancellor of the realm, and those belonging to Thomas Holles, 1st Duke of Newcastle, successively Secretary of State for the Southern and the Northern Departments, and as of 1754, First Commissioner of the Treasury, can be found among the Additional Manuscripts of the British Library. Like Henry Pelham, these two Whig grandees were intimately concerned with Jacobite affairs and the security of the state. Their papers are supplemented by the correspondence of Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, which can be found among the Egerton collection. He served the government as Secretary of State in the Southern and Northern Departments from 1751 to 54, and from 1757 to 1761. Because of financial limitations, and time constraints, the following archives, though of interest, have not been investigated. In order to determine the full extent of Frederick II’s involvement in the Elibank conspiracy, a thorough search through Prussian diplomatic and domestic correspondence could possibly have turned up some interesting leads, or even evidence of an incriminating nature. A potential starting point could be the unpublished Prussian diplomatic correspondence, hitherto kept at Merseburg, but


transferred to the Berliner Staatsarchiv since the reunification of Germany.77 Likewise beyond the scope of this project were the indubitably relevant French documents in the Archives Etrange`res at the Quai d’Orsai, and the archive of the Ministry of War at the Chaˆteau de Vincennes. A collection in the private hands of the present Duke of Argyll, alternatively referred to as the Inveraray or Argyll papers, apparently remains inaccessible to graduate students.78 Though the variety of the manuscript material used is not comprehensive, I hope the selection of evidence to be at least sufficiently representative. As this project is constructed on two, at times conflicting Jacobite and Whig/ Hanoverian, perceptions of the post-Culloden period in Britain and France, the archives consulted are accordingly diverse. This is, however, not to say that every manuscript collection yielded only one, exclusive point of view; depositions in the State papers would at times also mirror Jacobite viewpoints, albeit in a distorted fashion, and Hanoverian attitudes were equally projected, though through an antagonistic lens, in the correspondence belonging to the Stuart papers. Attitudes and opinions on either side were almost invariably heterogeneous, often issue-oriented, cloaked, ambivalent and largely inconsistent. Most important, the inestimable amount of the evidence lost should remain ever present in the mind of the reader.

The Main Body of the Book As this chapter has attempted to determine the position of the present book by portraying the modern debate on Jacobitism, to explain methodological precepts and discuss the manuscript evidence used, those which follow will try to give a chronological and narrative account of the Jacobites’ fate from Culloden to Quiberon Bay. The two main themes in Chapter 2 are, on the one hand, the changing nature of Jacobite resistance, and, on the other, the response of the British military and administration in the months following the battle of Culloden. The most significant conclusions of this chapter are the underrated extent of continued, albeit localized, Jacobite military activities, and the protracted failure of Hanoverian troops to restore order in the Highlands into early 1747. Chapter 3 explores the activities of the exiled Jacobites in France from 1746 to 1748, where, it would seem, their ardour to inveigle the French to support a resuscitation of the rising was not much dampened by the setback suffered at Culloden. Owing to the complex detail surrounding Jacobite clandestine activities in the period after the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748), the emphasis of the two following chapters is of a reconstructive and descriptive rather than an analytical nature. The period following Charles’ expulsion from France in late 1748 to the failure of the Elibank plot in 1753 is dealt with in some depth in the next chapter; Chapter 4 is mainly concerned with the multitude of Jacobite


initiatives culminating in the abortive schemes referred to as the Elibank conspiracy, and traces, some of them new, linking Frederick II of Prussia to Jacobite projects. The fifth and last of the narrative chapters, constituting the main body of the book, is an exposition on the resumption of FrancoJacobite relations shortly before the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War to the last attempt at restoring the Stuarts with French aid in October 1759, but also seeks to adumbrate a genealogy of Jacobite plans shortly before the Diplomatic Revolution. The sixth and final chapter attempts to draw together the main themes of the book in a conclusion; therein, I have also attempted to link my conclusions to larger perspectives in mid-eighteenthcentury political history.

2 Suppression and Resistance: Hanoverians and Jacobites in 1746–1747

For had the Clans been there that day, As they were far awa, Willie, They’d chas’d you faster off the field, Than ever Wind did blow, Willie.1 The Rebellion is not yet at an end.2

Introduction The Jacobite rising of 1745–46 came to an abrupt end at Culloden on 16 April 1746 OS. In historiographical terms, this idea – especially the sudden and simultaneous end to the Jacobite threat following the battle – has assumed a near axiomatic quality. Succinctly illustrating this point is the pertinent reference in the Dictionary of National Biography: ‘The clans, outnumbered and outgeneralled, suffered a severe and complete defeat, and the cause of the prince lost its last and only hope.’3 But then such a view, which by default has been accorded the position of a well-entrenched historical paradigm by what Dr Daniel Szechi has dubbed the ‘pessimist’ and the still more sceptical ‘rejectionist’ schools in the field of Jacobite studies, is not entirely flawless.4 For instance, Professor Speck’s recent attack on ‘enthusiasts’, who apparently rely on ostensibly circumstantial or controversial evidence, begs the question why he has not made more use of the available Scottish material in his own work, but instead heavily relies on archives based in England, especially the Cumberland papers lodged at the Royal Archives.5 That the situation of the Jacobites in Scotland after April 1746 gradually deteriorated, militarily as well as politically, cannot be called into doubt. But the Jacobites, or the threat they posed, neither vanished immediately, nor was their potential ignored by the British military and civil authorities of the 21


post-Culloden era. Indeed, Jacobite activities were recorded long after the battle of Culloden was fought. Endeavours to resuscitate the rising were under way from the day of the battle into the month of May 1746, and beyond. The eventual collapse of organized resistance was occasioned by the mounting military pressure exerted by the British forces in the Highlands, the failure of Charles to rally his troops when it was still possible, and, more generally, the prevailing disunity among the leaders of his army. After this first phase of decline, Jacobite resistance assumed a different shape, its nature becoming sporadic and localized. The lack of a central command following the immediate aftermath of the rising precluded the insurrectionists’ ability to fight a guerrilla-style campaign, though this had been an option; but several chiefs and officers of the Jacobite army escaped Cumberland’s troops, and either succeeded in absconding to France, or managed to evade capture and go into hiding. In the light of the considerable British military presence in the Highlands, the ability of a significant number of Jacobite leaders to remain at large, and rely on local support-networks was regarded as a threat by the British army command and civil authorities. Essentially, Jacobite officers who remained at liberty constituted a leadership potential, which could serve as a focus for straggling soldiers of Charles’ army after its dispersion. As a consequence of the extensive destruction of Jacobite property throughout the Highlands, which was compounded by the limited effectiveness of the government’s initial attempt at disarming the clans, armed bands of Jacobites reverted to an indigenous brand of banditry, namely that of cattle-lifting. A distinct feature of post-Culloden Jacobite activity was the targeting of Whig landowners. That the ensuing acts of depredation were directed against a specific target-group is evident from the multitudinous complaints of Whig landowners. Such raids had a specifically political overtone, and though dictated by necessity, the political alignment of the victims suggests that the thefts were also motivated by a spirit of revenge. To date, only Allan Macinnes has taken notice of continued Jacobite lowlevel resistance in the months after Culloden.6 With the onset of winter, Lochaber, the epicentre of Jacobite activity in the West, became virtually inaccessible; rumours of Charles’ promised return in the spring of 1747 with a French invasion contingent raised the expectations of the Jacobite clans to renew the hostilities. Intelligence reports sent by Hanoverian spies and sympathizers indicated that the Jacobites were in a belligerent mood, and that they would rise again should the French attempt a landing. By early 1747, the government’s representatives in Scotland were in an apprehensive mood, which, in turn, is suggestive either of their credulity, or, conversely, of the fact that they indeed had reason to believe in the possibility of another Jacobite rising. This chapter seeks to demonstrate the hitherto underestimated extent and shifting nature of Jacobite resistance after April 1746; to discuss various

Suppression and Resistance 23

difficulties faced by the government in its attempted pacification of the Highlands in 1746–47; to expose the fearful response of leading Hanoverian representatives in Scotland, and the vulnerability of the British forces in case of a second, foreign-sponsored attempt; and to reconsider the disposition and the prospects of the Highland Jacobites in the immediate post-Culloden era. For this chapter, use has been made of manuscript material from the National Library of Scotland, the Scottish Record Office, the West Highland Museum, the State papers for Scotland, the State papers Domestic, the Pelham papers and the Loudon papers lodged at the Huntington Library in San Marino, California.

Jacobite Resistance after Culloden: Ruthven, the Muirlaggan Resolution and Lochiel’s Last Stand, 1746 The defeat of the Jacobites at the battle of Culloden (16 April 1746 OS) was provoked by the Jacobites themselves, and facilitated by their unreliable French allies, rather than achieved by the government troops under William, Duke of Cumberland.7 The inexplicable failure of the Jacobites to dispute the crossing of ‘several Rivers where great resistance might have been made’ prior to the battle even puzzled Cumberland’s secretary, and Voltaire’s friend, Sir Everard Fawkener.8 The choice of ground – a boggy field – on which the engagement was fought favoured the superior British artillery, and rendered a Highland charge impracticable. On the eve of the battle, Charles’ army was exhausted by an arduous night-march to and from Nairn. Furthermore, the Jacobite force was on the verge of starvation because of the incompetent handling of victualling-logistics. In short, they were ripe for the plucking. Prior to the engagement, Lord George Murray, the Jacobite general, had suggested three viable options to a pitched battle at Culloden: first, retire to Inverness, in which case the British army would have been forced to storm the fortified town, and, as a consequence, would indubitably have incurred severe losses; second, retire into the hills of the eastern shires and reform in the spring – with the prospect of seeing Cumberland over-extend his supplylines in case of pursuit; third, the Jacobite army could move on to a more suitable field of battle situated on the southern bank of the River Nairn.9 There they could hold the enemy at bay until reinforcements arrived on the next day. Charles refused to countenance any of these alternatives. Frank McLynn has argued that the Jacobite defeat at Culloden was by no means inevitable; in fact, he has recently suggested that the British army could have been defeated on the day after the actual battle was fought, if Charles had followed Lord George’s third piece of advice. According to McLynn, the outcome of the battle was not immediately looked upon as being the decisive engagement which terminated the ’Forty-five; he regards such a view as the product of distorted hindsight. More generally, he has challenged the notion that the ’Forty-five lacked the prospect of success.10


Another historian, Jeremy Black, has lately disagreed with McLynn on the issue of a possible Jacobite victory in April 1746. Black concedes that Cumberland could have been repulsed by Charles’ army, but argues that the clans would have been forced to submit sooner or later. He does, however, admit that they could have expected better terms after a successful confrontation, as the government was desperate to ship troops back to the main theatre of war in Flanders.11 What is important in this debate is not so much the divergence of the views on a different outcome of the battle, as the two historians’ concurrence on the viability of an advantageous alternative to Culloden. The view of an anonymous observer writing in 1747 echoes Lord George’s second proposal, and lends credence to this point: ‘there is no Doubt . . . that the Highlanders could have avoided fighting till they had found their advantage[.] [B]y so doeing, they could have made a Summer Campaign . . . they could have marched thro’ the hills to places . . . by ways that regular Troops could not have followed them’.12 Even so, Cumberland’s army of 9,000 men outnumbered that of Charles by almost 4,000. The most important single reason responsible for the numerical imparity between the two armies was the notable absence of near 2,000 Jacobite troops, among whom was Ewan MacPherson of Cluny’s elite regiment which had successfully repulsed Cumberland’s vanguard at Clifton during the retreat from England.13 McLynn further estimates that 1,500 exhausted Jacobites slept right through the battle.14 When Cumberland crossed the River Spey on 12 April without opposition, Cluny had mustered his regiment in Badenoch and immediately set out for Culloden. On the day of the battle, he was at a distance of only 5–6 miles, at Dalmagarry, with 600 men, when the news of the Jacobite defeat reached him shortly after noon.15 Of the Jacobite troops deployed in the North, the MacKenzies under the Earl of Cromarty were routed at Golspie, near the Little Ferry, the day before Culloden by an inferior force consisting of the Earl of Loudon’s Independent Companies and the Sutherland Militia.16 On their return to Inverness, another Jacobite detachment made up of 700 Glengarry MacDonells and MacGregors unwittingly stumbled onto the margins of the battle at Ferry Bridge. The Glengarry contingent of this detachment also never arrived on the battlefield of Culloden, leaving their battalion under strength.17 They were led to believe that the government force engaged with the MacKenzies was twice their number, and accordingly fled.18 The engagement at Ferry Bridge cost the Jacobites the North, and thus prevented the possibility of regrouping Charles’ troops after Culloden in a region under Jacobite control. But the government’s greatest prize was the interception of £15,000, sent by the French aboard the Prince Charles to the Scottish east coast in order to replenish the Jacobite war-treasury.19 The simultaneous loss of direly needed funds, and Cromarty’s defeat, coupled with the debacle at Culloden, constituted a severe blow to Charles’ ailing cause. Nevertheless, it should now


become clear that over a third of the entire Jacobite army either never reached the battle of Culloden, or slept through it. Consequently, the Jacobite survivors of the battle and their partisans, who had not taken a part in the engagement, by all estimates still added up to a partially regimented force of at least 5,000–6,000 men; and several Jacobite officers listed as dead were in fact very much alive.20 In terms of manpower, Jacobite resistance after Culloden was therefore not only viable, but even likely. After the battle, David, Lord Elcho, the commanding officer of the Prince’s Lifeguards, argued that the Jacobite army had only been checked at Culloden, while the wily chief of clan Fraser, Lord Lovat, recalled that Charles’ ancestor Robert Bruce had lost eleven battles, and won his crown by the twelfth.21 While the Jacobite commanders in Scotland remained hopeful of the promised reinforcements from France, by the end of May the Jacobites in exile and the French, who were blissfully ignorant of Cumberland’s victory in April, still discussed plans to support Charles in Scotland.22 Moreover, reports of a clandestine operation to ship a number of French and Swedish officers, 12,000 muskets and 151 barrels of powder and shot from Amsterdam via Gothenburg to the Isle of Skye had reached the Admiralty. Two British vessels, the Triton and Greyhound, were immediately dispatched to intercept and destroy the Swedish ship conveying the contraband and troops to Scotland.23 By early May 1746, and after many tribulations, the Fredericus, which was bound to carry the officers and arms from Sweden to Scotland, ultimately made its way to Ostend in order to serve under the French. Apparently, a Swedish unit comprised of former soldiers serving in French regiments did make its way to Scotland and supported Charles.24 Between 17 and 19 April, units of the Jacobite army converged on the barracks at Ruthven in Badenoch, which had been prepared as early as late March, though for different reasons, to receive less than half the number of troops that actually arrived there. Though only Lord Ogilvy’s and Cluny’s regiments were intact, the 4,000–5,000 men assembled were hopeful of another encounter with Cumberland. An express from one of the Prince’s aides-de-camp reached Cluny, stating that the western clans loyal to Charles were to muster at Fort Augustus, recently demolished by the Jacobites.25 On the day after the battle, Lord George Murray, the senior general officer present at Ruthven, had sent the fugitive Prince a letter, in which he sharply criticized him on various accounts, but most of all for arriving in Scotland without substantial French military support.26 Lord George’s rebuke to Charles exemplified the deep division separating the Jacobite command. The dispute between the two leaders, which had first come to the fore during the council-of-war held at Derby preceding the retreat from England in December 1745, culminated in mutual recriminations after the defeat at Culloden, when unity between the Stuart prince and his general were most needed.


The controversial nature of the reason why Charles in turn instructed the Jacobites at Ruthven to shift for themselves requires clarification. McLynn has presented a convincing case that it was in fact Lord George’s admonitory message to Charles that undermined Lord Elcho’s advocacy for the continuation of the campaign. Moreover, the Irish advisors close to the Prince convinced their leader of the treacherous disposition of his Scottish adherents.27 Against the better judgement of many present, who firmly believed that a guerrilla-style campaign would have been feasible, the Jacobite army was ordered to disperse on 19 April. A letter of 23 April by Charles to the chiefs, however, suggests that he wanted them to scatter, defend themselves by assembling their supporters in various, small bodies, and wait until the French could send succour or obtain better terms for them.28 Notably, a capitulation was not an option discussed by the Jacobites. The massing of Jacobite regiments at Ruthven did not go unnoticed by Hanoverian supporters, as it moved the Lord Lyon of Scotland, Alexander Brodie, to entreat Lord President Duncan Forbes not to unload the transport vessels lying off Findhorn, which were carrying money and arms for the government troops, ‘untill you see whether The Troops Said to be to Ly at Ruthven to morrow be Superior to Those under my Lord Loudon’s Command’.29 The homeward march of the MacGregor regiment following the dispersal of the Jacobite army held an especially defiant note. As a member of the British army observed, ‘they had the insolence to march into the Mountains of Buchanan and Balquhidder in the face of day with Colours flying and pipes playing’.30 Finally, what can be said with a reasonable degree of certainty is that the regrouped Jacobite army under a determined leadership could have mounted a guerrilla campaign in the summer which would have prevented the return of at least a part of Cumberland’s force to the main theatre of war in Flanders for some time, and would in all likelihood have cost the ministry dearly, both in terms of casualties and funds. The extensive deployment of government troops in the Highlands following the battle further suggests that Cumberland did not discount the possibility of a Jacobite defensive action. Towards the end of April 1746, four regiments under the command of the Earl of Ancram were given the task of pursuing Jacobite stragglers. In the hope of forestalling an enemy initiative, Cumberland specifically ordered Ancram not to give any quarter to belligerent Jacobite war parties, while at the same time Loudon received instructions to ‘seize or destroy all persons you can find who have been in the Rebellion’.31 In an attempt to intercept Jacobite fugitives who intended to leave the mainland, Major-General John Campbell of Mamore established a ‘flying camp’ of 600–700 men on the western seaboard, and from there advanced into Appin.32 The royal Duke himself marched to Fort Augustus with Kingston’s dragoons and fifteen battalions of infantry, while Lord Loudon’s auxiliaries flanked the regular army’s progress through Glen Mhor with orders ‘to pursue & hunt out these Vermin [the Jacobites]


amongst their lurking Holes’.33 Though Cumberland was convinced he would make short work of the enemy in four to five days after his arrival, the disposition of his troops, as they moved into the heart of enemy territory, indicates that he remained cautious. The time necessary to crush any pockets of resistance estimated by Cumberland proved unrealistic, as the unfolding events forced him to remain in the western Highlands for another two and a half months. Culloden may have been the last significant battle fought on British soil, but it did not conclude the string of hostile encounters of the ’Forty-five. On 3 May, the Baltimore, Terror, and the Greyhound surprised two French vessels, the Mars and the Bellone in Loch nan Uamh. The ensuing battle lasted five hours and left the French, who were unloading provisions for the Jacobites, masters of the loch. The three sloops of the Royal Navy attacking the French had been forced to disengage when their rigging and masts had been critically damaged by the enemy’s counter-barrage.34 Compelled by those Jacobites waiting on the beach, the French left behind a hoard of some 35,000 louis d’or in six casks, which was taken into the custody of Charles’ secretary, John Murray of Broughton.35 According to British intelligence, a shipment of 3,000 stand of arms had also been landed.36 A part of the victuals and military stores were seized by the ubiquitous Coll MacDonell of Barrisdale.37 According to Andrew Fletcher, the Lord Justice Clerk, the ‘Report of the Countrey people, was, that there were more Ships expected with 6000 Troops, and that it was in confidence thereof, that they, in the mean time, landed the Stores out of the Ships already come’.38 The successful landing of the Locharkaig treasure, as the consignment of French gold became known, boosted Jacobite morale. The true significance of the Locharkaig treasure, however, can be gauged from the information furnished by the Jacobite banker Aeneas MacDonald, who considered it was ‘equall to pay regularly ane Army of 7000 Men for Six Months’.39 The pressure exerted by the British army’s westward march was not without result. The opening days of May 1746 witnessed a tensioning of the military situation in the Lochaber district. By his own admission, Cumberland was not of the opinion that the rising was at an end, as he still intended ‘to bring them to a total submission to his Majestys Mercy’.40 Major-General Campbell’s report concluded that ‘a great many of the Chiefs were Said to be retir’d to Locharkaig, Knoydart, Moydart, Arisaig, and Morvern’.41 He deferred marching to Fort William upon receipt of this intelligence on 3 May, feeling that his presence in Appin, in the Jacobites’ rear, constituted a strategic advantage, as he could easily land his troops on the western coast by passing through the Sound of Mull. Upon reaching the fort, he suggested that Lord Loudon should march from Cumberland’s headquarters at Fort Augustus via Glenmorriston to Glenshiel ‘& so hem the Rebells in on that side’.42 Even before the suggestion of the pincer movement advocated by the major-general was put to use during the month of May, McLynn points out that Cumberland’s occupation


of Fort Augustus and Loudon’s advance on Arisaig would effectively isolate the Camerons and MacDonalds from the other Jacobite clans, rendering a guerrilla war in Lochaber an unlikely prospect. At the time, Charles was encouraged to make a second stand by old Ranald MacDonald of Clanranald, but, grasping the constellation of the British army’s movements, probably reiterated his earlier instructions to scatter, and retain a skeletal defensive force until the French could land reinforcements.43 The Prince’s orders of 23 April to this effect were actually anticipated insofar as Murray of Broughton conferred with three Jacobite colonels, and commanders of their respective clan regiments at Invermallie, near Locharkaig on 22 April: Ewan MacPherson of Cluny, the badly wounded Donald Cameron of Lochiel and Charles Stewart of Ardshiel.44 The three Jacobite officers agreed to muster a force in the hills, and coordinate actions at a place situated two miles from the head of Locharkaig called Muirlaggan. Accordingly, the several Jacobite leaders convened on 8 May agreed to abide by a resolution to concert their actions. All able-bodied men were to be raised; within a week, the western clans would assemble at Lochiel’s house at Achnacarry; the Frasers and other loyal clans north of the River Ness were instructed to link up with the Glengarry MacDonells, while the Stratherrick Frasers, the Macintoshes and the MacPhersons should mass in Badenoch; the MacGregors, Menzies and the Glenlyon Jacobites would combine their force with their partisans in Atholl and Rannoch, and then join the main army in the Braes of Mar. The most significant article of the Muirlaggan resolution was the attendants’ decision not to conclude a separate peace with Cumberland.45 The British army’s reaction to this event is revealing. Intelligence reports concerning the Muirlaggan meeting stated that the Jacobite clans, now expecting aid from France and Spain, were gathering for a second round; and that they intended to assemble a corps of 4,000 men in order to harass Cumberland’s army and descend on Argyllshire. The spy Alexander MacMillan added that ‘if any Succours come from ffrance you may depend on the Rebells will have another brush for ’t’.46 At the time, the Duke of Newcastle informed Cumberland that the French had in fact dispatched the Brest squadron, carrying 6,000 troops, which the Admiralty believed was bound for North America.47 According to the information received by the Lord Justice Clerk, however, ‘[i]t might incline one to think, that They were originally design’d for Scotland’.48 The various chiefs apparently pressured their clansmen to participate in the venture, which, the writer warned, they would agree to, if the government failed to indemnify them and their properties.49 Unknown to the Jacobites, Alexander MacDonald of Glencoe acted as a mole, and conveyed the entire proceedings to Major-General Campbell, whose report to Sir Everard Fawkener is worth quoting at length: They had Couriers . . . gathering all the Men they can around this part & I am afraid theyll be pritty strong . . . that there was two Considerable


Bodies of Men on both sides guarding the Cattle . . . I am credibly informed that the Rebells are again getting together in a Body at Invernachiel three Miles above Lochiel’s House, that they have a quantity of Meal by Sea, that every private Man is paid . . . besides their Arrears which were all clear’d off. The Camerons and Clanronalds Men it is said are there, and the Fraziers and McPhersons hourly expected.50 Lochiel was indubitably the driving force behind the Jacobites’ desperate effort to regroup following the battle of Culloden. At the time, Cumberland attempted to separate the Cameron chief by offering him favourable terms, which were rejected.51 Almost certainly as a consequence of this refusal to surrender, which was compounded by the prominent part Lochiel and his clan had taken in the rising, Cumberland instructed Major-General Campbell to ‘direct . . . operations & pursuits chiefly against them’.52 On 13 May, Lochiel apprised Cluny, who had not been present at the Muirlaggan meeting, that ‘we are prepareing for a Summer Campaign and hopes Soon to join all our forces, Mr. Murray [of Broughton] desires if any of the [Irish] Picketts or of Lord John Drummonds Regiment . . . are Stragling in your Country that you Conveen them and keep them with yourself till we join you’.53 In the light of Lochiel’s intentions, the idea of Culloden as the battle terminating the rising in the minds of the Jacobites is no longer tenable; and if the vestigial forces of the Jacobite army were not perceived as a threat by Cumberland, there was no explicable reason for the considerable military presence in the Highlands, especially when all the support possible was needed for the allied war-effort in Flanders. Despite the numerical superiority and better supplies of the British army in Lochaber, the Jacobites held a tactical advantage. Owing to the lack of proper provisions they periodically sallied into Argyllshire. The problem with pinning them down was that as ‘theyll have neither a regular disposition or Motion, its very difficult to get a hit of them or to prevent their committing the greatest Barbaritys’.54 The Jacobites were also equipped with new arms, and, as Major-General Campbell’s spy asserted, it was only the lack of meal which prevented them from ‘keeping in a Large Body’.55 That, however, was not necessarily correct. In the absence of a fully assembled Jacobite army, equipped with the requisite supplies, any concentration of troops was dangerous as it would draw British attention to itself. This was a lesson Lochiel and his confederates were quick to learn. The rendezvous at Achnacarry, planned at Muirlaggan, did take place on 21 May, but the detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Donald MacDonell of Lochgarry failed to keep the deadline.56 Lochiel found himself alone with about 400 of his and MacDonell of Barrisdale’s clansmen.57 No help from the North was forthcoming, for the Sutherland militia prevented the Frasers from linking up with the Lochaber Jacobites, and Lord Loudon was commencing a pincer movement with the intention of encircling Lochiel at Achnacarry.58


Fed up with Lochiel’s open display of defiance, Loudon had moved out from Fort Augustus with 2,000 men, another corps under Colonel Campbell and 300 regulars. Lochiel, who was then not aware of the enemy’s strength, hoped to intercept them at Lochy, but soon realized there was no purpose in opposing the government force.59 The necessity of employing overwhelming numbers to cow the Jacobites may indicate the quality the British army attributed to the irregular Jacobite soldiers, but it can definitely be better understood in the light of Loudon’s own judgement, that it was not safe for 250 men under Colonel Campbell to march to Fort William through Lochiel’s estate. Loudon’s troops were in position on 23 May: 800 men of the Independent companies and 300 regulars advanced through Glengarry, while an equal force marched on Achnacarry from the South.60 Also intending to intercept the Jacobites, Colonel Howard was delayed by the poor condition of the road; but instead of closing in on Lochiel from the rear, Howard’s detachment returned to Fort William. With one flank open, Lochiel’s men escaped the trap laid by Loudon by retiring into the hills.61 Lochiel himself ruefully admitted to Cluny that the agreements reached at Muirlaggan had not been kept. The Clanranald MacDonalds refused to leave their country open to enemy attack; Lochgarry, who had promised to guard the approaches to Achnacarry and return with more Glengarry men, failed to keep both his promises, and Lord Lovat’s son, the Master of Lovat, had not even replied to Lochiel’s summons.62 The Cameron officers were instructed to disperse their clansmen, with orders to reassemble should the French finally land.63 But even the forceful personality of their chief did not prevent some of the Camerons’ submission to the government.64 With the arrival of Cumberland’s army at Fort Augustus on 24 May 1746, the British government had gained a significant foothold in the western Highlands, and thus rendered Lochiel’s task of moulding the Lochaber clans into an effective fighting force unfeasible. At the end of May 1746, organized Jacobite resistance collapsed in the face of overwhelming odds; in order to evade capture, the leadership was forced to go into hiding. Further complicating the situation of the Jacobites in the face of such adversity was a growing internal conflict: the western clans were at loggerheads over the distribution of the Locharkaig treasure. ‘[T]he Camerons keeps posession of it & its thought theyl come to blows about it & the Commoners are disobliged as they wont get the long Arrears due to them’.65 But even if the Jacobites had been soundly defeated, and a counter-offensive was prevented by the penetration of Lochaber, Cumberland must have realized that his initial optimism was misplaced. For six weeks after Culloden, the Jacobites had, against all odds, attempted to fall back and organize resistance. In the light of such evident tenacity, Cumberland warned Newcastle: ‘I hope his Majesty will not imagine that by these Peoples laying down their Arms, Highlander is possess’d of two or three sets of Arms, the which are


hid.’66 In regard to continued Jacobite activity in the Highlands, time was to prove him right.

The Changing Nature of Jacobite Resistance in the Scottish Highlands, 1746 Generally, the character of the resistance offered to the British conquerors after Culloden went through a visible transition, from regular to irregular warfare, from organized to incidental resistance. The shift from open resistance to political banditry was a distinct consequence of the collapse of organized Jacobite warfare.67 The government’s decisive intervention in Lochaber after the Muirlaggan meeting nipped Lochiel’s initiative in the bud, and since the time when the Duke of Cumberland’s troops were deployed against the Camerons and MacDonells after the Muirlaggan Resolution and forced the Jacobites to disperse yet again, there was no coordinated resistance against a Hanoverian occupation of the Highlands. In spite of the extent of the military pressure exerted by the victors of Culloden, and, later, the enactment and implementation of remedial legislation, the problem of marauding stragglers in the Highlands remained extant.68 Cumberland’s proclamation in early May to apprehend all Jacobites, who ‘presumptuosly and insolently remain in Possession of those Arms, with which they attempted the Overthrow of the Government’, demonstrably acknowledged the existence of armed enlistees of Charles’ army who had not yet submitted.69 Under the threat ‘that the most rigorous military Execution shall be ordered & directed against their Lands [of those Jacobites refusing to submit]’, instructions to the same effect had been given for the western Highlands as early as 20 April 1746.70 The government’s policy of neutralizing the Jacobite threat by the confiscation of all weaponry in private hands did make some progress, but the nature and scope of the plan constituted an invitation for trouble: while the Hanoverian clans, and those on the Jacobite side closest to Cumberland’s force had little choice but to comply, enough Jacobite stragglers remained under arms to merit the full attention of the British army. Another aspect of the failure effectively to disarm the insurrectionist clans was that of potential future repercussions. Two months after Culloden, Major-General John Huske had warned that the disarming of the defeated clans had to be conducted thoroughly, for otherwise an invading force could count on substantive support from a well-armed, indigenous force: [T]he Troops by detatchments clears a way as much as can be done in Disarming the Rebels, to a certain degree w:[hich] is firelocks only, the Rebels not thinking themselves as yet obliged to give up their Swords & those Arms they bring in ar[e] most of them bad Arms; they must be compeled to bring in all Arms, or the Pretender will have a standing Army


here when ever France shall please to furnish Money to these Rebellious people.71 Illustrative of this difficulty was the conditional submission of the MacGlasserichs, a sept of clan Campbell settled in the western Jacobite heartland. In their case, the fear of their former partisans’ reprisals prompted Lord Glenorchy, who acted as their protector, to request either certificates to secure the supplicants from British retaliation, or a special dispensation to retain their weapons until the threat emanating from hostile neighbours could be eliminated.72 Glenorchy pointed out that the Rannoch, Glenlyon and Balquhidder Jacobites had not yet surrendered, and complained of the MacGregors, who were flaunting white cockades in their bonnets.73 By the following month, another army officer confided to the principal deputy chief law enforcement agent in the region, Archibald Campbell of Stonefield, sheriff-depute of Argyllshire, that he thought the government’s repressive measures were ‘of no service to the cause’.74 Even a member of a nominally Jacobite family, John Farquharson of Invercauld, whose chief had stayed at home during the rising, while his clan fought for the Stuart prince, vociferously complained to Lord Loudon: this Premature dissarming has putt my Intrest in [a Miserable State and Situation], and some of my Nighbours who followed my example, beyond any others in this kingdome. The Thievs have allready found to tend much to ther account to Atack us in our present defenceless Condition ther being in this eight or ten days bygon four or five differents parcells of Black Cattell and Horses taken from our doors, whyll others in our Nighbouring Countreys not yet dissarmed continue safe[.] Our great missfortune is, that betwixt this and the tyms, that the generall dissarming Act coms down and is executed it is out of our power to make use, of even but a few of the arms now in our Custodis, for following after, and recovering such Stollen goods.75 Though promises were made and assurances given to the victims of Jacobite war parties, the government troops were unable to implement their policy of completely disarming the clans.76 In the face of proliferating enemy activity, their open failure at protecting Hanoverian loyalists, law-abiding chiefs or their clansmen, proved them severely taxed, if not exposed as impotent. Conversely, by striking against the neutral clan-gentry, or Jacobite clans, they forfeited the possible cooperation from the local population – an asset the British army stood in need of.77 Based upon the receipt of recent intelligence, Stonefield himself opined that ‘it is most probable that thefts & disorders will be more frequent this year than formerly, when the Rebells are pinchd for Provisions & Shelter in their own Country . . . I coud not be answerable to leave the Frontiers of the


Country [Argyllshire] expos’d to the Insults of Small parties of the Rebells’.78 This was especially true when most of the local Hanoverian loyalists were away serving in the Argyll militia. Following Lochiel’s stillborn resuscitation of the rising, Cumberland’s mopping-up operations expanded in scope. His orders for the destruction of ‘the remainder of the Rebels that are in Arms’ envisaged the encirclement of the Lochaber district by several army detachments.79 Lord George Sackville was instructed to scour the coast with a detachment of 500 men by way of Glenelg. Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Cornwallis with 300 men was under orders to traverse Cameron territory, while Captain Carolina Scott of Guise’s regiment split an equal number of soldiers in order to march along both shores of Lochiel.80 To close the circuit, Major-General Campbell’s corps was dispatched to Morvern. Sackville’s account of the operations conducted under his command in the MacDonald, Cameron and even nominally loyal MacKenzie territories, documents instances of resistance. Sackville admitted that only fifty Jacobites could have held the surrounding passes against his force.81 In other words, any organized, numerically inferior body of Jacobites could still have caused the British military considerable trouble, in which case it may be inferred that a force, such as was assembled at Ruthven in late April, directed by a functioning command, could have successfully obstructed a Hanoverian occupation of the Highlands for weeks, if not months after Culloden. Peter E. Russell states that hostilities in the Highlands did not begin to abate until September 1746; British patrols incurred casualties, despite proper care being taken against enemy ambushes. What is still more surprising is that the losses were incurred even though Cumberland had deployed irregular auxiliaries as a counter-insurgency measure to combat Jacobite hit-and-run tactics on similar terms.82 Moreover, Professor Black believes that Charles’ could have succeeded if the Duc de Richelieu had launched his invasion from Dunkirk in December 1745. He further contends that had the French landed in England at that time they would have met with little opposition, and Richelieu’s battlehardened veterans would almost certainly have swept the local militias and few regular forces around London before them.83 As we will see, the assessment of successive British military commanders concerning the preparedness of the armed forces in Scotland corroborates this conjecture as late as 1746–47. But even if no French aid was forthcoming, and if Cumberland’s advance into the western Highlands and islands proper could have been obstructed by compelling him to flush out Jacobite pockets of resistance, the vastly superior French army operating in Flanders at that time would have gained considerable time to crush the opposing allied troops, which, in turn, could have freed a sufficient number of French, Irish and Scots regiments in Louis XV’s service for an invasion of Britain, or at least a relief expedition to Scotland. That this scenario did not manifest itself was largely


due to the French ministers’ constant vacillation, and their respective conflicting political agenda, not inability, or lack of morale, on the part of the Scottish Jacobites.84 Even though the pacification of the western Highlands progressed at an even pace, three months after Culloden the British military occupation signally failed to eliminate the problem caused by roving Jacobite ‘caterans’.85 Sheriff Stonefield actually pleaded with Major-General Campbell to keep the detachment under Captain MacNeil of Ardmeanish within the bounds of Argyllshire. Moreover, he requested an additional company for guard duty. ‘I am of opinion the Rebellion is quash’d, but do not at all See the troubles in the Highlands or Countrys bordering with those of the Rebells near an end, I rather think they are beginning.’86 Not only raiding, but actual combat ensued, when, in early July, a detachment of Sackville’s corps surprised Lieutenant-Colonel Donald MacDonell of Lochgarry with approximately 100 men.87 By way of retaliation, two British privates of Johnston’s regiment had been dismembered by Jacobites while fishing on Cameron territory.88 In the parishes of Lismore and Appin alone, 94 individuals concerned in the rising had failed to hand over their arms by 6 July; similar conditions prevailed among the MacKenzies to the North.89 Cumberland’s proclamation published the following week, outlawing collaboration with the enemy in any shape, strongly suggests the harried Jacobites received support from the local population. Moreover, Cumberland threatened to have ‘the utmost rigore exercised against’ sympathizers who sheltered fugitives, to burn their houses, seize their cattle and sequester their moveable goods.90 Such Draconian measures, however, could also have a detrimental effect, as they irritated Hanoverian loyalists. Notably, the government’s often undifferentiated retributory operations in the Highlands and Lowlands adversely affected its own supporters in that region, especially when they became the victims of the occupation forces’ unchecked wrath. Protests issued by influential nobles, such as the Dukes of Montrose and Gordon, may not have put a stop to the British army’s depredations against Jacobite dwellers on their respective estates, but they clearly constituted a warning that the unfettered violence and material destruction committed by Cumberland’s troopers would not be tolerated indefinitely.91 By late 1746, even Sheriff Stonefield, on behalf of the Duke of Argyll, entered a claim of compensation for the indiscriminate demolition wreaked by the notorious Captain Frederick Carolina Scott on Charles Stewart of Ardshiel’s estate, whose subject superior the Campbell chief was.92 The recall of the Duke of Cumberland took some of the heat out of the British army’s pursuit of skulking Jacobites. Cumberland departed from Fort Augustus for London on 18 July, and was duly replaced with William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle, the son of one of William of Orange’s favourites.93 As opposed to Cumberland, Albemarle, though he might not have lacked the sense of duty necessary to discharge his commission, was patently


unenthusiastic about his task. He expressed his attitude towards his new appointment in following words: ‘En un mot . . . , L’Ecosse est ma bete.’94 The new commander was instructed to march his troops to southern Scotland, where they were to be quartered. Should the Jacobites stir once more, Albemarle was under orders to secure the South by garrisoning Blair Atholl, Castle Menzies, Perth, Crieff and Stirling. Cumberland, who issued the directions, kept in mind that many Jacobites were still under arms, and that a speedy recruitment of the troops remaining in Scotland was of the highest importance as, according to his own words, ‘[t]his Country is in so unsteady a Situation’.95 In the light of his superior’s own estimation of the military situation in Scotland, Albemarle’s claim that he ‘should desire nothing better than a descent of French Troops’ sounded hollow.96 Albemarle was given little time to relish his misplaced optimism. Despite the fact that another thirty-eight men of Appin had since surrendered, Donald Campbell of Airds, a local Justice of the Peace, had received reports that Stewart of Ardshiel ‘very lately order’d 6 Weeks Arrears due his Regimt to be paid’.97 The Jacobites’ depredations against the Argyllshire landowners must have reached epidemic proportions, for in early August Sheriff Stonefield apprised no lesser personage than the Duke of Argyll of the local landowners’ intention to apply for further protection.98 A memorial addressed to Major-General Campbell by the Argyllshire gentry explained the true state of the troubles better than the British army was prepared to admit: Tho’ we Consider the rebellion as Extinguish’d and the Actors greatly distress’d . . . yet we cannot allow ourselves to believe, that peace & Tranquility can for Sometime be restored perfectly . . . Several of the rebell Chiefs & Commanders lurking in the Hills, They will be forming new Schemes, & Intrigues, and their followers will Continue in Arms, & Resort to them, these Circumstances must disturb & give uneasiness to His Majestys Loyal Subjects. The great distress the Rebels have Justly brought upon themselves, ‘give us the deepest Apprehensions that Disorders and Depredations must ensue, They are now quite Destitute . . . from whence it is natural to Imagine they will Supply themselves.99 Notably, the signatories were all Whigs, which indicates that the perpetrators were in fact quite selective about their victims. At this point, it seems sensible to stress the common, anti-Whig denominator of Jacobite raids in Argyllshire, and to offer the suggestion that they were indeed acts of political, rather than social, banditry. In this particular sense, these raids can be classed as acts of retaliation. The motive of the raiders is further corroborated by Lochiel’s and the late Alexander MacDonald of Keppoch’s declaration of war against the Campbell gentry in March 1746, in which the authors promised that they would ‘certainly endeavour to make Reprisals’.100 Jacobite cattle-lifting, one could argue, was born of necessity and the desperation of


undernourished clansmen on the run. Conversely, no measure could hurt the Hanoverian loyalists more than to have their livestock carried away. Ultimately, the Jacobites’ raids had a twofold effect: first, they guaranteed their own survival; secondly, the depredations visited upon their enemies inflicted pecuniary losses. The damage done to the Lowlands alone was estimated at no less than £37,000 in 1747, of which £5,000 had been expended on blackmail, or protection money, and only £2,000 for the recovery of lifted cattle.101 Though basically sympathetic, Major-General Campbell, who felt that the removal of units belonging to the Independent Companies would only ‘incourage the Rebells’, found himself unable to furnish the necessary protection for the territory of his own clan.102 Not only Argyllshire felt the heat of Jacobite resentment and desperation. Apparently, the MacPhersons of Badenoch also excelled in acts of depredation, raiding deep into Strathdown, and openly drinking James’ and Charles’ healths, which prompted one observer to write ‘[t]hese Thieves are throughly ripe for another Rebellion’.103 On a more practical level, the British army’s attempts at ferreting out Jacobites, who even had managed to retain their own cattle, proved frustratingly unsuccessful. In Appin, Captain Scott’s mission to this effect had to be aborted before it was commenced, the Jacobites having ‘had notice of our Marching almost as soon as we left Fort William’.104 In a letter to Newcastle, Albemarle conceded that the Jacobites’ intelligence system often eliminated any element of surprise which could give his troops any tactical advantage in the country-side.105 Furthermore, there is reason to believe that after Culloden, Jacobite soldiers of Cromarty’s and Barrisdale’s units re-enlisted in one of Lord Loudon’s Independent Companies to escape Hanoverian persecution. If British army units had indeed been infiltrated, as the Duke of Cumberland claimed on the very day of the last battle, the Jacobites in hiding would have had an outstanding source of information.106 Conversely, Scottish collaborators often paid dearly for their services to the British. On 27 May, the St James’s Evening Post reported that ‘[a] Countryman near Cullen, who had been very serviceable in giving Intelligence to his Royal Highness the Duke, was last Week called from his Bed, and in the Cloud of Night was barbarously murdered’, while the Laird of MacLeod related to Lord Loudon that ‘your Spy M’rath was hanged . . . he had time to Say God Save Him’.107 In at least one case, that of John Catanach, a former servant to a Jacobite officer, the brutality which accompanied the execution of this Hanoverian intelligencer had a certain exemplary quality to it, intentionally degrading the victim to the role of traitor.108 Two incidents occurring in the late summer stung the British worse than even the increase of cattle-raids in the Highlands, or the continued evasion of the Disarming Act. The murder of Captain George Munro of Culcairn on 31 August near Locharkaig was an overt act of revenge.109 Though


Culcairn’s assassination smacked of a personal vendetta, it was associated with Jacobitism, and accordingly precipitated new efforts on the part of Lord Loudon at suppressing the bellicose mood of the Cameron gentry, in whose territory the deed had taken place; it was a blow that Loudon could not possibly stomach without retribution. The instrument Loudon used in this case was Lochiel’s younger brother, John Cameron of Fassifern.110 During the rising, Fassifern, unlike his brothers, had remained at home. As the brother to the attainted Lochiel, he was, at least nominally, the leader of his people. Prompted by the Earl of Albemarle, who told Loudon that ‘[t]he Murder of Poor Culcairn makes so much noise, both here & in England, that it is absolutely necessary to come at the Assassin’, the pressure exerted on the hapless Fassifern to produce the guilty party was mounting.111 Fassifern, despite all possible efforts to secure Culcairn’s assassin and Loudon’s growing impatience, in the end asserted that the suspect, Dugal Roy MacIllony, was not to be had. Though most of the Cameron country had been savaged by mid-November, Fassifern’s village was spared.112 Harassed because of the death of a Munro, the Camerons’ resentment against Lord Loudon and the British army of occupation was thus given a new incentive. Slightly more audacious, and, hence, still more rankling to the pride of the British army, was the abduction of a member of the Banffshire Whig gentry, Mr Alexander Garden of Troop, on the same day Culcairn was shot. According to the story related by an informer in Albemarle’s employ, ‘a party of Arm’d Rebels . . . Commanded by a Young Man who appeared to be about 30 and look’t like a Gentleman . . . Came . . . about 10 a Clock at night to the House of Troop . . . where they seized Alexander Garden of Troop and made a demand of £2000 Sterling. The leader of the kidnappers obviously felt little remorse, as he was heard to say that ‘tho’ he received the £2000 it was small to divide among so many Noblemen and Gentlemen whose houses were burnt and his among the rest’.113 The Laird of Troop was released on 6 September of the same year; there is no evidence to suggest that the culprits were ever arrested. The retaliation meted out by the Jacobites up to that time may have been minuscule on the grand scale, but considering the condition the Scottish Jacobite movement had been in for the past few months, and the overwhelming superiority of the British military, the very fact that Hanoverian spies and loyalists were attacked was remarkable by itself. As if to underline the inconclusive state of the government’s victory in the Highlands, Stonefield had news that Jacobite officers and the rank and file had again ‘receiv’d the Arrears due to them . . . Since the second of Aprile last’.114 By October, the Camerons, MacGregors, Appin Stewarts and MacPhersons had been paid out of Cluny’s hands for past services against the Hanoverian regime, while other notables among the clan gentry had received various disbursements as well.115 Adding insult to injury, every private of the Jacobite army who had not given up his arms to army or civil officials received £5, while officers


drew pay in proportion.116 But the greatest coup the Jacobites engineered in the autumn of 1746, was the well-known escape of Charles and a significant part of the leadership aboard two French privateers.117 Furthermore, Albemarle and Major-General Campbell were painfully aware that despite schemes to the contrary, with the onset of winter British control in the western Highlands was slipping; the Argyllshire gentry too, feared a potential proliferation of raids.118 Should the Jacobites, however unlikely the possibility, go onto the offensive, Albemarle told Newcastle bluntly that he would be caught unprepared, for the army lacked bivouacking equipment and had ‘no supply to take the Field in case of need’.119 Finally, an attempt to celebrate Charles’ birthday on 20 December in the port of Leith was not to Lord Justice Clerk Milton’s palate, and ended the year in anything but a cheery note for the government supporters.120 Jacobite vestigial resistance, to sum up the last eight months of 1746, caused the victors of Culloden plenty of trouble; and though no organized Jacobite force was assembled again after Lochiel’s attempt in May, the British military proved incapable of establishing its undisputed grip on the western Highlands, as it obviously failed to eliminate the threat of the armed Jacobite bands. In the light of Charles’ promised return with French troops, the result of the British army’s efforts at weeding out Jacobite stragglers was, after its initial impact following the battle, remarkably meagre. The consequence of the government’s difficulty in eradicating skulking Jacobites, as one spy put it, was that ‘if he [Charles] arrives at the head of any Foreign forces, he will be joined by several’.121 Further hampering the full-fledged suppression of Jacobitism, was the lacklustre leadership of the Earl of Albemarle. Even so, in September 1746, unabating Jacobite activity in the Highlands forced him to concede to the Duke of Newcastle that the ‘Rebellion is not yet at an end.’122 By January 1747, Albemarle’s complete lack of enthusiasm for his Scottish command finally got him the promise of being relieved from his post.123

The Jacobite Recovery in Britain, 1747 A report on the state of the western Highlands, Badenoch and the Northeast, compiled by a government operative at the beginning of 1747, painted a bleak picture: the Jacobites had handed in only their worst arms, clandestine meetings were held throughout the country and it was believed they were inclined to rise in a ‘Rebellion in the Spring, as they had great assurances of a landing as they say, & seem all willing to Joyn’.124 Hopes of an impending French invasion spread through Lochaber, and the spies on the government payroll reported little else. Even the practical strategic aspect of a renewed Jacobite rising found its way into at least one report, according to which the insurrectionists intended to attack Fort William first, ‘being a fit place to Land their Artillery, in the Center of their Friends & a Communication from thence to other parts of the Dominions’.125


In spite of lacking French or Spanish commitment since Charles’ return to France in September 1746, Jacobite preparations for a rising in Britain went forward. Captured Jacobite papers indicate that in late 1746 efforts were under way to recover 2,000 stand of arms which had been lodged with two merchants in Holland since 1719. According to this journal, Murray of Broughton had furnished a Jacobite agent with credit guaranteed by the Parisian Stuart banker George Waters in order to purchase an additional 5,000 broadswords.126 In January 1747, Charles had advised the English Jacobites of his mission to solicit support from Madrid and of his request to Louis XV for 18,000–20,000 men.127 He truthfully apprised them of the dispiriting state of Franco-Jacobite relations, but postponed any definitive evaluation of what could be expected from the Bourbons until after his return from Spain. In the interim, they were instructed to determine the smallest possible external force necessary to ensure a successful invasion, presumably one directed against England. The following adumbration of English Jacobitism does not pretend to be complete, but refers to events which also had a bearing on the Scottish situation. The English Jacobite leaders were also to re-unify their party, and should fate will George II’s sudden death, they were instructed to divide the resulting regency, and subsequently to rise in arms.128 While the ailing Hanoverian monarch tenaciously held on to his life, and insurrection was not an immediate option, in June 1747, leading members of the Tory party – most of whom possessed impressive Jacobite credentials – were negotiating an alliance in opposition to the Pelham ministry with the estranged Prince of Wales Frederick at Carlton House.129 Though in the last instance little came of Frederick’s initiative to wed his parliamentary interest to that of the Tory opposition, the latter’s cooperation may very well have been a consequence of Charles’ instruction to divide the enemy. What better opportunity was there to cultivate the son’s friendship, and thus render him utterly repugnant to the father and his ministry? In the wake of the Tory defeat at the elections, a Jacobite riot at the Lichfield races escalated, and almost sparked off a rising.130 The Duke of Bedford, a prominent member of the Whig aristocracy, was assaulted on the racecourse, while the de jure King’s health was drunk in public. Prosecution witnesses supporting charges against Aeneas MacDonald – one of the ‘Seven Men of Moidart’, who accompanied Charles to Scotland in August 1745 – did not feel safe enough to testify in an open trial.131 An anonymous commentator from Scotland using the pseudonym ‘P.O.’ stated that ‘the Late appearance att Letchfield & the Incouraging Correspondence they have from London & other Parts gives them to believe their time is att hand’. Even if both the Carlton House talks and the Lichfield races were essentially of an ephemeral nature, and phenomena indigenous to English political culture, they suggest a recrudescence of Jacobite self-esteem within the general political context of what Dr Eveline Cruickshanks aptly named the ‘Tory Backlash’.132


Jacobite recovery of the shock caused by the catastrophe at Culloden is further indicated by a confidential report relayed from England to Charles through a Jacobite agent at Versailles, the Chevalier Alexander-Peter Mackenzie-Douglas of Kildin. Sir Watkin Williams Wynn, one of the Carlton House signatories, and John Baptist Caryll, scion of an English recusant family, asked the Prince for arms and foreign military support.133 In an uncharacteristic flight of goodwill, they also indicated their consent to coordinate their actions with the Scottish Jacobites. Sir Watkin and Caryll found that the Scots peer Patrick, 5th Viscount Elibank also judged the condition of Charles’ affairs to be improving.134 According to their intelligence, no more than 6,000 troops were stationed in England, with an equal number being deployed in Scotland. According to intelligence available to Charles in November 1746, there were 13,780 soldiers in Scotland, and in excess of 20,000 troops, including those on garrison duty, in England. In view of the rapid redeployment of the regiments called to Britain at the height of the ’Forty-five, the figures mentioned in Mackenzie-Douglas’ letter seem possible. As early as June 1746, Newcastle ordered transports readied for no less than 3–4 battalions, which were to reinforce Marshal Bathiany’s Imperial army in Flanders. By late February 1747, Albemarle notified Henry Pelham’s office that troops were embarking for the Continent.135 Discontent in the army over unjust preferments of English at the expense of Scots and Irish officers was soaring. The Scots, Lowland and Highland, Elibank reported, were equally disgruntled over the rough treatment they had of late suffered at the hands of the British forces, the abolition of heritable jurisdictions in Scotland and the no less rankling disdain shown them by the Hanoverian court.136 James Bishopp, an e´migre´ officer in the French army, who was also a younger brother to Sir Cecil Bishopp, MP for Parham in Sussex, offered to raise money for a landing.137 He further proposed to recruit sympathizing smugglers operating in Kent and eastern Sussex, in order to hamstring any force brought against the invaders. John Baptist Caryll, styled Lord Caryll by Mackenzie-Douglas, would endeavour to prepare the western end of Sussex for a similar venture, while Viscount Montagu and Sir Charles Goring, along with ‘[s]everal others would facilitat[e] the Success of the undertaking’.138 The Chevalier’s information seems reliable, as the Sussex smugglers caused quite a commotion in 1747–48. Goaded by the Irish Jacobite Comte de LallyTollendal, a regimental commander of the Irish Brigade in French service, one Wilson (Dr Monod identifies him as Samuel Wilson, a grocer), a smuggler in Sussex, and his gang attacked a customs house at Poole, recovering some confiscated goods in the process, and later killed a revenue officer and a witness. The bodies were hidden in a well in Ladyholt in West Sussex. Ladyholt’s owner was the same John Baptist Caryll mentioned by Mackenzie-Douglas. Aside from obviously being capable of resisting government forces, the smugglers seemed rather well connected with the English


Jacobites. Lally’s involvement with these purveyors of contraband dated back to the ’Forty-five, during which he had endeavoured to recruit some of them into a unit – ‘Prince Charles’ Volunteers’, whose task it would have been to divert British coastal defences during an invasion. The Lord Mayor of London, Alderman William Benn, and his colleague George Heathcote, who were to play a prominent role in 1750–52, assured Charles of their support in the capital. This display of English Jacobite energy was of an unequivocal character and thus encouraging. But Bishopp’s last suggestion to ‘make proposals and offer[s] from your Royal Highness, either to My Ld. Granville . . . or the Pelham’s themselves’ by using the Bishopp family interest must have staggered even the resourceful Charles.139 Jacobite activity in Scotland had witnessed an increase since the Prince’s departure. This picture is largely substantiated by the indefatigable efforts of several intelligencers in British pay attempting to unveil the murky proceedings in the traditionally Jacobite Highlands and Northeast. As many of these reports tend to be contradictory, their contents are to be treated with some caution. The main point, however, is that the myriad rumours of another Jacobite rising, confirmed or not, elicited a fearful response from the military and civil administration of Scotland, and the Pelham ministry. Hence, not only the possibility, but also the probability, of such an attempt were not taken lightly by British government representatives. As early as December 1746, Baron Philipp von Stosch, a well-connected British correspondent in Florence, warned his employers at Whitehall that the French were lavishing favours on Charles, and their support for another expedition was likely.140 A profile of the political unrest prevalent in the Highlands indicates that, at least unofficially, Henry Pelham, or his staff, were fully conscious of the veracity of von Stosch’s apprehensions: [is] it to be taken for Granted that the Ministers of France are So Bland, to their Own Interest, or So Sparing of a few Men, and a Little Money, that they will fail to Prevent his R. H. [Cumberland’s] appearance, at the head of a Brittish army in Flanders; at So Small an Expence – not to Mention the Many other Advantages, that would Accrue to them, from the Confusions, we Should be Flung into . . .[?]141 Ironically, the British ministry’s understanding of why they should fear Louis XV’s future intervention on behalf of the Stuarts went deeper than French appreciation of what they stood to gain by supporting Charles. Indeed, the Jacobites in exile were actively plotting a second coming of their Prince; in one proposal, submitted around March 1747, the renewed raising of the western clans in strength was envisaged in spite of the losses they had incurred at Culloden.142 Despite the contradictory nature of the intelligence, reports on the general situation in Scotland were far from reassuring. Major-General William


Blakeney claimed that the Highland gentry was covertly supporting Jacobite stragglers by supplying them with victuals, while the magistrates of Inverness were doing their best to obstruct the British military’s efforts to confiscate goods intended for the outlaws.143 Another source of worry to government factors on the Jacobite estates possessed by attainted persons were the tenants who, though they paid their new masters in full, loyally continued to remit their rents to their former landlords – be they fugitives in Scotland, or exiles in France.144 As one correspondent remarked in a letter to Sheriff Stonefield: [T]here is reason to Apprehend That Some of the said Attainted persons who may be themselves yet Lurking or Concealled in this Country or others in their Name or on their behalf Factors or Agents May prevail with the Tenents and Possessors of the Estates that formerly belonged to them to pay their rents to Such Factors themselves or to others for their use and behoof, which if it Should be practised would not only be prejudiciall to his Majesties Interest but highly Detrimentall and dangerous to the Tenents and possessors themselves.145 Double-remitting must have been widespread and was looked upon as a form of subversive activity, as regulations to the factors specifically forbidding this practice were not long in being issued by the Scottish administration.146 While Lord Justice Clerk Milton’s information of a progressing PrussoJacobite alliance was apparently not given too much weight, Newcastle was perturbed over the return of attainted, high-profile Jacobites.147 An account of Lochiel’s presence was rebutted; but as an informed spy had argued, Lochiel would never return without a substantial force. His brother’s presence, however, would herald a new Jacobite attempt.148 During the autumn of 1747, the renewed arrival of Dr Archibald Cameron was confirmed.149 Early reports by Donald Campbell of Airds declared that he had conveyed orders to Cluny for the disbursement of funds to Jacobite officers in Scotland, while another informer contended that ‘[t]he design of his coming is said to be, to prepare the Highlanders for a Second Insurrection, to which we hear many are inclined, if they saw encouragement’.150 But not only the recent influx of agents from abroad was cause for concern. Several Jacobite leaders had managed to remain at large for almost a year; by that time the consternated Lord Glenorchy noted that ‘[t]is wonderfull how [Charles Stewart of] Ardsheal & Ludovick Cameron [of Torcastle] escape so long the Search made after them and others, and I’m surprise’d Cluny has kept his person and his money all this time out of the hands of the Parties sent after him’.151 Glenorchy’s comment gains weight in the light of both Ardsheal’s and Torcastle’s impressive Jacobite credentials; the former had been the acting colonel of the Appin Stewart regiment, while the latter had served under his nephew Lochiel as lieutenant-colonel.152


Lord Justice Clerk Milton and Lieutenant-General Humphrey Bland, who assumed command of the British army stationed in Scotland in October 1747, were both distrustful of their intelligence system’s haphazard nature.153 Accordingly, they decided to compare reports of agents unknown to each other; Bland sent Ensign James Stewart on a reconnaissance mission into the disaffected parts of the Highlands. The lieutenant-general, who believed that prospects for an invasion were significantly diminished by Rear-Admiral Hawke’s recent victory over the French West-India fleet at the second battle of Cape Finisterre (14 October 1747), was soon forced to acknowledge apparent signs of subversive activity.154 The ministry’s orders, however, were clear, and less sanguine in character than Bland’s optimism: he was instructed to investigate the appearance of a new French-sponsored Jacobite initiative.155 In due course, Ensign Stewart reported that Scotland’s Jacobite manager, Ewan MacPherson of Cluny, buoyed up the clans’ hopes, circulating the story that an invasion was in the offing; rumour had it that General James Keith, brother to the exiled Earl Marischal, a veteran of the ’Fifteen and ’Nineteen, was to lead the expedition to England, while a diversionary force would touch off a general revolt in the Highlands. Charles’ officers, the ensign remarked, would find ready recruits among the many embittered, and dispossessed clansmen, who had suffered as a consequence of their former Jacobite enlistment.156 Towards the end of the year, the Duke of Argyll feared that the government’s disarming scheme had not been as successful as it was supposed to be: ‘I almost daily hear of the Jacobites cabals, & I very much fear that they would have a better Rebel Army than they had in 1745 if the French thought fit to set them to work’, while his principal manager, Lord Justice Clerk Milton, had earlier postulated that ‘as till a Peace is actually concluded we may lay our account that France will do all in her power to distress us, we must as far as possible be on our Guard every where’.157 Information from government sources fuelled apprehensions that a Jacobite fifth column was ostensibly ‘kept in constant Pay’.158 As late as November 1746, one of Albemarle’s agents was certain that there were ‘a good many still in the hills with full Arms that are under pay, particularly the Clan of Cameron’s and of the Clan of MacDonald’s in the country of Moidart’.159 That the armed Jacobite bands at times did persist as much out of necessity as on directions from their superiors can be gleaned from the following example. The exiled Stuarts’ writ carried much weight with their adherents in Scotland, also in terms of procuring funds hijacked by refractory Jacobites. Murdoch MacKenzie, who had served as an officer in Lord Cromarty’s regiment, was abducted by fellow clansmen, as he had in his possession part of £3,000 landed by the French during the ’Forty-five. The perpetrators, led by Alexander MacKenzie of Leutron and John MacKenzie of Torridon, apparently acted on ‘an Order from the Pretender, requiring . . . [ Murdoch MacKenzie and his accomplices] to deliver up the Mony to the Gentlemen, who Still


adhere to his Interest in this Country, to Subsist themselves & their Adherents’.160 Ultimately, the reason why the MacKenzies needed the funds was, as the author of the report warned, that they were ‘[s]till so audacious as to keep together a Small Body of Armed Men . . . Their presuming in this manner to go unmolested portends Destruction & Depredation to their Neighbours, who are well affected’.161 The MacKenzies’ activities certainly gave the late Captain Munro of Culcairn’s kinsman, and aspirant for a factory on one of the forfeited estates, Sir Harry Munro, a fright.162 Sir Harry’s apprehension was wellfounded, as his own estate had been raided by Jacobites in September 1746.163 As if the disquieting news from the West of Scotland were not bad enough, the London government was apprised of perturbing developments in the traditionally Episcopalian Northeast, where supporters of the government found themselves unable to procure any intelligence, because of the overwhelming number of the disaffected.164 The Duke of Gordon complained of Non-Jurors meeting in public while the Jacobite ‘Spleen & Venom is more apparent than ever’.165

Conclusion Despite the disastrous culmination of the ’Forty-five, the Jacobites in Britain throughout 1746 and 1747 expected Charles’ arrival with foreign aid, and the consequent resuscitation of the ’Forty-five. They had no reason to believe that the battle of Culloden would terminate the rising. There is no better explanation for the Ruthven muster, the Muirlaggan resolutions, or Lochiel’s subsequent effort in Lochaber. As suggested by both sceptics and optimists in the field, what renders any assessment of Jacobite strength in Britain controversial is the scarcity of incontrovertible evidence. The reason for the lack of pertinent manuscript material should also be given its due consideration: most of it was destroyed by its authors because it represented incriminating evidence.166 There is, however, no need to rely on the dubious logic of the argument from silence, because even the Hanoverian sources will, as has been demonstrated in this chapter, yield sufficient evidence of continuing low-level insurrection in the Highlands. Moreover, the correspondence in the Stuart papers, however controversial it may appear to sceptics, corroborated by the Hanoverian intelligence reports in the Scottish manuscript collections, bears out that the Jacobites in Britain and in their French exile remained active and were indeed plotting another attempt. The government documents cited strongly suggest that military commanders were aware of clandestine Jacobite proceedings, and attached enough importance to these activities as to pay spies in order to unveil them, and to detain some troops in Scotland for a considerable time after the rising had petered out.167 What can be said about the situation in Britain is that whereas in England recovery manifested itself in the shape of an overt, virulent Tory political


reaction, in Scotland, armed resistance continued long after the rising was supposed to be over. It was essentially conducted in a low-key fashion and was largely confined to the traditionally Jacobite areas, such as the Lochaber district, Rannoch and Badenoch. In the West, Jacobite activity assumed the shape of double-remitting, and the conveyance of intelligence about troop movements; that of political banditry mostly manifesting itself as selective cattle-lifting by armed Jacobite parties, which did result in protracted guerrilla warfare in the Rannoch area; or of unabated recruiting for the Scots and Irish regiments in French service, and the trafficking of Stuart agents from abroad, grooming Jacobite morale among the chafing clansmen. The practice of religious non-conformity persevered in the Northeast.168 At its most extreme, in the immediate aftermath of the last rising, the Jacobite response in Scotland had been of a retaliatory nature. In general, it can be said with a reasonable degree of certainty that the embers of Jacobite discontent in Scotland were still smouldering by 1747, and that the resentment caused by Cumberland’s scourging of the Highlands did not necessarily act as an effective deterrent, but could very likely have served as an incentive for another rising with foreign aid by creating, as it certainly did, a reservoir of resentment. On the government side, LieutenantGeneral Bland’s orders of December 1747 to his regimental commanders in Scotland clearly attest to the government’s evaluation of the Jacobite threat. Pursuant to the orders Bland himself received from the London ministry, army officers were not only to inquire into the identity of the several chiefs and officers of Charles’ army who had managed to evade capture, and were manifestly directing Jacobite affairs, the lieutenant-general also wanted to know about the extent of Jacobite armament and communications with the exiles on the Continent, and finally ‘what motive or encouragement from abroad wou’d induce another General Revolt in the Highlands’.169 In the first place, the quest after such information presumes that the government considered a second rising possible, if not probable. In response, military intelligence sources asserted that the Jacobites in the western Highlands were in high spirits, as they had received repeated promises of succour from emissaries out of France. ‘The Jacobite Highlanders are at this time more compleately armed than they were very [ever] known to be . . . They are at this time more masters of the Country where they live . . . next time they rise . . . they will . . . assemble all their friends [in Argyllshire] . . . They think themselves sure . . . of the Mackdonalds of Skye, & hope for MacLeod.’170 As to the weaknesses of the British army in Scotland – predominantly logistical, supply and equipment problems – Albemarle had fully admitted to them in September 1746. Bland was in no better position by the end of 1747. He reminded Henry Pelham that the Jacobites, should they have the means for offensive action, could very well catch the government forces unaware. Conversely, arms and victuals could easily reach the Jacobites, ‘as it may be easily done without the least Danger either from the


Sea or Land, not one Ship or Sloop being on the Western Coast of this Kingdom to Guard it; nor any land Forces but at Fort William and Barnaro [i.e. Bernera], which are a great distance from one another’.171 Bland concluded that because of the lack of a continuous chain of fortifications through enemy territory, ‘the Jacobites are quite Masters of Lochaber, and may carry on their Plots and Schemes with impunity’.172 In other words, the existing garrisons were too few in case of a future campaign in the Highlands. Several requests of Whig landowners for military protection against Jacobite depredations further demonstrate that neither Albemarle nor his successor were able effectively to suppress the endemic raiding. As late as April 1747, a memorialist suggested that the Earl of Loudon should be commissioned to raise a task force consisting of thirteen irregular companies, which were to be further augmented by regular troops intended for guard duty between May and November each year, the high-season of cattle-raiding.173 Though British Jacobitism had taken a stunning blow in 1746, it would be premature to presume its immediate obsolescence after Culloden. One further conclusion which can be drawn from the developments in the Jacobite parties on both sides of the Channel in late 1746 and 1747 is the almost certain impracticability of a self-sustained rising in Britain. Hence, any future attempt would have to be backed by a foreign power, if only to supply the Jacobites in Britain with more money and better arms. On the other hand, it must be pointed out that should France or Spain have decided to intervene in Scotland – either directly or indirectly – the British government’s darkest fears, that the Highlands would rise in response to material military aid, or in support of an invading force, could have become very true. But although a successful rising in the near future in both Scotland and England would have required foreign intervention, the situation in the latter kingdom was different from that of the former by degrees. The English Jacobites could not call on armed dependants; the prerequisite for a rising in the South was in any case a massive French cross-Channel invasion. In Scotland, however, the tenacity with which Charles’ defeated and scattered troops continued to resist a superior enemy from April 1746 onwards lends credence to the idea that, as opposed to the indispensable arms-supplies from a third party, no, or only a token, external force would have proved necessary to initiate, support and carry through another indigenous Jacobite rising. Furthermore, the establishment of a bridgehead in Scotland, which could subsequently serve as a platform for an attack on England, would have been more attractive to the French. By their own admission, which was corroborated by their intelligence sources, successive military commanders in Scotland in the aftermath of the ’Forty-five judged that not only were the coasts poorly protected, but that the Highland Jacobites were prepared to fight again. The reason why the Scots Jacobites never succeeded in rallying after Culloden, and why they failed to initiate a second insurrection, is thus better explained by Charles’


decision to abort the ’Forty-five because of a lack of French or Spanish support, the subsequent refusal of the Prince to countenance a second landing in the North and the signal failure of France and Spain to supply him with the means for a relief expedition in late 1746 and 1747, than by the absence of Jacobite capacity or motive to turn on their persecutors.

3 The Jacobite Movement in Exile after Culloden, 1746–1748

But what does it matter? the cause was there, an image to keep the good hearts strong, unselfish, and expectant. Ah! the songs they sang, so full of that hopeful melancholy of the glens you speak of, mademoiselle; the stories they told of Tearlach’s Year; the hopes that bound them in a brotherhood – and binds them yet, praise le bon Dieu!1 Behold this blood that Cries This Day on Tower hill For Vengeance it doth Cry Unto the Lord on high . . . 2

Introduction: The Last Jacobite Exile Since the Revolutionary war of 1688–91, the established Jacobite community in exile had represented a ready tool of French foreign policy against Britain. The continuing Anglo-French rivalry in Europe and the colonies, which had reached a critical stage by the mid-eighteenth century, provided an ideal political climate within which the Jacobite diaspora could flourish. In the long term, French expansionism overseas was bound to clash repeatedly with the ascendant British Blue Water policy. Thus, even after the failure of the last Jacobite campaign, and though the dying embers of the ’Forty-five could not be rekindled immediately, the continuity of potentially hostile relations with France, at least in theory, opened up a plethora of possibilities for a future Jacobite insurrection in Britain. For these reasons, the Jacobite movement continued to be a potential threat to Britain’s political order after its most crushing defeat at Culloden. The last Jacobite exile in the aftermath of the ’Forty-five was a time of reorganization and realignment within the movement. In terms of its composition and nature, the last wave of exiles remained in keeping with the Jacobite diaspora at large; as a pressure group it was primarily an aristocratic, political force. It also had a twofold influence on British security policy considerations. In the short term, the largely successful evacuation of the 48

The Jacobite Movement in Exile after Culloden 49

Jacobite leadership to France opened up the prospect of resuscitating the waning resistance to the British government troops in the Scottish Highlands.3 In the long run, the very presence of a strong Jacobite interest in France soliciting Louis XV’s court for reinforcements, funds and arms in the wake of the disaster at Culloden posed a still greater threat to the Hanoverian establishment than did the covert proceedings of Jacobitical Tories in England, or the widespread disaffection in the Highlands, and the Northeast of Scotland. This was true for the simple reason that, at least for the duration of the War of Austrian Succession (1740–48), the Jacobite movement in France was securely beyond the reach of British intervention. Hence, it was free to act. Moreover, the memory of early Stuart triumphs and the sudden collapse of Hanoverian control in Scotland in 1745 was still fresh in the minds of George II’s ministers. Conversely, Jacobitism was vulnerable at its core. External pressure forced some degree of unity on the heterogeneous membership of the Jacobite exiles, but factionalism, the movement’s principal stumbling block since its inception, continued to wreak havoc within its ranks. Even as James continued to exercise his power as de jure King at his shadow court in Rome, many Jacobites were looking to Charles for inspired leadership. In the wake of the recent debacle, the nascent divergence between father and son exacerbated the divisions already in place along ethnic and religious lines among the e´migre´ aristocracy, which percolated down to the rank and file. In the light of this general absence of cooperation, it is all the more surprising to find that the Jacobite movement in exile proved not only resilient, but was indefatigable in its pursuit of the cause’s grand objective – a second Stuart restoration. This chapter is concerned with the political activities of the Jacobites returning to France after the ’Forty-five to December 1748, with the French settlement of the last wave of exiles, the changing nature of Franco-Jacobite relations, with Jacobite initiatives for a reanimation of the ’Forty-five and later plans for a second attempt under Charles’ leadership, factionalism among the Jacobites and, lastly, with the potential threat the Jacobite movement in exile posed to the British government. The manuscript sources used in this chapter for the Jacobite side, and to a limited degree for that of the French government, are almost exclusively part of the Stuart papers in the Royal Archives lodged at Windsor Castle. The British perspective is based on correspondence from the Hanoverian State papers, the State papers for Scotland and to a lesser degree on British diplomatic and secret correspondence of the respective residents and spies abroad, all of which are kept at the Public Record Office; the Pelham papers at Nottingham University also provide useful information. From the archives of the National Library of Scotland, the Scottish Record Office and the West Highland Museum, both Hanoverian and Jacobite letters have been used to illustrate the situation in Scotland.4


Return to France, 1746 When Colonel Richard Warren announced the safe arrival of Prince Charles at Roscoff in lower Brittany on 10 October 1746, the sense of relief at the courts of Rome and Versailles must have been great.5 Charles was given a hero’s welcome by the French court. James’ official envoy in France, Colonel Daniel O’Brien, who was busy organizing an audience for Charles and his brother Henry with Louis XV at Fontainebleau, painted Jacobite prospects in rosy colours: the French were not only showing signs of equipping a relief expedition to Scotland, but had also consented to furnish the returned Scots officers with a gratification fund of 34,000 livres. The Stuart Princes were granted a private audience with the French king, but only under ‘une forte d[’]incognito’.6 The discordant quality of the French king’s order was not lost on attentive observers. Sir John Graeme predicted that Louis XV’s refusal to meet Charles and Henry in public would not be well received.7 Ultimately, Charles, with his brother and the Jacobite elite in tow, was given a public reception at Fontainebleau on 23 October. But Louis XV would not commit himself to open support for the Jacobites. Advised of Charles’ intention to arrange a secret meeting, the French king declined. Louis XV’s reticence was the result of cautionary advice proffered by his ministers, his fear of jeopardizing the peace conference then progressing at Breda and French reluctance to launch a campaign in the winter season.8 James warned his son that he would ‘have little reason to be satisfyed with The Court of France’, and accordingly counselled him to remain patient, ‘for by a contrary conduct you would make things worse’.9 Contrary to explanations suggesting the Prince left his defeated army in the lurch after Culloden, Charles’ early analysis of French political expediency was largely proven accurate, and even suspected by two Hanoverian officers. In regard to French ambivalence towards the House of Stuart, past and present, his thoughts were clear. This is evident from his directions to the clan chiefs in late April 1746: It is thought to be a Politick, tho’ a false one, of the French Court, not to restore our Master, but to keep a continual civil war in this Country [i.e. Scotland], which renders the English government less powerful and, of consequence, themselves more . . . This is absolutely destroyed by my leaving this Country, which nothing else but this will persuade them, that this Play cannot last, And, if not remedied, the Elector will soon be as despotick as the French King, which I should think will oblige them to strike the great stroke, which is always in their power, however averse they may have been to it for the time past.10 If the French planned to use him for their own purposes, the Prince had here left an early indication of his disinclination to play along. As Louis XV was


the main beneficiary of the recent Jacobite rising, Charles intended to exact a price for this service from the Bourbon ruler. The sudden eruption of the ’Forty-five had sapped the British Treasury to such a degree that George II found himself unable to continue his subsidy payments to the Austrians; the rising had also necessitated the immediate withdrawal of British troops from the Continent, thus exposing the Allied army to the full might of the French war-machine.11 Forging ahead in complete disregard of policy trends at the French court, Charles again requested a secret meeting with the French king on 5 November.12 Even if Louis XV had at first been inclined to aid Charles, his ministers had not reached a consensus on the issue. Louis XV’s vacillating behaviour can be ascribed to fluctuations of power in the several conseils. Among the French ministers only two, Cardinal Tencin and Rene´-Louis Voyer, Marquis D’Argenson, had held a benign view of the Jacobites between 1744 and 1746. The remainder regarded the stormy relationship with James’ subjects at best with undisguised scepticism.13 To say that Charles faced considerable ministerial opposition in his endeavours would be understating the case. His response to French stagnancy was his refusal to play out the role of pliable ally that his fickle patrons wanted him to embrace. As early as 26 October, Colonel O’Brien had dispatched a report on the mounting tension between Charles and the French to his master in Rome. O’Brien, feared that if Charles kept up his pressure on the French court for succour, he was not only risking his rapport with Louis XV, but also jeopardizing Jacobite political credit with Cardinal Tencin, the one remaining French minister loyal to James’ interest.14 Though Tencin claimed to have submitted a proposal to Louis XV for 6,000 men, transports and money, Charles’ solicitations for immediate aid only grew more insistent. Eventually, Tencin’s proposal was rejected by the anti-Jacobite members of the Conseil d’E´tat, namely the Duc de Noailles and the Comte de Maurepas, on the grounds that a restored Charles would constitute a greater threat than the Hanoverian incumbent.15 O’Brien especially complained of George Kelly, the Prince’s Irish secretary, whose influence in Charles’ council was widely felt. Kelly’s ascendancy irritated not only the French king, but proved conducive to factions outside the Prince’s immediate circle.16 Kelly’s rise to power in late 1746 was largely responsible for the eruption of a bitter feud between the Scottish faction and the predominantly Irish coterie surrounding the Prince. Charles’ next step was anything but a monument to diplomacy, but the memorandum of 10 November spoke volumes of his exasperation with French ambiguity. He warned Louis XV that Jacobite Scotland was about to be laid waste by British troops, and that, in spite of widespread disaffection with the Hanoverians, his adherents faced persecution: La Situation dans laquelle J’ay laisser l’Ecosse a` mon depart, merite toutte l’attention de Votre Majeste´[.] [C]e Royaume, est a` la Veille de se voir


Aneantir et le Gouvernement d’Angleterre, est resolu de Confondre les Sujets qui lui ont restez fideles avec ceux qui ont pris les Armes pour moi.17

The state in which I have left Scotland upon my departure merits Your Majesty’s full attention. This kingdom is on the verge of seeing itself put to waste [sic!] and the Government of England is resolved to equally [mal]treat those subjects having remained loyal to it and those having taken up arms for me. Westminster was determined to implement remedial legislation swiftly, which, if effected, would indubitably cripple the clan system, and hence diminish chances of another successful rising. More than a simple request for military aid, this memorandum exemplified Charles’ hapless strategy of driving home the ill-consequences of French wavering during the ’Fortyfive. If Charles’ dissatisfaction with the French had reached a critical stage, James’ own misgivings of his eldest son did not stand far behind. James blamed Kelly for attempting to exclude him from Charles’ plans, and his son for keeping him ignorant of his interview with the French king.18 In early December, O’Brien’s correspondence suggests that renewed efforts for a meeting with the French king were under way.19 The private interview with Louis XV did finally take place, as is evident from Charles’ overdue report to James in early 1747.20 He tried to engage the French king and the Marquis D’Argenson for an invasion force of 18,000 men. In his opinion, any future strike had to be directed at England; Scotland could only serve as a diversionary theatre of war. Louis XV’s instruction to delegate the Stuarts’ affairs to the lukewarm Comte D’Argenson was indicative of the general drift of French policy. In the absence of a solid response from the French ministry, a disgusted Charles Stuart left Paris for the Papal enclave of Avignon. Indeed, the long-awaited answer from the French government had not yet arrived at Avignon when, in February 1747, the Prince secretly left for Spain in the hope of a warmer reception at the court of Ferdinand VI.21

The Jacobite Diaspora, 1746–1747 Although the growing Franco-Jacobite rift was a matter of grave concern, the state of the Jacobite party based in France in 1746–47 merits some attention. The most pressing issue on the Stuart agenda at the time was the retrieval of captured Jacobites. The spirited intervention of the Marquis D’Argenson, the French foreign minister, on behalf of Jacobite prisoners-of-war was laudable, but in fact exacerbated the precariously strained wartime relations with the


British government. The continuing trials and eventual executions of the Scots peers Lovat, Balmerino and Kilmarnock, and of many Jacobite enlistees, left the French in little doubt of British determination. Lord Nithsdale absconded, abetted by his wife, and reached Calais. In retaliation, all British subjects without valid passes were detained in French prisons, among whom were Lord Morton, closely connected with the British ministry, his spouse, children and domestics at the Bastille.22 Morton’s arrest had a dampening effect on British pugnacity. As a consequence, Newcastle conceded that George II was prepared to set at liberty all captured French officers in accordance with the Cartel of Frankfort (1743). The conditions set by Newcastle pertained to Jacobite prisoners who were either not British subjects, or natural-born Britons bearing French commissions, who did not stand attainted of high treason. In the latter case, the captives were never to serve against George II or his dominions again.23 But strong opposition to D’Argenson by Noailles and Maurepas gave French policy an ambivalent cast. On the one hand, the French refused to accept British prisoner-exchange conditions prejudicial to captive Jacobites enlisted in French regiments. On the other hand, they released Lady Morton in late November 1746; and she was one of the few bargaining levers they held for the coming negotiations with the enemy.24 Charles who was ‘tres surprise et me´me choquee´’, protested vigorously against what he regarded as an act of French duplicity.25 In November 1746, Charles pressed for the release of his private secretary, John Murray of Broughton, Sir Hector MacLean and Alasdair ‘Ruadh’ MacDonell of Glengarry, the last of whom had been intercepted by the Royal Navy en route to join his regiment, the Royal Ećossais, in Scotland.26 His explanation for giving these prisoners his special attention, if not precedence, was that together they were able to field 3,000 Highlanders.27 D’Argenson replied on 20 November 1746: Broughton, who bore Louis XV’s commission was safe, whereas another prominent Jacobite prisoner, Charles Radcliffe, brother to the late Earl of Derwentwater executed for his part in the ’Fifteen, faced capital punishment.28 The Jacobites proposed to threaten the British government by using Lord Morton as hostage for Radcliffe’s safety.29 Charles agreed to leave the disposal of some forty British prisoners captured by Jacobites to Louis XV, if such would contribute to better the lot of Radcliffe, Broughton and the other Jacobite prisoners; he went out of his way to aid Radcliffe, thereby running the risk of worsening the delicate state of relations with the French foreign minister by invoking Article Four of the Franco-Jacobite Treaty of Fontainebleau.30 On 31 December 1746, O’Brien informed the French foreign minister of their failure: Radcliffe had died by the executioner’s hand.31 Charles’ indignant response to Lady Morton’s discharge therefore hardly came as a surprise. With the notable exception of Sir Hector, time would prove Radcliffe the worthiest of the lot. Broughton turned king’s evidence against Simon Fraser,


11th Lord Lovat, but the chief of clan Fraser was only the most prominent victim.32 His further disclosures led to the arrest of several other Jacobites. Broughton implicated a number of Jacobites in having been materially involved in the rising, among whom were the Earl of Traquair, his brother John Stuart, William Drummond of Balhaldy, Sir James Campbell of Auchinbreck, Sir Alexander MacDonald of Sleat, Norman MacLeod of MacLeod, Lord Sempill, the Earl of Barrymore, Sir John Hynde Cotton, Sir Watkin Williams Wynn, Dr Barry, Colonel Brett and the Earl of Clancarthy. Lord Traquair, Sir John Douglas of Killhead MP and one Dr Barry, ‘and Several others were taken up upon Murray’s Information and deposition, and if no other Concurring witness Cast’s up, they are expos’d to have Bannishment, or Peines and Pennaltys inflicted upon them’.33 Significantly, Broughton had also indicated his willingness to aid the British government in the discovery of the Locharkaig treasure.34 Murray’s subsequent vilification on the part of the Jacobites underscores the gravity of his betrayal.35 There is probable cause to believe that young Glengarry asked for the Duke of Argyll’s protection, and was prepared to defect to the Hanoverian fold as early as October 1747.36 To date, conclusive, as opposed to Andrew Lang’s circumstantial though convincing, evidence against Alasdair ‘Ruadh’ MacDonell of Glengarry has been accumulated by the present writer to identify him as one of the most successful British government agents, better known under his cant name ‘Pickle’.37 The exiles could only suspect the apostate, but most were ignorant that it was a future chief of clan MacDonell of Glengarry who sabotaged Jacobite plotting during the next decade.38 Pickle was not the only willing defector, nor the first exile of the last wave to court Argyll’s patronage. Lord Elcho, the very man who had called Charles a ‘cowardly Italian’ at Drumossie Moor, upon his arrival in Paris offered his surrender to the leaders of the Argathelians, providing George II would grant him ‘a pardon for my past offences’.39 The publication of Elcho’s offer of submission in an Utrecht periodical, coupled with his acerbic comments on Jacobite incompetence during the ’Forty-five, rendered him persona non grata in the Prince’s circle. In the light of his record, a British indemnity for Elcho was out of the question. Ironically, John Hay of Restalrig, who first interceded (in an impressively contemptuous tone) with the Lord Advocate on behalf of Charles’ detractor Elcho, a few months later found himself petitioning the Prince to clear him of allegations of neglect during the last campaign.40 Last but not least, Lord Lovat’s eldest son, Simon Fraser (better known as Robert Louis Stevenson’s sinister turncoat, the Master of Lovat, in Catriona), solicited Henry Pelham for a pardon in April 1749. He eventually worked his way back into the good graces of the Hanoverian establishment, not least by acting as counsel for the prosecution in the 1752 trial against his former fellow officer in Charles’ army, James Stewart of Aucharn.41 Newcastle’s order in February 1747 to the British commander-in-chief in Scotland, Lord Albemarle, to embark all officers and privates bearing com-


missions in the French service for repatriation at Berwick, did little to conclude the difficult process of exchanging prisoners.42 A major source of friction was the British judiciary’s frequent refusal to acknowledge Scottish expatriates as naturalized French subjects. In one controversial case, Lord Lewis Drummond, acting commander of the Royal Ećossais, refused to quit Carlisle on the eve of his return for France, unless Captain James Hay, one of his officers who had been singled out to stand trial as a Jacobite traitor, was returned to his regiment unscathed.43 Professor Lenman’s assertion, that Jacobite officers who produced regular French commissions were untouchable, irrespective of their country of origin, as their lives were secured by ranking British prisoners of war in the custody of France, seems optimistic in the light of Captain Hay’s case, and the considerable number of executed, deported, or banished Jacobites, whose fate bears out the price of British vindictiveness or, conversely, of French impotence.44 Apart from the necessity to aid those Jacobites who had remained in Scotland, veterans of the 1745–46 campaign, then trickling into France, were going to pose a challenge. Following the ’Forty-five, most of these expatriates had lost all their possessions in Britain to forfeiture, and were themselves barred from returning home by an Act of Attainder (19 Geo. II c. 46) passed by Parliament, which received royal assent on 4 June 1746; or by being nominally excepted from the Act of Indemnity, passed in 1747 (20 Geo. II c. 52).45 Well-versed in the hardships of exile, Jacobite aristocrats and gentlemen were sagacious enough to press for some kind of settlement. Charles could after all fail to procure the means for another expedition. This type of arrangement was of a double-edged nature for, once enlisted in a foreign military service or established in a trade, Jacobite soldiers would not only be under another sovereign’s effective command, but they would also gradually lose the incentive to support the dynastic struggle of the Stuarts. But, as means for subsistence had to be found for the mostly impecunious exiles, the French government set several of the most high-ranking officers of Charles’ army on a gratification list. The composition of the first list of 6 October 1746 was by no means comprehensive: included were members of the general staff, and regimental commanders such as Henry Patullo, the Jacobite muster-master, and David, Lord Ogilvie.46 Many of Charles’ field commanders received promotions in the Scots regiments and the Irish Brigades of the French army. The former quartermaster-general, John William O’Sullivan was, for example, given the choice of a reformed colonelcy in Clare’s, Bulkeley’s, or Dillon’s, while John Roy Stuart was offered a captaincy in the grenadiers of the Royal Ećossais.47 Appointments of Jacobites in the French service often necessitated the Stuarts’ patronage at Versailles. On the whole, the exiled King in Rome and the Prince in Paris were successful, but finding a satisfactory solution for all of their adherents proved impossible. Energetically, Charles applied himself


to procure the Scottish exiles regimental appointments; meanwhile James was forced to turn down the destitute Sir Hector MacLean’s request for a recommendation towards a lucrative colonelcy.48 By July 1748, lists of officers serving in the regiment of the Royal Ećossais, and Ogilvy’s suggest that many ranking Jacobites who had served during the ’Forty-five were provided for. Notable among those Jacobite veterans given commissions in Ogilvy’s were Donald MacDonell of Lochgarry, previously lieutenant-colonel of Glengarry’s regiment, Sir William Gordon of Park, who held the same rank in Lord Pitsligo’s Horse, and John Holker, who had held a lieutenancy in the ill-fated Manchester regiment. Serving with the Royals – essentially a Drummond family enterprise embodied in 1743 – were Lord Strathallan (probably the eldest son of William Drummond, 4th Viscount Strathallan, who had commanded the Perthshire Horse and met an untimely death at Culloden), and James Maxwell of Kirkconnel, formerly captain in Lord Elcho’s Lifeguards.49 By February 1747, French government expenditure for returned Jacobite officers on the first two of three gratification lists exceeded £23,000; in fact, sixty-four individuals were subsidized.50 French efforts to assist the last wave of exiles were undertaken not only in a benevolent spirit. An anonymous voice suggested that the raising of the Scots regiments was intended to render Charles receptive to French interests. To avert the potential consequences of complacency among veterans, who were being absorbed into the French army establishment, Charles reverted to a simple but effective stratagem. Clamouring for regiments to employ their clients, many of the exiled aristocrats expected to be given colonelcies, preferentially in the Irish Brigade. However, only a few were given such commissions. Of all the leaders who had followed Charles to France, Donald Cameron of Lochiel, nineteenth chief of his clan, most forcefully advocated another attempt on Scotland. The numerous clansmen at his disposal made Lochiel a likely candidate for a commission to raise a regiment under his name.51 His bellicose disposition, and his unassailable Jacobite credentials made him the obvious choice. The embodiment of a clan regiment under Lochiel’s auspices would serve a twofold purpose: first, the inception of a potential invasion force consisting of veterans of the late campaign, whose past combat experience in the field against Hanoverian regulars and the Independent Companies would prove invaluable in any future attempt; the second reason, which was of more immediate interest to the generally impoverished subalterns and privates of the former Jacobite army, was the prospect of employment in a Scots unit. Conversely, a French request for the formation of a Scots regiment under the command of David, Lord Ogilvie, was delayed by Charles, who was acting on Lochiel’s advice, but was eventually processed.52 Even so, ‘Le Re´giment Ogilvy’ proved itself no less committed to the Stuart cause, swearing its oath of allegiance to King James VIII; and all regimental promotions and appointments were accordingly submitted to the Jacobite court in Rome for approval.53


Pressure on the part of his partisans also obliged Charles to continue his solicitations with the French to launch a second expedition into Scotland. Not unlike the precedent of the Wild Geese after 1692 which culminated in the embodiment of the Irish Brigade, the formation of a regular force consisting of the Scottish exiles constituted a significant element of the Jacobite initiative to reanimate French interest in a new attempt in the wake of Culloden. In December 1746, several officers and chiefs petitioned Charles to support the formation of a Scottish Brigade; their arguments were dangerously persuasive.54 Lochiel was the only participant to amend his views expressed in the memorial of the proponents. In his private correspondence with James, he argued categorically against the raising of any Scots regiments in French service, for the very reason that it might decrease Jacobite enthusiasm.55 Once the Scottish exiles had secured positions in the French army, their incentive to return home would slacken. Though Lochiel in the end obtained his regiment, the idea of a Scots Brigade fell prey to internecine rivalry. According to Glengarry, the French ministers actually agreed with the Scots’ proposal, ‘but to this the Irish [Jacobites], by means of the Influence that they had over the Young Pretender, got a Stop . . . to’.56 Ironically, the very clique opposed to the Highland faction, comprised of many Scottish chiefs and nobles in exile, was instrumental in subverting the creation of a Scots’ counterpart to the Irish Brigade, which Lochiel himself had warned of. The jealousy of the Irish Jacobites may have played into Charles’ hands in the short term, and thus ensured their own indispensability; in the long run, however, the Wild Geese had effectively clipped their own wings, reducing chances of a potential future campaign in Britain by three stillborn Scots regiments. Problems of still greater import plagued the decision-makers of the exiled community. The Jacobite leadership in France was riven by diverging views on the details of a future invasion. A major change in Charles’ assessment of his affairs had taken place since the heady days of 1745. His new position, which to his mind had been corroborated by past events, was a blow to the Scottish chiefs. The Prince had discarded the belief that Britain should be taken by the back door; that is, through peripheral Scotland. London represented the core of British power, and, as Charles had told the Comte D’Argenson, he would only head a descent on England. Once the capital fell, the rest would indubitably submit. This belief of his, encouraged by Kelly, in time assumed a doctrinaire quality. In fact, there is reason to believe that Charles was playing with the idea of disembarking troops on the banks of the Thames, or, alternatively, of an amphibious operation in Pevensey Bay, only 60 miles distant from the capital. According to this scenario, the landing on the English coast was to be complemented by a diversionary expedition, equipped at Warbergen, Sweden, which would cross the North Sea to land on the eastern Scottish seaboard. The Russo-Jacobite Generals James Keith, Earl Marischal’s brother, and Count Peter Lacey were proposed for a joint command of this subsidiary invasion.57


In the view of the exiled chiefs, no time was to be lost for another attempt on their country, where the military infrastructure was available to them in the shape of their clans. The latest reports from Scotland prompted Lochiel, Gordon of Glenbucket, Sir Hector MacLean, John Roy Stuart, young Glengarry and his cousin Lochgarry to press for immediate measures. Aware of Charles’ predictable rejection of their scheme, the memorialists warned him ‘that Your Royall Highness needs never expect that England will undertake any thing by itself, or without Considerable fforeign Assistance’.58 In the absence of full French commitment, the sine qua non for a successful restoration attempt, the importance Charles had come to attribute to England may have been strategically sound, but hardly realistic. Charles’ primary objective would only be attainable provided there was a simultaneous, not only complementary, landing in Scotland. Cunningly, the Scots left an opening. They proposed a compromise, while hoping to provide Charles with a mediatory tool in his increasingly disadvantageous position vis-a`-vis Louis XV’s government: if you did not do the whole work of the Restoration immediately, you would at least make Such a powerfull diversion from Scotland, as would greatly facilitate a landing in England, and render a less number of men Sufficient to be Sent to England, besides that tho’ ffrance could send no men at all to England, when your Royall Highness were once Settled in Scotland, you would Soon march a Sufficient Army into England to protect all the Loyall partie that would Join you.59 In other words, the secondary military operation in Scotland, in effect a rerun of the ’Forty-five, was necessary as it would render an invasion of England feasible. The implication, that the Scottish offensive was at least as important, if not more so, than an attack on England, was subtly embedded in the proposition. Going even further, the consideration of leaving the French out altogether was presented as a last resort. In the predicament that the Jacobites in Scotland found themselves at the time, this last suggestion can only be seen as an expression of their utter desperation. Charles could hardly disregard advice proffered by some of his most experienced officers. He was, however, at liberty to disagree with his Scottish adherents, which amounted to the same as ignoring the gist of their propositions.60 Lochiel, who took a determined stance against the Prince’s stubborn refusal to endorse a realistic plan, sent an admonitory letter to Avignon in February 1747. The substance of Lochiel’s argument was intended to move Charles away from Kelly’s restoration recipe, the ‘England-or-nothing’ position. ‘As for the disposition of Scotland’, he expostulated: [i]f we could return to the Highlands with artillery, arms and amunition, and only four or five battalions of foot, we would not only relieve our


distress’d friends and save the remains of our Countrey, but deliver the whole Kingdom of Scotland from the Slavery to which it is, or will soon be reduced.61 Earnestly hopeful to dissuade his headstrong master from his present course of action, he added that there were reasons to believe that the Scottish nation as a whole, including those who had fought on the Hanoverian side, were ‘incensed,’ and wanted ‘ane opportunity to show their resentment’.62 Primarily, the position Lochiel represented was rooted in his belief that limited goals were realistically attainable. Hence, Charles’ more extravagant views of his affairs were bound to clash with those of the pragmatic Cameron chief, and his associates; but Lochiel’s personal motive for advocating a resuscitation of the rising was still more profound. He divulged the cause for his unyielding position to James, whom he believed to be an ally in this affair: ‘I hope Your Majesty will approve of the resolution I have taken to share in the fate of the people I have undone, and If they must be Sacrificed to fall along with them. It is the only way I can free myself from the reproach of their blood.’63 Remorse, then, for his clan’s harsh fate, as much as his untarnished loyalty to the Stuarts, drove the conscionable Lochiel. James, in turn, admitted: ‘I thank God I had neither hand in nor knowlege of the unfortunate undertaking.’64 Those who had encouraged the project in 1745, he judged, had ‘much to answer for’.65 He referred to George Kelly, Sir Thomas Sheridan and the other members of the Irish e´minence grise. The indictment of the Stuart King was the result of his implacable hostility to the predominantly Irish architects of the ’Forty-five, who at the time had buttressed Charles’ resolve to go ahead in spite of James’ fatalistic attitude, which could not disguise his painfully obvious resignation. Though he shared the Scots’ disapproval of Kelly’s regime, James was not prepared to lend his name to faction. He wanted his eldest son, who retained the powers of regency conferred upon him on 23 December 1743, to head the Jacobites in France; James did not desire the unsavoury job of de facto leadership which had cost him so many disappointments.66 James’s ambivalence regarding his eldest son’s position fully came to bear on the Cameron chief. Because Charles was closer to the French Court, James decided the only sensible course was to act, as he put it, ‘in concurrence with The Prince’.67 The treatment of Lochiel’s case was not unprecedented. Two of James’ senior adherents, the meddlesome Francis Sempill, second titular Baron Sempill and William Drummond of Balhaldy, the exiled chief of the Gregarach, had been equally disappointed when Sempill’s plan to present their restoration scheme in person was vetoed by James. Their criticism of the Prince’s party essentially went unheard.68 What both James and his adherents had failed to perceive was that the focus of the Prince’s hopes had shifted from Versailles to Madrid. After his


mostly fruitless exertions in relation to the exchange of prominent prisoners, and the partly successful settlement for a majority of repatriated Jacobites, Charles could deal with the future course of a restoration attempt. Ever sensitive to the currents of chance, Charles, it seems, had come to the conclusion that if one Bourbon prevaricated, the other should be given the opportunity to show his friendship for the Stuarts. Spain had an enterprising new king, Ferdinand VI, who might leap at the chance to outface his mighty Bourbon relative. In January 1747, the protracted French incommunicado concerning a second expedition to Britain prompted Charles to abandon Paris for his new domicile in Avignon. There he received notification of his father’s intention to dispatch Henry on a diplomatic mission to Spain.69 Charles moved pre-emptively. He implored Henry to remain silently in Paris, as any contrary act could be misconstrued by the Jacobite community, ‘the consequences of which must be fatal’.70 Acting on assurances given to him by the Spanish ambassador in Paris the Prince had made up his mind: on 12 February, Charles advised his father of his imminent and secret departure, and shortly thereafter received his brother’s promise of ‘blind obedience’.71 Writing from Barcelona, Charles requested an interview with Ferdinand VI, via the joint chief minister Don Jose´ Carvajal y Lancaster. On 2 March 1747 the Prince reached Madrid with two companions. A rude awakening awaited him.72 Carvajal proved less than cooperative, and even asked Charles to quit Spain immediately.73 Apparently, the presence of the Jacobite prince-regent unnerved the Spanish minister, as much as it embarrassed his royal master. More than anything else, Charles made use of this circumstance to wring some concessions out of Carvajal. In a memorial, Charles presented his requirements in the shape of carefully weighed questions. How many men and vessels would Ferdinand VI grant for a joint expedition with France? Would he be willing to procure 30,000 guns and 10,000 broadswords and put them at the Jacobites’ disposal ‘in a Convenient place[?]’ Would the Spanish King be willing to deploy three ‘small little barks Laden with Corn . . . to My poor People in Scotland[?]’74 When he asked for commissions to raise three Highland regiments in the Spanish service, Charles certainly sought to create employment opportunities for his clientele, and thereby an additional equipped Jacobite regular force. These he hoped to form into a Scots brigade. On the other hand, it is possible that the Prince also sought to compensate his Scottish subjects for the late opportunity lost because of the intervention of the Irish Jacobites in the service of Louis XV. The point was moot in any case, as Carvajal brusquely disabused him of his high-flying notions. On 11 March 1747, the Spanish minister answered Charles’ queries; he could not envision a joint venture with France, while the employment of Highland regiments in His Most Catholic Majesty’s service was out of the question. Carvajal was, however, willing to send arms and supplies to


Scotland.75 In a sombre mood, Charles left Spain behind him. On 14 March, he sent Sir Thomas Geraldine instructions for the Spanish vessels which were to be sent to Scotland, recommending that only one at a time was to make its way via Coll or the Uists to either Loch nan Uamh or Loch Moidart. The cargo, containing some seventy-eight tons of supplies, meal for the common clansmen, brandy, wine, soap, tobacco and dried raisins ‘Agreeable to the better sort [of people]’, would be received by the loyal Highlanders, who should by then be put in a state of readiness.76 Dr Archibald Cameron was accordingly dispatched to Scotland. His instructions directed him to retire to the Highlands, where he was to alert Charles’ partisans, and subsequently see to the disbursement of some £3,000 to the local Jacobites.77 The contradictory nature of British intelligence concerning the activities of Jacobite agents sent to the Highlands from France renders any identification difficult. But the temporal coincidence of several reports on Dr Cameron’s sighting, and a matching description of his mission, give rise to the belief that he had indeed journeyed to Lochaber and Badenoch in early 1747; Hardwicke’s biographer avers that he smuggled arms.78 The Spaniards proved their chimerical worth to the Stuart cause; suffice to say that the promised supplies never arrived in Scotland.79 Charles was under no misapprehension that the mission to Madrid had brought him and his cause next to nothing in terms of effective aid. All he could do at the moment was to put on a good face, making such use of the Spanish fiasco as he possibly could. He gave no outward sign of an admission of failure. Instead, he wrote Louis XV a polite note, informing him of the Spaniards’ ardent desire to aid him.80 Similar missives sent to the Comte D’Argenson and the Comte de Maurepas, on 26 and 28 March respectively, followed. Indicative of remaining British insecurity, Charles’ mission to Madrid had also alarmed the Duke of Newcastle, while Cumberland was inclined to believe that the French were then preparing to invade Kent, Sussex, or Essex. In regard to the French, there was no good reason why the Prince should not transform the Spanish setback into a public relations success. The blatant nature of this obvious lie was only superseded by Charles’ audacious recommendation to the French of another attempt in his favour; as the Earl of Chesterfield apprehended, the momentary situation seemed propitious. This last proposition, however, was based on solid information.81

The Jacobite Schism, the Scots’ Resurgence and Charles’ Expulsion, 1747–1748 While James patiently awaited the outcome of Charles’ negotiations with Carvajal, his son sent a ciphered memorial to the Comte D’Argenson towards the end of March 1747, informing the French minister of an embassy he had received from his supporters in Britain.82 Unfortunately for the


Jacobites, French support had become lukewarm, but Charles seemed oblivious to recent changes in his allies’ attitude towards him. Emboldened by Louis XV’s pugnacious message to the Estates-General of the United Provinces in mid-April 1747, the Prince, whose anger at Versailles’ earlier indifference seemed to lapse momentarily, applied for the position of an aide-de-camp in the French army then fighting in Flanders.83 As he remained in Paris, it is safe to assume the desired commission was never issued. After January 1747, the Jacobite star in French councils had sunk low. Since the downfall of the Marquis D’Argenson, the French foreign minister and Cardinal Tencin’s political ally during the ’Forty-five, Charles, who had previously been able to count on reluctant support, suddenly faced a formidable enemy in his successor, Louis-Philogene, Vicomte de Puysieux. Implacably hostile to the Stuarts, Puysieux opposed any kind of restoration plan on the grounds that Charles was uncooperative in the extreme, and, after his maverick exploit in Spain, did not merit Louis XV’s favour.84 The true bone of contention lay in Charles’ opposition to an invasion of Scotland; in the eyes of the French ministry, he retained his incorrigible view of England as principal target of any attempt on the British Isles. Such a plan, Puysieux countered, would necessitate the employment of far more troops than France could spare from the main theatre of war in Flanders. Cunningly, Puysieux argued that it was rather the impotence of the Prince’s adherents in Britain which obliged him to ask for massive French support. For the time being, Charles’ request to be informed about the proceedings of the various conseils went unheard.85 True to Charles’ earlier analysis of his allies’ intentions, the French, flustered by the Prince’s obduracy, determined that plunging Scotland into chaos, with or without the Stuarts, should be their prime objective. Finally, the possibility of setting up a Scottish republic was seriously considered.86 This radical plan was the brainchild of Alexander de Boyer, Marquis d’Eguilles, who had served Louis XV as accredited French ambassador to Charles during the ’Forty-five. His memorial, which was submitted to the Comte de Maurepas in June 1747, argued that a Stuart restoration was not in the interest of France; but a potential detachment of Scotland from the United Kingdom could and would significantly weaken Hanoverian Britain. D’Eguilles had to concede that in any case Charles was indispensable to achieve such an end, even if only as a figurehead, as the anti-Hanoverian Scots were mostly Jacobites. But even d’Eguilles knew that the possibility of a Scottish republic was marginal at best. Politically speaking, his plan was too progressive to receive much notice, and it was probably for that reason that no more was heard of it.87 Charles’ categorical refusal to countenance any Scottish scheme involving his family necessarily drew French and Jacobite attention to George Kelly, the man suspected to be the cause of the Prince’s preposterous expectations. Obnoxious to the French, Kelly fared no better on the Jacobite side, where opposition to his growing influence was mounting. Sempill’s spiteful tone,


when asked for his opinion on the Jacobites’ situation in France, left Kelly in little doubt regarding his sentiments: [A]s to the disposition of Askeing to what I might propose regarding his [Charles’] affairs, I am persuaded there is nothing now in my power . . . the Court of France is not now so favourably dispos’d towards us as it was some months ago; and tho’ it were, I doubt whether such a Body of troops could be obtain’d at this Season, as we might then have had . . . I own, my fears vastly exceed my hopes; indeed I have hardly any hope left.88 Instead of setting a quick end to Sempill’s defeatist obstructionism, James confided to his partisan Balhaldy that he did not wish outsiders to perceive the divided councils within the Jacobite movement. James felt that his son’s invasion plans were indeed far-fetched; Charles, in his opinion, should concentrate on aiding the exiles. An attempt could but succeed if foreign aid, ‘& the concurrence of Our friends’ in Britain, could be obtained; any independent venture ‘would only serve to give the finishing stroke to all our hopes’.89 Ultimately, James’ own defeatism, or rather his half-hearted support for Charles, played into the hands of the emerging French policy of retrenchment towards his heir. Unperturbed by, and probably quite ignorant of, James’ lacklustre disposition, Charles continued to lobby the French court, and was rewarded with some measure of success. When the Marquis D’Argenson conveyed Louis XV’s message of goodwill to him towards the end of May 1747, the blight of the past few months seemed to have been mastered.90 Charles was then also able to represent the English Jacobite position. In response to the Prince’s instructions sent to England in January, an unidentified person of distinction crossed the Channel, bearing news from Charles’ supporters.91 The Jacobites in Britain were ready to rise at a call, but, Charles did not fail to amend, there were conditions he could not disregard. Troops and stores, carefully specified by the messenger, were to be furnished by the French: the listed prerequisites were a large body of regulars, 25,000–30,000 stands of arms, some field-pieces and a war-treasury.92 An alliance between Louis XV and Ferdinand VI was considered necessary to induce the Spaniards to dispatch 2,000–3,000 men to Scotland – but only as a diversionary force. To D’Argenson, Charles sent the British Jacobites’ demands for a minimum quota of troops; no less than 12,000 regulars for England alone were deemed indispensable.93 As if fate had conspired to frustrate Jacobite plans, improving relations with France were rudely disturbed by Henry’s unexpected elevation to the purple. In its consequence for the Jacobite cause, Henry’s accession to the Catholic hierarchy proved a catastrophe probably worse than the rout at Culloden. It drove an indelible wedge of distrust between Charles, on the one side, and James and Henry, on the other.94 The Jacobite movement had


been sundered at its very core. As if the stunned Charles did not have enough to contend with, the witch-hunt against Kelly reached new heights. In a letter to James, Balhaldy accused Kelly, whom he had disdainfully dubbed ‘Trebby’, of outright treason.95 The indictment, which went too far even for the moderately inclined James, whose patience with the proliferating internal Jacobite feuds (especially with the protracted quarrelling between Scottish and Irish exiles after the ’Forty-five) had been nearing its end, was withdrawn.96 Regarding Henry’s, now Cardinal York’s, newly acquired rank in the hierarchy, however, Balhaldy voiced his criticism in general concurrence with Charles’ indignation.97 Even the more cautious Jacobites in the King’s party, he maintained, ‘would rather attend H.R.H. the Duke [i.e. Henry] in ane expedition to Brittain, then in a consistory at Rome’.98 Balhaldy’s constant stream of correspondence to Rome may reveal another reason for the growing despair among his partisans. While the movement on the Continent went through its profoundest schism, the pressure to satisfy the impatient Scottish Jacobites demanded the exact opposite. Expectancy, and the desperate straits the Jacobites in Scotland had been left in after the ’Forty-five, had fuelled their hope of Charles’ return in time to spare them of Hanoverian retribution. But by the end of the Parliamentary session, a general sense of despondency had set in among the Jacobite leadership in England.99 Meanwhile, on 2 July 1747, the French had won a decisive victory over the Allies under the Duke of Cumberland at Laffeldt. Six French brigades were initially repulsed by Cumberland’s forces, when Maurice, Comte de Saxe ordered the Irish Brigade under James Galloway, Lord Dunkeld, a Scots Jacobite peer, and the Brigade des Vaisseaux to advance on the enemy. Allied resistance crumbled, and Cumberland was almost taken prisoner during the engagement. The particular ferocity with which the Irish Brigade fought at Laffeldt was ascribed to Charles’ presence on the field.100 While most Jacobites were content to sulk, the Prince’s party, never loath to seize an opportunity, hammered out new proposals. According to reports received by Balhaldy, Kelly presented a spectacular plan to Charles, despite an earlier French refusal to consider a level-headed scheme by the Irish Jacobite Thomas Lally, Comte de Lally-Tollendal. Balhaldy further asserted that Kelly had suggested using 200 boats, then deployed by the Comte de Saxe to intimidate the Dutch province of Zeeland, as transports to cross the Channel with 20,000 men. Nothing more was heard of Kelly’s plan; it probably never left Jacobite circles.101 Charles, assiduously trying to patch up his tattering relations with the French, congratulated Louis XV on his triumph over his enemies.102 Ten months after Charles’ return from Scotland, little enough had been achieved for the Stuart cause. Obviously, the enduring status quo in the negotiations between the French and their confederates was equally distasteful to both sides, though clearly to a greater Jacobite disadvantage. James’ support for Charles had followed the course of a downward spiral, at first


tentative, but gradually more hesitant, and constantly attended by irritatingly cautioning notes from Rome, while Henry’s elevation to high ecclesiastical office behind his brother’s back had caused a breach within the movement’s leadership. Under the given circumstances, then, it was rather surprising that the Jacobite movement did not collapse in the face of such adversity. On the contrary, judging by the penchant exhibited for plotting and scheming by the ranking protagonists, and considering the established character of the correspondence with their partisans in Britain, Jacobitism in exile was in a healthier state than when it had lain in the doldrums during the Walpole–Fleury de´tente. Once the storm over the fraternal schism had been weathered, and Charles had established himself as the leader of a faction, the continued survival of the cause was no longer in question. Evidently, external pressure forced unity on the disparate figures of the Jacobite diaspora; only at its core was the cause vulnerable. Whether it was Charles’ intention to give his clique a touch of respectability, or whether he really trusted the ailing George Keith, 10th Earl Marischal of Scotland, we can only guess at. The fact is, however, that Charles did call on the elderly aristocrat to join him in Paris as his personal advisor.103 He was the only Jacobite with the necessary clout to stabilize the Prince’s shaky position. Marischal was also unique in that he was acceptable to Charles and the Jacobites loyal to James. The only man of rank, integrity and ability to rival Marischal was Lord George Murray – and he was clearly beyond the pale of Charles’ favour.104 Marischal’s refusal to accept his offer must have been all the more disconcerting for Charles at this difficult time. The Prince desperately needed an experienced councillor to guide his affairs, as also the influence with the King’s men that Marishal’s accession to his council would have put at his disposal.105 As a consequence, Kelly’s hegemony remained unimpaired for the time being. The ongoing feud between Charles’ Irish coterie, on one side, and an opposing coalition, headed by Sempill and Balhaldy on the other, continued to be a divisive and, therefore, impeding factor to efficacious action. The prolific outpouring of Balhaldy’s complaints about ‘Trebby’, Kelly’s sobriquet, was only outmatched by Sempill’s embassy to Rome in February 1748.106 Encouraged by the French foreign minister Puysieux, backed by Balhaldy, Lochiel, John William O’Sullivan and Louis XV himself, Sempill presented a memorial to James in which he viciously lashed out against secretary Kelly.107 He did not even spare the recently deceased Sir Thomas Sheridan, Charles’ late tutor, from his censure.108 In order to gain a maximum impact on James, Sempill concluded his indictment by invoking the sanction Louis XV had given him for his mission: I was deeply penetrated . . . upon finding that the Court of France had not only rejected the overture of an Embarkation, last Summer, through a difference of the Prince’s Counsellors, but that the King of France himself


had caus’d his Minister [i.e. Puysieux] tell me, that he did not see how any thing could be done while H.R.H. confided in persons disagreeable to Y.M. and in all respects unfit to be trusted.109 In regard to Charles’ relations with the French, the full extent and damage of Sempill’s meddling for Jacobite prospects can only be guessed at. He did, however, clearly play into Louis XV’s hands, legitimizing French uncooperative behaviour towards the Prince by allowing Louis XV’s servants to mask their position of retrenchment as moral enforcement of James’ hostility towards Kelly’s ascendancy. Forcing Kelly to be Charles’ whipping boy was one thing; it was quite another to accuse him of corruption, which Balhaldy, on behalf of Lochiel, did with undisguised relish.110 Mutual recriminations continued unabatingly, and Sempill’s eventual death did little to mitigate this bitter conflict, silencing only one of many nagging voices.111 As the Franco-British dimension of the War of Austrian Succession was grinding to a halt in early 1748, the prospect of immediate peace became imminent. With an end to hostilities between the belligerent powers, Jacobite hopes plummeted. Not unlike the Treaty of Quadruple Alliance of 1718, the new Anglo-French accords would include a clause repudiating the legitimacy of the dynastic challenge posed by the Stuarts.112 Exploiting the official capacity of his rank to the fullest possible extent, Charles had a protest published against the peace preliminaries at Aix-la-Chapelle, a copy of which was sent to Puysieux.113 If the French government found this remonstrance not to its palate, at least the philosopher Montesquieu praised the Prince for his nobility and eloquence.114 In this situation of mounting despair the Scottish exiles grew restive. Sempill believed that Britain would demand terms unacceptable to France at Aix-la-Chapelle, without realizing that the French could, if forced, protract the war. According to Sempill, the preliminary peace talks were highly unpopular; he proposed to fuel French disinclination towards a disadvantageous peace by procuring encouraging news of resurgent Jacobitism in England and Scotland. In June 1748, he urged Balhaldy to undertake this mission, reasoning that ‘it may be very practicable to retrieve our misfortunes by procuring proper Intelligence from Scotland, and renewing our Confidence and correspondence with our English friends’.115 Almost at the same time, Charles instructed Sir James Harrington to inquire into the possibility of settling a correspondence with the English Jacobite circle around Sir Watkin Williams Wynn, and possibly with Colonel Brett.116 Balhaldy’s and Sempill’s initiative was seconded by several prominent veterans of the ’Forty-five. Clamouring for an expedition to Scotland, they again turned to Charles. The Prince’s continued, maddening refusal to find any merit in the achievement of limited military aims finally got the better of them. The Highland faction, obviously intent on dispelling Kelly’s illusory grand plan, bluntly told him:


[T]hat whatever Suggestions may formerly have been and probably Still may be made, by the evil designing malice of Some, or the well meaning ignorance of others who can not possibly be well informed of the truth of our affaires that Scotland has been So reduced and oppressed that it is out of their power to do your R. H. any further Service, and consequently no relyance to be made any attempt from that end for the futur, and that if even it were in their power it would be disagreable to [your] R. H. friends in England, we can with truth assure your R. H. that Scotland never was so generally willing and Capable to Serve you Since the Revolution as at this present time, nor was it ever So agreeable to your R. H. true friends in England that they Should do So, who look upon Scotland, Supposeing no forreign force can be got, as the only Sure Card to begin the affaire at home.117 In order to corroborate their argument they suggested to ‘[s]end two or more persons, into Scotland to know their Situation intentions & resolutions’, and to this end, Sir Hector MacLean, one of the signatories, appended a catalogue of queries to be put to their friends back home. He also included a few suggestions of his own. For instance, Sir Hector proposed Cromarty Bay as an ideal point to land 10,000 troops, and advocated the immediate seizure of Edinburgh Castle, while he thought that proportioning the distribution of funds according to the military potential of a clan, and the difficulties it had laboured under since the ’Forty-five, determinant factors. He also wanted a discretionary power in order to commission ranking Jacobites in Scotland to effect the simultaneous seizure of all fortresses in the countryside.118 It is not clear whether Jacobite agents were dispatched across the Channel on Sempill’s advice but it seems likely that both Colonel John Roy Stewart, and Lieutenant-Colonel Donald MacDonell of Lochgarry acted on instructions from the Scottish faction. Evidence suggests that Lochgarry visited England in 1748, as Cumberland’s secretary, Sir Everard Fawkener, was alerted to his presence at Southampton, Bath and London.119 According to British intelligence from Scotland, there had been sightings of John Roy in September 1746 and late 1747. A report of December 1747 to the sheriffdepute of Argyllshire related that John Roy, by his own admission, had arrived in Scotland during the month of August in the company of several Jacobite gentlemen, of whom only Captain David Hunter of Burnside was mentioned by name.120 The result of John Roy’s travels was a thorough survey of Jacobite sentiment in Britain, which was subsequently presented to Charles; it covered much detail, and thus suggests that John Roy spent considerable time visiting his British co-partisans. The report was issued in two parts, one concerning England, the other concentrating on Scotland. In England, the Jacobites were expectant, to say the least. After meeting with ‘people of rank’ and the ‘leading men in the City’ who assured him that Charles enjoyed as much support in London and the countryside as he could wish for, John Roy sounded out the extent of


their loyalty to the cause, and their willingness to risk life and limb.121 If required to do so, the English Jacobites would rise, with, or without, foreign military aid, but only if absolutely necessary. In great hopes for an attempt in the opening months of 1748, the London Jacobites had made provisions for a landing. Apparently, they were able to raise 2,000 fencibles in the city of London alone, which would hamper Hanoverian troops sent against the invaders; John Roy also knew that the English Jacobites had amassed an abundance in treasure.122 They essentially needed arms, which they wanted conveyed to the West, as well as Swedish regulars, now that the French forsook them. But they assured John Roy, that if necessary, they could do without the Swedes. What must have come as a pleasing surprise to the exiles was the English Jacobites’ reiteration of the concession made through Mackenzie-Douglas in 1747: that, should they rise, they were prepared to support the Scots. Despite the obvious risk to themselves in case of discovery, the London Jacobites asked Charles for a regular correspondence, which was, of course, necessary for planning. They also requested the presence of his envoy.123 The colonel’s evaluation of the state of the North answered the highest expectations of his confederates in France. ‘As for Scotland’, he opened his laudation, ‘I can talk more positively of it, than of England’.124 But unfettered enthusiasm is conspicuously absent in John Roy’s account, and with good reason. In June 1747, he had submitted a list of highly critical observations to James’ secretary of all the blunders that had ultimately led the Jacobite army to defeat and despair at Culloden.125 In the last instance, he championed Lochiel’s pragmatic line of argument, advocating a second descent upon Scotland. Consistent with his earlier views, and apparently with good sources in Scotland to corroborate his position, John Roy set his mind to the refutation of two contentions: first, that post-Culloden, Jacobite Scotland was too weak for another rising, and second, that the limited alliance between the English and the Scots Jacobites, Highland and Lowland, as it had existed during the ’Fifteen, could never be achieved again: [T]hey never were So able and willing, for there is Scarcely two oppinions now in Scotland upon that head, So that it is infallible that the least Show of a Landing, with money and arms Sufficient, would in a verry Short time make your R. H. absolute master of that Kingdom, and able to Support your Self in it, which, by what I have reason to be convinced of from England, would be so far from being dissagreeable to them, that they would aid and assist the Scots to the utmost of their power . . . the Low country in a manner keeps pace with the Highlands in their hopes and wishes, especially the City of Ed[inbu]r[gh] . . . in So much Sir that I’m convinced, that not only with the forreign Small assistance mentioned, but even if no forces at all could be got, only money and arms, the whole Kingdom would in a manner unanimously rise at your R. H. presence.126


In 1748, as in the previous year, Jacobitism was reportedly rife in the British Isles. More than two years after the Jacobites were defeated in Scotland, anti-Hanoverian sentiment still smouldered, contained by only a host of remedial legislative acts and a highly unpopular and predominantly foreign army of occupation. The chiefs maintained that more propitious circumstances for another Jacobite rising, based on an accumulation of resentment, could scarcely be asked for. But in the face of the Prince’s determined opposition, the Scottish initiative was bound to collapse. In his own words ‘any attempt in S[cotland] wou’d be us’Less unless one Effective in En:[gland]’.127 To make things worse, Lochiel’s untimely demise at Bergue on 26 October 1748, deprived the cause of the Scottish activists in exile of much needed focus and prestige.128 In spite of the Scottish e´migre´s’ ardent desire to aid their persecuted friends at home, and though he fed Puysieux the arguments to further undermine Franco-Jacobite cooperation, Charles’ tough stance was not without foundation. Dr McLynn suggests that Charles’ adamant refusal even to consider another Scottish venture was devoid of a rational basis. His theory, that Charles was plagued by strong feelings of guilt because of the ill-success of the ’Forty-five, and was therefore unwilling to expose his followers to the risk of another abortive rising, seems plausible.129 Alternatively, the explanation for the Prince’s motive, supplied by an anonymous writer, is also entirely reasonable: [H]e told the Ministry in plain Terms, that the Troops they offer’d were but an inconsiderable Few in Comparison with the Number requisite for succeeding in his Attempt; and that he would neither hazard his own Person, nor the Lives of those who might possibly join him on his Landing, on so vague and romantick an Expedition.130 Ultimately, a restoration could not be effected by establishing a semipermanent bridgehead in Scotland; if anything, the ’Forty-five had proven the difficulty of sustaining a war in England. As a leader, Charles’ current position was responsible and correct to a fault, though it can hardly be denied that guilt may have played a key role in his decision not to alter his view in this affair. His strategic perspective, although sound, was based on expectations that were unrealistic within the political context of deteriorating Franco-Jacobite relations of 1746–48. In any event, Charles’ days in France were numbered. In early November 1748, Louis XV informed him of the fait accompli of a treaty between France and the Allies, signed at Aix-la-Chapelle on 18 October. The King of France advised him of his intention to abide by all its stipulations concerning the Protestant Succession. Hence, Charles’ continued presence within the French dominions was no longer tenable.131 Louis XV added that he hoped for the Prince’s full cooperation. Under protestations of his deepest respect for


the French crown, Charles, who sent his reply via the Duc de Gesvres, regretted the circumstances which forced his hand, but was resolved to resist expulsion.132 The irony of a de´ja` vue could not have escaped Charles.133 With Franco-Jacobite relations reaching a nadir, Charles’ stubborn defiance seemed highly impolitic in the face of beckoning opportunities in Scotland. Driven to extremities by the French, Charles, however, had little time for restoration schemes; he was determined to force the issue with his erstwhile benefactors. The memories of the passive behaviour, bordering on outright meekness, displayed by his distant father under similar circumstances following the Utrecht accord, might have provoked the Prince into an aggressive posture. Or maybe Charles’ evil genius, George Kelly, had insinuated his ambitious ideas to disastrous effect. Oddly enough, James, though probably disapproving of his son’s open recalcitrance at this critical juncture, seems to have supported him, for he cut short Balhaldy’s habitual denunciation of the Prince’s party, and expressed his confidence in Charles’ competence to decide on issues of Jacobite policy. The exiled king’s reasoning seems less strange in the light of Henry’s defection from his dynastic duties. James was painfully aware of Kelly’s influence, but he also feared exacerbating the rift between his son and himself.134 Signs of waning French patience reached Horace Mann, the British resident in Florence, on 6 December 1748.135 On 10 December, as Charles was on his way to the opera house with some companions, the Prince’s arrest was effected by a contingent of no less than 1,200 men under the Duc de Biron.136 He was escorted to the Chaˆteau de Vincennes under heavy guard, while his friends were lodged in the Bastille.137 The infuriated Charles complained to Biron’s senior major that he could have expected better treatment at the hands of his Hanoverian enemy.138 After a brief spell at Vincennes, Charles consented to quit French soil, but declared himself dissatisfied about not being able to communicate his thoughts personally to Louis XV.139 On 13 December, Maurepas notified Charles that he was to be escorted out of France.140 Unable to cope with the otherwise sympathetic French king’s volte face, Charles wrote to him shortly after his release in January 1749 that he would remain steadfast in his attachment to his person, but that he was likewise convinced of the French ministers’ treachery.141 Charles’ view of the French reaction gains some substance if Louis XV’s ambivalent Jacobite policy is given some consideration. One observer remarked: that the King [i.e. Louis XV] had really a very great personal Regard for the young Chevalier, though the Interest of his Kingdom, and the incessant Remonstrances of his Ministers (some of whom it is suspected have other Views, besides the national Concerns) has prevented his Majesty from giving such Proofs of that Regard as the other expected, and he made him hope.142


From the outset, the Jacobites in France could rely on the support of only two out of six French ministers on the Conseil d’E´tat. While Tencin was James’ creature, the bond with his patron’s son was based on little friendship; following D’Argenson’s disgrace, the foreign ministry devolved upon a man who had no sympathy for the Stuarts. At Aix-la-Chapelle, committed French political and military support for the Jacobites had been sacrificed at the altar of raison d’E´tat, the agenda of which was dictated by French strategy, and hence strongly influenced by the French ministers.143 In the end, Charles was the principal casualty of French political expediency, and his expulsion nothing more than a consequence thereof. Significantly, the face of French political ambivalence towards the Jacobites was not only duplicitous, but, obversely, oddly sincere, albeit in a selfinterested fashion. While the French were willing to take on the unsavoury task of expelling Charles, they continued to support their Jacobite community of exiles. Thus, for instance, following James’ recommendation, Lochiel’s regiment securely passed into the hands of his son John, although still in his minority, and despite continued applications of other Jacobite candidates keen on getting their hands on such a prize.144 This gesture of tacit support by the French court for a family interest spearheading the hawkish faction within the Jacobite party was followed up by Louis XV’s order for the exiled leaders to assemble at the Scots College in Paris. He intended to establish a lasting financial settlement for the impoverished veteran nobles and gentlemen of the ’Forty-five.145 The Irish Brigade endured the ravages of time, serving the Bourbon dynasty to the dawn of the French Revolution, to be disbanded in 1791; and following Napoleon Bonaparte’s fall, Dillon’s, Walsh’s and Berwick’s regiments offered their services to the Comte de Provence, better known as the restored Louis XVIII.146 Implicitly, France had not disavowed Jacobitism per se, only removed an obstacle to a peace with Britain which would allow her a respite in an exhausting struggle for global supremacy. As the resurgence of French interest in 1758–59 clearly demonstrates, the Jacobite option was only deferred, not discarded. For France, the betrayal of Charles was a necessary act, and his expulsion may have been intended only as a temporary concession to the House of Hanover, but in the long term the damage it wrought was permanent. The Stuart prince would never trust France again.

Conclusion An admixture of colliding Franco-Jacobite political interests, and the widening internal divisions within the French ministry and the Jacobite movement after October 1746, prevented a resuscitation of the ’Forty-five. The reasons for the failure of a renewed French-sponsored offensive in Britain are complex. On the one hand, conflicting, multiple French war objectives resulting in the prioritization of the Continental and colonial


war agenda, coupled with a growing ministerial antipathy towards the Prince’s party, epitomized by the covert fear of a restored Charles Stuart, rendered Louis XV’s full backing for another rising unfeasible.147 On the other hand, the withdrawal of French aid was facilitated by Charles’ determined opposition to military operations limited to Scotland.148 Blaming Charles for the Jacobites’ setbacks of 1746–48 is neither productive, nor does it permit a differentiated view. Aside from constituting an ex post facto indictment, the assumption of Charles’ axiomatic culpability would distort avenues to answers beyond the simple question of guilt. Charles’ view of attaching a higher priority to England, than either Scotland or Ireland, as a target for a French invasion demonstrates his keen understanding of strategy. While his expectations of serious French commitment for a full-scale invasion of Britain were unacceptable to his allies, in political and strategic terms they were sound. Essentially, Charles offered to eliminate Hanoverian Britain as France’s principal contender in the War of Austrian Succession, as well as her rival in the race for colonial hegemony.149 As Dr McLynn has pointed out recently, the consequence of French inaction in regard to the Jacobite option during the War of Austrian Succession was the collapse of her colonial pretensions in the aftermath of the Seven Years’ War.150 A brief counterfactual exercise may serve here as an eye-opener. The consequences of a best-case scenario – in which a restored Stuart monarchy would emasculate the Whig party so as to be able to enact an isolationist policy towards the Continent (which was the case in the eighth and ninth decades of the seventeenth century) – would have been profound.151 Significantly, British neutrality, or only a working compromise in relation to the contentious colonial issues, would in all likelihood have invited the threat of a renascent, unfettered France upon its hereditary opponents, Habsburg Austria, and the United Provinces. The reanimation of the old European imbalance of power would probably also have appealed to France’s principal ally, Frederick II of Prussia, and claimed Hanover as a victim. This way both France and the House of Stuart stood to accomplish their goals. Charles’ proposition was, at least in theory, attractive, and the French had the means at their disposal to realize an invasion of Britain. But as so often those in power were not willing to take the risk, or pay the price – because they were not forced to. Despite his heroic intermezzo at Dettingen in 1743, George II was after all not a Henry V, whose conquests in France during the early fifteenth century had brought the Valois dynasty to its knees. As we shall see, French strategic priorities shifted dramatically under the direction of the Duc de Choiseul in the opening stages of the Seven Years’ War. The indigenous and exogenous political contexts within which the negotiations with Louis XV and his ministers had occurred after the last rising were not amenable to the Jacobite agenda. Charles was not wrong; he was incapable of brokering his views astutely in a political climate turned hostile


to his cause. But then, haggling with the fickle French was an art in itself. Had the pendulum of Louis XV’s favour swung towards the Jacophile Tencin–Marquis D’Argenson bloc, Charles’ demands would not have seemed as extravagant. In the last instance, the Prince’s refusal to fight a second diversionary war in Scotland on behalf of France, from which the Jacobites could gain little, was sensible. Even if France had furnished 6,000 men, as Tencin indicated her King would have in late 1746, and a Jacobite victory in Scotland could have been effected, the mere fact that the Hanoverian establishment remained free to act within England, and could again launch a successful reconquest of the North, exposed the hollowness of such a Phyrric undertaking. Charles understood the necessity of England’s elimination, as she constituted the base of the enemy’s military power. James believed that a second debacle in Scotland would not only have crippled Jacobitism militarily, but almost certainly resulted in the cause’s immediate and total ruin. Labouring under these adverse conditions, the Jacobite movement in exile was further hampered by faction and the lack of a unified leadership. In the main, the Jacobite inability to close ranks as a political party in the face of mounting pressure to present the lukewarm French with a unified front, undermined Stuart credibility, and thereby offset all their efforts to convince their allies. Furthermore, the uninhibited bickering between the two activist factions in France, the Scots’ interest and the Prince’s Irish circle, exemplified by the Kelly controversy, served the anti-Jacobite block among the French ministers, who finally capitalized on the conspicuous absence of unity in order to disassociate themselves from Charles when expedient. Henry’s abandonment of his dynastic duties, and James’ connivance at his younger son’s plans, alienated Charles from the rest of his family, thereby creating an unbridgeable gap where cooperation was vital. Misgivings about Henry’s cardinalate were voiced from all the corners of the Jacobite movement. In this particular case, even Jacobite members of the Catholic clergy found James’ and Henry’s political myopia offensive. Secular observers could only shake their heads at such folly, as it confirmed Hanoverian propaganda regarding the Stuarts’ reputed religious mania and attachment to Rome to the very hilt.152 The ensuing dichotomy had a disastrous effect on the comprehensive identity of Jacobitism at home and abroad; but, as the following chapter demonstrates, it also released Charles and his partisans into political adulthood. Leading exponents of the British political elite feared, even expected, a Franco-Jacobite counter-offensive. According to intelligence sources available to the exiles, the resentment caused by government persecution of Jacobites in the wake of Culloden only required a focus for it to be unleashed, which could have been provided by a French invasion of Britain. In no other plausible way are the Pelham ministry’s judicial reforms, the massive military presence and the wide-reaching fortification programme in Scotland explicable. All of these measures were prophylactic in nature and,


as the Elibank conspiracy and subsequent French interest in a Jacobite fifth column during the Seven Years’ War suggest, justified.153 While the British government was gradually able to cow the Jacobites of the North, those who safely escaped were well beyond their grasp and integrated into a widereaching, and influential community in exile. Obviously, this perturbed the British ministers. Furthermore, contemporary British military and political sources indicate that well-informed representatives of the Hanoverian order appreciated the potential of the Jacobite movement in exile as a political weapon in the hands of their rivals. King George II’s ministers did not overestimate the possible Jacobite backlash; rather did their French counterparts underestimate the strength of Charles’ convictions. To dismiss the Jacobite threat as an irrelevance in the immediate postCulloden period is to ignore that it was a Stuart prince who initially provoked what one recent historian has judged to have been the most serious crisis faced by Hanoverian Britain.154 Jacobitism had been pronounced dead in Walpole’s day; instead, Francis Atterbury’s conspiracy, the last significant Jacobite plot, was more than twenty years past when the Stuarts struck again. In other words, the application of a retrospectivist view is inadmissible as any hindsighted perspective is conducive to distortion.155 The ultimate outcome of a Jacobite failure was not discernible to either Charles or his contemporaries. In the light of the early successes the Jacobites achieved in 1745, British fears after the ’Forty-five are understandable. Demonstrably, the burgeoning Jacobite community in France, and the inherent threat it posed to the Brunswick dynasty following Culloden, may serve here as an appropriate example of the unpredictability of eighteenth-century European politics and the advisability of a contextualist approach.156 Illustrative of this last point are the following two chapters, which demonstrate that though the French shelved the Jacobite option in December 1748, British apprehension of Jacobite conspiracy, and French collusion, remained alive.

4 The Plot that Almost Happened: The Jacobite Movement, the British Government and the Elibank Conspiracy, 1749–1754

That there is a great deal more material relating to the later Jacobite period hidden away in old houses up and down the country I do not doubt, though not the least difficulty of endeavouring to trace the course of an unsuccessful conspiracy is that, for obvious reasons, the most valuable documents have almost invariably been destroyed.1 Sir Charles Petrie

Introduction The conspiracy known to posterity as the ‘Elibank plot’ was probably the most obscure project, or more accurately, hodge-podge of conspiracies, to restore the House of Stuart to its ancestral dignity. On the one hand, this circumstance is partially due to the fragmentary nature of the primary source material on the Jacobite side – incriminating evidence was more often than not destroyed on the spot. On the other hand, the lack of conclusive evidence may be ascribed to the politically expedient cooperation of the British government in obfuscating all the available information concerning the details of the plot.2 In the absence of an unbroken historical record, but also because of the labyrinthine interrelations of the numerous schemes culminating in the Elibank conspiracy, any attempt to reconstruct the plot in its entirety is rendered impossible. Though the conclusions of this inquiry are mostly based on hard evidence, the attainment of productive results necessitated the inclusion of a speculative element. More generally, the point of this chapter is not so much the probably productive comparison with previous works (though it includes information of such), or the fashionable engagement with what the late Sir Geoffrey Elton with some justice dubbed a ‘parlour game’ – the historiographical debate, but instead its priorities are to extend our knowledge about the plot, to set it in a wider 75


temporal frame; and therefore its emphases are of a reconstructive and inquisitorial nature.3 This chapter seeks to establish the genesis of the conspiracy; to introduce the main actors; to include traditional interpretations and add detail to such accounts; to reconstruct the various phases of the conspiracy in France, the Empire and Britain; to touch upon the aftermath of the affair; and to pose several pertinent questions which have remained unanswered. How viable was the plot in reality? Could the Jacobites have mustered indigenous or exogenous support? What was the nature of the problems the Jacobites had to overcome? How much did the British government know, and why was its reaction to the Elibank plot muted? The Elibank plot stands out because, as opposed to most Jacobite conspiracies, its architects did not rely as heavily on the support of a foreign power. Though they could, and had ample reason to, support the Jacobites, the Prussians did not commit themselves to the extent the French had during the ’Forty-five. The sources, though in the main fragmented, are extant in abundance. The volume of the material, and the limits set upon this investigation, are the reasons for a selective approach. German material, with the notable exception of the Politische Correspondenz Friedrichs des Grossen, has not been included in this piece of work.4 The majority of the documents consulted are from the Stuart papers, the Public Record Office, the British Library and the Pelham papers; a special emphasis was given to Scottish archives and manuscripts, such as the National Library of Scotland, the Scottish Record Office and the London-based State papers for Scotland.

The Locharkaig Treasure: Asset or Setback? In his seminal article on the Jacobite conspiracy of the early 1750s, Sir Charles Petrie concluded that the Elibank plot began with Charles Edward Stuart’s visit to London in September 1750.5 The only problem with that assertion is that Charles was already preparing for a coup d’e´tat at that time. The actual reasons for his visit to the British capital, which will become clear in due course, were his need to remove the religious stigma attached to his family, reconnoitre the lie of the land and to sound the sentiments of his coconspirators to be. It was the time before the Prince’s visit in which the stage was set for the later conspiracy. Thus, we turn to the closing month of 1748. The expulsion of Charles from the French dominions in December seemed catastrophic; but at a closer look at this crucial event in the evolution of the exiled Jacobite party the advantages to the movement become discernible. The forcible termination of the relationship with the French had severed a political umbilical cord tying Charles to the conflicting foreign state interests and policies of the most formidable power of mid-eighteenth-century Europe. What Charles had lost in patronage he could make up with the,

The British Government and the Elibank Conspiracy 77

admittedly unwelcome, freedom of independent movement and action. Blunting the edge of the superficially tough French stance towards Jacobitism, was Louis XV’s friendly relationship with the exiles. The French king probably did not bear Charles a personal grudge, but had rather followed his ministers’ interpretation of the dictates of state reason, at the end of a war which had all but exhausted French resources.6 Conversely, the root-cause for Charles’ refusal to countenance another French alliance during the following decade was the perceived affront suffered at the hands of his erstwhile confederates: he hated the French ministry for adhering to the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (18 October 1748), which stipulated that the Stuarts were not to be granted an asylum in France, and, subsequently, for literally forcing him, as he perceived it, to submit to ‘Lois hanoveriens’.7 His sense of betrayal was probably reinforced by the fact that the French accession to the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle stood in direct contravention to Articles 2 and 4 of the Franco-Jacobite Treaty of Fontainbleau (24 October 1745).8 Without the financial backing of the French crown to fall back upon – Charles had refused to accept a pension – the Prince and his partisans were forced to tap alternative financial sources.9 Moreover, Charles’ breach with official Jacobitism was widening, which eliminated still another pecuniary resource. On the one hand this was necessary to ensure the party’s own continued existence and financial independence, and, on the other hand, constituted the prime requirement for the furtherance of its restoration plans. Apart from collecting contributions from the preponderantly English remitters, Charles’ efforts were therefore directed at recovering the treasure supplied by the French on 3 May 1746, and intended for the Jacobite army, but largely left untouched in Scotland.10 Subsequently, the Locharkaig treasure, as it was referred to, had gone through many hands, but had finally been entrusted into the care of Colonel Ewan MacPherson of Cluny, a powerful chieftain of the clan Chattan confederation.11 We cannot understand the origins of the plot without first dwelling on the Prince’s efforts to recover the treasure. The role of the Locharkaig treasure – the Jacobite war-chest – was of critical importance to future developments within the Jacobite party in Scotland, and indirectly contributed to the failure of the Elibank plot. No single initiative sponsored by the British ministry had, at least in the short term, a comparably divisive effect on the internal cohesion of the Jacobite movement in general, and the Highlands in particular: human greed in the end accomplished more than a repressive military administration could in the space of a generation. The later squabbles over the distribution of the Locharkaig treasure accelerated the disintegration of the ties of loyalty among the Jacobite clan gentry laying claim to portions of the French gold.12 In late 1748, Charles had requested a passport intended for one Major Kennedy from the French foreign ministry.13 His application probably stood


in connection with the ensuing negotiations leading to a partial retrieval of the Locharkaig treasure.14 Charles’ request had probably received the ministerial fiat, for, in early December 1748, Kennedy sent his cipher under the assumed name of Thomas Newton. In his correspondence ‘Newton’ would pretend to act as an agent purchasing steeds for a Mr Williams’ stables, ‘[s]o that if they [the letters] sho.[ul]d be opened, [’]tis of no consequence’.15 Kennedy would forward his letters via the Parisian banker George Waters, a loyal servant of the Stuarts, who provided the safest channel for sensitive correspondence. His mission was threefold: first, to establish a link with Cluny, the official trustee of the treasure; second, to retrieve the money; and, third, to see the funds securely conveyed to France. On 6 February 1749, Kennedy reported a partial success, but anticipated a prolonged sojourn in London as the people he was dealing with were ‘naturally dilitary’.16 In due course, Charles confirmed the receipt of a bill drawn upon Waters of 40,000 livres.17 The movements of another Jacobite emissary in Britain did not go unnoticed. In early May, the sheriff-substitute of Perthshire sent word of a meeting between Cluny and 2nd Lieutenant Samuel Cameron of the Royal Ećossais, and a correspondence from Lochaber being carried on with Samuel’s brother Angus Cameron of Downan. This in itself was serious enough; what gave the intelligence still more weight was the fact that several prominent Jacobite officers were involved. Following the rendezvous, Samuel Cameron hastily fled towards London, but was reported to embark for France from Dundee ten days later.18 The authorities immediately issued a warrant for his arrest, albeit with no success.19 Major Kennedy was almost as lucky, for he was seized in transit at Newcastle, but almost immediately released.20 During the summer, Kennedy’s Northumbrian liaison with Scotland reported an unsatisfactory answer from Cluny, whereupon Charles reassured his agent, ‘I still remain in Obscurity as to C.[luny] but do not dout of y[ou]r acting ye necassary Part.’21 That Cluny was stalling became apparent all too soon, for he complained of the pressure applied by Kennedy, ‘and attributes in Some measure the delay to it’.22 This was at best a lame excuse which Cluny had previously used to explain similar procrastination. Kennedy’s correspondence with Charles in 1750, corroborates the view that the Scots’ Jacobites remaining in the Highlands opposed the removal of the treasure, claiming it as reparation payment for the damage sustained during the last rising.23 The difficulties encountered in the transfer of the Locharkaig funds are likely to have occasioned a delay for Charles’ plans, and gave various individuals sufficient time to lay their hands on the treasure, thus diminishing the stock from which the Jacobites could have better equipped their forces. The good news was that Kennedy had finally managed to obtain a bill of 8,200 livres, while his Northumbrian agent reported in September 1749 that


he had reason to believe that the intractable Cluny would be ‘acting his proper part’, and received the chieftain’s assurance that he would remit the desired money ‘when the season permitts’.24 Another possible explanation as to why Cluny was dragging his feet offers itself upon taking into consideration that, except for the mercilessly harried Duncan Robertson of Struan, he was the only attainted Jacobite leader of profile in the Highlands with an active commission (that of managing the Jacobite war-chest) to have evaded capture.25 Hiding out in his ‘Cage’ at Ben Alder, Cluny waited for the moment he would be allowed to participate in the successor to the ’Fortyfive; it must have occurred to him that the preservation of the Locharkaig treasure within the bounds of the Highlands would be of the utmost importance to the success of such a venture.26 Several other figures of note were concerned in the many attempts to secure the treasure for the Stuart cause. Their intervention provoked further division within the Scottish Jacobite party, and even culminated in mutual recriminations among officers of rank. Obliging several requests for his presence in Scotland by Cluny and his brother John Cameron of Fassifern, Dr Archibald Cameron and some notable Jacobite gentlemen travelled to the Highlands in 1749 to discuss the distribution of the French gold. There can be little doubt that they were also considering the state of their political affairs. According to one government source, they met in the Braes of Rannoch, and as a consequence the Highland Jacobites were ‘flushed with Expectations’.27 At their meeting, Cluny proposed dividing the remainder of the treasure into two portions: 5,000 louis d’or to remain with him, while Fassifern would receive 6,000 in trust for Lochiel’s clan.28 His motive, Dr Cameron explained, was that ‘as he was torn to pieces by the Countrey about that money he would keep none of it, but what he would take for himself for the most of which he had the Prince’s allowance in writeing’. Following the meeting, Dr Cameron compiled a report including an account, in which he exonerated mostly himself.29 The consequential bickering with MacDonell of Glengarry’s eldest son, Alasdair Ruadh, arose over the private arrangement between the three Jacobite gentlemen present, for, as Dr Cameron claimed in his subsequent justification to James, apparently Cluny had suggested: that Archie [Dr Cameron] should give him a letter as if he had taken the 6000 designed for Locheil att his own hand out of the place Archie knew the money lay formerly in, which A[rchie] was so well natured as to do . . . the real fact is that Archie did not know where Clunie removed the money to, after the Prince came abroad as apears by Clunies acct. sent the King, further severals who were present knows that Archie saw none except the 300 Louis Clunie sent for, and that Archie parted with Clunie and came south, Clunie brought Fasfern North to receive the [remaining] 5,700 Louis30


As such a release of funds had not been unequivocally authorized, Cluny sought to legitimize his proposition by mentioning a tenuous promise made by Charles. Supposedly, the French bullion was also budgeted for the support of those who had suffered as a consequence of their participation in the last rising; Lochiel and Cluny also had received securities from Charles on their estates prior to the rising. Hence, the money was not to leave Scotland.31 Initially intended to support Lochiel’s and Cluny’s clans, this independent transaction was intentionally misconstrued by young Glengarry, and probably became the platform on which he based part of his charge of embezzlement against Dr Cameron.32 Glengarry, who had tried to obtain part of the Locharkaig funds by producing forged credentials from James in late 1749, returned to France.33 Writing from Boulogne in June 1750, he accused Dr Cameron of disseminating defeatist rumours among the clans, of effectively having undermined Jacobite morale. Wedded to this glib lie was Glengarry’s claim that Dr Cameron had embezzled 6,000 louis d’or taken against Cluny’s cosmeticized receipt.34 He even asked James’ secretary, James Edgar, to have Dr Cameron arrested at Rome!35 Conversely, Glengarry, who had faced a similar charge against his person in late 1749, and who therefore continued to revile Dr Cameron at the court in Rome, was forced to set up his own defence in an attempt to account for the money he had received from Cluny, his co-trustee Angus Cameron of Downan and MacDougal, the Edinburgh merchant.36 In the end, his indictment against Dr Cameron fell on deaf ears.37 Instead of arbitrating the case, James, in a characteristic move, ultimately delegated the affair to Charles.38 By late 1749, Major Kennedy’s endeavours had borne no fruit, but instead prompted Cluny to complain about the increased risk of discovery through the frequent expresses sent to the North.39 A few weeks later, Kennedy professed utter hopelessness for the success of his mission in the face of Cluny’s protracted prevarications, whereupon Charles sent him instructions for another mission to remove all the money held in Cluny’s hands.40 If Charles had harboured any suspicions against Dr Cameron and Glengarry earlier, Kennedy’s devastating report of March 1750 should have given credence to his worst fears. Kennedy levelled his charges against both Cameron and Glengarry, reporting that they had suddenly parted for Rome, and of late had ‘been very flush of money, so that it seems they took good care of themselves’.41 Charles’ equanimity at the reception of this letter must have taken Kennedy by complete surprise.42 In his next, the exasperated major told his master that Dr Cameron had managed to acquit himself on all charges at Rome, while he heard rumours to the effect that the Scots Jacobites involved would blame him, ‘for attempting to carry out of their Country what they had to support them’.43 The arguments used in Dr Cameron’s defence of the Highland triumvirate’s decision, including himself, his brother Fassifern and Cluny, are suggestive of Kennedy’s rejoinder: with James’ approval the remaining 11,000 louis d’or were to be used for the


support of Lochiel’s and Cluny’s families if Charles did not soon find the means to give them succour.44 To make things worse, Alasdair ‘Ruadh’ of Glengarry was indeed the infamous Hanoverian mole in the Jacobite movement, who was immortalized by the Victorian scholar, Andrew Lang, in Pickle the Spy. Pickle’s identity has hitherto never been satisfactorily established. The evidence cited here for Glengarry’s guilt should put to rest all partisan claims to the contrary. Unlike Lang’s case, the present indictment of Glengarry is not based on circumstantial evidence, but instead rests on documents which simply identify him as the culprit.45 Pickle foiled Charles’ attempts to employ the entire Locharkaig treasure towards a restoration attempt, and engendered a climate of distrust and jealousy among the Jacobites to boot. On the one hand, the disbursements made from the Locharkaig treasure, in the words of a government officer, did ‘infinite Mischief in keeping up the Rebellious Spirits in this Country’; but in the final analysis, the several Jacobite projects to recover the French bullion had caused more harm to the internal cohesion of the movement, emphasized existing lines of division and created more interpersonal feuds than a host of Hanoverian agents provocateurs could have hoped to effect in decades.46 It was Andrew Lang who appropriately commented that ‘[t]he bayonets of Cumberland scarcely dealt a deadlier blow at Jacobitism than the spades which . . . buried the . . . French gold at Loch Arkaig’.47 Meanwhile, events in England were coming to a head.

The Elibank Plot: The First Phase, 1749–1750 In 1749, Charles was still attempting to harness the influence of his wellrespected former mentor and Jacobite veteran, the Earl Marischal, to his service. If Marischal would lend his name to Charles’ cause, the policy of the Prince’s party would have gained weight in the eyes of James’ supporters. Charles was planning to meet his old associate in Venice, when William Drummond of Balhaldy reported to James’ secretary that the English Jacobites had met with the Prince at Lie`ge. They were annoyed at the numerous emissaries representing him in their home country.48 There is little room for surprise at the English Jacobites’ complaint, for among the gentlemen sent across the Water in a quasi-ambassadorial capacity was one of Charles’ closest advisors and a prominent advocate of the Prince’s party, Sir James Harrington – not exactly the representative of official Jacobitism they had expected. In 1747, Sir Watkin Williams Wynn, the Earl of Uxbridge and Sir James had almost incited a local Jacobite rising at the Lichfield races. Not unlike the Irishman George Kelly, and the Comte de Lally-Tollendal, whose ascendancy in the Prince’s council the Jacobites in Britain resented equally and who had been involved in the high-risk project of 1747 including the Sussex smugglers, Sir James had since become suspect to the English Jacobites if he had not already lost all credit with them for his (as they saw it)


irresponsible actions.49 The widening rift between the King’s and the Prince’s party became glaringly obvious when agents of both factions appeared in England towards the end of the year to sound the disposition of their allies. While Marischal showed himself from his most evasive side, Balhaldy sent a ciphered report to Rome in which he expressed himself certain that the English Jacobites would rise under any pretext as long as foreign auxiliaries could be procured.50 The English Jacobites’ bitter invectives against George Kelly and their complaints of his continued influence with the Prince were not lost on Balhaldy, whose inveterate hatred of the Irish parson outmatched any strong feelings his confederates across the water may have harboured.51 According to Andrew Lang, the essence of Colonel Henry Goring’s parallel mission to England was to assure his master’s scrupulous adherents that Charles had distanced himself from his party’s hotheads, Lally-Tollendal, Kelly and Sir James Graeme. In exchange for his good behaviour, the English Jacobites, who had afforded the King’s party a temporary victory over their rivals, sent Charles £15,000. Far from being cowed, Charles continued his machinations: Goring’s report of December 1749 mentioned the involvement of Sir James Harrington’s son in the preparations of the plot. Young Harrington was negotiating with Dr William King of St Mary’s Hall, Oxford, James’ chief agent in England.52 Dr King presented a list of 275 notable supporters who had been at the Lichfield races, while Goring was expecting ‘resolutions’ from ‘B’. This was possibly Charles Noel Somerset, 4th Duke of Beaufort, another member of the English Jacobite leadership and the leader of the ‘Remitters’, who contributed funds for the benefit of the exiled James.53 The British government was not entirely ignorant of Charles’ underhand dealings in 1749, only quite helpless to devise the means to disrupt his designs. The ministry did not know where their quarry was. Their watchdog in Florence, Baron Philipp von Stosch, was certain that neither the Pope nor James knew where Charles was, that he had in fact embarked for Sweden, while the British resident in Florence and the envoy in Leipzig, Horace Mann and Sir Charles Hanbury-Williams, were certain that the elusive Prince had journeyed to Poland in quest of Prince Radziwil’s daughter.54 The problem with these contradictory messages was that they all seemed plausible. During the ’Forty-five, Sweden had almost furnished a secret fighting force for the Jacobites in Scotland, and Hanbury-Williams expressed concern that Charles’ connection with the former royal house of Sobieski would constitute a ready tool in the hands of the factious Poles, who wanted to rid themselves of ex-King Stanislas’ successor and George II’s ready ally, August III of Saxony and II of Poland.55 The next blow to the British intelligence community followed in stride: Hanbury-Williams’ dispatch of 18 May 1749, informed the Duke of Newcastle that the bogus story of Charles’ journey to Poland had been circulated by his adherents and the Prussians. Recent reports corroborated the assumption that the fugitive had been hovering


on the French border, and had in fact visited Paris incognito. This story received further confirmation through British intelligence channels, but ¨ hl, informed Hanburyon 9 June, the Saxon minister, Count Heinrich Bru Williams that Charles was in Venice – information seconded by von Stosch – where his movements were being monitored by the Saxon resident. On 13 August, Austrian sources suggested that the subject of this massive search was staying with relatives in Lorraine, though retaining the strictest incognito. At one point, the exasperated Hanbury-Williams proposed to ‘seize upon his Person, in any Part of Poland, and carry him to any Port in the North’.56 Charles had made the best of his freedom to move, and thrown the British and all their Continental connections into confusion. As Horace Mann candidly wrote to his confidant at Strawberry Hill, ‘[w]e are totally ignorant of the motions of the Pretender’s son. So many reports are spread that one is totally at a loss what to believe.’57 The year 1749 saw another plan for the restoration of the Stuarts germinating; this schemes’ sponsor, however, was attached to the King’s party. As in the case of the later Elibank plot, we know only about Sir Hector MacLean’s plans because of Pickle’s, alias Alasdair ‘Ruadh’ MacDonell of Glengarry’s, participation in, and betrayal of, this scheme. Glengarry has left us a blueprint of Sir Hector’s plan, identifying himself as co-author, Louis XV as sponsor, the Duc de Richelieu, the Comte de Tretsan, the Comte de Fitzjames, General James Keith, and the enthusiastic schemer Eleanor Oglethorpe, Marquise de Me´zieres, Cluny, Fassifern, his kinsman Alexander Cameron of Glenevis, Lochgarry and Menzies of Culdares as the principals of the conspiracy.58 As Glengarry put it: [t]hey told Several of the Clans that were in France in 1749, that they intended to raise some new disturbances, but they kept their negotiations with Monsr. de Richelieu a profound Secret from them . . . He . . . desired that Sr. Hector & A:[lasdair] M:[acDonell] wou’d make out a Scheme & lay before him, which they accordingly did & which he approv’d greatly of, & gave them positive assurances of the French King’s Assistance.59 The plan was to make use of the then tense atmosphere prevalent among the Northern powers, deploy the 4,000 Swedes and 5,000 French regulars promised to the Jacobites on the West and East coasts of Scotland respectively, and to raise no less than 9,000–10,000 Highlanders for the campaign.60 The castles of Edinburgh and Stirling were to be taken in the same night. About Ireland, Glengarry related that ‘Lord Clancarty undertook to go . . . with what Men he could pick out of the Irish Brigades & land them upon his own Estate’.61 Despite Sir Hector’s sobering warning to James Edgar in January 1750, concerning the questionable veracity of the information sent about the state of the North, many Jacobites seemed optimistic in regard to Scotland: even Lord George Murray expressed his conviction to James that


the Highlanders would rise again, though he could not properly assess their present strength.62 ‘By all accounts, privat, and publick’, Glengarry’s cousin, Lochgarry, answered Sir Hector’s scepticism, ‘the Country was never so generally Disposed (Since ye revolution) as at present to restore their Lawfull King and throw off their Slaverie’.63 Glengarry, who encouraged the scheme, also states that the principal reason for his journey to the Highlands in that year was to obtain the approval of the chiefs, with whom he met in Badenoch.64 Apparently, even three unidentified gentlemen of clan Campbell attended this meeting, and promised to raise an additional 500 men from the Breadalbane and Argyll estates to augment the traditional Jacobite clans. If Glengarry’s report is to be trusted, Sir Hector’s plan foundered not because it was unrealistic, but because of James’ fear of intervening in Charles’ operations. In this one instance, the reason for the abortion of this scheme highlights the adverse effect of the schism of 1747 on the Jacobite movement’s power to act in concert. In one respect the British ministry, by focusing on a goose-chase for the elusive Charles in the wake of his expulsion, gained a decisive advantage over their enemy. Because of Charles’ incognito, which was at least the partial result of Hanoverian persecution, the Prince’s party failed to coordinate its undertakings with those of James’ adherents, for Sir Hector’s project, and the consequential connections made with France and Sweden, could have supplemented rather than impeded the Elibank plot. As they both turned out to be structurally similar, the former scheme may at least have served as a prototype for the latter.

The Elibank Plot: The Second Phase, 1750–1751 What fuelled the progress of the Elibank plot in a wider context were the inner European political developments of the next two years which gave rise to hopes on the Jacobite side. On the diplomatic front, the British were doing no better in 1749 in their endeavours to track down Charles, for their relations with France and Prussia were rudely disturbed by the appointment of the Jacobite Richard Talbot, 3rd Earl of Tyrconnel as French ambassador to Berlin.65 To add insult to injury, the Prussians in turn sent Marischal, who was still under attainder, to Paris in 1751.66 To say that these appointments caused the British much dismay, and conversely encouraged the Jacobites, would be understating the case. Charles was also aware that the ailing George II’s hold on the throne was weakening, and the succession would be endangered by the pretensions of the Duke of Cumberland; he could hope that domestic strife would prove disruptive to British political stability.67 In July 1751, Glengarry reported that Jacobites in London were now openly discussing their political proclivity as they expected an attempt to be made in case of a minority, ‘or at any Event befor the Electors grand son becomes of Age, as the popularity he Affects and his being born a Briton may prove of the worst consequence if not timely prevented’.68


Far more threatening a prospect to the Hanoverian succession than the potential for internal dissension in Britain was the possibility that the Jacobites would receive support from a foreign power. Despite the general peace prevailing in Europe by the middle of the eighteenth century, rivalries between potentates still persisted. In order to understand the Prussian connection with Jacobitism, we must briefly turn to the relationship between Frederick II and his uncle George II. Their mutual antipathy was grounded in two separate disputes concerning the Silesian Loan and the Friesland Succession. The first case actually dates back to the reign of Emperor Charles VI, who took out a loan of £250,000 from British merchants, which he secured against various Silesian mines. Following the cession of Silesia by the Austrians to Frederick after the first Silesian War (1740–41), the Prussian monarch had agreed to continue the repayment of the loan, which he guaranteed by the treaties of Breslau and Berlin (1742). In the course of the War of Austrian Succession, however, the Royal Navy, contrary to verbal guarantees given by Lord Carteret when secretary of state, seized Prussian vessels carrying contraband to France, which in turn gave Frederick the pretext to terminate further payments. From 1751 to the advent of the Convention of Westminster in 1756, in which the dispute was finally laid to rest, Prusso-British relations reached a nadir.69 Accordingly, neither power exchanged accredited representatives.70 The second divisive contention, which exacerbated the first, revolved around the succession of the ducal fief of East Friesland. In 1694, Emperor Leopold I had granted the duchy to the Hohenzollern Elector, while the ¨ neburg had claimed East Friesland by virtue of a ducal house of Brunswick-Lu personal union through Duke Christian Eberhard. When the last Duke of Friesland died in 1744, Frederick pre-emptively moved his troops into Friesland, thus effectively checking Hanoverian pretensions. Pending a solution during the War of Austrian Succession, the dispute was vigorously renewed six years later. George II, as Elector of Hanover, found himself on a frontal collision course with the King of Prussia.71 Moreover, in the context of the ensuing election of a new King of the Romans, Frederick II feared the Duke of Newcastle’s attempts at swaying the College of Electors’ vote in favour of the Habsburg candidate Joseph II, and the almost certain strengthening of Anglo-Austrian relations which would follow and could not possibly bode well for the Prussian acquisition of Silesia. In the light of the existing situation, Prusso-British tensions are not to be underestimated, and the potential for a convergence of interests between the violently antiHanoverian Frederick and the resilient Stuart prince, who was an object of his admiration, should be acknowledged even by the most exacting sceptic.72 For sceptics, the word of that acerbic critic of the House of Stuart, Horace Walpole, may carry more weight, for his considered opinion was ‘[t]hat Prussia, who opened its inhospitable arms to every British rebel, should have tampered in such a business [Jacobite conspiracy], was by no


means improbable’.73 Whether, and to what degree, Frederick was involved in the Elibank plot, we shall discover as the Jacobite plot unfolds, but it would certainly be premature to foreclose a serious Prussian implication at this stage as previous inquiries have not exhausted or fully contextualized the pertinent source material.74 In January 1750, the Duke of Bedford was apprised of Charles’ rumoured presence at the Prussian court, and also of a sighting of his close companion Goring at the Wesel about the beginning of December 1749. The source of this piece of intelligence, Cumberland’s crony the Earl of Albemarle, put much stock in the value of the information.75 This report was followed up by Albemarle’s countermand, wherein he stated – despite the Marquis de Puysieux’s fervent dementi – that Charles had been in Paris, while HanburyWilliams, doubted that he had been anywhere near Berlin.76 With the British busy tracking his movements, Charles was advancing his schemes, requesting intelligence via Goring from General Lally in January 1750, and prompting his agent at Antwerp, James Dormer, to fulfil his commission.77 Dormer’s ‘commission’ was nothing less than a massive arms-purchase intended for the Jacobites in Britain. In May 1750, Charles had resolved to cross the Channel. While he was preparing for the momentous journey, Charles secretly deposited 186,000 livres with his banker, George Waters, at Paris.78 Around the middle of February and again in early June, he sent secret instructions to Antwerp where Dormer was to purchase 20,000 guns, bayonets, with a commensurate quantity of ammunition, and 4,000 swords and pistols for use on horseback, all of which were to be put on board one ship. An additional 6,000 guns, this time without bayonets, but with ammunition, and the same amount of broadswords were to be obtained and transported aboard a second vessel.79 The type of edged weaponry sent in the latter consignment indicates that it was destined for Scotland. As to the Prince, his close friend, Lieutenant-General Bulkeley, believed that he had gone to Britain in early 1750.80 In April 1750, Lieutenant-Colonel MacDonell of Lochgarry and his cousin Pickle returned from a mission to the Highlands. They were to represent the Jacobite chiefs’ views on the current state of affairs to James and probably also to Charles.81 Because of the stranglehold put on them by the remedial legislation enacted in the wake of the last rising, the clans’ desperation for immediate action was growing. The chiefs themselves expressed their concern that they had been falsely represented, and that the extent of foreign aid they required had been exaggerated. Lochgarry concurred with his peers. He urged James to act, as the clans would otherwise grow impatient and attempt the rising on their own. The casualties of 1745–46, he argued, were more than compensated for by the steady influx of soldiers belonging to disbanded British Highland units who were thoroughly disgusted with their Hanoverian masters. Even the Whig clansmen would rise, irrespective of their chiefs’ attachment to the Revolution Settlement.82 Effectively, the


clans were highly motivated to embark on what could prosaically be referred to as the ‘Redgauntlet Complex’.83 After the ’Fifteen and the ’Forty-five, the set of circumstances which inspired Sir Walter Scott to write about a fictitious rebellion set in 1765 could, more than a decade earlier, have resulted in the third significant Jacobite insurrection that, we now know, never happened. To state simply that it did not occur is tantamount to falling prey to the fallacy inherent in the retrospectivist Whig interpretation; the puzzling and indeed far more interesting question is why – in spite of the motivation of the clans and a promising constellation, and the sheer probability asking for it to happen – a Jacobite rising in the early 1750s did not materialize. We shall return to this question at the end, where it is best answered. Again, the British ministry was informed. The Duke of Newcastle ordered the Lord Justice Clerk of Scotland to investigate reports of ‘great Numbers of Rebels, and attainted Persons’ being returned to Scotland, of fresh supplies of money they had allegedly received, and ‘whether any Thing be now Stirring amongst the Jacobites . . . whether There be any Reason to suspect, That there is any Design . . . of giving any Disturbance’.84 A government spy from Lochaber suggested that the local Jacobites were expecting an invasion during the season, but that they had experienced difficulties with their communications to the Continent, while a source from the Northeast reported that the northern Jacobites interpreted the late reinforcements and restocking of arms in the Highlands as a sign of the government’s fear. The Lochaber spy also indicated that a European power was involved in the attempt.85 This last snippet of information was taken seriously, for Hanbury-Williams was dispatched to Berlin as envoy extraordinary with the specific task of finding out whether Charles had been in the Prussian capital, whether he had had conferences with Frederick and, if true, what had passed between them. More specifically, George II wanted to know if his nephew had given the Stuart prince any encouragement or advice, and of what substance any kind of forthcoming aid would be. But Hanbury-Williams’ search was once again fruitless.86 To end all the surmising, Albemarle – who had reason to believe that Charles had been on the point of death – suggested that an obituary of the elusive Stuart be published in various European newspapers, thereby forcing the Jacobites to betray his abode by furnishing proof to the contrary.87 Far from being mortally ill, Charles had probably given orders to Dormer for a vessel to be readied at Antwerp.88 His request of 2 July for a renewal of his original commission of regency issued on 23 December 1743 barely escaped Hanoverian interception. The commission was granted, or rather ceded, on 5 August, although with bad grace on James’ part.89 For good measure, the Stuart prince prepared a political programme which was to be implemented in case the Jacobite counter-Revolution should succeed.


Charles’ ideas are notable, if only because he intended to outwhig the Whigs in their cherished Revolution principles. Among other radical reforms, he would call for annual or triennial Parliaments, and abolish the corrupt Septennial Act, limit the number of civil and military MPs acting as placemen in order to avoid the formation of factional interest and establish a militia while slowly phasing out the standing army; he also engaged to prevent any encroachment upon civil and religious liberties, or the freedom of the press.90 Before Charles embarked for Britain in September, two events presaged his coming. In April 1749, Dr William King had delivered his carefully cloaked, but nevertheless virulently anti-Hanoverian, oration with the ambivalent motto ‘Redeat ille Magnus Genius Britanniae’ at the opening of the Radcliffe Library and, in June 1750, six thousand colliers from Northumberland heard the Stuart prince proclaimed as Charles III, ‘which’, he himself added with a gloating overtone, ‘gives our Regents perplexety’.91 Charles arrived in London with Lieutenant John Holker of Ogilvy’s regiment on 16 September 1750, and paid Lady Primrose an unexpected visit at her house in Essex Street, whereupon Dr King was immediately summoned.92 ‘The impatience of his friends who were in exile’, the vice-principal of St Mary’s Hall later wrote, ‘had formed a scheme which was impracticable; but although it had been feasible as they had represented it to him, yet no preparation had been made, nor was any thing ready to carry it into execution’.93 This was not entirely true, as James Dormer’s activities at Antwerp contradict Dr King’s comment; maybe Charles, for his own unfathomable reasons, chose not to impart the details or the extent of his preparations. Nevertheless, a gathering of the Jacobite leadership was convened at Pall Mall, among whom Sir Charles Petrie claims were Noel Somerset, 4th Duke of Beaufort, and John Fane, 7th Earl of Westmoreland.94 Charles’ explained that there was no need for an external sponsor to execute his scheme; but if the English Jacobites could furnish him with 4,000 men, he would succeed. The English Jacobites, whose leaders it is reasonably safe to assume were mostly of the King’s party, made short work of his efforts: with the consummate skill of the habitually prevaricating, they rationalized their hesitancy. They argued that no longer could they raise men, and dispose of cash at short notice, for their every step and move was certain to be observed by the ministry. Further, their summary arrest could easily be effected by a general warrant. McLynn believes that instead they tried to sway Charles to concentrate on a diversionary attack in the Celtic fringe.95 It is almost certain that he would not have agreed, for he had only recently told his father’s secretary that ‘any attempt in S[cotland] would be us’less unless one Effective in En:[glan]d’.96 It is telling that Charles exhorted his followers not to harm ¨ neburgs should a restoration be effected.97 A hint of why the Brunswick-Lu this was so important to him, can be gleaned from the memoirs of Philip


Thicknesse, whose authority, a one-armed Irish officer by the name of Segrave, related to him: that he had been with the Prince in England, between the years, forty-five and fifty six, and that they had laid a plan of seizeing the person of the King (George the second) as he returned from the play, by a body of Irish chairmen, who were to knock the servants from behind his coach, extinguish the lights, and create confusion; while a party carried the King to the water side and hurried him away to France. It is certain, that the late King often returned from the theatres in so private a manner, that such an attempt was not impracticable, for what could not a hundred or two, desperate villains effect, at a eleven o’clock at night, in any of the public Streets of London? Ten minutes start would do it, and they could not have failed of a much greater length of time.98 This may very well have been where Alexander Murray of Elibank’s later plan to rush St James’ palace derived from. The genesis of the conspiracy posterity would call the Elibank plot may well have been Charles’ visit to London, but the preparations predating it suggest that the conspiracy received its impetus in 1749, but needed much refining. This was attempted over the next three to four years. That Charles seriously countenanced an English rising is certain, for there is no other compelling reason for his examination of the Tower, and his abjuration of the Catholic faith.99 The latter step may have been influenced by Bulkeley’s claim that Prince William of Orange had offered to restore James if he turned Protestant. With all he undertook at London in 1750, Charles ran high risks of being recognized and hence exposed himself to arrest.100 His denominational manoeuverings may have lent him an air of acceptability in the eyes of his Protestant adherents – they removed the religious stigma attached to the House of Stuart – but his conversion could also be interpreted as a cynical breach of faith by his recusant supporters in Britain and his Catholic European allies.101 Though it fell far from his expectations, Charles’ visit to London had given him a realistic perception of the English Jacobites’ strength.102 The meeting also offered some interesting avenues he intended to pursue – more detailed planning for a coup in London being one of the tasks that would confront him and his co-conspirators. With Holker in tow, he left on 22 September and safely passed via Dover to Paris, where he arrived two days later.103 Despite McLynn’s assertion that Charles remained undetected while in England, this time the ministry was closely on his heels. By early October, the Duke of Newcastle was tipped off by Hanbury-Williams, who, in turn, had access to an Irish Catholic informant with reliable connections to the French embassy at Berlin: Charles was in ‘the Heart of the Kingdom’. Newcastle thought this piece of intelligence ‘wild’. But repeated and urgent


assertions from Hanbury-Williams and the circumstance that his source was probably a Jacobite, well-off, who declined any remuneration, but instead was prepared to defect in exchange for a pardon, must have convinced him.104 The consequences of the Stuart prince’s capture do not bear contemplation; what saved Charles was Hanbury-Williams’ late discovery of the informant. Instead, the itinerant leader of the Jacobite conspirators was safely tucked away at Andrew Lumisden’s, six leagues from Paris, if we are to believe Albemarle, or with Lord Nairne at Villeneuve-St-Georges, or with Colonel Charles Stewart of Ardshiel at Sens, or with his fiery mistress, the Princesse de Talmond, or at the Scots Seminary at Paris. Goring was his only companion, and Charles himself was disguised as an Abbe´ with an eye-patch.105 It seems as if Charles’ incognito had once again confounded the British and left him with plenty of room for action. He tried his hand at conjuring up what he felt were the necessary auxiliaries for an attempt in England, and at organizing a marriage alliance at the same time. His intended victim was the Duke of Daremberg, a minor German princeling, who held an alleged grudge against George II: Charles wanted the Duke to land 12,000 regulars in England as a dowry for the marriage to his daughter. He further proposed a meeting at Basle in Switzerland and asked Goring to attend to the security aspects. His equerry dispatched the message but, once on the road, Goring expressed his fear of being shadowed. On 9 November, Goring wrote from Worms, where he felt his master’s plan could best be brought to fruition, that should he move on to Mainz he would risk discovery. He decided to stay put, adding ‘vous savez queu [dans] notre commerce le secret en fais le profit’.106 McLynn maintains nothing came of the affair, despite a meeting between representatives of both sides.107 Of the many strands that combined to become the Elibank plot, Dormer’s operations at Antwerp seem to merit some attention. In a document that obviously referred to the progress of the arms-purchasing entrusted to Dormer, he stated that he was unable to convey the merchandise to Goring, who apparently acted as an intermediary in the affair. He nevertheless reported that he had inspected three different types of weaponry, guns or swords, and found fault with Charles’ choice, to which he referred as the ordinary type. They were only suited for adolescents, and he expected complications with the deal, unless he was authorized to buy 2,000–3,000 of the better sort which could be had in 2–3 months.108 In mid-January, Charles asked Goring to let Dormer know that he should await his precise orders, as he had not yet decided on the quantity.109 Three days after Dormer sent his progress report, Duncan McVicar, the government operative in Lochaber, warned the Lord Justice Clerk that Glengarry had recently ‘transmitted Wheat’ to his clan, ‘Wheat’ being the code for money or arms.110 McVicar’s intelligence of 17 December was overcast by fear for his life; the information was so sensitive that he even entreated his


Edinburgh correspondent to keep their exchanges a strict secret. Several attainted persons, veterans of the ’Forty-five, had returned to Scotland: Captain Alan Stewart of Invernahyle, an officer of Ardshiel’s regiment wounded at Culloden, had been in the Highlands in November and had ridiculed his friends for complying with the Disclothing Act, for he claimed they would soon need their plaids and arms. Invernahyle also alerted them to the possibility of a sudden need to mobilize. In addition, McVicar was aware of the presence of Captain John MacDonald of Guidale, stepbrother to the acting lieutenant-colonel of Clanranald’s regiment, one unidentified brother of Clanranald, Hugh MacDonald, Catholic Bishop of Morar and another gentleman of the clan. Furthermore, the Appin Stewarts were engaging in a busy correspondence with their friends in Lochaber and Moidart, traditional Jacobite territories. Then MacVicar finally let the cat out of the bag: in case of an attempt, Charles was to receive support from Prussia and Spain.111 While there is no known proof for Spanish collusion in the Elibank plot there certainly is evidence of a contradictory type for Prussian tampering, especially in the later phase of the conspiracy. Albemarle was convinced that Charles was closeted with General James Keith, Marischal’s brother, at Berlin, and that he had not only been received by Frederick II, but that he had asked for the hand of the King’s sister. The marriage proposal was rejected by the Prussian king, because he was still entertaining hopes for a breakthrough in the negotiations concerning his disputes with George II. Charles was next sighted at Borscheit, near Aix-la-Chapelle, and subsequently disappeared again. The distraught Albemarle admitted that he could not locate Charles and his companions in that neighbourhood. They were not there, ‘unless they are hid in some private House’.112 Naturally, Frederick would not have imperiled his fragile relations with his uncle by receiving Charles officially. His testimony in relation to Charles’ alleged earlier visits to Berlin is doubly suspect. In June 1749, he had written to his Ministre d’E´tat, the Count of Podewils in Berlin: ‘Je suis bien aise de savoir . . . que les bruits qui s’e´taient repandus de l’arriveé a` Berlin du fils ane´ du Pre´tendant, se trouvent absolument faux et sans fondement’.113 Yet in 1751, Glengarry deposed that ‘the Young Pretender was at Venice about three years ago, & that from thence he went to Prussia’.114 Glengarry, who sabotaged the Elibank plot, is no less suspect than Frederick; but his testimony is credible, as it is highly probable that he sought to gain credit with his new employer, the Pelham ministry, by furnishing reliable information.115 Goring also had embarked on a mission to Prussia in the spring of 1749, only to be denied access to Marischal, whose personal proximity and newfound loyalty to Frederick did little to allow for his involvement in Jacobite plotting – at least, initially.116 The reason why Frederick II, rather than Louis XV, was targeted as a sponsor by Charles, can best be explained by juxtaposing the affront he


suffered at his expulsion from France, with his recent accession to the Protestant interest. As Prussia was not a traditional ally of the Stuarts, Charles’ choice on the one hand probably compounded his rift with his father’s court, but it also gave him more independence to act without the patronage of the Catholic powers, of whose ambivalent stance he had become suspicious.117 Charles and his party had seized upon the newfound Protestant identity with a vengeance. This was clearly shown by the tendencies of Charles’ liberal political programme, his followers’ advice to distance himself from the political impediment vested in the stigma attached to his family’s unabashed Catholicism by the British polity and his efforts to forge links with the Protestant states of Prussia and Sweden.118 The contrast between James’ traditional policy and the pragmatically inclined new departure of the Prince’s party could not have been more obvious than in the sphere of marriage alliances. While the father openly attacked his son’s incognito with the argument that his peripatetic, secretive lifestyle would foreclose the possibility of a much desired marriage – meaning, with a suitable Catholic bride – Bulkeley and like-minded spirits concurred generally, but urged the Prince to chose a Protestant princess and hence initiate a Protestant Stuart succession. The Irish general also advocated a system of Protestant alliances. He argued that the Keith brothers should be employed to persuade the Swedes that the only way to regain Bremen and Verden, which had fallen prey to the ambition of the Hanoverian Electorate, was to aid the Jacobites. The Prussians would look favourably on such an undertaking, as it was in the interest of Frederick’s sister, the Queen of Sweden. Charles was to promise Frederick that he would effect a turnabout in British foreign policy, dissolving the ‘Old System’ on the Continent. Prussia would consequently replace the Empire as Britain’s principal Continental ally. The ingenious twist, which Bulkeley added to his plan, was to nip official Jacobite objections in the bud by delegating the leadership to Marischal and his brother, who epitomized the virtues of their movement in their heyday, and accordingly wielded a commensurate amount of influence.119 In June 1751, Goring was again charged with a mission to Berlin, where he was to deliver a letter to Marischal, ‘and favour his Advice in furthering the execution of the full powers I have given you’.120 The plenipotentiary powers conferred upon Goring allowed him to treat with any state except for France. After Berlin, Stockholm was to be his next destination.121 His instructions were to be shown only to Marischal and his English liaison, one Mr MacNamara. Charles wanted money or men to be raised and a banker to be found, from whom MacNamara was to collect the money. He also stated that it was the opinion of some of his partisans that as many officers as possible were to be engaged for the execution of the scheme. If the plan, as it presently stood, somehow failed, Charles wanted ‘a Surprise to be attempted’.122 That Charles’ ideas were not exclusively well received is evident from his own reflections. Apparently certain elements within his own ranks were


unwilling to abandon the French connection, whereas the Prince was adamant in his refusal to countenance them as potential sponsors of the plot unless they made amends for his expulsion. Though he was quite willing to risk his person for the cause, and employ a plethora of Machiavellian moves to achieve his own goals, Charles could not gloss over so grievous an insult. ‘I woud make use of ye Greatest Enemy’, he asserted, ‘and recompence him, iff he served me effectually’.123 In regard to Frederick, Charles also stuck to his principles: he respected the unscrupulous monarch, not as a King but ‘as a Clever man’, – who was implicitly not to be underestimated. If Frederick wanted to support the Jacobite cause, Charles insisted on proof in the shape of a marriage alliance, and official acknowledgment of his status at Berlin: ‘I shall be firm to my point – ou Tout ou Rien.’ He was, in fact suspicious, and even expected to be used by Frederick. Though Charles did not end up as a Hohenzollern in-law, Frederick engaged to procure 6,000 Swedes for an invasion of Britain.124 Despite Bulkeley’s recommendation to harness Marischal’s influence, Charles commented that if he did not agree with the aging Earl on the details of the plan, nobody could coerce him to participate. The Prince’s inflexible principles would cost him dearly, for he was set on a course which would lead him and his party to an impasse. Marischal’s championing the cause of the English Jacobites – the bone of contention was Charles’ evil genius, Kelly – exacerbated this situation. Lady Primrose was quick to warn the Prince of a certain set of people who, she seemed to feel, constituted an obstacle to the progress of the plot, suggesting that such persons were not acceptable to her faction, and further indicated that the English Jacobites were divided over the question whether they should strike in the winter, or await the next year.125 From a Jacobite perspective, the political development in Britain also gave rise to hope. While the tensions in the Hanoverian family were well known, the Earl of Granville’s renewed rise to prominence early in the year and the subsequent death of Frederick the Prince of Wales, which shook Leicester House, seemed to portend internal turmoil.126 This set of circumstances was compounded by George II’s declining health, and his intention to install the universally detested Cumberland as regent.127 The view of a deteriorating Pelhamite government, however, was a luxury only a few Jacobites indulged in. During the summer, Charles had the unpleasant experience of discovering just how far the arm of the government could extend.128 In France, Marischal’s accreditation to, and arrival at, Versailles sorely tried Anglo-French relations: Colonel Yorke’s protest directed against what his government interpreted as a blatant insult and the visible evidence for a Franco-Prussian conspiracy, was easily emasculated by a generous dosage of French ministerial savvy. Despite Marischal’s assurance that he had received positive orders not to meddle with his partisans in Paris, the British were deeply concerned over the attention showered on the Jacobites by Frederick’s appointment of a living


Jacobite legend. Marischal even possessed the effrontery to pay the British representative, Colonel Yorke, a visit in his capacity as Prussian minister.129 An irritant to George II, this step was, at least at that stage, in reality no more than a promise devoid of any commitment to Charles; but it kept Jacobite hopes in the state Frederick intended them to be; that is, unfulfilled but expectant. In the wake of Culloden, Charles had required Marischal’s approbation and influence for an operation in England, and now that the Earl was employed in Prussian service, such sanction was Frederick’s to give, or deny. For obvious reasons, the King of Prussia would neither openly display his support for the Stuarts, nor would he allow Charles to take overall charge of any affair in which his capital, financial and political, was tied up. Compelled to play along, Charles ordered Goring to establish contact with Marischal in Paris. What followed was a classic cat-and-mouse chase for an interview with the slippery Earl.130 Finally, on 18 October 1751, the two parties managed to agree on a suitable location. The safe-house they selected for their rendezvous was that of George Waters, the Stuart banker in Paris.131 Very little is known of what had been discussed at this meeting, but it must have been of considerable interest, for the British government seemed to be aware of Charles’ dealings with the Prussian ambassador.132 Charles’ own interpretation and warning to the English Jacobites of Marischal’s role is probably more accurate: on the one hand, he was in France to bully the British, on the other, he was a Prussian spy ensuring that the Jacobites would be dependent on his master’s aid. Marischal was also discouraging Goring. Because of Prussian foreign political imperatives ‘[e]very thing Relating to Sweden’, was ‘suspended for some time’.133 If we can rely on Charles’ assessment, Marischal’s mission was diametrically opposed to his own plans.134 In September, he decided to continue without foreign aid, and accordingly authorized Dr King, Lady Primrose and Alexander Murray of Elibank, the rising star in the Prince’s party, to proceed at their own discretion. But MacNamara had earlier told him that the coup was not realistic without at least enlisting the aid of their own people in foreign service. Charles complicated everything by making the participation of officers conditional upon their renouncing the colours of their own regiments. This was intended to restrict the inclusion of the numerous Franco-Jacobite officers, whose loyalty was questionable in his eyes. As in Thicknesse’s story of the Irish chairmen, Charles wanted a number of ordinary people engaged, but not trusted, in the scheme. The English Jacobites promised that 500 men could be raised for his service ‘in & about Westminster’. By 1753, Charles attempted to recruit deserters, probably of the Scots Dutch service, in France in order to form a regiment numbering 6,000.135 As things came to pass, Charles did not cross the Channel, but rather received support from Britain. The man whose influence on Charles was at times to rival that of George Kelly, and who had lent his family’s name to the amalgam of schemes coming to life between 1751 and 1753, reached the


Continent in 1751. Alexander Murray, younger brother to Patrick, 5th Viscount Elibank, had been incarcerated for his part in the tumultuous Westminster election of May 1750. The Jacobites had been alienated by Lord Gower’s defection to the Whigs, and when his son, Lord Trentham, ran for a parliamentary seat, they endeavoured to defeat him by all means at their disposal. Trentham was opposed by the Tory candidate, Sir George Vandeput. Alexander Murray acted as a leader of the Independent Electors of Westminster and drew up their petition against Lord Trentham’s return. Following the contest, Alexander Murray, whose unruly behaviour had drawn the ministry’s attention, refused to kneel at the bar of the Commons to hear his admonition. He was consequently held in Newgate gaol. Following his release, friends urged him to escape to France as his case remained controversial.136 The British government’s high-handed manner in this affair finally drove Murray into the arms of the Jacobites. Murray’s new career however, did, not start off with an unblemished record. A Catholic priest’s accusations against Murray stated that he had insinuated himself into the Prince’s confidence by lending the impecunious Charles a few hundred pounds.137 While the hapless Albemarle conveyed news of further sightings of Charles in Paris, Spain, Italy, Poland and Prussia, the Jacobite initiative had certainly been given a new impetus since Murray of Elibank’s accession to the cause.138 Though the request for a meeting with the Jacobite shipbuildercum-slave-trader, Antoine Vincent Walsh, on the borders of Germany had been sent as early as 20 March, the next clue in their correspondence followed several months later, when Charles received an offer through the antiquarian Thomas Carte.139 Walsh’s role in the conspiracy was varied. After negotiations between the Prince and the Prussian ambassador had ground to a halt, he served as conduit with Marischal, mainly dealing with the evanescent case of Kelly, and as an agent among the Franco-Irish privateers; he also seemed to have acted in the capacity of a remittance-collector in England in the early 1750s, and, last but not least, he served his cause as an arms-dealer. Charles wanted to know what Walsh’s brother, the Comte de Serrant, could effect in Spain or Portugal, obviously in connection with his question ‘about W[alsh’]s having a pretext by sum [some] employment to be able of furnishing arms’, or what the other great privateer of FrancoIrish extraction, Sir Walter Rutledge, could undertake for his service.140 In December, Murray of Elibank was attempting to cross the Channel, indubitably with the intention of managing the factious English Jacobites to the Prince’s satisfaction; meanwhile Pickle had received notification in September that Goring had actually been in London.141 There is reason to assume that his planned journey to England meant that Murray of Elibank had also taken on a leading part in the preparation of the conspiracy. But the English Jacobites were not the only troublesome element in Charles’ plans. The danger inherent in the fledgling state of preparations


in Scotland was first exacerbated by the continued wrangling over the scraps of the Locharkaig treasure between the MacPhersons and Camerons on the one side, and the MacDonalds on the other; and secondly, by a serious leak in Jacobite security of which Pickle was aware. Alexander Cameron of Glenevis and his brother Samuel were known to be in communication with Charles’ former private secretary, Murray of Broughton, who had turned king’s evidence during Lord Lovat’s trial in 1747.142 A few months later Pickle’s intelligence was confirmed by Jacobite sources. The former Lieutenant John Holker, meanwhile promoted captain in Ogilvy’s, suspected that Samuel Cameron’s and Broughton’s exchange of letters stood in connection with ‘Searches & Examinations that have happend of late.’143 Unfortunately, there is little by way of hard evidence to ascertain his duplicity, but it may be said that Samuel Cameron’s case is highly ambivalent. Glengarry was also suspected, but, as his continued activities show, he remained untouchable.144 Thus, in the best of cases, the Elibank plot, especially in Scotland, proceeded under an incalculable risk of betrayal from among the Jacobites’ own ranks – but proceed it did. In the last days of November 1751, Milton’s successor in the Court of Sessions, Charles Erskine, Lord Tinwald wrote to Henry Pelham that he ‘was in Some apprehensions from a number of french officers being in the Highlands that Some Mad Scheme had been going forward’.145 According to Tinwald, not only had regular officers arrived, but also Jacobites under attainder. It is not clear whether the government sent David Bruce into the Highlands as their ‘Watchman’ in response to the swelling influx of exiled Jacobites, or whether he was only assigned to act as government liaison with Pickle.146 Known to us is that Bruce’s mission included some travelling from Dunblane via Crieff to Tay Bridge between 16 and 23 December, and that his cover did not pass Jacobite scrutiny. He was hoping to meet with Pickle, and was perturbed when the spy did not make the rendezvous on time. The intelligence he gathered was, however, significant. Bruce by and large confirmed Tinwald’s apprehension, as his own progress report and other information gathered by his network show. Plans to capture Cluny failed, despite Bruce’s optimism, but John Donn, postmaster at Crieff, reported how two Cameron agents from France had journeyed to Rannoch, while the latest news from Drummond Castle indicated that two gentlemen, who gave all outward signs of being French officers, were awaiting messages there. Pickle then sent Bruce the request he had received from Lochgarry to return to France in order to settle accounts – probably a reference to the Locharkaig treasure. Furthermore, the postmaster stated that a meeting between exiles and local Jacobites had taken place in his home town. Donn, who feared reprisals because he also implicated Lord Glenorchy’s prote´ge´ and government factor, John Campbell of Barcaldine, related how several gentlemen from France brought their partisans promises of a new insurrection. Indeed, they claimed to be its ‘Fore-Riders’.147 If Henry Pelham and his colleagues


were doubting Pickle’s and other informers’ accounts about Jacobite agents, widespread recruiting for the Jacobite regiments in French service and correspondence in the Highlands, they received irrefutable confirmation through their own sources.148 Further disturbing news of Jacobite activity reached the ministry through their embassy at Paris, and von Stosch in Florence. The rumour of Charles’ impending arrival at St-Germain, where several Jacobites were conducting regular meetings, was never proved, but von Stosch was certain that James had bought back the Sobieski jewels. This in itself was perturbing enough, as the jewels’ estimated price of 50,000 scudi vastly exceeded the annual gift of the Pope. Von Stosch concluded that the funds must have derived from an external source, and that ‘le parti des Jacobites en Angleterre a traine´ quelque projet contraire au Gouvernement de S.[a] Maj:[este´]’.149 Surprisingly, Albemarle’s response was to grant Major Kennedy, who had been banished for life after the ’Forty-five, an official leave to enter England for six weeks on personal business. He was hoping the known Jacobite courier would lead the secret service directly to his fellow conspirators; but maybe all that Kennedy needed was an alibi to meet with his English paymasters.150

The Elibank Plot: The Last Phase, 1752–1753 The result of heightened government sensitivity towards Jacobitism in 1752 stemmed, at least in part, from the debate in both houses of Parliament which culminated in the Annexing Act on 9 March, a legal instrument designed to confiscate the forfeited estates and to vest them in the Crown. During this debate, the parliamentary opposition under the Duke of Bedford had produced evidence for widespread disaffection in Scotland – among government officials. The Duke of Newcastle felt that the accusation was mostly groundless, and even tried to ameliorate it in a letter to Henry Pelham by construing it as an attack on Argyll. Nevertheless, concerning the alleged Jacobites, Newcastle admitted that ‘[i]t is right to get rid of these people; they only comply seemingly’.151 The consequence of the controversy surrounding the ‘Scots’ Bill,’ as it was generally called, was a serious investigation into allegations of misconduct and collaboration with Jacobites. In his attack on the Pelhams, Bedford declared ‘that he was but too well founded in his apprehensions of new commotions, both from the countenance showed to the disaffected, and the discouragement given to the loyal’.152 The consequence of Bedford’s accusations was a stringent inquest which gradually took on the dimensions of a minor witch-hunt. Under siege, the Pelham ministry attempted to ferret out all those with Jacobite connections, in order to cashier them from government service, and thereby blunt Bedford’s offensive.153 The results of the inquiry conjured an image which gave the impression of a Scottish administration vulnerable to Jacobitism: the commander-in-chief was not a Justice of the Peace, and could not therefore issue warrants at his


discretion, which, for instance, allowed Lord Ogilvy to abscond a second time; nor were a sufficient number of army personnel on the Commissions of the Peace; the identity of government informers lacked adequate protection, and they were thus exposed to Jacobite reprisals; several government officers had been charged for ‘excesses’ in the fulfilment of their duty after the last rising, while Whigs had been prosecuted for seizing cattle belonging to avowed Jacobites; Non-Jurors and Episcopalians were allowed to enjoy the emoluments accruing from their positions as sheriff-substitutes; Highlanders of dubious loyalty had been appointed to factories, among them Colin Campbell of Glenure and his half-brother Barcaldine and, more generally, factors showed little enthusiasm for cooperation with government troops. The list of grievances was long.154 Although the veneer of the inquiry was that of an impartial one, it was highly unpopular among the Whigs in Scotland, who saw in it the by-product of party-strife at Westminster. While the Jacobites were reported to feel ‘uneasy’, the Argathelians considered it Bedford’s personal attack on Argyll, and the Squadrone did not believe that the outcome would be fair – despite the fact that all presumptive evidence carried no validity – as it was conducted by their political opponents who controlled most of the boards. The Squadrone Whigs doubted that their members would be foolish enough to inform against Jacobite sympathizers, for they apprehended that they would not be taken seriously by the Argathelians, but risk exposure to the enemy’s malice. Overall, they felt that a public inquiry was utterly unproductive; instead, the investigation should be conducted in private.155 Pelham, or a member of his staff, even suspected Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald.156 Ultimately, this initiative, provoked by Bedford, failed to sweep through the northern Augean Stable, but instead divided the Scottish administration still further. While the debate on the Annexing Bill and the concomitant inquiry were conducted on government levels, Pickle’s disclosures began in earnest, probably because his Jacobite associates were beginning to suspect him. Bruce finally met Pickle on 1 January, only to be told that the Scottish Jacobites distrusted his charge, for only those who dealt with Glengarry in 1749 had suffered. Bruce himself was also no longer above suspicion, being thought of as the government official responsible for Glengarry’s recruitment. Pickle, in turn, attempted to cover Bruce. He was, however, burdened with the additional charge of being responsible for the arrest of Dr Cameron’s wife, whose occupation was that of a Jacobite courier. The accusation had been engineered by Glenevis, and constituted an extension of the Cameron/MacDonald feud over the Locharkaig treasure. The culprit was summoned before Pickle and his friends, forced to apologize, and told that, possibly as a form of atonement, he should arrange a meeting with the unusually shy Cluny.157 Pickle finally ran afoul of Cluny, and thus manifestly failed to see him.158 Beforehand, he even engaged a member of his family’s cadet branch, the Barrisdales, to capture Cluny.159


The episode which sheds some light on the shady proceedings of the Jacobites probably occurred between the close of 1751 and January 1752. Pickle had reported that ex-Alderman George Heathcote, ‘a principall Manager’ of the English Jacobites, had written to James Maxwell of Kirkconnel, a captain in the Prince’s Lifeguards, about Goring’s presence in London. Goring had inquired whether a Mr Charteris could collect funds for Charles.160 Whether his further information stood in direct connection with those fundraising activities in England, or a rising in Scotland, is difficult to determine, but Pickle stated the Jacobites in Scotland were: all in high Spirits, & very ready to enter into a Contract what Brandy [foreign arms?] their friend can Spare them; – the Whisky [local arms?] here has been very dear of late; – they desire me to offer any price & not to stick at Placks & Bawbies; we have Calculated that Six Thousand pounds coud be rais’d in four weeks, if the Brandy [foreign arms?] proves good; – this, I am desir’d to Communicate to No.3. [the Earl Marischal], who they are sure, they say, wont put a bad bargain into their hands; They have offer’d to make me Chief Super cargo; that No.14 [John Cameron of Lochiel] shou’d be Second; – No.16 [Alexander Cameron of Glenevis] will be ready to dispose of the Cargoe as quickly as possible; – I have not refus’d the Offer, but being determin’d never to deal in Smuggling without No.3 [the Earl Marischal] gives her Consent, it lies there till that is fix’d.161 If Pickle’s information was correct, Frederick II’s ambassador at Paris, Marischal, was to act as a potential arms-dealer for the Jacobites in Scotland. Pickle’s other major undertaking in conjunction with Bruce was the uprooting of both his own clan and that of his rivals, the Camerons. He was primarily interested in wresting the Glengarry chieftaincy from his father; but when the government started to act against Fassifern and Glenevis, whom he had both incriminated, Pickle protested that such forward action jeopardized his operations.162 For the remainder of the spring, Pickle and Bruce were at loggerheads over the spy’s prolonged sojourn at Edinburgh, and little information trickled to the government.163 While the Jacobites in the Highlands continued their cabal, Albemarle had discovered that Murray of Broughton, against the opposition of many of his former associates, was trying to return to the Jacobite fold, his entry ticket being vital intelligence to the cause.164 Goring was again sent as Charles’ agent to James James Dormer at Antwerp in order to ‘Concert with him what may be necessary for my Cervice’.165 At the same time, Murray of Elibank, who had donated £300, was concerting a collection for Charles with the wealthy West Indian James Dawkins.166 Moreover, in April the Prince received an emissary of the English Jacobites, bearing Lady Primrose’s request for a meeting with Charles.167 A few weeks later, Sir James Harrington was


telling Goring that he still hoped to meet with Jeremy Dawkins, Lady Primrose and the Earl of Westmoreland, probably to coordinate the plot that was now forming.168 In November, Charles received another Jamaican planter, Anthony Langley Swymmer MP, and his father-in-law, Sir John Astley MP, to coordinate the details of the English rising.169 Throughout the year, the British at home and abroad were busy chasing a phantom in the whole of Europe. Except for the riots at Exeter in June, which may have stood in connection with the Elibank Plot, little enough happened during the summer of 1752; it was not unlike the silence which precedes a storm.170 Pickle’s signal warning that the Jacobites were prepared to strike reached the ministry in early November: ‘I assure you, . . . you’l soon hear of a hurly Burly’.171 Indeed, the Jacobites were finally prepared to set their plan in motion. The Elibank plot, however, was not a uniform undertaking. Frank McLynn suggests that the evolving plan of the conspirators went through three developmental stages. As suggested previously, the initial idea was to kidnap the Hanoverian family, and whisk them away to France, where they could be kept in custody. A task force, 2,500 men strong, was to lodge in various places in the vicinity of Westminster, and assemble when St James’ and the Tower were to be taken.172 A select group of London’s Tory aldermen were the ‘Mannagers in the City’, and ‘[i]ff any thing is to be attempted its to be executed by a Set of resolute daring young fellows, laid on by a Sett of young Gentelmen, conducted by a few Regular Officers; Iff ever any attemp[t] is made it’s to be a Night onset’.173 The logistics involved were considered impracticable, which then led Murray of Elibank to suggest the wholesale elimination of the rival dynasty.174 Charles’ great detractor and former commanding officer of his Lifeguards, David, Lord Elcho, and the retrospective judgement of Sir Walter Scott confirm this picture.175 The final development of the core plan resulted in a synthesis of the other variants: George II and his family would be held hostages, while Charles would cross the Channel to fill the political vacuum. In his characteristic way, the Prince balked at the idea of political assassination. Marischal, usually sceptical and ambiguous, was apparently quite encouraging.176 The full weight of the plot did not, however, fall on the shoulders of only the English Jacobites. In the autumn of 1752, Lochgarry and Dr Cameron were dispatched to the Highlands.177 Prior to their departure, Charles met them at Menin; he had procured the Doctor and Lochgarry a conge´, or leave of absence, from their regimental service. They arrived in Scotland with a clear mission: to mobilize the clans for a third Jacobite rising.178 Again, Pickle’s disclosures are the only guide to the intricacies of this labyrinthine conspiracy: [Charles] Informed . . . [Lochgarry and Dr Cameron] that he hop’d he had brought matters to Such a bearing particularly at the King of Prussias


Court, whom he Expected in a short time to have a strong alliance with, that he did not desire the Highlanders to raise in Arms untill General Keith was landed in the North of Scotland with some Swedish troups, He likewise assurd them that some of the greatest weight in England, tho formerly great oposers to his family, were Engaged in this Attemp[t], and that he Expected to meet with very little oposition . . . at furnes . . . the young pretender enter’d my room. The discourse Chiefly turnd upoon the Scheme in England, when he repeated the same Assurances as to Loch[g]ary . . . with the Adition that the Swedes were to Embark at Gottenburgh . . . Probably the landing from England was to be from france, as there is 12000 troops in flanders more then the Ordinary Compliment . . . The Young Chevalier has more than once Seen the King of Prussia, But non other of his Court that I ever could learn, But General Keith.179 The implications of Pickle’s report are dazzling: either he made up a few juicy elements of his story, or the potentates of France, Prussia and Sweden were truly involved in the Elibank plot. The sources are quite explicit that Stuart agents were maintaining a communications network in Scotland, and that they met with many important representatives of the Jacobite clans. The ubiquitous Fassifern, his kinsman Glenevis and Menzies of Culdares acted as local coordinators and relays with their Lowland allies in Scotland. Lochgarry and Archibald Cameron spirited up the clans by telling them that they faced transportation or eviction, and that an insurrection was the only viable alternative. According to Pickle, Charles sent his emissaries in company of Major James Robertson of Blairfetty, Captain Donald Robertson of Woodshiel and one Skalleter to meet the loyal chiefs at the Crieff market.180 The spy had also received commissions – probably blank ones for the clan officers – from Murray of Elibank with instructions for Scotland.181 What those instructions contained is not known, but an educated guess can be hazarded: in the least, Pickle, in his capacity as a ranking member of the Glengarry clan hierarchy, was to raise his father’s tenants. Then something unforeseen happened. ‘I waited of Lord Elibank’, Pickle continued his account, ‘how [who] after the strong assurances of the Young pretender, Surprisd me to the greatest degree, by telling me that All was put off for some time, and that his Brother had repassd the Seas in order to aquent the Young pretender of it’.182 From Glengarry’s derisive comments concerning the aborted attack on St James’ Palace, we know that it was originally scheduled for 10 November 1752, and an alternative date had been set for May or June 1753.183 With the prospect of success within his grasp, Charles’ haste had led him to misinterpret the Prussian position represented by Marischal’s veneer of benign neutrality. Frederick II had not fully committed himself to aid the conspirators, but he had encouraged the Jacobites to proceed. The complacency of Charles’ followers may have come to a sudden end when the realization of their mistake hit home with a


vengeance; or, as another source suggests, Murray of Elibank and his assault team suddenly got cold feet upon their arrival in London.184

The Plot that Almost Happened Why was the first attempt of the Elibank plot aborted? Where the sources remain silent, some speculation may prove helpful. Even within the Byzantine complexity of this conspiracy there seem to have existed some fairly ensconced structures. First, disunity plagued the Jacobites involved, and, second, there were several security leaks – of which Pickle was by far the worst but not the only one. The principal participants in the conspiracy were the Prince’s party, the preponderantly French exiles, the English Jacobites, their Scottish counterparts and indirectly (via Marischal), the Prussians. Officially, no indication of French or Swedish complicity materialized.185 Of these factions, Charles’ coterie, a faction comprising the exiles in France, and many of the fanatically anti-Hanoverian Highland chiefs, were determined to strike at any rate, preferably with, but if necessary without, foreign support.186 With the outcome of the ’Forty-five fresh in mind, the English Jacobite elite, who would have had to bear the brunt of government retaliation in the wake of another abortive rising in Britain, and the King’s party in exile were more timid and demanded a diversionary rising. Meanwhile, the Prussians looked on in interest, and remained expediently ambivalent. In these circumstances, a serious argument between Charles and his more sceptical adherents about his mistress Clementina Walkinshaw could have been part of the reason which caused the postponement of the planned attack, for a fair number of them surmised that she was the traitor in their midst. She was suspected of conducting a secret correspondence with her sister, a member of the household at Leicester House.187 The consequence of the impasse may have been the suspension of the attack. To what degree the dispute concerning Clementina Walkinshaw influenced the outcome of the Elibank plot in 1752 is not known. However, it is certain that it caused serious friction between the Prince and Dr King, Lady Primrose and their associates. The Prince’s hapless mistress was unjustly suspected, or at least no tangible proof for her guilt has yet been discovered.188 The potential culprits however, should, be assessed by the quality of evidence which stands against them: Andrew Lang’s alliteration of circumstantial evidence against Glengarry has been corroborated by the discovery of incontrovertible proof presented in this chapter. Pickle’s further revelations in 1753 show just how sensitive the contents of his dispatches to the English ministers were. Although Glengarry’s betrayal of the Jacobite cause was responsible for keeping the government informed about the plot, it did not necessarily constitute the only reason for its failure. Two other suspects of a peripheral character did exist. The first one was ‘Jackson’, possibly Sir James Harrington’s son, who used the same cant name and was accused by Pickle of


divulging ‘Secretts’.189 The second one was Samuel Cameron, whose indictment here is also based on Pickle’s testimony. Apparently, Samuel was involved in a quarrel with Dr Archibald Cameron. The consequence was that Dr Cameron refused to admit Samuel to the team of operatives fielded by the Jacobites in late 1752, and instead probably selected his nephew and chief, John Cameron of Lochiel.190 Jackson’s case may be more obscure, but Samuel’s is highly ambiguous, for he later protested his innocence in the face of charges relating to the betrayal of Dr Cameron. The government received ample warning from other sources. The Lord Justice Clerk, the head of clan MacLeod, the Duke of Argyll and his extensive intelligence contacts sent urgent messages to apprise the ministry of the Jacobite agents’ presence and their intention to winter in the Highlands. A companion of Dr Cameron gave out that all the French officers in Scotland, whose numbers were reportedly significant, were under orders not to recross the Channel until June or July 1753 – the only sensible motive behind their deployment was to support an invasion. Tinwald, who was not sure whether they had come in quest of the Locharkaig treasure or to encourage the Scottish Jacobites, immediately issued warrants for their arrest. The incoming reports, however, confirmed the military’s worst fears. But most Jacobite agents were experienced at evading their Hanoverian pursuers, and notoriously difficult to find in the Highland warren of glens, braes and shielings.191 Argyll’s tense behaviour was the consequence of the recent trial of James Stewart of Aucharn. The convict was Ardshiel’s half-brother and a former officer in the Appin regiment. He was convicted as an accessory to the murder of Colin Ruadh Campbell of Glenure, government factor on the forfeited estate of Ardshiel, by what the Jacobites dubbed a ‘Cumberland Jury’.192 The jurors were mostly Campbells. In due course, the trial became a Jacobite cause ce´le`bre and the convict a martyr. Because James Stewart was a member of a Jacobite clan and his ostensible victim a Campbell, and by association a Whig, the subsequent execution gained as strong a political overtone as did Glenure’s assassination. Conversely, the Earl of Breadalbane was quick to suggest that former allegations against the slain factor and his half-brother Barcaldine for their Jacobitically discoloured past were conveniently forgotten by the authorities. But the victim had been a government factor, an officer of state. Hence, a fearful Whig establishment demanded a scapegoat; and when the principal murder suspect, Alan Breac Stewart, escaped beyond the seas despite all efforts to the contrary, a frightened and vindictive government sent James of Aucharn to the gallows.193 The impact of the murder and the trial for the Scottish administration, and by extension the ministry, should be fully appreciated, as it generated a climate of fear against the backdrop of the Elibank plot. Tinwald, for instance, predicted that ‘if this go’s unpunish’t it will intimidate people to undertake His Majesty’s Service in that Countrey’, while another of Pelham’s correspondents saw Glenure’s murder as ‘an attempt to intimidate others from


venturing to act vigorously in rightly colonizing ye forfeited Estates in ye Highlands’, and added, that ‘the immediate extirpation – that is punishment, of all ye Stuarts of Appin, would carry such an example’.194 It would be ‘the worst Shot . . . the Stewarts . . . ever made’.195 Pelham certainly took the affair seriously, but also displayed more sagacity than his bloodthirsty inferiors. He told Argyll: ‘I see clearly, if this is not most surely punishd, it is in vain to think of civilizing the Highlands by wholesome laws, and any other way of keeping them in order, for a long process of time, is a remedy almost as bad as the disease.’196 Months after the execution, Argyll opposed the publication of the trial because he feared a ‘Pamphlet war’. He also delayed his departure for Edinburgh, as he apprehended some ‘unforseen accident’.197 In the wake of the Elibank plot’s abortion, the noose was tightening around the Jacobite agents in Britain. Dr Cameron narrowly escaped capture near Glenahurich by a party of redcoats from Strontian, and Lochgarry evaded a trap set for him by the government troops.198 A government messenger had sighted Charles Stewart of Ardshiel in London, and Pickle himself was put under tight surveillance upon his return to France. Pickle was known to confer with Marischal, Ogilvy and a host of other exiles in the Paris area; probably his employer wanted to know more about the inner trappings of the conspiracy.199 A rumour of Charles’ imminent demise in February was quickly laid to rest, and Pickle’s investigations started to turn up sensitive intelligence. As early as November 1752, he was absolutely convinced that Frederick would consider the Jacobite option. The Prussian king was apparently inveigling the French ministry to do the same.200 The question of the extent of Prussia’s involvement in the conspiracy was, and is, the most glaring loose end of the entire affair. This belief also holds true for the concomitant questions of why the plot failed and why the British government studiously avoided going public with its findings, however marginal they were. Sir Charles Petrie held the subsequent arrest and execution of Dr Cameron responsible for the termination of the Jacobite attempt, while McLynn implies that there was no single reason, but a host of them – among which the dissension of the Jacobite factions and the Walkinshaw debacle feature prominently.201 Somewhere beyond the above conclusions lies a third, which, though supported by circumstantial evidence, still provides a plausible answer, and does not negate but rather enhances the other two. For the purpose of investigating this alternative explanation, the precarious nature of AngloPrussian relations must be taken into consideration, for the Friesland Succession, if not the dispute over the repayment of the Silesian Loan, held much potential for conflict. The British soon realized that Frederick’s disgruntlement constituted an open door to Jacobite overtures. Apart from the general tenet of British foreign policy in the early 1750s, which was not to rock the European boat, an open breach with Frederick was undesirable. Newcastle made this point very clear to Hardwicke. He professed his belief that the ministry should even:


submit to the insults and flights of the king of Prussia, now avowedly the principal, if not the sole support, of the Pretender, and the Jacobite cause . . . For, though we do not in words yield to the king of Prussia, if we avoid any thing that may bring this dispute to an honourable end, we do effectually and essentially give up the point . . . This argument, I own, turns upon a supposition, that the having [of ] a strong Russian army on the frontiers of the king of Prussia’s country, will be a means of preventing the king of Prussia from breaking the peace, and enable us the better to come to terms with him, by making him desist from his unjust violences, exerted against the rights and properties of his Majesty’s subjects [the repayment of the Silesian Loan]. Every body knows, the king of Prussia acts only from interest or fear; by interest we cannot gain him, by fear we have no means of doing it but by Russia; and, as the king of Prussia must be looked upon to be ill-disposed to the king and this nation, and the most likely power in all Europe to stir up a war, whatever contributes to keep him quiet, must contribute also to the preservation of the peace.202 If Newcastle’s view was accorded any merit by his sovereign and fellow ministers, it could, aside from Sir Walter Scott’s cryptic reference to protecting the ministers’ principal source of intelligence, explain the cover-up of the Elibank plot. As the ministry never went public with its findings in the wake of the conspiracy (Dr Cameron’s subsequent execution was, not unlike Charles Radcliffe’s, juridically based on his attainder of seven years past, and constituted the only recognizable instance of official government intervention), the assumption that Newcastle’s advice was implemented is fairly safe. The British believed to know of Frederick’s implication in the plot, but there is little indication that they were aware of the degree of his involvement. Newcastle, however, thought of Frederick’s hostility as important enough to give it some serious thought. Hardwicke’s biographer was convinced of the government’s awareness of a connection between Dr Cameron’s mission and Frederick’s complicity; but the news of Prussian meddling had reached beyond the inner circle of the ministry. In a letter to Mann, Horace Walpole commented: ‘What you say you have heard of strange conspiracies, fomented by our nephew [Frederick II], is not entirely groundless.’203 When Marischal recommended to instal a liaison between his Prussian master and the Jacobite leadership at Berlin, Frederick displayed his interest unabashedly: ‘[J]e serais . . . bien aise d’eˆtre mis au fait par votre ami des affaires ci-dessus alle´gueés; au surplus, il ne de´pendandrait que de lui et de sa convenance de quelle maniere il souhaiterait de venir ici’.204 Marischal invited a Jacobite representative to Berlin on Frederick’s orders. James Dawkins visited Berlin in his capacity as Jacobite emissary in June 1753, and received ample encouragement from Frederick II.205 Thus, the question of Prussia’s involvement in the Jacobite conspiracy was no longer pertinent, for the British did suspect Frederick; it is rather the


questions relating to the extent and nature of Prussian support for the Jacobites – as far as this is possible within the parameters of the present investigation – we now turn to. If Frederick did not live up to Charles’ expectations, especially in terms of military support, he may well have been abetting the shipment of contraband. This type of undertaking constituted a form of considerable support. In any case, the ministry was sketchily apprised of Jacobite gun-running to Scotland. In March 1753, Newcastle ordered Tinwald to seize Captain Hugh Clark, a wine-merchant at Leith, in connection with an arms delivery.206 As the bearing of arms in Scotland was strictly forbidden under the remedial legislation of the post-Culloden era, the mere idea of smuggling arms had to make the authorities suspicious. The investigation of Captain Clark probably stands in a subsidiary relation to the ¨ rtemberg. case of Christian Gottlib Christhold, a Jewish convert from Wu The Christhold incident does indeed throw some light on the nature of Prussian support for the Jacobites. Christhold arrived in London in September 1752, and lodged with Salomon Jonas, a Jewish merchant. After Salomon’s brother, Simon, returned from Emden, an English gentleman frequently called at their house late at night, whereupon Simon departed for the Continent again. It seems as if Christhold had fled his German debtors, for when Salomon divulged the reason for the midnight meetings in his house, the merchant also offered to obtain an indemnification for the debts of the fugitive from no less a person than Frederick II. Christhold further deposed that Salomon had confided that: [T]his English Gentleman, who has been so often with me & my Brother, is Solliciting from the King of Prussia Two Ships of war, with Sailors & Soldiers; and the English Gentleman is to Sail with Them Himself, in order to make a Settlement, which is to yield an Hundred Thousand Pounds Sterling a year to the King of Prussia . . . He was to give the King of Prussia a Pledge of Fifty Thousand Pounds worth of Jewels; which He would forfeit, if Things did not turn out So . . . [Salomon] hoped, He and His Brother would gain Ten Thousand Pounds by it.207 The references to the two vessels and a financial settlement are notable, as they authenticate the veracity of the statement. Frederick would not expose himself in such a manner, unless the prize he stood to gain would be at least commensurate to the risk he would take. Christhold subsequently tried to ¨ nchhausen. betray the Jonas brothers to the Hanoverian minister, Baron Mu The Jonases in turn charged him with theft; but Christhold was acquainted with the Messenger Nathaniel Carrington, whose intervention saved him and yielded his deposition.208 Seen in isolation, Christhold’s revelation hardly seems worth mentioning, and that may be true despite its implicit indictment of Prussia in connection with the Stuart cause. Rather, it is the hitherto unnoticed evidence corrobor-


ating Christhold’s wild tale which is quite stunning. In September, Newcastle alerted Tinwald to a contraband operation with unmistakably Jacobite characteristics. The mercantile company Sineg, Laken & Walsh had received vessels at Hamburg; they had come down the Elbe. Thus, the cargo would have originated in, or passed by, Prussian territory. These ships were carrying assorted weaponry, and Newcastle believed the contraband was destined for Scotland. Tinwald, who was to investigate, was also informed about armstrafficking from St Malo in Brittany to the North of Scotland.209 Orders to search and seize were issued for all major Scottish sea ports.210 By October, Argyll’s intelligence stated that the Jacobites ‘gave out that a Ship is soon to follow loaded with Arms, Ammunition & Money, that this Ship is to come from a Town called Hambourg where they say the King of Prussia has great influence on whom they build great Hopes’.211 Hanbury-Williams did report Charles’ recent presence in Berlin by February 1753; and according to military intelligence in Scotland, the Prince had claimed to enjoy the support of France, Prussia and Sweden. In fact, Charles had sent Dr Cameron to Scotland in order to ascertain ‘what number he may depend on’, with the express purpose, ‘that he may shew it to the King of Prussia, who was to send over Arms & other Warlike Stores for their use this Spring’.212 It was probably Pickle who provided the corroborative evidence. A report of 6 November, possibly furnished by Pickle, mentioned two ships of war loaded with arms and ammunition – information congruent with that in Christhold’s deposition and Newcastle’s intelligence! This shipment was destined for Scotland and Ireland. The purveyor most frequently referred to by Pickle since 1752 was James Ogilvie, ship-master at Boulogne and Leith. In this particular case, Ogilvie, who had also been operating a kind of Jacobite postal service, had taken on the task of shipping 8,000 swords in hogsheads, apparently hidden at Berlin since 1745, from a place near Dunkirk to Airth in Scotland. The blades were to be stored two miles from Stirling, at the house of Charles Smith’s wife at Tough, and Pickle recommended that Sir Hugh Paterson’s home be watched for the same reason. Indeed, Ogilvie’s vessel was sighted near Airth in November 1753.213 Pickle’s cousin, one John MacDonald, ‘said, in March last, that, If there was any Invasion, there was Plenty of Arms’.214 In fact, Pickle was convinced that 9,000 stand of arms, which could be readied quickly, were already stored on Clanranald’s estate, while Tinwald knew that arms had been hidden away after the ’Forty-five, and had subsequently been dispersed. The curators of this Jacobite arsenal were Major Alexander MacDonald of Glenaladale, and a brother of the late Colonel Donald MacDonald of Kinlochmoidart, both veterans of Clanranald’s regiment.215 Pelham’s sources related that Dr Cameron and Lochgarry had landed arms and ammunition in Scotland, and that Ardshiel and Lord Ogilvy assured the Highlanders that Charles was being active on their behalf, having sent arms and plaids. The contraband was taken ashore in a joint operation supervised by Cluny and Lochgarry. Even


though Newcastle and Tinwald believed in the existence of a Jacobite arsenal, there is no conclusive evidence that the British government acknowledged a successful raid, or that, in spite of their considerable efforts, they found any Jacobite arms-cache. In the light of the government’s later cover-up of the plot, its affected inefficiency is to be treated with some care.216 The disclosures concerning Ireland were but an extension of the spy’s reports on Scotland. They defied, to say the least, common sense, and the ministry’s incredulity can be easily understood. The sanguine Irish Jacobites proposed to raise 14,000 men in two days, and land them in Wales or Scotland – logistically speaking a feat that was challenging, but, if it had succeeded against all odds, it would almost certainly have caught the British defences off guard.217 Balhaldy, the main sponsor of the Irish initiative fielded by Rob Roy’s notorious son, James Mo´r MacGregor, a captain in his clan regiment, and Marischal suggested that 11,000 men be disembarked in North Wales, and 3,000 in Campbelltown, on the Duke of Argyll’s doorstep. All the Irish Jacobites asked for was a convoy to protect their crossing of the Minch.218 Emissaries had been sent to Ireland, and at least one highly placed Irish agent had been in Paris incognito since May 1753. Lord Clare, the commander of the Irish Brigade, had given his approval to employ members of his corps in the operation, and other well-connected indigenous Irish peers seemed to be involved as well.219 A further source Pickle had tapped surmised that 2,500 men could be raised in Argyll alone. From the western seaboard the invaders, under the command of Marischal and Lord George Murray, would march to Perthshire in order to link up with the northern clans.220 Even if this plan was remotely realistic, the ministry would have known some of its details – either from Pickle, or, more likely in this case, from their double-agent James Mo´r, who considered Dr Cameron’s mission a foolish one, but warned that ‘what is now in agitation [under Marischal’s direction] is extremely well connected’.221 A government memorandum of the time suggests that the ministry considered stationing the regiment of Lord George Murray’s violently whiggish brother, Lord John, at Drogheda and Rush, but also in remote Connaught. In addition, an espionage task force, including James Mo´r, who had made the initial contact, and a government trusty, was to be employed to ferret out the Irish conspirators, especially the aristocrats. The same memorandum advised the dispatch of two independent companies to the Scottish Highlands, mostly to monitor and prevent the gatherings of disaffected clans.222 According to John McKinnon, a government spy in Scotland, the Camerons had held an important meeting attended by the clan gentry. The nature of the gathering, McKinnon stressed in his journal, was unequivocally treasonable. Plans for the coming rising were actively discussed among Camerons and MacDonalds alike. More particularly, Glenaladale had approached late Clanranald’s brother, Alexander of Boisdale, and asked him to store arms.223 Indubitably, the Highlands were in a ferment.


If the British ministers were truly ignorant of the preparations concerted for the overthrow of the Hanoverian dynasty, the Jacobites may have met with partial or even complete success. But they did not attain their goal – in fact, their attempt was nipped in the bud – nor was the Pelhamite administration unaware of what they were planning, as Pickle and other informers kept them up to date. In March 1753, the ministry had received a clear warning about the international dimension of the Elibank plot: ‘Let England take Care – The French[,] Swedes and Prussians threaten her, And the Young Man of 1745 – A Word is enough for the Wise’, and when Holdernesse informed George II of the plot ‘carrying on by the late Lord Marschal at Paris, against Your Majestys Government by the Knowledge & by the Direction of the King of Prussia’, he made it clear that the secret should not to be divulged, except to those ministers involved. Holdernesse had recommended to recall Lieutenant-General Humphrey Bland, who was on his way to Scotland, and, quite notably, George II himself added: ‘I wish Gl. Bland may not be gone, but am affray’d Sending for him back again, would give the allarm, and discover the Secret.’224 Conversely, the Jacobites, especially Captains Holker and Edgar, but also some of the Highland gentry had already suspected that they had been infiltrated, the prime suspects being Glengarry, Samuel Cameron and James Mo´r.225 Thus, we are left with the question of why George II and his ministers truly feared bursting the bubble of mystery surrounding the plot. The most plausible explanation is that the British did not fear the Jacobites as much as the e´minence grise backing them, especially if that veiled presence behind the Stuarts was probably Frederick II.226 After all, the prerequisites for increased Anglo-Prussian tensions were ideal for a rupture: the unresolved disputes concerning the Friesland Succession and the Silesian Loan gave the Prussian king all the pretext he needed to act against his Hanoverian uncle. Merely the notion of an open breach between Britain and Prussia within the context of Newcastle’s foreign, stability-oriented, political precepts was, to say the least, abhorrent. In spite of the ostensible ‘peace’ of Aix-la-Chapelle, Frederick was still Louis XV’s principal ally, while Britain’s vindictive confederate, Austria, retained her appetite for the re-acquisition of Prussian-occupied Silesia. The potential for an escalation of hostilities on the Continent was apparent for all who cared to look: an Anglo-Prussian rupture would drag Catholic France and Austria into an all-out European war. By extension, such an explosive me´lange would also involve Prussia’s Protestant allies Denmark and Sweden, and, conversely, Britain’s long-time maritime associate, and Prussia’s principal commercial rival, the Dutch. The Russian policy of containment towards a potential Prussian expansion to the East prompted Frederick II to guarantee Sweden’s borders against Catherine II’s territorial ambitions.227 George II also had to consider the risk to his Continental possessions, for the Electorate of Hanover would be fully exposed to Franco-Prussian aggression; and Parliament had, almost invariably, dis-


played little interest in sacrificing its own resources in the defence of Hanover. Consequently, the full disclosure of the British government’s knowledge concerning the Elibank plot would almost certainly have led to mutual recriminations, culminating in a worsening, if not termination, of relations with the bellicose King of Prussia. This may very well have accounted for the unusual circumspection with which the British ministers dealt with the entire affair.228

The Aftermath The silence of the government ultimately paid off: though Anglo-Prussian relations reached a nadir before the Convention of Westminster in 1756, there never was – at least traceably – a confrontation between the two powers, owing to the Elibank plot. In fact, it was partially headed off by Dr Cameron’s arrest on 26 March at Stewart of Glenbuckie’s house, near Inversnaid barracks – paradoxically at a time when the documentary evidence suggests a surge in the degree of Prussian commitment.229 The question of who betrayed Dr Cameron stands in connection with the question of why the Elibank plot failed, and by extension, why all semblance of Prussian aid dwindled away – therefore it is a question well worth answering fully. In the speech prepared for his execution in early June, Dr Cameron identified Lieutenant Samuel Cameron, ‘the basest of their Spies’, as his betrayer.230 Not only Samuel’s contemporary, Captain John Edgar, but also Andrew Lang and, more recently, Stewart of Ardvorlich have treated the Doctor’s indictment as prima facie evidence, but in this case there is more than meets the eye.231 Andrew Lang asserted that in October 1751, Glengarry and Glenevis, Samuel’s brother, had been at odds over that fatal Jacobite bone of contention, the Locharkaig treasure, and that Glenevis had accused Alasdair Ruadh of denouncing him and his other brother Angus of Downan to the redcoats; following Dr Cameron’s arrest, Fassifern, his lawyer Charles Stewart of Banavie, Angus and Alexander were incarcerated.232 Glenevis, who, unlike the intrepid Fassifern, eventually cracked under pressure from his captors, was not discouraged in his belief that Glengarry had sold him to the government.233 But from a Jacobite perspective, Pickle was not the prime suspect. A court martial held at Lille effected Samuel’s arrest for seven months.234 At a first glance, there is no reason to indicate that the French retributory proceeding against Glenevis’ brother did not stand in direct connection with his alleged activities as Hanoverian spy. There is ample reason to assume, however, that, beyond the Cameron/MacDonell feud originating in the post-Culloden period, the families of Lochiel and Glenevis were engaged in a rivalry over authority within the clan Cameron, and the distribution of the Locharkaig treasure, which, according to Fassifern, did result in Glenevis’ denouncing him to the governor at Fort William, and reprisals against the


informer. There also may have been bad blood because of Glenevis’ aloofness during the ’Forty-five.235 If we also consider the patronage available to Glenevis because of the influential position his brother Angus held alongside Cluny in connection with the trusteeship of the French gold, an emotional potential for more than rivalry becomes apparent: hatred. An indication that Samuel’s plight may very well have been engineered by the influence of Lochiel’s family and allies, who felt threatened by Angus’ and Glenevis’ disclosures to the government, was given by Glenevis’ subsequent desperation. In fact, he was left with little choice but to apply to the British government for protection: You will see the boundless Malice of my Enemies, who finding they cannot Accomplish their wicked designs against my Person, are determined to ruin my Brother for my sake, and for the late Service done the Government in discovering some of their Secret Practices, by which you are sensible how obnoxious I have made myself . . . If anything can be done for my Brother in Britain, let me beg for your friendly Interposition.236 The reason for Glenevis’s plea was a letter he had received from Samuel: The misunderstanding betwixt you and the family of Lochiel, is like at last to be my Ruin . . . I thank God I am innocent of what they lay to my Charge. The reason I write you this, is, that you immediately send me . . . above all, a Copy of that Letter my Enemies Say is in the Hands of the Governor of Fort William, wherein it’s said, that I gave Information of twenty three Officers of both Scots Regiments, and in particular of the late Mr. [Archibald] Cameron, and Loch-Garry, who went to rais new disturbances in the Highlands . . . All you can do, is to get three or four of the best People in Maryburgh, and beg of the Governor to shew you the Letter, if there is none, be so good as get it Attested by the said gentlemen what he tells you – For the Love of God use your Endeavours to discover the betrayers of that unhappy man. I am here in Prison by the Courts Orders, nor can I tell you what my fate may be, all that I can assure you of, that I am prepared for the Worst.237 General Bland’s reflections upon this case five months later show that he was ignorant of Samuel’s alleged betrayal of Dr Cameron. The general informed Newcastle that it was believed that the recent defamation of Samuel was the consequence of Glenevis’ defection to the Hanoverians.238 It was entirely for political reasons that Bland, following the divisive policy introduced by his predecessor, General Churchill, urged Newcastle to intervene on Samuel’s behalf – because it was in his interest to exploit the discord among the Jacobites and to inveigle them to believe in Samuel’s duplicity.239 The


consequence of Newcastle’s intervention with the French government may well have been Samuel’s expulsion from the French demesnes in 1754.240 Samuel was probably not the man who betrayed Dr Cameron; but if he did commit the foul deed, he covered his tracks professionally. A likelier culprit may have been Pickle, whose known proclivity to sabotage the Camerons, his covert activities against the Jacobites at large and Glenevis in particular, establishes him as the prime suspect; nor should we forget the possibility, however improbable, of James Mo´r, who only outmatched Pickle by his impressive criminal record. In the wake of the Elibank plot, clan Cameron, as a functioning Jacobite cell, and unlike the Glengarry MacDonells, was systematically dismantled by the British government. In spite of all efforts to the contrary, Dr Cameron was sent to the gallows at Tyburn on 7 June 1753, by a vindictive George II. Glenevis’ information against Fassifern ultimately led to the latter’s repeated incarceration and subsequent banishment for ten years on charges of forgery. As a consequence of the debacle, the Glenevis sept was detached from the body of the clan; and the new chief, John Cameron of Lochiel, was in such straits that he was forced to solicit James for his advancement in the French service.241 But not even the memory of the Elibank plot’s single martyr, Dr Cameron, is left unblemished by the sources, and the shadow cast upon his character by a piece of incriminating evidence is not taken lightly. Much elation over the success of the Doctor’s captor, Captain Craven of Beauclerk’s regiment, was evidenced in Newcastle’s congratulatory missive to Tinwald. ‘[T]here is great Reason to believe, from the Circumstances of Dr. Cameron, that He may have it in His Power to make very material Discoveries; and particularly of the Designs, (if there are any,) of France and Prussia . . . He should be immediately brought up to London, to be examined here.’242 Dr Cameron’s claim, that he had visited Scotland in connection with his late brother’s affairs concerning the Lochiel estate, was received with scepticism by his interrogators. In the process of his examination, his very integrity as a devoted Jacobite, asserted by himself before his demise, is questionable in the light of potential new evidence.243 The messenger who attended Dr Cameron in prison, Nathaniel Carrington, witnessed a conversation between the prisoner and the Lieutenant of the Tower. During this exchange the Doctor was heard to say that ‘being wholly dependant upon his brother Lochiel, He was ye occasion of his going into ye Rebellion. That if His Majesty would extend his mercy to him, He would engage to be made anyways usefull, And do any Service’.244 If Dr Cameron had thereby indicated his willingness to disclose Charles’ plans to the British in order to save his life, a whole new perspective of Jacobite martyrology would have to be taken into consideration. As Archibald Cameron was executed, and no hard evidence of his culpability survives, his case is, retrospectively speaking, impossible to judge. Jacobite reactions to Dr Cameron’s sorry exit were varied.245 The aftermath, however, only emphasized the untested probabilities opened up by


the initial conspiracy, and resulted in a protracted uneasiness on both sides. In 1754, General Bland continued with his efforts to eliminate the Jacobite party in Scotland, while Albemarle was still hounding Charles on the Continent, albeit with little success.246 From the Jacobite perspective the Elibank plot gradually wound down and fizzled out in confusion, bitterness and much dejection. The Jacobite failure was attended by consequences. So well had the government succeeded at intimidating the conspirators that they now asked Charles to send all incriminating documents authored by them to Marischal for safekeeping, ‘[a]s they are ignorant where you are and in the greatest concern for your safety’.247 What they really intended with the papers, Marischal surmised, was ‘to burn them in presence of one trusted by them’ as, ‘they suppose any paper safer in my house, than in your custody in your present situation’.248 The Earl’s message bore portentous overtones, insinuating some unspecified danger to the Prince’s person. Ever since Dr Cameron’s arrest in March, Charles had feared that the British could somehow force information out of their prisoner, which would allow them to locate him on the Continent.249 As is evident from Carrington’s memorandum, he may have been closer to the mark than he thought possible. Then Murray of Elibank’s frenzied warning that the danger of assassination was imminent reached Charles in Ghent: You are surely no stranger to the immense sums of money that are employed to find You out, and destroy You, and that those villains [i.e. British agents] so employed have each of them Your picture to direct them with a particular description of Your person.250 Charles immediately destroyed the incriminating documents, and quickly left Ghent, ‘when Mr. Cambel [Murray of Elibank’s alias] Came to fflanders and gave me en alarum’.251 The British government, it appears, neither thought of Charles as a harmless bogeyman, nor did it consider the Jacobite threat diminished. In spite of the attendant international scandal, Charles’ murder would indubitably have caused throughout the European kingdoms (but certainly in most Roman Catholic courts), the Pelham administration did not shy away from political assassination in the aftermath of the Elibank plot. The extremity of this measure of attentat, to which the British government was obviously willing to resort, begs the question of how feasible its members thought the possibility of another major Jacobite rising in the British Isles actually was. The suggestion offers itself that apparently at least some of the governing Whig oligarchs had not forgotten how close the Stuarts had come to overthrowing the Hanoverian establishment in 1745–46. The Jacobite leadership, however, incapacitated itself. Despite its attendant advantages in terms of freedom for action, the secession of the Prince’s party from the cumbersome, conservative, main stream


of Jacobitism accounts for part of the unsuccessful outcome. In May 1753, Lord George Murray expressed his concern at Dr Cameron’s imprisonment, which only a few months later turned into grief over his execution.252 James’ perturbed rejoinder to Lord George amounted to a confession of utter ignorance of his son’s affairs: he had no clue as to what the controversial contents of Archibald Cameron’s message could have been. Instead, James was perturbed by the Hanoverians’ harsh treatment of Lochiel’s brother, which definitely proves that he was a complete stranger even to the most overt trappings of Charles’ intrigues against the British.253 The absence of a concerted effort of all Jacobite factions to bring the Elibank plot to fruition, is thus at least partially responsible for the failure of the conspiracy.

Conclusion The feasibility of the Elibank plot cannot be assessed without understanding its heterogeneous nature. The Jacobite conspiracies of the early 1750s sponsored by the Prince’s party had one common denominator in that they shared an innovative, direct approach to a Stuart restoration, as opposed to previous projects, which invariably depended on the employment of foreign surrogates. This is true despite Frederick II’s shady support, for it never fully materialized. Though the Prussians were peripherally involved in the conspiracy, the Elibank plot collapsed before Frederick’s interest in the Jacobite card could be put to the test. In all other regards, Jacobite planning was as diverse as the people behind it. Thus, the attempt to find an encompassing answer concerning the viability of the project would almost certainly fail. However, individual strands of the Elibank plot are discernible, and therefore present a better target for a critical examination. As there existed a multitude of approaches to the execution of the conspiracies, two examples characteristic of the large-scale and low-intensity type plan should suffice for this speculative inquest. The invasion plans hinted at in Highland intelligence reports, and presented by James Mo´r in 1753, would have confronted the Prince’s party with immense logistical problems. The magnitude of the difficulties inherent in an amphibious attack on Britain would have necessitated the active support of at least one foreign power. After the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, France had been officially eliminated as a potential Jacobite abettor; Austria, as Britain’s long-time Continental ally, could definitely be ruled out as a sponsor for the Stuarts, while Catholic Spain, not unlike the Ottoman Empire, was in its decline as a first-rate power. In the mid-eighteenth century, Prussia was the only expanding state, whose aggressive foreign policy caused disharmony in the European concert. But even in the event that Frederick II would have committed his resources to a third Jacobite rising, could the Prussians have successfully invaded Britain?


The notion seems ridiculous in the light of ascendant British naval power. It is not Prussia in isolation we should consider, but the Prussian political network – in this case the political and diplomatic ties with Sweden and France, which were nursing their own grievances against the Hanoverian dynasts. Sweden coveted the return of the duchies of Bremen and Verden, ceded to Hanover at the Peace of Stockholm in 1719, while the rapid expansion of British settlements in North America and its trade operations in India threatened French possessions.254 For France, the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle represented no more than a breathing space in a protracted conflict for mercantile and colonial hegemony. Only one year after the conclusion of that treaty, Louis XV and his government were heavily implicated in Sir Hector MacLean’s scheme to invade Britain. Furthermore, Carl Fredrick Scheffer, Sweden’s ambassador to France and his Francophile party back home, the ‘Hats’, had, with the connivance of their king, Frederick I, abetted a plan to send an expeditionary force to Scotland during the ’Forty-five.255 With covert aid from Prussia’s allies, the Jacobites could have landed military stores and money in the Celtic fringes of the British archipelago to effect and sustain a rising, conventional or guerrilla, over several weeks, if not months. While government forces would have been tied down to quell the insurrection, reinforcements from across the North Sea, and maybe even from France, could have been landed at several locations. We should not forget that during the ’Forty-five, the French did manage to disembark a relief force on Scotland’s east coast, and it is evident that not even the Royal Navy was able to seal off all approaches to Scotland at all times: reinforcements would have gradually trickled in. Once an invading force established only one beachhead, supply lines to the indigenous Jacobites could probably have been opened. In this scenario, components of the Elibank plot come to the fore: first, the mobilization of the Highland clans, and the landing of a corps of Irish Jacobites on Scotland’s western seaboard; second, the clandestine import of contraband with the active support of the Prussians, and probably the connivance of the French256; third, the deployment of a Prusso-Swedish task force, and possibly the joint operation of that contingent with a covert French army most likely consisting of levies drawn from the Scottish and Irish regiments in French service. The template for such an operation can easily be found in Scheffer’s precedenting Swedish scheme with the Royal Sue´dois of 1745, and French troop deployment during that rising; if it were inverted, Franco-Jacobite troops could have trickled into the Swedish, and hence Prussian, service. If available in the second phase of such a plan, a Prussian corps could have easily marched along the Elbe and crossed into the annexed territories of Friesland, from where transports could carry Frederick’s troops across the North Sea; alternatively, the Prussians could also have been transported to Scotland by sea (via Gothenburg), where they could have disembarked in


one of the myriad fjord-like apertures on the western Scottish seaboard. That the British Navy could simply not be everywhere was clearly demonstrated by Thurot’s successful raid of the Western Isles and Ulster some six years after the Elibank plot.257 Moreover, the collaboration of many Franco-Irish privateers and British smugglers with Jacobite sympathies should also be taken into consideration, for they had first-hand knowledge of their islands’ coastal geography, and would probably have acted as scouts and pilots. The outcome of a multipronged attack on a probably undermanned and out-generalled British army facing a multitude of well armed, properly fed and resentful Highland irregulars, Franco-Jacobite veterans and a wellequipped Prusso-Swedish invasion force needs no further elaboration.258 The second example is of the low-intensity variant. This type of plan involved far less manpower, for it was essentially similar to a modern-day surgical strike, governed by a clearly defined objective, and directed against an individual or a small group of people. Was the abduction of George II possible? The answer must invariably be yes. If we are to believe Dr King, the general outline of the plan convinced the Prince of its feasibility.259 Dr King’s objection was that the preparations left something to be desired, but then he gave no indication of being aware of James Dormer’s arms purchases in Antwerp, or the English Jacobites’ claim that they could furnish plenty of men to execute the scheme, nor of Charles’ underhand negotiations with Scots officers in the Dutch service. Then we have Mr Segrave’s highly pertinent observation, recorded by Philip Thicknesse, on why he thought ‘that such an attempt was not impracticable’.260 The most puzzling mystery remains the conspirators’ sudden abortion of the attack on St James’ and the Tower on 10 November 1752. Unless new and clarifying evidence is found, this question cannot be answered. Finally, the abduction scheme is so convincing because of its logistical manageability; in fact, the small scale of this operation gave it a much better prospect of success than either a separate rising in a part of Britain, or an insurrection supported by a subsequent Prusso-Swedish invasion. The Prince’s party could count on Highland support; it had a feasible plan to hijack George II, and it is more than likely it enjoyed the sympathy of France and the covert support of Frederick II – possibly even that of his Scandinavian allies, Sweden and Denmark. In relation to Protestant interests hostile to George II, and the prevalent anti-Catholicism in Britain, Charles’ conversion to the Church of England bore much propagandistic value.261 Consequently, the successful combination of all three components, a third Jacobite rising in the Highlands, the invasion of Britain with reinforcements for the indigenous troops and the elimination of the Hanoverian monarch, would almost certainly have ensured an overall military victory for the Jacobites. But it was the nature of this very concept which ultimately led to the failure of the Elibank plot. The plot was never that; it was composed of several inherently diverging sub-plots that might have been brought to-


gether by careful planning. This, however, never happened because of the various Jacobite factions which pursued their own interests within the wider movement. The separation of the Prince’s party from the main stream of Jacobitism, and the tensions between Jacobite elite communities of different nationalities in the British Isles and in exile ensured that any productive dialogue would constitute a challenge to be reckoned with. James was a disappointed old man in the 1750s, who had further reduced the number of his followers by conniving at Henry’s abandonment of his dynastic duties in 1747. Charles himself had the verve to proceed, but was hampered by his own sense of honour, guilt for the debacle of the ’Forty-five and an amalgam of progressive and prejudicial notions, which rendered French aid for him, or another rising in Scotland led by him, impossible. The Prince’s hauteur in relation to his adherents’ wishes concerning Clementina Walkinshaw, and his excessive drinking, only exacerbated existing tensions. Aside from these general reasons for the failure of the plot, the divisive effect of the Locharkaig treasure, and Pickle’s disclosures also deserve some attention. The struggle for the French gold severely damaged the cohesion of the Lochaber clans, resulting in internecine struggles which left the Camerons in a shambles and at odds with various septs of clan Donald. The attendant rivalry, absence of mutual trust and treachery did much to undermine the prospects of the conspiracy’s success in Scotland.262 In the resulting strife, Pickle’s intervention proved instrumental for the further disintegration of the Jacobite geography of loyalty in the western Highlands. Andrew Lang first demonstrated that, to a considerable extent, it was his activity as a government spy which foiled the progress of the Elibank plot. The sensitive data supplied by him gave the ministry an advantage over the Jacobites, which would have allowed the government to take the appropriate measures if events had escalated. Lang’s investigation turned up much circumstantial evidence against Glengarry, but he found no conclusive proof of his guilt. The evidence found in the Pelham papers and used in this chapter has, almost one hundred years after the publication of his work, proven Lang’s thesis by positively establishing Pickle’s identity. If Pickle’s intelligence is to be taken into serious consideration, which, judging by the content and extent of his disclosures, the reaction of the ministry to them in the early 1750s and the ongoing posthumous dispute concerning his character, it apparently was and still is, the spy’s information on Prussian implication also gains weight. This leads us to our last correlated set of questions of how much the British government knew about Prussian collusion, and why it tried to bury its knowledge thereof with Archibald Cameron. This chapter has shown that the government’s diplomatic and military information channels provided the English ministry with an impressive amount of intelligence on the movement of Jacobite agents in the Highlands, the inner trappings of the Jacobites’ indigenous and exogenous


networks, and, through Pickle, James Mo´r and Glenevis, and maybe young Harrington, Major Kennedy, Samuel Cameron and Dr Cameron, about their plans. Newcastle made Prusso-Jacobite collaboration a policy consideration, and even a court gossip such as Horace Walpole suspected Frederick’s sympathy for the Stuart cause. All knowledge of Prussian involvement in the Elibank plot remained a guarded secret of the British government. As to the reason why the Pelham ministry was so intent on keeping it that way, this chapter has in the main already answered that question.263 Figuratively speaking, Prusso-British relations in the early 1750s would best be described as a powder-keg at the edge of a bonfire. At the time, it was not in the interest of the British government to ignite the fuse, and by extension create a political context which again would have furnished Prussia’s ally France with a pretext to reconsider the Jacobite option. Worse, the very proceedings of the Elibank conspirators had proven that the Jacobite threat was still very real.264 Moreover, there was a domestic consideration closely linked to the diplomatic struggle with Prussia. Whereas the Earls of Stanhope and Sunderland, and later Sir Robert Walpole, were all able to capitalize on the Jacobite threat as a result of the abortive Swedish and Atterbury plots, the Pelham ministry was either unable, or unwilling, to replicate its predecessors’ feat of artfully exploiting such a scare.265 If the context established in this chapter is considered, the assumption that George II and the Pelham ministry believed that the potential political gains by going public with the Elibank conspiracy were not commensurate with the drawbacks of implicating, and thereby antagonizing, Frederick II is plausible. If this assumption were used as the basis for further speculation about the reason why George II and his ministers chose not to capitalize upon a failed Jacobite conspiracy, then further, compelling reasons for their cover-up of the Elibank plot would become clear. It is likely that an alienated Frederick would have considered invading Hanover, and George II’s Electoral troops would have been no match for the best army of mid-eighteenth-century Europe. As King of Britain and Ireland, George II could not simply order a British army to the Continent; if he had tried to do so, he would have encroached upon rights jealously guarded by both Houses of Parliament. Of the last three monarchs who had tried to rule without parliamentary sanction, Charles I had lost his head, Charles II had been repeatedly confronted with serious political crises and James II was ultimately driven from his throne. Consequently, George II, in his capacity of Elector of Hanover, would have been forced to seek support from his British subjects. A forceful bid by the government for British military support in the defence of George II’s Continental possessions would almost certainly have further estranged the Tories and other isolationist elements in Parliament. The risk of a strong polarization in Parliament would then have become incalculable: the strife that followed in the wake of his predecessors’ fateful decisions to set their personal interest over the wishes of Parliament


could very well have served to remind George II of the potential consequences of setting the safety of Hanover before that of Britain. Finally, there was still a possible alternative to George II: a Protestant Stuart on the Continent, who had promised to respect the liberties of Parliament.

5 The Last Attempt: The Jacobites and the ’Fifty-Nine, 1756–1759

. . . as to any Invasion, in Spite of all the flat Bottoms Abroad, the French must have a broad Bottom here . . . 1

Introduction: The Context of the Seven Years’ War If any single development in European power politics decisively influenced the fortunes of the Jacobite movement in the years after the Elibank plot, it was the ‘Diplomatic Revolution’ of early 1756. As the renewed rise of Jacobite fortunes should be understood within a wider European context, a short recapitulation of the events leading up to, and following, this momentous development is appropriate. The British subsidy-treaty with Russia, concluded towards the end of 1755, increased the pressure on Prussia’s northeastern border and forced Frederick II to seek a rapprochement with his estranged uncle, George II. The Convention of Westminster (16 January 1756) stipulated that the signatories would endeavour to resist any attack on German territory; the treaty was designed to protect Hanover from French and Silesia from Imperial transgressions. This treaty precipitated the disintegration of the ‘Old System’ of English and subsequently British foreign policy: since the Dutch invasion of 1688 had placed William of Orange on the throne, the Habsburg alliance, dating from the days of the League of Augsburg (9 July 1686), had been regarded as the cornerstone of the Continental system against the French. The Empire’s role in the context of Williamite and Hanoverian policy since the late seventeenth century had been to contain and counteract French Universal Monarchy, and Louis XIV’s attendant policy of expanding France to its ‘Natural Frontiers’. To a lesser degree, the alliance with the other maritime power, the Dutch, was designed to check French expansion to the North. The principal consequence of the Anglo-Prussian defensive treaty was the alienation of Austria. Frederick II’s blatant breach of the Pragmatic Sanction, instituted as a guarantee for the maintenance of the Habsburg dominions by Emperor Charles VI before his demise, was given unequivocal force by the 120

The Last Attempt: Jacobites and the ’Fifty-Nine 121

Prussian invasion of Silesia in 1740. Prussian aggression had left in its wake a vengeful Austria, which was bent on regaining wealthy Silesia at all costs. Thus, hostility to the ascendant power of Prussia superseded enmity towards the Bourbons as the principal tenet of Imperial foreign policy. Britain’s new commitment to Prussia stood in glaring contrast to its traditional alliance with Austria. Despite the Duke of Newcastle’s reassurances, relations between London and Vienna cooled notably in early 1756.2 If the term ‘Diplomatic Revolution’ underlines the magnitude of events in the period between January and May 1756, the French ‘Renversement des Alliances’ conveys a better idea of what actually happened. As Frederick II drew into the British orbit, and thus ended more than a decade of lukewarm, if not hostile, relations with George II, Austria realigned with its traditional enemy, Bourbon France. The principal architect of the Habsburg-Bourbon de´tente after 1750, and subsequently, as a response to the Convention of Westminster, of the first defensive Treaty of Versailles (1 May 1756), was Maria Theresa’s ablest diplomat, Count Wenzel Anton Kaunitz.3 He endeavoured and managed to convince the Austrophobe French ministers to accede to the treaty by disclosing information about Frederick II’s duplicity. According to the stipulations of this treaty, the French and Austrians engaged to supply 24,000 troops each, or a commensurate subsidy in the event of an attack on their possessions.4 Acting on information about Austrian and Russian hostile intentions, Frederick II pre-emptively attacked the Saxon Electorate in August 1756. The Seven Years’ War had begun. Yet Prussia and Austria, whose concerns led both into political marriages of convenience with Britain and France respectively, were on the margins of a far more serious conflict. It is to Anglo-French relations, and the struggle for empire, we now turn. Since the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, which concluded the War of Austrian Succession (1740–48), both the English and the French understood that the peace was but a respite, an interval in the unresolved conflict for supremacy in Europe and the colonies. While hostilities on the Continent were resumed in 1756, growing tension in North America and the West Indies over territorial disputes in the previous year rendered the prospect of war between France and England a likely alternative to further negotiations. In fact, the rivals had been engaged in a running fight a year before Britain declared war on France (17 May 1756), and after Admiral Byng’s mission to relieve the naval base of Minorca ended in utter failure.5 The initial phase of the Seven Years’ War witnessed the fall of Minorca, the defeat of the Prussians at Kolin (18 June 1757) and the victory of the French under Louis Ce´sar Le Tellier, Comte d’Estreés over the Duke of Cumberland’s Army of Observation at Hastenbeck (26 July 1757). The man who had prided himself on routing a reduced, hungry and exhausted Jacobite army at Culloden eleven years earlier was forced to sign the humiliating Convention of Kloster Zeven (8, 9 and 10 September 1757).6 Kloster Zeven amounted to a Hanoverian


capitulation. To add insult to injury, Cumberland’s successor, Duke Ferdinand of Brunswick, repudiated the Convention eleven weeks later. At that point, the Duke of Newcastle would not even have attempted to prevent George II, though strictly in his electoral capacity, from concluding a separate peace with the Franco-Imperial enemy alliance.7 Under Cardinal de Bernis, who became French foreign minister in June 1757, the war-effort was at best a faint-hearted affair.8 French fortunes in the war suffered a drastic reversal with Frederick II’s unexpected victory at Rossbach in late 1757, and an allied success at Minden on 1 August 1759. In 1758, British advances in North America, which culminated in the fall of Louisbourg and the failure of the French expedition under the Jacobite Count Lally-Tollendal in India, forced France into a defensive position; a growing sense of desperation set in. It was not until Etienne François Choiseul, Duc de Choiseul replaced de Bernis at the helm in December 1758 that the French were again considering an offensive strategy, and Jacobitism consequently became a serious factor in French foreign policy.9 The setbacks in the colonies and Europe left France with two alternatives: first, to conclude a disadvantageous peace; second, to force the British out of the war by an invasion – and that meant playing, rather than brandishing, the Jacobite card. Choiseul’s target was Britain proper: he desired no less than to strike at the heart of the enemy by launching an invasion which would, by way of comparison, make Richelieu’s attempted expedition of 1744 pale into insignificance. Within this strategic context of the newly defined French war policy, which emerged as a direct consequence of the Diplomatic Revolution, Jacobitism was again considered as a viable option by its former ally. The negotiations between Charles Edward Stuart and the French ministers in the period between 1756 and 1759 have hitherto remained in almost complete obscurity.10 The purpose of this chapter is, on the one hand, to give a detailed account of the Franco-Jacobite plans and negotiations from the Jacobite viewpoint, and on the other hand, to demonstrate that Jacobite support for the invasion attempt was perceived and understood as a threat by the Hanoverian establishment. Charles Edward Stuart’s party played an important, hitherto underrated role in these negotiations; the Prince’s men were on occasion unwelcome, but necessary allies.11 Lastly, I will be making a point of showing that the Jacobites would have had reasonable prospects of success, had the French effected a cross-Channel invasion.

The State of the Jacobite Movement at the Beginning of the Seven Years’ War The most surprising circumstance relating to the Jacobites in exile was that they still existed as a relatively coherent interest-group at the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War. Though heterogeneous in terms of its composition, and its


members’ proneness to factious politics, the objective of a Stuart restoration continued to provide the Jacobite movement with a focus after Culloden. Clashes among individual Jacobites jockeying for position within the community of exiles did not significantly accelerate the attrition which ultimately consigned the movement to oblivion; factionalism had been a feature of the Jacobite diaspora since the days of St Germain-en-Laye. Aside from the prospering, resident Irish diaspora which had been well ensconced in the French, and other, military establishments after the flight of the Wild Geese in the early 1690s, the number of the Scots community had increased with the influx of Jacobite fugitives after the risings of 1715, 1719 and 1745.12 Since then, many of them had risen through the ranks of the French army. Besides the large number of veterans of the ’Forty-five, a new generation of Jacobites, bred to the military service, had grown into adulthood.13 Thus, John Cameron of Lochiel, heir to the ‘Gentle Lochiel’, had been serving as a captain for seven years in the French army by the time he was trying to enlist his sovereign’s support for a colonel’s brevet in 1753. Though serving in a foreign army, most Jacobites retained a strong sense of their allegiance, which defined their collective identity. Aware of Franco-Jacobite negotiations as he probably was, David, Lord Ogilvy, who had been a young man during the uprising in Scotland, wrote to Charles in late 1757, offering his services. Lord Ogilvy further assured the Prince: ‘that although I’m in this [the French] Service that it shall never interfeer with my Allegance to your Royal Family’.14 General Charles Edward Rothe equally offered to keep the Jacobite troops in French pay ‘in such discipline as to be ready at all times to be usefull to your interest’.15 Supporters of the Whig establishment in Scotland were well aware that the exiles had not given up hopes of coming ‘into their own’ again. As late as 1756, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald pointedly observed to the Earl of Hardwicke that ‘[t]he forfeited Familys of Perth, Lochiel & Strowan, and others, have either Children, or Relations, who still have an Eye to those Estates’.16 Division had ostensibly weakened the movement in the decade after Culloden. The schism of 1747, over Henry’s being created a Cardinal, had caused the Jacobites to align with either the conniving James in Rome, or his scandalized older son in Paris. Following his expulsion from the French dominions, the long incognito of the estranged Charles did little to weaken his resolve to effect a restoration of his family. A significant consequence of the years in the wilderness for Charles, and implicitly his partisans, was a growing sense of independence from the ailing King, and his shadow court. The importance of this unwelcome trend was not lost on James, who imputed his son’s protracted obduracy, and his refusal to countenance a return to Rome, to the bad influence of evil advisers. ‘[I] must conclude’, James wrote to his son in 1751, ‘that your conduct in all respects has been & is still directed by others’.17 In his repeated attempts to goad the rebellious Prince back into the fold of official Jacobitism, it was not beneath the exiled


monarch to instil Charles with the fear of treachery among his own ranks. James may not have realized that the Prince’s itinerant lifestyle and his continued obscurity were largely a consequence of Hanoverian persecution. British diplomats abroad assiduously reported on Charles’ movements, while repeated attempts on his life made his elusiveness a vital necessity.18 The English government’s policy of targeting Charles, rather than the sedentary, and therefore controllable, James at Rome, was based on the correct assumption that the Jacobite threat emanated from the Prince, and his scheming friends.19 Illustrative of this point is the almost complete absence of James’ various sobriquets in foreign diplomatic dispatches after the ’Fortyfive.20 The disadvantage of two separate parties within the Jacobite movement was that this situation could be used to adverse or positive effect by friend and foe alike. As Frank McLynn has pointed out, the Prince was aware that the French in 1758–59 were able to capitalize on the schism, arguing that they could not be expected to treat with the Jacobite court in exile and the Prince’s party at the same time.21 The long-term effects of the split, however, enabled the movement to retain an active character throughout the 1750s, without which it is questionable whether the Prince’s party would have been able to negotiate with the French from a position of relative authority. Though members of the Prince’s party, as individuals or as a collective, did not dare defy James openly, their deeds and attitudes spoke clearer than words. The one notable exception to this rule was the vociferous George Kelly.22 His denunciation of Henry’s alleged indolence during the ’Forty-five, promptly seconded by Charles, preceded and facilitated the ensuing split of 1747.23 It is not surprising that James singled the Irishman out for special treatment; he saw in Kelly an extension of his own beˆte noire, Sir Thomas Sheridan. Sheridan had been the Prince’s Protestant tutor, and, in James’ eyes, the incarnation of everything that had gone wrong with the ’Forty-five. Kelly’s partisanship, however outspoken, should not be seen in isolation, for the most scathing criticism of Henry’s elevation to the purple was penned by William Drummond of Balhaldy, one of James’ senior adherents.24 To think that there was a widespread consensus on this issue among the otherwise contentious Jacobites is probably no idle speculation. Essentially, Charles’ conversion to the Church of England was a political step; he could not condone his family’s genuflections towards Rome, and retain his credibility in the eyes of his predominantly Protestant adherents of, or in, Britain.25 Charles and his advisors had long since grasped the importance of remodelling the ‘Pretender’s’ public image. In the early 1750s, James’ staunch Catholicism had, in the eyes of some, once more become a political liability. Elucidating the divergence within the Jacobite diaspora is an anonymous memorial of late 1753, obviously intended for circulation within Charles’ retinue, which advised the Prince not to return to Rome in case of his father’s demise. Its tone is reminiscent of the secular


ideas disseminated by the Politiques of the sixteenth century, and, notably, marks a clear departure from the religio-dynastic discourse commonly employed during the halcyon days of Non-Juring and Jacobite political argument in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries: All the World seems now convinc’d that the Prince is really and truly Protestant, and the people of Britain can form no objection against him upon the Score of Religion; – but if he Shou’d go to Rome upon the Kings Death, it is easy to imagine what Constructions his Enemies will put upon such a Step, and what pains they will take to convince the World that he has been all along attach’d to the Roman Church in his heart . . . and it may happen that the prejudice against the Prince upon that Account shall be at the highest pitch at the critical moment that the Nation shall be forc’d to make Some extraordinary Effort . . . From this Consideration alone we humbly inferr that H.R.H. shou’d never Set his foot upon Italian ground.26 Religion, in other words, could not be allowed to interfere with the political realities underlying a potential restoration.27 Patricia Kneas-Hill appropriately juxtaposed Henri IV’s alleged, famous utterance with the politically expedient conversion of his descendant Charles, remarking that if Paris was worth a Mass to the former, the Thirty-Nine Articles were a small price to pay for the latter.28 The French, who had realized this by 1755, apprehended that the long exile ‘would . . . prevent any of its [the Stuarts’] Descendants from attempting any thing against the Libertys or Religion of the People’.29 A perceptible attitudinal shift had taken place since the early days of Jacobitism. The hard-nosed political pragmatism that replaced the earlier doctrinal precepts in the post-Culloden era forced a new generation of Jacobites to jettison the moribund legacy of divine right.30 What remained was legal legitimism. Furthermore, this development undermined the allegiance of Jacobite activists to an ailing monarch, who had long since given up three crowns for his religion, and, hence, any hope of success. The emancipation of the Prince’s party was a consequence of the schism of 1747, and the subsequent years away from the official Jacobite fold. Paradoxically, the split which should have weakened the movement by reducing its strength, instead engendered a climate in which the Prince’s fledgling party grew into political adulthood. In the process, Charles’ men emerged as the principal actors of the Franco-Jacobite negotiations before the large-scale French invasion attempt of November 1759. The Prince’s determination to be master of his own affairs, despite the civil relations resumed with his father in 1756, becomes clear in the following exchange. James’ undisguised scepticism in connection with his son’s activities, and the sour tenor in his correspondence, suggest that he was excluded ˆ ye French Matter has from the unofficial proceedings with the French. ‘Tho


not as yet Come to a Dessiscion,’ Charles wrote to his father in November 1757, ‘I Cannot but think they must come to one Soon, and in favour of our Friend Vincent [a restoration].’31 The infuriatingly general tone in which Charles referred to his affairs, hit a raw nerve in the exiled monarch: ‘I was expecting it [Charles’s letter] with impatience, and I own I am disappointed to find it contains nothing more material . . . For my part, I see I must be entirely useless to you at The Court of France’.32 James’ complaint in the same letter about the Prince’s ‘mysteries & Secrets’, and his caustic remark about English Jacobites – that if they could not satisfy the prerequisites set by the French for a landing, ‘they do not exist, or . . . have little Spirit’ – only advertised the fact that he was not in the secret. Charles’ riposte is representative of the position he assumed for almost the entire duration of the Franco-Jacobite negotiations. ‘It is not at all easy to persuade Wake [Charles] of the Sincerity of Forster [the French], he has as he Says deseived him so often, how Can he trust him, without Such assurances as are not Equivocal?’33 His answer served the twofold purpose of impressing upon his father that he had no intention of letting the French manipulate him, and of insinuating that he did not need his advice on the matter. This time, Charles was determined to go his own way.

A Genealogy of Jacobite Plans, 1754–1759 In the wake of the Elibank affair, several other Jacobite plans for an eventual restoration of the Stuarts took shape. Of course, many of these conspiracies proved chimerical, but they sufficed to keep a spirit of hope alive within the movement in general, and the Prince’s party in particular. With the advantage of hindsight, this could be singled out as their most important function. Of more immediate importance to the Jacobites in exile was the intelligence gathered for the schemes in progress, which kept them apprised of the state of their English and Scots partisans in Britain. More generally, Jacobite schemes of the years before the renewed collaboration with the French in 1756–59 contributed to the plans finally laid out for the ’Fifty-nine. Therefore, it is to their precedents that we now turn. For the Jacobites in exile, the major dangers were vested in the time-factor, and the commensurately waning interest in their cause at home. A growing sense of urgency was reflected in their plans. There was, however, an inadvertent, but positive side-effect. Despite the bloody reminder of their continued presence of 1745–46, the character of the Jacobite exiles’ plans emphasized the growing sense that time was running out for them, as their cause gradually passed into recorded memory. Conversely, the ingenuity and versatility of the schemes hatched after 1754, and the frequency with which they were presented to the Jacobite leadership, indicate that the movement was still thriving – considering the adverse conditions it laboured under. As far as the Hanoverian establishment was concerned, an active Jacobite fac-


tion in exile determined to play the game of diplomacy for their own ends, constituted a focused and hostile political force beyond their immediate reach. Worse, the Jacobites could and would, if given the opportunity, raise the spectre of rebellion and civil war again. Jacobite plans on how a Stuart restoration should be effected diverged. Even among the Prince’s party there was little consensus. This was not necessarily a disadvantage, and furnished the Prince’s party with plenty of ideas in 1758–59. Indeed, most of the schemes were, at least in theory, practicable. For example, Aeneas MacDonald, the Franco-Jacobite banker whose fall from the Prince’s grace could not curb his enthusiasm for the cause, in early 1754 submitted a proposal which clearly favoured the option of a Scottish descent. Following the failure of a purely offensive strategy of the Elibank plot, MacDonald reverted to the idea of using internal British weakness to aid the Jacobites. He encouraged Charles to make an attempt ‘[d]uring the dissolution of the Parliament’.34 The moment, MacDonald argued, was demonstrably propitious for a Jacobite venture, but thought the English Jacobites unfit for a rising. For the sum of £100,000 Charles should endeavour to create an interest in Parliament. One Jacobite MP was to arrange the election of suitable candidates.35 A high-ranking British army officer, whose anonymity was preserved by the memorialist, with an unspecified number of his colleagues offered to second military operations. The conspirators serving in the British army were willing to disclose their identities, but, alas, not in writing.36 In Scotland, MacDonald’s intention was to arrange a second coming of the ‘Bonnie Prince’; he was obsessed with the idea of resuming the struggle against the Hanoverians where the Jacobite army had left off in 1746. ‘Skillful persons in a mercantile way’, were to negotiate a secret loan of over £200,000 in order to buy arms and ammunition, and one or two vessels under some pretext.37 Charles was to land, as in August 1745, with only a few officers and arms. For according to MacDonald’s computation, at least 8,950 clansmen would rally to the Stuart standard. His estimation excluded Lowland troops.38 Whether MacDonald’s proposal was shelved, or simply forgotten is not clear; it is probable that he submitted his plans to the French ministry at the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War.39 Therefore, it could have had an immediate influence on the French conception of the Jacobites’ role in their own plans. The problem with MacDonald’s scheme was that Charles would never agree to any invasion not principally aimed against the English capital. He had, as early as 1746, perceived the ‘fallacy’ of a Scottish expedition, rejected Lochiel’s solid proposal for a rerun of the ’Forty-five in April 1747, and was since operating in the belief that his cause would stand or fall by the capture of London.40 In time, and because of French attempts to fob him off with promises of a more limited nature, this idea assumed an axiomatic character in the Prince’s mind.41 Charles’ stubborn refusal to consider Scotland or Ireland as potential targets would create an insurmountable obstacle for


closer Jacobite involvement in the ensuing negotiations with the French. MacDonald’s attempt at resuscitating Lochiel’s Scottocentric contribution to Jacobite planning did little enough to change the Prince’s mind. Charles’ fixation on London as the prime strategic target continued to hold sway over the arguably more practicable plan of a descent on Scotland. The Highland clans, however, did continue to play a critical role in his considerations. As if he wanted to test the veracity of MacDonald’s claim of Highland resilience, Charles ordered Lochgarry to sound out the sentiments of the pro-Stuart clans.42 Upon his return, he did suggest that he had news of considerable import. Lochgarry stated that he was only authorized to disclose the details of his message to the Prince in person, because he was bound by the ‘Stricktest Secrecy . . . under ye Strongest Oaths religion and honour Coud Invent’.43 Indeed, Jacobite Intelligence, and British apprehensions, indicate that ten years after Culloden there was unabated and widespread disaffection in the Highlands.44 In September 1755, the exiled chief Duncan Robertson of Struan advanced an idea which was modelled on Marshal Maurice de Saxe’s plan of 1744. According to his analysis, the basic problem with the French navy was the insufficiency of their vessels, and their subjection to constant surveillance by the superior Royal Navy. To evade the enemy’s detection, and to keep the tactical advantage of making direct landfall, the French again needed to employ flat-bottomed vessels for an amphibious operation. Robertson knew where to obtain these specialized carriers and how to use them to maximum advantage: I imagine it wou’d not be impossible to borrow Transports, at least for a part of the Embarkation. I look upon it as almost certain, and it was confidently told me upon the Spot two years ago, that the Chief men in the Province of Zeeland wou’d risk a great deall to get rid of the Stadtholdership that was cramm’d down their Throats last War; Now, they think the S[t]adholdership wou’d fall but for the Influence of the Brunswick Family. Zeeland is furnish’d with a prodigious Number of the Stoutest Boats at least on this Side of Europe, I mean their fishing Boats, pilote Boats & what they call Bilanders, which are by far fitter for our purpose than ships of Burden; they are flat bottom’d to humour their own Coasts, and can run into Creeks & upon Shoals where no Ship can Approach them. There are likewise in this province Numbers of Scots and English Sailors that deal in the Smuggling Business, and consequently good Pilots for the east Coast of Great Britain. If the French were in good earnest they have officers of Sufficient Ability to make proper use of those Circumstances, which wou’d remove a part of the Difficulty of transporting Troops.45 An exhaustive account published by the Hanoverian double-agent, Oliver MacAllester, in 1767, which pertained to the Duke of Choiseul’s projects


involving flat-bottomed boats during, and after, the ’Fifty-nine, demonstrates that the French considered such an idea not merely practical, but actually implemented it.46 Would the French, however, do more than listen to the Jacobites? In fact, there were plenty of indicators for French willingness to consider the Jacobites as an asset in case of an invasion. That the French employed people among their own ranks with known Jacobite sympathies as gobetweens is suggestive of their cooperative stance. The day after Britain’s declaration of war against France, Thomas, Count Lally, a Franco-Irish general, who had been appointed commander of the coastal district in the Bollognois, asked to see Charles incognito in Normandy or Flanders. His intention was to discuss the details of a future plan of monumental proportions. To ‘keep england in a constant ferment’, the French had 70,000 men massed on the Breton, Norman and Flemish coasts: 60,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry, all of which would be encamped by 1 July 1756.47 A fleet of 500–600 boats and transport vessels, and ‘also an immense number of all warlike stoars such as canon, mortars[,] gunns’ were located in Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne, Dieppe, Havre, St Malo, Granville and Brest. The latest political shiftings at Versailles, and Britain’s pugnacious bearing, had made the prospect of open French support for the Stuarts as likely as in 1744–46. Lally’s intimate knowledge of French court politics allowed him to see through the veil of ministerial prevarication. Thus, he assured Charles: that if they could doe without you they would, yett as things may change in a moment & that even we are here in a dayly expectation of englands declaring war, who knows but ye least unhappy accident happening to france may determine her to send a body of troops over & to apply underhand to ye [R. H.] . . . I find they would not be aversed to ye venturing in a body of 8 or 10000 men either in Scotland or ireland, & I prevailed so far with them as to oblidge them to provide a number of 6000 sabres & as many coats which will be ready on some part of our coasts before ye first of september.48 The crux of the entire affair was that Charles refused to lend his name to an invasion of Scotland or Ireland. In any case, Lally did not think the French would free the necessary 30,000–40,000 troops for an invasion of England, unless the Jacobites could land a major intelligence coup by infiltrating the Royal Navy, or obtain information about the state of the armed forces in Britain. Given past experiences in the realm of espionage, and despite the incoming stream of data from their spies based in England and Scotland, such a spectacular success on the part of the Jacobites was unlikely, but not impossible.49 The greatest misfortune for the Prince’s party was the loss of so able a man as Lally: in the same year he was appointed commander-in-chief of the ill-fated expedition sailing for India.50 Yet before Lally’s departure, in


November 1756, the Prince met with him and the Duc de Richelieu to discuss plans in Paris.51 What emerged clearly from the discussion was the French concern with the war in Germany; the time for a restoration attempt had not yet come. Of the many invasion plans that surfaced during the initial phase of the Seven Years’ War, one in particular gave Charles and his partisans the confidence to stand up to the French in the negotiations of 1758–59. Responsible for the sensitive data and the overall plan was an obscure Jacobite agent, and his indefatigable efforts to come up with a tangible plan for the projected descent on Britain. William Stewart, 9th Baron Blantyre had been deeply implicated in the Franco-Jacobite plot of 1745, connived at by Karl Fredrick Scheffer, the Swedish ambassador to France, to bring a contingent of approximately 1,000 Swedish troops to Charles’ aid in Scotland.52 The first trace of Blantyre’s participation in the ’Fifty-nine appears in a report of 10 April 1758, sent to Charles by his agent in Brussels, Peter Wood.53 The Prince was told that Blantyre had a few propositions to make. His credentials were vouched for by both Wood and Alexander Murray of Elibank. Murray was probably referring to Blantyre when he informed Charles on 29 September that he had finally located the right person to negotiate with the English Jacobites on their behalf.54 Two weeks earlier, Blantyre, who had just concluded a reconnaissance mission in Britain, requested an audience with the Prince.55 The prolific Blantyre submitted numerous memorials and intelligence reports. The only possible way he could have obtained the sensitive information contained therein, was his making use of Jacobite contacts in Britain. Blantyre’s astounding compendium of knowledge suggests, if anything, that an unspecified number of contributing collaborators and sympathizers must have either been well established members of British state institutions, the army and the Royal Navy, or were otherwise given access to sensitive information of the kind this spy supplied to the exiles in France.56 Blantyre’s intelligence is too vast and detailed to be considered the work of a single individual.57 In the course of his journey, Blantyre had been anything but idle: his intelligence supplied the Jacobite exiles with precise figures of the enemy’s army establishment on the Continent, including the strength of garrisons, and the independent companies in British service.58 Blantyre’s sterling service to the cause extended to putting the usually amorphous invasion plans in concrete terms. In two separate documents, he carefully weighed all arguments for and against a landing at the place William of Orange had chosen in 1688. The surf on this coast could easily delay the disembarkment of troops, which would prove disastrous, as Portsmouth, Plymouth and the Isle of Wight, all major English naval bases, were situated in close proximity. British defences could be mobilized while the invaders wasted their time waiting for the unpredictable Channel waters to calm. Even if a landing


could somehow be effected, Charles would find himself in the midst of a region hostile to his cause. If a French fleet cruising off the English shore were sighted, his enemy would take care to denude the countryside of all cattle, thus forcing the invaders to forage. The consequential delays would allow the British to retrench, and worse, Hanoverians would still hold the capital.59 Milford Haven lay equidistant from Brest, with the notable difference that the west coast provided ideal conditions for a landing. The attacking squadrons’ only likely contender was the British Channel fleet, for the location of the naval bases which rendered a descent upon Cornwall unlikely would, according to this plan, work in favour of the invaders. Also, the Welsh were still considered loyal to the Stuarts, and could easily procure a sizable amount of horses and victuals.60 After a successful landfall, the FrancoJacobite troops would have to seize all the urban centres in the West with the utmost celerity. Oxford was mentioned as the best possible base of operations after the initial thrust, being ‘only 52 miles from London’.61 A decisive battle fought near London would force the enemy to retire into the confines of the capital, while French detachments sent to seize Bristol, Worcester, Coventry, Birmingham and the arsenal lodged at Warwick would ensure a Franco-Jacobite superiority in the Midlands. Following the ancient stratagem of divide et impera, a simultaneous diversionary uprising in Scotland should force the British high command to concentrate on more than one theatre of war, and thus substantially weaken the enemy’s inevitable counter-offensive. Also, the loss of one battle would not stem the tide of the Franco-Jacobite onslaught, as they would still be able to retreat into any of the occupied territories, and receive reinforcements from Wales and Scotland. As an afterthought, Blantyre recommended the use of 5,000 Swiss mercenaries, as they were better suited to the climate. This last snippet of information strongly points to a brumal invasion schedule, an assumption borne out by the French attempt in November 1759. The Scottish section of Blantyre’s master-plan envisioned the disembarkation of 3,000–4,000 troops at the Clyde estuary. An anonymous memorialist specifically earmarked the Irish Brigades for service in Scotland.62 The French regulars should take care to eschew all engagements with the enemy, but instead concentrate on a siege of Edinburgh castle, and upon landing commence with the conscription of the Highland clans, until they had assembled a body of 20,000–25,000 men. The exact words used by Blantyre for the latter endeavour were ‘Press, or take by force’ – a notorious practice used with some success during the ’Fifteen and the ’Forty-five.63 The Scottish levies would have to be organized into units. A draft plan of Blantyre’s projected the embodiment of eleven Lowland and clan regiments, amounting to at least 13,500 men.64 Many prominent Jacobite exiles, such as the Lords Strathallan, Nairne and MacLeod, Ewan MacPherson of Cluny, young Lochiel, Ranald MacDonald of Clanranald, Lochgarry, Lord


Kilmarnock’s heir, Mr Boyd, Lockhart of Carnwath and Hay of Drumelzier were to receive commissions in the Scottish corps.65 Blantyre himself petitioned Charles for a command in a regiment of Guards.66 According to the memorialist’s plan, a detachment consisting of only 500–1,000 northbound men should raise the MacLeans of Mull, march on Inveraray and subsequently secure the capital of the Highlands. When the Franco-Jacobite forces initiated their land offensive, the Scottish diversion would have to be well under way, as the Highland clans hostile to a restoration would otherwise be given time to defect to the Hanoverians. Blantyre especially feared that a prolonged civil war would be the inevitable consequence of any tardy action on the part of either one of the Franco-Jacobite corps in Britain.67 Once Scotland was firmly in the hands of the Jacobites, institutions of civil government were to be installed with all haste. The preUnion Privy Council was to be re-established and consist of six peers of the realm and four gentlemen, who would issue the writs for a convocation of the estates of a newly constituted Scottish parliament in Charles’ name. Among the candidates for high office were the Earls Marischal, Airlie and Cromarty, the lords Pitsligo, Strathallan, Elibank and Lockhart of Carnwath and, of course, Blantyre himself.68 In conclusion, it is noteworthy that the final version of Choiseul’s plan in 1759, with the exception of the additional descent on Ireland already mentioned by De la Tournelle in 1757, so closely resembled that of Blantyre.69 In fact, the similarity is such that it begs the question whether the French scenario was influenced by Jacobite intelligence and planning. The ‘genealogy’ of plans above, tracing the development of invasion schemes, bears out the origins of some of the main ideas intended to be used in an attempt on Britain, and gives an impression of the energy of the Jacobites.

The Franco-Jacobite Negotiations, 1757–1759 Following the Convention of Westminster, Jacobite fortunes were on the rise. As early as October 1755, British intelligence had detected serious signs of a Franco-Jacobite rapprochement; rumours of a match between Charles and a daughter of France abounded.70 That the Jacobites themselves were fully conscious of the altered circumstances can be gleaned from their own analysis of the situation in early 1756. On 24 February, secretary Edgar told Lord George Murray that war had been declared in all but name; the French, he argued, would again look to the Stuarts in the coming struggle.71 The former Jacobite general concurred. As the French had not divided their forces by sending an army against Hanover, the Jacobites could now expect Louis XV’s backing for their plans. In anticipation of the unfolding events, Lord George figured that an attack on the British naval base at Minorca would divide the enemy’s forces still more than they already were, due to colonial tensions.72 As a consequence, he speculated that ‘the British coast will not be always


guarded’.73 In August, Frederick II invaded Saxony, and thus precipitated the Continental war. One of the most critical questions about the ’Fifty-nine is whether the French were serious about involving the Jacobites in their plans to invade Britain. Claude Nordmann argues that Jacobitism was an instrument, albeit an unwieldy one, in the hands of Choiseul.74 In any case, the French position on the Jacobites as partners in trade had always been equivocal. As in 1743–46, Louis XV’s councillors were divided on the question of supporting the Jacobites.75 According to a British intelligence report of 1755, the French meant to use the Jacobites for their own purposes, but were afraid of a restored Stuart monarchy under Charles, it therefore: being a fixed Sistem, or Principle, in the Council; that ’tis not the interest of France that the house of Stuart shoud ever be restored, as it would only unite the three Kingdoms in one body against Them; then England would have no exterior Interest to mind, and the sufferings of that Familly, would in all human probability, prevent any of its Descendants from attempting any thing against the Libertys or Religion of the People.76 This statement, however, is to be juxtaposed with this intelligencers’ assertion that ‘[w]hen all measures fail they imagin they have a sure card to play, which is that of landing a body of about ten, or twelve, thousand Men in England, with the young Chevalier at their Head’.77 In other words: if desperate enough, the French were quite willing to play, rather than brandish, the Jacobite card.78 But Charles demanded substantial support. Conversely, the French ministers wanted Charles to invade the Celtic fringe with fewer troops, and content himself with the crowns of Scotland and Ireland.79 After Charles refused to cooperate in March 1756, unless his demand of 15,000–20,000 troops was met, the French ministry, in need of a Stuart leader, tried to persuade the weary James to travel to Paris. James refused, pleading his health. This meant that the French had to treat with Charles. Despite these tensions, the British too, realized the importance of a Jacobite accession to the French invasion effort.80 In the following year, French reactions strongly indicated that a seaborne operation against the common enemy was, if not in the making, then at least a realistic future prospect. A French memorial suggests that the Jacobites featured prominently in the planning of the 1757 campaign. Anticipating Choiseul’s grand strategy in 1758–59, this French scheme was planned on a massive scale. Aside from a simultaneous invasion of Ireland and Scotland, the plan envisioned a landing in England at Torbay, another one at St David in Wales and a two-pronged attack on London, which was to be preceded by a descent on Bristol.81 Jacobite hopes also centred upon Louis Charles Auguste Fouquet, MarećhalDuc de Belle-Isle, who was an important and driving force behind the


late French political tendency of rapprochement with the champions of the Stuart cause. Allied to James’ in-laws (the Sobieskis) by his second marriage, he was a staunch supporter of the exiled monarch.82 Between late November 1755 and mid-January 1756, Belle-Isle sent Charles a letter by way of the Franco-Jacobite agent, Alexander-Peter Mackenzie-Douglas of Kildin.83 According to Mackenzie-Douglas’ report, the contents of Belle-Isle’s missive justified the Jacobites’ most fantastic expectations. Louis XV’s interests were again in alignment with those of the Prince’s party. The French wanted to conclude a treaty with the Jacobites. The formalization of their relation, they hoped, would encourage the English Jacobites, and animate their will to prepare for the coming struggle.84 On 16 May 1756, Louis XV elevated BelleIsle to the position of minister of state. He met the Prince near Evreux, at the Chaˆteau de Navarre, and impressed upon his host the importance of an undertaking. In Belle-Isle, the Jacobites had a powerful friend and advocate of their cause in the French king’s highest council. Despite the recent change of fortune, Charles seems to have been rather reluctant to accept the capricious French as potential allies. Ever since his expulsion in 1748, he deemed his former allies unworthy of his trust. In early March 1757, Belle-Isle relayed a complaint to Charles about the sluggish progress of negotiations with the Jacobites.85 Prodding his master, Alexander Murray of Elibank proposed to travel to England in order to stir up the Jacobites there, and encouraged the Prince to ‘make use of the advantages that seem to present’ themselves.86 Impressing ‘the vast importance, of being active at this time’, Murray proceeded to argue that as all his friends were then attending Parliament, Charles ought to issue to his English supporters the final instructions necessary to end his ‘Lawsuit’. Surprisingly enough, Murray obtained the Prince’s authorization for the mission on 19 May 1757.87 Murray was to travel from Paris via Sedan and Marche to Lie`ge, where he was instructed to stay at the Hotel des E´tats Nobles, and expect further directions from a Mr Smith.88 The meeting with Smith was acknowledged by Murray in his report of 4 June 1757.89 During the following summer, all contact between master and servant ceased, until Murray resurfaced, writing from Lie`ge towards the end of the year.90 Apparently a proposal was in the making, for on 19 December, the Prince sent Murray his corrections of a text evidently belonging to a memorial intended for the French court. Charles especially resented Murray’s description of him as an ally of Louis XV, because of ‘ye great divertion he made at that time [1745–46], of which they [the French] only reped ye advantage’.91 Murray defended the formulation in his composition, explaining that he did not consider it wise to insinuate the slightest note of reproach to potential allies; and this was all the more important, as the contents of the draft had already been divulged to a member of the French ministry, who would, in turn, surely present it to Louis XV. The document had already ‘produced a very good effect’, and Charles should therefore reconsider his position – also,


because the French were not yet convinced of Jacobite support in Britain.92 Belle-Isle’s friendly reminder of Louis XV’s well-meaning disposition, and Murray’s comment that the Bourbon king actually regretted the Prince’s forcible and humiliating removal in 1748, were both designed to nudge Charles towards a reconciliation with France.93 The culmination of Murray’s effort probably manifested itself in the shape of the memorial submitted to the Dauphin, a remonstrance of sorts, intending to clear French prejudices against English Jacobite potential. The argument presented by Murray is notable for its sophistication. With the consummate skill of an experienced politician, he set out to unveil the fallacy behind the threadbare claim of Charles’ detractors at Versailles, that the Jacobites enjoyed but minimal support in England. As a rule, the grossly disproportional representation prevalent throughout the British kingdoms, but especially vested in the rotten boroughs, did not reflect a true image of the geography of loyalty. The towns and the country, Murray assured the Dauphin, were clearly opposed to Hanoverian rule. He therefore proposed a new attempt at restoring the Stuarts. With 25,000 men, and a sufficient amount of money, which would be reimbursed once the Prince had come into his own, the memorialist explained, the scheme had a realistic prospect of success, for Charles could depend on at least half of the British establishment to rally behind him.94 Frustratingly enough, a specific answer to, or at least an acknowledgement for, this memorial has not survived; but the negotiations concerning the nature and extent of the alliance between the French and the Jacobites grew more animated, and increasingly complex. Belle-Isle was appointed secretary of the Department de la Guerre on 3 March 1758, and immediately informed both Charles and James of his promotion; he assured son and father of his zeal for their cause.95 While Murray conducted his project in England and Versailles, other agents on the Jacobite side set foot upon the stage, on which the events leading to the ’Fifty-nine would be acted out. Robert MacCarthy, 5th Earl of Clancarthy, had no doubt that the time was ripe for action.96 Charles selected Clancarthy, who was experienced in naval affairs, and ranked high in the pecking order of the Jacobite diaspora, for a representative appointment at the French court, and, in late autumn of 1757, informed Belle-Isle of his choice.97 In December 1757, the preliminary negotiations with the French began in earnest. On the 11th, Kelly informed Charles that Clancarthy was to meet with Belle-Isle. The man who would provide him an entreé at Versailles was Anthony Vincent Walsh, first Lord Walsh, the shipbuilder and slave-trader from Nantes.98 Then, Kelly’s dispatch warned Charles that a problem had cropped up: Cambel [Murray] was, it seems, beforehand with him [Belle-Isle] and convinced Legrange [Rouille´?] that he had a power to act, which if Palmer


[Walsh] had known, would have prevented his application; in this case it will be best for Mr. Burton [Charles] to assign them their different parts, that they may not clash with each other; for when two Sollicitors apply to the same person, it gives him a bad opinion of one at least if not both . . . Palmer is very well with Cambel but never communicates any of [his] dealings to him . . . I wish these applications may have the desired Success; but am afraid that so many agents may thwart one another.99 Despite Murray’s meddling, Clancarthy reported favourably about the interview with Belle-Isle. The French minister had promised to present a letter to Louis XV, presumably written by Charles, and report back to Clancarthy, as soon as he could produce any results.100 Walsh and Clancarthy had established a successful first contact with the French. Notably, both had perfect pedigrees as members of the Prince’s party. Clancarthy displayed his own fractiousness by blackening his opportunistic Scottish co-partisan. ‘I can say nothing of his heart’, he wrote to Charles after Christmas, ‘but have no opinion at all of his Head . . . he must be managed as it may be in his power to do harm’.101 Even if he were right about Murray, it must be remembered that when the Jacobites were offered a chance to strike at their enemy through their French allies during the ’Forty-five and after, it had been internal friction within the Jacobite ranks that had sped up the termination of Franco-Jacobite cooperation. Charles’ refusal to recall Murray, or his other ‘independent’ operative, Daniel O’Heguerty, must have chagrined Kelly, Walsh and Clancarthy.102 The Prince would not risk ‘disobliging both’.103 In his instructions to Clancarthy, however, he used a very different language: ‘You will do very well not to Let him Know whatever private things you may Learn Concerning Burton’s Lawsute [Stuart restoration] but do not Let him perceive it, for it might be of Bad Consequence’.104 Kelly came round to the Prince’s way of thinking, commenting that ‘the people they [Murray and O’Heguerty] deal with, will soon discover they act without authority’105 Belle-Isle again met with Clancarthy and Walsh on the 23rd, and recommended they approach the rising force, and Rouille´’s likely successor in the foreign ministry, François Joachim, Abbe´ de Bernis. Walsh suggested writing to the Abbe´, which Charles did.106 The result of the subsequent interview with de Bernis was symptomatic for the policy pursued by the new minister. Louis XV, de Bernis’ pointed out to the Jacobite delegation, was anxious his favourite, the Duc de Richelieu, should succeed in Germany. But, Clancarthy reported, ‘if he [Louis XV] gets the better of that We may hope that he will cordially assist Burton [Charles].107 Unfortunately, de Bernis was not an enthusiastic supporter of the Jacobites, nor a determined statesman. A recent biographer referred to him as ‘the best in a bad lot’.108 While de Bernis was at the helm in 1758, French priorities lay with the war in Germany.109


The new year saw a few significant changes in the organization and disposition of the Jacobites. Charles’ scepticism towards the French became glaringly obvious when he refused to settle in France after the outbreak of the war. Captain John Holker of Ogilvy’s regiment, always a frank commentator, warned the Prince that his remaining at Lie`ge could easily be misconstrued by his enemies at Versailles.110 His life, O’Heguerty pointed out to the Prince, was not safe beyond the French dominions, where he would be ‘Shelterd and out of [his] adversary’s reach’.111 In order not to lose his face in the eyes of his supporters, his actions had to be consistent with the image of a Prince injured by the French. The new abode of his choice was the perfect compromise. He decided to move to Bouillon, the fief of his relative, Charles-Godefroy, Duc de Bouillon. ‘I thought proper to Come here’, Charles told Pierre Andre´ O’Heguerty in May, ‘as being nearer to France, and so more Convenient for Correspondence in case things turned out to become favourable.’112 The Prince adopted the incognito of ‘Le Baron Douglas’, a Scots gentleman who had participated in the ’Forty-five; he was generously provided with the Chaˆteau de Carlsbourg by the Duc de Bouillon.113 There was another reason for the Prince’s decision to settle in Bouillon. The Duc de Bouillon was well connected at Versailles, and the notion that he could solicit on behalf of the Jacobites could not have been far from Charles’ mind. Kelly, who had sounded the Duc de Bouillon, opined that he would be glad to accept the commission if the Prince sent him a ‘procuration in form’.114 Charles, who had initially made the suggestion himself, refused Kelly’s request at first. He probably moderated his position, as a duplicate conferring plenipotentiary powers on the Duc de Bouillon and the Prince de Turenne, with whom he was assiduously exchanging pleasantries, has survived. He even told Kelly that ‘Mr Douglas [Charles] has not ye Least repugnance as to Newland’s [the Duc de Bouillon’s] Acquainting Ellis [Louis XV] [of his presence] [but] in that case not to make it publick’.115 The sanguine Duc de Bouillon threw himself into his new task as early as February, and even enjoyed the confidence of the rival factions among the Prince’s negotiators. ‘I yesterday saw Newland [the Duc de Bouillon]’, Clancarthy relayed in his next report, ‘who was just come from Mr. Ellis [Louis XV], Masterson [Madame de Pompadour], and Sackville [the Dauphin] . . . there was nothing in their Power, that Mr. Burton [Charles] might not Command’.116 When the Prince initially balked at investing Bouillon with the power to deal with the French court, Murray protested that ‘without giving such a power to Newland [the Duc de Bouillon], I am convinced nothing can, or will be done here’.117 While Bouillon surely was an asset to the Jacobites, the positive involvement of the Favourite, after an alleged breach in 1752, constituted the real challenge.118 In May 1757, the Prince had opined that ‘[i]f Masterson [Pompadour] wishes to aid her [Mrs. Burton ¼ Charles] effectually, I shall be charmed to have a conversation with her, but it must not be for vague talk, the time for that is past’.119 The


suggestion to approach Madame de Pompadour was again put to the Prince by Clancarthy in early February. He hoped the solicitation would receive more weight by coinciding with the activities of the Duc de Bouillon. When Charles received no return after more than a week, the Irishman conceded partial defeat. Bouillon had another rendezvous with the Favourite, and he had reason to believe that she was well disposed. Clancarthy himself had received instructions to proceed to court, and wanted his journey kept a positive secret. Not even his confederates Kelly and Walsh were to be informed of his latest mission.120 Though we do not know the short-term results of Clancarthy’s activities, and despite the absence of a real breakthrough by either side, it can be said that the continuing Franco-Jacobite dialogue, and the increasing frequency with which Jacobite agents made their appearance at court, suggest a closer working relationship. Again, the fact that the Jacobite team consisted of men closely associated with Charles cannot be emphasized enough. For most of the year, the negotiations dragged on in much the same, desultory fashion. While Walsh and Clancarthy, backed by Kelly, continued to operate as the official task force, the mavericks, O’Heguerty, senior and Murray, pursued their own, semi-sanctioned negotiations with the French. The ‘officials’ mostly dealt with the Jacophile minister of war, while O’Heguerty, with the Prince’s connivance, concentrated on the foreign minister, de Bernis and the Favourite – but he never forewent the chance of pestering Belle-Isle.121 O’Heguerty had the temerity to complain to the Prince of Walsh’s obstructionism. The full ambivalence of Charles’ policy in regard to his agents became painfully obvious by October. Daniel O’Heguerty fulminated against Walsh, and angrily told his Prince: that I Sollicit Mrs. Burton’s [Charles’] Suite in order to bring it to a hearing, without haveing her power [illegible] to doe, what else have I done these three years passt and have not been contradicted by her, which gave me to understand She was pleased with my warmness in her favour, and now, after Labouring to the height of my Little capacity, that I have brought things to maturity, I find for my reward Mrs Burton’s Silence on one Side and Mr W[alsh]’s Seeming obstruction on the other . . . Mr W[alsh] is jealous and uneasy at my not imparting with him my transactions with Mr Wynn [de Bernis] and Mr Masterson [Pompadour]; had I thought he coud in any Shape have been instrumental to Serve Mrs Burton, noe doubt but i would have made him privy to my Steps.122 Belle-Isle, who had assured Walsh of his devotion to the Stuart cause in the summer, a few months later complained to Kelly about ‘the hurt done to [the Prince’s] affaires by the Multiplicity of those employed’.123 Though O’Heguerty’s intervention in the negotiations may have annoyed both the French and the ‘officials’, his successes were considerable. His constant badgering


secured de Bernis’ commitment to a closer cooperation with the Jacobites.124 An invitation to meet the ministers, which O’Heguerty had procured for the Prince in November, was summarily declined by Charles. The hapless man next tried to justify Charles’ stubborn refusal to meet with the French ministers at Versailles. O’Heguerty warned the Prince that the British and Irish Jacobites would not look favourably upon his contumacy – nor in fact did James. When a messenger arrived at court instead of the Prince himself, O’Heguerty concluded in frustration ‘that my Service is of no further use’.125 Walsh’s sudden departure for St Domingo in December may have been a small consolation to his thwarted rival, but it was a blow, not only to the ‘officials’, but to the entire party of the Prince. In retrospect, Charles’ behaviour towards his servant may have been ungrateful. At the same time, he had learned the hard way that he could not accredit more than one delegation to treat with the French. Fortunately, Belle-Isle must have dealt with the whole affair as a minor source of irritation, for at his behest instructions were issued to the effect that the negotiations with the Prince would have to be conducted with all possible honesty. Of course, his motives were not altogether altruistic: he feared that Charles’ distrust would not allow the French to verify promises made by the English Jacobites.126 On the peripheries of Franco-Jacobite diplomacy, the Prince’s party undertook strenuous efforts to establish links with the Spanish and Austrian courts. As allies to the French, the two powers were likely to co-sponsor an attempt on behalf of the Stuarts. Once again, it was the indefatigable Murray of Elibank who had introduced the Austrian option following the Diplomatic Revolution. He diligently fostered relations with the Austrians by cultivating his acquaintance with a Habsburg envoy, who had agreed to act as a messenger to the Viennese court.127 Murray suggested asking Maria Theresa through his contact ‘to use her interest; and advance money to finish our friends law suit [Stuart restoration]’.128 Peter Wood, a Jacobite agent, claimed to know from a reliable source that Maria Theresa had told Louis XV about Charles ‘that She had nothing more at heart than to do Justice to [his] family’.129 In response to the popularity of an Imperial dimension in Jacobite plans, and more than likely urged by Murray, the Prince addressed a letter to Charles, the Austrian prince of Lorraine. The piece, drafted by Murray and Andrew Lumisden, James’ under-secretary of state, explicitly asked the recipient to lobby the Jacobite cause at Vienna.130 Murray’s skilled penmanship lent Charles’ appeal the requisite persuasive substance. In addition, Charles wanted Murray to ask Stanislas Leszczynski, ex-King of Poland, and Louis XV’s father-in-law, to solicit his cause at the Imperial court. Ultimately, the Prince hoped that all the Jacobite initiatives at Vienna would cause Maria Theresa to use her good offices for his benefit with Louis XV.131 Stanislas was willing to help, but, on a previous occasion in July, he had proven himself to be quite useless.132 Still another attempt was made through the Jacobite Thomas, Baron de Hussey, a colonel in the


Austrian regiment du Platzen stationed at Luxembourg. Hussey planned to approach his fellow Irishman Count O’Donnel, a cavalry general in the Austrian service, whom he considered fit for the assignment owing to ‘the great consideration and Credit that he is in at our Court’.133 Mackenzie-Douglas, active at Versailles, was in communication with Murray, whom he probably approached because of his Austrian proclivity. In his letter of 21 October 1758, Murray was instructed to make his way to court as soon as he had obtained the credentials necessary for his introduction to Belle-Isle, de Bernis and their patroness, the Marquise de Pompadour. It would be Murray’s task to convince these French potentates of the favourable disposition of Spain towards the new Franco-Jacobite alliance. Mackenzie also recommended that Charles send an envoy to the court of Ferdinand VI.134 The message was relayed to Charles via Murray for his perusal, and an eventual decision regarding a Spanish mission.135 But Spain was a different case. Despite his impeccable Irish Jacobite pedigree, Ricardo Wall, the foreign minister, wanted to keep Spain clear of the Anglo-French hostilities.136 The Jacobites tried anyway. Fortunately, the French evinced more enthusiasm. The idea of Spanish, and even Habsburg, intervention on the side of a Franco-Jacobite descent on Britain appealed equally to both sides. The French suggested a tripartite alliance with Spain, though mostly for material support; furthermore, the Swedish and Russian fleets should play a significant role in a Scottish diversionary invasion.137 With the French willing to aid him, and the recent efforts at welding Spain and Austria into an anti-British league, Charles’ situation had improved. In late 1758, it was the Prince’s turn to take matters into his hands – and act he did. In a memorial addressed to Belle-Isle, Charles adumbrated the latest Jacobite restoration plan. He wanted no less than 25,000 men for an invasion attempt, a sine qua non adamantly upheld by Murray, but was hesitant to divulge any details. Oddly enough, this proposal reflects the sobriety of a carefully formulated business proposal, not the characteristics of a Jacobite plot: as soon as Belle-Isle had promised to give the Jacobites his full backing for an invasion of Britain, Charles would disclose the full extent of Jacobite plans to the French ministry.138 At the same time, Belle-Isle was warned of Charles’ promise to his British adherents – that the principal attack was to be directed against the English capital. In their next exchange, the Prince foreclosed the possibility of an Irish diversion; in his mind, the role of the Celtic fringe clearly ought to be of an auxiliary nature. In return, Charles considered several concessions to the French, beginning with the restitution of the American colonies, and ending with a full reimbursement of the expenses incurred by the French on his behalf. The impending fall of de Bernis raised Jacobite hopes to a pitch, but Louis XV had no inclination to accept conditions set by Charles. He expected the full disclosure of all schemes, and ordered the Duc de Choiseul, who had replaced the ineffective de Bernis as foreign minister in December 1758, to


evaluate the quality and solidity of the Stuart prince’s plans.139 Under Choiseul’s direction, pressure was applied to the Jacobite nerve centre. Murray had conferred with the foreign minister at Versailles, and concluded that Charles’ proximity to the French court would have a conducive effect on the negotiations. Choiseul reiterated Belle-Isle’s earlier promises, that the French government would support a Jacobite venture, but not in advance of a treaty with Charles. The French king and his ministers would never believe that the Jacobites in Britain had the strength to effect auxiliary action in support of a French landing, unless they had the Prince’s solemn word on the matter. The abandonment of Charles’ policy of distrust towards the French, Murray remonstrated with his master, was vital to an ensured continuation of the negotiations.140 As Charles was not willing to enter Paris at any cost, Choiseul proposed to send an envoy, in order to bridge the impasse.141 The Prince suggested Colonel Wall of Fitzjames’ regiment; from the very beginning, however, Belle-Isle disagreed with Choiseul’s ideas.142 Clancarthy’s report on England of 31 December 1758, was entirely positive. He was certain that George II had been stricken down by some ailment, of which nobody expected him to recover. Charles’ response to the French ministers was possibly influenced by the nature of the incoming intelligence, as he lost no time to assert his position. Raising the Highlands, Murray suggested, was neither sufficient to launch a rising in Britain, nor did such a course of action fit into Charles’ grand scheme: in order to mobilize the full strength of the Jacobites, the exiled leader had to include his intractable English adherents. Belle-Isle and Choiseul were informed that, as the Prince’s plans hinged on the English Jacobites’ full cooperation, the treaty with Louis XV had become a prerequisite for action, because the conspirators in England would not budge without a formal agreement.143 What the Prince’s party did not mention, and wisely so, was that their English supporters had once more threatened to stall, unless Charles dismissed his unpopular mistress Clementina Walkinshaw.144 This was the bone of contention. Louis XV would not sign a treaty with Charles alone; and James, who had surprisingly offered to abdicate in his son’s favour, attached unacceptable conditions to such an act of resignation.145 The argument, with which the Prince’s party tried to force their French partners’ compliance, was that only they could provide the seaborne invasion with the assistance of an invaluable fifth column in Britain. The English Jacobites could prepare forage, procure transports and victuals, and raise the local militias, which had, they claimed, fallen victim to infiltration.146 Their argument was further corroborated by Blantyre’s numerous intelligence reports, which had been submitted to Charles between late December 1758 and early January 1759.147 What Blantyre had shown in the detail of his intelligence reports, Clancarthy seconded in his more general memorial presented to the court of France at about the same time. Clancarthy emphasized the fragility of


Hanoverian supremacy in case of a forceful Jacobite bid for power. As the National Debt had reached an insupportable level as a consequence of the scope of recent naval activities off the French coast, and the immense subsidies paid to George II’s Continental ally Prussia, the British state was inexorably exhausting resources of manpower and finances to keep the war-effort under way.148 In that, the British were in an only marginally better situation than France. An anonymous voice, however, predicted that a successful FrancoJacobite invasion at this juncture would force a commercial breakdown of unprecedented proportions in Britain.149 Deprived of the sinews of war, the British government would eventually be forced to sue for peace. Eager to alert and mobilize the British Jacobite leaders in time for the great event, Blantyre urged Charles to send him back to England as soon as possible. The message he proposed to disseminate among his confederates was that the French king and his ministers had all given ‘ample ashurances’ for a restoration attempt with no less than 25,000 men destined for England, and 6,000 for Scotland, which ‘no consideration will prevent them from fulfilling’. Because of French delays, Sir John Philips, the Earl of Westmoreland and Lord Elibank would also have to be informed of the recent change of plans: the landing which at first had been expected for the spring of 1759 was postponed until September or October of that same year. Blantyre stressed the importance of his return to Britain before July. Otherwise he would risk being apprehended by the British, and would not be given enough time to fulfil his mission of apprising his confederates of the latest developments.150 Despite Blantyre’s increasing impatience to quit the Continent, MackenzieDouglas ordered him to remain in Brussels, until Charles’ negotiations with the French ministers had come to a satisfactory conclusion.151 The gap between the reluctant negotiating parties was eventually bridged in the period between January and February 1759. The only controversial issues left to deliberate were the conclusion of a treaty similar to the one that had been signed at Fontainbleau in 1745, and Charles’ unwillingness to present himself to the French king at Versailles. The most serious problem remained: although the French had suggested a Franco-Jacobite treaty in the first place, and Charles had seconded a formalized agreement, Louis XV was expediently shying away from the idea of a treaty because he apparently felt its conclusion with an uncrowned head was inconsistent with the royal protocol. The Jacobites in turn had argued that such a document was absolutely necessary, if only to placate the apprehensions of their English friends. Charles persisted that they would not rise in arms unless they found a Stuart prince heading the invasion.152 The Prince’s dilemma was compounded by James’ overt sabotage. Adding insult to injury, James opined: that the circumstances of the times render it not advisable to take such a step at present; It might make me less useful to him abroad, it would be in reality yielding to him what I have not as yet, and giving him [Charles] an


empty title, which would be a load and of no service to him. Were he once in England, that alters the case entirely; and in general, I cannot think of taking such a step but in concert with France.153 The division between James and Charles could not have been more obvious, or useful to French interests. For the time being, the question of the Prince’s presence at the French court was resolved by Charles’ choice of Colonel Wall for a courier. Wall was instructed to depart for Versailles, and to explain Charles’ continued absence to the two ministers. Choiseul and Belle-Isle were told by Wall that the Prince feared his presence at Versailles would alert the British to Jacobite involvement in the planned invasion. The negotiations should be continued by the use of trustworthy messengers. The ministers could not find this idea palatable.154 By April, British intelligence had received reports on the close association between the Stuart prince, and the French invasion effort.155 In the following two weeks, the stubbornness displayed by both sides in connection with the controversy over Charles’ refusal to meet the ministers in Paris almost proved too much of a strain for the fledgling alliance.156 Fortunately, Colonel Wall’s mission to Versailles was gratifyingly successful in that it finally produced unequivocal answers from the French king and his ministers. Louis XV promised to satisfy the Jacobite demand of 50 men-ofwar and 25,000 men.157 He also agreed with James’ plan for an abdication, but he asked Charles not to commence negotiations for alliances with any other foreign powers before they had come to a satisfactory agreement with each other. That, however, would have to happen in Paris.158 The Jacobites continued their prodding, and, more specifically, their insisting on documentary evidence of the French proposals; the exiles pointed out to the French that time was running out for all of them, as the English Jacobites urgently required Charles’ fiat. Otherwise, they would refuse to stir. A disclosure of Jacobite plans, which had been Louis XV’s proviso all along, depended on incontrovertible proof of French aid.159 The long awaited rendezvous with Choiseul at the beginning of February left the French minister unimpressed, and the Prince unconvinced.160 Allegedly inebriated, but more likely just exhausted, Charles arrived in Paris ˆ tel de Choiseul, where late at night, and immediately proceeded to the Ho the meeting was to be held.161 He recapitulated his demands, and was assured by Choiseul that the French were doing everything in their power to prepare for a massive amphibious operation. Though the French may have been sincere, they would have been sorely taxed to procure the means to substantiate their promises of assistance.162 In fact, the Seven Years’ War eventually bled the French treasury dry, and by October 1759, Louis XV’s government faced near bankruptcy. On 14 February, Choiseul reiterated his government’s position towards Charles, that nothing would be done without him, only through him, and


always for him – ‘pour que rien ne le fasse Sans Luy, Par Luy, Et pour Luy’.163 Meanwhile, the Prince de Soubise had given up his post at the head of the corps stationed in Germany, and was reassigned to the command over the troops earmarked for the invasion of Britain. Charles, in turn, had made an effort at cultivating the friendship of Soubise’s patroness.164 The importance of harnessing the powerful Marquise de Pompadour’s support to the Jacobite cause cannot be stressed enough. Murray understood this.165 De Bernis, entirely her creature, had done nothing for the Jacobites in 1758, but then Charles’ relationship with the Favourite at that time had not been as advanced. Even more fortunate for the Jacobites was the elevation of Pompadour’s openly pro-Stuart prote´ge´ Soubise to the position of secretary of state; it was rumoured that this princely member of the powerful Rohan clan would be Belle-Isle’s successor.166 Assessing the latest fluctuations in the corridors of power at Versailles, Mackenzie-Douglas was certain that the French were determined to terminate the costly war with Britain by a direct strike at their enemy’s political and economic epicentre.167 The euphoria of the Jacobites in early 1759 was exemplified by Clancarthy’s suggestion to approach the British ministers in order to offer them a chance for defection, as George II’s condition was declining rapidly.168 Between April and May 1759, Blantyre repeatedly addressed Charles on the issue of the impatiently awaited message for his English Jacobite friends.169 To his chagrin, the Prince time and again refused to authorize preparations for the invasion in Britain until he could be absolutely certain that the French would not again abuse him, or his party, as bogeymen to force George II’s hand.170 The bad bargain that the Jacobites had made with their French allies in 1745–46, was neither forgotten, nor did Charles care to repeat the experience. In spite of the Prince’s caution, Blantyre proceeded to exert pressure: as communications between the Jacobite camps in Britain and on the Continent had lapsed for some time, it was imperative for the project to be communicated immediately.171 Finally, in July, Blantyre’s patience was at an end: he departed for Aix-la-Chapelle, but not without first informing Murray of Elibank that he would return in two weeks time to take ship for Britain, as his private affairs now compelled him to leave.172 Franco-Jacobite preparations proceeded well enough throughout the remainder of the summer of 1759. Charles may have finally conferred with Louis XV in a chaˆteau near Boulogne.173 Ceaselessly driving the French, Murray concentrated his activities on stabilizing relations between Charles and Versailles. Concerning Ireland, Belle-Isle disagreed with the Prince’s party. While the French favoured the idea of a simultaneous descent on all three kingdoms in the British Isles, Charles stubbornly persevered in his ideé fixe that the invasion hinged on a concentration of all invading forces on London. ‘[N]ot a Man of any consideration will stir in Scotland, unless there is a landing made in England at the same time’, was what Murray intimated to Belle-Isle in Charles’ name.174


There is reason to believe that an unidentifiable section of the Jacobite establishment at Versailles also opposed Charles’ ‘England or nothing’ position.175 The individuals involved were probably the remnants of vested interests defined by national lines or the conservative few, who still sought guidance from Rome. As could be expected, Murray closed ranks with his master.176 It was he who told Soubise that Charles was adamant on the point in question; the Prince would not compromise his British followers by deviating from the original plan.177 A memorial addressed to Louis XV stated Charles’ position in plain language, and emphasized the importance of dispatching a positive answer to the representative of the British Jacobites at Brussels, Lord Blantyre, with all haste. Murray’s main argument – that the French did not stand a chance of success at invading Britain without the active support of a segment of the island’s population – was formulated to achieve maximum effect with the French.178 The quintessence of the Jacobite position was that, if the French venture would founder because of Choiseul’s and Belle-Isle’s plan to attack Ireland and Scotland, as well as England, Louis XV would only have himself to blame. To make the progressing disaster perfect, the exasperated Blantyre announced his imminent departure on 10 July, and left the Continent some time before 13 August 1759.179 Despite French setbacks on the Continent and in the colonies during the late summer and early autumn of 1759 – Lally had just been recalled from India in disgrace – the invasion project was continued.180 The fall of Quebec rendered a descent on Britain necessary.181 All this time, the Royal Navy continued to blockade Le Havre and Brest, but could not prevent the successful transfer of 300 completed, flat-bottomed boats to Le Havre and Rouen.182 Towards the end of August, Blantyre managed to get a letter through to Peter Wood, who promptly relayed the contents of the message to Charles. Unexpectedly, the re-establishment of a communications channel with the Jacobite leadership in England was again made possible owing to a system devised by Wood and Blantyre.183 Charles cautioned his adherents not to risk exposure under any circumstance until he landed at the head of the French expeditionary corps.184 By mid-October, the French told Charles that his relative, Comte Joachim Casimir de Be´thune, or the Duc de Bouillon, would inform him when they were ready to launch the invasion.185 Little room is left to doubt that Louis XV’s government was entirely committed to the invasion plan, but, as has been pointed out earlier, neither primarily, nor necessarily, to a second Stuart restoration.186 Moreover, Choiseul confessed that the French had already spent 24 million livres for the construction of the transport vessels, but had been unable to complete the projected quota.187 Admiral Boscawen’s victory over La Clue’s Toulon squadron at Lagos by the end of August boded ill for the French invasion of England.188 Nevertheless, Murray’s urgent note to Charles of 17 October reported that the French admiral in charge of the


Channel operations, the Comte de Conflans, had received definite orders to ‘give battel to the English fleet that is before Brest’.189 The Duc d’Aiguillon, under whose auspices the troops were to embark, would finally be able to commence the first phase of the plan. Writing from Rouen, Holker expressed satisfaction with the steady, albeit slow, completion of the French armada. Conversely, he seemed preoccupied because of the hitherto impenetrable British blockade off the French Channel ports. All incoming and outbound vessels were intercepted, except for those sailing under a Spanish flag. The British were loath to supply the French, and consequently also the Jacobites, with another Bourbon ally. All others were obliged to land their cargoes at Dieppe, and transport their goods overland. Holker, too, had heard of the imminent embarkation of the French expeditionary corps. The grenadiers were under orders to keep in readiness for the 25th of October, and Marećhal Conflans was given carte blanche to set sail and engage the enemy.190 The biggest French military operation to restore the Stuarts was finally under way. As we have seen, the Jacobites had been at pains to become involved in the French invasion attempt since before the commencement of the Seven Years’ War. Some of their emissaries were more successful than others. Nevertheless, the Jacobites had a significant share in the ’Fifty-nine: men associated with Prince Charles conducted the negotiations, planned and procured intelligence. In the course of the negotiations with the French government, the Prince’s party encountered many difficulties. Their leader distrusted the French alliance, he was at odds with some of the leading English Jacobites and was also fixated on England as the only viable target of an invasion. Charles’ unyielding stance jeopardized the diplomatic relations with Versailles, which had been carefully cultivated by his principal agents. His intransigence made further negotiations with the French almost impossible. But the Prince’s party slowly overcame these obstacles, primarily by sustaining the dialogue with the French ministers in the face of mutual distrust, and conflicting priorities. Under the given circumstances, their efforts were successful.

Britain and the Jacobite Factor, 1755–1759 The view through the lens of the British intelligence system goes a long way to demonstrate the obsessive concern of the Hanoverian establishment with Jacobitism during the years 1755–59.191 In 1755, the Earl of Holdernesse’s agents reported that Charles had arrived in France on 28 July, and by 24 August was conferring with Louis XV’s ministers at Versailles and Fontainbleau.192 Earlier that year, Charles had an interview with the Prince de Conti on the Îsle d’Adam.193 This meeting was presumably arranged by the French to consult the Jacobite prince on an invasion project, for a week later his demand of 30,000 troops was reported.194 The rumour of a descent on


Scotland was duly taken notice of, and talk of a marriage with Madame Adelaide, Louis XV’s favourite daughter, soon became common currency.195 In November and December, Charles and his brother the Cardinal-Duke of York were ostensibly at Fontainbleau and Paris.196 The British soon discerned that Franco-Jacobite negotiations were not proceeding smoothly. The Earl of Holdernesse’s papers seem to corroborate the impression given in the Stuart papers, which suggest that there were considerable tensions between the French and the Jacobites in 1756.197 British interest in the Jacobites, however, did not flag. Quite the contrary was the case.198 With war imminent in late 1755, intelligence reports concerning the renewed Franco-Jacobite collaboration in early 1756 gained credibility; portentous news soon found their way back to London: Since a Council that was lately held at the French Court, all Paris talk of an Invasion on England, that is to be headed by the Young Pretender; This has been talked of in the best Company . . . it may be concluded that the French Ministry is determined to execute the Plan of Invasion, that has been presented to Them . . . Letters have certainly been sent to the Pretender, who has been consulted on the Affair. His Son will appear at the Head of it. He has been at Versailles some Time, & has seen the King as well as his Ministers. His Partisans say, He will be joined by Number[s] on His Landing.199 The British agent at Rotterdam, Richard Wolters, thought it ‘probable that the french intend to bring him [Charles] into play in some Shape or other’, while another intelligencer was sure that ‘[n]o Embarkation for England will be made without him’.200 The British secret service’s efforts at localizing the elusive Charles demonstrates that the London government did not feel comfortable losing track of him. The reason for this is obvious: unobserved, the ‘Young Pretender’ could do irreparable damage to British interests with his secret diplomacy. In fact, the British went to great lengths to establish an effective surveillance system covering many of his adherents, and with war drawing near, those in the military establishment were given special attention. The close monitoring of the ‘brawns’ of the exiled movement – the Irish Brigade and the Scots regiments in French service – during the late 1750s also suggests that the Hanoverian establishment in Britain realized that, apart from the Jacobite elite, there was a strong involvement of the Jacobite rank and file in the French invasion effort.201 But Michael Hatton’s comment that all the manoeuvering of the Irish Brigade was but a ‘parade’, as the French did not intend to ‘embark a Man without the Chevalier’, also reveals the British perception of the close association between the Jacobite prince and the descendants of the Wild Geese.202 If the Scottish and Irish regiments in the service of France represented an anti-Hanoverian interest group in exile,


the fact that they drew almost all their recruits from the Celtic fringe points to an actively hostile fifth column in Scotland and Ireland. Though Ireland was the principal recruiting ground for the Brigade, Scotland’s proximity to the London-based Whig regime made it all the more threatening. There, supposedly loyal North Britons were joining the Jacobite expatriate regiments in numbers. Some of these recruits actually went out of their way to enlist in the French service. The onset of the Seven Years’ War compounded this problem. ‘The Arrival of several Ships, from Scotland’, one British spy wrote from Campvere: with Recruits for The Scots Regiments in The Dutch Service, has made me think it my Duty to acquaint Your Lordship with a gross Abuse . . . By Desertion from These Regiments, The Scots and Irish Regiments, in The French Service, get Yearly, at least, Two or Three Hundred Men. The Six Battalions of Scots, in this Service . . . require, Yearly, about Six Hundred Recruits . . . By far the greatest Part have been raised in The Highlands; and I am not without Suspicion, that many of Them list into the Dutch Service with Intention to desert to The French . . . The French have Decoy Ducks in or near all The Garrisons, where Our Scots Regiments are quartered, in order to pick up & conduct the Fellows . . . The Irish Regiments pick up what They can, &, it is thought, not a few. But that Regiment of Renegadoes, which is call’d Royal Scots, is kept quite full with Natives, & I am assured, That it is, at present, a very sightly, & very hardy Body of Men, & that Three Fourths of Them are from the Dutch Service.203 In spite of the peace-time conditions in mid-1755, Lieutenant-General Humphrey Bland warned the government of ‘French Officers’ in the Highlands, and their efforts at encouraging the clans by ‘preaching up Speedy Invasions in favour of the Pretender’.204 It was not only recruits, leaving the country, however, that caused great concern; with the possibility of a FrancoJacobite descent becoming more probable there can be little doubt that if not Scotland, then the Highlands proper were in a ferment. As early as April 1755, Bland received orders for the disposition of his troops in case of a rising, and furthermore was to ‘take all the necessary Measures for informing himself of any Steps that may be taken in those Northern Parts, towards any Commotion & Insurrection, or any Attempts on the Coast’.205 The sense that the London government overreacted may linger, but Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald’s pertinent observation hinted at the motive underlying its policy: ‘the Conjuncture being extreamly Critical, I hope, may plead my excuse – I cannot say it raises fear in me, because All the Chances are against, our Enemys . . . however as the Stake is so high – Our All – there is no getting rid of anxiety’.206 The knowledge of Charles’ presence in France had also penetrated the Highlands, as Jacobite emissaries assiduously spread the news.207 By 1756, the Jacobite threat became palpable in the govern-


ment’s eyes. Tinwald, who was, if anything, more level-headed than his predecessor, Lord Milton, and definitely more competent to judge the situation in the Highlands than the English ministers, warned Holdernesse: that the disaffected in this Place Speak very well concerning the Interest of Britain upon this Occasion, and are at pains to give those they converse with, to believe, the Pretender, or the French, upon Landing, could expect no Assistance from such as are reckon’d to be disaffected; And yet at the same time they are not able to conceal a Secrete Satisfaction from the Prospect of an Invasion.208 In the years immediately preceding the invasion attempt, Jacobite emissaries from abroad – and there can be no doubt that this is what they were – flocked into Scotland, probing, and communicating with, their local counterparts. The government closely monitored this activity.209 If Jacobitism was not perceived as a threat to the British state, then why was this effort undertaken? At this point, the question of Jacobite support in Scotland requires further discussion. At a first glance, the sheer numbers Lord Blantyre estimated would rally to the Stuarts stand in sharp contrast with the political demography of the Highlands in the post-Culloden era. Aeneas MacDonald’s plan of 1754 also begs the question how the Prince could possibly hope to draw on such numbers from a region in which the Jacobites’ principal asset, namely the martial culture of the Highlands, had allegedly been crippled by the implementation of effective remedial legislation after the ’Forty-five. This question haunted all architects of Jacobite conspiracies in the later 1750s. Despite this bleak prospect, the latest Jacobite intelligence from Scotland held evidence to the contrary. In 1758–59, Lochgarry, one of James’ reliable sources, estimated that no less than 10,700 clansmen would rise in any event. Moreover, he believed that at least part of the lukewarm Seaforth MacKenzies, the similarly hesitant Grants, Drummonds, Gordons, Ogilvies and Breadalbane Campbells would join the Jacobites. In case of ‘the least plausible appearance of Succours Landed they [the Jacobite Highland levies] would be Joined by considerable numbers from other Clans’.210 The Whig Earl of Findlater and Seafield concurred. According to him, Jacobitism was not yet dead: I firmly believe, that, on very little encouragement from abroad, as great numbers wou’d apear in the pretender’s cause, as did in the year 1745 . . . for Reformation in the Highlands has not yet made such a progress, as to give the least foundation to expect, that they are not still entirely atach’d to their ancient Prejudices and Customs.211 More recently Murray Pittock has emphasized the traditionally small size of Highland armies, and the importance of Lowland support for the Jacobites


in 1715 and 1745. His unfavourable assessment of Jacobite support in the later 1750s is apparently not based on thorough archival research of the period.212 Thus, Pittock’s ex post facto contention should be carefully weighed against Blantyre’s, MacDonald’s and Lochgarry’s claims.213 Pittock does make allowances for the potential of the exiled community after 1746, but, mostly for the benefit of his own argument, ascribes the demise of Scottish Jacobitism to declining support in the Lowlands, which was compounded by the persecution of the Episcopalian Church. The previous chapters have shown the consistency of Jacobite activity, the unabated apprehensions of military commanders, who measured the pulse of Jacobitism in the Highlands, and the fears harboured by the English ministries in the decade after Culloden. Even if we presently know that the Jacobites did not rise again, the assumption that they would, or could, not have taken the field in any case is as ahistorical as it is patently wrong.214 The bloodletting of the clans during the ’Forty-five, Aeneas MacDonald claimed, was limited. A period of relative recuperation since Culloden had brought them back up to their previous strength. His most compelling argument in the mid-1750s, however, was that the clans were: more ready, and Capable of action att present than they were att that time [i.e. 1745–46]. [O]ne reason in particular, is worth observation; which is that Since the end of the War [of Austrian Succession] there has been betwixt Six and Seven thousand men reform’d out of the Brittish and Du[t]ch service, most of whom were of the Loyal [i.e. Jacobite] Clans.215 The government’s attitude towards the Highland ‘powder keg’ also confirms the Jacobite analysis for the late 1750s. At the height of the Seven Years’ War, the British government, suspecting the existence of lingering Jacobitism, was unwilling to extend the Militia Act to Scotland.216 One pamphleteer, though arguing for the inclusion of the disarmed counties of Scotland in this legislation, cogently summarized government’s fears as late as 1760: Will it not be dangerous to train to the exercise of arms, the inhabitants of those counties disarmed by act of parliament, upon account of their known disaffection to the present royal family? What proofs are there of their principles being changed? or what security have we, that, when provided with arms, and taught the use of them, they will not again rebel, and once more attempt to subvert our liberties and government?217 The argument for extending the Militia Act was partially based on the ostensible sparsity of Jacobite support in Scotland during the ’Forty-five, which is, ironically, contested by Pittock.218 That Whitehall’s hesitance during the period of the militia controversy was closely connected to a fear of recruiting members of a Jacobite fifth column into a newly embodied


militia is what the Earls of Hardwicke and Breadalbane implied.219 MacDonald argued that the Highlanders were imbued with an enduring, but long denied spirit of revenge. In 1758–59, Lochgarry again expressed this point of view: the main reason for the recent upsurge in pro-Jacobite sentiment was the unrelentingly harsh treatment meted out to the Highlanders during the tenure of Hanoverian military occupation since 1746. This contention seems to be borne out by a largely consistent ‘discourse of fear’ prevalent in the Highland intelligence reports, and in the correspondence between the Scottish administration and the British ministers at Whitehall.220 MacDonald pointed out that this reservoir of resentment should be made proper use of, before the new Fort George on Ardersier Point near Inverness, then under construction, was completed. If there was no perceived indigenous or exogenous Jacobite threat at the time, the government’s substantial expenditure of £175,000 for the new stronghold is incomprehensible.221 Evidently, the Hanoverians and their opponents understood its importance as a deterrent to Jacobitism; as the most advanced and costly fortification project in Britain, the new Fort George was the penultimate manifestation of the government’s will to preclude foreign aid for, and a future rising of, the Jacobite clans.222 In the absence of a fear of Jacobite resurgence, the government’s long-winded negotiations with the Duchess of Gordon over the lease of strategically important land surrounding Fort William is equally mystifying.223 Under close scrutiny, the gloss of mystery disappears. According to an army memorialist, the principal township in the area, Maryburgh, was disaffected: ‘almost the Whole are a Nest of Spies on the Garrison’.224 For those who needed confirmation of the army’s apprehensions, Lord Advocate Robert Dundas spelled out the situation: The Lands lye contiguous to The King’s Fort [William], which is situated in a very Suspicious & disaffected Corner of the Highlands; The Inhabitants of the Village [Maryburgh] have more Access than almost any others in the Highlands, to be acquainted with what is carrying on in that Country, consequently can either be of great Service, or Disservice to the Government, & I am sorry to say, partly from Experience, and partly from what I have learned from others, that the present Set of Inhabitants are as bad both in their publick & private Principles as any I know.225 When the negotiations did not keep pace with General Bland’s impatience, he suspected ‘Some False Insinuations privately carried on by the Enemies of the Government, to keep up the Jacobite Faction in this Country’.226 The Jacobites were fully cognizant of the relevance of tackling enemy strongholds in case of a combined invasion and rising. In fact, the heads of the Jacobite clans had already taken measures to seize all enemy garrison in a single night.227


In 1757, reports from the Highlands corroborated the intelligence of the previous year. A reliable government correspondent on the isle of Barra knew ‘[t]hat Such Persons as had Suffered lately in a certain Cause Might expect Some agreeable Satisfaction; that a Sudden, great, & unexpected Blow was to be given’.228 Two years later the Highlands were in full expectation of a French landing in Charles’ favour.229 In 1759, British intelligence from France corroborated the Highland impression of close Franco-Jacobite collaboration.230 Despite the contradictory nature of the information received from various sources in the Highlands, the government could not summarily dismiss the potential of the Jacobite factor, especially not in conjunction with the possibility of an impending French invasion attempt. The internal threat, however, was inextricably linked with a successful French invasion. Without a French naval victory the Jacobites could not even hope to launch an offensive. To effect a cross-Channel invasion the French not only needed the material and troops, but they heavily depended on information concerning the British forces. If Scotland held a reservoir of seasoned troops prepared to support a French bid, in England Jacobite spies were actively supporting the planning of the invasion attempt. The domestic state papers provide compelling evidence to show how vulnerable Britain’s most guarded secrets were to the prying of Jacobite intelligencers. Henry Page, who worked for the Excise Office, William Dunster, a tailor, and Archibald Manson, a labourer, were an unusual team of agents. One experience they all shared was their service in Lord Lewis Drummmond’s regiment in French service, the Royal Ećossais. Dunster and Page set out for Portsmouth in July 1757 to sketch the ramparts, gun wharf and the dockyard. Information about men and armaments were also put to paper.231 Dunster, who claimed to be a deserter from the Royal Ećossais, deponed that he had acted independently. There is reason to doubt this statement. In his examination his account concerning the manner in which he had drawn the plans conflicts with that of Page. Dunster contended that he gathered his intelligence from ‘[t]he Court Kalendar, News Papers, & accidental Questions’, not by sketching on the site.232 In late October, Archibald Manson, a Scotsman, was to carry intelligence of another kind in the lining of his coat to the appointed rendezvous in a tavern situated on Tower Hill. There, he and Page would await Dunster’s arrival, after which they were to embark for Ostend.233 Then the British messenger struck. The intelligence found on Manson was too carefully researched to be the work of an amateur, giving exact figures of the entire British army at home and abroad. Furthermore, the seized papers contained information on the state of the Royal Navy, British privateers and the number of vessels being repaired in home ports.234 The sketches found on William Dunster were definitely of British fortifications.235 What gave this undertaking a strong Jacobite overtone were the oaths of secrecy mentioned in the examinations and the repeated toasts to James and Charles, ‘and not that old Black guard George’.236


Far more damaging to British security was the correspondence carried on by a Jacobite spy from County Clare. Dr Florence Hensey was educated in France, where he met one La Ponce, who was the secretary to the Comte de Gisors. De Gisors was closely associated with Marećhal Belle-Isle. After a meeting with de Gisors, Dr Hensey offered to supply intelligence for a remuneration of 100 guineas per annum. Notably, Hensey was an insider of the Irish and British Jacobite scene. He received his first set of instructions from France in 1756; Hensey’s employers requested information on Ireland. The French were apparently considering a descent on Ireland, and Hensey surmised that the attempt was to be headed by the prominent Jacobite exile Charles O’Brien, 6th Viscount Clare, who had assumed the title of Earl of Thomond.237 A French memorial to this effect left certain questions unanswered, and de Gisors asked Hensey to procure the desired information. Hensey’s correspondence was conveyed to France by Spanish couriers.238 But then the Irish project was shelved owing to de Bernis’ ascendancy to power. Next, the French tried to peddle the Irish invasion project, albeit with little success, at the Spanish court. In 1757, Hensey supplied intelligence on the ill-fated British raid on Rochefort.239 Crucial to the value of Hensey’s intelligence was his recruiting of James O’Donnel, tutor to the son of a Sussex nobleman. O’Donnel did indeed gather useful information about British troop and naval movements in his employer’s household; but with the probably inadvertent accession of a Mr Huske, whom Hensey referred to as having ‘a Place under the present Treasurer of His Majesty’s Chamber’, O’Donnel landed a real coup. An acquaintance of Huske’s judged ‘[t]hat no Man in England knew the strong and weak Side of this Country better than Mr Huske’.240 To Hensey’s surprise, his French contact told him that Huske was also working for them. Shortly before he was taken into custody, Hensey was trying to obtain information about the destination of the British expedition preparing at the Isle of Wight.241 Hensey was assisted by several Jacobite agents. After his apprehension and conviction, he made wide-ranging disclosures on the Jacobite community in London, and in exile. Among the more significant operatives he implicated, were the Irish peer Lord Bellew, the affluent tobacco trader George FitzGerald and an anonymous Jacobite mole in the Admiralty Office.242 Dr Hensey received a capital sentence, but was temporarily reprieved, and, according to Horace Walpole, pardoned because of the intercession of the Spanish resident.243 The Hanoverian establishment could not, and did not, discount the Jacobite factor during the early years of the Seven Years’ War. After the ’Fortyfive, the loyal clans remained a wild card for a number of years. Jacobite and Whig observers agreed that the remedial legislation had not yet uprooted the power of the clans; traditionally Jacobite areas in the Highlands were treated as if they existed beyond the British pale, garrisoned, riddled with informers and fortified against internal and external danger; the outflow of Highland


recruits to the Jacobite regiments in French service underscored, if anything, the survival and authenticity of a Jacobite spirit of revenge. A strong motive for another rising existed in the vivid memory of the aftermath of the ’Fortyfive, which fuelled the clans’ lingering resentment against an army of occupation, and an oppressive regime. The link between the French invasion attempt and an active Jacobite fifth column was acknowledged in the dispatches of the Scottish civil and military administration, as well as in the ministerial correspondence from Whitehall. Intelligence from France corroborated British fears of close Franco-Jacobite cooperation. Informed observers on both sides agreed on the real possibility of a Jacobite attempt with French support in the years leading up to the ’Fifty-nine. In these critical years, Jacobite spies in England, making use of a widespread network of contacts, successfully infiltrated British government institutions, and conveyed sensitive data to the French. Conversely, the British secret service had been able to penetrate the Jacobite intelligence network as early as 1755, and was thus able to pinpoint enemy correspondence channels and gather other crucial data on French plans and the Jacobites.244 Nevertheless, Jacobite espionage activity demonstrates on the one hand, the danger it posed to British security by maintaining a spy ring in England, and on the other, reveals the French estimation of Jacobite intelligence, as in the case of Dr Hensey.245 Also, while a French agent could easily be discovered because of an outlandish accent or different mannerisms, British and Irish Jacobites easily blended in with their surroundings. As the efficiency of Jacobite spies can only be gauged from their failures – only those caught divulged information of their operations – it is difficult to assess the damage they did to British security. Judging by the above examples it was not inconsiderable.

Conclusion: The Invasion Attempt of 1759 and the End of the Jacobite Threat The decisive naval engagement between Sir Edward Hawke and Marećhal Conflans near Quiberon Bay on 24–25 November, 1759, resulted in the destruction of the Brest fleet, which had been on its way to protect the flat-bottomed transports waiting in the French Channel ports. Choiseul’s desperate plan to cripple the colonial rival of France with a combination of secret diplomatic advances designed to weld Swedes, Batavians, Danes and Russians into an anti-British alliance, and a gargantuan seaborne offensive, failed.246 In fact, Choiseul planned to embark a Russo-Swedish contingent of 24,000 in Gothenburg and land them in Scotland.247 The history of the battle is well documented, and it is therefore not necessary to repeat all its details.248 In November 1759, the British Navy prevented a Stuart restoration against overwhelming odds, while in 1688 its predecessor had been unable to withstand a Dutch invasion under far more favourable circumstances: what William of Orange had managed with a smaller military force, a


massive, custom-made fleet, designed to carry 50,000 French troops, vengeful Highland Jacobites and the home-sick descendants of the Wild Geese to boot, could not accomplish 71 years later. Conversely, Choiseul’s attempt to invade the British Isles produced an incident which goes a long way to demonstrate what could have been accomplished by Franco-Jacobite forces, if they had landed a substantial army in Britain. Captain François Thurot, an experienced privateer of Irish extraction, commanded a smaller, separate expedition; his destination was at first unknown.249 By the spring of 1759, the British were aware of Thurot’s preparations at Dunkirk. They did not believe, however, that he could break through the British naval cordon off the French Channel ports, and bypass Commodore William Boys before Dunkirk.250 According to one report, Thurot’s intention was to land in Scotland, establish a bridgehead, and distribute arms to 20,000 Highlanders. The actual purpose of his mission, so the British believed, was to divert them from the main French landing in England.251 If their own assessment of the situation in the Highlands is to be credited with some accuracy, and assuming their intelligence was correct, Thurot was expected to cause a disproportionate amount of disruption. Over a month before the French defeat at Quiberon Bay, Thurot’s squadron, consisting of six ships carrying approximately 1,100–1,300 troops under the command of Brigadier Flobert, slipped out of Dunkirk during a gale which drove Boys off his station.252 Thurot’s departure did not go unnoticed. On 19 and 23 October 1759, the administration and the military in Scotland were alerted by the Earl of Holdernesse.253 On 25 October, the British government received a petition from the city of Aberdeen, asking for a body of regular troops. The memorialists pointed out that the ‘East Coast of Scotland betwixt the Murray ffrith, and the Frith of Forth’ had been denuded of British forces which left them virtually defenceless against an invasion.254 On the same day, Lord George Beauclerk, the commander-in-chief in Scotland, considered all possible targets of Thurot’s expedition. His worst fear, however, was not a landing on the eastern seaboard: [T]he Scheme I shou’d be most apprehensive about woud be their going North-about, and attempt to make themselves Masters of Fort William (which their Force is fully equal to) and in that remote Corner of the Country, set up the Pretender’s Standard, and wait in hopes, perhaps with some Encouragement, of being joined by some of the disaffected Clans.255 Beauclerk proposed to issue warrants against the principal suspects in the Highlands, which Holdernesse vetoed, ‘as there is Nothing Specifick laid to Their Charge’.256 The weakness of the British position in the Highlands, Beauclerk, warned, could easily be turned to Thurot’s advantage. Winter was drawing near, which would render any troop movements – not to


speak of transporting cannon, and supplies – well nigh impossible. Meanwhile, all Thurot had to do was to sail up one of the myriad lochs and wait. The reasons for Beauclerk’s apprehensions were not altogether exaggerated. For months the clans had been prepared for a French landing. Furthermore, Thurot apparently carried treasure and equipment for an indigenous army, and his troops were well chosen: one third consisted of French and Swiss guards, and the rest of his corps comprised soldiers drawn from the Artois, Cambis and Boulogne regiments. Last, but not least, there was an unspecified number of foreign volunteers.257 It was the identity of this last group, which caused some consternation among the British. ‘[W]hat confirms the notion of his [Thurot’s] going to Scotland’, Boys related to Beauclerk, ‘is, that there are Several Persons on Board who have followed the Pretender in the last Rebellion’.258 The veracity of this report was confirmed when some of Thurot’s men appeared on the isle of Islay in February 1760. The commander of the landing party ‘spoke English & Highlands’.259 In the interim, Boys and the Scottish administration remained ignorant of Thurot’s movements.260 Holdernesse, however, was soon apprised of the enemy’s arrival in Gothenburg, where the privateer’s fleet was taking on provisions.261 Subsequently, Tinwald, Beauclerk and John Duncan, Aberdeen’s Provost, secondguessed the enemy’s intention: he was not bound for Scotland at all, but for Ireland.262 In due course, the news of Thurot’s sack of Carrickfergus reached the British.263 The plan to attack Belfast, Thurot’s prime objective, had to be abandoned as Brigadier Flobert would not countenance it. But the citizenry of Belfast was forced to victual the invaders.264 In the end, the French squadron was discovered by the Royal Navy. On 29 February, the Aeolus, Pallas and Brilliant, under the command of Captain Elliot caught up with Thurot’s flagship, the Marećhal de Belle-Isle, the Blonde and the Terpsichore. In the ensuing engagement off the Isle of Man, Thurot was killed, and the French surrendered.265 This vestige of Choiseul’s grand strategy is revealing of what the FrancoJacobite forces could have accomplished, had the invasion succeeded. Thurot’s early successes caused much concern in Scotland; the French landing in Ireland, and British observations on the weakness of their coastal defences, indicate what could have been accomplished had a larger contingent succeeded at making landfall in Scotland, or England.266 Thurot’s mission was challenging in the first place; his difficulties were compounded by the friction between himself and Brigadier Flobert. With a larger force the French could have attempted to disembark anywhere in Scotland, though Beauclerk was probably correct in that they would have attempted either to establish a bridgehead, or to capture a strategically important site on the western seaboard. With the aid of the clans, which – according to the assessment of the Jacobites and the apprehensions of the Hanoverians – had the potential to rise again, the French would in all likelihood have achieved the diversion


they wanted to effect. If the Royal Navy had been busy chasing enemy squadrons in the Channel, and the Irish and North seas, the bottled-up Brest fleet would not have been forced into the desperate action off the Morbihan. In such a scenario, the French could have fought the British with odds more favourable to their fleet, or even chased them off their stations along the Brittany coast. Their numerical parity would also have allowed them improved chances to convoy the flat-bottoms across the Channel. The outcome of Choiseul’s attempt, and, hence, the consequences for Britain, would have been different; for one thing, the Jacobites would in all probability have come to play an active role in the British Isles. Any attempt at an historical exegesis claiming to do justice to the Jacobites after Culloden, or intending to make allowances for British fears, will inevitably fail, unless historians are willing to dispense with genuflections at the altar of the Whig idols of abbreviation, hindsight and teleology.267 Consequently, the Jacobite threat can only be understood within the boundaries of a mid-eighteenth century temporal context. What hindsight reveals to us today was not at all obvious to the Jacobites, or their French allies. The Jacobites’ general attitude towards the battle of Quiberon Bay was comparable to their understanding of the rout at Culloden thirteen years earlier: the engagement was considered a battle lost, but by no means a definitive end to the war, or their cause. If the Jacobites had not seen a future for their movement in 1746, then why had they plotted to bring about a Stuart restoration since? They did not know then that Culloden was to be the last battle they would fight. Quiberon Bay was no different. From the Breton coast Sir Richard Warren, the man who had rescued Charles after the ’Fortyfive, and meanwhile advanced to the rank of French brigadier, suggested that though the late debacle at sea had caused the French momentarily to suspend their efforts on behalf of the Jacobites, not all was lost.268 Certainly, the French, at the instigation of Charles-François, Comte de Broglie, planned several other attempts during the Seven Years’ War and after, while Jacobite lobbying after Quiberon Bay continued with undiminished vigour. Choiseul again met with a Jacobite representative in early December, and the Comte de Be´thune defended Charles’ objectives by rebutting faction-sponsored pro-Irish invasion schemes at Versailles. On 28 December 1759, orders had been given out by the French court to continue the construction of the flat-bottomed boats with all haste.269 What prevented a French invasion of Britain during the remainder of the Seven Years’ War, and to what degree did the Jacobites participate in these efforts? Fortunately, Captain John Holker’s correspondence proves obligingly helpful partially to answer the first question. Arriving in Paris at the beginning of December 1759, Holker was aghast at the confusion and misery he met with. He described the economic situation of France in the bleakest terms. If, in the space of two weeks, the government proved unable to procure ‘a considerable summ’, Holker, who himself had a considerable


stake in the fortune of the country, predicted that ‘one halve of Fra[nce] must become Bankrupts’.270 Losses on the North American continent and in India had finally taken their toll: the war with Britain had driven the French state to the brink of a financial collapse.271 To what degree the Jacobites were actively involved in those later efforts to invade Britain, and not used as a legitimating embellishment of French ambitions, remains unclear. After Quiberon Bay, the French once more proved consistent only in their opportunism, for their priority was no longer a Stuart restoration. Instead, Choiseul and the Comte de Broglie invested their remaining resources in the preservation of their overseas possessions, and the reconquest of the colonies lost to Britain in the course of the Seven Years’ War. There is no clear indication of a pronounced French interest in collaborating with the Jacobites for a cross-Channel invasion after the ’Fiftynine.272 Moreover, the template of the Franco-Jacobite modus operandi established in the negotiations during the War of Austrian Succession and the Seven Years’ War is probably indicative of what might have followed in the wake of the battle of Quiberon Bay. If the disastrous outcome of the ’Fifty-nine did not influence Jacobite optimism at first, the multilateral Peace of Paris signed on 10 February 1763, which concluded the Seven Years’ War, precluded the possibility of another invasion attempt supported by France for as long as it lasted. The post-war concordance between Britain and France held for over a decade. The Stuart cause had always thrived in an atmosphere of discord between Britain and the Continental powers; in the absence of an open conflict, the active Jacobite movement slowly choked to death in a vacuum of peace.273 Conversely, the longevity of the Jacobite threat to Revolutionary Britain which for the most part emanated from, and was significantly sustained by, the Jacobites in Scotland and the exiled community on the Continent should be given its due acknowledgement. In the wake of the ’Forty-five a thriving and versatile Jacobite movement confidently weathered at least another thirteen years before internal friction, an enduring peace between Britain and France and waning interest in the cause at home rendered it a spent force.

6 A Jacobite Renaissance or Epitaph, 1746–1759?

From the moor of Culloden to the shores of Quiberon Bay, Jacobitism continued to act as a viable political interest group. During this period, it retained a realistic, albeit slim, prospect of attaining its prime objective of a second restoration of the de jure British dynasty. The claim that the termination of the Jacobite movement as a military and political threat to the postRevolutionary establishment of Britain occurred in April 1746, was as much the result of the Jacobites’ repeated failures to effect an overthrow of George II’s government in the thirteen subsequent years, as of the retrospectivist, historiographical portrayal drawn of Jacobitism by generations of biased or sceptical historians in the past, as well as in the present. Ironically, it is the Jacobites’ ultimate failure to achieve their goal which is the source of a tendency of historical retrospectivity among scholars in the field. The sceptics have, by alternately ignoring, disparaging, or without thoroughly examining or presenting, evidence supportive of the thesis of an active Jacobite movement in the period from 1746 to 1759, prematurely consigned it to the grave. Not even in retrospect did the crushing defeat at Culloden bury the Jacobites’ hope of success. If hindsight were to be taken advantage of, it would be more sensible to say that it was the resounding British victory of 1759 over the Brest fleet which cut short the last, realistic effort of the exiled Stuarts’ to retake their royal legacy by force. But like Culloden thirteen years earlier, Quiberon Bay could not take their hope. Sir Edward Hawke’s intervention eliminated the Jacobites’ potential to act through the power of France, and her allies, and hence destroyed their means to overthrow the Revolution settlement. In the interim, a host of Jacobite schemes to restore the Stuarts had been hatched. It is not disputed here that they all were unsuccessful; rather the present inquiry attempts to demonstrate that although multiple factors contributed to the eventual failure of the Jacobite movement, it was at times close to a breakthrough, and lacking the advantage of hindsight, its enemy perceived it as a substantive threat. This was reflected by the government’s apprehensive and consistent vigilance, and by its disproportionately harsh response to Jacobite attempts. Indeed, as long as 159


Jacobite initiative and a foreign, adversarial power could converge, Britain’s rulers could hardly allow themselves to feel safe. For a long time, not even Hawke’s victory at Quiberon Bay could guarantee an end to Jacobite plotting; only the flagging Jacobite spirits, sapped by decades of a fruitless pursuit, and the absence of foreign power perceiving an advantage in supporting the Stuarts’ claim would finally lay an end to this old struggle. The Jacobites’ French allies fared no better. Under the auspices of the Duc de Choiseul and, later, Charles-François, Comte de Broglie, French invasion schemes were considered into the later years of the Seven Years’ War, and beyond. Compared to 1744 or 1759, there was at least one significant difference. ‘The goal was no longer the restoration of the Stuarts but the reacquisition of the French colonial empire.’1 In the end, France lost the war and was forced to submit to the humiliating Peace of Paris (1763). The archival sources document anything but a clear-cut picture of an invulnerable British state, or that of an obsolete, impotent Jacobite movement. At times quite the contrary is the case: the Whig administration and its sous-ministres in Scotland of that period were clearly aware of Jacobite vitality, and when government decision-makers chose to react, their measures were alternately insecure, fearful and, at times, exaggerated. As always, the line between the actual danger and the perceived threat was blurred. Considering the present accumulation of evidence, the government response to the Jacobite challenge was as deceptive as it was revealing; equally, the Jacobite perception of its activities, strength and prospects cannot be said to constitute a trustworthy indicator of its true potential. It follows that a more productive historical insight can only be reached as the result of comparing and contrasting the two perspectives; even such a comprehensive approach is no guarantee of a balanced account. The optimists’ revisionism, however, may moderate the monolithic legacy of the Jacosceptics’ hegemony in the field. As we have seen, the British government’s fear of Jacobitism in the years 1746–59 found ample, and genuine expression in the correspondence of its principal representatives. Therefore, a broad application of the contention, that the government ministers’ fear was of an exclusively fabricated and expedient nature, can no longer stand undisputed. If a narrow view of the Jacosceptics’ position regarding the government’s exaggeration of the Jacobite threat were taken, it could be maintained that the adherents of such a thesis seek to ignore and disqualify the authenticity of an entire discourse of fear for the sake of their argument. Implicitly, the Jacosceptics would then be guilty of setting their argument of ulterior ministerial motives over the substance of the documented Jacobite challenge to the British government. Such a perspective would entail the transformation of ministerial perception of Jacobitism after 1746 into a vast propaganda exercise with no, or at best marginal, basis in fact. Implicitly, the Jacobite threat could then be perceived as having been commensurately hollow. Such an analysis is dissatisfying, for

A Jacobite Renaissance or Epitaph? 161

if this were the case, then it would consequently reduce the majority of the British polity to an assembly of gullible simpletons. Certainly, this was not the case.2 The attempted regrouping of Charles’ army at Ruthven, the Muirlaggan resolution, Lochiel’s initiative in Lochaber and the subsequent, tenacious, albeit sporadic, resistance of Jacobite stragglers into 1747 leave little room to doubt that Cumberland’s victory in April 1746 was not understood as being as decisive then, as we make it out to be in the present. Nor were the Jacobites unable to resist thereafter. The nature of Charles’ dispositional orders in the aftermath of Culloden, from the dispersal of the Jacobite army at Ruthven to the Prince’s order to maintain skeletal units in the Highlands, lacked defeatist overtones in spite of being defensive, and further indicates that the underlying assumption in issuing such instructions was that the French would still send reinforcements. Though the French patently failed to send succour, in the end, Charles’ Scottish legacy – a reservoir of resentment against the victors – was not the worst of all prerequisites for another attempt. At the same time, Charles realized that the main beneficiary of his continued presence in the Highlands would be Louis XV. By the military and financial attention the British government was forced to expend on the last rising, France had been able to exploit the Allies’ resulting weakness in Flanders in 1745, and early 1746, making substantial gains in the process. Unless the French sent immediate support, Charles was determined not to let his allies use him further, and it was therefore as much as for the increasing British military pressure that he left Scotland; at the same time, Charles understood that his presence, and his nuisance value, at Versailles stood his cause a better chance of obtaining military aid than a last, hopeless stand at the head of the clans. In a way, French support did indeed reach the Jacobites in the shape of the Locharkaig treasure and, supposedly, a delivery of arms.3 By itself, this aid package proved insufficient to sustain coordinated defensive action. What the Jacobite army required in order to regroup was a French regular force of sufficient numbers to screen it from Cumberland’s troops. Though the weakened state of the Jacobite army, and its leaders’ poor choice of a battlefield practically handed victory to the government forces at Culloden, the war in Scotland was lost in France. The failure of the factious French ministers in perceiving the true value of an indigenous insurrection in Scotland, and Louis XV’s almost pathological indecisiveness, were in the main responsible for the suppression of the ’Forty-five. French attribution of a higher priority to the campaign in Flanders during the latter half of the War of Austrian Succession, rather than the possibility of directly striking against the Whig establishment in Britain in the end proved a costly, if not fatal, mistake. McLynn observed that ‘[b]y failing to take its chance at the time when the British political system was at its most brittle, France condemned itself to the later indignities of the Treaty of Paris in 1763’.4


Not only during the ’Forty-five, but also at the time of the Franco-Jacobite negotiations in connection with Choiseul’s invasion scheme of 1758–59, the initially myopic French strategic evaluation of the European and colonial theatres of war interfered with the Jacobite project of attacking Britain. Arguably, if the pro-Jacobite Tencin–D’Argenson bloc in the Conseil d’E´tat had persevered in 1746, the outcome of the ’Forty-five would have looked very different. In a similar manner, the belated rise to prominence of first Belle-Isle and later Choiseul during the Seven Years’ War could not offset the damage done to French military resources by the Continental policy of Cardinal de Bernis’ reign. The fallacy of this narrow, Eurocentric view of the Anglo-French struggle for supremacy adopted by a majority of successive French ministers was not fully realized by the mid-eighteenth-century ancien re´gime. Conversely, Jacobite lobbying for French intervention in late 1746 and throughout 1747 was inhibited by Charles’ refusal, endorsed by George Kelly but sharply criticized by James and the Scottish Jacobite faction in exile, to countenance strategic objectives limited to the Celtic fringe. It was, however, the lack of understanding on the part of the French ministers, and their attendant policy decisions, which had catastrophic consequences for the Jacobite movement of that period, and thereby contributed directly to its demise after 1759. Still, if the Jacobites proved unable to regroup in Scotland, this cannot be said of their ability to reorganize and maintain their ranks in exile. In the wake of the ’Forty-five, the majority of the veteran elite re-established itself mainly in France as the last wave of e´migre´s in an already ensconced, and well-connected, Jacobite diaspora; the few who remained in Scotland successfully went underground, and, clandestinely, continued to groom the Jacobite interest. This last was certainly not an easy task, not the least of difficulties being the progressive disintegration of the Jacobite geography of loyalty because of internecine struggles. Nevertheless, it appears that a Jacobite fifth column existed to the days of Choiseul’s invasion attempt. By the largely successful evacuation of its elite beyond the pale of British punitive action in 1746, Jacobitism was thus able to retain most of its cadre of leaders. This was a requisite element for the focusing of future efforts, and an invaluable asset for the direction of another rising. Any chance for a breakthrough of Charles’ repeatedly unsuccessful bids for a French accession to a resuscitation of the ’Forty-five was foreclosed by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle towards the end of 1748, after the conclusion of which the Prince was forced into a peripatetic, secretive existence on the Continent. However, the veterans of the ’Forty-five, and Jacobite exiles settled in France since 1688, remained, and were gradually integrated into their host society. Many chose to join the French military establishment but retained their loyalty towards the Stuarts. The Scots and Irish Jacobite regiments of the French army were constantly replenished by recruiting in the


British Isles, and the influx of deserters from the Scots regiments in the service of the United Provinces. As part of the French army, Jacobite soldiers received training during which most of them attained some degree of combat experience. A maximum of nine, mostly veteran, regiments of the line, paid for by the French treasury, and nominally owing their allegiance to Louis XV, were among other, more immediate, purposes kept in readiness towards the prospect of a Stuart restoration. In other words, though Charles was forced to quit the French dominions like his father before him, France had not permanently shelved the Jacobite option, but instead was biding her time, while she was nursing the vanguard of a future invasion force. Continued French interest in the Jacobites as an anti-British political and military tool was vindicated during the Seven Years’ War, and culminated in the Jacobites’ participation in Choiseul’s invasion project of 1759. Deprived of officially sanctioned French support, sundered at its core and generally riven by factionalism after 1748, the Jacobite movement underwent its most profound development: a split which precipitated a new departure. Shunned by its erstwhile allies, and looked upon with ample suspicion by those Jacobites loyal to the exiled court in Rome, the nascent Prince’s party grew into political adulthood in the blight separating the War of Austrian Succession from the Seven Years’ War. Since its inception, Jacobitism had thrived, if not entirely depended, upon a state of discord between Britain and any of the Continental powers. A similar situation to the limbo of 1748–56 had persisted following the conclusion of the Triple Alliance of 1717, which marked the beginning of an enduring Anglo-French de´tente; under the direction of Cardinal Fleury and Walpole, the former belligerents settled into a period of mutual peace and relative stability. The consequence of the Anglo-French confluence of interests was that until Walpole’s fall from power in 1742, Jacobitism had lain in the doldrums. But if this analogy is to serve as a useful comparison with the prevailing situation after 1748, the most important of all the parallels requires mentioning, for despite the unpropitious, foreign political circumstances in the early 1720s, the Atterbury plot had taken its fatal course.5 It seems as if the prevailing consensus in the field concerning the sudden demise of Jacobitism after Culloden can only be valid in a retrospectivist universe, for as Paul Kle´ber Monod recently pointed out in reference to the Elibank conspiracy, ‘it would be erroneous to assume that after 40 years, the cause of the exiled Stuarts simply vanished’.6 The several schemes leading up to the initiation of the Elibank conspiracy were also hatched in a period of calm in the European political theatre, and also following a treaty terminating hostilities between Britain and France. The major difference between the two attempts at restoring the Stuarts was that the eloquent Bishop of Rochester was no Charles Edward. Alternatively, this was also true for the Prince’s father. Ever since the collapse of the ’Fifteen, James’ penchant for assuming the role of a determined leader had


lost the restrained verve exhibited during the second and third decades of the eighteenth century; his resignation was also reflected in the dearth of initiatives after 1723. His headstrong son was a different case. If fortune had favoured the bold, Charles would surely have been more successful than the shadow king who had been his father. As in 1743–45, Charles and his adherents were willing to take matters into their own hands to effect a Stuart restoration. The Prince’s maverick behaviour in those years was vindicated after the incremental disavowal he suffered at the hands of Louis XV, and also because of his brother’s secret and sudden elevation to the Catholic hierarchy in 1747. Henry, whose new office demanded a celibate life, and a disillusioned, aging James, who was accessory to the younger son’s plan to enter holy orders, were both guilty of leaving Charles to deal with the full weight of his family’s dynastic duties. The secrecy surrounding the Elibank plot was but an outward manifestation of the Prince’s sentiments in relation to his family’s effective abandonment of the Jacobite cause. By excluding James and Henry from his councils, by his apostasy and by substituting Protestant Prussia for Catholic France as a receptacle for his hopes, Charles burned nearly all his bridges with the old Jacobite movement. Of course, this was not without its problems. To begin with, by implementing this policy, Charles tore open a rift which intensified the existing polarities separating his adherents from the Jacobites loyal to his father, though both sides were at pains not to let the unwelcome reality of this dichotomy surface. Because of the Prince’s strict incognito after his expulsion from France, James found himself unable to communicate directly with his son, and thus Charles’ credibility and influence with the movement at large were jeopardized; the damage done to the cohesion of the panEuropean Jacobite network and its resources cost the Prince’s party dearly. Because of the decisions he made, Charles and his circle found themselves increasingly isolated from the rest of the Jacobites. Although Charles was set on a course to attempt, if necessary without the material support from a foreign power, a counter-revolution in the early 1750s, the Elibank conspiracy cannot be understood apart from the ambivalent collusion of Frederick II. The full extent of Prussian involvement in Jacobite activities in 1751–53 remains unknown; but archival evidence from the state papers shows, if anything, that the English ministers were aware of Frederick’s encouragement for the Jacobites, and suspected at least one Prussian operation to ship arms to Scotland. The activities of James Dormer at Antwerp leave little room to doubt the Prince’s determination to procure significant amounts of weapons for, and means to convey them to, his British partisans. The highly motivated state of the Jacobite clans in Scotland, and the limited implementation of the disarming scheme in the aftermath of the ’Forty-five clearly indicate that, should Murray of Elibank’s plan for a coup de main in London have met with any success, it would have


been highly probable that the British government would have had another rising on its hands. In itself, the available, but not positively incriminatory information, regarding Frederick II’s underhand encouragement of the Jacobite cause at that time may merely serve as an indicator towards a potential Prussian tendency to support the Elibank conspirators. An exploration of the European political context of the early 1750s reveals, however, that Frederick II had ample reason to consider the Jacobite card: the King of Prussia found himself pitted against his uncle, George II, over a British and a Hanoverian controversy. A dispute over the restitution of the Silesian Loan, aborted by Frederick II because of the confiscation of Prussian vessels by the Royal Navy, and the conflicting Hohenzollern-Guelph claims to the duchy of Friesland, both bore plenty of adversarial potential for an open conflict. Added to these bones of contention was Prussia’s alignment with France, dating from the War of Austrian Succession, then an alliance directly opposed to the ‘Old System’ sponsored by the Anglo-Austrian coalition. George II’s support for Frederick II’s nemesis, Maria Theresa, which was also influenced by his position as a member of the Imperial College of Electors opposed to Prussian expansionist pretensions, did little to sustain the brittle relations with his nephew. In the light of the given circumstances, covert, and eventually, overt Prussian backing for a Jacobite bid by way of procuring 6,000 Swedish regulars and Prussian shipping would have been understandable then; the new, circumstantial evidence implicating Prussia adds weight to such a line of argument now. The failure of the Elibank plot was caused by a combination of factors. The exact reason for the postponement of the scheduled date of 10 November 1752, selected for the attack on St James’ palace and the Tower, to May or June 1753 remains in the dark. What is clear, however, is the fact that the conspiracy’s secrecy was compromised by the Hanoverian recruitment of several double-agents, the most prominent of whom was the redoubtable Pickle, alias Alasdair MacDonell of Glengarry. Pickle’s identity has been positively proven by evidence from among the papers of his employer, Henry Pelham. His defection and subsequent disclosures were largely responsible for the well-apprised state of the Whig ministers. Internecine wrangling over the scraps of the Locharkaig treasure in the Highlands, and the favour showered on his Irish advisors, but also Charles’ irascibility, especially coming to the fore during the controversy over the confidentiality of his mistress, Clementina Walkinshaw, with a sceptical English leadership, undermined the tenuous chance of coordinating the various strands of the conspiracy by establishing a continuous rapport with the key actors in Britain. Even the abortion of the conspiracy was not without its price, both for the Jacobites and the British government: Dr Archibald Cameron suffered the capital punishment he was sentenced to at the close of the last rising. With


the exception of his execution, a well-informed British government chose not to react, possibly for wanting to protect its intelligence source, but still likelier to contain the probability of an open rift with an ill-disposed Prussia, by whom a British accusation of implication in the plot could have been used as a ready pretext for the commencement of open hostilities. With Hanover vulnerable to Prussian invasion, the government may very well have chosen to ignore traces of Frederick II’s meddling. As long as the archives at the Quai d’Orsay and the Berliner Staatsarchiv, and, according to Sir Charles Petrie’s hunch, unspecified private British repositories, are not seriously investigated in the future, the full extent of Prussian involvement in the Elibank conspiracy will remain an unknown quantity. The present inquiry can only be an indication of what remains hidden, but will hopefully provide a launching point for a new and more satisfactory project. Among other consequences, the abortive Elibank plot taught the Prince’s party a lesson about its own limitations by impressing the importance of support by a foreign power upon the architects of a new scheme. The rapprochement with France was facilitated by the increasingly hostile climate of Anglo-French relations in 1755; this tendency was underscored by the Diplomatic Revolution following the Franco-Imperial Treaty of Paris and the Anglo-Prussian Convention of Westminster a year later. As during the War of Austrian succession Louis XV’s government again considered the Jacobite card, as the prospect of open war against Britain became imminent. From 1756 to 1758, Jacobite efforts to reinstate a working relationship with the French government were hampered by Cardinal de Bernis’ Continental and colonial war priorities. As long as these directives determined the distribution of resources, an invasion of Britain was improbable. Charles’ deep-seated distrust of his former allies also complicated matters on the diplomatic front; this problem was compounded by the conflicting Jacobite emissaries in and around Paris who all laid claim to having been invested with the Prince’s credentials. In spite of serious impediments, on the French side the initially tenuous Jacobite links with Versailles were chiefly sustained by Marećhal de Belle-Isle, and several less auspicious courtiers, such as Pompadour’s prote´ge´, the Prince de Soubise. Though Louis XV’s ministers may have wanted to concede Jacobitism only a legitimizing role in an invasion of Britain, or, at the least, again to use the movement as a tool for the advancement of their own plans, the spirited intervention of Charles’ embassies during the negotiations of 1758–59, and the interested French response and close cooperation, suggest that the Jacobites, as several of them had argued, indeed constituted an indispensable military and political asset to Choiseul’s grand strategy. Aside from being able to procure a fifth column in the Highlands in case of a landing, the Jacobites provided access to a network of informers and pertinently placed sympathizers, whose ability to blend in with their surroundings made them harder to detect than French spies. From the failed


attempts to gather intelligence, it is apparent that Jacobite agents were active in England, as well as Scotland, where, according to government reports, clandestine recruiting for the Irish and Scots regiment in French service was yielding hundreds of privates. During the Scottish militia debate, the Pitt ministry’s wary stance suggests it still regarded a majority of its Highland subjects as disaffected – an assumption corroborated by Jacobite intelligence; the government’s vast fortification programme in the former epicentres of the ’Forty-five, and the clearly apprehensive mood of leading figures in the Scottish military and administration further indicates that no less than the worst was expected of the former Jacobite clans. These findings, then, directly contradict the view that ‘Jacobitism throughout Britain was plainly dust and ashes’ during the early years of the Seven Years’ War.7 Finally, Thurot’s expedition to Ulster, and the British reaction it provoked, demonstrate that had an invasion succeeded, and considering that Pitt had denuded the country of regulars, Britain would have proven vulnerable to such an undertaking. Sir Edward Hawke’s victory at Quiberon in November 1759 cost the French their material basis for a seaborne, cross-Channel attack. The subsequent lack of funds for the reconstruction of a strong enough fleet was the consequence of the exorbitant expenditure France incurred in the early stages of the war, and her inability to compensate for them owing to the loss of territories and, hence, income in India and Canada. Louis XV’s successor would have to wait until after 1774 for another chance to strike against Britain. The American Revolution, however, occurred long after the Jacobites actively participated in the last scheme to restore their King by force of arms. By itself, the survival of Jacobitism into the Seven Years’ War is an important discovery. If the Jacobite movement weathered the experience at Culloden, it follows that the British state had to consider itself at risk after 1746. According to Professor Black ‘the manner in which foreign powers, hostile to Britain and to her Hanoverian rulers, could be encouraged to support Jacobitism, and were themselves encouraged in their stance by a belief in the strength of Jacobitism’ was at least as serious as the Tories’ loyalties were dubious during the Anglo-French alliance.8 The former, however, turned out to be the more persistent phenomenon, as France colluded with the Stuart Prince in 1745–46 and again in 1758–59; circumstantial evidence suggests that Prussia aided the Jacobites in the early 1750s. As long as even a marginal chance of a Stuart restoration remained extant – and that possibility existed as long as Charles and his followers remained at liberty to scheme, and advance foreign powers to act on their behalf – the Pelham ministry could not afford to ignore the Jacobite movement. The Jacobite threat the Pelhams faced in the years after Culloden was twofold: external as well as internal. J. C. D. Clark observed ‘as we can now see, the years 1740–60 were marked by the most bitter tactical and theoretical conflicts over religion, war, the dynasty and the possession of power


within the Whig party which had no reflection in a rising number of contests at general elections’.9 If Frank McLynn is correct in his assertion that historians have set the advent of a full acceptance of the Hanoverian dynasty before it actually occurred – after the British successes during the Seven Years’ War – in its absence, the longevity of a Jacobite fifth column posed a still more dangerous challenge to the regime of the day than hitherto suspected.10 According to Claude Nordmann, French intervention in 1759 could have activated this fringe group, and equally have roused dormant, sympathizing interests in Ireland and Wales.11 On the historiographical front, the wider consequences of an active Jacobite movement posing a real challenge to the Protestant Succession and the Whig oligarchy can be seen within the parameters of the debate concerning eighteenth-century Britain. As has been previously pointed out, the ramifications of what the optimists in the Jacobite debate conclude are momentous, as they thereby challenge the slowly eroding historiographical consensus of political stability in eighteenth-century Britain, or as Speck put it, ‘[h]ow British politics moved from the rage of party of Queen Anne’s last months to the stable oligarchy of George II’s final years’.12 According to Professor Clark, early-Hanoverian revisionists have argued that ‘[h]istorians . . . had imposed a picture of a Walpolian consensus on a bitterly polarised society’ in order ‘to avoid considering the implications of the long survival of the supposedly anachronistic, backward-looking, Tory/ Jacobite alternative to modernising Whig rule’.13 The implications are grave. Should the optimist/revisionist Jacobite school’s analysis prove correct, the shape of eighteenth-century British political history would stand in dire need of a fundamental reappraisal. Compared to the civil wars of the seventeenth century, the reigns of the first two Georges may strike historians as relatively stable, but this is to apply the wrong lens to the subject of inquiry: not temporal, but, if at all, spatial comparisons would probably prove more productive. The Spanish and Polish wars of succession of the first half of the eighteenth century can easily illustrate the potential for civil strife and disruption of governmental stability found in most dynastic struggles. Hence, by Continental standards the Jacobite movement, in spite of its ultimate collapse, can be seen as a serious destabilizing force during its heyday, plunging Ireland and Scotland into dynastic war from 1689 to 1692, and Scotland into one counter-revolutionary war from 1689–91, and two civil wars in 1715–16 and 1745–46.14 Dynastic conflict, rather than stability, is the appropriate model for the Hanoverian era: the spectre of violence remained. In the instance of rebellion, revolution, counter-revolution and invasion, Britain’s special, insular status, granted by a significant portion of her historical community, and separating her historical development from that of the rest of Europe, can no longer apply. The crucial point for the post-Culloden period is that after 1746 Jacobitism could not be discounted as an anachronism, as the Jacobite movement, and


through it, hostile foreign powers, still bore the means to disrupt Britain’s new regime. Thus, in a sense, the thirteen last years of Jacobite activism from 1746 to 1759 constituted a renaissance, entailing a galvanizing reconfiguration within the movement which culminated in the emergence of a vigorous Prince’s party at the helm. But they also represented an epitaph, in that the close of this period witnessed the failure of the last armed attempt to restore the Stuarts, releasing the Jacobite cause into its long twilight, and eventual redundancy.

Addendum: University of Nottingham Letters

170 Figure 1: Copy of Father Grant’s letter to A. M. —1st September 1751. The recipient of the letter is here identified as ‘A: M: —’. Source: Reproduced with the kind permission of the Department of Manuscripts and Special Collections, University of Nottinghan.

171

Figure 2: The recipient of this letter is here identified as ‘Alexander Mc Donell of Glengarry Esqr.’. Source: Reproduced with the kind permission of the Department of Manuscripts and Special Collections, University of Nottinghan.

172

Figure 3: ‘Key to Scotch Names etc.’ (NeC ¼ Newcastle of Clumber Mss.). Source: Reproduced with the kind permission of the Department of Manuscripts and Special Collections, University of Nottinghan.

173

Figure 4: In position 91 are the initials ‘A: M: —,’ which, according to the information in NeC 2,089, corresponds to the name ‘Alexander Mc Donell of Glengarry Esqr.’, are on the same line as the cant name ‘Pickle’. Source: Reproduced with the kind permission of the Department of Manuscripts and Special Collections, University of Nottinghan.

Notes 1

The Historians and the Last Phase of Jacobitism: From Culloden to Quiberon Bay, 1746–1759

1. Theodor Fontane, Jenseit des Tweed (Frankfurt am Main, [1860] 1989), 283. ‘The defeat of Culloden was followed by no other risings.’ 2. Sir Geoffrey Elton, The Practice of History (London, [1967] 1987), 20. 3. Any subtle level of differentiation in the conclusions reached by participants of the debate must necessarily fall prey to the approximate nature of this classification. Daniel Szechi, The Jacobites. Britain and Europe, 1688–1788 (Manchester, 1994), 1–6. 4. Murray G. H. Pittock, The Myth of the Jacobite Clans (Edinburgh, 1995), 14. 5. Lawrence Stone, ‘The Revival of Narrative: Reflections on a New Old History’, Past & Present, 85 (1979), 3–24, 9. 6. Szechi, The Jacobites, 4–6. 7. Typical for this strand of pessimism bordering on outright rejectionism is Basil Williams, who maintained that the Jacobites ‘lost their last chance, even then a small one, of carrying the country by surprise’, when Francis Atterbury, Bishop of Rochester, failed to convince the dying Queen Anne’s Tory ministry of recalling James Stuart from exile in 1714. Basil Williams, The Whig Supremacy, 1714–1760 (Oxford, [1939] 1962), 150. 8. Edward Gregg, Jacobitism (London, 1988), 24. 9. In reference to the ‘Glorious Revolution’, J. G. A. Pocock warns of historical vindication by hindsight, observing that ‘only because it [an English civil war] did not recur are we able to look upon the Highland War which ended at Glencoe and the Irish War which ended at Limerick as marginal in their significance’. There is probably some truth in what Pocock argues. Obviously, the chance of a ‘Fourth Civil War’ in England after the Dutch invasion was forestalled by William’s victory in Ireland; conversely, and where I beg to differ, a Jacobite victory in the Celtic fringes of Britain and Ireland would have proven conducive to, and would have decisively influenced, any later conflict in England, if only because of its potential strategic and logistic value. J. G. A. Pocock, ‘The Fourth English Civil War: Dissolution, Desertion and Alternative Histories in the Glorious Revolution’, Government and Opposition, 23, 2 (1988), 151–66, 153. For an example of a counterfactual scenario in which William of Orange’s invasion was bound to fail, and the consequences of the Henrican Reformation were, of course, reversed, see Conrad Russell, ‘The Catholic Wind’, in Conrad Russell, Unrevolutionary England (London, 1990), 305–8. Russell’s main point was, not unlike Pocock’s, to demonstrate that though ‘[i]t is not in the nature of such imaginative work to prove that James II might have defeated William in 1688 . . . it will make us pause for some time before we make the opposite assumption’. Russell, ‘The Catholic Wind’, 305. 10. William Speck, The Butcher. The Duke of Cumberland and the Suppression of the 45 (Caernarfon, [1981] 1995), intro., 1. For a recent cinematic example in which the ‘lost cause model’ features prominently, see the documentary by Bob Carruthers, The Jacobites (Cromwell Films Limited, 1995). 174

Notes 175 11. Colley’s representation of a loyal Tory opposition was her response to Dr Eveline Cruickshanks’ thesis of a strong Jacobite commitment within the Tory party. More recently, Professor Jeremy Black has criticized Colley’s argument stating that ‘[s]uch a view would have found little support from George I and George II, both of whom believed that although individual Tories were loyal and could be trusted, the party as a whole was factious and disloyal’. Linda Colley, Britons. Forging the Nation, 1707–1837 (New Haven, 1992), intro., 4–5, 7. Also see In Defiance of Oligarchy. The Tory Party, 1714–1760 (Cambridge, 1982); Jeremy Black, The Collapse of the Anglo-French Alliance, 1727–1731 (Gloucester, 1987), 6. For Cruickshanks’ thesis see note 44. 12. Colley, Britons, 72. Also see Colley’s accompanying endnote (no. 45) to this statement, where she maintains: ‘[i]n the sense that many of the keenest chroniclers of Jacobitism in the twentieth century have come from firmly Scottish Nationalist, Roman Catholic or High Tory backgrounds. This is scarcely surprising since antiUnionist Scots, Catholics, and High-Tories – not Tories in general – were at the heart of active Jacobitism in the eighteenth century.’ I am not certain this is true for most modern revisionist scholars of Jacobitism, whose works have been published since the 1970s, and, except for the obvious historiographical divergence based on the possibly different training or historical tradition, I have had no reason to suspect such partisan inclinations in the works of modern Jacobite scholars, such as Dr F. J. McLynn, Dr D. Szechi, or those of the prolific Professor J. Black. Also see Szechi, The Jacobites, 2–3, for a similar exercise in discreditation aimed at Sir Charles Petrie, in whose case the charge of enthusiasm, if not partisan bias, is probably more permissible than if it had been levelled at the modern optimists. 13. David Cannadine, ‘The State of British History,’ Times Literary Supplement, 10 October (1986), p. 1,140, quoted in Szechi, The Jacobites, 7. 14. See Speck, The Butcher, preface, ix–x. 15. Colley, Britons, 367–8; Colley, In Defiance of Oligarchy, 291; William Speck, Stability and Strife. England 1714–60 (London, 1977), intro., 1, 4, 7 16. Szechi, The Jacobites, 4; Bruce Lenman, The Jacobite Risings in Britain, 1689–1746 (Aberdeen, [1980] 1995), 287. 17. Lenman, Jacobite Risings, 288. Lenman is not the first, and surely not the last, historian to suggest that a restored Stuart dynasty would constitute but a satellite in the French political orbit. Conversely, Frank McLynn observes that the Duc de Noailles and the Comte de Maurepas advised Louis XV against supporting Charles in December 1746, fearing that ‘if restored he would be a more dangerous enemy to France than George II ever was’. Philip C. Yorke, The Life and Correspondence of Philip Yorke, Earl of Hardwicke, Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain, 3 vols (Cambridge, 1913), I, 432; Frank J. McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie. Charles Edward Stuart (Oxford, [1988] 1991), 315. For French fear of the prospect of a restored Charles Edward shortly before the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War, see BL Eg. Mss 3465, ff. 161–6. ‘Extract of a letter from Lille the 15th Decemr. 1755’, enclosed in Michael Hatton to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, 19 December 1755. 18. Lenman, Jacobite Risings, 291. 19. Bruce Lenman, The Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen, 1650–1784 (Aberdeen, [1984] 1995), 177–212, and see especially 178, where the author writes: ‘there was no absolute barrier, in many cases, between Highland Jacobites and the House of Hanover, except the latter’s understandable suspicion of recent rebels’. 20. Paul Fritz, The English Ministers and Jacobitism between the Rebellions of 1715 and 1745 (Toronto, 1975), 7, 35, 97. See also his preface, vii–viii.

176 Notes 21. Ibid., 34. ´ ’Ciardha, previously of Clare Hall, Cambridge, in a private communi22. Eámonn O cation. 23. Fritz, The English Ministers and Jacobitism, 64. 24. Gregg, Jacobitism, 25. 25. On a general point of evidence, Sir Geoffrey Elton reminds us of the patchy and frail nature of our own knowledge when he tell us that the object of the study of history is not the past, but the documents and other artifacts which have survived the vicissitudes of time. Geoffrey Elton, The Practice of History (London, [1967] 1987), 20. 26. Gregg, Jacobitism, 6. 27. Eveline Cruickshanks, ed., Ideology and Conspiracy: Aspects of Jacobitism, 1689–1759 (Edinburgh, 1982), intro., 1. 28. Eveline Cruickshanks, ‘Charles Spencer, Third Earl of Sunderland and Jacobitism’, English Historical Review, 450 (1998), 65–76, 68. 29. Colin Kidd, Subverting Scotland’s Past. Scottish Whig Historians and the Creation of an Anglo-British Identity, 1689–c.1830 (Cambridge, 1993), especially 77. See also Herbert Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History (New York and London, [1931] 1965), 9–33, 105. 30. Allan I. Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603–1788 (East Linton, 1996), 162. 31. Pittock, Myth of the Jacobite Clans, 14. 32. Niall Ferguson, ‘Virtual History: Towards a ‘‘Chaotic’’ Theory of the Past’, in Niall Ferguson, ed., Virtual History: Alternatives and Counterfactuals (London, 1997), 1–90, 74. 33. Pocock, ‘The Fourth English Civil War’, 157. 34. Ferguson, ‘Virtual History’, 19. See also J. C. D. Clark, Revolution and Rebellion. State and Society in England in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Cambridge, [1986] 1990), 10. 35. Jeremy Black, ‘Could the Jacobites Have Won?’, History Today, 45, 7 (1995), 24–9, 28. 36. Frank J. McLynn, The Jacobites (London, [1985] 1988), 119. 37. Ibid., 118; Murray G. H. Pittock, The Invention of Scotland. The Stuart Myth and the Scottish Identity, 1638 to the Present (London, 1991), 61. See also my second chapter for continued Jacobite resistance in the wake of Culloden. 38. McLynn, The Jacobites, 119; Frank McLynn, Invasion. From the Armada to Hitler, 1588–1945 (London and New York, 1987), 39. McLynn estimated that the maximum number of fencible clansmen of all political denominations, and which could have been raised in the North of Scotland, would have been about 30,000. McLynn, The Jacobites, 119. 39. McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, preface, ix-x; James Tully, ‘The Pen is a Mighty Sword: Quentin Skinner’s Analysis of Politics’, in James Tully, ed., Meaning and Context. Quentin Skinner and his Critics (Cambridge, 1988), 7–25, 19–20. 40. Ferguson, ‘Virtual History’, 59. 41. McLynn, Jacobites, 123, (my italics). 42. See Clifford Geertz, ‘Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight’, Daedalus, 101 (1972), 1–37; and by the same author, ‘Thick Description: Toward an Interpretative Theory of Culture’, in Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York, 1973), 3–31. 43. John Brooke, King George III (London, 1972), 5.

Notes 177 44. To date, Dr Eveline Cruickshanks’ main contribution to the historiographical debate, important in itself but not directly relevant for the present project, has been her thesis of a strongly Jacobitical Tory party during Sir Robert Walpole’s ministry to the end of the ’Forty-five. Eveline Cruickshanks, Political Untouchables. The Tories and the ’45 (London, 1979), preface, v. See also Szechi, The Jacobites, 90. 45. Frank J. McLynn, France and the Jacobite Rising of 1745 (Edinburgh, 1981), 1–3. 46. Ibid., 232. 47. Paul Kle´ber Monod, Jacobitism and the English People, 1688–1788 (Cambridge, [1989] 1993), 209. 48. Claude Nordmann, ‘Choiseul and the Last Jacobite Attempt of 1759’, in Eveline Cruickshanks, ed., Ideology and Conspiracy, 201–17, 201. 49. See Chapter 5, pp. 146–52. 50. Andrew Lang, Pickle the Spy (London, 1897), 195–9; Sir Charles Petrie, ‘The Elibank plot, 1752–3’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 14 (1931), 175–96, 184. 51. McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 400–1; Cruickshanks, Political Untouchables, 112–13. 52. Cruickshanks, Political Untouchables, 87–100. 53. McLynn, The Jacobites, 127. See also Robert Clyde, From Rebel to Hero. The Image of the Highlander, 1745–1830 (East Linton, 1995), 16–17. 54. Black, ‘Could the Jacobites Have Won?’, 28. 55. Jeremy Black, Culloden and the ’45 (Stroud and New York, [1990] 1993), 201. 56. Peter Burke, ‘Ranke the Reactionary’, in Georg G. Iggers and James M. Powell, eds, Leopold von Ranke and the Shaping of the Historical Discipline (New York, 1990), 36–44, 37. 57. Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, The Territory of the Historian, trans. B. and S. Reynolds (Hassocks, 1979), 111. 58. Colley’s observation should be juxtaposed with that of Guy Chaussinand-Nogaret who, in 1973, attempted to answer the question of why the Flight of the Wild Geese had not attracted the same interest in the historical community as the Huguenots’ expulsion from France following the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685. Chaussinand-Nogaret suspected that ‘the dynamics of an exile essentially bourgeois [i.e. the Huguenots] followed the direction of a historiography arranged round two major axes themselves defined, not without a curious distortion, as bourgeois: the Enlightenment and capitalism’. He then posed the crucial question: ‘Is it because of its aristocratic nature that the Jacobite exodus has not attracted the same attention?’ Guy Chaussinand-Nogaret, ‘Une e´lite insulaire au service de l’Europe. Les Jacobites au XVIIIe sie`cle’, Annales, Economies, Socie´te´s, Civilisations (1973), 1,087–122, 1,097, quoted in Patrick Clark de Dromantin, ‘France, Land of Refuge: Memoirs of a Family Exiled by the Treaty of Limerick, 1690–1914’, in Edward Corp, ed., L’Autre Exile (Presses du Languedoc, 1993), 157–70, 158. On a similar, critical observation concerning the historians of the Huguenots, see Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History, intro., 5–6. 59. Mark Phillips, ‘The Revival of Narrative: Thoughts on a Current Historiographical Debate’, The University of Toronto Quarterly, 53, 2 (1983–4), 149–65, 149. 60. Stone, ‘The Revival of Narrative’, 8. 61. Peter Burke, ‘History of Events and the Revival of Narrative’, in Peter Burke, ed., New Perspectives on Historical Writing (Pennsylvania, 1991), 233–48, 235. 62. Bernard Bailyn, ‘The Challenge of Modern Historiography’, American Historical Review, 87, 1 (1982), 1–24, 24.

178 Notes 63. Stone, ‘The Revival of Narrative’, 22–3; Burke, ‘History of Events’, 240–6; Phillips, ‘The Revival of Narrative’, 161–2. 64. Stone, ‘The Revival of Narrative’, 10. 65. See McLynn, The Jacobites, 78–90; Szechi, The Jacobites, 12–40; Murray G. H. Pittock, Poetry and Jacobite Politics in Eighteenth-Century Britain and Ireland (Cambridge, 1994); Kle´ber Monod, Jacobitism and the English People, 1–12. 66. See Michel Bollag’s essay, ‘In Gottes Gebot die Freiheit des Menschen’, in Livio ¨ rich, 1997) 147–52, 147. Piatti, Schtetl Zu¨rich. Von orthodoxen Ju¨dischen Nachbarn (Zu 67. McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie; France and the Jacobite Rising; Nordmann, ‘Choiseul and the Last Jacobite Attempt of 1759’. See also James Dennistoun of Dennistoun, Memoirs of Sir Robert Strange, Knt., Engraver, Member of Several Foreign Academies of Design; and of his Brother-in-Law Andrew Lumisden, Private Secretary to the Stuart Princes, 2 vols (London, 1855), in which some of Lumisden’s post-1746 correspondence was printed. 68. Except for Bruce Lenman in his The Jacobite Risings in Britain and in The Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen, no other published historian I am aware of has made use of the West Highland Museum manuscripts in relation to Jacobitism in the postCulloden period. 69. Notably, William Speck and Allan I. Macinnes have both used the Loudon Scottish Collection. 70. Lord Milton’s political correspondence was partially published as an appendix in the second volume of C. S. Terry, ed., Albemarle Papers, 2 vols (Aberdeen, 1902). 71. Some of the Stonefield letters were published in Sir James Fergusson of Kilkerran, Argyll in the ’Forty-five (London, 1951), preface, 9–10. Sir James Fergusson also drew on the Campbell of Mamore Mss (NLS), and the Argyll Mss lodged at Inveraray Castle, currently the private property of the present Duke. 72. William Speck’s account in The Butcher heavily relies on the Cumberland papers. The only Scottish manuscripts collection Speck used for his account is the Loudon Scottish Collection lodged at the Huntington Library in San Marino, California. His preference for the Cumberland papers, a primary source which, in terms of its bias, is at least as problematic as the Stuart papers themselves, could easily be construed as a partisan choice in itself. See note 69. 73. See Andrew Lang, Pickle the Spy, which was published in 1897. For the presentation of my case, see Chapter 4, p. 81. 74. See McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie. 75. Documents belonging to both collections have been used in D. B. Horn, Sir Charles Hanbury Williams & European Diplomacy, 1747–58 (London, 1930). 76. In John Doran, Mann and Manners at the Court of Florence, 1740–1786, 2 vols (London, 1876), Dr John Doran quoted numerous excerpts of Mann’s correspondence with Sir Horace Walpole. 77. Ex info. Thomas Biskup, Emmanuel College, Cambridge. The bulk of the Prussian diplomatic correspondence was printed in Friedrich der Grosse, Politische Correspondenz Friedrichs des Grossen (Berlin, 1879–1939), 46 vols. 78. Ex info. Dr John Morrill, Selwyn College, Cambridge.

2

Suppression and Resistance: Hanoverians and Jacobites in 1746–1747

1. HEH 330346. ‘Jacobite Song from the Chevalier’s Favourite, addressed to William Duke of Cumberland,’ in N. D. Fellowes, State Tryals, unpublished scrap-book (1819–February 1828), 385.

Notes 179 2. William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 23 September 1746, printed in C. S. Terry, ed., Albemarle Papers, 2 vols (Aberdeen, 1902), I, 235. 3. Leslie Stephen and Sidney Lee, eds, Dictionary of National Biography, 63 vols (London, 1885–1900), X, 108. For the tenacity of this thesis of a foreclosure of active Jacobitism after 1746, printed a century later, see Edward Gregg, Jacobitism (London, 1988), 24. An example of a simplistic, reductionist view of Charles Edward Stuart’s further career can be found in Linda Colley, Britons. Forging the Nation 1707–1837 (New Haven, 1992), 80. What compounds the undifferentiated nature of Colley’s representation of Charles Edward Stuart in this case is that she cites Frank McLynn’s seminal and exhaustive biography of Charles, which, if anything, documents the gradual decline of this Stuart prince over a time-span encompassing almost four decades. In no manner does McLynn’s detailed interpretation of Charles’ life lend itself to the kind of myopic judgement passed by Colley. For McLynn, see my note 10. 4. Daniel Szechi, The Jacobites. Britain and Europe 1688–1788 (Manchester, 1994), 4–6. Of the ‘pessimist’ school Szechi writes: ‘The crucial point on which they [i.e. the pessimists] consistently differ with the optimists is in their evaluation of the power of inertia, the Revolution settlement and the British state to hold the Jacobites at bay and ultimately defeat them.’ Szechi’s ‘rejectionists’ are historians, such as Lord Macaulay and G. M. Trevelyan steeped in the ‘great Whig, progressivist tradition of historiography’ to whom Jacobitism is only a marginal non-event; according to Szechi, the modern rejectionists are John Owen, Sir Lewis Namier, Paul Langford, William Speck and Linda Colley. 5. For Professor Speck’s recent assertion of the sceptical view in the field, see the new introduction of W. A. Speck, The Butcher. The Duke of Cumberland and the Suppression of the 45 (Caernarfon, [1981] 1995), ix–x. The only Scottish primary source used by Speck, is the Loudon Scottish Collection, of which the greatest part consists of documents written by Hanoverians and their Scottish allies. Nevertheless, his account of the immediate aftermath of Culloden is the most detailed to date. The author is thorough, but overtly partial in favour of the Duke of Cumberland. Though Speck does not seek a blatant exoneration of Cumberland, he comes dangerously close to mitigating the latter’s brutality after the ’Forty-five. 6. Allan I. Macinnes, ‘The Aftermath of the ’45’, in Robert C. Woosnam-Savage, ed., 1745. Charles Edward Stuart and the Jacobites (Glasgow, 1995), 103–13, 109; Allan I. Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603–1788 (East Linton, 1996), 214. 7. William Augustus, Duke of Cumberland, was the third son of George II. He served in Flanders against the French in the capacity of commander-in-chief in 1744, and fought at the battle of Fontenoy a year later. He assumed command of British troops sent to Scotland in order to quell the Jacobite rising of 1745–46, and defeated Charles Edward Stuart at the battle of Culloden in 1746, following which he returned to Flanders, where he also commanded an allied army in the Seven Years’ War (1756–63), until he was relieved of command in 1757. He died in 1765. Gordon Donaldson and Robert S. Morpeth, eds, A Dictionary of Scottish History (Edinburgh, [1977] 1992), 51; John Sibbald Gibson, Lochiel of the ’45. The Jacobite Chief and the Prince (Edinburgh, [1994] 1995), appendix, 197–8. According to a government intelligence report of late May 1746, this opinion was expressed by the Jacobites themselves. See SP 54/31, f. 138. Alexander MacMillan to ?, Edinburgh, 24 May 1746.

180 Notes 8. NeC 1,740. Sir Everard Fawkener to Henry Pelham, Inverness, 18 April 1746; Jeremy Black, Culloden and the ’45 (Stroud and New York, [1990] 1993), 161. 9. Lord George Murray was the son of John Murray, 1st Duke of Atholl. His elder brother was William Murray, Marquis of Tullibardine (the 2nd Duke of Atholl in the Jacobite peerage), who led the ’Nineteen with George Keith, 10th Earl Marischal. Lord George was a veteran of both the ’Fifteen and the ’Nineteen. He went into exile, but returned in the late 1720s with a pardon. At the outset of the ’Forty-five, he was appointed lieutenant-general of Prince Charles’ army, and decisively defeated government troops at the battles of Prestonpans and Falkirk. Lord George opposed a pitched battle with Cumberland at Culloden. His direct manner caused much friction with Charles, who disavowed him following the engagement. He subsequently went into his final exile, living in Holland and Germany. He died in Holland in 1760. John Keay and Julia Keay, eds, Collins Encyclopaedia of Scotland (London, 1994), 719; Gibson, Lochiel of the ’45, appendix, 201. See also Chapter 3, note 104. 10. Frank J. McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie. Charles Edward Stuart (Oxford, [1988] 1991), 249–51. McLynn states that ‘[t]he failure of the ’45 was a failure of resources, supplies, quartermastering, ammunition, money, communications, nerve, even perhaps intelligence in all senses; but it was never a foregone conclusion in military terms, whatever the ‘‘know-best’’ of modern historians say’. Frank J. McLynn, The Jacobites (London, [1985] 1988), 60, 118. 11. Black, Culloden and the ’45, 167. Cumberland was preparing the transports for the embarkation of Hessian troops as early as 30 April 1746. SP 54/30, ff. 234–8. William Augustus, Duke of Cumberland to [Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle?], Inverness, 30 April 1746. Also see SP 54/31, ff. 70–4. Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle to William Augustus, Duke of Cumberland, Whitehall, 12 May 1746. 12. SRO GD 24/5/162. Anon. ‘Copy Letter &c. Account of the Battle of Culloden’, c. 1747. 13. Ewan MacPherson of Cluny was offered a commission in the British service but instead raised his clan for Charles. He remained in Scotland until 1754, evading capture and administering the French gold landed on the west coast in May 1746. He subsequently joined Charles in exile. Keay and Keay, Encyclopaedia of Scotland, 670; Gibson, Lochiel of the ’45, appendix, 201. An anonymous observer even noted that ‘about 3,000 of their best Men who were at some Distance had not joined their Army’ at Culloden. NLS Ms 17501, pp. 1–18. Anon. ‘Essay on the Highlands’, c. 1747. Professor Macinnes recently pointed out that 2,000 Jacobite troops were deployed elsewhere, while according to his estimate 20 per cent of Charles’ army at Culloden was incapacitated. Allan I. Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 163, 202. 14. McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 251–2. 15. Alan Gibson MacPherson, A Day’s March to Ruin. The Badenoch Men in the ’FortyFive and Col. Ewan MacPherson of Cluny (Newtonmore, 1996), 154–6; Alastair Livingstone of Bachuil, Christian W. H. Aikman and Betty Stuart Hart, eds, The Muster Roll of Prince Charles Edward Stuart’s Army, 1745–46 (Aberdeen, [1984] 1985), 186. 16. John Campbell, 4th Earl of Loudon joined the British army in 1727, and succeeded to his father’s title in 1731. He served as captain in the Queen’s Own regiment of dragoons, and was governor of Stirling Castle in 1741. He served as George II’s aide-de-camp in Germany, and was commissioned to raise a Highland regiment intended for America. During the ’Forty-five, Loudon raised the Inde-

Notes 181

17. 18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

pendent Companies, which served as a government auxiliary force at Culloden. He was sent to Holland in 1747, but his regiment was disbanded upon its return to Britain a year later. He was given the rank of major-general in 1755, replacing General Braddock as commander-in-chief of the British forces in America in 1756. He also served in Portugal before he died in 1782. Henry E. Huntington Library and Art Gallery, Guide to British Historical Manuscripts in the Huntington Library (San Marino, CA, 1982), 321–2. Livingstone of Bachuil et al., Muster Roll, 148. NLS Acc. 11202. Lieutenant John MacKay to [the same?], Inverness, 4 May 1746; SP 54/31, ff. 84–5. Duncan Forbes of Culloden, Lord President to [Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle?], Inverness, 13 May 1746. A news report on the battle of Ferry Bridge was printed in the St. James’s Evening Post, No. 5665, 10 May 1746, a copy of which can be found in HEH 330346. N. D. Fellowes, State Tryals, 114; I. H. MacKay of Scobie, ‘The Highland Independent Companies of 1745–47’, Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, 20 (1941), 5–37, 27–8. Also see SP 54/30, f. 200. ‘List of Prisoners taken in Sutherland yt 15 Apr. & embarked on board His Majestys Sloop Hound Capt. Dove Commander’, 1746. LO 11091, Box 5. Donald Campbell to Captain Campbell of Skipness, 14 April 1746; LO 11985, Box 35. Captain George MacKay to John Campbell, 4th Earl of Loudon, 21 April 1746. Casualty figures for the Jacobites are contradictory and range from 1,000–3,600 killed, and approximately 1,000 taken prisoner. Lord Glenorchy believed that reports on Jacobite casualties were exaggerated, and added that ‘several who were said to be kill’d are in good health’. LO 11003, Box 48. ‘A List of the Kill’d, & Prisoners at the Battle of Culloden’, 16 April 1746; LO 11993, Box 35. Captain George MacKay. ‘Account of the principal people killed and taken at the Battle of Culloden’, 21 April 1746; NLS Ms 3735, ff. 568–9. John Campbell, Lord Glenorchy to Major-General John Campbell of Mamore, Taymouth, 23 April 1746; SP 54/30, f. 198. ‘List of Officers, who, (the Rebells themselves say) were killed in the Battle, April 16th, 1746’; Speck, The Butcher, 145; Michael Hook and Walter Ross, The Forty-Five. The Last Jacobite Rebellion (Edinburgh, 1995), 111–12; Black, Culloden and the ’45, 174. Also see McLynn, The Jacobites, 60. David Wemyss, Lord Elcho, was the eldest son of the 4th Earl of Wemyss. He sided with the Jacobites in September 1745, and served Charles faithfully for the duration of the campaign. Elcho escaped to France after Culloden. Despite his application, he was never pardoned by the British government. Gibson, Lochiel of the ’45, appendix, 198. For the further career of Lord Elcho in exile, see Chapter 3, p. 54. HEH 33046. N. D. Fellowes, State Tryals, 43; Bruce Lenman, The Jacobite Risings in Britain, 1689–1746 (Aberdeen, [1980] 1995), 260; Bruce Lenman, The Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen, 1650–1784 (Aberdeen, [1984] 1995), 163; McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 261–2. Stuart Mss 273/119. Picard ¼ Rene´-Louis Voyer, Marquis D’Argenson to Bonnar ¼ Colonel Daniel O’Brien, 23 April 1746; Stuart Mss 274/28. Lumley ¼ Francis, 2nd tit. Baron Sempill to James, [Paris?], 2 May 1746; Stuart Mss 274/61. Fra. Lacey ¼ Same to the same, [Paris?], 9 May 1746; Stuart Mss 278/81. Rene´-Louis Voyer, Marquis D’Argenson to Sir Thomas Sheridan, Brussels, 12 May 1746; Stuart Mss 274/86. Picard ¼ Same to Colonel Daniel O’Brien, [Brussels?], 13 May 1746; Stuart Mss 274/134. James to Francis, 2nd tit. Baron Sempill, Albano, 23 May 1746; Stuart Mss 275/152. Same to George Keith, 10th Earl Marischal, Rome, 18 July 1746.

182 Notes 23. SP 54/30 f. 181. Intelligence, 15 April 1746; SP 54/30, f. 226. Whilo and Collist to Andrew Fletcher, Lord Justice Clerk, 24 April 1746; NLS Ms 3735, f. 539. ‘By the Commrs. for executing the Office of Lord High Admil. of Great Britain and Ireland, &c.’, 17 April 1746. ¨ ran Behre, ‘Sweden and the Rising of 1745’, Scottish Historical Review, 51, 2, 152 24. Go (1972), 149–71, 163–4. For the Swedish troops which participated in the ’Forty-five, see Marsha Keith Schuchard, ‘Charles Edward Stuart as ‘‘Chevalier de Soleil d’Or’’: The Role of ‘‘Ećossais’’ Freemasonry in the Jacobite–Swedish Crusade’, (unpublished paper presented to the conference on ‘Jacobitism, Scotland and the Enlightenment: Focus on the North’, organized by the Thomas Reid Institute and the Eighteenth-Century Scottish Studies Society, and held at the University of Aberdeen, 29 July–3 August 1995), 1–10, 7. 25. WHM MSD 15. Colonel Ewan MacPherson of Cluny to Captain Donald MacPherson of Breakachy, Blair Atholl, 23 March 1746; MacPherson, A Day’s March to Ruin, 157–60. 26. Stuart Mss 273/96. Lord George Murray to Charles, 17 April 1746. 27. Stuart Mss 273/116. Charles to Sir Thomas Sheridan, 23 April 1746; McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 263. 28. Stuart Mss 273/117. Charles to the Chiefs of the Jacobite Clans, 23 April 1746. In regard to the condition of the assembled Jacobite troops at Ruthven, Daniel Szechi recently commented: ‘It is a testament to the [Jacobite] army’s discipline and potential as a fighting force that even after the defeat the stragglers and unengaged units rallied at the agreed rendezvous in the event of such an emergency, and only dispersed when ordered to do so by Charles.’ He also agrees that a guerrilla war could have forced the Hanoverian army to make concessions. Szechi, The Jacobites, 102, 132. 29. Alexander Brodie represented Elginshire in Parliament from 1720–41, Caithness from 1741–47, and Inverness Burghs from 1747–49. He was appointed Lord Lyon King of Arms for life in 1727, and was firmly attached to the party of Sir Robert Walpole’s ‘vice-roy’ for Scotland, Lord Islay, the future 3rd Duke of Argyll. He assisted the prosecution in the trial against Simon Fraser, 11th Lord Lovat after the ’Forty-five. Duncan Forbes of Culloden was closely associated with the interest of John Campbell, 2nd Duke of Argyll, and, following the ’Fifteen advocated a lenient policy towards the defeated Jacobites. In 1721, John Campbell, 2nd Duke of Argyll secured Forbes a seat in Parliament for Ayr Burghs. He consistently worked against the Squadrone party opposed to the Argathelian interest in Scotland, and upon the fall of his political enemies from office for opposing the Malt Tax in Scotland, he succeeded Robert Dundas as Lord Advocate. Following the break between his patron, and Sir Robert Walpole, he sought to check the activities of Argyll’s younger brother, and Walpole’s political manager for Scotland, Lord Islay, later 3rd Duke of Argyll. He was appointed Lord President of Session, and thus neutralized as a political force in Parliament; during the ’Forty-five his diplomatic skill secured the loyalty of the potentially Jacobitical chiefs of Skye. He was also instrumental in the raising of the Independent Companies. Following the battle of Culloden, Forbes again supported a policy of leniency towards the Jacobites, and thereby incurred the wrath of the Duke of Cumberland. Romney Sedgwick, The Commons, 1715–1754, 2 vols (London, 1970), I, 488–9; II, 43–4. LO 10890, Box 4. Alexander Brodie, Lord Lyon of Scotland to Duncan Forbes of Culloden, c. late April 1746.

Notes 183 30. NLS Ms 17527, ff. 14–17. ‘Copy of Answers to the Complaints of the Duke of Montrose’s Factors about the Depredations of the King’s Troops in the MacGregor Country’, Fort Augustus, 14 July 1746. 31. SP 54/30, f. 242. ‘Copy of His Royal Highness’s Orders to the Earl of Ancram’, Inverness, 29 April 1746; Cumberland Mss 14/123. William Augustus, Duke of Cumberland to John Campbell, 4th Earl of Loudon, Inverness, 25 April 1746. 32. John Campbell of Mamore served the Duke of Cumberland in the suppression of the ’Forty-five, and was appointed commander of the government’s forces in the west of Scotland. He succeeded Archibald Campbell, 3rd Duke of Argyll as the 4th Duke in 1761. Sedgwick, The Commons, I, 523–4; Gibson, Lochiel of the ’45, appendix, 197. NLS Ms 3735, ff. 610–11. Major-General John Campbell of Mamore to William Augustus, Duke of Cumberland, Inveraray, 30 April 1746; NLS Ms 3735, ff. 620–1. Same to Sir Everard Fawkener, Inveraray, 3 May 1746. 33. SP 54/30, ff. 234–8. William Augustus, Duke of Cumberland to [Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle?], Inverness, 30 April 1746. 34. NLS Ms 3735, f. 630. Captain Thomas Noel to Major-General John Campbell of Mamore, aboard the Greyhound, Aross Bay, 4 May 1746; SP 54/31, f. 17. Same to Captain George Munro, aboard the Greyhound, Eigg, 3 May 1746; SP 54/31, f. 22. Same to Commodore Smith, aboard the Greyhound, off Moidart, 3 May 1746; SP 54/31, f. 19. Captain George Munro to ?, Keanlochnindale, 4 May 1746; SP 54/31, f. 51. Captain Thomas Noel to ?, aboard the Greyhound, Aross Bay, 4 May 1746. 35. John Murray of Broughton aligned himself with the Jacobite cause prior to the ’Forty-five, and served as an agent of the Stuarts in Scotland. He visited the Jacobite court in exile at Rome in 1742, and was in Paris two years later, where he met Charles. Broughton joined the rising at Kinlochmoidart in 1745. He served Charles in the capacity of private secretary. After Culloden, he attempted to flee Scotland, but was apprehended by government troops at his sisters’ home in Polmond, and subsequently turned king’s evidence, disclosing incriminating information during the trial of Simon Fraser, 11th Lord Lovat. For further reference to John Murray of Broughton, see Chapter 3, p. 53–4. Cumberland Mss 15/17. Enclosed in Major-General John Campbell of Mamore to Sir Everard Fawkener, Fort William, 15 May 1746; Robert Fitzroy Bell, ed., Memorials of John Murray of Broughton Sometime Secretary to Prince Charles Edward 1740–1747 (Edinburgh, 1898), 272–3; Marion F. Hamilton, ed., ‘The Locharkaig Treasure’, Miscellany of the Scottish History Society, VII, Third Series (Edinburgh, 1941), 133–68, 140–1. 36. NLS Ms 3735, f. 717. Major-General John Campbell of Mamore to Sir Everard Fawkener, Strontian, 31 May 1746. 37. Coll MacDonell of Barrisdale was one of the most controversial figures involved in the ’Forty-five. From the outset of the rising, he served as an officer in Glengarry’s regiment, and later embodied his own regiment. He attained the rank of lieutenantcolonel. He was accused of duplicity after Culloden – there was reason to assume that he had collaborated with Cumberland’s successor, the Earl of Albemarle – apprehended on Charles’ orders, and brought to France as a prisoner. He was excluded from the Act of Indemnity in 1747, and died three years later, a prisoner, in Edinburgh Castle. Andrew Lang, The Companions of Pickle (London, 1898), 100–23; Gibson, Lochiel of the ’45, appendix, 200. LO 11092, Box 5. Donald Campbell to John Campbell, 4th Earl of Loudon, 10 May 1746; HEH 330346. St. James’s Evening Post, no. 5671, 24 May 1746 in N.D. Fellowes, State Tryals, 124.

184 Notes 38. Andrew Fletcher, Lord Milton was the nephew of the Scottish patriot Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun. He acted as the 3rd Duke of Argyll’s political ally and subsidiary in the Scottish administration, specifically in the Scottish Court of Session, from 1725–61. Argyll procured his appointment to the bench in 1724, and that of Lord Justice Clerk in 1734. Following the ’Forty-five, Milton incurred the lasting wrath of the Duke of Cumberland for his advocacy of a benign policy towards the Jacobites. During the rising he directed the Scottish administration almost single-handedly, and was given the sinecure of Keeper of the Signet as a reward in 1746, which was turned into a life appointment in 1748, when Milton resigned his judicial office. He did, however, retain his place on the bench as ordinary Lord of Session. Alexander Murdoch, The People Above. Politics and Administration in Mid-Eighteenth-Century Scotland (Edinburgh, 1980), 12; Alexander Allardyce, ed., Scotland and Scotsmen in the Eighteenth Century from the Mss of John Ramsay, Esq. of Ochtertyre, 2 vols (Edinburgh, 1888), I, 86–90. SP 54/31, f. 86. Andrew Fletcher, Lord Justice Clerk Milton to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 13 May 1746. 39. Cumberland Mss 16/60. Aeneas MacDonald to Major-General Campbell, Tobermory, 10 June 1746. 40. Cumberland Mss 14/414. Sir Everard Fawkener to Major-General John Campbell of Mamore, Inverness, 13 May 1746. 41. Cumberland Mss 14/276. Major-General John Campbell of Mamore to Sir Everard Fawkener, Inveraray, 3 May 1746. 42. NLS Ms 3735, f. 648. Major-General John Campbell of Mamore to Sir Everard Fawkener, Fort William, 13 May 1746. 43. Ranald MacDonald of Clanranald the elder promised to raise his clan for the Jacobites, but it was his son, and namesake, who actually led the Clanranald MacDonalds during the rising. Gibson, Lochiel of the ’45, appendix, 200–201. McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 268. 44. Donald Cameron of Lochiel, known alternately as ‘Young Lochiel’ or ‘Gentle Lochiel’, succeeded to his father’s estate and the leadership of his clan in 1716 as 19th chief. His father, John, fought for the Jacobites in 1689, 1715 and 1719. Donald joined Charles with his clan at the beginning of the rising, and was seriously injured at Culloden. Charles Stewart of Ardshiel led his clan out, while his chief, Dugald Stewart of Appin, remained at home. Following the rising, the regimental banner of the Appin Stewarts was the only one that escaped the ritual burning by the common hangman at Edinburgh. Apparently, he escaped to France in 1746, and died in exile eleven years later. John Stewart of Ardvorlich, The Camerons. A History of Clan Cameron (Stirling, 1974), 94; Keay and Keay, eds, The Collins Encyclopaedia of Scotland, 126–7; Gibson, Lochiel of the ’45, appendix, 197, 202; Livingstone of Bachuil et al., Muster Roll, 11. 45. MacBean Special Collection. John Burton. A Genuine and True Journal of the most miraculous Escape of the Young Chevalier, From the Battle of Culloden, to his landing in France (London, 1749), 76–7; Gibson, Lochiel of the ’45, 117–88; MacPherson, A Day’s March to Ruin, 163–5. In fact, a MacGregor messenger carrying a proposal to link up with the Lochaber Jacobites had been intercepted shortly after Culloden. NLS Ms 17527, ff. 14–17. ‘Copy of Answers to the Complaints of the Duke of Montrose’s Factors about the Depredations of the King’s Troops in the MacGregor Country’, Fort Augustus, 14 July 1746. 46. SP 54/31, f. 138. Alexander MacMillan to ?, Edinburgh, 24 May 1746. 47. Thomas Pelham-Holles, Duke of Newcastle was responsible for Scottish affairs as Secretary of the Southern Department from 1724–48, and as Secretary of the

Notes 185

48.

49. 50.

51. 52. 53.

54. 55. 56.

57.

Northern Department from 1748–54. Basil Williams, The Whig Supremacy, 1714–1760 (Oxford, [1939] 1962) 1965, 472; Murdoch, The People Above, 7. SP 54/31, ff. 126–32. Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle to William Augustus, Duke of Cumberland, Whitehall, 23 May 1746. According to the declaration of Simon Fraser, 11th Lord Lovat, seven French men-of-war carrying 3,000 soldiers had reached the Orkneys, while the Brest fleet, protected by the combined strength of the Franco-Spanish fleet, was ostensibly crossing the Channel in order to land 20,000–26,000 men. Though Lovat’s intelligence was clearly false, it suggests that the Muirlaggan confederates assumed reinforcements were in fact on their way, and therefore planned their own strategy accordingly. NLS Ms 3755, f. 752. ‘Lord Lovat’s Declaration’, Tobermory, 10 June 1746. SP 36/83, ff. 267–9. Donald Campbell to ?, 15 May 1746. Alexander MacDonald of Glencoe raised his clan for the Jacobites. After the battle of Prestonpans, his clan fought as a company in the Keppoch MacDonalds’ regiment. He evaded capture after Culloden despite his illness, but surrendered to Major-General Campbell in May 1746. Livingstone of Bachuil et al., Muster Roll, 146; Gibson, Lochiel of the ’45, appendix, 199. Cumberland Mss 15/39. Intelligence from Castle Mingary, enclosed in Cumberland Mss 15/17. Major-General John Campbell of Mamore to Sir Everard Fawkener, Fort William, 15 May 1746; SP 36/ 83, f. 331. Alexander MacDonald of Glencoe to Major-General John Campbell of Mamore, c. 9–19 May 1746. For the disbursement of money to pay Jacobite regiments at the Muirlaggan meeting, see Stuart Mss 274/49. John Murray of Broughton. Receipts from the Chiefs at Muirlaggan, 8 May 1746. Gibson, Lochiel of the ’45, 115–16. Cumberland Mss 14/414. Sir Everard Fawkener to Major-General John Campbell of Mamore, Inverness, 13 May 1746. Lord John Drummond was the brother to the Jacobite Duke of Perth, and later succeeded him as fourth titular Duke. He raised the Re´giment Royal Ećossais in France, and in November 1745 landed with approximately 800 men of his own regiment, and the Piquets under the command of Brigadier Walter Stapleton, formerly of Berwick’s regiment, who were drawn from the six regiments of the Irish Brigade in the service of France. Lord John escaped with his ailing brother aboard the Bellone, but was killed during the siege of Bergen-op-Zoom in 1747. Livingstone of Bachuil et al., Muster Roll, 60; Gibson, Lochiel of the ’45, appendix, 198. WHM MSD 16. Colonel Donald Cameron of Lochiel to Colonel Ewan MacPherson of Cluny, Locharkaig, 13 May 1746. For a copy of this letter made on 27 May 1855, see SRO GD 50/121/18. Colonel Donald Cameron of Lochiel to Colonel Ewan MacPherson of Cluny, Locharkaig, 13 May 1746. Cumberland Mss 15/39. Major-General John Campbell of Mamore to Sir Everard Fawkener, Fort William, 17 May 1746. Cumberland Mss 15/83. Major-General John Campbell of Mamore to Sir Everard Fawkener, Fort William, 19 May 1746. Donald MacDonell of Lochgarry held a lieutenant’s commission in a Hanoverian Highland regiment, but defected to the Jacobites. He attained the rank of lieutenantcolonel, and commanded the Glengarry regiment after the accidental death of the chief’s second son, Angus MacDonell of Glengarry, on 22 January 1746. Livingstone of Bachuil et al., Muster Roll, 148; Gibson, Lochiel of the ’45, appendix, 200. For further reference to Lochgarry in exile, see Chapter 3, pp. 56, 58, 67. According to an estimate by Loudon, the combined Jacobite force at Achnacarry numbered around 380. SP 36/94 ff. 190–203. ‘The Examination of John Murray of

186 Notes

58.

59. 60.

61.

62.

63. 64. 65.

66. 67. 68.

69.

70. 71.

Broughton Esqr.’, Tower of London, 14 February 1747; Cumberland Mss 15/191. John Campbell, 4th Earl of Loudon to Major-General Humphrey Bland, Achnacarry, 25 May 1746; Gibson, Lochiel of the ’45, 119. LO 11510, Box 25. Duncan Forbes of Culloden to John Campbell, 4th Earl of Loudon, 25 April 1746; NLS Ms 3735, f. 692. John Campbell, 4th Earl of Loudon to Major-General John Campbell of Mamore, Dachenase, 23 May 1746. R. F. Bell, ed., Memorials of John Murray of Broughton, 284. NLS Ms 3735, f. 692. John Campbell, 4th Earl of Loudon to Major-General John Campbell of Mamore, Dachenase, 23 May 1746; Gibson, Lochiel of ’45, 121. NLS Ms 3735, f. 692. Alexander Campbell to Major-General John Campbell of Mamore, Fort William, 24 May 1746; HEH 330346. St. James’s Evening Post, no. 5681, 17 June 1746; St. James’s Evening Post, No. 5683, 21 June 1746, in N. D. Fellowes, State Tryals, 140, 144. Simon Fraser, Master of Lovat was the son of Simon Fraser, 11th Lord Lovat, who was executed for high treason in 1747. He led his clan in support of the Jacobites during the ’Forty-five, and surrendered after Culloden, but received a pardon in 1750. The Master of Lovat acted as advocate for the prosecution in the trial of James Stewart of Aucharn in 1752, and raised two Highland regiments for the government in America; he was elected an MP in 1761, and was the first Jacobite to be returned his estates in 1771. Donaldson and Morpeth, eds, A Dictionary of Scottish History, 80. WHM MSD 17. Colonel Donald Cameron of Lochiel to Colonel Ewan MacPherson of Cluny, 25 May 1746. For a copy, see SRO GD 50/121/17. NLS Ms 3735, ff. 698–9. Alexander Campbell to Major-General John Campbell of Mamore, Fort William, 26 May 1746. NLS Ms 3735, f. 700. Donald Campbell to Major-General John Campbell of Mamore, Mingary, 26 May 1746. For a full treatment of the Locharkaig treasure as a source of conflict for the Jacobites in Scotland and in exile see Chapter 4, pp. 76–81. SP 54/31, ff. 141–4. William Augustus, Duke of Cumberland to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Fort Augustus, 27 May, (my italics). See also Macinnes, ‘The Aftermath of the ’45’, 103–13, 109. The remedial legislation enacted by Parliament in the wake of the ’Forty-five has received full treatment in Byron Frank Jewell’s doctoral dissertation. As the topic has already been covered, there is no need for repetition in the present book, which is only marginally concerned with legislative questions. Byron Frank Jewell, ‘The Legislation Relating to Scotland after the Forty-Five’, unpublished Ph.D. thesis (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1975). See also Colin Kidd, Subverting Scotland’s Past. Scottish Whig Historians and the Creation of an AngloBritish Identity, 1689–c.1830 (Cambridge, 1993), 150–60. For reference to the Acts of Attainder and Indemnity, see Chapter 3, p. 55. SP 54/30, ff. 246–7. ‘William Augustus Duke of Cumberland, and Duke of Brunswick Lunenburg etc. etc. Captain General of all His Majesty’s Land Forces, in the Kingdom of Great Britain & c.’, c. May 1746. For a printed copy dated Inverness, 1 May 1746, see SP 54/31, f. 135. NLS Ms 17562, f. 187. Major-General John Campbell of Mamore, Inveraray, 20 April 1746. NeC 1,765. Major-General John Huske to [Henry Pelham?], Fort Augustus, 16 June 1746. ‘P.O.’ contended that ‘not with Standing all the Search made its Informed

Notes 187

72.

73. 74.

75.

76. 77.

78.

79. 80.

that there well be concealed among them Arms for 5000 men’. NeC 1,848/1. P.O. to [Henry Pelham?], Edinburgh, 20 November 1747. John Campbell, Lord Glenorchy was the eldest son of the 2nd Earl of Breadalbane. He served successively as Master of the Horse to the Princess of Wales in 1718, minister to Copenhagen from 1720–30, to St Petersburg in 1731, was a Lord of the Admiralty from 1741–42, and, among other offices and appointments, as Keeper of the Privy Seal. At the battle of Culloden, 400 of his clansmen fought under Cumberland. Upon succeeding his father as 3rd Earl of Breadalbane, his application through the Duke of Newcastle for being made a representative peer was turned down by George II, who believed him to be a Jacobite. Only with the aid of Newcastle was his request finally granted. He died in 1782. Sedgwick, The Commons, I, 525–6. NLS Ms 3735, ff. 703–5. John Campbell, Lord Glenorchy to Major-General John Campbell of Mamore, Taymouth, 28 May 1746. SRO GD 14/97. [Colonel?] John Campbell to Archibald Campbell of Stonefield, Strontian, 6 July 1746. The author of this letter was probably Major-General Campbell’s son, and namesake, who served as a colonel during the Scottish campaign. James Farquharson of Invercauld was a veteran of the ’Fifteen, and purposefully stayed at home during the ’Forty-five. His nephew, Francis Farquharson of Monaltrie raised 300 of the clan, but only joined the Jacobites when they besieged Stirling Castle following the invasion of England. Monaltrie was captured after the battle of Culloden, imprisoned in Inverness, but transferred to the Tower of London, where he awaited his execution. Monaltrie was reprieved but remained a prisoner until 1762, when he was pardoned. Livingstone of Bachuil et al., Muster Roll, 200. LO 11444, Box 24. John Farquharson of Invercauld to John Campbell, 4th Earl of Loudon, Invercauld, 4 August 1746. LO 11799, Box 10. John Campbell, 4th Earl of Loudon to Lieutenant Adam Gordon, Fort Augustus, 20 September 1746. LO 7352, Box 5. Isabel Cameron of Glenevis to John Campbell, 4th Earl of Loudon, September 1746. Alexander Cameron of Glenevis is not listed among the officers of Lochiel’s regiment. There is reason to believe that he was involved in the preparations leading up to the Elibank plot in the early 1750s, but that he turned informer for the government in the process. Livingstone of Bachuil et al., Muster Roll, 32–3. For further reference to Cameron of Glenevis, see Chapter 4, pp. 83, 96, 98–9, 101, 110–12. SRO GD 14/90. Archibald Campbell of Stonefield to Major-General John Campbell of Mamore, Inveraray, 30 May 1746; NLS Ms 3735, ff. 712–13. Archibald Campbell of Stonefield to Major-General John Campbell of Mamore, Inveraray, 30 May 1746. NLS Ms 3735, f. 715. William Augustus, Duke of Cumberland to Major-General John Campbell of Mamore, Fort William, 30 May 1746. Lord George Sackville was the third son of Lionel Cranfield, 1st Duke of Dorset, and through his father’s influence, entered the Irish Parliament at the age of seventeen. In 1741, Lord George Sackville was returned for Dover. He served as colonel of the 20th Foot regiment, fought against the French at the battle of Fontenoy in 1745, and became known as the ‘coward of Minden’ during the Seven Years’ War. Captain Carolina Scott successfully defended Fort William during the Jacobite siege in March and April 1746. He was active in the pursuit of Charles after Culloden, and known for his cruelty towards the defeated Jacob-

188 Notes

81. 82.

83. 84. 85.

86. 87. 88.

89.

90.

91.

92.

93.

94. 95.

ites. Lieutenant-Colonel Cornwallis has been described by Professor Macinnes as being similarly cold-blooded during the hunt for Jacobite fugitives after April 1746. Sedgwick, The Commons, II, 399–400; Black, Culloden and the ’45, 178; Gibson, Lochiel of the ’45, appendix, 202; Macinnes, ‘The Aftermath of the ’45’, 107. NLS Ms 9828, ff. 89–91. Lord George Sackville to Lionel Cranfield, 1st Duke of Dorset, Fort Augustus, 13 June 1746. Peter E. Russell, ‘Redcoats in the Wilderness: British Officers and Irregular Warfare in Europe and America, 1740 to 1760’, William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, 35, 4 (1978), 639–40. Jeremy Black, ‘Could the Jacobites Have Won?’, History Today, 45, 7 (1995), 24–9, 28. For a discussion of this topic see Chapter 3, pp. 50–2. The term ‘cateran’ was used to describe a Highland raider or marauder. This definition was specifically applied when the Highland clansmen descended on the Lowlands. Donaldson and Morpeth, A Dictionary of Scottish History, 37. NLS Ms 3735, ff. 755–6. Archibald Campbell of Stonefield to Major-General John Campbell of Mamore, Inveraray, 11 June 1746. NLS Ms 9828, ff. 92–3. Lord George Sackville to Lionel Cranfield, 1st Duke of Dorset, Fort Augustus, 8 July 1746. Cumberland Mss 15/33. Captain Carolina Frederick Scott to Colonel Napier, Fort William, 16 May 1746; John MacLauchlan to William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle, 3 August 1746, printed in Terry, ed., Albemarle Papers, I, 27. SRO GD 14/98. ‘List of Persons within the Parish of Lismore & Appin who have not delivered up their Arms’, Islandstalker, 6 July 1746; Captain George Munro of Culcairn to William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle, Kirktown of Lochbroom, 4 August 1746, printed in Terry, ed., Albemarle Papers, I, 51. NLS Ms 3736, f. 431. Sir Everard Fawkener, Fort Augustus, 12 July 1746; NLS Ms 3736, f. 828. Sir Everard Fawkener by the Command of William Augustus, Duke of Cumberland, Fort Augustus, 12 July 1746. SRO GD 44/14/15/33. ‘Abstract of Dammages sustained by His Grace the Duke of Gordon, in those Parts of his Estate after mentioned – Sterling – by the Kings Army’, c. 1746; NLS Ms 3730, ff. 92–7. ‘Memorial concerning the Sufferings of the Duke of Montrose’s Tenants in June 1746 & c.’; NLS Ms 17527, ff. 14–17. ‘Copy of Answers to the Complaints of the Duke of Montrose’s Factors about the Depredations of the King’s Troops in the MacGregor Country’, Fort Augustus, 14 July 1746. SRO GD 14/117. Archibald Campbell of Stonefield to?, c. late 1746. See also NLS Ms 3736, f. 470. Isabel Stewart to Major-General John Campbell of Mamore, Ardshiel, 25 August 1746. During the War of Austrian Succession (1740–48), William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle fought under George II at the battle of Dettingen in 1743; he was a veteran of Fontenoy in 1745, and served under the Duke of Cumberland at Culloden a year later. Gibson, Lochiel of the ’45, appendix, 196; Terry, ed., Albemarle Papers, I, 9, footnote 1. William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Fort Augustus, 13 July 1746, printed in Terry, ed., Albemarle Papers, I, 9. SP 36/85, ff. 232–3. William Augustus, Duke of Cumberland to William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle, Fort Augustus, 17 July 1746. The Earl of Loudon’s regiment, for instance, was clearly under its nominal strength in May, having enlisted only 370 of 910 men. Two companies had by that time not even enlisted one single recruit. SP 54/31, f. 113. ‘A Return of the Earle of Loudon’s Regiment’, Inverness, 21 May 1746.

Notes 189 96. NLS Ms 3736, f. 458. William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle to MajorGeneral John Campbell of Mamore, Fort Augustus, 1 August 1746. 97. SRO GD 14/104. Donald Cambpell of Airds to Archibald Campbell of Stonefield, Airds Castle, 20 July 1746. For Campbell of Airds, see Seamus Carney, The Appin Murder. The Killing of the Red Fox (Edinburgh, [1989] 1994), 1994, xi. 98. Archibald Campbell, 1st Earl of Islay succeeded his brother John as 3rd Duke of Argyll in 1743. He served under the Duke of Marlborough with distinction, and supported the Act of Union in 1707. In 1710 he was appointed Lord JusticeGeneral of Scotland for life; Islay fought alongside his brother for the government at the battle of Sheriffmuir in 1715. In the realm of British politics, he aligned himself first with Sir Robert Walpole, and later with the Duke of Newcastle. As 3rd Duke of Argyll, he led the most influential Scottish faction, bearing the name of his title, the ‘Argathelians’. Keay and Keay, eds, Collins Encyclopaedia of Scotland, 129. SRO GD 14/110. Archibald Campbell of Stonefield to Archibald Campbell, 3rd Duke of Argyll, c. early August 1746. 99. SRO GD 14/109. ‘Memorial of the Justices of the Peace, Deputy Lieutenants & other Proprietors in Argyllshire conven’d at Inveraray the 20th of August 1746.’ (my italics). 100. Alexander MacDonald of Keppoch raised 300 men of his clan and joined Charles at Glenfinnan in August 1745. He was a commissioned officer in Charles’ army, with the rank of colonel. His regiment served under Brigadier Stapleton, whose force captured Fort Augustus, and besieged Fort William following the Jacobite army’s return from England. Keppoch was killed during the battle of Culloden. Livingstone of Bachuil et al., Muster Roll, 161. LO 10902, Box 5. Donald Cameron of Lochiel and Alexander MacDonald of Keppoch. ‘Declaration of War. Camerons against Campbells’, Glenevis, 20 March 1746. 101. Williams, The Whig Supremacy, 279–80. 102. SRO GD 14/106. Major-General John Campbell of Mamore to Archibald Campbell of Stonefield, Horse Shoe Harbour, 6 August 1746. 103. NLS Ms 17514, f. 268. ‘Copy of a Letter about the State of the Highlands’, September 1746. 104. Captain Carolina Scott to William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle, Ardshiel, 3 August 1746, printed in Terry, ed., Albemarle Papers, I, 26. 105. William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Fort Augustus, 12 August 1746, printed in Terry, ed., Albemarle Papers, I, 97. 106. LO 12839, Box 47. William Augustus, Duke of Cumberland. ‘A List of Persons listed into the Master of Ross’s Company. . . ’, 16 April 1746. 107. St. James’s Evening Post, no. 5671, 24 May 1746, in HEH 330346, N. D. Fellowes, State Tryals, 126; LO 12153, Box 36. Normand MacLeod, Laird of MacLeod to John Campbell, 4th Earl of Loudon, 22 May 1746. 108. John Catanach was employed by Mr Ogilvy of Kennedy, a captain in the Jacobite Forfarshire regiment, and had been captured by English dragoons. He was set at liberty by the commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Arabin, to whom Catanach returned a couple of times. His neighbours in the village of Kenney ‘suspected that he gave the Colonel Intelligence of the Rebels in that Part of the Country’. Plotting his destruction, two of the said neighbours, Francis Anderson and Andrew Fithie, ‘came up to him, and telling him they had something to say to him, brought him behind a Barn, where they instantly threw him down, and knocked out his Brains with Stones’. The two men went back to work, leaving the body at the scene of the crime. They made no effort to hide the corpse; probably

190 Notes

109.

110.

111.

112. 113. 114. 115.

116. 117.

118.

119. 120. 121.

it was supposed to be seen. Anderson and Fithie were eventually arrested, alongside a third accomplice, and confessed. St. James Evening Post, no. 5684, 28 June 1746, in HEH 330346, N. D. Fellowes, State Tryals, 155. Brother to Sir Robert, Laird of Foulis, and a former MP for Wick Burghs, Culcairn had a well established record of Hanoverian loyalism. He also had a debt to settle with the Jacobites, especially with the Camerons, who had been responsible for the deaths of two of Culcairn’s brothers, Sir Robert and Duncan of Obdale. Gibson, Lochiel of the ’45, appendix, 201. NLS Ms 17514. f. 261. ‘Journal from the 24th of Augt. to 31st of the Party sent in Quest of Barrisdale 1746’. John Cameron of Fassifern was made a burgess of Glasgow in 1735, and persecuted by the government despite his neutrality during the ’Forty-five. Gibson, Lochiel of the ’45, 197. For further reference to Fassifern, see Chapter 4, pp. 79–80, 83, 99, 101, 110, 112. LO 7134, Box 32. William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle to John Campbell, 4th Earl of Loudon, 21 September 1746; LO 10907, Box 5. John Cameron of Fassifern to John Campbell, 4th Earl of Loudon, 29 September 1746; LO 10908, Box 5. Same to the same, 8 November 1746; LO 11801, Box 10. John Campbell, 4th Earl of Loudon to John Cameron of Fassifern, 13 November 1746. Gibson, Lochiel of the ’45, 161. NLS Ms 3730, ff. 90–1. ‘Information relating to Mr. Garden of Troup’, c. early September 1746; Also see Terry, ed., Albemarle Papers, I, 218. NLS Ms 3730, ff. 42–3. Donald Campbell to Archibald Campbell of Stonefield, Islandstalker Castle, 10 September 1746. SRO GD 50/121/14x. Receipts, Stronacardoch, 6 October 1747; SRO GD 50/121/ 13, pp. 1–4. ‘Copy (from the Prince’s autograph) on a Slip of Paper’, 1746–9; For Ardshiel’s request to Cluny for funds, and William Stewart’s receipt for £100 paid to Ardshiel, see WHM MSD 18. Colonel Charles Stewart of Ardshiel to Colonel Ewan MacPherson of Cluny, 24 September 1746 and Receipt of William Stewart, Stronacardoch, 6 October 1746. NLS Ms 3736, f. 984. ‘Intelligence received by [Donald Campbell] of Airds, from Appin’, 29 October 1746. NLS Ms 3736, f. 935. Donald Campbell of Airds to Major-General John Campbell of Mamore, Airds, 17 September 1746; NLS Ms 3736, f. 947. John MacLachlan to William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle, Fort William, 21 September 1746; NLS Ms 3736, f. 961. ‘Extract of a Letter from Lord Loudon to Lord Albemarle, Fort Augustus, dated 22 September, 1746’; NLS Ms 3736, f. 966. Captain Duncan McVicar to Major-General John Campbell of Mamore, Fort William, 26 September 1746. NLS Ms 3736, f. 482. William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle to MajorGeneral John Campbell of Mamore, Sterling, 17 September 1746; NLS 3736, ff. 533–4. ‘Memorandum for General Campbell concerning the Country of the Rebells’, c. October 1746; NLS Ms 17527, f. 97. Donald Campbell of Airds to William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle and Andrew Fletcher, Lord Justice Clerk Milton, ‘Scheme for Civilizing Clan Cameron’, Edinburgh, 3 October 1746. William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 1 September 1746, printed in Terry, ed., Albemarle Papers, I, 211. NLS Ms 17527, f. 114. Andrew Fletcher, Lord Justice Clerk Milton, Warrant, Edinburgh, 20 December 1746. Intelligence, 24 September 1746, printed in Terry, ed., Albemarle Papers, I, 282.

Notes 191 122. William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 23 September 1746, printed in Terry, ed., Albemarle Papers, I, 235 (my italics). 123. NeC 1,770. William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle to Henry Pelham, Edinburgh, 2 January 1747; NeC 1,771. Same to the same, Edinburgh, 7 January 1747. 124. NLS Ms 3730, ff. 72–3. ‘Journey from the North-East’, January 1747. 125. NLS Ms 17514, f. 273. ‘Abstract of Intelligence from the North Hand to Mr Campbell of Stonefield Sheriff of Argyll’, Inveraray, 5 February 1747; NLS Ms 17514, f. 274. ‘Abstract of Intelligence from a Person that us’d to give me what was good came to hand’, Inveraray, 15 February 1747. 126. SP 36/90, [not regularly foliated; old foliation ff. 291–2]. ‘Journal of a Person employed in Holland to buy Arms for the Pretender from the 5 Oct to about Christmas 1746’. Waters’ bill was dated ‘5 Oct. last’. Internal evidence suggests that the word ‘last’ here refers to the year 1745. 127. For a full rendering of Charles’ diplomatic efforts in Spain of early 1747, see Chapter 3, pp. 59–61. 128. Stuart Mss 280/127. B[urton] ¼ Charles. ‘Instructions for England’, [Avignon?], 22 January 1747. 129. BL Add. Ms 35870, ff. 129–30, [transcript]. ‘Political Program of Frederick, Prince of Wales, Carlton House, 4 June, 1747, (and an answer from several Tory lords and gentlemen)’; Linda Colley, In Defiance of Oligarchy. The Tory Party, 1714–1760 (Cambridge, 1982), 253–5. Among the Tory delegation, who accepted Frederick’s propositions for political reform, were several prominent Jacobites such as Noel Somerset, 4th Duke of Beaufort; George Henry Lee, 3rd Earl of Lichfield; John Fane, 7th Earl of Westmoreland; Sir Watkin Williams Wynn and Sir John Hynde Cotton. Significantly, Lord Shaftesbury’s name is among the fourteen signatories of the reply to the Carlton House declaration. See Sedgwick, The Commons, I, 584–5; II, 25–6, 205, 431, 542–5; Ian R. Christie, ‘The Tory Party, Jacobitism and the ’Forty-Five: A Note’, Historical Journal, 30, 4 (1987) 921–31, 922–5, 928. I would like to thank Dr Eveline Cruickshanks for providing me with a transcript of the Carlton House proposals. 130. NeC 1,848/1–2. P.O. to [Henry Pelham?], Edinburgh, 20 November 1747. According to Andrew Lang, Sir James Harrington, a member of Charles’ inner circle, was planning to incite an insurrection at the Lichfield races in September 1747. Lang, Pickle, 90. 131. SP 36/102, f. 82. ‘The Petition of Donald Stewart, John Urquhart, William McGhie & John Falconer, the only material Evidences in the Trial of Aeneas McDonald’ [London?], 19 October 1747. 132. NeC 1,848/2. P.O. to [Henry Pelham?], Edinburgh, 20 November 1747; Devonshire Mss, 1st series, 343.1. Anon. to Richard Boyle, 3rd Earl of Burlington, Lichfield, 4 October 1747; Paul Kle´ber Monod, Jacobitism and the English People, 1688–1788 (Cambridge, [1989] 1993), 199; Eveline Cruickshanks, Political Untouchables. The Tories and the ’45 (London, 1979), 106–7. Dr Cruickshanks used the term ‘Tory Backlash’ in the title of her last chapter (p. 104), which describes the Tory reaction in the post-Culloden era. I would like to thank Dr Cruickshanks for bringing the Chatsworth manuscript to my attention. 133. Sir Watkin Williams Wynn of Wynnstay, Denbighshire, was the grandson of James II’s Solicitor-General. He entered the Commons in 1716, having won his seat in a by-election. Sir Watkin was a member of the Cycle of the White Rose, a

192 Notes secret Welsh Jacobite society, and was the acknowledged leader of the Tories in North Wales from the early 1720s onwards. During the preparations leading to the ’Forty-five, he expressed himself in favour of a rising. He opposed Sir Robert Walpole in Parliament. At the outset of the ’Forty-five, Sir Watkin and his political ally Lord Barrymore sent Charles promises to support him should he reach London, and he agreed to raise his county for the Stuarts. Sir Watkin was implicated by John Murray of Broughton at Lord Lovat’s trial, but escaped open allegations. He died in 1749. Sedgwick, The Commons, II, 543–5. For John Baptist Caryll, 3rd Baron Caryll of Durford in the Jacobite peerage, see Kle´ber Monod, Jacobitism and the English People, 29, 33–4, 83, 88, 90, 115, 137, 219, 230–1; Melville Henry Massue, Marquis de Ruvigny and Raineval, The Jacobite Peerage, Baronetage, Knightage & Grants of Honour (London and Edinburgh, [1904] 1974), 29. For more information on John Baptist Caryll and his family, see Howard Erskine-Hill, The Social Milieu of Alexander Pope. Lives, Example and the Poetic Response, (New Haven and London, 1975), 101–2. 134. It is possible that Mackenzie-Douglas was a commissioned officer in the Royal Ecossais. Stuart Mss 292/122. ‘E´tat des Noms des Officiers du Re´giment Royal Ećossois’, 10 July 1748. For Mackenzie-Douglas, see Lang, Pickle the Spy, 302. For a full biographical sketch of Mackenzie-Douglas, see Chapter 5, note 83. For Viscount Elibank, see Alexander Allardyce, ed., Scotland and Scotsmen in the Eighteenth Century, I, 318–22; Hon. Arthur C. Murray, The Five Sons of ‘Bare Betty’ (London, 1936), 45–7. For further reference to Murray of Elibank, see Chapter 4, p. 95. 135. Henry Pelham gained high office after his former patron, Sir Robert Walpole, fell from power. He was appointed Chancellor of the Exchequer and First Commissioner of the Treasury in 1743, and held the latter office for a longer term as of February 1746. Williams, The Whig Supremacy, 469. Stuart Mss 279/46–7. ‘A List of the Forces in England brought over by Mr. G.[oring?].: in Novr. 1746’ (in George Kelly’s hand); ‘An Exact List of all the Forces in Great Britain and Ireland as taken out of the Warr Office in Lond.o.’; SP 54/32, ff. 3–10. Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle to William Augustus, Duke of Cumberland, Whitehall, 5 June 1746; NeC 1,772/1. William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle, to [Henry Pelham?], Edinburgh, 28 February 1747. 136. The power some of the clan chiefs and Scottish landowners held over their subjects was vested in them by hereditary jurisdictions. A landowner thereby held judicial power over his tenant (or a chief over his clansmen), establishing a bond of immediate dependency, and could therefore almost invariably raise his tenants at will. In some cases, this judicial power was reinforced by a tenurial landholding system referred to as ward-holding. This system was basically feudal in that it required the tenant to serve the subject-superior in arms as part of the leasing contract. In the post-Culloden period, the heritable jurisdictions were perceived as the foundation of Jacobite military power by the British government. In direct contravention to Article 20 of the Act of Union (1707), the Heritable Jurisdiction Act (20 Geo. II c. 43) received royal assent on 17 June 1747, and, after 25 March 1748, abolished the majority of all extant jurisdictions not directly exercised by the Crown. Dr B. F. Jewell referred to the act as ‘a fundamental remodeling of the Scottish judicial system’. SP 54/31, ff. 161–2. Anon. Memorial, c. 1746; Jewell, ‘The Legislation Relating to Scotland after the Forty-Five’, 147, 168. Also see McLynn, The Jacobites, 128; W. A. Speck, The Butcher, 176, and on ward-holding, 177; Bruce P. Lenman and John S. Gibson,

Notes 193

137.

138. 139.

140.

141. 142. 143. 144.

The Jacobite Threat. Rebellion and Conspiracy, 1688–1759. A Source Book (Edinburgh, 1990), 241–2; Lenman, Jacobite Risings in Britain, 278, 280; Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 5, 30, 215–16. In December 1745, James Bishop was sent to France with a copy of Dr Barry’s message of English Jacobite support (under the leadership of Sir Watkin Williams Wynn and Lord Barrymore) to Charles. Bishopp, who tried to obtain a passage to the Continent was arrested near Pevensey. His elder brother, the MP, subsequently disassociated himself from James and his activities. SP 36/91, ff. 223–4. ‘First part of a Letter confirming Information about Bishop Abbotson & Lord George Drummond’, c. January–February 1746 [1747?]; Paul Kle´ber Monod, ‘Dangerous Merchandise: Smuggling, Jacobitism, and Commercial Culture in Southeast England, 1690–1760’, Journal of British Studies, 30, 2 (1991), 150–82, 160; Monod, Jacobitism and the English People, 114; Sedgwick, The Commons, I, 463. There is reason to assume that James Bishopp was involved in Jacobite cross-Channel operations. See SP 36/91, ff. 223–224. ‘First Part of a Letter confirming Information about Bishop Abbotson & Lord George Drummond’, c. January–February 1747; Stuart Mss 296/24. Charles. ‘Memorandum concerning the British Army & Mr. Bishopp & Ld. Elibank’, c. 1747–48. Stuart Mss 288/172. Chevalier Alexander-Peter MacKenzie-Douglas to Charles, 1747. J. C. O’Callaghan, History of the Irish Brigades in the Service of France (Glasgow, 1870), 421; Kle´ber Monod, ‘Dangerous Merchandise’, 156–7, 163–4, 167–8; Monod, Jacobitism and the English People, 115. For connections between smugglers and the Jacobite families of Southeast England, see Kle´ber Monod, ‘Dangerous Merchandise’, 156–9. In regard to Jacobite negotiations with smugglers, or their inclusion in Jacobite planning, see Stuart Mss 291/209. Charles to Sir James Harrington, Paris, 16 June 1748. Stuart Mss 288/172; Chevalier Alexander-Peter Mackenzie-Douglas to Charles, 1747; Stuart Mss 358/16. Duncan Robertson, 11th Laird of Struan to James Edgar, Corbeil, 4 September 1755; Sedgwick, The Commons, II, 121–2. Benn’s support of Charles, and Heathcote’s managerial role during the Elibank plot are referred to in Cruickshanks, Political Untouchables, 108,112. On Alderman Heathcote, see also Chapter 3, note 122. SP 98/29, ff. 353–4. John Walton ¼ Baron Philipp von Stosch to [Horace Mann?], Florence, 6 December 1746. For a brief survey on von Stosch, see McLynn, The Jacobites, 180–1. For full reference to his services to the British government, see Chapter 4, note 54; and Chapter 5, note 20. NeC 1,865. ‘Some Considerations on the Present State of the Highlands of Scotland, Tending to Show what may be expected to happen –’, c. Summer, 1746. NLS Ms 299, f. 98. Henrietta Tayler, ‘Notes on Transcripts from French Archives in Paris’, March, 1747. SP 36/93, f. 216–217. Major-General William Blakeney to William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle, Inverness, 10 January 1747. Robert Louis Stevenson refers to the practice of double-remitting in Kidnapped. In this novel, the character of Alan Breac Stewart, notorious for being accused of murdering Colin Campbell of Glenure, the government factor of Ardshiel’s forfeited estate on 14 May 1752, is given the role of a Jacobite remittance agent. Robert Louis Stevenson, Kidnapped (Oxford, [1886] 1986), 52–3. According to Professor Macinnes, double-remitting had been an established recourse of loyal Jacobite clansmen as early as after the ’Fifteen. Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 196.

194 Notes 145. SRO GD 14/121. Alexander Home to the Sheriff [Archibald Campbell of Stonefield] or His Deputies of the Shire of Argyle’, Edinburgh, 10 March 1747. 146. SRO GD 14/122 ‘Intimation made to the Vassals & Tennants of the Estate of McLachlan by the Deputy Sheriff of Argyllshire’, Inveraray, 15 April 1747. Dr McLynn has offered an alternative for the motive of the double-remitters, believing them to prefer paying their chiefs in exile to rendering military service, which they would otherwise have owed their superiors under the terms of wardholding, a quasi feudal mode of tenurial landholding. This explanation, however, is not satisfactory if one considers the circumstance that none, or, at best, only a few, of the exiled or fugitive Jacobite chiefs had the means to force their clansmen to rise in the immediate aftermath of the ’Forty-five, but were rather forced to rely upon the traditional ties with their tenants for support, which only the patriarchal tenets of clanship could afford them. It may, therefore, be concluded that the double-remitters were inspired by a genuine principle of clan loyalty which irrevocably put them in the Jacobite camp, but can hardly be said to have acted under duress from their hunted chiefs. McLynn, The Jacobites, 54. 147. SP 54/37, ff. 3–4. Andrew Fletcher, Lord Justice Clerk Milton to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 4 October 1747; SP 54/37, ff. 9–13. Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle to Andrew Fletcher, Lord Justice Clerk Milton, Whitehall, 8 October 1747; Andrew Fletcher, Lord Justice Clerk Milton to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 17 October 1747, printed in Terry, ed., Albemarle Papers, II, appendix, 463–5; SP 54/37, f. 61. ‘Copy of Letter from the Collector of ye Customs at Fort William [Duncan McVicar]’, Fort William, 26 October 1747. Also see SP 54/37, ff. 114–15. Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, to Lieutenant-General Humphrey Bland, Whitehall, 26 November 1747; SP 54/ 37, ff. 116–19. ‘Copy of a Letter from ye North Nov. the 20th 1747 . . . ’; SP 54/37, f. 120. Anon. Intelligence, to Lieutenant-General Humphrey Bland, 26 November 1747. Bland, however, also sent Newcastle a report on the ostensible marriage treaty between the houses of Stuart and Hohenzollern. SP 54/37, ff. 209–10. Lieutenant-General Humphrey Bland to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 19 December, 1747. Also see NeC 1,848/1–2. P.O. to [Henry Pelham?], Edinburgh, 20 November 1747; Frederick II to Charles, Berlin, 8 November 1747 in HEH 330346, N. D. Fellowes, State Tryals, 16. 148. SP 54/37, f. 59. ‘Copy of a Letter from Mr. Douglass’, Fort William, 27 October 1747. 149. Dr Archibald Cameron was the younger brother of Donald Cameron of Lochiel, and served as lieutenant-colonel in Lochiel’s regiment during the ’Forty-five. He escaped to France with Charles in September 1746, but was apprehended and, on the basis of his attainder of 1746, executed in 1753. There is reason to believe that he lost his life because of his role in the Elibank plot. For further reference to the extent of Dr Cameron’s involvement in the Elibank plot, see Chapter 4, pp. 79–80, 100–1, 103–4, 107–8, 110–13, 118. Reports of an earlier sighting of Dr Cameron were sent to British general officers in February and April. NeC 1,772/2. ‘Copy of a Letter from Capt. Mackay to Lord Albemarle’, Fort Augustus, 21 February 1747; NLS Ms 307, f. 2. Alexander Campbell, Deputy Governor of Fort William to MajorGeneral John Huske, Fort William, 6 April 1747; NLS Ms 307, f. 3. Lieutenant-Colonel Duroure to Major-General John Huske, Fort William, 6 April 1747. 150. SP 54/37, ff. 17–18. Donald Campbell of Airds to [Archibald Campbell, 3rd Duke of Argyll?], Airds, 18 October 1747; Same to Andrew Fletcher, Lord Justice Clerk

Notes 195

151.

152. 153.

154.

155. 156.

157.

Milton, Airds, 25 October 1747, printed in Terry, ed. Albemarle Papers, II, appendix, 469; SP 54/37, f. 103. ‘Copy of some Paragraphs in a Letter from an itinerant Preacher in the Isle of Skye’, 6 November 1747; SP 54/38, f. 3. George J. Douglas, Master Gunner to Lieutenant-General Humphrey Bland, Fort William, 23 December 1747. Ludovick Cameron of Torcastle was the brother of John Cameron of Lochiel, the 18th chief of clan Cameron, and Donald Cameron of Lochiel’s uncle. He raised 300 Camerons for Charles’ army, and served in his nephew’s regiment throughout the campaign. Gibson, Lochiel of the ’45, appendix, 197. SRO GD 87/1/28. John Campbell, Lord Glenorchy to ?, London, 23 April 1747. Livingstone of Bachuil et al., Muster Roll, 12, 32. Humphrey Bland first served under the Duke of Marlborough, and during the ’Forty-five he was a commissioned major-general under the Duke of Cumberland. Subsequently, he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant-general; in 1753, he was appointed commander-in-chief of the British army in Scotland. Gibson, Lochiel of the ’45, appendix, 196. SP 54/37, ff. 67–8. Lieutenant-General Humphrey Bland to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 3 November 1747; SP 54/37, f. 138. Same to the same, Edinburgh, 1 December 1747; SP 54/37, ff. 153–6. Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle to Lieutenant-General Humphrey Bland, Whitehall, 8 December 1747; SP 54/37, ff. 175–6. Lieutenant-General Humphrey Bland to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 12 December 1747. Williams, The Whig Supremacy, 261–2; Black, Culloden and the ’45, 184. For Lord Milton’s hope of a dispiriting effect on the Jacobites because of Sir Edward Hawke’s success, see Andrew Fletcher, Lord Justice Clerk Milton to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 3 November 1747, printed in Terry, ed. Albemarle Papers, II, appendix, 468–9. SP 36/102 ff. 60–3. ‘Instructions for our Trusty, and Well Beloved Humphrey Bland’, Kensington, 16 October 1747. SP 54/38, ff. 8–9. Ensign James Stewart to Lieutenant-General Humphrey Bland, Edinburgh, 29 December, 1747. Also see SP 54/38, f. 6. Murdoch MacLeod ¼ Mr J. Stewart to Lieutenant-General Humphrey Bland, 24 December 1747. According to information received from a former officer in the Jacobite army, the invasion was scheduled for the Spring of 1748, and the expedition to Scotland was to be headed by General James Keith. The gist of the plan was to attack Fort William, in order to allow the Jacobite clans to assemble without fear of harassment from British garrison troops. Also see SP 54/37, ff. 229–30. ‘Copies of Letters of Intelligence sent to Lieut.- Genl. Bland by the Military Officers’, 16–21 December 1747. Also see the letter of Andrew Fletcher, Lord Justice Clerk Milton to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 17 February 1747, printed in Terry, ed., Albemarle Papers, II, appendix, 432–4, for an early estimation of Cluny’s leading role in the management of Jacobite affairs in the post-Culloden period. NeC 1,956. Archibald Campbell, 3rd Duke Argyll to [Henry Pelham?], Inveraray, 4 October 1747. Also see NeC 1,954. Same to [the same?], Inveraray, 29 August 1747; NeC 1,955. Same to [the same?], Inveraray, 24 September 1747; Andrew Fletcher, Lord Justice Clerk Milton to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 17 April 1747, printed in Terry, ed., Albemarle Papers, II, appendix, 447. Huske’s and Argyll’s apprehensions were also mentioned in a government memorandum of c. 1748–49, in which the anonymous author concluded that the measures taken to date were insufficient. If not timeously prevented, the

196 Notes

158.

159.

160. 161. 162.

163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168.

Highlanders’ state of armed readiness would become a serious danger; if effectively disarmed, the clans would depend on foreign arms, which could not be distributed easily, without the government’s knowledge. NeC 2,024. Anon. Memorandum for the Disarming and Subjugation of the Highlands, c. 1749. SP 54/37, ff. 9–13. Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle to Andrew Fletcher, Lord Justice Clerk Milton, Whitehall, 8 October 1747; SP 54/37, ff. 116–19. ‘Copy of a Letter from ye North of Nov. the 20th 1747 . . . ’ The probable genesis of Jacobite efforts at maintaining a core of armed men was Charles’ order to this effect, written to the loyal Chiefs on the advice of Old Clanranald in late April 1746. McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 268. Also see NLS Ms 3736, f. 509; f. 984. ‘Intelligence Received by [Donald Campbell of] Airds from Appin,’ 29 October 1746; SRO GD 14/ 98. ‘List of Such of the Appin Men as have not yet given in their Arms,’ 6 July 1746; WHM, MSD 18. Charles Stewart of Ardshiel to Ewan MacPherson of Cluny, 24 September 1746 & Receipt of William Stewart, Stronacardoch, 6 October 1746; WHM, MSD 19. Lieutenant-Colonel Ludovick Cameron of Torcastle, Dunan [i.e. Downan?]. Receipt for Funds received from Ewan MacPherson of Cluny, 2 April [1748?]; Donald Campbell to Archibald Campbell of Stonefield, Sheriff-Depute of Argyllshire, printed in Terry, ed. Albemarle Papers, I, 239. ‘Intelligence from the Hills’, enclosed in William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 15 November 1746, printed in Terry, ed., Albemarle Papers, I, 303. NLS Ms 17514, f. 275. ‘Copy of a Letter from Dingwall’, 10 March 1747. Ibid. Sir Harry Munro, 7th Baronet, represented Ross-shire in Parliament from 1746–47, and Tain Burghs from 1747–61. During the ’Forty-five, he served as a captain in Lord Loudon’s regiment. His father was killed at the battle of Falkirk, and Sir Harry was captured at the battle of Prestonpans. His uncle was the unfortunate Captain George Munro of Culcairn shot on the shore of Locharkaig. After Culloden, he was actively informing against Jacobite MacKenzies in his native Ross-shire. Sedgwick, The Commons, II, 281. NeC 1,882. Sir Harry Munro to [Henry Pelham?], Edinburgh, 23 June 1747. LO 12357, Box 38. Sir Harry Munro, 7th Baronet to John Campbell, 4th Earl of Loudon, 17 September 1746. SP 54/37, ff. 209–10. Lieutenant-General Humphrey Bland to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 19 December 1747. SP 54/37, ff. 159–60. Cosmo George, 3rd Duke of Gordon to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Gordon Castle, 5 October 1747. Speck, The Butcher, introduction, ix; McLynn, The Jacobites, 149. Also see P. D. G. Thomas, ‘Jacobitism in Wales,’ Welsh History Review, 1 (1962), 279–300, 300. For a discussion of Jacobite plans to initiate a second rising in French exile, see Chapter 3. See Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 214. For government intelligence on Jacobite recruiting activities in the wake of the ’Forty-five, see SP 36/92, f. 219. Anon. ‘Information about Recruiting in Scotland for the French Service & the Smuggling Trade carried on with France’, 1746; WHM, MSE 22. Lieutenant-General Humphrey Bland to Major Adams, Edinburgh, 6 January 1748; WHM, MSE 21. Same to Major Webb, Edinburgh, 7 January 1748. In June 1748, a British informer with connections in the French army claimed to know of ‘near 4 and above 3000 disaffected People . . . in Arms & Association in Scotland against the Government’. As he would have been accused of the grossest mis-

Notes 197

169. 170.

171. 172. 173.

3

conduct for failing to relay such vital information, Bland immediately dismissed this intelligence as bogus, remarking that past experience had taught him to rely only on his own agents. As these armed Jacobites never appeared in a single body, but were widely spread over the country, Bland’s immediate response in the negative seems too hasty. An earlier complaint by a Mr Robertson, presumably Alexander Robertson of Struan, who was a suspected Jacobite, referred to 1,200– 1,500 armed ‘Thieves’ in the Highlands alone, who had played an instrumental part in the ’Forty-five. He added that ‘[t]hey are supported by his Majesties Enemies with Arms and Money’. The numbers in the above reports are surely exaggerated; but the persecution of Jacobite soldiers after Culloden, and the onset of winter in 1746 combined to ensure that plenty of outlawed survivors of the ’Forty-five roamed the Highlands in search of victuals and plunder. It is also not unthinkable that these veterans received support in one shape or another from the population of traditionally Jacobite regions. SP 54/38, ff. 307–8. ‘Mr. Robertson’s Meml. relating to the Highlands’, c. March, 1748. SP 54/39, ff. 170–1; Paul Kearney to William Sharpe, Esq., Cross Keys Tavern, Cornhill, London, 17 June 1748; SP 54/39, f. 176. Lieutenant-General Humphrey Bland to John Potter, Esq., Under-Secretary, Edinburgh, 19 July 1748. NLS Ms 304, f. 8. Lieutenant-General Humphrey Bland. Circular to Regimental Officers in Scotland, Edinburgh, 15 December 1747. NLS Ms 17514, ff. 307–308. Anon. Intelligence, late 1747. Both Normand MacLeod of Dunvegan, chief of clan MacLeod, and Sir Alexander MacDonald of Sleat, had betrayed Charles by failing to join the Jacobite army in 1745 in spite of their prior pledges to rise for the Stuarts. Dr McLynn believes that the failure of the two Skye chiefs to aid the Jacobites in 1745–46 was of great consequence, for if they had acceded to Charles’ cause, the Prince could have invaded England with a sufficient number of men. Thus, their potential support for a future Jacobite rising would have been of critical importance. McLynn, The Jacobites, 61–2. MacBean Special Collection. Mss [not foliated] Lieutenant-General Humphrey Bland to Henry Pelham, Edinburgh, 19 December 1747. Ibid. SP 36/ 96, ff. 108–9. Anon. to Andrew Stone, ‘Memorial concerning the Highlands of Scotland’, 13 April 1747.

The Jacobite Movement in Exile after Culloden, 1746–1748. 1. Neil Munro, Doom Castle, (Edinburgh, [1901] 1996), 127. 2. SP 36/90 f. 187. [Intercepted Jacobite Poem]. Captain John Fergusson to [Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle?], [aboard the Raven?], 24 December 1746. 3. The ’Fifteen may serve as one precedent for the Jacobite ‘tradition’ of seeking asylum in France after an abortive rising; but even the great Jacobite rising of 1715 was antedated by the mass exodus of 11,000–40,000 Irish Jacobites – better known as the Flight of the Wild Geese – who followed their leader Patrick Sarsfield, Earl of Lucan into French exile subsequent to the Treaty of Limerick of early 1692. John Cornelius O’Callaghan gives an even higher figure (19,000) for the period between October 1691 and January 1692. Paul Kle´ber Monod estimates that after the Revolution of 1688, 50,000 Jacobites settled on the Continent. Patrick Clark de Dromantin quotes a figure of no less than 50,000– 60,000 Jacobites. O’Callaghan believed that 450,000 Irishmen were recruited into the ranks of the Irish Brigade and other French military corps between

198 Notes

4. 5.

6.

7. 8.

October 1691 and May 1745. Frank J. McLynn, The Jacobites (London, [1985] 1988), 18, 129–34, 136; Allan I. Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603–1788 (East Linton, 1996), 214; Paul Kle´ber Monod, ‘Dangerous Merchandise: Smuggling, Jacobitism, and Commercial Culture in Southeast England, 1690–1760’, Journal of British Studies, 30, 2 (1991), 150–82, 170; Patrick Clark de Dromantin, ‘France, Land of Refuge: Memoirs of a Family Exiled by the Treaty of Limerick, 1690–1914’, in Edward Corp, ed., L’Autre Exile (Presses du Languedoc, 1993), 157–70; J. C. O’Callaghan, History of the Irish Brigades in the Service of France (Glasgow, 1870), 61, 163. Two comprehensive accounts of the Jacobite exile are to be found in Daniel Szechi, The Jacobites. Britain and Europe, 1688–1788 (Manchester, 1994), 126–30 and McLynn, The Jacobites, 126–41, 158–70. Time constraints and the emphasis on Scotland did not permit further investigation in French archives. See Chapter 1, p. 18. Stuart Mss 277/127. Colonel Richard Warren to James, Roscoff, 10 October 1746; Stuart Mss 278/75. James to Charles, Albano, 3 November 1746. Warren, an Irish Jacobite who served in the Jacobite army as aide-de-camp to Charles, was subsequently given a baronetcy (278/82), and continued to rise through the French and Jacobite ranks. He was given a commission for the rank of brigadier-general in August 1750 by James, and another for the rank of major-general in February 1760, while, at the same time, he was also a brigadier-general in Louis XV’s service. Stuart Mss 397/146. Sir Richard Warren, Brigadier, to James Edgar, Vannes, 1 January 1760; 401/90; Misc. Vol. 21, Warrant Books, No. 128, 131; Alastair Livingstone of Bachuil, Christian W. H. Aikman and Betty Stuart Hart, eds., Muster Roll of Prince Charles Edward Stuart’s Army, 1745–1746 (Aberdeen, [1984] 1985), 7. For a short biographical sketch of Warren, see Richard Hayes’ Irish Swordsmen of France (Dublin, 1934), 257–79. Stuart Mss 277/164. Quentin ¼ Colonel Daniel O’Brien to James, Fontainebleau, 17 October 1746; Stuart Mss 277/162. Rene´-Louis Voyer, Marquis D’Argenson to Colonel Daniel O’Brien, Fontainebleau, 6 October 1746; Stuart Mss 277/163. ‘E´tat du Gratification que le Roy a voulu accorder aux Gentilshommes Ećossois arrive´r depuis peu en France’, enclosed in 277/162. For Colonel Daniel O’Brien, see Stuart Mss 263/5. James (Credentials for Colonel Daniel O’Brien, to officially represent James at the French court) to Rene´-Louis Voyer, Marquis D’Argenson, Rome, 22 February 1745. The French, however, preferred the presence of Francis, 2nd titular Baron Sempill, an active Jacobite schemer, over that of O’Brien. Sempill, upon being given a free hand to act as official representative, conferred at length with the Comte de Maurepas, minister of marine. James, who was partial to the representative of his choice, demanded an explanation. Stuart Mss 274/28. Lumley ¼ Francis, 2nd tit. Baron Sempill to James, [Paris?], 2 May 1746; 274/61. Fra. Lacey ¼ Francis, 2nd tit. Baron Sempill to James, [Paris?], 9 May 1746; 274/104. Fra. Lacey ¼ Francis, 2nd tit. Baron Sempill to James, [Paris?], 16 May 1746. For O’Brien and Sempill, see Melville Henry Massue, Marquis de Ruvigny and Raineval, The Jacobite Peerage, Baronetage, Knightage & Grants of Honour (London and Edinburgh, [1904] 1974), 74–6, 165. Stuart Mss 277/165. [Sir] J[ohn] Graeme to James, Clichy, 17 October 1746. Stuart Mss 273/4. Charles to Louis XV, King of France, 22 October 1746; Frank J. McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie. Charles Edward Stuart (Oxford, [1988] 1991). McLynn, 311–12. For a brief account of Charles’ pageant to Fontainbleau, see MacBean Special Collection. John Burton (Ralph Griffiths) Ascanius or the Young Adventurer (Aberdeen, 1748), 136–7.

Notes 199 9. Stuart Mss 278/75. James to Charles, Albano, 3 November 1746. 10. Stuart Mss 273/117. Charles to the Chiefs of the Jacobite Clans, 23 April 1746. Also see Intelligence, enclosed in William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 15 October 1746, printed in C. S. Terry, ed., Albemarle Papers, 2 vols (Aberdeen, 1902), I, 291–2. Dr McLynn has recently tried to exonerate Charles from the charge of deserting his mustering army at Ruthven by explaining that the Prince fled the pressures of the stress caused by the immense responsibility he bore. This explanation has strong overtones of an apologia. Instead, my suggestion, that, in political terms, the Prince indeed acted in a thoroughly pragmatic fashion, as indicated above, seems more feasible. Moreover, the latter thesis gains validity, if Charles’ previous experience with the dithering Duc de Richelieu, and more generally, the French court during the French invasion preparations of 1743–44 is taken into consideration. Notably, McLynn himself states that the most competent of general officers serving under Cumberland and later Albemarle, Major-General Campbell of Mamore, was convinced that Charles had remained in the Highlands, as he believed that it was in the interest of the French to keep the Prince in Scotland. Mamore’s opinion corroborates Charles’ own suspicions about French motives stated above. McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 263–4, 299. Moreover, suspicions relating to the French desire to keep the Jacobites in the field as long as possible were raised by the Duke of Cumberland’s aide-de-camp, Colonel Joseph Yorke. Captured Jacobite papers, formerly in the possession of Charles’ private secretary John Murray of Broughton, indicated that the French wanted to ‘alimenter la re´bellion, and it was therefore contrary to all their views that the Rebels hazarded the Battle of Culloden’. Colonel Joseph Yorke to the Hon. Philip Yorke, Fort Augustus, 5 July 1746, printed in Philip C. Yorke, The Life and Correspondence of Philip Yorke, Earl of Hardwicke, Lord Chancellor of Great Britain, 3 vols. (Cambridge, 1913), I, 546–7. Conversely, there is reason to believe, as Michael Hook and Walter Ross recently argued, that the Jacobite position in early 1746 was grossly misrepresented to Louis XV by Charles’ self-seeking emissaries. The French ministers, lulled into complacency by false reports, thus never felt the need to expedite the dispatch of a relief force. Michael Hook and Walter Ross, The ’Forty-Five. The Last Jacobite Rebellion (Edinburgh, 1995), 98–9. For a corroboratory poetic response by the Highland bard Alasdair MacMhaighstir Alasdair in relation to Charles’ departure, see his poem ‘Oran Araid’ (‘A Certain Song’). John Lorne Campbell, ed., Highland Songs of the Forty-Five (Edinburgh, [1933] 1984), 86–93. I wish to thank Eámonn ´ ’Ciardha for sensitizing me towards the poetic evidence of the Scottish bards. O 11. Stuart Mss 280/17. ‘Examen de la Proposition s’il conviena mieux aux interests de ˆ ne d’Angleterre, la France de laisser la Maison de Brunswick en possession du Tro plustot que d’y retablir la Maison royale de Stuart’, 1746. The claim that the British were unable to continue the payment of subsidies to their allies on the Continent is disputed by Hook and Ross in The ’Forty-Five, 101; see also 120, for French superiority in Flanders, and the value of the Jacobite campaign as a diversion. The basis of Hook and Ross’s first contention, however, is not clear as their publication is devoid of detailed source references. 12. Stuart Mss 278/95. Charles to Louis XV, Clichy, 5 November 1746. 13. The Byzantine quality of French ministerial shiftiness makes every attempt at a full analysis of faction at Versailles invariably result in a voluminous treatment of the subject, but, even so, certain alignments were discernible among the six most important men in Louis XV’s councils. While Cardinal Tencin, minister without

200 Notes

14.

15.

16.

17.

portfolio, was probably the most consistent supporter of Jacobitism, and bitterest enemy of Britain in the Conseil d’E´tat, Adrien Maurice, Duc de Noailles, also minister without portfolio, and Jean Fre´de´ric Phe´lypeaux, Comte de Maurepas, minister of marine, could easily be described as the anti-Jacobite party. The D’Argenson brothers’ interest by no means converged: the pugnacious minister of war, Pierre de Voyer de Paulmy, Comte D’Argenson, tended towards the strongly pro-Austrian and pro-Spanish Maurepas-Noailles bloc, while his elder brother, Rene´-Louis Voyer, ‘D’Argenson de la Paix’, was Cardinal Tencin’s lukewarm ally. M. Philibert Orry de Fulvy, the Comptroller-General, and head of finances was not really a minister Jacobites had any dealings with, but his association with the Duc de Noailles might as well put him among the anti-Jacobite ministerial camp. These alliances were at best tentative, if not entirely circumstantial. Frank J. McLynn, France and the Jacobite Rising of 1745 (Edinburgh, 1981), 43, 45, 47, 50–1. For a detailed study of the oscillations in the French ministries, see his second chapter in ‘The Ministers of State’, 35–56. Stuart Mss 279/171. Titus ¼ Colonel Daniel O’Brien to James, Paris, 26 October 1746. Cardinal Tencin, despite being James’ creature – he owed his cardinal’s hat to his Jacobite patron’s influence – had only so much patience for the intransigent Charles. Conversely, Charles lost little love on this prelate, who was his family’s principal ally at the French court. McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 69, 107, 108, 328, 345. Lord Elcho alleged that the French offered to supply 6,000 men for an invasion of Scotland, which Charles refused. David Wemyss, Lord Elcho, A Short Account of the Affairs of Scotland in the Years 1744, 1745, 1746, ed. The Hon. Evan Charteris (Edinburgh, 1907), 446. Dr McLynn states that the idea for this expedition to Scotland originally came from Louis XV a few days prior to Christmas 1746, and that it enjoyed the support of Cardinal Tencin and the Marquis D’Argenson. Bonnie Prince Charlie, 315. For the Duc de Noailles’ early opposition to a French invasion of Britain on behalf of James in early 1744, see Szechi, The Jacobites, 96–7; McLynn, France and the Jacobite Rising, 45–6. To some extent, Noailles’ fear vitiates Professor Lenman’s claim that a restored Stuart government could not act with initiative. Bruce Lenman, The Jacobite Risings in Britain, 1689–1746 (Aberdeen, [1980] 1995), 288. George Kelly was one of the Seven Men of Moidart, who sailed to Scotland with Charles in August 1745. Suspected by Sir Robert Walpole of having connived at, if not participated in, the Atterbury Plot of 1722, he was incarcerated in the Tower of London from 1723–36. Frank McLynn referred to Kelly as ‘one of the few truly evil men among the Jacobites’. McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 312; Rev. George Kelly, Memoirs of the Life, Travels and Transactions of the Reverend George Kelly, From his Birth to Escape from his Imprisonment out of the Tower of London, October 26, 1736 (London, 1736); MacBean Special Collection. John Charles Fox, ed., The Official Diary of Lieutenant-General Adam Williamson Deputy-Lieutenant of the Tower of London 1722–1747, Camden Third Series, XXII (London, 1912), 166–172; G. V. Bennett, The Tory Crisis in Church and State 1688–1730. The Career of Francis Atterbury Bishop of Rochester (Oxford, 1975), 263–73; Paul S. Fritz, The English Ministers and Jacobitism between the Rebellions of 1715 and 1745 (Toronto, 1975), 96; John Sibbald Gibson, Lochiel of the ’45. The Jacobite Chief and the Prince (Edinburgh, [1994] 1995), 199. Stuart Mss 278/153–4. Charles to Louis XV, King of France, 10 November 1746. ‘The state in which I have left Scotland upon my departure merits Your Majesty’s

Notes 201

18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

24.

25. 26.

27. 28.

full attention. This kingdom is on the verge of seeing itself put to waste [sic!] and the Government of England is resolved to equally [mal]treat those subjects having remained loyal to it and those having taken up arms for me.’ Charles claimed that with only 3,000 French regulars he would have completed his conquest of England; General Henry Hawley’s defeated troops could then have been routed at Falkirk, while a full war-chest would have put him on an equal footing with the Duke of Cumberland’s forces. Almost as an afterthought, Charles added that if he was given a command over 18,000–20,000 troops, provided he received it right away, he still stood a chance of turning the tide in his favour. That this last remark smacked of reproach must have been apparent to Louis XV. For British remedial legislation in the post-Culloden period, see Byron Frank Jewell, ‘The Legislation Relating to Scotland after the Forty-Five’, unpublished Ph.D. thesis (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1975). See also Alasdair MacMhaighstir Alasdair’s pertinent poem ‘Gairm do Phrionnsa Tearlach’ (‘A Call to Prince Charles’). Notable is the following excerpt: ‘We care not if thou comest never/ Unless thou comest at this moment/ . . . Make now the invasion’. Campbell, ed., Highland Songs of the Forty-Five, 122–3. Stuart Mss 279/44. James to Charles, Rome, 28 November 1746. Stuart Mss 279/76. Colonel Daniel O’Brien (dictated by Charles) to Rene´-Louis Voyer, Marquis D’Argenson, Paris, 7 December 1746. Stuart Mss 281/89. Charles to James, Avignon, 12 February 1747. Stuart Mss 280/122. Charles to James, Paris, 21 January 1747; Stuart Mss 281/89– 90. Same to the same, Avignon, 12 February 1747. Françisque Michel, Les Ećossais en France, et les français en Ećosse, 2 vols (London, 1862), II, 437–9. Professor Speck claims that a total of 382 Jacobites were exchanged for British prisoners of war; Hook and Ross computed a total of 387 men in French and Spanish service exchanged. Stuart Mss 278/5. Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle to Abraham Van Hoey, Whitehall, 10 November 1746; McLynn, France and the Jacobite Rising of 1745, 214–20; W. A. Speck, The Butcher. The Duke of Cumberland and the Suppression of the 45 (Caernarfon, [1981] 1995), 181, 182; Hook and Ross in The Forty-Five, 123. Stuart Mss 279/147. Rene´-Louis Voyer, Marquis D’Argenson to Colonel Daniel O’Brien, 22 November 1746; see also Stuart Mss 279/142. Colonel Daniel O’Brien to Rene´-Louis Voyer, Marquis D’Argenson, [Paris?], c. 21–31 December 1746. O’Brien, on behalf of Charles, protested against the Duke of Newcastle’s stipulation that British-born French subjects could only hope for release if they vowed never to fight George II again. Stuart Mss 279/22. Colonel Daniel O’Brien (dictated by Charles) to Marc-Pierre de Voyer, Comte D’Argenson, Clichy, 25 November 1746. Stuart Mss 278/128. Charles to Rene´-Louis Voyer, Marquis D’Argenson, Clichy, 8 November 1746. For young Glengarry’s capture, see Stuart Mss 272/116. Alasdair MacDonell of Glengarry to James Edgar, Tower, 31 January 1746. See also Stuart Mss 292/122. ‘E´tat des Noms des Officiers du Re´giment Royal Ećossois’, 10 July 1748. Stuart Mss 278/128. Charles to Rene´-Louis Voyer, Marquis D’Argenson, Clichy, 8 November 1746. SP 36/89, f. 342. Charles Radcliffe, tit. 4th Earl of Derwentwater to [Philip Yorke, 1st Earl of Hardwicke?], 26 November 1746; Stuart Mss 279/138. Rene´-Louis Voyer, Marquis D’Argenson to Daniel O’Brien, tit. Earl of Lismore, [Paris?], 20 November

202 Notes

29. 30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

1746. Charles Radcliffe had been under sentence of death ever since his escape from Newgate goal on 11 December 1716. Leo Gooch, The Desperate Faction? The Jacobites of North-East England, 1688–1745 (Hull, 1995), 95. Stuart Mss 279/122. Daniel O’Brien, tit. Earl of Lismore to Rene´-Louis Voyer, Marquis D’Argenson, Paris, 17 December 1746. Stuart Mss 279/103. Daniel O’Brien, tit. Earl of Lismore to Rene´-Louis Voyer, Marquis D’Argenson, [Paris?], 14 December 1746. The fourth article of the Treaty of Fontainbleau stipulated: ‘In accordance with the alliance between the Most Christian King and the royal house of Stuart, the King and the Royal Prince promise and undertake to give no assistance to their respective enemies, to prevent as far as lies within their power all injury and harm which might be attempted against the states and their subjects, and to work together and in harmony for the restoration of peace on a basis which can be of reciprocal advantage of the two nations.’ (my italics). The translation is taken from Bruce P. Lenman and John S. Gibson, The Jacobite Threat. Rebellion and Conspiracy, 1688–1759. England, Ireland, Scotland and France (Edinburgh, 1990), 209. For the original see: Stuart Mss 270/13. ‘Copie du traite´ Signe´ a fontainbleau le 24e octobre 1745, par Mr le marquis dargenson et Mr D’obryen’; Stuart Mss 270/14. ‘Copie du traite´ de fontainbleau du 24e ocbre 1746’. SP 36/90, f. 46. Charles Radcliffe, 4th tit. Earl of Derwentwater. Paper delivered to the Sheriff of Middlesex at his Execution, Tower, 8 December 1746. Stuart Mss 279/189. Colonel Daniel O’Brien to Rene´-Louis Voyer, Marquis D’Argenson, Paris, 31 December 1746. Lovat referred to Murray of Broughton as ‘the greatest Criminal’. HEH RB 321580:13. Simon Fraser, 11th Lord Lovat, The Genuine Speech of Simon Lord Lovat in Westminster Hall, March 18. 1746–7 ([London?], 1747), 8; Lenman, Jacobite Risings in Britain, 275. Stuart Mss 288/172. Chevalier Alexander-Peter Mackenzie-Douglas to Charles, 1747; NeC 1,782. ‘List of Names of the Persons mention’d by Mr. Murray in his Examination to have been concerned in the Rebellion’, c. early 1747; Stuart Mss Box 1/261, No. 1 and 2. Colonel Bret[t] to Charles, c. 15 May 1747, and c. 18 June 1747. Also see SP 54/39, ff. 288–9. ‘A List of Several Persons excepted out of the late Act of Grace against whom Bills of Indictment have not been prefer’d before the Justiciary Court in Scotland, other than those who are now in Custody’, c. end of November, 1748. Andrew Lang, ‘Murray of Broughton’, Blackwood’s Magazine (August, 1898), 220–30, 228. Furthermore, Lang, in this article, claims that Broughton screened the Duke of Beaufort, that he attempted to undermine the evidence against Lovat, and ultimately consoled himself with the belief that he had only denounced the small fry. More generally, Broughton’s information to the British government was extensive, and very damaging to the Jacobite cause. SP 36/86, ff. 120–1. ‘The Examination of John Murray of Broughton’, 8 August 1746; SP 36/86, ff. 172–92. ‘Examination of John Murray of Broughton in the County of Peebles, Esq.’, 13 August 1746; SP 36/86, ff. 195–6. ‘The Further Examination of John Murray of Broughton’, 13 August 1746; SP 36/86, f. 384. John Murray of Broughton to [Philip Yorke, 1st Earl of Hardwicke?], 27 August 1746; SP 36/87, f. 25. Same to [the same?], Tower, 3 September 1746; SP 36/89, ff. 110–18. ‘The Further Examination of John Murray of Broughton Esqr &c.’, Whitehall, 11 November, 1746; Robert Fitzroy Bell, ed., Memorials of John Murray of Broughton Sometime Secretary to Prince Charles 1740–47 (Edinburgh, 1898), intro., xxviii–xxx.

Notes 203 35. To Mr S–—— M–—, on His Turning Evidence 17 (London, 1747). Also see Atticus, A Congratulatory Letter to John Murray, Esq; Late Secretary to the Young Pretender (London, 1747), in which Murray is charged with duplicity. 36. SP 54/37, f. 14. William Baillie to Major MacDonald, Rotterdam, 17 October 1747. According to Baillie’s letter, young Glengarry had been won over by ‘advice’ given him by this letter’s recipient and a Major White during his term at the Tower of London. Norman MacDonald implies that young Glengarry did not accept this offer to abandon the Jacobites. Norman H. MacDonald, The Clan Ranald of Knoydart & Glengarry. A History of the MacDonalds or MacDonells of Glengarry (Edinburgh, [1979] 1995), 113–14. 37. Charles apparently prevented Glengarry from obtaining command over a regiment. ‘[T]his occasiond a difference between them’, and may have underscored Glengarry’s intention to defect. NeC 2,086. ‘Narrative & Informations of A:[lasdair] M:[acDonell],’ August 1751. See Chapter 4, note 45 and the Addendum for incontrovertible proof of Pickle’s identity. Andrew Lang presented his evidence against Glengarry in Pickle the Spy (London, 1897), and by the same author The Companions of Pickle (London, 1898). 38. Aeneas MacDonald, the Parisian banker who accompanied Charles to Scotland in August 1745, blamed Murray of Broughton for his brother’s (MacDonald of Kinlochmoidart) accession to the rising. Subsequent to his capture, and after his unsuccessful invocation of the Cartel of Frankfort (1743), Aeneas also turned king’s evidence, and was granted a pardon by George II. SP 36/106, ff. 14–16. ‘The Examination of Aeneas MacDonald’ [London], 12 January 1748; SP 36/106, ff. 147–8. Aeneas MacDonald to [?], [London], 21 March 1747; SP 36/107, f. 276. The Lords Justices to the Attorney or Solicitor-General [London], 7 July 1748. Lenman, Jacobite Risings in Britain, 285. The Crown witnesses arrayed against Aeneas complained about Jacobite attempts at intimidating them. SP 36/102, f. 82. ‘The Petition of Donald Stewart, John Urquhart, William McGhie and John Falconer, the only material Evidences in the Trial of Aeneas McDonald’, [London?], 19 October 1747. 39. Elcho refused to obey Charles’ request to join Lochiel shortly after Culloden. He also held a grudge against Charles, who had borrowed 1,500 guineas from him during the ’Forty-five, and at the time of the Elibank plot had still not cleared the debt. The Prince’s accusations directed at Elcho’s acquaintances, Lord George Murray and Aeneas MacDonald, and Elcho’s own submission to the British government, exacerbated the situation, eventually forcing Elcho to distance himself from the Jacobites. Elcho, A Short Account of the Affairs of Scotland, 93,110–11; SP 54/32, f. 72. David Wemyss, Lord Elcho to Archibald Campbell, 3rd Duke of Argyll, Paris, 17 June 1746; SP 54/32, f. 120. Same to Andrew Fletcher, Lord Milton, Paris, 27 June 1746. McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 266–7. See also NLS Ms 3187, ff. 76–7. Francis, 2nd tit. Baron Sempill to William Drummond of Balhaldy [Paris], 23 August 1748. In this letter to Balhaldy, Sempill mentioned not only Elcho’s but also Sir James Stuart’s offer of submission to the British government. 40. SP 54/32, f. 76. John Hay of Restalrig to William Grant, Lord Advocate, Paris, 20 June 1746; Stuart Mss 279/71. Same to Charles, Paris, 5 December 1746; Stuart Mss 279/91. Charles to John Hay of Restalrig, Paris, 10 December 1746; Alan Gibson MacPherson, A Day’s March to Ruin. The Badenoch Men in the ’Forty-Five and Col. Ewan MacPherson of Cluny (Newtonmore, 1996), 155, 158; Hook and Ross, The ’Forty-Five, 101. Elcho, A Short Account of the Affairs of Scotland, 107, 109. Horace

204 Notes

41.

42. 43.

44.

45.

46.

Walpole accused Elcho of wanting to maim captured Hanoverian officers. It was Lord George Murray, who first accused Hay of Restalrig of mismanaging the supplies of the Jacobite army at the most critical juncture. Stuart Mss 273/96. Lord George Murray to Charles, 17 April 1746. NeC 1,981. Simon Fraser, Master of Lovat to Henry Pelham, Glasgow, 3 April 1749. Bruce Lenman, The Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen, 1650–1784 (Aberdeen, [1984] 1995), 178–9, 187. For the literary reference, see Robert Louis Stevenson, Catriona (Oxford, [1893] 1986), 255–61, 272–80. For the trial of James Stewart of Aucharn, see Chapter 4, pp. 103–4. SP 36/94, f. 39. Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle to William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle, Whitehall, 17 February, 1747. SP 36/101, ff. 54–5. Captain Henry Patton to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Carlisle, 28 September 1747; SP 36/101, f. 56. Lord Lewis Drummond de Melfort to Mr Ward, Mayor of Carlisle, [Carlisle], 27 September 1747; SP 36/101, f. 58. Mr Ward, Mayor of Carlisle to [Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle?], Carlisle, 20 September 1747. A total of 120 Jacobites were executed, 92 were forced to enlist in the British army, apparently 772 (22 per cent) prisoners expired in goal and approximately 1,150 individuals were transported or banished for life. Less than 10 per cent of the Jacobite army could lay claim to having served under a different sovereign, and, hence, to immunity from the penalties prescribed by the British law of treason in relation to levying war against the king. McLynn, The Jacobites, 127; Lenman, Jacobite Risings in Britain, 275; Scottish Record Office, The ’45 and After. Historical Background Documents, Extracts, and Copies (Edinburgh, 1995), 14; Hook and Ross, The ’Forty-Five, 122–3; Sir Bruce Gordon Seton and Jean Gordon Arnot, The Prisoners of the ’45, 3 vols (Edinburgh, 1928–29), I, 39–41; Livingstone of Bachuil et al., Muster Roll, appendix I, 213–14. See my note. 23. Lenman and Gibson, The Jacobite Threat, 239–41; Lenman, The Jacobite Risings in Britain, 277; Jewell, ‘The Legislation relating to Scotland after the Forty-Five’, 94–6, 107–12; W. A. Speck, The Butcher, 177. The British government went to great lengths in order to attaint, or except from the general pardon, all leading Jacobites by name. See NLS Ms 3187 ff. 51–2. ‘Persons excepted by Name in the Act for a General Pardon’, [1747]; NLS Ms 5129, ff. 24–31. ‘List of Persons excepted from the Act of Indemnity, against whom Proof is led conform to an Abstract from Precognitions’, 1746; NLS Ms 5129, ff. 33–4. ‘List of Persons Excepted in the late Act of Indemnity against whom Bills were found by the Grand Jury’, October 1748; SP 36/92 ff. 1–2. Sir Everard Fawkener, ‘List of Rebels, not contained in the First Bill of Attainder. . . ’, 1 November 1746; SP 36/92 f. 67. ‘List of Persons proposed to be excepted in the Bill of Indemnity’, c. November 1746; SP 36/92, ff. 191–4. ‘General List of Persons to be Excepted in the Act of Grace’, c. November 1746. This last list contains the names of 109 individuals. See also Seton and Arnot, Prisoners of the ’45, I, 52–6, where 157 individuals were listed for a provisional second Act of Attainder, but because of the passage of the Act of Indemnity, many of them were later excepted from the general pardon. For a biographical sketch of David, Lord Ogilvie, see Rev. William Wilson, The House of Airlie, 2 vols. (London, 1924), II, 161–211. Henry Patullo and Lord Ogilvy were part of a group of thirteen Jacobite fugitives who escaped to Norway aboard the Terry after Culloden. They were promptly arrested at Bergen. According to a ‘List of Rebel Prisoners confined by the Governor of Bergen . . . ’ (SP 54/31, f. 140), only ten were actually held in custody, while in another list of detainees (SP 54/31,

Notes 205 f. 145), thirteen partially different names have been recorded. The French government, in conjunction with the resident Jacobites, notably one ‘Leslie’ or ‘Major Leslie’, an alias used by William Stewart, 9th Lord Blantyre, proved instrumental in aiding the refugees. Lord Ogilvy eventually became a lieutenant-general in the French army. SP 54/31, ff. 136–7. Andrew Fletcher, Lord Justice Clerk Milton to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 23 May, 1746; SP 54/31, f. 138. Alexander MacMillan to ?, Edinburgh, 24 May, 1746; Arne Odd Johnsen, ‘Jacobite Officers at Bergen, Norway, after the Battle of Culloden: Letters from the French Consul-General in Bergen’, Scottish Historical Review, 57, 2, 164 (1978), 186–91; ¨ ran Behre, ‘Jacobite Refugees in Gothenburg after Culloden’, Scottish Historical Go Review, 70, (1991), 58–65. For rank and appointments of Patullo and Lord Ogilvy in the Jacobite army, see Livingstone of Bachuil et al., Muster Roll, 6, 90; McLynn, The Jacobites, 129–30. For a biographical sketch of William Stewart, 9th Lord Blantyre, see Chapter 5, note 52. 47. Stuart Mss 277/163. ‘E´tat du Gratification que le Roy a voulu accorder aux Gentilshommes Ećossois arrive´r depuis peu en France’, c. 6 October 1746; Stuart Mss 278/116. Marc-Pierre de Voyer, Comte D’Argenson to Colonel Daniel O’Brien, Fontainbleau, 6 November, 1746. For Colonel John Roy Stuart, see note 120. For a biographical sketch of John William O’Sullivan, see Richard Hayes, Biographical Dictionary of Irishmen in France (Dublin, 1949), 263–5. 48. Stuart Mss 287/116. Charles to Louis XV, King of France, [Paris?], 9 October 1747; Stuart Mss 287/115. Same to the same, [Paris?], c. 29 August–3 November, 1747; Stuart Mss 287/117. Donald Cameron of Lochiel to Louis XV, King of France, [Paris?], 9 October 1747; Stuart Mss 288/92. Sir Hector MacLean to James Edgar, Paris, 2 December 1747; Stuart Mss 290/30. Sir Hector MacLean to James, Paris, 15 March 1748; Stuart Mss 290/131. Same to the same, [Paris?], 14 April 1748. Sir Hector was particularly unfortunate in that this was not the first time his application for a commission was refused. In August 1751, Alasdair MacDonell of Glengarry told the British government that shortly after the Battle of Dettingen (1743) ‘Ld. John Drummond . . . did by his Interest at the Court of France get a Stop to be put to Sr. Hector’s obtaining the Commission [for a lieutenant-colonelcy]’. John Burton claims Sir Hector succeeded Lochiel to the command of his regiment following the latter’s death. I have, however, not found any evidence to support this contention. NeC. 2,086. ‘Narrative & Informations of A:[lasdair] M:[acDonell]’, August 1751; MacBean Special Collection. John Burton, A Genuine and True Journal of the most miraculous Escape of the Young Chevalier, From the Battle of Culloden, to his landing in France (London, 1749), 79. 49. Stuart Mss 292/121. ‘E´tat des Noms des Officiers du Regiment Ećossois d’Ogilvy’, 10 July 1748; Stuart Mss 292/122. ‘E´tat des Noms des Officiers du Regiment Royal Ećossois’, 10 July 1748; I. H. Mackay of Scobie, ‘The Highland Independent Companies of 1745–47’, Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, 20 (1941), 5–37, footnote 28; Livingstone of Bachuil et al., Muster Roll, 47, 53, 57, 61, 149, 195; Albert Nicholson, ‘Lieutenant John Holker’, Transactions of the Lancashire and Cheshire Antiquarian Society, 9 (1891), 147–54; Andre´ Re´mond, John Holker. Manufacturier et grand fonctionnaire en France au XVIIIe Sie`cle, 1719– 1786 (Paris, 1946), 25–7; Lenman, Jacobite Risings in Britain, 291; Gibson, Lochiel of the ’45, 198. The Lord Strathallan mentioned in the officers’ list among the Stuart papers is probably identical with Viscount Strathallan’s eldest son, William Drummond of Machany, who crossed to Scotland with M. Boyer, Marquis d’Eguilles in early October. Michel, Les Ećossais en France, II, 431, 433, footnote 2.

206 Notes 50. Stuart Mss 281/131. ‘E´tat de 64 Officiers Ećossois pour la Subsistence desquels le Prince Edouard a recoura a la Generosite´ de Sa Majeste´’, c. 20–21 February 1747; Stuart Mss 281/132. ‘Troisieme Liste des Officiers de l’Armeé de Son Altesse Royale le Prince de Galles qui n’ont pas encore e´te pourvus par la Cour, pourvus enfin le 22 Fevrier 1747’; Stuart Mss 281/173. Complete List of Gratification Recipients, c. February 1747; Stuart Mss 281/175. ‘E´tat du 2d Payment de la 1re & 2de Liste des Gratifications’, c. February 1747; Stuart Mss 281/176. ‘E´tat des Gratifications que le Roy a bien voulu accorder aux Gentilshommes Ećossois arrive´s depuis par la France’, c. February 1747 51. MacBean Special Collection. John Burton (Ralph Griffiths J.) Ascanius, 137; Stuart Mss 280/96. Donald Cameron of Lochiel to James, [Paris?], 16 January 1747; McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 314. 52. Stuart Mss 279/178. Marc-Pierre Voyer, Comte D’Argenson to Colonel Daniel O’Brien, Versailles, 29 November 1746. McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 315. Livingstone of Bachuil et al., Muster Roll, 89. 53. Wilson, The House of Airlie, II, 200. 54. Stuart Mss 293/165. John Gordon of Glenbucket, Donald Cameron of Lochiel, Sir Hector MacLean of MacLean, John Roy Stuart, Alasdair MacDonell of Glengarry, and Donald MacDonell of Lochgarry to Charles, c. December 1746. 55. Stuart Mss 280/96. Donald Cameron of Lochiel to James, [Paris?], 16 January 1747. 56. NeC 2,088/1. ‘Queries put to A.[lasdair] M.[acDonell] with his answers to them; as also information from him; 1751’. 57. Charles’ view on England as the main target of any successful restoration attempt was not unprecedented, as both Henry St John, 1st Viscount Bolingbroke and James Erskine, 11th Earl of Mar had voiced similar opinions. Paul Fritz, The English Ministers and Jacobitism between the Rebellions of 1715 and 1745 (Toronto, 1975), 8. False reports on the British side, stating that the French had landed 15,000 men at Pevensey Bay, had caused a fright on 12 December 1745, and occasioned the Duke of Cumberland’s recall from his pursuit of the Jacobite army. The panic provoked in this case does suggest that the threat of an invasion in the South of England was not taken lightly. Moreover, Cumberland’s subsequent detour gave Charles a head-start of a full day. Stuart Mss 281/89. Charles to James, Avignon, 12 February 1747; Stuart Mss 279/3–4 Father James Duaney to Charles, 18 November 1746; W. A. Speck, The Butcher, 193–4. For Peter Lacey, see O’Callaghan, History of the Irish Brigades, 481–99; McLynn, The Jacobites, 130. 58. Stuart Mss 293/167. John Gordon of Glenbucket, Donald Cameron of Lochiel, Sir Hector MacLean, John Roy Stuart, Alasdair MacDonell of Glengarry, Donald MacDonell of Lochgarry to Charles, c. December 1746. 59. Ibid, (my italics). 60. The memory of the dismal council-of-war at Derby must have been fresh in his mind. There, the majority of his Scottish officers had sided with Lord George Murray, who advocated a retreat against the Prince’s express wishes. See Elcho, A Short Account of the Affairs of Scotland, 335–41. 61. Stuart Mss 281/138. Donald Cameron of Lochiel to Charles, [Paris?], 23 February 1747. 62. Ibid. 63. Stuart Mss 280/96. Donald Cameron of Lochiel to James, Paris, 16 January 1747. 64. Stuart Mss 280/110. James to Donald Cameron of Lochiel, Rome, 20 January 1747. James’ letter to the Earl Marischal in January was of the same stamp. Stuart Mss 280/60. James to George Keith, 10th Earl Marischal, Rome, 12 January 1747.

Notes 207 65. Stuart Mss 280/110. James to Donald Cameron of Lochiel, Rome, 20 January 1747. 66. See Stuart Mss 310/15. James. Renewal of Powers of Regency, Rome, 5 August 1750. 67. Stuart Mss 281/126. James to Donald Cameron of Lochiel, Rome, 21 February 1747. 68. Stuart Mss 279/107. Francis, 2nd tit. Baron Sempill to Charles, Chaillot, 15 December 1746; Stuart Mss 280/62. James to Francis, 2nd tit. Baron Sempill, Rome, 12 January 1747; Stuart Mss 280/74. James to Charles, Rome, 13 January 1747; Stuart Mss 281/123. James to Charles, Rome, 21 February 1747. James did, however, counsel Charles to give Sempill a fair hearing, as the experienced schemer had apparently retained the French king’s ear. For French dislike of Kelly’s behaviour, see Stuart Mss 279/171. Titus ¼ Daniel O’Brien, tit. Earl of Lismore to James, Paris, 26 October 1746. From 1738 to 1743, Sempill had beleaguered Cardinal Fleury to support a Jacobite venture. At that time, he had carried a certain political weight as James’ official agent at the French court. Furthermore, Sempill’s mandate was bolstered by his role as liaison of leading Tory gentlemen and nobles with the French government for, in 1743, the Duke of Beaufort, the Earl of Barrymore, Lord Orrery, Sir Watkin Williams Wynn, Sir John Hynde Cotton and Sir Robert Abdy entrusted Sempill with an invitation for the French to invade England. According to Andrew Lang, the breach between Sempill and Balhaldy, who enjoyed James’ confidence, and the faction opposing them, consisting of Marischal, Murray of Broughton, Sir Thomas Sheridan and Kelly, had occurred in 1744. The Jacobites thus split into a protean King’s and a Prince’s party. By late 1746, only Kelly remained as serious contender of Sempill and Balhaldy. Szechi, The Jacobites, 94–5. MacBean Special Collection. Andrew Lang, ‘Murray of Broughton,’ Blackwood’s Magazine (1898), 220–30, 222–3. For Balhaldy, see Melville Henry Massue, Marquis de Ruvigny and Raineval, The Jacobite Peerage, Baronetage, Knightage & Grants of Honour (London and Edinburgh, [1904] 1974), 97. 69. Stuart Mss 280/67. Charles (in Henry’s hand) to Louis XV, King of France (copy sent to Rome), [Paris?], 12 January 1747; Stuart Mss 280/74. James to Charles, Rome, 13 January 1747. 70. Stuart Mss 281/67. Charles to Henry Benedict, Avignon, 9 February 1747. 71. Stuart Mss 281/100. Henry Benedict to Charles, Paris, 15 February 1747; Stuart Mss 281/89. Charles to James, 12 February 1747; Stuart Mss 281/90. Same to the same, Avignon, 12 February 1747. 72. Stuart Mss 281/135. Charles to Ferdinand VI, King of Spain, Barcelona, 22 February, 1747; Stuart Mss 281/136. Same to Don Jose´ Carvajal y Lancaster, Barcelona, 22 February 1747; Stuart Mss 281/54. Charles to James, Madrid, 3 March 1747. This last document is dated 3 February 1747, which, as an archivist at Windsor realized, must be wrong. Charles’ companions were Sir Thomas Geraldine and Dr Archibald Cameron, Lochiel’s brother. 73. McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 321. 74. Stuart Mss 282/11. Charles to Don Jose´ Carvajal y Lancaster, c. March 1747; Stuart Mss 296/23. Charles to ye ‘C’ ¼ Don Jose´ Carvajal y Lancaster, c. 2–11 March 1747. 75. Stuart Mss 282/12. Don Jose´ Carvajal y Lancaster to Charles, [Madrid?], 11 March 1747. 76. Stuart Mss 282/62, No. 1. Charles [in George Kelly’s hand?] to Sir Thomas Geraldin, 14 March 1747.

208 Notes 77. Stuart Mss 282/62, No. 2. Charles [in George Kelly’s hand?] to Dr Archibald Cameron, Instructions, 14 March 1747. Philip C. Yorke claimed that Dr Archibald Cameron crossed the Channel in a French vessel, transporting and landing arms in Scotland, and that Dr Cameron conferred with the Jacobite chiefs. Yorke, Earl of Hardwicke, I, 538. 78. NeC 1,772/2. ‘Copy of a Letter from Capt. MacKay to Lord Albemarle’, Fort Augustus, 21 February 1747. Apparently, the Jacobite chiefs had conferred with Charles before his departure in September 1746, and agreed to await directions sent by the Prince from France ‘some time in the month of February 1747’. Conceivably, Dr Cameron was the expected Jacobite emissary. Intelligence, enclosed in William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 15 December, 1746, printed in Terry, ed., Albemarle Papers, I, 338; and see also I, 367–8, and II, 443, for other reports in February on Dr Cameron’s presence in the Highlands. 79. McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 322. Professor Black has suggested that the reason for the refusal of Ferdinand VI to support the Jacobites was his desire to withdraw from the War of Austrian Succession. In fact, Spain was negotiating with the British government to this end. Jeremy Black, Culloden and the ’45 (Stroud and New York, [1990] 1993), 185–6. 80. Stuart Mss 282/93. Charles to Louis XV, King of France, Paris, 26 March, 1747. 81. Stuart Mss 282/92. Charles to Marc-Pierre Voyer, Comte D’Argenson, Paris, 26 March 1747; Stuart Mss 282/102. Charles to Jean-Fre´de´ric Phe´lypeaux, Comte de Maurepas, Paris, 28 March 1747. On 20 October 1747, the Duke of Cumberland recommended the transfer of units from the Low Countries to England. The speed with which Newcastle followed the royal Duke’s advice is suggestive of how serious the threat of French aggression must have appeared to the first minister. And if the French ventured to invade the South of England, the Jacobites would not be far behind. In only three days, five battalions were moved to Newcastle, Kent and Sussex. Black, Culloden and the ’45, 180–2. On the recovery of the English Jacobites after Culloden, see Chapter 2, pp. 38–44. 82. Stuart Mss 282/177. James Edgar to Francis, 2nd tit. Baron Sempill, Rome, 28 March 1747; Stuart Mss Box 1/254. [Charles?] [dictated to Michael Sheridan?] to Marc-Pierre Voyer, Comte D’Argenson, c. 27 March 1747. 83. Stuart Mss Box 6/76. Louis XV, King of France, Dećlaration communiqueé par ordre de Sa Majeste´ Tre`s-Chre´tienne aux Seigneurs E´tats geńe´raux des Provinces-unies ([Paris?], 1747); Stuart Mss 283/21. Charles to Marc-Pierre Voyer, Comte D’Argenson, Paris, 23 April, 1747. 84. McLynn, France and the Jacobite Rising, 235; McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 317, 324. 85. Stuart Mss 283/144. Charles to Marc-Pierre Voyer, Comte D’Argenson, c. 17 April– 29 May 1747. 86. McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 325. 87. Frank J. McLynn, ‘An Eighteenth-Century Scots Republic? – An Unlikely Project from Absolutist France’, Scottish Historical Review, 59 (1980), 177–81. 88. Stuart Mss 283/32. Francis, 2nd tit. Baron Sempill to George Kelly, Nogent-surSeine, 25 April 1747. 89. Stuart Mss 283/51. James to William Drummond of Balhaldy, Rome, 1 May 1747. 90. Stuart Mss 283/170. Marc-Pierre Voyer, Comte D’Argenson to Charles, Versailles, 28 May 1747.

Notes 209 91. For the Prince’s instructions to his English adherents, see Stuart Mss 280/127. B[urton] ¼ Charles. ‘Instructions for England’ [Avignon?], 22 January 1747. On the state of the English Jacobitism at that time also see Stuart Mss 296/24. Charles. ‘Memorandum concerning the British Army & Mr Bishopp & Ld. Elibank’, c. 1747– 48; and Stuart Mss 288/172. Chevalier Alexander-Peter Mackenzie-Douglas to Charles, 1747. 92. Stuart Mss Box 1/263. Charles (in Colonel A. Brett’s hand) to Louis XV. Memoir, c. June 1747. 93. Stuart Mss 284/121. Charles to Marc-Pierre Voyer, Comte D’Argenson, Paris, 17 June 1747. 94. MacBean Special Collection. Burton, Ascanius, 137; McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 331. 95. Stuart Mss 285/68. William Drummond of Balhaldy to James Edgar, Paris, 4 July 1747. 96. Stuart Mss 285/171. William Drummond of Balhaldy to James, [Paris?], 22 July 1747. 97. Ibid. 98. Stuart Mss 285/177. Watson ¼ William Drummond of Balhaldy to James Edgar, 23 July 1747. The Marquis D’Argenson contended that Cardinal Tencin, and James’ envoy at Paris, Colonel Daniel O’Brien, had been bribed by the British government to talk Henry into accepting the offered cardinalate. Lang, Pickle, 34–5. 99. Stuart Mss 285/177. Watson ¼ William Drummond of Balhaldy to James Edgar, 23 July 1747. 100. O’Callaghan, History of the Irish Brigades in the Service of France, 467–9. For James Galloway, 4th Lord Dunkeld, see Michel, Les Ećossais en France, II, 448, footnote 4. 101. Stuart Mss 285/68. Watson ¼ William Drummond of Balhaldy to James Edgar, Paris, 4 July 1747. Lally’s plan was probably vetoed by the French government, but it was not forgotten. Duncan Robertson of Struan’s proposal of September 1755 was almost certainly based on that of Lally. For Struan’s proposal, see Chapter 5, p. 128. 102. Stuart Mss 285/80. Charles to Marc-Pierre Voyer, Comte D’Argenson, St Oan, 6 July 1747. 103. Stuart Mss 286/109. Charles to George Keith, 10th Earl Marischal, Paris, 14 August 1747. 104. Harsh words of censure directed at the Prince after the battle of Culloden had ensured that Lord George was subsequently regarded as persona non grata by Jacobite circles loyal to Charles. By 1747, Lord George had become a pariah in a community of exiles. After the dispersal of the Jacobite army at Ruthven, on 20 April 1746, Lord George Murray vanished for a period of eight months, after which he reappeared in Holland around December 1746. Stuart Mss 285/119. Lord George Murray to James Edgar, Paris, 11 July 1747; Stuart Mss 273/96. Lord George Murray to Charles, 17 April 1746; MacBean Special Collection. John Burton, A Genuine and True Journal, 76; Gibson MacPherson, A Day’s March to Ruin, 161. 105. Stuart Mss 287/45. George Keith, 10th Earl Marischal to Charles, Treviso, 13 September 1747. 106. Stuart Mss 289/120. Watson ¼ William Drummond of Balhaldy to James Edgar, Hesdin, 8 February 1747; Stuart Mss 289/145. Francis, 2nd tit. Baron Sempill to James, Rome, 16 February 1748.

210 Notes 107. Stuart Mss 289/146. Francis, 2nd tit. Baron Sempill to James, Rome, 16 February 1748. 108. Gibson, Lochiel of the ’45, 202. Sir Thomas died at Rome in 1746. 109. Stuart Mss 289/146. Francis, 2nd tit. Baron Sempill to James, Rome, 16 February 1748 110. Stuart Mss 290/13. William Drummond of Balhaldy to James Edgar, Paris, 19 March 1748. Kelly had persuaded Lord Ogilvy of the inadvisability of the Scottish option, and was trying to ingratiate himself with Charles Stewart of Ardshiel, the colonel of the Appin regiment. NLS Ms 3187, ff. 65–6. Francis, 2nd tit. Baron Sempill to [William Drummond of Balhaldy?], [Paris], 17 June 1748; McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 325. 111. Stuart Mss 295/79. James to William Drummond of Balhaldy, Rome, 3 December 1748; Stuart Mss 295/82. James Edgar to the same, Rome, 3 December 1748. 112. This exclusion clause, which was incorporated into the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, was not unprecedented, as its precursor in Article 19 of the Treaty of the Quadruple Alliance of 2 August 1718 clearly shows. NeC 837. ‘Translation of Definitive Treaty of Peace at Aix-la-Chapelle’, 18 October 1748; Lenman and Gibson, The Jacobite Threat, 250. 113. Stuart Mss 292/122. Charles to Louis XV, King of France, Paris, 10 July 1748; Stuart Mss 292/143. Charles to Louis Philogene de Brulart, Marquis de Puysieux, [Paris?], 18 July 1748. By May 1748, the official British resident at Florence, Horace Mann, was aware of James’ intention to lodge his protest during the preliminary talks held at Aix-la-Chapelle. SP 98/56 [no foliation], Horace Mann to John Russell, 4th Duke of Bedford, Florence, 14 May 1748. 114. McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 345. 115. NLS 3187, ff. 63–4. Francis, 2nd tit. Baron Sempill to William Drummond of Balhaldy, [Paris], 15 June 1748. Two months later, Sempill again impressed the importance of visiting the British Jacobites on Balhaldy, adding ‘that the most desponding State of our friends at home can quickly be render’d as hopeful as we desire by proper encouragement from hence’. NLS. Ms 3187, ff. 76–7. Same to the same, Chartres, 23 August 1748. 116. Stuart Mss 291/209. Charles to Sir James Harrington, Paris, 16 June 1748. For Colonel A. Brett, see Chapter 4, note 99. 117. Stuart Mss 293/166. John Gordon of Glenbucket, Donald Cameron of Lochiel, Sir Hector MacLean, Alasdair MacDonell of Glengarry, and Donald MacDonell of Lochgarry to Charles, c. September 1748 (my italics). 118. Ibid. The series of questions to be put to the Jacobites in Scotland, carefully compiled by Sir Hector MacLean, were designed to give the exiles a good idea of what reservoir of strength, morale and capacity they would be able to draw upon in case of an invasion of North Britain. Who would rise, and how many stands of arms would the insurrectionists require; where should they land with what number of men; should they attack Edinburgh Castle before, or after the invasion; what amount of money should be distributed to the clan chiefs, and how should they go about disbursing such funds? Should the Prince accompany his subjects on this second descent on Scotland, or would it be safer for him to arrive separately? 119. SP 36/109, f. 59. ‘Information about Donald MacDonell of Lochgarry’ (in Sir Everard Fawkener’s hand), [London], 1748. I have been unable to find other incontrovertible evidence relating to Lochgarry’s sojourn in England, but a reference in Donald Campbell of Airds’ intelligence report of late October 1747

Notes 211

120.

121. 122.

123.

124. 125.

126. 127. 128.

129. 130. 131. 132.

suggests that Lochgarry was then in the Highlands; he had been travelling ‘through the most parts of Brittain’, disguised as a peddlar. On this journey, Lochgarry had apparently visited ‘all the Garrissons’. SP 54/37, ff. 17–18. Donald Campbell of Airds to [Archibald Campbell, 3rd Duke of Argyll?], Airds, 18 October 1747. SP 54/33, f. 108. Anon. to Archibald Campbell of Stonefield, Sheriff-Depute of Argyllshire, 6 September 1746; SP 54/37, f. 182. G.M. ‘Intelligence of John Roy Stewart’, Dunkeld, 9 December 1747; SP 54/37, ff. 209–10. Lieutenant-General Humphrey Bland to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 19 December 1747. The other emissary, John Roy Stuart, had commanded a Jacobite regiment levied in Edinburgh, and, as well as being an accomplished Gaelic poet, had served with distinction at Clifton and Culloden. Campbell, ed., Highland Songs of the Forty-Five. For a short biography, see 165–7, and for his poetry, see 168–91. Stuart Mss 367/118. Colonel John Roy Stuart (in Sir Hector MacLean’s hand) to Charles, c. September 1748. See SP 36/86, ff. 195–6. ‘The further Examination of John Murray of Broughton’ [Tower?], 13 August 1746, in which Murray disclosed the details of his meeting with Sir John Douglas of Killhead MP, during the Jacobite siege of Sterling. Sir John’s mission was to inform Charles of funds raised by the London Jacobites. The figure referred to in this examination was £10,000. Also see Christie, ‘The Tory Party, Jacobitism and the ’Forty-Five’, 924, where Alderman George Heathcote is given credit for raising these assets. Stuart Mss 367/118. Colonel John Roy Stuart (in Sir Hector MacLean’s hand) to Charles, c. September 1746. John Roy’s report on England also revealed a flaw of the British counter-intelligence system. The government, out of necessity, focused on information gained through the interception of letters. Sensitive information, orally conveyed – a method frequently resorted to by Jacobite couriers, who committed the contents of messages to memory, – was, short of seizing the messenger, virtually undetectable. Stuart Mss 367/119. Colonel John Roy Stuart (in Sir Hector MacLean’s hand) to Charles, c. September 1748. Stuart Mss Box 1/265. Colonel John Roy Stuart to James Edgar, c. June 1747. For French bungling during the preparations to reinforce Stuart troops in Scotland, see Frank McLynn’s France and the Jacobite Rising, 143–63. Stuart Mss 367/119. Colonel John Roy Stuart (in Sir Hector MacLean’s hand) to Charles, c. September 1748 (my italics). Stuart Mss Box 1/297. Charles to James Edgar, draft, c. 1749. Stuart Mss 294/169. William Drummond of Balhaldy to James, Paris, 4 November 1748; Stuart Mss 295/79. James to William Drummond of Balhaldy, Rome, 3 December 1748; Stuart Mss 295/82. James Edgar to the same, Rome, 3 December 1748; Stuart Mss 295/137. Dr Archibald Cameron to James, [Paris?], 16 December 1748. McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 325. HEH RB 131316. Anon., An Authentic Account of the Conduct of the Young Chevalier (London, 1747), 14. Stuart Mss 294/175. Louis XV, King of France to Charles, Fontainbleau, 4 November 1748. Stuart Mss 294/176. Charles to Louis XV, King of France, [Paris?], 6 November 1748.

212 Notes 133. Following the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), his father and the Jacobite court had also been obliged to leave French soil under similar circumstances; and after the abortive rising of 1715, James and his retinue were compelled to quit their haven at Bar in Lorraine. G. V. Bennett, The Tory Crisis in Church and State, 1688–1730, 205; McLynn, The Jacobites, 162. 134. Stuart Mss 295/79. James to William Drummond of Balhaldy, Rome, 3 December 1748; McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 354. 135. SP 98/56, ff. 260–3. Horace Mann to John Russell, 4th Duke of Bedford, Florence, 6 December 1748. Even earlier, in June 1748, the French had approached the states of Fribourg to negotiate an asylum for Charles. Therefore, the inference, that the necessity of complying with the exclusion clause directed against the Stuarts, ratified at Aix-la-Chapelle, had been anticipated by the French before the conclusion of that treaty, is not entirely unjustified. MacBean Special Collection. Anon., Genuine Copies of Letters from The French Ambassador, and Mr. Burnaby the English Resident in Switzerland, to the Laudable Canton of Fribourg, & c., ([n.p.], [n.d.]), 6–9. 136. Lochiel Mss Anon. ‘Copy of a Letter from france concerning the Adventurer’, 10 December 1748; Stuart Mss 295/104. Charles. ‘Lettre de Madame xxx a Monsieur de xxx’, c. December 1748–49; McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 361–5; Andrew Lang, Pickle the Spy, 39–40. 137. Michel, Les Ećossais en France, II, 449. 138. McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 363. 139. Stuart Mss 295/122, no. 1. Charles to Louis XV, King of France, Vincennes, 12 December 1748. 140. Stuart Mss 295/122, no. 2. Charles to Jean-Fre´de´ric Phe´lypeaux, Comte de Maurepas, Vincennes, 13 December 1748. 141. Stuart Mss Box 1/295. Charles to Louis XV, King of France, c. January 1749. 142. HEH RB 131316. Anon., An Authentic Account, 7 (my italics). 143. Recently, Professor Jeremy Black has argued that Dr McLynn exaggerated the importance of Charles’ pressure on the French to equip an expedition to England. At the same time, he concedes that Louis XV had a personal stake in the Stuart Prince’s affairs. Even though Professor Black is right to point out the duplicitous position of the French – they had suggested the conditional nature of their support for the Jacobites to both the Prussians and the Dutch at Breda between late 1746 and March 1747 – he underestimates the importance of the Jacobites as a French foreign political asset, and the fact that Louis XV’s ministers still saw a card in them that could not only be set aside, but played at the right moment. The French government would not have funded the great number of Jacobite exiles, if they had not recognized their usefulness. Arguably, the gratifications paid out to, and military appointments bestowed upon, the aristocrats and gentlemen who had fought in the Jacobite army constituted a French acknowledgement of Jacobite services rendered. As this chapter has shown, continued French interest in the Jacobites held up to the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in October 1748. Black, Culloden and the ’45, 182–3, 185. 144. Stuart Mss 295/83. James Edgar to Sir Hector MacLean, Rome, 3 December 1748; Stuart Mss 296/124. Lord George Murray to James, Cleves, 22 January 1749; Stuart Mss 295/137. Dr Archibald Cameron to James, [Paris?], 16 December 1748; Stuart Mss 295/158. Same to the same, Paris, 23 December 1748. In any case, John Cameron of Lochiel lost the clan regiment soon after the demise of his father. By April 1753, he was soliciting James for his advancement in the French service.

Notes 213

145.

146. 147. 148. 149.

150. 151. 152. 153.

154. 155.

156.

Stuart Mss 340/159. Captain John Cameron of Lochiel to James Edgar, Paris, 27 April 1753; Stuart Mss 340/160. Same to James, Paris, 27 April 1753. Stuart Mss 296/99. Louis XV, King of France. ‘L’Ordre de la Cour’, c. 31 December 1748–11 February 1749; Stuart Mss 296/100. [Louis XV, King of France?]. ‘Preamble de la Liste donneé par les Commissions’, c. 31 December 1748–11 February 1749; Stuart Mss 296/101. [George Innes to the French Court?], Paris, 22 February 1749; Stuart Mss 297/97. James Edgar to Sir Hector MacLean, Rome, 4 March 1749; Stuart Mss 297/159. Same to the same, Rome, 1 April 1749. O’Callaghan, History of the Irish Brigades in the Service of France, 633–4; McLynn, The Jacobites, 131. See Macinnes, Commerce, Clanship and the House of Stuart, 160. See Black, Culloden and the ’45, 183. This point has also been made by Linda Colley. According to Colley, ‘Jacobite agents were not above suggesting to French politicians that invading Britain would be the best way to take it out of the colonial and commercial race’. Linda Colley, Britons. Forging the Nation, 1707–1837 (New Haven, 1992), 79. My views on this point are in full accord with those postulated by Dr McLynn. The Jacobites, 125. See Black, Culloden and the ’45, 184. McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 330–3. As early as October 1746, the Earl of Albemarle, Cumberland’s successor as commander-in-chief in Scotland, recommended that the three forts and several barracks in the Highlands ‘should be made strong’, in order ‘to prevent any further attempts’. William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 15 October 1746, printed in Terry, ed., Albemarle Papers, I, 287–90. Even Professor Lenman, whose agnosticism in the field has a tendency to veer into the confines of Jacoscepticism, conceded that although the massive, Vauban-style fortress at Ardersier was considered a ‘white elephant’ by the time it was completed in 1769, the military road system in the Highlands was considered necessary until its value became questionable in the 1760s. Implicitly, Lenman’s position does not, and my treatment of this case in Chapter 5 of this book suggests he cannot, easily dismiss my claim that both the rebuilding of fortifications and the road-building programme were perceived as indispensable assets for the prevention of another rising and/or a French invasion up to the naval engagement at Quiberon Bay in 1759. Lenman, Jacobite Risings in Britain, 270. See Black, Culloden and the ’45, 201. Presaged by George Hilton Jones’ verdict on this issue, which finds ample expression in one of his subchapters entitled ‘The End of Practical Jacobitism’, the brief summary of Jacobitism following Charles’ return to France in Hook and Ross’s recent publication on the ’Forty-five may serve here as an example of a conveniently concluded Jacobite saga. But, as this chapter has demonstrated, and those following it will demonstrate, shutting the book on the Jacobites after Culloden can no longer serve as an acceptable historiographical norm, but instead must be unmasked as the relict of Whig teleology, and of the mores of a superannuated, insular historiographical tradition. George Hilton Jones, The Main Stream of Jacobitism (Cambridge, MA, 1954), 239–46; Hook and Ross, The ’Forty-Five, 126–30. See Chapter 1, p. 9.

214 Notes

4

The Plot that Almost Happened: The Jacobite Movement, the British Government and the Elibank Conspiracy, 1749–1754

1. Sir Charles Petrie, ‘The Elibank plot, 1752–3’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 15 (1931), 175–96, 176. 2. The material available from the Stuart papers is sketchy, but still provides insight into nodal points of this conspiracy. Where evidence in this collection has survived the vagaries of time, it presently often meets with hostile criticism from sceptical practitioners of our trade. On the other side of the political divide, George II and the Pelhams were anxious to preserve the secret of the Elibank Plot. This point will be more fully discussed below, see pp. 109–10, 118–19; BL Add. Ms 32733, ff. 351–2. Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse to George II via Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, c. November 1753; BL Add. Ms 32733, ff. 353–6. Hugh Valence Jones to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Whitehall, 1 December 1753; Frank J. McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie. Charles Edward Stuart (Oxford, [1989] 1991), 405; Patricia Kneas-Hill, The Oglethorpe Ladies and the Jacobite Conspiracies (Atlanta, 1977), 113; Sir Walter Scott, Redgauntlet (Oxford, [1824] 1985), intro., 5–6. On the issue of ignoring inconvenient evidence by discrediting the Stuart papers, see Chapter 1, p. 6. 3. Sir Geoffrey Elton, The Practice of History (London, [1967] 1987), 131. 4. Friedrich der Grosse, Politische Correspondenz Friedrichs des Grossen (Berlin, 1879– 1939), 46 vols. I was unable to consult the recent Merseburger acquisition of the Staatsarchiv in Berlin. 5. Petrie, ‘Elibank plot’, 177. 6. Simultaneously, Louis XV succeeded in retaining the political and military potential resting with the exiles dependent upon him – as much as an insurance for George II’s continued good behaviour as for the maintenance of the Jacobite card per se, to be brandished or played as needed in the future. A subtle, and therefore no less dangerous, effect inherent in the distribution of funds to the predominantly impecunious Jacobite community in exile was the consequentially induced pliancy towards French attempts at manipulating the Jacobite movement to their own advantage. The two-edged nature of the situation, however, should be pointed out, for as long as the French king would continue to keep the Jacobite Damocles’ sword dangling over the heads of his British contenders, there was always the chance that renewed hostilities with Britain would one day force his hand to substantiate this implied threat. See Chapter 3, pp. 70–1; see also Chapter 3, note 143. 7. Stuart Mss Box 1/293. Charles. Memorandum, c. late 1748, or early 1749; Stuart Mss Box 1/294. Charles. Notes, c. late 1748 or early 1749. The exclusion clause of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle was based on a precedent in Article 19 of the Treaty of the Quadruple Alliance of 2 August 1718. NeC 837. ‘Translation of Definitive Treaty of Peace at Aix-la-Chapelle’, 18 October 1748; Bruce P. Lenman and John S. Gibson, The Jacobite Threat. Rebellion and Conspiracy 1688–1759: England, Ireland, Scotland and France (Edinburgh, 1990), 250. Just how deep Charles’ disgust with the French ran can be gleaned from a memorandum in which he states that he ‘does not think it propper’ for him to go to France, and that his adherents were henceforth to seek him in the Queen of Hungary’s territories (i.e. the Habsburg dominions). Stuart Mss 302/129. ‘An undated Memorandum concerning Charles’ Movement’, c. 1749. 8. Stuart Mss 270/13. Treaty of Fontainebleau, Fontainebleau, 24 October 1745. The full text is printed in Lenman and Gibson, Jacobite Threat, 208–10.

Notes 215 9. Charles’ refusal to accept a French pension was grounded in his belief that such a move would constitute an admission of defeat, and make him fully dependent on the good graces of Louis XV. Stuart Mss 345/162. General Francis, Lord Bulkeley. ‘Historical Essay on the Stuart Cause’, c. late 1753. 10. This treasure, its value variably assessed at £36,000–£37,775, or even £40,000, was initially administered by Charles’ former private secretary turned traitor, John Murray of Broughton. Following the Hanoverian victory in April 1746, it had been buried at the shores of Loch Arkaig, and other locations, to escape seizure by government troops. Cumberland Mss 15/17. Intelligence enclosed in MajorGeneral John Campbell of Mamore to Sir Everard Fawkener, Fort William, 15 May 1746; Marion F. Hamilton, ed., ‘The Locharkaig Treasure’, Miscellany of the Scottish History Society (7th vol.), Third Series (Edinburgh, 1941), 133–68, 161; Gordon Donaldson and Robert S. Morpeth, eds., A Dictionary of Scottish History (Edinburgh, [1977], 1992), 128; J. C. O’Callaghan, History of the Irish Brigades in the Service of France (Glasgow, 1870), 457; Bruce Lenman, The Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen, 1650–1784 (Aberdeen, [1984] 1995), 169–70; Andrew Lang, The Companions of Pickle (London, 1898), 130; David, Lord Elcho, A Short Account of the Affairs of Scotland in the Years, 1744, 1745, 1746, ed. The Hon. Evan Charteris (Edinburgh, 1907), 102. Aeneas MacDonald, in his examination of 12 January 1748, stated that the French vessels which carried the treasure to France were fitted by the Franco-Jacobite shipowners Antoine Vincent Walsh and a Mr Neal of Nantes. SP 36/106 ff. 14–16. ‘The Examination of Aeneas MacDonald’ [London], 12 January 1748. 11. Stuart Mss 300/80–81. James Edgar, ‘Ane Exact Copy of ane Acct. Written by Clunies own Hand . . . ’ [Rome?], 22 September 1749; Stuart Mss 350/94. Charles to Ewan MacPherson of Cluny. Enclosure, 14 September 1754; Stuart Mss 358/27–28. Ewan MacPherson of Cluny to James, Paris, 8 September 1755; Stuart Mss 358/87. Same to Charles, Paris, 21 September 1755; W. Cheyne-MacPherson, The Chiefs of Clan MacPherson (London, 1947), 52. For Cluny’s career after the ’Forty-five, see SRO GD 50/121/111. Anon., Account concerning the activities of Ewan MacPherson of Cluny after the ’Forty-five, c. April 1756, pp. 7–10. 12. See Frank McLynn, The Jacobites (London, [1985] 1988), 61. 13. Alan Gibson MacPherson, A Day’s March to Ruin. The Badenoch Men in the ’Forty-five and Col. Ewan MacPherson of Cluny (Newtonmore, 1996), 185. Though Kennedy’s mission was preceded by that of Dr Archibald Cameron in March 1747, the former endeavour seems to have been oriented towards the restoration plan tying into the Elibank plot, while the latter constituted an earlier attempt to streamline the French bullion with promised supplies from Spain. 14. Stuart Mss 292/122. ‘E´tat des Noms des Officiers du Regiment Royal Ećossais’, 10 July 1748; Stuart Mss 293/99. Charles to Rene´-Louis Voyer, Marquis D’Argenson, c. 9 August–6 October, 1748; Stuart Mss 293/156. Same to the same, 30 September 1748. If this Major Kennedy is identical with the one who served in the Irish Piquets during the ’Forty-five, he was an uncle to Lochiel, who had previously served with Bulkeley’s regiment in the Irish Brigade. See Alastair Livingstone of Bachuil, Christian W. H. Aikman and Betty Stuart Hart, Muster Roll of Prince Charles Edward Stuart’s Army, 1745–46 (Aberdeen, [1984] 1985), 136. Also see John Sibbald Gibson, Lochiel of the ’45. The Jacobite Chief and the Prince (Edinburgh, [1994] 1995), 133–5, 137–9, for Major Kennedy’s role in the immediate aftermath of Culloden. 15. Stuart Mss Box 1/290. Thomas Newton ¼ Major Kennedy to Charles, > 5 December 1748.

216 Notes 16. Stuart Mss 297/7, no. 2 Mr Williams ¼ Charles to Thomas Newton ¼ Major Kennedy, c. 11 February–22 April 1749; Stuart Mss 296/175. Thomas Newton ¼ Major Kennedy to Charles, London, 6 February 1749. 17. Stuart Mss 297/7, no. 2 Mr Williams ¼ Charles to Thomas Newton ¼ Major Kennedy, c. 11 February–22 April 1749; Stuart Mss 297/7 no. 3. Alexandre de Villelongue ¼ Charles to George Waters, Jr, 12 April 1749. 18. SP 54/40, ff. 50–1. Lieutenant-General George Churchill to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 11 April 1749; NLS Ms 5076, ff. 95–6. Sheriff-Substitute of Perthshire to James Erskine, Advocate, Sheriff-Depute of Perthshire, Achmore, 5 May 1749; NLS Ms 5076, ff. 97–8. Copy of Information by Angus Roy Kennedy. Sergeant ? in Rannoch to Captain Duncan Campbell of Inverawe, 15 May 1749. The dispatch received by Campbell of Inverawe further implicated Alexander Cameron of Glenevis, brother to Angus Cameron of Downan; Ewan MacPherson of Cluny; Donald MacPherson, younger of Breakachie, who probably served the clan regiment in the capacity of lieutenant-colonel after Ewan MacPherson of Dalwhinnie; Major Angus MacDonell of Greenfield, brother to LieutenantColonel Donald MacDonell of Lochgarry; and probably Major Alexander MacDonald of Glenaladale. In 1751, Glengarry confirmed Samuel Cameron’s status of Jacobite courier. NeC 2,086. ‘Narrative & Informations of A:[lasdair] M:[acDonell]’, August 1751. John Stewart of Ardvorlich, The Camerons. A History of the Clan Cameron (Stirling, 1974), 131–2; MacPherson, A Day’s March to Ruin, appendix iv, 273; Livingstone of Bachuil et al., Muster Roll, 140, 149. For Angus of Downan, see Andrew Lang, The Companions of Pickle, 149. For Samuel Cameron, see Sir Bruce Gordon Seton and Jean Gordon Arnot, The Prisoner’s of the ’45, 3 vols. (Edinburgh, 1928–29), II, 86. For MacPherson of Breakachie, see SRO GD 50/216/ 63/3, and note 36a. 19. NLS Ms 5076, f. 99. [Captain?] Duncan Campbell [of Inverawe?] to [Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald?], Killmure, 18 May 1749. 20. Andrew Lang, Pickle the Spy (London, 1897), 78; SP 54/40, ff. 41–2. Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle to Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald, Whitehall, 7 April 1749. John Campbell, Lord Glenorchy, who succeeded his father as 3rd Earl of Breadalbane in 1752, furnished the government with information about Major Kennedy’s treasonable activities. Conversely, it is possible that Kennedy was a British double-agent. If Kennedy was indeed on the British payroll by that time, it would explain the surprisingly lenient treatment he met with following his arrest at Newcastle. BL Add. Ms 35450, ff. 181–2. John Campbell, Lord Glenorchy to Philipp Yorke, 1st Earl of Hardwicke, Taymouth, 18 May 1749. For Kennedy’s purported defection to the Hanoverians, see note 150. 21. Stuart Mss 299/40. Mr Williams ¼ Charles to Thomas Newton ¼ Major Kennedy, Paris, 16 July 1749; Stuart Mss 299/24. Thomas Newton ¼ Major Kennedy to Charles, Paris, 16 July 1749. 22. Stuart Mss 299/119. Thomas Newton ¼ Major Kennedy to Charles, 18 August 1749. Colonel Cluny communicated to Kennedy that nothing could be done until winter, ‘on acct. of the Shielings’, that is, the supervision of livestock kept in the higher pastures until late in the year. 23. Stuart Mss 305/69. Thomas Newton ¼ Major Kennedy to Charles, 18 March 1750; The military administration in Scotland was not as disturbed by the prospect of the treasure’s continued presence in the Highlands as by its removal. For General Churchill’s apprehension that the Jacobites were planning to smuggle the Locharkaig treasure out of Scotland, see SP 54/40, ff. 59–60. Lieutenant-General George

Notes 217

24.

25.

26.

27.

Churchill to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 18 April 1749; SP 54/ 43, ff. 98–9. Lieutenant-Colonel John Crawfurd to Lieutenant-General George Churchill, Fort William, 17 March (?) 1753. Stuart Mss 300/34. Thomas Newton ¼ Major Kennedy to Charles, 3 September 1749; Stuart Mss 299/119. Same to the same, 18 August 1749. The money was carried in two runs by Cluny’s brother-in-law, Lieutenant-Colonel Donald MacPherson of Breakachie, and delivered at the farmhouse of Yearl near Wooler in Northumberland, where Major Kennedy either picked it up himself, as would seem plausible considering his arrest in Newcastle, or had it conveyed to him by his Northumbrian liaison. MacPherson, A Day’s March to Ruin, 186–7. Stuart Mss 343/4. Duncan Robertson, 11th Laird of Struan to Captain James Robertson of Blairfetty or Blairfelty, Paris, 18 September 1753; See SP 54/40, ff. 118–19. ‘List of Gentlemen that are Prisoners in the Castle of Edinburgh on Account of the late Rebellion, against whom no Proceedings have been had’ [Edinburgh], 7 June 1749. Cluny, despite his being under attainder himself, and even his unblemished co-trustees were operating a high-risk venture. Legally speaking, the very act of administering the Locharkaig funds was considered treasonable by Crawfurd. SP 54/43, 132–8. Lieutenant-Colonel John Crawfurd to Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald, Edinburgh, 4 June 1753. When not busy with the trusteeship of the treasure, the itinerant Cluny hid in various places, depending on the season, and the routes chosen by redcoat patrols. The later disbursements for the clearing of mostly debt-based claims entered upon the forfeited estates of Cluny and Lochiel – with an eye to keeping them within the Jacobite sphere of influence – suggests that the veterans of the ’Forty-five were expecting to rise again in the near future. In fact, the preparations for the intended next rising were put into Cluny’s hands by Charles before he went into exile in September 1746. SRO GD 1/53/93. Duncan MacPherson of Cluny (Ewan’s son) to Colonel David Stewart of Garth, Cluny House, 9 June 1817; MacPherson A Day’s March to Ruin, 182–90, 212–13. Andrew Lang, Pickle, 70; McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 306. NLS Ms 5076, f. 115. EFF ¼ Duncan McVicar, Collector of Customs at Fort William to Alexander Legrand, Commissioner of Customs at Edinburgh, 21 October 1749. According to this report Dr Cameron was in Scotland at the same time that Colonel Ranald MacDonald, younger of Clanranald, Captain Allan Cameron of Callart, Colonel Charles Stewart of Ardshiel, probably Captain Alasdair Ruadh MacDonell of Glengarry, and more than ten others came over as well, bringing their number to a total of seventeen gentlemen. It is not clear whether they all met in the Braes of Rannoch. It is highly probable that Cameron of Callart travelled with the Doctor. See BL Add. Ms 35450 ff. 187–8. John Campbell, Lord Glenorchy to Philipp Yorke, 1st Earl of Hardwicke, Sugnal, 30 October 1749. Young Clanranald was graced with good luck, for in 1752 he apparently escaped his attainder because of a misnomer – he was listed as Donald, not Ranald. Nonetheless, upon his ‘official’ return to Britain, the government had him detained and questioned. Stuart Mss 339/13. Ranald MacDonald of Clanranald to Charles, c. 1753; NeC 2,081. ‘Names of some of the Attainted & Excepted Rebels, who are, or have been in Scotland’, 1752; NeC 2,191/1. ‘Examination of Mr. Ranald MacDonald taken June 17th, 1752’; NeC 2,189/2. Ranald MacDonald of Clanranald to (?) Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, [London?], 18 June 1752; SP 78/244, ff. 282–3. Also see NeC 2,188. Archibald Campbell, 3rd Duke of Argyll

218 Notes

28.

29.

30.

31.

32. 33.

34.

to (?) Henry Pelham, Whitton, 13 June 1753, for Argyll’s opposition to withdraw Clanranald’s forfeiture. The Scottish administration was aware of the fact that the Jacobites had distributed money, and that Glengarry, who was encouraging his partisans in the Highlands to muster for a rerun of the ’Forty-five, was one the recipients. But whether it was to be disbursed to the Scottish Jacobites, or to be returned to Charles, their source could not tell. NLS Ms 5076, f. 140. EFF ¼ Duncan McVicar, Collector of the Customs at Fort William to (?) Alexander Legrand, Commissioner of the Customs at Edinburgh, [Fort William?], 20 April 1750. According to Dr Archibald Cameron’s account, 800 louis d’or of the original amount of 35,000 had been stolen upon landing the treasure in May 1746; 4,200 disbursed to troops in Jacobite pay until after Culloden; and Murray of Broughton had carried some 3,000 to Edinburgh, and there handed the sum over to one Mr MacDougal, a merchant of his acquaintance. Dr Cameron’s account further details that Charles took another 3,000 louis d’or abroad when he quit Scotland with Colonel Richard Warren, leaving 24,000 behind, of which Cluny had spent, 12,981 louis d’or for various items, including the 6,000 previously conveyed to Major Kennedy in London for Charles’ use. Stuart Mss 300/80. Dr Archibald Cameron to James, ‘Ane Accompt of 35,000 Louis d’Ors sent from France and landed in the West Highlands . . . and taken in charge by Murray who continued in the Countrey as it was then resolved to goe again to Arms’, c. September–22 October, 1749. By 1753, Alexander Cameron of Glenevis disclosed the full extent of Dr Cameron’s account to the British government. SP 54/43, f. 96. Lieutenant-General George Churchill to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 14 May 1753; SP 54/43, ff. 98–9. Lieutenant-Colonel John Crawfurd to Lieutenant-General George Churchill, Fort William, 17 March (?) 1753; SP 54/43, ff. 100–1. Alexander Cameron of Glenevis to Lieutenant-General George Churchill, Edinburgh Castle, 9 May 1753. Stuart Mss 300/80. Dr Archibald Cameron to James, ‘Ane Accompt of 35,000 Louis d’Ors sent from France and landed in the West Highlands . . . and taken in charge by Murray who continued in the Countrey as it was then resolved to goe again to Arms’, c. September–22 October 1749. A copy of the account Cluny sent to James in Rome is in Stuart Mss 300/81. ‘Ane exact Copy of ane Acct. written by Clunies own hand the Original by Clunies orders has been lay’d [before?] H. Majesty . . . ’ [Rome?], 22 September 1749. Alasdair MacDonell of Glengarry told the government that the money given to Fassifern in 1749 was intended for the payment of, among other things, the cess, tithes and arrears on the estate of Lochiel. NeC 2,102. ‘State of Cash received by Clunie from the Pretender’, c. 1751–52. MacPherson, A Day’s March to Ruin, 188–9. Conversely, Glenevis deposes that Cluny’s motive for not crossing the Channel was threadbare, as he held a commission of lieutenant-colonel a` la Suite in Ogilvy’s. SP 54/40, ff. 252–3. Colonel John Crawfurd to Lieutenant-General George Churchill, Fort William, 31 October 1751. Andrew Lang, The Companions of Pickle, 140. NLS Ms 5076, f. 120. EFF ¼ Duncan McVicar, Collector of the Customs at Fort William to Alexander Legrand, Commissioner of the Customs at Edinburgh, [Fort William ?], 12 December 1749; Stuart Mss 305/49. James to Charles, [Rome?], 17 March 1750; Stuart Mss 306/148. James to Charles, [Rome?], 5 May 1750; Andrew Lang, The Companions of Pickle, 155. Stuart Mss 303/63. Alasdair ‘Ruadh’ MacDonell of Glengarry to James Edgar, Boulogne, 6 June 1750. That Glengarry was falsely accusing Dr Cameron is evident

Notes 219

35.

36.

37. 38. 39.

40.

41. 42. 43.

44. 45.

for he later contradicted his claim that the Doctor had invested the embezzled funds, instead stating that the missing money was still in the country. Stewart of Ardvorlich, The Camerons, 137. Glengarry’s preposterous charge is easily refuted, for upon Dr Cameron’s execution in June 1753, no effects, financial or otherwise, were left to his impoverished family. Andrew Lang, The Companions of Pickle, 143; see also 142–6 for Dr Cameron’s innocence; Stewart of Ardvorlich, The Camerons, 141. Stuart Mss 300/80. Dr Archibald Cameron to James, c. September–22 October, 1749; Stuart Mss 310/82–83. Alasdair ‘Ruadh’ MacDonell of Glengarry (copy in Andrew Lumisden’s hand) to James, c. 30 August 1750; Stuart Mss 310/84. Donald MacDonell of Lochgarry (for Ewan MacPherson of Cluny) to Charles, c. 22 June 1750; NeC 2,102. ‘State of Cash received by Clunie from the Pretender’, c. 1751– 52. Glengarry met Cluny in the ‘Muir of Drimoughractrach’ in 1749, and at Edinburgh received £1,900 of the money Murray of Broughton carried with him after Culloden. For Angus of Downan’s role as Jacobite treasurer, see Andrew Lang, Companions of Pickle, 152. For Cameron of Downan’s early involvement in the distribution of funds, see SRO GD 50/121/14x. ‘Various Receipts for Money received from Ewan MacPherson of Cluny by Angus Cameron of Downan and Angus MacDonald [i.e. MacDonell] of Greenfield’, Stronacardoch, 6 October 1746 (copy, 24 July 1855). Besides Cameron of Downan, Donald MacPherson of Breakachie was mentioned as a co-trustee of the Locharkaig treasure. Breakachie served as a lieutenant-colonel in Cluny’s regiment, and married his chief’s sister. NLS Ms 98, ff 39–40. Anon., ‘Unto His Grace the Duke of Newcastle one of his Majestys Principal Secretarys of State’, c. 1749–52. MacPherson, A Day’s March to Ruin, appendix iv, 273. Elcho, A Short Account of the Affairs of Scotland, 131. Stuart Mss 305/49. James to Charles, [Rome?], 17 March 1750. Stuart Mss 301/84. Thomas Newton ¼ Major Kennedy to Charles, [Paris?], 22 November 1749; Stuart Mss 302/56. Ewan MacPherson of Cluny (via Major Kennedy) to Charles. Copy, c. 13–31 December 1749. Stuart Mss 303/79. Thomas Newton ¼ Major Kennedy to Charles, 18 January 1750; Stuart Mss 303/132. Charles to Major Kennedy, 31 January 1750; Stuart Mss 305/69, no. 2, ‘D’ ¼ Captain Donald MacPherson of Breakachie to Major Kennedy, < 20 January 1749. Stuart Mss 305/69, no. 1 Thomas Newton ¼ Major Kennedy to Charles, 18 March 1750. Stuart Mss 305/118. Charles to Thomas Newton ¼ Major Kennedy, 6 April 1750. Stuart Mss 305/69, no. 1 Thomas Newton ¼ Major Kennedy to Charles, 18 March 1750; Stuart Mss 306/104. Thomas Newton ¼ Major Kennedy (via George Waters) to Charles, 27 April 1750. MacPherson, A Day’s March to Ruin, 188. NeC 2,089. ‘Copy of Father Grant’s Letter to A.M., 1st September 1751’; NeC 2,096/1. ‘A Compleat List of All Jacobites and Government Officials’, c. October– November 1751. Andrew Lang himself admitted that the nature of the evidence he had collected against Glengarry could ‘be called . . . circumstantial’. Lang, Pickle, 164. The damning evidence which corroborates Andrew Lang’s thesis presented in Pickle the Spy after almost a full century consists of two documents in the Pelham papers lodged at Nottingham University. In NeC 2,089 the spy’s initial’s ‘A.M.’ are identified as ‘Alasdair McDonell of Glengarry Esqr.’ (bottom of second ms folio); while in NeC 2,096/1 the very same initials are directly linked to

220 Notes

46.

47.

48.

49.

the cant name ‘Pickle’ (pos. 91). What lends my argument still more force is the circumstance that the second document happens to be a government list of cant names used by both Jacobite and Hanoverian agents. Reproductions of the two incriminating documents can be found in the Addendum. Among the Pelham papers are also Glengarry’s addresses in London and Boulogne, and a cipher for his correspondence. NeC 2,120. ‘A.[lasdair] M.[acDonell] . . . Very Private. Cipher and Directions’, October 1752. As late as 1979, a critical rejoinder to Lang’s thesis was published by Norman H. MacDonald for the posthumous rehabilitation of Alasdair ‘Ruadh’ in The Clan Ranald of Knoydart & Glengarry. A History of the MacDonalds or MacDonells of Glengarry (Edinburgh, [1979] 1995), 113–27. It is odd that Mr MacDonald does not consider Glengarry’s final instructions to his only executrix, that all political papers of his be burned, to be an indictment in itself. MacDonald, The Clan Ranald, 127. SP 54/41, ff. 252–3. Colonel John Crawfurd to Lieutenant-General George Churchill, Fort William, 31 October 1751. Glenevis states that owing to existing family ties Cluny aligned himself with the Camerons. His mother was the daughter of Old John Cameron of Lochiel. One intelligence report from the Highlands suggests that the clan Donald felt that Charles was lavishing preferential treatment on the Camerons. NLS Ms 5076, ff. 145–6. Donald Campbell to [Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald or Archibald Campbell, 3rd Duke of Argyll?], Isle of Mull, 4 June 1750. This is corroborated by Pickle’s own observation that Cluny, Glenevis, Fassifern, Ludovick Cameron of Torcastle and John MacFarlane formed a clique, excluding the MacDonalds from the treasure’s bounty. This may be Glengarry’s own partisan view, but in the light of Cluny’s generous disbursement to the Lochiel family, and the fact that Glenevis’ brother, Angus of Downan, was appointed co-treasurer, this accusation rings true. NeC 2,094. ‘Information from A.[lasdair] M.[acDonell]’, 28 September 1751. For Fassifern’s case against Glenevis, see Stewart of Ardvorlich, The Camerons, 131–2. Also see NLS Ms 5077, ff. 146–7. Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle to Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald, Whitehall, 20 April 1753; SP 36/124, f. 156. Alexander Cameron of Glenevis to Colonel Watson, copy, Glenevis, 12 December 1753; SP 36/124, f. 156. Alexander Cameron of Glenevis to Colonel Watson, copy, Glenevis, 12 December 1753. Andrew Lang, The Companions of Pickle, 129. More recently, Dr McLynn argued that the introduction of hard currency to the remote Highlands, where the circulation of money was scarce, had an undermining effect on the loyalty of the clans. McLynn, The Jacobites, 61. Stuart Mss 298/32. Charles to George Keith, 10th Earl Marischal, [5?] May 1749; Stuart Mss 298/46. W. Malloch ¼ William Drummond of Balhaldy to James Edgar, Paris, 9 May 1749. Sir James Harrington and Robert MacCarthy, 5th Earl of Clancarthy, had acted as a liaison between the English Jacobites and the Prince’s men in the preparations leading up to the ’Forty-five. At the time, Sir James had ‘claimed to represent the wishes of the party in England’. Eveline Cruickshanks, Political Untouchables. The Tories and the ’45 (London, 1979), 77; Frank J. McLynn, France and the Jacobite Rising of 1745 (Edinburgh, 1981), 84; Paul Kle´ber Monod, Jacobitism and the English People, 1688–1788 (Cambridge, [1989] 1993), 199; Andrew Lang, Pickle, 89–90; Stuart Mss 301/5. W. Malloch ¼ William Drummond of Balhaldy to James, Paris, [26?] October 1749. For the pronounced antipathy of the Scottish Jacobites in exile towards their Irish co-partisans, and the French preference for the Scots, see

Notes 221

50.

51.

52. 53.

54.

55.

NeC 2,088/1. ‘Queries put to A.[lasdair] M.[acDonell] with his answers to them; as also information from him; 1751’. For Jacobite collusion with the smugglers of Southeast England also see Chapter 2, note 139. Stuart Mss 298/61. George Keith, 10th Earl Marischal to Charles, Berlin, 17 May, 1749; Stuart Mss 298/178. Same to the same, Berlin, 5 July 1749; Stuart Mss 301/5. W. Malloch ¼ William Drummond of Balhaldy to James, Paris, [26?] October 1749. Jacobite bickering was noisy enough to be registered by the Earl of Albemarle at Paris. SP 78/235, ff. 17–22. William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle to John Russell, 4th Duke of Bedford, Paris 6/17 January 1750. In 1753, Pickle reported that the English Jacobites employed the antiquarian Thomas Carte to tell Charles that if he did not sack Kelly ‘persons of note would enter no Scheme with him’. BL Add. Ms 33050, ff. 194–5. Pickle ¼ Alasdair Ruadh MacDonell of Glengarry to [Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle?], c. March/April 1753. John Doran, London in the Jacobite Times, 2 vols (London, 1877), II, 267. Andrew Lang, Pickle, 83–4, 90, 92; Stuart Mss Box 1/310. Colonel Henry Goring to Charles, c. December 1749; Stuart Mss 301/97. R. Jackson ¼ Young Harrington to Sir James Harrington, London, 28 November, 1749; Romney Sedgwick, The Commons, 1715–1754, 2 vols (London, 1970), II, 431; Petrie, ‘The Elibank plot’, 177–8; Ian R. Christie, ‘The Tory Party, Jacobitism and the ’Forty-Five: A Note’, Historical Journal, 30, 4 (1987), 921–31, 924; Linda Colley, ‘The Loyal Brotherhood and the Cocoa Tree: The London Organization of the Tory Party, 1727–1760’, Historical Journal, 20, 1 (1987), 77–95, 81. For an account of the riots at the Lichfield races, see Devonshire Mss., 1st series, 343.1. Anon. to Richard Boyle, 3rd Earl of Burlington, Lichfield, 4 October 1747. For further reference to the role of the Lichfield races as a Tory political gathering, see Cruickshanks, Political Untouchables, 106–7; ´ ’Ciardha suggested that ‘B’ could Colley, ‘The Loyal Brotherhood’, 84. Eámonn O also stand for ‘Burlington’. SP 98/53, ff. 230–1. John Walton ¼ Philipp von Stosch to Horace Mann, Florence, 4 April 1749. Von Stosch added that the marriage negotiations were handled by Marie Louise Jablonowska, Princesse de Talmond, the Queen of France’s cousin, and Charles’ mistress; SP 98/56, ff. 314–16. Horace Mann to John Russell, 4th Duke of Bedford, Florence, 2 May 1749; SP 88/70, f. [not foliated ?], Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle to Sir Charles Hanbury Williams, Whitehall, 2 May 1749; W. S. Lewis, gen. ed., The Yale Edition of Horace Walpole’s Correspondence, 48 vols (New Haven, 1937–84), XX, 1960, 44, footnote 11; For von Stosch, see D. B. Horn, The British Diplomatic Service, 1689–1789 (Oxford, 1961), 28; Dorothy Mackay Quynn, ‘Philipp von Stosch: Collector, Bibliophile, Spy, Thief’, The Catholic Historical Review, 27, 3 (1941), 332–4; and Lesley Lewis, Connoisseurs and Secret Agents in Eighteenth Century Rome (London, 1961), 12, 49–90. For his correspondence with Horace Mann in general, see John Doran, Mann and Manners at the Court of Florence, 1740–1786, 2 vols (London, 1876); For Sir Charles Hanbury Williams, see Sedgwick, Commons, 105–6; for his career in the British diplomatic service, see D. B. Horn, Sir Charles Hanbury Williams & European Diplomacy, 1747– 1758 (London, 1930). There even was a report of Charles’ presence in Scotland. SP 54/ 40, ff. 41–2. Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle to Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald, Whitehall, 7 April 1749. Claude Nordmann, ‘Jakobiterna och det Svenska Hovet, 1745–1746’, Historisk Tidskrift (1959), 408–17. According to Marscha Keith Schuchard, Swedish troops actually participated in the ’Forty-five. Marsha Keith Schuchard, ‘Charles Edward

222 Notes

56.

57. 58.

59. 60.

Stuart as ‘‘Chevalier de Soleil d’Or’’: The Role of ‘‘Ećossais’’ Freemasonry in the Jacobite-Swedish Crusade’ (unpublished paper presented to the conference on ‘Jacobitism, Scotland and the Enlightenment: Focus on the North’, organized by the Thomas Reid Institute and the Eighteenth-Century Scottish Studies Society, and held at the University of Aberdeen, 29 July–3 August 1995), 1–10, 7. The Swedes were also considered as potential allies in the Franco-Jacobite invasion scheme of 1758–59. See Claude Nordmann, Grandeur et liberte´ de la Sude, 1660– ¨ ran Behre, ‘Sweden and the Rising of 1745’, Scottish 1792 (Paris, 1971), 264; Go Historical Review, Li, 2, 152 (1972), 149–71; SP 88/70, [not foliated], Sir Charles Hanbury-Williams to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Leipzig, 5 May 1749; SP 88/70, [not foliated], Same to the same, Leipzig, 12 May 1749; Charles relation to the former royal house of Poland extended to John Sobieski, his maternal greatgrandfather, who saved Vienna from the Turks in 1683. His mother, Clementina Sobieska, was the daughter of Prince James Sobieski. McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 3–4. Lord Bulkeley says of Charles that in the event of being offered the elective crown of Poland, he would have refused. Stuart Mss 345/162. General Francis, Lord Bulkeley. ‘Historical Essay on the Stuart Cause’, c. late 1753. SP 88/70, [not foliated]. Sir Charles Hanbury Williams to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Dresden, 11 June 1749; SP 88/70, [not foliated]. Same to the same, Dresden, 18 May 1749; SP 88/70, [not foliated]. Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle to Sir Charles Hanbury-Williams, Whitehall, 19 May 1749; SP 88/70, [not foliated]. Sir Charles Hanbury-Williams to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Dresden, 25 May 1749; SP 88/70, [not foliated]. Same to the same, Dresden, 9 June 1749; SP 88/70, [not foliated]. Same to the same, [Dresden?], > 11 June 1749; SP 88/90, ff. 233–4. Francis Lawrence to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, 18 June 1749; SP 88/70, [not foliated]. Sir Charles Hanbury-Williams to [Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle?], Dresden, 13 August 1749; SP 98/53, ff 304–5. John Walton ¼ Baron Philipp von Stosch to [Horace Mann?], Florence, 12 December 1749. See also D. B. Horn, The British Diplomatic Service, 261. Horace Mann to Horace Walpole, Florence, 18 April 1749, printed in Lewis, Horace Walpole’s Correspondence, vol. xx, 42–6. NeC 2,086. ‘Narrative & Informations of A:[lasdair] M:[acDonell]’, August 1751. For Sir Hector MacLean, 5th Baronet in the Jacobite peerage, see Melville Henry Massue, Marquis de Ruvigny & Raineval, The Jacobite Peerage, Baronetage, Knightage & Grants of Honour (London and Edinburgh, [1904] 1974), 101–2. NeC 2,088/1. ‘Queries put to A.[lasdair] M.[acDonell] with his answers to them; as also information from him; 1751’. The number of approximately 10,000 Jacobite fencibles was quoted with some consistency by Jacobite sources for the decade following Sir Hector’s scheme of 1749; an earlier report furnished by Colonel John Roy Stuart of September 1748 also gives a clear impression of the eagerness displayed by the Jacobite chiefs in Scotland to rise in arms following the ’Forty-five. The difficulty with this type of information lies in its nature; as the intelligence derives from Jacobite sources, sceptics can either accept, or reject the above numbers out of hand. It is the sheer tenacity with which various, and for the most part, reliable Jacobite agents returned with those figures from their forays into Scotland, which struck me as uncharacteristic. The established sceptical attitude towards Jacobite intelligence has indeed become an obstacle, leading people to ignore the potential validity in this information. One of the most enterprising Scottish historians must have had this complacent, retrospectivist criticism in mind when he stated: ‘historiograph-

Notes 223

61. 62.

63.

64.

65.

ical appreciation of these factors [i.e., impetus and initial degree of success in the major risings of 1689, 1715, 1745, which were owed to native Scottish factors], particularly clan commitment to the Jacobite cause, has rarely cut free from the polemical and ideological constraints of Whig propaganda.’ Allan I. Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603–1788 (East Linton, 1996), 162. Stuart Mss 367/169. Colonel John Roy Stuart (in Sir Hector MacLean’s hand) to Charles, c. September 1748; Stuart Mss 318/136. Charles. ‘An exact Copy of an Account writen by C[luny] M[acPherson] [in] his own hand, Laid before y[e] H[ighness] by A[rchibald] C[ameron] in March 1750’; Stuart Mss 389/93. Lieutenant-Colonel Donald MacDonell of Lochgarry to James. ‘List of the Loyall Clans in Scotland and What Number they would Raise Immediately in Armes’, c. 31 December, 1758–4 January, 1759; NeC 2,088/1. ‘Queries put to A.[lasdair] M.[acDonell] with his answers to them; as also information from him; 1751’. Stuart Mss 303/166. Sir Hector MacLean to James Edgar, Paris, 24 January 1750; Stuart Mss 306/69. James to Lord George Murray, Rome, 20 April 1750; Stuart Mss 307/44. Lord George Murray to James, Emmerich, 19 [29?] May 1750. Stuart Mss 310/151. Lieutenant-Colonel Donald MacDonell of Lochgarry to Sir Hector MacLean, Douay, 15 September 1750. The bard Alasdair MacMhaighstir Alasdair captured these sentiments in several of his poems. MacMhaighstir’s poetry of the post-Culloden period reflected the resentment of the Highlanders against the Hanoverian conquerors. A few excerpts should give the reader an impression of the passion and hatred present in MacMhaighstir’s work. One stanza of his poem ‘Tearlach Mac Sheumais’ (‘Charles son of James’) is especially noteworthy: ‘The blood thou [i.e. George II] hast shed will yet cost thee dearly/Ere the game is concluded that thy father began.’ Also see his poem ‘Gairm Do Phrionnsa Tearlach’ (‘A Call to Prince Charles’), in which the motif of revenge comes strongly to the fore: ‘We’ll revenge on George’s puppy [i.e. the Duke of Cumberland]/All the mischief he has done to us’. Some of MacMhaighstir’s poetry was published in 1751, and subsequently burned by the common hangman at Edinburgh. MacMhaighstir’s close friend John MacCodrum also vituperated against the Hanoverians in his poem ‘Oran an Aghaidh an Eididh Ghallda’ (‘A Song Against the Lowland Garb’). Moreover, MacCodrum expressed his ardent desire for the clans to rise and join a returning Charles at the head of ten thousand French troops. In the light of the fact that MacCodrum was a member of Sir Alexander MacDonald of Sleat’s household, his sympathies for the Jacobite cause are surprising. Sir Alexander had betrayed Charles by breaking his promise, given before the ’Forty-five, to raise his clan for the Stuarts. John Lorne Campbell, ed., Highland Songs of the Forty-Five (Edinburgh, [1933] 1984), 39–40, 60–1, 90–1, 120–3, 246–7, 253. NeC 2,086. ‘Narrative & Informations of A:[lasdair] M:[acDonell]’, August 1751; Newcastle suspected a surge of Jacobite activities in the Highlands, and ordered Tinwald to investigate. The Lord Justice Clerk’s subsequent reports did indeed suggest that the Jacobite clans expected an invasion from abroad. SP 54/40, ff. 190–1. Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle to Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald, Whitehall, 16 April 1750; SP 54/40, ff. 239–40. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to John Russell, 4th Duke of Bedford, Edinburgh, 7 June 1750; SP 54/40, ff. 246–7. Same to the same, Edinburgh, 14 July 1750; SP 54/40, ff. 302–3. Same to the same, Edinburgh, 6 October 1750. SP 78/233, ff. 416–1. William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle to John Russell, 4th Duke of Bedford, Paris, 27 December 1749 OS/7 January 1750 NS; SP 78/235,

224 Notes

66.

67.

68. 69.

70.

71. 72.

73. 74.

75. 76.

[not foliated], John Russell, 4th Duke of Bedford to William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle, Whitehall, 4 January 1750. In 1746, Tyrconnel was on his way to join the Jacobites in Scotland with French reinforcements when he was captured at sea, claimed as a French officer and exchanged; he subsequently fought against Cumberland at Laffeldt (1747). Richard Hayes, Biographical Dictionary of Irishmen in France (Dublin, 1949), 296. SP 78/242, ff. 41–2. Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse to Colonel Joseph Yorke, Whitehall, 26 August 1751; Françisque Michel, Les Ećossais en France, et les françois en Ećosse, 2 vols (London, 1862), II, 434–6; Edith E. Cuthell, The Scottish Friend of Frederic the Great. The Last Earl Marischal, 2 vols (London, 1915), I, 245. McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 395. That such ideas entertained by Charles were not steeped in desperation-born day-dreaming for lack of realistic prospects can be gleaned from two Jacobite intelligence reports of June 1750, and April 1751. According to these sources, Cumberland’s intent was to have his elder brother declared non compos mentis by Parliament, and assume the regency until Frederick’s heir came of age. Cumberland was supported by the influential Duke of Bedford, but bitterly opposed by the Pelham ministry. Stuart Mss 308/84. Anon., Copy of a Report made in Charles’s hand, 11 June; Stuart Mss 320/66. John Dixon ¼ Robert Gordon to Charles, London, 10 April 1751. Stuart Mss 323/61. Alasdair Ruadh MacDonell of Glengarry to James, London, 15 July 1751. Before the cessation of diplomatic relations with Frederick II, Sir Charles HanburyWilliams even suggested to bring the weight of the Anglo-Austrian alliance system to bear on the Prussians. SP 88/71, [not foliated]. Sir Charles Hanbury-Williams to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Berlin, 6 February 1750. See D. B. Horn, The British Diplomatic Service, 6–7. William Coxe, Memoirs of the Administration of the Right Honourable Henry Pelham, 2 vols (London, 1829), II, 225–7; Robert B. Asprey, Frederick the Great. The Magnificent Enigma (New York, [1986] 1988), 359, 413–14; Norwood Young, The Life of Frederick the Great (London, 1919), 174–5; Jeremy Black, The Rise of the European Powers, 1679–1793 (London, 1990), 104. Coxe, Pelham Administration, II, 226. Szechi, The Jacobites, Britain and Europe, 1688–1788 (Manchester, 1994), 115. Frederick II to Charles, Berlin, 8 November 1747, printed in Stephen Collet, A.M., Relics of Literature (London, 1823), 64–5. Horace Walpole, Earl of Orford, Memoires of the Last Ten Years of the Reign of George the Second, 2 vols (London, 1822), I, 290 (my italics). Nor does the present chapter lay any claim to totality, but is to be understood as an extension of previous studies on the subject. See note 2; and Sir Charles Petrie, ‘The Elibank plot, 1752–3’, 192–3. SP 78/235, ff. 17–22. William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle to John Russell, 4th Duke of Bedford, Paris, 6 January 1750 OS/17 January, 1750 NS. SP 78/235, ff. 41–2. William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle to John Russell, 4th Duke of Bedford, Paris, 17 January 1750 OS/28 January, 1750 NS; SP 78/235, ff. 45–6. Same to the same, 24 January 1750 OS/4 February 1750 NS; SP 88/71, [not foliated]. Sir Charles Hanbury-Williams to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Berlin, 6 February 1750. Andrew Lang has collected evidence substantiating the story of Charles’ frequent visits to Paris between 1749–52, and claims that he usually stayed at the convent of St Joseph in the Rue St Dominique, Faubourg St Germain. Andrew Lang, Pickle, 79, 81.

Notes 225 77. Stuart Mss 303/133. Charles to Colonel Henry Goring, 31 January 1750. James Dormer was the sixth son of Charles, 5th Lord Dormer by his second marriage. Andrew Lang, Pickle, 93; 101, footnote 1. For a short biographical sketch of James Dormer, see the Stuart Mss. index, and for his family, Kle´ber Monod, Jacobitism and the English People, 136, 167. Also see Kle´ber Monod, ‘Dangerous Merchandise: Smuggling, Jacobitism, and Commercial Culture in Southeast England, 1690– 1760’, Journal of British Studies, 30, 2 (1991), 150–82, 171. 78. This sum could have been made up of various funds available to Charles at the time. Aside from the £15,000 he received from his English supporters in 1749, his share of a sale of family jewels, he was told by James in March 1750, was in excess of 4,526 Roman Crowns. By August, Charles had been notified that Major Kennedy’s 6,000 louis d’or of the Locharkaig treasure had safely reached the Continent, so that they would have been available to him before he went to London in September of that year; in May 1750, he intended to have the remainder of the Locharkaig treasure returned, and noted that Antoine Vincent, Comte de Walsh was able to secure a loan under certain conditions. He also wanted to ask a member of the English Jacobite leaders to come over to France with further remittances, and referred to an actual transaction of 22 June 1750. Stuart Mss 305/49. James to Charles, [Rome?], 17 March 1750; Stuart Mss 306/142. ‘Memoir of B.[urton ¼ Charles], [3 May?] –22 June 1750; Stuart Mss Box 1/321. Colonel Henry Goring to Charles, c. August 1750. 79. Stuart Mss 304/55. Charles to James Dormer, c. 16 February 1750; McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 396; Andrew Lang, Pickle, 99. Another author claims that the consignment consisted of 26,000 muskets. Seamus Carney, The Appin Murder. The Killing of the Red Fox (Edinburgh, [1989] 1994), 19. 80. Stuart Mss Box 1/317. Lieutenant-General Francis Bulkeley to [George Waters?], 17 February [1750?]. Lieutenant-General Francis, Comte de Bulkeley (Viscount Bulkeley of Cashel in the Irish peerage) was descended from an Anglo-Norman family which had settled in the Palatinate of Chester. He went to France in 1700 and was promoted through the ranks, fighting at Almanza in 1707 and later alongside his brother-in-law, the Marshal Duke of Berwick. In 1733, he was given Lee’s regiment in the Irish Brigade and fought at Rocoux in 1746 under the command of August III’s half-brother, the Marećhal de Saxe. He resigned his regiment in 1754 and was succeeded by his son, François Henri, Comte de Bulkeley. O’Callaghan, Irish Brigades in the Service of France, 32–8; The incumbent in the English peerage, James, 6th Viscount Bulkeley of Baron Hill in Anglesey, was also known as an enthusiastic Jacobite. Ian R. Christie, ‘The Tory Party, Jacobitism, and the ’FortyFive’, 925; Sedgwick, The Commons, I, 505. On the Bulkeleys of Anglesey also see P. D. G. Thomas, ‘Jacobitism in Wales,’ Welsh History Review, 1, 3 (1963), 279–300, 292–4. 81. It is safe to assume that Charles also received the Jacobite chiefs’ message, for he thanked Lochgarry for intelligence and proposals in June or July 1750. Lochgarry was ordered to keep their correspondence a secret. Stuart Mss 309/76. Charles to Lieutenant-Colonel Donald MacDonell of Lochgarry, c. June/July 1750. 82. Casualty figures of the battle of Culloden are highly contradictory, ranging from c. 1,000–3,000. The reader should remember that casualty figures are in no way representative of the effective number killed in the engagement. For reference, see Peter Harrington, Culloden 1746. The Highlands Clans’ Last Charge (London, [1991] 1996), 83; Michael Hook and Walter Ross, The ’Forty-Five. The Last Jacobite Rebellion (Edinburgh, 1995), 112; Allan I. Macinnes, ‘The Aftermath of the ’45’, in

226 Notes

83. 84. 85.

86.

87.

88. 89.

90.

Robert C. Woosnam-Savage, ed., 1745. Charles Edward Stuart and the Jacobites (Glasgow, 1995), 108; Allan I . Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 163. Also see Chapter 2, note 20. Stuart Mss Box 1/318. Alasdair Ruadh MacDonell of Glengarry to James, [Boulogne?], c. April 1750. In the light of Glengarry’s activities on behalf of the British government, this report may be dismissed as an effort to misinform James, but the sceptic should remember that not only did Glengarry have to retain his credibility if he wanted to be of any use to his paymasters – and the blatant misrepresentation of the Jacobite chiefs would have been far too obvious to escape detection within the movement – but that his fanatically zealous cousin, Lochgarry, who accompanied him to the Highlands, ensured the veracity of this report. Lieutenant John Holker, a Jacobite with an utterly unblemished record, seconded Glengarry’s opinion stating that ‘Friends & Enemies are so greatly exasperat’d at their late treatment yt they all swear if the Devill himself was to come they would join him’. Holker’s source was a Scots officer in the service of the States General. The Scottish corps in Dutch pay was notoriously disaffected to the Hanoverian establishment. For further reference, see Chapter 5, note 203. Stuart Mss 323/159. Sir James Harrington to Charles, Avignon, 6 August 1751. For poetic corroboration of the clans’ willingness to rise after Culloden, see the poems of Duncan Ban MacIntyre and John MacCodrum in Campbell, ed., Highland Songs of the Forty-Five, 218–25, 248–53. Sir Walter Scott was clearly inspired by the Elibank plot. See Scott, Redgauntlet, intro., 3–11. NLS Ms 5076, f. 138. Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle to Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald, Whitehall, 16 April 1750. NLS Ms 5076, f. 142. Duncan McVicar, Collector of the Customs at Fort William to [Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald?], [Fort William?], 24 April 1750; NLS Ms 5076, ff. 143–4. EFF ¼ Same to Alexander Legrand, Commissioner of the Customs at Edinburgh, [Fort William?], 14 May 1750; NLS Ms 5076 ff. 149–50. Same to the same, [Fort William?], 17 June 1750; John Thomson to [Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald?], 3 July 1750, Aberdeen. SP 88/71, [not foliated]. George II. ‘Secret Instructions for. . . Sir Charles HanburyWilliams . . . whom we have appointed to repair to the court of . . . the King of Prussia, with the character of our Envoy extraordinary’. Herrenhausen, 20 June 1750 OS/1 July, 1750 NS; SP 88/71, [not foliated] Sir Charles Hanbury-Williams to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Berlin, 11 July 1750 OS/22 July, 1750 NS BL Add Ms 33050, ff. 126–7. ‘Private Memorandums concerning the Pretender’s eldest son’, Paris, 28 August 1750; SP 78/236, f 351. William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Paris, 10 August 1750 OS/21 August, 1750 NS; SP 78/236, f. 396. Colonel Ruvigny de Cosne to [Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle?], Nancy, 25 August 1750; SP 78/238, f. 125. Same to Richard Nevill Aldworth, Esq., Paris, 2 September 1750. Stuart Mss 306/142. ‘Memoire of B.[urton ¼ Charles]’, 3 May–[22?] June 1750. Stuart Mss 309/15. Charles to James, 2 July 1750; Stuart Mss 310/14. James to Charles, Rome, 4 August 1750; Stuart Mss 310/15. James. Renewal of Commission of Regency, Rome, 5 August 1750. Stuart Mss Box 1/322. ‘A Declaration from Charles drafted by Henry Goring’s hand’, c. August 1750. More generally, Professor Jonathan Clark has recently hinted at this innovative drift. J. C. D. Clark, ‘British America: What If There Had Been No American Revolution?,’ in Niall Ferguson, ed., Virtual History: Alternatives

Notes 227

91.

92.

93. 94.

95. 96. 97. 98. 99.

100.

and Counterfactuals (London, 1997), 125–74, 130–1. On this point also see Daniel Szechi, The Jacobites, 30, 33. For the subtle differentiation in Charles’ liberal, but clearly anti-republican, public relations image as ‘a Sulla, a Caesar, an Augustus [rather] than a Cicero or Brutus’, see Kle´ber Monod, Jacobitism and the English People, 80–6. For the intellectual precedent of Charles’ progressive, ‘patriot’ rhetoric, see Quentin Skinner, ‘The Principles and Practice of Opposition: The Case of Bolingbroke versus Walpole’, in Neil McKendrick, ed., Historical Perspectives in English Thought and Society in Honour of J. H. Plumb (London, 1974), 93–128. Stuart Mss Box 1/320. Charles to Stouf ¼ Colonel Henry Goring, c. 12 June 1750; Kle´ber Monod, Jacobitism and the English People, 36; Doran, London in the Jacobite Times, II, 268–9, 273. Sir Charles Petrie claims Charles left the Continent on 12 September, McLynn on the 13th. Sir Charles Petrie, ‘The Elibank plot’, 178; McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 398, and for Lady Primrose, 143, 435, 447, and Sir Charles Petrie, The Jacobite Movement. The Last Phase, 1716–1807 (London, 1950), 143, 147–8. Also see Chapter 5, note 57. For Holker, see Andre´ Re´mond, John Holker. Manufacturier et grand fonctionnaire en France au XVIIIe sie`cle, 1719–1786 (Paris, 1946); Albert Nicholson, ‘Lieutenant John Holker,’ Transactions of the Lancashire and Cheshire Antiquarian Society, 9 (1891), 147–54; McLynn, The Jacobites, 139. William King, Political and Literary Anecdotes of His Own Times (London, 1819), 197. George Harris, The Life of Lord Chancellor Hardwicke; with Selections from his Correspondence, Diaries, Speeches, and Judgments, 3 vols (London, 1847), II, 420–1; Sir Charles Petrie, ‘The Elibank plot’, 179. For the Duke of Beaufort and the Earl of Westmoreland, see Sedgwick, The Commons, II, 25–6, 431. Among other Jacobite leaders, Richard Barry, second son to James Barry, 4th Earl of Barrymore was probably also present at this meeting. Sedgwick, The Commons, I, 442–3. McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 398. Stuart Mss Box 1/297. Charles to James Edgar, c. 1749. Joseph Forsyth, Remarks on Antiquities, Arts, and Letters During an Excursion in Italy, in the Years 1802 and 1803 (London, [2nd edn], 1816), 432. Philip Thicknesse, Memoirs and Anecdotes (Dublin, 1760), 341–2. Colonel A. Brett, who corresponded with Charles in 1747, and accompanied him on his examination of the Tower in September 1750, probably died soon after the Prince’s visit to London; all his papers were burnt so that ‘no ill consequences can be apprehended’. Stuart Mss 318/91. Sir James Harrington to Charles, Avignon, 15 February 1751; Stuart Mss 313/152. Same to the same, Avignon, 2 December 1750. Also see Stuart Mss Box 1/261. Colonel Brett to Charles, (2 letters), c. 15 May 1747; c. 18 June 1747. For Charles’ conversion, see SP 78/245, ff. 202–3. William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Paris, 22 November 1752; Stuart Mss 345/162. General Francis, Lord Bulkeley. ‘Historical Essay on the Stuart cause’, c. late 1753; Stuart Mss 345/164. Charles. Memorandum (in George Kelly’s or Michael Sheridan’s hand), c. 1759–60. Stuart Mss Box 6/86. Archibald Cameron, Copy of What Dr. Archibald Cameron Intended to have Delivered to the Sheriff of Middlesex at the Place of Execution, but which he left in the Hands of his Wife for that End (London, 1753). With the exception of a servant in Lady Primrose’s house, he was only recognized by some of his own followers. King, Political and Literary Anecdotes, 199; Thicknesse, Memoirs and Anecdotes, 340; Forsyth, Remarks on Antiquities, 432. Bulkeley’s assertion concerning William’s offer to James has been substantiated by Nathalie

228 Notes

101. 102.

103. 104.

105. 106.

107. 108. 109. 110.

111.

Rouffiac, ‘La Premie`re geńe´ration de l’E´xil Jacobite a Paris et Saint-Germain-enLaye, 1688–1715’, unpublished thesis (Ećole Pratique des Hautes E´tudes, 1995), 136. McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 407. Dr King suggested that Charles was disappointed by the timidity of his English adherents, and thus left with a sense that he had been deceived. King, Political Anecdotes of His Own Time, 197. McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 399. SP 88/71 [not foliated]. Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle to Sir Charles Hanbury-Williams, Hanover, 7 October 1750 OS/18 October 1750 NS; SP 88/71 [not foliated]. Sir Charles Hanbury-Williams to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Berlin, 13 October 1750; SP 88/71 [not foliated]. Same to the same, Berlin, 17 October 1750; SP 88/71 [not foliated]. Same to the same, Berlin 22 October 1750. Also see D. B. Horn, The British Diplomatic Service, 273. Moreover, Hardwicke sent Newcastle an urgent message about Charles’ presence in Britain. He was puzzled by the fact that the Jacobites had not struck during George II’s absence – he was in Hanover until November 1750 – and added that he had appraised some of the Lords, activated private intelligence channels and ordered a concentration of troops in the capital. Harris, The Life of Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, II, 422. SP 78/237, f. 72 et seq. William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle to John Russell, 4th Duke of Bedford, Paris, 5 October 1750. Stuart Mss Box 1/326 A. De Marsin ¼ Colonel Henry Goring to Charles, Worms, 9 November 1750; Stuart Mss 311/32. no. 1. Charles to the Duke of Daremberg, 29 September 1750; no. 2. Instructions for Mr Bourne [and Button ¼ Colonel Henry Goring?], 10 October 1750; Stuart Mss 312/151. Colonel Henry Goring to Charles, 3 November 1750. McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 400. Where Dr McLynn has taken this information from, I am at a loss to say. Stuart Mss 313/51. J. Du Moulin ¼ James Dormer to Monsieur Smith ¼ Charles, Antwerp, 23 November 1750. Stuart Mss 313/51. Charles to Mr Marsin ¼ Colonel Henry Goring, 16 January 1751. NLS Ms 5076, ff. 166–7. EFF ¼ Duncan McVicar, Collector of the Customs at Fort William to Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald, [Fort William?], 26 November 1750. The word ‘Wheat’ in this specific context, and more generally, within the cant vocabulary used in the extensive correspondence of the intelligence community at large, does not allow for much leeway in terms of its interpretation. The very circumstance that a cant name was employed by the correspondent indicates that he tried to conceal sensitive information, and at that time there were only a few contraband articles in connection with the Jacobite party in Scotland which could arouse the government’s interest. For McVicar’s identity, see NeC 2,199/1. Archibald Campbell, 3rd Duke of Argyll to [Henry Pelham?], Inveraray, 31 October 1752; SRO GD 50/22/1, f. ‘B’. ‘Notes Ewan Cumming . . . ’, [n.d.]. NLS Ms 5076, ff. 151–4. Duncan McVicar, Collector of the Customs at Fort William to Alexander Legrand at Edinburgh, Inveraray, 17 December 1750 (to be forwarded to Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald). For Captains Invernahyle and Guidale, see Livingstone of Bachuil et al., Muster Roll, 12, 140. For Bishop Hugh MacDonald, see David Bruce’s report of 24 February 1752, in NeC 2,114. The poetic expression of the Highlanders’ sentiments in relation to

Notes 229

112.

113. 114. 115.

116. 117.

118.

119.

120.

the impact of the Disclothing Act demonstrates that Invernahyle’s jibe must have hit a raw nerve. For two examples of such reactive poetry, see John MacCodrum’s ‘Oran an Aghaidh an Eididh Ghallda’ (‘A Song against the Lowland Garb’), and Duncan Ban MacIntyre’s ‘Oran Do’n Bhriogais’ (‘A Song to the Breeches’). Campbell, ed., Highland Songs of the Forty-Five, 218–25, 248–53. SP 78/240 [not foliated]. William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle to John Russell, 4th Duke of Bedford, Paris, 30 January 1751 OS/10 February 1751 NS; SP 78/240, ff. 168–71. Same to the same, Paris, 20 February 1751 OS/3 March 1751 NS; SP 78/240, f. 176. Same to the same, Paris, 27 February 1751 OS/10 March 1751 NS. In early 1753, British government intelligence from the Highlands suggested that General James Keith was to receive a joint command for Scotland with his brother, while Charles was to take command of a foreign expeditionary force after a successful landing in England. SP 54/43, f. 43. Anon. to Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald, Maryburgh, 13 March 1753. Frederick II to Heinrich, Count Podewils, Potsdam, 12 June 1749, printed in Politische Correspondenz, VI, 559. NeC 2,088/1. ‘Queries put to A.[lasdair] M.[acDonell] with his answers to them; as also information from him; 1751’. Andrew Lang surmises that Glengarry started working for the British government as early as 1749. Pickle, 160. My research indicates that he was prepared to defect as early as October 1747. See Chapter 3, note 36. Stuart Mss 298/61. George Keith, 10th Earl Marischal to Charles, Berlin, 17 May 1749. Conversely, Charles obviously realized that he could not entirely discount the possibility of working with an anti-British Catholic power, even the anglophile Empire. He was, however, more interested in the Scandinavian states and Russia. Stuart Mss Box 1/333. Charles. Memorandum, c. June 1751. At the height of the Elibank plot, Charles told Glengarry ‘that all this Scheme was laid and transacted by whiggish, that no Roman Catholick was Concerned, and Oblidged me to give my word and honour that I would write nothing Concerning him or his plan to Rome’. BL Add. Ms 33050, ff. 197. Pickle ¼ Alasdair Ruadh MacDonell of Glengarry to Henry Pelham, c. December 1752. For a similar precedent of selecting a Protestant patron during the Swedish plot of 1717, see Szechi, The Jacobites, 106. Stuart Mss Box 1/322. ‘A Declaration from Charles drafted by Henry Goring’s hand’, c. August 1750; Stuart Mss 345/163. Anon., Memorial, 1753; Stuart Mss. General Francis, Lord Bulkeley. ‘Historical Essay on the Stuart Cause’, c. late 1753 >; NeC 2,088/1. ‘Queries put to A.[lasdair] M.[acDonell] with his answers to them; as also information from him; 1751’. Charles XII of Sweden had displayed a similar interest in the restitution of Bremen and Verden during the Swedish-Jacobite Conspiracy of 1717. Paul Fritz, The English Ministers and Jacobitism between the Rebellions of 1715 and 1745 (Toronto, 1975), 13, 29. Szechi, The Jacobites, 104–5. Stuart Mss 320/125. James to Charles, Rome, 9 April 1751; Stuart Mss 329/1. ‘A Memorial copied by Gen. F. Bulkeley. . . to Charles’, c. 28 February–August 1751. Charles was also willing to make concessions to the Prussian navy. Stuart Mss Box 1/334. Charles. Memorandum, c. June 1751. Stuart Mss 321/58, no. 2. Charles to Colonel Henry Goring, 21 June 1751. Marscha Keith Schuchard also refers to this letter. Keith Schuchard, ‘Charles Edward Stuart as ‘‘Chevalier de Soleil d’Or’’ ’, 7.

230 Notes 121. Stuart Mss 322/126. Charles to Colonel Henry Goring, 21 June 1751. 122. Stuart Mss 322/38. Charles to Stouf ¼ Colonel Henry Goring, 8 June 1751. In his examination, the Franco-Jacobite spy Dr Florence Hensey mentioned a Mr Daniel MacNamara, ‘who lives in Bartlett’s Buildings, is a Roman Catholick Solicitor or Chamber Council, is very intimate with Dr. King of Oxford, and with all the Party; which he, Hensey, understands to be That of the Jacobites; He, Hensey, believes him to be very deep in the Secrets of that Party’. SP 36/140, ff. 71–93. ‘Dr. Hensey’s Examination continued’, Whitehall, 18 July 1758. For MacNamara also see Stuart Mss 323/37. Daniel MacNamara to Charles, 11 September 1751. 123. Stuart Mss 323/35. Charles. ‘Memorial concerning his Political Reflections’, c. July, 1751. 124. Ibid.; BL Add. Ms 33050, ff. 198–9. ‘Pickle’s Account of Walsh’, c. December 1752. McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 400. Also see 401, for Jacobite apprehensions concerning Prussian manipulation. 125. Stuart Mss 324/39. Fines ¼ Anne Drelincourt, Lady Primrose to [Charles?], 12 August 1751; Also see Stuart Mss 324/4. John Dixon ¼ Robert Gordoun to Charles, London, 12 August 1751. 126. Pickle suggested that in case of a successful attempt, Lord Granville, along with other members of the Duke of Bedford’s party, would defect to the Jacobites. BL Add. Ms 33050, ff. 194–5. Pickle ¼ Alasdair Ruadh MacDonell of Glengarry to [Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle?], c. March/April 1753. 127. NeC 2,092. ‘Information from A.[lasdair] M.[acDonell]’, [London?], 27 September 1751. Glengarry claimed that in case of a successful counter-Revolution, James would have made Granville his principal minister. The Duke of Beaufort, Lord Bath, whose wife was connected with the arch-Jacobite Marquise de Me´zieres and Lord Lichfield would also have been preferred. For George Lee, Viscount Quarendon and 3rd Earl of Lichfield, see Sedgwick, The Commons, II, 205. Stuart Mss 318/61. Sir James Harrington to Charles, Avignon, [8?] February 1751; Stuart Mss 320/81. Same to the same, Avignon, 12 April 1751; Stuart Mss 320/185. Same to the same, Avignon, 28 April 1751. Sir James proposed to send a courier to the French coast in order to improve communications with their English allies. He probably suggested this with an eye to seizing the moment when Charles could step in for a bloodless takeover. Lieutenant Holker predicted that a minority would throw the British government into a state of confusion. Stuart Mss 323/159. Sir James Harrington to Charles, Avignon, 6 August 1751. 128. At Enville, a village near Luneville in Lorraine, Charles escaped in the nick of time as four armed riders descended upon his party; meanwhile a Mr Grosset, otherwise customs-collector at Alloa in Scotland, who tracked Charles to Berlin, was allegedly an assassin out for his blood. Sir James promised that if Grosset passed near Avignon, he would ‘be taken care of’. Stuart Mss 320/321. ‘An Account of one of his Escapes near Luneville’, 20 May 1751; Stuart Mss 323/ 159. Sir James Harrington to Charles, Avignon, 6 August 1751; Stuart Mss 325/ 148. Same to the same, Avignon, 6 October 1751. 129. Nowadays, we probably would refer to Frederick’s appointment of Marischal as an ingenious public relations ploy. NeC 2,091. ‘Information from A.[lasdair] M.[acDonell]’, 14 September 1751; SP 78/272, f 44–6. Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse to Colonel Joseph Yorke, Whitehall, 2 September 1751 (with enclosed intelligence from Rotterdam); SP 78/241, f. 80. Colonel Yorke to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, [Paris?], 24 August 1751 OS/4 September 1751

Notes 231

130.

131.

132. 133. 134.

NS; SP 78/241, ff. 94–7. Same to the same, Paris, 28 August 1751 OS/8 September 1751 NS; SP 78/241, ff. 98–9. Same to the same, Paris, 31 August 1751 OS/11 September 1751 NS; SP 78/241, ff. 100–1. Same to the same, Paris, 4 September 1751, OS/15 September 1751 NS; SP 78/241, ff. 104–8. Same to the same, Paris, 4 September 1751 OS/15 September 1751 NS; SP 78/241, ff. 118–19. Same to the same, 7 September 1751 OS/18 September 1751 NS; SP 78/241, f. 120. Same to the same, Paris, 11 September 1751 OS/22 September 1751 NS. Colonel Yorke’s elation over his reassignment to The Hague in September must have been great. SP 78/242, f. 54. Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse to Colonel Joseph Yorke, Whitehall, 16 September 1751. For a parallel to Colonel Yorke’s troubles with Marischal, experienced by another British diplomatist at the prospect of the insufferable presence of Lord George Murray at Dresden see, D. B. Horn, The British Diplomatic Service, 17. Stuart Mss 325/5, no. 2. Colonel Henry Goring (in Charles’ hand) to George Keith, 10th Earl Marischal, Paris, 20 September 1751; no. 1. George Keith, 10th Earl Marischal to Colonel Henry Goring, Paris, 20 September 1751; Stuart Mss 325/17, no. 1. Same to the same, [Paris], 23 September 1751; no. 2. Charles to Colonel Henry Goring. Instructions, 23 September 1751. Stuart Mss 326/63, no. 1. Colonel Henry Goring (in Charles’ hand) to George Keith, 10th Earl Marischal. Copy, 18 October 1751; no. 3. George Keith, 10th Earl Marischal to Colonel Henry Goring, [Paris?], 18 October 1751; no. 2. Same (in Charles’ hand) to the same. Copy, [Paris?], 18 October 1751. Andrew Lang, Pickle, 132–3. Stuart Mss 323/37, no. 1 LM ¼ George Keith, 10th Earl Marischal to H.G. ¼ Colonel Henry Goring, Berlin, 18 July 1751. James also seemed to distrust Marischal. If the Earl had indeed instilled hopes in the Jacobites of the Prince’s party which stood little, or no chance of being realized, he paid the price for his opportunistic behaviour in time. His apologia to James at Rome for having accepted an office in Frederick’s service redounded to his discredit. Marischal was obviously willing to play his deceptive game both ways, between father and son, arguing that he had only accepted the Prussian offer under condition of being allowed to revert to James’ service should it prove necessary. In his carefully manipulative style, Marischal mentioned to James Edgar in January 1752 that he believed that Frederick ought ‘to be managed on our part . . . and you will, I am positively sure, agree with me that it is unpolitick to offend him’. Meanwhile, Marischal told James that he had reason to believe that he had been misrepresented at the Jacobite court. When he finally condescended to answer the Earl’s letter in the third week of February, James was all innocence, not understanding why Marischal felt guilty for having accepted the position kindly offered to him by the Prussian king. According to all outward appearances, James was setting an end to a misunderstanding, though judging by the veneer of his reply it seems he was exhibiting an atypical penchant for subtle disingenuity. In the wake of the Elibank plot, Marischal eventually found a legitimate excuse to abandon the fold of active Jacobitism, and settled into his more lucrative Prussian assignment. The Earl’s defection was symptomatic for the gradual, erosive process undergone by the Jacobite movement at large. By 1761, Marischal had even wormed his way back to the Hanoverian fold by divulging information about the third Franco-Spanish Family Compact to the British ministry. Stuart Mss 329/66. George Keith, 10th Earl Marischal to James Edgar, Paris, 8 January 1752; Stuart Mss 326/11. George Keith, 10th Earl

232 Notes

135.

136.

137.

138.

Marischal to James, Paris, 11 October 1751; Stuart Mss 329/67. Same to the same, Paris, 8 January 1752; Stuart Mss 330/22. James to George Keith, 10th Earl Marischal, Rome 21 February 1752; Stuart Mss 346/36. George Keith, 10th Earl Marischal to Charles, 8 January 1754; Stuart Mss 346/89. Same to the same, 28 January 1754; Stuart Mss 347/130, no. 1. Same to the same, 15 April 1754; Stuart Mss 347/130, no. 2. Charles to George Keith, 10th Earl Marischal, 9 May 1754; Stuart Mss 348/80, no. 1. Same to the same, 16 May 1754; Stuart Mss 348/51. Same to the same, 16 May 1754; Stuart Mss 348/80, no. 2. George Keith, 10th Earl Marischal to Mr. Douglas ¼ Charles, < 16 May 1754; Stuart Mss 348/88. Same to the same, Paris, 18 May 1754; Stuart Mss 348/89. Charles to George Keith, 10th Earl Marischal, 18 May 1754; Stuart Mss 348/94. George Keith, 10th Earl Marischal to Antoine Vincent Walsh, tit. Earl Walsh and Comte de Serrante. (The memorial was given to Walsh on 20 May 1754, and passed on to Charles on the 24th); Stuart Mss 352/78. Charles to George Keith, 10th Earl Marischal, 10 December 1754; Stuart Mss 352/152. George Keith, 10th Earl Marischal to Charles, 21 December 1754; McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 418, 428–31; D. B. Horn, The British Diplomatic Service, 264; Edith Cuthell, The Scottish Friend of Frederic the Great, II, 84–90; Bruce Lenman, The Jacobite Risings in Britain, 1689–1746 (Aberdeen, [1980] 1995), 286, 290; Lenman, Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen, 191. See also MacBean Special Collection. I Geo. III cap. 15., An Act to enable His Majesty to grant unto George Keith, late Earl Marischall, a Sum therein limited, out of the Principal Money and Interest now remaining due to the Public on account of the Purchase Money of certain Parts of the Forfeited Estates of the said Earl (London, 1761). Stuart Mss 323/37. Charles to Dixon ¼ Robert Gordoun. Instructions, [28 September 1751?]; no. 2. Mr Daniel MacNamara to Charles, 11 September 1751; no. 5. Charles to Mrs Fines ¼ Anne Drelincourt, Lady Primrose, c. 29 September 1751; Stuart Mss 324/146. Charles. Notes, 13 September 1751; Stuart Mss Box 1/ 337. Duplicate of a Memorandum by Charles, 29 September 1751. For the plans concerning the formation of a renegade regiment, see BL Add. Ms 33050, ff. 409–0. Anon., Intelligence, c. 1755. The Hon. Arthur C. Murray, The Five Sons of ‘Bare Betty’ (London, 1936), 87–107; Sir Charles Petrie, ‘The Elibank plot’, 183. There seems to have been a pamphlet war over Murray’s proceedings in the Commons, and as a consequence the government was at pains to suppress the publication of seditious tracts. Cruickshanks, Political Untouchables, 108–9; Stuart Mss 320/2. Sir James Harrington to James Edgar, Avignon, 1 April 1751; Stuart Mss 320/128. James Edgar to Sir James Harrington, Rome, 20 April 1751; Stuart Mss 327/162. Elizabeth Gordoun to Charles, 4 December London, 1751; NLS Ms 5076, f. 192. Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle to Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald, Whitehall, 2 July 1751. Stuart Mss 398/89. Father Bernard Rothe, S.J. to James Edgar, [Paris?], January 1760. Father Rothe also mentioned that Alexander Murray held a lieutenant’s commission in a Hanoverian infantry regiment, ‘and by his other industrys he enjoys . . . three thousand a year’. For a corroboration of Father Rothe’s contention about Alexander Murray, see Stuart Mss 330/61. Charles to Colonel Henry Goring, 1 March 1752; and Stuart Mss 330/112. Alexander Murray of Elibank to Charles, 27 March 1752. See also McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 403. SP 78/241, f. 148. William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Paris, 28 September 1751 OS/9 October 1751 NS; SP 78/ 241, f. 150. Same to the same, enclosed in f. 148.

Notes 233 139. Anthony Vincent, 1st Earl Walsh in the Jacobite peerage, owned considerable plantations at St Domingo. He served in the French navy, and subsequently became a wealthy shipbuilder at Nantes. In 1745, Lord Clare, the commander of the Irish Brigade, enlisted his support for the planned Jacobite rising. Walsh, Daniel O’Heguerty, and another Irishman, Walter Rutledge of Dunkirk, furnished Charles with two vessels for his expedition to Scotland. According to Pickle the spy, Walsh advanced £12,000 for the expedition. During the ’Forty-five, he was entrusted with the embarkation and transport of eighteen battalions of infantry and two squadrons of cavalry, when his undertaking had to be abandoned because of the news of Culloden. For his services to the Stuart cause, he was created an Earl. In 1753, his title was recognized by Louis XV. He may have been involved in an arms purchase for the Prince in 1754. His brother Francis James was active in the shipbuilding business at Cadiz, and in 1749 acquired the Chaˆteau de Serrant in Anjou. In 1755, Francis James was created a pair de France, and given the title of 1st Count Walsh de Serrant. Stuart Mss 319/82. Charles to Walsh, Anthony Vincent, 1st Lord Walsh Antoine Vincent Walsh, Comte de Walsh, c. 20 March 1751; J. Douglas ¼ Charles to Monsieur Le Grand ¼ Antoine Vincent Walsh, Comte de Walsh, 15 April 1751, printed in Charles, Duc de la Tre´moı¨lle, A Royalist Family Irish and French (1689–1789) and Prince Charles Edward, trans. by A. G. Murray MacGregor (Edinburgh, 1904), vii–viii, 48, 50; BL Add Ms 33050, ff. 198–9. ‘Pickle’s Account of Walsh’, c. December 1752; Hayes, Biographical Dictionary of Irishmen in France, 280–1, 306–7; Françisque Michel, Les Ećossais en France, II, 427 footnote 6; Melville Henry Massue, Marquis de Ruvigny and Raineval, The Jacobite Peerage, 178–9. Thomas Carte was a NonJuring clergyman implicated in the Atterbury Plot of 1722. But before he could be arrested, Carte had absconded. During an interview with Sir Robert Walpole in 1739, Carte, who had been sent to England by James in order to solicit Walpole’s support for his cause, was duped into disclosing Jacobite plans. Fritz, The English Ministers and Jacobitism, 77, 89, 124. For Thomas Carte’s role as Jacobite courier, see BL Add. Ms 33050, ff. 196–7. Pickle ¼ Alasdair Ruadh MacDonell of Glengarry to Henry Pelham, c. December 1752. 140. BL Add. Ms 33050, ff. 198–9. ‘Pickle’s Account of Walsh’, c. December 1752; Stuart Mss 326/122. Charles. Notes, 26 October 1751. For Walsh’s role as collector of Jacobite contributions also see J. Douglas ¼ Charles to M. Le Grand ¼ Antoine Vincent Walsh, 10 November 1752, printed in Tre´moı¨lle, A Royalist Family, 48–9. For Sir Walter Rutledge, see Hayes, Biographical Dictionary of Irishman in France, 280–1. According to Pickle, Walsh was in London during the Fall of 1751. NeC 2,091. ‘Information from A.[lasdair] M.[acDonell]’, 14 September 1751. 141. Stuart Mss 327/153. Alexander Campbell ¼ Alexander Murray of Elibank to Charles, Calais, 3 December 1751; NeC 2,106. Pickle ¼ Alasdair Ruadh MacDonell of Glengarry to [Henry Pelham?], Edinburgh, 12 December 1751. For Goring’s presence in London also see NeC 2,111. Pickle’s Intelligence, [Glengarry?], 23 January 1752. 142. According to British military intelligence, the Camerons and MacDonalds were at loggerheads over the distribution of the Locharkaig treasure as early as May 1746. NLS Ms 3735, f. 700. Donald Campbell to Major-General John Campbell of Mamore, Mingary, 26 May 1746; Intelligence, enclosed in William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 11 February 1747; Andrew Fletcher, Lord Justice Clerk Milton to the same,

234 Notes

143.

144.

145.

146.

Edinburgh, 28 January 1748, printed in C. S. Terry, ed., Albemarle Papers, 2 vols (Aberdeen, 1902), I, 372–3; II, 524–8; NeC 2,094. ‘Information from A.[lasdair] M.[acDonell]’, 28 September 1751. Stuart Mss 330/10. Captain John Holker (via George Waters) to Captain John Edgar, Paris, 14 February 1752. In November 1751, George Waters had received an anonymous letter denouncing one Lesley, ‘an errand Royal’ and ‘a traitor, a spy, to the English ministry’, who had informed against Lord Traquair, and was then on Charles’ trail in Lorraine. Stuart Mss 327/115. Anon., Information, [30 November?], 1751. The other observation made by Holker pertained to Glengarry in London, who again gave out to be charged with James’ affairs, but was also known to be in contact with Murray of Broughton. On 14 February 1752, he had his message sent to a fellow captain serving in the same regiment, John Edgar, whose father, in turn, was James’ longtime secretary at Rome. As James Edgar had no clue where to look for the elusive Charles, Holker’s letter was forwarded from Rome to George Waters at Paris, who was apparently informed about the Prince’s whereabouts. Edgar senior warned Charles that neither Glengarry, nor any Jacobite agent was presently operating in Britain with James’ sanction. An open indictment against Glengarry, however, was problematic, as his station vouchsafed him some credibility, and his previous missions to the Highlands in connection with his family or the Locharkaig treasure lent his presence in London some legitimacy. Stuart Mss 330/10. Captain John Holker (via George Waters) to Captain John Edgar, Paris, 14 February 1752; Stuart Mss 330/41. James Edgar (via George Waters) to Charles, Rome, 29 February 1752; Stuart Mss 330/42. Same to the same, Rome, 29 February 1752; Andrew Lang, Pickle, 204. NeC 1,991/1. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to Henry Pelham, Edinburgh, 28 November 1751. According to a list compiled by the government, the most important Jacobites who had been in Scotland in 1752 were Lord Forbes of Pitsligo, Lord Lewis Gordon, Lord David Ogilvy (titular Earl of Airlie), Donald MacDonald of Clanranald, Archibald MacDonell of Barrisdale, Sir William Gordon of Park, William Drummond of Balhaldy, John Gordon of Avachie, Gordon of Cobardie, Patrick Grant of Glenmorriston, David Hunter of Burnside, Andrew Hay of Rannes, John MacGregor-Murray of Glengyle and James Robertson of Blairfetty. All of the above, with the possible exception of Gordon of Cobardie, stemmed from the top ranks of the Jacobite army of 1745–46. The anonymous author – probably a government clerk – claims that Lord Ogilvy just barely escaped General Churchill. SP 36/120, f. 210. ‘Names of Some of the Attainted & Excepted Rebels, who are, or have lately been in Scotland’, 1752. Also see NeC 2,081. ‘Names of Some of the Attainted & Excepted Rebels, who are, or have been in Scotland’, 1752; SP 54/42, ff. 5–6. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 10 March 1752; SP 54/42, f. 7. Same to the same, (enclosure), 10 March 1752. For a biographical sketch of Andrew Hay of Rannes, see Alistair and Henrietta Tayler, A Jacobite Exile (London, 1937). Charles Erskine or Areskine (1680–1763) was the son of Sir Charles Erskine, and was appointed Lord Justice Clerk in June 1748. Philip C. Yorke, The Life and Correspondence of Philip Yorke, Earl of Hardwicke, Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain, 3 vols (Cambridge, 1913), I, 551 footnote 2. David Bruce was at one time employed as Surveyor by the Board of Annexed Estates, and was also mentioned in the Edinburgh Almanac of 1755 as agent and messenger for the Excise Office. Aside from being Pickle’s chaperone, Bruce

Notes 235 probably also compiled an extensive, written profile on the Highlands. Andrew Lang describes him as ‘ ‘‘Court Trusty’’, or Secret Service Man’, as ‘violently Whiggish and Protestant’. His cant name ‘Watchman’ is on a government list of Jacobites and its own operatives among the Pelham papers, as is his sensitive correspondence, which both strongly suggests that he was working under the first minister’s auspices. Virginia Wills, ed., Reports on the Annexed Estates, 1755– 1769 (Edinburgh, 1973), 89, 104; Alexander Murdoch, ‘The People Above’. Politics and Administration in Mid-Eighteenth-Century Scotland (Edinburgh, 1980), 143; Andrew Lang, The Highlands of Scotland in 1750 (London, 1898), intro., vii–viii; NeC 2,096/1. ‘A Compleat List of all Jacobites and Government Officials’, c. October–November 1751. 147. NeC 2,109/1. David Bruce to [Henry Pelham?], Dunblane, 16 December; Crieff, 17–20 December; Tay Bridge, 21–23 December 1751; NeC 2,108. Same to [the same?], 23 December 1751; NeC 2,101. ‘Copy of John Donn’s Letter,’ Crieff, 18 December 1751; NeC 2,095. ‘Copy of Donald Johnstone’s Letter to A.[lasdair] M.[acDonell]’, Paris, 27 October 1751. John Campbell of Barcaldine, and his halfbrother, Robert Louis Stevenson’s ‘Red Fox’, Colin ‘Ruadh’ Campbell of Glenure were indeed suspected by Henry Pelham. Conversely, Pelham’s man on the Scottish Court of Exchequer, Baron Edward Edlin, argued that though the Camerons hated Glenure for his favouritism, and Barcaldine could be laid off by forcing him to pay arrears on his factory, the true reason for the brothers’ discredit was their attachment to the moderate party (i.e. Argathelians?); Glenure and Barcaldine were hence reviled by the hard-liners. NeC 2,090. ‘Observations’, 6 September 1751; NeC 2,064. Henry Pelham to Edward Edlin, Baron of the Court of Exchequer, 5 November 1751; NeC 1,885/1–2, 5. Edward Edlin, Baron of the Court of Exchequer to Henry Pelham, Saughton Hill, 23 November 1751. For Glenure and Barcaldine, see also NeC 2,116/1. ‘Observations upon some of the Factors upon the Forfeited Estates in Scotland’, 12 May 1752. 148. NeC 2,094. ‘Information from A.[lasdair] M.[acDonell]’, 28 September 1751; SP 54/42, f. 8. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 16 March 1752; SP 54/42, ff. 14–15. Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse to Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald, Whitehall, 7 May 1752; SP 54/42, ff. 17–18; Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle via Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Edinburgh, 14 May 1752; SP 54/42, ff. 19–20. Same to the same (via same), Edinburgh, 15 May 1752; SP 54/43, ff. 49–52. Captain Ferguson to John Clevland, Secretary to the Lords of the Admiralty, aboard the Porcupine at the Caullickstone, 30 March 1753; SP 54/43, ff. 62–3. Same to the same, aboard the Porcupine in Greenock Road, 9 April 1753. Franco-Jacobite recruiting reached intolerable levels during the Elibank plot. As a consequence, General Bland pressed for remedial legislation in order to curb the recruiters’ ardour. The crux of the legal problem was that while British subjects could not enlist in a foreign service, the pertinent Act did not extend to British subjects who had attained an officers’ rank. SP 54/43, ff. 278–80. ‘Abstract of Lieut.-Gen. Bland’s Letters’, Edinburgh, 20, 25, 29 December; 5 January 1753/54; SP 54/44, ff. 1–2. D[udley] Ryder, Attorney-General, and William Murray, Solicitor-General to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, [London], 13 January 1754. 149. SP 78/241, ff. 220–2. William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Paris, 20 November 1751 OS/1 December 1751 NS; SP 78/241, f. 245. Same to the same, Paris, 7 December 1751 OS/18 December,

236 Notes

150.

151.

152. 153.

154.

1751 NS; SP 78/241, ff. 279–81. Same to the same, Paris, 25 December 1751 OS/5 January, 1752 NS; SP 98/58, ff. 101–2. John Walton ¼ Baron Philipp von Stosch to [Horace Mann?], Florence, 31 December 1751. See also note 207. There is a possibility that the very same Major Kennedy was accused of defecting to the Hanoverians by a member of the King’s party, Francis, 2nd titular Baron Sempill, in 1748. In August 1748, Sempill told his associate, William Drummond of Balhaldy that ‘Major Kennedy’s preferment in the English Guards [is a] very curious Phenomenon . . . If Kennedy’s desertion proves true, of which I make little doubt, it will make our friends in Britain see the true Spirit of those to whom the P—ce has given his confidence’ NLS Ms 3187, ff. 76–7. Francis, 2nd tit. Baron Sempill to William Drummond of Balhaldy, Chartres, 23 August 1748. SP 78/241, ff. 223–4. William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Paris, 23 November 1751 OS/4 December 1751 NS; SP 78/242, f. 107. Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse to William Anne Keppel, Whitehall, 5 December 1751; SP 78/241, f. 258. William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Paris, 11 December 1751 OS/22 December 1751 NS. Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle to Henry Pelham, Hanover, 15 May 1752 OS/ 26 May 1752 NS printed in Coxe, Pelham Administration, II, 420. A. MacKillop, ‘Military Recruiting in the Scottish Highlands, 1739–1815: The Political, Social and Economic Context’, unpublished Ph.D. thesis (University of Glasgow, 1996), 34; As early as June 1751, General Churchill complained to Newcastle of the wellknown disaffection among the Highland factors on the forfeited estates. SP 54/ 41, ff. 36–7. Lieutenant-General George Churchill to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 18 June 1751; SP 54/41, ff. 56–7. Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle to Lieutenant-General George Churchill, Whitehall, 26 July 1751. Horace Walpole, Memoirs, I, 231. BL Add. Ms 35447, ff. 244–5. ‘Acts of Violence & Barbarity Committed in the Highlands for which none never suffer’d’, c. 1752; NLS Ms 5077, ff. 50–7. Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse to Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald, Whitehall, 30 June 1752; NeC 2,065. ‘A List of the Officers taken Notice of in the Boards Report to Mr. Pelham’, c. 1752; NeC 2,156. ‘List of Officers in the Customs, Excise and Salt Revenues in Scotland Discharged since the last Rebellion’, c. 1752; NeC 2,075. ‘Minute of Matters contained in ye Papers delivered to Mr. Pelham & which are taken Notice of in ye Draught of his Report’, c. 1752; NeC 2,079. [Henry Pelham?]. ‘Abuses and Neglects in the General Management in Scotland, since the Rebellion’, 1752; NeC 2,076. ‘Various Charges against Officers of the Customs and Excise in Scotland for Jacobite Sympathies and Activities’, c. 1752; NeC 2,077. ‘Some Few of the Instances, where Jacobites, or Non-Jurors have been Provided for, since the Rebellion’, 1752; NeC 2,186. Henry Pelham’s draft to the Commissioners of the Excise in Scotland, [London/ Whitehall?], 2 April 1752; NeC 2,167. ‘List of a Few of the many Persons employed in His Majesty’s Excise in North Britain who are thought to be Disaffected to the present Government, given by Captain Trapaud of Lord Viscount Bury’s Regiment’, Inverness, 1 May 1752; NeC 1,826. ‘Memorandum by Captain Trapaud of Lord Viscount Bury’s Regiment, relating to two Sheriff Substitutes who are not supposed well affected to the present Government’, Inverness, 1 May 1752. For the lukewarm demeanour of factors, see NeC 2,116/1. ‘Observations upon some of the Factors upon the Forfeited Estates in Scotland’, 12 May 1752; for Ogilvy’s case, see NeC 2,081. ‘Names of some of the Attainted & Excepted Rebels,

Notes 237

155.

156.

157.

158.

159.

160.

161.

who are, or have lately been in Scotland’, 1752. SP 54/41. ff. 262–3. Captain Stewart, Aide de Camp, to Lieutenant-General George Churchill, Edinburgh, 12 November 1751; SP 54/41, ff. 266–9. Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle to Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald, Whitehall, 28 November 1751; SP 54/41, f. 289. Lieutenant-General George Churchill to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 24 December 1751; SP 54/42, ff. 251–2. Same to the same, Edinburgh, 14 December 1752; SP 54/44, ff. 67–8. Lieutenant-General Humphrey Bland to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Edinburgh, 13 June 1754; SP 54/ 44, f. 76. ‘Names to be added in the Nomination of the Peace for Invernessshire’ (enclosure), Edinburgh, 13 June 1754. The necessity of legal protection for informers was apparently understood and proposed by an anonymous memorialist shortly after the ’Forty-five. Robert Clyde, From Rebel to Hero. The Image of the Highlander, 1745–1830 (East Linton, 1995), 11. NeC 2,069. Corbyn Morris to Henry Pelham, Edinburgh, 12 May 1752. The board of the excise commissioners in Scotland was not too enthusiastic about dismissing suspected officers in its service. NeC 2,168/1–2. Commissioners of the Excise in Scotland to [Henry Pelham?], Edinburgh, 18 September 1752; NeC 2,182/1–2. Sir Everard Fawkener to Henry Pelham, London, 20 November 1752; NeC 2,183. ‘Copy of a Warrant, signed by Lord John Drummond, appointing Mr. J. Cumming supervisor of Excise at Montrose’, Perth, 26 December 1745.; NeC 2,184. ‘Copy. Lord John Drummond . . . ’, Perth, 19 December 1745; NeC 2,185. Henry Pelham to the Commissioners of the Excise, 21 November 1752. NeC 2,222/2. Anon. ‘Characters’, c. 1753 >. The Duke of Cumberland had also suspected Tinwald’s predecessor, Andrew Fletcher, Lord Milton. Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle to Philip Yorke, 1st Earl of Hardwicke, [Whitehall?], 21 March 1752, printed in Coxe, Pelham Administration, II, 412. SP 54/41, ff. 139–41. Lieutenant-General George Churchill to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 5 September 1751; SP 54/41, ff. 227–8. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to the same, Edinburgh, 22 October 1751; SP 54/41, ff. 229–30. Lieutenant-General George Churchill to the same, Edinburgh, 24 October 1751; NeC 2,110. ‘Copy of David Bruce’s Letter’, Fort Augustus, 16 January 1752. To make things worse, Pickle passed Cluny’s hideout only a few days before the redcoats tried to capture the Jacobite treasurer, and as a consequence had to apply to the governor of Fort Augustus for protection against Cluny’s bodyguards. NeC 2,112. David Bruce to [Henry Pelham?], Fort Augustus, 20 February 1752. NeC 2,113. David Bruce to [Henry Pelham?], Fort William, 11 February 1752. This could either be the youngest or eldest of the family, whose Christian names were identical, i.e. Archibald. Coll, the middling Barrisdale, served as lieutenantcolonel in Glengarry’s regiment during the rising of 1745–46. It is likelier that Pickle referred to Archibald MacDonell of Barrisdale, the youngest. For George Heathcote, see BL Add. Ms 33050, ff. 196–7. Pickle ¼ Alasdair Ruadh MacDonell of Glengarry to Henry Pelham, c. December 1752; NeC 2,111. Pickle’s Intelligence, 23 January 1752; Ian R. Christie, ‘The Tory Party, Jacobitism, and the ’Forty-Five’, 924; Andrew Lang, Pickle, 178; Sedgwick, The Commons, II, 121–2. For Kirkconnel, see Livingstone of Bachuil et al., Muster Roll, 47. NeC 2,111. Pickle’s Intelligence, 23 January 1752. Colonel Henry Goring’s letter of 18 October 1751, contains a possible hint about Marischal as Jacobite armsdealer. What lends this piece of circumstantial evidence more force is the fact

238 Notes

162.

163.

164. 165.

166.

167. 168. 169.

that Goring instructed Marischal to travel to Hamburg, which may have been the port of origin for a consignment of arms destined for Scotland. See Lang, Pickle, 132. Moreover, Government intelligence eventually picked up on a surge of Jacobite activities in late 1751. Recruiting for the Scots regiments in French service was rife throughout the Highlands. Tinwald warned Newcastle that ‘[i]f my information has any foundation, I begin to Suspect, that so many of the Arch Rebels, being sent over, there must be Some Scheme among them abroad’. SP 54/ 41, ff. 242–3. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 29 October 1751; SP 54/41, ff. 244–5. Lieutenant-General George Churchill to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 29 October 1751; SP 54/41, ff. 262–3. Captain Stewart, Aide de Camp, to Lieutenant-General George Churchill, Edinburgh, 12 November 1751; SP 54/41, ff. 266–9. Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle to Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald, Whitehall, 28 November 1751. NeC 2,111. Pickle’s Intelligence, 23 January 1752; NeC 2,113. David Bruce to [Henry Pelham?], Fort William, 23 January 1752; NeC 2,112. Same to [the same?], Fort Augustus, 20 February 1752. Andrew Lang, The Companions of Pickle, 158–72. NeC 2,115. ‘Copy of A.[lasdair] M.[acDonell]’s Letter. . . to G. [wynne]. V.[aughan]’, 2 May 1752; NeC 2,117. ‘Copy of A.[lasdair] M.[acDonell]’s Letter to David Bruce’, Edinburgh, 16 May 1752; NeC 2,118. ‘Copy of A.[lasdair] M.[acDonell]’s Letter to D.[avid] B.[ruce]’, [Edinburgh], 9 June 1752. For Vaughan, see Andrew Lang, Pickle, 174, where Pickle refers to Gwynne Vaughan as one of his correspondents. SP 78/243, ff. 88–9. William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Paris, 29 January 1752 OS/9 February 1752 NS. Stuart Mss 330/61. Charles to Colonel Henry Goring, 1 March 1752. Charles received a note from one of his agents, Daniel MacNamara, that the merchandise (a common cant name for arms) were expected to arrive in Brussels towards the end of August 1752. Stuart Mss 334/113. Du Val ¼ Daniel MacNamara to Charles, Luxembourg, 14 August 1752. Stuart Mss 330/77. [George] Waters to Charles, [Paris?], 11 March, 1752; Stuart Mss 330/112. Alexander Murray of Elibank to Charles, 27 March 1752. For Dawkins, see Ian R. Christie, ‘The Tory Party, Jacobitism and the ’Forty-Five’, 924; Sir Lewis B. Namier and J. Brooke, The House of Commons, 1754–1790, 3 vols (London, 1964), II, 304–5; McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 404. In the Spring of 1753, Pickle estimated that Dawkins had collected some £4,000. BL Add. Ms 33050, ff. 194–5. Pickle ¼ Alasdair Ruadh MacDonell of Glengarry to [Thomas Holles], Duke of Newcastle, c. March/April 1753. Stuart Mss 330/141. Mrs Elizabeth Dixon ¼ Mrs Elizabeth Gordoun to Charles, London, 3 April 1752. Stuart Mss 331/126. Sir James Harrington to Colonel Henry Goring, [18?] May 1752. Stuart Mss 338/137. James Edgar to Sir James Harrington, Rome, 19 December 1752; BL Add. Ms 33050, ff. 194–5. Pickle ¼ Alasdair Ruadh MacDonell of Glengarry to [Thomas Holles], Duke of Newcastle, c. March/April 1753; Sir Charles Petrie, The Jacobite Movement: The Last Phase, 154; Andrew Lang, Pickle, 190; Sedgwick, The Commons, I, 424; II, 459; Kle´ber Monod, Jacobitism and the English People, 218; Ian R. Christie, ‘The Tory Party, Jacobitism and the ‘FortyFive’, 924. There is an indication of Anthony Swymmer’s presence in Boulogne in

Notes 239

170.

171. 172.

173.

174. 175. 176.

177. 178.

September 1753. Stuart Mss 342/69. Sir James Harrington to James Edgar, Boulogne, 18 August 1753. Sir John Astley was mentioned in a list of Jacobite supporters for a rising in 1721. Fritz, The English Ministers and Jacobitism, appendix III, 153. SP 88/73, [not foliated] Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle to Sir Charles Hanbury-Williams, Whitehall, 2 January 1752; SP 88/73, [not foliated] Sir Charles Hanbury-Williams to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Dresden, 23 April 1752; SP 88/73, [not foliated]. Same to the same, Leipzig, 27 April 1752; SP 88/73, [not foliated]. Same to the same, Dresden, 14 May 1752; SP 98/58, ff. 127–8. John Walton ¼ Baron Philipp von Stosch to [Horace Mann?], Florence, 31 March 1752; SP 98/58, ff. 135–6. Same to [the same?], Florence, 5 May 1752; SP 78/243, ff. 231–2. William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Paris, 23 March 1752 OS/3 April 1752 NS; SP 78/244, ff. 179–80. Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle to William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle, Hanover, 10 June 1752 OS/21 June 1752 NS; SP 98/57, ff. 433–5. Horace Mann to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, [Florence?], 29 September 1752. For the Exeter riots of 10–12 June 1752, see Kle´ber Monod, Jacobitism and the English People, 217–18. BL Add. Ms 32730. Pickle ¼ Alasdair Ruadh MacDonell of Glengarry to [Henry Pelham?], Boulogne, 2 November 1752, printed in Andrew Lang, Pickle, 170. The assault was to be spearheaded by officers drawn from Ogilvy’s regiment, which, on the one hand explains the fuss Charles was making over those officers having to renounce their (French) colours, and, on the other, suggests that Captain John Holker was in the secret. Stuart Mss 353/19. Campbell ¼ Alexander Murray of Elibank to Charles, < 23 September 1753. BL Add. Ms 33050, ff. 194–5. Pickle ¼ Alasdair Ruadh MacDonell of Glengarry to [Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle?], c. March/April 1753. Pickle suggests that the officers leading the attack would probably have been drawn from the Scots Dutch regiments – Charles distrusted his own adherents in French service. British intelligence discovered that Charles was soliciting Frederick II for ‘a Number of Officers’. Considering that Captain Holker accompanied Charles to England in 1750, it is possible the Prince did extend his confidence to a select few officers from the Royal Ećossais, Ogilvy’s, Albany’s (Lochiel’s) and the Irish Brigade. SP 78/247, f. 237. Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle to William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle, Whitehall, 5 July 1753. Also see BL Add. Ms 33050, ff. 409–10. Anon., Intelligence, c. 1755; Sir Charles Petrie, ‘The Elibank plot’, 190. McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 404–5. Elcho, A Short Account of the Affairs of Scotland, 448; Scott, Redgauntlet, intro., 5. BL Add. Ms 33050, ff. 194–5. Pickle ¼ Alasdair MacDonell of Glengarry to [Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle?], c. March/April 1753. There was a precedent for this plan. During the Atterbury plot, Christopher Layer, a barrister from Norfolk executed in 1723 for his peripheral role in the actual conspiracy, had suggested the arrest of George I and his eldest son, and furthermore presented a detailed plan for the seizure of the Tower of London in seven stages. Fritz, The English Ministers and Jacobitism, 80. NeC 2,097. ‘Hints about Dr. Cameron and MacDonell of Lochgarry’, c. Fall of 1752. An intelligencer belonging to Pelham’s network later added that Dr Cameron and Lochgarry were pro forma agents, and that the Jacobite command intended

240 Notes to send over an emissary with extensive powers to act. Dr Cameron and Lochgarry apparently carried James’ seal as credential, and were instructed to tell the chiefs that they were to expect Charles with a ‘powerfull Force’, and that they were to keep themselves in a state of readiness for the coming insurrection. NeC 2,202/1–2. Josiah Corthine to [Henry Pelham?], Port Glasgow, 15 May 1753. See also SP 54/43, ff. 29–30. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 17 March 1753. According to David Greenwood, Charles had crossed the Channel to England in September 1752, and was staying with Lady Primrose. I have been unable to locate any documentary evidence for Charles’ presence in England, but Greenwood refers to a commemorative medal struck at that time, bearing the inscription ‘SEPT XXIII MDCCLII’. David Greenwood, William King. Tory and Jacobite (Oxford, 1969), 237. 179. BL Add. Ms 33050, ff. 196–7. Pickle ¼ Alasdair Ruadh MacDonell of Glengarry to Henry Pelham, c. December 1752 (my italics). The dating of this document is difficult, as Pickle says Charles met with Cameron and Lochgarry during the ‘latter end of September’, and it is therefore not entirely clear whether he meant September 1751, or the closing days of September 1752. I incline to the second possibility, as Lochgarry’s and the Doctor’s major and, in Cameron’s case, final mission to the Highlands was undertaken during the Fall of 1752. The Jacobites were also not fully prepared to strike in 1751. 180. A ‘David Robertson of Woodshiel’ was on a list of excepted Jacobites of late 1746, and a ‘Robert of Woodshiels’ was mentioned in a list of attainted individuals of 1752. He fought and was wounded at Culloden, but escaped Cumberland’s death squadron in the days following the battle. See SP 36/92, ff. 191–4. ‘General List of Persons to be excepted in the Act of Grace’, c. November 1746; NeC 2,080. ‘Names of Rebels omitted in the first Bill of Attainder; & Left out also of the list of those Excepted in the General Indemnity, but whose Names were Transmitted by his Royal Highness to the Ministry, with the Evidences, or Precognitions taken against several of them, at that time’, 1752; MacBean Special Collection. John Sobieski Stolberg Allan and Charles Edward Allan, Lays of the Deer Forest, 2 vols (Edinburgh, 1848), II, 347–8, footnote 5. For Culdares, see BL Add. Ms 33050, ff. 194–5. Pickle ¼ Alasdair Ruadh MacDonell of Glengarry to [Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle?], c. March/April 1753. For the Jacobite agents’ attempt to inveigle their Scottish partisans also see SP 54/42, ff. 247–8. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, 14 December 1752; SP 54/42, ff. 251–2. Lieutenant-General George Churchill to same, Edinburgh, 14 December 1752; SP 54/42, ff. 253–4. ‘Extract of Two Paragraphs of a Letter from Lieut. Governor Leighton to Lieut. General Churchill; Extract of a Letter from Major Pym to Lieut. General Churchill’, (enclosure), Fort William, 5 December 1752. In May 1753, Alexander Cameron of Glenevis deposed that at least another dozen Jacobites had crossed the Channel with the Lochgarry/ Dr Cameron group of agents. SP 54/43, ff. 90–2. ‘Declaration of Alexander Cameron of Glenevis, in the Presence of Charles Areskine, L. J. C.’, Edinburgh Castle, 7 May 1753. The person in Blairfetty’s and Woodshiel’s company referred to as ‘Skalleter’, may be identified as Lieutenant-Colonel George Forbes of Skellater, who had served in Major-General John Gordon of Glenbucket’s regiment during the ’Forty-five. Forbes was also Glenbucket’s son-in-law, and according to Lord Milton again raised part of the Strathdon battalion upon hearing of the Mars and the Bellone landing near Arisaig in early May 1746. See Stuart Mss 281/131. ‘Etat

Notes 241

181.

182. 183.

184.

185.

de 64 Officiers Ecossois pour la Subsistence des quelles le Prince Edouard a recoura ala Generosite´ de Sa Majeste´’; NLS Ms 98, ff. 39–40, Anon., ‘Unto His Grace the Duke of Newcastle one of His Majestys Principal Secretarys of State’, c. 1749–1752; SP 54/31, ff. 136–7. Andrew Fletcher, Lord Justice Clerk Milton to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 23 May 1746; Livingstone of Bachuil et al., Muster Roll, 120–121. NeC 2,199/2. Duncan McVicar, Collector of the Customs at Fort William to Archibald Campbell, 3rd Duke of Argyll, Fort William, 19 October 1752; NeC 2,200/2. Archibald Campbell, 3rd Duke of Argyll to [Henry Pelham?], Inveraray, 1 November 1752; BL Add. Ms 33050, ff. 196–7. Pickle ¼ Alasdair Ruadh MacDonell to Henry Pelham, c. December 1752. Dr Cameron, Lochgarry, Blairfetty and a Captain Cameron, possibly John Cameron of Lochiel, all quit France at the same time. NLS Ms 5077, ff. 95–6. Anon., Intelligence, 9 December 1752. In a later report, Pickle says that Murray ‘when he came over in Novr Last brought over several manifestos to England, with a very ample Comission for—to raise the Clans and comand in Chief untill ane Expereins’d Generall Officer landed, and even then the Clans were to have a particular Comander (a Highlander) this they Insisted upon knowing what tools they have been in times past to Low Country Comanders no more Experiensd then the most ordinary amongest themselves’. BL Add. Ms 33050, ff. 194–5. Pickle ¼ Alasdair MacDonell of Glengarry to [Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle?], c. March/April 1753. See also SP 36/122, ff. 93–4. Archibald Gardiner to John Clevland, Secretary to the Lords of Admiralty, (enclosure), 22 June 1753, where the commissions are explicitly mentioned. BL Add. Ms 33050, ff. 196–7. Pickle ¼ Alasdair Ruadh MacDonell of Glengarry to Henry Pelham, c. December 1752. Stuart Mss 340/106. Alasdair Ruadh MacDonell of Glengarry to James Edgar, Arras, 5 April 1753. It was only in April 1753, that Tinwald informed Newcastle of a significant change in the previously sanguine behaviour of the Scottish Jacobites. He surmised that they had met with some disappointment. This is possibly a reference to the premature termination of the Elibank plot. SP 54/43, f. 60. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald, to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 9 April 1753. Sir Charles Petrie, ‘The Elibank plot’, 189; Elcho, A Short Account of the Affairs of Scotland, 139; Edith Cuthell, The Scottish Friend of Frederic the Great, I, 258. Mitigating the ostensibly naive character of Charles’ credulity in regard to potential Prussian support is the circumstance that not even one of James’ sources had any reason to suggest a better sponsor for Charles’ venture; the King in Rome received an exhaustive analysis of European power politics in which its author concluded that Frederick, in his then position, would do well to ally with the Jacobite interest. Stuart Mss 341/69. Arthur Goold to James, c. 9 May–17 September 1753. In his report of 4 November 1752, Pickle was certain that if the French ministry would support the conspiracy, it was through Frederick’s influence. Andrew Lang, Pickle, 173. Pickle met Charles in the Spring of 1753, and was told ‘that he Expected matters would go well in a very little time, He often mentioned foreigne assistance by the Court of Berlins Influence, from Swedland’. BL Add. Ms 33050, ff. 194–5. Pickle ¼ Alasdair Ruadh MacDonell of Glengarry to [Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle?], c. March/April 1753. See also McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 400.

242 Notes 186. For Charles’ determination to take a direct approach to a restoration of his family, see Stuart Mss 345/162. General Francis, Lord Bulkeley. ‘Historical Essay on the Stuart cause’, c. late 1753. 187. C. Leo Berry, The Young Pretender’s Mistress. Clementine Walkinshaw (Comtesse D’ Albestroff) 1720–1802 (Edinburgh and London, 1977), 39–57; Sir Charles Petrie, The Jacobite Movement: The Last Phase, 156; King, Political and Literary Anecdotes, 204–9; Sir Walter Scott, Redgauntlet, intro., 7–8. For Goring’s estrangement of Charles, see Stuart Mss 332/139. Charles to Colonel Henry Goring, 6 June 1752; Stuart Mss Box 1/349. Stouf ¼ Colonel Henry Goring to Charles, c. 7–18 June 1752; Stuart Mss 332/145. Same to the same, 7 June 1752. 188. Szechi, The Jacobites, 116. 189. NeC 2,111. ‘Pickle’s Intelligence Report’, [Glengarry?], 23 January 1752; Stuart Mss 301/97. Jackson ¼ Young Harrington to ?, London, 28 November 1749. This Jackson is probably the same person who went to Jamaica with Henry Dawkins, James’ brother. Andrew Lang, Pickle, 92. 190. The dispute concerned money from the Locharkaig treasure, or its distribution: Samuel’s brother, Glenevis, got £3,000, whereas Fassiefern, as Lochiel’s last representative, received £6,000 of which £4,000 was handed over to a solicitor named MacFarlane, who may have used a full £1,000 to transport swords to Scotland. NeC 2,097. ‘Hints about Dr. Cameron and MacDonell of Lochgarry’, c. 1752. Also see SP 54/43, ff. 27–8. Anon., ‘Substance of an Information Lo.[rd] J.[ustice] C.[lerk] Received this Morning from one in whom he can Intirely Confide . . . ’, Edinburgh, 14 March 1753. 191. SP 54/42, ff. 207–8. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Edinburgh, 6 November 1752; SP 54/42, ff. 221–2. Same to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 23 November 1752; SP 54/42, ff. 239–40. Same to the same, Edinburgh, 2 December 1752; SP 54/42, ff. 251–4. Lieutenant-General George Churchill to the same (cover-letter and enclosure), Edinburgh, 14 December 1752; SP 54/43, 15–16. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to the same, Edinburgh, 29 February 1753; SP 36/121, f. 57. Normand MacLeod of MacLeod to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, London, 27 January 1753. BL Add. Ms 35447, f. 297. James Ogilvy, 5th Earl of Findlater and 2nd Earl of Seafield to Philip Yorke, 1st Earl of Hardwicke, Cullen House, 8 November 1752; BL Add. Ms 35447, f. 307. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to Philip Yorke, 1st Earl of Hardwicke, Edinburgh, 23 December 1752; NLS Ms 5077, ff. 88–9. Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse to Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald, Whitehall, 17 November 1752; NeC 2,040. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to Henry Pelham, Edinburgh, 2 December 1752; NeC 2,081. ‘Names of some of the Attainted & Excepted Rebels, who are, or have been in Scotland’, 1752; NeC 2,199/2. Duncan McVicar, Collector of the Customs at Fort William to Archibald Campbell, 3rd Duke of Argyll, Fort William, 19 October 1752; NeC 2,200/2. Archibald Campbell, 3rd Duke of Argyll to [Henry Pelham?], Inveraray, 1 November 1752; NeC 2,200/ 1. Same to the same, Inveraray, 5 November 1752. For Tinwald’s complaint about the difficulty of tracking down Jacobite agents in the Highlands, see SP 54/42, ff. 5–6. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 10 March 1752; SP 54/42, ff. 19–20. Same to the same, Edinburgh, 15 May 1752; SP 54/43, ff. 27–8. Anon., ‘Substance of an Information Lo.[rd] J.[ustice] C.[lerk] received this Morning from one in whom he can Intirely Confide . . . ’, Edinburgh, 14 March 1753. This unnamed Scots officer in the

Notes 243 French service was probably Donald Cameron of Lochiel’s son, John. SP 54/43, f. 31. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 20 March 1753; SP 54/43, ff. 49–52. Captain Ferguson to John Clevland, Secretary to the Lords of Admiralty, aboard the Porcupine at the Caullickstone, 30 March 1753. 192. I would not go quite as far as Dr McLynn in saying that Glenure’s murder was the consequence of the Jacobite Highlanders’ frustration arising from the abortive Elibank plot. His suggestion however, can not be entirely discounted. Conversely, Professor Lenman’s assertion that the Master of Lovat’s assistance in the prosecution of James Stewart of Aucharn served to demonstrate ‘that violent resistance would be in no way condoned by the former Jacobite proprietors’, is probably conjectural, as Lenman cites no convincing evidence to support this contention. Young Lovat cannot be said to have been representative of the remaining Jacobite interest in the Highlands; if anything, he was viewed by them as a turncoat. Lenman’s application of the term ‘agrarian violence’ to describe the murder of Glenure and the continuing Jacobite guerrilla warfare in the Highlands ignores both the political connotation of the deed and the Jacobite nature of the albeit low-key, but then nevertheless continuing, armed resistance against the Hanoverian loyalists in the Highlands. McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 410; Lenman, Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen, 187. 193. NeC 2,132/2. ‘Memorandum of the Account received at Edinburgh by Express, of the Murder of Colin Campbell of Glenure, Factor upon the forfeited Estate of Ardshiel’, Edinburgh, 19 May 1752; NeC 2,133. John Campbell, 3rd Earl of Breadalbane to [Henry Pelham?], Taymouth, 19 May 1752; NeC 2,137. M. Cardonell, Jos[eph] Tudor, Co[lin] Campbell, Commissioners of Customs to James West at the Treasury, Edinburgh, 19 May 1752; NeC 2,135. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to Henry Pelham, Edinburgh, 23 May 1752; NeC 2,199/1. Archibald Campbell, 3rd Duke of Argyll to [Henry Pelham?], Inveraray, 31 October 1752; BL Add. Ms 35447, ff. 217–18. William Grant, Lord Advocate Prestongrange to Philip Yorke, 1st Earl of Hardwicke, Edinburgh, 11 June 1752; BL Add. Ms 35447, ff. 282–3. Archibald Campbell, 3rd Duke of Argyll to Philip Yorke, 1st Earl of Hardwicke, Inveraray, 25 September 1752; BL Add. Ms 35447, f. 284. Philip Yorke, 1st Earl of Hardwicke to Archibald Campbell, 3rd Duke of Argyll, Wimple, 11 October 1752; BL Add. Ms 35447, f. 291. Nathaniel Wiseman to Philip Yorke, 1st Earl of Hardwicke, 26 October 1752. SP 54/42, ff. 33–4. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Edinburgh, 18 May 1752; SP 54/42, ff. 35–6. Same to the same, Edinburgh, 19 May 1752; SP 54/42, ff. 41–2. Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse to Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald, Whitehall, 26 May 1752; SP 54/42, ff. 43–4. Lieutenant-General George Churchill to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle (via Claudius Amyand), Edinburgh, 5 June 1752; SP 54/42, ff. 45–6. Same to the same (via the same), (enclosure), Edinburgh, 5 June 1752; SP 54/42, ff. 47–8. Lieutenant-Colonel John Crawfurd to Lieutenant-General George Churchill (copy), Fort William, 24 May 1752; SP 54/42, ff. 94–5. Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse to Lieutenant-General George Churchill, Whitehall, 9 July 1752; SP 54/42, ff. 112–13. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Edinburgh, 18 July 1752; SP 54/42, ff. 114–15. Lieutenant-General George Churchill to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Edinburgh, 18 July 1752; SP 54/42, ff. 142–43. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, 7 July 1752. The declaration

244 Notes

194.

195. 196. 197. 198.

199.

of Allan Cameron of Callart’s son, however, exonerated Alan Breac. Apparently, the suspect, after his return to France, ‘very peremptorily Refus’d that he murdered Glenure, but own’d he could not deny that he expected it might happen’. SP 36/ 125, f. 102. ‘Declaration of Ewan Cameron [of Callart],’ 16 January 1754. In fact, Lieutenant-Colonel John Crawfurd later blamed Fassifern for engineering the assassination of Glenure, and in 1753 attempted to use Glenevis’ information to levy capital charges against the last Cameron chieftain in the Highlands. He failed in his endeavour. SP 54/43, ff. 132–8. Lieutenant-Colonel John Crawfurd to Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald, Edinburgh, 4 June 1753. For Claudius Amyand, see Sedgwick, The Commons, I, 414. The charge may have been based on the testimony given by an anonymous government witness known to Fassiefern, who deeply implicated the Cameron chieftain in Glenure’s murder. NLS Ms 315, f. 48. ‘Copy. Letter [Anon.], John Cameron of Fassiefern’, Blairmafildachinn, [6/16?] June 1752. For the trial of James Stewart, see HEH RB 335938. James Stewart, The Dying Speech of James Stuart, Tacksman of Aucharn in Appine, Tryed in a Justiciary Court at Inveraray the 21 of Sep. 1752, for the alledged Crime of being Art and Part, in the Murder of Colin Campbell of Glenure, present Factor upon the Estate of Ardsheil attainted; who was shot in the Wood of Lettermore upon the 14th of May last. Delivered from his own Hand at the Place of Execution ([Edinburgh?], 1752); HEH RB 345140. James Stewart, The Trial of James Stewart in Aucharn in Duror of Appin for the Murder of Colin Campbell of Glenure, Esq; Factor for His Majesty on the forfeited estate of Ardshiel; Before the Circuit Court of Justiciary held at Inveraray on Thursday the 21st, Friday the 22d, Saturday the 23d, and Monday the 25th of September last; by his Grace the Duke of Argyll, Lord Justice-General, and the Lords Elchies and Kilkerran, Commissioners of Justiciary (Edinburgh, 1753); MacBean Special Collection. Andrew Lang, ‘Historical Mysteries. The Case of Allan Breck’, Cornhill Magazine, March (1904), 323–36; David N. Mackay, ed., Trial of James Stewart (Edinburgh [1907] 1931); Carney, The Appin Murder, 72–153, 164–91; James Fergusson, ‘The Appin Murder Case’, Scottish Historical Review, 31, 2, 112 (1952), 116–30; and an unpublished, but nevertheless brilliant, essay by Niall MacKenzie, ‘The Appin Murder in Historical Perspective’ (1991). NeC 2,132/1. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to Henry Pelham, Edinburgh, 18 May 1752; NeC 2,154. Morris Corbyn, Secretary to the Customs in Scotland to Henry Pelham, 19 May 1752; Carney, The Appin Murder, 19–20. For the use of Aucharn’s trial and execution in the context of the government’s antiJacobite policy, see Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 217. NeC 2,136. ‘Copy of a Letter from Lord Bury, to Lieutenant-General Churchill’, Fort William, 24 May 1752. NLS Ms 5077, f. 37. Henry Pelham to [Archibald Campbell, 3rd Duke of Argyll?], 28 May 1752. BL Add. Ms 35447, ff. 295–6. Archibald Campbell, 3rd Duke of Argyll to Philip Yorke, 1st Earl of Hardwicke, Inveraray, 7 November 1752. NLS Ms 5077, ff. 93–4. EFF ¼ Duncan McVicar, Collector of Customs at Fort William to Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald, [Fort William?], 4 December 1752; SP 54/42, ff. 203–4. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Edinburgh, 26 October 1752; SP 54/43, ff. 12–13. Same to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 15 February 1753. SP 36/124, f. 170. ‘Memorandum from Mr. [Nathaniel] Carrington’, 1753; BL Add. Ms 33050, ff. 425–36. Anon., ‘Intelligence relating to the Pretender’s

Notes 245

200.

201.

202.

203.

204. 205.

206.

207.

Party’, c. January 1753. For the dating of this last document, see NeC 2,121/1. William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle to Henry Pelham, Paris, 17 January 1753. SP 78/246, ff. 134. William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Paris, 7 February 1753; SP 78/246, ff. 119–120. Same to the same, Paris, 9 February 1753; SP 88/75, [not foliated]. Sir Charles HanburyWilliams to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Dresden, 21 February 1753. Andrew Lang, Pickle, 173. Sir Charles Petrie, ‘The Elibank plot’, 191; McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 404–6. The British ministry did indeed hope that Dr Cameron’s arrest would constitute a serious blow to Jacobite operations. His arrest very likely did alert the Jacobites, and may have contributed to the premature termination of operations in Britain. SP 54/43, f. 37. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 26 March 1753; SP 54/43, ff. 30–40. Lieutenant-General George Churchill to the same, Edinburgh, 25 March 1753; SP 54/43, f. 80. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to the same, Edinburgh, 21 April 1753. Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle to Philip Yorke, 1st Earl of Hardwicke, Newcastle House, 21 September 1753, printed in Coxe, Pelham Administration, II, 492–3. See also Edith Cuthell, The Scottish Friend of Frederic the Great, I, 255. In the context of the dispute about the repayment of the Silesian Loan, the Jacobite card was Frederick’s principal tool of intimidation against Hanoverian Britain, and Cuthell states that it was indeed Marischal who suggested playing it. For Sir Walter Scott’s alternative explanation, possibly in reference to Pickle, see Redgauntlet, intro, 6. Horace Walpole to Horace Mann, Strawberry Hill, 27 April 1753, printed in Lewis, gen. ed., Horace Walpole’s Correspondence, XX, 371–4. Philip C. Yorke plainly states that Dr Cameron’s mission was undertaken in connection with ‘a new and dangerous project of rebellion, supported by Frederick of Prussia, whose emissary he was, and who was preparing to send arms to Scotland to kindle the flames anew’. Yorke, Earl of Hardwicke, I, 538. In fact, by the 1750s the British secret service’s deciphering office regularly spent three hours on Prussian correspondence a day. Kenneth Ellis, The Post Office in the Eighteenth Century. A Study in Administrative History (London, 1958), 76. Frederick II to George Keith, 10th Earl Marischal, Potsdam, 27 February 1753, printed in Politische Correspondenz, IX, 356 (my italics). Concerning the serious nature of Prussian support by 1753, my research corroborates that of Dr McLynn. Further research into Frederick’s connection with the Jacobites among the recently incorporated Merseburger collection at the Berliner Staatsarchiv could turn up interesting evidence. McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 410–11. Edith Cuthell, The Scottish Friend of Frederic the Great, I, 259–61. Tinwald had received orders to investigate Clark’s presence in Scotland as early as February. NLS Ms 5077, ff. 116–17. Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle to Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald, Whitehall, 27 February 1753. NLS Ms 5077, f. 133. Same to the same, Whitehall, 20 March 1753; SP 54/43, ff. 35–6. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 24 March 1753. SP 36/121, ff. 153–7. Nathaniel Carrington, Messenger. ‘Information of Christian Gottlib Christhold’, translation (original in German), [London?], 25 March 1753. In November, Christhold mentioned three vessels, not two. SP 36/161,

246 Notes

208.

209.

210.

211.

ff. 334–5. Christian Gottlib Christhold. Petition to George II, [London], 19 November 1753. Christhold’s tale is further corroborated by Colonel MacDonell of Lochgarry’s report, submitted to Charles shortly after his return from a mission to the Highlands in early 1753. In his memorial, which was submitted to Charles, Lochgarry suggested purchasing two vessels at London ‘to batter down the small Forts on the Western Coast of the Highlands’. Lang, Pickle, 210–17. Moreover, Christhold’s reference to the jewels is notable. The financial security of the Stuart family rested, in part, on the duchy of Ohlau in Silesia, transferred to the Sobieski family as a security against a loan of 400,000 Rhenish Florins to the Polish diet. Subsequently, the ‘Fund of Ohlau’ was proven to be a phantom inheritance – at the latest after the first Silesian War of 1740–41. On the other hand, Poland had pawned the crown jewels to the Sobieski family, but reserved the right to redeem them in the space of the next fifty years. Following the demise of Charles’ maternal grandfather, Prince James Sobieski, these jewels came into the possession of James’s two sons, Charles and Henry. It is possible that the anonymous English gentleman of Christhold’s deposition was referring to the Sobieski jewels. McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 104–5. Baron von Stosch stated that the Sobieski jewels were estimated at 50,000 Roman scudi. One standard Roman scudo weighed 3.5 grams and contained 986/1000 parts of gold; an English guinea of 1663 weighed 8.5 grams and contained 916,666/1000 parts of gold. According to von Stosch’s estimate, and if the approximate nature of the following conversion is taken into consideration, the Sobieski jewels could have fetched a price of about 22,546.716 guineas in the year 1663. Moreover, the reader should also consider the circumstance that currencies were constantly being debased. This essentially means that the 22,546.716 guineas of 1663 would have been of a higher value by ¨ lscher of Leu Numismatik AG in the early 1750s. I would like to thank Mr Detlef Ho ¨ rich, for his time and effort. Also see p. 97. Zu SP 36/161, ff. 334–5. Christian Gottlib Christhold. Petition to George II, [London], 19 November 1753. The prime suspect, the anonymous English Gentleman, was arrested but absconded, whereupon Simon and Salomon Jonas were discharged for lack of evidence. Christhold’s German-Jewish origins, and ¨ nchhausen and the messenger Nathaniel his prior connection with Baron Mu Carrington, both officials in Hanoverian service, gives rise to the assumption that his relation with the Jonases was not left to chance. After all, and despite ‘being in a Strange Country’, he knew exactly to whom he had to apply when he denounced his hosts. NLS Ms 5077, ff. 194–5. Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle to Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald, Whitehall, 25 September 1753; SP 54/43, f. 252. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, 20 October 1753. St Malo and Nantes were the Brittany ports most frequently used by the Franco-Irish privateers. McLynn, The Jacobites, 34, 138. For the Franco-Irish privateer Antoine Vincent Walsh, see note 139. This Walsh was in all probability the son of Count Antoine Vincent Walsh, Charles’ long-time associate. NLS Ms 5077, ff. 198–9. Alexander Legrand, Commissioner of the Customs at Edinburgh to Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald, [Edinburgh], 6 October 1753. SP 36/123, ff. 152–3. Archibald Campbell, 3rd Duke of Argyll to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Inveraray, 21 October 1753; SP 36/123, f. 158. Same to the same, Inveraray, (enclosure) 28 October 1753 (my italics). Also see BL Add. Ms 33050, ff. 409–10. Anon., Intelligence, c. 1755.

Notes 247 212. SP 36/122, ff. 93–4. Archibald Gardiner to John Clevland, Secretary to the Lords of Admiralty, (enclosure), 22 June 1753; SP 88/75, [not foliated]. Sir Charles Hanbury-Williams to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Dresden, 11 February 1753; SP 54/43, f. 268. ‘Copy of a Letter received by Lord Justice Clerk’, 22 November 1753. This intelligence report states that the Jacobites expected not only arms from France and Sweden, but an invasion in the Spring of 1754. 213. SP 54/43, f. 264. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 20 November 1753; SP 36/124. ff. 55–60. Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle to Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald, Whitehall, 16 November 1753. Also see BL Add. Ms 33050, ff. 409–10. Anon., Intelligence, c. 1755. This source states that arms were hidden away in subterranean arsenals located underneath various houses in Scotland. Sir Hugh Paterson was one of the individuals referred to as managers of the ‘Scots Affairs’. The other principals in Scotland mentioned in this report were ‘Stirling of Kear, M. Murray of Abercairney, M. Smith’. See BL Add. Ms 33050, f. 371. General Bland also aired his suspicions about Sir Hugh Paterson in early 1754. See SP 36/125, ff. 192–5. Abstracts of Letter from Lt. Gen. Bland and Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, [Edinburgh], 24 January–7 February 1754. 214. NeC 2,120. ‘A.[lasdair] M.[acDonell]. Very Private. Cypher and Directions’, October, 1752; BL Add. Ms 33050, ff. 369–76. Pickle ¼ Alasdair Ruadh MacDonell of Glengarry to [Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle?], 6 November 1753. (This report, written in a secretarial hand, may not have been authored by Pickle. Internal evidence suggests that the informer responsible for the intelligence in this report could have been James Mo´r MacGregor.); BL Add. Ms 33050, ff. 397–8. Anon., Memorandum, c. November 1753; BL Add. Ms 33050, ff. 409–10. Anon., Intelligence, c. 1755; SP 36/124. ff. 55–60. Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle to Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald, Whitehall, 16 November 1753. What implicated James Ogilvie still more, was his reported presence at the Scots College in Paris, where he may have met Charles. 215. See Livingstone of Bachuil et al., Muster Roll, 140. Alexander of Glenaladale was a fervent Jacobite, who, though recovering from his battle-wounds and in spite of Old Clanranald’s refusal to help, had assisted Charles during his five-month sojourn in the Highlands after Culloden. McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 292. For 3,000 stand of arms delivered to the Jacobites by the French just over a month after the battle of Culloden, see Cumberland Mss 15/278. Major-General John Campbell of Mamore to Sir Everard Fawkener, Strontian, 31 May 1746. 216. NeC 2,122. ‘Journal of John McKinnon’s Progress through the Highlands,’ Leith, 17 May 1753; NeC 2,202/1–2. Josiah Corthine to [Henry Pelham?], Port Glasgow, 15 May 1753. Also see SP 36/123, ff. 152–3. Archibald Campbell, 3rd Duke of Argyll to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Inveraray, 21 October 1753; SP 36/ 123, f. 158. Same to the same, Inveraray, (enclosure) 28 October 1753. For similar cases recorded in early 1747 and 1748, see ‘Substance of J.D.’s Examination taken before [the] Lord Justice Clerk and Lord Albemarle’, enclosed in William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 14 February 1747; Intelligence, enclosed in same to the same, Edinburgh, 28 January 1748, printed in Terry, ed., Albemarle Papers, I, 376; II, appendix, 524–8. Apparently, Ardshiel, Dr Cameron and possibly Lochgarry, had been in the Highlands in 1751, and Ogilvy’s presence in Angus was also reported, though doubted by Churchill, in November 1752. Another report of March 1753

248 Notes positively confirmed Lord Ogilvy’s arrival in Scotland. SP 54/41, ff. 248–9. Lieutenant Archibald MacLauchlan to [(Captain?) Colonel Trapaud?], Strontian, 15 October 1751; SP 54/42, ff. 213–14. Lieutenant-General George Churchill to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 21 November 1752; SP 54/43, ff. 17–18. Archibald Campbell [of Stonefield], Sheriff-Depute of Argyleshire to Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk, Levenside, 27 February 1753, (cover-letter and enclosure), Levenside, 27 February 1753; SP 54/43, ff. 19–20. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 3 March 1753; SP 54/43, ff. 23–4. Same to the same, Edinburgh, 10 March 1753; SP 54/43, f. 43. Anon. to Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald, Maryburgh, 13 March 1753; SP 54/43, ff. 49–52. Captain Ferguson to John Clevland, Secretary to the Lords of Admiralty, aboard the Porcupine at the Caullickstone, 30 March 1753; SP 54/43, ff. 78–9. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 21 April 1753. Concerning the inconclusive investigation into the arms-smuggling from Prussia and France, see SP 54/43, f. 252. Same to the same, Edinburgh, 20 October 1753; SP 54/43, f. 254. Same to the same, 30 October 1753; SP 54/43, f. 264. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 20 November 1753; SP 54/43, ff. 275–6. Same to the same, Edinburgh, 13 December 1753; SP 54/43, ff. 283–4. Same to the same, Edinburgh, 29 December 1753. 217. See my treatment of the Franco-Jacobite privateer Captain François Thurot in Chapter 5, pp. 155–6. For reference, see Hayes, Biographical Dictionary of Irishmen in France, 297–8. 218. Representing his kinsman’s case to James, Balhaldy sent a full report to Rome. Tried and incarcerated by the High Court of Justiciary alongside his brother Robin Oig – also a Jacobite agent – for his part in the abduction, and subsequent forcible marriage of the widow Jean Keay, James Mo´r managed to abscond in 1752. Notably, Barcaldine’s attempt to stay James Mo´r’s execution, in order to save him as a material witness in the Appin murder trial, failed. Apparently, James of Aucharn had attempted to hire Robin Oig as an assassin. On his way to France, the fugitive was forced to travel across Ireland, where he miraculously met with a lost sept of his own clan. Following the proscription of the MacGregors in the early seventeenth century, some 300 fled to, and settled in, Ireland. James Mo´r had been able to converse with two leading gentlemen of the Irish MacGregors, a Mr Savage, and a Mr Kalley, who assured him that they were willing to rise for James: indeed, they were prepared to launch a seaborne invasion with 3,000 men in their whirries across the Irish Sea to Argyll. They even thought themselves capable of targeting such a distant destination as Wales. James Mo´r agreed to lay their proposal at James’ feet. When it came, secretary Edgar’s response must have been particularly disappointing, for Balhaldy was told that James was going to inform his son, but could not ‘enter into that matter’, as he was ‘an absolute stranger to all H. R. H.s projects, & in an entire obscurity as to every thing that relates to him’. James would rather shift the burden of his family’s affairs on his son, with whom he had neither contact nor reached any semblance of accord, than abandon his resignation-induced position of nonintervention. Stuart Mss 342/43. Malloch ¼ William Drummond of Balhaldy to James, Bievre, 10 August 1753; Stuart Mss 342/182. James Edgar to William Drummond of Balhaldy, Rome, 11 September 1753; SP 54/43, ff. 61–2. Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse to William Grant, Lord Advocate Prestongrange, Whitehall, 18 June 1752; SP 54/42, ff. 63–4. William Grant, Lord Advocate

Notes 249 Prestongrange to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Edinburgh, 23 June 1752; SP 54/42, ff. 65–7. William Grant of Prestongrange, Indictment and Accusation against James MacGregor for Hamesucken, Ravishing of Women, and Forcible Abduction, by William Grant of Prestongrange, Lord Advocate ([Edinburgh?], [c. June?] 1752); SP 54/42, f. 118. ‘Copy Interloquotor of the Court of Justiciary. . . Against James MacGregor’, Edinburgh, 5 August 1752; SP 54/42, ff. 174–5. John Campbell of Barcaldine. ‘Memorial to the Lord Chief Baron & Barrons of his Majesty’s Court of Exchequer in Scotland’ (enclosure), Edinburgh, 12 August 1752; SP 54/42, ff. 179–80. Claudius Amyand to Lord Chief Baron John Idle and Baron Edward Edlin, Whitehall, 14 September 1752; SP 54/42, ff. 182–5. William Grant, Lord Advocate Prestongrange to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle (via the Lords Justices), Inveraray, 25 September 1752; SP 54/42, ff. 209–10. Same to the same [? or Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse], Edinburgh, 18 November 1752; SP 54/42, ff. 211–12. Lieutenant-General George Churchill to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Edinburgh, 18 November 1752; SP 54/43, f. 126. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 2 June 1753; SP 54/43, ff. 128–9. ‘Declaration of Robert Campbell, alias MacGregor, in the Presence of Charles Areskine, L. J. C.’, Stirling, 4 May 1753; John and Julia Keay, eds., The Collins Encyclopedia of Scotland (London, 1994), 654–5. For his commission in the Jacobite army, see Livingstone of Bachuil et al., Muster Roll, 167. For literary use of the historical figure of James Mo´r, see Robert Louis Stevenson, Catriona (Oxford, [1893], 1986), 424–53, 466–71. 219. For Charles O’Brien, 6th Viscount Clare, and tit. Earl of Thomond, see O’Callaghan, Irish Brigades in the Service of France, 42–4; Hayes, Biographical Dictionary of Irishmen in France, 32–3. 220. Lord George Murray’s involvement in this scheme would have been unlikely. After the battle of Culloden, Lord George had quarrelled with Charles, and was since excluded from the Prince’s inner circle. Stuart Mss 273/96. Lord George Murray to Charles, 17 April 1746; BL Add. Ms 33050, ff. 369–76. Pickle ¼ Alasdair MacDonell of Glengarry to [Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle?], 6 November 1753; SP 36/124, ff. 55–60. Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle to Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald, Whitehall, 16 November 1753. 221. Though Andrew Lang did not think that James Mo´r was Pickle, I cannot exclude the possibility that the government intelligence of 6 October (BL Add. Ms 33050, ff. 369–76) was penned by the MacGregor renegade. See Pickle, 164. James Mo´r’s motivation to inform against the Jacobites may be explicable, if the list of witnesses called against him at his trial is closely read. Among those listed were the Cameron chieftains Fassiefern and Dungallon. See SP 54/42, ff. 65–7. William Grant of Prestongrange, Indictment and Accusation against James MacGregor. For James Mo´r’s duplicity, see Stuart Mss 341/31. Certificate on behalf of James Mo´r MacGregor signed by Viscount Strathallan, Charles Boyd and William Drummond of Balhaldy, Boulogne, 22 May 1753; Stuart Mss 341/30. James Mo´r MacGregor to James Edgar, Boulogne, 22 May 1753; BL Add. Ms 33050, ff. 431–2. Anon., ‘Mr. Bulkeley’s Papers’, c. 1753>; NLS Ms 3187, ff. 164–5. James Mo´r MacGregor to Charles, Paris, 20 September 1753; NLS Ms 3187, ff. 193–4. ‘Questions to James Drummond by the Lord Chancellor [Hardwicke] of England’, November 1753; SP 54/41, ff. 266–7. Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle to Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald, Whitehall, 28 November 1751; SP 54/43, f. 256. Claudius Amyand to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, London, 3

250 Notes

222. 223.

224.

225.

226.

227.

228.

November 1753; SP 54/43, ff. 258–9. ‘Minutes taken from Mr. James Drummond, signed by him’, Whitehall, 3 November, 1753; SP 78/248, pt. 2, ff. 183–4. Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse to William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle, [Whitehall?], 18 October 1753; SP 78/248, pt. 2, ff. 227–8. Same to the same, Whitehall, 8 November 1753; NeC 2,132/2. David Bruce to [Henry Pelham?], Edinburgh, 31 November 1753. BL Add. Ms 33050, ff. 397–8. Anon., Memorandum, c. November 1753. NeC 2,122. ‘Journal of John McKinnon’s Progress through the Highlands’, Leith, 17 May 1753. As late as June 1754, Captain John Ferguson of the Porcupine reported Jacobite clan gatherings in Arisaig, Knoydart, Moydart, the Isle of Raasay and Portree on the Isle of Skye. SP 54/44, ff. 78–9. Captain John Ferguson to John Clevland, Secretary to the Lords of Admiralty, aboard the Porcupine in Greenock, 13 June, 1754. SP 54/43, ff. 35–6. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, 24 March 1753; BL Add. Ms 32733, ff. 351–2. Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse to George II (via Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle), c. November 1753 (my italics). Captain John Holker, Alexander Cameron of Glenevis and Dr Cameron’s widow suspected Glengarry of being a British spy. Andrew Lang, Pickle, 160–4; Companions of Pickle, 152–6. Lieutenant Samuel Cameron was the object of his fellow exile’s distrust; Captain Edgar of Ogilvy’s identified him as the same person suspected by Captain John Holker in 1751. Stuart Mss 330/10. Captain John Holker to Captain John Edgar, Paris, 14 February 1752; Stuart Mss 342/67. Captain John Edgar to James Edgar, Lille, 18 August 1753. James Mo´r was driven from France by Lochgarry, who actively spread the rumour of his being a spy in British pay. NLS Ms 3187, ff. 206–7. James Mo´r MacGregor to William Drummond of Balhaldy, c. October 1754 Following Pickle’s full disclosure of the Elibank plot, Holdernesse urged Albemarle to investigate the Prusso-Jacobite connection. SP 78/248, pt. 2, ff. 283–6. Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse to William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle, Whitehall, 6 December 1753. According to an anonymous informer, who presumably derived his intelligence from the inner circles of the Scots’ Jacobites command, a foreign expeditionary force, numbering 16,000 regulars, and consisting of Swedes, Prussians, Danes and French regiments, was preparing to invade Britain in early 1753. Apparently, the Swedes had already embarked their troops. This information was accorded some weight by the British government, as it passed through ministerial channels. SP 54/43, ff. 12–14. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle (cover-letter and enclosure), Edinburgh, 15 February 1753. See McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 411–12, for the international dimension and implications of the plot. I fully agree with Dr McLynn’s analysis of the European situation, who contends that Prussian aid for Charles in the given political context made perfect sense. I also agree that Frederick’s increased interest in Jacobitism during the final year of the plot probably did come too late. I would, however, like to add that my own investigation strongly suggests that the extent of Prussian involvement has not been fully realized by McLynn, and that he also underrates the explosive potential of the Prusso-British disputes concerning the Silesian Loan and the Friesland succession. See BL Add. Ms 32733, ff. 353–6. Hugh Valence Jones to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Whitehall, 1 December 1753. Pelham thought that the intelligences

Notes 251

229.

230.

231. 232.

concerning the Elibank plot transmitted through the British representative at Vienna, Robert Keith, who had been tipped off by the Austrian diplomat, Count Karl Colloredo, ‘were of a very serious Nature, and deserv’d the most mature Consideration’. Pelham suggested the stationing of Navy vessels off the Scottish and Irish coasts. The intelligence sent to the Irish administration should only ‘put them on their guard’; that is, it should not be fully released so as not to cause a panic. The cautious proceedings of the government can also be gauged from Jones’ belief that the arrest of the notorious Jacobite intriguer Eleanore Oglethorpe, Marquise de Me´zieres then staying at Westbrook, Godalming would be imprudent in spite of the fact that she had not even obtained official leave to enter Britain. Obviously, Jones did not want to alert the Jacobites prematurely. See also Amos Aschbach Ettinger, James Edward Oglethorpe. Imperial Idealist (Oxford, 1936), 281. SP 54/43, ff. 39–40. Lieutenant-General George Churchill to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 25 March 1753; SP 54/43, ff. 41–2. Captain Charles Craven to Captain Stewart, Inversnaid, 22 March 1753; SP 36/124, ff. 196–211. The Life of Dr. Archibald Cameron, Brother to Donald Cameron of Lochiel, Chief of that Clan (London, 1753); McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 410. An order to arrest Glenbuckie on charges of high treason was issued, but the fugitive absconded. SP 36/124, f. 168. Anon., Memorandum, May/December 1753. SP 54/ 43, ff. 102–3. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 14 May 1753. Stuart Mss Box 6/86. Archibald Cameron, Copy of what Dr. Archibald Cameron intended to have delivered to the Sheriff of Middlesex at the Place of Execution, but which he left in the Hands of his Wife for that End (London, 1753). Stuart Mss 342/67. Captain John Edgar to James Edgar, Lille, 18 August 1753; Stewart of Ardvorlich, The Camerons, 138; Andrew Lang, Pickle, 204. NLS Ms 5077, ff. 146–7. Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle to Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald, Whitehall, 20 April 1753; Stewart of Ardvorlich, The Camerons, 132. Glenevis had been arrested for his dealings with the Locharkaig treasure as early as October 1751, but had to be released as his and Fassifern’s papers, which were seized, were found to be ‘[c]ouched in very Ambiguous terms’. A request to detain him for another fortnight at Fort William was granted. Colonel John Crawfurd received powers to treat with Glenevis, who subsequently made material discoveries, which suggests the prisoners’ will to cooperate with the authorities. SP 54/41, ff. 229–30. Lieutenant George Churchill to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 24 October 1751; SP 54/41, 244–5. Lieutenant-General George Churchill to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 29 October 1751; SP 54/41, ff. 252–3. Colonel John Crawfurd to Lieutenant-General George Churchill, Fort William, 31 October 1751; SP 54/43, f. 82. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 24 [29?] April 1753; SP 54/43, ff. 84–5. ‘Declaration of Angus Cameron [of Downan], Brother to Cameron of Glenevis in the Presence of Charles Areskine, L. J. C.’, c. April 1753; SP 54/43, ff. 88–9. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 7 May 1753; SP 54/43, ff. 90–2. ‘Declaration of Alexander Cameron of Glenevis, in the Presence of Charles Areskine, L. J. C.’, Edinburgh Castle, 7 May 1753; SP 54/43, f. 94. ‘Declaration of Charles Stewart, Notary Publick Writer in Maryburgh, in the Presence of Charles Areskine, L. J. C.’, Edinburgh Castle, 7 May 1753; SP 54/43, ff. 102–3. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to Thomas Holles, Duke of

252 Notes

233.

234. 235.

236.

237. 238.

239.

Newcastle, Edinburgh, 14 May 1753; SP 54/43, ff. 104–5. ‘Declaration of John Cameron of Fassifern, in the Presence of Charles Areskine, L. J. C.’, Edinburgh Castle, 14 May 1753. SP 54/43, ff. 98–9. Lieutenant-Colonel John Crawfurd to Lieutenant-General George Churchill, Fort William, 17 March [1753?]; SP 54/43, ff. 100–1. Alexander Cameron of Glenevis to same, Edinburgh Castle, 9 May 1753; Andrew Lang, The Companions of Pickle, 137, 148, 150–1, 152–7. Andrew Lang, Pickle, 205. At the time of this dispute, two attempts to assassinate Glenevis had failed. SP 54/ 42, ff. 213–14. Lieutenant-General George Churchill to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 21 November 1752; SP 54/42, ff. 215–16. ‘Unto Mr. George Douglas Sheriff Substitute of Inverness. The Petition of Alexander Cameron of Glenevis’ (enclosure), 21 November 1752; SP 54/43, ff. 90–2. ‘Declaration of Alexander Cameron of Glenevis, in the Presence of Charles Areskine, L. J. C.’, Edinburgh Castle, 7 May 1753; SP 54/43, ff. 98–9. Lieutenant-Colonel John Crawfurd to Lieutenant-General George Churchill, Fort William, 17 March [1753?]; SP 54/43, ff. 100–1. Alexander Cameron of Glenevis to the same, Edinburgh Castle, 9 May 1753. For Fassifern’s case against Glenevis, see Stewart of Ardvorlich, The Camerons, 131–2. For Alexander of Glenevis’ absence from the Jacobite officers’ corps in 1745–46, see Livingstone of Bachuil et al., Muster Roll, 32–3. Of this sept of clan Cameron, only Alexander’s brother Allan Cameron is listed as having held a commission below the rank of captain. After the ’Fortyfive, Glenevis was, however, only arrested on suspicion of collaboration with the Jacobites. Seton and Arnot, Prisoners of the ’45, 68–9. SP 36/124, f. 156. Alexander Cameron of Glenevis to Colonel Watson, copy, Glenevis, 12 December 1753; SP 54/43, ff. 272–4. ‘Copy of a Letter from Alexr. Cameron of Glenevis, to Colo. Watson, Glenevis’, 12 December 1753. And another from Captain [Samuel] Cameron to his brother Cameron of Glenevis, dated at Lisle, 31 August 1753.’ Glenevis’ call for succour from the government on behalf of his brother may have been hasty, but he had good reason to expect their aid. Notably, Tinwald had written to Newcastle in May that ‘Glenevis shall be distinguish’t in the manner of treating and examining him, as your Grace has order’d’. Crawfurd echoed this type of approach in his recommendation to the Lord Advocate. In other words, Glenevis and Angus of Downan were accorded preferential treatment in exchange for sensitive informaton. SP 54/43, f. 106. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 22 May 1753; SP 54/43, ff. 164–5. William Grant, Lord Advocate Prestongrange to [Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle?], Edinburgh, 14 June 1753; SP 54/43, f. 174. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 5 July 1753. SP 36/124, f. 157. Alexander Cameron of Glenevis to Colonel Watson, copy, Glenevis, 12 December 1753. SP 36/124, ff. 153–8. Lieutenant-General Humphrey Bland to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, [25?] December 1753; SP 54/43, ff. 281–2. ‘Extract of a Letter from Lieut.-Gen. Bland to the Duke of Newcastle . . . ’, Edinburgh, 25 December 1753. SP 36/124, ff. 153–8. Lieutenant-General Humphrey Bland to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, [25?] December 1753; SP 54/42, ff. 213–14. Lieutenant-General George Churchill to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 21 November 1752. There is a matching case to Bland’s treatment

Notes 253

240.

241.

242. 243.

of Samuel Cameron’s case: that of young Archibald MacDonell of Barrisdale. Bland’s and Tinwald’s intention had been to detach cells from the Scottish Jacobite party by encouraging mutual suspicion. See SP 54/44, f. 40. LieutenantGeneral Humphrey Bland to James Wallace, Inverness, 20 May 1754; SP 54/44, f. 42. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Edinburgh, 21 May 1754; SP 54/44, f. 58. ‘Letter of Reprieve for Archibald MacDonell of Barrisdale signed by the Duke of Argyle’, Edinburgh, 20 May 1754; BL Add. Ms 35448, ff. 98–9. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to Philip Yorke, 1st Earl of Hardwicke, Edinburgh, 2 May 1754; SP 54/ 43, f. 86. Same to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 1 May 1753; SP 54/43, ff. 132–8. Lieutenant-Colonel John Crawfurd to Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk, Edinburgh, 4 June 1753; SP 54/43, ff. 278–80. ‘Abstract of Lieut.Gen. Bland’s Letters’, Edinburgh, 20, 25, 29 December; 5 January 1753/54. SP 54/44, ff. 12–17. Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle to Lieutenant-General Humphrey Bland, Whitehall, 26 January 1754; SP 36/125, ff. 192–5. Abstracts of Letters from Lieutenant-General Humphrey Bland and Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, 24 January–7 February 1754; Andrew Lang, Pickle, 205; Robert Forbes, The Lyon in Mourning, ed. Henry Patton, 3 vols (Edinburgh, 1895), III, 137. Stuart Mss 340/128. John Sempill (in Charles’ hand) to James Dormer, Lille, 13 April 1753; Charles to Colonel Henry Goring, 22 April 1753; Stuart Mss 340/159. Captain John Cameron of Lochiel to James Edgar, Paris, 27 April 1753; Stuart Mss 340/160. Same to James, Paris, 27 April 1753; BL Add. Ms 35448, f. 222. Robert Dundas, Lord Arniston to Philip Yorke, 1st Earl of Hardwicke, [Edinburgh], 24 December 1754; BL Add. Ms 35448 f. 218. William Grant, Lord Advocate Prestongrange to the same, Edinburgh, 24 December 1754; NLS Ms 3187, ff. 220–1. Captain John Cameron of Lochiel to William Drummond of Balhaldy, St Germain, 22 April 1755; SP 54/43, ff. 100–1. Alexander Cameron of Glenevis to Lieutenant-General George Churchill, Edinburgh Castle, 9 May 1753; SP 54/43, ff. 164–5. William Grant, Lord Advocate Prestongrange to [Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle?], Edinburgh, 14 June 1753; SP 54/43, f. 170. Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle to William Grant, Lord Advocate Prestongrange, Whitehall, 29 June 1753; SP 54/43, ff. 188–9. William Grant, Lord Advocate Prestongrange to [Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle?], Edinburgh, 7 August 1753; SRO GD/50/22/1 no. 19. John Cameron and Alexander Lockhart, ‘Answers for John Cameron of Fassfern . . . ’, 10 August 1753; SRO GD/50/22/ 1/ no. 19/3. William Grant of Prestongrange, The Complaint of His Majesty’s Advocate, for his Majesty’s Interest; against John Cameron of Fassfern, the second or immediate younger Brother of Donald Cameron late of Lochiel, attainted ([Edinburgh], 1753); Stewart of Ardvorlich, The Camerons, 139; Andrew Lang, Companions of Pickle, 147–75. NLS Ms 5077, ff. 142–3. Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle to Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald, Whitehall, 30 March 1753. SP 54/43, ff. 45–6. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 27 March 1753; SP 54/43, ff. 47–8. ‘Declaration of Doctor Cameron – Taken before the Lord Justice Clerk upon the 27 March 1753 within the Castle of Edinburgh’, Edinburgh, 27 March 1753; SP 54/43, ff. 68–77. ‘The Examination of Dr. Archibald Cameron, taken at Whitehall, on the 17th. Day of April’, Whitehall, 17 April 1753; SP 36/124, ff. 196–211. The Life of Dr. Archibald Cameron.

254 Notes 244. SP 36/122, ff. 10–11. ‘Memorandum concerning Dr. Cameron’, Tower, 16 May 1753 (my italics). Moreover, Dr Cameron’s gaolers believed ‘[t]hat The Prisoner was going to say Something, which, He thought, might merit Mercy’. The fact that Dr Cameron was executed could either mean that, if he did indeed betray the details of the Elibank plot, his information was not important enough for the government to spare him, or otherwise could indicate his refusal to divulge any significant details of the conspiracy. If Dr Cameron did make substantial disclosures during his examinations (of which the government would probably not have made a record), and if the news of his betrayal had somehow reached the Jacobite conspirators, the sudden abortion of the Elibank plot would be explicable. Conversely, also see Stuart Mss Box 6/86. Archibald Cameron, Copy of What Dr. Archibald Cameron Intended to have Delivered, wherein he states ‘I am accused of being deeply concerned in a new Plot against this Government; which, if I was, neither the Fear of the worst Death their Malice could invent, nor much less the blustering and noisy Threatenings of the tumultous Council, nor even their flattering Promises, could extort any Discovery of it from me.’ 245. Following the execution of Dr Cameron, James’ court in Rome was (in a fit of righteous indignation) stirred into invectives against the British government, while previously his arrest had apparently not elicited much emotion from the Jacobite community in Paris. According to the Earl of Albemarle’s report, Marischal called Lochgarry and Archibald Cameron two weak men, who had wanted to go home. Predictably, Jacobite hopes in Scotland subsided; but the ministry was not satisfied that the Jacobite attempt had been successfully averted with the destruction of one agent, however important he may have been. Campbell of Airds agreed with what ‘[s]ome ffriends to the Government’ suspected. As he put it: ‘If the party has a [illegible] prospect of an Invasion . . . the design is carried on in a more Secret way than usual . . . that some Persons are not now, tho’ formerly intrusted with their secrets’. NLS Ms 5078, ff. 7–8. Donald Campbell of Airds to [Archibald Campbell, 3rd Duke of Argyll?], Airds, 16 January 1754; SP 78/247, ff. 61–2. Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse to William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle, Whitehall, 16 April 1753; SP 78/247, 56–7. William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Paris, 21 April 1753; SP 98/59, ff. 63–4. Horace Mann to the same, Florence, 13 July, 1753; SP 36/125, ff. 137–40. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald, (enclosure), Edinburgh, 26 January 1754. 246. SP 36/125, ff. 143–6. Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle to Lieutenant-General Humphrey Bland, Whitehall, 26 January 1754; BL Add. Ms 35448, ff. 49–50. ‘Memorandum relating to the Western Islands of Scotland’, c. early 1754; BL Add. Ms 35448, ff. 57–8. Lieutenant-General Humphrey Bland to Philip Yorke, 1st Earl of Hardwicke, Edinburgh, 22 February 1754; SP 78/249, f. 17. William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Paris, 9 January 1754; SP 78/249, f. 196. Same to Sir Thomas Robinson, Paris, 17 April 1754; SP 78/249, f. 263. Same to the same, Paris, 29 May 1754; SP 78/249, f. 274. Same to the same, Paris, 5 June 1754; SP 78/249, f. 280. Sir Thomas Robinson to William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle, Whitehall 6 June 1754; BL Add. Ms 35448, f. 142. Lieutenant-General Humphrey Bland to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, copy, Edinburgh, 13 August 1754. 247. Stuart Mss 343/2, no. 1. George Keith, 10th Earl Marischal to Charles, 18 September 1753. 248. Ibid. 249. Andrew Lang, Pickle the Spy, 207.

Notes 255 250. Stuart Mss 353/19. Campbell ¼ Alexander Murray of Elibank to Charles, < 23 September 1753. 251. Stuart Mss 343/2, no. 2. Charles to George Keith, 10th Earl Marischal, 23 September 1753. 252. Stuart Mss 341/27. Lord George Murray to James Edgar, Emmerich, 22 May 1753; Stuart Mss 343/129. Same to the same, Emmerich, 2 October 1753. 253. Stuart Mss 341/138. James to Lord George Murray, 9 July 1753. 254. Uriel Dann, Hanover and Great Britain 1740–1760 (London, [1986] 1991), 15; Basil Williams, The Whig Supremacy, 1714–1760 (Oxford, [1939] 1962), 347–8. 255. NeC 2,086. ‘Narrative & Informations of A:[lasdair] M:[acDonell]’, August 1751; ¨ ran Behre, ‘Sweden and the Rising of 1745’, 150. See also Keith Schuchard, Go ‘Charles Edward Stuart as ‘‘Chevalier de Soleil d’Or’’ ’, 7. Sir Hector MacLean’s scheme of 1749, which implicated Louis XV and his favourite, the Duc de Richelieu, certainly gives rise to some questions concerning French ambivalence towards the British after the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. See also McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 400, for Prussian promises to secure 6,000 Swedish regulars for an invasion of Britain. 256. SP 54/41, ff. 248–9. Lieutenant Archibald MacLauchlan to [Captain Trapaud?], Strontian, 15 October 1751. Ardshiel, Dr Cameron, and probably Lochgarry were sent to the Highlands as emissaries. They carried dispatches to the chiefs saying that Louis XV was prepared to lend James his full support, and was only awaiting an opportunity to provoke hostilities with Britain. 257. See my treatment of Captain François Thurot’s expedition within the context of the ’Fifty-nine in Chapter 5, pp. 155–6. For reference, see Hayes, Biographical Dictionary of Irishmen in France, 297–8. 258. Irregular warfare did present the conventional British army with problems; though the British regulars did adapt to the Highland terrain, so-called Independent Companies drafted from the Whig clans had to be employed against the Jacobites. In any case, a Jacobite guerrilla campaign in the Highlands would have tied down much of the government forces stationed in Scotland, and would implicitly have provided any invader with a strategic advantage over the defenders. The British troops would have had to spread into a thin red line; in the process, they would almost certainly have had to over-extend their communications and supply lines. Peter E. Russell, ‘Redcoats in the Wilderness: British Officers and Irregular Warfare in Europe and America, 1740 to 1760’, William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, 35, 4 (1978), 629–52, 635–41; For the Independent Companies, see MacKillop, ‘Military Recruiting in the Scottish Highlands’, 25–7; Major I. H. Mackay of Scobie, ‘The Highland Independent Companies of 1745– 47’, Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, 20 (1941), 5–37. For smugglers willing to act as pilots during the ’Forty-five, see SP 36/92, f. 219. Anon., ‘Information about recruiting in Scotland for the French Service þ the smuggling trade carried on with France’, late 1746; Cruickshanks, Political Untouchables, 62–3; also see, Kle´ber Monod, ‘Dangerous Merchandise’, 154, 167. The recruitment of British smugglers as pilots for an invading fleet was again suggested by the attainted chief of clan Robertson in 1755. Stuart Mss 358/16. Duncan Robertson, 11th Laird of Struan to James Edgar, Corbeil, 4 September 1755. 259. King, Political and Literary Anecdotes, 197. 260. Thicknesse, Memoirs and Anecdotes, 341–2. 261. SP 54/43, ff. 12–14. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle (cover-letter and enclosure), Edinburgh, 15 February

256 Notes

262.

263.

264.

265.

5

1753. In early 1753, the British government had reason to believe in the possibility of Franco-Prussian connivance at, and support for, Jacobite schemes. SP 54/ 43, ff. 35–6. Same to the same, Edinburgh, 26 March 1753. Charles Stewart, Fassifern’s lawyer, suggested that a Swedish expeditionary force of 12,000 was to be landed in Wales with the active support of the combined Franco-Spanish fleets. SP 54/43, f. 94. ‘Declaration of Charles Stewart, Notary Publick Writer in Maryburgh, in the Presence of Charles Areskine, L. J. C.’, Edinburgh Castle, 7 May 1753. A government report of late 1753 warned that the Jacobites expected the invading force to consist of Protestant troops. SP 54/43, f. 268. ‘Copy of a Letter received by Lord Justice Clerk’, 22 November 1753. By late 1751, the government intercepted coded letters, which suggested tensions among the Highland Jacobites owing to the distribution of the Locharkaig treasure; obviously, little was done to discourage the scramble for the French gold. SP 54/41. ff. 227–8. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 22 October 1751. For Major Kennedy’s possible defection to the Hanoverians, see NLS Ms 3187, ff. 76–7. Francis, 2nd tit. Baron Sempill to William Drummond of Balhaldy, Chartres, 23 August 1748. Dr MacKillop suggests that, at the time of the Elibank plot, the British polity was aware of Jacobite potential. MacKillop, ‘Military Recruiting in the Scottish Highlands’, 34. See Fritz, The English Ministers and Jacobitism, 39–40, 59, 99–108.

The Last Attempt: The Jacobites and the ’Fifty-Nine, 1756–1759 1. MacBean Collection. Secret History Relating to the Times, Particularly The Rumour of an Invasion: An Essay tending to quiet the Minds of the People (London, 1756), 17. 2. For the anti-French League of Augsburg, see Philippe Erlanger, Ludwig XIV. Das Leben eines Sonnenko¨nigs (Frankfurt am Main, [1971] 1987), 279; Herbert H. Rowen, The Princes of Orange. The Stadholders in the Dutch Republic (Cambridge, [1988] 1990), 143; Barry Coward, The Stuart Age (New York, [1980] 1992), 300, and especially 322. On Anglo-Prussian relations in the mid-eighteenth century, see Manfred Schlenke, England und das Friderizianische Preussen, 1740–1763, published Habilitationsschrift, Philipps-University at Marburg (Munich, 1963), 171–4; 187–95. 3. Schlenke, England, 195. 4. G. P. Gooch, Louis XV. The Monarchy in Decline (London, 1956), 161–5. 5. Uriel Dann, Hanover and Great Britain, 1740–1760 (London, [1986] 1991), 96. 6. Jeremy Black, Culloden and the ’45 (Stroud and New York, [1990] 1993), 201. It is ironical that the French commander was Louis-François-Armand du Plessis, Duc de Richelieu, who had commanded the Franco-Jacobite fleet preparing to invade Britain in 1744. Frank McLynn, France and the Jacobite Rising of 1745 (Edinburgh, 1981), 116. 7. E. J. S. Fraser, ‘The Pitt-Newcastle Coalition and the Conduct of the Seven Years’ War, 1757–1760’, unpublished D. Phil. thesis (Oxford, 1976), 165. 8. Horace Walpole said of de Bernis that he had ‘an easy talent for trifling poetry; it was his whole merit and his whole fortune’. Horace Walpole, Earl of Orford, Memoires of the Last Ten Years of the Reign of George the Second, 2 vols (London, 1822), II, 332–3. 9. Frank J. McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie. Charles Edward Stuart (Oxford, [1988] 1991), 449.

Notes 257 10. The one notable exception is the seminal article by Claude Nordmann, ‘Choiseul and The Last Jacobite Attempt of 1759’, in Eveline Cruickshanks, ed., Ideology and Conspiracy: Aspects of Jacobitism, 1689–1759 (Edinburgh, 1982), 201–17. Two general accounts of the negotiations can be found in McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, see chapters 30 and 31, 433–54; and in The Jacobites (London, [1985] 1988), 35–8, by the same author. Andrew Lang was aware of renewed Franco-Jacobite collusion, and French plans to invade the British Isles during the first phase of the Seven Years’ War. Andrew Lang, Pickle the Spy (London, 1897), 301–23. 11. In 1979, Dr Eveline Cruickshanks stated that Choiseul ‘did not consult the Pretender, although he had an inconclusive meeting with Charles Edward in France’. Actually, Charles’ partisans established a continuous dialogue with the French ministers which may be deemed to have been outright negotiations. Moreover, there is reason to believe that after the fall of Cardinal de Bernis, Charles frequently met with several French ministers, attended their cabinet meetings incognito and that Louis XV received him in his closet on more than one occasion. Six years later, in 1985, Dr McLynn acknowledged the reality of Franco-Jacobite cooperation for an invasion scheme during the Seven Years’ War. To date, there has been no comprehensive account of the events leading to the ’Fifty-nine. The present chapter seeks to present a detailed treatment of the Franco-Jacobite negotiations during the years 1756–59, and to enlarge upon McLynn’s perspective thereof. Eveline Cruickshanks, Political Untouchables. The Tories and the ’45 (London, 1979), 113; McLynn, The Jacobites, 35–8. For the inclusion of James and Charles in French deliberations, see BL Eg. Mss 3478, ff. 41–2. Intelligence, R. 21 January–7 February, 1756; and note 173. 12. For the definitive account on the Irish exiles in France, see J. C. O’Callaghan, History of the Irish Brigades in the Service of France (Glasgow, 1870); for the Irish exiles in Imperial service, see Christopher Duffy, ‘The ‘‘Wild Geese’’ in Austria,’ History Today, (1968), 646–52. A general account of the Scots Jacobites in France is rendered in Claude Nordmann, ‘Les Jacobites Ećossais en France au XVIIIe Sie`cle’, in Miche`le S. Plaisant, ed., Regards sur l’Ećosse au XVIIIe Sie`cle (Lille, 1977), 81–108. Two lists of Jacobites in France after the ’Fifteen can be found in the Bibliothe`que Municipale at Avignon. The first one bears the misleading title ‘Liste des Anglois de la Suite de Jacques III. Roy dangleterre arriveé a avignon en 1716. Le 2. avril’ (Bibliothe`que Municipale d’Avignon, Ms 2827, ff. 611–12). The second list (‘Liste des Anglois qui se trouvent presentement a Avignon . . . 1716. toud Seigneurs qualifie´s d’Ecosse ou ailleurs’) is in Bibliothe`que Municipale d’Avignon, Ms 3188, ff. 213–15, ‘journal du docteur BRUN. se´jour de Jacques III en Avignon’. I would like to thank Dr Eveline Cruickshanks for bringing these two documents to my attention. See also Chapter 3, pp. 48–9. 13. See, for example, Stuart Mss 340/159. John Cameron of Lochiel to James Edgar, 27 April 1753; Stuart Mss 340/160. Same to James, 27 April 1753. 14. Stuart Mss 378/31. David, Lord Ogilvy, tit. Earl of Airlie to Charles, Paris, 31 December 1757. 15. Stuart Mss 392/63. General Charles Edward Rothe to [Charles or James?], Paris, 11 April 1759. 16. BL Add. Ms 35449, ff. 17–18. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to Philip Yorke, 1st Earl of Hardwicke, Edinburgh, 7 March 1756. ‘Hints humbly offered by the Lord Justice Clerk, and Some considerable well affected Persons in Scotland, For the Consideration of His Majesty’s Ministers, on Occasion of the present critical Conjuncture’. In his intelligence report of August 1751, Alasdair

258 Notes

17. 18.

19. 20.

Ruadh MacDonell of Glengarry told the British government that John Cameron of Lochiel and his brother ‘long much to see their own Country, and dont despair of getting their Estate again, being made to believe that the Clann Act will stand good, and that in that Case, the Superiors will restore it to them’. NeC 2,086. ‘Narrative & Informations of A:[lasdair] M:[acDonell]’, August 1751. An anonymous memorandum in the Pelham papers referring to the Clan Act, states that ‘[t]he Persons who have forfeited, are made to believe that the Clan Act is to stand good, & if so, that all such Forfeitures as are devolv’d upon Subjects Superiors will be made easy to the Original Proprietors; and indeed there is little doubt but many of the Rebells will in a Short time have their Estates return’d to them & their Families by such Subjects Superiors, as was done after the Rebellion, 1715’. NeC 2,090 ‘Observations, Septemr. 6th 1751’. On attempted evasions of forfeiture by Jacobites using the Clan Act, also see Annette M. Smith, Jacobite Estates of the Forty-Five (Edinburgh, 1982), 6. For Tinwald see, Romney Sedgwick, The Commons, 1715– 1754, 2 vols (London, 1970), I, 420. The Earl of Hardwicke was Lord Chancellor from 1737–56. Dann, Hanover and Great Britain, 151. Stuart Mss 320/125. James to Charles, Rome, 19 April 1751. For example, see SP 88/71 [not foliated], Sir Charles Hanbury Williams to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Berlin, 17 October 1750; SP 78/241, ff. 156–7. William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Paris, 5 October 1751 OS/16 October 1751 NS; NeC 2,121/1. Same to Henry Pelham, Paris, 17 January 1753; Horace Mann to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Florence, 4 August 1752; Lang, Pickle the Spy, 21; McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 382–5, 413, 434; Stuart Mss 323/159. Sir James Harrington to Charles, Avignon, 6 August 1751; Stuart Mss 325/148. Same to the same, Avignon, 6 October 1751; Stuart Mss 321/109. Charles. ‘An Account of one of his Escapes near Luneville’, 20, May 1751. Stuart Mss 327/115. Anon. to George Waters, Jr., 30 [November?] 1751. Conversely, a French assassin, J. Louis Vallettan, tried to kill George II on his return from Parliament in 1756. He was closely connected to a Mr Sheridan. Sheridan tried to recruit an artist in the Fleet prison, who was to draw plans of fortifications for him. Though it is unlikely that the assassination-plot was sanctioned by Charles – he had vetoed Murray of Elibank’s plan to this effect in the early 1750s – the contact with Sheridan suggests that Vallettan was in touch with Jacobite agents operating in England. The British government discovered the plot because Sheridan lost his letter in the Fleet prison, where it was found by the very man he wanted to recruit. Henry Fox, the principal secretary of state, then issued a warrant to apprehend Vallettan. SP 36/133, f. 178. Henry Fox to Nathaniel Carrington and Charles Turner, Messengers in Ordinary, 13 March 1756; f. 181. J. Louis Vallettan to Mr. Sheridan, Chelsea, 9 March 1756; ff. 182–4. ‘John Clevland’s minute concerning the case of R. Chandler, J. Louis Vallettan, and a scheme to assassinate George II’, 13 March 1756; ff. 189–92. ‘The Examination of Robert Chandler a Prisoner in the Fleet’ [London?], 15 March 1756; McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 405. Clevland was the secretary to the Admiralty from 1751–63. See Sedgwick, The Commons, I, 559–60. Lesley Lewis, Connoisseurs and Secret Agents in Eighteenth Century Rome (London, 1961), 138. One notable exception was Sir Horace Mann (1701–86), British representative in Florence from 1740–86, whose gossipy correspondence about the Stuarts outlived James. Much of it can be found in the foreign State papers for Tuscany (SP 98). See also Dr John Doran, Mann and Manners at the Court of Florence, 1740–1786, 2 vols

Notes 259

21. 22.

23. 24. 25.

26.

(London, 1876), in which numerous excerpts of Mann’s correspondence with Sir Horace Walpole have been quoted. Baron Philip von Stosch, a Prussian by birth, was also on the payroll of the British secret service for thirty-five years. Using the alias of ‘John Walton’ he passed on a staggering amount of minutiae on the daily routine of the Stuart court in Rome to his employers at Whitehall. Von Stosch was intimately acquainted with, and recruited by, Cardinal Alessandro Albani, who supervised the intelligence network for the British in Rome. Lewis, Connoisseurs, 12, 49–90. His reports can also be found in the foreign State papers for Tuscany. McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 449. George Kelly was the Irish Non-Juring parson who had languished in the Tower for his part in Bishop Atterbury’s plot to restore the Stuarts in 1722–23, and subsequently served the arch-Jacobite Duke of Ormonde as secretary until the latter’s death in 1744; he was one of the ‘Seven Men of Moidart,’ accompanying Charles to Scotland in the following year. Richard Hayes, Biographical Dictionary of Irishmen in France, (Dublin, 1949), 139–40; John Sibbald Gibson, Lochiel of the ’45. The Jacobite Chief and the Prince (Edinburgh, [1994] 1995), appendix, 199; Fitzroy Maclean, Bonnie Prince Charlie (Edinburgh, [1988] 1995), 31. For a more extensive treatment of George Kelly, see Chapter 3, note 16. McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 315. Stuart Mss 285/177. Watson ¼ William Drummond of Balhaldy to James Edgar, 23 July 1747. Peggy Miller, James (London, 1971), 328; Colin Haydon, Anti-Catholicism in Eighteenth-Century England, c.1714–80. A Political and Social Study (Manchester and New York, 1993), 165. When he was appraised of Charles’ conversion, the British ambassador in Paris, William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle, immediately grasped its political ramifications, writing to the Earl of Holdernesse: ‘If this alteration in his Religious Principles be true, I take it for granted it must be with design to engage his Protestant Adherents more firmly to his Cause, and the news of it will be soon publickly spread, though at the same time I am sure it will make him many Ennemies among those of His Party who are of the Catholick Religion, but my informations say he has taken this step, by the advice and at the Sollicitation of his Friends in England’. SP 78/245 ff. 202–3. William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Paris, 22 November 1752. To Charles, religion was not nearly as important as his family’s dynastic claim. According to Alice Shields, Charles denied his apostasy after his return to Rome, and eventually returned to the Catholic fold. MacBean Special Collection. Alice Shields, ‘A Last Grasp at the Crown’, Gentleman’s Magazine, July (1902), 40–52, 45. Stuart Mss 345/163. Anon., Memorial, 1753 (my italics). As Daniel Szechi has concluded, the exiled Stuarts’ close association with the Holy See, assiduously promoted by the British after the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), was a useful propaganda tool for the Hanoverian regime. To the overwhelmingly Protestant British polity, James’ Catholicism had always been repugnant; accordingly, his physical presence on papal territory did little to assuage British religious phobia. Lord Bulkeley also claimed that Prince William of Orange had offered to restore James, if he turned Protestant. This offer made to his father, and the consequences of James’ refusal to accept it, could have influenced Charles’ decision to convert to the Church of England. Daniel Szechi, The Jacobites. Britain and Europe, 1688–1788 (Manchester, 1994), 118; Stuart Mss 345/162. General Francis, Lord Bulkeley. ‘Historical Essay on the Stuart Cause’, c. late 1753. According to Alasdair Ruadh

260 Notes

27.

28. 29.

30.

31.

MacDonell of Glengarry, Charles ‘declared that he never will return to Rome’. NeC 2,088/1 ‘Queries put to A.[lasdair] M.[acDonell] with his answers to them; 1751’. It is possible that the Marquis D’Argenson was responsible for the dissemination of the ideas expressed in Stuart Mss 345/163, as he recommended the same course of action in another memorial entrusted to Colonel Daniel O’Brien at Antwerp. See Lang, Pickle, 42. Stuart Mss 329/1. ‘A Memorial copied by Gen. F. Bulkeley and sent to Charles’, c. 28 February–August 1751. A significant point made in this memorial is the absolute necessity of a marriage between Charles and a Protestant princess, as only such a union would remove the stigma of Catholicism attached to the house of Stuart. That the Prince and his circle ideologically diverged from the traditional Stuart agenda is also shown by the approval showered upon Choiseul’s Swedish initiative by the Prince’s party during the ’Fifty-nine, and the importance placed on Charles conversion as a political weapon. Thus, the Franco-Jacobite spy Dr Florence Hensey relates that: ‘I remember discoursing with Mr. Pierce about an Invasion & mentioning the good Dispositions of the Swedes towards the Cause, which I was informed of by my Brother, who had been Six Years at Stockholm. He said he could wish some thousands of the Swedes would land at the same Time, in Order to take away the pretence of Religion; And upon asking if the Pr[ince] . . . had not really changed his Religion he told me Dr. Cameron had affirmed as much in his Speech; & that he, with his Friends, laboured to inculcate the same, in hopes, in some Measure of removing the great Stumbling block.’ SP 36/140, ff. 42–4. Dr Florence Hensey to Mr Webb [London?], 14 July 1758. Patricia Kneas-Hill, The Oglethorpe Ladies and the Jacobite Conspiracies (Atlanta, 1977), 108. BL Eg. Mss 3465, ff.. 161–6. ‘Extract of a letter from Lille the 15th Decemr. 1755’, enclosed in Michael Hatton to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, 19 December 1755. Stuart Mss 323/35. Charles. Memorial concerning his Political Reflections, [n.d.]. Ample expression of Charles’ determination to leave all options open for a restoration can be gauged from the following comment written during the opening stages of the Elibank plot: ‘I woud make use of ye Greatest Enemy, and reccompence him, iff he served me effectually.’ Furthermore, he seemed to be quite willing to take the risk of losing Catholic support in Britain and on the Continent. This was clearly demonstrated by his conversion in 1750 – an act which at least to some degree served the purpose of removing the stigma of Catholicism with which his family had been identified since the Revolution of 1688. See Stuart Mss 345/162. General Francis, Lord Bulkeley, ‘Historical Essay on the Stuart Cause’, c. late 1753. Professor Clark’s view on the evolution of Jacobite political thought in its last phase is that it added ‘to its dynastic doctrinal core a series of social grievances which anticipated the platform of John Wilkes’. J. C. D. Clark, ‘British America: What if there had been no American Revolution?’, in Niall Ferguson, ed., Virtual History: Alternatives and Counterfactuals (London, 1997), 125–74, 130–1. For the growing radicalism of the Jacobite movement also see Szechi, The Jacobites, 30, 33. But Charles’ testimony hints at a quasi-Machiavellian frame of mind. My own findings and impressions relating to the post-schism attitudinal make-up of Charles’ position are in full accord with Dr McLynn’s conclusion. McLynn, The Jacobites, 152. Stuart Mss 377/9. Charles to Mr Orry ¼ James, 25 November 1757. To decypher the Jacobite correspondence, I have used lists of cant names and the keys in the

Notes 261

32. 33.

34. 35.

36. 37.

38. 39.

40. 41. 42.

Stuart Mss. Box 5/222; 224; 230; 232; 233. I have also used older lists and keys. Box 5/209; 211; 213; 219; 220; 221; 226. Stuart Mss 377/20. James to Charles, Rome, 28 November 1757. Stuart Mss 377/107. Charles to Mr Orry ¼ James, 23 December 1757. Earlier in the decade, Charles had resolved not to deal with the French government, until such time as it would make ‘ample satisfaction’ for the ‘affrunt suffered ye 10 Decem [b]e[r], 1748’, when Louis XV had him apprehended and removed from the French dominions. Stuart Mss 323/35. Charles. Memorial concerning his Political Reflections. Stuart Mss 353/24. Aeneas MacDonald to [Charles?], < 6 March 1754. Stuart Mss 353/28. Aeneas MacDonald. ‘Considerations on the Present Situations of the Government’, < 6 March 1754; Stuart Mss 353/24. Aeneas MacDonald to [Charles?], < 6 March 1754; Stuart Mss 353/26. Aeneas MacDonald. ‘Sentiments of Oppositions of Severall Persons of Great Emminence, Concerning the Manner His Royal Highness shou’d Act with Respect to the Ensuing Election’, < 6 March 1754. Stuart Mss 353/25. Aeneas MacDonald. ‘Propositions Concerning the Military Forces in Brittain’, < 6 March 1754. Stuart Mss 353/24. Aeneas MacDonald to [Charles?], < 6 March 1754. Aeneas could have very well been meaning to get himself employed for the task. There is reason to believe that his idea may have been formulated on the basis of an actual precedent, involving two London based Jewish merchants and Frederick II between late 1752 and early 1753. SP 36/121, ff. 153–7. ‘Information of Christian Gottlib Christhold’, 25 March 1753. This is the English translation from the original deposition in German. An indication of a suitable candidate for the part of financier is provided in Pickle’s report on Antoine Vincent Walsh of c. December 1752, wherein he states ‘that Monsr. Paris Montmartel is the Pretender’s great friend, & told Pickle, he woud Contrive to raise £200000 for his Service, upon a proper occasion’. BL Add. Ms 33050, ff. 198–7. ‘Pickle’s account of Walsh’, c. December 1752. Like Paris de Montmartel, Aeneas MacDonald was a Paris banker, and it is therefore likely that they were acquainted, or had at least heard of each other. In 1755, Pickle related to the British government that Charles had tried to obtain £200,000 from his English supporters, ‘but has had no assurances of having it’. BL Add. Ms 33050, f. 420. Intelligence, c. 1755. On the Jacobite project of obtaining a loan over £200,000 from Paris de Montmartel, see Lang, Pickle, 215. For the Christhold incident, see Chapter 4. Stuart Mss 353/27. Aeneas MacDonald to [Charles?], < 6 March 1754. Stuart Mss 385/80. Aeneas MacDonald to the Marquis de Paulmy [nephew of Marc-Pierre Voyer de Paulmy, Comte D’Argenson?], ‘Projet Militaire et Raisone´ d’un Debarquement dans L’Isles Brittanique[s]’, 28 August 1756. McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 325. For Lochiel’s proposal, see the ‘Me´moire d’un Ećossais’, in Gibson, Lochiel of the ’45, 173–85. For example, see BL Eg. Mss 3465, f. 192. ‘Advices from France the 20th of March 1756’; Stuart Mss 381/84. Charles to Mr Orry ¼ James, 19 May 1758. Stuart Mss 350/37. Donald MacDonell of Lochgarry to Charles, 17 August 1754. See also Alasdair Ruadh MacDonell of Glengarry’s report of 1750, in which he indicated that the clan chiefs were driven to desperation by the remedial legislation which followed in the wake of Culloden, and that they were pressing James and Charles to take immediate measures to initiate another rising in the Highlands. The chiefs even insinuated that, should their leadership in exile tarry, they would rise without any support from abroad. In the light of Glengarry’s duplicity

262 Notes

43. 44.

45. 46.

47.

48. 49. 50.

this report must be read with caution. What, however, lends this plea for succour credibility is the fact that Glengarry was accompanied by his incorruptible cousin, Lochgarry, whose Jacobite credentials were beyond any reproach. Stuart Mss Box 1/318. Alasdair Ruadh MacDonell of Glengarry to James, [Boulogne?], c. April 1750. Stuart Mss 353/20. Donald MacDonell of Lochgarry (via Waters) to Charles, c. August 1754. BL Add. Ms 35448, f. 234. James Ogilvy, 5th Earl of Findlater and 2nd Earl of Seafield to Philip Yorke, 1st Earl of Hardwicke, Cullen House, 14 February 1755; BL Add. Ms 35449, ff. 15–16. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to Philip Yorke, 1st Earl of Hardwicke, Edinburgh, 16 March 1756; ff. 17–18. ‘Hints humbly offered by the Lord Justice Clerk, and Some considerable well affected Person in Scotland, For the Consideration of His Majesty’s Ministers, on Occasion of the present critical Conjuncture’; NLS Ms 5078, f. 143. Duncan McVicar, Collector of the Customs at Fort William to [Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald/ Archibald Campbell, 3rd Duke of Argyll?], Fort William, 25 February 1755; f. 147. Same to the same, Fort William, 3 March 1755. For McVicar’s identity, see NeC 2,199/1. Archibald Campbell, 3rd Duke of Argyll to [Henry Pelham?], Inveraray, 31 October 1752. Stuart Mss 358/16. Duncan Robertson, 11th Laird of Struan to James Edgar, Corbeil, 4 September 1755. Oliver MacAllester, A Series of Letters Discovering the Scheme Projected by France in MDCCLIX, for an Intended Invasion upon England with Flat-bottom’d Boats; and Various Conferences and Original Papers touching that Formidable Design. Pointing at The Secret and True Motives which precipitated the Negociations, and Conclusion of the last Peace. To which are prefixed, The Secret Adventures of the Young Pretender; and The Conduct of the French Court respecting him during his Stay in Great Britain, and after his return to Paris. Also the Chief Cause that brought on the late Banishment of the Jesuits from the French Dominions; a Secret as yet concealed from the Jesuits themselves; with the real Examinations of Father Hamilton, taken at Fountainbleau, October 1756, who was employed to assassinate the Young Pretender. Together with The Particular Case of the Author. In a Memorial to his late Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland, 2 vols (London, 1767), especially see I, 257–8. Stuart Mss 362/146. General Thomas Arthur Lally, Comte de Lally-Tollendal, tit. Earl of Moenmoye to Charles, Paris, 18 May 1756. I would like to thank Eámonn O’Ciardha, previously of Clare Hall, Cambridge, for bringing this document to my attention. Also see BL Eg. Mss 3465, ff. 172–3. ‘Advices from France dated the 15th January 1756’; and BL Eg. Mss 3465, f. 303. ‘Advices dated the 7th Febry. 1757’, for French plans to assemble 80,000 men in early 1757 ‘somewhere in French Flanders, next April’. For Lally’s biographical information, see Hayes, Biographical Dictionary of Irishmen in France, 146–8, and by the same author, Irish Swordsmen of France (Dublin, 1934), 223–53; McLynn, The Jacobites, 135; Melville Henry Massue, Marquis de Ruvigny and Raineval, The Jacobite Peerage, Baronetage, Knightage & Grants of Honour (London and Edinburgh, [1904] 1974), 119–21. Stuart Mss 362/146. General Thomas Arthur Lally, Comte de Lally-Tollendal, tit. Earl of Moenmoye to Charles, Paris, 18 May 1756. For the activities of Jacobite and French spies, see pp. 152–4. SP 36/140, ff. 42–4. Dr Florence Hensey to Mr Webb, [London?], 14 July, 1758; Dr Florence Hensey, a Franco-Jacobite spy apprehended by the British, disclosed

Notes 263 information about Jacobite contacts. Of Lally’s departure for India, he said: ‘I am sure he never would have done [i.e. left], had not the project of an Invasion been ˆ Lally had agreed with the [French] East then laid aside. And I understood that tho India Company for four Years for himself & his Regiment, yet he contrived to putt off his Departure for some Time, in Hopes of being aiding in some Expedition against these Kingdoms; And indeed when Lally was known to be gone to the East Indies the Jacobites here began to despair of any Thing being done for them, he being the Man they chiefly depended on. And I have known him Cursed for carrying away his Regiment.’ Also see Hayes, Biographical Dictionary of Irishmen in France, 147. 51. McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 440. 52. Claude Nordmann, ‘Jakobiterna och det Svenska Hovet, 1745–1746’, Historisk Tidskrift (1959), 408–17. On 16 October 1745, Blantyre, who alternately assumed ¨ m’, received the Comte d’Argenson’s orders to the names of ‘Leslie’ and ‘Fahlstro proceed to Sweden where he arrived on 8 December. Under the pretext of enlisting recruits for the French regiment of the Royal Sue´dois, in which Blantyre held a Major’s commission, he was to lead the Swedish expedition from Gothenburg to Scotland. As usual, the British secret service had done impeccable work. The court at St James alerted Guy Dickens, their ambassador to Sweden. The Jacobites’ element of surprise was lost when he tipped off the Swedish advisory council and Secret Committee. After the Jacobite defeat at Culloden, Blantyre also helped to transfer prominent Jacobite refuges to France. Dr McLynn believes that Blantyre’s principal role during the ’Fifty-nine was that of liaison between the Scottish ¨ ran Behre, ‘Jacobite Refugees in Gothenburg Jacobites and the French exiles. Go after Culloden’, Scottish Historical Review, 70 (1991), 58–65; McLynn, The Jacobites, 36, 42. Also see James Frederick Chance, ed., British Diplomatic Instructions, 1689– ¨ ran Behre, ‘Sweden and the Rising of 1745’, 1789 (London, 1928), XV, 124, and Go Scottish Historical Review, 51, 2, 152 (1972), 149–71. According to Sir James Balfour Paul, Blantyre succeeded his brother. He was at one time a colonel in the service of the States of Holland, and died unmarried at Erskine, 16 January 1776. Sir James Balfour Paul, ed., The Scots Peerage, founded on Wood’s Edition of Sir Robert Douglas’s Peerage of Scotland. Containing an Historical and Genealogical Account of the Nobility of that Kingdom, 9 vols (Edinburgh, 1904–14), II, 90. Glengarry also claimed that one Major Leslie – Leslie being Blantyre’s cant name during the ’Forty-five – had held a commission in the French regiment of the Royal Sue´dois. NeC 2,086. ‘Narrative & Informations of A:[lasdair] M:[acDonell]’, August 1751. He was also not above the British government’s suspicion during the time of the Elibank plot. Blantyre’s cant name ‘John O’Noakes’ was on a government list of Jacobites in 1751. NeC 2,096/1. ‘A Compleat List of all Jacobites and Government Officials’, c. October–November, 1751. I would like to thank David King of Emmanuel College, for helping me translate the original Swedish article. 53. Stuart Mss 380/107. Peter Wood to Charles, [Brussels?], 10 April 1758. As mentioned above, Lord Blantyre’s name is also included on a list of Jacobite cant names belonging to the Pelham papers, where he featured as ‘John O’Noakes’. NeC 2,096/1. ‘Key to Scotch Names &c.’ c. October–November 1751. The inclusion of his name on a list, which was probably compiled for the British government by Alasdair Ruadh MacDonell of Glengarry towards the end of 1751, suggests that Blantyre could have been involved in the planning of the Elibank plot, or even implicated in the actual conspiracy. At the very least, Henry Pelham had to suspect Blantyre as a Jacobite contact.

264 Notes 54. Stuart Mss 384/50. Peter Wood to Charles, 15 July 1758; Stuart Mss 386/12. Campbell ¼ Alexander Murray of Elibank to Charles, Aix-la-Chapelle, 29 September 1758. 55. Stuart Mss Box 1/434. Peter Wood to Le Baron Douglas ¼ Charles, [Brussels?], 13 September 1758. 56. A hint towards a potential source is given in the examination of the FrancoJacobite spy Dr Florence Hensey, who, after being taken into custody, confessed: ‘With relation to the Intelligence from the Admiralty Office, He, Hensey, was told by O Donnal, a little before he was taken up, that he had seen Perkins Macmahon. He had before told him the Contents of a Letter, . . . which mentioned the said Macmahon, and from thence they both knew, that Perkins Macmahon used to write to France; he said, he did not wonder, he should send good Intelligence, as he had an Acquaintance at the Admiralty, who supplied him with Materials. O Donnal said, he had seen this Person of the Admiralty at Hammersmith at the Roman Catholic Boarding School; and that this said Person mentioned Perkins Macmahon as very intimate Acquaintance; and spoke to him, O Donnal, very freely concerning Navy Affairs. O’Donnal, after That, told him, Hensey, That from thence Perkins Macmahon had his Materials. This Person O Donnal judged to be a Roman Catholick; but that he did not profess himself to be such. He, Dr. Hensy, never thought of this Man, till he heard . . . that this young Man was a Relation of his, a Clerk in the Dispatch office at the Admiralty’. SP 36/140, ff. 70–93. ‘Dr. Hensey’s Examination continued’, Whitehall, 18 July 1758 (my italics). A direct connection between Lord Blantyre, on the one hand, and Dr Florence Hensey, James O’Donnel, Perkins Macmahon and the unnamed clerk on the other, cannot be established. The examination of Hensey, however, clearly shows that the Admiralty had been infiltrated by the Jacobites. 57. Leaving Brussels on 19 June 1758, Lord Blantyre arrived in London ten days later. As most of the important figures in the Jacobite scene had left town, Blantyre made his way to Scotland, where he met with Murray’s brother, Patrick, 5th Lord Elibank. On Lord Elibank’s Jacobitism, see Hon. Arthur C. Murray, The Five Sons of ‘Bare Betty’ (London, 1936), 45, 87; Sir Charles Petrie, The Jacobite Movement. The Last Phase, 1716–1807 (London, 1950), 158–9. The Scottish peer furnished him with a letter of introduction to Sir John Philips, an influential, Jacobitically inclined, English Tory. Sir John Philips, 6th Baronet (1701–64), MP for Carmarthen 1741–47, for Petersfield 1754–61, and for Pembrokeshire 1761–64, and a Lord of Trade and Plantations 1744–45, was a prominent member of the Tories in the House of Commons. John B. Owen, The Rise of the Pelhams (New York, 1957), 335; Sedgwick, The Commons, II, 344–5; Ian R. Christie, ‘The Tory Party, Jacobitism, and the ’Forty-Five: A Note’, Historical Journal, 30, 4 (1987), 921–31, 924. During his sojourn in England, Blantyre came to suspect Philips and his confederate John Fane, 7th Earl of Westmoreland, both leading members of the Stuart interest in Britain, of lukewarm zeal. There is reason to believe that Westmoreland was deeply implicated in the Elibank plot; he was mentioned in Frederick II’s diplomatic correspondence, and described by the conniving Prussian king as ‘homme sage, prudent, d’une bonne tete, bon citoyen, respecte´ et respectable’. Friedrich des Grosse, Politische Correspondenz Friedrichs des Grossen, 46 vols (Berlin, 1879–1939), IX, 437. For Westmoreland, see Sedgwick, The Commons, II, 25–6. Blantyre attributed their slackening enthusiasm for the cause to Lady Primrose’s undermining ministrations. Anne Drelincourt, Lady Primrose was the widow of the 3rd Viscount Primrose. Her father was Peter Drelincourt, Dean of

Notes 265

58.

59.

60.

61.

62.

63. 64.

65. 66. 67.

Armagh. She was largely responsible for the rumours of Charles, alcoholism circulating in England after the Elibank plot. Petrie, Jacobite Movement, 143, 147–8; McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 435,447. Except for these reservations, English and Scottish Jacobite feedback convinced Blantyre of the propitious nature of the situation. Stuart Mss 389/88. William Stewart, 9th Lord Blantyre to Charles. ‘Narrative of my Transactions in England, 1758’, c.31 December 1758–4 January 1759. Stuart Mss 389/56. William Stewart, 9th Lord Blantyre to Charles, 31 December 1758–4 January 1759; Stuart Mss 389/87. Same to the same. ‘An Exact List of the Troops in England, Scotland, and Ireland & those in Germany, 1758’, c.31 December 1758–4 January 1759. Blantyre’s figures for Britain are confirmed by an anonymous piece of intelligence in Stuart Mss vol. 389, dating from c.1758–59. Unfortunately, the document in question bears no numerical designation. Also compare Stuart Mss 386/28. ‘E´tat des troupes en Infanterie et en Cavallerie qui sont actuellement en Angleterre, en Ecosse, en Irlande, et en Allemagne’. Copy in Michael Sheridan’s hand of an original sent by Peter Wood. Endorsed and dated by Charles, 6 October 1758. Stuart Mss 389/50. William Stewart, 9th Lord Blantyre to Charles. ‘Reasons against Landing att Torbay & the inconveniences that may attend it’, 31 December 1758– 4 January 1759. The French considered the Welsh, but also the Cornish, to be dependable allies. See Stuart Mss 378/53. Marquis de la Tournelle. ‘Tableau politique et militaire pour la Campagne de la presente Anneé 1757’. In 1745, the Hon. Richard Barry, second son to James Barry, 4th Earl of Barrymore – who had been the designated Jacobite general for England during the ’Forty-five – had reached Charles two days after he had left Derby, with a message from his father and Sir Watkin Williams Wynn, the leader of the Welsh Jacobites. Sir Watkin and Barrymore had pledged to rise for the Stuart cause. Sir Watkin sent Charles his last promise of support shortly before his untimely death in 1749. Moreover, P.D.G. Thomas believes that the Sea Serjeants, a Welsh Jacobite club, were closely connected to the Pembrokeshire riots of 1755. Sedgwick, The Commons, I, 442; and Linda Colley, ‘The Loyal Brotherhood and the Cocoa Tree: The London Organization of the Tory Party, 1727–1760’, Historical Journal, 20, 1 (1977), 77–95, 82. Maclean, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 127; P. D. G. Thomas, ‘Jacobitism in Wales’, Welsh History Review, 1, (1962), 279–300, 291–2, 299. Stuart Mss 389/51. William Stewart, 9th Lord Blantyre to Charles. ‘Reasons why Milford Haven is a more Commodious Safe Harbour & more Proper for Landing then Torbay’, c. 31 December 1758–4 January 1759. Stuart Mss 389/94. Anon., ‘Ideas on the Resources that may be Drawn from Scotland shou’d an Invasion be made in England for the King’, c. 1758–1759. See also MacAllester, A Series of Letters, II, 31–2. Stuart Mss 389/52. William Stewart, 9th Lord Blantyre to Charles, c. 31 December 1758–4 January 1759. Stuart Mss 389/55. William Stewart, 9th Lord Blantyre to Charles. ‘A Plan for Forming and Raising a Body of Troops in Scotland’, c. 31 December 1758–4 January 1759. Stuart Mss 389/58. William Stewart, 9th Lord Blantyre to Charles. ‘A List of Collonels’, c. 31 December 1758–4 January 1759. Stuart Mss 389/45. Goodwin ¼ William Stewart, 9th Lord Blantyre to Peter Wood, c. 31 December 1758–4 January 1759. Stuart Mss 389/52. William Stewart, 9th Lord Blantyre to Charles, c. 31 December 1758–4 January 1759.

266 Notes 68. Stuart Mss 389/46. Goodwin ¼ William Stewart, 9th Lord Blantyre to Peter Wood. ‘A Paper Relating to Scotland’, c. 31 December 1758–4 January 1759; Stuart Mss 389/53. Same to Charles. ‘A List of Lords and Gentlemen, out of whom a Privy Council may be Formed’, c. 31 December 1758–4 January, 1759; Stuart Mss 389/ 54. Same to the same. ‘The Privy Council for Scotland may be Composed of Ten, Six Peers & Four Gentlemen’, c. 31 December 1758–4 January 1759. The Scottish Privy Council came into being during the early sixteenth century; the register of the council was established in 1545. Following the passage of the Act of Union, the Scottish Privy council was abolished in 1708. Gordon Donaldson and Robert S. Morpeth, A Dictionary of Scottish History (Edinburgh, [1977] 1992), 176. 69. Frank McLynn, Invasion. From the Armada to Hitler, 1588–1945 (London and New York, 1987), 51–4, 56–8; Norman Longmate, Island Fortress. The Defence of Great Britain, 1603–1945 (London, 1991), 175. For the Marquis de la Tournelle’s plan, see Stuart Mss 378/53. Marquis de la Tournelle ‘Tableau politique et militaire pour la Campagne de la presente Anneé 1757’. 70. BL Eg. Mss 3465, ff. 119–20. Michael Hatton to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Ostend, 1 October 1755. BL Eg. Mss 3465, ff. 123–4. Same to the same, Ostend, 4 October 1755. This information was obtained through a contact of Hatton’s, who desired ‘a liberty of going home’, and asserted ‘that a pardon was the only thing he aimed at’, which strongly suggests he was an exile with access to Jacobite circles. In his report of 18 October (ff. 136–7), Hatton refers to his agent being ‘the only Colonel in France who has a Conge´’. One Marquis de Meni, in company of the Prince de Soubise, claimed to know that: ‘Le Roy est si incenseé contre les procede´s de L’Angleterre, que Je ne serai point surpris si sa Majeste´ luy donna une des Dames de France; nous leur menerons beau jeu pour le prinstemps, nous aurons cinquante Vaissaeaux de Ligne a mettre en mer: et Sa Majeste´ est resol de faire une descente en Angleterre sans Declaration de Guerre: les Ministres travaillant presentment a s’assurer du Prince Edouard, cela fait, il viendra en flandres, pur leur faire croire: point de tout.’; f. 134. Same to the same, Ostend, 11 October 1755. BL Eg. Mss 3465, f. 142. Same to the same, 28 October 1755. Hatton says that ‘the Young Chevalier’s Marriage is quite off: and more, the Court of France only amused him’. Following the French debacle, Hatton’s intelligence suggests that Charles was seeking an alliance with the House of Parma. BL Eg. Mss 3465, ff. 149–50. Same to the same, London, 18 November 1755. 71. Stuart Mss 361/97. James Edgar to Lord George Murray, Rome, 24 February 1756. 72. After the fall of Minorca, the Highland Jacobites were elated over the defeat inflicted on Admiral Byng, who had been sent to recapture the British naval base. To them, a French naval victory over the British was a favourable omen for a future landing in Britain. BL Add. Ms 35,450, ff. 251–2. John Campbell, 3rd Earl of Breadalbane to Philip Yorke, 1st Earl of Hardwicke, Edinburgh, 24 July 1756. 73. Stuart Mss 362/27. Lord George Murray to James Edgar, Emmerich, 31 March 1756. See also Stuart Mss 361/105. Same to the same, Emmerich, 29 February 1756. 74. Nordmann, ‘Choiseul and the Last Jacobite Attempt of 1759’, 210. 75. Frank McLynn, France and the Jacobite Rising of 1745 (Edinburgh, 1981). See his chapter entitled ‘The Ministers of State’, 35–56. 76. BL Eg. Mss 3465, ff. 161–6. ‘Extract of a letter from Lille the 15th Decemr. 1755’, enclosed in Michael Hatton to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, 19 December 1755; McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 315. 77. BL Eg. Mss 3465, f. 164. ‘Extract of a letter from Lille the 15th Decemr. 1755’. 78. BL Eg. Mss 3465, f. 188. ‘Advices from France dated the 17th March 1756’.

Notes 267 79. BL Eg. Mss 3465. f. 192. ‘Advices from France the 20th March 1756’; f. 218. Michael Hatton to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Ostend, 5 August 1756. 80. BL Eg. Mss 3465, ff. 185–90. ‘Advices from France dated the 17th March 1756’. 81. Stuart Mss 378/53. Marquis de la Tournelle, ‘Tableau politique et militaire pour la Campagne de la presente Anneé 1757’. Especially see the section entitled ‘E´tat de l’Embarquement’. 82. Nordmann, ‘Choiseul and the last Jacobite Attempt of 1759’, 202. 83. As the labyrinthine Franco-Jacobite negotiations were carried on by a number of actors, a dramatis personae in the shape of a short biographical sketch for each Jacobite negotiant is necessary. The most conspicuous feature of the principal agents working for the French and the Jacobites was their relative success, despite their lack of cooperation. Their only common denominator as negotiating parties was their Jacobitism. Of all the agents and self-appointed envoys operating in 1757–59, the Chevalier Alexander-Peter Mackenzie-Douglas deserves the place of primus inter pares. The Mackenzies of Kildin were the only remaining Catholic branch within the clan. His father Colin Mackenzie, a near relation of the Earl of Seaforth, had risen in arms in 1715, and he himself was forced to flee England in February 1747. During the last rising, Mackenzie-Douglas had enjoyed the confidence of the Lords Traquair and Elibank, and that of John Murray of Broughton. Andrew Lang claims he was a Jesuit, who had been a spy in the Dutch service. Attaching himself to the retinue of the Prince de Conti, Mackenzie-Douglas soon became embroiled in the Secret du Roi, Louis XV’s private policy. In 1755, he was sent on a diplomatic reconnaissance mission to St Petersburg. A second mission, for which he was accorded full accreditation to the Russian court, followed in due course. On this second trip, Mackenzie-Douglas was accompanied by a secretary, the mysterious Chevalier D’Eón de Beaumont, whose alleged hermaphrodite gender was one of the great curiosities of the eighteenth century. D’Eón was to become one of the most successful secret agents of the French king. In a memorial to James, in which he used the style of Baron, Mackenzie-Douglas claimed to have delivered a mortal blow to Hanoverian influence ‘dans tout le Nord’. His diplomatic activities in 1756 certainly proved conducive to a Russian accession to the alliance between France and Austria, and did not go unnoticed by Sir Charles Hanbury-Williams, the British resident at St Petersburg. In 1757–59, MackenzieDouglas’ coded correspondence apprised Charles of developments at Versailles. His principal function, however was that of French liaison-agent with the Jacobites. Stuart Mss 378/79. Chevalier Alexander-Peter Mackenzie-Douglas to James, 1 January 1758; BL Add. Ms 35481, ff. 4–7. Sir Charles Hanbury-Williams to Robert Keith, 13 July 1756; Lang, Pickle the Spy, 302; McLynn, The Jacobites, 136; Gooch, Louis XV, 208–9. 84. Stuart Mss 360/132. Chevalier Alexander-Peter Mackenzie-Douglas to Charles, c. 30 November 1755–12 January 1756. 85. Stuart Mss 369/72. Louis Charles Auguste Fouquet, Marećhal-Duc de Belle-Isle to [probably an envoy of Charles], Versailles, 4 March 1757. 86. Stuart Mss 371/25. Campbell ¼ Alexander Murray of Elibank to Charles, 11 May 1757. The Hon. Alexander Murray of Elibank we have already met. Though he enjoyed the Prince’s confidence, it can safely be assumed that in 1757–59 Alexander Murray often acted without obtaining his master’s fiat, and may have disrupted the work of official Jacobite envoys at Versailles. At the same time, he was one of the most active agents on behalf of his Prince. For Murray of Elibank, see Chapter 4, pp. 130–2.

268 Notes 87. Stuart Mss 371/63. Charles to Campbell ¼ Alexander Murray of Elibank, 19 May 1757. 88. Stuart Mss 371/121. Charles to Campbell ¼ Alexander Murray of Elibank, 30 May 1757. 89. Stuart Mss 371/148. Campbell ¼ Alexander Murray of Elibank to Charles, 4 June 1757. 90. Stuart Mss 376/91. Campbell ¼ Alexander Murray of Elibank to Charles, Lie`ge, 1 November 1757. After the French defeat in 1759, Murray of Elibank stated that he had travelled to England and Scotland in the Prince’s service on several occasions. He also claimed to have been earmarked to participate in a descent on Scotland. MacAllester, A Series of Letters, II, 59, 237. 91. Stuart Mss 377/107. Charles to Campbell ¼ Alexander Murray of Elibank, 19 December 1757. 92. Stuart Mss 377/164. Alexander Murray of Elibank to Charles, 24 December 1757. 93. Stuart Mss 377/164. Alexander Murray of Elibank to Charles, 24 December 1757; Stuart Mss 377/153. Louis Charles Auguste Fouquet, Marećhal-Duc de Belle-Isle to Charles, Versailles, 22 [December?] 1757. 94. Stuart Mss 378/51. Alexander Murray of Elibank to the Dauphin of France, c. 24 December 1757–20 June 1758. 95. Stuart Mss 380/3. James to Louis Charles Auguste Fouquet, Marećhal-Duc de BelleIsle, Rome, 27 March [1758]; Stuart Mss Box 1/420. Louis Charles Auguste Fouquet, Marećhal-Duc de Belle-Isle to Charles, Versailles, 30 March [1758]. See also Stuart Mss 379/100. Daniel O’Heguerty to Charles, Paris, 29 February 1758. 96. A close friend of General Lally, Robert MacCarthy, 5th Earl of Clancarthy, was one of the Prince’s most active supporters in France. His father Donough MacCarthy had lost his estates in Ireland following the Williamite settlement of 1691. In the hope of regaining his patrimony, Robert served in the Royal Navy, and was even installed as governor of Nova Scotia from 1733–35. When the Clancarthy estate was not returned to him at his father’s death, he resigned his commission and went to France, where he established himself in the navy, and attained the rank of vice-admiral. There, he became an active supporter of Charles, and often used his considerable influence at Versailles to advance Jacobite schemes. From Louis XV he received a pension of £1,000 per annum. During the preparatory phase, and after, George Kelly served as communications link between the Prince and the Earl of Clancarthy. Moreover, Clancarthy was well connected among the English and Irish elite: he was married to a daughter of the Earl of Sunderland, and was the Earl of Orrery’s cousin. Nordmann, ‘Choiseul and The Last Jacobite Attempt of 1759’, 204; Hayes, Biographical Dictionary of Irishmen in France, 29–30; Cruickshanks, Political Untouchables, 77. 97. Stuart Mss Box 1/412. Charles to Louis Charles Auguste Fouquet, Marećhal-Duc de Belle-Isle, c. late Autumn 1757. 98. For Anthony Vincent Walsh, see Chapter 4, note 138. For reference, see Hayes, Biographical Dictionary of Irishmen in France, 280–1, 306–7; McLynn, The Jacobites, 138; BL Add. Ms 33050, f. 198 et seq. ‘Pickle’s Account of Walsh’; Tre´moı¨lle, A Royalist Family, vii–viii, 50; Marquis de Ruvigny and Raineval, The Jacobite Peerage, 178–9; O’Callaghan, History of the Irish Brigades, 95. 99. It is likely that Walsh was connected to Antoine-Louis de Rouille´, Comte de Jouy, the minister for foreign affairs from 1754–57. Stuart Mss 377/80. George Kelly to Charles, 11 December 1757. Lists of codes used by the Prince’s party throughout the 1750’ can be found in Box 5/222; 224; 230. De Rouille´’s cant name in Pierre

Notes 269

100. 101. 102.

103. 104. 105. 106.

107. 108. 109. 110.

111. 112.

113.

Andre´ O’Heguerty’s list of c. 1756, is ‘Lestrange’. As the misspelling of cant names was a recurring problem in sensitive Jacobite correspondence, I concluded that Kelly’s phonetically similar ‘Legrange’ is likely to be identical with O’Heguerty’s ‘Lestrange’. See also Stuart Mss 378/29. G. Mansfield ¼ George Kelly to Charles, 31 December 1757. Stuart Mss 377/93. Robert MacCarthy, 5th Earl Clancarthy to Charles, 14 December 1757. Stuart Mss 378/11. John Elliot ¼ Robert MacCarthy, 5th Earl Clancarthy to Charles [Dunkirk?], 27 December 1757. Hayes, Biographical Dictionary of Irishmen in France, 116. Whereas the identity of Daniel’s son is established, that of the elder O’Heguerty is not clear. In his biography of Charles, Frank McLynn refers to Walsh’s partner as Dominique. He also does not establish the nature of relationship between the two. The archivist of the Stuart papers, who compiled the correspondence index, failed to identify the elder O’Heguerty beyond the description of ‘d’Heguerty of Paris’. The Duc de la Tre´moı¨lle identifies the cant name ‘Desborough’ with ‘Heguerty de Paris’, and Hayes says that Daniel uses the same cant name in his correspondence. I am inclined to trust Hayes. Charles, Duc de la Tre´moı¨lle, A Royalist Family Irish and French (1689–1789) and Prince Charles Edward, trans. A. G. Murray MacGregor (Edinburgh, 1904), 58; McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 118, 404, 457. Stuart Mss 377/107. Charles to Mr Mansfield ¼ George Kelly, 19 December 1757. Stuart Mss 377/107. Charles to Mr Elliot ¼ Robert MacCarthy, 5th Earl Clancarthy, 23 December 1757. Stuart Mss 377/156. G. Mansfield ¼ George Kelly to Charles, 23 December 1757. Stuart Mss 377/154. John Elliot ¼ Robert MacCarthy, 5th Earl Clancarthy to Charles, 23 December 1757; Stuart Mss 378/15. Le Grand ¼ Antoine Vincent Walsh, 1st Comte de Walsh to Charles, 24 December 1757; Stuart Mss 378/29. Charles to Wynn ¼ François Joachim de Pierre, Abbe´ de Bernis, 31 December 1757. Stuart Mss 378/35. John Elliot ¼ Robert MacCarthy, 5th Earl Clancarthy to Charles, 31 December 1757. Marcus Cheke, The Cardinal de Bernis (London, 1958), 133. McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 449. Stuart Mss 378/128. Captain John Holker to Charles, 13 January 1758. For biographical information on Holker, see Albert Nicholson, ‘Lieutenant John Holker’, Transactions of the Lancashire and Cheshire Antiquarian Society, 9 (1981), 147–54; Andre´ Re´mond, John Holker. Manufacturier et grand fonctionnaire en France au XVIIIe sie`cle, 1719–1786 (Paris, 1946), 25–7. Stuart Mss 381/6. Daniel O’Heguerty to Charles, Paris, 25 April 1758. Stuart Mss 381/85. Charles to Pierre Andre´ O’Heguerty, 22 May 1758. Daniel O’Heguerty’s third son, Pierre Andre´ O’Heguerty, was equally involved in the negotiations of 1757–59. Pierre Andre´ served as a volunteer during the ’Fifteen, and, after his return to France, embarked on a legal career. In 1718, he acted as a lawyer in the Breton parlement, and successively gained the positions of attorneygeneral, and that of president of the supreme council of the Île de Bourbon. After his return to Paris in 1745, he was appointed royal censor of the academy founded by Stanislas Leszczynski, the ex-King of Poland. Hayes, Biographical Dictionary of Irishmen in France, 117–18. Stuart Mss 379/125. Charles to Mr Mansfield ¼ George Kelly, 6 March 1758; Stuart Mss 379/126. Charles to Mr. Mansfield ¼ George Kelly, 12 April 1758;

270 Notes

114. 115.

116. 117. 118.

119. 120. 121.

122. 123. 124. 125.

126. 127. 128. 129. 130.

Stuart Mss 380/133. Le Baron Douglas ¼ Charles to Mr. Thibault, 16 April 1758; Stuart Mss 381/84. Charles to Charles-Godefroy, Duc de Bouillon, 1 May 1758. Stuart Mss 379/47. G. Mansfield ¼ George Kelly to Charles, 8 February 1758. Stuart Mss 379/125. Charles to Mr Mansfield ¼ George Kelly, 4 April 1758; Stuart Mss 379/50. Same to the same, 16 February 1758; Stuart Mss Box 1/452. Charles to Charles-Godefroy, Duc de Bouillon and Charles-Godefroy-Henry, Prince de Turenne, c. 1758; Stuart Mss 382/51. Charles to Charles-Godefroy-Henri, Prince de Turenne, 26 May 1758; Stuart Mss 382/116. Same to the same, 1 June 1758. Stuart Mss 379/86. Robert MacCarthy, 5th Earl Clancarthy to Charles, Paris, 23 February 1758. Stuart Mss 380/11. Campbell ¼ Alexander Murray of Elibank to Charles, 30 March 1758. NeC. 2,087/1. According to Alasdair Ruadh MacDonell of Glengarry, Charles alienated Madame de Pompadour after his arrival from Scotland in 1746. BL Add. Ms 33050. ff. 198 et seq. ‘Pickle’s Account of Walsh’. Pickle the spy (i.e. Glengarry) reported to Newcastle in December 1752 that he ‘was told by the Pretender himself, that Madame Pompadour was not his friend, for that she had been gained over by Considerable Sums of money from England, & had taken Offence at him for his Slighting two Billets that had been sent by her to him, which he done for fear of giving Umbrage to the Queen of France & her Relations’. In the event that the Favourite was on the British payroll, it is unlikely that the British continued their pension after the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War, which explains the Jacobite attempt at a rapprochement with the Pompadour. See also MacAllester, A Series of Letters, I, 257. La Tre´moı¨lle, A Royalist Family, 55. Stuart Mss 379/39. J. Elliot ¼ Robert MacCarthy, 5th Earl Clancarthy to Charles, 2 February 1758; Stuart Mss 379/55. Same to the same, 11 February 1758. Stuart Mss 380/7. G. Mansfield ¼ George Kelly to Charles, 29 March 1759; Stuart Mss 385/2. Antoine Vincent Walsh, 1st Earl Walsh to Charles, Paris, 2 August 1758; Stuart Mss 385/22. Same to the same, Paris, 11 August, 1758. Stuart Mss 379/69. Charles to Daniel O’Heguerty, Paris, 15 February 1758; Stuart Mss 386/13. Daniel O’Heguerty to Charles, Paris, 30 September 1758; Stuart Mss 386/ 76. Same to the same, Paris, 21 October 1758. Stuart Mss 386/110. Daniel O’Heguerty to Charles, Paris, 30 October 1758. Stuart Mss 386/123. G. Mansfield ¼ George Kelly to Charles, 2 November 1758; La Tre´moı¨lle, A Royalist Family, 65. Stuart Mss 386/125. Daniel O’Heguerty to Charles, Paris, 4 November 1758; Stuart Mss 386/130. Same to the same, 5 November 1758. Stuart Mss 388/134. Same to the same, Paris, 29 December 1758; Stuart Mss 386/ 152. Daniel O’Heguerty to Charles, Paris, 14 November 1758; Stuart Mss 387/17. Same to the same, 21 November 1758. Stuart Mss 388/14. Louis Charles Auguste Fouquet, Marećhal-Duc de Belle-Isle to Mr Alliot, Versailles, 22 October 1758. Stuart Mss 364/127. Campbell ¼ Alexander Murray of Elibank to Charles, Paris, 11 September 1756. Stuart Mss 275/145. Campbell ¼ Alexander Murray of Elibank to Charles, Paris, 16 July 1756. Stuart Mss Box 1/440. Peter Wood to Charles, c. November 1758. Stuart Mss Box 1/438. Andrew Lumisden. Memorandum in reference to addressing the Emperor, c. November 1758; Box 1/439. Charles (drafted by Alexander

Notes 271

131. 132. 133.

134. 135. 136.

137.

138. 139.

140. 141. 142.

143. 144.

Murray of Elibank) to Charles, Prince of Lorraine, c. November 1758; Stuart Mss Box 1/444. Alexander Murray of Elibank, draft sent to Charles for a letter to Charles, Prince of Lorraine, > 17 November 1758. Stuart Mss 386/157. Charles to Alexander Murray of Elibank, 17 November 1758. McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 447. Stuart Mss 388/94. Thomas, Baron de Hussey to Charles, Prague, 22 December 1758. For the O’Donnells in Austrian service, see Duffy, ‘The Wild Geese in Austria’, 647–8. Stuart Mss 386/75. Chevalier Alexander-Peter Mackenzie-Douglas to Alexander Murray of Elibank, Paris, 21 October 1758. Stuart Mss 386/103. Campbell ¼ Alexander Murray of Elibank to Charles, Lie`ge, 28 October 1758. BL Eg. Mss 3465, ff. 101–5. Michael Hatton to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Ostend, 30 August 1755. In his examination, Dr Florence Hensey claimed that Wall’s lukewarm, if not hostile, stance towards Jacobitism was the result of having been snubbed by James, while Dr McLynn believes that Wall prioritized Spanish interests at the expense of his loyalty to the Stuarts. SP 35/140, ff. 50–61. ‘Dr Hensey’s Examination’, Whitehall, 17 July 1758; McLynn, Invasion, 53; McLynn, The Jacobites, 41; see also 136–7. Stuart Mss 389/118. Anon., A French memorial suggesting an alliance between France and Spain to effect a Stuart restoration, c. 31 December, 1758–4 January 1759; Michael Roberts, British Diplomacy and Swedish Politics, 1758–1773 (Minnesota, 1980), 22–3. Roberts believes that the Scottish descent was to be carried out by Swedish troops. Conversely, he also points out that because the Swedes depended on the export of iron ore to Britain, their initial enthusiasm to participate in Choiseul’s plan gradually evaporated. Also see Nordmann, ‘Choiseul and The Last Jacobite Attempt of 1759’, 205; McLynn, The Jacobites, 36. All French diplomatic approaches to Ferdinand VI of Spain failed, but his successor, Charles III, entered into an alliance with France by concluding the Third Family Compact on 15 August 1761. Jeremy Black, The Rise of the European Powers, 1679–1793 (London, 1990), 116. Stuart Mss 387/5–6. Charles to Louis Charles Auguste Fouquet, Marećhal-Duc de Belle-Isle, 18 November 1758. Stuart Mss 386/142. G. Mansfield ¼ George Kelly to Charles, 11 November 1758; Stuart Mss 387/123. Same to the same, 8 December 1758; Stuart Mss 388/67. Blaqis ¼ [Mr Alliot?] to Paviston ¼ Etienne François Choiseul, Marquis de Stainville and Duc de Choiseul, Luneville, 17 December 1758. Stuart Mss 388/73. Campbell ¼ Alexander Murray of Elibank to Charles, 19 December 1758. Stuart Mss 388/142. Campbell ¼ Alexander Murray of Elibank to Charles, Paris, 30 December 1758. Hayes, Biographical Dictionary of Irishmen in France, 304–5; Stuart Mss 387/8. Louis Charles Auguste Fouquet, Marećhal-Duc de Belle-Isle to Charles, Versailles, 18 December 1758; Stuart Mss 389/118. Charles to Etienne-François Choiseul, Marquis de Stainville and Duc de Choiseul [Bouillon?], 1 January 1759. Stuart Mss 389/81. Alexander Murray of Elibank. Memorial to the French ministers, c. 31 December 1758–4 January 1759. Her sister’s attachment to Leicester House, and the security breach caused by Pickle which roughly coincided with the re-establishment of Clementina’s affair

272 Notes

145.

146. 147. 148.

149. 150.

151.

152.

153. 154.

155. 156.

157.

with the Prince, caused the English Jacobites to believe she was in the employ of the Hanoverians. The Prince, however, would not take orders from his followers. McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 441; Sir Charles Petrie, The Jacobite Movement. The Last Phase, 156. McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 442. Stuart Mss 386/30. James to Charles, Rome, 7 October 1758. Stuart Mss 386/31. Copy of instructions by James for Andrew Lumisden, Rome, 7 October 1758. Stuart Mss 391/30–31. James. Draft of an abdication, c. January–February 1759. Stuart Mss 391/32. Anon., Memorial about an abdication, endorsed by James, c. January–February 1759. Stuart Mss 389/81. Alexander Murray of Elibank. Memorial to the French ministers, c. 31 December 1758–4 January 1759. See my treatment of Lord Blantyre’s intelligence and plans, pp. 130–2. Stuart Mss 389/89. Robert MacCarthy, 5th Earl Clancarthy. English draft of a memorial to the court of France, c. 31 December 1758–4 January 1759; Stuart Mss 389/90. Robert MacCarthy, 5th Earl Clancarthy. French translation of the English draft with an addition by Charles [Bouillon?], c. 31 December 1758–4 January 1759. Stuart Mss 389/91–92. Anon., ‘Memoire sur l’Utilite´ et la Possibilite´ d’une Descente en Angleterre’, c. 1758–1760. Stuart Mss 389/44. William Stewart, 9th Lord Blantyre to Charles. ‘Instructions for Britain’, c. 31 December 1758–4 January 1759; Stuart Mss 389/48. William Stewart, 9th Lord Blantyre. ‘A Copy of the Message sent to ye Prince’s Friends in Britain’, 31 December 1758–4 January 1759; Stuart Mss 389/43. William Stewart, 9th Lord Blantyre to Charles [Brussels?], 31 December 1758–4 January 1759. Stuart Mss 390/152. Chevalier Alexander-Peter Mackenzie-Douglas (for Charles) to Etienne François Choiseul, Marquis de Stainville and Duc de Choiseul [Versailles/Paris?], 12 February 1759. Stuart Mss Box 1/458. Charles (drafted by Alexander Murray of Elibank) to Louis XV, King of France, c. January 1759; Stuart Mss Box 1/462. Alexander Murray of Elibank (for Charles) to the French ministry, c. January 1759. Stuart Mss 386/31. James. Copy of Instructions given to Andrew Lumisden, Rome, 7 October 1758 (my italics). Stuart Mss 389/118. Charles to Colonel Wall, Bouillon, 2 January 1759; Same to Louis Auguste Fouquet, Marećhal-Duc de Belle-Isle, [Bouillon], 3 January 1759. Same to Etienne François Choiseul, Marquis de Stainville and Duc de Choiseul, Bouillon, 3 January 1759. BL Eg. Mss 3474, f. 155. Intelligence, Brest, 12 April 1759; f. 195. Intelligence, Paris, 11 May 1759. Stuart Mss 390/33. Louis Charles Auguste Fouquet, Marećhal-Duc de Belle-Isle to Charles, Versailles, 10 January; Stuart Mss Box 1/460. Memorandum by Charles drawn up in January 1759; Same (via Colonel Wall) to Louis Charles Auguste Fouquet, Marećhal-Duc de Belle-Isle, < 10 January 1759; Stuart Mss 390/69. Same to the same, [Bouillon], 17 January 1759; Stuart Mss 390/55. Same to Colonel Wall, c. 4 January–20 February 1759. In early 1758, Murray told the Prince not to accept any French offer of less than 25,000 men, unless the English Jacobites gave advice to the contrary. According to McLynn, Jacobite demands were surpassed by the numbers the French government projected for the effort, having earmarked 337 vessels and 48,000 men for Choiseul’s invasion attempt. Stuart Mss 378/140. Alexander Murray of Elibank to Charles, 16 January 1758; McLynn, The Jacobites, 36–7.

Notes 273 158. Stuart Mss 390/20. Colonel Wall to Mr. Douglas ¼ Charles, [Versailles?], 8 January 1759; Stuart Mss 390/60. Same to the same, Bouillon, 15 January 1759; Stuart Mss 390/97. Same to the same, [Paris?], 24 January 1759. 159. Stuart Mss 391/28. Charles (in Andrew Lumisden’s hand). Proposals to be made to the French ministers, c. end of January 1759; Stuart Mss 390/69. Charles to Louis Charles Auguste Fouquet, Marećhal-Duc de Belle-Isle, [Bouillon?], 30 January 1759; Stuart Mss 390/132. Etienne François de Choiseul, Marquis de Stainville and Duc de Choiseul to [Charles?], Paris, 5 February 1759. 160. The date for this meeting is given alternatively as 5 or 7 February 1759. See McLynn, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 450; Nordmann, ‘Choiseul and The Last Jacobite Attempt of 1759’, 203. 161. This claim has been perpetuated by McLynn, Nordmann, and Fitzroy Maclean. Carolly Erickson, in her biography of the Prince, does not even quote any evidence to support this contention. McLynn is the only historian, who has qualified his view, stating that ‘the political significance of Charles Edward’s drinking has been overplayed by hostile critics. It is quite clear from a close study of the evidence that the French were not unduly perturbed when the prince arrived drunk for his 1759 meeting with Choiseul’. Fact is that they all base their account on Sir N. William Wraxall’s memoirs, which are, to say the least, written by a hostile observer, and of dubious quality. Wraxall has the story of Charles’ alleged intoxication at the meeting with Choiseul from an unnamed nobleman in the retinue of the Whig Duke of Gloucester – and that eleven years after the event. Wraxall also wrongly dates the meeting at 1770. McLynn, The Jacobites, 201; Bonnie Prince Charlie, 450; Nordmann, ‘Choiseul and The Last Jacobite Attempt of 1759’, 203; Maclean, Bonnie Prince Charlie, 339; Carolly Erickson, Bonnie Prince Charlie (London, 1989), 267. Sir N. William Wraxall, Historical Memoirs of My Own Time (London, 1818), 3 vols., I, 308–10. 162. James Pritchard, Louis XV’s Navy, 1748–1762 A Study of Organization and Administration (Kingston and Montreal, 1987), 5. 163. Stuart Mss 390/161. Etienne François Choiseul, Marquis de Stainville and Duc de Choiseul to the Chevalier Alexander-Peter Mackenzie-Douglas, [Paris?], 14 February 1759. 164. Stuart Mss 390/177. Charles to Alexander Murray of Elibank, [Bouillon?], 19 February 1759; Stuart Mss 390/179. Campbell ¼ Alexander Murray of Elibank to Charles, [Paris?], 19 February 1759; Stuart Mss Box 1/468. Same to Charles de Rohan, Prince de Soubise. Copy, 18 February 1759; Stuart Mss Box 1/469. Charles (drafted by Alexander Murray of Elibank) to Jeanne Antoinette Poisson, Marquise de Pompadour, 18 February 1759. 165. Stuart Mss Box 1/473. Alexander Murray of Elibank to Charles, late February, or early March 1759. With the words:‘[r]emember that Your expectations from Ellis [i.e. Louis XV], requires a great deal of management with Master mar [i.e. Pompadour]’, Murray impressed Madame de Pompadour’s importance on the Prince. According to MacAllester, it was Madame de Pompadour who engineered Cardinal Bernis’ dismissal, and Choiseul’s succession. Moreover, apparently Charles’ ‘cause was now strongly revived’, and the Prince himself ‘stood extremely well in the good graces of that lady’. MacAllester, A Series of Letters, I, 257. 166. Stuart Mss Box 1/494. Alexander Murray of Elibank to Charles, c. 15 October 1759. 167. Stuart Mss 391/1. Chevalier Alexander-Peter Mackenzie-Douglas to Charles, [Paris?], 20 February 1759.

274 Notes 168. Stuart Mss 391/16. John Elliot ¼ Robert MacCarthy, 5th Earl Clancarthy to Mr. Douglas ¼ Charles, Boulogne, 25 February 1759. 169. Stuart Mss 392/45. Charles to Peter Wood, 8 April 1759; Stuart Mss 392/54. Leslye ¼ William Stewart, 9th Lord Blantyre to Alexander Murray of Elibank, Lie`ge, 9 April 1759; Stuart Mss 392/83. The Jesuit ¼ Peter Wood to Charles, Brussels, 16 April 1759; Stuart Mss 392/94. Alexander Murray of Elibank to Charles, 18 April 1759; Stuart Mss 393/75. Same to the same, [Paris?], 6 May 1759; Stuart Mss 393/ 53 Campbell ¼ Alexander Murray of Elibank to Charles, 13 May 1759. 170. Stuart Mss 393/54. Alexander Murray of Elibank to Goodwin ¼ William Stewart, 9th Lord Blantyre, 13 May 1759. 171. Stuart Mss Box 1/479. Leslye ¼ William Stewart, 9th Lord Blantyre to Charles, c. 20 May 1759. 172. Stuart Mss Box 1/486. William Stewart, 9th Lord Blantyre to Alexander Murray of Elibank, c. July 1759. 173. BL Eg. Mss 3474, f. 195., Intelligence, Paris, 11 May 1759. If the report is to be trusted, the interview with Louis XV lasted for one and a half hours. MacAllester claims that after the fall of Cardinal Bernis, Charles was a welcome guest of the French court, that he attended French cabinet meetings, and that he was closeted with Louis XV on several occasions. MacAllester, A Series of Letters, I, 256–7. 174. Stuart Mss 395/168. Campbell ¼ Alexander Murray of Elibank to Charles, [Paris?], 10 October 1759. 175. Stuart Mss 394/160. Campbell ¼ Alexander Murray of Elibank to Charles, [Paris?], 2 August 1759. 176. Stuart Mss 394/152. Campbell ¼ Alexander Murray of Elibank to Charles, 24 July 1759. 177. Stuart Mss Box 1/489. Alexander Murray of Elibank to Charles, 4 August 1759. 178. Stuart Mss 394/65. Alexander Murray of Elibank to Louis XV, King of France, 4 August 1759. 179. Stuart Mss Box 1/485. Leslye ¼ William Stewart, 9th Lord Blantyre to Charles, 10 July 1759; Stuart Mss 395/16. Campbell ¼ Alexander Murray of Elibank to Charles, 13 August 1759. 180. Stuart Mss 395/14. Alexander Murray of Elibank to Charles, 11 August 1759; Stuart Mss 395/168. Same to the same, 10 October 1759. 181. BL Eg. Mss 3475, f. 186. Intelligence, Lille, 26 October 1759. 182. Geoffrey Marcus, ‘Hawke’s Blockade of Brest’, Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 104 (1959), 475–88; BL Eg. Mss 3475. f. 24. Intelligence, Havre, 10 July 1759; Stuart Mss 395/25. Lieutenant John Holker to Sheldon ¼ Michael Sheridan, Rouen, 14 August 1759; Stuart Mss 395/93. Same to the same, Rouen, 9 September 1759; Michael Sheridan to Lieutenant John Holker, [Bouillon?], [13?] September 1759. 183. Stuart Mss Box 1/490. Peter Wood to Charles, [Brussels?], 20 August 1759; Stuart Mss 395/43. Campbell ¼ Alexander Murray of Elibank to Charles, 21 August 1759. 184. Stuart Mss Box 1/492. Charles to Alexander Murray of Elibank, c. late 1759. 185. Stuart Mss Box 1/494. Alexander Murray of Elibank to Charles, c. 15 October 1759. 186. BL Eg. Mss 3465, ff. 161–6. ‘Extract of a letter from Lille the 15th. December. 1755’. For General Lally’s comment on French equivocacy in relation to a Stuart restoration and the French position on a Stuart restoration, see p. 133.

Notes 275 187. Nordmann, ‘Choiseul and The Last Jacobite Attempt of 1759’, 210. 188. NLS Ms 14260, f. 20. Andrew Lumisden to Alexander Murray of Elibank, [Rome?], 18 September 1759. 189. Stuart Mss 396/4. Campbell ¼ Alexander Murray of Elibank to Charles, 17 October 1759. 190. BL Eg. Mss 3475, f. 175. Intelligence, Paris, 19 October 1759. 191. For the Hanoverian government’s lively interest in Jacobite plotting between the ’Fifteen and the ’Forty-five, see Paul Fritz, The English Ministers and Jacobitism between the Rebellions of 1715 and 1745 (Toronto, 1975), especially see his chapter entitled ‘Walpole’s intelligence system’, 109–25; also see his article ‘The Anti-Jacobite Intelligence System of the English Ministers, 1715– 1745’, Historical Journal, 16, 2 (1973), 265–89. Fritz states that between the ’Fifteen and the ’Forty-five the government ministers developed ‘an almost pathological fear of a Stuart restoration’, Fritz, ‘Anti-Jacobite Intelligence System’, 265. 192. BL Eg. Mss 3468, f. 163. Intelligence, Brussels, 21 August 1755; f. 169. Intelligence, Brussels, 8 September 1755; BL Eg. Mss 3478, f. 144. ‘Advices R. August 27th 1755. From the Earl of Holdernesse’s office’; f. 157. ‘Advices R. Septr. 16th 1755’, Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse was the Secretary of State for the Northern Department from 1754–61. Dann, Hanover and Great Britain, 151. Holdernesse’s information was actually a few months old; it was preceded by an earlier report from the Highlands. The Scottish Jacobites were not even trying to make their leader’s presence in France a secret. NLS Ms 5078, f. 143. Duncan MacVicar to Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald, 25 February 1755. 193. BL Eg. Mss 3465, f. 64. Michael Hatton to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Paris, 9 April 1755. 194. BL Eg., Ms 3465, f. 67. Michael Hatton to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Paris, 16 April 1755. 195. BL Eg. Mss f. 3478, f. 29. ‘Advices R. 24 February 1755’; BL Eg. Mss 3468, f. 176. Intelligence, Furnes, 10 September 1755; BL Eg. Mss 3465, ff. 123–4. Michael Hatton to [Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse], Ostend, 4 October 1755; f. 134. Same to the same, Ostend, 11 October 1755; BL Eg. Mss 3465, ff. 172–3. ‘Advices from France the 15th January 1756’. Contradictory reports did crop up from time to time, such as the claim that Charles was to marry the Duke of Parma’s daughter. See BL Eg. Mss 3465, ff. 149–50. ‘Advices. R 19th Novm. 1755. From Mr. Hatton’, London, 18 November 1755. 196. BL Eg. Mss 3478, f. 189. ‘Advices R. Novemr. 12th 1755’; BL Eg. Mss 3468, f. 235. Intelligence, Paris, 1 December 1755. 197. BL Eg. Mss 3465, f. 170. ‘Advices. R. Janry 7th 1756. From Mr. Hatton’; f. 174. ‘Advices from France dated the 23 January 1756.’; f. 198. ‘Advices from France dated the 12th May 1756’. 198. BL Eg. Mss 3466, 134–5. Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse to R. Wolters, Whitehall, 24 February 1756. 199. BL Eg. Mss 3478, ff. 41–2. Intelligence, R. 21 January–7 February 1756 (my italics). 200. BL Eg. Mss 3466, f. 192. R. Wolters to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Rotterdam, 17 December 1756; BL Eg. Mss 3465, f. 189. ‘Advices from France dated the 17th March 1756’. Between 1745 and 1770, Richard Wolters supervised a British espionage network in the main French and Spanish ports. Fraser, ‘The

276 Notes

201.

202. 203.

204.

Pitt-Newcastle Coalition’, 266; D. B. Horn, The British Diplomatic Service, 1689– 1789 (Oxford, 1961), 274; Kenneth Ellis, The Post Office in the Eighteenth Century. A Study in Administrative History (London, 1958), 61–2. BL Eg. Mss 3465. f. 94. ‘Extract of a Letter from Compeigne dated the 26th July 1755’; ff. 108–10. Michael Hatton to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Ostend, 9 September 1755; BL Eg. Mss 3468, f. 182. Intelligence, Furnes, 17 September 1755; f. 215. Intelligence, Furnes, 2 November 1755; f. 225. Intelligence, Furnes, 16 November 1755; BL Eg. Mss 3474, f. 196. Intelligence, Ypres, 10 May 1759; BL Eg., Ms 3475, f. 56. Intelligence, Dunkirk, 28 July 1759; f. 120. Intelligence, Brest, 3 September 1759; f. 147. Intelligence, Brest, 26 September 1759. Also see Basil Williams, The Whig Supremacy, 1714–1760 (Oxford, [1939] 1962), 291. BL Eg. Mss 3465, ff. 101–5. Michael Hatton to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, 30 August 1755. BL Eg. Mss 3466, ff. 150–2. Charles Stuart to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Campvere, 28 April 1756. As early as June 1747, in the closing phase of the War of Austrian Succession, the Comte D’Argenson connived at Lord Ogilvy’s recruiting activities among Scots Dutch prisoners of war; according to a report of a government spy in the Highlands, Lochiel also obtained recruits from the same source. In the early 1750s, Alasdair Ruadh MacDonell told the British government that he had planned to recruit his own regiment in the French service from deserters in that of the Dutch, and that he had heard that ‘most of the Scots Dutch Officers are disaffected, & particularly Ld. Drumlanrig’s, several of whose Officers were in the last Rebellion’. According to MacDonell, General Graham of the Scots Dutch service ‘enter’d into an Agreement with Sr. Hector Maclean, that his own, & Coll: Marjoribank’s Regiment shoud be Contrivd to be so quarterd in some of the Frontier-towns belonging to the States, as to be ready to Join in any Scheme that shoud Concerted for the Interest of the Pretender’s Cause’. NLS Ms 3187, f. 48. ‘Copie de la Lettre ecrite par Mg. le Comte d’Argenson a My Lord Ogilvy de Versailles’, 5 June 1747; SP 54/38, ff. 4–6. ‘Copy of a Letter from Mr. Jno. Stewart, Minister in Lochaber under the Name of Murdoch MacLeod’, 24 December 1747; NeC 2,086. ‘Narrative & Informations of A:[lasdair] M:[acDonell]’, August 1751. MacDonell also recommended that the Scots Dutch be stationed away from the French frontier, because ‘the Jacobites here rely greatly upon those Officers, in case on any new troubles arising’. NeC 2,091. ‘Information from A.[lasdair] M.[acDonell] . . . Septemr. 14th. 1751’. For Dutch recruiting officers enlisting Jacobites and Roman Catholics after the ’Forty-five, see William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle to Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, Edinburgh, 22 November 1746, printed in C. S. Terry, ed., Albemarle Papers, 2 vols (Aberdeen, 1902), I, 317. Also see Allan I. Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603–1788 (East Linton, 1996), 168–9, 194; SP 78/237, 72 et seq. William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle to John Russell, 4th Duke of Bedford, Paris, 5 October 1750, for the audacity of one recruiting agent. SP 54/44, ff. 245–6. Lieutenant-General Humphrey Bland to Sir Thomas Robinson, Edinburgh, 16 August 1755. Consequently, these so-called French officers, who were also suspected of recruiting, were directed to quit Scotland. See f. 249. Same to Claudius Amyand, Edinburgh, 2 September 1755. Amyand was UnderSecretary of State in the Northern Department from 1750–56. Sedgwick, The Commons, I, 414.

Notes 277 205. SP 36/130. f. 42. Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse to Lieutenant-General Humphrey Bland, Whitehall, 13 April 1755; ff. 43–5. ‘Proposed Orders to General Bland, for the Disposition of His Majesty’s Forces in North Britain’, 8 April 1755; ff. 49–50. Lieutenant-General Humphrey Bland to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Edinburgh 17 April, 1755; ff. 60–1. Same to the same, Edinburgh, 17 April 1755. 206. BL Add. Ms 35449, ff. 15–16. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to Philip York, 1st Earl of Hardwicke, Edinburgh, 16 March 1756. 207. NLS Ms 5078, f. 143. Duncan McVicar, Collector of the Customs at Fort William to [Archibald Campbell, 3rd Duke of Argyll/Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald?], Fort William, 25 February 1755; f. 147. Same to [the same?], Fort William, 3 March 1755; f. 196. ‘Copy of a Declaration transmitted by the Lieut. Govr. of Carlisle to Lieut. General Bland,’ Carlisle, 22 November 1755. 208. For descriptions of Lord Tinwald’s character, see NeC 2,222/2. Anon., ‘Characters,’ [n.d.], where he is credited with ‘Solid Judgement’, but at the same time is accused of having had Jacobite inclinations in the past; Alexander Allardyce, ed., Scotland and Scotsmen in the Eighteenth Century from the Mss. of John Ramsay, Esq. of Ochtertyre (Edinburgh, 1888), 2 vols., I, 105; SP 36/133, ff. 72–3. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Edinburgh, 24 February 1756; SP 54/45, f. 50. Same to the same, Edinburgh, 1 June 1756. Also see BL Add. Ms 35449, ff. 19–20. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to Philip Yorke, 1st Earl of Hardwicke, Edinburgh, 23 March 1756. 209. SP 54/44, ff. 233–4. Lieutenant-General Humphrey Bland to Sir Thomas Robinson, Edinburgh, 19 July 1755; ff. 245–6. Same to the same, Edinburgh, 16 August 1755; SP 36/131, f. 174. Intelligence concerning Lieutenant John MacDonell of Ogilvy’s Regiment and Lieutenant Donald Stewart of Lord Drummond’s Regiment [i.e. Royal Ećossais], 4 August 1755; SP 36/133, ff. 62–3. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Edinburgh, 19 February 1756; SP 54/45, f. 102. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Edinburgh, 27 November 1756; BL Eg. Mss 3434, f. 210. ‘Memorandum of the late Dr. Cameron’s son being arrived in the Highlands of Scotland’, 7 January 1758; NLS Ms 5078, f. 147. Duncan MacVicar to [Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald?], Fort William, 3 March 1755; NLS Ms 5078, f. 196. ‘Copy of a Declaration Transmitted by the Lieut. Govr. of Carlisle to Lieut. Gen. Bland. Information of David MacKay Late of Dundee and Now Residing in Carlisle taken upon Oath before Richard Cook, Esq. Mayor of the said City, 22d of Novr. 1755’; NLS Ms 5080, f. 1. Duncan MacVicar to [Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald?], Fort William, 9 January 1758. MacVicar reported that Charles had ostensibly visited England and Wales during the months of September and October 1757 ‘upon invitation’; NLS Ms 5080, f. 33. Same to [the same?], Fort William, 28 March 1758. Ewan Cameron, a Jacobite agent, advised his friends ‘to dispose of their cattle, as inevitably ane invasion would happen without loss of time’; NLS Ms 5080, f. 124. Same to [the same?], Fort William, 3 July 1759. 210. Stuart Mss 389/93. Donald MacDonell of Lochgarry to James. ‘List of the Loyall Clans in Scotland and What Number they would Raise Immediately in Armes’, c. 31 December 1758–4 January 1759. Also note that Lochgarry’s picture of 1758– 59 on the geography of loyalty in Scotland agrees with Ewan MacPherson of Cluny’s intelligence dating from the early period of the Elibank plot. Stuart Mss 318/136. Charles. ‘An exact Copy of an Account writen by C[luny] M[acPherson] [in] his

278 Notes own hand, Laid before y[e] H[ighness] by A[rchibald] C[ameron] in March 1750’. In April 1750, the clan chiefs complained that their requirement for foreign aid had been exaggerated to James, and that, if their leaders in exile would not promote another rising, they would take matters into their own hands. Stuart Mss Box 1/318. Alasdair Ruadh MacDonell of Glengarry to James, [Boulogne?] c. April 1750. Also see note 214. 211. BL Add. Ms 35448, f. 234. James Ogilvy, 5th Earl of Findlater and 2nd Earl of Seafield to Philip Yorke, 1st Earl of Hardwicke, Cullen House, 14 February 1755; Same to the same, Cullen House, 25 October 1755 (my italics). 212. Murray G. H. Pittock, The Myth of the Jacobite Clans (Edinburgh, 1995), 78–82, 86. In his book, Pittock does not cite any evidence in support of his contention on page 86 that Jacobitism in Scotland was a spent force by the 1750s. Moreover, the evidence I have cited for increased Franco-Jacobite recruiting activity in Britain and in Ireland during the first phase of the Seven Years’ War stands in direct contradiction to Linda Colley’s somewhat bold assertions that ‘[s]upport for the Seven Years War had been remarkably and deceptively unanimous [i.e. in Britain]’, and that there had been ‘no even halfway serious plot for an internal rising on their [i.e. the Jacobites’] behalf’. Linda Colley, Britons. Forging the Nation, 1707–1837 (New Haven, 1992), 103. Blantyre’s thorough intelligence and planning undertaken during Charles’ negotiations at that time, demonstrates quite the contrary. See, for example, Stuart Mss 389/55. William Stewart, 9th Lord Blantyre to Charles. ‘A Plan for Forming and Raising a Body of Troops in Scotland’, c. 31 December 1758 – 4 January 1759; Stuart Mss 389/58. William Stewart, 9th Lord Blantyre to Charles. ‘A List of Collonels’, c. 31 December 1758–4 January 1759; Stuart Mss 389/46. Goodwin ¼ William Stewart, 9th Lord Blantyre to Peter Wood. ‘A Paper Relating to Scotland’, c. 31 December 1758–4 January 1759; Stuart Mss 389/53. Same to Charles. ‘A List of Lords and Gentlemen, out of whom a Privy Council may be Formed’, c. 31 December 1758–4 January 1759; Stuart Mss 389/54. Same to the same. ‘The Privy Council for Scotland may be Composed of Ten, Six Peers & Four Gentlemen’, c. 31 December 1758–4 January 1759; also see Stuart Mss 389/94. Anon. ‘Ideas on the Resources that may be Drawn from Scotland shou’d an Invasion be made in England for the King’, c. 1758–1759. In regard to a rising in the western Highlands in 1759, the Hanoverian double-agent Oliver MacAllester states that he had been informed by ‘a gentleman, who knew the whole design, and whose word I could rely on’, that ‘measures had been, and were to be taken, with more precaution and success, than in 1745’. MacAllester, A Series of Letters, II, 54. 213. NLS Ms 5080, f. 124. Duncan MacVicar to [Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald?], Fort William, 3 July 1759. Aside from being the Government’s collector of customs at Fort William, MacVicar guided a well-organized spy network in the Western Highlands. A few months before the actual invasion attempt was staged by the French in 1759, MacVicar warned the Government that ‘it is the Opinion of Clan Cameron, unless Lochiel [John, son of Donald, the deceased 19th Chief] be firmly attatched in favour of the present well Established Government, and that the ffrench policy brings the Pretender on the Carpet in their designs against Brittain, it were to be wished Lochiel was Secured, this gives me room to Suspect, that if Lochiel was to join the Pretender, a number of the Clan might be tempted and influenced to follow him’. In 1745, the 19th Chief of Clan Cameron had unleashed the rising by bringing 800 clansmen to Glenfinnan. Only after he had thrown in his lot with Prince Charles, did the other clans

Notes 279

214.

215.

216.

217. 218.

219.

220.

follow his lead. Even in the late 1750s, John Cameron of Lochiel’s prestige and rank in the hierarchy of the Jacobite clans should not be underestimated. In 1750, the Jacobite chiefs expressed their concern to James, that they and the strength of their clans had been misrepresented, and the extent of the foreign aid required by them had been exaggerated out of proportion; that they were quite desperate for another rising, and that the casualties of the ’Forty-five had been more than compensated for by the influx of men from disbanded British Highland units, who would join the Jacobites irrespective of their whiggish chiefs’ attachment to the Hanoverian dynasty. Stuart Mss Box 1/318. Alasdair Ruadh MacDonell of Glengarry to James, [Boulogne?], c. April 1750. In the light of Glengarry’s activities as an Hanoverian agent, this information seems unreliable, but the sceptic should consider two ameliorating circumstances which render this document the hardest type of evidence available: first, Glengarry had to retain his credibility in the eyes of his peers in order to continue his activities for the British government unimpeded, and therefore could not possibly misrepresent the Jacobite chiefs at the court in exile – such a betrayal would have been too obvious, as Glengarry’s information would have been disseminated among James’ confidants; second, Glengarry’s cousin, the fanatically loyal LieutenantColonel Donald MacDonell of Lochgarry, who accompanied him to Scotland, was the best safeguard for the authenticity of the message. See also Chapter 4, note 60. Stuart Mss 353/27. Aeneas MacDonald to [Charles?], < 6 March 1754. This observation receives corroboration in Alasdair Ruadh MacDonell of Glengarry’s report on the sentiments of the clans of April 1750. Alasdair Ruadh MacDonell of Glengarry to James, [Boulogne?], c. April 1750. John Robertson, The Scottish Enlightenment and the Militia Issue (Edinburgh, 1985), 112, 115, 160–1. When Robertson states that there were rumours of Jacobite correspondence in 1757, and maintains that government spies could not detect much disaffection in 1759, he is understating the case. See the reports on Jacobite activities in Britain quoted in this section, pp. 146–54. MacBean Collection, Reasons for Extending the Militia Acts to the Disarmed Counties of Scotland (Edinburgh, 1760), 4. Pittock, Myth of the Jacobite Clans, see his second chapter, bearing the same title as the book, 43–87; Reasons for Extending the Militia Acts, 5–11; When the rumour of a planned French descent on the Clyde estuary in 1759 reached Scotland, and specifically Ayrshire, it was taken seriously. The question of raising a militia had still not been resolved; actually the Earl of Eglinton opposed the Earl of Loudon on the issue of a proposal submitted by Lord Auchinleck at a county meeting, because the said proposal had allegedly been tailored to suit the Argathelian interest. Alexander Murdoch, ‘The People Above’. Politics and Administration in Mid-Eighteenth-Century Scotland (Edinburgh, 1980), 90–1. BL Add. Ms 35450, f. 261. Philip Yorke, 1st Earl of Hardwicke to John Campbell, 3rd Earl of Breadalbane, Grosvenor Square, 30 June 1759; ff. 262–3. John Campbell, 3rd Earl of Breadalbane to Philip Yorke, 1st Earl of Hardwicke, Sugnal, 4 July 1759. Notably, Breadalbane was attempting to disassociate the Jacobite element from the French invasion attempt. For Breadalbane, see the entry under Lord Glenorchy. Sedgwick, The Commons, I, 525–6. Alexander Murdoch points out that the Duke of Newcastle’s inconsistent Scottish policy after Henry Pelham’s death in 1754 had much to do with his fear of the Jacobites. Murdoch, ‘The People Above’, 52. See SP 36/133. ff. 72–3. Charles

280 Notes

221. 222.

223.

224.

225.

Areskine, Lord Tinwald to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Edinburgh, 24 February 1756; SP 36/139. ff. 7–8. Same to the same, Edinburgh, 30 December 1757; SP 36/139. ff. 12–13. Same to the same, Edinburgh, 12 January 1758; NLS Ms 5080, f. 124. Duncan McVicar, Collector of the Customs at Fort William to [Charles Areskine, Lord Tinwald/Archibald Campbell, 3rd Duke of Argyll ?], Fort William, 3 July 1759; NLS Ms 5080, f. 136. Same to [the same?], Fort William, 3 July 1759; SP 54/44, f. 184. Lieutenant-General Humphrey Bland to Claudius Amyand, Edinburgh, 20 May 1755. Though he was otherwise sceptical, even the Lord Advocate of Scotland, Robert Dundas, admitted that he received information ‘that Should a Pretender land too many are Still ready to joyn him’. BL Add. Ms 35449, f. 181–2. Robert Dundas of Arniston, Lord Advocate to Philip Yorke, 1st Earl of Hardwicke, Edinburgh, 24 July 1759. Chris Tabraham and Doreen Grove, Fortress Scotland and the Jacobites (London, 1995), 92–98. Longmate, Island Fortress, 173. NeC 2,082. ‘Measures taken by the Military, since the Rebellion, & the Effects thereof’, 1752. The memorialist argued that it would be easier to punish the errant Highlanders, ‘especially when the new Fort, now erecting, is finished; which will at all times give a certain Inlet to the Heart of that Country [i.e. Lochaber], whenever any future Disturbances may happen; and that without taking the Hazards of a long March, through the Country, as nothing can cut off the Communication to it by Sea’. SP 54/44, f. 110. Lieutenant-General Humphry Bland to James Wallace, Edinburgh, 1 August 1754; SP 54/44, ff. 129–30. Same to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Edinburgh, 13 August 1754. At the end of August, the two parties finally reached a consensus, of which a draft survives. SP 36/128, ff. 225–6. ‘Articles of Agreement ’twixt The Duke of Gordon’s Tutors and Lieut. Colonel Watson for as Tack upon the Lands of Achintorebegg & [the] Village of Gordonsburgh’, Maryburgh/Gordonsburgh, 30 August 1754; SP 36/132, f. 12. Robert Dundas of Arniston, Lord Advocate to Claudius Amyand, Arniston, 10 September 1755. SP 54/44, ff. 22–3. ‘Accompt of the Villages and Farms lying adjacent to Fort William’, in Lieutenant-General Humphrey Bland to [?], [Edinburgh?], 13 April 1754. Also see NeC 2,116/1. ‘Observations upon Some of The Factors upon the Forfeited Estates in Scotland; May 12th. 1752’. and NeC 2,079. ‘Abuses and Neglects in the General Management in Scotland, since the Rebellion, 1752’. This last list, apparently prepared at the behest of Henry Pelham (see NeC 2,075), contains an interesting point, in which the memorialist warned that if the ground surrounding the new Fort George at Ardersier was not purchased in time from Campbell of Calder this would ‘occasion great Disputes between the Engineer & some of Mr. Campbell’s Minister’s Tenants, who cut & spoil the Sod which he proposes to use in the Parapets, & . . . will be attended with the same inconveniency as Fort William is; where Stuart, who was Major to the Rebel Regiment of Appin, and a number of Persons who were in the last Rebellion are settled in a Village they call Maryburgh, close to the Fort, and are Spies upon every Motion of the Troops, the Ground never having been purchased by the Crown’ (my italics). The identity of the anonymous major of Appin’s regiment has not yet been established. Alastair Livingstone of Bachuil, Christian W. H. Aikman and Betty Stuart Hart, eds., Muster Roll of Prince Charles Edward Stuart’s Army, 1745–46 (Aberdeen, [1984] 1985), 12. SP 54/44, 251–2. Lord Advocate Robert Dundas of Arniston to Claudius Amyand, Arniston, 10 September 1755.

Notes 281 226. SP 54/44, f. 110. Lieutenant-General Humphrey Bland to James Wallace, Edinburgh, 1 August 1754. 227. Stuart Mss 389/93. Donald MacDonell of Lochgarry to James. ‘List of the Loyall Clans in Scotland and What Number they would Raise Immediately in Armes’, c. 31 December 1758–4 January 1759. 228. SP 36/137, f. 9. ‘Copy of a paragraph in a Letter received this Day from the Highlands’, in Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Edinburgh, 25 January 1757. 229. NLS Ms 5080, f. 124. Duncan McVicar, Collector of the Customs at Fort William to [Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald/ Archibald Campbell, 3rd Duke of Argyll?], Fort William, 3 July 1759; Same to [the same?], Fort William, 11 July 1759. By early November, Sir Charles Hanbury-Williams warned that ‘however desperate & rash the Enterprize [i.e. the invasion] may seem, it will be risked and may succeed’, BL Add. Ms 35483, ff. 40–1. Sir Charles Hanbury-Williams to [Robert?] Keith, 2 November 1759. 230. BL Eg. Mss 3474, ff. 154–5. Intelligence, Brest, 12 April 1759; f. 195. Intelligence, Paris, 11 May 1759. On the other side of the political divide, Andrew Lumisden noted: ‘I scarce believe that the French will risque a descent on England, without the participation of a certain person, for without him they can expect little success’. NLS Ms 14260, f. 16. Andrew Lumisden to M. Ballantyne, [Rome?], 21 August 1759. 231. SP 36/138, ff. 64c-h. ‘Henry Page’s Accot. of Donston [i.e. Dunster] & Manson, in his own handwriting’, 26 June–19 October 1757. 232. SP 36/138, ff. 115–17. ‘The Examination of William Dunster, of Deptford, Tayler’, [London], 3 November 1757. 233. SP 36/138, ff. 109–12. ‘The Examination of Archibald Manson late of Deptford in the County of Kent Labourr’, [London?], 1 November 1757. 234. SP 36/138, ff. 66–78. ‘Archibald Manson’s papers seized by N. Carrington’, 25 October 1757. 235. SP 36/138, [not foliated, but probably ff. 91–6]. ‘Wm. Dunston’s [i.e. Dunster’s] Papers, seized by N. Carrington’ [25 October 1757?]. 236. SP 36/138, ff. 100–[1?]. ‘Deposition of Alexander MacCraw’, Kent, 29 October 1757; ff. 64c-h. ‘Henry Page’s Accot. of Dunston [i.e. Dunster] & Manson, in his own handwriting’, [London] 26 June–19 October 1757; ; ‘Deposition of Henry Page’, Kent, 29 October 1757; ff. 109–12. ‘The Examination of Archibald Manson late of Deptford in the Country of Kent Labourr’, 1 November 1757. 237. Hayes, Biographical Dictionary of Irishmen in France, 32–3; O’Callaghan, History of the Irish Brigades, 42–5; especially see 44. 238. Dr Florence Hensey was the physician of the Spanish resident, and thus must have had access to his employer’s diplomatic infrastructure. Moreover, Hensey regularly attended the meetings of the Loyal Brotherhood which met at the ‘Cocoa Tree’ in Pall Mall and the ‘Fountain’ in the Strand. The Loyal Brotherhood was a Tory/Jacobite club, which, since its inception in 1709, had included distinguished members of the Tory/Jacobite political scene, such as Sir John Hynde Cotton, Sir Watkin Williams Wynn, Sir John Philipps, Sir Cecil Bishopp, Sir William Wyndham, its founder, the 3rd Duke of Beaufort, his brother and successor, Charles Noel Somerset, the Earl of Orrery, the Earl of Barrymore, his son the Hon. Richard Barry, the Earl of Lichfield, the Earl of Denbigh, Lord Craven and the Duke of Hamilton. Walpole, Memoirs, II, 309; Colley, ‘The Loyal Brotherhood and the Cocoa Tree’, 77–95, 81–3, 88, 92–4.

282 Notes 239. SP 36/140, ff. 59–70. ‘Examination of Dr. Hensey’, Whitehall, 17 July 1758. For the British expedition to Rochefort, see W. Kent Hackmann, ‘The British Raid on Rochefort, 1757’, The Mariner’s Mirror, 64 (1978), 263–75; Walpole, Memoirs, II, 309. 240. He was in all probability John Huske (1724–73), whose uncle Lieutenant-General John Huske fought on the Hanoverian side during the ’Forty-five. Huske the younger was Chief Clerk and Deputy to the Treasurer of the Chamber from December 1756 to March 1761. Sir Lewis Namier and John Brooke, The House of Commons, 1754–1790, 3 vols (London, 1964), II, 658–62. 241. SP 36/140, ff. 71–93. ‘Dr. Hensey’s Examination continued’, Whitehall, 18 July 1758. 242. Jacob M. Price, France and the Chesapeake. A History of the French Tobacco Monopoly, 1674–1791, and of Its Relationship to the British and American Tobacco Traders, 2 vols (Ann Arbor, MI, 1973), I, 557–81; SP 36/140, ff. 42–4. Dr Florence Hensey to Mr. Webb, [London?], 14 July 1758; ff. 71–93. ‘Dr. Hensey’s Examination continued’, Whitehall, 18 July 1758. The Jacobite contact in the Admiralty Office could have possibly supplied Lord Blantyre with the information on the Royal Navy. For John Bellew, 4th Baron Bellew and the Bellews of Duleek in East Meath, see O’Callaghan, History of the Irish Brigade, 79–81. 243. Walpole, Memoirs, II, 309; D. B. Horn, The British Diplomatic Service, 270. 244. BL Eg. Mss 3465, ff. 136–7. Michael Hatton to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Ostend, 18 October 1755; ff. 224–6. Same to the same, Brussels, 26 August 1756. In this case, the British recruited a spy, apparently an attainted Jacobite, by offering him a pardon. ff. 119–20, Michael Hatton to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Ostend, 1 October 1755. See also note 70. 245. Another Franco-Jacobite intelligence operation had been eliminated in April, 1756. SP 36/134, ff. 45–6. ‘Papers concerning Romain Blot or Billot, a French spy & priest sent to England by Prince de Soubise, and his associates Thomas Newby, Mons. Chambon, Robert Heney, John Carry, Wallier Dungan and others’ [London?], 6–20 April 1756. 246. Nordmann, ‘Choiseul and The Last Jacobite Attempt of 1759’, 205, 208–9. As early as 1755, rumours of Swedish support for a descent on Britain were circulating in the Highlands. SP 36/129, f. 70. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Edinburgh, 10th March 1755; BL Add. Ms 35449, ff. 27–8. Norman MacLeod to Philip Yorke, 1st Earl of Hardwicke, Edinburgh, 10 April 1756. By January 1759, British intelligence was fully aware of the enthusiastic response given by the Swedes to Choiseul’s overtures. According to this account, the Swedes were to aid the French with an expeditionary corps of 8,000 men under Charles. Fraser, The Pitt-Newcastle Coalition, 265. Linda Colley’s contention that ‘[i]n contrast with every previous war with France since 1689, there had been no French-sponsored invasion of the British mainland on behalf of the Stuart claimants to the throne [during the Seven Years’ War]’, is at least partially wrong. There had been no invasion of Britain during the War of Spanish Succession (1702–14), for the Franco-Jacobite invasion force poised to strike in 1708 never landed a body of troops on British soil. However close the invasion of 1708 came to an actual landing, in the end it was more of an abortive attempt, than an attempted invasion. By contrast, the planned Franco-Jacobite invasion of Britain in November 1759, which, in terms of manpower and tonnage, made any previously attempted amphibian operation launched from the French coast pale into insignificance, had to be confronted,

Notes 283

247. 248.

249.

250. 251. 252.

253.

254.

255.

256.

257.

and fought to a standstill by the Royal Navy in the Morbihan. The outcome of the battle of Quiberon Bay was never a forgone conclusion. Though the French did not actually land in Britain at that time, Colley seems to underrate the danger posed to British security by the combined French fleets participating in the Duc de Choiseul’s invasion-scheme. Furthermore, when Colley states that the British mainland was not invaded, her contention is only generally correct, for, as we shall see, Carrickfergus in British-ruled Ireland was indeed attacked, occupied and subsequently sacked by Franco-Jacobite invaders in 1759. Colley, Britons, 103. For the invasion attempt of March 1708, see John S. Gibson, Playing the Scottish Card. The Franco-Jacobite Invasion of 1708 (Edinburgh, 1988), 106–31. Claude Nordmann, Grandeur et liberte´ de la Sue`de, 1660–1792 (Paris, 1971), 264. See Geoffrey Marcus, Quiberon Bay. The Campaign in Home Waters, 1759 (London, 1960); Julian S. Corbett, England in the Seven Years’ War, 2 vols (London, [1907], 1992), II, 1–70. Hayes, Biographical Dictionary of Irishmen in France, 297–8. On his paternal side, Francis Thurot descended from Captain O’Farrel, who, like so many Wild Geese, was forced to quit Ireland after the Jacobites lost the Revolutionary War in 1691. O’Farrel married a French lady by the name of Thurot, and had a son by her, whose son, in turn, was Francis the privateer. BL Eg. Mss 3474, ff. 215–16. Intelligence, Dunkirk, 26 May, 1759; BL Eg. Mss 3475, ff. 41–3. Intelligence, Paris, 23 July 1759. BL Eg. Mss 3475, ff. 45–6. Intelligence, Paris, 27 July 1759. McLynn, Invasion, 56; Longmate, Island Fortress, 180–1; BL Eg. Mss 3475, ff. 175–6, Intelligence, Paris, 19 October 1759; ff. 177–8, Intelligence, Courtray, 19 October 1759. SP 54/45, f. 295. Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse to Lord George Beauclerk and Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald, Whitehall, 19 October 1759; ff. 301–2. Same to the same, Whitehall, 23 October, 1759. For Beauclerk see, Sedgwick, The Commons, I, 448–9. SP 54/45, f. 312. John Duncan, Provost, James Jopp, Baillie, Andrew Robertson, Baillie, Francis Leys, Dean of Guild, George Raitt, Baillie, George Shand, Baillie to [Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse?], Aberdeen, 25 October 1759. SP 54/45, ff. 314–16. Lord George Beauclerk to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Edinburgh, 25 October 1759. Lord Beauclerk’s conjecture was seconded by the Hon. Joseph Yorke, the Earl of Hardwicke’s 3rd son. Yorke believed that Thurot planned to attack Fort George at Ardersier, ‘others to seize a Fort at the mouth of the River Tay, to march from thence to Perth, from thence cross the Highlands’, where he surmised Thurot’s force would link up with another French corps under Admiral de la Clue. SP 54/45, f. 317. Commodore William Boys to Lord George Beauclerk, Preston at Sea, 20 October, 1759. For Joseph Yorke, see Sedgwick, House of Commons, II, 569. SP 54/45, ff. 327–8. Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse to Lord George Beauclerk, Whitehall, 1 November, 1759. Beauclerk’s list of Jacobites included such illustrious individuals as MacDonell of Glengarry, MacDonald of Clanranald, MacDonald of Boisdale, Grant of Glenmoriston, Alexander More Cameron, MacPherson of Breakachie and MacPherson of Banchor. See SP 54/45, ff. 314–6. Lord George Beauclerk to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Edinburgh, 25 October 1759. BL Eg. Mss 3475, ff. 41–2. Intelligence, Paris, 23 July 1759.

284 Notes 258. SP 54/45, f. 317. Commodore William Boys to Lord George Beauclerk, Preston at Sea, 20 October 1759. 259. SP 54/45, f. 407. John Campbell to Lieutenant-Colonel Dougal, Inveraray, 20 February 1760; f. 414. ‘Extract of Intelligence just now received from Argyle Shire’, c. February 1760. 260. SP 54/45, f. 319. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Edinburgh, 25 October 1759; f. 321. Same to the same, Edinburgh, 27 October 1759; f. 324. Same to the same, Edinburgh, 30 October 1759. 261. BL Eg. Mss 3475, f. 211. Intelligence, Furnes, 13 November 1759; BL Eg. Mss 3466, f. 343. Richard Wolters to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Rotterdam, 6 November 1759. Beauclerk and Tinwald were informed by the British representative at Copenhagen. SP 54/45, f. 331. Lord George Beauclerk to Richard Potenger, Edinburgh, 13 November 1759; f. 333. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to Richard Potenger, Edinburgh, 13 November 1759. 262. SP 54/45, f. 356. Lord George Beauclerk to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Edinburgh, 27 November 1759; f. 358. John Duncan, Provost of Aberdeen to [Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald?], Aberdeen, 24 November 1759; f. 360. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, 27 November 1759. 263. SP 54/45, f. 421. Richard Rigby to Lord George Beauclerk, Dublin Castle, 23 February 1760. 264. SP 54/45, f. 415. Charles Areskine, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald to Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Edinburgh, 26 February 1760. 265. Corbett, England and the Seven Years’ War, I, 91. 266. In 1759, Britain was practically denuded of regular troops, which had been sent to fight in the colonial theatres of war. The Pittite government had considerable problems with the raising of the militia, and E. J. S. Fraser has pointed out that even Pitt himself had ‘major reservations’ as to its value in countering a French invasion force. Fraser, The Pitt-Newcastle Coalition, 267–8; Charles Chenevix Trench, George II (London, 1973), 294; Walpole, Memoires, II, 356. 267. Sir Herbert Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History (New York and London, [1931], 1965), 20–5, 75, 101–2, 105. 268. Stuart Mss 397/146. Sir Richard Warren, Brigadier, to James Edgar, Vannes, 1 January 1760. 269. McLynn, Invasion, 58–63; MacAllester, A Series of Letters, II, 114–15; Black, Rise of the European Powers, 116. Stuart Mss 397/12. Campbell ¼ Alexander Murray of Elibank to Charles, 10 December 1759; Stuart Mss 397/95. Same to the same, 28 December 1759. One of the principal French spies used against Britain in the late 1760s was a Scottish Jacobite, Colonel Grant of Blairfindy. D. B. Horn, The British Diplomatic Service, 271. 270. Stuart Mss 397/11. Lieutenant John Holker to Michael Sheridan, Paris, 9 December 1759. For Holker’s economic undertakings in France, see Re´mond, John Holker. Manufacturier et grand fonctionnaire. The main body of this book is concerned with Holker’s entrepreneurial career in exile. 271. Walpole, Memoires, II, 388. 272. McLynn, Invasion, 58–63. According to Kle´ber Monod, a Jacobite proposal for a rising in Scotland was presented to the French government by John Baptist Caryll in 1779. The overture was not well received, and nothing came of it. Paul Kle´ber Monod, Jacobitism and the English People, 1688–1788 (Cambridge, [1989] 1993),

Notes 285 219. Andrew Lang states that Charles ‘never wholly despaired, and was soliciting Louis XVI even in the dawn of the Revolution’. Lang, Pickle the Spy, 301. 273. After the rout of Quiberon Bay, the Jacobites anticipated a peace disadvantageous to their cause. See Andrew Lumisden’s letter to Alexander Murray of Elibank, Rome, 8 January 1760, printed in James Dennistoun of Dennistoun, Memoirs of Sir Robert Strange, Knt., Engraver, Member of Several Foreign Academies of Design; and of his Brother-in-Law Andrew Lumisden, Private Secretary to the Stuart Princes, 2 vols (London, 1855), I, 189. As to a further Jacobite participation and optimism in regard to a restoration, Lumisden wrote to Blantyre: ‘I need use few words to persuade you of the affliction it gives me to find that our mercantile undertakings should have been so much neglected; and which is still encreased, as the principal partner [i.e. the Prince] has of late shewn so little activity in exerting himself in his own and our own common interests. I flatter myself, however, that at this critical conjuncture he will lose no time to form an expert and able crew to man our ship, whereby alone we can have our returns sooner than our Hamburgh rivals [i.e. the Hanoverians]. I am persuaded that all the steps you have taken in this affair are wise and proper; and I doubt not but your prudence and address will yet be able to bring things to their desired issue.’ Andrew Lumisden to Goodwin ¼ William Stewart, 9th Lord Blantyre, [Rome?], 3 December 1760, printed in Dennistoun, Memoirs of Sir Robert Strange, I, 192–4, 23

6

A Jacobite Renaissance or Epitaph, 1746–1759? 1. Frank J. McLynn, Invasion. From the Armada to Hitler, 1588–1945 (London and New York, 1987), 62; 58–63. 2. In 1975, not only Paul Fritz, who had shown the double-edged nature of such a thesis in the Walpolian era by demonstrating that for the English ministers to exploit the Jacobite threat it had to exist in the first place, but also Byron Frank Jewell observed for the immediate post-Culloden period that the ministers at Westminster ‘had a real fear of Jacobitism’. While a ‘real fear’ of the Jacobites is not to be equated with a fear based on reality, we should again be reminded of Edward Gregg’s dictum that, when dealing with the Jacobite threat, frequently the perceived fear, rather than its substance, matters most. Nevertheless, the British ministers’ genuine apprehension was justified within the European historical and political context of the mid-eighteenth century, and reflected a deeper understanding of the Jacobites’ ability to disrupt the prevalent political consensus than modern historians have evinced of late. The events of the postCulloden period bear this out. Paul Fritz, The English Ministers and Jacobitism Between the Rebellions of 1715 and 1745 (Toronto, 1975), prologue, 7; Byron Frank Jewell, ‘The Legislation Relating to Scotland after the Forty-Five’, unpublished Ph.D. (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1975), 248, footnote 1; Edward Gregg, Jacobitism (London, 1988), 25. 3. See Cumberland Mss 15/278. Major-General John Campbell of Mamore to Sir Everard Fawkener, Strontian, 31 May 1746. 4. Frank J. McLynn, The Jacobites (London, [1985] 1988), 125. 5. See G. V. Bennett, The Tory Crisis in Church and State, 1688–1730. The Career of Francis Atterbury Bishop of Rochester (Oxford, 1975), 224, 251–2. 6. Kle´ber Monod is also inclined to proclaim the obsolescence of Jacobitism as a threat to the British state somewhat prematurely, pushing the date of its demise from 1746 to 1750–53. Paul Kle´ber Monod, Jacobitism and the English People, 1688–1788 (Cambridge, [1989] 1993), 209, 219.

286 Notes 7. Linda Colley, Britons. Forging the Nation, 1707–1837 (New Haven, 1992), 4. 8. Jeremy Black, The Collapse of the Anglo-French Alliance, 1727–1731 (Gloucester, 1987), 6. See also Eveline Cruickshanks, ed., Ideology and Conspiracy: Aspects of Jacobitism, 1689–1759 (Edinburgh, 1982), intro., 9. 9. J. C. D. Clark, Revolution and Rebellion. State and Society in England in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Cambridge, [1986] 1990), 116. 10. McLynn, The Jacobites, 124–5. 11. Claude Nordmann, ‘Choiseul and The Last Jacobite Attempt of 1759’, in Eveline Cruickshanks, ed., Ideology and Conspiracy: Aspects of Jacobitism, 1689–1759 (Edinburgh, 1982), 201–17, 201–2. 12. William Speck, Stability and Strife. England 1714–1760 (London, 1977), intro., 1. 13. Clark, Revolution and Rebellion, 115. 14. For my reference to a counter-revolutionary war in Scotland during the late seventeenth century, see Paul Hopkins, Glencoe and the End of the Highland War (Edinburgh, 1986). On this point, Szechi remarked: ‘In the mid-1980’s Paul Hopkins added to the weight of the optimists’ gathering reassessment of the Jacobite phenomenon by conclusively proving that the Highland war of 1689–91 was not the unimportant little episode most historians had previously considered it to be, but rather a crippling civil war that bankrupted the post-Revolutionary Scottish state morally and financially.’ Daniel Szechi, The Jacobites. Britain and Europe, 1688–1788 (Manchester, 1994), 3, 13.

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England British Museum, British Library, London Additional Manuscripts 1. Newcastle Papers: Official Correspondence of Thomas Pelham Holles, Duke of Newcastle (1697– 1768). a) Home Correspondence Add. Ms 32730. Add. Ms 32733. b) Papers relating to the Scotch Jacobites, 1745–55 Add. Ms 33050. 2. Hardwicke Papers: Official Correspondence of Philip Yorke, 1st Earl of Hardwicke (1690–1764). a) Scottish Affairs Add. Ms 35447. Add. Ms 35448. Add. Ms 35449. b) Letters from John Campbell, Baron Glenorchy, afterwards (1752) 3rd Earl of Breadalbane and Holland, to Philip Yorke, 1st Earl of Hardwicke. Add. Ms 35450. c) Diplomatic Affairs Add. Ms 35481. Add. Ms 35483. Add. Ms 35870. Egerton Manuscripts 3. Leeds/Holdernesse Papers: Official Correspondence of Robert D’Arcy, 4th Earl of Holdernesse (1718–1778). a) Home Affairs Eg. Mss 3434. b) Diplomatic and Foreign Affairs Eg. Mss 3465. Eg. Mss 3466. Eg. Mss 3468. Eg. Mss 3474. Eg. Mss 3475. Eg. Mss 3478.

Devonshire Papers, Chatsworth Chatsworth Mss. 343.1. Anon. to Richard Boyle, 3rd Earl of Burlington, Lichfield, 4 October, 1747.

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288 Bibliography

Hallward Library, Nottingham University, Nottingham Newcastle of Clumber Manuscripts, Correspondence of Henry Pelham (1696–1754). a) Foreign Affairs NeC 837: Translation of the Definitive Treaty of Peace at Aix-la-Chapelle of 18th of October 1748. b) Scottish Affairs NeC 1,740: Letter from Sir Everard Fawkener to Henry Pelham, 1746. NeC 1,765; 1,770; 1,771; 1,772/1–2: Military correspondence, 1746–47. NeC 1,782: Papers concerning disaffected persons, c. 1747. NeC 1,826: Papers relating to Commissioners of Customs, 1752. NeC 1,848/1–2; 1,865: Letters from ‘P.O.’ to Henry Pelham, 1746–48. NeC 1,882: Political correspondence including elections, 1746–48. NeC 1,885/1–2, 5: Correspondence relating to Jacobites, Legal process, revenue and forfeited estates, 1746–54. Nec 1,865. ’Some Considerations on the Present State of the Highlands of Scotland, Tending to show what may be expected to happen–’, c. Summer, 1746. NeC 1,954: 1,955; 1,956: Letters from Archibald Campbell, 3rd Duke of Argyll to Henry Pelham, 1747. NeC 1,981: 1,991/1: Miscellaneous letters to Pelham, 1747–52. NeC 2,024: Anon., Memorandum for the Disarming and Subjugation of the Highlands, c. 1749. NeC 2,040: Charles Areskine Lord Justice Clerk to Pelham, 1752. NeC 2,064; 2,065; 2,069; 2,075; 2,076; 2,077; 2,079; 2,080; 2,081; 2,082: Correspondence and other papers relating to persons charged with disaffection, 1751–52. NeC 2,086; 2,087/1; 2,088/1; 2,089; 2,090; 2,091; 2,092; 2,094; 2,095; 2,096/1; 2,097; 2,101; 2,102; 2,106; 2,108; 2,109/1; 2,110; 2,111; 2,112; 2,113; 2,114; 2,115; 2,116/1; 2,117; 2,118; 2,120; 2,121/1; 2,122: Secret Intelligence about Jacobites in Britain and in France, 1751–55. NeC 2,132/1–2; 2,133; 2,135; 2,136; 2,137: Letters relating to the murder of Colin Campbell of Glenure, 1752. NeC 2,154: Letter from Jos. Tudor to Pelham, with enclosures, 1752. NeC 2,156: Miscellaneous papers including correspondence relating to disaffected persons, especially those employed in customs and excise, 1752. NeC 2,167; 2,168/1–2; 2,182/1–2; 2,183; 2,184; 2,185: Papers relating to persons employed by the excise in Scotland, reported to be disaffected, 1752. NeC 2,186; 2,188; 2,189/2; 2,191/1: Correspondence and other papers relating to disaffected persons, 1752–53. NeC 2,199/1–2; 2,200/1–2; 2,202/1–2: Miscellaneous letters mainly Jacobite intelligence, 1752–53. NeC 2,222/2: Book (quarto), Characters of officials and other leading persons in Scotland ([n.p.], [n.d.]).

Public Record Office, Chancery Lane, London State Papers for Scotland (SP 54) vols: 30, 31, 32, 33, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45.

Public Record Office, Kew Gardens, London State Papers Domestic, George II (SP 36), vols: 83, 85, 86, 87, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 101, 102, 106, 107, 109, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 137, 138, 140, 161.

Bibliography 289 State Papers for France (SP 78), vols: 233, 235, 236, 237, 238, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248 pt. 2, 249, 272. State Papers for Saxony/Poland (SP 88), vols: 70, 71, 73, 75, 90. State Papers for Tuscany (SP 98), vols: 29, 53, 56, 57, 58, 59.

Royal Archives, Windsor I used the Stuart and Cumberland manuscripts available on microfilm at the Cambridge University Library. To decypher the Jacobite correspondence cited, I have used lists of cant names and the keys in the Stuart Mss. Box 5/222; 224; 230; 232; 233. I have also used older lists and keys. Box 5/ 209; 211; 213; 219; 220; 221; 226. Cumberland Mss 1746, Box: 14, 15, 16. Stuart Mss, 1745–60, vols: 263, 270, 272, 273, 274, 275, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 329, 330, 331, 332, 334, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 345, 346, 347, 348, 350, 352, 353, 358, 360, 361, 362, 364, 367, 369, 371, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 401. Box: 1 (approximately dated letters), 5 (ciphers), 6 (printed documents), Misc. vols, 21.

France Bibliothe`que Municipale, Avignon Ms 2827, ff. 611–12. ‘Liste des Anglois de la Suite de Jacques III. Roy dangleterre arriveé a avignon en 1716. Le 2. avril.’ Ms 3188, ff. 213–15. ‘Liste des Anglois qui se trouvent presentement a Avignon . . . 1716. toud Seigneurs qualifie´s d’Ecosse ou ailleurs.’

Scotland MacBean Special Collection, University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen The manuscripts in the MacBean Special Collection have not been classed. Lieutenant-General Humphrey Bland to Henry Pelham, Edinburgh, 19 December 1746. Reasons for Extending the Militia Acts to the Disarmed Counties of Scotland (Edinburgh, 1760). Secret History Relating to the Times, Particularly The Rumour of an Invasion: An Essay tending to quiet the Minds of the People (London, 1756).

Lochiel Manuscripts, Achnacarry The papers at Achnacarry have not been catalogued. Anon., ‘Copy of a Letter from ffrance concerning the Adventurer’, 10 December 1748.

National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh Acc. 11202: Account of the battle of ‘Ferry Bridge’ (15 April 1746), near Golspie. Ms 98: ‘Informations’ regarding the Highlands, c. 1750. Ms 299: ‘Notes and transcripts from French Archives in Paris’, made by Miss Henrietta Tayler. Ms 304: Letter-books of the Commanders-in-Chief in Scotland, November 1747– January 1749; December 1753–August 1754.

290 Bibliography Ms 307: Letter-books of the Commanders-in-Chief in Scotland. Letters to General George Churchill, April 1747–October 1749. Ms 315: Letter to John Cameron of Fassiefern, 1752. Ms 3187: Balhaldie Papers. Correspondence of the Family of MacGregor or Drummond of Balhaldie. Ms 3730: Albemarle Papers. Letters and papers of William Anne Keppel, 2nd Earl of Albemarle, Commander-in-Chief in Scotland, 1746–47. Ms 3735: Campbell Papers. Correspondence of Major-General John Campbell of Mamore, later (1761), 3rd Duke of Argyll. Orders, intelligence reports, intercepted Jacobite correspondence. Ms 3736: Ibid. Ms 3755: Bagpipe music. Angus Mackay’s four untitled manuscripts. Ms 5076: Erskine-Murray Papers. Correspondence of Charles Areskine of Alva, afterwards Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald (1748). Official correspondence relating especially to the condition of the Highlands after the ’Forty-five, 1747–51. Ms 5077: Ibid., 1752–53. Ms 5078: Ibid., 1754–55. Ms 5080: Ibid., 1758–59. Ms 5129: Papers relating to affairs in church and state, 1689–1794. Lists of persons exempted from the Act of Indemnity 1746; 1748. Disposition of troops in the Highlands, 1749. Ms 9828: Typescript copies of letters of Lord George (later 1st Viscount) Sackville to his father, the 1st Duke of Dorset, 1745–46. Ms 14260: Andrew Lumisden, letter-books and correspondence, 1759–97. Ms 17501: Anon., ‘Essay on the Highlands,’ c. 1747. Ms 17514: Saltoun Collection. Intelligence Reports on the progress and aftermath of the rising, 1745–47. Ms 17527: Saltoun Collection. Miscellaneous papers concerning the rising and its consequences, 1745–52. Ms 17562: Correspondence, petitions, reports and papers concerning manufactures, especially linen and wool, relating principally to techniques and organizations, to duties on foreign goods and to the British Linen Company, 1749–52.

Scottish Record Office, HM General Register House, Edinburgh Gifts and Deposits. Miscellaneous collections: GD 1/53/93. Campbell of Stonefield Papers: GD 14/97; 14/98; 14/104; 14/106; 14/109; 14/110; 14/ 117; 14/121; 14/122. Abercairney muniments: GD 24/5/162. Gordon Castle muniments: GD 44/14/15/33. John MacGregor collection: GD 50/22/1; 50/121/13; 50/121/14x; 50/121/17; 50/121/ 18; 50/121/111; 50/216/63/3. Mackay of Bighouse Papers: GD 87/1/28.

West Highland Museum, Inverness Manuscript File D: 15, 16, 17, 18, 19. Manuscript File E: 21, 22.

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I Geo. III cap. 15, An Act to enable His Majesty to grant unto George Keith, late Earl Marischall, a Sum therein limited, out of the Principal Money and Interest now remaining due to the Public on account of the Purchase Money of certain Parts of the Forfeited Estates of the said Earl (London, 1761). Allardyce, Alexander, ed., Scotland and Scotsmen in the Eighteenth Century from the Mss. of John Ramsay, Esq. of Ochtertyre, 2 vols (Edinburgh, 1888). Anon., An Authentic Account of the Conduct of the Young Chevalier (London, 1747). Anon., Genuine Copies of Letters from The French Ambassador, and Mr. Burnaby the English Resident in Switzerland, to the Laudable Canton of Fribourg, & c. ([n.p.], [n.d.]). Atticus, A Congratulatory Letter to John Murray, Esq; Late Secretary to the Young Pretender (London, 1747). Bell, Robert Fitzroy, ed., Memorials of John Murray of Broughton Sometime Secretary to Prince Charles 1740–1747 (Edinburgh, 1898). Burton, John, A Genuine and True Journal of the most miraculous Escape of the Young Chevalier, From the Battle of Culloden, to his landing in France (London, 1749). ——, Ascanius or the Young Adventurer, (Aberdeen, 1748). Other editions of this publication have been attributed to Ralph Griffiths. See Paul Kle´ber Monod, Jacobitism and the English People, 1688–1788 (Cambridge, [1989] 1993), bibliography, 361. Cameron, Archibald, Copy of What Dr. Archibald Cameron Intended to have Delivered to the Sheriff of Middlesex at the Place of Execution, but which he left in the Hands of his Wife for that End (London, 1753). Collet, Stephen, Relics of Literature (London, 1823). Coxe, William, Memoirs of the Administration of the Right Honourable Henry Pelham, 2 vols (London, 1829). Dennistoun of Dennistoun, James, Memoirs of Sir Robert Strange, Knt., Engraver, Member of Several Foreign Academies of Design; and of his Brother-in-Law Andrew Lumisden, Private Secretary to the Stuart Princes, 2 vols (London, 1855). Duke of Cumberland, William Augustus, William Augustus Duke of Cumberland, and Duke of Brunswick-Lunenburg, Captain-General of all His Majesty’s Land-Forces in the Kingdom of Great-Britain, &c. &c. &c. &c. (Proclamation) ([Inverness], 1746). Doran, John, Mann and Manners at the Court of Florence, 1740–1786, 2 vols (London, 1876). Elcho, David Wemyss, Lord, A Short Account of the Affairs of Scotland in the Years 1744, 1745, 1746, ed. The Hon. Evan Charteris (Edinburgh, 1907). Forbes, Robert, The Lyon in Mourning, ed. Henry Patton, 3 vols (Edinburgh, 1895). Fox, John Charles, The Official Diary of Lieutenant-General Adam Williamson DeputyLieutenant of the Tower of London 1722–1747, Camden Third Series, xx ii (London, 1912).

292 Bibliography Forsyth, Joseph, Remarks on Antiquities, Arts, and Letters During an Excursion in Italy, in the Years 1802 and 1803 (London, [2nd edn] 1816). Friedrich der Grosse, Politische Correspondenz Friedrichs des Grossen, 46 vols (Berlin, 1879–1939). Grant of Prestongrange, William, The Complaint of His Majesty’s Advocate, for his Majesty’s Interest; against John Cameron of Fassfern, the second or immediate younger Brother of Donald Cameron late of Lochiel, attainted ([Edinburgh], 1753). —— , Indictment and Accusation against James MacGregor for Hamesucken, Ravishing of Women, and Forcible Abduction by William Grant of Prestongrange, Lord Advocate ([Edinburgh?] [c. June] 1752). Harris, George, The Life of Lord Chancellor Hardwicke: with Selections from his Correspondence, Diaries, Speeches, and Judgments, 3 vols (London, 1847). Kelly, Rev. George, Memoirs of the Life, Travels and Transactions of the Reverend George Kelly, From his Birth to Escape from his Imprisonment out of the Tower of London, October 26, 1736 (London, 1736). King, William, Political and Literary Anecdotes of His Own Times (London, 1819). Lang, Andrew, The Highlands of Scotland in 1750 (London, 1898). Lewis, W. S., gen. ed., The Yale Edition of Horace Walpole’s Correspondence, 48 vols (New Haven, 1937–84). The Life of Dr. Archibald Cameron, Brother to Donald Cameron of Lochiel, Chief of that Clan (London, 1753). Louis XV, King of France, Dećlaration communiqueé par ordre de Sa Majeste´ Tre`sChre´tienne aux Seigneurs E´tats geńe´raux des Provinces-unies ([Paris?], 1747). Lovat, Simon Fraser, 11th Lord, The Genuine Speech of Simon Lord Lovat in Westminster Hall, March 18, 1746–7 ([London?], 1747). MacAllester, Oliver, A Series of Letters Discovering the Scheme Projected by France in MDCCLIX, for an Intended Invasion upon England with Flat-bottom’d Boats; and Various Conferences and Original Papers touching that Formidable Design. Pointing at The Secret and True Motives which precipitated the Negociations, and Conclusion of the last Peace. To which are prefixed, The Secret Adventures of the Young Pretender; and The Conduct of the French Court respecting him during his Stay in Great Britain, and after his return to Paris. Also the Chief Cause that brought on the late Banishment of the Jesuits from the French Dominions; a Secret as yet concealed from the Jesuits themselves; with the real Examinations of Father Hamilton, taken at Fountainbleau, October 1756, who was employed to assassinate the Young Pretender. Together with The Particular Case of the Author. In a Memorial to his late Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland, 2 vols (London, 1767). Scottish Record Office, The ’45 and After. Historical Background Documents, Extracts and Copies (Edinburgh, 1995). Stewart, James, of Aucharn, The Trial of James Stewart in Aucharn in Duror of Appin for the Murder of Colin Campbell of Glenure, Esq; Factor for His Majesty on the forfeited estate of Ardshiel; Before the Circuit Court of Justiciary held at Inveraray on Thursday the 21st, Friday the 22 rd, Saturday the 23 rd, and Monday the 25th of September last; by his Grace the Duke of Argyll, Lord Justice-General, and the Lords Elchies and Kilkerran, Commissioners of Justiciary (Edinburgh, 1753). —— , The Dying Speech of James Stuart, Tacksman of Aucharn in Appine, Tryed in a Justiciary Court at Inveraray the 21 of Sep. 1752, for the alledged Crime of being Art and Part, in the Murder of Colin Campbell of Glenure, present Factor upon the Estate of Ardsheil attainted; who was shot in the Wood of Lettermore upon the 14th of May last. Delivered from his own Hand at the Place of Execution ([Edinburgh?], 1752). Terry, C. S., ed., Albemarle Papers, 2 vols (Aberdeen, 1902).

Bibliography 293 Thicknesse, Philip, Memoirs and Anecdotes (Dublin, 1760). To Mr. S——M—, on His Turning Evidence (London, 1747). Walpole, Horace, Earl of Orford, Memoires of the Last Ten Years of the Reign of George the Second, 2 vols (London, 1822). Wills, Virginia, ed., Reports on the Annexed Estates, 1755–69 (Edinburgh, 1973). Wraxall, Sir N. William, Historical Memoirs of My Own Time, 3 vols (London, 1818). Yorke, Philip C., The Life and Correspondence of Philip Yorke, Earl of Hardwicke, Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain, 3 vols (Cambridge, 1913).

1.3

Periodicals

St. James’s Evening Post (London, 1746): Nos 5665, 5671, 5681, 5683, 5684.

2.1

Printed Secondary Sources: Books

Aschbach Ettinger, Amos, James Edward Oglethorpe. Imperial Idealist (Oxford, 1936). Asprey, Robert B., Frederick the Great. The Magnificent Enigma (New York, [1986] 1988). Bennett, G. V., The Tory Crisis in Church and State, 1688–1730. The Career of Francis Atterbury Bishop of Rochester (Oxford, 1975). Berry, C. Leo, The Young Pretender’s Mistress. Clementine Walkinshaw (Comtesse D’ Albestroff) 1720–1802 (Edinburgh and London, 1977). Black, Jeremy, Culloden and the ’45 (Stroud and New York, [1990] 1993). —— , The Rise of the European Powers, 1679–1793 (London, 1990). —— , The Collapse of the Anglo-French Alliance, 1727–1731 (Gloucester, 1987). Brooke, John, King George III (London, 1972). Butterfield, Herbert, The Whig Interpretation of History (New York and London, [1931] 1965). Campbell, John Lorne, ed., Highland Songs of the Forty-Five (Edinburgh, [1933] 1984). Carney, Seamus, The Appin Murder. The Killing of the Red Fox (Edinburgh, [1989] 1994). Chance, James Frederick, ed., British Diplomatic Instructions, 1689–1789 (London, 1928). Cheke, Marcus, The Cardinal de Bernis (London, 1958). Chenevix Trench, Charles, George II (London, 1973). Cheyne-MacPherson, W., The Chiefs of Clan MacPherson (London, 1947). Clark, J. C. D., Revolution and Rebellion. State and Society in England in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Cambridge, [1986] 1990). Clyde, Robert, From Rebel to Hero. The Image of the Highlander, 1745–1830 (East Linton, 1995). Colley, Linda, Britons. Forging the Nation, 1707–1837 (New Haven, 1992). —— , In Defiance of Oligarchy. The Tory Party, 1714–1760 (Cambridge, 1982). Corbett, Julian S., England in the Seven Years’ War, 2 vols (London, [1907] 1992). Coward, Barry, The Stuart Age (New York, [1980] 1992). Cruickshanks, Eveline, ed., Ideology and Conspiracy: Aspects of Jacobitism, 1689–1759 (Edinburgh, 1982). —— , Political Untouchables. The Tories and the ’45 (London, 1979). Cuthell, Edith E., The Scottish Friend of Frederic the Great. The Last Earl Marischal, 2 vols (London, 1915). Dann, Uriel, Hanover and Great Britain 1740–1760 (London, [1986] 1991). Doran, John, London in Jacobite Times, 2 vols (London, 1877).

294 Bibliography Ellis, Kenneth, The Post Office in the Eighteenth Century. A Study in Administrative History (London, 1958). Elton, Geoffrey, The Practice of History (London, [1967] 1987). Erickson, Carolly, Bonnie Prince Charlie (London, 1989). Erlanger, Philippe, Ludwig XIV. Das Leben eines Sonnenko¨nigs (Frankfurt am Main, [1971] 1987). Erskine-Hill, Howard, The Social Milieu of Alexander Pope. Lives, Example and the Poetic Response (New Haven and London, 1975). Fergusson of Kilkerran, Sir James, Argyll in the ’Forty-five (London, 1951). Fontane, Theodor, Jenseit des Tweed (Frankfurt am Main, [1860] 1989). Fritz, Paul, The English Ministers and Jacobitism between the Rebellions of 1715 and 1745 (Toronto, 1975). Gibson, John Sibbald, Lochiel of the ’45. The Jacobite Chief and the Prince (Edinburgh, [1994] 1995). —— , Playing the Scottish Card. The Franco-Jacobite Invasion of 1708 (Edinburgh, 1988). Gibson MacPherson, Alan, A Day’s March to Ruin. The Badenoch Men in the ’Forty-Five and Col. Ewan MacPherson of Cluny (Newtonmore, 1996). Gooch, G. P., Louis XV. The Monarchy in Decline (London, 1956). Gooch, Leo, The Desperate Faction? The Jacobites of North-East England, 1688–1745 (Hull, 1995). Greenwood, David, William King. Tory and Jacobite (Oxford, 1969). Gregg, Edward, Jacobitism (London, 1988). Haydon, Colin, Anti-Catholicism in Eighteenth-Century England, c.1714–80. A Political and Social Study (Manchester and New York, 1993). Harrington, Peter, Culloden 1746. The Highland Clans’ Last Charge (London, [1991] 1996). Hook, Michael and Walter Ross, The Forty-Five. The Last Jacobite Rebellion (Edinburgh, 1995). Hopkins, Paul, Glencoe and the End of the Highland War (Edinburgh, 1986). Horn, D. B., The British Diplomatic Service, 1689–1789 (Oxford, 1961). —— , Sir Charles Hanbury Williams & European Diplomacy, 1747–1758 (London, 1930). Jones, George Hilton, The Main Stream of Jacobitism (Cambridge, MA, 1954). Kidd, Colin, Subverting Scotland’s Past. Scottish Whig Historians and the Creation of an Anglo-British Identity, 1689–c.1830 (Cambridge, 1993). Kle´ber Monod, Paul, Jacobitism and the English People, 1688–1788 (Cambridge, [1989] 1993). Kneas-Hill, Patricia, The Oglethorpe Ladies and the Jacobite Conspiracies (Atlanta, 1977). La Tre´moı¨lle, Charles, Duc de, A Royalist Family Irish and French (1689–1789) and Prince Charles Edward, trans. by A. G. Murray MacGregor (Edinburgh, 1904). Lang, Andrew, The Companions of Pickle (London, 1898). —— , Pickle the Spy (London, 1897). Le Roy Ladurie, E., The Territory of the Historian, trans. B. and S. Reynolds (Hassocks, 1979). Lenman, Bruce, The Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen, 1650–1784 (Aberdeen, [1984] 1995). —— , The Jacobite Risings in Britain, 1689–1746 (Aberdeen, [1980] 1995). —— and John S. Gibson, The Jacobite Threat: Rebellion and Conspiracy, 1688–1759: A Source Book (Edinburgh, 1990). Lewis, Lesley, Connoiseurs and Secret Agents in Eighteenth Century Rome (London, 1961). Longmate, Norman, Island Fortress. The Defence of Great Britain, 1603–1945 (London, 1991).

Bibliography 295 MacDonald, Norman H., The Clan Ranald of Knoydart & Glengarry. A History of the MacDonalds or MacDonells of Glengarry (Edinburgh, [1979] 1995). Macinnes, Allan I., Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603–1788 (East Linton, 1996). Mackay, N., ed., Trial of James Stewart (Edinburgh, [1907] 1931). Maclean, Fitzroy, Bonnie Prince Charlie (Edinburgh, [1988] 1995). McLynn, Frank J., Bonnie Prince Charlie. Charles Edward Stuart (Oxford, [1988] 1991). —— , Invasion. From the Armada to Hitler, 1588–1945 (London and New York, 1987). —— , The Jacobites (London, [1985] 1988). —— , France and the Jacobite Rising of 1745 (Edinburgh, 1981). Marcus, Geoffrey, Quiberon Bay. The Campaign in Home Waters, 1759 (London, 1960). Michel, Françisque, Les Ećossais en France, et les français en Ećosse, 2 vols (London, 1862). Miller, Peggy, James (London, 1971). Munro, Neil, Doom Castle (Edinburgh, [1901] 1996). Murdoch, Alexander, ‘The People Above’. Politics and Administration in Mid-EighteenthCentury Scotland (Edinburgh, 1980). Murray, Hon. Arthur C., The Five Sons of ‘Bare Betty’ (London, 1936). Nordmann, Claude, Grandeur et liberte´ de la Sue`de, 1660–1792 (Paris, 1971). O’Callaghan, J. C., History of the Irish Brigades in the Service of France (Glasgow, 1870). Owen, John B., The Rise of the Pelhams (New York, 1957). Petrie, Sir Charles, The Jacobite Movement. The Last Phase, 1716–1807 (London, 1950). Pittock, Murray, G. H., The Myth of the Jacobite Clans (Edinburgh, 1995). —— , Poetry and Jacobite Politics in Eighteenth-Century Britain and Ireland (Cambridge, 1994). —— , The Invention of Scotland. The Stuart Myth and the Scottish Identity, 1638 to the Present (London, 1991). Price, Jacob M., France and the Chesapeake. A History of the French Tobacco Monopoly, 1674–1791, and of Its Relationship to the British and American Tobacco Traders, 2 vols (Ann Arbor, MI, 1973). Pritchard, James, Louis XV’s Navy, 1748–1762. A Study of Organization and Administration (Kingston and Montreal, 1987). Re´mond, Andre´, John Holker. Manufacturier et grand fonctionnaire en France au XVIIIe sie`cle, 1719–1786 (Paris, 1946). Roberts, Michael, British Diplomacy and Swedish Politics, 1758–1773 (Minnesota, 1980). Robertson, John, The Scottish Enlightenment and the Militia Issue (Edinburgh, 1985). Rowen, Herbert H., The Princes of Orange. The Stadholders in the Dutch Republic (Cambridge, [1988] 1990). Schlenke, Manfred, England und das Friderizianische Preussen, 1740–1763 (Munich, 1963). Scott, Sir Walter, Redgauntlet (Oxford, [1824] 1985). Smith, Annette M., Jacobite Estates of the Forty-Five (Edinburgh, 1982). Sobieski Stolberg Allan, John and Charles Edward Allan, Lays of the Deer Forest, 2 vols (Edinburgh, 1848). Speck, William, The Butcher. The Duke of Cumberland and the Suppression of the 45 (Caernarfon, [1981] 1995). —— , Stability and Strife. England 1714–1760 (London, 1977). Stevenson, Robert Louis, Catriona (Oxford, [1893] 1986). —— , Kidnapped (Oxford, [1886] 1986). Stewart of Ardvorlich, John, The Camerons. A History of Clan Cameron (Stirling, 1974).

296 Bibliography Szechi, Daniel, The Jacobites. Britain and Europe, 1688–1788 (Manchester, 1994). Tabraham, Chris and Doreen Grove, Fortress Scotland and the Jacobites (London, 1995). Tayler, Alistair and Henrietta, A Jacobite Exile (London, 1937). Williams, Basil, The Whig Supremacy, 1714–1760 (Oxford, [1939] 1962). Wilson, Rev. William, The House of Airlie, 2 vols (London, 1924). Young, Norwood, The Life of Frederick the Great (London, 1919).

2.2 Printed Secondary Sources: Articles and Chapters in Books Bailyn, Bernard, ‘The Challenge of Modern Historiography’, American Historical Review, 87, 1 (1982), 1–24. ¨ ran, ‘Jacobite Refugees in Gothenburg after Culloden’, Scottish Historical Behre, Go Review, 70 (1991), 58–65. —— , ‘Sweden and the Rising of 1745’, Scottish Historical Review, 51, 2, 152 (1972), 149–71. Black, Jeremy, ‘Could the Jacobites Have Won?’, History Today, 45, 7 (1995), 24–9. Bollag, Michel, ‘In Gottes Gebot die Freiheit des Menschen,’ in Livio Piatti, ed., Schtetl ¨ rich, 1997), 147–52. Zu¨rich. Von orthodoxen Ju¨dischen Nachbarn (Zu Burke, Peter, ‘History of Events and the Revival of Narrative’, in Peter Burke, ed., New Perspectives on Historical Writing (Pennsylvania, 1991), 233–48. —— , ‘Ranke the Reactionary’, in Georg G. Iggers and James M. Powell, eds, Leopold von Ranke and the Shaping of the Historical Discipline (New York, 1990), 36–44. Chaussinand-Nogaret, Guy, ‘Une e´lite insulaire au Service de l‘Europe. Les Jacobites au XVIIIe sie`cle’, Annales, Economies, Socie´te´s, Civilisations (1973) 1,087–122. Christie, Ian R., ‘The Tory Party, Jacobitism and the ’Forty-Five: A Note’, Historical Journal, 30, 4 (1987), 921–31. Clark, J. C. D., ‘British America: What If There Had Been No American Revolution?’, in Niall Ferguson, ed., Virtual History: Alternatives and Counterfactuals (London, 1997), 125–74. Clark de Dromantin, Patrick, ‘France, Land of Refuge: Memoirs of a Family Exiled by the Treaty of Limerick, 1690–1914’, in Edward Corp, ed., L’Autre Exile (Presses du Languedoc, 1993), 157–70. Colley, Linda, ‘The Loyal Brotherhood and the Cocoa Tree: The London Organization of the Tory Party, 1727–1760’, Historical Journal, 20, 1 (1987), 77–95. Cruickshanks, Eveline, ‘Charles Spencer, Third Earl of Sunderland and Jacobitism’, English Historical Review, 113, 450 (1998), 65–76. Duffy, Christopher, ‘The ‘‘Wild Geese’’ in Austria’, History Today, 18 (1968), 646–52. Ferguson, Niall, ‘Virtual History: Towards a ‘‘Chaotic’’ Theory of the Past’, in Niall Ferguson, ed., Virtual History: Alternatives and Counterfactuals (London, 1997), 1–90. Fergusson, James, ‘The Appin Murder Case’, Scottish Historical Review, 31, 2, 112 (1952), 116–30. Fritz, Paul S., ‘The Anti-Jacobite Intelligence System of the English Ministers, 1715– 1745’, Historical Journal, 16, 2 (1973), 265–89. Geertz, Clifford, ‘Thick Description: Toward an Interpretative Theory of Culture’, in Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York, 1973), 3–31. —— , ‘Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight’, Daedalus, 101 (1972), 1–37. Hamilton, Marion F., ed., ‘The Locharkaig Treasure’, Miscellany of the Scottish History Society, v i i, Third Series (Edinburgh, 1941), 133–68.

Bibliography 297 Johnsen, Arne Odd, ‘Jacobite Officers at Bergen, Norway, after the Battle of Culloden: Letters from the French Consul-General in Bergen’, Scottish Historical Review, 57, 2, 164 (1978), 186–91. Kent Hackmann, W., ‘The British Raid on Rochefort, 1757’, The Mariner’s Mirror, 64 (1978), 263–75. Kle´ber Monod, Paul, ‘Dangerous Merchandise: Smuggling, Jacobitism, and Commercial Culture in Southeast England, 1690–1760’, Journal of British Studies, 30, 2 (1991), 150–82. Lang, Andrew, ‘Historical Mysteries. The Case of Allan Breck’, Cornhill Magazine, March (1904), 323–36. —— , ‘Murray of Broughton’, Blackwood’s Magazine, August (1898), 220–30. Macinnes, Allan I., ‘The Aftermath of the ’45’, in Robert C. Woosnam-Savage, ed., 1745. Charles Edward Stuart and the Jacobites (Glasgow, 1995), 103–13. Mackay Quynn, Dorothy, ‘Philipp von Stosch: Collector, Bibliophile, Spy, Thief’, The Catholic Historical Review, 27, 3 (1941), 332–4. MacKay of Scobie, I. H., ‘The Highland Independent Companies of 1745–47’, Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, 20 (1941), 5–37. McLynn, Frank J., ‘An Eighteenth-Century Scots Republic? – An Unlikely Project from Absolutist France’, Scottish Historical Review, 59 (1980), 177–81. Marcus, Geoffrey, ‘Hawke’s Blockade of Brest’, Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 104 (1959), 475–88. Nicholson, Albert, ‘Lieutenant John Holker’, Transactions of the Lancashire and Cheshire Antiquarian Society, 9 (1891), 147–54. Nordmann, Claude, ‘Choiseul and the Last Jacobite Attempt of 1759’, in Eveline Cruickshanks, ed., Ideology and Conspiracy: Aspects of Jacobitism, 1689–1759 (Edinburgh, 1982), 201–17. —— , ‘Les Jacobites Ećossais en France au XVIIIe Sie`cle’, in Miche`le S. Plaisant, ed., Regards sur l’Ećosse aus XVIIIe sie`cle (Lille, 1977), 81–108. —— , ‘Jakobiterna och det Svenska Hovet, 1745–1746’, Historisk Tidskrift (1959), 408–17. Petrie, Sir Charles, ‘The Elibank Plot, 1752–3’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 15 (1931), 175–96. Phillips, Mark, ‘The Revival of Narrative: Thoughts on a Current Historiographical Debate’, University of Toronto Quarterly, 53, 2 (1983–4), 149–65. Pocock, J. G. A., ‘The Fourth English Civil War: Dissolution, Desertion and Alternative Histories in the Glorious Revolution’, Government and Opposition, 23, 2 (1988), 151–66. Russell, Conrad, ‘The Catholic Wind’, in Conrad Russell, Unrevolutionary England (London, 1990), 305–8. Russell, Peter E., ‘Redcoats in the Wilderness: British Officers and Irregular Warfare in Europe and America, 1740 to 1760’, William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, 35, 4 (1978), 629–52. Shields, Alice, ‘A Last Grasp at the Crown’, Gentlemen’s Magazine, July (1902), 40–52. Skinner, Quentin, ‘The Principles and Practice of Opposition: The Case of Bolingbroke versus Walpole’, in Neil McKendrick, ed., Historical Perspectives in English Thought and Society in Honour of J. H. Plumb (London, 1974), 93–128. Stone, Lawrence, ‘The Revival of Narrative: Reflections on a New Old History’, Past & Present, 85 (1979), 3–24. Thomas, P. D. G., ‘Jacobitism in Wales’, Welsh History Review, 1, 3 (1962), 279–300. Tully, James, ‘The Pen is a Mighty Sword: Quentin Skinner’s Analysis of Politics’, in James Tully, ed., Meaning and Context. Quentin Skinner and his Critics (Cambridge, 1988), 7–25.

298 Bibliography

2.3

Works of Reference

Balfour Paul, Sir James, ed., The Scots Peerage, founded on Wood’s Edition of Sir Robert Douglas’s Peerage of Scotland. Containing an Historical and Genealogical Account of the Nobility of that Kingdom, 9 vols (Edinburgh, 1904–14). Donaldson, Gordon and Robert S. Morpeth, eds, A Dictionary of Scottish History (Edinburgh, [1977] 1992). Gordon Seton, Sir Bruce and Jean Gordon Arnot, The Prisoners of the ’45, 3 vols (Edinburgh, 1928–29). Henry E. Huntington Library and Art Gallery, Guide to British Historical Manuscripts in the Huntington Library (San Marino, CA, 1982). Hayes, Richard, Biographical Dictionary of Irishmen in France (Dublin, 1949). —— , Irish Swordsmen of France (Dublin, 1934). Keay, John and Julia Keay, eds, Collins Encyclopaedia of Scotland (London, 1994). Livingstone of Bachuil, Alastair, Christian W. H. Aikman and Betty Stuart Hart, eds, Muster Roll of Prince Charles Edward Stuart’s Army, 1745–46 (Aberdeen, [1984] 1985). Massue, Melville Henry, Marquis de Ruvigny and Raineval, The Jacobite Peerage, Baronetage, Knightage & Grants of Honour (London and Edinburgh, [1904] 1974). Namier, Sir Lewis B. and J. Brooke, The House of Commons, 1754–1790, 3 vols (London, 1964). Sedgwick, Romney, The Commons, 1715–1754, 2 vols (London, 1970). Stephen, Leslie and Sidney Lee, eds, Dictionary of National Biography, 63 vols (London, 1885–1900).

2.4

Unpublished Doctoral Theses, Papers, and Essays

Fraser, E. J. S., ‘The Pitt-Newcastle Coalition and the Conduct of the Seven Years’ War, 1757–1760’, unpublished D.Phil. thesis (Oxford, 1976). Jewell, Byron Frank, ‘The Legislation Relating to Scotland after the Forty-Five’, unpublished Ph.D. thesis (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1975). Keith Schuchard, Marsha, ‘Charles Edward Stuart as ‘‘Chevalier de Soleil d’Or’’: The Role of ‘‘Ećossais’’ Freemasonry in the Jacobite–Swedish Crusade’, (unpublished paper presented to the conference on ‘Jacobitism, Scotland and the Enlightenment: Focus on the North’, organized by the Thomas Reid Institute and the EighteenthCentury Scottish Studies Society, and held at the University of Aberdeen, 29 July–3 August 1995), 1–10. MacKenzie, Niall, ‘The Appin Murder in Historical Perspective’, unpublished essay, (1991). MacKillop, A., ‘Military Recruiting in the Scottish Highlands, 1739–1815: The Political, Social and Economic Context’, unpublished Ph. D. thesis (University of Glasgow, 1996). Rouffiac, Nathalie, ‘La Premie`re Geńe´ration de l’Exil Jacobite a Paris et Saint-Germainen-Laye, 1688–1715’, unpublished thesis (Ećole Pratique des Hautes E´tudes, 1995).

3

Motion Pictures

Bob Carruthers, The Jacobites (Cromwell Films Limited, 1995).

Index Abolition of Heritable Jurisdictions, 40 Achnacarry, 28, 29, 30 Act of Attainder, 55 Act of Indemnity, 55 Anne, Queen of Britain and Ireland, 168 Annexing Act, 97 Annexing Bill, 98 Antwerp, 86, 87, 88, 90 Argathelians, 54, 98 Argyllshire, 28, 29, 32, 34, 36, 67 Arisaig, 27 Astley, Sir John, 100 Atterbury Plot (1722), 163 Atterbury, Francis, Bishop of Rochester, 74, 163 August III, Elector of Saxony and King of Poland, 18, 82 Avignon, 52, 58, 60 Badenoch, 24, 25, 28, 38, 45, 61 Bailyn, Bernard, Prof., 14–15 Balquhidder, 26, 32 Baltimore, 27 Barcelona, 60 Barry, James, 4th Earl of Barrymore, 131 Barry, Richard, Dr, 54 Basle, 90 Beauclerk, George, Lord, 155, 156 Benn, William, 41 Berlin, 87 Bernera, 45–6 Bishopp, James, 40 Bishopp, Sir Cecil, 40 Black, Jeremy, Professor, 8, 12, 24, 33 Blair Atholl, 35 Blakney, William, Major-General, 41–2 Bland, Humphrey, Lieutenant-General, 43, 45, 46, 109, 111, 113, 148, 151 Boscaven, Edward, Admiral, 145 Boulogne, 80 Boyd, William, 13th Lord and 4th Earl of Kilmarnock, 53, 131–2 Boys, William, Commodore, 155, 156

Braes of Mar, 28 Breda, 50 Brett, A., Colonel, 54, 66 Brodie, Alexander, Lord Lyon of Scotland, 26 Broglie, Charles-François, Comte de, 158, 160 Brooke, John, Prof., 9 Bruce, David, 96, 98, 99 Brulart de Sillery, Louis-Philogene, Marquis de Puysieux, 62, 65, 66, 69, 86 Bulkeley, Francis, Viscount Bulkeley of Cashel, 55, 86, 89, 92, 93 Byng, John, Admiral, 121 Cameron, Alexander, of Glenevis, 83, 96, 98, 99, 101, 110–12, 117–18 Cameron, Angus, of Downan, 78, 80, 110, 111 Cameron, Archibald, Dr, 42, 61, 79, 80, 98, 100, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110, 111–14, 117, 118, 165 Cameron, Donald, of Lochiel, 16, 28–31, 33, 35, 37, 42, 44, 56–9, 65, 66, 68, 69, 71, 79, 80, 111, 112, 114, 123, 127, 128, 161 Cameron, John, of Fassifern, 37, 79, 83, 99, 101, 110 Cameron, John, of Lochiel, 99, 103, 112, 123, 131 Cameron, Ludovick, of Torcastle, Lieutenant-Colonel, 42 Cameron, Samuel, Lieutenant, 78, 96, 103, 109, 110–11, 118 Cameron/MacDonell feud, 110 Campbell, Archibald, 3rd Duke of Argyll, 19, 34, 35, 43, 54, 84, 97, 98, 103, 104, 107, 108 Campbell, Archibald, of Stonefield, 17, 32, 33–5, 37, 42 Campbell, Colin, of Glenure (‘The Red Fox’), 98, 103 Campbell, Donald, of Airds, 35, 42

299

300 Index Campbell, John, 4th Earl of Loudon, 16, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 36, 37, 46 Campbell, John, Lord (later 3rd Earl of Breadalbane), 32 Campbell, John, of Barcaldine, 96, 98 Campbell, John, of Mamore, MajorGeneral, 26, 27–9, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38 Campbell, Sir James, of Auchinbreck, 54 Cannadine, David, Prof., 48 Carlisle, 55 Carrington, Nathaniel, 106, 112, 113 Carte, Thomas, 95 Carteret, John, Earl of Granville, 41, 97 Carvajal y Lancaster, Don Jose´, 60, 61 Caryll, John Baptist, 40–1 Catherine (The Great), Czarina of Russia, 109 Chaˆteau de Vincennes, 70 Charles VI, Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire of German Nations, 85, 120 Choiseul, Etienne François, Duc de, 72, 122, 128, 132–3, 140, 141, 143, 145, 154, 155, 156–8, 160, 162–3, 166 Christhold, Christian Gottlieb, 106–7 Clark, Hugh, Captain, 106 Clark, J.C.D., Professor, 167, 168 Clifton, 24 Cluny’s ‘Cage’ at Ben Alder, 79 Coll, 61 Colley, Linda, Prof, 4, 6, 14 Convention of Kloster Zeven (8, 9 and 10 September, 1757), 121 Convention of Westminster (16 January, 1756), 120 Cornwallis, Edward, Lieutenant-Colonel, 33 Crieff, 35, 96 Cromarty Bay, 67 Cruickshanks, Eveline, Dr, 6, 10, 12, 39 Cullen, 36 Culloden, Battle of (16 April 1746), 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 10, 11, 13, 19–25, 27, 29, 30, 31, 34, 36, 40, 41, 44, 49, 50, 56, 57, 63, 68, 73, 74, 91, 94, 121, 123, 150, 157, 159, 161, 163, 167 Cumberland, William Augustus, Duke of, 3, 16, 17, 21, 23–5, 26–9, 30, 31, 33–5, 36, 45, 61, 64, 67, 84, 86, 93, 121, 161

D’Arcy, Robert, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, 18, 109, 146, 147, 149, 155, 156, 166 Dalmagarry, 24 Dawkins, James, 99, 105 Dawkins, Jeremy, 100 De Be´thune, Joachim Casimir, Comte de Be´thune, 145, 157 De Bernis, François Joachim, Cardinal, 122, 136, 139, 140, 144, 153, 162 De Bourbon, Louis Fronçois, Prince de Conti, 146 De Boyer, Alexander, Marquis d’Eguilles, 62 De Brienne, Hubert, Comte de Conflans, 146, 154 De Fleury, Andre´ Hercule, Cardinal, 163 De la Tour d’Auvergne, Charles Godefroy, Duc de Bouillon, 137, 138, 145 De Rohan, Charles, Prince de Soubise, 144, 145, 166 De Rouille´, Antoine-Louis, Comte de Jouy, 136 De Saxe, Maurice, Comte de Saxe, 64 De Turenne, Charles-Godefroy-Henry, Prince de Turenne, 137 De Voyer de Paulmy, Pierre, Comte D’Argenson, 52, 57, 61, 63 De Voyer, Rene´-Louis, Marquis D’Argenson, 51, 52, 53, 62, 71, 73, 162 Dettingen, Battle of (27 June, 1743), 72 Diplomatic Revolution (‘Renversement des Alliances’, 1765), 11, 20, 120, 121, 122, 139, 166 Disannexing Act, 5 Disclothing Act, 91 Dormer Stanhope, Philip, Earl of Chesterfield, 61 Dormer, James, 86, 87, 88, 90, 99, 116, 164 Double-remitting, 42, 45 Douglas, Sir John, of Killhead, 54 Drelincourt, Anne, Lady Primrose, 88, 93, 94, 99, 100, 102 Drummond, Lewis, Lord, 55, 152 Drummond, William, 4th Viscount Strathallan, 56 Drummond, William, of Balhaldy, 54, 59, 63–7, 70, 81, 82, 108, 124

Index 301 Drummond, William, of Machany, 5th titular Viscount Strathallan?, 56, 131 Du Plessis, Louis François Armand, Duc de Richelieu, 33, 83, 122, 130, 136 Dundas, Robert, Lord Advocate, 151 Dunkirk, 33 Dunster, William, 152 Edgar, James, Secretary, 80, 83, 132 Edgar, John, Captain, 109, 110 Elibank Plot (1749–53), 1, 11, 12, 20, 74, 75–7, 83, 84, 86, 89, 90–1, 96, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 109–10, 112, 113–18, 120, 126, 127, 163–6 Elphinstone, Arthur, 6th Lord Balmerino, 53 Elton, Sir Geoffrey, 75 Erskine, Charles, Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald, 17, 96, 98, 103, 106, 107, 108, 112, 123, 148, 149, 156 Fane, John, 7th Earl of Westmoreland, 88, 100, 103, 142 Farquharson, John, of Invercauld, 32 Fawkener, Sir Everard, 23, 28, 67 Ferdinand VI, King of Spain, 52, 60, 63, 140 Ferguson, Niall, Prof., 7 ‘Ferry Bridge’, Battle of (15 April, 1746), 24 ‘Fifteen, 5, 131, 163 ‘Fifty-nine, 126, 129, 133, 135, 146, 154, 158 First Silesian War (1740–41), 85 FitzGerald, George, 153 Flanders, 24, 29, 33, 62 Fletcher, Andrew, of Saltoun, Lord Justice Clerk Milton, 17, 27, 38, 42, 43, 96, 149 Florence, 18, 70 Fontainebleau, 50 Forbes, Alexander, 4th Lord of Pitsligo, 132 Forbes, Duncan, Lord President, 26 Fort Augustus, 25, 26, 28, 30, 34 Fort George, 151 Fort William, 27, 30, 36, 38, 151, 155 ‘Forty-five, 12, 13, 16, 49, 51, 52, 54–6, 58, 62, 64, 66–7, 69, 71, 72, 74, 82, 91, 102, 115, 117, 123, 124, 127, 131,

136, 137, 149–51, 153, 157, 158, 161, 162, 164, 167 Fouquet, Louis Charles Auguste, Marećhal-Duc de Belle-Isle, 133–6, 138–41, 143, 144, 145, 153, 162, 166 Frankfort, Cartel of (1743), 53 Fraser, Simon, 11th Lord Lovat, 25, 182, 53, 54, 96 Fraser, Simon, Master of Lovat, 182 Frederick, Prince of Wales, 39, 93 Frederick II, King of Prussia, 11, 12, 18, 20, 72, 85, 86, 91–93, 94, 99, 101, 104–6, 109, 114, 115, 116, 118, 120–1, 133, 164–6 Friesland Succession, 12, 85, 104, 109, 115, 165 Fritz, Paul, Dr, 5 Galloway, James, 4th Lord Dunkeld, 64 Garden, Alexander, of Troop, 37 George II, Elector of Hanover and King of Britain and Ireland, 12, 39, 49, 51, 53, 54, 72, 74, 82, 84, 85, 87, 90, 91, 93, 94, 100, 109, 112, 116, 118–19, 141, 142, 144, 159, 165, 168 Geraldine, Sir Thomas, 61 Gordon, John, of Glenbucket, MajorGeneral, 58 Gordon, Sir William, of Park, 56 Goring, Henry, Colonel, 82, 86, 90, 91, 92, 94, 99, 100 Goring, Sir Charles, 40 Gothenburg, 25 Graeme, Sir James, 82 Graeme, Sir John, 50 Gregg, Edward, Dr, 3, 6 Hanbury-Williams, Sir Charles, 82, 83, 86, 87, 89, 90, 107 Harrington, Sir James, 66, 81, 99, 102 Hastenbeck, Battle of, 121 Hatton, Michael, 147 Hawke, Sir Edward, Rear-Admiral, 43, 154, 159, 160, 167 Hay, James, Captain, 54, 55 Hay, John, of Restalrig, 54 Heathcote, George, 41, 99 Hensey, Florence, Dr., 153–4 Holker, John, Lieutenant/Captain, 56, 88, 89, 96, 109, 137, 146, 157

302 Index Holles, Thomas, 1st Duke of Newcastle, 9, 18, 28, 30, 36, 38, 40, 42, 53, 54, 61, 82, 85, 87, 89, 97, 104–8, 109, 111, 112, 118, 121, 122 Hunter, David, of Burnside, Captain, 67 Huske, John, Major-General, 31 Hussey,Thomas,BarondeHussey,139,140 Hynde Cotton, Sir John, 54 Independent Electors of Westminster, 94 Invermallie, 28 Inverness, 16, 23, 24, 42 Irish Brigades in the Service of France, 55–7, 64, 71, 83, 131, 147 Jablonowska, Maria Ludwika, Princesse de Talmond, 90 Jacobite Schism (1747), 123, 125 James II, King of England, Scotland and Ireland, 118 Jonas, Salomon, 106 Jonas, Simon, 106 Kaunitz, Wenzel Anton, Count, 121 Keith, George, 10th Earl Marischal, 43, 65, 81, 82, 84, 91–4, 95, 99, 100, 101, 102, 104, 105, 108, 113, 132 Keith, James, General, 43, 57, 83, 91, 92, 101 Kelly, George, Secretary, 51, 57–9, 62, 63–7, 70, 73, 81, 93, 94, 95, 124, 135, 136–8, 162 Kennedy, Major, 77, 78, 80, 97, 118 Kent, 40, 61 Keppel, William Anne, 2nd Earl of Albemarle, 34, 36–8, 40, 43, 45, 46, 54, 86, 87, 90, 91, 97, 99, 113 King, William, Dr, 82, 88, 94, 102, 116 Kingston’s dragoons, 26 Kle´ber Monod, Paul, Dr, 11, 40, 163 Kloster Zeven, Convention of (8,9 and 10 September, 1757), 121 Knoydart, 27 Kolin, Battle of, (18 June, 1757), 121 Lacey, Peter, Count, 57 Ladyholt, 40 Laffeldt, Battle of (20 July, 1747), 64 Lally, Thomas, Comte de Lally-Tollendal, General, 40, 64, 82, 86, 122, 129, 145

Lang, Andrew, 11, 17, 54, 80–2, 102, 110, 117 Langley Swymmer, Anthony, 100 Le Tellier, Louis Ce´sar, Comte d’Estreés, 121 League of Augsburg (9 July, 1686), 120 Lenman, Bruce, Prof., 5, 55 Leszczynski, Stanislas, King of Poland, 82, 139 Lichfield Races, 39, 81, 82 Loch Moidart, 61 Loch nan Uamh, 27, 61 Lochaber, 22, 29–31, 33, 38, 44, 45, 46, 61, 87 Locharkaig, 27 Locharkaig treasure, 27, 30, 54, 77, 79, 81, 96, 98, 103, 110, 117, 161, 165 London, 12, 33, 34, 57, 67, 68 Louis XV, King of France, 10, 33, 39, 41, 48–53, 58, 60–3, 64–6, 69–73, 77, 83, 91, 98–103, 109, 115, 132, 133, 134, 136–7, 139, 140, 141, 142–7, 161, 163, 164, 166, 167 Louis XIV, King of France (The ‘Sun King’), 120 Lumisden, Andrew, 90, 139 MacDonald, John, of Guidale, Captain, 91 MacAllester, Oliver, 128 MacCarthy, Robert, 5th Earl of Clancarthy, 54, 135–7, 138, 141, 144 MacDonald, Aeneas, Banker, 27, 39, 127, 149, 150 MacDonald, Alexander, of Glenaladale, Major, 107, 108 MacDonald, Alexander, of Glencoe, 28 MacDonald, Alexander, of Keppoch, 35 MacDonald, Donald, of Kinlochmoidart, Colonel, 107 MacDonald, Hugh, Catholic Bishop of Morar, 91 MacDonald, Ranald, of Clanranald, 28, 131 MacDonald, Sir Alexander, of Sleat, 54 MacDonell, Alasdair, of Glengarry, alias ‘Pickle the Spy’, 17, 30, 53, 54, 57, 58, 80, 81, 82–4, 86, 90, 95–7, 104, 107, 108–9, 110, 112, 117, 165

Index 303 MacDonell, Coll, of Barrisdale, 27 MacDonell, Donald, of Lochgarry, Lieutenant-Colonel, 29, 30, 34, 56, 58, 67, 83, 84, 86, 96, 100, 101, 104, 107, 131, 149–150 MacGregor, James Mo´r, 108–9, 112, 114, 118 Macinnes, Allan, Professor, 7, 22 MacKenzie, Alexander, of Leutron, 43 MacKenzie, George, 3rd Earl of Cromarty, 24, 36, 43, 132 MacKenzie, John, of Torridon, 43 MacKenzie-Douglas, Alexander-Peter, of Kildin, Chevalier, 39–40, 68, 134, 140, 142, 144 MacLean, Sir Hector, 53, 56, 58, 67, 115 MacLeod, Norman, of MacLeod, 36, 45, 54, 131 MacMillan, Alexander, 28 MacPherson, Ewan, of Cluny, Colonel, 16, 24, 25, 28, 29, 30, 37, 42, 43, 77–80, 82–4, 96, 98, 107, 111, 131 Madrid, 59–61 Mann, Horace, 18, 70, 82, 83, 105 Manson, Anthony, 152 Maria Theresa, Empress of the Holy Roman Empire of German Nations, 121, 139, 165 Maxwell, James, of Kirkconell, 56, 99 McLynn, Frank, Dr, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 23, 26, 27, 69, 72, 88–90, 100, 104, 124, 161, 168 McVicar, Duncan, 90 Militia Act, 150 Minden, Battle of (1 August, 1759), 122 Minorca, 121, 132 Moidart, 27, 43 Morvern, 27, 33 Muirlaggan, ‘Muirlaggan Resolution’, 27–31, 44, 161 Munro, George, of Culcairn, Captain, 36, 44 Munro, Sir Harry, 44 Murray, Alexander, of Elibank, 89, 94–5, 99, 100, 101, 113, 130, 134, 139, 144, 164 Murray, George, Lord, 23, 25, 65, 83, 108, 114, 132 Murray, John, 3rd Baron Nairne, 90, 131 Murray, John, Lord, 108

Murray, John, of Broughton, 27, 28, 29, 39, 53, 96, 99 Murray, Patrick, 5th Viscount Elibank, 40, 95, 101, 142 Noailles, Adrien Maurice, Duc de, 51, 53 Nordmann, Claude, Prof., 11, 13, 16, 133, 168 O’Brien, Charles, 6th Viscount Clare, 108, 153 O’Brien, Daniel, 1st Earl of Lismore, Colonel, 50, 51, 52, 53 O’Heguerty, Daniel, 136, 138, 139 O’Heguerty, Pierre Andre´, 137 O’Sullivan, John William, 55, 65 Ogilvy, David, Lord, 25, 55, 56, 98, 104, 107, 123 Ogilvy, James, 5th Earl of Findlater and 2nd Earl of Seafield, 149 Oglethorpe, Eleanor, Marquise de Me´zieres, 83 ‘Old System’, 92, 120, 165 Oranje-Nassau, William Henry, Prince of Orange (‘William III’), 34, 89, 120, 130, 154 Page, Henry, 152 Pall Mall, 88 Paris, 18, 54, 55, 60, 62, 65 Paris, Peace of (1763), 158, 161 Paterson, Sir Hugh, 107 Patullo, Henry, 55 Pelham, Henry, 9, 12, 17, 18, 40–1, 45, 54, 73, 96–8, 104, 107, 113, 118, 165 Petrie, Sir Charles, 12, 75, 76, 88, 104, 166 Pevensey Bay, 57 Phe´lypeaux, Jean-Fre´deric, Comte de Maurepas, 51, 53, 61, 62, 70 Philips, Sir John, 142 Pitt, William, 1st Earl of Chatham (The ‘Elder Pitt’), 9, 167 Pittock, Murray, Professor, 3, 7, 8, 149 Pocock, J.G.A., Professor, 7 Poisson, Jeanne Antoinette, Marquise de Pompadour, 137, 138, 140, 144, 166 Potier, François Joachim Bernard, Duc de Gesvres, 70

304 Index Pragmatic Sanction (19 April 1713), 120 Prince’s party, 113, 114, 116 Protestant Succession, 9, 69, 168 Quiberon Bay, Battle of (24–25 November, 1759), 1, 13, 19, 154, 155, 157, 158, 159, 160, 167 Radcliffe, Charles 4th Earl of Derwentwater, 53, 105 Rannoch Moor (Braes of Rannoch), 28, 32, 45, 79, 96 Remitters, 82 Revolution Settlement, 4, 9, 86 Robertson, Donald, of Woodshiel, Captain, 101 Robertson, Duncan, of Struan, 79, 128 Robertson, James, of Blairfetty, Major, 101 Rome, 18, 50, 51, 55, 56, 63–6, 73 Rossbach, Battle of (5 November, 1757), 122 Rothe, Charles Edward, General, 123 Russell, John, 4th Duke of Bedford, 39, 86, 97–8 Ruthven, 25, 26, 33, 44 Rutlege, Sir Walter, 95 Sackville, George, Lord, 33 Scheffer, Carl Frederick, 115, 130 Scott, Frederick Carolina, Captain, 33, 34, 36 Scott, Sir Walter, 87, 100, 105 Second Battle of Cape Finisterre (14 October, 1747), 43 Sempill, Francis, 2nd titular Baron Sempill, 54, 59, 62, 63, 65–8 Septennial Act, 88 Seven Years’ War (1756–63), 11, 72, 74, 121, 127, 130, 143, 146, 148, 150, 153, 157, 158, 160, 162, 163, 167, 168 Sheridan, Sir Thomas, 59, 65, 124 Silesian Loan, 12, 85, 105, 109, 165 Skinner, Quentin, Prof., 9 Somerset, Charles Noel, 4th Duke of Beaufort, 82, 88 Speck, William, Prof., 4, 21, 168 Squadrone, 98 Stevenson, Robert Louis, 54

Stewart, Alan ‘Breac’, 103 Stewart, Alan, of Invernahyle, Captain, 91 Stewart, Charles, of Ardshiel, Colonel, 28, 34, 35, 42, 90, 91, 103, 104, 107 Stewart, James, Ensign, 43 Stewart, James, of Aucharn, 54, 103 Stewart, John Roy, Colonel, 55, 58, 67, 68 Stewart, William, 9th Baron Blantyre, 129–132, 141, 142, 144, 145, 149, 150 Stockholm, Peace of (1719), 115 Stone, Lawrence, Prof., 3, 14 Strathdown, 36 Stuart, Charles Edward (Charles III), 1, 8, 10, 12, 18, 20, 21–6, 27, 28, 31, 33, 36, 37–41, 43, 44, 46, 47, 49–68, 68–74, 78, 80–3, 84, 86, 87–95, 99, 100–102, 104, 106, 107, 112–4, 116, 122–8, 129–30, 131–47, 148, 152, 157, 160–7 Stuart, Charles, 5th Earl of Traquair, 54 Stuart, Henry Benedict, Cardinal-Duke of York, 50, 60, 63–5, 70, 73, 117, 124, 147, 164 Stuart, James Francis Edward (James III), 13, 36, 49–50, 51–3, 56, 59, 62, 63–6, 73, 69–71, 79, 81, 82, 83, 86, 89, 92, 112, 114, 117, 123–5, 126, 134, 135, 141, 142, 143, 149, 152, 162, 163 Sussex Smugglers, 40, 81 Swedish Plot (1717), 5 Szechi, Daniel, Dr, 3, 21 Talbot, Richard, 3rd Earl of Tyrconel, 84 Tencin, Pierre Gue´rin de, Cardinal, 51, 62, 71, 73 Thicknesse, Philip, 88–9, 94, 116 Thurot, François, Captain, 116, 154–7, 167 Treaties of Breslau and Berlin (1742), 85 Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748), 19, 66, 69, 71, 109, 114, 115, 121, 162 Treaty of Fontainbleau (24 October, 1745), 53, 71 Treaty of Paris (1763), 161, 166 Treaty of Quadruple Alliance (1718), 66 Treaty of Versailles (1 May, 1756), 121 Triple Alliance (1717), 163

Index 305 United Provinces, 13, 62, 72 Utrecht, Treaty of (13 July 1713), 70 Vandeput, Sir George, 95 Venice, 81, 91 Versailles, 10, 40, 50, 55, 59, 62, 93 Von Ranke, Leopold, 9 Von Stosch, Philipp, Baron, 41, 82, 97 Wales, 2, 11 Walkinshaw, Clementina, 102, 117, 141 Wall, Ricardo, Spanish Foreign Minister, 140 Walpole, Horace, 85, 105, 118, 153 Walpole, Sir Robert, 2, 5, 65, 74, 118, 163 Walsh, Anthony Vincent, 1st Lord Walsh, 71, 95, 107, 135–7, 138 Walsh, Francis James, Comte de Serrant, 95

War of Austrian Succession (1740–48), 49, 66, 72, 85, 121, 150, 161, 163, 165, 166 Warren, Richard, Colonel, 50 Waters, George, Banker, 39, 78, 86, 94 Wemyss, David, Lord Elcho, 25, 26, 54, 100 Westminster, Convention of (16 January, 1756), 85, 110, 121, 132, 166 Wild Geese, 57, 123, 147, 155 Williams Wynn, Sir Watkin, 40, 54, 66, 81 Wilson, Samuel, 40 Wolters, Richard, 147 Wood, Peter, 130, 139, 145 Yorke, Joseph, Colonel, 93, 94 Yorke, Philip, 1st Earl of Hardwicke, 18, 61, 104, 105, 123, 151

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