The Harp and the Shield of David (Israeli History, Politics & Society S.)

The Harp and the Shield of David

The Harp and the Shield of David: Ireland, Zionism and the State of Israel examines the relationship between Ireland and the Zionist movement in the context of Palestine’s partition, the rescue of Jews from Nazi persecution, and the delay in Ireland’s recognition of the State of Israel until 1963. Divided into two sections, Part I addresses the Irish attitude toward the partition of Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish state as proposed in the Peel Plan of 1937 and the UN partition resolution of 1947. Topics addressed include the unsuccessful efforts of Palestine’s Chief Rabbi, Isaac Herzog, to save Jews from Nazi persecution with the help of his friend, Eamon de Valera. Part II analyzes the diplomatic activities of Israel and Ireland and reviews Israel’s attempts from its inception in 1948 to normalize its relations with Ireland. Attention is drawn to issues such as the Vatican’s influence on Ireland; the internationalization of Jerusalem; the Arab factor and the contrast between Ireland’s separatism and Israel’s proactive foreign relations. Based on numerous documents from archives in Ireland and Israel, this engaging book provides a fresh point of access to understanding the link between Ireland and the not so distant Israel. The book will be of great interest to both undergraduates and postgraduates specializing in modern Irish and Israeli history. Shulamit Eliash is a senior lecturer at the History Department of Bar-Ilan University, Israel.

Israeli History, Politics and Society Series Editor: Efraim Karsh Kings College London

This series provides a multidisciplinary examination of all aspects of Israeli history, politics and society, and serves as a means of communication between the various communities interested in Israel: academics, policy-makers, practitioners, journalists, and the informed public. 1. Peace in the Middle East The challenge for Israel Edited by Efraim Karsh

8. Israel at the Polls, 1996 Edited by Daniel J. Elazar and Shmuel Sandler

2. The Shaping of Israeli Identity Myth, memory and trauma Edited by Robert Wistrich and David Ohana

9. From Rabin to Netanyahu Israel’s troubled agenda Edited by Efraim Karsh

3. Between War and Peace Dilemmas of Israeli security Edited by Efraim Karsh 4. US-Israeli Relations at the Crossroads Edited by Gabriel Sheffer 5. Revisiting the Yom Kippur War Edited by P. R. Kumaraswamy 6. Israel The dynamics of change and continuity Edited by David Levi-Faur, Gabriel Sheffer and David Vogel 7. In Search of Identity Jewish aspects in Israeli culture Edited by Dan Urian and Efraim Karsh

10. Fabricating Israeli History The ‘new historians’, second revised edition Efraim Karsh 11. Divided against Zion Anti-Zionist opposition in Britain to a Jewish state in Palestine, 1945–1948 Rory Miller 12. Peacemaking in a Divided Society Israel after Rabin Edited by Sasson Sofer 13. A Twenty-Year Retrospective of Egyptian-Israeli Relations Peace in spite of everything Ephraim Dowek 14. Global Politics Essays in honor of David Vital Edited by Abraham Ben-Zvi and Aharon Klieman

15. Parties, Elections and Cleavages Israel in comparative and theoretical perspective Edited by Reuven Y. Hazan and Moshe Maor 16. Israel and the Polls 1999 Edited by Daniel J. Elazar and M. Ben Mollov 17. Public Policy in Israel Edited by David Nachmias and Gila Menahem 18. Developments in Israeli Public Administration Edited by Moshe Maor 19. Israeli Diplomacy and the Quest for Peace Mordechai Gazit 20. Israeli-Romanian Relations at the End of Ceaucevcu’s Era Yosef Govrin 21. John F. Kennedy and the Politics of Arms Sales to Israel Abraham Ben-Zvi

26. British, Israel and Anglo-Jewry 1947–1957 Natan Aridan 27. Israeli Identity In search of a successor to the pioneer, tsabar and settler Lilly Weissbrod 28. The Israeli Palestinians An Arab minority in the Jewish State Edited by Alexander Bligh 29. Israel, the Hashemites and the Palestinians The fateful triangle Edited by Efraim Karsh and P. R. Kumaraswamy 30. Last Days in Israel Abraham Diskin 31. War in Palestine, 1948 Strategy and diplomacy David Tal 32. Rethinking the Middle East Efraim Karsh 33. Ben-Gurion against the Knesset Giora Goldberg

22. Green Crescent over Nazareth The displacement of Christians by Muslims in the holy land Raphael Israeli

34. Trapped Fools Thirty years of Israeli policy in the territories Schlomo Gazit

23. Jerusalem Divided The armistice region, 1947–1967 Raphael Israeli

35. Israel’s Quest for Recognition and Acceptance in Asia Garrison state diplomacy Jacob Abadi

24. Decision on Palestine Deferred America, Britain and wartime diplomacy, 1939–1945 Monty Noam Penkower

36. The Harp and Shield of David Ireland, Zionism and the State of Israel, 1937–1963 Shulamit Eliash

25. A Dissenting Democracy The case of ‘peace now’, an Israeli peace movement Magnus Norell

37. H. V. Evatt and the Establishment of Israel The undercover Zionist Daniel Mandel

38. Navigating Perilous Waters An Israeli strategy for peace and security Ephraim Sneh 39. Lyndon B. Johnson and the Politics of Arms Sales to Israel In the shadow of the hawk Abraham Ben-Zvi 40. Israel at the Polls 2003 Edited by Shmeul Sandler, Ben M. Mollov and Jonathan Rynhold 41. Between Capital and Land The Jewish National Fund’s finances and land-purchase priorities in Palestine, 1939–1945 Eric Engel Tuten 42. Israeli Democracy at the Crossroads Raphael Cohen-Almagor 43. Israeli Institutions at the Crossroads Raphael Cohen-Almagor

44. The Israeli-Palestine Peace Process Negotiations, 1999–2001 Within reach Gilead Sher 45. Ben-Gurion’s Political Struggles, 1963–67 A lion in winter Zaki Shalom 46. Ben-Gurion, Zionism and American Jewry 1948–1963 Ariel Feldestein 47. The Origins of the American-Israeli Alliance The Jordanian factor Abraham Ben-Zvi 48. The Harp and the Shield of David Ireland, Zionism and the State of Israel Shulamit Eliash

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3. Politics and Society Since 1948 Edited by Efraim Karsh

The Harp and the Shield of David Ireland, Zionism and the State of Israel

Shulamit Eliash

First published 2007 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2007 Shulamit Eliash

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2007. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested

ISBN 0–203–69611–5 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN10: 0–415–35035–2 (hbk) ISBN10: 0–203–69611–5 (ebk) ISBN13: 978–0–415–35035–8 (hbk) ISBN13: 978–0–203–69611–8 (ebk)

To Amoz, Nitai, Einat, Miriam, and Michal

Contents

Acknowledgments

xi

Introduction

1

PART I

Ireland and Zionism: 1937–47

11

1

From partition to partition

13

2

Rabbi Herzog, de Valera, and Jewish rescue

49

PART II

Ireland and the State of Israel: 1948–63

71

3

De facto recognition of Israel by Ireland

73

4

From de facto to de jure

98

Conclusion

175

Notes Bibliography Index

180 220 231

Acknowledgments

I wish to record my gratitude to the directors, custodians and staff of the following archives and record offices: the Irish National Archives, the Dublin Diocesan Archives, the Irish Jewish Museum – Dublin; University College Dublin – Archives Department; National Library of Ireland; the State of Israel Archives, the Central Zionist Archives, Abba Eban Center for Israel Diplomacy, Rabbi Herzog Archive – Jerusalem; the Religious Zionism Archive – Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan; Jabotinsky Archives – TelAviv; the Public Record Office – London; the National Archives – Washington. Special thanks go to Katrina Goldstone who helped me collect archival material in Ireland. I am deeply indebted to the late chief rabbi of Ireland, Rabbi Immanuel Jakobovits (1949–58) who was involved in the events discussed in the book, and to Rabbi Isaac Cohen, chief rabbi of Ireland (1959–80), whose valuable contributions were most helpful. I owe a debt of gratitude to the Ambassador of Ireland in Israel, Patrick Hennessy (2001–5); the Israeli Ambassadors to Ireland: Zvi Gabay (1994–9) and Mark Sofer (1999–2002); Owen Brooks, Director International Markets, Irish Department of Agriculture and Food; Philip Grant, First Secretary at the Embassy of Ireland in Tel Aviv; Daniel Halevy-Goetschel, Deputy Director, Economic Division of Europe Department, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs; David C. Sheehy, Dublin Diocesan Archives; Scott Kelly, Assistant Director of the American Irish Historical Society in New York; Brian Quinn, Chairman of the Ireland-Israel Friendship League; Robert Briscoe’s sons, Ben and Joe; Jacob Herzog’s wife Pnina. All have enlightened me on the diverse issues. I also wish to thank Sharon Ramon and Yehuda Aviram, who toiled on the translation, in a most pleasant and fruitful cooperation. I am duty-bound to mention the late Professor Avraham Saltman, Rector of Bar-Ilan University, and Israel Prize laureate, who died prematurely. He read parts of the manuscript and enriched it with his comments. Blessed be his memory.

Introduction

On the morning of September 23, 1937, in a speech addressing the Sixth Committee of the League of Nations Assembly in Geneva,1 Eamon de Valera, president of the Executive Council of the Irish Free State, attacked the British proposal to partition Palestine into two separate states, Jewish and Arab. This plan was the product of the Palestine Royal Commission (known as the Peel Commission, as it was headed by Lord William Robert Peel), appointed by the British Government on August 1936 to scrutinize the intricate relationship between Jews and Arabs in Palestine. The Arab revolt that broke out in Palestine in April 1936 and was directed against both the yishuv 2 and the British mandate, exacerbated Arab-Jewish relationships, which were thorny in any case, spurring Britain to seek an in-depth solution to the conflict. On July 7, 1937 the Peel Commission published its report, which included the partition proposal as the plan for achieving a lasting peace.3 Some two months later the plan was on the agenda of the international organization. This book opens with de Valera’s address,4 the first public expression by such a high-ranking Irish leader on an issue of cardinal importance to the Zionist movement and the Jewish people. Part I covers the period between the Peel Commission report and the resolution adopted by the UN Assembly on November 29, 1947, regarding the partition of Palestine. Discussed in this part are two subjects expressing the momentousness of the time, both from the Zionist and the general Jewish standpoints. First explored is the position of de Valera and Irish public opinion on the partition of Palestine, as well as de Valera’s contacts on this issue with leaders of the Zionist movement and the yishuv. Further examined are the efforts by Rabbi Isaac Halevi Herzog, Chief Rabbi of Palestine as of 1937 and former Chief Rabbi of the Irish Free State, to enlist de Valera’s help to save Jews who were being persecuted by the Nazis. Part II is devoted to the mainly diplomatic activities of Israel and Ireland5 from the establishment of the State of Israel on May 14, 1948 until May 1963, when Ireland recognized Israel de jure. The issue of Ireland’s recognition of Israel was naturally at the core of this activity. This study examines these events from the Zionist-Israeli perspective. A British proposal to establish a sovereign Jewish state by partitioning Palestine, surfaced first in 1937. Although supported by the majority of the Zionist movement, the proposal was opposed by the Arabs, and consequently shelved by Britain.

2

Introduction

Some 10 years later, in November 1947, the UN Assembly, relying on the UNSCOP (United Nations Special Committee on Palestine) proposal, again recommended partitioning the territory and the establishment of two states. This time the partition plan was adopted. However, its actual implementation neither reflected accurately the Assembly’s decision, nor was it agreed to by both parties concerned. While the Jews accepted the partition, the Arabs rejected it in its entirety. Aiming to destroy the fledgling state, the Arabs invaded Israel on May 15, 1948 – just one day after Israel’s proclamation of independence, forcing Israel to wage a bitter war for its survival. As Israel finally emerged victorious, the Jewish State covered a larger part of Palestine than that outlined in the UN partition plan. The Arab state that was to be established under the partition plan never came into being at all, as the territory allocated to it was occupied by Jordan and Egypt.6 As noted, de Valera opposed the Peel Plan, and so did Irish public opinion as reflected in the Irish press. Public opinion in Ireland continued to signal its opposition to the 1947 partition plan. At the end of Israel’s War of Independence, John A. Costello’s inter-party government (1948–51) also dealt with the partition of Palestine, as part of the government’s campaign against the partition of Ireland. Costello’s government, while it also avoided recognition of Israel immediately after the proclamation of the state, recognized it de facto in February 1949. Yet notwithstanding Israel’s persistent efforts, all Irish governments delayed full recognition of Israel for many years. The Irish position on the partition of Palestine and the establishment of the Jewish state should therefore be viewed as the opening of a cycle that was closed only in 1963, when Ireland finally recognized Israel de jure. On the face of it, Ireland is both geographically and practically, far away from the Zionist movement and the State of Israel. Nor was it ever home to a large Jewish community which could serve as a connective link. As individuals, members of the small Jewish community, its majority in Dublin, etched their mark on Irish public life beyond their actual numbers – mainly in the liberal professions and the arts.7 However, they had no influence as a national minority and were no more than a negligible component of the relationship between Ireland, the Zionist movement, and the State of Israel. Nonetheless, Ireland’s stance toward Zionism and the State of Israel and the relationship between them is significant, mainly due to two factors whose importance has not waned for many years after the period discussed in this book. The first factor here is the fact that independent Ireland is also the result of a compromise partition, designed to resolve an age-old and complex conflict between two communities of different religious-national identities. On December 23, 1920, the British Parliament passed the Government of Ireland Act which divided the island of Ireland into two autonomous states (each with its own parliament) affiliated with Great Britain: Southern Ireland, with a massive Catholic majority in its 26 counties, and Northern Ireland with a Protestant majority in 6 counties (in the northeast) of the 9 counties of Ulster. The objective of the partition was to resolve the complex challenge that the Irish situation

Introduction 3 posed for Lloyd George’s government. The success of Sinn Féin8 in the parliamentary elections in Westminster in December 1918, the refusal of those elected to participate in parliament, the establishment of their own assembly in Dublin as Dáil Éireann and as an alternative government, and the outbreak of the Anglo-Irish war in January 1919 (that developed into effective guerilla warfare under the direction of the Irish Republican Army (IRA))9 for gaining the independence of Ireland, compelled the London government to create a new constitutional structure in the form of home rule based on the partition of Ireland. The Government of Ireland Act was accepted by the Unionist Protestants in the six counties that continued to refuse to accept the authority of an All-Ireland Parliament residing in Dublin. However, the act fell short of fulfilling the aspirations of the Sinn Féin and the IRA, which rejected it as a meaningless gesture and continued the war unabated. In the summer of 1921 the British were sufficiently exhausted to bring the Anglo-Irish conflict to an end. In July a cease-fire came into effect and negotiations began with the Sinn Féin. On December 6, 1921, upon completing negotiations, the parties signed the Anglo-Irish Treaty in London, establishing the Irish Free State in the 26 southern counties as a self-governing dominion within the British Commonwealth. The treaty was passed in the Dáil in January 1922 by a small majority, but it agitated Sinn Féin and the IRA to the point of launching a civil war. The pro-treaty side dominated the political arena and established the provisional government, while the majority of the IRA remained anti-treaty. The war that began in June 1922 ended in May 1923 with the defeat of the antitreaty side.10 Yet this did not abate the aspirations of Irish sovereignty over the entire island. On the contrary, in the Irish constitution of 1937 which remains in force (including amendments added over the years), this aspiration is given a declaratory expression. The constitution speaks in the name of the Irish nation and defines its national territory as covering all Ireland, a definition far from political reality. Nevertheless, the formulators of the constitution attributed cardinal importance, both political and psychological to this definition, underscoring it in the constitution.11 Moreover, the leaders of Ireland in the years concerned, stressed the harsh political injustice embodied in the partition of Ireland, as well as any other national territorial partitioning, and from time to time organized propaganda campaigns against the partitioning of Ireland.12 On the other hand, there was a militant faction whose goal was to unite the island by physical force. This was the hard core of the IRA, which since its defeat in the civil war persisted in not recognizing the legitimacy of the governments of Northern Ireland, the Irish Free State, and Ireland. This illegal organization suffered from lack of public support and was incapable of military confrontation. Nevertheless, from time to time it tested its strength by organizing violent attacks on the soil of Britain and Northern Ireland, albeit without much success.13 There is no doubt that when evaluating the Irish standpoint vis-à-vis the issue of the partition of Palestine and the State of Israel, it would be mandatory to examine how this position was affected by the partition of Ireland. It is noteworthy that any historical comparison is problematic. An analogy between two cases does

4

Introduction

not necessarily imply total similarity. It could well be that there would be similarities in many or just a few aspects. Nonetheless, discussing the Irish position against the backdrop of the partition analogy may provide a better point of departure for evaluating the similar and specific factors that determined the state of affairs in both the Irish and the Zionist-Israeli cases. The second factor that left its mark on the Irish-Zionist-Israeli relationship was Ireland’s Catholic devoutness in that period, with all its implications on unique ties with the Vatican and its affinity to the Holy Land as the cradle of Christianity. Approximately 95 percent of the Irish population was Catholic,14 the majority committed and practicing Catholics. The huge attendance at Sunday Mass (some 90 percent), the status of the priest in his community, and respect of and obedience to the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church, all testify to this. Since the establishment of the Irish Free State, a broad consensus evolved on strict observance of Catholic norms and values among all parties, governments, and political echelons.15 This was manifested in the relatively harmonious relationship between the state and the Church hierarchy, and in constitutional endeavors. Among the important constitutional acts were those of 1923 and 1929 dealing with censorship of films, books, and publications. However, the jewel in the crown was the 1937 constitution. Despite the fact that it attempted to reconcile liberal-democratic and theocratic principles, it placed emphasis on Ireland’s Christian Catholic character.16 Starting in the late 1950s, this intense religious atmosphere began to change. This was the result of the shockwaves that rocked the Catholic world within the brief, albeit ground-breaking, papacy of Pope John XXIII (1958–63). He renounced the seclusion of the Vatican and displayed a great deal of interest in social progress and concern for peace. He also showed an unusually favorable attitude toward other Christian churches and toward the Jews, and even tried to improve relations between the Catholic Church and the Communist states. The discussions of the Second Vatican Ecumenical Council (1962–5), which he initiated, were an impressive achievement for the Church. The shockwaves also reached isolated Ireland, still immersed in its deep conservatism. This also signaled the beginning of a process – Ireland’s exposure to outside influences through tourism, British TV, the national Irish TV Channel, and the country’s participation in UN peace keeping. This process of exposure broke through the walls of conservatism and isolation, and raised doubts regarding the religious-clerical status quo.17 The first decades of Ireland’s independence witnessed a special relationship between the government of Ireland and the Vatican. In a world gradually succumbing to atheism, Ireland was considered the most devout of Catholic states, and a source of solace for the Holy See, sharing its concerns about Communism. But toward the late 1960s, as Irish society became more pluralistic and liberal, people began challenging the Catholic piousness. The special relationship began to crumble and finally ended less than 20 years later.18 Christian affinity to the landscapes of the Holy Land as the birthplace of Jesus and the arena of events recorded in the Holy Scriptures, inevitably linked Ireland,

Introduction 5 one of the strongest Christian communities of the period, to the events unfolding in Palestine. One facet of such linkage was the Catholic objection on theological and popular grounds to the possibility of Jewish control of the Holy Land. Against the background of the Jewish-Arab conflict, the partition proposal and the establishment of a Jewish State, we will examine the interest in the fate of the Holy Land and its holy places on the part of the religious hierarchy, the political echelons, and public opinion in Ireland. We will also examine and evaluate, with reference to the ties between Ireland and the Vatican, the effect of Vatican’s animosity toward Zionism, the State of Israel, and its theological and political infrastructure, on Ireland’s position on the issue of recognizing Israel. The transition that took place in this context during the reign of Pope John XXIII will be evaluated as well. Partition of national territory is only one of the analogies that can be drawn between the national revival processes in Ireland and Israel. These analogies are almost self-evident, particularly from the overall aspect which glosses over the singular traits of each of these processes. The reference here is to the struggle for independence against Great Britain, the revival of a national language and the existence of a large diaspora, specifically a large community in the United States. Analogies may also be drawn between the Jewish and the Irish people and their histories, such as an ancient history linked to the present through deep awareness of historical continuity,19 identification with a unique religion that preserved their separate existence, a prolonged denial of sovereignty, and the tragic experience of persecution against a religious backdrop that produced a diaspora and scattering.20 Our book is devoted to analyzing the Irish-Zionist-Israeli relationship on a practical level. It does not theorize on the collection of analogies relating to processes of revival, a subject in its own right. Some analogies have indeed been researched both theoretically and in depth.21 It is nonetheless worth noting briefly the instrumental element shared by these analogies vis-à-vis the Irish-Zionist-Israel relationship. Over the course of the book documents are presented indicating political-rhetorical usage of the similarities between the Irish and the Jewish peoples by Irish and Jewish personages in order to generate identification and empathy. In particular, a torrential flow of words has been produced about the analogy of suffering, since on the face of it sensitivity to suffering and persecution can be found in particular among those who themselves suffered and were persecuted. In this way it was possible to exploit the analogies for political purposes. Thus, for example, when the League of Nations discussed the Peel plan, Rabbi Herzog sought to arouse pro-Zionist sympathy in his friend de Valera by pointing out these similarities.22 The similarities between the two peoples, and particularly the analogies of the common experiences of suffering as causing a unique connection of solidarity, understanding, and identification, were underscored by Sean MacBride, Minister for External Affairs in Costello’s government (1948–51) in an address in the Dáil in July 1949. This address was designed to soften Israel’s stance on the issue of corpus separatum for Jerusalem and the holy sites.23 Despite the fact that the two peoples have an extensive historical memory, it is difficult to prove whether their similarities and even the analogy of suffering

6

Introduction

created an affinity of identification as MacBride indicated. Not all similarities are equal on such a matter. Even seemingly analogous situations of suffering do not always create a feeling of solidarity, since this feeling derives from additional factors besides those related to the nature and circumstances of suffering. But even so, identification as expressed in political rhetoric also creates an affinity with a certain effect. Another identification link between Ireland, Zionism, and the State of Israel, visible in the period described and even earlier, stems from the mutual effect of events and personalities bearing similarities to the national revival progress of both peoples. However, if we find in the Irish national movement traces of its having been affected by the Jewish people’s struggle for freedom in its historical past, the Zionist movement, born in a later period, displays quite a few examples of having been inspired by Irish nationalism. The rhetoric of Irish nationalism, like that of other Western national movements, is rife with concepts, metaphors, and symbols borrowed from the Bible and the ancient Hebrew tradition, which serve to create a national self-image, such as “the chosen people,” “the promised land,” and so on. As used, these concepts were separated from their Hebrew sources and assimilated into national culture to such an extent that they became part of the language.24 Yet we also see the Irish using events and symbols taken from postbiblical Jewish history. An example of such is a poem written by radical poet Fanny Parnell, sister of the Irish national leader Charles Stewart Parnell, named Massada, after the last stronghold that fell in the heroic battle of the Jewish rebellion against the Romans (AD 73). Published in 1864 against the backdrop of Fenianism – the militant anti-British nationalist movement, the poem “carried an obvious analogy with a beleaguered Ireland.”25 The extraordinary congruence between the timing of the poem’s publication and the very time when the story of Massada returned to communal Jewish consciousness after having been forgotten for many generations is fascinating. Bringing it back from oblivion is connected to the awakening of interest in Jewish history at that time. But 60 years would pass before the story of Massada would be transformed into a myth of heroism and national martyrdom for freedom among the new Jewish settlers in Palestine.26 The different variations of Irish nationalism and its leaders served as inspirational models for Zionism. Thus, for example, Parnell, leader of the constitutional nationalism captivated his contemporary, Theodor Herzl, the father of political Zionism, as the model of a national leader. In an entry in his diary for October 20, 1895, Herzl wrote, “I shall be the Parnell of the Jews.”27 It is astonishing how these words became a self-fulfilling prophecy. Herzl, like Parnell, Ireland’s uncrowned king, was called the King of Israel by numerous Jews.28 Parnell was admired as a Moses who led his people to the promised land of self-government, and Herzl fulfilled the yearnings of many of his people for a redeeming leader. Among Eastern European Jews belief spread that he was the people’s messiah.29 They both died prematurely, and took their places in their respective national pantheons.30 However, it was militant Irish nationalism that served as the principal inspiration for the activist Zionist sector. The testimony of Robert Briscoe – a scion of

Introduction 7 a traditional Dublin Jewish family and a revisionist Zionist, an intimate friend of de Valera who shared his views ever since they joined in the Irish struggle against the British and the civil war – illuminates this. As related by Briscoe, Ze’ev Vladimir Jabotinsky, leader of the Revisionist Zionist Movement and founder of the New Zionist Organization (NZO) in 1935 as a right wing alternative to the “official” Zionist movement, sought to use Briscoe’s IRA experience to inquire into the Irish revolt model, as part of an examination of the feasibility of a military uprising against British Mandatory rule in Palestine that was conducted in the late 1930s in his movement, as well as in IZL and Betar circles.31 The armed struggle of the IZL and Lehi,32 two militant organizations that sprung from revisionist Zionism, against the British administration in Palestine at the end of the British mandate, is a notable illustration of the moral and practical effect the Irish experience had on revisionist Zionism. IZL and Lehi, being smaller organizations, viewed Irish radical republicanism as a model war for freedom. They drew moral sustenance from the victory of the small rebellious Irish faction that succeeded in uniting so many Irish people around the rebellion, for their belief that the few should not be deterred from persisting in the fight for national independence.33 The executed leaders of the Easter Rebellion became a paradigm for Avshalom Haviv, an executed IZL member (July 29, 1947): no power in the world can ever prevail over a man willing to give his life for freedom.34 Yitzhak Shamir, member of the Lehi leadership triumvirate (and later prime minister of Israel) chose “Michael” (for Michael Collins, IRA head of organization and intelligence in the Anglo-Irish war) for his underground nom de guerre. But the lessons learned by the IZL from the IRA rebellion were to be applied on the operative level as well. Thus, for example, Menachem Begin, the IZL commander (1943–8), and later prime minister of Israel, also sought to learn from the IRA rebellion when he proclaimed in February 1944 an armed rebellion against the British Mandate. Begin believed that the yishuv, which at the time numbered some 600,000 souls, would not be able to successfully engage in conventional warfare against the British army. He therefore opted for irregular warfare and a war of attrition employing Collins’ urban guerilla methods to disrupt public order and weaken the functioning of the Mandatory government.35 It is illustrative to note that the events of the IZL rebellion also created a sort of feedback reaction in Ireland. Thus the execution of IZL member Dov Gruner on April 16, 1947 became analogous in the mind of many Irish with the November 1, 1920 hanging of Kevin Barry, the first IRA man to be executed in the Anglo-Irish war. Both young men in the flower of youth were both sentenced to death after having been captured in an armed raid on British forces. Gruner’s tragic end produced a mixed reaction in certain Irish circles, running the gamut from empathy and participation in mourning by nationalists of radical orientation,36 through a negative-rational approach which leaned toward balance as presented by the liberal newspaper, The Irish Times.37 Finally, the contribution of personal factors to Irish-Zionist-Israeli affinity is worthy of note. Even though as already mentioned, the role of the Jewish

8

Introduction

community in this context was minor, one cannot ignore the prominent and high-ranking Jewish personages who were connected in some way to Ireland. Some were part of the community’s leadership and were active in drawing Ireland closer to Zionism and the State of Israel, among these Rabbi Herzog, who had close ties with de Valera; his Dublin-born son Jacob, a senior diplomat in the Israeli Foreign service who served, inter alia, as counselor on religious matters and specifically relations with the Catholic church, as well as a special advisor for Jerusalem affairs (1948–57); Robert Briscoe, an active member of the Jewish community, who climbed to the summit of Catholic Irish society and served as the only Jewish member of the Dáil (as of 1927) and mayor of Dublin (1956–7, 1961–2); Dr Leo Cohen, political advisor in the Israeli Foreign Office, as well as Max Nurock, born in Dublin,38 also a diplomat in the Israel Foreign Office. Cohen, who specialized in constitutional and international law (and since 1953 held a chair in the Department of International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem), lived in Dublin in the early 1930s, where he researched the constitution of the Irish Free State, and established himself in the Irish political and legal elite.39 Each in his way strived to tear down the barriers that separated Ireland from Zionist and Israeli causes by calling on the personal friendships that they formed with the top political and social echelons of Ireland. It is symbolic that Cohen, who studied the constitution of the Irish Free State, wrote an early draft for a constitution for the State of Israel (never adopted for reasons beyond the scope of this book). While the subject matter covered in this book has never been thoroughly and systematically explored. I must note Professor Dermot Keogh’s study of Rabbi Herzog’s efforts to enlist the help of Ireland to save Europe’s Jews, one of the issues discussed in his important book Jews in Twentieth-Century Ireland: Refugees, anti-Semitism, and the Holocaust. When dealing with Rabbi Herzog’s rescue efforts, I largely based my work on Keogh, although I also used documents taken from Israeli archives and other sources. I would also mention Paula Wylie’s article, which focuses on the issue of Ireland’s de facto recognition of Israel, based on documents from the Irish National Archives.40 My book, however, deals with Irish-Israeli relations from 1948 to 1964 – with the issue of recognition at their core – and is based on documents from additional archives in Ireland and Israel. Several issues dealt with here relate to events crucial to the Jewish people and the Zionist movement. Some shed light on various aspects of foreign and even internal affairs issues shared by both Ireland and Israel. Others touch upon extremely important problems in the international arena and issues with universal implications, such as the Israeli-Arab conflict, the proposed corpus separatum for Jerusalem, the Cold War and reforms in the Catholic Church, among others. Such issues raise fascinating questions – some of far broader significance and extending beyond the scope of this book. Seen against the background of the equation of the Catholic-Protestant conflict in Ireland and the Jewish-Arab conflict in Palestine, this study confronts the differences between the Irish position and that of the Zionist movement in respect

Introduction 9 to the partition of Palestine in the years 1937–47. It also touches upon the question of whether the Irish viewed the Jews or the Arabs to be analogous to the Catholic Irish. This question is also raised in connection with the problem of the Palestinian refugees. A complex dilemma arises from this issue beyond its Irish context and continues to reverberate in the world public discourse on the IsraeliPalestinian conflict: the Zionist narrative stressing the justice of the rightful reestablishment of the Jewish people in their land, and the Palestinian narrative that views Jewish sovereignty in the Middle East to be a foreign colonial element. In discussing Rabbi Herzog’s rescue efforts I examined the weight of the personal factor as manifested by his friendship with de Valera, juxtaposed with the prevalent anti-Semitic attitude in Irish government circles, which barred a safe haven for Jewish refugees in Ireland. An attempt is also made in the book to address questions regarding Ireland’s recognition of Israel: why was full de jure recognition delayed beyond all reasonable time? Why did Israel so persist in its efforts to win it? What role did the partition analogy play in the recognition issue? What was the effect and extent of Vatican’s animosity toward the State of Israel and its insistence on the corpus separatum in Jerusalem in this context, and what was the nature of the change that has taken place on this issue since the late 1950s? What part did the Irish isolationist tradition and the paucity of its foreign relations play in the context of Ireland’s refusal to advance full recognition of Israel? What effect did Ireland’s joining the United Nations have on its relations with Israel, and to what extent did the Arab factor affect the Irish position on this issue? How was the Jewish community in Ireland affected by this state of affairs between Ireland and Israel? The work before us attempts to provide answers to these questions. Due to the absence of many items in this historical puzzle some answers cannot be verified and will remain assumptions only.

Part I

Ireland and Zionism 1937–47

1

From partition to partition

In mid-May 1937, two months before the official publication of the Peel report, when rumors were already afoot that partition of Palestine was imminent, an editorial in the Irish Independent, a large-circulation Catholic newspaper, stated somewhat cynically: “Partition has not been such a success in Ireland as to form a favorable precedent for trying it elsewhere.”1 Ten years later, on November 29, 1947, the UN General Assembly adopted yet another plan for the partition of Palestine. Although this scheme differed in some details from the Peel plan, it retained the same concept of dividing the land into two states. As in 1937, the Irish Independent once again dedicated an editorial to the subject, echoing the same idea as it had the last time: “No nation has better reason than our own to realize the evil effects that flow from the partition of a country.”2 As will be seen further, these two quotes epitomize the Irish attitude between 1937 and 1947 toward the concept of the partition of Palestine. Their attitude toward this plan clearly originated in the parallel that the Irish drew between the partition plan for Palestine and the partition of their own island. It is this analogy that makes the Irish stance on the Palestine problem important, notwithstanding Ireland’s geographic distance from the Middle East and apparent uninvolvement in the region’s affairs. An additional reason was Ireland’s affinity to the Holy Land, making its position on the issue even more significant. The Irish position is examined here in two separate time frames. First the Irish position is examined through the prism of the Peel Commission’s recommendations. The Peel Commission found that the British Mandate of Palestine could not be implemented because of the inherent contradiction between its commitments toward Jews on the one hand and toward Arabs on the other hand. Partition was the only solution for the serious conflict between these two sides, the Commission concluded. The Peel Commission demarcated the boundaries, including the Galilee, the Valley of Jezreel, most of the Beth-Shean Valley, and the coastal strip between the border with Lebanon in the north and Beer Tuvia in the south, in the Jewish State. The area designated for the Arab State spanned the central mountain range (Samaria and Judea), the southern part of the coastal plain, the Negev, and Transjordan. Jerusalem and its surroundings, where the holy places of the three monotheistic religions are concentrated, as well as a corridor of land

14 Ireland and Zionism: 1937–47 connecting the city to the seaside city of Jaffa, were to be governed under a new mandate to be designated by the League of Nations.3 When, toward the end of 1938, Britain withdrew its support for the Peel Commission’s partition plan, the concept of partition was set aside, only to be resurrected in the 1940s in Britain, in the international arena and in Zionist circles. Once Britain turned the problem over to the United Nations in April 1947, it seemed that the partition plan would be implemented. The UNSCOP was sent to the region to examine the situation from close up, and most of the members recommended partition as the best solution. On November 29, 1947, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution along these lines: terminating British Mandate in Palestine and dividing the territory into two separate states. The Jewish state was to incorporate the eastern Galilee, the northern part of the Jordan Valley, the Beit-Shean and Jezreel Valleys, the coastal strip from a point south of Acre to a point south of Rehovot, and most of the Negev. The city of Jerusalem and its environs was to be established as a corpus separatum, administered by a High Commissioner appointed by the United Nations. This commissioner would also be in charge of the holy places within the sovereign Jewish and Arab States. The remaining parts of the country, including the city of Jaffa, were to be included in the Arab State.4 The discussion of the Irish stance revolves mainly around the attitude of Eamon de Valera toward the Peel partition plan. De Valera clearly stated his opinion on this matter on September 23, 1937 in the Sixth Committee of the Assembly of the League of Nations, and reiterated his position on other occasions as well. Also examined here is the public sentiment in Ireland toward the Peel plan, as expressed in the Irish press. Keeping the analogy between Ireland and Palestine in mind, the views of de Valera and the Irish people on the issue of territorial partition, and those of the Zionist Movement in 1937, will be compared. Also examined will be the question whether in employing this analogy de Valera viewed the Jews or the Arabs to be the equivalent of the Irish Catholics, and a determination made of whether de Valera acknowledged the right of Jews to their historic homeland, or whether they were in his mind more like the Irish Protestants – colonists under a British protectorate, and a threat to the local Arab population. Finally, De Valera’s attitude toward Britain in the context of the proposed partition of Palestine will be addressed as well. Examination of the second time frame focuses on the Irish reaction – as reflected in the press – to the partition plan of Palestine proposed in the UN resolution of November 29, 1947, from the end of 1947 onward. As in 1937, the 1947 Irish response to the UN partition plan for Palestine, was deeply rooted in the analogy to the partition of Ireland. However, a slight change has taken place in Irish public opinion in the 10 years between 1937 and 1947, a change that will be evaluated and two comparisons made: between the Irish stance on the Peel plan and on the UN partition plan, and between the Irish stance on the UN partition plan and that of the Jewish and Zionist establishment on that same issue.

From partition to partition 15

Discussion of the Peel Commission partition plan at the League of Nations In 1937, the partition plan proposed by the Peel Commission was brought by the British cabinet before the organs of the League of Nations, namely, the Permanent Mandates Commission, the Council of the League of Nations, the Assembly and the Sixth Committee, which were charged with supervising Britain’s implementation of the Palestine Mandate. In order to get these institutions to agree to the partition plan in principle, the British cabinet asked that a new, technical commission be appointed to further explore the concept of partitioning the territory and prepare a detailed plan. However, any such plan would have to be approved by the organs of the League of Nations.5 While this move ostensibly highlighted the power of the League of Nations at the time, it appears incongruent with the League of Nations’ ineffectual efforts to contain the mounting global violence in the 1930s. Nevertheless, the League of Nations was not considered completely impotent at the time, with many believing that it was better to have a weak League of Nations than none at all. Although the discussions and resolutions of the Assembly and the Sixth Committee were merely academic, while only those of the Council were legally binding, the former were not completely without importance. Their main value was in their ethical force and their indirect influence on public opinion and the political process. The League’s delegates, some highly influential in their own countries, would debate these issues for hours, bringing home the views they were exposed to, helping form public opinion and influencing the positions of their governments.

De Valera leads the Irish delegation to the League of Nations General Assembly – fall, 1937 After the Irish Free State was admitted to membership in the League of Nations in 1923, its leaders viewed Geneva as an important venue in which to reinforce their country’s status in the international arena. De Valera himself, who was also Minister of External Affairs, never concealed his belief that his country should assume a key role in the community of nations. As the Irish delegation gradually acquired the distinguished position of speaker for the smaller countries, de Valera also gained a reputation as a capable and charismatic statesman. He was one of the most enthusiastic supporters of the ideals represented by the League of Nations, and promulgated the freedom and sovereignty of smaller countries. He had already served in the prestigious roles of chairman of the League of Nations Council in 1932 and chairman of the Sixth Committee in 1935.6 Thus it is clear why de Valera insisted on personally leading his country’s delegation to the League of Nations Eighteenth General Assembly in the fall of 1937, in the face of reservations expressed by his country’s permanent delegation accredited to the League of Nations. The permanent delegation felt that there was no point in sending such a high-ranking statesman, for since the Assembly had

16 Ireland and Zionism: 1937–47 fallen from grace in 1935, serious political issues were now being decided elsewhere.7 But de Valera, who probably felt very much at home in the international arena and was not in the habit of accepting advice on foreign affairs,8 did not relinquish his stand. Furthermore, the fact that foreign ministers of other countries were planning to attend, surely contributed to his decision. But perhaps it was also the assumption that Palestine would rank high on the Assembly’s agenda9 that prompted de Valera to head his country’s delegation. Support for this view can be found in the autobiography of his close friend Robert Briscoe, who wrote that de Valera had exhibited unusual interest in the Palestine problem ever since he served as President of the Council of the League of Nations. He even sent Joseph Walshe, secretary of the Department of External Affairs and his confidant,10 on a personal mission to the Arab countries and Palestine to closely study the problem.11 Briscoe wrote little about this mission and its timeframe, but another source – Aengus Nolan’s doctoral thesis on Walshe – provides additional details, albeit in a slightly different version. According to Nolan, Walshe set out with a friend on a journey of several months (ending June 1938) to Egypt and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Nolan’s version (based on Walshe’s letters to de Valera in May–June 1948 from Cairo and Khartoum) is unclear on whether Palestine was one of his destinations. Nonetheless his version indisputably shows that Walshe did not visit Palestine. On his visit to Egypt he discussed the Jewish-Arab conflict with several officials. In one of his conversations Walshe said that he had set out on his journey with the support of de Valera who was expecting a report. According to Walshe, de Valera recognized the importance of Egypt and the Middle East as one of the most sensitive regions in the world and the imbroglio of the Jewish-Arab conflict. It is of interest that officials of the Irish Ministry of External Affairs held firm to the Briscoe version that Walshe visited Palestine,12 possibly because from the outset the trip was also intended to examine the conflict in Palestine from close up. Returning to the Irish delegation in Geneva, in addition to de Valera, the delegation included the Irish permanent delegate to the League of Nations, Frank T. Cremins, the legal advisor of the Department of External Affairs, John J. Hearne and the head of the League of Nations section at the Department of External Affairs, Dr Michael Rynne.13 At the Eighteenth Assembly de Valera could not chair the Sixth Committee again, as the same person could not act as chairman twice, and served as a committee member. He was also elected one of the eight vice presidents of the Assembly, and as such was a member of the General Committee that supervised the session and the work of the Assembly.14

De Valera’s attempt to meet with the Jewish representatives During his sojourn in Geneva, de Valera tried to meet with Jewish and Arab representatives in order to gain a better understanding of the views of both parties. While the Arab side wielded much influence in Geneva through

From partition to partition 17 representatives of the Arab states (Iraq became a member in October 1932 and Egypt in May 1937) and through Islamic and Asian countries affiliated with the Arab world (e.g. Afghanistan, India, Persia, and Turkey), the Jews and the Zionist Movement had no official representation. However, from the earliest days of the League of Nations, Jewish and Zionist organizations had permanent representatives to the League of Nations, who followed developments concerning the Jewish people and the Palestine issue. The persecution of Jews in Germany, the violation of the rights to which Jews were entitled under the minority protection treaties in Eastern Europe, and the obstacles in implementing the British Mandate for Palestine, made the need for such representation even greater. It is not surprising then, that when the partition of Palestine was placed on the agenda of the League of Nations, Zionist leaders, including the President of the Zionist Movement Chaim Weizmann, Chairman of the Executive of the Jewish Agency David Ben-Gurion and the secretary of the Jewish Agency’s political department Moshe Shertok (subsequently Hebraized to Moshe Sharett), rushed to Geneva. They joined the permanent representatives of the Jewish and Zionist movements in Geneva, primarily Nahum Goldmann, Chairman of the World Jewish Congress and the Jewish Agency’s representative at the League of Nations. De Valera met with the Arabs, but a scheduled meeting with the Jewish side never took place. The Zionist representative (whose identity could not be discerned from existing documentation) simply did not show up at the designated time.15 Goldmann met with members of the Irish delegation, but available documentation provides little information on this meeting and does not specify the participants or the exact date on which it took place.16 The indifference – even disrespect – shown by the Zionist representative in missing the meeting with de Valera may have stemmed from a belief that Ireland was a small country with little influence. It may also be that since Goldmann had already explained the Zionist position to the Irish delegates, the Zionist representatives felt that a personal meeting with de Valera was not of much importance. After all, Ireland was not a member of the Council of the League of Nations at the time, and the Sixth Committee – in which it was represented – did not have the same authority as the Council. Moreover, once the Council finished drafting its resolutions on September 16, even before the sessions of the Sixth Committee were due to begin (on September 21), the discussions of this Committee became less relevant – and thus its members as well. Whatever the reason for the Zionist representative’s behavior, it was certainly a mistake not to show up for the meeting; de Valera was not only President of the Executive Council of the Irish Free State, but also a highly admired figure in his country. Although the permanent Irish delegation included bright Irish diplomats, de Valera was, without any doubt, its shining light. Indeed, following the discussions in the Sixth Committee, including de Valera’s address, the Zionist side quickly came to its senses and realized the importance of forging personal ties with this leader before the partition resolution was to be voted upon.

18 Ireland and Zionism: 1937–47

De Valera’s address at the Sixth Committee From the Zionists’ point of view, the speakers at the Sixth Committee could be divided into three groups.17 The pro-Zionist group included the delegates of Norway, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, the countries of the Little Entente (Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia), Mexico, and Uruguay. These countries unequivocally sided with the official Zionist position (some of these not because they supported the Zionist cause but rather because they wanted to be rid of their Jewish populations). The delegates of these countries argued that the Palestine Mandate was not unfeasible, as was declared by the Peel Commission. Although the delegates accepted the Peel partition plan in principle, they demanded that it be revised so as to make the Jewish State more viable, both strategically and economically.18 The pro-Arab group, which included delegates from Egypt, Iran, and Iraq (the Turkish delegate did not participate in the discussion), voiced the traditional Arab arguments against the Balfour Declaration, against Jewish immigration to Palestine and against any partition of the land. An intermediate group, comprised of delegates from France, Ireland, Albania, and Haiti, objected to the official Zionist position but did not adopt a pro-Arab line. De Valera’s address to the Committee reflected the views of this group, and related to several other matters as well.19 De Valera’s attitude toward the partition of Palestine seems to have been rooted in events, experiences, and intense emotions that became an integral part of Irish politics after the island was partitioned. De Valera apparently projected these strong emotions onto the Palestinian conflict. Indeed, in his address to the Sixth Committee, de Valera could not have been more opposed to any partition of Palestine, on the grounds that territorial division was the cruelest injustice that could be inflicted on a nation; the very idea of partition was to de Valera like a red rag to a bull. Summing up de Valera’s address, Goldmann speculated that “His real motive was obviously the bitter feeling of Ireland against the Irish partition.”20 By protesting the proposed partitioning of Palestine, de Valera was condemning Britain not only for a possible future wrong, but also – and mainly – for the wrong that it had already committed in partitioning Ireland. De Valera accused several of the other speakers at the Sixth Committee of being two-faced. On one hand, he said, they asked the Committee to give its blessing to a partition-based solution, while on the other, they maintained that the Committee was free to make any decision and that it was not committed to a solution that would necessarily involve territorial partition. De Valera made it clear that he believed that Committee members should keep an open mind in their quest for a solution. The concept of partition need not govern the discussions, as it would mean prima facie endorsement of the division of Palestine. To substantiate his argument that partition was unlikely to resolve the problem, de Valera described how the three parties involved felt about the concept of partition: the Christian world was concerned with the holy places only, while neither the Jews nor the Arabs had embraced the Peel partition plan.

From partition to partition 19

The Catholic world and the partition plan It was no coincidence that the Catholic de Valera, spokesman for a predominantly Catholic Ireland,21 was concerned primarily with the Christian world and placed it first on the list of interested parties in the Palestine problem. De Valera’s private archives contain segments of notes, suggesting they are dated September 21, 1937 (hereafter: the notes),22 expanding on issues he discussed in his address to the Sixth Committee. The author’s identity could not be ascertained, since this typewritten material bears no signature. However, it would not be unreasonable to assume that the notes were written by de Valera. Yet an even more reasonable scenario would be that they were prepared at his request by the Irish delegation to Geneva prior to his address at the Sixth Committee. Be that as it may, these notes shed more light on the atmosphere in his immediate surroundings in respect to Palestine. The notes stress the clear interest of the Christian world in the fate of the Holy Land despite the small number of Christians actually living there, mainly because of the Christian holy places and Christian missionaries living there. Also stressed is that the Holy See was opposed to any arrangement that would abandon Christian holy places to Arab or Jewish custody. The author further notes that the Holy See complained that the Peel Commission had failed to address the issue of the Christian holy places in Nazareth and by the Sea of Galilee. Yet the notes did not go into the details of the Vatican’s position, which can nonetheless be deduced from other documents in the Public Record Office in London, including a letter from the Vatican to the British government dated August 6, 1937. In carefully chosen words, the letter lays down the Vatican’s position on the partition plan proposed by the Peel Commission. It reflects the Vatican’s growing fears regarding the future of Christian life in the Holy Land, expressing, albeit cautiously, a principal objection from a Christian standpoint to the partition of the Holy Land. The letter probably echoes an instinctive objection held by many Christians, but focused mainly on stipulations pertaining to the Christian holy places and the Christian minority in Palestine: the Vatican was pleased with the Peel Commission’s proposal that the Jerusalem and Bethlehem enclave remain under a new mandate, but was extremely concerned that the other holy places would be governed by the future two states, neither of which would be Christian. The letter therefore demanded that Nazareth, the Sea of Galilee, and Mount Tabor, among the holiest sites in Christianity, would also be governed by a new mandate. Although the Peel Commission had determined from the outset that Nazareth and the Sea of Galilee would be part of the Jewish State, the Commission added a recommendation that the administration and safekeeping of these sites be assigned to a mandate similar to that proposed for the Jerusalem and Bethlehem enclave. Even though all of the Peel Commission’s recommendations were just that – recommendations, a distinction should be drawn between the unequivocal recommendation for a new mandate to govern the enclave of Jerusalem and Bethlehem, and that regarding a mandate for Nazareth and the Sea of Galilee, which was left to the discretion of the decision-makers.23

20 Ireland and Zionism: 1937–47 This vague recommendation on Nazareth and the Sea of Galilee seems to reflect a dilemma with which the Peel Commission had to wrestle. The Commission was aware of the need to treat the Christian holy places separately, but also acknowledged the fact that too many areas governed by a foreign mandate would detract from the territory of the Jewish State, small to begin with, and make it difficult for this enclave-studded country to maintain territorial contiguity. It may well be that the Peel Commission did not propose that the Mount Tabor site be also given to a new mandate as they were wary of the Jewish response if more land was wrested from their prospective country. The Vatican, on the other hand, demanded that this site be also incorporated in an enclave spanning Nazareth and the Sea of Galilee. The Vatican also expressed a keen interest in Christian communities of all denominations in Palestine. It was probably fear of the fate that would befall these communities under non-Christian rule and concern of their possible splintering and becoming a marginal minority within each of the two future states, that led the Vatican to demand in the letter that all the guarantees that the Peel Commission had recommended to impose on the new Jewish and Arab States for the protection of minorities be meticulously upheld.24 From a purely theological standpoint, the Vatican opposed the creation of a political Jewish entity anywhere in the world, and was doubly hostile to the idea of Jewish sovereignty in Jerusalem, since the destiny of the Jews was to prepare the coming of Jesus the Messiah. But with the coming of Jesus, the Christian Church replaced Israel as God’s chosen people and it became Verus Israel (the True Israel); therefore the Jews have no right to the Promised Land and should such a right exist, it has been transferred to the Church. Moreover, to many Catholics, Jews were a hardheaded people who denounced Jesus and had committed the crime of killing Christ. Because of their crime they were eternally damned and sentenced to exile and wandering until the end of days. Since living in exile was viewed as proof that the Jews were being punished for denouncing Jesus, the transfer of the Holy Land to Jewish hands was viewed by the Christian world to be a grave affront. From the inception of Zionism, the Holy See never tried to conceal its objection to the Jewish State. Its opposition toughened following the issue of the Balfour Declaration on November 2, 1917, and the occupation of Jerusalem about a month later. The Holy See reiterated its opposition during the Paris Peace Conference and the League of Nations discussions on the British Mandate in Palestine. Pragmatically, the Vatican was afraid that the Zionists, whose political aspirations – according to the Vatican – were offensive to Christian sentiment, would “de-Catholicize” the Holy Land. The immigration of Jewish pioneers to Palestine, perceived by the Vatican as motivated by Bolshevik and atheist ideology, heightened these concerns. Furthermore, since some of the Arabs living in Palestine were Christians, the Vatican endorsed most of the arguments presented by the Arab side in its anti-Zionist struggle.25 Surprisingly enough, neither the Vatican’s letter of August 1937 nor the notes found in de Valera’s archives contain any allusion to the Vatican’s objection to

From partition to partition 21 the concept of a Jewish State. The Vatican’s response to the partition plan revolved entirely on protection of the Holy See’s interests and care of its followers in the Holy Land. It is reasonable to assume that the Vatican’s reaction had to do with its relations with Britain as formulated under Pope Pius XI (1922–39). As a Christian superpower, Britain was considered by the Vatican to be one of the primary buffers against the spread of communism, including in the Middle East. This reinforced bond was probably one of the factors that toned down the Vatican’s stance on the issue of Palestine. Since the Vatican was aware of the support of the British Cabinet for the partition plan, the Holy See avoided a conflict with Britain and exercised restraint in connection with the concept of partition.26 De Valera was aware of the Vatican’s position and probably of its motives as well. Both the report to Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden by the British delegation to the Vatican and the Vatican’s letter itself, indicate that the Holy See expected de Valera, as the head of a Catholic state, to support Rome’s position in his address to the League of Nations. These reports stated that the Pope was at that time under great pressure from Catholic circles worldwide to induce the British government to protect the Christian holy places in Palestine. The Vatican viewed it to be its privilege and its duty to inform other Christian countries of its appeal to the British government and asked for their support, as both the letter and the report indicate.27 The relationship between de Valera and the Vatican regarding the 1937 constitution (largely de Valera’s work), is also important in this context. Even though the constitution recognized the special status of the Catholic Church in Ireland, it did not fully comply with the ideals of the Holy See, provoking objections by leading Catholic churchmen. De Valera, concerned for the confirmation of the constitution, used his representatives at the Vatican to prevent its intercession for the other side. Understanding that the constitution was an optimal compromise, the Vatican held back, its silence a vote in de Valera’s favor. The favor in which de Valera was eventually held by the Holy See developed gradually. When de Valera first came to power in 1932, the Church was suspicious of him, influenced by de Valera’s and his Fianna Fáil party’s revolutionary, radical image – to which the Irish bishops contributed no small amount. In fact, de Valera and other members of his cabinet were devout Catholics. Within just a few years, after they proved their loyalty in contributing to the success of the Thirty First Eucharistic Congress in Dublin in 1932 and visited Rome in 1933, their anticlerical stigma was removed. De Valera’s deeply religious and impressive speech at the Assembly of League of Nations in 1934,28 further strengthened his perception as a loyalist.29 In view of the above, De Valera did not feel obligated to do any more than the Pope had. In his speech before the Sixth Committee he backed the Holy See when he made reference to the Christian interest in the holy places, albeit in brief.

Arab and Jewish attitudes toward the partition plan As mentioned earlier, in his address de Valera also discussed the objections presented by Jews and Arabs to the concept of partition. His description of the Arab

22 Ireland and Zionism: 1937–47 stance as all-out rejection was accurate. However, de Valera’s portrayal of the Jewish position was guided by his own interpretation, which was influenced both by his personal negative feelings toward partition and by the ambiguous Jewish stance. The notes that were later found in his archives had undoubtedly influenced him. These notes described the dichotomy within the Jewish world and quoted the resolution adopted by the Twentieth Zionist Congress which convened in Zurich in August 1937 and focused on the partition plan. The resolution reflected both the majority opinion at the Congress that rejected the Peel Commission’s conclusions, but also the minority opinion that rejected the very idea of partition. The resolution, the notes explained, rejected the conclusion that the Mandate for Palestine could not be implemented, and the conclusion stemming from it that a new arrangement based on partition of the land had to be found. The minority opinion was described as a clear and unyielding rejection of the partition plan. Despite the great similarity between the draft resolutions of the majority and minority at the Zionist Congress on several issues, the core difference was that the minority rejected the very concept of partition, while the majority did not. However, since the territory demarcated for the Jewish State was deemed ideologically, strategically, and economically insufficient, the Congress empowered the Zionist leadership to negotiate with the British government to have the partition plan revised, so that an improved plan could be brought before the next Congress. The resolution adopted by the Twentieth Zionist Congress thus did not make a case for or against partition, but rather deferred the final decision to a later time.30 Naturally, debates ensued in the Zionist camp on the meaning of this ambiguous decision, each side interpreting it to match its own worldview. In the pro-partition camp, there were those who perceived the resolution as an agreement in principle to the concept of partition, with the negotiations clause designed only to obtain improved terms.31 On the other hand, those opposed to partition were concerned that the resolution might be construed as endorsing the partition of Palestine, since it did not unequivocally condemn it.32 There was also a third interpretation, according to which the resolution expressed neither support nor objection to the concept of partition.33 None of these interpretations viewed the resolution as rejecting the concept of partition prima facie. But to buttress his own position on the matter, de Valera said that the Jewish side rejected it completely. In his representation of the facts de Valera relied only on Article 7 of the resolution, which determined that the Peel Plan was unfeasible, but disregarded other articles (8, 9) in which the Zionist leadership was instructed to conduct negotiations based on territorial partition as a working assumption.

Lashing out against Britain In his address, de Valera emphasized that partition would not lead to reconciliation – it would only further confuse an already complex problem. Lashing out against Britain, he argued that since conflicting promises had been given to the rival

From partition to partition 23 parties in Palestine, Britain should at least avoid a cynical and phony attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable parties based on the same old promises. De Valera’s address, which was balanced in respect to Jews and Arabs, was in essence anti-British. He attacked the partition plan and the Mandate for Palestine, but suggested no constructive alternative. It seemed as though the audience he was really targeting was the British, or even the Irish, population. De Valera’s approach to the partition of Ireland throughout his political career was as complex as the historical-political reality itself, and could not always be characterized as hard-line dogmatism. De Valera was a versatile thinker, both doctrinaire and pragmatic. He was an orator who in sentimental style ignored Ulster’s insistence on maintaining a separate identity. At the same time de Valera was also a realist. He was ready to admit the complexity of the issue, understanding that the ideal of a united, republican Ireland could not be achieved by using force and coercion at the price of losing the sympathy of the world. De Valera expressed much of his dogmatic approach, but when faced with crucial decisions – particularly in his role as prime minister – his pragmatism invariably took over.34 In February 1921, in response to The Government of Ireland Act, de Valera put forward his own plan, in which Ireland would be parceled into autonomous administrative units that together would be joined in a confederacy. De Valera envisioned the Swiss model when suggesting that a federal parliament should be established, whose jurisdiction would be limited to general Irish issues. The proposed parliament would have two chambers: a national council elected by the general population, and a council of counties composed of two deputies from each county (much like the Swiss Nationalrat and Ständerat respectively).35 Although de Valera spoke of a confederacy, his model was actually federal.36 Every now and again during his years in politics, de Valera resurrected the solution of a federation with Ulster retaining local autonomy, as the most generous compromise he was willing to make.37 After the civil war, he focused even more on the issue of partition and decried the injustice inherent in this plan. Yet when he took power in 1932, in line with the policies he laid down when founding the Fianna Fáil, he set the issue of partition aside for a while in favor of other more pressing matters, aiming to gradually eliminate the links connecting the British Crown with the Irish Free State.38 But in informal talks with British ministers, he continued trying to advance his perspective on reversing the partition of the island. Having ensured ratification of the constitution in 1937, the territorial integrity of the island became the key element of his policy wherever relations with England were concerned. Indeed, after the signing of the Anglo-Irish agreement of April 1938,39 de Valera announced that partition remained the only stumbling block in his relations with Britain. However, since he believed that the British government would not act to cancel the partition due to the lack of public support, de Valera set out to whip up the necessary public support, by means of an information and propaganda campaign (in the press and on the radio), directed at the British public and the Irish diaspora, particularly in the United States and at the Unionists in Northern Ireland. In 1938, against the backdrop of the likelihood of outbreak of war, de Valera even

24

Ireland and Zionism: 1937–47

spoke in public of a possible alliance between Ireland and Britain in order to cooperate in repelling an enemy attack, in return for agreement to end the partition, for if not, Irish public opinion will not permit this. In the propaganda campaign, which was cut short by the war, the Taoiseach ruled out any forced solution, not because of pacifism but rather because he believed that such a solution had a very slim chance of success.40 Ostensibly, then, de Valera’s address to the Sixth Committee was of no surprise to the British. But in fact the British were stunned and enraged by several fallacies they claimed it contained, and mostly by the force and timing of the attack. The British Foreign Office was infuriated. On October 4, Malcolm MacDonald (Dominions Secretary in Neville Chamberlain’s government, May 1937–May 1940) met with de Valera and conveyed to him the reaction of Britain’s ruling circles. Evidence of their exchange can be found in MacDonald’s letter to the cabinet dated October 14.41 MacDonald reported that he had told de Valera how regretful his address was, and warned him not to repeat his misrepresentation of the truth as if all parties to the Palestine conflict were opposed to the concept of partition. MacDonald maintained that many Zionist leaders were staunch supporters of the concept, although they demanded that the Peel plan be revised. For obvious reasons, MacDonald explained, they did not go so far as to openly advocate partition, but did manage to consolidate a majority at the Zionist Congress that authorized the Zionist Executive to conduct negotiations for a better partition plan. De Valera responded that he could only repeat what he himself had heard, and could not be expected to know what Jewish leaders said behind closed doors. To the best of his knowledge, he said, the vast majority of Zionist delegates opposed partition. This description was inaccurate, because, as noted above, no one in the Zionist camp considered the resolution of the Zionist Congress to be the all-out rejection of partition as was held by de Valera. MacDonald was angry that de Valera represented the Christian side as objecting to the concept of partition, for he himself felt that many Christians would welcome mandatory control over the Christian holy places. MacDonald also did not conceal his disapproval of de Valera’s ferocious attack and of the fact that he had never given British statesmen any clue of his intention to charge Britain in such a way. He believed that de Valera should have discussed the issue of Palestine with the British delegates in Geneva before addressing the Sixth Committee. Ostensibly, MacDonald’s criticism seems unwarranted in light of de Valera’s reputation as a leader who furthered his country’s independence and upheld the independent policies of the Irish Free State in the League of Nations.42 But MacDonald’s response can be explained as his personal disappointment and frustration. Until 1935 the British Cabinet perceived de Valera as a dangerous eccentric with poor people-skills whose logic was hard to follow.43 When in November 1935 MacDonald was appointed Secretary for Dominion Affairs (in Stanley Baldwin’s government – June 1935–May 1937), this sentiment changed. The British became more open to settling their differences with de Valera and basing their relations with him on common sense rather than on emotion. As part of this process, relations between the British and Irish delegates in Geneva also

From partition to partition 25 improved.44 MacDonald can be credited for much of this shift; an unyielding optimist, he never stopped believing that good relations with de Valera were an important goal. MacDonald was supported by one of the most senior members in Baldwin’s Cabinet – Chancellor of the Exchequer, N. Chamberlain (who would become Prime Minister from May 1937 to May 1940).45 Although MacDonald understood why de Valera was so emotional on the partition issue, he was nevertheless disappointed at having worked so hard in vain. De Valera’s attack came precisely when sincere efforts to reconcile the differences between Britain and Ireland (the land annuity)46 were underway. Explaining his move to MacDonald, de Valera maintained that he was stunned when Walter Elliot, one of the British delegates to the Sixth Committee, said that Britain was committed to the partition concept and asked the Committee to allow Britain to pursue this avenue. De Valera had expected Elliot to leave an opening for other solutions as well. It was not his original plan to address the Palestine issue, de Valera said, but he felt compelled to do so after what Elliot had said. Had he kept silent, he would have shared the blame for a policy that he strongly opposed. MacDonald would not accept this explanation. He apparently thought de Valera was just making excuses. MacDonald argued – and with good reason – that what Elliot said should have come as no surprise, since immediately after the Peel Commission had submitted its report, the British government issued a White Paper endorsing the plan. Colonial Secretary William Ormsby-Gore, had further stated in Parliament that the concept of partition was the one preferred by the British government. Parliament authorized Ormsby-Gore to repeat this message to the League of Nations’ Permanent Mandates Committee. Parliament further instructed him to add that Britain was willing to consider alternative solutions, provided that the parties concerned agreed to that.47 The Council of the League of Nations had also been informed by Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden that the partition policy would be pursued.48 Elliot was thus merely reiterating his country’s announced policy, and had said nothing that should have surprised de Valera. To this de Valera replied that even though he was involved in the work of the League of Nations and had attended all the meetings,49 he was not aware of these developments. MacDonald then added that if the parties agreed to another solution, Britain would be certain to entertain it, but that practically speaking there was not much chance of this happening, thereby playing into de Valera’s hands. MacDonald rebuked de Valera for making the British government feel as if his address was designed to manipulate Britain’s difficulties to score political gains for his own country, in line with the long-standing Irish motto: “England’s difficulty is Ireland’s opportunity.” In his defense, de Valera said that his address was in no way influenced by any such political policy. On the contrary, his highest hope was that Ireland and Britain would work together in the international arena, he said.50

Irish public opinion and the partition of Palestine In his opposition to partition, de Valera moved in tandem with Irish public opinion, as reflected in the coverage that the Irish press gave to the Peel plan and

26 Ireland and Zionism: 1937–47 de Valera’s address to the Sixth Committee. The papers showed interest in the subject, and some were quite familiar with the details. An overwhelming majority of the columnists condemned any partition of Palestine. This negative approach to the prospect of partition was based primarily on their own painful and complicated experience. It is therefore not surprising that on July 8, the day after the Peel report was published, the headline in The Irish Press, the mouthpiece of de Valera’s party, was “Holy Land Partition” – a headline that carried enormous emotional and religious weight for Irish readers. Two months before the Peel report was published, an editorial in the Irish Independent, a mainstream newspaper, the voice of the moderately nationalist Catholic middle class, expressed disapproval of a partition solution. The editorial described the partition proposal as crude and declared that it would invite bloodshed. “In Palestine as in Ireland there is no clean-cut division of the country between the two sections of the people. Partition would simply leave a Jewish minority in the part given to the Arabs and an Arab minority in Jewish Palestine,”51 the editorial read. After the report was published, the paper once again drew a comparison with the Irish predicament, and was even more unequivocal in denouncing partition, which – the paper explained – would satisfy neither side. Partition is typically a solution the British favored whenever they found themselves in a dead-end political entanglement. Partition shows how shallow their understanding is of the complex problems with which they are faced.52 An editorial along the same lines was published in the radical Catholic monthly, The Cross, which was directed toward a narrower audience consisting mainly of priests and other clergy.53 A year earlier The Cross had already compared the strikes, bombing attacks, and ambushes of convoys during the riots in Palestine with those in the troubled times of 1920–1 in Ireland. The root of the conflict is the antagonism between Jews and Arabs, The Cross explained, but stressed that one of the major causes of unrest was the belligerence between the British army and the Arabs, much like in the war of the “Black and Tans” in the Irish case. Even though The Cross published anti-Jewish propaganda in accepting the Arab interpretation of the promise made by Sir Henry McMahon (High Commissioner in Egypt) in October 1915 to Sharif Hussein of Mecca to establish an Arab State in Palestine, The Cross placed more blame on the British than on the Jews for the Arab distress. It was Britain that went back on MacMahon’s promise when it gave the Jews the Balfour Declaration. Based on this declaration the Jews started immigrating to Palestine en masse, to the extent that the Arabs felt they might be expelled from the land on which they had been living for centuries.54 The empathy that The Cross expressed toward the Arabs may be explained as a projection of sentiments as well as subjective understanding of the intricate relations between the communities in Ireland onto the conflict in Palestine. The Cross perceived the Arabs to be the native inhabitants of the land, who were being threatened by an injurious and unjust intrusion of Jews, who had immigrated under the auspices of the Balfour Declaration and were trying to strike root in the Arab homeland. Similarities can easily be found between this analysis and that of the Catholics in Ireland, who also viewed themselves as a native population

From partition to partition 27 whose rights were being violated by a minority of Protestant colonists who had settled in Ireland under British protection. A pro-Arab anti-British approach based on an analogy to the Irish situation once again became evident in the Irish press toward the end of the Arab Revolt in Palestine. In an editorial in the Irish Independent on January 10, 1939, Britain was accused of having forgotten nothing and learned nothing, and of oppressing the Arabs with the same methods used by the “Black and Tans.”55 The Irish press also responded in detail to the partition plan itself. The Irish Independent explained that the Jews were frustrated by the Lilliputian territory they were being offered because it only spanned the historical territory of four of the twelve tribes of Israel. This may have been an attempt to portray the tribebased partition of Palestine as an equivalent of the county-based partition of Ireland. But the paper also mentioned the Arabs’ dissatisfaction with the proposition that parts of their land would be taken away. Openly siding with the Arabs, the author argued that the area earmarked for the Jews was small but extremely fertile and included half of the shoreline, while the Arabs were promised the undeveloped mountain range.56 Elaborating on the Jews’ indignation, The Irish Press explained that to the Jews, such a small piece of land meant Zionism without Zion, and that they were upset because it would be impossible to settle all the Jewish refugees fleeing Europe in such a small area. In order not to be one-sided, the paper also noted the Arab outrage for having been left with only the barren mountain region.57 Alongside its opposition to the concept of partition, the Irish papers repeatedly accused Britain of being responsible for the tragic imbroglio in Palestine. It was the conflicting promises that Britain had made to both sides that led to this deadend situation, the papers said. Explaining the historical background of these promises, The Irish Press depicted Britain as the true villain, while the parties to the conflict themselves were both just in their claims. In simplistic terms typical of journalistic writing, and perhaps also influenced by the propaganda claiming that Jews were omnipotent (mainly thanks to wealth), the paper chose to focus on the less important motivations that had led Britain to issue the Balfour Declaration, such as requiting the financial help that American Jews had lent to the war effort. The Irish Press further explained that the resettlement of Jews in the Land of Israel would have been a long and slow process had it not been for the German persecution of Jews, which accelerated the flow of immigrants to Palestine. These Jews spent vast amounts of money to buy land from the Arabs, which heightened Arab concerns that they would soon be governed by a Jewish majority.58 The plan to instate a mandate-governed enclave in the Holy Sites did not go unnoticed. Irish Journalists emphasized Britain’s strategic interest in maintaining a stronghold – under the guise of a mandate from the League of Nations – in such an important region of the world.59 The Standard, a popular weekly representing mainstream Catholic views, focused on a rather marginal issue of the partition concept, but one that was important to Christians: the fate of the German Templar (Tempelgesellschaft)

28

Ireland and Zionism: 1937–47

colonies in Palestine.60 The weekly described these settlements as an “Aryan island in a Jewish sea,” and explained that these Christian residents felt threatened by the prospect of being subordinated to the future Jewish State. The paper further pointed out that given the treatment of German Jews by the Nazis, the concerns of the Templar settlers for their future were quite understandable. The Jews would have to be saints to allow the Templars to live tranquilly in the Jewish State.61 Indeed, the 2,000 German Templar settlers in Palestine supported the Nazi regime and most sided with the Arabs. The persecution of German Jews stirred concerns of retribution among the Templars who under the Peel plan were to be governed by the Jewish State.62 The descriptions of the fate that would befall German Templar settlers in the Jewish State in terms that conjured up danger and threat may well indicate that this weekly did not lean toward the Jewish side. The Irish press also expressed support for de Valera’s speech at the Sixth Committee. In his own paper, the address was naturally given a front-page headline63 while taking a less central place in other publications, although the partition issue always remained on the agenda. The Irish Independent chose to describe the attack on the partition plan in Geneva mainly from a pan-Arab angle, quoting the speeches made by the Egyptian and Iraqi delegates before the General Assembly. The paper also quoted the address of Egyptian delegate Boutrous Ghali on September 18, in which he proposed an alternative that would guarantee Arab independence in Palestine, vouch for the rights of the Jewish residents and regulate future Jewish immigration, provided that the Arabs’ rights would not be infringed. The paper also described the Jewish side, which at first rejected the partition plan but had since reconsidered the issue, to an extent that some Jewish circles were even considering endorsing the plan. But even at that early stage, the Irish Independent discerned signs that Britain would withdraw from the principle of partition. The Palestine Partition Commission (a technical commission chaired by J. Woodhead) was appointed solely as an instrument to help shelve the Peel plan, the paper said.64 Similar questions regarding the real agenda of the Woodhead Commission were expressed by The Irish Times, a rather liberal paper reflecting the views of Anglo-Irish Protestants and liberal Catholics. On January 7, 1938, the paper published an article addressing a statement made by the British government on January 4, 1938, regarding the appointment and authority of the Woodhead Commission.65 The statement did not unequivocally clarify the British position on the issue of partition. Although the statement pronounced partition to be the best solution, it also indefinitely deferred the implementation of this plan. Its language was chosen in order to bridge between the Colonial Office, which wanted to promote partition and believed that the Woodhead Commission could come up with a feasible solution, and the Foreign Office, which leaned toward a pro-Arab solution and trusted that the Woodhead Commission would find partition to be impractical.66 The Irish Times expressed no regret that partition was unlikely to materialize. It too viewed the plan as appalling and desperate. Since it was rejected by the Arabs, and the Jews only accepted it for lack of a better alternative, it would inevitably cause complications similar to those that accompanied the partition of Ireland, the paper said.67 The Irish Catholic, a Catholic weekly

From partition to partition 29 more radical than The Standard and not as widely read, fully endorsed de Valera’s address to the League of Nations. In an editorial published on October 7, 1937, the paper stressed that the Holy Land could not be treated like any other country. It is the birthplace of Jesus, and Christians all around the world naturally took a close interest in what happened there. But the focus of the editorial was on the partition plan. The Irish Catholic accused Britain of once again selecting an unnatural, arbitrary solution, in complete disregard of previous historical lessons. The paper also commended de Valera for noting the integral injustice in any partition and for stressing the similarity with the unhappy Irish precedent and thus fiercely protesting the proposed partition. In order to illustrate the difficulty that would be involved in the partition of Palestine, the paper drew an imaginary Irish equivalent in which Ireland was divided by the Shannon River, and a small area around Dublin placed under a foreign mandate.68 Apparently, such a partition, rather than the actual division line through the northeastern corner of the island, seemed to the author more consistent with the Peel plan, which divided Palestine along parts of the coastal plane and left Jerusalem and its surroundings as a mandate at the core of the country. By and large, de Valera’s opposition to the partition plan was in line with Irish public opinion. But in contrast to de Valera’s address at the Sixth Committee, there were those in the Irish public who did not maintain a balanced attitude toward both sides, and sided unequivocally with the Arabs.

Origins of the disparity between the Irish and Zionist positions De Valera’s attitude as well as that of Irish public opinion toward the partition of Palestine was a reflection of how the Irish felt about the partition of their own country. Compared to such unanimity, the Zionist Movement was divided, with the majority supporting the concept in principle. These different attitudes toward territorial partition merit an explanation. The main reason seems to stem from demographics. Since the Peel Commission had based its partition plan on the distribution of Jewish settlements as a practical and fair basis for a solution, Jewish settlement in Palestine was concentrated in the area that the Peel plan had allocated to the Jewish State. However, the partition plan did not provide absolute ethnic homogeneity. Jerusalem, with a Jewish population of 70,000, was to be placed under a mandate. The area of the triangle spanning Lake Tiberias, the Yarmuk River, and the Jordan River, containing seven Jewish agricultural settlements (kibbutzim), was incorporated into the Arab State. At the same time, some 300,000 Arabs were to live in the area earmarked for the Jewish State.69 It is reasonable to assume that the Jewish proponents of the partition concept endorsed the idea because they looked at the positive side of creating a Jewish State, albeit divided, which would include most of the Jewish population living in the country. However, most felt that the new and largely Jewish West Jerusalem (unlike the Old City, also holy to other religions and with a relatively small Jewish

30 Ireland and Zionism: 1937–47 population) and the kibbutzim in the vicinity of Lake Tiberias and the Jordan River ought to be part of the Jewish State, and included in the Zionist demands for a revised plan.70 Irish demographics were different. The six northeastern counties of Ulster – Antrim, Armagh, Down, Tyrone, Londonderry, and Fermanagh – in which the majority of the population was Protestant, comprised the political entity of Northern Ireland, separate from the island’s other 26 counties; but in 1937 the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland comprised one-third of a population of one and a half million.71 Moreover, in Tyrone and Fermanagh and in the regions bordering the southern counties, the majority was Catholic. In fact, the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland was larger in absolute terms than the Protestant minority in the entire island.72 Since the Catholics comprised the majority in the island, they felt that the same guidelines that led Britain to recognize the Unionist Protestants’ right to secede from the other counties, should also justify their demands to unite Northern Ireland with the South. To the Catholics, any partition of Ireland made no sense whatsoever. The fact that the Irish were looking at the Peel plan through the prism of a sovereign state with defined borders, may also explain the difference between their attitude and that of the Zionists. To Jews, sovereignty was then only a yearning. They therefore viewed the Peel plan as an historic opportunity to establish a Jewish State that would provide their people with all the political, economic, social, and cultural advantages that sovereignty imparts (primarily opening the country to Jewish refugees and the possibility that the Arab world would recognize the Jewish entity). To the Zionists, these advantages were substantial enough to offset the unsatisfactory size and borders of the territory they were being offered. Being a sovereign people in their own country, the Irish were oblivious to this trade-off. Moreover, those on the Zionist side who supported partition believed that sovereignty was more important than possession of all the territory to which they felt they were entitled, especially since they estimated that the borders proposed by the Peel Commission were not fixed and final and could be changed through negotiations.73 In retrospect, another factor that may explain the difference between the Irish and Zionist positions seems to emerge. European Jewry was facing a crisis that may have generated a sense of urgency that swayed the Zionist side to support partition as the only solution that could provide immediate relief. Although the delegates at the Zionist Congress did have European Jewry in mind, they did not discuss this issue in depth. Rather, it was Palestine and the Zionist perspective that took center stage. The delegates were aware that the political, social, and financial rights of European Jews were being crushed. Yet while they realized that this was an ominous sign, they could in no way have envisioned the enormous and unprecedented scale of the genocide that would befall their brethren. Even where a sense of urgency could be read into the Congress transcripts, it was not a sense of urgency generated by fear of an imminent holocaust. Delegates were clearly thinking in terms of decades.74 It is thus doubtful that the distress of Europe’s Jews can be used to explain the difference between the Irish and Zionist positions on partition.

From partition to partition 31 Clearly, the difference also stemmed from the disparate meanings that the partition of Palestine carried for the Jews and for the Irish. For Jews it was a practical (at least until late 1937, when they began doubting whether Britain ever intended to actually implement it) and pivotal plan. For the Irish it was a remote theoretical scheme meaningful to them only because of the analogies that could be drawn to their own history. It is always easier to be dogmatic from afar, but pressing concrete problems call for concessions and flexibility.

The Zionist response to de Valera’s address The Zionist delegates in Geneva apparently believed in all sincerity that those who were not for them were of necessity against them. They were unhappy with de Valera’s address to the Sixth Committee, to say the least. In his diary, Shertok, who attended the meetings, used unflattering zoological metaphors to describe de Valera’s address: ungraceful appearance, his hawk-like looks . . . conjure up the image of a bird of prey. From his very first word, he dug his claws into Britain. A harsh attack on partition – without a single positive word in our favor. A very dangerous combination of opinions. He did not forget the Catholic claim to the holy places. It is evident that he detests Britain and that he sees any partition as an affront.75 De Valera’s address may not have been pro-Zionist, but neither was it as anti-Zionist as Shertok’s description implies. De Valera’s goal was to discredit the concept of partition and attack Britain. Shertok’s account was probably influenced by British sources. It bears striking resemblance to the derogatory and even repulsive depiction of de Valera as a dangerous, delusional eccentric in the British press, in Parliament, by the civil service and in several biographies.76 Shertok criticized not only what de Valera’s address contained but also what it did not, namely, something positive about the Jewish position. The impression made by the address may have caused the Zionist leadership to rethink their attitude toward the Irish leader; perhaps they thought that the absence of ties with de Valera was harming their cause. They may have also recalled de Valera’s welcome intervention in the case of the Franz Bernheim petition four years earlier, via Sean Lester, Ireland’s permanent delegate to the League of Nations. This petition, a manifestation of the Jewish struggle against Hitler shortly after he rose to power, subsequently became a symbol of the tragedy of the Jewish people. The petition, which was meant to be addressed by the Council of the League of Nations, was drafted by the Comité des Délégations Juives in Paris, and submitted to the Secretariat of the League of Nations on May 17, 1933. Bernheim was a Jew and former German citizen, who moved to Prague after having been dismissed from his office job in Upper Silesia because of Nazi anti-Semitic legislation. Bearing Bernheim’s signature, the petition was based on the assumption that his dismissal was a violation of the Geneva Convention governing Upper Silesia. The petition was designed to

32 Ireland and Zionism: 1937–47 prompt the international organization to condemn and try to put an end to the persecution of Jews in Germany and the infringement of their rights. Testimony of the Irish contribution to the petition can be found in the accounts of Nathan Feinberg,77 an expert in international law (later dean of the law school of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem), who at the time represented the Palestinian [Jewish] Friends of the League of Nations which was lobbying at the League of Nations and promoting the Bernheim petition on behalf of the Comité des Délégations Juives. Feinberg noted that the Committee had estimated from the outset that Lester, rapporteur for the Bernheim petition, would play an important and perhaps even a pivotal role. After rumors began to circulate in Geneva that the Reich was trying to influence de Valera to instruct Lester to moderate his response to the petition, the Committee mobilized Nahum Sokolov, who at the time was President of the World Zionist Organization. Sokolov was to convince de Valera to back Lester in his support of the petition. Feinberg’s comments on the matter end there, but Dermot Keogh’s book provides information about a meeting that took place between Sokolov and de Valera during that same month, May 1933. According to Keogh, and judging by Lester’s subsequent actions, it appears that de Valera did not let them down. The meeting at the government facilities in Dublin was also attended by Rabbi Herzog, Chief Rabbi of the Irish Free State (1921–37), and Robert Briscoe who had very close ties with de Valera. At this meeting, de Valera promised that the Irish Free State would support the cause of the Jewish settlement in Palestine at the League of Nations, and made a very good impression on Sokolov.78 Keogh’s version, based on a 1966 account by Ben Briscoe (who, like his father, later became a member of the Dáil), does not indicate that the meeting was in any way related to the Bernheim petition. However, the timing of the meeting, as well as Feinberg’s report, which is based on first-hand knowledge of the facts, leave no doubt as to such a link. Lester indeed took action immediately. Despite German pressure, he initiated a comprehensive public debate on the petition and on May 30 and June 6, 1933 the Reich was condemned for violating the rights of its Jewish citizens. This “victory” led the people behind the petition to commend Lester’s contribution, as relayed by Feinberg: And here, to our great delight, the Germans encountered a man with moral backbone and a courageous fighter for human liberty. He was not deterred by pressure and was unwilling to compromise . . . The fact that the Germans were unable to muzzle the petition and prevent a public debate . . . should be credited primarily to Mr. Lester, who exercised responsibility and exemplary courage.79 . . . During two weeks of tedious, nerve-racking negotiations he gallantly defended human dignity and demanded that human rights be honored.80 Although Lester led the victory, de Valera’s contribution must have been noted too, since Lester was implementing the policies outlined by de Valera. As mentioned,

From partition to partition 33 it is very likely that Zionist leaders, including Goldmann, remembered this, albeit belatedly, at the Assembly of the League of Nations in 1937. Goldmann was personally involved in the petition campaign in 1933 as the representative of the American Jewish Congress, which promulgated active protection of Jewish rights in the international arena and supported the activity of the Comité des Délégations Juives.81 The Zionist leadership’s renewed appreciation of de Valera after his speech may explain the efforts that various Jewish leaders invested in rallying de Valera’s support. In any case, the objective was to bring de Valera closer to the Zionist side before the partition issue was decided, as Zelig Brodetsky, a member of the Zionist Executive who met with de Valera in Dublin on December 20, 1937, wrote: In view of Mr. De Valera’s speech at the recent meeting of the Assembly of the League of Nations, and his further intervention when the final decision was taken, it was thought useful that he should be seen in order that the fundamental principles on which any solution of the Palestine Problem must depend, could be discussed with him.82 Rabbi Herzog, by then Chief Rabbi of Palestine, and Leo Cohen the Political Secretary of the Jewish Agency’s Political Department in Jerusalem, took an active role in attaining this goal. Both men took advantage of their personal acquaintance with de Valera to begin a correspondence with him in the fall of 1937.

Rabbi Herzog’s correspondence with de Valera Herzog was the first to make contact with de Valera. Having coordinated this move with the Zionist leadership in Palestine, he sent de Valera a letter on October 14. He explained that he was writing because the Palestine problem was expected to come up again at the League of Nations. He did not, however, express an opinion on the issue of partition, perhaps because he felt this would anger de Valera, or because Herzog himself was of two minds about it.83 Herzog tried to make de Valera see the validity of the Zionist argument. He noted that the Arab nation had vast lands at its disposal, while the Jewish people’s historic homeland, “the ancient, prophetic cradle land of Israel promised divinely to Israel through the Patriarchs and through Moses,” was very small. He also discussed the fateful connection between the tragedy of most of the Jewish Diaspora, and Palestine as the only safe haven for these people. Herzog described how desolate the country had been before Jewish settlement began and how it had changed unrecognizably since the Jews began to return to their homeland. He rejected the claim that the Jews were exploiting the Arabs, were pushing them out and stealing their land, and thus he wrote: the Arabs in charge of this country for several centuries have neglected it in the most miserable fashion. We have found Palestine to be malarial, pestiferous land, virtually a desert. We have brought civilization, sanitation, hygiene,

34 Ireland and Zionism: 1937–47 health, industry, cleanliness to the country, and have reclaimed large parts of it from the sloth and dirt and misery of centuries. We have benefited the Arabs. We have wronged no one. We have paid dearly for every inch of soil. In his arguments, among other things, Herzog suggested that the linking of Zionism and colonialism was totally baseless. However, Herzog’s primary purpose was to invalidate the analogy between Zionism and the British colonialism in Ireland. The initial linking of Zionism with colonialism was made by enemies of Zionism at the First Palestinian Congress that convened in Jerusalem at the beginning of 1919, if not before. Relevant to this matter are arguments set out by Israeli historian Yoav Gelber, refuting this linkage. Gelber holds that the colonial paradigm characteristic of European colonialism (in North America, South-East Asia, Australia, and South America) does not pass the test when compared with Zionism, due to a number of reasons: Unlike the colonial territories, Palestine was lacking in natural resources. Unlike the colonial occupation, Zionism until 1948 paid money for the land bought from the Palestinians and did not occupy them. Zionism was characterized by importing capital and ideology – two factors (except for religious missionary activity) absent from the colonial actions. The Jews, like colonial immigrants throughout the world who fled their misfortunes and sought a better future, also emigrated to Palestine due to distress and persecution. What made them unique was their separation from their countries of origin and cultures. They sought to revive their national heritage and ancient language in their historical homeland, as the basis for creating a new culture.84 Herzog also stressed that the Jews wished to achieve a harmonious existence with their neighbors. They were not, however, willing to give up their claim for free Jewish immigration and for self-determination, he wrote. Finally, Herzog played on de Valera’s emotions, lavishing praise on him: I desire to appeal to your natural, inborn sympathy for an unfortunate homeless, historic race. . . . I appeal to your historic sense, to your lofty idealism, to you as the great regenerator of the Irish race, whose history, as you once remarked to me, offers so many parallels with the history of Israel, to throw your weight of your influence and authority into the scales of the League of Nations in favor of the most unfortunate of races, of that homeless race, a wanderer for nearly two thousand years, in favor of that misunderstood and misrepresented race which has given so much in the spiritual and moral directions to the whole of civilized humanity – Christian and Moslems.85 It appears that Herzog was not merely paying lip service, but meant what he said. This is a self-evident conclusion in light of Herzog and de Valera’s deep friendship ever since he served as Dublin’s Rabbi and Chief Rabbi of the Irish Free State (1919–37).86 Herzog did not get a direct answer from de Valera, but the latter knew of, and most likely endorsed, the response that Herzog had received from Briscoe, de Valera’s confidante. As a fellow traveler on de Valera’s Republican path since the

From partition to partition 35 days of struggle against the British and the civil war, Briscoe worshipped de Valera almost as a god.87 Rabbi Herzog, who was a close friend of Briscoe’s, sent him a copy of his letter to de Valera in the hope that he would help sway the latter in the right direction. Apparently, being aware of the special relationship between de Valera and Briscoe, Rabbi Herzog was not offended by the indirect response, especially since he must have known that de Valera was busy at the time seeking the approval of the 1937 constitution. As much as Herzog tried to avoid the partition issue, he soon discovered that de Valera and Briscoe, who had discussed his letter, both agreed that partition was the heart of the matter. Briscoe asked Herzog to expand on this issue so that de Valera could be informed of his views.88 Briscoe, a multifaceted personality, was an Irish patriot who became an avid Zionist after the Nazis came to power in Germany. He was gradually captivated by the ideology of the Revisionist-Zionist movement and by Jabotinsky, its leader. Revisionist Zionism perfectly suited his inclinations, revolutionary record,89 and political views. Briscoe was against partition not only because of his Irish background, but also because of his affiliation with the Revisionist Movement and his admiration for Jabotinsky, who was one of the principal opponents of the Peel plan in the Zionist camp. In his letter, Briscoe laid down his views on the solution for the Palestine problem, views that may have received de Valera’s blessing. Briscoe wrote to Herzog that he was seriously considering traveling to Palestine in the end of 1937 in order to promote a solution that would not involve territorial partition. He had learned from non-Jewish sources that there were Arabs, Christians, and Muslims who were willing to accept the existence of a national Jewish entity in Palestine. Having had many conversations (with whom he did not say) he reached the conclusion that a federation of independent states – Iraq, Syria, Transjordan, and the Jewish homeland in Palestine – was a plan that both sides could accept; and that the issue of Jerusalem could be resolved if the parties agreed to joint guardianship by the three monotheistic religions.90 Briscoe’s writings on the subject were too brief for a thorough understanding of his plan, where it derived from, and whether it was influenced by de Valera’s confederative proposal. It stands to reason that de Valera, who in the past had proposed a federative solution for Ireland, would support a confederative solution for Palestine. Briscoe may have also been influenced by other proposals brought forth by Jews and non-Jews alike, which suggested confederative and federative solutions for the Jewish-Arab problem. Various plans of this kind had been in existence since Britain was first given the mandate for Palestine. The first to draft such a plan was Jabotinsky, with his 1922 two-tiered scheme that proposed a federation between Transjordan and Palestine, and later on, a regional cantonal confederacy, in which the land on both sides of the Jordan River would constitute a Jewish canton. In the early 1920s, Weizmann supported a plan for a Middle Eastern confederacy. In his meetings with various leaders, mainly Arabs, between 1934 and 1937, Ben-Gurion tried to promote a regional confederacy between the Arab States and the Jewish State.91

36 Ireland and Zionism: 1937–47 The timing of Briscoe’s letter to Herzog may indicate an entirely different source of inspiration. In the fall of 1937, talks were held between Arabs, Jews, and the British as a follow-up to earlier initiatives for a solution. Under all these initiatives, the Jews were to remain a minority forever. A proposed Palestinian federation of Jews and Arabs (to be governed by a British mandate for a limited period), as part of an Arab confederacy, was also discussed. Paradoxically, several Jewish leaders were willing to consider this alternative if only to avoid partition, which they felt was the worst option of all. Eventually, the talks reached a dead-end: the Jewish Agency would not lend its hand to an agreement that would leave the Jews forever a minority, while the Arab side did not support these talks to begin with.92 Briscoe may have been feeding on inaccurate rumors surrounding these talks, which were shrouded in secrecy because of the caution exercised by those Arabs who dared to participate.93 Since Briscoe was set on thwarting the partition of Palestine, his interpretation of these rumors was nothing more than wishful thinking. Briscoe’s proposal on Jerusalem is not very clear. Did he have the entire city in mind, with the object of answering Catholic concerns at the same time in line with de Valera’s philosophy, or was he referring only to the Old City – or only to the holy places within it, which would make his proposal more like that of Jabotinsky? At the time, Jabotinsky agreed that supervision of the holy places, including Jerusalem, should be regulated by agreements reached between representatives of the religions concerned.94 In his letter to Herzog, Briscoe said he was promised substantial support for the plan, and that if he received the proper backing, he would devote his time and money to make it materialize. Was he hinting that he had de Valera’s or Jabotinsky’s support? Neither Briscoe’s book nor any other source is available to substantiate this possibility. Moreover, Jabotinsky had abandoned the confederative solution long before this,95 and were he to re-endorse it, he would not have chosen to do so in a roundabout way through Briscoe. Although Briscoe had asked Herzog to respond to this plan, no evidence could be found of any correspondence between Herzog and Briscoe or de Valera on this matter. Communications were probably terminated, at first because of the delays in promoting the partition plan and later because of Britain’s complete withdrawal from the plan.

Leo Cohen’s response to de Valera’s address to the Sixth Committee The links that Cohen forged with the Irish political leadership, including de Valera, can explain the long letter he wrote to de Valera in response to his address to the Sixth Committee. The letter reflects the opinions that prevailed among Zionist leaders at the time, and probably was even approved by them. Although there is no proof that the letter was ever posted, its content and the very fact that it was written shed light on the Zionist attitude toward de Valera at that time.96

From partition to partition 37 Cohen expanded on Herzog’s arguments and added others. Unlike Herzog, Cohen did address the issue of partition and explained that bearing in mind the tragedy of European Jewry, this solution should be embraced as the lesser of the evils. Cohen also cautioned against a common fallacy, which held that Palestine was an Arab country and the Jews were foreign invaders. This argument, like the one that Arabs were being robbed of their land – and to which Herzog was requested to respond, shows that Cohen, like Herzog, explained the Palestine problem to de Valera using terminology analogous to that used in the Irish case. Assuming that de Valera was observing the developments in the Middle East through the Irish prism, and bearing in mind that in the Irish conflict he had supported the Catholics, Herzog and Cohen may have suspected that de Valera would side with the Arabs. Cohen explained that the depiction of the Jews as invaders, flies in the face of the historical truth. The Jews, not the Arabs, made the Land of Israel unique in the history and culture of mankind. When the Jews were exiled from their land, Jewish political independence in the Land of Israel ceased, but owing to the concept of a national home as set out in the Balfour Declaration, the Land of Israel had once again become a political Jewish entity. The affinity of the Jews toward Zion is without equal and fundamental to their culture and lifestyle. Jewish immigration to the Land of Israel had never ceased, and Jews had always lived in the Holy Land. Cohen hoped that de Valera would use his influence to help translate the bonds that tie Jews to their national homeland into reality.

Brodetsky’s meeting with de Valera Zelig Brodetsky, whose meeting with de Valera in Dublin was prompted by the same motivations as those of Herzog and Cohen, summarized the meeting. The two men broke the ice by discussing applied mathematics, in which both had a keen interest.97 Like Herzog before him, Brodetsky also refrained from discussing the partition plan because of the negative connotations of this term in the Irish reality. Instead, he focused on the need to remove all political barriers to immigration of European Jewry. The only solution for the tragic situation of European Jews was a homeland in Palestine, in which Jews will not forever remain a minority, he argued. Brodetsky noted in his summary that de Valera seemed receptive to his ideas. Moreover, de Valera expressed his empathy with the Jewish aspirations in Palestine, and apologized for the hard-line he had taken in Geneva. What he said there was not intended to make things harder for the Jews, de Valera reportedly told Brodetsky, but to express his discontent with the partition concept. In their talk, de Valera repeated his rejection of any territorial partition, but also voiced similar objections to those expressed by the Zionists, noting, for example, the small territory earmarked for the Jewish State, which would make it very hard to defend militarily.98 The discrepancy between Brodetsky’s impression and the opinions voiced by de Valera at the Sixth Committee is puzzling. The gap may be explained by the different atmosphere in the two forums: the intimacy of the private meeting versus

38 Ireland and Zionism: 1937–47 the publicity and formality of the Sixth Committee session, especially since de Valera’s address was intended for Arab and Muslim listeners. But it may be that the views that de Valera expressed to Brodetsky were no more than lip service. Briscoe, who helped organize and attended the meeting between Brodetsky and de Valera, mentioned this meeting in his autobiography. His report complements Brodetsky’s, but also contains information that contradicts some of the details provided by the latter. While according to Brodetsky it was de Valera who raised the subject of the partition of Palestine, Briscoe states that it was Brodetsky who did so, in violation of their prior understanding. According to Briscoe, Brodetsky implored de Valera to support the partition plan the next time it came before the League of Nations. De Valera rejected his pleas. He tauntingly responded by referring to the moral of the Biblical story about the judgment of King Solomon in the case of two women who claimed the same baby. De Valera was adamant in his conclusion that the true owners of the Land of Israel would never consider partition.99 The inconsistency between Briscoe’s and Brodetsky’s versions is too great to reconcile. All that can be done is to present both. However, if de Valera did indeed make the acerbic remark as Briscoe reports, Brodetsky may have chosen to omit the alleged remark in his account to the Zionist Executive because it mocked the Zionists’ consent to partition and because it did not harmonize with Brodetsky’s report of the support that de Valera had otherwise expressed for the Jewish side. De Valera’s alleged remark does not necessarily imply that he viewed the Jews to be the lawful owners of the land, nor does it indicate that he advocated the ideal of a Jewish State in all of Palestine. But Briscoe, who believed de Valera was pro-Jewish and pro-Zionist, and noted in his book how de Valera had always taken an interest in Jewish history and how he empathized with the Jewish aspirations in Palestine,100 would have surely wanted to make the meeting appear consistent with this picture. Briscoe’s and Herzog’s estimates were probably not completely objective. They may have expressed their subjective feelings, based more on their own long-standing friendly relations with de Valera than on the unvarnished truth.

Jabotinsky’s meeting with de Valera It is thus unclear whether de Valera’s true opinions were those that he expressed at the Sixth Committee, those reflected in Brodetsky’s account and Briscoe’s and Herzog’s impressions, or perhaps none of these. Therefore it can be instructive to examine another meeting between a Zionist leader, Ze’ev Jabotinsky, and de Valera that took place in Dublin on January 10, 1938, in which the partition of Palestine was discussed.101 It should be taken into account, however, that the reports of that meeting are incomplete and based mainly on Briscoe’s description. Jabotinsky received a warm welcome from the Irish Times even before he arrived in Dublin. The newspaper described him as the internationally renowned leader of Revisionist Zionism, one of the greatest Jewish orators, an acclaimed writer, and the leader behind the Jewish Legion of World War.102

From partition to partition 39 The meeting was part of the round of exchanges that Jabotinsky and the other leaders of his movement were conducting at that time with European governments (among these Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, France, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Sweden, and Yugoslavia) as well as with the United States and South Africa, to exert pressure on Britain to open up Palestine to Jewish immigration and thus resolve the problem of Europe’s Jews.103 Jabotinsky had reason to expect that de Valera, who had made a name for himself at the League of Nations as the patron of small, weak countries, would empathize with his cause, relevant also for other small nations. In a speech delivered about a month later, in February 1938, at the NZO convention in Prague, Jabotinsky alluded to having approached de Valera: Sometimes we Jews come to other weak nations and their governments and say to them: . . . protect us, kindly help us explain to England that it must be true to its word . . . They cannot respond . . . that it is not their concern . . . because this might serve as bad example . . . if this rule according to which promises need not be kept is endorsed, no one will ever help weak nations against strong ones. That will be the end.104 It seems that Jabotinsky encouraged de Valera to keep up his opposition to the partition of Palestine, and explained why the Zionist Revisionist Movement felt that his support for an undivided Jewish State in all of Palestine was of paramount significance. For Jabotinsky this was an important meeting because there were no signs that de Valera was sympathetic to pro-Zionist arguments in line with Jabotinsky’s ideology. Indeed, the Zionist leadership interpreted this as an about-face from the position that was expressed in de Valera’s meeting with Brodetsky, and was apprehensive about the outcome.105 Briscoe, who orchestrated and attended the meeting,106 described it in his book, but not in full. De Valera, he wrote, gave Jabotinsky the third degree. He tried to undermine Jabotinsky’s arguments on the rights of the Jews to Palestine, claiming that the Jews had lost these rights to the Arabs, who have been living there for many years while the Jews were gone for two millennia. De Valera was thus reiterating the Arab position according to which Palestine belonged to the Arabs, and the immigration of Jews – a foreign element – was a threat to the Arabs’ rightful existence there. This argument, which is reminiscent of the Catholic position on the conflict between the different communities in Ireland, ostensibly indicates that de Valera viewed the Arabs in Palestine as the equivalent of the Irish Catholics. Briscoe, who was an avid Zionist, must have felt uncomfortable with this conclusion. Therefore Briscoe, made a point of mentioning in his book that de Valera did not hesitate to ask Jabotinsky difficult questions despite his great sympathy for the strong bonds of the Jews with their homeland. According to Briscoe, Jabotinsky did not leave de Valera’s comments unanswered. Jabotinsky explained to de Valera that the Jewish right to the land was based on a historic heritage that was never severed, even when most of the Jews were in exile, since there were always Jews in the Land of Israel, albeit a few. To illustrate this point

40 Ireland and Zionism: 1937–47 Jabotinsky referred to a tragic chapter in Irish history – the Great Famine of the mid-nineteenth century. Ireland lost millions to starvation and immigration in that era. Jabotinsky asked rhetorically: Had the Irish population dwindled to 50,000 and had foreigners – Welsh, Scots, or English – taken their place, would the Irish have given up their homeland? The Irish leader conceded that as long as even a single Irishman remained on the isle, the Irish would keep title to the land. Briscoe attested that he himself had been deeply persuaded by Jabotinsky’s arguments. As for de Valera, Briscoe would only go so far as to speculate that he too was convinced.107 Based on what Briscoe had described to him in 1940, Jabotinsky’s biographer Shmuel Katz wrote how impressed Briscoe was by the meeting between Jabotinsky and de Valera. To Briscoe, who deified de Valera and admired Jabotinsky, and thought both to be two of the greatest national leaders of the time, the meeting was the most exciting day of his life.108 Briscoe may have found parallels between the two men. Both were adamantly opposed to the partition of their country; both worked tirelessly to revive their national language; both fought the more powerful moderate factions in their community. There were also similarities in their attitude toward Britain. De Valera fought Britain and worked tirelessly to have Ireland gradually released from Britain’s hold, but in 1937 was still in favor of maintaining a link with the British Commonwealth where foreign relations were concerned.109 Jabotinsky’s views on Zionist relations with Britain fluctuated between maintaining steady relations and severing the ties with it. Here it should be mentioned that Jabotinsky was also impressed by Briscoe, recognizing his talent and skills once he had gotten to know him well during this visit to Dublin. Jabotinsky quickly enlisted him for NZO political assignments in Poland and the United States, and for fund-raising in South Africa.110 Jabotinsky viewed him as an asset for the Zionist movement and found it symbolic that Briscoe, who had grazed in foreign fields, had found his way to Zionism. This for him was an example of the power of Zionism in mobilizing all Jewish potential to its ranks. However, with all the esteem in which he held Briscoe, Jabotinsky was not deterred from reproving Briscoe for his lack of knowledge of the history of Zionism and the Zionist endeavor.111 There is no known account, neither by de Valera nor his spokesmen, of the meeting with Jabotinsky, in the Irish press or in any other written document. However, Jabotinsky gave the Irish press general, nonspecific details of the meeting. Obviously, being media reports, these accounts should be treated with caution. In an interview with the Irish Independent, Jabotinsky conveyed his deep appreciation of de Valera’s qualities: “I have always been an admirer of his, and I think he has a most striking personality.”112 However, in an interview with The Irish Press, Jabotinsky did not say whether de Valera was receptive to his opinions on partition, nor did he portray de Valera as pro-Jewish or pro-Zionist as Brodetsky and Briscoe had done. Jabotinsky only noted that the atmosphere was friendly, that de Valera appeared to be very knowledgeable about the Palestine problem and had expressed the hope that a solution acceptable to both parties would be found.113

From partition to partition 41

The covert purpose of Jabotinsky’s visit The vagueness of Jabotinsky’s statements to the Irish press after his meeting with de Valera may stem from the fact that his visit to Dublin had another objective. Briscoe’s book sheds light on this matter. Briscoe writes that Jabotinsky came to Dublin in order to learn all he could of the methods we had used in training our young men and boys for the Revolution against England in order to form a physical force movement in Palestine on exactly the same line as Fianna Éireann and the IRA.114 Since, according to Briscoe, he was probably the only Jew in the IRA,115 it was only natural for Jabotinsky to want to learn from his extensive experience. Briscoe continued and said that he taught Jabotinsky “how we had secretly trained our Fianna boys in the time of peace; and the methods we had found most effective in the guerrilla war.”116 Briscoe also added, without going into detail, that after the visit “I . . . began to work closely with Jabotinsky in organizing the Irgun (IZL) along the lines of the IRA. In the course of this collaboration I made many trips to England.”117 Jabotinsky indeed held Briscoe in the highest regard as an unequaled Jewish freedom fighter and even spoke about it publicly at the NZO Prague convention.118 I found no other source which could corroborate that the covert purpose was one of Jabotinsky’s goals for his Dublin visit, apparently due to its clandestine character. On the other hand, since no other source contradicts Briscoe’s testimony, it is difficult to dismiss its reliability. Moreover, in his book (published 20 years later) Briscoe did not associate de Valera with the covert purpose. It may well be that de Valera was not involved in it, or perhaps Briscoe refrained from mentioning it since when the book was published de Valera was serving as Taoiseach. In any event, Briscoe and de Valera’s close friendship, and the latter’s involvement in matters that interested Jabotinsky and his cohorts at the time,119 support the assumption that de Valera was privy to the secret. Briscoe’s testimony seemingly supports the radical Revisionist historical tradition related to IZL. The tradition places emphasis on Jabotinsky as father of the armed revolt that IZL declared at the beginning of 1944 (four years after Jabotinsky’s death) against the British Mandate in Palestine. This revolt was therefore perceived as the realization of Jabotinsky’s idea which was formulated about a decade earlier. Lehi objected to this tradition because it expropriated the initiative of the military revolt plan from Lehi’s founder, Abraham Stern, and distorted the fact that Lehi preceded IZL by five years in implementing the revolt. Tracing Lehi, historian Yaakov Shavit120 stresses the tendentiousness in the Revisionist historical tradition which seeks to create a continuum between the Revisionist movement and the IZL and between Jabotinsky and Begin. It thus sought to establish a historical awareness that elevated Jabotinsky as a leader capable of envisioning events as they actually took place in the future.

42

Ireland and Zionism: 1937–47

The need to clarify the concept of the revolt on a concrete political level was evoked by Jabotinsky at the end of 1929 when bitter disappointment was heard in his movement regarding his British orientation, and speculations surfaced of an armed revolt against British rule. Britain’s pro-Arab policy intensified during the 1930s, reaching its peak in the White Paper of May 1939 that severely limited Jewish immigration and purchase of land by Jews in Palestine. The mounting distress about the plight of Jews in Europe, the Arab uprising, and the establishment of IZL in April 1937, kept the revolt on the agenda of the Revisionist movement. Shavit adamantly claims that Jabotinsky did not undermine the British Mandate but only the legality of the steps it was taking against the Yishuv, and thus, Shavit believes, he was not inclined toward an armed revolt. Despite the fact that Jabotinsky spoke a great deal about the military ethos, imparting it to Betar members as an educational message, Jabotinsky was inclined toward open and ceremonial militarism. Shavit admits that from 1937 there is indeed evidence of a change in this attitude, but he believes that it did not signal any substantial change. The evidence also contradicts Jabotinsky’s written and spoken statements. Thus, for example, at Betar’s world conference in Warsaw in September 1938, Jabotinsky openly attacked the idea of the revolt prevalent in IZL and Betar. He differentiated between emotions and the rhetoric of the revolt and the ability to actually launch a military revolt, which was unrealistic from the standpoint of Betar and IZL. He rejected the analogy between the state of affairs of Zionism and that of other nations who fought for freedom, even on the arithmetical level: “no strategist will say that in such a state of affairs we can do as Garibaldi and de Valera. It’s ridiculous. We are far from being like the Italians and the Irish.”121 By this Jabotinsky meant that many Irish and Italians were living in their own country while their peoples were fighting for independence. This was not so in the case of the Jews, where only a minority lived in Palestine. Examination of the1939 testimony on Jabotinsky’s intentions vis-à-vis the revolt, shows that his intentions were no more than a dramatic and demonstrative act of short-term revolt, one which would shock and change British policy in favor of Zionism.122 The outbreak of the war inevitably returned Jabotinsky to cooperation with Britain. Is Shavit refuting Briscoe’s testimony? Not at all. First, even if Jabotinsky was against a military revolt, as Shavit believes, it does not follow that he did not engage, as leader and mentor, in deliberations and uncertainty on the issue. On the contrary, evidence of his support of the revolt, despite its paucity, indicates this. Second, even Shavit believes that Jabotinsky meant to stage a short-term demonstrative revolt in 1939. It is against the background of Jabotinsky’s doubts, his need to clarify the idea of revolt, and his intention of staging a demonstrative revolt that we can understand Jabotinsky’s secret contacts with Briscoe. Jabotinsky sought to learn from him – and perhaps from de Valera as well – about organizing an underground movement and the IRA revolt, and examine its suitability for the IZL and the Palestinian reality. However, study is one thing and executing an IZL revolt patterned after the IRA revolt is another matter entirely.

From partition to partition 43 To conclude the subject of Irish public opinion and de Valera’s views on the 1937 partition plan: the Jewish-Arab conflict in Palestine was in and of in itself of no interest to de Valera and his people – except in the context of their own partition trauma. They viewed the Palestine problem through the prism of the national, interfaith conflict in their own country. Moreover, de Valera’s statements and moves concerning the partition of Palestine were designed to promote his own interests and were intended primarily to demonstrate an anti-British stance. Contrary to the Irish public opinion, which rejected outright the partition of Ireland, most members of the Zionist movement supported such a solution in principle. The difference stemmed mainly from the diverging demographic realities of Palestine and Ireland. Most of the Jewish population was within the boundaries of the proposed territory, whereas Catholics numbered one-third of the population in the six northern counties of Ireland, and constituted a majority along the border with the south. Despite the balanced approach de Valera voiced toward the parties at the Sixth Committee, other evidence points in opposite directions. The sum of available sources is insufficient to determine unequivocally whether the opinion he expressed at the Committee was genuine. And if not – what was his actual stance on the Jewish claim to Palestine versus the Arab claim, and which of the two sides was viewed by him as analogous to the Catholics in the Irish case. Although Zionist leaders who met with de Valera formed favorable impressions, their individual accounts are incomplete and inconsistent. Some in fact appear to be biased, thus making it difficult to discern de Valera’s real views. It is also possible that being aware of his international standing, de Valera made a deliberate effort to appear impartial in his address to the Sixth Committee. Apparently, deciphering de Valera’s true opinions is no easier today, more than half a century later, than it was for the Zionist leaders who met de Valera or had a personal relationship with him. The interest and concern expressed by the Zionist leadership in late 1937 and early 1938 regarding the position that de Valera would take if the prospect of partition came up again at the League of Nations, faded over the following months as Britain gradually withdrew from the plan and finally shelved it at the end of 1938. Neither de Valera’s attitude toward the Peel partition plan nor the contacts that the Zionists had had with him made any difference, after all. Like all other debates and discussions surrounding this plan, these, too, went up in smoke and are of academic value only.

The Jewish side and the United Nations’ partition resolution – November 1947 Ten years passed before the Irish were again required to address the partition of Palestine. But before discussing the Irish position on the UN partition resolution of 1947, a closer look at the Jewish response to it would be in order. The debate that engrossed the Yishuv and the Zionist camp after the Peel Commission submitted its recommendations, did not recur in 1947. Quite the opposite: the UN

44 Ireland and Zionism: 1937–47 resolution was consistent with that of the Jewish Agency, which in 1946 adopted a revised version of the Peel partition plan (consisting of the Peel plan, plus West Jerusalem, plus the Negev – where Jews settled in the 1940s – reinforcing the Zionist claim to the region) as the most realistic avenue toward a Jewish State and resolution of the Jewish-Arab conflict. Before the vote at the United Nations, the Zionist Executive even urged various leaders and governments, primarily the United States, to support the partition plan. Eventually, the only advantage that the UN plan added for the Jewish side over the Peel plan, was the Negev. Yet, notwithstanding its 1937 position, in 1947 the Jewish Agency was willing to give up West Jerusalem in order to attain the long-awaited sovereignty. An internationally appointed mandate, a corpus separatum, to govern the city was considered in Zionist circles to be a heavy price, but one that had to be paid in view of the bonds linking the major monotheistic religions with Jerusalem. It was also clear that without this painful concession, the United Nations was highly unlikely to endorse the partition plan and the establishment of a Jewish State.123 The vast majority of Jews in Palestine and all over the world rejoiced at the UN resolution. To the Yishuv, this resolution was a historic hallmark and the realization of what had been only a dream for many generations. Most political parties in the Yishuv, even the anti-Zionist (the orthodox Agudat Yisrael on one hand and the Communist party on the other), did not object. The factions on both the right and left extremes of the political spectrum, which ideologically opposed partition, reluctantly accepted that Jewish sovereignty would be limited only to certain parts of Palestine. Some (the General Zionists and religious Zionist circles) only expressed their discontent and sorrow. Others (Hashomer Hatzair Zionist socialist movement on the one hand and the Revisionist Movement on the other) issued belligerent statements, albeit without any operative intentions, that they would continue their struggle, the former, in favor of a bi-national state, the second for extending Jewish sovereignty to all parts of the country.124 This change in general attitude in the Zionist camp was engendered by the very same Jewish leaders who in 1937 rejected partition, but in 1947, in the wake of the Holocaust and the continuing British policy of severely restricting Jewish immigration to Palestine, were willing to accept it as the lesser of two evils. The incomprehensible massacre in Europe, coupled with Britain’s locking the gates to Palestine to Jewish survivors and thus preventing evolution of the Yishuv into a political entity, urged the Jewish leadership to opt for sovereignty even at the price of territorial concessions.

The Irish reaction In 1947, as in 1937, the specter of Ireland’s partition dominated the Irish response. While Ireland’s neutrality in the Second World War weakened de Valera’s efforts, by the end of 1947 de Valera, still the Prime Minister, cast his entire weight toward revoking the partition of Ireland. De Valera’s renewed efforts should be seen in the context of the election campaign that reached its peak at that time. De Valera had pushed up the elections

From partition to partition 45 (to February 15, 1948) in order to curb the impressive momentum being gained by Clann na Poblachta (Family of the Republic), the radical republican party led by Sean MacBride. This party, which supported a more aggressive approach to partition, posed an electoral threat to de Valera and his Fianna Fáil party as the mainstream nationalist-republican movement.125 Despite de Valera’s renewed efforts on the home front, in 1947 Ireland’s politicians did not take a stand on the Palestine’s partition, and reactions were limited to the press only. The silence of Ireland’s politicians at the time can be explained by the fact that in 1947 Ireland was not a member of the United Nations, and was thus not obligated to issue official policy statements on external affairs that did not directly impact Ireland. This was also reflected in the relatively incomplete and low-key coverage in the press, compared with 1937. In its 1947 treatment of the Palestine problem, the Irish press dealt mainly with the issue of partition, naturally addressing also the issue of international rule for Jerusalem and other Christian holy places. All other aspects of the partition plan received little attention, if any at all. The Irish press expressed opinions similar to those of the Vatican regarding international rule of the holy places, but diverged from the Holy See on the partition concept. The Vatican maintained the same restrained attitude it had held in 1937, although in principle it still objected to partition. Even though some of the Arabs living in Palestine were its followers, the Vatican was careful not to openly support the establishment of an Arab state in all of Palestine, because it could challenge the international support for the establishment of a Jewish State. The Vatican was especially careful not to annoy the United States, which it needed as an ally against Communism after the Second World War. Under these circumstances, the Vatican found some consolation in the plan to place Jerusalem, where much of the Christian population lived126 and many of the holy places were located, under international rule. Jerusalem, so the Vatican hoped, would become a religious Catholic center, and Jewish hegemony – which would violate the Catholic belief as to the fate of the Jewish people – would be avoided.127 An editorial in the Irish Independent described the 27 bad years that Ireland lived through since it was forced into an unnatural partition, and enumerated the adverse political and economic effects that this partition had on the country. The paper also referred to India’s recent partition in July 1947, whose consequences were even more horrendous than those in Ireland, since many more people lost their lives and their homes. The Irish Independent was upset that the warning signs posted by the Irish and Indian precedents did not stop the United Nations from considering partition of such a small country as Palestine, whose territory was less than one-third of Ireland’s. Since the Arabs in Palestine – backed by the entire Arab World – had announced they would stop at nothing to fight the partition of Palestine, and since Jews in Palestine and in the Diaspora had begun to mobilize in response to the Arab threat, a bloodbath was certain to ensue in the Holy Land, the paper forecast. The Irish Independent did not propose an alternative solution, but – observing impartiality – called for political wisdom that would do justice to both parties.128

46 Ireland and Zionism: 1937–47 An editorial on December 15, 1947 in The Irish Press described the UN resolution as a mistake and a failure to learn the lesson from the Irish and Indian precedents. De Valera’s paper used the comparison to once again decry Ireland’s partition. Compared to the injustices inflicted by the partitions of India and Palestine, and despite the atrocities that resulted from India’s partition, Ireland’s partition was entirely unjustifiable, the editorial insisted. To prove his point, the author raised various arguments and generalizations, some of which were one-sided and controversial. Neither India, with its multiplicity of races, nor Palestine, can claim to be a nation in the sense that Ireland is. Neither one has a centuries’ long history as a national unit, nor natural fixed frontiers, nor the same racial cohesion, nor an overwhelming majority people utterly antagonistic to partition, as Ireland has. The case against partitioning Ireland is, in fact, as strong as that against partitioning any nation in the world. To partition England would not be a greater crime.129 The argument made in the editorial, according to which India and Palestine lacked the racial cohesiveness that Ireland has, illustrates the author’s one-sided approach. It indicates that The Irish Press perceived Ireland’s partition to be a division of a nation, while that of India and Palestine were merely partitions of states.130 In his discussion of Ireland, the author one-sidedly represented the worldviews of Irish Nationalists, ignoring those of the Northern Unionists. In reference to India, on the other hand, the paper took the opposite approach. To illustrate the severity of Ireland’s partition, it adopted the perception of the Muslim League, which endorsed partition of India based on the principle that Muslims and Hindus were separate nations. In this case, the paper chose not to adopt the opinion of the Indian National Congress, which believed in India’s homogeneity and viewed the Muslims as yet another of India’s religious sects and an integral part of the Indian nation.131 But unlike in 1937, this time not all Irish papers rejected the partition of Palestine. This change may have come about because of the Holocaust, and especially after the Exodus affair in the summer of 1947, which made the travails of illegal Jewish immigrants to Palestine known throughout the world. The Irish Times was unique in that it did not view the Jewish-Arab conflict through the Irish prism. The Irish Times – like the Irish Independent and unlike The Irish Press – was restrained in its criticism of Britain. The reason why the general uproar against Britain that the Peel plan had generated 10 years earlier did not repeat itself is obvious. In 1937 it was a Royal British commission that proposed to divide Palestine, while in 1947 the United Nations assumed this role. Moreover, Arab militancy toward the prospect of partition, coupled with Britain’s intention to maintain its standing in the Middle East, led Britain to oppose the partition of Palestine in 1947. This explains the passive attitude evident in mid-October 1947 when the British Cabinet decided not to take part in the implementation of the partition plan (by refraining from assigning British troops for this purpose, for example) if and when it was endorsed by the UN Assembly. Another such instance was when Britain abstained during the UN Assembly vote on November 29, 1947. However, since Britain had to eventually accept the

From partition to partition 47 verdict of the UN Assembly, it was preparing to withdraw from Palestine.In an editorial published on December 2, 1947, The Irish Times (probably influenced by the tragedy of European Jewry) empathized with the joy that swept Jews around the world following adoption of the UN partition plan, which was perceived to be a quantum leap toward realizing the Zionist dream. The paper was nevertheless balanced in its report, which also described the turmoil on the Arab side and its preparations to prevent implementation of the resolution by force. The paper did not pass judgment on the resolution either way, but did state that once a decision had been made and once Britain accepted it, the United Nations should make certain its plan would be implemented, despite Arab objections. This was a test for the UN’s prestige, The Irish Times said. The paper once again called upon the United Nations to implement its resolution 10 days later, after Britain’s Colonial Secretary Creech Jones announced that the end of the British Mandate in Palestine would be pushed up to May 15, 1948, and that British troops would withdraw no later than August 1 of that year. If the United Nations did not, the paper cautioned, there would be a risk of anarchy and Soviet influence might fill the void left by Britain’s withdrawal. Although this time the paper acknowledged the problems that the partition plan involved and conceded that there was little chance that the plan would generate peace in the Holy Land, the paper was realistic enough to agree that any other solution would be just as problematic and held that failure to implement the plan would be much worse.132 The arguments that the Catholic papers used against the partition plan were the same as those they had voiced in 1937, focusing on the impact that partition would have on Christian interests in the Holy Land. The extreme Catholic publications leaned toward the Arab side. The Standard emphasized the timing of the partition plan, shortly before Christmas, when the entire Catholic world looked to Jesus’ birthplace. The paper complained that the United Nations had hardly given any weight to the Christian-Catholic interest in the holy places, and that these interests must not be forgotten even when the Jewish-Arab conflict reached new peaks.133 A similar focus on the holy places was also evident in an interview published by The Standard two weeks later with the Franciscan priest Anthony Bruya, a US resident who stopped for a visit in Ireland on his way back from Palestine to America. Although Bruya’s views did not reflect the opinion of The Standard, the fact that the publication chose to print his views was tantamount to a full endorsement. Bruya stressed that although one-tenth of all Arabs living in Palestine were Christian and many of them were affiliated with the Catholic Church, Americans, and Europeans, notwithstanding their Christian tradition and culture – hardly knew anything about these communities. This was probably because the communities in Palestine had no media platforms like press or radio at their disposal, as did their counterparts in other places in the world, Bruya explained, implicitly criticizing the influence that the Jews had on the American media. As for the partition plan, Bruya said that theoretically it was a positive prospect but that in practical terms it was not feasible. Who could understand this better than the Irish, he commented. The chessboard distribution of the two populations made

48 Ireland and Zionism: 1937–47 things even more complicated, because partition into two or even three units would not yield homogenous populations.134 The Cross was much more blunt in its attack on the Jewish side. This paper returned to the contradiction between the Balfour Declaration and McMahon’s promise, and referred to the partition proposal as “ridiculous in concept and unworkable in practice,” and as one that “has precipitated a major tragedy.” In fact, The Cross believed that the promises were not of equal value, since the Balfour Declaration spoke only of a “national home,” not a state. According to The Cross, it was the Jewish side that was to blame for the dead-end situation, because it kept insisting on “political domination,” as The Cross put it. In other words, The Cross did not perceive the Jewish-Arab conflict to be the result of a clash between two just claims, but between Palestinian Arabs, who deserved a state of their own, and the Jews, who were a foreign community that obstinately demanded sovereignty in a land to which they were not entitled. In March 1948 The Cross made no effort to hide its pleasure at the prospect that the Jewish State would never become a reality. Outnumbered as it was, the Jewish side stood no chance against the Palestinian Arabs who waged war against the Jews, supported by the Arab League and volunteers from neighboring countries. Under these circumstances, not even the United States could save Jewish statehood. “The Jewish settlers stand now on the brink of the catastrophe to which the folly of their own extremists has hastened them,” The Cross concluded.135 But three months later, once the State of Israel was already in place and the Arabs’ chances of winning the military campaign were waning, The Cross was no longer so certain that the Jewish State would collapse. It then vented its rage on the partition plan. An editorial in June, based on an expert opinion, complained that the plan discriminated against the Arabs, gave them the barren hill country, while the fertile plains were earmarked for the Jews. Another injustice against the Arabs was that the Jews only had a 55 percent majority in the Jewish State. The Cross further said: “Only in . . . the coastal strip from Haifa to Tel Aviv have the Jews an absolute majority,” and therefore concluded that the Arabs “are to be subjected to Jewish rule against every principle of democracy and commonsense by a partition plan which could have been devised only in Bedlam.”136 To conclude, both in 1937 and in the case of the UN partition plan of 1947, the main factor influencing opinions in the Irish press was Ireland’s partition. The bias in favor of the Arab side expressed by the extreme Catholic publications was also the same on both occasions. However, in 1947 the Irish press did not oppose Palestine’s partition as sweepingly as it did 10 years earlier, and there was even one instance of empathy for the Jewish State. Apparently, the same factor that changed the Jewish attitude toward partition in 1947 left its mark on a small segment of the Irish public as well. The majority, however, maintained the same views as in 1937, with the experience of Ireland’s partition determining their attitude toward the Palestine problem.

2

Rabbi Herzog, de Valera, and Jewish rescue

While Chapter 1 dealt with correspondence and contacts between de Valera and the leaders and dignitaries of the Zionist Movement and the yishuv, including Rabbi Herzog, on the Palestine partition plans, the current chapter is devoted to correspondence and contacts between Rabbi Herzog, in his role as Chief Rabbi of Palestine (1936–48) and Irish political leaders, primarily de Valera, on the rescue of Jews from Nazi persecution. Rabbi Herzog’s term as Chief Rabbi of Palestine was a period of unprecedented challenges to Jewish and Zionist leaders. Herzog addressed these challenges at a farewell party held for him upon concluding his tenure as the rabbi of Dublin (which began in 1919) and as Chief Rabbi of the Irish Free State (an office he held since its inception) at Dublin city hall on April 8, 1937, four months after he was elected to the office in Palestine. At the party, attended by the mayor, Irish dignitaries and Jewish community leaders, the rabbi spoke of the historic turning point at which he was called upon to go to Palestine and explained why he felt compelled to take up this challenge.1 Rabbi Herzog addressed himself to this challenge with devotion, taking advantage of his unique status as Chief Rabbi of the Holy Land, and leveraging his many talents – language skills, broad education,2 vast leadership experience, and ties with political and religious leaders. Although Herzog was in contact with dozens of dignitaries, his relationship with de Valera was special, because it was also personal. Herzog was not alone in his efforts to rescue Jews by way of Ireland. Other Jewish leaders and institutions, such as the Chief Rabbi of Great Britain, Joseph Hertz, and his Religious Emergency Council, his son-in-law Rabbi Solomon Schonfeld, who led the Council, Harry Goodman, who headed the World Executive Committee of Agudat Israel and the Union of Orthodox Rabbis of the United States and Canada, and leaders of the World Jewish Congress, also exerted constant pressure on the Irish foreign service and diplomatic corps, as did representatives of the Jewish community in Dublin. But Rabbi Herzog was the only person outside of Ireland to appeal directly to de Valera. Due to Ireland’s neutrality in the war, its relationship with the German Reich, and its special ties with the Vatican, it seemed that Ireland may be able to provide an asylum for Jewish refugees or use its contacts to save them from death.

50 Ireland and Zionism: 1937–47 Herzog’s motivation in appealing to de Valera was compounded by the strong friendship that evolved between the two men. Before discussing their communications on the matter of rescue, let us first examine how their relationship developed and what it meant.

Beginning of a beautiful friendship Rabbi Herzog prided himself in his close ties with Irish leaders during Ireland’s fight against the British, and in his friendship with de Valera, who often visited Herzog at his residence.3 One Irish source even indicates that de Valera took refuge in Rabbi Herzog’s home during the Irish War of Independence.4 Rabbi Herzog’s solidarity with the Irish campaign and the support lent by him and his community to the Irish rebels is described in the memoirs of his son, Chaim Herzog (President of the State of Israel, 1983–93): My father was an open partisan of the Irish cause. When Irish prisoners went on hunger strike, he pleaded with them to cease endangering their lives. In many circles in Ireland our family name is still associated with those who fought for liberty . . . The Jewish community as a whole gave a lot of help to the Irish. After the establishment of the Irish Free State, when Eamon de Valera was in opposition, he would come to visit . . . and unburden his heart to my father.5 At first glance, such closeness between the rebel Irish leadership and Rabbi Herzog, who was by nature a moderate, soft-tempered man distant from oppositional activism, seems puzzling. Later on, during the Arab Revolt in Palestine (1936–9), Herzog promulgated restraint in the face of Arab terrorism, explaining that this was the true expression of Jewish ethics. In one of his speeches, a comparison with the violent conflict between the Irish and the British shed a positive light on Jewish restraint in Palestine: “I was there in those dark times. Even though Ireland is a civilized country, cruelty had the upper hand. But here in Eretz Israel the yishuv has demonstrated . . . a pure spirit, expressing the Jewish ethics it upheld.”6 Rabbi Herzog also opposed the armed fight waged by IZL and Lehi against British rule. Moreover, during most of his term as Chief Rabbi of Palestine he held pro-British views. Yet when he changed course toward the end of the British Mandate, as the British had barred the last remnants of Europe’s Jewry from immigrating to Palestine, he was barraged by local British officials, who missed no opportunity to bring up his unsavory ties with the Irish underground.7 Apparently, the main reason for the solidarity expressed by Rabbi Herzog and his community with the Irish struggle for independence was not ideology but rather practical considerations regarding the status of the Jewish community in Ireland. The small community8 could not afford to oppose a campaign that was widely supported by the Irish. After the Civil War, Rabbi Herzog skillfully maneuvered his community within the rifted Irish society; regardless of his warm

Rabbi Herzog, de Valera, and Jewish rescue 51 friendship with de Valera, Rabbi Herzog also maintained close ties with his rivals, who controlled the Irish Free State until 1932.9 Rabbi Herzog was a well-known figure in Ireland. He nurtured good relations with the clergy, primarily with Cardinal Joseph MacRory, Catholic primate for all of Ireland (1929–45), who held Herzog in high regard. Herzog also enjoyed prestige among the general public. In 1936 he was proven a social reformer highly sensitive to the plight of the poor. In an article in the Irish Press he expressed horror at the deplorable living conditions in the slums of Dublin. Herzog called for heightened civic awareness for the evil of slums, irrespective of creed, and for setting up welfare funds.10 His solidarity with Ireland, as seen through the poverty issue, undoubtedly contributed to his special relations with Irish leaders. But the affection de Valera and Herzog had for one another cannot be fully appreciated without acknowledging the mutual respect between them. Both were impressive, authoritative leaders whose reputation extended beyond the boundaries of their own country. De Valera gradually acquired the status of a prominent statesman and advocate of small nations seeking sovereignty. Rabbi Herzog was one of the most erudite Talmudic scholars of his time and a well-known rabbinical authority. He represented a rare combination of religious genius and general academic scholarship and his reputation preceded him even in non-Jewish circles. In his capacity as chief Rabbi of Palestine, Rabbi Herzog became the supreme worldwide spiritual authority of the Jewish people. De Valera’s approach to religion seems to have also played a role in their mutual respect. Although a devout Catholic, de Valera also held liberal and democratic views. The constitution of 1937, while based on the Catholic ethos, was for him a compromise between theocratic and democratic principles.11 Herzog’s perspective on the role of religion in a sovereign Jewish state was similar. While he fundamentally believed that politics in any sovereign Jewish community should be based on Jewish law (Halacha), as a pragmatist he knew that in a Jewish state, democracy could not be subordinated to theocracy and held that the two would have to coexist, albeit with mutual concessions.12 De Valera’s interest in and acquaintance with the history of the Jewish people, prompted by similarities with the tormented history of the Irish nation, his keen interest in Jewish thought13 and his knowledge of the Palestine issue, as well as both men’s love of mathematics, also helped bring them together.14 In Chapter 1 we noted the high regard in which Rabbi Herzog held de Valera as an idealist and humanist as well as being sensitive to the hardships of the Jewish people. De Valera’s appreciation for Herzog is evidenced by an account provided by Leo Cohen. In a private visit to Dublin in July 1960, Cohen met with de Valera, who spoke highly of Rabbi Herzog.15 According to Rabbi Jakobovits’ testimony,16 it was de Valera and Herzog’s friendship that led to de Valera’s empathy with Jews and with Israel. De Valera and Herzog did not lose touch when the rabbi left Ireland. To a large extent, the survival of their friendship is due to the hardships of the times, since de Valera was one of many contacts that Herzog pursued in his search for support for the yishuv and for ways to rescue European Jews.

52

Ireland and Zionism: 1937–47

Naturally, their relationship had both personal and public aspects. For example, de Valera sent Rabbi Herzog a copy of the constitution he had created.17 Rabbi Herzog was one of the people whom de Valera consulted when he drafted Article 44 of the 1937 constitution regarding the status of religious denominations in Ireland, which included express recognition of the Jewish community and guaranteed its freedom of religion. Of course, the subject itself called for such consultation, but de Valera sought Rabbi Herzog’s advice also because of his juridical insight.18 Article 44 was undoubtedly a significant factor in Herzog’s admiration of de Valera, since beyond its importance from the local Jewish standpoint, it was of considerable importance within the broader context of the attitude toward the Jews of Europe following the rise of Nazis to power, so well described by historian Joseph Lee as, “a gesture not without dignity in the Europe of 1937.”19 Rabbi Herzog did not stop following developments in Ireland. After Ireland and Britain entered into the agreement of April 25, 1938,20 he sent de Valera a warm letter congratulating him on the feat and commending his vision as a leader: This friendly settlement due in so large a measure to your wisdom . . . as well as lofty idealism, is on the one hand a source of added strength to true civilization, to the forces which stand for justice and freedom . . . democracy and humanity, and on the other, it inspires the hope that inter-racial difficulties elsewhere . . . may also . . . find their peaceful . . . solution.21

Efforts to mobilize de Valera for Jewish rescue Rabbi Herzog’s communications with de Valera on the subject of partition had little practical effect, and tragically so did his efforts to get de Valera to help him rescue Europe’s Jews from annihilation by Nazi Germany. Ostensibly, it could be said that their friendship did not withstand this test. However, a discussion of de Valera’s policy on Jewish rescue may contribute to the understanding of his approach to Jews and the Zionist movement in general. This approach cannot be viewed in isolation but only as part of the broader picture of anti-Semitism in Ireland during the years in question. The discussion that follows will also shed light on the relationship between the two leaders. Herzog’s communications with de Valera on the subject of rescue intensified as news of the horrors perpetrated against Jews under Nazi occupation was emerging from late 1942 onward. Herzog was seeking any avenue that could save even a single individual from death. But his attempts to mobilize de Valera began even before the war, when no one conceived the danger lurking for Europe’s Jews in terms of genocide. At that time, Herzog was trying to rescue Jews from acts of violence, discrimination, and humiliation.22 He expected de Valera to help mainly in providing refuge for a limited number of Jews in Ireland and in bringing the matter up for discussion with the Vatican. This was a direct continuation of the unofficial personal lobbying policy that Herzog had pursued as Ireland’s chief

Rabbi Herzog, de Valera, and Jewish rescue 53 rabbi, in his communications on behalf of his community with the relevant Church and state authorities.23 Herzog apparently believed de Valera would come through to the empathy between them, the humanitarian nature of his appeals, the reputation that de Valera and other Irish diplomats had in the League of Nations as being attentive to persecuted minorities, and particularly due to the image of de Valera’s government, which Herzog viewed as being free of any prejudice against Jews.24 Also, Herzog viewed de Valera as pro-Jewish, pro-Zionist, a humanist, and an idealist who fights for justice. As subjective as this image may have been, it was supported in varying degrees by similar impressions that other Jewish leaders had of de Valera, among them Sokolov, Brodetsky, Cohen, and of course Briscoe. It is nevertheless difficult to assume that Herzog, who had experienced antiSemitism first hand during his term as Ireland’s Chief Rabbi as will be seen further, could have been oblivious to the connection between Catholicism, deeply rooted in Ireland, and prejudice against Jews, such as the common hostility against Jews over the crucifixion of Jesus Christ, which under certain circumstances was likely to evolve into overt anti-Semitism. But Herzog associated such views with Catholic zealots, not with the leaders of the Church and certainly not with the architects of Ireland’s official policy. Herzog also preferred to paint a rosier picture of Ireland’s history than it really was, as a country in which Jews were hardly ever persecuted. For example, in the farewell party he was given at Dublin’s city hall, he praised Irish history and said: “A few isolated unfriendly utterances in recent times could not in the slightest degree mar so noble a record.” Since Herzog’s intention in his speech was to thank Ireland for the honor it had bestowed upon him, he added, probably just for the sake of eloquence, that he was convinced that “those uncharitable utterances were not native products – they were imported from abroad.”25 Contrary to Herzog’s belief, Irish documents from the 1930s and 1940s concerning internal discussions held by Ireland’s political ranks on the matter of Jewish refugees reveal that anti-Semitism existed even at the highest level of decision-makers in Ireland. At the time, however, Rabbi Herzog was unaware of this, and be that as it may, since he had no qualms where rescue was concerned, the Irish avenue was a natural one for him to follow.

Irish anti-Semitism since the late nineteenth century Before addressing Herzog’s attempts to mobilize Ireland’s assistance, and to gain a better understanding of these attempts, a brief review of the history of antiSemitism in Ireland would be in order. Although the Jewish community on the isle had always been tiny, including in the decades before and after the Holocaust of European Jewry, Ireland had its share of anti-Semitism. This review also provides a deeper insight into the issue of Ireland’s recognition of the State of Israel, as discussed in the following chapters. Many Irishmen prided themselves in the fact that unlike the histories of other European nations, theirs was not tainted by persecutions and massacres of Jews.

54

Ireland and Zionism: 1937–47

It is hardly surprising that this “fact” was repeatedly mentioned by Rabbi Herzog and other speakers at his farewell party at Dublin’s city hall. The Irish Times said in an editorial about the party that one cannot but feel “at least a faint glow of pride” after such words of praise, even though Ireland did no more than act as any civilized country should, especially since Ireland’s Jews have more than repaid the favor with their significant contribution to Ireland’s business arena and art sphere.26 But the fact that throughout Ireland’s history not a single Jew was killed over his beliefs does not necessarily mean that the country was free of antiSemitism. Moreover, the well-known quote from James Joyce’s Ulysses, “Ireland never persecuted the Jews . . . because she never let them in,” offers a cynical perspective on this country’s purported tolerance toward Jews. The distinction drawn by Keogh in connection with anti-Semitism in Ireland in the early twentieth century, between Irish Catholicism in the political context and Irish Catholicism in general, helps elucidate Ireland’s treatment of Jews: Irish political Catholicism was not characterized by hostility towards Jews which might be found among co-religionists . . . in France and other continental countries. On the other hand, Irish Catholicism was not noted for its toleration of other religious minorities. While most antagonism was reserved for Protestants, the liturgical and theological antipathy towards Jews was rooted in intellectual foundation out of which a strong anti-Semitism might emerge at any time.27 One of the conclusions that this distinction leads to is that anti-Semitism in Ireland was not directed from above by the authorities. Indeed, immigration of Jews fleeing massacres in Russia in the late nineteenth century and the spread of anti-Semitism in Europe in the wake of the Dreyfus affair prompted an outbreak of fears and hostility toward Irish Jews. One incident that has gone down in Ireland’s collective memory is the violent anti-Semitic outbreak that took place in 1904 at the city of Limerick. Incited by a Redemptorist priest, Fr John Creagh, the local Christian population struck out against the tiny Jewish community that numbered less than 10 families. In his sermons, Creagh, who was raised on right-leaning Continental Catholicism, denounced the Jews as the greatest enemies of the Catholic Church, the crucifiers of Jesus Christ and bloodsuckers of the nations among which they reside. His preaching also included financial elements – the Jewish immigrants, he said, were competing with native Irishmen and robbing them of their livelihood. This conflict, which received international coverage, included an economic boycott, terrorization, and physical attacks, but led to no deaths and was a one-off. By and large, Ireland’s political or religious leadership did not side with Creagh. In the first two decades of the twentieth century, animosity against Jewish immigrants,28 reverberated in propagandist articles and cartoons in the press, including the publications associated with the Labor party and Arthur Griffith’s Sinn Fein. His previous paper, the United Irishmen, was also a podium for antiSemitic views, including support for Creagh, for example. The United Irishmen

Rabbi Herzog, de Valera, and Jewish rescue 55 was influenced by the Dreyfus affair and prejudice against Jews (and blacks) that Griffith absorbed at the end of the nineteenth century from the Boers in South Africa.29 There is evidence of silent anti-Semitism in the form of social and economic discrimination in the first 10 years after the inception of the Irish Free State, when Jews played key roles in Ireland’s trade, academe, and art scene, and even in the civil service. Jews had already been unofficially banned from sports and social clubs, and job applicants were often turned down because of their religious affiliation.30 Concurrently, the radical popular Catholic newspapers and journals published inciting articles. The venomous article about Jewish immigrants printed by the Irish Rosary in its April 1927 issue is a case in point. Regardless of its actual numbers,31 Jewish immigration was referred to as an invasion of parasites whose finances thrived at the expense of the weak Christian population and which left the young Irish generation no choice but to emigrate. The anti-Semitic undertones were clearly evident, as the author lashed out against the Jews who polluted the purity of the Celtic Christian race. Inspired by the xenophobic saying – Ireland for the Irish and not for anyone else, the article read: We do not want to see the Celt and the Catholic clear out to make room for the Russian Jew and his class, creed, breed and country. We have enough of them . . . and want no more on any conditions. We want to keep our blood pure and our morals equally so. Young Irishmen . . . able to occupy land should get it, and not be obliged to go abroad to the colonies or America.32 An anonymous reader, who was probably afraid to state his name, responded in the Irish Catholic. The reader attacked the editorial in the Irish Rosary as inconsistent with the traditional treatment of Jews in Ireland, and commended the Jewish nation for its invincible spirit and its contribution to civilization.33 Apparently, Rabbi Herzog did not expect any responses of this kind, and therefore expressed his gratitude in a letter to the Archbishop of Dublin, Dr Edward Byrne (1921–40): neither I nor any one in our community considered the article published in the Irish Rosary as in any way voicing the sentiments of the Catholic Church or of the Irish people. But we regard that beautiful paragraph in the Irish Catholic – as truly reflecting the attitude of Ireland and the Catholic Church towards our severely tried people.34 Herzog truly believed that anti-Semitism was a marginal phenomenon in Ireland. But persecutions of Jews in Europe in the following decade led to a rise in hostility in Ireland as well. Radical statements in popular Catholic publications forced Herzog to confront the demon of anti-Semitism. For example, between April and August 1934 and in November and December that year, The Cross printed several provocative articles similar in tone to the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Jews were blamed for the moral corruption of

56 Ireland and Zionism: 1937–47 Western culture, because of their affiliation with depraved movements such as the Freemasons and communism, and for a capitalist takeover of finance and communications. Again, Jewish immigration was in the eye of the storm. Jews were being painted as a threat in order to disseminate fear that their local population might grow. This incitement manipulated Christian faith and made use of teachings of staunch anti-Semitic Catholics such as the Jesuit Edward Cahill and Holy Ghost priest, Denis Fahey.35 These two writers berated the democraticliberal heritage of the French Revolution. They considered the Jews architects of the world revolution and enemies of Divine Order, as embodied by the Catholic Church. In the name of the Cross, they legitimized hatred of the Jews, who purportedly had Satanic power and were out to destroy Christianity and Western society.36 Rabbi Herzog rallied to ward off these malignant publications, and even tried to call on Byrne to help.37 In the beginning of 1937 Herzog once again sought Byrne’s help to thwart calls to outlaw shehitah (the traditional Jewish method of slaughtering livestock for human consumption, which thanks to Rabbi Herzog’s efforts was permitted by the Dublin Corporation in 1934). The campaign to rescind the legal stamp of approval was led by Patrick Belton, Dáil member and chairman of Dublin County Council. Belton, a prominent figure in the Irish Christian Front that supported the Nationalist rebels in Spain, was a declared anti-Semite.38 In the 1930s, anti-Semitism in Ireland revolved mainly around the fascist Irish Blueshirts movement, which was not long-lived and at its peak consisted of 48,000 members,39 and the chapters of the Nazi and Italian Fascist parties in Dublin.40 The Irish envoy to Berlin, Charles Bewley (1933–9) was also an avid anti-Semite and Nazi sympathizer. By procrastinating on visa processing he curbed any possibility for persecuted German Jews to find refuge in Ireland.41 In 1940–2, anti-Semitic activity in Ireland comprised only marginal pro-Nazi movements such as the People’s National Party and Friends of Germany, whose leaders and activists, like George Griffin and Eoin O’Duffy, were veterans of the Blueshirts.42 An astonishing illustration of anti-Semitism among Catholic clergy in postwar Ireland can be found in a letter written in October 1946 by Ireland’s first ambassador to the Vatican (1946–54), Joseph Walshe, to Frederick H. Boland, secretary of the Department of External Affairs (1946–50). In this letter, Walshe recounted a conversation he had with a large group of Irish priests and nuns visiting in Rome, about the difficulties facing de Valera’s government. What most impressed Walshe was the fact that his dialog partners, who held senior positions in their orders, were united in their opinion that the only serious problem faced by the government was Jewish infiltration. They explained that since Jewish influence is anti-Christian, anti-nationalist, and detrimental to the cultural and religious revival of Ireland, Jews should be barred from buying property and businesses in the country. Some of them also repeated the trite argument about the link between Judaism, materialism, and communism.43 Upon Boland’s recommendation the report was not delivered to de Valera.44 As opposed to Walsh and knowing Walshe’s tendency to overreact,45 Boland did not take the so-called threat of an

Rabbi Herzog, de Valera, and Jewish rescue 57 influx of Jewish immigrants too seriously. Boland’s estimate aside, the fact remains that less than two years after the Holocaust, influential Irish clergy were extremely prejudiced against Jews. Anti-Semitism also seeped into the highest ranks of the Catholic Church. Books and essays by Fahey, published between the early 1930s and the early 1950s, were received with tolerance and sometimes even sanctioned by Catholic officials such as the Archbishop of Dublin, John Charles McQuaid (1940–72) and the Bishops of Cork, Waterford, and Ferns.46 In the 1950s, anti-Semitic diatribes based on Fahey’s preaching were also directed against Israel. These teachings were disseminated through Maria Duce, an association Fahey founded in 1945 (which means literally “under Mary’s leadership”). The association had two mouthpieces – a magazine named Fiat and a newsletter by the name of Saoirse, both of which targeted the Jewish community. The association lasted into the early 1960s, but its decline started a few years beforehand. Although Maria Duce played a marginal role in Irish politics and social affairs, it was not altogether negligible.47 Even after Fahey’s death in 1954, his writings were still widely read. But several years later Ireland gradually became more open and tolerant and antiSemitism continually declined. Nevertheless, even in the final decades of the twentieth-century prejudice against Jews was found to be surprisingly prevalent in Irish society.48

Herzog’s appeals to de Valera on the eve of the war – Ireland’s policy on Jewish refugees On October 9, 1938, in response to the Third Reich’s legislative prohibition on Jewish physicians engaging in professional activities, Rabbi Herzog asked de Valera to have Ireland take in several Jewish refugees, physicians by training. Rabbi Herzog’s appeal was turned down49 – a precursor of the treatment that would be given to further appeals he would make to de Valera during the war. This rejection should be seen in the context of Ireland’s general policy in the matter of Jewish refugees. Ireland’s policy in the matter of refuges was, by and large, ungenerous and even rigid, and hardly allowed any asylum seekers to enter. Immigrants and refugees were generally unwanted in Ireland, but Jewish refugees were especially unwelcome. The issue of refugees was handled by the Departments of External Affairs, Justice, and Industry and Commerce, and after the war started, also by Military Intelligence [G2]. Differences between these agencies sometimes made it impossible to form a coherent policy. The Department of Justice played a crucial role in setting policy, since it was in charge of enforcing the 1935 Aliens Act. Supported by the Department of Industry and Commerce, the Department of Justice adopted a narrow interpretation of the law, particularly in connection with Jews, and opposed even the entry of a handful of Jews out of concern that this would encourage additional visa applications. The underlying perception was that Jews cannot easily mingle with the general population and would therefore constantly provoke

58 Ireland and Zionism: 1937–47 anti-Semitism and potentially threaten public order. The apparent anti-Semitic undertones are confirmed by statements made in internal discussions of civil service officials that the Jewishness of the refugees makes them less welcome. In the latter part of 1938, the Department of Justice offered an economic excuse for its objection to increasing the Jewish population in Ireland even by a handful of immigrants. With unemployment skyrocketing, entry of more competition into the labor market might spur anti-Semitism, the Department explained. Throughout the war this Department stuck to its guns and reiterated these two explanations, that Jews cannot assimilate and that an increase in their number would boost anti-Semitism. De Valera was thus surrounded, in his cabinet and the highest ranks of the civil service, by colleagues who were bigots and even anti-Semites. Keogh’s study of anti-Semitism in Ireland indicates that de Valera himself did not share their views. The ethos of the Department of the Taoiseach and the Department of External Affairs (which was known for its sensitivity to Ireland’s international reputation), was more liberal and just than that of the Departments of Justice and Industry and Commerce. There were several occasions before the war and especially during the war, as detailed below, when the actions of de Valera and the Department of External Affairs did not conform to the policy of the Department of Justice, especially in the case of direct appeals from personages like Rabbi Herzog to rescue Jews from certain death. After the war, the Department of Justice and the Department of Industry and Commerce upheld their stringent policy concerning survivors of the death camps, now referred to as displaced persons, while the Departments of the Taoiseach and External Affairs pursued their more liberal practices. While arguments that Jews cannot be immersed in the general population and that the wealth and power of the Jewish community constituted a social problem continued to reverberate at the Department of Justice, the Department of Industry and Commerce continued to oppose Jewish immigration because of unemployment. At the same time, de Valera and the Department of External Affairs set the government’s policy on liberal tracks, overcoming the opposition.50 It should be noted, however, that Ireland did not treat Jewish refugees any worse than did all other nations at the time. Its policy was consistent with the indifference practiced toward Jews throughout the world in those days. Like other countries, Ireland did not open its doors to the victims of Nazi terror, and missed the chance to rise up to the highest calling of all – saving lives.

Using the Irish avenue to gain an audience with Pope Pius XII Rabbi Herzog was undoubtedly disappointed with the response of his Dublin friend in the case of the Jewish physicians, but was not dissuaded. A few months later, he again tried to leverage his Irish connection, this time in order to secure an audience with the newly elected pope, Pius XII. The idea of meeting the Pope occurred to Rabbi Herzog in the winter of 1937, following anti-Semitic

Rabbi Herzog, de Valera, and Jewish rescue 59 radicalization in Europe in the years after the rise of Nazism, and the increased danger for the physical existence of the Jews.51 At the time Rabbi Herzog, who had already been elected as the Chief Rabbi of Palestine, was still in Dublin. Doubtlessly he wanted to make use of his connections with the heads of the Irish church and Irish state, so that they would help him in arranging the interview and speak in his favor before Pius XI (1922–39). Rabbi Herzog probably believed that the Holy See would be attentive to the hardship of Europe’s Jews when he would appear before him as the head of the Jewish world, by virtue of the fact that he was the Rabbi of the Holy Land. However, influenced by his friend Rabbi Meir Berlin, President of the World Mizrahi Movement, Rabbi Herzog decided to postpone the matter for a later date. Berlin was doubtful about the benefit of a premature meeting, before Herzog officially took up his new appointment.52 Only two years later, when Herzog was in London (February 7–March 7, 1939) for the Round Table Conference,53 did he begin implementing the idea. On February 10, Pius XI died, and at the beginning of March Cardinal Eugenio Pacelli was elected as Pope Pius XII. The Pope’s death motivated Herzog to act immediately. At first, Herzog made a direct approach to the newly elected Pope in order to secure an audience with him,54 but it seems he was turned down. From then on Herzog decided to operate through the Irish channel in order to arrange an audience. The testimony of Herzog’s personal secretary, Rabbi Jacob Goldman,55 shows the reason for the urgency of such an audience. According to Goldman, Herzog at the time already sensed that war was imminent and foresaw the tragic implications it would have on his people. He expressed his concerns in a letter to Rabbi Chaim Ozer Grodzinski, one of the greatest Rabbinical authorities in Eastern Europe, who at the time was living in Vilnius: “the threat of war waxes over greater and greater. Such a calamity . . . might prove disastrous for all mankind. But its first and principal victim will be the downtrodden and broken Jewish people.” With a sense of calling, he added: “War always brought to the Jewish people particular tragic consequences. It is the obligation of the rabbis to anticipate these consequences and plan, in good time, such measures that might mitigate them.” In his letter to Grodzinski, Herzog also offered confidential information about his efforts to secure an audience with the Pope through his friend Cardinal MacRory, in order to get the Holy See to stop anti-Semitic governments from persecuting Jews in Europe. Herzog, who knew that the Jewish leadership was powerless to ward off the evil, considered papal intervention to be imperative. Herzog wanted to consult with Grodzinski on how to present his case to the Pope. Moreover before and during the Round Table conference the Zionists noticed with concern the strengthening of Britain’s pro-Arab orientation. They also found out that Britain’s attitude toward their cause had changed for the worse, especially in connection with Jewish immigration quotas to Palestine. This was soon evidenced in the highly unfavorable outcome and in the ensuing White Paper of May 17, 1939. Presumably, Britain’s anti-Zionist stance also motivated Rabbi Herzog to activate the Irish channel in order to reach the Pope.

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A conversation that Herzog had with de Valera on or about February 22, 1939, probably by telephone, and reported by Rabbi Berlin who also participated in the Round Table conference,56 confirms this analysis. According to Berlin – Rabbi Herzog’s confidant – in this conversation Herzog and de Valera scheduled a meeting in which they were to discuss Britain’s anti-Zionist stance. From the timing of the conversation it is reasonable to assume that the interview with the Pope was one of the subjects discussed. Indeed, Berlin did not mention the subject in his reports – probably due to confidentiality. Moreover, a worsening in Britain’s policy regarding immigration quotas to Palestine was inevitably associated with the reason for his seeking an audience with the Pope, that is, the tragic situation of Europe’s Jews. With the almost complete closing of the gates to Palestine by the White Paper, their situation would deteriorate even more. From the available documentation no clear picture emerges whether the meeting between Herzog and de Valera ever took place. On the other hand it is clear from Herzog’s letter to Walshe, of April 11, 1939,57 that Herzog had visited Dublin at the beginning of March 1939 and met with Walshe who promised to secure an audience with the Pope through J. B. Macaulay, the Irish envoy to the Holy See (1934–40). Herzog who left London for Palestine on March 7, 1939, before the Conference was over,58 first planned to stop in Rome on his way to Palestine in order to move the interview forward. Perhaps he hoped to meet de Valera in Rome, since the latter had gone there on March 7 to attend the coronation of Pope Pius XII.59 Ultimately, due to the approaching Passover holiday, Herzog reconsidered his plans and went directly back to Palestine, hoping that he would be able to meet with the Pope after the holidays on April 11. He even wrote a letter to Macaulay, asking him to help in setting up an interview on the preferred date.60 Macaulay, who had received instructions from Walshe, immediately supported him and conveyed Herzog’s request. In a letter dated April 13, 1939 to Monsignor Giovanni Montini, the Vatican Undersecretary of State (1939–44), Macaulay stated that Herzog would like to discuss in the meeting matters he defined as being “of non-political nature which are of the most vital importance to Jewry.”61 From Rabbi Herzog’s letter to Rabbi Grodzinski, mentioned in the previous lines, it is clear that Herzog’s intention was to ask for the Pope’s intervention in stopping anti-Semitic governments from persecuting Jews. Macaulay also reported that he had been instructed by his government to help Herzog secure an audience with the Pope or at least with the Vatican Secretary of State, since Herzog is “a man of great sanctity and learning and they [the government] feel that nothing but good could come from his meeting with the Holy Father at this time when all believers in God join together in the struggle against atheism.”62 This shows that the Irish Department of External Affairs, with the objective of obtaining the Vatican’s agreement to the audience, made its instructions to Macaulay more flexible in comparison with Herzog’s stance, as Herzog asked for an interview with the Pope only. Montini wasted no time and on the very same day – April 13 – he contacted the Pope and recommended giving Herzog an audience. Because of the special relationship between Ireland and the Vatican, Montini stressed what must have

Rabbi Herzog, de Valera, and Jewish rescue 61 seemed to him a compliment for the rabbi, and said that Herzog is “of English nationality, but probably had changed his nationality to Irish, when Ireland became a free state.”63 Sensing he was running out of time, Herzog did not wait very long. On May 1, 1939 he again asked for an audience, this time in a letter to Cardinal Luigi Maglione, the Vatican’s Secretary of State, noting the letter of reference he had received from “my dear friend Cardinal MacRory.” Apparently, the Pope sought to avoid the embarrassment of meeting with the rabbi of the Holy Land, and Herzog’s request for an audience was denied. However, out of respect for the Irish government, on May 13, Montini asked Macaulay to inform Herzog that he would be received for an audience with Cardinal Maglione. Macaulay reported this to Herzog four days later.64 On July 27, 1939 Herzog again approached Macaulay. This time he based his request for an audience with the Pope on Cardinal MacRory’s letter of recommendation of July 17, 1939, which was intended for the Pope. In his letter MacRory introduced Herzog as “a very and valued friend of mine,” and added that he would regard the Pope’s agreement to an audience as “a great personal favour.” Meanwhile Herzog read in the press that the Pope had left for the papal estate at Castel Gandolfo for his summer retreat, and would not return to Rome before September. Encouraged by Cardinal MacRory’s recommendation and convinced of the urgency of his request, Herzog expected that Pius XII would see him at Castel Gandolfo.65 Again his request was refused, but Herzog was granted a meeting with Cardinal Maglione.66 Herzog, who insisted on an interview with the Pope, saw no point in coming to Rome to meet the Vatican Secretary of State. Meanwhile, the situation kept escalating. Apparently, the slow wheels of Vatican diplomacy, which did not keep up with the pace required in times of emergency or live up to Herzog’s expectations, as well as the outbreak of the war, which disrupted all plans, were to blame for the delay. Under these circumstances Herzog was forced to change his mind and eventually meet Cardinal Maglione. According to J. Goldman’s report, on February 1940, Herzog stopped in Rome on his way to London.67 The objective of his trip to London was to discuss with British officials the rescue of several thousands of rabbis and especially refugees from yeshivas (colleges of Talmudic studies) who at the outset of the war fled from Soviet rule in Poland to neutral Lithuania, but were now subject to deportation under laws enacted by their host country. Herzog hoped Britain would agree to make a special gesture and issue them immigration visas to Palestine. The meeting with Maglione also revolved around this enterprise, in an attempt to get the Pope to intervene with the Lithuanian government.68 According to Goldman’s account, in his visit to Rome, Herzog was the guest of the Irish legate to the Vatican, and was even given an official reception. Despite the scheduled meeting with Maglione, Herzog did not give up trying to meet the Pope too, but since the Pope was not in Rome, such a meeting could not take place. Assisted by the Irish legate, Herzog nevertheless reached the Pope on the telephone. The Pope replied in what may have been an attempt to brush Herzog off, that he would be happy to see Herzog immediately on his return to Rome, if the Rabbi would be willing to wait for him there a few days.

62 Ireland and Zionism: 1937–47 Since Herzog had to leave for London, the Pope said he would ask Maglione to receive Herzog without delay, and promised that whatever Herzog said to Maglione would be given appropriate weight as though stated in a conversation between Herzog and the Pope himself. Goldman usually did not attend Herzog’s meetings with dignitaries, and was therefore not present in Herzog’s meeting with Maglione. His account of the conversation reflects what Herzog told him immediately after. Herzog told the Cardinal he wanted to meet the Pope because prewar tools were no longer sufficient to handle the horrors with which Jews in Europe were faced, such as those faced by the Jews of Poland after the German and Russian conquests. Herzog drew a connection between these disasters and the White Paper policy which almost totally halted Jewish immigration to Palestine, the only safe haven for Jews. Herzog also appealed to the Catholic Church to make efforts to help Jews in life-threatening situations anywhere. From the Jewish tragedy, Herzog moved on to discuss the spiritual crisis experienced by all mankind at this historic crossroads. Herzog cautioned that humanity would only be saved when “the salvation of Israel, the people against which the greatest powers of evil were being unleashed, would lay bare the Arm of God and be the miracle that could ultimately redeem whole of civilized humanity from spiritual disintegration.”69 Goldman was shocked to hear this. In his mind, a simple humanitarian appeal for help should have been enough, and no theological arguments should have been needed in order to get the Church to help rescue Jews, especially since the Germans were persecuting Catholic believers as well. Drawing on his experience, Herzog provided the following explanation about the attitude of the Catholic Church toward Jews and Zionism: I have been dealing with Catholics in Ireland for many years. I have never found them indifferent to the sufferings of our people. It is not “hardness of heart” that I fear at the Vatican. Never before has the agony of our people been so profound. Yet I tremble. For the means of the rescue of our people are now inseparably bound up in the minds of all with our restoration to our ancient homeland. Catholics are heirs to a long tradition that embodies a belief that the homelessness of the Jew stems from his rejection to the Christian Messiah.70 Herzog’s defense of Irish Catholics is consistent with his letter to the Archbishop of Dublin, Edward Byrne.71 Despite his bitter experience with radical Catholicism in Ireland in the last few years of his term, Herzog attributed anti-Semitic instances to insignificant riffraff, unenlightened clergy, and Catholic zealots with a financial angle. Still, his empathy seems disproportionate after his appeal to save the German Jewish physicians had just been turned down. When challenged by Goldman, Herzog explained: I had, in some way, to counteract the restraining influence which such an attitude might have on Catholic efforts to save Jews if indeed they felt that they

Rabbi Herzog, de Valera, and Jewish rescue 63 were thereby furthering the progress towards the fulfillment of our . . . hope of Zion’s restoration . . . This I could only do by pointing out that the restoration . . . – which would . . . be the fulfillment of a prophecy – could only deepen the faith of all believers rather than disturb it.72 This perspective on the ostensibly inherent Catholic resentment toward Zionism raises questions about Herzog’s image of de Valera as a Zionist sympathizer. While according to Herzog, de Valera’s Catholic devoutness cast no shadow on his support of the Jewish people, it is hard not to see the inconsistency in Herzog’s perception of him as a proponent of the Jews’ national aspirations in Palestine. One simplistic explanation may be that in Herzog’s eyes, de Valera was not a typical Catholic and did not endorse the usual approach to Zionism. But the answer may also be found in the dual attitude that de Valera and other Irish Catholic nationalists were forced to adopt in connection with the Zionist movement. Having been raised on the Catholic ethos, they were hostile to the Jews’ struggle for sovereignty over their homeland; at the same time, they could not but identify with this struggle, since it involved opposition to British rule. Herzog’s attempts to get Ireland and the Vatican to help the Lithuanian refugees did not end with the audience with Maglione. On May 12, 1940 Herzog cabled MacRory to ask the Holy See to intervene with the Lithuanian government. Two days later MacRory wrote a letter to Maglione, noting that Jewish welfare organizations were prepared to handle the transportation of yeshiva men and their welfare in Palestine and other destinations.73 Apparently, this letter was no more effective than any of the other Irish avenues attempted in this affair. Only a quarter of the rabbis and yeshiva students from Lithuania were rescued, but neither the Vatican nor Ireland was involved in any way. Just a handful of these refugees were able to reach Palestine, mainly because of the White Paper policy.

Herzog’s appeals to de Valera during the war As the truth about Hitler’s Final Solution began to surface at the end of 1942, Herzog’s appeals to de Valera intensified, since Herzog saw him as his only lifeline. Herzog sought to rescue Jews in any way possible, by making use of Ireland’s closeness to the Vatican and its neutrality in order to negotiate with the German Reich and its satellites. In a cable to de Valera dated December 7, 1942, Herzog pleaded: “Revered friend pray leave no stone unturned to save tormented remnant of Israel doomed alas to utter annihilation in Nazi Europe.” De Valera seemed to be coming through. In his empathetic cable to Rabbi Herzog of January 5, 1943, he promised: “I know you will believe that everything we can do as a neutral state to prevent or alleviate suffering anywhere we shall do to the utmost of our power.”74 In another more detailed cable which was sent with the consent of the Jewish Agency’s Joint Rescue Committee, Herzog described the horrific picture that emerged from an announcement made by the US Secretary of State: two million

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Jews had already been murdered and another five million were in imminent danger. Deportations from Belgium, France, Germany, Holland, Norway to ghettos in Poland and from there to mass-murder facilities continued nonstop. Herzog noted that various proposals had been made (by whom he did not say) to remove Jews from German-occupied territories and relocate them temporarily to neutral countries until they are taken overseas. This, however, would require Germany’s consent, Herzog explained, imploring de Valera: Beg you use good offices stop mass destruction European Jewries and secure permission gradual departure. Please approach His Holiness the Pope for support both directions. May our Heavenly Father vouchsafe you his counsel and guidance and make you Providential agent for salvation millions innocent men women children.75 De Valera was not indifferent. A debate commenced in the Irish Department of External Affairs (Iveagh House),76 which also included communications with Irish diplomats in London (High Commissioner John Dulanty), in Berlin (Cornelius Christopher (Con) Cremin) and Vichy (Sean Murphy) about several proposals that Goodman and Schonfeld had made. But these discussions yielded no practical results, mainly because the Germans were unlikely to allow Jews to leave their territories. One of the proposals was to give some one hundred Jewish refugees visas to Ireland, provided that Rabbi Hertz’s Religious Emergency Council would ensure their welfare and future emigration; another was to bring a limited number of Jewish children to Ireland to live with local Jewish families. It was also proposed that Ireland would use the money collected by the Religious Emergency Council to charter a ship that would take Jewish children through Bulgaria to Turkey or Palestine, under the auspices of the Red Cross. This plan fell through because the Bulgarian government refused to grant transit visas. Meanwhile, things were going from bad to worse. In a cable to de Valera on July 10, 1943, Rabbi Herzog expressed his shock at news that in Italy, 80,000 Jews, natives and refugees alike, were threatened with deportation to Poland. He beseeched de Valera to take action in any way possible, including by contacting the Pope. Joseph Walsh, secretary of the Department of External Affairs, inquired with Ireland’s envoy to the Vatican Thomas J. Kiernan (1941–6), and was told on July 24 that the actual number was 40,000, including 32,000 Italians of mixed blood; 8,000 of pure Jewish blood had already been deported to Poland.77

Efforts to rescue Jews from Vittel Between December 1943 and July 1944, Rabbi Herzog pleaded with de Valera to rescue some 200 families of Jewish dignitaries from Poland who were interned at a camp in Vittel in northeast France and threatened with deportation to death camps at any moment. Goodman made efforts on their behalf in Dublin as part of Agudat Israel’s numerous attempts to save them, as some of the internees were members of this

Rabbi Herzog, de Valera, and Jewish rescue 65 movement, among them renowned rabbis.78 The Jewish Agency’s Joint Rescue Committee was making similar efforts vis-á-vis the United States. These internees carried various South American passports, although questionable. Based on these papers and on guarantees for their maintenance by responsible Jewish public bodies, Herzog pleaded with de Valera to get Ireland to issue them temporary visas.79 Following Herzog’s requests and repeated requests by Goodman to Walshe in mid-April, the Irish diplomatic corps was sent into action, first at Vichy (in December 1943), and later on in Berlin (between January and August 1944), where inquires were made about Germany’s stance on temporary relocation of the families to Ireland. But these efforts bore no fruit. Although de Valera played along, he never agreed to any radical measures such as mass distribution of Irish passports in order to save the Vittel internees.80 Had he agreed to do so, the 200 families may have been saved, since in the course of the war there were several instances, including that of Vittel, when the Germans did agree to exchange nationals of enemy and neutral countries that were imprisoned in Germany and in the Nazi-occupied territories in exchange for German nationals who were being held by countries at war with Germany.81 Rabbi Herzog would not give up. After all else had failed, he was ready to pin his hope on Ireland’s ties with Germany’s world of diplomacy. On July 24, 1944 he sent another cable to Dublin, this time to Walshe, informing him (based on information he received through released internees who had made it to Palestine)82 as follows: all exception 29 sick deported from Vittel on 18.4.44 and 16.5.44 to unknown destination. It is possible they are in camp Bergen Belsen . . . On day of deportation terrible scenes took place. Vigorous efforts being undertaken Allied Powers arrange repatriation through exchange but we fear that completion negotiations find they have already been sent to death camps in Poland. May I on behalf House Israel while thanking esteemed government for previous intervention appeal you make final call to German Government hold up deportation these people. In face cruel tragedy which will shock history till end of days the voice of God and civilization calls to whole humanity not to rest save what can be saved . . . from fire.83 On that very same day, de Valera sent Herzog a cable explaining that his department was doing everything it possibly could. What this meant in practice was that on July 28 and August 9 Walshe cabled Cremin, asking him again to pull some diplomatic strings. Cremin indeed raised the matter with the Germans again, but to no avail. Shortly after that news came that the Vittel Jews were doomed. In the second half of August confirmation arrived that they had been sent to Bergen Belsen and that several had committed suicide.84

Efforts to rescue Budapest’s Jews On December 28, 1944 Rabbi Herzog once again called on de Valera, this time for the rescue of the surviving Jews of Budapest. At the time, Budapest was the

66 Ireland and Zionism: 1937–47 only place in Hungary where any Jews remained, after 435,000 Jews who had been ordered into ghettos in other cities upon the German takeover in March 1944, had been deported to Auschwitz between mid-May and early July. Most of Budapest’s Jews (some 250,000) were assembled in the ghetto in town under constant death threats and terror by the Hungarian Nazi party, the Arrow Cross. Supported by the Germans, this party controlled Hungary as of mid-October 1944, after Regent Miklós Horthy had been ousted by the Germans following his botched attempt to reach a cease-fire with the Russians. Throughout November, deep into the Russian siege, many of Budapest’s Jews were sent to Auschwitz and on death marches to the Austrian border. Some of the Jews of Hungary’s capital found refuge in the city itself, in houses owned by neutral countries. Although his previous attempts to rescue Jews through de Valera had come to naught, Herzog decided to try his Irish connection once again. Perhaps after his failed efforts in May through September of 1944 to meet with the Pope – among them his request to Cardinal MacRory to help in obtaining the Vatican’s consent to a meeting85 – and have him exert his influence to halt the transports of Hungarian Jews to the death camps,86 he perceived de Valera as his last hope to sway the Vatican. Herzog, of course, had no way of knowing what we know today about Pius XII.87 In any event, he made every effort, even when chances were slim to none. On January 17, 1945, Walshe cabled his response: “have been doing everything possible behalf Hungarian Jews.”88 The Irish Department of External Affairs and the diplomatic corps had indeed tried to help Hungary’s Jews several months earlier, following communications between Goodman and Walshe in July 1944. Walshe tried to mobilize Kiernan, but this effort boomeranged; lulling reports Kiernan forwarded to Dublin in the end of July (based on information that the apostolic nuncio in Budapest had passed on to Rome) regarding decent treatment of the Jews by Hungary’s administration in the implementation of discriminating laws, were soon refuted.89 As indicated earlier, deportations were temporarily discontinued in July (under Horthy’s instructions, as a result of international pressure and in order to facilitate a cease-fire). Treatment of the Jews somewhat improved under the new Hungarian government established by Horthy in August, which was less compliant with the Germans. But, as mentioned, in October things took a serious turn for the worse.90 Evidence does not confirm that de Valera and the Department of External Affairs did their utmost, as de Valera and Walshe had assured Herzog in their cables. Granted, Keogh credits de Valera for never turning down any request to help rescue groups of Jews in danger of deportation to the death camps, for using the diplomatic corps to try and save Jews and for being prepared to let a few hundreds Jewish children into Ireland on a temporary basis during the war (although this never materialized). However, Keogh argues that in all, de Valera made do with responding to calls; he never made any initiative of his own, nor did he go out of his way to try and save Jewish lives.91 It seems that at some point even Rabbi Herzog started to doubt de Valera’s sincerity. This assumption is supported by a report submitted to the Jewish

Rabbi Herzog, de Valera, and Jewish rescue 67 Agency Executive and its Rescue Committee by the rabbi, at the beginning of March 1944, upon his return from a rescue mission in Turkey accompanied by Dr M. Eliash, an attorney and well-known public figure. According to a report, for which I could find no additional support, Rabbi Herzog and Eliash considered the possibility of transferring Jews from the Balkans on a neutral ship to Istanbul, where they would stay temporarily. At the Executive meeting on March 5 Herzog reported: “I also thought of an Irish ship; I cabled de Valera and was told that they were doing everything they could, but nothing practical came out of it.”92 Two days later, in an address to the presidium of the Rescue Committee, Rabbi Herzog repeated his statement, albeit more realistically: “I telegrammed Ireland, although we knew we would not get any ships.”93 This qualification indicates Herzog realized that his calls on de Valera were useless, but nevertheless telegrammed him again. Like the relatives of a terminal patient who never stop seeking a cure, Rabbi Herzog was convinced that even if logically all hope was lost, he must not give up. Did he do this to ease his own conscience, or to encourage those who desperately sought his help so that they would not feel abandoned? It could be said that he deeply believed in the ability of Divine Intervention to assist in rare and fantastic ways, provided that humans do the best they can.94

De Valera’s condolence call after Hitler’s death It can generally be said that de Valera’s efforts to rescue Jews were not as comprehensive as they could have been, although their ethical value should not be underestimated. However, his disgraceful conduct shortly before the end of the war casts a heavy shadow on his record. On May 2, 1945 de Valera paid a visit to the German envoy to Dublin, Eduard Hempel, to convey condolences on the death of Hitler. This shameful visit took place after the British armed forces had liberated Bergen Belsen on April 15 and exposed the atrocities perpetrated by the Germans. De Valera’s call on Hempel sent shockwaves throughout the international community, and provoked a barrage of criticism. Headlines in Europe and the United States marred de Valera’s reputation forever.95 Surprisingly, the Hebrew newspapers in Palestine treated the visit quite casually and did not devote much attention to the matter. There were nevertheless a few pointed articles that stressed the Jewish perspective and expressed deep disgust with de Valera’s behavior. To underscore de Valera’s fall from grace, critics mentioned how admired he was as an Irish freedom fighter, how he had supported the Zionist cause, and how he had tried to help rescue Jews. The bottom line, however, was that all of these good deeds combined could not offset his partnering with absolute evil when he grieved the death of the devil.96 It is easy to imagine how shocked Briscoe and Rabbi Herzog must have been at de Valera’s call on Hempel. For obvious reasons, Briscoe made no mention of this transgression in his book, and in any case continued to admire and support de Valera in years to come. Appalled and upset as it was, the Jewish community in Ireland also kept silent. Apparently, the community’s tradition of caution and

68 Ireland and Zionism: 1937–47 avoiding overexposure came into play this time too. I found no evidence of Rabbi Herzog’s response to the visit; whatever it was, Herzog did not sever his ties with de Valera, on the contrary, a short time later, in September 1946, the two leaders met in Dublin to discuss providing refuge in Ireland, even if temporary, for 100 Jewish orphans who survived Bergen Belsen. On his visit to Dublin together with his son Jacob, the Rabbi sought to support the Religious Emergency Council, which had undertaken organizing the children’s transfer to Ireland and keeping them there until their passage to the United States or Palestine would be possible. While the Department of Justice pursued his stringent wartime policy and opposed bringing the children to Ireland, de Valera was attentive to Rabbi Herzog and was willing to respond to this humanitarian request. Eventually the Ministry of Justice was forced to its dismay to retract its opposition, thus enabling the Religious Emergency Council to carry out the mission some time later.97 On behalf of the Irish government de Valera took this opportunity of Herzog’s visit, to award him with £80,000 worth of cattle with which to feed Jewish refugees.98 In late July of 1950 de Valera held a private seven-day visit to Israel, accompanied by his two sons and by Briscoe. The visit was in the nature of a private pilgrimage to the holy places, particularly those in old and new Jerusalem. Yet, de Valera did not conceal his desire to study what was happening in Israel from up close, particularly the efforts to restore the Hebrew language. Israel’s newspapers described de Valera as Rabbi Herzog’s guest. Although there were several writers who accused him of despotism, by and large the Israeli press portrayed him as a true democrat, the historic leader of Ireland, pivotal in its fight for freedom and one of the most admirable figures of his time. Rabbi Herzog gave a dinner party for de Valera at his own residence, with Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, Minister of Interior Moshe Shapira and Minister of Supply and Rationing Dov Yosef among the guests. Years later, de Valera looked back at this meeting very fondly, recalling Ben-Gurion’s warmth.99 Rabbi Herzog had conveyed his friendship for and admiration of de Valera to his family as well. This can be seen in a letter Jacob Herzog sent some 16 years later to Mervyn L. Abrahamson, chairman of the representative council of Irish Jews. The letter was sent on the occasion of planting of a forest in the Galilee in de Valera’s honor on behalf of the Jewish community in Ireland. J. Herzog, then Director General of the Prime Minister’s Office, echoed in his letter the words he had heard his father use when he was a child, in praise of de Valera. Herzog wrote Abrahamson about the depth of de Valera’s insight on the revival of the Jewish nation and of the empathy he had expressed for Israel’s struggle for independence.100 Even if J. Herzog exaggerated as a result of the festive circumstances in which the letter was written, his words still express genuine admiration for de Valera, reflecting the views of his father, Rabbi Herzog. Friends tend to play down problems and blunders and focus on good deeds, sometimes giving them more weight than they in fact deserve. It is easy to imagine that while de Valera’s deplorable visit with Hempel was a serious blow to Rabbi Herzog, de Valera’s responsiveness to his rescue attempts, as tepid and

Rabbi Herzog, de Valera, and Jewish rescue 69 unenthusiastic as they were, spoke – in Herzog’s eyes – of de Valera’s virtue and tipped the scales in his favor. Still, de Valera’s behavior remains enigmatic, as does his complex, multifaceted personality as a whole.101

In conclusion The friendship between de Valera and Rabbi Herzog, founded on mutual respect that the two prominent leaders had for each other and on their common interests, lasted many years. They were attentive to each other and helped one another in hard times, but this relationship was not fully symmetrical. During the Irish uprising against the British and in the lowest point in de Valera’s political career Rabbi Herzog was there to offer him physical assistance in the form of a hideout, as well as spiritual support. But the greatest need was Rabbi Herzog’s. In the tragic times described here, Herzog was in urgent need of de Valera’s support, although not for his own personal needs. Herzog hoped de Valera would help the yishuv, but mostly pinned his hopes on his friend, to leverage his status in the League of Nations, and as the leader of a neutral country that had ties with the Vatican, to help save his people. De Valera completely failed to meet Rabbi Herzog’s expectations in this respect. Surely there were times when Rabbi Herzog questioned the sincerity of de Valera’s statements that he was doing the best he could, but Herzog did not forget that in those dark days when rescue avenues were almost entirely blocked, de Valera never closed his door to him. After the war, Rabbi Herzog continued to view de Valera not only as his personal friend, but also as a friend of the Jewish people.

Part II

Ireland and the State of Israel 1948–63

3

De facto recognition of Israel by Ireland

Ireland was one of the many countries contacted by Moshe Shertok, Foreign Minister of the provisional government1 of Israel, immediately after statehood was declared on May 14, 1948, with an official request for diplomatic recognition of Israel and its government.2 This was the beginning of a campaign that would be given top priority by the Foreign Ministry, due to the unique political and military circumstances of Israel at that time. The Declaration of Independence, with the borders set in the UN partition plan of November 1947, was adopted unilaterally by the People’s Council,3 without the UN’s blessing. In fact, faced with Arab opposition to the partition plan and the bloody military onslaught against the yishuv immediately after the vote, the UN began to backtrack. Immediately following its Declaration of Independence, Israel had to repel invasion by five Arab countries aiming to annihilate the newborn state. Under these circumstances, Israel was in dire need of support, and searched for avenues to the community of nations. It was therefore essential for Israel to gain recognition by as many states as possible, small or large, the sooner the better. The number of states recognizing Israel was just as important as the weight these states carried.4 But Shertok’s request went unanswered. It was the first step in a long process that would end only in 1993, when the two countries finally exchanged ambassadors. On February 12, 1949, Ireland recognized Israel de facto. This delay was not unusual. Many countries, including the United Kingdom, the countries of the British Commonwealth and Ireland’s neighbors in western Europe, also withheld their de facto recognition during this interval. But unlike these countries and many others that reinforced their de facto recognition by recognizing Israel de jure within a reasonable time thereafter, Ireland refrained from recognizing Israel de jure until May 1963. It also deferred the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel until the end of 1974, making it one of the last western European countries to do so. Until 1967 it was even counted among the few countries in the whole of Europe that had not yet established diplomatic relations with Israel.5

The concept of recognition in international law The analysis of the evolution of diplomatic relations between Israel and Ireland must be preceded by a discussion of the concept of recognition in international law and

74 Ireland and the State of Israel: 1948–63 the distinction between de facto and de jure recognition. The starting point for this discussion is the definition in international law regarding the four fundamental conditions required for statehood as codified by the Montevideo Convention of 1933: The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.6 Since there is no central international body that can make a binding decision, as to whether these conditions are met for any new state, the rule in international law is that each state may choose whether to recognize the newcomer. Therefore, states that withhold their recognition of new states, even ones that meet all the conditions are not in violation of international law. As actual practice shows, states have exercised this prerogative as a political and even an ideological instrument. For political or other reasons, they may be reluctant to expressly recognize a new entity that claims statehood or refuse to recognize a new state even when all four conditions have clearly been met. When they do grant recognition, states often choose the timing meticulously. Thus, despite the legal character of recognition, the decision of whether to recognize a new state is not based on law alone. In fact, political factors often play a more decisive role. As for de jure and de facto recognition, Oppenheim’s International Law provides the following distinction: “that the former is the fullest kind of recognition while the latter is a lesser degree of recognition.”7 A broader definition provides that de facto recognition is that which is usually granted early on and temporarily, to a new entity claiming statehood, while the recognizing state is still deliberating as to whether the entity complies with the conditions for statehood and is not convinced that it will survive as an independent state over time. The recognizing state nevertheless finds it to be in its best interests to maintain official relations with the entity, albeit relations that do not conform to diplomatic protocol. De jure recognition is, in most cases, granted at a later stage, once the recognizing state estimates that the conditions have all been met and that the existence of the new state is a fait accompli.8 As noted, this definition is not necessarily adopted by existing states. The Israeli example is a case in point. President Truman announced on May 14, 1948 that he intended to recognize Israel immediately once he received a suitable request. Eliahu Epstein (who later changed his name to the more Israeli sounding Elath), Jewish Agency representative in the United States at the time, understood the implied message and without delay submitted a request on behalf of Israel’s provisional government. Truman reacted just as fast, and announced US recognition of this government as the de facto government of the newly established State of Israel, reaffirming the truthfulness of the saying Bis dat, qui cito dat (he gives twice who gives promptly). The significance of this instant de facto recognition cannot be overstated.9 The Soviet Union did not dawdle either: it was the first to grant Israel de jure recognition, only three days after the Declaration of Independence. These states recognized Israel even though the prospects of its survival at the time were unclear.

De facto recognition of Israel by Ireland 75 Other countries, including Ireland, were motivated by political and other considerations, and withheld their de facto recognition for varying durations. Some of these states, including Ireland, continued to refrain from recognizing Israel de jure, well after its existence and survival could no longer be questioned.

The Vatican’s influence on Ireland One of the main factors, perhaps even the most important, that hampered Irish-Israeli diplomatic relations, was the Vatican, which did not recognize Israel until 1993, and urged Ireland to withhold its recognition as well. To analyze the influence of the Holy See on Ireland in this context, the Vatican’s own policy in this period must first be understood. Faced with broad international support for Jewish statehood after the Holocaust, the Vatican was forced to temper its reaction to the UN partition resolution of November 1947, particularly because it needed the United States as its ally against the Soviet threat. But the Vatican was able to accept the partition resolution, albeit reluctantly, only thanks to the territorial internationalization clause, which proposed organizing Jerusalem and its surroundings as a demilitarized, neutral, corpus separatum under UN supervision.10 This reflected Vatican’s traditional concern for the holy places and in particular for Jerusalem, which plays an important role in Christian tradition. Jerusalem was the venue for the suffering, death, and resurrection of Jesus and the cornerstones of Christian faith. It was in Jerusalem that the first Christian community, led by the Apostles, had formed, and it was from there that the Gospel was spread. Jerusalem was where the first church was built, laying the foundation for the history of the Christian Church. This was also one of the first places for which Christians longed and has always been a site of pilgrimage.11 The Vatican remained cautious and refrained from publicly supporting either side, even after the onset of hostilities the morning after the partition resolution. It also made no response upon the foundation of the State of Israel, whose future – as well as the outcome of the war in Palestine – was as yet uncertain. To solve its dilemma, the Vatican simply did not recognize the new state.12 In its response to the UN partition plan, the Zionist establishment fulfilled the Holy See’s expectations with regard to Jerusalem, when it was forced to concede the dream of a Jewish Jerusalem and accept territorial internationalization. But shortly after the state was established, Israel’s provisional government began to disengage from the corpus separatum plan. This process was the outcome of the Arab attempt to thwart the partition plan by force, and of the chain of events that followed: the inability of the United Nations to enforce internationalization in the face of the Arab attacks on the Jewish community in Jerusalem that began in February 1948, and eventually the United Nations’s abandonment of the besieged city; the breakthrough to Jerusalem and the reoccupation of the city, including all the Arab neighborhoods in the western part of town, by the Haganah (which became the IDF in May 1948) and the IZL by August 1948.

76 Ireland and the State of Israel: 1948–63 Israel’s control of west Jerusalem and Transjordan’s control of the Old City (after the Jewish Quarter was taken by the Transjordan army, the British-officered Arab Legion, at the end of May 1948) illustrated to Israel’s leaders the impracticality of the corpus separatum idea. Seeing the impotence of the Christian world at the danger to Jerusalem, Israel’s leaders considered themselves morally released from honoring the corpus separatum requirement. On July 29, 1948, the provisional government passed a resolution stating that Israel was not bound by this principle. Around the same time, negotiations with Transjordan started for the partition of Jerusalem. On November 15, at the political committee of the UN Assembly in Paris, Shertok announced that the internationalization of Jerusalem as a whole had expired, and that internationalization could only be implemented at the holy places. In other words, Shertok said that the principle of functional internationalization would replace that of territorial internationalization.13 Alternatively, Shertok suggested the internationalization of the Old City – ostensibly an option that represented Israel’s best interests, but also one that was justified because practically almost all the holy places are located there.14 On February 12, 1949 – after the provisional government announced that Jerusalem was no longer to be considered occupied territory – the constitutive assembly (which later became the Knesset, Israel’s parliament) was convened in Israel-held area of Jerusalem – an act designed to overtly and irrevocably assert Israel’s presence in the city. The struggle climaxed with Ben-Gurion’s announcement on December 13, 1949 that the government offices and the Knesset would relocate to Jerusalem, and in the Knesset’s announcement of January 23, 1950, that Jerusalem was Israel’s eternal capital. This was the final response to the repeated support lent by the UN General Assembly on December 9, 1949 to territorial internationalization of Jerusalem as a whole.15 The Vatican’s reserved, neutral front concealed the great hostility it harbored against Israel. The age-old theology was coupled with the question of Jerusalem and the holy places. The Vatican’s insistence on the internationalization of Jerusalem, would impact on its relationship with Israel for years to come. Reports received by the Vatican from local Catholic circles during the military conflict between Israel and the Arabs fed the fire. These reports, which were disseminated throughout the world and spawned an anti-Israeli and even antiSemitic slander campaign, accused Israel of mistreatment of clergymen, deliberate destruction of holy places and Church property and looting. But no such accusation were made against the Arabs. Although Israeli forces were not free of blame, the reports overstated the incidents to illustrate Israel’s inability to protect Christian interests and even hint that Israel was out to eradicate the Christian presence in the Holy Land. The Arab-Israeli conflict naturally positioned the Vatican on the Arab side, since due to diplomatic and religious considerations, the Vatican was concerned with the fate of the Christian communities in the Arab countries, and had to take their governments’ reactions into account.16 However, the problem of the Arab refugees had a decisive influence on the Vatican’s attitude to Israel. The Christians among the refugee population accounted for 70 percent of the native Christian population in Palestine. Nevertheless, the Vatican did not expressly

De facto recognition of Israel by Ireland 77 discriminate between Christians and Muslims and supported the Arab population as a whole. This policy was evident in the Vatican’s humanitarian and political intervention in favor of the refugees. Their problem strengthened the Vatican’s support of the corpus separatum concept, since it would have enabled the return of thousands of refugees – enhancing Christian presence in Jerusalem. Thus the Vatican intertwined the two issues and made their solution a condition for rapprochement with Israel. The Vatican also perceived Israel as a spearhead for Communist penetration of the Middle East. This descendant of the older equation between Zionism and Judaism on the one hand and Bolshevism on the other, was another factor that influenced the Vatican’s unreceptive attitude toward Israel. The Soviet Union’s support of the partition resolution, the fact that it was first to recognize Israel de jure, the fact that most of the Eastern bloc instantly recognized Israel, the military aid that Czechoslovakia lent to Israel in its war of independence, the socialist structure of the kibbutz, and the overwhelming ratio of eastern European Jews in Israel’s leadership, all seemed to corroborate the Vatican’s concerns that Israel would be pro-Soviet. These concerns were dispelled as Israel’s relationship with the Soviet Union deteriorated.17 Faced with the state of war in Palestine at the end of the summer of 1948 and the dramatic reports of damage to Christian interests in the Holy Land, the Vatican abandoned its restraint. On October 2, 1948, Pius XII published an encyclical – “In Multiplicibus Curis” – in which he explained the need to internationalize Jerusalem and its environs and provide international guarantees for freedom of worship and free access to all other holy places in Palestine. He repeated this demand in his Christmas address. In early 1949, he complained, through his nuncios to various governments about the inappropriate conduct of the Israeli military at holy places and churches and about its mistreatment of missionaries and clergymen.18 With the end of the war in sight,19 the Pope reiterated his demands about Jerusalem and the holy places with even greater force. On April 15, 1949, in another encyclical – “Redemptoris Nostri,” he repeated his complaints regarding the desecration of Catholic places of worship. He also demanded guarantees for age-old Catholic rights to the holy places, freedom of access and worship for pilgrims and the continued operation of educational and charity institutions. He expounded on the suffering of hungry refugees living in “concentration camps” and called for their rehabilitation. He also called on his followers to use all legal means possible to convince their governments of the need to comply with these demands.20 The Vatican did not relax its position in the following years. The Holy See considered the sweeping international recognition that Israel received to be a waiver on the part of the Christian world of the strongest card that could be played in forcing Israel to accept internationalization. The Vatican also tried, unsuccessfully, to influence UN member states to make Israel’s acceptance into the organization contingent upon guarantees for territorial internationalization. However, from the time of Vatican’s achievement to obtain a new vote on the territorial internationalization resolution of December 1949, and until the death of Pius XII

78 Ireland and the State of Israel: 1948–63 on October 1958, the Vatican took no further action. Perhaps it realized how hard it would be to repeat this success; but possibly it did not want to confront the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, which since April 1950 controlled the holy places in the Old City of Jerusalem.21 The Pope’s policy on the issue of Jerusalem and the refugees, as defined by Pius XII and the Vatican’s acting secretary of state, Domenico Tardini who was known for his hostility to Israel, influenced that of Pius’ successor, Pope John XXIII (November 1958–June 1963). Despite the empathy and openness of the Pope himself and of several members of the Curia Romana toward Israel, Tardini’s views held sway.22 In fact, the Vatican’s influence on Irish policy visà-vis Israel was not characteristic of Irish foreign policy as a whole. Leaders such as Eamon de Valera and John A. Costello generally followed the formula attributed to Daniel O’Connell: “Take religion from Rome and politics from home,” although they sometimes did not draw clear distinctions between these two spheres.23 Generally, Ireland had its own independent foreign policy, which did not always dovetail with the Vatican’s preferences. A cardinal case from Costello’s first Inter-Party Government, illustrates this point. In 1949, the government refused to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), although the Vatican strongly supported cementing Western solidarity against the Soviets. This refusal contrasted starkly with the fierce anti-Communist sentiment among the Catholic majority in Ireland and the anti-Soviet orientation of Costello’s party and government. Furthermore, Costello’s government made a point of emphasizing its loyalty to the Vatican, in order to counter the anti-clerical image of the radical national party, Clann na Poblachta (Party of the Republic), and its dynamic leader, Minister of External Affairs MacBride, who was perceived as the strongman of the government. His anti-clerical image emanated from his revolutionary past as the son of Major John MacBride and Maud Gonne, and as former chief of staff of the IRA. The NATO question was nevertheless decided on domestic political grounds, mainly the survival of the fragile coalition.24 The government depended on Clann na Poblachta, which championed the eradication of the partition of Ireland. It therefore found it difficult to join NATO in which Britain, which was responsible for this partition, played such a prominent role. Another element that further supports the understanding that foreign policy is frequently a reflection of domestic affairs, was the threat that de Valera and his opposition represented for the coalition. Free of the constraints of office, de Valera ran a campaign of global reach against the partition plan. With its fragility and its unwillingness to risk hostile public opinion, Costello’s government could not afford to be more conciliatory than de Valera. It therefore made its membership in NATO contingent upon eradication of the partition.25 However, with regard to the recognition of Israel, Ireland honored the Vatican’s will, primarily because of Catholic loyalty and the holy places. Other contributing factors included Israel’s pro-Soviet image in its first years, and the anti-Semitic sentiment which could be found especially among Catholic and Church circles. Ireland’s reluctance to recognize Israel de jure was also designed to avoid the next

De facto recognition of Israel by Ireland 79 natural step – full diplomatic relations. This dovetailed with Ireland’s policy at the time of limiting its diplomatic relations to a minimum, a policy that was supported by a public that was indifferent to foreign relations, except with Britain – Ireland’s primary trading partner. Passivity and even hostility to all foreign matters was still present among Dáil members until the early 1970s. Irish modest participation in international politics which was due to some extent to its geographic and cultural isolation, survived for many years, in fact until Ireland joined the European Community in 1973.26 These factors were inevitably intertwined with reasons of financial order, which also influenced the scarcity and slow evolution of Ireland’s diplomatic ties.27 After Ireland joined the UN, its need to gain footing in the international arena, coupled with its desire not to hurt the Arab bloc, also impacted on its Israeli policy.

Israel’s policy toward Ireland Israel developed during that time extensive diplomatic relations, far beyond its relative size. International recognition and diplomatic relations were essential to Israel from the outset not only because of the standard reasons shared by all states, but also because of Israel’s specific situation. Surrounded by a hostile Arab world and subjected to the Arab boycott, Israel had no choice but to develop its foreign relations to a much greater degree than most other countries of its size. Israel also had to create economic, trade, and cultural relations outside of the Middle East. The frequent UN discussions of matters pertaining to Israel also required Israel to conduct public relations activities in the capitals of the world. Israel’s role as the home of the Jewish nation and its closeness to and interdependence with the Diaspora also necessitated as many strong relationships with other countries as possible.28 But Israel’s repeated attempts to normalize its relationship with Ireland were apparently also motivated by a unique belief that the road to Vatican passes through Catholic countries. This assumption was the foundation of Israel’s Vatican policy after the United Nations’s reapproval of the corpus separatum concept in December 1949. A review by J. Herzog, Director of the Christian Communities desk at the Ministry of Religious Affairs (1948–54), and Counselor on Jerusalem in the Foreign Ministry (1951–7), sheds light on this policy. The Vatican’s insistence on the Jerusalem issue, led the Israel Foreign Ministry to adopt a new approach and stop trying to negotiate with the Vatican directly. As part of this focus shift, Israel intensified its efforts to convince Catholic states that the corpus separatum plan could never work, and Israel’s rule in Jerusalem was therefore a fait accompli. Israel was apparently trying to isolate the Vatican in its demand for internationalization and eventually force a thaw in relations between the two states.29 While Herzog did not make any direct reference to Ireland in his review, it could be assumed that Ireland was included in this policy approach, since the ties with Ireland, a state with substantial clout in the Catholic world, were considered to be invaluable. The factors that slowed Ireland’s recognition of

80 Ireland and the State of Israel: 1948–63 Israel, along with other issues, such as Israel’s position, initiatives and responses, are discussed in the following pages.

Response of the Costello government to Shertok’s cable Costello’s inter-party government was in no rush to recognize Israel, and, at MacBride’s advice, apart from confirming receipt of Shertok’s cable, it did not take any step forward.30 The government’s reluctance might be associated with the campaign on the part of Costello and MacBride against the partition of Ireland.31 Perhaps because the partition was on the agenda, the government was conceptually unable to recognize Israel – a state based on partition and therefore “born in sin.” Although I found no documents to support this hypothesis, Rabbi Immanuel Jakobovits had forwarded it when he assumed the office of Ireland’s Chief Rabbi in 1949.32 Another likely influence strengthening the irresponsiveness of the Irish government was the similar stance taken by Britain and other western European states. Such influence was consistent with the tendency of the Irish Department of External Affairs to increase its involvement in European affairs, despite the marginal role of foreign affairs in the Irish public eye. This transformation occurred, as political and economic circumstances forced Ireland to abandon the physical and psychological isolation of its wartime neutrality. The Cold War pushed it even closer to the Western bloc, although not to the extent of joining NATO.33 Ireland was a member of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and was among the beneficiaries of the Marshall Plan. It was also a founder member of the Council of Europe in 1949. Its involvement in European affairs was prompted, to a great degree, by MacBride, who – perhaps thanks to his French upbringing – advocated European cooperation and integration.34

Efforts of the Israeli Foreign Ministry Although Ireland’s response to the issue of recognition was long in coming, Israel’s Foreign Ministry never lost hope. In the fall of 1948, it began to search for ways to win over the Irish government. Israel’s delegates to Washington were also mobilized, but the focus was on the London team, which served as the main communication channel with Dublin. Although recognition is a one-way street – only existing states can recognize new states, and all that a new state can do is ask for such recognition – the Israeli Foreign Ministry was proactive. The Israeli delegation in Washington was instructed to try to organize a meeting with Costello during his visit to Canada and the United States in the fall of 1948. But this opportunity was missed because of problems typical of a newly created diplomatic service. Elath, Israel’s special envoy to Washington, was only informed of the plan to meet with Costello after the latter had left the country.35 Even before October 1948, Shertok assigned Joseph Linton, the acting delegate of Israel’s provisional government to London, to visit Dublin when he felt the

De facto recognition of Israel by Ireland 81 time was ripe, to examine ways to advance the issue of Irish recognition. Linton had friends in high places such as Solicitor Herman Good, a member of the Jewish Representative Council (later a district judge and president of the Dublin Hebrew Congregation) who had connections with MacBride. Linton hoped that Good and his other friends would be instrumental in this task.36 Israel’s Foreign Ministry was also offered help by a Jewish attorney from Dublin, Raphael Seligman (cousin of Max Seligman – an Israeli attorney, renowned for defending IZL operatives), who had good connections in the Irish Department of External Affairs. Raphael Seligman, an avid Zionist and anxious to help, asked the Israel’s Foreign Ministry for a green light. But the Ministry held him back, explaining that no action should be taken before the United Nations decided whether to accept Israel as a member.37 Indeed, the Israeli issue was on the agenda of the General Assembly and Security Council, which convened in Paris in the fall of 1948. Clearly, Israel’s Foreign Ministry felt that the international legitimacy Israel would receive if accepted into the United Nations, would serve as an incentive for states that had not yet recognized it, such as Britain and some western European countries; this in turn would motivate Ireland to recognize Israel as well. On December 22, after the UN rejected Israel’s application,38 Seligman again offered the Foreign Ministry his assistance. His argument in favor of rapprochement between Israel and Ireland was Ireland’s moral influence with the Holy See and Catholic nations, which for Israel could have been “a valuable link in the establishment of satisfactory relations with the Vatican.”39 In retrospect and as the following pages explain, the dynamic was actually reversed: it was the Vatican that stopped Ireland from normalizing its relationship with Israel. But all this of course is wisdom after the fact. The Foreign Ministry did not accept Seligman’s offer this time either, explaining that his involvement as a private citizen was unwanted.40 The reason was apparently Linton’s willingness, as early as the end of December 1948 after the UN Paris discussions, to take vigorous action to motivate Ireland to recognize Israel. Linton planned to go to Ireland in early January, hoping to convince his friends there to organize meetings with Costello and MacBride. Linton was optimistic due to reports from his friends about expressions of goodwill toward Israel among influential circles in Dublin. Apparently, Linton’s friends were alluding primarily to MacBride, a long-time adversary of Britain, who was likely to support a nation that had only just won its independence from the British. This hypothesis is also supported by a letter a month later from Seligman to Michael Comay, head of the Commonwealth desk in the Israeli Foreign Ministry. Seligman indicated in his letter that MacBride could be trusted to be sympathetic, although the support of the government as a whole was by no means guaranteed. One insurmountable obstacle he noted was James Dillon, the dynamic Minister for Agriculture, who associated Zionism with communism.41 Dillon’s approach was widely accepted in Vatican and in Catholic circles. It can be seen as representing an anti-Jewish approach, this time in an anti-Israel guise. The account by Dr Fish, Israel’s trade representative in Britain, who visited Dublin, also contributed to Linton’s optimism. Fish reported enthusiasm in the

82 Ireland and the State of Israel: 1948–63 government and the Irish commercial sector for possible trade relations with Israel, prompted by the interest expressed by the latter in buying Irish beef. But Linton was careful with his optimism. Based on impressions of his friends in Dublin, he assessed that Irish recognition would in any event require the approval of the Vatican, and that the Vatican’s opinion would count at least as much as Ireland’s sympathy for Israel and potential trade relations. Linton therefore suggested another important route – America. The State Department would have to be convinced to talk to Ireland’s representatives in Washington, he wrote to Elath. Alternatively, he suggested that the US representative in Dublin, George Garrett,42 talk to the Irish Department of External Affairs. Linton also said that prominent leaders in the Irish community in the United States should be mobilized to influence Irish representatives in Washington to expedite recognition.43 This suggestion was supported by Comay, who empowered Elath to follow this course of action.44 Elath chose the shortest route available – via the Irish representative in Washington – and asked him to reiterate the official request for recognition that Israel’s provisional government had made in May 1948. Elath underscored the economic interests at stake, but also played the sentiment card, noting the solidarity that Jews felt for Ireland, whose struggle for independence was a model for Israel’s own.45 Linton’s friends in Dublin were not idle either. At the beginning of January 1949, they secured MacBride’s consent to meet with Linton when he came to Dublin. But the meeting never took place. The Royal Air Force incident at the Egyptian border forced Linton to stay in London.46

Inquiries into the Vatican’s position Toward the end of January, an initiative undertaken by Spain to protect the holy places in Palestine, coupled with news of Britain’s intention to recognize Israel, forced the Irish Department of External Affairs and its ambassador to the Vatican, Walshe, to address these issues. Spain’s initiative, spurred by the Pope’s repeated demand for territorial internationalization of Jerusalem in his Christmas address, was meant to remove the mandate for internationalization from the United Nations, in favor of Catholic states. Spain, which was not a UN member, was concerned by the fact that it and other prominent Catholic states, such as Ireland and Portugal, which did not belong to the United Nations either, would not be able to participate in the supervision of the holy places. It, therefore, proposed that their ambassadors to the Vatican make simultaneous démarches to the Holy See. Walshe was to be appointed to this job, since it was well known that he had more influence with the Holy Father than any other diplomat. The idea was to convince the Vatican to receive a UN mandate to supervise the holy places. Thus empowered, the Holy See would authorize Catholic states to practice this supervision. Iveagh House upon receiving Spain’s proposal suspected that Spain’s motivation was simply to boost its own prestige, and treated this proposal as impractical. After consulting with Walshe, it ultimately shelved it. Walshe had also been informed

De facto recognition of Israel by Ireland 83 by Tardini – Vatican’s acting secretary, and Montini – Vatican’s acting secretary for ordinary (or non-diplomatic) affairs (1944–54) – that the Vatican considered the notion of receiving a mandate to supervise the holy places to be nothing short of absurd. The Vatican rejected this notion for practical reasons, realizing it would bar the United States from playing an active role. The Vatican, eager to work with the rising superpower, knew this would only be possible under the auspices of the United Nations. The Holy See nevertheless wanted the supervising forces to be joined by the Catholic states, such as Ireland, which – through its diasporas in the United States and Australia – had an extremely strong position in the English-speaking Catholic world.47 While looking into the Vatican’s stance regarding this initiative, and faced with the de facto partition of Jerusalem between Transjordan and Israel, Walshe tried to inquire whether the Pope’s position on internationalization had changed. However, he did not receive a straightforward answer. In the meantime, on January 20, he sent a letter to the Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, Frederick Boland,48 containing an English translation of an article entitled “La Questione Palestinese” from Civilta Cattolica, a mouthpiece of the Vatican. The article, published in the January 1 issue, stated as follows: there will be no respect for the Holy Places, no protection of acknowledged Catholic rights . . . unless there is established in Jerusalem and district an international regime guaranteed by the United Nations together with a system of guarantees also collective for the protection of religious liberty. Walshe felt this was the most that the Pope was willing to reveal officially and publicly, but was unsure whether the Holy See had another plan apart from territorial internationalization. Walshe also underscored the Vatican’s distaste for Jewish rule over the Holy Land in general, and for the Israeli government in particular, since this government was perceived to be atheistic or at least anti-Roman Catholic with a tendency to favor the Orthodox groups. Walshe probably shared this dissatisfaction, but interestingly, felt that the Vatican should have abandoned the concept of territorial internationalization, because the chances of implementing such a solution were rapidly decreasing. Based on publications in the Jewish press, indicating that the Israeli government had already relocated its offices from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem,49 Walshe inferred that the Jews intended to immediately declare Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. He postulated they would also make statements about the holy places that would not satisfy the Holy See, but that the latter would be forced to accept. If Jerusalem were to be pronounced Israel’s capital, he thought, chances were that American and British support for territorial internationalization would decline; these two states would not risk possible charges by the powerful Jewish lobby that they were trying to deny the Jews their historic capital. Walshe therefore held that it may be better for the Holy See to take half a loaf, and accept the promises made by the Jews, insufficient as they were. Insistence on territorial internationalization would also mean risking heightened Jewish propaganda

84 Ireland and the State of Israel: 1948–63 about Catholic dominion in the Jewish capital, he argued. Thus, paradoxically, Walshe defended the Jewish stance on internationalization, motivated by the classical anti-Semitic myth of undefeatable Jewish political clout. In another letter to Boland, two days later,50 Walshe – a tireless writer – again expressed his position of compromise. Faced with the news that Britain would soon be recognizing Israel, Walshe conjectured that many other states, including Ireland, would follow Britain’s lead. But this news gave him no pleasure, and he even berated the British for their rush to recognize Israel. With the Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia in 1948 in mind, he wrote: “The British, in spite of the humiliations they have suffered, seem to have suddenly become obsessed with the idea that, unless they establish friendly contact at once with the Jews, the Russians will turn Palestine into another Czechoslovakia.” Realizing that British recognition would force Ireland to make up its mind on the subject, Walshe held that Ireland had to find out whether Jerusalem was considered an integral part of the State of Israel in British (and American) eyes. In Walshe’s analysis, the Irish Department of External Affairs had two immediate tasks: first, to ascertain the practical plans of the Jews regarding the holy places, and, second, to gain a clear understanding of the Vatican’s position on the issue of recognition. Walshe’s strong feelings on the need to compromise on this subject is evidenced by the fact that, apparently impressed by Israel’s military accomplishments, he believed it necessary to ascertain the Vatican’s position on the worst-case scenario – Jewish control of the entire Holy Land – although even he perceived this possibility as merely hypothetical. Inquiries should be made, Walshe held, as to whether under such circumstances, the Vatican would negotiate with the Israeli government to make the best of a bad thing, and whether, subject to written Israeli guarantees, it would be prepared to establish diplomatic relations in order to gain locus standi in Jerusalem. While Walshe exercised his customary discretion51 and classified his letters to Boland as “secret,” he did not conceal his dissatisfaction with the Vatican’s insistence on territorial internationalization. For example in January 1949, he told colleagues at the US embassy in Rome that “Vatican policy urging internationalization Jerusalem unwise in view of imminent wholesale de facto recognition of Israel.”52 There was another reason, which eventually proved to be valid, as to why Walshe found the Vatican’s insistence on territorial internationalization to be misguided: “guarantees by Israel to guard and maintain holy places would better serve interests of Christian churches for preservation and free access for worship.”53 Walshe’s conciliatory flexible note combined with information sent on December 23 by Canada to MacBride through Turgeon, its representative in Ireland, indicating Canada’s intention to announce de facto recognition of Israel the next day,54 may well have influenced the Minister. MacBride, who from the outset expressed goodwill toward Israel, was inclined to take concrete action on this issue. On January 26, Boland told Count Ostroróg, the French delegate who came to see him at his office, that MacBride had already given much thought to the question of recognizing Israel, and although he had not yet made up his mind,

De facto recognition of Israel by Ireland 85 it would not be incorrect to say that the decision was “less one of substance than of timing.”55 But the main catalyst for the Irish government’s final decision was at the end of January, when many states granted Israel de facto recognition, including Britain and other western European countries, as well as Catholic states such as France and Italy.56 This put the number of states that had recognized Israel at more than 40, including the United States, which on January 31 granted de jure recognition.57 This positive change for Israel was motivated by its victory over its neighbors and the ceasefire negotiations with Egypt, which commenced on January 10, under the auspices of the United Nations. These developments proved Israel was a fait accompli. This was further substantiated by the elections for the Constitutive Assembly (which later became the Knesset) on January 25, 1949, which boosted Israel’s reputation as a democracy. To Walshe, the recognition granted by these states was a red flag, and on February 5 he dispatched another letter to Boland.58 Walshe, who was aware of MacBride’s intentions regarding Israel,59 was concerned about Ireland’s status in the Vatican, and did not want his country to hastily recognize Israel without guarantees for the holy places. He wrote Boland that he had met with Montini, who told him he had discussed the difficulties in internationalizing Jerusalem with the Pope. Montini even quoted Walshe’s position, advocating “getting all we can out of the Jews without imposing upon them the humiliation of taking their Capital from them.” According to his own account to Boland, Walshe responded to Montini’s report as follows: In any case we had come to a stage, quite suddenly, at which we have really have to abandon all our old conceptions about the Holy Land. Also . . . we should be taking a line open to misunderstanding, if we were to raise the issue of the Holy Places as if it were vital to the continuation of the faith in the world. Walshe added: I believed the Jews would agree to protect our Holy Places and to give us the rights we had in the days of Turkish dominion. They would have all sorts of reasons for doing so and the development of the tourist industry was one of them. Walshe’s conclusion was that: the H.S. [Holy See] would now be very grateful if the Minister [MacBride] upon receiving a request for recognition, or any hints to that effect, would make it a condition of recognition that the rights of Catholics to approach the Holy Places and to celebrate the Sacred Mysteries should be officially guaranteed in a public internationally recognized statement.

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Logically following from his conclusion, Walshe added that: “Naturally, before coming to that point, the Minister would be anxious to discover from the Jews what their attitude is.” In this context, Walshe had an original idea – to have Dulanty in London communicate with Abraham Abrahams, who was a member of the presidium of the NZO and editor of The Jewish Standard – the London weekly published by the Revisionist Movement. Walshe believed that Abrahams, who was a long-time friend and reportedly very well disposed toward Ireland, could give them a reliable account of the Jewish position on the matter. The friendship between Walshe and Abrahams apparently began in the late 1930s, thanks to the contacts at the time between Jabotinsky and the New Zionist Organisation (NZO) and de Valera. Walshe, who was then the secretary of the Department of External Affairs and a confidant of de Valera, was probably involved in those contacts. Walshe considered Abrahams to be a person who valued tradition and religion, and opposed the secular socialist worldview shared by so many Zionist left-wing immigrants to Israel from Russia. Walshe therefore felt that Abrahams, rather than the leaders of the majority Mapai – Labor party headed by Ben-Gurion who set the tone at the provisional government – who were perceived as atheistic, was the authoritative spokesperson for the authentic Jewish position on the holy places. Naturally, his suggestion of contacting Abrahams was only meant to further Ireland’s understanding of the Jewish way of thinking, since only declarations made by Israel’s official leadership had any political value. Walshe expected a prompt response from MacBride. There is no indication that Iveagh House heeded Walshe’s recommendation about Abrahams. But Iveagh House had to decide other, more pressing issues before the cabinet could proceed on the question of recognition: whether Ireland should recognize the State of Israel or only the government – as did some of the other states – and whether Ireland should recognize Israel de jure or only de facto. Another question was whether prior to recognition, Ireland should to try to secure Israeli guarantees about the holy places. Boland realized the need to decide on this question after Walshe’s proposal of January 22 to look into the Jewish position on the holy places before granting recognition.60 Dr Michael Rynne, the Department’s legal advisor, had to answer these questions after Boland had asked him on February 4 to draft the best language he could for the official statement that Ireland would release when it decided to recognize Israel.61 Addressing the first two issues from a purely juridical perspective, Rynne stated in his opinion of February 10:62 “it is not easy to defend mere de facto recognition of the Israel Government at this advanced stage.” This meant that from the legal perspective alone, de jure recognition was called for. By way of elimination, Rynne explained that the Israeli government was not “a successfully rebellious faction contesting power in a long-established state,” as was the regime enforced by General Franco in 1937, for example, “nor a foreign invading regime in an already recognized sovereign entity,” as were the Italians in Ethiopia in 1935. Rather, Israel was “a body of persons who claim to rule over a new international entity.” The determining factor for de jure recognition is not

De facto recognition of Israel by Ireland 87 moral (the worthiness of Israel’s government), but legal; that is, did the state exist under international law. According to Rynne, the answer “would seem to be in the affirmative,” since Israel was established based on valid legal resolutions: the UN resolution of November 1947, and the official declaration of independence of May 14, 1948, made by an elected council of representatives. Consequently, Rynne held that a statement of de facto recognition would be “the virtual minimum of recognition which is possible to concede.” This conclusion, which dovetails with Oppenheim’s succinct definition, was the basis for Rynne’s answer to the third question. Rynne held that stipulating another condition for recognition, beyond the standard conditions required by international law, would be inappropriate. Any such condition, including the requirement of an official Israeli guarantee to protect holy Christian sites, was inappropriate from the legal perspective, because it went “too far below the minimum prescribed by commonsense and normal practice,” whereas “commonsense indicates that, since de facto recognition is recognition of state of fact, no extra condition or proviso would ever be relevant in the context.” Rynne added that should the Irish government need to defend itself at the Dáil and Seanad after recognizing Israel, it should point to Shertok’s cable of May 27, 1948, in which he requested Ireland to grant Israel recognition. In his cable Shertok also promised that the State of Israel “will safeguard sanctity and inviolability of shrines and holy places.”63 In support of his legal opinion favoring de jure recognition, Rynne offered nonlegal arguments, such as the Jews’ dissatisfaction with limited recognition, or the likelihood of Ireland having to upgrade the level of recognition if Britain did the same, which would make it appear as though Ireland did not have any policy of its own. If Ireland made do with de facto recognition, Rynne suggested that as a noncommittal gesture toward Israel, Ireland should consider appointing its Honorary Consul General in Beirut as a “special representative” in Israeli territory. A day after receiving Rynne’s opinion, the Irish cabinet decided to adopt MacBride’s recommendation, and recognize Israel de facto. The Taoiseach was to announce this the following evening, at a dinner held for Ireland’s new Chief Rabbi Jakobovits. On February 12, MacBride cabled Shertok, informing him of this decision. The decision and cable were released to the press.64 The cabinet embraced Rynne’s recommendation to recognize Israel, rather than only its government. The cabinet realized that while immediately after Israel’s declaration of independence and in the early stages of the Palestine struggle, it might have been appropriate to limit de facto recognition to the government only, by February 1949, limited recognition of this kind would be a poor compliment and might be resented, rather than welcomed, by the Jews. The cabinet’s decision to recognize Israel only de facto was not Rynne’s favorite alternative, but did not conflict with his views. This cabinet decision was motivated by concerns that the public would not approve of de jure recognition. The fact that Britain, France, and other countries were delaying de jure recognition until a detailed understanding could be reached with Israel about the specifics of international supervision over the holy places, made the Irish more determined

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not to let their country be less zealous. The emphasis that the Pope gave this issue in his Christmas address heightened the need to take public opinion into account.65 But the attention paid to public opinion might indicate not only the significance of the holy places in Irish tradition, but also reservations, if not outright antagonism, toward Jews in their new incarnation as Israelis, among the Irish people. As recommended by Rynne, recognition was not made contingent on Israeli guarantees for the holy places. But since the Department of External Affairs was concerned about the disapproval of the Irish public, the department suggested contacting Israel’s representatives in Washington and London, and inquiring as to whether Israel was prepared to accept the internationalization of the holy places. This idea was born in a conversation between Boland and Ostroróg in January 26, in which Boland learned that the French government, before granting de facto recognition, received an assurance that Israel was prepared to accept the internationalization of the Old City of Jerusalem, in which practically all the holy places are situated.66 In other words, France received an assurance along the lines of the statement that Shertok had given the UN Assembly in November. Ostroróg told Boland that Israel had pledged preferential rights to French educational and religious institutions in the country, and promised that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) would vacate any French institutions it had occupied.67 Obviously, promises of this kind were of no interest to Ireland, which had no establishments in Palestine. It is appropriate to explain here the absence of Irish missionary (education and health) institutions in Palestine, compared with Catholic missionary institutions from other Catholic countries, such as France and Italy, in the Holy Land. It appears that the roots of the absence of Irish Catholic missionary activity in the Holy Land should be sought in the dejected past of the Catholic Church in Ireland. Since the time of the Reformation, the Church was persecuted and preoccupied mainly with its own survival. Only after the annulment of the penal laws at the end of the eighteenth century and the Catholic Emancipation Act of 1929, did the Church become stronger. In its improved condition it could once again muster new energy to revive Irish missionary work that it conducted in the Middle Ages and which was notable in disseminating Christianity in western Europe. However, as of the 1830s, the Irish Catholic missionaries focused on a new goal: caring for the religious, educational, and health-related needs of Irish communities abroad (such as the United States, Canada, South Africa, Australia), whose numbers were growing as a result of the great famine. The missionaries were also active among the families of Irish soldiers who served in the British Army in British territories (such as India and South Africa). Since the end of the nineteenth century, the Catholic Irish missionaries began activities among the natives in the new British colonies in Africa (such as Nigeria, Uganda, and Kenya), as well as in the Far East (China). The humanitarian motives (education and health) underpinning this activity were directed at serving one of the main apostolic goals of bringing natives under the wings of Christianity. In the second decade of the twentieth century the Catholic Irish mission gathered momentum among non-Christians. Since the 1970s the activity of the mission slowed

De facto recognition of Israel by Ireland 89 markedly, due to the decline of the Church as the final adjudicator in public and private life. Palestine was thus beyond the normal scope of activity of the Irish Catholic mission, which was focused on other regions of the globe.68 Let us then return to the steps taken by the Irish Foreign Ministry vis-à-vis the recommendation to guarantee Israel’s agreement to the internationalization of the holy places. Based on the French precedent, the delegates in Washington (Sean Nunan) and London (Dulanty) were instructed to negotiate with Israel’s representatives in these capitals, in order to obtain authoritative explanations about their government’s intentions.69 On February 11, Dulanty met Linton for a long conversation which is documented in a report submitted by Linton to Comay.70 By his own account, Linton portrayed the Israeli position in a way similar to Shertok’s November statement: I saw no insuperable difficulties about international supervision of the Holy Places, both in Jerusalem or outside, but that I wanted to make quite clear that there could be no question for us of internationalizing the new city of Jerusalem . . . as far as lay in our power we would see to it that there should be proper access to Holy Places within our territory and that traditional worship should be conducted in conditions of tranquility and decorum. In their conversation, Dulanty made it clear to Linton that Ireland would recognize Israel in any event, independent of the issue of internationalization.71 This gives rise to doubt as to whether the Irish cabinet and Iveagh House waited to hear the answers of Israel’s representatives, and only then decided to grant Israel de facto recognition. The fact that Linton and Dulanty met on February 11, the very day on which the Irish cabinet so decided, supports these doubts; however, it is possible that Dulanty sent Linton’s comments to Dublin by telegram on that very day. The same is true of Nunan’s account of his conversation with Elath, which could have arrived in Dublin even earlier.72 Either way, it seems that this inquiry was meant only to satisfy the Irish public and the Vatican, proving that before granting de facto recognition, Ireland had ensured that the holy places would be safeguarded. Once the die was cast and Ireland recognized Israel de facto, Walshe’s main concern was the precise content of the statements made by the Israeli delegates. In his report to Boland of February 24,73 Walshe expressed his impatience and dissatisfaction at his long wait for the Department’s response: “It is not too easy to explain to the Holy See that I am still waiting for a reply to a very legitimate question which interests the Holy See and Ireland so profoundly.” Walshe stated that cooperating with the Vatican on the matter of the holy places was a golden opportunity for Ireland to reinforce its prestige with the Vatican, which had already been boosted in the Mindszenty case.74 Ireland was in a particularly good position, since, unlike Spain and Italy, it had no political or material interests in the Holy Land, and its motivation was purely religious. The emphasis given by Walshe to Ireland’s prestige can be understood against the backdrop of the tension between the Irish government and the Vatican over the

90 Ireland and the State of Israel: 1948–63 appointment of the papal nuncio in Dublin, after the death of Monsignor Paschal Robinson on August 27, 1948.75 I could not find references by Walshe on the issue of the holy places in the context of the nuncio crisis. However, in light of the fact that both these matters were simultaneously at the heart of the relationship between Ireland and the Vatican,76 and considering the emphasis Walshe gave to Ireland’s prestige at the Vatican, the conclusion that the two were associated is almost inevitable. Walshe probably felt that cooperation between Ireland and the Vatican on the holy places would calm the whirlwind of the nuncio crisis and counterbalance the injury caused by this crisis. Interestingly, he also made the reverse argument, that Irish surrender on the nuncio crisis would seriously undermine Ireland’s prestige, since the Holy See had little respect for states that did not hold their own against it.77 Both perspectives underscore the weight attributed by Walshe to Ireland’s special status in the Vatican. In an attempt to spur the Department of External Affairs to cooperate with the Vatican, Walshe indicated that the Pope had relaxed his position and was no longer so attached to the idea of an international territorial regime. Walshe went even further: “I personally believe that the Holy See itself would not delay too long about making de facto contacts with the Israel Government.”78 Boland’s letter to Walshe of February 24,79 which crossed with Walshe’s on the way, and covered the same subjects, was designed to placate Walshe, and through him the Vatican. Boland tried to demonstrate that Ireland had adapted itself to the Vatican’s demands: “Everything that could be reasonably done at the present stage . . . was done before de facto recognition was accorded. Actually, of course, we were one of the last States to grant recognition.” Boland reiterated that prior to granting recognition, MacBride “took steps to satisfy himself . . . that the Israel Government were prepared to accept the principle of the international control of the Holy Places in Jerusalem and district.” In support of his account, Boland attached Nunan’s report of his conversation with Elath.80 Elath’s statements to Nunan were likely quite similar to those of Linton to Dulanty. But although these statements were sufficient for the Department of External Affairs in Dublin to grant the lowest level of recognition, they were probably not enough for Walshe, let alone the Vatican. Boland therefore saw fit to highlight the fact that Israel had accepted the principle of international supervision. But he qualified this comment by adding that, in effect, there was still much room for argument as to the precise form that the international control should take. The bottom line in Boland’s letter, which was intended to placate the Vatican, was that although Ireland was not a member of the United Nations, and thus had no influence over its discussions regarding Jerusalem, it could still apply indirect pressure on Israel by withholding de jure recognition. Obviously, Walshe approved of Boland’s conclusion, but not of the Iveagh House assurances given by Israel. In his response to Boland, dated March 4, 1949,81 Walsh stressed that “The Vatican aren’t a bit satisfied with the Israel [sic] ideas of guarantees which so far have remained absolutely in the air.” Walshe himself also felt that there was much room for improvement in Elath’s statements to Nunan. However, once Ireland had recognized Israel de facto, Walshe estimated that the Vatican would

De facto recognition of Israel by Ireland 91 focus on a demand to withhold de jure recognition until Israel guaranteed the issue of the Holy Sites in a manner accepted by the Holy See. Walsh expressed the hope that the Minister for External Affairs would act in this direction, and once again emphasized the importance of this matter for Ireland’s prestige at the Vatican: As in the Mindszenty case we stand to gain in prestige by making strong attitude on all issues where there is an acknowledged Christian principle at stake. I can never describe what we have gained in Rome by the Minister’s and the country’s attitude in that case, and, although the parallel isn’t perfect, the protection of the Holy Places is of the most vital interest to our people all over the world, and has, therefore . . . all elements which make it an ideal case for championing by our Minister. At the end of his letter, Walshe reiterated his impression: “I haven’t any doubt . . . that there is a considerable softening . . . with regard to the Vatican demands . . . ” He further added that once the Vatican was satisfied with the Israeli guarantees, it would even assign a diplomatic representative there. As explained in the following chapter, this analysis was clearly overoptimistic, as Walshe himself quickly realized. Interestingly, Israeli representatives (J. Herzog and his deputy in the Christian Communities desk at the Ministry of Religious Affairs, Haim Vardi) who held unofficial talks with members of the Vatican’s Secretariat in the fall of 1948, shared the feeling that the Vatican’s attitude toward Israel had changed for the better. Meetings between key Israeli figures (including the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister) and Monsignor Thomas McMahon (assistant for Palestine affairs to Cardinal Francis Spellman of New York), who visited Israel between December 1948 and March 1949, also made a positive impression. Following these meetings, the Israeli Foreign Ministry was optimistic about the possibility of reaching a compromise with the Vatican based on functional internationalization, or on territorial internationalization of the Old City alone. The Ministry formed this impression, even though McMahon, who was briefed by the Vatican’s Secretariat before coming to Israel, left no doubt as to the Vatican’s insistence on territorial internationalization of Jerusalem and on the refugees’ right of return. Furthermore, at the beginning of 1949, the Ministry even expected diplomatic recognition by the Vatican, and was considering potential representatives to be assigned there.82 Evidently, the difficulty in deciphering the Vatican’s true position led both Walsh and his Israeli counterparts to form opinions in which wishful thinking played a pivotal role.

Reaction in Ireland to de facto recognition of Israel Perhaps due to the limited nature of de facto recognition, the reaction in Ireland to the recognition granted to Israel was somewhat belated, and became evident

92 Ireland and the State of Israel: 1948–63 only in the spring of 1949. This reaction was spurred by and dovetailed with the anti-Israel sentiment that prevailed in the Catholic world, Ireland included, following April’s Redemptoris Nostri. The Pope’s call in this encyclical deeply influenced his flock, especially in the solidly Catholic countries, and prompted many initiatives by the clergy, such as conferences, demonstrations, advertisements in the press, and calls on governments to support the internationalization of Jerusalem and Catholic rights to the holy places. The reaction was so intense that it even evolved into anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli incitement, which took full advantage of the Christian affinity to the Holy Land and played on the subconscious animosity toward Jews in Christian tradition.83 The Catholic Hierarchy in Ireland also played a part, especially after the Vatican Secretariat asked it to inform the community of the Redemptoris Nostri and encourage public figures and organizations to speak out in favor of the internationalization plan, Catholic rights to the holy places, and the defense of Catholic institutions.84 Due to the obvious link between Ireland’s recognition of Israel and the question of Jerusalem and the holy places, this subject inevitably made its way into the response of the Catholic hierarchy and organizations to the Pope’s call. The Catholic Hierarchy convention in Maynooth on June 21, 1949, presided over by the Primate of all Ireland, Archbishop of Armagh, Dr John D’Alton, released a statement of loyalty to the Pope and support of his efforts. The Irish Hierarchy did not even consider mentioning Israel by name, nor did it mention the de facto recognition. It did, however, stress that: There should not be any final recognition of the new states85 or final determination of boundaries unless the rights of Catholics in regard to permission and free access to the Holy Places are effectively recognized by giving Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Nazareth an international status. The Irish Hierarchy also stressed that the holy places must not be abandoned to the arbitrary rule of Arabs and Jews, who might use various pretexts to inhibit access and might allow their vicinity to be profaned.86 The Archbishop of Dublin, John Charles McQuaid (1941–72) was notably intolerant towards Israel. His views carried great weight, since he exemplified Ireland as the rigorist champion of orthodoxy and ecclesiastical authority. For over three decades, he exercised enormous spiritual and temporal power more than any other Irish churchman.87 It is hardly surprising that McQuaid had exhibited anti-Semitism both before and after his appointment as Archbishop. He was influenced by Fr Fahey, and even wrote the preface to Fahey’s first book in 1931. In a constitutive sermon he gave as president of Blackrock College in 1932, McQuaid, described the “true” struggle in the modern world as a conflict between Jesus Christ and Satan. He accused the Jews, representing absolute evil, of leading the battle against Christ’s church, using their domination of global finances to do so. McQuaid was also sympathetic to the core beliefs of the Maria Duce – the movement Fahey had fathered.88 In 1942, he personally intervened to prevent Jews from playing an equal role in the dialog at the Pillar of Fire Society, an

De facto recognition of Israel by Ireland 93 interfaith group in Dublin that was founded after rumors arrived of the Final Solution, in order to fight a new outbreak of anti-Semitism.89 However, at around the same time (1941–2), he also took a stand against pro-Nazi Irish groups in Dublin. Years later, in 1949, he boasted of this intervention to Jakobovits,90 which might indicate either that acts of this kind were rare on his part or that he was two-faced. Interestingly, in retrospect, and perhaps also due to a subconscious need to please, the rabbi himself was undecided about McQuaid’s attitude toward the Jews. He chose not to dub him an anti-Semite, although he did not find him to be a friend of the Jews either. Jakobovits said that to him personally, the archbishop was friendly and that his door was always open.91 In any case, it is clear that McQuaid exercised all the influence he could to prevent Ireland from recognizing Israel de jure before the issue of the holy places was resolved to the Vatican’s satisfaction. For this purpose, and in consultation with Gino Paro of the Nunciature in Dublin,92 he maintained constant communications with cabinet ministers and other people of influence, such as the Mayor of Dublin.93 Rabbi Jakobovits believed that the Archbishop of Dublin went out of his way to pacify the Holy See on the Israeli issue because he considered this a good platform for an appointment as cardinal.94 The statements of Dr Michael Browne, the Bishop of Galway who was considered very conservative,95 received wide coverage at the time. In a sermon he gave at St Nicholas Cathedral in Galway, he refused to recognize the legitimacy of Jewish control of the Holy Land, offering the theological view that Jews must be humiliated in exile as a punishment for their crime against Jesus. However, in the same breath, he also said that the Catholics do not hate the Jews, from whom their savior emerged, nor do they oppose their demands for sovereignty – provided that Christian rights in the Holy Land, which also have a historic foundation, are upheld. Browne further added that he trusted the Irish government to do whatever it would take to prevent diplomatic recognition of the new regime in Palestine (he was very careful not to mention the word “Israel”) until it guaranteed the legitimate Catholic right of ownership over the holy places. The Standard echoed Browne’s speech with a supportive article.96 Once the Irish Independent printed the sermon on May 24, Monsignor Paro hastened to Iveagh House , where Boland told him that all moves were coordinated with the Vatican and informed him of the guarantees provided by Israel before the de facto recognition.97 The report of the Irish Jewish Representative Council of May 26 indicates that Browne was not alone – other bishops had made similar anti-Israeli statements too.98 The Pope’s call found a sympathetic ear in the Irish counties as well. Westmeath County Council called on the government to withdraw its de facto recognition and implored it not to grant de jure recognition under any circumstances unless the holy places were internationalized.99 The resolutions adopted by the councils of Letterkenny Urban District and Limerick and sent to Costello were not quite as radical. They called on the government not to recognize Israel de jure unless Israel accepted internationalization.100 But these resolutions pale in comparison to that of the executive of the Maria Duce, delivered to Costello, McBride, and McQuaid.101 This resolution protested

94 Ireland and the State of Israel: 1948–63 against the calculated and persistent persecution in Palestine of the Catholic Church, Christ’s Mystical Body,102 by the so-called Israeli Government, which . . . has come to power by means of deceit, terror and huge financial resources. The Irish government was requested to exercise all its influence with nations with which it had diplomatic relations, in order to prevent further “persecution” and ensure the Vatican’s wishes for Palestine were met. Anti-Israeli incitement in the spring of 1949 was also expressed in the radical Catholic press, which had taken this line a year earlier, after the establishment of Israel.103 In May 1949, the Irish Catholic described Israel and Zionism as the antithesis of and as harboring hatred and contempt toward Christianity. Israel and Zionism, the paper said, were determined to erase every trace of all that Christianity held sacred. The paper referred to excerpts from a report from Jerusalem’s broadcast by Vatican Radio which demonized Zionism as a new Nazism, under which the future of Christian interests is doomed. The publication called to stop Israel’s ambition by launching a widespread campaign for the internationalization of Jerusalem.104 The Standard was a podium for the anti-Israel and anti-Semitic venom of Fr Dempsey, a US priest, who wrote about the celebrations of thousands of Jews in Hollywood on Israel’s first Independence Day. Dempsey accused the Jews of gradually taking over the American film industry, accumulating wealth at the expense of Christians and setting out to eradicate the Cross wherever they could reach.105 Thus was replayed a familiar tune: the Jews controlled international capital and the media, and dictated a threatening agenda for Christianity. The wave of oral and written protest was also accompanied by demonstrations in Dublin. These, however, did not escalate into violence.106

Reaction of the Jewish community The establishment of the State of Israel created new challenges for the Jewish community in Dublin, as it did for Jews throughout the Diaspora. The new Jewish state was a source of interest and pride for them, but also of concern that they might be accused of dual loyalties and become victims of anti-Israeli sentiment. These concerns, coupled with maintaining a low profile something that has always characterized this small community’s relationship to its Catholic environment,107 explain why in the spring of 1949 the leadership of the Jewish community refrained from any public reaction to avoid fanning the flames of incitement. However, they tried to calm the situation through communications with McBride, Archbishop McQuaid, and the Israeli authorities.108 Rabbi Jakobovits and Edwin Solomons, President of the Dublin Hebrew Congregation, met with McQuaid on May 23, and subsequently maintained correspondence with him. McQuaid and Solomons had already worked together before, as evidenced by McQuaid’s boast to Jakobovits that during the war he had, thanks to Solomons’ clever assistance, managed “to forestall incidents which

De facto recognition of Israel by Ireland 95 could have provoked retaliation or roused unjust antipathy.”109 Although he did not elaborate, there is not doubt he was referring to the incidents instigated by the pro-Nazi groups mentioned above. It is no wonder, then, that McQuaid held Solomons in high regard as a man who had extensive experience with Irish Catholics. Jakobovits was a new face, and drew the archbishop’s attention, especially because of his young age. McQuaid sensed his inexperience at the meeting, when the rabbi announced his intention to have the newspapers print his response to the anti-Israeli statements. Obviously, the Archbishop with the full support of Solomons – who advocated staying away from the limelight – advised Jakobovits to refrain from any such reaction.110 Furthermore, both at the meeting and in his letter to Jakobovits, McQuaid underscored in a rather menacing tone that Irish concerns of injury to the rights held by Catholics in Jerusalem and other holy places for generations, ran much deeper and wider than he had originally believed. Only an official statement by the Israeli government that would be disseminated in Ireland and throughout the Irish Diaspora, especially in the United States, expressing unequivocal support of the internationalization of Jerusalem and free access to the holy places, could help prevent anti-Semitic incidents that might otherwise be hard to restrain. To emphasize his disapproval of the Israeli government, he spoke, by way of contrast, of the peace-loving Jewish community in Ireland. It would be regrettable, he said, if after successfully emerging from the crisis of the war, they would be hurt through no fault of their own, because of “the attitude and actions of irreligious members Israeli.”111 He was referring to Israel’s first elected government under Ben-Gurion’s lead, which indeed comprised mainly representatives of secular parties.112 In his meeting with Jakobovits and Solomons, McQuaid was struck by the rabbi’s fear that Catholics might take revenge on Jews around the world. As the rabbi put it (quoted by McQuaid): “We Jews have too many hostages in the Christian countries to wish to have trouble in the Holy Places.”113 McQuaid drew his own conclusions about the power of Catholic public opinion, and in his letter to Paro he commented with satisfaction and sarcasm: “He (Jakobovits) put his finger on that which most worries a Jew: the fear of reprisals.”114 Seeing McQuaid’s insistence on the necessity of a public Israeli statement, Solomons maintained that a representative of the community should meet with the Israeli Legation in London to expedite publication of such a statement. Jakobovits was selected for this mission, but was unsuccessful, because Dr Mordechai Eliash, Israel’s Envoy Extraordinary to Britain (March 1949–spring 1950),115 expressed no interest.116 Eliash apparently doubted that any such statement would quash the soaring incitement. But Solomons, who was anxious to appease McQuaid, did not wait for the statement to arrive. On May 29 he told McQuaid, he would try to deliver the interview, his relative Lord Herbert Samuel, had given on the radio. Samuel, who had returned to London from a visit in Israel in early May,117 made it clear in the radio interview that Israel advocated free access to the holy places. Solomons chose to quote Samuel, a famous British statesman and Palestine’s first High Commissioner.

96 Ireland and the State of Israel: 1948–63 He also saw fit to note that his grandfather, Elias Solomons, had moved to Ireland from London in 1824. He was apparently trying to demonstrate his family’s deep roots and loyalty to Ireland, to incur McQuaid’s favor. As promised, he forwarded the quote from Samuel to McQuaid, who found the interview to be of value.118 Since we do not have the full content of Samuel’s interview,119 we can only assume that its value to McQuaid was the same as that of Jakobovits’s comment, namely, that it illustrated the power of global Catholic unrest to arouse fear of reprisal among the Jews. The archbishop expressed his opinion, which was also shared by Paro, to Prof O’Brien, a “Goodwill Ambassador” from New York City who came to Dublin after a tour of the world’s capitals. Apparently, McQuaid suggested creating a mass Catholic movement in the United States that would protect Christian holy places. But O’Brien questioned the efficacy of such a movement. Instead, he advocated peaceful diplomacy, such as private negotiations between Cardinal Spellman and President Truman to exert American pressure on Israel to accept the Catholic stance. McQuaid disagreed. He felt that where Jews were concerned, only unrestrained action could yield any results.120 Jakobovits was also trying to appease McQuaid. In a letter dated May 31, he underscored the loyalty of the Jewish community to Ireland and its uncompromising solidarity with the Irish Catholics. In order to relieve the community of any responsibility for events in Israel, he emphasized that the community was unable to influence the policies of the Israeli government. Still, he promised to do his utmost to ensure “the government of Tel-Aviv” (this choice of language, rather than “the government of Israel,” seems to have been intentionally designed to placate McQuaid, as the government had not yet relocated to Jerusalem) made an appropriate statement.121 McQuaid found Jakobovits’ letter somewhat satisfactory,122 but in another letter to the rabbi dated July 2, he referred to the holy places again – this time in defense of the Pope. He berated the Israeli foreign minister for doubting the factual basis for the position of Pius XII regarding the holy places.123 McQuaid was referring to an address Sharett had given at the Knesset on June 15, 1949 about the hate campaign that the Catholic world was waging against Israel, although the latter had pledged to safeguard the holy places and uphold the rights of all churches. Sharett described how the Israeli Ministry of Religious Affairs protected the rights of Christians in general and Catholics in particular with the utmost vigilance, and expressed the hope that the Pope “would consider looking into the facts as they really are . . . so that issues of religion and sanctity do not serve as cause for blood libels and slander.”124 Nine days after his speech, the Standard censured Sharett for his baseless attack on the Pope.125 The Standard’s rebuke, McQuaid’s rage, and the entire body of anti-Israeli incitement as he was making his first steps as Ireland’s chief rabbi, left an indelible mark on Jakobovits’ memory: “This was the first time I realized how much Jews living outside of Israel depend on what goes on there. I was a young rabbi at the time, only 28, and it was a lifetime lesson,” he wrote.126 Jakobovits was referring to the powerful and complex bonds between the State of Israel and the Jewish Diaspora. In this specific instance, he was apparently

De facto recognition of Israel by Ireland 97 referring to the impact that Israel had on Jewish life abroad, as reflected in the unhappy phenomenon of projecting anti-Israeli hostilities onto Jewish communities, including a small community like that of Ireland, isolated and trying to remain inconspicuous. It seems Jakobovits was also saying that the lofty value of solidarity and an alliance of fate, which has been a leitmotif throughout Jewish history, this time acted against the Diaspora Jews. Possibly by then Jakobovits may have realized that Herzl’s Zionist vision that the very creation of a Jewish state would put an end to anti-Semitism has failed the test of reality. Not only that, but like a Jewish tragedy, the events that unfolded in Israel actually stoked the renewal of anti-Semitism. The Israeli legation in London did not expedite the statement that the Jewish community in Ireland awaited so eagerly. Instead, at the end of June 1949, it suggested dispatching Rabbi Herzog to Dublin to help the community ward off the hostile anti-Israel propaganda, mainly through dialogue with the Catholic hierarchy. But the Jewish Representative Council considered this unnecessary. In essence, the council held that the matter had to be addressed by the political rather than the clerical ranks. In addition, it felt that the time of critical necessity had passed. At the end of August, media trends led the leadership of the community to feel that the media atmosphere had improved. The community attributed this to a change in the attitude of the Vatican, which ostensibly realized that the war between Israel and the Arabs left most of the holy places in Jerusalem out of Israeli hands.127

In conclusion Following in the footsteps of Britain and other countries, Ireland granted Israel de facto recognition, but in granting such recognition, the lowest level possible, Ireland had the status of the holy places and the Vatican’s support of a corpus separatum scheme for Jerusalem in mind. This was clearly evidenced in an inquiry conducted by Iveagh House at Walshe’s instigation, as to Israel’s position on the matter before granting it de facto recognition. The inquiry was in Ireland’s best interest as it was intended to placate the Holy See. It was also intended to placate Irish public opinion, which was uncompromising on the issue of Jerusalem and the holy places and toed the Vatican line. Walshe’s impression that the Holy See had relaxed its stance on the corpus separatum idea made it easier for the Department of External Affairs to make do with clarifications by Israel’s representatives regarding their government’s readiness to implement functional internationalization of the holy places. These clarifications however, were not sufficient for the Vatican. From that point on, the Vatican would play an important role in Ireland’s refusal to recognize Israel de jure. In the spring of 1949, the issue of recognizing Israel headed the agenda of anti-Israeli incitement by Irish clergy, various public bodies, and the press, driving Ireland’s policymakers to realize how problematic it would be to upgrade the relationship and why they had to heed the Vatican.

4

From de facto to de jure

Contacts between Eliash and Dulanty In his telegram thanking MacBride for the de facto recognition, Shertok expressed the hope of the provisional government of Israel for early establishment of formal relations between the two countries.1 On April 27, 1949, Eliash, Israel’s Envoy Extraordinary to Britain, met with Dulanty to test the waters as to Ireland’s willingness to follow in the steps of Britain and allow appointment of an Israeli envoy to Dublin, even before Ireland’s de jure recognition. He offered himself for this position, citing savings and shortage of human resources. Out of courtesy, he added that the Israeli Foreign Ministry would prefer a separate envoy to Dublin from the outset. This observation hit the mark regarding Irish sensitivities on issues related to Britain, and was received by Dulanty with satisfaction. However, Dulanty clarified that his country, which insisted on complete political independence, had already rejected similar proposals. In the course of the conversation, Dulanty invited Eliash to Dublin to meet government members and discuss issues common to both countries, such as Jerusalem.2 Comay, who reported on the meeting, and Leo Cohen, who was in the know, regarded the visit to be advantageous due to Ireland’s importance in the Catholic world. Comay told Eliash that he could drop a hint to the Irish that Israel would want its envoy to London to serve as its envoy in Dublin as well. Taking into account Ireland’s reluctance regarding this possibility, Comay suggested Paris as an alternative – with some hesitation, due to the language problem. Comay also wanted to check whether Israel and Ireland had common commercial interests and whether Dublin’s Jews were likely to immigrate to Israel, which could justify appointment of an Israeli consul in Dublin.3 Despite the green light from Jerusalem, Eliash put off the visit to Ireland. At that time, he was occupied with the submission of his credentials as envoy to the King of Great Britain, but it was mainly the anti-Israeli atmosphere in Dublin that led to the postponement.4

MacBride’s speech in the Dáil With the improved atmosphere, and influenced by MacBride’s speech in the Dáil on July 13 that was imbued with empathy toward Israel, Eliash renewed his ties

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with Dulanty. In his speech, MacBride reviewed Ireland’s foreign policy, including its policy vis-à-vis the holy places. This review was apparently based on written notes that he was given on June 13. The notes summarized the policy of the Department of External Affairs on this subject, and was based on an Italian initiative on the issue of the holy places, and on Walshe’s evaluation of Vatican’s approach.5 It would thus be proper to precede the discussion of MacBride’s speech, by addressing first the Italian initiative and Walshe’s evaluation. In April 1949, Italy invited Austria, Ireland, Spain, and Portugal – Catholic nations which were not UN members – to join its appeal to Catholic UN member states (which, according to the Irish, included states with a significant Catholic population and Christian culture and tradition, such as the United States and Britain) and convince them of the necessity for assuring a regime of international guarantees for the Holy Places that would be as comprehensive and efficient as possible. Italy also suggested informal discussions between the Vatican and the ambassadors of these five countries to iron out the details of the proposal’s implementation, such as the countries to be approached and the content and timing of the appeal. Ireland had reservations about the viability of the Italian proposal because of the debate on internationalization that had recently taken place in the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine.6 Nevertheless, Walshe was ordered to cooperate. However, apart from one meeting at the Vatican, nothing came of this proposal and it began to founder in mid-June. While on the surface the Vatican welcomed this suggestion, it in fact avoided committing itself to any particular proposal to implement the principle of internationalization, preferring to let others pull the chestnuts out of the fire.7 The Irish Department of External Affairs explained this approach as a tactic stemming from an acute realization in the Vatican of the political difficulties which any international regime must present from the point of view of the Israeli government. Internationalization of the city, which represented the ultimate objective of Jewish nationalist endeavor, would inflame the extreme nationalist Jews and impede Israel’s current moderate government.8 It was explained that the Vatican did not want to be portrayed as being responsible for promoting further disturbances in Palestine.9 Apart from this tactic, the Vatican’s fundamental position remained rigid. It is therefore unsurprising that Walshe backed down from the optimism he had exhibited in March. In a letter to Boland on May 21, he expressed his disagreement with the Vatican, which continued to adhere to territorial internationalization. To this end, he put forth a unique argument on the significance of the holy places to the Christian believer and the salvation of his soul: The Italian mind is prone to give too much importance to the material relics of our Lord’s life in the Holy Land. Our tradition which is of course, now much more powerful in the world, emphasizes the importance of his life and teaching [sic]. That element the Jews can never destroy even if, per impossibile [sic]10 they were really so evil as the Vatican thinks they are.11

100 Ireland and the State of Israel: 1948–63 About one month later, he wrote again: a more important fundamental consideration . . . appealing especially to the non-Italian tradition in the Church, is that our faith and teaching remain quite independent of the material relics of the Holy Places, and if they were finally destroyed it would make no difference to the essentials of the life of the Church. Even Italians of wider view regret that the HOLY FATHER [emphasis in original] has so strongly emphasized a matter which belongs rather to the Domain of piety than to religion.12 These comments touched on the age-old question addressed by the Church’s forefathers, that is, whether physical proximity to the holy places enhances the spiritual connection with Christianity and its values. This question stems from the absence of any specific instruction in Christianity to make a pilgrimage to Jerusalem or other holy places. Walshe was referring to the Christian school that regards the holy places in their worldly forms as material relics of the life and death of Jesus, and as such secondary in importance compared to the transcendental religious value represented by Jesus’ life and teachings. Most fathers of the Church nullified the importance of the earthly Jerusalem and its centrality in Christianity in favor of the heavenly, spiritual Jerusalem as the objective of Christian salvation. The exhortation to part from the earthly Jerusalem enveloped vigorous opposition to mass pilgrimages to the holy places, as a materialistic phenomenon that diminished the spirituality of the faith, as God is everywhere, and is not confined to dwell in any place.13 The quotations from Walshe’s letters illuminate the religious aspects to his multidimensional personality. On the one hand, he was a devout Catholic, traditional14 but not fundamentalist. Although his opinions on religion and the Vatican changed over the years, he nevertheless held the Vatican in respect and ascribed to it, and Church affairs in general, an inordinate diplomatic importance. On the other hand, he was a professional diplomat (considered to be the father of the Irish diplomatic service) an educated man of culture, who looked down on the narrowmindedness that he believed characterized many members of the Italian clergy and the Vatican Secretariat.15 In Walshe’s letter to Boland of June 14, 1949, classified “most secret,” he presented a pragmatic case in favor of realism and implementation with regard to internationalization. Walshe estimated that most governments would hesitate to take a radical anti-Israel stand vis-à-vis the holy places, so as not to risk the alienation of world Jewry. Citing what could be considered an anti-Semitic stereotype of Jews as leaders of the world, he referred to the immense financial power of Jews in the United States, and to a lesser extent, in Britain. In the shadow of the Italian initiative, which even then appeared to him to be a farce, largely because of the Vatican, Walshe suggested waiting until Israel asked Ireland for de jure recognition and then asking the Vatican pointedly: “What exactly would you like us to say to the Israel government? Surely a mere non possumus [we cannot] without discussion of alternatives would be stupid and

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could lead to [sic] nowhere.”16 Ten days later, in a letter to Boland, Walshe again emphasized the ability to be flexible and still ensure “a more or less satisfactory position without rousing the whole world Jewry against us.” He also mentioned that “the holy places have also a sacred character for the Mahometans, and some of them, [are held holy by all three monotheistic religions] at least for the JEWS [emphasis in original] themselves. [Such as] the Wailing Wall and the site of the Temple.”17 Ever considerate in his approach, he added a nostalgic remark that was highly empathetic toward the Jews, perhaps in order to justify the pragmatism he was advocating from a different perspective: I always remember that Sol Bloom was very friendly to us in New York. There must be a good residue of the Jewish population still with us, and I know that many of the Israel Jews feel a debt of gratitude to us for having shown them how to beat the ENGLISH [emphasis in original].18 The apparently unexpected remark, which clarifies Walshe’s mixed relations with the Jews,19 apparently surprised Boland. Boland tried to excuse this, some time later, with Walshe’s visit to Palestine at the end of the 1930s.20 In another letter to Boland, dated August 8, Walshe again criticized the Vatican’s inflexibility. This time he cited non-radical elements in the Vatican, which wondered whether the remedy – territorial internationalization, with the potential for infinite dispute between the delegates of the different countries – would not be worse than the disease itself, which was Jewish control of Jerusalem with the balancing factor of normal international representation in the city.21 Apparently this was Walshe’s final critique of the subject. Pius XII’s persistence regarding the corpus separatum eventually persuaded him that criticism was futile. But Walshe remained firm in his decision to respect the Pope’s stance, because this was in Ireland’s best interest. Let us return to MacBride’s review at the Dáil on July 13: the Minister started by quoting his brief response the month before, on June 15, to Deputy Gogan’s query on the issue. He described the government’s fierce support of the demand by the entire Christian world to guarantee protection of the holy places, and claimed that this required internationalization of Jerusalem and its environs.22 Territorial internationalization was hence presented as an objective to be striven for but not as a condition for recognition of Israel. The Minister went on to refer briefly to the following points: the issue of the holy places was under discussion in the Conciliation Committee and it is sub judice; Ireland was not a member of the United Nations, but was doing what it could, together with other non-UN Catholic states, to ensure Israel’s willingness to accept the principle of international supervision of the holy places (a reference to the Italian initiative). In his concise review, MacBride followed Walshe’s advice “to be extremely sparing of words.”23 MacBride made no mention at all of the Vatican, and in any case drew no distinction between the opinions of Ireland

102 Ireland and the State of Israel: 1948–63 and the Vatican on the issue. However at the end of the review, he spared no words when he addressed the government of Israel with optimism: We know how cruelly and unjustly the Jewish People have suffered from intolerance and persecution . . . I personally, am glad that the pages of our history have never been stained with any thing of the kind. On the contrary, I think we can claim that our common suffering from persecution and certain similarities in the history of the two races create a special bond of sympathy and understanding between the Irish and Jewish peoples. Speaking from that point of view, I venture to make a special appeal to the Government of Israel to meet the Just claims of the Christian world for an international regime guaranteeing the safety of the Holy Places . . . an act of generous statesmanship by the Israeli Government will do more than anything else could to bridge the gulf between Christians and Jews which has been responsible throughout the ages for so much hatred and suffering and which we in Ireland can, I think, justly claim to have been more successful in closing than most other Christian countries.24 It turns out that this rhetoric had another purpose – beyond resolving the issue of the holy places – it served the Irish interest in winning over Jewish support, especially in the United States, for Ireland’s anti-partition campaign.25 This struggle became an article of faith in the Costello government, with MacBride playing a principal role. The government’s spokespersons took advantage of every international platform to express its opposition to the partition, arguing it would serve as an obstacle to Ireland’s joining NATO and its natural integration into the European arena. And so, this anti-partition fever, as Lyons called it,26 was surprisingly also tied to Jewish public opinion. The Irish Department of External Affairs expected the Jews to sympathize with this struggle because of the partition of the State of Israel. Paradoxically, contrary to Rabbi Jakobovits’ rationale, the Irish nightmare of their country’s partition was suddenly portrayed as a factor that brought them closer to Israel. Walshe was pleased with MacBride’s statement. He considered the absence of any mention of the Pope to be advantageous for the impression it would make on the non-Catholic mind. He also considered the Minister’s call for understanding between Jews and Christians to be “far more Christian than that of the VATICAN [emphasis in original] and the HF [⫽Holy Father] and the Vatican officials who are going through a period of anti-Semitism cannot but be edified at the Minister’s plea.”27 As discussed, MacBride’s speech at the Dáil encouraged Eliash to renew his ties with Dulanty in mid-July, to promote his visit to Ireland.28 Despite Dulanty’s hesitation, Eliash repeated his offer to represent Israel in Ireland as well. This time he cited an authority: a newspaper announcement by the Irish Government Information Bureau relating to a solution of joint accreditation with the Indian government.29 The announcement clarified that the arrangement with India was made possible owing to the special historic circumstances between both countries,

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but that it was unique and could not serve as a precedent. Eliash nevertheless referred to it in the hope that Ireland would be considerate of Israel, as a fledgling state that was having difficulty in mobilizing the human resources that would be required for a mission of this kind. Eliash was apparently alluding to the fact that both Ireland and India were engaged in a struggle against the British, and hoped that Israel, which gained its independence after a comparable struggle, would receive similar treatment. To placate MacBride, Eliash suggested to Comay that a “public answer accepting MacBride’s appeal would be most opportune.”30 However, Comay thought that this was unnecessary after Abba Eban, Israel’s ambassador to the United Nations, had publicly presented Israel’s stance at the UN Assembly on May 5, 1949.31 Instead of attempting to placate MacBride, Comay suggested that Eliash should “make appropriate noises when in Dublin.”32 Perhaps he believed that Eliash should excoriate the Irish on their discrimination. Although Ireland criticized Israel with regard to internationalization of Jerusalem, Jordan itself escaped censure. And indeed Jordan, which held East Jerusalem, also opposed internationalization. Dulanty reported his ties with Eliash to Boland.33 On August 17, Boland presented Eliash’s proposals to MacBride and suggested that they should be rejected because of the general opposition to joint accreditation of a foreign representative to Ireland, but mainly because of the complicated issue of Israel’s relations with the Vatican. Boland thought that agreeing to an Israeli envoy in Dublin could imply Ireland’s de jure recognition of Israel. He may have found support for his assessment in international law (Article 7 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention), according to which recognition could be given explicitly – by a declaration that would speak for itself – or implicitly – by an action that would imply intended recognition. And indeed the question of implicit recognition is sometimes controversial. It is generally agreed that diplomatic relations or bilateral international agreements, such as trade pacts, qualify as implicit recognition.34 Since Ireland had already given Israel explicit de facto recognition, any implicit recognition beyond that would take on the meaning of de jure recognition. However, Boland ruled out de jure recognition of Israel, if only because of the bishops’ opposition (in their July meetings in Maynooth), until the issue of the holy places was resolved to the Vatican’s satisfaction. Obviously, under these circumstances, Eliash’s visit to Dublin was no longer an option. Nevertheless, Boland suggested not flatly rejecting Eliash. His suggestion was accepted,35 probably because of etiquette or so as to keep the door open for future contact. Dulanty was given the opportunity to explain to Eliash that the public and the government did not, in principle, accept the concept of joint accreditation, and that the government was not interested in deviating from the ordinary rule and appointing a diplomatic envoy before de jure recognition was granted.36

Conor Cruise O’Brien and the Irish anti-partition campaign But there were other voices in the Irish Department of External Affairs. Conor Cruise O’Brien, appointed by MacBride to head a new information section and in

104 Ireland and the State of Israel: 1948–63 fact was in charge of propaganda (a subject important to MacBride, necessitating close contact between them),37 supported a public and immediate gesture of friendship toward Israel. Even an unimportant trade agreement or the appointment of an Irish envoy for trade or other interests in Tel Aviv would do. O’Brien apparently had in mind the position of consul, which according to modern practice also handles tasks that are normally fulfilled by diplomatic representatives,38 in addition to the traditional roles relating to trade, passports, and so on. O’Brien, who anticipated criticism of his proposed gesture, headed off the attack by declaring that an Irish envoy in Tel Aviv would expedite handling the issue of the holy places. The gesture was intended to score points with America’s Jewry and with Israel’s supporters there, in order to gain their support for Ireland’s anti-partition campaign. O’Brien was the most prominent of some able and intelligent Irishmen who were trying to arouse as much sympathy as possible for the problem caused by Ireland’s partition, thereby embarrassing Britain. In the end, however, they failed. Their attempt to turn the partition of Ireland into a European issue found little sympathy among continentals, who regarded Britain to be their liberator from tyranny. The attitude in the United States was no different. Americans regarded the issue to be more relevant to London than to Washington, and were not worried by Ireland’s refusal to join NATO as long as they could count on access to bases in Northern Ireland. Furthermore, in those initial days of the Cold War, most Americans felt that Britain was their true partner in curbing Soviet aspirations. The anti-British goal of the campaign therefore did not dovetail with the prevalent sentiment in America at the time. This too was the reason why the campaign had failed to stir interest among Irish Americans. After long-standing enthusiastic participation in the struggles of their homeland, Irish politics were no longer their primary concern, as they shifted their attention to their new homeland. The change began when Ireland gained independence. Until then, Irish Americans were actively involved in efforts to bring about Irish independence, in the hope that this would improve their status in the United States. Once this goal was achieved, their involvement in Irish affairs subsided, as they focused instead on integrating into American society. By the mid-1950s, Irish Americans had already integrated into the mainstream of American life.39 Years later, O’Brien admitted his error in wasting so much energy on the struggle which, in retrospect was pointless,40 but at that time he was dedicated to the campaign. By his own account, the idea of the gesture came to his mind when Arthur G. Klein, a Jewish Democratic Congressman, addressed the US Congress on July 21. The speech was part of the activities of the American League for an Undivided Ireland. This voluntary league (similar to others in the United Staes, Ireland, and the United Kingdom) carried out public relations campaigns to recruit funds and public support against Ireland’s partition. These activities were redoubled after the June 1949 Ireland Act of the British government, which confirmed the constitutional position of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom.41 Some league members appeared before House and Senate committees, and also sought the assistance of Irish and non-Irish Congress members.42

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In an anti-British speech, in which he spoke at length aiming to win over Jewish hearts against the partition of Ireland, Klein drew a comparison between the histories of the Irish and Israeli peoples. The similarities included harsh treatment at the hands of the British, ideals of liberty and refusal to surrender, fulfillment of the national dream despite arrogant British resistance, and of course the partition, which was seen as a British tool to weaken the two new states. Apparently, for the purposes of his anti-British propaganda, Klein ignored the fact that the Partition Resolution of 1947 was approved by the United Nations, and that Britain abstained in the vote. Perhaps he was referring to the 1937 Peel plan as the possible inspiration for the 1947 partition. As proof of the affinity between the two nations, Klein emphasized the deep empathy that he and most other Jews felt toward the Irish and Irish Americans.43 According to Klein, the similar histories created a rapport between the Irish and the Jews. Klein’s analogy inspired O’Brien to use the gesture as a tool in the anti-partition campaign from an angle that he believed had not been sufficiently explored. Did this idea have a solid foundation? Were Jewish-Irish relations in the United States as ideal as described by Klein? A review of the relationship between these groups in the first half of the twentieth century will help answer these questions. In Ireland, the Irish had hardly any contact with the local Jewish community. In the United States, on the other hand, they literally lived side by side. But this proximity led to an ambivalent relationship, with empathy and cooperation on the one hand and confrontation and hostility on the other. The empathy was anchored in similar experiences in the form of persecution, foreign governance, a feeling of exile as a result of catastrophic mass migration, and also in close attachment to tradition. The Jews, who felt themselves to be outsiders at the beginning of the century, regarded the Irish, who had immigrated before them and were already assimilated into society, even achieving fame (in sports, for example), as role models. However, from the beginning of the 1920s, given their proximity and the political and economic circumstances, tensions between the two communities also began to rise. Irish and Jewish affinity for the Democratic Party created a rapport. In the beginning, the Irish controlled the party and tried to woo the Jewish vote. Over time, as Jewish involvement in politics grew, the competition for positions of power became more intense. The Great Depression of the 1930s impacted on the socio-economic level of these two groups. Further tensions were rooted in the Catholicism of the Irish and their loathing of Communism, with which the Jews were mistakenly identified – which also led to expressions of anti-Semitism. Such expressions were centered in the radio broadcasts of Father Charles Coughlin and the Christian Front, which was established in 1938 to save America from Communism. This group, whose members were mostly Irish, accused the Jews of controlling the government and the media. It boycotted Jewish merchants and dragged the conflict into the street. After the FBI thwarted the Christian Front’s 1940 plot to assassinate Jewish Congressmen, the Christian Front went temporarily underground. Its call for isolationism in the war and identification of Jews as warmongers fueled hostilities. After the

106 Ireland and the State of Israel: 1948–63 United States joined the war, there were also incidents of vandalism against Jews in mixed neighborhoods in Boston and New York. Irish animosity toward Jews gradually started to wane only after the war, when the proportions of the Holocaust were discovered. However, the manifestations of this animosity caused concern among the leaders of the Democratic Party. Irish American party leaders fought the Christian Front, banned its members from the party, and established the Committee for Tolerance, calling for Jewish-Irish cooperation.44 Klein and O’Brien naturally focused on the positive aspect of the relations between Irish and Jewish Americans. In this context, it is worth mentioning Irish and Jewish-Zionist cooperation in the United States during the reviewed period, as reflected in archival and other sources. Walshe’s praise for Sol Blum – the prominent Jewish Congressman – for his friendly relations with the Irish has already been noted. According to Walshe, it appears that Blum was not alone. Eliahu Elath, Israeli envoy and ambassador to Britain [1951–9] heard similar comments from de Valera in 1953, who told him that he had met with many Jews when visiting the United States, some of whom were supportive of Ireland’s struggle for independence.45 There was significant cooperation from 1939 to 1948 between Irish Americans affiliated with the Democratic Party and Revisionist Zionist operatives, with the IZL’s armed struggle against the British in the background. It was Briscoe who contributed greatly to Irish and Revisionist-Zionist ties in the United States. At the beginning of 1938, Briscoe asked de Valera’s permission to go to the United States on a six-month political mission on behalf of Jabotinsky and the NZO. De Valera gave him his blessing and even promised to help, after assessing the possible benefits of Jewish-Irish cooperation in the United States on the basis of common opposition to partition and the aspiration for an independent national entity.46 De Valera, who made the statements shortly after the 1937 Peel plan, preceded O’Brien with this idea by over a decade. Briscoe’s mission came about only at the beginning of 1939.47 His task was to harness American public (Jewish and non-Jewish) and government support for the NZO’s Plan, based on 1920 plan of Max Nordau. The aim was to force President Roosevelt to urge Britain to bring one million Eastern European Jews to Palestine, in one wave.48 These were Jews who were at risk now that Hitler’s threat reached beyond the borders of the Third Reich. At the same time, Briscoe was part of a joint IZL-Betar delegation to recruit funds in the United States for revisionist illegal immigration. However, this delegation did not gain the support of American Jewry, which was internally divided to the extent that no consensus could be reached. Furthermore, both the Zionist and non-Zionist establishments opposed activities of parties that they considered to be revisionist and even “fascist.” Briscoe found it difficult to rely on the NZO in the United States, which was a fly-by-night party steeped in internal bickering. It was the Irish who helped him: Ireland’s delegates in Washington, who tried unsuccessfully to arrange a meeting for him with Roosevelt, and the Irish Americans, with whom he formed friendly relations in

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his 1922 IRA mission to the United States. The most prominent of these was William O’Dwyer, Brooklyn District Attorney (who later became mayor of New York, 1946–50), who also appeared with him at a press conference in Manhattan. Briscoe’s own explanation for his failure was that Jews and non-Jews alike had refused to believe his predictions of an impending catastrophe, and that the Jewish organizations were hostile toward him, suspecting he was not interested in saving Jews, but rather in embarrassing Britain in its time of need. According to Briscoe, the American government could not justify active involvement in Palestine issues without popular support, and a meeting with Roosevelt was therefore pointless.49 Briscoe failed in his tasks, but succeeded in forging a link between Irish Americans and the IZL delegation in the US – a permanent delegation that furthered the activities of its predecessor. It was run by a group of young IZL and Betar members from Palestine led by Hillel Kook, who appeared in America under the name of Peter Bergson. They operated from 1939 to 1948 through groups that they had established: American Friends of a Jewish Palestine, The Committee for a Jewish Army, The Committee to Save the Jews of Europe, The Hebrew Committee for National Liberation, and The League for Free Palestine. Through these groups, they hoped to acquire supporters and recruit funds for the revisionist illegal immigration to Palestine, build a Jewish army, and establish a Jewish state. Although the delegation was small, it succeeded in setting off media reverberations and in mobilizing 40,000 supporters, including Irish Americans. The members of the delegation were inspired by the Irish militants, while the Irish Americans identified with the anti-British, anti-colonial orientation of the delegation, and with its aim of achieving national liberation in an armed struggle. One prominent Irish American was Paul O’Dwyer (William’s younger brother), who was born in Ireland in 1907. The Irish rebellion against the British, which he had experienced in his youth, was a formative experience. In 1925 he immigrated to New York and became a leading civil rights lawyer and a steadfast opponent of the Christian Front. After 1945 he was active in the drive to recruit funds for illegal immigration to Palestine and for arms shipments for IZL. Another ardent supporter was the Irish American Congressman from Brooklyn, Andrew Sommers, who let the Bergson group use his office in Congress for its activities on Capitol Hill. His crowning achievement was the bill submitted during the war, which demanded that the President intervene with the British government to establish Jewish military units in Palestine. This bill was somewhat surprising, due to Ireland’s neutrality in the war. But the solidarity that Sommers and other Irish Americans felt with the concept of a Jewish army stemmed from the belief that this could reinforce opposition to British colonialism in the Middle East. Sommers’ proposal became bogged down in the Foreign Affairs Committee and was never debated by Congress, because of opposition by the chairman of the Committee, Sol Blum. Despite the fact that he was Jewish, or perhaps because of it, Blum was loyal to the State Department, which at that time did not regard establishment of a Jewish army to be in the American interest.50

108 Ireland and the State of Israel: 1948–63 After the 1947 UN partition resolution, Paul O’Dwyer expanded his support to all Zionist circles. In coordination with Zionist Jews who were not affiliated with IZL, he urged his brother William, New York’s mayor, to thwart the proposal of Warren Austin, the American delegate to the United Nations from March 1948, to establish a temporary trusteeship for Palestine. William used his close ties with the President to persuade him not to back down from the partition plan. Once the State of Israel was established, a group of Irish Americans, including P. O’Dwyer, appealed to Costello to recognize Israel. During the Middle East arms embargo, Paul extended legal assistance to young Jews who were arrested for involvement in smuggling arms to Israel and used his connections in the New York Police Department to help them. He also headed an organization that granted financial support to widows and orphans of former IZL members.51 It is possible that O’Brien knew of this cooperation. He was certainly aware of the help offered to the Irish anti-partition campaign by Stanford H. Bolz, a Jewish lawyer from Washington, and was encouraged by it. Bolz served as General Counsel for the Jewish Congress of the United States and was involved in Jewish and Zionist activities. The issue of Ireland’s partition struck a chord with him and he offered to help the Irish delegation in Washington garner the support of the Jewish organizations for the campaign.52 In any event, O’Brien was convinced that his proposed pro-Israel gesture would be more effective than any other measure, given the Anglophobia of Israel and its US supporters, who wielded influence in the American government, and given Israel’s demands for border adjustments that could be compared to the Irish anti-partition demand.53 O’Brien’s claim of Israeli influence with the American government apparently stemmed from the strong impression left by the Jewish lobby’s success in influencing the White House to take a pro-Zionist, pro-Israeli stand. This claim was proven true by the US support of the 1947 UN partition plan, Truman’s recognition of Israel upon its establishment and his support for a loan to the newly born Israel.54 Moreover, at this point the President was swayed more by the Jewish lobby than the Irish.55 O’Brien’s reference to Israel’s demands for border adjustments related to Israel’s stance before its talks with the Arab states in the UN Conciliation Commission in Lausanne at the end of August 1949: not to return to the 1947 partition borders and to regard the armistice lines as a basis for negotiations for Israel’s permanent borders. These lines, which were achieved at the height of the war, were the result of the IDF’s clear superiority, and significantly expanded the territory under Jewish control as compared to the partition plan. Areas that had been earmarked for the Arab state, such as the Western Galilee, the mountainous Central Galilee, parts of the eastern Coastal Plain, Northern Negev, environs of Beersheba, Western Negev along the Egyptian border and the Jewish areas of Jerusalem, which were to be part of the corpus separatum, all were added to Israeli territory. Israel explained that the 1947 borders were accepted under the assumption that partition would be implemented peacefully. But after the Arabs states attacked and attempted to annihilate Israel, the 1947 lines were no longer valid.56

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It seems that the farfetched parallelism that O’Brien drew between the Irish demand to abrogate the partition and the Israeli demand to make border adjustments was designed to promote the campaign against the partition of Ireland. O’Brien cited Israel’s demands for border adjustment because his intellectual integrity did not allow him to ignore the obvious difference between the Irish case and the Israeli. While the unity of the Irish isle was the raison d’etre of the anti-partition campaign, Israel’s demand for border adjustments was based on the very principle of partition. The Israeli public had come to terms with the fact that the Jewish state would not have all of the historic Land of Israel. This acceptance prevailed for many years, until Israel’s victory in the Six Day War. Until the IDF took the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in 1967, no party or faction in Israel made any overt militant demand to undo the partition. Certainly there were no paramilitary groups fighting for the return of territories that remained outside of Israeli control in the aftermath of the War of Independence. The platforms of all Zionist parties were based on the inalienable rights that the Jewish people had to the Land of Israel, but Greater Israel remained a dream, a yearning that remained only in the realm of prayer. This resignation may be due to the sense of awe at the fact that Israel was established at all and the shock of the terrible war by which this independence was won, a war in which 6,000 Israelis, 1 percent of the population, were killed. But there are two additional factors that illustrate the difference between the Irish and Israeli cases. First, the establishment of the State of Israel and the partition of the land ultimately did not take place in accordance with the 1947 Partition Plan; but rather, they were the consequence of war. In the Irish case, however, partition was implemented and the Irish Free State was established with the consent of the majority in the country and the Dáil. The fact that Israel’s partition was the outcome of a war, made it futile to challenge the principle of partition and pointless to fight the partition itself. Furthermore, Israel’s insistence on maintaining the ceasefire lines, which constituted an outright rejection of the 1947 Partition Plan, reinforced the futility of any such campaign. Another factor, which was already mentioned earlier in connection with the Peel Plan, has to do with the fact that there was no Jewish population in the parts of the land that were in Arab hands from the end of the 1948 war until 1967. The few Jewish settlements that existed in those areas before the 1948 war (Beit Ha-Arava and Kalia in the Jordan Valey; Atarot and Neveh Yaakov north of Jerusalem; the four Etzion Bloc settlements near Bethlehem; Kfar Darom and Beerot Yitzhak in the Western Negev), as well as the 5,000 Jewish residents of the Old City of Jerusalem, were evacuated during the war because of the fear that the Arabs would slaughter their population. This was a very different demographic reality compared with the situation in the Emerald isle. At the time, the Catholics in the six Ulster counties accounted for one-third of the population.57 Israel’s post-Independence War demographics ruled out any territorial claims extending beyond the ceasefire lines. Demographics were also the reason why no IRA counterpart emerged in Israel.58 This distinction between the Irish and the Israeli case may have been clear to Boland, who showed no enthusiasm for O’Brien’s proposed gesture.

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Boland thought that after achieving a border agreement that would satisfy Israel, it would no longer be possible to harness US Jewry to Ireland’s anti-partition campaign. Nevertheless, he proposed that if it was decided to mobilize American Jewry, it should be done “very unobtrusively and with careful avoidance of anything in the nature of return commitments.” The reason for this qualification may be found in another comment he made, where he said he felt obligated to recommend that the Minister of External affairs avoid any public gesture of friendship toward Israel until there had been progress in resolving the issue of the holy places to the Vatican’s satisfaction.59 Apparently, MacBride and Boland did not see eye to eye on the matter. This assumption is based on an informal discussion at that time between MacBride and Philip Sayers – a wealthy, elderly Jew of Irish origin, who had friends in high places in Dublin and Israel, and who tried to advance commercial ties between the two states. The details of this conversation were conveyed by Eliash, who heard them from Sayers. According to Eliash, MacBride told Sayers that Ireland would postpone de jure recognition of Israel until the issue of Jerusalem had been resolved and public opinion had changed. They also discussed – apparently following O’Brien’s proposal – the option of establishing consulates in Tel Aviv and Dublin, or appointing someone in the local community as honorary consul for Israel, as a first step. A number of individuals were even considered for this appointment. Prof. Abrahamson was ruled out, possibly because of his affiliation with Trinity College. The Irish preferred Good, the solicitor who had captured a respectable place in the community as vice president of the Jewish Representative Council of Ireland and vice president of the Hebrew Congregation in Ireland. MacBride reportedly told Sayers that he intended to formally submit his proposals to the Israelis through Dulanty.60 Furthermore, behind the scenes MacBride initiated significant rapprochement with Israel. His letter to Walshe of August 22, 1949 cast light on this initiative.61 MacBride started his letter by mentioning that his speech in the Dáil on the issue of the holy places had led to offers of assistance by local Jewish dignitaries, and that he was also approached on the matter of de jure recognition of Israel. MacBride did not mention names, but was probably alluding to Sayers, since this subject had come up in their discussion. In his letter, MacBride indeed noted that in these discussions, he (the Minister) had indicated his willingness to do as much as possible to resolve the problem of the holy places. Sayers picked up the gauntlet. He contacted the Israeli government directly, and was authorized by it to say that Israel would welcome negotiations with the Vatican regarding the holy places, directly or through MacBride. Sayers also asked for written authorization from the Israeli government, but MacBride did not support this. He preferred to operate informally, and first explore whether the Vatican was at all interested in negotiating with Israel, indirectly or through him. Surprisingly, there is no indication in Israeli sources of MacBride’s offer to mediate; this may be due to the discrete nature of the communication. Somewhat ironically, MacBride added in his letter: “It may well be that I am walking where angels fear to tread and that all this ground has been gone over

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before and been rejected by the Holy See for some good reason.” Despite this, he emphasized how important it was for Ireland to mediate an ultimate solution to the problem, both because of its direct interest in the holy places and to boost Irish prestige. He also stressed another considerable interest that he tied to the anti-partition campaign. The Minister of External affairs regarded resolution of Israel-Vatican relations as an essential condition for Ireland’s de jure recognition of Israel. However, from the Irish point of view, the true importance of this action would lie in garnering the support of American Jewry for the campaign. He believed that solving the issue of the holy places and its implications for advancing Irish recognition of Israel were the key to the support of American Jewry. Were it not for the problem of the holy places, MacBride emphasized, the Jews would be natural allies of the Irish in the United States, because of their fierce opposition to Britain and their powerful influence in the Democratic Party. MacBride’s initiative seems to have confirmed the evaluation formed in the Jewish and Israeli side that Ireland could be one of the bridges between Israel and the Vatican; however, in reality, this initiative was designated first and foremost to serve Irish interests. Once again, Walshe found it difficult to clarify the Vatican’s stance with regard to MacBride’s proposal for mediation. In his letters to the Minister on August 26 and September 8 (after the meeting with Montini), he ascribed the difficulty to the particularly delicate nature of the problem of the holy places and the disagreements within the Vatican itself regarding the solution. Only in November, following a conversation with Tardini, did Walshe learn that the Vatican, which was waiting for the UN Conciliation Commission’s decision on the issue of internationalization, was not taking any positive steps toward solving the problem. Walshe also discovered that the Vatican had received other offers for mediation, similar to that of MacBride. However, the Vatican, which had a curious latent dislike for the Jews, was highly suspicious of Jewish intentions.62 Indeed, between July and October 1949, Israel attempted to reach the Vatican via third parties, such as the US ambassador to Israel and the Italian ambassador to the Holy See. Israel’s envoys in Rome, Paris, and Brussels also tried to reach the Vatican through the local apostolic delegates. Like Walshe, the Israelis also suspected that there were significant disagreements within the Vatican between the hostile elements, represented by Tardini, and the moderates who sympathized with Israel, headed by Cardinal Tisserant. This sympathy nurtured Israeli optimism regarding a possible compromise with the Vatican, which would have far-reaching consequences. But this illusion was soon dispelled. On December 9, 1949, it emerged that heavy pressure by the Vatican on some UN members had tipped the scales in the General Assembly in favor of reapproval of territorial internationalization.63 While MacBride followed the fate of his proposal for mediation, O’Brien, with MacBride’s blessing, tried to mobilize US Jewry to support the anti-partition campaign. The incentive was a letter at the beginning of August 1949 from Edward Joseph Flynn to Nunan, Ireland’s delegate in Washington. The letter was transferred to the Department of External Affairs in Dublin. The Irish Flynn was a Democratic Party leader and Truman’s crony. From 1940 to 1942 he served

112 Ireland and the State of Israel: 1948–63 as Democratic National Committee chairman and controlled the Bronx Democratic Party. Flynn promised MacBride he would help the campaign. He was given the opportunity at a dinner planned in his honor on October 27 by the Zionist movement in the Bronx. Flynn, who wanted to publicize the event, asked Nunan to help him prepare his speech for the dinner. Nunan passed the task on to Dublin; in the end, O’Brien prepared the outline for the speech, which he sent to Washington on 9 October.64 The outline was intended as propaganda, so it is hardly surprising that it was loaded with rhetoric, citing parallels from the tragic histories of both nations (e.g. long martyrdom for faith and nationhood and dispersion throughout the world), but also similarities that left room for hope: simultaneous independence (establishment of the State of Israel and the Irish Republic) and both nations’ determination to develop their countries, such as Ireland’s exploitation of its swamps to produce electric energy and Israel’s desert agriculture. Nevertheless, it was stressed that unfortunately, neither nation had reached quiet waters. In this context the analogy between the partition of Ireland and Israel was emphasized, stressing that the plight of partition united Irish and Jewish Americans who identified with their mother country. This comment, in fact, was the entire purpose of the speech. I did not find any other reference in the documents of the Irish Department of External Affairs or of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the mobilization of American Jews to the Irish campaign against the partition. The only possible conclusion is that Klein’s speech in the US Congress, the willingness of Bolz to help the campaign, and Flynn’s address were isolated instances. In all likelihood, most of America’s Jews were indifferent to the Irish campaign, especially given the general Jewish and Zionist acceptance of the partition of the State of Israel in its first two decades. The attempt to garner Israeli support for the unrelenting anti-partition campaign did not cease even at the height of the battle for UN reapproval of the internationalization of Jerusalem at the beginning of December; indeed, it continued after the General Assembly confirmed this principle on December 9. This assumption is based on Sayers’ reports to Eliash on December 1 and 18 of the meetings he held with MacBride. According to the reports, Sayers understood that the Minister was eager to establish friendly relations with Israel, and hoped to pave the way for an understanding between Israel and the Vatican. Did MacBride expect Israeli flexibility on the issue of Jerusalem following the December 1949 resolution? Perhaps he expected graciousness in victory from the Vatican towards Israel? Either way, Sayers, for whom MacBride’s door was always open, was concerned at the time, with the initiative (probably his), which was approved by MacBride, for a meeting between the Minister and Sharett in Dublin. The meeting was to take place no later than December 15 – when MacBride was due to leave the country. Sharett, who was in New York for the session of the UN General Assembly, planned to stop in Dublin on his way back to Israel. The Irish agreed to a secret meeting, probably fearing a hostile public response.65 But the visit did not take place, even after MacBride agreed to postpone his

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departure from Ireland by two days. It would seem that Sharett, who was reeling from the sharp blow of the December 9 resolution, and was preoccupied with Israel’s response,66 ascribed lesser importance to the meeting with MacBride. The idea of the meeting did not end there. On December 24, Healy, Ireland’s consul general in New York approached his colleague, Arthur Lurie, Israel’s consul general in the city. This contact followed an urgent coded telegram he had received, to explore the possibility of a meeting between MacBride and Sharett in Rome. It seems that Sayers also had his finger in this pie. But this opportunity was missed: Sharett left Paris for Israel that same day.67

Comay visits Dublin Several months passed before Sharett sent a letter to MacBride, apologizing for failing to meet with him. He made up for this by sending the letter by personal courier: Michael Comay, Head of the Commonwealth desk at the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs which was also responsible for Irish affairs. Comay paid a courtesy visit to Dublin, coordinated with the Irish Department of External Affairs, from June 12 to June 14, 1950.68 In the letter, Sharett expressed the Israeli nation’s deep sympathy for the Irish nation, which was engaged in a comparable struggle for political and cultural independence. He also noted his government’s special interest in strengthening friendly relations with Ireland. MacBride reciprocated in a letter to Sharett, bearing a similar message. As expected, he cited the partition of Ireland as an obstacle to his nation’s full freedom and a stumbling block in its international relations.69 In the meeting with MacBride, Comay explained Israel’s interest in strengthening diplomatic and commercial relations with Ireland; this received some mention in the Irish press.70 The issue of the holy places naturally came up in the discussion. Comay gave MacBride a memorandum submitted by Israel in May 1950 to the United Nations Trusteeship Council, which was responsible for implementing the resolution of December 9, 1949. In the memorandum, Israel agreed to functional internationalization of the holy places, granting extensive supervisory authority to the UN delegate.71 Comay and MacBride also discussed advancing the fledgling trade relations between Ireland and Israel. In 1949, Israel had expressed interest in importing beef and seed potatoes from Ireland and exporting citrus to the Irish market. The value of Israeli exports to Ireland that year was estimated at £270,000. At the beginning of 1950, the value of the transactions on the table was even greater.72 Ireland identified the Israeli market as potentially valuable because of its surging population fed by the waves of immigration and because it would be years before Israel could supply its own needs. The Israeli market was especially attractive because of Ireland’s postwar difficulties in selling agricultural produce, especially beef, to European markets. In the spring of 1950, Israel considered purchasing 3,000 tons of carcass beef, which would represent 12,000– 15,000 animals. This was considered to be a valuable quantity. Israel wanted

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to anchor its commercial ties with Ireland in an official trade agreement, and there were oral and written communications between representatives of both governments via London. But there were numerous problems, primarily Israel’s shortage of hard currency. Israel therefore made purchase of products from Ireland contingent upon receipt of a two or three year credit line from the Irish, with attractive payment terms. There was also talk of collecting part of the payment through contributions by Ireland’s Jewish community (characteristic of those days, when Jewish communities were Israel’s main source of foreign aid).73 However the idea lost steam after it was discovered that the community could only raise a few thousand pounds sterling. There were also technical problems, which would have to be solved, such as slaughtering of cattle according to kashrut regulations or a shortage of cooling facilities for storing the beef. The relevant Irish government offices (Taoiseach, External Affairs, Agriculture, Industry and Commerce, and Finance) were divided on Israel’s conditions. The Department of Finance naturally headed the opposition to granting credit to a poor country suffering from a shortage of hard currency, especially since it realized that Israel’s meager hard currency reserves were needed for imports that were more vital than the Irish products. The Department of Agriculture, on the other hand, could not resist the temptation of the valuable Israeli market, and leaned toward accepting Israel’s terms. The same applies for the Department of External Affairs, which took into account, not at all surprisingly, the anti-partition campaign. Granting credit would be considered a display of goodwill toward Israel, which could help generate American Jewish support for the campaign. However, the Department of External Affairs contemplated the following legal issue: “Would the conclusion of a trade agreement be regarded as going beyond our de facto recognition of Israel and amounting to a de jure recognition of that country?”74 According to international law a trade agreement could be interpreted as recognition.75 Therefore, the Department of External Affairs argued that a trade agreement would be better than explicit and formal de jure recognition, which entailed difficulties. Either way, the question of credit could not be ignored. It remained a stumbling block, and hampered the signing of a trade agreement between Israel and Ireland for many years.76

MacBride’s initiative – April 1951 In 1951, MacBride resolved that there was no reason to further delay full recognition, and ordered Walshe to explain this to the Holy See.77 He made the decision after the Department of External Affairs had begun, a year earlier, to reevaluate the issue of recognizing Israel. The reevaluation was probably motivated by the anti-partition campaign, but the Irish interest in advancing commercial ties with Israel also played a part. The final incentive was the foot-dragging of the United Nations in advancing the corpus separatum. The Trusteeship Council failed to implement the December 9 internationalization resolution, owing to the non-cooperation of Israel and Jordan. Each country

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had already annexed a part of Jerusalem: Israel annexed the western part in December 1949 and Jordon the eastern part in April 1950. This forced the Trusteeship Council to return the issue to the General Assembly in June 1950. Two months before, on April 27, Britain granted Israel de jure recognition, with the exception of West Jerusalem (which it regarded as part of the corpus separatum), and apparently this encouraged the reevaluation. In October 1950, Valentine Iremonger, first secretary of the political division of the Department of External Affairs, examined the issue and concluded that a decision to upgrade recognition should be made as quickly as possible. Citing Rynne’s opinion of February 1949, which even then failed to find a legal argument for postponing de jure recognition of Israel,78 Iremonger stressed that after almost two years there was no justification for this policy. Israel clearly met all the conditions for full recognition, including political stability and the ability to meet international commitments. Iremonger also wished to reevaluate the issue of the holy places. He claimed that Israel’s sincere and numerous efforts to reach a satisfactory resolution of the issue, and its commitment to effective functional internationalization, as reflected in its memo to the Trusteeship Council, should satisfy Ireland. He felt that after the failure of the Trusteeship Council and return of the issue to the United Nations, the debate over the actual form of the internationalization could continue indefinitely, because of the dispute between the sides. It was therefore pointless to continue postponing recognition. Only after he had examined the issue did Iremonger realize the benefit that upgraded recognition would have for Ireland in the shape of immeasurably improved relations with Israel and support by American Jewry for the anti-partition campaign.79 MacBride accepted Iremonger’s position, as evidenced by MacBride’s decision of April 1951. But he delayed this decision for about six months. First, he waited for the results of the forthcoming debate on the issue of Jerusalem in the next meeting of the UN General Assembly. And indeed, when the debates on the issue were renewed in December 1950, there were two proposals. The first proposal, Swedish-Dutch, which supported functional internationalization and was close to Israel’s stance, was not voted on. The second was Belgium’s proposal, which was based on territorial internationalization and was actively supported by the Vatican. This proposal failed to receive the required two-thirds majority.80 This dead end could have been interpreted as indicating weakened international resolve to impose the corpus separatum, and could therefore lead to the conclusion that Ireland should no longer delay granting full recognition. The Irish Department of External Affairs examined Israel’s ties with other countries and the findings also reinforced this conclusion. MacBride reported in his memo to the government in April 1951 that of all the countries that had recognized Israel, Ireland was part of a minority of 5 countries that had granted de facto recognition, compared to 59 countries that had granted de jure recognition.81 MacBride was undoubtedly displeased with this information. As Minister for External Affairs, he was involved in the European and global arenas, and spent a good deal

116 Ireland and the State of Israel: 1948–63 of time outside of Ireland.82 He probably did not want to see himself as a representative of a marginal and reclusive country. If the decision had been in his hands, he would have granted Israel full recognition, probably modeled on the British precedent. But he was prevented from doing this in the absence of government and Vatican approval. After his meeting with MacBride in March 1951, Sayers indicated to Israel that despite the Minister’s willingness to recommend that the Cabinet grant Israel de jure recognition, he had difficulty in receiving Cabinet support for this step. MacBride made special mention of Minister of Agriculture Dillon, and the very conservative Minister of Education, General Richard Mulcahy,83 who were known for their insistence on Vatican approval.84 MacBride’s loss of power in the government at the time, compared to the beginning of his tenure, may also have been significant. His influence was waning for various reasons, such as his meager achievements as the minister responsible for implementation of Marshall Aid, and his colossal failure in responsible leadership of the Clann na Poblachta, and thus of the social radicalism platform.85 In any event, recognition of Israel could not be decided upon without consulting the Vatican. And the Vatican responded vehemently. Walshe himself, in his response of May 2, 1951 to Sean Nunan, secretary of the Department of External Affairs (1950–4),86 had difficulty offering a cogent explanation for MacBride’s intentions. Considering the complete opposition of the Jewish stance to that of the Vatican, he regarded de jure recognition as departing from the moral stand of Ireland. Walshe rejected the legal argument advocating immediate recognition as unworthy of serious attention, and did not present it to the Vatican. In a discussion with Tardini, he limited the explanations to Ireland’s difficulty in developing satisfactory trade relations with Israel, and its desire to garner the support of American Jewry for the anti-partition campaign. Although Tardini could sympathize with the second reason, he stood firm against de jure recognition of Israel. Walshe recognized Tardini’s disappointment and inflexibility, and advised against haste “if only to keep the good will of the Holy Father towards Ireland. Palestine is one of the issues on which he holds extremely strong views.” Walshe criticized the Holy See’s inflexibility on the subject of the corpus separatum more than once, but when it transpired that this rigidity could not be softened, he felt that there was no choice for Ireland but to come to terms with the Pope’s position on the issue. In any case, as far as MacBride was concerned, Walshe’s recommendation, to adjust to the Vatican’s position and not hasten to grant Israel de Jure recognition, became by then a moot point. MacBride’s term was coming to an end, together with the fall of Costello’s government and the beating taken by Clann na Poblachta (a loss of eight of its ten seats in the Dáil) in the elections on May 30, 1951. Recognition of Israel, which MacBride had treated seriously and with empathy, especially given the anti-partition campaign, was back to square one. However, even if MacBride had continued to serve as Minister for External Affairs, it is doubtful whether there

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would have been any progress in Ireland’s relations with Israel, as the Vatican was a significant barrier for him too.

Israeli initiative via the US delegation About one year later, following Comay’s request, Abba Eban, Israel’s ambassador to Washington (1950–9) and head of its delegation to the United Nations (1949–59), spurred John J. Hearne, Ireland’s ambassador to Washington (1951–60) to stir up his government on the issue of recognition of Israel.87 At this time, de Valera’s minority government was in power (June 1951–May 24, 1954).88 Due to his age (68) and failing eyesight, de Valera had relinquished the External Affairs portfolio. The portfolio was given to Frank Aiken, who was probably his closest friend and who acted as Minister for External Affairs for 17 years (1951–4, 1957–69). But de Valera continued to hold the reigns of foreign policy.89 Comay preferred Eban to Elath, Israel’s envoy to Britain [1951–2] because of his close friendship with Hearne. Their friendship reflected the relationship between both embassies, as expressed by Esther Herlitz, an Israeli embassy staff member (who later became a Labor Party Knesset member): “All of us here have excellent relations with the Irish embassy and they seek our company even more than we seek theirs.”90 Comay recalled the list of 61 countries that had recognized Israel. Thirty-nine had granted Israel de jure recognition since its establishment. The other 22 had granted it de facto recognition and, except for four countries (Ireland, Greece, Iran, and Ceylon), had upgraded to full recognition.91 As normalization with Greece was in the cards,92 Comay estimated that Ireland would remain the only European country without full relations with Israel. He lashed out furiously. In his letter to Eban on February 4, he threw political correctness to the wind when he said that Ireland may remain “the last little nigger boy.”93 But this was somewhat inaccurate, and indeed in another letter to Eban and Elath on February 10, Comay admitted that he had forgotten to mention Spain and Portugal. At the same time he took pains to stress that he did not even bother to take Germany into account. This was an obvious allusion to Germany’s dark past.94 Comay added that while Spain was a special case, there was no logic to the absence of relations with Portugal, and indeed, Israel had already taken steps to establish relations.95 It is noteworthy that Franco’s Nazi-Fascist affiliation reflected on the relations between Israel and Spain. Israel was not eager to ask Spain for immediate recognition. Furthermore, once it joined the United Nations, Israel voted against Spain’s membership; even though this was eventually liable to position Spain against Israel in the United Nations, the historical and emotional burden prevailed.96 Following Comay’s letters, Eban told Hearne that Ireland was just about the only European country that had not yet fully recognized Israel. After checking the issue with his department, Hearne was convinced that, in Eban’s words, “this is nothing more than a negligent error . . . as there is not the slightest calculated intention in this standstill in the development of Irish

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recognition of Israel, and there is no doubt . . . that Mr. de Valera will correct this slight as soon as he receives the ambassador’s cable”.97

Edwin Samuel meets de Valera But Hearne’s optimism quickly dissipated with the report of Edwin Samuel (son of Herbert Samuel, the first British High Commissioner in Palestine) of April 21, 1952, which painted a gloomy picture of his meeting with de Valera five days earlier. The report reached the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Jerusalem and was forwarded to Eban in the United States.98 The meeting took place in Taoiseach’s office and continued for about half an hour. Samuel noted a number of visual details, such as the modesty of the office, de Valera’s poor eyesight, and the Irish language speaker’s badge on his lapel. Samuel also cited de Valera’s obvious devout Catholicism, which was also expressed in his comments on his pilgrimage to Jerusalem in 1950 (Samuel mistakenly noted 1949). There was no news in Samuel’s report on de Valera’s ardent opposition to partition, particularly that of Ireland, and his belief that Jerusalem should be internationalized. More interesting was his claim that de Valera recognized the impracticality of internationalization, and his awareness that most of the Christian holy places were controlled by Jordan – he probably witnessed this himself on his 1950 visit. He also spoke vaguely of internationalization of the Old City only, possibly because he knew the United Nations’ determination to implement the corpus separatum had weakened, especially since the question of Jerusalem was no longer under debate in the General Assembly in 1951.99 However, de Valera, an astute politician – according to Samuel – stated that any change in his government’s position on the issue would be met with Catholic protest across Ireland, a protest in which he had no interest in fueling. Samuel was aware of de Valera’s animosity toward Israel and support for the Arabs. This was expressed in his clear belief that Israel was to blame for the problem of Palestinian refugees, and in his categorical claims that the Catholics fared better under Arab regimes than that of Israel. The refugee problem, a focal point in the Jewish-Arab conflict, was created in the 1948–9 war between the yishuv, and subsequently the Jewish state, and the Arabs, when masses of Palestinians fled areas allocated to the Jewish state under the partition plan, as well as areas that Israel had conquered and annexed. There is great disparity between the Palestinian and Israeli narratives about the war. An important study recently published by Yoav Gelber, an Israeli scholar, indicates that the Palestinian flight resulted from the crumbling of Palestinian society and its inability to cope with difficult conditions during the war. Another factor was the Palestinians’ fear of the Hagana forces, later the IDF, following exaggerated Arab propaganda of horrors inflicted by these forces when conquering Arab villages and towns. But there were also cases in which the IDF did indeed expel Arabs during the war (e.g. in Ramle and Lod), explaining this as military necessity. The refugees sought temporary asylum in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

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and the areas it had occupied in the West Bank, in the areas occupied by the Egyptians in the Gaza Strip, and in Lebanon and Syria. However, the Palestinians, who thought they were fleeing their homes temporarily, became long-term refugees. UN General Assembly Resolution 194 of December 11, 1948 (which ordered establishment of the Palestinian Conciliation Commission) stated that “refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date.” It also determined eligibility for compensation for property for refugees who choose not to return. However, in the aftermath of war, faced with Arab refusal to recognize Israel’s right to exist, and to ensure the essential conditions for its existence as a Jewish homeland, Israel did not allow the Palestinians to return. It cast the responsibility for their fate onto the Arab states and expected them to resettle the refugees within their borders. Israel was only willing to compensate them for their property as part of a comprehensive peace agreement. On the other hand, after their defeat, the Arabs, whose goal in the war had been to keep Palestine in Arab hands, clung stubbornly to the right of return, and rejected the legitimacy of the State of Israel. The Arab states (with the exception of Jordan) refused to resettle the refugees, and most of them were housed in camps that were established in these countries (except for a handful of refugees who rehabilitated themselves in the Middle East and elsewhere). They still live in abject conditions, supported by the charity of aid organizations, mainly the UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency), and await repatriation. The Arab version casts the blame on Israel: the Jews of the yishuv, who were perceived as colonialists under the patronage of the imperialist British Empire, launched a war to establish a state on Palestinian land, expelling the Palestinians and carrying out horrific acts. Israel was portrayed as a cruel conqueror that was established at the expense of the Palestinians and on their land. In comparison, the Israeli version, which was also recognized by early Israeli historiography, cast the blame on the Palestinians: refusing to accept the partition of Palestine, they started the bloody war and called in the invading Arab armies. They followed their leaders and the Arab regimes, which encouraged them to desert their homes and land and flee so that the Arab armies could annihilate the Jewish state unhindered. In the absence of a reliable census of the refugee population, their number is also controversial. According to the data of the refugee aid organizations, at the end of the war there were over one million refugees. According to UNRWA estimates, there were 881,000. Israel estimated that there were half a million refugees after the war. This number is repeated in more recent Israeli estimates.100 A memo dated September 8, 1951, from the files of the Irish Department of External Affairs, may shed light on the position of the department and de Valera in the Israeli-Arab conflict. The memo touches on the refugee problem, although it focuses on the holy places and Jerusalem. It presents a pro-Arab stance with regard to the refugees, portraying the Jews, newcomers to Palestine, as having robbed the native Palestinians of their land. It expresses empathy with the frustration of the Arab states at the growing Jewish population in Palestine following mass Jewish immigration in the 1930s, in the shadow of escalating persecution

120 Ireland and the State of Israel: 1948–63 of the Jews in Europe. Unsurprisingly, considering the Irish narrative, the 1947 partition of Palestine was mentioned as another cause for frustration. The memorandum noted the flight or expulsion of Arabs from their homes in the Arab-Israeli war. The flight was associated with expulsion, perhaps so that it would not be interpreted as voluntary. It also cited Israel’s refusal to heed the United Nations regarding repatriation of the refugees, and its housing of Jewish immigrants in the abandoned homes. The memorandum did not ignore Israel’s agreement to the principle of compensation for property of refugees who chose not to return, in the context of a comprehensive peace agreement. But it did not mention that the Arabs insisted on the right to return, and refused to recognize Israel’s existence. Needless to say, the memorandum included a dismal description of the refugees’ situation in the camps, dependent on the charity of the UNRWA and voluntary organizations, including the Pontifical Mission in Palestine. The contribution of Ireland’s government was also mentioned, especially the 250 tons of oatmeal contributed through the Pontifical Mission.101 Since the collective Irish memory was formed by repeated evictions and confiscation of the land of the Catholic majority, it was easy for de Valera to identify with the tragedy of the refugees. Could he have adopted the Arab version in full, did he project the Irish case, brought to an extreme on the Israeli situation? Indeed, a metaphor of this sort can be found in an article that was published a year earlier in the Irish Ecclesiastical Record: “Hell or Connaught’ policy in Ireland gives a fair idea of what happened in Palestine during 1948 to Arabs whose homes then were in what is now Jewish territory.”102 De Valera’s understanding of the facts was probably not so simplistic. He surely knew this was not a competition between an all-good narrative and an all-evil narrative, and realized that while he could deeply identify with the refugees, he could also accept the legitimacy of Israel’s existence, as a correction of the historic injustice inflicted upon the Jewish people. De Valera’s interest in the refugee problem could also be related to his visit to Israel in 1950. During his visit to Jerusalem, he also went on a one-day visit to Jordan, where he met with King Abdullah and visited the holy Christian sites. He probably passed by some of the West Bank refugee camps and witnessed their condition.103 Unfortunately, Samuel and others (to be discussed later) did not describe de Valera’s position on the issue extensively, making it difficult to draw an unequivocal conclusion. Samuel was also aware of de Valera’s criticism of Israel’s relations with its Catholic minority. This criticism could be ascribed to the Israeli military administration under which Israel’s Arab minority lived for the first 18 years of the state’s existence. At the beginning of 1951, this minority numbered 162,000, of which 35,000 were Christian – mostly Roman Catholics and Greek Catholics. Theoretically, they were citizens with equal rights, but in fact, they were considered to be loyal to their Palestinian brothers and the hostile Arab world. The Israeli government treated them as a security risk, monitoring them and restricting their movements, and nipping in the bud any subversion on their part.104 As early as 1951, Catholic press coverage painted a harsh picture of Israel’s treatment

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of the Christians. It included reports of monitoring of the clergy’s movements in regions under military rule, difficulties in receiving permits for visiting clergy, attempts to restrict activities of Christian schools and missions, and the expulsion of the villagers of Ikrit and Biram, on the Lebanese border in the Galilee.105 The Irish press also spotlighted these issues. For example, the Irish Independent revealed the tragic stories of the Christian residents of Ikrit (and in fact also Biram) who became refugees in Israel.106 The Irish Press published an article on the Easter curfew in Nazareth (population 19,000, one-third of which is Muslim and the remainder Catholic) in response to skirmishes between Muslim youth and Greek Catholic boy scouts, which ended in two dead and three seriously wounded.107 Although he was struck by de Valera’s pro-Arab stance, Samuel refrained from portraying him as an outright anti-Semite, and chose to define him as more hostile than friendly. Samuel, who understood that the cardinal problem of internationalization was compounded by the refugee issue, which further hardened de Valera’s attitude toward Israel, concluded that Ireland’s relations with Israel were unlikely to improve during his tenure. This conclusion was confirmed by Max Nurock on his return from Dublin at the beginning of May.108 After studying Samuel’s report, Eban realized why he did not receive a response from Hearne, as reflected in his wry comment: “The fact that the Irish ambassador has been silent since he made his lavish declaration to me suggests the view that something is sour in Dublin.”109 At the same time Eban did not refrain from asking Colonel Chaim Herzog, the military attaché in Washington (1950–4), to protest Hearne’s lack of response to the Irish embassy staff.110 Hearne knew about the involvement of Chaim Herzog’s father – the rabbi – in Ireland’s struggle for independence, and they had many common subjects of interest.111 While the specifics of how Hearne handled Eban’s request are not mentioned in the documents in my possession, it appears that Eban’s evaluation was correct. The 1956 review of the Irish Department of External Affairs on the subject of recognizing Israel indicates that in June 1952, when Walshe was on holiday in Dublin, he was asked whether the Vatican would change its stance toward Israel. Walshe ruled out this possibility, at least during the lifetime of Pius XII. Walshe’s suggestion to postpone Israel’s de jure recognition unless sufficient reason was found, was accepted.112 It would seem that the Israeli government’s decision one month earlier, on May 4, to transfer the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, gave the Irish another reason to refuse recognition.

Relations with the Irish media When Israel realized that it was treading water on the political level, it decided to try its luck with the media. The driving force was Michael Arnon, press attaché in the Israeli delegation in London, who labored to establish personal relations with newspaper editors in Ireland. From Israel’s perspective, the little attention it

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received in the Irish press was distorted and slanderous, whether it was about the holy places or its relations with the Catholic minority. Arnon did not want to abandon Israel to this sort of propaganda. In June 1952, Arnon began to reap the fruit of his labor. The Irish Times, Ireland’s leading newspaper, published a sympathetic article by Norman Bentwich, former legal advisor to the Mandatory Government of Palestine (1920–31) and professor of international relations at Hebrew University (1931–51). The article addressed the Negev: its arid climate, mineral deposits, settled areas, agricultural research stations for collection of flood waters, the future of Beer Sheba as the capital of the Negev, and the economic potential of Eilat’s port as a gateway to the East.113 Arnon visited Dublin on July 1–4, 1952 and met with the editors of the Irish Times, Irish Independent, Irish Press, Standard, and with Irish Radio’s news editor and the general manager of the Irish press agency.114 Upon his return from Dublin, Arnon sent the editors government press releases from Israel on issues such as Jerusalem, the circumstances of the Christians, and Israel’s economic development.115 Arnon closely followed every scrap of information about Israel in the Irish press, especially in the leading newspapers. In the autumn of 1952, there seemed to be some improvement. For example, the Irish Times published a sympathetic editorial about the reparations agreement signed on September 10, 1952 between Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of West Germany, and Sharett, Israel’s foreign minister. Germany undertook to pay more than three billion German marks, over a period of 14 years, to compensate for material damage inflicted on the Jews by the Nazi regime. The article saw poetic justice in the agreement, although it stressed that no agreement could compensate for the immense suffering, and certainly not for the loss of 6 million Jews, which was twice the population of the Irish Republic. The issue was that Germany had begun to atone for its crimes against the Jews.116 But there was a snag. Arnon found that this was the only response to the agreement in the Irish press. On December 23, another article was published in the Irish Times, which was praised by Arnon. For the first time, the Irish media published a review of the issue of the holy places that was fair from an Israeli perspective. It included significant facts, such as Jordan’s control of most of the Christian sites in the Jerusalem area, and the rejection of the corpus separatum principle by both Jordan and Israel. The article explained that while Jordan regarded Jerusalem as the third holiest site for Muslims, for Israel, it was the cradle of Jewish culture. The corpus separatum was presented as hopeless, as it was impossible to ignore the new areas of Jerusalem, where Israel’s vibrant capital now resided. The article also stated that Israel’s proposal to internationalize only the holy places appeared to be the solution with the greatest chance of achieving peace.117 An editorial in the Irish Press in November 1952 presented one aspect of the effort to establish the Jewish state that would interest advocates of the Irish language: the success of Hebrew compared to the difficulties with the Irish

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language. The success was described as stemming from utilitarian motives: the need for a common language in Israel’s melting pot, together with national enthusiasm and religious faith. However, there was no benefit in the revival of Irish since there was no social or economic necessity for its success as a spoken or academic language. It was also emphasized that despite the national enthusiasm that characterized the early glory days of the Gaelic League, Irish was relegated to compete with the English language, to which the Irish had become accustomed.118

Elath visits Ireland – January 1953 Boland, Ireland’s new ambassador to London (1951–5), made a good impression in his chance meeting with Elath on August 28, 1952. According to Elath, Boland told him that Israel should not doubt the sympathy of the Irish people, although full relations between the two countries could not be expected before the problem of Jerusalem was resolved. Concurrently, Boland encouraged Israel to pursue its public relations with the Irish people and among the country’s leaders. He explained that this was required because the Irish were ignorant about Israel and did not know the truth about the holy places. Indeed, the Israeli representatives who had visited Ireland (Comay and Arnon; Shenar and Brin – trade envoys) sensed this ignorance and ascribed it to the fact that the Irish were involved in their own affairs and did not take any interest in foreign affairs, apart from their relations with their British neighbor.119 Boland ascribed particular importance to direct contact with de Valera, who, due to his poor vision (verging on blindness), gleaned most of the information relating to foreign affairs from oral reports. He suggested a personal meeting between Elath and de Valera, and between Elath and government and Dáil members. Boland was prepared to arrange these meetings, and hoped that Nunan, who had replaced him as Secretary at the Department of External Affairs (1951–4), would help him. Nunan and Elath served in Washington at the same time, and had maintained close personal ties ever since. Nunan was also close to de Valera and enjoyed the trust of many politicians. Following this conversation, Elath decided to visit Ireland, and was given the green light by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs.120 Boland’s version was somewhat different: Elath initiated the trip when he visited Boland’s office and expressed his ardent desire to pay a private visit to Dublin. Boland thought that Elath’s request should be granted, and tried to convince the Department of External Affairs that there was nothing political behind the visit. In a letter to Nunan on September 1, 1952, he showered Elath with praise, saying that he was highly respected in London’s diplomatic circles, and an enthusiastic admirer of Ireland; that Elath had told him that he would like to utilize the visit to establish personal, even though unofficial contacts with the Irish Government; that Israel did not want to embarrass Ireland and would avoid any initiative with regard to its recognition until the issue of the holy places had been resolved; and that Israel attributed great importance to commercial ties with Ireland, based on export of fertilizers to Ireland and import of beef to Israel.121

124 Ireland and the State of Israel: 1948–63 Iveagh House accepted Boland’s suggestion, after citing an authority – the Pope, who had granted Sharett’s request for an audience. Sharett indeed met the Pope at the end of March 1952 but the meeting was defined by the Vatican as purely a courtesy visit. Thus, the Pope’s example was to be followed: Ireland should respond positively to Elath’s request to meet the top politicians, but avoid any discussion of recognition. In Sharett’s meeting with the Pope, which Walshe reported, this issue was not discussed either.122 Elath’s visit was delayed until after he had submitted his credentials to Queen Elizabeth II on October 21.123 Elath was scheduled to visit Dublin on November 10–14. The visit was arranged by Boland, who planned receptions and meetings with Ireland’s president, Taoiseach, Minister for External Affairs, members of the Dáil, the press, and representatives of the Jewish community. The Director General of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Walter Eitan, asked Elath to allude to the issue of recognition by describing, in passing, Israel’s good relations with primarily Catholic countries such as Belgium, Italy, Argentina, and Brazil. He also instructed him to politely reject offers to appoint an honorary consul for Israel in Dublin.124 The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not enthusiastic about the appointment of an honorary consul from within Dublin’s Jewish community. Such an appointment had already been discussed by MacBride and Sayers at the end of the summer of 1949. Since the ministry ascribed a political role to the position of consul, it doubted that a local community member could explain Israel’s policy on sensitive issues such as Jerusalem. Its reluctance also stemmed from the fact that a number of dignitaries in the Jewish community were eager to fill this prestigious position. Appointment of one of them might stimulate the jealousy of the others, instigate rivalry and in the end, compromise their cooperation with Israel. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs only supported the appointment when it became apparent that there was someone in the community who was accepted by one and all.125 However, Rabbi Jakobovits attributed great importance to this appointment: in the absence of a spokesperson for Israel, the Irish public held the Jewish community responsible for events in Israel related to sensitive issues such as the well-being of its Catholic minority. The Rabbi wanted Good to fill the position, and urged the Israeli delegation in London to facilitate his appointment. Jakobovits was aware of Good’s limited Jewish and Zionist education, but recognized his virtues as a sharp, intelligent person with integrity and common sense, who lent a hand in every community and Zionist endeavor, and who had earned a favorable reputation among Jews and non-Jews alike. Another advantage was that he had no rivals. Other personalities in the community who were worthy of the position were rejected by the Irish government, as noted. In March and April 1951, the Rabbi thought that the hostile coverage in the Irish press regarding Israel’s handling of religious affairs could turn the public against the community, and he again cautioned Elath about possible danger unless a consul was appointed. But the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not heed his warnings.126

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Foreign Minister Sharett asked Elath to inquire after the health of de Valera and Prof. Jacob Weingreen, a Jewish professor of Semitic languages at Trinity College.127 On November 9, the day before Elath’s scheduled flight to Dublin, Israeli President Chaim Weizmann passed away. The thirty days of mourning and the Christmas holidays led to postponement of the visit to January 5–9, 1953.128 The favorable tone in the Irish press that preceded Elath’s visit afforded a hospitable welcome in the best Irish tradition. The climax of the visit was his meeting with de Valera on January 6. Elath’s report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs described the content of this meeting.129 Despite its subjectivity, it is important in that it includes a detailed description of a meeting for which there is no documentation in other sources. The meeting lasted for approximately one hour, during which time they discussed a number of issues, such as Israel’s political and social affairs, its treatment of the Christians and the problem of Palestinian refugees. Elath was impressed by de Valera’s intensity and curiosity: Taking into account his health, I tried . . . to be brief . . . however . . . he put forth new questions, and in some cases even chided me when he saw that I was limiting my response. Although he is in fact blind, I found him healthy and lively, and despite his age, knowledgeable of everything that interests him. De Valera expressed his confidence that Elath, a citizen of a newly born state, would be able to understand Ireland’s problems. De Valera agreed with Elath when he said that achieving independence was not the end of the road. He also added that his government was concerned the Irish people did not fully understand this and that their determination might wane. De Valera was astounded when Elath reviewed the scope of immigration to Israel, which had doubled the Jewish population within four years: 687,000 new immigrants had joined the 650,000 Jews who lived in Israel at its establishment. The massive emigration from Ireland, mostly to the United Kingdom but also to the United States and Canada, which was intensifying at that time because of the economic crisis,130 made Israel’s demographic growth a source of envy for de Valera. He was curious about how Israel managed to absorb so many immigrants without creating havoc, although he assumed with complete confidence that Israel had the finances for this. Elath set him straight on this and described Israel’s scarce means for economic development. He attributed the relatively seamless integration of the immigrants to the pre-state Yishuv, which had prepared the ground for Jewish sovereignty, but also to the enthusiastic support of the Jewish people. De Valera commented that he had always appreciated the skills of the Jewish people. He knew many Jews in the United States and they had taught him the devotion of all Jews to their nation. When Elath said that in this respect the Jews and the Irish were similar, de Valera replied that there was only a general similarity. If the Irish diaspora, especially that of the United States, were as devoted to its homeland as the Jewish diaspora, Ireland’s situation would

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be immeasurably better, as it was compelled to cope with its difficulties by itself, with limited resources. The conversation flowed from the Jewish and Irish diasporas to the social and cultural absorption of immigrants into Israel. De Valera noted that Zionism’s greatest achievement was the revival of Hebrew. This awakened his sorrowful reflections regarding the Irish language, and he said: “Without their own language, the Irish will remain spiritually displaced, and although there are some advantages in belonging to the English speaking world, they will miss the intimacy which is irreplaceable in the nation’s consciousness and soul and which is a national asset.” The Irish language revival was a most sensitive issue for de Valera. He never stopped believing that Irish nationalism would degenerate if it failed to revive the language. In 1939, he publicly announced that he would rather see restoration of Irish than the end of the partition. On another occasion, he said that if he had to choose between political freedom without Irish and Irish without political freedom, he would choose Irish.131 De Valera told Elath that his government had allocated substantial resources to revive Irish, but progress was slow and there was still a long way to go. However, he and his colleagues would continue to fight defeatism and would certainly need a great deal of idealism to sacrifice some of the advantages in the use of English. He expressed his confidence that Irish would be revived when personalities such as William Butler Yeats, James Joyce, and George Bernard Shaw rose to the occasion. Ironically, these authors did not write in Irish. Obviously, de Valera was referring to their literary stature. However, his comments reflect the universal truth that a language cannot be revived without an educated elite from which most writers, scholars, artists, and statesmen emerge, that is, those who create and maintain a national culture as reflected in its language.132 By way of encouragement, Elath noted that the revival of the Hebrew language was no simple feat, and that not everyone spoke it yet. He attributed the success of this revival to the fact that this was the language of the Bible and of the spiritual assets of the Jewish people that had been compiled over generations. He added that the revival of Hebrew was also a necessity: thousands of Jews had gathered from all corners of the earth, speaking dozens of different languages, and needed a common tongue. Hebrew was the obvious choice. This only increased de Valera’s frustration. Barely concealing his ire, he commented on how detrimental English had been to the Irish. With regard to Israel’s international orientation, de Valera noted, stressing that he did not wish to be misunderstood, that Israel’s image had been pro-communist in certain circles, and that the Soviet Union had supported Israel as a means of introducing destructive atheism into the Middle East. As to de Valera’s comment, it should be noted that the identification of Zionism and Israel with Communism was based in part on the short-lived friendship between Israel and the Soviets, which was expressed in the political and military assistance that the USSR and its satellites provided Israel at its inception. The Soviet Union had also allowed Jews from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Hungary to

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immigrate to Israel. The Soviets’ strategy was to use the Jewish state to tip the balance of power in the Middle East at the expense of the reactionary, pro-British Arab regimes. But the Israeli-Soviet honeymoon soon went sour. The Soviets were disappointed with Israel, which had sided with the West on the Korean War. Jewish emigration from the USSR was another source of tension, as the Soviets sought to assimilate the Jews and refused to let them leave. The Soviet Union began to court the Arabs. This tendency grew increasingly stronger after the military coup in Egypt in the summer of 1952 and Egypt’s refusal to play along with the US initiative for a Middle East defense bloc. To signal to the Arabs that the Eastern Bloc took their side, anti-Zionist and anti-Semitic propaganda was revived, portraying Zionism and Israel as the tools of Anglo-American imperialism. The highlights of this campaign included the Prague Trials at the end of 1952, the Doctors’ Plot of January 1953 and the suspension of diplomatic relations between Jerusalem and Moscow for several months beginning in February 1953.133 In truth, despite Israel’s mistakenly pro-Soviet image, its international policy until the Korean war was careful and pragmatic, seeking assistance wherever it could while refraining from systematically siding with either party during the Cold War. Furthermore, Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first prime minister, consistently viewed the Soviet Union as an ideological threat to Israel, which was a democracy and by no means communist. However, he found it hard to turn a cold shoulder to this superpower, which had supported the establishment of Israel, and maintained that a modus vivendi could be reached. But while he adamantly objected to any overt, direct criticism of the Soviet Union, he waged an uncompromising ideological campaign against the radical left wing, represented by the Israeli Communist Party and the Zionist Mapam party which zealously advocated a pro-Soviet orientation.134 Elath rightfully rejected de Valera’s comment about Israel’s alleged procommunist leanings, and mentioned the Prague Trials. De Valera responded that he was shocked at the overt anti-Semitism of these trials, but that in the end, they had proved beneficial to Israel in that they had established its anti-communist position. De Valera inquired about Israel’s opposition to the internationalization of Jerusalem, which would satisfy the Christian world – for which Jerusalem was just as holy as it was to the Jews. Elath spoke at length on this issue, realizing it lay at the heart of the problem vis-à-vis Ireland. De Valera acknowledged Israel’s difficulty in agreeing to internationalization of new Jerusalem. Nevertheless, he said, Israel should demonstrate sensitivity to this explosive issue, which was liable to hinder communications between Israel and the Christian world. The underlying message was clear – the Vatican was interfering with Ireland’s full recognition of Israel. De Valera asked Israel to be generous on the refugee issue as well. This issue, like that of Jerusalem, was an open wound. The Palestine problem could not be resolved unless these two issues were answered, de Valera asserted. In his account, Elath did not mention which arrangement de Valera preferred, perhaps

128 Ireland and the State of Israel: 1948–63 because de Valera did not spell it out. Although de Valera reportedly admitted having learned new facts in these conversations, Elath himself did not feel he had convinced him. Furthermore, de Valera’s position on Jerusalem and the refugees, along with his comments on Israel’s financial acumen, led Elath to conclude “that he belonged to those who were anti-Semites by virtue of their extreme religious upbringing, which even the most advanced political views cannot erase,” even though “he was most cordial and did not in any way . . . give me any reason to believe that he was not our friend.” Elath had the feeling that the courteous treatment he had received was due simply to Irish good manners. It is unlikely that Elath reached his conclusion about de Valera’s anti-Semitism from this conversation alone. Elath may have been influenced by de Valera’s Catholicism, or was perhaps so sensitive as to perceive anyone who did not see eye to eye with Israel as an anti-Semite. In the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs there were those who disagreed with Elath’s view and held that on the issue of Jerusalem, de Valera represented a popular Catholic stance. His comments regarding Israel’s financial strength were attributed to the naivety that took root even among Israel’s staunchest allies, who perceived the Jews as omnipotent in financial matters. Moreover, there were those in the Ministry who expressed parochial enthusiasm at Elath’s meeting with de Valera, to the extent of dubbing it a historic moment in the relationship between the two states. In the end, though, it was understood that the meeting was significant primarily in that de Valera had been able to hear Israel’s position from an authorized, high-ranking official.135 During the visit Elath dined with Frank Aiken, Ireland’s Minister for External Affairs. He also spoke with Sean Lemass, Minister for Industry and Commerce, to whom he explained Israel’s economic problems and its plans for agricultural and industrial development. While Elath did not raise the issue of diplomatic relations, it became clear beyond the shadow of doubt that the subject would not be placed on the agenda before Israel resolved its relationship with the Vatican. His meeting with Costello and MacBride was not promising either. True to their role as members of the opposition, the two criticized the attitude of de Valera’s government toward Israel, but made no promise to change this attitude if and when they regained power. In a brief review of the visit, which Elath sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on January 12, he described de Valera as the main opponent to upgrading the relationship with Israel. Because of his authoritative personality, no one dared defy him, Elath explained. But in his report two weeks later, he was less decisive, noting that he had been unable to get a clear response on de Valera’s willingness to take steps toward normalization and the degree of importance he attributed to this subject. Elath nevertheless concluded if anyone could establish a full relationship with Israel, it would be de Valera. Despite the sincere sympathy for Israel he had found in Ireland, Elath believed his only achievements were ties with journalists, scientists, and writers, and strengthening the Zionist affiliation of the local Jewish community.

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The discrepancy between Irish sympathy for Israel and the strict Irish adherence to protocol was reflected in the response of the Department of External Affairs to the death of Israel’s first president, Chaim Weizmann. Given Weizmann’s illustrious personage, Aiken sent a letter of condolence to “Sharett, his colleagues, and the relatives of Weizmann.” Using the term “his colleagues,” Aiken deliberately avoided any reference to the Israeli government. He also refrained from referring to Weizmann as president, choosing instead to describe him as “a great leader and statesman.” The constraints of non-recognition of Israel and the issue of the holy places both influenced the Iveagh House decision to refrain from sending an official delegation to the ceremony held in Weizmann’s memory by the Dublin Jewish community at the synagogue on Adelaide Road. Accepted practice was thus contravened, although relations with Israel were considered amicable and there was some desire to express solidarity with the local Jewish community. It was considered ill-advised for the president of Ireland to attend, because he represented the entire Irish people. Since the issue of the holy places had not yet been resolved to the satisfaction of the majority of the Irish nation, many people would surely object to his participation in the ceremony. The same logic applied for any other government representative, whose participation might have been misconstrued as recognition of Israel.136 Arnon’s ties with the Irish press finally proved useful, as Elath’s visit received positive coverage from the leading newspapers. They published details of his personal history, as a native of the Ukraine whose family had been forced to flee anti-Semitic persecution when he was a child. They quoted him on the solidarity that many Israelis felt with Ireland, on Israel’s wish to establish full diplomatic and trade relations with Ireland, and on Israel’s acceptance of the principle of internationalizing the holy places.137 While Elath made a positive impression on the Irish, they naturally did not attach much importance to his visit. Nunan made a point of telling Walshe that the visit was unofficial and had little significance.138 Walshe had read about the visit in the newspapers, but Nunan’s report set his mind at ease. Walshe, negatively influenced by the difficulties experienced by Christians in Israel, found that these difficulties, like the refugee issue, further justified withholding recognition. In general, he believed that a relationship with Israel at that time was pointless: “People here, generally, are not disposed to believe that the State of Israel has a long life . . . With the increasing threat of war between the great powers, the future of Israel becomes particularly precarious.”139 These gloomy projections probably stemmed from Israel’s political and military isolation during the Cold War. Israel’s relations with the Soviet Union had reached an impasse, and it had not been able to make a place for itself in any of the strategic Middle East alliances for which the United States and the United Kingdom had been pushing since 1951. In the race with the Soviet Union, the Western democracies had been trying to establish a strategic axis of Arab and Muslim states. Israel, however, was not yet perceived as a strategic asset in the region.140

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Costello’s second inter-party government When Costello’s second inter-party government was established (May 1954–March 1957),141 Elath hoped for a change in Ireland’s relationship with Israel. Although his meeting with Costello in January 1953 was hardly a source of optimism, Elath nevertheless expected some movement. Given past failures, Elath, at the behest of Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Walter Eitan, sought the mediation of Professor Leonard Abrahamson, who was close to Costello. Abrahamson was asked to tell Costello that despite differences on the Jerusalem issue, the relationship could be normalized. As proof, Abrahamson was to cite the full diplomatic relations that Israel enjoyed with other Catholic states that differed with Israel on this matter. But Elath saw fit to explain to Abrahamson that normalizing the relationship with Ireland “is no matter of life and death; we have managed so far without diplomatic relations with Ireland, and can so continue; but there are quite a few economic and other interests on both sides which would benefit from the opening up of the ‘official channels’.”142 Abrahamson fulfilled his mission. Costello was welcoming and promised to consider the matter, but his answer was long in coming. Jerusalem interpreted this as refusal and decided to wait for the Irish to take the initiative.143 This reading was supported by an analysis provided by Yoseph Ariel, Israel’s envoy in Brussels, based on a conversation he had had with Denis R. McDonald, Ireland’s envoy there. McDonald who knew the ins and outs of Vatican diplomacy (after having been an advisor with the Irish delegation there) believed that despite Irish sympathy for Israel, Costello’s government would not recognize it de jure as long as the Vatican remained hostile to Israel; the Vatican was not likely to change its position during the lifetime of Pius XII.144 Indeed, Costello’s government pursued the same policy as its predecessor with regard to Israel. Furthermore, thanks to Costello and Liam Cosgrave, his Minister for External Affairs and a devout Catholic, the Holy See became of central importance in the new government’s foreign policies, compared to the less intimate relationship between Ireland and the Vatican toward the end of the previous government’s term.145 The Vatican’s attitude toward Israel did not change for the better. Moreover, Walshe’s successor at the Vatican, Con Cremin (1954–6), reported to Dublin on January 19, 1955, following a conversation with Tardini, that the Holy See was more adamant than ever about the corpus separatum.146

Ireland joins the United Nations If not for the Vatican’s position, it would have been expected that once Ireland joined the United Nations in December 1955, it would grant Israel full recognition as a fellow member state. A memo of January 1956 by Eoin MacWhite, first secretary in the Department of External Affairs, seems to support this expectation. In his memo, MacWhite called on Ireland to reevaluate its policy of recognition, including in regard to newly established states. He saw Ireland’s reluctance

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as antithetical to expectations of a country that had battled hard for its own independence, not so very long ago, and claimed this would cause Ireland to be portrayed as “the odd man out.” MacWhite’s arguments ripened into a diplomatic circular in November 1956 that was sent to Irish delegations abroad. Among other things, the circular listed Near and Far East countries, mostly UN members, whose status Ireland should elevate from de facto to de jure. However, Israel was not on the list.147 While nothing came of this list, Israel’s exclusion illustrates Irish inflexibility on this front as a result of the Vatican’s influence. Other factors added to Ireland’s inflexibility when it joined the United Nations. These factors were related to its status in the United Nations and to the Arab influence which would shortly manifest itself. Paradoxically, the Arab factor produced the opposite reaction in Israel. After Ireland joined the United Nations, Israel launched another campaign to normalize relations. While Israel view of the United Nations declined over the years, in Israel’s early days it was an important arena for diplomacy, mainly because of the focus on the Israeli-Arab conflict in General Assembly debates, the annual debate on the refugee problem in the Special Political Committee, and the Security Council debates that routinely dealt with problems related to Israel, such as its right of passage in the Suez Canal, and IDF reprisals.148 But contrary to the noble principles of the United Nations, its members found it difficult to cooperate in the reality of the Cold War, as was necessary in order to advance a constructive solution for the Israeli-Arab conflict. From the beginning of the 1950s, the real powers at the United Nations began to lean toward the Arabs, who in turn used the organization against Israel. The Soviet Union blindly supported the Arabs, using its veto in the Security Council in their favor from 1954 onward. At the same time, in response to and given the rise of Arab regimes that were antiWestern, such as that of Nasser, the West was conciliatory toward the Arabs at Israel’s expense. Formation of the Afro-Asian bloc in the United Nations following decolonization, with the decisive influence of the Arab and Muslim nations in this bloc, and Israel’s disfavor among Catholic UN member countries due to the issue of Jerusalem, were also detrimental to Israel. The bloc system in the United Nations did not allow Israel to participate in the United Nations on a par with other members, as it was excluded from its regional bloc – Asia – because of Arab and Muslim opposition, and had no other bloc it could join. Thus Israel was prevented from being elected to the Security Council or Social Economic Council, or serving as head of one of the central or secondary committees.149 Under such circumstances, Israel became increasingly sensitive to every country that joined the United Nations. Moreover, Ireland joined the United Nations in the shadow of two developments that threatened Israel’s existence. The first was the attempt by the Western bloc to consolidate Middle Eastern defense contracts under its auspices, which led to the Baghdad Pact in February 1955. This involved a revolutionary American decision to supply arms to Iraq. The second was the Czech-Egyptian arms deal in September 1955, which armed Egypt and threatened Israel’s existence for the first time since 1948. At the same time,

132 Ireland and the State of Israel: 1948–63 Israeli attempts in 1955 to reach a bilateral defense contract with the United States failed to bear fruit.150 It is not surprising that in November 1955, when the United Nations was about to accept 18 new countries, including Ireland, Israel proposed to redress its relationship with Ireland, since “Most of the new members are not friendly towards Israel, and everything possible should be done . . . to improve its representation . . . in those countries where something can be done.”151 Following this proposal, Eitan asked Eban to explain to Hearne, Israel’s interest in establishing diplomatic relations with Ireland. Jerusalem was aware of the role that the Vatican played in Ireland’s decision-making; however, it believed that Arab rapprochement with the Eastern bloc and the Catholic aversion to communism would make it easier for Ireland to normalize relations with Israel. To impress the Irish, Eitan boasted of Israel’s diplomatic relations with some 45 countries.152 He also wanted to reassure the Irish in case they were concerned about having to submit diplomatic credentials to Israel’s president. This had been customary since the end of 1953 for all diplomatic representatives accredited in Israel, including representatives of overwhelmingly Catholic countries such as Italy and Belgium.153 On March 13, 1956, Eban explained Israel’s position to Hearne, who pledged his support with enthusiastic spontaneity. Two days later, Eban again raised the subject at an intimate dinner in honor of Costello, who was in Washington at that time, and received a positive response from the Taoiseach. Costello’s reply undoubtedly reflected courtesy, since Iveagh House quickly sent a different message that dampened Hearne’s enthusiasm. Hearne was told to inform Eban, without any further explanation that diplomatic ties were not on the table.154 Eban was convinced that the Vatican was behind this response.155 He was only partially right. The Vatican factor was the main obstacle, but there were others that were described in a letter from the Department of External Affairs to Hearne at the beginning of April, unbeknownst to Eban. These factors related to Ireland’s acceptance to the United Nations. Although Dublin was aware of doubts in the United Nations about the viability of the corpus separatum plan, it did not rule out the possibility that one day the subject would return to the agenda. Dublin assumed that when the time came, Ireland would play an important role in the United Nations due to its closeness to the Vatican. But this trump card would be snatched out of its hand if it recognized Israel de jure the moment it joined the United Nations. Another factor had to do with Israeli-Arab relations. The Irish Department of External Affairs believed that full recognition of Israel under the cloud of a war between Israel and the Arab states would be interpreted as a pro-Israel step. And indeed, the winds of war were blowing, following the Czech-Egyptian arms deal which fueled concerns that Nasser was planning a second round with Israel. At the time, Israel was primarily concerned with warning the world of the danger to regional peace; however, it was also arming itself. While the Americans and the British rejected Israel’s request to purchase arms, so as not to alienate the Arab countries, French arms became available, given the French anti-Arab

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orientation after the Algerian revolt. In April 1956, there was renewed tension on the Israel-Egypt border, following deep incursions into Israel by the fedayeen, Palestinian groups from the Gaza Strip that the Egyptians had sent into Israel to commit acts of murder. The IDF responded with a fierce artillery attack on the Gaza Strip. Previously, in December 1955, the IDF moved against Syrian positions northeast of the Sea of Galilee in retaliation for Syrian attacks on Israeli vessels. In March 1956, there were also serious incidents on the Jordan border.156 Iveagh House surmised that Eban’s appeal to Hearne was spurred by his fear of the imminent outbreak of war in the Middle East; hence, Ireland refused the appeal,157 probably to maintain an unbiased position in the United Nations. These considerations apparently reflect the policy of Costello’s second inter-party government toward the United Nations. Cosgrave defined the three principles of this policy in the Dáil in July 1956, as follows: unequivocal support for the UN Charter; maintaining an independent position and avoiding joining UN blocs and groups; strong ethical commitment to preserve the anti-communist Western Christian civilization, of which Ireland was part, and helping those powers principally responsible for the defense of the free world. As it led a small country without military power in a world controlled by superpowers, the Costello government tried to establish a unique position of influence. Its closeness to the Vatican and the Christian ethos it represented helped to some extent. But above all, it considered the United Nations the most effective platform from which to encourage the world toward peace and order.158

Public relations after Ireland joined the United Nations After Ireland joined the United Nations, Israeli public relations in Ireland became even more important. Leo Savir, who replaced Arnon as press attaché at the London embassy, invited an Irish representative to join the group of foreign journalists visiting Israel. Savir contacted the Irish Times, largely because of his relationship with Murry, an Irish Times reporter in London and a friend of Israel. However, the decision was principally a result of the newspaper’s quality, its distribution among the political and educated elite, and the fact that, despite its Protestant leanings, it was read in Catholic circles. The Irish Times agreed to send its managing editor, William Jack White, to Israel. White, an Anglo-Irish Protestant, was an influential and savvy journalist who was well-versed in politics. He was responsible for the editorial column and the paper’s policy, together with the new editor-in-chief, Arthur Newman. White had covered events in Germany, Yugoslavia, and London. He also hosted a weekly debate on international issues on Radio Ireland.159 White visited Israel on February 13–26, 1956 as a guest of the government, under the auspices of the Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which provided the official record of the visit. He visited universities and met with top government officials – the most senior being Sharett – and with senior officials in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance, and Education. He also met with Gershon Agron, mayor of Jerusalem; Gershon Shocken, editor of

134 Ireland and the State of Israel: 1948–63 the Haaretz newspaper; Rabbi Herzog and his son Chaim; Leo Cohen; and UN officials. When Savir met with White after the latter returned from Israel, he knew the investment in him had paid off. Savir was impressed with his intellectual curiosity, but also with his attitude toward Israel – a combination of dogmatism and openness. He found that although White was enchanted by Israel, he was given to a number of rational barriers and did not accept the Israeli narrative as the one and only truth.160 But a series of in-depth articles published in the Irish Times in March 1956 portrayed him as more pro-Zionist than Savir had thought. The articles were full of facts and statistics based on material he received from Savir.161 They covered a range of subjects – some of particular interest to Ireland – relating to the roots of Israel’s existence. These subjects included the Israeli-Arab conflict, the problem of Jerusalem, absorption of immigrants, the water problem, financial difficulties, religious diversity, and the kibbutz and its future. While each of these subjects merits debate, they are only summarized here. White drew a descriptive picture of daily life in Israel’s border settlements, including Jerusalem. To all appearances, it was a normal life, yet it existed in the shadow of war. He clearly understood that Israel could not ignore the safety of its citizens; however, he questioned the value of Israel’s reprisals given their result. It was impossible to ignore the negative image they created for Israel, and the enormous amount of propaganda they provided for the Arab nations. The reprisals also generated an internal Israeli dispute between the defense establishment and the Foreign Ministry. The military believed that the reprisals were an effective deterrent and regarded them as essential, as Israel could not rely on the United Nations or other countries. The Foreign Ministry, on the other hand, emphasized the damage to Israel from an international point of view.162 Given the Czech-Egyptian arms deal, White explained the logic and justification in Israel’s request for arms from the West, even with its highly motivated and skilled fighters. Towing the official Israeli line, he also described the history of the war between the Arabs and Israel. The Arabs had gained nothing by their attacks, apart from humiliating defeat. Their desire to avenge this defeat fueled their hostility toward Israel. To summarize this issue, he wrote: The first requisite is to make it as clear as may be that the survival of Israel is a fundamental assumption of western policy. The second is to furnish her with enough arms of modern standard to deter the Arabs from an attack this year.163 While White agreed that the refugees were genuinely miserable, he adopted the Israeli version as to the creation and solution of the problem, stressing the refusal of the Arab countries to take responsibility for the refugees and their insistence on the right of return. Repatriation was not an option because of security reasons, but also because Israel had absorbed some 400,000 Jews from Islamic countries, including Arab countries,164 thereby effecting a partial population exchange. Israel might also have agreed to repatriate some refugees if peace talks commenced.165

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But the Arab countries had no interest in solving the problem; they preferred to perpetuate the refugees’ status as a political weapon against Israel. White’s position on the problem of Jerusalem was similar to Israel’s official stance. He asserted that due to the central role that the city played in Judaism throughout history, there was no legitimate reason to prevent the Jewish nation from holding it as its capital. Internationalization of the entire city was not financially feasible, because it was located in a mountainous region, far from any seaport or trade route, and because it had no independent water supply. Moreover, international governance would be transient and this would be a source of friction. The problem needed to be solved by an agreement between Israel and Jordan, ensuring free access to the holy places with UN supervision. Addressing the Catholics, White wrote that the issue should be handled unemotionally. He praised Israel for defining its relationship with the Christian minority as a national responsibility, and for its investment in the renovation of the holy Christian sites. In his discussion of Israel’s internal affairs, he started by noting that the size of the population and its diversity had turned it into a pressure cooker. Up to 1950, the majority of immigrants came from eastern Europe, but after that year the majority came from oriental countries: Iran, Iraq, Yemen, and North Africa.166 They had lived for generations in undeveloped Muslim countries, and most spoke Arabic. In assessing the problematic meeting of European and oriental Jews, White concluded that the former “view their oriental kinsmen with the purposeful affection of a mission-worker at a boy club.”167 White added that military service played an important role in narrowing the differences between the communities and forging a unique Israeli spirit. However, in hindsight we know that White’s conclusions regarding relations between the communities were far too optimistic. For in 1956 the severe injustices visited upon oriental Jews were still hidden below the surface, only to erupt in violent outbursts just a few years later. In describing the financial aspects of the wave of immigration, he focused on the agricultural development of the Negev. Israel’s financial future depended on settling some immigrants in its open spaces. White further explained that there was a shortage of water in most of the land reserves in the Negev, and most of the water sources were in the north. Israel therefore began transporting water to the desert. One project was underway to transport water from the Yarkon River to the northern Negev. Another project, to transport water from the Jordan River to the Negev, had been suspended due to Syrian opposition. White noted Israel’s dependence on American aid ($20m per annum) and contributions by world Jewry, especially from the United States ($80m per annum).168 This dependence stemmed from the high cost of immigrant absorption, as well as from the difficulties inherent in a nascent economy. This economy was characterized by small-scale industrial and agricultural production that could not compete in the international marketplace, dependence on imports, a relatively expensive and inefficient workforce, and a labor federation known as Histadrut HaOvdim, which undermined free competition. Despite his admiration for the young and dynamic Israel – in his words, “Nowhere else in the world today is

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there a people generating such creative energy”169 – he believed that its economic future was unclear. White devoted the last article in the series to the heightening tensions in Israeli society with regard to religion and politics. He described the fanatical ultraOrthodox faction, which had enclosed itself into a ghetto in Jerusalem and regarded Israel as a state of heresy. In contrast, many Orthodox Jews were striving to establish the state on the foundations of Jewish law, while adapting to the modern world and partaking in parliamentary life. This cooperation had won the Orthodox faction legislative achievements, notably the marriage and divorce laws that are based on Jewish law. But these laws were attacked by the liberal (secular) majority. White expected the majority to win, as the Orthodox solutions for running the country in compliance with religious law (such as hiring a nonJew to perform tasks forbidden to Jews on the Sabbath) would not withstand the tests of logic or conscience in the long run. On the political left, White noted the embarrassment among radical circles. Their pro-Soviet approach had been undermined by the display of anti-Semitism in the Eastern bloc, and by its support for the Arabs. Also, they could not turn their backs on the West, because of Israel’s dependence on the United States. But the radical right, which championed the expansion of Israel to its historic borders, did not have the upper hand either. White concluded: “Perhaps . . . this is one of the few countries where one may look for political advance in the center.”170 In addition, he asserted that the kibbutz had reached the limit of its development. As a communal settlement that could be compared to a Christian monastic community, the kibbutz was right for idealistic socialists. However, it was already showing signs of capitalism, such as ownership of industrial plants and a movement away from communal life in favor of individualism.171 With the passage of time, it turned out that White’s series of pro-Israeli articles was a one-time expression in the Irish press, never to be repeated again.

The Suez crisis and the Sinai War172 In the autumn of 1956, Ireland, as a UN member, was required to take a stand on the pre-emptive strike that Israel had launched against Egypt. This strike was secretly coordinated with the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt, which was a reaction to the nationalization of the Suez Canal by Nasser in July 1956. The British and French perceived nationalization of the Canal as a challenge to their regional interests and a threat to the uninterrupted supply of oil from the Persian Gulf. Israel’s objective was to end the fedayeen raids, to act before Egypt felt the military benefit of the arms deal and to end the Egyptian closure of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israel’s shipping and to cargoes for Israel. On October 29, the IDF invaded the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula to destroy fedayeen bases in Gaza and wipe out the Egyptian army in the Sinai. On October 31, British and French forces attacked military targets in Egypt, using the Israel-Egypt conflict as a pretext. But only on November 5 did their forces land at Port Said and threaten to take control of the Canal.

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On November 2, the diplomatic battle was waged in an emergency session of the UN General Assembly, held after the Anglo-French veto removed the Security Council from the picture. Ireland voted with the majority (64 in favor, 5 objections, and 6 abstentions) and supported a US sponsored resolution. The decision called for an immediate cease-fire, and withdrawal of all forces behind the lines delineated by the 1949 Israeli-Egyptian General Armistice Agreement. The next day, Ireland supported a Canadian proposal for the establishment of a UN force that would ensure implementation of the earlier decision.173 This proposal was approved in the General Assembly by a majority of 57 votes, with no objections and 19 abstentions. Two days earlier, Cosgrave attacked Israel in his speech at the Dublin Chamber of Commerce. However, France and Britain did not escape unscathed, either. His speech echoed Ireland’s political principles in the United Nations. Cosgrave rejected the assertion that Ireland, as a country with no military influence, had no right to voice its opinion. The principles of the UN Charter bore witness to the moral power of public opinion, and Ireland could contribute to their reinforcement. Furthermore, the survival of a small country could only be guaranteed by honoring international commitments, including peaceful resolution of conflicts. This is why as Minister for External Affairs, it was his duty to voice his opinion when countries, including those with which Ireland had relations, used war as an instrument of policy. Israel’s invasion of Egypt, joined by the Anglo-French coalition, breached a clause in the Charter that prohibits use of force to resolve conflicts. He emphasized that Britain and France used their force against the victim and not against the aggressor. Cosgrave stated that he was not sitting in judgment in the conflict between Israel and its neighbors, or between Egypt and the countries that needed the Canal, as the conflict was complicated and no side was free of blame, but he nevertheless pointed an accusing finger at Israel: Whatever the provocation may have been – it is clearly Israel that is the aggressor; it is Israel, not Egypt, that ought to be restrained and it is the United Nations, not England and France, that ought to do the restraining.174 His comments were in keeping with international denunciation of British and French neocolonialism, and with the shower of accusations against Israel for aggression and for plotting with imperialistic countries.175 Contrary to these comments, his speech delivered on November 30, 1956 in the general debate of the UN General Assembly, which was devoted to the Suez crisis (and Soviet suppression of the Hungarian uprising in early November), was notable for its balance and even empathy toward Israel. The speech resonated positively in New York and Ireland, and it is no surprise that it was praised by Abba Eban.176 Unlike Cosgrave’s speech in the Chamber of Commerce at the height of the Suez crisis, he spoke in the General Assembly under the impression that the crisis had come to an end, particularly since Israel commenced to withdraw from the occupied territory in late November.177

138 Ireland and the State of Israel: 1948–63 This and the balanced policy adopted by the Irish government in the international forum, may explain the change in his style. Moreover, O’Brien, head of the International Organizations section in Iveagh House, was largely responsible for the speech,178 and certainly shaped the parts relating to Israel. It can be assumed that in the period between Cosgrave’s speeches, the Irish were also exposed to the Israeli public relations campaign in the United Nations and in American and international media. Israel’s representatives wished to differentiate between Anglo-French motives and Israeli motives. They further sought to change the way Israel was perceived, transforming it from the accused, to the accuser of Egypt and the United Nations for its failure to prevent Egyptian aggression. They presented Israel as a country that was acting in self-defense to ensure rights that had been withheld by Egypt, such as passage of Israeli vessels in the Suez Canal even before it was nationalized. Since the early 1950s, free passage through the Gulf of Aqaba was also denied to Israel due to the Egyptian blockade of the Straits of Tiran.179 In his comments on November 30 regarding the Suez crisis, Cosgrave focused on the drive for freedom that was shaping international relations: freedom from colonialism and freedom from Soviet imperialism. With regard to Israel, Cosgrave declared Ireland’s commitment to a balanced and unbiased position. He noted the location of the Irish delegation’s seat in the United Nations: I may say, in parenthesis, that my delegation’s seat in this assembly, by the fortune of the alphabet, is between Israel and Iraq, and I sometimes feel that our presence in that place is a small but real Irish contribution to the cause of peace. In this spirit, he said that he could understand the opposition of the Arab world to the establishment of Israel, and its fury at the refugee problem. On the other hand, he claimed that Israel, the Arab countries and the international community had a common interest in finding a quick resolution to the conflict. The continuing state of war “constitutes a standing invitation for any great power that wants to intervene.” While the Arab countries pressed for a just solution, they had to relinquish their desire to destroy Israel and accept its existence. As an example, he said that his nation was determined to abolish the partition of Ireland, but resolved to achieve this peacefully. He chided Egypt for its lack of moderation and realism, saying that the Suez crisis would not have erupted if it had not nationalized the canal and tried to destroy Israel. At the same time, he emphasized Ireland’s traditional friendship with Egypt and Ireland’s ability, as the only Western country that had suffered generations of colonialism, to identify with Egypt’s campaign against the Anglo-French attack. Warning against Soviet intervention in the Middle East, he expressed his hope that Egypt could still pull back from this dangerous involvement. Israel withdrew slowly from the areas it had occupied, and only completed the pullout on March 7, 1957. This move was intended to stall for time, to recruit support for a comprehensive arrangement: withdrawal, but not without guarantees

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for Israel’s security and free passage in the Gulf of Aqaba. However, UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld and the Eisenhower administration, which had been elected on November 6, 1956, insisted on unconditional withdrawal.180 Given these events, Walter Eitan, at the beginning of 1957, believed that Israel’s position should also be explained in Dublin; he did not want to rely solely on the ties between the representatives of the two countries in the United Nations. In an effort to nurture the positive attitude toward Israel that Cosgrave displayed in the United Nations, Eitan planned a short, informal visit by Elath to Dublin as the guest of Briscoe – Dublin’s mayor at that time – on the assumption that the visit would include a meeting with Cosgrave. Elath mistakenly thought that Eitan intended to further diplomatic relations and not public relations. Foreseeing certain failure, he said: It should be crystal clear to us that until there is a radical change in the Vatican’s attitude toward us, there is no hope of normalizing relations between us and the Irish government, as Ireland, more than any other Catholic country, depends in its foreign relations on Vatican policy. However, he was strongly in favor of cultivating relations with any Irish representative, especially with its UN delegation, in order to explain Israel’s position.181 On the other hand, J. Herzog, head of the US department in the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1954–7) supported indirect contacts with the Irish government. In a cable to the Israeli embassy in Washington, he asked to make use of American personages with an affinity to Ireland, including members of Congress, in order to convey to the Irish government, Israel’s respect for its position in the United Nations, and to request its continued support.182 But if Herzog’s request produced positive results, they were never put to the test, since Israel yielded to pressure from Hammarskjöld and the US administration. Foreign Minister Golda Meir (1956–65) announced on March 1 in the General Assembly that Israel will complete its withdrawal, but will reserve its right to self-defense under the UN Charter, should its free passage through the Gulf of Aqaba be denied following the withdrawal. Just a few days later, Israel completed its withdrawal from all occupied territory.183 In view of the efforts to recruit Irish representatives who had contacts with Israeli representatives into the pro-Israeli lobby on the withdrawal issue, it would be fitting to present a few examples of such contacts. Although Ireland did not have delegations in many capital cities, wherever it did, a network of personal relationships was established between the Irish and Israeli representatives. There was friendship and great mutual respect between the Israeli and Irish UN representatives. This is reflected in comments written by C. O’Brien, who, as head of the UN section in Iveagh House (1956–61), participated in General Assembly and Special Political Committee debates. He became closely acquainted with the Israeli delegation, seated to his right. In his book on Israel and Zionism, he described the quality of the personal relationships that developed between members of the two delegations, despite the Vatican factor, which

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hindered the official relationship: “in general a good working relationship – and in some cases a joking relationship, built up between the delegations of Ireland and Israel in those years.” He also praised Israel’s representatives: I found my neighbors on my right invariably, interesting, informative, and instructive, not merely about the Middle East . . . but also about international politics generally . . . They were a first-rate professional team – much the best in the place, not excluding the superpowers – and I liked to pick their brains, to put it at its lowest. But also there were several of them – I think of Michael Comay, Arieh Eilan, Gideon Rafael – whose company as neighbors was particularly enjoyable because of their quick wit, and pungent pithy asides, when something odd came up, every now and then.184 Boland, head of the Irish UN delegation, also commented on Abba Eban: Although some people here . . . criticize him for self satisfaction and arrogance, we have always found Mr. Eban very friendly and cooperative and he is generally admitted to be shrewd, forceful and able. At the time of the attack on Suez he defended his country more adroitly and successfully than the French and British representatives did theirs.185 Also noted should be the friendship and affection between I. H. Levin, advisor at the Israeli embassy in Washington, and Joseph D. Brennan at the Irish embassy there. Like Hearne, Brennan too repeatedly demonstrated his friendship with Israel. Levin believed this could be explained by his respect for the Zionist struggle against the British. After his 1957 promotion to envoy in Stockholm, Brennan developed a close friendship with Chaim Yahil, Israel’s envoy there.186

De Valera’s government: March 1957–June 1959 The new government, elected in March 1957, maintained a relaxed stance toward Israel in the international arena. With a landslide victory of the Fianna Fáil, the 75-year old de Valera returned to the premiership (until he resigned and was elected president of the republic in June 1959),187 with Aiken as Minister for External Affairs. J. Herzog sensed this position in his meeting with de Valera and Sean Murphy, secretary of the Department of External Affairs (1955–7) in September 1957. Herzog, who was on his way to Washington to serve as Israel minister plenipotentiary, stopped over in Dublin for a short visit of a day and a half. It is possible that the return to power of his father’s friend encouraged him to visit Dublin. Briscoe helped to arrange the meetings, in which he also participated in person. De Valera was cordial and expressed concern for Israel’s fate, as he believed the Soviets were prepared to fight to maintain their presence in the region. He also promised to help Herzog nurture relations with the Irish community in the United States and to schedule a meeting between Herzog and Hearne, Ireland’s ambassador to Washington.

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Murphy also welcomed Herzog warmly, and this may be due in part to Murphy’s favorable memory of Herzog’s father, the rabbi.188 Murphy stated that Ireland supported any step that would promote peace in the Middle East, and opposed any discriminatory policies with regard to the relations between Israel and its neighbors. The refugee problem, however, was an exception. Whenever this was discussed in Dublin, Herzog discerned the influence of Arab incitement. Herzog was impressed with Briscoe’s strong influence in bolstering Israel’s status in Dublin, alluded to by de Valera himself. The warm relationship between Briscoe and de Valera had grown ever warmer over the years, and Briscoe’s boundless loyalty to him was rewarded. Furthermore, about two months earlier, Briscoe had completed his term as Lord Mayor of Dublin under the Fianna Fáil, the pinnacle of his public career, a tenure unusual for a Jew in a city that was over 93 percent Catholic. During his term, he made a two-month visit to the United States, initiated by Irish organizations, which invited him to New York to review the St Patrick’s Day parade. He also accepted a request by the United Jewish Appeal to raise funds for absorption of immigrants in Israel, as well as other causes.189 During this trip, he met with President Eisenhower and was afforded exceptionally extensive and popular media coverage. He won over hearts with his wit, his revolutionary record fighting for Irish independence, and his achievements as a Jew in a Catholic country. He was surrounded by crowds of admirers wherever he went. The visit to the United States was successful from the Irish point of view, as it stimulated interest in Ireland and encouraged Americans to visit the country. Furthermore, it added to his prestige in the upper echelons of the Irish government.190 Herzog was so convinced of Briscoe’s pro-Israel influence with the de Valera government that he advised Foreign Minister Meir to send him a letter expressing her appreciation. Meir was pleased to send the letter, especially since she herself had heard similar praise for Briscoe from Aiken, whom she had met in the autumn of 1957 at the UN General Assembly.191 Briscoe’s contribution to the successful fundraising drive for absorption of immigrants192 probably also enhanced his image in Israeli eyes. De Valera sent his regards via Herzog to Ben-Gurion, Israel’s prime minister (1955–63), whom he had met at Rabbi Herzog’s house during his visit to Israel. Indeed, this meeting with Ben-Gurion was pleasant. Unexpectedly and evidently affected by the ambience, no controversial political topics were discussed, but rather a scholarly discourse developed on classical Greece and mathematics. Ben-Gurion and Herzog were both well-versed in classical Greece, and de Valera had visited Athens on his way to Israel.193 De Valera remembered the warmth and friendship that Ben-Gurion showed him for many years.194 They also corresponded: after de Valera was elected Taoiseach in March 1957, Ben-Gurion sent him a letter congratulating him in person. De Valera replied cordially that he was following events in Israel and hoped it would successfully resolve its problems. He added that Ireland’s hardships were minor in comparison.195 That is not to say that de Valera made light of Ireland’s problems,

142 Ireland and the State of Israel: 1948–63 such as economic backwardness (especially compared to the dramatic international prosperity and industrialism of the 1950s), mass emigration,196 an in-particular failure to unify the island and the revival of the Irish language – two goals to which de Valera had devoted extensive efforts,197 as well as IRA violence.198 It is clear that de Valera intended to express empathy in his letter to Ben-Gurion; he was also observant enough to accurately weigh Ireland’s problems compared to Israel’s existential issues. A comparison between de Valera and Ben-Gurion is called for here. Both were leaders of Olympian stature, devoted to the freedom of their respective peoples. However, unlike de Valera, who for many years was a member of the militant minority rebelling against the British, Ben-Gurion believed in cooperating with the British over the years and despite his activism fought an all-out war against the rebellious Zionist Revisionism. In contrast with de Valera, Ben-Gurion supported the partition of Palestine, and declared the establishment of the State of Israel according to the UN partition plan. Both were men of intellectual breadth and were devotedly committed to their national languages and cultures. However, unlike de Valera, Ben-Gurion was a socialist, leader of the pragmatic Zionist left and totally secular, even though he fiercely loved the Bible and was a “true Jewish soul.” A thawing of tensions between Israel and the Vatican, toward the end of Pius XII’s reign, contributed to J. Herzog’s positive reception in Dublin. With the rise of Nasser and the growing Soviet influence in the Arab world, Muslim Arab countries had fallen from grace as allies of the Christians in the war against communism. Concurrently, Israel’s image in the Vatican had improved. Its agreement in late 1955 to compensate Catholic institutions for war damages contributed to this; the positive impression of prominent clergymen who had visited Israel, and favorable reports by Church representatives regarding Israel’s preservation of the holy places, also played a role in this.199 Evidence of Israel’s improved image reached Iveagh House in a confidential memo from Ireland’s ambassador to the Vatican, Leo McCauley (1956–62) to Murphy, about a month before J. Herzog’s visit to Dublin.200 The memo was based on a German-language broadcast over the Vatican Radio. The broadcast announced, among other things, that Vatican’s relationship with Israel had greatly improved since Israel has relaxed its treatment of missionary activities and agreed to compensate the Church for property damages. However, the broadcast was overly optimistic in speculating that diplomatic relations between Israel and the Vatican were a viable prospect. Israeli officials and Israel’s Catholic friends attempted to explore this possibility, but came up empty-handed. The Pope’s response was unfriendly, while Tardini was outwardly hostile.201 In any event, the Taoiseach and Department of External Affairs were aware of Israel’s improved image in the Vatican, which probably contributed to their positive attitude toward Israel, but this of course, does not diminish Briscoe’s role in any way.

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Aiken’s speech at the UN General Assembly, autumn 1958 De Valera and Aiken were quite close (Aiken was probably his closest confidant in the cabinet and enjoyed his full support in foreign policy).202 It was this pair that brought about the change in Ireland’s stance in the United Nations. Instead of the pro-West position of the Costello government, they advocated an autonomous, dynamic approach to establishing peace and preventing the escalation of interbloc tensions. This goal was of supreme importance for a small country in an unstable world under the nuclear threat. Thus, they continued Ireland’s traditional involvement in the League of Nations, which was based on recognizing the importance of the League’s smaller members. While in the League, Ireland chose to play a role that would enable it to assert its identity as an independent nation, by the late 1950s its place in the international community was sufficiently assured and it expected to take on responsibilities that its size alone would not merit. Aiken overestimated the United Nations as a forum for resolving conflicts, and believed the small member nations played an important role in achieving goals such as reduced inter-bloc tensions, nuclear non-proliferation, decolonization, and protection of small countries and human rights. Aiken felt that Ireland should function as a middle power 203 and take the initiative in realizing these goals, even if it meant opposing the superpowers. The General Assembly was relatively strong at that time (due to the USSR’s excessive use of its veto in the Security Council), thus the smaller members could play a more effective role. And indeed, every vote in the General Assembly was of equal value. Aiken fulfilled his mission and raised the Irish delegation’s profile at the Assembly to new heights.204 During his tenure, Aiken initiated a number of plans to promote peace, including an ambitious plan for comprehensive peace in the Middle East, under the auspices of the United Nations. This plan, naturally, included clauses concerning Israel and the Arab States. He presented his plan at a special emergency session of the UN General Assembly on August 14, 1958.205 The emergency session was convened in the shadow of a regional crisis in the Middle East that led to a global confrontation between the West and the proSoviet and pan-Arab groups in the region, all this at the height of the Cold War. In February 1958, Egypt and Syria (which had become pro-Soviet) announced their political union, naming it the United Arab Republic (UAR). This announcement led to unrest in Lebanon, where riots broke out between Christians and Nasser sympathizers. After Lebanon failed to quell the riots, the United States sent its Sixth Fleet to intervene. In the midst of all this, in July a military coup in Iraq toppled the pro-Western Hashemite dynasty, the cornerstone of the Baghdad Pact. The goal of the coup was to turn Iraq into a people’s republic, a name with clear pro-Soviet overtones. The upheavals in Lebanon and Iraq threatened King Hussein of Jordan, also facing active incitement of subversion in his kingdom by the UAR. Britain, which had lost its foothold in Iraq, was called in to save Hussein’s shaky throne. As American marines were landing on Lebanon’s shores to restore order, the British flew paratroopers into Jordan in July, crossing

144 Ireland and the State of Israel: 1948–63 Israeli airspace. Although Israel was not directly affected by these events, they had an unavoidable impact on its position and future. By the end of the summer, calm had been restored to the region. The West had come to terms with the loss of Iraq, the riots in Lebanon died down, and Hussein’s regime was again protected by Arab Legion forces.206 In September, the Americans and the British withdrew their troops. The emergency session of the UN General Assembly was held toward the end of the crisis (at the request of Nikita Khrushchev), to discuss American and British intervention in Lebanon and Jordan. The final draft of Aiken’s plan for comprehensive peace in the Middle East was approved by the cabinet and submitted to the emergency session. This version included changes to the first draft (completed in July), following comments and criticism, especially from Boland. The draft was unrealistic, in keeping with Aiken’s great belief in the United Nations’s ability. Boland, who better understood the limitations of the United Nations’s, tried to make the plan more moderate. De Valera was an active partner in the consolidation of the final draft, and C. C. O’Brien and C. C. Cremin, secretary of the Department of External Affairs (1958–63), were also involved. The first draft of the plan comprised 10 points. These included the right of countries in the region to unite or establish a federation; UN recognition of the Arab aspiration for unity as a historic fact; a call upon the nations of the region to commit to denuclearization, non-aggression, and opening of the region’s communications and its abundant oil supplies to all nations. Three of the ten points related indirectly to Israel. Two of these three points were intended to balance the others: UN acceptance of Israel’s existence as a historic fact, and recognition of its current borders, in return for its guarantee that it would not expand beyond them. These points were very provocative from the Arab point of view, but Aiken was convinced his approach was balanced. A year earlier, he had told Arab diplomats in the United Nations that they should face the fact that Israel could not be driven into the sea. But Boland, who was in regular contact with the Arab delegations in the United Nations and was considerate of their sensitivities, found it difficult to accept these points. He criticized the individual points in the plan that related to Israel and warned that it would be a serious mistake to demand recognition of Israel with its current borders. He asserted that it was entirely chimerical to believe the Arabs would accept this, since from their perspective, the Palestinian problem did not revolve around Israeli guarantees and border definitions; according to the Arab point of view, Israel had no right to exist in the first place and the only solution was therefore its destruction. By way of illustration, Boland also offered the following analogy with Ireland: The Arabs would no more think of accepting the existence of the State of Israel as a historic fact than we would think of accepting the existence of the Six Counties as a historic fact! We would be asking the Arabs to do something which we would not dream of doing ourselves.207

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He claimed that the Arabs were bound to regard this request as an imposed solution, and as Irish inconsistency on the matter of the partition of Palestine, given de Valera’s firm opposition in the League of Nations in 1937. Boland added that a public proposal of this kind would hit the rawest Arab nerve, causing Ireland to be associated with the West, as an enemy of the Arab world. He also said that explicit recognition of Israel’s borders was technically difficult and contradicted Ireland’s official position, which ruled out de jure recognition of Israel because of the problem of Jerusalem. Skelly rightfully argues that although it may seem so, Boland was not biased in favor of the Arabs at Israel’s expense. Unlike Aiken, he was simply a realist, who was familiar with the Arab diplomats in the United Nations and knew they would reject Aiken’s position outright.208 Be it as it may, Boland, while not leaning toward the Arab side, expressed views that were not completely symmetrical on this issue due to his considerations of maintaining proper relations between Ireland and the Arab states. Another point in Aiken’s draft concerned the refugee problem. It referred to the United Nations’s willingness to adopt a new approach to resolving the problem: a financial contribution for each refugee repatriated or resettled, and assistance in implementing any solution to which the Arabs and Israel would both agree. Boland was critical of Aiken on this point as well, claiming his handling of the subject indicated unfamiliarity with the problem and its background. He added that the seemingly new approach that Aiken proposed was not new at all. Since Israel’s establishment, the United Nations had affirmed its financial commitment to resolving the problem, and had even approved funds for this purpose; the fact that they were never used was due to political rather than financial reasons. In other words, the refugees, supported by the Arab countries, opposed a permanent solution in any territory other than Israel, and insisted on repatriation or reparations for property and suffering. In his speech to the emergency session of the General Assembly on August 14,209 Aiken took Boland’s advice and refrained from calling for explicit recognition of Israel and its borders. He nevertheless alluded to this by daring to mention the Israeli-Arab conflict and the centrality of its impact on the Middle East and on world peace. At that time, these issues were considered to be taboo by many UN delegations, although he was eventually proven right: I know that because of the great difficulties of this problem, and the tremendous emotional forces involved, many delegations are tempted to set it aside, and to restrict their attention to the approachable and less forbidding aspects of the Middle Eastern question. Unfortunately, experience suggests that this aspect cannot be ignored. Unless better relations between Israel and her Arab neighbors are made possible there can be no lasting peace in the Middle East.210 Regarding the refugee issue, “the greatest embittering factor between Israel and her neighbors,” Boland’s mark was apparent. Aiken recognized the refugees’ right

146 Ireland and the State of Israel: 1948–63 to either repatriation or monetary compensation. He was also sympathetic to their demand to be recognized as victims of an injustice: “They have been wronged; they have the right not only to generosity but to justice.” As to Israel’s part in resolving the problem, he said “Israel would be invited to state . . . how many refugees she was prepared to receive back and how much she would contribute to the compensation scheme.” He added, “But we repudiate the idea that their injury is the result of Israel’s action alone, or that Israel alone ought to be required to carry the full burden of compensation.”211 And so he asserted that the United Nations should take responsibility for resolving the problem: repatriation of the maximum number of refugees, and full compensation for the others. Influenced by Boland, Aiken’s speech included the demand for internationalization of the holy places. Aiken’s speech had no practical importance.212 The emergency session approved the proposal of the Arab bloc unanimously. Naturally, the resolution supported the Arab League’s aspiration for closer unity and called for an end to intervention in the internal affairs of Arab countries. It also gave the UN secretary general a limited role in finding a solution to the crisis.213 While Aiken aspired for a comprehensive agreement, based on his overestimation of the United Nations, the General Assembly focused merely on an ad hoc solution. Indeed, in a cabinet discussion, when Aiken referred to the emergency session’s resolution, he noted that the solution could not but be transient, because it disregarded the Israeli perspective. In any event, Aiken believed the speech would increase Ireland’s prestige in the United Nations. The General Assembly received Aiken’s speech positively.214 This gave the Israelis cause for a certain degree of satisfaction. Leo Cohen, who cared about few things as much as he did about the issue of relations with Ireland, wrote to Eitan that in view of Ireland’s growing importance in the United Nations, and in view of the absence for the time being of diplomatic relations with it, Israel’s diplomatic representatives in the major world capitals should be instructed to nurture relations with their Irish counterparts. Cohen, who claimed that the Irish were simply not familiar with the Israeli case, especially regarding the refugees, again proposed routine visits to Dublin by Israeli embassy staff in London and Paris.215 Comay’s request a few days later for the list of Ireland’s diplomatic delegations216 shows that Cohen’s proposal was taken seriously. At that time, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs placed special emphasis on O’Brien’s positive attitude toward Israel in the United Nations.217

The era of Pope John XXIII When Pius XII died in October 1958, and was succeeded by Cardinal Angelo Giuseppe Roncalli as Pope John XXIII (November 1958–June 1963), the Israelis sensed an opportunity for change in Ireland’s position on recognition of Israel. The new Pope was a true humanitarian and showed a great deal of goodwill toward the Jewish nation. During the war, as papal nuncio to Ankara, he worked hard to rescue Jews.218 The election of the new Pope improved the

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Vatican’s de facto relations with Israel, even before a theological change came about. The presence of an Israeli representative (Eliahu Sasson, ambassador to Rome) at the papal coronation, and the exchange of greetings between Israel’s President Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, Rabbi Herzog and John XXIII upon his election219 boded well. The excitement caused by this breakthrough is described in the reports submitted by deputy director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Maurice Fischer, to Foreign Minister Golda Meir. Fischer described his meetings on February 9 and 14, 1959 with John XXIII and Cardinal Tardini, who was appointed Vatican Secretary of State immediately after the election of the new Pope. Fischer was previously involved in Israel-Vatican relations, having attempted to promote them two years earlier, also by means of Ireland, based on the belief that the road to Vatican passes through the Catholic countries. In a top secret account dated February 18, 1957, Fischer described a visit he just paid to the Vatican on behalf of the Israeli government, in which he explored the possibility of stepping up diplomatic relations between the two states. One of his recommendations was to try to mobilize representatives of predominantly Catholic states that are accredited to the Vatican including Ireland, to support a rapprochement.220 This recommendation may be explained in Fischer’s Belgian origins and his lengthy diplomatic career in France, during which he established contacts with Catholic and Vatican-oriented countries. Fischer served as delegate of the Jewish Agency Political Department in France (1947–8), and later, as Israel’s diplomatic representative in France, and eventually was Israel’s first ambassador to Paris (1948–53). Even though it was clear at the time that Ireland would take the lead from the Vatican on the Israeli issue, the recommendation was made probably in the hope that Fischer would succeed in enlisting Ireland’s envoy to the Vatican to use his diplomatic contacts to the benefit of Israel. In February 1959, the personal dimension was a factor as well, with Fischer’s friendship with John XXIII dating from the end of the war, during Roncalli’s tenure as nuncio to Paris at the same time that Fischer was posted there. Fischer reported that John XXIII evinced a spirit of reconciliation and mutual respect between Jews and Christians, but avoided the problematic issue of Vatican–Israel relations. Fischer tried to shift the conversation in this direction; the Pope refrained from making a commitment, although he did express willingness to re-examine the issue from a more sympathetic standpoint. However, when Fischer proposed that the Pope appoint a special apostolic vicar to Israel (who would be in charge of the Catholic population and its relations with the Israeli government), both John XXIII and Tardini agreed. Tardini considered such an appointment to be a significant step for the Vatican, which usually moved slowly, and advised Israel to be satisfied with it. Predictably, Tardini stated that the appointment should not be interpreted as the establishment of diplomatic relations, with its implied recognition of Israel, as the Vatican still insisted on corpus separatum in Jerusalem.221 However, Fischer remained optimistic, an outlook that was mirrored at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Jerusalem.

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Influenced by Fischer’s reports, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concluded that “it is highly desirable that the Irish, and especially the Prime Minister, know about the change in the Vatican’s position toward us following the election of the new Pope,” and asked Elath to secretly convey this message to Dublin.222 A similar message was apparently also sent to Israel’s representatives serving in capitals with Irish delegations. There is no documentation of Elath’s response to the request. Having been repeatedly disappointed by the Irish, he probably did not see much hope in another attempt. However, Gideon Raphael, Israel’s ambassador to Brussels (1957–60) stepped in; he asked McDonald, Ireland’s envoy to Brussels, to convey Jerusalem’s message to Dublin. McDonald dutifully did so in a letter to the Secretary of the Department of External Affairs at the end of March 1959. In this letter, he reported that secret talks had been held between Israel and the Vatican. He did not specify the content of these talks, but wrote that they resulted in the Holy See’s promise to appoint an apostolic vicar to Israel. He also emphasized Israel’s great satisfaction with the winds of change in the Vatican; however, the issue of the holy places, at the core of the dispute between Israel and the Vatican, was still not on the table.223 But the wheels of Irish diplomacy turned slowly with regard to relations with Israel. In addition, even at the end of November 1958, Iveagh House was probably not overly pleased with the Israeli reading of the climate at the Vatican. Tardini’s appointment as Secretary of State, led Cremin to believe that the Vatican would remain inflexible on the issue of Jerusalem.224 A year later, on October 23, 1959, McCauley, Ireland’s ambassador to the Vatican, made a similar evaluation in a memorandum he wrote.225 McCauley noted that John XXIII had been responsible for a number of initiatives, which could be interpreted as expressions of change. These included the amendment to the Good Friday liturgy in 1959, which marked a positive change toward the Jews,226 the appointment of Monsignor Giorgio Chiappero in the summer of 1959 as apostolic vicar in Israel and the exchange of greetings between Rabbi Herzog and the Pope. McCauley nevertheless added that following these initiatives, he was informed unequivocally by Monsignor Angelo Dell’ Acqua, head of the Vatican secretariat, that Vatican support for the corpus separatum doctrine remained unchanged, and the appointment of Chiappero was a purely ecclesiastical step. Dell’ Acqua was very emphatic and left the impression “that relations might even have deteriorated” McCauley preferred the non-political interpretation of Chiappero’s appointment. He explained the changes in the liturgy as a gesture of reconciliation toward all Jews, not only those living in Israel.

Norton meets the Pope Cremin, secretary of the Department of External Affairs, heard otherwise from William Norton, leader of the Irish Labor Party (1932–63), a devout Catholic with close connections in Vatican circles.227 Norton met with Cremin some time before November 5, 1959, and told him that he had met the Pope a few months earlier (on February 24) and was struck by his positive attitude toward Israel.

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Norton wanted to report this meeting to Aiken,228 but the Minister was attending the UN Assembly in New York.229

Norton visits Israel Norton met with the Pope on his way back to Ireland after visiting Israel between February 9 and 19. At that time, he was also occupied with his private business: he managed the Irish Home Product import-export company with solicitor Herman Good and Joseph Bloom, a Jewish Dubliner. He initiated the visit to Israel following discussions with Israeli industrialists who had visited Ireland to explore the potential for commerce with Israel.230 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Jerusalem was informed of the visit by Moshe Porat, a Tel Aviv lawyer who represented himself as an agent of Norton’s company. Given Norton’s public stature, the ministry organized meetings with Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, Finance Minister Levi Eshkol, Minister of Trade and Industry Pinhas Sapir, and senior officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the goal of advancing relations with Ireland. Norton also met with Histradrut officials and Rabbi Herzog.231 Norton met Leo Cohen, who was conversant in Vatican affairs, at the rabbi’s house. Cohen expressed optimism about the change expected in Israel-Ireland relations following the election of the new Pope, and Norton responded with an offer to discuss the issue in his forthcoming meeting with John XXIII in Rome.232 Following Norton’s report on his meeting with the Pope, Cremin wrote a letter to McCauley on November 5, 1959,233 which he did not send. Nevertheless, both the content and the fact that it was not sent are significant. Cremin wrote in the unsent letter that McCauley’s October memo, in which he described the Vatican’s relations with Israel, had generated great interest. Cremin reminded McCauley of Joseph Walshe’s insistence that the Vatican’s inflexibility toward Israel was anchored in Pius XII’s personal perception, with no hope of change in his lifetime. Now, given the revision in the liturgy ordered by John XXIII, the general impression at Iveagh House was “that his Holiness might be less intransigent on the subject of Israel than his predecessor had been.” Cremin added that according to Norton, John XXIII spoke about Israel “in very warm terms,” and specifically asked Norton to relay his best regards to Rabbi Herzog.234 Cremin also wrote that Norton was personally convinced that John XXIII did not believe that Ireland’s official recognition of Israel “would constitute an act to which the Holy See could take exception.” It is worth noting that Cremin himself questioned Norton’s assessment, emphasizing the obvious difference between the Pope and personalities with decisive weight in the Vatican, such as Tardini, who regarded de jure recognition of Israel to be contrary to the Holy See’s policy. Cremin emphasized in his letter that Aiken had no special plan regarding recognition of Israel. However, given Norton’s adamant opinion that full recognition of Israel would not embarrass the Pope, “the minister is anxious to get as clear an idea as possible of the true position.” Having second thoughts, Cremin

150 Ireland and the State of Israel: 1948–63 decided to wait for Aiken to return from New York before sending the letter to McCauley. Indeed, when Cremin met with Aiken in early December, he discovered that the minister’s position remained unchanged. Moreover, Aiken, who by now was well-versed in the intricacies of the UN playing field, emphasized the Arabs’ anticipated opposition as an obstacle that could not be ignored, if and when Ireland recognized Israel de jure.235 But why did Norton delay his report to Cremin on his meeting with the Pope for eight months? Two apparent reasons can be proposed for the delay. The first is somewhat prosaic – Norton was busy with parliamentary issues and his own private business. The second, more likely, was that discussions upon his return from Rome (which were not documented) achieved nothing.236 Eventually, the catalyst for Norton’s report to Cremin of his meeting with the Pope was a letter he had received from Cohen. Cohen, who had been waiting impatiently since February for Norton’s report, wrote to him on July 27 to shed light on the issue.237 As mentioned, nothing came of Norton’s meeting with Cremin either. Cremin’s unsent letter to McCauley speaks for itself.

The ball returns to Boland’s court While Norton attempted unsuccessfully to mediate, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Israel refocused its efforts on Boland. In early December 1959, toward the end of the General Assembly session, Golda Meir gave Arthur Luria, head of Israel’s UN delegation, the green light to ask Boland about Aiken’s promise in autumn 1957 to normalize relations with Israel.238 Luria had replaced Eban as head of Israel’s UN delegation before beginning his stint as ambassador to Britain (1960–5). Luria met with Boland, who promised to explore Aiken’s position. Comay, who had just begun his term as head of the Israeli delegation to the United Nations, continued the dialogue with Boland.239 In the end, Boland’s promises proved to be empty words. He and Aiken opposed de jure recognition of Israel at that time, because of the Arab factor. Apparently, his promises to Luria and Comay were made because at that time – January 1960 – he wanted Comay to support his candidacy for the presidency of the UN General Assembly.240 Correspondence between Cremin and Boland in March–April 1960 sheds more light on the position of Boland and Aiken regarding recognition. This correspondence followed discussions between Israel and Ireland for a possible official trade agreement. The discussions, facilitated by Norton, were held at the end of March 1960 in Dublin. The idea of the agreement, which had come up in the past, reemerged at the end of December 1959 in the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The ministry was encouraged by the private trade agreement that was being finalized between a commercial company headed by Norton and an Israeli company.241 In the end, the idea of the trade agreement, especially on the Irish side, became a palliative and a way to end the stalemate in advancing recognition.242 Dr S. Gilat, Economic Counselor of the Israeli Embassy in London, was invited to Dublin by the Irish Exporters Association and served as the official Israeli representative. His report to Jerusalem was one of the sources of information on

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the talks.243 Gilat held talks with Jack Lynch, Minister for Industry and Commerce in the first government of Sean Lemass (1959–61). He also held talks with Cremin, representatives of the Departments of Finance and Agriculture, governor of the Central Bank, and importers and exporters. The discussions addressed the import of meat, potatoes, fish, and fishing boats from Ireland to Israel, and the export of potash and chemicals, fresh and canned fruit, and vegetables from Israel to Ireland. Cooperation in the export of textiles to the United States (Irish fabric pieced in Israel), with target markets of Irish and Jewish American customers, was also discussed. But the core of the discussions was the link between the trade agreement and de jure recognition, which had arisen in the past. Norton was also present during the meeting with Lynch, who was very much in favor of a formal trade agreement and promised to use his influence to close the deal. However, Lynch claimed that from a procedural perspective, the decision was up to the Department of External Affairs. Norton wanted the trade agreement to be regarded as a prelude to full recognition of Israel. He echoed the Pope’s feeling that the Christian world had to come to terms with Israel’s control of Jerusalem. These dramatic comments are based on Gilat’s report. They do not appear in any other source related to Norton’s meeting with the Pope. Gilat’s meeting with Cremin was less encouraging. Cremin claimed that he did not object to a formal trade agreement, providing it was not interpreted as de jure recognition. Unlike Norton, Cremin was not interested in upgrading recognition of Israel, and postponing the discussion was a subtle way to dodge the issue. Cremin himself sheds additional light on this meeting and on Gilat’s discussion with Lynch, in the account he sent to Boland at the end of March.244 Cremin wrote that on March 24 he met with MacCarthy, secretary at the Department of Industry and Commerce. MacCarthy told him that Gilat and Norton had estimated potential imports from Ireland to Israel at $5,000,000 annually, but stressed that this required a formal trade agreement. Lynch, who was aware of the possibility that an official trade agreement would be interpreted as de jure recognition, asked MacCarthy to discuss this with the Department of External Affairs. In this discussion, in which Aiken also participated, Cremin repeated his reservations regarding the trade agreement. Aiken, on the other hand, did not address the juridical aspect at all. He focused on de jure recognition, questioning its logic at this stage, given both the Vatican and the Arab factors. In his account, Cremin also reported on his meeting the following day with Gilat, who discussed the possibility of importing meat from Ireland to Israel. Clarifying that the Israeli government was responsible for this import, Gilat insisted on the need for a formal agreement. In response, Cremin directed his attention to the problems inherent in a formal trade agreement that could be interpreted as de jure recognition, but he softened his response by adding: the fact that we have not accorded de jure recognition to Israel does not connote an attitude of hostility or any lack of friendly feelings of our part, either for Jews generally or for the State of Israel. The situation arises simply from circumstances.

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Cremin said that if the government decided to recognize Israel, it would probably do so by direct decision and not by implication in a trade agreement. Thus Cremin was uncomfortable with a trade agreement with Israel since it may be interpreted as de jure recognition. In his reply of April 6, 1960 to Cremin’s report from the end of March,245 Boland wondered whether the time had not come to change the mindset regarding relations with Israel. Indeed, when de facto recognition was decided upon, Palestine was still in a state of flux, and there was room for hope that the corpus separatum would come to be. At that time, therefore, Ireland’s position toward Israel was, in Boland’s words, “a gentle means of pressure towards that end.” But Boland added, A lot of water has flowed under the bridges since then, however, and any hope that the city of Jerusalem and the Holy Places might be internationalized in the foreseeable future is now quite chimerical. To continue to make our de jure recognition of Israel dependent on the realization of the plans discussed here in 1947 and 1948, therefore, is tantamount to withholding recognition from Israel until the Greek Kalends. Indeed, instead of taking his pointed comments to their logical conclusion, Boland counted on a formal trade agreement with Israel, which would indirectly indicate de jure recognition, justified by its commercial advantages. He therefore wanted to have the best of both worlds: to appease the Israelis with a formal trade agreement that could be interpreted as de jure recognition, and to avoid offending the Arabs. Given the more general acceptance throughout the world of the status quo in Jerusalem, Cremin, in his response to Boland,246 was prepared to admit the incongruity of Ireland’s reluctance to recognize Israel de jure. He also claimed that the recognition of Israel had been discussed more than once at Iveagh House during the past year, following Norton’s meeting with the Pope. But the discussions had failed to bring about any change. Cremin blamed the stagnation on the Vatican secretariat, which maintained its adamant opposition to Israel. He also blamed Aiken, who was worried about the Arab countries’ vigorous opposition to Ireland’s full recognition of Israel. Yet at the same time, Cremin himself believed that if Arab opposition were ranked as critical, there would be little chance of Irish recognition for many years, unless there were a radical change in the Arab position, which appeared to be unlikely. In his reply to Cremin on 26 April,247 Boland explained that the Arab issue was the reason for his opposition to de jure recognition that a formal recognition of Israel by us at this stage would be taken as an unfriendly act by the Arab countries. As you know, they are at the moment intensifying their efforts to isolate Israel in the world and the Arab boycott committee working from Beirut is having some success. Our recognition of Israel at this moment would run directly counter to this effort.

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From the point of view of timing, therefore, the present moment is not a good one – particularly having regard to the forthcoming election for the presidency of the assembly. At the end of the paragraph, Boland’s meaning became clear: he yearned for the presidency of the General Assembly, and he needed the Arab vote. This is why he opposed de jure recognition of Israel. But he also had his eye on the Israeli vote, and therefore he reiterated his support for a trade agreement. However, he was undecided, and possibly influenced by Cremin’s ambivalent position, as to “whether the conclusion of a trade agreement necessarily and in all circumstances implies de jure recognition.” The difficulty Iveagh House had in deciding on a trade agreement with Israel, was again evident in the inter-department committee meeting for foreign trade on April 29. Representatives of the Department of External Affairs, in an attempt to stall for time, claimed that the political implications of the agreement were still being examined. Representatives of the Industry and Commerce Department interpreted this as political opposition to the agreement, and claimed that as long as there was opposition, they would not push for the agreement, despite its perceived advantages.248 Indeed, this was typical of the policy of the Irish Department of External Affairs on the Israeli issue. If the Vatican position was initially the key factor in postponing recognition, the Arab factor now also played a part. The two countries continued to discuss a trade agreement. Gilat’s sudden death in November 1960, was a major setback, but did not halt the talks altogether.249 Nonetheless, an agreement did not seem to be forthcoming. Boland’s request to Comay in January 1960 to support his candidacy for the presidency of the General Assembly was regarded by Jerusalem as an opportunity to advance relations with Ireland.250 Apparently after Boland’s slow response to Comay regarding Aiken’s position on relations, Boland’s request became a bargaining chip. For example, at the beginning of June 1960, Comay was asked to tell Boland, on behalf of G. Meir, that the question of support would be debated by the government; he was also asked to find out whether Ireland’s position toward Israel had shifted.251 A shift in position did not seem to be imminent. On the contrary, information on Ireland’s unwillingness to normalize relations reached Jerusalem indirectly through Joseph Linton, Israel’s ambassador to Berne. Linton visited Ireland at the end of May 1960 for the launch of the United Jewish Appeal in Ireland. On this visit, he heard from Briscoe, de Valera’s confidante who had connections in the Lemass government, that “the Irish government believes that exchange of diplomats would not contribute to the friendly relations that already exist and may cause unnecessary difficulties.”252 Although Linton did not go into detail, Briscoe was probably alluding to the Vatican and Arab factors. In his report, Linton assumed that Briscoe himself opposed advancing relations. This is not surprising. As Briscoe was still a member of the Dáil and was aiming for re-election as mayor of Dublin,253 he toed his party line with regard to Catholic public opinion. Moreover, while non-Jews such as Norton and O’Brien had no difficulty in supporting relations with Israel,

154 Ireland and the State of Israel: 1948–63 Briscoe, as a Jew in a Catholic-dominated society, was overly cautious in his attempts to avoid suspicion of such support. Yitzhak Unna, of the Israeli embassy in London, got it right when he visited Dublin in November 1960 and met with Briscoe. He perceived that the Jewish community was suspicious of Briscoe as being more Catholic than the Pope.254 If Unna’s impression was right, then it could be said that Briscoe, unique in being a Jew who succeeded in a Catholic country, also paid a price for his success – partial loss of his Jewish and Zionist identity. But it is possible that the tensions between Briscoe and Dublin’s Jews arose because he was an exception to the rule. With his political achievements, he was impatient with displays of parochialism and preoccupation with the trifles that characterize life in a small community. Although he served as a role model for the community, he also came across as arrogant and aloof.255 Despite their reservations, the Israelis still believed they should not dismiss Briscoe’s potential contribution to relations with Ireland. Max Nurock expressed this contribution as follows: “He [Briscoe] must not be ignored but he must be handled with circumspection.”256

Leo Cohen’s visit to Dublin in July 1960 Shortly after Linton’s report, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs gained a clearer view of the Irish position. This came from Cohen’s reports after he returned from Dublin in July 1960, where he gave a lecture on Israel’s foreign affairs to the Friends of the Hebrew University.257 During his visit, Cohen met with President de Valera, Aiken, Boland and O’Brien, who had recently been appointed Assistant Secretary in charge of United Nations and political affairs. He also met with Jewish and non-Jewish personages such as Jacob Weingreen and Bedell Stanford. Weingreen, a Jew and a Zionist, was a professor of Semitic Languages and had connections in both academia and Irish social circles. Stanford, one of the most prominent professors at Trinity College was also an independent member of the senate. Stanford, who was quite taken with Israel following his visit, hosted Cohen at the Dáil. Here, Cohen saw a familiar face: de Valera’s eldest son, Vivion. Cohen had first met him at a dinner at Rabbi Herzog’s home when he visited Israel with his father in 1950. According to Cohen, Vivion displayed a deep understanding of Israel’s problems and helped set up a meeting between Cohen and his father at the presidential residence. Cohen also dined at de Valera’s table, together with Boland. Cohen and de Valera discussed the absence of diplomatic relations between Israel and Ireland. However, de Valera avoided discussion of the main causes. It was probably convenient for him to attribute such absence to the Irish desire to remain neutral, as befitting impartial mediators, in order to help resolve the IsraeliArab conflict. De Valera’s evasion of such a cardinal question did not dampen Cohen’s positive impression of the president. He found him to be a true friend of Israel and attributed this to his close friendship with Rabbi Herzog, of whom he spoke warmly and with great admiration.258

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Cohen felt that de Valera reserved a special place in his heart for Israel following his 1950 visit. De Valera told Cohen how much he valued Israel since it held the key to the development of the Middle East. He understood Israel’s security requirements, but was convinced that the Arabs also felt the need for peace. Inspired by the multilateral settlement for Cypriot independence of February 1959, based on the unification of the island under a Greek-Turkish government, de Valera and Cohen agreed that the Arabs and Israelis needed to sit down and resolve the conflict. But history proved them wrong. They could not foresee that in just a few years, Cyprus would no longer be a shining example of co-existence, but rather an arena for a violent struggle that would lead to its partition. De Valera asserted that Israel and the Arabs had to hammer out a peace agreement. Boland, who knew both sides very well, was realistic and more skeptical, and thus disagreed with de Valera, pointing out that there are problems that cannot be resolved in one fell swoop. However, de Valera strenuously opposed this approach. Cohen sided with him. Indeed, Cohen saw de Valera as someone who genuinely wished to help Israel, while his attitude toward Boland was quite frosty. Cohen explained in his reports that Boland was probably unwilling to risk a falling out with the Arabs because he had his sights set on becoming the president of the General Assembly. Cohen described to de Valera Israel’s ties with African countries, whose numbers in the United Nations were growing. These relations began to occupy a special place in Israel’s foreign affairs at the end of the 1950s. At that time the groundwork was being laid for the golden age of the 1960s, when Israel established ties with almost all of the 33 newly independent African countries.259 Israel was prepared to assist with their economic, social, and even military development. Israel’s willingness to help was born of its political interest in hindering Arab attempts to isolate it, but also of economic (the purchase of raw materials and sales of Israeli industrial products), strategic (ensuring sea and air passage to the Far East and South Africa) and humane interests, as partners with African nations that had also suffered from racial discrimination. Israel, being a small country, was not perceived in Africa as having colonial aspirations, and it was therefore welcomed with open arms. This continued until the gradual deterioration of relations following the Six Day War.260 De Valera had good reason to show interest in Israel-Africa ties. The growing weight of the Afro-Asian bloc in the United Nations also led to increased Irish interest in Africa. Although before it joined the United Nations, Ireland had had a presence in this continent and in the Third World in general, it was limited to religion – the Irish mission, which was largely in Nigeria. The mission later paved the way for diplomatic ties that ripened into full diplomatic relations between Ireland and Nigeria, after the latter gained independence in 1963. This was the first sign of the expansion of Ireland’s diplomatic ties with African countries over the next decades. These ties were reinforced by the fact that Ireland had experienced colonial domination itself and had joined the United Nations just when the Third World was throwing off the shackles of Western colonialism. The General Assembly was the ideal forum for Ireland to enhance its prestige in the Afro-Asian bloc, as it identified with the struggle against colonialism.261

156 Ireland and the State of Israel: 1948–63 Cohen met O’Brien for the first time at a dinner held by Winegreen in his honor, and spoke with him at length. Cohen was impressed by O’Brien’s brilliant intellect, broadmindedness, sincerity, and great energy. Cohen and O’Brien, as well as de Valera, stressed the importance of scientific and cultural ties, and the exchange of students between Ireland and Israel. Such ties, considered essential for addressing Israeli ignorance of Irish affairs, as well as vice versa, were practically nonexistent at that time.262 O’Brien was impressed with the Israeli explanation of the refugee problem. He said that the Arabs’ fear of Israel did not stem from strategic factors, but from their fear that Israel would dominate the Middle East through its economic power. This may have been based on the change in Israel’s economy, which moved from recession in 1954 to vigorous growth that continued until 1965, and a rapidly rising standard of living that was considered very high by international standards.263 Given the improved relations between the Vatican and Israel, Cohen asked O’Brien to explain why Ireland continued to avoid normalizing relations. O’Brien admitted that the Vatican exerted a certain degree of influence on this issue. However, there was a more prosaic explanation, stemming from Ireland’s financial difficulties as a small country: it could only afford diplomatic representation in Europe and America, where Ireland had special interests. He claimed that Ireland had no representation in Asia, Africa, and the Arab countries, and had only recently begun to consider the establishment of delegations in New Delhi and Lagos, because of the many Irish missionaries in these countries. O’Brien anticipated that the diplomatic network would be expanded over time, and would undoubtedly include Israel. Cohen took advantage of his discussion with Aiken to explain the refugee problem in depth. Aiken claimed that he understood Israel’s position, but insisted that it had to repatriate some of the refugees. Cohen responded that there was no sign of any Arab willingness to discuss the issue. But of course, countries such as Ireland were most welcome to try and persuade them to talk to Israel. Cohen found no sign of friendship or goodwill toward Israel in Aiken and Boland, although in his opinion, Boland had a better understanding of Israel than the Minister, “having received a Zionist education from Abba’s (i.e. Eban’s) . . . speeches at the Assembly.”264 Cohen believed that their position was related to Boland’s candidacy for president of the General Assembly. Therefore he did not rule out the possibility that the visit of Mahmoud Fawzi – UAR Minister for Foreign Affairs – to Dublin at that time, was also related to this candidacy. In other words, Fawzi pledged UAR votes to Boland in return for Irish agreement to establish a UAR delegation in Dublin, without the establishment of an Irish delegation in Cairo. Cohen was concerned that the Egyptians aimed to make Dublin a center of anti-Israel and anti-Semitic propaganda that would spread throughout Ireland, the Irish diaspora, and the Catholic world. This danger could not be underestimated, he claimed, given the latent anti-Semitism in all walks of Irish society. Furthermore, Cohen was concerned that Nasser would quietly galvanize highranking Germans with a Nazi past who lived near Dublin.265

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Cohen’s concerns regarding the affinity between UAR, Nasser, and anti-Semitism were not unfounded. In response to the establishment of the State of Israel, the traumatic experience of the Arab downfall, and the Arab-Israeli conflict, there was a growing number of incidents of virulent anti-Semitism in literature and the press in Arab countries, and especially in the UAR.266 The Arab need to portray Israel as an evil, imperialistic demon to justify the battle for its destruction, led to the portrayal of the entire Jewish nation as evil. This literary anti-Semitism spread from the top down: from political circles, writers and journalists, and even from the government. Such publications made extensive use of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, which played an important role in the development of Nazi anti-Semitism. The Protocols, which describe a global Jewish conspiracy that gave the Jews frightening power, were translated into Arabic and published in various editions, some of which were government-sponsored. Nasser himself did not hesitate to use them in his speeches in 1958. In addition, the Arabs based their anti-Semitism on Islamic foundations, especially the dispute between Mohammed and Jews of the Arabian Peninsula. This hatred was thus transformed into a hatred based on religion.267 As for the Nazis who had settled in Ireland, this issue made headlines shortly before Cohen’s visit to Dublin, and it can be assumed that Cohen was aware of this. On March 31, the Irish Times printed an item by Joel Brand, member of the wartime Budapest Jewish Relief Committee. Brand claimed that Ireland was a Nazi center and that former Colonel in the Waffen SS (Armed SS) Otto Skorzeny and Léon De∫relle, the leader of the Belgian Rexist pro-Nazi Movement, lived near Dublin. On the same day, the Department of Justice published a brief and unconvincing denial which was based on the Minister for Justice’s response on February 17, 1960 to a query that arose in the Dáil. The Minister said that Skorzeny had not taken up residence in Ireland, although he had announced that he would do so if allowed. De∫relle, on the other hand, had never been in Ireland.268 Keogh casts more light on the issue by saying that Ireland was a popular postwar destination for highranking Nazis and their sympathizers. An example was Otto Strasser, a high level ex-Nazi who wanted to take up residence in Ireland, but was turned down by the authorities, although he was allowed to make a short visit in 1955. As for De∫relle, who was sentenced to death in absentia, there were rumors in 1946 that he had reached Ireland. While the rumors proved to be false, S. A. Roche, secretary of the Irish Department of Justice, regarded him as a political refugee and wanted Ireland to grant him refuge, but the Department of External Affairs opposed this. Other lesser-known Nazi sympathizers, however, did succeed in settling in the country.269 Most people with whom Cohen spoke in Dublin did not agree with his concerns regarding Fawzi’s visit. But in August 1960, the results of this visit were broadcast in Hebrew on Radio Cairo and published in the Beirut daily newspaper El Jarida. These results included the establishment of an Irish embassy in Cairo, Aiken’s acceptance of Fawzi’s invitation to visit Cairo, and his announcement that his country would not establish relations with Israel.270 Although these reports would prove to be false, there was no way of knowing this during Cohen’s visit to

158 Ireland and the State of Israel: 1948–63 Dublin, and immediately after. Cohen received the impression that Ireland was keenly ambitious to play a role in the international arena. He believed that the presidency of the General Assembly had become a top priority at Iveagh House, which was willing to achieve it at all costs.271 Irish documentation shows that Cohen exaggerated. The Irish were interested in the Arab vote for Boland’s candidacy, but they were not prepared to reciprocate with a commitment to establish relations with the UAR, beyond a general promise. In practice, the Irish responded to the UAR with their typical inertia: they preferred the status quo and postponed the decision indefinitely, due to their financial straits and shortage of personnel. Boland’s letter to Cremin on June 24, 1960 indicates that it was Fawzi, and not the Irish, who initiated the visit to Dublin. Boland wrote that Omar Loutfi, UAR ambassador to the United Nations, would not divulge the purpose of Fawzi’s visit. Boland assumed that Fawzi wanted to explain to Aiken in person that despite its excellent relations with the Irish delegation in the United Nations, the UAR could not support Boland and would have to vote for Nosek, the Czech representative, so as not to compromise its important trade relations with the Iron Curtain countries. Given these circumstances, Boland believed that Ireland should at least ensure, through Fawzi, that the UAR would not influence other Arab countries to vote for Nosek. Boland further assumed that Fawzi came to Dublin to offer the establishment of diplomatic relations with Ireland. Assuming that Ireland was about to establish relations with African countries, Fawzi saw the importance in advancing diplomatic relations between Ireland and the UAR. Boland probably meant that the UAR wanted to steer Irish interest in Africa toward pro-Arabism, to counterbalance Western and Israeli influence in Africa.272 Either way, Boland believed that the establishment of a UAR delegation in Dublin should be welcomed, but the establishment of an Irish delegation in Cairo should be rejected, because of Ireland’s many prior commitments, such as the establishment of a delegation in India. As a temporary arrangement, he proposed that the Irish ambassador to Rome serve as ambassador to Cairo as well. Boland believed that Fawzi should be welcomed warmly and hoped to return to Dublin to participate in the preparations, since: Not only has Dr. Fawzi always been a good friend of ours, the Arab vote is extremely important to us from the point of view of the presidential election . . . On more than one count, therefore, there is everything to be said for giving Dr. Fawzi the warmest possible welcome.273 During Fawzi’s visit to Dublin, the Irish agreed in principle to exchange envoys, but Aiken made the establishment of an Irish delegation in Cairo contingent upon the availability of funds and a diplomatic staff; these were found to be lacking. Official approval of the principle agreement also moved slowly. The elections at the end of August 1961 were another reason for postponement. Irish voters were not interested in expanding diplomatic representation. Instead of addressing external problems, they wanted the government to deal with economic difficulties

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at home.274 After Boland was elected president of the General Assembly in September 1960, it was no longer necessary to placate the UAR, and the Irish could delay addressing the issue.

Activities following Cohen’s reports Cohen’s reports at the end of July 1960 encouraged Comay and Luria, who had been given the green light from Jerusalem, to urge the Irish envoys in the United Nations and London not to establish a UAR delegation in Dublin before Ireland fully recognized Israel. They still hoped to advance recognition by supporting Boland for the presidency of the General Assembly. Comay met with Boland at the beginning of September. For obvious reasons, Boland confirmed that Aiken had not made any promises to Fawzi regarding UAR delegation in Dublin.275 To the chagrin of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Iveagh House refrained from any decision on the recognition of Israel as well. This message was conveyed on September 12 to Luria by H. McCann, Ireland’s ambassador to London (1958–63), with whom he was on good terms.276 Boland also responded in a similar way when G. Meir asked him about it at a dinner party he attended, together with other UN representatives, which she hosted in New York during the UN Assembly session at the end of 1960.277

Luria visits Dublin – May 1961 Luria, who was almost obsessed with the subject of relations with Ireland, would not give up. He was planning to visit Dublin in the spring of 1961, as the guest of honor of the Jewish National Fund jubilee celebrations, and wanted to take this opportunity to hold discussions with the Irish Department of External Affairs.278 And indeed, on May 15, 1961, he met with Aiken, Cremin, and O’Brien who helped to set up the meeting with the Minister. Luria left for Dublin with instructions from Jerusalem to clarify that normalization did not have to be mutual, meaning that the Irish did not have to establish a delegation in Israel. He also received instructions regarding the trade agreement: although the Irish associated a trade agreement with de jure recognition, it was important to separate the two issues; de jure recognition should be demanded, regardless of the efforts to achieve an agreement. This policy was defined after serious difficulties in the negotiations on the trade agreement had emerged. The difficulties stemmed from the consistent imbalance in the informal trade relations between the two countries, which were exclusively in Israel’s favor. The Israelis proposed amending this by importing massive quantities of meat from Ireland. But the proposal was taken off the table because the price of Irish meat was too high. Israel’s proposal to purchase Irish fishing boats also encountered difficulties because of Irish unwillingness to accept Israeli credit terms.279 The Israelis understood, therefore, that tying recognition to a trade agreement, which was not likely to be signed, meant that Ireland would never recognize Israel.

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At the invitation of Aiken, Luria had dinner with the Minister, Cremin, and O’Brien on May 15 at the Russell Hotel in Dublin. This was preceded by an open and encouraging discussion with O’Brien. However, the conversation over dinner went on for more than three hours and boiled over into a heated argument.280 Luria complained to the Minister that Ireland, which was part of the free world and displayed friendship toward Israel, was still tarrying over de jure recognition. As such, Ireland was the exception in Israel’s wide network of foreign relations, which excluded only the Arab countries, a few Muslim countries and Spain.281 Even the Soviets had an embassy in Israel, despite their hostility. Ireland’s position was especially surprising, given the improved Israel-Vatican relations, Luria noted. In the preliminary discussion, O’Brien brought up the question of the relations between Israel and Spain. Luria explained the Spanish case, in an attempt to demonstrate that it was not Spain’s Catholicism that tipped the scales against normalization, but rather its pro-Arab orientation. Luria wanted him to infer that the Vatican factor was not the stumbling block in establishing full relations between Ireland and Israel. O’Brien disagreed with this conclusion, although he admitted that there had been a change in the Vatican’s position, and Ireland’s stand toward Israel did not have to strictly conform to the Vatican’s. O’Brien stressed that after the Irish had vehemently adhered to the Vatican’s position, they now faced the problem of “how to get ourselves off the hook of our own making without appearing to rebuff the Holy See.” O’Brien added that the Irish were not consulting the Vatican on the Israeli issue at that time, so as to avoid the risk of being told expressly recognition was out of the question. They wanted to move forward discreetly and so they adopted the idea of the trade agreement, which would not require any official political statement. In his response, Luria explained his doubts about the trade agreement, and noted that since Gilat’s death, negotiations between the sides had lapsed. At the dinner meeting, Aiken confirmed his country’s friendship toward Israel, which was reflected in the UN arena. But he stressed that unlike Israel, Ireland was not interested in establishing ties with as many countries as possible. The upcoming establishment of the Irish embassy in Nigeria was an exceptional step, motivated by the 1,000 Irish missionaries in Nigeria. Luria responded with the traditional Israeli response: reciprocity was not essential, and Ireland should at least allow the establishment of an Israeli embassy in Dublin. This fell on deaf ears. Aiken was not interested in de jure recognition, and even less in the establishment of an Israeli embassy in Dublin. When he shifted the discussion to the trade agreement, Luria repeated Israel’s reservations about such an agreement. Aiken tried to further justify his country’s hesitation to recognize Israel de jure by alluding that this gave Ireland influence with the Arabs. He even said that on a number of occasions he himself had urged them to accept Israel’s existence. Luria rejected the argument forcefully, claiming that it was an illusion to think that Irish discrimination against Israel would give them influence with the Arabs in a way that would benefit Israel. On the contrary: the only way to persuade the Arabs to recognize Israel’s existence was through unequivocal international recognition.

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Aiken protested his use of the word “discrimination,” but Luria insisted that as long as Ireland recognized other countries de jure, and settled for de facto recognition of Israel, this constituted discrimination. Aiken also addressed the refugee problem. Admitting that most of the refugees would obviously not be returning to Israel, he demanded partial repatriation, and pressed for an Israeli offer of financial compensation and resettlement. Luria replied, as expected, that Israel would only be willing to discuss this as part of negotiations for a comprehensive settlement of the dispute. In such case, Israel will be prepared to discuss repatriation in family reunification cases and to make a material financial contribution to the resettlement of refugees in other places. Having no funds of its own, it would need loans. At the end of the discussion, Luria made three alternative proposals: the best option for Israel would be a mutual exchange of diplomatic delegations, through a resident or nonresident ambassador; the second best would be the establishment of an Israeli delegation in Ireland, on a unilateral basis; the third option would be to grant Israel de jure recognition. These proposals did not receive any specific response from Aiken. The above description is based on Luria’s impressions. Cremin also relayed an account, although shorter, in a cable and letter to W. P. Fay, Ireland’s ambassador to Canada, and in a letter to Boland. In his cable about one week after Luria’s meeting with Aiken, Cremin described Luria’s attitude in the meeting as very direct. In his letter to Boland about one month later, he went further, and described Luria’s approach as aggressive and even sarcastic. Cremin sent the cable and letter to Fay, after the latter enquired how he should respond to the invitation from Israel’s ambassador to Canada (J. Herzog 1960–3) to attend a dinner in honor of Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, who was visiting the country. Since Iveagh House assumed that the invitation was part of Israel’s efforts to gain de jure recognition, Cremin told Fay there was no objection, providing he would make no comments on the issue of recognition. Cremin took the opportunity to explain Aiken’s refusal to recognize Israel de jure, and mentioned the refugee problem as one of the reasons. Cremin added that there was a feeling in the Department of External Affairs that while the relationship with Israel was somewhat anomalous, the advantages to be gained by recognition were not sufficiently clear. The position of the Vatican also had to be considered. As far as the Department knew, the Vatican still remained “quite opposed to the Israeli attitude towards control over the Holy Places.” Apparently, due to his previous post as ambassador to the Vatican, Cremin saw fit to stress the role of the Vatican.282 Following Luria’s disappointment with the meeting with Aiken, Comay tried to see how things stood with Boland, when they met at a UN luncheon in honor of Ben-Gurion. Boland was somewhat embarrassed and defensive, and put the blame on Aiken. The frustrating result of the meeting between Luria and Aiken surprised him too.283 Boland, who personally thought that Ireland’s attitude toward Israel was strange and no longer justified, wrote to Cremin: “I wonder, are there many countries besides ourselves who still accord Israel only de facto recognition.”284

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Nurock’s talks in Dublin As before, Luria and others at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could not come to terms with Aiken’s turndown. They were determined to gain full recognition from Ireland, and would not relent. Max Nurock stood at the center of these efforts. In coordination with his brother-in-law, Leonard Abrahamson, and with Luria, he held talks in Dublin in June 1961 with three prominent figures from Trinity College: Dr McConnell, provost, Professor Stanford, and Dr Owen SheehySkeffington, a socialist, a lecturer and former senate member (1954–6) who was known as champion of freedom and equality, and vigorously opposed the influence of the Irish Catholic Church.285 Nurock’s report of his impressions of these talks is interesting. It sheds a light, albeit subjective, on the feelings of Irish academic and political supporters of Israel toward their country’s approach to Israel. These three scholars agreed that the delay of recognition made no sense and tarnished Ireland’s international reputation. They promised to help as much as they could. In his analysis of the position of these scholars regarding the Irish delay of recognition, Nurock even used a politically incorrect language: Generally, I discerned acceptance in Skeffington and Stanford of the suspicion that the Catholic hierarchy of Ireland are the “niggers in the woodpile” and are carrying on the old struggle for the internationalization of Jerusalem, or at least preserving the dogmatic prejudice against Jews being in control of any Christian Holy Places, which the Vatican – and they knew it – has virtually abandoned long since. Aiken is, apparently, very much in priestly grasp.286

Reevaluation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Following Nurock’s report, at the end of 1961, Tuvia Arazi, CD director, asked Nurock to reevaluate the issue of Israel’s relations with Ireland.287 Nurock responded to the request in his memo of November 2, 1961.288 In the first part of the memo, he ascribed Ireland’s stubborn refusal to accord Israel full recognition to a “threefold allergy.” The first was bureaucratic inertia stemming from the reluctance of Iveagh House to change the 1949 policy, because of the Vatican. The second was the reluctance of Ireland’s headstrong and powerful Catholic hierarchy, which was more papal than the Pope, to drop the corpus separatum concept, and at the Irish government surrendering to Church pressure. The third was Irish fear of the territorial and political consequences of partition anywhere in the world, including Israel. In the second part of the memo, Nurock proposed “a new assault on the stubborn Irish.” They must be reminded each and every day, diplomatically and politely, of course, that their attitude toward Israel was strange, no longer justified and far from logical or fair. It should be made clear to them that Israel was their natural ally, given similarities such as their struggle against

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the British, the attempt to revive an ancient language, and the financial difficulties that were characteristic of young countries. Nurock also mentioned the folk legends289 and the similarity in the elegiac music of both nations. He also proposed the dispatch of an Israeli goodwill delegation to Dublin to run a public relations campaign. Because of Irish sensitivity, Israel’s ambassador to London could not be on the delegation, but that personalities such as Walter Eitan, Israel’s ambassador to France (1960–70) should be included. Nurock also recommended appointing an economist and a scholar or artist. Nurock’s other proposals were to harness Israel’s supporters in Ireland to the task, to extract an official announcement on the change in the Vatican’s position toward Israel and to mobilize the support of Catholic and Vatican-oriented countries that had accorded Israel full recognition. In order to consolidate the ties between the countries, Nurock proposed cooperation in theater and sports and Israeli assistance in reviving the Irish language. Nurock did not ignore the subject of trade relations, but claimed that this could not replace official de jure recognition and diplomatic relations. In response to Nurock’s proposal, Arazi suggested additional steps – some of which had already been discussed before – such as the distribution of pro-Zionist and pro-Israeli films (Exodus, for example), harnessing the support of the Irish community in the United States, and establishing a rapport with Ireland’s ambassador to the Vatican and who could then facilitate the process. Arazi wondered whether Irish public opinion carried any weight, which was necessary for the success of any public campaign. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Jerusalem, the answer was yes.290 One of the tests of the strength of public opinion is the media’s freedom of operation and size of the readership. As for freedom of the press, at the end of the 1950s, cultural and other changes in Irish society led to a relaxation of the government’s strict control of the media.291 Furthermore, it appears that the positive answer of Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding Irish public opinion was based on the image of the Irish press which was described on August 1960 in the detailed review, by S. A. Freifeld, charge d’affaires at the Canadian embassy in Dublin. Freifeld, a Jewish supporter of Israel, gave his review to Unna, who passed it on to CD. Freifeld pointed out the relatively large readership of the leading newspapers (Irish Independent, Irish Press, and Irish Times) and Irish and English Sunday papers, which was particularly impressive given Ireland’s large rural population. He also noted the standards of the leading newspapers, which were higher than would be expected of a developing country, adding that the newspaper reports were usually accurate, but subject to more self-censorship than in any other newspaper in the free world,292 mainly because of moral attitudes of the public toward issues such as crime and offences to the clergy. In the meeting held at CD on December 28, 1961, which Luria also attended, Nurock, who was about to travel to Dublin at the beginning of January, was instructed to prepare the ground for the public relations campaign.293

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Nurock visits Dublin – January 1962 The information about the visit is derived from Nurock’s report and should be treated accordingly.294 Nurock had an exceptionally large number of meetings: with Aiken and Cremin, representatives of the Departments of Industry and Commerce, Agriculture, and Education, dignitaries from the legal, academic, and economic echelons including friends and acquaintances, Briscoe, Edwin Solomons, O’Brien (who had just resigned from his position in the Department of External Affairs), Chief Justice Cearbhall Ó Dálai∫h,295 Skeffington and Stanford, and John Ross, a senate member. He also met with attorneys and newspaper editors. The meeting with Aiken was considered to be the crowing achievement of the visit, and Nurock pressed for it to take place. Due to the Minister’s poor health, the meeting was postponed to January 24, the day of Nurock’s return to London. Edwin Solomon’s’ attempts to arrange a meeting between Nurock and McQuaid, Dublin’s archbishop, were unsuccessful. McQuaid refused to meet him, claiming it could be interpreted as intervention in political affairs. Nurock did not accept this pretext, as McQuaid was known for his political activism. Briscoe was the only supporter of Israel who opposed normalization. This was not surprising, as he was in his second term as mayor of Dublin. He explained that he was concerned that normalization would spur Catholic circles in Ireland to demand government intervention in Israel’s handling of the holy places. He added that during his visit to Israel with de Valera, they had both concluded that it was better not to have any official relationship, because this spared Ireland and Israel from this concern. This argument, however, was no longer relevant. Over a decade had passed, and since then Israel had received praise, even from church representatives, for its treatment of the Christians and the holy places within its borders. Briscoe also had a financial explanation: as part of normalization with Israel, Ireland demanded a change in the trade balance in its favor, as at that time there was a ratio of one to thirty in Israel’s favor.296 In fact, this explanation bore within itself one of the reasons for the Irish refusal to normalize relations with Israel. Namely, the obstacles faced by Irish exports to Israel – primarily beef – harmed Ireland’s commercial interest in Israel, which was thus not sufficiently attractive to justify breaking through the Vatican barrier, or damaging Ireland’s relations with the Arabs. However, Nurock regarded Briscoe’s comments as “gloomy . . . tendentious . . . nonsensical.” He did not hesitate to explain to him that Ireland’s recognition of Israel was just as essential for Ireland’s status in the Western world as it was for Israel. McConnell and Skeffington, who also had their doubts about Briscoe, confirmed Nurock’s unpromising impression of the man. Skeffington summed this up by saying that “Briscoe wants no troubles.” Possibly Briscoe served as a mouthpiece for others in the community who opposed normalization with Israel and establishing an Israeli embassy in Dublin, fearing prominence and confrontation with the society surrounding them – an ever present typical concern of the community.

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Nurock saw that Stanford missed no opportunity to help Israel. Skeffington, who recalled with admiration how Irish Jews supported Sinn Féin in its struggle against Britain, promised to take action and to galvanize others. Nurock sensed his deep affinity to Israel and his enthusiasm for the socialist school within it. Skeffington and Stanford attributed Ireland’s attitude toward Israel to bureaucratic inertia. McConnell said that Ireland did not want to risk losing its neutrality, claiming that a pro-Israeli stand would jeopardize its relations with the Arabs. Skeffington asserted that the Vatican and partition still played a role. Ross, on the other hand, emphasized that a pro-Israeli approach were likely to undermine Ireland’s interests in the Afro-Asian bloc. Ó Dálai∫h, who was close to Ireland’s Jewish community, expressed his wish to visit Israel. Nurock described him as an extremely captivating young man, who spoke admiringly of Leo Cohen.297 As chairman of the Cultural Division in the Department of External Affairs, Ó Dálai∫h pointed out the committee members’ sympathy toward Israel, their support for cultural relations, and their desire to learn from Israel’s experience in reviving the language. Among the newspaper editors, Alan Montgomery from the Irish Times stood out in his support of Israel. He found it difficult to understand his government’s position on the Israeli issue and offered to help through his editorials. He believed the Irish were curious about Israel, and there was therefore room for his newspaper to devote an article to the subject, as a follow-up on White’s articles from 1956. Rooney from the Irish Independent and Carty from the Irish Press also offered to lend a hand, if required. This cooperativeness was probably out of courtesy to Nurock. It is doubtful whether Montgomery’s comment on Irish curiosity was accurate. It is more likely that the Irish were generally not interested in the Middle East and were quite indifferent toward Israel,298 excepting of course their Christian attachment to the Holy Land. In his meeting on January 22 with representatives of the Departments of Industry and Commerce, and of Agriculture and the Irish Export Board, Nurock provided estimated trade figures from 1960 onward between private Irish and Israeli companies; the projected trade balance favored Israel.299 Nurock also mentioned the potential export of machinery and ships from Ireland to Israel, given that deliveries to Israel in those categories under German reparations were to cease within a year or so. Representatives of the Cultural Division in the Irish Department of External Affairs and representatives of the Department of Education insisted on advancing cooperation in sport and in the arts. They showed an interest in the revival of Hebrew, and also analyzed the elements acting against the revival of the Irish language, such as the influence of the English neighbor and the fact that Irish, unlike Hebrew, had never been a language of prayer. On a stormy day, Nurock traveled to O’Brien’s home in Howth, north of Dublin. It proved to be worth the effort. O’Brien “was friendly, erudite and displayed excellent analytical skills.” O’Brien said that when he resigned from the Department of External Affairs, the department had already agreed on the need for de jure recognition of Israel, indirectly and without fanfare, using the trade

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agreement route. To the best of his knowledge, the department had concluded that unless the trade agreement contained an explicit restriction that it did not constitute de jure recognition, it would inevitably be construed as granting such recognition. O’Brien agreed in general with Nurock’s analysis of the delay in Ireland’s recognition of Israel. Referring to the Vatican issue, he said that although one year earlier, Ambassador McCauley had received a negative response from Monsignor Dell’Acqua regarding change in the Vatican’s position toward Israel, he, O’Brien, reaffirmed that “the holy places was no longer a live issue for the government of Ireland or for Aiken.” Nonetheless he stressed – in the same vein of what he had said to Luria – that “the Irish government had gone out on a limb and was now eager to withdraw without face-losing in excess; it wanted to get off the hook gracefully.” O’Brien agreed that the Irish, especially Aiken, shrank from the idea of partition. He asserted that the bureaucratic inertia was a result of a very thinstaffed Department of External Affairs. Because of this, chronic problems were pushed aside in favor of urgent and unexpected ones. As for the Arab issue, he claimed that Ireland expected an Israeli gesture regarding the refugee problem. But the atmosphere in Nurock’s talks with Aiken and Cremin was strained. Nurock was deeply shocked by Cremin’s comments, which could imply that Aiken regarded Israel’s agreement to repatriate some of the refugees as a condition for de jure recognition. Nurock responded bitterly that no government in the world had made this stipulation. Cremin, sensing Nurock’s anger, tried to placate him with the trade agreement, which had become the magic word. Cremin claimed that were Ireland to sign an agreement, it would find it difficult to put off de jure recognition. Israel should therefore wait for a signal from the Iveagh House regarding the agreement, which would not be long in coming.300 Was Cremin just trying to escape Israeli badgering? Nurock, who had his mind set on normalization, discerned some support in his comments, which he wished to verify this in the meeting with Aiken. In addition to Nurock’s report, the details of the meeting with Aiken are evidenced in the review of the Irish Department of External Affairs.301 Evidenced by the review Aiken indirectly criticized Israel when he said that the Jews had chosen to establish a state at the heart of a fanatic Arab world. According to Nurock, his remark was even more scathing, and left a dismal feeling that the Minister was obsessed with the Arab plight and the refugee problem. Although Aiken started off by saying that Ireland was full of goodwill toward Israel, and always remembered Jewry’s past tribulations and its right to a place of its own, he went on to refer to the Arab claim, which he patently considered to be natural and just, that the Jews were intruders and their expansion and aggression should be curbed. He said that the situation in the Middle East was volatile, but it should be hoped that responsible leaders would reach a solution. Nurock rejected his claims, saying that Israel had been the traditional home of the Jewish people for over 2,000 years. The blame for the unrest in the Middle East lay with the Arab countries, which were also gaining political advantage from the refugee problem. Nurock noted that some refugees were being integrated into Arab countries,

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such as the naturalized refugees living in Jordan. He added that Israel had absorbed about half a million Jewish refugees from Arab countries. Nonetheless, he repeated that Israel was willing to help solve the problem. To remove any doubt, Nurock asked whether signing the trade agreement would be tantamount to de jure recognition and whether, after the agreement was signed, Aiken would be prepared to establish diplomatic relations quietly, without appointing an Irish representative in Tel Aviv. Nurock displayed goodwill and said that in time, his government would consider concessions for Irish pilgrimage to the holy places by canceling the visa fee. He also said he would be pleased to host Aiken in Israel. The Minister responded positively to the question of the trade agreement, but immediately clarified that this would not lead to the automatic establishment of an Israeli delegation in Dublin. This was a separate issue that required a government decision. He also emphasized that Ireland, being such a small country, could not handle too many overseas delegations, which was also the reason for the delay in appointing an ambassador to New Delhi. He claimed that the unilateral establishment of an Israeli delegation might embarrass his government. After the meeting, Nurock concluded that the trade agreement was the most that could be hoped for as long as Aiken was minister of External Affairs. In Nurock’s opinion Aiken opposed de jure recognition of Israel since he estimated that the next step would be an Israeli request to establish a delegation in Dublin. Apparently, Aiken feared a chain reaction: establishment of an Israeli delegation in Dublin would require establishment of an Irish delegation in Israel and lead to Arab delegations in Dublin (to counterbalance the Israeli delegation), which would inevitably require Ireland to expand its own diplomatic network. The Irish pubic opposed this, preferring to focus on internal affairs. Another explanation for Aiken’s objection to de jure recognition and normalization was Aiken’s reputation as anti-Semite among Nurock’s family and friends in Dublin, Jews and non-Jews alike. Nurock learned of this for the first time from his four nephews. All four were upstanding members of the community and politically knowledgeable.302 They believed that Aiken was the stumbling block, by reason of an ingrained anti-Jewish bigotry. Nurock’s Jewish friends in Dublin confirmed this. Citing the cherche la femme rule, they put the blame on Aiken’s wife, who was known to deliver herself of acutely anti-Jewish remarks.303 But Ross pointed a finger at Aiken, noting his blind pro-Nazi inclination during the Second World War. This fits in with Aiken’s wartime image as a man whose sympathies lay with Nazi Germany, rather than the allies.304 As Minister for Coordination of Defensive Measures, Aiken fully supported de Valera’s April 1945 condolence visit to the German envoy.305 However, Ross qualified his comments on Aiken’s past by adding that there had since been a great change as a result of the influence of Boland and O’Brien. Aiken’s reassuring remarks about Israel at the United Nations seem to validate this analysis, but do not suffice to portray him as a friend of Israel, especially when considering Ireland’s declared policy of impartiality in the United Nations. Be it as it may, this illustrates the difficulty of determining unequivocally Aiken’s attitude toward Jews and Israel.306

168 Ireland and the State of Israel: 1948–63 Notwithstanding his disappointment with Aiken, Nurock did not give up, perhaps because he thought there was Irish goodwill toward Israel, or because he believed that diplomatic relations would be advanced in any case, as soon as a trade agreement was signed. Nurock’s report was sent to Israel’s representatives in the United Nations, London, and Rome. The report was met with both praise and doubts regarding the prospects of normalization with Ireland. Since the report did not contain a decisive answer regarding the Vatican’s position, M. Fischer, Israeli ambassador to Rome (1960–5) suggested taking advantage of his friendship with Ireland’s ambassador to Rome, Thomas V. Commins, and request him to ask Ireland’s ambassador to the Vatican to put the following question to Dell’Acqua: Would the Vatican disapprove if Ireland granted Israel de jure recognition? The question was not whether the Vatican would approve but if it would disapprove, leaving room for a negative answer that would not be as binding, but would nevertheless enable Ireland to recognize Israel. Hence it had an advantage over the question that McCauley had presented to Dell’Acqua about a year before.307 Fischer’s proposal was accepted after consultation at CD. It was also decided to avoid further direct pressure, and to wait for clarifications in Nurock’s upcoming visit to Dublin at the beginning of July 1962, when he was to receive an honorary doctorate from Trinity College. It was also recommended to invite Ó Dálai∫h to Israel as a guest of the government.308 Fischer immediately implemented his proposal, and met with Commins, who had just been appointed Ireland’s ambassador to the Vatican. Commins promised to find out from Dell’ Acqua, who, according to Fischer, was the most sympathetic toward Israel in the Vatican secretariat, whether the Vatican objected normalization.309 Walter Eitan, Israel’s ambassador to Paris, was hesitant. Although in his former position of director general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs he had supported efforts to strengthen ties between Ireland and Israel, he now dampened any enthusiasm felt by Nurock, who was toiling to advance the relationship with Ireland (and who had ironically suggested that Eitan run the public relations campaign in Dublin). Apparently, Eitan thought that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was being provincial in its efforts to gain recognition from an insignificant country. Despite the status that Ireland had gained in the United Nations by filling positions such as the presidency of the General Assembly and its participation since 1960 in the UN Peacekeeping Force in the Congo, Eitan did not feel Ireland was all that important.310 He was also surprised that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was taking it so seriously and was prepared to establish an embassy or legation in Dublin. He thought, at most, that the Israeli ambassador to Brussels, Rome, or Paris could serve as ambassador to Dublin as well.311

Nurock’s visit to Dublin in July 1962312 Nurock met with Cremin on July 5, and was bitterly disappointed to find that no progress whatsoever had been made on the Israeli issue since February. This time Nurock changed his tune. Israel, he said, could survive without Irish recognition,

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and had no incentive to continue pursuing it. He failed to understand how his homeland could discriminate against his fatherland this way. Anyone else who did not feel so strongly about Ireland would have given up long since, Nurock added regretfully. Cremin tried to placate him, saying that Ireland had done nothing to advance its diplomatic relationship with Egypt either.313 Nurock also met with Boland, who was vacationing in Dublin at the time, at a dinner party at Trinity College. They had quite a lot in common: both were holders of Trinity College Studentships in Classics. Boland scoffed at Iveagh House for its insufferable indifference on the Israeli issue, and volunteered to help. It is hardly surprising that at the end of the meeting, Nurock recommend that Jerusalem adopt the tactics of silence and inaction. All they had to do, he said, was: “keep the kettle boiling through reminders opportunely made by Arthur Luria to his opposite number in London, and by Michael Comay to Frederick Boland at the United Nations.”314 The pleasant part of Nurock’s visit was his receipt of an honorary doctorate, and a meeting with Ó Dálai∫h who was gratified to be invited to Israel. Ó Dálai∫h was proud of telling how as a teenager in Dublin, he would stop every Saturday morning on his way to the Christian Brothers’ School, at the home of his Jewish neighbor, Greenspan the milkman, to light the gasfire. Amused, Nurock added “Then a Shabbes-goy,315 now the Chief Justice of Ireland.” Ó Dálai∫h also spoke of his forthcoming visit to Israel and his intention of learning first hand about Israel’s legal system, about the revival of Hebrew and about university education in Israel. He also mentioned that a member of the committee for university reform which he headed, Dr Thomas Walsh of the Irish Agricultural Research Institute, had just returned from a visit to Israel, deeply impressed with the Israelis and their pursuit of their goals. If the Irish had similar faith in themselves, Ó Dálai∫h said, nothing could stand in their way. Based on the reports of Nurock, Aryeh Levavi, deputy director general of Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, concluded that Aiken held the key, but that his goal was to solidify Ireland’s position in the United Nations by nurturing its ties with the Arab world. If Aiken were not a factor, Levavi surmised, Ireland would normalize its relations with Israel even without conferring with the Vatican.316

The decision of the Irish government to recognize Israel de jure It seems Levavi was wrong about the Vatican. While its animosity toward Israel had weakened since John XXIII became Pope, the Irish government still needed the go-ahead from the Vatican to grant Israel de jure recognition, if only to maintain its position with the Holy See, and to placate the Catholic Hierarchy and Irish public opinion. This is reflected in a draft memorandum from the Irish Department of External Affairs to the Irish government, dated December 1962. In this draft, the government was asked to consider, among other things, Aiken’s recommendation to grant de jure recognition to several states which had been

170 Ireland and the State of Israel: 1948–63 widely recognized by Western European countries. In fact, the draft was designed to prepare the ground for a new circular, which would replace the diplomatic circular of November 1956. The draft listed countries that had been mentioned in the November 1956 circular, with the addition of Israel and other countries that were new members of the United Nations.317 Six years after the November 1956 circular, Ireland’s recognition policy was put to the test once again. MacWhite’s arguments from 1956 were stronger than ever. Since many new countries had joined the United Nations but had not yet been fully recognized by Ireland, this anomaly finally had to be corrected.318 Pressure was brought to bear from an unexpected direction. In July 1962, Ireland was in the process of establishing trade relations with South Vietnam, which insisted on de jure recognition as a prerequisite. This led Iveagh House to revisit the entire issue of de jure recognition.319 The draft memo from early December 1962 offered an explanation for the recommendation to grant Israel de jure recognition. First, it explained why such recognition had been withheld, that is, Ireland’s support of the Vatican in the matter of the corpus separatum in Jerusalem. It further noted that in July 1962, Commins, acting on Aiken’s instructions, approached the Vatican about its position in this matter, and was told “there would be no objection to the granting of full recognition to Israel; the Holy See would be pleased, however, if due care were taken by the Government not to recognize Jerusalem as the Capital of Israel.” Given that the Vatican neither approved nor objected, it is reasonable to assume that the talk Commins had with Fischer had influenced his choice of language in his question to the Holy See. The timing of Nurock’s conversation with Boland leads to the conclusion that Boland actively encouraged Aiken to approach the Vatican. Moreover, the improved attitude of the Vatican’s secretariat toward Israel after the death of Tardini in 1961,320 may explain the rather positive answer (from the Israeli point of view) that the Vatican gave to Commins’ question. The Vatican’s response enabled Ireland to back away from its position of stubbornly adhering to Vatican policy. It was thus Vatican policy that was the main factor in Ireland’s non-recognition of Israel. Even when this factor was mitigated after the death of Pius XII, Ireland was still confounded, fettered by the shackles of the Vatican, waiting for a green light from to grant Israel official recognition. Of course, there were other factors that contributed to the delay, which were not mentioned in the draft memo. These included the Arab issue, whose influence is clearly evidenced in both Irish and Israeli documents. But the Arab issue was noted in the draft in a different context: the draft enumerated the reasons for withholding de jure recognition from five Arab states that had already been mentioned in the November 1956 circular: Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Sudan (whose population was mixed), and Tunisia. The first reason was “uncertainty about the political situation during the period of Arab-Israeli tension.” In other words, recognition was withheld because of the Israeli-Arab conflict, and could only be granted after a period of relative calm between Israel and its neighbors in the years following Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai in March 1957.321 The second reason was intertwined with the first, as stated

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in the draft memo: “The possibility of giving offence to Israel.” These reasons, which reflected an attempt to maintain neutrality in the Israeli-Arab conflict, also explained the delay in de jure recognition of Israel. But these reasons were not expressly stated in the Israeli context, since the Vatican was offered as an explanation. It is appropriate here to question the weight of Irish neutrality in withholding recognition of the Arab countries. Was it not a factor, mentioned mostly for appearances, while the real reasons were quite different, such as Irish reluctance to expand its diplomatic network, or the fact that Ireland had no special interest – commercial, for example – in these Arab countries? Indeed, Ireland’s thoughtfulness toward the Arabs in the United Nations, as was the case with Boland’s election to the presidency of the General Assembly, suggests this. Aiken and Boland were at the time inclined to allow a UAR delegation in Dublin and to accredit Ireland’s ambassador in Rome to Cairo. Had it not been for budgetary problems and opposition of the Irish public, it is possible that they would have realized this. On the other hand, the Irish persisted in their refusal, due to the Arab factor as well, to recognize Israel de jure and establish diplomatic relations with it, notwithstanding unprecedented pressure by Israel.322 After various amendments, the draft was submitted to the government for approval on May 7. The recommendation about Israel was unchanged. However, the amended version omitted the second reason for withholding recognition from the five Arab countries, perhaps because of the pro-Israeli language.323 One week later, on May 14, the government approved Aiken’s recommendation to grant de jure recognition to some 40 countries, including Israel. Following this approval, the November 1956 circular was canceled, and replaced by a new circular of October 10, 1963, which reflected the May 7 memo of the Department of External Affairs. The new circular, which was forwarded to Ireland’s diplomatic delegations, contained a qualification about Israel, stating that de jure recognition did not extend to Jerusalem as its capital. It further stated that the change in the status of recognition would not be publicized and that official notice would not be given.324 On May 9, before the government decided on the Israeli issue, Sean Ronan, counselor at the Information Section of the Department of External Affairs in Dublin, asked Ireland’s embassy in London to inquire as to how Britain and other countries handled the matter of Jerusalem. This inquiry was pertinent given the upcoming presidential elections in Israel (after the death of President Yitzhak Ben-Zvi on April 23, 1963) and the official letters of congratulations delivered from other countries to mark the occasion. In his letter to the embassy in London, Ronan noted that as agreed with the United States and France, Britain’s new ambassador presented his credentials to the President of Israel in Jerusalem, “on the grounds of international courtesy,” while clarifying that this had no political meaning. Ronan asked whether official letters to the Israeli prime minister or foreign minister from foreign delegations in Tel Aviv were addressed to Jerusalem. He also asked whether the procedure of submitting the letter of credence to the president in Jerusalem was still the protocol. Nonetheless Ronan thought it

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appropriate to stress that Ireland and Israel would not exchange diplomatic delegations in the foreseeable future. In answer to Ronan’s questions, the British Foreign Office stated that when Britain granted Israel de jure recognition in April 1950, it excluded west Jerusalem until the city’s status could be decided. Britain also specified a similar qualification in its recognition of Jordan. The Foreign Office further stated that since Britain did not recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, its embassy was located in Tel Aviv. But following the international outcry when Israel relocated its Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Jerusalem in July 1953, Israel set up a liaison office in Tel Aviv for the foreign diplomatic delegations. However, this office was closed in July 1962. From then on the British ambassador, as all other ambassadors, had communicated directly with the Israeli authorities in Jerusalem, although this should not be construed as a change in Britain’s official position.325 In other words, Britain had technically adapted to the seat of Israeli government, but refused to grant any juridical recognition. As provided in the October 1963 circular, no official statement was made regarding de jure recognition of Israel. Israel was therefore unable to know about this recognition, granted almost in camera. In any event, Luria’s interest in the Irish issue did not come to an end. On May 20, 1963, he met with Cremin, who was then Ireland’s ambassador to London, and asked to be informed if anything changed.326 Only six months later, in November, did the Israeli side, that is, Comay, hear about the change from Boland. Boland was authorized to deliver the news, with a request that the Israeli government keep it quiet for the time being.327 Israel respected this request. As proof of this, even Nurock, who was almost obsessed with the relationship between Ireland and Israel, was, to his chagrin, unaware of it until it was leaked to the press.328 On January 13, Maurice Samuelson, assistant editor of the Jewish Observer and Middle East Review – a weekly that appeared in London – telephoned Ronan to ask whether Ireland had indeed recognized Israel. Having received the approval of Aiken, Ronan confirmed. Ronan explained that under international law, recognition was a unilateral move, and that it was therefore not Ireland’s practice to notify recognized countries, unless they asked. Ronan added that Ireland had also granted Jordan de jure recognition, and that it did not have full diplomatic relations with any Middle Eastern country, except for honorary consuls that it maintained in Lebanon and Syria. He also explained that for a small country such as Ireland, de jure recognition did not mean automatic establishment of diplomatic relations. This depended on Irish interests in the recognized country, such as trade relations, historical ties or the existence of an Irish community in that country. Samuelson asked whether the catalyst for Israel’s recognition was Pope Paul VI’s decision to visit the Holy Land and Ronan answered that the decision had been made earlier.329 That was the truth. Paul VI was elected Pope on June 21, 1963, more than a month after the Irish cabinet approved the recommendation to recognize Israel de jure. The Jewish Observer published an item about this recognition on January 17. The Irish Times ran a piece a week later.330 These publications spurred Dáil

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member Dr Noel Browne to submit a query about this to the Secretary of External Affairs. Aiken was not long in responding. On January 29, he answered: There had been no recent change in the status of diplomatic relations between Ireland and Israel. While in May last year the Government formally determined that Israel was recognized de jure, the exchange of diplomatic missions was not contemplated.331 Ironically, while this resolute announcement was intended to shelve or at least delay the appointment of an Israeli delegation in Dublin, Israel would not relent. Aiken’s concerns were proven valid. The first move was made as early as January 1964, when Luria approached the Irish Department of External Affairs, through Cremin who was then Ireland’s ambassador to London, asking Ireland to consider accepting a letter of credence from a nonresident Israeli ambassador, perhaps the ambassador to London or Paris.332

Afterword Ireland’s de jure recognition of Israel was viewed by the Israeli Foreign Ministry to be the end of the beginning; a lever of sorts for exchanging resident ambassadors between the two states – a target achieved only in 1996. Relations between Ireland and Israel in these two decades are outside the scope of our study. But we can very briefly review the developments to come in just a few sentences, a sort of epilogue. Before long, faced with Ireland’s continuing refusal to establish diplomatic relations, Israel preferred to remain reactive rather than be proactive.333 The reason for Ireland’s refusal was its apprehension that establishing relations would lead to opening an Israeli diplomatic mission in Dublin, leading to pressure on the part of Arab countries to establish diplomatic missions in Dublin; an undesirable development for the Irish, due to their tendency to minimize diplomatic ties.334 At the same time the two countries continued to maintain contacts on the diplomatic level at the United Nations and between the Irish and Israeli embassies in London, as well as in the areas of commerce, culture, and science, albeit on a limited scale.335 In 1969 the Israeli Foreign Ministry began to re-examine the reactive approach. At that time, Aiken, described by Nurock as “our arch-enemy,” left Iveagh House engendering Israeli expectations of an improved attitude toward Israel.336 Nonetheless, and in view of past experience, it was commonly believed that because of the Arab factor, particularly following the Six Day War, and the Vatican’s position on the issue of corpus separatum, the Irish would prefer to leave the relations with Israel as they were, until there would be peace in the Middle East, or at least until an understanding would be reached between Israel and the Vatican.337 This pessimistic estimate was proven wrong. In December 1974 the two states agreed to exchange diplomatic representatives at the level of nonresident

174 Ireland and the State of Israel: 1948–63 ambassadors.338 The change was generated by Ireland becoming a member of the European Community (EC). By joining the EC, Ireland inescapably became party to the regional free trade agreement signed between Israel and the EC in June 1971, which entered into force in late 1974.339 Moreover, it may be assumed that Ireland too did not want to remain the only member of the EC without diplomatic relations with Israel.340 At first, Ireland’s Ambassador to Switzerland represented his country to Israel. For reasons of convenience, he was replaced in 1979 by Ireland’s Ambassador to Greece. Israel’s Ambassador to the United Kingdom represented Israel toward Ireland.341 Ireland thus advanced its diplomatic relations with Israel because of pragmatic reasons, yet this does not detract from the importance of this step as it signified finally Ireland’s coming out of its shell. Irish diplomatic representation by means of a nonresident ambassador was not an unusual case, due to Ireland’s economic constraints. Yet the Irish government delayed its consent to the appointment of an Israeli ambassador in Dublin until 1993. The first Israeli ambassador presented his letter of credence to President Mary Robinson in July 1994, while the Israel Embassy flying the flag of Israel was formally opened only in 1996.342 That same year Ireland’s Embassy opened in Tel Aviv. These delays lead us to wonder whether there were not additional reasons for this, reasons that we can only guess at.343 It could be assumed that one of the reasons was that from 1973 and onward Ireland began to export live cattle to the Middle East and North African regions. Initially Morocco and Libya were the main markets and trade was relatively small. However, it gradually developed with Libya and Egypt becoming the main markets. Other markets included Yemen, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia. But Egypt and Libya remained the principal markets until 1996 when the Bovine Spongiforms Encephalpathy (BSE) crisis in UK (mad cow disease)344 closed all markets except Lebanon. Trade has now ceased to all countries and is unlikely to start up again.345 Thus it is possible that due to the attractiveness of the Arab markets, the Irish preferred to abstain from highly visible diplomatic relations with Israel.346 On the other hand, starting in the 1980s an opposite trend began to develop, encouraging economic cooperation and trade relations between Ireland and Israel. This trend was related to the fact that both states moved effectively from their agriculture-based economies to high-tech economies. Particularly impressive was the turnabout in Ireland. From a country that was industrially backward and suffered greatly from emigration of its residents who left the Irish shores in search of bread, Ireland became a thriving country with high growth rates and even an immigration target. The tremendous growth in trade volume between Israel and Ireland since the 1980s, compared to what it was in the 1950s and 1960s, and the turnaround of the trade balance in favor of Ireland,347 undoubtedly intensified the need to establish the embassies of Israel and Ireland in Dublin and Tel Aviv respectively. Did the Oslo Agreement between Israel and the Palestinians of September 1993 have any affect on this? The answer to this and many other questions regarding Ireland-Israel relations in the period from 1964 onward will have to await an additional study.

Conclusion

Relations between Ireland and the Zionist Movement and ultimately the State of Israel, were defined by two intertwined elements, running like a scarlet thread throughout our narrative. First is the Irish intercommunal conflict, with the partition of the island at its core. The second is Ireland’s Catholic character, its affinity to the Holy Land and its special relationship with the Vatican. Being at the focal point of Ireland’s national political experience and its religious-cultural ethos in the years covered here, these elements uniquely imbue our narrative with its meaning. The importance of the Holy Land in Christian tradition, concern for its holy places and above all, the traumatic experience of partition of the Irish isle, explain the interest shown by the Irish in the two plans for partitioning Palestine, that of July 1937 and that of November 1947. The partition of the island and the intercommunal conflict served de Valera and Irish public opinion as a sort of prism through which they observed the analogous Jewish-Arab conflict and the proposed partition plans. De Valera in his piercing attack on the Peel Commission plan and the Irish public opinion in its strongly negative reaction to this plan and the 1947 UN plan, intuitively made use of the thought patterns, emotions, and residues of the past related to the partition of their own country, projecting these onto the partition of Palestine. It seems that the effect of the collective historical memory of dispossessing the Catholic Irish by the colonial Protestant minority, led the radical pro-Arab Catholic Irish press to identify with the Palestinian Arabs, viewing them to be in danger of being dispossessed of their land by the Jewish immigrants. Unlike the strongly negative stance of the Irish, the 1937 partition plan was supported by a majority in the Zionist camp, while the 1947 partition plan, with Jerusalem as corpus separatum was accepted by the yishuv and Jews throughout the world, stemming from a realistic approach yet even producing outbursts of joy. The difference between these attitudes is spellbinding. In 1937 it stemmed primarily from the different demographic situations in Palestine and Ireland. The vast majority of the Jewish population was within the borders of the proposed state, while Catholics constituted about a third of the population of Northern Ireland, and a majority along its borders with the South, a condition that remained constant during the years covered. The response of the Jewish side to the

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Conclusion

establishment of a Jewish state within the 1947 partition borders must be viewed first and foremost against the background of the Holocaust and shutting the gates of Palestine to Jewish survivors. As in 1937, the absence of a Jewish population in the areas of Palestine under Arab control after Israel’s war of independence, was one of the factors for general acceptance by the Israeli public of a Jewish state within the armistice lines between Israel and its neighbors, a situation that lasted until occupation of Gaza and the West Bank by the IDF in 1967. The Irish conflict and the partition of the island could be also discerned in the issue of Ireland’s recognition of Israel as expressed in our discussion by raising the question, did Irish resistance to the partition of their country affect the Irish government’s refusal to recognize Israel, viewing it to be “born in sin” of the partition? This assessment was proposed by personages such as Rabbi Jakobovits and Max Nurock. But the strongest confirmation of this could be found in the words of Aiken on Irish rejection of partition anywhere in the world.1 Quite illustrative is the fact that in 1949 the partition of the Irish island was again bound with the issue of Ireland’s recognition of Israel, this time with a different and quite opposite meaning. In the course of the anti-partition campaign of the Costello government, proposals were raised at Iveagh House for a gesture toward Israel, primarily MacBride’s proposal to mediate between Israel and the Vatican in order to resolve the issue of the holy places, thus advancing the recognition of Israel. Although nothing came of this initiative, it entailed, first and foremost, a political interest to achieve gains by enlisting Jewish public opinion and supporters of Israel in the United States for the Irish anti-partition campaign. The Irish conflict with a collective memory of dispossession of Catholics, apparently also left its mark on the position taken by the Irish government on the Palestinian refugee problem. This assumption is supported by evidence found in the study on the influence of the Palestinian Arab narrative on the Irish regarding this issue. The special status enjoyed by Ireland in the Vatican was reflected in the persistent efforts by Rabbi Herzog from 1939 and throughout the war, to enlist Cardinal MacRory, de Valera, and the Department of External Affairs to arrange audiences for Rabbi Herzog with the Pope, or to involve Pius XII in rescuing Jews and stopping the extermination. However, the Vatican played a decisive role in the issue of recognition of Israel. Its effect could be seen when Ireland consulted with the Holy See even before granting de facto recognition and much more so in the years to follow, when Ireland persisted in its exceptional refusal, even compared with other Catholic and Vatican-oriented states, to recognize Israel de jure. In this Ireland was affected by its desire to preserve its status and prestige in the Vatican and its need to please the Catholic hierarchy and public opinion that followed Pius XII in hostility to Israel and the cardinal issue of corpus separatum of Jerusalem. The relaxation of Vatican’s attitude toward Jews and Israel upon the succession of John XXIII to the papacy and the death of Tardini, gradually led Ireland to de jure recognition of Israel, a small step which was too little and much too late.

Conclusion 177 Once Ireland joined the United Nations, another factor was added to its considerations in avoiding full recognition of Israel. Being a small country, without military power in the era of the Cold War and tension between the blocs, Ireland strived to create for itself a standing beyond the status derived from its minor role in the international arena. Irish governments thus unequivocally supported UN principles and elected to follow an independent line reflected by Ireland’s avoidance of joining any of the blocs or groupings at the United Nations, so that it would be viewed as a third party that could contribute to advancing peace. This tendency was even stronger in the Fianna Fail governments (primarily that headed by de Valera) in which Aiken served as Minister for External Affairs and which strived to act in the United Nations as an autonomous, dynamic, and unbiased middle power. Due to this approach and set against the background of the Arab-Israel conflict and its impact on the struggle between the blocs, Ireland refused to promote full recognition, and establishing diplomatic relations with Israel so as not to offend the Arabs. On the other hand, it adopted a position that was convenient for Israel in its declarations and voting patterns in the United Nations. Yet at times it deviated from this balanced position in favor of the Arabs, in realistic cognizance of their many votes compared with Israel’s lone vote. Such asymmetry raises doubts whether Ireland’s concurrent refusal to recognize Arab states was indeed the result of a balanced policy toward both sides, or it was due to other reasons. The study showed that during Boland’s candidacy for presidency of the UN General Assembly, while Iveagh House was unresponsive to requests by Israeli representatives to advance normalization between the two states, Aiken and Boland indicated readiness, following Fawzi’s request, to establish a certain level of diplomatic relations with the UAR. Had it not been for the problem of allocating resources to this end, Ireland would have perhaps actually taken such a step. And indeed, budgetary problems, resistance of the public, and additional factors, such as the Irish narrow diplomatic horizons that resulted from a tradition of seclusion, personnel shortage in the diplomatic service and lack of attractive commercial interest, characterized Ireland’s policy on the issue of recognition and diplomatic relations with other countries, including the Arab states, and not only with Israel. These factors combined with the Vatican and Arab issues provided additional justification for not advancing full recognition of Israel and establishing diplomatic relations with it. Concurrently, notwithstanding Irish refusal, the Israeli Foreign Ministry persisted in its efforts to achieve full recognition by Ireland and make it a partner in its array of diplomatic relations. This approach was anchored primarily in an objective of Israel’s foreign policy, pursued ever since its founding, to achieve recognition from as many countries as possible and establish a diplomatic network on a scale much larger than customary for states of similar size. This objective was considered to be essential due to Israel’s security problems, the blockade imposed on it by its neighbors, the Arab boycott, and its difficult situation in the United Nations. In our case there is support for another motive. The Israeli assumption was that the road to the Vatican passed through the Catholic

178 Conclusion countries, including Ireland – a piously Catholic country with connections in the Vatican. On the face of it, MacBride’s proposal to mediate between the Vatican and Israel, and Ireland’s expectations upon joining the United Nations to fulfill some day a similar function in the matter of corpus separatum, supports this assumption. But in fact, here the dynamic was reversed. Instead of Ireland being the means enabling Israel to normalize its relations with the Vatican, Ireland obeyed the Vatican in refusing to recognize Israel. We needed to relate to the personal factor in the course of this study. A conclusion that arose from the discussion was that the friendly relations and empathy between Irish and Jewish personages halted at the informal level. Except for a few isolated cases, where there was some influence, these relations did not in fact affect Ireland’s policy in all matters related to recognition of Israel. It actually turned out that this issue belongs to relationships between states, with purposeful interests, political, and others, at the core of the decision. Even de Valera, Rabbi Herzog’s close friend, did not in any way meet Herzog’s expectations in rescuing Jews. This leads us to another question that had been raised regarding de Valera’s attitude to Jews and to the State of Israel, a question most difficult to answer unambiguously. Article 44 of the Constitution of Ireland is the proper testimony in de Valera’s favor. But even subjective impressions by Jewish Zionist personages and Israeli representatives who came in contact with him during the period dealt with here, presented a polarized picture: an admirer of the Jewish people and recognizing its rights to its own land, while on the other hand, a personality tainted by antiSemitism. Even documentary and research material available to us on the issue of rescue, does not permit a clear determination. De Valera’s door was always open to the heartrending appeals of Rabbi Herzog. Urged by him, de Valera activated the Irish diplomatic corps in the Vatican and the German Reich and its satellites. After the war de Valera made humanitarian gestures toward the Jewish refugees, but de Valera did not move worlds to rescue Jews, did not fight the “closed door” policy against the Jewish refugees, and Herzog indeed totally failed in his efforts to rescue Jews through Ireland. The study raises doubts regarding de Valera’s empathic replies to Herzog that he is doing his best, even though we should note, for the sake of balance, the murderous acts of the German Reich and the impassivity of the Vatican as significant factor when weighing the negative result. But when all is said and done, the disgraceful condolence visit on Hitler’s death must never be forgotten. It may be that de Valera was trapped in an internal contradiction regarding the Jews, Zionism, and Israel, rooted in his Catholic and cultural ethos. Even more so, the suffering of the Irish under the British enslaver, and their struggle to expel it from Ireland, influenced his identification with the Jewish suffering and with the Zionists who fought British rule. Israel – a small country with existential problems, yet with idealism and creative energy of early days, with its accomplishments and mainly for instilling its language – aroused his interest and impressed him, the head of a small young state facing acute problems. As opposed to this, that very same Irish suffering gave rise within him to empathy

Conclusion 179 toward the Palestinian refugees, which detracted greatly from his attitude to Israel. Possibly something of this complexity could have been also found in other Irish personages who had contacts with Zionist and Israeli leaders. Here we need to consider whether the typical Irish culture of hospitality and being attentive to others, did not at times serve as a mask that concealed the true position. The historical debate on de Valera’s complex, multifaceted personality, applies therefore also to his attitude toward Jews and Israel. On this issue as well, the last word has not yet been spoken. History is a fascinating narrative whose lessons arise not only from the study of past events themselves but also the manner in which these events shed light on current events. Anyone examining the parallel between the Irish conflict and the partition of the isle and the Jewish-Palestinian Arab conflict and the partition of Palestine from a time perspective of several decades, cannot ignore the tragic truth that this parallel entails. In Ireland, as well as in Palestine, the partition plan was not a means to resolve the conflict, but rather the opening of a door to many years of violence and bloodshed. “History is indeed little more than the register of the crimes, follies and misfortunes of mankind,” wrote Edward Gibbon, the historian. But the philosopher Yeshayahu Leibowitz, commented that it is the struggle of mankind against these that imbues history with significant values: “in a world where all problems have been solved and full harmony prevails . . . there is no room for struggles and efforts, and they are therefore of no value. In reality, their ‘value’ is in . . . the conflicts and differences against which humans struggle and over which they fight.”2 The political developments of recent years in the Irish isle as well as in Israel, offer an additional parallel between far-reaching peace schemes that have been adopted both in Northern Ireland and in Israel in the previous decade. Yet notwithstanding the differences, comparison of these schemes, ways of implementation and the difficulties facing them, will surely be the subject of future historical research. Moreover, unlike the Israelis and Palestinians who are still wallowing in the curse of these “interesting” times, and inasmuch as can be concluded from an initial glance, the solution of the conflict in Northern Ireland is a breakthrough, even though it still bleeds from time to time. This shard of light is the proper way to conclude our sad historical narrative.

Notes

Introduction 1 One of the six committees of the Assembly that addressed political issues such as mandates and minorities. 2 The succinct Hebrew term yishuv, referring to the organized Jewish-Zionist settlement in Palestine. 3 Palestine Royal Commission Report, presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Parliament by Command of His Majesty, July 1937, London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1937 (PRCR). 4 A synopsis of the address (not verbatim) designed for the Irish press, University College Dublin, Archives Department (UCDAD) Eamon de Valera papers, P150/2807, or: E. de Valera, Peace and War: Speeches by Mr. de Valera on International Affairs, Dublin: M. H. Gill, 1944, pp. 65–6. 5 Under the new constitution formulated by de Valera, approved by referendum on July 1, 1937, and in effect as of December 29 of the same year, the country’s name was changed from the Irish Free State to Éire in Irish, or Ireland in English. Although the constitution was republican in essence, the term “republic” does not appear in it. Ireland maintained its affiliation with the British Commonwealth until the spring of 1949, when the Republic of Ireland Act came into force. De Valera, whose title from the time he attained power in 1932 was President of the Executive Council, became, in accordance with the 1937 constitution, Prime Minister (Taoiseach in Irish). See: F. S. L. Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine, London: Fontana, 1985, pp. 518–19, 536–50. It is noteworthy that according to the Republic of Ireland Act, the appellation “Republic of Ireland” was the description but not the name of the state as defined in the 1937 constitution. See: J. M. Kelly, The Irish Constitution, 3rd edn, G. Hogan and G. Whyte (eds), Dublin: Butterworths, 1994, p. 24. 6 For more details on the history of the partition plan from the Peel Commission Report until the establishment of the State of Israel: T. G. Fraser, Partition in Ireland, India and Palestine: Theory and Practice, New York: St. Martin, 1984, pp. 130–91. 7 In the 1930s the Jewish community numbered less than 4,000. According to a 1946 and 1961 census, it numbered 3,907 and 3,255 respectively. See: D. Keogh, Jews in Twentieth-Century Ireland: Refugees, Anti-Semitism and the Holocaust, Cork: Cork University Press, 1998, pp. 92, 224. 8 A radical nationalistic movement formed in the course of 1917. It united in its ranks radical republicans who participated in the Easter Rising, more moderate nationalists from the original Sinn Féin of Arthur Griffith and radical elements of the old Home Rule Party. 9 IRA – Irish Republican Army, another name for the Irish Volunteers (who initiated the Easter Rising and continued the violence that led to the outbreak of the Anglo-Irish war), that has been their customary name since the establishment of the Dáil Éireann.

Notes 181

10 11

12

13 14 15

16

17

18

Despite the fact that there was a great deal of overlapping between the leaders of the IRA and Sinn Féin, and despite the fact that the IRA pledged allegiance to the government of the Dáil Éireann, the IRA never fully accepted its political control. T. G. Fraser, Partition in Ireland, India and Palestine, pp. 20–67. Lyons, Ireland since the Famine, pp. 538–9; Also see opening articles and Article 2 in the constitution: Kelly, Hogan and Whyte, The Irish Constitution, pp. 1, 10. It is noteworthy that in Article 3 of the constitution (ibid., p. 10) emphasis is placed on the declaratory character of Article 2, which determines that jurisdiction was limited to the 26 counties. Under the terms of the Good Friday Agreement of April 10, 1998, Articles 2 and 3 were amended to state that a united Ireland should only come about with the consent of a majority in Northern Ireland, but also to guarantee the people of Northern Ireland the right to be a part of the Irish Nation, and to Irish citizenship. De Valera’s 1938 and 1948 propaganda campaigns against partition are worthy of note, as well as Costello’s inter-party government, 1948–51. Also noteworthy are the words of Frank Aiken, the Irish Minister for External Affairs (1951–4, 1957–69) in an address delivered on June 5, 1961. The address dealt with the Irish position in the UN, and touched also on the partition: “We have consistently spoken and voted against . . . partition . . . we do not of course forget that the partition of Ireland and other countries are grave injustices.” The full text of the address (without mentioning the forum in which it was delivered) was sent by the Commonwealth desk at the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (CD), responsible for Irish affairs, to the office of Golda Meir, Israel’s Foreign Minister (1956–66) on July 6, 1961, Israel State Archives (ISA), FM, 3303/24. Such as the bombing campaign in Great Britain in January 1939, or the “border campaign” against Northern Ireland during 1956–62. Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine, pp. 533–6, 580–1, 752. In 1926 the Catholics constituted 92.6 percent of the Irish population; in 1936 – 93.4 percent in 1946 – 94.3 percent in 1961 – 94.9 percent. See: J. H. Whyte, Church and State in Modern Ireland 1923–1979, Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1980, p. 3. This includes: (1) The government headed by Cumann na nGaedheal (party of the Irish) (1923–32), that was based on supporters of the treaty; (2) Governments headed by Fianna Fáil (soldiers of Ireland) – (1932–48, 1951–4, 1957–69). This party was founded in 1926, made up of those who opposed the treaty with Sinn Fáil, led by de Valera, with the objective of integrating into the parliament. Its objectives of founding a united republican Ireland and make Irish the spoken language became over time theoretical ideals only. (3) The inter-party governments headed by the Fine Gael (Kindred of the Irish) party (1948–51, 1954–7). This party was founded in 1933 as a reaction to the victory of Fianna Fáil in the 1932 elections. It represented a moderate position on the national questions in the Cumann na nGaedheal tradition. The religious character is reflected in the opening and in additional articles such as: Article 41, Subarticle 3 – the prohibition of divorce (annulled in the amendment to the constitution of February 1997) and Article 44, Subarticle 2 – recognition of the special status of the Catholic Church (annulled in the 1972 amendment); See: Kelly, Hogan and Whyte, The Irish Constitution, pp. 1, 989, 1094; Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine, pp. 538, 539, 545–8, 686–8. . For more detail see: ibid., p. 689; S. M. Reamoinn, “The Religious Position,” in O. D. Edwards (ed.), Conor Cruise O’Brien Introduces Ireland, London: Andre Deutsch, 1969, pp. 67–9; Whyte, Church and State in Modern Ireland, pp. 352–4, 359–61. D. Keogh, Ireland and Europe 1919–1948, Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1988, p. 200; D. Keogh, Ireland and the Vatican, Cork: Cork University Press, 1995, pp. xv–xvi, 357–69.

182 Notes 19 Thus, for example, the historical link to Palestine, a central element in Jewish identity, is expressed in Israel’s Declaration of Independence. In the preface to the constitution of the Irish Republic there is also an expression of affinity to the Irish national forefathers hundreds of years earlier and their heroic struggle to restore Irish independence as part of the identity and culture of contemporary Ireland. A. Yakobson and A. Rubinstein, Israel and the Family of Nations: Jewish Nation-State and Human Rights Tel Aviv: Schocken, 2003, pp. 123–4 [Hebrew]. 20 A study by K. A. Miller, B. Boling and D. N. Doyle (“Emigrants and Exiles: Irish Cultures and Irish Emigration to North America 1790–1922,” Irish Historical Studies, 22, no. 86, 1980–1, pp. 98–9) shows that emigration was perceived by Irish emigrants as exile from Erin and as an enforced and agonized exile, similar to Israel’s exile from its land. See also discussion of the similarities in the book by Rabbi I. Jakobovits, Chief Rabbi of Ireland (1949–58): Journal of a Rabbi. New York: Living Books, 1966, pp. 63–4. 21 For example: (1) A study of the influence of the Catholic Church and Catholicism on Irish nationalism, and that of the Jewish religion on Zionism, against the background of the revolutionary-secular origin of both movements: Hedva Ben-Israel, “The Role of Religion in Nationalism: Some Comparative Remarks on Irish Nationalism and on Zionism,” in Ben-Israel, A. Goren, O. Handlin, M. Heyd, G. Mosse, and M. Zimmerman (eds), Religion, Ideology and Nationalism, Jerusalem: The Historical Society of Israel and Zalman Shazar Center, 1986, pp. 321–40. (2) A study of the political aspects of the partitions of Ireland and Palestine, within the frame of a comparison of three cases of partition against the backdrop of a national conflict: T. G. Fraser, Partition in Ireland, India and Palestine. (3) Collected articles based on an international seminar held by the Institute for Study of Language and Society, Aston University, Birmingham, United Kingdom, which dealt with a comparison between the success of the revival of Hebrew vs. the relative lack of success of revival of Irish. Despite long lasting efforts to cultivate the Irish language, English remains dominant as the spoken language of Ireland, and the chief language of its modern culture: Sue Wright (ed.), Language and the State: Revitalization and Revival in Israel and Eire, Clevedon: Multilingual Matters, 1996. 22 Rabbi Herzog’s letter to de Valera of October 14, 1937, Rabbi Herzog Archives – Jerusalem (HA). 23 Dáil Éireann Parliamentary Debates, July 5–21, 1949, vol. 117, cols 865–7. MacBride repeated this idea in a letter to Moshe Sharett, the Minister of Foreign Affairs (1948–56), June 15, 1950, ISA, FM, 38/9. Further on MacBride’s address, see Chapter 4. 24 Hedva Ben-Israel, “The Role of Religion in Nationalism . . . ,” in Ben Israel, Goren, Handlin, Heyd, Mosse, Zimmerman, Religion, Ideology and Nationalism, pp. 336–7. 25 R. Kee, The Laurel and the Ivy: The Story of Charles Stewart Parnell and the Irish Nationalism, London: Penguin, 1994, p. 32. It may well be that F. Parnell’s use of Massada is connected to the inauguration of the site by the Americans in 1838 after hundreds of years of oblivion, and to the visit of the English painter (Tipping) in 1842, who left his precise paintings. 26 On the Massada myth and its place in the revival of Hebrew, see: Anita Shapira, Land and Power, Tel Aviv: Am-Oved, 1992, pp. 421–9, 430–1 [Hebrew]. 27 J. Patai (ed.), The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl, vol. 1, New York and London: Herzl and Thomas Yosseloff, 1960, p. 248. 28 A. Elon, Herzl, Tel Aviv: Am-Oved, 1979, pp. 420–1 [Hebrew]. 29 C. C. O’Brien, Memoir: My Life and Themes, London: Profile Books, 1999, p. 382. 30 On the mythological aspect of Parnell’s personality, see: Kee, The Laurel and the Ivy, pp. 13, 289. 31 R. Briscoe, For the Life of Me, Boston, MA, and Toronto: Little Brown and Company, 1958, p. 264. See also Chapter 1. IZL (or Irgun), the Hebrew acronym of Irgun Zevai

Notes 183

32 33 34

35 36

37

38

39 40

Le’umi, which means National Military Organization. Betar: Hebrew acronym of Berit Trumpeldor – an activist Zionist youth movement whose members constituted most of the rank and file of the NZO. Lehi (or Stern Group) is the Hebrew acronym of Lohamei Herut Yisrael, which means the Fighters for the Freedom of Israel. See the IZL and Lehi rhetoric on the matter: J. Heller, Lehi: Ideology and Politics, 1940–1949, vols 1, 2, Jerusalem: Keter, 1989, pp. 101, 102, 119, 122, 136, 147, 155, 175, 178, 181, 187, 188, 190, 191, 198, 219, 220, 327 [Hebrew]. From a declaration made by Haviv before a British military court that sentenced him to death for his participation in the break into the Acre jail. See: M. Begin, The Rebellion: The Memoirs of the Commander of the IZL in Palestine, Tel Aviv: Achiasaf, 1984, pp. 498–9 [Hebrew]. The information cited in this note appears in the Hebrew edition of the book only and was not included in the English edition [SE]. Y. Markovitzky, “The Rebellion: Continued Attrition Attacks which Undermined the Mandate,” Ha-umma, 41, no. 154, December 2003, pp. 46–7 [Hebrew]. Such as a letter of condolence from the South Dublin Fianna Fáil party to Briscoe, the community and the Dublin synagogues; an elegy written by L. J. O’Casey, an active member of Sinn Féin in which he compared Gruner to Barry. To view the letter, Briscoe’s correspondence with the Jewish community and synagogues, and O’Casey–Briscoe correspondence, April 1947, see: National Library of Ireland, Briscoe Papers. The paper reflected Anglo-Irish Protestants and liberal Catholics with leftist proclivities. An editorial on April 17, 1947 integrated condemnation of the IZL as a parallel to the IRA, yet expressed understanding of the motivation for its struggle, that is, locking the gates of Palestine before the Holocaust survivors, as well as criticism of Great Britain for not learning anything from the Irish experience. The article claimed that while the scaffolds had been erected lawfully, their actual use was a political error, which should have been absorbed from the Irish lesson of the vicious cycle of violence. Another editorial in the same spirit was written on July 30, 1947, the day after three IZL members, Haviv, Weiss, and Nakar, were hanged. After they were sentenced on June 16, 1947, the IZL kidnapped two British sergeants as hostages, and threatened to execute them if their men were hanged. The article, written before the threat was carried out on July 30, assumed that it would be carried out, based on the fanaticism that the article attributed to the IZL. The conclusion was that these problems cannot be resolved by force but by implementing a sober policy, of the sort that led to the cease-fire in Ireland in the summer of 1921. Max, William Nurock’s son, who was one of the dignitaries of the Jewish community and a leader of the Zionist movement in Dublin – was a summa cum laude graduate of Trinity College who also served as the secretary of Herbert Samuel, the first British High Commissioner in Palestine. Keogh, Jews in Twentieth-Century Ireland, pp. 67–8. Testimony to this were his letters to Rabbi Herzog and Judge Huge Kennedy, of the Irish Supreme Court, December 17, 1934, ISA, 581/52/68. P. Wylie, “ ‘The Virtual Minimum’: Ireland’s decision for de facto recognition of Israel 1947–9,” in M. Kennedy and J. M. Skelly (eds), Irish Foreign Policy 1919–1966: From Independence to Internationalism, Dublin: Four Courts, 2000, pp. 137–54.

1 From partition to partition 1 “Palestine and the Jews,” Irish Independent, May 19, 1937. 2 “Conflict in Palestine,” Irish Independent, December 9, 1947. 3 Y. Katz, Partner to Partition: The Jewish Agency’s Partition Plan in the Mandate Era, London: Frank Cass, 1998, pp. 4–5, 9–10.

184 Notes 4 UN General Assembly Resolution 181 (II), November 29, 1947, United Nations Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly Resolutions September 16–November 29, 1947, New York: n.d., pp. 131–50. 5 See the closing address of British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden at the 98th session of the Council of the League of Nations: League of Nations Official Journal, September 14, 1937, pp. 899, 900–2. 6 M. Kennedy, Ireland and the League of Nations 1919–1946, Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1996, pp. 13–14, 147–9, 162–71, 204–5, 222–4, 256–7; D. McMahon, Republicans and Imperialists: Anglo Irish Relations in the 1930s, New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1984, p. 83. 7 Memorandum from the Irish delegation in Geneva to the Department of External Affairs in Dublin, August 16, 1937, National Archives, Ireland (NAI ), DFA, 126/37. 8 Keogh, Ireland and Europe, p. 61. 9 Rynne to Cremins, August 19, 1937, NAI, DFA, 126/37. 10 MacMahon, Republicans and Imperialists, p. 25. 11 Briscoe, For the Life of Me, p. 264. 12 See Chapter 4. See also Nolan’s version: A. Nolan, Joseph Walshe and the Management of Irish Foreign Policy, 1922–1946: A Study in Diplomatic and Administrative History, PhD thesis, National University of Ireland, University College, Cork, October 1997, pp. 94–6. 13 See copy of the letter sent by the Irish Department of External Affairs to the permanent delegate in Geneva, August 31, 1937, NAI, DFA, 126/37. 14 Rynne to Cremins, August 19, 1937; Hearne, Geneva, to the Department of External Affairs, Dublin, September 13, 1937, ibid. 15 This data emerges from an account provided by Zelig Brodetsky, a member of the Jewish Agency Executive in London, reporting on his meeting with de Valera in Dublin on December 20, 1937, Central Zionist Archive (CZA) S25/6579. According to Brodetsky, de Valera had mentioned the meeting with the Zionist side. Briscoe, who was present at Brodetsky’s meeting with de Valera, added that the Zionist delegate had failed to show up, and Brodetsky felt obliged to apologize. 16 Report about our Activities in Geneva in connection with the Meeting of the Council and the Assembly of the League of Nations, September 29, 1937, CZA Z4/17118. 17 The classification is Goldmann’s, ibid. 18 For example, they claimed New Jerusalem and the Negev plateau for the Jewish state, and stressed the necessity of giving the Jews a stronghold in the mountains. See for the sake of comparison, the summary of the official Zionist stance as represented in the majority opinion draft resolution at the Twentieth Zionist Congress, which was eventually endorsed: The Twentieth Zionist Congress and the 5th session of the Agency’s Council, Zurich, August 3–21, 1937, stenographic report, Jerusalem: Zionist Organization Executive and Jewish Agency Executive. n.d., pp. 201–4 [Hebrew]. 19 UCDAD Papers of Eamon de Valera, P150/2807. 20 Report about our Activities in Geneva, September 29, 1937, CZA, Z4/17118. 21 A census that was held in the Irish Free State in 1936 indicated that the Catholic population numbered 2,773,920, while the rest of the population totaled 194,500. Ergo, less the 4,000 Jewish residents, the number of Protestants was about 190,000. See: Census of Population, vol. 3, Part 1 – Religions, Dublin: Stationery Office, 1939, p. 3. 22 The notes are not dated, but the contents indicate that they were composed the day after the address of the Iraqi Foreign Minister at the League of Nations on September 20, 1937. For the notes, see: UCDAD Eamon de Valera papers, P150/2807. 23 Compare Articles 11 (on the Jerusalem enclave) and 14 (on Nazareth and the Sea of Galilee), PRCR chapter 22. 24 For the Vatican’s letter, see: PRO, FO, 371 20811 E4639; A. Kreutz, Vatican Policy in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: The Struggle for the Holy Land, New York: Greenwood,

Notes 185

25

26 27 28

29 30 31 32 33 34

35 36

37 38

39

40 41 42

1990, pp. 63–5. It should be noted that in 1937 the Arab population in Palestine numbered about one million, the Jewish population about 400,000, and the Christian community about 100,000. See: PRCR, chapter 14, Article 1; chapter 20, Article 5. On the guarantees for the protection of minorities, see: PRCR, chapter 22, Article 8. S. I. Minerbi, The Vatican, The Holy Land and Zionism: 1895–1925, Jerusalem: Yad Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, 1985, pp. 115–236 [Hebrew]. N. Ben-Horin, “The Vatican and Israel in the Maze of Theology, Religious and Political Interests,” in M. Yegar, Y. Govrin, and A. Oded (eds), Ministry for Foreign Affairs: The First Fifty Years, vol. 2, Jerusalem: Keter, 2002, p. 994 [Hebrew]. The Vatican was also averse to an Arab state with a Muslim majority, which would not guarantee the protection of Christian interests. Kreutz, Vatican Policy in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict, pp. 45–62. See the letter from the British delegation at the Vatican to Anthony Eden, August 4, 1937: PRO, FO, 371 20811 E4639. In this speech, de Valera – speaking for millions of Catholics – denounced Soviet atheism and demanded guarantees for freedom of religion in the USSR. See: M. Moynihan (ed.), Speeches and Statements by Eamon de Valera 1917–73, Dublin and New York: Gill and Macmillan, 1980, pp. 259–60. Whyte, Church and State in Modern Ireland, pp. 53–61; D. Keogh, Ireland and the Vatican, pp. 93–141. The Twentieth Zionist Congress, pp. 201–2, 205–6, 218, 359–60. This interpretation emerges from the remarks made by Shertok at the meeting of the Smaller Zionist Actions Committee on November 3, 1937, CZA, S5/306. See the remarks made by Menahem Ussishkin, President of the Zionist Actions Committee, ibid. See the comments by Rabbi Meir Berlin, President of the World Mizrahi Movement, ibid. J. Bowman, De Valera and the Ulster Question 1917–1973, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982, pp. 44, 65–8, 75, 143; T. R. Dwyer, “Eamon de Valera and the Partition Question,” in J. P. O’Carroll and J. A. Murphy (eds), de Valera and His Times, Cork: Cork University Press, 1986, pp. 74–91. Dwyer, “Eamon de Valera and the Partition Question,” in O’Carroll, Murphy, de Valera and His Time, pp. 74–5. A federation is a sovereign state comprising autonomous political units that draw their authority from a single political center. A confederacy is an alliance between sovereign states, which is based on the assumption that they will continue to exist as such. It could be that de Valera adopted the term “confederacy” because that is in the Swiss model, or could be that he simply confused the two legal terms. Dwyer, “Eamon de Valera and the Partition Question,” in O’Carroll, Murphy, de Valera and His Times, pp. 81, 85; Bowman, De Valera and the Ulster Question, pp. 186–8, 262–3. Like removing the oath of allegiance to the British Crown from the constitution in 1933, terminating the office of the Governor General in 1937, and the fight to stop the land annuity payments to the British government of the 63.5-year loan given to Irish tenants for the reclamation of their land, under the Land Acts enacted by the British Parliament after 1887. According to this agreement that resolved the fight to stop the land annuity payments, a lump sum payment replaced the 63.5-year arrangement, and Ireland was given back the ports of Berehaven, Lough Swilly, and Cobh, which in 1921 were handed over to the British Navy. McMahon, Republicans and Imperialists, pp. 156–7; Dwyer, “Eamon de Valera and the Partition Question,” in O’Carroll, Murphy, de Valera and His Times, pp. 74–6, 78–85. See the letter: PRO, Cab 24/271. Lyons, Ireland since the Famine, pp. 550–4, 593.

186 Notes 43 As Lloyd George said, it is as hard to understand de Valera as it is to catch mercury with a fork. See: McMahon, Republicans and Imperialists, p. 30. 44 Ibid., pp. 158–61, 223. 45 Ibid., pp. 165–8, 177. 46 Note 38 in this chapter. 47 See Ormsby-Gore’s parliamentary address of July 21, 1937, and the Parliament resolution: Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 326, London: 1937, cols 2247, 2637. 48 Closing address of British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden at the 98th session of the Council of the League of Nations: League of Nations Official Journal, September 14, 1937, pp. 899, 900–2. 49 Shertok, who attended the meetings of the Sixth Committee, said that de Valera did not leave the room even for a second. M. Sharett, Making of Policy – The Diaries of Moshe Sharett, vol. 2, Tel Aviv: Am-Oved, 1971, p. 337 [Hebrew]. 50 Macdonald’s report to the Cabinet of his talks with Dulanty, the Irish High Commissioner (a title given as of 1931 to any ambassador of one sovereign member of the Commonwealth of Nations in the country of another) in London, December 20, 1937, PRO, Cab 24/273. 51 “Palestine and the Jews,” Irish Independent, May 19, 1937. 52 “Matters of Moment,” Irish Independent, July 9, 1937. 53 “Partition of Palestine,” The Cross, August 1937. 54 “Arab against Jew,” The Cross, July 1936. 55 “Palestine,” Irish Independent, January 10, 1939. 56 “Matters of Moment,” Irish Independent, July 9, 1937. 57 “Palestine Imbroglio,” Irish Press, July 10, 1937. 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid.; “Matters of Moment,” Irish Independent, July 9, 1937. 60 Sarona, which bordered on Tel Aviv, Wilhelma near Lod, Beit Lehem Haglilit, in the Galilee, and the Templar residences in Haifa and near Acre. The Templar neighborhood in Jaffa was intended to be part of the Arab state, and that in Jerusalem was to be controlled by the new mandate. 61 “Partition,” Standard, July 16, 1937. 62 D. Israeli, The Palestine Problem in German Politics, Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 1974, pp. 161–2, 179–83 [Hebrew]. 63 “Mr. De Valera Protests against Palestine Partition,” Irish Press, September 24, 1937. 64 “Matters of Moment,” Irish Independent, September 21, 1937. 65 On the British government’s resolution in this context, see: Katz, Partner to Partition, p. 14. 66 Ibid., p. 176. 67 “Partition in Palestine,” Irish Times, January 7, 1938. Although the paper sided with de Valera in his rejection of the partition plan, it spared no criticism of de Valera’s dogmatic policy in regard to Northern Ireland, which eliminated any chance of uniting the island. See: “Irish Unity,” ibid., October 23, 1937. 68 “Palestine Pickle – Partition is Britain’s Unnatural Solution,” Irish Catholic, October 7, 1937. 69 See: PRCR, chapter 22, Articles 17, 22. 70 See: The Twentieth Zionist Congress and the 5th session of the Agency’s Council, pp. 71, 110; Sharett, Making of Policy, vol. 2, pp. 258, 265. 71 L. Kennedy, People and Population Change, Dublin: Co-Operation North, 1994, p. 9. 72 Compare Note 21 in this chapter. 73 On the rationale of the Zionist proponents of partition, see: Y. Katz, Partner to Partition, pp. 18–19. 74 See A. Shapira, “Time Perception as a Factor in the Partition Controversy of 1937,” in M. Avizohar and I. Friedman (eds), Studies in the Palestine Partition Plans

Notes 187

75 76 77 78 79 80

81 82 83

84 85 86 87 88 89

90 91

92 93 94

95 96

1937–1947, Sde-Boqer: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, 1984, pp. 21–39 [Hebrew]. Sharett, Making of Policy, p. 337. Bowman, “Eamon de Valera: Seven Lives,” in O’Carroll, Murphy, De Valera and His Times, pp. 182–8. N. Feinberg, The Jewish Campaign Against Hitler at the League of Nations: Bernheim’s Petition, Jerusalem: Bialik, 1957 [Hebrew]. Keogh, Jews in Twentieth-Century Ireland, p. 91, and compare: Feinberg, The Jewish Campaign, p. 66. Ibid., pp. 66–7. Ibid., p. 83. For more on Lester’s activity regarding Bernheim’s petition, and Ireland’s reputation among Jews, as a supporter of minority groups, which was created as a result of the petition, see: Katrina Goldstone, “ ‘Benevolent Helpfulness’? Ireland and the International Reaction to Jewish Refugees, 1933–9,” in Kennedy, Skelly, Irish Foreign Policy, pp. 119, 120–1. Feinberg, The Jewish campaign, pp. 30, 46. Brodetsky’s summary of the meeting, December 20, 1937, CZA, S25/6579. Being affiliated with the religious Zionists, Herzog was against partition, but as a Halachic scholar he leaned toward the view that was prevalent in non-Zionist orthodox circles, according to which relinquishing parts of the Land of Israel is not prohibited by Jewish Law. See: Shulamit Eliash, “The Religious Zionist and AntiZionist Attitudes Regarding the Partition Plan,” in Avizohar and Friedman, Studies in the Palestine Partition Plans, pp. 55–67. Y. Gelber, Independence Versus Nakba, Or Yehuda: Dvir, 2004, pp. 16–17 [Hebrew]. Copy of Herzog’s letter to de Valera, October 14, 1937, HA. The friendship and mutual respect between the two is dealt with extensively in the following chapter. As conveyed to the author by his son, Joe Briscoe, on August 8, 2002. Briscoe to Herzog, November 2, 1937, HA. For a copy of the letter see CZA, J1/7628. As of the summer of 1917 he was fully immersed in revolutionary activities. At first, he joined Fianna Éireann – a nationalist youth organization, which was connected to the Irish Volunteers and the IRA. At the beginning of 1920 he was seconded to the IRA General Headquarters, and left for Germany on a mission for M. Collins. There he purchased arms which were held by clandestine German organizations comprising former naval and army officers. Briscoe, For the Life of Me, pp. 51–64, 77– 83. Briscoe’s suggestion indicates he had a confederative rather than a federative solution in mind. Jabotinsky abandoned the idea of a regional confederacy in 1923, but shortly before his death readopted the federative concept as the basis for a state with a Jewish majority on both sides of the Jordan River. See: Y. Gorni, Policy and Imagination: Federal Ideas in the Zionist Political Thought 1917–1948, Jerusalem: Yad Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, 1993, pp. 17–23, 71–5 [Hebrew]. D. Ben-Gurion, Meetings with Arab Leaders, Tel Aviv: Am-Oved, 1967, pp. 155–7 [Hebrew]; Sharett, Making of Policy, pp. 431–3; S. Dothan, The Struggle for Eretz-Isrel, Tel Aviv: Israeli Ministry of Defense, 1981, pp. 157–61 [Hebrew]. Sharett, Making of Policy, pp. 432–3. Ben-Gurion, Meetings with Arab Leaders, pp. 162–7. See Jabotinsky’s address to the NZO convention in Prague in February 1938, regarding the Revisionists’ plan for Jewish immigration to and settlement of Palestine in the decade to follow: Z. Jabotinsky, Speeches 1927–1940, Jerusalem: Eri Jabotinsky, 1948, p. 300 [Hebrew]. See Note 91, in this chapter. Cohen’s draft letter to de Valera, n.d., CZA, S25/3798.

188 Notes 97 De Valera was a gifted mathematician and before he entered the political sphere he taught mathematics in high schools and institutes of higher education in Ireland. Brodetsky was a professor of mathematics at Leeds University from 1920. 98 Brodetsky’s summary of the meeting, December 20, 1937, CZA, S25/6579. 99 Briscoe, For the Life of Me, pp. 266–7. 100 Ibid., pp. 264, 302. 101 In his 1938 visit to Dublin, Jabotinsky also met the papal nuncio to Dublin, Paschal Robinson, whom he had already met before, when in 1925 he was appointed apostolic visitor to Palestine. Naturally, the two men discussed the holy sites in Palestine. For an account of this conversation see the letter sent by the head of the NZO’s political department, Benjamin Aktzin, to Briscoe, February 24, 1938, JA, P/5/5253. Jabotinsky also met with J. Walshe to discuss a matter near and dear to them both: the revival of Hebrew and the Irish language. For more details, see: the undated handwritten notes Jabotinsky had made on letterhead of the Shelbourne Hotel, where he was staying in Dublin, JA, A1/4/40. 102 “A Jewish Visitor,” Irish Times, January 8, 1938. 103 S. Katz, Lone Wolf: A Biography of Vladimir ( Ze’ev) Jabotinsky, vol. 2, New York: Barricade Books, 1996, pp. 1597–605. 104 Jabotinsky’s opening address at the NZO Prague convention, Jabotinsky, Speeches, p. 292. 105 Ben-Zvi to Brodetsky, January 14, 1938, CZA, J1/7628. 106 The meeting was also attended by Eliyahu Ben-Horin of the Presidium of the NZO, who accompanied Jabotinsky in this visit, and Dr Leonard Abrahamson, a reputable Dublin physician who led the recently-established chapter of the NZO in Ireland. See: “Jewish Tribute to Ireland,” The Irish Press, January 12, 1938. 107 Briscoe, For the Life of Me, pp. 264–5. 108 Katz, Lone Wolf, p. 1598. 109 Lyons, Ireland since the Famine, pp. 448–9, 518–22, 563. 110 On Briscoe’s mission to Poland and the United States before the war, see: Note 119 in this chapter; Chapter 4. On his mission to South Africa at the beginning of the war see, Briscoe, For the Life of Me, pp. 277–81. 111 This emerges from Jabotinsky’s letter to Briscoe, February 26, 1939, JA, P/253/5. 112 “Jewish Leader’s Visit,” Irish Independent, January 12, 1938. 113 For the interview with Jabotinsky, see: “Against Palestine’s Partition,” Irish Press, January 11, 1938. 114 Briscoe, For the Life of Me, p. 264. On Fianna Éireann, see: Note 89 in this chapter. 115 Briscoe was not unequivocal about this because there was at least one other Jew, Michael Noyk, a Dublin solicitor who was affiliated with the IRA. An admirer and confidant of M. Collins, Noyk assisted mainly with the legal defense of Sinn Fein prisoners between 1919 and 1921. See: Keogh, Jews in Twentieth-Century Ireland, pp. 72–3, 262. 116 Briscoe, For the Life of Me, p. 264. 117 Ibid., p. 265. 118 Jabotinsky’s opening address at the NZO Prague convention, Jabotinsky, Speeches, p. 296. 119 This involvement is reflected in Briscoe’s letter to Abraham Abrahams – a member of NZO Presidium – November 24, 1938 (JA, P 253/3). Briscoe wrote: “. . . I had a very lengthy conversation with Mr De Valera, and I am very happy at the attitude he is now taking and I feel that when he is required he will be beyond our expectations. I cannot afford to take the risk of reducing to writing the conversation, but I will report when I am again in London when I am sure your [our] organization will be quite happy at the result of the discussion.” The letter included matters that are better kept secret. Probably, according to the timing, the letter relates to Briscoe’s mission to Poland on behalf of Jabotinsky during December 1938, in the shadow of the imminent war.

Notes 189

120

121 122

123 124 125 126

127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136

Briscoe, who wrote about it in his book (For the Life of Me, pp. 267–70) met with Colonel Joseph Beck, Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs in Warsaw. It may well be that de Valera was involved in arranging the meeting. Briscoe proposed to Beck a plan designed to save the Polish Jews: Poland would demand that Britain transfer the mandate for Palestine in exchange for a treaty with Britain which was on the agenda at the time, in order to enable Poland to rid itself of millions of its Jews by mass immigration to Palestine. Needless to say the chances of implementing the plan were minimal. Briscoe was impressed by Beck’s interest, but he understood that the plan was doomed to failure, inter alia, because of the brevity of time and the opposition of the anti-Zionist rabbinical leadership in Poland. Reference to Briscoe’s meetings with representatives of the Polish Foreign Ministry and the Jewish community, based on general reports in the Polish press, can also be found in a letter from H. Kennrad of the British Embassy in Warsaw to the British Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax, December 28, 1938, PRO, FO, 371 22541. In his article, “Jabotinsky ‘The Father of the Revolt’: An Examination of its History and Function in the Historical Tradition of Revisionism, Etzel and Herut,” in S. Ettinger, Y. D. Gilat, and S. Safrai (eds), Millet – Everyman’s University Studies in Jewish History and Culture, vol. 2, Tel Aviv: Everyman’s University Press, 1985, pp. 387–407 [Hebrew]. Ibid., p. 397. Testimonies such as Jabotinsky’s conversation in July 1939 with his son Eri, who coordinated Betar’s illegal immigration to Palestine, about the possibility that Jabotinsky himself would head the landing from the sea of thousands of Betar’s armed members who would be trained on European soil; Jabotinsky’s order from the end of 1939 to Etzel headquarters in Tel Aviv to examine the possibility of implementing an armed invasion plan via the sea, and a 24-hour military revolt in order to conquer strategic installations and government buildings. Ibid., p. 402. For further details, see: Katz, Partner to Partition, pp. 179–86. There were a few marginal organizations that rejected the partition plan altogether, such as elements of and those affiliated with Lehi. For further details on the opinions in the Yishuv, see: Dothan, The Struggle for Eretz-Israel, pp. 381–88. For further details see: Bowman, De Valera and the Ulster Question 1917–1973, pp. 207–66; Dwyer, “Eamon de Valera and the Partition Question,” in O’Carroll, Murphy, de Valera and His Time, p. 86. Of the population of 205,512 that according to the UN resolution was to live in the Jerusalem enclave, 44,850 were Christian, as were 46,340 of the 726,970 residents of the would-be Arab state and 53,870 of the 897,980 residents of the planned population of the Jewish state. See: Kreutz, Vatican Policy in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict, p. 94. For further detail, see ibid., pp. 87–94; S. Ferrari, “The Vatican, Israel and the Jerusalem Question, 1943–1984,” Middle East Studies, 39, no. 2, Spring 1985, pp. 316–19. “Conflict in Palestine,” Irish Independent, December 9, 1947. “Only One Solution,” Irish Press, December 15, 1947. For a discussion of the distinction between these nuances, see: S. Waterman, “Partitioned States,” Political Geography Quarterly, 6, no. 2, April 1987, pp. 153–4. For further detail, see: Fraser, Partition in Ireland, India and Palestine, pp. 8–129. “UNO’s Decision,” Irish Times, December 2, 1947; “Test for UNO,” Irish Times, December 12, 1947. “Christian between Two Fires,” Standard, December 12, 1947. “Partition of Palestine Unworkable,” Standard, January 2, 1948. “The Arab Attitude,” The Cross, March 1948. “The Partition Plan,” The Cross, June 1948. The statistics quoted by The Cross are supported in a UNSCOP plan, according to which the proposed Jewish State would contain 498,000 Jews and 407,000 Arabs. See: Fraser, Partition in Ireland, India and Palestine, p. 177.

190 Notes 2 Rabbi Herzog, de Valera, and Jewish rescue 1 Keogh, Jews in Twentieth-Century Ireland, pp. 112–13. 2 Rabbi Herzog studied oriental languages at the Sorbonne and classics and mathematics at the University of London, where he also obtained his doctoral degree in marine biology with a dissertation about royal purple and the Biblical blue. Rabbi Herzog spoke Arabic, English, French, German, Polish, and Spanish – apart from his knowledge of Greek and Latin. See: Geulah Bat Yehudah, “Yitzhak Isaac Halevy Herzog,” in L. Jung (ed.), Men of the Spirit, New York: Kymson, 1964, pp. 127; C. Herzog, Living History: A Memoir, New York: Pantheon Books, 1996, p. 7. 3 Rabbi Herzog made a comment in this vein in his meeting with the High Commissioner in Palestine, Alan Cunningham (1945–8), February 1, 1947, CZA, S25/5647. 4 Keogh, Jews in Twentieth-Century Ireland, p. 77. 5 Herzog, Living History, p. 12. 6 His talk at the assembly of the yishuv, July 10, 1938, CZA, J1/ 7238. 7 J. Maybaum, “Suffering and Punishment,” Jewish Chronicle, July 18, 1947; Shulamit Eliash, “The Chief Rabbinate, Terrorism and the Revisionists,” in H. Genizi (ed.), Religion and Resistance in Mandatory Palestine, Tel Aviv: Moreshet, n.d., pp. 116–17 [Hebrew]. 8 The Jewish population in the 26 counties (that later became the Irish Free State) numbered 3,805 in 1911 and 3,686 in 1926; Keogh, Jews in Twentieth-Century Ireland, p. 9. 9 The Cumann na nGaedheal Party led by President of the Executive Council, William T. Cosgrave. 10 Herzog, Living History, p. 15; Keogh, Jews in Twentieth-Century Ireland, p. 109. 11 Ibid., p. 95; Whyte, Church and State in Modern Ireland, pp. 40, 53–6. 12 This emerges from his paper: “Legislation and Law,” in A. Y. Goldratt and S. Daniel (eds), The Book of Religion in Israel, vol. 1, Tel Aviv: Hasbara, 1954, p. 5 [Hebrew]. 13 As indicated in an undated conversation J Herzog had with de Valera when he was Taoiseach. It appears that this relates to a conversation that took place when J. Herzog visited Dublin in September 1957. See Chapter 4. Herzog, a bright, educated diplomat with extensive knowledge in Jewish studies, was asked by de Valera about the meaning of the hereafter in Judaism. Herzog explained the difference, as he understood it, compared to the Christian perception: “Judaism makes no distinction between life before and after death; good deeds in this life give one the sense of life eternal; the distinction exists purely in the human mind, because the body dies in this world, while in terms of eternity the soul is everlasting. The difference between Judaism and Christianity is therefore that Judaism emphasizes this world, not only as a corridor leading to the main hall, but rather as the hall itself . . . ” See: M. Bar-Zohar, The Life and Times of a Jewish Prince: A Biography of Yaacov Herzog, Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth, 2003, p. 249 [Hebrew]. The fact that this question must have been on de Valera’s mind, offers insight into his spiritual world. 14 On their mathematical education, see: Note 97, Chapter 1; Note 2 in this chapter. 15 These emerge from: 1. Cohen’s report of his visit to Dublin, July 1960; 2. Cohen’s letter to M. Nurock, July, 21, 1960, ISA, FM, 3303/26. 16 As conveyed to the author in an interview, March 4, 1999. 17 The text was delivered through R. Briscoe, who had close ties with both men. See Briscoe’s letter to Rabbi Herzog, November 2, 1937, HA. 18 Keogh, Jews in Twentieth-Century Ireland, p. 110. 19 J. J. Lee, Ireland 1912–1985: Politics and Society, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 203. 20 See Note 39 Chapter 1.

Notes 191 21 A draft of Herzog’s letter to de Valera, undated, HA. The date of the final letter – April 29 – is indicated in de Valera’s response, June 1, 1938, and signed by his personal secretary, HA. 22 Shulamit Eliash, “The ‘Rescue’ Policy of the Chief Rabbinate of Palestine Before and During World War II,” Modern Judaism, 3, no. 3, 1983, pp. 293–4. 23 Keogh, Jews in Twentieth-Century Ireland, p. 92. 24 Ibid., p. 91; Goldstone, “ ‘Benevolent Helpfulness’?,” in Kennedy and Skelly, Irish Foreign Policy, pp. 119–21. 25 Keogh, Jews in Twentieth-Century Ireland, p. 113. 26 Ibid., p. 113. 27 Ibid., p. 26. 28 Jewish immigration from 1881 to 1926 totaled about 2,500. Ibid., pp. 8–9. 29 M. O’Riordan, “Anti-Semitism in Irish Politics,” The Irish Jewish Year book, 34, 1985, pp. 15–27. On Griffith’s support for Creagh, see: L. Hyman, The Jews in Ireland from Earliest Times to the Year 1910, Shanon: Irish University Press, 1972, pp. 212–13. In his book, Jews in Twentieth-Century Ireland, p. 56, Keogh hypothesizes that Griffith may have later on modified his views. 30 Keogh, Jews in Twentieth-Century Ireland, pp. 79–83, 91. 31 For figures, see Notes 8 and 28 in this chapter. 32 “The Jewish Invasion,” Irish Rosary, April 1927. 33 The Irish Catholic, April 23, 1927. 34 Herzog’s letter to Byrne, April 28, 1927, Dublin Diocesan Archives (DDA), Byrne Papers. 35 The Holy Ghost Fathers is an important order that sends missionaries throughout the world and operates some of the most esteemed high schools in Ireland. Whyte, Church and State in Modern Ireland, pp. 72–3. 36 Keogh, Jews in Twentieth-Century Ireland, pp. 92–5; Mary C. Athans, The CoughlinFahey Connection: Father Charles E. Coughlin, Father Denis Fahey and Religious Anti-Semitism in the United States, New York: P. Lang, 1991, pp. 47–50, 71–91. 37 For example: “A Letter from the Chief Rabbi to the Editor of the Cross,” The Cross, July 1934. With detailed arguments, Herzog refuted the false allegations made in The Cross about an alleged intimate link between Judaism and communism. Herzog explained that the first social theorists were not Jewish; Marx was born a Jew, but had been baptized into Christianity and never had any association with the Jewish community, while Engels was born and died a Christian. Persecution may have caused Jews to support socialism and communism, but their contribution to these movements should not be overrated. He rejected the concept of international Jewish capitalism as nonsense, pointing to the contradiction between this accusation and the one that charged Jews with leading the communist movement. Herzog’s letter prompted a reply from the editor in the same issue of The Cross, which carried on the incitement. Previously, on May 28, 1934, Herzog sent Byrne a copy of his letter to The Cross (DDA, Byrne Papers), asking him to stop the incitement. There is no documentation to indicate how Byrne responded. 38 On Belton’s attack at the Dublin County Health Committee see Irish Independent, December 16, 1936. In a letter to Byrne, January 1, 1937 (DDA, Byrne Papers), Herzog tried to alert the general public so that it would not get carried away by the incitement. See also Keogh, Jews in Twentieth-Century Ireland, pp. 91, 107–8. 39 Ibid., p. 96. On the Blueshirts see: M. Cronin, “The Blueshirt Movement, 1932–5; Ireland’s Fascists?,” Journal of Contemporary History, 30, no. 2, 1995, pp. 311–32. 40 Keogh, Jews in Twentieth-Century Ireland, pp. 105–7, 148–50. 41 Ibid., pp. 99–103, 129, 131–6; A. Roth, Mr Bewley in Berlin: Aspects of the Career of an Irish Diplomat, 1933–1939, Dublin: Four Courts, 2000. 42 Keogh, Jews in Twentieth-Century Ireland, pp. 166–70.

192 Notes 43 44 45 46 47

48

49 50

51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68

Walshe’s letter to Boland, October 17, 1946, NAI, DFA, 20/56. Wylie, “ ‘The Virtual Minimum’,” in Kennedy, Skelly, Irish Foreign Policy, p. 140. Keogh, Ireland and the Vatican, p. 321. O’Riordan, “Anti-Semitism in Irish Politics,” p. 23. The hard core included 100 members, but total membership was 5,000–6,000. But the association won the support of many lower-middle class Irishmen who were not active members. Fiat had a five-digit readership. See Whyte, Church and State in Modern Ireland, pp. 163–5. For example, a survey on prejudice among the older population in Dublin in the 1970s revealed that around half those polled believed in the stereotype that Jews have financial power. A large ratio believed Jews were responsible for the crucifixion of Jesus. A similar survey in the 1990s indicated a relatively high level of prejudice toward Jews in the more rural areas. Keogh, Jews in Twentieth-Century Ireland, pp. 234–7. Ibid., p. 138. The illiberal ethos of the Department of Justice on the matter of refugees lasted through the coalition government of John Costello (1948–51) and de Valera’s next term (1951–4). But eventually the more liberal line took over in these cabinets as well. For further detail see: Keogh, Jews in Twentieth-Century Ireland, pp. 115–52, 158–64, 202–8, 216–23. On Ireland’s policy on Jewish refugees in the 1930s compared to other countries, particularly Britain, see: Goldstone, “ ‘Benevolent Helpfulness’?,” Kennedy and Skelly, Irish Foreign Policy, pp. 116–36. Due to pogroms in Poland (Przytyk, 1936) and the death of Jewish prisoners who opposed the Nazi regime in its early years in the concentration camps in Germany. This emerges from a letter from Rabbi Berlin – Palestine – to Rabbi Herzog – Dublin, March 19, 1937, Religious Zionism Archive (RZA) Berlin Papers. The Conference was called by Britain (February 7–March 17, 1939) in the aim of finding a solution for the conflict in Palestine, and was attended by delegates from all sides: British, Jews, and Arabs. This emerges from Herzog’s letter to J. B. Macaulay Irish envoy to the Holy See. March 21, 1939, HA. J. Goldman, “Rabbi Herzog’s Visit to the Vatican in February 1940,” Niv Hamidrashia, 4, 1965, p. 29. Berlin’s letter – London, to Mizrahi members – Palestine, February 22, 1939, RZA, Berlin Papers. HA. Hatsofeh, March 9, 1939. Keogh, Ireland and the Vatican, p. 142. These emerge from Herzog’s letter to Walshe, April 11, 1939, HA. This definition is quoted from Macaulay’s letter to Montini of April 13, 1939, as provided by Keogh, Ireland and the Vatican, p. 218. Ibid. Ibid. Rabbi Herzog was born in Poland in 1888, but emigrated with his family to England when just a child. This emerges from Macaulay’s letter to Herzog, August 2, 1939, HA. MacRory’s letter of recommendation, July 17, 1939; Herzog’s letter to Macaulay, July 27, 1939, HA. Macaulay’s letter to Herzog, August 2, 1939, HA. Having left Palestine on February 6, 1940, Haaretz, February 7, 1940. Keogh (Ireland and the Vatican, p. 218), relies on published Vatican sources and mentions the audience in Rome in February 1940, but does not draw a link between it and the rescue of the yeshiva refugees. The account provided by Goldman, who was traveling with Herzog, is quite reliable. Herzog’s appeals to London and the Vatican were but few of many attempts he made during the war to mobilize leaders from all over the world to rescue these refugees. The Soviet takeover of Lithuania in June 1940

Notes 193

69 70 71 72 73 74 75

76 77

78 79 80 81 82

83 84

85 86

made it all the more urgent for Jews there to flee. Between the summer of 1940 and May 1941, a few of the yeshiva students managed to escape to Japan through the Soviet Union. Most of those who stayed behind were murdered by the Germans, who took Lithuania in June 1941. On these rescue attempts and especially on Herzog’s negotiations with Britain, see: Shulamit Eliash, “Rescue of Polish yeshivas that fled to Lithuania at the outset of World War II,” Yalkut Moreshet, 32, 1981, pp. 127–68 [Hebrew]. Goldman, “Rabbi Herzog’s Visit to the Vatican,” p. 31. Ibid. See Chapter 2 of this book. Goldman, “Rabbi Herzog’s Visit to the Vatican,” p. 31. Keogh, Ireland and the Vatican, pp. 218–19. Herzog and de Valera’s telegrams, NAI, DFA, 419/44. Herzog’s telegram January 30, 1943, NAI, DFA, 419/44. A copy of the telegram can also be found in the files of the Jewish Agency’s Joint Rescue Committee (CZA, 26/1144), but there are two differences: this telegram is dated January 17, 1944, and it starts with the line: “Deeply grateful kind message,” which refers to de Valera’s cable to Herzog of January 5, 1943 (see Note 74 in this chapter). The omission of this line in the telegram that was eventually sent to de Valera may have been accidental; alternatively, Herzog may have decided to delete it after consulting the Joint Rescue Committee, which considered such an expression of gratitude to be premature. Called Iveagh House, for it was the former Dublin home of Lord Iveagh, head of the Guinness family, which was purchased from the family by the Irish Government in 1939, following which it became the location of the Irish Department of External Affairs. Keogh, Jews in Twentieth-Century Ireland, pp. 174–7. In retrospect, Kiernan’s account of the deportation of 8,000 Jews to Poland, was also incorrect. Until Italy’s surrender to the Allied Forces in September of 1943, Mussolini had stopped the Germans from implementing the Final Solution in Italian territory. Only after this date, did the Germans start to carry it out in Rome and the Northern part of Italy, where (for historical reasons) the bulk of the Jewish population of Italy was concentrated. Approximately 8,500 Jews were sent to death camps from Italy after September 1943, and 7,500 of them were murdered. See M. Michaelis (ed.), entry for Italy, I. Gutman (ed.), Encyclopedia of the Holocaust, vol. 2, New York: Macmillan, 1990, pp. 720–6. C. Shalem, Agudat Israel in Palestine and the Holocaust: 1942–1945, PhD Thesis Submitted to the Senate of Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan: 2003, pp. 210–26 [Hebrew]. Herzog’s cable, December 15, 1943, NAI, DFA, 419/44. Keogh, Jews in Twentieth-Century Ireland, p. 191. H. Barlas, Rescue during the Holocaust, Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1975, pp. 150–8 [Hebrew]. This is about sixty one Vittel internees who were considered “repatriated Palestine residents” since they held immigration permits to Palestine, obtained for them by the Jewish Agency from the Mandatory authorities. They arrived in Palestine by boat on July 8, 1944 as part of the exchange program. Ibid., p. 153. Herzog’s cable to Walshe, July 24, 1944, NAI, DFA, 419/44. Keogh quotes historian Nathan Eck, who maintains they were killed in Auschwitz. This version is supported by A. Rutkowski, who wrote the entry for Vittel in: I. Gutman (ed.), Encyclopedia of the Holocaust, vol. 4, New York: Macmillan, 1990, pp. 157–9. On the efforts made by the Irish Department of External Affairs to rescue Vittel’s Jews, see: Keogh, Jews in Twentieth-Century Ireland, pp. 179–80, 182–4. On Herzog’s telegram to MacRory of July 2, 1944, see Herzog’s letter to Izhak Ben-Zvi, Chairman of the National Committee of the Yishuv, July 6, 1944, HA. On his unsuccessful attempt to gain an audience with the Pope in Rome, and on the meeting on September 5 and 6, in Cairo – with which he had to make do – with

194 Notes

87

88 89 90 91 92 93 94

95

96 97 98 99

100

Monsignor Hughes, the Pope’s legate to the Near East, which was also attended by Herzog’s son Jacob, see: Rabbi Herzog’s report, CZA, S26/1144. The meeting seemed encouraging thanks to Hughes positive reaction to J. Herzog’s proposal to offer the protection of the Pope to Hungary’s Jews. Hughes indeed forwarded this message to Rome, but the Pope did not cooperate. See: Bar-Zohar, The Life and Times of a Jewish Prince, pp. 57–8. Based on studies that showed that Pius XII closed his eyes to the Nazi atrocities, such as S. Friedlander, Pius XII and the Third Reich: A Documentation, New York: Octagon, 1980; J. Cornwell, Hitler’s Pope: The Secret History of Pius XII, New York: Viking, 1999. See the telegrams, NAI, DFA, 419/44. Keogh, Jews in Twentieth-Century Ireland, pp. 185–6. On Hungary’s Jews in 1944 see: Y. Bauer, Jews for Sale?: Nazi-Jewish Negotiations 1933–1945, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994, pp. 153–8, 232–7. Keogh, Jews in Twentieth-Century Ireland, p. 191. Minutes of the Executive meeting, March 5, 1944, CZA. Minutes of the meeting of the presidium of the Jewish Agency’s rescue committee, March 7, 1944, CZA, S26/1237. In the plenary session of the National Committee of the Yishuv, December 1938 (CZA, J1/7238) Herzog said: “We must not despair even for a second . . . We have an obligation to do whatever we can in order to rescue our miserable, persecuted, dying brothers and sisters; God will do whatever we cannot.” The visit was not impulsive, and took place after consultation with cabinet members and political confidants. Many of these advisors, including Frank Aiken, Minister for the Coordination of Defensive Measures, and apparently also Walshe, advocated the visit, but Walshe’s assistant, Frederick Boland apparently did not. De Valera, who in this case pursued what seemed to him consistent with Ireland’s wartime neutrality, distinguished between Hitler and the German nation, with which Ireland maintained diplomatic relations, and explained that his move was in strict adherence to diplomatic practice. De Valera also explained that failing to call on Hempel would have been an act of unpardonable discourtesy to the German nation and to Hempel himself, who behaved impeccably throughout the war. For further detail see: D. Keogh, “Eamon de Valera and Hitler: An Analysis of International Reaction to the Visit to the German Minister, May 1945,” Irish Studies in International Affairs, 3, no. 1, 1989, pp. 69–92. Next to this visit, his friendship with Fr Edward Cahill (Keogh, Jews in TwentiethCentury Ireland, pp. 92–5; Whyte, Church and State in Modern Ireland, pp. 72–3) and his relationship with Fr Dennis Fahey (Athans, The Coughlin-Fahey Connection, p. 59) seem quite benign. Although de Valera’s ties with these men do not necessarily mean he adopted their anti-Semitic thinking, from a Jewish perspective they certainly weigh against him. J. H. Heftman, Haboker, May 11, 1945; Foeirstein –; “De Valera – Britain’s enemy,” Hatsofeh, May 17, 1945. Keogh, Jews in Twentieth-Century Ireland, pp. 210–16. S. Z. Shragai, The Rescue Campaign, Jerusalem: Dfus Haivri, 1947, p. 92 [Hebrew]. Briscoe, For the Life of Me, pp. 302–5; “Mr. de Valera’s Holy Land Pilgrimage,” Irish Press, July 28, 1950. For coverage in the Israeli press see: “Eamon de Valera visits Israel,” Haaretz, July 28, 1950; “De Valera and his two sons visit Israel,” “De Valera – to visit Israel,” Hatsofeh, July 28, 1950. Following are sections of J. Herzog’s letter to Abrahamson, August 18, 1966, UCDAD papers of Eamon de Valera, 844: The name of Eamon de Valera is not only enshrined for all time on the tablets of Irish Independence. His name is by-word across the world as one of the pioneers of the present epoch in human history, a central theme of which is the

Notes 195 emergence of small countries to independence, their assertion of their freedom and right to pursue their national destiny . . . and to make their contribution on the international scene in equality. Eamon de Valera’s leadership, integrity, deep humanity and sense of purpose have for many decades now left their imprint on the international community. This affection is also reflected in a letter from Pnina, J. Herzog’s widow, to de Valera, April 20, 1972, after her husband’s death: Keogh, Jews in Twentieth-Century Ireland, p. 232. 101 For an analysis of de Valera’s intricate personality see: T. P. Coogan, De Valera: Long Fellow, Long Shadow, London: Hutchinson, 1987, pp. 1–2, 693–704. 3 De facto recognition of Israel by Ireland 1 This government headed by David Ben-Gurion, was in office from the establishment of the state until replaced on March 9, 1949 by the first elected cabinet. 2 Cable sent by Shertok to Irish Minister of External Affairs Sean MacBride, May 27, 1948, NAI, DFA, 305/81/1. From the establishment of the State through the end of June 1948, similar appeals were made to 55 other states as well. See: Y. Freundlich (ed.), Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel, Jerusalem: Israel State Archives, 1981, p. 13 [Hebrew]. 3 This was a group of 37 leaders representing all parties and sections in the yishuv and the Zionist Movement, which, following the Declaration of Independence, became the Provisional Council of the State. 13 members of the Council served as the provisional government of the State. 4 W. Eitan, “The First Year,” in M. Yegar, Y. Govrin, and A. Oded (eds), Ministry for Foreign Affairs: the First Fifty Years, vol. 1, Jerusalem: Keter, 2002, pp. 12–13 [Hebrew]. 5 After 1975, Portugal and Spain were the only western European countries that did not have diplomatic relations with Israel. The Soviet Union and the countries of eastern Europe – Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia – had all recognized Israel immediately after its foundation and conducted diplomatic relations with it, albeit in varying degrees of closeness. All these countries, except Romania, terminated their relations with Israel following the Six Day War. 6 Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Montevideo, December 26, 1933, Article 1 at www.ibiblio.org/pha/paw/023.html (accessed on December 17, 2006). 7 R. Jennings, A. Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law, vol. 1, 9th edn, London: Longman, 1992, p. 155. 8 Ibid., pp. 154–60; J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations, 6th edn, Oxford: Clarendon, 1963, pp. 146–7; Y. Dinstein, International Law and the State, Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Law Faculty and Shocken, 1971, pp. 100–5 [Hebrew]. 9 Eitan, “The First Year,” Yegar, Govrin, Oded, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, vol. 1, p. 11. 10 As opposed to functional internationalization, in which the sovereign state retains control of the territory while the international community has limited authority in the scope for which internationalization is exercised. 11 A. Schiller, Guide to Christian Historical Sites and Holy Places in Israel, Jerusalem: Ariel, April 1992, p. 48 [Hebrew]. 12 N. Ben-Horin, “The Vatican and Israel . . . ,” Yegar, Govrin, Oded, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, vol. 2, pp. 994–6. 13 See Note 10 in this chapter. 14 M. Sharett, At the Threshold of Statehood: 1946–1949, Tel Aviv: Am-Oved, 1958, pp. 324–6 [Hebrew]. 15 M. Brecher, “The Political War for Jerusalem,” in E. Shaltiel (ed.), Jerusalem in the Modern Period, Jerusalem: Yad Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, 1981, pp. 384–402 [Hebrew]; N. Lorch, “Ben-Gurion and Jerusalem as Israel’s Capital,” in H. Lavsky (ed.),

196 Notes

16 17 18

19 20

21

22

23 24

Jerusalem in Zionist Vision and Realization, Jerusalem: Shazar Center, 1989, pp. 377–403 [Hebrew]; M. Golani, “Jerusalem – from International Status to Incorporation in the State of Israel,” in V. Pilowsky (ed.), Transition from Yishuv to a State 1947–1949, Herzl Institute for Research in Zionism, Haifa University, 1990, pp. 299–312 [Hebrew ]; Y. Shavit (ed.), Jerusalem – A Biography, Tel Aviv: Am-Oved and Shazar Center, 1998, pp. 247–52 [Hebrew]. M. J. Dubois, “The Catholic Church and the State of Israel – After 25 Years,” Christian News from Israel, 23, no. 4, 1973, p. 221. Ben Horin, “The Vatican and Israel,” in Yegar, Govrin, Oded, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, vol. 2, pp. 996–7. Letter of M. Kahani, Israel’s delegate to the United Nations’ European office, sent from Geneva to the Israeli Foreign Ministry, on February 16, 1949, reporting his meeting with the papal nuncio to Bern, Philippe Bernardini, who told him about the Pope’s memo. See: ISA, FM, 2396/15 I. After Israel signed ceasefire agreements with Egypt on February 24, Lebanon on March 23, and Transjordan on April 3. The ceasefire agreement with Syria, signed on July 20, 1949, officially ended the war. S. Ferrari, “The Holy See and the Postwar Palestine Issue: The Internationalization of Jerusalem and the Protection of the Holy Places,” in International Affairs, 60, Spring 1984, pp. 261–70. Kreutz, Vatican Policy on the Palestinian–Israeli Conflict, pp. 94–101; Ben Horin, “The Vatican and Israel . . . ,” in Yegar, Govrin, Oded, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, vol. 2, pp. 998–9. In the war of 1948 Transjordan took over the Old City of Jerusalem and most of the area that the partition plan had earmarked for the Arab state. Transjordan began de facto annexation of these territories in May 1948, and completed the process in April 1950, by joining both banks of the Jordan river under the name the “Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,” usually shortened to “Jordan.” But John XXIII nevertheless revolutionized the Catholic Church’s approach to Judaism, indirectly influencing the relationship between the Vatican and Israel in the years to follow. This revolution began when the Pope broached the subject of the Church’s treatment of Judaism at the Second Vatican Council. The discussion which was deferred to the office of Paul VI (June 1963–August 1978) due to internal opposition, led to Article 4 of the Nostra Aetate which the Council approved in October 1965. This document acquitted the Jewish people of the collective responsibility for the crucifixion, and paved the way for a Jewish–Christian dialogue, which slowly dispelled the theological element in the Holy See’s attitude to Israel. The Six Day War reshuffled the cards, placing the entire city of Jerusalem, holy places included, in Israeli hands. From this point onward, the Vatican took an even greater interest in the Palestinians and following the Yom Kippur war even stressed its recognition of their national rights as a nation. But concurrently, the Vatican also recognized the legitimacy of the State of Israel, which led to official, uninterrupted negotiations with Israel. The Madrid Conference (October 1991) expedited normalization, and the Oslo Accords gave this process its final thrust. In December 1993, Israel and the Holy See signed an agreement normalizing their relations. In June 1994, full diplomatic relations were established. However, the conflict between Israel and the Vatican surrounding the issue of Jerusalem has not been resolved as yet. Ben Horin, “The Vatican and Israel . . . ,” Yegar, Govrin, Oded, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, vol. 2, pp. 1000–29. Keogh, Ireland and the Vatican, p. 2. Due to the government’s partisan composition as follows: Costello’s Fine Gael Party, which was second-largest in the Dáil (31 seats) ; Labor (19); Clann na Talmhan – the farmers’ party (7); Clann na Poblachta (10); Independents (12). De Valera’s Fianna Fáil was in the opposition, even though it was the largest (68). See: Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine, p. 561.

Notes 197 25 Keogh, Ireland and the Vatican, pp. 191–225; Keatinge, The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy, Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 1973, p. 30; D. McCullagh, A Makeshift Majority: The First Inter-Party Government, 1948–51, Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 1998, pp. 109–10; I. McCabe, A Diplomatic History of Ireland 1948–1949: The Republic, the Commonwealth and NATO, Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1991, pp. 20, 22. 26 Keatinge, The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy, pp. 174–5, 215–21, 258, 260. 27 It was because of budgetary reasons that Ireland delayed in establishing official diplomatic relations with Denmark, for example. See the letter sent by the Ministry of External Affairs to the legation of the Federal Republic of Germany, Dublin, September 5, 1955, NAI, DFA, 305/149. 28 W. Eitan, “The Foreign Service,” in Yegar, Govrin, Oded, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, vol. 1, p. 23. 29 Herzog’s survey appears in two of his letters: (1) To M. Arnon at the Israeli embassy in London, September 2, 1953, ISA, FM, 2396/15 II; (2) To Israel’s Ambassador to France, October 27, 1955, ISA, FM, 2396/15. 30 Extract from Cabinet Minutes June 4, 1948, NAI, S 14330 A. 31 McCullagh, A Makeshift Majority, pp. 109–10. 32 “Chief Rabbi Hopes Eire will Recognize Israel,” Irish Times, February 1, 1949. 33 Keogh, Ireland and Europe, pp. 197–212; Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine, pp. 589–92. 34 MacBride was an avid supporter of the Council of Europe, and in 1950 served as President of the Committee of Ministers of the Council. He was also Vice President of the OEEC. Keatinge, The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy, pp. 80–1. 35 Elath’s cable to J. Linton: October 15, 1948, ISA, FM, 38/9. Elath was promoted to serve as Israel’s Ambassador to Washington in April 1949 and held this position until June 1950. 36 Linton’s letters to Michael Comay, the head of CD, October 2, 1948 and February 13, 1949, ISA, FM, 38/9. Regarding Good’s ties with MacBride, see: Jewish Representative Council (JRC), Executive Minute Book, June 15, 1949, Irish Jewish Museum (IJM) M/S 43.021. 37 As indicated by Comay’s letter to Linton, September 19, 1948, and the letter from S. Rosen, the Foreign Ministry’s legal adviser, to Linton, November 22, 1948: ISA, FM, 38/9. 38 Israel’s application was addressed by the Security Council on December 17, but did not win the required seven-member majority and was therefore not even submitted to the Assembly. The application was eventually granted at the UN General Assembly on May 11, 1949. 39 Letter from R. Seligman to Rosen, December 22, 1948, ISA, FM, 38/9. 40 Letter from Comay to Seligman, January 13, 1949, ISA, FM, 38/9. 41 Letter from Seligman to Comay, January 25, 1949, ISA, FM, 38/9. Dillon was Minister for the Independent Party. His activities for the agricultural sector enhanced the government’s popularity. See: Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine, pp. 562–3, 571. 42 Garrett was made ambassador in 1950. 43 Letter from Linton to Elath, December 23, 1948, ISA, FM, 38/9. 44 As implied in his letter to Linton, January 13, 1949, ibid. 45 Letter from the Irish delegation in Washington to Boland, February 2, 1949, NAI, DFA, 305/81/1; DFA, 305/81/1. 46 Letter from Linton to Comay, January 26, 1949, ISA, FM, 38/9. The RAF incident should be seen against the backdrop of Israel’s victory over Egypt and Britain’s intervention on the side of the Egyptians. On January 4, 1949, after the IDF had pushed the Egyptian army out of the Negev and the IDF had started its retreat from Egyptian soil, a war almost started between Britain and Israel. Tension heightened when the Israelis shot down four RAF aircraft on a reconnaissance mission to ensure the IDF

198 Notes

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48 49

50 51 52 53 54 55 56

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67

was indeed retreating. On January 7, after the IDF had withdrawn to the international border, the fighting was halted and the road was cleared for cease-fire negotiations with Egypt. This incident made it crystal clear that Israel was there to stay and could protect its borders. The British Labor government came under serious domestic criticism, and was forced to acknowledge Israel’s existence and thus recognize Israel de facto. Britain’s backing of Egypt reflected its pro-Arab strategy. Britain also believed the newly born state was liable to turn communist and threaten the Middle East, since most of the immigrants came from Eastern Europe. See: W. R. Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East: 1945–1951, Oxford: Clarendon, 1984, pp. 107, 538–40, 560–71. Letter from the Irish legation to Madrid to the Secretary of the Department for External Affairs – Dublin, December 29, 1948; letter from Walshe to Boland, January 20, 1949; Boland’s minutes, February 5, 1949; Memorandum by the Department of External Affairs regarding the Holy Places 1948–9, November 21, 1952, NAI, DFA, 305/62/1. Letter from Walshe to Boland, January 20, 1949, ibid. In fact, it was not government offices but only a few government institutions that were to be relocated to Jerusalem under a cabinet resolution dated December 20, 1948. See: M. Brecher, Decisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy, London: Oxford University Press, 1974, p. 42. Letter from Walshe to Boland, January 22, 1949, NAI, DFA, 305/62/1. D. Keogh, “Profile of Joseph Walshe, Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs 1922–46,” Irish Studies in International Affairs, 3, no. 2, 1990, p. 59. Cable from Dunn of the US embassy in Rome, to the State Department, January 31, 1949, based on Walshe’s report to the US embassy. See: Segregated Records, National Archives Washington, 360 Israel 1949, Dublin 17 RG 84. Ibid. Notes of the Secretariat of the Department of External Affairs, December 23, 1948, NAI, DFA, 305/81/1. Boland’s notes, January 27, 1949, ibid. The countries that recognized Israel in this period included the Dominions of Canada, New Zealand, South Africa; the western European countries: Belgium, France, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands; the Scandinavian countries: Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. The list is based on a memo prepared by the Israeli Foreign Ministry: Representations of Israel Abroad (Jerusalem, November 3, 1997). I would like to thank Yehuda Mechaber of the Foreign Ministry’s Department for International Organizations, who gave me this report. Since the report does not specify the level of diplomatic representation when the relationship was normalized, I completed the picture using the following sources: Letter from Comay to Seligman, February 7, 1949, ISA, FM, 38/9; letter from Comay to Eban and Eilat, February 4, 1952, ISA, FM, 357/9. According to Representations of Israel Abroad, by the beginning of 1949, 43 states had already recognized Israel, de jure or de facto. NAI, DFA, 305/62/1. Boland’s notes, January 28, 29, 1948, INA, DFA, 305/81/1. Boland’s note to MacBride, February 5, 1949, NAI, DFA, 305/62/1. Boland’s note to Rynne, NAI, DFA, 305/81/1. Rynne’s note, February 10, 1949, ibid. Shertok’s cable, NAI, DFA, 305/81/1. Extract from Cabinet minutes, February 11, 1949; Statement by the Government Information Bureau, February 12, 1949, NAI, DFA, 305/81/1. The cabinet’s mindset can be inferred from an unsigned draft letter (apparently from Boland to MacBride) February 11, 1949, ibid. Boland’s note, February 5, 1949, NAI, DFA, 305/62/1. Boland’s note, January 27, 1949, NAI, DFA, 305/85/1.

Notes 199 68 E. M. Hogan, The Irish Missionary Movement: A Historical Survey 1830–1980, Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, Washington Catholic University Press, 1990. 69 Draft letter to MacBride, February 11, 1949, NAI, DFA, 305/85/1. 70 Letter from Linton to Comay, February 13, 1949, ISA, FM, 38/9. 71 Ibid. 72 In his letter to Walshe, February 24, 1949, Boland refers to Nunan’s account, but does not specify its date or content. See: NAI, DFA, 305/62/1. 73 Extract from Walshe’s secret report to Boland, February 24, 1949, NAI, DFA, 305/81/1. 74 The Hungarian prelate, Josef Cardinal Mindszenty, was arrested on December 26, 1948 and sentenced to life imprisonment on February 8, 1949. The Irish government helped mobilize international support for his cause, and to many Irish Catholics he was a martyr, persecuted by the communists for his beliefs. Keogh, Ireland and the Vatican, pp. 248–9. 75 The appointment of Robinson’s successor took on national significance. Iveagh House wanted an appointee of Irish descent. The Vatican insisted on selecting the nominee independently, and appointing the Italian Ettore Felici, the titular archbishop of Corinth, who had no knowledge of Irish history or politics. Walshe toiled for a year to thwart this appointment, but the Vatican’s rigidity left Iveagh House little choice. In August 1949, Walshe conceded the appointment, which became effective in October. Ibid., pp. 265–304. 76 As V. Iremonger, first secretary of the political division at Iveagh House, wrote in his minute, October 12, 1950 (NAI, DFA, 305/81/1): “At the time we extended de facto recognition there were two questions exercising us in relation to the Vatican . . . the new Nuncio and . . . the Holy Places . . . .” 77 Keogh, Ireland and the Vatican, p. 269. 78 Extract from Walshe’s Secret Report to Boland, February 24, 1949, NAI, DFA, 305/81/1. 79 NAI, DFA, 305/62/1. 80 Referred to by his previous name, Epstein. 81 NAI, DFA, 305/81/1. 82 Ben Horin, “The Vatican and Israel . . . ,” in Yegar, Govrin, Oded, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, vol. 2, pp. 998–9. 83 Ibid., p. 1000; Ferrari, “The Holy See and the Postwar Palestine Issue,” pp. 272–4; Sharett, At the Threshold of Statehood, p. 73. 84 Letter from the Nunciature in Dublin to McQuaid, May 19, 1949, DDA Apostolic Nuncio Folder (II) 1947–51 522/1. 85 The other new state was Jordan of course. 86 DDA McQuaid Papers, Hierarchy Meetings, Maynooth 1941–9, 519/1A. 87 J. Cooney, John Charles McQuaid Ruler of Catholic Ireland, Dublin: O’Brien, 1999, pp. 13, 15. 88 Ibid., pp. 69–72, 239–40; Whyte, Church and State in Modern Ireland, p. 165. 89 Keogh, Jews in Twentieth-Century Ireland, p. 172. 90 Letter from McQuaid to Jacobovits May 26, 1949, DDA, McQuaid Papers, 2 AB8. 91 Testimony of Rabbi Jacobovits, March 4, 1999. 92 Paro served as auditor (1950–2). Since the death of Nuncio Robinson in August 1948 and until Felici took office in September 1949, Paro played a central role at the Nunciature. 93 Letter of McQuaid to Paro, June 13, 1949, DDA, McQuaid Papers, 2 AB8/B. 94 Testimony of Jacobovits, March 4, 1999. 95 Whyte, Church and State in Modern Ireland, p. 162. 96 “Christians United on Holy Father’s Claim,” Standard, May 27, 1949. 97 Boland’s minute, May 25, 1949, NAI, DFA, 305/62/1. 98 JRC, 26 May 1949, IJM, M/S 43,021.

200 Notes 99 A news item about this was published on the Dublin Evening Mail on June 1, 1949. The Israeli Envoy Extraordinary to Britain, M. Eliash, sent the excerpt to M. Comay on June 9, 1949. See ISA, FM, 38/9. 100 Letter from Letterkenny Urban District to Costello, June 15, 1949, NAI, S 24330A; letter from the Limerick County Council to Costello, August 11, 1949, NAI, Palestine, D/T 53982. 101 Attached to the letter from the secretary of the Maria Duce in Dublin to McQuaid, June 11, 1949, DDA McQuaid Papers, Lay Organizations, Maria Duce folder. 102 An age-old term used by the Catholic Church as part of normative theology. 103 Examples of incitement during the preceding year were the editorials of The Cross, which were written in the shadow of the Jewish-Arab war. The first (“The Pope’s Plea,” June 1948) lamented the fall of holy Christian sites into the hands of the Jews and their desecration by infidels. The second (“Editorial Notes,” August 1948) blamed the Jews for destroying churches and monasteries in Jerusalem. 104 “Zionism will not Tolerate Doctrine of Christianity,” Irish Catholic, May 19, 1949. 105 “Father Dempsey’s Letter . . . ,” Standard, June 3, 1949. 106 I. Jakobovits, Journal of a Rabbi, p. 56; M. Shashar, I. Jakobovits, The Lord Rabbi: Talks with Michael Shashar, Jerusalem: Shashar, 1996, p. 81 [Hebrew]. 107 Keogh, Jews in Twentieth-Century Ireland, p. 83. 108 This emerges from: DJRC, Executive Minute Book, May 26, 1949, June 15, 1949, IJM, M/S 43.021. 109 Letter from McQuaid to Jakobovits, May 26, 1949, DDA, McQuaid Papers, 2 AB8/B. 110 Letter from McQuaid to Paro, June 13, 1949, ibid. 111 Letter from McQuaid to Jakobovits, May 26, 1949, ibid. 112 This government (March 8, 1949–October 16, 1950) numbered 12 members: 9 members of secular parties – 7 for Mapai, 1 for the Progressive Party, 1 for the Union of Sephardic Jews; 3 members of religious parties – Hamizrahi, Ha-Poel Ha-Mizrahi, and Agudat Israel. 113 Letter from McQuaid to Paro, June 13, 1949, DDA, McQuaid Papers, 2 AB8/B. 114 Ibid. 115 His full title was: Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary. 116 Shashar, I. Jakobovits The Lord Rabbi, p. 82; Letter from Solomons to McQuaid, May 25, 1949, DDA, McQuaid Papers, Box 2 AB8. 117 The Times (London), May 11, 1949. 118 Letter from Solomons to McQuaid, May 29, 1949; Letter from McQuaid to Paro, June 13, 1949, DDA, McQuaid Papers, Box 2 AB8. 119 I have been unable to find traces of Samuel’s radio interview, either in the London Times, The Jewish Chronicle, or Haaretz. 120 Letter from McQuaid to Paro, June 13, 1949, DDA McQuaid Papers, Box 2 AB8. 121 Letter from Jakobovits to McQuaid, May 31, 1949, ibid. Until the end of 1949, the government was situated in Tel Aviv. The government itself relocated to Jerusalem in January 1950, but the offices, with the exception of the Foreign Ministry, which only moved in July 1953, and the Ministry of Defense, which stayed in Tel Aviv, relocated to Jerusalem only in 1951. M. Golani, “Israel’s Jerusalem Policy 1948–1967,” in Anita Shapira (ed.), Independence: The First Fifty Years, Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Centre, 1998, p. 285 [Hebrew]. 122 Letter from McQuaid to Paro, June 13, 1949, DDA, McQuaid Papers, 2 AB8. 123 Letter from McQuaid, July 2, 1949, ibid. The addressee is not named here, but in his testimony on March 4, 1999, Rabbi Jakobovits confirmed it was him. 124 Sharett, At the Threshold of Statehood, p. 373. 125 “Israeli Insult to Holy Father,” Standard, June 24, 1949. 126 Shashar, I. Jakobovits, The Lord Rabbi, p. 82. 127 DJRC, Executive Minute Book, June 23, 1949, August 25, 1949, IJM, M/S 43.021. The Christian holy places that remained in new Jerusalem included the Dormition

Notes 201 Church and the Cenaculum (also known as the Last Supper Room) on Mount Zion; the Church of St John (the Baptist) and the Church of the Visitation in Ein Kerem on the western edge of Jerusalem. The Christian holy places in old Jerusalem and its surroundings that remained under Jordanian control, included the Basilica of the Holy Sepulchre; Bethany; Church of St Anne; Church of St James; Church of St Mark; House of Caiphas and Prison of Christ; Pool of Bethesda; Sanctuary of the Ascension; Tomb of the Virgin; the Nine Stations of the Cross, collectively known as Via Dolorosa, and the three holy places in Bethlehem zone: Basilica of the Nativity; Milk Grotto; and Shepherd’s Field. 4 From de facto to de jure 1 The undated cable (INA, DFA 305/81/1) was sent before March 8, 1949, the date on which Israel’s first permanent government was established. 2 Eliash’s summary of the meeting, April 28, 1949: ISA, FM, 38/9. 3 Communication between Eliash and Comay April 26, 1949; May 24, 1949, ibid. 4 Letter from Eliash to Comay, June 9, 1949, ibid. 5 Note for Minister’s information, June 13, 1949, NAI, DFA, 305/62/1. 6 This commission, which was made up of representatives from the USA, Turkey, and France, was established in accordance with the General Assembly decision of December 11, 1948 to continue the efforts of UN mediator Count Bernadotte for permanent peace. The commission was given the task of preparing a detailed proposal for internationalization of Jerusalem, along with guarantees by Israel and the Arabs to protect the holy places, and presenting the proposal to the General Assembly in September 1949. 7 For further details, see Irish Department of External Affairs communications with: (1) Walsh May 11, 1949, May 12, 1949, May 25, 1949, June 2, 1949, June 7, 1949, June 14, 1949; (2) Ireland delegation in Rome May 12, 1949, June 7, 1949; (3) Ireland delegation in Madrid May 23, 1949, NAI, DFA, 305/62/1. 8 See Note 112 in Chapter 3, regarding this government. The radical nationalistic right that for years was barred from any involvement in government was represented by Herut – a party established in the summer of 1948 as an extension of Zionist Revisionism, which championed the concept of Greater Israel. 9 Note for Minister’s information, June 13, 1949, NAI, DFA, 305/62/1. 10 Latin expression meaning “impossible,” in this case, “assuming the impossible was true.” 11 Letter from Walshe, May 21, 1949, NAI, DFA, Holy See Embassy P12/2a 1946–65. 12 Letter from Walshe to Boland, June 24, 1949, NAI, DFA, 305/62/1. 13 J. Prawer, “Christianity Between Heavenly and Earthly Jerusalem,” in Jerusalem Through the Ages: The Twenty-Fifth Archaeological Convention October 1967, Jerusalem: The Israel Exploration Society, 1968, pp. 179–92 [Hebrew]; Schiller, Guide to Christian Historical Sites and Holy Places in Israel, pp. 43–4. 14 He belonged to the Jesuit order for 13 years, beginning in his youth, and taught languages and mathematics at Clongowes Wood, Jesuit College. McQuaid, who later became Dublin’s archbishop, was one of his students. 15 Keogh, “Profile of Joseph Walshe . . . ,” pp. 62–3, 69, 74. My thanks to David C. Sheehy who, in a conversation on April 11, 2000, helped me to understand Walshe. 16 Letter from Walshe to Boland June 14, 1949, NAI, DFA,305/62/1. 17 Walshe probably meant Mt Zion, which is holy for Christians due to the traditions that tie it to events in the life of Jesus, his Mother, and the Apostles. According to ancient tradition, it is the burial place of Kind David and has also been held holy by Muslims since the fifteenth century. The Temple Mount, one of the more important places in Jesus’ last journey to Jerusalem, is the holiest site for Jews – the place of their Holy Temple, and the Western Wall that forms the border of

202 Notes

18

19

20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39

40

the Temple Mount is the last remnant of the Second Temple. The Temple Mount, on which the El Aqsa mosque and the Dome of the Rock stand, is also the third holiest place in Islam. Letter from Walshe to Boland, June 24, 1949, INA, DFA, 305/62/1. Sol Bloom (1870–1949) was Jewish and successful in New York’s real-estate business. From 1923 until his death, he was a Democratic Party Congressman and held prominent positions such as chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee. He supported Zionism and acted to harness US and UN support for the establishment of the State of Israel. For example, Walshe’s activities in 1941, ordered by de Valera, to stop the antiSemitic propaganda of the Italian Legation in Dublin, and his active participation in Pillar of Fire Society. Keogh, “Profile of Joseph Walshe . . . ” p. 76; Keogh, Jews in Twentieth-Century Ireland, pp. 170–2, 173. Boland’s notes, November 30, 1949, INA, DFA, 305/62/1. Boland was mistaken vis-à-vis the place of the visit. Compare Chapter 1 of this book. Letter from Walshe to Boland, August 8, 1949, NAI, DFA, 305/62/1. Extract from Dáil Debates, June 15, 1949, NAI, D/T Palestine, 53982. Letter from Walshe to Boland June 24, 1949, NAI, DFA, 305/62 /1. Dáil Éireann Parliamentary Debates, July 5–21, 1949, vol. 117, cols 865–7. Note for Minister’s information, June 13, 1949, NAI, DFA, 305/62/1. Lyons, Ireland since the Famine, pp. 590–1. See also: Lee, Ireland 1912–1985, p. 301. Letter from Walshe to Boland, July 20, 1949, INA, DFA, 305/62/1. He met with Dulanty and then sent him a note on July 15, 1949. See the note and the reference to the meeting in Dulanty’s letter to Boland, June 19, 1949, NAI, DFA, F100/2/220. Eliash referred to the announcement in the Irish Press, June 1, 1949, according to which Krishna Menon, India’s ambassador to Britain, would also serve as ambassador to Ireland. Letter from Eliash to Comay, June 9, 1949, ISA, FM, 38/9. Cable from Eliash to Comay, July 18, 1949, ISA, FM, 38/9. In his speech, Eban stressed that Israel supported the principle of internationalization, but believed its implementation should correspond to the political reality in Jerusalem in the spring of 1949. This meant either that territorial internationalization would be limited to the Old City, or that functional internationalization would be implemented in all holy places in both parts of Jerusalem. See: A. Eban, Voice of Israel, New York: Horizon, 1957, pp. 31–3. Cable from Comay to Eliash, July 22, 1949, ISA, FM, 38/9. Letters from Dulanty to Boland July 19, 1949; August 17, 1949, NAI, DFA, F100/2/220. Dinstein, International Law and State, p. 104. Boland’s notes, August 17, 1949, NAI, DFA, 317/45. From the Irish Department of External Affairs Secretariat to Dulanty August 17, 1949, INA, DFA, F100/2/200. C. Cruise O’Brien, Memoir: My Life and Themes, p. 136. Oppenheim’s International Law, vol. 1, p. 1133. Lee, Ireland 1912–1985, pp. 301–2; K. Kenny, The American Irish: A History, Harlow: Longman, 2000, 246–7; T. Davis, “Anti-partitionism, Irish American and Anglo-American Relations,” in Kennedy, Skelly, Irish Foreign Policy, 1919–1966, pp. 199–202; J. M. Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, 1945–65, Dublin Irish Academic Press, 1997, p. 35–6. At the end of the 1960s, with the emergence of the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland, there was a reversal and Irish Americans again took an active part in Ireland’s affairs. Lyons, Ireland since the Famine, p. 591. O’Brien’s life story reflects his unique personality as historian, member of the academe, writer, journalist, diplomat, minister, and senator. He is considered one of Ireland’s most internationally distinguished intellectuals.

Notes 203 41 Keatinge, The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy, p. 285. 42 S. Kelly’s review on behalf of the Irish National Press in Washington, July 23, 1949, NAI, DFA, 90/3/90. 43 Film clip of Klein’s speech, July 21, 1949, ibid. 44 R. H. Bayor, Neighbors in Conflict: The Irish, Germans, Jews and Italians of New York City 1929–1941, Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978, pp. 87–107, 155–66; R. H. Bayor, “Ethnic Relations: the Jews and the Irish,” in M. Glazier (ed.), The Encyclopedia of the Irish in America, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999, pp. 285–8. 45 Elath’s report on his meeting with de Valera, January 1953, ISA, FM, 332/10. 46 Letter from Briscoe to Eliahu Ben Horin, member of the Presidium of the NZO, February 26, 1938, JA, P 5/253. 47 Because his mission to Poland was moved forward. See: Briscoe, For the Life of Me, pp. 267–70. 48 The plan of Max Nordau – co-founder of the World Zionist Organization – discussed saving 600,000 Jews from eastern Europe and bringing them all at once to Palestine. See Katz, Jabo, vol. 2, p. 1654. 49 See: Excerpt from an undated and unsigned letter to Jabotinsky, with a fragmented report of Briscoe’s mission. The letter was apparently sent by Abrahams, who was Briscoe’s associate and who met him in Dublin after he returned from the United States in the early spring of 1939, JA, P 5/253. See also: Briscoe, For the Life of Me, pp. 271–6; P. O’Dwyer, Counsel for the Defense: the Autobiography of Paul O’Dwyer, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979, pp. 151–3; Judith Tydor Baumel, Between Ideology and Propaganda: The “Irgun” Delegation and the Origins of AmericanJewish Right–Wing Militancy, Jerusalem: Magnes, 1999, pp. 20–1, 47 [Hebrew]. 50 Ibid., pp. 47, 85–6, 91, 168, 174, 181. 51 O’Dwyer, Counsel for the Defense, pp. 153, 156–7, 160–4, 166–7; cable to Costello, May 23, 1948, NAI, DTS, 14330/A. 52 As indicated in the letter from the Irish delegation in Washington to the Department of External Affairs – Dublin, July 20, 1949, NAI, DFA, 96/3/9. 53 O’Brien’s notes, August 16, 1949, ibid. 54 Truman was driven by political and electoral considerations, as well as the moral implications of the Holocaust. The State Department and the Pentagon were pro-Arab and opposed the establishment of the Jewish state. See: H. Bar-On, “Five Decades of Israel-USA Relations,” in Anita Shapira (ed.), Independence: The First Fifty Years, Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Center, 1998, pp. 378–9 [Hebrew]; E. Elath, Through the Mist of Time: Reminiscences, Jerusalem: Yad Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, 1989, pp. 114–21 [Hebrew]. 55 McCullagh, A Makeshift Majority, p. 138. C. Cruise O’Brien, in his book (The Siege: The Saga of Israel and Zionism, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1986, p. 374) points out the exceptional power of the Jewish lobby in those days (its size, variety, and efficiency) compared with other ethnic lobbies, not just the Irish lobby. O’Brien ascribes this power to the sense of solidarity between the children of the Holocaust. 56 D. Shaham, Israel – 50 Years, Tel Aviv: Am-Oved, 1998, pp. 44–5 [Hebrew]; Z. Shalom, “Israel’s Leadership and the ‘Land for Peace’ Formula in the 1950s,” in Shapira, Independence: The First Fifty Years, pp. 297–300. 57 This ratio persisted between 1937 and 1961. Lyons, Ireland since the Famine, p. 757. 58 For the sake of accuracy it must be noted that in the 1948–9 war, some people in Israel supported its continuation until full control was gained over all areas of historic Israel. This was advocated by Herut, which had limited influence. The same holds true for the activists of Mapam who aspired for complete occupation of the land west of the Jordan River, but did not publicly deviate from the position of their party, which supported partition. Splinters of the Lehi which resumed underground operations after the establishment of the State, produced the group that murdered Count Bernadotte in order to end his initiative for internationalization of Jerusalem.

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64

65 66 67 68

69 70 71

72

Another marginal, short-lived underground movement was Kingdom of Israel, with an ideology of liberating areas of Palestine occupied by the Arabs and which operated at the beginning of the 1950s. Its leaders were also from the Lehi. It managed to operate very briefly before its members were caught and tried. For further details see: Y. Neeman, “Partition viewed as Incomplete Liberation of the National Territory: Ireland and the Land of Israel,” Nativ, 6 (53), 1996, pp. 29–36; Shaham, Israel: 50 Years, p. 36. Boland’s notes, August 18, 1949, August 19, 1949, NAI, DFA, 96/3/90. On MacBride’s discussion with Sayers see: letter from Eliash to Comay, September 1, 1949, ISA, FM, 38/9. The reason why Abrahamson was ruled out is explained in a letter from Rabbi Jakobovits to Sayers, March 20, 1950, ibid. NAI, DFA, 305/62/1. Letters from Walshe to MacBride: August 26, 1949; September 8, 1949; November 15, 1949, ibid. The Conciliation Committee plan, announced on September 13, 1949, proposed demilitarization of Jerusalem and its partition into two areas, Arab and Jewish, which would both have administrative autonomy. Jewish immigration to Jerusalem was to be restricted and the UN forces were to guarantee free access to the holy places. The Vatican rejected the plan and Israel tried to thwart it in the United Nations. Surprisingly, an Australian proposal for territorial internationalization was submitted on November 24. This was the plan that the Assembly eventually approved on December 9. See: Ben Horin, “The Vatican and Israel . . . ,” in Yegar, Govrin, Oded, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, vol. 2, pp. 1000–2. Letter from Flynn to Nunan, August 5, 1949; letter from Nunan to MacBride, August 10, 1949; Boland’s notes, August 18, 1949; outline for Flynn’s speech, September 5, 1949; letter from O’Brien to the delegation in Washington, October 9, 1949, NAI, DFA, 96/3/90. Letters from Sayers to Eliash: December 1, 1949, December 18, 1949, ISA, FM, 38/9. Ben Horin, “The Vatican and Israel . . . ,” in Yegar, Govrin, Oded, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, vol. 2, pp. 1001–2. Letter from Luria to Eliash, December 27, 1949, ISA, FM, 2412/34; letter from Comay to Eliash, January 10, 1950, ISA, FM, 38/9. Correspondence between the delegations of Israel and Ireland in London, and between the Department of External Affairs in Dublin and its delegation in London, May 16–17 and 31, 1950, INA, DFA, 305/81/1. The sensitive Irish found Comay’s position to be in bad taste. He was asked to play things down, with the official explanation that Ireland was no longer a member of the British Commonwealth. Comay complied with the request and clarified that this name was for internal purposes, and that the department was also responsible for states that did not belong to the Commonwealth, such as Indonesia and Ireland. Sharett’s letter, May 24, 1950, ISA, FM, 2412/34; MacBride’s letter, June 15, 1950, ISA, FM, 38/9. Such as a brief front page review with Comay’s picture in the Irish Times, June 14, 1950. The memorandum was sent under MacBride’s orders to Walshe to explore the Vatican’s position (letter from V. Iremonger to Walshe, July 24, 1950, NAI, DFA, 305/62/1). I did not find Walshe’s response. If he replied, it was probably along the lines of the publication in Osservatore Romano on September 15, 1950, which rejected the memorandum out of hand. See: Ben Horin, “The Vatican and Israel . . . ,” in Yegar, Govrin, Oded, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, vol. 2, p. 1002. Israeli imports from Ireland, valued at over £1m, were under discussion. In January 1951, imports of seed potatoes and beef from Ireland totaled £2.7m and exports of citrus from Israel totaled £300,000. In April 1951, Israel offered to purchase 3,000 tons of beef, 800 tons of milk powder, 100 tons of tinned milk and 5,000 tons of seed potatoes. See correspondence: (1) between the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Notes 205

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74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82

83 84 85

86 87 88

89 90

and the delegation in London, February 1950 and January 1951, ISA, FM, 39/9; (2) between the Israeli delegation in London and the Irish Department of Agriculture, April 1951, NAI, R314/5. In the first four years of its existence, Israel received paltry assistance from foreign countries, especially the United States, which covered no more than 13 percent of the import surplus. At that time, assistance from Jewish sources was twice and three times higher than assistance from foreign governments. Reparations from Germany only started in 1953. Esther Alexander, “The Absorption Economy in Israel’s First Decade,” in Shapira, Independence: The First Fifty Years, pp. 89–90, 103. Note addressed to MacBride, May 10, 1950, NAI, DFA, 348/117. See: Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Montevideo, December 26, 1933, Article 7, www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/intdip/interam/intam03.htm (accessed on December 17, 2006). On the negotiations for signing the trade agreement in May 1950, and April–May 1951, see, NAI, DFA, 348/117. Question of de jure Recognition of the State of Israel, NAI, DFA, 305/81/1. See Chapter 3. Iremonger’s notes, October 12, 1950, NAI, DFA, 305/81/1. Ben-Horin, “The Vatican and Israel . . . ,” in Yegar, Govrin, Oded, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, vol. 2, p. 1002. Memorandum for the Government, April 19, 1951, NAI, DFA, 305/ 81/ 1. Lee, Ireland 1912–1985, p. 308. Due to his involvement in human rights issues and his training in law, MacBride was able to launch an international career as chairman of Amnesty International (1961–75); Secretary General of the International Commission of Jurists in Geneva from 1963; UN Assistant Secretary-General and Commissioner for Namibia (1973–7). In 1974 he received the Nobel Peace Prize. See: A. J. Jordan, Sean MacBride: A Biography, Dublin: Blackwater, 1993, pp. 157–71. Mulcahy was a leader of the Fine Gael (1944–59); however, his activist past against the anti-treaty forces ruled him out as head of the inter-party governments (1948–51, 1954–7). See: McCullagh, A Makeshift Majority, pp. 30–1, 45. Letter from M. Kidron, member of the Israeli delegation in London who received the information from Sayers, to Comay, March 20, 1951, ISA, FM, 2391/23. His failure was evident in the spring of 1951, in the fierce dispute between conservative and liberal Ireland regarding the Mother and Child Scheme. The scheme that Minister of Health, Dr Noel Browne (for Clann na Poblachta) drew up, proposed free medical care for all mothers and children under 16. The Catholic bishops fought the scheme, fearing that it would undermine family values, and emerged victorious. Browne was forced to resign on April 8, 1951 by Costello, who supported the conservative forces in his party, and by MacBride, who ignored the social radical circles in his party. Thus MacBride led his party to anarchy and loss of political influence. Lee, Ireland 1912–1985, pp. 305–7, 313–20. NAI, DFA, 305/81/1. For Comay’s request to Abba Eban, see his letter to him and to Elath, February 4, 1952, ISA, FM, 2391/23. The government, which was based on 69 Fianna Fáil representatives, and was dependent on 14 representatives of the Independents Party, was unstable. The remaining Dáil seats were divided as follows: Fine Gael 40; Labor 16; Clann na Talmhan 6; Clann na Poblachta 2. Disagreement between the factions in the previous government prevented reestablishment of a government led by Fine Gael. Lyons, Ireland since the Famine, p. 579. Keatinge, The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy, pp. 55–60; Keogh, Ireland and the Vatican, p. 325; Bowman, De Valera and the Ulster Question, p. 72, footnote 97. The comment was written on a note attached to a letter from Comay to Eban on February 4, 1952, ISA, FM, 2391/23.

206 Notes 91 Eighteen countries upgraded their recognition from de facto to de jure: Belgium, Canada, Cuba, Denmark, Finland, France, Holland, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. Iran granted Israel de facto recognition in March 1950 and dispatched a diplomatic representative. In 1951 it recalled its representative in an attempt to achieve Arab support for its struggle to nationalize the oil industry. Ceylon granted Israel de facto recognition in 1949, but took a pro-Arab stand that was influenced by its Muslim minority and its commercial ties with the Arab states. On Greece, see next endnote. 92 Greece granted Israel de facto recognition when it was established; however, it maintained a pro-Arab stance because of its dependence on oil and the Arab markets, and out of concern for the Greek communities in these countries, including the large and prosperous community in Egypt. At the beginning of 1952, Greece hinted to Israel that it would like to normalize relations. This was apparently due to Greek–Egyptian tensions resulting from the fierce riots in Cairo in January 1952 (as part of the Egyptian antiBritish struggle), which resulted in damage to property belonging to British and other minorities, including Greek. Given these tensions, Comay predicted that Greece would grant Israel de jure recognition within a short time. Due to its pro-Arab position, Greece only granted de jure recognition in 1990, years after Ireland. See: M. Gilboa, “Background and Preparations for Greek Recognition of Israel,” in Yegar, Govrin, Oded, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, vol. 1, pp. 377–97. 93 ISA, FM, 2391/23. 94 For years, Israel avoided any ties with West and East Germany because of the Holocaust. Although the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs relaxed its stance, as evidenced in the 1952 reparations agreement, because of Arab pressure in Bonn, relations between Israel and West Germany were only established in 1965. See: P. Eliav, “The Jewish Aspect of Israel’s Foreign Relations,” in Yegar, Govrin, Oded, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, vol. 2, p. 912 [Hebrew]. 95 Letter from Comay to Eban and Elath, February 10, 1952, ISA, FM, 357/19. 96 In the course of the 1950s, Israel pragmatically expressed interest in ties with Spain, but met with refusal because of Spain’s pro-Arab policy. When the Socialist party came into power in Spain in 1982, the road was paved for establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel in January 1986. See: N. Lorch, “Israel and Spain: Diplomatic Relations,” in Yegar, Govrin, Oded, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, vol. 2, pp. 398–403 [Hebrew]. 97 Letter from Eban to the US Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Jerusalem, March 28, 1952, ISA, FM, 357/19 [Hebrew]. 98 See copy of the report as appended to the letter from Comay to Eban, May 6, 1952, ISA, FM, 357/19. E. Samuel divided his time between Britain and Israel, where he lectured on British institutions and political theory. 99 Ben-Horin, “The Vatican and Israel . . . ,” in Yegar, Govrin, Oded, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, vol. 2, p. 1002. 100 In the late 1980s, Israeli historiography underwent a change with the appearance of the new revisionist, post-Zionist historians, such as Baruch Kimmerling, Ilan Pappe, and Avi Shlaim. These historians agreed with the Palestinian narrative and described the Palestinians as miserable victims of Israeli repression and violence. Gelber, who referred to British and Israeli archival documentation as well as Arab sources, rejects their version as full of political biases intended to serve the claim that Israel was born in sin. But Gelber also dispels the myths in the Israeli version. For example, he claims that the Arab leadership tried to halt the escape and encouraged the refugees to return and join the battle against Israel. Regarding the number of refugees, he believes that the Israeli estimate is more reliable. For more details: Gelber, Independence Versus Nakba, pp. 12–17, 131–51, 235–59, 281–310, 346–76.

Notes 207 101 Memorandum and appendix, September 8, 1951, NAI, DFA, 305/81/1. 102 J. Murphy, “Britain and Palestine,” Irish Ecclesiastical Record, August 1950, p. 126. 103 Briscoe, who visited Israel with him, did not accompany him on his visit to Jordan. However, in his book he relates the conversations they had at the King David Hotel in Jerusalem about impressions of their visit. In one of these conversations, Briscoe tried to convince him that the solution to the refugee problem proposed by Israel was the right one. Briscoe did not go into detail, but noted that de Valera “. . . sympathizes with the Arab people in their hope of independence and prosperity.” Briscoe further wrote that, probably thanks to the visit to Israel, de Valera had gained a new understanding of Israel’s problems. He was also impressed by the creative energy of the Jewish people in building their little country, and by their genuine wish to live in peace with their neighbors. It appears that Briscoe refrained from presenting him in an anti-Israel light, and only hinted at his identification with the refugees. Briscoe, For the Life of Me, pp. 306–8. 104 Gelber, Independence versus Nakba, pp. 424, 428–9; Y. Amitai, “The Arab Minority in Israel: the Period of Military Administration, 1948–1966,” in Shapira, Independence: The First Fifty Years, pp. 129–48. 105 Ben-Horin, “The Vatican and Israel . . . ,” in Yegar, Govrin, Oded, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, vol. 2, p. 1002. 106 In November 1948, the IDF asked residents to leave their villages temporarily and move south. Their evacuation was intended to enable control of the permeable border with Lebanon, to prevent the return of Palestinians who had fled to Lebanon. The evacuees were promised that they would be allowed to return to their villages when the security situation improved. This promise was never kept. They appealed to Israel’s High Court of Justice in 1951, which ruled that Israel had to find a way for them to return to their villages, but this did not help either. Their problem is an albatross around the neck of the Israeli government, which has not found a solution for the evacuees or their descendants. Y. Gelber, Independence versus Nakba, pp. 308, 352, 355, 415. See also: “Jewish Military wiped out Catholic Village,” Irish Independent, February 27, 1952. 107 “Arabs fight Christians in Nazareth,” Irish Press, April 15, 1952. 108 This was indicated in a letter from Comay to Eban, May 22, 1952, ISA, FM, 357/19. 109 Letter from Eban to Comay, May 14, 1952, ibid. 110 Letter from Eban to Herzog, June 10, 1952, ibid. 111 In his autobiography (Living History, pp. 127) C. Herzog presents an amusing anecdote. Hearne, who did not have a military attaché of his own, asked him to fill this position in the embassy’s reception on St Patrick’s Day. Hearne was sure that no one would notice the difference. And indeed this was so. Herzog’s accent was somewhat heavy, but obviously Irish. He even knew how to speak Irish, which most of the Irish visitors did not. Herzog added that his Irish roots were a clear asset in his activities in Washington. The ways of history are wondrous. Herzog, who represented Ireland so amusingly in Washington, represented the State of Israel in Ireland when he officially visited Dublin as Israel’s president in 1985. 112 Question of de jure recognition of the State of Israel. March 21, 1956, NAI, DFA, 305/81/1. 113 N. Bentwich, “The El Dorado of Israel,” The Irish Times, June 6, 1952. 114 Arnon’s letter to Elath, May 7, 1953, ISA, FM, 532/4. 115 Letter from Arnon to M. Smyllie, Irish Times editor, July 7, 1952; letter from P. O’Curry, Standard editor, to Arnon, August 1, 1952, ibid. 116 “Atonement,” Irish Times, September 13, 1952. 117 “Jerusalem and the Holy Places Today,” The Irish Times, December 23, 1952. 118 “The Language,” Irish Press, November 21, 1952. 119 A. Yapo – CD – to Arnon, July 20, 1952, ISA, FM, 332/9.

208 Notes 120 Letter from Elath to Comay, July 16, 1952; letter from Yapo to Elath, August 18, 1952, ISA, FM, 332/10. 121 Letter from Boland to Nunan, September 1, 1952, INA, DFA, 434/304. 122 Letter from secretary of Frank Aiken to secretary of Taoiseach’s Department, September 5, 1952, INA, DFA, 434/304. See also an article from Le Monde, March 27, 1952 which said that the Vatican appreciated Sharett’s request for an audience with the Pope, ibid. Iveagh House made reference to this article. Sharett’s report of April 1952 (ISA, 72.10) confirms that Sharett initiated the visit. According to the Israeli press agency the Vatican saw the request as proof of Israel’s acknowledgment that the Catholic Church was an international power that must be accepted as such. At the audience the Pope spoke with Sharett on love of mankind and faith in God and on the truth as revealed to humanity and found in Christianity. 123 Letter from Elath to Comay, July 16, 1952; letter from Yapo to Elath, August 18, 1952, ISA, FM, 322/10; letter from Boland to the secretariat of the Department of External Affairs, September 29, 1952, INA, DFA, 434/304. 124 Correspondence between Elath and Eitan, October 24, 1952, November 2, 1952, ISA, FM, 2412/34. 125 Letter from Comay to Eliash, November 4, 1949; letter from Comay to Kidron at the Israeli delegation in London, March 12, 1950, ISA, FM, 38/9. For more on this subject: W. Eitan, “The Foreign Service,” in Yegar, Govrin, Oded, in Ministry for Foreign Affairs, vol. 1, pp. 26–7. 126 Letter from Jakobovits to Sayers, March 20, 1950; correspondence between Jakobovits and Elath, March–May 1951, ISA, FM, 38/9. 127 Cable from Eitan to Elath, October 31, 1952; cable from Sharett’s secretary to Elath, November 4, 1952, ISA, FM, 38/9. 128 Letter from Elath to Boland, November 10, 1952; letter from Arnon to Rabbi Jakobovits, December 12, 1952, ISA, FM, 332/10. 129 The report [Hebrew] was sent on January 29, 1953, ISA, FM, 332/10. A meeting that was planned with Ireland’s President, Sean T. O’Kelly, was canceled due to the president’s health. See: letter from Nunan to Elath, January 27, 1953, NAI, DFA, 434/304. 130 De Valera’s government inherited a serious balance of payments deficits from its predecessor. MacEntee, Minister of Finance, implemented a deflationary policy in response, but this led to the depression. Emigration had reached its highest point since the 1880s. The average annual number of emigrants in 1951–6 reached 39,353 – 0.92 percent of the population. See: Lee, Ireland 1912–1985, pp. 322–6; Keogh, Twentieth Century Ireland, pp. 215–18. 131 Dwyer, “Eamon de Valera and the Partition Question” in O’Carroll, Murphy, de Valera and His Times, p. 84; Bowman, De Valera and the Ulster Question, p. 18. 132 See: Z. Jabotinsky, “Popular and National Tongue,” in Z. Jabotinsky, Selected Writings, vol. 1, Tel Aviv: Salzmann, 1936, pp. 329–33 [Hebrew]. 133 The Prague Trials: Anti-Western, anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli show trials, conducted under Soviet influence. Leaders of the Czech Communist Party were accused of treason, including espionage for the West, in collusion with Jewish and Zionist organizations and with Israeli representatives. Eleven of the fourteen defendants were Jewish, led by Rudolf Slansky, Secretary General of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The defendants cracked during their interrogation, “confessing” to all charges. Eleven were executed, eight of them Jewish. Three others were sentenced to life imprisonment. The Doctors’ Plot: On January 13, 1953, several famous physicians most of whom were Jewish were arrested in the Soviet Union, for allegedly conspiring to poison the leaders of the Soviet state. The defendants confessed to these accusations, saying that they had been sent by the Zionist Movement, the Joint Distribution Committee, and the US Central Intelligence Agency. They were slated to receive death sentences, but were exonerated after Stalin’s death in March 1953. Stalin’s

Notes 209

134

135 136 137 138

139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148

149

death enabled the Soviet Union and Israel to renew their relationship in July 1953, but the Soviet Union’s pro-Arab stance and Israel’s campaign to allow Jews from the Eastern Bloc to immigrate to Israel caused the relationship to deteriorate until it was terminated altogether during the Six Day War. For further information, see: M. Yegar, Czechoslovakia, Zionism and Israel: Shifts and Turns in Complex Relations, Jerusalem: The Zionist Library, 1997, pp. 75–111, 119–51 [Hebrew]; Y. Ro’i, Soviet Decision Making in Practice: The USSR and Israel 1947–1954, New Brunswick, NJ and London: Transaction Books, 1980; A. Krammer, The Forgotten Friendship: Israel and the Soviet Bloc 1947–53, Urbana, Chicago, IL: University of Illinois, 1974. A. Bialer, “Ben-Gurion and Israel’s International Orientation 1948–1956,” in Shapira, Independence: The First Fifty Years, pp. 222–32. Ben-Gurion was Israel’s prime minister from May 1948 until December 1953, and from November 1955 to June 1963. This emerges from a letter from Yapo – CD – to Elath, February 11, 1953, ISA, FM, 332/10. Note of T. J. Horan, counselor in the Irish Department of External Affairs, November 11, 1952, NAI, DFA, 305/62/1. “Israeli Envoy on Irish Visit,” Irish Press, January 6, 1953; “Israeli Diplomat’s Irish Visit,” Irish Independent, January 6, 1953; “Israeli Ambassador in Ireland,” Irish Times, January 6, 1953. Nunan’s letter to Walshe, January 9, 1953, NAI, DFA, 434/304. D. R. McDonald, Nunan’s aide who was appointed Ireland’s envoy in Brussels shortly after, told Yosef Ariel, Israel’s envoy in Brussels, that Elath had made an excellent impression in Dublin. See: Ariel’s letter to the Office of the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs, June 28, 1954, ISA, FM, 332/10. Walshe’s letter to Nunan, February 6, 1953, ibid. Yemima Rosenthal, “Israel’s Foreign Policy: Between Security and Diplomacy,” in Z. Zameret and H. Yablonka (eds), The First Ten Years 1948–1958, Jerusalem: Yad Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, 1997, pp. 184–6 [Hebrew]. The government leaned on Fine Gael (50 representatives in the Dáil ), Labour (19) and Clann na Talmhan (5). Clann na Poblachta (3) supported it from outside. Lyons, Ireland since the Famine, pp. 580–1. Letter from Elath to Abrahamson, June 21, 1954, ISA, FM, 2412/34. Correspondence between Abrahamson and Elath, May–June 1955, ibid. Letter from Ariel to the office of Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 28, 1954, ibid. De Valera and Aiken continued to nurture a “special relationship” with the Vatican, but did not consider it the epicenter of world power. Keogh, Ireland and the Vatican, p. 342. Review of the Irish Department of External Affairs, March 21, 1956, NAI, DFA, 305/81. The list included: Cambodia, Jordan, Laos, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunis, South Korea, and South Vietnam, which were not UN members. Wylie, “The Virtual Minimum,” in Kennedy, Skelly, Irish Foreign Policy, pp. 152–3. The reprisals were a response to sporadic Arab infiltration into Israeli territory, for purposes of smuggling, theft, sabotage, or reuniting families. There were also incursions by organized armed gangs that resulted in over 400 Israelis killed and 900 wounded, mostly civilians, between 1951 and 1956. In view of the helplessness of the UN observers and the Mixed Armistice Commissions, the Israeli government felt itself obliged to protect its citizens. N. Lorch, Between Israel and Nations, Tel Aviv: Am-Oved, 1980, pp. 73–4 [Hebrew]. S. Kahana, “Israel in the United Nations Arena,” in Yegar, Govrin, Oded, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, vol. 2, Jerusalem: Keter, 2002, pp. 789–801; Y. Bloom, “Israel and the UN in Hindsight,” ibid., 824–7; M. Kidron, “Israel and the UN – The First Years,” ibid., pp. 830–5.

210 Notes 150 Bialer, “Ben-Gurion and Israel’s International Orientation,” in Shapira, Independence: The First Fifty Years, p. 240. The Baghdad Pact was based on the northern part of the region: Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan, and was directed against the Soviet Union. 151 From the UN department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Jerusalem to CD, November 16, 1955, ISA, FM, 332/10. 152 Compared to the 20 countries with which Ireland had official relations. Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations 1945–1965, p. 19. 153 Letter from Eitan to Eban, February 29, 1956, ISA, FM, 332/10. 154 Cable from Eban to Eitan, March 15, 1956; letter from Hearne to Eban, April 23, 1956, ibid. 155 Letter from Yohanan Meroz, first secretary at the Israeli embassy in Washington, to Eitan, April 26, 1956, ibid. 156 D. Shaham, Israel – 50 Years, pp. 122–6. 157 From Iveagh House to Hearne, April 9, 1956, INA, DFA, 317/45. 158 Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, pp. 29–39. Skelly (ibid., pp. 38–9, 84) expressed his opinion on the apparently inherent tension between Cosgrave’s second and third principles, a tension that scholars had already studied. Skelly believed that from the point of view of the Costello government, this tension did not exist, because they were not of equal significance. The second principle was no more than a nod to Irish neutrality and was intended for internal purposes. The third principle, on the other hand, was considered to be essential to Irish international interests. 159 Letter from Savir to Eilat, December 30, 1955; letter from Savir to Arnon, who was promoted to director of the Press Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Jerusalem, November 8, 1956, February 10, 1956, ISA, FM, 523/4. 160 Communication between Savir and Arnon, March 12, 1956, March 4, 1956, ibid. 161 Letter from White to Savir, January 29, 1956, ibid. 162 Rosenthal, “Israel’s Foreign Policy: between Security and Diplomacy,” in Zameret, Yablonka, The First Decade 1948–1958, pp. 171–3; Kahana, “Israel in the United Nations Arena,” in Yegar, Govrin, Oded, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, vol. 2, pp. 800–1. 163 “Land of Promise – Troubled Water,” Irish Times, March 8, 1956. 164 Their immigration is related to the Israeli-Arab conflict and growing Arab nationalism combined with solidarity with the Palestinians. Their persecution, both official and unofficial, began after the war broke out in Palestine in 1948, and led to their direct and indirect immigration to Israel and Western Europe (especially from Egypt). This movement also included Jews in Arab countries that were not involved in the conflict, such as Libya and French North Africa. Gelber, Independence Versus Nakba, pp. 477–8; I. Zur, “Immigration from Islamic Countries,” in Zameret, Yablonka, The First Decade, pp. 58–73. 165 At the Conciliation Committee in Lausanne – summer 1949 – under pressure from the Americans, Ben-Gurion agreed to accept 100,000 refugees, but refused to announce this publicly. However, in the second round of talks at Lausanne, the Israeli delegation announced that Israel was willing to accept 25,000 refugees to reunite families. Gelber, Independence Versus Nakba, pp. 368–9. 166 The Eastern European immigrants were Holocaust survivors from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. Israel was perceived as both a home and a substitute for what had been lost. See: H. Yablonka, “European Immigrants and the Consciousness of the Holocaust,” in Zameret, Yablonka, The First Decade 1948–1958, p. 42. For the oriental immigration, see Note 164 in this chapter. 167 “Land of Promise: the Pressure Cooker,” Irish Times, March 16, 1956. 168 His data is for 1955 and is almost identical to authorized Israeli data. Alexander, “The Absorption Economy in Israel’s First Decade,” p. 103. 169 “Land of Promise: the Pressure Cooker,” Irish Times, March 16, 1956.

Notes 211 170 “Land of Promise: Stresses and Strains,” Irish Times, March 19, 1956. 171 Ibid. 172 See: W. R. Louis and R. Owen (eds), Suez 1956: The Crisis and its Consequences, Oxford: Clarendon, 1989; Brecher, Decisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy, chapter 6. 173 Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, pp. 52–5. See also: D. Shaham, Israel – 50 Years, pp. 129–37. 174 “Israel is the Aggressor, Says Mr. Cosgrave,” Irish Independent, November 2, 1956. 175 Lorch, Between Israel and Nations, p. 86; Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, p. 52. 176 Ibid., pp. 57–8. For the full speech: NAI, PMUN, NY, 198/J/I 1956–8. 177 On November 6, after a quick conquest of the Sharm Al Sheikh bay, which dominates the entry to the Straits of Tiran, Israel had achieved its goals in the Sinai and considered the battle to be over. On the same day, UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold announced that Britain and France (which had not yet captured the entire canal region), Israel and Egypt were prepared to agree on a ceasefire. The Soviet threat to take direct action if the demand for a ceasefire is not acted upon, led to Ben-Gurion’s announcement on November 8, on the Israel army’s withdrawal from Sinai and Israel’s agreement to a UN force on the peninsula. On November 14, a UN force departed for the Suez region and Britain and France were ready to pull out their troops. In the last week of November, Israel began to withdraw its forces from Sinai. Shaham, Israel – 50 Years, p. 318. 178 Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, p. 58. 179 Kahana, “Israel in the United Nations Arena,” in Yegar, Govrin, Oded, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, vol. 2, p. 801. 180 Lorch, Between Israel and Nations, pp. 86–7; Shaham, Israel – 50 Years, pp. 139–40; M. Bar-On, “ ‘Out of the north an evil shall break forth’: Israel’s Security from the Sinai Campaign to the Six-Day War 1957–1967,” in. Z. Zameret and H. Yablonka (eds), The Second Decade 1958–1968, Jerusalem: Yad Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, 2000, p. 347 [Hebrew]. 181 Letter from Elath to Eitan, January 11, 1957, ISA, FM, 3095/28. See also: Letter from Eitan to Elath, January 9, 1957, ISA, FM, 3095/28. 182 Cable from Herzog to the embassy in Washington, January 24, 1957, ISA, FM, 3095/28. 183 Shaham, Israel – 50 Years, p. 140; O’Brien, The Siege, pp. 396–7. 184 O’Brien, The Siege: The Saga of Israel and Zionism, pp. 14–15. See also O’Brien, Memoir, pp. 173, 175. 185 Excerpt from Boland’s letter to C. C. Cremin, secretary of the Department of External Affairs (1958–63), February 5, 1959, INA, DFA, PMUN, X/81. Boland wrote this after hearing from Eban that he would be leaving the United Nations, probably to serve as Foreign Minister in Ben-Gurion’s cabinet – an expectation that was not realized. Boland also sent Eban a warm letter, dated May 17, 1957, thanking him for his book: Voice of Israel, Abba Eban Center for Israel Diplomacy, 0011/0099. 186 Memo from Levin to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Jerusalem, March 14, 1957, ISA, FM, 3140/3; letter from Yahil to Levin, April 7, 1957, ISA, FM, 3095/28. 187 He served as president for two terms, until 1973. 188 Letter from Murphy to Comay, September 25, 1957, ISA, FM, 3095/28. 189 This was targeted at immigration from Romania, Hungary, and Poland, against the background of anti-Soviet unrest (Yablonka, “European Immigrants and the Consciousness of the Holocaust,” in Zameret, Yablonka, The First Decade 1948–1958, p. 42), immigration from Egypt following the Sinai campaign, and immigration from Tunisia and Morocco when conditions for Jews deteriorated following the transition from colonialism to an independent Arab regime. See: Zur, “Immigration from the Islamic Countries,” in Zameret, Yablonka, The First Decade 1948–1958, pp. 76–8.

212 Notes 190 Briscoe, For the Life of Me, pp. 309–33; “U.S. Goes for Dublin’s First Jewish Mayor,” The National Jewish Monthly, B’nai Brith, April 1957; Herzog, Living History, p. 127. 191 Cable from the Israeli embassy in London (sent at Herzog’s request) to the director general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Jerusalem, September 25, 1957; letter from Herzog to the Foreign Minister’s office in Jerusalem, October 20, 1957; correspondence between Meir and Briscoe, November 1957, ISA, FM, 3095/28. 192 Briscoe, For the Life of Me, p. 322. 193 Ibid., pp. 304–5. 194 This emerges from de Valera’s letter to M. Abrahamson July 26, 1966, UCDAD, de Valera papers, file 844. 195 Letter from de Valera to Ben-Gurion, April 10, 1957, ISA, FM, 332/10. 196 In 1956 and 1957, Ireland was the only country in the Western world where the total volume of goods and services consumed actually fell. Between 1951 and 1961, 412,000 people emigrated. F. O’Toole, The Irish Times Book of the Century, Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1999, pp. 206–7, 222–4. Compare Note 130 in this chapter. 197 Since de Valera’s return to the government in 1951, his despair regarding unification of the island deepened. In 1957, he came close to announcing that a united Ireland was not a realistic goal for the near future. He completely ruled out any violent solution to the partition problem, but also rejected international intervention. The dimensions of the problem were expressed in his declaration in July 1958 that “anybody who would get the solution would be regarded as one of the greatest men in Irish history.” See: Bowman, De Valera and the Ulster Question, pp. 293–5; Dwyer, “Eamon de Valera and the Partition Question,” in O’Carroll, Murphy, de Valera and His Times, p. 88; O’Toole, The Irish Times Book of the Century, pp. 207–8. 198 After the IRA reorganized in the mid-1950s, it started a “border campaign” against Northern Ireland. Incursions by the IRA’s Flying Columns started in December 1956 and continued until 1962. Tim Pat Coogan, The I.R.A, London: Harper Collins, 1987, pp. 377–418. 199 Ben-Horin, “The Vatican and Israel . . . ,” Yegar, Govrin, Oded, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, vol. 2, pp. 1002–3. 200 Memo from McCauley to Murphy, August 1, 1957, NAI, DFA, 313/6D. 201 Ben-Horin, “The Vatican and Israel . . . ,” Yegar, Govrin, Oded, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, vol. 2, p. 1003. 202 Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, pp. 96, 288. 203 A name given to independent disinterested UN members who were trying to judge all issues on their merits and vote accordingly. These should not be confused with the neutralist, non-aligned Afro-Asian bloc. Aiken’s assertive policy and Irish military neutrality paved the way for Ireland’s inclusion in the middle powers, which included the Nordic countries; Canada and the Netherlands, which were low-profile NATO countries; and moderate Afro-Asian countries such as Tunisia and Malaysia, which at that time did not belong to the neutralist bloc lead by India and Ghana. Ibid. p. 100. 204 From 1959, when Sean Lemass replaced de Valera as leader of the Fianna Fáil and as Taoiseach, Ireland was drawn more closely to the sphere of Western influence. This was due to its anti-communist position in the Cold War, and the Continental orientation of Lemass, who struggled to get his country accepted into the European Economic Community. Ibid., pp. 86–98; M. Kennedy and J. M. Skelly, “The Study of Irish Foreign Policy from Independence to Internationalism,” in Kennedy and Skelly (eds), Irish Foreign Policy 1919–1966, from Independence to Internationalism, Dublin: Four Courts, 2000, p. 24. 205 See Skelly’s thorough analysis of Aiken’s Middle East peace plan and his speech at the emergency session, in his book: Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, pp. 151–61. 206 Shaham, Israel – 50 Years, pp. 162–5; Bar-On, Israel’s Security, p. 346.

Notes 213 207 208 209 210 211 212 213

214 215 216 217 218

219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226

227

228

Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, p. 154. Ibid. “Plan for the Middle East,” NAI, DFA, 305/81/1. Ibid. Ibid. Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, pp. 151–5. The proposal of the Arab bloc was approved after two other proposals failed to achieve a two-thirds majority: the proposal of the Soviet bloc and the Afro-Asian delegations, which supported condemnation of the Anglo-American action and called for withdrawal of their troops, and the proposal of the moderate European countries, which supported withdrawal, provided that this would not jeopardize regional stability. Ibid., pp. 158–9. Ibid., p. 159, note 27. Memo from Cohen to Walter Eitan, November 3 and 7, 1958, ISA, FM, 3095/28. Communication between Comay and the Israeli embassy in London, November 1958, regarding Ireland’s diplomatic delegations. Ibid. M. Fisher to the UN department in Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 17, 1958, ibid. This is evident in the letter of J. Herzog to A. Meir, Israeli consul in Milan, November 3, 1953, ISA, FM, 2396/15II. J. Herzog was aware of Roncalli’s humanism and the warm feelings he displayed toward his father when he met him in February 1944. The nuncio promised Rabbi Herzog, who was in Turkey on a rescue mission, that he would do whatever he could to save Jews. See also: Barlas, Rescue during the Holocaust, pp. 35, 129, 162, 163, 168, 170; Dubois, “The Catholic Church and the State of Israel . . . ,” p. 217. Lapide, Three Popes and the Jews, p. 319. Summary of Fischer’s Vatican mission, February 18, 1957, ISA, FM, 394/5. Fischer’s reports to Foreign Minister Meir, February 10 and 15, 1959, ISA, FM, 334/18. Letter from Comay to Elath, February 23, 1959, ibid. [Hebrew]. Letter from MacDonald to the Secretary of the External Affairs Department, March 24, 1959, NAI, DFA, 313/20. This emerges from a note from Cremin to Aiken, November 24, 1958, NAI, DFA, 305/62/1. The memo was sent to all the Irish diplomatic delegations, NAI, DFA, PMUN, 128/X/81. John XXIII ordered that the Latin perfidis, which was used as an epithet for Jews, and originated in the seventh century, be omitted from the Good Friday prayer. The original meaning of perfidis was unbelieving; that is, those who refuse to accept the Christian faith. However, this term, in consonance with the Church portrayal of the Jews was soon translated into different languages in thousands of prayer books into words synonymous with perfidious, which has a much more pejorative meaning – turning a prayer into a moral condemnation. In 1949, Pius XII authorized the translation of perfidis as unbelieving. John XXIII went even further than that. Lapide, Three Popes and the Jews, pp. 301, 320–1. Norton served in both of Costello’s governments as Tánaiste (deputy prime minister). During this time, he served alternately as both Minister for Social Welfare and Minister for Industry and Commerce. He headed Ireland’s delegation to the European Council between 1949 and 1951. Biographical Sketch of Norton, from Irish Embassy, Washington, 1956, ISA, FM, 3127/9. After de Valera resigned from the premiership, Aiken continued to serve as Minister of External Affairs in the Lemass government. Lemass had no choice but to allow him to remain in this position because of his experience and his status in Fianna Fáil. See: Keatinge, The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy, pp. 50, 65.

214 Notes 229 Letter from Norton to Leo Cohen November 12, 1959, ISA, FM, 3095/28. 230 Letter from the Economic Desk of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Jerusalem to CD, January 15, 1959; from CD to the economic advisor of the Israeli embassy in London, February 1, 1959, ibid. 231 The files of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Jerusalem contained only information about Norton and his career, not about the private visit. 232 This is evident in a letter from Cohen to Elath, May 29, 1959, ibid. Cohen’s familiarity with Vatican matters is evident in a memo from Sharett to Eitan, December 29, 1949 (ISA, FM, 2396/15) in which Cohen is described as deeply enmeshed in Vatican affairs. 233 NAI, DFA, PMUN, 128/X/81. 234 Norton did this in his letter to the rabbi, April 22, 1956, ISA, FM, 3127/9. 235 As evidenced by Cremin’s letter to Boland, April 19, 1969, NAI, DFA, PMUN, X/81. 236 These reasons are evident in Norton’s letter to Cohen, August 11, 1959, ISA, FM, 3127/9. 237 As evidenced by Norton’s letter to Cohen, 11 August 1959, ibid. 238 Cable from H. Yahil, director general of the Foreign Ministry (1959–64) to Luria, December 1959, ibid. 239 Cable from Luria to Jerusalem, December 8, 1959; cable from Comay to Jerusalem, December 14, 1959, ibid. 240 This is expressed in the letter from Pauline Coopersteina (probably Comay’s secretary) on behalf of Comay to A. Harman, Israel’s ambassador to Washington (1959–68), February 3, 1960, ibid. 241 Letter from the economic department of the foreign ministry to Gilat at the Israeli embassy in London, December 31, 1959, ISA, FM, 3095/28. According to the outline agreement signed in Tel Aviv between the Irish & Allied Trading Corporation, Ltd. and the Israeli company, Trans Ocean Trading Corporation, Ltd, each company undertook, over the next four years, to buy Israeli or Irish goods at the value of £250,000. 242 This is expressed in the letter from Reuven Nell – CD, to Luria, April 30, 1961, ISA, FM, 3303/26. 243 Letter from Gilat to the directors general of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Industry, April 25, 1960, ibid. 244 Cremin’s note, March 28, 1960, NAI, DFA, 305/81/1. 245 Letter from Boland to Cremin, April 6, 1960, NAI, DFA, PMUN, X/81. 246 Letter from Cremin to Boland, April 19, 1960, NAI, DFA, PMUN, 128/X/81. 247 Letter from Boland to Cremin, April 26, 1961, ibid. 248 Inter-department committee report, April 29, 1960, INA, DFA, 348/117A. 249 Letter from Nell to Luria, April 30, 1961; Luria’s report on his meeting with Aiken, May 15, 1961, ISA, FM, 3303/26. 250 Cable from CD to Luria, March 8, 1960, ISA, FM, 3095/28. 251 Cable from Gideon Raphael, deputy director of the Foreign Ministry (1960–5) to Comay, June 2, 1960, ISA, FM, 3303/26. Because minutes of Israeli government meetings from 1955 onwards remain sealed, it is not possible to verify whether the discussion in the government did indeed take place. 252 Cable from Linton to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Jerusalem, June 9, 1960, ibid. [Hebrew]. 253 Briscoe, For the Life of Me, p. 339. 254 From Unna to CD, November 22, 1960, ISA, FM, 3303/27. 255 L. Tye, Home Lands: Portraits of the New Jewish Diaspora, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2001, p. 203. Testimony of Briscoe’s sons, Joe and Ben, August 2002. 256 From Nurock, Johannesburg, to Unna, December 1, 1960, ISA, FM, 3303/27.

Notes 215 257 Letter from Cohen to Nurock, July 21, 1960; Cohen’s report of July 1960; letter from Cohen to Comay, September 27, 1960, ISA, FM, 3303/26. 258 Letter from Cohen to Luria, November 28, 1960, ibid. 259 Except for Arab Algeria, and Muslim Mauritania and Somalia, which were strongly influenced by the Arabs. 260 From that time, until the Yom Kippur War in 1973, most African countries that had had ties with Israel severed them. In the 1980s and 1990s, Israel returned to Africa: A. Oded, “Israel and Africa: Historical and Political Aspects,” in Yegar, Govrin, Oded, Ministry for Foreign Affairs: The First Fifty Years, vol. 2, pp. 615–29. 261 B. Whelan, M. Holmes and N. Rees, “Ireland and the Third World – A Historical Perspective,” Irish Studies in International Affairs, 5, 1994, pp. 107–11. 262 Except for isolated cases, such as transfer of information on education in Israel at the request of the Irish Department of Education. See: correspondence between the Irish and Israeli delegations in London, and between the Israeli delegation in London and the Department of Cultural Affairs in the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June–September 1950, ISA, DFA, FM, 38/9. With the assistance of the Cultural Relations Committee in the Department of External Affairs, a choir comprised of Jews and non-Jews, under the auspices of the Dublin Jewish Musical Society, sang Irish folk songs in an international choral festival that took place in Israel under government sponsorship. “Dublin Choir Welcomed in Israel with the Londonderry Air,” Irish Times, August 31, 1955. 263 There was an average annual increase of 9.7 percent in the gross domestic product, and an average annual increase of 6.5 percent in the per capita product. This can be attributed to accelerated development following reparations from Germany, contributions from world Jewry, increased immigration at the beginning of the 1960s, and a centralized economy. N. Gross, “Israel’s Economy,” in Zameret and Yablonka (eds), The Second Decade 1958–1968, Jerusalem: Yad Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, 2000, pp. 30–43 [Hebrew]. 264 Letter from Cohen to Luria, November 28, 1960, ISA, FM, 3303/26. 265 Ibid. 266 There is a degree of discomfort in the use of the term “anti-Semitism” regarding Arab hatred of Jews, as Arabs are also Semites. Indeed the assertion that Arab antiSemitism is a self-contradiction is only wordplay, as anti-Semitism has been assigned to hatred of Jews. Y. Harkabi, The Arabs’ Position in their Conflict with Israel, Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1968, p. 207 [Hebrew]. 267 For additional information: ibid., chapter 5. 268 The information on the response to the query in the Dáil and the publication in the Irish Times, under the heading “Top Nazis in Ireland,” was included in a letter from the Irish embassy in London to the Israeli embassy in London, June 8, 1960, ISA, FM, 3303/26. 269 Keogh, Jews in Twentieth-Century Ireland, pp. 208–9. 270 This is evident in the letter from Comay to Boland, September 9, 1960, ISA, FM, 3303/26. 271 Cohen’s report on his visit to Dublin, ibid. 272 This policy took a clear anti-Israel, pro-Palestinian direction in January 1961, at the Conference of African States, headed by Nasser, in Casablanca. The conference aimed to thwart the efforts of the Monrovian bloc of the pro-West African countries, and to stop Israel’s entry into Africa. 273 Letter from Boland to Cremin, June 24, 1960, NAI, DFA, PMUN, 476/4. 274 This explanation was made by O’Brien to Gideon Raphael. O’Brien also attributed the delay in normalization of relations with Israel to this. See: cable from Raphael from Washington to Jerusalem, April 19, 1961, ISA, FM, 3303/26. The elections were eventually held in October 1961. The Fianna Fáil, which went to the elections for the

216 Notes

275 276 277 278 279 280 281

282 283 284 285

286 287 288 289

290 291 292

293 294 295 296

first time in four decades without de Valera at its head, dropped from 78 to 70 seats in the Dáil. Lemass was elected Taoiseach and worked with a minority government until 1965. J. Horgan, Sean Lemass: The Enigmatic Patriot, Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1997, pp. 199–201. Cable from Comay to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Jerusalem, September 6, 1960, ISA, FM, 3303/26. Cable from Luria to CD, September 12, 1960, ISA, FM, 3303/26. Letter from Cohen to Luria, November 14, 1960, ISA, FM, 3303/26. Cable from Luria to Yahil, November 21, 1960, ibid. Letter from CD to Luria, April 30, 1961; correspondence between A. Levavi and Luria, May 4, 1961; May 8, 1961, ibid. Luria’s reports, May 15, 1961, ibid. Portugal was not mentioned, as it had an Israeli consulate since 1958. During the 1960s, trade relations also developed. Portugal postponed full relations until 1977 because it was concerned about the Arab response. For Spain’s refusal to establish relations with Israel, see Note 96 in this chapter. The language of the cable to Fay of May 23, 1961 can be found in Cremin’s letter to him, May 26, 1961, NAI, DFA, F100/2/158; letter from Cremin to Boland, June 17, 1961, NAI, DFA, PS 35/1. Letter from Comay to Raphael, June 6, 1961, ISA, FM, 3303/26. Letter From Boland to Cremin, June 22, 1961, INA, DFA, PMUN, P12/16B. Sheehy Skeffington criticized the British Mandate government in Palestine, but also vehemently condemned IZL violence. On the other hand, he was enthusiastic about the Jewish kibbutz and cooperative settlements. See: A. S. Sheehy-Skeffington, Skeff: The Life of Owen Sheehy Skeffington 1909–70, Dublin: Lilliput, 1991, p. 132. Nurock’s report in his Letter to Luria, July 2, 1961, ISA, FM, 3303/26. Letter from Arazi to Luria, December 3, 1961, ISA, FM, 3303/26. See memo, ibid. He gave as an example the Irish legend about the connection between Tuatha de Danaan, early settlers of Hibernia, and Dan, one of Israel’s tribes. Another example was the legend of the stone upon which the Patriarch Jacob lay in his dream. According to this legend, over 2,500 years ago a Jewish princess brought the stone to Westminster Abbey via Tara, which has been regarded traditionally as the seat of the high kings of Ireland. Letter from Arazi to Luria, December 3, 1961, ibid. J. Horgan, Irish Media: A Critical History since 1922, London and New York: Routledge, 2001, pp. 2–3. For example, he provided the daily readership of the Irish Independent – 169,500; Irish Press – 131,000; Irish Times – 35,700; and the larger readerships of the evening and Sunday papers affiliated with these dailies. He also stated that the English Sunday Observer and Sunday Times each had a readership of 60,000 and that the popular English Sunday press had even more readers in Ireland, whose population was merely 2,750,000. See: letter from Unna to CD, November 6, 1960; Freifield’s memo to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, and Appendix thereto with the review of Irish press, August 6, 1960, ISA, FM, 3303/26. Letter from Arazi to A. Levavi, deputy director general of Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 3, 1962; letter from Arazi to Yahil, January 29, 1962, ISA, FM, 3391/35. The report was sent to Yahil, February 11, 1962, ibid. He was appointed to this position by Lemass in December 1961, after serving as a member of the Supreme Court since 1953. Horgan, Sean Lemass, pp. 201–2. Between 1974 and 1976 he was Ireland’s president. This is exaggerated compared to Cremin’s data, see Note 299 in this chapter.

Notes 217 297 From 1967 he was patron of the Ireland-Israel Friendship League. 298 This was the analysis of Mattityahu Sharon, of the Israeli embassy in London, based on conversations with these editors during his visit to Dublin in April 1964. Sharon’s report to CD, April 22, 1964, ISA, FM, 3521/12. 299 In 1960, Israeli exports totaled £400,000, while imports from Ireland reached only £24,000. It is not surprising that Norton described this as a “moribund adventure.” Cremin had more detailed information: £485,000 compared to £45,000 in Israel’s favor in the first eight months of 1961, and £400,000 compared to £25,000 in Israel’s favor in the preceding years. Nurock’s report, February 11, 1962, ISA, FM, 3391/35. 300 This is evidenced in the letter from Arazi to Yahil, April 8, 1962, ISA, 130/3141/4. 301 Diplomatic Relations with Israel, January 30, 1962, INA, DFA, London Embassy, 130/5/1. 302 One was professor of pharmacology at the Royal School of Surgeons; the second was a lecturer at the School of Dentistry; the third was the president of the Stock Exchange, and the fourth was a professor of law at Trinity College. 303 Letter from Nurock to Luria, July 2, 1961, ISA, FM, 3303/26. 304 Keogh, Ireland and the Vatican, p. 325. 305 Keogh, “Eamon de Valera and Hitler . . . ,” p. 73. 306 This is reflected in Aiken’s image engraved in the consciousness of the Irish and the Jews with whom I spoke. Patrick Hennessy, Ireland’s ambassador to Israel, in his testimony of July 2, 2004, was surprised to hear of Aiken’s anti-Semitic image. Rabbi Isaac Cohen, opposed this image in his testimony of January 17, 2002; however, he explained Aiken’s unfriendly attitude to the Jews by his Catholic piousness and cold temperament. On the other hand, Joseph Briscoe confirmed his anti-Semitic image in his testimony of August 11, 2002. 307 Letter from Netanel Lorch, director of the Africa desk in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Nurock, March 23, 1962; letter from Fisher to Yahil, March 26, 1962, ibid. Compare Chapter 4 text. 308 Letter from Arazi to Yahil, April 8, 1962, ISA, FM, 3391/35; Nurock’s report, July 1962, ISA, FM, 3521/12. 309 Letter from Fischer to Arazi, May 25, 1962, ISA, FM, 3391/35. 310 He played down Ireland’s importance and did not mention its participation since 1958 in the UN Observer Group in Lebanon, and from 1959 in the UN Truce Supervision Organization along the Israeli-Egyptian border, established in the late 1940s. Skelly, Irish Diplomacy in the United Nations, pp. 266–70. 311 Letter from Eitan to Levavi, June 11, 1962, ISA, FM, 3391/35. 312 Nurock’s report, July 1962, ISA, FM, 3521/12. 313 Cremin mentioned Egypt and not the UAR since the UAR was dissolved in September 1961. 314 Letter from Nurock to Lorch, October 23, 1962, ISA, 130/314/4. 315 A Yiddish term for a non-Jew who performs work on Sabbath that a Jew is not allowed to do according to Jewish Law. 316 Letter from Nurock to Levavi, August 5, 1962, ISA, FM, 3391/34; Letter from Levavi to Fischer, August 24, 1962, ISA, FM, 33911/35. 317 Draft memorandum for the government, December 1962, NAI, DFA, 305/149/1; and compare Chapter 4 text. 318 At the beginning of 1964, Ireland had only 22 embassies and delegations throughout the world. CD memorandum, March 1964, ISA, FM, 3521/14. 319 Wylie, “The Virtual Minimum . . . ,” p. 153. 320 Ben-Horin, “The Vatican and Israel . . . ,” Yegar, Govrin, Oded, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, vol. 2, p.1004. 321 The “quiet years” lasted through 1965, since the IDF deterrent power strengthened in the Sinai Campaign, leading to relative calm on Israel’s borders. The Gulf of Aqaba

218 Notes

322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339

340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347

remained open to Israeli shipping. Israel political status improved and a rapprochement began with the United States. Bar-On, “ ‘Out of the north an evil shall break forth’ . . . ,” in Zameret and Yablonka, The Second Decade 1958–1968, pp. 354–62; O’Brien, The Siege, pp. 400–4. Israel’s pressure to receive recognition, was emphasized in the minutes of the Secretariat of the Department of External Affairs, May 22, 1963, NAI, DFA, 305/149/1. Memorandum for the Government, May 7, 1963, NAI, DFA, F100/2/158. Circular No. 2/63, October 10, 1963, ibid. Correspondence: between Ronan and Iremonger, Counselor at the Irish embassy in London, May 9, 1963, June 7, 1963; between Iremonger and G. F. Hiller at the British Foreign Office, May 14, 1963, May 30, 1963, ibid. Letter from Cremin to J. G. Molloy, Assistant Secretary, Department of External Affairs, Dublin, July 29, 1963, ibid. CD Memorandum, March 1964, ISA, FM, 3521/14. Letter from Nurock to CD, February 6, 1964, ISA, FM, 3521/12. Ronan’s minute, January 13, 1964, NAI, DFA, F100/2/158. “Irish Republic Recognizes Israel,” Jewish Observer, January 17, 1964; “Ireland Grants Full Recognition to Israel,” Irish Times, January 23, 1964. Aiken’s response in a letter from F. A. Coffey of the secretariat of the Irish Department of External Affairs, to Nurock, February 3, 1964, ISA, FM, 3521/12. On Luria’s approach, see: ibid. Letter from Nurock to Luria, Deputy Director General, Foreign Ministry, August 6, 1969, ISA, FM, 4173/26. Memorandum on diplomatic relations with Ireland, February 6, 1967, ISA, FM, 3997/23. Report from the Israeli Economic Mission in London to the Economic Department of the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem, July 27, 1966, ISA, FM, 1387/18; memorandum on Ireland-Israel scientific and economic relations, June 6, 1969, ISA, FM, 4173/26. Letter from Nurock to Luria, August 6, 1969, ibid. Letter from, the Israel Ambassador to Britain, Michael Comay (1970–7 ) to the Foreign Minister of Israel, Eban (1966–77), June 19, 1971, ISA, FM, 4562/23. Keogh, Jews in Twentieth-Century Ireland, p. 229. According to the agreement between Israel and the EC, its terms did not apply in the course of 1973 to Ireland, as well as to Britain and Denmark who joined the EC on January 1973. See: memorandum to the Office of the Director-General of Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Ireland and Israel, 1973, ISA, FM, 5315/9. A. J. Fischer, “Eire and Israel Establish Diplomatic Relations,” The Contemporary Review, 227, no. 1319, 1975, p. 285. Ibid., p. 289; Keogh, Jews in Twentieth-Century Ireland, p. 229. Keogh, Jews in Twentieth-century Ireland, p. 229. Israeli or Irish documents from the mid-1970s onward years remain classified and are not accessible. BSE: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy. My thanks to Owen Brooks, Director International Markets, Food Board, Irish Department of Agriculture and Food, who provided me this information by e-mail on February 28, 2006. My thanks to Mark Sofer, former Ambassador of Israel in Dublin, who proposed this assumption. Sofer heard it from a senior personage in Dublin. In 1988 Israeli exports to Ireland were valued at $23.5 million, while Irish exports to Israel were valued at $32.8 million. A decade later, Israeli exports to Ireland amounted to $196 million, while Irish exports amounted to $230 million. Today Irish exports total $344 million and Israeli exports are approaching $200 million.

Notes 219 Ireland’s exports to Israel and vice versa, are mainly in the sectors of machinery and electronics, chemicals, textiles and optical/medical and related equipment. My thanks to Daniel Halevy-Goetschel of the Economic Department in the Israel Foreign Ministry, who provided me with this information. Conclusion 1 See Introduction, p. 181, Note 12. 2 Y. Leibowitz, Notes to the Weekly Tora Readings, Jerusalem: Academon, 1998, pp. 15–16 [Hebrew].

Bibliography

Archives Ireland Diocesan Archives, Dublin – DDA Edward Byrne Papers John Charles McQuaid Papers

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National Archives, Ireland (Dublin) – NAI Department of Foreign Affairs (External Affairs in the years covered): Holy See Embassy International Organizations, Delegation – League of Nations London Embassy Permanent Mission to the United Nations Secretary’s Office Department of the Taoiseach

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Index

Abrahams, Abraham 86 Abrahamson, Leonard 110, 130, 162 Abrahamson, Mervyn L. 68 Adenauer, Konrad 122 Agron, Gershon 133 Agudat Israel 44, 49, 64 Aiken, Frank 117, 128–9, 140, 149–51, 154, 157–8, 161–2, 164, 166–71, 173, 176–7; and condolence visit on Hitler’s death 167; speech at UN General Assembly 1958 143–6 Algerian revolt 133 Aliens Act (1935) 57 Anglo-Irish agreement, of April 1938 23 Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 3 Anglo-Irish war of 1919–21 3, 7 Anti-Semitism and anti Zionism in Eastern bloc 127, 136 Anti-Semitism in Ireland 52–7, 78, 92–5; among Catholic clergy 56–7, 62; and anti-Israel incitement 91–7; Keogh’s study of 58 Arab boycott 79, 177 Arab-Israeli conflict 76 Arab League 48 Arab Legion 76, 144 Arab Revolt in Palestine (1936–9) 1, 27, 50 Arazi, Tuvia 162–3 Ariel, Yoseph 130 Arnon, Michael 121–3, 129, 133 Arrow Cross party 66 Baghdad Pact (1955) 131 Balfour Declaration 18, 26–7, 48 Barry, Kevin 7 Begin, Menachem 7 Belton, Patrick 56 Ben-Gurion, David 17, 35, 68, 76, 86, 95, 127, 141–2, 149, 161

Ben-Zvi, President Yitzhak 147, 171 Bergson, Peter (Kook, Hillel) 107 Berlin, Rabbi Meir 59, 60 Bernheim, Franz 31; petition 32–3 Betar 7, 42 Bewley, Charles 56 Black and Tans 27 Bloom, Joseph 149 Blum, Sol 101, 106–7 Boland, Frederick H. 56, 84–5, 88–90, 93, 99, 101, 103, 109, 123, 144–5, 150, 152–6, 158–9, 161, 167, 169, 171–2, 177; and presidency of UN General Assembly 152–3, 158–9, 177 Bolshevism 77 Bolz, Stanford H. 108 Brand, Joel 157 Brennan, Joseph D 140 Briscoe, Ben 32 Briscoe, Robert 6, 7, 8, 32, 35–6, 39–41, 67–9, 106–7, 140–1, 153–4, 164 Britain: pro-Arab orientation of 59; and United Nations partition resolution 1947 46–7 British Commonwealth 3, 40 British Mandate in Palestine 13, 17, 47 Brodetsky, Zelig 33, 38–9 Browne, Michael 93 Browne, Noel 173 Bruya, Anthony 47 Budapest Jews 65, 66 Byrne, Archbishop Edward 55, 62 Cahill, Fr Edward 56 Catholic Emancipation Act (1929) 89 Catholic Hierarchy of Ireland 4, 97, 162, 169, 176; Convention in Maynooth (1949) 92, 103 Catholicism 53; continental 54

232 Index Catholic-Protestant conflict, in Ireland 8 Chamberlain, Neville 24–5 Chiappero, Monsignor Giorgio 148 Chief Rabbi of Palestine see Herzog, Isaac Halevi Christian Front 105–7 Civilta Cattolica 83 Clann na Poblachta 45, 78, 116 Cohen, Leo 8, 33, 36–7, 51, 98, 134, 146, 149–50; at Dublin 154–9, 165 Cold War 8, 80, 104, 127, 129, 143, 177 Collins, Michael 7; urban guerilla methods 7 Comay, Michael 81, 103, 113–14, 117–23, 140, 146, 150, 161 Comité des Délégations Juives, in Paris 31–3 Commins, Thomas 169, 170 Committee for Tolerance 106 Communism 45, 56, 126, 142 Confederative and federative solutions to the Jewish-Arab conflict 35–6 Constitution of Ireland (1937) 4, 21, 23, 35, 51–2; Article 44 52, 178, 181 corpus separatum 5, 8–9, 14, 44, 75–7, 79, 97, 101, 108, 114–15, 118, 122, 130, 132, 147, 162, 170, 173, 175–6, 178 Cosgrave, Liam 130, 137–9 Costello, John A. 81, 93, 128, 132; anti partition campaign 80; first government 2, 78, 80, 102, 116; second government 130, 133, 143, 176; Coughlin, Fr Charles 105 Council of Europe 80 Creagh, Fr John 54 Cremin, Cornelius, Christopher (con) 64–5, 130, 144, 148–52, 161, 164, 166, 169 Cremins, Frank T. 16 Cross 26, 48, 55 Czech-Egyptian arms deal (1955) 131–4 Dáil Éireann 3, 5, 8, 32, 79, 87, 110, 124, 154, 157; MacBride’s speech in 5, 98–103 D’Alton, Archbishop John 92 de facto and de jure recognition, of Israel see Israel statehood De∫relle, Léon 157 Dell’ Acqua, Monsignor Angelo 148, 166, 168 De Valera, Eamon 1, 5, 8, 9, 15–16, 17, 19, 32, 41, 42, 43, 143–4, 176, 178, 179;

address at the Sixth Committee 14, 18, 19, 21, 23, 24, 26, 31, 33, 36, 38, 43; attitude towards the British 22–5; and Briscoe 35, 40, 67, 106, 140, 153; and Brodetsky, Zelig 37–8; condolence visit on Hitler’s death 67–9; government of (March 1957–June 1959) 117, 140–2; Herzog’s appeals for Jewish rescue 57–8, 60, 63–7; and Jewish representatives at Geneva 16–17; at the League of Nations 15–16, 69, 145; meeting with Elath 125–8; and partition of Ireland 23–4, 44, 78; relationship with Herzog, Isaac Halevi 33–6, 50–2, 68–9; relationship with Jabotinsky, Ze’ev 38–40; Samuel’s perception of 118–21; Speech at the assembly of the League of Nations (1934) 21; visit to Israel 68, 118, 120, 141; and Zionists’ responses to address at the Sixth Committee 31, 33 Dillon, James 81, 116 Doctor’s plot 127 Dreyfus affair 54–5 Dulanty, John 64, 86, 89, 90, 98, 102 Easter Rebellion 7 Eban, Abba 103, 117, 121, 132–3, 137, 150, 156 Eden, Anthony 21, 25 Eilan, Arieh 140 Eisenhower, President Dwight David 141 Eitan, Walter 124, 132, 139, 163, 168 Elath, Eliahu (Epstein) 80, 82, 90, 106, 117, 123–30, 139 Eliash, Mordechai 95, 98, 102, 110 Elizabeth II, Queen 124 El Jarida 157 Epstein, Eliahu 74; see also Elath Eretz Israel 50 Eshkol, Levi 149 European Community (EC) 79, 174 European Jewry 37 Exodus affair 46 Fahey, Fr Denis 56–7, 92 Fawzi, Mahmoud 156–8, 177 Fay, W. P. 161 Fedayeen 133; raids 136 Feinberg, Nathan 32 Fenianism 6 Fianna Éireann 41 Fianna Fáil 21, 23, 45, 177 Fiat 57

Index 233 First Palestinian Congress 34 Fischer, Maurice 147–8, 168, 170 Flynn, Edward Joseph 111–12 Freemasons 56 Friends of Germany movement 56 Functional internationalization, principle 75–6, 115; see also Jerusalem Garibaldi 42 Garrett, George 82 Gelber, Yoav 34 German persecution, of Jews 27 German Templar settlers 27–8 Gibbon, Edward 179 Gilat, S. 150–1, 153, 160 Goldman, Rabbi Jacob 59 Goldmann, Nahum 17–18, 33 Good, Herman 81, 110, 124, 149 Goodman, Harry 49, 64, 66 Government of Ireland Act 2–3, 23 Great Depression of the 1930s 105 Great Famine, of the mid-nineteenth century 40 Griffin, George 56 Griffith, Arthur 54 Grodzinski, Rabbi Chaim Ozer 59 Gruner, Dov 7 Guerilla warfare 3 Haaretz 134 Haganah 75 Halacha 51 Hammarskjold, Dag 139 Hashemite dynasty 78, 143 Hashomer Hatzair 44 Haviv, Avshalom 7 Hearne, John J. 16, 117–18, 121, 132–3, 140 Hebrew revival 122–3, 126 Hempel, Eduard 67 Hertz, Chief Rabbi Joseph 49, 64 Herzl, Theodor 6, 97 Herzog, Chief Rabbi Isaac Halevi 1, 5, 8–9, 32–6, 97, 134, 141, 147, 149, 154, 176; efforts for Jewish rescue 52–3, 57–67; efforts by, to rescue Budapest Jews 65–7; efforts by, to rescue Jews from Vittel 64–5; efforts by, to rescue yeshiva refugees 61, 63; relationship with De Valera, Eamon 33–6, 50–2, 68–9, 178; relationship with Pope Pius XII 58–63 Herzog, Colonel Chaim 50, 121, 134 Herzog, Jacob 8, 68, 79, 91, 139–41, 161

Histadrut HaOvdim 135 Hitler 106; Death of 67–9 Holocaust 44, 46, 75, 106, 176; Bergen Belsen 65; death camps in Poland 65–6; final solution 63, 93 Holy Land 4, 19–20, 77, 85, 88–9, 93 Holy places issue 85–6, 88–90, 92–3, 97, 100–1, 111, 122–3, 161, 176 Holy See 4, 19–21, 59–60, 63, 75, 77, 81–3, 85, 89–91, 93, 97, 114, 130, 148–9, 160, 170 Horthy, Miklós 66 Hussein, King 143–4 Indian National Congress 46 India’s partition 45–6 Ireland: Catholic devoutness 4–5; embassy in Tel Aviv 174; export to the Middle East and North Africa countries 174; and German Reich 49, 63; mass emigration from 125, 142; ties with African and Asian countries 155–6, 160; and United Nations 45, 90, 130–2, 155, 168 Ireland Act of the British government, 1949 104 Ireland partition 2, 48, 176; Anti-partition campaign 103–13, 176 Iremonger, Valentine 115 Irgun see IZL Irish Americans 104, 107; and Revisionist Zionist operatives 106–8 Irish anti-Semitism see anti-Semitism in Ireland Irish Blueshirt movement 56 Irish Catholic 28–9, 55, 94 Irish Catholic Missionary 88–9, 155 Irish civil war (1922–3) 3, 23, 50 Irish Diaspora 95, 128–9 Irish Ecclesiastical Record 120 Irish Free State 3, 4, 8, 17, 23, 32, 34, 49, 50, 55, 109 Irish Independent 13, 26–8, 40, 45–6, 93, 121–2, 163, 165 Irish intercommunal conflict 175 Irish language revivel 122–3, 126, 163 Irish National Archives 8 Irish nationalism 6, 182 Irish Press 26–7, 40, 46, 51, 121–2, 175, 163, 165 Irish public opinion 163, 169; and the issue of jerusalem and the holy places 89, 97; and Palestine partition plans (1937, 1947) 25–9, 43–8

234 Index Irish radical republicanism 7 Irish Republican Army (IRA) 3, 7, 41, 109 Irish Rosary 55 Irish sovereignty 3 Irish Times 7, 28, 46–7, 54, 122, 133–4, 157, 163, 165, 172 Irish War of Independence 50 Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 75, 88, 109, 131, 133, 136, 176 Israeli Communist Party 127 Israeli-Egyptian General Armistice Agreement (1949) 137 Israel statehood: and 1947 Partition Plan 108–9; absorption of immigrants 125, 134–5; American aid 135; Arab minority 120–1; Christian minority 120–1; and Cohen’s report 154–9; commercial relations with Ireland 113–14, 123, 150–4, 159–60, 164, 174; and Costello government’s stand 80; Declaration of Independence 73, 87; de facto recognition by Ireland 2, 73, 86–7, reactions in Ireland 91–4, Vatican factor 75–9; de jure recognition by Ireland 2, 73, 78–9, 86–7, 132, 150–3, 169–73, 176, Arab factor 153, 160, 164, 166, 170, 177, Vatican factor 153, 160, 168, 170–1, 177; Elath’s visit to Ireland 123–9; embassy in Dublin 174; empathy of MacBride 98–103; MacBride’s decision 114–17, 178; military administration of Arab minority 120; Norton’s visit to 149–50; Provisional government 76; public relations in Ireland 133–6; relations with Germany 117; relations with Soviet Union 126–7, 129, 131; relation with Spain 117, 160; Reparations Agreement between Israel and West Germany 122; role of Boland 150–4, 177; role of Irish media 121–3; ties with African countries 155; United Nation’s stance on 81, 131–3; Vatican’s position on 75–80, 82–91; War of Independence 19, 48–9 IZL 7, 41–2, 50, 75, 106; delegation of, in US 109 Jabotinsky, Ze’ev Vladimir 7, 35, 86, 106; and armed revolt 41–2; and relationship with de Valera, Eamon 38–40, 86; statements of, to Irish press 41–3 Jakobovits, Chief Rabbi Immanuel 80, 87, 93–6, 102, 124, 176; Jakobovits’ testimony 51

Jerusalem: in Christian tradition 75; functional internationalization of 75–6, 115; Issue of 127–8, 134–5, 172; Old City 76, 78, 88; territorial internationalization of 75–6, 84, 94–5, 90–101, 111; see also corpus separatum Jewish Agency 44 Jewish Agency’s Joint Rescue Committee 63, 65, 67 Jewish agricultural settlements 29–30, 77, 134, 136 Jewish-Arab conflict, in Palestine 5, 8, 16, 47, 175, 179 Jewish community in Ireland 2, 50, 68, 95, 97; Jewish Representative Council 81, 93, 97 Jewish community in Jerusalem 75 Jewish Diaspora 126 Jewish-Irish relations in the US 105–6 Jewish law 51, 136 Jewish Legion of World War I 38 Jewish Observer 172 Jewish Standard 86 John XXIII, Pope 4, 78, 146–9, 176; meeting with Norton 148–9 Jones, Creech 47 Joyce, James 54, 126 Katz, Shmuel 40 Keogh, Dermot 8, 32, 54, 66, 157; study of anti-Semitism 58 Kibbutz, kibbutzim see Jewish agricultural settlements Kiernan, Thomas J. 64, 66 Klein, Arthur G. 104, 106; Anti-British speech of 105 Knesset 76, 85, 96, 115 Korean War 127 League of Nations 5, 14, 15, 43, 53, 143, 145; Assembly 1, 15; Council 15, 17; Permanent Mandates Commission 15 Lee, Joseph 52 Lehi 7, 41, 50 Leibowitz, Yeshayahu 179 Lemass, Sean 128 Lester, Sean 31–2 Levavi, Aryeh 169 Levin, I. H. 140 Linton, Joseph 80–2, 89, 90, 153 Lithuanian refugees see Herzog, I. H., rescue of yeshiva refugees Lloyd George’s government 3 Loufti, Omar 158

Index 235 Luria, Arthur 113, 150, 163, 169, 172; at Dublin 159–61 Lyons, Francis S. L. 102 MacBride, Sean 5–6, 81, 84–7, 93–4, 98, 103–4, 110, 113–17, 124, 128, 176; and anti-partition campaign 80, 116–17; initiatives on Israel recognition 110–12, 114–17; speech in the Dáil 98–9, 101–2, 110 McCann, H. 159 McCauley, J. B. 60–1 McCauley, Leo 142, 148–9,166 McDonald, Denis R. 130, 148 MacDonald, Malcolm 24–5 McMahon, Sir Henry 26 McMahon, Thomas 91 McQuaid, Archbishop John Charles 57, 92–5, 164 MacRory, Cardinal Joseph 51, 63, 66, 176 MacWhite, Eoin 130–1, 170 Maglione, Cardinal Luigi 61–3 Mapai 86 Mapam 127 Maria Duce 57, 92–3 Marshall Plan (Aid) 80, 116 Massada 6 Meir, Golda 139, 141, 147, 150, 153, 159 Mindszenty case 89, 91 Montevideo Convention (1933) 74, 103 Montini, Monsignor Giovanni 60–1, 83, 85, 111 Murphy, Sean 64, 140–1 Muslim League 46 Nasser, Gamal Abdel 132, 142, 156–7 Newman, Arthur 133 New Zionist Organization (NZO) 7, 39, 86, 106 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 78, 80, 102, 104 Northern Ireland 2, 30, 104, 179; Protestant majority 2 Norton, William 148–53 Nunan, Sean 64, 89–90, 111–12, 116, 123, 129 Nuncio crisis 90 Nurock, Max 8, 121, 154, 162–3, 173, 176; Talks in Dublin 162, 164–9, 176

O’Brien, Conor Cruise 103, 138, 146, 153–4, 156, 159, 160, 165–6; Irish anti-partition campaign of 103–13 O’Connell, Daniel 78 Ó Dálai∫h, Chief Justice Cearbhall 164–5, 168–9 O’Duffy, Eoin 56 O’Dwyer, Paul 107–8 O’Dwyer, William 107 Oppenheim’s International Law 74 Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) 80 Ormsby-Gore, William 25 Oslo agreement 174 Palestine Partition Commission 28 Palestine Royal Commission see Peel Commission Palestinian (Arab) refugees 9, 76–7, 91, 118–20, 127–8, 131, 135–6, 145–6, 156, 161, 166–7, 176 Paris Peace Conference 20 Parnell, Charles Stewart 6 Parnell, Fanny 6 Paro, Gino 93, 95 partition plan of 1937 1, 2, 5, 13, 14, 18, 19, 22, 29, 35, 43–4, 46, 105–6, 109, 175, 180; British Mandate of Palestine in 13–14; and Irish public opinion of 13–14; at the League of Nations 15; and mandate for Nazareth and the Sea of Galilee 19–20; and Zionists’ attitude 30 Partition Resolution (1947) see UN, partition resolution (plan) 1947 Paul VI, Pope 172 Peel, Lord William Robert 1 Peel Commission 13, 18–20 People’s National Party movement 56 Pillar of Fire Society 92–3 Pius XI, Pope 21, 59 Pius XII, Pope 60, 66, 101, 121, 130, 142, 146, 169–70; In Multiplicibus Curis 77; Redemptoris Nostri 77, 92 Pontifical Mission in Palestine 120 Prague Trials 127 President of Israel see Ben-Zvi, Yitzhak; Weizmann, Chaim Protocols of the Elders of Zion 55, 157 Raphael, Gideon 148 Recognition of states in international law 73–5

236 Index Red Cross 64 Redemptoris Nostri 92; see also Pius XII Religious Emergency Council 49, 64, 68 Revisionist illegal immigration 106 Revisionist Zionism 35, 38, 44 Robinson, President Mary 174 Robinson, Monsignor Paschal 90 Roche, S. A. 157 Roncalli, Cardinal Angelo Giuseppe see John XXIII Roosevelt, President Franklin Delano 106 Ross, John 164, 167 Round Table Conference (1939) 59–60 Rynne, Michael 16, 86–8, 115 St Patrick’s Day parade 141 Samuel, Edwin 118–21 Samuel, Lord Herbert 95–6, 118 Saoirse 57 Savir, leo 133 Sayers, Philip 110, 112, 116, 124 Schonfeld, Solomon 49, 64 Seanad 87 Second Vatican Ecumenical Council (1962–5) 4 Seligman, Raphael 81 Shamir, Yitzhak 7 Shapira, Moshe 68 Sharett, Moshe 96, 112–13, 124–5, 129, 133; see also Shertok Shavit, Yaakov 41–2 Shaw, George Bernard 126 Sheehy Skefington, Owen 162, 164–5 shehitah 56 Shertok, Moshe (Sharett) 17, 31, 73, 76, 80, 87–9 Shocken, Gershon 133 Sinai War 136–9 Sinn Féin 3, 54 Six Day War 109, 155, 173 Six Fleet 143 Sixth Committee 16, 43; De Valera, Eamon address at 18, 43; on Palestine partition 15–17, 19, 24 Skorzeny, Otto 157 Sokolov, Nahum 32 Solomons, Edwin 94, 164 Sommers, Andrew 107 Spellman, Cardinal Francis 91, 96 Standard 27, 29, 47, 93–4, 96, 122

Stanford, Bedel 154, 162, 164–5 Strasser, Otto 157 Suez crisis 136–9 Taoiseach 24, 41, 58, 87, 114, 118, 124, 132, 141 Tardini, Cardinal Domenico 147–9, 170, 176; see also Tardini Domenico Tardini, Domenico 78, 83, 111, 116, 130, 142; see also Cardinal Domenico Tempelgesellschaft 27–8 Territorial internationalization (principle) 75–6; see also Jerusalem, Issue of Third Reich’s legislative prohibition, on Jewish physicians 57 Thirty First Eucharistic Congress, in Dublin (1932) 21 Tisserant, Cardinal Eugéne 111 Truman, President Harry S. 74, 96, 108 Twentieth Zionist Congress (1937) 22 Ulster 2 Ulysses 54 Union of Orthodox Rabbis of the United States and Canada 49 United Arab Republic (UAR) 143, 156–9 United Irishmen 54 United Nations 9, 45; Charter of 133, 137, 139; Conciliation Commission for Palestine 99, 108–9, 111; General Assembly 143–6; General Assembly, Emergency session, autumn 1958 143–6; General Assembly, Emergency session, November 1956 137–9; partition resolution (plan) 1947 1, 2, 14, 43–4, 46, 48, 73, 75, 105, 108; partition resolution (plan) 1947 and Irish reaction 44–8; partition resolution (plan) 1947 and Jewish reaction 43–4; Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) 119–20; Security Council 143; Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) 2; territorial internationalization resolution, December 1949 76–7; Trusteeship Council 113–15 Unna, Yitzhak 154 Vardi, Haim 91 Vatican 19; and the concept of a Jewish state 20–1; and Peel Commission’s partition plan 19–20; position toward Israel 75–80, 82–91, 97, 115–16, 121, 130, 132, 142, 148–9, 160–1, 163; relations with Britain 21; relations with

Index 237 Ireland 4, 89, 127, 175; relations with United States 45; second Ecumenical Council 4; and United Nations partition resolution (plan) 1947 75; and UN territorial internationalization resolution of December 1949 77, 99–101 Walshe, Joseph 16, 56, 60, 64–6, 82, 84–6, 89, 90–1, 99–102, 110, 106, 111, 114, 116, 121, 129–30 Weingreen, Jacob 125, 154 Weizmann, President Chaim 17, 35, 125, 129 West Jerusalem 76 White, William Jack 133–6, 165 White Paper of May 1939 42, 59–60, 63 Woodhead Commission 28; see also Palestine Partition Commission

World Jewish Congress 49 World Zionist Organization 32 Wylie, Paula 8 Yahil, Chaim 140 Yeats, William Butler 126 yishuv 1, 7, 42, 44, 49, 50, 73, 118, 125, 175, 180; People’s Council 73 Yosef, Dov 68 Zionism 5–6, 8, 20, 27, 77, 81, 94, 126, 178; Catholic approach to 63 Zionist establishments 75, 106 Zionist Executive 38; and Peel plan 22, 43 Zionist left wing 127 Zionist movement 1, 6, 8, 14, 17, 29, 39, 52, 75