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How to go to your page This eBook set contains four volumes. Each volume has its own page numbering scheme for front matter and contiguous numbering for all other content. The front matter pages and indices are labeled with the Volume number and page separated by a colon. For example, to go to page xxv of Volume 1, type ‘1:xxv’ in the “page #” box at the top of the screen and click “Go”. To go to page xv of Volume 2, type ‘2:xv’ in the "page #" box… and so forth. Inside content has regular numbering. Please refer to eTOC.
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE VIETNAM WAR Second Edition
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THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE VIETNAM WAR A Political, Social, and Military History, Second Edition
VOLUME I: A–G
Dr. Spencer C. Tucker Editor Dr. Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr. Associate Editor
Merle L. Pribbenow II Dr. James H. Willbanks, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army (retired) Dr. David T. Zabecki, Major General, Army of the United States (retired) Assistant Editors
Santa Barbara, California Denver, Colorado Oxford, England
Copyright 2011 by ABC-CLIO, LLC All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The encyclopedia of the Vietnam War : a political, social, and military history / Spencer C. Tucker, editor. — 2nd ed. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-85109-960-3 (hard back : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-1-85109-961-0 (e-book) 1. Vietnam War, 1961-1975—Encyclopedias. I. Tucker, Spencer, 1937– DS557.7.E53 2011 959.704'3—dc22 2011007604 ISBN: 978-1-85109-960-3 EISBN: 978-1-85109-961-0 14 13 12 11 10 1 2 3 4 5 This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an eBook. Visit www.abc-clio.com for details. ABC-CLIO, LLC 130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911 Santa Barbara, California 93116–1911 This book is printed on acid-free paper Manufactured in the United States of America
To all those who fought in the Indochina and Vietnam Wars
About the Editor
Spencer C. Tucker, PhD, graduated from the Virginia Military Institute and was a Fulbright scholar in France. He was a U.S. Army captain and an intelligence analyst in the Pentagon during the Vietnam War and then taught for 30 years at Texas Christian University before returning to his alma mater for 6 years as the holder of the John Biggs Chair of Military History. He retired from teaching in 2003. He is now Senior Fellow of Military History at ABC-CLIO. Dr. Tucker has written or edited 38 books, including ABC-CLIO’s award-winning The Encyclopedia of the Cold War and The Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli Conflict as well as the comprehensive A Global Chronology of Conflict.
E DITORIAL A DVISORY B OARD M EMBERS Col. Walter J. Boyne
Dr. Carol Reardon
U.S. Air Force (Ret.)
Professor of Military History Department of History Pennsylvania State University
Dr. David Coffey Professor and Chair Department of History and Philosophy University of Tennessee at Martin
Dr. Prisci lla Roberts Professor of History, School of Humanities Honorary Director, Centre of American Studies University of Hong Kong
Shawn Livingston, MLIS Director of Information Service University of Kentucky Libraries
Capt. Carl O. Schuster
Dr. Michael R. Nichols
U.S. Navy (Ret.) Adjunct Professor Hawaii Pacific University
Department of Social Sciences Tarrant County College
Sandra Wittman Library Services Oakton Community College
Nguyen Cong Luan Independent Scholar
Cartographer Internal Mapping Associates
ABC-CLIO M ILITARY H ISTORY A DVISORY B OARD M EMBERS Dr. David Coffey
Dr. Carol Reardon
Professor and Chair Department of History and Philosophy University of Tennessee at Martin
Professor of Military History Department of History Pennsylvania State University
Dr. Don Hickey
Dr. Prisci lla Roberts
Professor of History Department of History Wayne State College (Nebraska)
Associate Professor of History, School of Humanities Honorary Director, Centre of American Studies University of Hong Kong
Dr. James Matray Professor and Chair Department of History California State University, Chico
Dr. James H. Wi llbanks Director, Department of Military History U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth
Dr. Jack McCallum Adjunct Professor Department of History and Geography Texas Christian University
Dr. Steven E. Woodworth Professor of History Department of History Texas Christian University
Dr. Justin D. Murphy Director, Academy of Freedom; Brand Professor of History Department of History, Political Science, and Geography Howard Payne University
Dr. Jim Piecuch Associate Professor of History Department of History Kennesaw State University
Dr. David T. Zabecki Major General Army of the United States, Retired Honory Senior Research Fellow in War Studies University of Birmingham, England
Contents Volume I: A–G List of Entries xi List of Maps xxv Foreword xxvii Preface xxxi General Maps xxxiii Overview of the Vietnam War Entries 1 Index I-1
Volume III: Q–Z List of Entries xi List of Maps xxv General Maps xxvii Entries 951 Index I-1 xli
Volume IV: Documents List of Documents xi Introduction—xvii Documents 1365 Appendix A: Unit Designations 1679 Appendix B: Military Ranks 1683 Appendix C: Order of Battle 1691 Chronology 1731 Glossary 1765 Selected Bibliography 1779 List of Editors and Contributors 1789 Categorical Index 1795 Index I-1
Volume II: H–P List of Entries xi List of Maps xxv General Maps xxvii Entries 439 Index I-1
ix
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List of Entries
VOLUME I
Amerasians American Friends of Vietnam American Red Cross Amnesty Amphibious Warfare Andersen Air Force Base Angkor Wat An Khe An Loc, Battle of Annam Antiaircraft Artillery, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam Antiwar Movement, U.S. Antiwar Protests, Non-U.S. APACHE SNOW, Operation Ap Bac, Battle of Arc Light Missions Armored Personnel Carriers Armored Warfare Army Concept Team in Vietnam Arnett, Peter Arnheiter, Marcus Aurelius Art and the Vietnam War Artillery, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam Artillery Fire Doctrine A Shau Valley A Shau Valley Special Forces Camp, Battle for Assimilation versus Association Association of Foreign Correspondents in Vietnam ATLAS WEDGE, Operation Atrocities during the Vietnam War ATTLEBORO, Operation
ABILENE, Operation
Abrams, Creighton Williams, Jr. Abzug, Bella Acheson, Dean Gooderham Adams, Edward Adams, Samuel A. Ad Hoc Military Buildup Committee African Americans in the U.S. Military Agnew, Spiro Theodore Agricultural Reform Tribunals Agroville Program Aiken, George David Air America Airborne Operations Aircraft, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam Aircraft, Bombers Aircraft Carriers Air Defenses, Democratic Republic of Vietnam Air Mobility Air Naval Gunnery Liaison Company Airpower, Role in War Air-to-Air Missiles Air-to-Ground Missiles Air War Study Group Report, Cornell University ALA MOANA, Operation Alessandri, Marcel Ali, Muhammad Alpha Strike Alsop, Joseph Wright, V Alvarez, Everett, Jr. xi
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List of Entries
Attrition August Revolution Au Lac, Kingdom of Australia BABYLIFT, Operation Bach Dang River, Battle of Ba Cut Baez, Joan Chandos Ball, George Wildman Baltimore Four Ban Karai Pass Ban Me Thuot, Battle of Bao Dai Barker, Frank Akeley, Jr. BARREL ROLL, Operation Beau, Jean-Baptiste Paul Beckwith, Charles Alvin Ben Suc Ben Tre, Battle of Berger, Samuel David Berrigan, Daniel Berrigan, Philip Bidault, Georges Bien Hoa Air Base Binh Gia, Battle of BINH TAY I–IV, Operations Binh Xuyen Bird & Sons Black Flags Black Muslims Black Panthers Blaizot, Roger Blassie, Michael Joseph BLU-82/B Bomb BLUE LIGHT, Operation Blum, Léon Body Armor Body Count BOLD MARINER, Operation Bollaert, Émile BOLO, Operation Bombing Halts and Restrictions Bombs, Gravity Booby Traps Bowles, Chester Bliss Bradley, Omar Nelson Brady, Patrick Henry BRAVO I and II, Operations Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich BRIGHT LIGHT, Operation Brown, George Scratchley
Brown, Hubert Gerald Brown, Samuel Winfred, Jr. Browne, Malcolm Wilde Bruce, David Kirkpatrick Este Brzezinski, Zbigniew Kazimierz Buddhism in Vietnam BUFFALO, Operation Bui Diem Bui Phat Bui Tin BULLET SHOT, Operation Bundy, McGeorge Bundy, William Putnam Bunker, Ellsworth Burchett, Wilfred Burkett, Bernard Gary Bush, George Herbert Walker Calley, William Laws, Jr. Cambodia Cambodia, Vietnamese Invasion and Occupation of Cambodian Airlift Cambodian Incursion Camden 28 Cam Lo Camp Carroll Cam Ranh Bay Canada Can Lao Nhan Vi Cach Mang Dang Cao Bang Cao Dai Cao Van Vien Caravelle Group Carpentier, Marcel Carter, James Earl, Jr. Case, Clifford Philip Case-Church Amendment CASTOR, Operation Casualties Catholicism in Vietnam Catonsville Nine Catroux, Georges CEDAR FALLS, Operation Cédile, Jean Central Highlands Central Intelligence Agency Central Office for South Vietnam Chams and the Kingdom of Champa CHAOS, Operation Chapman, Leonard Fielding, Jr. Chappelle, Georgette Meyer Charner, Léonard Victor Joseph
List of Entries CHECO Project Chennault, Anna Chennault, Claire Lee Chicago Eight Chieu Hoi Program China, People’s Republic of China, People’s Republic of, Policy toward Vietnam China, Republic of Chinese in Vietnam Chomsky, Avram Noam Church, Frank Forrester Chu Van Tan Civic Action Civilian Irregular Defense Group Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support Civil Rights Movement Clarey, Bernard Ambrose Clark, William Ramsey Clark Air Force Base Clear and Hold Cleland, Joseph Maxwell Clemenceau, Georges Clergy and Laymen Concerned about Vietnam Clifford, Clark McAdams Clinton, William Jefferson Cochin China Coffin, William Sloane, Jr. Cogny, René Colby, William Egan Collins, Joseph Lawton COMMANDO FLASH, Operation COMMANDO HUNT, Operation Concerned Officers Movement “Conduct of the War in Vietnam” Report Conein, Lucien Emile Confucianism Conscientious Objectors Con Son Island Prison CONSTANT GUARD, Operation Containment Policy Con Thien, Siege of Continental Air Services Cooper, Chester Lawrence Cooper, John Sherman Cooper-Brooke Amendment Cooper-Church Amendment Corps Tactical Zones Counterculture Counterinsurgency Warfare CRIMP, Operation Cronauer, Adrian Cronkite, Walter Leland
Cubi Point Naval Air Station, Philippines Cu Chi Tunnels Cunningham, Randall Harold Cuong De Cushman, Robert Everton, Jr. Da Faria, Antônio Dai Viet Quoc Dan Dang Dak To, Battle of Da Lat Daley, Richard Joseph Da Nang DANIEL BOONE, Operation Dao Duy Tung D’Argenlieu, Georges Thierry Dau Tranh Strategy Davidson, Phillip Buford, Jr. Davis, Raymond Gilbert Davis, Rennard Cordon Day, George Everett Dean, John Gunther Dèbes, Pierre-Louis De Castries, Christian Marie DECKHOUSE V, Operation Decoux, Jean Deer Mission Defense Meteorological Satellite Program Defense Satellite Communications System DEFIANT STAND, Operation Defoliation De Gaulle, Charles DELAWARE–LAM SON 216, Operation Dellinger, David Demilitarized Zone Democratic National Convention of 1968 Denton, Jeremiah Andrew, Jr. DePuy, William Eugene De Rhodes, Alexandre DEROS Desertion, U.S. and Communist DeSoto Missions Détente De Tham Devillers, Philippe Dewey, Albert Peter DEWEY CANYON I, Operation DEWEY CANYON II, Operation Dien Bien Phu, Battle of Dien Triet Lake, Battle of Dikes, Red River Delta Dinassauts Dith Pran
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List of Entries
Dixie Station Doan Khue Dobrynin, Anatoly Fedorovich Do Cao Tri Doi Moi Domino Theory Do Muoi Don Dien Dong Ha, Battle of Dong Quan Pacification Project Dong Xoai, Battle of Donlon, Roger Hugh C. Donovan, William Joseph Dooley, Thomas Anthony, III Do Quang Thang DOUBLE EAGLE, Operation Doumer, Paul Drugs and Drug Use Dulles, Allen Welsh Dulles, John Foster Duong Quynh Hoa Duong Van Duc Duong Van Minh Dupuis, Jean Durbrow, Elbridge Dustoff Duy Tan Dylan, Bob EAGLE PULL, Operation
Easter Offensive Economy, U.S., and the Vietnam War Eden, Sir Robert Anthony Eisenhower, Dwight David Elections, National, Republic of Vietnam, 1955, 1967, 1971 Elections, U.S., 1964 Elections, U.S., 1968 Elections, U.S., 1972 Elections, U.S., 1976 Electronic Intelligence Ellsberg, Daniel EL PASO II, Operation Ély, Paul Henri Romuald Elysée Agreement Embargo, U.S. Trade Enclave Strategy ENHANCE, Operation ENHANCE PLUS, Operation ENTERPRISE, Operation Enthoven, Alain Enuol, Y Bham Ethnology of Southeast Asia
European Defense Community Ewell, Julian Johnson FAIRFAX, Operation
Fall, Bernard B. FARM GATE, Operation Faure, Edgar Federal Bureau of Investigation Fellowship of Reconciliation Felt, Harry Donald Fernandez, Richard Ferry, Jules Film and the Vietnam Experience Fire-Support Bases Fishel, Wesley Robert Fishhook Five O’Clock Follies FLAMING DART I and II, Operations Flexible Response Fonda, Jane Seymour Fontainebleau Conference Forces Armées Nationales Khmères Ford, Gerald Rudolph Forrestal, Michael Vincent Forrestal, USS, Flight Deck Fire Fortas, Abraham Fort Hood Three Forward Air Controllers Four-Party Joint Military Commission Fragging France, Air Force, 1946–1954 France, Army, 1946–1954 France, Navy, 1946–1954 France and Vietnam, 1954–Present FRANCIS MARION, Operation Franco-Thai War Fratricide FREEDOM PORCH BRAVO, Operation FREEDOM TRAIN, Operation Free Fire Zones Free World Assistance Program French Foreign Legion in Indochina French Indochina, 1860s–1946 FREQUENT WIND, Operation Front Unifié de Lutte des Races Opprimées Fulbright, James William Galbraith, John Kenneth Galloway, Joseph Lee GAME WARDEN, Operation Garnier, Marie Joseph François Garwood, Robert Russell
List of Entries Gavin, James Maurice Gayler, Noel Arthur Meredyth Gelb, Leslie Howard Geneva Accords of 1962 Geneva Conference and Geneva Accords of 1954 Geneva Convention of 1949 Genovese, Eugene Dominick Geography of Indochina and Vietnam Germany, Federal Republic of Ginsberg, Allen Godley, George McMurtrie Goldberg, Arthur Joseph Goldman, Eric Frederick Goldwater, Barry Morris Goodpaster, Andrew Jackson Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gracey, Douglas David Gravel, Maurice Robert Gravely, Samuel Lee, Jr. Great Society Program GREELEY, Operation Greene, Graham Greene, Wallace Martin Grenade Launchers Groupement Mobile 100, Destruction of Gruening, Ernest Henry Guam Guam Conference Guizot, François Gulf of Tonkin Incident Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
VOLUME II Habib, Philip Charles Hackworth, David Haskell Haig, Alexander Meigs, Jr. Hainan Island Haiphong Haiphong, Shelling of Halberstam, David Halperin, Morton H. Hamburger Hill, Battle of Hamlet Evaluation System Ham Nghi Hand Grenades Hanoi Hanoi, Battle of, and the First Tet Offensive Hanoi Hannah Harassment and Interdiction Fires Hardhats Harkins, Paul Donal Harriman, William Averell
Harris, David Hartke, Vance Rupert HARVEST MOON, Operation HASTINGS, Operation Hatfield, Mark Odom Hatfield-McGovern Amendment HAWTHORNE, Operation Hayden, Thomas Emmett Healy, Michael D. Heath, Donald Read Helicopters, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam Helicopters, Employment of, in Vietnam Helms, Richard McGarrah Henderson, Oran K. Heng Samrin Herbert, Anthony Herbicides Hersh, Seymour Myron Hershey, Lewis Blaine Herz, Alice Hickey, Gerald Cannon HICKORY–BELT TIGHT–BEAU CHARGER–LAM SON 54, Operation HICKORY II, Operation High National Council Hilsman, Roger Hilsman-Forrestal Report Hispanics in the U.S. Military Historiography, Vietnam War Hmongs Hoa Binh, Battle of Hoa Hao Hoa Lo Prison Hoang Duc Nha HOANG HOA THAM, Operation Hoang Van Hoan Hoang Van Thai Ho Chi Minh Ho Chi Minh Campaign Ho Chi Minh Trail Hochmuth, Bruno Arthur Hoffman, Abbie HOMECOMING, Operation Honolulu Conference Hooper, Joe Ronnie Hoopes, Townsend Hoover, John Edgar Hope, Leslie Townes HOP TAC, Operation Ho-Sainteny Agreement Hot Pursuit Policy Hourglass Spraying System Hue
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List of Entries
Hue, Battle of Hue and Da Nang, Fall of Hue Massacre Humanitarian Operation Program Humphrey, Hubert Horatio Hun Sen Huston Plan Huynh Phu So Huynh Tan Phat Huynh Van Cao Ia Drang, Battle of Imperial Presidency India Indochina War Indonesia International Commission for Supervision and Control International Rescue Committee International War Crimes Tribunal Iron Triangle IRVING, Operation Jackson State College Shootings JACKSTAY, Operation Jacobson, George D. James, Daniel, Jr. Japan Jaunissement Javits, Jacob Koppel JEFFERSON GLENN, Operation Jiang Jieshi Johnson, Harold Keith Johnson, Lyndon Baines Johnson, Lyndon Baines, Johns Hopkins University Speech Johnson, Ural Alexis Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office Jones, David Charles JUNCTION CITY, Operation K-9 Corps Kampuchean National Front Kattenburg, Paul Katzenbach, Nicholas deBelleville Kelly, Charles L. Kelly, Francis J. Kennan, George Frost Kennedy, Edward Moore Kennedy, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, Robert Francis Kent State University Shootings KENTUCKY, Operation Kep Airfield
Kerrey, Joseph Robert Kerry, John Forbes Kerwin, Walter T., Jr. Key West Agreement Khai Dinh Kham Duc Special Forces Camp, Fall of Khe Sanh, Battle of Khieu Samphan Khmer Kampuchea Krom Khmer Rouge Khmer Serai Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeyevich Kien An Airfield King, Martin Luther, Jr. KINGFISHER, Operation Kinnard, Harry William Osborn Kissinger, Henry Alfred Kit Carson Scouts Knowland, William Fife Koh Tang Komer, Robert W. Kong Le Kontum, Battle for Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Republic of Korean War Koster, Samuel William, Sr. Kosygin, Aleksei Nikolayevich Kovic, Ronald Kraft, Joseph Krulak, Victor H. Kunstler, William Moses Laird, Melvin Robert Lake, William Anthony Kirsop LAM SON 719, Operation Landing Zone Land Reform, Vietnam Lang Bac, Battle of Lang Son Lang Vei Special Forces Camp, Battle for Laniel, Joseph Lansdale, Edward Geary Lao Dong Party Laos Lattre de Tassigny, Jean de Lavelle, John Daniel LÉA, Operation Leclerc, Jacques-Philippe Le Duan Le Duc Anh Le Duc Tho
List of Entries Le Dynasty Lefèbvre, Dominique LE HONG PHONG II, Operation Le Kha Phieu Le Loi LeMay, Curtis Emerson Lemnitzer, Lyman Louis Le Myre de Vilers, Charles Marie Le Nguyen Khang Le Nguyen Vy Le Quang Tung Leroy, Catherine Le Thanh Nghi Le Thanh Tong Letourneau, Jean Le Trong Tan Le Van Hung Le Van Kim Le Van Vien Levy, Howard Brett LEXINGTON III, Operation Lifton, Robert Jay Lima Site 85 Lin, Maya Ying LINEBACKER I, Operation LINEBACKER II, Operation Lippmann, Walter Literature and the Vietnam War Loc Ninh, Military Operations near Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr. Logistics, Allied, Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and Viet Cong Long Binh Long Chieng Long-Range Electronic Navigation Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrols Lon Nol LORRAINE, Operation Lowenstein, Allard Kenneth Luce, Henry Robinson Lu Han Luong Ngoc Quyen Ly Bon Lynd, Staughton MacArthur, Douglas MACARTHUR, Operation Machine Guns, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam Madman Strategy Mailer, Norman Malaysia MALHEUR I and II, Operations Manila Conference
xvii
Mansfield, Michael Joseph Mao Zedong March on the Pentagon MARIGOLD, Operation Marine Combined Action Platoons MARKET TIME, Operation Marshall, Samuel Lyman Atwood Martin, Graham A. MASHER/WHITE WING, Operation MASSACHUSETTS STRIKER, Operation Mayaguez Incident May Day Tribe MAYFLOWER, Operation McCain, John Sidney, Jr. McCain, John Sidney, III McCarthy, Eugene Joseph McCloy, John Jay McCone, John Alex McConnell, John Paul McGarr, Lionel Charles McGee, Gale William McGovern, George Stanley McNamara, Robert Strange McNamara Line McNaughton, John Theodore McPherson, Harry Cummings Meaney, George Medevac Media and the Vietnam War Medicine, Military Medics and Corpsmen Medina, Ernest Lou Mekong Delta Mekong River Mekong River Project Mendenhall, Joseph Abraham Mendès-France, Pierre MENU, Operation Michigan State University Advisory Group Midway Island Conference Military Airlift Command Military Assistance and Advisory Group, Vietnam Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Military Decorations Military Regions Military Revolutionary Council Military Sealift Command Mine Warfare, Land Mine Warfare, Naval, Communist Forces and Allied Countermining Operations Minh Mang Mining and Mine Clearance in North Vietnam
xviii
List of Entries
Mini–Tet Offensive Missing in Action, Allied Missing in Action and Prisoners of War, Communist Mitchell, John Newton Mobile Guerrilla Forces Mobile Riverine Force Mobile Strike Force Commands Moffat, Abbot Low Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich Momyer, William Wallace Montagnards Moore, Harold Gregory, Jr. Moore, Robert Brevard Moorer, Thomas Hinman Moratorium to End the War in Vietnam Mordant, Eugène Morrison, Norman Morse, Wayne Lyman Mortars, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam Mortuary Affairs Operations Moscow Meeting, Brezhnev and Nixon Moyers, Billy Don Mu Gia Pass Muller, Robert Munich Analogy Murphy, Robert Daniel Music and the Vietnam War Muste, Abraham Johannes My Lai Massacre Nam Dong, Battle of Nam Tien Nam Viet Napalm Napoleon III Na San, Battle of National Assembly Law 10/59 National Bank of Vietnam National Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam National Leadership Council National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia National Security Action Memorandum Number 328 Native Americans in the U.S. Military Naval Gunfire Support Navarre, Henri Eugène Navarre Plan Neutrality
NEVADA EAGLE, Operation
New Jersey, USS New Zealand Ngo Dinh Can Ngo Dinh Diem Ngo Dinh Diem, Overthrow of Ngo Dinh Khoi Ngo Dinh Luyen Ngo Dinh Nhu Ngo Dinh Nhu, Madame Ngo Dinh Thuc Ngo Quang Truong Ngo Quyen Nguyen Binh Nguyen Cao Ky Nguyen Chanh Thi Nguyen Chi Thanh Nguyen Co Thach Nguyen Duy Trinh Nguyen Dynasty Nguyen Hai Than Nguyen Ha Phan Nguyen Hue Nguyen Huu An Nguyen Huu Co Nguyen Huu Tho Nguyen Huu Tri Nguyen Khanh Nguyen Khoa Nam Nguyen Luong Bang Nguyen Manh Cam Nguyen Ngoc Loan Nguyen Ngoc Tho Nguyen Phuc Anh Nguyen Sinh Sac Nguyen Thai Hoc Nguyen Thi Binh Nguyen Thi Dinh Nguyen Thi Minh Khai Nguyen Tuong Tam Nguyen Van Binh Nguyen Van Cu Nguyen Van Hieu Nguyen Van Hinh Nguyen Van Linh Nguyen Van Thieu Nguyen Van Toan Nguyen Van Xuan Nguyen Viet Thanh NIAGARA, Operation Nitze, Paul Henry
List of Entries Nixon, Richard Milhous Nixon Doctrine Noel, Chris Nolting, Frederick Earnest, Jr. Nong Duc Manh Novosel, Michael, Sr. Nui Ba Den Nuon Chea Nurses, U.S. Oakland Army Base Oberg, Jean-Christophe O’Daniel, John Wilson Office of Strategic Services Olds, Robin Olongapo, Philippines Operation Plan 34A Order of Battle Dispute Oriskany, USS, Fire aboard Pacification Palme, Olof Palmer, Bruce, Jr. Paracel and Spratly Islands, South China Sea Paris Negotiations Paris Peace Accords Parrot’s Beak PASSAGE TO FREEDOM, Operation Pathet Lao Patti, Archimedes L. A. Patton, George Smith, IV PAUL REVERE I–IV, Operations Paul VI, Pope Pearson, Lester Bowles Peers, William R. Peers Inquiry PEGASUS–LAM SON 207A, Operation PENNSYLVANIA, Operation Pentagon Papers and Trial People’s Self-Defense Forces Perot, Henry Ross PERSHING, Operation Peterson, Douglas Brian Pham Cong Tac Pham Duy Pham Hung Pham Ngoc Thao Pham The Duyet Pham Van Dong Pham Van Phu Pham Xuan An
Phan Boi Chau Phan Chu Trinh Phan Dinh Phung Phan Huy Quat Phan Khac Suu Phan Quang Dan Phan Van Khai Philastre, Paul-Louis-Félix Philippines Phnom Penh Phoenix Program Phoumi Nosavan PIERCE ARROW, Operation Pigneau de Béhaine, Pierre Pignon, Léon PIRANHA, Operation PIRAZ Warships Pistols Plain of Jars Plain of Reeds Pleiku Podgorny, Nikolai Viktorovich Poland Polgar, Thomas Pol Pot POPEYE, Operation Porter, William James Port Huron Statement Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Potsdam Conference Poulo Condore Powell, Colin Luther PRAIRIE I, Operation PRAIRIE II–IV, Operations Precision-Guided Munitions Prisoners of War, Allied Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam Project Agile Project Delta Project Omega Project 100,000 Project Sigma Protective Reaction Strikes PROUD DEEP ALPHA, Operation Provincial Reconnaissance Units Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam Proxmire, Edward William Psychological Warfare Operations Public Opinion and the War, U.S. Pueblo Incident
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List of Entries
Puller, Lewis Burwell, Jr. Punji Stake
VOLUME III Quach Tom Quadrillage/Ratissage Quang Ngai Quang Tri, Battle of Qui Nhon Quoc Ngu Racial Violence within the U.S. Military Radford, Arthur William Radio Direction Finding RANCH HAND, Operation RAND Corporation Raven Forward Air Controllers Read, Benjamin Huger Reagan, Ronald Wilson Red River Delta Red River Fighter Pilots Association Reeducation Camps Refugees and Boat People Reinhardt, George Frederick Republican Youth Research and Development Field Units Reserve Officers’ Training Corps Revers Report Rheault, Robert B. Richardson, John Hammond Ridenhour, Ronald Ridgway, Matthew Bunker Rifles Rigault de Genouilly, Charles Ripcord Fire-Support Base, Battle for Risner, James Robinson River Assault Groups Riverine Craft Riverine Warfare Rivers, Lucius Mendel Road Watch Teams Robinson, Rembrandt Cecil Rockefeller, Nelson Aldrich Rockets and Rocket Launchers Rogers, William Pierce ROLLING THUNDER, Operation Romney, George Wilcken Roosevelt, Franklin Delano Rostow, Eugene Victor Rostow, Walt Whitman Route Coloniale 4, Battles for Route Packages
Rowe, James Nicholas Rubin, Jerry Rules of Engagement Rusk, David Dean Rusk-Thanat Agreement Russell, Richard Brevard, Jr. Russo, Anthony J., Jr. Sabattier, Gabriel Saigon Saigon Military Mission Sainteny, Jean Salan, Raoul Albin Louis Salisbury, Harrison Evans SAM HOUSTON, Operation San Antonio Formula Sanctuaries Sarraut, Albert Schlesinger, Arthur Meier, Jr. Schlesinger, James Rodney SCOTLAND, Operation Scruggs, Jan Craig Seabees SEA DRAGON, Operation Seale, Bobby SEALORDS SEAL Teams Seaman, Jonathan O. Sea Power, Role in War Search and Destroy Search-and-Rescue Operations Selective Service Sharp, Ulysses Simpson Grant, Jr. Sheehan, Cornelius Mahoney SHINING BRASS, Operation Shoup, David Monroe Sigma I and II Sihanouk, Norodom Sijan, Lance Peter Simons, Arthur David Sino-French War Sino-Soviet Split Sino-Vietnamese War Sisowath Sirik Matak SLAM Smith, Walter Bedell Snepp, Frank Warren, III SOMERSET PLAIN–LAM SON 246, Operation Song Be, Battle of Son Tay Raid Son Thang Incident Souphanouvong
List of Entries Southeast Asia Treaty Organization Souvanna Phouma Spellman, Francis Joseph Spock, Benjamin McLane Spring Mobilization to End the War in Vietnam Staley, Eugene STARLITE, Operation Starry, Donn Albert STEEL TIGER, Operation Stennis, John Cornelius Stevenson, Adlai Ewing, II Stilwell, Richard Giles Stockdale, James Bond Stockdale, Sybil Bailey Strategic Air Command Strategic Hamlet Program Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee Students for a Democratic Society Studies and Observation Group Submachine Guns Sullivan, William Healy Summers, Harry G., Jr. SUNFLOWER, Operation SUNRISE, Operation Surface-to-Air Missiles, Democratic Republic of Vietnam Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape Training Swift Boats Swift Boat Veterans for Truth SWITCHBACK, Operation Tache D’Huile Tactical Air Command Tallman, Richard Joseph Tanks, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam Tan Son Nhut Taoism Tarr, Curtis W. Task Force 116 Task Force Oregon Taylor, Maxwell Davenport Taylor-McNamara Report Taylor-Rostow Mission Tay Ninh Tay Son Rebellion Teach-Ins and Sit-Ins Television and the Vietnam War Territorial Forces Tet Offensive, Overall Strategy Tet Offensive and the Saigon Circle TEXAS, Operation TEXAS STAR, Operation Thailand
Thanh Hoa Bridge Thanh Thai Thich Quang Duc Thich Tri Quang Thieu Tri Thomas, Allison Kent Thomas, Norman Mattoon Thompson, Hugh, Jr. Thompson, Sir Robert Grainger Ker Thud Ridge THUNDERHEAD, Operation Tianjin, Treaty of Tiger Cages TIGER HOUND, Operation Tinker v. Des Moines TOAN THANG, Operation To Huu Ton Duc Thang Tonkin Ton That Dinh Ton That Thuyet Top Gun School Torture Tran Buu Kiem Tran Do Tran Dynasty Tran Hung Dao Tran Kim Tuyen Transportation Group 559 Tran Thien Khiem Tran Van Chuong Tran Van Do Tran Van Don Tran Van Giau Tran Van Hai Tran Van Huong Tran Van Lam Tran Van Tra Trieu Au Trieu Da Trinh Lords Truman, Harry S. Trung Trac and Trung Nhi Truong Chinh Truong Dinh Dzu Truong Nhu Tang Truong Son Corridor Truong Son Mountains Tsuchihashi Yuitsu Tu Duc Tuesday Lunch Group Tunnel Rats
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List of Entries
Tunnels Tu Ve Tuyen Quang, Siege of Twining, Nathan Farragut U Minh Forest Uniforms Union of Soviet Socialist Republics UNION I and II, Operations UNIONTOWN, Operation United Front United Kingdom and the Indochina and Vietnam Wars United Nations and the Vietnam War United Services Organization United States, Involvement in Indochina through 1954 United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1954–1965 United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1965–1968 United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1969–1973 United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1973–1975 United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1975–Present United States, Nongovernmental Organizations, 1954–Present United States Agency for International Development United States Air Force United States Army United States Army, Vietnam, Installation Stockade United States Army Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii United States Army Special Services United States Coast Guard United States Congress and the Vietnam War United States Department of Justice United States Department of State and Formation of U.S. Policy toward Vietnam United States Information Agency United States Joint Chiefs of Staff United States Marine Corps United States Merchant Marine United States Navy United States Reserve Components United States Reserve Components, Decision Not to Mobilize United States Special Forces United States Veterans Administration United States v. O’Brien United States v. Seeger University of Wisconsin Bombing Ut, Nick UTAH, Operation U Thant Valluy, Jean-Étienne VAN BUREN, Operation Van Cao Vance, Cyrus Roberts
Van Es, Hubert Vang Pao Van Lang Vann, John Paul Van Tien Dung Versace, Humbert Rocque Vessey, John William, Jr. Vientiane Agreement Vientiane Protocol Viet Cong Infrastructure Viet Minh Vietnam, Climate of Vietnam, Climate and Terrain, Impact of on the Vietnam War Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, 1945–1954 Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, 1954–1975 Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, Air Force Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, Army Vietnam, History of, Prehistory to 938 CE Vietnam, History of, 938 CE through the French Conquest Vietnam, Republic of, 1954–1975 Vietnam, Republic of, Air Force Vietnam, Republic of, Army Vietnam, Republic of, Commandos Vietnam, Republic of, Da Lat Military Academy Vietnam, Republic of, Joint General Staff Vietnam, Republic of, Marine Corps Vietnam, Republic of, National Police Vietnam, Republic of, Navy Vietnam, Republic of, Revolutionary Development Cadre Training Center Vietnam, Republic of, Special Forces Vietnam, Socialist Republic of, 1975–Present Vietnamese Communist Party Vietnamese Culture Vietnamese National Army Vietnam Information Group Vietnamization Vietnam Magazine Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang Vietnam Syndrome Viet Nam Thanh Nien Cach Mang Dong Chi Hoi Vietnam Veterans Against the War Vietnam Veterans Memorial Vietnam Veterans of America Vietnam War Frauds, Fakes, and Wannabes Vinh Vo Chi Cong Vogt, John W., Jr. Voices in Vital America Vo Nguyen Giap Vo Tran Chi Vo Van Ba
List of Entries Vo Van Kiet Vu Hong Khanh VULTURE, Operation Vu Ngoc Nha–Huynh Van Trong Spy Case Vung Tau Vu Oanh Vu Quoc Thuc Vu Van Giai Wage and Price Controls Waldron, Adelbert F., III Wallace, George Corley, Jr. Walt, Lewis William Ware, Keith Lincoln Warnke, Paul Culliton War Powers Act War Resisters League Warships, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam Wars of National Liberation War Zone C and War Zone D WASHINGTON GREEN, Operation Washington Special Actions Group Watergate Scandal Weathermen Webb, James Henry, Jr. Wei Guoqing Weiss, Cora Welsh v. United States
Westmoreland, William Childs Weyand, Frederick Carlton Wheeler, Earle Gilmore WHEELER/WALLOWA, Operation White Star Mobile Training Teams Wild Weasels Williams, Samuel Tankersley Wilson, James Harold Wilson, Thomas Woodrow Wise Men Women in the Vietnam War, U.S. Women in the Vietnam War, Vietnamese Women Strike for Peace Woodstock Xa Loi Pagoda Raid Xuan Loc, Battle of Xuan Thuy Yankee Station YANKEE TEAM, Operation YELLOWSTONE, Operation Yen Bai Mutiny Youth International Party Zhou Enlai Zorthian, Barry Zumwalt, Elmo Russell, Jr.
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List of Maps
General Maps Map Key: xxxv French Indochina, 1954: xxxvi Provinces of North Vietnam: xxxvii Provinces of South Vietnam: xxxviii Cease-Fire Areas of Control, January 1973: xxxix Collapse of South Vietnam, March–April 1975: xl
Demilitarized Zone: 279 Ethnology of Vietnam: 353 Expansion of Imperial Vietnam: 1256 French Conquest of Indochina, 1858–1893: 399 French Reoccupation of Indochina, September 1945–August 1946: 397 Indochina War: Situation in 1953: 1236 Indochina War in Northern Vietnam, 1946–1954: 534 Infiltration Routes: 504 Operation CEDAR FALLS, January 8–26, 1967: 181 Operation LAM SON 719, February 8–March 24, 1971: 618 Operation ROLLING THUNDER: Bombing Restrictions: 123 Operation ROLLING THUNDER, March 2, 1965–October 31, 1968: 992 Siege of Khe Sanh, January–April 1968: 581 South Vietnam: 752 Tet Offensive: Battle for Saigon, January–February 1968: 1106 III Corps Tactical Zone in South Vietnam: 241 Vietnamese Invasion of Cambodia and Sino-Vietnamese War, 1978–1979: 1047
Entry Maps Air War in Southeast Asia: 33 Ambush at LZ Albany, November 17, 1965: 620 Battle of Dak To, November 1967: 255 Battle of Dien Bien Phu, March 13–May 7, 1954: 295 Battle of Hamburger Hill, May 11–20, 1969: 448 Battle of Hue, January 31–February 25, 1968: 518 Battle of the Ia Drang Valley, October 19–November 26, 1965: 529 Cambodian Incursion, April 29–July 22, 1970: 159 Corps Tactical Zones in South Vietnam: 1189
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Foreword
My own experience with Vietnam began in 1962 when I became director of arms control in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. The assistant secretary, Paul H. Nitze, a brilliant and experienced statesman, made use of his staff without bureaucratic regard for their assigned titles, and so I began to be involved in analyses of the Vietnam situation, among other assignments. In late 1963 Nitze became secretary of the navy and took me with him as his executive assistant; our involvement with Vietnam intensified until my departure for sea duty in 1965. From 1966 to 1968 I served as the U.S. Navy’s director of systems analyses, where Nitze, by then deputy secretary of defense, involved me almost weekly in discussions of Vietnam. From 1968 until 1970 I served as commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam. From 1970 to 1974 as chief of naval operations and a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), I was involved in the assignment of forces, analyses of strategic and tactical issues, and, subject to presidential direction, the overall conduct of the war.
attendance of the chairman of the JCS to ensure military input directly to the commander in chief. For me this inappropriate system provided the opportunity to participate with Nitze for the three years of increased involvement (1962–1965) in the development of national strategy. In 1962 Dr. Walt Rostow, in discussions with Defense Department officials, espoused on behalf of President John F. Kennedy a theory of reprisal attacks by U.S. forces against North Vietnam. The North Vietnamese were to be given warnings that if their support of the war in South Vietnam continued, the United States would initiate a “punishing” strike. After a pause, if their action continued or increased, greater “punishment” would be administered. The military view was strongly against such a strategy. We believed that the “punishment” would not deter the Communist regime and that pauses between strikes would allow them to rebuild and learn lessons as to how better to deal with such strikes and thus would be totally counterproductive. Regrettably, this strike and pause theory within the White House continued under both Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, and pauses in military action against North Vietnam, while building up U.S. forces in South Vietnam, greatly hampered the opportunity for a favorable outcome in the war. While this overall strategy of reprisal and pause against North Vietnam persisted throughout the war, the strategy with South Vietnam developed in several phases. Initially those of us preparing discussion papers for Nitze to use with McNamara, reflecting Nitze’s guidance, advocated that
The Formulation of Policy as I Saw It The development of consensus concerning U.S. strategy for Vietnam was made much more difficult by virtue of the personality of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, who demonstrated essential contempt for military leaders; frequently bypassed the JCS by using his secretaries of air force, army, and navy and his assistant secretaries of defense to do operational analyses; and often provided military advice to the president without the
Editor’s note: Admiral Elmo Zumwalt Jr. died in 2000. His distinguished career included command of U.S. Navy forces in Vietnam (1968–1970) and then the highest command position in the navy, chief of naval operations (1970–1974). His insights regarding the Vietnam War are therefore especially important and for that reason are included in this new edition of the encyclopedia.
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Vietnam was not the place to maintain the U.S. policy of containment of communism. We believed in the policy of containment of Communist expansion by the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, and North Vietnam. But we held that South Vietnam was not a viable national entity, that the conditions for nation building did not exist, and that containment should be achieved by building the economies and military capabilities of Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Under this concept our efforts in South Vietnam would be limited to modest logistic support and military advisory personnel. This advice was not acceptable to McNamara, who insisted that the uncertainty of a favorable outcome for South Vietnam using the above strategy made it mandatory to do more. The second phase of U.S. involvement, resulting from McNamara’s rejection of the “contain elsewhere” policy, flowed from consideration of another two alternative views. Those of us working with Nitze presented the view that for South Vietnam to have a high probability of survival as a non-Communist regime upon commitment of U.S. forces, U.S. forces would have to be brought to bear against North Vietnam by air and naval surface ship bombardment and by blockade. If this did not cause Hanoi to cease its infiltration of South Vietnam, amphibious landings to seize Haiphong and Hanoi would have had to follow. In that later eventuality we estimated that on the order of 5,000 U.S. casualties would result and that with all logistic lines by land and sea cut off, only limited efforts by the Communists could continue. We held that Chinese forces would not intervene against such U.S. action. U.S. forces had improved by an order of magnitude over PRC forces since they had last fought each other in Korea. U.S. nuclear superiority over the PRC was apparent to both sides. These facts plus assurances to Beijing that U.S. forces would not operate in the vicinity of the PRC borders were, we judged, adequate to neutralize the PRC. We further believed that if our calculations were proven inaccurate, U.S. forces would defeat invading PRC forces, as did the North Vietnamese military forces (who were good but not as formidable as U.S. forces) in the subsequent invasion of North Vietnam by the Chinese after the U.S. war ended. We advocated that U.S. Army forces in South Vietnam be limited to major advisory efforts to equip and train South Vietnamese forces to fight their own war against indigenous Communist forces as the United States contained the threat in North Vietnam as outlined above. McNamara was unwilling to depart from his grand strategy of reprisal and pause in North Vietnam, accepting the view that a PRC invasion was highly likely and that the risks to the United States were too great. His alternative was almost the exact opposite of our proposals: no invasion in North Vietnam, no all-out use of air and sea power in North Vietnam, reprisal against limited target systems followed by pauses, and ultimately a massive buildup of U.S. ground forces in South Vietnam. Having been overruled by McNamara’s decision, the Nitze school of thought maintained that we were in for a long-drawn-out war,
that the U.S. public support would weaken as American casualties mounted in such inconclusive operations, and that we must therefore move to Vietnamize the war as rapidly as possible. This strategy was not to be fully implemented until Richard Nixon became president. By that time, beginning the withdrawal of U.S. forces was judged to be politically necessary, and this meant that Vietnamization had to be accomplished in a much shorter than optimal time frame. Having been ordered in September 1968 to Vietnam to accomplish the Vietnamization of naval forces, which I had been advocating, I told my staff that if Hubert Humphrey were to be elected that November we would probably have one year to complete Vietnamization and that if Nixon was elected we would probably have three years. We drew up a one-year plan with an alternatively more efficient three-year option. In fact, we were able to follow the three-year plan. U.S. naval forces set up a river/canal blockade along the Cambodian border. Communist logistic support of their forces in the Mekong Delta was greatly curtailed; Vietnamese sailors were trained and replaced U.S. sailors, one sailor at a time on each boat, ship, and shore facility. By the time of the fall of Saigon, the delta had been so completely pacified and the people had become so supportive of U.S. objectives that it took a considerable amount of time for the Communist forces to take control there after the fall of Saigon. As an interesting footnote, South Vietnam’s navy never surrendered. Naval personnel loaded their families on board their ships and steamed to Subic Bay in the Philippines, where they turned the ships over to the U.S. Navy. Despite all obstacles and despite a far less than optimal strategy, by the time of the truce in 1973 U.S. forces had successfully turned over the war fighting to the South Vietnamese. These forces proved their steadfastness in defeating and driving back the North Vietnamese invasion by People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) regular units after U.S. forces had departed. Had the United States been politically capable of carrying out in 1974 and 1975 President Nixon’s two secret commitments to President Nguyen Van Thieu—that is, to replace attrited equipment and to retaliate vigorously against truce violations—in my judgment a successful two-Vietnams solution would have been achieved. The balance of forces between the two sides was much more favorable to South Vietnam than in the case of South Korea after the Korean War. With continuing U.S. support, as occurred in the Korean case, over time South Vietnam’s burgeoning economy would have achieved a superiority over the Communist forces, as had happened in Korea. In my meetings with former North Vietnamese leaders in 1994, there was general agreement on their part that they always knew that they had to win the war in the United States and that the great constitutional crisis brought on by Watergate, superimposed upon the efforts of the antiwar faction in the United States, was responsible for their victory. One additional point needs to be made to put the Vietnam War into historical context. Despite the great loss of political support
Foreword for strong foreign policy initiatives by the United States as a result of Watergate and the defeat of South Vietnam that followed, despite the tragic loss of 58,000 lives versus the 5,000 or so that would likely have been lost with an aggressive early strategy against North Vietnam, and despite the success that the Soviet Union was able to achieve in such places as Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia as the United States lay prostrate in the post–Vietnam War environment, the U.S. actions in Vietnam gave Southeast Asia time to gain an economic and defense posture to survive Communist penetration. As I left Vietnam in 1970 to become a member of the JCS, I visited Lee Quan Yew in Singapore and General Jiang Jieshi (Chiang
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Kai-shek) in Taipei. Both of these leaders made the point to me then and again in later years that the U.S. stand in Vietnam had given Southeast Asia nations the time to prosper and survive. In the long light of history, the disastrous, grossly inefficient, and incompetently conceived U.S. strategy in Vietnam caused a breakdown in containment in Africa but did contain Communist expansion in Southeast Asia, with the result that, coupled with the resurgence of U.S. power and influence during the Reagan and Bush years, the free world’s global containment policy proved successful. ADMIRAL ELMO R. ZUMWALT JR. U.S. NAVY (RETIRED)
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Preface
Until the Iraq War that began in 2003, the Vietnam War was to many the most controversial of U.S. military conflicts. No U.S. war since the 1861–1865 American Civil War has sparked so much public debate and protest, and the Vietnam War continues to impact public policy. Democratic Party candidate Senator John Kerry’s Vietnam War service and his subsequent antiwar activities became a major issue in the 2004 U.S. presidential election, and some contend that his failure to respond promptly to attacks by his critics in the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth cost him the election. More recently, the Vietnam War has been much discussed in the debate over Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, the U.S. military effort to destroy the Al Qaeda terrorist organization in Afghanistan. There is an ongoing debate about the reasons behind America’s involvement in Vietnam and possible lessons to be learned from the conflict. When Stanley Karnow, author of the best-selling book Vietnam, was asked by General Stanley A. McChrystal, commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, what lessons he had learned from studying the war, Karnow reportedly replied that the one lesson he had learned was that we should not have been there in the first place. How did the United States come to be involved in Vietnam? Was the war indeed winnable? If so, what are the tactics and strategies that might have brought success? What were the major political influences in the United States? Are there indeed lessons to be learned from the war that we can apply to other conflicts? These are but some of the enduring questions. This encyclopedia seeks to address these issues. It is the second encyclopedia published by ABC-CLIO on the war. The first, appearing in 1999, was a three-volume award-winning work of two volumes of entries and one volume of documents. This new version follows the same general format of the first but adds an entire additional volume of entries and updates all entries from the first
edition. It is certainly the most comprehensive reference work on the war to appear in print. One of the major contributions of the new edition is that it adds significant new information, heretofore unavailable in English, on Communist participation in the war in both the political and military realms. This is evident not only in the individual entries but also in a number of new documents provided and translated by Assistant Editor Merle Pribbenow. Unlike the first version, this new encyclopedia also has detailed introductions to the 225 documents. The encyclopedia traces the long history of Vietnam and details America’s involvement there, beginning in the 19th century. The encyclopedia also covers the period of French rule including the Indochina War, during which the seeds of America’s participation in the Vietnam conflict were sown. The encyclopedia contains entries on key individuals who fought in the war and who shaped American policy as well as those who were outspoken proponents and opponents of U.S. involvement; has detailed descriptions of battles and campaigns and of weapons systems, ground, sea, and air; and discusses the contributions of other nations in the conflict and details the antiwar movement in the United States and its impact on the conflict. In addition, the encyclopedia has articles on Vietnam War–related literature and film, a detailed chronology of events, an extensive bibliography of works on the war, and the most comprehensive Vietnam War order of battle ever to be published. I would be remiss without thanking these individuals who were of special assistance in the first iteration of the encyclopedia: Professor Michael R. Nichols, then my graduate assistant at Texas Christian University (TCU) and now a professor at Tarrant County College, Texas; David Coffey, another TCU graduate student who is currently chair of the Department of History and Philosophy at the University of Tennessee at Martin; Nguyen Cong Luan, a xxxi
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former Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) officer now residing in California; and Sandra Wittman, who is now retired but was then the head of library services at Oakton Community College, Des Plaines, Illinois. I am also most grateful to Shawn Livingston, MLIS, director of Information Service at the University of Kentucky Libraries, who has been able to answer many questions concerning reference citations. This new edition particularly benefits from the input of four key individuals. As always, my good right-hand and associate editor Dr. Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr., a specialist in 20th-century American history, has helped solicit contributors, written a number of his own entries in addition to keeping track of all the contributions, and helped me edit the whole. This new edition benefits particularly from three extraordinarily knowledgeable individuals as assistant editors. Merle L. Pribbenow II is a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Vietnamese specialist who served in Saigon during 1970–1975. Following his retirement from the CIA in 1995, Mr. Pribbenow has worked as an independent researcher and author specializing in the Vietnam War and as a translator of Vietnamese-language
source materials. He has published numerous articles on the Vietnam War, and his translation of the official Vietnamese history of the war was published in 2002 under the title Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People’s Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975. Lieutenant Colonel USA (Ret.) James H. Willbanks, PhD, is a retired army officer who served in Vietnam during 1971–1972 as an adviser with a South Vietnamese infantry division. The author of a number of books on the Vietnam War, he is the director of the Department of Military History at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Major General AUS (Ret.) David T. Zabecki, PhD, served in Vietnam during 1967–1968 as a rifleman in the 9th Infantry Division. The author of numerous books of military history, he is editor emeritus of Vietnam Magazine and an honorary senior research fellow in war studies at the University of Birmingham in England. All three assistant editors read the entire manuscript and suggested numerous changes. All of us in the project have worked very hard to minimize mistakes. I take full responsibility for any that may appear. SPENCER C. TUCKER
General Maps
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Map Key X
Generic Troops
Brigade III
Cavalry
Regiment II
Forces/Troops/Infantry
Battalion I
Armored
Company
Armored Cavalry
Fortification/Redoubts
Mechanized
Fort/Station/Military Base
Air Assault
Battery/Artillery
International Boundary
Palisade
Major Roads
City
Minefields/Landmines
State Capital
Battle Site
Capital (of country)
Railroad
Bridge/Pass
Army Group
Hills
Army
Military Camp
Corps
Swamp
Division
Surrender
XXXXX
XXXX
XXX
XX
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General Maps
General Maps
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General Maps
General Maps
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General Maps
Overview of the Vietnam War
The Vietnam War, or what the Vietnamese call the “American War,” grew out of the Indochina War (1946–1954). The 1954 Geneva Conference, which ended the Indochina War between France and the nationalist-Communist Viet Minh, provided for the independence of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Agreements reached at Geneva temporarily divided Vietnam at the 17th Parallel, pending national elections in 1956. In the meantime, Viet Minh military forces were to withdraw north of that line and the French forces south of it. The war left two competing entities, the northern Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and the southern French-dominated State of Vietnam (SV), each claiming to be the legitimate government of a united Vietnam. In June 1954 SV titular head Emperor Bao Dai appointed as premier the Roman Catholic Ngo Dinh Diem, whom Bao Dai believed had Washington’s backing. Diem’s base of support was narrow but would soon be strengthened by the addition of some 800,000 northern Catholics who would relocate to southern Vietnam. In a subsequent power struggle between Bao Dai and Diem, in October 1955 Diem established the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), with himself as president. The United States then extended aid to Diem, most of which went to the South Vietnamese military budget. Only minor sums went to education and social welfare programs. Thus, the aid seldom touched the lives of the preponderantly rural populace. As Diem consolidated his power, U.S. military advisers also reorganized the South Vietnamese armed forces. Known as the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) and equipped with American weaponry, it was designed to fight a conventional invasion from North Vietnam rather than deal with countering the growing insurgency in South Vietnam. Fearing a loss, Diem refused to hold the scheduled 1956 elections. This jolted veteran Communist North Vietnamese leader
Ho Chi Minh. Ho had not been displeased with Diem’s crushing of his internal opposition but was now ready to reunite the country under his sway and believed that he would win the elections. North Vietnam was more populous than South Vietnam, and the Communists were well organized there. Fortified by the containment policy, the domino theory, and the belief that the Communists, if they came to power, would never permit a democratic regime, U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower’s administration backed Diem’s defiance of the Geneva Accords. Diem’s decision led to a renewal of fighting, which became the Vietnam War. Fighting resumed in 1957 when Diem moved against the 6,000–7,000 Viet Minh political cadres who had been allowed to remain in South Vietnam to prepare for the 1956 elections. The former Viet Minh (now called Viet Cong [VC], for “Vietnamese Communists”) began the armed insurgency on their own initiative but were subsequently supported by the North Vietnamese government. In December 1960 the Viet Minh established the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (National Liberation Front [NLF]). Supposedly independent, the NLF was controlled by Hanoi. The NLF program called for the overthrow of the Saigon government, its replacement by a “broad national democratic coalition,” and the “peaceful” reunification of Vietnam. In September 1959 North Vietnamese defense minister Vo Nguyen Giap established Transportation Group 559 to send supplies and men south along what came to be known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail, much of which ran through supposedly neutral Laos and Cambodia. The first wave of infiltrators were native southerners and Viet Minh who had relocated to North Vietnam in 1954. VC sway expanded, spreading out from safe bases to one village after another. The insurgency was fed by the weaknesses of the central government, by the use of terror and assassination, and by xli
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Overview of the Vietnam War
Saigon’s appalling ignorance of the movement. By the end of 1958 the insurgency had become a serious threat in several provinces. In 1960 the Communists carried out even more assassinations, and guerrilla units attacked ARVN regulars, overran district and provincial capitals, and ambushed convoys and reaction forces. By mid-1961, the Saigon government had lost control over much of rural South Vietnam. Infiltration was as yet not significant, and most of the insurgents’ weapons were either captured from ARVN forces or were left over from the war with France. Diem rejected American calls for meaningful reform until the establishment of full security. He did not understand that at that time the war was still primarily a political problem and could be solved only through political means. Diem, who practiced the divide-and-rule concept of leadership, increasingly delegated authority to his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, and his secret police. Isolated from his people and relying only on trusted family members and a few other advisers, Diem resisted U.S. demands that he promote his senior officials and officers on the basis of ability and pursue the war aggressively. By now, U.S. president John F. Kennedy’s administration was forced to reevaluate its position toward the war, but increased U.S. involvement was inevitable, given Washington’s commitment to resist Communist expansion and the belief that all of Southeast Asia would become Communist if South Vietnam fell. Domestic political considerations also influenced the decision. In May 1961 Kennedy sent several fact-finding missions to Vietnam. These led to the creation of the Strategic Hamlet Program as part of a general strategy emphasizing local militia defense and to the commitment of additional U.S. manpower. By the end of 1961, U.S. strength in Vietnam had grown to around 3,200 men, most in helicopter units or serving as advisers. In February 1962 the United States also established a military headquarters in Saigon, when the Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) was replaced by the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), to direct the enlarged American commitment. The infusion of U.S. helicopters and additional support for the ARVN probably prevented a VC military victory in 1962. The VC soon learned to cope with the helicopters, however, and with the increased flow of infiltrators and weapons from North Vietnam, the tide of battle turned again. Meanwhile, Nhu’s crackdown on the Buddhists in the spring and summer of 1963 led to increased opposition to Diem’s rule. South Vietnamese generals now planned a coup, and after Diem rejected reforms, the United States gave the plotters tacit support. On November 1, 1963, the generals overthrew Diem, murdering both him and Nhu. Three weeks later Kennedy was also dead, succeeded by Lyndon B. Johnson. The United States seemed unable to win the war either with or without Diem. A military junta now took power, but none of the South Vietnamese leaders who followed Diem had his prestige. Coups and countercoups occurred, and much of South Vietnam remained in turmoil. Not until General Nguyen Van Thieu became president in 1967 was there a degree of political stability.
Both sides steadily increased the stakes, apparently without foreseeing that the other might do the same. In 1964 Hanoi made two important decisions. The first was to send to South Vietnam units of its regular army, the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army). The second was to rearm its forces in South Vietnam with modern Communist-bloc weapons, giving them a firepower advantage over the ARVN, which was still equipped largely with World War II–era U.S. infantry weapons (up until this time, because the Hanoi leadership was trying to conceal its involvement in the insurgency in South Vietnam, most of the weapons being sent down from North Vietnam had been older weapons of Western manufacture). On August 2, 1964, the Gulf of Tonkin Incident occurred when North Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked the U.S. destroyer Maddox in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin. A second attack on the Maddox and another U.S. destroyer, the Turner Joy, that was reported two days later probably never occurred, but Washington believed that it had, and this led the Johnson administration to order retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnamese naval bases and fuel depots. It also led to a near-unanimous vote in Congress for the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution authorizing the president to use whatever force he deemed necessary to protect U.S. interests in Southeast Asia. Johnson would not break off U.S. involvement in Vietnam, evidently fearing possible impeachment if he did so. At the same time, he refused to make the tough decision of fully mobilizing the country and committing the resources necessary to win, concerned that this would destroy his cherished Great Society social programs. He also feared a widened war, possibly involving the People’s Republic of China (PRC). By 1965 Ho and his generals expected to win the war. Taking their cue from Johnson’s own pronouncements to the American people, they mistakenly believed that Washington would not commit ground troops to the fight. Yet Johnson did just that. Faced with Hanoi’s escalation, in March 1965 U.S. marines arrived to protect the large American air base at Da Nang. A direct attack on U.S. advisers at Pleiku in February 1965 also led to a U.S. air campaign against North Vietnam. Ultimately more than 2.5 million Americans served in Vietnam, and nearly 58,000 of them died there. At the height of the Vietnam War, Washington was spending $30 billion per year on the war. Although the conflict was the best-covered war in American history (it became known as the first television war), it was conversely the least understood by the American people. Johnson hoped to win the war on the cheap, relying heavily on airpower to inflict pain on North Vietnam and frighten the Communist leaders in Hanoi into halting their support for the war in South Vietnam. Johnson’s goal was to hold down American casualties but also to secure the support of the Republican Party for his domestic Great Society program. Under the code name Operation ROLLING THUNDER, the bombing of North Vietnam, which was paralleled by Operation BARREL ROLL, the secret bombing of Laos
Overview of the Vietnam War
A U.S. Navy McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II of Fighter Squadron 3 from the aircraft carrier Coral Sea drops bombs on North Vietnam. (National Museum of Naval Aviation)
(which became the most heavily bombed country in the history of warfare), the air campaign would be pursued in varying degrees of intensity over the next three and a half years. Its goals were to force Hanoi to negotiate peace and to halt infiltration into South Vietnam. During the war, the United States dropped more bombs on Indochina than it had on the Axis powers in all of World War II, but the campaign failed in both its objectives. In the air war, Johnson decided on graduated response rather than the massive strikes advocated by the military. Gradualism became the grand strategy employed by the United States in Vietnam. Haunted by the Chinese intervention in the Korean War, at no time would Johnson consider an invasion of North Vietnam, fearful of provoking a Chinese reaction. By May and June 1965, with PAVN forces regularly destroying ARVN units, MACV commander General William Westmoreland appealed for U.S. ground units, which Johnson committed. PAVN regiments appeared ready to launch an offensive in the rugged Central Highlands and then drive to the sea, splitting South Vietnam in two. Westmoreland mounted a spoiling attack, with the recently arrived 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) formed around some 450 helicopters. During October–November 1965 the 1st Cavalry Division won one of the war’s rare clear-cut victories in the Battle of Ia Drang and may have derailed Hanoi’s plan of winning a decisive victory before full American might could be deployed. Hanoi, however, took encouragement from the heavy casualties that the 1st Cav-
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alry Division had suffered during this battle (230 U.S. troops were killed during the four-day battle, with 155 Americans killed during a single afternoon). To Hanoi, these casualty figures meant that in spite of tremendous U.S. superiority in firepower and mobility, Communist troops were capable of inflicting sufficient casualties on U.S. forces to weaken America’s resolve and ultimately force the United States to give up the effort in South Vietnam. Heavy personnel losses on the battlefield, while regrettable, were entirely acceptable to the North Vietnamese leadership. Ho remarked at one point that North Vietnam could absorb an unfavorable loss ratio of 10 to 1 and still win the war. Washington never understood this and continued to view the war through its own lens of what would be unacceptable in terms of casualties. From 1966 on the Vietnam War was an escalating strategic stalemate, as Westmoreland requested increasing numbers of men from Washington. By the end of 1966 U.S. troop strength in Vietnam had reached 385,000. In 1968 U.S. strength was more than 500,000 men. Johnson also secured some 60,000 troops from other nations—most of them from the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) and Thailand—surpassing the 39,000-man international coalition of the Korean War. Terrain was not judged important. The goals were to protect the population and kill the enemy, with success measured in terms of body counts that, in turn, led to abuses. During 1966 MACV mounted 18 major operations, each resulting in more than 500 PAVN or VC troops supposedly verified dead. Fifty thousand enemy combatants were supposedly killed in 1966. By the beginning of 1967, the PAVN and VC had 300,000 men versus 625,000 ARVN and 400,000 Americans. Hanoi, meanwhile, had reached a point of decision, with casualties exceeding available replacements. Instead of scaling back, North Vietnam prepared a major offensive that would employ all available troops to secure a quick victory. Hanoi believed that a major military defeat for the United States would end its political will to continue. Hanoi now prepared a series of peripheral attacks at Con Thien, Song Be, Dak To, and Loc Ninh, followed in January 1968 by the start of a modified siege of some 6,000 U.S. marines at Khe Sanh near the demilitarized zone (DMZ). With U.S. attention riveted on Khe Sanh, Hanoi planned a massive offensive to occur during Tet, the lunar new year holiday, called the General Offensive–General Uprising. The North Vietnamese government believed that this massive offensive would lead people in South Vietnam to rise up and overthrow the South Vietnamese government, bringing an American withdrawal. The attacks were mounted against the cities and key military installations. In a major intelligence failure, U.S. and South Vietnamese officials misread both the timing and the strength of the attack, finding it inconceivable that the attack would come during the sacred Tet holiday because this would mean that the Communists were sacrificing the goodwill of the South Vietnamese public. Both the Americans and the South Vietnamese had forgotten that there was a precedent in Vietnamese
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history for such an attack; one of Vietnam’s most renowned emperors had won a decisive victory over an invading Chinese army with a surprise attack during the Tet holiday in 1798. The Tet Offensive began in full force on January 31 and ended on February 24, 1968. Poor communication and coordination plagued Hanoi’s plans. Attacks against several provinces and cities in the northern part of South Vietnam occurred a day early, alerting the U.S. command. The following night, Communist forces mounted simultaneous attacks against 40 cities and province capitals throughout South Vietnam, including the South Vietnamese capital city of Saigon. Hue, Vietnam’s former imperial capital, was especially hard hit. Fighting there lasted for three weeks and destroyed half the city. Hanoi’s plan failed. ARVN forces generally fought well, and the people of South Vietnam did not support the attackers. In Hue the Communists executed 3,000 people, and news of this caused many South Vietnamese to rally to the South Vietnamese government. Half of the 85,000 VC and PAVN soldiers who took part in the of-
fensive were killed or captured. It was the worst military setback for North Vietnam in the war. Paradoxically, the Tet Offensive was also North Vietnam’s most resounding victory, in part because the Johnson administration and Westmoreland had trumpeted prior allied successes. The intensity of the fighting came as a profound shock to the American people. Disillusioned and despite the victory, they turned against the war. At the end of March, Johnson announced a partial cessation of bombing and withdrew from the November presidential election. Hanoi persisted, however. In the first six months of 1968, Communist forces sustained more than 100,000 casualties, and the VC was virtually wiped out. In the same period, 20,000 allied troops died. All sides now opted for talks in Paris in an effort to negotiate an end to the war. American disillusionment with the war was a key factor in Republican Richard Nixon’s razor-thin victory over Democrat Hubert Humphrey in the November 1968 presidential election. With no
Men of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, rest alongside a battered wall of the Imperial Palace in Hue while fighting for the Citadel during the Tet Offensive, February 1968. (AP/Wide World Photos)
Overview of the Vietnam War plan of his own, Nixon embraced Vietnamization, actually begun under Johnson. This turned over more of the war to the ARVN, and U.S. troop withdrawals began. Peak U.S. strength of 543,400 men occurred in April 1969. There were 475,000 men by the end of the year, 335,000 by the end of 1970, and 157,000 at the end of 1971. Massive amounts of equipment were turned over to the ARVN, including 1 million M-16 rifles and sufficient aircraft to make the Republic of Vietnam Air Force (VNAF, South Vietnamese Air Force) the world’s fourth largest. Extensive retraining of the ARVN was begun, and training schools were established. The controversial counterinsurgency Phoenix Program also operated against the VC infrastructure, reducing the insurgency by 67,000 people between 1968 and 1971, but PAVN forces remained secure in sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia. Nixon’s policy was to limit outside assistance to Hanoi and pressure the North Vietnamese government to end the war. For years, American and South Vietnamese military leaders had sought approval to attack the sanctuaries. In March 1970 a coup in Cambodia ousted Prince Norodom Sihanouk. General Lon Nol replaced him, and President Nixon ordered U.S.-ARVN combined operations against the PAVN Cambodian sanctuaries. Over a two-month span there were 12 cross-border operations, collectively known as the Cambodian Incursion. Despite widespread opposition in the United States to the widened war, the incursions raised the allies’ morale, allowed U.S. withdrawals to continue on schedule, and purchased additional time for Vietnamization. PAVN forces now concentrated on bases in southern Laos and on enlarging the Ho Chi Minh Trail. In the spring of 1971 ARVN forces mounted a major invasion into southern Laos, known as Operation LAM SON 719. There were no U.S. advisers, and ARVN units took heavy casualties. The operation may have set back Hanoi’s plans to invade South Vietnam but took a great toll on the ARVN’s younger officers and pointed out serious command weaknesses. Shrugging off its own losses, the PAVN was encouraged by the performance of its main-force troops against some of ARVN’s finest fighting units and massive U.S. air support, and this helped to solidify PAVN plans for an all-out offensive the following year. By 1972 PAVN forces had recovered and had been substantially strengthened with new weapons, including heavy artillery and tanks, from the Soviet Union. The PAVN now mounted a major conventional invasion of South Vietnam. Hanoi believed that the United States would not be able to reintervene with ground troops and that PAVN forces were capable of destroying ARVN in a headto-head battle. PAVN general Vo Nguyen Giap had 15 divisions. He left only 1 in North Vietnam and 2 in Laos and committed the remaining 12 to the invasion. The attack began on Good Friday, March 30, 1972. Known as the Spring Offensive or the Easter Offensive, it began with a direct armor strike southward across the DMZ at the 17th Parallel, surprising the South Vietnamese, whose defenses were oriented against an attack from the west, out of Laos, and who had assigned
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a newly formed and inexperienced division to man their critical northern defense line. Allied intelligence misread the invasion’s scale and its precise timing. Giap risked catastrophic losses but hoped for a quick victory before ARVN forces could recover. At first it appeared that the PAVN would be successful. Quang Tri fell after a month of fighting, and bad weather initially limited the effectiveness of airpower. However, at Kontum and An Loc, the South Vietnamese forces held out against repeated PAVN attacks. In April, President Nixon authorized B-52 bomber strikes on Hanoi and North Vietnam’s principal port of Haiphong, and in early May he approved the mining of Haiphong’s harbor. This new air campaign was dubbed LINEBACKER I and involved the use of new precision-guided munitions (so-called smart bombs). The bombing cut off much of the supplies for the invading PAVN forces. Allied aircraft also destroyed 400–500 PAVN tanks. In June and July the ARVN counterattacked. The invasion cost Hanoi half its force—some 100,000 men reportedly died—while ARVN losses were only 25,000. With both Soviet and Chinese leaders anxious for better relations with the United States in order to obtain Western technology and with their forces on the front lines beginning to lose the territory that they had taken during the early days of the invasion, Hanoi gave way and switched to negotiations. Finally in October an agreement was hammered out in Paris, but South Vietnamese president Thieu balked and refused to sign, whereupon Hanoi made the agreements public. A furious Nixon blamed both Hanoi and Saigon for the impasse. In December he ordered a resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam and at the same time issued a stern warning to Thieu to drop his opposition to the peace agreement. The bombing of North Vietnam, the principal element of which was the use of concentrated B-52 strikes against Hanoi, Haiphong, and other key targets in the Red River Delta, was dubbed LINEBACKER II but was also known as the December Bombings and the Christmas Bombings. Although 15 B-52s were lost during the two-week campaign, by the end Hanoi had fired away virtually its entire stock of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and now agreed to resume talks. After a few cosmetic changes, an agreement was signed on January 23, 1973, with Nixon forcing Thieu to agree or risk the end of all U.S. aid. The United States recovered its prisoners of war and departed Vietnam, leaving the South Vietnamese alone to face the PAVN. Following the signing of the peace agreement and especially as the growing Watergate crisis weakened President Nixon’s hand, the U.S. Congress steadily reduced the budget for aid to South Vietnam. Tanks and planes were not replaced on the promised onefor-one basis as they were lost, and ammunition, spare parts, and fuel were all in short supply. All of this had a devastating effect on ARVN morale. In South Vietnam both sides violated the cease-fire, and fighting steadily increased in intensity. In January 1975 Communist forces attacked and quickly seized Phuoc Long Province on the Cambodian border north of Saigon. Washington took no action.
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Overview of the Vietnam War In March the Communists took Ban Me Thuot in the Central Highlands, and in mid-March President Thieu decided to try to preserve his forces by abandoning much of the northern half of South Vietnam. Thieu issued his order to his top generals in total secrecy without informing the United States and with no prior planning or preparation. Confusion led to disorder and then disaster; six weeks later PAVN forces controlled all of South Vietnam. Saigon fell on April 30, 1975, to be renamed Ho Chi Minh City. Vietnam was now reunited but under a Communist government. An estimated 3 million Vietnamese—soldiers and civilians—had died in the struggle. Much of the country was devastated by the fighting, the economies of both North Vietnam and South Vietnam were in shambles, and Vietnam suffered from the effects of the widespread use of chemical defoliants. The effects were also profound in the United States. The American military was shattered by the war and had to be rebuilt. Inflation was rampant from the failure to face up to the true costs of the war. Many questioned U.S. willingness to embark on such a crusade again, at least to go it alone. In this sense, the war forced Washington into a more realistic appraisal of U.S. power. SPENCER C. TUCKER
A U.S. civilian pilot tries to maintain order as panicked Vietnamese civilians scramble to get aboard an aircraft during the evacuation of Nha Trang on April 1, 1975. Thousands of civilians and soldiers fought for space on aircraft to Saigon as Communist forces advanced on the city following the fall of Qui Nhon to the north. (AP/Wide World Photos)
References Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. Maclear, Michael. The Ten Thousand Day War: Vietnam, 1945–1975. New York: St. Martin’s, 1981. O’Ballance, Edgar. The Wars in Vietnam, 1954–1980. Rev. ed. New York: Hippocrene Books, 1981. Palmer, General Bruce, Jr. The 25-Year War: America’s Military Role in Vietnam. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1984. Tucker, Spencer C. Vietnam. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1999.
A ABILENE,
Operation
Start Date: March 30, 1966 End Date: April 15, 1966 U.S. Army military operation conducted from March 30 to April 15, 1966. The 1st Infantry Division (“Big Red One”) in Vietnam named many of its operations—such as ABILENE, JUNCTION CITY, and MANHATTAN—after familiar landmarks near their home station at Fort Riley, Kansas. Operation ABILENE involved the 2nd and 3rd brigades of the division, reinforced by the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment and Number 161 Battery Royal New Zealand Artillery, in a search-and-destroy operation 40 miles east of Saigon in Phuoc Tuy and Long Khanh provinces. On April 11 about 10 miles south of Cam My village, Company C, 2nd Battalion, 16th Infantry Regiment (nicknamed the “Rangers”), of Colonel Albert E. Milloy’s 2nd Brigade initiated a pitched battle against the well-trained D800 main-force Viet Cong (VC) battalion (the D800 Battalion was also known as the 1st Battalion/4th Regiment/VC 5th Division). The Americans killed five VC soldiers and then pursued the fleeing survivors toward Cam My village in heavy jungle growth, not realizing that the VC platoon was falling back on its battalion base. Near the end of the afternoon, the VC battalion reacted with heavy mortar and automatic weapons fire. The VC mounted three successive human-wave assaults against Charlie Company’s defensive positions during the night. According to an official Vietnamese Communist unit history, by the end of the afternoon all three battalions of the VC 4th Regiment/5th Division had become involved in the assaults on the American position. Rifle platoon team leader Sergeant James W. Robinson received the Medal of Honor posthumously for conspicuous heroism in this action, as he charged and destroyed a VC heavy machine-gun em-
placement with only hand grenades. Many other members of the company were also cited for bravery. On the morning of April 12, Boeing CH-47 Chinook helicopters brought in engineers to chop a landing zone out of the jungle and medics to treat the many wounded soldiers. Charlie Company was then evacuated by helicopter to the 2nd Brigade’s operational base at Ben Cat, situated to the north along National Highway 15. Company B had reached the battle area before dawn and linked up at 7:15 a.m. Other brigade units continued to search for the VC but without further major contacts. Charlie Company’s battle was the significant action of Operation ABILENE. It cost the Viet Cong 41 dead and perhaps another 100 dead or wounded who were not found. Postwar Vietnamese histories admit that their forces suffered heavy casualties in this battle, including more than 80 dead or wounded personnel who were transported back to the rear. The Americans lost 36 killed and 71 wounded from a company team of 134 men that had taken the field the day before. During the balance of Operation ABILENE, U.S. forces killed another 40 VC soldiers, captured a number of supply caches, and destroyed more than 50 bases. The allied forces had penetrated a major Viet Cong sanctuary, but the jungle still belonged to the Communists. George C. Wilson, who described the unit and the battle in Mud Soldiers (1989), reported that after Charlie Company’s costly battle, U.S. Army chief of staff General Harold K. Johnson flew to Vietnam and told 1st Infantry Division commander Major General William E. DePuy that the American people would stop supporting the war if such high casualties continued. Battle casualties continued to increase, but the end to U.S. involvement in Vietnam was still seven years in the future. JOHN F. VOTAW
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Abrams, Creighton Williams, Jr.
See also DePuy, William Eugene; Johnson, Harold Keith; JUNCTION CITY, Operation; Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; Search and Destroy; United States Army References Haldane, Robert, ed. The First Infantry Division in Vietnam, 1965–1970. Paducah, KY: Turner, 1993. Ho Son Dai, Lieutenant Colonel, and Major Nguyen Van Hung. Lich Su Su Doan 5. Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1995. Wheeler, James Scott. The Big Red One. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007. Wilson, George C. Mud Soldiers: Life Inside the New American Army. New York: Collier Books, 1989.
Abrams, Creighton Williams, Jr. Birth Date: September 15, 1914 Death Date: September 4, 1974 U.S. Army general; commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), during 1968–1972; and celebrated combat leader. Born on September 15, 1914, in Springfield, Massachusetts, Creighton Williams Abrams Jr. grew up in a family of modest means in the semirural setting of nearby Agawam. Graduating from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, in 1936, Abrams was posted to the famous 7th Cavalry Regiment at Fort Bliss, Texas. When World War II loomed he volunteered for armored service, finding there a mode of warfare entirely congenial to his own hard-driving and imaginative style of leadership. Abrams rose to professional prominence as commander of a tank battalion that often spearheaded General George Patton’s Third Army during World War II. Abrams led the forces that punched through German lines to relieve the encircled 101st Airborne Division at Bastogne during the Battle of the Bulge, earned two Distinguished Service Crosses and many other decorations, and received a battlefield promotion to full colonel. He inspired General Patton to say that “I’m supposed to be the best tank commander in the Army, but I have one peer—Abe Abrams. He’s the world’s champion.” After World War II Abrams served as director of tactics at the Armor School, Fort Knox (1946–1948); graduated from the Command and General Staff College (1949); and was a corps chief of staff at the end of the Korean War (1953–1954). He graduated from the Army War College in 1953 and then was promoted to brigadier general in 1956 and major general in 1960. Abrams held a variety of staff assignments during this period, and from 1960 to 1962 he commanded the 3rd Armored Division. In 1963 he was promoted to lieutenant general and was made commander of V Corps in Germany. When American involvement in Vietnam intensified, in mid-1964 Abrams was recalled from Germany, promoted to full (four-star) general from far down the list of lieutenant generals, and made the army’s vice chief of staff. In that assignment during 1964–1967 he was deeply involved in the army’s troop buildup, a task made infinitely more difficult by President Lyndon Johnson’s
refusal to call up reserve forces. In tandem with U.S. Army chief of staff General Harold K. Johnson, with whom he shared a set of professional values rooted in integrity and concern for the soldier, Abrams made an effective steward of the army’s affairs. In May 1967 Abrams was assigned to Vietnam as deputy commander of MACV. In that position he devoted himself primarily to the improvement of South Vietnamese armed forces, crisscrossing the country to see firsthand what units and commanders were doing and what they needed in the way of training, support, and guidance. When during the 1968 Tet Offensive the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) forces gave a far better account of themselves than was expected, Abrams rightly received much of the credit. Soon after the beginning of the Tet Offensive, Abrams was sent north to Phu Bai to take command of fighting in I Corps. Operating out of a newly established headquarters designated MACV Forward, Abrams concentrated on the battle to retake Hue, forming in the process a close relationship with ARVN general Ngo Quang Truong, commander of the ARVN 1st Division. Abrams coordinated the efforts of a growing assortment of U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps elements and ARVN forces while working to improve the logistical system.
U.S. Army general Creighton W. Abrams Jr. (1914–1974) was deputy commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), during 1967–1968 and its commander during 1968–1972. As chief of staff of the army from 1972 to 1974, Abrams worked to rebuild the army and laid the foundation for its later success. (Herbert Elmer Abrams/ Center for Military History)
Abrams, Creighton Williams, Jr. After a month of hard fighting, Truong’s forces cleared Hue and raised the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) flag over the Citadel. Truong praised Abrams for knowing exactly what his forces were doing and supplying them with what was necessary if they aggressively accomplished their mission. Soon it was announced that Abrams would assume the top job in Vietnam. General Abrams formally assumed command of MACV on July 3, 1968, having been in de facto command since shortly after the Tet Offensive. As commander of MACV, Abrams changed the conduct of the war in fundamental ways. His predecessor’s attrition strategy, search-and-destroy tactics, and reliance on body count as the measure of merit were discarded. “Body count,” Abrams said, “is really a long way from what’s involved in this war. Yeah, you have to do that, I know that, but the mistake is to think that that’s the central issue.” Instead Abrams stressed population security as the key to success. He directed a one-war approach, pulling together combat operations, pacification, and upgrading South Vietnamese forces into a coherent whole. “In the whole picture of the war,” he observed, “battles really don’t mean much.” Under Abrams, combat operations had as their ultimate objective providing security for the population so that pacification, the most important thing, could progress. “That’s where the battle ultimately is won,” he said. Abrams was a consummate tactician who proved to have a feel for this kind of war. He urged his commanders to reduce drastically so-called H&I (harassment and interdiction) fires, unobserved artillery fire that he thought did little damage to the enemy and a good deal of damage to innocent villagers. He also cut back on the multibattalion sweeps that gave Communist forces the choice of terrain, time, and duration of engagement. He replaced these with multiple small-unit patrols and ambushes that blocked the enemy’s access to the people, interdicting their movement of forces and supplies. Abrams’s analysis of the enemy system was key to this approach. He had observed that to function effectively the enemy needed to prepare the battlefield extensively, pushing forward a logistics nose instead of being sustained by a logistics tail, as in common military practice. This meant that many enemy attacks could be preempted if their supply caches could be discovered and captured or destroyed. Abrams also discerned that Communist main forces depended heavily on guerrillas and the Viet Cong (VC) infrastructure in the hamlets and villages, not the other way around, and that digging out that infrastructure could deprive the main forces of the guides, bearers, intelligence, locally procured food and supplies, and other elements that they needed to function effectively. These insights were key to revising the tactics of the war. By April 1970 Abrams’s staff had developed a briefing titled “The Changing Nature of the War.” Change had been under way since Tet 1968, said the study: “Although shifts in the level of violence, type of military operations, and size and location of forces involved are characteristics of this change, the allied realization that the war was basically a political contest has, thus far, been
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decisive.” The significant aspect was what Abrams had done about acting on that realization. “For the first time in the war,” said the analysis, “the enemy’s traditional bases of power are being directly challenged—his political organization and his control of the population.” That, it appeared, was where the outcome of the war would be decided, because “both sides are finally fighting the same war.” Abrams’s force of personality and strength of character were, during his years in command, at the heart of the American effort in Vietnam. Over the course of the years his army was progressively taken away from him, withdrawn chunk by chunk until he was in a symbolic sense almost the last man left. Still, Abrams did what he could to inspire, encourage, and support the remaining forces, American and Vietnamese alike. A diplomat, observing the skill with which Abrams orchestrated the complex endeavor, once remarked that he “deserved a better war.” That wasn’t the way Abrams looked at it, recalled his eldest son: “He thought the Vietnamese were worth it.” Abrams left Vietnam in June 1972 to become army chief of staff. In that position he set about dealing with the myriad problems of an army that had been through a devastating ordeal. He concentrated on readiness and on the well-being of the soldier, always the touchstones of his professional concern. Stricken with cancer, Abrams died in office on September 4, 1974. However, he had set a course of reform and rebuilding that General John W. Vessey, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), later recalled: “When Americans watched the stunning success of our armed forces in DESERT STORM, they were watching the Abrams vision in action. The modern equipment, the effective air support, the use of the reserve components and, most important of all, the advanced training which taught our people how to stay alive on the battlefield were all seeds planted by Abe.” LEWIS SORLEY See also Body Count; Clear and Hold; Hue, Battle of; Johnson, Harold Keith; Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; Ngo Quang Truong; Provincial Reconnaissance Units; Tet Offensive, Overall Strategy; Tet Offensive and the Saigon Circle; United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1969–1973; Vietnam, Republic of, Army; Vietnamization References Buckley, Kevin. “General Abrams Deserves a Better War.” New York Times Magazine, October 5, 1969. Colby, William, with James McCargar. Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America’s Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam. Chicago: Contemporary Books, 1989. Davidson, Phillip A. Vietnam at War: The History, 1946–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1988. Palmer, General Bruce, Jr. The 25-Year War: America’s Military Role in Vietnam. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1984. Sorley, Lewis. A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1999. Sorley, Lewis. Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times. 2nd ed. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008.
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Abzug, Bella
Abzug, Bella Birth Date: July 24, 1920 Death Date: March 31, 1998 Attorney, U.S. congresswoman (1971–1977), and leader in the Civil Rights, antiwar, women’s rights, and environmental movements. Bella Abzug was born Bella Savitsky to poor Russian immigrant parents in Bronx, New York, on July 24, 1920. Her admirers have jokingly claimed that she was born “yelling.” Certainly her indomitable spirit manifested itself at an early age, when she began to challenge the status quo in her synagogue and school. Her father died when she was 13 years old, and at that point in her life she defied Jewish tradition—and her rabbi—by insisting that she say kaddish, or special prayers for the departed, even though tradition prohibited her from doing so. She asserted that because her father did not have a son, she was the one who should offer the prayers. Savitsky graduated from Hunter College (New York) in 1942, and after defiantly applying to Harvard Law School, which at the time did not admit women, she received a scholarship to Columbia University, from which she earned a law degree in 1945. A brilliant student, she married Martin Abzug that same year and passed the New York bar exam in 1947. Her lengthy legal career centered on labor law and civil rights and liberties, and she handled a number of civil rights cases in the South during the 1950s and 1960s. Her law career was remarkable, not least of all because very few women became attorneys in the 1940s and 1950s. Although she did not attain elective office until 1970, Abzug was very much in the vanguard of American politics and political causes in the 1950s and 1960s. Indeed, she was one of the few lawyers willing to stand up against the excesses of McCarthyism and the House Un-American Activities Committee in the early 1950s. During the next decade she cofounded and led Women Strike for Peace, an organization dedicated to ending nuclear testing, curbing the nuclear arms race, and bringing to a close American involvement in the Vietnam War. In the meantime, Abzug continued to work for the civil rights agenda and women’s rights. She also became a prominent voice in the anti–Vietnam War movement. Disgusted with the Lyndon Johnson administration’s war policies, she actively campaigned for Democratic senator Eugene McCarthy for president in 1968. By this time Abzug was already noted for her seemingly endless array of colorful and sometimes overwrought hats, which became her trademark. In 1970 Abzug ran for a U.S. congressional seat as a Democrat and won. She was the first female of Jewish heritage to serve in the House of Representatives. She served three full terms, during which she lambasted the Richard Nixon administration for its continuation of the Vietnam War, excoriated Republican economic policy, and introduced or cosponsored numerous landmark legislative initiatives. Her outspoken brashness reportedly earned her a high spot on Nixon’s infamous “enemies list” in the early 1970s. Before long, her congressional colleagues were referring to her as “Battling Bella” and “Hurricane Bella.” Indeed, on her first day in
Congress she introduced a resolution calling for the immediate withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam. In 1974 Abzug introduced the first gay rights bill in Congress. She also actively advocated a feminist agenda, which included ardent backing of the Equal Rights Amendment. When the Watergate Scandal became public in 1973, Abzug was the first in Congress to call for Nixon’s impeachment. In 1976 Abzug lost a Democratic primary to become a New York state U.S. senator by the narrowest of margins to Daniel Patrick Moynihan. She left Congress in January 1977. She ran unsuccessfully for mayor of New York that same year but continued her advocacy of civil rights, women’s rights, and increased economic opportunity. Two other attempts to regain a seat in the U.S. House, once in 1978 and again in 1986, ended in failure. In the late 1970s she headed the Jimmy Carter administration’s National Advisory Committee on Women until she was asked to step down in 1979 after she criticized Carter’s economic policies. Later that same year Abzug founded Women USA, a nonprofit women’s advocacy group that counted among its leadership many of the illuminati of the women’s movement, including Gloria Steinem. In the meantime, Abzug continued to practice law, gave many speeches and talks, took a key role in the International Women’s Conferences sponsored by the United Nations (UN), and published numerous articles, books, and opinion pieces. In 1990 she established the Women’s Environment and Development Organization (WEDO), an international association that wedded environmental activism and women’s rights. In her later years her health declined precipitously due to a bout with breast cancer and then heart failure. Abzug, one of the great liberal voices of the post–World War II era, died in New York on March 31, 1998. PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR. See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; McCarthy, Eugene Joseph; Women Strike for Peace References Abzug, Bella. Bella! Ms. Abzug Goes to Washington. New York: Saturday Review Press, 1972. Faber, Doris. Bella Abzug. New York: William Morrow, 1976. Levine, Suzanne Braun, and Mary Thom. Bella Abzug. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007.
Acheson, Dean Gooderham Birth Date: April 11, 1893 Death Date: October 12, 1971 U.S. lawyer, diplomat, secretary of state (1949–1953), and frequent presidential adviser. Born on April 11, 1893, in Middletown, Connecticut, Dean Gooderham Acheson graduated from Yale University in 1915 and Harvard University Law School in 1918. He served in the U.S. Navy in 1918 and as private secretary
Acheson, Dean Gooderham
Dean G. Acheson was U.S. secretary of state during 1949–1953. President Harry S. Truman’s principal foreign policy adviser during the Korean War, he also helped set U.S. policy toward Indochina in this critical period. (Harry S. Truman Presidential Library)
to U.S. Supreme Court justice Louis D. Brandeis from 1919 to 1921. Acheson then joined a law firm, where he remained until he reentered government service in 1933 as undersecretary of the treasury and subsequently assistant secretary of state for economic affairs (1941–1944), where he managed the LendLease program and played a key role in creating several postwar international organizations, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency, and the World Bank. He was an undersecretary of state from 1945 to 1947. He became President Harry S. Truman’s secretary of state in 1949. Truman and Acheson agreed that differences between the United States and the Soviet Union were so great that negotiations with the Soviets would be fruitless. The two men believed that the Soviets respected only power, so the task of the West was to maintain its strength and contain Soviet expansionism. This attitude was expressed most clearly in a top-secret report given to President Truman in April 1950, National Security Council Report 68 (NSC68), which anticipated continuing difficulty with communism and recommended that the United States maintain military superiority. NSC-68, which was championed by Acheson, envisioned a vast conventional and nuclear rearmament effort. Truman at first chose not to adopt the plan because of fiscal and political considerations. Meanwhile, the newly formed North Atlantic Treaty Organization
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(NATO), which Acheson had helped to create in 1949, had little military means at that point to check a Soviet incursion into Western Europe. Nevertheless, some Republicans charged that Democratic policies were too Eurocentric and slighted Asia, an attitude that intensified after the October 1949 Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War and Acheson’s speech before the National Press Club on January 12, 1950. Defining the U.S. “defense perimeter” in Asia as a line extending along the Aleutians to Japan and through the Ryukyu Islands to the Philippines, Acheson did not state specifically that the United States would not assist the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) if it was attacked. Critics, however, charged that his omission of South Korea from the defensive perimeter encouraged the invasion of South Korea by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) that June. Historians later proved this conclusion to be unfounded. The Korean War essentially vindicated Acheson’s hawkish policy vis-à-vis defense spending. By September 1950 Truman had reluctantly embraced NSC-68, and between 1950 and 1953 U.S. defense expenditures nearly quadrupled. The Korean War, however, proved unwinnable for the Democrats, and rising casualties set against a static war of attrition made Truman and Acheson very unpopular. Regarding Southeast Asia, Acheson, although critical of French colonialism, presumed that the Communist-led Vietnamese independence movement was dominated by China and the Soviet Union. He thus believed in what would later be termed the domino theory: that the collapse of Vietnam to communism would result in the fall of all of Southeast Asia. Thus, by the end of 1950 the United States was supporting the French effort in Vietnam with $100 million in aid in addition to military equipment. By 1952 U.S. aid to the French had doubled to $300 million per year; by 1954 it was more than $1 billion per year. Near the end of the Truman administration, in late 1952, Acheson tried unsuccessfully to convince Britain and France to join the United States in a program to develop and support an indigenous Vietnamese force to combat the Communist movement. In a significant way, the Korean War marked the commencement of growing U.S. involvement in Vietnam. After leaving office in January 1953, Acheson continued in an unofficial advisory role. He was one of the prominent figures known as the so-called Wise Men, a group of senior advisers who served Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, advising them on numerous foreign policy issues. In 1968 Acheson joined other Wise Men in advising Johnson to de-escalate the Vietnam War. Acheson died on October 12, 1971, in Sandy Spring, Maryland. KENNETH R. STEVENS See also Ball, George Wildman; Bundy, McGeorge; Clifford, Clark McAdams; Containment Policy; Domino Theory; European Defense Community; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; McNamara, Robert Strange; Rusk, David Dean; Truman, Harry S.
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Adams, Edward
References Acheson, Dean. Present at the Creation: My Years at the State Department. New York: Norton, 1969. Brinkley, Douglas, ed. Dean Acheson and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy. New York: St. Martin’s, 1993. McLellan, David S. Dean Acheson: The State Department Years. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1976. Smith, Gaddis. Dean Acheson. New York: Cooper Square, 1972.
ACTIV See Army Concept Team in Vietnam
Adams, Edward Birth Date: June 12, 1933 Death Date: September 19, 2004 Pulitzer Prize–winning photojournalist who gained worldwide fame with his 1968 photograph showing a suspected Viet Cong (VC) infiltrator being shot in the head at point-blank range by Brigadier
General Nguyen Ngoc Loan, director of the National Police of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Edward (“Eddie”) Adams was born in New Kensington, Pennsylvania, on June 12, 1933. Becoming interested in photography while in high school, he joined the U.S. Marine Corps and served in the Korean War as a combat photographer. One of his assignments called upon him to photograph the entire length of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) along the 38th Parallel, a task that took him nearly six weeks to complete. Following the Korean War, Adams took a job with the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin newspaper and then joined the Associated Press (AP). After a brief stint with Time magazine, he rejoined the AP as a special correspondent. Adams usually focused on the human element of warfare, having covered 13 wars in a career that spanned some 45 years. His photos, he explained, were meant to tell a story and often zeroed in on the human suffering brought about by war. Having won an estimated 500 photojournalism awards over the course of his career, Adams became forever known as the photographer who captured the iconic execution of Nguyen Van Lem on a Saigon street on February 1, 1968. The black-and-white photograph, taken during the Tet Offensive, shows the VC prisoner, with his face toward the camera, grimacing as the police chief pulls the trigger of a handgun. Nguyen Ngoc Loan’s back is toward the cam-
Associated Press photographer Eddie Adams in the field near Da Nang, South Vietnam, June 1965. (AP/Wide World Photos)
Adams, Samuel A. era, but his face is easily recognizable because it is turned toward the prisoner as he shoots him. The photo earned Adams a Pulitzer Prize in 1969. The photo also served to further galvanize antiwar passions in the United States and around the world. Much to the chagrin of Adams, many interpreted the photo as more proof that the U.S. presence in Vietnam had run amok and that the South Vietnamese regime was a heavy-handed bloodthirsty government with little regard for human rights. The picture, without an accompanying explanation of the circumstances surrounding it, would appear to be a grisly and random execution. However, as Adams pointed out, the picture was taken while Saigon was under siege by the VC during the infamous Tet Offensive. After Adams shot the picture, General Nguyen explained to Adams that the man he had shot was a VC infiltrator who had just shot and killed a friend of his—a South Vietnamese colonel— along with his wife and six children. Adams, who had no reason to disbelieve this story, spent the remainder of his life defending the action taken by Nguyen. Indeed, it may not be an exaggeration to say that Adams regretted having shot the picture. Adams later apologized for the negative publicity his photograph had engendered for Nguyen and his family. In the mid-1970s Adams began to concentrate on the plight of the Vietnamese boat people fleeing their homeland in the aftermath of the takeover of South Vietnam by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) in 1975. One photo, which he captured as a small boat packed with Vietnamese refugees tried to make it to the Thai coast, showed petrified women and children clinging to one another after they had been robbed by pirates and turned away by Thai marines. Adams’s photos of the boat people ultimately helped to persuade the U.S. Congress and the Jimmy Carter administration to admit up to 200,000 Vietnamese refugees to the United States. Adams always said that he was most proud of the boat photos and that they, and not the execution scene, had made a real difference. Nevertheless, Adam’s Saigon street photo, along with Huynh Cong (Nick) Ut’s 1972 photo showing a young naked Vietnamese girl fleeing her just-napalmed village, remain the most iconic of the entire war. During the final 20 years of his life, Adams was a special correspondent for the weekly magazine Parade. Adams died in New York City on September 19, 2004, following a struggle with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), often referred to as Lou Gehrig’s disease. PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR. See also Media and the Vietnam War; Nguyen Ngoc Loan; Tet Offensive, Overall Strategy; Ut, Nick References Appy, Christian G. Patriots: The Vietnam War Remembered from All Sides. New York: Viking, 2003. Hallin, Daniel C. The “Uncensored War”: The Media and Vietnam War. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986.
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Adams, Samuel A. Birth Date: June 14, 1934 Death Date: October 10, 1988 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analyst during the Vietnam War. Born outside of Bridgeport, Connecticut, on June 14, 1934, Samuel A. Adams attended St. Mark’s in Southampton, Massachusetts; Harvard University; and Harvard University Law School. After Adams joined the CIA in 1963, his duties included developing estimates of Viet Cong (VC) troop strengths in South Vietnam. Adams believed that U.S. officials conspired to conceal the actual number of VC and People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) soldiers in South Vietnam from Congress and the American public to convey a favorable impression of the military situation in Vietnam, particularly during the period from 1967 to 1968. His first public articulation of this belief came in a May 1975 article in Harper’s Magazine. He noted that senior-level CIA personnel consistently rejected information that contradicted their presentation of the situation. Adams charged that this selfdelusion or “groupthink” led to misleading intelligence reports. He constructed his own estimates based on an analysis of captured documents and interviews with individuals in the field. Adams discovered high desertion rates among the VC and took these to be the result of poor morale. This coupled with casualty rates and other factors gave the impression of success of the allied forces. But agents in the field revealed that this was not the case. Adams compared notes about troop strengths in captured documents to intelligence figures already gathered. His findings indicated that U.S. estimates were much lower than those documented in captured Communist reports and directives. Thus, the desertion rate was high only when CIA troop strength projections were used. Adams brought these discrepancies to the attention of his superiors, but they rejected his conclusions. It was not until after the 1968 Tet Offensive that the various intelligence agencies reopened discussions of VC troop strength estimates. The problem was that acceptance of higher estimates implied greater American participation. Consequently, Adams found himself increasingly isolated within the CIA. This situation intensified after he and a colleague concluded that there were approximately 20,000 Communist agents within the South Vietnamese military and government. As a result, Adams was transferred to a Cambodian research post, where he found the same techniques of troop strength estimation. Adams argued strenuously for an upgrading of Communist troop strength estimates. He even charged that General William C. Westmoreland, commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, might have been involved in a conspiracy to conceal true Communist troop strengths. Adams testified at the trial of Daniel Ellsberg in connection with the troop numbers controversy. Adams left the CIA in 1973. Upon publication of his account in Harper’s in 1975, he was denounced by former deputy director of the CIA Admiral Rufus Taylor, former
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Ad Hoc Military Buildup Committee
member of the Board of National Intelligence Estimates James C. Graham, and others. Adams’s position was then attacked as an intellectually arrogant and unjustified assault on those within the CIA who were working through proper channels to provide the best intelligence estimates. They insisted that there had been no “sell-out” by the CIA to the military. Adams’s work formed the basis for the 1982 CBS Television documentary The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception, which accused General Westmoreland of ordering intelligence officers to manipulate enemy troop strengths to give the appearance of battlefield success. Westmoreland sued CBS, and the case was later settled out of court. Adams died on October 10, 1988, of an apparent heart attack at his home in Strafford, Vermont. His book concerning the affair was published posthumously in 1994. PAUL R. CAMACHO See also Central Intelligence Agency; Ellsberg, Daniel; Order of Battle Dispute; Westmoreland, William Childs References Adams, Sam. “Vietnam Cover-Up: Playing War with Numbers.” Harper’s Magazine (May 1975): 41–44, 62–73. Adams, Sam. War of Numbers: An Intelligence Memoir. South Royalton, VT: Steerforth, 1994. Janis, Irving L. Groupthink. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982.
Ad Hoc Military Buildup Committee Group of private citizens formed to provide awareness of U.S. military policies in Vietnam. In April 1972 a small group of New England–area activists and veterans opposed to the war in Vietnam formed to monitor, document, and publicize information on the mobilization of American forces to Southeast Asia. Based in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and dubbing themselves the Ad Hoc Military Buildup Committee (AHMBC), they organized in the wake of increased bombing campaigns against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) by the Richard Nixon administration. The objective was to raise awareness of and expose renewed deployments of American forces to the region, as an indicator of the U.S. government’s determination and willingness to continue the war in support of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). As an outgrowth of the antiwar movement, the AHMBC worked jointly with other groups in collecting data, including Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW), its parent organization, the GI Movement, and the GI Press Service, a Washington, D.C.–based publisher of an antiwar newspaper. Through an extensive network of antiwar servicemen and veterans groups operating throughout the United States and Asia, the AHMBC was able to reveal American military preparations for the war effort weeks in advance in an attempt to prevent such measures. Even more, the AHMBC often revealed the information to the media in advance of the government’s public acknowledgment
of the plans. Because of the efficiency and depth of this network, the AHMBC accurately determined within two weeks of its formation a major upcoming deployment of military personnel and materials scheduled for the war zone. This included the movement and operational preparations of numerous naval ships, hundreds of aircraft, and thousands of servicemen. For the most part, the information was gathered by telephone through active-duty or civilian contacts at locations on or near military facilities, including restaurants, bookstores, and coffeehouses. In certain instances, the AHMBC was able to receive official recognition of its goals. On April 24, 1972, AHMBC representatives brought before the Cambridge, Massachusetts, City Council a motion demanding that the U.S. government cease any further expansion of the war, disclose the extent of the American commitment in Southeast Asia, and immediately withdraw all American troops from Vietnam. Accordingly, the Cambridge City Council passed a resolution calling for the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Southeast Asia and the release of information detailing the scope of American involvement in the region. Needless to say, this resolution was not binding on the federal government. To some, the AHMBC’s actions amounted to treason that aided the enemy; to others, the AHMBC’s actions provided a valuable public service and a voice against the war. In spite of its short-lived existence, lasting less than a month, the AHMBC’s work demonstrated the declining morale among troops and waning global support, at home and abroad, for the war. STEPHEN R. SAGARRA See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Vietnam Veterans Against the War References Committee on Internal Security, United States Congress. Investigation of Attempts to Subvert the United States Armed Services: Hearings. 92nd Congress, 1st session. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972. Cortright, David. Soldiers in Revolt: GI Resistance during the Vietnam War. 2nd ed. Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2005. DeBenedetti, Charles, with Charles Chatfield. An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1990. Rothrock, James. Divided We Fall: How Disunity Leads to Defeat. Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2006. Zaroulis, N. C., and Gerald Sullivan. Who Spoke Up? American Protest against the War in Vietnam, 1963–1975. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1984.
African Americans in the U.S. Military African Americans have served in every war waged by the United States. Throughout the nation’s history, African American soldiers, sailors, and marines have contributed conspicuously to America’s military efforts. From the American Civil War through
African Americans in the U.S. Military the Korean War, segregated African American units, usually officered by whites, performed in both combat and support capacities. In 1948 President Harry Truman ordered the military establishment to desegregate. Although the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force accomplished integration by 1950, the U.S. Army, with the vast majority of African American servicemen, did not achieve desegregation until shortly after the Korean War ended in 1953. The Vietnam War thus marked the first major combat deployment of an integrated military and the first time since the turn of the century that African American participation was actually encouraged. In 1962 President John F. Kennedy reactivated the President’s Committee on Equal Opportunity in the Armed Forces. Chaired by attorney Gerhard Gesell and known as the Gesell Committee, the panel explored ways to draw qualified African Americans into military service. In 1964 African Americans represented approximately 13 percent of the U.S. population but less than 9 percent of the nation’s men in arms. The committee found uneven promotion, token integration, restricted opportunities in the National Guard and the Reserves, and discrimination on military bases and in surrounding communities as causes for low African American enlistment. Before the government could react to the committee’s report, the explosion of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia changed the problem. An expanded military, a discriminatory draft, and other government programs brought not only increased African American participation but also accusations of new forms of discrimination. U.S. involvement in Vietnam unfolded against the domestic backdrop of the Civil Rights Movement, which had begun in earnest in the mid-1950s and accelerated rapidly in the early 1960s. From the outset the use, or alleged misuse, of African American troops in Vietnam brought charges of racism. Civil rights leaders and other critics, including the formidable civil rights leader Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., described the Vietnam conflict as racist: “a white man’s war, a black man’s fight.” King maintained that black youths represented a disproportionate share of early draftees and that African Americans faced a much greater chance of seeing combat. The draft did indeed pose a major concern. Selective Service regulations offered deferments for college attendance and a variety of essential civilian occupations that favored middle- and upperclass whites. The vast majority of draftees were poor, undereducated, and urban blue-collar workers or were unemployed. This reality struck hard in the African American community. Furthermore, African Americans were woefully underrepresented on local draft boards. In 1966 blacks accounted for slightly more than 1 percent of all draft board members, and seven state boards had no black representation at all. Project 100,000, a Great Society program launched in 1966, attempted to enhance the opportunities of underprivileged youths from poverty-stricken urban areas by offering more lenient military entrance requirements. The project largely failed. Although more than 350,000 men enlisted under Project 100,000 during the
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An African American marine in the 1st Division on patrol south of Da Nang. U.S. involvement in Vietnam unfolded against the domestic backdrop of the Civil Rights Movement. From the outset, there were charges that African Americans faced a much greater chance of seeing combat. (National Archives)
remainder of the war, 41 percent were African American, and 40 percent drew combat assignments. Casualty rates among these soldiers were twice those of other entry categories. Few Project 100,000 inductees received training that would aid their military advancement or create better opportunities for civilian life. African Americans often did supply a disproportionate number of combat troops, a high percentage of whom had voluntarily enlisted. Although they made up less than 10 percent of American men in arms and about 13 percent of the U.S. population between 1961 and 1966, they accounted for almost 20 percent of all combat-related deaths in Vietnam during that period. In 1965 alone, African Americans represented almost one-fourth of the army’s killed in action. In 1968 African Americans, who made up roughly 12 percent of U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps total strengths, frequently contributed half the men in frontline combat units, especially in rifle squads and fire teams. Under heavy criticism, army and marine commanders worked to lessen black casualties after 1966, and by the end of the conflict African American combat deaths amounted to approximately 12 percent, more in line with national population figures. Final casualty estimates do not support the assertion that African Americans suffered disproportionate losses in Vietnam, but this in no way diminishes the fact that they bore a heavy share of the fighting burden, especially early in the conflict.
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Agnew, Spiro Theodore
Destructive riots in Harlem in 1964, in the Watts district of Los Angeles in 1965, and in Detroit in 1967 had negative effects on the military, but the widespread violent reaction to the April 1968 assassination of Dr. King brought the greatest racial turmoil to the armed forces. After that, racial strife, rarely an issue among combat units because of shared risk and responsibility, became most evident in rear areas and on domestic installations. At the naval base at Cam Ranh Bay in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), white sailors donned Ku Klux Klan–like outfits, burned crosses, and raised the Confederate flag. African American prisoners, many of whom were jailed for violent crimes, rioted at the U.S. Army stockade at Long Binh in South Vietnam; one white soldier was killed and several others were wounded during the upheaval, which spread over weeks. The marine base at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, and the army’s base at Fort Benning, Georgia, were among the important domestic posts to witness serious racial problems. African Americans played a major role in the Vietnam War and in the process changed the complexion of the U.S. armed forces. Contrary to popular impressions, a large proportion of African American servicemen were well-trained, highly motivated professionals; some 20 received the Medal of Honor, and several became general officers. Despite the likelihood of seeing hazardous duty, they reenlisted at substantially higher rates than whites. In 1964 blacks represented less than 9 percent of all U.S. armed forces; by 1976 they made up more than 15 percent of all men in arms. Much remained to be done. Although the percentage of African American officers doubled between 1964 and 1976, they still accounted for less than 4 percent of the total. DAVID COFFEY See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Casualties; Civil Rights Movement; Desertion, U.S. and Communist; James, Daniel, Jr.; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; King, Martin Luther, Jr.; Powell, Colin Luther; Project 100,000; Selective Service; Truman, Harry S.; United States Air Force; United States Army; United States Marine Corps; United States Navy References Appy, Christian G. Working Class War: American Combat Soldiers & Vietnam. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993. Binkin, Martin, Mark J. Eitelberg, et al. Blacks in the Military. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1982. Dougan, Clark, and Samuel Lipsman. A Nation Divided. The Vietnam Experience Series. Boston: Boston Publishing, 1984. Goff, Stanley, and Robert Sanders, with Clark Smith. Brothers: Black Soldiers in the Nam. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1982. Nalty, Bernard C. Strength for the Fight: A History of Black Americans in the Military. New York: Free Press, 1986.
Agent Orange See Defoliation; Herbicides
Agnew, Spiro Theodore Birth Date: November 9, 1918 Death Date: September 17, 1996 Attorney, Republican politician, governor of Maryland (1967– 1969), and vice president of the United States (1969–1973). Born on November 9, 1918, in Baltimore, Maryland, Spiro Theodore Agnew attended Johns Hopkins University for three years and then the University of Baltimore, where he eventually earned a law degree in 1947. During World War II he was a U.S. Army captain and company commander, after which he entered law practice. He was recalled to service for a year during the Korean War (1950–1953). During the 1950s Agnew worked in several successful Republican campaigns, earning an appointment to the Baltimore Zoning Board of Appeals. From that post he rose to Baltimore County executive and finally, in 1966, was elected governor of Maryland. Two years later in a surprise to almost everyone, including Agnew, Republican standard-bearer Richard M. Nixon selected him as his vice presidential running mate. The Republicans won the 1968 presidential election by a narrow margin, and Vice President Agnew faithfully served as a battering ram for Nixon and the Republican Party, despite Agnew’s exclusion from the president’s inner circle. In speeches crafted by Patrick J. Buchanan and William Safire, Agnew frequently polarized the nation. He often attacked the media, which he accused of lacking neutrality and blamed for undermining the U.S. effort in Vietnam. In a speech on November 13, 1969, at Des Moines, Iowa, for example, he charged the media with consistently interfering with Nixon’s ability to communicate directly with the American people. Agnew maintained that the press should report the news without interpreting it so that the people might form their own opinions. He also held that network broadcasts on the war were inaccurate, intentionally misleading, and designed to criticize the armed forces and discourage American patriotism. Agnew maintained that network broadcasts were not entitled to First Amendment protection because the impact of television was different than that of print media. Perhaps his most famous line describing the press and antiwar activists, penned by Safire, was “nattering nabobs of negativism,” which soon found its way into the American vernacular. Agnew was also the Nixon administration’s point man on Vietnam, frequently attacking the student protest movement. Agnew concluded that educational pursuits on college campuses had been replaced by illicit drug use and anti-American activities that were injurious to the U.S. war effort. He blamed campus unrest on the intellectual community, which he referred to as “impudent snobs.” Agnew accused the media of encouraging student demonstrations by providing television coverage of them. As vice president, Agnew consistently favored any option that might win an outright victory in Vietnam. He endorsed the Cambodian Incursion, the blockade of Haiphong Harbor, and the De-
Agricultural Reform Tribunals
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See also Amnesty; Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Ford, Gerald Rudolph; Hardhats; Media and the Vietnam War; Nixon, Richard Milhous References Agnew, Spiro T. Go Quietly . . . or Else. New York: William Morrow, 1980. Cohen, Richard M., and Jules Witcover. A Heartbeat Away: The Investigation and Resignation of Vice President Spiro T. Agnew. New York: Viking, 1974. Lucas, Jim Griffing. Agnew: Profile in Conflict. New York: Award, 1970.
Agricultural Reform Tribunals Start Date: 1953 End Date: 1956
Spiro T. Agnew was vice president of the United States in the Richard Nixon administration during 1969–1973. An outspoken critic of the media, Agnew resigned in October 1973 amid charges of bribery and tax evasion. (Library of Congress)
cember 1972 bombings of Hanoi. While on a second inspection tour of Asia in February 1973, he maintained that these actions helped bring about the January 1973 peace settlement. On this trip Agnew met in Saigon with President Nguyen Van Thieu to assure him that the United States would not abandon the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). On October 10, 1973, Agnew resigned the vice presidency following allegations of bribery and income tax evasion while he was governor of Maryland. In a negotiated settlement with the U.S. Justice Department, he pleaded no contest. Although Agnew maintained his innocence and blamed the press for persecuting him for his outspokenness on controversial issues, the deal plunged him into political obscurity and denied him the opportunity to become president after Nixon’s resignation less than a year later. After the State of Maryland disbarred Agnew in 1974, he pursued a second successful business career as a broker of international deals. In 1976 he published The Canfield Decision, a novel about a vice president destroyed by ambition. His 1980 memoir Go Quietly . . . or Else contended that he had accepted only campaign contributions, not bribes. Agnew died of leukemia in Ocean City, Maryland, on September 17, 1996. DALLAS COTHRUM
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) land reform campaign. The December 1953 Land Reform Law called for the confiscation of the lands and property of almost the entire landlord class. Those who supported the Lao Dong Party (Workers Party, Communist Party) were compensated with government bonds but were permitted to keep only subsistence land. North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh described it as a “peasant revolution, a class struggle in the countryside,” and explained that it would be tightly managed by the party as to timing, location, leadership, and “correct implementation.” As in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), advisers from which were plentiful in North Vietnam at that time, the North Vietnamese program was preceded by a rent-reduction program. During this phase cadre were trained, and selected poor peasants were led to believe that landlords were their enemy and that the party was their guide. Those successfully indoctrinated were called cot can and were expected to be the backbone of the land reform. The population was divided into five categories: landlords, rich peasants, middle peasants, poor peasants, and farm workers. Cadre and cot can teams surveyed village landholdings and brought those classified as landlords before peasant-struggle meetings, where they were denounced and sentenced. In 1955 these trials gave way to the more formal agricultural reform tribunals or people’s courts consisting of 6 to 10 members, drawn mostly from the cot can, that continued to denounce even greater numbers of landlords, about 25 percent of whom were labeled “despots.” The party had calculated that landlords made up 5 percent of the rural population, and the tribunals zealously fulfilled the quotas they had been given. Anxious to avoid indictment, many peasants trumped up charges against their neighbors. Anyone who worked for the French or had merely showed insufficient ardor for the Viet Minh might be a victim. Tens of thousands were executed, sent to forced labor camps, or starved to death. Despite a law that permitted appeal to the president for clemency, Ho pardoned no one. There are reports, however, of pardons arriving after the victims had been executed. Bureaucratic
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Agroville Program
problems were blamed for this, and formal ceremonies were held to restore the victims’ party membership and/or citizenship. Exploitation of mass psychology was apparent in the preplanned Rectification of Errors campaign, during which 12,000 victims were released from labor or reeducation camps. Employing the Marxist cathartic of criticism and self-criticism, after the reform ended in August 1956 Ho apologized to the people, admitting that “errors” had been committed and that those wrongly classified as landlords or rich peasants would be reclassified. General Vo Nguyen Giap, head of the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army), told the party Central Committee in October that there had been too many executions, widespread terror and torture, and failures to respect religion and minorities. The government allowed the relatives of many victims to take revenge on Land Reform Group members and cot can. Many hundreds of those who had recently carried out government orders now became secondary victims of the campaign. But this was not enough to prevent a number of peasant revolts, the most serious of which occurred in Ho’s native province of Nghe An. Perhaps the party’s plans to collectivize the land had been discovered and were a factor in the revolt, which was crushed by the PAVN 325th Division. The people who had served on the tribunals or supported the process were now committed to the Lao Dong leadership by their complicity. Many of them took positions in the party, while the rest of the population was shocked into submission, thus ensuring that collectivization would not meet with the popular resistance encountered in the Soviet Union. In June 1958 the party acknowledged that the ultimate objective of the land reform had not been confiscating land of landlords but instead had been “motivating the masses” to suppress the landlord class. CLAUDE R. SASSO See also Ho Chi Minh; Land Reform, Vietnam; Lao Dong Party; Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, 1954–1975; Vo Nguyen Giap References Bain, Chester A. Vietnam: The Roots of the Conflict. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1967. Gheddo, Piero. The Cross and the Bo Tree: Catholics and Buddhists in Vietnam. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1970. Hoang Van Chi. From Colonialism to Communism: A Case History of North Vietnam. New York: Praeger, 1964. Moise, Edwin E. Land Reform in China and North Vietnam: Consolidating the Revolution at the Village Level. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983.
Agroville Program A Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) program of fortified communities designed to isolate South Vietnam’s rural population from the Viet Cong (VC) Communist insurgents. In mid-1959, responding to mounting VC attacks throughout South Vietnam, South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem launched
the Agroville Program. Envisioned as a series of strategically located, fortified settlements into which the populations of entire rural villages could be relocated, Agrovilles theoretically offered security to peasants while denying the VC access to recruits, information, and logistical support. Administered by Diem’s brother Nhu, the ambitious relocation campaign called for construction of more than 80 Agrovilles, each offering water, electricity, health care, and security to several thousand peasants. The program was doomed from its inception. First, the Ngo brothers displayed a remarkably poor understanding of the peasant population. The plan required peasants to abandon their homelands and the graves of cherished ancestors, it frequently demanded substantial sacrifice with few governmental incentives, and the Agrovilles more resembled concentration camps than the advertised protected havens. The program was plagued from the beginning by governmental corruption. The peasants largely resisted relocation, and many came to view the Diem government as a greater menace than the VC. By 1961 the Agroville Program was abandoned. Less than 20 of the proposed communities were ever constructed, and most of these were in ruin within months of completion. Nor did the Agrovilles ever substantially isolate nonaffiliated peasants from VC operatives. The Ngo brothers, however, retained their belief in the Agroville concept, more as a means of extending their influence than winning the hearts and minds of the peasants. British counterinsurgency expert Sir Robert Thompson advanced the idea of strategic hamlets, based on the successful British experience against Malayan guerrillas. Diem remained noncommittal until a similar proposal, submitted by American economist Eugene Staley, brought a favorable response from the John F. Kennedy administration. With U.S. backing, the South Vietnamese government enacted the Strategic Hamlet Program in 1962. This effort, like the Agroville Program before it, ended in failure. DAVID COFFEY See also Staley, Eugene; Strategic Hamlet Program; Thompson, Sir Robert Grainger Ker References Asprey, Robert B. War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History. New York: William Morrow, 1994. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997.
Aiken, George David Birth Date: August 30, 1892 Death Date: November 19, 1984 Republican politician, governor of Vermont (1937–1941), and U.S. senator (1941–1975). Born on August 30, 1892, in Dummerston,
Air America
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an alternative policy. In May 1969 Aiken called for U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, and the next year he voted for the Cooper-Church Amendment barring the president from sending funds to support U.S. troops in Cambodia. Aiken retired from the Senate in 1975 and died on November 19, 1984, in Putney, Vermont. KENNETH R. STEVENS See also Cooper-Church Amendment; Gulf of Tonkin Resolution; Morse, Wayne Lyman References Aiken, George D. Aiken: Senate Diary, January 1972–January 1975. Brattleboro, VT: Stephen Greene, 1976. Lichtenstein, Nelson, ed. Political Profiles: The Johnson Years. New York: Facts on File, 1976. Sherman, Michael. The Political Legacy of George D. Aiken: Wise Old Owl of the U.S. Senate. Montpelier, VT: Vermont Historical Society, 1995.
Air America
George D. Aiken (R-Vt.), shown here in 1947, was a U.S. senator from 1941 to 1975. By 1965 he had become an early critic of American involvement in Vietnam. (Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images)
Vermont, George David Aiken became owner of a Vermont nursery store. He entered politics as a Republican member of the state legislature in 1930. He later became Speaker of the Vermont House, lieutenant governor, and governor of the state, a post he held from 1937 to 1941. Aiken was a progressive Republican and supported numerous New Deal social and economic programs, which often put him at odds with conservative Republicans. Elected to the U.S. Senate in 1940, Aiken took office in 1941 and remained there until his retirement in 1975. Despite expressed misgivings, Aiken voted for the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution on August 7, 1964. By April 1965, however, he had become an early critic of the Vietnam War. He participated in a fact-finding mission to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) in November 1964, during which he concluded that the United States should seek a political rather than a military settlement of the war. In a Senate speech on October 19, 1966, Aiken proposed that the United States declare that it had won the war, stop bombing the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), and redeploy its forces in strategic centers only. Despite his opposition to the war, Aiken continued to vote for appropriations for it because he believed that troops in Vietnam should be supported. In May 1967 he argued that the Lyndon B. Johnson administration could not achieve an “honorable peace” in Southeast Asia and called for the Republican Party to develop
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) air operation in Asia, especially Laos. Air America’s origins can be traced to the CIA’s requirement for air transport capability to conduct covert operations in Asia in support of U.S. policy objectives. In August 1950 the CIA secretly purchased the assets of Civil Air Transport (CAT), an airline started in China after World War II by General Claire L. Chennault (of Flying Tiger fame) and Whiting Willauer. CAT continued to fly commercial routes throughout Asia, acting in every way as a privately owned commercial airline. At the same time, under the guise of CAT Incorporated, the airline provided airplanes and crews for secret U.S. intelligence operations from Tibet to Indonesia. On March 26, 1959, largely because of administrative problems connected with doing business in Japan, the name of CAT Incorporated was changed to Air America. Air America took on an increasingly prominent role in Southeast Asia as the United States became more deeply involved in the growing conflict in the region. Although the airline developed extensive operations in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), providing air transport for CIA activities in the country, it played an even more important role in Laos, where it became a key element in U.S. assistance to the Royal Lao Government in its struggle against the Communist Pathet Lao and its allies in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). The growth of Air America in Laos began early in 1961 after Washington approved a CIA recommendation to arm and train Hmong tribesmen as a counterweight to Communist forces in the northern part of the country. With the Hmongs scattered on mountainous terrain surrounding the strategic Plain of Jars, CIA paramilitary specialist James W. Lair recognized that effective communications would be essential for successful operations. Air America, he believed, would have to develop both a rotary-wing and short takeoff and landing (STOL) capability to assist Laotian guerrilla forces.
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Airborne Operations
Air America had only four helicopters at the beginning of 1961 but expanded that March when President John F. Kennedy ordered the U.S. Marine Corps to transfer 14 Sikorsky UH-34 Choctaws to the CIA’s airline. At the same time, Air America acquired a small fleet of single-engine Helio Courier aircraft that were able to use the short, primitive airstrips that dotted the mountainous areas of Laos. From less than a dozen Victor sites, as they were known in 1961, the STOL program grew to encompass more than 100 Lima sites by late 1964 and more than 400 by the early 1970s. Air America quickly became involved in the war in Laos, supplying arms and ammunition to the 9,000 Hmong tribesmen who had been trained by the CIA and air-dropping rice to the tens of thousands of refugees who had been displaced by the fighting. On May 30, 1961, the airline suffered its first casualties in Laos when helicopter pilots Charles Mateer and Walter Wizbowski crashed in bad weather while attempting to land supplies to a besieged Hmong garrison at Padong, a mountaintop position adjacent to the Plain of Jars. Air America’s operations declined sharply following the signing in Geneva of the Declaration of the Neutrality of Laos on July 23, 1962. Helicopter flight operations, for example, went from a monthly average of 2,000 before the agreement to 600 by early 1963. The truce in Laos, however, proved temporary. Full-scale fighting broke out again in March 1964 as Communist forces attacked government positions on the Plain of Jars. Washington declined to commit U.S. combat forces to the war and instead expanded the role of the CIA in Laos in an effort to avoid a major confrontation with North Vietnam in an area of clearly secondary importance. North Vietnam also controlled the level of violence in the country. As CIA analysts recognized, while Hanoi had the capability of overrunning most of Laos in short order, the North Vietnamese were mainly interested in protecting their supply routes to South Vietnam and did not wish to destroy the general framework of the 1962 Geneva settlement. Nonetheless, within this general context of restraint, a bitter guerrilla war took place in Laos over the next four years. Air America embarked upon an expansion program as it assumed a paramilitary role in support of CIA-led forces. In addition to providing air transport for the Hmongs, Air America also took responsibility for search-and-rescue operations as the U.S. Air Force began to fly combat sorties in the country. The character of the war began to change in 1968 and 1969 as the North Vietnamese introduced major new combat forces of its People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) into Laos. Air America’s role in the war continued to grow as the fighting increased in intensity. By the summer of 1970, the airline was operating in Laos some two dozen twin-engine transports, another two dozen STOL aircraft, and some 30 helicopters. Air America had more than 300 pilots, copilots, flight mechanics, and air freight specialists flying out of Laos and Thailand. During 1970 Air America air-dropped or landed in Laos 46 million pounds of foodstuffs,
mainly rice. Helicopter flight time reached more than 4,000 hours a month during that year. Air America crews transported tens of thousands of troops and refugees, flew emergency medevac missions, and rescued downed airmen throughout Laos. The crews also inserted and extracted road-watch teams, flew nighttime airdrop missions over the Ho Chi Minh Trail, spent long nights at high altitudes monitoring sensors along infiltration routes, and conducted a highly successful photo reconnaissance program over northern Laos. They also engaged in numerous clandestine missions, using night-vision glasses and state-of-the-art electronic equipment. Air America’s operations became increasingly hazardous during the early 1970s as the Communists launched a series of major offenses in the country. Although CIA-led forces were able to delay a final Communist victory, they could not prevent it. In February 1974 a cease-fire agreement was signed, leading to the formation of a coalition government for Laos. On June 3, 1974, the last Air America aircraft crossed the border from Laos into Thailand. The war had cost the lives of 97 crew members, lost as a result of enemy action and operational accidents. Air America continued to fly in South Vietnam, as it had since the early 1960s. The airline went on to take a major part in the final evacuation of the country in April 1975. Indeed, one of the most enduring images of the final days in Saigon is a photograph of an Air America helicopter loading passengers atop the Pittman Apartments. Even before the departure of the United States from Vietnam, Air America’s fate had been decided. On April 21, 1972, CIA director Richard Helms had ended a lengthy debate within the CIA over the continued need for a covert airlift capability and ordered the agency to divest itself of ownership and control of Air America and related companies. Air America would be retained only until the end of the war in Southeast Asia. On June 30, 1976, Air America closed its doors and returned $20 million to the U.S. Treasury. WILLIAM M. LEARY See also Bird & Sons; Central Intelligence Agency; Continental Air Services; Geneva Accords of 1962; Helms, Richard McGarrah; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Laos; Plain of Jars References Leary, William M. Perilous Missions: Civil Air Transport and CIA Covert Operations in Asia. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1984. Parker, James E., Jr. Covert Ops: The CIA’s Secret War in Laos. New York: St Martin’s, 1997. Robbins, Christopher. Air America. New York: Putnam, 1979.
Airborne Operations The term “airborne” has traditionally referred to combat troops who are transported by aircraft and parachuted into battle or, as in certain instances in World War II, landed by glider. The term
Airborne Operations also refers to a much broader class of actions. In this sense, the Encyclopedia of the U.S. Military defines an airborne operation as one “involving movement and delivery of combat forces by air.” In current usage, the term “airborne” refers to those troops who are parachute qualified. Here airborne operations are defined as those involving troops parachuting into battle. During the Indochina War, the French employed airborne tactics in their fight against the Viet Minh. Elite paratroopers (known as paras) jumped to relieve isolated posts, carry out raids, and gather intelligence. They also supported infantry units during ground operations. On July 17, 1953, three French parachute battalions conducted an operation at the Viet Minh–occupied border town of Lang Son. Located along Route Coloniale 4 on the China border, Lang Son was a major logistics center for incoming Chinese military supplies. The French withdrew after destroying 5,000 tons of matériel, including arms and ammunition. In Operation CASTOR (November 20, 1953), France conducted its largest airborne operation of the war in northwestern Vietnam at Dien Bien Phu. Sixty-five Douglas C-47 Skytrains dropped two battalions of paratroopers into the valley; they dropped a third battalion during a second lift that same afternoon. By November 22 the French had deployed six airborne battalions to Dien Bien Phu. By December airborne forces, utilizing the airstrip at Dien Bien Phu, began being replaced by ground units there. One of the heroic stories of the Indochina War came during the Siege of Dien Bien Phu (April–May 1954) when parachute reinforcements insisted on dropping into a battle that was already lost so that they might fight alongside their comrades. During the Vietnam War, airborne operations were not a major factor. This was because of the terrain and the development of air mobile–air assault tactics. The first major U.S. Army ground combat unit sent to Vietnam, however, was the 173rd Airborne Brigade (Separate). Known as the “Sky Soldiers,” the brigade arrived in Vietnam on May 7, 1965. Formed in May 1963 and headquartered at Okinawa, the 173rd Airborne Brigade was the U.S. Pacific Command’s quick-reaction strike force. The brigade was initially sent to Vietnam on temporary assignment to provide security for the Bien Hoa Air Base complex until elements of the 101st Airborne Division could be deployed from the United States. The 173rd Airborne Brigade remained in Vietnam for six years. The 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry, of the 173rd Airborne Brigade conducted the only major U.S. airborne operation of the war while attached to the 1st Infantry Division. This was during Operation JUNCTION CITY in February 1967 and included 800 troopers of the 2nd Battalion in a 30,000-man multidivision force against War Zone C. On the morning of February 22 the 2nd Battalion, lifted by 16 Lockheed C-130 Hercules transports, carried out the first major U.S. airborne assault since the Korean War. The “Screaming Eagles” of the 101st Airborne Division also served in Vietnam. Its 1st Brigade arrived there in the summer of
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1965, and the remaining brigades arrived by November 1967. With the introduction of new tactics involving helicopters during this period, the division was in the process of transforming itself from parachute operations to air mobile–air assault tactics. While the 101st Airborne Division remained one of the premier U.S. combat units in Vietnam, it did not conduct airborne operations there. The U.S. Marine Corps had parachute-qualified reconnaissance battalions in Vietnam, and in June 1966 a marine reconnaissance company conducted a combat jump near Chu Lai. Other military formations possessing an airborne capability and conducting limited airborne operations were the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Studies and Observation Group (MACV SOG); the Vietnamese Strategic Technical Directorate; and the Australian Special Air Service (SAS). All members of U.S. Army Special Forces in Vietnam were airborne qualified. Other U.S. units, including the Navy SEALs and Army Rangers, were airborne qualified but generally used riverine craft and air assault (helicopters) during the war. Airborne units also developed within the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army). These began in 1955 with the three battalions of the Airborne (or Parachutist) Group. In 1960 the Airborne Group was reorganized as the Airborne Brigade. On December 1, 1965, it officially became the Airborne Division, with three brigades. A fourth brigade was added in early 1975. Between 1962 and 1966, ARVN Airborne units conducted various parachute assaults. In 1966 with the infusion of helicopters from the United States, these elements began adopting air mobile– air assault tactics. By 1968 the Airborne Division, headquartered in Saigon, was serving as a helicopter-borne reaction force. ARVN Airborne units made a combat parachute jump on May 4, 1972, during an operation near Pleiku. During 1966–1968 U.S. Army Special Forces units trained six airborne-qualified battalions of Montagnards as well as other ethnic groups. Led by American Special Forces advisers, these battalions conducted four airborne operations during 1967 and 1968 and established Special Forces camps in Communist-held territory. Special warfare operations incorporating native fighters and marked by rapid movement and fluidity were, on the whole, very effective in dealing with Communist guerrillas. Attempts to construct stationary compounds with set defensive perimeters were not as successful as operations depending on stealth, natural cover, and surprise. Given U.S. domination of the air, neither the Viet Cong (VC) nor the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) utilized airborne forces during the Vietnam War. The small North Vietnamese airborne force, developed during the late 1950s and early 1960s as a part of the North Vietnamese 335th Brigade, was disbanded during the course of the war. JAMES MCNABB See also Air Mobility; CASTOR, Operation; Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; JUNCTION CITY, Operation; Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; Montagnards; Studies and Observation Group
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Aircraft, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam
References Arkin, William M., et al., eds. Encyclopedia of the U.S. Military. New York: Hallinger, 1990. Davidson, Phillip A. Vietnam at War: The History, 1946–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1988. Hoyt, Edwin F. Airborne: The History of American Parachute Forces. New York: Stein and Day, 1979. Galvin, General John R. Air Assault: The Development of Airmobile Warfare. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1969. Simpson, Howard R. Dien Bien Phu: The Epic Battle America Forgot. Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1994.
Aircraft, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam Aerial warfare over Indochina began as early as 1941, when Japanese land-based bombers took off from airports near Saigon (present-day Ho Chi Minh City) to sink the British capital ships Repulse and Prince of Wales. During the Indochina War (1946–1954), there were insufficient numbers of French aircraft available to contain the Viet Minh and carry out effective airlift. Most French aircraft were of World War II vintage, including the Grumman F6F Hellcat and the Junkers Ju-52 and Douglas C-47 transports. A few remnant Japanese aircraft were used briefly but were quickly retired for maintenance reasons. The Grumman F8F Bearcat, introduced at the end of World War II but too late to see service in that conflict, became the chief French ground-support aircraft during the Indochina War. U.S. Fairchild C-119s were pressed into covert service in the futile attempts to relieve the French cornered at Dien Bien Phu. The French sought heavy bomber aircraft, which the United States refused to supply. When the United States began military assistance to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) in October 1954, the initial aviation equipment supplied was of similar limited capability. By the end of the war, however, the United States had made a large commitment in aircraft and associated necessary equipment. Unfortunately for the United States and its South Vietnamese ally, the level of strategy and political leadership did not measure up to the quantity of aircraft or the quality of technology employed. The principal fixed-wing aircraft used in the Vietnam War, along with a brief description of their missions and characteristics, follow.
Allied Forces Bombers Boeing B-52 Stratofortress. An eight-engine heavy jet bomber originally designed as an intercontinental weapon system, the Boeing B-52 Stratofortress (“Buff”) in Vietnam was utilized in duties equivalent to World War I artillery bombardments. Operating from Andersen Air Force Base at Guam and the Royal Thai Navy Air Force Base at U-Tapao, Thailand, the B-52s usually flew Arc Light strikes in three-ship cells and dropped their bombs on
cue from special equipment such as the Combat Skyspot. Primarily B-52D and G aircraft were employed, although F models were used early in the war. Used for carpet bombing, B-52s were eventually called upon for close air support, bombing near perimeters of fortified camps. D models were capable of carrying up to 108 500-pound bombs. Specifications (typical B-52D) are wingspan, 185 feet; length, 156.6 feet; height, 48.25 feet; empty weight, 173,600 pounds; maximum weight, 450,000 pounds; power plants, eight 13,750-pound thrust Pratt & Whitney J57-P-43 engines; maximum speed, 610 miles per hour (mph); and range (unrefueled), 6,400 miles. Douglas A-1 Skyraider. Originally developed as a U.S. Navy single-place, carrier-based dive bomber and torpedo plane, the Douglas Skyraider (“Spad”) served in both the Korean War and Vietnam War, in the latter with U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine, U.S. Air Force, and Republic of Vietnam Air Force (VNAF, South Vietnamese Air Force) units. Several versions were developed, but most bombing was carried out by the single-seat A-1 version, powered by a Wright R-3350 reciprocating engine. A-1s were prized for their accuracy in close support, particularly in air-rescue operations, and for the ability of their rugged fuselage and engine to sustain damage and keep flying. Specifications (typical A-1) are wingspan, 50 feet 9 inches; length, 40 feet 1 inch; height, 15 feet 10 inches; empty weight, 12,313 pounds; maximum weight, 25,000 pounds; power plant, one 2,700-horsepower (hp) Wright R-3350 engine; maximum speed, 320 mph; and range, 1,202 miles. Douglas B-26 Invader. First flown in July 1942 as the XA-26, the Douglas Invader flew in World War II, the Korean War, and Vietnam. Redesignated the B-26 after World War II, the basic design was extensively modified by On Mark Engineering as the B-26K Counter-Invader, and when introduced in Vietnam it was redesignated the A-26A. This twin-engine light bomber was a delight to fly and was among the first U.S. combat aircraft introduced in Operation FARM GATE. Many operated out of Nakhom Phanom, Thailand. Some RB-26s were used for reconnaissance. Specifications are wingspan, 71 feet 6 inches; length, 51 feet 7 inches; height, 19 feet; empty weight, 25,130 pounds; maximum weight, 39,250 pounds; power plants, two 2,500-hp Pratt & Whitney R-2800 engines; maximum speed, 327 mph; and range, 1,480 miles. Douglas A-4 Skyhawk. The Douglas A-4 Skyhawk was first flown in 1954 and was in continuous production longer than any other combat aircraft. The last of 2,960 A-4s was delivered in 1979. Small and rugged, the A-4 was a favorite workhorse of U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps crews in Vietnam. The Skyhawk carried a wide variety of weapons during tens of thousands of sorties against enemy targets. Specifications (typical A-4E) are wingspan, 27 feet 6 inches; length, 40 feet 1.5 inches; height, 15 feet 2 inches; empty weight, 9,853 pounds; maximum weight, 24,500 pounds; power plant, one 8,500-pound thrust Pratt & Whitney J52-P-2 engine; maximum speed, 660 mph; and range, 1,160 miles.
Aircraft, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam
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U.S. Navy Douglas A-1 Skyraiders, their wings collapsed to save space, crowd the flight deck of USS Core after that escort carrier arrived in Saigon with more than 70 aircraft in June 1965. The A-1 was a primary ground-support aircraft for both the U.S. Air Force and the Republic of Vietnam Air Force during the Vietnam War. (AP/Wide World Photos)
Douglas EB/RB-66 Destroyer, A-3 Skywarrior. First flown in October 1952 as the Navy XA3D-1 Skywarrior, a twin-jet carrierbased nuclear bomber, this durable aircraft served in Vietnam with the U.S. Navy as the KA-3B tanker and EKA-3B tanker/electronic countermeasures (ECM) aircraft. The U.S. Air Force employed it principally as the EB-66 ECM aircraft. Operating with or without fighter escort, EB-66s probed deep into Communist-held territory; 15 were lost, 6 in combat and 9 to accidents. Specifications (typical RB/EB-66C) are wingspan, 74 feet 7 inches; length, 75 feet 2 inches; height, 23 feet 7 inches; empty weight, 43,966 pounds; maximum weight, 82,420 pounds; power plants, two 10,200-pound thrust Allison J71-A-13 turbojet engines; maximum speed, 640 mph; and range, 2,935 miles. Martin B-57/RB-57 Canberra. The only non-U.S. design adopted by the U.S. Air Force since World War II, the B-57 was originally built by Britain’s English Electric as the Canberra, with its first flight in May 1949. The first U.S. Air Force example was
English built, but Martin was awarded a contract to redesign the aircraft and produce it. A Martin B-57B was the first American jet to be employed in Vietnam. Canberras were subsequently used in bombing, flak-suppression, night-interdiction, and reconnaissance roles. The Viet Cong (VC) called the B-57 the con sau (“caterpillar”) and dreaded its long time on-station and its great bomb capacity. The VNAF also operated a few B-57s for a brief period. B-57s and RB-57s flew almost 38,000 sorties in Southeast Asia. A total of 33 B-57s were lost. Specifications (B-57B) are wingspan, 64 feet; length, 65 feet 6 inches; height, 15 feet 7 inches; empty weight, 27,000 pounds; maximum weight, 55,000 pounds; power plants, two 7,200-pound thrust Wright J65 turbojet engines; maximum speed, 598 mph; and range, 2,300 miles. Grumman A-6, EA-6A Intruder, EA-6B Prowler (also KA-6D Tanker). The innocuous-looking Grumman A2F-1 (later designated A-6) first flew on April 19, 1960; it went on to serve an
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Aircraft, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam
increasingly important role as an attack, reconnaissance, electronic-warfare, and tanker aircraft. Intruders began operations in Vietnam in 1965 and were in the forefront of battle until the end of the war. Always a complex aircraft with a difficult mission, the Intruder/Prowler’s versatility won wide popularity. Specifications (EA-6B) are wingspan, 53 feet; length, 59 feet 7 inches; height, 17 feet; empty weight, 32,162 pounds; maximum weight, 60,610 pounds; power plants, two 11,200-pound thrust Pratt & Whitney J52-P408 turbojet engines; maximum speed, 659 mph; and range, 2,022 miles. Vought A-7 Corsair II. Designed to replace the McDonnell Douglas A-4 and based heavily on the Vought F-8 design, the Vought A-7 proved to be a highly successful attack bomber for both the U.S. Navy and, later, the U.S. Air Force. Built for a ground-attack role with armor and damage-resistant systems, the Corsair II proved to be as rugged as its World War II namesake. Specifications (A-7E) are wingspan, 38 feet 9 inches; length, 46 feet 1.5 inches; height, 16 feet .75 inch; empty weight, 19,111 pounds; maximum weight, 42,000 pounds; power plant, one 15,000-pound thrust Allison (Rolls-Royce) TF41-A-2 engine; maximum speed, 691 mph; and range, 2,861 miles.
Fighters and Fighter-Bombers Convair F-102 Delta Dagger. First flown in October 1953, the Convair F-102 Delta Dagger (“Deuce”) delta-wing aircraft was modified to have an area-ruled fuselage and became a missile-carrying supersonic interceptor. The F-102 flew air-defense missions in Vietnam from 1962 to 1969, was phased out of the U.S. Air Force inventory in 1976, and had a second career as a drone aircraft (PQM-102A). Specifications are wingspan, 38 feet 1.5 inches; length, 68 feet 5 inches; height, 21 feet 2.5 inches; empty weight, 19,050 pounds; maximum weight, 31,500 pounds; power plant, one 17,000-pound thrust (with afterburner) Pratt & Whitney J-57-P-25 turbojet engine; maximum speed, 825 mph; and range, 1,350 miles. General Dynamics F-111 Aardvark, EF-111A Raven. One of the most controversial of warplanes, the General Dynamics F-111 Aardvark, derived from Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s quest for the TFX triservice fighter. The variable-geometry F-111 overcame early problems to become an extraordinarily capable long-distance low-level fighter-bomber and, as the EF-111A, a remarkable ECM aircraft. The first deployment of F-111s to Thailand for the Vietnam War ended in disaster, but the second deployment allowed the F-111A to perform brilliantly, flying more than 4,000 missions at night and in bad weather. Specifications (F-111A) are wingspan, 63 feet (unswept) and 31 feet 11 inches (fully swept); length, 73 feet 6 inches; height, 17 feet .5 inch; empty weight, 45,200 pounds; maximum weight, 92,500 pounds; power plants, two 18,500-pound thrust Pratt & Whitney TF30-P3 turbofan engines; maximum speed, 1,650 mph; and range, 3,800 miles. Lockheed F-104 Starfighter. A product of Lockheed’s famous Skunk Works, the F-104 Starfighter was to have far more success
in foreign service than it did with the U.S. Air Force. Intended as a lightweight air superiority fighter, the F-104 set numerous speed and altitude records. It was transferred from Air Defense Command squadrons to National Guard units when the U.S. Air Force decided that it lacked the endurance and all-weather capability required for the interceptor role. Ironically, the F-104 proved more useful in its foreign F-104G ground-support role. U.S. Air Force F-104s, despite their inability to carry an adequate weapons load, were deployed to Vietnam in 1965 and to Thailand in 1966–1967 for operations over both the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and South Vietnam, where heavy losses eventually forced their replacement by McDonnell F-4s. Specifications (F-104C) are wingspan, 21 feet 9 inches; length, 54 feet 8 inches; height, 13 feet 5 inches; empty weight, 12,760 pounds; maximum weight, 27,853 pounds; power plant, one 15,800-pound thrust (with afterburner) General Electric J79GE-7 turbojet engine; maximum speed, 1,150 mph; and range, 1,500 miles. McDonnell F-101 (RF-101). Originally designed to the concept of penetration fighter, the McDonnell F-101 (“Voodoo”) was an outgrowth of the earlier XF-88. First flown in September 1954, the F-101 was subsequently developed in a wide variety of roles, including interceptor, tactical bomber, and nuclear bomber and, in the RF-101, as a reconnaissance aircraft. RF-101s flew the majority of U.S. Air Force reconnaissance missions in Vietnam until replaced by RF-4C Phantoms. Specifications (RF-101C) are wingspan, 39 feet 8 inches; length, 69 feet 4 inches; height, 18 feet; empty weight, 26,136 pounds; maximum weight, 51,000 pounds; power plants, two 15,000pound thrust (with afterburner) Pratt & Whitney J57-P-13 turbojet engines; maximum speed, 1,012 mph; and range, 2,145 miles. McDonnell Douglas F-4 (RF-4) Phantom. Unquestionably the most successful Western fighter produced during the Vietnam War period, the McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom was both versatile and rugged, performing well for all three U.S. Air Force services. Originally designed as a missile-equipped all-weather fleet-defense fighter for the U.S. Navy, the Phantom was adopted by the U.S. Air Force initially as an interceptor and later served in a variety of roles, including air-superiority fighter, fighter-bomber, reconnaissance, fast forward air control, Wild Weasel, and many others. Not an aesthetic triumph but continually modified and upgraded, the Phantom earned a formidable reputation in Vietnam. Specifications (F-4E) are wingspan, 38 feet 4.875 inches; length, 63 feet; height, 16 feet 6 inches; empty weight, 29,535 pounds; maximum weight, 61,651 pounds; power plants, two 17,900pound thrust (with afterburner) General Electric J79-GE-17 turbojet engines; maximum speed, 1,485 mph; and range, 1,885 miles. North American F-100 (RF-100) Super Sabre. The world’s first operational fighter capable of supersonic speed in level flight, the North American F-100 Super Sabre first flew in May 1953. Distinguished by its 45-degree swept wings, the Super Sabre had a somewhat troubled early development. This was followed by
Aircraft, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam
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A flight of U.S. Air Force McDonnell Douglas F-4C Phantom fighter-bombers refuel from a Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker aircraft before striking targets in North Vietnam. The Phantoms are fully loaded and carrying 750-pound general-purpose bombs and rockets. (U.S. Air Force)
widespread service, first as an air-superiority fighter and then in Vietnam as a ground attack, Wild Weasel, reconnaissance, and fast forward air control aircraft. As many as 13 squadrons of F-100s served in Vietnam, prolonging the F-100’s life in service. Specifications (F-100D) are wingspan, 38 feet 9 inches; length, 47 feet 5 inches; height, 16 feet 2.5 inches; empty weight, 20,638 pounds; maximum weight, 38,048 pounds; power plant, one 16,000-pound thrust (with afterburner) Pratt & Whitney J57-O21A engine; maximum speed, 892 mph; and range, 1,200 miles. North American T-28 (RT-28) Trojan. Used for training, ground attack, and reconnaissance, the North American T-28 Trojan was one of the first U.S. Air Force aircraft to participate in the Vietnam War. Specifications are wingspan, 40 feet 1 inch; length, 33 feet; height, 12 feet 8 inches; empty weight, 6,424 pounds; maximum weight, 8,486 pounds; power plant, one 1,425-hp Wright R-1820 engine; maximum speed, 343 mph; and range, 1,060 miles. Northrop F-5 Tiger. Designed as a lightweight fighter to be furnished to approved nations by the United States under the Military Assistance Program, the Northrop F-5 Tiger was sold aggressively to many countries around the world. In 1965 the U.S. Air Force took 12 F-5As (modified with aerial refueling equipment to F-5C
status) to Vietnam in the Skoshi Tiger program. These aircraft were later transferred to the VNAF. A later version, the F-5E, with more powerful engines, was called the Tiger II and was used subsequently for dissimilar air combat training. Specifications (F-5C) are wingspan, 25 feet 3 inches; length, 47 feet 2 inches; height, 13 feet 2 inches; power plants, two 4,090pound thrust General Electric GE85–13 turbojets; empty weight, 8,085 pounds; maximum weight, 20,667 pounds; maximum speed, 924 mph; and range, 700 miles. Republic F-105 Thunderchief. Originally designed as a supersonic fighter-bomber to deliver nuclear weapons, the Republic F-105 Thunderchief distinguished itself by carrying the brunt of the aerial offensive against North Vietnam. Familiarly known as the “Thud” and first flown in October 1955, the F-105 went through a troublesome development period that marred its reputation, which was redeemed over Vietnam. The Thunderchief served brilliantly in fighter-bomber and Wild Weasel roles. About 350 Thunderchiefs were lost in action to either combat or operational causes. The last operational flight in a Thunderchief was in 1984, almost 30 years after its first flight. Specifications (F-105D) are wingspan, 34 feet 11 inches; length, 64 feet 5 inches; height, 19 feet 8 inches; power plant, one 16,100-
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Aircraft, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam
pound thrust (24,500 pounds with afterburning) Pratt & Whitney J57-P-19W engine; empty weight, 26,885 pounds; maximum weight, 52,550 pounds; maximum speed, 1,390 mph; and range, 1,500 miles. Vought F-8 (RF-8A) Crusader. Often called “the last of the gunfighters,” the Vought F-8 Crusader was beloved by its pilots and ground crew members. Designed as a supersonic air-superiority fighter, it exceeded Mach 1 on its maiden flight in March 1955. Unusual with its variable-incidence wing, the Crusader had the great advantage in Vietnam of carrying four 20-millimeter (mm) cannons at a time, while F-4s had only missiles. The F-8 was credited with downing 19 MiGs in Vietnam. The RF-8 served equally well in the reconnaissance role, although suffering heavy losses. Specifications (F-8E) are wingspan, 35 feet 2 inches; length, 54 feet 6 inches; height, 15 feet 9 inches; power plant, one 18,000pound thrust (with afterburner) Pratt & Whitney J-57-P20A engine; empty weight, 19,925 pounds; maximum weight, 28,000 pounds; maximum speed, 1,120 mph; and range, 1,100 miles.
Trainers, Transports, Reconnaissance Aircraft, Defoliators, Psychological Warfare, Forward Air Control, Etc. Cessna A-37 Dragonfly. The Cessna T-37 trainer first flew on October 12, 1954. The design was modified to the A-37A Dragonfly (“Tweetie-Bird”) attack plane that was sent to Vietnam for evaluation in 1967. An advanced version with in-flight refueling provisions and a reinforced airframe was placed into production as the A-37B. Many of these were delivered to the VNAF and to U.S. Air National Guard units. The A-37 was used in Vietnam for forward air control and designated the OA-37B. Specifications are wingspan, 33 feet 9 inches; length, 29 feet 3 inches; height, 9 feet 2 inches; empty weight, 7,300 pounds; maximum weight, 12,000 pounds; power plants, two 2,400-pound thrust General Electric J85–17A turbojet engines; maximum speed, 476 mph; and range, 1,200 miles. Douglas C-47 (AC-47, HC-47, EC-47, RC-47, SC-47) Skytrain. First flown in December 1935, the Douglas DC-3 gained a reputation more as a civilian transport than as the military jack-of-alltrades C-47. More than 13,000 of the type were built by 1945, and they continue in military and civil service. The faithful “Gooneybird” was adapted to the gunship role in Vietnam, where, known as “Puff the Magic Dragon” and outfitted with three General Electric 7.62 miniguns, it proved invaluable. It also did well in electronic reconnaissance, photographic reconnaissance, and psychological warfare roles. Specifications (C-47) are wingspan, 95 feet 6 inches; length, 63 feet 9 inches; height, 17 feet; power plants, two 1,200-hp Pratt & Whitney R-1830–92 engines; empty weight, 18,200 pounds; maximum weight, 26,000 pounds; maximum speed, 230 mph; and range, 1,600 miles. Curtiss C-46 Commando. Another World War II design, the Curtiss C-46 Commando was first flown in March 1940. It served in World War II and the Korean War and received a brief new
period of service with the 1st Air Commando Group of the Tactical Air Command in Vietnam in 1962. Many Commandos were also used by civil and paramilitary airlines in the area. Specifications are wingspan, 108 feet 1 inch; length, 76 feet 4 inches; height, 21 feet 9 inches; empty weight, 32,400 pounds; maximum weight, 56,000 pounds; power plants, two 2,000-hp Pratt & Whitney R-2800 engines; maximum speed, 269 mph; and range, 1,200 miles. Fairchild C-119 (AC-119, RC-119) Flying Boxcar. An outgrowth of the Fairchild C-82 Packet, the Fairchild C-119 “Flying Boxcar” first flew in November 1947 and was used extensively in the Korean War. In the Vietnam War the C-119 was a troop and cargo transport but came into its own as the AC-119 gunship, of which there were several variants. The C-119Ks had the added power of two J85 jet engines slung under the wing. Specifications (C-119G) are wingspan, 109 feet 3 inches; length, 86 feet 6 inches; height, 26 feet 6 inches; empty weight, 40,785 pounds; gross weight, 72,000 pounds; power plants, two 3,500hp Wright R-3350–89A engines; maximum speed, 281 mph; and range, 1,630 miles. Fairchild C-123 (UC-123K, NC-123K, AC-123K) Provider. Developed from a Chase XG-20 cargo glider, the Fairchild C-123 “Provider” had first two and then four engines installed to undertake a variety of roles in Vietnam. Its most controversial use was during Operation RANCH HAND, the herbicide-spraying campaign used by the U.S. Air Force to defoliate the jungle to permit observation of People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) and Viet Cong (VC) operations. These aircraft were fitted with spray bars and two additional J85 jet engines. Specifications (C-123B) are wingspan, 110 feet; length, 75 feet 9 inches; height, 34 feet 1 inch; empty weight, 29,900 pounds; gross weight, 60,000 pounds; power plants, two 2,300-hp Pratt & Whitney R-2800–9W engines; maximum speed, 245 mph; and range, 1,470 miles. Douglas C-54 Skymaster. One of the most beloved transports in history, the Douglas C-54 Skymaster distinguished itself in World War II, the Berlin Airlift, and Korea. In Vietnam it served in small numbers as an early airborne command post; the U.S. Marine Corps also used some as transports. Specifications are wingspan, 117 feet 6 inches; length, 93 feet 10 inches; height, 27 feet 6 inches; empty weight, 37,000 pounds; maximum weight, 62,000 pounds; power plants, four 1,290-hp Pratt & Whitney R-2000–7 engines; maximum speed, 265 mph; and range, 3,900 miles. Douglas C-124 Globemaster II. The portly Douglas C-124 Globemaster II was a workhorse, carrying tons of supplies around the world and into Vietnam. Called “Old Shakey” because of its shake, rattle, and roll vibrations, it nonetheless was a dependable aircraft with a great capacity for outsize cargo. Specifications are wingspan, 174 feet 2 inches; length, 130 feet; height, 48 feet 4 inches; empty weight, 101,165 pounds; maximum weight, 194,500 pounds; power plants, four 3,800-hp Pratt & Whit-
Aircraft, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam ney R-4360–63A engines; maximum speed, 271 mph; and range, 4,050 miles. Lockheed EC-121 (RC-121) Super Constellation. Considered by many to be the most beautiful piston-engine airliner ever built, the Lockheed EC-121 (RC-121) Super Constellation served in Vietnam to provide air defense control and as an airborne communication relay aircraft. Specifications (EC-121D) are wingspan, 123 feet 5 inches; length, 116 feet 2 inches; height, 27 feet; empty weight, 80,611 pounds; maximum weight, 143,600 pounds; power plants, four 3,250-hp Wright R-3350 Turbo-Compound engines; maximum speed, 321 mph; and range, 4,600 miles. Lockheed C-130 (DC-130, WC-130, RC-130, AC-130, EC-130, HC-130) Hercules. One of the most efficient and longest-lived aircraft in history, the Lockheed C-130 served in multiple roles in Vietnam and did them all well. First flown in August 1954 and still in production four decades later, the “Herky-bird” distinguished itself as a troop carrier, a gunship, an electronic reconnaissance craft, and a drone launcher and in a variety of other roles. Rugged, reliable, and able to endure flak damage, the C-130 was and remains indispensable. Specifications (C-130H) are wingspan, 132 feet 7 inches; length, 97 feet 9 inches; height, 38 feet 3 inches; empty weight, 76,780 pounds; maximum weight, 175,000 pounds; power plants, four 4,910-equivalent shaft horsepower Allison T56-A15 turboprops; maximum speed, 386 mph; and range, 2,745 miles. Lockheed C-141 Starlifter. Based on the experience gained with the C-130 but much larger and with more advanced systems, the Lockheed C-141 Starlifter brought jet power to the cargo transport age and did yeoman service, transporting large cargo and personnel to Vietnam especially during times of emergency. Specifications are wingspan, 160 feet; length, 145 feet; height, 39 feet 4 inches; empty weight, 136,900 pounds; maximum weight, 323,100 pounds; power plants, four 21,000-pound static thrust Pratt & Whitney TF33-P7 engines; maximum speed, 565 mph; and range, 4,155 miles. Lockheed C-5 Galaxy. Designed to be able to carry cargo as wide and as heavy as the largest army tanks, the Lockheed C-5 Galaxy was destined for a turbulent introduction to a skeptical Congress and public. Despite early difficulties, it proved itself during the Vietnam War where, in conjunction with the Starlifter, it was able to rush supplies on an emergency basis. The Galaxy’s capability for in-flight refueling made it especially valuable. Specifications are wingspan, 222 feet 8.5 inches; length, 247 feet 9.5 inches; height, 65 feet 1.25 inches; empty weight, 321,000 pounds; maximum weight, 769,000 pounds; power plants, four 40,000-pound thrust General Electric TF-39 turbofans; maximum speed, 564 mph; and range, 8,400 miles (unrefueled). Boeing KC-135 (EC-135, RC-135) Stratotanker. Developed in parallel with the famous Boeing 707 transport, the Boeing KC-135 became a true force multiplier, enabling bombers and fighters to extend their range and increase their sortie rate as well as
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permitting them to take off with larger loads of ammunition. KC135s served dangerously near enemy positions, and amazingly none were lost to North Vietnamese fighters. Many a returning fighter pilot owed his life to the persistence and daring of KC-135 crews. Specifications (KC-135A) are wingspan, 130 feet 10 inches; length, 136 feet 3 inches; height, 38 feet 4 inches; empty weight, 98,466 pounds; maximum weight, 297,000 pounds; power plants, four 11,200-pound static thrust (13,750 pounds augmented) Pratt & Whitney J57-P-9W turbojet engines; maximum speed, 585 mph; and range, 9,200 miles. De Havilland C-7 (CV-2) Caribou. Originally developed for the U.S. Army, the De Havilland C-7 Caribou served the U.S. Air Force well in Vietnam with its short takeoff and landing (STOL) characteristics. After U.S. forces departed, some Caribous were turned over to the VNAF and presumably were later of use to the air force of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the Vietnam People’s Air Force (VPAF), previously the air force of North Vietnam. Specifications are wingspan, 95 feet 7.5 inches; length, 72 feet 7 inches; height, 31 feet 9 inches; empty weight, 18,260 pounds; maximum weight, 28,500 pounds; power plants, two 1,450-hp Pratt & Whitney R-2000-D5 engines; maximum speed, 230 mph; and range, 600 miles. McDonnell Douglas C-9 Nightingale. Appearing in Vietnam in 1972, the McDonnell Douglas C-9 Nightingale aeromedical evacuation plane was a welcome sight for sick and wounded military personnel leaving the country. A straightforward development of the standard Douglas DC-32CF, the C-9 supplemented the venerable C-118s also used for the task. Specifications are wingspan, 93 feet 5 inches; length, 119 feet 5 inches; height, 27 feet 6 inches; empty weight, 59,706 pounds; maximum weight, 110,000 pounds; power plants, two 14,500pound thrust Pratt & Whitney JT8D-9 engines; maximum speed, 576 mph; and range, 2,900 miles. Douglas C-118 (R6D-1) Liftmaster. The military version of the marvelous, beloved Douglas DC-6, the Douglas C-118 Liftmaster was used both by the U.S. Army and the U.S. Navy. Rugged, dependable, and comfortable, the C-118s gave good service in Vietnam. Specifications are wingspan, 117 feet 6 inches; length, 100 feet 7 inches; height, 28 feet 5 inches; empty weight, 51,495 pounds; maximum weight, 97,200 pounds; power plants, four 2,500-hp Pratt & Whitney R-2800 engines; maximum speed, 356 mph; and range, 3,820 miles. Douglas F-10 (F-3D) Skyknight. The portly Douglas F-10 Skyknight was first flown in 1950 and was used effectively in the Korean War, where it destroyed more enemy aircraft than any other U.S. Navy or U.S. Marine Corps aircraft. Aging and difficult to exit in an emergency, the Skyknight was pressed into service in Vietnam as an ECM aircraft. Specifications are wingspan, 50 feet; length, 45 feet 6 inches; height, 16 feet; empty weight, 18,160 pounds; maximum weight,
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Aircraft, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam
26,850 pounds; power plant, two 3,400-pound static thrust Westinghouse J34-WE-36 engines; maximum speed, 600 mph; and range, 1,200 miles. Cessna O-1 (L-19) Bird Dog. Following in the tradition of liaison aircraft in World War II, the Cessna O-1 Bird Dog played an essential forward air control role in Vietnam. Unarmed and unarmored, O-1s were constantly in the thick of the battle spotting enemy targets. Specifications are wingspan, 36 feet; length, 25 feet 9.5 inches; height, 7 feet 3.5 inches; empty weight, 1,614 pounds; maximum weight, 2,400 pounds; power plant, one 213-hp Continental O-470 engine; maximum speed, 151 mph; and range, 530 miles. Cessna O-2A (O-2B). A militarized version of the standard Cessna 337 “Push-Pull” Skymaster, the O-2A supplemented the Bird Dog in the forward air control role. The O-2B version was used for psychological warfare. Specifications are wingspan, 38 feet 2 inches; length, 29 feet 9 inches; height, 9 feet 4 inches; empty weight, 2,848 pounds; maximum weight, 5,400 pounds; power plants, two 210-hp Continental IO-360C/D piston engines; maximum speed, 199 mph; and range, 1,060 miles. Grumman OV-1 Mohawk. The Mohawk served the U.S. Army well in Vietnam as a night reconnaissance and battlefield surveillance aircraft. It was modified continually with equipment such as Side-Looking Airborne Radar. Specifications are wingspan, 48 feet; length, 41 feet; height, 12 feet 8 inches; empty weight, 11,747 pounds; maximum weight, 17,826 pounds; power plants, two 1,400-hp Lycoming T53-L-701 turboprops; maximum speed, 305 mph; and range, 1,080 miles. North American Rockwell OV-10 Bronco. The product of a competition for a so-called COIN aircraft (an armed reconnaissance plane for counterinsurgency work), the North American Rockwell OV-10 Bronco was delivered to both the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Marine Corps. The Bronco served as a forward air control aircraft and in reconnaissance. Specifications are wingspan, 40 feet; length, 41 feet 7 inches; height, 15 feet 2 inches; empty weight, 6,969 pounds; maximum weight, 14,466 pounds; power plants, two 715-shaft horsepower (shp) AiResearch T76-G-416/417 turboprop engines; maximum speed, 281 mph; and range, 1,428 miles. Lockheed P-3 Orion. A development of the ill-starred Lockheed Electra civil transport, the Lockheed P-3 Orion was originally intended for antisubmarine warfare work but was adapted for a variety of other roles. Specifications are wingspan, 99 feet 8 inches; length, 116 feet 10 inches; height, 33 feet 8.5 inches; empty weight, 61,491 pounds; maximum weight, 142,000 pounds; power plants, four 4,910-shp Allison T-56 turboprops; maximum speed, 473 mph; and range, 2,384 miles. Lockheed P-2 (RB-69A, OP-2E) Neptune. From its first flight in May 1945, the Lockheed P-2 Neptune proved to be an aircraft of exceptional ability. The P-2 filled the U.S. Navy’s requirement for a long-range land-based patrol and antisubmarine warfare plane.
The U.S. Air Force used the P-2 in Vietnam as the RB-69A for electronic countermeasure tests and training. Specifications are wingspan, 103 feet 10 inches; length, 91 feet 4 inches; height, 29 feet 4 inches; empty weight, 49,350 pounds; maximum weight, 79,985 pounds; power plants, two 3,500-hp Wright R-3250 engines; maximum speed, 400 mph; and range, 3,685 miles. De Havilland U-6 (RU-6A, TU-6A, L-20) Beaver. Known as “the General’s jeep” in Korea, the De Havilland U-6 Beaver served equally well in Vietnam. A simple aircraft that was easy to maintain, the U-6 was popular with its pilots. Specifications are wingspan, 48 feet; length, 30 feet 3 inches; height, 9 feet; empty weight, 2,850 pounds; maximum weight, 5,100 pounds; power plant, one 450-hp Pratt & Whitney R-985 engine; maximum speed, 163 mph; and range, 455 miles. De Havilland U-1 Otter. The De Havilland U-1 Otter was built in Canada for the U.S. Army, the U.S. Navy, and the Royal Canadian Air Force. Capable of STOL performance, it was both rugged and versatile. Specifications are wingspan, 58 feet; length, 41 feet 10 inches; height, 12 feet 7 inches; empty weight, 4,431 pounds; maximum weight, 8,000 pounds; power plant, one 600-hp Pratt & Whitney R-1340 engine; maximum speed, 153 mph; and range, 875 miles. Lockheed U-2C and U-2R. Another of the great triumphs of Lockheed’s Skunk Works, the U-2 first gained international prominence when one was shot down over the Soviet Union in May 1960. The high-flying U-2s operated out of both Vietnam and Thailand. Specifications (U-2R) are wingspan, 103 feet; length, 63 feet; height, 16 feet; empty weight, 15,101 pounds; maximum weight, 41,000 pounds; power plant, one 17,000-pound thrust Pratt & Whitney J75-P-13B engine; cruising speed, 470 mph; and range, 3,455 miles. Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird. An aircraft that excited public imagination since it was first announced, the Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird’s performance outstripped all other aircraft for a period of more than 20 years. Specifications are wingspan, 55 feet 7 inches; length, 107 feet 5 inches; height, 18 feet 5 inches; empty weight, 60,000 pounds; maximum weight, 172,000 pounds; power plants, two 32,500-pound static thrust (with afterburner) Pratt & Whitney J58 turbojet engines; maximum speed, 2,275 mph; and range, 3,250 miles (at Mach 3). Helio U-10 Super Courier. The Helio U-10 Super Courier is a six-seat long-range STOL aircraft with the capability of getting into and out of primitive airstrips. Specifications are wingspan, 39 feet; length, 31 feet; height, 8 feet 10 inches; empty weight, 2,010 pounds; maximum weight, 4,420 pounds; power plant, one 295-hp Lycoming GO-480 engine; maximum speed, 167 mph; and range, 615 miles. Beech QU-22B Bonanza. An adaptation of a conventionally tailed A-36 Bonanza with drone capability, the QU-22B was usually flown in Vietnam as a radio-relay aircraft in Igloo White operations.
Aircraft, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam
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The SR-71 is unofficially known as the “Blackbird.” (Department of Defense)
Specifications are wingspan, 33 feet 5.5 inches; length, 26 feet 8 inches; height, 8 feet 5 inches; empty weight, 2,020 pounds; maximum weight, 3,600 pounds; power plant, one 280-hp Continental IO-520 engine; maximum speed, 204 mph; and range, 980 miles.
Democratic Republic of Vietnam Aircraft (Principal Types Only) Antonov AN-2. An outstanding light transport built in large numbers, the biplane Antonov AN-2 (North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] code name “Colt”) appeared anachronistic but possessed exactly the performance needed for a transport in North Vietnam. Specifications are wingspan, 59 feet 8 inches; length, 41 feet 10 inches; height, 13 feet 1.5 inches; empty weight, 7,606 pounds; maximum weight, 12,125 pounds; power plant, one 1,000-hp Shvetsov radial engine; maximum speed, 160 mph; and range, 600 miles. Ilyushin IL-28. The twin-jet Ilyushin IL-28 bomber (NATO code name “Beagle”) was reportedly easy to fly and to maintain. Although only a threat in the Vietnam War, it was a significant one, for it could have done damage to U.S. airfields. Specifications are wingspan, 70 feet 4.5 inches; length, 57 feet 10.75 inches; height, 22 feet; empty weight, 28,417 pounds; maximum weight, 49,300 pounds; power plants, two 5,952-pound thrust Klimov VK-1 turbojets; maximum speed, 559 mph; and range, 1,355 miles. Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-15. A classic fighter of the Korean War, Chinese-built versions of the Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-15 (NATO code name “Fagot”) were the first jet fighters delivered to the VPAF. They were used primarily for training.
Specifications are wingspan, 33 feet 1 inch; length, 33 feet; height, 12 feet 2 inches; empty weight, 7,456 pounds; maximum weight, 10,595 pounds; power plant, one 5,952-pound static thrust Klimov RD-45 jet engine; maximum speed, 652 mph; and range, 882 miles. Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-17. A development of the famous MiG15 of the Korean War, the Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-17 (NATO code name “Fresco”) began equipping frontline Soviet units in 1953. More than a decade later, the MiG-17 was still a formidable opponent in Vietnam because of its great maneuverability and firepower. Specifications are wingspan, 31 feet 7 inches; length, 36 feet 11 inches; height, 12 feet 6 inches; empty weight, 8,663 pounds; maximum weight, 13,400 pounds; power plant, one 5,730-pound thrust (7,450 pounds augmented) Klimov VK-1F turbojet engine; maximum speed, 710 mph; and range, 1,230 miles. Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-19 (J-6). Built in large numbers in the Soviet Union and as the Shenyang J-6 in China, the MikoyanGurevich MiG-19 (NATO code name “Farmer”) was a formidable supersonic fighter with a very effective armament package centered around three 30-mm cannon. Specifications are wingspan, 30 feet 2 inches; length, 48 feet 11 inches; height, 12 feet 10 inches; empty weight, 11,402 pounds; maximum weight, 19,621 pounds; power plants, two 7,165-pound thrust (with afterburning) Tumansky RD-9B turbojet engines; maximum speed, 901 mph; and range, 1,367 miles. Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21. An interceptor designed for high speeds and a swift climb, the tiny delta-wing Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21 (NATO code name “Fishbed”) was a formidable opponent to the heavier F-4s and F-105s it faced in Vietnam.
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Aircraft, Bombers
Specifications are wingspan, 23 feet 6 inches; length, 51 feet 9 inches; height, 14 feet 9 inches; empty weight, 13,500 pounds; maximum weight, 22,000 pounds; power plant, one 19,850-pound thrust (augmented) Tumansky R-25 turbojet engine; maximum speed, 1,385 mph; and range, 400 miles. WALTER J. BOYNE See also Airpower, Role in War; FARM GATE, Operation; McNamara Line; RANCH HAND, Operation; Raven Forward Air Controllers; Search-and-Rescue Operations References Berger, Carl, ed. The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, 1961– 1973: An Illustrated Account. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1977. Bowers, Peter M., and Gordon Swanborough. United States Military Aircraft since 1909. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1989. Bowers, Peter M., and Gordon Swanborough. United States Navy Aircraft since 1911. New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1968. Bowers, Ray L. The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia: Tactical Aircraft. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983. Francillon, René J. Lockheed Aircraft since 1913. London: Putnam, 1982. Francillon, René J. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft since 1920. London: Putnam, 1979. Littauer, Raphael, and Norman Thomas Uphoff. The Air War in Indochina. Rev. ed. Boston: Beacon, 1971. Van Vleet, Clarke, and William J. Armstrong. United States Naval Aviation, 1910–1980. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980.
Aircraft, Bombers Boeing B-52 Stratofortress An eight-engine heavy jet bomber originally designed as an intercontinental weapon system, the Boeing B-52 Stratofortress (“Buff”) in Vietnam was converted to duties equivalent to World War I artillery bombardments. Operating from Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, and the Royal Thai Navy Air Force Base at U-Tapao, Thailand, the B-52s usually flew Arc Light strikes in three-ship cells and dropped their bombs on cue from special equipment such as the Combat Skyspot. Primarily B-52D and G were employed, although F models were used early in the war. Used for carpet bombing, B-52s were eventually called upon for close air support, bombing near perimeters of fortified camps. D models were capable of carrying up to 108 500-pound bombs. The B-52s also contributed heavily to LINEBACKER I and LINEBACKER II operations over North Vietnam, and a number were shot down. Specifications (typical B-52D) are wingspan, 185 feet; length, 156.6 feet; height, 48.25 feet; empty weight, 173,600 pounds; maximum weight, 450,000 pounds; power plants, eight 13,750-pound thrust Pratt & Whitney J57-P-43 engines; maximum speed, 610 miles per hour (mph); and range (unrefueled), 6,400 miles.
Douglas A-1 Skyraider Originally developed as a U.S. Navy single-place, carrier-based dive bomber and torpedo plane, the Douglas A-1 Skyraider (“Spad”) served in both the Korean War and the Vietnam War, in the latter with U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Air Force, and Republic of Vietnam Air Force (VNAF, South Vietnamese Air Force) units. Several versions were developed, but most bombing was carried out by the single-seat A-1 version, powered by a Wright R-3350 reciprocating engine. A-1s were prized for their accuracy in close support, particularly in air-rescue operations, and for the ability of their rugged fuselage and engine to sustain damage and keep flying. Specifications (typical A-1) are wingspan, 50 feet 9 inches; length, 40 feet 1 inch; height, 15 feet 10 inches; empty weight, 12,313 pounds; maximum weight, 25,000 pounds; power plant, one 2,700-horsepower (hp) Wright R-3350 engine; maximum speed, 320 mph; and range, 1,202 miles.
Douglas B-26 Invader First flown in July 1942 as the XA-26, the Douglas Invader flew in World War II, the Korean War, and Vietnam. Redesignated the B-26 after World War II, the basic design was extensively modified by On Mark Engineering as the B-26K Counter-Invader, and when introduced in Vietnam it was redesignated the A-26A. This twin-engine light bomber was a delight to fly and was among the first U.S. combat aircraft introduced in Operation FARM GATE. Many operated out of Nakhom Phanom, Thailand. Some RB-26s were used for reconnaissance. Specifications are wingspan, 71 feet 6 inches; length, 51 feet 7 inches; height, 19 feet; empty weight, 25,130 pounds; maximum weight, 39,250 pounds; power plants, two 2,500-hp Pratt & Whitney R-2800 engines; maximum speed, 327 mph; and range, 1,480 miles.
Douglas A-4 Skyhawk The Douglas A-4 Skyhawk was first flown in 1954 and was in continuous production longer than any other combat aircraft. The last of 2,960 A-4s was delivered in 1979. Small and rugged, the A-4 was a favorite workhorse of U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps crews in Vietnam. The Skyhawk carried a wide variety of weapons during tens of thousands of sorties against enemy targets. Specifications (typical A-4E) are wingspan, 27 feet 6 inches; length, 40 feet 1.5 inches; height, 15 feet 2 inches; empty weight, 9,853 pounds; maximum weight, 24,500 pounds; power plant, one 8,500-pound thrust Pratt & Whitney J52-P-2 engine; maximum speed, 660 mph; and range, 1,160 miles.
Douglas EB/RB-66 Destroyer, A-3 Skywarrior First flown in October 1952 as the Navy XA3D-1 Skywarrior, a twin-jet carrier-based nuclear bomber, this durable aircraft served in Vietnam with the U.S. Navy as the KA-3B tanker and EKA-3B tanker/electronic countermeasures (ECM) aircraft. Its principal use there was by the U.S. Air Force as the EB-66 ECM aircraft.
Aircraft Carriers
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Operating with or without fighter escort, EB-66s probed deep into enemy territory; 15 were lost, 6 in combat and 9 to accidents. Specifications (typical RB/EB-66C) are wingspan, 74 feet 7 inches; length, 75 feet 2 inches; height, 23 feet 7 inches; empty weight, 43,966 pounds; maximum weight, 82,420 pounds; power plants, two 10,200-pound thrust Allison J71-A-13 turbojet engines; maximum speed, 640 mph; and range, 2,935 miles.
pounds; maximum weight, 42,000 pounds; power plant, one 15,000-pound thrust Allison (Rolls-Royce) TF41-A-2 engine; maximum speed, 691 mph; and range, 2,861 miles. WALTER J. BOYNE
Martin B-57/RB-57 Canberra
References Berger, Carl, ed. The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, 1961– 1973: An Illustrated Account. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1977. Bowers, Peter M., and Gordon Swanborough. United States Military Aircraft since 1909. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1989. Bowers, Peter M., and Gordon Swanborough. United States Navy Aircraft since 1911. New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1968. Bowers, Ray L. The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia: Tactical Aircraft. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983. Francillon, René J. Lockheed Aircraft since 1913. London: Putnam, 1982. Francillon, René J. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft since 1920. London: Putnam, 1979. Littauer, Raphael, and Norman Thomas Uphoff. The Air War in Indochina. Rev. ed. Boston: Beacon, 1971. Van Vleet, Clarke, and William J. Armstrong. United States Naval Aviation, 1910–1980. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980.
The only non-U.S. design adopted by the U.S. Air Force since World War II, the B-57 was originally built by Britain’s English Electric as the Canberra, with its first flight in May 1949. The first U.S. Air Force example was British built, but Martin was awarded a contract to redesign the aircraft and produce it. A Martin B-57B was the first American jet to be employed in Vietnam. Canberras were subsequently used in bombing, flak-suppression, nightinterdiction, and reconnaissance roles. The Viet Cong (VC) called the B-57 the con sau (“caterpillar”) and dreaded its long time onstation and its great bomb capacity. The VNAF also operated a few B-57s for a brief period. B-57s and RB-57s flew almost 38,000 sorties in Southeast Asia. A total of 33 B-57s were lost. Specifications (B-57B) are wingspan, 64 feet; length, 65 feet 6 inches; height, 15 feet 7 inches; empty weight, 27,000 pounds; maximum weight, 55,000 pounds; power plants, two 7,200-pound thrust Wright J65 turbojet engines; maximum speed, 598 mph; and range, 2,300 miles.
Grumman A-6, EA-6A Intruder, EA-6B Prowler (also KA-6D Tanker) The innocuous-looking Grumman A2F-1 (later designated A-6) first flew on April 19, 1960; it would go on to serve an increasingly important role as an attack, reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and tanker aircraft. Intruders began operations in Vietnam in 1965 and were in the forefront of battle until the end of the war. They remain in active service. Always a complex aircraft with a difficult mission, the Intruder/Prowler’s versatility has won wide popularity. Specifications (EA-6B) are wingspan, 53 feet; length, 59 feet 7 inches; height, 17 feet; empty weight, 32,162 pounds; maximum weight, 60,610 pounds; power plants, two 11,200-pound thrust Pratt & Whitney J52-P408 turbojet engines; maximum speed, 659 mph; and range, 2,022 miles.
Vought A-7 Corsair II Designed to replace the McDonnell Douglas A-4 and based heavily on the Vought F-8 design, the Vought A-7 proved to be a highly successful attack bomber for both the U.S. Navy and, later, the U.S. Air Force. Built for a ground-attack role with armor and damage-resistant systems, the Corsair II proved to be as rugged as its World War II namesake. Specifications (A-7E) are wingspan, 38 feet 9 inches; length, 46 feet 1.5 inches; height, 16 feet .75 inch; empty weight, 19,111
See also Airpower, Role in War; FARM GATE, Operation; McNamara Line; RANCH HAND, Operation; Raven Forward Air Controllers; Search-and-Rescue Operations
Aircraft Carriers From the early days of the Viet Minh insurgency against the French to the Mayaguez Incident almost 30 years later, both French and American aircraft carriers played a prominent role in the fighting in Southeast Asia. On April 2, 1947, the Dixmude, an ex-American escort carrier, sent its Douglas SBD Dauntless dive bombers into action supporting French forces in the central section of Vietnam. Then, steaming to France to ferry additional planes to the war, the Dixmude returned to launch strikes near Hanoi in October of the same year. The Dixmude set a pattern of aircraft transport and strike operations that French carriers would follow until 1954. In November 1948 the light carrier Arromanches, formerly of the British Royal Navy, joined the fray, and its aircraft repeatedly struck the Viet Minh in 1949, in 1951, and in 1954 during the siege of Dien Bien Phu. The U.S. Navy also transferred to France light carriers, which were renamed the LaFayette and the Bois Belleau. Only the former saw action, with the Bois Belleau arriving in Haiphong in June 1954. The operations of U.S. aircraft carriers overlapped with those of France and closely paralleled the American involvement in the Southeast Asian struggle. U.S. carriers made their first appearance in the theater in March 1950 when aircraft from the Boxer overflew Saigon in a show of support for the French. Soon thereafter the
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Aircraft Carriers
U.S. Navy transferred to France two light aircraft carriers. During the Dien Bien Phu crisis, the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration deployed several carriers to the South China Sea, as did President John F. Kennedy in 1961 during the Laotian crisis of that year. Full-fledged operations for carriers began three years later with reconnaissance flights over the Plain of Jars from Seventh Fleet warships deployed on Yankee Station in the Gulf of Tonkin. On June 6, 1964, a Vought RF-8A Crusader from the Kitty Hawk became the first American carrier plane lost to enemy fire. Two months later, carrier planes initiated combat strikes during the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, followed by the PIERCE ARROW, BARREL ROLL, and FLAMING DART retaliatory raids. In March 1965 the carriers Hancock and Ranger joined the U.S. Air Force in opening the episodic campaign dubbed ROLLING THUNDER. By the end of that year U.S. carriers had launched 31,000 sorties; their planes would strike targets in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) until 1973. Additionally, the ships also operated from Dixie Station to the south, their aircraft flying one-third of the missions directed at Communist forces in
the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) over a 16-month period beginning in April 1965. From 1964 to 1975 carriers averaged three on-station at a time, but they reached peaks of seven in June 1972 and January 1973. Twentyone carriers made at least one deployment to the theater, with four of those ships (the Bennington, Hornet, Kearsarge, and Yorktown) conducting only antisubmarine sweeps and rescue operations. Except for the John F. Kennedy, all of the U.S. Navy’s large attack carriers (the America, Constellation, Enterprise, Forrestal, Independence, Kitty Hawk, Ranger, and Saratoga) made at least one tour, as did the three carriers of the Midway class (the Coral Sea, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Midway). Six ships of the smaller Essex class also participated: four attack carriers (the Bon Homme Richard, Hancock, Oriskany, and Ticonderoga) and two antisubmarine carriers (the Intrepid and Shangri-La) with air groups configured for attack purposes. Individual tours generally lasted about nine months, and most of the carriers returned repeatedly to the war. The Hancock held the record for the highest number of cruises (eight); however, the Coral Sea made the longest cruise (331 days between December
The U.S. aircraft carrier Oriskany (CVA-34) en route to the Gulf of Tonkin and operations off Vietnam, June 23, 1967. Operating from both Dixie and Yankee stations, carriers were a vital part of U.S. air operations over both South and North Vietnam. (Naval Historical Center)
Air Defenses, Democratic Republic of Vietnam 1964 and November 1965) and spent the most time (875 days) on the line. Conversely, the Forrestal operated during its single war tour for only five days before an accident and fire sent it home. The navy’s first nuclear-powered carrier, the Enterprise, made six tours to Southeast Asia. Unlike their World War II predecessors, U.S. carriers off Vietnam remained in action day after day for months at a time. For example, during the summer of 1972, carriers launched an average of 4,000 sorties monthly and accounted for 60 percent of all missions supporting ground operations in South Vietnam. Techniques such as vertical replenishment and at-sea transfer of munitions and stores made possible such lengthy time on-station. The air groups on the largest carriers numbered about 90 airplanes each and, on the three Midway-class ships, about 75 airplanes. The smaller Essex-class carriers were quite crowded with their complements of 70 airplanes. The carriers operated a number of aircraft types. For attack, the propeller-driven Douglas A-1 Skyraider and the jet-powered Douglas A-3 Skywarrior and Douglas A-4 Skyhawk were gradually supplanted by the Ling-TemcoVought A-7 Corsair II and the Grumman A-6 Intruder. Fighter coverage was provided by the Vought F-8 Crusader and increasingly by the McDonnell F-4 Phantom II that also conducted attack missions. Reconnaissance tasks fell to the North American RA-5 Vigilante and Douglas RA-3B Skywarrior and specially configured fighters. The Grumman E-1 Tracer and Grumman E-2 Hawkeye provided air-control and early-warning capabilities. A few Grumman EA-6 Prowler electronics countermeasures aircraft saw service beginning in 1972. Helicopters such as the Sikorsky SH-3 Sea King and the Sikorsky UH-2 Seasprite were employed primarily for antisubmarine patrols and search-and-rescue missions. Unlike their U.S. Air Force counterparts, most U.S. Navy planes retained their light colors (for ease of deck spotting at night) and vivid squadron insignia. Despite restrictions imposed by Washington, carrier strike aircraft frequently hit with success important North Vietnamese targets. These included the Uong Bi thermal power plant in December 1965 and the oil tank farms in 1966. Efforts to interfere with North Vietnamese lines of communication proved less effective, however. Although Communist forces never confronted carriers directly, on many occasions North Vietnamese fighters challenged U.S. Navy planes that flew from them. Following an unacceptably high loss rate early in the war, in 1969 the U.S. Navy instituted its Top Gun School and thereafter enjoyed a 12:1 kill ratio. The Constellation fighters alone claimed 15 Soviet-made MiGs; airmen flying from this carrier included the team of Randall H. Cunningham and William P. Driscoll, the only navy aces of the conflict. Overall, carrier pilots received credit for 62 confirmed kills while losing 15 planes to enemy aircraft. More dangerous than MiGs to U.S. Navy aviators was enemy antiaircraft fire, which downed 345 planes. An additional 91 aircraft fell victim to surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and 79 were lost to other causes, making a total of 530 planes destroyed in action.
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Operational losses totaled 329 aircraft. Accidental fires claimed 39 additional planes aboard the Oriskany, Forrestal, and Enterprise. Even as the Richard M. Nixon administration gradually wound down the war, it kept a large carrier presence in the theater. For instance, six carriers were still on-station for much of 1972; naval aviators spent more time on the line that year than during any other period of the war. The number of attack sorties dropped, however; by the end of 1972, the majority of missions were reconnaissance flights. Carriers remained on-station following the cease-fire of January 23, 1973; four of the ships participated in Operation FREQUENT WIND, the final evacuation of Saigon. On May 15, 1975, planes from the Coral Sea helped cover the Mayaguez rescue operations. Over the long conflict, U.S. Navy aircraft carriers provided one of the strong arms of the U.S. war effort. Essentially invulnerable to enemy countermeasures, the carriers gave policy makers flexibility, mobility, and power. In return, the war validated the large carrier. MALCOLM MUIR JR. See also BARREL ROLL, Operation; Dixie Station; FLAMING DART I and II, Operations;
Forrestal, USS, Flight Deck Fire; FREQUENT WIND, Operation; Mayaguez Incident; Oriskany, USS, Fire aboard; PIERCE ARROW, Operation; Plain of Jars; ROLLING THUNDER, Operation; Top Gun School; United States Navy; Yankee Station References Francillon, René J. Tonkin Gulf Yacht Club: U.S. Carrier Operations off Vietnam. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988. Friedman, Norman. U.S. Aircraft Carriers: An Illustrated Design History. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1983. Marolda, Edward J., and Oscar P. Fitzgerald. The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict: From Military Assistance to Combat, 1959– 1965, Vol. 2. Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 1986. Nichols, John B., and Barrett Tillman. On Yankee Station: The Naval Air War over Vietnam. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987. Rausa, Rosario. Gold Wings, Blue Sea: A Naval Aviator’s Story. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1980.
Air Defenses, Democratic Republic of Vietnam Air defenses of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) expanded rapidly during the conflict in Southeast Asia and became one of the most formidable integrated air defense systems (IADS) yet seen in modern warfare. When American air strikes began against North Vietnam in 1964, North Vietnamese air defenses resembled those of North Korea in 1950. They included an estimated 1,426 antiaircraft guns, 22 early-warning radars, and 4 fire-control radars (the latter capable of directing the fires for medium and heavy guns). By the end of 1968, however, North Vietnamese air defenses included 8,050 antiaircraft artillery (AAA) pieces, 152 fighter aircraft (106 of these safely based in China), 40 active SA-2 missile battalions, and more than 400 radars of all types.
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Air Defenses, Democratic Republic of Vietnam
People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) personnel man a surface-to-air missile (SAM) launcher on the outskirts of Hanoi during the Vietnam War. Such missile systems were a key component of North Vietnam’s air defenses. (Bettmann/Corbis)
North Vietnam’s IADS consisted of three elements: detection, communication, and response. Detection elements provided warning of an imminent air attack by either active or passive means, including early-warning radars, radar-detection devices, and even observers with binoculars. Communication elements tied this system together by telephone or radio. Because North Vietnamese air defenses operated under strict Soviet-style centralized control, they were highly dependent on fast, efficient communications. There were three basic types of response elements available: AAA, airborne interceptors, and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). Antiaircraft artillery, responsible for 80 percent of American aircraft losses over Southeast Asia, fired unguided shells into the sky based on either the gunner’s judgment or radar-based predictions. The sizes, tactical ranges, and rates of fire of these weapons varied. Smaller-caliber weapons (7.62-millimeter[mm], 20-mm, and 37-mm) had higher rates of fire and threw a high volume of projectiles into the air. Medium-caliber (57-mm) and heavycaliber (85-mm and 100-mm) weapons had relatively slower rates of fire and often relied on fire-control radars for target data. Antiaircraft artillery fire was exceptionally deadly at lower altitudes simply because of the amount of bullets flying in the air. For example, from January 1965 to December 1966 AAA downed 384 U.S. aircraft, and for every 1 of these, 3 others suffered battle dam-
age. Of those aircraft lost, more than 53 percent were initially hit once the aircraft descended below 4,500 feet in altitude. Regarding fighter aircraft, North Vietnam had no interceptor force at the time of the August 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Incident. Two days later, however, Vietnam’s first fighter regiment flew 36 Sovietmade MiG-17 aircraft from the regiment’s training base in China to an airfield near Hanoi. In 1966 the newer, more capable Soviet MiG-21s entered North Vietnam’s inventory. North Vietnamese aircraft operated sporadically throughout the conflict, working in concert with the other elements of the air defense system. U.S. aviators noted that on some days the MiGs assumed primary responsibility for the air defense, while on other days the SAMs assumed the role. Interceptor pilots might entice American pilots to pursue them into an area well defended by SA-2s, or SA-2s might be fired to force U.S. air formations into a MiG ambush. North Vietnamese pilots followed the Soviet doctrine of operating under strict ground control. North Vietnamese radar operators and their Soviet advisers directed every action of fighter pilots other than takeoffs and landings. Radar operators would typically vector MiGs to the rear of U.S. formations, where they would strike either early in a mission, forcing U.S. Republic F-105 Thunderchiefs to jettison their bombs, or after the bomb run, when escorting McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom IIs would be low on
Air Mobility fuel. These guerrilla-style air tactics were often effective especially throughout Operation ROLLING THUNDER, when North Vietnamese airfields were declared off-limits to U.S. air strikes. SAMs, primarily the radar-guided SA-2 (and in 1972 the infraredguided SA-7), constituted the third response element of the IADS. Although SA-2s were relatively ineffective at low altitudes (where AAA was deadliest), they were much more effective at higher altitudes (where AAA was less accurate). Of the more than 9,000 SA-2s fired from 1965 to 1972, fewer than 2 percent brought down aircraft. However, SAMs were a constant threat to aircraft formations, and in the early stages of ROLLING THUNDER, SA-2s actually denied U.S. aircraft the opportunity to operate at medium and high altitudes until the advent of Wild Weasels, AGM-45 Shrikes, and ALQ-71 jamming pods. PATRICK K. BARKER See also Aircraft Carriers; Aircraft, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam; LINEBACKER I, Operation; LINEBACKER II, Operation; ROLLING THUNDER, Operation; Surface-to-Air Missiles, Democratic Republic of Vietnam References Lavalle, A. J. C., ed. The Tale of Two Bridges and the Battle for the Skies over North Vietnam. Monographs 1 and 2. USAF Southeast Asia Monograph Series, Vol. 1. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Staff, 2001. Michel, Marshall L., III. The Eleven Days of Christmas: America’s Last Vietnam Battle. San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2002. Momyer, William W. Airpower in Three Wars: World War II, Korea and Vietnam. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978. Morrocco, John, et al., eds. Thunder from Above: Air War, 1941–1968. The Vietnam Experience Series. Boston: Boston Publishing, 1984. Nordeen, Lon O. Air Warfare in the Missile Age. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1985.
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his corps being decimated in a nuclear attack. He proposed using aircraft to disperse his troops in defense and to concentrate them for attack, thus presenting fleeting nuclear targets. While heading operations on the U.S. Army General Staff, Gavin pushed the idea of using troops in helicopters to fulfill traditional cavalry missions. Like-minded officers soon advocated development of a turboshaft utility helicopter, an experimental cavalry unit, and armed helicopters. Gavin secured an airmobile doctrine, appointed a director of U.S. Army aviation to push air cavalry concepts, and arranged flight training for senior officers. Thus, somewhat ironically the foundations for air mobility were laid under President Dwight D. Eisenhower, despite his administration’s emphasis on massive retaliation by nuclear weapons. The John F. Kennedy administration placed emphasis on conventional warfare during a nuclear standoff and was highly receptive to air mobility because it promised increased combat power through greater mobility. Despite opposition from the U.S. Army staff, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara ordered the army to experiment with air mobility. The result was the 1962 Tactical Mobility Requirements Board (also known as the Howze Board, named for its chair, Major General Hamilton H. Howze), which recommended the organization of airmobile units. McNamara supported further testing of the Howze Board recommendations, using the 11th Air Assault Division (Test) at Fort Benning, Georgia. In 1964 the airmobile 11th Division, commanded by Major General Harry W. O. Kinnard, outperformed the 82nd Airborne Division in Exercise Air Assault II in the Carolinas. The need for such a division in Vietnam led to the redesignation of the 11th Di-
Air Mobility Tactical doctrine developed by the U.S. Army in the 1960s. An innovative concept, air mobility entailed the use of helicopters to find the enemy, carry troops to battle, provide them with gunship support, position artillery, carry out medical evacuation, and provide communications and resupply. In Vietnam the U.S. Army’s 1st Cavalry and 101st Airborne Divisions were designated airmobile divisions, but most other allied combat units used air mobility to some degree. Air mobility had its origins in the Korean War (1950–1953) and the potential for tactical nuclear war in Europe. In their infancy in the 1950s, helicopters proved their worth in Korea by completing many missions, including reconnaissance, limited repositioning of troops, aerial resupply, and medical evacuation. So impressed was the U.S. Army with the helicopter’s potential that in 1952 it committed itself to organizing 12 helicopter transport battalions. The danger of tactical nuclear warfare in Europe led the U.S. Army to examine the helicopter not just for transport but also for direct use in combat. Lieutenant General James Gavin, a U.S. Army corps commander in Germany in 1952, ran war games that showed
A Boeing CH-47 Chinook delivers a 105-mm howitzer and ammunition pallet to American soldiers in South Vietnam. The use of these powerful helicopters greatly expanded the versatility of combat units on the ground. (U.S. Army Center of Military History)
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Air Naval Gunnery Liaison Company
vision as the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and its deployment there in 1965. Before the 1st Cavalry Division arrived in Vietnam, the army had already been experimenting there with airmobile concepts. In 1962, U.S. Army Piasecki H-21 Shawnee/Workhorse and U.S. Marine Corps Sikorsky H-34 Choctaw helicopters began lifting Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) troops into battle. Using ground troops or air reconnaissance to locate Viet Cong (VC) units, army and marine advisers developed quickreaction “Eagle Flights” of ARVN troops to be flown into pursuit or blocking positions. Beginning in 1962, the army used the Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV) to test airmobile concepts. The team tested many workable ideas, including armed helicopters, Bell UH-1 Iroquois (“Huey”) helicopters as troopships, reconnaissance helicopters, and improved communications and navigation. In Vietnam, the 1st Cavalry Division consisted of eight maneuver battalions controlled by three brigades. Other units included four artillery battalions, an air cavalry squadron, an engineer and signal battalion, and an aviation group. Artillery was organized into three 105-millimeter howitzer battalions and an aerial rocket artillery battalion. The aviation group included two UH-1 Huey battalions and a Boeing CH-47 Chinook battalion, enough lift for a third of the division’s troops at one time. After organizing at An Khe, the 1st Cavalry entered battle near the Ia Drang Valley. The tactics used were typical of later operations. Teams of Bell H-13 Sioux scouts and UH-1 gunships from the 9th Cavalry sought out and located People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) forces near the Ia Drang. Then CH-47s lifted artillery to landing zones (LZs) Columbus and Falcon to cover infantry landing sites near the Chu Pong Massif. After suppressive fire at the LZ, UH-1s lifted infantry to LZ X-Ray on the Chu Pong, where they made contact with the PAVN troops. Soon Hueys carried reinforcements and supplies to LZ X-Ray and evacuated the wounded. As PAVN troops hurled themselves at the U.S. forces, forward observers called in artillery and air strikes, the latter delivered by the air force and the division’s own aerial artillery battalion. The area outside the infantry’s perimeter became a killing zone. When the battle ended, UH-1s lifted the troops to home base. These airmobile tactics were repeated in fast-paced actions that emphasized attrition rather than holding ground. Later tactics featured airlifted platoons or companies to contact the enemy while other units were inserted in blocking positions. Operations in which the 1st Cavalry and 101st Airborne divisions used airmobile tactics included the Ia Drang operation; Operations MASHER/WHITE WING, CRAZY HORSE, LEJEUNE, PERSHING, PEGASUS–LAM SON 207A, DELAWARE–LAM SON 216; and the Cambodian Incursion. These operations showed that airmobile units were capable of many types of missions, including scouting, search and destroy, pursuit, raiding, and cordon. Airmobile divisions were also capable of long moves on short notice. While the 1st Cavalry and the 101st Airborne had organic (dedicated) aircraft, many other combat units had helicopters attached
to make them airmobile for short periods. For this reason, the U.S. Army located aviation units in every corps tactical zone. Units using these aircraft developed their own procedures, so aviation units could not easily be switched from one combat unit to another. The army thus established the 1st Aviation Brigade in 1966 and named Brigadier General George P. Seneff its commander. He quickly established training schools, enforced safety regulations, and standardized operating procedures throughout Vietnam. Seneff allocated one aviation battalion headquarters to each division. By 1968 the 1st Aviation Brigade managed four combat aviation groups containing a total of 14 aviation battalions and 3 air cavalry squadrons. Air mobility proved itself in Vietnam, and the war thus became known as the “Helicopter War.” Airmobile divisions were proficient in airmobile operations because artillery, aviation, cavalry, and infantry units worked together. Their men had a different concept of combat because terrain was not a major obstacle. These units were more flexible in responding to enemy initiatives and had shorter reaction time. Troops could go into battle rested and carrying less weight. While helicopters proved survivable in battle, a great many were also shot down, and they still required the air superiority and close air support provided by the U.S. Air Force. JOHN L. BELL JR. See also Army Concept Team in Vietnam; Gavin, James Maurice; Helicopters, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Helicopters, Employment of, in Vietnam; Ia Drang, Battle of; Kinnard, Harry William Osborn; McNamara, Robert Strange References Stanton, Shelby L. Anatomy of a Division: The 1st Cav in Vietnam. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1987. Tolson, John J. Airmobility, 1961–1971. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1973.
Air Naval Gunnery Liaison Company Tracing its roots back to the Joint Assault Signals Companies (JASC) that supported the amphibious assaults in the Pacific theater during World War II, the U.S. Marine Corps Air Naval Gunnery Liaison Company (ANGLICO) is a specialized unit that reports directly to the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) commander. Normally the MEF commander allocates his subordinate teams to other service’s units as required to ensure that they receive the most effective air, artillery, and naval gunfire support. As did their predecessors in the JASC units, ANGLICO teams coordinate the use of air, artillery, and naval gunfire support. ANGLICO personnel are airborne and scuba qualified and train with all the U.S. military services as well as most allied militaries. As such, they are intimately familiar with the specific tactics and procedures of all the military services that might be involved in supporting various operations, including amphibious landings. Only the U.S. Air Force provides similar fire-support and coordi-
Airpower, Role in War nation teams. In Vietnam, the 1st ANGLICO was assigned to the III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) headquartered at Da Nang in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) in the northern portion of Military Region I. Subunit 1 of 1st ANGLICO was the first to deploy to Vietnam, landing at Da Nang in late May 1965. Initially deployed to support U.S. Marine Corps operations along the coast, ANGLICO’s mission expanded after 1966 to providing air, artillery, and naval gunfire support to all allied units operating within III MAF’s area of responsibility. As the ground war escalated, ANGLICO teams were assigned to support Australian, South Vietnamese, New Zealand, and U.S. Army forces as well as U.S. and South Korean Marine Corps units. This expanded mission required Subunit 1 to draw more 1st ANGLICO personnel from Hawaii into South Vietnam. By late 1968, more than 75 percent of 1st ANGLICO’s 120 personnel were in-country. The headquarters remained at the U.S. Marine Corps’ Base Kaneohe, training and equipping the personnel and teams that deployed to South Vietnam. Subunit 1 commanded the units in-country, normally deploying teams of 4–6 men to work with allied ground forces. These teams saw extensive combat, participating in the battles for Da Nang and Hue City and in virtually every ground combat action conducted within 10 nautical miles of the coast between 1968 and 1972. With III MAF’s 1971 withdrawal, Subunit 1 increasingly assigned its teams to South Vietnamese marine and army units, with their fire-support coordination proving critical during the 1972 Easter Offensive carried out by Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). Allied air and artillery support was often the difference between victory and defeat in those battles as well as the battles of the war’s earlier years. The last ANGLICO teams were withdrawn from South Vietnam in 1973, having provided a critical service during the Vietnam War. CARL OTIS SCHUSTER
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U.S. Marine Corps; allied aviation; and civilian contract airlines. Although occasionally pivotal, especially in supporting ground operations, airpower was never decisive. The role of airpower in the Vietnam War remains subject to controversy and myth. Airpower enthusiasts perpetuate the myth that if U.S. air forces had been unleashed, quick and decisive victory would have followed. To support their contention, they point to the so-called Christmas Bombings (Operation LINEBACKER II) in December 1972. Advocates of airpower claim that air operations did all they were asked to do and that they could have been more effective had their hands not been tied. The myth perpetuated by some in the antiwar movement is that a cruel technology was unleashed on the people of Indochina. They claim that the cities of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) were carpet bombed and that napalm was used indiscriminately throughout the war. Although many of these claims are the result of ignorance or shoddy scholarship, some, such as the contention that 100,000 tons of bombs fell on Hanoi during LINEBACKER II, border on the fanciful. Indeed, from 1962 through 1973 the United States dropped nearly 8 million tons of bombs on Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) received about half
See also Easter Offensive; Hue and Da Nang, Fall of; Naval Gunfire Support; United States Marine Corps References Andradé, Dale. America’s Last Vietnam Battle: Halting Hanoi’s 1972 Easter Offensive. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001. Gilbert, Edward. The U.S. Marine Corps in Vietnam, 1965–1975. Oxford, UK: Osprey, 2006. Henderson, Charles. Marshalling the Faithful: The Marines’ First Year in Vietnam. New York: Berkeley Publishing, 2006. Marolda, Edward J. By Sea, Air, and Land: An Illustrated History of the U.S. Navy and the War in Southeast Asia. Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 1994.
Airpower, Role in War More than half of the $200 billion that the United States expended to wage the Vietnam War went to support air operations, including those of the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Army, and the
Four Republic F-105 Thunderchiefs bomb a North Vietnamese target at the direction of a Douglas B-66 Destroyer. From 1962 to 1973, the United States dropped nearly 8 million tons of bombs on Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. This compares to 3.4 million tons dropped by the Allies in all of World War II. (Department of Defense)
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that tonnage, making it the most-bombed country in the history of aerial warfare, a dubious distinction for an ally. The air campaign resulted in the U.S. Air Force losing 2,257 aircraft. Total air losses for the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Marine Corps, and the U.S. Army came to 8,588 fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. Although missions against North Vietnam caught the popular imagination and perhaps inspired the most controversy, the focus of air operations was South Vietnam. Nearly 75 percent of all sorties (one aircraft on one mission) were flown in support of U.S. and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) ground forces. Indeed, many veterans claim that they owed their survival to close air support by the air force and marines. But airpower played a larger role than dropping bombs. Helicopters provided unprecedented mobility to American and allied forces by hauling troops and artillery to and from the battlefield. Medical evacuation helicopters carried wounded—many of whom otherwise would not have survived—to modern rear-area medical facilities, where specialists performed life-saving surgery. Air force transports kept far-flung outposts such as Kham Duc and Khe Sanh supplied, even when they were surrounded by Communist forces and cut off from land lines of communications. Twinengine, propeller-driven, side-firing gunships, such as the Douglas AC-47 Spooky and, later, the Fairchild AC-119 Shadow/Stinger and Lockheed AC-130 Spectre, went aloft at night to prevent Communist forces from overrunning isolated Special Forces outposts. Boeing B-52 Stratofortress Arc Light missions pounded supply caches and sometimes obliterated entire Communist regiments when they massed for an attack. These were particularly effective during the siege of Khe Sanh in 1968 and at An Loc in 1972. The unprecedented weight of this effort indicates that the primary role for airpower in Vietnam was in support of ground operations. This ran counter to the tenets of U.S. Air Force doctrine that held that airpower could be better used in a strategic air campaign against North Vietnam. The argument can be made that airpower played a strategically counterproductive role in South Vietnam. Images of napalm bursting over villages and huts, of denuded forests resulting from the use of Agent Orange, and of bombs tumbling from B-52s fed the claims of the antiwar movement. On a more rational level, the argument can be made that the ability of the air force to provide support for troops actually prolonged the war by making it possible for army and marine forces on the ground to remain engaged in a conflict that they really did not know how to win. Airpower used outside South Vietnam in so-called out-country operations accounted for nearly another 4 million tons of bombs. Out-country operations included three major air campaigns over North Vietnam, a series of interdiction campaigns along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos, and various air operations over Cambodia. Of all the campaigns conducted out of country, only Operation LINEBACKER I, the air response to North Vietnam’s Spring Offensive of 1972, was an unmitigated success. The rest either failed or are subject to conflicting interpretations.
Operation ROLLING THUNDER, the bombing of North Vietnam from March 2, 1965, to October 31, 1968, was the longest air campaign ever conducted by the U.S. Air Force. ROLLING THUNGER was an effort at both strategic persuasion and interdiction. Although the vast majority of historians agree that ROLLING THUNDER failed to achieve its stated objectives, the most ardent airpower enthusiasts claim otherwise. They maintain that Hanoi was on the verge of defeat when the bombing was curtailed following the 1968 Tet Offensive. Critics contend that the shift from what had been a guerrilla war, albeit with increasingly conventional aspects, to what had become much more a conventional war by 1969 was indicative both of Hanoi’s ability to move supplies and troops to South Vietnam and of the failure of ROLLING THUNDER. LINEBACKER I, the air response to Hanoi’s 1972 Spring Offensive, was the most successful employment of airpower in the Vietnam War. The strategy of using conventional airpower to stop a conventional invasion was effective. The nature of the war in South Vietnam had changed by the spring of 1972, and Hanoi’s 14 divisions fighting inside South Vietnam needed up to 1,000 tons of supplies a day to continue their operations. Furthermore, LINEBACKER I was the first modern air campaign in which precision-guided munitions (so-called smart bombs) played an integral role in a coherent and effective strategy. The use of conventional airpower to stop a conventional invasion made it the classic example of a successful aerial interdiction campaign. LINEBACKER II (the “Eleven-Day War” as it is called by some airpower enthusiasts) took place during December 18–29, 1972. Some 739 B-52 sorties dropped 15,000 tons of bombs on targets in and around Hanoi, Haiphong, Vinh, and other major North Vietnamese cities. Fighter-bombers added another 5,000 tons. The North Vietnamese launched virtually every SA-2 surface-toair missile (SAM) in their inventory to shoot down 15 B-52s, nine fighter-bombers, a U.S. Navy reconnaissance jet, and a U.S. Air Force Sikorsky HH-53 Jolly Green Giant helicopter. Airpower advocates claim that LINEBACKER II brought North Vietnam to its knees. They further contend that if airpower had been used with equal resolve at any point after 1965, the war could have been concluded quickly and on terms favorable to the United States. Critics point out that just as the nature of the war in 1972 was different than it was earlier, U.S. demands on Hanoi were also different. By 1972 most American troops had been withdrawn. All that the leaders in Washington wanted was to get the remaining U.S. troops out and get prisoners of war back and for the Saigon government to survive for a reasonable interval. With its air defenses in shambles, however, Hanoi had little reason to test U.S. resolve. The bombing compelled them to sign an agreement that basically allowed for the continued withdrawal of U.S. forces and the return of prisoners of war held in North Vietnam and South Vietnam. The Ho Chi Minh Trail in southern Laos was subjected to a massive aerial interdiction effort that dwarfed ROLLING THUNDER and LINEBACKER I combined. Bombing of the trail began in 1965 with Operations BARREL ROLL, STEEL TIGER, and TIGER HOUND. None of these had
Airpower, Role in War
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much effect on what was still a guerrilla war in South Vietnam. But as the war steadily escalated and the flow of supplies became more critical, the bombing increased. On November 15, 1968, two weeks after President Lyndon Johnson ended ROLLING THUNDER, Operation COMMANDO HUNT began. Before the United States stopped bombing Laos in February 1973, nearly 3 million tons of bombs were dropped, mostly on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. COMMANDO HUNT was a series of seven campaigns, each of about six months’ duration. During this effort, gunships such as the fourengine Lockheed AC-130 Spectre roamed over the trail at night using infrared sensors and low-light–level television to find trucks, which were then destroyed by their computer-aimed 40-millimeter (mm) cannon or 105-mm howitzers. B-52s flew up to 30 sorties a day to dump bombs into interdiction boxes around Tchepone (a key transshipment point) and in the four passes leading from North Vietnam into Laos and from Laos into South Vietnam and Cambodia. During the day when few trucks ventured onto the trail, fighter-bombers attacked suspected truck parks, storage areas, and antiaircraft gun emplacements. But in the final analysis this massive employment of airpower, while generating statistical success, failed to curtail the flow of troops and supplies moving from North Vietnam into South Vietnam and Cambodia. In fact, airpower never effectively shut down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Air operations over Cambodia made up the last component of the out-country air war. Beginning with the secret Operation MENU (March 18, 1969–May 26, 1970) bombing until August 15, 1973, when Congress mandated an end to air operations over Cambodia, about 500,000 tons of bombs fell on People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army), Viet Cong (VC), and Khmer Rouge base camps and supply dumps. Although it is difficult to determine the effectiveness of this bombing, the argument can be made that the MENU bombing helped prevent a major buildup of Communist forces that would have preceded an attack toward Saigon. Had such an attack developed, Vietnamization and the continued withdrawal of American troops might have been jeopardized. On the other hand, despite the dropping of half a million ton of bombs, the Khmer Rouge steadily increased its strength and extended its hold on the countryside to win the war in April 1975. Despite what may seem to be a succession of failures, airpower did some remarkable things. There were noteworthy technical and tactical innovations introduced during the Vietnam War. These included aerial defoliation of jungles and crop destruction, the development and employment of propeller-driven side-firing gunships, and the use of forward air controllers (FACs) to coordinate air strikes in South Vietnam and northern Laos. One of the greatest success stories for the U.S. Air Force was the development of a superb long-range combat aircrew search-and-rescue (SAR) capability. Although the recovery of downed aircrews is a good operational capability to have when rescuing downed pilots is a highlight of an air war, this says something about the overall performance of airpower.
The United States was the first major power to lose a war in which it controlled the air but was not, however, the last. In the 1980s the Soviet Union experienced some of the same frustrations in its long and bloody war in Afghanistan. What Vietnam did indicate for airpower is that winning or losing in warfare is much more than a function of sortie generation and firepower on targets. Airpower incorporates many factors, including politics, national will and resolve, geography, time, and the weather. Above all, warfare, especially limited warfare, is an art. U.S. airpower leaders in Vietnam may have been masters of airpower, but they were not masters of the art of war. EARL H. TILFORD JR. See also Aircraft, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam; COMMANDO HUNT, Operation; Forward Air Controllers; Helicopters, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Helicopters, Employment of, in Vietnam; LINEBACKER I, Operation; LINEBACKER II, Operation; Long-Range Electronic Navigation; MENU, Operation; Raven Forward Air Controllers; ROLLING THUNDER, Operation; Search-and-Rescue Operations; Yankee Station References Berger, Carl, ed. The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, 1961– 1973: An Illustrated Account. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1977. Clodfelter, Mark. The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam. New York: Free Press, 1989. Frankum, Ronald B., Jr. Like Rolling Thunder: The Air War in Vietnam, 1964–1975. New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005. Michel, Marshall L., III. The Eleven Days of Christmas: America’s Last Vietnam Battle. San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2002. Momyer, William W. Airpower in Three Wars: World War II, Korea and Vietnam. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978. Morrocco, John. Rain of Fire: Air War, 1969–1973. The Vietnam Experience Series. Boston: Boston Publishing, 1985. Morrocco, John, et al., eds. Thunder from Above: Air War, 1941–1968. The Vietnam Experience Series. Boston: Boston Publishing, 1984.
Air-to-Air Missiles The Vietnam War was the first war to see extensive use of air-toair missiles (AAMs), first by the United States and, after 1965, by the Vietnam People’s Air Force (VPAF, North Vietnamese Air Force). The United States employed two main types: the AIM-7 Sparrow and the AIM-9 Sidewinder (the U.S. Air Force also used the much-reviled AIM-4 Falcon for a few months in 1967). VPAF fighters carried the Soviet-supplied AA-1 Alkali and AA2 Atoll (the Soviet copy of the American Sidewinder). Although many air warfare theorists believed that the introduction of these missiles had eliminated the need for guns on fighter aircraft and dogfight training, the war’s air-to-air combat engagements demonstrated that the days of the gunfighter were not over. American fighter pilots quickly learned that missiles that
Air-to-Ground Missiles performed well against straight-flying drones in peacetime training exercises were not so successful against an agile fighter aircraft flown by an experienced pilot. AAMs of the Vietnam War came in two types: those that relied on radar guidance and those that used infrared guidance. Both types were susceptible to countermeasures (e.g., flares to defeat infrared and chaff to defeat radar). Infrared-based systems guided the missile up the target aircraft’s exhaust plume. They were simpler and more reliable than radar-guided systems but had a shorter range and had to be launched from behind the target. Most Sidewinder and all AA-2 missiles used in the war were infrared guided and had an engagement range of less than two nautical miles. Radar guidance theoretically enabled the missile to be launched from any quadrant of the target aircraft, but as a practical matter the target had to be either coming at or going away from the launch platform. However, radar guidance stretched the engagement range in head-on intercept out to four (AA-1) and six nautical miles (Sparrow). Unfortunately, radar guidance relied on the launch aircraft maintaining a radar track on the target and used either the reflected radar signal (e.g., the American AIM-7 Sparrow and AIM-9C) or the launch aircraft’s radar beam (Soviet AA-1) to guide the missile onto the target. In either case, the launch platform had to maintain radar lock on the target; that is, the launch aircraft’s radar had to be pointed onto and maintain constant radar contact on the target until the engagement was completed. If that radar contact was lost for any reason, the missile flew off and missed the target. Often the radarguided missile’s vacuum tube technology failed. The problems involved in maintaining radar lock throughout the engagement made most pilots prefer infrared-guided missiles. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) quickly dropped the AA-1 and generally flew only with the AA-2. The American F-8, A-4, and F-100 aircraft carried only Sidewinders, while the F-4 carried both Sparrow and Sidewinder missiles, up to four of each. Unfortunately, the Sparrow was designed to engage large and relatively unmaneuverable bombers, not nimble fighter aircraft. Sparrows suffered a 66 percent failure rate in combat, and only 9 percent hit their targets. Sidewinders were more reliable, suffering a 47 percent failure rate, with 18 percent hitting their targets. Statistics on the AA-2 remain unavailable, but most consider its success rate to have been slightly lower than that of the AIM-9. The uncertainty of missile engagements in the Vietnam War era drove most aerial engagements into a gunfight in which the pilot’s marksmanship and skill at employing his plane’s strengths determined the victor. The absence of a cannon placed the early American F-4s at a disadvantage, exacerbated by the decision in the early 1960s to eliminate aerial combat maneuver from fighter pilot training. After the early combat experiences against obsolete VPAF MiG-17s, the U.S. Air Force quickly installed guns on its
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F-4s, and a cannon has remained a feature on modern fighter aircraft to this day, serving alongside the now-reliable AAMs. CARL OTIS SCHUSTER See also United States Air Force; United States Navy; Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, Air Force References Marolda, Edward J. By Sea, Air, and Land: An Illustrated History of the U.S. Navy and the War in Southeast Asia. Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 1994. Michel, Marshall L., III. Clashes: Air Combat over North Vietnam, 1965–1972. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Nichols, John B., and Barrett Tillman. On Yankee Station: The Naval Air War over Vietnam. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987. Sherwood, John D. Afterburner: Naval Aviators and the Vietnam War. New York: New York University Press, 2004.
Air-to-Ground Missiles Although World War II saw the introduction of the first air-toground missiles, the Vietnam War was the first major conflict to see widespread use of these weapons, particularly by tactical aircraft. In 1959 the U.S. Navy developed the first tactical air-toground missile, known as the Bullpup. Initially designated the ASM-N-7, in 1962 it became the AGM-12 under U.S. secretary of defense Robert McNamara’s new joint weapons designation system of that year. Weighing in at just under 1,000 pounds, the Bullpup could be employed by the U.S. Navy’s Douglas A-4 Skyhawk, Grumman A-6 Intruder, and Chance Voight A-7 Corsair and the U.S. Air Force’s Republic F-105 Thunderchief as well both services’ McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II. Designed to enable the attacking aircraft to make a precision attack from outside antiaircraft artillery range, the early Bullpups had a 250-pound warhead and were powered by a small solid-fuel rocket engine. The pilot or the A-6/F-4 weapons operator visually guided the missile to the target via a joystick control, not unlike that used by the German Fritz X guided bomb of World War II. As with the German weapon, the Bullpup had a burning tracer in its tail fin that enabled the operator to track the missile as it flew to the target. The Bullpup also came in a larger version with a 1,000-pound warhead and a more powerful rocket engine to increase range and speed. Nonetheless, it lacked the range to enable a standoff attack from outside the reach of the SA-2 surface-toair missile (SAM) systems of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). To deal with the SA-2 threat, the United States developed the AGM-45 Shrike antiradiation missile. Essentially an AIM-7 Sparrow air-to-air missile with its seeker modified to home in on missile fire-control and acquisition radars, the Shrike weighed less than 200 pounds and was carried by A-4, A-7, and F-4 aircraft. Although
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its range of 10–12 nautical miles placed the launch aircraft within the SA-2’s maximum range, the Shrike’s 44-pound warhead shredded the SAM’s fire-control radar. The Shrike also proved to be an easy system to modify in the face of newly emerging threats. North Vietnamese radar operators often shut down their systems if they thought they were facing a Shrike attack, effectively ending the SAM threat to incoming U.S. aircraft without a missile being fired. Phased out in the early 1990s, the Shrike has been replaced by the AGM-88 high-speed antiradiation missile (HARM). The U.S. Army also employed air-to-ground missiles in Vietnam, both optically tracked and wire guided. The French-produced AGM-22 (AS-11 is the French and German designation) was carried by UH-1 gunships for most of the war. Developed in the 1950s, it entered service with the U.S. Army in 1961 and first saw combat in 1966, being employed primarily against bunkers, but it is also credited with destroying North Vietnamese PT-76 tanks. The AGM-22 had a maximum range of 9,842 feet but proved slow and inaccurate under combat conditions. The missile-guidance system required the operator to guide it with a joystick while the pilot maintained a stable flight path, something that proved to be almost impossible in combat conditions. Intended as an interim solution to the army’s need for a guided antitank missile (ATM) following the failure of the army’s DART ATM program, the AGM-22 was to become the primary helicopter-borne air-to-ground missile of the war. However, its shortcomings drove the army to accelerate development of an aerial version of the BGM-71 tube-launched optically tracked wire-guided (TOW) missile. Developed by Hughes Aircraft between 1963 and 1968, the ground-launched version entered production in 1970. The TOW operator tracks the target optically, and the guidance system guides the missile onto the target via commands sent through two wires that trail behind the missile. Missile guidance was not affected by the helicopter’s flight path, ensuring more accurate placement in combat. Maximum effective range of the model used in Vietnam was approximately 9,842 feet. The ground-launched missile had a shaped charge 5-inch–diameter warhead with 5.4 pounds of HDX explosive. The air-launched version and the assigned evaluation and related support personnel arrived in Vietnam on April 14, 1972, along with two specially modified UH-1B helicopter gunships. The detachment first saw combat on May 2, 1972, destroying four captured tanks, a truck, and a howitzer near the Dak Poko River. Seven days later the detachment destroyed its first North Vietnamese armor near Kontum. The detachment was credited with destroying more than 24 North Vietnamese tanks during its five weeks of combat operations. The air-launched version entered production in late 1972, becoming the standard guided missile on U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps AH-1 Cobra and later-model scout and attack helicopters. The TOW has seen constant improvement since first employed in Vietnam, receiving more powerful warheads, longer range, and a more reliable guidance system. It has remained in American ser-
vice through Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and among America’s militaries through 2010. CARL OTIS SCHUSTER See also Air-to-Air Missiles; Surface-to-Air Missiles, Democratic Republic of Vietnam References Frieden, David R. Principles of Naval Weapons Systems. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989. McCarthy, Mike. Phantom Reflections. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007. Nichols, John B., and Barrett Tillman. On Yankee Station: The Naval Air War over Vietnam. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987. Sherwood, John D. Afterburner: Naval Aviators and the Vietnam War. New York: New York University Press, 2004. Yenne, Bill. Secret Weapons of the Cold War. New York: Berkley Publishing, 2005.
Air War Study Group Report, Cornell University Report produced in 1972 by Cornell University’s Program on Peace Studies, which sought to assess the military and political impact of U.S. aerial bombing against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) during the Vietnam War. The Air War Study Group was headed by professors Raphael Littauer and Norman Uphoff. Assistance in compiling the report was obtained through military, National Security Council, and congressional documents and from various academic and public policy research institutions. The report begins by describing how the United States became involved in the conflict and the origins and evolution of U.S. military airpower strategy during the Vietnam War. Specific chapters address the use of airpower in particular theaters of operation, such as North Vietnam, South Vietnam, northern and southern Laos, and Cambodia. Later chapters examine the air war’s ecological impact as a consequence of defoliants and herbicides, economic costs incurred by the United States in the bombing, the evolution of air war technology, and whether the president has the power to engage the United States in a war without explicit congressional declaration. These later chapters also assess whether the war met international legal normative standards and analyze existing military aeronautic trends such as the initial emergence of precisionguided missiles (so-called smart bombs) capable of homing in on their targets to minimize collateral civilian damage and casualties. An initial conclusion of the report is that U.S. airpower in Vietnam had limited positive military effects but also produced devastating collateral civilian psychological, political, and environmental consequences. The report goes on to argue that while the economic cost of the air war continued to increase, its military successes did not; that airpower escalation is a facile, attractive option because of the low likelihood of retaliatory action by hostile
Alessandri, Marcel forces; that withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from combat operations leaves airpower as the only way to achieve military objectives; that airpower has limited effect in a restricted conventional conflict, such as the Vietnam War; and that continued bombing would have increased political polarization in Southeast Asia and might indeed have strengthened the position of hostile governments in the area. Finally, the report concluded that U.S. political and military leaders had placed excessive faith in technology such as airpower as a means of resolving the political issues that had produced the conflict. The Air War Study Group was inspired at least in part by the existing political climate in the United States and antiwar sentiment. The report reflected this, as it frequently denigrated U.S. civilian and military policy makers and their objectives while at the same time uncritically accepting as legitimate the political and military objectives of the U.S. opponents. While the report contains some useful analysis, scholarship, and quantitative data on U.S. aerial operations, readers should be aware of its ideological biases regarding U.S. political and airpower strategy during the war. The report also failed to examine the relationship of U.S. airpower strategy in Vietnam to U.S. ground force strategy. Another weakness is that it did not consider the more successful strategic bombing of World War II against Germany and Japan, as documented in the U.S. military’s postwar strategic bombing surveys. Serious students of the air war in Vietnam will need to examine official U.S. Air Force histories and other analytical assessments of this conflict for more dispassionate and summative analyses of U.S. airpower strategy during the Vietnam War. ALBERT T. CHAPMAN See also Airpower, Role in War; United States Air Force References Clodfelter, Mark. The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam. New York: Free Press, 1989. Littauer, Raphael, and Norman Thomas Uphoff. The Air War in Indochina. Rev. ed. Boston: Beacon, 1971. Stanford Biology Study Group. “The Destruction of Indochina.” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 27(5) (May 1971): 36–40. U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, Preparedness Investigative Subcommittee. Air War against North Vietnam, Pts. 1–5. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967. U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Bombing as a Policy Tool in Vietnam: Effectiveness. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972.
ALA MOANA,
Operation
Start Date: December 1, 1966 End Date: May 14, 1967 Military operation conducted by elements of the 25th Infantry Division, principally in Hau Nghia Province, from December 1,
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1966, to May 14, 1967. The choice of the operation’s name reflects the “Tropic Lightning” Division’s Hawaiian home. The operation’s goal was to push Viet Cong (VC) forces away from a major rice-producing area near Saigon. During the first month of ALA MOANA, 25th Infantry Division troops made sporadic contact with VC forces near Duc Hoa to the south of Cu Chi. In the early months of 1967, units of the 25th Infantry operated principally along Highway 1 east of their base camp at Cu Chi and also in the area to the northeast. Concurrent with ALA MOANA in January, the division’s 2nd Brigade, serving temporarily as a blocking force 10 miles north of Cu Chi as part of a multidivision operation, known as Operation CEDAR FALLS, in the so-called Iron Triangle collided with a company of the VC 165th Regiment and killed 50 VC soldiers. The heaviest action in Operation ALA MOANA occurred in late February, when the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry, and the 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, engaged in a tough fight in the Filhol Rubber Plantation northeast of Cu Chi. In this battle, 25th Infantry Division forces claimed 381 killed in action, detained 650 VC troops, and captured 120 tons of rice. After the conclusion of CEDAR FALLS, the heaviest action shifted to the area around Duc Hoa, south of Cu Chi, as elements of the 2nd Brigade swept along the banks of the Vam Co River and claimed another 67 killed in action by the end of March. Again while ALA MOANA continued, elements of the 25th Division participated in another multidivision operation, JUNCTION CITY, in War Zone C. During most of ALA MOANA, several battalions of the 25th Infantry Division also were assigned to clearing operations between Cu Chi and Trang Bang District to the west but made little contact. After ALA MOANA officially ended on May 14, for the remainder of 1967 the 25th Division’s 1st and 2nd brigades returned from big-unit war and began an all-out pacification effort in Hau Nghia Province, which had been a Communist stronghold since the days of the Viet Minh. JOHN D. ROOT See also CEDAR FALLS, Operation; Iron Triangle; JUNCTION CITY, Operation
References Bergerud, Eric M. The Dynamics of Defeat: The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991. Stanton, Shelby L. The Rise and Fall of an American Army: The U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985.
Alessandri, Marcel Birth Date: July 23, 1895 Death Date: December 26, 1968 French Army general and second-in-command to General Gabriel Sabattier during the French Army retreat into Yunnan following the Japanese coup of March 9, 1945. Born at Boulogne-sur-Mer on
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July 23, 1895, Marcel Alessandri entered Saint-Cyr in 1914. He was promoted to lieutenant in 1916 and to captain in 1917. Alessandri was posted to French West Africa in 1923 and to Morocco in 1930. He first went to Indochina in 1939 as a lieutenant colonel. Alessandri was promoted to colonel in 1940. In Indochina he served as chief of staff to the commander of French forces there, General Maurice Martin. Alessandri then commanded Foreign Legionnaires in Tonkin. In 1943 he was promoted to brigadier general. A year later he secretly joined the Resistance headed by Charles de Gaulle. Alessandri was in command of the 2nd Tonkin Brigade when on March 9, 1945, the Japanese staged their coup and endeavored to arrest all French officials and military personnel in Indochina. During the retreat to escape from the Japanese on March 11, Alessandri decided to disarm his Indochinese riflemen and leave them behind to their own devices. Most were loyal to the French, and the action was a great affront to them; the Viet Minh used it as an example of French perfidy. At the end of the war, Alessandri commanded in southern China some 5,000 French troops who had escaped Indochina. Regarded as anti-American and anti-Chinese, Alessandri returned to Indochina on September 19, 1945. The next month he became commissioner to Cambodia. In March 1946 he led French troops into Laos to replace the Chinese there. He then commanded French Army units in Tonkin. Alessandri left Indochina at the end of August 1946 but returned two years later as commander of French ground forces. Commander of the Expeditionary Corps General Marcel Carpentier had little knowledge of Indochina and deferred to Alessandri’s judgment. Alessandri opposed the May 1949 recommendation by General Army chief of staff Georges Revers that France evacuate its outposts along Route Coloniale 4. Following the disastrous French defeat in the battles for Route Coloniale 4 and the evacuation of Cao Bang, Alessandri was relieved of command and recalled to France. He departed Indochina on December 2, 1950. Two years later in September 1952, Alessandri again went to Vietnam as military adviser to the Bao Dai government. Alessandri returned to France in June 1955. He died in Paris on December 26, 1968. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also France, Army, 1946–1954; French Indochina, 1860s–1946; Sabattier, Gabriel References Dalloz, Jacques. The War in Indo-China, 1945–54. Savage, MD: Barnes and Noble, 1990. Gras, Yves. Histoire de la Guerre d’Indochine. Paris: Éditions Denoël, 1992. Marr, David G. Vietnam 1945: The Quest for Power. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995. Patti, Archimedes L. A. Why Viet Nam? Prelude to America’s Albatross. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.
Ali, Muhammad Birth Date: January 18, 1942 American prizefighter who lost his boxing title when he refused to be drafted or serve in the Vietnam War. Born Cassius Marcellus Clay Jr. in Louisville, Kentucky, on January 18, 1942, Muhammad Ali captured the gold medal in the light heavyweight division at the 1960 Olympics in Rome. As a professional fighter, he introduced an aggressive and flamboyant style that attracted publicity and sponsors. He first captured the heavyweight title in 1964. In 1965 Ali joined the Nation of Islam and changed his name. Because many white Americans viewed this organization as racist, Ali’s conversion, along with his brash style, sparked much controversy. Previously deferred by the Selective Service because of slow reading, Ali was reclassified and called for service in 1966. He sought conscientious objector (CO) status on religious grounds. Denied the exemption, Ali was called to service in April 1967. He refused induction and was stripped of his title and boxing license. On June 20, 1967, he was found guilty of violating the Selective Service Act, fined $10,000, and sentenced to five years in prison, although he remained free pending appeal. In 1971 the U.S. Supreme Court overturned his conviction; Ali never spent time in prison for his refusal to serve. Subsequently a federal court ruled that he had been arbitrarily denied his boxing license. Supposedly disgraced after his conviction, Ali became a focal point for the peace movement and disenchanted African Americans. A spokesman against injustice and oppression, he spoke at colleges and peace rallies, calling for social change in America. Ali also returned to the ring, regaining his heavyweight title in 1974. He held the heavyweight championship a total of three times, the last time in 1978. Already showing signs of a general physical decline, he retired from boxing in 1979, only to come back in 1980 in an attempt to gain the heavyweight title for an unprecedented fourth time. He lost that bid and fought his last professional match in 1981. Three years later Ali was diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease, and since then he has suffered a slow decline in his health. The disease robbed him of the grace of movement from his earlier days and affected his speech, which was so much a part of his career and persona. Nevertheless, Ali has stayed active in philanthropic endeavors and received the Presidential Medal of Freedom from President George W. Bush in 2005. Ali remains a beloved and revered figure in the United States and around the world. LAURA MATYSEK WOOD See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Conscientious Objectors; Selective Service References Ali, Muhammad, with Richard Durham. The Greatest: My Own Story. New York: Random House, 1975. Hauser, Thomas. Muhammad Ali: His Life and Times. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994. Remnick, David. King of the World: Muhammad Ali and the Rise of an American Hero. New York: Vantage, 1999.
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Prizefighter Muhammad Ali, formerly Cassius Clay, with sportscaster Howard Cosell on WABC radio in 1965. Ali was stripped of his boxing title when he refused to be drafted or serve in Vietnam. (Library of Congress)
Alpha Strike Name for a carrier air strike. The term “Alpha Strike” was first coined during the Vietnam War. Usually involving anywhere from 25 to 32 aircraft launched from U.S. carriers in the South China Sea, Alpha Strikes during the Vietnam War were the means whereby military planners could launch large surprise strikes against designated targets in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) usually in Route Packages V and VI. Alpha Strikes had their origins in remarks to Congress on February 23, 1966, by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara concerning the success of carrier strikes in Vietnam and the need for more carriers. The typical composition of an Alpha Strike was three groups of 10–16 aircraft, 1 navigation aircraft, electronic countermeasure aircraft off the coast, and fighter aircraft protecting the bombers to the sides of and behind the formation. There would be perhaps one hour between each recovery and launch, with a total time involved of six to seven hours.
The carriers operated in groups of three in 12-hour shifts to permit around-the-clock missions. Between April 1965 and March 1973 the United States flew 528,000 missions into North Vietnam; of those, 52 percent were flown by U.S. Navy aircraft, 5 percent by the U.S. Marine Corps, and the remainder by the U.S. Air Force. The use of multiple groups of aircraft could overwhelm a target’s air defenses. The pilots of the Alpha Strike could approach, drop their bombs, and leave the target area in just three minutes. Once an aircraft returned to the carrier, it would land, rearm and refuel, and then launch for second and third missions of the day. The three strikes from the carrier would usually take six to seven hours each from the first launch to the last recovery. Mission targets for the Alpha Strikes were usually approved in Washington, D.C., and then transmitted to the carrier groups off Vietnam. Mission planning would also involve briefings to pilots and crews two to two and a half hours before a strike would launch. Arming and fueling of aircraft would occur just before launch. The
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Alsop, Joseph Wright, V
fighters would launch first, followed by bombers, tanker aircraft, and other support aircraft. The strike would also have aircraft tasked with suppressing enemy antiaircraft gunfire and surface-toair missiles (SAMs) around the target. STEVEN FRED MARIN See also Aircraft Carriers; Aircraft, Bombers; Dixie Station; LINEBACKER I, Operation; McNamara, Robert Strange; ROLLING THUNDER, Operation; Route Packages; Sharp, Ulysses Simpson Grant, Jr. References Levinson, Jeffery. Alpha Strike Vietnam: The Navy’s Air War, 1964 to 1973. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1989. Nichols, John B., and Barrett Tillman. On Yankee Station: The Naval Air War over Vietnam. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987.
Alsop, Joseph Wright, V Birth Date: October 11, 1910 Death Date: August 28, 1989 Journalist and syndicated columnist who was perhaps the most prominent and outspoken journalist supporting the Vietnam War. Born on October 11, 1910, in Avon, Connecticut, to a distinguished and well-to-do family, Joseph Wright Alsop V graduated from Groton in 1928 and from Harvard University in 1932. He began reporting from Washington, D.C., in 1935. Enlisting in the U.S. Navy before Pearl Harbor, he served during World War II with Colonel (later general) Claire Chennault’s American Volunteer Group (known as the “Flying Tigers”) in China. From 1946 to 1958 Alsop and his brother Stewart Alsop wrote columns for the New York Herald Tribune syndicate that appeared three times per week. Joseph Alsop’s own influential column, “Matter of Fact,” appeared three times per week in the Washington Post from 1958 to 1974. From 1953 to 1972 Alsop made annual trips to Vietnam. His January 27, 1954, article “Where Is Dien Bien Phu?” was the first detailed account of the impending battle there. Until 1963 Alsop lauded and defended the Ngo Dinh Diem regime against increasing attacks by other American journalists. In turn, Alsop was one of the few to whom Diem would grant interviews. In later years Arthur Krock of the New York Times would assert that it was Alsop, along with Walt W. Rostow, who talked President John F. Kennedy into escalating the American commitment in Vietnam. In September 1963, however, while accusing youthful American correspondents such as David Halberstam and Neil Sheehan of having instilled paranoia in a heroic anti-Communist leader, Alsop advised Kennedy that Diem had lost his ability to govern, and Alsop subsequently felt guilty that his advice may have led to Diem’s overthrow and assassination on November 2, 1963. Obsessed with what he believed to be the necessity of winning the
Vietnam War, Alsop was highly critical of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s policy of gradual escalation and goaded him, privately and in print, to commit more troops or be prepared to preside over America’s first military defeat. During his visits to Vietnam, Alsop was accorded VIP status, often staying in the U.S. ambassador’s residence and always given complete access to the highest U.S. military and civilian officials. Former national security adviser McGeorge Bundy told Johnson in October 1967 that one favorable report from Alsop was worth 10 official spokesmen. Consequently, Alsop was fed classified information that allegedly demonstrated the precariousness of the Communist position. In late 1967 Alsop was one of the few journalists to predict that climactic fighting in Vietnam lay ahead. After the failure of the Communist January 1968 Tet Offensive, he urged that the United States press home the attack, and he thought that President Johnson’s speech of March 31, 1968, which offered to renew peace talks and an end to attacks on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), represented a loss of nerve. Johnson also declined not to run for reelection in this landmark address. Although suspicious of President Richard M. Nixon and worried that Vietnamization might be a cover for surrender, Alsop heartily approved of the Cambodian and Laotian invasions and developed an intimate relationship with Nixon’s national security adviser and later secretary of state, Henry Kissinger. Alsop’s increasingly bitter feuds with prominent liberals and his fellow journalists left him isolated but unapologetic by the time of his retirement at the end of 1974. The eminent journalist Walter Lippmann suggested that Alsop bore 50 percent of the responsibility for President Johnson’s decision to escalate the war in Vietnam, and John Kenneth Galbraith declared that next to Johnson, Alsop was “the leading noncombatant casualty of Vietnam.” Alsop died in Washington, D.C., on August 28, 1989. JOHN D. ROOT See also Bundy, McGeorge; Galbraith, John Kenneth; Halberstam, David; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Kissinger, Henry Alfred; Lippmann, Walter; Media and the Vietnam War; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Rostow, Walt Whitman; Sheehan, Cornelius Mahoney References Almquist, Leann G. Joseph Alsop and American Foreign Policy: The Journalist as Advocate. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1993. Alsop, Joseph W., with Adam Platt. “I’ve Seen the Best of It”: Memoirs. New York: Norton, 1992. Andrews, Deborah, ed. The Annual Obituary, 1991. Detroit: St. James, 1992. Merry, Robert W. Taking On the World: Joseph and Stewart Alsop— Guardians of the American Century. New York: Viking, 1996. Yoder, Edwin M., Jr. Joe Alsop’s Cold War: A Study of Journalistic Influence and Intrigue. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995.
Amerasians
Alvarez, Everett, Jr. Birth Date: December 23, 1937 U.S. Navy officer and the first American pilot taken prisoner by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). The grandson of Mexican immigrants, Everett Alvarez Jr. was born on December 23, 1937, in Salinas, California. He joined the U.S. Navy in 1960 and was eventually deployed to Vietnam. On August 5, 1964, 26-year-old Lieutenant (Junior Grade) Alvarez was flying a Douglas A-4 Skyhawk when it was shot down over Hon Gai during Operation PIERCE ARROW, the first bombing raids against North Vietnam in retaliation for the disputed August 2 and August 4, 1964, attacks on U.S. destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin. Alvarez spent eight and a half years in captivity, the first six months as the only American prisoner of war (POW) in North Vietnam. Although he was among the more junior-rank POWs, his conduct helped establish the model emulated by the many others who joined him in captivity during the next few years. He finally returned home to the United States in 1973 and as such was the second-longest-held POW in U.S. history.
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After retirement from the U.S. Navy in 1980, Alvarez served as deputy director of the Peace Corps and deputy administrator of the Veterans Administration (VA) during the Ronald W. Reagan administration. After leaving the service Alvarez also earned a master’s degree and a law degree. Later he was a vice president for the Hospital Corporation of America, served as chair of the VA CARES Commission, and was president of Conwal, Inc., a defense firm. Alvarez has also written two books: Chained Eagle (1989) and Code of Conduct (1991). JOE P. DUNN See also Gulf of Tonkin Incident; Prisoners of War, Allied References Alvarez, Everett, Jr., and Anthony S. Pitch. Chained Eagle. New York: Dell, 1989. Alvarez, Everett, Jr., with Samuel A. Schreiner Jr. Code of Conduct: An Inspirational Story of Self-Healing by the Famed Ex-POW and War Hero. New York: Donald I. Fine, 1991. Howes, Craig. Voices of the Vietnam POWs: Witnesses to Their Fight. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. Hubbell, John G., Andrew Jones, and Kenneth Y. Tomlinson. P.O.W.: A Definitive History of the American Prisoner-of-War Experience in Vietnam, 1964–1973. New York: Reader’s Digest, 1976.
Amerasians
Navy commander Everett Alvarez Jr. was the first American pilot to be shot down in the Vietnam War. Captured on August 5, 1964, he was held as a prisoner of war until February 12, 1973. (Department of Defense)
Children born of American fathers and Vietnamese mothers. Born between 1962 and 1975, Amerasian children formed only a tiny fraction of Vietnamese refugees admitted to the United States until the late 1980s. The fall of the U.S.-backed government of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) in 1975 and the reunification of the country under Communist leadership led to the evacuation of about 130,000 Vietnamese, mostly former employees of U.S. government agencies. For Amerasian children, however, if they could not provide documentation of their American citizenship, exit visas from Vietnam proved almost impossible to acquire. Vietnamese officials refused to negotiate through intermediaries with the U.S. government for the immigration of these children and their relatives; Washington in turn refused to negotiate directly with the Vietnamese government. For more than 10 years after the end of the war, these children of American servicemen and officials were held hostage to leftover suspicions and diplomatic hostility. Vietnamese called Amerasian children con lai (“half-breed”) and bui doi (“dust of life”). Although rumors of retribution against the children and their mothers spread through the country, no national policy sanctioned such discrimination. On the local level, however, social ostracism often existed. Attitudes of local officials apparently determined the extent of this. Many officials selected families with Amerasian children for movement into the New Economic Zones (uninhabited or unimproved land intended for
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A group of Amerasian children with their mothers on a street in Ho Chi Minh City (formerly Saigon) in 1981. Amerasian children were subjected to widespread discrimination, and many mothers simply abandoned them. Orphanages took some, but many grew up on the streets. Children of black American soldiers usually suffered a higher level of discrimination. (Bettmann/Corbis)
settlement by the surplus urban population). Mothers of Amerasian children heard taunts of “whore” and “bastard,” and some families abandoned their Amerasian children. Orphanages took a small number, but many grew up on the streets of Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon). Children of African American soldiers usually suffered a higher level of discrimination. Mothers interviewed by refugee workers often reported that they had lived with their American lovers for several years, but for most the relationship ended with the termination of the father’s tour of duty. Some men returned to the United States never knowing that they were fathers of Vietnamese children. Others hoped to bring their Vietnamese families back to America with them but were stymied by bureaucratic red tape. Between 1975 and 1982 only children recognized as American citizens could hope to leave Vietnam. Refugee organizations attempted to identify fathers, who were then asked to have their state governments recognize the children as legitimate. If the father and state officials cooperated, the children could be declared U.S. citizens. Even with citizenship, immigration from Vietnam required
a mastery of extensive bureaucratic red tape in both Vietnam and the United States. In 1982 Congress passed the Amerasian Immigration Act, designed to expedite the immigration of Amerasian children from a host of Asian countries. Unfortunately, this law required a consular interview for the Amerasian immigrant, and at that time the United States had no official diplomatic contact with Vietnam. Other provisions, intended to keep the refugees from overwhelming the U.S. welfare system, required American sponsors who agreed to support each child up to age 21 or for five years (whichever was longer). Despite these restrictions, in September 1982 under the auspices of the United Nations (UN) Orderly Departure Program (ODP), a small number of Amerasian children left Vietnam for the United States. Two years later Secretary of State George P. Shultz announced a special Amerasian subprogram within the ODP, but the rate of departures remained very slow. In 1986, citing a backlog of 25,000 applicants, the Vietnamese government stopped processing new cases. Amerasian immigrants dropped from 1,498 in 1985 to 578 in 1986 and to 213 in 1987.
American Friends of Vietnam Congress responded to magazine articles about these “forgotten children” by passing the Amerasian Homecoming Act. Sponsored by U.S. representative Robert Mrazek, the act took effect on March 21, 1988. It allowed Vietnamese Amerasians and specified members of their families to enter the United States as immigrants and provided resettlement assistance in the states. The act had an immediate effect. Between 1982 and 1988, the ODP brought about 11,500 Vietnamese Amerasian children and their relatives to the United States. By 1991, 67,028 had arrived. In 1994 refugee aid societies estimated that only a few thousand Amerasians remained in Vietnam, mostly by choice. Resettlement in the United States was not easy. Given their general backgrounds of poverty, limited education, parental loss, and discrimination, Amerasian children faced formidable obstacles. Usually the children had no contact with their American relatives. Just as they faced discrimination in Vietnam, the doors to the American Vietnamese community were not opened for many of the Amerasians. Many had unrealistically optimistic expectations about their future in the United States. Those who identified themselves in Vietnam as Americans found that culturally, linguistically, and in all ways but appearance, they were Vietnamese in America. Mothers of Amerasian children had similar problems. Many hoped to find the fathers of their children, but few had enough information on which to base a search. The American Red Cross helped those who wished to search for the fathers of their children. If a father could be located, he was told of the search, and the decision to contact the child or mother was left up to him. Only about 2 percent of father searches ended positively. Most articles written about Amerasian children have stressed their adjustment problems. Success stories do exist, however. Many children who came to America as young teenagers graduated from high school and went on to college, some graduating with honors. Those who came to America with their relatives, especially their mothers, seemed to fare best. Big Brother and Big Sister organizations were especially important in locating mentors for Amerasian children, and studies demonstrated their effectiveness. When the youngest members of this legacy of the Vietnam War reached adulthood in the mid-1990s, programs to assist their assimilation ended. ELIZABETH URBAN ALEXANDER See also United Nations and the Vietnam War; Vietnam, Socialist Republic of, 1975–Present References Bass, Thomas A. Vietnamerica: The War Comes Home. New York: Soho Press, 1996. DeBonis, Steven. Children of the Enemy: Oral Histories of Vietnamese Amerasians and Their Mothers. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1995. Montero, Darrel. Vietnamese Americans: Patterns of Resettlement and Socioeconomic Adaptations in the United States. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1979.
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American Friends of Vietnam One of the first privately organized associations promoting U.S. interests in Vietnam. American Friends of Vietnam (AFV) was announced to the press in December 1955. It was formed by prominent liberals and conservatives who considered Vietnam a critical contest in the Cold War. The AFV had its roots in an earlier network of people that had vigorously promoted U.S. support for Ngo Dinh Diem, the Vietnamese Catholic considered the antiCommunist/nationalist answer to Ho Chi Minh. When Diem came to power in southern Vietnam in July 1954, the so-called Vietnam Lobby organized formally and pushed the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration to bolster the new nation in southern Vietnam. International Rescue Committee members Leo Cherne and Joseph Buttinger founded the AFV along with Harold Oram and Elliot Newcombe, both of whom were employed by the New York public relations firm hired by Diem. The AFV attracted support from such politically diverse figures as Cardinal Francis Spellman, publisher Henry Luce, U.S. Supreme Court justice William O. Douglas, and senators John F. Kennedy, Mike Mansfield, Hubert Humphrey, and William Knowland. AFV members had the specific goal of saving Vietnam from communism. They sponsored conferences and relief projects, solicited business investments, and published articles to win support for Diem’s regime. The U.S. government provided information, speakers, and fund-raising assistance to help the AFV counter criticism of U.S. policy regarding Vietnam. In the early 1960s AFV activities dwindled when its members became bitterly divided over how to respond to Diem’s autocratic rule. Still believing that a non-Communist nation in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) was necessary and possible, the AFV revived after Diem’s November 1963 ouster. Working closely with the Lyndon B. Johnson administration, the AFV supported military escalation against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and countered criticism of U.S. policy with government help and funds. These official connections made the AFV a frequent target of policy critics and antiwar protesters. By the 1970s, however, financial and administrative problems plagued the organization and undermined its operations, and by 1975 it had all but ceased to exist. There is debate over the extent of AFV influence on U.S. policy regarding Vietnam. Contemporary critics charged that the Vietnam Lobby purposely distorted Diem’s capabilities and set the ideological stage for American intervention in Vietnam. The AFV’s first two presidents, generals William Donovan and John O’Daniel, were so intimately connected to America’s covert operations that some scholars have suggested that the group likely had the endorsement—if not the veiled support—of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Still, most historians argue that the AFV’s influence was marginal because the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations were always strongly committed to
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Vietnam, and thus the AFV was preaching to the converted. Still, the group represents the shared assumptions held by those Americans who supported and advanced U.S. intervention in Vietnam. The AFV also illustrates how private groups attempt to sway the government, the press, and the public. DELIA PERGANDE See also Humphrey, Hubert Horatio; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Mansfield, Michael Joseph; Ngo Dinh Diem; O’Daniel, John Wilson; Spellman, Francis Joseph References Anderson, David L. Trapped by Success: The Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam, 1953–1961. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991. Kahin, George McT. Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam. New York: Knopf, 1986. Morgan, Joseph G. The Vietnam Lobby: The American Friends of Vietnam, 1955–1975. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997.
American Red Cross The American Red Cross was founded in May 1881 by Clara Barton. Barton, a nurse during the American Civil War, had learned of the activities of the International Red Cross while on a trip to Europe after the war. On her return she campaigned both to found an American organization to be affiliated with it and for U.S. ratification of the Geneva Convention protecting those individuals wounded in war, which occurred in 1882. Thereafter the Red Cross took an active role in American wars, especially World War I, World War II, and the Korean War. The Vietnam War was no exception. Although closely associated with the U.S. government in pursuit of its goals, the Red Cross is an entirely independent volunteer-led organization that is supported by voluntary public contributions and cost-reimbursement charges. The American Red Cross operated three primary programs during the Vietnam War. The first of these was Service to Military Installations (SMI). This program arranged military leaves and acted as a liaison for pertinent information between families back home and the military for such events as births and deaths. The SMI employed both men and women. The second program was Service to Military Hospitals (SMH). SMH groups were all-female recreation programs within designated hospital complexes. SMH women wrote letters for the soldiers, ran day rooms and centers for convalescing patients, and helped with the general morale of those hospitalized. The third program was Supplemental Recreational Activities Overseas (SRAO). This program hired only women to run recreation centers and construct and deliver active audience participation programs to firebases, landing zones, signal sites, and other locations. The SRAO provided for psychological health and welfare programs to able-bodied soldiers.
The SRAO began in World War II. Located primarily in Britain and later in Western Europe, the SRAO also had a presence in India. After the war the program operated at U.S. air bases in France and Morocco. The SRAO concept carried over to Korea, where United Nations Command (UNC) commander General Douglas MacArthur and the U.S. Department of Defense requested that the American Red Cross establish its recreation program for military clubs. Some of the first Korean War SRAO women had been performing this function in Europe. In 1953 the Army Special Services picked up the Recreation Center Program, and the SRAO women established a clubmobile program for the more isolated units, which continued until 1973. The SRAO program in Vietnam began in 1965 and ended in 1972. It was started there at the request of the Department of Defense and the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). Initial personnel were transferred from other sites to the first Vietnam locations. The first unit was established in Da Nang in September 1965. The last unit departed the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) in May 1972. The Red Cross had units at two locations during 1965–1966: Da Nang and then Bien Hoa. As U.S. troop strength in South Vietnam increased in 1966, so did the SRAO program. Locations expanded to Nha Trang, Phan Rang Air Force and Army Base, Cam Ranh Bay Air Force and Army Base, Qui Nhon, An Khe, Cu Chi, Di An, Lai Khe, Long Binh, Dong Ba Thin, and Pleiku-Camp Enari. By 1967 other units such as Xuan Loc–Black Horse, Chu Lai, Phu Loi, Dong Tam, and Phu Bai were in operation. The need for starting and stopping certain program locations changed with the military situation, but by August 1967 the Red Cross had 20 units and 12 recreation centers run by 109 young women. The clubmobile program made 2,635 visits to outlying units a month. Although accurate mileage records were difficult to maintain, it is estimated that clubmobile workers logged more than 2.125 million miles via truck, jeep, helicopter, airplane, and boat during the program’s seven-year history. During the course of the war there were a total of 627 women in Vietnam in the SRAO program. Unit size varied from 4 to 10 women. The base locations rotated on a regular basis to maintain morale. Many women began as recreation aides and were then promoted to program director and finally to unit director. A few previous ARC or SRAO service personnel performed Saigon staff functions such as training and logistical organization. Qualifying requirements for the women stipulated that they had to be 21 years of age or older, college educated, and single. The women were predominately white, but varying ethnicities were in the program. The uniforms consisted of issued U.S. Army fatigues and regulation Arc Light blue dresses, culottes, and a box-style jacket, or Class “A” uniforms. Initial training occurred in Washington, D.C., by American Red Cross staff and returning SRAO personnel. On arrival in South Vietnam, SRAO members attended an orientation program in Saigon before being assigned to a unit. The remaining training came from on-the-job experiences. SRAO women were housed in
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See also BABYLIFT, Operation; United Services Organization References Lamensdorf, Jean Debelle. Write Home for Me: A Red Cross Woman in Vietnam. Milsons Point, New South Wales: Random House, 2006. Morgan, Marjorie Lee. The Clubmobile: The ARC in the Storm. St. Petersburg, FL: Hazlett Printing and Publishing, 1982. Reunion ’93: From Saigon to DC; The American Red Cross Women Who Served. Bowie, MD: American Red Cross Reunion Committee, 1998. Walker, K., ed. A Piece of My Heart: The Stories of Twenty-Six American Women Who Served in Vietnam. New York: Ballantine, 1985.
Amin, Jamil Abdullah alSee Brown, Hubert Gerald
Amnesty A Red Cross volunteer worker plays cards with a marine, August 23, 1967. (National Archives)
military-supplied billets, sometimes sharing facilities with nurses. Quarters included tents, wood and canvas houses, local homes called villas, and base houses and trailers. Most accommodations had locals hired to help maintain the facilities and do laundry. Programs were often self-made audience-participation venues based around game shows, magazines, or knowledge that the women brought to Vietnam via their personal backgrounds and educational experiences. The units that had a recreation center always maintained two women in the center. Hours of operation varied but generally were from 10:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. If not on center duty the remaining women were sent in pairs to isolated areas such as firebases, landing zones, and signal sites. These women offered a sense of security and a bit of home for the soldiers. Three SRAO women were killed while in Vietnam, and a fourth former SRAO woman was killed during Operation BABYLIFT. The SRAO women were called by many affectionate names such as Donut Dollies, DDs, Delta Deltas, Chopper Chick, Kool-Aid Kids, and Round Eyes. On occasion there were pejorative names, such as Biscuit Bitches. Many of the women received the Civilian Service Medal for their tour in Vietnam. In addition to the American Red Cross women, there were also a limited number of Australian Red Cross women working in the Australian hospitals. The United Services Organizations (USO) had 17 recreation centers staffed by civilian women, and the U.S. Army provided the Special Services Program. There were also civilian contractors and airlines employing women as well as news organizations, U.S. governmental agencies, and humanitarian assistance programs. JEANNE CHRISTIE
A pardon or exemption from prosecution granted to groups or individuals convicted or accused of violations of law. Amnesty in the United States dates back to the presidency of George Washington and the 1794 Whiskey Rebellion. Since Washington’s first proclamation of amnesty, presidents and the U.S. Congress had granted amnesty 33 times prior to the Vietnam War. Amnesty has been granted in cases of treason, civil and racial strife, draft avoidance, tax refusal, espionage, bigamy, polygamy, and murder, often in cases involving political or religious beliefs as grounds for violations. Amnesty was first proposed during the Vietnam War when the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) asked President Richard M. Nixon to grant it to draft evaders, deserters, exiles, and lessthan-honorable dischargees. Vice President Spiro Agnew expressed his opposition to the move. He believed that an amnesty proclamation of this extent would be one of the broadest and most unconditional in U.S. history. President Nixon stated his policy in a news conference late in 1972 when he said that those who served had paid their price and that those who deserted must pay theirs. The price of desertion was a criminal charge, and those who sought to return to the United States would have to pay that penalty. Public support for amnesty grew as the Vietnam War came to an end. Yet the government still avoided implementing it. Something of an us-against-them scenario existed that pitted many American citizens against their government. The ACLU was the strongest advocate of amnesty. According to ACLU records, 7,400 draft evaders had been convicted by federal courts, while 39,000 were referred to the Department of Justice for prosecution. Another 5,700 draft evaders still had indictments pending. Between August 1964 and December 1972 there were 495,689 cases of desertion. Adding to these numbers were approximately 37,000 to 40,000 exiles who resisted prosecution by
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fleeing the country. Less-than-honorable discharges accounted for another 450,000 men seeking official relief. Amnesty organizations repeatedly proposed a blanket amnesty, but Congress and the president refused to act. Nixon once claimed that he held a liberal view on amnesty; what he actually supported was executive clemency in cases of the convicted. He never supported a true blanket amnesty program. Exiles saw a midwar amnesty as an empty gesture, but by 1972 most supported the idea. Arguments for amnesty evolved from an issue of relief to exiles and draft dodgers and then to moral condemnation of the Vietnam War altogether. Yet Nixon believed that amnesty was “the most immoral thing [he] could think of.” The antiwar movement reconstituted itself into an amnesty lobby. In 1971 Senator Robert Taft (R-Ohio) sponsored a bill providing that draft resisters could gain amnesty if they worked for four years at a public service job. Taft’s bill was defeated. Following the Watergate Scandal and Nixon’s forced resignation from office in August 1974, President Gerald R. Ford sought to restore public confidence in the federal government, and he believed that compromise would be one of the best ways to accomplish this. Ford saw clemency as a midway course between those opposed to amnesty and those who supported it. But shortly after he announced his clemency program, Ford granted Nixon a full pardon. This action angered many Americans. Ford’s clemency program offered leniency to offenders rather than a full pardon. The program required that draft resisters, exiles, and deserters meet with their local U.S. attorneys and sign an agreement to work for 24 months in alternative service. After their alternative service terms were completed, charges against them would be dismissed. Ford’s clemency program reduced the fugitive list by two-thirds, but it was not ultimately successful. Only 6 percent of 350,000 offenders applied for it, and of these only a limited number completed their terms because of the lack of hiring opportunities. Few employers would hire draft dodgers, especially if the employer had family members who had served in the war. The program did work as a symbol of forgiveness and did achieve its purpose in disarming the amnesty issue, however. In fact, the ACLU abandoned its amnesty project in 1975. Democrat Jimmy Carter defeated Ford in the 1976 presidential election. Carter had attempted to avoid amnesty issues while campaigning, but he favored a blanket pardon for deserters and draft resisters. On his first full day in office in January 1977, he offered a blanket pardon to draft resisters. He granted no relief to deserters but asked the Defense Department to conduct a study on the issue. Carter’s pardon received mixed reactions. In March 1977 the Defense Department announced the Special Discharge Review Program, which offered 432,000 veterans the opportunity to apply for upgrades from undesirable/clemency discharges and to receive medical benefits. However, the program did not extend to all veterans. It omitted more than 22,000 Vietnam War veterans. The Carter program was not as strong as it first appeared; it required offenders to apply for their pardons within
the first six months of the announcement. At the end of the sixmonth period, only 15 percent had applied. This small number was attributed to the requirement that offenders apply in person. The Defense Department’s program was even less successful. Only 9 percent of 432,000 persons eligible applied for upgrades. This lack of success led to a public perception that both programs were unfair and that the Carter administration had been as unsuccessful in resolving this issue as had previous administrations. In the end, there was to be no national reconciliation. The amnesty issue faded in importance as many Americans lost interest in it. LACIE BALLINGER See also Agnew, Spiro Theodore; Carter, James Earl, Jr.; Ford, Gerald Rudolph; Nixon, Richard Milhous References Baskir, Lawrence M., and William A. Strauss. Chance and Circumstance: The Draft, the War, and the Vietnam Generation. New York: 1978. Schardt, Arlie, et al. Amnesty? The Unsettled Question of Vietnam. Lawrence, MA: Sun River, 1973.
Amphibious Warfare Military activity involving landing from ships, either directly or by means of landing craft or helicopters. During the Indochina War, the French developed and employed with some success special integrated tactical army and navy units for conducting riverine warfare. These were the Dinassauts, for divisions navales d’assaut. Dinassauts played a key role in the French victories in the 1950 battles for the Red River Delta in northern Vietnam. U.S. amphibious warfare during the Vietnam War was based in large part on U.S. Marine Corps doctrine developed during the 1920s and 1930s by Major Earl H. Ellis. He had studied amphibious operations in World War I, most notably the Gallipoli Campaign, and in 1934 produced his Tentative Manual of Landing Operations. Amphibious warfare was widely conducted in the Pacific theater of operations during World War II, and the European theater also saw large amphibious landings including the Normandy Invasion. In Korea, the masterful Inchon Landing of September 1950 that turned the tide of war was made possible because of the U.S. Marine Corps’ now highly refined amphibious warfare capability. For U.S. planners, the Vietnam War posed a far different challenge to amphibious operations, procedures for which were spelled out in Doctrine for Amphibious Operations (also known as LFM-01), than these two prior conflicts had posed. South Vietnam did not offer the hostile shore environment that this doctrine was directed toward in conventional warfare considerations. Instead, the fighting early in the Vietnam War was marked by guerrilla warfare waged by Communist forces against the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). This situation resulted in unanticipated problems for the more than 50 amphibious operations conducted during the war.
Amphibious Warfare
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U.S. marines of the Special Landing Force approach the shore in the Rung Sat Special Zone. Controlling the Rung Sat was essential for the safety of supply ships to and from Saigon (now Ho Chi Minh City) during the Vietnam War. (National Archives)
Initial U.S. Marine Corps landings were anticlimactic. Marine support elements were sent to Vietnam in mid-February 1965, a few weeks ahead of Marine Corps combat units. Furthermore, the traditional absolute authority of the Amphibious Task Force commander within the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA) came into question. Innocent civilians loyal to the South Vietnamese government resided in this area, and friendly air operations were being conducted by allied forces within it, as were commercial flights. Finally, potential security breaches existed because these commercial flights had to be warned of no-fly zones for impending amphibious operations. The Seventh Fleet’s amphibious task force was designated Task Force 76 and was composed of the Amphibious Ready Group/ Special Landing Force (ARG/SLF). Created in 1960, the task force was subsequently augmented by a second force created in April 1967. An ARG was initially composed of three to four ships (later raised to five), an amphibious assault ship (LPH), an attack transport (APA), a landing platform dock (LPD), a landing ship, a dock (LSD), and a tank landing ship (LST). Each 2,000-man SLF was composed of a U.S. Marine Corps Battalion Landing Team (BLT) and a helicopter squadron. Four types of amphibious operations took place in Vietnam. The first type, including operations such as DECKHOUSE I (June 1966)
and BEAU CHARGER (May 1967), was based solely on Fleet Marine Force (FMF) and Seventh Fleet forces. The second was composed of FMF and Seventh Fleet forces as part of an in-country operation. Operation BEAVER TRACK (July 1967) was representative of this most common type of operation. The third type was an amphibious operation utilizing in-country, FMF, and Seventh Fleet forces. Operation DOUBLE EAGLE (January–February 1966) is a prime example. The fourth type of amphibious operation was based on in-country and Seventh Fleet forces. Operation BLUE MARTIN (November 1965) is an example. Two debates concerning amphibious forces raged during this period. The initial debate dealt with the deployment of the SLF. The commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet viewed this force as a naval contribution to the war effort and, for that reason, under its direct authority. The commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), however, viewed it as a ready manpower reserve that circumvented Pentagon-mandated troop ceilings. The second debate concerned the needs of brown-water (riverine) versus blue-water operations. The U.S. Marine Corps was criticized for not adapting its amphibious doctrine to proper operations suited for the Mekong Delta. In both of these debates, the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps kept their focus on future naval requirements and successfully fended off critics.
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Andersen Air Force Base
With the policy of Vietnamization in the 1970s, one of the final amphibious operations was conducted by the 31st Marine Amphibious Unit during Operation LAM SON 719 (February–March 1971). The 31st Marine Amphibious Unit provided helicopter support on the eastern side of the Vietnamese border with Laos and carried out a demonstration near Vinh in southern North Vietnam. The last U.S. Marine Corps amphibious operations ashore in Vietnam occurred during the April 1975 Operations EAGLE PULL and FREQUENT WIND that evacuated U.S. personnel from Phnom Penh and Saigon, respectively. With the fall of Cambodia and South Vietnam, the final employment of U.S. amphibious forces in the Vietnam War took place in May 1975 during the Mayaguez Incident. Although some U.S. Marine Corps officers considered amphibious warfare doctrine adequate, others viewed it as inappropriate for the needs of the overall counterinsurgency effort in Vietnam. They noted that the air space and landing sites were already controlled by U.S. forces. Because of this fact, it has been suggested that most SLF operations were simply contrived to protect the future of the Marine Corps. In 1972 new U.S. Marine Corps commandant General Robert E. Cushman Jr. best summed up this institutional perspective when he wryly observed that “we are pulling our heads out of the jungle and getting back into the amphibious business.” ROBERT J. BUNKER See also Cushman, Robert Everton, Jr.; Dinassauts; DOUBLE EAGLE, Operation; EAGLE PULL, Operation; FREQUENT WIND, Operation; MARKET TIME, Operation; Mayaguez Incident; McNamara Line; PIRANHA, Operation; United States Marine Corps References Alexander, Joseph H., and Merrill L. Bartlett. “Amphibious Warfare and the Vietnam War.” In Sea Soldiers in the Cold War: Amphibious Warfare, 1945–1991, 45–61. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994. Hilgartner, Lieutenant Colonel P. L. “Amphibious Doctrine in Vietnam.” In The Marines in Vietnam, 1954–1973: An Anthology and Annotated Bibliography, edited by Peter L. Hilgartner, 294–297. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974. Marolda, Edward J., and G. Wesley Pryce III. A Short History of the United States Navy and the Southeast Asia Conflict, 1950–1975. Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 1984. Shulimson, Jack, and Charles M. Johnson. U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Landing and the Buildup. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1977. Simmons, Brigadier General Edwin H. “Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, 1965–66, 1967, 1968, 1969–72.” In The Marines in Vietnam, 1954–1973: An Anthology and Annotated Bibliography, edited by Peter L. Hilgartner, 35–157. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974.
Andersen Air Force Base U.S. Air Force base located on the northern end of the island of Guam in the western Pacific Ocean. Liberated from the Japanese in 1944 and made an operational base by 1945, North Air Force Base,
Guam, was renamed Andersen Air Force Base in 1949 in honor of Brigadier General James Roy Andersen, who died in an aircraft accident near Kawajalein in February 1945. Early in 1965 the number of Boeing B-52 Stratofortresses at Andersen sharply increased with the escalation of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. On June 18, 1965, 27 B-52s took off from Andersen and struck Viet Cong (VC) targets in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), the first in a long series of such strikes under the Arc Light code name. From June 1965 until August 1970, B-52s from Andersen flew numerous Arc Light missions over Vietnam. Because of Andersen’s distance from Vietnam, the U.S. Air Force initiated B-52 missions from Thailand, which was closer to Vietnam than was Guam. In April 1967 U-Tapao Air Base in Thailand opened as a forward base for American B-52s, and by January 1968 U-Tapao became a fully operational base for B-52 strikes. In 1965, 1,500 B-52 missions were flown, and in 1966 the number of missions increased fourfold. In 1967 almost 10,000 missions were flown. The year 1968 was the peak for B-52 missions, with more then 20,000 flown from Andersen and U-Tapao. After the end to the bombing pause between August 1970 and early 1972, the number of B-52s based at Andersen again increased. At the peak of Operation LINEBACKER II (December 18–29, 1972), Andersen had 153 B-52s stationed there on five miles of ramp space as well as 15,000 personnel and aircrews. The base normally had 1,000–2,000 personnel permanently deployed. Massive tent cities sprang up all over the base to house the influx of personnel supporting the raids in Vietnam. The largest LINEBACKER II raid was on December 18, 1972, when 87 B-52s from Andersen and 40 more from U-Tapao flew and struck targets in and around Hanoi. B-52s launching from Andersen to Hanoi flew 8,200 miles round trip and were in the air for 18 hours from takeoff to landing. In all, Andersen lost 15 of its B-52s in combat during the Vietnam War. The worst single loss was 6 B-52s on the night of December 20, 1972, during Operation LINEBACKER II. Throughout the entire Vietnam conflict, 31 B-52s were lost; of those, 17 were due to combat. By the end of the conflict, 7 million tons of bombs had been dropped on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Some 2.5 million tons of those explosives were dropped by B-52s from Andersen and U-Tapao. Flying more then 102,000 missions throughout the war, B-52s from Andersen and U-Tapao dropped more tonnage then all the aerial ordnance used in World War II. With the end of American military involvement in Vietnam in early 1973, B-52s from Andersen continued flying missions in Cambodia and in Laos until August 1973, when all combat missions were halted. By the end of September 1973, the 100 B-52s stationed at Andersen were redeployed to other bases. Andersen played a role during the fall of Saigon in April 1975 and the evacuation that followed. In Operation NEW LIFE, refugees taken out of Vietnam by air were transported to Andersen and housed on the base. Andersen sheltered some 40,000 refugees and
Angkor Wat saw 109,000 moved through the base on their way to the United States on 500 aircraft. After the war in Vietnam ended, Andersen continued as a key U.S. base in the Southwest Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Andersen served as a transshipment point for supplies during the 1991 Persian Gulf War and continues to serve U.S. forces in the global War on Terror. Andersen Air Force Base is also one of the few authorized alternative landing sites for the Space Shuttle outside the continental United States. STEVEN FRED MARIN See also Arc Light Missions; Guam; LINEBACKER II, Operation; Thailand References McCarthy, James R., and George B. Allison. Linebacker II: A View from the Rock. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, U.S. Air Force, 1985. Michel, Marshall L., III. The Eleven Days of Christmas: America’s Last Vietnam Battle. San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2002. Thornborough, Anthony, and Tony Cassanova. B-52: A History of an American Icon. Yardley, PA: Westholme, 2008.
Angkor Wat A massive Khmer temple and capital city complex constructed under King Suryavarman II in the early 12th century and located a
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short distance north of the present-day Cambodian town of Siem Reap (Siemreab). The image of the main entrance to Angkor Wat (Angkor Vat) has come to symbolize Cambodia and has appeared on each of the country’s national flags since the 19th century. Angkor Wat is part of a huge area of Khmer ruins, collectively referred to as Angkor, and was designated a United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage Site in 1992. The site has been repeatedly sacked by foreign invaders, including a Cham army in 1177 and Siamese forces in 1353 and again in 1431. Much of the site was subsequently abandoned except for Angkor Wat, which continued to be visited by Buddhist pilgrims. In the 19th century the site became a popular destination for European visitors. Angkor Wat covers an area of 203 acres and is surrounded by a wall more than 2 miles long and a water-filled moat. The larger area of Khmer ruins surrounding it covers more than 1,000 square miles, which is nearly the size of the state of Rhode Island. Warfare returned to Angkor Wat in 1970 when the Vietnam War spilled over into the interior of Cambodia. Following the overthrow of Prince Norodom Sihanouk on March 18, 1970, and the formation of the Khmer Republic under Lon Nol, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) sought to protect its logistical lifelines in Cambodia that supported its forces in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Clashes occurred between the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese
View of the 12th-century ruins of Angkor Wat and its surrounding moat. (PhotoDisc, Inc.)
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Army) forces and Lon Nol’s weak Forces Armées Nationale Khmer (FANK, Khmer National Armed Forces). The mixed Khmer Rouge (Red Khmer, Cambodian Communists) and Viet Cong (VC) C-40 Division swiftly entered Siem Reap Province, seizing control of the ruins at Angkor Wat, followed by a reinforced PAVN regiment. Two miles to the south at Siem Reap, three FANK brigades established defensive positions. French archaeologist Philippe-Bernard Groslier was able to direct maintenance and restoration of the ruins until January 1972, when 20 of his Cambodian employees were executed for purportedly providing information to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). A stalemate then ensued. Beginning in May 1972, FANK launched a series of unsuccessful attacks on Angkor Wat; these efforts were terminated in September. FANK units at nearby Siem Reap found themselves progressively isolated but managed to hold out until the collapse of Lon Nol’s government in mid-April 1975. During the years of Khmer Rouge rule (1975–1979) the site was subject to vandalism. Relatively little damage was done, although at least one mass grave of Khmer Rouge victims is located nearby. Restoration of the site resumed after the fall of the Khmer Rouge regime. Today Angkor Wat is once again a popular tourist destination. GLENN E. HELM See also Cambodia; Cambodia, Vietnamese Invasion and Occupation of; Khmer Rouge; Lon Nol; Sihanouk, Norodom References Deac, Wilfred P. Road to the Killing Fields: The Cambodian War of 1970–1975. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1997. Freeman, Michael, and Roger Warner. Angkor: The Hidden Glories. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990. Higham, Charles. The Civilization of Angkor. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001.
ANGLICO See Air Naval Gunnery Liaison Company
An Khe Primary base camp in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) for the U.S. Army 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) from August 1965 to early 1968. Located in an area that saw major fighting in early 1953 during the Indochina War, the base was situated on exceptionally difficult terrain at the top of An Khe Pass in Gia Lai Province, II Corps Tactical Zone. The base permitted wide access to the Central Highlands, a key strategic region. Highway 19, which ran along An Khe Pass, witnessed many ambushes by the Viet Cong (VC). Originally the base was named “The Golf Course” when the division commander selected the site in August 1965 and told
his advance team to “Cut brush until we have a golf course.” The 1,000-man advance party arrived on August 25, with security for the site being provided by the 1st Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division. Once the advance party had cleared the area and prepared it for occupation, the rest of the 1st Cavalry Division began to arrive. When the division had settled in, the base was renamed Camp Radcliff to honor the first man from the division killed in Vietnam. Major Donald G. Radcliff, executive officer of 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, died on August 18, 1965, when the helicopter gunship he was flying was struck by enemy ground fire while supporting U.S. marines during Operation STARLITE. Camp Radcliff remained the home of the 1st Cavalry Division until January 1968, when most of the division was moved to I Corps north of Hue. The division comprised 16,000 men organized to move using just over 400 aircraft, mainly tactical helicopters. Helicopters ferried not only men and light weapons but also artillery, motor vehicles, and all required support matériel. The versatile Bell UH-1 (“Huey”) helicopter, a symbol of American airmobile operations in the Vietnam War, was used extensively for fire support as well as transport. However, a wide range of helicopters was used by the 1st Cavalry at An Khe. In addition to a number of helicopter landing areas, the base included a C-130–capable airfield on the north end of the base and a smaller fixed-wing airstrip on the southwest corner. To mark its area of operations, the 1st Cavalry Division cut and painted a huge replica of the division patch and emplaced it on the south face of Hon Cong Mountain, just adjacent to the base. The patch was several stories high and could be seen for many miles. Important operations supported from An Khe included the Battle of Ia Drang Valley and Operations MASHER/WHITE WING, CRAZY HORSE, PAUL REVERE II, THAYER I–II, and PERSHING. After the 1st Cavalry Division was redeployed to I Corps, An Khe was occupied by the 173rd Airborne Brigade. ARTHUR I. CYR AND JAMES H. WILLBANKS See also Central Highlands; Ia Drang, Battle of; MASHER/WHITE WING, Operation; PAUL REVERE I–IV, Operations; PERSHING, Operation References Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. Moore, Harold G., and Joseph L. Galloway. We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young: Ia Drang—The Battle That Changed the War in Vietnam. New York: Random House, 1992. Stanton, Shelby L. Anatomy of a Division: The 1st Cav in Vietnam. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1987.
An Loc, Battle of Start Date: April 13, 1972 End Date: July 20, 1972 An Loc, located only 65 miles from Saigon, was the capital of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) Binh Long Province
Annam in III Corps Tactical Zone. The struggle for An Loc was the southernmost prong of the 1972 People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) Easter Offensive, which was a large-scale conventional three-pronged attack designed to confuse and defeat the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) defenders. The architect of the offensive plan, PAVN commander General Vo Nguyen Giap, divided his assault force of more than 120,000 troops into three separate operations. The offensive began with a multidivisional PAVN attack across the demilitarized zone (DMZ) toward the cities of Hue and Da Nang, with other forces pressing in from the A Shau Valley in the west. Giap wanted to force South Vietnamese president Nguyen Van Thieu to commit reserves to protect his northern provinces, after which Giap planned to launch a second assault from Cambodia to threaten Saigon. Then Giap would launch the third attack in the Central Highlands to take Kontum and aim for the coast in Binh Dinh Province, thus splitting South Vietnam in two. This would lead to a collapse of the South Vietnamese government or, at the very least, a peace agreement on Hanoi’s terms. Giap launched the offensive on March 30, 1972. PAVN forces routed ARVN defenders in Quang Tri Province. On April 2 Giap launched the second prong of the offensive when PAVN troops crossed the Cambodian border into III Corps area of operations and threatened Tay Ninh City. This proved to be a feint, and the main attack followed on April 5 against Loc Ninh to the east. The town was quickly overwhelmed, opening up a direct route down Highway QL-13 to Saigon through An Loc and Lai Khe. After the fall of Loc Ninh, the 5th, 7th, and 9th Viet Cong (VC)/ PAVN divisions moved to prepare for the attack on An Loc itself. President Thieu ordered the ARVN 5th Division, normally headquartered at Lai Khe, to move to An Loc and assume control of the defense of the city. By April 7, PAVN forces had surrounded An Loc and blocked QL-13, effectively cutting off An Loc from outside ground reinforcement and resupply. On April 12, PAVN troops began shelling the city with mortars, rockets, and artillery. Major General James F. Hollingsworth, senior adviser to the ARVN III Corps commander, persuaded Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), commander General Creighton Abrams to provide maximum U.S. air strikes against what he saw as the coming main attack. On April 13, PAVN troops began a massive infantry attack supported by T-54 and PT-76 tanks and increased artillery fire on An Loc from several directions. The attackers were almost successful in the hand-to-hand and house-to-house fighting, but Bell AH-1G Cobra helicopter gunships and continuous tactical air support from U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Marine Corps fighter-bombers and U.S. Air Force Lockheed AC-130 Spectre gunships enabled the defenders to hold out against the initial assault, but not before they were pushed into an area less than a mile square. Another factor in the ability of the ARVN forces to hold out in this and subsequent attacks was B-52 Arc Light strikes that ringed the city and precluded the Communists from massing their forces and completely overrunning the defenders.
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President Thieu ordered an attack by the ARVN 21st Division to relieve the city from the south, but this attempt quickly bogged down, and An Loc remained cut off and besieged, suffering repeated ground attacks and round-the-clock heavy shelling. ARVN forces, aided by U.S. Army advisers and U.S. airpower, continued to hold their ground against overwhelming odds, sustaining heavy casualties in the process. Air support was vital. During the course of the battle, Boeing B-52 Stratofortresses flew 252 missions; there were also 9,023 tactical air strikes. The siege was finally lifted in June, and the ARVN 5th Division was replaced in July by the ARVN 18th Division. During the siege, the three attacking PAVN divisions sustained an estimated 10,000 casualties and lost most of their tanks and heavy artillery. The ARVN suffered 5,400 casualties, including 2,300 dead or missing. Although An Loc was in ruins, the ARVN defenders had been successful in stopping a direct assault on Saigon and effectively blunted the PAVN Easter Offensive in South Vietnam. JAMES H. WILLBANKS See also Airpower, Role in War; Arc Light Missions; Easter Offensive; Nguyen Van Thieu; Vietnamization; Vo Nguyen Giap References Andradé, Dale. America’s Last Vietnam Battle: Halting Hanoi’s 1972 Easter Offensive. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001. Ngo Quang Truong. The Easter Offensive of 1972. Indochina Monographs. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1980. Pimlott, John. Vietnam: The Decisive Battles. New York: Macmillan, 1990. Willbanks, James H. Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and South Vietnam Lost Its War. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004. Willbanks, James H. The Battle of An Loc. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005. Willbanks, James H. Thiet Giap! The Battle of An Loc, April 1972. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1993.
Annam The middle state of the three former French possessions—Tonkin, Annam, and Cochin China—that make up present-day Vietnam. The name “Annam” (or “An Nam”) was first applied to all of Vietnam by the Chinese during their first occupation of the country between the first century BCE and the tenth century CE. The name “An Nam” was composed of the Chinese characters for an, meaning “contented or pacified,” and nam, meaning “south,” but the Vietnamese were far from pacified then or under any conqueror. From 1883, the French divided Vietnam into the three administrative states of Tonkin, Annam, and Cochin China. Under the French, the Vietnamese people became known as Annamese and even referred to themselves as such over time. Tonkin and Annam were ruled by titular Vietnamese emperors under the imposed protectorate, while Cochin China was administered directly as a
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Antiaircraft Artillery, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam
French colony. In Hue, the emperor and his mandarins continued to administer internal affairs observed by the French resident superior, who answered to the French Indochina governor-general headquartered in Hanoi. Geographically Annam was a relatively narrow strip of land about 750–800 miles long and encompassing some 50,000 square miles. Its main geographical features were plateaus and wooded mountains that generally ran north-south. The area was rich in mineral resources, and its plateaus and mountain valleys were ideal for agriculture, which thrived in its well-drained fertile soil. Annam was well served by a series of river systems that runs to the coast. The area had a correspondingly long coastline, and fishing was a major local occupation. Chief crops raised at the time of the French occupation included rice, cotton, tea, cinnamon, tobacco, jute, sugarcane, and coffee. Rubber was also harvested from Annam’s forests, and silkworms were cultivated here. Annam was also a significant source of gold, silver, lead, and iron. ARTHUR T. FRAME See also Cochin China; French Indochina, 1860s–1946; Minh Mang; Nguyen Phuc Anh; Tonkin; Tu Duc; Vietnam, History of, Prehistory to 938 CE; Vietnam, History of, 938 CE through the French Conquest References Buttinger, Joseph. Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled. 2 vols. New York: Praeger, 1967. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997.
Antiaircraft Artillery, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam During the Vietnam War, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) developed the most sophisticated antiaircraft defense network in the world. This included antiaircraft artillery (AAA), Soviet-supplied MiG interceptors and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and extensive communications and radar links. The United States ultimately developed effective countermeasures to the North Vietnamese system, but AAA took a heavy toll on American aircraft throughout the war. In contrast, the United States and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) did not require or develop robust air defenses against North Vietnam, which used its air force purely in a defensive role and restricted it to its own airspace. Through late 1964, the North Vietnamese air defense system was very primitive and had no more than 700 AAA weapons. However, when the United States began its bombing campaign, Operation ROLLING THUNDER, against North Vietnam in early 1965, the Chinese quickly supplied air defense equipment. When China subsequently refused to supply additional amounts of AAA weapons to Hanoi, the Soviet Union became the primary supplier. Moscow
provided a wide variety of guns, ranging from the 85-millimeter (mm) M1944 to the ZU-23. The 12.7-mm and 40-mm weapons were capable of firing 80 and 50 rounds per minute, respectively, up to 4,500 feet; the 37-mm gun fired 80 1.6-pound shells a minute up to 9,000 feet; the 57-mm S-60 fired 70 6-pound rounds a minute to 15,000 feet; the 85-mm M1944 fired 20 shells a minute up to 30,000 feet; and the 100-mm weapon fired 15 35-pound rounds a minute to 45,000 feet. As a result of their widespread ranges, North Vietnamese AAA weapons were responsible for approximately 80 percent of all American aircraft shot down. AAA rapidly became the primary concern for U.S. pilots, and things only got worse in 1968, when North Vietnam married radar tracking to many of its 8,000 AAA weapons. Prior to radar tracking, U.S. pilots sacrificed bombing accuracy for safety. They operated at altitudes of more than 5,000 feet to avoid the low-altitude lethality of the 12-mm and 40-mm guns. With radar tracking, however, the genuinely effective range of North Vietnamese AAA now covered from 1,500 to more than 40,000 feet. Only in 1972, with the LINEBACKER bombing campaigns, did U.S. air forces finally neutralize the North Vietnamese air defense system. During the Vietnam War, North Vietnamese AAA batteries performed multiple roles, including air-base defense and the protection of the Hanoi and Hai Phong areas. In the latter cases, AAA units often operated in residential areas, hospitals, and dikes. This practice violated international law, but North Vietnamese leaders knew that the rules of engagement, as defined by the United States, protected these batteries from attack. As a result, American pilots basically had two options for neutralizing the AAA threat, which in 1967 lobbed up to 25,000 tons of ammunition a month at them. First, the American pilot could jam AAA batteries that were equipped with radar, although low-flying aircraft were still vulnerable to line-of-sight fire. The other option was jinking. This involved radical random changes in speed, altitude, and/or direction to confuse the radar fix on an aircraft. However, when the pilot approached the target, he had to fly straight and steady to drop his bombs accurately, at which point he was extremely vulnerable to enemy fire. In contrast to South Vietnam’s very limited air defense system, which included two Hawk missile battalions from 1965 to 1968 along with three AAA battalions used to support ground combat, North Vietnam’s system was exceptionally well equipped. One very simple but effective North Vietnamese antiaircraft device against low-flying aircraft was the so-called People’s Air Defense. This tactic relied on large numbers of rifles and machine guns provided by the government to private citizens in urban areas. Alerted by loudspeakers, these individuals would take up assigned positions. A central commander would then order them to concentrate fire on one selected low-flying aircraft. By requiring time, resources, and technology to neutralize their air defense system, North Vietnam was able to deny the United States total control of North Vietnamese airspace until 1972. North
Antiwar Movement, U.S. Vietnam’s air defense system, of which AAA was a major component, thus became the model for other nations to follow during and after the Vietnam War. ADAM J. STONE See also Air Defenses, Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Airpower, Role in War; LINEBACKER I, Operation; LINEBACKER II, Operation; ROLLING THUNDER, Operation References Lavalle, A. J. C., ed. The Tale of Two Bridges and the Battle for the Skies over North Vietnam. Monographs 1 and 2. USAF Southeast Asia Monograph Series, Vol. 1. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Staff, 2001. Morrocco, John. Rain of Fire: Air War, 1969–1973. The Vietnam Experience Series. Boston: Boston Publishing, 1985. Nordeen, Lon O. Air Warfare in the Missile Age. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1985. Sharp, U. S. G., and W. C. Westmoreland. Report on the War in Vietnam. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969.
Antiwar Movement, U.S. Along with the civil rights campaigns of the 1960s, the antiwar movement was one of the most divisive forces in 20th-century U.S. history. The movement actually consisted of a number of independent interests, often only vaguely allied and contesting each other on many issues and united only in opposition to the Vietnam War. Attracting members from college campuses, middle-class suburbs, labor unions, and government institutions, the movement gained national prominence in 1965, peaked in 1968, and remained powerful throughout the duration of the conflict. Encompassing political, racial, and cultural spheres, the antiwar movement exposed a deep schism within 1960s’ American society. A small core peace movement had long existed in the United States, largely based in Quaker and Unitarian beliefs, but had failed to gain popular currency until the Cold War era. The escalating nuclear arms race of the late 1950s led Norman Cousins, editor of the Saturday Review, along with Clarence Pickett of the American Society of Friends (Quakers) to found the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) in 1957. Their most visible member was the prominent pediatrician and writer Dr. Benjamin Spock, who joined in 1962 after becoming disillusioned with President John F. Kennedy’s failure to halt nuclear proliferation. A decidedly middle-class organization, SANE represented the latest incarnation of traditional liberal peace activism. Its goal was a reduction in nuclear weapons. Another group, the Student Peace Union (SPU), emerged in 1959 on college campuses across the country. Like SANE, the SPU was more liberal than radical. After the Joseph McCarthy–inspired dissolution of Communist and Socialist organizations on campuses in the 1950s, the SPU became the only option remaining for nascent activists. The goal of
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the SPU went beyond that of SANE. Unwilling to settle for fewer nuclear weapons, the students desired a wholesale restructuring of American society. The SPU, never an effective interest group, faded away by 1964, its banner taken up by a more active assemblage, Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). The SDS formed in 1960 as the collegiate arm of an Old Left institution with an impressive heritage, the League for Industrial Democracy. Jack London had been a member, as had author and journalist Upton Sinclair, but the organization had long lain dormant until Michael Harrington, a New York Socialist, revived it late in the 1950s as a forum for laborers, African Americans, and intellectuals. Within a single year, however, the SDS was taken over by student radicals Al Haber and Tom Hayden, both of the University of Michigan. In June 1962, 59 SDS members met with Harrington at Port Huron, Michigan, in a conference sponsored by the United Auto Workers. From this meeting materialized what has been called the manifesto of the New Left, the Port Huron Statement. Written by Hayden, the editor of the University of Michigan student newspaper, the 64-page Port Huron Statement expressed disillusionment with the military-industrial-academic establishment. Hayden cited the uncertainty of life in Cold War America and the degradation of African Americans in the South as examples of the failure of liberal ideology and called for a reevaluation of academic acquiescence in what he claimed was a dangerous conspiracy to maintain a sense of apathy among American youths. Throughout the first years of its existence, the SDS focused on domestic concerns. The students, as with other groups of the Old and New Left, actively supported President Lyndon Johnson in his 1964 campaign against Barry Goldwater. Following Johnson’s victory, the SDS refrained from antiwar rhetoric to avoid alienating the president and possibly endangering the social programs of the Great Society. Although not yet an antiwar organization, the SDS actively participated in the civil rights struggle and proved an important link between the two defining causes of the decade. Another bridge between civil rights and the antiwar crusade was the Free Speech Movement (FSM) at the University of California at Berkeley. Begun in December 1964 by students who had participated in the Freedom Summer campaign in Mississippi, the FSM provided an example of how students could bring about change through organization. In several skirmishes with university president Clark Kerr, the FSM and its dynamic leader Mario Savio publicized the close ties between academic and military establishments. With the rise of the SDS and the FSM, the Old Left peace advocates had discovered a large and vocal body of sympathizers, many of whom had gained experience in dissent through the civil rights battles in the South. By the beginning of 1965 the base of the antiwar movement had coalesced on campuses and lacked only a catalyst to bring wider public acceptance to its position. That catalyst appeared early in February 1965 when the United States began bombing the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV,
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Antiwar Movement, U.S.
In Washington, D.C., more than 100,000 antiwar protesters rally near the Lincoln Memorial on October 21, 1967, before marching across the Arlington Memorial Bridge to the Pentagon. The march was one of the first important anti–Vietnam War demonstrations in the United States. (Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library)
North Vietnam). The pace of protest immediately quickened, and the scope of protest broadened. In February and again in March, the SDS organized marches on the Oakland Army Terminal, the departure point for many troops bound for Southeast Asia. On March 24 faculty members at the University of Michigan held a series of teach-ins, modeled after earlier civil rights seminars, that sought to educate large segments of the student population about both the moral and political foundations of U.S. involvement. The teach-in format spread to campuses around the country and brought faculty members into active antiwar participation. In March the SDS escalated the scale of dissent to a truly national level, calling for a march on Washington to protest the bombing. On April 17, 1965, between 15,000 and 25,000 people gathered at the capital, a turnout that surprised even the organizers. Buoyed by the attendance at the Washington march, movement leaders, still mainly students, expanded their methods and gained new allies over the next two years. “Vietnam Day,” a symposium held at Berkeley in October 1965, drew thousands to debate the moral basis of the war. Campus editors formed networks to share
information on effective protest methods; two of these, the Underground Press Syndicate (1966) and the Liberation News Service (1967), became productive means of disseminating intelligence. In the spring of 1967 more than 1,000 seminarians from across the country wrote to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara advocating recognition of conscientious objection on secular, moral grounds. In June 10,000 students wrote, suggesting that the secretary develop a program of alternative service for those who opposed violence. A two-day march on the Pentagon in October 1967 attracted nationwide media attention, while leaders of the war resistance called for young men to turn in their draft cards. The movement spread to the military itself; in 1966 the so-called Fort Hood Three gained acclaim among dissenters for their refusal to serve in Vietnam. Underground railroads funneled draft evaders to Canada or to Sweden, and churches provided sanctuary for those attempting to avoid conscription. Perhaps the most significant development of the period between 1965 and 1968 was the emergence of civil rights leaders as active proponents of peace in Vietnam. In a January 1967 article written for the Chicago Defender, civil rights leader Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. openly expressed support for the antiwar movement on moral grounds. Reverend King expanded on his views in April at the Riverside Church in New York, asserting that the war was draining much-needed resources from domestic programs. He also voiced concern about the percentage of African American casualties in relation to the total population and stated that war burdens fell disproportionately to the poor. King’s statements rallied African American activists to the antiwar cause and established a new dimension to the moral objections of the movement. The peaceful phase of the antiwar movement had reached maturity, as the entire nation was now aware that the foundations of administration foreign policy were being widely questioned. As the movement’s ideals spread beyond college campuses, doubts about the wisdom of escalation also began to appear within the administration itself. As early as the summer of 1965, Undersecretary of State George Ball counseled President Johnson against further military involvement in Vietnam. In 1967 Johnson fired Defense Secretary McNamara after the secretary expressed concern about the moral justifications for war. Most internal dissent, however, focused not on ethical but instead on pragmatic criteria, with many believing that the cost of winning was simply too high. But widespread opposition within the government did not appear until 1968. Exacerbating the situation was the presidential election of that year in which Johnson faced a strong challenge from peace candidates Eugene McCarthy, Robert Kennedy, and George McGovern, all Democrats, as well as his eventual successor, Richard M. Nixon. On March 25, 1968, Johnson learned that his closest advisers now opposed the war; six days later he withdrew from the race. As with the bombing of North Vietnam in 1965, which had touched off an explosion of interest in peace activities, another Southeast Asian catalyst instigated the most intense period of
Antiwar Protests, Non-U.S. antiwar protest early in 1968. The Tet Offensive of late January led many Americans to question the administration’s veracity in reporting war progress and contributed to Johnson’s decision to retire. After the Tet Offensive, American public opinion shifted dramatically, with fully half of the population opposed to escalation. Dissent escalated to violence. In April protesters occupied the administration building at Columbia University; police used force to evict them. Raids on draft boards in Baltimore, Milwaukee, and Chicago in which activists smeared blood on records and shredded files soon followed. Offices and production facilities of Dow Chemical, manufacturers of napalm, were targeted for sabotage. The brutal clashes between police and peace activists at the August 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago typified the divided nature of American society and foreshadowed a continuing rise in domestic conflict. The antiwar movement became both more powerful and, at the same time, less cohesive between 1969 and 1973. Most Americans pragmatically opposed escalating the U.S. role in Vietnam, believing that the economic cost was too high. In November 1969 a second march on Washington drew an estimated 500,000 participants. At the same time, most disapproved of the counterculture that had arisen alongside the antiwar movement. The clean-cut, well-dressed SDS members, who had tied their hopes to McCarthy in 1968, were being subordinated as movement leaders. Their replacements deservedly gained less public respect, were tagged with the label “hippie,” and faced much mainstream opposition from middle-class Americans uncomfortable with the youth culture of the period that included long hair, casual drug use, and sexual promiscuity. Protest music, typified by Joan Baez and Bob Dylan, contributed to the gulf between young and old. Cultural and political protest had become inextricably intertwined within the movement’s vanguard. The new leaders became increasingly strident, greeting returning soldiers with jeers and taunts and spitting on troops in airports and on public streets. A unique situation arose in which most Americans supported the cause but opposed the leaders, methods, and culture of protest. The movement regained solidarity following several disturbing incidents. In February 1970 news of the My Lai Massacre became public and ignited widespread outrage. In April President Nixon, who had previously committed to a planned withdrawal, announced that U.S. forces had entered Cambodia. Within minutes of the televised statement, protesters took to the streets with renewed focus. Then on May 4, Ohio National Guardsmen fired on a group of student protesters at Kent State University, killing 4 and wounding 16. Death, previously distant, was now close at hand. New groups, including Nobel science laureates, State Department officers, and the American Civil Liberties Union, all openly called for withdrawal. Congress began threatening the Nixon administration with challenges to presidential authority. When the New York Times published the first installment of the Pentagon Papers on June 13, 1971, Americans became aware of the
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true nature of the war. Stories of drug trafficking, political assassinations, and indiscriminate bombings led many to believe that military and intelligence services had lost all accountability. Antiwar sentiment, previously tainted with an air of anti-Americanism, became instead a normal reaction against zealous excess. Dissent dominated America; the antiwar cause had become institutionalized. By January 1973 when Nixon announced the effective end of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, he did so in response to a mandate unequaled in modern times. MARK BARRINGER See also Ali, Muhammad; Baez, Joan Chandos; Clark, William Ramsey; Conscientious Objectors; Democratic National Convention of 1968; Dylan, Bob; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Fort Hood Three; Ginsberg, Allen; Goldman, Eric Frederick; Hardhats; Hayden, Thomas Emmett; Hoover, John Edgar; Huston Plan; International War Crimes Tribunal; Jackson State College Shootings; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, Robert Francis; Kent State University Shootings; King, Martin Luther, Jr.; Levy, Howard Brett; May Day Tribe; McCarthy, Eugene Joseph; McGovern, George Stanley; McNamara, Robert Strange; My Lai Massacre; Pentagon Papers and Trial; Seale, Bobby; Spock, Benjamin McLane; Students for a Democratic Society; Tinker v. Des Moines; United States Department of Justice; University of Wisconsin Bombing; Vietnamization References DeBenedetti, Charles, with Charles Chatfield. An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1990. Garfinkle, Adam. Telltale Hearts: The Origins and Impact of the Vietnam Antiwar Movement. New York: St. Martin’s, 1995. Halstead, Fred. Out Now! A Participant’s Account of the American Movement against the Vietnam War. New York: Monad, 1978.
Antiwar Protests, Non-U.S. People around the world followed print and broadcast news reports on the Vietnam War with considerable interest. Many viewed televised images of the war from U.S. as well as non-U.S. sources, all of which helped shape antiwar sentiments across the globe. Opposition to the Vietnam War manifested itself in multiple ways. This included foreign activists’ and politicians’ public criticism of U.S. policy and of U.S.-allied governments seen as complicit in the war, demonstrations by university and high school students and other political activists, and assistance to American males seeking to evade conscription or deserting military service. Antiwar sentiment also showed up in popular media, including graffiti, posters, and music. Protests abroad became evident in 1965 and 1966 in response to the U.S. escalation of the war in the bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and the deployment of large numbers of U.S. combat personnel to Vietnam. In Great Britain in 1966 Tariq Ali, an immigrant from Pakistan, helped to found the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign. In 1967 the British philosopher
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Antiwar Protests, Non-U.S.
Police arrest an anti–Vietnam War demonstrator outside the American embassy in London in June 1966. There was little popular support in Britain for the U.S. role in Vietnam, and the British government did not provide military or material support. (AP/Wide World Photos)
and peace activist Bertrand Russell published a condemnation of the war titled War Crimes in Vietnam. He was one of the organizers of the Russell Tribunal (also known as the International War Crimes Tribunal and the Russell-Sartre Tribunal) in Stockholm and Copenhagen that brought together prominent intellectuals and political leaders from around the world. Journalists, physicians, academics, and other speakers presented reports on the effects of the war in Southeast Asia. The organizers compared the tribunal to the post–World War II Nuremberg Trials of Nazis in 1945 and 1946. Although the hearings publicized charges of illegal acts committed by the United States and its allies in the Vietnam War, the tribunal did not itself possess any official powers of prosecution. Although the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) remained a close U.S. ally during the Vietnam War, many West Germans disapproved of U.S. military actions in Southeast Asia. In February 1968 the Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund (West German League of Socialist Students) hosted the International Vietnam Congress, attended by student activists from various countries, and arranged a march in West Berlin that drew an estimated 8,000–20,000 participants. There they encountered large numbers of counterdemonstrators who declared their support for the United States. In the late 1960s West German students established contact with some African American military personnel stationed in West Germany, many of whom would be or had
been deployed to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Together they sought to oppose the American role in the war, U.S. military interventions generally, and racism in the U.S. military and in American and German societies as a whole. In Japan, activists protested at U.S. military installations that provided support for operations in Vietnam. Although a majority of Australians backed their nation’s commitment to South Vietnam until 1969, at which time public support for the war began to recede, a protest movement had emerged in Australia by 1967 that was comprised of members of religious groups, veterans, students, and opponents of Australia’s conscription of young men to serve in the war. Demonstrators all over Western Europe used tactics similar to those employed by the American civil rights and antiwar movements, such as sit-ins and teach-ins. Some radical activists, like their counterparts in the United States, studied the example of revolutionaries such as Ernesto “Che” Guevara and Mao Zedong. Activists outside the United States were also informed by their own nations’ histories. For example, West Germans compared atrocities in Vietnam to Nazi war crimes, while Japanese activists recalled the aggression of their country’s military in the 1930s and 1940s. Protests against the U.S. role in the war intermingled with local concerns. In Western Europe, youths who opposed the war also criticized authoritarianism, the lack of student input in educational institutions, crowded and run-down universities, racism against nonwhite immigrants, colonialism in Africa and the developing world, and the excesses of capitalism. Many West German and Japanese opponents of the war also objected to the large and continuing U.S. military presence in their countries. In addition to protesting against the Vietnam War, some Japanese activists also demanded the reversion of Okinawa, under U.S. control, to Japanese control. Although most activists demonstrated peacefully, violence did occur. On March 17, 1968, in London’s largest Vietnam War rally to date, an estimated 20,000 marchers, including British students and workers and members of the West German League of Socialist Students, approached the U.S. embassy. Although organizers had not planned to attack the embassy, some marchers did charge the building, resulting in clashes between police and demonstrators and inspiring the Rolling Stones’ song “Street Fighting Man.” Mass violence also occurred in Paris in 1968 in confrontations between student leftists, police, and right-wing supporters of South Vietnam. Although international peace activists were among the many critics of the U.S. role in the war and sought an end to the violence in Southeast Asia, not all demonstrators opposed warfare as a means to bring about political change. Many protesters outside the United States not only demonstrated opposition to the U.S. intervention in Vietnam but also expressed support for the Vietnamese fighting to overthrow the South Vietnamese government and allied forces. North Vietnamese leaders believed that the worldwide protests could affect Americans’ will to continue the war and contribute to the U.S. government’s decision to withdraw its forces.
Ap Bac, Battle of While in no way equal to the fervor and numbers of antiwar protestors in the United States, widespread condemnation abroad of U.S. military operations in Vietnam showed that many people, including those in allied nations, doubted the judgment and the morality of the United States as a global leader and its claims that it sought to promote democracy and freedom abroad. DONNA ALVAH See also Antiwar Movement, U.S. References Daum, Andreas W., Lloyd C. Gardner, and Wilfried Mausbach, eds. America, the Vietnam War, and the World: Comparative and International Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Duffett, John, ed. Against the Crime of Silence: Proceedings of the Russell International War Crimes Tribunal, Stockholm, Copenhagen. New York: Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, 1968. Fraser, Ronald, et al., eds. 1968: A Student Generation in Revolt. New York: Pantheon Books, 1988. Höhn, Maria. “The Black Panther Solidarity Committees and the Voice of the Lumpen.” German Studies Review 31(1) (February 2008): 133–154. Kurlansky, Mark. 1968: The Year That Rocked the World. New York: Ballantine Books, 2004. Suri, Jeremi. Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003.
APACHE SNOW,
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became embroiled in heavy contact on the second day of the operation as it approached Ap Bia Mountain (Hill 937 on their maps), the predominant hill in a series of ridges. Having engaged the 7th and 8th battalions of the PAVN 29th Regiment that were dug into heavily fortified positions on the hill, the Rakassans were reinforced with two more 101st Airborne Division battalions (1st Battalion, 506th Infantry, and 2nd Battalion, 501st Infantry) and a battalion of the ARVN 3rd Regiment. The Battle of Ap Bia Mountain (also known as the Battle of Hamburger Hill) became one of the more infamous engagements of the war and the major event of APACHE SNOW. Although at heavy cost, the battle forced PAVN forces out of the A Shau Valley into Laotian sanctuaries. Despite this success, as soon as U.S. and ARVN forces withdrew, PAVN troops moved back into the area, as occurred in previous operations. Total U.S. losses in APACHE SNOW were 113 killed in action and 627 wounded; 5 South Vietnamese troops were also killed. Communist losses were given at 977 killed in action. In addition, 152 individual and 25 crew-served weapons were captured. ARTHUR T. FRAME See also Attrition; Hamburger Hill, Battle of References Stanton, Shelby L. The Rise and Fall of an American Army: The U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985. Zaffiri, Samuel. Hamburger Hill: The Brutal Battle for Dong Ap Bia, May 11–20, 1969. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1988.
Operation
Start Date: May 10, 1969 End Date: June 7, 1969 U.S. military operation designed to keep pressure on People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) units and base camps in the A Shau Valley. Located southwest of the city of Hue in western I Corps Tactical Zone near the Laotian border, the A Shau Valley was, during the Vietnam War, a PAVN base area and terminus for replacements and supplies sent south by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Cessation of bombing during the limited visibility of the monsoon season allowed the Communists to move and stockpile large quantities of matériel throughout their infiltration network in the A Shau Valley. In February 1969 Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), intelligence reported a rush of bunker and way station construction in the valley, and several Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) and U.S. operations were conducted there to disrupt the activity and destroy PAVN units in order to prevent attacks on the coastal provinces. APACHE SNOW involved the 3rd Brigade, U.S. 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile); the U.S. 9th Marine Regiment; and the ARVN 3rd Regiment, 1st Infantry Division. Although most elements met with some resistance, the 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry (“Rakassans”),
Ap Bac, Battle of Event Date: January 2, 1963 A fierce battle fought on January 2, 1963, in the small village of Bac (the Vietnamese term ap means “hamlet”), located approximately 40 miles southwest of Saigon. Stung by the October 1962 loss of a South Vietnamese Ranger platoon and concerned about the ease with which the Viet Cong (VC) was recruiting support in the important Mekong Delta region, Lieutenant Colonel John Vann, senior adviser to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) 7th Division, hoped for a quick victory at Ap Bac and its sister hamlet, Ap Tan Thoi, 1 mile to the north. Aware that an ARVN attack was imminent, Communist regular forces totaling about 320 men (the headquarters and one company of the main-force 261st Battalion, one company from the 514th
Estimated Casualties at the Battle of Ap Bac, January 2, 1963 ARVN PAVN
Killed
Wounded
Total
80 18
100 39
180 57
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Ap Bac, Battle of
Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) paratroopers run to board CH-21 Shawnee helicopters during the Battle of Ap Bac with Communist Viet Cong (VC) forces in January 1963. (Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images)
Provincial Battalion, and several support units), augmented by about 30 local guerrillas, assumed strong defensive positions in tree lines and along canals. Dedicated and well-trained fighters, they demonstrated superior weapons discipline throughout the day. Conversely, the ARVN 7th Division exhibited incompetence, confusion, and cowardice. Despite Vann’s well-conceived plan calling for a three-pronged attack from the north, south, and east, the mission quickly disintegrated on January 2, as ARVN soldiers refused to advance under fire despite exhortations of the few U.S. advisers on the scene. By noon, five U.S. helicopters carrying ARVN soldiers had been downed. Intermediate ARVN commanders refused to act. Finally ARVN paratroopers, hoping to contain the Communist forces, dropped into the battle zone, but they landed on the west side rather than on the east side of Ap Bac, as Vann intended. As in October, the greatly outnumbered Communist troops outfought ARVN forces, and when nighttime covered their movements, they simply escaped. Miscommunication, perhaps intended, compounded the negative consequences of the battle. General Paul Harkins, then the senior-ranking military officer in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN,
South Vietnam) and commander of the United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), claimed that the mission was a success because Ap Bac had been secured, although he neglected to mention that this occurred after the VC enemy had escaped the ARVN’s blunder-filled attack. However, reporters David Halberstam, Neil Sheehan, and Malcolm Brown, covering the battle at the site, revealed what they observed to be a debacle. They reported that even with the assistance of American technology and planning, the ARVN was still an inferior fighting force. Although the Communist forces lost 18 men killed and 39 wounded that day, the ARVN suffered about 80 dead and more than 100 wounded. Rather than demonstrating a strengthening ARVN as officials had hoped, the Battle of Ap Bac became emblematic of that army’s difficulties. Furthermore, in mishandling communications about this event, the U.S. military severely damaged its credibility with the press, a problem that increased as the war continued. CHARLES J. GASPAR See also Halberstam, David; Harkins, Paul Donal; Mekong Delta; Sheehan, Cornelius Mahoney; Taylor-McNamara Report; Vann, John Paul
Arc Light Missions References Halberstam, David. The Making of a Quagmire: America and Vietnam during the Kennedy Era. Rev. ed. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. Sheehan, Neil. A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam. New York: Random House, 1988. Toczek, David M. The Battle of Ap Bac, Vietnam: They Did Everything but Learn from It. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007.
Ap Bia Mountain, Battle of See Hamburger Hill, Battle of
Arc Light Missions Start Date: 1965 End Date: 1973 General term and code name for U.S. Air Force Boeing B-52 Stratofortress operations in Vietnam flown out of Guam and Thailand during the period June 18, 1965, to August 15, 1973. Arc Light missions were flown above 30,000 feet in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) and Laos in support of ground troops or to interdict Communist infiltration. In the 1950s when the earliest versions of the B-52 “Buffs” were being incorporated into the primary nuclear strike force of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), they were not designed to carry conventional iron bombs. When in 1965 President Lyndon Johnson committed U.S. air forces to the Vietnam War, however, it became clear that nuclear weapons would not be used. Thus, in a program dubbed Project Big Belly, all B-52Ds and one B-52F, which flew the majority of Arc Light sorties, were modified to enable each to carry nearly 30 tons of conventional bombs. Arc Light operations were most often close air support carpet bombing raids of Communist base camps, troop concentrations, and/or supply lines. These were unusual close air support operations in that they were carried out at high altitudes by strategic bombers, but they were welcomed by the ground forces, who called the raids “aerial excavations.” The majority of Arc Light sorties were flown south of the 17th Parallel, particularly before 1966. Only 141 missions were flown in the northern region, most near the demilitarized zone (DMZ). One of the most famous southern operations came during the 1968 People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) siege of the U.S. Marine Corps base at Khe Sanh. The two most famous B-52 operations in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) were the 1972 LINEBACKER I and II operations, but these were not Arc Light strikes.
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On June 28, 1965, 27 B-52Fs of the 7th and 320th Bomb Wings in Guam made the first Arc Light raid against a Viet Cong (VC) jungle redoubt. No VC were killed, and two B-52s were lost in a midair collision. Eight of the 12 crew members died. One newspaper report later compared Arc Light to a housewife “swatting flies with a sledge-hammer.” Nonetheless, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), commander General William Westmoreland was convinced of the B-52s’ potential effectiveness, but he had no role in planning or commanding air strikes against North Vietnam. From June through December 1965, the 7th, 320th, and 454th Bomb Wings flew more than 100 missions. Most were saturation attacks, but some were tactical support missions, such as for the U.S. Marine Corps’ Operation HARVEST MOON and the U.S. Army’s Ia Drang Valley operations. These initial missions were flown with F-model B-52s that could carry 51 750-pound bombs, 27 internally and 24 externally on the wings. The need for greater payload led to the initiation of the aforementioned Big Belly program for B-52Ds. The program increased internal 500-pound bomb capacity from 27 to 84 and 750-pound bomb capacity from 27 to 42. Concurrently, they still carried 24 500-pound or 750-pound bombs externally. Between April 12 and 16, 1966, B-52s raided outside South Vietnam for the first time when they bombed the Mu Gia Pass in Laos to stop PAVN infiltrations. Later they also attacked PAVN infiltration routes along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. In 1966 they dropped an average of 8,000 bombs a month and flew 5,000 sorties. In this period the Buffs flew out of Andersen Air Force Base, Guam. By April the B-52Fs had been replaced by the Big Belly B-52Ds of the 28th and 484th Bomb Wings. That summer SAC units also began arriving in Thailand for operations from U-Tapao Airfield. In early April 1967, B-52s began Arc Light operations from UTapao. On September 13, 1967, the final modified B-52D arrived at Guam. By the end of the year, B-52 units in Southeast Asia had been augmented by elements of the 306th, 91st, 22nd, 454th, 461st, and 99th Bomb Wings. Operations in support of U.S. marines at Khe Sanh began in late January 1968, and even though the siege ended in early April, B-52s continued to pound areas in northern South Vietnam throughout the year. Targets of particular importance included the A Shau Valley, the Kontum–Dak To triborder area, and the PAVN/VC infiltration area in southeastern War Zone C (the Cambodian border nearest Saigon). During the fighting at Khe Sanh, crews used ground-based radar to direct their aircraft to the targets. The attacks on PAVN supply and troop concentrations were one of the greatest Arc Light successes. During the battle the Buffs dropped some 60,000–75,000 tons of bombs, most of them 500- and 750-pounders. Even though President Johnson halted the bombing of North Vietnam in March 1968, numerous B-52 strikes continued throughout 1969 in South Vietnam. With the election of Richard M. Nixon as president, raids increased. In January 1969 U-Tapao was converted from a forward operating base to a main operating base. In
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Arc Light Missions
Bombs are loaded aboard a U.S. Strategic Air Command B-52 Stratofortress aircraft participating in Arc Light strikes over South Vietnam, December 1972. (Department of Defense)
1970 Nixon’s Vietnamization program led to a reduction of Arc Light raids. Even so, significant missions were flown against Laotian infiltration routes and Cambodian supply dumps, base areas, and troop concentrations. From November 1969 to April 1970, B-52s flew in Operation COMMANDO HUNT III in Laos. In April and May they supported ground operations in both Laos and Cambodia. In 1972 in an effort to stem the tide of the PAVN’s Easter Offensive and to force North Vietnam and the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (National Liberation Front [NLF]) back to the Paris peace talks, Nixon twice ordered B-52 raids on Hanoi and Hai Phong. LINEBACKER I lasted from May 10 to October 23, 1972, and was composed of raids on infiltration routes and some attacks on Hanoi and Haiphong. LINEBACKER II lasted from December 18 to 29, 1972, and focused on 24 military targets including rail yards, shipyards, communications facilities, power plants, railway bridges, MiG bases, air defense radars, antiaircraft artillery (AAA) sites, and surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites. B-52s accounted for 15,000 of the 20,370 tons of bombs dropped. SAMs
downed 15 B-52s. Of the 92 downed crew members, 26 were rescued, 33 bailed out and were captured, 29 were listed as missing, and 4 were killed. On December 30, 1972, Hanoi agreed to return to negotiations (resumed on January 8, 1973), which concluded with the Paris Peace Accords of January 27, 1973. Because of cease-fire violations in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, B-52 raids continued until August 15, when the last Arc Light raid was carried out over targets in Cambodia. Between June 18, 1965, and August 15, 1973, SAC scheduled 126,663 B-52 combat sorties, of which 126,615 were launched. Of these, 125,479 actually reached their targets and 124,532 released their bombs. More than 55 percent of these sorties were flown over South Vietnam, 27 percent over Laos, 12 percent over Cambodia, and only 6 percent over North Vietnam. Altogether, the U.S. Air Force lost 31 B-52s, 18 to enemy fire over North Vietnam and 13 due to operational problems. WILLIAM P. HEAD
Armored Personnel Carriers See also Aircraft, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Airpower, Role in War; HARVEST MOON, Operation; Ia Drang, Battle of; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; LINEBACKER I, Operation; LINEBACKER II, Operation; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Westmoreland, William Childs References Berger, Carl, ed. The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, 1961– 1973: An Illustrated Account. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1977. Hopkins, J. C., and Sheldon A. Goldberg. The Development of the Strategic Air Command, 1946–1986: The Fortieth Anniversary History. Offutt Air Force Base, NE: Office of the Historian, Headquarters Strategic Air Command, 1986. Schlight, John. The War in South Vietnam: The Years of the Offensive, 1965–1968. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1988. Tilford, Earl H., Jr. Setup: What the Air Force Did in Vietnam and Why. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1991. U.S. Air Force Special Study, Headquarters Strategic Air Command. Activity Input to Project Corona Harvest–Arc Light Operations, 1 Jan 65–31 Mar 68. 3 vols. (declassified May 31, 1990). Omaha: Strategic Air Command, Offutt Air Force Base, 1990.
Armored Personnel Carriers Armored vehicles that are used for transporting personnel and equipment. Despite an operational terrain consisting largely of
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jungles, rice paddies, and mountains, armored personnel carriers (APCs) were widely and successfully employed in Vietnam. Based on studies conducted by the Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG), two companies of APCs were organized in April 1962 and assigned to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) 7th and 21st Infantry Divisions, operating in the Mekong Delta. By January 1968 more than 2,100 APCs were operating with ARVN and American units. Most APCs in Vietnam were variants of the M-113, which became the most successful and widely used APC in the non-Communist world. The M-113 was first introduced in 1960 to replace the bulky post–Korean War M-59. Designed to carry 11 infantrymen plus a driver, the M-113 was constructed from aluminum armor welded over a watertight hull. Its 1.5- to 1.75-inch armor provided ballistic protection only from shell fragments, flash burns, and small-arms fire of less than .50 caliber. The M-113 was not intended as a fighting platform; instead, it was designed to carry troops to the point of combat, where they would dismount and fight, supported by the APC’s machine gun. Thus, the M-113 was a personnel carrier rather than a true infantry fighting vehicle (IFV). The first version of the M-113 was powered by a gasoline engine. Gasoline is a highly combustible fuel, and this soon caused serious problems in combat. In 1964 the U.S. Army introduced the M-113A1 with a diesel engine. The new engine not only reduced the combustible fuel hazard but also increased the M-113’s
U.S. infantrymen and M-113 armored personnel carriers in a jungle clearing three miles inside Cambodia, May 2, 1970. (AP/Wide World Photos)
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Armored Personnel Carriers
Characteristics of Armored Personnel Carriers Used during the Vietnam War Model M-113 M-113A1 M-114A1 M-125A1 M-106A1 M-577A1 LVTP-5
Type APC APC Carrier Carrier Carrier Carrier Landing
Post Tracked ACAV Recon Mortar Mortar Command Vehicle Variant
Personnel Gross Weight (pounds)
Height (inches)
Width (inches)
Length (inches)
Crew
22,900 24,238 15,276 24,527 26,147 24,570 65,563
86.5 86.5 84.9 86.5 86.5 101.0 115.7
106.00 106.00 91.75 106.00 106.00 106.00 141.30
191.5 191.5 175.75 191.5 191.5 191.5 358.1
1+11 1+11 3 6 6 1+7 3+34
cruising range by 50 percent. With its watertight hull, the M-113 was designed to be amphibious. The front of the vehicle was fitted with a hinged breakwater plate (called a trim vane) that maintained the vehicle’s balance in water. In actual operations, conditions had to be almost perfect for the M-113 to swim properly. Swamped M-113s were not uncommon. Most of the M-113 variants were based on the M-113A1. Worldwide, more than 150 variants of the M-113 appeared. Those most commonly used in Vietnam included the M-125A1, a self-propelled platform for an 81-millimeter (mm) mortar; the M-106A1, a self-propelled 4.2-inch mortar; and the M-132, a self-propelled flamethrower that GIs called the “Zippo.” Another variant was the M-577A1 command post carrier. The M-577 had a large armored box added just behind the driver’s compartment to provide 15 inches of additional headroom. Equipped with extra radios but no armament, M-577s were used as mobile command posts, fire direction centers, and even ambulances. Several other APC models saw service in Vietnam. The much smaller M-114A1 was intended as a reconnaissance vehicle. It was underpowered and too light and was withdrawn from service after only a few years. The thin-skinned M-548 tracked cargo carrier was based on the M-113 drive train. In the northern region of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), the U.S. Marine Corps used its huge LVTP-5 (Landing Vehicle, Tracked, Personnel) as an APC. When the troops in Vietnam received a newly issued M-113, they immediately began making their own modifications. First to go were the rubber mud guards that covered the upper half of the road wheels and tracks. These made repairing the tracks quickly in difficult situations more difficult. Next, troop seats were ripped out and replaced with more practical wooden benches. The insides of the benches were used to store ammunition, C-rations, and personal gear. The most significant local modifications to the M-113 was the armored cavalry assault vehicle (ACAV). This included mounting an armor shield in front of the .50-caliber M2 machine gun and installing extra plating around the gunner’s cupola. All APCs were supposed to carry an extra 7.62-mm M60 machine gun inside the vehicle for the troops to use while dismounted. That machine gun was mounted behind a small armor plate on one side of the top
deck cargo hatch. Another M60 was mounted on the other side of the hatch. Thus, with the ACAV, the M-113 evolved into the IFV that it was never intended to be. At first the Viet Cong (VC) and the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) did not know how to engage the APCs, but they learned quickly. Weapons of choice against the M-113 were the 57-mm and later the 75-mm recoilless rifle, the RPG-2 (rocket-propelled grenade) and later the more powerful RPG-7, and the antivehicular mine. All of these could easily destroy or cripple an M-113 with a solid hit. If an M-113 was hit by an RPG or if it hit a mine, the chances were very slim that anyone inside the vehicle would survive. Anyone riding on top of the vehicle had a better chance of surviving, as the full impact of an RPG blast was directed into the vehicle. If the APC hit a mine, those on top stood a good chance of being thrown clear. Thus, almost all the pictures of APCs in Vietnam show the troops riding on the top, preferring to take their chances with small-arms fire. Usually only the driver rode inside. Casualty rates for drivers were high. In the final analysis the M-113 did not provide very much protection, but it did offer significant increases in firepower, speed, and mobility. Soldiers in the mechanized infantry and armored cavalry units grew very attached to their own APCs, which they called “tracks.” Crews often painted wild designs on their APCs, reminiscent of World War II aircraft nose art. Improved versions of the M-113 remained in service in the U.S. Army until the 1990s, when they were replaced by the M-2 Bradley IFV. In many other Western armies, M-113 and M-113 variants have remained in service into the 21st century. DAVID T. ZABECKI See also Armored Warfare References Crimson, Fred W. U.S. Military Tracked Vehicles. Osceola, WI: Motor Books International, 1992. Stanton, Shelby L. Vietnam Order of Battle. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2003. Starry, Donn A. Mounted Combat in Vietnam. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1978.
Armored Warfare
Fuel
Max Speed (miles per hour)
Cruising Range (miles)
Vertical Obstacle (inches)
Trench (inches)
Gas Diesel Gas Diesel Diesel Diesel Gas
40 40 36 40 40 35 28
200 300 300 300 300 300 185
24 24 18 24 24 24 36
66 66 60 66 66 66 145
Armored Warfare During the Vietnam War, allied tanks were deployed both offensively and defensively. The offensive employment of allied tanks made good use of their mobility, heavy firepower, defensive armor, and shock effect. Communist tanks were deployed mostly during the conflict’s last few years and primarily in an offensive role. Initially the American military held that Vietnam was not appropriate tank country. Although some lighter combat vehicles, such as the M551 Sheridan and M50A1 Ontos, were viewed as better suited for this combat environment, the perception was eventually dispelled by the M48 Patton. Known for its jungle-busting ability, the Patton was commonly used to create paths through dense vegetation. It was also used to assault Viet Cong (VC) bunkers and grind them down beneath its tracks in a can opener–like motion. M48 crews often sandbagged the tank turrets for crew protection, and the bulldozer variant of this tank commonly had Claymore mines directly attached to its working blade for added firepower. In a counterinsurgency support role, tanks were used to help clear out Communist strong points, patrol secure areas, and engage in sweeps and ambushes. When armor went on the defensive, crews employed night laagers (defensive perimeters), with fighting positions between each vehicle that had supporting infantry—usually but not always mechanized infantry—deployed between them. The crews placed concertina wire and Claymore mines around the defensive perimeter and employed listening posts. The defenders employed harassment and interdiction (H&I) missions fired by supporting artillery to keep Communist forces off balance and away from the night laager positions. Tanks were prime targets for VC and People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) forces. They attacked tanks with mines and with rocket-propelled grenades, recoilless rifles, Sagger antitank missiles, satchel charges, or antitank grenades. Land mines were the principal cause of U.S. armor losses in Vietnam and were placed in roads, possible routes of advance, and likely night laager positions. Consequently, armor units did not normally use the same static position two nights in a row. Mines ranged from TNT demolition blocks and converted dud
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Main Armament
Secondary Armament
1x .50 machine gun 1x .50 machine gun 4.2'' mortar 1x 7.62-mm machine gun 1x .50 machine gun 81-mm mortar None
1x 7.62-mm machine gun 2x 7.62-mm machine gun 1x .50 machine gun None 2x 7.62-mm machine gun 1x .50 machine gun None
bombs to conventional Soviet and Chinese antitank munitions. Although crews of the heavy M48 had a good chance of surviving a mine detonation, crews of lighter armored vehicles had a much lower survival rate. Attacks on tanks with rocket-propelled grenades—Soviet RPG2 (Vietnamese B40) and RPG7V (Vietnamese B41)—were a common problem, especially when the tanks were in static positions. Crews soon discovered that regular cyclone fencing would defeat both of these grenades. The RPG2 would prematurely detonate, while RPG7 detonation circuitry would be rendered inert from the initial impact with the fencing. A second fencing screen was usually established by command elements to protect vehicles in static positions.
M50 Ontos antitank tracked and light-armored vehicles deploy from landing craft on Chu Lai beach in South Vietnam in 1965 during the Vietnam War. (National Archives)
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Army Concept Team in Vietnam
The first use of a Sagger (9M14M Malyukta) antitank guided missile in Vietnam occurred in April 1972 when one destroyed an Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) M48A3. Armor units soon learned how to counter this missile by firing at the gray plume of smoke at the launch site to make the gunner, who controlled the wire-guided missile with a joystick, flinch and miss the target. In the meantime, the crew of the target vehicle counted to five and maneuvered it violently in hopes of disrupting the missile’s flight path. ARVN crews also sought to confuse the missile’s control system by throwing flares. Tank crews used two methods to repel suicide groups with satchel charges or antitank grenades. The first was the lobbing of a so-called tanker’s grenade—two pounds of TNT wrapped with barbed wire or chain—over the side. The other was back-scratching, the firing of small-caliber weapons by one tank at a buttonedup tank that had come under assault. Armor was never considered a strong point for North Vietnamese forces. PAVN tank crews tended to be undertrained, and in any case their tanks were inferior to their U.S. counterparts. The optic systems in the T-54 and T-55, for example, were inferior to that of the M-48. In 1972 in Quang Tri, an M-48 scored a hit on one at a range of nearly 1.5 miles. The side-mounted gasoline tanks and ammunition storage of the T-54 and T-55 were also vulnerable to enemy fire. Furthermore, PAVN tanks were not initially well integrated with infantry and artillery units. This was in direct contrast to such highly decorated allied units as the U.S. Army’s Company A, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor Regiment. Prior to 1973 Communist armor forces were seen only sporadically in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) and Laos, and the tank employed tended to be the light PT-76 amphibious tank, which was an excellent design. Tanks did prove critical to the Communist victories at the Lang Vei Special Forces camp in February 1968 and at Landing Zone 31, north of A Luoi, during Operation LAM SON 719 in February 1971. At the Battle of An Loc during the 1972 Easter Offensive, however, the PAVN employed approximately 100 tanks, 80 of which they lost. These fell prey to ARVN tank-hunter teams, armed with M72 light antitank weapons (LAWs), and allied air assets. Farther to the north during the Battle of Kontum, tube-fired optically tracked wire-guided (TOW) missiles, mounted on Bell UH-1B Iroquois (“Huey”) helicopters, only recently deployed, registered a remarkable number of kills. With the U.S. military withdrawal from Vietnam in January 1973, military and material support for ARVN forces began to evaporate. With fuel, ammunition, and spare parts dwindling, ARVN armor forces became nothing more than a hollow shell confined to motor parks. In the final 1975 offensive, PAVN armor units, now better trained and integrated with infantry and artillery, proved integral in the swift conquest of South Vietnam. ROBERT J. BUNKER
See also An Loc, Battle of; Easter Offensive; Grenade Launchers; LAM SON 719, Operation; Mine Warfare, Land; Tanks, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam References Dunstan, Simon. Vietnam Tracks: Armor in Battle, 1945–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1982. Hay, John H. Tactical and Materiel Innovations. U.S. Army Vietnam Studies Series. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974. Pimlott, J. C. “Armour in Vietnam.” In Armoured Warfare, edited by J. P. Harris and F. H. Toase, 145–157. New York: St. Martin’s, 1990. Starry, Donn A. Armored Combat in Vietnam. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1980. Zumbro, Ralph. Tank Sergeant. New York: Pocket Books, 1988. Willbanks, James H. The Battle of An Loc. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005.
Army Concept Team in Vietnam When the Tactical Mobility Requirements Board (also known as the Howze Board, named for its chair, Major General Hamilton H. Howze) in August 1962 recommended new airmobile units, air mobility was still unproven. Secretary of the Army Cyrus R. Vance prevailed on Brigadier General Edward L. Rowny to take a team to Vietnam to explore ways to improve counterinsurgency warfare. Rowny drafted his own charter that required his team of 30 military and 25 civilian personnel to evaluate “new or improved operational and organizational concepts, doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures, and to gain further information on materiel.” Although the major emphasis was on air mobility, the Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV) also examined armor, communications, logistics, civic action, and even scout dogs and snipers. Knowing ACTIV’s interest in air mobility, the U.S. Air Force opposed its mission because air mobility would impinge on its troop transport and close air support missions. ACTIV first experimented with armed Bell UH-1 Iroquois (“Huey”) helicopters. Hueys armed with rockets and machine guns were found to be essential in escorting Piasecki H-21 Shawnee helicopters loaded with Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) troops and in providing suppressive fire at landing zones (LZs). Hueys were survivable in combat and could also be used for reconnaissance and surveillance. ACTIV also found Hueys to be acceptable troop carriers and useful for night illumination. Tests of the U.S. Army’s armed Grumman OV-1 Mohawks, allowed by the U.S. Air Force to fire only defensively, found that their infrared, radar, and photography capabilities could provide effective intelligence on the Viet Cong (VC). ACTIV tested the De Havilland CV-2 Caribou light transport plane in various modes. It was found to be adaptable in radio relay,
Arnett, Peter command and control, air support operations, and troop carrier, low-level extraction, and general supply functions. A short takeoff and landing (STOL) aircraft, the Caribou could fly into 77 percent of all landing strips in Vietnam, whereas the U.S. Air Force Chase/ Fairchild C-123 Provider could use only 11 percent of them. In 1966 the army gave up the armed Mohawks and Caribous to the air force in return for the latter dropping its opposition to the armed helicopter. ACTIV also tested Boeing CH-47 Chinook helicopters armed with various machine guns and grenade launchers. The 1st Cavalry troops liked its massive firepower, but the army decided that it needed the Chinook more for lift capability. Experiments conducted by ACTIV improved counterinsurgency warfare in Vietnam and also contributed to the development of air mobility concepts in the army in the United States. JOHN L. BELL JR. See also Air Mobility; Aircraft, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Helicopters, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Helicopters, Employment of, in Vietnam; Vance, Cyrus Roberts References Krepinevich, Andrew F., Jr. The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. Rowny, Edward L. It Takes One to Tango. Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1992. Tolson, John J. Airmobility, 1961–1971. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1973.
Army of the Republic of Vietnam See Vietnam, Republic of, Army
Arnett, Peter Birth Date: November 13, 1934 Acclaimed foreign correspondent and television journalist who covered much of the Vietnam War. Born on November 13, 1934, in Riverton, New Zealand, Peter Arnett left college to become a journalist. Subsequently he worked for newspapers in New Zealand and Australia. On June 26, 1962, the Associated Press sent Arnett to Saigon. In August of that year near the Mekong Delta he first witnessed combat, an experience that led him to question U.S. involvement in the war. Arnett’s coverage of the Vietnam War established him as a high-profile reporter. His commitment to get the real story, no matter the danger, won him the admiration of his peers and the respect of soldiers. Journalist David Halberstam once remarked that Arnett was the “gutsiest” man he had ever known and was a consummate combat reporter.
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Arnett’s candor created controversy, however. In 1963 Premier Ngo Dinh Diem, who was upset with Arnett’s coverage of the treatment of Buddhist monks by the government of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), threatened him with expulsion from the country. On July 23, 1963, members of the South Vietnamese secret police accosted Arnett on a Saigon street and began to beat him; a colleague intervened, saving Arnett from possible serious injury. The Diem regime then demanded that Arnett leave the country; only after the John F. Kennedy administration intervened on his behalf was he allowed to remain in South Vietnam. Arnett’s forthright style also caused tension with the U.S. military establishment. On several occasions officials attempted to convince him to report a more sanitized version of the war. Because he refused to compromise the accuracy of his stories, Arnett was targeted by the Lyndon B. Johnson administration for surveillance. Military officials also sought to limit his access to combat, but Arnett’s many connections with men in the field negated those efforts. Arnett developed a penchant for covering difficult and revealing stories. In 1966 his dedication earned him a Pulitzer Prize for International Reporting. During the 1968 Tet Offensive he reported the now-infamous statement of an American officer who said that U.S. forces had to destroy the village of Ben Tre in order to save it. That same year Arnett quoted John Paul Vann, U.S. chief of the civilian pacification program, who opined that the initial U.S. troop withdrawals from Vietnam would consist of “nonessentials.” That statement led readers to question the veracity of the Richard M. Nixon administration’s promised troop reductions. In 1972 Arnett witnessed the release of the first American prisoners of war in Hanoi, and in 1975 he covered the fall of Saigon to Communist forces. Arnett believes that newsmen do not deserve much of the negative criticism they have received for their coverage of the war. He maintains that journalists merely reported the events and did not make policy decisions. In 1981 Arnett joined the Cable Network News (CNN); he was with the network until 1999. During the 1991 Persian Gulf War he became well known for his “Live from Baghdad” reports. In the opening hours of the war he was the only Western reporter airing live as air raid sirens blared in the background and bombs exploded in the distance. Later Arnett’s reports on civilian casualties in Iraq earned him the enmity of the U.S. military and the White House. Two weeks after the war began, Arnett conducted an uncensored interview with Iraqi president Saddam Hussein. Arnett also secured the first-ever television interview with Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, which took place in eastern Afghanistan in late March 1997. In late 2001 Arnett reported on the war in Afghanistan (Operation ENDURING FREEDOM) for HDNet. Two years later, reporting for National Geographic and NBC television, Arnett covered the beginning of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, which ousted Hussein from power. Arnett again sparked controversy after giving an interview to statecontrolled Iraqi television. After being dismissed by both NBC and
66
Arnheiter, Marcus Aurelius
Acclaimed war correspondent Peter Arnett talks with an Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) soldier in South Vietnam, October 1965. (AP/Wide World Photos)
National Geographic, Arnett became a correspondent for the British tabloid Daily Mirror, which had opposed the invasion of Iraq. DEAN BRUMLEY AND PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR. See also Halberstam, David; Media and the Vietnam War; Ngo Dinh Diem; Vann, John Paul References Arnett, Peter. Live from the Battle Field: From Vietnam to Baghdad, 35 Years in the World’s War Zones. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994. Halberstam, David. The Best and the Brightest. New York: Random House, 1972. Prochnau, William. “If There’s a War, He’s There.” New York Times Magazine, March 3, 1991. Sheehan, Neil. A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam. New York: Random House, 1988.
Arnheiter, Marcus Aurelius Birth Date: November 8, 1925 Death Date: August 18, 2009 Controversial U.S. naval officer and commander of USS Vance from 1965 to 1966 who was relieved of his command because
of differences with his crew and his superiors. Marcus Aurelius Arnheiter, who was named after the Roman emperor and Stoic philosopher, was born on November 8, 1925, in New Jersey and raised in New York City. His grandfather, Louis van Arnheiter, was a pioneer inventor in the aeronautics industry. The younger Arnheiter attended the Millard Preparatory Academy in Washington, D.C.; Amherst College; and then the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis, from which he graduated in 1952. In the last years of the Korean War he served on the battleship Iowa and then was assigned to the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. By 1960 Arnheiter was working in the Progress Analysis Group. On December 22, 1965, as a lieutenant commander he took command of the Vance, an Edsall-class destroyer escort. The Vance had been commissioned in 1943 and had been decommissioned three years later but was refitted during 1955–1956 and recommissioned. Arnheiter, however, professed to be appalled by the condition of the ship and the apparent laxness of its crew when he took command. Indeed, he claimed that the Vance was not fit to be sent into combat off the coast of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). He stated in reports that the ship was poorly maintained and that the crew was not suitably trained or motivated for combat duty. There was also clear evidence, Arnheiter claimed, of nonrated seamen threatening, intimidating,
Art and the Vietnam War and actually attacking petty officers. However, a number of the Vance’s crew disagreed with Arnheiter’s assessment, and some of them began keeping notes of Arnheiter’s comments in what became known as the “Marcus Mad Log,” a 38-page dossier critical of Arnheiter’s command of the Vance. Assigned to support Operation MASHER (later renamed Operation WHITE WING), a combined operation by South Vietnamese, U.S., and South Korean troops to sweep through the Bong Son Plain and Kim Son Valley in January–March 1966, the Vance performed coastal patrol duties, searching small vessels off Binh Dinh Province for weapons and contraband that might be used by the Communist insurgents. On one occasion the Vance shelled a Buddhist pagoda, which Arnheiter suspected was being used by the Viet Cong (VC). The ship nearly ran aground during this action. Because the destroyer’s motor whaleboat was not fast, Arnheiter used monies set aside for crew welfare and recreation for the purchase of a new model that was faster. This was misappropriation of funds, and by now some of the crew members were complaining about Arnheiter, comparing him to Captain Queeg in Herman Wouk’s novel The Caine Mutiny. Reports of Arnheiter’s actions came to the attention of his superiors, and on March 31, 1966, when the Vance was refitting at Manila, Arnheiter was relieved of his command after just 99 days. Vice Admiral B. J. Semmes Jr., the chief of naval personnel, stated that Arnheiter was guilty of “a gross lack of judgment and inability to lead people.” Arnheiter responded by claiming that his aim had been to “prosecute the war effort wherever I could, as forcefully as I could, and that got in the way of the holiday routine I found when I came aboard.” Arnheiter demanded that a court-martial be convened so that he could clear his name, but the navy refused, and he then left the service. The Arnheiter Affair, as the entire incident became known, was well covered in the press at the time and received much more publicity after the publication of The Arnheiter Affair by journalist Neil Sheehan in December 1971. In February 1972 Arnheiter launched legal proceedings against Sheehan and Random House, the book’s publisher, as well as the New York Times, which had printed a long account of the story in August 1968. None of the suits were successful. The Vance was decommissioned for a second time in 1969 and was struck from the U.S. Navy list on June 1, 1975. Arnheiter retired to Santa Rosa, California, shunning all publicity. He died in Novato, California, on August 18, 2009. JUSTIN J. CORFIELD See also MASHER/WHITE WING, Operation References “The Arnheiter Incident.” Time Magazine, December 1, 1967, 18–19. Regan, Geoffrey. The Brassey’s Book of Naval Blunders. London: André Deutsch, 2001. Sheehan, Neil. The Arnheiter Affair. New York: Random House, 1971.
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Art and the Vietnam War Following the formal U.S. commitment of troops to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) in March 1965, artists in New York collectively known as the Artists and Writers Protest (AWP) group published on April 18, 1965, the first of two openletter advertisements in the New York Times intended to arouse the attention of the art community. Similarly, the Artists Protest Committee in Los Angeles began orchestrating a series of socalled whiteout demonstrations in front of local museums to close down the galleries. This same committee would later oversee the construction of the Peace Tower on a vacant lot in downtown Los Angeles. Designed by Mark di Suvero and erected with the help of Mel Edwards, the tower was decorated with 400 uniformly sized panels contributed by artists from around the world and was intended to stand from February 26, 1966, until the end of the war. More than 600 artists gathered during January 29–February 5, 1967, for Angry Arts Week, a series of well-received dance, art, film, poetry, and music exhibitions that served as the catalyst to help launch a more comprehensive protest movement among the artists. Included in the exhibition was the 10-foot by 150-foot Collage of Indignation, a collaborative work of more than 150 artists organized by critics Dore Ashton and Max Kozloff at the New York University Student Center. Although such nascent attempts at protest succeeded in arousing the public consciousness, the art itself was a popular expression of revulsion against the Vietnam War. While the desire to speak out against the war quickly surfaced within the artistic community, the artists themselves had not yet perfected a means of expressing externally through art their outrage and opposition to the American involvement in Vietnam. Imbued with the selfreflective values that governed the predominant pop, minimalist, kinetic, and abstract art movements of the time, artists in 1967 had rarely touched on social issues, for the artists themselves had been convinced early on that political art was old-fashioned, and few possessed the prescience to break from this dominant view. As it would do in many other aspects of American life, however, the Vietnam War sparked a revolution of sorts within the art world and marked the return of political art. Although the general climate in the art world of the 1960s refrained from touching upon social issues, a few striking individuals, most notably Wally Hedrick, began producing serious responses to the Vietnam conflict as early as the late 1950s. A veteran of the Korean War, Hedrick was knowledgeable of the troubles brewing in Vietnam under the French and U.S. presence throughout the 1950s. Hedrick’s 1963 Anger/Madame Nhu’s BarB-Q detailed a black sun with a brown penis penetrating into a red vagina, readable as a heart and a mushroom cloud; in addition, the piece bears the inscription “Madam Nhu Blows Chiang.” A reaction to both the self-immolation of Vietnamese Buddhist monks and the American presence, Hedrick’s early works more closely resemble the grotesque expressions of rage common to the late 1960s, particularly evidenced in the works of Peter Saul.
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Art and the Vietnam War
Such productions were exceptions rather than the rule, however, as artists continued to focus on group antiwar actions. On April 2, 1969, the Art Workers Coalition (AWC) and the AWP engineered a “Mass Antiwar Mail-In” in which mailable artworks, including a papier-mâché bomb, were marched in procession down to the Canal Street Post Office in New York and mailed to Washington. Public artistic activities, known as “Events” or “Happenings,” also became popular during the war, especially under the guise of the Guerrilla Art Action Group (GAAG). The group, which consisted mainly of Jon Hendricks and Jean Toche, often performed unannounced. In October 1969 Hendricks and Toche entered the Museum of Modern Art and replaced Malevich’s White on White with a manifesto denouncing poverty, war, and the enjoyment of art during wartime. At the Whitney Museum of American Art in November 1969 the two again dropped a list of written demands on the floor while ripping at each other’s clothes and screaming “Rape!” By 1969 artists were beginning to produce individual pieces of protest. One of the more powerful pieces done in this early period was Jasper Johns’s subtly critical poster Moratorium (1969). The work, which consisted of black stars and stripes on an orange and green field with a bullet hole in the middle, stood in stark contrast to the respected flag series that Johns had done in the late 1950s. In Moratorium the colors produce an afterimage of the American flag, with the bullet hole possibly referencing lines from a poem by Yevgeny Yevtushenko: “The stars / in your flag America / are like bullet holes.” Numerous other artists also began to utilize the poster as a means of criticism. Between 1965 and 1973 an estimated 20,000 to 40,000 posters of protest were produced. One of the allures of political protest posters was their visibility, as issues too controversial for media coverage could be expressed in these works. Among the more successful poster images to emerge from this period was one produced by the AWC’s Poster Committee titled Q: And Babies? A: And Babies (1970). Picturing Ronald Haeberle’s graphic color photo of the My Lai Massacre and titled after a Mike Wallace interview with My Lai participant Paul Meadlo, this collaborative effort by Irving Petlin, Jon Hendricks, and Fraser Dougherty was reproduced more than 50,000 times, showing up in all parts of the world. In 1972 a second version of Q: And Babies? surfaced again, although this time with the caption changed to “Four More Years?” in reference to President Richard Nixon’s reelection campaign. Similarly, by the early 1960s artists were also beginning to incorporate war images into paintings, as evidenced by James Rosenquist’s gigantic 10-foot by 86-foot F-111 (1965). Trained as a billboard painter in Times Square, Rosenquist completed F-111 in 1964, just as U.S. involvement in the war was escalating. Although F-111 was not initially viewed in an antiwar context, Rosenquist himself admitted in a 1994 interview with Craig Adcock that the Vietnam War influenced this particular work. The painting contrasts the dominant image of the U.S. Air Force fighter-bomber of the same name against a montage that includes a mushroom cloud shaded by a beach umbrella, a small girl seated under a hair
dryer, a large Firestone tire preparing to crush a light bulb, an angel food cake, and bubbles from a scuba diver. In addition, the red tip of the plane penetrates into a field of spaghetti and tomato sauce; the reference to entrails is clearly visible. The “gulp” of bubbles, according to the artist himself, represents the “gulp” of the atomic explosion represented by the mushroom cloud. Moreover, the inclusion of the little girl points out that some little girls could live in style because other little girls were going to be burned alive. Rosenquist’s 1968–1969 Horse Blinders dealt with the war as well. In the same 1994 interview the artist stated that Blinders “dealt with the idea of painting in the dark, like those people who wouldn’t believe the newspaper accounts of what was happening in Vietnam.” F-111 and Horse Blinders represent a powerful critique against both the war and the U.S. military-industrial complex of the 1960s. Other large works, known as “installations,” also began to emerge in the 1960s. Claes Oldenburg’s sarcastic Lipstick Monument (1969), a 24-foot-high red and gold lipstick mounted on a red tractor tank, served as a biting commentary on how the American munitions industry maintained the affluence of the 1960s. Duane Hanson’s installation, known as War or Vietnam Scene (1969), presented the gross brutality of war by contrasting realistic scenes of mud-caked and bloody dead and wounded American soldiers against the clean white galleries. Ed Kienholz also contributed two major installations, the first of which was The Portable War Memorial (1968). On the left side of the work, a television showing the classic “I Want You” Uncle Sam poster provides the background for a group of Iwo Jima soldiers raising the American flag over an overturned café chair. The café furniture serves to link the war side of the work with the peace side, a hot dog and chili stand emerging from a blackboard containing the names of some 475 extinct countries. Moreover, the two scenes are further linked by a tombstone cross in the middle of the work that commemorates “V__ Day, 19__.” A young smiling couple sits at the hot dog stand, oblivious to the action. Kienholz’s other piece, The Eleventh Hour Final (1968), denounced the media’s rosy approach to the Vietnam conflict, especially criticizing the daily body count numbers that had become a staple of the evening news. In an average American TV room replete with coffee table, TV Guide, remote control, flowers, ashtray, and wood paneling, a television encased in a tombstone displays the daily body count numbers over the watchful eyes of an Asian child. The remote control stretches to the couch, implicating the viewer in the carnage on the television. Along with the numbers of enemy and allied deaths, on-thescene reporters in South Vietnam brought home images of combat and war. Leon Golub, whose wife Nancy Spero was instrumental in championing the cause of the woman artist in her spectacular and powerful Bombs and Helicopter series, had been incorporating these scenes of combat into his works since the early 1960s. Heavily influenced by classical mythology, Golub in the earlier part of the decade had painted large scenes of monstrous nude he-
Art and the Vietnam War
Excerpt of a lithograph by James Rosenquist titled F-111, 1974. Vietnam War images increasingly found their way into art in the 1960s and 1970s. (© James Rosenquist/Licensed by VAGA, New York, NY/ www.vagarights.com)
roic figures engaged in battle in his Gigantomachy series. In 1969 Golub did a variation on this theme, draping molten-looking paint across the chest of a fallen wounded giant; Golub subsequently titled the work Napalm (I). Beginning in 1972 Golub expanded on this theme in his Assassins series, later titled the Vietnam series for timelessness. Consisting of three oversized canvases, the Vietnam series represented a modernization of sorts for the classical Golub. Whereas previously his antique figures were nude and somewhat abstract, the figures here were clothed in modern military garb. Moreover, the gestures, stances, and bodies of the figures moved toward naturalism. Influenced by media photos and military handbooks, Golub even included machine guns and an armored car in his works. To depict the savage brutality of war, Golub began manipulating his canvases. His practice of scraping paint from and into the canvas not only conveyed a sense of time passing yet going nowhere but also showed how his surfaces endure, like ruins. In addition, Golub cut large chunks out of his canvases to demonstrate the savage brutality of war. Throughout the Vietnam series Golub painted with reds, blacks, browns, grays, and beiges to resemble hell on earth; that the soldiers fight shiftless (because of the heat) and that their guns are “nasty pointy things” reinforce this image. The empty background invokes the feeling of timelessness and space, as all that exists is merely a dragging, relentless now. Although the first two works in the series depict actual battle scenes as American soldiers massacre unarmed, horrified, and naked Vietnamese civilians, there still remains a curi-
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ous timelessness as Golub depicts the moments before the conflict when the impending violence is being drifted into, just as the U.S. gradually drifted into Vietnam. The void between the Americans and the Vietnamese in the paintings further heightens the sense of blankness and desperation, so clearly manifested in the screaming and bewildered head of the Vietnamese boy staring out at the viewer in Golub’s 1973 Vietnam (II). Peter Saul took a somewhat different approach. His work was geared more toward shocking the passing viewer into disapprobation through a series of graphic pictorial state-of-emergency addresses. Saigon (1967), one of Saul’s earliest social consciousness canvases, demonstrates the artist’s affinity for racist and sexist pornography in his Vietnam paintings. The writhing and active work centers around a yellow Vietnamese whore labeled “innocent virgin.” Also included in the colorful composition are “her father,” “her mother,” and “her sister,” all of whom are grotesquely contorted and are in the act of being severely abused by American Coke-guzzling GIs. Myriad eyeballs, mines, helmets, and palm trees further confuse the canvas, with oriental inscriptions reading “White Boys Torturing and Raping the People of Saigon” and “High Class Version” rounding out the painting. Typical Saigon (1968) and Pinkville (1969–1970) present similar repulsive scenes in inexhaustible detail, for in Saul’s view, “wasting the Viet Cong or screwing their women pretty much amounted to the same thing, since the entire conflict was more of an opportunity for robust American farm boys to give their libidos healthy exercise than any serious attempt to resolve global political instability.” With equal brutality, Fantastic Justice (1968) depicts a disfigured Lyndon Johnson crucified on a yellow palm tree cross with live firecrackers inserted into his rectum. Saul felt no obligation to cater to the standards of decency but sought instead to evince the unabashed spectacle of a national consciousness focused on destruction. Sam Wiener focused not on American atrocities but instead made his appeal through American dead in his 1970 work originally titled 45,391 . . . and Counting. Simple yet haunting and moving, Wiener’s work is a small open-topped box sculpture filled with six coffins, each draped with an American flag and lined with mirrors that cause the coffins to stretch into infinity. Following U.S. involvement in Central America, this work, now titled Those Who Fail to Remember the Past Are Condemned to Repeat It, was resurrected and used in the 1980s in poster form. For many African Americans, Vietnam was somewhat of a paradox. African American troops often bore an excessive burden of the fighting. Vietnam, however, was for many the only alternative to a futureless America back home. Aware of these difficulties, African American artists spoke out against both the war and racist America. Cliff Joseph’s 1968 My Country, Right or Wrong presented black and white Americans blindfolded with American flags and drifting through a sea of bombs, bones, skulls, and blood. In the periphery of the painting a cross, the Star of David, and an upside-down flag all reference different historical and militaristic
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chauvinisms. Rupert Garcia, who guarded planes, bombs, and other munitions in Thailand in the 1960s, began painting about his experiences in the mid-1970s. Disturbed by American incursions into the affairs of Central America, Garcia produced Fenixes and another work, Prometheus under Fire, in 1984. Broken into three sections, Fenixes details a burning man, a swarm of helicopters, and the profile of a Sandinista during the Nicaraguan Revolution, giving the work a cyclical dimension that connects present and past. Michael Aschenbrenner sustained a leg injury during the Tet Offensive of 1968 near Laos, an experience that obviously affected him, as evidenced in his Damaged Bone Series: Chronicle 1968 (1982). In this work, begun in 1980 and created over a six-year period, the leg bone is represented in its many forms: broken, split, bandaged, healed, and splinted as a bow. Originally displayed in varying situations, in 1982 these pieces were consolidated into a unified 10-foot by 12-foot wall of fragments. As such, Aschenbrenner made this work into a new whole. Like Aschenbrenner’s art, works by John Wolfe do not focus so much on laying blame for his experiences as they do on the experiences themselves. This is not to say that Wolfe never incorporated atrocities into his paintings. Indeed, his 1986 piece Incident near Phu Loc details the story of three young GIs standing above a nude spread-eagled Vietnamese woman. At least one of the soldiers is contemplating raping the girl, who is bound by her pajamas; at least one other looks skeptical of the situation. Three Buddhists stand at the woman’s head proselytizing to the soldiers, while a South Vietnamese soldier arbitrates the developing confrontation. Taken as a whole, Incident near Phu Loc passes no judgment on the players involved in the drama. Instead Wolfe merely presents in unflinching sincerity events as they occurred, and events such as these are unlikely to be forgotten. Other veteran art is more gentle and even somewhat regretful. Michael Page’s wooden sculpture Pieta (1980) beautifully represents a helmeted, hooded, and despairing GI holding a dead Vietnamese baby in his arms. The work is particularly distinguished by the soldier’s face, which seems to depict the face of a man at the point of realization of what has happened, what is happening, and what lies ahead for both him and his enemies. Not all veteran art bears this self-reflective quality, however. Several Americans who participated in the war, such as Leonard Cutrow and William Linzee Prescott, were sent over as combat artists. Commissioned by the American armed forces, these men were charged with creating war images to commemorate the conflict for the armed forces museums. In response, other veterans such as Kim Jones helped “commemorate” the war on their own terms. With mud-caked boots, body-stockinged face, and a bundle of bound sticks jutting from his back and head, Jones adopts the persona of the Mudman to help the American public remember the legacy of the Vietnam War. Appearing unannounced at art galleries, public streets, and the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, the Mudman exists as the Lazarus who reminds us not
of the political maelstrom surrounding the Vietnam conflict but instead of the harsh reality that was the war, resisting any popular effort to sanitize the war in retrospect. No piece of artwork, however, better captures the spirit of conflict and controversy surrounding the war than does the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, D.C., completed in 1982. From the outset, the debate over the extent to which memorials should combine war and politics marred Maya Lin’s effort to honor American casualties of war. Indeed, the conflict grew so heated that Frederick Hart was later commissioned to supplement her work with a statue of three soldiers gazing at the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, along with an American flag on a flagpole. There is nothing heroic about the monument, and the Vietnam Veterans Memorial makes no reference to the political turmoil that clouded the era. Instead, the memorial merely honors the patriotic service of the veterans themselves. Contemplative in nature, the memorial’s main purpose is therapeutic. Thus, the artwork itself is apolitical and leaves the viewer to come to his or her own conclusions regarding the Vietnam War. JOHN GREGORY PERDUE JR. See also Film and the Vietnam Experience; Goldman, Eric Frederick; Lin, Maya Ying; Literature and the Vietnam War; Media and the Vietnam War; Vietnam Veterans Memorial References Cameron, Dan. “The Trials of Peter Saul.” Arts Magazine, January 1990. Castelli, Leo. James Rosenquist: The Big Paintings. New York: Leo Castelli Gallery, 1994. Castleman, Riva. Jasper Johns: A Print Retrospective. New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1986. Lippard, Lucy R. A Different War: Vietnam in Art. Seattle: Real Comet, 1990. Marzorati, Gerald. “Leon Golub’s Mean Streets.” ARTNews, February 1985. Mitchell, W. J. T., gen. ed. Art and the Public Sphere. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990. Norris, Margot. “Painting Vietnam Combat: The Art of Leonard Cutrow.” Michigan Quarterly Review (Spring 1989): 155–173. Safer, Morley. “Prescott’s War.” American Heritage (February–March 1991): 100–113. Walsh, Jeffrey, and James Aulich, gen. eds. Vietnam Images. New York: St. Martin’s, 1989.
Artillery, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam Artillery is called the “king of battle” and for good reason. Although it does not have the reach of aerial-delivered fire support, artillery fire is more accurate. Unless an aircraft is already orbiting onstation, artillery can deliver fire much more quickly. Artillery is far more flexible than close air support because artillery can easily shift to firing different types of ammunition. Once an aircraft is loaded and in the air, it is limited to delivering the ordnance that
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U.S. Artillery Weapons Used during the Vietnam War Model M55 quad machine gun M42A1 SP twin AA gun M101A1 towed howitzer M102 towed howitzer M108 SP howitzer M114A1 towed howitzer M109 SP howitzer M107 SP gun M110 SP howitzer
Caliber
Weight (pounds)
Projectile Weight (pounds)
Time to Emplace (minutes)
Range (meters)
Maximum Rate of Fire (rounds per minute)
.50-in 40-mm 105-mm 105-mm 105-mm 155-mm 155-mm 175-mm 8-in
3,000 48,000* 4,980 3,017 46,221* 12,950 52,461* 62,100* 58,500*
n/a 2 33 42 42 95 104 147 200
1 1 3 4 1 5 1 3 2
18,252 5,000 11,000 11,500 11,500 14,600 14,600 32,700 16,800
2,000 240 30 30 30 12 12 4.5 4.5
*Note: Total weight for self-propelled weapons includes the gun and the motor carriage.
it has on board. Because artillery is not limited by fuel capacity and on-station loiter time, it can continue to hit a target for longer periods, although in the short run aircraft can put more ordnance on the target. In addition, artillery can fire in all sorts of weather and all conditions of visibility. The U.S. Army used both towed and self-propelled artillery in Vietnam. Although all artillery cannon are generically called “guns,” the vast majority of the U.S. weapons were actually howitzers. A gun has a relatively long barrel and fires at a high velocity and a flat trajectory. A howitzer has a shorter barrel and fires at a lower velocity and a more arched trajectory. Guns are used almost exclusively as tank weapons because they are best suited for direct fire. Howitzers generally make better artillery weapons because their trajectory is better suited for indirect fire. The most widely used American artillery piece in Vietnam was the venerable M101A1 towed 105-millimeter (mm) howitzer. Based on a post–World War I design, the M101A1 was a slightly modified version of the American mainstay in World War II and the Korean War. The M101A1 is probably the most widely used artillery piece in history. Although it was finally phased out of U.S. service in the early 1990s, it had remained in the inventory of other armies into the 21st century. The M102 towed 105-mm howitzer was a completely new design particularly suited to the environment in Vietnam. As the M102 was almost a ton lighter than the M101A1, more ammunition could be carried when the gun was helicopter lifted. The M102’s much lower silhouette made it a more difficult target for enemy ground fire. Rather than being stabilized by conventional spades and trails as with the M101A1, the M102 used a firing platform mounted in the center of its undercarriage. This gave the M102 the ability to traverse 6,400 mils (360 degrees). The M101A1 could traverse only about 450 mils (25 degrees), right and left. Firing on targets outside the arc of traverse meant pulling the spades out of the ground and relaying the gun, all of which took time. The M102 was therefore capable of faster fire in many missions. The first M102s arrived in Vietnam in March 1966. The M109 155-mm howitzer is to self-propelled (SP) weapons what the M101A1 is to towed howitzers. The M109 saw its
first combat service in Vietnam and has since become the most widely used SP weapon in the world. An improved version of the M109 was the main American howitzer in the Persian Gulf War and, with upgrades, will remain in the American arsenal for many years to come. The M107 SP 175-mm gun was the only actual gun that the Americans used in Vietnam. The M107 was the longest-range artillery weapon of the war but was fairly inaccurate. The M110 SP 8-inch howitzer had the same motor carriage and gun mount as the M107. With its 200-pound shell, the M110 packed the heaviest punch of all U.S. artillery. It was also one of the most accurate artillery pieces in the world. The U.S. Army used two semiobsolete air defense systems in a ground fire role in Vietnam. The M42A1 SP twin 40-mm automatic cannon and the truck-mounted M55 .50-caliber quad machine gun were widely used for perimeter defense and convoy escort. Not in the active army inventory at the start of the war, the weapons were recalled from National Guard and Army Reserve units. During the Vietnam War, an air defense artillery battalion armed with the M42A1 “Duster” was usually augmented with an additional air defense artillery battery armed with the M55 “Quad 50.” The Viet Cong (VC) for the most part did not have conventional artillery. Generally the VC relied on mortars and rockets for fire support. Occasionally the VC used U.S.-made 75-mm pack howitzers that Communist forces had captured from the French years earlier. The People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) was well equipped with Soviet-designed artillery and some American weapons, captured either from the French or from the South Vietnamese, and those supplied by the Chinese, who had taken them from the Nationalists in the Chinese Civil War (1945– 1949). The American M101A1 was used by both sides at Dien Bien Phu. Some of the PAVN’s older Soviet-designed guns, such as the M46 and M38, were actually Chinese-made. During the early part of the Vietnam War, PAVN artillery was deployed mostly along the demilitarized zone (DMZ). Later in the war the PAVN moved more of its big guns into the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). The PAVN and the VC employed some 400 artillery pieces in their 1975 final offensive.
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At Khe Sanh, a marine throws aside an empty shell casing after having just fired a 105-mm howitzer against a nearby People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) position during the siege of the marine base, February 28, 1968. (AP/Wide World Photos)
During the final attack in the Central Highlands, PAVN artillery had a two-to-one superiority over the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army). According to an old gunner’s axiom, the shell, or projectile (called a “projo” by the cannoneers), is the real weapon of the artillery. The gun is simply the means of pointing it at the target. During the Indochina War, in 1951 French artillery fired almost half a million rounds. During the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954, Viet Minh gunners put more than 2,000 rounds a day into the French positions. In 1969 alone, U.S. artillery in Vietnam fired in excess of 10 million rounds. The basic shell for all artillery is the high-explosive (HE) round, which produces both blast and fragmentation effects, the latter usually being the most lethal to troops. Different fuses also produce different effects. The most commonly used fuse is the point detonating fuse (called “Fuze Quick”). The time fuse is used to achieve air bursts of varying heights. The fragmentation pattern from an air burst is always much more deadly than from a ground burst. The variable time fuse is a proximity fuse that produces a
65-foot-high air burst, generally considered the optimal height of burst. Concrete-piercing fuses are effective against bunkers, and delay fuses are used to penetrate thick jungle canopy. The 8-inch and 175-mm guns fired HE projectiles for the most part. The 105-mm howitzers had the widest range of ammunition types. Although not designed as an antitank gun, the 105-mm did have high-explosive antitank (HEAT) ammunition. HEAT rounds were very effective against bunkers. Other specialized shells included the smoke round, used for signaling and screening; the white phosphorus round, used for quickly establishing a smoke screen as well as for incendiary effect; and the illumination round, which deposited a parachute flare 600 feet above the target. The 105-mm howitzer also had a leaflet-scattering round, which was rarely used in Vietnam. Not used at all in Vietnam were various types of gas rounds for both the 105-mm and 155-mm guns and nuclear rounds for the 155-mm and 8-inch guns. Two new types of artillery ammunition were introduced in Vietnam; both were resurrections of old ideas wrapped in new technology. The antipersonnel round, which fired 8,000 one-inch-long steel
Artillery Fire Doctrine fléchettes, was designed to defend firebases from ground attack by firing almost point-blank into attacking enemy formations. Codenamed the “Beehive” round, it was simply a revival of the old canister round that had proved so deadly in the days of muzzle-loading smooth-bore artillery. The first major use of the Beehive round came on March 21, 1967, during the defense by the 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery, of Fire Support Base Gold. The battalion commander in that fight was Lieutenant Colonel John W. Vessey, who in 1982 became chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The improved conventional munition (ICM) round was another new application of an old idea. The ICM round was an artillery-fired version of a cluster bomb. In effect, the shell itself was little more than a cargo carrier that transported the bomblets and ejected them into the air over the target. This essentially is the same principle as the World War I–era shrapnel round except that the submunitions in the shrapnel round did not contain explosive charges. Code-named “Firecracker,” the 105-mm ICM round carried 18 bomblets, the 155-mm round carried 60, and the huge 8-inch round carried 104. The first ICM round was fired in combat by Battery C, 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery, on February 12, 1968, in the northern I Corps Tactical Zone. Every American division normally had one battalion of direct support (DS) artillery for each maneuver brigade and a battalion of general support (GS) artillery for the entire division. DS battalions had 105-mm howitzers, with three batteries of six guns each. GS battalions normally had 155-mm howitzers. In some cases divisional GS battalions were composite units of 155-mm towed howitzers and 8-inch SP howitzers or 175-mm guns and 8-inch howitzers. The heavy 8-inch and 175-mm batteries had only four guns each. During the war the U.S. Army put 68 artillery battalions into Vietnam to support 93 maneuver battalions. The total figure included 32 105-mm towed and 2 105-mm SP battalions, 7 155mm towed and 5 155-mm SP battalions, 5 composite battalions of 155-mm and 8-inch guns, 12 composite battalions of 175-mm and 8-inch guns, 2 aerial rocket artillery battalions, and 3 40-mm Duster battalions. Five separate target-acquisition batteries provided survey control, meteorological data, and radar support, and four separate searchlight batteries provided battlefield illumination. Two of the 155-mm battalions—the 2nd Battalion, 138th Artillery, and the 3rd Battalion, 197th Artillery—were National Guard units. The nondivisional artillery units, for the most part larger than 105-mm, were organized into five artillery groups. The 41st and 52nd Artillery groups supported I Field Force, the 23rd and 54th Artillery groups supported II Field Force, and the 108th Artillery Group supported IV Corps. The U.S. Marine Corps 1st Field Artillery Group consisted of the 11th and 12th Marine regiments, totaling 10 artillery battalions. The Marine Corps also had five separate batteries and a searchlight battery. Among the allied forces, New Zealand had one artillery battery, Australia and the Philippines had an artillery battalion
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each, Thailand had a three-battalion artillery brigade, and South Korea had six 105-mm battalions and two 155-mm battalions. In 1972 the ARVN had 44 battalions of 105-mm howitzers, 15 battalions of 155-mm howitzers, and 5 battalions of 175-mm SP guns. By 1975, many of these weapons had passed into the PAVN arsenal. During the 1972 Easter Offensive alone, the ARVN lost 117 guns and howitzers, enough to arm 6.5 battalions. DAVID T. ZABECKI See also Artillery Fire Doctrine; Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; Harassment and Interdiction Fires; Mortars, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Rockets and Rocket Launchers; Rules of Engagement; Vessey, John William, Jr. References Caruthers, Lawrence H. “Characteristics and Capabilities of Enemy Weapons.” Field Artilleryman 24 (September 1970): 11–24. Ott, David E. Field Artillery, 1954–1973. Vietnam Studies Series. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1975. Scales, Robert H., Jr. Firepower in Limited War. 2nd ed. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1995. Stanton, Shelby L. Vietnam Order of Battle. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2003.
Artillery Fire Doctrine The two basic elements of combat power are maneuver and firepower. Maneuver is the movement of combat forces to gain positional advantage, psychological shock, physical momentum, and massed effects. Firepower is the destructive force essential to defeating an enemy’s ability and will to fight. Throughout history, maneuver and firepower have alternated in dominating the battlefield. In World War I the new firepower technologies completely dominated the tactical situation, resulting in the gridlock of trench warfare. As a revolutionary war, the Vietnam War might have seemed like an ideal environment for maneuver to dominate. The U.S. military, however, had a long-standing tradition of heavy reliance on firepower, and the Vietnam War was no exception. Until the 20th century, artillery was almost the sole source of battlefield firepower. During the Vietnam War, firepower support also came from U.S. Army helicopters and U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Marine Corps tactical and strategic (B-52s) aircraft. Each system had its advantages, which compensated for the disadvantages of the others. Artillery is accurate, responsive, and flexible; helicopters offer precision and direct observation; and close air support is highly destructive. The challenge for ground commanders was to integrate these forms of firepower with the scheme of maneuver to produce the desired tactical effect. Most field artillery units had a mission of either direct support (DS) or general support (GS). A division normally had one DS artillery battalion for each maneuver brigade plus a GS battalion to provide fires for the whole division. Nondivisional artillery units were
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organized into artillery groups, which had a mission of providing general support to an entire corps (called “field forces” in Vietnam). For some specific operations, nondivisional artillery could be given the mission of reinforcing the fires of a divisional unit. In the absence of large divisional operations in Vietnam, most nondivisional artillery units were used to provide support for a specific geographical area. When supporting a brigade, the DS artillery battalion normally had three firing batteries of six guns each. In conventional operations this would mean that there was one artillery battery to support each maneuver company, although the firing batteries remained under the control of the artillery battalion to provide massed fires across the brigade sector. In Vietnam, however, operations tended to be fragmented and dispersed, and the guns had to disperse in order to support them. This was a violation of the time-proven principle that artillery is effective only when fired in mass, but during the Vietnam War the enemy rarely presented massed targets for allied artillery. Starting at the company level, every echelon in the maneuver chain of command had a fire-support coordinator (FSCOORD). The company FSCOORD was the company commander, but he was assisted in this task by a forward observer (FO) from the DS artillery battalion. FOs generally were the most junior lieutenants in the artillery. Nonetheless, good FOs were highly prized by their infantry units, and a company commander usually kept his FO within arm’s reach. Communist forces were well aware of the extra combat power the FO represented and made special efforts to identify and kill him quickly if possible. At the maneuver battalion the FSCOORD was the artillery liaison officer (LNO), a more senior captain also supplied by the DS artillery battalion. Quite often the artillery LNO worked from a command and control (C2) helicopter, along with the supported maneuver battalion commander and his operations officer (S-3). The LNO was responsible for coordinating all fires for the battalion, not just artillery-delivered fires. Thus, the LNO had to ensure that artillery, helicopters, and tactical air were synchronized on the target yet separated from each other in time and space to preclude midair collisions. Making the task more complicated, radios in U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force strike aircraft were incompatible. Operating a bank of radios in the C2 helicopter, the LNO had to pass messages and commands back and forth between FOs on the ground, army helicopters in the air, and air force forward air controllers on the ground or in the air, who then talked to the air force aircraft. The commander of the DS artillery battalion was the designated FSCOORD for the brigade, and the division artillery commander was the FSCOORD for the division. In practice, assistant FSCOORDs at the brigade and division fire-support coordination centers (FSCCs) performed the day-to-day tasks. When a company FO called for fire on the radio, his request went directly to either the battery or battalion (depending on the situation) fire direction center (FDC). The LNO at the maneuver battalion monitored the call and had the authority to cancel or modify the
request. If the LNO failed to intervene, his silence implied consent, and the mission continued. The fire direction officer made the final determination and issued the fire order. The FDC crew then computed the data and sent the fire commands to the gun crews. Most FDCs in Vietnam, especially in the later years, were equipped with FADAC (also known as “Freddy”), the U.S. Army’s first digital fire direction computer. Freddy, however, was a notoriously unreliable piece of equipment and was often inoperable for one reason or another. It was also slow, requiring two-thirds of the projectile time of flight for an initial solution. A well-trained FDC using manual charts and graphical computational tools could beat Freddy every time. Where Freddy excelled was in handling multiple fire missions simultaneously. Artillery was (and still is) the fastest of the fire-support means. Under ideal conditions, a well-trained battery had the technical capability of placing rounds on the target within two to three minutes of the FO’s initial request. Combat conditions are never ideal, however, and in Vietnam the actual average was something more like 6 minutes for light artillery and 13 minutes for heavy guns, which often had to shift their trails to fire. Even longer delays were caused by the political nature of the war itself. In populated areas, the local Vietnamese sector headquarters had to approve the mission before it could be fired. Later in the war, Air Warning Control Centers were established to broadcast warnings to all friendly aircraft in the area. This added another element of delay. Despite these delays, artillery was still much more responsive than tactical air, which took anywhere from 40 minutes to an hour from the initial call to target attack. A revolutionary war such as the Vietnam War warped the traditional relationships between firepower and maneuver in subtle ways. On the strategic level, the front line of the war may have been the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and the Cambodian border, but on the operational and tactical levels there were no front lines. Instead of being linear, the war was circular. The enemy was capable of being anywhere. This combined with the dense jungle in which actions were often fought reduced the effectiveness of envelopments, turning movements, and the other classical forms of tactical maneuver. Company commanders quickly learned that adding more friendly infantry to a fight quite often led to more friendly casualties. Concern about friendly casualties was another factor inhibiting maneuver in Vietnam. More than any other war in American history, the preservation of soldiers’ lives was the overriding tactical imperative. This was driven by the very shaky political support for the war at home combined with the close scrutiny and almost immediate (and sometimes inaccurate) media coverage. The war had no clearly defined objectives, and no clearly articulated national interests were at stake. Faced with these tactical, social, and political imperatives, the only alternate course of action was to use firepower in massive quantities and to give it primacy over maneuver. The prevailing philosophy became “bullets, not bodies.” The United States, with its abundant matériel resources, could of course do this easily. But in so doing the United States provided
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Five U.S. Army 105-mm howitzers at Fire Support Base O’Reilly near Hue in South Vietnam respond to Communist mortar and recoilless rifle fire. (AP/Wide World Photos)
the worst sort of role model for the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army), which did not have the resources but knew no other way of operating once it had to fight on its own. Thus, infantry units in Vietnam maneuvered to achieve two objectives: first to find the enemy and then to take up the best position from which to call in and direct overwhelming fire assets to finish the job. The automatic response of bringing in heavy firepower meant that infantry units had to stay at least 218–328 yards away from the enemy to avoid becoming casualties of their own supporting fires. The Viet Cong (VC) and the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) quickly recognized this weakness and developed so-called hugging tactics, which brought them in so close that allied firepower became unusable. Some U.S. commanders decried this overdependence on firepower and the corresponding loss of infantry maneuver skills. They advocated the adoption of the same guerrilla tactics used by the VC and the PAVN. But even these minority voices recognized that U.S. firepower was the final trump card. As Lieutenant Colonel David Hackworth said of his experiences with the 9th Infantry
Division’s 4th Battalion, 39th Infantry, “Only guerrilla tactics augmented by U.S. firepower can defeat the enemy at low cost.” Of all the forms of allied operations, the VC and the PAVN most feared the cordon. This operation normally began with multiple helicopter assault landings to isolate and encircle an enemy unit in its base camp. Once on the ground, allied troops formed a perimeter with a radius of 547 to 1,094 yards. When the cordon was sealed, everything inside was systematically pounded with air and artillery firepower. This was both slow and methodical to avoid casualties from friendly fire. It became even more careful as infantry moved in toward the center, shrinking the circle and the target area. The slowly moving infantry always carefully marked their positions well to avoid taking friendly fire. If set up properly and sprung quickly, cordon operations were very effective. Earlier in the war, firebases were little more than temporary artillery emplacements established to support infantry operating in a given area. They were set up quickly, usually by air, and abandoned just as quickly. But then the Communist forces drastically scaled back operations after suffering a crushing tactical defeat in the
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A Shau Valley
1968 Tet Offensive. The allies responded by using firebases as a means to lure the enemy into firepower traps. Firebases thus became semipermanent fortresses with dug-in gun pits, bunkers, and up to 25,000 sandbags for a single battery. This basically was the same tactic that the French had tried, and they failed with it on a grand scale at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. For the Americans it was a success, on the tactical level at least, because they had both the artillery and air assets to overwhelmingly reinforce any firebase that came under attack. One result of this approach was that many infantry units were reduced to little more than perimeter security guards for the firebases. Another result was that American artillery positions routinely came under direct ground attack more than at any other time since the American Civil War, when artillery was still a direct-fire weapon. Artillerymen devised many innovative ways to defend themselves, including the fléchette-firing “Beehive” round and the “Killer Junior,” a high-explosive round with a time fuse set to detonate 30 feet off the ground at ranges of between 218 and 1,094 yards. Communist forces never managed to overrun a single American firebase. Operating from firebases required new ways of thinking for American artillerymen. In conventional operations, the guns of a battery usually were positioned in a staggered line parallel to the infantry front line, 2,187 or 3,281 yards to the front. In Vietnam the front was in all directions and was only 55 or 109 feet away. The solution was to position the guns on a firebase in either a diamond (four-gun battery) or a star (six-gun battery) formation. The guns could thus fire in any direction, and the pattern of rounds (called a sheaf) impacting on the ground would be the same. Setting up to fire in all directions also required special preparations in the gun pits and modifications to the firing charts in the FDC. The firebase concept led to a sharp increase in one particularly worthless form of artillery fire. Harassment and interdiction (H&I) fire consisted of random rounds fired at suspected and likely enemy locations and routes. H&I fire was usually used at night and was unobserved. It became slightly more effective later in the war with the introduction of sophisticated remote sensors, which served as firing cues. In general, however, H&I fire was largely a waste of ammunition, accounting for some 60 percent of all artillery fire during the war. In fact, only about 15 percent of all artillery rounds fired was in support of troops in contact. From a purely systems analysis standpoint, artillery fire in Vietnam was rather ineffective. According to the most optimistic estimates, killing a single enemy solder took well over 1,000 rounds. But these results were no different than in other wars. Artillery is effective only when used in conjunction with maneuver to produce a synergistic effect. Artillery is in fact most effective when used to neutralize (rather than destroy) an enemy force while friendly maneuver units gain overwhelming positional advantage for the final kill. This, of course, did not happen during the Vietnam War. Early in the war, U.S. policy makers opted for a war of attrition based in part on an imperfect understanding and unrealistic expectations of the ability of American firepower to send a persuasive message.
The Communist forces never did crack despite the ever-increasing levels of destruction. In the end it came down to a classic Clauswitzian test of wills and national resolve. U.S. Army major general Robert H. Scales Jr. best summarized the principal firepower lesson of the Vietnam War in his book Firepower in Limited War: “If a single lesson is to be learned from the example of Vietnam it is that a finite limit exists to what modern firepower can achieve in limited war, no matter how sophisticated the ordnance or how intelligently it is applied. Overwhelming firepower cannot compensate for bad strategy.” DAVID T. ZABECKI See also Artillery, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; Rules of Engagement References Bailey, Jonathan B. A. Field Artillery and Firepower. Oxford, UK: Military Press, 1987. Ott, David E. Field Artillery, 1954–1973. Vietnam Studies Series. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1975. Scales, Robert H., Jr. Firepower in Limited War. 2nd ed. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1995. U.S. Department of the Army. FM 6-40 Field Artillery Cannon Gunnery. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967.
A Shau Valley Valley in northwestern South Vietnam and the location of some of the fiercest fighting of the Vietnam War. Located southwest of Hue, the valley is approximately 22 miles in length and 2 to 3 miles in width. It runs from northwest to southeast in Thua Thien Province, close to and roughly paralleling the border with Laos. The eastern and western sides of the valley are mountainous and thickly forested. During the period of the Vietnam War, the valley contained only a few isolated hamlets. The Da Krong River crosses north of the valley. Route 548, a loose-surface dry-weather road, runs almost the entire length of the valley. Finally, the A Shau can be considered as the valley through which the headwaters of the Rao Lao (A Sap) River flow. The northernmost of the two western fingers of the long and narrow valley was the site of the May 1969 Battle of Ap Bia Mountain, better known as the Battle of Hamburger Hill, one of the bloodiest fights of the Vietnam War. PAUL R. CAMACHO See also Geography of Indochina and Vietnam; Hamburger Hill, Battle of; Vietnam, Climate of References Dutt, Ashok J., ed. Southeast Asia: Realm of Contrasts. 3rd rev. ed. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985. Marshall, S. L. A. Battles in the Monsoon: Campaigning in the Central Highlands, South Vietnam, Summer, 1966. New York: William Morrow, 1967.
Assimilation versus Association U.S. Army Military Maps: Sheet 6441 II, “A SAP,” Series L 7014, Edition 3-TPC (29 ETB), Prepared by 29th Engr Bn U.S. Army, 1970, Printed by 29th Engr Bn (BT) in April 1971; and Sheet 6441 IV, Series L 7014, “A LUOI” [A LUOi], Edition 3-TPC, Prepared by U.S. Army Topographic Command and printed in September 1970. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Topographical Command.
A Shau Valley Special Forces Camp, Battle for Start Date: March 9, 1966 End Date: March 10, 1966 U.S. Special Forces had established a camp with a garrison of Vietnamese Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) personnel in the A Shau Valley of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). The camp was in Thua Thien Province some 30 miles southwest of Hue near the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the principal Communist infiltration route into South Vietnam through Laos. A total of 434 people were in the camp. There were 17 U.S. Army Special Forces personnel commanded by Captain John D. Blair IV, 6 Luc Luong Dac Biet (LLDB, South Vietnamese Special Forces), 143 Nungs of the Nha Trang Mobile Strike Force Command (Mike Force), 210 CIDG personnel, 7 interpreters, and 51 civilians. Throughout February the camp came under regular Communist harassment attacks. On March 5, 1966, two People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) defectors revealed under questioning that four battalions of the PAVN 325th Division were planning an attack. Ground and aerial reconnaissance also indicated a major Communist buildup, and the defenders called in air strikes by Douglas A-1 Skyraiders and Douglas AC-47 Spooky gunships. Taking advantage of poor weather to negate air support for the defenders, beginning at 3:50 a.m. on March 9 heavy PAVN mortar fire on the camp destroyed a number of structures and severed communications. Some 2,000 PAVN 325th Division and Viet Cong (VC) troops then attacked. The A Shau Valley Special Forces camp was beyond friendly artillery range and was thus entirely dependent on air support. An AC-47 attacked the Communist positions but was shot down by antiaircraft fire and crashed about three miles from the camp. All six crewmen survived the crash but came under PAVN attack, in which three were killed. The three survivors were rescued by helicopter. Although U.S. aircraft dropped supplies of ammunition by parachute, these most often went awry and landed outside the camp perimeter, where they could not be retrieved. Also, troop reinforcements from Hue and Phu Bai could not be deployed because of the poor weather. Early on March 10 the Communists launched another attack, supported by mortar and recoilless rifle fire. The attackers breached the reconstructed defensive perimeter; hand-to-hand combat ensued, with the defenders consolidating in the northern part of the camp. U.S. Marine Corps and Republic of Vietnam Air Force
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(VNAF, South Vietnamese Air Force) aircraft attacked the Communist positions that afternoon. One A-1 Skyraider was lost to antiaircraft fire and crash-landed on the airstrip, but its pilot was picked up almost immediately by another A-1 that landed briefly and then took off again. But with the defenders’ supplies and ammunition stocks running low, the decision to evacuate was made. The defenders destroyed their communications equipment and heavy weapons, and the evacuation was carried out by 15 Sikorsky H-34 Choctaw helicopters and 4 Bell UH-1B Iroquois (“Huey”) gunships. There was near chaos that afternoon as South Vietnamese forces rushed the helicopters in an effort to escape, greatly impeding the evacuation effort. Two of the H-34s were shot down during the evacuation. Those in the camp who were unable to be evacuated by air attempted escape and evasion action, and a number were subsequently rescued. Of 434 people in the camp at the start of the battle (including 53 civilians), only 186 returned, 101 of them wounded. U.S. casualties were 5 missing and presumed dead and 12 wounded. The Communist death toll was estimated at 800. PAVN forces then consolidated their hold over the A Shau Valley, bringing in antiaircraft guns and artillery. U.S. forces did not return to the A Shau Valley until 1968. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Aircraft, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam; A Shau Valley; Civilian Irregular Defense Group; Helicopters, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Mobile Strike Force Commands; United States Special Forces; Vietnam, Republic of, Special Forces References Dooley, George E. Battle for the Central Highlands: A Special Forces Story. New York: Ballantine, 2000. Stanton, Shelby L. Green Berets at War: U.S. Army Special Forces in Southeast Asia, 1956–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985.
Assimilation versus Association Terms used to describe two conflicting French colonial policies. Assimilation built on the principles of the French Revolution of 1789 that professed the universality of French civilization. Assimilation, which attempted to bridge the gap between humanitarianism and the actualities of French colonial role, was bound up in the term mission civilisatrice (“civilizing mission”), a kind of generous cultural imperialism that suggested that the French government should undertake to make the colonies a carbon copy of France in institutions and in culture. This would be best accomplished by promoting the French language and France’s educational system and laws. It also meant employing French officials at every administrative level to train the natives so they would act as if they were French. The pull of assimilation was strongest in the late 19th century when, as Joseph Buttinger has noted, many Frenchmen regarded their country’s overseas possessions as “distant suburbs of Paris.” Assimilation failed because of a shift of opinion in France itself
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Association of Foreign Correspondents in Vietnam
(many anthropologists and sociologists had come to the conclusion that desirable or not, assimilation was in fact impossible) and because it failed in practice. By 1905 association rather than assimilation held sway in France. Association held that France should work with native leaders and concentrate on economic policies (economic exploitation), leaving cultural patterns largely untouched. Defenders of association included political scientists and colonial writers who had studied the issue. Among them were such proponents of the French Empire as the editor of L’Economiste française Pierre Paul Leroy-Beaulieu and politician and premier Jules Ferry. Associationists attacked assimilationists on pragmatic grounds. Associationists believed that what really mattered was the volume of trade rather than the number of civilized souls. Associationists believed that Franco-native cooperation was indeed possible. After the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), the idea of association also received support in some military circles that saw Japan as bent on endeavoring to control all of South Asia. This group included French Army officers such as Joseph Gallieni and Louis Hubert Lyautey. Some even proposed the use of natives in colonial armies. In Vietnam the two conflicting viewpoints are exemplified by, for assimilation, Le Myre de Vilers, Cochin China’s first civilian governor (1879–1882), and Governor-General Paul Beau (1902– 1908) and, for association, by Indochina governor-general Paul Doumer (1897–1902). SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Beau, Jean-Baptiste Paul; Cochin China; Doumer, Paul; Ferry, Jules; Le Myre de Vilers, Charles Marie References Buttinger, Joseph. The Smaller Dragon: A Political History of Vietnam. New York: Praeger, 1958. Thompson, Virginia. French Indo-China. New York: Octagon Books, 1968.
Association of Foreign Correspondents in Vietnam Professional association of foreign correspondents in Southeast Asia. The Association of Foreign Correspondents in Vietnam (AFCV) represented foreign journalists of all media with the government of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), foreign embassies, and international organizations such as the International Press Institute and the International Committee of the Red Cross. The AFCV’s annual General Assembly and monthly meetings of the board were held at the Hotel Continental Palace in Saigon. The AFCV also published a mimeographed annual report. In 1970 AFCV membership totaled 66 people. To confront the tragic disappearance in Cambodia of a large number of foreign journalists, the AFCV attempted to draw international attention to the problem by distributing a list of those missing, dates and places
of disappearance, and their credentials. The AFCV circulated the list to the various parties to the conflict. ARTHUR J. DOMMEN See also Media and the Vietnam War References Brown, Malcolm, Stuart MacGladrie, and Candace Sutton. You’re Leaving Tomorrow: Conscripts and Correspondents Caught Up in the Vietnam War. Sydney, Australia: Random House, 2007. Hammond, William M. Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1962–1968. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1988. Hammond, William M. Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1968–1973. Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2002.
ATLAS WEDGE,
Operation
Start Date: March 18, 1969 End Date: April 2, 1969 Joint military operation conducted northwest of Lai Khe along Highway 13 north of Saigon in the Michelin Rubber Plantation area. ATLAS WEDGE was part of the larger Operation TOAN THANG 3 that began on February 17, 1969. For ATLAS WEDGE, the 1st Infantry (“Big Red One”) Division exercised operational control of the 11th Armored Cavalry (“Blackhorse”) Regiment and worked with the 25th Infantry (“Tropic Lightning”) and 1st Cavalry (“First Team”) divisions. Combat activities consisted of reconnaissance in force, night ambush patrols, land clearing, and route security. The objective was “to control land areas to include population and resources.” U.S. forces were poised to enact the Vietnamization program, with emphasis on securing the local hamlets from Viet Cong (VC) and People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) infiltration and control while providing support units of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) that ultimately had to manage the operational area. The 1st Division’s 3rd Brigade committed one armor and two infantry battalions plus the division’s cavalry squadron (1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, the “Quarterhorse”). The Blackhorse Regiment provided two cavalry squadrons and its air cavalry troop to give a heavy armored punch to ATLAS WEDGE. The operation’s target was the 7th PAVN Division. Using its maneuverability and firepower, the Blackhorse Regiment’s air cavalry troop effectively engaged large PAVN groups in the central and northern parts of the Michelin Plantation on March 18. A major contact was developed by the Quarterhorse on March 30 while it was securing emplacement of an armored vehicle–launched bridge (AVLB) over a creek at the southern end of the Michelin’s heavily wooded area. Hit by rocket-propelled grenades, the cavalrymen pursued a platoon-sized PAVN force northward until they came under fire from both sides of the road. The mounted column reacted to the ambush by maneuvering their armored personnel carriers (APCs)
Atrocities during the Vietnam War into a herringbone formation, created by driving their armored vehicles slightly off the road and angled to the flanks so that all automatic weapons could be fired at the attackers. Charlie Troop, supported on its left flank by a company of tanks, began to move on line to the south when the left flank came under fire from low, heavily fortified bunkers. Bravo Troop then moved through Charlie Troop to continue the attack. This armored force, supported by artillery and air strikes, exacted a heavy toll on PAVN soldiers boxed in the killing zone in fierce close combat, killing about 90 by the onset of darkness. For the entire operation, U.S. forces claimed a total of 421 PAVN soldiers killed. They also captured more than seven tons of rice and seized many small arms and a large quantity of ammunition. U.S. losses were 20 soldiers killed and 100 wounded. Operation ATLAS WEDGE was followed on April 10 by a five-day operation named ATLAS POWER that featured armor and infantry attacks into the same operational area after it had been pounded by Boeing B-52 Stratofortress strikes. JOHN F. VOTAW See also Airborne Operations; TOAN THANG, Operation; United States Army References Haldane, Robert, ed. The First Infantry Division in Vietnam, 1965–1970. Paducah, KY: Turner, 1993. Summers, Harry G., Jr. The Vietnam War Almanac. New York: Ballantine, 1985.
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ficient, these booby traps killed or maimed many GIs and left their frightened and angry comrades with no means for revenge. Veterans regaled new soldiers arriving in-country with tales of buddies who had been blown up while buying soft drinks or cigarettes from children. Although in truth only a small minority of American soldiers in Vietnam experienced an ambush or encountered mines or booby traps, the stories created an atmosphere of distrust toward all Vietnamese civilians. Retribution, or payback as it was known to GIs, took several forms. Mutilation was by far the most prevalent. Taking an ear or finger from a dead enemy or emptying a clip of ammunition into an incapacitated foe proved adequate vindication for some. Others were not so easily satisfied. One of the most horrific examples of a U.S. atrocity occurred in 1966 when some soldiers stopped a passing flatbed truck, claiming that they were out of gas. When the driver consented, the soldiers siphoned fuel from the tank and carried it to the middle of a field where a young Vietnamese girl had been staked to the ground. Soaking her with the gasoline, they set fire to her. Some GIs sought recreation in taking target practice on farmers or their stock. Less random was the torture of captured VC suspects, which ranged from bare-knuckle beatings to forcible ejection from airborne helicopters. Members of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) police accompanied
Atrocities during the Vietnam War The Communist insurgents in Vietnam, the Viet Cong (VC), outmatched by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) and the United States in a material sense, carried out guerrilla warfare. Evasion of decisive set-piece battles, surprise attacks, and civilian cover served to counterbalance limited resources. The practice of seeking refuge in the guise of civilians frustrated and infuriated American troops and led to misdirected reprisals. Likewise, the VC perpetrated a number of massacres to achieve political ends. Writers on both sides of the conflict have also employed the term “atrocity” to describe every action from bombing raids to American involvement in the war. To avoid such philosophical questions, the present discussion describes only those situations in which an unarmed nonresisting noncombatant or prisoner of war (POW) died as the result of small-arms fire, beating, or other corporal assault. Most U.S. atrocities occurred because of the nature of the American response to guerrilla tactics. Search-and-destroy missions, designed to deprive the VC of civilian cover and supplies, replaced conventional large-unit tactics early in the war. A search might reveal hidden weapons caches, rice stores, or a variety of booby traps. Small units patrolled the countryside in pursuit of the VC, who left mines or punji pits in their wake. Viciously ef-
Atrocities during wartime are axiomatic, and perhaps inevitable. When two Viet Cong (VC) battalions attacked and systematically killed 252 civilians in the small hamlet of Dak Son, they left three-year-old Dieu Da, pictured here, wounded, homeless, and fatherless. (National Archives)
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American units in the field, serving as interpreters and, on occasion, as executioners. Some operations that seemed routine at the outset degenerated into massacres. Early in 1967 two marine companies advanced on Thuy Bo expecting only token resistance. The engagement lasted for three days, however, resulting in heavy casualties for the Americans. Upon withdrawal of the VC, the marines entered the village and, by their own account, began shooting anything that moved. In 1968 three companies of the Americal Division committed what were probably the best-known atrocities of the war at My Lai. Unlike Thuy Bo, American forces expected heavy resistance but met with little or none. Estimates of Vietnamese civilian dead, however, ranged from 100 to 400 women, children, and elderly men. The unpredictable nature of the war dictated tactical adjustments. The method of drawing the enemy out and annihilating him, so effective in World War I, World War II, and the Korean War, no longer sufficed. The Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), thus resorted to a policy of attrition. The term “body count” replaced the term “area secured” as a measure of progress. As support for the war waned and pressure for some indication of success mounted, the body counts became increasingly inflated. Commanders padded mission reports at every level; some offered extra rest and recuperation (R&R) to units with the highest counts. Many GIs, already disillusioned about their role in the conflict, interpreted the incentive as tacit approval for indiscriminate killings. Attrition policy thus gave rise to the philosophy that “if it’s dead and Vietnamese, it’s VC.” The VC engaged in atrocities as well but in different situations and for different reasons. Emotional outbursts triggered American atrocities, and, excluding some Phoenix Program operations, few were planned as such. In contrast the VC killed systematically, most often with a political end in mind. The VC assassinated village leaders, disemboweling and decapitating them in full view of the rest of the village to demonstrate the VC’s primacy in a given area. The VC also used terror tactics during the 1968 Tet Offensive, most notably in the ancient imperial capital of Hue, where they killed thousands of people judged to be hostile to their side in the war. Communist operatives abducted “enemies” and either clubbed or shot them or buried them alive. In battle, some VC units skinned or eviscerated captured GIs. Hung in the paths of American patrols, the defiled corpses elicited rage in some and fear in others, robbing commanders of control and the entire unit of its focus. Allied units of the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) also contributed to the gruesome litany of human suffering. Like many U.S. atrocities, a surprise mine detonation triggered the action by South Korean troops at Phong Nghi, Quang Nam Province, in 1968. After the explosion had destroyed one of their armored personnel carriers, the South Korean 2nd Marine Brigade turned on the hamlet. The South Koreans leveled the village, and the evidence suggested that they had shot women and children at point-blank range. Although it is unclear whether the South Korean troops involved in the Phong Nghi massacre received disciplinary action,
at least some war crimes did not go unpunished. The records of the U.S. judge advocate general show that between 1965 and 1971 courts-martial convicted 201 U.S. Army personnel and 77 U.S. Marine Corps personnel of murder, rape, and assault. Interestingly, more than three-quarters of this number received sentences after public revelation of the My Lai Massacre in September 1969. More enlisted men served time than did officers, and few of either group served the entire length of their sentences. Atrocities in war are axiomatic, perhaps even inevitable. The conflict in Vietnam, however, bears the dubious distinction of having been especially dirty and loathsome. Advances in communications technology allowed almost instantaneous dissemination of reports of search-and-destroy missions, torture of POWs, and other alleged misdeeds. For the first time, national and local news services broadcast a war, concentrated to fit the demands of scheduling, to an already antagonized and confused public. Some 200 documented and 500 suspected American atrocity cases over a more than 10-year period during which some 3 million GIs served in Vietnam hardly constitutes a widespread and pervasive pattern. War by its very definition is a brutal and dehumanizing environment, and the sad truth is that soldiers on all sides of all the wars in recorded history have committed atrocities. The perception of the Vietnam War as atrocity-ridden owes as much to the various sociopolitical contexts of American wars in this century as to any illegal military action. BENJAMIN C. DUBBERLY See also Body Count; Booby Traps; My Lai Massacre; Search and Destroy References Caputo, Philip. A Rumor of War. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1977. Ebert, James R. A Life in a Year. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1993. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. Lewy, Guenter. America in Vietnam. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978. MacPherson, Myra. Long Time Passing: Vietnam and the Haunted Generation. New York: Doubleday, 1984.
ATTLEBORO,
Operation
Start Date: November 5, 1966 End Date: November 25, 1966 Major military operation that occurred during November 5–25, 1966, in War Zone C. Although Operation ATTLEBORO had modest beginnings in September 1966—a single battalion air assault followed by a search-and-destroy mission in a tactical area of operations about 12 miles by 37 miles north and west of Tri Tam (Dau Tieng)—by the end of November it had gradually expanded into a confrontation between the resurgent 9th Viet Cong (VC) Division
ATTLEBORO, Operation
and more than 22,000 allied troops. The U.S. 196th Light Infantry Brigade conducted battalion-sized operations in the area with very few VC contacts until the end of October, when the 1st Infantry (“Big Red One”) Division encountered a battalion of the 9th VC Division’s 273rd Regiment just east of the ATTLEBORO area. The 196th Light Infantry Brigade expanded the operation to include the entire brigade, reinforced by a battalion from the 25th Infantry (“Tropic Lightning”) Division. In early November contacts with units of the 9th VC Division near Dau Tieng and the Special Forces camp at Suoi Da, in the shadow of Nui Ba Den (“Black Virgin Mountain”), led to an expansion of the operation, with command passing first to the Big Red One Division and then to II Field Force, the U.S. corps-sized headquarters near Saigon. ATTLEBORO had become the largest American joint operation of the war to date. Later intelligence estimates indicated that VC/People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) forces sustained a total of 2,130 killed (1,000 by air strikes alone), nearly 900 wounded, and more than 200 missing or captured. The casualties included four battalion and five company commanders killed in action. U.S./Allied losses were 155 killed and 494 wounded. The Communist casualties were serious enough, but the allies destroyed the 9th VC Division’s extensive base area, including shops and factories. Operation ATTLEBORO reduced the effectiveness of one of the first-echelon VC divisions for about six months but did not knock it out of the war. More importantly for the United States and its allies, ATTLEBORO suggested that large numbers of battalions could arrive quickly in an operational area to confront major VC and PAVN troop concentrations and bring them to battle. ATTLEBORO thus set the scene for Operations CEDAR FALLS and JUNCTION CITY. Several pitched battles occurred between allied forces and the Communist forces, but the fight at Ap Cha Do on November 8 was perhaps the most significant of the operation. Ap Cha Do was a small village located about 65 miles northwest of Saigon in the battle area known as War Zone C, directly west of the Minh Thanh Rubber Plantation. On November 4 II Field Force (IIFFV) commander Lieutenant General Jonathan O. Seaman, former commander of the Big Red One, committed the 1st Infantry Division to ATTLEBORO. The division’s 3rd Brigade closed into Suoi Da, and its 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry, moved by helicopter to a landing zone north of Suoi Da by noon on November 6. The landing zone had been cleared by its sister battalion (2nd Battalion, 28th Infantry), which was located nearby. Both battalions were in defensive positions by nightfall on November 7 after a day of vigorous patrolling and small skirmishes. Early on the morning of November 8, the 1st Battalion’s commander alerted his forces and commenced a reconnaissance by fire using mortars, which fired from east to west along the northern edge of the battalion’s defensive perimeter. This prematurely triggered intense small-arms fire from VC units that had assembled during the night to attack the 1st Battalion’s perimeter. The first Communist assault fell on the defensive perimeter at 6:20 a.m.,
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followed by others in rapid succession. The 1st Battalion brought withering artillery fire and air strikes down on the heads of the attacking VC soldiers. By 11:30 a.m. the battle was over. The 2nd Battalion swept through the battle area and discovered an enormous Communist base camp, large enough to support the 9th VC Division’s operations. The 2nd Battalion recovered 19,000 grenades, 1,135 pounds of explosives, 400 bangalore torpedoes, 121 bicycles, and numerous field kitchens and discovered a maze of bunkers and underground storage depots. Captured documents revealed that the PAVN 101st Regiment and the VC 272nd Regiment, both assigned to the VC 9th Division, had been engaged in the battle at Ap Cha Do. They lost nearly 400 soldiers killed, compared with 21 Americans killed and 42 wounded. This battle demonstrated that in a stand-up fight between large U.S. units and equivalent VC and PAVN units, the advantage lay with the allies because of their maneuverability and firepower. Operations CEDAR FALLS and JUNCTION CITY, both of which followed ATTLEBORO by several months, again demonstrated that disparity. But a string of successful battles did not necessarily guarantee strategic victory in Vietnam. As Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr. concluded in The Army and Vietnam, Communist documents show that the VC and PAVN forces were concentrating their main-force units in remote areas in order to prevent the concentration of American forces in the populated Coastal Plain. Moreover, the Communists hoped to distract the allies from pacification and tie them down in battle deep in the jungle so as to inflict casualties and erode their determination to stay the course in a protracted war. Krepinevich’s analysis suggests that North Vietnamese military leader Vo Nguyen Giap, not General William Westmoreland, had a better understanding of what was happening in 1967. The Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), was convinced that the character of the war had changed from insurgency/guerrilla warfare to large-unit conventional warfare; statistics and analysis of captured PAVN documents, however, suggested that it was still a smallunit war. As General Bruce Palmer Jr. noted in The 25-Year War, the U.S. strategy to force the VC/PAVN away from the populated areas was undermined by the Communist troops slipping past U.S. and allied forces into the populated areas, with the local populace failing to reveal their presence during the 1968 Tet Offensive. JOHN F. VOTAW See also CEDAR FALLS, Operation; JUNCTION CITY, Operation; Palmer, Bruce, Jr.; War
Zone C and War Zone D References Haldane, Robert, ed. The First Infantry Division in Vietnam, 1965–1970. Paducah, KY: Turner, 1993. Krepinevich, Andrew F., Jr. The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. Palmer, General Bruce, Jr. The 25-Year War: America’s Military Role in Vietnam. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1984. Rogers, Bernard W. Cedar Falls Junction City: A Turning Point. Vietnam Studies Series. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1974.
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Attrition
Attrition Attrition was the military strategy adopted by General William Westmoreland, commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), to win the Vietnam War. Also referred to as the body count syndrome, attrition became the measure of progress of a war in which neither conquering and holding enemy territory nor winning total victory were U.S. objectives. To Westmoreland and his supporters, the attrition strategy had two strengths in the effort to find, fight, and destroy the enemy: it appeared to be the quickest way to end hostilities, and it also preserved the traditional mission of the U.S. infantry. The goal of the strategy was to cajole the Viet Cong (VC) and People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) to fight a midintensity war. U.S. forces would then destroy their opponents at a rate faster than the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) or VC could replace them. Unfortunately, and despite its elegant logic, the attrition strategy suffered from four basic problems. First, it did not account for the American people’s historical antipathy toward long-drawn-out conflicts, especially in the absence of a formal declaration of war. In the case of Vietnam, this national hostility toward gradualism collided with two revealing statistics: North Vietnam had 13 million people available for military service during the war, and unlike other nations, which historically capitulated when they lost 2 percent of their prewar population, Hanoi readily and consistently accepted losses closer to 3 percent and showed no signs of surrender. Given these numbers, U.S. military analysts determined by 1969 that the attrition strategy had failed. The analysts concluded that based on 1965 rates of attrition, North Vietnam could have continued the war until 1981. Westmoreland’s strategy was thus tragically overly optimistic. After the Tet Offensive in early 1968 the American people turned against the war, but the strategy had yet to succeed. A second problem with the attrition strategy was that it vainly tried to turn what was at first largely an insurgency in the jungles of Southeast Asia into a conventional European-style war. But the Vietnam War was a war unlike anything the United States had ever fought. U.S. forces did perform extremely well in large operations that matched their European-style training; however, if North Vietnamese troops suffered defeat in conventional battles, they quickly reverted back to irregular warfare in which they employed hit-and-run tactics that minimized contact with U.S. troops. As a result, the Vietnam War was a mismatch in paradigms. The U.S. Army’s approach, which emphasized body counts and conventional warfare, did not match North Vietnam’s Maoist, largely unconventional strategy. The consequence was a grinding (and lengthy) war of attrition rather than a quick war of annihilation. A third problem with attrition was that it was not compatible with the U.S. Army’s pacification program. Not only did the strategy pull U.S. troops away from the population centers, but it typically allowed Hanoi to determine when and where combat would
occur. As a result, Communist commanders could control their own attrition rates to a level low enough to sustain the war indefinitely and thus fatigue U.S. forces to the point of defeat. The fourth problem with the attrition strategy was that it indirectly eroded the moral fiber of American forces. As the war staggered on, distinguishing insurgents from civilians remained a problem. Some U.S. units became less concerned about inflicting civilian casualties. Furthermore, field commanders began padding reports of enemy dead to make themselves appear more efficient and thus enhance their own prospects for promotion in what they saw was a dead-end war. ADAM J. STONE See also Body Count; Casualties; Westmoreland, William Childs References Krepinevich, Andrew F., Jr. The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. Lewy, Guenter. America in Vietnam. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978. Palmer, General Bruce, Jr. The 25-Year War: America’s Military Role in Vietnam. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1984.
August Revolution Event Date: August 19, 1945 The proclamation of a sovereign Vietnamese government in August 1945. When Japan agreed to Allied surrender terms on August 14, 1945, thereby ending World War II, this created a power vacuum in Indochina, for the previous March the Japanese had arrested all French officials and French Army personnel they could find. Viet Minh leader Ho Chi Minh now filled the void. On August 16, 1945, in Hanoi, Ho declared himself president of the provisional government of a “free Vietnam.” Three days later, on August 19, the Viet Minh seized power in Hanoi in what was known at the time as the August General Uprising and was soon renamed the August Revolution. It was followed by uprisings against the French in other towns and cities across Vietnam. Five days later in Saigon, Tran Van Giau declared the insurrection under way in southern Vietnam. Ho held his first cabinet meeting on August 27, at which time it was decided to fix September 2 as National Independence Day. On that day Ho publicly announced the formation of the provisional government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), with its capital at Hanoi. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Ho Chi Minh; Viet Minh; Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, 1945–1954 References Marr, David G. Vietnam 1945: The Quest for Power. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.
Australia Patti, Archimedes L. A. Why Viet Nam? Prelude to America’s Albatross. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980. Tucker, Spencer C. Vietnam. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1999.
Au Lac, Kingdom of The second Vietnamese kingdom. According to Vietnamese legend, Vietnam began as the kingdom of Van Lang, ruled by the Hong Bang dynasty for more than 2,600 years, from 2879 BCE to 258 BCE. Van Lang was located in what was subsequently known as Tonkin, today northern Vietnam. In 258 BCE (some sources say 257 BCE), King Thuc Phan of neighboring Tay Au to the north mounted a surprise invasion of Van Lang and overthrew the last of the Hong Bang rulers. Thuc Phan then annexed Van Lang to his own territory, creating the new kingdom of Au Lac, with himself as ruler. Co Loa (some dozen miles west of present-day Hanoi) became the new capital, and soon a citadel was under construction there. A vast undertaking that involved the removal of some 2 million cubic yards of earth, Co Loa Citadel was a sophisticated defensive work to enable defense from both land and the Red River. It had two circular ramparts (the outer being some 5 miles in circumference, 36 feet high, and 75 feet wide at the base) surrounding a rectangular citadel. The Co Loa Citadel is regarded as the most important historical ruin of ancient Vietnam. Based on the large number of bronze arrowheads recovered in the vicinity, it is assumed the citadel was the site of a number of battles. Little is known of Au Lac society or culture, although it is assumed to have been based on slavery, which would have permitted the construction of such works as the citadel. The new Vietnamese state of Au Lac lasted only half a century, for in 207 BCE Chinese warlord Zhao Tuo (Chao T’o), who was known to the Vietnamese as Trieu Da and who had broken with the Qin (Ch’in) emperor, defeated King An Duong Vuong and conquered Au Lac. Trieu Da combined Au Lac with his previously held territory to form the new kingdom of Nam Viet (Nan Yueh), or “southern country of the Viet.” Its capital was Phien Ngu (later Canton and today Guangzhou). The formation of Nam Viet marks the beginning of verifiable Vietnamese history. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Nam Viet; Vietnam, History of, Prehistory to 938 CE References Buttinger, Joseph. The Smaller Dragon: A Political History of Vietnam. New York: Praeger, 1958. Chapuis, Oscar M. A History of Vietnam: From Hong Bang to Tu Duc. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1995. Taylor, Keith Weller. The Birth of Vietnam. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983.
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Australia Large primarily English-speaking nation located in the South Pacific and south of Indonesia and surrounded by the Indian Ocean to the west and the South Pacific to the east. Australia, including the island state of Tasmania, comprises more than 2.9 million square miles. In 1960 it had a population of approximately 10.392 million people. Australia was founded as a penal settlement for Great Britain in the 18th century. In 1901 the six former colonies on the continent united to form the Commonwealth of Australia, with a constitution modeled after that of the United States. Australia remained closely tied to the British Commonwealth through the first half of the 20th century, after which Cold War realities pushed the Australians away from their Commonwealth obligations and toward alliance with the United States. Following World War II, Australia sought to rank among the leading nations in Asia, which sometimes resulted in conflict with U.S. policy. Throughout the Cold War, Australia played a delicate balancing act that allowed it to pursue its own interests while still remaining a key U.S. Cold War ally. Australia was one of the original signers of the United Nations (UN) Charter and greatly contributed to the economic, social, and humanitarian efforts of that organization, including peacekeeping activities. Australia was also a founding member of the Colombo Plan for the Cooperative Economic and Social Development of Asia and the Pacific and used its economic prosperity to aid in the advancement of its regional neighbors. Australia was also a charter member of the 1954 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and committed forces to the 1950–1953 Korean War. During the early years of the John F. Kennedy administration, the military involvement of the United States in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) significantly expanded. Indeed, by the end of 1963 there were some 16,000 American military personnel in South Vietnam. In early 1962 U.S. officials asked Australia and New Zealand to support the American effort in South Vietnam. Australia, long concerned that a Communist victory in Vietnam would threaten its interests, responded quickly. During the summer of 1962 Australia provided 30 military advisers to South Vietnam. The group, known formally as the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV), or simply “The Team,” was roughly a counterpart to the U.S. Army’s Special Forces, which were highly favored by the Kennedy White House and were then serving as advisers in Vietnam as well. By 1964 under the Lyndon B. Johnson administration, the Australian ground troop deployment had increased to 80 personnel, and their mission was changed to include direct combat in April 1965 in tandem with the major expansion in the role as well as numbers of U.S. forces. In June 1965 the 1st Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment (RAR) was augmented by the 79th Signal Group and a logistical support company. That September, artillery, armored personnel carriers, engineers, and light support aircraft also arrived intheater. This force, numbering 1,400 troops, was attached to the U.S. 173rd Airborne Brigade.
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By 1967 the Australian government, under increased pressure from the United States, had deployed to Vietnam some 8,000 ground troops, which marked the peak of the Australian commitment. In June 1966 the 1st Battalion, RAR, was replaced by the 1st Australian Task Force (ATF), formed by the newly arrived 5th and 6th Battalions, RAR, and attached logistical support elements. The ATF was later augmented by a Special Air Service squadron of commandos, a medium tank squadron, a helicopter squadron, artillery, engineers, and supply, signal, and other support elements, including a new field hospital. A unit from New Zealand, including two infantry companies and a Special Air Service outfit, was also added to the ATF. Australian troops were rotated by unit; during the war, nine battalions of the RAR saw duty in Vietnam. Reflecting the manpower pressures generated by the conflict in Southeast Asia, Australia had reintroduced military conscription in 1964. Women from Australia also served in Vietnam in nursing and support-related capacities, primarily in the 1st Australian Field Hospital and the medical evacuation (medevac) service. In South Vietnam, Australian ground forces were notable for their emphasis on small-unit tactics; they generally avoided largescale conventional military sweeps and the heavy use of artillery and air support that characterized U.S. Army strategy during the second half of the 1960s. The largest concentration of ATF (joint Australian and New Zealand forces) forces was in Phuoc Tuy Province, southeast of Saigon. In August 1966 Australian success in beating back sizable North Vietnamese and Viet Cong (VC) attacks in the Battle of Long Trang resulted in the awarding of a U.S. Presidential Unit Citation to D Company, 6th Battalion, RAR. In October 1966 President Lyndon B. Johnson became the first U.S. president to visit Australia, where he sought to bolster cooperation in Vietnam with the Australian government led by Prime Minister Harold Holt. Holt pledged continued support for the war in Vietnam. At the time, Australian public opinion toward the conflict was still fairly positive. The Australian emphasis on working directly with the local population in Phuoc Tuy to build support as well as provide basic security was generally successful. In March 1967 a civil affairs unit was added to the combat units already based in Phuoc Tuy. The civil affairs unit permitted construction of new facilities and the introduction of programs to promote education, medical and dental care, and the resettlement of refugees. Three major operations beyond Phuoc Tuy Province involved Australian ground forces operating as distinctive units. Operation COBURG during January–February 1968, Operation THOAN THANG I in May 1968, and Operation FEDERAL in February 1969 all helped to secure fortified bases in Long Binh, Bien Hoa, and Saigon. During this period, ATF forces also were successful in defending against VC and People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) attacks, which at times were quite sizable. By 1971, few attacks against Australian forces were occurring. Units of the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) began operations in Vietnam in August 1964. Australia’s air commitment to
Vietnam was divided into three main missions. The first was led by the RAAF Transport Flight Vietnam, which was initially responsible for airlift operations. Reconstituted as No. 35 Squadron on June 1, 1966, it was equipped with the versatile fixed-winged De Havilland A-4 Caribou transportation aircraft. The squadron remained in continuous operation from August 1964 to February 1972. During the course of the war, No. 35 Squadron flew approximately 81,500 sorties (43,800 hours) and transported 676,353 passengers, including 45 medical evacuations. Twelve Caribou aircraft flew during the war, three of which were lost; two others were retired for major repairs. The RAAF’s second mission involved direct support to the ATF in Phuoc Tuy Province. No. 9 Squadron, employing helicopters, deployed to Nui Dat in June 1966 to conduct a series of diverse missions, from psychological operations such as dropping leaflets to the spraying of insecticides to control the mosquito population and of herbicides for defoliation. However, the primary mission of the 32 Bell UH-1 Iroquois (“Huey”) helicopters was troop-lift and combat support, including the insertion of Special Air Service units into contested areas to engage the enemy. No. 9 Squadron moved 409,972 passengers in 237,424 sorties (58,745 hours) and was also responsible for the medical evacuation of 4,280 soldiers. No. 9 Squadron served in South Vietnam until November 1971. The squadron suffered six fatalities and six helicopters destroyed or written off as damaged beyond repair. The final mission of the RAAF included bombing missions by No. 2 Squadron, which flew 18 English Electric Canberra Mk 20 aircraft. No. 2 Squadron arrived in South Vietnam in April 1967 and was placed under the tactical control of the U.S. 35th Tactical Fighter Wing based in Phan Rang. The squadron flew 11,994 sorties over South Vietnam, attacking 13,503 targets and delivering 26,938 tons of bombs. Before it was redeployed to Australia in May 1971, the squadron had lost two aircraft in the war, one as a result of a surface-to-air missile and one retired after a landing accident. The squadron also lost three pilots to nonbattle casualties and reported two pilots as missing in action but presumed dead. Three additional members of the RAAF died in Vietnam, all as a result of nonbattle injuries. The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) also participated in the Vietnam War. Contributions from the RAN included transport and logistical support for the Australian ground forces based in Phuoc Tuy Province, the use of Australian destroyers with the U.S. Navy Seventh Fleet, Fleet Air Arm involvement, and the insertion of Clearance Diving Team 3 to ensure the safety of the ports and waterways around Vung Tau. The converted aircraft carrier HMAS Sidney served as the principal fast troop transport for the RAN’s mission of transport and support. Known by the Australian troops as the “Vung Tau Ferry,” the Sidney made 24 trips to South Vietnam from April 1965, with the insertion of the 1st Battalion, RAR, until November 1972. In 1966 as Australia’s commitment to the war increased with the creation of the 1st ATF stationed in Phuoc Tuy Province, the Sid-
Australia
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Royal Australian Air Force airmen deplane at Saigon in South Vietnam on August 10, 1964. The Australian Air Force aided South Vietnamese and U.S. forces by transporting soldiers and supplies. (National Archives)
ney was joined by the hired Australian National Line cargo ships Jeparit and Boonaroo as well as a series of escorts for the voyage between Australia and South Vietnam. The RAN contingent attached to the U.S. Seventh Fleet was Australia’s most publicized naval contribution during the war. The RAN destroyers were attached to Task Force 77.1, which revolved around Operation SEA DRAGON (the destruction of coastal targets north of the 17th Parallel), and Task Unit 70.8.9 (Naval Gunfire Support). HMAS Hobart, a guided missile destroyer, was the first RAN destroyer to join the gun line in March 1967 in what would be the first of nine deployments that saw the continuous service of at least one Australian destroyer until October 1971. Three Charles F. Adams–class guided missile destroyers (the Hobart, Perth, and Brisbane) and one Daring-class escort (the Vendetta) took part in operations with the Seventh Fleet. They fired a combined 101,602 rounds from 4.5-inch and 5-inch naval guns during the duration of the operation. Clearance Diving Team 3 (CDT3) arrived in South Vietnam on February 6, 1967, for its first active-service deployment in the branch’s history and commenced missions that included clearing mines planted by Communist forces in the water surrounding Vung Tau and inspecting ships and harbors used by allied
forces. The eight contingents of CDT3 inspected more than 7,000 vessels before it departed in August 1970. The final contingent to see action in Vietnam was the RAN’s helicopter pilots, who were attached to the Royal Australian Air Force Squadron No. 9, operating in Phuoc Tuy in support of the ATF. They also contributed to the 135th Assault Helicopter Company, which also operated in Phuoc Tuy. Overall, 7 RAN personnel were killed in action during the war, all in 1968, while 2 RAN personnel were killed in nonbattle incidents. Eighteen sailors were wounded, 7 were injured in action in battle, and 23 were injured in nonbattle events. As the Vietnam War dragged on, opposition to the war in Australia steadily grew, in parallel with the antiwar movement in the United States. In the case of Australia, the unpopularity of the military draft was combined with frustration over steadily growing casualties to turn public opinion sharply against the war. In November 1970 the Australian government began to sharply reduce the number of Australian forces in South Vietnam. In November 1971 the principal Australian expeditionary force departed from Phuoc Tuy. However, a small contingent of Australian military personnel continued training South Vietnamese forces until January 11, 1973, when the Australian government announced
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that all Australian forces in South Vietnam would be withdrawn by December 31, 1971, except for an army platoon guarding the embassy in Saigon. A total of about 50,000 Australian military personnel from all branches served in the Vietnam War. A total of 423 Australians were killed, and 2,398 others were wounded in the conflict. ARTHUR I. CYR, RONALD B. FRANKUM JR., AND JAMES H. WILLBANKS See also Free World Assistance Program; Korea, Republic of; New Zealand; SEA DRAGON, Operation; United States Air Force; United States Army; United States Navy References Coulthard-Clark, Chris. The RAAF In Vietnam: Australian Air Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1962–1975. St. Leonards, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1995.
Fairfax, Denis. Navy in Vietnam: A Record of the Royal Australian Navy in the Vietnam War, 1962–1972. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1980. Foster, Randy E. M. Vietnam Firebases, 1965–73: American and Australian Forces. Oxford, UK: Osprey, 2007. Grey, Jeffrey. Up Top: The Royal Australian Navy and Southeast Asian Conflicts, 1955–1972. St. Leonards, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1998. Grey, Jeffrey, Peter Pierce, and Jeff Doyle, eds. Australia’s Vietnam War. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. King, Peter, ed. Australia’s Vietnam: Australia in the Second Indo-China War. Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1983. McNeill, Ian. The Team: Australian Army Advisers in Vietnam, 1962–1972. Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1984. Odgers, George. Mission Vietnam: Royal Australian Air Force Operations, 1964–1972. Canberra: Australian Government Publication Service, 1974.
B B-52 Raids See Arc Light Missions
BABYLIFT,
Operation
Start Date: April 4, 1975 End Date: April 14, 1975 Plan to bring 2,000 Vietnamese orphans to the United States for adoption by American parents. Operation BABYLIFT was announced by President Gerald R. Ford on April 3, 1975, and went into effect the next day. BABYLIFT was to last 10 days and was to be carried out during the final desperate phase of the war as People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) and Viet Cong (VC) forces closed in on Saigon. The first flight, on April 4, ended in tragedy. The airplane crashed soon after takeoff from Saigon’s Tan Son Nhut Air Base, killing 138 people, most of them Vietnamese children. It was not until the 1980s that settlements were reached in legal suits. All subsequent flights took place without incident, and BABYLIFT continued to ferry orphans across the Pacific until its conclusion on April 14, only 16 days before the fall of Saigon and the end of the war. In all, more than 2,600 children were adopted. At the time some questions were raised regarding how these particular children were selected. Also, there was the possibility that at least some of them were not technically orphans at all but were children whose parents wanted them safely out of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). But for better or worse, the operation that had been decreed by President Ford was successfully completed.
Two women carry Vietnamese orphans off a plane after they arrived in the United States during Operation BABYLIFT, a program to find the orphans new homes. (Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images)
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Subsequent critics of the operation pointed to the excessive public relations spin that accompanied it. This included oftrepeated predictions of a bloodbath once North Vietnam conquered South Vietnam. Covered by the major media, President and Mrs. Ford personally greeted one flight on April 5 in San Francisco. Much was made of the fact that the 325 orphans who arrived that day had been brought over in a $250,000 charter flight paid for by an American businessman. Another criticism focused on the possible political motives behind the airlift. There was the accusation, for instance, that the Ford administration hoped that the flights would create public sympathy for the embattled Nguyen Van Thieu government, thus pressuring Congress into rushing emergency aid to South Vietnam. In fact, the entire BABYLIFT experience was simply a footnote to a long, violent, and divisive war. As with the U.S. involvement in the war, the operation represented a combination of humanitarianism and political manipulation. ERIC JARVIS See also Ford, Gerald Rudolph; Nguyen Van Thieu; Saigon References Burkard, Dick J. Military Airlift Command: Historical Handbook, 1941–1984. Scott Air Force Base, IL: Military Airlift Command, 1984. DeBenedetti, Charles, with Charles Chatfield. An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1990. Leuter, David. “The Babylift Case Goes On Despite New Settlement.” National Law Journal 7 (December 3, 1984): 6. Taylor, Stuart, Jr. “Settlement Reached in 1975 Crash of Orphans’ Jet.” New York Times, November 15, 1984.
Bach Dang River, Battle of Event Date: 938 CE One of the great battles in Vietnamese history that freed Vietnam (then known as Giao Chi) from Chinese control. The Chinese had conquered Giao Chi in 111 BCE. With the decline of the Tang dynasty in the 10th century CE, chances improved for the Vietnamese to shake off Chinese rule. Vietnamese success in this endeavor owed much to Duong Dinh Nghe, who ruled Ai and Hoan (the area of present-day Ha Trung and Thanh Hoa) in the south. Although the Southern Han had ennobled him in hopes that he would remain loyal, Dong Dinh Nghe was determined to drive the Chinese from Giao Chi. In 931 after first assembling and training an army of 3,000 men, he marched north from Ai, routed the Chinese, and took Dai-la (Ha Dong) on the Red River. Dong Dinh Nghe then defeated a Chinese relief force, after which he proclaimed himself military governor and won recognition of this from the Chinese. Although later revered by the Vietnamese for his accomplishments, Dong Dinh Nghe ruled only briefly. In the spring of 937 he was assassinated by Kieu Cong Tien,
a lesser military officer, who took power himself and attempted to institute pro-Chinese policies. Ai governor Ngo Quyen took up arms against Kieu Cong Tien. Recognized for his bravery, physical strength, and wisdom, Ngo Quyen was a general at age 33. When Dong Dinh Nghe defeated the Southern Han, he had given Ngo Quyen one of his daughters in marriage and appointed him governor of Ai Province. Ngo Quyen now took the field to defeat Kieu Cong Tien and avenge the death of his father-in-law. Undoubtedly the Vietnamese of Giao Chi preferred rule by the smaller Ai to that of the more powerful Han. In any case, they did not rally to Kieu Cong Tien, which forced him to call on the Chinese for assistance. Southern Han ruler Liu Kung (known as Luu Nham to the Vietnamese), who wanted Giao Chi for himself, promptly assembled a force at Sea Gate to conquer Giao Chi. He placed his son Liu Hongcao (Luu Hoang Thao to the Vietnamese) in command of the expeditionary force, naming him peaceful sea military governor and king of Giao. Luu Nham then ordered Liu Hongcao to sail to Giao Chi. By the time Liu Hongcao arrived in Vietnamese waters in 938, Ngo Quyen had already defeated and executed Kieu Cong Tien. Ngo Quyen also had sufficient time to prepare to meet the anticipated Chinese invasion force. Ngo Quyen anticipated the Chinese plan to sail up the Bach Dang River, the main water route into the Red River plain. Liu Kung planned to advance deep into Giao Chi before disembarking his forces to fight ashore. In the autumn of 938 Ngo Quyen assembled his army at the mouth of the Bach Dang River and had his men plant stakes in the water. Sharpened and tipped with iron, these were of such height to be concealed beneath the water’s surface at high tide. When the Southern Han force appeared, Ngo Quyen sent out a small naval force of shallow-draft ships to engage them. Operating according to plan, his ships then withdrew up the Bach Dang, and the Chinese fleet followed. When the tide fell, the Chinese ships were trapped on the stakes in the river and were easily destroyed. Reportedly more than half of the Chinese, including Liu Hongcao, perished. Liu Kung then withdrew what remained of his army to Guangzhou (Guangdong, Canton). This great Vietnamese victory ended the long Chinese rule over Vietnam. After more than 1,000 years of Chinese control, the Vietnamese were again independent. Although China continued to enjoy nominal suzerainty over Vietnam until the Treaty of Tianjin (Tientsin) in 1885, the Vietnamese in fact now controlled all the territory from the foothills of Yunnan to the 17th Parallel. Nonetheless, under the long period of Chinese domination the country had slowly separated from other nations of Southeast Asia to become a part of East Asia, and the Chinese imprint on Vietnam proved permanent. The Vietnamese continued to use Chinese characters in writing and Chinese traditions and customs, although over time a synthesis emerged that combined native and Chinese elements. In 939 Ngo Quyen took the title of king. Duong Dinh Nghe had not dared to call himself anything other than military governor.
Baez, Joan Chandos Ngo Quyen chose Co Loa as his capital. His dynasty did not last long, however. He died in 944, and his children were unable to maintain order. Vietnam soon fell into serious troubles, especially in 965 in the Period of the Twelve Lords (Muoi Hai Su Quan), a time of civil strife that lasted until 968, when Dinh Bo Linh reunified the kingdom. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Vietnam, History of, Prehistory to 938 CE References Chapuis, Oscar M. A History of Vietnam: From Hong Bang to Tu Duc. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1995. Taylor, Keith Weller. The Birth of Vietnam. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983.
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Cut was guillotined in Can Tho on July 13, 1956, against the advice of American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) adviser Colonel Edward Lansdale, who feared that the act would solidify the opposition of Ba Cut’s followers to the South Vietnamese government. True to Lansdale’s prediction, most Hoa Hao supporters joined the Viet Cong (VC) guerrilla movement against the South Vietnamese government following Ba Cut’s execution. MICHAEL R. HALL See also Bao Dai; Buddhism in Vietnam; Cao Dai; Geneva Conference and Geneva Accords of 1954; Hoa Hao; Ho Chi Minh; Lansdale, Edward Geary; Ngo Dinh Diem; Viet Cong Infrastructure; Viet Minh References Jacobs, Seth. Cold War Mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America’s War in Vietnam, 1950–1963. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006. Nguyen Long Thanh Nam. Hoa Hao Buddhism in the Course of Vietnam’s History. Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science Publishers, 2004.
Ba Cut Birth Date: 1924 Death Date: July 13, 1956 Vietnamese nationalist and anti-Communist. Le Quang Vinh, commonly known as Ba Cut, was born in French-held Vietnam sometime in 1924. Little is know of the circumstances of his birth or his early years. In 1939 he led a resistance movement of men recruited from the Hoa Hao, an ultranationalist militaristic Buddhist sect formed by Huynh Phu So, in the Mekong Delta. The Hoa Hao sect, which vehemently opposed French colonial rule in Vietnam, supported Coung De, a member of Vietnam’s Nguyen royal family living in exile in Japan, as the legitimate ruler of Vietnam. To emphasize his determination in the struggle against the French, in 1941 Le Quang Vinh cut off the tip of his third finger and assumed the name Ba Cut (“Short Third”). During World War II Ba Cut and the Hoa Hao supported the Japanese occupation of Vietnam as the best way to end French colonialism. At this point Ba Cut came into conflict with Ho Chi Minh’s Viet Minh because of the latter’s anti-Japanese agenda and Marxist opposition to organized religion. After World War II Ba Cut led some 20,000 men in an armed struggle against the French colonial government, the Viet Minh, and a rival religious sect, the Cao Dai. Although giving nominal support to French-supported Emperor Bao Dai, Ba Cut believed that the Vietnamese emperor was tainted by his collaboration with the French colonial administrators and was a mere puppet of them. Following the Geneva Conference in 1954, which resulted in the end of French colonial rule in Vietnam and the temporary division of the country pending nationwide elections in 1956, Ba Cut vowed not to cut his hair until Vietnamese reunification. Although most leaders of the Hoa Hao chose to support Ngo Dinh Diem’s regime in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), Ba Cut led 4,000 men against the South Vietnamese government until he was captured in April 1956. Condemned to death, Ba
Baez, Joan Chandos Birth Date: January 9, 1941 Popular American musician, songwriter, folk singer, and social protestor. Born on January 9, 1941, in Staten Island, New York, the daughter of a Mexican father and an Anglo mother, Joan Chandos Baez encountered discrimination at an early age. After briefly attending Boston University Fine Arts School, she dropped out to pursue a career in folk music. In 1959 she received an invitation to perform at the prestigious Newport Folk Festival, where the audience enjoyed her mysterious soprano voice and traditional style. Despite little original material, Baez recorded her debut album in 1960 and within two years had sold more folk records than any other American female singer. She altered her act in 1963 with songs written by Bob Dylan, with whom she often appeared and collaborated. Although their personal and professional relationship ultimately failed, the collaboration nonetheless pushed Baez to social protest and humanitarian causes. In the 1960s Baez dedicated herself to myriad protest movements. She sang and marched for civil rights in the South, and in August 1963 she led Reverend Martin Luther King Jr. and hundreds of thousands of demonstrators in singing “We Shall Overcome” during King’s March on Washington. Baez was a severe critic of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, often making significant financial donations to antiwar movements and draft-resistance groups. While performing at a reception to honor President Lyndon B. Johnson, Baez performed Dylan’s “The Times They Are A-Changin’” and voiced her opposition to the war in Vietnam. In 1964 she informed the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) that she would not pay that portion of her taxes going to the armed forces. The following year Baez gained international recognition when she established the School for the Study of Nonviolence to
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Folk singers Joan Baez and Bob Dylan entertain demonstrators during the 1963 March on Washington. (National Archives)
examine the concept, history, and various applications of nonviolence. Her activities in 1967 included an antiwar performance in Tokyo; a draft card turn-in and concert for 30,000 people at the Washington Monument in Washington, D.C.; and her arrest along with her mother and sister for demonstrating at an induction center in California. At the 1969 Woodstock Festival, Baez, the most experienced protest singer of the many performers, brought an intellectual and political element to the generally reckless nature of the proceedings. In 1972 Baez visited Hanoi as a guest of the Committee for Solidarity with the American People and was there during the so-called Christmas Bombings. Upon her return home she produced a bitter antiwar album, Where Are You Now, My Son? The album included recordings from her time in Hanoi. After the mid-1970s Baez was not as successful as she had been in the 1960s, but she continued to perform on behalf of humanitarian causes and was active in numerous protest movements. Among the social causes that Baez has more recently championed are gay and lesbian rights, environmental issues, international human rights, poverty mitigation, and opposition to the death penalty. During the 1991 Persian Gulf War and again during the 2003 Anglo-American– led invasion of Iraq, she performed at numerous protest rallies around the United States. Baez continues to write, sing, and record
songs, having released more than 30 albums in her career; she also continues to perform alone and in concert in a variety of venues. DALLAS COTHRUM See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Dylan, Bob; Music and the Vietnam War; Woodstock References Baez, Joan. And a Voice to Sing With: A Memoir. New York: New American Library, 1987. Garza, Hedda. Joan Baez. New York: Chelsea House, 1991. Scadato, Anthony. Bob Dylan. New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1971.
Ball, George Wildman Birth Date: December 21, 1909 Death Date: May 26, 1994 Lawyer, diplomat, presidential adviser, and steadfast opponent of the Vietnam War. Born in Des Moines, Iowa, on December 21, 1909, George Wildman Ball was educated at Northwestern University, where he earned a bachelor’s degree in 1930 and a law degree in 1933. Admitted to the Illinois bar in 1934, he pursued a
Baltimore Four successful career as a lawyer with both federal government agencies and private firms. From 1933 to 1935 Ball served in the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of General Counsel. During World War II he served with the Lend-Lease Administration (1940–1942) and as director of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey in London from 1944 to 1945. For a few months during 1945–1946 he also served as general counsel of the French Supply Council in Washington, D.C. Later in 1946 Ball returned to his legal practice and became involved in Democratic Party presidential politics, first on behalf of Adlai Stevenson, who ran for the presidency in 1952 and 1956, and then on behalf of John F. Kennedy. After Kennedy received the 1960 Democratic presidential nomination, Ball drew up a memorandum that urged the Kennedy campaign to begin a comprehensive review of U.S. foreign policy for the new decade. Kennedy liked the idea, and Ball ultimately bore the responsibility for drafting the report, which was well received. When Kennedy assumed office in January 1961, he named Ball undersecretary of state for economic affairs and, later, undersecretary of state, a post he held until 1966. A close adviser to President Kennedy, Ball became an early opponent of American military involvement in Vietnam. In November 1961 he privately warned Kennedy that committing troops there would prove a tragic error. “Within five years we’ll have 300,000 men in the paddies and jungles,” Ball predicted. “That was the French experience.” Kennedy replied that Ball was “just crazier
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than hell.” Although Ball was best known for his antipathy to U.S. military involvement in Vietnam, he also participated in the secret meetings of the Executive Committee (EXCOM) during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, brokered a wheat deal with the Soviet Union, and served as a mediator for crises in Cyprus, Pakistan, the Congo, and the Dominican Republic. Following Kennedy’s November 1963 assassination, Ball continued in his role as devil’s advocate in the Lyndon B. Johnson administration, arguing against escalation of the war in Vietnam. Ball opposed the conflict on the grounds that Southeast Asia was diverting attention from more important European affairs. Instead, he sought de-escalation and a political settlement with Hanoi. Realizing that his position with the Johnson administration was increasingly untenable, Ball resigned in 1966 and returned to private legal practice. Ball’s public service days were not over, for in 1968 he was called upon to chair a committee investigating the Pueblo Incident. Later that same year Johnson nominated Ball to become the permanent U.S. representative to the United Nations (UN), a post he was reluctant to take. Nevertheless Johnson pressured Ball, who took up the post in June 1968. In September, however, he resigned, fearing that Republican Party presidential nominee Richard M. Nixon was poised to win the November 1968 election. Ball subsequently campaigned hard for Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey, who lost the contest to Nixon by a narrow margin. Had Humphrey won, Ball would undoubtedly have been named secretary of state. After Nixon took office in 1969, Ball continued to openly criticize the U.S. government’s Vietnam policies until the conflict finally ended with an American withdrawal in 1973. Ball remained active in diplomatic and Democratic Party political circles, serving as an ad hoc adviser to President Jimmy Carter in the 1970s and to the early Bill Clinton administration in the 1990s. Ball wrote five books after he left office in 1968 and was working on a sixth when he died of cancer in New York City on May 26, 1994. JAMES FRIGUGLIETTI AND PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR. See also Carter, James Earl, Jr.; Clinton, William Jefferson; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Stevenson, Adlai Ewing, II; United Nations and the Vietnam War References Ball, George W. The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs. New York: Norton, 1982. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997.
Baltimore Four George W. Ball, undersecretary of state for economic affairs, after taking his oath of office in Washington, D.C., February 1, 1961. Ball was a major critic of the Lyndon B. Johnson administration’s Vietnam War policies. (AP/Wide World Photos)
Group of antiwar activists that orchestrated a raid on a draft board office in Baltimore, Maryland, on October 17, 1967. The incident was spearheaded by Father Philip Berrigan, a Roman Catholic priest and well-known peace activist. After having participated in
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numerous antiwar protests and actions, Berrigan decided to make a bold statement by raiding the local draft board offices located in the Baltimore Custom House in downtown Baltimore. Berrigan sought to move from dissent to open resistance. Accompanying Berrigan in his act of defiance were Tom Lewis, an artist, teacher, and author; David Eberhardt; and Reverend James L. Mengel, a missionary and pastor of the United Church of Christ. On October 17, 1967, in broad daylight and in the presence of draft board employees, Berrigan and Lewis casually entered the office of the Baltimore Draft Board. Despite warning from the employees, the two men walked around a long counter and began opening filing cabinets, searching for draft cards. Eberhardt and Mengel meanwhile physically kept the employees at bay, preventing them from stopping Berrigan and Lewis. Using vials of blood (some of which came from the four men, the rest being poultry blood purchased from a butcher), Berrigan, Lewis, and Eberhardt proceeded to deface and ruin numerous draft cards by pouring the blood onto them. Mengel handed out Bibles to the employees, newsmen, and curious onlookers as the Baltimore Four waited for police to arrive. None of the men threatened anyone or used violence to carry out their act of resistance. Nevertheless, all four were promptly arrested and put on trial. Berrigan provided a written statement explaining the group’s actions: “This sacrificial and constructive act is meant to protest the pitiful waste of American and Vietnamese blood in Indochina.” All four men were subsequently found guilty. Berrigan and Lewis received six-year sentences, Eberhardt received a two-year sentence, and Mengel was given probation and ordered to undergo psychiatric evaluation. The incident and trial received much domestic and international coverage and helped spur on the growing antiwar movement in the United States. In May 1968 Berrigan, who had been released on bail, and his brother Daniel, also a Roman Catholic priest, staged an even bigger raid on a local draft board office in Catonsville, Maryland. That protest would ignite an even bigger groundswell of civil disobedience among antiwar protesters. The Baltimore Four action is considered the first openly defiant act against a local draft board in the United States. After the Baltimore Four there were more than 100 copycat groups that perpetrated various acts of resistance against draft boards. By 1972, draft board raids had all but ceased, however, as U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War wound down. PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR.
Ban Karai Pass
See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Berrigan, Daniel; Berrigan, Philip; Camden 28; Catonsville Nine
See also
References Berrigan, Daniel. To Dwell in Peace: An Autobiography. New York: HarperCollins, 1988. Polner, Murray, and Jim O’Grady. Disarmed and Dangerous: The Radical Life and Times of Daniel and Philip Berrigan, Brothers in Religious Faith and Civil Disobedience. New York: Basic Books, 1997.
References Head, William P. “Playing Hide-and-Seek with the ‘Trail’: Operation Commando Hunt, 1968–1972.” Journal of Third World Studies 19(1) (Spring 2002): 101–115. Mark, Eduard. Aerial Interdiction: Air Power and Land Battle in Three American Wars. Washington, DC: Center for Air Force History, 1994.
Located in rugged mountains on the border between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and Laos, Ban Karai Pass was considered a major gateway to the beginning of the Ho Chi Minh Trail logistics network from North Vietnam into Laos and then the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Route 137 traversed through the pass. The construction of infiltration routes began in the 1950s during the Indochina War, although the Ho Chi Minh Trail can be said to date from 1959. In the early 1960s Hanoi sought to expand and upgrade the infiltration network by carving roads through mountain passes as high as 5,000 feet, an arduous task that necessitated hacking through dense jungles and fording raging rivers. By 1971, the North Vietnamese had expanded the Ho Chi Minh Trail from a jungle footpath into thousands of miles of motor roads. Hanoi subdivided southern Laos into 15 semiautonomous military districts, or Binh Trams, each with a commander responsible for keeping his section of the route open. Truck convoys carrying supplies and troops began their journey from the supply hub at Vinh, North Vietnam, through the Mu Gia and Ban Karai passes. Traffic moved mostly at night; in daylight vehicles were concealed under camouflage in the jungle. The U.S. Seventh Air Force bombed the caravans using squaremile boxes labeled A, B, C, and D representing the Mu Gia, Ban Karai, Ban Raving, and Nape passes, respectively. The passes, including Ban Karai, were a major focus of U.S. air strikes throughout the course of the Vietnam War but never more so than during Operation COMMANDO HUNT (November 1968–March 1972). At that time the passes were a chief target for B-52 bombers, their bombs causing massive landslides, altering the courses of rivers, flattening elevations, and stripping vegetation from the jungles, all in an effort to block the passes. The bombing transformed the area into a virtual wasteland. In theory, once the passes had been closed, U.S. aircraft could then attack trucks and supply centers with impunity, reducing the flow of supplies and troops into South Vietnam. While the number of bombs dropped seemed impressive, the fact that the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) was able to mass 14 divisions and 200 tanks for a major offensive into South Vietnam on March 30, 1972, brought into question the effectiveness of the raids. WILLIAM P. HEAD COMMANDO HUNT, Operation; Ho Chi Minh Trail; Mu Gia Pass; Laos; Viet
Minh; Vinh
Ban Me Thuot, Battle of Tilford, Earl H., Jr. Crosswinds: The Air Force’s Setup in Vietnam. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1993.
Ban Me Thuot, Battle of Start Date: March 10, 1975 End Date: March 12, 1975 The first major battle of the final People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) offensive in the Vietnam War that took place during March 10–12, 1975, at Ban Me Thuot, a city in the Central Highlands and the capital of Darlac Province. Encouraged by the failure of the United States to respond militarily to their seizure of Phuoc Long Province in early January 1975, two months later the PAVN undertook an offensive, code-named CAMPAIGN 275. Under the direct supervision of General Van Tien Dung, the operation was to prepare the way for a decisive general offensive the following year. CAMPAIGN 275 began with small diversionary attacks north of Ban Me Thuot, followed on March 4 by the isolation of the Central Highlands from the coast with the blocking of Route 19
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east of Pleiku and the cutting off of Route 21 a day later. Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) II Corps commander Major General Pham Van Phu ignored mounting evidence of the forthcoming attack on Ban Me Thuot, convinced that the main blow would fall on or near his Pleiku headquarters. On March 8 Dung’s forces blocked Route 14 between Pleiku and Ban Me Thuot. Attacks in Quang Duc Province, south of Ban Me Thuot, began the following day. Early on March 10 three PAVN divisions moved against Ban Me Thuot, sidestepping outlying defenses to attack command posts and supply depots. Initially the ARVN put up a stout resistance, particularly at the Phung Duc airfield east of the city. Destruction of the ARVN sector command post ended defensive coordination, and ARVN attempts to reinforce the city from Buon Ho to the north failed. By March 12 General Dung’s forces had secured the city, although fighting continued on its periphery and around the Phung Duc airfield. An ARVN attempt to mount a counterattack from Phuoc An to the east failed as airlifted soldiers deserted in large numbers to save their families. With many of the city’s defenders and their dependents already fleeing in disarray toward the coast, resistance ended entirely on March 18.
A refugee family flees fighting in and around the key Central Highlands city of Ban Me Thuot in South Vietnam, March 14, 1975. The struggle for Ban Me Thuot was the opening battle in the final People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) offensive. (AP/Wide World Photos)
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Bao Dai
On March 14 President Nguyen Van Thieu made a difficult situation worse when he ordered the withdrawal of regular ARVN forces from the Central Highlands in an attempt to bolster defenses around Saigon and along the coast. A complete debacle ensued. Neither regional forces nor civil administrators were informed of Thieu’s plan, and when General Phu’s units began to withdraw, thousands of civilians, many already in flight from Kontum, joined the exodus. General Phu, abandoning his command, flew to Nha Trang. Although the South Vietnamese forces surprised the enemy by withdrawing along Route 7B, an abandoned provincial highway, General Dung soon had units moving to engage them. PAVN troops struck the fleeing column at Cheo Reo on March 18, and from that time on the commingled mass of disorganized military and civilian refugees suffered almost constant attack. They sustained heavy casualties, and only a small fraction managed to reach the coast. The withdrawal from the Central Highlands dealt a devastating blow to South Vietnamese morale and furthered the disintegration of its military. PAVN forces occupied Kontum and Pleiku on March 18, and two days later the Hanoi Politburo began to reevaluate its timetable for the final offensive, sensing that it need not wait until 1976 to achieve complete victory. By April 3, 1975, all of the major coastal cities in the ARVN II Corps area except Phan Rang had fallen to Dung’s rapidly advancing troops. JOHN M. GATES See also Nguyen Van Thieu; Pham Van Phu; Van Tien Dung
crowned emperor, taking the imperial name Bao Dai (“Keeper or Preserver of Greatness” or “Protector of Grandeur”) before returning to France. The French government did not permit him to return to Vietnam until September 10, 1932. Enthusiastic about forming a loyal alliance between the colonial power and his own government, Bao Dai was left with little maneuvering room. The 1884 Treaty of Protectorate gave France the ability to manage affairs as it wished, and the Agreement of 1925 stripped the Vietnamese court of most of its remaining authority, leaving emperors with little to do except issue ritual decrees. All other matters would be left to the French resident superior. Undaunted, Bao Dai began a series of reforms. He hoped in that fashion to erect a modern imperial government and to convince France to establish a framework allowing limited independence for Vietnam under his rule. He fired most of his Francophile mandarin advisers in order to bring new blood into the Vien Co Mat, or cabinet. He established the Commission of Reform, abolished the requirement that people prostrate themselves in his presence, and dissolved his official harem. In 1933 he promulgated his Labor Charter, prohibiting requisitioned labor except in time of public emergency. The French stymied his zeal at every turn, however. In March 1934 Bao Dai married a daughter of the wealthy Nguyen Huu Hao, Marie-Therese Nguyen, who became Empress Nam Phuong. As Bao Dai’s enthusiasm for reform waned, he settled into a sedentary life, browbeaten also by his mother. He complained of debilitating migraine headaches and neurasthenia, characterized by fatigue, depression, worry, and localized pains without apparent
References Dougan, Clark, and David Fulghum. The Fall of the South. The Vietnam Experience Series. Boston: Boston Publishing, 1984. Hosmer, Stephen T., Konrad Kellen, and Brian M. Jenkins. The Fall of South Vietnam: Statements by Vietnamese Military and Civilian Leaders. New York: Crane, Russak, 1980. Isaacs, Arnold R. Without Honor: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983. Le Gro, William E. Vietnam from Cease-Fire to Capitulation. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1981. Van Tien Dung. Our Great Spring Victory. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977.
Bao Dai Birth Date: October 22, 1913 Death Date: July 30, 1997 The last of the Nguyen emperors. Bao Dai, son of Khai Dinh, was born in Hue on October 22, 1913, and was named Nguyen Phuoc Vinh Thuy. Educated in France, he lived with a wealthy dignitary’s family under the charge of nannies and tutors and was immersed in the French language as well as French history, music, and art. He did not return to Vietnam until the death of his father, whose funeral he attended in November 1925. On January 8, 1926, he was
Bao Dai, the last of the Nguyen emperors, and his first wife, Empress Nam Phuong. After the start of the Indochina War, Bao Dai struck a deal with the French that led to the creation of the State of Vietnam, but the French never permitted it real independence and Bao Dai soon succumbed to a playboy lifestyle. (Library of Congress)
Barker, Frank Akeley, Jr. causes. He spent ever more time at his villa in Da Lat on hunting expeditions that lasted for weeks. With little else to do, he traveled regularly around Vietnam on ceremonial visits. He became a playboy governor, interested primarily in gambling, women, and hunting; reportedly he shot a large percentage of Vietnam’s tigers. As the years passed he was increasingly occupied with gambling on the French Riviera and jet-setting from one spa to another. Bao Dai cooperated with the Japanese during their World War II occupation and in March 1945, at their behest, declared independence from France in proclaiming the Empire of Viet Nam. In the few months allotted to this government Bao Dai tried to deal with northern famine, supported extensive press freedoms, and called on his people for support. It was not to be. With the collapse of the Japanese government, the Viet Minh took control during the August Revolution and called on Bao Dai to abdicate. This he did on August 25, 1945, becoming simply First Citizen Vinh Thuy. Elected to a seat in the new Viet Minh legislature from his dynasty’s ancestral home in Thanh Hoa Province, Vinh Thuy quickly became dissatisfied with his Communist overlords and left his country as part of an official diplomatic delegation to China. Bao Dai remained in Chongqing (Chungking) until September 1946, when he moved to Hong Kong and remained there through late 1947 until he returned to Europe. In June 1946 French high commissioner for Indochina Admiral Georges Thierry d’Argenlieu created the Autonomous Republic of Cochin China as a means to limit Viet Minh power and called on Bao Dai to serve as its head. Unenthusiastic, Bao Dai called instead for real Vietnamese independence. Émile Bollaert, d’Argenlieu’s replacement, continued to urge Bao Dai to return to Vietnam as chief of state. Bao Dai did so, somewhat reluctantly, after signing the Elysée Agreements with French president Vincent Auriol on March 8, 1949. Now designated as an Associated State within the French Union, the State of Vietnam received official acknowledgment on January 29, 1950, when the Elysée Accords were ratified by the French National Assembly. Bao Dai took up residence in Saigon and remained head of this government through the partitioning of Vietnam by the 1954 Geneva Conference and the first year of existence of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). In this capacity Bao Dai institutionalized corruption by his dealings with Le Van “Bay” Vien, leader of the Binh Xuyen gang, the illicit activities of which included control of opium trafficking, gold smuggling, racketeering, prostitution, and gambling in South Vietnam. Following the 1954 Geneva Accords, Bao Dai, then in France, named Ngo Dinh Diem as his premier. Later regretting this move, Bao Dai tried to regain control, finally authorizing one of his generals to lead a coup against Diem. This failed, and Diem then called for an election to determine whether the nation should be a monarchy or a republic. Held on October 23, 1955, the voting was supervised by Diem’s henchmen; Diem won handily and became the president of South Vietnam. Bao Dai spent much of the remainder of his life at his chateau near Cannes. His first wife died in 1968, and the next year he mar-
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ried Monique Baudot. From these two marriages he had two sons and four daughters. With most of his royal fortune gone, Bao Dai spent the final years of his exile in a modest Paris apartment. He died in a military hospital in Paris on July 30, 1997. CECIL B. CURREY See also Binh Xuyen; Bollaert, Émile; D’Argenlieu, Georges Thierry; Elysée Agreement; French Indochina, 1860s–1946; Le Van Vien; Vietnam, Republic of, 1954–1975 References Currey, Cecil B. “Bao Dai: The Last Emperor.” Viet Nam Generation 6(1–2) (1994): 199–206. Chapuis, Oscar. The Last Emperors of Vietnam: From Tu Duc to Bao Dai. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2000. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. Marr, David G. Vietnam 1945: The Quest for Power. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.
Barker, Frank Akeley, Jr. Birth Date: January 26, 1928 Death Date: June 13, 1968 Commander of Task Force Barker, a part of which committed the 1968 My Lai Massacre. Born in New Haven, Connecticut, on January 26, 1928, U.S. Army lieutenant colonel Frank A. Barker Jr. had previously served in Vietnam with the Special Forces. In March 1968 he commanded Task Force Barker, a battalion-sized strike force of the 11th Light Infantry Brigade, that on March 16, 1968, killed some 400 Vietnamese civilians in Son My village, in Quang Ngai Province, in what became known as the My Lai Massacre. Barker conceived and planned the My Lai operation against an area allegedly occupied by a large Viet Cong (VC) force. Whether or not Barker directly ordered the deliberate killing of noncombatants, Company C commander Captain Ernest Medina later testified that Barker had instructed him to destroy the hamlet known as My Lai. After the dimensions of the massacre and its cover-up became known, the Peers Inquiry concluded that at least 28 officers, including 2 generals and 4 colonels, were at fault, but only Lieutenant William Calley was convicted for wrongdoing. The inquiry found that Barker, who has killed in a helicopter crash on June 13, 1968, was culpable of at least 11 violations of army regulations, some of which were considered war crimes. Among his alleged violations were the following: he planned and directed an unlawful operation and created a belief that his men were authorized to kill noncombatants; the artillery preparation violated the intent of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), regulations; he intentionally or negligently told his commanders that no civilians would be present; he conspired to conceal the number of civilians killed, falsely attributing most of the casualties to artillery fire; he submitted a false and misleading
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after-action report; and he failed to investigate indications of war crimes that were reported to him. Barker’s report, which describes the operation as “well-planned, well-executed, and successful,” is a sad and dishonorable epitaph to what had been a promising military career. JOHN D. ROOT See also Calley, William Laws, Jr.; Medina, Ernest Lou; My Lai Massacre; Peers Inquiry References Belknap, Michael R. The Vietnam War on Trial: The My Lai Massacre and the Court-Martial of Lieutenant Calley. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002. Bolton, Michael, and Kevin Sim. Four Hours in My Lai. New York: Viking, 1992. Goldstein, Joseph, Burke Marshall, and Jack Schwartz. The My Lai Massacre and Its Cover-Up: Beyond the Reach of the Law? New York: Free Press, 1976.
BARREL ROLL,
Operation
Start Date: 1964 End Date: 1973 Allied air campaign carried out in northern Laos primarily to support ground forces of the Royal Lao Government and General Vang Pao’s Hmong (mountain people) irregular forces, trained by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The area of operation stretched from the Laotian capital of Vientiane on the border of Thailand north to the strategic Plain of Jars and then northeast to the Pathet Lao capital of Sam Neua in Sam Neua Province bordering the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). Operation BARREL ROLL was born out of the North Vietnamese government to support implementation of the July 1962 Geneva Accords, which declared Laos an independent and neutral state. In 1963 when Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma failed to create a coalition government as a result of Communist intransigence, he called for and received U.S. military aid in the form of arms and supplies, including North American T-28D Trojan aircraft. These trainers were adapted to a counterinsurgency role as fighter-bombers. In June 1964 in response to a Pathet Lao and People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) spring offensive in the Plain of Jars, allied air forces, with approval from President Lyndon Johnson, commenced Operation BARREL ROLL in support of Royal Laotian forces. The first attacks were on June 9 by U.S. Air Force North American F-100 Super Sabres against Communist antiaircraft artillery (AAA). Throughout its nine years, BARREL ROLL operated under a strange set of rules of engagement; all air assets were controlled by the U.S. ambassador in Vientiane. America’s three ambassadors during this time were, in succession, Leonard Unger, William H. Sullivan, and G. McMurtrie God-
ley. As head of the so-called Country Team (i.e., all the Americans in-country), they were responsible for directing all air operations in northern Laos. Although they did not develop the details, they did validate targets, usually with approval of the Laotian government. No target could be bombed without their permission. Attacks were often limited to specific areas to avoid hitting irregular units operating beyond the control of allied authorities. At the outset, the U.S. Air Force established Headquarters 2nd Air Division/Thirteenth Air Force at Udorn, Thailand, 45 miles from Vientiane to support the Royal Lao Air Force (RLAF). This command was headed by a major general who reported directly to the Thirteenth Air Force commander and the 2nd Air Division commander in Saigon as well as to the U.S. ambassadors in Thailand and Laos. This officer established actual directives for daily BARREL ROLL missions. The Udorn headquarters unit was redesignated Seventh Air Force/Thirteenth Air Force in April 1966 when the Seventh Air Force was established at Tan Son Nhut Air Base. The U.S. embassy in Vientiane also had an air staff that by the end of 1969 had grown to 125 personnel. There were also air operations centers in each of the five military regions of Laos. In turn, American-flown forward air controllers (FACs), known as “Ravens,” were also assigned to support Hmong units as well as Royal Laotian air and ground forces. Ravens flew Cessna O-1 Bird Dogs, Cessna U-17 Skywagons, and T-28Ds during their six-month tours of duty. They also employed Douglas C-47 Skytrains as airborne battlefield command and control centers. These tours were hazardous and unofficial, since the United States and Laos maintained the fiction of adhering to the 1962 Geneva Accords that forbade belligerent forces of any nation in Laos. Between 1965 and 1973 the war in Laos took on a regular pattern tied to the region’s weather. The makeup of the warring forces in Laos was almost exactly the opposite of those in Vietnam. In this case, the Communists had the regular army troops, tanks, and trucks, while the Hmongs, who did the vast majority of the fighting for the allies, operated most often as guerrilla or irregular units. Indeed, because Royal Lao Army (RLA) troops were generally poor fighters, U.S. interests increasingly depended on General Vang Pao’s youthful soldiers. However, attrition soon took its toll, and by the 1970s the United States was also depending on Thai volunteer forces. Given the relative size and firepower of Hmong and Communist forces (increasingly PAVN regulars), it was the Hmongs who used the monsoon season (April–August) to take to the offensive; the Pathet Lao and PAVN, needing open roads, used the dry season (September–March) to launch counterattacks. Even though Vang Pao’s forces were most often outnumbered and outgunned, with significant support from U.S. and RLAF airpower they not only held their own but often launched highly successful offensives deep into Communist territory. By August 1966 Hmong forces had pushed to within 45 miles of the North Vietnamese border, only to be countered by 14,000 PAVN regulars and 30,000 Pathet Lao. By April of the next year the Communist counteroffensive had overrun several key Royal
BARREL ROLL, Operation
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Sorties Conducted and Ordnance Dropped by the U.S. Air Force as Part of Operation BARREL ROLL Phase 1: November 1968–July 1970
Phase 2: August 1970–March 1972
Phase 3: April 1972–February 1973
Total
Location
Sorties
Ordnance Dropped (tons)
Sorties
Ordnance Dropped (tons)
Sorties
Ordnance Dropped (tons)
Sorties
Ordnance Dropped (tons)
South Vietnam North Vietnam Cambodia Laos Total
239,952 867 9,266 241,741 491,826
1,044,024 1,559 21,384 902,223 1,969,190
38,767 1,702 25,065 140,217 205,751
203,941 4,989 76,856 688,935 974,721
80,921 44,431 5,479 19,338 150,169
541,062 230,588 45,305 108,089 925,044
359,640 47,000 39,810 401,296 847,746
1,789,027 237,136 143,545 1,699,247 3,868,955
Lao and Hmong villages and defensive positions including several Lima sites (LSs), mountaintop strong-point bases. By diverting significant numbers of aircraft from Operation ROLLING THUNDER in North Vietnam, intensive U.S. air strikes halted Communist advances and allowed Vang Pao’s forces to go on the offensive during the monsoon season of 1967. However, the dry season of late 1967 and early 1968 witnessed another counterattack led by PAVN regulars using Soviet tanks and Soviet AN-2 Colt aircraft to overrun several allied towns and bases, including the key LS85 position only 25 miles from Sam Neua and 180 miles west of Hanoi. LS85 had an important 700-foot runway and tactical air navigation system built by U.S. Air Force personnel in 1966. In late 1967 this system was augmented with an all-weather unit manned by 19 U.S. Air Force personnel. Not only did PAVN forces capture and destroy the site in March 1968, but they killed 7 of the U.S. airmen. The ebb and flow of events continued in 1968 and 1969. The Communists employed more and better Soviet tanks and artillery throughout. In spite of these additions, RLA and Hmong forces enjoyed their greatest victories in the summer of 1969. By September of that year, supported by hundreds of BARREL ROLL sorties, they had taken nearly all of the Plain of Jars, including Xieng Khouang. They captured enormous caches of ammunition, supplies, food, and fuel as well as 12 frontline tanks, 13 jeeps, and 30 trucks. Unfortunately for the allies, the Communist counteroffensive that began in December 1969 retook all the lost territory, including Xieng Khouang and most of the high ground surrounding the Plain of Jars. So significant was it that in February 1970 Ambassador Godley was forced to beg President Richard M. Nixon for Boeing B-52 Stratofortress strikes to save the situation. During February 17–18, 1970, B-52s flew 36 sorties and dropped 1,078 tons of bombs. During the first battle for Skyline Ridge, B-52s, supported by truck-killing night-raiding T-28Ds, AC47s, Fairchild AC-119 gunships, and Lockheed AC-130 Spectres, flew nearly 3,000 sorties. By March 18, 1970, Communist forces had been beaten back from Vang Pao’s base camp at Long Tieng. The next year the Communists repeated their successes during the second battle for Skyline Ridge, only to be pushed back again by determined Hmong defenders and 1,500 American air sorties. Between August and November 1972 a third PAVN offensive
pushed to within 16 miles of Long Tieng, only to be halted by massive B-52 and General Dynamics F-111 Aardvark strikes. On November 10, 1972, cease-fire talks began between the Pathet Lao and the Royal Lao Government of Souvanna Phouma. Anticipating a cease-fire, Communist forces used the negotiation period to mop up Royal Lao outposts on the Plain of Jars. On February 21, 1973, Washington signed the cease-fire agreement and all but abandoned its Laotian allies. While B-52 sorties were flown on February 23 followed by tactical aircraft sorties in April, because of potential cease-fire violations they were futile gestures. The last BARREL ROLL sortie was flown on April 17, 1973. Before the end of the war, allied aircraft had dropped more than 3 million tons of bombs on Laos, three times the tonnage dropped on North Vietnam. Of this number, 500,000 tons were dropped in northern Laos. From 1965 to 1968, allied aircraft flew fewer than 100 sorties per day on average over northern Laos. In 1969 this number jumped to approximately 300, but in 1970 it fell back to 200 and from 1971 to 1973 returned to pre-1969 levels. As with other Laotian air operations such as STEEL TIGER and TIGER HOUND, the numbers and performance were impressive but in the end proved fruitless. WILLIAM P. HEAD See also Airpower, Role in War; Geneva Accords of 1962; Godley, George McMurtrie; Hmongs; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Laos; Lima Site 85; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Plain of Jars; Raven Forward Air Controllers; ROLLING THUNDER, Operation; Souvanna Phouma; STEEL TIGER, Operation; Sullivan, William Healy; TIGER HOUND, Operation; Vang Pao; Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, Army References Berger, Carl, ed. The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, 1961– 1973: An Illustrated Account. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1977. Momyer, William W. Airpower in Three Wars: World War II, Korea and Vietnam. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978. Morrocco, John. Rain of Fire: Air War, 1969–1973. The Vietnam Experience Series. Boston: Boston Publishing, 1985. Morrocco, John, et al., eds. Thunder from Above: Air War, 1941–1968. The Vietnam Experience Series. Boston: Boston Publishing, 1984. Schlight, John. The War in South Vietnam: The Years of the Offensive, 1965–1968. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1988. Tilford, Earl H., Jr. Crosswinds: The Air Force’s Setup in Vietnam. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1993.
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Ba Trieu See Trieu Au
Beau, Jean-Baptiste Paul Birth Date: January 26, 1857 Death Date: February 14, 1927 French government administrator, diplomat, and governorgeneral of French Indochina (1902–1908). Jean-Baptiste Paul Beau (usually known as Paul Beau) was born in Bordeaux on January 26, 1857. He entered the French diplomatic service in 1882. Ten years later he was head of the Bureau of Personnel in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1894 he was an aide to Foreign Minister Gabriel Hanotaux. Two years later Beau was chief of staff to French premier Léon Bourgeois. Beau then performed the same functions for Foreign Minister Theophile Delcassé. In 1901 Delcassé sent Beau to Beijing to negotiate peace with China following the Boxer Rebellion. In June 1902 Premier Pierre Waldeck-Rousseau appointed Beau governor-general of French Indochina, succeeding Paul Doumer; Beau took up his duties that October. In contrast to his predecessor, Beau fostered assimilation. Although his administration paid lip service to the principle of association, Beau pursued a whole range of assimilationist policies. He believed that France had the duty to bring about material change and also to reform Vietnamese customs and institutions. Handicapped by financial constraints (the good harvests of the Doumer years gave way to three bad harvests in a row under Beau), he was able to reform only those areas that involved little capital outlay. Beau reorganized the administrative system. In the first serious attempts at a form of representative government, he created provincial councils and advisory chambers at the regional level in Annam and Tonkin. These had both fiscal and administrative responsibilities. Beau was heavily involved in educational reform, although it should be pointed out that through World War I Franco-Vietnamese education was limited to the largest cities. In 1906 Beau created a public educational system based on three levels: primary, secondary, and university. Primary education was based on the vernacular. Because the government considered education in Chinese characters a barrier to modernization, it provided textbooks in the Vietnamese romanized writing form of quoc ngu (“national language”). Chinese and French studies were added at the higher levels, and courses in such modern subjects as mathematics and science were increased. These subjects were also added to the civil service examinations. At the highest level, Beau created a university at Hanoi composed of colleges of literature, law, and natural science. It should be borne in mind, however, that these reforms by no means made for universal education in Vietnam. Even after World War I, only some 10 percent of Vietnamese of school age were attending Franco-Vietnamese schools.
Beau also greatly improved the quality of local medical care and worked to reduce the opium trade. He also ended certain corporal punishments. In addition, he was instrumental in railroad construction, made Saigon very much a European city, and negotiated with Siam (present-day Thailand) the 1907 demarcation of the borders between that country and Cambodia that saw the retrocession of the provinces of Angkor and Battambang to Cambodia. Beau’s hopes that his reforms would make the Vietnamese more grateful to France proved fleeting. Many French in Vietnam considered the reforms dangerously radical, while Vietnamese patriots, such as Phan Chu Trinh, considered them totally insufficient. With the example of an Asian nation defeating a European power in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) and resentment to heavy taxes resulting from poor harvests during the Beau years, the French administration found itself having to deal with rising Vietnamese nationalism. Beau forfeited what confidence he had gained from the Vietnamese by ordering the 1907 exile of Emperor Thanh Thai after the latter had demanded political reforms. The necessity of maintaining order co-opted Beau’s policy of cooperation. In 1908 Beau published a multivolume account of his tenure in Indochina. Recalled to France in February of that year, he became minister plenipotentiary to Belgium. Three years later he was ambassador to Switzerland, where he performed important service for France during World War I. After the war he served on the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations. Beau died in Paris on February 14, 1927. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Annam; Assimilation versus Association; Doumer, Paul; Franco-Thai War; French Indochina, 1860s–1946; Phan Chu Trinh; Quoc Ngu; Thanh Thai; Tonkin References Beau, Paul. Situation de L’Indo-Chine de 1902 à 1907. 2 vols. Saigon: Imprimerie Commerciale Marcellin Rey, 1908. Buttinger, Joseph. The Smaller Dragon: A Political History of Vietnam. New York: Praeger, 1958. Chapuis, Oscar. The Last Emperors of Vietnam: From Tu Duc to Bao Dai. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2000. Duiker, William J. The Rise of Nationalism in Vietnam, 1900–1911. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976. Prevost, M., and Roman D. Amat, eds. Dictionnaire de Biographie Française, Vol. 5. Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Ané, 1951. Thompson, Virginia. French Indo-China. New York: Octagon Books, 1968.
Beckwith, Charles Alvin Birth Date: January 22, 1929 Death Date: June 13, 1994 U.S. Army officer and U.S. Army Special Forces leader. Charles Alvin Beckwith was born on January 22, 1929, in Atlanta, Georgia. In high school he was an outstanding all-state football player, and he went on to play football at the University of Georgia. Beckwith
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U.S. Army Special Forces colonel Charles Beckwith, who is largely credited with the creation of Delta Force and who led the unsuccessful attempt to rescue the Americans held hostage in Iran, at the White House ceremony for the released hostages on January 27, 1981. (AP/Wide World Photos)
also participated in the university’s Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) program and upon graduation in 1952 was commissioned a second lieutenant. In the mid-1950s Beckwith was assigned to the elite 82nd Airborne Division, where he was a support company commander of the 504th Infantry Regiment. In 1957 he joined the U.S. Army Special Forces (Green Berets), an unconventional warfare branch that became a high priority of the John F. Kennedy administration. Beckwith went to Southeast Asia in 1960 and served as military adviser in Laos and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). This was followed by a tour as an exchange officer in Great Britain with that nation’s elite Special Air Service (SAS) during 1962–1963. Beckwith was impressed by both the antiterrorism focus of the SAS and the expertise and effectiveness of the unit. Beckwith returned to Vietnam to command a Special Forces unit dubbed Project Delta, a 250-man force. In 1966 he was seriously wounded in combat while flying in a helicopter. Medical personnel initially estimated the wound to his abdomen, caused by a large 50-caliber bullet, as fatal and his condition as hopeless. Nevertheless, he recovered fully from the wound, a result credited to his iron will and superb physical condition. After his service in Vietnam, Beckwith assumed command of the Florida component of the rigorous U.S. Army Ranger School. In this assignment he is credited with reforming the school to ad-
dress unconventional Vietnam War–style challenges and environments. The program previously had been based on the U.S. Army’s lessons from conventional military conflicts, in particular World War II. Beckwith’s work with the rangers made it a unit that was well prepared to deal with both regular and irregular warfare. Beckwith, promoted to colonel in 1976, played a principal role in the formation of Delta Force, formally known as the 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment–Delta. This elite fighting unit, formally established in 1977, was in part inspired by and based generally on the British SAS antiterrorism unit. Beckwith had repeatedly sought to create an American version of the SAS, and his superiors finally gave in to his urgings in 1974. The unit focuses on countering terrorists, including hostage rescues, specialized reconnaissance, and other particularly demanding and irregular warfare missions. Beckwith became generally well known to the public as the commander of the unsuccessful Operation EAGLE CLAW in April 1980, which involved a special interservice military task force to rescue the American embassy hostages being held in Tehran, Iran. The embassy had been overrun and occupied on November 4, 1979, and American diplomatic personnel were taken captive at that time and held for 444 days. The complex rescue effort involved a dangerous night flight across Iran by RH-53D helicopters and a rendezvous in a remote desert location in Iran with C-130 aircraft. Three of the eight
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helicopters on the mission experienced mechanical problems en route, leaving one ship less than the minimum required for success. Beckwith himself took the decision on April 25, 1979, to terminate the mission at the rendezvous site. A collision in the dark between a helicopter and an aircraft killed three marines and five airmen and seriously injured eight others. The incident ended Beckwith’s military career, and he retired in 1981 at the rank of colonel. His book Delta Force, published in 1983, blamed the failure of the mission on the marines piloting the helicopters and the helicopters themselves, which he argued were not designed for operation in adverse conditions such as the ones found in the Iranian desert. Beckwith’s principal legacy is his devotion to the development of unconventional warfare skills and techniques, primarily through the Special Forces and Delta Force. After leaving the service he formed his own security company, Security Assistance Services, in Austin, Texas, where he died suddenly on June 13, 1994. ARTHUR I. CYR See also Project Delta; United States Special Forces References Beckwith, Charlie A., and Donald Knox. Delta Force: The Army’s Elite Counterterrorist Unit. New York: Avon Books/HarperCollins, 2000. Stanton, Shelby L. Green Berets at War: U.S. Army Special Forces in Southeast Asia, 1956–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985.
Ben Suc Vietnamese village along the Saigon River at the southwestern boundary of the Iron Triangle and site of the blocking position in Operation CEDAR FALLS (January 8–26, 1967). Operation CEDAR FALLS, the first corps-sized search-and-destroy operation of the war, was a hammer-and-anvil attack directed against the Iron Triangle and headquarters of Viet Cong (VC) Military Region IV. The anvil, or blocking position, was along the Saigon River at the southwestern boundary of the Iron Triangle. Ben Suc and three nearby villages housed a VC base responsible for moving supplies by sampan along the river. At 8:00 a.m. on January 8 without preparatory artillery fire, 60 transport helicopters protected by 10 armed helicopters lifted 500 men of the 2nd Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division directly into Ben Suc itself. The assault achieved tactical surprise. Artillery fire was then directed north of the village to prevent escape by that route and at 8:30 a.m. men from the 2nd Brigade were airlifted south of the village to block escape in that direction. There were no U.S. casualties, and by midmorning the village was secured. An Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) battalion that had been driven out of the area by the VC months earlier then returned to conduct a methodical search of Ben Suc. The village itself was destroyed. Bulldozers knocked down buildings, scrub trees, and brush. Acetylene gas, explosives, and, later,
Vietnamese forced to leave their homes at Ben Suc on the Saigon River in the Iron Triangle area near Saigon during Operation CEDAR FALLS on January 11, 1967. U.S. forces surrounded the Viet Cong–controlled area and evacuated its population to a refugee center north of Saigon. (AP/Wide World Photos)
Ben Tre, Battle of bombs were used to collapse VC tunnels beneath the village. Nearly 6,000 villagers (some 3,500 of them from Ben Suc), two-thirds of them children, were removed to a resettlement camp at Phu Loi. By January 26 engineers had cleared some 2,711 acres of jungle. For the most part, VC forces avoided battle and escaped. For all of CEDAR FALLS, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), reported 750 VC and People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) killed, 280 captured, and 540 defectors. Allied losses came to 83 killed and 345 wounded. Although a setback for the VC, the operation was hardly what Major General William DePuy, commander of the 1st Infantry Division, characterized as a “turning point . . . and a blow from which the VC in this area may never recover.” Indeed, Communist forces soon returned there. For the villagers, relocation was a nightmare. They were allowed only such personal possessions as they could carry, and for security reasons no advance preparations had been made to receive them at Phu Loi. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also CEDAR FALLS, Operation; Iron Triangle; Search and Destroy
References Rogers, Bernard W. Cedar Falls Junction City: A Turning Point. Vietnam Studies Series. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1974. Schnell, Jonathan. The Village of Ben Suc. New York: Knopf, 1967.
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Ben Tre, Battle of Start Date: January 31, 1968 End Date: February 2, 1968 A fierce battle raged for control of Ben Tre in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) during the 1968 Communist Tet Offensive. Ben Tre, with a population of 18,000 people, was the capital of Ben Tre Province, located less than 50 miles south of Saigon in the northeastern region of the Mekong Delta. The area around the town is covered with rice paddies and coconut groves. During the month prior to Tet, tension remained high in the province as intelligence reports indicated Viet Cong (VC) units moving into staging areas prior to the launching of ground attacks. VC units numbering some 2,500 men began to infiltrate Ben Tre during the night of January 30–31, 1968. Gunfire broke out at 4:00 a.m., followed by a mortar barrage and small-arms fire that lashed the downtown South Vietnamese administrative bunker complex. After fierce fighting, Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) forces secured the vicinity of the provincial hospital and reinforced troops at the beleaguered local radio station. Beginning in the afternoon and continuing through the next morning, two battalions of the U.S. 9th Infantry Division were deployed by air to prevent the town from being overrun.
The central market hall of the provincial capital of Ben Tre in the Mekong Delta of South Vietnam and much of the city lie in ruins as a result of fighting during the Tet Offensive in early 1968. Some 1,000 civilians died at Ben Tre. (AP/Wide World Photos)
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Until fighting subsided on February 2, allied infantry supported by air strikes successfully battled to clear the VC from the urban area. During the fighting nearly 1,000 civilians were killed, more than 50 percent of the town’s houses were destroyed, and many of the remaining 2,000 structures were badly damaged. Allied military casualties around Ben Tre numbered 101 killed and 242 wounded; VC casualties came to approximately 300. The most notable quote to emerge from the Tet Offensive resulted when a U.S. Army briefing officer reportedly attempted to explain the widescale destruction in Ben Tre by saying that “It became necessary to destroy the town to save it.” GLENN E. HELM
Vietnamese Army) was “developing a healthy professional quality.” Berger remained a “hopeful pessimist.” In February 1971 he wrote that the operations in Laos and Cambodia were accomplishing what had been hoped for. After he had finished his four-year tour, he optimistically wrote that “I do not believe that they [the Communists] will succeed.” In 1973 Berger received an appreciative letter from President Nixon thanking him for serving “America with such dedication” and helping to “achieve the honorable peace we fought for.” Berger died on February 12, 1980, and is buried at Arlington National Cemetery. PAUL S. DAUM AND B. J. ROGERS
See also Tet Offensive, Overall Strategy; Tet Offensive and the Saigon Circle
See also Bundy, William Putnam; Harriman, William Averell; Nguyen Van Thieu; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Vietnamization
References Braestrup, Peter. Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1994. Oberdorfer, Don. TET! The Turning Point in the Vietnam War. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001. Pham Van Son and Le Van Duong, eds. The Viet Cong Tet Offensive. Saigon: Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, 1969.
References Berger, Graenum. Not So Silent an Envoy: A Biography of Ambassador Samuel David Berger. New Rochelle, NY: John Washburn Bleeker Hampton, 1992. Dougan, Clark, and Stephen Weiss. Nineteen Sixty-Eight. The Vietnam Experience Series. Boston: Boston Publishing, 1983.
Berrigan, Daniel Berger, Samuel David Birth Date: December 4, 1911 Death Date: February 12, 1980 U.S. career diplomat and deputy ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) during 1968–1972. Born in Gloversville, New York, on December 4, 1911, Samuel David Berger attended the University of Wisconsin and the London School of Economics. He then served with the U.S. Army in World War II and subsequently joined the U.S. State Department. Following assignments in both Europe and Washington, Berger went to Japan during 1953–1954. Vice President Richard M. Nixon, after visiting Japan, insisted on Berger’s removal for underestimating Japan’s internal Communist threat. Some think that Berger’s ties with W. Averell Harriman and the Democrats were a more likely reason. After a benevolent exile in New Zealand (1954–1958) and a tour in Greece (1958–1961), Berger served as ambassador to the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) from 1961 to 1964. The following year he became deputy to Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs William Bundy, who was then devoting most of his energies to Vietnam. From 1968 to 1972 Berger served as deputy ambassador to South Vietnam, where he supported President Nguyen Van Thieu as the best means of establishing a stable South Vietnamese government. In 1970 Berger thought that Vietnamization was working and that the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South
Birth Date: May 9, 1921 Roman Catholic priest, prominent antiwar and peace activist, poet, and writer. Born on May 9, 1921, in Virginia, Minnesota, Daniel Berrigan is the brother of the late antiwar activist Philip Berrigan. Interested in the Jesuit order at an early age, Daniel Berrigan entered training for the priesthood in 1939 directly out of high school and was ordained a Jesuit priest in 1952. He received a BA degree from St. Andrew-on-Hudson in 1946 and an MA degree from Woodstock College, Baltimore, in 1952, the same year he was ordained. He spent the next year in France as part of his religious training. Influenced by French worker-priests, Berrigan returned to the United States a social activist. This found expression at LeMoyne College in Syracuse, New York, where he taught from 1957 to 1963. One of Berrigan’s students later became the first convicted draft card burner in the United States. Berrigan’s opposition to American involvement in Vietnam was evident as early as 1964, when he helped found the Catholic Peace Fellowship. In 1968 he witnessed firsthand the effects of the U.S. bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) when he traveled to Hanoi and secured the release of three captured American pilots. On May 17, 1968, Berrigan joined his brother Philip and seven other Catholic activists who used napalm to burn draft cards from the draft office in Catonsville, Maryland. Sentenced to three years in prison for this action, Daniel Berrigan went underground for several months before being apprehended in August 1970. Poor
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Reverend Daniel Berrigan speaks at a news conference in New York City on March 11, 1966. Berrigan and his brother Philip, also a Catholic priest, were outspoken critics of the Vietnam War. (AP/Wide World Photos)
health led to his parole on January 26, 1972. Later he became prominent in the antinuclear movement. In 1980 along with his brother Philip and several other peace activists, Berrigan founded the Plowshares Movement. To inaugurate the movement, on September 9, 1980, the Berrigan brothers and six accomplices broke into a General Electric nuclear-missile plant in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, where they carried out some damage and poured blood on company documents before being apprehended. They were tried and convicted of numerous crimes. Berrigan now resides in New York City, where he continues to write and involve himself in activist movements, including women’s rights, the pro-life movement, and the abolition of capi-
tal punishment. He is also active in volunteer work, counseling AIDS and cancer patients. Berrigan actively protested against and criticized the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the Afghanistan War (2001–), and the Iraq War (2003–2010). A prolific author, he has published more than a dozen books. JAMES E. SOUTHERLAND See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Berrigan, Philip; Catonsville Nine References Berrigan, Daniel. No Bars to Manhood. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1970. Cargas, Harry. “Daniel Berrigan: The Activist as Poet.” Laurel Review 9 (1969): 11–17.
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Polner, Murray, and Jim O’Grady. Disarmed and Dangerous: The Radical Life and Times of Daniel and Philip Berrigan, Brothers in Religious Faith and Civil Disobedience. New York: Basic Books, 1997. Zinn, Howard. The Twentieth Century: A People’s History. New York: Harper and Row, 1984.
Berrigan, Philip Birth Date: October 5, 1923 Death Date: December 6, 2002 Prominent antiwar activist, former Roman Catholic priest, and younger brother of peace activist Father Daniel Berrigan. Born on October 5, 1923, in Two Harbors, Minnesota, Philip Berrigan was drafted into the U.S. Army in 1943 while studying at St. Michael’s College in Toronto. He served in the artillery and infantry in the European theater during World War II. In 1950 he earned a BA degree in English from the College of the Holy Cross. He later earned a BS degree in secondary education from Loyola University of the South and in 1961 received an MS degree from Xavier University. In 1955 Berrigan was ordained a Josephite priest. His first assignment after ordination was to teach at St. Augustine High School in New Orleans. His activities in the Civil Rights Movement there led his superiors to transfer him to a seminary in Newburgh, New York, where in 1964 he founded the Emergency Citizens’ Group concerned about Vietnam and helped found the Catholic Peace Fellowship. On October 27, 1967, Berrigan and three others poured blood onto draft records at the Selective Service Office in Baltimore. Brought to trial, he became the first Roman Catholic priest in the United States to be sentenced to prison for a political crime. Before his sentencing, on May 17, 1968, he participated in burning draft files in Catonsville, Maryland, along with his brother, for which he was sentenced to federal prison for three and a half years for conspiracy and destruction of private property, to be served concurrently with his earlier six-year sentence from the Baltimore protest. While in prison, Berrigan was unsuccessfully prosecuted for conspiring to kidnap Henry Kissinger and blow up the heating systems of federal buildings in Washington, D.C. Berrigan was paroled in December 1972 and left the priesthood in 1973. He thereafter married. In September 1980 Berrigan and his brother Daniel created the Plowshares Movement, a peace association whose major goal was the eradication of nuclear weapons. To inaugurate the movement, on September 9, 1980, the Berrigan brothers and six accomplices broke into a General Electric nuclear-missile plant in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, where they managed to carry out some damage and pour blood on company documents before being apprehended. They were tried and convicted of numerous crimes. Philip Berrigan nevertheless continued his peace and social activism and operated Jonah House in Baltimore, Maryland, which
is involved in antiwar activities and in feeding the hungry. He also wrote several books. He died in Baltimore on December 6, 2002, following a battle with cancer. JAMES E. SOUTHERLAND See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Baltimore Four; Berrigan, Daniel; Catonsville Nine; Kissinger, Henry Alfred References Berrigan Philip, and Fred A. Wilcox. Fighting the Lamb’s War: Skirmishes with the American Empire. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2002. Meconis, Charles. With Clumsy Grace: The American Catholic Left, 1961–1975. New York: Continuum, 1979. Polner, Murray, and Jim O’Grady. Disarmed and Dangerous: The Radical Life and Times of Daniel and Philip Berrigan, Brothers in Religious Faith and Civil Disobedience. New York: Basic Books, 1997. Zaroulis, N. C., and Gerald Sullivan. Who Spoke Up? American Protest against the War in Vietnam, 1963–1975. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1984. Zinn, Howard. The Twentieth Century: A People’s History. New York: Harper and Row, 1984.
Bidault, Georges Birth Date: October 5, 1899 Death Date: January 26, 1983 French politician, Resistance leader, premier (1946, 1949–1950), and foreign minister (1944–1948, 1953–1954). Georges Bidault was born on October 5, 1899, in Moulins (Allier Department), France. As a student he was active in one of the Catholic Action movements. A history teacher by training at the University of Paris (Sorbonne), in 1938 he published a series of articles condemning the Munich Agreement. During World War II Bidault was cofounder of the Combat Resistance organization. After the 1943 arrest and execution of Jean Moulin, Bidault was elected president of the National Resistance Council, which coordinated Resistance activities in occupied France. Bidault was foreign minister in the provisional government, a post he held from 1944 to 1948 and again from 1953 to 1954. He was twice premier, from July to December 1946 and from October 1949 to June 1950. Bidault was a cofounder of the Christian Democrat Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP, Popular Republic Movement) that became, along with the Socialist Party and the Communist Party, one of the three large political parties in immediate postwar France. Bidault was closely associated with the formation of the Council of Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the European Coal and Steel and European Defense Communities, but he feared a resurgent Germany. In colonial matters Bidault was a staunch defender of the French Empire. He was premier on November 23, 1946, when the French cruiser Suffren bombarded the port of Haiphong. Bidault had approved French high commissioner in Indochina Admiral Georges Thierry d’Argenlieu’s request to “teach the Vietnamese
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Bidault, Georges. Resistance: The Political Biography of Georges Bidault. Translated by M. Sinclair. New York: Praeger, 1967. Callot, E.-F. Le M.R.P., Origine, structure, doctrine, programme et action politique. Paris: M. Rivière, 1978. Irving, R. E. M. Christian Democracy in France. London: Allen and Unwin, 1973.
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French politician Georges Bidault was a leader in the Resistance during World War II and cofounder of the Christian Democrat Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP, Popular Republic Movement) afterward. Bidault was premier of France at the start of the Indochina War in 1946. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)
a lesson,” which resulted in the bombardment. In fairness to Bidault, he probably did not believe that such action was imminent. He left office the next month. Bidault supported General Charles de Gaulle’s return to power in May 1958 but broke with the general over his Algerian policies. Bidault then formed the new National Resistance Council and expressed unequivocal support for Algerie française (the retention of Algeria as a part of France) and the activities of the terrorist Secret Army Organization. Threatened with arrest, in 1962 Bidault went into exile and did not return to France until 1968. He was in poor health during much of his later years and reportedly had a drinking problem. Bidault died at Cambo-les-Bains in the PyrénéesAtlantiques Department on January 26, 1983. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also D’Argenlieu, Georges Thierry; Haiphong, Shelling of References Bell, David S., Douglas Johnson, and Peter Morris, eds. Biographical Dictionary of French Political Leaders since 1870. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990.
Major U.S. air base in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) during the Vietnam War. Bien Hoa’s importance to U.S. military operations, especially in the form of close air support, rendered it a frequent target for Viet Cong (VC) attacks. Located about 20 miles north of Saigon, the air base is adjacent to the major city of Bien Hoa in Dong Nai Province. In 1964 the air base was the scene of the first major VC operations against U.S. forces. Beginning in August 1964, the airfield supported a squadron of Martin B-57 Canberra bombers deployed for training South Vietnamese pilots. In October insurgents infiltrated surrounding communities in preparation for a mortar assault on the base. The ensuing raid killed 4 Americans and wounded 72 others while destroying six bombers before the guerrillas disappeared unscathed. With the U.S. elections just four days away, President Lyndon B. Johnson refrained from ordering retaliation. Nevertheless, the Communist attack on Bien Hoa played a key role in high-level deliberations to escalate the U.S. military presence in South Vietnam well beyond that necessary for an advisory effort. With two 10,000-foot runways, Bien Hoa housed a wide range of military aircraft during its years of operation, including Northrop F-5 Freedom Fighter and North American F-100 Super Sabre fighters, Douglas A-26 Invader and Cessna A-37 Dragonfly attack aircraft, Douglas C-47 Skytrain transports, Douglas B-26 Invader bombers, North American T-28 Trojan trainers, and Boeing CH-47 Chinook and Bell UH-1 Iroquois (“Huey”) helicopters. At its peak capacity in 1969, the base housed 815 officers and more than 8,000 enlisted personnel. By 1968 Bien Hoa was busy providing air support for the III Corps Tactical Zone and the IV Corps Tactical Zone. On January 30, 1968, during the Tet Offensive, Communist forces stormed the air strip and the city of Bien Hoa. The VC overran several of the airfield’s eastern bunkers. Roughly 300 U.S. Air Force security personnel and 100 rear-echelon troops struggled to halt the assault until they could be reinforced. Only Bunker Hill 10, a holdover from the French occupation, lay between the VC and F-100 fighter jets, among other valuable aircraft. With Bien Hoa’s 10-mile perimeter breached, it became impossible to launch jets safely from the air base. Almost reaching the hangars, the guerrillas were engaged by helicopter gunships and the makeshift ground forces. Captain Reginald Maisey Jr. was posthumously awarded the Air Force Cross and the Purple Heart for rallying the beleaguered defenders at Bunker Hill 10.
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Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) rangers board U.S. Army helicopters at Bien Hoa Air Base near Saigon to be airlifted into Viet Cong–controlled mountains, July 31, 1965. (AP/Wide World Photos)
But success rested on the arrival of part of the U.S. Army’s 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. Coping with ambushes and the detonation of a key bridge, these troops joined with reinforcements from the 101st Airborne Division to reclaim control of Bien Hoa. By February 1 the battle had concluded, with perhaps more than 200 Communist personnel killed. Although the political impact of the Tet Offensive greatly intensified the controversy surrounding the Vietnam War, the successful U.S. defense of Bien Hoa contributed significantly to the military success of U.S. forces during the Communist offensive. By the time of the U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam in 1973, the base had been responsible for more than 360,000 sorties by U.S., Republic of Vietnam Air Force (VNAF, South Vietnamese Air Force), and Australian Air Force aircraft. Bien Hoa Air Base was also a major terminal for chartered commercial aircraft bringing troops into and back from South Vietnam during the war. On April 14, 1975, during the Ho Chi Minh Campaign, People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) 130-millimeter heavy guns shelled Bien Hoa for the first time in the war, and the next day Communist sappers blew up its ammunition dump. On April 16 PAVN gunners damaged 20 aircraft on the ground,
effectively ending close air support for beleaguered Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese) troops. JEFFREY D. BASS See also Tet Offensive, Overall Strategy References Fox, Roger. Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam, 1961–1973. Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2005. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. Vick, Alan. Snakes in the Eagle’s Nest: A History of Ground Attacks on Air Bases. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1995.
Binh Gia, Battle of Start Date: December 28, 1964 End Date: January 1, 1965 Binh Gia was a village some 40 miles southeast of Saigon in coastal Phuoc Tuy Province (now part of Ba Ria–Vung Tau Province) in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Most of Binh
Binh Gia, Battle of
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The sun breaks through the dense jungle foliage around the embattled town of Binh Gia, 40 miles southeast of Saigon, in early January 1965. Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) soldiers, joined by U.S. advisers, rest after a cold, damp, and tense night of waiting in an ambush position. (AP/Wide World Photos)
Gia’s 1964 population of 6,000 people were Catholics who had been resettled there from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) after 1954. In late 1964 the 271st and 272nd regiments of the Viet Cong (VC) 9th Division moved in small groups from War Zone C and War Zone D to the coast to receive supplies sent by sea from North Vietnam. They then regrouped to train in rubber plantations surrounding Binh Gia. Early on the morning of December 28, 1964, a battalion of the 9th Division attacked Binh Gia, which was defended by two platoons of South Vietnamese regional forces. Never before in the war had VC troops attacked in such a large number. After their successful attack, the Communists were reinforced. The South Vietnamese regional forces were also reinforced, for Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) Military Region III headquarters dispatched there the 30th Ranger Battalion by helicopter. The VC laid an ambush and attacked the Rangers in the landing zone. Surviving Rangers sought refuge in the village church. The next day the 33rd Ranger Battalion was also lifted by helicopter to a point south of Binh Gia and counterattacked toward it. The fight lasted all day, but the Rangers could not clear the VC from their dug-in positions. On the morning of December 30
the South Vietnamese 4th Marine Battalion was also sent into the battle; the VC had already moved to the northeast, and the marines were able to retake the village. At night the VC returned and attacked but were pushed back. On December 31 the 4th Marine Battalion was ordered to retrieve a downed helicopter and its crew on the Quang Giao rubber plantation about 2.5 miles from Binh Gia. In trying to reach the helicopter, the 2nd Company of the marines fell into a VC ambush. The remainder of the battalion then arrived but took heavy casualties and was forced to retreat to Binh Gia. On January 1, 1965, the 1st and 3rd Airborne battalions were airlifted to the eastern side of the battlefield, but the Communists had already left. On January 4, 1965, the VC held a press conference, with reporters Wilfred Burchett (Australian) and M. Riffaud (French) in attendance. The VC announced that during the Battle of Binh Gia they had killed 2,000 ARVN and 28 American troops and destroyed 37 military vehicles and 24 airplanes. Actual casualties were some 200 killed, including 5 U.S. advisers. The 4th Marine Battalion was especially hard hit. It had 112 men killed and 71 wounded, including its commander, Major Nguyen Van Nho, and 29 of its 35 officers. Probably 250 VC died in the battle.
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Seven battalions of elite ARVN units fought in the Battle of Binh Gia, which served as a warning to South Vietnam and the United States that well-trained VC forces supplied with modern weapons were capable of fighting large battles. The battle also signaled a mix of guerrilla and conventional warfare in the Vietnam War. HIEU DINH VU See also National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam; Vietnam, Republic of, Army; Vietnam, Republic of, Marine Corps References Maitland, Terrence, and Peter McInerney. A Contagion of War. The Vietnam Experience Series. Boston: Boston Publishing, 1984. Nguyen, Duc Phuong. Nhung tran danh lich su trong chien tranh Viet Nam 1963–1975. Glendale, CA: Dai Nam, 1993. Pham, Kim Vinh. The ARVN, a Stoic Army: How They Victimized the Army of Free Vietnam. Orange County, CA: Pham Kim Vinh, 1983.
BINH TAY I–IV,
Operations
Start Date: May 4, 1970 End Date: June 27, 1970 The northernmost operations of the 1970 Cambodian Incursion that occurred during May 4–June 27, 1970. Binh Tay means “Taming the West.” While the principal allied thrusts were in the Fishhook and Parrot’s Beak areas abutting III and IV Corps (Operations TOAN THANG 43 and 44), Operation BINH TAY was a fourstage primarily Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) operation directed at logistical support complexes of the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) B-3 front in northeastern Cambodia. The U.S. 4th Infantry Division and the 40th Regiment of the ARVN 22nd Division initiated BINH TAY I on May 4, 1970, although the American participation was poorly executed and relatively brief. In fairness, Major General Glen D. Walker’s 4th Infantry Division was overextended. It had only recently relocated to Binh Dinh Province and turned over the western Central Highlands to the ARVN 22nd Division. Having no forward installations and only limited logistical support, Walker planned to place artillery at the Plei D’Jereng Special Forces Camp. A convoy of 4th Infantry Division mechanized infantry and the 40th Regiment, ARVN 22nd Division, moved down Highway 19, reaching Plei D’Jereng on May 4. This occurred before the artillery arrived and before Lockheed C-130 Hercules cargo planes could supply sufficient helicopter fuel. Despite bombing in the form of six Boeing B-52 Stratofortress sorties, the U.S. 3rd Battalion, 506th Infantry (3-506 Infantry), encountered heavy machine-gun fire while attempting to land at densely vegetated landing zones (LZs), and the insertions were aborted. By late the following day, the 3-506 Infantry and the 1st
Battalion, 14th Infantry (1-14 Infantry), were on the ground but were under heavy fire and at the cost of several helicopters down. Joined by the 2nd Battalion, 8th Infantry (2-8 Infantry), on May 6, during the next few days 1st Brigade troops discovered an abandoned PAVN training camp, complete with a 30-bed hospital and large amounts of supplies. As his battalions took significant casualties without making substantial contact with PAVN units, Walker decided to turn the operation over to the ARVN. All 4th Infantry Division units had left Cambodia by May 16. Supported by U.S. air and artillery from inside the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), the ARVN 22nd and 23rd divisions, 2nd Ranger Group, and 2nd Armored Brigade moved into Ratankiri Province. When BINH TAY I terminated on May 25, allied forces claimed 212 PAVN dead. They had also seized 20 crew-served and 859 individual weapons and had destroyed 500 tons of rice and more than 2,000 huts. Allied casualties were 43 killed and 118 wounded. Captured documents revealed that the PAVN B-3 front had anticipated the allied incursion and had orders to avoid direct contact as much as possible. BINH TAY II began on May 14 along the border with Darlac Province in Vietnam and was directed at Enemy Base Area 701, from which three known PAVN regiments had operated. Following air strikes, U.S. helicopters inserted the 40th and 47th regiments of the ARVN 22nd Division, while the 3rd Armored Cavalry Squadron drove across the border. The ARVN troops discovered caches of hundreds of weapons and tons of ammunition and medical supplies. Contact was made only with PAVN security forces. When BINH TAY II ended on May 27, the ARVN claimed to have killed 73 PAVN soldiers and captured 6 at the cost of only 1 killed and 4 wounded. BINH TAY III was conducted by the ARVN 23rd Division in three phases from May 20 to June 12. Its objective was Enemy Base Area 740, located in Cambodia west of Ban Me Thuot. In the first phase, supported by U.S. artillery and gunships, 23rd Division troops were inserted into the area to search for the PAVN 33rd Regiment and 251st Transportation Battalion. The most dramatic event was the destruction of a 10-truck convoy by U.S. gunships and ARVN infantry. ARVN forces killed 98 PAVN troops while suffering 29 killed and 77 wounded. During the second and third phases, conducted in the Nam Lyr Mountains area, tactical air and gunship attacks inflicted heavy casualties on company-sized PAVN units on the move. Together, Operations BINH TAY I–III accounted for 434 PAVN troops killed, 1,900 weapons captured, and more than 1,000 tons of rice destroyed. A final unplanned operation, called BINH TAY IV, took place during June 23–27. An ARVN 22nd Division task force of military and civilian vehicles, protected by U.S. artillery and air cavalry, moved deep into Cambodia along Highway 19 to reach a Khmer army garrison and hundreds of refugees threatened by PAVN forces at Labang Siek. On June 25 the ARVN forces transported the Khmers east to Ba Kev, from where U.S. helicopters flew them to Duc Co in
Bird & Sons Pleiku Province. Several hundred more refugees who arrived in Ba Kev by foot were transported to Duc Co in ARVN vehicles. BINH TAY IV ended on June 27, with 6 PAVN killed and 2 ARVN killed and 8 wounded. By then, all ARVN II Corps troops had left Cambodia, and a total of 7,571 Khmer soldiers, dependents, and refugees had been evacuated to Camp Enari at Pleiku. JOHN D. ROOT
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See also Le Van Vien; Ngo Dinh Diem References Buttinger, Joseph. Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled. 2 vols. New York: Praeger, 1967. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997.
See also Cambodia; Cambodian Incursion; Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, Army; Vietnam, Republic of, Army; Vietnamization References Nolan, Keith William. Into Cambodia: Spring Campaign, Summer Offensive, 1970. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1990. Shaw, John M. The Cambodian Campaign: The 1970 Offensive and America’s Vietnam War. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005. Tran Dinh Tho. The Cambodian Incursion. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1979.
Binh Xuyen Bandit organization that operated along the Saigon River area beginning in the 1920s. A loosely knit confederation of pirate gangs, they numbered perhaps 200–300 men and were involved in such activities as piracy and kidnappings. Under the leadership of Bay Vien (real name Le Van Vien), the Binh Xuyen became a political force after World War II. Headquartered in the Cholon District of Saigon, Binh Xuyen entered an alliance with the Viet Minh, and Binh Xuyen mercenaries participated in the massacre in Saigon on September 15, 1945, of some 150 French and Eurasian civilians, most of whom were women and children. In 1947 the Binh Xuyen switched loyalties. Recognized as a legal sect by the French and the Bao Dai regime, the Binh Xuyen offered monetary, military, and political support to the government in exchange for governmental protection of Binh Xuyen’s illegal activities. Bay Vien soon gained total control of the region’s gambling, prostitution, money laundering, and opium trafficking. By the early 1950s he controlled a private army that numbered 40,000 soldiers. In 1955 Ngo Dinh Diem gained control of southern Vietnam and immediately launched a crackdown on his political and religious opposition. Binh Xuyen posed a major obstacle. On April 27, 1955, Bay Vien refused Diem’s order to move his army out of Saigon. Diem ordered an attack on Binh Xuyen, which brought a bloody battle in the streets of Saigon that left 500 dead and 25,000 homeless. Vicious fighting followed, but within a month Diem’s forces had scattered the Binh Xuyen army, and Bay Vien escaped to France, taking most of his personal fortune with him. Some survivors joined the Viet Cong (VC), but Binh Xuyen thereafter ceased to exist as an organized entity. DAVID COFFEY
Bird & Sons An air carrier that operated in Southeast Asia for the U.S. government between 1960 and 1965 and from 1970 to 1975. Bird & Sons (Birdair) was owned by William H. Bird, a construction contractor who had been based in the Philippines following World War II. In 1959 he received a contract to construct an all-weather runway at Wattay Airport in Vientiane, Laos. The following year he acquired a Twin Beechcraft and began an air division of his company. Bird & Sons grew in response to the expanding American role in Laos. By 1965 the company was operating 22 aircraft and had 350 employees. It flew primarily short takeoff and landing (STOL) airplanes into tiny airstrips throughout Laos under contract with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Bird & Sons had the distinction of introducing to Southeast Asia the Swiss-manufactured Pilatus Porter, the most capable STOL aircraft used during the war. Bird & Sons also flew clandestine missions for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). CIA operations personnel valued the flexibility offered by Bird & Sons, which often could respond more promptly to urgent requests than the CIA’s own proprietary airline, Air America, a much larger and more bureaucratic organization. In addition, the CIA admired the piloting skill and personal discretion of Robert L. Brongersma, Bird & Sons’ operation manager, who flew many of the most sensitive covert missions. In September 1965 Bird sold his air division to Continental Airlines for $4.2 million. The agreement included a five-year nocompetition restriction. In 1970 after the restriction lapsed, Bird returned to air transport operations. His new company, Birdair, flew helicopters in northern Thailand and Laos, mainly for the USAID medical program, until 1975. WILLIAM M. LEARY See also Air America; Central Intelligence Agency; Laos; United States Agency for International Development References Leary, William M. Perilous Missions: Civil Air Transport and CIA Covert Operations in Asia. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1984. Parker, James E., Jr. Covert Ops: The CIA’s Secret War in Laos. New York: St Martin’s, 1997. Seagrave, Sterling. Soldiers of Fortune. Alexandria, VA: Time Life Books, 1981.
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Black Flags Following the great Taiping Rebellion in China (1850–1864), many Chinese armed bands sought refuge in Tonkin (present-day northern Vietnam). They were known as the White Flags, the Yellow Flags, and the Black Flags for the colors flown by each section and officer. The French called them pirates, which they were. Only the Black Flags submitted to the authority of the imperial Vietnamese court at Hue. The Black Flags were known in Vietnam as Giac Co Den and were especially feared by the peasants, for the Black Flags seized whatever they wanted. The ensuing fighting between the French and the Black Flags came to be known as the Black Flags Wars or the Tonkin Wars. The Vietnamese imperial court extended recognition to the Black Flags because they helped control the Montagnards to the northeast of the Red River Delta. In 1865 Liu Yongfu (Liu Yungfu), self-proclaimed leader of the Black Flags, established a base at the strategically located town of Son Tay on the Red River. Although illiterate, Liu Yongfu was a capable leader, and his Black Flags enjoyed support from the Chinese armed forces in Guangxi and Yunnan, especially after Liu cooperated with the Chinese in 1869 to defeat the Yellow Flags. The Black Flags soon controlled traffic on the Red River and imposed a levy on goods using that route. This prompted the French governor of Cochin China, Admiral Marie-Jules Dupré in Saigon, to send former French Navy lieutenant Francis Garnier to Hanoi in 1873 to extricate French arms merchant Jean Dupuis and to negotiate freedom of navigation on the Red River. On arriving in Hanoi with about 60 marine infantry in three small ships, Garnier
Illustration showing Black Flag fighters preparing to ambush French troops in northeastern Vietnam. (L. Huard, La guerre du Tonkin, 1887)
exceeded his instructions and joined his forces to the private army of Dupuis and attempted to conquer Tonkin. On November 15 Garnier announced that the Red River was open for international trade and that he would be introducing more favorable tariffs. On November 20 after receiving modest reinforcements from Saigon and using his artillery to good effect, Garnier’s forces stormed the Hanoi citadel. He then sought to expand his control beyond Hanoi to the coast. Although his forces did capture Nam Dinh, Garnier was killed fighting some 600 Black Flags under Liu Yongfu outside of Hanoi on December 21, 1873. There matters rested until 1882, when some 1,500 Chinese regular troops reinforced 3,000 Black Flags at Son Tay, some 20 miles west of Hanoi, and the French grew concerned about their own small garrisons in Hanoi and Haiphong. In March 1882 the French authorities in Saigon dispatched 233 French marines and Vietnamese auxiliaries under French Navy captain Henri Rivière to Tonkin. Despite orders to the contrary, Rivière proceeded to reprise Garnier’s action and storm the Hanoi citadel. The French then sent reinforcements to Haiphong. Rivière, meanwhile, was killed in a Black Flag ambush outside of Hanoi. When news of these events reached Paris, the government of the Third Republic voted 5.5 million francs to support operations in Tonkin and sent out 3,000 reinforcements. The French dispatched a naval force up the Perfume River, seized forts guarding access to Hue, and forced the imperial court to sign a treaty that established a French protectorate over Vietnam. In December 1883, 600 French troops, including a Foreign Legion battalion, attacked and captured the Black Flag base at Son Tay. This action prompted the Chinese to reinforce Bac Ninh, which they believed would be the next French target. However, after only slight resistance the Chinese abandoned it to the French on March 12, 1884, and two months later agreed to withdraw entirely from Tonkin. In June 1884 when the French sent troops to Lang Son, fighting broke out en route between them and the Chinese. This began the Sino-French War of 1884–1885 in which the Black Flags fought on the side of the Chinese. Liu Yongfu became a divisional commander in the Yunnan Army. The Black Flags distinguished themselves in the subsequent fighting at Hung Hoaa, Phu Doan, and Tuyen Quang. Reportedly some 3,000 Black Flags took part in the epic siege of the French garrison at Tuyen Quang. When the French carried the war to Taiwan (then known as Formosa) and Fuzhou (Foochow), the Chinese agreed to peace. The ensuing Treaty of Tianjin (Tientsin) of June 9, 1885, saw China recognize French control of Indochina. The treaty also required Liu Yongfu and the remaining 2,000 men of his Black Flag army to quit Tonkin. Liu crossed into China with his more loyal followers, but most of the Black Flag army simply disbanded in Tonkin. Not having been paid in months, they took to banditry. It was February 1886 before the French were able to secure the route between Hunh Hoa and Lao Cai. SPENCER C. TUCKER
Black Muslims See also Garnier, Marie Joseph François; Nguyen Dynasty; Sino-French War; Tianjin, Treaty of; Tonkin; Vietnam, History of, 938 CE through the French Conquest References Dupuis, Jean. Les Origines de la Question du Tonkin. Paris: Challamel, 1886. McAleavy, Henry. Black Flags in Vietnam: The Story of a Chinese Intervention. New York: Macmillan, 1968. Nguyen Van Ban. Giac Co Den: Mot Ong Cu Gia 90 Tuoi Ke Truyen [The Black Flags Pirates as Told by a Ninety-Year-Old Man]. Hanoi: Trung Bac Thu Xa, 1941. Pham Cao Duong. Vietnamese Peasants under French Domination, 1861–1945. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1985. Porch, Douglas. The French Foreign Legion: A Complete History of the Legendary Fighting Force. New York: HarperCollins, 1991. Tucker, Spencer C. Vietnam. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1999.
Black Muslims A term given to African American Muslims by C. Eric Lincoln in 1961. Black Muslims have mainly been members of the Nation of Islam, founded in the United States, although the group has avoided using the term to describe itself. They were generally the followers of Elijah Muhammad, a charismatic African American Black Muslim leader. In 1930 Wallace Fard founded the Lost Found Nation of Islam in the Wilderness. He called for African Americans to embrace Islam, teaching them that they were being oppressed by whites, whom he labeled “evil creatures.” Because many African Americans were yearning for relief from oppression and discrimination, a sizable number embraced Fard’s theology. Fard preached to his followers that they were superior to whites, doing so in the name of Islam. In 1934 when Fard disappeared without any trace, Elijah Muhammad became the leader of the Nation of Islam and moved its headquarters to Chicago, where he built a successful movement that shaped the future of Islam in America. The term “Black Muslims” also applies to other African American Muslim organizations, whether they are orthodox Muslims or not. Under Elijah Muhammad, the Nation of Islam became a racist movement that preached the supremacy of blacks over whites. However, he also encouraged African Americans to free themselves of the “slave mentality” and to be financially independent. He established numerous companies and opened schools and stores where many Black Muslims were employed, and he encouraged his followers to become industrious, educated, and well behaved. Although Elijah Muhammad worked hard to build the Nation of Islam, the roles that some of his followers—such as Malcolm X, Louis Farrakhan, and Warithu Deen Mohammed—played in sustaining the organization cannot be overlooked. Indeed, it was Malcolm X who recruited many black youths into the Nation of Islam through his tireless efforts and charisma. When Malcolm X joined the Nation of Islam, there were only a few thousand youth members and limited numbers of temples. Elijah
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Muhammad appointed Malcolm X a minister, and through his eloquence and hard work he brought thousands of blacks from all fields of life into the organization. As he became famous, however, tensions grew between himself and Elijah Muhammad. Malcolm X was excommunicated in 1964 because of comments he made about the November 1963 assassination of President John Kennedy. Malcolm X eventually established a new organization, the Muslim Mosque Incorporation, after he left the Nation of Islam. He also traveled to Mecca and throughout Africa preaching black nationalism and Pan-Africanism and became a Sunni Muslim. Early on Malcolm X became a vocal opponent of the Vietnam War, asserting that its sacrifices fell disproportionately to African Americans. He began to make such assertions even before the first major escalations of the Vietnam War began in mid-1965. Malcolm X was assassinated in February 1965 while giving a speech in New York. The murder plot has never been fully revealed, although many believe that he was killed on Elijah Muhammad’s orders. Other Black Muslim groups similarly challenged the American establishment, especially after the major war escalations began in 1965, and Black Muslims played a notable role in the antiwar movement. Boxing great Muhammad Ali, who had become a Black Muslim in 1965, greatly raised the profile of the movement in 1966 when he refused to be inducted into the military on religious grounds, realizing that he would probably be sent to fight in Vietnam. In 1967 he was convicted of violating the Selective Service Act and was stripped of the heavyweight boxing title. Although the U.S. Supreme Court overturned his conviction in 1970, Ali forever linked antiwar sentiment and Black Muslims in the minds of most Americans. Malcolm X left behind a lofty legacy of fighting for the rights of blacks all across the globe and emphasizing the pursuit of truth wherever it might be found. After Malcolm X’s death, Elijah Muhammad appointed Louis Farrakhan to head New York’s Temple, where Malcolm X had previously preached. When Elijah Muhammad died in 1975, his son, Warithu Deen Mohammed, succeeded him. Mohammed immediately introduced a deeper understanding of Islam and denounced many of his father’s ideas of Islam and racism. Mohammed thus turned the Nation of Islam into a mainstream Islamic group and linked African American Muslims with universal Islam. He also flatly rejected the label “Black Muslims.” That change of direction angered some of the older members of the organization, who did not like his new approach, but Imam Mohammed was convinced of the dire need for change and for a better understanding of Islam, which he insisted must be based on the Qur’an. Eventually Farrakhan broke with Mohammed in 1978 and renewed the old racist ideologies of Elijah Muhammad. In 1985 Imam Mohammed decentralized his group and asked each imam to lead his group. In October 2003 he resigned from the national leadership of the African American Muslims and encouraged each local mosque to be in charge of its own affairs. Farrakhan remains the spiritual leader of the Nation of Islam. At present, Black Muslims engage in community activities as well
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Black Panthers
Members of the Nation of Islam, known as “Black Muslims,” in traditional dress at a 1974 gathering in Chicago, Illinois. (National Archives)
as local and national politics. Farrakhan launched the Million Man March in 1995 and 2005 to boost the morale of African Americans as he encouraged them to be industrious and to take care of their own lives and be responsible for their actions. Although many Americans during the 1960s decried the ideology and tactics of some Black Muslims, the movement did serve to raise black consciousness and certainly fed into the emerging Black Power movement of the late 1960s. The Black Muslim movement also raised awareness of the Civil Rights Movement, which marched in lockstep fashion with the antiwar movement after 1966. While it is true that Black Muslims generally embraced an ideology that was too extreme for most Americans, both black and white, it did add a new dimension to the antiwar movement, especially with high-profile cases such as that of Muhammad Ali. YUSHAU SODIQ
See also Ali, Muhammad; Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Civil Rights Movement; King, Martin Luther, Jr. References Lincoln, C. Eric. The Black Muslims in America. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1994. Marsh, Clifton E. From Black Muslims to Muslims: The Transition from Separatism to Islam 1930–1980. Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow, 1984. Turner, Richard Brent. Islam in the African American Experience. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997.
Black Panthers A radical black nationalist group founded in 1966 in Oakland, California, by Huey Newton and Bobby Seale. Angered by police
Black Panthers brutality against the black community and impatient with the pace of nonviolent reform espoused by civil rights leader Martin Luther King Jr., the Black Panthers, or the Black Panther Party, encouraged self-reliance and the right to self-defense. The Black Panthers’ leadership considered American blacks an oppressed minority and part of an international insurgency throughout the developing world. Along these lines, the Black Panthers’ Ten-Point Program called for an immediate end to police brutality and the murder of black people, other people of color, and all oppressed people inside the United States. Their domestic agenda called for full employment, decent housing, improved education, free health care, and the release from prison of “black and oppressed people.” Their international agenda, linking their cause with the anti–Vietnam War movement, demanded “an immediate end to all wars of aggression.” Black Panther popularity increased, especially in Oakland, as members established free health clinics, created organizations to mitigate drug and alcohol dependency, held adult education classes, and sponsored free breakfast programs for children in the community. As the Black Panthers established roots in other cities around the country and grew to approximately 5,000 members, they attracted the attention of both local police and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Members of the Black Panther Party, emphasizing the right to self-defense, carried guns publicly in certain states (such as California), where doing so was legal. By 1968–1969 the FBI had focused its domestic counterintelligence program (COINTELPRO) on the Black Panthers and accordingly increased its surveillance and infiltration of the group to disrupt its activities. Police and federal agencies conducted raids of Black Panther houses, which often resulted in violence. In one controversial raid, the Chicago police killed Fred Hampton and Mark Clark in Hampton’s apartment in December 1969. While the police claimed that they had met resistance, Black Panther reports insisted that the men were killed while sleeping and unable to defend themselves. Law enforcement agencies continued to target Black Panther leaders, the best known of whom included the founders Newton and Seale as well as Eldridge Cleaver and Angela Davis. After a gunfight between Black Panthers and police in 1967, Newton was charged with killing an officer and was convicted of manslaughter. A Free Huey movement soon developed, and Newton’s conviction was eventually overturned. Nevertheless, his life remained difficult. Arrested again for murder, he sought asylum in Cuba. He later returned to the United States, was tried but not convicted, and was then murdered by a drug dealer in Oakland in 1989. Seale was arrested and charged with conspiracy in the aftermath of the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in 1968. During the trial of the Chicago Eight, his demand to represent himself enraged presiding Judge Julius Hoffman, who ordered Seale bound and gagged. Seale was convicted and sentenced to prison, where he was accused of killing another Black Panther inmate who was suspected of being a police informant. Seale’s subsequent trial
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ended in a hung jury, and he was released in 1971. Since leaving the Black Panthers, Seale has written several books and devoted himself to community projects in Philadelphia. Cleaver had been in and out of jail as a young man before joining the Black Panthers. He became famous for his book Soul on Ice (1968), a series of essays that dealt with race, masculinity and sexuality, and prison life. After a shoot-out with police in 1968, Cleaver was charged with attempted murder. He fled the United States and lived in Mexico, Cuba, and Algeria. He later became increasingly conservative and flirted with several religions. Cleaver eventually returned to the United States but had problems with cocaine addiction. He died in 1998 of unknown causes. Davis was a member of the Communist Party–USA as well as the Black Panthers. A gun registered in her name was used in a murder in 1970, but after a controversial trial she was acquitted because she had not been present when the murder took place. Her support for Reverend Jim Jones and his movement located in Jonestown, Guyana, remains controversial. In 1980 and 1984 she was a candidate for vice president on the Communist Party ticket. Davis is currently a professor at the University of California at Santa Cruz. The Black Panther Party eventually fell apart. Various factors played a role in its downfall, including splits within the leadership over tactics and goals, police and FBI repression, and changes in the political atmosphere of the United States. Indeed, by the mid1970s the Black Panther Party had largely disintegrated. HAROLD J. GOLDBERG See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Chicago Eight; Civil Rights Movement; Democratic National Convention of 1968; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Seale, Bobby References Austin, Curtis J. Up Against the Wall: Violence in the Making and Unmaking of the Black Panther Party. Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2006. Brown, Elaine. A Taste of Power: A Black Woman’s Story. New York: Anchor Books, 1993. Cleaver, Eldridge. Soul on Ice. 1968; reprint, New York: Delta, 1999. Foner, Philip. The Black Panthers Speak. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo, 1995. Forbes, Flores A. Will You Die With Me? My Life and the Black Panther Party. New York: Atria Books, 2006. Jones, Charles Earl. The Black Panthers Reconsidered. Baltimore: Black Classic, 1998. Joseph, Peniel E. Waiting ’Til the Midnight Hour: A Narrative History of Black Power in America. New York: Henry Holt, 2006. Newton, Huey. Revolutionary Suicide. New York: Writers and Readers Publishing, 1995. Seale, Bobby. Seize the Time: The Story of the Black Panther Party and Huey P. Newton. 1970; reprint, Baltimore: Black Classic, 1997.
Black Virgin Mountain See Nui Ba Den
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Blaizot, Roger
Blaizot, Roger Birth Date: May 17, 1891 Death Date: March 21, 1981 French Army officer and commander of French forces in Indochina during 1948–1949. Born at Saint-Denis, Department of the Seine, on May 17, 1891, Roger Blaizot entered the French Army in 1910 and Saint-Cyr in 1911. Choosing colonial troops, he was commissioned as a second lieutenant in 1912. Promoted to captain in 1916, he returned to France in 1917 and served on the Western Front. Following World War I, Blaizot was posted to China during 1919 and 1920. He attended the École de Guerre in 1923, and from 1928 to 1930 he was military attaché in Chile. Blaizot was promoted to major in 1929 and to lieutenant colonel in 1933. In 1936 he spent some months in Indochina and the next year was advanced to colonel. In 1941 he became a brigadier general, and the next year he was advanced to major general. In 1942 he was named commander of ground forces at Dakar. Command of divisions of colonial infantry followed. On September 8, 1943, the French Committee of National Liberation named Blaizot to head the French military mission in India. On September 20 he received command of a future expeditionary corps to participate in the war against Japan and liberate Indochina. At the same time Blaizot was promoted to general de corps d’armée (lieutenant general), to date from November 10. It was not until after the liberation of France in 1944, however, that the provisional government authorized creation of the French Far East Expeditionary Forces of 60,000 men under Blaizot. Blaizot reached Kandy, Ceylon, that October, but for months he had nothing to command; even at the end of the war he had only 1,000 men. He remained head of the French military mission with the South-East Asia Command from October 6, 1944, until June 16, 1945. In June 1945 when the French government created an expeditionary corps of two divisions for Indochina, command went to General Jacques-Philippe Leclerc. On April 22, 1948, Blaizot replaced General Étienne Valluy as commander of French forces in Indochina. Blaizot arrived in Saigon on May 15. He favored concentrating on the northern part of the country, and within it he wanted ambitious operations against enemy strongholds in the highlands to retake parts of Tonkin that had been abandoned by the French the previous year. The major French military effort that autumn was in the north, although the tardy arrival of reinforcements caused Blaizot to push back his plans. Operation DIANE, which began in October 1948 and extended into mid-February 1949, had as its goal the expansion of French military control of the Red River Valley upstream in order to control the Tonkin redoubt. Largely unsuccessful, this operation had to be scaled back. Blaizot also soon found himself in disagreement with High Commissioner Léon Pignon, who wanted the main military effort to be in the south. During May and June 1949 French Army chief of staff General Georges Revers made a fact-finding trip to Indochina. In his report
he recommended the evacuation of vulnerable French military positions in northern Tonkin to concentrate on the vital Red River Delta. Just as Blaizot was about to evacuate Cao Bang and Route Coloniale 4 (the operation was planned for that September), General Marcel Carpentier replaced him as French military commander in Indochina. Hounded by those who opposed the evacuation, Carpentier put it on hold. Ironically, the outcry over the French loss of Cao Bang the next year led to Carpentier’s replacement. Blaizot left Indochina on September 2, 1949. He retired in 1950 and died in Lyon, France, on March 21, 1981. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Carpentier, Marcel; De Gaulle, Charles; France, Army, 1946–1954; Indochina War; LE HONG PHONG II, Operation; Pignon, Léon; Revers Report; Tonkin References Dalloz, Jacques. The War in Indo-China, 1945–54. Savage, MD: Barnes and Noble, 1990. Gras, Yves. Histoire de la Guerre d’Indochine. Paris: Éditions Denoël, 1992. Porch, Douglas. The French Foreign Legion: A Complete History of the Legendary Fighting Force. New York: HarperCollins, 1991.
Blassie, Michael Joseph Birth Date: April 14, 1948 Death Date: May 11, 1972 U.S. Air Force pilot killed in action in 1972 and until 1998 the serviceman whose remains represented the Vietnam War at the Tomb of the Unknowns at Arlington National Cemetery in Arlington, Virginia. Michael Joseph Blassie was born on April 14, 1948, in St. Louis, Missouri. He graduated from the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1970 and was commissioned a second lieutenant. Following additional training, he joined the 8th Special Operations Squadron and deployed to Vietnam. On May 11, 1972, 24-yearold First Lieutenant Blassie had already flown 132 missions as a tactical fighter when his A-37 Dragonfly light attack aircraft was shot down over An Loc in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) during the East Offensive conducted by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). His remains were not immediately found, and he was classified as “Killed In Action, Body Not Recovered.” Five months later, remains recovered from the crash site were turned over to the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii. In the beginning they were labeled as “BTB Lieutenant Blassie,” but they were later classified “unknown” and marked “X-26.” In 1973 Congress passed Public Law 93-43, which directed the secretary of defense to bury an unknown American serviceman from the Vietnam War at the Tomb of the Unknowns in Arlington National Cemetery. Finally, on May 17, 1984, during ceremonies at Pearl Harbor, Sergeant Major Allan J. Kellogg Jr., a Medal of Honor
BLU-82/B Bomb recipient from the Vietnam War, placed a wreath before a casket containing a few bones, a piece of a parachute, and other remnants of an American flier that were still labeled X-26. The remains of the unknown arrived at the U.S. Capitol on May 25, 1984, and lay in state in the Rotunda for three days. On May 28, 1984, President Ronald Reagan presided over the funeral of the Vietnam War Unknown Soldier and presented the Medal of Honor to him posthumously. The Vietnam War hero was then laid to rest with the unknowns of World War I, World War II, and the Korean War. A decade later, mounting evidence had indicated that X-26 was Blassie. His family was convinced, despite opposition from some veterans’ groups, that they had to uncover the entire story. Enduring the protests from veterans groups and from people who believed that they were dishonoring the tradition of the unknowns, the Blassies persevered. After much lobbying by the Blassie family and their supporters, the U.S. government finally agreed to an
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exhumation, and on May 14, 1998, 26 years after Blassie was shot down over South Vietnam, the body of X-26 was exhumed for Mitochondrial DNA testing. On June 30 Secretary of Defense William Cohen notified the Blassie family that the bones that had rested in the Tomb of the Vietnam War Unknown Soldier were in fact those of Michael Blassie. On July 10, 1998, an MC-130 plane from Blassie’s unit, the 8th Special Operations Squadron, flew his casket home to St. Louis. The next morning he was laid to rest in Jefferson Barracks National Cemetery with full military honors. With the advent of DNA technology, it is more and more likely that future conflicts may not produce unknown casualties. The Medal of Honor awarded to the Vietnam War Unknown Soldier did not stay with Blassie once he was identified. KATHLEEN WARNES See also Casualties References Scott, Wilbur J. Vietnam Veterans since the War. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2004. Sheehan, Susan. A Missing Plane. New York: Berkeley Publishing, 1988.
BLU-82/B Bomb
Jean Blassie and her son George Blassie, brother of U.S. Air Force first lieutenant Michael Blassie, gather at his gravesite in Jefferson Barracks National Cemetery in St. Louis, Missouri. Lieutenant Blassie was shot down over South Vietnam and killed on May 11, 1972. A mix-up with dog tags and body identification led the remains to be listed as unknown and to be buried in the Tomb of the Unknowns at Arlington National Cemetery. Using DNA testing, the remains were identified as those of Blassie and were then reburied in St. Louis. (Department of Defense)
Bomb initially developed to clear helicopter landing areas. The BLU-82/B “Daisy Cutter” bomb is a large high-altitude bomb developed for use in the Vietnam War. During that war the United States Air Force (USAF) at first employed World War II–vintage M121 10,000-pound bombs to blast instant clearings in jungle and dense undergrowth from which helicopters could operate in connection with U.S. ground forces and those of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). With stocks of M121s diminishing, the USAF embarked on a replacement program and developed the Bomb Live Unit-82/B. Known as the “Daisy Cutter,” the large (11 feet 10 inches long and 4.5 feet in diameter) BLU-82/B weighs 15,000 pounds. It is the heaviest bomb currently in use. The largest bomb of all time is the Grand Slam of 22,000 pounds employed by the Royal Air Force Bomber Command against strategic targets in Germany during World War II. Some 225 BLU-82/Bs have been produced. Contrary to reports that it is a fuel-air explosive device, the BLU-82/B is in fact a conventional bomb. It has a very thin .25-inch steel wall and is filled with 12,600 pounds of a GSX explosive slurry of ammonium nitrate, aluminum powder, and a binding agent. This filler has perhaps twice the power of TNT. As a result, the bomb can produce casualties among humans out to a radius of almost 400 yards from the point of detonation. The Daisy Cutter has a minimum release altitude of 6,000 feet above the target. It relies upon a cargo extractor/stabilization parachute to slow its descent to the target (approximately 27 seconds from a release point of 6,000 feet). A 38-inch fuse extender detonates the bomb just above ground level without producing a crater.
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BLUE LIGHT, Operation
At the point of blast, there is an overpressure of some 1,000 pounds per square inch. The BLU-82/B was first utilized in combat during the Vietnam War on March 23, 1970. The bomb found employment as means to create helicopter landing zones and artillery firebases in terrain covered by dense growth, to cause landslides for road interdiction, and for use against enemy troop concentrations. The BLU-82/B was also utilized during the rescue of the crew of the American merchant ship Mayaguez from the Cambodian Khmer Rouge in May 1975. The remaining bombs were then placed in storage. In air operations during Operation DESERT STORM the USAF 8th Special Operations Squadron employed Lockheed MC-130E Combat Talon aircraft to drop 11 BLU-82/Bs, first in an attempt to clear mines and then for both antipersonnel and psychological effects. The USAF also dropped several BLU-82/Bs in Afghanistan to attack Taliban and Al Qaeda strongholds. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Bombs, Gravity; Helicopters, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Helicopters, Employment of, in Vietnam; Landing Zone; Mayaguez Incident Reference Doleman, Edgar C. Tools of War. The Vietnam Experience Series. Boston: Boston Publishing, 1984.
BLUE LIGHT,
Operation
Start Date: December 23, 1965 End Date: January 23, 1966 First major U.S. Air Force airlift operation of the Vietnam War. Two Military Airlift Command units, the 60th and 61st Military Airlift Wings (MAWs), demonstrated U.S. ability to deploy large numbers of men and matériel on short notice. The units flew a combination of Lockheed C-141 Starlifter, McDonnell-Douglas C-133 Cargolifter, and Douglas C-124 Globemaster II aircraft to transport 2,841 troops and 6,087 tons of equipment from Hawaii to Pleiku in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Flying troops and equipment from the U.S. Army’s 25th Infantry Division into Pleiku presented several challenges to Twenty-Second Air Force planners. The runway there was an asphalt-covered pierced steel plate (PSP) design only 6,000 feet long. Combat engineers did not know whether the runway surface could withstand the strain of heavy aircraft loads. In addition, landing C-141s would be difficult since 6,000 feet was the minimum runway length that the aircraft required. Finally, BLUE LIGHT missions would complicate an already heavy transport schedule. To meet the challenge, Twenty-Second Air Force planners decided that utilizing a combination of C-141 and C-133 aircraft would result in the least amount of interference with other operations. The Twenty-Second Air Force also used experienced flight
examiners on all missions into Pleiku to assist C-141 crews during the difficult landings. Operation BLUE LIGHT had two phases. The first involved transporting the 25th Infantry’s advance deployment team to Pleiku. This took place during December 23–26, 1965, and used four C-133 and two C-141 missions to transport 111 men and 104 tons of equipment required for the advance team. The second phase involved transporting the remainder of the 3rd Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division. The 61st MAW, assisted by aircraft and crews from the 60th MAW, flew 88 C-141 missions carrying personnel and individual equipment. The 61st MAW also flew 126 C-133 missions that moved oversized cargo, including the brigade’s larger vehicles. Crews from other wings flew 11 C-124 missions to fill in gaps left by primary aircraft shortfalls. BLUE LIGHT was the first impromptu test of the new C-141, which had entered service in 1964 as the U.S. Air Force’s first turbojet transport aircraft. The operation also highlighted the older turboprop C-133’s ability to deliver oversized cargo to forward locations. Finally, by conducting 231 missions into a marginal airfield without incident, the U.S. Air Force demonstrated that it could project military power into areas that had been inaccessible. LARRY GATTI See also Aircraft, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam References Gunston, Bill. The Illustrated Encyclopedia of the World’s Modern Military Aircraft. New York: Crescent Books, 1978. U.S. Department of the Air Force. Military Airlift Command History, Jul 65–Jan 66. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Force Historical Research Agency, n.d. U.S. Department of the Air Force. 61st Military Airlift Wing History, Dec 65–Jan 66. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Force Historical Research Agency, n.d.
Blum, Léon Birth Date: April 9, 1872 Death Date: March 30, 1950 French political leader, premier, and man of letters. Léon Blum was born in Paris on April 9, 1872, into a middle-class republican Jewish family. He entered the École Normale Supérieure in 1890 but did not pursue an academic career. After obtaining degrees in law and literature at the University of Paris (the Sorbonne), Blum made his mark in literary criticism and law before abandoning both on the eve of World War I to enter politics. Blum was a supporter of French Socialist Party leader Jean Juarès and in 1919 won election to the Chamber of Deputies as a Socialist. Soon Blum drafted the French Section of the Workers’ International (Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière, SFIO) program. After the split at the 1920 party congress (Ho Chi Minh was among those voting with the majority, thereby becoming a founder of the
Blum, Léon French Communist Party), Blum devoted his efforts to reviving the SFIO. His leadership was a major factor in rebuilding the SFIO into a formidable political force. This is remarkable, given that Blum was an intellectual with no great oratorical skills and was heading a proletarian party. He also established a new party newspaper, Le Populaire (the Communists had taken control of L’Humanité). By the mid-1930s the SFIO was the leading party in the leftist Popular Front (with the Radical Socialists and Communists), and the 1936 election victory catapulted Blum into the premiership in June. He was the first Jewish and first Socialist premier of France. The Popular Front was not a success, and Blum lasted barely a year as premier, the coalition collapsing under economic pressures and the Spanish Civil War. The liberal labor laws of the Popular Front government did, however, directly influence the 1937 labor code in Vietnam that reduced hours of work for women, prohibited labor by children younger than 12 years old, and provided for an obligatory one-day rest per week and minimum wages. Blum’s second premiership, March–April 1938, was even less successful. Long an advocate of disarmament, Blum now championed French rearmament. The defeat of France in 1940 splintered the SFIO. Blum was among those who refused to vote for Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain to assume power and courageously chose to
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remain in France. Arrested by the Vichy government, Blum was brought to trial at Riom, an event that he turned into a major triumph and defense of republicanism that helped inspire the Resistance. Blum supported General Charles de Gaulle, and in 1943 the Gestapo took Blum to Buchenwald. Blum was welcomed back to France after the war, although his role was then that of an elder statesman. From December 1946 to January 1947 he headed an all-Socialist government. It was during this turbulent period in the new Fourth Republic that events in Indochina came to crisis. A week before heading the government, Blum had written in Le Populaire that independence (later qualified to read “independence within the French Union”) was the only solution for Vietnam. A hopeful Ho Chi Minh sent Blum proposals to relieve Franco-Vietnamese tensions, but French military censors in Saigon held up the cable until it was too late to do any good. Even so, it is doubtful if Blum could have carried this off. Since the Liberation the Socialists were but one of three major French political parties, locked in uneasy coalition with the Mouvement Républicain Populaire (Popular Republican Movement, MRP) and the Communists. The French political centrists and the Right opposed colonial concessions. And Blum’s government was a stopgap affair designed to bridge the period until the new constitution took effect. In any case, there was a certain irony that a long-standing critic of French colonialism should be premier when the Indochina War began. In responding to the events of December 19, 1946, Blum reacted very much as a leader of the center or Right would have done. He told the Assembly that France was using military force in self-defense, certain of the justness of its cause. “Before all, order must be established,” he said. In January fellow Socialist Paul Ramadier replaced Blum as premier. After leaving the premiership, Blum carried out a number of important diplomatic assignments. He continued to write for Le Populaire until his sudden death during a party meeting on March 30, 1950. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also De Gaulle, Charles; French Indochina, 1860s–1946; Haiphong, Shelling of; Ho Chi Minh References Blum, Léon. Léon Blum, chef de gouvernement. Paris: A. Colin, 1967. Colton, Joel. Léon Blum. Humanist in Politics. New York: Knopf, 1966. Hammer, Ellen J. The Struggle for Indochina. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1954. Hutton, Patrick H., ed. Historical Dictionary of the Third French Republic, 1870–1940, Vol. 1. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1986. Logue, William. Léon Blum: The Formative Years, 1872–1914. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1973. Thompson, Virginia. French Indo-China. New York: Octagon Books, 1968.
Léon Blum was one of the most important French politicians in the first half of the 20th century. An intellectual and political activist, he became the leader of the French Socialist Party and the first socialist premier of France. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)
Boat People See Refugees and Boat People
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Body Armor
Body Armor Body armor in Vietnam was primarily known by the terms “flak jacket” and “flak vest.” The term “flak” is derived from the German word for antiaircraft gun, fliegerabwehrkanone. The American soldier—sleeveless in his flak jacket, bug juice stuck in his helmet band, and M16 rifle at the ready—became a common media image in this war. Flak suits were in widespread use by the U.S. Army Air Forces in 1945. These protected an airman’s torso, groin, and thighs and were complemented by an armored centerpiece on which the airman sat. These suits evolved into infantry body armor during the Korean War. The M1951 flak vest represented a significant technical innovation that protected the ordinary soldier’s chest, abdomen, and back from small shell and grenade fragments. The U.S. Marine Corps’ M1955 armored vest and the U.S. Army’s M69 fragmentation protective vest, fielded in 1962, both offered neck protection. These two vests, along with the earlier M1951 and M1952 models, were standard for U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Army forces in Vietnam. The M1955 armor weighed about 10 pounds, while the M69 armor weighed about 8.5 pounds. These sleeveless vests were composed of nylon filler and inserts enclosed in cloth. Although they were against regulations, slogans such as “LBJ’s Hired Gun” typically adorned such flak jackets. Until late 1968, helicopter crewmen generally wore infantry body armor. Hard face composite (HFC) kits were commonly used to provide seat ballistic protection. In 1965 about 500 HFC chest protectors also existed, but these were never used because of design problems. They were reengineered as T65–1 frontal torso armor. Aviator body armor was introduced in 1968. Sarcastically referred to as “chicken plate,” its official classified designation was Body Armor, Small Arms Protective, Aircrewmen. Gunners wore full armor, while pilots and copilots generally wore only frontal armor. Torso armor was composed of aluminum oxide ceramics and was able to defeat high-velocity small-arms projectiles. Leg armor was made from composite steel. Full armor weighed about 25 pounds; however, new variants incorporated even lighter and stronger ceramics based on boron carbide. Body Armor, Fragmentation-Small Arms Protective, Aircrewmen was introduced in 1968; it became the standard-issue body armor. Later infantry body armor developments were directly inspired by advances in aircrew armor. Special body armor was also used by naval and riverine forces. Naval and coast guard forces were issued floating body armor, while many riverine troops wore a light flak jacket composed of a special titanium-nylon composite that offered better protection against fléchettes. ROBERT J. BUNKER See also Riverine Warfare; United States Air Force; United States Army; United States Coast Guard; United States Marine Corps; United States Navy
References Dean, Bashford. American and German Helmets and Body Armor of World War I and Body Armor in Modern Warfare. Baltimore: Gateway Printing, 1980. Dunstan, Simon. Flak Jackets: 20th Century Military Body Armor. London: Osprey, 1984. Katcher, Philip. The American Soldier: U.S. Armies in Uniform, 1755 to the Present. New York: Military Press, 1990. Kennedy, Stephen J. Battlefield Protection of the Soldier through His Clothing/Equipment System. Natick, MA: U.S. Army Natick Lab, 1969. U.S. Army. Body Armor for the Individual Soldier: DA PAM 21-54. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965.
Body Count The term “body count” refers to the calculation of the number of enemy troops killed in battle. As Lieutenant General William R. Peers observed in his book The My Lai Inquiry, “It certainly was not a new concept; in most battles throughout history a count of enemy and friendly killed in action was made to determine the ratio of casualties.” But in Vietnam “the problem was that, with improper leadership, ‘body count’ could create competition between units, particularly if these statistics were compared like baseball standings and there were no stringent requirements as to how and by whom the counts were to be made.” There is little doubt that preoccupation with body count during the Vietnam War was fueled by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s obsession with statistical indicators. General Earle G. Wheeler told General William Westmoreland in a January 1967 cable that there was “an insatiable thirst for hard numbers here in Washington.” General Westmoreland, in turn, kept pushing his commanders to achieve the “crossover point,” at which more of the enemy were being killed than could be replaced by infiltration from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) or recruitment in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), essential to success in his strategy of fighting a war of attrition. That elusive goal was never reached, but in striving for it considerable corruption was introduced into the reporting of body counts. The unreliability of body counts was well documented by Brigadier General Douglas Kinnard in his book The War Managers. Based on input from army general officers who had commanded in Vietnam, Kinnard revealed that only 2 percent of respondents thought that body count was “a valid system to measure progress in the war.” Fully 61 percent thought that body count as reported was “often inflated.” As one general officer wrote, body counts “were grossly exaggerated by many units primarily because of the incredible interest shown by people like McNamara and Westmoreland.” Besides the pressure from Washington and General Westmoreland’s decision to conduct a war of attrition, the importance
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Clearly fearful, women and children loaded down with their possessions scurry past the bodies of three Viet Cong killed in the fighting during the Communist Mini-Tet Offensive in May 1968. (National Archives)
of body count in Vietnam was also increased by the absence in this peculiar war of the usual indicators of progress, such as seizing and holding enemy terrain and advancing the front lines. Ultimately body count was irrelevant because, as General Kinnard wrote, “there was no way of really comparing the number of enemy against his manpower potential because the manpower base varied with the effectiveness of his political apparatus and losses never approached his absolute limit to sustain them.” Besides being deceptive, body count was an inappropriate and misleading method of trying to determine the course of the war. As became evident when General Creighton Abrams assumed command in 1968, it was security of the populace of South Vietnam, not slaughter of enemy main forces, that was the real determinant of progress. Abrams made this clear early in his tenure. “Body count is really a long way from what’s involved in this war,” he told his commanders, a radical change in outlook on what mattered in this complex war. LEWIS SORLEY
See also Abrams, Creighton Williams, Jr.; Attrition; Casualties; McNamara, Robert Strange; Peers, William R.; Westmoreland, William Childs; Wheeler, Earle Gilmore References Kinnard, Douglas. The War Managers. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1977. Peers, William R. The My Lai Inquiry. New York: Norton, 1979.
BOLD MARINER,
Operation
Start Date: January 13, 1969 End Date: February 9, 1969 Operation during January–July 1969 that employed two battalions of the U.S. Army’s 23rd Infantry (Americal) Division and two U.S. Marine Corps battalion landing teams. RUSSELL BEACH was the army’s name for the operation; the marines knew it as BOLD
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BOLD MARINER, Operation
MARINER. The operation began on January 13, 1969, in the Batangan Peninsula in Quang Ngai Province, one of the least secure provinces of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Previous efforts by U.S., Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army), and Republic of Korea Army (ROKA, South Korean Army) forces had failed to clear the Viet Cong (VC) from the peninsula, site of the infamous massacre of Vietnamese civilians at the village of My Lai in March 1968. The operation’s basic objective was to support the pacification of the peninsula by clearing out VC forces and converting the Communist stronghold into an area of government control. In RUSSELL BEACH/BOLD MARINER, U.S. forces helped to cordon the peninsula and round up VC forces. The operation involved the deliberate relocation of people from their homes and the destruction of property, a tactic that the Ministry of Refugees, the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), and Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), policy normally discouraged. Civilians were to be moved to a tent encampment, screened for VC cadres, and then returned home. Because the operation envisioned the return of the villagers to their homes in about a month, the government and CORDS approved the relocation.
The operation began on January 13 when two U.S. marine battalions were landed on the peninsula, one by helicopter and the other from the sea. The landings met little resistance. On the same day Task Force Cooksey, composed of units from the U.S. 23rd Infantry Division, sealed off the southern boundary. The cordon lasted until February 6, and the operation ended in July. The peninsula was laced with tunnels and caves, and army engineers destroyed more than 13,000 yards of underground passages and hiding places. All dwellings in the area of operation were destroyed to preclude the VC from using them and to facilitate the identification of tunnel entrances. The Americans suffered 56 combat deaths; VC losses were put at 158. Most casualties resulted from concealed mines and booby traps. The sweep displaced close to 12,000 persons. Villagers were evacuated by helicopter to a holding and interrogation center, where they were crowded into 125 tents. The operation was conducted in the cold season, but the South Vietnamese government did not have enough blankets for everyone. Of the 1,000 people detained for screening, the 23rd Division asserted that 256 belonged to the Viet Cong infrastructure (VCI). Other reports more realistically placed the number of confirmed members of the VCI captured at fewer than 50.
Two battle-weary leathernecks of the 26th Marine Regiment take a break in the rain during Operation BOLD MARINER (January–February 1969) on the Batangan Peninsula in Quang Ngai Province, South Vietnam. (National Archives)
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By late February, province officials began to resettle refugees in new settlements south of the peninsula but refused to let people rebuild on their original home sites. The new camps proved inaccessible by land and difficult to expand because of mines and booby traps in surrounding areas. As of January 1970 some refugees were still unable to return to their original hamlets, and farmers were unable to work their plots because of continuing insecurity and uncleared minefields. People in one hamlet were living on manioc because they had exhausted their government rice allowance. To feed persons displaced from the Batangan Peninsula, the ARVN 2nd Division made available 36 tons of rice that it had confiscated from the VC. Not until 1971 did security improve sufficiently to permit all refugees displaced during BOLD MARINER to return to the areas where their homes once stood. The operation bestowed little political advantage on the South Vietnamese government because it mishandled the relocation of people and alienated them. No lasting military gains accrued, and the area remained insecure for another two years. Allied forces had entered a Communist stronghold but had failed to eliminate it. VC forces continued to levy taxes and abduct local officials. A second operation, NANTUCKET BEACH, took place in the same area in February 1970. Again numerous GIs were killed by booby traps and mines, and army engineers destroyed additional bunkers and tunnels in nearly the same sites as during the previous operation. By January 1971 the VC 48th Battalion was back in action on the peninsula. RICHARD A. HUNT
tried to keep the door open to negotiations with Ho as well as with Bao Dai but lacked both boldness and authority. Bollaert succeeded Admiral Georges Thierry d’Argenlieu in February 1947 as high commissioner for Indochina. Treading a thin line between the advocates of improved Franco-Vietnamese relations and the military, who favored a hard-line policy, Bollaert prepared a plan for announcing an offer of independence tied to a unilateral cease-fire on August 15, 1947, the same day that the British were to grant independence to India. However, news of the plan alarmed opponents of concessions to the Viet Minh, and Bollaert was forced to delay the speech and tone down its political content considerably. In the end, it came to naught. Instead of engaging the Viet Minh in a dialogue, Bollaert approached Bao Dai, then in exile in Hong Kong, and signed a preliminary agreement with him in the Bay of Ha Long on December 7, 1947, to assuage his nationalist supporters. This agreement was formalized in a second meeting in the Bay of Ha Long on June 5, 1948, by which Vietnam was to be granted a carefully circumscribed independence as an Associated State within the French Union. The Bao Dai solution, in the hands of Bollaert’s successor, Leon Pignon, was to become a pretext for waging all-out war against the Viet Minh and ultimately failed to win the struggle for allegiance of the Vietnamese people. Bollaert died in Paris on May 18, 1978. ARTHUR J. DOMMEN
See also Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support; My Lai Massacre; Refugees and Boat People
References Hammer, Ellen J. The Struggle for Indochina. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1954. Thompson, Virginia. French Indo-China. New York: Octagon Books, 1968.
References Hunt, Richard A. Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts and Minds. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995. Lewy, Guenter. America in Vietnam. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978. Wiesner, Louis A. Victims and Survivors: Displaced Persons and Other War Victims in Viet-Nam, 1954–1975. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1988.
Bollaert, Émile Birth Date: November 13, 1890 Death Date: May 18, 1978 French high commissioner for Indochina from March 1947 to October 1948. Born on November 13, 1890, in Dunkerque, France, Émile Bollaert, a member of the Radical Socialist Party, went to Indochina for only a period of 6 months but stayed for 18 months. He is best remembered for presiding over the beginning of the socalled Bao Dai solution in which the French attempted by guarded concessions to build up the former Vietnamese emperor as an alternative to Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh. For a while Bollaert
See also Bao Dai; D’Argenlieu, Georges Thierry; Pignon, Léon; Viet Minh
BOLO,
Operation
Event Date: January 2, 1967 A ruse designed by the U.S. Air Force to engage Vietnamese People’s Air Force (VPAF, North Vietnamese Air Force) MiG-21s on an equal footing. Because the Lyndon B. Johnson administration prohibited U.S. aircraft from bombing airfields in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) until April 1967, the U.S. Air Force sought another method of reducing increasingly dangerous levels of MiG activity in North Vietnam. Consequently, in December 1966 Seventh Air Force Headquarters planned a trap for the MiGs by exploiting deception and the weaknesses of the North Vietnamese ground radar network. Normally U.S. Air Force strike packages flew in standard formations, which included refueling Republic F-105 Thunderchief fighter-bombers at lower altitudes than their McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II escorts. In Operation BOLO, F-4s imitated F-105
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formations—including their electronic countermeasure emissions, attack patterns, and communications—to convince North Vietnamese ground controllers that their radars showed a normal F-105 strike mission. However, when controllers vectored VPAF MiG interceptors against their enemies, the MiG-21s found F-4s, equipped for air-to-air combat, rather than the slower bomb-laden F-105s. To maximize fighter coverage over Hanoi and deny North Vietnamese MiGs an exit route to airfields in China, Operation BOLO called for 14 flights of U.S. Air Force fighters to converge over the city. Aircraft from the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) based at Ubon Air Base in Thailand would fly into the Hanoi area from Laos, while fighters from the 366th TFW based at Da Nang would arrive from the Gulf of Tonkin. Marginal weather on January 2, 1967, delayed the start of the mission until the afternoon and prevented more than three flights of F-4s from reaching the target area. Colonel Robin Olds, 8th TFW commander, led the first of the three flights; Lieutenant Colonel Daniel “Chappie” James led the second flight; and Captain John Stone led the third flight. Olds’s flight passed over the Phuc Yen airfield twice before MiG-21s popped out of the clouds. The intense air battle that followed lasted less than 15 minutes but was the largest single aerial dogfight of the Vietnam War. Twelve F-4s destroyed seven VPAF MiG-21s and claimed two more probable kills. Colonel Olds shot down two aircraft himself. There were no U.S. Air Force losses. The VPAF admits that it lost five MiG-21s in this battle. One of the Vietnamese pilots shot down that day, Nguyen Van Coc, went on to become North Vietnam’s top-scoring ace, credited with shooting down nine American aircraft. Ultimately Operation BOLO destroyed almost half of the VPAF inventory of MiG-21s. Although bad weather prevented the full execution of the plan, it did achieve its primary objective of reducing U.S. aerial losses. Because of the reduced number of MiG-21s, the VPAF had no choice but to stand down its MiG-21 operations. JOHN G. TERINO JR. See also Air Defenses, Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Aircraft, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Airpower, Role in War; Olds, Robin References Bell, Kenneth H. 100 Missions North. Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1993. Middleton Drew, ed. Air War—Vietnam. New York: Arno, 1978. Momyer, William W. Airpower in Three Wars: World War II, Korea and Vietnam. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978. Nordeen, Lon O. Air Warfare in the Missile Age. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1985. Pimlott, John. Vietnam: The Decisive Battles. New York: Macmillan, 1990. Ta Hong, Vu Ngoc, and Nguyen Quoc Dung. Lich Su Khong Quan Nhan Dan Viet Nam (1955–1977) [History of the People’s Air Force of Vietnam (1955–1977)]. Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1993.
Bombing Halts and Restrictions The sustained air bombardment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) was an integral element of U.S. prosecution of the Vietnam War from 1964 to 1972. However, the bombing was viewed by American leaders not only as a military tool to be finely calibrated but also as a vehicle to convey political and diplomatic messages. As such, factors unrelated to the tactical and operational military situation limited and in some periods precluded its use. The use of U.S. airpower against North Vietnam commenced on August 5, 1964, with strikes against military targets in retaliation for perceived attacks against U.S. destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin. These actions were sharply limited in time and were restricted to attacks on naval bases and barracks complexes. Attacks against Americans and U.S. military facilities on November 1, 1964, and February 6, 1965, with attendant American fatalities, led to demands for an American military response. The debate over how to respond presaged the deep policy disagreements between civilian and military authorities that would play out for the duration of the war. The military chain of command, including Pacific commander in chief Admiral Ulysses S. Grant Sharp and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), favored a robust bombing campaign centered on North Vietnam’s industry and infrastructure, much of which was in close proximity to civilian population centers. Civilian leaders, mindful of possible Soviet or Communist Chinese reaction as well as the potential for sullying the image of the United States worldwide, placed restrictions on the bombing campaign. On February 13, 1965, President Lyndon Johnson approved Operation ROLLING THUNDER, which was subsequently divided into smaller numerically sequenced operations. This was to be the overall scheme for attacking North Vietnam from the air. Vietnam was divided at the 17th Parallel, with the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) south of that line. Bombing during most of the war was restricted south of the 20th Parallel. The area south of this demarcation line, the so-called panhandle of North Vietnam, comprised half the length of the country but excluded most of its population and industrial centers, including the capital of Hanoi and the principal port of Haiphong. Additionally, air strikes were roughly sorted into two types: attacks against preplanned, mostly fixed targets and armed reconnaissance flights in which targets of opportunity, such as trucks or trains along transportation routes, might be engaged. Some initial bombing restrictions dictated that all strikes by U.S. aircraft were to be accompanied by Republic of Vietnam Air Force (VNAF, South Vietnamese Air Force) planes; U.S. aircraft were to strike the primary target only, with any deviation to a secondary target due to weather requiring approval from Washington; authority to change the precise days of strikes resided in Washington; no classified munitions were to be used; and narrow geographical restrictions were employed in targeting. Over the next three months the first four of the above restrictions were moderated or lifted, and by May 1965 Operation ROLLING
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targeted sites mostly south of the 20th Parallel, avoiding Hanoi and Haiphong. It was at this time that President Johnson, without publicity, ordered the first bombing halt, effective May 12 and designed to test the willingness of the North Vietnamese government to negotiate. After a week of no discernible change, the bombing was resumed on May 18. However, targeting of the most sensitive areas of North Vietnam remained tightly circumscribed and controlled by decision makers in Washington. Specifically, prohibited area circles of 10 and 4 miles, respectively, were drawn around Hanoi and Haiphong, with JCS permission required to strike targets within these areas. Areas of slightly looser rules of engagement (restricted areas), still subject to JCS oversight, were scribed in a 30-mile radius from the center of Hanoi and 10 miles from the center of Haiphong. Washington also continued to tightly meter the total number of sorties flown each month. An intense debate on the direction of the war in late 1965 culminated in the first large-scale bombing halt of North Vietnam beginning on Christmas Day 1965. This halt, initially planned as a short holiday cessation, was extended by President Johnson at the urging of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and was to last until January 31, 1966. The bombing halt was accompanied by increased U.S. efforts to open channels of negotiations with the North Vietnamese. These efforts met rebuff from the Communists, and after intense lobbying by Admiral Sharp, the bombing of North Vietnam resumed. As 1966 progressed, the issues of restrictions on targets and the degree of control exercised by Washington continued to manifest themselves. In April the number of sorties was increased, and armed reconnaissance flights by U.S. warplanes were allowed in the northeast quadrant of North Vietnam for the first time. However, restrictions that placed petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) storage facilities in the vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong off limits were stridently opposed by Sharp. After several months of policy deliberations, strikes on a significant number of these targets were made on June 30, 1966. Also, armed reconnaissance restrictions were lifted on all of North Vietnam except for a 30-mile buffer along the Chinese border and the Hanoi and Haiphong restricted areas on July 9, 1966. During February 8–13, 1967, the United States initiated a bombing pause during the Tet New Year holiday. This applied to all of North Vietnam; any major increase in North Vietnamese logistics activity in the southern part of North Vietnam was to be reported to the JCS for analysis only. Following a large increase in such activity, bombing of North Vietnam resumed. Beginning on May 19, 1967, restrictions were loosened to allow strikes on military airfields and power plants in the Hanoi restricted area. However, the possibility of negotiations with North Vietnam once again prompted the United States to cease all bombing in the Hanoi prohibited zone from August 24 to October 23. On October 24 limited bombing resumed, but military, diplomatic, and political developments were soon to lead to the end of Operation ROLLING THUNDER. THUNDER
President Lyndon B. Johnson reads a newspaper headline regarding the halt in Operation ROLLING THUNDER, the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam, November 1, 1968. (Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library)
The year 1968 marked a significant watershed in U.S. war policy, particularly with regard to the bombing of North Vietnam. On January 29, 1968, a bombing halt of 36 hours for the Tet holiday ended when the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong (VC) launched the Tet Offensive, a series of attacks throughout South Vietnam. A reappraisal of American strategy in March 1968 resulted in a halt of all bombing north of 20 degrees north latitude and renewed efforts at negotiations on March 31. On November 1 this was expanded to all of North Vietnam, thus ending ROLLING THUNDER. Reconnaissance flights continued, however, with aircraft allowed to return fire when fired upon. Although the U.S. bombing of Laos and Cambodia continued throughout 1969–1971, American aircraft would not bomb North Vietnam again until Operation LINEBACKER I, which commenced on April 7, 1972. January 15, 1973, saw the final halt to U.S. bombing as part of the Paris Peace Accords that ended U.S. military involvement in the Vietnam War. ROBERT M. BROWN See also Airpower, Role in War; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; LINEBACKER I, Operation; LINEBACKER II, Operation; McNamara, Robert Strange; ROLLING THUNDER, Operation; Sharp, Ulysses Simpson Grant, Jr.
Booby Traps References McNamara, Robert S., with Brian VanDeMark. In Retrospect, the Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam. New York: Vintage Books, 1995. Sharp, Ulysses S. Grant. Strategy for Defeat: Vietnam in Retrospect. San Rafael, CA: Presidio, 1978. Sheehan, Neil, et al. The Pentagon Papers: As Published by the New York Times. New York: Bantam, 1971.
Bombs, Gravity A class of unguided munitions dropped by aircraft that relies primarily on gravity and prerelease aiming to reach a target. Precisionguided bombs (also known as smart bombs) date from World War II and were also employed in Vietnam. During the Vietnam War, a wide variety of so-called dumb bombs were employed by U.S. forces. These can be principally classified into standard bomb and cluster bomb types; however, such classification is at times misleading. Standard bombs tend to be more effective against troops in fortified bunkers or in dense vegetation such as jungles. Cluster bombs tend to be more useful against troops in open ground. Standard, or conventional, bombs have been extensively employed in modern warfare since World War I. Those used in Vietnam were larger and more streamlined than earlier conventional bombs because of advances in aircraft and bomb design. General purpose (GP) bombs, such as the Mk82, M-117, Mk84, and M-118 weighed 500, 750, 2,000, and 3,000 pounds, respectively. These bombs had equal proportions of high-explosive filler and fragmenting steel casing. Variants of the GP bomb, known as fragmentation bombs, had a higher percentage of steel casing, while those with a higher percentage of explosive filler were known as concussion bombs. There were also incendiary bombs. Cluster bombs are a more recent development than standard bombs. Their origins can be traced back to the so-called Molotov bread basket, first used in 1937 in the Spanish Civil War. Cluster bombs, as the name implies, are groups of bombs released together in a cluster. This allows a larger area to be targeted than with single conventional munitions. An extensive series of dispensers and cluster bombs was employed in the Vietnam War. A dispenser, or suspension and release unit (SUU), carried a large number of submunitions, or bomblet units (BLUs). Later modifications to both dispensers and cluster bombs resulted in the development of almost indecipherable designations. To add to this confusion, many BLUs, such as the 500pound BLU-57 fragmentation bomb, are in actuality conventional bombs. A wide range of munitions was thus used in BLU designations. These ranged in weight from about 1 pound for bomblets up to 15,000 pounds. Such munitions were based on blast, antipersonnel fragmentation, antiarmor shaped charge, white phosphorus, smoke, napalm, fuel-air explosive (FAE), and chemical warfare types. Specific bombs of note are the BLU-82B, MK20, and BLU-73. The BLU-82B is the renowned “Daisy Cutter,” first employed in early 1970. This
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15,000-pound bomb is filled with DBA-22M, a special slurry of ammonium nitrate, aluminum powder, and a binding agent. The result is an explosive filler with about twice the power of TNT that for this bomb produced casualties out to a radius of almost 450 yards. The Daisy Cutter, which relied on a parachute to slow its descent, was used to create helicopter landing zones, to cause landslides for road interdiction, and against enemy troop concentrations. The MK20 “Rockeye” was a very common 500-pound antitank cluster bomb. It dispensed 247 Mk118 nine-inch antiarmor/ antipersonnel bomblets shaped like darts and could discriminate between hard and soft targets. The BLU-73 was a 100-pound FAE bomblet. Three of them were contained within a CBU-55 and relied on a parachute for a controlled descent. These bomblets burst on impact with the ground and sprayed out an ethylene oxide vapor cloud. After a few seconds’ delay the cloud was detonated, producing an immense and violent explosion. The explosive principle here is similar to what happens in a grain elevator explosion. This bomb became operational in Vietnam in October 1970. Cluster bombs, while considered “dumb,” should still be considered highly advanced from a technical perspective. The number of bomblets that a Boeing B-52 Stratofortress bomber could drop is almost unimaginable. In a single sortie, a B-52 can disperse 25,488 BLU-26B or BLU-36B submunitions. A BLU-26B “Guava” fragmentation bomblet was 2.3 inches in diameter, and upon impact each projected some 300 steel pellets. The BLU-36B variant had a random delay fuse. A single B-52 loaded with these bomblets could thus saturate an area of approximately 629 acres, slightly less than a square mile, with more than 7.5 million steel pellets. ROBERT J. BUNKER See also Arc Light Missions; Napalm; Precision-Guided Munitions References Doleman, Edgar C. Tools of War. The Vietnam Experience Series. Boston: Boston Publishing, 1984. Naval Air Systems Command. Antitank Bomb Cluster Mk 20, Mods 2, 3, 4 and 6 and Antipersonnel/Antimateriel Bomb Cluster CBU-59/B. NAVAIR 11-5A-3. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Anti-Personnel Weapons. London: Taylor and Francis, 1978. U.S. Army. Bombs and Bomb Components. TM9-1325-200. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966.
Bong Son Campaign See MASHER/WHITE WING, Operation
Booby Traps Concealed devices used to inflict casualties. Booby traps were an integral component of the war waged by Viet Cong (VC) and
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A medic treats a young U.S. Army lieutenant whose leg has been burned by an exploding Viet Cong white phosphorus booby trap in 1966. (National Archives)
People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) forces in Vietnam. Between January 1965 and June 1970, 11 percent of the fatalities and 17 percent of the wounds sustained by U.S. Army troops were caused by booby traps and mines. These devices were used to delay and disrupt the mobility of U.S. forces, divert resources toward guard duty and clearance operations, inflict casualties, and damage equipment. They were a key component in prearranged killing zones. The use of booby traps also had a long-lasting psychological impact on marines and soldiers and helped to further alienate them from civilian populations that could not be distinguished from combatants. Many of the materials for the mines and booby traps were of U.S. origin. These included dud bombs, discarded and abandoned ammunition and munitions, and indigenous resources such as bamboo, mud, coconuts, and venomous snakes. Booby traps can be divided into explosive and nonexplosive antipersonnel devices and antivehicle (i.e., tank, vehicle, helicopter, and riverine craft) devices. Antipersonnel booby traps were concentrated in helicopter landing zones, narrow passages, paddy dikes, tree and
fence lines, trail junctions, and other commonly traveled routes. Antivehicle booby traps were deployed primarily on road networks, bridges, potential laager positions, and riverine choke points. Nonexplosive antipersonnel devices included punji stakes, bear traps, crossbow traps, spiked mud balls, double-spike caltrops, and scorpion-filled boxes. Punji stakes were sharpened lengths of bamboo with needlelike tips that had been fire-hardened. Often they were coated with excrement to cause infection. Dug into shallow camouflaged holes and rice paddies and mounted on bent saplings, the punji stake was a common booby trap. Another similar device was a spiked mud ball suspended by vines in the jungle canopy with a trip-wire release. It functioned as a pendulum, impaling its intended victim. Variations of explosive antipersonnel devices encompassed the powder-filled coconut, mud ball mine, grenade in tin can mine, bounding fragmentation mine, cartridge trap, and bicycle booby trap. The mud ball mine was a clay-encrusted grenade with the safety pin removed. Stepping on the mud ball released the safety lever, resulting in the detonation of the mine. The cartridge trap
Bowles, Chester Bliss was a rifle round buried straight up and resting on a nail or firing pin. Downward pressure applied to the cartridge fired it into the foot of the intended victim. Antivehicle devices included the B-40 antitank booby trap, concrete fragmentation mine, mortar shell mine, and oil-drum charge. The B-40 was a standard artillery rocket, which in this instance was placed in a length of bamboo at the shoulder of a road and commandfired at a vehicle crossing its forward arc. The mortar mine was simply the warhead of a large-caliber mortar that had been separated from its body and retrofitted with an electric blasting cap. The oil-drum charge was based on a standard U.S. five-gallon oil drum filled with explosives and triggered by a wristwatch firing device. This booby trap had immense sabotage applications for use against fuel dumps. As the Vietnam War progressed and the casualty list stemming from booby traps mounted, U.S. forces employed numerous countermeasures. The most effective countermeasures were proactive in nature and focused on the destruction of underground VC and PAVN mine and booby trap factories and the elimination of raw materials used in the manufacture of such devices. Tactical countermeasures included using electronic listening devices and ground-surveillance radar, patrolling, deploying scout-sniper teams and Kit Carson Scouts, booby-trapping trash left by a unit, and employing artillery ambush zones. Principal individual countermeasures were wearing body armor, sandbagging the floors of armored personnel carriers, and abstaining from the collection of souvenirs. ROBERT J. BUNKER
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on April 5, 1901, in Springfield, Massachusetts. After graduating from Yale University he worked in advertising in New York City. In 1929 he established the agency of Benton and Bowles, serving as its chairman from 1936 to 1941. During World War II Bowles was a government official, serving as head of the Office of Price Administration (1943–1946). He later was governor of Connecticut (1949–1951), ambassador to India (1951–1953), and U.S. congressman from Connecticut (1959–1961). Bowles essentially owed his State Department position, which he took in January 1961, to his political connections. A New Deal Democrat who preferred economic aid and development to military coercion, he opposed the growing U.S. troop commitment to Laos and Vietnam, arguing that they might provoke Chinese intervention. He recommended that conflict in Southeast Asia be neutralized under international guarantees. Fired from the State Department in November 1961, Bowles then received a vague and largely meaningless appointment as the president’s special representative for foreign policy. In this capacity Bowles continued to call for a “Peace Charter for Southeast Asia,” a continuation of his earlier neutralization schemes, together with massive economic aid for the region. He resigned in
See also Kit Carson Scouts; Mine Warfare, Land References Doleman, Edgar C. Tools of War. The Vietnam Experience Series. Boston: Boston Publishing, 1984. U.S. Army Foreign Service and Technology Center. Mines and Booby Traps. (Translation of Minas e Armadilhas.) Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1969. U.S. Marine Corps. Vietcong Mine Warfare. Quantico, VA: Department of the Navy, 1966. Wells, Robert, ed. The Invisible Enemy: Boobytraps in Vietnam. Miami: J. Flores Publications, 1992.
Border Campaign See LE HONG PHONG II, Operation
Bowles, Chester Bliss Birth Date: April 5, 1901 Death Date: May 25, 1986 Advertising executive, diplomat, Democratic Party politician, and U.S. undersecretary of state (1961). Chester Bliss Bowles was born
Chester Bowles was a successful businessman, U.S. government administrator, politician, and diplomat. As undersecretary of state in 1961, Bowles opposed the growing U.S. commitments to Laos and the Republic of Vietnam. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)
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January 1963 and later that year returned to India as ambassador, staying there until 1969. As a private citizen Bowles continued to advocate similar economic policies and supported a halt to bombing in Vietnam and the opening of peace negotiations; publicly he remained silent. The Lyndon Johnson administration ignored Bowles’s dissenting advice. In January 1968 Bowles represented the United States in talks with Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia. Bowles’s intended objectives were to deny Cambodian sanctuary to Viet Cong (VC) and People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) forces and to limit U.S. military incursions into Cambodian territory to preserve that country’s neutrality and integrity. The talks were initially successful but ultimately failed to prevent a full-scale American invasion of Cambodia. Bowles died of Parkinson’s disease on May 25, 1986, in Essex, Connecticut. PRISCILLA ROBERTS See also Cambodia; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Sihanouk, Norodom References Bowles, Chester B. Promises to Keep: My Years in Public Life, 1941–1969. New York: Harper and Row, 1971. Schaffer, Howard B. Chester Bowles: New Dealer in the Cold War. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993.
II Corps, leading it with distinction in both the Tunisian and Sicily campaigns. In October 1943 Bradley assumed command of First Army and led American ground forces in the June 1944 invasion of France. In August he received command of the 12th Army Group and directed the southern wing of the Allied drive across northern France. At its peak Twelfth Army Group included 1.3 million men, the largest force ever commanded by an American general. Promoted to full general in March 1945, Bradley continued in command of Twelfth Army Group until the end of the war. From 1945 to 1947 he headed the Veterans Administration. In February 1948 he succeeded Eisenhower as army chief of staff and in August 1949 became the first chairman of the JCS, a post he held throughout the Korean War until August 1953. Bradley was promoted to general of the army (five-star rank) in September 1950. Bradley sought to maintain the Korean War as a limited conflict and to keep Europe as the top U.S. military priority, something that General Douglas MacArthur could not appreciate. This was exemplified in Bradley’s well-known 1951 characterization of a potential
Bradley, Omar Nelson Birth Date: February 12, 1893 Death Date: April 8, 1981 U.S. Army general and first chairman (1949–1953) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Born on February 12, 1893, in Clark, Missouri, Omar Nelson Bradley graduated from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, in 1915 and was commissioned a second lieutenant of infantry. He served in several posts in the United States including along the Mexican border in 1916. He missed combat in World War I but was promoted to major in 1918. Bradley taught at West Point and in 1925 graduated from the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia. He then served in Hawaii before graduating from the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He next served as an instructor at the Infantry School before graduating from the Army War College in 1934. Bradley returned to West Point and in 1936 was promoted to lieutenant colonel. Bradley was on the Army General Staff from 1938 to 1941 and was promoted to brigadier general in February 1941. He then commanded the Infantry School before taking command of the 82nd Infantry Division and next commanded the National Guard 28th Infantry Division. He was promoted to major general in February 1942. Bradley served briefly as aide to General Dwight D. Eisenhower and then was assigned by him as deputy commander of Lieutenant George S. Patton’s II Corps in Tunisia. When Patton took command of Seventh Army, Bradley assumed command of
General of the Army Omar Bradley, shown here in 1950, was the last U.S. Army five-star general (promoted in September 1950) and the first chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1949–1953. (Library of Congress)
BRAVO I and II, Operations
wider war in Asia as the “wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.” Bradley backed President Harry S. Truman’s decision to relieve MacArthur. Bradley supported U.S. military aid for the French in Indochina. He characterized the Navarre Plan as “a marked improvement in French military thinking” but added a cautionary note that based on “past performances” by the French, there could be no predictions regarding the effects of increased U.S. assistance. In U.S. contingency planning, Bradley doubted that American air and naval attacks could alone bring victory, although he accepted these as preferable to U.S. involvement in another Asian ground war. Bradley retired from the service in August 1953. In 1968 he was one of the so-called Wise Men who advised President Lyndon Johnson. Bradley opposed a withdrawal from Vietnam. He died in Washington, D.C., on April 8, 1981. Modest, unassuming, and concerned about the welfare of his men, Bradley was regarded as a soldier’s general and one of the most successful commanders of World War II. He was known for his excellent administrative skills and his calmness when under stress. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Eisenhower, Dwight David; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; MacArthur, Douglas; Navarre Plan; Wise Men References Arnold, James R. The First Domino: Eisenhower, the Military, and America’s Intervention in Vietnam. New York: William Morrow, 1991. Bradley, Omar N. A Soldier’s Story. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1951. Dupuy, Trevor N., Curt Johnson, and David L. Bongard. The Harper Encyclopedia of Military Biography. New York: HarperCollins, 1992. Prados, John. The Sky Would Fall: Operation Vulture, the U.S. Bombing Mission in Indochina, 1954. New York: Dial, 1983.
Brady, Patrick Henry Birth Date: October 1, 1936 U.S. Army officer, considered by many to be the top helicopter pilot of the Vietnam War. Born in Philip, South Dakota, on October 1, 1936, Patrick Henry Brady joined the military and first reported to Vietnam in January 1964. He was assigned as a medical evacuation pilot in the 57th Medical Detachment (Helicopter Ambulance), then under the command of Major Charles L. Kelly. After Kelly was killed in action on July 1, 1964, Brady assumed command of the 57th’s Detachment A, operating out of the Mekong Delta. In August 1967 Brady returned to Vietnam for a second tour of duty, this time as the operations officer and later commander of the 54th Medical Detachment. He instilled in his new unit the ethos of his old mentor Kelly: “No compromise. No rationalization. No hesitation. Fly the mission. Now!” Patients came above all else.
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On January 5, 1968, piloting “Dust Off 55,” Brady flew an incredible series of medevac missions in the fog-wrapped mountains near Chu Lai, south of Da Nang. Under intense enemy fire, he flew nine different missions and evacuated 51 wounded soldiers. He went through three different helicopters. On his third mission of the day, three helicopters following his own were forced back by thick fog and Communist ground fire. For his actions that day Brady was awarded the Medal of Honor. By the time he finished his second tour in Vietnam, he was also awarded the Distinguished Service Cross and the Distinguished Flying Cross with five Oak Leaf Clusters. Brady retired from the U.S. Army in September 1993 as a major general. One of his last assignments was as the U.S. Army’s chief of public affairs. DAVID T. ZABECKI See also Dustoff; Helicopters, Employment of, in Vietnam; Kelly, Charles L.; Medevac References Brady, Patrick H. “When I Have Your Wounded.” ARMY (June 1989): 64–72. Dorland, Peter, and James Nanney. Dust Off: Army Aeromedical Evacuation in Vietnam. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1982.
BRAVO I
and II, Operations
Start Date: October 29, 1963 End Date: November 2, 1963 The two stages of the 1963 pseudocoup in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) devised by Ngo Dinh Nhu to preempt an anticipated generals’ revolt and preserve the regime of his brother, President Ngo Dinh Diem. In early October 1963 political chaos, religious repression, and military reverses racked South Vietnam. Against this backdrop, a cabal of Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) generals conspired with U.S. approval to overthrow the government of Ngo Dinh Diem. Led by General Tran Van Don, the plotters included generals Duong Van Minh, Le Van Kim, Nguyen Van Vy, Mai Huu Xuan, and Ton That Dinh and Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao. As the planning went forward, U.S. ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer Lieutenant Colonel Lucien Conein provided crucial support and encouragement to the conspirators. The generals’ coup was first scheduled for October 26, Armed Forces Day in South Vietnam, so that insurgent ARVN units could be deployed in the capital without attracting undue attention. Uncertainties, however, caused the date to be pushed back to November 2. The generals proceeded cautiously, anxious about U.S. policy and unsure of themselves in the complex and turbulent world of South Vietnamese politics. Saigon seethed with obscure and murky plots within plots.
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A thorny problem for the plotters was the recruitment of Saigon regional commander General Ton That Dinh, whose cooperation was essential if the coup was to succeed. Adroitly playing to Dinh’s ego, Don advised him to demand that Diem appoint him minister of the interior. When Diem refused, as Don knew he would, Don then promised Dinh the same post in the successor regime if he joined the conspiracy. Dinh accepted. Although now officially a conspirator, Dinh was far from a trusted partner. Don used Dinh’s position to neutralize General Huynh Van Cao, a Diem loyalist commanding ARVN forces in the Mekong Delta. Cao’s three divisions, deployed near Saigon, could easily thwart the coup if they were allowed into the city. To avert this, Don and Dinh planned to have Dinh’s deputy, Colonel Nguyen Huu Co, take temporary command of Cao’s nearest division at My Tho on the eve of the coup. Co would then use these troops to block any rescue attempts by Cao’s other forces. News of this supposedly secret maneuver, however, reached Ngo Dinh Nhu. Nhu called Dinh to his office in the presidential palace and confronted him with his knowledge of Co’s role. Feigning astonishment, Dinh flew into such a theatrical rage at his deputy’s supposed duplicity that he convinced Nhu of his complete loyalty to the regime. Nhu then took Dinh into his confidence, advised him of his knowledge of the rest of the plot, and proposed an elaborate phony coup to trap the generals in their betrayal. “Coups,” Nhu told Dinh, “like eggs, must be smashed before they are hatched.” Nhu divided his scheme into two phases, designated BRAVO I and BRAVO II, and assigned Dinh a pivotal role in each. In early November, Dinh would begin BRAVO I by ordering Colonel Le Quang Tung’s loyalist Special Forces out of the city on the pretext of campaigning against guerrillas. During their absence loyalist police and other soldiers disguised as rebels and hoodlums would stage a spontaneous revolt, murdering selected Vietnamese and U.S. officials and spreading terror throughout the city. During the uproar, Diem and Nhu would flee to a secure refuge. Saigon radio would then issue a false proclamation announcing the creation of a revolutionary government dedicated to the eviction of all Americans and conciliation with the Communists. BRAVO II would follow a few days later. Spearheaded by Tung’s Special Forces, Dinh would sweep back into Saigon, crush the uprising, rescue the Diem brothers, and triumphantly return the rightful government to power. His legitimacy reaffirmed, Diem would emerge stronger than ever. His opponents would be crushed, and he would appear the champion of anti-Communists in both his own country and the United States. The success of Nhu’s plot, of course, rested with the ubiquitous Dinh. General Dinh promptly informed Don of Nhu’s scheme, prompting the generals to move up their own coup to November 1 to preempt that of Nhu. In turn, when he learned through more informants of the generals’ change of schedule—although astonishingly not of Dinh’s treachery—Nhu moved BRAVO I up to October 29. Believing that he could now turn his phony coup into a real countercoup, Nhu instructed Dinh to order Colonel Tung’s Special
Forces out of the city to begin BRAVO I. Dinh obeyed but insisted on command of General Cao’s Mekong Delta divisions to ensure the smooth unfolding of BRAVO II. Despite all of his informants, Nhu was still unaware of Dinh’s true purpose and agreed. Thus, at the start of the coup Dinh personally controlled almost all of the military forces in and around Saigon. During the last days of October, Dinh freely deployed troops inside the capital and positioned them to attack key government installations. The Ngo brothers, sequestered in the Presidential Palace and still believing Dinh to be on their side, confidently awaited news of their countercoup. On November 1 the coup leaders summoned Colonel Tung and Captain Ho Tan Quyen, Diem’s loyalist navy commander, to a routine meeting. Both men were killed along with Tung’s brother, Major Le Quang Trieu. Still believing that BRAVO I was unfolding smoothly, Diem and Nhu rejected the generals’ initial demands that they surrender. They began to have doubts when Dinh would not return their calls. At about 3:00 p.m. on November 1 Diem telephoned Don and attempted to initiate conciliatory talks. Then when calls for resistance failed, the Ngo brothers fled to Cholon, where they were arrested and murdered on November 2. EDWARD C. PAGE See also Conein, Lucien Emile; Duong Van Minh; Huynh Van Cao; Le Quang Tung; Le Van Kim; Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr.; Ngo Dinh Diem; Ngo Dinh Nhu; Nguyen Huu Co; Pham Ngoc Thao; Taylor, Maxwell Davenport; Ton That Dinh; Tran Van Don References Berman, Larry. Planning a Tragedy: The Americanization of the War in Vietnam. New York: Norton, 1982. Davidson, Phillip A. Vietnam at War: The History, 1946–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1988. Kahin, George McT. Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam. New York: Knopf, 1986. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. Morrison, Wilbur H. The Elephant and the Tiger: The Full Story of the Vietnam War. New York: Hippocrene Books, 1990.
Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich Birth Date: December 19, 1906 Death Date: November 10, 1982 Soviet leader, secretary-general of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1964–1982), and head of state (1977–1982). Born on December 19, 1906, in the Ukrainian town of Dneprodzerzhinsk (then called Kamenskoye), Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev graduated as an engineer from the Kamenskoye Metallurgical Institute in 1935 and rose through the local party ranks, holding various positions. In 1957 he became a member of the Communist Party secretariat and the Politburo, the two most important bodies in the Soviet Union. His rapid ascent to power can be credited in
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Leonid Brezhnev was the dominant figure in the Soviet Union from 1966, when he became secretary-general of its Communist Party, until his death in 1982. (AFP/Getty Images)
large measure to his patron, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev. After Khrushchev’s ouster in 1964 in which Brezhnev played a key part, Brezhnev became the Communist Party’s first secretary. Two years later he appointed himself secretary-general, the Soviet Union’s most important position. Brezhnev was a moderate conservative in both domestic and foreign affairs. Under his leadership the Soviet Union achieved strategic nuclear parity with the United States. Yet this came at a very heavy cost that eventually resulted in an economic crisis in the late 1980s, which destroyed the Soviet Union. In August 1968 Brezhnev sent Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops into Czechoslovakia to crush the Prague Spring reform movement. He justified this with what became known as the Brezhnev Doctrine, which held that Socialist regimes had the obligation to intervene whenever socialism was perceived to be threatened in any country where it had come to power. Brezhnev viewed American involvement in Vietnam as a windfall for the Soviet Union. Almost immediately he reversed Khrushchev’s policy of disengagement. Brezhnev increased economic and military aid to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), hoping to entice it from its pro-Chinese position. Yet
he discouraged a further escalation of the war, fearing a direct confrontation with the United States. Thus, Soviet assistance was carefully calculated to allow North Vietnam to hold its own and to tie up American forces. Brezhnev greatly improved relations between North Vietnam and the Soviet Union. Vietnam, however, was never high on Brezhnev’s list of priorities, and he would not allow the Vietnam War to destroy his emerging détente with the United States. After North Vietnam’s 1975 military victory, Brezhnev continued the close relationship and extensive aid. The North Vietnamese/Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) leadership held Brezhnev in higher regard than any other Soviet leader, believing that he best understood their North Vietnamese efforts and goals. In recognition of this, in 1980 the SRV awarded Brezhnev its highest decoration, the Order of Golden Star. Brezhnev also engaged in détente with the West, signing the 1968 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, and the 1979 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II, the latter two with the United States. Détente collapsed, however, when Brezhnev applied the Brezhnev Doctrine to Afghanistan by sending thousands of troops there in December 1979 to prop up
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the pro-Soviet Communist regime. As it turned out, the war in Afghanistan, which lasted for nearly 10 years, was a disaster that embroiled the Soviets in a vicious war of attrition against determined insurgents who were being aided by the West. The war ruined the morale of the Soviet Army and virtually bankrupted the nation. Bitterly disappointed at the revival of the Cold War after the invasion of Afghanistan and increasingly inactive due to poor health, Brezhnev died in Moscow on November 10, 1982. MICHAEL SHARE See also Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeyevich; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; Vietnam, Socialist Republic of, 1975–Present References Bacon, Edwin, and Mark Sandle. Brezhnev Reconsidered. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. Edmonds, Robin. Soviet Foreign Policy: The Brezhnev Years. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983. Gelman, H. The Brezhnev Politburo. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984.
BRIGHT LIGHT,
Operation
Start Date: 1966 End Date: 1970 Generic code name for operations designed to rescue American and allied servicemen captured by Communist forces during the Vietnam War. Operation BRIGHT LIGHT included rescue operations that targeted North Vietnamese, Viet Cong (VC), or Pathet Lao captors. Between 1966 and 1970, U.S. forces mounted 45 separate raids in Cambodia, Laos, and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) to rescue American prisoners of war (POWs) but freed only one. He died shortly after the rescue of injuries inflicted by his captors only moments before he was rescued. In many of the BRIGHT LIGHT attempts time was of the essence because of the fragility of the intelligence on which these rescue attempts were based and the fact that their captors often moved the POWs at unscheduled intervals. The rescue operations were often joint efforts between U.S. Air Force and/or naval aviation assets and the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Studies and Observations Group (MACV-SOG), a Special Operations command. A typical MACV-SOG operation would be launched using sufficient air cover and delivery aircraft, while on the ground a Hatchet Team (a special operations unit numbering between a platoon and a company of indigenous personnel or contracted troops and led by Americans) would be inserted into the target area to locate, forcibly free if necessary, and egress the rescued personnel. After a U.S. serviceman was lost, a search-and-rescue effort was immediately mounted. If the attempt was unsuccessful, the individual was presumed missing or captured. Early in the war there was no U.S. effort to collect intelligence on U.S. POWs for possible rescue attempts. This problem was remedied with the creation
of the Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC), a joint command charged with both developing that needed intelligence and launching possible rescue operations. Unfortunately, while many POWs were indeed rescued via JPRC operations, none were Americans. There were several reasons for this, including interservice rivalry, command issues, political complications, and the problem of securing and acting on accurate and timely intelligence. Communist counterintelligence activities and leaks from American or South Vietnamese sources added to the frustration. Political difficulties were especially prevalent in Laos, where many aircrew and Special Forces members were actually but not officially lost because U.S. personnel were not supposed to be fighting there. Thus, when the JPRC wanted to launch a rescue operation in Laos, it needed special permission from State Department personnel, which in the best of times came very slowly and was sometimes denied. The largest rescue attempt of the war was of course the Son Tay Raid of November 21, 1970, code-named Operation KINGPIN. This was a joint U.S. Army/U.S. Air Force raid on a POW camp 23 miles northwest of Hanoi in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) to free about 70 American POWs. The raid was almost flawless in its execution but ended in failure because the POWs had been moved just prior to the raid. While no POWs were rescued, many defenders were killed, and no American lives were lost. The Son Tay Raid led the North Vietnamese authorities to consolidate their American POWs in fewer well-defended locations. SCOTT R. DIMARCO See also Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; Missing in Action, Allied; Missing in Action and Prisoners of War, Communist; Prisoners of War, Allied; Son Tay Raid; Studies and Observation Group References Gargus, John. The Son Tay Raid: American POWs in Vietnam Were Not Forgotten. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2007. Plaster, John L. Secret Commandos: Behind Enemy Lines with the Elite Warriors of SOG. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004. Plaster, John L. SOG: The Secret Wars of America’s Commandos in Vietnam. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997. Schemmer, Benjamin F. The Raid. New York: Harper and Row, 1976. Veith, George J. Code Name: Bright Light. New York: Free Press, 1998.
Brown, George Scratchley Birth Date: August 17, 1918 Death Date: December 5, 1978 U.S. Air Force general and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) during 1974–1978. Born on August 17, 1918, in Montclair, New Jersey, George Scratchley Brown graduated from the United States Military Academy, West Point, in 1941 and was
Brown, Hubert Gerald commissioned in the Army Air Forces. After distinguished service as a bomber pilot in Europe with the Eighth Air Force during World War II that included the costly raid on Ploesti, Romania, in August 1943, Brown held various command and staff assignments, including service on the Joint Staff and as an assistant to the secretary of defense. During the Korean War (1950–1953) Brown commanded the 62nd Troop Carrier Group at McChord Air Force Base in Washington state and then the 56th Fighter Wing at Selfridge Air Force Base in Michigan. In May 1952 he was assigned as director of operation at Headquarters, Fifth Air Force, in Seoul, Korea. Brown graduated from the National War College in 1957 and then served in the Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force. In 1959 he became military assistant to the deputy secretary of defense and then held the same post under the secretary of defense. In 1963 Brown assumed command of the Eastern Transport Air Force, McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey. During 1966–1968 he was assistant to the JCS chairman in Washington, D.C. In 1968 Brown was promoted to full (four-star) general and assumed command of the Seventh Air Force. He was also designated deputy commander for air operations for Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). In these dual capacities Brown emphasized his role as MACV commander General Creighton Abrams’s primary adviser on air operations while delegating great authority over daily operations to his staff. Brown believed that airpower was underutilized, and he sought to fully integrate air operations into all tactical and strategic plans. Abrams agreed with this approach, and the two men worked well together in the effective management of joint operations. After two years of service in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), Brown left there in 1970. In 1973 he served briefly as U.S. Air Force chief of staff, and in June 1974 he was appointed chairman of the JCS. In this position he successfully led the services through the initial crises of the post–Vietnam War era. His tenure was somewhat tarnished by comments he made that were interpreted to be anti-Semitic, or certainly anti-Israeli. Brown claimed that Israel was becoming a burden to the United States because of military aid to the Jewish state and that this was a result of the hold of Israel’s supporters over U.S. newspapers and elected officials. Although there were calls for his resignation regarding these remarks, Brown finished out his term. Among his other statements, he predicted that Iran would become a major Middle Eastern military power. Brown retired in June 1978 and died of cancer in Bethesda, Maryland, on December 5, 1978. RICHARD D. STARNES See also Abrams, Creighton Williams, Jr.; Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; United States Air Force References Bongard, David L. “Brown, George Scratchley.” In The Harper Encyclopedia of Military Biography, edited by Trevor N. Dupuy, Curt Johnson, and David L. Bongard, 106. New York: HarperCollins, 1992.
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Puryear, Edgar F., Jr., and George S. Brown. General, U.S. Air Force: Destined for Stars. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1983. Tilford, Earl H., Jr. Crosswinds: The Air Force’s Setup in Vietnam. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1993.
Brown, Hubert Gerald Birth Date: October 4, 1943 Civil rights leader, head of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), and militant proponent of the Black Power movement. Hubert Gerald Brown, also known as H. Rap Brown and later as Jamil Abdullah al-Amin, was born in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on October 4, 1943. He attended Southern University and A&M in Baton Rouge during 1960–1964, when he became involved in the burgeoning Civil Rights Movement.
H. Rap Brown, national chairperson of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and a leader in the Black Power movement, during a press conference on July 27, 1967. Brown was shot and wounded in 1967 after delivering a fiery speech about the cause. The Black Power movement was an attempt by militant African Americans to establish their own political, cultural, and social institutions independent of white society. (Library of Congress)
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While at Southern, Brown joined the SNCC and became an active leader in the organization. By 1966 he had become the SNCC’s project director in Alabama, and in 1967 he succeeded Stokely Carmichael as national director. That same year Brown was arrested in Cambridge, Maryland, for inciting a crowd to riot. Brown soon abandoned the pacifistic premises of the SNCC and Martin Luther King Jr., believing that they had not advanced the agenda of African Americans. In 1968 Brown left the SNCC to join the radical Black Panthers. In 1969 Brown cemented his reputation as a militant radical with his incendiary autobiography titled Die Nigger Die! He also became known for his famous cry “Burn, Baby, Burn!” during the race riots of 1968. Between 1969 and 1971 Brown was charged several times with inciting riots and for weapons violations but remained on the lam. He was finally apprehended in New York during an armed robbery of a bar. Tried and convicted of this offense, he spent the next five years in prison. While imprisoned in New York State’s infamous Attica State Prison, Brown converted to Islam, changing his name to Jamil Abdullah al-Amin. Upon his release Brown settled in Atlanta, where he became a community activist and religious leader. In March 2000 two Atlanta area police officers, Aldranon English and Rick Kinchen, arrived at Brown’s home to serve him with an arrest warrant for an alleged theft. Brown inexplicably opened fire on the officers, wounding one and killing the other. In March 2002 Brown was convicted of 13 felonies, including murder, and was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR. See also Black Panthers; Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee References Hogan, Wesley C. Many Minds, One Heart: SNCC’s Dream for a New America. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007. Rhodes, Jane. Framing the Black Panthers: The Spectacular Rise of a Black Power Icon. New York: New Press, 2005.
Brown, Samuel Winfred, Jr. Birth Date: July 27, 1943 Political activist and organizer and cofounder and coordinator of the Vietnam Moratorium Committee. Born in Council Bluffs, Iowa, on July 27, 1943, Samuel Winfred Brown Jr. received his BA from Redlands University, where he was president of the student body and the Young Republicans. While he was at Redlands he participated in the National Student Association, met Allard Lowenstein, joined the 1964 Mississippi Summer Project, and became an anti–Vietnam War activist. In 1966 after receiving his MA from Rutgers University, Brown enrolled at Harvard Divinity School, where Lowenstein recruited him to organize seminarians against the Vietnam War and to help form the Alternative Candidate Task Force. Brown directed the
Children’s Crusade, student volunteers in Senator Eugene McCarthy’s 1968 New Hampshire presidential primary campaign. Responding to the concept of a nationwide strike against the war, on June 30, 1969, Brown and others established the Vietnam Moratorium Committee. His impressive organizational skills contributed in large measure to the success of the October and November demonstrations, the largest public protests to that time in U.S. history. The following year he coedited Why Are We Still in Vietnam?, an examination of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. In May 1970 Brown cofounded Operation Pursestrings to lobby for the McGovern-Hatfield end-the-war amendment. In 1972 Brown actively supported Senator George McGovern’s presidential campaign. After holding the office of Colorado state treasurer (1974–1977), Brown served as President Jimmy Carter’s director of ACTION, the umbrella agency of the Peace Corps and Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA). In the 1980s Brown became a Colorado real estate developer, financing low- and middle-income housing. He also raised funds for the nuclear freeze movement and for Colorado Democratic senator Gary Hart’s 1988 presidential campaign. Ironically, Brown supported the 1991 Persian Gulf War, believing that it was necessary to keep the Iraqis from attaining nuclear weapons and to stabilize the Middle East. He rejected parallels at the time that had warned that the conflict would become another Vietnam. On May 4, 1994, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved President Bill Clinton’s nomination of Brown as ambassador to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Senate Republicans, especially Jesse Helms of North Carolina and Vietnam War veteran Hank Brown of Colorado (no relation), led an opposition filibuster. Opponents of the nomination focused on Brown’s activities as an anti–Vietnam War protester and a supporter of Eugene McCarthy’s presidential campaign and, as an example of Vietnam revisionism, knowingly misrepresented Brown as an unrepentant 1960s radical who engaged in violence at the 1968 Democratic National Convention and celebrated the Communist victory in Vietnam. The nomination failed when the Senate was twice unable to break the filibuster. Nevertheless Clinton went ahead with the appointment, although Brown would not have ambassadorial rank. In 2000 Brown became executive director of the Fair Labor Association, and in 2004 he worked for the John F. Kerry presidential campaign. Brown was reportedly outraged by right-wing attempts to blemish Kerry’s Vietnam War record and resurrect the war for crassly political purposes. PAUL S. DAUM AND FRANCIS RYAN See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Hatfield-McGovern Amendment; Kerry, John Forbes; McCarthy, Eugene Joseph; McGovern, George Stanley; Moratorium to End the War in Vietnam References Brown, Sam, and Len Ackland, eds. Why Are We Still in Vietnam? New York: Random House, 1970.
Bruce, David Kirkpatrick Este DeBenedetti, Charles, with Charles Chatfield. An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1990. Rosenbaum, David E. “Moratorium Organizer.” New York Times, October 16, 1969. Zaroulis, N. C., and Gerald Sullivan. Who Spoke Up? American Protest against the War in Vietnam, 1963–1975. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1984.
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References Browne, Malcolm. Muddy Boots and Red Socks: A Reporter’s Life. New York: Crown, 1993. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997.
Bruce, David Kirkpatrick Este Browne, Malcolm Wilde Birth Date: April 17, 1931 Journalist, Vietnam War correspondent, and photographer. Malcolm Wilde Browne was born on April 17, 1931, in New York City. He was educated at Swarthmore College in Pennsylvania and at New York University. His career in journalism began when he was drafted into the U.S. Army during the 1950–1953 Korean War and was assigned to write for Pacific Stars and Stripes. When he returned home from the war, he continued his career as a journalist, joining the Associated Press and working in Middletown for the New York Daily Record (1958–1960) and in Baltimore for the Associated Press (1960–1961), at which point he became chief correspondent for Indochina. He was among a group of young journalists who reported that there were serious problems with the Ngo Dinh Diem regime in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) and with the conduct of the war there, contradicting the optimistic reports coming from Ambassador Frederick Nolting and head of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), General Paul Harkins. In January 1963 Browne covered the Battle of Ap Bac, reporting on the ineptitude of the South Vietnamese armed forces. On June 11, 1963, he photographed the self-immolation of Buddhist monk Thich Quang Duc in Saigon. The photograph of the Buddhist’s supreme act of protest against the government in Saigon reportedly helped convince President John F. Kennedy that South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem would have to be removed from office. Browne and David Halberstam of the New York Times shared the Pulitzer Prize in 1964 for their 1963 reporting from Vietnam. Browne worked for ABC News from 1965 to 1966. In 1968 he joined the New York Times in 1968 as foreign correspondent and later became a science reporter. He left the New York Times for several years to serve as a senior editor for Discover magazine but returned to New York Times science department in 1985. In 1991 he covered the Persian Gulf War, but he has primarily been a science writer in recent years. JAMES H. WILLBANKS See also Halberstam, David; Harkins, Paul Donal; Ngo Dinh Diem; Ngo Dinh Diem, Overthrow of; Nolting, Frederick Earnest, Jr.; Thich Quang Duc
Birth Date: February 12, 1898 Death Date: December 5, 1977 American diplomat and head of the U.S. delegation to the Paris peace talks (1970–1971). Born in Baltimore, Maryland, on February 12, 1898, David Kirkpatrick Este Bruce was educated at Princeton University, the University of Virginia, and the University of Maryland Law School. From 1917 to 1919 he served in the U.S. Army, and in 1918 he went with the American Expeditionary Forces to France. This experience began a lifelong fascination with Europe. In the late 1920s Bruce’s initial attempt to join the U.S. Foreign Service was postponed because of the health problems of his first wife, wealthy heiress Ailsa Mellon, daughter of Andrew W. Mellon, whom Bruce married in 1927. In 1939 the outbreak of war in Europe gave Bruce a second opportunity to serve his country, which with only short interruptions
Ambassador David K. E. Bruce headed the U.S. delegation to the Paris peace talks during 1970–1971. (National Archives)
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he continued to do until two years before his death in 1977. In the process he became one of America’s most respected and professional diplomats, his noncareer status notwithstanding. A brief assignment as chief representative of the American Red Cross War Mission in London in 1940 was followed the next year by a four-year posting to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), becoming the head of its European branch in 1943. A committed advocate of European integration, Bruce was successively assistant secretary of commerce (1947–1948), chief of the European Cooperation Administration (1948–1949), and ambassador to France (1949–1952). In these posts he was heavily involved in Europe’s postwar reconstruction. His subsequent assignments included undersecretary of state during 1952–1953, U.S. observer to the European Defense Community interim committee and U.S. representative to the nascent European Coal and Steel Community during 1953–1955, ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) during 1957–1959, and ambassador to Great Britain during 1961–1969. From the late 1940s on Bruce, who did not share the anticolonialist leanings of many Americans, paid much attention to French Indochina and at first enthusiastically urged greater American military and economic assistance for French efforts to subdue the Viet Minh and promote Emperor Bao Dai, to whom Bruce thought his own government was too unsympathetic. He was, however, somewhat relieved by the final French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, which he believed ended an increasingly pointless and expensive commitment to an unwinnable war. Dubious as to the wisdom of American involvement in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), Laos, and Cambodia and unconvinced that U.S. military efforts were likely to succeed, Bruce in the 1960s nonetheless believed that the United States, having pledged itself to these states, should keep its commitments. He loyally supported his country’s policies, which, as ambassador to Great Britain, he was frequently obliged to defend in public, even as private skepticism led him to question the accuracy of reports of the August 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Incident. Bruce was repelled by growing public protests against the war, particularly the violent demonstrations of which both the London embassy and his Georgetown home were targets. Bruce’s growing private doubts as to the likelihood of an American victory in Southeast Asia and concern over the war’s domestic and international political implications for the United States led him to hope for a negotiated settlement. To this end he supported various proposals, particularly an abortive attempt to end the war mounted in 1967 by British prime minister Harold Wilson in collaboration with visiting Soviet premier Aleksei Kosygin. Bruce therefore welcomed President Lyndon B. Johnson’s decision in 1968 to seek peace and American withdrawal, efforts in which from 1970 to 1971 Bruce participated, heading the American delegation at the largely nonsubstantive peace talks in Paris. There he frequently found himself frustrated by the lengthy propaganda harangues of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North
Vietnam) and came to regard his assignment as an empty charade in which each side’s rhetoric was designed for public consumption rather than to further genuine negotiations. Bruce’s penultimate assignment was as the first head of the new U.S. Liaison Office to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) during 1973–1974. In this largely symbolic position his seniority, ability, and charm proved important assets at a crucial stage in the reopening of Sino-American relations. In poor health, he retired after a final stint as ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) during 1974–1975. Bruce died in Washington, D.C., of heart failure on December 5, 1977. PRISCILLA ROBERTS See also Kosygin, Aleksei Nikolayevich; Paris Negotiations References Lankford, Nelson D. The Last American Aristocrat: The Biography of Ambassador David K. E. Bruce. Boston: Little, Brown, 1996. Weiner, Tim. Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA. New York: Doubleday, 2007.
Brzezinski, Zbigniew Kazimierz Birth Date: March 28, 1928 Prominent international affairs scholar, academic, leading Sovietologist, diplomat, and U.S. assistant to the president for national security affairs (national security adviser) from 1977 to 1981. The son of a Polish diplomat who immigrated to Canada, Zbigniew Kazimierz Brzezinski was born on March 28, 1928, in Warsaw, Poland. In 1938 he went to Canada with his father, a diplomat stationed there, and in 1953 settled in the United States. Brzezinski received a BA from McGill University in 1949 and an MA in 1950. He earned his doctorate at Harvard University in 1953. The Communist takeover of his homeland may have led him to study communism and the Communist bloc. Noted throughout his political career as a hard-line antiCommunist, Brzezinski was an early advocate of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. An academic by profession, he served as a foreign policy adviser to presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. Brzezinski was appointed to the U.S. State Department’s Policy Planning Council in 1966. He resigned in 1968, however, over U.S. policies toward the Vietnam War, which he viewed as ineffective. In the 1960s and 1970s Brzezinski saw Communist expansion in Asia as the greatest threat to world peace and worked to oppose it. His antiexpansionism persisted during his tenure on the National Security Council under President Jimmy Carter, although the focus shifted to the Soviet Union and the Middle East. Named national security adviser in 1977, Brzezinski played a key role in the 1978 Camp David meetings and the 1979 Camp David Accord, which brought peace between Egypt and Israel. Like Carter, Brzezinski became engrossed in the Iran Hostage Crisis,
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Brzezinski, Zbigniew. Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1983.
Buddhism in Vietnam
Foreign policy specialist Zbigniew Brzezinski served as an adviser to Democratic presidents John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Jimmy Carter. Known as a staunch anti-Communist, he strongly supported U.S. assistance to the Republic of Vietnam. (AP/Wide World Photos)
which commenced in November 1979 and did not end until Carter left office in January 1981. The crisis was a large factor in Carter’s loss to Republican Ronald Reagan in 1980. Hailed by Carter as his “teacher” in international affairs, Brzezinski received the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1981. That same year he became Nitze Scholar on Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, having previously taught at Harvard (1954–1960) and Columbia University (1960–1962 and 1981–1989). Brzezinski has written numerous books on international affairs. TIMOTHY C. DOWLING See also Carter, James Earl, Jr.; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald References Andrianopolis, Gerry Argyris. Kissinger and Brzezinski: The NSC and the Struggle for Control of U.S. National Security Policy. New York: St. Martin’s, 1991. Brown, Seyom. The Faces of Power: United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Clinton. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994.
Buddhism is a body of beliefs and practices based largely on the teachings of Siddhartha Guatama, otherwise known as Buddha (the “Awakened One”), who lived in the northeastern portion of the Indian subcontinent circa 525–405 BCE. He is recognized as the enlightened spiritual leader who shared his insights with his followers so that they could understand the true nature of all things and thereby achieve Nirvana, which is the absence of the cycle of suffering and rebirth. Buddha’s teachings are believed to have been transcribed and handed down over the centuries in the Buddhist texts. Buddha is not technically viewed as a deity; rather, he is seen as the pinnacle of earthly enlightenment and is therefore to be emulated. There are two major schools of Buddhist thought: Mahayana and Theravada. All schools of Buddhism teach to one extent or another that Nirvana may be attained by practicing scrupulously ethical conduct, compassion, altruism, asceticism, meditation, physical fitness, and the constant cultivation of wisdom. Most Buddhists also engage in regular devotional ceremonies and read the Buddhist texts. Because there is much disagreement among Buddhists over sacred texts and beliefs, there is no set of core beliefs or teachings embraced by all such as exist in Islam or JudeoChristian traditions. Buddhism was introduced to Vietnam from China in the second and third centuries. Vietnamese culture modified the traditional observance of the popular Mahayana school to include animism, ancestor cults, and Confucianist and Taoist ethics. After a period of growth lasting until the 15th century, Buddhism declined slightly during Confucianist rule. With the French control of Indochina in the second half of the 19th century, Buddhism faced some restrictions as the French sought to spread Catholicism. In 1951 Vietnamese Buddhists formed the General Association of Buddhists (GAB) to reorganize their religious activities. By the mid-1960s only 3 million Vietnamese considered themselves active Buddhists, but 15 million, or 80 percent of the population, were nominally associated with the religion. President Ngo Dinh Diem of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), who was raised in a prominent Catholic family, granted high-level administrative and military positions to Catholics and refused to repeal anti-Buddhist restrictions remaining from the French occupation. On May 8, 1963, thousands of Vietnamese gathered in the city of Hue to celebrate Buddha’s birthday. A local military official enforced the restriction prohibiting Buddhists from flying their flag. Just a week before, however, he had encouraged the Catholics to fly the papal flag in a ceremony commemorating the 25th anniversary
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Buddhism in Vietnam
Elders of the Hoa Hao Buddhist sect participate in an interdenominational prayer for peace on April 22, 1975, at Saigon Cathedral. The banner above them reads “pray for peace.” Today, there are some 2 million Hoa Hao in Vietnam. (AP/Wide World Photos)
of the ordination of the archbishop of Hue, Ngo Dinh Thuc, President Diem’s brother. At the rally several thousand people gathered in front of a radio station to hear the broadcast of a speech by the Venerable Thich Tri Quang, popular leader of the militant Buddhists in Hue and the central provinces. The station manager canceled the speech, saying that it had not been censored. He then called a local military official, who sent five armored cars and then ordered his men to fire on the crowd. Nine people were killed. Diem ignored the bloodshed. A Buddhist delegation presented him with five demands calling for an end to religious persecution. Diem claimed that the deaths were from a Communist terrorist’s grenade. This blatantly false statement outraged the Buddhists, who publicized their complaints and called for Diem’s resignation. His intransigence had forced them to act. On June 11, 1963, the 60-year-old monk Thich Quang Duc sat down at a busy Saigon intersection, doused himself with gasoline, and then quietly folded his hands in prayer. As 200 to 300 monks and 400 to 500 spectators watched, a fellow monk ignited the gasoline, immolating Duc. Another monk had also volunteered for this protest, but Duc prevailed because of his age and respected position in the community.
During the next few months more protests and self-immolations took place. In August 1963 special troops disguised as regular soldiers attacked Buddhists in Saigon and Hue, jailing more than 1,000 monks, nuns, and students. Citizens rioted in protest. Washington demanded that Diem deal with the unrest, but he refused to capitulate. Madame Nhu, wife of Ngo Dinh Nhu, Diem’s brother and adviser, exacerbated the situation by characterizing the self-immolations as “barbecues.” The Buddhist protests were religious in nature. Recognizing that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) would use them to denounce Diem and the United States, the leaders wanted to keep political grievances separate. No evidence existed to support Diem’s accusation of Communist intervention. His stubbornness led Buddhist leaders to the conclusion that religious freedom would be achieved only with a new government. Although they did not take part in the actual coup, Buddhists were partly responsible for Diem’s November 1963 overthrow. Their unrest had diverted much of his government’s attention away from counterinsurgency operations and created a schism in Diem’s supporters. Three cabinet officials and 80–90 percent of the nation’s military forces were Buddhist.
BUFFALO, Operation
Following Diem’s assassination, General Nguyen Khanh, his successor, lifted some restrictions and appointed Buddhists to high-level positions. The Venerable Thich Tam Chau, recently elected leader of the growing GAB, cooperated with the government. Later when Khanh reneged on pledges, Thich Tri Quang organized more protests in Hue, citing the United States as an accomplice in the repressive regime. The American Library and Consulate in Hue as well as the U.S. embassy in Saigon were burned. Vietnamese Buddhists denounced communism, military governments, and the entrenched power of Roman Catholics. Their unified strength contributed to the collapse of Khanh’s regime in 1964 and the government headed by Tran Van Huong in 1965 and forced Nguyen Cao Ky to place political power in elected representatives. In May 1966 after Ky was accused of harboring pro-Diem sentiments, 10 monks and nuns, more than during the Diem protests, set themselves afire. General Nguyen Chanh Thi, the commander of South Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam’s northernmost five provinces, openly supported the Buddhist protest, provoking a major military and political crisis. General Ky was able to win back the allegiance of military leaders who had been supporting the Buddhists and jailed Thich Tri Quang, who was in the middle of a hunger strike. Because of strong support from Washington for Ky, the protest movement soon collapsed. CHARLES N. FASANARO See also Ngo Dinh Diem; Ngo Dinh Nhu, Madame; Nguyen Cao Ky; Thich Quang Duc; Thich Tri Quang References Boetcher, Thomas D. Vietnam: The Valor and the Sorrow. Boston: Little Brown, 1985. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. McHale, Shawn Frederick. Print and Power: Confucianism, Communism and Buddhism in the Making of Modern Vietnam. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2004.
BUFFALO,
Operation
Start Date: July 2, 1967 End Date: July 14, 1967 Military operation conducted in the summer of 1967 by U.S. military forces at Con Thien just south of the demilitarized zone (DMZ). A relatively small bit of terrain less than 250 feet in elevation and two miles south of the DMZ along roughly the 17th Parallel, Con Thien was considered by many on both sides as the most important natural observation post along the entire DMZ. Washington saw it as a critical element in the construction and completion of the McNamara Line, the purpose of which was to impede the movement of People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) regiments across the DMZ into the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South
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Vietnam). Con Thien overlooked the crucial area known as Leatherneck Square, a quadrilateral defined by U.S. Marine Corps strong points at Con Thien, Gio Linh, Dong Ha, and Cam Lo. At the end of June 1967 some 35,000 PAVN troops were positioned above the DMZ. Their mission was to launch a major invasion into Quang Tri Province and score an important propaganda victory. PAVN forces were organized into four divisions: the 304th, 320th, 324B, and 325C. Operation BUFFALO began on July 2, 1967, when Companies A and B of Lieutenant Colonel Richard Schening’s 1st Battalion, 9th Marine Regiment (1/9 Marines), went out to sweep an area east of Con Thien. The battalion’s primary mission was defense of the Con Thien combat base. Constraints imposed by Washington allowed PAVN troops to utilize the northern half of the DMZ for regrouping and employment of heavy artillery, and Companies A and B immediately came under fire from two PAVN battalions in prepared positions. Schening alerted Company C in Dong Ha to prepare for lifting by helicopter into Company B’s area. To support Companies A and B, he also dispatched four tanks and a platoon from Company D, under Assistant S-3 Captain Henry Radcliffe. As Company C arrived by helicopter, Captain Radcliffe ordered the platoon of Company D to secure the landing zone (LZ) and evacuate casualties. The battle grew in intensity. More than 700 artillery rounds fell on the 1/9 Marines alone, and Captain Albert Slater’s Company A remained under heavy fire. PAVN forces came within 55 yards of his lines before artillery and small arms broke their attack. Late in the afternoon commander of the 9th Marines Colonel George Jerue ordered Major Willard Woodring’s 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines, to move by helicopter to assist the 1/9 Marines. During the next three days there was constant contact, especially with heavy mortar and artillery fire. On July 3 Lieutenant Colonel Peter Wickwire’s battalion landing team (BLT) 1/3 Marines from Special Landing Force (SLF) Alpha joined the 9th Marines. The regiment planned to drive north and push the PAVN troops out of the Lang Son area to the northeast of Con Thien by 4,375 yards. Major Wendell Beard’s BLT 2/3 Marines from SLF Bravo joined the operation on July 4. The next day all units came under heavy artillery fire while recovering Company B’s dead. On July 6 following preparatory artillery fire, all units continued their drive north. By late afternoon on July 6 both Wickwire’s and Woodring’s battalions were taken under heavy PAVN artillery fire and were unable to move. Some 500 to 600 rounds hit the 3rd Battalion’s position, and more than 1,000 rounds fell on the BLT 1/3 Marines. Providing security on the left flank, Major Woodring’s forces were able to move into position without opposition and establish a strong outpost. By early evening heavy PAVN probes, including small-arms and mortar fire, were directed at Slater’s unit. Throughout the night PAVN units maintained pressure on the marines. On July 7 Woodring ordered Captain Slater’s Company A to pull back into the battalion perimeter.
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Late in the afternoon on July 7 the marines countered with supporting arms, attack aircraft, flare ships, naval gunfire, and artillery. By July 8 the marines had repelled the assault and reported that the Communists had pulled back across the Ben Hai River. The marines could not give an accurate count of PAVN losses because they could not continue north of the river. Based on recovered documents, the PAVN 90th Regiment had borne the brunt of the attack. Postwar Vietnamese military histories confirm that the PAVN 90th Regiment, a unit of the 324th Division that was operating under the direct command of the North Vietnamese B5 Front Headquarters, was the primary PAVN unit involved in this battle. Following this battle the B5 Front Headquarters sent the 101D Regiment of the 325th Division and the 803rd Regiment of the 324th Division south across the DMZ to replace the 90th Regiment in the Con Thien area. The last major engagements of Operation BUFFALO took place on July 8 when Companies F and G came under small-arms fire. The marines responded with both artillery and air strikes. Operation BUFFALO ended on July 14, 1967. The marines reported 1,290 PAVN dead and losses of their own totaling 159 killed and 345 wounded. Con Thien had held, and the fighting affirmed the importance of the U.S. Marine Corps doctrine with regard to close coordination between ground and air elements. Two ominous developments were evident, however: the ability of PAVN gunners to employ accurate long-range artillery and the increased use of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). WILL E. FAHEY JR. See also Con Thien, Siege of; Demilitarized Zone; United States Marine Corps; Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, Army References Lich Su Su Doan Bo Binh 324, 1955–2005 [History of the 324th Infantry Division, 1955–2005]. Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 2005. Nolan, Keith William. Operation Buffalo: U.S.M.C. Fight for the DMZ. New York: Dell, 1991. Telfer, Gary L. U.S. Marines in Vietnam: Fighting the North Vietnamese, 1967. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1984.
Bui Diem Birth Date: 1923 Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) ambassador to the United States during 1967–1972. Bui Diem was born in 1923 in Phu Ly in northern Vietnam. His father was the respected scholar Bui Ky. Bui Diem’s father, grandfather, and great-grandfather all attained the highest mandarin rank. His family refused to collaborate with the French, preferring to teach and write. In 1936 Bui Diem entered Thang Long high school in Hanoi, where he was deeply influenced by the anticolonialism of its faculty and
students. Among his professors was Vo Nguyen Giap, who taught a course in French history. Diem was also influenced by his uncle Tran Trong Kim, who wrote the classic Vietnamese history Viet Nam Su Luoc. Diem received his baccalaureate degree in June 1941 and matriculated to Hanoi University to study mathematics. In 1944 he joined the Dai Viet nationalist party and soon became a confidant of its leader, Truong Tu Anh. Following the Japanese anti-French coup of March 9, 1945, and Japan’s promises of Vietnamese independence, Emperor Bao Dai asked Kim to be prime minister of a new government in Hue, and Diem acted as liaison between Kim and Anh. That government fell in August when Ho Chi Minh’s Viet Minh took control of northern Vietnam. In October 1945 Bui Diem was sent to Lao Cai for Dai Viet military training. However, by early 1946 the French had returned and were negotiating with the Viet Minh. Diem’s father and brother eventually became Viet Minh supporters. In December 1946 the Viet Minh murdered Anh, and the Dai Viet fell apart. Diem spent the next two years in hiding and then in May 1949 went to French-controlled Hanoi. In 1951 Dai Viet members created a new party, the Quoc Gia Binh Dan (Popular Nationalist Party), headed by Dr. Phan Huy Quat. Diem edited its newspaper, Quoc Dan (The People). In early 1951 Diem married, and a year later the couple’s first daughter was born. His wife soon contracted tuberculosis, and she and Diem went to a sanatorium in France for a year. When they returned in April 1953, Bao Dai had created a new government with Dr. Quat as defense minister. Diem became Quat’s deputy chief of staff and chief negotiator with the French for an autonomous Vietnamese military. In November 1953 Tran Trong Kim died and was buried with national honors in Hanoi. The next spring Viet Minh forces defeated the French in the Battle of Dien Bien Phu. Bui Diem participated in the 1954 Geneva Conference that eventually ended the Indochina War, but he then remained outside of politics until after the November 1963 coup that toppled Ngo Dinh Diem. New efforts to create a democracy in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) soon failed. A succession of military leaders followed Ngo Dinh Diem. In 1965 Phan Huy Quat became prime minister, but he had no real power. Bui Diem became his chief of staff and, in 1966, secretary of state for foreign affairs. From 1967 to 1972 Bui Diem was South Vietnamese ambassador to Washington. Between 1973 and 1975 he was ambassador at large and special envoy to the Paris peace talks. In April 1975 Bui Diem settled in the United States. Since then he has been president of the executive board of the National Congress of Vietnamese in America. He also helped set up the Indochina Studies program at George Mason University. In 1987 Diem published his autobiography, In The Jaws of History. He now resides in Washington, D.C. WILLIAM P. HEAD
Bui Tin See also Bao Dai; Dai Viet Quoc Dan Dang; Geneva Conference and Geneva Accords of 1954; Ngo Dinh Diem; Paris Negotiations; Phan Huy Quat References Bui Diem. “Reflections on the Vietnam War: The Views of a Vietnamese on Vietnamese-American Misconceptions.” In Looking Back on the Vietnam War: A 1990s Perspective on the Decisions, Combat, and Legacies, edited by William Head and Lawrence Grinter, 241–248. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1993. Bui Diem and David Chanoff. In The Jaws of History. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987.
Bui Phat Refugee slum located in Saigon. Bui Phat was created by peasants, many of whom were Catholic, who had migrated from the northern dioceses of Phat Diem and Bui Chu after the signing of the 1954 Geneva Accords. The name of this ghetto was a blending of the names of the bishoprics of Phat Diem and Bui Chu. Because of their religion, the refugees provided a political power base for President Ngo Dinh Diem and actively supported his regime. Other such shantytowns formed as the Vietnam War expanded. Increasing military operations in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), including American aerial bombardment, the establishment of free fire zones, and search-and-destroy missions, displaced thousands of people and swelled refugee areas. Eventually the people residing in such slums represented 40–50 percent of South Vietnam’s total population. These refugees became so dependent on the American presence in South Vietnam that they actively resisted efforts by the Viet Cong (VC) and the Buddhists to organize protests against the growing American presence. ROBERT G. MANGRUM See also Ngo Dinh Diem; Saigon; Search and Destroy; Vietnam, Republic of, 1954–1975 References FitzGerald, Frances. Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam. Boston: Little, Brown, 1972. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997.
Bui Tin Birth Date: 1927 People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) officer, correspondent, and later opposition figure. Born near Hanoi in 1927 to an elite mandarin family, Bui Tin was educated in Hue and joined the Viet Minh struggle against the French in 1945. For
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a time he served as one of Ho Chi Minh’s bodyguards before entering officer training. Bui fought with Viet Minh forces in the 1951 battles in the Red River Delta area and at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. As a major commanding the 14th Battalion, 304th Division, in Nghe An Province, he watched the effects of the Great Migration as some 1 million of his countrymen went south from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). One of his own sisters was among them. Bui and members of his 14th Battalion helped move the refugees, gave them some of their own food, and sometimes carried those who were ill and children to points of departure. A trusted member of the Communist Party in the years that followed, Bui was sent south in 1963 by foot down the Ho Chi Minh Trail—a trip that lasted five weeks—to assess and report back on the situation in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). He returned to Hanoi in the spring of 1964 to inform his government that the Viet Cong (VC) would have to have help from the North Vietnamese government. During the course of the next decade Bui rose to the rank of colonel. During the final PAVN thrust into South Vietnam in 1975, he covered the battles as a newspaper correspondent. He rode a tank into the grounds of the South Vietnamese presidential palace on April 30, 1975, and, as the senior officer on the spot, reportedly accepted General Duong Van (“Big”) Minh’s surrender of South Vietnam. Bui then served in Hanoi as deputy editor of the Quan Doi Nhan Dan (People’s Army) newspaper and as deputy editor in chief of the Nhan Dan (People’s Daily) newspaper. Often using the pseudonym of Thanh Tin, Bui argued that the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) must not turn its back on the Viet Kieu (overseas Vietnamese), as there was great potential for the state if all 2 million of them could be mobilized, as were overseas Chinese, to help build their fatherland with modern technology, science, and management. Slowly frustrated by the conservative intransigence of the government, Bui went to Paris, ostensibly for health reasons, and chose not to return to Vietnam, living in Paris in exile. The Vietnamese government thereafter labeled him a traitor. In 1991 Bui traveled to the United States to appear before the U.S. Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. He testified that to his knowledge no American prisoners of war (POWs) were still alive in Vietnam. Later he and Arizona senator John S. McCain III, a former Vietnam POW, embraced, a move that captured national deadlines. Bui’s credibility was called into question, however, after he stated in 2000 that no American POWs had been tortured. In the early 1990s under the pseudonym of Thanh Tin, Bui published his memoirs Hoa Xuyen Tuyet (Snowdrop) (1991) and Mat That (The Real Face) (1993) in which he called for significant changes in his country’s government. He continues to live in Paris. CECIL B. CURREY
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BULLET SHOT, Operation
People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) lieutenant colonel Bui Tin, official spokesman for the North Vietnamese delegation to the Joint Military Commission (JMC), encounters an unidentified U.S. Air Force sergeant during the departure of the last American servicemen from Vietnam, May 29, 1973. (Bettmann/Corbis) See also Duong Van Minh; McCain, John Sidney, III; Prisoners of War, Allied; Viet Minh; Vietnam, Socialist Republic of, 1975–Present References Bui Tin. Following Ho Chi Minh: The Memoirs of a North Vietnamese Colonel. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995. Bui Tin. From Enemy to Friend: A North Vietnamese Perspective on the War. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997.
BULLET SHOT,
Operation
Start Date: February 5, 1972 End Date: May 23, 1972 The U.S. Air Force Strategic Air Command (SAC) five-phase redeployment of B-52 bombers, from February 5 to May 23, 1972, in support of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Initially U.S. leaders hoped that the redeployment would prevent an invasion of South Vietnam by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). Later stages of Operation BULLET SHOT were in response to the North Vietnamese Easter Offensive on March 30, 1972.
In late 1971 U.S. reconnaissance flights discovered that People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) forces were amassing supplies along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and sending troops into South Vietnam. Concerned that an invasion by PAVN forces might be in the offing, U.S. president Richard M. Nixon reversed his decision to withdraw U.S. air assets under the Vietnamization program. Between late 1971 and mid-1972 U.S. officials began a series of redeployments designed to augment Seventh Air Force and U.S. naval air assets. In so doing, the number of U.S. aircraft was increased from 375 to 900. On February 5, 1972, SAC officially initiated Operation BULLET SHOT. All total, SAC sent an additional 124 B-52 bombers to Andersen Air Base in Guam and to U-Tapao Royal Thai Air Force Base in Thailand. Ultimately there were 150 B-52s stationed in Guam alone, making it the largest such unit in the U.S. Air Force at that time. Operation BULLET SHOT I sent 8 B-52Ds to join 42 B-52Ds still operating out of U-Tapao Royal Thai Air Force Base. Two days later SAC deployed 29 B-52Ds to Andersen Air Base. BULLET SHOT II began on April 4 in direct response to the PAVN’s initial assault during the Nguyen Hue (Easter) Offensive by 14 PAVN divisions and 200 tanks, which lasted from March 30 to October 22, 1972, and threatened to overthrow South Vietnam’s government.
Bundy, McGeorge On April 8 BULLET SHOT IIA (BULLET SHOT II extended) deployed 6 more B-52s to Guam, and three days later BULLET SHOT III sent 28 B-52Gs to Andersen. This was the first deployment of G models. The Gs were not as well suited to conventional bombing, however, since the Ds had been converted into “Big Bellies” to support Arc Light and COMMANDO HUNT operations. The Ds carried 60,000 pounds of iron bombs, 22,000 pounds more than the Gs. In the late 1960s the Ds had replaced B-52Fs in flying Arc Light raids. Operation BULLET SHOT IV began on May 21, 1972, and deployed 6 more B-52s. Two days later BULLET SHOT V became the final deployment of B-52s. A total of 58 G models were dispatched, bringing the number of B-52s to 209. To support the bombers, between February 8 and May 21, 1972, SAC also deployed 24 KC-135 aerial refueling aircraft to Kadena Air Base in Japan and 7 to U-Tapao Royal Thai Air Force Base. From the time B-52 Arc Light operations began on July 27, 1965, B-52s fell into a routine that seldom changed. Launch times, tactics, and even attack altitudes were all standardized. By July 1971 with the U.S. drawdown well under way, Arc Light sortie rates were down to 1,000 per month. By the time BULLET SHOT ended, B-52s were capable of 3,150 sorties per month. They were also able to expand their bombing missions throughout Vietnam, even attacking north of the DMZ. Between May and October 1972 the bombers and other aircraft became the weapons of choice for what became known as Operation LINEBACKER I. When the peace talks in Paris stalled, President Nixon employed the B-52s during LINEBACKER II (December 18–29, 1972) to force the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) to sign the January 1973 Paris Peace Accords. WILLIAM P. HEAD
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Yale University in 1940. As a young man he assisted former secretary of war Henry Stimson in writing his memoirs. Bundy then served as dean of the faculty of arts and sciences at Harvard University (1953–1961) before joining the John F. Kennedy administration as national security adviser. Bundy continued in this post under President Lyndon B. Johnson until February 1966. Robert Komer, one of Bundy’s deputies, handled Bundy’s job on an interim basis until Walt W. Rostow permanently assumed the position. Bundy was known for his intelligence, although some thought him smug, even arrogant. But he was one of the most powerful and influential advisers in both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations and as such held the respect and confidence of both presidents. During his five years as special assistant, Bundy was intimately involved in critical decisions on the Vietnam War. He was part of Kennedy’s inner circle during the Buddhist Crisis of 1963 and the coup against Ngo Dinh Diem, president of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), that November. Bundy sought to ensure the survival of a democratic independent South Vietnam, but he did not want the United States to take over the fight against the Communist insurgents.
See also Andersen Air Force Base; Arc Light Missions; COMMANDO HUNT, Operation; Demilitarized Zone; Easter Offensive; Guam; LINEBACKER I, Operation; LINEBACKER II, Operation; Strategic Air Command References Head, William P. War from above the Clouds: B-52 Operations during the Second Indochina War. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2002. Lake, John. B-52 Stratofortress Units in Combat, 1955–1973. Botley, Oxford, UK: Osprey, 2004. Tilford, Earl H., Jr. Setup: What the Air Force Did in Vietnam and Why. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1991.
Bundy, McGeorge Birth Date: March 30, 1919 Death Date: September 16, 1996 Academic, foreign policy expert, special assistant to the president for national security affairs (1961–1966), and a key figure in the development of U.S. Vietnam policy. Born on March 30, 1919, in Boston, Massachusetts, McGeorge (“Mac”) Bundy graduated from
McGeorge Bundy was one of the young, brash, bright advisers who gave the administration of John F. Kennedy its reputation for intellectual prowess and ideological toughness. Bundy was also one of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s “Wise Men” and a key figure in the development of U.S. Vietnam policy throughout the war. (Yoichi R. Okamoto/Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library)
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After the assassinations of both President Diem and President Kennedy in November 1963 and the passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in August 1964, Bundy changed his views. By the end of that year he favored an enlarged U.S. role, including a graduated bombing campaign against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and the buildup of U.S. troops in South Vietnam. He was in South Vietnam when the Viet Cong (VC) attacked the U.S. barracks and helicopter base at Pleiku in February 1965, killing nine Americans and destroying five aircraft, an event that helped to confirm his belief that the U.S. military had to intervene. He supported retaliatory air raids on North Vietnam and believed that a strong military presence would strengthen the position of the United States and South Vietnam in peace negotiations. Yet even in the midst of the 1965 troop buildup, Bundy feared that the Americanization of the war would overwhelm civil reform programs and pacification efforts in South Vietnam. During 1965 he urged Johnson to enhance the pacification effort by allocating more resources and improving its management. By 1965 Bundy also began to question the continuing military escalation. He resigned from government service because he had already served more than five years, and he questioned continuing escalation in Vietnam. He had played an influential role in centralizing American management of pacification programs in Washington under Robert Komer and in Saigon under Ambassador William Porter. As one of Johnson’s so-called Wise Men, Bundy continued to advise the president after leaving the administration. During the critical post–Tet Offensive meeting with Johnson in March 1968, Bundy supported de-escalation and a new approach to the war. After leaving government, Bundy served as president of the Ford Foundation until 1979, at which time he left to become a professor of history at New York University for 10 years. In 1990 he joined the Carnegie Corporation of New York as the chairman of its committee on reducing the danger of nuclear war. He was its scholar-in-residence at the time of his death of a heart attack in Boston on September 16, 1996. RICHARD A. HUNT See also Bundy, William Putnam; Gulf of Tonkin Resolution; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Komer, Robert W.; McNamara, Robert Strange; Ngo Dinh Diem; Ngo Dinh Diem, Overthrow of; Pacification; Porter, William James; Read, Benjamin Huger; Rostow, Walt Whitman; Rusk, David Dean; Wise Men References Barrett, David M. Uncertain Warriors: Lyndon Johnson and His Vietnam Advisers. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993. Bird, Kai. The Color of Truth: McGeorge and William Bundy, Brothers in Arms: A Biography. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998. Halberstam, David. The Best and the Brightest. New York: Random House, 1972. Hunt, Richard A. Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts and Minds. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995. Preston, Andrew. The War Council: McGeorge Bundy, the NSC and Vietnam. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006.
Bundy, William Putnam Birth Date: September 24, 1917 Death Date: October 6, 2000 Vietnam policy maker (1961–1969). Born in Washington, D.C., on September 24, 1917, William (Bill) Putnam Bundy was the brother of influential presidential adviser McGeorge Bundy. Bill Bundy was educated at Yale University and Harvard University and married the daughter of Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson. A liberal Democrat, Bundy worked at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) until his appointment as assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs. He became deputy secretary of defense for international security affairs in 1961 and eventually assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs. Bundy, a devoted yet unheralded bureaucrat, knew Southeast Asia well and, as a supporter of U.S. objectives in the region, helped to frame policy for the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). As a Cold War warrior and advocate of military force, he favored covert operations and questioned President John F. Kennedy’s firmness. Bundy supported South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem and opposed pressuring his regime. Bundy thought that the Communist threat warranted a U.S. response and favored U.S. troop deployments to South Vietnam. By 1964 Bundy bore much of the responsibility for Vietnam policy making. Intolerant of in-house dissent, he labored to stave off doubters while proposing to strike the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) through interdiction of the port of Haiphong and through air attacks on transportation routes, industrial areas, and military bivouac areas. Such action, he believed, would bolster the South Vietnamese but required congressional authorization in the form of a resolution, the rough draft of which Bundy coauthored by late May 1964. Once Congress ratified the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution that August, Bundy again recommended forceful measures against the Hanoi government until its leadership decided to disengage. In November 1964 President Lyndon B. Johnson created a unit of eight intermediate-level State Department, Defense Department, and CIA functionaries chaired by Bundy. Instructed to examine U.S. policy choices for Southeast Asia, the group offered three approaches: Option A advanced limited bombing, additional reprisals, and greater resort to clandestine operations; Option B pleaded an all-out air campaign from the outset; and Option C, which Bundy backed, called for a graduated pressure but was noncommittal regarding the use of U.S. combat troops. Situated between administration hawks and doves, Bundy supported the Johnson administration’s Vietnam policy until leaving government in 1969. Even though he supported air raids against North Vietnam in 1965, he expressed reservations about South Vietnam’s leaders, generals Nguyen Cao Ky and Nguyen Van Thieu. Bundy went along with a bombing pause, yet he belittled a peace initiative by Florentine law professor Giorgio La Pira and questioned W. Averell Harriman’s appointment as ambassador-
Bunker, Ellsworth at-large, tasked with representing the United States at the Vietnam War peace negotiations. In 1966 Bundy accompanied President Johnson to the Honolulu Conference and felt relieved once the president decided against disengagement following the Buddhist Crisis. However, disenchantment with the president’s management style and the poor coordination of the war effort contributed to a growing pessimism about escalation that brought Bundy to the brink of hopelessness after the 1968 Tet Offensive. He left government service when Johnson left office in January 1969. From 1969 to 1971 Bundy served as a senior research associate at the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He then joined the faculty of Princeton University, a position he retained from 1972 to 2000. Between 1972 and 1984 he was also an editor of Foreign Affairs. Bundy also published several books before he died in Princeton, New Jersey, on October 6, 2000. RODNEY J. ROSS See also Acheson, Dean Gooderham; Buddhism in Vietnam; Bundy, McGeorge; Gulf of Tonkin Resolution; Harriman, William Averell; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Ngo Dinh Diem; Nguyen Cao Ky; Nguyen Van Thieu; Taylor-McNamara Report; Wise Men
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president. These constitute an impressive record of sound judgment and wise counsel, including his insight into military matters. After General Creighton Abrams took command, Bunker often emphasized, as he did in an October 1968 cable, that U.S. authorities were stressing more heavily than ever before that there was only one integrated military effort rather than separate wars of big battalions, pacification, and territorial security. On the political side, Bunker’s reporting was both practical and timely. In May 1968 he cabled that most Vietnamese regarded peace negotiations with trepidation and expected few results to come from them. Bunker consistently urged that the United States not cease bombing the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) until it provided a serious commitment to cease activity in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). The wisdom of this approach was demonstrated when, on the representations of W. Averell Harriman, the United States accepted vague assurances that reciprocity would be demonstrated, only to see the enemy subsequently deny that there had been any “understandings” while simultaneously violating their supposed terms.
References Bird, Kai. The Color of Truth: McGeorge and William Bundy, Brothers in Arms; A Biography. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998. Halberstam, David. The Best and the Brightest. New York: Random House, 1972. Herring, George C. LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994. Sheehan, Neil, et al. The Pentagon Papers: As Published by the New York Times. New York: Bantam, 1971.
Bunker, Ellsworth Birth Date: May 11, 1894 Death Date: September 27, 1984 U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), 1967–1973. Born on May 11, 1894, in Yonkers, New York, Ellsworth Bunker graduated from Yale in 1916 and entered the family sugar business. Not until midlife, after an extremely successful international business career, did he become a diplomat. Named first to be U.S. ambassador to Argentina, Bunker later held that same rank in Italy and then in India. He was U.S. representative to the Organization of American States (OAS) at the time of the 1965 U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic. Bunker played a key role in promoting a moderate civilian government there and worked closely with Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer Jr., the American commander of OAS forces. Bunker was lauded as a naturally skilled and highly effective diplomat. Arriving in Saigon as U.S. ambassador in April 1967, Bunker established the practice of sending periodic reporting cables to the
Ellsworth Bunker was the U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) for seven years, during 1967–1973. His open support for South Vietnamese president Nguyen Van Thieu drew criticism in some quarters. (Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library)
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Bunker developed great regard for the South Vietnamese during his years in their country. He also appreciated and stressed how the Vietnamese were taking on a growing share of the financial burden of prosecuting the war. He reported that in 1967 American support for the budget accounted for 40 percent of the total, in 1968 it was 24 percent, and in 1969 it was projected to be 16 percent. Furthermore, he believed that the Vietnamese reacted with great resolution and perseverance to the war. Bunker’s regard for President Nguyen Van Thieu also grew year by year. Bunker in turn enjoyed the wide respect of leaders of the South Vietnamese government. Bunker did draw criticism from some quarters for his open support for Thieu in the 1967 and 1971 elections, however. Bunker served as ambassador to South Vietnam for six years, a longer time than any other senior American official, military or civilian, had been in continuous service there. Between 1973, when he left his post, and 1978, Bunker performed an important last public service as chief negotiator of the Panama Canal Treaty. He died on September 27, 1984, in Brattleboro, Vermont. LEWIS SORLEY
was accused of interrogating American and Australian prisoners of war for the Communists. Burchett first went to Vietnam in March 1954, where he met Viet Minh leader Ho Chi Minh in his jungle encampment. For more than 20 years in articles in leftist publications such as Ce Soir and The Guardian and in six books, Vietnam preoccupied Burchett’s writing. From North of the Seventeenth Parallel (1956), which examined land reform, to the overtly polemical Vietnam Will Win! (1968) and to Grasshoppers and Elephants (1977), which depicted the Paris peace talks, Burchett steadfastly proselytized the Communist struggle against the evils of capitalism. Even his best book, Vietnam: Inside Story of the Guerrilla War (1965), which presents in firsthand immediacy the experiences of a National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (National Liberation Front [NLF]) cadre, is politicized to his purposes. Burchett’s affiliation with leftist political and military causes alienated him from Western governments, but his works influenced antiwar sympathizers. He continued to write about politics in Cambodia (with Prince Norodom Sihanouk), Portugal, and elsewhere until his death on September 27, 1983, in Sofia, Bulgaria. CHARLES J. GASPAR
See also Abrams, Creighton Williams, Jr.; Harriman, William Averell; Nguyen Van Thieu; Palmer, Bruce, Jr.; United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1965–1968; United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1969–1973
See also Australia; Fall, Bernard B.; Media and the Vietnam War; National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam; Sihanouk, Norodom
References Bunker, Ellsworth. The Bunker Papers: Reports to the President from Vietnam, 1967–1973. 3 vols. Edited by Douglas Pike. Berkeley, CA: Institute for East Asian Studies, 1990. Johnson, Lyndon B. The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963–1969. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971. Kissinger, Henry. White House Years. Boston: Little, Brown, 1979. Nixon, Richard M. RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon. New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978. Schaffer, Howard B. Ellsworth Bunker: Global Troubleshooter, Vietnam Hawk. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003.
Burchett, Wilfred Birth Date: September 16, 1911 Death Date: September 27, 1983 Australian journalist and author of 35 books. Born on September 16, 1911, in Melbourne, Australia, Wilfred Burchett was hardened by his family’s financial difficulties. When he left Australia to cover World War II in China for the London Daily Express, his leftist political sympathies were already evident. As a journalist Burchett strove to be in the action, and he was the first Western journalist to publicize the destruction of Hiroshima in August 1945. His leftist views showed during his reporting of the Korean War. He alleged that United Nations (UN) forces had used biological weapons, which was patently untrue, and he
References Burchett, Wilfred. At the Barricades. New York: Times Books, 1981. Kiernan, Ben. Burchett Reporting the Other Side of the World, 1939–1983. London: Quartet, 1986. Maclear, Michael. The Ten Thousand Day War: Vietnam, 1945–1975. New York: St. Martin’s, 1981.
Burkett, Bernard Gary Birth Date: 1944 Businessman, military researcher, and Vietnam War veteran who has tried to debunk pervasive myths about the war and also expose fake Vietnam veterans and wannabes. Bernard Gary Burkett (known as B. G. Burkett) was born in 1944, the son of a U.S. Air Force colonel, and is a graduate of Vanderbilt University and the University of Tennessee. He joined the U.S. Army in June 1966 and served in Vietnam with the 199th Light Infantry Brigade. Upon his return from the war he left the service and entered the financial world. He also joined with a group of other businessmen and Vietnam War veterans in Dallas, Texas, to raise money for the Texas Vietnam Memorial. As part of this effort, Burkett found himself continually having to counter the Vietnam War veteran stereotypes and what he saw as pervasive negative perceptions about those who served in Vietnam. Burkett set out on a mission to attack the stereotypes. In the process of conducting his research, Burkett discovered hundreds of instances of fake Vietnam War veterans. When he saw what he believed were phony news stories about veterans, usually
Bush, George Herbert Walker committing criminal acts, he took it upon himself to research the supposed war service of the individual in question. When he discovered that the subjects of the news stories had lied about their service, he contacted the journalist involved and offered to provide a copy of the alleged veteran’s military record. More often than not, journalists made no attempt to verify their stories and refused to change their reports when provided with contrary evidence. In the process of debunking individual stories, Burkett also began to collect data that flew in the face of conventional wisdom about Vietnam War veterans. After 10 years of research in the National Archives and filing hundreds of requests for military documents under the Freedom of Information Act, he uncovered a massive amount of information that he believed proved a distortion of history and the defamation of Vietnam War veterans. Burkett found that Vietnam War veterans were just as successful, or even more successful, than men of their age who did not go to war. He also found that contrary to popular opinion, Vietnam War veterans did not have higher incidences of drug abuse, unemployment, suicide, divorce, or homelessness than nonveterans of the same age. In the process of conducting this research, he exposed more than 1,200 bogus Vietnam War records, including those of prominent activists, celebrated war heroes, criminals, politicians, and even actors. Working with journalist Glenna Whitley, Burkett recorded his findings in the controversial 1998 book Stolen Valor, which exposed a number of prominent individuals who had falsely represented themselves as Vietnam War veterans. Following the publication of his book Burkett turned his attention to media bias, attempting to hold the media accountable for the way in which Vietnam War veterans were still being portrayed in the press. In 2003 Burkett received the U.S. Army’s highest decoration for civilians, the Distinguished Civilian Service Award. At the award ceremony he was cited for his tireless defense of the honorable records and reputations of Vietnam War veterans whom he had defended so tirelessly. JAMES H. WILLBANKS
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States during 1989–1993. Born on June 12, 1924, in Milton, Massachusetts, to a politically prominent and affluent family, George Herbert Walker Bush graduated from the exclusive Phillips Academy in Andover, Massachusetts, in 1942. Despite his acceptance at Yale University, Bush enlisted in the U.S. Navy’s flight training school on his 18th birthday. In the autumn of 1943 Lieutenant (Junior Grade) Bush, then the youngest pilot in the navy, reported for duty on the Independence-class light aircraft carrier San Jacinto. On September 2, 1944, Bush’s plane, a three-man Grumman TBM torpedo bomber, was shot down while on a diversionary attack in the Palau campaign. The other two crew members did not survive, but Bush parachuted from his burning plane and spent 1 night in a life raft and then 30 days with his rescuers of the U.S. submarine Finback. He then returned to the San Jacinto, earning the Distinguished Flying Cross and three Air Medals. After the war Bush entered Yale and majored in economics. After graduation in 1948 and determined to make his own mark, he moved to Texas, attacking the oil business with the same enthusiasm he had displayed during World War II and, in the process, becoming a multimillionaire.
See also Vietnam Veterans of America; Vietnam War Frauds, Fakes, and Wannabes References Appy, Christian G. Patriots: The Vietnam War Remembered from All Sides. New York: Viking, 2003. Burkett, B. G., and Glenna Whitley. Stolen Valor: How the Vietnam Generation Was Robbed of Its Heroes and Its History. Dallas, TX: Verity, 1998.
Bush, George Herbert Walker Birth Date: June 12, 1924 Republican politician, diplomat, director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) during 1976–1977, vice president of the United States during 1981–1989, and president of the United
U.S. representative George H. W. Bush (R-Tex.) talks with a group of young people at a rally in Houston on October 9, 1970. Before becoming president of the United States in 1989, Bush was a congressman, United Nations ambassador, Republican National Committee chairman, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and vice president under President Ronald Reagan. (AP/Wide World Photos)
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Bush entered politics in 1964, running unsuccessfully for the U.S. Senate. Two years later he won a seat in U.S. House of Representatives. In 1970 he again ran unsuccessfully for a Senate seat; he left the House that same year. He then sought an appointment in the Richard M. Nixon administration and served as ambassador to the United Nations (UN) from 1971 to 1973. Bush continued in public service as chairman of the Republican National Committee (1973–1974). He then headed the U.S. mission to China during 1974–1975 and served as director of the CIA from 1976 to 1977. As CIA head, Bush managed to restore the organization’s morale after a series of shocking public revelations about the agency’s past operations, which had included assassinations of foreign leaders and covert overseas coups engineered and financed by the CIA. Bush briefly returned to private life between 1977 and 1980 before running for vice president and winning election in November 1980 on the Republican Party ticket with President Ronald Reagan. Bush’s eight-year tenure was uneventful, and he was viewed by many as a loyal Reagan supporter and heir apparent. In 1989 Bush was elected president. Bush appears to have avoided much of the rancor of the Vietnam War in his public service. In 1991 during the Persian Gulf War he pledged that “this will not be another Vietnam.” After the quick U.S. victory he exclaimed, “By God, we’ve kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all.” Indeed, the Persian Gulf War was the first major conflict in which the United States fought since the Vietnam War. Many had feared that the United States might become bogged down in a similar quagmire in Iraq, but the Bush White House dedicated overwhelming power to the war and had a fixed exit strategy, which had not included ousting Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein from power or occupying Iraq. In 1989 Bush also presided over a very successful invasion of Panama, which had ousted Manuel Noriega from power. While the Bush administration conducted talks with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) concerning diplomatic recognition, Bush pleased conservatives in the United States by refusing to lift
the trade embargo or establish diplomatic relations. These were finally extended by President William J. Clinton in 1995. Bush served just one term in office, for as popular as he was after the Persian Gulf War, his approval ratings plummeted because of a steep and persistent economic downturn that his opponent, Clinton, worked to his advantage. Bush left office in January 1993 and retired to Houston, Texas. He also helped oversee construction of his presidential library at Texas A&M University. The first retired or sitting president to visit Vietnam since the war, in September 1995 Bush traveled to and spoke in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City on behalf of Citibank, reportedly for a six-figure fee. He welcomed the new relationship between the United States and the SRV but mildly criticized the Vietnamese government on its human rights record. In Hanoi, Bush said that he had delayed establishing diplomatic relations because of the issue of Americans missing in action. He subsequently took an active role with former president Clinton in world humanitarian relief causes. In a bitter irony Bush’s son, George W. Bush, who became president in 2001, chose to topple Saddam Hussein from power and occupy Iraq in 2003. He had done exactly what his father’s administration had sought to avoid: embroil the United States in a brutal civil war in the name of nation building. The Iraq War, in the eyes of many Americans, became a modern version of Vietnam, with the so-called Vietnam Syndrome again in evidence. BRENDA J. TAYLOR See also Central Intelligence Agency; Clinton, William Jefferson; Reagan, Ronald Wilson References Bush, George, with Victor Gold. Looking Forward. New York: Doubleday, 1987. Bush, George H. W., and Brent Scowcroft. A World Transformed. New York: Knopf, 1998. Greene, John Robert. The Presidency of George Bush. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000.
C CALCAV See Clergy and Laymen Concerned about Vietnam
Calley, William Laws, Jr. Birth Date: June 8, 1943 U.S. Army lieutenant and platoon leader found guilty in the 1968 My Lai Massacre. William Laws (“Rusty”) Calley Jr. was born on June 8, 1943, in Miami, Florida, the only son of middle-class parents. Calley’s school years were characterized by mediocrity, a trait that continued to haunt him as an adult. After flunking out of junior college he worked several jobs, including as a bellhop and as an insurance adjuster. Although he had been rejected by the military for health reasons (ulcers) several years earlier, the U.S. Army drafted Calley in 1966. After basic training at Fort Bliss, Texas, he was assigned as a clerk-typist to Fort Washington. Private First Class Calley excelled at this position and attracted the attention of his superiors, who helped secure his assignment to Officer Candidate School (OCS) at Fort Benning, Georgia. The army was then short of officers, which had much to do with Calley’s commissioning despite criticism of his “command presence.” Calley graduated 120th in his OCS class of 156 and was commissioned a second lieutenant in September 1967. In Vietnam, Calley commanded a platoon in Captain Ernest Lou Medina’s Company C of the 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry, 23rd Infantry (Americal) Division. On March 16, 1968, Calley participated, as part of Task Force Barker, in an assault on the hamlet of My Lai 4 in Quang Ngai Province. The Americans believed that My Lai was
An April 23, 1971, photo of Lieutenant William L. Calley Jr., taken during his court-martial at Fort Benning, Georgia, in connection with the largest U.S. atrocity of the Vietnam War, the massacre of 200 to 500 civilians in the village of My Lai in South Vietnam. (AP/Wide World Photos)
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the headquarters of the Viet Cong (VC) local-force 48th Battalion, which had inflicted heavy losses on Charlie Company during the previous weeks. Although expecting a hot zone, the attack force encountered mainly women, children, and elderly persons. During the next several hours hundreds of civilians were killed; some women were raped and then murdered. Charlie Company’s official report listed 128 VC killed and 3 weapons captured. In April 1969 Vietnam veteran Ronald L. Ridenhour exposed the massacre in letters to the Pentagon, the White House, and members of Congress. Upon recommendation of the Peers-MacCrate Commission, in September 1969 the U.S. Army indicted Calley for the murder of 109 Vietnamese civilians. After a 4-month-long court-martial (the longest in U.S. history), Calley was convicted and sentenced in March 1971 to life imprisonment. After he had served only 3 months in the stockade, President Richard M. Nixon freed him and ordered him confined to quarters pending review of the case. Calley’s punishment was subsequently reduced to 20 and then to 10 years. Finally, in November 1974 Federal District Court judge J. Robert Elliott, citing “prejudicial publicity,” ruled that Calley was convicted unjustly. Although the army disputed the civil court jurisdiction, Calley was paroled for good behavior after serving onethird of his sentence or 40 months, of which 35 were in the relative comfort of his own quarters. Calley worked for many years in his father-in-law’s jewelry store in Columbus, Georgia. He left Columbus in 2005 and took up residence in Atlanta, where his son, Laws Calley, lives. Calley had repeatedly turned down interviews with journalists about My Lai, but on August 21, 2009, speaking to the Columbus, Georgia, Kiwanis Club, Calley made an extraordinary public apology for his role in the massacre. “There is not a single day that goes by that I do not feel remorse for what happened,” Calley said. “I am very sorry.” BRENDA J. TAYLOR See also “Conduct of the War in Vietnam” Report; Medina, Ernest Lou; My Lai Massacre; Peers, William R.; Peers Inquiry References Belknap, Michael R. The Vietnam War on Trial: The My Lai Massacre and the Court-Martial of Lieutenant Calley. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002. “Ex Officer Apologizes for Killings At My Lai.” New York Times, August 23, 2009. Hersh, Seymour M. Cover-Up: The Army’s Secret Investigation of the Massacre at My Lai 4. New York: Random House, 1972. Olson, James S., and Randy Roberts. My Lai: A Brief History with Documents. New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1998.
Cambodia Cambodia, the last of the countries of Indochina to be drawn into the violence of the Vietnam War, ultimately endured an even greater tragedy of death and devastation than any of its neighbors. Present-day Cambodia occupies an area of 70,238 square
miles, about the size of the U.S. state of Missouri, and is wedged into the Indochina peninsula between southeastern Thailand and southern Vietnam. Cambodia’s 1965 population was estimated to be 6.602 million people. On the map Cambodia resembles a nut held tightly in the jaws of a giant wrench, an image that accurately reflects Cambodians’ historic fears of being extinguished by their larger, more powerful, and more vigorous neighbors, Thailand and Vietnam. King Norodom Sihanouk once called the Thai and Vietnamese “eaters of Khmer earth.” To the northeast, Cambodia borders on Laos; on the southwest is the Gulf of Thailand. Cambodia is rimmed by the Cardamom and Elephant mountains in the southwest, the Dangrek Hills in the northwest, and boulder-strewn ridges in the east along the border with Vietnam. Within that ring of mountains, Cambodia’s heartland is a flat green expanse of forests and alluvial fields watered by numberless brown streams that flow into three great rivers, the Mekong, the Bassac, and the Tonle Sap. The latter is also the name of the violin-shaped Great Lake, Southeast Asia’s largest lake, that stretches across the center of Cambodia. With Cambodia’s well-watered fields and rivers teeming with fish, Cambodians were traditionally well fed in times of peace, but a violent and turbulent history also brought periods of terrible hardship. Cambodia’s first major civilization, Funan (Kingdom of the Mountain, according to ancient Chinese chronicles), arose from among the Mon-Khmer tribes that had migrated to the Mekong basin from deep in Asia’s interior during earlier centuries. Although the Khmer people, like the Thai and Lao, originated in central Asia, their cultures were chiefly influenced by India, whose traders and priests had brought to Southeast Asia their religion, dress, legends, technology, artistic styles, and economic and administrative structures. Funan, which flourished from the first to the sixth centuries CE, was essentially Indian in culture. So were its successors, the state of Chenla and the Angkor kingdom, which represented the high point of Khmer civilization. Ruling from the 9th to the 15th centuries, the Angkor kings at the height of their power dominated most of present-day Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam as well as Cambodia. At the seat of their realm they built the great city of Angkor. Their temples were constructed in the shape of hills and symbolized Mount Meru, the sacred mountain at the center of the universe (later the design symbolized Mount Kailasa, abode of the god Shiva). On walls and pillars craftsmen sculpted images of gods, angels, serpents, lions, elephants, and other real and mythical creatures along with scenes from court life and epic legends. Among the carvings were glimpses of a dark strain of violence and cruelty that also ran through Khmer tradition. Stone friezes showed battle scenes full of dead and wounded soldiers, grisly executions, and prisoners tortured and burned. The greatest of the temples, Angkor Wat, was built during the reign of Suryavarman II, who ruled from 1113 to 1150. The older temples honor Shiva, the Hindu deity worshiped by the earlier Angkor rulers (“the one whom the sages adore like an inner light,”
Cambodia says one inscription). Later temples, though still bearing many Hindu symbols, reflect the Angkor kings’ 12th-century conversion to Buddhism. The Theravada branch of Buddhism, which teaches that every person must seek his or her own enlightenment through meditation, austerity, humility, and poverty, eventually became the religion practiced by the great majority of Cambodians. Except when it was brutally suppressed by the radical Khmer Rouge regime between 1975 and 1979, Buddhism and the sangha (clergy) have remained pervasive and powerful influences in the country’s life and beliefs. In the 13th and 14th centuries the Khmer kingdom declined. Thai invaders captured and destroyed Angkor in 1431. In succeeding centuries as the Thais seized more Cambodian territory, an expanding Vietnam also pressed into Cambodia from the east, gradually occupying the fertile lands of the Mekong Delta. With the Thai, the Khmers at least shared a common religion and cultural heritage. The Vietnamese, whose culture and political structures were essentially derived from China, were more alien. Their encroachments aroused among Cambodians a lasting legacy of hatred and racial fear. By the mid-19th century Angkor was a forgotten ruin, crumbling away in the jungle. The Cambodian monarchy was a virtual vassal of Thailand, which chose and crowned the Khmer kings. Cambodia appeared in danger of losing its national identity altogether until France, then in the process of establishing colonial rule over Vietnam, made Cambodia a protectorate in 1864. Cambodia’s King Norodom welcomed French protection but not France’s later moves that gave ever greater powers to its colonial administrators. Although Norodom and his successors remained on the throne, within 20 years Cambodia became a de facto colony, with all real governing power in French hands. Cambodia did, however, survive as an identifiable state, a status that it might well have lost had France not intervened. French rule lasted 90 years, with little benefit for the Cambodians. The French did oversee the construction of roads and a railway as the infrastructure for a colonial economy based chiefly on rubber plantations, rice exports, and small-scale timber and gemmining industries. There was no real development of a modern economy or of the educated population that modernization would require. Instead of training Cambodians, the French customarily brought in Vietnamese to fill civil service jobs; traders and shop owners were also predominantly Vietnamese. Thus, when Cambodia recovered its independence in November 1953 under King Norodom’s great-grandson Norodom Sihanouk, it lacked not only resources and infrastructure but also the trained technicians, managers, and administrators needed in a modern state. Cambodia’s independence was part of a larger upheaval in the region that spanned five years of Japanese occupation (1940–1945) and nine more years of conflict between France and Viet Minh revolutionaries led by Vietnamese Communist leader Ho Chi Minh. The July 1954 Geneva Accords ended French rule in all of
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Indochina but also left Vietnam divided, with the Viet Minh ruling in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and an anti-Communist government under Ngo Dinh Diem in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Within a few years violence occurred again in South Vietnam as Diem, supported by the United States, attempted to destroy the Communist movement in South Vietnam while the revolutionaries fought to reunify the country under their rule. In Cambodia, Sihanouk’s chief concern was to prevent his country from becoming involved in the violence that was engulfing its larger neighbor. In 1955 he had abdicated the throne in favor of his father, Norodom Suramarit, in order to control the government more directly as the country’s prime minister. After Suramarit died in 1960, Sihanouk was given the title of chief of state; the throne remained vacant. Outside Cambodia the prince was widely regarded as erratic, even flighty. But his frequent reversals of policy did have a consistent goal: to keep Cambodia neutral. After first cultivating relations with the United States, in 1963 Sihanouk abruptly ordered U.S. military and economic aid programs canceled and two years later broke relations completely. Believing that the Vietnamese revolutionaries were ultimately going to win, he then entered into a fateful compromise that allowed the Vietnamese Communists to set up bases on Cambodian territory along the border and to receive arms shipments that came by sea to Cambodia’s main port of Sihanoukville (later renamed Kompong Som) and then overland to the border region. Underlying this accommodation was Sihanouk’s calculation that if Cambodia helped the Vietnamese win their revolution, the Vietnamese might respect Cambodian independence after their victory. There was another benefit for Sihanouk. As part of the arrangement, the Vietnamese gave no help to the small Khmer Rouge (“Red Khmer”) Communist insurgency that was opposing the prince’s regime. The United States entered the Vietnam War, and instead of a quick Communist victory the conflict became a prolonged stalemate. In Cambodia, resentment of Sihanouk’s policies and Vietnamese encroachments grew among military leaders and students and in other segments of the population. Sihanouk’s authority was meanwhile weakening as the result of economic strains, corruption, and abuses of power in his regime. As the 1960s drew to a close, the prince was still balanced on his diplomatic and political tightrope, but his position was more precarious than ever, as was peace in Cambodia. Violence expanded in stages. In March 1969 the United States began secretly bombing Vietnamese Communist positions on the Cambodian side of the border. In August, Sihanouk named Cambodian Army commander General Lon Nol to head a new rightwing Government of National Salvation. The secret U.S. bombings meanwhile encouraged Cambodian Army commanders in the border region to conduct harassing operations against Communist Vietnamese bases. In November reinforcements were sent to the area, and attacks were stepped up. Then in March 1970 after
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violent government-orchestrated anti-Vietnamese demonstrations in Phnom Penh, Lon Nol publicly demanded a complete Vietnamese withdrawal from all Cambodian territory within 72 hours. Prince Sihanouk, who was traveling abroad, denounced the demand, but Lon Nol and his allies sent troops to surround the National Assembly and government ministries and obtained a unanimous National Assembly vote on March 18 deposing Sihanouk as chief of state. Five days later in Beijing, Sihanouk sealed an alliance with his former mortal enemies, the Khmer Rouge, against Lon Nol’s “reactionary and pro-imperialist” government. A month later Sihanouk formally allied with the Lao and Vietnamese Communists as well. The new leaders in Phnom Penh, having inflamed Cambodia’s traditional anti-Vietnamese feelings for their own political purposes, now called for national mobilization against the estimated 40,000 Vietnamese Communist troops on Cambodian territory. Thousands of young men and women enthusiastically flocked to recruiting stations to join the Forces Armées Nationale Khmer (FANK, Khmer National Armed Forces) and the national crusade against the Yuon, the pejorative Khmer term for Vietnamese. Legally the new government’s policy was indisputably justified: the Vietnamese were occupying Cambodian territory in flagrant violation of Cambodian sovereignty. Whether the policy was prudent was another matter. Cambodia’s small and poorly trained army was no match for the Vietnamese, who easily defeated the poorly armed and inexperienced Cambodian soldiers whenever an engagement took place. In their ambition and naïveté, Lon Nol and his associates marched blindly into a war they could not win, with catastrophic consequences for the land and people they sought to lead. Naive about their own weakness, the new Cambodian leaders were also naive about the United States, which they assumed would come unstintingly to their defense as it had come to the aid of the neighboring South Vietnam. But after years of frustrating stalemate in Vietnam, the American public had no appetite for a wider war. U.S. military leaders perceived Cambodian events through lenses that were focused almost entirely on their own tactical needs in Vietnam. Seeing a chance to disrupt the Communist logistical network on the Cambodian side of the border, the U.S. command supported several sizable operations by South Vietnam forces in Cambodia during April 1970. Then on April 30, 1970, 32,000 U.S. troops rolled across the border. This “incursion,” as U.S. officials insisted on calling it, aroused such a storm of protest at home that President Richard Nixon soon promised to withdraw all U.S. troops from Cambodia by the end of June. Although the United States continued to provide air support even after its troops left, FANK suffered a series of disastrous defeats. In less than four months the Communists took the entire region east of the Mekong River and large areas in the rest of the country. Those early defeats set a pattern that would never be reversed. During the five years of war that followed Lon Nol’s troops steadily lost ground,
while Cambodia’s economy disintegrated and its 7 million people sank into an agony of defeat, hunger, and despair. When the war began, the forces opposing Lon Nol’s hapless army were chiefly Vietnamese Communists. The Vietnamese moved quickly, however, to build up a Khmer resistance movement. A group known as Khmer Viet Minh, Cambodian veterans of the Viet Minh war who had been living in Vietnam ever since the 1950s, were sent back to Cambodia to manage the armed struggle there. The Khmer Rouge, now allies (if uneasy and mistrustful ones) of the Vietnamese Communists, were also expanding their strength. Joining the insurgent side too were soldiers, officials, and others who remained loyal to Sihanouk. Gradually Cambodians took over most of the fighting, although still with guidance and some direct combat support from North Vietnam. Led by two French-educated Cambodian Communists, Saloth Sar (better known by his pseudonym, Pol Pot) and Ieng Sary, the Khmer Rouge would emerge during the 1970s as the most extreme and violent of all the Indochina revolutionary movements. Sar and his colleagues nursed a bitter resentment toward the Vietnamese that was at least partly rooted in the Vietnamese Communists’ failure to support their struggle when it was young and weak. Cooperation between Vietnamese and Cambodians against Lon Nol ended after North Vietnam and the United States concluded a peace agreement in January 1973. The Khmer Rouge, regarding the cease-fire as a betrayal, secretly demanded that the Vietnamese leave Cambodia, meanwhile carrying out a bloody purge inside the insurgent ranks that killed hundreds of Khmer Viet Minh cadres and (although Sihanouk remained the titular head of the revolution) Sihanouk loyalists as well. From 1973 to 1979 the Khmer Rouge imposed the violent and fanatical doctrines they had nursed through years of isolation, hatred, and a war that was spiraling deeper and deeper into savagery. Meanwhile, the war-weary U.S. Congress ended U.S. bombing in Cambodia on August 15, 1973. On April 17, 1975, Lon Nol’s decrepit government surrendered. In five years of war approximately 10 percent of Cambodia’s 7 million people had died. The economy was in ruins, schools and hospitals had virtually ceased to exist, and half of the population had been uprooted from their homes. But worse was to come. The Khmer Rouge, bent on extirpating all traces of the old society, renamed the country Democratic Kampuchea and emptied the cities, forcing millions of Cambodians into the countryside in what amounted to slave labor camps. The Khmer Rouge also murdered hundreds of thousands of real or imagined opponents and caused more hundreds of thousands of deaths from exhaustion, hunger, and disease. Khmer Rouge rule came to an end in January 1979 when some 120,000 Vietnamese troops, who had invaded Cambodia after months of escalating border clashes, occupied Phnom Penh and installed a new pro-Vietnamese government. Falling back to the countryside, Khmer Rouge guerrillas—eventually joined by two smaller groups backed by the United States and the non-Communist Southeast Asian states—mounted a stubborn resistance
Cambodia against the Vietnamese and their Cambodian allies. Although the Khmer Rouge terror had ended, the new war brought new miseries. A third of 1 million Cambodians spent years in dismal refugee camps along the Thai border, and millions of others struggled to survive in a country devastated by years of butchery. After a 10-year occupation Vietnamese troops withdrew in 1989, but war continued between the Khmer Rouge and its allies and the Vietnamese-sponsored Phnom Penh government headed by Prime Minister Hun Sen. A peace agreement was finally signed under United Nations (UN) auspices on October 23, 1991. All sides agreed to give up their arms, but the Khmer Rouge never fully complied and also refused to participate in UN-supervised elections for a new government. Despite widespread Khmer Rouge attacks meant to disrupt the voting, the election was held in May 1993. Prince Sihanouk’s party, the United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (called FUNCINPEC, from its French initials), won a narrow plurality over Hun Sen’s Cambodian People’s Party. Following the election, a new constitution restored the monarchy. On September 24, 1993, Sihanouk resumed the throne that he had abdicated 38 years earlier. His son, Prince Norodom Ranariddh,
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and Hun Sen shared leadership as co–prime ministers of the new government. Ranariddh nominally ranked first among the two, reflecting the election results. Hun Sen’s loyalists, however, controlled most of the army, the police, and the judiciary and much of the press. Openly or in secret, Hun Sen’s network also owned a huge part of the Cambodian economy and largely controlled the flow of international aid, which reached more than $3 billion in the next three years. The power-sharing arrangement did not lead to a new era of compromise, cooperation, and multiparty democracy, as international peace brokers had hoped. Instead, Ranariddh and Hun Sen and their followers steadily broke apart into two hostile camps, each with its own armed bands of supporters. Killings and violent clashes grew so frequent that one foreign diplomat in Phnom Penh compared the two factions to “rival mafias competing for territory and assets.” Meanwhile, although free-market policies and the flow of foreign dollars brought prosperity to some Cambodians, corruption, abuses of power, and incompetent administration sapped the government’s moral authority. The coalition’s final destruction was precipitated in the late spring of 1997 when representatives of the disintegrating Khmer
Homeless Cambodian orphans await their turn to receive a bowl of rice at a refugee camp north of the Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh. Cambodia ultimately endured an even greater tragedy of death and devastation than any of its neighbors. A third of a million Cambodians spent years in refugee camps along the Thai border, and millions of others struggled to survive in a country decimated by years of butchery at the hands of the Khmer Rouge. (Bettmann/Corbis)
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Rouge, in defiance of their longtime leader Pol Pot, began negotiating with associates of Prince Ranariddh on the possible surrender of their remaining forces. In the talks the Khmer Rouge offered to join Ranariddh’s alliance in opposition to Hun Sen, whom they still regarded as a puppet of the hated Vietnamese. Under the terms of the deal, Khmer Rouge soldiers would change into government uniforms and pledge allegiance to the king, the government, and the constitution but would not be disbanded or disarmed and would remain in the territory they previously occupied. After Pol Pot and his few remaining followers were captured and put under arrest by the new Khmer Rouge leaders, the two sides were only a day away from announcing the surrender when Hun Sen, fearing that a Khmer Rouge alliance with Ranariddh’s forces would tilt the military balance against him, seized power in Phnom Penh early on the morning of July 6. Hun Sen, insisting that Ranariddh’s troops had started the fighting, called the coup a “counteroffensive.” But the United States and most other countries condemned him for overturning the elected government. Whoever actually fired the first shots, it was evident that both sides shared the blame for the climate of violence, revenge, and fear that had overtaken Cambodian political life. During the fighting Prince Ranariddh fled the country, while Hun Sen’s forces hunted down his political allies and armed supporters. A number of captured Ranariddh loyalists were tortured and then put to death in mass executions, a chilling reminder even if the killings did not reach the same unspeakable depths of horror of the Khmer Rouge bloodbath between 1975 and 1979. The coup left Hun Sen seemingly in firm control of Phnom Penh and most of the country. King Sihanouk, who by ironic coincidence was receiving medical treatment in Beijing on the day of Hun Sen’s coup exactly as he had been when he himself was overthrown 27 years before, was once again pushed to the sidelines, unable to protect his son’s position just as he had been unable to protect his own in the fateful events of 1970. Nevertheless, political stability slowly took root in Cambodia after the 1997 coup, and King Sihanouk remained king until 2004, when he voluntarily abdicated, allowing his son Norodom Sihamoni, Prince Ranariddh’s brother, to ascend the throne. In the meantime, in 1998 the Khmer Rouge finally bowed to pressure and agreed to turn Pol Pot over to an international war crimes tribunal. On April 15, 1998, the day that the announcement was made, Pol Pot was found dead, allegedly of a heart attack. His handlers promptly cremated the body, which prompted suspicions that he had been murdered to keep him quiet or that he had committed suicide. By 2000 the Khmer Rouge’s power had virtually evaporated except for isolated spots in the rural areas of Cambodia. Cambodia has been the beneficiary of significant foreign aid since the early 1990s, with the United States, Japan, France, Germany, Canada, Great Britain, and Australia giving the most. Reconstruction efforts have been steady if slow, and Cambodia is once again drawing in tourists. In 2007 alone some 4 million foreign travelers visited the Angkor Wat temple complex. Since the late
1990s Cambodia’s economic growth has been in the double digits, and foreign government and private investments have been on the increase. Corruption continues to be a major problem, however, and this has tended to keep the rising economic tide from working its way to the poorest citizens. In 2005 abundant petroleum and natural gas reserves were discovered in Cambodia’s territorial waters; extraction is slated to begin in 2011. If estimates hold true, these reserves will provide a huge windfall for the Cambodian economy. ARNOLD R. ISAACS See also Angkor Wat; Cambodia, Vietnamese Invasion and Occupation of; Cambodian Incursion; Khmer Rouge; Lon Nol; Parrot’s Beak; Pol Pot; Sihanouk, Norodom; United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1969–1973; Vietnam, Socialist Republic of, 1975–Present; Washington Special Actions Group References Becker, Elizabeth. When the War Was Over: The Voices of Cambodia’s Revolution and Its People. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986. Hardy, Gordon, Arnold R. Isaacs, MacAlister Brown, and the Editors of Boston Publishing Company. Pawns of War: Cambodia and Laos. Boston: Boston Publishing, 1987. Isaacs, Arnold R. Without Honor: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983. Mazzeo, Donatella, and Chiara Silvi Antonini. Monuments of Civilization: Ancient Cambodia. New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978.
Cambodia, Vietnamese Invasion and Occupation of Start Date: December 25, 1978 End Date: September 26, 1989 The Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia during December 25, 1978–September 26, 1989, isolated the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) from much of the international community, exacerbated troubled relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), led to a brief war in 1979 between the PRC and the SRV, proved a serious drain on the Vietnamese economy, delayed normalization of relations between Vietnam and the United States, and drove the Khmer Rouge from power. The background of the conflict lay not in ideology but rather in traditional animosity between Vietnam and Cambodia. Khmer Rouge leaders were also bitter that in the 1960s the Vietnamese Communists, anxious to keep their own useful accommodation with Prince Norodom Sihanouk’s government intact, had given the Khmer Rouge little support. This permanently embittered Khmer Rouge leaders, who were in any case instinctively anti-Vietnamese. After entering into an uneasy alliance with the Vietnamese Communists after Sihanouk’s fall, Khmer Rouge leaders believed that they had been betrayed a second time after the Vietnamese Communists signed the 1973 Paris Peace Accords. Khmer Rouge lead-
Cambodia, Vietnamese Invasion and Occupation of ers ordered the Vietnamese to leave Cambodian territory and even launched a purge to eliminate pro-Vietnamese elements within the Khmer Rouge. These purges killed nearly all the Khmer Viet Minh, those Cambodians who had fought against the French and had gone on to live in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) until 1970, when the government there had ordered them south to help lead the Cambodian resistance. From the spring of 1973 on, the Vietnamese Communists no longer played any role in the Khmer Rouge fight against the Lon Nol government except for serving as a conduit for aid shipments from China to the Khmer Rouge sent down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. They remained in their Cambodian sanctuaries, however, and from time to time there were armed clashes between them and the Khmer Rouge. In April 1975 the Khmer Rouge defeated the Lon Nol government. After they came to power, the Khmer Rouge ordered the people out of the capital of Phnom Penh and larger towns and put them to work in agricultural labor camps in the countryside. All private property was abolished, and paper money disappeared, replaced by ration tickets earned by productive labor. Schools were closed, and Buddhist temples were destroyed. Thousands of people died, including many ethnic Vietnamese; some 200,000 Vietnamese were expelled from the country. In January 1976 the Khmer Rouge promulgated a new constitution and changed the name of the country to the Democratic Republic of Kampuchea. In April, Prince Sihanouk resigned as head of state. Khieu Samphan took his place, but Pol Pot, another Khmer Rouge leader, was the dominant figure in the cabinet. Meanwhile, the government announced that 800,000 people, or roughly 10 percent of the population, had died in the war that brought the Khmer Rouge to power. There had long been border disputes between Vietnam and Cambodia, and in 1977 these disputes again led to serious fighting. In September, Vietnam claimed that four Kampuchean divisions had invaded its Tay Ninh Province. In September and December, Vietnam retaliated. The December incursion saw 60,000 troops, supported by tanks and artillery, striking as far as the outskirts of Svay Rieng and Kompong Cham. This incursion led to the first public disclosure of the conflict, and on December 31, 1977, an angry radio broadcast from Phnom Penh denounced the Vietnamese. A week later the Vietnamese withdrew, most probably on their own accord, but the Khmer Rouge declared that it had won a “historic victory” and rejected calls for negotiations. The Khmer Rouge also proceeded to carry out a violent purge centered on its armed forces in the eastern part of the country that were supposed to defend the regime from the Vietnamese. Up to 100,000 Cambodians were executed. Many Khmer Rouge fled into Vietnam to avoid being arrested and killed. Later they formed the backbone of the Vietnamese-sponsored anti–Khmer Rouge resistance. Kampuchea also laid claim to much of Cochin China (southernmost Vietnam), which had a large Khmer minority, and to small islands in the Gulf of Thailand. In 1960 Saigon had claimed seven of these, including the largest island of Phu Quoc, and had landed
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troops. In May 1975 there was a major clash over these islands when the new Khmer Rouge government sent troops to occupy several of them, including Phu Quoc. This clash was almost certainly prompted by the belief that there was oil in the area. The battle for these islands was ferocious, and it took the Vietnamese almost a month of heavy fighting, including numerous heavy air strikes flown by North Vietnamese pilots in U.S.-made South Vietnamese bomber aircraft, to expel the Cambodian troops from the islands. As the border conflicts escalated, Hanoi supported an anti– Khmer Rouge resistance. Eastern Cambodia had been an important part of the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) and Viet Cong (VC) logistics system during the Vietnam War, and ties between the people there and Vietnam were strong. This was strengthened by the fact that many of those opposed to the Khmer Rouge fled to the border area. Hanoi now organized those who had fled to Vietnam, including many ex–Khmer Rouge fighters, into anti–Khmer Rouge units to fight alongside the PAVN against Kampuchean forces. Much of this fighting occurred in the Parrot’s Beak area. Fighting along the border escalated, and by 1978 the Vietnamese were regularly conducing air strikes against Cambodian targets along the border. There were also reports of Cambodian planes being flown by Chinese pilots, but these were never confirmed. Although Hanoi made several offers to negotiate, all of these were rebuffed by the Khmer Rouge. Even though Kampuchea remained largely cut off from the outside world, stories of mass killings there began to circulate. In October 1978 Hanoi claimed that the Khmer Rouge had killed 2 million Kampucheans. At the time this was thought to be propaganda, but clearly something was happening. Kampuchea, regarded as a major rice producer in Southeast Asia, was close to starvation. Tensions between Vietnam and Kampuchea were exacerbated by the fact that the two states became proxies in the developing Sino-Soviet rivalry. Kampuchea was a client state of China, while Vietnam was a client state of the Soviet Union. Loyalties of the Communist world divided accordingly; most of the Warsaw Pact nations and Cuba, then relying heavily on financial assistance from the Soviet Union, supported Vietnam; Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) supported Kampuchea. At the beginning of December 1978, several anti–Khmer Rouge factions came together to form the Kampuchean National Front (KNF) led by Khmer Rouge defector Heng Samrin, former deputy commander in eastern Cambodia. Hanoi gave the KNF full support, including military assistance, and the KNF soon fielded an army of 20,000. Finally on December 25, 1978, the VPA invaded Cambodia along a broad front. Initially the SRV committed 18 divisions, or more than half of its army, to the operation. Ultimately there were 200,000 Vietnamese troops in Cambodia, along with Heng Samrin’s army. Pol Pot’s army was much smaller, perhaps less than a third of the size of the invading Vietnamese forces, and
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the Vietnamese had total air and naval supremacy as well as tremendous superiority in armor and heavy artillery. Heavily outnumbered and outgunned, the Khmer Rouge retreated into the countryside and waged guerrilla warfare. Vietnamese armored columns took Phnom Penh with little opposition and installed Heng Samrin and his supporters as the new Cambodian government. Soon Heng Samrin and his Vietnamese allies had all major Kampuchean cities under their control. Heng Samrin became president of the country, but only the presence of several Vietnamese divisions enabled him to remain in power. The Soviet Union, Laos, the SRV, and most other Communist states recognized the new government. In January 1979 the Soviet Union used its veto in the United Nations (UN) Security Council to kill a resolution demanding the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Kampuchea. Heng Samrin meanwhile entered into treaties with the SRV and Laos. With his forces down to only about 25,000 troops, Pol Pot continued to conduct guerrilla warfare, concentrating what remained of his army in the thick jungles of southwestern and northeastern Kampuchea near the Thai border. China meanwhile aided the Khmer Rouge, funneling this assistance through Thailand. Thai generals profited handsomely from the misery, allowing the transit of military assistance to the Khmer Rouge and securing gems and timber from their area of control. Only the Vietnamese occupation prevented the Khmer Rouge from returning to power and continuing their genocidal policies. Indeed, it was only because of the Vietnamese invasion that the mass killings of Cambodians by the Khmer Rouge were confirmed. China meanwhile threatened the SRV with force to punish Hanoi for the invasion of Kampuchea, and divisions of the PRC’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA, Chinese Army) actually invaded Vietnam in a brief war in February and March 1979. The Chinese invasion did not drive the Vietnamese from Cambodia. That came about from the sheer expense of the operation, the resultant drain on the Vietnamese economy, and the SRV’s attendant isolation in the international community at a time when the leadership recognized the need to revitalize the national economy and secure foreign investment. Finally in May 1988 Hanoi announced that it would withdraw 50,000 troops, about half of its forces, from Cambodia by the end of the year. In July the Phnom Penh government and rebel coalition met for the first time face-to-face in inconclusive peace talks in Indonesia. On April 5, 1989, Hanoi and Phnom Penh announced jointly that all Vietnamese troops would leave Cambodia by the end of September even if no settlement was found. On September 26, 1989, Vietnam announced that all its troops had withdrawn from Cambodia. Some 25,000 Vietnamese troops had died there. In the late 1990s after prolonged negotiations, rival Cambodian factions including the Vietnamese-installed regime (then headed by Hun Sen) and the Khmer Rouge agreed to a supreme national council headed by Prince Sihanouk. The UN also mounted a vast peacekeeping operation and supervised elections. The Khmer Rouge have
not returned to power, and by the early 2000s the group had splintered apart and was a mere shadow of its former self. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Cambodia; China, People’s Republic of; Heng Samrin; Kampuchean National Front; Khmer Rouge; Lon Nol; Parrot’s Beak; Pol Pot; Sihanouk, Norodom; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; Vietnam, Socialist Republic of, 1975–Present References Becker, Elizabeth. When the War Was Over: The Voices of Cambodia’s Revolution and Its People. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986. Chanda, Nayan. Brother Enemy: The War after the War. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986. Chen, King C. China’s War with Vietnam, 1979: Issues, Decisions, and Implications. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institute Press, 1987. Etcheson, Craig. The Rise and Fall of Democratic Kampuchea. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1984. Hardy, Gordon, Arnold R. Isaacs, and MacAlister Brown. Pawns of War. Boston: Boston Publishing, 1987. Isaacs, Arnold R. Without Honor: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983. Colonel Nguyen Van Phuc, ed. Lich Su Trung Doan Khong Quan 937 [History of the 937th Air Force Regiment]. Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 2005. O’Ballance, Edgar. The Wars in Vietnam, 1954–1980. Rev. ed. New York: Hippocrene Books, 1981.
Cambodian Airlift Start Date: September 1974 End Date: April 1975 The Cambodian airlift occurred after the U.S. Congress imposed restrictions on the presence of U.S. personnel in Cambodia. Anxious to support the government headed by Lon Nol, the Richard M. Nixon administration turned to an unorthodox solution to keep open the supply lines to Phnom Penh. After Communist Khmer Rouge forces threatened to close the 60-mile route along the Mekong River, Washington turned to William H. Bird, a longtime air transport operator in Southeast Asia, to organize a government-funded airlift. In July 1974 Bird submitted an “unsolicited proposal” to conduct an airlift from Thailand to Cambodia. The U.S. Air Force (USAF) would supply five Lockheed C-130 Hercules aircraft, fuel, and required maintenance; Bird would furnish the necessary aircrews and operations personnel. Within five months, Bird’s company, Birdair (formerly Bird & Sons), would have the capability of flying 450 hours per month. Although USAF personnel in Southeast Asia viewed with extreme distaste the use of civilian crews to fly its aircraft into combat conditions, a letter contract for $1.4 million was issued on August 28. Birdair mobilized five crews in September. After airmen had passed USAF ground and flight checks, they began operations from
Cambodian Incursion U-Tapao Royal Thai Air Force Base, 100 miles south of Bangkok. In October the civilian crews flew more than 350 hours, air-dropping 472 tons of ammunition and 277 tons of rice to Lon Nol’s troops in the field and landing another 258 tons at Phnom Penh’s Ponchentong airport. By the end of the year, Birdair had flown more than 1,000 hours, carrying 450,000 tons of supplies to Cambodia. In February 1975 military pressure against Phnom Penh intensified after Communist forces blocked the Mekong River supply route that had been carrying some 60,000 tons of supplies a month to the beleaguered capital. The U.S. government turned over to Birdair seven additional C-130s, ordered daily sorties doubled to 20 by the end of the month, and added $1.9 million to the original contract. At the same time, Washington awarded contracts to World Airways, Airlift International, and Trans-International Airlines to fly rice from Saigon to Phnom Penh. Each carrier would be paid $30,000 a day for every DC-8–60 used on the airlift, with full indemnification of $9 million if an aircraft was lost due to act of war. By March 1975 Birdair was employing 15 aircrews to fly 30 missions a day from U-Tapao to Phnom Penh, delivering 1,000 to 1,500 tons of supplies. As Communist troops neared the capital, flight operations often took place in the midst of rocket and artillery fire. Although several aircraft suffered damage, no crew members were injured. Although the airlift prolonged the life of the Lon Nol government, it could not affect the outcome of the conflict in Cambodia. On April 12, 1975, U.S. Marine Corps helicopters evacuated the embassy staff and other American personnel from Phnom Penh. Five days later Khmer Rouge troops entered the city, bringing the airlift—and the war—to an end. WILLIAM M. LEARY See also Bird & Sons; Cambodia; EAGLE PULL, Operation; Khmer Rouge References Hardy, Gordon, Arnold R. Isaacs, MacAlister Brown, and the Editors of Boston Publishing Company. Pawns of War: Cambodia and Laos. Boston: Boston Publishing, 1987. Isaacs, Arnold R. Without Honor: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983.
Cambodian Incursion Start Date: April 29, 1970 End Date: July 22, 1970 Joint U.S. Army and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) invasion of officially neutral Cambodia. With progress in pacification, Vietnamization, and U.S. troop withdrawals, 1970 may have passed quietly were it not for the overthrow of Cambodia’s neutralist Prince Norodom Sihanouk on March 18. Pro-U.S. prime minister General Lon Nol closed the
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port of Sihanoukville and sent his small army, the Forces Armées Nationale Khmer (FANK, Khmer National Armed Forces), against an estimated 60,000 Vietnamese Communist troops entrenched in three border provinces. On April 4, 1970, the Vietnamese Communist Party’s Politburo directed Vietnamese Communist forces in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), in cooperation with Cambodian Communist forces, to seize control of the 10 Cambodian provinces that bordered South Vietnam. The Politburo’s reference to “cooperation with Cambodian communist forces,” which were extremely weak at that time, was essentially a facade. In his postwar memoirs, senior Vietnamese Communist leader Vo Chi Cong admitted that in April 1970 after Khmer Rouge leader Ieng Sary rejected a Vietnamese offer to send troops to “liberate” northeastern Cambodia, the Vietnamese disregarded Ieng Sary’s response and sent several People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) regiments into Cambodia from Vietnam’s Central Highlands. The Vietnamese then informed Ieng Sary of their action after the fact. PAVN and Viet Cong (VC) forces went on to occupy two more Cambodian provinces and threaten Phnom Penh itself. What became known as the Cambodian Incursion actually began in early April when Republic of South Vietnamese forces, ostensibly with Lon Nol’s assent and unaccompanied by American advisers, mounted multibattalion raids against Communist bases in the Parrot’s Beak next to the III Corps border. Surprised PAVN and VC forces withdrew deeper into the Cambodian jungles, but by April 20 the ARVN claimed to have killed 637 PAVN/VC troops while losing 34. U.S. leaders viewed these raids with alarm, emphasizing to South Vietnamese president Nguyen Van Thieu the need to keep Cambodia neutral. But when Communist forces seriously threatened the new government in Cambodia, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), commander General Creighton Abrams argued for a full ARVN intervention with U.S. combat support. On April 25, despite opposition from Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and Secretary of State William Rogers, President Richard Nixon ordered both ARVN and U.S. ground forces into Cambodia to relieve pressure on FANK, to destroy Communist sanctuaries, and perhaps to capture the elusive headquarters of the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), assumed to be located in the Fishhook area. Broader goals included demonstrating the progress of Vietnamization, buying time for additional U.S. troop withdrawals, and breaking the bargaining stalemate. The Cambodian Incursion involved 50,000 ARVN and 30,000 U.S. troops and was the largest series of allied operations since Operation JUNCTION CITY in 1967. Troops were divided among three groups of operations: TOAN THANG (TOTAL VICTORY), conducted by ARVN III Corps and the U.S. II Field Force; CUU LONG (MEKONG), conducted by the ARVN IV Corps; and BINH TAY (TAME THE WEST), conducted by the ARVN II Corps and the U.S. I Field Force. The ARVN would operate more than 37.28 miles inside Cambodia, while U.S. forces would penetrate only 18.64 miles. Ordered by Abrams to be
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A U.S. armored personnel carrier passes by dead civilians as it pushes into Cambodia on May 9, 1970. Although Cambodia was supposed to be a neutral country, it had long served as a sanctuary for Communist forces fighting in Vietnam, and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and U.S. forces invaded the country that spring to destroy the Communist base areas and buy time for “Vietnamization.” (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)
ready to move into the Fishhook on 72 hours’ notice, Lieutenant General Michael S. Davison, II Field Force commander, met with Lieutenant General Do Cao Tri, ARVN III Corps commander, and Major General Elvy Roberts, commander of the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), to select areas of operation. Roberts quickly assembled a joint task force but without clear guidance about the real objectives or the duration of the operation and lacking hard intelligence about the Communist situation. Set for April 30, the hastily planned Fishhook invasion was delayed to allow ARVN forces to initiate Phase I of Operation TOAN THANG 42 on April 29, which was aimed at clearing Communist base areas in the Parrot’s Beak. Because this operation was entirely run by the ARVN, it attracted little media attention. During the first two days, an 8,000-man ARVN III Corps task force, including two infantry divisions, four Ranger battalions, and four armored cavalry squadrons, killed 84 Communist soldiers while suffering 16 dead and 157 wounded.
Phase II began on May 2, with ARVN III Corps forces attacking south of Route 1 into the Parrot’s Beak, while an ARVN IV Corps task force pushed north. The Communists broke contact after losing 1,043 killed and 238 captured; ARVN casualties were 66 killed and 402 wounded. Hundreds of individual and crew-served weapons and tons of ammunition were captured. In Phase III, which began on May 7, ARVN forces killed 182 retreating Communist soldiers near Prasot and also discovered a 200-bed hospital and several supply caches. The allies also rushed thousands of small arms and ammunition to Lon Nol’s army, which quickly expanded to more than 100,000 men but retreated into urban areas and never launched a real offensive. When the ARVN linked up with FANK forces, it discovered that Khmer soldiers had murdered hundreds of ethnic Vietnamese. ARVN troops avenged these acts by looting several Cambodian towns. In Phase IV as ARVN forces began clearing Route 1 as far as Kompong Trabek, some 30 miles inside Cambodia, President Thieu began assembling an armed flotilla to sail up the Mekong to repatriate as many as 50,000 ethnic Vietnamese. Ironically, while the ARVN was concerned with rescuing ethnic Vietnamese, the Cambodians asked them to relieve a FANK garrison under siege at Kompong Cham northeast of Phnom Penh. In Phase V of TOAN THANG 42, General Tri rushed a column of 10,000 men to accomplish this mission, but ARVN forces would have to retake Kompong Cham in June, inflicting and absorbing significant losses. When the Communists overran Kompong Speu southwest of Phnom Penh on June 13, a 4,000-man ARVN mechanized force quickly advanced to retake the town. ARVN and FANK troops then cleared Route 4 from Phnom Penh to Sihanoukville, which had been blockaded by the Republic of Vietnam Navy (VNN, South Vietnamese Navy). TOAN THANG 42 had upset Communist plans to overthrow the Lon Nol regime and accounted for 3,588 Communist killed or captured and the seizure of more than 2,000 weapons, 308 tons of ammunition, and 100 tons of rice. The second stage of the Cambodian Incursion, called TOAN THANG 43–46, was a series of joint U.S.-ARVN operations aimed at clearing Communist sanctuaries located in the densely vegetated Fishhook area. Commanded by Brigadier General Robert H. Shoemaker, deputy commander of the 1st Cavalry Division, the initial task force consisted of the 1st Cavalry’s 3rd Brigade (reinforced by a mechanized infantry battalion), the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), and the ARVN 3rd Airborne Brigade. TOAN THANG 43 began early on May 1, coinciding with President Nixon’s televised announcement that the incursion would “guarantee the continued success of our withdrawal and Vietnamization program.” Following extensive preparatory support by Boeing B-52 Stratofortress bombing, tactical air strikes, and artillery fire, an armada of U.S. helicopters inserted the ARVN Airborne troops into three landing zones (cleared by dropping 15,000-pound bombs) to block escape routes. The 1st Cavalry’s 3rd Brigade and the 11th ACR then advanced across the border in what Roberts described as “a walk in the sun.” On the first day, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry (1-9 Cavalry),
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gunships and ARVN Airborne troops accounted for 259 killed and 7 captured from the PAVN 7th Division. General Davison then ordered the 11th ACR to move north to capture the Communist-occupied town of Snoul. When sporadic fire greeted the armored column, the town was leveled in two days of incessant bombardment. No dead PAVN soldiers were found, only the bodies of 4 civilians. As the expectation of open-battlefield victories faded, the mission of TOAN THANG 43 largely became one of seizing and destroying supply depots. After entering the Fishhook on May 2, the 1st Cavalry Division’s 2nd Brigade stumbled into a massive but lightly defended supply base extending over 1.15 square miles of jungle and dubbed “The City.” Although not the COSVN, The City contained large weapons and ammunition caches and a training base with 18 buildings, including mess halls and a surgical hospital. Captured materials included more than 2,000 individual and crew-served weapons, 2 million rounds of ammunition, and nearly 40 tons of foodstuffs. By mid-June, allied forces in the Fishhook also captured or destroyed more than 300 trucks and other vehicles. TOAN THANG 43 accounted for 3,190 Communist soldiers killed or captured. TOAN THANG 44 began on May 6 as the U.S. 25th Infantry Division’s 1st Brigade, including two mechanized battalions, drove across the border west of Tay Ninh to search for Enemy Base Area 354. By May 14 in engagements south of the Rach Ben Go, the American forces accounted for 302 killed or captured and more than 300 weapons, 4 tons of ammunition, and 217 tons of rice seized. Also on May 6, the 1st Cavalry Division’s 2nd Brigade initiated TOAN THANG 45, aimed at Enemy Base Area 351 located north of Phuoc Long Province. Facing only sporadic contact, the brigade uncovered the largest depot ever captured during the war, so huge that it was dubbed “Rock Island East.” As at The City, the tonnage of supplies was so great that a road was built to remove them. By June, the entire 1st Cavalry Division was inside Cambodia and, amid frequent contact with Communist forces, uncovered many more weapons and supply caches as well as a vehicle-maintenance depot and an abandoned communications depot. TOAN THANG 45 accounted for 1,527 Communist troops killed or captured and 3,500 weapons, 791 tons of ammunition, and 1,600 tons of rice seized. 1st Cavalry Division units repelled numerous harassing attacks as they rushed to meet the withdrawal deadline. Their last firebase in Cambodia was dismantled by June 27, and all troops were back inside South Vietnam by June 29. Simultaneously with TOAN THANG 45, an ARVN 5th Division regiment and a squadron of the ARVN 1st Armored Cavalry Regiment launched TOAN THANG 46 against Enemy Base Area 350, north of Binh Long Province. ARVN forces discovered another surgical hospital and several major caches of supplies and ammunition. By June 20 increased Communist activity forced the termination of TOAN THANG 46 but not before it accounted for 79 Communist soldiers killed or captured and 350 weapons, 20 tons of ammunition, and 80 tons of rice seized.
ARVN IV Corps troops initiated Operation CUU LONG I, designed to open the Mekong River, on May 9. Within two days the ARVN 9th and 21st divisions, augmented by five armored cavalry squadrons, cleared both banks of the river, allowing a 100-ship convoy (including 30 U.S. vessels) to reach Phnom Penh and proceed north to Kompong Cham. By May 18 the convoy had repatriated nearly 20,000 Vietnamese held in refugee camps. Simultaneously, ARVN III Corps forces cleared Route 1 as far as Neak Luong. In CUU LONG II, from May 16 to May 24, ARVN IV Corps troops joined FANK forces in recapturing Takeo, 25 miles south of Phnom Penh, and cleared Route 2 and Route 3, killing 613 Communist troops while suffering only 36 killed and 112 wounded. IV Corps forces then launched CUU LONG III, again joining with FANK forces to reestablish control over towns south of Phnom Penh and to evacuate more ethnic Vietnamese. Two days after the Parrot’s Beak and Fishhook incursions began, the allies decided to expand operations to attack Communist base areas in northeastern Cambodia facing II Corps. In this operation, designated Operations BINH TAY I–IV, allied forces included the ARVN 22nd and 23rd Infantry divisions, the 2nd Ranger Group, the 2nd Armor Brigade, and two brigades of the U.S. 4th Infantry Division. These operations are absent from most accounts of the incursion, perhaps because American participation was relatively brief and poorly executed. In fairness, Major General Glen D. Walker’s 4th Infantry Division was overextended, having recently relocated to Binh Dinh Province, leaving the ARVN in control of the western Central Highlands. Having no forward installations and only limited logistical and artillery support, the 3rd Battalion, 506th Infantry (3-506 Infantry), had to abort its initial insertion into Cambodia on May 4. The next day the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry (1-14 Infantry), joined them in a successful insertion, but heavy hostile fire downed several helicopters. Joined by the 2-8 Infantry on May 6, 4th Division troops uncovered an abandoned PAVN training camp that included a 30bed hospital and tons of supplies. After his understrength battalions took significant casualties without making direct contact with Communist forces, Walker decided to turn the operation over to the ARVN. All 4th Infantry Division troops left Cambodia by May 16. When terminated on May 25, BINH TAY I had accounted for 212 Communist dead and the seizure of more than 1,000 weapons and 50 tons of rice. Allied casualties were 43 killed and 18 wounded. In BINH TAY II, from May 14 to May 27, battalions of the ARVN 22nd Division swept across the border from Darlac Province searching for Enemy Base Area 701. Contact was limited, but the ARVN uncovered several more caches of weapons and supplies. In BINH TAY III, from May 20 to June 12, the ARVN 23rd Division searched for Enemy Base Area 740, located west of Ban Me Thuot. The most dramatic event was the destruction of a 10-truck convoy. In BINH TAY II and III, ARVN forces killed 171 while losing 30 dead and 77 wounded. In BINH TAY IV, from June 23 to June 27, an ARVN 22nd Division task force of military and civilian vehicles, sup-
Camden 28 ported by U.S. artillery and helicopter gunships, moved deep into Cambodia along Route 19 to reach a beleaguered FANK garrison at Labang Siek and managed to evacuate more than 7,000 Khmer soldiers and dependents across the border to Pleiku Province. All II Corps ARVN troops left Cambodia by June 27. Although all American ground forces had departed Cambodia by June 30, President Thieu considered the survival of Lon Nol’s regime vital to Saigon and would not be bound by the deadline. ARVN units continued operating up to 37 miles inside Cambodia into 1971, supported by U.S. long-range artillery, tactical air support, and B-52 bombings. During the Cambodian Incursion the amount of supplies uncovered was 10 times more than that captured inside Vietnam during the previous year: 25,401 individual and crew-served weapons; nearly 17 million rounds of small-arms, 200,000 rounds of antiaircraft, and 70,000 rounds of mortar ammunition; 62,022 hand grenades; 43,160 B-40 and 2,123 107-millimeter (mm) or 122-mm rockets; 435 vehicles; 6 tons of medical supplies; and 700 tons of rice. The total was enough to supply 54 Communist main-force battalions for as much as a year. The human cost also was great: officially, at least 11,349 Communist, 638 ARVN, and 338 U.S. killed; 4,009 ARVN and 1,525 U.S. wounded; and 35 ARVN and 13 U.S. missing. In addition, 2,328 Communist soldiers rallied or were captured. U.S. national security adviser Henry Kissinger believed that the Cambodian Incursion dealt a stunning blow to the Communists, drove main-force units away from the border and damaged their morale, and bought as much as a year for the survival of the South Vietnamese government. During 1970 and 1971 the ARVN held the initiative on all battlefields in South Vietnam. The incursion temporarily reduced the pressure on Lon Nol, lessened the dangers to withdrawing American troops, and showcased the improvement of the ARVN. But while enhancing Vietnamization, the operations also exposed critical tactical and organizational deficiencies in the ARVN and its complete dependence on U.S. air support. The facade of renewed ARVN strength became evident during the disastrous Laotian incursion in February 1971. The short-term gains from the Cambodian Incursion actually may have boomeranged. Knowing that American intervention would be limited in both time and scope, Communist forces avoided open confrontation and quickly returned to reclaim their sanctuaries and reestablish complete control in eastern Cambodia. The PAVN compensated for its temporary losses in Cambodia by seizing towns in southern Laos and expanding the Ho Chi Minh Trail into an all-weather network capable of handling tanks and heavy equipment, eventually enabling the PAVN to overrun much of southern Laos with massive conventional assaults. Furthermore, the continuing withdrawal of U.S. combat units from III Corps forced the ARVN to deploy an excess of troops there, thus reducing their strength in northern South Vietnam where the Communist threat grew incessantly. In the long run, the Cambo-
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dian Incursion posed only a temporary disruption of the march of Communist forces toward the domination of all of Indochina. Despite Nixon’s boast in July 1970, the prospects for a “just peace” were as dim as ever. Hanoi now believed that little could be gained through negotiations. An unanticipated result of the Cambodian Incursion was to give the antiwar movement in the United States a new rallying point. Dissent was not limited to campus confrontations such as the tragedies at Kent State University in early May and at Jackson State later that month but also led to a series of congressional resolutions and legislative initiatives that would severely limit the executive power of the president. By the end of 1970 Congress had prohibited expenditures for U.S. forces operating outside of South Vietnam. Finally, the widening of the battlefield in 1970 eventually left Cambodia the most devastated nation in Indochina. To avoid massive allied bombings, Communist forces spread deeper inside Cambodian territory, and Lon Nol’s army, receiving only minimal U.S. assistance, would struggle futilely for five more years against both the Khmer Rouge and the PAVN. The Cambodian Incursion had turned the war into one for all of Indochina, and the departure of U.S. troops left a void too great for the ARVN or FANK to fill. JOHN D. ROOT See also Abrams, Creighton Williams, Jr.; Cambodia; Cambodian Airlift; Cao Van Vien; Central Office for South Vietnam; Do Cao Tri; Fishhook; Forces Armées Nationales Khmères; Hardhats; JUNCTION CITY, Operation; Kent State University Shootings; Kissinger, Henry Alfred; Laird, Melvin Robert; Lake, William Anthony Kirsop; Lon Nol; Nguyen Van Thieu; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Rogers, William Pierce; Sihanouk, Norodom References Davidson, Phillip A. Vietnam at War: The History, 1946–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1988. Military History Institute of Vietnam. Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People’s Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002. Nolan, Keith William. Into Cambodia: Spring Campaign, Summer Offensive, 1970. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1990. Shaw, John M. The Cambodian Campaign: The 1970 Offensive and America’s Vietnam War. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2005. Stanton, Shelby L. The Rise and Fall of an American Army: The U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985. Tran Dinh Tho. The Cambodian Incursion. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1979. Vo Chi Cong. Tren Nhung Chang Duong Cach Mang (Hoi Ky) [On the Road of Revolution: A Memoir]. Hanoi: National Political Publishing House, 2001.
Camden 28 Antiwar group that staged a raid on a local draft office in Camden, New Jersey, on August 21, 1971, designed to disrupt the draft board’s operations and showcase its antiwar sentiments.
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The so-called Camden 28 was part of a group of leftist ministers, Catholic priests and nuns, and laypeople who were vehemently opposed to the Vietnam War. The raid was stymied by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the resulting trial became a public referendum on the Vietnam War. The Camden 28 laid plans to raid and burglarize the Camden draft board office under the cover of night. Their goal was the location and destruction of all 1A status draft registration cards. However, one of the group’s members, Robert Hart, was conflicted about the planned raid. While he disdained the Vietnam War, he also believed that the raid was wrong. He voiced his concern to local FBI agents, who then recruited him as an informant. Hardy alleged that he did so only on the condition that none of the conspirators be imprisoned for their role in the soon-to-be crime. With the FBI’s help, Hardy took a major role in the planning of the raid, which would take place at the Federal Building in Camden, where the draft board offices were located. In the early morning hours of August 21, 1971, under the cover of darkness, the Camden 28 began to execute their plan. Unbeknownst to them, some 40 FBI agents were clandestinely watching their every move and recording their activities via videotape. The raiders gained entrance to the offices and began systematically riffling through draft board files. Soon thereafter, FBI agents moved in and arrested the burglars. Among those arrested were two Catholic priests and a Protestant minister. All 28 of those arrested desired to be tried together; each one had been charged with seven felony counts, punishable by up to 40 years in prison. By the time the trial began in May 1973, the case had become well-known around the nation, and its outcome was seen as a referendum on the Vietnam War itself. The prosecution offered to reduce the charges to one misdemeanor each, but the group decided in unison to go through with the trial. Hardy, who now believed he had been duped by the FBI, became a hostile witness for the prosecution, and ended up aiding the defense’s case. Indeed, he testified that the FBI had actually goaded the group to raid the draft board and had aided and abetted the break-in. On May 20, 1973, the jury found all 28 antiwar protesters not guilty of all charges. The outcome was startling, given the fact that there was incontrovertible evidence that the Camden 28 had indeed broken into and burglarized the Camden draft board offices. Indeed, after the so-called Baltimore Four broke into selective services offices in Baltimore in 1967 and defaced records, a jury had convicted them all, and one of the defendants, Father Philip Berrigan, a Catholic priest, had received a six-year prison term. The Camden 28 case clearly showed the collapse of public support for the Vietnam War. At the end of the trial, one jury member, a U.S. Army veteran, wrote a letter to the 28 congratulating them for their actions. Writing about the event in the New York Times, C. L. Sulzberger stated, “We lost the war in the Mississippi valley, not the Mekong valley.” PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR.
See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Selective Service References Hixson, Walter L. The Vietnam War: The Antiwar Movement. London: Routledge, 2000. Zinn, Howard. A People’s History of the United States. New York: Harper Perennial, 2003.
Cam Lo A U.S. Marine Corps base camp during the Vietnam War, located on Highway 9 in Quang Tri Province, the northernmost province of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Located approximately 8.5 miles south of the demilitarized zone (DMZ), Cam Lo was the site of the 3rd Marine Division headquarters and home to the 12th Marine Artillery Battalion, which provided artillery support to U.S. and South Vietnamese forces operating in the area during many military engagements beginning in the summer of 1966. The U.S. Marine Corps transferred the base to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) as the marines withdrew from South Vietnam in the early 1970s as part of President Richard M. Nixon’s Vietnamization program. At the beginning of the 1972 Easter Offensive, the South Vietnamese abandoned the base in the face of the onslaught from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). The base was never retaken by the South Vietnamese and remained in Communist hands for the rest of the war. JAMES H. WILLBANKS See also Demilitarized Zone; Easter Offensive; United States Marine Corps; Vietnamization References Andradé, Dale. America’s Last Vietnam Battle: Halting Hanoi’s 1972 Easter Offensive. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001. Kelley, Michael P. Where We Were in Vietnam: A Comprehensive Guide to the Firebases, Military Installations and Naval Vessels of the Vietnam War, 1945–75. Central Point, OR: Hellgate, 2002. Whitlow, Robert H., and Jack Shulimson. U.S. Marines in Vietnam. 8 vols. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1977–1997. Willbanks, James H. Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and South Vietnam Lost Its War. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004.
Camp Carroll U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Army artillery firebase during the Vietnam War located about five miles southwest of the town of Cam Lo in the region just south of the demilitarized zone (DMZ), halfway between the Vietnamese coast and the Laotian border.
Cam Ranh Bay Built in November 1966, the base became the home of the 3rd Marine Regiment. Originally known as Artillery Plateau, it was renamed for Captain James J. Carroll, commanding officer of M Company, 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines, who was killed by friendly fire on September 27, 1966, during Operation PRAIRIE. Camp Carroll, one of nine artillery bases constructed along the DMZ, was home to 80 artillery pieces, to include the M107 selfpropelled 175-millimeter gun, the most powerful American field artillery tube, that could fire a 150-pound projectile 20 miles. These guns played a key role in supporting the marines at Khe Sanh during the 1968 Tet Offensive. Camp Carroll became less important after 1968, when the U.S. Marine Corps began emphasizing more mobile operations. The U.S. Marine Corps transferred the base to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) as the marines withdrew from Vietnam as part of President Richard M. Nixon’s Vietnamization program in the early 1970s. On April 2, 1972, during the Communist Easter Offensive after several days of heavy shelling and several ferocious ground assaults by the 24th Regiment, 304th Division of the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army), ARVN lieutenant colonel Pham Van Dinh surrendered the facility, which had been renamed FSB Tan Lam, to the PAVN. The land is now part of a state-owned pepper business. JAMES H. WILLBANKS See also Easter Offensive; Khe Sanh, Battle of; United States Marine Corps; Vietnamization References Andradé, Dale. America’s Last Vietnam Battle: Halting Hanoi’s 1972 Easter Offensive. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001. Kelley, Michael P. Where We Were in Vietnam: A Comprehensive Guide to the Firebases, Military Installations and Naval Vessels of the Vietnam War, 1945–75. Central Point, OR: Hellgate, 2002. Nguyen Huy Toan and Pham Quang Dinh. Su Doan 304, Tap Hai [304th Division, Vol. 2]. Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1990. Whitlow, Robert H., and Jack Shulimson. U.S. Marines in Vietnam. 8 vols. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1977–1997. Wiest, Andrew. Vietnam’s Forgotten Army: Heroism and Betrayal in the ARVN. New York: New York University Press, 2007. Willbanks, James H. Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and South Vietnam Lost Its War. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004.
Cam Ranh Bay Protected natural harbor located in Khanh Hoa Province south of the city of Nha Trang about 180 miles northeast of Saigon (present-day Ho Chi Minh City). Cam Ranh Bay was developed into one of the largest seaports in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), with a population of 104,666 by 1971. Regarded
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as the best deep-water harbor in Southeast Asia, Cam Ranh Bay has been an important way station for navigators since the days of Marco Polo. In 1905 the Russian Baltic fleet stopped at Cam Ranh Bay on the way to its confrontation with the Japanese Navy in the Tsushima Strait. During World War II the Imperial Japanese Navy staged at Cam Ranh Bay for its invasion of Malaya in 1942. In 1944 the U.S. Navy attacked and largely destroyed Japanese facilities at Cam Ranh Bay, and the base was abandoned. In the 1960s the influx of U.S. military supplies and personnel into South Vietnam increased the need for an alternative deepwater port to relieve pressure on South Vietnam’s only modern facility at Saigon. Beginning in May 1965 the U.S. Army’s First Logistical Command established a support unit at Cam Ranh Bay to provide defense for the 72,000 U.S. and allied troops in the southern half of the II Corps Tactical Zone. In June 1965 the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers began improving the port with 70 miles of roads as well as warehouses, fuel tanks, and larger cargohandling facilities. A new pier was shipped from South Carolina and assembled at Cam Ranh Bay, giving the facility the ability to handle six large vessels simultaneously. These terminals and supply depots were turned over to the South Vietnamese government in June 1972, as was a jet-capable airfield with a 10,000-foot runway, constructed to serve as a base for the U.S. Air Force’s 12th Tactical Fighter Wing and 483rd Tactical Air Wing. Area security was provided by the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA, South Korean Army) 9th Infantry (“White Horse”) Division, whose 30th Infantry Regiment was headquartered at Cam Ranh Bay. The port was considered so safe that President Lyndon Johnson visited the base twice. The first incumbent president to visit Vietnam, Johnson plunged into a crowd of stunned GIs, exhorting them to “nail the coonskin to the wall.” Three years later, in 1969, Viet Cong (VC) forces raided Cam Ranh Bay, destroying a water tower and chapel and damaging a hospital. Most of the patients in the hospital were evacuated safely, but 2 Americans were killed and 98 wounded, while the attackers escaped with no apparent casualties. Security was tightened, and Cam Ranh Bay continued to serve as a key logistical base throughout the war, even after the port fell to Communist forces on April 3, 1975. The Soviet Union used Cam Ranh Bay as a naval base after the Socialist Republic of Vietnam signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union in 1978. In 2002 Russia, the successor state to the Soviet Union, balked at Vietnam’s demand for a $200 million per year rental fee and pulled out of Cam Ranh Bay altogether. The Vietnamese government has since been trying to develop the area into a civilian port facility, although India has also been reported as being interested in a naval base there. J. NATHAN CAMPBELL See also Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Vietnam, Socialist Republic of, 1975–Present
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The U.S. base at Cam Ranh Bay, photographed circa 1970–1971. Cam Ranh Bay is considered the finest deepwater harbor in Southeast Asia. (Naval Historical Center) References Dunn, Carroll H. Base Development in South Vietnam, 1965–1970. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972. Dunn, Carroll H. Building the Bases: The History of Construction in Southeast Asia. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. Ploger, Robert R. U.S. Army Engineers, 1965–1970. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974. Smith, Harvey H., et al. Area Handbook for South Vietnam. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967. Stanton, Shelby L. Vietnam Order of Battle. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2003.
Canada A large North American nation comprising 3.855 million square miles. Larger in area than the United States, Canada is bordered to the south by the continental United States, to the west by the Pacific Ocean and the U.S. state of Alaska, to the east by
the Atlantic Ocean and Greenland, and to the north by the Arctic Ocean. In 1965 Canada’s population was 20.071 million. Canada is both a constitutional monarchy and a parliamentary democracy. The prime minister is the head of government, and the British monarch, Queen Elizabeth II, is the titular head of state. Canada’s Liberal Party was in power during the duration of heavy U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. Both Lester B. Pearson, prime minister during 1963–1968, and Pierre Elliot Trudeau, prime minister during 1968–1979, found themselves caught between their general support of U.S. foreign policies in Southeast Asia and their desire to remain out of the Vietnam War militarily. As such, Canada never played a direct role in the Vietnam War. Canada did not send military units to participate in the fighting, nor did it consistently support American policies. The Canadian government was generally sympathetic to Washington’s concerns regarding the containment of communism and support for a democratic Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). However, Canada was often anxious about the degree of U.S. involvement in
Can Lao Nhan Vi Cach Mang Dang Southeast Asia and with what Canadian leaders saw as the excesses of American military strategy there. Canadian leaders attempted, generally unsuccessfully, to utilize their influence to moderate U.S. policy toward a more restrained approach. Washington’s response was to view Canada as unsupportive and somewhat sanctimonious. This attitude surfaced, for instance, in the case of a speech by Prime Minister Pearson at Temple University in Philadelphia on April 2, 1965. He called for a brief cessation of the bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). President Lyndon Johnson was furious over the speech and soon let Pearson know of his displeasure in person. Canada participated in two peacekeeping organizations during the war. The first was the International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC), also known as the International Control Commission (ICC). In 1954 following the Geneva Accords that ended the French phase of the conflict, Canada became a member of the ICSC along with Poland and India. Canada clearly represented Western non-Communist interests and used its position to feed intelligence about Communist activities to the United States. The second body, actually a reconstituted version of the first, was the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS), formed in 1973 to oversee the Paris Peace Accords that ended American military involvement in Vietnam. Canada reluctantly joined alongside Hungary and Indonesia but soon left the ICCS in July 1973 when it was obvious that the accords were not being honored. In addition, Canada had other indirect connections to the war. Many Canadian companies profited from the sale of war matériel to the United States that was later used in the war effort. This included nickel, aircraft parts, TNT, radio relay sets, chemical defoliants, napalm, and much more. Also, an estimated 10,000 to 12,000 Canadians served in the American military in Vietnam, although nearly half were Canadian citizens living in the United States. Seventy-eight Canadians are listed on the wall of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, D.C. At the same time, however, the government of Pierre Elliot Trudeau, Pearson’s successor, eased immigration laws and allowed into Canada a significant number of American draft resisters and a small number of deserters. Also, in January 1973 the Canadian Parliament passed a resolution condemning American prolongation of the war, an action that was strongly denounced by the Richard M. Nixon administration. By the late 1960s the growing American involvement in Vietnam and the domestic problems that it was causing tended to enhance the belief of many Canadians that their country was different from, and perhaps better than, the United States. Thus, ironically, the war that was tearing apart American society was, in the short term, creating an increased sense of national identity in Canada. ERIC JARVIS See also International Commission for Supervision and Control; Pearson, Lester Bowles; Selective Service; Vietnam Veterans Memorial
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Members of the American Deserters Committee in Montreal, Canada, gather at a Christmas party in 1969. Although Canada did not play a direct role in the Vietnam War, and its government did not take a consistent position of support or opposition to U.S. involvement, it did ease immigration laws to allow American draft dodgers and some deserters to live there. (Bettmann/Corbis) References Gaffen, Fred. Unknown Warriors: Canadians in the Vietnam War. Toronto: Dundurn, 1990. Granatstein, J. L., with Norman Hillmer. For Better or for Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s. Toronto: Copp Clark Pittman, 1991. Levant, Victor. Quiet Complicity: Canadian Involvement in the Vietnam War. Toronto: Between the Lines, 1986. Ross, Douglas. In the Interests of Peace: Canada and Vietnam, 1954– 1973. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984.
Canines See K-9 Corps
Can Lao Nhan Vi Cach Mang Dang Political party and intelligence apparatus on which Ngo Dinh Diem, president of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South
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Vietnam), relied in his early years in power. The Can Lao Nhan Vi Cach Mang Dang (Revolutionary Personalist Labor Party) grew out of other parties. Not long after Ho Chi Minh established his provisional government in 1945, Diem’s supporters formed the Catholic Socialist Party to promote an anti-Communist front. To attract non-Catholic patriots, the party was later renamed the People’s Coalition Movement. When Diem left Vietnam in 1950, his younger brother Ngo Dinh Nhu sought to establish a doctrine to counter communism. In 1952 Nhu began promoting Socialist personalism, which sought to combine social reform with respect for personality. In 1953 Nhu and five others formed a political group known as the Revolutionary Party of Workers and Peasants. It soon changed its name to Le Parti Travailliste (Labor Party) and then to Can Lao Nhan Vi Cach Mang Dang (Revolutionary Personalist Labor Party), usually known simply as the Can Lao. Nhu became its secretarygeneral and leader. Can Lao ideology drew on the writings of French philosopher Emmanuel Mournier, who had founded the journal Esprit in 1932. Nhu had become acquainted with Mournier’s writings during his prewar studies in France at the École des Chartres. Mournier, a leftist Catholic writer, accepted many of the economic propositions of socialism and communism, but his ideas were somewhat ambiguous. Diem and his brother fostered a Vietnamese version of the ideology. Their version included a virulent anticommunism (especially important in enlisting American support), respect for the dignity of the individual, a community life in which the common good took precedence over that of the individual, and a democratic structure that allowed pluralism within certain bounds. The relationship between individualism and the community on the one hand and democracy on the other were expounded in the regime’s doctrine of personalism, or nhan vi (“person” and “dignity”). This stressed human dignity and the value of humanism in modern society, in contrast to communism’s treatment of human beings as the masses. Can Lao’s professed objective was a harmony between society’s interests and the rights of its citizens. In addressing the importance of labor and the laborer, Nhu said that “Personalism stresses hard work, and it is the working class, the peasants, who are better able to understand the concept than the intellectuals.” But the Vietnamese also sought to incorporate elements from Confucianism. Can Lao placed emphasis on thanh (defined as “acute consciousness and clear vision”) and tin (“sincere and courageous practice of all duties”). In this way, cultivation of individuality became compatible with duty and obedience in Confucianism. Adherence to democracy took on a very special form. Diem believed that to think of form before substance was to invite failure, and he championed strong control as necessary for fostering a solid moral basis over a pluralistic bourgeois democracy. This opened the way for a cult of personality, which was very much at odds with the pluralistic and democratic society favored by the Americans. Personalism thus
became a useful cloak for the authoritarianism that was so much a part of the Diem regime. Appointed premier by State of Vietnam chief of state Bao Dai in June 1954, Diem returned to South Vietnam the next month. Support for Diem’s regime was at first quite narrow, resting primarily on Catholics and other northerners who had fled to the south following the 1954 Geneva Accords. To create a wider base of support, Diem and Nhu worked to build up the Can Lao as a political organization. In September 1954 the government authorized the Can Lao party. Can Lao was organized along the lines of the French Sûreté into four bureaus: Premier Bureau, administration; Deuxième Bureau, intelligence; Troisième Bureau, operations; and Quatrième Bureau, finances. The party came to have immense influence, largely because all government officials assumed its omnipotence. Nhu used Can Lao as an instrument of power to strike down opponents, real and imagined. Can Lao operated semicovertly. The party existed publicly, but its members and activities were secret. Can Lao’s actual active membership was quite small, not more than 20,000 to 25,000 people. The party was to be supported by the Phong Trao Cach Mang Quoc Gia (National Revolutionary Movement), founded in October 1954 with Diem as leader and Nhu as adviser. The National Revolutionary Movement was intended to provide mass support for the regime but in 1955 had only some 10,000 members. The National Revolutionary Movement also supported the Republican Youth. At its height Can Lao had about 50,000 members, most of them high-ranking government employees and military officers. Government officials were pressured to join and to submit to an initiation ceremony that reportedly involved kissing a picture of Diem and swearing loyalty to him. Certainly the party did not shrink from employing terror and intimidation against its opponents. Can Lao was closely linked to a secret police force and an intelligence organization that also answered to Nhu. This organization, which was called Service des Etudes Politiques, Economiques et Sociales (SEPES), was headed by Dr. Tran Kim Tuyen. The party was also involved in a number of shady financial dealings and reportedly siphoned off a proportion of U.S. aid to South Vietnam. Lieutenant Colonel Edward Lansdale, a U.S. adviser to Diem, early on recognized the threat that Can Lao posed to democratic institutions and a pluralistic society and strongly opposed it, both to Diem and the U.S. government. U.S. ambassador George F. Reinhardt, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration were unsympathetic to Lansdale’s arguments. They believed that Diem needed his own political party and ordered U.S. officials in Vietnam to support Can Lao. Nhu’s doctrine should not be confused with that espoused by Bishop Ngo Dinh Thuc, Diem’s oldest brother and bishop of the Vinh Long Diocese who became the archbishop of Hue in 1960 and advocated a Catholic form of personalism that differed from the Can Lao line. This displeased Nhu, who in any case did not inter-
Cao Bang fere with his brother. Can Lao was the strongest before Diem came to power and immediately afterward. As dissatisfaction with the Ngo family increased, Diem came under pressure to make changes in his government and to make public the activities of Can Lao or to dissolve it. After 1960 the party played an increasingly smaller role in the government. But it was not until General Nguyen Khanh took power that Can Lao and many other political parties were officially dissolved in March 1964. The dissolution of Can Lao, the trial and execution of Diem’s younger brother and warlord of central Vietnam Ngo Dinh Can, and the seizure of the Ngo brothers’ property were all considered positive steps for General Khanh’s regime. Enough Can Lao influence remained, however, for it to play a role in deposing General Khanh in 1965. The end of Can Lao contributed to instability in South Vietnam because it removed restraints on labor unions and student associations, which were now free to agitate against the government. HO DIEU ANH, NGUYEN CONG LUAN, AND SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Lansdale, Edward Geary; Ngo Dinh Diem; Ngo Dinh Diem, Overthrow of; Ngo Dinh Nhu; Ngo Dinh Thuc; Nguyen Khanh; Reinhardt, George Frederick References Currey, Cecil B. Edward Lansdale. The Unquiet American. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1988. Duncanson, Dennis J. Government and Revolution in Vietnam. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968.
Cao Bang Vietnamese city and province. The city of Cao Bang is located some 116 miles north-northeast of Hanoi and perhaps 20 miles from the border with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Cao Bang sits astride a traditional Chinese invasion route into Vietnam. Mountainous Cao Bang Province shares a 186-mile-long common frontier with Guangzi Province of the PRC. At least nine ethnic minorities inhabit the province, and Ban Gioc Falls in the province is regarded as the most impressive waterfalls in Vietnam and an important tourist attraction. Ban Gioc Falls was a favorite location for French vacation homes during the colonial era. Cao Bang is regarded as a cradle of the Vietnamese revolution. During the 1920s several anti-French Vietnamese nationalist groups were established. In December 1940 Vietnamese Communist leader Ho Chi Minh, then in China, decided to make Cao Bang a revolutionary base. He arrived there in late January 1941 and made it his headquarters for some time. In December 1944 Cao Bang Province was the site of the formation by Vo Nguyen Giap of the first unit of what would become the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army). Cao Bang saw considerable fighting during the Indochina War (1946–1954). In Operation LÉA during October 1947, French gen-
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eral Raoul Salan directed some 12,000 French troops in the region to try to capture the Viet Minh leadership and destroy their main battle units. As part of the operation, French troops occupied Cao Bang. While this operation and the follow-on Operation CEINTURE destroyed major supply caches and arms factories, they failed to take the Viet Minh leadership or destroy major military units. The operations also revealed the severe limitation imposed on the French by their lack of sufficient manpower to hold territory they had taken. Following the Communist victory in China in 1949, Cao Bang and the border region assumed new importance. On January 18, 1950, the PRC formally recognized the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and agreed to supply it with military assistance. Many would argue that the Indochina War was lost for the French at this point, for their long border with Vietnam allowed the PRC easy access to furnish the Viet Minh arms and equipment and provide a sanctuary to train Viet Minh forces. In early 1950 Viet Minh forces controlled virtually the entire northeastern corner of Tonkin except for a string of border outposts along the border with China on Route Coloniale 4, which ran from Cao Bang through Dong Khe, That Khe, and Lang Son to the Gulf of Tonkin. The 10,000 French troops manning the Route Coloniale 4 outposts were now in perilous position. High Commissioner Léon Pignon and French field commander Major General Marcel Alessandri opposed withdrawal. They believed that control of the route was necessary to block Chinese resupply of the Viet Minh. Nonetheless, the supply run to Cao Bang from Lang Son was soon costly for the French. From January 1950 their convoys could not reach beyond That Khe. Both Dong Khe and Cao Bang had to be supplied by air. On May 27, 1950, following two days of shelling, the Viet Minh took Dong Khe, midway between Cao Bang and That Khe. The French immediately inserted paratroopers and forced the Viet Minh to withdraw. On September 18 in Operation LE HONG PHONG II, Giap sent a larger force and retook Dong Khe. Cao Bang was now cut off. On September 24 French commander in Indochina General Marcel Carpentier ordered Cao Bang evacuated. Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Charton, the French garrison consisted of a reinforced battalion of legionnaires and a battalion of Tho (Tay) partisans as well as the latter’s families and several hundred Vietnamese and Chinese merchants. The roads from Cao Bang, Route Coloniale 3 and Route Coloniale 4, ran through difficult Viet Minh– controlled terrain, so Carpentier ordered Charton to destroy his heavy equipment and motor transport and bring out his 2,600 men and 500 civilians via foot trails. He also ordered a relief force of some 3,500 men commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Marcel Le Page to move from That Khe to Dong Khe and retake that place to allow the Cao Bang garrison to join it there on the morning of October 2. The Cao Bang garrison could have been evacuated by air. Its runway was long enough to accommodate Junkers JU-52 and
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Douglas C-47 Dakota aircraft. French air commander in Tonkin Colonel Alain de Maricourt believed that the entire garrison could have been withdrawn in two days, but Carpentier was unwilling to leave the civilians behind. Including them would take more time and entail considerably more risk. Carpentier’s decision to retreat on Route Coloniale 4 rather than Route Coloniale 3 led to disaster. While Route Coloniale 3 was a longer route to the main French defensive line, it was safer because there were fewer Viet Minh there. Route Coloniale 4, while only 45 miles to Dong Khe and 15 miles farther to That Khe, ran close to the Chinese border and through difficult terrain. As it turned out, the Viet Minh were far more numerous there than the French had believed. Still, Carpentier’s plan probably would have been successful had Charton followed orders. Instead, Charton attempted to bring out his vehicles. Progress was slow, and by the time Charton reverted to the original plan, it was too late. Remnants of the two French forces met in the hills around Dong Khe, only to be annihilated there on October 7, 1950. Only 12 officers and 475 men ultimately made it to That Khe. Carpentier then panicked and ordered a precipitous evacuation of Long Son. By the end of October 1950 northeastern Vietnam was for all intents and purposes a Viet Minh stronghold. Cao Bang was again the scene of fighting in the spring of 1954 when it briefly came under siege by French forces. During the Sino-Vietnamese War (February 17–March 16, 1979), Chinese forces captured Cao Bang on February 22 but withdrew at the end of the war. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Ho Chi Minh; LÉA, Operation; LE HONG PHONG II, Operation; Vo Nguyen Giap References Fall, Bernard B. Street without Joy: The French Debacle in Indochina. Rev. ed. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1994. Fall, Bernard B. The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis. 2nd rev. ed. New York: Praeger, 1967. Gras, Yves. Histoire de la Guerre d’Indochine. Paris: Éditions Denoël, 1992. Porch, Douglas. The French Foreign Legion: A Complete History of the Legendary Fighting Force. New York: HarperCollins, 1991. Tucker, Spencer C. Vietnam. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1999.
Cao Dai Indigenous religion founded in southern Vietnam in 1926. By the 1940s, Cao Dai (formally known as Dai Dao Tam Ky Pho Do, or the Great Religion of the Third Period of Revelation and Salvation) had become a major social and political force in Vietnam, playing a significant role in the conflicts that engulfed the country. The massive Cao Dai Great Temple at Tay Ninh, built between 1933
and 1955, was the spiritual center of the movement and became an enduring symbol of self-identity for many Vietnamese during the wars that plagued them throughout the 20th century. The Cao Dai religion is based on the beliefs of a Frencheducated civil servant turned mystic named Ngo Van Chieu, who in 1919 claimed to have communicated with supernatural spirits. The spirits told him to establish a new religion promoting world peace by mixing a belief in the supernatural with other faiths, including Judaism, Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism, Taoism, Confucianism, and Islam. The Cao Dai religion was formally launched at Tay Ninh in 1926. Adherents claimed that through repeated séances with the dead, many led by Chieu himself, understanding and even selfenlightenment could be achieved. The idea quickly developed into a popular religion. The supreme being or God is called Cao Dai, literally the “high palace” or “high tower.” It has no gender or personality and is regarded as the same God recognized by other faiths. Cao Daism holds that God created all things and instilled in them his spirit. Cao Daists worship God in the form of the Sacred Eye that shines over many saints, immortals, Buddhas, and others. The Sacred Eye is a symbol of universal consciousness, which includes humankind. Cao Daism believes in the existence of a God-endowed eternal spirit that stays with a person beyond earthly death and through subsequent reincarnations, which is in accordance with Karma and Buddhism. Like Buddhism and other religions, Cao Daism teaches its follower to eschew greed, avarice, materialism, earthly desires, and anger. Followers of Cao Dai engage in frequent meditation and self-enlightenment to achieve a higher religious purpose, with the goal of becoming one with their God-endowed spirits and thus attaining Nirvana, or Heaven. The structure and organization of the faith closely resemble that of the Roman Catholic Church, with a pope, cardinals, bishops, and priests. Cao Dai also developed an eclectic collection of saints, including Jesus Christ, Confucius, Buddha, Muhammad, a 16th-century Vietnamese poet named Nguyen Binh Khiem, the Chinese revolutionary Sun Yixian (Sun Yat-sen), and the 19thcentury French writer and humanist Victor Hugo. Prominent historical figures such as Joan of Arc, William Shakespeare, and Russian revolutionary Vladimir Lenin are also recognized for their teachings. Embracing all world ideas and religions, Cao Dai adherents chose as their symbol the all-seeing eye. French authorities governing Vietnam at the time viewed the new religion with great suspicion. As an inclusive faith, Cao Dai attracted many Vietnamese, the majority of whom were Mahayana Buddhists, and challenged the powerful Catholic elite who ran the country. Moreover, Cao Dai quickly became a focal point for Vietnamese nationalists who fought against French colonial rule. By the outbreak of World War II in 1939, Cao Dai had more than 300,000 followers, many of whom also served in various revolutionary movements throughout Vietnam. In fact, some Cao Daists fought alongside the Viet Minh, the major nationalist movement led by the Communist Ho Chi Minh, that directly battled the French.
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A service at the Cao Dai temple in Tay Ninh. The Cao Dai religion was founded in 1926. Its greatest influence in nationalist politics came during the Japanese occupation of Vietnam and it waned with the ascent of President Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam in the 1950s. After the Communist victory in 1975, many Cao Dai practitioners fled the country, fearful of religious persecution. Today the temple in Tay Ninh is a major tourist attraction. (Valery Shanin/Dreamstime.com)
Most Vietnamese initially welcomed the Japanese invasion of Indochina, beginning in September 1940, as liberation from the French. However, Japanese rule quickly turned into a brutal occupation, and many Vietnamese, including some Cao Daists, turned against the Japanese. A Cao Dai army was formed in 1943 and quickly established itself as a fairly effective and even ruthless fighting force. As World War II came to end in 1945, the Cao Daists clashed with other nationalist groups for control, including the Viet Minh, the Communist La Lutte (“the Conflict”), and the Buddhist reform movement Hoa Hao. Some Cao Dai units even switched sides and supported the French during the Indochina War (1946–1954). With the French withdrawal and the partition of Vietnam in 1954, the Cao Dai religion soon confronted a new rival in the government of Ngo Dinh Diem, who came to rule the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). The Diem regime worried that the Cao Dai undermined its authority, especially the 25,000-strong armed faction that supplemented both the French and South Vietnamese armed forces. Between March and May 1955 the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) battled against the Binh Xuyen, a criminal syndicate approximately 40,000 strong that dominated the drug and prostitution trades in Saigon.
In June 1955 Diem turned against the Hoa Hao and began rounding up members of other sectarian groups, including Cao Dai. The Cao Dai army was forcibly disbanded, and some of its leadership went into exile. Several thousand Cao Dai followers fled to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) or joined Communist networks in South Vietnam. Subsequent leaders of South Vietnam also kept the Cao Dai prostrate, although it continued to draw adherents as both a religion and an underground paramilitary organization. Some Cao Dai followers fought with the Viet Cong (VC) against U.S. forces during the American phase of the Vietnam War (1965– 1973). Cao Dai adherents served on the Central Committee of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (National Liberation Front [NLF]) and on the Advisory Council of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam. However, most Cao Dai did not support the Communist VC, the southern guerrillas who initially led the fight. Consequently, when the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) eventually overran South Vietnam in 1975, the Cao Dai were persecuted because they were seen as a possible source of opposition. However, Cao Dai continued to attract followers, even expanding overseas with expatriate Vietnamese who fled the Communist takeover.
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The Cao Daists continued to fight, however. Cao Dai guerrillas allegedly joined an anti-Communist coalition known as the Phuc Quoc (“National Salvation”) with remnants of the Hoa Hao, elements of the former ARVN, and the Montagnard (Degar) people of the Central Highlands. Cao Dai resistance activity continued into the mid-1980s before it was finally overwhelmed. After enduring more than 20 years of government suppression, the Cao Dai religion was finally recognized in 1997. Today its followers number approximately 6 million worldwide, half of them in Vietnam, making it the third-largest religion in the country behind Buddhism and Christianity. Cao Dai leaders remain politically active, championing the expansion of religious freedoms in the country. The Cao Dai Great Temple, still in existence, is located about 60 miles northwest of Ho Chi Minh City (formerly Saigon). The temple gained some international notoriety as a focal point in the best-selling novel The Quiet American by British author Graham Greene, published in 1955 and made into movies in 1958 and 2002. The Cao Dai Great Temple is now one of Vietnam’s most popular tourist attractions. ARNE KISLENKO See also Buddhism in Vietnam; Catholicism in Vietnam; Confucianism; Ngo Dinh Diem; Pham Cong Tac; Taoism; Viet Cong Infrastructure; Viet Minh References Blagov, Serguei A. Caodaism: Vietnamese Traditionalism and Its Leap into Modernity. New York: Nova Science, 2001. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. Phan, Khanh. Caodaism. London: Minerva, 2000. Tran Bach Dang, ed. Chung Mot Bong Co (Ve Mat Tran Dan Toc Giai Phong Mien Nam Viet Nam) [Under One Flag (The National Liberation Front for South Vietnam)]. Hanoi: National Political Publishing House, 1993. Unger, Ann Helen. Pagodas, Gods and Spirits of Vietnam. London: Thames and Hudson, 1997. Werner, Jayne Susan. Peasant Politics and Religious Sectarianism: Peasant and Priest in the Cao Dai in Vietnam. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981.
Cao Van Vien Birth Date: December 11, 1921 Death Date: January 22, 2008 Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) general and chief of the Joint General Staff (1965–1975). Cao Van Vien was born on December 11, 1921, in Vientiane, Laos, where his father was a merchant of Vietnamese ethnic origin. Vien enlisted in the French Army and was commissioned as a second lieutenant in 1949. After an initial assignment as a staff officer in army headquarters, he was sent to a combat unit in northern Vietnam. By 1953 he was a battalion commander in the Red River Delta near Hanoi.
During his rapid rise through the ranks, Vien developed a reputation for skill and courage. While in the army he continued his education and finally, in 1966, received a Licentrate of Letters degree from the University of Saigon. During 1956–1957 Vien attended the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. In 1957 Vien returned from the United States and became chief of staff to Ngo Dinh Diem, president of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Vien had high admiration and respect for Diem and his brother Nhu. In November 1960 after Airborne Brigade commander Colonel Nguyen Chanh Thi fled to Cambodia after an unsuccessful coup attempt against the Diem government, President Diem appointed Cao Van Vien to the post of Airborne Brigade commander. Colonel Vien was not a paratrooper and had never attended parachute training. In spite of his age (39 years old), Vien immediately went through the airborne training program in order to be able to jump into battle with his men. During the November 1963 overthrow of the Diem regime, Vien, who still commanded the airborne brigade, refused to participate in the coup and was briefly imprisoned. Later released, he was returned to command of the Airborne Brigade. In 1964 he was wounded while commanding his paratroopers in battle. He was awarded the U.S. Silver Star for gallantry in this action. In the autumn of 1965 Vien was appointed chief of staff to the ARVN Joint General Staff and subsequently commanded III Corps. He was later appointed chief of the Joint General Staff, concurrently acting as minister of defense for much of the time. Vien was a close friend of President Nguyen Van Thieu, and their families at one time shared the same house. However, Thieu maintained close control over the South Vietnamese armed forces, leaving Vien with little direct control of military matters. Vien’s role was further diminished as the Americans largely directed the conduct of the war. Vien attempted to resign his post as chief of the General Staff in 1970 to return to a combat command, and he reportedly attempted to resign on several other occasions. During the 1968 Tet Offensive, Vien used all of his staff and service personnel, with few exceptions, as combat troops and took personal command of them. Colonels and majors commanded platoons, with junior officers filling the ranks as privates. Vien later held that the United States and South Vietnam missed an opportunity to win the war immediately after the Tet Offensive by not going on the offensive with massive large-scale attacks. He also complained of not being consulted by the U.S. government on what he considered its expedient policy of Vietnamization, for which he considered the Vietnamese armed forces neither psychologically nor physically prepared. Vien was an enthusiastic advocate of the 1971 ARVN invasion of Laos, Operation LAM SON 719, having proposed in 1965 a strategy of isolation that involved establishing a fortified zone along the 17th Parallel and running through Laos to block infiltration by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), together with an amphibious landing at Vinh.
Carpentier, Marcel General Vien appeared in public for the last time on April 27, 1975, at a joint session of the South Vietnamese Congress, to which he reported on the deteriorating situation in South Vietnam. He made it clear that the ARVN was no match for the powerful Communist forces that were approaching Saigon. The next day he and his family secretly left Vietnam for the United States, where they settled and he became a citizen. Vien summed up the 1975 defeat by saying that the ARVN had fought well before it was overwhelmed by events over which it had no control. After his arrival in the United States, Vien worked at the U.S. Army Center of Military History and produced two monographs on his experiences in the war. He died in Annandale, Virginia, on January 22, 2008. HO DIEU ANH AND SPENCER C. TUCKER See also LAM SON 719, Operation; Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; Ngo Dinh Diem; Ngo Dinh Diem, Overthrow of; Ngo Dinh Nhu; Nguyen Van Thieu; Vietnam, Republic of, Army; Vietnam, Republic of, Joint General Staff References Cao Van Vien. The Final Collapse. Indochina Monographs. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1982. Cao Van Vien and Dong Van Khuyen. Reflections on the Vietnam War. Indochina Monographs. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1980. Kiem Dat. Chien Tranh Viet Nam [The Vietnam War]. Glendale, CA: Dai Nam, 1982. Nguyen Khac Ngu. Nhung Ngay Cuoi Cung Cua Viet Nam Cong Hoa [The Last Days of the Republic of Vietnam]. Montreal: Nhom Nghien Cuu Su Dia, 1979. Post, Ken. Revolution, Socialism and Nationalism in Viet Nam. 5 vols. Brookfield, VT: Darmouth, 1989–1994. Westmoreland, William C. A Soldier Reports. New York: Doubleday, 1976. Who’s Who in Vietnam. Saigon: Vietnam Press Agency, 1967–1968.
Caravelle Group A group of 18 prominent South Vietnamese belonging to various professions (law, medicine, religion) who, at a press conference at the Hotel Caravelle in Saigon on April 26, 1960, made public a manifesto addressed to President Ngo Dinh Diem of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Couched in moderate terms, the theme of the manifesto was that Diem had betrayed the hopes his people had placed in him in 1954 and thereby endangered the country. Among the main points of criticism were claims that Diem had isolated himself from his people by delegating power to family members, that repressive measures against religious sects had turned these into allies of the Viet Cong (VC), that public opinion and the press had been silenced, and that election fraud had been committed. The manifesto also called for total reorganization of the administration and the armed forces and for liberalization of the economy.
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The signatories included several former ministers and high officials, which gave the manifesto a credibility beyond that of an ordinary political tract. In 1960 such open dissent risked imprisonment, as the manifesto itself acknowledged. In fact, the government at first ignored its Caravelle critics, only later venturing to quietly arrest a number of them. Frank Gonder, an American businessman living in Saigon, acted as the Caravelle Group’s spokesman with the American embassy, attempting to bring about pressure for reform, but the embassy, while accepting much of the criticism as valid, maintained a hands-off policy. Significantly, the manifesto had nothing to say about the alleged persecution of the Buddhists, which three years later became a crucial issue in Diem’s downfall. In succeeding years one member of the Caravelle Group became head of state, two members became prime ministers, and another member headed a constitutional drafting convention. ARTHUR J. DOMMEN See also Ngo Dinh Diem; Vietnam, Republic of, 1954–1975 References Fall, Bernard B. The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis. 2nd rev. ed. New York: Praeger, 1967. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997.
Carpentier, Marcel Birth Date: March 2, 1895 Death Date: September 14, 1977 French general and commander of French forces in Indochina during 1949–1950. Born in Touraine on March 2, 1895, Marcel Carpentier entered the French military academy of Saint-Cyr at age 18 and was commissioned as a second lieutenant in August 1914. In May 1915 he was the youngest captain in the French Army. In 1916 he became a pilot. Carpentier was wounded 10 times, 4 times seriously, during the war. His war decorations included the Legion of Honor and the Croix de Guerre (five citations). Carpentier continued in the army after World War I and, on the outbreak of World War II, was serving in the Middle East. In March 1941 as a lieutenant colonel he was transferred to Algiers, where he was promoted to colonel the following year. After the Allied landing, Carpentier’s 7th Moroccan Regiment participated in the Battle of Tunis. Promoted to brigadier general in July 1943, he served as chief of staff to Marshal Alphonse Juin’s French Expeditionary Corps in Italy. In June 1944 Carpentier became chief of staff of the French First Army. In November 1944 as a major general he took command of the 2nd Moroccan Division and had charge of it during the liberation of Alsace and the crossing of the Rhine. In 1946 as a lieutenant general Carpentier commanded French forces in Morocco.
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In August 1949 Carpentier was named commander in chief of French forces in Indochina, replacing General Roger Blaizot there shortly before the Communist victory in China. Carpentier used this latter event as justification for U.S. military aid. He referred to the French Army on the border with China as the “last bulwark against Communism” and was quoted in Life magazine as saying that “The problem here has ceased to be Franco-Vietnamese. It is international. I don’t consider myself the commander of a colonial army but one of the vanguards of Western civilization confronting Communism.” Carpentier’s military strategy was a cautious one. Rather than seeking out the Viet Minh, he garrisoned northern Vietnamese frontier posts to defend against a Chinese invasion. The previous March the French government had concluded the Elysée Agreement, which provided for the creation of a Vietnamese National Army (VNA). Although Carpentier welcomed the expanded military manpower, he demanded that it be firmly in French hands. U.S. major general Graves B. Erskine reported that Carpentier told him that Vietnamese troops were unreliable, would not make good soldiers, and were not to be trusted on their own. Carpentier steadfastly refused to allow U.S. military aid to be channeled directly to the Vietnamese; if this was done, he said, he would resign within 24 hours. By late 1949 the French Army had lost the initiative in the war. General Blaizot had planned the evacuation of Cao Bang and Route Coloniale RC 4, but on pressure from his subordinate, General Marcel Allesandri, Carpentier had put it off. Later Carpentier was blamed for the disastrous October 1950 French withdrawal from Cao Bang. In November 1950 Paris named General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny to replace Carpentier as commander of French forces in Indochina. Upon leaving Indochina, Carpentier became deputy chief of staff to General Dwight D. Eisenhower, supreme allied commander in Europe. From 1953 to 1956 Carpentier commanded North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) land forces in central Europe. Carpentier died in Paris on September 14, 1977. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Blaizot, Roger; Elysée Agreement; France, Army, 1946–1954; Indochina War; Lattre de Tassigny, Jean de; LE HONG PHONG II, Operation; Vietnamese National Army References Current Biography, 1951. Edited by Anna Rothe. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1952. Davidson, Phillip A. Vietnam at War: The History, 1946–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1988. Gras, Yves. Histoire de la Guerre d’Indochine. Paris: Éditions Denoël, 1992. Hammer, Ellen J. The Struggle for Indochina. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1954. Spector, Ronald H. Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941–1960. United States Army in Vietnam Series. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1983. Who’s Who, 1974–1975. New York: St. Martin’s, 1975.
Carter, James Earl, Jr. Birth Date: October 1, 1924 Governor of Georgia (1971–1975) and president of the United States (1977–1981). Born on October 1, 1924, in Plains, Georgia, James Earl (Jimmy) Carter Jr. graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, in 1946 and was commissioned an ensign. In 1952 he transferred to the nuclear submarine program and commanded the precommissioning crew of the second U.S. Navy nuclear submarine, the Sea Wolf. Upon the 1953 death of his father, Carter left the navy to manage the family peanut business. In 1962 he was elected as a Democrat to the Georgia state senate, where he served two terms. In Georgia state races as late as 1971, Carter supported increased military aid to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) and did not oppose U.S. action there. After an initially unsuccessful bid for governor, Carter was elected to that post and served a single fouryear term, from 1971 to 1975. He launched his 22-month presidential campaign while still in the governor’s mansion. During his campaign Carter was especially critical of secrecy in foreign policy and insisted that the pall over the country from the Vietnam War and the Watergate Scandal called for a candidate who could restore integrity and faith in government. Trust became a key campaign issue, and Carter repeatedly assured Americans that he would not lie to them. In position papers released by the Carter campaign headquarters in 1976, he promised a pardon for those “outside our country, or in this country, who did not serve in the armed forces.” He refused an amnesty because that implied that what they did was right; a pardon conveyed that whether right or wrong they were forgiven. Deserters would be treated on a case-by-case basis. He attributed his election to the presidency to American disillusionment with the Vietnam War and the Watergate Scandal and to his promise not to allow the government to go back to its old ways. Although prepared to establish normal relations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) in 1977, the Carter administration ended negotiations until the summer of 1978, when Hanoi dropped demands for reparations. Talks did not proceed, however, because of what Washington saw as Hanoi’s callous disregard for refugees (the so-called boat people) and because of intelligence reports revealing the SRV’S preparations to invade Cambodia. The U.S. State Department announced on August 9, 1979, that normalization was impossible for these reasons. The United States restored diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on January 1, 1979, and the potential for widening conflict between China and the Soviet Union, which had signed a friendship treaty with Hanoi, was at the center of Carter’s talks with Chinese vice chairman Deng Xiaoping that same month. Carter disapproved of Chinese intentions to invade Vietnam in retaliation for its strikes against Cambodia. When the Chinese subsequently did attack Vietnam in February–March 1979, he warned the Soviets against intervening in the conflict. During the June 1979 Tokyo Economic Summit, Carter doubled the U.S. Indochina refugee quota, which led to openings in other
Case, Clifford Philip
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been deeply involved in its work for more than 25 years. Carter has also maintained a high-profile association with Habitat for Humanity and has written numerous books, including memoirs of several types and books on poetry, religion, human rights, and current events. It is entirely fair to say that Carter, who continues to reside near Plains, Georgia, has proven to be far more popular as an ex-president than he was as president. BRENDA J. TAYLOR See also Amnesty; Ford, Gerald Rudolph; Habib, Philip Charles; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Reagan, Ronald Wilson; Refugees and Boat People; Selective Service; Vance, Cyrus Roberts
President Jimmy Carter in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington, D.C. Carter attributed his election to the presidency in 1976 to American disillusionment with Vietnam and the Watergate Scandal. (Jimmy Carter Presidential Library)
countries to resettlement, a policy described by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance as one of the most significant acts of the Carter administration. There was much criticism of Carter’s lack of foreign policy cohesion, but author Kenneth A. Oye blamed this on the diffusion of power in the international arena. The United States had held hegemony between the end of World War II and the height of the Vietnam conflict, but America’s dominance ended with its defeat there. Carter’s presidency was severely tested by a series of domestic and foreign policy crises that included a deep economic recession, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the Iranian Revolution of that same year, and a resulting Middle East oil crisis that led to huge increases in the price of energy as well as gasoline shortages. Although much of this was beyond Carter’s control, many Americans believed—and with some justification—that the Carter White House had responded ineptly to these crises. Carter was especially taken to task for the bad economy, and his frosty relations with a Democratically controlled Congress meant that he had little room in which to maneuver. Carter lost his 1980 reelection bid to Republican Ronald Reagan largely due to Carter’s perceived mishandling of the Iran Hostage Crisis, which had begun in November 1979. That notwithstanding, he nevertheless deserves high praise for his efforts to bring peace to the Middle East that resulted in the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt. Since leaving office Carter has been one of America’s most active former presidents, offering his services as a foreign elections monitor, mediator, and negotiator in several major conflicts. In 1982 he founded the Carter Center, a nonprofit global organization for the advancement of human rights, and has
References Adee, Michael J. “American Civil Religion and the Presidential Rhetoric of Jimmy Carter.” In The Presidency and Domestic Policies of Jimmy Carter, edited by Herbert D. Rosenbaum and Alexej Ugrinsky, 73–82. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1994. Carter, Jimmy. Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President. New York: Bantam Books, 1982. Oye, Kenneth A. “The Domain of Choice: International Constraints and Carter Administration Foreign Policy.” In Eagle Entangled: U.S. Foreign Policy in a Complex World, edited by Kenneth A. Oye, 304–335. New York: Longman, 1979. Vance, Cyrus. Hard Choices: Critical Years in America’s Foreign Policy. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983.
Case, Clifford Philip Birth Date: April 16, 1904 Death Date: March 6, 1982 U.S. congressman (1945–1953) and U.S. senator from New Jersey (1955–1979). Clifford Philip Case was born on April 16, 1904, in Franklin Park, New Jersey. A New York corporate lawyer and moderate-liberal Republican, he served 10 years as a U.S. congressman from New Jersey (1943–1953) and won election to the U.S. Senate in 1954, defeating the extreme-right McCarthyites in the New Jersey Republican Party. Case took his seat in January 1955. In the Senate, Case became known as a champion of social and civil rights programs. He served on various committees, among them Appropriations, Atomic Energy, Intelligence, and Foreign Relations. In 1967 he became a strong critic of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia and remained so throughout the Richard M. Nixon administration. Case condemned the Vietnam War as an unconstitutional extension of executive power. Along with Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho), Case authored the 1973 Case-Church Amendment that severely restricted U.S. expenditures in Southeast Asia without explicit congressional approval. He also argued that the government of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) was so dependent on the United States that it could not survive alone and that the war itself was destroying Vietnam and damaging the United States. Case opposed U.S. military aid to Laos and Cambodia and was particularly hostile to the manner in which presidents Lyndon
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Johnson and Richard Nixon used the military assistance program to enlarge U.S. military commitments overseas without congressional consent. Defeated for reelection in 1978, Case subsequently practiced law in New York City and lectured at Rutgers University. He died in Washington, D.C., on March 6, 1982. PRISCILLA ROBERTS
to prevent the Nixon administration from engaging in any other covert or overt operations in Vietnam. The amendment also sent a strong signal that the United States was unprepared to prop up South Vietnam’s government even if that meant the fall of the regime to the Communists. DAVID C. SAFFELL
See also Case-Church Amendment; Church, Frank Forrester; Fulbright, James William; Goldwater, Barry Morris; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Nixon, Richard Milhous
See also Cambodia; Case, Clifford Philip; Church, Frank Forrester; CooperChurch Amendment; Hatfield-McGovern Amendment; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Watergate Scandal
Reference Schoenebaum, Eleanora W. Political Profiles: The Nixon/Ford Years. New York: Facts on File, 1979.
References Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1973. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997.
Case-Church Amendment Legislation that sought to end U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia that was passed by Congress in June 1973. President Richard M. Nixon’s decision to continue heavy bombing of Cambodia in early 1973 and his June 27 veto of a bill to immediately terminate that bombing provoked a strong reaction in the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate. Senators Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.) and Frank Church (D-Idaho), authors of several end-the-war measures, introduced an amendment to the State Department authorization bill in June 1973 to bar appropriations from being used to finance U.S. military operations in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), Laos, or Cambodia unless specifically authorized by Congress. Fearful that President Nixon might initiate a massive reconstruction program in which North Vietnam would receive aid, the Case-Church Amendment also blocked assistance “of any kind, directly or indirectly, to or on behalf of North Vietnam, unless specifically authorized hereafter by Congress.” In June the Case-Church Amendment was added to the bill in committee and slipped through the full Senate without debate. The amendment was modified in a House-Senate conference to conform to an August 15, 1973, cutoff compromise favored by the Nixon administration. The measure then was approved by the House. By the summer of 1973 events related to the Watergate Scandal were dominating the news. White House counsel John Dean had accused the president of a cover-up, and presidential aide Alexander Butterfield had disclosed the existence of White House tape recordings corroborating Dean’s allegations. In July testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee by a former U.S. Air Force major revealed that the United States had secretly bombed Cambodia a year before the 1970 incursion that had prompted the Senate to pass the Cooper-Church Amendment. American troops had been withdrawn from Vietnam, and the second round of U.S.– North Vietnamese negotiations was being conducted in Paris. It is clear that Congress intended, via the Case-Church Amendment,
CASTOR,
Operation
Event Date: November 20, 1953 Operation initiated by French commander in Indochina General Henri Navarre that led to the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. Operation CASTOR was Navarre’s response to the plans of Vo Nguyen Giap, commander of all Viet Minh military forces, to invade northern Laos. Navarre decided to establish an airhead in northwestern Tonkin (northern Vietnam) astride the main Viet Minh invasion route into Laos. Although Navarre was not enthusiastic about the idea, he believed that a strong base there would prevent an outright enemy invasion of Laos. The key position would be at Dien Bien Phu, some 185 miles by air from Hanoi. Despite Navarre’s statement in his memoirs Agonie de l’Indochine, 1953–1954, published in 1956, that “Contrary to what has been said many times, absolutely no unfavorable opinion on the tactical site of Dien Bien Phu was expressed by anyone before the battle,” many well-placed French officers in the north had opposed CASTOR. These included brigadier generals Jean Giles, the commandant of French airborne forces in Indochina; Jean Dechaux, commander of the Northern Tactical Air Group; and René Masson, deputy French commander in northern Vietnam. Nonetheless, in November 1953 Navarre, in Saigon, gave orders for CASTOR to proceed. In midmorning on November 20, 1953, the entire French transport lift of 65 Douglas C-47 Skytrains dropped 1,500 paras (paratroopers), the cream of the French Expeditionary Corps, into the valley north and south of the village of Dien Bien Phu, with its small Viet Minh garrison (two companies of the 910th Battalion of the 148th Regiment and a heavy weapons company of the 351st Division, armed with 120-millimeter mortars). The first drop consisted of Major Marcel Bigeard’s 6th Colonial Parachute Battalion and Major Jean Brechignac’s 2nd Battalion, 1st Regiment, of Parachute Chasseurs. Lieutenant Colonel Fourcade, commander of the 1st Airborne Battle Group, dropped with them. The speed of the aircraft and the extended length of the drop time
Casualties caused some of the paras to land outside the drop zone, where they were ambushed. French Martin B-26 Marauders assisted the operation by strafing Viet Minh positions. A second lift later on November 20 brought 700 additional French troops in the form of Major Jean Sousquet’s 1st Colonial Parachute Battalion and its equipment. Surgical teams, airborne engineers, and heavy weapons companies were also included in the drops. By the end of the day Dien Bien Phu was in French hands, at a cost of 11 dead and 52 wounded. Viet Minh casualties were given as 115 dead and 4 wounded. Hardly anyone had heard of Dien Bien Phu when the French arrived there. It was an obscure village situated in a valley surrounded by hills on all sides. To leave his enemy the opportunity to control the high ground surrounding it was dangerous, but as Navarre put it later, at the time the French arrived the Viet Minh did not have artillery, and there was then no danger. There is controversy surrounding Navarre’s exact motives in CASTOR. There were Montagnard tribesmen in the area around Dien Bien Phu, and some maintain that he merely intended to use the base as a blocking position or mooring point (mole de amarrage) from which the French and their auxiliaries could assault Viet Minh rear areas. Others hold that Navarre saw this as his best chance of inflicting serious losses on the Viet Minh by engaging them in conventional warfare. Inserting a force at Dien Bien Phu would tempt Giap and allow Navarre, with his artillery, airpower, and trained troops, to inflict a serious defeat on his adversary. At most he expected Giap to commit one division to the fight. Giap, however, took the bait and put all available resources into what would become the Battle of Dien Bien Phu. What is surprising is how in 1953, after more than six years of war, Navarre could have so badly underestimated his adversary. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; Navarre, Henri Eugène; Navarre Plan References Fall, Bernard B. Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu. New York: Lippincott, 1966. Navarre, General Henri. Agonie de l’Indochine, 1953–1954. Paris: Plon, 1956. Roy, Jules. The Battle of Dienbienphu. New York: Harper and Row, 1965.
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Simpson, Howard R. Dien Bien Phu: The Epic Battle America Forgot. Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1994. Windrow, Martin. The Last Valley: Dien Bien Phu and the French Defeat in Vietnam. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2004.
Casualties It is often difficult to arrive at precise casualty figures in war, and the Indochina War and the Vietnam War are not exceptions in this regard. For the Indochina War, the French government has given figures for France and its allies as 172,708: 94,581 dead or missing and 78,127 wounded. These are broken down as 140,992 French Union casualties (75,867 dead or missing and 65,125 wounded), with the allied Indochina states losing 31,716 (18,714 dead or missing and 13,002 wounded). Viet Minh losses have been estimated at perhaps three times those of the French. Vietnamese civilian deaths from the fighting are estimated at about 250,000. For the Vietnam War, estimates for troop losses for the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) vary. A low figure is 110,357 killed in action and 499,026 wounded. Some figures range as high as 184,000 or even as many as 250,000. The number of civilians killed in the war will never be known with any accuracy. Estimates vary widely, but the lowest figure given is 415,000, while the highest total may be 1 million. U.S. forces had 47,382 killed in action, 10,811 noncombat deaths, 153,303 wounded in action (some 74,000 survived as quadriplegics or multiple amputees), and 10,173 captured or missing in action. The majority of the U.S. casualties were from the U.S. Army. Between 1961 and 1975, 30,868 soldiers died in Vietnam as the result of hostile action, and 7,193 died from other causes. Of those killed, the U.S. Army accounted for 65.8 percent, the U.S. Marine Corps accounted for 25.5 percent, the U.S. Navy accounted for 4.3 percent, the U.S. Air Force accounted for 4.3 percent, and the U.S. Coast Guard accounted for .1 percent. Of ranks (including navy equivalents), 88.8 percent were enlisted men and warrant officers, 8.6 percent were lieutenants and captains, and 2.6 percent were majors and colonels. Twelve U.S. generals died in Vietnam. In April 1995 the U.S. Department of Defense listed 1,621 Americans missing in Vietnam and 2,207 for all of Southeast Asia. On
Estimated Casualties of the Vietnam War
United States South Vietnam Other Allied Forces Australia New Zealand South Korea Thailand North Vietnam and Viet Cong
Peak Troop Strength
Killed in Action or Died of Wounds
Wounded
Missing
Captured
Civilian Dead
543,400 1,048,000
47,382 225,000
203,678 1,170,000
2,207 75,000
7,966 Unknown
N/A 2,000,000
7,700 550 48,900 11,600 300,000
423 83 4,407 351 1,100,000
2,398 212 17,060 1,358 600,000
6 N/A N/A N/A 225,000
0 Unknown Unknown Unknown 127,500
N/A N/A N/A N/A 2,000,000
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A U.S. marine fires a rifle salute to comrades killed in Operation OSAGE during April–May 1966. During the Vietnam War, U.S. forces had some 47,000 personnel killed in action, nearly 11,000 noncombat deaths, more than 200,000 wounded in action, and some 10,000 captured and missing in action. (National Archives)
November 13, 1995, the Department of Defense announced that the remains of more than 500 American servicemen missing in Southeast Asia would never be recovered but held out hope for the recovery of the others. Other allied casualties included the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea), 4,407 killed in action; Australia, 436 killed in action, 64 dead from other causes, 2,398 wounded in action, and 6 missing in action (4 accounted for and repatriated); Thailand, 351 killed; and New Zealand, 83 killed. Previous estimates had placed total Communist losses at some 666,000 dead, but in April 1995 Hanoi announced that 1.1 million Communist fighters had died and another 600,000 were wounded between 1954 and 1975. This casualty total included both Viet Cong (VC) guerrillas in South Vietnam and People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) personnel. Presumably the figure includes some 300,000 missing in action. Hanoi estimated civilian deaths in the war in the same 1954–1975 time period at 2 million. The U.S. government estimate for civilians killed in the bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) is 30,000 people. In addition, losses for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) were reported as totaling 14, 11 of whom were pilots. The People’s Republic of China
(PRC) reported losing 1,100 soldiers killed and 4,200 wounded. The Soviet Union lost around one dozen personnel killed. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Fragging; Fratricide References Fall, Bernard B. Street without Joy: The French Debacle in Indochina. Rev. ed. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1994. Fall, Bernard B. The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis. 2nd rev. ed. New York: Praeger, 1967. Larsen, Stanley Robert, and James Lawton Collins Jr. Allied Participation in Vietnam. Vietnam Studies Series. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975. Qiang Zhai. China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000.
Catholicism in Vietnam The Roman Catholic Church left a significant mark on Vietnam, more so than in any other part of Asia except for the Philippines. The first Catholic missionaries arrived in Vietnam in the 15th century, but Catholic proselytizing made its greatest inroads
Catholicism in Vietnam two centuries later. In 1622 French Jesuit Alexandre de Rhodes arrived in Vietnam. He transcribed the Vietnamese language into the Roman alphabet and converted thousands of Vietnamese to Catholicism. He also successfully petitioned the Vatican to train indigenous priests and promoted a partnership of French religious and commercial interests to sponsor future Vietnam projects. This union of missionaries and merchants laid the groundwork for the French colonization of Indochina. By 1700, hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese had embraced Catholicism. Some merchants converted to ingratiate themselves with Western traders, while others saw Catholicism as an escape from the traditions of Confucian society and oppressive mandarins. Often whole districts and villages converted and turned to priests as community leaders. Vietnamese government attitudes toward Catholics vacillated. The missionaries’ technical information and connections to European arms suppliers encouraged toleration, yet some government officials feared that Christianity’s emphasis on individual salvation would undermine the Confucianist society’s reverence for state authority. Vietnamese Catholics’ divided loyalties and adherence to Vatican decrees made them a potentially subversive force. The emperors also correctly assumed that most Catholic missionaries were allied with European advocates of imperial conquest. Consequently, to varying degrees Vietnamese governments limited Catholic activities, jailed priests, deported missionaries, and persecuted converts. By the 19th century, France used Vietnam’s increasing hostility toward Catholicism as a pretext for military intervention and colonial domination, as in the case of the arrest of Catholic missionary Dominique Lefèbvre. Although Vietnamese Catholics often refused to support French forces, the declining mandarinic regime executed an estimated 20,000 of them for allegedly cooperating with France. Once France established imperial control, the Catholic Church enjoyed a privileged position and became one of the largest landholders in Indochina. The French hoped that Catholicism would disseminate Western culture and eventually shift the religious balance from Buddhism. Vietnamese Catholics both supported and resisted the return of French colonial forces after World War II. Still, the Viet Minh accused all Catholics of collaboration, attacked their villages, and, after the 1954 Geneva Accords, confiscated Church property and arrested priests. With help from the U.S. government and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), the Church launched a propaganda campaign, proclaiming that “The Virgin has gone South” to entice an estimated 800,000 Catholics among nearly 1 million refugees to flee from the Communist-controlled Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). Life for the approximately 600,000 Catholics who stayed in the North Vietnam was not easy. The Liaison Committee of Patriotic and Peace Loving Catholics encouraged them to “reintegrate” into society. Although the Church supposedly retained links to the Vatican, most of its foreign priests had fled to South Vietnam or
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U.S. marines camp on the grounds of a Roman Catholic church, a symbol of an older Western presence in Vietnam. An estimated 2.9 million Catholics remained in Vietnam after April 1975. (National Archives)
had been expelled. The Church also lost control of its property, including its schools, hospitals, and orphanages. Officially Catholics were free to worship, but they were forbidden to question collective socialism. South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem welcomed the Catholics who moved to South Vietnam after 1954. Diem was a devout Catholic, and he and U.S. officials viewed these refugees as a critical part of his regime’s anti-Communist constituency and allocated millions of dollars to resettle them. Prominent Catholics worldwide urged support for Diem’s nationalist struggle against communism and contributed to the misconception that South Vietnam was a predominantly Catholic nation. Under Diem, Catholics enjoyed special advantages in commerce, education, and the professions. They occupied positions of power at all government levels and helped polarize South Vietnamese society and politics. They strongly rejected accommodation with the Communists, the democratic Left, or southern insurgents, many of whom merely sought land reform and social justice. In fact, Diem’s brother, Ngo Dinh Thuc, served as archbishop of Hue and exercised great influence within the government and among Vietnamese Catholics. Such patronage and intransigence precipitated a political crisis that eventually toppled Diem and led to increased military control.
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As the insurgency of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (National Liberation Front [NLF]) strengthened, Catholics were among its first targets. NLF leaders pushed rural anti-Communists, especially Catholics, out of land-development centers and villages, increasing South Vietnam’s refugee burden. South Vietnamese Catholics became a wandering underclass, dependent on the uncertain aid of the government and private agencies. Thousands lost faith in the South Vietnamese government and fled the country in anticipation of the 1975 Communist takeover. An estimated 2.9 million Catholics remained in Vietnam after April 1975. The new regime promised to rebuild churches, but the government still viewed Catholicism as a reactionary force and urged Church members to join a Communist Party–controlled “renovation and reconciliation” movement. When Catholics continued to oppose Communist authority, the state created various organizations to recruit recalcitrant elements of the Catholic community and unite them behind socialism. Despite efforts to create the impression of cooperation, Hanoi officials continue to view the Catholic Church as a subversive force. An estimated 4 million to 6 million Catholics continue to practice in Vietnam under 3 archdioceses and 22 dioceses, but surveillance of Catholic activities by the Religious Affairs Committee persists. DELIA PERGANDE See also Buddhism in Vietnam; Confucianism; De Rhodes, Alexandre; Lefèbvre, Dominique; Ngo Dinh Diem; Ngo Dinh Thuc References Buttinger, Joseph. Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled. 2 vols. New York: Praeger, 1967. Cima, Ronald, ed. Vietnam: A Country Study. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. Wiesner, Louis A. Victims and Survivors: Displaced Persons and Other War Victims in Viet-Nam, 1954–1975. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1988.
Catonsville Nine A group of seven men and two women who staged a raid on a local draft board office in Catonsville, Maryland (a suburb of Baltimore), on May 17, 1968, that led to the burning of draft cards in protest of the Vietnam War. The group included three Roman Catholic priests and a former Catholic nun. Father Philip Berrigan, a noted antiwar activist who had staged a similar raid in Baltimore, Maryland, the preceding year, orchestrated the Catonsville Nine raid. Berrigan had already been tried and convicted for that action but was free on bail when the Catonsville raid occurred. The group heavily publicized its actions in Catonsville, so they received much media attention, as did the subsequent trial of the nine perpetrators. Many see the raid as a pivotal turning point in the antiwar movement, as the number of similar actions of open
defiance accelerated rapidly after May 1968. The raid also precipitated a major schism in the Roman Catholic Church that pitted social and political activist clergy against the old guard clergy, who eschewed overt political participation. By 1968 Philip Berrigan, a pastor in a Catholic church in Baltimore, had orchestrated a significant antiwar protest organization through the Baltimore Interfaith Peace Mission, an ecumenical group dedicated to ending the war in Vietnam specifically and to bringing about social justice and world peace more generally. Over several years, Berrigan and others in the mission intensified their antiwar activities, using increasingly active forms of social disobedience and resistance to advance their agenda. Following the 1967 Baltimore Four raid, led by Berrigan, some members had sought to resort to less risky tactics to get their point across. Berrigan, however, was determined to continue his hard-ball tactics in spite of the risk that this would mean for his life and career. Throughout March and April 1968 Berrigan and his accomplices carefully planned out their activity, choosing the quiet town of Catonsville in which to stage their raid for symbolic and public relations purposes. Berrigan hoped that a raid in a small, peaceful, middle-class suburb would jolt the American public and take the antiwar movement to the front yards of Middle America. This time instead of using blood to deface draft cards, which Berrigan had employed in Baltimore, the group would resort to burning draft cards in the parking lot in front of the draft office. Around noon on May 17, 1968, the nine protesters left Baltimore for Catonsville, timing their arrival and raid for early afternoon to maximize their publicity. Berrigan carefully orchestrated the raid, and he arranged for the local press to be called after the group had arrived on the scene in order to prevent the police from being tipped off but to ensure that their actions would be recorded by the media. The Catonsville Nine included Philip Berrigan; his brother Daniel, also a Catholic priest; David Darst; John Hogan; Tom Lewis, who had participated in the Baltimore Four raid; Marjorie Bradford Melville, a former Catholic nun; Thomas Melville, a former Catholic priest; George Mische; and Mary Moylan. After arriving in Catonsville, the group calmly went up to the second-floor offices of the Draft Board, brushed aside incredulous employees, riffled through filing cabinets, removed several hundred A-1 draft cards (those of potential draftees), and piled them into two wire baskets. Within minutes the deed was done, and the draft board employees had phoned the police. Before they could arrive, however, the raiders emptied the baskets onto the parking lot and, using improvised napalm, set them ablaze. Watching the action and recording it were several members of the media. The group then held hands and recited the Lord’s Prayer as the draft cards were incinerated. When the police arrived, the Catonsville Nine went quietly with them; they were arrested and would be tried together. Defended by famed leftist attorney William Kunstler, who would also defend the Chicago Eight, the group began its trial on October 5, 1968, less than two months after the tumultuous rioting in Chicago at the Democratic National Convention. Tensions
Catroux, Georges were running high, and local officials feared more violence during and after the trial. The trial was held in Baltimore’s Main Post Office building, which was surrounded by several hundred riot police armed with tear gas. Crowds numbering in the several thousands gathered along the police periphery, and antiwar protesters staged demonstrations. In the end, all nine protesters were found guilty on all charges. On November 9 the judge passed sentence. Philip Berrigan and Tom Lewis were given three and a half years in prison, to run concurrently with their previous sentence given during the Baltimore Four raid. The remaining raiders received sentences ranging from three years to two years. The Catonsville Nine raid was a seminal event in the antiwar movement, principally because of the media coverage it received and because of those involved. The press focused most intensely on the Berrigan brothers, who had become the darlings of the Catholic Left. Indeed, Philip and Daniel Berrigan’s picture appeared on the cover of Time magazine with the caption “Rebel Priests.” The action was important in a wider context because it demonstrated to Americans that the antiwar movement was not just the domain of long-haired hippies and radicals. The Berrigans appeared in conservative clerical attire and seemed on the outside to mirror solid middle-class values. The incident at Catonsville also prompted similar measures of civil resistance, including a draft board raid by the Camden 28 in 1971 that included numerous Catholic clergy. Also, the raid in Catonsville opened a noisy and sometimes vitriolic dialogue within the Catholic Church about the wisdom of clergy members becoming social activists and involving themselves in political activities, something that the old guard, including the Vatican, was very much against. PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR. See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Baltimore Four; Berrigan, Daniel; Berrigan, Philip; Camden 28; Chicago Eight References Berrigan, Daniel. To Dwell in Peace: An Autobiography. New York: HarperCollins, 1988. Polner, Murray, and Jim O’Grady. Disarmed and Dangerous: The Radical Life and Times of Daniel and Philip Berrigan, Brothers in Religious Faith and Civil Disobedience. New York: Basic Books, 1997.
Catroux, Georges Birth Date: January 29, 1877 Death Date: December 21, 1969 French soldier, civil servant, and governor-general of Indochina. Aristocratic in origin and bearing, Georges Catroux was born in Limoges on January 29, 1877. After graduation from the French military academy of Saint-Cyr in 1898, Catroux entered the
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Foreign Legion and served in North Africa. In 1916 during World War I, he was wounded and captured by the Germans. While a prisoner, Catroux became associated with another young captured French officer, Captain Charles de Gaulle. Catroux remained in the French Army after the war, and in 1931 he became a brigadier general and then in 1936 a lieutenant general. Advanced to full general in 1938, he commanded the XIX Army Corps in Algeria. In 1939 Catroux vainly urged change in the French military command. Only a few months before the start of World War II he was placed on the reserve list, but in August 1939 Georges Mandel named him governor-general of Indochina. Catroux, who came to be a colonial troubleshooter, was also one of the outstanding advocates of a liberal policy toward nationalism in the colonies. As governor-general, Catroux had the difficult task of dealing with the Japanese. With Indochina weak militarily, he had virtually no bargaining power. In the summer of 1940 Tokyo demanded the closing of the Sino-Vietnamese border and an end to transportation of war matériel from Indochina to the Chinese government at Chongging. Catroux tried to stall for time, but Japanese demands coincided with the French military defeat by Germany and replacement of the Third Republic with the collaborationist Vichy government. With the British and U.S. governments unwilling to help, Catroux had to accept Tokyo’s demands, including a Japanese control commission to oversee French compliance. Catroux hoped to use the rainy season to strengthen his forces with U.S. assistance and then deal with the Japanese. Catroux protested the armistice between the French government and the Germans, and he refused to submit to its conditions. This and his independence of action in dealing with the Japanese led the Vichy government to replace him with the commander of French naval forces in the Far East, Vice Admiral Jean Decoux. No more able to resist the Japanese, Decoux in September 1940 was forced to grant Japan the right to transport troops across northern Vietnam to southern China, to build airfields, and to station 6,000 men in Tonkin. Many in the British government and the Free French preferred Catroux to de Gaulle. When the British transported Catroux to London, some believed that Brigadier General de Gaulle would have to defer to the full general, but Catroux placed himself at de Gaulle’s disposal. In 1941 de Gaulle named Catroux Free French commander in the Near East. Catroux subsequently served as governor-general of Algeria (1943–1944) and French ambassador to Moscow (1944–1948). In 1955 Catroux negotiated with Sultan Mohammed ben Youssef of Morocco for the latter’s return to power. In 1956 Socialist French premier Guy Mollet named Catroux resident minister of Algeria, but his liberal reputation caused consternation among European settlers there, leading Mollet to rescind the appointment. Catroux’s memoirs, published in 1959, discuss both the June 1940 situation in Hanoi and the 1954 Battle of Dien Bien Phu. Catroux died in Paris on December 21, 1969. SPENCER C. TUCKER
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See also De Gaulle, Charles; Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; French Indochina, 1860s–1946 References Catroux, General [Georges]. Deux Actes du Drame Indochinois. Paris: Plon, 1959. Hammer, Ellen J. The Struggle for Indochina. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1954.
CEDAR FALLS,
Operation
Start Date: January 8, 1967 End Date: January 26, 1967 U.S. military operation against the Iron Triangle during January 8–26, 1967. In the early summer of 1966 Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), commander General William Westmoreland directed II Field Force (II FFV) to develop an operation in War Zone C to occur shortly after the Christmas–New Year holiday period. Lieutenant General Jonathan O. Seaman’s II FFV staff added as a preliminary to Operation JUNCTION CITY a strike into the Iron Triangle to interdict Viet Cong (VC) control of the transportation and communications network emanating from that base area. A coordinated intelligence-gathering plan tracked and analyzed VC movements and contacts over a period of months to identify patterns. The target of Operation CEDAR FALLS was the headquarters of the VC Military Region IV and its support units. The tactical technique chosen was that of the hammer-andanvil attack. The anvil was to be positioned along the Saigon River at the southwestern boundary of the Iron Triangle, with the hammer to swing through the triangle. Local residents were then evacuated, and the triangle area was stripped of vegetation. To preserve security for the operation, the plan was known only to a small group at II FFV headquarters, and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) III Corps commander was not briefed until January 6, 1967, two days before the operation commenced. Operation CEDAR FALLS consisted of two phases. Phase I was the stealthy positioning of forces (the anvil) during January 5–8, with an air assault on the village of Ben Suc on January 8. Phase II began on January 9 with two squadrons of the 11th Armored Cavalry (“Blackhorse”) Regiment and elements of the 173rd Airborne Brigade (Task Force Deane) making the hammerlike penetration from east to west beginning near Ben Cat and the 3rd Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division (“Big Red One”) making airmobile assaults into the jungle of the Thanh Dien forest to the north of the triangle to seal off the area and then sweep south toward the junction of the Saigon and Thi Tinh rivers. In all, CEDAR FALLS saw the commitment of two U.S. infantry divisions and one ARVN infantry division, supported by extensive artillery, engineer, and aviation units; it was the largest such operation of the war to date. The village of Ben Suc at the northwest corner of the Iron Triangle was the headquarters of the VC secret base area known as Long
Nguyen. About 6,000 Vietnamese residents had been organized into four service units charged with moving supplies by sampan on the Saigon River. Ben Suc and three smaller villages nearby were to be attacked by the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry (“Blue Spaders”), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Alexander M. Haig Jr. The villages would then be evacuated and demolished. A reinforced VC battalion was responsible for the defense of Ben Suc. Accordingly, without preparatory artillery fires, the U.S. infantry battalion was lifted swiftly in 60 transport helicopters directly into the village. Ten armed helicopters protected the troops on the closely coordinated route into Ben Suc. It took only minutes to land an entire infantry battalion of more than 400 men, achieving complete tactical surprise. By midmorning the village was secured, and an ARVN battalion that had been driven out of the area by the VC months earlier returned to conduct a methodical search of Ben Suc. VC tunnels beneath the village were collapsed by a combination of acetylene gas and explosives, while bulldozers knocked down scrub trees and brush. Nearly 6,000 villagers (two-thirds of them children), along with their livestock and food, were moved to a resettlement camp near Phu Cuong. The five infantry battalions, two cavalry squadrons, and one artillery battalion of the 3rd Brigade of the Big Red One had commenced operations in the heavily wooded and entrenched area of the Thanh Dien forest north of the Iron Triangle on the morning of January 9. They formed the hammer, along with the 173rd Airborne Brigade, reinforced by the Blackhorse Regiment, striking into the triangle from the east. Despite the large number of allied units engaged in the operation, the actual work of search and destroy was done by small units: infantry squads and fire teams. Search by day and ambush by night became the routine. The absence of strongly held VC defensive positions and counterattacks confirmed that the VC were trying to slip away from the attacking forces and exfiltrate the Iron Triangle to fight another day. Gradually the forces committed to CEDAR FALLS wound down their search-and-destroy activities in the Iron Triangle, with the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry (“Quarterhorse”), providing security for the engineer parties who completed their work by midnight on January 26. By the end of CEDAR FALLS 2,711 acres of jungle had been cleared, and 34 landing zones were chopped out of the jungle in the Iron Triangle. CEDAR FALLS provided important tactical lessons about engineers and infantry working in unison to deny cover and concealment to the VC and about the preparation of helicopter landing zones and artillery firebases. Procedures for clearing VC tunnel systems were refined, and a new type of soldier was introduced to the American reading public: the so-called tunnel rat. Tons of VC documents were recovered from the Military Region IV headquarters, many of which, when exploited, told the allies a great deal about their Communist antagonists. MACV estimated VC/People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) losses as 750 killed, 280 prisoners taken, and 540 Chieu Hoi converts, compared to allied losses of 83 killed and 345 wounded.
Cédile, Jean
The VC had suffered a significant setback with the penetration of their previously safe base areas close to Saigon, but they had avoided the destruction of their major combat forces in the area. The American commanders, however, ever optimistic of their combat power and ultimate victory, were not able to understand fully the determination of their foe to continue the war despite stinging losses. Communist forces had been damaged, but their will had not been destroyed. JOHN F. VOTAW See also Ben Suc; DePuy, William Eugene; Haig, Alexander Meigs, Jr.; Iron Triangle; JUNCTION CITY, Operation; Search and Destroy; Tunnel Rats; United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1965–1968; United States Army References Rogers, Bernard W. Cedar Falls Junction City: A Turning Point. Vietnam Studies Series. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1974. Summers, Harry G., Jr. The Vietnam War Almanac. New York: Ballantine, 1985.
Cédile, Jean Birth Date: January 26, 1908 Death Date: 1983 French commissioner for Cochin China immediately after World War II. Jean Cédile was born on January 26, 1908, at Pointe-à-Pitre
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(Guadeloupe). An administrator before World War II, during that conflict he joined the Gaullist Resistance. After seeing action in Tripolitania and Tunisia, Cédile became director of cabinet for René Pleven. Cédile was head of the French administrative mission at Vice Admiral Louis Mountbatten’s South East Asia Command headquarters in Kandy at the end of 1944. Cédile parachuted into Indochina on August 24, 1945, and was immediately captured by the Japanese, who interrogated him under torture even though the war had ended. A few days later Cédile escaped from the Saigon school where he was being held prisoner and, with the help of Loyalists, reasserted French control over the governor’s palace by outwitting Japanese soldiers and Viet Minh militia guarding the building. In this action as in later ones (he was adviser to the French delegations in the 1946 Dalat negotiations between the French and Viet Minh), he carried out his mission of reestablishing French administrative and political institutions in Cochin China. After leaving Indochina in 1947, Cédile served in various French territories until his retirement. He died in 1983. ARTHUR J. DOMMEN See also French Indochina, 1860s–1946 References Gras, Yves. Histoire de la Guerre d’Indochine. Paris: Éditions Denoël, 1992. Hammer, Ellen J. The Struggle for Indochina. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1954.
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Central Highlands
Central Highlands Important geographical feature of southern Vietnam. The Central Highlands, or Cao Nguyen Trung Phan, is located at the southern terminus of the Truong Son Mountains in remote west-central southern Vietnam. The northern part consists mainly of bamboo and tropical forests, with peaks ranging up to more than 8,000 feet in Ngoc Linh (90 miles north of Kontum City and the highest elevation in southern Vietnam). The southern portion is mostly more than 3,000 feet above sea level. The entire area is approximately 100 miles wide by 200 miles long (20,000 square miles). The area’s sparse population consists of tribes of Austroasiatic (related to Khmer) and Austronesian (related to Cham, Malay, and Indonesian) peoples, whom the Vietnamese call moi (“savages”) and the French call Montagnards (meaning “mountain people”). Principal ethnic groups include the Rhade, Jarai (Austronesian), and Bahnar (Austroasiatic). The French introduced coffee, tea, and rubber to the area and built the towns of Kontum, Dalat, and Ban Me Thuot to market their goods and serve as provincial capitals. Isolated by the forested mountains of the region, the Montagnards did not adopt Chinese tradition or writing and are considered backward by the Vietnamese, with whom there is a natural antipathy. In 1953 during the Indochina War the Viet Minh attempted to unify the disparate tribal groups into the National Union Front, and in 1954 following the Geneva Accords the North Vietnamese took about 1,000 disgruntled minority cadres with them to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) for training and subsequent use in their homelands. After President Ngo Dinh Diem came to power in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), he settled thousands of poor peasants from overpopulated central Vietnam coastal lowland villages in the area, and by 1958 the Montagnards were demanding autonomy. In 1961 U.S. Special Forces set up Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDGs) in an effort to block North Vietnamese infiltrations, which used the Central Highlands as the southern terminus of the Ho Chi Minh Trail logistic corridor into South Vietnam. A short-lived Montagnard rebellion in 1964, organized by the United Front of Liberation of the Oppressed Races (FULRO), was settled peacefully with U.S. assistance. FULRO subsequently led resistance to the Communists in the Central Highlands, but the Montagnards turned against the South Vietnamese government because of the exploitation of Montagnards by Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) officers and favoritism shown to Vietnamese soldiers. The Central Highlands has been known as the strategic fulcrum of South Vietnam, because South Vietnamese independence hung in the balance each time the North Vietnamese attempted to sever the country at its waist by attacking the area and aiming toward the coast to the east. Important battles here include attacks on the French in 1953 and 1954, the Ia Drang Valley Campaign of 1965, the Battle of Dak To in 1967 on the eve of the January 1968 Tet Offensive, the defense of Kontum during the 1972 Easter Offensive,
and the fall of Ban Me Thuot to People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) forces in 1975 that led to President Nguyen Van Thieu’s decision to concede central Vietnam and the subsequent collapse of the South Vietnamese government. Although Communist cadres speaking for the North Vietnamese had promised the Montagnards autonomy after the war, the promise was unfulfilled; many were instead sent to reeducation camps, and approximately 1 million Vietnamese were forcibly resettled on their lands. FULRO led an armed resistance against the government after the reunification of Vietnam in 1975. CLAUDE R. SASSO See also Ban Me Thuot, Battle of; Dak To, Battle of; Front Unifié de Lutte des Races Opprimées; Geography of Indochina and Vietnam; Ia Drang, Battle of; Montagnards References Duiker, William J. The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam. 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996. Hickey, Gerald Cannon. Sons of the Mountains: Ethnohistory of the Vietnamese Central Highlands to 1954. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982. Nguyen Van Canh. Vietnam under Communism, 1975–1982. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1983. Palmer, General Bruce, Jr. The 25-Year War: America’s Military Role in Vietnam. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1984.
Central Intelligence Agency Primary U.S. intelligence agency during the Cold War. Congress established the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in July 1947 to centralize and coordinate intelligence and espionage activities in reaction to the deepening Cold War. Early on the CIA’s main focus was on the Soviet Union and its satellites. The CIA assumed primary responsibility not only for intelligence collection and analysis but also for covert actions. Its origins can be traced to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) of World War II, which had conducted espionage, intelligence analysis, and special operations from propaganda to sabotage. The main impetus for the creation of the CIA came from the investigation into Japan’s surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. President Harry S. Truman vowed to prevent a repetition of this massive intelligence failure. On January 22, 1946, Truman signed an executive order forming the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) modeled after the OSS. The CIG’s mission was to provide analysis and coordination of information about foreign threats and to undertake advantageous policy initiatives. On July 26, 1947, Truman signed the National Security Act, replacing the CIG with the new CIA as an independent agency operating within the executive office of the president. Truman appointed legendary OSS spymaster William “Wild Bill” Donovan to serve as the first CIA director. The CIA’s primary function was to advise the National Security Council (NSC) on intelligence matters and make recommendations for coordination
Central Intelligence Agency of intelligence activities. To accomplish these goals, the CIA was to correlate, evaluate, and disseminate intelligence as well as perform other services in accordance with NSC directives. Because Congress was vague in defining the CIA’s mission, broad interpretation of the act provided justification for subsequent covert operations, although the original intent was only to authorize espionage. The CIA director was responsible for reporting on intelligence activities to Congress and the president. Power over the budget and staffing only of the CIA meant that no director ever exerted central control over the other 12 government entities in the U.S. intelligence community. Known to insiders as “The Agency” or “The Company,” the CIA consisted of four directorates. The Directorate of Operations supervised official and nonofficial agents in conducting human intelligence collection, covert operations, and counterintelligence. The Directorate of Operations was divided into geographic units and also contained the Center for Counterterrorism. The Directorate of Administration managed the CIA’s daily administrative affairs and housed the Office of Security. Created in 1952, the Directorate of Intelligence conducted research in intelligence sources and analysis of the results. The Directorate of Intelligence produced the “President’s Daily Brief” and worked with the National Intelligence Council in preparing estimates and studies. The Directorate of Science and Technology, created in 1963, was responsible for development and operation of reconnaissance aircraft and satellites, operation and funding of ground stations to intercept Soviet missile telemetry, and analysis of foreign nuclear and space programs. The Directorate of Science and Technology also operated the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), which monitored and analyzed all foreign media outlets. The Directorate of Administration was responsible for support, including logistics, personnel, finance, and security (which included polygraph). During its first years the CIA had difficulty prevailing in bureaucratic battles over authority and funding. For example, the State Department required CIA personnel abroad to operate under a U.S. ambassador. Walter Bedell Smith, who replaced Donovan in 1950, was an effective director, but the CIA’s power increased greatly after Allen W. Dulles, brother of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, became CIA director in 1953. An 80 percent increase in the agency’s budget led to the hiring of 50 percent more agents and a major expansion in covert operations. The CIA played a key role in the overthrow of allegedly radical governments in Iran in 1953 and Guatemala in 1954. With the advice of CIA operative Edward G. Lansdale, Philippine secretary of national defense Ramon Magsaysay during 1950–1954 crushed the Hukbalahap uprising in his country. The CIA was heavily involved in the Vietnam War. During World War II its predecessor, the OSS, had worked in Vietnam with the Viet Minh, led by Ho Chi Minh, to oppose the Japanese. Ho himself became Agent 19, charged with providing information about Japanese troop movements and general conditions in Indochina. After World War II the CIA supported France in its war against the Viet Minh.
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Following the 1954 Geneva Conference, the CIA strongly supported Ngo Dinh Diem’s effort to create a new state, the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). The CIA provided him funds with which to bribe the leaders of South Vietnam’s religious sects so that he could consolidate his control. One of Diem’s strongest American backers was Lieutenant Colonel Edward Lansdale. During World War II Lansdale had served with the OSS; later he went to the Philippines, where he helped rebuild the Philippine Army to suppress a Communist insurrection. Lansdale went to Saigon as CIA station chief in 1954 and used his expertise in countersubversion and guerrilla warfare to combat the Communists and undermine the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). For example, Lansdale launched a black propaganda campaign in North Vietnam to portray forthcoming conditions under Communist rule as grimly as possible. That campaign, called Operation EXODUS, helped stimulate the mass migration of some 900,000 people, mostly Roman Catholics, from North Vietnam in 1954 in the resettlement period following the Geneva Accords. Author Neil Sheehan asserts in A Bright Shining Lie that Lansdale’s actions prevented a total Communist victory by 1956. The CIA also conducted numerous missions against North Vietnam ranging from sabotage to intelligence gathering to bribes to bolster Diem. Yet even Lansdale, a strong friend of Diem, recognized that the South Vietnamese president’s repressive measures were proving counterproductive and driving all opposition into the hands of the Communists. Gradually Lansdale and the CIA turned against Diem. During a 1960 abortive coup against Diem, the CIA was in touch with the plotters but did not aid them. Following massive Buddhist demonstrations in 1963, several senior Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) officers plotted another coup against Diem. Of crucial importance to the success of any coup was the position of the United States. Acting on instructions from President John F. Kennedy, CIA director John McCone instructed his Saigon station not to prevent the coup. Influential CIA agent Lucien Conein, pursuant to orders issued to him by U.S. ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, went further and assured the generals that they had U.S. support in implementing the November 1963 coup that toppled Diem. After the successful November 1963 coup, the United States put sustained pressure on the North Vietnamese government. CIA station chief William Colby sought to foster a guerrilla war in North Vietnam with South Vietnamese infiltrators trained by the CIA. The idea was to frighten the North Vietnamese leaders into abandoning the Viet Cong (VC). The CIA carried out air drops and conducted coastal raids on targets in North Vietnam, sabotaging roads, bridges, and railroad lines. Yet these efforts had little effect in halting the escalating war. Within South Vietnam, during the early years of the war the CIA supported U.S. Special Forces units (Green Berets), who were sent into rural areas to conduct unconventional warfare as well as political-psychological activities. The Special Forces were very successful in setting up paramilitary units, especially among the
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Montagnards of the Central Highlands. Some 80 base camps were set up, all under Special Forces leadership, with the goal of sealing the border and cutting VC supply lines. By 1964 some 60,000 tribesmen were armed and trained. John Prados writes in Presidents’ Secret Wars that for all its difficulties, this effort in the Central Highlands was one of the most successful campaigns of the Vietnam War. In 1969 when American troops started withdrawing from Vietnam, Special Forces in the Central Highlands were also withdrawn. The number of Central Highlands Montagnard fighters was also reduced, and they were then integrated into ARVN. At the height of the Vietnam War the CIA built an extensive network of some 400 agents and officials, making the Vietnam station the largest in the world. One of their essential tasks was intelligence gathering. Throughout the war the CIA issued regular reports to Washington to assist in policy decisions. These reports make sobering reading. They pointed out, for example, that U.S. military operations had little long-term impact on the Communists. CIA reports detailed the political chaos, factionalism, and corruption within the South Vietnamese government that would only contribute to a Communist victory. As early as 1965 the CIA concluded that the war was stalemated and that the United States could not win it. Washington thus always had the information to allow policy makers to make accurate decisions based on facts. What U.S. officials did with that information was another story. In Laos, the United States engaged in a secret but extensive war. The CIA trained and equipped mountain tribesmen, mostly from the Hmong tribe, to fight the Communist Pathet Lao and to sever the Ho Chi Minh Trail into South Vietnam. This CIA operation began in 1960 and continued throughout the decade. The CIA flew in food, medicine, weapons, ammunition, and personnel on their proprietary airline, Air America. A secret army of some 40,000 men led by General Vang Pao fought the CIA’s secret war in Laos. For several years the war went well. However, declining morale among Lao tribesmen combined with additional troop buildups by the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) and Pathet Lao caused a deteriorating military situation for General Vang Pao’s army. Eventually after South Vietnam and Cambodia fell to the Communists in the spring of 1975, Vang Pao, his army, and many Hmongs had to be evacuated. Throughout the 1960s the CIA sought to destroy the VC infrastructure with pacification operations. The most controversial and brutal of these campaigns was the Phoenix Program, begun in 1968. Its task was to identify individual VC and then neutralize them through arrests, “conversion,” or assassination. Although Phoenix was basically a South Vietnamese operation, the CIA provided essential advice and personnel. In fact, its most ferocious section, the Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU), was under direct CIA command. Interrogation centers were set up in every district and provincial capital. Monthly quotas of 3,000 people to be killed or captured were then sent to these centers. Some 600 Americans, most of them U.S. military personnel, were assigned to the program under Colby. Altogether, some 20,000 to 40,000 peo-
ple died, 28,000 were imprisoned, and 20,000 were “reeducated” or “converted.” Torture was routinely employed. Many were innocent, victims of personal vendettas or of corruption. The impact of the Phoenix Program is difficult to estimate. Although the VC infrastructure was definitely hurt, many peasants were alienated by the number of casual arrests. Early in the 1970s the CIA came under tremendous pressure from congressional political critics. Revelations concerning the Phoenix Program raised many eyebrows. Much more severe was public reaction to Operation CHAOS, a program of wiretapping and other surveillance of American opponents to the war. Operation CHAOS violated the CIA’s charter and led to the creation of files on more than 7,000 Americans. Then it was alleged, without any solid evidence, that the CIA had been indirectly involved in drug operations within South Vietnam and Laos and that this had contributed to a booming heroin market in the United States. These abuses led Congress in 1974 to amend the Foreign Assistance Act to require that the CIA only be involved in intelligence activities outside the United States. Both houses of Congress established permanent oversight committees to monitor CIA activities. The CIA reportedly always had a low regard for the regime of President Nguyen Van Thieu. When the end came for the South Vietnamese government in 1975, the CIA was forced into a frantic evacuation, which included flying Thieu himself, allegedly carrying two huge suitcases full of gold, to Taiwan. Many Vietnamese CIA employees and agents were left behind, along with key documents identifying them for the Communists to capture when they took Saigon. Thus, the CIA record in Vietnam was indeed a mixed one. MICHAEL SHARE AND JAMES I. MATRAY See also Adams, Samuel A.; Air America; CHAOS, Operation; Colby, William Egan; Conein, Lucien Emile; Donovan, William Joseph; Dulles, Allen Welsh; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Hmongs; Hoover, John Edgar; Huston Plan; Lansdale, Edward Geary; Laos; McCone, John Alex; Montagnards; Nguyen Van Thieu; Office of Strategic Services; Phoenix Program; Provincial Reconnaissance Units; Quach Tom; United States Special Forces; Vietnam, Republic of, Commandos References Kolko, Gabriel. Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States, and the Modern Historical Experience. New York: Pantheon, 1985. Prados, John. Presidents’ Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations from World War II through Iranscam. New York: William Morrow, 1988. Sheehan, Neil. A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam. New York: Random House, 1988. Weiner, Tim. Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA. New York: Doubleday, 2007.
Central Office for South Vietnam Headquarters of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) for controlling all Viet Cong (VC) military forces in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). The Trung
Chams and the Kingdom of Champa Uong Cuc Mien Nam (Central Office for South Vietnam, COSVN) represented the Lao Dong (Worker’s, Communist) Party Central Standing Committee in South Vietnam and had charge of the war efforts on all fronts. Located in a corner of Tay Ninh Province, III Corps area of operations, near the Cambodian border, the COSVN was a continual target of American ground and air operations. The COSVN was the specific objective in Operation JUNCTION CITY in 1967 as well as the 1970 Cambodian Incursion. During the period May 1970 to 1972 the COSVN was located in Kratie Province, Cambodia, on the western side of the Mekong River. In early 1973 the COSVN moved from Cambodia back into Vietnam to a headquarters base in the Loc Ninh District, Binh Long Province, where it stayed until Communist forces captured Saigon on April 30, 1975. The COSVN eluded capture or destruction throughout the war. In terms of organization or structure, the COSVN itself was no more than what the U.S. Army would describe as a forward command post, consisting of a few senior officers and key staff personnel. As a result, the COSVN was extremely mobile and moved frequently to avoid capture or destruction. However, like any major headquarters, the COSVN had a large support apparatus. According to a postwar Vietnamese history, the COSVN’s total strength as of December 1969 was 7,357 personnel, consisting of more than 5,000 Lao Dong Party and government headquarters personnel, almost 1,300 armed security personnel, and more than 900 “Assault Youth” support personnel. The elusive American pursuit of the COSVN was symbolic of the myriad difficulties of fighting a guerrilla war. ROBERT G. MANGRUM See also Cambodia; Cambodian Incursion; Fishhook; JUNCTION CITY, Operation; National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam; Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, Army References Davidson, Phillip A. Vietnam at War: The History, 1946–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1988. Herring, George C. America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975. 4th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001. Colonel Ho Son Dai, ed. Lich Su Bo Chi Huy Mien (1961–1976) [History of the Military Headquarters for South Vietnam (1961–1976)]. Hanoi: National Political Publishing House, 2004. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. Olson, James S., ed. Dictionary of the Vietnam War. New York: Greenwood, 1988. Palmer, General Bruce, Jr. The 25-Year War: America’s Military Role in Vietnam. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1984. Reinberg, Linda. In the Field: The Language of the Vietnam War. New York: Facts on File, 1991. Summers, Harry G., Jr. The Vietnam War Almanac. New York: Ballantine, 1985. Trinh Nhu. Lich Su Bien Nien Xu Uy Nam Bo Va Trung Uong Cuc Mien Nam (1954–1975) [Historical Chronicle of the Cochin China Party Committee and the Central Office for South Vietnam (1954–1975)]. Hanoi: National Political Publishing House, 2002.
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Chams and the Kingdom of Champa The Chams are an ethnic minority in Southeast Asia, and the Kingdom of Champa existed along the central coast of Vietnam from as early as the late 2nd century to the late 15th century. In 2009 there were some 317,000 ethnic Chams in Cambodia, 127,000 in Vietnam, 15,000 in Laos, 10,000 in Malaysia, 4,000 in Thailand, 3,000 in the United States, and 1,000 in France. In Vietnam the Chams are concentrated along the south-central coast between Da Nang and Phan Rang, with the majority in Thuan Hai Province. Others live in An Giang, Dong Nai, and Tay Ninh provinces as well as in Ho Chi Minh City. The Chams are most recognizable today for their dress: long robes or the sarong worn by Cham women and the black head cloths that distinguish both men and women from ethnic Vietnamese. Chams are descendants of the ancient Kingdom of Champa, which evolved from the Hindu civilizations of India as early as 192 CE. Cham civilization flourished across central Vietnam until the kingdom was extinguished in 1471. At its height it stretched from Vinh southward along the central coast to Phan Rang. There were four major Cham centers: Amaravati (Quang Binh to Quang Nam–Da Nang), Vijaya (Nghia Binh), Kauthara (Khanh Hoa), and Panduranga (Binh Thuan/Thuan Hai). Archaeological remains have been found along the central coast, the most prominent located at My Son about 45 miles southwest of Da Nang, dating to the fourth century. My Son has temples dedicated to Hindu gods, with representations of Shiva, Brahma, and Vishnu, as well as to Cham kings who were deified. Ceremonial complexes with stupas surround central squares. The inscriptions of stelae at My Son suggest the division of Cham society into four castes akin to the Hindu caste system of India. Buddhism also flourished in Champa as early as the fourth century, as seen most prominently in the Buddhist monasteries built at Dong Duong, some 40 miles south of Da Nang, in the ninth century. The beautiful style of the thap cham (Cham temples), built without cement or mortar, makes them a popular tourist attraction. The Chams settled in coastal enclaves and engaged in seafaring and maritime trade across the South China Sea as far as China and islands in Southeast Asia. Today the Chams of central Vietnam live in communities primarily in Thuan Hai Province. Many Chams still derive their livelihood from the sea, through fishing and maritime industries. The Chams are also wet-rice farmers. In the plains around Phan Rang, remains of ancient hydraulic works attest to the height of Cham civilization. The Cham language is MalayoPolynesian of the Austronesian language family. Their ancient Hindu heritage is also seen in the written Sanskrit language. Along the central coast, Chams still practice both Hinduism and Buddhism; in the south they are Muslims. Cham society is organized into two clans (“areca” and “coconut”), which are broken down into subclans, each of which include 10 to 15 families organized by matrilineal descent patterns and matrilocal residence. By the 10th century the Vietnamese, Cham, and Khmer kingdoms had fought a series of intermittent wars with and against
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The Po Klaung Garai towers in Vietnam. The towers were constructed in the Cham Kingdom of central Vietnam at the end of the 13th and beginning of the 14th centuries. (Simone Van Den Berg/Dreamstime.com)
each other, but the primary concern of the Vietnamese remained the domination of the Chinese from the north. With the defeat of the Chinese in 1427 and the reign of Emperor Le Loi (r. 1428– 1433), the Vietnamese began their “March to the South” along the central coast. During the reign of Le Thanh Tong (r. 1460–1497), the Vietnamese eventually subdued the Cham kingdom in 1471, although the Chams still retained lands south of the Cu Mong pass. Vestiges of the kingdom lived on until the late 18th century, when the end of the Tay Son Rebellion saw the final suppression of Cham autonomy as well. DAVID M. BERMAN See also Le Loi; Le Thanh Tong; Tay Son Rebellion; Vietnam, History of, 938 CE through the French Conquest References Hickey, Gerald Cannon. Sons of the Mountains: Ethnohistory of the Vietnamese Central Highlands to 1954. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982. Lebar, Frank C., Gerald C. Hickey, and John Musgrave. Ethnic Groups of Mainland Southeast Asia. New Haven, CT: Human Relations Area Files Press, 1964.
CHAOS,
Operation
Start Date: 1967 End Date: 1973 Domestic intelligence operation conducted in the United States between 1967 and 1973 and designed to identify and monitor antiwar organizations and individuals and to provide information on persons of interest traveling abroad. In 1967 the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), responding to a directive from President Lyndon B. Johnson, began operating an internal surveillance program that was tasked with uncovering potential links between the antiwar movement and foreign governments. Richard Helms, CIA director from 1966 to 1973, launched the initiative and gave broad authority to his chief of counterintelligence, James Jesus Angleton, to conduct surveillance and gather information on individuals and organizations that might have had ties to overseas governments. To carry out his mandate, Angleton used a wide variety of already in place CIA personnel and operations, including the use of foreign agents and offices. Upon the advent of the Richard M. Nixon administration in 1969, all domestic surveillance relating to dissent and antiwar
Chapman, Leonard Fielding, Jr. activities were brought under the CHAOS umbrella. Nixon had a visceral dislike for the counterculture and antiwar movements and was convinced that enemies of the United States—and even of his administration—had infiltrated these activities and were giving them aid and support. Soon some 60 CIA agents working abroad were conducting surveillance on U.S. citizens overseas, using electronic eavesdropping as well as physical surveillance to gather information on “persons of interest.” Clandestine surveillance in the United States also picked up in the early 1970s. Operation CHAOS kept close tabs on groups such as Women Strike for Peace, Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), and the Black Panthers, among many others. The purview of Operation CHAOS quickly spun out of control, however, and the CIA began conducting surveillance on groups and individuals who did not have any direct links to the antiwar movement. The women’s liberation movement had become a target by the early 1970s, as had the Jewish organization B’nai B’rith. Indeed, the CIA even targeted the Israeli embassy to determine if B’nai B’rith had any links to the Israeli government. Reportedly, the agency was so intent on monitoring correspondence from the Israeli embassy that it formed its own bogus trash-removal company, which allowed it to sort through discarded mail. In his first report to President Johnson in November 1967, Helms reported that Operation CHAOS had found no substantial links between anyone in the antiwar movement and foreign governments. The five reports that succeeded this one all drew the same basic conclusion, yet the CIA’s activities were not only extended but also broadened, especially during Nixon’s first term. By the time CHAOS was ended in 1973, it is estimated that the CIA had compiled 7,000 files on individual Americans and 1,000 files on various groups and organizations. Furthermore, a list of some 300,000 Americans had been compiled, presumably as “persons of interest,” although there was little information on them. All of this domestic espionage had been conducted without Americans’ knowledge or permission. As the Watergate Scandal unfolded in 1973, laying bare the excessive secrecy and dirty tricks of the Nixon White House, Operation CHAOS was liquidated. Indeed, the Nixon administration feared that if the operation was revealed, its already-tenuous hold on power might be undermined entirely. But CHAOS did not stay secret for very long. On December 22, 1974, just four months after Nixon’s forced resignation from office, the investigative reporter Seymour Hersh revealed in the New York Times the basic outlines of Operation CHAOS. In the immediate aftermath of Watergate, the revelation sparked bipartisan outrage and triggered several investigations. The following year, U.S. representative Bella Abzug (D-N.Y.) conducted an investigation via the House Subcommittee on Government Information and Individual Rights. The revelations coming from the hearings were troubling to all and triggered a larger investigation, the President’s Commission on CIA Activities in the United States (also known as the Rockefeller Commission),
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chaired by Vice President Nelson Rockefeller. After the specifics of Operation CHAOS and other CIA activities had come to light, the government, and especially the CIA, attempted to downplay the impact of its programs on civil liberties. Dick Cheney, then President Gerald R. Ford’s deputy chief of staff, warned that the commission should resist congressional attempts to encroach on executive branch prerogatives. George H. W. Bush, CIA director in the last days of the Ford administration, downplayed the commission’s findings, saying only that Operation CHAOS “resulted in some improper accumulation of material on legitimate domestic activities.” PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR. See also Abzug, Bella; Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Central Intelligence Agency; Counterculture; Helms, Richard McGarrah; Hersh, Seymour Myron; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Students for a Democratic Society; Watergate Scandal; Women Strike for Peace References Theoharis, Athan, ed., with Richard Immerman, Loch Johnson, Kathryn Olmsted, and John Prados. The Central Intelligence Agency: Security under Scrutiny. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2006. Weiner, Tim. Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA. New York: Doubleday, 2007.
Chapman, Leonard Fielding, Jr. Birth Date: November 3, 1913 Death Date: January 6, 2000 U.S. Marine Corps general and commandant during 1968–1972. Born in Key West, Florida, on November 3, 1913, Leonard Fielding Chapman Jr. graduated from the University of Florida in 1935. He resigned a reserve commission in the U.S. Army to take an active commission in the U.S. Marine Corps. Chapman was promoted to captain in 1941 and to major in 1942, the same year he became an artillery instructor at Quantico, Virginia. He saw combat in World War II in the Pacific theater and then held assignments in Japan; Washington, D.C.; and North Carolina. In 1958 Chapman was advanced to brigadier general, and in 1961 he became a major general. Following promotion to lieutenant general in January 1967, he served as U.S. Marine Corps chief of staff from 1964 to 1967. In July 1967 President Lyndon Johnson appointed Chapman assistant commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps and then that December named him commandant. Chapman was promoted to general (four stars) in January 1968. Although some saw Chapman’s appointment as a dark horse compromise among factions within the U.S. Marine Corps, he was soon recognized as an expert in military logistics and communications. Chapman traveled extensively during his tenure, reportedly some 100,000 miles during his first year, to visit marines and U.S. Marine Corps facilities around the world. Twice in 1968 alone he visited Vietnam to size up the situation there for himself. At the
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Chappelle, Georgette Meyer
Chappelle, Georgette Meyer Birth Date: March 14, 1918 Death Date: November 4, 1965
U.S. Marine Corps commandant General Leonard F. Chapman Jr., shown in this photograph from August 11, 1970, oversaw the withdrawal of the corps’ last combat forces from Vietnam. (AP/Wide World Photos)
time of his four-year appointment, more than one-fourth of the U.S. Marine Corps’ 300,000 marines were on combat duty in Vietnam. Chapman’s main task was to use his considerable management skills to aid in their systematic withdrawal. He also had to deal with increased drug abuse in the ranks and racial tensions that often boiled over into physical violence. He has been credited with addressing racial strife in the U.S. Marine Corps by insisting on fairness in assignments and promotions and by fostering greater mutual understanding and respect within the ranks. Chapman retired from the U.S. Marine Corps in 1972 but served as commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service until he retired from public service in 1977. Both of his sons, also marines, saw active duty in Vietnam. Chapman died in Fairfax, Virginia, on January 6, 2000. GARY KERLEY See also Johnson, Lyndon Baines; United States Marine Corps References Current Biography Yearbook, 1968. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1969. Jessup, John E., and Louise B. Ketz, eds. Encyclopedia of the American Military. 2 vols. New York: Scribner, 1994. Millett, Allan R. Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps. Rev. and expanded ed. New York: Free Press, 1991. Webster’s American Military Biographies. Springfield, MA: G. and C. Merriam, 1978.
Intrepid war correspondent and photojournalist. Born Georgette Louise Meyer on March 14, 1918, in Shorewood, Wisconsin, Meyer demonstrated a keen intellect at an early age, and by the time she was 16 was enrolled in aeronautical design classes at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. More interested in becoming a pilot than in designing aircraft, she took a job at an airfield outside Milwaukee, Wisconsin. When her mother disapproved of her decidedly unfeminine interests and found out that she was romantically involved with a pilot, she sent her daughter to live in Florida with her grandparents. Meyer gave herself the nickname “Dickey” in honor of her favorite modern explorer, Admiral Richard Bird. She subsequently relocated to New York City, where she began working for Trans World Airlines (TWA). There she began taking photographs for the airline and also met her soon-to-be husband, Tony Chappelle. When World War began, Georgette Chappelle secured a job as war correspondent and photojournalist for National Geographic magazine. Although ridiculed by her colleagues for her meager photography credentials and tender age, Chappelle soon proved her mettle. Unafraid to position herself in harm’s way at or near the battle lines, she took photos at the Battle of Iwo Jima and the Battle of Okinawa. She served alongside the U.S. Marine Corps for much of the war. Chappelle returned to the United States in 1946 but was almost constantly on the go, reporting from war zones and taking photographs whenever and wherever she could. Frequently she received permission to embed herself with troops from foreign nations in order to cover a war story. She reported alongside troops fighting in Algeria, Cuba, and Hungary. During the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, Chappelle was detained for seven weeks by Soviet troops who had initiated the crackdown against the Hungarian uprising. In the early stages of Fidel Castro’s 1959 revolution against the Fulgencio Batista regime in Cuba, Chappelle traveled to the island nation and was embedded with Castro’s forces. Initially she supported Castro’s movement but backed away from that position when he began to exhibit Communist leanings. Chappelle was a rabid anti-Communist who was not afraid to exhibit her political leanings in her war reporting. In the early 1960s Chappelle traveled to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) to cover the growing U.S. presence there. Her stories and photos extolled the virtues of the American military advisers in South Vietnam, and she became the first female reporter to receive Pentagon authorization to jump with U.S. troops in Vietnam. In 1963 a photograph she took of a combatready marine in 1962 garnered the Press Photographers’ Association “Picture of the Year” award. However, her reporting became so biased that she was asked to leave South Vietnam by her editors.
CHECO Project Less than a year later, however, Chappelle, now working as a roving reporter for numerous large-circulation magazines, convinced her editors to send her back to South Vietnam. She once more joined the U.S. marines. On November 4, 1965, while on patrol with a platoon of marines, Chappelle was mortally wounded by a booby-trapped land mine near Chu Lai and the Song Tra Bong River. In what soon became a famous—and ironic—photograph, a bloodied Chappelle was captured as she lay dying, with a military chaplain bent over her administering the Last Rites. Chappelle thus became the first war correspondent killed in Vietnam as well as the first female U.S. reporter to die in combat. PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR. See also Media and the Vietnam War; Women in the Vietnam War, U.S. References Bartimus, Tad, Denby Fawcett, and Jurate Kazickas. War Torn: The Personal Experiences of Women Reporters in the Vietnam War. New York: Random House, 2004. Ostroff, Roberta. Fire in the Wind: The Biography of Dickey Chappelle. New York: Ballantine Books, 1992.
Charner, Léonard Victor Joseph Birth Date: February 13, 1797 Death Date: February 7, 1869 French admiral and commander of French forces in Cochin China in 1861. Born at Saint-Brieuc (Brittany) on February 13, 1797, Léonard Victor Joseph Charner entered the French Navy in February 1812 as a cadet at the École de Marine at Toulon. Appointed a midshipman in 1815, he served in various ships and took part in the expedition against Algiers in 1830. He attained the rank of captain in April 1841. Employed at sea from 1843 to 1848, in 1849 he entered the French Legislative Assembly as a representative of the Côtes-du-Nord. After Napoleon III’s 1852 coup, Charner became director general of the Ministry of Marine. He was promoted to rear admiral in February 1852. During the Crimean War (1854– 1856) Charner held a brief but important command in the Black Sea. In June 1855 he became a vice admiral. Named commander in chief of French naval forces in Chinese waters in February 1860, in 1861 Charner fought a brief but highly successful campaign against the Vietnamese as commander of French land and naval forces. By the end of the year the French were in control of much of Bien Hoa, Gia Dinh, and Dinh Tuong provinces. Returning to France, Charner became a senator in February 1862. In November 1864 he was promoted to full admiral. Charner died in Paris on February 7, 1869. The French named one of the principal boulevards of Saigon after him. ARTHUR J. DOMMEN See also French Indochina, 1860s–1946
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References Taillemite, Étienne, Dictionnaire des marines français. Paris: Tallandier, 2002. Whitfield, Danny J. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Vietnam. Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow, 1976.
CHECO Project Start Date: 1963 End Date: 1975 In-depth studies of military operations in Vietnam. In 1964 the U.S. Air Force created in Saigon the Contemporary Historical Examination of Combat Operations (CHECO) project. Its mandate was to provide top-level commanders with classified booklength studies that would contain immediate in-depth analyses of significant events and operations. The first title was The History of the War in Vietnam, October 1961–December 1963 (1964); one of the last titles was The Air War in Laos, January 1, 1972–February 22, 1973 (1974). The project produced in all more than 200 major studies. Titles included Night Interdiction in Southeast Asia (1966); Rolling Thunder, a continuing series about the bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam); and The Royal Lao Air Force (1970). In 1967 CHECO’s mission was expanded to include microfilming of all pertinent documents, such as letters, unit histories, communications, and after-action reports. In addition, a Thailand office was opened at Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base to cover operations in Laos. Key personnel involved in the project included Joseph Angell of the Office of Air Force History, Melvin Porter, and Kenneth Sams, chief in Saigon from 1964 to 1971. Numerous U.S. Air Force Academy faculty members also wrote reports on subjects ranging from rules of engagement to psychological operations. Some CHECO reports have since been declassified, and the complete collection, along with millions of frames of microfilmed documents, is deposited in the archives of the U.S. Air Force Historical Research Center at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. JOHN CLARK PRATT See also United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1954–1965; United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1965–1968; United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1969–1973; United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1973–1975; United States Air Force Reference Trest, William A. “Projects CHECO and Corona Harvest: Keys to the Air Force’s Southeast Asia Memory Bank.” Aerospace Historian (June 1986): 114–120.
Chemical Warfare See Defoliation; Herbicides; RANCH HAND, Operation
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Chennault, Anna
Chennault, Anna Birth Date: June 23, 1925 Chinese-born widow of Major General Claire Chennault, commander of the American Volunteer Group (“Flying Tigers”) and then the Fourteenth Air Force during World War II, and Republican Party operative. Anna Chennault was born Chen Xiangmei in Beijing, China, on June 23, 1925. In 1944 she earned an undergraduate degree at Lingnan University in Hong Kong and entered the field of journalism. In 1947 she married retired U.S. Army Air Forces major general Claire Lee Chennault, who directed the Allied tactical air effort in China during World War II. At that time she began using “Anna Chennault” as her name. As a journalist, Chennault worked with a number of news outlets and services, including the Voice of America (1963–1966). An old friend of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), leader of the Republic of China on Taiwan, and other Asian and American right-wing politicians, in 1968 Chennault served as the chairperson of the Republican Women for Nixon organization.
Just days before the November 1968 presidential election, Chennault worked secretly to try to undermine Democrats in their efforts to halt the bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). She recommended to President Nguyen Van Thieu of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) that he object to the last-minute halt of the bombing of North Vietnam and stall on the Paris peace talks. Chennault hoped that this move would embarrass the Democrats and help Richard M. Nixon in the impending election. She also urged Thieu to make it clear that his support for U.S. policy would hinge on Nixon’s election as president in 1968. In shades of what would later become the hallmark of the Nixon administration, President Lyndon B. Johnson had Chennault’s telephone bugged. South Vietnamese ambassador to the United States Bui Diem was Chennault’s contact, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) monitored his telephone conversations. Johnson warned Nixon not to depend on Chennault’s maneuvering to win the election for him, but her efforts to stall the peace talks may have had an impact on the close
Anna Chennault, wife of the U.S. general of “Flying Tiger” fame, signs her U.S. citizenship certificate in district court. General Claire Chennault is second from the left. (Bettmann/Corbis)
Chennault, Claire Lee
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presidential race. Nixon won the 1968 election with 43.3 percent of the vote to Democrat Hubert Humphrey’s 42.7 percent. Chennault remained in journalism for many years and also held several executive positions with privately held companies, including the Flying Tiger Line, an American-owned air cargo-transport company. She has also served on the President’s Advisory Committee for the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts since 1970; served as a representative to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); and from 1960 to 1999 served as president of the General Claire Chennault Foundation. She has also remained active in Republican Party politics and for many years was a committee member of the Republican Party of Washington, D.C. CHARLOTTE A. POWER See also Bui Diem; Chennault, Claire Lee; Elections, U.S., 1968; Humphrey, Hubert Horatio; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Nguyen Van Thieu; Nixon, Richard Milhous References Forslund, Catherine. Anna Chennault: Informal Diplomacy and Asian Relations. Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 2002. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. Young, Marilyn B. The Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990. New York: HarperCollins, 1991.
Chennault, Claire Lee Birth Date: September 6, 1893 Death Date: July 27, 1958 U.S. Army Air Forces general, leader of the American Volunteer Group (Flying Tigers), and founder of Civil Air Transport (CAT), which later became Air America. Born in Commerce, Texas, on September 6, 1893, Claire Lee Chennault was raised in rural Louisiana. He taught English and business at a number of southern colleges until August 1917, when he became a second lieutenant in the Army Reserve. He remained in the United States during World War I, transferring to the Signal Corps and completing pilot training in 1920. An accomplished airman, Chennault then held a number of assignments, among them command of the 19th Pursuit Squadron in Hawaii between 1923 and 1926. He developed into an outspoken advocate of fighter aircraft in a period when prevailing military thought subscribed to the doctrines espoused by Italian airpower theorist Giulio Douhet and the underlying assumption that “the bomber will always get through.” While serving as an instructor at the Air Corps Tactical School in 1935 Chennault wrote The Role of Defensive Pursuit, an important but controversial book at the time because it pointed out the need for fighter aircraft. In 1937 the army removed him from flying status because of a serious hearing loss and forced him into medical retirement as a captain.
U.S. Army Air Forces major general Claire Chennault, founder and leader of the American Volunteer Group (AVG), known as the Flying Tigers, in China in World War II. Chennault subsequently founded Civil Air Transport (CAT), which later became Air America. (National Archives)
In May 1937 Chennault went to China as aviation adviser to the Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist) government of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek). When the Japanese attacked China that September, Chennault became a colonel in the Chinese Air Force and began testing his tactical theories. In late 1940 he was allowed to recruit American military pilots for service in China, despite the strong opposition of the State Department, the War Department, and the Department of the Navy. His American Volunteer Group, popularly known as the Flying Tigers, consisted of some 200 ground crew and 100 pilots flying semiobsolete Curtiss P-40B fighters. The Flying Tigers entered combat for the first time on December 20, 1941. By the time the unit disbanded in July 1942, it had claimed 296 Japanese aircraft shot down, with only 12 of its own planes and 4 of its pilots lost. In April 1942 Chennault was recalled to active duty with the U.S. Army as a colonel. A few months later he was promoted to brigadier general and put in command of the newly formed China Air Task Force (CATF), a subordinate command of the U.S. Tenth Air Force in India. In March 1943 the CATF became the Fourteenth Air Force, with Chennault promoted to major general. The CATF and the Fourteenth Air Force were economy-of-force organizations in a tertiary theater and therefore always operated on a shoestring. Utilizing Chennault’s theories, however, both organizations achieved combat effectiveness far out of proportion to their size and resources. By 1945, the Fourteenth Air Force had
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destroyed some 2,600 Japanese aircraft and thousands of tons of supplies. During his time in China, Chennault conducted a long-running and public feud with Lieutenant General Joseph Stilwell, the equally stubborn and irascible U.S. commander of the China-Burma-India theater. Chennault engineered Jiang’s demand for Stilwell’s recall, but Chennault himself was removed from command and forced into retirement for a second time on August 1, 1945. Following the war, Chennault remained in China. In 1947 he married Anna (Chen Xiangmei) Chennault, an influential Chineseborn journalist and Republican Party operative. He then established and operated the Civil Air Transport (CAT) airline, which supported Jiang’s Nationalist government in its civil war with Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) and his Communist forces. In 1950 Chennault sold his interest in CAT to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), but he remained the chairman of the airline’s board until 1955. CAT later became known as Air America, but in the early 1950s while Chennault was still alive it flew clandestine supply missions for French forces in Indochina. In the 1960s Air America played a major role in Southeast Asia, both in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) and in Laos. Air America was a key player in Laotian operations into the early 1970s, but the CIA disbanded the airline in 1976 after the South Vietnamese government had fallen. Chennault died at Walter Reed Army Hospital in Washington, D.C., on July 27, 1958. Only days before his death, he was promoted to lieutenant general. DAVID T. ZABECKI See also Air America; Chennault, Anna References Byrd, Martha. Chennault: Giving Wings to the Tiger. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1987. Chennault, Claire Lee. Way of a Fighter. New York: Putnam, 1949. Ford, Daniel. Flying Tigers: Claire Chennault and the American Volunteer Group. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991. Samson, Jack. Chennault. New York: Doubleday, 1987.
Chiang Kai-shek See Jiang Jieshi
Chicago Eight Those individuals charged with criminal responsibility for the violent demonstrations in Chicago during the August 1968 Democratic National Convention. Defendants in the so-called Chicago Conspiracy Trial, which began on September 24, 1969, included David Dellinger, Rennie Davis, Thomas Hayden, Abbie Hoffman,
Jerry Rubin, Lee Weiner, John Froines, and Bobby Seale, all charged with conspiracy to cross state lines with intent to cause a riot. Dellinger, a longtime pacifist, chaired the National Mobilization Committee (NMC). Hayden and Davis, both products of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), helped plan the NMC’s antiwar demonstrations in Chicago. Flamboyant representatives of the 1960s counterculture, Hoffman and Rubin founded the Youth International Party (Yippies) in 1968, hoping to fuse the hippie and antiwar movements. Seale was chairman of the Black Panthers. Froines and Weiner were less well known. In the federal courtroom of Judge Julius Hoffman, attorneys William Kunstler and Leonard Weinglass represented all except Seale. Throughout the raucous trial while the judge and lawyers exchanged insults, the defendants used disruptive tactics, trying to make the Vietnam War, racism, and repression the real issues. When Seale’s attorney became ill, Judge Hoffman refused to allow Seale to defend himself. To blunt Seale’s outbursts, Hoffman ordered him gagged and strapped to a chair, eventually separating his trial from the others and imposing a four-year sentence for contempt. When the trial ended in February 1970, Hoffman found the seven defendants and their lawyers guilty of 175 counts of contempt and sentenced them to terms from two years (Weinglass) to four years (Kunstler) in prison. Although declaring the defendants not guilty of conspiracy, the jury found all except Froines and Weiner guilty of intent to riot. Each was sentenced to five years in prison and fined $5,000, but none served time. In 1972 a U.S. Court of Appeals overturned the criminal convictions, and eventually most of the contempt charges were dismissed. The cantankerous Judge Hoffman retired soon after the trial. Dellinger remained committed to pacifism until his death in 2004. Davis headed an environmental think tank and then a venture capitalist firm. Froines is a professor at the University of California, Los Angeles. Weiner directs special projects for the Anti-Defamation League in New York. Seale is a lecturer and community activist in Philadelphia. Hayden was a California state legislator from 1982 to 2000. He now teaches occasionally at Occidental College in Los Angeles and continues to be active in the Democratic Party. Abbie Hoffman remained an activist until going underground in the late 1970s following his arrest for selling cocaine. After surfacing in 1980, he was placed in a work-release program. Hoffman’s death in 1989 from a drug overdose was ruled a suicide. Surprisingly, Rubin forsook revolution to become a securities analyst in 1980 and at his death in 1994 was a prosperous distributor of nutritional drinks. Kunstler continued to represent highprofile celebrity clients and controversial causes until his death in 1996. Weinglass continues to practice law, chiefly in the realm of civil rights and liberties. JOHN D. ROOT See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Davis, Rennard Cordon; Dellinger, David; Democratic National Convention of 1968; Ginsberg, Allen; Hayden,
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Demonstrators protest the trial of the Chicago Eight (also known as the Chicago Seven). The Chicago Eight, antiwar activists arrested for protests during the Democratic National Convention held in Chicago in 1968, drew attention to their cause during a lengthy and often bizarre trial. (Library of Congress)
Thomas Emmett; Hoffman, Abbie; Kunstler, William Moses; May Day Tribe; Rubin, Jerry; Seale, Bobby; Students for a Democratic Society; Youth International Party References Epstein, Jason. The Great Conspiracy Trial. New York: Random House, 1970. Schultz, John. The Chicago Conspiracy Trial. Rev. ed. New York: Da Capo, 1993. Wiener, Jon. Conspiracy in the Streets: The Extraordinary Trial of the Chicago Eight. New York: Free Press, 2006. Zaroulis, N. C., and Gerald Sullivan. Who Spoke Up? American Protest against the War in Vietnam, 1963–1975. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1984.
Chieu Hoi Program Start Date: 1963 End Date: 1973 Amnesty program in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) created in 1963 and ended in 1973. The Chieu Hoi Program, also known as the Great National Solidarity or Open Arms Program, was a decade-long campaign initiated by South Vietnamese
president Ngo Dinh Diem in April 1963 to subvert the Communist military effort and convince their troops to desert or rally to the South Vietnamese cause. The basic theme of the program was that both sides were brothers in the same family. Because all wanted to end the war, the best and least costly way to do so was to renounce internecine bloodletting, to forsake hatred, and to cooperate in rebuilding the nation. The campaign promised clemency, financial aid, free land, job training, and family reunions to those Communists who stopped fighting and returned to live under South Vietnamese authority. The program was officially supposed to be a meaningful and humanitarian effort that provided real opportunities for those whom the government considered wrongdoers to mend their ways and begin a new and peaceful life. To this end the government and its allies used family contacts, radio and loudspeaker broadcasts, and propaganda leaflets to convince Communists to defect. At first the Chieu Hoi Program produced an encouraging number of participants. It soon faltered, however, and fell short of the annual goal of 40,000 defectors set for 1964. Beginning in September 1964 the government offered financial rewards to defectors who surrendered with weapons or who volunteered to lead allied forces to guerrilla arms caches or sanctuaries. This
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campaign uncovered a significant number of Communist arsenals and revived the program, aided in no small part by the arrival of U.S. combat forces in March 1965. During 1965 more than 11,100 Viet Cong (VC) defected, followed by a further 20,000 in 1966 and 27,000 more in 1967. Another reward campaign, the Third Party Inducement Program, was begun in mid-1967 in the IV Corps Tactical Zone. People who induced a Communist to defect received a financial reward commensurate with the defector’s rank and importance. Although most participants during the life of the program were of relatively low rank, evidence suggests that the Communists were hurt in limited ways by Chieu Hoi–induced manpower shortages. The reward programs of 1964 through 1967 and the increased allied military activities of 1967 and 1968 provided the entire Chieu Hoi Program with a needed boost, and in 1969 the number of defectors shot up from approximately 17,800 the previous year to more than 47,000. It was soon discovered, however, that many participants were not actually Communist defectors but instead were peasants who had been organized by corrupt South Vietnamese officials to surrender in return for a part of the reward. It was estimated in some areas that as many as 30 percent of all defectors were not actually VC at all but had merely agreed to turn themselves in to be awarded one year’s deferred conscription. When evidence of corruption became manifest in 1969, the financial reward aspects of the Chieu Hoi Program were terminated, causing a sharp drop in the number of defectors to about 16,400 by mid-1970. The Open Arms Program was run by the South Vietnamese government’s Chieu Hoi Ministry, which controlled a countrywide system of offices at the provincial, district, and village levels. Defectors were initially collected at provincial Chieu Hoi centers or in Saigon, where they underwent reeducation and rehabilitation. During the early years participants were well treated and were allowed to correspond with their families and receive visitors. They were also free to converse, watch television, listen to radio broadcasts, and read books. Depending on personal preferences, defectors were given access to vocational training, as the policy of the government was to help them acquire a skill to earn a living when they were eventually released after a period of 45 to 60 days. Defectors who wanted to return to their home villages were provided with an allowance to do so. The government also constructed more than 42 Chieu Hoi villages, 1 for each province, and provided free housing to defectors who had no place to go. Depending on their success at reeducation and rehabilitation, defectors were allowed to apply for civil service jobs; to enlist in South Vietnamese regular, territorial, or paramilitary forces; or to seek jobs in private industry. Of the total number who volunteered for government service as of 1970, 27 percent were employed in some capacity by the South Vietnamese government or armed forces, while another 20 percent were in private industry. The vast majority, more than 50 percent, returned to their villages and lived as farmers on land provided by the government.
Efforts to reintegrate defectors into society through government service had drawbacks. By late 1970 and early 1971, for example, evidence indicated that a concerted Communist effort was under way to use the various Chieu Hoi programs to infiltrate VC cadres into South Vietnamese territorial and paramilitary forces and pacification programs. Defectors were employed by U.S. military forces in large numbers, especially in units such as the Kit Carson Scouts, where their knowledge of terrain and Communist tactics proved very useful. Many other defectors were utilized for intelligence work against VC infrastructure throughout South Vietnam and came to make up the bulk of the membership of the Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs) that operated as part of the Phoenix Program after 1968. They also participated in long-range reconnaissance operations in Communist-controlled areas, including those north of the 17th Parallel. From 1963 to 1973 the Chieu Hoi Program produced more than 159,700 Communist defectors, of whom 30,000 were positively identified as members of the VC infrastructure. The program also netted 10,699 individual weapons and 545 crew-served weapons. The most successful year for the Chieu Hoi Program was 1969, when more than 47,000 cadres, VC, and People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) soldiers defected, primarily because of the setbacks suffered the previous year during the Tet Offensive and also because of the increasing pressures being placed on the VC infrastructure by South Vietnamese pacification programs. CLAYTON D. LAURIE See also Kit Carson Scouts; National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam; Ngo Dinh Diem; Phoenix Program; Vietnam, Republic of, Army References Andradé, Dale. Ashes to Ashes: The Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 1990. Dinh Tan Tho. Pacification. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1980. Lewy, Guenter. America in Vietnam. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978.
China, People’s Republic of The world’s most populous nation, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is a large Asian nation with an estimated 1965 population of 715.546 million. It covers 3.7 million square miles, just slightly smaller than the United States, and shares common borders with many nations. China is bordered to the north by Russia and Mongolia; to the south by the South China Sea, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar (Burma), India, Bhutan, and Nepal; to the west by Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan; and to the east by North Korea and the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and
China, People’s Republic of the South China Sea. During the Cold War period the PRC promulgated several initiatives that led to China emerging from this period in a far more consolidated position than the Soviet Union. Over the Cold War period the PRC also developed more flexible external policies, with a strong focus on its relations with the two superpowers but also involving linkages with developing nations. By the late 1960s the PRC had become a significant player in the international arena. Even as the PRC consolidated internally and sought to secure its borders, it positioned itself for a larger role in Asia and beyond. The PRC officially came into existence following the Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War (1945–1949). On October 1, 1949, Mao Zedong, the chairman of the Central People’s Administrative Council and leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), proclaimed the People’s Republic of China. Zhou Enlai became premier and foreign minister. Domestically the PRC followed varied political and economic policies, combining considerable centralized political control with an increasingly decentralized market economy in the final stages of the Cold War. Helping to drive the Chinese economy was its burgeoning population, which more than doubled during 1945–2009; China’s current population is approximately 1.319 billion. Despite the early ideological rivalry with the United States, the CCP tried to convey its message to the American public through progressive writers such as Edgar Snow, Jack Belden, William Hinton, Agnes Smedley, and others even before it came to power in 1949. Nevertheless, with the growing influence of the so-called China Hands and the China Lobby in the United States during the 1930s and 1940s, American administrations supported Jiang Jieshi’s rabidly anti-Communist Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist) government. This along with the Korean War (1950–1953) set the stage for a Cold War freeze between the PRC and the United States that lasted for nearly 30 years. This situation was compounded by a series of restrictive trade policies enacted by the United States. As the chances of building understanding with the United States during the last years of the Chinese Civil War declined—despite the U.S. diplomatic missions of General Patrick Hurley and General George C. Marshall— from 1949 the PRC looked to the Soviet Union for support. During and after the Korean War, U.S. trade embargoes on the PRC, troop deployments to East Asia, and security alliances such as the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) along the peripheries of China made the PRC even more reliant on the Soviet Union. The 1950s saw massive Soviet arms sales, economic aid, and technical assistance to the PRC. After the United States and the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan) signed a mutual security treaty in 1954, cooperation between the PRC and the Soviet Union increased again. The Communist Chinese and the Soviets differed on several political and international issues, however. When Soviet leader Joseph Stalin cautioned Mao against an open break with the Nationalists, PRC leaders felt slighted by the “superior” attitude with
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On October 1, 1949, following the defeat of Guomindang (Nationalist) Forces, Chinese Communist leader Mao Zedong officially proclaims the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in Beijing. (AP/Wide World Photos)
which the Soviets treated the PRC and other Socialist states. The leaders of the PRC and the Soviet Union disagreed sharply over who should lead the world Communist movement following Stalin’s death. The CCP also sharply criticized the Soviet leadership for its de-Stalinization campaign and for the policy of peaceful coexistence with the United States. The Soviet handling of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, and its neutral position during the 1962 Sino-Indian border clash greatly angered the Chinese leadership. Closer to home, Soviet proposals for building a joint Chinese–Soviet Union nuclear submarine fleet and the construction of long-wave radio stations along the Chinese coast were seen by the CCP as infringements on its independence and further steps toward full PRC integration into the Soviet orbit. Likewise, the PRC refused to adhere to the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) signed by the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain, arguing that the treaty would impede the PRC’s own nuclear program and make the nation all the more reliant on the Soviet Union. The Sino-Soviet split, which began in earnest in August 1960, along with repeated Soviet-Chinese border clashes led the PRC to distance itself from the two superpowers. The PRC leadership
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strongly denounced both of them, accusing the Americans of capitalist imperialism and the Soviets of Socialist imperialism. This led the Chinese leadership to identify with nations in the developing world, especially countries in Asia and Africa. In 1964 China exploded its first nuclear weapon and became the world’s fifth nuclear power, after the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France. The government communiqué issued on the occasion, while declaring a “no first-use principle,” stated that nuclear weapons were necessary to protect the nation “from the danger of the United States launching a nuclear war.” The PRC then developed long-range ballistic missiles for countering threats from either the United States or the Soviet Union. In 1954 China announced a good neighbor policy with the aim of building bridges along its periphery to counter what it saw as American encirclement efforts. In the mid-1950s the PRC, along with other Asian countries, also promulgated “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,” which called for mutual respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, noninterference in each other’s internal affairs, and economic equality. By the 1960s the Chinese had signed border agreements with Mongolia, Nepal, Afghanistan, Burma, and Pakistan. After the Korean War, however, China’s military engagements were mainly border disputes, such as in 1962 with India, in 1969 with the Soviet Union, and in 1979 with Vietnam. During the 1970s the PRC, prompted by increasing threats from the Soviet Union, normalized its relations with the United States under the policy of yitiao xian (“following one line”). U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger secretly visited China in 1971, setting the stage for the U.S.-Sino rapprochement. The following year President Richard Nixon made a historic visit to Beijing, opening the way for the normalization of relations. The Americans granted formal recognition to the PRC in 1978, and in 1979 both nations exchanged diplomatic legations. Despite their differences on issues such as democracy, human rights, the environment, and labor standards, the United States and China worked together in opposing the Soviet Union’s 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. The 1979 trade agreement between the United States and China granting most-favored nation status to each other went a long way in fully normalizing relations in the economic sphere. U.S. defense secretary Harold Brown’s visit to Beijing in early 1980 opened the prospects for American arms sales to the PRC, although the Ronald Reagan administration’s 1982 decision to sell arms to the ROC put any such agreement on indefinite hold. While the United States now recognized the PRC as the legitimate government of the Chinese people, the status of Nationalist China (Taiwan) remained unclear. A triangular strategic ambiguity thus came to exist in the relationship among the United States, China, and Taiwan. The PRC has codified, as its minimalist policy toward Taiwan, the “three nos”: no deployments of foreign troops on Taiwan, no independence movement, and no nuclear weapons on Taiwan. While the 8,000 U.S. troops stationed on Taiwan were withdrawn, the PRC’s threats to use force against the ROC and con-
certed military modernization efforts with a Taiwanese focus not only increased U.S. arms supplies to the island but also prompted the passage of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act by the U.S. Congress. In the late 1970s the PRC proposed its formula of “one country, two systems,” that is, one China and two different systems—Socialist and capitalist—for eventual reunification of the PRC. This formula was also applied to Hong Kong and Macao in Chinese negotiations with the British and Portuguese. The U.S.-Chinese rapprochement also had an impact on the PRC’s relations with Japan, Southeast Asia, and Western Europe. In August 1978 the PRC and Japan signed a peace and friendship treaty. The PRC leadership was highly critical of Japan’s occupation of Manchuria and much of coastal China during World War II, the Nanjing Massacre, Japanese history textbooks glorifying Japanese militarism, and visits by Japanese prime ministers to the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo to honor the war dead. China badly needed Japanese financial and technological assistance, however, especially during its economic reform and modernization efforts that had begun in the late 1970s. The PRC therefore granted incentives to Japan as well as to the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) and Taiwan to locate industry in China. There was a thaw in Sino-Soviet relations after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union in 1985. China conveyed to the Soviet Union that rapprochement was possible if the Soviets were to withdraw their troop concentrations from the Sino-Soviet border and Mongolia, cease their support of Vietnam, and pull out of Afghanistan. After 1989 Sino-Soviet relations continued to warm as some of the Chinese demands were met; others were realized as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. In the domestic political, social, and economic spheres, the PRC initially implemented a strong command-style Socialist system, with the CCP as the driving political force. During the Cold War the CCP held eight national congresses, from the Seventh Congress in April 1945 to the Fourteenth Congress in October 1992. CCP membership grew from an estimated 1.2 million in 1945 to 39.6 million during the Twelfth Congress in 1982. Still, CCP membership was small when compared to the PRC’s population. Three generations of top political leaders can be identified during the CCP’s Cold War history: Mao, Zhou, and Zhu De in the first generation; Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun in the second generation; and Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, and Qiao Shi in the third generation. Although there were eight other political parties, their role was quite limited. The PRC utilized competing political organizations and their leaders in the early years of postwar reconstruction. A united front of all Chinese parties was reflected in the work of the Chinese Peoples’ Political Consultative Conference, which was formed in September 1949. It held six conferences between 1949 and 1983, although the CCP was clearly the only party that wielded political and governmental control. Four constitutions were adopted (1954, 1975, 1978, and 1982) by the National People’s Congress (NPC), the highest executive body of state power in the PRC. Six NPC congresses were held dur-
China, People’s Republic of ing 1954–1987. Delegates to the NPC are elected for a period of five years. They in turn elect the president, vice president, and other high-ranking state functionaries. The State Council is the executive body of the PRC and includes the premier, vice premiers, councilors, ministers, and others. A similar dual political structure is reflected at the provincial levels of the country. There are no direct national elections in the PRC, although at the village and county levels direct elections for some local officials were gradually phased in after the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War several political campaigns were launched, which set the PRC’s political system apart from other Socialist countries and indicated its willingness to experiment. The CCP carried out a campaign to suppress so-called counterrevolutionaries during 1951–1953, effectively ending opposition from remnant Nationalists, feudal lords, and other dissident groups. This period also coincided with the campaign against corruption among government officials. In May 1956 the Hundred Flowers Movement was launched, inviting differing views from Chinese intellectuals. A barrage of criticism, however, led to the end of this program in the Anti-Rightist campaign of 1957. As China crushed the Khampa Rebellion in Tibet in 1959, sending the Dalai Lama to exile in India, the Soviets withdrew nearly 10,000 of their engineers and technicians in the
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later part of 1960. This coincided with the disastrous failure of the Great Leap Forward, a massive program of nationwide industrialization launched by Mao in 1958 and sharply criticized by Defense Minister Peng Dehuai at the 1959 Lushan Conference. The 1960s brought more experiments. In May 1963 Mao began the Socialist Education Campaign to counter the growing influence of capitalism, end the corrupt practices of CCP cadres, and inculcate the idea of self-sacrifice among the population. The ultra-leftist Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) was launched by Mao via a 16-point program that encouraged Red Guards to “bombard the headquarters” of CCP leaders and take out those following the “capitalist road.” Many CCP leaders, including Liu Shaoqi, Peng Zhen, and Luo Ruiqing, were summarily purged from the party and zealously persecuted. Although Lin Biao was anointed as Mao’s heir apparent, Lin was killed—probably by design—in a 1971 plane crash in Mongolia. His crime was an alleged coup attempt against Mao. An anti–Lin Biao rectification campaign was launched from 1971 to 1973. The country underwent turmoil following the deaths in 1976 of Zhou in January and Mao in September, when several demonstrations were held in Tiananmen Square in Beijing, supposedly mourning Zhou but also challenging the political ascendancy of the radical Gang of Four. These leftist extremists, who included Mao’s
Chinese poster from 1967 during the Cultural Revolution that shows an artist, a peasant, a soldier, and a Red Guard erasing an image of Liu Shaoqi, chairman of the People’s Republic of China, who had fallen out of favor. (Library of Congress)
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wife, Jiang Qing, and three Shanghai-based Communist Party members, Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan, initially tried to implement strongly ideological policies harkening back to the height of the Cultural Revolution. Within weeks of Mao’s death in September 1976, Hua Guofeng, who became premier in April 1976, ordered the arrest of the Gang of Four, who were tried and convicted of antiparty activities in 1981. Deng, who was rehabilitated a fourth and final time, introduced pragmatic policies of “seeking truth from facts” and extensive economic reforms in 1978. In response to growing corruption among the ranks of the CCP cadre, rising prices, and increased alienation among the people, in 1989 students, peasants, and workers launched prodemocracy protests leading to the Tiananmen Square Incident of June 4, which had been triggered by the death that April of a reformist former CCP chairman, Hu Yaobang, whose sympathies with previous prodemocracy groups had caused his expulsion from the CCP. The crisis resulted in scores of deaths, the resignation of Deng as the chairman of the Central Military Commission, and the appointment of Jiang in his place. An antibourgeois liberalization campaign was launched after this incident. In the economic arena, for most of the Cold War China followed Soviet-style centralized five-year plans designed to guide its economic and modernization activities. Given the backwardness and war-ravaged nature of the economy in 1949, when there was rampant and disastrous inflation, the PRC leadership undertook comprehensive measures in the reconstruction of the country. In the industrial sphere, private enterprise was encouraged initially to revitalize production, and 156 major projects were begun with Soviet assistance. The PRC established nearly 4,000 state-owned enterprises during 1949–1989, some allowing for the gradual incorporation of private enterprise in joint firms or state enterprises after paying interest on the private shares. In 1958 the Great Leap Forward was launched in part to increase iron and steel production by mobilizing the enthusiasm of the masses. State-controlled industrialization, the construction of transport and telecommunication networks, and trade with other Socialist countries based on import substitution have all been part of the Maoist self-reliance model of economic development at various times. While these endeavors greatly enhanced the PRC’s economic prowess, they also led to waste and increased bureaucratization. In 1975 China initiated the Four Modernizations Program of opening up to the outside world. The four modernizations dealt with agriculture, industry, science and technology, and defense, in that order of priority. China also adopted special policies and flexible measures to attract foreign investments and technology sharing and established special economic zones in the coastal regions for wholly owned or joint enterprises to promote exports. In agriculture, the PRC immediately initiated land reform with the Agrarian Law of 1950. The regime seized land from landlords and redistributed it to the landless, a process largely completed
by 1952. Through this reform some 300 million peasants acquired 113.6 million acres of land. By 1953 after the end of the Korean War, the PRC introduced mutual aid teams and gradually imposed agricultural collectivization. Following the Great Leap Forward, these farming co-ops were converted into People’s Communes, combining industry, agriculture, trade, education, and the militia. More than 20,000 such communes were established, although declining production and natural calamities limited their effectiveness. In the post-1978 reform period the collectivization and communalization process was reversed, beginning with the institution of household land contracts, rural industrialization, and incentives to private enterprises. The main features of the new reforms included contracting land to private households, which would control land use; increasing agricultural production; raising farmers’ income; shifting to commodity agriculture; forming conglomerates; encouraging private enterprises to privately hire labor; and competing in international markets. China’s breakneck economic development and partial conversion to a market-based economy over the past 20 years or so have made it an emerging superpower in the 21st century. Indeed, China currently has the world’s third-largest gross domestic product (GDP), the world’s fourth-largest military budget, and the world’s largest standing army. The PRC is the world’s second-largest exporter and the third-largest importer. Between 1981 and 2001 China’s poverty rate tumbled from 53 percent to 8 percent. Because of these great strides, the Chinese leadership has taken a central role in the world’s financial markets and in international affairs in general. Relations with the United States are sometimes strained over trade matters and differing approaches to international affairs and human rights. The Chinese government, for instance, continues to stifle dissent, and the CCP retains a firm grip on power. The 2008 Summer Olympic Games, held in Beijing, however, served to showcase to the world China’s many significant accomplishments. There are clear signs that the PRC’s economic progress has come at a high price, however. In the early 21st century China faces an energy crisis, as it now consumes more energy than any other nation except for the United States. China’s heavy industries and automobiles are highly inefficient, and on average China consumes 20–100 percent more energy than the West to achieve the same productive output. Volatile energy markets and soaring petroleum costs in 2007 and 2008 dampened Chinese economic growth and helped contribute to a painful economic retrenchment that began in mid-2007. China’s vast investments in the United States also contributed to this downturn. It is not surprising that China has serious pollution problems; currently the PRC contains 20 of the world’s 30 most-polluted cities. The government is attempting to rectify this, but accomplishment will be difficult. China’s growth has also exacerbated a widening gap in income between urban and rural residents. SRIKANTH KONDAPALLI
China, People’s Republic of, Policy toward Vietnam See also China, People’s Republic of, Policy toward Vietnam; China, Republic of; Mao Zedong; Sino-Soviet Split; Sino-Vietnamese War; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; Zhou Enlai References Camilleri, J. Chinese Foreign Policy: The Maoist Era and Its Aftermath. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1980. Gittings, John. The Changing Face of China: From Mao to Market. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. Hinton, Harold C., ed. The People’s Republic of China, 1949–1979: A Documentary Survey. 5 vols. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1980. MacFarquhar, Roderick, ed. The Politics of China, 1949–1989. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Riskin, Carl. China’s Political Economy: The Quest for Development since 1949. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987. Robinson, Thomas W., and David Shambaugh, eds. Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice. Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1998. Schurman, Franz. Ideology and Organization in Communist China. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966. Tan, Qingshen. The Making of U.S. China Policy: From Normalization to the Post–Cold War Era. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992.
China, People’s Republic of, Policy toward Vietnam The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has had a long and tumultuous history with Vietnam. A small Vietnamese state called Van Lang had been founded in this region as early as 2879 BCE. But in 111 BCE Van Lang, now called Nam Viet under the Trieus, was overrun by the Han dynasty and was gradually absorbed into the Chinese empire. Despite intensive Chinese influence and more than 1,000 years of Chinese rule, however, in 939 CE the Vietnamese reclaimed their independence from China and expanded south of the Red River Valley. This new state was called Dai Viet (Great Viet). Although Dai Viet remained a tributary state of China and adopted many Chinese customs and practices, it retained its political autonomy until the 19th century. During this period Dai Viet successfully assimilated the Champa kingdom from the Chams and seized the Mekong Delta from the crumbling Khmer empire. At the end of the 19th century, however, Vietnam was conquered by France and was joined with the French protectorates of Laos and Cambodia into the Union of Indochina. After World War II the Chinese Communists supported Ho Chi Minh’s Viet Minh guerrillas against France. Following the 1949 Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War, Chinese aid to the Viet Minh increased. PRC support was vital to the Viet Minh. The Chinese not only supplied arms, many of them captured U.S. weapons supplied to the Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist) regime of China and captured during the civil war, but their long common border allowed the Chinese to set up training camps and base
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areas. Chinese military assistance played a key role in the Viet Minh victory in the 1954 Battle of Dien Bien Phu. The leaders of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) were not happy when, at the 1954 Geneva Conference, PRC premier Zhou Enlai pressured Ho Chi Minh to accept the “temporary” division of Vietnam at the 17th Parallel as well as a relatively long wait before national elections were to be held (two years). Zhou Enlai also agreed to recognize the states of Cambodia and Laos, in large part because the PRC sought to curtail Vietnamese influence over the remainder of Southeast Asia. The promised elections were not held, however. The civil war in Vietnam was then renewed, and Hanoi adopted the people’s war strategy favored by Chinese Communist leader Mao Zedong. The PRC was the first Communist state to recognize the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (National Liberation Front [NLF]). The PRC also provided substantial material support to the insurgents, including considerable quantities of arms and help in the movement of supplies. Mao was determined to keep Hanoi in the fight, and after the early August 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Incident, China, which had been training the first North Vietnamese jet fighter regiment at a Chinese air base in southern China, arranged with the Vietnamese for the fighter regiment to fly their aircraft (36 MiG-17s) to a Vietnamese airfield north of Hanoi. A Chinese instructor pilot named Tao Minh flew with the regiment’s lead element during the flight south to Vietnam. The PRC leadership expressed outrage over U.S. escalation of the war in 1965, and in April of that year China signed an agreement with North Vietnam providing for the introduction into North Vietnam of Chinese air defense, engineering, and railroad troops to help maintain and expand lines of communications within North Vietnam. China later claimed that 320,000 of its troops served in North Vietnam during 1965–1971 and that 1,000 died there. The Vietnamese state that several Chinese engineering divisions built, maintained, and repaired roads and railroad lines from the Chinese border south to Hanoi from 1965 to 1969 and that the Chinese 68th, 168th, and 170th Air Defense divisions, along with a number of other antiaircraft units, were sent to Vietnam a year later and engaged U.S. aircraft from late 1966 through the end of the ROLLING THUNDER bombing campaign (late 1968) in the provinces located north and northeast of Hanoi. China probably provided some three-quarters of the total military aid given to North Vietnam during the war. Vietnamese figures show that the Soviet Union provided a total of 513,582 tons of military aid, including weapons, ammunition, equipment, and logistics supplies, during the period 1954–1975, while China provided nearly 1.6 million tons of military aid during the same period. However, the value of China’s military aid probably represented only about one-quarter of the total value of all military aid received by North Vietnam. Chinese aid to North Vietnam between 1949 and 1970 is estimated at $20 billion. While China’s government refused to allow Soviet aircraft to overfly Chinese airspace to Vietnam, it did
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Chinese premier Zhou Enlai (right) hosts North Vietnamese president Ho Chi Minh (left) at a banquet during the latter’s visit to Beijing, July 5, 1955. (AP/Wide World Photos)
permit the Soviets to ship military assistance to North Vietnam over its railroad network. The PRC took a hard line during negotiations between Hanoi and Washington. For the first time, however, the Chinese did endorse a North Vietnamese peace plan for ending the war in 1971. Worsening Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations and warming SinoAmerican friendship did play a role in ending the Vietnam War during the early 1970s. Certainly President Richard Nixon’s historic February 1972 visit to China shocked the North Vietnamese leadership and may have led it to put more pressure on Hanoi to reach a peace settlement, which was finally accomplished in January 1973. Diplomatic relations between China and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam soon soured, however, leading to military clashes during the late 1970s. In November 1978 Vietnam signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union, and in early 1979 Vietnamese forces invaded Cambodia and installed a pro–Hanoi government there. In response and on behalf of the ousted Khmer
Rouge government, Chinese troops invaded Vietnam the same year, and the two countries fought a short but costly border war that left the Sino-Vietnamese border virtually unchanged. During this entire period an estimated 1.4 million Vietnamese, many of them ethnic Chinese, fled Vietnam by boat. Approximately 50,000 of these so-called boat people perished at sea, while about 1 million settled abroad, including some 725,000 in the United States. In the 1990s Sino-Vietnamese relations developed into a new phase of cooperation. This was largely the result of the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, which left the two governments isolated in a much smaller and far less powerful Communist bloc. Apparently putting aside inherent conflicts and past confrontations, the governments of China and Vietnam thereafter maintained as smooth a relationship as they could manage. In the early 2000s both nations continued to foster a mutual rapprochement as trade and cultural exchanges increased. In December 2007 Hanoi and Beijing announced their intention to construct a major highway linking
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People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) soldiers carry part of an antitank gun in the Vietnamese-Chinese border area on February 22, 1979, during the first days of the Chinese invasion of northern Vietnam. (AP/Wide World Photos)
the two countries, which will go a long way toward demilitarizing their shared border and fostering improved economic and political relations. BRUCE ELLEMAN AND SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Mao Zedong; Refugees and Boat People; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; Vietnam, History of, Prehistory to 938 CE; Vietnam, History of, 938 CE through the French Conquest; Zhou Enlai References Butterfield, Fox. China: Alive in the Bitter Sea. New York: Times Books, 1982. Chen, King C. China’s War with Vietnam, 1979: Issues, Decisions, and Implications. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institute Press, 1987. Fairbank, John King. The Great Chinese Revolution, 1800–1985. New York: Harper and Row, 1992. Hsü, Immanuel C. Y. The Rise of Modern China. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. Nguyen Van Minh, ed. Lich Su Khang Chien Chong My Cuu Nuoc, 1954– 1975, Tap IV, Cuoc Dung Dau Lich Su [History of the Resistance War against the Americans to Save the Nation, 1954–1975, Vol. 4, A Historic Confrontation]. Hanoi: National Political Publishing House, 1999. Spence, Jonathan D. The Search for Modern China. New York: Norton, 1990. Ta Hong, Vu Ngoc, and Nguyen Quoc Dung. Lich Su Khong Quan Nhan Dan Viet Nam (1955–1977) [History of the People’s Air Force of Vietnam (1955–1977)]. Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1993.
China, Republic of Small island enclave located off the southeastern coast of China. The Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan) is bordered to the east by the Pacific Ocean, to the south by the South China Sea and the Luzon Strait, to the west by the Taiwan Strait, and to the north by the East China Sea. Taiwan encompasses a total land area of 13,823 square miles and had a 1965 population of approximately 12.978 million. Although the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has claimed Taiwan as its own since 1949, when Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist) leader Jiang Jieshi abandoned mainland China and established a rump government on Taiwan, the Chinese Communists have never controlled the island politically or economically. Over the years mainland China has made numerous threats to unite Taiwan with the PRC but has never made good on them, fearing intervention from the United States, which has generally supported Taiwanese autonomy. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s Jiang and his GMD government ran Taiwan as a virtual dictatorship. There was one-party rule, state-run security forces kept opposition minimal, and citizens enjoyed limited economic and personal freedoms. As Taiwan became more prosperous, however, the Taiwanese people gained more freedoms, and the government loosened its grip on political power. In 1969 open elections were held for the national assembly for the first time. After Jiang’s death in 1975, the process
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of democratization sped up enormously. By 1987 martial law had been lifted, and the political system allowed parties other than the GMD to participate in open elections. By the early 1970s the United States had virtually ceased all aid to Taiwan, and the U.S. rapprochement with the PRC, which began in earnest in 1972 when President Richard Nixon visited mainland China, seriously strained U.S.-Taiwan relations. Since then the United States has supported continued Taiwanese autonomy, but whether the United States would intervene directly in an all-out war between China and Taiwan remains unclear. Taiwan made several offers to the United States to provide combat troops during the Vietnam War. These included the use of Taiwanese military forces against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and against the Chinese island of Hainan. Taiwanese military contributions to the war effort remained limited, however. Washington did not want to offend the Taiwan government by declining its offers but feared provoking overt retaliation by China. Furthermore, as the United States moved toward rapprochement with Beijing in the early 1970s, U.S. policy makers did not wish to derail that process by involving Taiwan in the Vietnam War. An anti-Chinese attitude among the Vietnamese was also a factor in U.S. considerations. Consequently, the United States minimized Taiwanese military assistance and sought to channel its aid into the area of civic action. Taiwanese assistance to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) began with the dispatch of a military assistance advisory group in 1964. Taiwan gave aid in such areas as political warfare, health care, refugee relief, logistics, electrical power generation, and agriculture. In all, Taiwanese economic and technical assistance totaled some $3 million. Taiwan also sent 31 military advisers. Approximately 300 Vietnamese technicians received training in Taiwan. During the January 1968 Tet Offensive, Taiwan was one of the first countries to provide emergency assistance to South Vietnam. This took the form of 5,000 tons of rice. Other materials provided by Taiwan included prefabricated warehouses, agricultural implements, seeds, fertilizers, and textbooks. Improved Taiwanese agricultural techniques were also much appreciated by South Vietnamese farmers. PETER W. BRUSH See also China, People’s Republic of; Civic Action; Jiang Jieshi; Order of Battle Dispute; Tet Offensive, Overall Strategy; Tet Offensive and the Saigon Circle References Larsen, Stanley Robert, and James Lawton Collins Jr. Allied Participation in Vietnam. Vietnam Studies Series. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975. Rubinstein, Murray A., ed. Taiwan: A New History. New York: Sharpe, 1999.
Chinese in Vietnam In 1960 Chinese made up the largest single minority group in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), numbering some 1 million people, or about 8 percent of the total population. The first mass migration of Chinese to Vietnam occurred in the late 17th century, when defeated Ming dynasty generals and their followers received large landholdings in the Saigon area and in the Mekong Delta. They founded Cholon, near Saigon. Ultimately 85 percent of all Chinese lived in the Saigon-Cholon area. Cholon became Vietnam’s greatest commercial city, and soon the Chinese community dominated Vietnam’s economy. The Chinese organized themselves according to their origins into five groups (bangs), known as congregations by the French. These bangs were responsible to the government for both the good behavior of their members and payment of taxes. In return each bang had substantial autonomy. In fact, the Chinese were somewhat compartmentalized and segregated from the local Vietnamese population. The self-contained world of the congregations set the Chinese on a collision course with Vietnamese nationalism in its first attempts to seek assimilation by all minority groups in an independent Vietnam. During the period of French administration, the Chinese acquired a commanding position in rice processing, marketing, transport, meat slaughtering, and small grocery stores. Their privileges in Vietnamese society were ratified through a series of bilateral treaties between France and China. Eventually the Chinese had the same privileges as the French. The Vietnamese resented these special privileges, Chinese domination of much of the economy, and Chinese isolation from the rest of the Vietnamese community. During the Indochina War the Chinese were caught in the middle, not clearly allied with one side or the other. Taking advantage of the conflict, they continued to prosper economically. Close relations developed between the Chinese community and the Chinese Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist) government, located after 1949 on Taiwan. Vietnamese nationalists questioned whether the Chinese were loyal to Vietnam or to Taiwan. In the autumn of 1956 President Ngo Dinh Diem launched an attack against the Chinese community on both the political and economic fronts. His intention was to assert his nationalist credentials and to curb Chinese economic power. One decree required that all Chinese become Vietnamese citizens and adopt Vietnamese names. Another barred Chinese nationals from several occupations, including those involving meat and fish processing, coal, petroleum, scrap metal, transport, cereals, and rice processing. A third decree required that the Vietnamese language be used exclusively in Chinese schools, which would come under direct Vietnamese government control. A final decree in 1960 ordered the dissolution of all five Chinese bangs. Had these decrees been fully enforced, they would have politically, economically, and culturally destroyed the Chinese community.
Chinese in Vietnam The Chinese reacted immediately to these decrees. Their response to demands that they become Vietnamese citizens was outright refusal. Furthermore, Taiwan vigorously protested these decrees, bringing relations between these two anti-Communist states and U.S. allies to a new low. The Chinese also demonstrated their great economic power by withdrawing all their money from banks, causing a collapse of the piaster. As the Chinese ran Vietnam’s distribution system, commercial transactions virtually ceased. In 1957 South Vietnam quickly plunged into a near economic depression. The United States pressured both sides to negotiate face-saving steps so that the effects of these assimilationist measures were at best limited. At the same time, government discrimination against Chinese nationals provoked more resentment by the Chinese. During the Vietnam War the Chinese continued to control most South Vietnamese commerce, industry, and trade (in fact, some 80–90 percent of the wholesale and retail trades). Cholon remained the economic hub of South Vietnam. As in several other Southeast Asian countries, crony capitalism was prevalent in South Vietnam. For Chinese merchants, bribes (food, liquor, women, and antiques as well as the more customary cash) were an integral part of business. In the absence of effective legal and judicial mechanisms to protect wealth and property, business leaders were forced to
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develop relations with political patrons to gain protection. Corruption pervaded South Vietnam right up to the end of the war, although occasionally the government embarked on a campaign against corruption. These campaigns were often for show and were often directed against the obvious scapegoat of the Chinese. The Chinese community was represented in only token numbers in the upper and middle ranks of the South Vietnamese government and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army). Few Chinese played an active role militarily. Many Chinese were middle class or even rich, and virtually all were urban. Although the Chinese were apolitical, remaining aloof from South Vietnam’s turbulent political life, they were deeply conservative. Thus, the Chinese were a natural constituency for the rightist South Vietnamese government. But Diem’s policy of forced assimilation, an endless war, economic depression, endemic corruption, discrimination, and persecution all caused this group to become essentially neutral. Above all, the Chinese were pragmatists. They were never ideologically motivated in Vietnam. During the 1968 Tet Offensive, Cholon came under attack and was badly damaged in heavy street fighting. After the offensive inflation increased, causing popular resentment among the mostly Chinese merchants. The government arrested and executed many
The destruction to a residential area along Minh Mang Street in the Chinese Cholon district of Saigon during the Communist Tet Offensive, February 10, 1968. (AP/Wide World Photos)
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Chinese to assure the population that the government was cracking down on corruption. The 1972 Spring Offensive by the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) worsened the economy, plunging South Vietnam into an economic depression. Numerous Chinese factories and businesses closed. Unsure of their future, people held on to their money. As they controlled the bulk of imports to South Vietnam, the Chinese suffered the most. Thus, in April 1975 when PAVN troops entered the Saigon area, thousands of Chinese in Cholon welcomed them. All were glad to see the end of the war. Perhaps then, with peace and unification, economic prosperity could resume. In the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), the Chinese had lived in all-Chinese neighborhoods for hundreds of years. During the French period the Chinese were privileged aliens, although interaction with local Vietnamese was not as favorable as in South Vietnam. After 1954 the North Vietnamese government continued to give Chinese favorable privileges. As relations between Vietnam and China worsened in the postreunification period, however, Chinese in both northern and southern Vietnam became hostages. In 1976 virtually all southern Chinese were forced to become Vietnamese citizens, an action contrary to all prior North Vietnamese government and Viet Cong (VC) pledges. Then the Vietnamese government nationalized some 30,000 Chinese businesses, impoverishing the Chinese community and ending their livelihoods. Many Chinese were forced by the government to leave Cholon for a harsh life in the New Economic Areas, recently created in underpopulated and poor regions. As a result of these actions, thousands of Chinese sought to leave Vietnam. In May 1978 China charged Vietnam with deliberate persecution and sent a few ships to rescue the Chinese. Vietnam’s reaction was sharp and harsh. Government officials expelled hundreds of thousands of Chinese, demanding exorbitant fees in hard currency or gold. More than 250,000 Chinese fled, often in tiny poorly equipped boats, out on the open seas. Between 30,000 and 40,000 drowned under horrible circumstances. Thousands of others crossed the northern border into China. As tensions mounted between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the new Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) over this issue and other matters, the SRV government sent to internment camps at least 6,000 Vietnamese suspected of being Chinese moles or sympathizers. With the expulsion of the skilled Chinese the economy of southern Vietnam deteriorated, but the SRV had solved its socalled China problem. Since the institution of free-market reforms and the opening of the SRV to foreign investment, those Chinese remaining in Cholon resumed their commercial roles, this time with the support of compatriots in Taiwan and the United States. They continue to have a major influence in the Vietnamese economy, perhaps greater than before 1975. Although many Vietnamese do not like the Chinese, there has never been any movement against them comparable to the massacres of ethnic Vietnamese by Cambodians. MICHAEL SHARE
See also China, People’s Republic of; China, Republic of; Ngo Dinh Diem; Refugees and Boat People; Vietnam, Republic of, 1954–1975; Vietnam, Socialist Republic of, 1975–Present References Pao-min Chang. Beijing, Hanoi, and the Overseas Chinese. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982. Schrock, J. L. Minority Groups in the Republic of Vietnam. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966. Share, Michael. “The Chinese Community in South Vietnam during the Second Indochina War.” Journal of Third World Studies (Fall 1994): 240–265. Tsai Maw-Kuey. Les Chinois au Sud-Vietnam. Paris: Bibliothèque Nationale, 1968.
Chin Vinh See Tran Do
Chomsky, Avram Noam Birth Date: December 7, 1928 Linguist, philosopher, writer, and leading critic of U.S. foreign policy and the Vietnam War. Born on December 7, 1928, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Avram Noam Chomsky was the son of a prominent Hebrew scholar, which helped orient Chomsky’s interests toward linguistics. He earned a BA in 1951 from the University of Pennsylvania and a PhD from the same institution in 1955. As a young man Chomsky also developed an interest in Zionism and politics. After receiving his doctorate, Chomsky joined the Department of Linguistics and Philosophy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). He has made major contributions to the development and progress of linguistic theory. His book Syntactic Structures (1957) helped begin a new approach to linguistics, sometimes known as the Chomskian Revolution. Chomsky was also a leading intellectual critic and political activist in the antiwar movement. His critiques emphasized the immorality of the Vietnam War and the institutional culpability of the state and other institutions, such as the mass media, corporations, and universities. He was particularly critical of what he called the “new mandarins,” or elite intellectuals who he believed provided an ideological defense for an indefensible war. Chomsky argued that U.S. policy in Vietnam had an imperial strategic objective. Namely, because Southeast Asia had global significance, it had to be ordered according to American dictates. He rejected the view that U.S. policy was largely the result of wellintentioned but misguided leaders. Chomsky defended the courage and moral commitment of the antiwar protestors and was respected in turn by nearly all segments of the antiwar movement. Although his political cri-
Church, Frank Forrester
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor Noam Chomsky was a leading intellectual critic of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. (AP/Wide World Photos)
tiques have evolved over time, they are perhaps best described as anarcho-syndicalist. Indeed, Chomsky views syndicalism as the primary ordering principle in an essentially anarchist world. He favors replacing traditional states and corporate capitalism by laborers who would democratically control the means of production. Although he has certainly criticized Socialist and Communist nations from time to time, he has remained a consistently harsh critic of American foreign and domestic policies. Chomsky continues to teach as professor emeritus in linguistics and philosophy at MIT, publish in linguistics and politics, and lecture on a wide variety of subjects. In recent years Chomsky has resurrected his former antiwar persona by sharply criticizing the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. MICHAEL G. O’LOUGHLIN See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; LINEBACKER II, Operation; Spock, Benjamin McLane References Barsky, Robert. Noam Chomsky: A Life of Dissent. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997. Chomsky, Noam. American Power and the New Mandarins. New York: Pantheon, 1969.
Halstead, Fred. Out Now! A Participant’s Account of the American Movement against the Vietnam War. New York: Monad, 1978. Peck, James, ed. The Chomsky Reader. New York: Pantheon, 1987.
Chou En-lai See Zhou Enlai
Christmas Bombings See LINEBACKER II, Operation
Church, Frank Forrester Birth Date: July 25, 1924 Death Date: April 7, 1984 Attorney, U.S. senator, and opponent of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. Frank Forrester Church was born in Boise, Idaho, on July 25, 1924. He served in World War II and graduated from
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Stanford University in 1947. In 1950 he earned a law degree at Stanford and returned to Boise to practice law. Elected as a Democrat to the U.S. Senate in 1956, Church became a member of the Foreign Relations Committee. An early critic of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, in 1963 the liberal Church opposed U.S. aid to the Ngo Dinh Diem regime. In June 1965 Church called for direct negotiations with the Viet Cong (VC), free elections in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), and a scaling down of the U.S. effort there. During the remainder of 1965 and throughout 1966 Church voted against supplemental appropriations for the war. In May 1967 he drafted a letter signed by 16 antiwar senators warning the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) that the U.S. objective was to settle the war at the conference table but not at the expense of American commitments or unilateral withdrawal. In the spring of 1970 Church and Senator John Sherman Cooper, a liberal Republican from Kentucky, introduced an amendment to the foreign military sales bill that barred funding future military operations in Cambodia. Although the bill eventually passed the Senate, the House rejected it. A scaled-down version did pass in December 1970 as part of the defense appropriations bill. As a result, limitations were imposed on the president’s power as commander in chief. In 1973 Congress passed a bill sponsored by Church and Senator Clifford Case (R-N.J.) that authorized a complete cutoff of all funding of American combat operations in Indochina, a move that deeply angered the Richard M. Nixon administration. Defeated for reelection in 1980, Church died of cancer in Washington, D.C., on April 7, 1984. ROBERT G. MANGRUM See also Case, Clifford Philip; Case-Church Amendment; Cooper, John Sherman; Cooper-Church Amendment; Fulbright, James William; Kennedy, Edward Moore; McGovern, George Stanley References Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. Summers, Harry G., Jr. The Vietnam War Almanac. New York: Ballantine, 1985.
In 1934 Tan joined the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP). Over the next six years he organized protest demonstrations, strikes, and secret self-defense groups. In 1941 Tan received a field command in the newly formed National Salvation Army. He held out for eight months against French military raids but in March 1942 was forced to withdraw to the Chinese border. In February 1943 when the French concentrated to the south, Tan returned to his old base in the Bac Son–Vu Ninh area. During the course of the next two years he built up his military strength, and in March 1945 he joined Vo Nguyen Giap in the Cao Bang area to form the Vietnam Army of Liberation. Elected to the ICP Central Committee in 1945, Tan continued in that capacity into the mid-1970s. He was minister of defense in Ho Chi Minh’s first cabinet. Tan held a variety of other posts in the North Vietnamese government, including being a member of the National Defense Council. Promoted to the rank of colonel general in 1959, he served as chairman of the Viet Bac Autonomous Zone near the Chinese border from 1956 until 1975. Suspected of being pro-Chinese, in August 1979 Tan was removed from his posts and reportedly placed under arrest. He is said to have died in a prison in a Saigon suburb in 1984. Whether or not the stories of Tan’s arrest are true, his reputation has now been rehabilitated, and he has been awarded a place of honor in the pantheon of Vietnamese Communist military leaders. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, 1945–1954; Vietnam, Socialist Republic of, 1975–Present References Chu Van Tan. Reminiscences on the Army for National Salvation: Memoir of General Chu Van Tan. Translated by Mai Elliott. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1974. Marr, David G. Vietnam 1945: The Quest for Power. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995. Ministry of Defense. Tu Dien Bach Khoa Quan Su Viet Nam [Vietnamese Military History Encyclopedia]. Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1996. Patti, Archimedes L. A. Why Viet Nam? Prelude to America’s Albatross. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.
CIDG Chu Van Tan
See Civilian Irregular Defense Group
Birth Date: 1910 Death Date: 1984 People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) general and key political figure in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). A member of the Nung Chinese ethnic group, Chu Van Tan was born in 1910 to a peasant family in Thai Nguyen Province in Tonkin. Because his family was poor, Tan was able to attend school only to age 10.
Civic Action General term used by Americans for civilian assistance programs and projects of U.S. military units within the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Sometimes referred to as military-civic action, civic action was viewed as one component of the nationbuilding effort also known as pacification. Civic action projects
Civic Action were to promote social and economic development and identification with and support for the Saigon government. This was more commonly known as “winning the hearts and minds” of the Vietnamese people. The pacification effort was also known as “the other war,” hence the common references to “the two wars” being fought parallel to each other at the same time and in the same places, one to destroy the enemy who threatened the nation and the other to build the nation itself. Other terms used in reference to civic action programs were “revolutionary development” and “rural reconstruction.” To military and civilian personnel at the ground level, the pacification effort was seen in concrete form through a variety of civic action projects. These included the construction of schools, health centers, wells, roads, bridges, and canals; the distribution of food, clothing, and medical supplies to orphanages; and medical civic action programs (MEDCAPs) that brought military doctors and medics to rural villages and hamlets. Civic action also included American military personnel conducting English classes for Vietnamese, agricultural advisers under the protection of military patrols introducing new strains of rice to villagers in contested areas, and the placing of Montagnard and Vietnamese refugees in refugee resettlement centers. In some cases, civic action projects were viewed as an extension of the role of many military units. In other cases, civic action programs became the primary mission of many units operating in the Vietnamese countryside. The MEDCAP was perhaps the best known form of civic action project. U.S. military units, often with their medics or corpsmen and sometimes escorting doctors from nearby field or evacuation hospitals, offered medical assistance to villages in their area of operations. Doctors or medics would treat villagers for conditions ranging from minor illnesses (including pulling abscessed teeth and giving aspirin for headaches) to major illnesses (including treatment of malaria, yellow fever, bubonic plague, and tuberculosis). In many cases, villagers were brought back to military or civilian hospitals for treatment. MEDCAPs also provided preventive medicine in the form of inoculations against illnesses, established local dispensaries, and conducted training programs for local villagers for the treatment of minor conditions. Such civic action projects served two purposes. First, they addressed the primary mission of the pacification effort, to win the hearts and minds of the people for the South Vietnamese government. A government commitment to address such basic needs of the population as health care was an attempt to gain the allegiance of the population in the face of Viet Cong (VC) opposition. The problem with this was that these projects were usually carried out by U.S. forces without the involvement of the Saigon government or the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army). Second, in the process of addressing the pacification effort, civic action projects also served military objectives. MEDCAPs, for example, involved military patrols into rural villages and portrayed the U.S. military presence in a positive light. During these opera-
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A soldier conducts an English class during a civic action program of the 199th Infantry Brigade. Viewed as one component of the nation-building effort known as pacification, civic action programs were designed to promote social and economic development and support for the Saigon government. (National Archives)
tions, patrols often gathered intelligence through their own observations and discussions with local villagers. Over time, patrols developed intelligence on the movement of villagers, on VC infiltration, on executions or kidnappings that had taken place, and on the allegiance of the village to either the government or the VC. U.S. Marine Corps civic action programs were of particular note. They evolved out of the tactical situation in the I Corps Tactical Zone where in March and April 1965 U.S. Marine Corps combat operations began against the VC in heavily populated areas along the coast. As the marines moved inland from the coastal enclaves of Da Nang, Chu Lai, and Phu Bai, they created tactical areas of responsibility (TAOR), enlarging the coastal enclaves through clearand-hold operations. These deprived the VC of perhaps 90 percent of the population base of the I Corps Tactical Zone. The marines also instituted pacification programs to gain the allegiance of the estimated 2 million people living in the coastal area. This approach was in direct opposition to more conventional search-and-destroy operations conducted by the U.S. Army. The chief advocates of this strategy were Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, commanding general of Fleet Marine Force Pacific, and Lieutenant General Lewis W. Walt, commanding general of the III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF). They believed that military civic action programs were the key to the pacification
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effort. Every battalion in the III MAF, for example, was responsible for military civic action programs in their TAORs. Initially the most common form of civic action was the MEDCAP, whereby marine units with navy corpsmen paid regular visits to villages in their areas, offering medical assistance and training local villagers in basic medical practices. Because haphazard civic action programs proved ineffective in gaining the allegiance of the local population, during August 1965 the U.S. Marine Corps developed the combined action company (CAC), whereby South Vietnamese Popular Forces (PF) soldiers were integrated into marine tactical units. By placing these units into Vietnamese hamlets and relying on indigenous PFs, combined action operations began to achieve success against the VC. By the spring of 1966 there were some 40 CACs operating throughout the I Corps area. By February 1967 the combined action platoon (CAP) became the means to wage what the marines termed “the other war.” The CAP combined a marine rifle squad of 14 men and 1 navy corpsman with three 10-man PF militia squads and a five-man platoon headquarters into a combined platoon of 50 American and Vietnamese soldiers to provide security at the local level and initiate civic action programs as part of the pacification effort. As William Corson noted in The Betrayal, the CAP mission was to destroy the VC infrastructure within the village or hamlet area of responsibility, protect public security and help maintain law and order, protect the friendly infrastructure, protect bases and communication axes within the villages and hamlets, organize people’s intelligence nets, and participate in civic action and conduct propaganda against the VC. The marines saw civic action projects as an outgrowth of the military and security mission to gain the allegiance of the local population within the TAOR. Underneath the security umbrella, civic action programs were an integral part of the CAP mission. Over their six-year existence (1965–1971), some 114 marine CAPs operated throughout the five I Corps provinces to implement the marine counterinsurgency strategy. U.S. Army civic action programs developed within a somewhat different tactical situation. Army combat operations first began against regular People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) units in the Central Highlands with the October–November 1965 Battle of the Ia Drang Valley. The Central Highlands was occupied primarily by indigenous Montagnard tribesmen whose subsistence base was slash-and-burn agriculture, made possible by the low population density in the Central Highlands. Early army experiences in hunting regular PAVN units underlay its search-and-destroy operations, which were generally conducted in less densely populated areas than the coastal lowlands of the I Corps Tactical Zone. The primary army mission was to hunt down and destroy PAVN main-force units. Pacification, or “the other war,” became a secondary emphasis. With their military bases more segregated from the indigenous population than those of the marines along the coast, army civic action programs tended to emphasize specific civic action projects rather than the ongoing
military civic action programs of the marines that were integrated with indigenous units at the village or hamlet level. One notable and short-lived exception was the 25th Infantry Division’s Operation LANIKAI in Long An Province. Begun in September 1966 by the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry, in conjunction with ARVN units, the operation sought to secure a district with a dense population. Battalion units lived with the indigenous population to develop cooperation with local forces and provide security for the local population. The operation lasted only two to three months, until the battalion was pulled out to participate in Operation FAIRFAX, a search-and-destroy operation in Gia Dinh. MEDCAPs were perhaps the most common form of civic action. The 25th Infantry Division initiated the Helping Hand program, which involved the distribution of thousands of parcels of goods to villages along Highway 1, along with various self-help projects, such as the construction of public works. The 1st Cavalry Division out of An Khe distributed health care supplies to villages along Highway 14 and sponsored Boy Scout jamborees. In fact, most army units had a G-5 and/or S-5 civil affairs officer, whose primary responsibility was the coordination of civic action programs within the unit’s area of operations. Civil affairs teams were the closest U.S. Army analogy to the U.S. Marine Corps’ combined action platoons. By 1968 there were three army civil affairs companies and one detachment, a total of 439 men, operating in South Vietnam in conjunction with the Refugee Division of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS). The 29th Civil Affairs Company operated in the I Corps Tactical Zone and worked exclusively on refugee assistance. The other two companies, the 41st Civil Affairs Company in the II Corps Tactical Zone and the 2nd Civil Affairs Company in the III Corps Tactical Zone, also worked on refugee resettlement but had other civic action responsibilities. In the case of the 41st Civil Affairs Company, for example, 15 teams of 6 men each were spread throughout the II Corps Tactical Zone with various command and mission responsibilities. Under the operational command of the Pleiku Province senior adviser, Team 9 was assigned to the Edap Enang Resettlement Center in western Pleiku Province. Working with Regional Forces (RF) and PF units, who provided local security, and CORDS advisers, the team provided refugee assistance and worked to resettle some 5,000 indigenous Jarai Montagnard tribesmen, many of whom were refugees from the Ia Drang Valley. Team 14 was assigned to the 4th Infantry Division at Camp Enari under the operational command of the division civil affairs officer. Team members coordinated division civic action programs in Montagnard villages and resettlement centers in the immediate area of the camp. Team 15 worked in the Montagnard villages to the north of Pleiku, also under the operational command of the Pleiku Province senior adviser, coordinating civic action projects of military units in the area. Civic action programs were an outgrowth of U.S. military efforts to win the war by destroying Communist forces while at the same time attempting to win the hearts and minds of the indig-
Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support enous population. Civic action was viewed by the U.S. military as integral to the “other war” and part of the pacification effort to gain the allegiance of the people for the South Vietnamese government. The U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps viewed civic action in different terms, however, based on their initial experiences in combat operations against the PAVN and the VC and the environments in which these operations took place. In the short term, civic action projects had positive benefits including the inoculation of people against various diseases, improvement of medical care for the local population, resettlement of Vietnamese and Montagnard refugees, construction of housing and public works, establishment of short-term goodwill toward the government, and the gathering of intelligence information. In the long term, the results were at best minimal. With the exception of the U.S. Marine Corps CAPs and U.S. Army civil affairs teams, few U.S. military personnel lived with the Vietnamese long enough to learn their language and their culture in order to win their hearts and minds and thus their allegiance to a government that failed to heed their concerns. DAVID M. BERMAN See also Clear and Hold; Krulak, Victor H.; Marine Combined Action Platoons; Montagnards; Pacification; Refugees and Boat People; Search and Destroy; United States Agency for International Development; Walt, Lewis William References Corson, William R. The Betrayal. New York: Norton, 1968. Hunt, Richard A. Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts and Minds. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995. West, F. J. The Village. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985. Wiesner, Louis A. Victims and Survivors: Displaced Persons and Other War Victims in Viet-Nam, 1954–1975. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1988.
Civilian Irregular Defense Group In 1961 and 1962 U.S. Army Special Forces (Green Berets) on temporary duty (TDY) established a number of isolated camps in remote areas in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). These camps served three purposes: to extend the influence of the South Vietnamese government, to provide security for the local population, and to isolate the people from Communist influence and intimidation. The Special Forces recruited volunteers from the local populations and trained them as soldiers. Known as the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) and, until July 1963, paid by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Combined Studies Division/Group through the Special Forces (in July 1963, the U.S. military took over funding for the program), the CIDG played a significant role in securing sparsely populated highland areas. At its peak, CIDG strength was some 45,000 men. U.S. Special Forces first operated around Ban Me Thuot in the Central Highlands with Rhade and
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Jarai Montagnards. The vast majority of CIDG personnel throughout Vietnam were Montagnard tribesmen, although there were also Cambodians and Vietnamese. The initial Special Forces approach was to organize the Montagnards, place them under government control, and train them to fight the Viet Cong (VC). The Special Forces troopers organized CIDG personnel into combat units. CIDG units were assigned specific missions: border surveillance and interdiction of Communist infiltration, communications and supply routes, offensive operations against VC units and sanctuaries, identification and destruction of VC infrastructure, and establishment of area security. Another CIDG concept was to organize and train tactical reserve reaction forces to serve as mobile strike force units. Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) Special Forces (Luc Luong Dac Biet) placed officers in each camp to serve as its commander and staff; the Special Forces assumed the CIA mission and served as advisers. Camps were organized into three companies of 132 men each, three reconnaissance platoons, a heavy weapons section with two 105-millimeter howitzers, and a political warfare section. Each camp was authorized a total of 530 men. Because of their isolated locations, many CIDG camps came under attack or siege. In 1965 People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) forces besieged the CIDG camp at Duc Co in the Central Highlands for more than two months. In June 1965 VC units overran the CIDG camp at Dong Xoai but failed to take the town because of fierce CIDG resistance. In March 1966 two PAVN regiments attacked the A Shau CIDG camp, forcing U.S. and ARVN Special Forces to withdraw. Other CIDG camps were abandoned because of insufficient manpower. The CIDG program also experienced problems with fraud and corruption, and in March 1970 U.S. and South Vietnamese military leaders agreed to convert the CIDG camps to ARVN Border Ranger camps. The last two CIDG border camps were officially converted on January 4, 1971. HIEU DINH VU AND HARVE SAAL See also Central Intelligence Agency; Montagnards; United States Special Forces; Vietnam, Republic of, Special Forces References Ahern, Thomas L. Vietnam Declassified: The CIA and Counterinsurgency. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2009. Kelly, Francis J. The Green Berets in Vietnam, 1961–71. New York: Brassey’s, 1991. Westmoreland, William C. A Soldier Reports. New York: Doubleday, 1976.
Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support Umbrella organization for U.S. pacification efforts in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) organized all civilian
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agencies involved in the pacification effort in South Vietnam under the military chain of command. Established under the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), on May 10, 1967, CORDS was placed under the direction of Robert Komer, a MACV civilian deputy commander. Komer, special assistant to President Lyndon B. Johnson, held the rank of ambassador and the military equivalent of three-star general and reported directly to MACV commander General William C. Westmoreland. Upon Komer’s departure in November 1968, William Colby, who had been the assistant chief of staff for CORDS, took direction of CORDS. CORDS succeeded the Office of Civil Operations (OCO), originally created to assume responsibility over all civilian agencies working in South Vietnam under the jurisdiction of the U.S. embassy in Saigon. CORDS integrated American aid programs targeting the social and economic development of South Vietnam. These were viewed as the basis upon which to build the Vietnamese nation and win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people in the face of Communist political and military opposition. CORDS activities were primarily directed toward the 80 percent of the South Vietnamese population who lived in the rural villages and hamlets most vulnerable to the Viet Cong (VC). In this way, the Communists would be deprived of their traditional population base. CORDS was organized into six operational divisions: Chieu Hoi, Revolutionary Development, Refugees, Public Safety, Psychological Operations, and New Life Development. The Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) program was designed to induce VC and People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) soldiers to turn themselves in to the South Vietnamese government as hoi chanh (“returnees”) through government propaganda campaigns and monetary payments. Returnees were given job training, welfare services, and resettlement assistance and were also integrated into Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) military units. The Revolutionary Development (RD) division was organized into 59-member teams designed to provide security and promote economic development at the village level. RD teams were trained at the National Training Center in Vung Tau and assigned to villages throughout the country. Working through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the refugee program was designed to resettle millions of displaced villagers across the country, often through the establishment of refugee resettlement centers, and to provide them security. CORDS integrated all military and civilian personnel into a single chain of command by assigning them to the same missions through the establishment of CORDS advisory teams at the province level. During 1968, for example, in the 12 II Corps provinces some 4,000 CORDS personnel served under the operational command of CORDS deputy James Megellas, who held the military equivalent of major general and reported directly to Lieutenant General William R. Peers, commander of I Field Force, Vietnam. CORDS teams at the province level consisted of State Department, USAID, U.S. Information Agency (USIA), and U.S. Public Health
Service personnel. In Khanh Hoa Province, for example, Team 35 had 87 military and 23 civilian personnel, including foreign service officers, public health nurses, and rural health and agricultural advisers. Priority projects in 1968 were the resettlement of Montagnard tribesmen and improving the quality and effectiveness of Regional Forces/Popular Forces (RF/PF) units to provide security at the village level. With the war intensifying and the increasing vulnerability of civilian aid efforts in the countryside, providing security for what became known as nation building or pacification became a military priority. In September 1969 there were 6,464 U.S. military advisers assigned to CORDS, 5,812 of whom served in the field. Major efforts were made within the U.S. Army in particular (which had 95 percent of CORDS military advisers) to assign qualified military advisers to CORDS advisory teams. Three army civil affairs companies (the 2nd, 29th, and 41st companies) were directly involved in pacification programs under CORDS administration. Major efforts were also made under both Komer and Colby to improve the effectiveness of RF/PF units by increasing both their manpower and their firepower equivalent to local VC units. By the end of 1969, RF/ PF units numbered 475,000 men. Their effectiveness was a major factor in providing security at the village level in support of pacification efforts. With the January 1973 Paris Peace Accords and the withdrawal of American armed forces, the rationale for the existence of CORDS was removed. CORDS ceased operations on February 27, 1973, and selected functions were assumed by the office of the special assistant to the ambassador for field operations, a civilian operation headed by George Jacobson, who had been assistant chief of staff of CORDS under Colby. DAVID M. BERMAN See also Chieu Hoi Program; Civic Action; Colby, William Egan; Komer, Robert W.; Marine Combined Action Platoons; Pacification; Psychological Warfare Operations; Refugees and Boat People; Territorial Forces; United States Agency for International Development; Vann, John Paul; Westmoreland, William Childs References Hickey, Gerald Cannon. Free in the Forest: Ethnohistory of the Vietnamese Central Highlands, 1954–1976. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982. Hunt, Richard A. Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts and Minds. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995. Wiesner, Louis A. Victims and Survivors: Displaced Persons and Other War Victims in Viet-Nam, 1954–1975. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1988.
Civil Rights Movement The Civil Rights Movement began in earnest in 1955 in Montgomery, Alabama, where African Americans successfully organized a boycott that desegregated public buses. Reverend Martin Luther
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Rosa Parks, whose refusal to give up her bus seat to a white passenger sparked the Montgomery Bus Boycott and fueled the Civil Rights Movement, sits in the front of a bus on December 21, 1956. After the court ruling, the Interstate Commerce Commission banned the segregation of public transit. (Library of Congress)
King Jr. came to the fore during this yearlong struggle. This event came on the heels of the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case Brown v. Board of Education, which had asserted that segregated educational facilities were unconstitutional. Lasting until roughly 1968, the movement sought racial equality, economic and political selfsufficiency, and freedom from the constraints of white society. Civil rights advocates argued that although slavery had ended in the 19th century, racism and prejudice continued through overt and covert racial segregation. Racial segregation was especially prevalent in the South, but more insidious racism and segregation were widespread in the North as well. The movement brought about specific civil rights legislation that codified the equality of all races in the United States and increased awareness of continued racism and inequalities. Rosa Parks, regarded as the “mother” of the Civil Rights Movement, provided inspiration for the cause through her refusal to give her seat to a white man on a public bus in Montgomery, Alabama. Her arrest and conviction on this charge led to the Montgomery
Bus Boycott. With the success of this boycott, the direct-action emphasis of the Civil Rights Movement began. As events progressed, the national media began focusing on the cause of civil rights, providing greater national support for the movement’s advocates. The next significant step took place in 1957 with the fulfillment of the requirement to integrate black and white schools. In 1963 the movement reached full force, witnessing King’s nationally televised March on Washington in August 1963. Some 250,000 people attended the gathering. That same year under the glare of the news media, Eugene “Bull” Connor (Birmingham, Alabama, commissioner of public safety) unleashed police dogs and used the city’s fire hoses against thousands of unarmed black high school students. The replaying of this event across the United States garnered greater support for the Civil Rights Movement throughout the country. As the Civil Rights Movement progressed, it split into two forms: active nonviolent resistance, advocated by King and his adherents, and Black Power. The nonviolent faction organized marches and
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Registered African American Voters in Selected Southern States (1960, 1966) State Alabama Mississippi South Carolina
Registered African American Voters (1960)
Registered African American Voters (1966)
66,000 22,000 58,000
250,000 175,000 191,000
demonstrations throughout the South and the Midwest to protest against continued segregation and racism. King also masterfully used the media to bring the civil rights agenda to the forefront of Americans’ attention. After 1965 King decried the Vietnam War as a war against poor African American youth, but he refused to employ militancy to further his agenda. King was assassinated on April 4, 1968, in Memphis, Tennessee. His nonviolent methods had brought about significant progress for the Civil Rights Movement through the media’s coverage of the events he had led. The second form of resistance within the Civil Rights Movement was that of Black Power. Disillusioned by the slow progress of nonviolent resistance and convinced that King’s efforts were having little effect in northern cities, the Black Panther Party and the Nation of Islam led the Black Power movement. Calling for violent resistance, Black Power groups began standing up to the Ku Klux Klan, armed and ready to fight. The Nation of Islam, a black organization with beliefs diverging from mainstream Islam, sought to establish a country apart from the white people of the United States through violent action if necessary. This segment of the movement effected little change, however, as many Americans were turned off by its radical rhetoric and activities. The Civil Rights Movement certainly brought about significant progress in civil rights and liberties. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlawed discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, transforming society through its prohibition against discrimination in all areas of American society. The 1965 Voting Rights Act removed all impediments to voting, which had kept many African Americans away from the polls, by ensuring the power of the federal government to enforce voting laws. The efforts of civil rights advocates throughout the 1950s and 1960s brought about significant changes to the United States and helped secure greater civil liberties for all people regardless of race or color. After King’s assassination the work of the movement continued, as it does today, but never again would the movement have another spokesman as forceful and dynamic as Dr. King. After 1968 the Civil Rights Movement witnessed continual but slower and more episodic progress than it did during the 1950s and 1960s. Some historians have argued that the Civil Rights Movement— especially the Black Power movement—radicalized some African American servicemen serving in Vietnam, leading to racial tensions between blacks and whites in the armed forces in the late 1960s. Many African American soldiers questioned their role in
defending democracy abroad when they still faced racial and economic inequality at home. This is a theme that King took up in 1966, when his opposition to the Vietnam War began to take shape. Black involvement in the war certainly raised black consciousness and politicized many returning veterans who had not formally considered themselves politically engaged. As the Vietnam War took center stage in the United States, many civil rights advocates took up the mantle of antiwar opposition; other 1960s reform groups, particularly Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), underwent similar transformations. PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR. See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Black Muslims; Black Panthers; King, Martin Luther, Jr. References Bullard, Sara, and Julian Bond. Free At Last: A History of the Civil Rights Movement and Those Who Died in the Struggle. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. Davis, Jack E., ed. The Civil Rights Movement. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2000. Morris, Aldon D. Origins of the Civil Rights Movement. New York: Free Press, 1986. Tarrow, Sydney. Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Clarey, Bernard Ambrose Birth Date: May 4, 1912 Death Date: June 15, 1996 U.S. Navy admiral and commander of U.S. Navy forces in the Pacific (1970–1973). Born in Oskaloosa, Iowa, on May 4, 1912, Bernard Ambrose (“Chick”) Clarey graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, in 1934. He subsequently trained at the Submarine School in New London, Connecticut. Clarey survived the December 7, 1941, Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and participated in submarine operations against Japan during the remainder of World War II. During the Korean War (1950–1953), Clarey served with the U.S. Seventh Fleet as executive officer on the heavy cruiser Helena. Promoted to captain in July 1953, he then held a variety of assignments, including tours in Washington, D.C.; Norfolk, Virginia; and Pearl Harbor. He was promoted to rear admiral in July 1959 and to vice admiral in June 1964. In 1967 he became director of navy program planning and budgeting. In January 1968 Clarey was promoted to full admiral and was appointed vice chief of naval operations. In 1970 when Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt became chief of naval operations and chose his own aides, Clarey became commander of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii. As such, he had command of all U.S. Navy ships in Pacific waters, including those off Vietnam, as well as naval air operations against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). Agitation at home was accompanied by
Clark, William Ramsey racial unrest in the Pacific Fleet, leading Clarey to order his unit commanders to be more sensitive to minority grievances. Clarey retired from the U.S. Navy in Honolulu in October 1973. He was then vice president of the Bank of Hawaii for Pacific Rim operations. He died in Honoloulu on June 15, 1996. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also United States Navy; Zumwalt, Elmo Russell, Jr. Reference Zumwalt, Elmo R., Jr. On Watch. New York: Quadrangle, 1976.
Clark, William Ramsey Birth Date: December 18, 1927 Lawyer and U.S. attorney general of the United States under President Lyndon B. Johnson during 1967–1969. Born in Dallas, Texas, on December 18, 1927, William Ramsey Clark served in the U.S. Marine Corps from 1945 to 1946. He received his undergraduate degree from the University of Texas in 1949 and MA (in history) and JD degrees from the University of Chicago in 1950. Clark then joined the Dallas law firm of Clark, Coon, Holt & Fisher, a firm founded by his grandfather, and worked there for 10 years, losing only one jury trial. Because his father Tom had become an associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court in 1949, Ramsey avoided high court cases except for one in which his father recused himself. Clark worked actively in Democratic Party politics, and in 1960 he campaigned for John F. Kennedy. In 1961 Kennedy appointed Clark assistant attorney general in charge of the Lands Division of the Justice Department (1961–1965). During his tenure Clark instituted cost-cutting measures and reduced the backlog of cases. He also supervised other projects, mainly in the civil rights area. He headed federal civilian forces at the University of Mississippi after the 1962 riots there and served in Birmingham in 1963. He visited school officials throughout the South in 1963 to help them coordinate and implement desegregation plans. He also helped formulate the landmark 1964 Civil Rights Act. As a consequence of his diligent work, Clark was appointed deputy attorney general in 1965. In this post he helped to draft the 1965 Voting Rights Act, and after the riots in the Watts section of Los Angeles in 1965, he headed federal forces sent to find solutions to the problems that led to the violence. When Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach became undersecretary of state in 1966, President Johnson appointed Clark acting attorney general. Five months later Johnson made the promotion permanent. Two hours after the official appointment, Justice Tom Clark announced his retirement from the Supreme Court to avoid any potential conflict of interest. On March 10, 1967, Ramsey Clark was sworn in as attorney general; his father administered the oath of office. As attorney general from 1967 to 1969, Clark strongly supported civil rights for all Americans. He also opposed the death
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penalty, criticized police violence toward citizens and antiwar protesters, and steadfastly refused to use wiretaps except in cases of national security. These positions, in addition to his lenient stance on antiwar activities, attracted criticism from within the Johnson administration and from conservatives, who labeled him as being soft on crime. After leaving office in 1969 Clark actively opposed the Vietnam War, and in 1972 he visited the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) to investigate American bombing of civilian targets. He also taught, first at Howard University (1969–1972) and then at Brooklyn Law School (1973–1981). Clark continued to practice law in New York City, and in 1974 he ran unsuccessfully for the U.S. Senate. In 1980 he led a group of private citizens to Tehran, Iran, during the hostage crisis there, and in 1982 he made a private fact-finding tour of Nicaragua. Clark also found time to write a book, Crime in America (1970), that examines the social and economic causes and potential solutions to crime. In more recent years Clark has proven even more controversial, as he vigorously and publicly opposed the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the War on Terror, the Afghanistan War, and the Iraq War. In 1991 he accused the George H. W. Bush administration of crimes against humanity committed during the Persian Gulf War. Clark views the War on Terror as a war against Islam and believes that the War on Terror is eroding American’s civil liberties. He has even gone so far as to propound, with no evidence to support this, that Al Qaeda was not behind the September 11, 2001, attacks. Instead he
Ramsey Clark, U.S. attorney general during 1967–1969, in August 1974. After leaving office, Clark actively opposed the Vietnam War, and in 1972 he traveled to North Vietnam to investigate American bombing of civilian targets. (AP/Wide World Photos)
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blames the U.S. government, which he believed planned and staged the event in order to wage war against the Taliban and Iraq. From 2003 to 2009 Clark was active in the drive to bring impeachment proceedings against President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney. After the 1999 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombing campaign of Yugoslavia, Clark “charged” the organization with 19 counts of genocide. Equally controversial have been the clients he has chosen to defend. They include Radovan Karadzic, Slobodan Milosevic, former Liberian strongman Charles Taylor, and former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein. Clark insisted that Hussein would be unable to receive a fair trial if it was held in Iraq. LAURA MATYSEK WOOD See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Katzenbach, Nicholas deBelleville References Clark, William Ramsey. Crime in America: Observations on Its Nature, Causes, Prevention and Control. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970. Who’s Who in America, 1968–1969. New Providence, NJ: Marquis Who’s Who, 1969.
Clark Air Force Base U.S. Air Force base in the Republic of the Philippines located 3 miles west of Angeles City, itself north of Manila on the island of Luzon. Before its closure in 1991, Clark Air Force Base was the largest overseas U.S. military installation, with an area of more than 156,000 acres. The United States acquired the Philippine Islands as a consequence of the 1898 Spanish-American War, and in 1903 the U.S. Army established a cavalry installation known as Fort Stotsenburg some 50 miles north of Manila. A flying school was located there in 1912, and an air strip was constructed during 1917–1918. A portion of the fort was then set apart for flying activities. It was named Clark Field in September 1919 for Major Harold M. Clark, a U.S. Army pilot killed in a crash in the Panama Canal in May 1919. Clark Field was an important U.S. air base at the beginning of World War II, and both fighters and a significant number of fourengine Boeing B-17 Flying Fortresses based there. Clark came under Japanese air attack on December 8, 1941, and most of the big bombers were destroyed on the ground. In the course of their invasion of the Philippines, the Japanese captured the airfield in December 1941. The Americans did not retake Clark Field until January 1945, after which a number of U.S. Army Air Forces bombardment groups (mostly Consolidated B-24 Liberators) and several fighter groups were located there. The bombers mounted attacks on targets in Japan, Taiwan (Formosa), and mainland China. In 1947 with the establishment of the independent U.S. Air Force, Clark Field became Clark Air Force Base, and the next year all
of Fort Stotsenburg was designated Clark Air Force Base. During the Korean War (1950–1953) photo reconnaissance missions operated from the base, while during the Indochina War (1946–1954) aircraft from Clark flew both special operations and resupply missions. Clark Air Force Base was especially active during the Vietnam War. During that conflict the base’s population swelled to 60,000 personnel, and from 1963 to 1967 Clark was the second-mostpopulous U.S. Air Force installation in the world. During the 1960s and 1970s the base underwent several significant improvements, including a large hospital and improved living quarters. Clark served as a major U.S. military logistical hub for operations in the Southeast Asian theater. During the war U.S. Air Force units stationed there included the 405th Fighter Wing, the 1st Medical Service Wing, the 6200th Air Base Wing, and the 463rd Tactical Airlift Wing, the latter of which rotated its C-130 squadrons between Clark and Tan Son Nhut Air Base in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Thai Air Force personnel also received air defense training there. The base played a key role in Operation HOMECOMING as the first stop for returning American prisoners of war. At Clark Air Force Base they underwent medical evaluations, were debriefed, and began their readjustment from captivity. At the end of the conflict, Clark also provided important support for Operations BABYLIFT and NEW LIFE, the evacuations of Vietnamese for resettlement in the United States. Once close relations between the United States and the Philippines soured with the overthrow of Philippine president Ferdinand Marcus in 1986, many Filipinos held the United States responsible for the excesses of his rule. An agreement to extend the leasing arrangement on Clark Air Force Base was rejected by the Philippine Senate, which sought greater compensation. Negotiations continued, with the United States warning the Philippine government that it might give up the lease entirely. Clark Air Base was completely evacuated in June 1991 following the eruption of Mount Pinatubo. Damage to the base was so extensive that it became increasingly likely that the United States would not increase the leasing offer. The base was turned over to the Philippine government in November 1991. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also BABYLIFT, Operation; HOMECOMING, Operation; Philippines; Prisoners of War, Allied; United States Air Force References Berger, Carl, ed. The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, 1961– 1973: An Illustrated Account. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1977. Fletcher, Harry R. Air Force Bases: Air Bases Outside the United States of America, Vol. 2. Washington, DC: Center for Air Force History, United States Air Force, 1993. Rochester, Stuart I., and Frederick Kiley. Honor Bound: American Prisoners of War in Southeast Asia, 1961–1973. Washington, DC: Historical Office Secretary of Defense, 1998. Utts, Thomas C. GI Joe Doesn’t Live Here Anymore: A History of Clark Air Base, America’s Mighty Air Force Bastion in the Philippines. Baltimore: Publish America, 2006.
Cleland, Joseph Maxwell
Clay, Cassius See Ali, Muhammad
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References Summers, Harry G. On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War. Novato, CA: Presidio Press 1995. Westmoreland, William C. A Soldier Reports. New York: Doubleday, 1976.
Claymore Mines See Armored Warfare; Fire-Support Bases; Mine Warfare, Land
Cleland, Joseph Maxwell Birth Date: August 24, 1942
Clear and Hold Designation for allied military efforts to eradicate the Communist presence in selected areas of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Part of the pacification program, the clear and hold concept was an attempt to solve the unconventional problems of a guerrilla conflict with a conventional solution of traditional land warfare: the effective garrisoning of territory after it was taken. The dilemma in Vietnam lay in holding, not clearing. Although massive sweep operations against areas controlled by the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) or the Viet Cong (VC) were generally successful, these effects were temporary. Communist guerrillas simply reasserted themselves once clearing forces departed. Also, the civilian population fully understood that any cooperation with allied soldiers during the sweeps could well prove fatal to them afterward when the guerrillas returned. The clear and hold concept envisioned the permanent stationing of garrison troops in selected areas after their clearing to prevent a Communist return. The problem with the clear and hold solution was the large numbers of personnel required for success. The allies did not have enough reliable soldiers to both conquer the countryside and control it. General William Westmoreland, commander of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), stated that the main goal was to seek out and destroy PAVN and VC forces rather than to pacify the countryside. He later argued that he believed that the clear and hold concept could have worked had he received sufficient numbers of American troops to perform both functions. The larger numbers he wanted, however, would have required the mobilization of U.S. reserve forces, an option that was unacceptable to both President Lyndon Johnson and the American people. Consequently, while U.S. combat troops pursued an attrition strategy against Communist main-force units, MACV was forced to use unreliable soldiers from the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army), the Popular Forces, and the Regional Forces to hold the cleared areas. The combination proved unsuccessful. EDWARD C. PAGE See also Civic Action; Marine Combined Action Platoons; Pacification; Search and Destroy; United States Marine Corps; Westmoreland, William Childs
U.S. Army officer, head of the Veterans Administration (VA) during 1977–1981, Democratic Party politician, and U.S. senator during 1997–2003. Born in Atlanta, Georgia, on August 24, 1942, Joseph Maxwell (Max) Cleland received a BA from Stetson University in Florida in 1964 and earned an MA in American history from Emory University the following year. Shortly thereafter he entered the U.S. Army, initially serving in the Signal Corps. After successfully completing jump school, in 1967 he volunteered for duty in Vietnam with the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). The next year near Khe Sanh, Captain Cleland lost both legs and his right arm as a result of a grenade blast. He received numerous citations, including the Bronze Star and the Silver Star. Not released from the hospital until 1970, Cleland wasted little time in resuming a productive life. In 1971 he won a seat
U.S. senator Max Cleland of Georgia was a major force behind improvements in the Veterans Administration and in issues affecting the disabled. (U.S. Senate)
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in the Georgia Senate and used his position to promote issues related to veterans and the handicapped. From 1975 to 1977 he served on the professional staff of the U.S. Senate Veterans Affairs Committee. In February 1977 President Jimmy Carter nominated his fellow Georgian to head the VA. Speedy Senate confirmation followed, and Cleland became at age 34 the youngest person to ever head the VA and the first Vietnam veteran to hold the position. He launched a vigorous expansion of VA programs, including drug and alcohol treatment and counseling services. He also worked to improve the public image of the VA and Vietnam veterans. His tenure at the VA ended in 1981 with the election of President Ronald Reagan. Returning to Georgia, Cleland became secretary of state, holding that position from 1982 to 1996. In 1996 he received the Democratic nomination to fill the Senate seat vacated by Democrat Sam Nunn and won the election that November, joining such prominent Vietnam veterans as John Kerry (D-Mass.), Robert Kerrey (D-Neb.), and John McCain (R-Ariz.). In 2003 Cleland was among 29 Senate Democrats to vote for the authorization for war with Iraq. Later he announced that he deeply regretted his decision and admitted that his vote was in part influenced by his upcoming reelection bid. In 2002 Cleland experienced a bruising reelection campaign, running against Republican Saxby Chambliss. The election made national news after the Chambliss campaign ran incendiary television commercials implicitly questioning Cleland’s patriotism because he had failed to support some of the George W. Bush administration’s homeland security decisions. The ads featured likenesses of Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden. The ads were pulled amid much uproar, and senators McCain and Chuck Hagel, both Republicans, chastised Chambliss for his tactless and meanspirited campaign. Nevertheless, Cleland lost the election to Chambliss, who had no military experience at all. The smear campaign against Cleland was in a sense a dry run of the smear campaign against Senator John Kerry, who ran for president on the Democratic ticket in 2004. Cleland campaigned vigorously for Kerry, and when the anti-Kerry Swift Boat Veterans for Truth organization ran ads questioning Kerry’s patriotism and war record, Cleland paid a personal visit to President Bush’s Texas ranch to protest the ads. Cleland’s appeal had little effect, however. Kerry lost the election to the incumbent Bush. Cleland has written extensively on veterans’ issues and the plight of Vietnam veterans. DAVID COFFEY
Clemenceau, Georges Birth Date: September 28, 1841 Death Date: November 24, 1929 French politician and premier (1906–1909, 1917–1920). Born at Mouilleron-en-Pareds in the Vendée on September 28, 1841, Georges Clemenceau was the son of a doctor and was educated at the medical schools of Nantes and Paris. After pursuing a career in medicine and journalism in the United States during 1865–1869 he returned to France, where he first rose to national prominence as the mayor of the Eighteenth Arrondissement of Paris during the German siege of Paris in the 1870–1871 Franco-Prussian War. A political leftist, he was nonetheless a maverick. Elected to the National Assembly, Clemenceau voted against the peace terms that yielded Alsace-Lorraine to the Germans. As a leader of the Radical Party and a newspaper publisher, he was a leading figure during the travails of the Third Republic. During the Dreyfus Affair he strongly defended Alfred Dreyfus, a young Jewish army captain wrongly accused of treason. Clemenceau was a strong opponent of French imperial efforts in Indochina and elsewhere, believing that these detracted from France’s real interests in Europe and inhibited military preparedness against Germany. His reputation in debate led to the nickname “the Tiger.” Clemenceau first served as premier of France from 1906 to 1909. The outbreak of World War I found him an outsider and critic of
See also Kerry, John Forbes; Khe Sanh, Battle of; McCain, John Sidney, III; Swift Boat Veterans for Truth References Cleland, Max. Strong at the Broken Places. Atlanta: Cherokee Publishing, 1989. Who’s Who in America, 1997. New Providence, NJ: Marquis Who’s Who, 1996.
Georges Clemenceau was arguably the most important French politician in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. His lively and often controversial career spanned the first 55 years of the French Third Republic, and he served as prime minister several times, most notably during World War I. (Library of Congress)
Clergy and Laymen Concerned about Vietnam what he believed was a failure on the part of the government to push for an all-out effort to win. In November 1917 following the disastrous Nivelle Offensive and wide-scale French Army mutinies, Clemenceau again became premier. He thoroughly dominated the government and was known as France’s “one-man Committee of Public Safety.” His leadership helped infuse the French with the will to fight through to final victory. Much criticized in Britain and the United States for his role at the Paris Peace Conference, Clemenceau was seen as a vengeful Shylock determined to exact the pound of flesh and keep Germany in subjection, but his goal was simply security for France. Forced to compromise over the Rhineland issue (both on its separation from Germany and the length of the Allied occupation), he endured bitter attacks by the French Right. At the peace conference, Clemenceau rejected concessions to native nationalists in the French colonies, including Indochina. In January 1920 most observers expected the 78-year-old “Father of Victory” to easily win election to the presidency. But Clemenceau’s many enemies felt free to attack him, and he was passed over. He immediately resigned the premiership and went into embittered retirement. He spent his remaining years writing and trying to warn the French people about the need for vigilance and enforcement of the Treaty of Versailles. Clemenceau died in Paris on November 24, 1929. SPENCER C. TUCKER
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See also French Indochina, 1860s–1946 References Brunn, Geoffrey. Clemenceau. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1943. Jackson, John Hampden. Clemenceau and the Third Republic. New York: Macmillan, 1948. Watson, David R. Georges Clemenceau: A Political Biography. New York: David McKay, 1974.
Clergy and Laymen Concerned about Vietnam Religiously based antiwar organization. Several New York religious leaders, including Reverend Richard Neuhaus, Rabbi Abraham Heschel, and Father Daniel Berrigan, founded Clergy Concerned about Vietnam in October 1965. The organization, most often known by the acronym CALC, went through a number of name changes: National Emergency Committee of Clergy Concerned about Vietnam in January 1966, Clergy and Laymen Concerned about Vietnam—A National Emergency Committee (CALCAV) in April 1966, Clergy and Laymen Concerned about Vietnam in 1967, and Clergy and Laity Concerned in 1973. Creating an outlet for religious antiwar protest and building on interfaith cooperation in
Members of the clergy demonstrate against the Vietnam War in 1972. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)
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the civil rights struggle, CALC evolved in 1966 into a national organization with reverends John Bennett, Martin Luther King Jr., and William Sloane Coffin assuming leadership roles. CALC sought an indefinite halt to the U.S. bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and a negotiated settlement. Under Executive Director Richard Fernandez (1966–1973), CALC broadened its base by recognizing the interest of laypeople in its moderate forms of protest that avoided the stigma of radical antiwar organizations. In February 1967, with King as chairman, CALC initiated the Fast for Peace, which included possibly 1 million participants. Its moderate approach did not keep the federal government from targeting CALC in 1967 for investigation as a threat to national security. In February 1968 CALC released In the Name of America, accusing the United States of violating international law and being guilty of war crimes. CALC protested at the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago, and in 1972 CALC had representatives at the World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina. By August 1973 the founders, never believing that the war would last so long, changed the name to Clergy and Laity Concerned, enabling the group to address a wider variety of issues. PAUL S. DAUM AND FRANCIS RYAN
Washington, D.C., which, with the exception of his time as secretary of defense, he continued to do. By 1960 Clifford was widely regarded as the most influential and well-connected Democratic Party lawyer in Washington. After handling several delicate legal matters for then-Senator John F. Kennedy, in late 1960 Clifford headed the president-elect’s transition team but refused any formal office for himself. Both Kennedy and his successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, however, called upon Clifford for advice on various issues. In the early 1960s Clifford did not oppose the relatively smallscale incremental increases in U.S. economic and military aid to Vietnam. In May 1965 Johnson consulted Clifford as to the proposed major escalation of American ground forces in Vietnam by 100,000 men, with further increases to follow. Together with George W. Ball, Clifford argued forcefully but unsuccessfully against this, urging that Washington should seek a negotiated settlement at that time, even if it was unsatisfactory, rather than entering into a potentially dangerous and limitless commitment that might require ever-larger troop deployments without the hope of a likely victory. After losing this argument Clifford believed that the United States should prosecute the war strongly, without being diverted
See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Berrigan, Daniel; Coffin, William Sloane, Jr.; Democratic National Convention of 1968; Fellowship of Reconciliation; Fernandez, Richard; King, Martin Luther, Jr. References DeBenedetti, Charles, with Charles Chatfield. An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1990. Hall, Mitchell Kent. “Clergy and Laymen Concerned about Vietnam: A Study of Opposition to the Vietnam War.” PhD dissertation, University of Kentucky, 1987. Zaroulis, N. C., and Gerald Sullivan. Who Spoke Up? American Protest against the War in Vietnam, 1963–1975. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1984.
Clifford, Clark McAdams Birth Date: December 25, 1906 Death Date: October 10, 1998 Prominent attorney, presidential adviser to four administrations, and U.S. secretary of defense (1968–1969). Clark McAdams Clifford was born on December 25, 1906, at Fort Scott, Kansas. He earned an LLB from Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri, in 1928. After spending some years in St. Louis as a lawyer, in 1944 he joined the U.S. Navy and undertook various administrative assignments. A posting to the White House in 1945 as assistant naval aide soon led to his appointment as naval aide, then assistant, and finally counsel to President Harry S. Truman, a position that Clifford held until late 1949. He then began to practice law in
Clark M. Clifford served as U.S. secretary of defense during 1968–1969. In early March 1968, Clifford recommended to President Lyndon Johnson that the United States commit only those forces necessary to meet immediate needs in Vietnam and not embark on another major buildup. (Yoichi R. Okamoto/Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library)
Clinton, William Jefferson from its aims. Until 1967 he therefore opposed bombing halts and pauses and recommended that the United States make an intensive effort to win the war. On a mission to Vietnam in late 1965 Clifford was impressed by the evidence of American progress, even as he noted the signs of counterescalation by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). At a meeting of the so-called Wise Men, Johnson’s senior policy advisers, in November 1967, which Clifford attended, he joined the rest in urging Johnson to stand firm in Vietnam. Later that month Clifford spoke against a memorandum by Robert S. McNamara that called for determined U.S. efforts to make peace. In late January 1968 Clifford was confirmed as secretary of defense, replacing the now-dovish McNamara who had resigned. Almost immediately the Tet Offensive occurred, after which General William C. Westmoreland requested an additional 206,000 U.S. troops. Clifford set up a Vietnam Task Force to reassess the situation in Vietnam and learned to his dismay that U.S. military leaders could offer no plan for victory or assurance of success. In early March he therefore recommended to the president that the United States commit only the forces necessary to meet immediate needs in Vietnam and not embark on another major buildup. Fearing that victory was impossible, Clifford summoned another meeting of the Wise Men. After extensive briefings from State Department and Defense Department officials, most of this group concluded that the United States could not attain its ends in Vietnam and should begin peace negotiations. Throughout 1968 Clifford, now opposed to further escalation of the war, battled the hawks in the administration, most notably National Security Advisor Walt W. Rostow and Secretary of State Dean Rusk, in pushing for a bombing halt and negotiations with North Vietnam and in publicly putting pressure on the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) to join in peace talks. He left office in 1969 with the rest of the Johnson administration. In the early months of the Richard M. Nixon administration, Clifford approved of the new president’s intention to withdraw American troops. But Clifford alienated both Nixon and Johnson when he published an article in the summer 1969 issue of Foreign Affairs in which he called for the withdrawal of 100,000 American troops by December 1969 and all U.S. ground forces by December 1970. Clifford believed that only this prospect would impel South Vietnam to enter into serious negotiations. He repeated these suggestions in an article in Life magazine the following summer in which he also condemned the U.S. invasion of Cambodia in May 1970. Clifford continued to practice law in Washington and to play the role of an elder statesman of the Democratic Party. In the late 1980s and early 1990s his involvement with the Bank of Credit and Commerce International, which lost billions of dollars under fraudulent circumstances, proved highly embarrassing to him, although he pleaded ignorance of any knowledge of its criminal activities. His advanced age, poor health, and marginal role saved him from prosecution, but his image was tarnished and his influ-
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ence in Democratic circles greatly diminished. Clifford died in Bethesda, Maryland, on October 10, 1998. PRISCILLA ROBERTS See also Acheson, Dean Gooderham; Harriman, William Averell; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; McNamara, Robert Strange; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Rostow, Walt Whitman; Rusk, David Dean; Tet Offensive, Overall Strategy; Tet Offensive and the Saigon Circle; Truman, Harry S.; Vietnamization; Warnke, Paul Culliton; Westmoreland, William Childs; Wise Men References Barrett, David M. Uncertain Warriors: Lyndon Johnson and His Vietnam Advisers. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993. Berman, Larry. Lyndon Johnson’s War: The Road to Stalemate in Vietnam. New York: Norton, 1989. Clifford, Clark, with David Holbrooke. Counsel to the President: A Memoir. New York: Random House, 1991. Frantz, Douglas, and David MacKean. Friends in High Places: The Rise and Fall of Clark Clifford. Boston: Little, Brown, 1995. Hoopes, Townsend. The Limits of Intervention. New York: David McKay, 1969. Schandler, Herbert Y. Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam: The Unmaking of a President. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977.
Climate of Vietnam See Vietnam, Climate of; Vietnam, Climate and Terrain of, Impact on the Vietnam War
Clinton, William Jefferson Birth Date: August 19, 1946 Democratic Party politician, governor of Arkansas (1979–1981 and 1983–1992), and president of the United States (1993–2001). William Jefferson Clinton was born on August 19, 1946, in Hope, Arkansas, to a family of humble origins. He attended Georgetown University, graduating in 1968. While a student there he worked part-time for Arkansas senator J. William Fulbright, head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The committee’s investigation in 1968 of the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Incident appears to have increased the Georgetown senior’s interest in the war. As a draft-age male, Clinton was determined to keep his deferment by entering law or graduate school; a Rhodes Scholarship proved the solution. While studying in England from 1968 to 1970, he protested U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Clinton secured a II-S student deferment from the military draft to attend Georgetown, but the government stopped granting graduate deferments in late 1967. Influenced by Fulbright, the Hot Springs draft board passed over Clinton’s file in 1968, but in February 1969 he received a draft notice. That summer he solicited a Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) appointment
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at the University of Arkansas, receiving a deferment; in October Clinton reversed his decision and requested a return to his available status. Later, critics accused Clinton of realizing that the likelihood of his being drafted was nil, as President Richard M. Nixon had announced in September that draft calls would be curtailed for the rest of the year. Clinton’s avoidance of the draft became a major issue in the 1992 presidential campaign. Indeed, the “draftdodger” label followed Clinton into the presidency and soured his relationship with the military. Clinton graduated from Yale University Law School in 1973; there he met future U.S. senator and secretary of state Hillary Rodham. The two married in 1975. After a failed election bid for a seat in the U.S. House of Representatives in 1974, Clinton taught law at the University of Arkansas from 1974 to 1976. From 1977 to 1979 he served as attorney general of Arkansas. In 1978 he was elected governor of Arkansas, serving from 1979 to 1981; subsequently reelected, he served as governor again from 1983 to 1992. Clinton was elected president of the United States in 1992, defeating Republican incumbent George H. W. Bush. Clinton’s campaign revolved around new ideas for government programs, including an overhaul of the health care system, and a promise to revitalize the economy after a major downturn that had begun in 1992. Clinton’s first year in office witnessed numerous controversies, including his order to end restrictions on gays in the military, which caused such an uproar, especially from the military establishment, that he had to settle for the awkward “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy that appeased no one. The president’s attempt to overhaul the health care system was torpedoed by conservatives in Congress, who resented First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton’s attempts to assemble a sprawling bureaucratic apparatus to administer health insurance, which was done without the input of the political opposition. Nevertheless, Clinton did enjoy successes during his first term in office, particularly after economic health and prosperity returned by 1994. Indeed, he did an admirable job juggling foreign and domestic policy initiatives, which included welfare reform, deficit reduction, peace negotiations between the Palestinians and Israelis, free trade agreements, and the extraction of American troops from Somalia. In 1995 Clinton normalized relations with Vietnam, and he appointed Douglas “Pete” Peterson the first U.S. ambassador to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), in effect ending the Vietnam War as far as Americans were concerned. Clinton, however, suffered a major political setback in 1994 when Republicans swept the congressional elections and took majorities in both the House and Senate. A shrewd campaign run by Republicans had painted Clinton’s presidency as a return to big intrusive government. Clinton won reelection handily in 1996, running against Kansas senator Bob Dole who was almost old enough to be Clinton’s father. Clinton trumpeted the booming economy and his achievements in foreign policy. To beat the Republicans at their own game, he also
pledged a tough approach to crime and continued welfare reforms and deficit reduction initiatives. Clinton’s second term began amid much promise. The economy was the healthiest it had been in years, and in 1997 the president submitted to Congress the first balanced budget in almost 30 years. Thereafter, working with Republicans and Democrats, Clinton submitted balanced budgets that soon turned into huge budget surpluses by the end of his term. By 1998 unemployment was at an all-time low, and the stock market was soaring. In 1998 Clinton ordered air strikes against Iraq to coerce that nation to comply with United Nations (UN) weapons inspections. The next year he assembled a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military air campaign to stop the genocide being waged against Albanians in Kosovo by the Serbians. The campaign forced Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic to end the carnage. Meanwhile, Clinton continued to bring the Israelis and Palestinians closer together in a series of conferences and retreats, which included much personal diplomacy on Clinton’s part. Although he failed to arrive at a final comprehensive peace in the Middle East, Clinton had done more to foster peace in the region than any president since Jimmy Carter, some 20 years before. Clinton’s second term was, however, soon marred by myriad legal difficulties and a personal scandal that nearly cost him the presidency. From 1998 to 2001 in fact, much of Clinton’s time and energy were spent fending off allegations of wrongdoing. In 1998 his affair with a White House intern, Monica Lewinsky, resulted in embarrassing details made public of the president’s personal life, on which many Republicans were all too eager to capitalize. In a strictly partisan vote, the House of Representatives impeached Clinton for having lied under oath to a federal grand jury and for having obstructed justice in December 1999. The following month the U.S. Senate acquitted him. The scandal badly damaged Clinton’s effectiveness in office. When Clinton left office in January 2001 the United States had record budget surpluses, but there was still no peace in the Middle East. There were also signs that the economy was beginning to suffer. Many have posited that had Clinton not been involved in scandal, these problems may have been resolved or significantly reduced in scope. Clinton has enjoyed a high-profile ex-presidency. He helped his wife win election to the U.S. Senate, representing New York; wrote his memoirs; planned and established his presidential library in Little Rock; opened an office for himself in Harlem (New York City); and traveled extensively on speaking engagements and to raise huge sums of money for philanthropic causes, including AIDS and, with former president George H. W. Bush, tsunami relief in 2005–2006. Clinton also founded the William Clinton Foundation, an internationally based initiative that seeks to fund myriad humanitarian causes. He also received mixed reviews for his involvement in Hillary Clinton’s unsuccessful run for the Democratic Party nomination for president in 2008. BRENDA J. TAYLOR AND PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR.
Coffin, William Sloane, Jr. See also Bush, George Herbert Walker; Embargo, U.S. Trade; Fulbright, James William; Peterson, Douglas Brian; Selective Service; United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1975–Present References Clinton, William J. My Life. New York: Knopf, 2004. Marannis, David. First in His Class. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995. Oakley, Meredith L. On the Make: The Rise of Bill Clinton. Washington, DC: Regnery, 1994.
Cluster Bombs See Bombs, Gravity
Coastal Surveillance Force See MARKET TIME, Operation
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only outright colony. This was only a fiction, however, for all three were administrated from Paris. ARTHUR T. FRAME See also Annam; French Indochina, 1860s–1946; Minh Mang; Nguyen Phuc Anh; Tonkin; Vietnam, History of, Prehistory to 938 CE; Vietnam, History of, 938 CE through the French Conquest References Buttinger, Joseph. Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled. 2 vols. New York: Praeger, 1967. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. Tucker, Spencer C. Vietnam. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1999.
Coffin, William Sloane, Jr. Birth Date: June 1, 1924 Death Date: April 12, 2006
Cochin China Cochin China (Cochinchina) was the southernmost of the three former French colonies that today constitute the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV). The area occupied approximately 30,000 square miles of territory. The name “Cochinchina” originated from “Cauchinchina,” a title given to all of Vietnam by Portuguese explorers and traders in the 16th century. “Cauchin” was derived from “Giao Chi,” the Chinese characters for “Vietnam,” and “China” was added to distinguish it from Cochin, one of the Portuguese colonies in India. Later the French used the term “Cochinchine” to describe only the southern part of Vietnam in order to perpetuate the notion of a divided country. The French established their first trading post in Vietnam in 1680, but Vietnamese persecution of French Catholic missionaries provided an excuse for French military intervention there. Cochin China was the first to fall to French control, in 1862. The administrative center of the region was Saigon (present-day Ho Chi Minh City). The French believed that what was then a small fishing village would become an important commercial center once it was opened to Europeans. Even though Tonkin had larger numbers of Vietnamese Catholics, Cochin China was the initial focus of the French colonization efforts because it constituted the “rice bowl” of Vietnam and because it was the newest territory to be colonized by the Vietnamese and thus would be the easiest to conquer. (The Vietnamese did not secure the lower plain of the future Cochin China until the last decades of the 18th century.) With the creation of French Indochina in 1887, Annam and Tonkin were listed as protectorates, with Cochin China being the
Ordained minister, liberal clergyman, prominent anti–Vietnam War activist, and lifelong peace proponent. Born in New York City on June 1, 1924, to a prominent and well-to-do family, William Sloane Coffin Jr. served in the U.S. Army during World War II. He later studied at both Yale University, graduating in 1949, and Union Theological Seminary. His uncle Henry Sloane Coffin, one of the nation’s foremost clergymen, had been the president of that seminary. For a time William Coffin worked at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as a specialist on the Soviet Union, but he left the agency after becoming disillusioned with its policies. Ordained a Presbyterian minister in 1956, two years later Coffin became the chaplain of Yale University and held that position during the course of the Vietnam War. There he came under the influence of theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, who inculcated in Coffin the need for social activism. Active in the Civil Rights Movement, Coffin also came to hold a prominent position in the antiwar movement as both a moral leader and a political strategist. He was particularly involved in efforts to resist the military draft. In September 1967 Coffin cosigned with 319 other ministers, writers, and professors “A Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority.” Among other things, the document pledged aid to draft resisters. That same year he played an important role in a national Stop the Draft week. On October 20, 1967, he and others attempted to deliver more than 1,000 draft cards to the Justice Department in Washington, which refused them. He was also active in the organization Clergy and Laymen Concerned about Vietnam. In 1968 Coffin was indicted for his role in the drafting of “A Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority” along with other coconspirators. In June 1968 he was found guilty for having aided and abetted draft
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Presbyterian minister William Sloane Coffin Jr. was a prominent activist in the antiwar movement of the 1960s. (UPI-Bettmann/Corbis)
evasion, but the verdict was overturned in 1970. Throughout the war Coffin emphasized the immorality of the conflict. Coffin resigned his position at Yale in 1975 to pursue interests in writing and lecturing. He also served several high-profile churches in New York City. Coffin continued to champion civil and human rights and became an outspoken proponent of gay rights. He also founded a significant antinuclear organization in the 1970s, and in 1987 he became the head of SANE/FREEZE, the largest U.S. antinuclear/peace organization. Coffin became emeritus president in the early 1990s and thereafter concentrated his work on speaking and advocating for peace and human rights issues. He also authored numerous books. After several years of failing health, Coffin died at his home in Strafford, Vermont, on April 12, 2006. MICHAEL G. O’LOUGHLIN See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Clergy and Laymen Concerned about Vietnam; Conscientious Objectors; Selective Service References Goldstein, Warren. William Sloane Coffin, Jr.: A Holy Impatience. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004. Halstead, Fred. Out Now! A Participant’s Account of the American Movement against the Vietnam War. New York: Monad, 1978. Mailer, Norman. Armies of the Night: History as a Novel, the Novel as History. New York: New American Library, 1968. “320 Vow to Help Draft Resisters.” New York Times, September 27, 1967.
Cogny, René Birth Date: April 25, 1904 Death Date: September 11, 1968 French Army general and commander of French forces in northern Vietnam during the final phase of the Indochina War, when the siege of Dien Bien Phu caught the world’s attention. René Cogny was born on April 25, 1904, in Saint-Valéry-en-Caux (Seine-Inférieure). He joined the French Army in 1925, was commissioned in 1929, and was promoted to captain of artillery in 1935. Taken prisoner by the Germans in World War II, he escaped from a prison camp in 1941 and joined the Resistance. Arrested in 1943, he was sent to Buchenwald, where he was liberated in 1945. Cogny rose rapidly through a number of staff positions with General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny. Promoted to general in 1950, Cogny went to Indochina with his chief and served as director of de Lattre’s military cabinet there. Virtually alone among senior officers who had accompanied de Lattre to Indochina, Cogny stayed on there after de Lattre’s departure. He then commanded a division in northern Vietnam and in May 1953 became commander of ground forces in northern Vietnam. After advocating the occupation of Dien Bien Phu as a means of controlling Viet Minh movements threatening Laos, Cogny oversaw the hasty abandonment of Lai Chau in December 1953, which
Colby, William Egan led to the loss of most of the groupements de commandos mixtes aéroportés (airborne battle groups) based there. They were left to their own devices, remaining on the sidelines as the Viet Minh encircled the camp at Dien Bien Phu in preparation for the climactic battle of the war. Cogny’s orders to Colonel Christian M. de Castries were criticized afterward as indecisive, but this was largely because General Henri Navarre denied Cogny the use of the forces that would have been necessary to mount an operation to save the camp. Cogny was reduced to coordinating aerial resupply from his headquarters in Hanoi. After the fall of Dien Bien Phu in May 1954, Cogny gave a good account of himself in waging a punishing campaign against the Viet Minh that succeeded in preserving French control of the Hanoi-Haiphong axis. By then, however, the fate of Indochina was being decided in the armistice negotiations at Geneva. After the armistice and partition of Vietnam, Cogny served briefly as French delegate general for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) before being posted to Africa, where he continued to hold commands until being forced to retire on April 25, 1964, because of his age. He died in the crash of an Air France Caravelle airliner in the Mediterranean on September 11, 1968. ARTHUR J. DOMMEN See also Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; France, Army, 1946–1954; Geneva Conference and Geneva Accords of 1954; Indochina War; Navarre, Henri Eugène; Salan, Raoul Albin Louis
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agents into Europe and assisting resistance forces during World War II, led to a 33-year intelligence career. In 1947 Colby earned a law degree from Columbia University, and in 1950 he joined the CIA. In 1959 he became CIA station chief in Saigon. During the next three years Colby and other CIA officials experimented with various forms of security and rural development programs for the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). From these endeavors the Citizens’ (later Civilian) Irregular Defense Groups (CIDGs), the Mountain Scout Program, and the Strategic Hamlet Project emerged in 1961. In 1962 Colby became chief of the CIA’s Far East Division, a position he held until 1968. This new appointment forced him to concentrate not only on Southeast Asia, including Laos, Thailand, and Cambodia, but also on China and other areas, such as the Philippines. In this new position he stressed pacification as the key to overcoming Communist aggression in Vietnam. In 1965 CIA analysts established the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) to measure certain factors in the villages in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). These elements contributed to identifying the progress of pacification in the countryside. Despite this, an aggressive pacification strategy did not emerge until 1968. In 1968 Colby returned to Vietnam and, with ambassadorial rank, succeeded Robert Komer as deputy to the commander of MACV for Civil Operations and Revolutionary (later changed to Rural) Development Support (CORDS). While serving in this post, Colby oversaw
References Fall, Bernard B. Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu. New York: Lippincott, 1966. Gras, Yves. Histoire de la Guerre d’Indochine. Paris: Éditions Denoël, 1992. Roy, Jules. The Battle of Dienbienphu. New York: Harper and Row, 1965. Simpson, Howard R. Dien Bien Phu: The Epic Battle America Forgot. Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1994. Windrow, Martin. The Last Valley: Dien Bien Phu and the French Defeat in Vietnam. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2004.
Colby, William Egan Birth Date: January 4, 1920 Death Date: April 27, 1996 U.S. Army officer; ambassador; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) station chief in Saigon; deputy to the commander of U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV); and director of the CIA (1973–1976). Born on January 4, 1920, in St. Paul, Minnesota, William Egan Colby graduated from Princeton University in 1940. He obtained a commission in the U.S. Army and in 1943 began working with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Colby’s involvement with this organization, which included parachuting
William Colby, shown here in 1973, was director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency during 1973–1976. Earlier, Colby had headed Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), the umbrella organization for U.S. pacification efforts in the Republic of Vietnam. (AP/Wide World Photos)
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Collins, Joseph Lawton
the Accelerated Pacification Campaign. Initiated in November 1968, the campaign focused on enhanced security and development within South Vietnam’s villages and included such components as the Phoenix Program and the People’s Self-Defense Force. From 1969 to 1970 planning for pacification and development shifted from the Americans to the South Vietnamese in accordance with the Richard M. Nixon administration’s policy of Vietnamization. Then in 1971 the program shifted to a more self-oriented role for the villages of South Vietnam. A year later Colby returned to Washington, D.C., to become the executive director of the CIA and then served as CIA director from May 1973 until his retirement in November 1976. Colby assumed leadership of the CIA during the worst crisis in its history, triggered in part by that agency’s assistance of former agent E. Howard Hunt in his illegal break-ins, including that at the Watergate complex in June 1972. Colby’s predecessor, James R. Schlesinger, had ordered the compilation of a list of CIA actions that might have violated its charter. Colby inherited that list and revealed to Congress the agency’s involvement in illegal domestic surveillance programs, plots to kill foreign leaders and overthrow governments, use of humans as guinea pigs in mind-control experiments, and other violations of its charter. He believed that revealing to Congress the agency’s unsavory side helped to save it from congressional abolition. This action earned Colby admiration from many in Congress and the public but also earned him the enmity of many Cold War warriors, which helped bring an end to his tenure as director in 1976. In retirement Colby maintained that the United States and South Vietnam might have won the war if only they had fought the CIA’s kind of war and countered Communist guerrilla tactics. In his 1989 memoir he argued that the Americans had employed incorrect strategy and tactics. He claimed that in the early 1970s Vietnamization was succeeding and pacification was building the base for a South Vietnamese victory, culminating in the defeat of the 1972 Communist offensive, with U.S. air and logistical support but no ground assistance. Colby believed that this chance for victory was thrown away when the United States sharply reduced its military and logistical support and then “sold out” the South Vietnamese government during negotiations in Paris. The final straw came when Congress dramatically cut aid to South Vietnam, making inevitable the 1975 Communist victory. Colby also spoke out against the nuclear arms race, and in 1992 he spoke out in favor of cutting the defense budget and spending the money on social programs. Colby drowned in a canoeing accident off Rock Park, Maryland, on April 27, 1996. R. BLAKE DUNNAVENT See also Air America; Central Intelligence Agency; Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support; Hamlet Evaluation System; Komer, Robert W.; Pacification; Phoenix Program; Psychological Warfare Operations; Schlesinger, James Rodney; Strategic Hamlet Program; Taylor-McNamara Report; Watergate Scandal
References Andradé, Dale. Ashes to Ashes: The Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 1990. Colby, William. Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978. Colby, William, with James McCargar. Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America’s Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam. Chicago: Contemporary Books, 1989.
Collins, Joseph Lawton Birth Date: May 1, 1896 Death Date: September 12, 1987 U.S. Army general and special representative of President Dwight D. Eisenhower sent to Vietnam in 1954 to assess the situation following the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu and the Geneva Accords and to determine the size and scope of future U.S. assistance. Born in New Orleans, Louisiana, on May 1, 1896, Joseph Lawton Collins graduated from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, in 1917 and was commissioned a second lieutenant. He rose steadily through the ranks and commanded a division and a corps in World War II. In 1947 he became deputy chief of staff of the U.S. Army under General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Promoted to full general in January 1948, Collins became chief of staff of the U.S. Army in 1949, a post he held until 1953. Collins was intimately involved in the Korean War and was the first commander to recommend that U.S. ground troops be sent to the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) to repel the June 25, 1950, invasion by forces of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea). By 1953 Collins had grown sufficiently weary of the costly and stalemated Korean War to support the use of nuclear weapons to force the Communists back to the negotiating table. His routinely scheduled retirement as chief of staff in August 1953 occurred only weeks after the July armistice agreement was signed. Collins is credited with fully integrating U.S. Army units during the Korean War, per President Harry S. Truman’s 1948 executive order calling for the racial integration of American armed forces. When sending Collins to Vietnam in November 1954, President Eisenhower gave him the rank of ambassador and, in his letter of introduction, “broad authority to direct, utilize and control all agencies and resources of the U.S. government with respect to Vietnam.” Upon his arrival in Saigon, Collins found the government under challenge from the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao religious sects and from the Binh Xuyen gangsters, and there was also a threatened coup by General Nguyen Van Hinh, chief of staff of the armed forces of southern Vietnam. After Collins reached agreement with the French authorities in Vietnam, combined French and U.S. pressure induced General Hinh to go to France for “consultations” with State of Vietnam titular head of state Bao Dai. Although Collins personally agreed with the French that Ngo Dinh
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U.S. Army chief of staff General J. Lawton Collins (left) and French high commissioner for Indochina, General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny (right) in Hanoi, October 1951. Later, as ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam, Collins believed that President Ngo Dinh Diem was incapable of leading his country. (National Archives)
Diem was not capable of leading the State of Vietnam, his instructions were to support the Diem government by helping it establish a military training program and agrarian reforms, which he did. The observations and reports that Collins relayed to Washington solidified the American commitment in Vietnam and served as a blueprint for U.S. policy there until the early 1960s. Collins retired from the army in March 1956 at four-star rank and worked for the pharmaceutical firm of Chas. Pfizer & Co. from 1957 to 1969. He died in Washington, D.C., on September 12, 1987. ARTHUR T. FRAME See also Bao Dai; Binh Xuyen; Cao Dai; Dulles, John Foster; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Ély, Paul Henri Romuald; Hoa Hao; Military Assistance and Advisory Group, Vietnam; Ngo Dinh Diem; Nguyen Van Hinh References Collins, General J. Lawton. Lightning Joe: An Autobiography. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979. Spector, Ronald H. Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941–1960. United States Army in Vietnam Series. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1983.
Combined Action Platoons See Marine Combined Action Platoons
COMMANDO FLASH,
Operation
Start Date: December 29, 1971 End Date: February 8, 1972 Military operation carried out by U.S. forces to prevent a potential invasion of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) by forces of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). In late 1971 U.S. reconnaissance flights identified a large buildup of People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) supplies along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and an increase in the number of PAVN troops entering South Vietnam along the Ho Chi Mint Trail infiltration network. Concerned that the Communists might be planning a major offensive against South Vietnam as his Vietnamization plan was unfolding, President Richard M. Nixon decided to take steps to prevent this from occurring.
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COMMANDO HUNT, Operation
In early November 1971 Nixon decided to reverse the drawdown of U.S. air forces in Vietnam to support the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) ground forces, which were still reeling from the bloodbath of Operation LAM SON 719 into Laos during the summer of 1971. The United States also initiated Operation PROUD DEEP ALPHA on December 26, 1971. The largest U.S. bombing campaign since the end of Operation ROLLING THUNDER in November 1968, PROUD DEEP ALPHA extended for five days and was directed against PAVN supply and troop concentrations in southern North Vietnam. Coincidentally, Headquarters Pacific Air Forces planners developed Operation Plan C-101 designed to augment the in-theater Seventh Air Force F-4 Phantom fighter force. In one of many redeployment operations undertaken in late 1971 and early 1972, Operation COMMANDO FLASH sent F-4 fighter jet aircraft from the Philippines to Thailand. COMMANDO FLASH began on December 29, 1971, when 6 F-4s flew from Clark Air Base in the Philippines and relocated to Korat Royal Thai Air Force Base in Thailand. On February 8, 1972, 12 additional aircraft departed Clark Air Base, with 6 going to Ubon Royal Thai Air Force Base and 6 to Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base. Even as the F-4s were arriving in Thailand, Headquarters Pacific Air Forces developed a second plan known as Operation Plan C-103 or Operation COMMANDO FLY. It began on April 3, 1972, only 5 days after the PAVN’s Easter Offensive began. Eight F-4s deployed to Ubon Royal Thai Air Force Base and to Da Nang Air Base in South Vietnam. It soon became clear that the magnitude of the invasion would require more fighter aircraft from the United States. This led to the redeployment of 144 additional F-4s and 12 F-105s during Operation CONSTANT GUARD. These aircraft were employed during Operation LINEBACKER I (May–October 1972) to blunt the Easter Offensive. WILLIAM P. HEAD See also Demilitarized Zone; Easter Offensive; Ho Chi Minh Trail; LAM SON 719, Operation; LINEBACKER I, Operation; Nixon, Richard Milhous; PROUD DEEP ALPHA, Operation References Mark, Eduard. Aerial Interdiction: Air Power and Land Battle in Three American Wars. Washington, DC: Center for Air Force History, 1994. Nicholson, Capt. Charles A. The USAF Response to the Spring 1972 NVN Offensive: Situation and Redeployment (Project CHECO Report). Saigon: 7AF DOAC, 1972. Tilford, Earl H., Jr. Setup: What the Air Force Did in Vietnam and Why. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1991.
COMMANDO HUNT,
Operation
Start Date: November 15, 1968 End Date: April 10, 1972 A series of aerial interdiction campaigns aimed at the Ho Chi Minh Trail logistical corridor in southeastern Laos. Each campaign lasted approximately six months, covering the period of either
a dry or a wet season as dictated by the monsoonal climate. The objectives of Operation COMMANDO HUNT were twofold: first to reduce the flow of People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) troops and supplies from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) into the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) and Cambodia, and second to destroy trucks, supply caches, storage bases, the trail support structure, and even the topography of the area around the trail. Of the nearly 3 million tons of bombs that fell on Laos from 1962 to 1973, approximately 95 percent were dropped on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Laos became the third most-bombed country in the history of warfare. The U.S. Air Force conducted most of these attacks, although U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and Royal Laotian Air Force planes also participated. During the day, jet fighters and Boeing B-52 Stratofortresses attacked suspected truck parks and storage areas. Bombs fell on the passes leading from North Vietnam into Laos in an attempt to cause landslides. Into 1969 occasional Operation RANCH HAND jungle-defoliation missions were also flown. At night, when the bulk of the traffic moved on the trail, U.S. Air Force Lockheed AC-130 Spectre and Fairchild AC-119 Shadow gunships, specially modified Martin B-57G Canberras, and a variety of other aircraft attacked trucks. Meanwhile, up to 30 B-52 sorties a day were flown to bomb predetermined interdiction boxes located around Tchepone, a key transshipment point leading into South Vietnam, and in each of the four passes leading from North Vietnam into Laos. Although the operation was intensive and sophisticated, COMMANDO HUNT failed for two reasons. First, PAVN forces controlled the tempo of the war in South Vietnam, and their consumption of supplies was easily regulated according to their ability to receive those supplies. Second, while the war was becoming increasingly conventional, the Ho Chi Minh Trail possessed no easily spotted and targeted railroad marshaling yards or difficult-to-repair steel and concrete bridges. The trail consisted of some 200 miles of paved roads and 6,000 miles of dirt roads, pathways, and waterways down which supplies could move. The truck count, a statistical compilation of trucks destroyed or damaged, was the measure of success. But statistics became meaningless estimates based on faulty assumptions for determining whether or not a truck had been destroyed. For instance, during COMMANDO HUNT V (October 1970–April 1971), the U.S. Air Force claimed 16,266 vehicles destroyed and 4,700 damaged. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) countered that according to its estimates, there were only 10,000 trucks in all of North Vietnam and Laos. Official Vietnamese figures show that in fact COMMANDO HUNT V destroyed a total of 2,120 Vietnamese vehicles, a little more than 50 percent of all Vietnamese vehicles operating along the Ho Chi Minh Trail during this period. The American figures for trucks destroyed, although adjusted, were never rectified because COMMANDO HUNT became an exercise in the compilation of statistics, which, given the managerial ethos of the U.S. Air Force at that time, became an end unto themselves.
Concerned Officers Movement On April 20, 1972, as the North Vietnamese Spring (Easter) Offensive got under way and 14 PAVN divisions streamed into South Vietnam, COMMANDO HUNT VII came to an end, and the operation was canceled. Concerted bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail continued, however, until February 1973. According to Vietnamese figures, COMMANDO HUNT VII was the most successful of all the bombing campaigns against the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Vietnamese records reveal that U.S. forces destroyed almost 60 percent of all Vietnamese trucks operating along the Ho Chi Minh Trail during this time period (3,373 out of a total force of 5,756 trucks). EARL H. TILFORD JR. See also Airpower, Role in War; Ho Chi Minh Trail; Laos; RANCH HAND, Operation; STEEL TIGER, Operation; TIGER HOUND, Operation References Berger, Carl, ed. The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, 1961– 1973: An Illustrated Account. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1977. Gibson, James William. The Perfect War: Technowar in Vietnam. Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986. Littauer, Raphael, and Norman Thomas Uphoff. The Air War in Indochina. Rev. ed. Boston: Beacon, 1971. Nguyen Viet Phuong. Van Tai Quan Su Chien Luoc Tren Duong Ho Chi Minh Trong Khang Chien Chong My [Strategic Military Transportation on the Ho Chi Minh Trail during the Resistance War against the Americans]. Hanoi: People’s Army of Vietnam, General Department of Rear Services, 1988. Tilford, Earl H., Jr. Setup: What the Air Force Did in Vietnam and Why. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1991.
Concerned Officers Movement An organization of junior U.S. military officers who were opposed to the Vietnam War. In September 1970 following the Labor Day weekend (September 4–7) protest sponsored by the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, popularly known as Operation RAW (“Rapid American Withdrawal”), 28 naval officers held a press conference on September 28 announcing the creation of the Concerned Officers Movement (COM). The organization tied its opposition to the Vietnam War with domestic social reconstruction. In a prepared statement, the young officers not only decried the military policies that had turned an internal struggle into a nationdestroying bloodbath but also called for American leaders to shift funds away from military priorities to areas such as poverty mitigation, education, and the environment. No one individual assumed leadership of COM. It was instead a collective effort on the part of the officers to act as one in their criticisms of the war. The movement was short-lived for two principal reasons. First, its appearance coincided with a drawdown in American military operations in Vietnam. Second, many of the junior officers were discharged or forced to resign their commissions. However, during its brief tenure the COM was able to estab-
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lish close to 28 locals throughout all the military branches and at its peak had approximately 3,000 members, including many supporters from the enlisted ranks. COM carried out antiwar actions in various ways. It published a newsletter, Common Sense, and distributed it to junior officers throughout the armed services. COM also paid for advertisements in local newspapers, calling for an immediate withdrawal of American combat forces from Vietnam. Junior officers in COM’s local chapter at the Norfolk Naval Base, for example, paid for a local billboard advertisement outside the installation that read “Peace Now.” By 1971 COM’s actions became bolder. The revelations associated with Lieutenant William Calley and the My Lai Massacre of 1968 increased its opposition to the war. That same year a series of written and public protests took place. Some 29 members of COM from Fort Bragg and Polk Air Force Base in North Carolina along with 38 members from Fort Knox, Kentucky, publicly signed antiwar statements. On the U.S. Navy aircraft carrier Hancock, 20 officers demanded an open discussion of the war, and 27 others signed a letter addressed to Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird demanding an immediate withdrawal from Vietnam. On April 23, 1971, junior officers organized a memorial service at Washington’s National Cathedral. The purpose of the memorial was to honor all the war dead; more than 250 officers in uniform attended the service. Those who attended ignored the higher brass’s warning that it considered such action a political demonstration. A letter signed by 40 COM members was also sent directly to President Richard M. Nixon urging him to end the war immediately. One local chapter, Concerned Military, was particularly active as early as the summer and autumn of 1970. In San Diego, California, the Concerned Military chapter joined with other antiwar protestors in an effort to mobilize opposition to the departure of the carrier Constellation, then bound for Vietnam. Working with veteran antiwar activists, this local chapter also helped organize a local referendum on whether the ship should set sail. This action led to other “Stop Our Ship” (SOS) campaigns in a wider effort to prevent naval vessels from heading to Southeast Asia. A strong resistance movement within the Seventh Fleet was led by COM and its local chapter. Even the Pentagon had a local COM chapter by 1971. When officials discovered that it had been organized by a U.S. Navy physician, he was given a discharge in less than 48 hours. COM did not capture the headlines as dramatically as the Vietnam Veterans Against the War had done in the final years before the war ended. Most of COM’s actions took place in the form of letter writing and petitions. Some of COM’s public statements were reflective of more popular views espoused by war resisters who linked peace with domestic social and economic reform. Nevertheless, the creation of COM symbolized an important political shift among junior officers in the early 1970s and growing concerns about the duration and impact of the Vietnam War upon the military and American society at large. CHARLES FRANCIS HOWLETT
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See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Laird, Melvin Robert; My Lai Massacre; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Vietnam Veterans Against the War References Anderson, Terry. “The GI Movement and Response from the Brass.” In Give Peace a Chance: Exploring the Vietnam Antiwar Movement, edited by Melvin Small and William D. Hoover, 93–115. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1992. Cortright, David. Soldiers in Revolt: GI Resistance during the Vietnam War. 2nd ed. Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2005. DeBenedetti, Charles, with Charles Chatfield. An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1990. Hauser, William L. America’s Army in Crisis: A Study in Civil-Military Relations. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973. Moser, Richard. The New Winter Soldiers: GI and Veteran Dissent during the Vietnam Era. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1996. Nicosia, Gerald. Home to War: A History of the Vietnam Veterans’ Movement. New York: Carroll and Graff, 2004. Wells, Tom. The War Within: America’s Battle over Vietnam. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.
“Conduct of the War in Vietnam” Report Report commissioned in the wake of public outrage over the March 16, 1968, My Lai Massacre that explored the question of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), commander General William Westmoreland’s personal culpability for war crimes. In early 1970 Columbia University law professor Telford Taylor, who had been the chief U.S. prosecutor at Nuremberg, published Nuremberg and Vietnam in which he argued that General Westmoreland was culpable for war crimes committed at My Lai and would have been held responsible had World War II–era standards been in effect. Taylor lent a note of academic respectability to the cacophony of sometimes sensational public criticism of the U.S. Army’s handling of the My Lai Massacre, which included the perceived coverup and questionable dismissal of charges by Lieutenant General Jonathan O. Seaman, commander of First Army and the deciding officer in the cases of Major General Samuel W. Koster and 13 other officers involved in the failure to investigate or in covering up the My Lai Massacre. Under increasing public pressure and encouraged by General Westmoreland, who wanted to clear his name, the U.S. Army commissioned a task force to prepare an investigative report of the allegations against him. In May 1971 after an extensive 14-week investigation, the task force produced a report titled “Conduct of the War in Vietnam” (also known as the COWIN Report). The task force had been instructed to examine how effectively the rules of engagement had been carried out, whether violations had occurred, if those violations had been properly reported, and if so whether appropriate
disciplinary measures had been taken. The committee investigated whether the need to adhere strictly to the rules of engagement had been communicated to the troops involved at My Lai or if they had been communicated with the tacit understanding that they were merely “window dressing.” If the latter was true, it was those at the top of the chain of command who should have been held culpable rather than individuals such as Lieutenant William Calley, who had previously been found guilty of the murder of 25 people at My Lai. Westmoreland’s critics, including Professor Taylor, compared his situation to that of convicted Japanese general Yamashita Tomoyuki during World War II, who had denied knowledge of war crimes committed by troops under his command. The COWIN Report did not accept this comparison and exonerated General Westmoreland. The report concluded that the undeniable crimes against Vietnamese civilians had been investigated and prosecuted appropriately. The fact that the charges against many of those originally implicated had been dropped by highranking military officers held no sway with the task force. The report concluded that Westmoreland had in fact outlined clear and appropriate procedures for the proper treatment of civilians and had sufficiently communicated these guidelines to his immediate subordinates. In conclusion, the task force determined that there was no basis whatsoever for holding General Westmoreland responsible for war crimes committed by the troops. JOHN M. BARCUS See also Calley, William Laws, Jr.; Koster, Samuel William, Sr.; My Lai Massacre; Seaman, Jonathan O.; Westmoreland, William Childs References Lewy, Guenter. America in Vietnam. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978. Taylor, Telford. Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970. Zaffiri, Samuel. Westmoreland: A Biography of General William C. Westmoreland. New York: William Morrow, 1994.
Conein, Lucien Emile Birth Date: November 29, 1919 Death Date: June 3, 1998 Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer in Vietnam. Lucien Emile Conein was born in Paris, France, on November 29, 1919. His widowed mother sent him alone at age five to live in Kansas City, Missouri, with his aunt, who had married a U.S. World War I veteran. In 1939 Conein returned to France and enlisted in the 13th Demi-Brigade of the French Foreign Legion and served with it in Africa and Europe. In 1940 when his unit withdrew from Narvik, Norway, and returned to Africa
Confucianism following the French surrender to Germany, Conein had to decide whether to continue in the legion and serve the Nazi-sponsored French Vichy government or join Free French Forces under General Charles de Gaulle. Happy with neither option, Conein used the existing confusion to make his way back to the United States by way of Dakar and Martinique. Conein joined the U.S. Army in September 1941. After basic training and jump school at Fort Benning, Georgia, he attended Officer’s Candidate School. He received his commission as a second lieutenant in July 1943. Recruited by the OSS, he soon parachuted into France, where he worked with the Resistance until France was liberated by advancing Allied armies. When the fighting in Europe ended in May 1945, he was sent to China. After further training and briefing, Conein parachuted into northern Vietnam to provide aid and advice to French troops there who were still fighting against the Japanese. When Japan surrendered in August 1945 Conein made his way to Hanoi, where he met Ho Chi Minh and other senior Viet Minh leaders. When the OSS was abolished at the end of the war, Conein served on different classified assignments both in Europe and in Southeast Asia. Between 1954 and 1956 he was back in Vietnam as a vital part of Colonel Edward Lansdale’s Military Mission team, working on sabotage and destabilization activities north of the 17th Parallel. Returning to the United States, Conein joined the Special Forces but was still occasionally employed by the CIA. He was involved in training Cuban Brigade 2506 for its invasion, which failed, at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961. Conein retired from the U.S. Army in 1961. The next year he was called back by the CIA, given the cover of an army lieutenant colonel, and sent to Saigon, ostensibly assigned to the Interior Ministry. His real mission was to maintain CIA contacts with senior Vietnamese generals, many of whom he had known in northern Vietnam in 1945 when they were junior officers. Conein was one of the few Americans they were willing to trust. Operating under the code names Lulu or Black Luigi, he served as liaison between Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and such Vietnamese generals as Tran Van Don and Duong Van Minh at the time of the November 1963 coup against President Ngo Dinh Diem. Conein let the generals know that America would not look unfavorably on a change in their government. In the autumn of 1964 almost a year after the coup, Conein departed Vietnam. He left the CIA in 1968. He later joined the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) as a senior intelligence officer. He retired from government service in the early 1970s to McLean, Virginia, and died in Bethesda, Maryland, on June 3, 1998. CECIL B. CURREY See also Central Intelligence Agency; Duong Van Minh; Lansdale, Edward Geary; Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr.; Ngo Dinh Diem, Overthrow of; Office of Strategic Services; Richardson, John Hammond; Tran Van Don
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References Ahern, Thomas L., Jr. CIA and the Generals: Covert Support to Military Government in South Vietnam. Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1998; declassified 2009. Grant, Zalin. Facing the Phoenix: The CIA and the Political Defeat of the United States in Vietnam. New York: Norton, 1991. Prados, John. Presidents’ Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations from World War II through Iranscam. New York: William Morrow, 1988.
Confucianism Confucianism (in Vietnamese, Khong Giao) is not so much a religion as a way of life. Since being founded in China by the disciples of Confucius (551–449 BCE) some 2,500 years ago, Confucianism has had a pervasive influence on China, Japan, Korea, Mongolia, and Vietnam. In Vietnam the traditional social structure was largely based on the Confucian model, which binds subject to ruler, son to father, wife to husband, younger brother to older brother, and friend to friend. Confucius believed that the primary goal of education was to train noblemen so that they could serve the public good as retainers of the emperor. Because Confucius supported the rights of the ruler over his subjects, Confucianism was later used in the service of autocratic governments to justify strong central states. Thus, as happened in China, Vietnam’s traditional government was extremely hierarchical, with a large class of mandarin bureaucrats trained in the Confucian classics. These bureaucrats acted as emissaries of the emperor throughout the country, all the way down to the village level. Confucian literature consists of Five Canonical Books and Four Books. The Five Canonical Books are the Book of Rites, the Book of Change, the Book of History, the Book of Poetry, and the Book of Spring and Autumn Annals (Kinh Le, Kinh Dich, Kinh Thu, Kinh Thi, and Kinh Xuan Thu). The Four Books are the Analects, the Golden Mean, the Great Learning, and the Book of Mencius (Luan Ngu, Trung Dung, Dai Hoc, Manh Tu). The Book of Change in particular promotes a belief in the cyclical movement of history. This is called the Theory of Cyclical Change, which means that the movement of the universe is cyclic. At the end of its revolution, beginning and end are the same (Tian di xun huan zhong er h shi, Thien Dia tuan hoan chung nhi phuc thuy). In the sense that history is thought to move forward by stages, this aspect of Confucianism was not radically different from the Marxist concept of dialectical materialism. In addition, even though oriental Marxists have generally accused Confucianism of supporting feudalism and thus have sought to destroy it, many elements of Confucianism, such as unquestioned loyalty to the ruler and the state, have been successfully incorporated into the revolutionary philosophy of numerous Communist regimes. NGUYEN VAN THO
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Statue of Confucius in the Temple of Confucius in Beijing, China. Confucius was the most influential thinker in Chinese history. His philosophy dominated China, Japan, Korea, Mongolia, and Vietnam. In Vietnam, the traditional social structure was largely based on the Confucian model. (Sofiaworld/Dreamstime.com) See also Buddhism in Vietnam; Vietnam, History of, Prehistory to 938 CE References The I Ching, or Book of Changes. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977. Legge, James. The Chinese Classics. 5 vols. London: H. Frowde, 1861–1876. Legge, James. Four Books of the Chinese Classics. 8 vols. Tokyo: Z. P. Maruya, 1885.
Conscientious Objectors U.S. classification for active-duty or draft-eligible individuals opposed to war or combatant participation in war on certain moral or religious grounds. Throughout American history potential soldiers have sought, often without success, to avoid military service on grounds of conscientious objection. During World War I, World War II, and the Korean War, men who opposed war
because of religious training or deeply held beliefs were allowed to perform nonmilitary service. This status, normally restricted to members of historically pacifist groups such as Mennonites, Quakers, and Jehovah’s Witnesses, was not open to all persons who sought exemption on matters of conscience. Recognized conscientious objectors (COs) endured ridicule, isolation, and, frequently, hard labor, but those without official sanction faced harsh punishments, including prison terms. Throughout most of the 20th century, COs represented a very small percentage of service-eligible and active-duty men. Resistance to U.S. involvement in Vietnam, however, significantly changed the aspect of conscientious objection. As U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia deepened in the early 1960s, more than 20 million draft-eligible young Americans faced the increasing possibility of being drafted and sent to Vietnam. Many of these sought to avoid military service by taking advantage of the numerous deferment and exemption programs available. Conscientious objection also became a popular avenue of draft avoidance.
Conscientious Objectors Existing rules limited the scope of conscientious objection. Applicants had to present convincing pacifist credentials (such as letters from clergy) and declare opposition to all war. Selective aversion, such as moral opposition to U.S. involvement in Vietnam, did not justify eligibility. Applicants were also subject to inconsistent review from local draft boards. A study of three boards in one southern city found that one board granted CO exemptions to almost every applicant, another granted no CO exemptions, and one reviewed the merits of each case. Growing opposition to the draft brought challenges to traditional interpretations of conscientious objection. A barrage of lawsuits and court decisions continually expanded the criteria. The 1965 case United States v. Seeger held that neither church affiliation nor belief in God was required for CO status: a “sincere and meaningful belief that occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by God” would suffice if the applicant met all other requirements. This left with draft boards the ill-defined task of establishing sincerity. Pacifist Muslims tested the law on grounds that they could fight only if called to do so by Allah. Since they could not claim opposition to all wars, most were denied CO exemptions, and consequently many Muslims went to prison for refusing military service.
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Selective Service System (SSS) classifications listed three CO categories: I-A-O: CO available for noncombatant military service only. I-O: CO available for civilian work contributing to the maintenance of the national health, safety, or interest. I-W: CO performing civilian work contributing to the maintenance of the national health, safety, or interest. By far, I-O status proved the most sought after. Between 1960 and 1973, more than 170,000 men received I-O status, which became I-W upon entering alternative service. Almost 100,000 men accepted two years of alternative service as hospital orderlies or in other low-paying public-service positions. The monitoring of I-W COs usually fell to overburdened local draft boards, which exercised little supervision. More than 70,000 I-O COs never completed alternative service, a third of whom were later excused because of high lottery numbers. Of the remaining 40,000 who faced prosecution, only 1,200 were ever convicted. COs granted I-A-O status were included with I-As (available for military service) in the group most likely to be drafted. These COs were just as likely to be sent to Vietnam as any draftee. I-A-Os were assigned noncombatant duties (not required to carry or fire
Heavyweight champion Muhammad Ali has a “no comment” as he is confronted by newsmen leaving the Federal Building in Houston during a court recess on June 19, 1967. Ali was on trial, charged with refusing induction into the U.S. Army. (AP/Wide World Photos)
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weapons) as cooks, orderlies, and drivers. Many of these were trained as medics, and while most of these worked in field hospitals and rear-area medical facilities, others went into combat units. Although no accurate statistics exist, COs did see combat, and a number were killed or wounded in action. CO status was not restricted to potential draftees. Active-duty personnel could also apply. Between 1965 and 1973, almost 20,000 active-duty personnel from all branches of service applied for discharges or noncombatant assignments as COs. Active-duty applicants confronted a more rigorous examination process. Potential COs applied through company or base commanders and had to be interviewed by an officer, a chaplain, and a psychiatrist. A unanimous finding was required in order to receive CO status. Many active-duty COs received discharges, but others, as with I-A-O inductees, worked in numerous noncombatant capacities and often saw hazardous duty as combat medics. Between 1966 and 1969 the military granted fewer than 20 percent of all CO applications processed, but by 1975 almost all were being confirmed. Disapproved CO applicants were required to return to duty without any restrictions. Those who refused faced court-martial and imprisonment. DAVID COFFEY See also African Americans in the U.S. Military; Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Project 100,000; Selective Service; United States v. Seeger References Baskir Lawrence M., and William A. Strauss. Chance and Circumstance: The Draft, the War, and the Vietnam Generation. New York: 1978. Dougan, Clark, and Samuel Lipsman. A Nation Divided. The Vietnam Experience Series. Boston: Boston Publishing, 1984. Gioglio, Gerald R. Days of Decision: An Oral History of Conscientious Objectors in the Military during the Vietnam War. Trenton, NJ: Broken Rifle, 1989.
Conscription See Selective Service
Con Son Island Prison Commonly referred to as the “Devil’s Island of Southeast Asia,” Con Son Island Prison, begun by French colonial authorities in 1862 to incarcerate political prisoners, was used by the government of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) to house prisoners during the Vietnam War. The penal colony was located on Con Son Island, the largest of the 16 islands and islets in the Con Dao archipelago located in the South China Sea. Measuring 13 miles long and 5 miles wide, the heavily wooded island of Con Son is 60 miles off the coast of the Ca Mau Peninsula. Eventually
growing to include 11 distinct prison camps, the largest and most notorious prison camp established on the island was the Phu Hai prison complex. During the 1930s and 1940s the French imprisoned hundreds of Vietnamese nationalists, including Pham Van Dong and Le Duc Tho, on the island. Following the 1954 Geneva Accords, the French turned over control of the facility to the South Vietnamese government. Between 1954 to 1975 an estimated 20,000 prisoners died at the Con Son Island Prison, many of them from torture and abuse. Allegations of torture and human rights violations prompted the July 1970 visit to the prison by Democratic Party congressmen Augustus Hawkins from California and William Anderson from Tennessee. Accompanying the representatives were congressional aide Tom Harkin, translator and human rights advocate Don Luce, and director of the U.S. Agency for International Development’s Office of Public Safety Frank Walton. During the short plane trip from Saigon to Con Son Island, Walton described the prison as a well-run humane facility that did not engage in human rights violations. During its tour of the prison complex, however, the congressional delegation, armed with information (including a detailed map) provided by a former prisoner, located the barracks housing the infamous “tiger cages.” Initially constructed by the French in 1939 and modeled after similar holding cells on Devil’s Island in French Guiana, the 120 tiger cages were five-by-nine-foot cement pits with metal bars serving as the ceiling. At the time the Con Son Island Prison was the largest South Vietnamese prison for noncombatants, housing more than 9,000 prisoners, all with no legal rights. The tiger cages, which usually held five men shackled to the floor, were used to torture the most recalcitrant prisoners. Guards would frequently douse the prisoners with buckets of lime. After months of internment, prisoners lost the use of their legs and frequently developed tuberculosis. Photos taken by Harkin were published in the July 17, 1970, issue of Life magazine. The graphic brutality depicted in the photos helped convince scores of Americans that supporting the South Vietnamese government was unethical and undemocratic. The revelation of human rights abuses strengthened the antiwar movement in the United States, although some critics of the antiwar movement argued that the photos were merely journalistic propaganda that attempted to undermine the war effort. Following the reunification of Vietnam in 1975, the Vietnamese government closed the penal colony on Con Son. The Vietnamese government subsequently incorporated much of the island into the Con Dao National Park. Today tourists who visit the pristine beaches of Con Son are afforded the opportunity to visit the Con Son Island Prison and the adjacent Hang Doung Cemetery, where the victims of the penal colony are interred. MICHAEL R. HALL See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Le Duc Tho; Pham Van Dong; Tiger Cages; Vietnam, Republic of, 1954–1975
CONSTANT GUARD, Operation
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Prisoners being held in so-called “tiger cages” at the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) prison on Con Son Island on July 7, 1950. Although RVN and U.S. officials claimed the prisoners were treated humanely, a fact-finding mission composed partly of U.S. congressmen reported shocking conditions there. (Bettmann/Corbis) References Bordenkircher, D. E., and S. A. Bordenkircher. Tiger Cage: An Untold Story. Morristown, TN: Abby Publishing, 1998. Brown, Holmes, and Don Luce. Hostages of War: Saigon’s Political Prisoners. Washington, DC: Indochina Mobile Education Project, 1973. Zinoman, Peter. The Colonial Bastille: A History of Imprisonment in Vietnam, 1862–1940. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001.
CONSTANT GUARD,
Operation
Start Date: April 1, 1972 End Date: May 13, 1972 One of several operations designed to redeploy U.S. aircraft to Southeast Asia in 1972 initially to prevent an invasion by the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) and later in response to the Easter Offensive by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) that began on March 30, 1972. Operation CONSTANT GUARD consisted of four phases. CONSTANT GUARD I–III was the buildup of Tactical Air Command (TAC) fighters and
fighter-bombers in response to the PAVN invasion of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), while CONSTANT GUARD IV was designed to augment tactical airlift capabilities in Southeast Asia. On April 1, 1972, TAC initiated CONSTANT GUARD I, sending 36 F-4E Phantom fighters from Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, North Carolina, to Ubon Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thailand, and 4 EB-66s equipped with electronic warfare (EW) systems from Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina, to Korat Royal Thai Air Force Base. Also dispatched to Korat were 12 F-105G Thunderchiefs from Seymour Johnson Air Base. The F-105s were equipped with Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) systems designed to disable enemy surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) by firing antiradiation missiles at the radars guiding them. By April 15, 1972, the first deployment was complete. CONSTANT GUARD II began the next day with the deployment of two squadrons of 18 F-4s, one from Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, and the other from Homestead Air Force Base, Florida. Both were restationed at Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base. The final deployment of fighters began on May 3, 1972, when Operation CONSTANT GUARD III sent 72 F-4s from Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico, to the reopened Takhli Royal Thai Air Force
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Base, which had been closed in 1970 as part of President Richard M. Nixon’s Vietnamization drawdown program. This redeployment ended on May 13, 1972. In total, the U.S. Air Force deployed 144 F-4s and 12 F-105s, first to the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) and then to various bases in Thailand. These aircraft played a key role in Operation LINEBACKER I during May 9–October 23, 1972, which more than anything else halted the PAVN invasion of South Vietnam. During CONSTANT GUARD III, the 49th Fighter Wing sent 2,600 personnel to reopen Takhli Royal Thai Air Force Base in support of the F-4s. Even though the personnel of the 49th Fighter Wing arrived without any of their basic equipment and supplies, their aircraft flew 21,000 combat hours without the loss of a single plane. The 49th Fighter Wing subsequently received the Outstanding Unit Award with Combat “V” Device. WILLIAM P. HEAD See also Aircraft, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Airpower, Role in War; Easter Offensive; LINEBACKER I, Operation; Surface-to-Air Missiles, Democratic Republic of Vietnam; United States Air Force References Clodfelter, Mark. The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam. New York: Free Press, 1989. Frankum, Ronald B., Jr. Like Rolling Thunder: The Air War in Vietnam, 1964–1975. New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005. Morocco, John. Rain of Fire: Air War, 1969–1973. Boston: Boston Publishing, 1985. Nicholson, Capt. Charles A. The USAF Response to the Spring 1972 NVN Offensive: Situation and Redeployment (Project CHECO Report). Saigon: 7AF DOAC, 1972.
Containment Policy Strategic policy by which the U.S. government endeavored to limit the expansion of communism during the Cold War. The doctrine of containment originated in the antagonism that developed between the United States and the Soviet Union during World War II and in the immediate postwar period. The doctrine gained potency from the historical lessons that American policy makers learned from the prewar era—that appeasement of aggression merely fueled increasingly more strident and unreasonable demands from dictators—and from the domino theory, the belief that the fall of one country to communism would lead to a chain reaction in neighboring nations. George F. Kennan, a career foreign service officer stationed in Moscow from July 1944 to April 1946, was the architect of containment. On February 22, 1946, he sent the State Department what has since been called the Long Telegram, an 8,000-word analysis of Soviet actions and ideology asserting that the Soviet Union was driven by a traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity and hostility blended with the rhetoric of messianic Marxism. The Soviet Union, Kennan said, represented a political force fanatically
committed to the destruction of capitalist society. The Long Telegram received a positive reception in Washington and was distributed to officials, diplomats, and the military. The next year Kennan was selected to head the newly created State Department Policy Planning Staff, an exclusive study and reporting group charged with advising the secretary of state on foreign policy. Kennan’s containment doctrine was cogently expressed in his essay “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” published under the pseudonym “Mr. X” (although his authorship was soon revealed) in the July 1947 issue of Foreign Affairs. In the article, Kennan suggested “long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.” The Soviets, he believed, would eventually mellow or break up, but in the meantime the United States should “confront the Russians with unalterable counterforce, at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world.” Kennan’s views did not go unchallenged. Journalist Walter Lippmann wrote 12 critiques of the article that were later published as the book The Cold War. Kennan himself acknowledged deficiencies in the article, including the failure to show clearly that he meant “political containment of a political threat” rather than containment by military means. Kennan’s views were readily adopted by U.S. policy makers suspicious of Soviet actions and intentions. Containment, along with the domino theory, became the touchstone of U.S. Cold War policy, and its implementation through military as well as political and economic means can be seen in conflicts with the Soviet Union and, after 1949, the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Examples of containment in action include the 1947 Marshall Plan for European economic recovery, the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the 1948–1949 Berlin Airlift, the refusal to recognize the PRC, the 1950–1953 Korean War, and the Vietnam War. Containment in Vietnam initially was linked with checking communism in Europe. During World War II President Franklin D. Roosevelt had favored the independence of France’s Indochina colonies, but in the postwar period American leaders supported French colonialism because they needed France as a military ally to contain the Soviet Union in Europe. They also believed, erroneously, that because Ho Chi Minh was a Communist, he was controlled by Moscow and Beijing. Beginning in 1950 soon after the Korean War began in June, the United States provided France with direct military and economic assistance in the Indochina War. Containment of communism seemed jeopardized by the 1954 French defeat at Dien Bien Phu and the de facto division of Vietnam at the Geneva Conference later that year. To contain the Communist threat, U.S. secretary of state John Foster Dulles took the lead in establishing the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1955, which included the United States, France, and Britain in a defense alliance with Asian nations. In 1956 the United States assumed responsibility for training and supporting the military in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam).
Con Thien, Siege of President John F. Kennedy continued the policy of Communist containment and increased the American presence in Vietnam. In May 1961 he authorized commando raids against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and sent Special Forces advisers to South Vietnam. When Kennedy was assassinated in November 1963, the United States had about 16,000 troops in Vietnam. In the following years under President Lyndon B. Johnson, the number of U.S. troops increased to more than 500,000 men, and the war destroyed Johnson’s presidency. In the end, the United States was unable to contain communism in Vietnam. On April 30, 1975, Communist forces captured Saigon and renamed it Ho Chi Minh City. Kennan, the original author of the containment doctrine, regarded American involvement in Vietnam as a tragic mistake. He believed that Vietnam was a marginal area in the Cold War and thought that involvement there kept the United States from taking advantage of divisions within the Communist world. In 1966 he testified before Senator J. William Fulbright’s hearings on the war that containment was designed for Europe and did not fit Asia. In the judgment of many historians, Kennan was right. KENNETH R. STEVENS See also China, People’s Republic of; Domino Theory; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennan, George Frost; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Korean War; Munich Analogy; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; Stevenson, Adlai Ewing, II; Truman, Harry S.; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics References Gaddis, John Lewis. Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. Kennan, George F. Memoirs, 1925–1950. Boston: Little, Brown, 1967. Lippmann, Walter. The Cold War: A Study in U.S. Foreign Policy. New York: Harper and Row, 1947.
Contemporary Historical Examination of Combat Operations See CHECO Project
Con Thien, Siege of Start Date: September 4, 1967 End Date: October 4, 1967 Site of major fighting during the later part of 1967, Con Thien (correct Vietnamese spelling: Con Tien) was located 14 miles from the coast of Vietnam and 2 miles south of the demilitarized zone (DMZ). A low hill just 525 feet in elevation, Con Thien overlooked one of the principal People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) infiltration routes into the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam).
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In the spring of 1967 the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), ordered the construction of an anti-infiltration barrier across the DMZ. Manned strong points would occupy prominent terrain features overlooking infiltration routes. Artillery positions would provide fire support and house reaction forces needed to man the strong point system. Con Thien was to be an important component of this anti-infiltration barrier. By mid-1967, U.S. marines had established a formidable presence in the area. Dong Ha was the major logistics base in the region, and Con Thien provided a clear view of it. If the PAVN could seize Con Thien, they would be able to bring the Dong Ha base under artillery and rocket fire. Con Thien remained a primary target for PAVN artillery. During September 1967 the PAVN subjected the marines at Con Thien to one of the heaviest shellings of the war. Con Thien’s defenders came to expect 200 rounds of incoming artillery fire daily, and on September 25 more than 1,200 rounds fell there, killing 23 marines. PAVN ground activity increased under this artillery umbrella. On September 4 and 7 marines located and fought PAVN forces south of Con Thien. On September 10 the 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines, engaged a PAVN regiment in battle near Con Thien, spoiling a major attack. On September 13 a PAVN company attacked the perimeter at Con Thien but failed to breach the defensive wire. The marines then sent two additional battalions to reinforce Con Thien. The PAVN response was to blast the defenders with 3,000 incoming rocket, artillery, and mortar rounds during September 19–27. U.S. forces reacted to these attacks with one of the greatest concentrations of artillery and air firepower of the Vietnam War. PAVN forces were struck by what MACV commander General William C. Westmoreland called Operation NEUTRALIZE. This 49-day bombing campaign was orchestrated by Seventh Air Force commander General William M. Momyer and was known as SLAM (for Seek, Locate, Annihilate, and Monitor). During the period aircraft flew 4,200 sorties to drop 40,000 pounds of bombs, while the U.S. Navy fired 6,148 shells, and land artillery added another 12,577 shells. This intense bombardment was undoubtedly the major reason that the PAVN siege forces around Con Thien (101D Regiment of the 325th Division and the 803rd Regiment of the 324th Division) pulled back across the DMZ into the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) during this time period, although an official Vietnamese account claims that the forces were withdrawn because of the effects of unusually heavy monsoon rains. The constant combat took a heavy toll. In a one-month period, the 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines, saw its strength cut in half, from 952 to 462 men. On October 14 a PAVN ground force attacked 2nd Battalion’s position, overran a company command post, and engaged the marines in hand-to-hand combat. By the end of October, the 2nd Battalion’s strength was down to about 300 men. Although fighting around Con Thien fell off after October, it remained a harsh environment. The monsoon provided endless drizzle and turned roads into quagmires. The threat of Communist
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A member of the U.S. 3rd Marine Division looks for snipers north of Con Thien. During September 1967, the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) subjected the marines at Con Thien to one of the heaviest shellings of the war. (National Archives)
artillery fire was constant, as was the possibility of massed infantry attacks. Neuropsychiatric, or shell shock, casualties were common. Westmoreland described the fighting around Con Thien as a “crushing defeat” for the PAVN. MACV estimated PAVN deaths in the area of Con Thien during the autumn of 1967 at 1,117. The fighting had taken a heavy toll on the Americans as well. U.S. Marine Corps casualties totaled more than 1,800 killed and wounded. PETER W. BRUSH See also Artillery, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Clear and Hold; Momyer, William Wallace; SLAM; United States Marine Corps; Westmoreland, William Childs References Coan, James P. Con Thien: The Hill of Angels. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2004. Momyer, William W. Airpower in Three Wars: World War II, Korea and Vietnam. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978. Pham Gia Duc. Su Doan 325, 1954–1975, Tap II [325th Division, 1954–1975, Vol. 2]. Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1986. Simmons, Edwin H., ed. The Marines in Vietnam, 1954–1973: An Anthology and Annotated Bibliography. 2nd ed. Marine Corps Vietnam Series. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters, 1985. Telfer, Gary L. U.S. Marines in Vietnam: Fighting the North Vietnamese, 1967. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1984.
Continental Air Services Airline that flew for the U.S. government in Southeast Asia. Continental Air Services (CAS), a wholly owned subsidiary of Continental Airlines, began flight operations in Southeast Asia on September 1, 1965. Robert Six, president of the parent company, had been anxious to expand his airline’s activities in Asia. As part of Continental’s growing presence in the Pacific, Six had acquired the assets of Bird & Sons for $4.2 million. CAS continued to fly under U.S. government contracts, especially for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). In addition to routine commercial business, CAS often functioned (as had Bird & Sons) as a paramilitary adjunct to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)–led guerrilla forces in Laos. Six hired Robert E. Rousselot, formerly head of flight operations for Air America, as the president of CAS. Rousselot hoped to dominate the air transport market in Laos by introducing Lockheed 382Bs into the country. The civilian version of the military’s Lockheed C-130 Hercules, however, never lived up to Rousselot’s expectations. Plagued by operational problems, these four-engine aircraft were soon withdrawn from Laos. By the early 1970s, De Havilland Twin Otters and Pilateus Porters were the workhorses of CAS. These planes carried rice, ammunition, and personnel throughout Southeast Asia. The airline’s 50 aircraft averaged 4,000 hours per month, transporting 20,000 passengers and 6,000 tons of cargo.
Cooper, John Sherman CAS and Air America performed identical tasks in support of the American war effort, and both airlines suffered losses due to hostile action and the difficult operating conditions. More than a dozen CAS aircrew members were killed in Laos, Cambodia, and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). The airline’s business declined as the war in Southeast Asia drew to a conclusion. On December 19, 1975, Six dissolved the company. WILLIAM M. LEARY See also Air America; Bird & Sons; Cambodian Airlift; Central Intelligence Agency; Laos; United States Agency for International Development References Davies, R. E. G. Continental Air Lines: The First Fifty Years, 1934–1984. The Woodlands, TX: Pioneer Publications, 1985. Leary, William M. Perilous Missions: Civil Air Transport and CIA Covert Operations in Asia. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1984.
Cooper, Chester Lawrence Birth Date: January 13, 1917 Death Date: October 30, 2005 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer and National Security Council (NSC) assistant for Asian affairs (1964–1966). Chester Lawrence Cooper was born in Boston, Massachusetts, on January 13, 1917. He first attended the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and then New York University, where he received a BA degree in 1939 and an MBA in 1941. Cooper undertook doctoral work at Columbia University but ultimately received his PhD from American University. He served with the U.S. Army in the infantry and intelligence branches. From 1945 to 1964 Cooper worked for the CIA and specialized in Far Eastern affairs in the Office of National Estimates. He served on the U.S. delegations to the 1954 Geneva Conference, the 1954 Manila Conference that established the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), and the 1961–1962 Geneva Conference on Laos. During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, Cooper was sent to London to show British prime minister Harold Macmillan in person the incriminating aerial photos of the Soviet missile buildup in Cuba. From 1964 to 1966 Cooper served on McGeorge Bundy’s NSC staff as assistant for Asian affairs, where Cooper was one of the few policy makers genuinely knowledgeable on Indochina. Throughout the Vietnam conflict he recommended that it be resolved by political rather than military means. Unlike many who supported this approach, he stood by the American commitment to Ngo Dinh Diem, arguing that it was inappropriate for Washington to treat Diem in the manner of a colonial master. Cooper also warned President Lyndon Johnson in 1965 that there were inherent and
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potentially dangerous risks involved in bombing the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). In 1966 Cooper left the NSC but shortly thereafter became chief of staff to the group of would-be peace negotiators surrounding W. Averell Harriman. Disillusioned by their lack of progress, however, in the autumn of 1967 he again resigned. Cooper opposed the American invasion of Cambodia, which he feared would make any peace settlement impossible. By 1972 he was convinced that the Indochinese states should be neutralized, that is, left to work out their own futures free from interference by the Great Powers. After leaving government service, he held several important executive positions. He also headed international programs at the Battelle Memorial Institute at the University of Maryland from 1995 to 2001. Cooper died on October 30, 2005, in Washington, D.C. PRISCILLA ROBERTS See also Bundy, McGeorge; Harriman, William Averell; Ngo Dinh Diem References Cooper, Chester L. In the Shadows of History: Fifty Years behind the Scenes of Cold War Diplomacy. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2005. Cooper, Chester L. The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam. Rev. and updated edition. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1973. Gibbons, William C. The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War. 4 vols. to date. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986–1995.
Cooper, John Sherman Birth Date: August 23, 1901 Death Date: February 21, 1991 U.S. senator, ardent opponent of American involvement in Southeast Asia, and cosponsor of the 1970 Cooper-Church Amendment. John Sherman Cooper was born in Somerset, Kentucky, on August 23, 1901, and graduated from Yale College in 1923. He attended law school at Harvard University but did not receive a degree. In 1928 he was admitted to the Kentucky bar and began practicing law in Somerset. Cooper then embarked on a life of public service, beginning with the Kentucky legislature from 1928 to 1930. He spent eight years as a judge in Pulaski County, was a circuit judge in the 28th Judicial District between 1938 and 1946, and was elected to a seat in the U.S. Senate in 1946. Cooper, a Republican, served in the Senate from 1946 to 1948, from 1952 to 1955, and from 1956 to 1973. During the 1960s Cooper became a vocal critic of U.S. policy in Vietnam. Along with Senator George McGovern (D-S.Dak.), Cooper expressed reservations about the power that the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution had provided the president. Under pressure from Senator J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.), Cooper voted for the resolution. He expressed confidence in the Johnson administration
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but urged the president to keep in mind the difference between defensive measures and offensive operations in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). In 1970 after the U.S. invasion of Cambodia, Cooper called for a U.S. troop withdrawal from that country. Cooper and Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho) sponsored the Cooper-Church Amendment that barred funds for U.S. ground combat forces and advisers in Cambodia after June 30, 1970, and prohibited any combat activity in the air above Cambodia in support of Cambodian forces unless preapproved by Congress. The amendment passed in the Senate but met failure in the House of Representatives. Cooper chose not to run in the autumn 1972 election and left the Senate in January 1973. From 1974 to 1976 he was U.S. ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany). Cooper retired from public life in 1976 and again took up the practice of law. He died on February 21, 1991, in Washington, D.C. CHARLOTTE A. POWER See also Case, Clifford Philip; Case-Church Amendment; Church, Frank Forrester; Cooper-Church Amendment; Fulbright, James William; Gulf of Tonkin Resolution; McGovern, George Stanley References Olson, James S., ed. Dictionary of the Vietnam War. New York: Greenwood, 1988. Young, Marilyn B. The Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990. New York: HarperCollins, 1991.
Cooper-Brooke Amendment Amendment attached to a U.S. Senate foreign military aid bill in 1972 that linked American troop withdrawal from Vietnam with the release of U.S. prisoners of war (POWs) without provisions or preconditions. The amendment was named for Republican senators John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky and Edward Brooke of Massachusetts. By the summer of 1972, despite generally favorable public opinion subsequent to the peace negotiations with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and increased military pressure by American forces, there remained strong and growing support for a legislative push to end American involvement in Vietnam. Simultaneously, U.S. ground troops had already largely been withdrawn under President Richard Nixon’s Vietnamization policy. The Senate approach to ending the war generally fell along one of three lines: an unconditional deadline for American withdrawal based on the belief that this would lead North Vietnam to release the American POWs held in Hanoi, American withdrawal contingent upon the release of American POWs, or American withdrawal dependent upon a cease-fire. Throughout 1971 and early 1972 the Senate group that favored American withdrawal contingent only
upon release of POWs grew, while support for the stipulation of a cease-fire dwindled. Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger continued to insist on a mutual cease-fire and an agreedupon release of POWs as preconditions for a withdrawal; the opposition favored simply the release of POWs, if that. In July 1972 Senate majority leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) attempted to force the issue of withdrawal by proposing an amendment to the foreign military aid bill then being considered. This would have required American withdrawal by August without provision for the release of American POWs; it failed by a vote of 49 to 44. Senator Cooper subsequently proposed an amendment that supported funds for Indochina for the express purpose of withdrawing American troops from Vietnam in four months. However, before the amendment could come to a vote (it probably would not have passed), Senator Brooke proposed a change to the amendment. His proposal specifically linked the release of POWs to the withdrawal. Floor debate in the Senate on the amendment was spirited. Senator John Stennis (D-Miss.) opposed the amendments and protested that the power of negotiation rested with the office of the president, not Congress. Senator Cooper replied that “If we accept this argument for all time, we will have placed upon ourselves a condition, a prohibition that would forbid us from ever exercising our constitutional responsibility.” However, Stennis’s opposition was checked. On July 24 the Brooke amendment carried with a vote of 50 to 46. Ironically, Cooper then voted against his own amendment because he did not like Brooke’s addition to it, but it passed nevertheless by a vote of 49 to 46. The Cooper-Brooke Amendment, attached to the foreign military aid bill that included aid to Indochina, stipulated that all funding for air, naval, and ground combat in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos would cease based solely upon the successful release of U.S. POWs held in North Vietnam. On the same day an attempt by Senator James Allen (D-Ala.) to make withdrawal contingent upon a supervised cease-fire was defeated by only five votes. Nixon’s policy stipulating withdrawal based on a cease-fire and release of POWs now appeared in jeopardy by congressional action. In what Senator Robert Dole (R-Kans.) later called a “rearguard action,” Nixon’s Senate allies rallied to vote down the foreign military aid bill because of the Cooper-Brooke amendments. Ironically, Senator Mansfield and longtime anti–Vietnam War interventionist Senator J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.), both leaders of the opposition to Nixon’s Vietnam policies, voted with the Nixon supporters in defeating the foreign military aid bill by a vote of 48 to 42. They believed that the most pragmatic approach to ending the war was to deny President Nixon the necessary funds to continue involvement in Vietnam and also believed that the amendments would have been deleted in the ensuing legislative action if the bill had passed. Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho), longtime opponent of the Vietnam War, opposed the Mansfield-Fulbright move to defeat the bill in its entirety, desiring instead to leave the antiwar amendments
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in place. Following the vote, a dejected Church complained that his erstwhile allies had allowed Nixon to “snatch victory from the jaws of defeat.” But victory was not especially sweet for the backers of the president’s policy, because more senators than ever seemed to be wavering in their support of the White House’s war policies. KARL LEE RUBIS See also Church, Frank Forrester; Cooper, John Sherman; Fulbright, James William; Kissinger, Henry Alfred; Mansfield, Michael Joseph; Nixon, Richard Milhous; United States Congress and the Vietnam War; Vietnamization References Kissinger, Henry. Ending the Vietnam War: A History of America’s Involvement in and Extrication from the Vietnam War. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2003. Mann, Robert. A Grand Delusion: America’s Descent into Vietnam. New York: Basic Books, 2001.
Cooper-Church Amendment U.S. legislation imposing restrictions on U.S. military action in Southeast Asia. The U.S. military incursion into Cambodia in late April 1970 provoked antiwar demonstrations across the United States and spurred the most serious congressional challenge to date of the president’s war powers in Indochina. As passed by the U.S. Senate, the Cooper-Church Amendment, introduced by John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) and Frank Church (D-Idaho), would have barred funds for the support and maintenance of U.S. ground combat forces and advisers in Cambodia after June 30, 1970, and prohibited any combat activity in the air above Cambodia in support of Cambodian forces unless Congress approved such operations. The amendment also would have barred U.S. support for third-country forces, in particular forces of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), in Cambodia. During the seven-week Senate debate from May 13 through June 30, 1970, the amendment and the military appropriations bill to which it was attached brought about heated discussion of the Richard M. Nixon administration’s Asian policy and blocked Senate action on other major legislation. After numerous amendments were introduced to weaken it, the Cooper-Church Amendment was approved by a vote of 58 to 37 on June 30, 1970. During the debate, Senator Robert Dole (R-Kans.), a leader of the anti–Cooper-Church forces, introduced an amendment to repeal the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. It was overwhelmingly approved. The Nixon administration opposed the Cooper-Church Amendment but was neutral on the Gulf of Tonkin matter. House and Senate conferees remained deadlocked for six months over the Cooper-Church Amendment. Eventually the Cooper-Church Amendment was attached to the supplementary foreign aid authorization bill but was later dropped from the bill. A revised Cooper-Church Amendment was added to the fiscal 1971 foreign aid authorization bill, clearing Congress on December 22,
Republican senator John Sherman of Kentucky was a staunch opponent of U.S. involvement in Vietnam and a sponsor of the Cooper-Church Amendment. He is shown here in 1972. (Bettmann/Corbis)
1970. The bill was enacted on January 5, 1971. Unlike the earlier Cooper-Church Amendment passed by the Senate, the final version did not prohibit U.S. air activity over Cambodia. The amendment’s approval came about six months after U.S. ground troops had pulled out of Cambodia. President Nixon denounced the Cooper-Church Amendment and other antiwar amendments as harmful to his bargaining position with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). In February 1971 the Nixon administration supported the South Vietnamese invasion of Laos and eventually rode out the political storm over Cambodia. Still, the Cooper-Church Amendment and the proposal of even more restrictive amendments in the Senate put increasing pressure on the Nixon administration to end the war in Indochina. Senate debate also encouraged increased antiwar sentiment among the media, clergy, and other opinion leaders in the United States. DAVID C. SAFFELL See also Cambodia; Case, Clifford Philip; Case-Church Amendment; Church, Frank Forrester; Cooper, John Sherman; Cooper-Brooke Amendment; Fulbright, James William; Gulf of Tonkin Resolution; McGovern, George Stanley; Nixon, Richard Milhous References Herring, George C. America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975. 4th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001. Morris, Roger. Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy. New York: Harper and Row, 1977.
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Corps Tactical Zones
CORDS See Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support
Corps Tactical Zones Designation of military operational regions in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) during the Vietnam War. Following the Geneva Conference of 1954 that ended the fighting between French and Communist forces, Vietnam was divided, ostensibly temporarily, at the 17th Parallel. The South Vietnamese government, in cooperation with the United States, sought to provide for the security of South Vietnam by dividing the country into corps tactical zones (CTZ) to help provide for the military and administrative control of its territory. Four such zones were established: the I CTZ in the region immediately south of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) included the five northernmost provinces of the country, the II CTZ consisted of the Vietnamese Central Highlands, the III CTZ encompassed 11 provinces surrounding the capital city of Saigon, and the IV CTZ included the southwestern portion of South Vietnam, encompassing the remainder of the Mekong Delta and bordering Cambodia and the South China Sea. Originally created by the Joint General Staff of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
(RVNAF, South Vietnamese Armed Forces) to help organize military operations against Viet Cong (VC) and Peoples’ Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) forces, the CTZ concept remained in place throughout the American phase of the war. The Vietnamese Joint General Staff appointed commanders for each CTZ, and these commanders served as governors in each region; as such, they enjoyed tremendous authority in their respective zones. Each CTZ was subdivided into smaller military districts, although a special zone was created for the administration and protection of Saigon. There was no overall coordination of military operations between the CTZs under the RVNAF, with all major decisions emanating from the government in Saigon. Civilian authorities were responsible for the nonmilitary aspects of governance within each CTZ and continued to work with civilian ministries in Saigon. With the introduction of allied (mostly American) ground forces in 1965, the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), under the command of General William Westmoreland, assigned U.S. ground forces to each of the CTZs. In addition to commanding U.S. combat forces in each CTZ, ranking American commanders in each region served as senior advisers to ranking commanders of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) in each CTZ. American forces in each CTZ remained under the operational control of the MACV com-
Artillerymen of the new Army of the Republic of Vietnam 25th Division line up for a parade in front of their 105-mm and 155-mm howitzers in the coastal town of Quang Nai in the I Corps Tactical Zone of northern South Vietnam, August 15, 1962. (AP/Wide World Photos)
Counterculture
mander and worked in coordination with ARVN forces. The III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) assumed responsibility for the I CTZ; the U.S. Army’s I Field Force and II Field Force assumed responsibility for the II and III CTZs, respectively; and the IV Corps Advisory Group controlled combat and advisory units in the IV CTZ. Although ARVN commanders assumed overall responsibility for military operations in each CTZ, Free World infantry units operated in tactical areas of responsibility (TAORs) within each CTZ and directed operations within their respective TAOR. KELLY E. CRAGER See also Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; Military Regions; Vietnam, Republic of, Army; Westmoreland, William Childs References Clarke, Jeffrey J. Advice and Support: The Final Years; The U.S. Army in Vietnam. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988. Eckhardt, George S. Command and Control, 1950–1969. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1974. Stanton, Shelby L. The Rise and Fall of an American Army: The U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985.
COSVN See Central Office for South Vietnam
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Counterculture A sociological reference that describes the cultural and/or societal values and modes of behavior of a specific group, or subculture, within a larger culture. The values and behavior of a counterculture are not in sync with the larger culture’s values, mores, or behavior, therefore causing friction between the larger culture and the subculture. In the political realm, a countercultural group would be akin to a political opposition party. The term “counterculture” in the United States is usually attributed to the historian Theodore Roszak, who popularized the word with his 1968 book The Making of a Counter Culture. The term was certainly used before that, however, and had been previously employed by some political scientists. By the late 1960s the media, both foreign and domestic, began employing the term “counterculture” to describe a wide array of subgroups and behaviors that ran counter to prevailing cultural prescriptions. During the late 1960s and early 1970s countercultures were said to exist not just in the United States but also in Western Europe, Japan, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. In the United States the counterculture was chiefly a reaction to the conservative and culturally homogenous society that had prevailed in the 1940s and 1950s; the American racial divide, especially in the South; and the Vietnam War. A wide-ranging phenomenon, the counterculture encompassed many kinds of cultural nonconformity. In the 1960s in the United States, what became known as the counterculture movement was a major driving force behind
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Counterculture
Concertgoers on the roof of a Volkswagen bus at the Woodstock Music and Art Fair in Bethel, New York, in August 1969. (AP/Wide World Photos)
opposition to the Vietnam War. College students, young people, intellectuals, musicians, artists, and political activists of many stripes challenged the existing American culture along with governmental and political assumptions. The counterculture challenged, among other things, the post–World War II U.S. foreign policy doctrine of containment, which the counterculture blamed for the quagmire in Vietnam. Members of the counterculture movement, most of whom were white middle-class teenagers and young adults, became known as and were often referred to as Hippies. Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and the Black Panthers were two of the most famous—perhaps even infamous—groups in the counterculture movement. The SDS was a radical student organization formed in 1960 to promote political and social activism, such as ending racial discrimination and the nuclear arms race, increasing government spending to end poverty, and halting what it viewed as America’s anti-Communist fanaticism. The Black Panthers was a sometimes militant African American organization dedicated to the promotion of civil rights, social justice, and self-defense. The 1960s, especially the period after 1965, exposed a chasm in American politics and society between both youths and middle-
and older-aged Americans and between the traditional Left— mostly elected party officials who controlled the Democratic Party—and the New Left, which comprised youthful, militant, and more liberal counterculture activists disenchanted with the traditional Left, particularly with its anticommunism. The social conservatism of the 1950s, along with the political upheaval of the 1960s owing to the Vietnam War, the Civil Rights Movement, and the women’s rights movement, contributed to the counterculture movement. Although the election of President John F. Kennedy in 1960 portended an administration geared toward youthful boldness, Kennedy’s policies reflected a continuation of the old Cold War consensus, and his short administration left many issues outstanding. Following Kennedy’s assassination in November 1963, Lyndon Johnson became president. His decision in 1965 to escalate the war in Vietnam ultimately cast a long shadow on his presidency and led him to bow out of the 1968 presidential race. By the late 1960s the counterculture movement, including the SDS, viewed the Vietnam War with open hostility. The war came to serve as a catalyst for the SDS’s activism and militancy. Universities became incubators for antiwar protests, often led by professors who encouraged sit-ins and teach-ins. University students protested against the war and demonstrated for other causes, such as civil rights, women’s rights, gay and lesbian rights, and an end to wars and poverty. Whereas deference to authority and tradition had been typical in the 1950s, a new attitude of hostility toward authority emerged in the 1960s in reaction to, at least in the eyes of the restless youths, the seemingly complacent 1950s that, admittedly, had not improved the political and legal situations for minorities and women. Components of the counterculture included a questioning of the older generation’s sexual mores, which led to fundamental changes in relations between men and women, the alteration of gender roles, and the introduction of abortion into the nation’s social and political discourse. Drug use became prevalent among the counterculture adherents, including the use of psychedelic drugs, and new forms of musical expression, such as acid rock, began to appear in the late 1960s. The counterculture also made its way into film, the most famous example of which was Easy Rider, released in 1969, a movie that showcased the wanderings and ramblings of a group of social misfits who experience mind-altering drug use. The Vietnam War was the first so-called television war, and as such the daily images of that conflict on the small screen, whether accurate or not, led Americans viewers to more easily identify with and form their own personal views of that war, unlike earlier wars. The Selective Service, which naturally fell mostly on young adults, became increasingly unpopular with male youths as the war continued on and U.S. casualties increased. Moreover, the draft was viewed as unfair, with the rich and well-connected and college students, including Hippies, often able to avoid military service through student deferments. Unquestionably the draft fell disproportionally on workingclass and poor whites and black youths. To Hippies and SDS ac-
Counterinsurgency Warfare tivists the draft seemed to be a metaphor for the exploitive and oppressive nature of American politics and society. In addition, because enforcement of draft regulations depended somewhat on local boards, the Selective Service system served only to further de-legitimize the war among many of the youths, who believed that the way they were being recruited and sent to fight in an increasingly unpopular war was both un-American and patently unfair. Moreover, the inability of the Johnson administration to rally public support for the war contributed to the perception by many Americans, especially the young, that the United States had no business being in Vietnam. In sum, the Vietnam War crystallized the restless and politically active youths of America, many of whom became part of the counterculture. The counterculture movement petered out by the early 1970s as the Vietnam War wound down and Americans became exhausted by the social and political upheavals that were the movement’s hallmarks. With American involvement in Vietnam at an end, the counterculture movement proved incapable of sustaining itself. Its legacy is still actively debated. STEFAN M. BROOKS See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Drugs and Drug Use; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Music and the Vietnam War; Students for a Democratic Society References Carter, Dan. The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, the Origins of the New Conservatism, and the Transformation of American Politics. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000. Gitlin, Todd. The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage. New York: Bantam, 1987. Johnson, Paul. A History of the American People. New York: Harper Perennial, 1999.
Counterinsurgency Warfare An insurgency is defined as an armed or unarmed rebellion against an established authority with the ultimate goal of undermining and/or overthrowing the ruling party or government. Insurgencies have been around as long as human history. In more recent history many have come to be known as guerrilla wars. The term “guerrilla” (literally meaning “little war”) is derived from the Spanish diminutive of guerra (“war”), with its origin in the Peninsular War against Napoleon. However, modern insurgencies (also known as revolutionary wars) imply not merely fighting another force by guerrilla tactics but also trying to seize political power. Revolutionary war is perhaps best exemplified by the Communist struggle against the Nationalists in China and the post–World War II conflicts in Vietnam. Counterinsurgency is in effect the strategy whereby a government sets out to defeat an insurgency, a guerrilla war, or a revolutionary war. British counterinsurgency expert Robert Thompson, drawing on his own experience in helping to defeat Communist
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guerrillas in Malaya, gave five rules for successfully defeating an insurgency: (1) the goal must be the establishment of a democratic, economically stable state; (2) this must be done within the law rather than outside of it, avoiding brutal methods; (3) there must be a coherent plan; (4) the first priority must be the defeat of opposing political operatives rather than the guerrillas; and (5) making base areas secure must be a top priority. Those knowledgeable about insurgencies recognize that the key in defeating them is to win control of the people: the “sea” in which the guerrillas “swim,” as Chinese revolutionary Mao Zedong once put it. The French Army did not ignore what it called revolutionary war, although its theories for combating such a war were for the most part developed after the Indochina War and were used in Algeria. Early theorists who wrote about revolutionary war during the Indochina War included General Lionel-Max Chassin, who commanded the French Air Force against the Viet Minh. His book La conquête de la Chine par Mao Tsé-Toung (1945–1949) was published in 1952. Others were Colonel Charles Lacheroy and General J. M. Nemo (En Indochine: Guérilla et contre-guérilla, 1952), both of whom contributed articles to Revue de Défense Nationale. Their principal argument was that a numerically inferior military force can triumph over a larger one only if the inferior force has the support of the people in a particular area. The French theorists also came to appreciate the close marriage of politics and the military by both the Chinese Communists and the Viet Minh. They were convinced that proper psychological measures could create cohesion among fighters and the civilian population. The point missed by the French and later by the Americans was that as foreigners in Southeast Asia they were operating at a tremendous disadvantage. Given the long history of Vietnamese resistance to foreign occupation, this was a serious and perhaps insurmountable liability especially for the French, who were seen as returning foreign masters. Despite appearances, Paris never did grant Vietnam its independence. The State of Vietnam was always a sham with no real power, including none over its own army. As such, it was the Viet Minh rather than the State of Vietnam that gained the loyalty of the people. Although the lessons learned had largely been forgotten, the United States had more experience in guerrilla war than almost any other country, extending from wars against the Native Americans to the Philippine Insurrection (1899–1902). For all practical purposes, U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine came into being in the 1960s to counter Communist “wars of national liberation.” On January 6, 1961, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev had stated that while the Soviet Union and other Communist-bloc nations opposed world wars and local wars, they recognized and would support “just wars of liberation and popular uprisings.” This led President John F. Kennedy to seek solutions for countering Communistsupported insurgencies against vulnerable friendly nations. Washington’s interest in counterinsurgency predated U.S. involvement in Vietnam. In 1952 Congress gave the U.S. Army authority to create a new formation that would mirror American
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heritage in unconventional warfare. Known as the Special Forces, the military formation would carry on the traditions of Roger’s Rangers, Francis Marion, Darby’s Rangers, Merrill’s Marauders, the 1st Special Service Force, and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Special Forces had come into being in June 1952 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Their training stressed infiltration and land-navigation techniques and the use of parachutes and small boats. More individually suited specialized training followed and included sabotage, intelligence gathering, communications, medicine, and weaponry. Volunteers from the U.S. Army who successfully completed the secret training were detached from the army and assigned directly to Special Forces. This did not sit well with many in the U.S. Army’s hierarchy, however. Both President Kennedy and his military adviser, General Maxwell D. Taylor, were strong advocates of counterinsurgency and an enhanced Special Forces capability. In his book The Uncertain Trumpet (1959), Taylor had argued that the United States should not place undue reliance on nuclear deterrence and massive retaliation (President Dwight Eisenhower’s “more bang for the buck”) and should develop its own limited-war capability, including the ability to fight local and regional insurgencies. Kennedy relieved U.S. Army chief of staff General George Decker, who opposed anything apart from conventional warfare. Kennedy also strongly supported the development of counterinsurgency forces, and in February 1962 he appointed U.S. Marine Corps major general Victor Krulak to a newly established position as a counter–guerrilla warfare specialist within the Pentagon’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). In this position, identified as the special assistant for counterinsurgency and special activities, Krulak had responsibility for monitoring the use of unconventional warfare in Southeast Asia and reporting his findings to the JCS and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. The chief instrument of U.S. counterinsurgency policy was the U.S. Army Special Forces. Here the goal was not so much to destroy enemy armed forces as to win the allegiance of the people, inspiring them to defend themselves and reject the insurgent fighters. On September 21, 1961, the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces, was activated at Fort Bragg. Its mission was to train personnel in counterinsurgency methods to be employed in Vietnam. Under a number of guises, including pacification and population control, the United States set out not only to destroy the Viet Cong (VC) infrastructure but to win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people. A variety of programs involved the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Special Forces (operating mainly with Montagnards), doctors, engineers, agricultural experts, and civilian advisers. During January 1962 the Special Topographic Exploitation Service of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) was given responsibility for internal security and operations outside South Vietnam. An activated element, the Special Branch for Clandestine Operations, had the mission of recruiting military and civilian per-
sonnel for intelligence operations against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). To increase counterinsurgency initiatives in Vietnam, in August 1962 a paramilitary program was established throughout South Vietnam under the control of the CIA’s Combined Studies Division/Group. Known as the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG), its members were to defend villages and carry out interdiction operations, including ambushes, against the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) and VC guerrillas. CIDG members concentrated their efforts in areas where the Ho Chi Minh Trail entered South Vietnam. Beginning in November 1962, the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), gradually took over control of the CIA’s paramilitary operations. The CIDG and the border surveillance program were transferred to MACV (military) control. When intelligence reports indicated increased Communist activities during December 1962, emphasis was placed on building and occupying border camps for the CIA’s Border Surveillance program. Initially five Special Forces camps were built to hold the troops who performed the border surveillance mission. During the Vietnam War it made little sense for U.S. forces, most of whom did not speak Vietnamese and did not understand the language, to be the chief instrument of counterinsurgency. By 1964 the vast majority of Special Forces, prior to being sent on temporary duty to Vietnam for six-month periods, were being schooled in the Vietnamese language at Fort Bragg. In January 1962 Roger Hilsman, assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs, presented “A Strategic Concept for South Vietnam” that defined the war essentially as a political struggle and proposed policies aimed at the rural Vietnamese as the key to victory. This led to the Strategic Hamlet Program. Hilsman also recommended that the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) adopt guerrilla warfare tactics. President Lyndon Johnson rejected the latter. In any case, General William Westmoreland’s priority was never pacification but rather seeking out and destroying main Communist battle units. He left pacification and counterinsurgency largely up to the South Vietnamese government. The South Vietnamese leadership was little interested in pacification and saw the Strategic Hamlet Program as a means of control rather than an exercise in materially aiding the peasants and in the process winning their allegiance. In any case, established programs were riddled with corruption, including the CIDG program controlled by the Luc Luong Dac Biet (LLDB, South Vietnamese Special Forces). In 1970 the CIDG camps were abandoned altogether and were turned over to the ARVN Rangers. In 1967 a great many U.S.-sponsored projects were brought together under one authority, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), headed by Robert W. Komer. This also led to the controversial Phoenix Program, which incorporated the use of counterterrorism. Whether earlier implementation of a fully developed pacification effort would have been successful remains questionable. In
CRIMP, Operation
any case, the principal U.S. effort in that regard came when the insurgency was already too well established for the pacification effort to have a chance at success. HARVE SAAL AND SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Central Intelligence Agency; Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Hilsman, Roger; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Komer, Robert W.; Krulak, Victor H.; McNamara, Robert Strange; Montagnards; Pacification; Phoenix Program; Psychological Warfare Operations; Strategic Hamlet Program; Taylor, Maxwell Davenport; Thompson, Sir Robert Grainger Ker; United States Army; United States Special Forces; Vietnam, Republic of, Special Forces; Westmoreland, William Childs References Bell, J. Bower. The Myth of the Guerrilla: Revolutionary Theory and Malpractice. New York: Knopf, 1971. Blaufarb, Douglas S. The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance 1950 to Present. New York: Free Press, 1977. Cable, Larry. Conflict of Myths: The Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War. New York: New York University Press, 1988. Johnson, Chalmers. Autopsy on People’s Wars. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973. Kelly, Francis John. U.S. Army Special Forces, 1961–1971. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985. McClintock, Michael. Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency and Counter-Terrorism, 1940–1990. New York: Pantheon Books, 1992. Paret, Peter. French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria: The Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine. New York: Praeger, 1964. Saal, Harve. MACV, Studies and Observations Group (SOG). 4 vols. Milwaukee, WI: Jones Techno-Comm, 1990. Shafer, D. Michael. Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988. Sutherland, Ian D. W. 1952/1982: Special Forces of the United States Army. San Jose, CA: R. James Bender, 1990. Westmoreland, William C. A Soldier Reports. New York: Doubleday, 1976.
COWIN Report See “Conduct of the War in Vietnam” Report
CRIMP,
Operation
Start Date: January 7, 1966 End Date: January 13, 1966 Joint American-Australian search-and-destroy operation launched on January 7, 1966. The objective of Operation CRIMP was to clear out the Ho Bo woods, a Viet Cong (VC) stronghold located west of the so-called Iron Triangle in Tay Ninh Province
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in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). General William Westmorland who ordered the operation, billed as the largest military operation conducted in South Vietnam to date, hoped that a massive attack utilizing troops, airplanes, helicopters, tanks, and other vehicles would be a crippling blow to insurgent forces in South Vietnam. Operation CRIMP commenced with a massive bombing raid in the area, U.S. B-52s dropping as much as 30 tons of ordnance over the suspected area. Units from the U.S. 1st Division, the 173rd Airborne Brigade, and the Royal Australian Regiment made up the 8,000-strong strike force. Opposing the allied force was the 7th Cu Chi Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Thanh Linh. The operation led to the discovery of the vast tunnel complex known as the Cu Chi Tunnels used by the VC. Shortly after the operation began allied units along the entire front came under hostile fire, but when the troops advanced to the presumed VC positions, they found nothing but empty trenches and some rice; their attackers had seemingly vanished into thin air. The operation proceeded to sweep through the woods, continuously coming under fire. Yet despite finding traces of a sizable enemy presence, the Americans and Australians could not locate any enemy troops. The mystery was solved when an American private sat down to rest and immediately jumped back to his feet, feeling something sharp on the ground. Initially he thought that he had received an insect or snake bite. The “bite,” however, was actually a nail attached to a hidden trapdoor that led to a tunnel. Beyond the trapdoor lay an immense network of tunnels and rooms that included barracks, kitchens, and hospital facilities (where VC doctors performed procedures ranging from amputations to brain surgery), ammunition and food depots, and workshops. Smoke and gas blown into the tunnels in the hopes of flushing out the enemy forces revealed the full extent of the network when the smoke began to rise from locations scattered throughout the jungle. The troops of Operation CRIMP were not trained for tunnel warfare, so the mission was terminated on January 13. Operation BUCKSKIN was subsequently launched to clear the tunnels uncovered by CRIMP. New units composed of infantry and engineers were sent into the tunnels, often equipped only with a flashlight, a side arm, and a combat knife. These “tunnel rats,” as they came to be known, crawled throughout the vast network on the lookout for documents, hidden rooms, booby traps, weapons, and enemy soldiers. The discovery of the tunnel networks forced changes in military strategy. Massive search-and-destroy operations such as CRIMP could be easily weathered by the VC in their tunnels. The network meant that the enemy could be hiding anywhere on, above, or below the ground. This forced the Americans to concentrate on suspected tunnel areas instead of embarking on wide-ranging search-and-destroy missions. The VC also learned lessons during CRIMP. Linh used the opportunity of living among the enemy to study their tactics and formations, harass them with sniper fire, and learn which booby traps were the most effective. CHRIS THOMAS
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See also Cu Chi Tunnels; Iron Triangle; Tunnel Rats; Tunnels; Viet Cong Infrastructure; Westmoreland, William Childs References Mangold, Tom, and John Penycate. The Tunnels of Cu Chi. New York: Random House, 1985. Rottman, Gordon L. Viet Cong and NVA Tunnels and Fortifications of the Vietnam War. Oxford, UK: Osprey, 2006.
Cronauer, Adrian Birth Date: September 8, 1938 Attorney and celebrated disc jockey whose program on American Forces Network (Armed Forces Network) entertained thousands of U.S. soldiers in Vietnam. Born on September 8, 1938, in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Adrian Cronauer began his broadcasting career at age 12 as an amateur guest on a Pittsburgh radio station. He attended the University of Pittsburgh, where he helped create the university’s college radio station, and he also attended American University, where he worked at the student radio station. Later he earned a law degree from the University of Pennsylvania. Cronauer honed his morning radio broadcast skills listening to Rege Cordic’s morning radio show in the 1950s in Pittsburgh. After joining the armed forces, Cronauer broadcast to Iraklion Air Station in Crete, where he opened his program with “Good Morning, Iraklion.” When he went to Vietnam as a U.S. Air Force sergeant, he changed his greeting to “Good Morning, Vietnam,” and began every program with it. His show was broadcast from 6:00 to 9:00 a.m. during 1965–1966 in Saigon. Cronauer’s show was the focus of a major Hollywood motion picture titled Good Morning, Vietnam (1987), which picked up on the signature phrase that he used to begin his show. He was played by comedic actor Robin Williams. Cronauer’s real-life program hardly resembled the madcap antics of the movie, however. Instead, Cronauer stayed within the limits of the Armed Forces Radio format. He recalled that in contrast to the one-liners that Williams had delivered in the movie, his humor was much more situational. Cronauer crafted a program of a mix of top-40 songs and oldies and also presented a stock of prerecorded characters, conducted interviews, and talked to studio drop-ins. He saw his job in Vietnam as one that would counteract the culture shock and homesickness experienced by many young soldiers while serving in Vietnam. When Cronauer returned from his stint in Vietnam, he wrote a story about his experiences there that ultimately served as the inspiration for the film Good Morning, Vietnam. He subsequently worked in a number of radio and television venues, provided voice-overs, and became a senior partner in a law firm based in Washington, D.C. Cronauer continues to appear on television from time to time and is sometimes a guest on syndicated radio programs. His 1991 program on National Public Radio about the role of military radio in Vietnam won a 1992 Ohio State Award and
two 1991 Gold Medals from the New York Radio Festival. In 1994 he played a cameo role in Street Fighter, portraying a comic radio personality that mirrored his job in Vietnam. Cronauer, a longtime Republican, was such a well-known veteran that President George W. Bush asked him to serve in his first administration. While Cronauer was considering the offer, terrorists attacked the United States on September 11, 2001. Cronauer thought about rejoining the military but instead became special assistant to the director of the Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office at the Department of Defense. He also serves as an adviser to the deputy assistant secretary of defense and is responsible for programs that provide outreach to family, veterans, and activist groups. According to Cronauer, the work is both rewarding and frustrating. He notes that there are still approximately 88,000 people missing from all the American wars. KATHLEEN WARNES See also Film and the Vietnam Experience; Literature and the Vietnam War References Baker, Mark. Nam: The Vietnam War in the Words of the Men and Women Who Fought There. New York: William Morrow, 1981. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997.
Cronkite, Walter Leland Birth Date: November 4, 1916 Death Date: July 27, 2009 Influential and iconic CBS television news reporter and anchorman. Born on November 4, 1916, in St. Joseph, Missouri, Walter Leland Cronkite moved to Texas as a young boy. After two years at the University of Texas–Austin, he left school and began his journalism career at the Houston Post in 1933. He then entered the world of radio broadcasting, taking his first job as a radio journalist and announcer in Oklahoma City in the 1930s. During World War II he worked for United Press International (UPI), and during 1945–1946 he served as chief correspondent for the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunals. Cronkite spent two years as the chief UPI correspondent from the Moscow desk before joining CBS News in 1950. He was personally recruited by the venerable journalist Edward R. Murrow, who admired Cronkite’s work during World War II. Besides working as a reporter, Cronkite also narrated several popular series, which earned him wide public recognition. In 1962 Cronkite became the anchor and editor of the CBS Evening News. A year later he convinced CBS management to extend the evening news from 15 minutes to 30 minutes, which became the industry standard for years thereafter. He also anchored CBS space launches and national political conventions. From 1953 to 1957 Cronkite also hosted You Are There, a popular television program dedicated to reenacting significant historical events.
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philanthropic and political causes. Cronkite died on July 27, 2009, in New York City. LAURA MATYSEK WOOD See also Media and the Vietnam War; Television and the Vietnam War; Tet Offensive, Overall Strategy; Tet Offensive and the Saigon Circle References Fensch, Thomas, ed. Television News Anchors. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1993. Hallin, Daniel C. Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. James, Doug. Cronkite: His Life and Times. Brentwood, TN: JM Press, 1991.
Cubi Point Naval Air Station, Philippines
Highly respected journalist Walter Cronkite was among the first of the profession to use television as his primary medium. As the anchor of the popular CBS Evening News from 1962 until 1982, Cronkite reported from Vietnam in early 1968 and, on his return, stated publicly that he believed the United States could not win the war. President Lyndon B. Johnson allegedly commented, “If I’ve lost Cronkite, I’ve lost America.” (AP/Wide World Photos)
With his reputation for hard work, accuracy, competitiveness, gravitas, and impartiality, Cronkite achieved great believability, often ranking in polls as the “most trusted man in America.” As such, his rarely seen emotions carried great significance to his viewing public. His emotional coverage of the John F. Kennedy assassination in November 1963 mirrored the feelings of the American public. In 1968 Cronkite, upon returning from a trip to Vietnam from which he reported extensively, stated publicly that he believed that American policy there would not win the war. This statement came shortly after the Tet Offensive and, coupled with the public’s growing doubts about the war, seemed to confirm that Americans wanted out of the Vietnam War. President Lyndon B. Johnson allegedly lamented that “If I’ve lost Cronkite, I’ve lost America.” Although Cronkite was not by a long shot the only American journalist to proclaim the Vietnam War to be unwinnable, he was certainly the most influential and well-respected reporter to do so. During his career Cronkite received two Peabody Awards and an Emmy Award. After retiring in 1982 he was honored with the Presidential Medal of Freedom. After his retirement, he contributed to numerous special television projects and was active in
Cubi Point Naval Air Station (NAS), located in the Republic of the Philippines (abutting the Bataan Peninsula on Luzon), played a critical role in the U.S. Navy’s air war in Vietnam. Cubi Point was constructed by U.S. Navy Construction Battalion (Seabee) units beginning in 1951. The project involved displacing an entire town and cutting away half of a mountain to build a 10,000-foot runway and supporting facilities. This project extended over five years and cost $100 million. Naval Air Station Cubi Point was commissioned on July 25, 1956. As the Vietnam War intensified in 1964–1965, U.S. Navy aircraft carriers began operating from two main locations off the Vietnam littoral, Yankee Station off the coast of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and Dixie Station off the coast of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Three to five carriers and up to 400 mostly jet aircraft were involved in this portion of Operation ROLLING THUNDER. This huge air armada required a proximate base to provide maintenance and provisioning, and NAS Cubi Point filled that bill. Located approximately 700 nautical miles, or two days’ steaming time, from carrier stations in the South China Sea, Cubi Point was an ideal location to provide logistical support for Commander Task Force 77, the carrier strike force of the U.S. Seventh Fleet. In addition to its long runway, Cubi Point contained a pier capable of accommodating the largest carriers in the fleet. The pier was enlarged in 1965 to include pipelines for both ship and aircraft fuel. The NAS also was abutted by a large naval magazine from which aircraft carriers and their supporting ammunition ships took aboard large quantities of bombs and other ordnance. Critical spare parts and mail were staged for delivery by carrier onboard delivery aircraft. Another significant capability was the Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Facility, which at its peak was able to deliver two fully refurbished jet engines to the fleet on a daily basis. The rugged terrain and tropical climate of Cubi Point also made it an ideal home for the U.S. Navy’s Jungle Environmental Survival Training
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A view of the runway at the Naval Air Station at Cubi Point in the Philippines. This installation played an important role in the U.S. Navy’s air operations during the Vietnam War. (Department of Defense)
School. This school held weekly classes for more than 300 U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Army pilots and aircrew bound for Vietnam. Beginning in 1971, Cubi Point also hosted a number of rotating deployed U.S. Navy aircraft squadrons, including maritime patrol squadrons of up to nine Lockheed P-3C Orion aircraft. Aircraft of Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron One and Composite Squadron Five were also based at the NAS and provided intelligence, logistics, and training support to U.S. Navy forces in the Gulf of Tonkin. NAS Cubi Point was also famous for its Officers Club, the contents of which were transferred intact to the National Naval Aviation Museum in Pensacola, Florida, upon the closure of the Cubi Point installation in 1992. ROBERT M. BROWN See also United States Navy References Hooper, Edwin B. Mobility, Support, Endurance. Washington DC: Department of the Navy, 1972. Mersky, Peter B., and Norman Polmar. The Naval Air War in Vietnam. Annapolis, MD: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1981.
Cu Chi Tunnels Important Communist base area. The district of Cu Chi is located some 40 miles northwest of Saigon on the way to Tay Ninh. In 1966 Cu Chi lay astride the Viet Cong (VC) main supply line to Cambodia. Thus, it is not surprising that VC leaders decided to locate a headquarters complex here as well as to fortify the surrounding area. What was surprising to Americans was that the VC constructed these positions underground. The interlocking series of tunnels and chambers, sometimes three or four levels in depth, were a marvel of military engineering, made possible by dense clay soil in the Cu Chi area. Stretching well over 100 miles, the tunnels contained hospitals, armories, classrooms, kitchens, living quarters, and even munitions factories. A complex series of ventilation shafts allowed occupants to survive underground for months at a time. Trapdoors at the surface were well concealed, and the tunnels themselves had many hidden doors and passages that enhanced their tactical advantage. Although they did not find it pleasant duty, VC soldiers were able to use the tunnel networks to considerable advantage. On January 7, 1966, units of the U.S. 1st Infantry Division and the 173rd Airborne Brigade discovered this extensive network. This initial contact provided only a glimpse of the problems that
Cunningham, Randall Harold tunnel fortifications would pose for U.S. forces at Cu Chi and across Vietnam. When the 25th Infantry Division established its base camp at Cu Chi later that spring, it assumed the task of clearing the tunnels. For several weeks the rear areas of the division were attacked by VC soldiers emerging from the tunnels, a type of envelopment from below. U.S. personnel attempted different approaches to clearing the tunnels. These included tear gas, acetylene gas, and explosives. Soon U.S. commanders realized that the only way to clear them effectively was by hand. This task fell to a group of volunteers who became known as “tunnel rats.” Because of the narrow tunnel passages, these men were almost uniformly small in stature and performed their duties with a minimum of equipment. Usually a tunnel rat went below with a pistol, a knife, and a flashlight. The tunnels proved to be physically and psychologically draining on American troops, and most tunnel rats served relatively short periods in this taxing assignment. Tunnel networks were later discovered in other parts of Vietnam, but none were as extensive or as problematic as those at Cu Chi. By 1967 the tunnels had been cleared, but they served as an early example of the tactical ingenuity and tenacity facing U.S. forces in Vietnam. Today the Cu Chi tunnels are a major tourist attraction. RICHARD D. STARNES See also Clear and Hold; National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam; Tunnel Rats; Tunnels References Bergerud, Eric M. Red Thunder, Tropic Lightning: The World of a Combat Division in Vietnam. San Francisco: Westview, 1993. Mangold, Tom, and John Penycate. The Tunnels of Cu Chi. New York: Random House, 1985. Stanton, Shelby L. The Rise and Fall of an American Army: The U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985.
Culture, Vietnamese See Vietnamese Culture
Cunningham, Randall Harold Birth Date: December 8, 1941 U.S. Navy officer and first ace in the Vietnam War (five MiG kills), television commentator, and U.S. congressman. Born in Los Angeles, California, on December 8, 1941, Randall Harold (Duke) Cunningham graduated from the University of Missouri in 1964 and the following year earned a master’s degree in education. Between 1965 and 1967 he became a highly successful swimming coach; three of his students went on to win Olympic gold or silver medals.
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Cunningham joined the U.S. Navy in 1967 and received his pilot’s wings the next year. He took his operational training in McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantoms at the Naval Air Station in Miramar, California, and then joined Fighter Squadron 96. His first combat deployment was aboard the carrier America during 1969 and 1970. On January 19, 1972, during Lieutenant Cunningham’s second Vietnam tour he shot down a Vietnam People’s Air Force (VPAF, North Vietnamese Air Force) MiG-21, and on May 8, 1972, he shot down a VPAF MiG-19. On May 10, 1972, he downed three MiG-17s. While returning to the carrier Constellation, his plane was hit by a surface-to-air missile (SAM) and downed, but Cunningham and his radar intercept officer, Lieutenant (Junior Grade) Bill Driscoll, were picked up at the mouth of the Red River by a search-andrescue (SAR) helicopter. In all, Cunningham flew 300 Vietnam combat missions. His decorations included the Navy Cross, two Silver Stars, and the Purple Heart. In 1984 Cunningham returned to Miramar, assigned to train fighter pilots at the Navy Fighter Weapons School in the Top Gun program. As commanding officer of the elite Navy Adversary Squadron, he flew Soviet/Russian tactics and formations against some of the best U.S. fighter pilots. Many of his real-life experiences as both naval aviator and fighter pilot instructor were depicted in the 1986 film Top Gun. Cunningham retired from the navy with the rank of commander in 1988. He subsequently became a part-time commentator for CNN television on military matters and became well know for his observations during the lead-in to the Persian Gulf War (1991). In 1990 Cunningham was elected on the Republican ticket to the U.S. House of Representatives from California. He was chairman of the House Subcommittee on Early Childhood, Youth, and Families and served as assistant majority whip. He was also a member of the Committees on Economic and Educational Opportunities and National Security. The archly conservative Cunningham became well known for his frequent outbursts and intemperate remarks. In one instance, he became involved in a shoving match with a Democratic colleague over the prospect of sending American troops to Bosnia in 1999. In December 2005 Cunningham was forced to resign his seat after he pled guilty to having accepted more than $2 million in bribes in exchange for federal government contracts and to conspiracy to commit bribery, mail fraud, wire fraud, and tax evasion. In March 2006 he was sentenced to eight years and four months in federal prison and ordered to pay $1.8 million in restitution. The judge refused to grant Cunningham a lighter sentence, despite the fact that he was suffering from prostate cancer. JAMES MCNABB See also Aircraft Carriers; Aircraft, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Airpower, Role in War; Alvarez, Everett, Jr.; McCain, John Sidney, III; Search-and-Rescue Operations; United States Navy
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Lieutenant Randall Cunningham (center, left) and Lieutenant William Driscoll (center, right) are honored in June 1972 as the U.S. Navy’s only Vietnam War flying aces. The two aviators are flanked by Secretary of the Navy John Warner (left) and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo Zumwalt (right). Cunningham was a Republican congressman from California during 1991–2003. (Naval Historical Center)
References Cunningham, Randy, and Jeffrey L. Ethell. Fox Two: The Story of America’s First Ace in Vietnam. New York: Warner Books, 1989. Duncan, Phillip D., and Christine C. Lawrence, eds. Congressional Quarterly’s Politics in America: The 104th Congress. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1995.
Cuong De Birth Date: 1882 Death Date: 1951 Prince of the Nguyen dynasty and leader of an anti-French movement in the early 20th century. Also known as Ky Ngoai Hau Cuong De, Cuong De was a direct descendant of Prince Canh, the first son of Emperor Gia Long (r. 1802–1820), founder of the Nguyen dynasty (1802–1945). Cuong De was selected by Phan Boi Chau and other Confucian scholars in central Vietnam to head their anti-French movement in 1903. In 1906 through the Dong Du (Travel to the East) movement, Cuong De left Vietnam for Japan
and was elected president of the Viet Nam Duy Tan Hoi (Association for Modernization of Vietnam). In 1910 following an agreement with the French in 1907 and to please them, the Japanese deported all Vietnamese students. Cuong De then moved to China where, together with Phan Boi Chau, he founded the Viet Nam Quang Phuc Hoi (Association for the Restoration of Viet Nam), of which Cuong De was elected president. During World War I Cuong De visited Berlin seeking assistance from the German government, and in 1915 he returned to Japan. During World War II the Japanese had a plan to support him as an alternative ruler to Bao Dai for Vietnam. This plan attracted many Vietnamese nationalists, including Ngo Dinh Diem and leaders of the Cao Dai religious sect, but it was never realized. In January 1945 Japanese administrator for Indochina General Tsuchihashi Yuichi rejected a proposal to fly Cuong De from Tokyo to Saigon, deciding that Bao Dai should remain on the throne to maintain “social order.” Cuong De died in Tokyo in 1951. PHAM CAO DUONG See also Cao Dai; French Indochina, 1860s–1946; Ngo Dinh Diem; Nguyen Dynasty
Cushman, Robert Everton, Jr. References Cuong De. Cuoc Doi Cach Mang Cuong De. Saigon: Trang Liet, 1957. Le Thanh Khoi. Le Viet-Nam: Histoire et civilisation. Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1955. Marr, David G. Vietnam 1945: The Quest for Power. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995. Marr, David G. Vietnamese Anticolonialism, 1885–1925. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971. Nguyen Huyen Anh. Viet Nam Danh Nhan Tu Dien [Dictionary of Vietnamese Great Men and Women]. Houston, TX: Zieleks, 1990. Nguyen The Anh. Viet Nam Duoi Thoi Phap Do Ho [Vietnam under French Domination]. Saigon: Lua Thieng, 1970.
Cushman, Robert Everton, Jr. Birth Date: December 24, 1914 Death Date: January 2, 1985 U.S. Marine Corps general and commandant. Born in St. Paul, Minnesota, on December 24, 1914, Robert Everton Cushman Jr. graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, in 1935 and was commissioned in the U.S. Marine Corps. He served with distinction in the Pacific theater during World War II in Guam,
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Bougainville, and Iwo Jima. Later he served in important staff assignments with Vice President Richard Nixon and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Cushman was promoted to brigadier general in July 1958 and to major general in August 1961. General Cushman’s most important combat assignment was as commander of the III Marine Amphibious Force in Vietnam from June 1967, when he was promoted to lieutenant general, to March 1969. Numbering more than 172,000 troops, this was the largest force ever commanded by a U.S. Marine Corps officer to that date. Cushman was responsible for operations in the I Corps Tactical Zone, a task that required him to manage assets from all arms and services. Cushman distinguished himself directing operations during the 1968 Tet Offensive. First and foremost a marine, he clashed with the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), staff and even its commanding officer, General William Westmoreland, over what Cushman saw as mismanagement of U.S. Marine Corps assets, particularly the U.S. Air Force control of U.S. Marine Corps air wings. Cushman left Vietnam in March 1969 to become deputy director of the CIA. In January 1972 upon promotion to full (four-star) general, he became commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps. Much
U.S. Marine Corps general Robert E. Cushman Jr. holds his first press conference since becoming Marine Corps commandant in January 1972. During 1967–1969, Cushman had commanded the III Marine Amphibious Force in Vietnam. He had then been deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency. (Bettmann/Corbis)
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of his time as commandant was spent overseeing a reduction in the strength of the U.S. Marine Corps while at the same time maintaining readiness. Cushman retired in June 1975 and died on January 2, 1985. RICHARD D. STARNES See also United States Marine Corps; Walt, Lewis William
References Millett, Allan R. Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps. Rev. and expanded ed. New York: Free Press, 1991. Smith, Charles R. High Mobility and Standdown, 1969, Vol. 6, U.S. Marines in Vietnam. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 1988. Telfer, Gary L. U.S. Marines in Vietnam: Fighting the North Vietnamese, 1967. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1984.
D Da Faria, Antônio
Dai Viet Quoc Dan Dang
the Ly (1010–1225 CE), Tran (1225–1400 CE), and Le (1428–1788 CE) dynasties. The party’s founder, Truong Tu Anh, and most of the party’s members were Hanoi-based university students. For ideology the Dai Viet adopted the theory of dan toc sinh ton (“people’s existence”), which focused on economic development and the people’s welfare. During World War II the Dai Viet Quoc Dan Dang (DVQDD, National Party of Greater Vietnam) established a number of bases in locations such as Viet Tri and Dong Trieu and also established a training center. But during 1945–1946 the DVQDD shared the fate of other nationalist parties in being subsumed by the Communists. The DVQDD’s leaders, including Truong Tu Anh, were killed or kidnapped. In the early 1950s the DVQDD began a revival in areas controlled by Bao Dai’s State of Vietnam. According to one of its leaders, the DVQDD recruited up to 200,000 new members, most of whom were in northern Vietnam and in the provinces of Quang Tri, Thua Thien, and Quang Nam in southern Vietnam. Besides the DVQDD, many other Vietnamese nationalist parties chose to incorporate the term “Dai Viet” in their names. These included the Dai Viet Duy Dan, well known among Vietnamese intellectuals for its nhan chu duy dan (“people’s populism”) theory. Its founder, Ly Dong A, was also kidnapped and disappeared. Another such party was the Dai Viet Dan Chinh headed by Nguyen Tuong Tam, the well-known founder of the Tu Luc Van Doan group. A third party was the Dai Viet Quoc Xa of Phan Quang Dan, a party supported by the Japanese. A fourth such party was the Dai Viet Quoc Gia Lien Minh, founded by Ngo Thuc Dich, Nguyen Xuan Mai, Nhuong Tong, and others. PHAM CAO DUONG
Vietnamese nationalist party founded in 1936. Dai Viet, which can be translated as “Greater Viet,” was the name of Vietnam under
See also Bao Dai; Viet Minh
Birth Date: Unknown Death Date: Unknown Portuguese explorer. During the 16th century, many European powers launched exploration and empire-building efforts. The Portuguese were particularly successful in Asia, where they gained important footholds in India, Malaya, Siam, Burma, and China. In 1535 Portuguese Antônio da Faria became the first European to establish a lasting settlement in Vietnam. The village of Faifo, located 15 miles south of present-day Da Nang, offered a usable harbor that da Faria hoped to exploit. He envisioned a major Portuguese trade center, such as those developed at Goa and Malacca, but Faifo never prospered to that extent. DAVID COFFEY See also Vietnam, History of, 938 CE through the French Conquest References Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. Tucker, Spencer C. Vietnam. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1999.
Daisy Cutter Bomb See BLU-82/B Bomb
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References Nguyen Khac Ngu. Dai Cuong Ve Cac Dang Phai Chinh Tri Viet Nam [Overview of Political Parties in Vietnam]. Montreal: Tu Sach Nghien Cuu Su Dia, 1989. Nguyen Van Canh. “Thanh Nien Va Cac Phong Trao Chong Phap Thoi Can Dai (1900–1945).” In Tuyen Tap Ngon Ngo Va Van Hoc Viet Nam: Essays on Vietnamese Language and Literature, No. 2, Fascicle II, 491–505. San Jose, CA: Mekong-Tynan, 1994.
Dak To, Battle of Start Date: June 17, 1967 End Date: November 22, 1967 Series of battles in 1967 at the U.S. Special Forces camp at Dak To, northeast of Pleiku. On June 17, 1967, Dak To came under heavy mortar fire. During the next few days the 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry, 173rd Airborne Brigade, searched the slopes of Hill 1338 for the attackers. On June 22 Company A encountered a battalion of the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) 24th Infantry Regiment. The difficulty of fighting in the junglecovered mountains became immediately evident. Commanders
in helicopters could not see their units on the ground, artillery exploded in treetops rather than on the ground, and smoke from smoke grenades dissipated before reaching the top of the jungle and served only to identify for the enemy the location of American soldiers. In this battle, U.S. losses were 76 killed in action and 23 wounded. PAVN losses were estimated at 475 killed or wounded, although that number is disputed. During July, companies from the 173rd Airborne Brigade continued to patrol near Dak To. Documents found in numerous PAVN camps indicated the presence in the area of three PAVN regiments with a mission to attack U.S. Army Special Forces camps blocking infiltration routes into the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). On July 7 Company B, 4th Battalion, 503rd Infantry, met a strong PAVN force on Hill 830 and suffered 24 killed and 62 wounded. Contacts continued throughout the month. In late 1967 the PAVN began moving more units south to prepare for the Tet Offensive. Units from the U.S. 4th Infantry and 1st Cavalry divisions, units from the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army), and other battalions from the 173rd Airborne Brigade deployed to Dak To. Facing the Americans in the Dak To area were four regiments (the 24th, 66th, 174th, and 320th regiments) of the reinforced PAVN 1st Division,
On November 22, 1967, members of the U.S. 173rd Airborne Brigade reached the crest of Hill 875. In the late afternoon of November 19, a U.S. Air Force fighter dropped a 500-pound bomb in the middle of Company C, killing 42 Americans and wounding 45. Three days of fighting here against entrenched People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) soldiers cost the Americans 115 killed, 253 wounded, and 5 missing. (Bettmann/Corbis)
Dak To, Battle of
led by the division commander Nguyen Huu An, who had commanded PAVN forces during the brutal fight against the U.S. 1st Air Cavalry Division in the Battle of the Ia Drang Valley in November 1965. During the first nine days of November, companies from the 8th Infantry and 12th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division, and from the 173rd Airborne Brigade engaged in savage fighting near Hill 823. In the ensuing battles, paratroopers from the 4th Battalion, 503rd Infantry, killed about 125 PAVN soldiers but lost 15 killed and 48 wounded. Examination of PAVN dead revealed that the unit was composed of well-equipped fresh troops. A major battle occurred on November 11 between the PAVN 66th Regiment and American units. On Hill 724 the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry, fought off a PAVN attack that resulted in 92 PAVN troops killed. U.S. casualties were 18 killed and 188 wounded. On Hill 223, Companies A, C, and D of the 1st Battalion, 503rd Infantry, 173rd Airborne Brigade, encountered a PAVN battalion. Hit by mortar, rocket, and small-arms fire from the well-camouflaged PAVN, Companies A, C, and D were surrounded. Company C of the 4th Battalion, 503rd Infantry, arrived about 875 yards from the battle and relieved the 1st Battalion. U.S. casualties were 20 killed, 184 wounded, and 2 missing. PAVN losses were officially
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reported as 175 killed, but participants believed that no more than 80 were actually killed. During November 12–15 units from the 1st and 2nd battalions, 503rd Infantry, encountered PAVN troops in well-constructed bunkers and trenches. In the ensuing battles, American troops lost numerous killed and found 85 PAVN troops dead. PAVN rockets meanwhile destroyed the ammunition dump at the Dak To firesupport base. On November 19 the 2nd Battalion of the 503rd Infantry began moving up Hill 875, unaware that in front of them the PAVN 174th Regiment occupied bunkers and trenches connected by tunnels. As two companies advanced, PAVN troops closed behind them. Company A’s command post was overrun, and the remnants of that company plus Companies C and D were surrounded. In late afternoon a U.S. Air Force fighter dropped a 500-pound bomb in the middle of Company C. The explosion killed 42 Americans (several of them officers) and wounded 45. Throughout November 20 the survivors repelled numerous PAVN attacks. That night three companies from the 4th Battalion, 503rd Infantry, arrived to reinforce the defenders. Units from the 4th Infantry Division and the ARVN 42th Infantry Regiment encountered PAVN troops west, south, and northeast of Dak To.
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Not until November 22 did the 4th Battalion, along with two 4th Infantry Division companies, gain the crest of Hill 875. In the battle American casualties totaled 115 killed, 253 wounded, and 5 missing. Total PAVN losses since November 1 were estimated at 1,000. In these engagements, known collectively as the Battle of Dak To, the PAVN failed to achieve one of its main objectives: the destruction of an American unit. The PAVN had, however, come close. Despite heavy losses, the Americans had achieved a victory. Three PAVN regiments scheduled to participate in the upcoming Tet Offensive were so mauled that they had to be withdrawn to refit. In his memoirs General Nguyen Huu An admitted that at the time of the 1968 Tet offensive, “After the battle of Dak To, the combat strength of [my] 1st Division had deteriorated, and we no longer possessed the strength to ‘devour’ an American infantry brigade.” RICHARD L. KIPER
of the 1968 Tet Offensive. From January 31 to February 9, 1968, fierce fighting occurred in and around Da Lat between South Vietnamese forces and the Viet Cong (VC). After the war the Communists used the city as a rehabilitation center for their cadre. With its European-style villas, cobbled streets, churches, and pagodas, Da Lat is a popular tourist resort venue. JUSTIN J. CORFIELD See also Bao Dai; Ho-Sainteny Agreement; Ngo Dinh Diem; Nguyen Van Thieu; Tet Offensive, Overall Strategy; Viet Cong Infrastructure References Shipway, Martin. The Road to War: France and Vietnam. Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1996. Warner, Denis. Out of the Gun. London: Hutchinson, 1956.
See also Central Highlands; Tet Offensive, Overall Strategy; Tet Offensive and the Saigon Circle; United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1965–1968; Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, Army; Vietnam, Republic of, Army
Da Lat Military Academy
References Murphy, Edward F. Dak To: The 173rd Airborne Brigade in South Vietnam’s Central Highlands, June–November 1967. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1993. Nguyen Huu An and Nguyen Tu Duong. Chien Truong Moi [New Battlefield]. Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 2002.
Daley, Richard Joseph
Da Lat City located at the southern end of the Central Highlands in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (Republic of Vietnam [RVN, South Vietnam] until 1975), with a population in 2008 of some 120,000 people. Da Lat was established in 1897 by the French as a mountain resort for Europeans and remained a popular destination during the period of French colonial rule (up to 1954). French officials dammed up the Cam Ly River, which led to the creation of Lake Xuan Huong near the city center. The city was the location of the Da Lat Military Academy, where many Vietnamese officers were trained including Nguyen Van Thieu, later president of South Vietnam. In April and May 1946 the city was the location of the Da Lat Conference, where representatives of the French government met with Vietnamese Communists to discuss the terms of the March 1946 Ho-Sainteny Agreement. The failure of the conference helped contribute to the start of the Indochina War in December 1946. Da Lat was popular with Emperor Bao Dai during the latter period of the Indochina War, and after the end of French rule many of the Saigon elite bought homes there, including members of the Ngo Dinh Diem family. With the surrounding region populated by the Montagnards and other tribes people, there was little fighting around the city during the Vietnam War with the notable exception
See Vietnam, Republic of, Da Lat Military Academy
Birth Date: May 15, 1902 Death Date: December 20, 1976 Democratic politician and longtime mayor of Chicago from 1955 until his death in 1976. Born in Chicago on May 15, 1902, Richard Joseph Daley was the son of an Irish American sheet-metal worker and union activist. A hard worker even as a teenager, Daley early became interested in politics. A Democrat, he was a precinct captain at the age of 21. Later he became a state assembly member and state senator. Going to school at night, he earned a JD degree from DePaul University in 1933, although he rarely practiced law. As a member of the Cook County (in which the city of Chicago is located) Democratic Central Committee, Daley increased his political importance. In 1955 he was elected mayor of Chicago and became the powerful boss of that city’s potent political machine. The positions that Daley held allowed him to fill thousands of patronage jobs with loyal supporters. His close ties to industry and labor gave him considerable control over the sizable African American vote in the city. There is no question that Daley was the most powerful mayor in the nation. During his 21 years in office, Daley presided over numerous and massive construction and development projects in America’s second-largest city. These included the University of Illinois–Chicago campus, McCormick Place (a massive convention center), O’Hare International Airport, the Sears Tower (the nation’s tallest building, renamed the Willis Tower in 2009), and myriad highway and subway construction and extension projects. As such, he
Da Nang
Richard J. Daley was mayor of Chicago from 1955 to 1976. As the head of Chicago’s Democratic Party machine, Daley was one of the most powerful politicians in the country. (City of Chicago, Office of the Mayor)
was credited with having saved Chicago from the plight of many other northern industrial cities, which experienced painful and long-term declines after the late 1960s. It is almost axiomatic that what Daley accomplished included a significant amount of graft, corruption, and patronage, but although many of his subordinates were accused and convicted of abuse of power, bribery, etc., Daley remained above the fray and was enormously popular for much of his tenure. Daley famously extended his control over Illinois and Chicago voters to sway the 1960 presidential vote in favor of John F. Kennedy. In 1964 Daley again delivered the Illinois vote to President Lyndon Johnson. Daley’s heavy-handed response to three days of rioting in Chicago following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. on April 4, 1968, was a preview of the 1968 Democratic National Convention riots. Daley made security the number-one priority at the convention site by creating a fortress there, complete with barbedwire and chain-link fencing outside, while inside he clearly tried to manipulate the convention in favor of his choice for the nomination, Senator Hubert Humphrey.
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The Chicago police clashed with antiwar demonstrators before the convention even opened, and Daley’s opening remarks to the convention included a promise to keep law and order. On his orders, Chicago police brutally attacked the crowds. During the unrest, Senator Abraham Ribicoff (D-Conn.) denounced Daley’s “law and order” outside the convention hall as “Gestapo tactics” and attempted to close the convention down and reconvene it elsewhere. Daley, outraged, shouted the senator down and prevented the motion from reaching the floor for a vote. Later dubbed a “police riot,” the brutality on the streets of Chicago stunned the nation as it watched the violence unfold on television. After the August riots the Daley administration was lambasted for its repressive policies, and for the first time the shine on Daley’s image became somewhat tarnished. Nevertheless, Daley insisted that what he had done was right and made no apologies for the violence, instead attributing it to “radicals.” Despite his loss of popularity, Daley was reelected to an unprecedented fifth term in 1971, although many have pointed out that this was due more to the lack of worthy opposition rather than Daley’s popularity itself. It was also obvious that Daley, through his political machine and patronage, saw to it that he had no viable opposition. Daley died suddenly of a heart attack in Chicago on December 20, 1976. His son, Richard M. Daley, has been mayor of Chicago since 1989. If he finishes his current term, which ends in 2010, he will have bested his father’s record as the city’s longestreigning mayor. CHARLOTTE A. POWER AND PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR. See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Chicago Eight; Democratic National Convention of 1968; Elections, U.S., 1968; Humphrey, Hubert Horatio References Cohen, Adam, and Elizabeth Taylor. American Pharaoh: Mayor Richard J. Daley; His Battle for Chicago and the Nation. Boston: Little, Brown, 2000. Lichtenstein, Nelson, ed. Political Profiles: The Johnson Years. New York: Facts on File, 1976. Royko, Mike. Boss: Richard J. Daley of Chicago. New York: Signet, 1971.
Da Nang Capital of Quang Nam Province and the second-largest city in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Da Nang had a 1967 population of 143,910 people. In 1954 the Geneva Conference partitioned Vietnam along the 17th Parallel. Da Nang represented a major concession by the Communists because the Viet Minh controlled much of the territory between the 13th and 17th parallels. On March 8, 1965, the first U.S. combat units in Vietnam landed at Da Nang. The city was the headquarters of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) I Corps. Da
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U.S. marines come ashore at Da Nang, South Vietnam, on March 8, 1965. The marines were dispatched to the Republic of Vietnam to protect U.S. air bases there and were the vanguard of U.S. ground troops in the country. (UPI-Bettmann/Corbis)
Nang was also the site of a major military base, port, and resupply area for ARVN and U.S. forces and became headquarters for the U.S. III Marine Amphibious Force, the U.S. 1st and 3rd Marine divisions, and later the U.S. Army’s XXIV Corps. As the Vietnam War progressed, Da Nang was strangled with refugees who had been forced to flee their ancestral homes; many of them entered the drug trade or prostitution. During the 1966 Buddhist Crisis, the city was the site of massive antigovernment demonstrations as rebellious ARVN troops joined the Buddhists against Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky’s government. U.S. marines secured the city and averted the confrontation by positioning themselves between belligerent troops. In 1967 Communist forces mortared and rocketed Da Nang’s air base, destroying aircraft valued at $75 million. During the January 1968 Tet Offensive, Da Nang was attacked by People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) and Viet Cong (VC) forces. During the Communist 1975 Spring (Easter) Offensive, large numbers of refugees desperately attempting to stay close to their families crammed into the city, which fell quickly to the PAVN onslaught, prompting a catastrophic retreat in which thousands of ARVN soldiers and civilians perished amid heavy fighting. Following the Communist victory, Da Nang became a major staging area for the mass flight of Vietnamese boat people.
Today Da Nang remains an important city and port in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, and since the 1970s the city has experienced a large increase in population. Da Nang is one of five independent municipalities in the country and has a current estimated population of 750,000 people. The larger metropolitan area boasts a population of slightly more than 1 million. With four major universities, Da Nang is home to a myriad of light and medium industries and derives much of its income from the massive port facilities along the coast. Tourism has also emerged as a major industry. J. NATHAN CAMPBELL See also Geneva Conference and Geneva Accords of 1954; Hue and Da Nang, Fall of; Nguyen Cao Ky; Tet Offensive, Overall Strategy; Tet Offensive and the Saigon Circle; United States Marine Corps References Dunn, Carroll H. Base Development in South Vietnam, 1965–1970. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972. Dunn, Carroll H. Building the Bases: The History of Construction in Southeast Asia. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975. FitzGerald, Frances. Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam. Boston: Little, Brown, 1972. Kahin, George McT. Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam. New York: Knopf, 1986. Smith, Harvey H., et al. Area Handbook for South Vietnam. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967.
D’Argenlieu, Georges Thierry
Dang Xuan Khu See Truong Chinh
DANIEL BOONE,
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Operation
Start Date: May 1967 End Date: December 1968 Code name for cross-border reconnaissance operations from the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) into Cambodia by U.S. Special Forces. In June 1966 the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) authorized Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), commander General William Westmoreland to institute this project, which developed under the code name DANIEL BOONE. Final approval for the conduct of these operations was not granted until May 1967 and then only for the small section of the Cambodian triborder area above the Se San River. Teams typically included 2 or 3 Americans and about 10 indigenous personnel. Their mission was to penetrate Cambodia on foot or by helicopter-borne insertion, conduct reconnaissance, plant sanitized self-destruct antipersonnel mines, commit sabotage, and gather intelligence. DANIEL BOONE operations were expanded in October 1967 to cover Cambodia’s border facing Vietnam to a depth of 12.5 miles (later 18.75 miles) and was divided into two zones. Zone Alpha stretched approximately from Snoul north to Laos, while Zone Bravo stretched from Snoul to the Gulf of Thailand. Missions in Zone Bravo required presidential approval on a case-by-case basis. In November 1967 assets from Project Sigma were transferred to DANIEL BOONE, and the DANIEL BOONE teams increased their efforts. During November and December 1967 DANIEL BOONE teams detected a large People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) and Viet Cong (VC) buildup in such areas as the so-called Fishhook. General Westmoreland urgently requested approval to launch spoiling attacks into the detected base areas, but his appeals were denied. The success of the DANIEL BOONE strategic reconnaissance effort was not capitalized upon, and these areas later proved to be key PAVN/VC staging bases for the 1968 Tet Offensive. Operation DANIEL BOONE was renamed SALEM HOUSE in December 1968 and THOT NOT in 1971. During the four-year life of these operations, 1,835 missions were conducted. JAMES H. WILLBANKS See also Cambodia; Cambodian Incursion; Project Sigma; United States Special Forces; Westmoreland, William Childs References Shawcross, William. Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon, and the Destruction of Cambodia. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979. Stanton, Shelby L. Green Berets at War: U.S. Army Special Forces in Southeast Asia, 1956–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985.
Key figure in the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP). Dao Duy Tung, a northerner, built up his strength in the VCP hierarchy as a veteran officer in charge of propaganda. Born probably in 1922, he was a high school classmate of many Vietnamese leaders, including Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach and Minister of Interior Mai Chi Tho. Little is known about Tung’s activities during the Indochina War. Tung had been deputy chief of the Propaganda and Training Department of the VCP Central Committee at least since the 1960s. He was also the editor of Hoc Tap, later renamed Tap Chi Cong San (Communist Review), the political journal of the VCP. Tung became an alternate member of the VCP Central Committee at the party’s Fourth Congress in December 1976. In the March 1982 VCP Fifth Congress, Tung was elected a full member of its Central Committee and was promoted to chief of the Propaganda and Training Department. Tung became the sole alternate member of the Politburo by the VCP 6th Congress and was also appointed to its Central Committee’s Secretariat in December 1986. He relinquished his post as chief of the Propaganda and Training Department of the Central Committee, but it is believed that he continued to supervise propaganda and training. In June 1991 Tung was promoted to become a full member of the VCP Politburo. Considered a hard-liner who tried to adhere to Socialist ideology, Tung was dropped from the Politburo at the 8th Communist Party Congress in June 1996. He reportedly died in 1998. NGO NGOC TRUNG See also Vietnam, Socialist Republic of, 1975–Present Reference Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997.
Daoism See Taoism
D’Argenlieu, Georges Thierry Birth Date: August 7, 1889 Death Date: September 7, 1964 Roman Catholic priest, diplomat, commander in chief of Free French naval forces in World War II, and high commissioner of Indochina during 1945–1947. Born on August 7, 1889, in Brest, France, Georges Thierry d’Argenlieu followed his father into the navy, becoming a naval cadet at age 16. From 1912 to 1914 the
260 Dau Tranh Strategy younger d’Argenlieu saw service in Morocco, and during World War I he served in the Mediterranean in patrol boats and submarine chasers. After the war d’Argenlieu resigned his commission and began studying for the priesthood. Taking the name of Louis de la Trinité, in 1920 he became a Carmelite friar. Twelve years later he was chosen to restore the old Carmelite province of Paris, and in 1939 he became the provincial of all the Carmelite Order for France. Recalled to service at the start of World War II, d’Argenlieu was posted to Cherbourg. Captured with the fall of the arsenal there, he escaped by leaping from a moving prison train headed to Germany. One of the first to rally to Brigadier General Charles de Gaulle in London, d’Argenlieu remained fiercely loyal to the general. De Gaulle named him chaplain to the Free French Navy. D’Argenlieu was seriously wounded while serving as captain of a French shore party in the 1940 effort to capture Dakar in French West Africa. Within six weeks d’Argenlieu was back aboard ship commanding raids to seize West African ports, and he played a key role in assisting General Jacques-Philippe Leclerc once ashore. In 1941 d’Argenlieu was appointed high commissioner for the French territories of the Pacific and the Far East. Later he received plenipotentiary powers and the rank of rear admiral. Under his command, New Caledonia became a staging point for the Allied naval advance in the Pacific. In 1943 d’Argenlieu returned to London as commander of French naval forces in Britain. He was French naval adviser to the 1944 Normandy Invasion and accompanied de Gaulle on his return to France later that summer. In 1945 d’Argenlieu was appointed vice president of the Supreme Naval Council and inspector general of French naval forces, and in mid-August de Gaulle named him high commissioner to Indochina with instructions “to restore French sovereignty in the Indo-China Union.” It was in this period of his public service that d’Argenlieu became controversial. He was correctly seen as a staunch defender of French colonialism and its mission civilisatrice (“civilizing mission”), and his appointment to the Indochina post came over heated Socialist opposition. In The Two Viet Nams, Bernard Fall writes that d’Argenlieu’s appointment was France’s “major postwar blunder in Southeast Asia.” Fall describes d’Argenlieu as a man of narrow vision who saw the world as one of extremes in which evil was to be eradicated: “He had neither the patience nor the tact for negotiating with ‘natives.’” D’Argenlieu’s June 2, 1946, proclamation of a “Republic of Cochin-China” presented both Ho Chi Minh, leader of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), and the French government in Paris with a fait accompli, effectively torpedoing the Fontainebleau Conference and ending the possibility of working out accommodation with Ho and the Viet Minh. D’Argenlieu succeeded in convincing French premier Georges Bidault of the need to “teach the Vietnamese nationalists a lesson.” D’Argenlieu, who was in Paris at the time, cabled General Jean-Étienne Valluy, his deputy in Saigon, who in turn ordered
the French commissioner in Tonkin, General Louis Constant Morlière, to use force in north Vietnam. This produced the November 23, 1946, shelling of Hai Phong by the cruiser Suffren, which led directly to the December 19 outbreak of war. In February 1947 d’Argenlieu was recalled to France. He immediately reentered the Carmelite order and died at a monastery near Brest on September 7, 1964. He had pursued his two contradictory careers as a man of war and a man of peace with the same intense dedication. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Bidault, Georges; De Gaulle, Charles; Fontainebleau Conference; Haiphong, Shelling of; Leclerc, Jacques-Philippe; Valluy, Jean-Étienne References Alford, Elisée. Le Père Louis de la Trinité, Admiral Thierry d’Argenlieu. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1969. Fall, Bernard B. The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis. 2nd rev. ed. New York: Praeger, 1967. Hammer, Ellen J. The Struggle for Indochina. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1954.
Date of Estimated Return from Overseas See DEROS
Dau Tranh Strategy Strategy reportedly devised by Vo Nguyen Giap, Ho Chi Minh, and Truong Chinh, leaders of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). The theory of a long war, or people’s war, is incomprehensible to Western military and political leaders. Truong Chinh said that because war is the most acute form of struggle between man and man, people’s warfare rather than weapons and techniques decides victory. People’s warfare means mobilization of every person in the nation. Involvement of entire families becomes critical to dau tranh (“struggle”) because the idea of a noncombatant is eliminated. Dau tranh has two elements, political struggle and armed struggle. They are the jaws of the pincer movement and must work together against an enemy. Only then is victory possible, and that dualism forms the dogma. Armed struggle is the program of violence involving military actions and other forms of bloodshed. Political struggle is the systematic coercive activity involving individual and societal mobilization, organization, and motivation. Every action taken in war falls within the framework and scope of these two elements. In one interpretation, dau tranh means “the people as instrument of war.” The strategy has a threefold sequence of implementation: control the people, forge them into a weapon, and hurl the
Dau Tranh Strategy
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An Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) soldier questions a suspected Viet Cong sympathizer in a South Vietnamese village on January 5, 1967. (Bettmann/Corbis)
weapon into battle. Dau tranh is a political strategy in that any revolution is political. In that sense, violence is necessary to dau tranh but is not its essence. The strategy’s goal is to seize power by disabling society through primarily organizational means. Organization becomes more important than ideology or military tactics. A united front, an organization of organizations, is the basic instrument of control. The organizations become channels of communication. Organization leads to mobilization and then motivation. Victory goes to the side that is best organized, stays best organized, and most successfully disorganizes the other side. The dau tranh strategist never uses a real grievance to undermine the enemy because spontaneity is unpredictable. The strategist manufactures a grievance and follows a manufactured timetable to achieve a new social order. Armed dau tranh is unlike ordinary military combat because it includes various military actions as well as assassinations, kidnappings, and other activities not usually associated with regular armed forces. This method is a program of violence that is always cast in a political context. Dau tranh’s strategic objective is to put armed conflict in the context of political dissidence so that available resources must constantly be divided between the armed and political methods. Political dau tranh consists of three programs that move the abstract into reality. The first is action among the people, its most
potent aspect being the village-level effort to gain support. In the Vietnam War, this program worked to limit American military response and to affect the American public’s perception of the war, undermining support for the war and therefore undercutting American international diplomacy. This program required complete advanced planning and absolute control during execution. The second program, action among the military, was a proselytizing effort aimed at individual enemy soldiers and civil servants. Its goal was to weaken the government of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). The third program, action among the people controlled by the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (National Liberation Front [NLF]), also known as the Viet Cong (VC), exercised administrative and motivational control of liberated areas (the rudimentary beginning of Marxist society) and gave Communist forces a place to rest and recuperate in liberated areas. Superior organization to allow more complete mobilization is the key to success in dau tranh. This kind of struggle channels the enemy’s response and in effect dictates the enemy’s strategy. The enemy is forced to fight under unfavorable terms. The devastation formerly directed at a target or confined to a battle zone is turned on the people themselves, for they have become the battlefield. Countering the dau tranh strategy requires control of resources and population, which inevitably means deliberately inflicting
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civilian casualties. Moreover, dau tranh confuses the enemy’s perception of the war and can channel that perception. This aspect of the strategy confused Americans about the essential nature of the war and its conduct and its outcome as well as the nature of their enemy. Dau tranh succeeds only to the extent that it avoids or nullifies an enemy’s total military, political, and economic strength. THOMAS R. CARVER See also Ho Chi Minh; National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam; Truong Chinh; Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, Army; Vo Nguyen Giap References Military History Institute of Vietnam. Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People’s Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002. Pike, Douglas. PAVN: People’s Army of Vietnam. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1986. Truong-Chinh. Selected Writings. Hanoi: Gioi Publishers, 1994. Vo Nguyen Giap. People’s War People’s Army: The Viet Cong Insurrection Manual for Underdeveloped Countries. New York: Praeger, 1962.
Davidson, Phillip Buford, Jr. Birth Date: November 26, 1915 Death Date: February 7, 1996 U.S. Army general and assistant chief of staff for intelligence (G-2), Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). Born on November 26, 1915, at Hachita, New Mexico, Phillip Buford Davidson Jr. graduated from the United States Military Academy, West Point, and was commissioned a second lieutenant of cavalry in 1939. During World War II he served in various command and staff positions in armored cavalry units. After the war his career turned largely to intelligence. During the 1950–1953 Korean War, Davidson was an intelligence staff officer in General Douglas MacArthur’s United Nations Command (UNC). The unexpected massive Chinese intervention in the conflict in November 1950 is still considered one of the greatest failures of military intelligence in modern history. In May 1967 Major General Davidson was appointed assistant chief of staff for intelligence in MACV. As chief intelligence adviser to MACV commander General William C. Westmoreland, Davidson revamped and redirected U.S. military intelligence efforts, focusing on providing useful intelligence estimates and accurate predictions of future enemy activities. In this assignment he played a prominent role in the controversial 1967 enemy order of battle estimates. Davidson left Vietnam in 1969 to command Fort Ord, California. He was promoted to lieutenant general in 1972 and retired from the army at that rank in 1974. In 1984 Davidson was a plaintiff’s witness in the libel case brought by Westmoreland against the Columbia Broadcasting
System (CBS). The lawsuit alleged that CBS erroneously reported during a television special about the Vietnam War that Westmoreland and others had knowingly and purposely underestimated the strength of the Viet Cong (VC) in 1967 to boost the morale of the military and maintain public support for the war. Davidson testified as to the accuracy of estimates of enemy order of battle in 1967 and claimed that possible political considerations had not influenced that process. He wrote two books about the Vietnam War, one of which, Vietnam at War: The History, 1946–1975 (1988), treats both the Indochina War and the Vietnam War. Davidson died on February 7, 1996, in San Antonio, Texas. RICHARD D. STARNES See also Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; Order of Battle Dispute; Westmoreland, William Childs References Davidson, Phillip B. Secrets of the Vietnam War. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1990. Davidson, Phillip B. Vietnam at War: The History, 1946–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1988. Zaffiri, Samuel. Westmoreland: A Biography of General William C. Westmoreland. New York: William Morrow, 1994.
Davis, Raymond Gilbert Birth Date: January 13, 1915 Death Date: September 3, 2003 U.S. Marine Corps officer and commanding general, 3rd Marine Division, Vietnam (May 1968–April 1969). Born in Fitzgerald, Georgia, on January 13, 1915, Raymond (Ray) Gilbert Davis graduated from the Georgia School of Technology in 1938. A member of the U.S. Army Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC), he resigned his army reserve commission on graduation to accept an appointment as a U.S. Marine Corps second lieutenant. During World War II he fought in the Pacific theater, participating in the Battle for Guadalcanal, where he cultivated a close personal relationship with Lewis B. (“Chesty”) Puller. Davis also saw service in the Eastern New Guinea and Cape Gloucester campaigns and in the fighting on Peleliu. In April 1944 while commanding a battalion of the 1st Marine Division, he earned both the Navy Cross and the Purple Heart. During the Korean War, Davis, then a lieutenant colonel, commanded a battalion, the 7th Marines, from August to December 1950. He earned the Medal of Honor for his heroic efforts in extricating his men from the Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir region in December 1950. He also was awarded two Silver Stars and the Legion of Merit with “V” Device. Davis was then executive officer of the 7th Marines from December 1950 to June 1951. Following a variety of assignments, Davis was promoted to colonel in October 1953 and to brigadier general in July 1963. He graduated from the National War College in Washington, D.C., in 1960 and was then assigned to the United States European Com-
Davis, Rennard Cordon mand. From March 1965 until March 1968 he served as assistant chief of staff, G-1, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. He was promoted to major general in November 1966. Ordered to Vietnam, Davis served briefly as deputy commanding general, Provisional Corps. From May 1968 to April 1969 he was commanding general of the 3rd Marine Division. Under Davis, marine tactics changed from manning fixed defensive positions to conducting highly mobile operations throughout western Quang Tri Province. This change led to Operation DEWEY CANYON in early 1969. Davis was also instrumental in the reestablishment of unit cohesion at the battalion and regiment levels within the 3rd Marine Division. For his Vietnam service he received the Distinguished Service Medal. Davis earned promotion to lieutenant general in July 1970. In March 1971 he received his fourth star and appointment as assistant commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps. Davis retired in March 1972. In 1975 he became president of RGMV, Inc., in Stockbridge, Georgia. Later President George H. W. Bush appointed Davis chairman of the Korean War Veterans Memorial Advance Board. Davis died on September 3, 2003, in Conyers, Georgia. WILL E. FAHEY JR.
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See also Bush, George Herbert Walker; DEWEY CANYON I, Operation; United States Marine Corps Reference Millett, Allan R. Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps. Rev. and expanded ed. New York: Free Press, 1991.
Davis, Rennard Cordon Birth Date: May 23, 1941 Outspoken anti–Vietnam War activist and one of the Chicago Eight. Rennard (“Rennie”) Cordon Davis was born on May 23, 1941. He received an undergraduate degree from Oberlin College in Ohio and a master’s degree from the University of Illinois. While in school he became active in the antiwar movement and was the national director of community organizing programs for Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). During the tumultuous year of 1968, Davis worked closely with the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam
Rennie Davis (center) with Abbie Hoffman (left) and Jeremy Rubin (right) during a press conference as they await the verdict on their case in Chicago, Illinois, February 14, 1970. They were three of the so-called Chicago Eight, charged with conspiring to incite a riot during the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago. (AP/Wide World Photos)
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and collaborated with Tom Hayden, another outspoken opponent of the war. Through the committee Davis, Hayden, and others hatched plans to stage massive antiwar demonstrations during the August 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago. Major rioting ensued, with hundreds wounded and several thousand jailed or manhandled by Chicago police and national guardsmen. Davis, along with seven others, including Abbie Hoffman, Jerry Rubin, and Bobby Seale, were arrested and indicted for conspiracy, inciting a riot, and various other serious offenses. Seale’s case was separated from the others, so the Chicago Eight now became the Chicago Seven. The raucous trial, which resembled more a farce than a criminal proceeding, began in September 1969. Davis’s claim to fame came in the fact that he was only one of two members of the Chicago Seven who testified during the trial. Hoffman was the other. In February 1970 Davis was acquitted on the charge of conspiracy, but he and four others were found guilty of crossing state lines to incite a riot, a federal offense that carried more weight than a state offense. The conviction was later reversed by a U.S. Court of Appeals. Davis kept a low profile for several years before becoming an adherent of Guru Maharaj Ji (Prem Rawat), an Eastern mystic and founder of the Divine Light Mission. Davis became an organizer for the Divine Light Mission and frequently spoke at its meetings and conventions. Many questioned Davis’s sanity because of his rabid devotion to Prem Rawat and the Divine Light Mission. In 1973 when Davis promoted a huge meeting of the Divine Light Mission in the Houston Astrodome, the San Francisco Sunday Examiner asserted that perhaps he had undergone a lobotomy and went on to recommend that “if not, maybe he should try one.” After his dalliance with Eastern philosophy, Davis became a fairly successful venture capitalist. He continues to lecture on meditation and self-awareness. In 1996 Davis and Hayden chaired a well-received panel at the Democratic National Convention titled “A Progressive Counterbalance to the Religious Right.” PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR. See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Chicago Eight; Students for a Democratic Society References Seale, Bobby, Rennie Davis, David Dellinger, John Froines, Tom Hayden, Jerry Rubin, Lee Weiner, and Abbie Hoffman. The Conspiracy: The Chicago Eight. New York: Dell, 1969. Weiner, John, ed. Conspiracy in the Streets: The Extraordinary Trial of the Chicago Eight. New York: New Press, 2006.
Day, George Everett Birth Date: February 24, 1925 U.S. Air force officer, Vietnam War prisoner of war (POW), and Medal of Honor recipient. Born in Sioux City, Iowa, on February 24, 1925, George “Bud” Everett Day left high school prior to graduation in order to join the U.S. Marine Corps during World War
II. He served on active duty for two and a half years, posted to an artillery battalion on Johnson Island in the South Pacific. Upon returning from the war, he attended Morningside College and then the University of South Dakota School of Law. Day was admitted to the South Dakota bar in 1949. The next year he received a direct commission as a second lieutenant in the Iowa Air National Guard. Called to active duty in 1951 during the Korean War, he underwent flight training. He then saw combat in two tours as a pilot flying the Republic F-84 Thunderchief fighterbomber in Korea. Promoted to captain, Day remained in the air force. In 1967 with the anticipation of retiring the next year, Major Day requested assignment to Vietnam. There he was assigned in April 1967 to the 31st Tactical Fighter Wing at Tuy Hoa Air Base in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Shortly after his arrival he took command of Detachment 1, 416th Tactical Fighter Wing. His men flew North American F-100 Super Sabres out of Phu Cat Air Base. His aircraft served as fast forward air controllers in missions over Laos and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). On August 26, 1967, in the course of his 65th mission while directing an air strike against a North Vietnamese surface-to-air missile (SAM) site west of Dong Hoi, 20 miles north of the demilitarized zone (DMZ), Day’s aircraft was shot down. During his ejection his right arm was broken in three different places, and he sustained eye and back injuries. The other member of his crew ejected safely and was subsequently picked up by a rescue helicopter. Day, however, was taken prisoner by local militia forces shortly after he landed. On the fifth night of his captivity Day escaped, and despite his injuries and the fact that the North Vietnamese had taken his boots, he was able to cross the DMZ back into South Vietnam. Unfortunately for Day, following 12 days of successful evasion and just two miles from the U.S. Marine Corps firebase at Con Thien, he was again captured, this time by a Viet Cong (VC) patrol, the members of which wounded him in the leg and hand. Returned to his original prison camp, Day was tortured for having escaped, during which his right arm was again broken. He was then moved to a succession of prison camps near Hanoi, where he was starved, beaten, and tortured. In December 1967 he shared a cell with U.S. Navy lieutenant commander John S. McCain III. Following the Paris Peace Accords and after five years and seven months as a POW, Day was released on March 14, 1973. He had been promoted to colonel during his captivity, and he now decided to remain in the U.S. Air Force in hopes of earning promotion to general. After a year in physical rehabilitation and with 13 medical waivers, he was finally returned to flying status. He subsequently served as vice commander of the 33rd Tactical Fighter Wing at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. On March 4, 1976, President Gerald R. Ford awarded Day the Medal of Honor for his personal bravery while a captive in North Vietnam. Day retired from active duty in 1977. He then took up the practice of law in Florida. In 1996 Day took the lead in filing
Dean, John Gunther a class action lawsuit against the U.S. government on behalf of military retirees who had been stripped of their medical benefits. He won the case in district court in 2001, but that decision was overturned by the U.S. Court of Appeals in 2002. During the 2004 U.S. presidential election Day appeared in a Swift Boat Veterans for Truth advertisement, speaking against Democratic presidential candidate John F. Kerry. JAMES H. WILLBANKS See also Forward Air Controllers; Kerry, John Forbes; McCain, John Sidney, III; Prisoners of War, Allied References Coram, Robert. American Patriot: The Life and Wars of Colonel Bud Day. New York: Little, Brown, 2007. Day, George E. Return With Honor. Mesa, AZ: Champlin Museum Press, 1991. Newman, Rick, and Don Shepperd. Bury Us Upside Down: The Misty Pilots and the Secret Battle for the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Novato, CA: Presidio, 2007.
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Dean, John Gunther Birth Date: February 24, 1926 U.S. diplomat who saw lengthy service in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), Laos, and Cambodia during the Vietnam War. Born in Breslau, Germany, on February 24, 1926, John Gunther Dean immigrated to the United States in 1939 and was naturalized in 1944. He served in the U.S. Army between 1944 and 1946. Dean graduated from Harvard University with a BS degree in 1947, obtained a doctorate in law from the Sorbonne in 1949, and received an MA from Harvard in 1950. After entering the U.S. Foreign Service, Dean was stationed in Paris from 1950 to 1953. He was in the embassy in Saigon from 1953 to 1956; with the embassy in Vientiane, Laos, from 1956 to 1958; in Washington, D.C., from 1961 to 1965; and with the embassy in Paris from 1965 to 1969. In Paris he played a central role in the peace talk between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). Dean was regional
New U.S. ambassador to Cambodia John Gunther Dean confers with Cambodian president Lon Nol after presenting his credentials in Phnom Penh on April 5, 1974. (AP/Wide World Photos)
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director of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) in central Vietnam from 1970 to 1972. Between 1972 and 1974 he was deputy chief of mission at the embassy in Vientiane, where he was involved in efforts to recover American prisoners of war and soldiers missing in action, thought at the time of the Vientiane Agreement to be in Pathet Lao hands. From Laos, Dean went to Phnom Penh as U.S. ambassador to Cambodia from 1974 to 1975. There he was involved in American attempts to negotiate a settlement of the bitter war between Lon Nol’s government forces and the Khmer Rouge. These efforts failed, and when the Khmer Rouge prepared to enter the capital, Dean oversaw the embassy evacuation, code-named Operation EAGLE PULL, in April 1975. He was then successively ambassador to Denmark, Lebanon, Thailand, and India from 1975 to 1988. He retired from public service in 1988. While Dean was at the U.S. embassy in Beirut, he helped negotiate the release of several American hostages being held by radical students in Tehran, Iran. ARTHUR J. DOMMEN See also Cambodia; Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support; Khmer Rouge; Laos; Lon Nol References Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. Kiernan, Ben. The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia Under the Khmer Rouge. 3rd ed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008.
Dèbes, Pierre-Louis Birth Date: November 17, 1900 Death Date: March 30, 1947 French Army officer and commander at Haiphong in November 1946 when a bombardment of the town by naval gunfire caused serious damage and many casualties in what is sometimes considered to be the opening shots of the Indochina War. Pierre-Louis Dèbes was born in Paris on November 17, 1900. In May 1918 he entered the French military academy at Saint-Cyr, and after graduation he chose service with colonial troops. He served first in French West Africa, next in Indochina (1931–1934), and then in Morocco. During World War II he served in the 9th Division d’Infanterie Coloniale, General Jean-Étienne Valluy’s future command. Dèbes went to Indochina soon after his promotion to colonel in 1945. The so-called Haiphong Incident began when a French patrol boat accosted a Chinese junk smuggling fuel and brought it into the port. The patrol boat was fired upon by Viet Minh militia on shore and returned fire. Exchanges of fire between French troops and Viet Minh militia in the town, in violation of the modus vivendi negotiated the previous March between General Jacques-Philippe
Leclerc and Ho Chi Minh, leader of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), went on for several days in spite of efforts by the beleaguered French to contact local Viet Minh commanders under a flag of truce. Dèbes, having received orders from General Valluy to obtain the evacuation of the town by the Viet Minh as a guarantee against a repetition of the exchanges of gunfire, then issued an ultimatum threatening heavy reprisals. Local Viet Minh commanders pleaded for additional time to consult their leaders in Hanoi, but Dèbes gave the order to French ships in the harbor to open fire. At the end of five days the French were in complete control, at a cost of 23 dead and 86 wounded. Estimates of the number of dead among the Vietnamese civilian population range from the official 300 to 6,000, the latter a frequently published figure that some consider highly exaggerated. Although criticized later for his actions by the commander in Tonkin General Louis Constant Morlière, Dèbes was not reprimanded and went on to take part in the clearing of the area around Hanoi. He died in an airplane accident on March 30, 1947. ARTHUR J. DOMMEN See also French Indochina, 1860s–1946; Haiphong, Shelling of; Indochina War; Valluy, Jean-Étienne References Fall, Bernard B. The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis. 2nd rev. ed. New York: Praeger, 1967. Gras, Yves. Histoire de la Guerre d’Indochine. Paris: Éditions Denoël, 1992.
De Castries, Christian Marie Birth Date: August 11, 1902 Death Date: July 29, 1991 French Army general and commander of French forces in the 1954 Battle of Dien Bien Phu. Born in Paris on August 11, 1902, Christian Marie Ferdinand de la Croix de Castries came from an aristocratic family with a tradition of high-ranking military service dating back to King Louis XV. De Castries did not attend the French military academy at Saint-Cyr; in 1921 he enlisted in the army as a private. Commissioned a cavalry officer in 1926, he was regarded as an excellent soldier, but bored by garrison life he resigned from the army. During the 1930s he represented France in international equestrian events; he also held a commercial pilot’s license. In 1940 De Castries rejoined the French Army as a lieutenant. Fighting in Lorraine, he and the 60 men he commanded held out for three days against a German battalion reinforced with tanks and aircraft. Wounded and captured, he was later decorated for valor. In 1941 he escaped on his fourth attempt and joined the Free French resistance. He fought in Italy and was again wounded but recovered in time to take part in the 1944 invasion of southern France, where
De Castries, Christian Marie
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French Army brigadier general Christian Marie Ferdinand de la Croix de Castries is best remembered for his heroic but ill-fated defense of Dien Bien Phu during the Indochina War. The French defeat at Dien Bien Phu signaled the end of French rule in Indochina. (Roger-Viollet)
he served in Colonel Henri Navarre’s regiment of the 3rd Moroccan Spahis in the French First Army. Promoted to major, he led his troops in a bold maneuver that took the city of Karlsruhe. De Castries remained in the army and from 1946 to 1949 served in Indochina, where he gained an excellent reputation in command of a mobile raiding force. After study in France at the Army Staff College, in 1950 Lieutenant Colonel de Castries returned to Indochina and in 1951 commanded the critical Red River Delta sector. A swashbuckling and elegant adventurer, this tall steely-eyed soldier-aristocrat, who always seemed to have a cigarette pressed to his lower lip, was an inveterate gambler and womanizer (the French strong points at Dien Bien Phu were supposedly named for his then-current lovers). In November 1953 French commander in Indochina General Henri Navarre named de Castries to command at Dien Bien Phu. Navarre knew de Castries through his service under him on several occasions and respected the former cavalryman’s dash and leadership. De Castries’s men also greatly admired and trusted him. During the subsequent battle, de Castries kept a high profile and called his wife, a nurse in Hanoi, daily. At times he showed reckless bravery under fire, but at other times he seemed detached and withdrawn. De Castries was promoted to brigadier general during the battle.
In retrospect, it is easy to question de Castries’s defensive dispositions at Dien Bien Phu, especially the separation of the Isabelle strong point, with one-third of the French defenders, too distant from the other defensive positions, but it is unlikely that anything de Castries could have done would have changed the outcome. His appeals for reinforcements were rejected, and on May 7, 1954, after a siege of nearly two months that resembled the World War I Battle of Verdun, he surrendered what remained of the garrison. As a prisoner, de Castries fared better than the vast majority of his men. He was released after four months and found himself a national hero. On his return from Indochina, he commanded the 5th Armored Division in Germany. After an automobile accident, in 1959 he retired from the army and headed a firm engaged in recycling waste paper. De Castries died in Paris on July 29, 1991. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; Indochina War; Navarre, Henri Eugène References Andrews, Deborah, ed. The Annual Obituary, 1991. Detroit: St. James, 1992. Fall, Bernard B. Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu. New York: Lippincott, 1966. Roy, Jules. The Battle of Dienbienphu. New York: Harper and Row, 1965.
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Simpson, Howard R. Dien Bien Phu: The Epic Battle America Forgot. Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1994. Windrow, Martin. The Last Valley: Dien Bien Phu and the French Defeat in Vietnam. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2004.
DECKHOUSE V,
Operation
Start Date: January 6, 1967 End Date: January 15, 1967 Multibattalion amphibious assault launched by the U.S. Seventh Fleet’s Special Landing Force against a Viet Cong (VC) coastal stronghold in the Mekong Delta in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Both U.S. and South Vietnamese forces participated in the operation during January 6–15, 1967. Unlike previous DECKHOUSE landings, which were conducted in support of operations taking place on the ground, DECKHOUSE V was conceived as a strictly amphibious undertaking aimed at several
VC battalions concentrated in the Mekong Delta province of Kien Hoa about 60 miles south of Saigon. The operation brought together a U.S. Marine Corps battalion landing team and two Republic of Vietnam Marine Corps (RVNMC, South Vietnamese Marine Corps) battalions in the first and only major combined amphibious expedition of the Vietnam War. DECKHOUSE V also marked the first time that American combat troops were committed in force to the Mekong Delta region. Bad weather and rough seas delayed the start of the operation by two days to January 6, 1967, and as a result part of the assault force ended up being landed by helicopter. Once ashore, the marines of both nations spent a fruitless week chasing the VC, who may have been tipped off in advance by a security leak. The operation was supported by Sikorsky UH-34 Choctaw and Boeing CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters operating from the amphibious assault ship Iwo Jima. The marines were withdrawn on January 15. The entire operation resulted in 21 VC killed, 2 weapons workshops destroyed, 44 weapons confiscated, 42 tons of rice seized, and 25 prisoners taken, only 10 of whom turned out to be actual guerrillas.
Marine amphibious tractors in the water during Operation DECKHOUSE V, a multibattalion amphibious assault by the U.S. Seventh Fleet’s Special Landing Force against the Viet Cong in the Mekong Delta. (National Archives)
Decoux, Jean The United States lost 7 marines, while 1 South Vietnamese marine died from drowning. The operation was generally considered a failure. JEFF SEIKEN See also Amphibious Warfare; Mekong Delta; Mekong River; United States Marine Corps; Vietnam, Republic of, Marine Corps References Marolda, Edward J. By Sea, Air, and Land: An Illustrated History of the U.S. Navy and the War in Southeast Asia. Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 1994. Shulimson, Jack. U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1966: An Expanding War. Marine Corps Vietnam Series. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Marine Corps Historical Center, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters, 1982. Telfer, Gary L. U.S. Marines in Vietnam: Fighting the North Vietnamese, 1967. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1984.
Decoux, Jean Birth Date: May 5, 1884 Death Date: October 20, 1963 French Navy admiral, commander of the French Far Eastern Fleet in 1939, and governor-general of French Indochina during 1940–1945. Born on May 5, 1884, at Bordeaux, Jean Decoux entered the École Navale in 1901. He served with the French Navy in the Pacific and the Mediterranean. Promoted to lieutenant in October 1913, during 1914–1916 he commanded the submarine Volta in the English Channel and then in the Mediterranean. For the rest of World War I he was attached to the General Staff, where he again served from 1923 to 1925. He was promoted to lieutenant commander in October 1920, to commander in April 1923, and to captain in July 1929. He served in other staff positions and then commanded the cruiser Primauguet. In February 1935 he was raised to rear admiral. In 1936 he became commander of the 3rd Light Cruiser Division in the Mediterranean, and in April 1938 he had charge of the defenses of Toulon. Promoted to vice admiral on April 11, 1939, Decoux was named on May 12, 1939, to head all French naval forces in the Far East. A protégé of Admiral Jean Darlan, Decoux in June 1940 succeeded Georges Catroux as governor-general in Indochina. In this capacity Decoux was obliged to negotiate a series of agreements with the Japanese, who were endeavoring to take advantage of France’s weakness to press for concessions in the region. Decoux tried to limit the extent of these concessions and avoid the outbreak of hostilities with the vastly superior Japanese military. Within the bounds imposed by the agreement that allowed the Japanese to station troops in Indochina, Decoux endeavored to maintain the symbols and substance of French sovereignty over Indochina. He was successful in this to a considerable degree despite the loss to
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Thailand of Laotian territory on the right bank of the Mekong River and of the Cambodian provinces of Siem-Reap and Battambang following a Japanese-brokered armistice ending the Franco-Thai War of November 1940–January 1941. Decoux at least had the satisfaction of winning a naval victory over Thailand in that war. Eventually Decoux’s policies became controversial. His insistence on strict allegiance to Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain’s Vichy government brought punishment for “dissidents,” as Decoux called them, who followed General Charles de Gaulle and the Resistance. Also, it became increasingly difficult for Decoux to meet the ever-growing demands of the Japanese occupiers. He was able to circumvent or delay meeting many of their demands for war production, particularly of rice, and for measures to ensure the common defense of Indochina. On the former he simply pleaded poor harvests. On the latter he ensured that French antiaircraft batteries did not aim accurately, while making a lot of show, when U.S. planes bombed Japanese shipping at Saigon, Haiphong, and Nha Trang. Efforts by de Gaulle’s provisional government to set up Resistance forces in Indochina that would lead toward liberation by the French themselves finally doomed Decoux’s efforts. Because of Decoux’s pro-Vichy sympathies, Gaullist agents contacted General Eugène Mordant about placing Indochina under the National Council of the Resistance. When Decoux found out about this arrangement and threatened to resign, a deal was struck in which the admiral was confirmed as nominal head of the new Council of Indochina and Mordant actually ran affairs. Decoux, however, warned that the Gaullist efforts to parachute in agents and stockpile arms to prepare for an uprising against the Japanese were foolhardy in the extreme. The resulting chaos and clash of personalities inevitably caused confusion among the French authorities in Indochina. As Decoux feared, the Japanese military police, the Kempeitai, soon discovered the too-open Resistance activities. On March 9, 1945, Japanese authorities demanded that Decoux hand over command of all French forces to them. He refused and was immediately arrested. After the Japanese surrender to the Allied forces, Decoux was held incommunicado. His plea to be reinstated in office was ignored. In October 1945 Decoux was returned to France in humiliating circumstances and in May 1946 was brought up for trial on a charge of treason. A mistrial was declared, although he was dismissed from the navy. But after charges of collaboration with the Vichy government were dropped, he was restored to his rank and prerogatives in February 1949. He wrote three books about his experiences. Decoux died in Paris on October 20, 1963. ARTHUR J. DOMMEN AND SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Catroux, Georges; De Gaulle, Charles; Franco-Thai War; French Indochina, 1860s–1946; Mordant, Eugène References Buttinger, Joseph. The Smaller Dragon: A Political History of Vietnam. New York: Praeger, 1958.
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Decoux, Admiral Jean. A la barre de L’Indochine (1940–1945). Paris: Plon, 1949. Devillers, Philippe. Histoire du Vietnam de 1940 à 1952. Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1952. Marr, David G. Vietnam 1945: The Quest for Power. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995. Patti, Archimedes L. A. Why Viet Nam? Prelude to America’s Albatross. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980. Taillemite, Étienne, Dictionnaire des marines français. Paris: Tallandier, 2002.
Deer Mission Event Date: 1945 World War II U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) operation in Indochina. Conceived by OSS headquarters in Kunming, China, the Deer Mission had two objectives. The first was to support Operation CARBANADO, the possible landing of a U.S. expeditionary force in southern China. A Deer Mission team would penetrate Vietnam on foot, set up a base, and destroy the Hanoi–Lang Son railroad and highway to hinder movement of Japanese troops from Vietnam into China. The second objective was to gather intelligence on Japanese forces in Vietnam for the U.S. Fourteenth Air Force. This became critical after March 9, 1945, when the Japanese carried out a coup against the Vichy French government in Indochina. On that date the Japanese incarcerated all French troops and took over direct rule of the French colony, cutting off the flow of intelligence from Free French agents located there. The OSS canceled the walk-in approach after making contact with Viet Minh leader Ho Chi Minh. His headquarters was 65 miles northwest of Hanoi in mountainous jungle in the area of Kim Lung (later Tan Trao). Contact was made possible through the help of the Air Ground Aid Service (AGAS) and the three-man private intelligence net known as GBT, operated by Laurence Gordon, Harry V. Bernard, and Frank Tan. Ho said that he and his group would be glad to help the OSS gather intelligence, retrieve downed fliers, and cooperate on other matters. On July 16, 1945, the seven-man Deer Mission, led by Major Allison Kent Thomas, parachuted from Douglas C-47 Dakota airplanes. With them came containers of small arms and explosives sufficient to equip 100 guerrillas. When the Deer Mission team arrived they learned that Ho was extremely ill. Team medic Paul Hoagland treated the Viet Minh leader and possibly saved his life. In the weeks that followed, Deer Mission personnel trained the guerrillas, observed them in the attack, and had many conversations with Ho and Vo Nguyen Giap, both of whom gave assurances that they were friendly to the United States and were willing to assist the United States against the Japanese. They also expressed hatred of the French and swore willingness to fight to the death to secure their independence.
On August 15, 1945, the Japanese surrendered. Deer Mission team members ceased their operations and reached Hanoi on September 16, 1945. Soon afterward they were withdrawn. CECIL B. CURREY See also Ho Chi Minh; Office of Strategic Services; Thomas, Allison Kent; Vo Nguyen Giap Reference Kolko, Gabriel. Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States, and the Modern Historical Experience. New York: Pantheon, 1985.
Defense Meteorological Satellite Program A satellite program developed by the U.S. Department of Defense to provide worldwide meteorological, oceanographic, and solar geophysical data and imagery to the U.S. military for use in planning and executing military operations. The U.S. Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) at the Los Angeles Air Force Base in California designed, built, and launched the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) satellites. Since the launch of the first DMSP satellite in 1965, the U.S. Air Force has launched 34 more. In December 1972 the Department of Defense made DMSP data available to civil and scientific communities. In June 1998 the air force transferred the control of the satellites to the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), but the SMC retained responsibility for the development and acquisition of future DMSP satellites. DMSP satellites send images and data to tracking stations in New Hampshire, Greenland, Alaska, and Hawaii. These sites in turn send the images to the U.S. Air Force Weather Agency (AFWA) at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska; the 55th Space Weather Squadron at Falcon Air Force Base, Colorado; and the U.S. Navy’s Fleet Numerical Meteorology and Oceanography Center (FNMOC) at Monterey, California. The AFWA and the FNMOC process the images and data into a product that is then sent to military installations, where meteorologists develop up-to-date weather observations and forecasts for use by unit commanders in scheduling and planning military operations. During the Vietnam War, early DMSP satellites supplied cloud-cover information to military headquarters in Saigon and to aircraft carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin for more precise planning of tactical air missions. DMSP imagery provided highly accurate weather forecasting that operational commanders used to plan air strikes over the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and close air support over the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), determine air-to-air refueling tracks, and plan rescue operations. The DMSP weather data eliminated the need for weather reconnaissance aircraft in Southeast Asia. For Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM from August 1990 to February 1991, the SMC procured the Rapid Deployment
Defense Meteorological Satellite Program
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An illustration of a Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) satellite. (U.S. Air Force)
Imagery Terminal, which supplemented by older weather terminals provided DMSP data and images directly to the commanders of field forces in the Persian Gulf region. The terminals provided commanders with high-resolution nearly real-time weather information that allowed them to select targets and munitions, especially laser-guided weapons that required clear weather for accurate targeting, during the air campaign. Commanders also used weather data and images to plan and redirect aerial and ground missions and optimize night-vision equipment and night-capable targeting systems. DMSP satellites also provided information to alert troops to sandstorms and to predict the possible use and spread of chemical agents. In December 1990 the U.S. Air Force launched a third DMSP satellite to augment coverage in the Persian Gulf area. With the additional capability of detecting areas of moisture and standing water, DSMP imagery helped coalition ground forces plan movement routes into Kuwait during Operation DESERT STORM. DMSP and other weather satellites also provided extensive imagery and data of the oil fires
ignited by the Iraqi Army as it fled Kuwait in February 1991. The fires produced large smoke plumes, causing significant environmental effects in the Persian Gulf region. There have been some problems with the terminals and dissemination networks, however. For example, the incompatibility of the four different types of terminals delayed the receipt of timely weather data. With rapidly changing weather conditions, field units often did not have the latest target-area weather data, and high-quality satellite imagery did not get to the flyers. Some U.S. Navy ships could not receive DMSP data at all. These problems emphasized the need for more compatible and userfriendly systems. During Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM some of these problems had been eliminated, and DMSP provided badly needed weather data to troops in both theaters of war. ROBERT B. KANE See also ROLLING THUNDER, Operation; United States Air Force; United States Navy
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References Hall, R. Cargill. A History of the Military Polar Orbiting Meteorological Satellite Program. Chantilly, VA: National Reconnaissance Office History Office, 2001. History Office, Space and Missile Systems Center, Los Angeles Air Force Base. Historical Overview of the Space and Missile Systems Center, 1954–2003. Los Angeles: Missile Systems Center, 2003. Peeples, Curtis. High Frontier: The United States Air Force and the Military Space Program. Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museum Program, 1997. Spires, David N. Beyond Horizons: A Half Century of Air Force Space Leadership. 2nd ed. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Force Space Command and Air University Press, 2007.
Defense Satellite Communications System A constellation of nine satellites in geosynchronous orbit 22,300 miles above the earth that provides high-volume secure voice and data communications among the White House, senior U.S. defense officials, and U.S. military forces in the field worldwide. The U.S. Air Force launched the first Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) satellite in 1966. In 1967 DSCS I satellites transmitted reconnaissance photographs and other data from military headquarters in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) to Hawaii and from Hawaii to Washington, D.C. In 1968 the air force declared the satellite system, along with 2 fixed and 34 mobile ground terminals, to be operational and changed the system’s name to the Initial Defense Satellite Communication System (IDSCS). After having launched 26 IDSCS satellites, the U.S. Air Force renamed the program the Defense Satellite Communications System. In 1971 the air force began launching a more sophisticated satellite, DSCS Phase II (DSCS II). DSCS II, the first operational military communications satellite system to occupy a geosynchronous orbit, became fully operational in early 1979. By 1989 the air force had launched 16 DSCS II satellites. In 1982 the U.S. Air Force launched the first DSCS III, the only current model of the DSCS family still operational, and achieved a full constellation of five satellites in 1993. The DSCS III satellites carry multiple beam antennas that provide flexible coverage over six communication channels and resistance to jamming. The U.S. Air Force Space Command’s Space and Missile Systems Center at the Los Angeles Air Force Base, California, contracted with Martin Marietta to build the DSCS III satellites and ground segment. The Electronics Systems Center at Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts, developed the air force portion of the terminal segment. The 3rd Space Operations Squadron, 50th Space Wing, at Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado, provides command and control of the DSCS satellites. During Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM (August 1990–February 1991), satellite communications provided essential command and control of deployed coalition forces. Although military communications were very tenuous at the start of DESERT
SHIELD, U.S. military forces within the first 90 days established more
military communications connectivity to the Persian Gulf than they had achieved in Europe over the previous 40 years. Operation DESERT SHIELD forces communicated through a U.S. Navy Fleet Satellite Communications satellite (FLTSATCOM), a Leased Satellite program satellite, and two DSCS satellites over the Indian Ocean. In addition, the U.S. Department of Defense used FLTSATCOM satellites over the Atlantic Ocean and DSCS satellites over the eastern Atlantic to facilitate communications between the U.S. Central Command headquarters in the Persian Gulf and various headquarters in the United States. DSCS III satellites also provided long-haul communications for U.S. military forces during Operations DENY FLIGHT (1993–1995) and ALLIED FORCE (1999) in the Balkans and during Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM in the Middle East since 2001. Throughout these operations, communications requirements steadily grew, reaching the capacity of the DSCS satellites to provide for the increasing needs. For Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, the U.S. Air Force reconfigured the DSCS satellites to provide added bandwidth. The introduction of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, or drones) and increased use of digital imagery and data in Middle Eastern combat operations contributed to the growing demand for large communications networks. Since 2000 the U.S. Air Force, through the DSCS Service Life Enhancement Program, has upgraded the last four DSCS III satellites prior to launch to extend the usable lifetime of the DSCS III satellites. In addition, the air force has incorporated several technology upgrades to increase the capabilities of the DSCS satellites prior to launch into orbit. ROBERT B. KANE See also United States Air Force References History Office, Space and Missile Systems Center, Los Angeles Air Force Base. Historical Overview of the Space and Missile Systems Center, 1954–2003. Los Angeles: Missile Systems Center, 2003. Levis, Alexander H., John C. Bedford (Colonel, USAF), and Sandra Davis (Captain, USAF), eds. The Limitless Sky: Air Force Science and Technology Contributions to the Nation. Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 2004. Peeples, Curtis. High Frontier: The United States Air Force and the Military Space Program. Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museum Program, 1997. Spires, David N. Beyond Horizons: A Half Century of Air Force Space Leadership. 2nd ed. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Force Space Command and Air University Press, 2007.
DEFIANT STAND,
Operation
Event Date: September 7, 1969 The last of 62 Seventh Fleet Special Landing Force operations in Vietnam. Operation DEFIANT STAND was also the first amphibious
Defoliation assault conducted in the 25-year history of the Republic of Korea Marine Corps (ROKMC, South Korean Marine Corps). On September 7, 1969, an ROKMC battalion, in conjunction with the U.S. 1st Battalion, 26th Marines, landed by amphibian tractor on sandy, squalid Barrier Island, 34 miles south of Da Nang. The Special Landing Force then swept inland across the island while naval patrol craft cut off escape routes. The Viet Cong (VC), however, offered only light resistance and successfully avoided the massive sweep, the third landing on the island. The marines would not use the Seventh Fleet for amphibious operations again until the evacuations of Saigon and Phnom Penh in the spring of 1975. EDWARD C. PAGE See also Korea, Republic of; United States Marine Corps; United States Navy References Krepinevich, Andrew F., Jr. The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. Stanton, Shelby L. The Rise and Fall of an American Army: The U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985.
Defoliation Systemic defoliation is the process of applying herbicides to plants to inhibit their growth. Long used in the United States and elsewhere in agriculture and in the vicinity of roads and highways, in Vietnam defoliation became a recognized tactic with two primary objectives: to reduce the dense jungle foliage so that Communist forces might not use it for cover and to deny them use of crops needed for subsistence. Secondary objectives included spot clearing in sensitive areas such as around base perimeters. About 19 million gallons primarily of three major herbicides were applied in Vietnam over the nine years from 1961 through 1970. Operation RANCH HAND aircrews, flying specially equipped C-123 Chase/Fairchild Provider aircraft, sprayed more than 90 percent of that quantity; other distribution equipment, for use in specific small-scale situations, included backpacks, towed vehicles, and helicopters. The optimal application rate was 3 gallons per acre. RANCH HAND aircraft would deliver their payload, 1,000 gallons, in a 300-foot-wide path about 8.5 miles long. The preferred herbicides to defoliate both inland forests and maritime mangrove forests were Agent Orange and Agent White, each of which had its own characteristics. Both acted by causing drying of the foliage, with the leaves dropping about three to eight weeks after application. Generally, foliage would not reappear for four to six months. During the rainy season Agent Orange, which was oil soluble, was preferred because it would not wash away. For similar reasons, it was the optimal herbicide for use on thick jungle canopy and on trees with waxy leaves. On crops the preferred herbicide was Agent Blue, although about half of this chemical’s use was as a jungle defoliant. Agent
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Blue was most effective when applied during a period of rapid crop growth. A fast-acting desiccant, it prevented the fruit or grain from forming without killing the plant itself. Within two to four days Agent Blue would affect a wide range of crops including rice, manioc, and sweet potatoes. It was less persistent than other agents; new growth after this water-soluble herbicide was applied usually began about 30 days after spraying. In terms of area, inland forest defoliation missions were the most extensive. Agents Orange and White were sprayed on approximately 450,000 acres, mostly in the III Corps area north of Saigon, during the nine years of application. In addition, inland forest areas near borders with Cambodia and Laos and along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) were sprayed to help prevent Communist troops from using these areas to mask their movements into the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Agents Orange and White were also used on about 50,000 acres of mangrove forest to discourage the use of these areas to interrupt supplies coming to the city. These areas included the Rung Sat Special Zone near Saigon and the Ca Mau Peninsula at South Vietnam’s southernmost tip. Agent Blue was used on approximately 40,000 acres of cropland, primarily in tightly defined areas in the northern and eastern provinces of South Vietnam. Initial results of defoliation missions were extremely positive, and field commanders requested more support than the RANCH HAND aircrews could provide. Surveys of those responsible for operations indicated the significant effects of the defoliation efforts. For example, when field commanders were surveyed in 1968, they reported that horizontal visibility increased by as much as 70 percent and vertical visibility increased by as much as 90 percent, and they believed that these were significant factors in increasing the safety and efficiency of their operations. The precise long-term effects of defoliation on the ecosystem are difficult to assess for several reasons, some political and some experimental. Certainly some soil damage occurred, yet dioxin, the most dangerous contaminant of the herbicides, has only a
Herbicides Sprayed by the U.S. Military in Vietnam by Year Year 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 Year Unknown Total
Herbicides Sprayed (gallons)
Area Sprayed (square miles)
17,171 74,760 281,607 664,657 2,535,788 5,123,353 5,089,010 4,558,817 758,966 10,039 281,201 19,395,369
27 117 440 1,039 3,962 8,005 7,952 7,123 1,186 16 439 30,305
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Defoliation
A Fairchild UC-123 Provider aircraft completes an Operation RANCH HAND mission during the Vietnam War. Defoliation operations had the goals of reducing the dense jungle foliage so that Communist forces might not use it for cover and denying them crops needed for subsistence. About 19 million gallons of herbicides were applied in Vietnam during 1961–1970. (AP/Wide World Photos)
three- to five-year half-life in the soil. Moreover, while some species of animals appear less frequently than before the war, many others have begun to reappear as the forests return to fuller growth. The forests themselves suffered immediately after the war from inept reforestation techniques, which included annual burning, and from erosion by heavy rains. By the late 1980s, evidence suggested that the environment was recovering more rapidly than originally expected. In the inland forests, which in some areas were sprayed repeatedly, growth was starting to return when shade trees were planted first, followed later with native trees planted in the shade. In the mangrove forests, where extensive damage occurred to the sensitive coastal habitat, growth began when plantings were done in a dense pattern to allow interlocking root systems to develop. Despite these
successes, however, as late as the 1990s some land still needed to be properly reforested in order to recapture that land from nonproductive grass cover and bamboo. The effects of defoliants on humans has been well documented. Dioxin has been clearly shown to be a human carcinogen and is believed to induce genetic defects, all of which have been reported among Vietnamese exposed to the chemical as well as among U.S. soldiers. Agent Orange especially had been suspected of causing illness and premature death in thousands of individuals. Exposure to Agent Orange has been a major issue among Vietnam War veterans for years, many of whom allege sickness due to the defoliant. The U.S. government, however, has been slow to react to these complaints, and only recently has it begun to take steps to fully investigate veterans’ claims and conduct research into the effects
De Gaulle, Charles of defoliants on humans. The Vietnamese government claims that as many as 5 million Vietnamese were exposed to Agent Orange, resulting in the deaths and/or disabilities of some 400,000 people and an estimated 500,000 children born with birth defects. The U.S. government has dismissed such figures as unreliable and unrealistically high. CHARLES J. GASPAR See also Herbicides; International War Crimes Tribunal; RANCH HAND, Operation References Carlson, Elof Axel. “International Symposium on Herbicides in the Vietnam War.” Bioscience (September 1983): 507–512. Gough, Michael. Dioxin, Agent Orange. New York: Plenum, 1986. Irish, Kent R. Information Manual for Vegetation Control in Southeast Asia. Frederick, MD: Department of the Army, 1969.
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French citizens to continue the war against Germany. De Gaulle headed the French Resistance in World War II, but his wartime relations with the British and Americans were often difficult. De Gaulle acted as if he were a head of state, while the British and Americans persisted in treating him as an auxiliary. De Gaulle was embittered by blatant British efforts to dislodge the French from prewar positions of influence in Syria and Lebanon and by the continued failure of the Allies to consult him in matters regarding French interests. From late August 1944 de Gaulle ruled France as provisional president. He was determined that France would retain its role as a Great Power. To reestablish French influence in Asia, in late 1943 the French Committee of National Liberation had called for the future creation of an expeditionary corps to participate in the war against Japan and liberate Indochina. After the liberation of France in 1944, the provisional government authorized the creation of a Far East Army. On June 4, 1945, de Gaulle, acting with the National Defense Committee, decided to create an expeditionary corps of two divisions for Indochina, command of which
De Gaulle, Charles Birth Date: November 22, 1890 Death Date: November 9, 1970 French Army general, head of the French government-in-exile during World War II, provisional president of the French Fourth Republic (1944–1946), and president of the French Fifth Republic (1958–1969). Born in Lille, France, on November 22, 1890, Charles André Marie Joseph de Gaulle was arguably France’s greatest 20th-century statesman. In 1909 de Gaulle joined the French Army and three years later graduated from the French Military Academy at Saint-Cyr. He fought in World War I and was severely wounded twice. Promoted to captain in September 1915, de Gaulle was wounded a third time and captured by the Germans at Verdun in March 1916. After the war, de Gaulle returned to Saint-Cyr as professor of history. Later he taught at the École de Guerre and then served for a time as aide-de-camp to French Army commander Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain. De Gaulle also became a theorist of the new highspeed armored warfare and in 1934 published an important book on the subject, Vers l’Armée de métier (published in English as The Army of the Future). Had his ideas been followed, the 1940 defeat of France by the Germans might never have occurred. When World War II began, Colonel de Gaulle commanded a tank brigade. As the start of the May 1940 battle for France began, he received command of the 4th Tank Division. The division achieved one of the few successes scored by the French Army, and on June 1 de Gaulle was promoted to brigadier general. Within a week Premier Paul Reynaud brought him into his cabinet as undersecretary of state for national defense. When a new defeatist government took power in France, on June 17, 1940, de Gaulle left Bordeaux for London. A day later he spoke over the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) airwaves and urged
Charles de Gaulle was a French Army general, head of the French government-in-exile in World War II, provisional president of the Fourth Republic from 1944 to 1946, and president of the Fifth Republic from 1958 to 1969. As president, he was a staunch ally yet persistent critic of U.S. foreign policy. (Library of Congress)
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went to an unenthusiastic General Jacques-Philippe Leclerc. In mid-August the National Defense Committee decided to send the expeditionary force along with a naval squadron centered on the battleship Richelieu, already in the Far East, and three aviation groups of about 100 aircraft. De Gaulle wrote in his memoirs that “The sending of troops was the condition on which everything else depended. Seventy thousand men had to be transported along with a great deal of material. This was a considerable undertaking, for we had to begin it in a period of demobilization and while we were maintaining an army in Germany. But it was essential, after yesterday’s humiliation, that the arms of France give an impression of force and resolution.” At the same time, in perhaps the most fateful decision in the coming of the Indochina War, de Gaulle appointed Admiral Georges Thierry d’Argenlieu to be high commissioner to Indochina and charged him with restoring French sovereignty over the Indochina Union. The command arrangement placed General Leclerc under Admiral d’Argenlieu. In January 1946 when political parties in France rejected his plan for a strong presidency, de Gaulle abruptly resigned. He spent the next years writing his war memoirs. Meanwhile, the Fourth Republic was stumbling toward disaster. In May 1958, having survived the long war in Indochina, the Fourth Republic finally collapsed under the weight of another war, this one in Algeria, and de Gaulle returned to power, technically as the last premier of the Fourth Republic. De Gaulle’s preservation of the democratic process was his greatest service to France. His Fifth Republic brought the strong presidential system that he had long advocated. The most pressing domestic problem remained that of Algeria, which became independent in 1962. In foreign affairs de Gaulle was arguably less successful, largely because he sought to reassert a French greatness that was gone forever. He saw France as leader of a “third” European force, between the two superpowers. De Gaulle pushed the development of a French atomic bomb and then a nuclear strike force, the Force de Frappe, to deliver it. His entente with Konrad Adenauer’s Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) was a success, and he began the process of détente with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. More questionable was his withdrawal of France from the military command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), although he gave strong support to NATO when the West was pressured by the Soviets. He twice vetoed British entry into the Common Market, cut France’s close ties to Israel, and called on Quebec to seek separation from Canada. De Gaulle also lectured the Americans on Vietnam. He warned President John F. Kennedy about involvement in Indochina. “You will find,” de Gaulle told him, “that intervention in this area will be an endless entanglement.” On the defeat of a national referendum in 1969, which he made a test of his leadership, de Gaulle again resigned and retired to write his final set of memoirs. He had completed two volumes and
part of the third when he died at Colombey-les-Deux Eglises on November 9, 1970. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also D’Argenlieu, Georges Thierry; Faure, Edgar; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Indochina War; Leclerc, Jacques-Philippe References De Gaulle, Charles. The War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle, Vol. 3, Salvation, 1944–1946. Translated by Richard Howard. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960. Gras, Yves. Histoire de la Guerre d’Indochine. Paris: Éditions Denoël, 1992. Lacouture, Jean. De Gaulle: The Rebel, 1890–1944. Translated by Patrick O’Brian. New York: Norton, 1990. Lacouture, Jean. De Gaulle: The Ruler, 1945–1970. Translated by Alan Sheridan. New York: Norton, 1972.
DELAWARE–LAM SON
216, Operation
Start Date: April 19, 1968 End Date: May 17, 1968 Operation in the A Shau Valley to eliminate People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) bases used in the 1968 Tet attack on Hue. U.S. Army lieutenant general William B. Rosson planned the operation, which called for his Provisional Corps of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) 3rd Regiment to air assault into the valley while the 1st Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division and ARVN Airborne troops blocked routes of escape. The 101st Airborne Division’s firebase of 175-millimeter (mm) guns would cover most of the valley, which was about 18 miles long and hedged in by 3,000-foot mountains. Lacking intelligence on the enemy, 1st Cavalry Division commander Major General John J. Tolson used Lieutenant Colonel Richard W. Diller’s 1st Battalion, 9th Cavalry, to conduct aerial reconnaissance. Diller uncovered heavy antiaircraft positions of 37-mm guns that were then attacked from the air. Still, PAVN fire destroyed 23 of Diller’s helicopters. Tolson attacked on April 19, 1968, landing Lieutenant Colonel James B. Vaught’s 5th Battalion and Lieutenant Colonel Joseph E. Wasiak’s 1st Battalion of the 7th Cavalry on peaks at the northern end of the valley. Heavy antiaircraft fire downed 10 U.S. helicopters. That night PAVN forces probed the U.S. defenses as a severe storm obscured visibility and forced Wasiak’s men to make a grueling three-day march to a lower elevation where resupply could reach them. For several days flying conditions were dangerous for aircrews. On April 24 Colonel John E. Stannard’s 1st Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division began an air assault near the A Luoi airstrip and
Dellinger, David quickly developed it into an airhead. CH-54 flying cranes lifted in engineering equipment while the men received air-dropped supplies from C-130s, one of which was shot down. Soon Caribous and C-130s landed to resupply the men. The 1st Brigade attacked south and west, discovering a mile-long depressed storage area defended by a PAVN company. Dubbed the “Punchbowl,” this area was secured on May 3. It contained a large logistical center of the PAVN 559th Transportation Group. On April 29 the ARVN 3rd Regiment landed and attacked southward along the Rao Lao River, uncovering a large supply cache. Operating to the east of A Shau, the 101st Airborne Division and ARVN Airborne troops made contact with the enemy and also uncovered large caches. Meanwhile, the troops came under heavy PAVN artillery and rocket attacks from Laos. DELAWARE–LAM SON 216 resulted in the capture of 2,319 small arms, 36 machine guns, 10 recoilless rifles, and 31 flamethrowers. The allies also took 135,000 small arms and 70,000 machinegun rounds, 8,000 artillery shells, 2,500 grenades, 2 bulldozers, 78 wheeled vehicles, and many other items. A 1st Cavalry Division sergeant also destroyed a PT-76 tank with an M-72 LAW (light antitank weapon). But U.S. losses included some 60 helicopters (including the first giant CH-54 Flying Crane lost in the war) and a C-130 cargo aircraft. The allies claimed 869 PAVN killed. U.S. personnel losses were 142 killed and 731 wounded, while the ARVN lost 26 killed and 132 wounded. As the troops began leaving on May 10, they booby-trapped the area and left acoustic sensors. Within weeks, however, PAVN troops returned to the A Shau Valley. They had to be cleared out again in 1969. JOHN L. BELL JR. See also Airborne Operations; Air Mobility; Aircraft, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Antiaircraft Artillery, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam; A Shau Valley; Geography of Indochina and Vietnam; Helicopters, Employment of, in Vietnam; Tanks, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Tet Offensive, Overall Strategy References Stanton, Shelby L. Anatomy of a Division: The 1st Cav in Vietnam. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1987. Tolson, John J. Airmobility, 1961–1971. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1973.
Dellinger, David Birth Date: August 12, 1915 Death Date: May 25, 2004 Pacifist and antiwar activist. David Dellinger was born in Wakefield, Massachusetts, on August 12, 1915, to a well-to-do family; his father
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Peace activist David Dellinger, one of the Chicago Eight arrested and tried for their part in the violent anti–Vietnam War protests outside the 1968 Democratic National Convention, talks to the press on October 22, 1967. (AP/Wide World Photos)
was a prominent Republican Party attorney. Dellinger graduated from Yale University in 1936 and from Union Theological Seminary in 1939. He represented an older generation of pacifists, active since the 1930s. He was a conscientious objector during World War II and worked with civil rights groups in the 1940s and 1950s. When President Lyndon Johnson ordered the bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) in early 1965, Dellinger organized a coalition of groups that held protests in Washington, D.C. The resulting August 1965 demonstrations marked the first use of civil disobedience tactics in the anti–Vietnam War movement. In November 1966 Dellinger served as cochairman of the Spring Mobilization to End the War in Vietnam (MOBE). The MOBE chose April 15, 1967, for protests and spent five months organizing churches, women’s leagues, universities, and peace groups to show that opposition to the war was not limited solely to radicals or the nation’s youth but instead included many Americans. The
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Demilitarized Zone
April marches were the largest demonstrations in U.S. history to that date. Dellinger was involved in the Chicago riots during the August 1968 Democratic National Convention and was one of the so-called Chicago Eight tried in 1969 for inciting violence at the convention. He was found guilty, but the verdict was overturned by a higher court in 1972. In September 1972 Dellinger was part of an antiwar delegation admitted into North Vietnam to accept the early return of three American prisoners of war. In 1971 he published a book, Revolutionary Non-Violence. A lifelong member of the Socialist Party of the United States, Dellinger worked tirelessly for social change and the establishment of peace in the international arena. He was active in the antinuclear movement and spoke out against the 1991 Persian Gulf War. In 1996 during the Democratic National Convention, he was arrested outside Chicago’s federal building along with several other protesters. He was there to remind the country of the violence that had ensued at the last Democratic National Convention to have been held in Chicago, in 1968. Dellinger died in Montpelier, Vermont, on May 25, 2004. CLAYTON D. LAURIE See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Chicago Eight; Democratic National Convention of 1968 References Dellinger, David. Revolutionary Non-Violence. New York: Doubleday, 1971. Gitlin, Todd. The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage. New York: Bantam, 1987. Maclear, Michael. The Ten Thousand Day War: Vietnam, 1945–1975. New York: St. Martin’s, 1981.
By 1956, however, the United States decided officially to support the government in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) and helped scuttle the scheduled elections throughout Vietnam. The DMZ then became, in Washington’s eyes, the official boundary between South Vietnam and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). To the leaders of North Vietnam, it was no such thing. During the Vietnam War, both the United States and North Vietnam regularly violated the neutrality of the DMZ by moving troops and matériel in and out of the area. North Vietnam sent soldiers and supplies through the zone to aid and train the Viet Cong (VC), while the United States conducted military operations to try to stop its enemy from doing so. Despite its failure to fulfill its original charter, the DMZ remained politically intact until the 1972 Spring (Easter) Offensive, when three People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) divisions crossed the DMZ and overran 12 Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) bases and outposts in the area. The political integrity of the DMZ was never restored, not even by those political leaders who had justified its existence years earlier. Today the only remnants of the DMZ are the decaying outposts that once lined its borders. BRENT LANGHALS See also Geneva Conference and Geneva Accords of 1954
Demilitarized Zone At the 1954 Geneva Conference, representatives from 11 nations, including the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), agreed with Vietnamese negotiators to divide Vietnam “temporarily.” Their motive was to separate French colonial forces from the Viet Minh, at least until 1956. The Geneva Accords provided that at that point there would be elections to establish a national government and reunify the country. In the interim, a demarcation line would divide Vietnam at roughly the 17th Parallel. From the South China Sea to the village of Bo Ho Su the line followed the Ben Hai River, and from Bo Ho Su the line proceeded due west to the border of Laos. This approximately 39-mile-long demarcation line also had a buffer zone, known as the demilitarized zone (DMZ), that was 5 miles wide. According to the Geneva Accords, there were to be no military forces, supplies, or equipment within the zone during its “temporary” existence.
U.S. Marine Corps lieutenant colonel William Rice is silhouetted by the setting sun as he looks through high-power binoculars into the demilitarized zone between North and South Vietnam, April 9, 1967. (AP/Wide World Photos)
Democratic National Convention of 1968
References Andradé, Dale. America’s Last Vietnam Battle: Halting Hanoi’s 1972 Easter Offensive. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001. Fall, Bernard B. Viet-Nam Witness, 1953–66. New York: Praeger, 1966. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. O’Ballance, Edgar. The Wars in Vietnam, 1954–1980. Rev. ed. New York: Hippocrene Books, 1981. Randle, Robert F. Geneva 1954: The Settlement of the Indochinese War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969. Turley, William S. The Second Indochina War: A Short Political and Military History, 1954–1975. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986. Young, Kenneth T. The 1954 Geneva Conference. New York: Greenwood, 1968.
Democratic National Convention of 1968 Start Date: August 26, 1968 End Date: August 29, 1968 Political controversy and civil unrest plagued the Democratic National Convention held in Chicago during August 26–29, 1968. The Democrats nominated Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota for president and Senator Edmund S. Muskie of Maine for vice president. But the Democratic Party was sharply divided,
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all the more so after Senator Robert F. Kennedy’s assassination in early June 1968. Two major issues—civil rights and the Vietnam War—polarized the convention and the city. Inside the Chicago Amphitheater the party establishment, dominated by President Lyndon B. Johnson and his loyalists, used political force and procedural manipulation to control official proceedings. On the streets outside, the Chicago police and Illinois state troopers and National Guardsmen, some 23,000 in all and directed by Mayor Richard J. Daley, used physical force to suppress unofficial opposition. The Democrats had suffered through tumultuous times in the months preceding the convention. President Johnson faced a challenge from within his own party from Minnesota senator Eugene J. McCarthy, who announced his candidacy in the autumn of 1967 as the standard-bearer of antiwar Democrats. Early in March 1968 McCarthy nearly upset Johnson in the New Hampshire primary; Senator Robert F. Kennedy of New York then entered the contest and divided the party’s peace faction. Johnson withdrew from the race on March 31, 1968, and Humphrey became a candidate on April 27. Kennedy’s death on June 6 further disrupted the process, and his campaign organization transferred its loyalty to Senator George S. McGovern of South Dakota, who took up his martyred colleague’s antiwar crusade. And yet another Kennedy—Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts—loomed as a possible contender at convention time in August. Despite the bitter
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Chicago policemen with nightsticks in hand confront a demonstrator on the ground in Grant Park, Chicago, on August 26, 1968. The site of the antiwar demonstrations, timed to coincide with the Democratic National Convention, became the scene of a number of violent clashes, while the scene inside the convention hall was one of political rancor and division over the issues of the Vietnam War and civil rights. (AP/Wide World Photos)
campaign, Humphrey arrived in Chicago with a clear majority of committed delegates and appeared to have the nomination firmly in hand. Following a week of platform hearings in Washington, D.C., on August 25 delegates descended upon Chicago to begin their convention. Clear distinctions, centered upon U.S. policy regarding Vietnam, had already been established between the majority loyal to Johnson, Humphrey, and Daley and a minority made up of McCarthy and McGovern supporters. Credentials and rules debates dominated the agenda of the first two days, which the majority effectively controlled, compromising only on the seating of delegations from Mississippi and Georgia. The decisive issue, adoption of a platform plank supporting administration Vietnam policies, was introduced by Platform and Rules Committee chairman Hale Boggs after midnight on Tuesday, August 27, a move orchestrated by the majority to limit television coverage of the debate. McCarthy supporters, unable to gain recognition from Permanent Chairman Carl Albert on an adjournment motion, loudly
protested. After several minutes of chaos, Albert abandoned the platform debate and adjourned the convention until noon the following day. The debate over the Vietnam plank highlighted the convention; the actual nominating process was anticlimactic. Throughout the afternoon of August 28, speakers from both majority and minority factions passionately defended their positions before the delegates and a national television audience. The debate was a final test of strength for the majority; the adoption of its plank would virtually assure Humphrey of the nomination. After four hours of heated exchange, the final vote of 1,567.75 to 1,041.25 favored the majority position supporting administration policy. By 12:02 a.m. on August 29, Humphrey had secured a first-ballot nomination and had become the Democratic Party candidate for president. While the establishment majority managed events inside the amphitheater, Daley’s Chicago police force, assisted by Illinois state troopers and National Guardsmen, attempted to control the far more contentious events outside. Thousands of antiwar pro-
DePuy, William Eugene testers had also converged upon Chicago for the convention and, although denied permits to demonstrate, marched, sang, and lobbied in support of the antiwar candidates and platform. The convention site itself, surrounded with barbed wire and defended by combat vehicles, resembled an armed camp. In several violent clashes thoroughly documented by television and print media and watched by a stunned nation, police and protesters epitomized the emotions on both sides of the Vietnam War debate. Chicago police arrested 668 demonstrators during the convention. The number of injuries on both sides remains in dispute, with estimates ranging from 200 to more than 1,000. Despite the spirited political fight within the convention hall, the images of armed conflict on Chicago streets remain the overriding memory for many Americans of the Democratic National Convention of 1968. For many years the convention was a black mark on Chicago, and not until 1996 did the Democratic Party return to the city to hold its convention. The spectacle also severely tarnished Mayor Richard Daley’s public image. MARK BARRINGER See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Chicago Eight; Daley, Richard Joseph; Humphrey, Hubert Horatio; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, Robert Francis; McCarthy, Eugene Joseph; McGovern, George Stanley; Nixon, Richard Milhous References Foote, Joseph, ed. The Presidential Nominating Conventions 1968. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1968. Mailer, Norman. Miami and the Siege of Chicago: An Informal History of the Republican and Democratic Conventions of 1968. New York: New American Library, 1968. Walker, Daniel. Rights in Conflict: Chicago’s Seven Brutal Days. New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1968.
Denton, Jeremiah Andrew, Jr. Birth Date: July 15, 1924 U.S. Navy admiral, one of the first and most senior-ranking prisoners of war (POWs), and U.S. senator (1981–1987). Born in Mobile County, Alabama, on July 15, 1924, Jeremiah (Jerry) Andrew Denton Jr. graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, in 1946 and became a naval aviator. He later graduated from the Armed Forces Staff College and from the Naval War College in 1964. He also earned an MA degree in international affairs from George Washington University. In 1965 Denton was the commander of Attack Squadron 75 (VA75) aboard the aircraft carrier Independence in waters off the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). On July 18, 1965, he was piloting a Grumman A-6A Intruder with his bombardier/navigator, Lieutenant (Junior Grade) Bill Tschudy, as part of a bombing mission over the city of Thanh Hoa. Their aircraft was shot down, and both men were taken prisoner and held by North Vietnam.
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Commander Denton spent seven and a half years in captivity (including more than four years of solitary confinement punctuated by torture). He was a key leader of the resistance movement, universally recognized by his peers as one of the bravest, toughest, and most inspirational of the POWs. In April 1966 during a televised interview with Japanese journalists, he blinked the word “torture” in Morse code. During the infamous July 1966 Hanoi Parade, he ordered his fellow POWs to keep their heads up and walk with pride. As the senior officer on the first plane of American POWs that landed in the Philippines in February 1973, Denton made his famous statement “We are honored to have had the opportunity to serve our country under difficult circumstances.” Denton’s book When Hell Was in Session (1976), among the best captivity accounts, was made into a television movie starring Hal Holbrook. After retirement from the U.S. Navy as a rear admiral, Denton worked for the Christian Broadcasting Network. In 1980 he was elected to the U.S. Senate from Alabama, the first Republican senator from that state since Reconstruction. Denton was a leading conservative voice in the Senate, especially on so-called family issues. Defeated for reelection in 1986, he retired from public life after leaving the Senate in 1987. Denton stated repeatedly that he believes that the error in Vietnam was not using decisive force early in the conflict. The Admiral Jeremiah Denton Foundation that he founded is involved in promoting fundamentalist Christian values and in relief work in the developing world. JOE P. DUNN See also Hoa Lo Prison; HOMECOMING, Operation; McCain, John Sidney, III; Prisoners of War, Allied References Denton, Jeremiah A., with Ed Brandt. When Hell Was in Session. New York: Reader’s Digest, 1976. Howes, Craig. Voices of the Vietnam POWs: Witnesses to Their Fight. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. Hubbell, John G., Andrew Jones, and Kenneth Y. Tomlinson. P.O.W.: A Definitive History of the American Prisoner-of-War Experience in Vietnam, 1964–1973. New York: Reader’s Digest, 1976.
Deo Mu Gia See Mu Gia Pass
DePuy, William Eugene Birth Date: October 1, 1919 Death Date: September 9, 1992 U.S. Army general and commander of the 1st Infantry Division in Vietnam (1966–1967). Born in Jamestown, North Dakota, on October 1, 1919, William Eugene DePuy graduated from South
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Major General William E. DePuy, commander of the U.S. 1st Infantry Division, shown here in September 1966. (AP/Wide World Photos)
Dakota State College and in June 1941 was commissioned an infantry lieutenant. Most of his wartime experience was with the 90th Infantry Division. DePuy’s personal combat experience in World War II as a company and battalion officer firmly established his attitudes about leadership and survival in wartime. DePuy’s post–World War II assignments included military professional schools and the Army Language School. In 1949 he served as a military attaché in Budapest, Hungary, followed by an assignment with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). He commanded a battalion in Europe in 1954 and then served in staff assignments in Washington. He attended the British Imperial Defence College in 1960 and then commanded a battle group in Germany. In 1962 he was assigned as director of special warfare in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. The following year while serving as the director of plans and programs in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, DePuy was promoted to brigadier general. In 1964 he was assigned as assistant chief of staff for operations (G-3) of General William C. Westmoreland’s Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). In March 1966 DePuy took command of the 1st Infantry (“Big Red One”) Division and was promoted to major general in April. Douglas Kinnard, in The War Managers, described DePuy as a person of great intensity,
with indefatigable energy and lofty ambitions, who was always well informed, well spoken, and persuasive. DePuy’s command of the 1st Infantry Division was anything but tranquil. While on Westmoreland’s staff DePuy had argued convincingly for more troops and an offensive strategy of attrition. Other units, notably the 25th Infantry (“Tropic Lightning”) Division and U.S. Marine Corps units in the I Corps Tactical Zone in the north, gave priority to supporting the Vietnamese by protecting them from Viet Cong (VC) harassment and recruiting, but DePuy’s 1st Infantry Division pursued Communist troops in their own territory and sought to destroy them by maneuver and firepower. In his book Changing an Army, DePuy described his philosophy as going “after the Main [VC] Forces wherever they could be found and to go after them with as many battalions as I could get into the fight,” what was later called “pile-on.” In January 1967 Major General John H. Hay Jr. took command of the division from DePuy. In July 1973 General DePuy became the first head of the U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command. In this post he helped fashion the organization and cultivated a talented group of subordinates to develop a new fighting doctrine to carry the army in the post–Vietnam War era. His intellect and leadership helped resurrect the spirit, morale, and fighting efficiency of the army. DePuy retired from active duty in July 1977 to Highfield, Virginia. The 1st Division Scholarship Fund he established to benefit the children of those of the division killed in Vietnam subsequently distributed more than $1 million in assistance. DePuy died on September 9, 1992. JOHN F. VOTAW See also Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; United States Army; Westmoreland, William Childs References DePuy, General William E. Changing an Army: An Oral History of General William E. DePuy, USA Retired. Interviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Romie L. Brownlee and Lieutenant Colonel William J. Mullen III. Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA: United States Military History Institute, 1986. DePuy, General William E. Selected Papers of General William E. DePuy. Compiled by Colonel Richard M. Swain. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1994. DePuy, General William E. “Troop A at Ap Tau O.” Bridgehead Sentinel, Summer 1988. Gole, Henry G. General William E. DePuy: Preparing the Army for Modern War. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2008. Halberstam, David. The Best and the Brightest. New York: Random House, 1972. Herbert, Paul H. Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations. Leavenworth Paper No. 16. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1988. Kinnard, Douglas. The War Managers. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1977. Sheehan, Neil. A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam. New York: Random House, 1988.
DEROS
De Rhodes, Alexandre Birth Date: March 15, 1591 Death Date: November 5, 1660 French Jesuit missionary to Vietnam who devised quoc ngu (“national language”), the Vietnamese writing system. Born in the papal city of Avignon in southern France on March 15, 1591, Alexandre De Rhodes became a Jesuit priest and dedicated himself to spreading the Roman Catholic faith among Asians. Weakened by civil wars, in the 17th century the Mac dynasty in Vietnam fell to the jealousies of the Le, Trinh, and Nguyen families. Intent upon battling one another for the right to rule, they barely noticed the arrival of De Rhodes, who came to Hanoi in 1627. Despite the fact that French, Portuguese, and Spanish Catholic missionaries had been in Indochina since the 16th century, it was De Rhodes who opened the door between East and West, between France and Vietnam. He learned Vietnamese quickly, although he said that at first it sounded to his Western ears like “twittering birds.” To enable Vietnamese to read the Gospel, he devised a Roman alphabet transliteration of the Vietnamese spoken language that came to be known as quoc ngu. De Rhodes initially had great success in his work, pacifying Lord Trinh Trang, who ruled the northern part of the country where De Rhodes resided, with gifts of books and clocks. A tireless worker, De Rhodes recorded how he preached six sermons daily and eventually baptized 6,700 Vietnamese into the Catholic faith. His activities aroused great animosity and suspicion among traditional Confucianists when some 18 members of the Trinh court nobility converted to Catholicism. In 1630 De Rhodes was banished from the north. He moved to the south, but his missionary labors there were found to be unacceptable by the equally hostile Nguyen court. Exiled from his chosen mission field, between 1640 and 1645 De Rhodes lived in the Portuguese Crown Colony of Macao but made repeated trips to Vietnam to continue his work to spread Catholic Christianity among the Vietnamese people. On each trip he risked his life. On one occasion he was sentenced to be beheaded but was expelled after three weeks’ imprisonment. When the Vatican failed to support his work, he turned to the French Catholic Church and urged it to increase its efforts in Vietnam. In 1644 De Rhodes convinced the French Catholic Church to organize the Société des Missions Etrangères (Society of Foreign Missions) to oversee mission endeavors in Vietnam. By 1700 there were hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese Christians. De Rhodes died on November 5, 1660, while on an assignment in Persia. CECIL B. CURREY See also Nguyen Dynasty; Quoc Ngu; Trinh Lords; Vietnam, History of, 938 CE through the French Conquest
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References Chesneaux, Jean. Contribution à l’Histoire de la Nation Vietnamienne. Paris: Editions Sociales, 1955. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997.
DEROS A U.S. military term. Because tours of duty in Southeast Asia were fixed in length, an individual’s Date of Estimated Return from Overseas (DEROS) was established at the same time as the assignment date. Standard combat area tours for all branches were 12 months except for the U.S. Marine Corps, for which tours of duty were generally 13 months. Assignments to nontheater areas in support of the war were also fixed in length, ranging from 12 to 24 months, again with the DEROS known before the assignment began.
A soldier of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) keeps track of the time he has left in Vietnam using marks on his helmet (known as the “Date of Estimated Return from Overseas”). Military tours during the war were fixed in length, which negatively impacted military effectiveness. (National Archives)
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An individual might request an extension to the length of the tour, usually 6 months or a year. In some cases a shortened term of enlistment was offered as an incentive for such extensions so that upon returning from overseas, the individual would be separated from active duty rather than serving out the remainder of his or her enlistment in a stateside assignment. The 12- or 13-month combat tour was an innovation in the Vietnam War. Originally intended, among other purposes, to increase morale by giving combat troops an idea of when their ordeal might end, the purpose seemed to work during the early years of the war. However, as other morale factors worsened in later years, the fixed DEROS was blamed for creating a so-called short mentality, a slackening of effort in anticipation of departure. Whether or not this was so, consciousness of the DEROS was an important part of every soldier’s life. Countdowns to the date were elaborately kept and sometimes displayed on equipment or in living and working quarters in base camps, and the term itself, originally a noun, was quickly transformed into a verb, for example, “When do you DEROS?” The individual replacement policy also destroyed the cohesion of American units, making it impossible for commanders to build effective teams. PHOEBE S. SPINRAD See also United States Army Reference Appy, Christian G. Working Class War: American Combat Soldiers & Vietnam. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993.
Desertion, U.S. and Communist By U.S. military definition, desertion means “absent with the intention to remain away permanently.” The term “AWOL” (absent without leave) is used for those in the military who overstay their leaves or are absent without permission but do not intend to desert. Although the two are often confused, they are quite different. Unless there are complicating circumstances, being AWOL is a misdemeanor, whereas desertion is a felony. A soldier can be charged with being AWOL for something as minor as being five minutes late signing in from a pass or missing morning roll call formation. It was not at all uncommon for a young soldier to be charged with being AWOL more than once during the period of his military service. Once a soldier has been absent from his unit for more than 30 days, the charge usually converts to desertion. Thus, although some 500,000 of the nearly 7.6 million Americans who served in the U.S. military during 1965–1973 were AWOL at some point or deserted, fewer than one-fifth (93,250 men and women) remained away from their units more than 30 days. Altogether there were 32,000 reported cases of failure to report for duty in Vietnam, refusal to return from rest and relaxation (R&R), and
desertion after service in Vietnam. Most of these, some 20,000, fell in the AWOL category. It is difficult to secure precise numbers regarding desertions during the Vietnam War. In many if not most cases, turning oneself in led to a removal of the desertion charge and to punishment assessed by a nonjudicial hearing under Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. It is clear, however, that the U.S. Army had the highest levels of desertion, while the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Navy, and the U.S. Marine Corps, with many more volunteers versus draftees, experienced much smaller rates. Desertion during the Vietnam War reflected that conflict’s growing unpopularity and peaked in 1971. For the entire conflict desertions were the highest for any U.S. war since the American Civil War. Most desertions occurred in the continental United States. Few took place in Vietnam, one of the reasons being that there was no place to go. Within the combat zone, there were only 24 cases of desertion related to avoidance of hazardous duty. Three-quarters of U.S. Army deserters were white, but African Americans were twice as likely to desert. U.S. Navy deserters also tended to be white, but U.S. Air Force deserters tended to be African American and better educated. Most desertions were prompted by noncombat-related reasons, such as personal and financial problems. Within the U.S. military, those deserters who were later located were given discharges under less-than-honorable conditions. In many cases the judicial proceedings against deserters included charges for other serious crimes committed while in a deserter status. Deserters were more reviled than draft dodgers. Nevertheless, presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter initiated clemency and amnesty programs. Ford formed the Presidential Clemency Board, which reviewed individual cases and assigned specific sanctions or acquittal. Ford proposed two years of alternate service for both draft resisters and deserters in return for clemency discharges. Carter, who in 1977 offered blanket pardons to draft resisters, succumbed to national outrage and offered almost nothing to deserters; they were ordered to apply in person to secure a change in their discharge status. The Ford and Carter administrations did agree to upgrade the discharges of the 20,000 who deserted after service in Vietnam. The highest desertion rates of the Vietnam War occurred among soldiers of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army). This grew particularly after 1960, when fighting intensified in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Between 1967 and 1971 more than 570,000 ARVN soldiers deserted. Desertion was primarily a problem in regular ARVN units. Regional Forces had a very low desertion rate, and there were almost no deserters in the village-level Popular Forces. Factors prompting ARVN desertions included low pay, separation from families, military corruption, dangerous field conditions, and hardships (including transportation problems that made taking leaves difficult). Although there were a number of Communist
DeSoto Missions moles within the ARVN personnel, only rarely did deserters join the Communists. Within South Vietnam, desertion was relatively easy. An ARVN deserter could easily find his way to a populous area and live there with little risk of being found and arrested. Most deserters sooner or later enlisted in another unit, usually under a different name. In the later years of the war little was done to pursue identity matters. Not unrelated to this, during large-scale Communist offensives the number of those volunteering for the ARVN dramatically increased, while the number of deserters decreased. Between 1967 and 1971 only 87,000 People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) and Viet Cong (VC) troops deserted within South Vietnam. This desertion rate was low in the early years of the war but grew as the fighting intensified. The much lower desertion rate for Communist troops is attributable primarily to their dedication and higher morale. Desertion from the PAVN within the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) was virtually impossible because of rigid population control. Every citizen had to present food stamps to buy basic foodstuffs, and on the date that a draftee was to report to local military authorities for basic training, these were canceled. Ethnic South Vietnamese soldiers serving in the PAVN deserted at a higher rate than native North Vietnamese. Desertion also grew during periods of intense allied military activity. In 1967 some 90 percent of two elite VC battalions, Phu Loi I and Phu Loi II in Binh Duong Province, deserted in a two-month period. Communist deserters who openly declared their intentions to become citizens of South Vietnam were given Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) status and then South Vietnamese citizenship. The few who refused were sent to prisoner-of-war camps. Some elite ARVN units, especially the Rangers, contained a high percentage of Communist defectors. Perhaps the best known of these was former PAVN lieutenant Bui Ngoc Phep, a talented sapper who surrendered in 1968 and became the leader of the Kit Carson Scouts working with the U.S. Army. Killed by a sniper, he was buried with full military honors by the U.S. Army and the ARVN. After the April 1975 Communist victory, almost all former Communist defectors were detained. Many were killed in the immediate aftermath, among them members of the elite Armed Propaganda Companies in Hue and Da Nang. In 1978 Hanoi courts-martial handed down death sentences to former PAVN colonel Le Xuan Chuyen and Captain Phan Van Xuong. Chuyen was executed by a firing squad in 1980. Xuong died in prison at about the same time. Others were given lengthy prison sentences. In more recent years, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) allowed many former Chieu Hoi to immigrate to the United States. NGUYEN CONG LUAN AND SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Amnesty; Carter, James Earl, Jr.; Chieu Hoi Program; Conscientious Objectors; Ford, Gerald Rudolph; Kit Carson Scouts; Selective Service
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References Baskir, Lawrence M., and William A. Strauss. Chance and Circumstance: The Draft, the War, and the Vietnam Generation. New York: 1978. Dong Van Khuyen. The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1980. MacPherson, Myra. Long Time Passing: Vietnam and the Haunted Generation. New York: Doubleday, 1984. Olson, James S., ed. Dictionary of the Vietnam War. New York: Greenwood, 1988.
DeSoto Missions Start Date: 1963 End Date: 1964 Clandestine U.S. naval mission designed to monitor and record electronic military transmissions of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). As American interest in Vietnam increased, the U.S. Navy looked for an opportunity to become involved. It had already carried out surreptitious projects along the coastlines of China, North Korea, and even the Soviet Union, using electronic listening gear to photograph, map locations, and measure frequencies of coastal radar stations in addition to monitoring shipping and naval traffic. President Lyndon B. Johnson authorized a late 1963 four-month experimental program (later extended for an additional year) dubbed DeSoto. Certain ships of the Seventh Fleet with electronic intelligence listening gear would cruise the coast of North Vietnam. While commandos of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) landed shore parties at various locations to harass radar installations, electronic intelligence (ELINT) ships would record resulting electronic transmissions. The first DeSoto mission was assigned to the destroyer Craig, but inclement weather forced its cancellation. The destroyer Maddox was then ordered from Japanese waters to the Gulf of Tonkin, where it was to take up station. Its captain was warned to go no closer than eight miles from the North Vietnamese coast and not to approach within four miles of coastal islands. Commissioned in June 1944, the Maddox was an Allen M. Sumner–class destroyer armed with 6 5-inch guns and 10 21-inch torpedoes. Securing its ELINT gear in Taiwan, it made its way into the Gulf of Tonkin, zigzagging its way seven to nine miles off the coast and four to six miles away from various islands along its course. At the same time, another program was in motion. Known as OPLAN 34A, it employed several U.S. Navy patrol torpedo (PT) boats stripped of their torpedo tubes as well as American-built light craft called “Swifts,” captained occasionally by Norwegian skippers, and Norwegian-built aluminum patrol boats nicknamed “Nasties,” captained by Americans. The Swifts were being phased out because of their insufficient weaponry and speed as Nasties came on line. Nasties were equipped with mounted machine guns and light cannon
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and were capable of speeds in excess of 50 knots. They transported South Vietnamese commandos from their base at Da Nang to locations on the coast above the 17th Parallel. These teams engaged in various covert actions ashore, including sabotage and kidnapping. In the early minutes of July 31, 1964, one such mission raked the shoreline of the island of Hon Me with its weaponry while another OPLAN 34A team fired at the island of Hon Ngu. The Maddox monitored these activities; at no time was the ship closer to Hon Me than five miles. In reaction, just after 3:00 p.m. on August 2 North Vietnamese patrol boats from Vinh attacked the Maddox, perhaps under the impression that it was part of OPLAN 34A activities. The patrol boats were driven off or sunk by aircraft from the carrier Ticonderoga. Commander of the Pacific Fleet Admiral Ulysses Grant Sharp Jr. then ordered another carrier, the Constellation, and another destroyer, the C. Turner Joy, as reinforcement. The latter, a 4,200-ton Forrest Sherman–class ship, carried three 5-inch guns, two 3-inch guns, six torpedoes, and depth charges. A supposed second attack by North Vietnamese patrol boats against both the Maddox and the C. Turner Joy came on August 4, whereupon President Johnson temporarily suspended both DeSoto missions and OPLAN 34A activities. These Gulf of Tonkin incidents paved the way for the passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution by the U.S. Congress and greater American involvement in the war in Vietnam. CECIL B. CURREY See also Electronic Intelligence; Gulf of Tonkin Incident; Gulf of Tonkin Resolution; Operation Plan 34A; Sharp, Ulysses Simpson Grant, Jr. References Jane’s Fighting Ships, 1976–1977. London: Jane’s Publishing, 1977. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. Moise, Edwin E. Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996. Mooney, James L., ed. Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships. Washington, DC: U.S. Navy Department, 1959.
Détente Period of relaxed Cold War tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union that began in the late 1960s and ended by 1980. The French term “détente” originally referred to the slackening of tension on the string of a crossbow. To release the tension on the string meant that the crossbow could not be fired quickly, as it would have to be cranked up again before it could be used. This explains the application of the term to warfare and to the Cold War. Détente figured fairly prominently in U.S. attempts to end the Vietnam War in the early and mid-1970s. Although U.S. president Richard Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger rightfully laid claim to the implementa-
tion of détente, a Cold War thaw was clearly well under way as early as 1967, the year that U.S. president Lyndon B. Johnson and Soviet prime minister Aleksei Kosygin met at Glassboro, New Jersey, in a summit that produced little of substance but was nonetheless hailed as a breakthrough in superpower diplomacy. That same year saw the superpowers sign the Outer Space Treaty, which forbade the placement of nuclear missiles and other weapons of mass destruction in space. When Nixon took office in January 1969, he and Kissinger immediately began to sketch out their grand design for the recasting of East-West relations. Part of the plan was to engage the Soviets in trade agreements, increased cultural exchanges, and arms limitation negotiations. Another piece of détente would capitalize on the growing Sino-Soviet split by simultaneously reaching out to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which the United States had heretofore refused to officially recognize. Nixon and Kissinger hoped to play the Soviets and Chinese against one another in order to entice both nations to alter their policies toward the West and its proxies. They also hoped to prod the Soviets and Chinese into diminishing their aid to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and believed that one or both nations might put pressure on Hanoi to bring an end to the Vietnam War. Larger international developments also played a part in the development of détente. Chancellor Willy Brandt (1969–1974) of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) and his successor Helmut Schmidt (1974–1982) helped ease East-West tensions with Brandt’s policy of Ostpolitik, which sought to smooth relations with the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) and the Soviet Union. Ostpolitik successfully drew West and East Germany closer together and undoubtedly added urgency to Nixon and Kissinger’s détente. The fact that the Soviets and Americans had reached rough nuclear parity by 1968 and were both eager to implement the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which went into effect in March 1970, suggested that détente was a necessary and desirable progression for both sides. Clearly, both the United States and the Soviet Union stood to gain from détente. The Soviets saw it as a way to boost East-West trade and to buy badly needed agricultural products, particularly grain, from the Americans. The Americans in turn viewed détente as a way to seal lucrative large-scale trade deals and to lessen the burden of high defense budgets resulting from the Vietnam War. Obviously, all benefited by reducing Cold War antipathies that might escalate to nuclear war. For his part, Nixon used détente for political gain as well. Seeking a way to boost his reelection chances in 1972, the president employed his high-profile trips to Beijing and Moscow that year to focus public attention on foreign policy triumphs during a time in which the economy was faltering, the backlash against Vietnam was increasing, and race relations were still at a slow boil. Soviet premier Leonid Brezhnev also employed détente for political expediency. Indeed, given the rocky relations with China, Brezhnev saw in détente a way to boost his popularity
Détente at home, elevate the Soviet position within the Communist bloc, and consolidate his power within the Kremlin. Nixon visited Beijing in February 1972, a widely publicized spectacle in which two former enemies—Nixon and Chairman Mao Zedong—were seen amiably toasting one another. That the opening of relations with China began before Nixon first visited Moscow in May 1972 was not lost on the Soviets, who showed a renewed commitment to détente, fearing that the Americans and the Chinese would conspire against them. Nixon and Brezhnev’s first summit took place in Moscow during May 22–30, 1972. The meeting was a cordial one that resulted in concrete diplomatic achievements. Altogether the two leaders arrived at seven separate agreements, ranging from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) Interim Agreement and the beginning of SALT II talks to expanded commerce, limiting the likelihood of accidental war, and promoting cooperative research projects. That summer the U.S. Congress approved the SALT I accords and a three-year grain deal with the Soviets. In the meantime, both nations became signatories to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Biological Warfare Convention in 1972. Brezhnev visited Washington in June 1973 for the second summit. The meeting was a generally productive one, and both men had obviously developed a considerable personal rapport. Both sides agreed to redouble their efforts in negotiating a second SALT agreement, which had run into technical problems over the existence of multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs). The third and last summit between Nixon and Brezhnev—occurring in June 1974—was the least productive. By then, Nixon’s personal and political fortunes as well as other roadblocks conspired to work against a broadening of détente. Although the Americans and the Chinese continued to inch their way toward normalized relations, after 1974 the forward momentum of the U.S.-Soviet détente began to falter. By the summer of 1974 Nixon was clearly preoccupied with the Watergate Scandal, which was about to doom his presidency; he was a lame duck. The SALT II talks were stalled, and neither side seemed willing to break the logjam. The U.S. Congress, which already had its sights on Nixon, balked at making any further trade or arms deals with the Soviets as long as they continued to mistreat their Jewish population. Nixon’s successor, Gerald R. Ford, was committed to détente. But his uneasy and brief term, seen by many as a caretaker presidency, did not give him much clout with a hostile and Democratically controlled Congress. When Jimmy Carter became president in 1977, he too supported détente. However, his administration’s emphasis on human rights soon strained relations with Moscow. Détente came unglued in 1979. The 1979 Iranian Revolution hamstrung Carter, compelling many Americans to conclude that the United States had become a toothless tiger. Deteriorating relations with the Soviets became a full-blown crisis when they invaded Afghanistan in December 1979. Carter, now under enormous pressure to act tough, condemned the Afghanistan invasion, initiated
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General secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev (left) and U.S. president Richard Nixon (right) after signing the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in Moscow on May 26, 1972, the first significant arms limitation agreement between the two superpowers. (National Archives)
a substantial military buildup, and pointedly boycotted the 1980 Moscow Olympics. Détente was all but finished. When Ronald Reagan came to office in January 1981, he took a hard-line stance with the Soviets. He engaged the nation in a massive conventional and military buildup, resorted to bellicose anti-Soviet rhetoric reminiscent of the early Cold War, and refused to negotiate with the Soviets. The doomed SALT II treaty was abandoned, and U.S.-Soviet relations reached a nadir not known since the early 1960s. Only after Soviet secretary-general Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in late 1985 did superpower relations improve, beginning the final phase of the Cold War that ended with the dissolution of the Soviet Union on December 31, 1991. The extent to which détente helped Vietnam War peace negotiations is still subject to conjecture, although there is little doubt that improved relations with both Moscow and Beijing gave the United States more latitude in its Vietnam policies without worrying about a Soviet or Chinese intervention. PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR. See also Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich; Carter, James Earl, Jr.; China, People’s Republic of; Ford, Gerald Rudolph; Kissinger, Henry Alfred; Kosygin, Aleksei Nikolayevich; Moscow Meeting, Brezhnev and Nixon; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Sino-Soviet Split; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics References Edmonds, Robin. Soviet Foreign Policy: The Brezhnev Years. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983. Froman, Michael B. The Development of the Idea of Détente. New York: St. Martin’s, 1991.
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Gaddis, John Lewis. Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. Lafeber, Walter. America, Russia and the Cold War, 1945–2002. Updated 9th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004. Nelson, Keith L. The Making of Détente: Soviet-American Relations in the Shadow of Vietnam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995.
De Tham Birth Date: 1858 Death Date: February 10 or March 18, 1913 Vietnamese nationalist hero who led an uprising against the French. De Tham, also known as Hoang Hoa Tham, was born in 1858 as Truong Van Nghia, son of Truong Van Than and Luong Thi Minh, in Di Chien village, Tien Lu District, Hung Yen Province, in northern Vietnam. Taking up arms against the French, Truong Van Nghia centered his resistance activities in the Yen The area of Bac Giang Province. He was subsequently honored by Vietnamese nationalists with the titles of De Tham (Marshal Tham) and the Gray Tiger of Yen The Area. Operating from Yen The, from 1886 De Tham expanded his activities, chiefly to Bac Giang, Thai Nguyen, and Hung Hoa provinces. In 1892 the French sent forces into Yen The without significant success. In late 1895 De Tham attacked Bac Ninh and secured a number of weapons. When he refused to return these, that November the French mounted a larger effort under Colonel Joseph Gallieni to destroy De Tham’s movement, but this met only partial success. De Tham withdrew into the jungle. In 1897 the French agreed to create an autonomous zone of six cantons containing 22 villages in the Phon Xuong area in return for disarmament by De Tham’s group. In fact, De Tham did not disarm. By 1899 he commanded some 500 well-armed combatants. In 1905 after contact with Phan Boi Chau, Phan Chu Trinh, and Pham Van Ngon, Tham decided to expand his activities and established the Nghia Hung Party. During the next eight years his forces battled the French and inflicted serious losses on them. In 1908 De Tham was involved in the revolt of the Garde Indochinoise (Linh Kho Xanh) at Bac Ninh, Nam Dinh, and Nha Nam. He participated in the plot on June 27, 1908, to poison the French garrison at the Hanoi citadel during a banquet while the Garde Indochinoise mounted simultaneous attacks on other French posts. The poison did not have the desired effect, proving to be only a strong purgative and alerting the French. De Tham’s troops outside the citadel then withdrew. The French authorities handed out a number of death sentences for the participants and demanded De Tham’s surrender. During January–November 1909 the French mounted a series of military operations against De Tham and his followers, winning
nearly a dozen pitched battles in the process. De Tham and his remaining followers were finally forced to take refuge at Yen The. The French surrounded him there, captured his wife, and deported her to Guyana. Most of his followers deserted him. On the night of March 18, 1913 (February 10, 1913, has also been given), De Tham was assassinated near Cho Go by one of his associates, Luong Tam Ky, a former member of the Black Flags and also a Vietnamese agent working for the French. De Tham’s death was a great blow to the Yen The resistance movement. His associates tried to continue the struggle, but the movement soon collapsed. De Tham continued to be revered by Vietnamese nationalists. During the Indochina War, the Viet Minh offensives of the first half of 1951, Operation HOANG HOA THAM, were named after him. NGO NGOC TRUNG AND SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Black Flags; French Indochina, 1860s–1946; HOANG HOA THAM, Operation References Buttinger, Joseph. The Smaller Dragon: A Political History of Vietnam. New York: Praeger, 1958. Chapuis, Oscar. The Last Emperors of Vietnam: From Tu Duc to Bao Dai. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2000. Gendre, Claude. Le De Tham (1858–1913): Un Résistant Vietnamien à la colonisation française. L’Harmattan, Paris: Éditions L’Harmattan, 2007. Nguyen Huyen Anh. Viet Nam Danh Nhan Tu Dien [Dictionary of Vietnamese Great Men and Women]. Houston, TX: Zieleks, 1990.
Devillers, Philippe Birth Date: November 11, 1920 French journalist and writer who went to Vietnam in 1945 with hardly any knowledge of the country and wrote the most influential political history of the Indochina War. Philippe Devillers was born Philippe Mullender in the town of Villers-Cotterêts in the Aisne on November 11, 1920. While in the army in August 1945 he accepted a position in the press section of General JacquesPhilippe Leclerc’s Expeditionary Corps leaving for Indochina to restore French sovereignty there in the wake of Japan’s surrender. Mullender arrived in Saigon in November 1945 and was assigned to write articles for the official publication Caravelle, but under a private arrangement with Hubert Beuve-Mery, the newspaper’s founder and director, he also began contributing articles to Le Monde using the pseudonym Devillers, after his birthplace. Devillers quickly made up for his lack of knowledge of Vietnam by a series of lucky breaks. First he made the acquaintance of F. Moresco, director of the Sûreté under the Vichy-supporting regime of Admiral Jean Decoux. Moresco allowed Devillers to consult and make notes from the dossiers of political parties in Vietnam, dossiers that had been prepared in exhaustive detail since 1932. This provided Devillers with a background on the Communists and the
Dewey, Albert Peter Viet Minh. In Hue in March 1946, Devillers made contact with the Viet Minh themselves through a métis engineer friend. Devillers then consulted other sources of information in the old imperial capital including newspaper files, which made him determined to write a book on the dramatic and little-known events of 1944– 1946. Finally, again through friends, he obtained copies of the typewritten transcripts of the negotiations between the French and the Viet Minh in Da Lat in April–May 1946 for a political settlement following the March 6 modus vivendi. Repatriated to France in October 1946, Devillers began turning his voluminous notes, documents, and reference books into the first draft of a book. Continuing his newspaper interviews with key players such as Decoux, Bao Dai, and others in the unfolding drama of Franco-Vietnamese relations, Devillers worked steadily at his project, all the while remaining in government service. A series of seven one-hour lectures on contemporary Vietnam that he was invited to give at the Collège Libre des Sciences Sociales et Economiques in the winter of 1949–1950 compelled him to arrange his material in readable form, and a strongly Vietnamese nationalist viewpoint emerged in his writing. The book, Histoire du Viet-Nam de 1940 à 1952, was published by Editions du Seuil in Paris on April 28, 1952, three days after Devillers resigned his civil service position. By presenting a firmly nationalist point of view rooted in Vietnam’s own history of struggle against outside domination, the book acted as a counterweight to the arguments of those who wanted to keep Indochina in the French Empire at all costs and a foil to propagandistic portrayals of the Viet Minh that had dominated the press up to that point. With the ensuing Vietnam War, Devillers experienced a renewal of his reputation as an expert on Vietnamese politics, and his subsequent writings provided ammunition for antiwar writers in the United States. Oddly enough, his first book was never translated into English. Many years later his research in the French archives confirmed the correctness of the documents he had seen and taken notes from, which up to the time of their declassification were merely “pieces of a jigsaw puzzle that I kept in my head,” as he said. ARTHUR J. DOMMEN
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in Chicago, Illinois, on October 8, 1916, Albert Peter Dewey was the son of Charles Dewey, who was secretary of the treasury in the Calvin Coolidge administration and a Republican congressman from Illinois. The younger Dewey was educated at St. Paul’s School in Concord, New Hampshire; in Switzerland; and at Yale University, from which he graduated in 1939. Dewey then became a foreign correspondent for the Chicago Daily News. In Paris when World War II began, Dewey enlisted in September 1939 as a lieutenant in the Polish Army. After the German victory in the East, he returned to France and covered the war in the West through the 1940 fall of Paris to the Germans and then wrote a book about his experiences. Dewey was able to escape France through Spain and Portugal and return to the United States. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, he enlisted in the U.S. Army and was ordered to Africa as an intelligence officer with the Air Transport Command. He was a captain in a paratroop unit when he was recruited by the OSS. As an OSS major, he was parachuted into southern France five days before the Allied invasion at Normandy in June 1944 to gather intelligence and assist the French underground. Decorated for this, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel.
See also Fall, Bernard B.; French Indochina, 1860s–1946 Reference Devillers, Philippe. Histoire du Vietnam de 1940 à 1952. Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1952.
Dewey, Albert Peter Birth Date: October 8, 1916 Death Date: September 26, 1945 Journalist, U.S. Army lieutenant colonel, Office of Strategic Services (OSS) officer, and the first American killed in Vietnam. Born
U.S. Army lieutenant colonel A. Peter Dewey, ordered by British major general Douglas D. Gracey to leave Vietnam, was mistaken for a French officer and shot and killed by the Viet Minh at a roadblock outside of Saigon on September 26, 1945. Dewey is sometimes held to be the first American fatality of the Vietnam conflict. (Bettmann/Corbis)
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In August 1945 Dewey was in Asia, sent to Saigon by his superiors as head of a seven-man contingent to search for missing Americans and to gather information on conditions there. That portion of Vietnam was then under British control, the Potsdam Conference having assigned Britain responsibility for disarming Japanese troops below the 16th Parallel. The British commander, Major General Douglas D. Gracey, was trying to cope with problems that he found there. In August 1945 the Viet Minh declared themselves the legitimate government for all of Vietnam. That claim was disputed by the French, the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao religious sects, other indigenous political parties, and the Binh Xuyen gangsters. The tattered remnants of the French military remained stripped of their weapons and confined to their barracks. Various representatives of the Paris government beset General Gracey to urge him to help them regain control of their colony. Unsympathetic to Viet Minh claims, on September 21, 1945, Gracey declared martial law and rearmed 1,400 French soldiers (mostly Legionnaires) as well as some of the Japanese who had not yet been sent home in order to augment his own British, Indian, and Gurkha troops. The next day these troops forced the Viet Minh from their government offices. Dewey’s sympathies lay with the Viet Minh, and Gracey took this as an affront to his own authority. He had already come to despise this outspoken and abrasive U.S. officer who dared to ride around Saigon flying the American flag from his jeep. Now Gracey forbade Dewey to do so, stating that only the area commander was entitled to a flag on his vehicle. When Dewey ignored him, Gracey ordered him to leave Indochina. Dewey’s flight was to leave Tan Son Nhut Airport on September 26, 1945. Early that day Dewey drove to the airport, only to learn that his plane had not yet arrived. He then returned to the city. Still in the morning hours, Dewey returned to the airport to check on his flight, this time accompanied by another OSS officer, Captain Herbert J. Bluechel. The two discussed the situation of a teammate who had just been wounded by soldiers of the Viet Minh. Now no flag identified the vehicle as American. Dewey took a shortcut past the Saigon golf course on his way to the airfield and encountered a roadblock staffed by three Viet Minh soldiers. In no mood to stop and parley, Dewey shouted at the three men in French, their only common language, as he attempted to drive around the pile of logs. It was a serious mistake, for the men at the barrier mistakenly assumed Dewey to be French and opened fire on him and his jeep. Dewey died instantly. Bluechel was not wounded and managed to escape on foot. In this way a tragic case of mistaken identity made Peter Dewey the first American fatality in Vietnam. CECIL B. CURREY AND SCOTT ROHRER See also Binh Xuyen; Cao Dai; Gracey, Douglas David; Hoa Hao; Office of Strategic Services
References Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. Marr, David G. Vietnam 1945: The Quest for Power. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995. Patti, Archimedes L. A. Why Viet Nam? Prelude to America’s Albatross. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.
DEWEY CANYON I,
Operation
Start Date: January 22, 1969 End Date: March 18, 1969 Military operation in early 1969 in the southwest corner of Quang Tri Province conducted by Major General Raymond Davis’s 3rd Marine Division. Operation DEWEY CANYON I took place in the I Corps Tactical Zone along the Laotian border approximately 35 miles west of Hue and 50 miles south of the principal marine support facility at Vandergrift Combat Base. The operation was conducted in response to a Communist buildup in Base Area 611 in the Da Krong Valley, an important location because it fed Route 548 through the A Shau Valley, off Route 922 into the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) from Laos. From the A Shau Valley, troops and supplies went east into Hue and southeast to Da Nang. DEWEY CANYON’s mission was to deny the Communist forces access to the critical populated areas of the coastal lowlands. The Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), believed that it was critical to cut infiltration of People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) forces and supplies from the Laotian sanctuaries, eliminate Communist antiaircraft capabilities, and destroy basic infrastructure capable of supporting another major offensive such as occurred with the 1968 Tet Offensive. On January 22, 1969, General Davis sent three battalions of the 9th Marine Regiment into the Da Krong Valley. The 9th Marines, commanded by Colonel Robert Barrow, were completely dependent upon helicopters for their logistical support. This proved a challenge, as the northwest monsoon season was then in its final month. Although rainfall was minimal, there was continual cloud cover for periods of longer than a week. General Davis and Colonel Barrow made skillful use of firesupport bases (FSBs). Initially the 9th Marines developed FSBs Shiloh, Razor, and Riley. As the regiment advanced, other FSBs were opened in a leapfrog manner. Phase I of DEWEY CANYON involved getting the forces established in the operation area. Under the FSB concept, engineer and reconnaissance elements went in first. Phase II commenced on January 24 and 25 as Colonel Barrow ordered his 2nd and 3rd battalions to extend their perimeters north of the east-west axis of the Da Krong River. Phase II was designed to clear out the area around the FSBs and gradually move into position for Phase III.
DEWEY CANYON I, Operation
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Smoke hangs over 105-mm howitzers as U.S. marines pour artillery shells into the A Shau Valley during Operation DEWEY CANYON I in Quang Tri Province in northern South Vietnam in 1969. The operation began on January 22, 1969; its objective was to deny Communist forces access to the populated coastal lowlands. (UPI-Bettmann/Corbis)
During the first week of February bad weather set in, and visibility and ceiling were near zero. With rations and water a potential problem, Colonel Barrow ordered the commanders of the 2nd and 3rd battalions to pull their companies into areas from which they could be supported. Continued bad weather during February 4–10 cost the regiment some of its momentum and also permitted the Communist forces to strengthen defenses to the south and better prepare to meet the marine attack. In Phase III each battalion had a zone of action (ZOA) about three miles wide. The total regimental ZOA was thus about nine miles east to west. From Phase Line Red, the regimental jumping-off point, each battalion would have to cover about five miles to the regimental objective. During February 11–12 as the battalions moved across Phase Line Red, they encountered very heavy enemy contact, with PAVN units fighting from their defensive positions until destroyed. During February 16–23 as the marine battalions pushed south toward their objectives, new FSBs were established; however, these remained under fire from reinforced PAVN units. The Americans uncovered large quantities of arms and ordnance, with most supplies stored in the bottoms of bomb craters. Company C, 1st Battalion, 9th Marine Regiment, overran a bunker complex and captured two 122-millimeter (mm) field guns. While the marines experi-
enced success, heavy PAVN mortar fire hampered resupply of rifle companies and casualty evacuation and replacement. By March 1 the weather closed in again. FSBs and company positions were not always open for helicopters, and only the skill and courage of the pilots made possible resupply, replacement of manpower, and casualty evacuation. Only marine pilots had full instrumentation to fly in such weather. Despite difficulties, the pilots were generally able to accomplish their missions within three hours after receiving orders. On March 18 with the extraction of the 1st Battalion, 9th Marine Regiment, Operation DEWEY CANYON was terminated. On March 19 MACV reported PAVN dead at 1,617 and 1,461 weapons recovered, along with hundreds of tons of ammunition, equipment, and supplies. DEWEY CANYON claimed 121 marines killed and 803 wounded over its 56 days. While PAVN forces involved in the fight (including the main-force 6th Regiment, the 3rd Sapper Battalion, the 675B Artillery Regiment, and logistics and support forces) claimed to have defeated the American operation, the Vietnamese admit that their forces suffered heavily in this operation. The 675B Artillery Regiment alone recorded the loss of eight long-range 122-mm guns and four 85-mm guns as well as 29 officers and men killed (including the regiment’s deputy chief of staff) and 39 wounded.
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Arguably, Operation DEWEY CANYON was the most successful highmobility regimental-size action of the war. WILL E. FAHEY JR. See also Davis, Raymond Gilbert; Fire-Support Bases; United States Marine Corps References Davis, Gordon M. “Dewey Canyon: All Weather Classic.” Marine Corps Gazette, July 1969, 32–40. Kieu Tam Nguyen. Chien Truong Tri-Thien-Hue Trong Cuoc Khang Chien Chong My Cuu Nuoc Toan Thang [The Tri-Thien-Hue Battlefield during the Victorious National Salvation Resistance War against the U.S.]. Hue: Thuan Hoa Publishing House, 1985. Simmons, Edward H. The United States Marines, 1775–1975. New York: Viking, 1976. Vu Lam, ed. Phao Binh Nhan Dan Viet Nam: Nhung Chang Duong Chien Dau, Tap II [Vietnam’s People’s Artillery: Combat Operations, Vol. 2]. Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1986.
DEWEY CANYON II,
Operation
Start Date: January 30, 1971 End Date: February 7, 1971 Operation DEWEY CANYON II supported Operation LAM SON 719, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) invasion of Laos in early 1971. The first major ARVN deployment unaccompanied by American advisers, LAM SON 719 was a 20,000-man operation to interdict the Ho Chi Minh Trail, advance to Tchepone, and destroy People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) supply dumps. DEWEY CANYON II technically lasted only from January 30 to February 7, 1971, but American involvement continued until the last ARVN troops departed Laos in late March. DEWEY CANYON II was a special operation because in 1970 Congress had prohibited American ground troops from entering Cambodia or Laos. U.S. Army lieutenant general James Sutherland, commander of U.S. XXIV Corps, coordinated airmobile and aviation operations, while commanding general of the 101st Airborne Division U.S. Army major general Thomas Tarpley led the ground forces. U.S. forces included two brigades of the 101st Airborne Division and its 2nd Squadron, 17th Cavalry (2-17 Cavalry); the mechanized 1st Brigade of the 5th Infantry Division; the 196th Light Infantry Brigade; two battalions of the 11th Infantry Brigade; two battalions of the 45th Engineer Group;, six battalions of the 101st Aviation Group; and four battalions of the 108th Artillery Group. The United States also supplied tactical air and Boeing B-52 Stratofortress bombing support. Operation DEWEY CANYON II began on January 30 when an armored cavalry detachment from the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division, moved down Route 9 to the Khe Sanh area, followed by an infantry insertion. Armored personnel carriers then reconnoitered
Route 9 to the Laotian border, securing the road by February 5. Meanwhile, the 101st Airborne Division launched a feint into the A Shau Valley to distract PAVN forces. Following B-52 strikes, the cross-border attack began on February 8 with U.S. helicopter gunships of the 2-17 Cavalry attacking PAVN weapons sites and troop columns and securing landing zones north and south of Route 9. ARVN armor proceeded into Laos, and U.S. helicopters inserted two ARVN divisions into the landing zones. Intense antiaircraft fire hampered American helicopter missions, and the flanks of the ARVN advance came under heavy attack. In the next three weeks, despite hundreds of U.S. tactical air and B-52 strikes, the PAVN mauled three ARVN battalions, completely overrunning one firebase. Nevertheless, the offensive continued. On March 3 an ARVN battalion air assaulted to the outskirts of Tchepone, but PAVN fire brought down 11 helicopters and damaged several more. Three days later following additional air strikes and a PAVN withdrawal, an ARVN regiment air assaulted into the ruined Laotian ghost town. Reports show that by this point ARVN forces and U.S. air assets had destroyed or captured 4,000 individual and 1,500 crew-served weapons, 20,000 tons of ammunition, 106 tanks, 76 artillery pieces, 405 trucks, and 12,000 tons of rice. The combined operations reported a total of 13,914 PAVN troops killed and 69 captured. After reaching Tchepone, officials of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) and U.S. officials proclaimed LAM SON 719 a tactical and strategic success, but the continued presence in southern Laos of 5 PAVN divisions, 1 tank regiment, and 20 antiaircraft battalions ruled out any further advance by ARVN units, severely weakened by 3,000 casualties. His forces having reached the primary objective, President Nguyen Van Thieu claimed a victory and ordered a withdrawal that soon became a chaotic retreat and, finally, a chaotic thrashing. A PAVN ambush of an armored convoy on March 19 caused panic. U.S. gunships had to destroy abandoned tanks and artillery, and in the following days, thousands more tactical air and B-52 sorties covered the retreat. When the ARVN 1st Airborne, responsible for flank security along Route 9, lost several firebases, only daring U.S. helicopter sorties enabled the disintegrating ARVN regiments to escape destruction. When the ARVN’s last unit pulled out of Laos on March 24, ARVN forces had suffered 1,500 killed, 5,400 wounded, and 425 missing. U.S. casualties totaled 219 killed, 1,200 wounded, and 37 missing. U.S. forces also lost 107 helicopters, with 615 more damaged. The PAVN was hurt, but within days its base at Tchepone was back in service. The LAM SON 719 debacle proved that PAVN troops still could defeat the best ARVN units, but President Richard M. Nixon nevertheless proclaimed to the American public on April 7, 1971, that “Tonight I can report that Vietnamization has succeeded.” JOHN D. ROOT See also Air Mobility; Airpower, Role in War; LAM SON 719, Operation; Nguyen Van Thieu; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Vietnamization
Dien Bien Phu, Battle of References Nolan, Keith William. Into Laos: The Story of Dewey Canyon II/Lam Son 719, Vietnam 1971. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1986. Tolson, John J. Airmobility, 1961–1971. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1973.
Diem, Overthrow of See Ngo Dinh Diem, Overthrow of
Dien Bien Phu, Battle of Start Date: March 13, 1954 End Date: May 7, 1954 Set-piece battle that ended the Indochina War. The siege of Dien Bien Phu was the most famous battle of the Indochina War and one of the great battles of the 20th century. In 1953 French military commander in Indochina General Henri Navarre decided to establish an airhead in northwestern Tonkin astride the main Viet Minh invasion route into Laos. Although not enthusiastic about the idea, Navarre believed that a strong base there would prevent an outright enemy invasion of Laos. The position would be located at the village of Dien Bien Phu, then held by a small Viet Minh garrison. Dien Bien Phu had a small airstrip and was some 185 miles by air from Hanoi. In November 1953 Navarre in Saigon gave orders for the operation, dubbed CASTOR, to proceed. On November 20, 2,200 French paras (paratroopers), the cream of the French Expeditionary Corps, dropped into the valley north and south of Dien Bien Phu. They easily defeated the few Viet Minh there and began establishing defensive positions. With a hubris not unknown to other French military commanders in Indochina, Navarre completely underestimated his enemy. He expected to use superior French artillery and airpower to destroy any Viet Minh forces attacking Dien Bien Phu and assumed that at most Viet Minh commander General Vo Nguyen Giap would commit one division to such an effort. Should this belief prove incorrect, Navarre was confident that the garrison could be evacuated. Even in retrospect, it is hard to believe that he could have so seriously underestimated his enemy, given prior experience and especially the 1951–1952 Battle of Hoa Binh. Hardly anyone had heard of Dien Bien Phu when the French occupied it. Dien Bien Phu was an obscure village situated in a valley surrounded by hills on all sides. To leave the enemy the opportunity to be in control of the high ground surrounding the base was dangerous, but as Navarre put it later, when the French arrived, the Viet Minh did not have artillery there.
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Colonel Christian Marie Ferdinand de la Croix de Castries (promoted to brigadier general during the subsequent battle) commanded French forces at Dien Bien Phu. An aristocrat with a reputation of a playboy (the French strong points were reportedly named for his current mistresses), de Castries had wide experience in Indochina and was regarded as a capable commander. During the subsequent battle, however, he at times showed signs of detachment, seeming to withdraw mentally. By the end of the first week, the French had 4,500 men in the valley. They were entirely dependent on air supply by a small number of transport aircraft (three groups totaling 75 Douglas C-47s Dakotas). The French also had available 48 Martin B-26 Marauder and Privateer bombers and 112 Bearcat and Hellcat fighter-bombers. There were also a few helicopters. After the battle Navarre wrote in his memoirs that “The insufficiency of aviation was, for our side, the principal cause of the loss of the battle.” The Viet Minh on the other hand relied, as they had in previous battles, on the very primitive system of transport by human porters. Giap’s troops later improved Route 41 leading to Dien Bien Phu to enable the roadway to handle trucks and artillery pieces. At the end of April thanks to Chinese support, Giap had 14 transport companies with 800 trucks in a total of 1,200 to 1,300 vehicles. Nonetheless, the laborers (the “people’s porters,” Giap called them) remained the core of the Viet Minh supply system and were critical to the battle’s outcome. The French central command post was in Dien Bien Phu itself. Around it de Castries ordered the construction of a series of strong points: Beatrice, Gabrielle, Anne-Marie, Dominique, Huguette, Françoise, Elaine, and Isabelle. Unfortunately for the French, Isabelle was separated from the others; some three miles to the south, it was easily cut off and diverted a third of the French forces. De Castries had originally planned a wider defensive ring, perhaps 30 miles in length, but the problems of bringing everything in by air shrank the perimeter. Fortifications were also woefully inadequate. The French assumed that they could use airpower and counterbattery artillery fire to knock out any Viet Minh artillery before it became a problem. Indeed, the French were contemptuous of Viet Minh artillery capabilities. The French made no effort to camouflage their own positions and placed their own guns in open pits without protective cover. The Viet Minh easily observed French work from the hills, but French light observation aircraft failed to detect the Viet Minh buildup. The Chinese directly supported the Viet Minh by handling some of the artillery batteries and helping to draw up fire plans. Chinese general Vy Quoc Thanh was also at Dien Bien Phu as military adviser and to help plan the campaign. The French flew in reinforcements, but these were negated because Giap had not only called off his northern offensive but also decided to commit all available divisions to attack Dien Bien Phu. Thus, the defenders would encounter a much larger force than the
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On November 20, 1953, 2,200 French “paras” dropped into the valley near Dien Bien Phu in northwestern Vietnam. They easily defeated the few Viet Minh there and established defensive positions. Both sides then built up their forces and, in the spring of 1954, the most important battle of the Indochina War occurred here. The Viet Minh defeat of the French paved the way for the French departure from Indochina. (AFP/Getty Images)
single division that Navarre had anticipated. Giap also worked to cripple the French airlift capacity. In daring raids in early March, Viet Minh commandos attacked French air bases at Gia Lam near Hanoi and at Do Son and Cat Bi airfields near Haiphong, destroying 22 aircraft. Meanwhile at Dien Bien Phu, the French had undertaken patrols. Ominously these were routinely mauled by the Viet Minh, and de Castries’s own chief of staff was killed just a few hundred yards from one of the strong points. The French then abandoned such patrolling as being counterproductive and providing little information about the enemy. Giap now closed the ring on the French fortress. The 304th, 308th, 312th, and 316th divisions were brought to the area. The French called in airpower. Grumman F-8F Bearcats and Martin B-26 Marauder bombers attacked Viet Minh hill positions with bombs, napalm, and rocket fire, but the positions were well disguised by natural camouflage and were difficult to identify. The French also flew in 10 M-24 Chaffee light tanks by air and assembled them in the fortress under fire, although these had little impact on the battle.
By mid-February de Castries had sustained casualties of almost 1,000 men. The Viet Minh meanwhile continued to build their strength. Bernard Fall estimates that the Viet Minh ultimately assembled at Dien Bien Phu some 49,500 combat troops and 31,500 support personnel, mostly unskilled porters. An additional 23,000 troops maintained supply lines back to the Chinese border. In midMarch the French had 10,814 men in the valley, of whom about 7,000 were frontline combat troops. Fully a third of the garrison was Vietnamese, although most of these were tribal Thai. The Viet Minh thus enjoyed a superiority of approximately 5 to 1 in manpower, and they also had greater firepower. The siege of Dien Bien Phu officially opened on March 13 with a heavy Viet Minh bombardment. Although the French added 4,000 men during the siege, Giap more than offset this with manpower increases of his own. He also steadily improved both the quantity and quality of his artillery. Ultimately the Viet Minh deployed 20 to 24 105-millimeter (mm) howitzers, 15 to 20 75-mm howitzers, 20 120-mm mortars, and at least 40 82-mm mortars. They also had some 80 Chinese-crewed 37-mm antiaircraft guns, 100 antiaircraft machine guns, and 12 to 16 six-tube Katyusha
Dien Bien Phu, Battle of rocket launchers. During the battle, the Viet Minh fired 103,000 rounds of 75-mm or larger-size artillery shells, most of it by direct fire, simply aiming down their gun tubes at the French positions. Approximately 75 percent of French casualties came from artillery fire. By contrast, French artillery assets were entirely inadequate. The French had only 4 155-mm howitzers, 24 105-mm howitzers, and 4 120-mm mortars. In contrast to the Viet Minh, the French fired only 93,000 shells during the battle and, unlike the Viet Minh, had difficulty identifying their targets. On the very first night of the siege, March 13–14, the Viet Minh took Beatrice. Gabrielle fell two days later. Giap’s basic tactic was massive artillery fire followed by waves of infantry. The Viet Minh also brought the airstrip under fire to try to destroy F-8F Bearcat fighters there. One was destroyed on March 13, and two escaped to Vientiane. The next day three more got away to Cat Bi airfield; the remaining six were destroyed on the ground. The control tower was also badly damaged, and the radio beacon guiding planes there in bad weather was knocked out. Pessimism now began to spread in the French command. In Hanoi, French commander in the north General René Cogny, who was never enthusiastic about the operation, now began to consider the possibility of losing the fortress. His resources were stretched thin, as Giap had sent the 320th Division, 3 autonomous regiments, and 14 regional battalions to disrupt the vital transportation link be-
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tween Hanoi and Haiphong and divert French resources by attacking French outposts in the Tonkin Delta. The Viet Minh offensive there began on March 12, the day before the battle began at Dien Bien Phu. Thus, Cogny had to fight two battles at once. Navarre, who held to the primacy of central Indochina, refused all reinforcements to Cogny. It is not surprising that de Castries’s pleas for reinforcements fell on deaf ears. Even ammunition was in short supply, as Viet Minh sappers blew up French stocks. On March 22 the French used their last four tanks to counterattack People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) troops that had cut off Isabelle. This met up with units from Isabelle striking north. It was the first French success of the battle, but it cost 151 French dead, 72 wounded, and 1 missing. Viet Minh casualties were heavier, but Giap had a seemingly inexhaustible supply of manpower. The arrival of the rainy season made conditions more miserable for attacker and defender alike and further complicated French resupply problems. C-47 transports still flew in supplies and evacuated wounded but at great risk. On March 26 one transport was shot down; two more were shot down on March 27. Late that same day one managed to land and pick up 19 wounded. This was the last flight in or out of Dien Bien Phu. On March 26 Major Marcel Bigeard, who had parachuted into the fortress only 10 days before, commanded a successful attack against Viet Minh positions. Supported by artillery, fighter
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aircraft, and a tank platoon from Isabelle, the French paras sallied from the fortress to assault the Viet Minh. Bigeard later gave Viet Minh losses at 350 dead and more than 500 wounded as well as 10 taken prisoner. The raiders also captured 5 20-mm AA cannon, 12 .50-caliber machine guns, 2 bazookas, and 14 submachine guns and reclaimed 10 prisoners. Having already suffered about 6,600 killed and 12,000 wounded, Giap’s force suffered from low morale, what Giap later called “right-wing tendencies.” Discussions led by political cadres about courage, right thinking, and dedication helped to restore morale, as did a more important change in tactics. Giap abandoned the costly human-wave attacks in favor of attrition warfare, resembling World War I. He pushed forward trenches until the particular target strong point was cut off from outside support. The last stage of the battle was fought without letup in an area of about a square mile around the airstrip. The Viet Minh attacked on April 29, and by May 4 French senior officers knew there was no longer any hope. The last French reinforcements, 165 men of the 1st Colonial Parachute Battalion, jumped into the garrison during May 5–6. They had come at their own insistence to share the fate of their comrades. This brought the cumulative total of the garrison to 16,544 men. By now most of the airdrops of supplies were falling into Viet Minh hands. The final Viet Minh assault occurred on May 6, accompanied by the explosion of mines and the firing of Katyusha rockets. The last French troops surrendered on the evening of May 7. During the siege, more than half of the French troops had been rendered hors de combat: 1,600 dead, 4,800 wounded, and 1,600 missing. The Viet Minh immediately sent their 8,000 prisoners off on foot on a 500-mile march to prison camps; less than half of them would return. Of the Vietnamese defenders taken, only 10 percent would be seen again. The Viet Minh had also shot down 48 French planes and destroyed 16 others on the ground. Viet Minh casualties are estimated at approximately 7,900 killed and 15,000 wounded. The French had two plans to rescue the garrison. Operation CONDOR called for an infantry thrust from Laos to link up with airborne forces sent from Hanoi. Operation ALBATROSS was a plan for the garrison to break out on its own. Navarre did not order Cogny to begin planning for this until May 3. Not until May 7 did de Castries decide to attempt to execute the plan, but it was then too late. Another plan, code-named VULTURE, was also considered. This envisioned massive U.S. intervention in the form of air strikes, but President Dwight D. Eisenhower could not secure British support, and the plan was dropped. The Battle of Dien Bien Phu was the death knell of the French in Asia. In Paris, Premier Joseph Laniel, dressed entirely in black, gave the news to the National Assembly. The Geneva Conference was already in progress to discuss a host of Asian issues, and the French defeat provided the politicians with an excuse to shift blame for the Indochina debacle to the military. Although France had not provided the troops or resources that the French military required to win the war, it could now blame the military for the
defeat and extricate the nation from the Indochina morass. A new government under Pierre Mendès-France came to power to carry out that mandate. Almost immediately after the Indochina War, the French Army found itself transferred to Algeria to fight again. This time, the army promised, there would be no sellout. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also CASTOR, Operation; Cogny, René; De Castries, Christian Marie; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Geneva Conference and Geneva Accords of 1954; Laniel, Joseph; Mendès-France, Pierre; Navarre, Henri Eugène; Navarre Plan; VULTURE, Operation References Bigeard, General Marcel. Pour une parcelle de gloire. Paris: Plon, 1975. Fall, Bernard B. Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu. New York: Lippincott, 1966. Morgan, Ted. Valley of Death: The Tragedy at Dien Bien Phu That Led America into the Vietnam War. New York: Random House, 2010. Porch, Douglas. The French Foreign Legion: A Complete History of the Legendary Fighting Force. New York: HarperCollins, 1991. Roy, Jules. The Battle of Dienbienphu. New York: Harper and Row, 1965. Simpson, Howard R. Dien Bien Phu: The Epic Battle America Forgot. Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1994. Windrow, Martin. The Last Valley: Dien Bien Phu and the French Defeat in Vietnam. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2004.
Dien Triet Lake, Battle of Event Date: 546 CE Following the introduction of higher taxes by the Chinese governor of Giao Chi (northern Tonkin), in 541 CE Ly Bon (Ly Bi), a government official of Chinese extraction in Duc Province at the mouth of the Ca River, led a sizable rebellion against Chinese rule. His forces were at first successful, defeating the Chinese and advancing north into Ai Province, where they were also victorious. The next year Bon defeated another invading Chinese army. At the beginning of 544 he proclaimed himself Ly Nam De, emperor of Nam Viet. He called his new state Van Xuan (“Ten Thousand Springs”). Bon’s base of operations was probably Gia Ninh at the head of the Red River plain where the river is joined by its two principal tributaries, but his territory reportedly included virtually the entire Red River Delta area from Lang Son to the border with Lin Yi (the Champa kingdom). Bon’s chief preoccupations during his short rule were to keep peace at home and prevent foreign invasion, including attacks by the mountain tribes that were known as the Lao. Bon’s fortunes changed in 545 when he came up against yet another invading Chinese army, this time led by Chen Baxian (Ch’en Pa-hsien) and that most likely came by sea. Defeated in the lower Red River Delta, Bon retreated to near present-day Hanoi, where he was again defeated. He then withdrew to his citadel at Gia Ninh, which Chen Baxian put under siege and took early in 546. Bon escaped into the nearby mountains, where he rallied what remained of his army. Winning the support of some of the Lao,
Dikes, Red River Delta by autumn he had assembled some 20,000 men on the shores of Dien Triet Lake. He had his men build a number of boats, which he planned to use to attack the Chinese army camped at the mouth of the lake. In the midst of this activity General Chen Baxian called together his dispirited generals and urged an attack. He reportedly told them that they were but one army deep in enemy territory and that if they lost the next battle they would probably not get out alive. He pointed out that the Vietnamese had earlier fled, that the loyalty of Bon’s supporters was shaky, and that his Lao allies were unreliable. The Chinese should therefore act immediately and decisively. If Bon’s earlier battles, described by the Chinese as defeats, had been part of a strategic plan to draw the Chinese deep into his territory so that they might be cut off and destroyed, they were countered by Chen Baxian’s stubbornness. Taking advantage of a sudden rise in the lake level, Chen Baxian launched his ships into the lake, crossed it, and utterly defeated Bon’s army, which was unprepared for the attack. Bon escaped into the mountains, but he was slain the next year by the Lao; his head was sent to the Chinese to collect the bounty placed on it. Resistance continued against the Chinese for a time under Bon’s elder brother Ly Thien Bao, who reportedly raised a force of as many as 20,000 men and again secured control of Bac. He then marched on Ai, but Chen Baxian returned and defeated him and drove him back into the mountains. Despite strong Tang rule, Vietnamese revolts against the Chinese continued to occur sporadically thereafter. As for Chen Baxian, he later took power in China, becoming Emperor Wu, founder of the Chen dynasty that ruled over parts of China roughly south of the Huai River from 557 to 589. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Ly Bon; Vietnam, History of, Prehistory to 938 CE References Chapuis, Oscar M. A History of Vietnam: From Hong Bang to Tu Duc. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1995. Taylor, Keith Weller. The Birth of Vietnam. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983. Tucker, Spencer C. Vietnam. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1999.
Dikes, Red River Delta System of walls or embankments built of earth and/or rock, usually along rivers or shorelines, to prevent flooding. Dikes can also be used as causeways separating two bodies of water. The Vietnamese constructed dikes throughout the country. They were especially prominent along rivers in northern Vietnam to protect the important Red River Delta and tributaries against flooding. Reportedly the first dike to be built in the Red River Delta was that of Co Xa under King Ly Nhan Tong (1072–1127 CE). Chinese sources hold that construction of the dikes dates back to very early
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times when the country was still known as Giao Chi. Later under the Tang dynasty Governor Cao Bien raised dikes around his capital of Dai La to protect it from river flooding. These dikes had a total length of 9,850 yards. Materials used for the construction of the dikes had never been well chosen or well packed down, and the courses were never well marked out. Therefore, over the centuries the Vietnamese undertook large-scale projects to reinforce the dikes. During the period of their rule in Indochina, the French not only consolidated the existing dikes but also raised their height to approximately 29.5 feet around the Hanoi area to hold floods. The total volume of the system reached 20.3 billion gallons in 1930, compared with 5.3 billion gallons in the late 19th century. Under French rule, the dikes were also widened. By the time of the Vietnam War, there were some 2,500 miles of earthen dikes, dams, levees, and sluices in the Red River Delta region. During the Vietnam War there was some discussion by U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) planners of a campaign to destroy the dikes and create widespread flooding. Similar action had been deliberately undertaken by the U.S. Air Force in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) during the Korean War (1950–1953). With nearly 15 million North Vietnamese living in the Red River Delta region at the time, such a campaign would have caused widespread crop and property destruction and great misery to the civilian population of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), not to mention loss of life. A confidential U.S. Air Force memorandum of 1965 concluded, however, that a conventional bombing campaign was unlikely to destroy the dike system entirely. In 1966 John T. McNaughton, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, proposed bombing the dikes to put pressure on Hanoi to reach a peace settlement, but Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara refused. In 1972 during Operation LINEBACKER II, U.S. president Richard Nixon reportedly again raised the issue, this time with Secretary of State/National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, including the use of nuclear weapons. No action was taken, however. Although there was no systematic U.S. effort to destroy the dike system of North Vietnam, this did not prevent the government of the North Vietnamese government from charging that such an effort took place. In June 1972 Xuan Thuy, the chief North Vietnamese negotiator to the Paris peace talks, claimed that the United States was “purposely creating disaster for millions of people during the flood season.” Some Europeans in North Vietnam, including two Swedish journalists, confirmed damage to the dikes and stated that they thought it had been methodically inflicted. Hardly an impartial witness, actress and anti–Vietnam War activist Jane Fonda returned from a two-week visit to North Vietnam with a 20-minute film that purported to show damage to the dikes. Undoubtedly there was damage to the dike system because of the U.S. bombing of the Hanoi area due to errant weaponry dropped against elements of the North Vietnamese antiaircraft system and also in large part the consequence of the North Vietnamese
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interceptor aircraft tactics that would cause U.S. fighter-bombers to release their bomb loads early. Despite this damage, U.S. investigations revealed that there were never any major breaks in the dike system protecting Hanoi. PHAM CAO DUONG AND SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Geography of Indochina and Vietnam; Kissinger, Henry Alfred; McNamara, Robert Strange; McNaughton, John Theodore; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Red River Delta; Xuan Thuy References Bac K Ha De Su Tich [History of Red River Dikes in North Vietnam]. Translation into Modern Vietnamese by Ha Ngoc Xuyen. Saigon: Bo Quoc Gia Giao, 1963. “The Battle of the Dikes.” Time Magazine, August 7, 1972. Dao Duy Anh. Viet Nam Van Hoa Su Cuong [An Outline History of Vietnamese Culture]. Saigon: Bon Phuong, 1961. Hersh, Seymour M. “Dikes in Hanoi Represent 2,000-Year Effort to Tame Rivers.” New York Times, July 14, 1972. Pham Cao Duong. Vietnamese Peasants under French Domination, 1861–1945. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1985.
Dinassauts French abbreviation for divisions navales d’assaut, integrated French tactical units composed of naval and army forces for riverine warfare during the Indochina War. Although riverboats had long been used to transport troops up and down rivers, the French were the first to develop specialized formations for that task. These units patrolled and, in the south, controlled the key rivers upon which Indochina’s inland commerce and communications so depended. Each Dinassaut had a permanently assigned light infantry battalion operating from a mix of landing craft, river patrol boats, and river transports. The units not only patrolled the rivers but could also project power inland. Dinassauts were formidable fighting units that achieved a remarkable combat record. Dinassauts evolved from operations conducted by the French Far East Naval Brigade (BMEO, for Brigade Marine l’Extrême Orient) during the war’s first 18 months. Drawing its personnel from a cadre of recently released French prisoners of war (POWs) and elements from two naval regiments sent from France, the BMEO was the first French unit to operate on the rivers. Originally forced to use requisitioned civilian craft and borrowed British landing craft, the Dinassauts eventually acquired four 200-ton river barges, which were then motorized, armored, and armed. With these they formed the first Naval Infantry River Flotilla. Two companies of naval infantrymen constituted the ground element. Naval Brigade commanding officer Commander François Jaubert used these barges to form combined-arms units capable of operating anywhere in the country, even in small creeks and estuaries. Jaubert’s first opportunity to prove his concept of combinedarms riverine units came in October 1945 during Operation MOUS-
SAC.
This operation, in which Jaubert borrowed British landing craft to transport 270 French naval infantrymen, was intended to relieve the siege of the provincial capital of My Tho by Viet Minh sappers. A French airborne relief force had become bogged down in rice paddies outside the city. The riverine force successfully relieved My Tho, landing ground troops to outflank Viet Minh ambushes. A similar joint army-riverine operation later retook Vinh Long. These initial successes along with the lessons learned from them provided the doctrinal foundations for the Dinassauts. Despite these successes, the formation of standing riverine forces awaited the arrival of permanently assigned river craft. Availability of British craft was subject to Britain’s requirements for its own forces. Permanent riverine units were therefore not established until the arrival of French landing craft (acquired from British stocks) in December 1945. One month later, with the addition of landing parties from the battleship Richelieu and the aircraft transport Bearn, the BMEO reached a strength of nearly 3,000 men, all naval personnel. The brigade’s ground component numbered some 700 men: approximately 400 naval commandos and nearly 300 naval infantrymen. Now under the command of French Navy captain Robert Kilian, the brigade finally had sufficient troops to assign specific Fusilier Marin (naval infantry) units to naval river flotillas. On January 1, 1947, the French units were organized into two flotillas, one in the north and one in the south. Each flotilla included river commandos, the combined-arms teams operating on the rivers. Five sections of commandos were assigned to the north and two to the more tranquil south. Designated Dinassauts in 1948, they became the primary French force on the rivers of Indochina. By 1950 there were six permanent Dinassauts in Indochina, as the landing parties from the surface ships returned to France on the departure of the Richelieu. By then, “Dinassaut” had become a term used to describe any combined-arms riverine units. Temporary units, involving river-transport units and locally available army troops, were also formed into Dinassauts when necessary, but the navy used the term only when referring to the permanent units. Dinassauts were employed whenever Viet Minh ground units were suspected of operating in a river area. Dinassauts fought their way through to isolated French garrisons, relieved towns, paved the way for supply convoys, and rushed reinforcements to threatened outposts and provincial capitals. Operating as self-contained units, they proved eminently flexible in combat. The Dinassauts were remarkably successful, especially considering that the total force structure never exceeded 6,000 personnel. CARL OTIS SCHUSTER
See also French Indochina, 1860s–1946 References Kilian, Robert. Fusiliers-Marins d’Indochine. Paris: Editions BergerLevrault, 1948.
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Koburger, Charles W., Jr. The French Navy in Indochina. New York: Praeger, 1991. McClintock, Robert. “The River War in Indochina.” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 1954, 1303–1311.
Dith Pran Birth Date: September 27, 1942 Death Date: March 30, 2008 Cambodian-born translator and journalist who worked for the New York Times in Cambodia (Khmer Republic). Born in Siem Reap, Cambodia, on September 27, 1942, the son of farmers in the northwestern part of Cambodia, Dith Pran attended the Lycée Siem Reap, where he learned to speak English. He then worked as an interpreter for the U.S. Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) in Cambodia from 1960 until 1965, when Cambodia broke diplomatic relations with the United States. Soon afterward he found work with a British camera crew filming Lord Jim in Cambodia. He then became a receptionist at the Hotel Auberge Royale des Temples, which catered to tourists visiting nearby Angkor Wat. In 1970 with the outbreak of fighting in Cambodia and with many Western journalists going to Phnom Penh to cover the war, Dith moved to the Cambodian capital and became an interpreter and a guide for journalists. He later became the assistant to Sydney Schanberg of the New York Times and with Schanberg covered many of the major stories in the war, including the accidental U.S. bombing of the Cambodian government naval base at Neak Luong and the subsequent escalation of the conflict. When the United States evacuated its Cambodian embassy and most remaining U.S. and allied citizens from Phnom Penh on April 11, 1975, Schanberg decided to remain in the country. Dith stayed with him, although Dith’s family was evacuated to the United States. Six days later the pro-U.S. Khmer Republic fell, with the Cambodian Communists (Khmer Rouge) capturing Phnom Penh. Schanberg and Dith, along with two other journalists, were taken prisoner, but Dith managed to persuade the Khmer Rouge to let them all go. The four made their way to the French embassy as the Khmer Rouge organized a forced evacuation of the entire city of Phnom Penh. When the Cambodians were forced to leave the French embassy, Schanberg and others contrived to forge a British passport for Dith to allow him to remain. This failed, and he was forced to leave the embassy, expecting to be killed straight away. However, when all of the Cambodians had been ejected from the embassy earlier, the Khmer Rouge had taken them all off for interrogation, and their interrogators had left. As a result, Dith was able to get away and make his way to the countryside, where he was forced to work in a labor gang at Dam Dek. He was there when the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia in December 1978–Janu-
Dith Pran, center, whose ordeals in a Khmer Rouge camp were depicted in the film The Killing Fields, embraces some of his relatives at a refugee camp in Thailand, August 16, 1989. Dith, who became a photographer for The New York Times, visited the camp with Dr. Haing Ngor, the Oscar-winning physician who portrayed him in the 1984 film. (AP/Wide World Photos)
ary 1979 and briefly worked for the new Vietnamese-installed government. Fearing arrest, however, Dith contacted Cambodian refugees on the Thai-Cambodian border, and a group of them rescued him. On October 9, 1979, Dith arrived in Thailand, where he was reunited with Schanberg. Dith then moved to the United States, where he rejoined his wife and four sons and settled in Brooklyn, continuing to work for the New York Times as a journalist and photojournalist. Dith’s journalistic accounts of the genocide carried out by the Cambodian Khmer Rouge became the central theme of the popular film The Killing Fields (1984). Dith was portrayed in the movie by first-time actor Haing S. Ngor, whose performance won him an Academy Award for Best Supporting Actor. In 1986 Dith became an American citizen and actively worked to publicize worldwide the horrors of the Cambodian genocide instigated by the Khmer Rouge. In 1994 he established the Dith Pran Holocaust Awareness Project to educate others about the Khmer Rouge genocide. He was awarded an Ellis Island Medal of Honor in 1998. Pran died from pancreatic cancer on March 30, 2008, in New Brunswick, New Jersey. JUSTIN J. CORFIELD See also Cambodia; Khmer Rouge; Pol Pot
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References Dith Pran, and Kim DePaul, eds. Children of Cambodia’s Killing Fields: Memoirs by Survivors. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999. Schanberg, Sydney H. The Death and Life of Dith Pran. New York: Penguin Books, 1980.
Dixie Station U.S. Navy area of operations in the South China Sea from which carrier-based aircraft supported U.S. and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) troops fighting Viet Cong (VC) and People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) units in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). In early 1965 as the American advisory mission gave way to active ground combat operations in South Vietnam and an air offensive (Operation ROLLING THUNDER) against targets in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), General William C. Westmoreland, head of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), lacked sufficient airpower to support the expanding military efforts. To buy time for the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Marine Corps to expand facilities for the additional land-based squadrons now required, Westmoreland asked Admiral Ulysses S. Grant Sharp Jr., commanding the United States Pacific Command, for additional carrier-based aircraft to provide the required air support. Westmoreland was so impressed with the initial performance of naval airpower that he asked for a permanent presence, and Sharp formally established Dixie Station on May 16, 1965. A series of changing map coordinates rather than a specific point, Dixie Station was located some 100 miles southeast of Cam Ranh Bay, South Vietnam. Yankee Station, the coordinates established for naval air operations against North Vietnam, was located farther to the north, approximately 100 miles east of Da Nang, South Vietnam. Collectively the carriers and support vessels operating in these two areas became known as Task Force 77. Dixie Station operated officially until August 1966, by which time sufficient aircraft had taken up station at land bases in South Vietnam. Still, until the end of the U.S. military effort in early 1973, the typical line period for any carrier began with a few days at Dixie Station’s coordinates to refresh the aircrews’ skills in the comparatively low-threat environment of South Vietnam’s skies before continuing on to Yankee Station to join one or two other carriers stationed there to keep around-the-clock pressure on North Vietnam when weather permitted. At the end of each line period a carrier’s aircrews kept their skills sharp by flying missions against targets in South Vietnam from Dixie Station’s coordinates while on their way to liberty ports, usually Subic Bay in the Philippines. Predominant aircraft that flew tactical air missions from carriers at Dixie Station during 1965–1966 included the Douglas A-1 Skyraider and the McDonnell Douglas A-4 Skyhawk. The A-6 Intruder, A-7 Corsair, and F-4 Phantom picked up many missions
as the war continued. Regardless of aircraft type, American aircrews flying from Dixie Station generally operated first through ground control centers in South Vietnam that directed them to areas where air support was required, and then they worked directly with airborne forward air controllers. Arguably the most useful aircraft at Dixie Station during the war’s early years was the Skyraider because of its low speed and high bomb load, especially in close air support missions in locations where ground fire was less of a threat. Missions flown from Dixie Station were generally safer than those flown from Yankee Station. American aircrews faced significantly less antiaircraft fire and until 1972 faced no serious threat from surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). The greatest risk was exposure to small-arms fire during low-altitude flight or on an attack run. If ground fire managed to shoot down an aircraft, the chances for a successful rescue of the aircrew remained high. Because of the relatively short distance to targets in northern South Vietnam or the Central Highlands, returning aircraft even volunteered on occasion to serve as bogey aircraft for Vought F-8 Crusaders, many based at Da Nang, that protected the airspace over the ships at Dixie Station. However, the 400- to 600-mile round trips for missions over the Mekong Delta area southwest of Saigon necessitated airborne refueling. By 1972, depending on the flying time to the target and other factors, the cycle for launching, executing the mission, and recovering the aircraft from a carrier strike might vary from a minimum of 1 hour and 30 minutes to as much as 1 hour and 45 minutes. KARL LEE RUBIS See also Sharp, Ulysses Simpson Grant, Jr.; Westmoreland, William Childs; Yankee Station References Foster, Wynn F. Captain Hook: A Pilot’s Tragedy and Triumph in the Vietnam War. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992. Mersky, Peter B., and Norman Polmar. The Naval Air War in Vietnam. Annapolis, MD: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1981. Mumford, Robert E. “Jackstay: New Dimensions in Amphibious Warfare.” In Vietnam: The Naval Story, edited by Frank Uhlig Jr., 344–364. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1986.
Doan Khue Birth Date: October 29, 1923 Death Date: 1998 Key figure in the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) and Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) army general and minister of defense. Born on October 29, 1923, in Trieu Phong District, Quang Tri Province, in the same hometown as Le Duan, Doan Khue joined the antiFrench cause as early as 1939 and was a member of the Communist Party since 1945. During the Indochina War, Khue was known as
Dobrynin, Anatoly Fedorovich an intelligence specialist, and he was once political commissar of a regiment in Interzone V of central Vietnam. During the Vietnam War he returned to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) and fought there as a deputy political commissar from 1964 to 1975. At the VCP Fourth Congress in December 1976, Khue was a member of the Central Committee. In 1977 he was a major general and commander and chief political officer of Military Zone V in Quang Nam–Da Nang. In late 1980 he was promoted to lieutenant general. He retained his position in Military Zone V until elected a member of the Politburo in December 1986. In 1987 Khue assumed the position of vice minister of defense and chief of staff. He then commanded Vietnamese forces in Cambodia. In early 1990 he was promoted to senior general. In August 1991 Khue was appointed minister of defense by the SRV’s National Assembly. Doan Khue died in 1998. NGO NGOC TRUNG See also Le Duan; Vietnam, Socialist Republic of, 1975–Present Reference Colonel Bui Vinh Phuong, ed. Tu Dien Bach Khoa Quan Su Viet Nam [Military Encyclopedia of Vietnam]. Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 2004.
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Dobrynin have the power to play a substantive role in making or affecting Soviet foreign policy. Recognizing Dobrynin’s talents as a negotiator, Moscow rewarded him by making him first a candidate member of the Communist Party’s Central Committee in 1966 and then a full member in 1971. In 1986 Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev appointed him a senior foreign policy adviser. From 1986 to 1988 Dobrynin served as a deputy in the Supreme Soviet, the Soviet Union’s parliament. In 1989 he attended the Malta Summit between President George H. W. Bush and Gorbachev that unofficially ended the Cold War. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Dobrynin retired from all public service. Dobrynin died in Moscow on April 6, 2010. MICHAEL SHARE See also Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich; Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeyevich; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics References Dobrynin, Anatoly. In Confidence. Edited by Lawrence Malkin. New York: Times Books/Random House, 1995. Longmire, R. A. Soviet Relations with South-East Asia: An Historical Survey. London: Keegan Paul International, 1989. Pike, Douglas. Vietnam and the Soviet Union: Anatomy of an Alliance. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1987.
Dobrynin, Anatoly Fedorovich Birth Date: November 16, 1919 Death Date: April 6, 2010 Soviet diplomat and politician. Anatoly Fedorovich Dobrynin was born in Krasnoya Gorka, near Moscow, on November 16, 1919. An aircraft engineer during World War II, he joined the diplomatic service in 1946 a year after having joined the Communist Party. He worked at the Soviet embassy in Washington from 1952 to 1955, first as counselor and then as minister counselor. He was junior foreign affairs minister and from 1957 to 1959 United Nations (UN) undersecretary general for political and security council affairs. Dobrynin became the Soviet Union’s chief expert on the United States. From 1959 to 1961 he headed its American department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1962 he returned to Washington as ambassador, a post he held for nearly a quarter of a century until 1986. As Soviet ambassador during the Vietnam War, Dobrynin acted as a conduit for messages from the U.S. State Department to the Soviet government, most often regarding the sincerity of negotiations between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and the United States. Dobrynin gave optimistic assessments that U.S. concessions would be positively received not only in Moscow but also in Hanoi. During two U.S. bombing pauses in May and December 1965, Dobrynin passed messages from the State Department to Moscow that sought Soviet support for negotiations. Nothing came of those attempts, however. At no time did
Newly-appointed Soviet ambassador to the United States Anatoly F. Dobrynin, shown here in April 1962. A highly effective diplomat, Dobrynin held this post for nearly a quarter century, until 1986. (Getty Images)
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Do Cao Tri
Do Cao Tri Birth Date: November 1929 Death Date: February 23, 1971 Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) general, respected as an effective commander. Born in Bien Hoa in November 1929 into a wealthy Buddhist family, Do Cao Tri received his basic officer training from the French and advanced military training in the United States. During the administration of President Ngo Dinh Diem, Tri, then a colonel, commanded at Hue, where he repressed the militant Buddhists. His seeming indifference to his own safety and his charisma soon won the attention of Diem, who promoted him to general. In 1963 as commander of I Corps, Tri participated in the coup d’état that removed Diem from power. Informed that the coup was imminent, Tri arranged a meeting in Da Nang with the province chief and other government officials to preclude their calling out
the Republican Youth or other movements that might defend the government. Tri then received command of II Corps (the 12 central provinces), but when General Nguyen Cao Ky became premier in 1965, Tri was one of a number of Buddhist generals exiled by Ky. After two years of traveling from Hong Kong to Paris to Washington, D.C., Tri was invited to return to Vietnam and was promptly appointed ambassador to the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea). After the 1968 Tet Offensive, Tri was recalled from Korea and appointed commander of III Corps. General William Westmoreland referred to Tri in his book A Soldier Reports as “a tiger in battle, South Vietnam’s George Patton.” In the Cambodian operation, Tri demonstrated his flamboyance by dropping down by helicopter to personally take command whenever his troops appeared stalled. On one occasion he rode into battle astride an armored personnel carrier, swagger stick in hand. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker reported on December 21, 1970, that Tri led a multibattalion operation to
Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) lieutenant general Do Cao Tri, who directed ARVN operations in Cambodia in 1970, here confers with Cambodian brigadier general Pham Muong, who sought help for his troops who were under attack by Communist forces at Kampong Cham. Tri was widely regarded as one of the best ARVN generals, and his death in a helicopter crash in 1971 was a serious blow to the South Vietnamese military. (Bettmann/Corbis)
Domino Theory relieve pressure on Kompong Cham, Cambodia, “with great precision.” General Bruce Palmer referred to Tri’s impressive leadership during the Cambodian Incursion and noted that the February 23, 1971, death of the colorful Tri in a helicopter crash in Cambodia while fighting People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) forces on the Chup rubber plantation caused the ARVN to lose heart and give up their campaign. President Richard M. Nixon described Tri’s death as a great loss to his nation. CLAUDE R. SASSO See also Cambodia; Ngo Dinh Diem; Nguyen Cao Ky; Vietnam, Republic of, Army References Bunker, Ellsworth. The Bunker Papers: Reports to the President from Vietnam, 1967–1973. 3 vols. Edited by Douglas Pike. Berkeley, CA: Institute for East Asian Studies, 1990. Hammer, Ellen J. A Death in November: America in Vietnam, 1963. New York: Dutton, 1987. Palmer, General Bruce, Jr. The 25-Year War: America’s Military Role in Vietnam. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1984. Westmoreland, William C. A Soldier Reports. New York: Doubleday, 1976.
Dogs See K-9 Corps
Doi Moi Commonly translated as “renovation,” the term doi moi is used to signify the liberalization of the economic and, to a lesser extent, political policies of the Vietnamese government ratified by the Sixth National Congress in July 1986. Although some of the policies included in doi moi can be traced back to earlier local experiments, the need to “renovate” the Vietnamese economy was clear by 1979. Faced with a serious loss of morale and an upsurge in refugees after an overly hasty socialization of southern agricultural lands and small businesses, a costly invasion of Kampuchea, and a U.S.-organized economic boycott, the Vietnamese economy was doing poorly in both the north and the south. By 1981 the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) therefore ended some of its restrictions on rural trade and established a contract system whereby the government leased land to peasants for a set fee, and the peasants could keep any surplus over that amount. Similarly, industries were given permission to break away from centrally planned allocations and buy and sell more on their own. Upset by the inflation and corruption that increased after economic controls were lightened, conservatives managed to stop further change and dismiss the reformist Nguyen Van Linh as mayor of Ho Chi Minh City (formerly Saigon). On
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the other hand, continued economic difficulties undermined the conservative position, as did the rise of the reformist Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union, Vietnam’s chief patron. Reformers also gained power after the death of Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) secretary Le Duan in July 1986. An important sign of this power shift came when Nguyen Van Linh was quickly restored to the Politburo. Thus for a variety of reasons, the VCP and the National Congress officially proclaimed doi moi at the end of 1986. Economically this meant that a host of new regulations were written to decentralize economic decisions, to demand that government industry be (in what is called “Socialist accounting”) profitable, to pay workers by productivity, to further strengthen the contract system in agriculture, and to encourage foreign investment. Politically there were some relaxation in censorship and an effort to allow voters more choices in elections, but these efforts were already being cut back even before major student protests in Tiananmen Square in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1989 and the fall of Gorbachev and the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991. Political pluralism, the regime declared, was not the proper system for Vietnam. The Vietnamese policy of doi moi thus resembled policies in China. Although the Vietnamese would hardly approve of the comparison, in both countries the same sorts of demands for a better life that had toppled so many Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union led to a rather unique effort to maintain a Communist government by liberalizing economically but not politically. Put another way, doi moi represented not simply a risky political maneuver but also an important change in basic Marxist theory. PETER K. FROST See also Nguyen Van Linh; Refugees and Boat People; Vietnam, Socialist Republic of, 1975–Present References Marr, David G., and Christine White, eds. Postwar Vietnam: Dilemmas in Socialist Development. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Studies Program, 1988. Turley, William S., and Mark Selden, eds. Reinventing Vietnamese Socialism: Doi moi in Comparative Perspective. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993.
Domino Theory Foreign policy precept and a view held by many U.S. policy makers during the Cold War that if one country fell to communism, its neighbors were threatened with a chain reaction of Communist takeovers. The domino theory arose from fear that the withdrawal of colonial powers from Southeast Asia would lead to the fall of Vietnam and then the rest of Southeast Asia and perhaps India, Japan, the Philippines, and Indonesia.
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Domino Theory
U.S. secretary of state Dean Rusk (left), President Lyndon B. Johnson (center), and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara (right) confer on February 9, 1968, at the height of the Vietnam War. Johnson, like presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy before him, believed strongly in the domino theory, which held that if one nation in Southeast Asia fell to Communism, others would surely follow. (National Archives)
Remembering the failure of appeasement before World War II, policy makers believed that unchecked aggression would eventually force a larger crisis, but firmness might deter Communist takeovers. The domino theory was also certainly influenced by the fall of China to the Communists in 1949 and the Korean War (1950–1953), which attempted to prevent a domino effect in East Asia. It was also likely informed by the rapid succession of Communist takeovers that occurred in Eastern and Central Europe in the immediate aftermath of World War II. In many ways, the theory was a natural extension of the containment policy, which had been operative—if not overtly expressed—since 1946. The domino theory was first publicly expressed by U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower at a press conference on April 7, 1954, in anticipation of French defeat at Dien Bien Phu. Eisenhower explained that “You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences.” Although the phrase “domino theory” was not used until Eisenhower’s press conference, the idea was already in place as early as 1947. When the Soviet Union supported Azerbaijani separat-
ists in Iran, Soviet client states backed a Communist rebellion in Greece, and the Soviet Union pressured Turkey to share control of the straits between the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea, President Harry S. Truman requested $400 million of aid for free peoples resisting subjugation by outside forces. Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, a Michigan Republican, publicly warned that failure to support the president could result in a “communist chain reaction from the Dardanelles to the China Sea and westward to the rim of the Atlantic.” Asia and Vietnam occupied a central place in the domino paradigm. A 1950 study commissioned by President Truman emphasized Vietnam’s strategic importance as a natural invasion route into Southeast Asia and anticipated repercussions for other countries in the region if Vietnam became Communist. U.S. aid for French operations in Vietnam began that year, soon after the Korean War began. Two years later National Security Council Report 124/2 (NSC-124/2) of June 24, 1952, warned that the loss of any one Southeast Asian country to communism would probably lead to the “relatively swift submission to or an alignment with communism by the remaining countries.” President Truman announced during the Korean War that the United States was fighting
Do Muoi in Korea “so we won’t have to fight in Wichita, or in Chicago, or in New Orleans, or on San Francisco Bay.” Entering office in 1953, Eisenhower accepted the domino theory without reservation. In August 1954 following the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu and the temporary division pending elections of Vietnam along the 17th Parallel at the Geneva Conference, Eisenhower approved NSC-5429/2, which stated that the United States had to prevent further losses to communism in Asia through all available means. Therefore, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) attempted a number of sabotage efforts against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). Additionally, in September 1954 the United States signed a treaty with Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Pakistan, and the Philippines creating the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) to defend each other against attack. With part of Vietnam under communism, Eisenhower saw Laos as the next domino. During a foreign policy briefing the day before John F. Kennedy’s 1961 inauguration, Eisenhower informed the president-elect that if Laos fell to the Communists, it was only a matter of time until the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), Cambodia, Thailand, and Burma collapsed. Presidents Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson also subscribed to the domino theory. Kennedy increased aid and the number of U.S. military advisers in Vietnam, which numbered about 16,000 when he was assassinated in November 1963. Johnson increased the number of U.S. troops in Vietnam to about 546,000. In a speech at Johns Hopkins University in April 1965, he said that retreat in Vietnam would not end conflict with communism in Southeast Asia. Echoing the lesson of appeasement for the generation that fought World War II, Johnson asserted that the “central lesson of our time is that the appetite of aggression is never satisfied. To withdraw from one battlefield means only to prepare for the next.” Much later, in the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan revived the domino theory to justify his administration’s policies that sought to overthrow the leftist Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. In 1990– 1991 President George H. W. Bush again invoked the theory during the Persian Gulf War, which sought to prevent Iraq from annexing or toppling any more regional powers in the Middle East. The eventual Communist victory in Vietnam in 1975 did not substantiate the domino theory in Southeast Asia. The neighboring states of Cambodia and Laos did fall to communism, but these nations were destabilized by the Vietnam conflict itself, and Cambodia is no longer Communist. Other Asian nations have remained safely non-Communist. KENNETH R. STEVENS See also Central Intelligence Agency; Containment Policy; Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Laos; Munich Analogy; Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; Stevenson, Adlai Ewing, II; Truman, Harry S.
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References Berman, Larry. Planning a Tragedy: The Americanization of the War in Vietnam. New York: Norton, 1982. Herring, George C. America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975. 4th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001.
Do Muoi Birth Date: February 2, 1917 Prominent Vietnamese Communist revolutionary, Viet Minh general, and government official of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV). Born on February 2, 1917, at Dong Phu village, Thanh Tri District, in the suburb of Hanoi, son of Nguyen Xeng, Do Muoi’s real name is Nguyen Cong. Muoi participated in revolutionary activities from an early age, joining the Popular Front against fascism at age 14. In 1939 he joined the Indochinese Communist Party to fight French colonial rule. The French arrested Muoi in 1942 and sentenced him to 10 years of hard labor. He escaped from Hoa Lo Prison, later known as the “Hanoi Hilton,” in 1945 when the Japanese overthrew the French in Indochina. Muoi then rejoined the Viet Minh underground movement against the French in his hometown of Ha Dong. He assumed various posts at the provincial level during the Indochina War and reached the rank of brigadier general. Muoi commanded the Viet Minh during the battle for Haiphong at the end of the war. From May 1955 to December 1956 Muoi was chairman of the People’s Military and Administrative Committee of Hai Phong. Within the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP), in 1955 Muoi was elected an alternate member of the VCP Central Committee. In 1960 he became a full member, in 1982 he became an alternate Politburo member, and in 1986 he became a full member of the Politburo. His first post at the central government level was that of vice minister of commerce from December 1956 until April 1958, when he was appointed minister of domestic trade. Muoi held this post until February 1961, when he left politics because of poor health. He was out of public life until November 1967, when he returned to government work as chairman of the Economy Board of the Premier’s Office, later renamed the State Pricing Commission. In 1969 Muoi was assigned to the building and construction sectors. It is believed that he was the liaison officer who worked with a Soviet team to build the Ho Chi Minh mausoleum in Hanoi. In December 1969 Muoi became vice premier and minister of construction in the North Vietnamese government. After the 1975 Communist victory, Muoi took charge of the unsuccessful effort to amalgamate the economies of North Vietnam and the former Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) by introducing socialism in the former capitalist South Vietnam. This
306 Don Dien policy prompted a serious economic crisis and exodus of people from the country. Muoi survived politically, however, and was the SRV’s key economic liaison with Soviet-bloc countries in the 1980s. In June 1988 he was elected chairman of the SRV’s Council of Ministers (the equivalent of premier) on the sudden death of Pham Hung. At that time Muoi was seen as a transitional figure. In June 1991 he was elected secretary-general of the VCP. Although Muoi was criticized for the economic failures after the war, something that he himself admitted, he was respected as an incorruptible idealist. In December 1997 General Le Kha Phieu replaced Muoi as secretary-general of the VCP. NGO NGOC TRUNG
Dong Ap Bia
See also Pham Hung; Vietnam, Socialist Republic of, 1975–Present; Vietnamese Communist Party
Start Date: April 29, 1968 End Date: May 15, 1968
Reference Vu Thu Hien. Dem Giua Ban Ngay. Westminster, CA: Van Nghe, 1997.
Don Dien Form of military settlement or colony dating from the 14th century CE. This form of settlement was widely used in traditional Vietnam as a strategy both to increase the amount of land under cultivation and to protect the border from foreign infiltration. The don dien can be traced at least as far back as 1343 under the Tran dynasty when the position of don dien su (military settlement commissioner) was created in the khuyen nong ty (agriculture encouragement department). After Vietnam was liberated from Ming rule, the Le kings used the don dien as a way to exploit lands abandoned during wartime or usurped by the Mings and those who had collaborated with them. After 1471 and the destruction of Champa following the expedition of Le Thanh Tong, the system had more of a military emphasis. In the 19th century under Minh Mang, the don dien were used as a means to improve peasant conditions in southern Vietnam and in the coastal region of northern Vietnam. By the middle of the same century under the direction of Nguyen Tri Phuong, about 100 villages were created in the Mekong Delta through the don dien system. These later became centers of resistance against the French. PHAM CAO DUONG See also Le Thanh Tong; Minh Mang; Vietnam, History of, 938 CE through the French Conquest References Le Thanh Khoi. Le Viet-Nam: Histoire et civilisation. Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1955. Pham Cao Duong. Vietnamese Peasants under French Domination, 1861–1945. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1985.
See Hamburger Hill, Battle of
Dong Da, Battle of See Hanoi, Battle of, and the First Tet Offensive
Dong Ha, Battle of
Battle in 1968 between the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) and U.S. marines in the northern I Corps Tactical Zone. On April 29, 1968, the PAVN 320th Division launched a widespread offensive through the demilitarized zone (DMZ). The 3rd Marine Division officially labeled the engagements above the Bo Dieu and Cua Viet rivers between April 29 and May 15 the Battle of Dong Ha. A town located in northeastern Quang Tri Province in I Corps Tactical Zone, Dong Ha provided the southeast anchor of “Leatherneck Square,” a defensive barrier along the DMZ. At the junction of Highway 1 and Highway 9 (the only major north-south and eastwest land lines) and accessible to the Cua Viet River system, this proved to be an ideal site for the Dong Ha Combat Base (DHCB). Located approximately half a mile south of the town, the DHCB served as 3rd Marine Division headquarters and logistics center for III Marine Amphibious Forces units. After the 1968 Tet Offensive, the strategy of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (National Liberation Front [NLF]) for improving their bargaining position at the upcoming Paris peace talks was to carry out successful military action. This led to 119 attacks on civilian and military targets. As the 3rd Marine Division was preparing a counteroffensive to attack PAVN units along the DMZ, on April 29 elements of the PAVN 320th Division were spotted about four miles north of the DHCB. The 1st and 2nd battalions, 2nd Regiment, ARVN 1st Division, made contact with a PAVN regiment along Highway 1. The 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines (“Magnificent Bastards”), engaged the PAVN main force in fierce fighting at Dai Do hamlet, one and a half miles northeast of Dong Ha. Following three days of hard fighting, the 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines, relieved the 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines, for an additional three days at Dai Do. The 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry (“Gimlets”), 196th Light Infantry Brigade, Americal Division (under the operational control of the 3rd Marines), shared in taking the brunt of
Dong Quan Pacification Project
Estimated Casualties at the Battle of Dong Ha, April 29–May 15, 1968 U.S. Marines ARVN PAVN
Killed
Wounded
Captured
Missing
233 42 2,366
821 124 Unknown
0 0 42
1 0 0
the PAVN attack in a bitter battle at Nhi Ha, six miles northeast of Dong Ha. On May 16 the PAVN 320th Division was able to break off contact (that division returned in late May; once again met the 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines; and by the end of the month was temporarily combat ineffective). Other marine units (in order of insertion the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines; 1st Battalion, 9th Marines; 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines; and 1st Battalion, 26th Marines) saw significant combat, as did the ARVN 1st Division. The 1st and 2nd battalions, 5th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), with its units positioned from northeast of Nhi Ha to north of Dong Ha, operated under the 3rd Marines during May 6–17 and called its participation Operation CONCORDIA. Total casualties in units under operational control of the 3rd Marines numbered 233 killed, 821 wounded, and 1 missing in action. ARVN casualties were estimated at 42 killed and 124 wounded. PAVN forces reportedly lost 2,366 dead and 43 taken prisoner. Dong Ha retained its role as command and logistics center until it was turned over to the ARVN in November 1969. During the 1972 North Vietnamese Easter Offensive, U.S. Marine Corps captain John Ripley braved enemy fire to rig explosives on the Dong Ha bridge across the Cua Viet River. When the span fell, a major route south from the DMZ was closed to the attacking North Vietnamese troops, temporarily slowing down their advance. Ripley received the Navy Cross for this action. PAUL S. DAUM AND B. J. ROGERS See also Demilitarized Zone; Easter Offensive; Tet Offensive, Overall Strategy; Tet Offensive and the Saigon Circle; United States Marine Corps; Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, Army References Andradé, Dale. America’s Last Vietnam Battle: Halting Hanoi’s 1972 Easter Offensive. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001. Botkin, Richard. Ride the Thunder: A Vietnam War Story of Honor and Triumph. Los Angeles: WND Books, 2009. Miller, John G. The Bridge at Dong Ha. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996. Nolan, Keith William. The Magnificent Bastards: The Joint Army-Marine Defense of Dong Ha, 1968. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1994. Olson, James S., ed. Dictionary of the Vietnam War. New York: Greenwood, 1988. Simmons, Edwin H. “Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, 1968.” In The Marines in Vietnam, 1954–1973: An Anthology and Annotated Bibliography, edited by Peter L. Hilgartner, 99–129. Washington, DC:
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History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters, 1974. Turley, Gerald H. The Easter Offensive: The Last American Advisors, Vietnam, 1972. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985.
Dong Quan Pacification Project Event Date: 1953 Dong Quan was an American-funded village regroupment plan developed in northern Vietnam in 1953 by the governor of Bac Bo, Nguyen Huu Tri. It was a prototype for the pacification of the Red River Delta. Tri, a staunch anti-Communist and leader of the Dai Viet Quoc Dan Dang (National Party of Greater Vietnam), proposed the Dong Quan project to the French. It was based on the successful model used by the British in Malaya, but Tri found little enthusiasm to fund it until he described his plans to the U.S. Special Technical and Economic Mission (STEM). STEM, which was a part of the Mutual Security Agency, consisted of a team of experts who bought fertilizer and seed to restore war-devastated agriculture, built medical dispensaries, and provided water pumps and other improvements. STEM representatives were proud of their public health and literacy programs, but the program that came to be considered most important to the war effort was Tri’s village regroupment plan. With an estimated 40,000 Viet Minh infiltrators in the ostensibly French-controlled Red River Delta, pacification held particular appeal to STEM special representative James P. Hendrick. The site selected for the first Great Village was 20 miles south of Hanoi near the boundary of Viet Minh–held territory in a region of destroyed villages and heavy Viet Minh presence. Because delta villages were often very small, Tri’s plan called for regrouping peasant farmers of 25 surrounding villages into Dong Quan. To attract the villagers to such an arrangement, the Great Village offered a handicraft and commercial area, a residential area with subsidized housing, and an agricultural area. It also included a hospital, a Catholic church, a pagoda, a school, a market, and a river port. STEM authorized an initial outlay of $340,000, but the key to the success or failure of the plan was security in a region where the Viet Minh ruled at night. Dong Quan appeared defensible, as it was situated on National Road 1 and surrounded on three sides by water (the Nhue River and two canals). Because the French would not detach troops from the war effort to provide security, Tri used three companies of recently reorganized and reequipped Bao Chinh Doan (national guardsmen). From the beginning of the project, the Viet Minh targeted Dong Quan. They terrorized the workers and residents alike with frequent attacks and threats. After local worker families were threatened with retaliation, workers had to be brought in from Hanoi. A trination committee made up of Vietnamese from Governor Tri’s
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Dong Xoai, Battle of
government, Americans from STEM, and a French military representative met weekly to oversee the project and adopt countermeasures. Despite their efforts, the project never reached its full potential. Although other less costly pacification sites similar to Dong Quan were set up in 1954, these mainly became sites to house the thousands of war refugees fleeing Viet Minh areas. CLAUDE R. SASSO See also Agroville Program; Dai Viet Quoc Dan Dang; Nguyen Huu Tri; Pacification; Strategic Hamlet Program; United States, Involvement in Indochina through 1954; Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, 1945–1954 References Dommen, Arthur J. The Indochinese Experience of the French and Americans: Nationalism and Communism in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. “Mission to Vietnam.” Record Group 469, Records of U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1942–1961, Regrouping Village Program (Dong Quan), ARC Identifier 2108979/MLR Number UD 1450, National Archives, Washington, DC.
a rubber plantation, the paratroopers were ambushed and quickly overrun, although some survivors made it back to Dong Xoai. Later the U.S. advisers were airlifted out. Lieutenant Charles Q. Williams was awarded the Medal of Honor for this battle. Wounded four times, he rallied defenders, personally knocked out a VC machine gun, and guided medevac helicopters to evacuate the wounded. The Americans suffered 8 killed, 40 CIDG were killed and another 124 captured, approximately 200 civilians died, and ARVN casualties totaled approximately 600. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), estimated VC casualties at 700; dead left behind totaled 134. VC propaganda claimed the Battle of Dong Xoai as a major victory. In it the VC proved that they were capable of fighting large battles and confronting ARVN elite units. The battle was important in undermining Washington’s confidence in the ARVN and thus bolstered arguments for the commitment of large numbers of American ground forces. HIEU DINH VU See also Civilian Irregular Defense Group; Montagnards; Rifles; Seabees; Vietnam, Republic of, Army
Dong Xoai, Battle of Start Date: June 9, 1965 End Date: June 12, 1965 Military engagement precipitated by a Viet Cong (VC) attack on a U.S. Special Forces camp on June 9, 1965. Beginning at 11:30 p.m. on June 9, approximately 1,500 men of the VC 762rd and 763nd regiments attacked the newly established U.S. Special Forces camp at Dong Xoai, a district capital in Phuoc Long Province in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Approximately 400 Montagnard Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) troops and 24 U.S. Seabees staffed the camp. In their attack the VC employed AK-47 assault rifles (the first time in the war by a VC unit), grenades, and flamethrowers. Unprepared for the attack, the defenders retreated to the district headquarters inside the town. The VC mounted four separate assaults but were pushed back, leaving their dead on the battlefield. The next morning Saigon dispatched one Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) infantry battalion by land and the 52nd Ranger Battalion into Dong Xoai by helicopter. Ambushed at Thuan Loi plantation, the infantry battalion was scattered. The 52nd Ranger Battalion counterattacked, supported by U.S. and South Vietnamese aircraft, which dropped napalm and phosphorous bombs. On June 11 the 52nd Ranger Battalion rested and regrouped because of casualties incurred. Pursuit of the VC went to the ARVN 7th Airborne Battalion, which had just arrived. Late on June 12 at
A weeping mother holds her child, killed in an air strike that preceded the recapture of Dong Xoai by Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) rangers, June 1965. Hundreds of villagers were caught in the fierce fighting after the Viet Cong swept into the village. (AP/Wide World Photos)
Donovan, William Joseph
References Nguyen Duc Phuong. Nhung Tran Danh Lich Su Trong Chien Tranh Viet Nam 1963–1975. Glendale, CA: Dai Nam, 1993. Westmoreland, William C. A Soldier Reports. New York: Doubleday, 1976.
Donlon, Roger Hugh C. Birth Date: January 30, 1934 U.S. Army officer, distinguished Vietnam War veteran awarded the first Medal of Honor since the Korean War, and executive director of the Westmoreland Scholar Foundation. Roger Hugh C. Donlon was born in Saugerties, New York, on January 30, 1934. In 1953 he enlisted in the U.S. Air Force with the intention of flying but failed his second physical examination because of cataracts. Discharged from the air force in 1955, he was admitted to the United States Military Academy, West Point, that same year. He resigned from West Point in April 1957 and returned to military service in February 1958, when he joined the U.S. Army. Donlon secured a commission through Officer Candidate School (OCS). He spent the first few years of his army career at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, progressing in responsibility from company officer to instructor, company commander, and finally staff officer. In September 1961 he served as platoon leader in the 9th Infantry Division at Fort Jonathan Wainwright, Alaska, until he became aide-de-camp to Brigadier General Lester L. Wheeler. In August 1963 Donlon joined the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, but later transferred to the 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) because of his training in Alaska. He assumed command of Detachment A-726, C Company, of the 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) in January 1964 and began preparations for deployment to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Captain Donlon arrived in South Vietnam with his 12-man detachment on May 27, 1964, and took over the camp at Nam Dong, 35 miles west of Da Nang. In the early morning of July 6, 1964, a reinforced Viet Cong (VC) battalion attacked the camp with mortar and small-arms fire, threatening to overrun the defending Americans, 1 Australian, the South Vietnamese, and Nung forces guarding Nam Dong. During the nearly five-hour battle for Nam Dong, Donlon received wounds in the stomach, left shoulder, leg, and face as well as other minor wounds over his body as a result of shrapnel. Throughout the fight and despite his wounds, Donlon regrouped his troops, administered first aid, directed counterfire with the camp’s mortars, and rallied his men against the VC assault. Two members of Detachment A-726, Gabriel R. Alamo and John L. Houston, died in the battle, along with the Australian adviser, Kevin Conway, the first Australian to be killed in action in the Vietnam War. Donlon returned to the United States shortly thereafter to recuperate. On December 17, 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson presented him with the Medal of Honor for
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his actions during the Battle of Nam Dong, making him the first recipient of the nation’s highest decoration for valor during the Vietnam War. After the war Donlon held a variety of assignments before retiring to Kansas from the army as a colonel on December 14, 1988. He has written two books about his Vietnam experiences, Outpost of Freedom (1965) and Beyond Nam Dong (1998). Donlon is also the executive director of the Westmoreland Scholarship Foundation. RONALD B. FRANKUM JR. See also Nam Dong, Battle of References Donlon, Roger. Beyond Nam Dong. Leavenworth, KS: R and N Publishers, 1998. Donlon, Roger H. C., with Warren Rogers. Outpost of Freedom. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965. Proft, Robert J. United States of America’s Congressional Medal of Honor Recipients: Their Official Citations. Columbia Heights, MN: Highland House II, 2007.
Donovan, William Joseph Birth Date: January 1, 1883 Death Date: February 8, 1959 American lawyer, army officer, administrator, and diplomat who directed the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) from 1942 to 1945. Born in Buffalo, New York, on January 1, 1883, William Joseph Donovan graduated from Columbia University with an undergraduate degree in 1905; three years later he earned a law degree, also from Columbia. While there he met and formed a close personal friendship with future president Franklin D. Roosevelt. In 1907 Donovan began practicing law in New York City. He served in the New York National Guard on the Mexican border in 1916, and in World War I he went to France with the 165th Infantry Regiment (formerly the New York 69th Regiment). He advanced to the rank of colonel and was awarded the Medal of Honor. Donovan was appointed U.S. district attorney for western New York in 1922, and he served as assistant attorney general in the Justice Department from 1924 to 1929. Thereafter he resumed the practice of law. In July 1941 President Roosevelt appointed him coordinator of information under the State Department. In 1942 with the need for more ambitious intelligence gathering and covert operations capability, Roosevelt created within the military command structure the OSS and named Donovan as its director. The following year he was promoted to brigadier general. By the autumn of 1942 Donovan had developed plans for intelligence-gathering operations in China, Mongolia, and Indochina. His base for operations in Indochina was Yunnan Province in southern China, especially the city of Kunming. The OSS stepped up activities in Indochina following the Japanese takeover in March 1945, as valuable French sources of information about the
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Dooley, Thomas Anthony, III allow him to serve in that post no longer than one year, he left Thailand in August 1954. Donovan died in Washington, D.C., on February 8, 1959. ARTHUR J. DOMMEN See also Deer Mission; Dewey, Albert Peter; Office of Strategic Services; Patti, Archimedes L. A. References Brown, Anthony Cave. The Last Hero: Wild Bill Donovan. New York: Vintage Books, 1982. Donovan, William Joseph. Papers. United States Army Military History Institute, Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA. Dunlop, Richard. Donovan, America’s Master Spy. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1982. Fineman, Daniel. A Special Relationship: The United States and Military Government in Thailand, 1947–1958. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997. Ford, Carey. Donovan of OSS. Boston: Little, Brown, 1970. Troy, Thomas F. Donovan and the CIA. Frederick, MD: Aletheia Books, 1981.
Dooley, Thomas Anthony, III During World War II, William Donovan organized and directed the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the military precursor of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The OSS was active in northern Vietnam and supported the Viet Minh, led by Ho Chi Minh. (Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library)
Japanese armed forces in Indochina disappeared. The OSS began contacting groups of Vietnamese living in exile in southern China. Among these were the Viet Minh, led by Ho Chi Minh. In the summer of 1945 with the Japanese defeat imminent, the OSS dispatched teams into the mountains of northern Indochina to establish Vietnamese intelligence networks and train guerrillas to cut Japanese supply routes. The most famous of these was the Deer Mission. After the Japanese surrender, teams were also sent from Kandy to Saigon (the Embankment Mission) and from Kunming to Vientiane (the Raven Mission) to recover prisoners of war and internees. The leader of the Embankment Mission, Lieutenant Colonel A. Peter Dewey, was killed in a road ambush on the outskirts of Saigon; he is often considered to be the first American casualty of the Vietnam War. After the disbanding of the OSS, Donovan founded the law firm of Donovan, Leisure, Newton, and Lumbard in New York City. In August 1953 he was named ambassador to Thailand by President Dwight Eisenhower and became a strong advocate of using Ho Chi Minh’s guerrilla tactics against the Communists. Donovan was instrumental in establishing Police Aerial Reconnaissance Units (PARUs), elite paramilitary units that were to play a role in advising the Hmongs in Laos from 1961 to 1973. In accordance with his stipulation that financial constraints would
Birth Date: January 17, 1927 Death Date: January 18, 1961 Physician, U.S. Navy officer, humanitarian, and ardent antiCommunist. Thomas Anthony Dooley III was born on January 17, 1927, in St. Louis, Missouri. After graduating from St. Louis University High School in 1944, he attended Notre Dame University and later that year joined the U.S. Navy’s corpsman program and was assigned to a navy hospital in New York. He returned to his studies at Notre Dame in 1946. Two years later he entered St. Louis University Medical School, graduating in 1953. Dooley promptly reenlisted in the navy, serving a medical internship as a lieutenant. In 1954 the navy assigned him to the attack cargo ship Montague, which that year participated in the evacuation of refugees from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and their transportation to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) as part of what was known as Operation PASSAGE TO FREEDOM. He also served for a time as an interpreter and medical officer for a preventive medicine unit at the North Vietnamese port of Haiphong. Dooley was also involved in the supervision of the building and then the maintenance of refugee camps in Haiphong until May 1955, when the operation ended and the Viet Minh took over that city. He then helped relocate the refugees to South Vietnam. While Dooley worked in the Haiphong camps, Lieutenant Colonel Edward G. Lansdale, who headed the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) office in Saigon, recognized his potential as an intelligence operative and recruited him to work for the agency. Lansdale saw Dooley as a symbol of Vietnamese-American cooperation
DOUBLE EAGLE, Operation
and encouraged him to write about his refugee camp experiences. Lansdale also asked Dooley to gather intelligence information. According to the Pentagon Papers, Dooley’s activities significantly aided in this effort. Apparently the CIA, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and several other agencies conducted fund-raising campaigns for the refugees that would be described in Dooley’s books. Late in 1955 Dooley returned to the United States, and in 1956 he published his first book, titled Deliver Us from Evil: The Story of Viet Nam’s Flight to Freedom. It became a best-seller and won him international recognition. It also instantly established him as a strong anti-Communist. Dooley was awarded the navy’s Legion of Merit, the youngest Medical Corps officer to be so honored, and he received the highest national decoration of the South Vietnamese government. During a promotional tour for the book in 1956, however, the navy accused him of having participated in homosexual activities and forced him to leave the service. After Dooley resigned from the navy, he convinced the International Rescue Committee to sponsor a bush hospital in Nam Tha, Laos. At Nam Tha during the summer and autumn of 1957 Dooley wrote his second book, The Edge of Tomorrow. Early in 1958 he established a second hospital in Laos at Muong Sing, near the Chinese border, and later that year he founded the Medical International Cooperation Organization (MEDICO), which established 17 medical programs in 14 countries. As he provided medical care to Laotian refugees, Dooley also collected intelligence, reported civilian movements to the CIA, and provided cover for U.S. Army Special Forces medics posing as civilian doctors. In August 1959 doctors at New York Memorial Hospital operated on Dooley for malignant melanoma, a rapidly spreading cancer. In October he went on the lecture circuit, raising nearly $1 million for MEDICO. In 1960 he published his third book, The Night They Burned the Mountain, detailing his experience in Laos. In early January 1961 Dooley flew back to New York Memorial Hospital, as his cancer had spread to his lungs, spleen, heart, and brain. He died at the hospital on January 18, 1961, a day after his 34th birthday. After Dooley’s death many of his admirers urged the Roman Catholic Church to canonize him, and his friend Father Maynard Kegler accepted the task of compiling and presenting research about Dooley’s life to the Church. While researching Dooley’s life, Kegler discovered nearly 500 CIA files through the Freedom of Information Act that revealed that Dooley had provided the CIA with information on villagers’ sentiments and troop movements around his hospitals in Laos in the mid and late 1950s. When President John F. Kennedy launched the Peace Corps in 1961, he invoked Dooley’s name as an example of selfless dedication to the cause of freedom and humanitarian relief around the world. Dooley was also posthumously awarded the Congressional Gold Medal for his work. KATHLEEN WARNES
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See also Central Intelligence Agency; Lansdale, Edward Geary References Dooley, Thomas A. Deliver Us from Evil: The Story of Viet Nam’s Flight to Freedom. New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1956. Fisher, James T. Dr. America: The Lives of Thomas A. Dooley, 1927–1961. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1997. Gallagher, Teresa. Give Joy to My Youth: A Memoir of Dr. Tom Dooley. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1965.
Do Quang Thang Birth Date: June 12, 1927 Death Date: August 17, 2009 Prominent leader in the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV). Born on June 12, 1927, in Pho Cuong village, Duc Pho District, Quang Ngai Province, Do Quang Thang was active only at the local level during the Vietnam War. He became secretary of Nghia Binh Province’s VCP committee in May 1983 and was reelected to this post in 1986. After the division of Nghia Binh Province into two provinces, in April 1991 Thang became secretary of the Quang Ngai Province Party Committee. He was also elected a full member of the national Central Committee during the 1986 VCP Sixth Congress and became chairman of the party Control Commission and secretary of the Secretariat. He ranked ninth in the Secretariat, being promoted to the Politburo in January 1994. Thang was also elected as a National Assembly deputy from Quang Ngai Province in July 1992. Do Quang Thang died in Ho Chi Minh City on August 17, 2009. NGO NGOC TRUNG See also Vietnam, Socialist Republic of, 1975–Present; Vietnamese Communist Party Reference Biographical Files, Indo-China Archives, University of California at Berkeley.
DOUBLE EAGLE,
Operation
Start Date: January 28, 1966 End Date: March 6, 1966 Unsuccessful attempt in 1966 by U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) forces to trap major Viet Cong (VC) and People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) units in Quang Ngai Province. In the autumn of 1965, I Corps intelligence analysts concluded that Communist main-force units were in Quang Ngai and that their critical base areas were in the Tam Quan region near the
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Doumer, Paul battered a limited number of targets, but rain and mountainous jungle terrain quickly impeded marine progress inland. Despite the large numbers of deployed U.S. units, Communist forces evaded contact. The marines moved toward Binh Dinh Province and the expected trap planned in conjunction with the U.S. Army’s 1st Cavalry Division. Unlike the marines, the 1st Cavalry Division did encounter heavy PAVN resistance when it moved north. In the first six days of the operation, U.S. Army soldiers killed more than 600 PAVN soldiers and captured 357. The marines and the 1st Cavalry Division were now poised to squeeze the PAVN 18th Regiment between them, especially when they linked up on February 4. During the next week, however, PAVN forces evaded the trap, and there were no real engagements. Despite numerous patrols and gunfire-support missions, the VC and PAVN had escaped. As a result, DOUBLE EAGLE ended on March 6, 1966, with most of the reported 2,000 Communist casualties occurring in the first week of the operation. DOUBLE EAGLE’s early delays had given Communist forces a window of opportunity to escape. VC and PAVN units moved too fast for the slow, linear U.S. tactics. By the time U.S. helicopters finally entered the fray, their targets had already vanished. This scenario would repeat itself throughout the war. LINCOLN HILL See also National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam; United States Army; United States Marine Corps; Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, Army
Marines bring a Viet Cong (VC) prisoner taken during Operation DOUBLE EAGLE to a collection area on February 1, 1966. DOUBLE EAGLE was an unsuccessful effort by U.S. Army and Marine Corps and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) forces to trap VC and People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) units in Quang Ngai Province. (National Archives)
coast. As a response, the U.S. Marine Corps planned Operation DOUBLE EAGLE during December 1965 and January 1966. The final plan called for the 4th and 7th Marines, both based in Quang Tin Province, to join units of the ARVN 2nd Division and deploy south. At the same time, units of the U.S. Army’s 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and the ARVN 22nd Division, both of which were operating in Binh Dinh Province, would move north and attack suspected VC-PAVN base areas. The pincer movements were designed to crush the Communist forces caught between them. DOUBLE EAGLE began on January 28, 1966, and soon included an operating area of 500 square miles. Members of the III Marine Amphibious Force began the operation by assaulting Red Beach, three miles northeast of Duc Pho. After the landing, the marines attempted to deceive their enemy into thinking that they would conduct only limited strikes against coastal areas. The buildup on the beach was intentionally slow, and two marine battalions remained at sea. On the second day when the exploitation phase began, the marines encountered problems. Boeing B-52 Stratofortresses
References Shulimson, Jack. U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1966: An Expanding War. Marine Corps Vietnam Series. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Marine Corps Historical Center, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters, 1982. Stanton, Shelby L. The Rise and Fall of an American Army: The U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985. West, Francis J. Small Unit Action in Vietnam, Summer 1966. Washington, DC: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters, 1967.
Doumer, Paul Birth Date: March 22, 1857 Death Date: May 6, 1932 French politician, governor-general of Indochina (1897–1902), and president of France (1931–1932). Joseph Athanase Paul Doumer (commonly known as Paul Doumer) was born on March 22, 1857, at Aurillac (Cantal Department) in the Dordogne region, the son of a railroad worker who died the same day. Doumer earned a teaching certificate and taught briefly before becoming a journalist and civil servant. In 1888 he won election to the Chamber of Deputies from the Department of the Aisne. Defeated in a reelection bid in 1889, the next year he won election from the
Drugs and Drug Use Department of Yonne. He was reelected in 1893. His special talents for finance brought him appointment as minister of finance in the 1895–1896 cabinet of Léon Bourgeois, when Doumer proposed a national income tax. In 1897 Premier Jules Méline appointed Doumer governorgeneral of French Indochina, perhaps to remove a political rival. Doumer arrived in the colony that summer and over the next five years set in motion the economic patterns that guided the colony throughout the French period. Interested in centralization, Doumer’s byword was “efficiency.” He also believed that the French government would have to take an active role in bringing about social change. He unified colonial administration by replacing the emperor’s mandarin advisory council with a new body containing French officials. Doumer also worked to expand industrialization on the basis that the colony was to be exploited for the benefit of France. He believed that Indochina should pay for its own development, and he set about transferring the financial burden from French taxpayers to the Vietnamese people, a major factor in reducing anticolonialism in France. Doumer also accelerated land policies that dispossessed many Vietnamese peasant proprietors. He created official monopolies on sales of salt, opium, and rice alcohol, and he was an inveterate builder, responsible for the construction of opera houses, roads, and railways as well as the long Hanoi railroad bridge that crossed the Red River and was named after him. In 1902 Doumer returned to France. This former member of the Radical Party presented himself as a nationalist, and he won reelection to the Chamber of Deputies from the Aisne. In 1905 he was president of the Chamber of Deputies (equivalent to the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives) and in 1912 was elected senator from Corsica. During World War I he supported Georges Clemenceau’s efforts to mobilize support for the war effort. Doumer lost four sons in the conflict. In the 1920s Doumer served as minister of finance in two cabinets, and in 1927 he was elected president of the Senate, a post he held until 1931, when he was elected president of France. On May 6, 1932, while presiding over the opening of a Paris book fair, Doumer was assassinated by Russian anarchist Pavel Gurgulov, who hoped to call attention to the plight of Ukraine under Soviet rule. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Assimilation versus Association; French Indochina, 1860s–1946 References Doumer, Paul. L’Indochine française (Souvenirs). Paris: Vuibert, 1930. Doumer, Paul. Situation de l’Indo-Chine, 1897–1901. Hanoi: F. H. Schneider, 1902. Hutton, Patrick H., ed. Historical Dictionary of the Third French Republic, 1870–1940, Vol. 1. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1986. Thompson, Virginia. French Indo-China. New York: Octagon Books, 1968. Tucker, Spencer C. Vietnam. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1999.
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Draft, Military See Selective Service
Drugs and Drug Use Drug use was a serious problem for U.S. forces in Vietnam, especially from 1968 onward. A Department of Defense study revealed that in 1968, slightly more than half of American servicemen in Vietnam used drugs. By 1970 that number had risen to more than 60 percent. The study estimated that by the time of American withdrawal in 1973, almost 70 percent of American servicemen in Vietnam had used some type of illicit drug. Cheap and readily available, drugs provided an escape from the anxiety and boredom prevalent among combat soldiers. After the 1968 Tet Offensive, drug use rose dramatically. Marijuana was the drug of choice for most GIs. In 1969, 30 percent of enlisted men sent to Vietnam had used marijuana previously. That rate jumped to nearly 60 percent after arrival in Vietnam. A marijuana cigarette cost a mere dime in Saigon but cost nothing when Vietnamese threw them into passing American jeeps and trucks. A soldier could buy an entire carton of prerolled marijuana cigarettes in resealed cigarette packs for either $5 or a carton of American cigarettes. Smoking marijuana eventually became part of the standard initiation rite for those arriving in Vietnam. Thomas Boettcher, in Vietnam: The Valor and the Sorrow, quotes a U.S. Marine Corps colonel as saying that “When a man is in Vietnam he can be sure that . . . there are probably drugs within twenty-five feet of him.” Amphetamines were also popular. GIs could purchase vials of liquid amphetamine on the black market and use it for staying alert on patrol or for parties in rear areas. Christian Appy noted in Working-Class War that some veterans remarked that coming down from an amphetamine high made them edgy and extremely irritable, so much so that they felt like shooting “children in the streets.” Perhaps for that reason, amphetamines were not as commonly used as marijuana. Narcotics, such as opium and heroin, ran a distant third behind marijuana and amphetamines for obvious reasons; no one wished to be caught nodding during an ambush. Binges remained fairly common in the rear, however, because of the astoundingly low prices and remarkable purity. In Vietnam soldiers could buy a gram of 95 percent pure heroin for $2. The same amount in the United States cost more than $100, and it was rarely more than 10 percent pure. Opium, available either in liquid form or rolled into cigarettes, gave the user a similar high. Although less common, opiates produced more lasting addictions than marijuana or amphetamines and led some veterans to crime to support their habits back in the United States. The relatively high incidence of drug use among GIs in Vietnam may be seen as either a predisposition to use of drugs or as a reaction to one’s environment. Easy access to the drugs may have been a determining factor. Statistics show, however, that personnel in
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Vietnam were much more likely to use drugs than were their comrades-in-arms in Europe, where drugs were also easily accessible. Combat stress certainly accounts for a portion of the disparity. Still, men who had used marijuana, narcotics, or amphetamines before entering the military composed the vast bulk of the user population. Many users in Vietnam did so for the first time, but for the vast majority this consequence of combat experience was not a lasting one: 93 percent of first-time narcotics users and 86 percent of first-time marijuana users stopped completely upon returning to the United States. BENJAMIN C. DUBBERLY See also Selective Service References Appy, Christian G. Working Class War: American Combat Soldiers & Vietnam. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993. Boetcher, Thomas D. Vietnam: The Valor and the Sorrow. Boston: Little Brown, 1985. Ebert, James R. A Life in a Year. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1993. Lewy, Guenter. America in Vietnam. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978.
Duc Thanh Tran See Tran Hung Dao
University and went into private practice with the international law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell, where his brother John was a senior partner. As head of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in Switzerland during World War II, Allen Dulles penetrated German intelligence networks and was responsible for secret negotiations that led to the German surrender in northern Italy. At the end of the war Dulles returned to the private practice of law, but following passage of the National Security Act of 1947, which he had helped draft and which established the CIA, he headed a study on the role and structure of the agency, which was submitted to President Harry S. Truman as National Security Council Report 50 (NSC-50). From 1951 to 1953 Dulles was deputy director of the CIA, and during the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration, from 1953 to 1961, Dulles served as the agency’s director. Because his brother John was secretary of state at the same time, Allen Dulles had more than usual influence on foreign policy in the Eisenhower years. During the Sect Crisis of 1955—in which South Vietnamese prime minister Ngo Dinh Diem challenged the power of the Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Binh Xuyen—French officials and U.S. ambassador to Vietnam General J. Lawton Collins argued that Diem was ineffective and should be removed. The Dulles brothers convinced the president to continue support for Diem. The United States was now the primary support for the government of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam).
Duc Tong Anh Hoang De See Tu Duc
Dulles, Allen Welsh Birth Date: April 7, 1893 Death Date: January 29, 1969 Diplomat, national security and intelligence expert, director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from 1953 to 1961, and brother of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Born on April 7, 1893, in Watertown, New York, Allen Walsh Dulles graduated from Princeton University in 1914 and, after completing an MA at the same institution in 1916, began what proved to be a long career in diplomatic service as a secretary of legation at the U.S. embassy in Vienna. During World War I he was stationed at Berne, Switzerland, where he oversaw intelligence gathering, and in 1919 he was a member of the U.S. Peace Commission at Paris. Subsequently assigned to missions in Berlin and Istanbul, Dulles was chief of the Far Eastern Affairs Division at the State Department in Washington from 1922 to 1926. He left government service in 1926 to earn a law degree from George Washington
Allen Dulles played a major role in the creation and organization of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and served as the first civilian director from 1953 to 1961. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library)
Dulles, John Foster Reflecting the Eisenhower administration’s preference for covert operations in lieu of overt military engagements, Allen Dulles was successful in helping to launch a successful antileftist coup in Iran in 1953, which restored Shah Reza Pahlavi to power, and a coup in Guatemala that ousted suspected Communist Jacobo Arbenz from power the following year. In 1961, however, Dulles presided over a disastrous plan to overthrow the Communist regime of Fidel Castro in Cuba, which ended in failure and greatly embarrassed the newly installed John F. Kennedy administration. Dulles resigned shortly after the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs Invasion. In the immediate aftermath of President Kennedy’s November 1963 assassination, Dulles served on the highly controversial Warren Commission, which was tasked with investigating the president’s murder. The commission’s work has been subject to much refutation, leading to myriad conspiracy theories, and Dulles’s participation in it only sowed the seeds of more distrust. Indeed, he argued that national security imperatives might compel CIA operatives to lie in their testimony, which did nothing to quiet critics of the commission. After he retired, Dulles authored several books on intelligence and national security issues. He died in Washington, D.C., on January 29, 1969. KENNETH R. STEVENS AND PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR. See also Binh Xuyen; Cao Dai; Central Intelligence Agency; Collins, Joseph Lawton; Dulles, John Foster; Hoa Hao; McCone, John Alex; Ngo Dinh Diem References Dulles, Allen. The Craft of Intelligence. New York: Harper and Row, 1963. Grose, Peter. Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1994. Mosley, Leonard. Dulles: A Biography of Eleanor, Allen, and John Foster Dulles and Their Family Network. New York: Dial, 1978. Srodes, James. Allen Dulles: Master of Spies. Washington, DC: Regnery, 1999.
Dulles, John Foster Birth Date: February 25, 1888 Death Date: May 24, 1959 American lawyer; diplomat; secretary of state, 1953–1959; and brother of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director Allen W. Dulles. Born in Washington, D.C., on February 25, 1888, the son of a Watertown, New York, Presbyterian minister, John Foster Dulles was also the grandson of President Benjamin Harrison’s secretary of state, John W. Foster, and the nephew of Robert Lansing, President Woodrow Wilson’s secretary of state. Following his graduation from Princeton University in 1908, where he studied under Woodrow Wilson, Dulles spent a year at the Sorbonne in Paris and then enrolled in the George Washington University Law School,
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Staunch anti-Communist John Foster Dulles was U.S. secretary of state in the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration from 1953 until his death in 1959. (Library of Congress)
from which he graduated in 1911. In 1913 Dulles joined the law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell. Dulles’s family connections certainly contributed to his wealth of experience in diplomacy. In 1907 he served as secretary to his grandfather, a delegate to the second Hague Peace Conference. During World War I Dulles served in army intelligence and on the War Board of Trade. As a member of the U.S. delegation at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, where he dealt with the issue of German reparations, Dulles disapproved of the harsh terms of the Versailles Treaty and later wrote in War, Peace, and Change (1939) that the treaty contributed to the rise of totalitarianism in Europe. Dulles was an internationalist. He believed that the United States, as the world’s leading creditor nation in the 1920s, had to assume a leading part in world affairs. In the 1930s Dulles attended church councils on world peace, and in 1940 he chaired the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace, sponsored by the Federal Council of Churches, that led to a call for the United Nations (UN). Dulles served as foreign policy adviser to Republican presidential candidate Thomas E. Dewey in the 1944 and 1948 campaigns and was appointed to a year’s term as a Republican U.S. senator during 1948–1949. As such, Dulles championed the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and favored increased European integration as a bulwark against Soviet expansionism. He also sought an American commitment to support Jiang Jieshi’s rump nationalist government on Taiwan (then known as Formosa).
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Dulles generally supported a bipartisan foreign policy for the Cold War. During the Harry S. Truman administration, from 1946 to 1949, Dulles was a U.S. representative to the UN General Assembly. During 1950–1951 he negotiated the U.S. peace treaty with Japan and a U.S.–Japanese security pact. He also supported Truman’s decision to intervene in the Korean War. Although he had earlier espoused bipartisanship in foreign relations, Dulles, who drafted the Republican Party’s foreign policy statement during the 1952 presidential campaign, criticized the Truman administration’s policy of containment as “negative, futile, and immoral.” Republican rhetoric promised the “rollback of the iron curtain” and the liberation of Eastern Europe from communism plus the prospect of massive retaliation with nuclear weapons against attacks by America’s enemies. After serving as the chief foreign policy adviser to Dwight D. Eisenhower during the 1952 presidential campaign, Dulles became secretary of state in January 1953. He hoped to create a European Defense Community (EDC) that combined military forces from France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, linked with NATO. Dulles’s ideas were soon tested in Southeast Asia in the spring of 1954. With French military forces under attack by the Viet Minh at Dien Bien Phu, the Joseph Laniel government requested U.S. military intervention. American officials debated such a plan (Operation VULTURE), which Dulles favored, but President Eisenhower refused unless it was supported by the “united action” of Britain, France, Australia, and New Zealand and the U.S. Congress, which proved unobtainable. With the surrender of the French forces at Dien Bien Phu, attention shifted to a conference on Asian problems at Geneva in April 1954. Dulles only attended briefly and refused to negotiate with the Communist delegates. The United States also refused to sign the final declaration, although the government said that it would abide by the declaration’s provisions. Subsequently, Dulles helped establish the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) to resist Communist expansion in the region and undertook an increased program of military and economic aid to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Under Dulles, U.S. relations with Britain and France deteriorated, especially during the 1956 Suez Crisis. During the crisis Dulles joined Eisenhower in vigorously protesting the joint BritishFrench-Israeli military operation to seize the Suez Canal, which Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser had recently nationalized. The incident had been precipitated by Dulles’s decision earlier in the year to withdraw American pledges to provide Egypt with funds for the massive Aswan Dam project. Dulles’s decision was fueled in part by Nasser’s purchase of weapons from the Soviet bloc. Later, in Eisenhower’s second term, Dulles’s hard-line anticommunism seemed more restrained, especially during the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958. Still, however, Dulles’s detractors allege that he needlessly accelerated Cold War tensions with ideas such as massive retaliation, nuclear brinksmanship, and incendiary rhetoric.
After contracting cancer, Dulles resigned his office on April 15, 1959; he died in Washington, D.C., on May 24, 1959. KENNETH R. STEVENS See also Containment Policy; Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; Dulles, Allen Welsh; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Faure, Edgar; Heath, Donald Read; Knowland, William Fife; Laniel, Joseph; Murphy, Robert Daniel; Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; VULTURE, Operation References Gerson, Louis L. John Foster Dulles. New York: Cooper Square, 1968. Goold-Adams, Richard. The Time of Power: A Reappraisal of John Foster Dulles. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1962. Guhin, Michael. John Foster Dulles: A Statesman and His Times. New York: Columbia University Press, 1972. Hoopes, Townsend. The Devil and John Foster Dulles. Boston: Little, Brown, 1973. Immerman, Richard H. John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in U.S. Foreign Policy. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1999. Marks, Frederick W., III. Power and Peace: The Diplomacy of John Foster Dulles. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993.
Dumb Bombs See Bombs, Gravity
Duong Quynh Hoa Birth Date: 1930 Death Date: 2006 Vietnamese nationalist, Communist, and founding member of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (National Liberation Front [NLF]). Born in 1930 to a prominent southern family, Duong Quynh Hoa attended medical school in Paris. While in France she joined the Communist Party. Upon her return to Vietnam in 1954 she established a medical practice in Saigon. Joining the resistance to President Ngo Dinh Diem, Duong used her access to Saigon social circles to gather information on the Diem government and its American supporters. In 1960 she became a founding member of the NLF while continuing her clandestine activities. During the 1968 Tet Offensive, Duong, along with her husband and son, slipped out of Saigon to a Viet Cong (VC) jungle camp, where her child soon died. That year she was appointed deputy minister of health in the NLF’s Provisional Revolutionary Government. For the remainder of the war she worked tirelessly for the Communist effort, traveling abroad to garner support. Following the 1975 fall of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), Duong administered a children’s hospital in Ho Chi Minh City (formerly Saigon). Disillusioned with the leadership of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), however, Duong eventually became an outspoken critic of that regime. In a 1981 interview with Stanley Karnow, she spoke with dismay and bitterness of the northern domination of postwar
Duong Van Minh Vietnam: “I’ve seen the realities of Communism, and it is a failure—mismanagement, corruption, privilege, repression. My ideals are gone.” In her view the northerners resented the southerners for having prospered from the American presence while the northerners carried the burden of war. She observed that the northerners did not understand local traits and conditions and acted accordingly. An example of this was their attempt to collectivize peasants in the Mekong Delta, whose desire to own land had inspired many of them to support the VC during the war. Pointing to the corruption, she told of administrators who padded payrolls, took kickbacks, and pilfered precious drugs for resale on the black market. Commenting on the disproportionately heavy losses suffered by the VC during the 1968 Tet Offensive, she said that “We lost our best people.” She noted that those killed during the Tet Offensive or lost through the Phoenix Program that followed were replaced by northerners who rebuilt the Communist apparatus and remained after the war to manage it. As a result, the northerners alienated their southern compatriots who still clung to their regional character despite attempts to forge a national identity. Duong remained a high-profile critic of Vietnamese communism until her death in 2006. ROBERT G. MANGRUM
Duong Van Minh Birth Date: February 19, 1916 Death Date: August 6, 2001 Leading Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) general and politician. Born on February 19, 1916, in My Tho in the Mekong Delta, Duong Van Minh, who became known as “Big Minh,” was trained by the French and rose to importance during the early years of Ngo Dinh Diem’s presidency. Considered a Diem loyalist in the military, Minh in early 1956 helped subdue religious sects causing problems for the Diem regime by capturing Hoa Hao guerrilla commander Ba Cut. Diem came to view the popular Minh as a threat, and in 1963 after Diem demoted Minh to special adviser because of his immense popularity among his troops, General Tran Van Don and General Le Van Kim recruited him into their planned coup d’état. On October 5, 1963, Minh met with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operative Lucien Conein at Camp Le Van Duyet, Saigon, garrison headquarters. He informed Conein that the conspirators did not expect U.S. assistance in the coup and that they sought only assurances that the Americans would not attempt to thwart it. Minh also asked for more military and economic aid after the overthrow of Diem.
See also National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam References Hiebert, Murray. “Ex-Communist Official Turns into Vocal Critic.” Far Eastern Economic Review 156 (December 2, 1993): 90. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997.
Duong Van Duc Birth Date: 1926 Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) general. Born in Sa Dec in the Mekong Delta in 1926, Duong Van Duc graduated from the Vietnam Military Academy at Da Lat and in 1953 from the French Staff School. He came to command paratroopers in the ARVN and was promoted to brigadier general in 1956. From 1956 to 1957 he served as minister to the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea). In September 1964 he participated in an unsuccessful coup, prompted by the situation that he was being relieved of command of ARVN forces in the Mekong Delta. The coup attempt collapsed within 24 hours. CHARLOTTE A. POWER See also Vietnam, Republic of, 1954–1975; Vietnam, Republic of, Army Reference Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997.
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Duong Van Minh, known as “Big Minh,” was an influential Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) general. He led the 1963 coup that overthrew and killed President Ngo Dinh Diem. In April 1975, Minh was the last president of the Republic of Vietnam and surrendered to Communist forces when they took Saigon. (AP/Wide World Photos)
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This dialogue gave U.S. ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. the situation that he wanted in that the United States could encourage the plot without directly assisting the plotters. Conein later told Minh that the United States would not attempt to stop the coup. Minh then assigned General Don to continue meeting with Conein. It was Minh’s bodyguard, Captain Nguyen Van Nhung, who was the executioner in the November 1, 1963, coup. He shot both Colonel Le Quang Tung and Major Le Quang Trieu. As General Mai Huu Xuan, Major Duong Hiuu Nghia, and Captain Nhung left army headquarters to secure Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu, Minh raised two fingers of his right hand to Nhung, a signal to kill the two Ngo brothers. Nhung and Nghia carried out the assassinations. When news of the deaths reached shocked U.S. authorities, Lodge ordered Conein to meet with Minh. Minh lamely claimed that Diem had committed suicide. Following the coup, the ruling generals formed a 12-member Military Revolutionary Council. Minh publicly stated that this arrangement would prevent the excesses of the previous regime. In truth, however, he had created this body to increase his prestige without assuming more personal responsibility. Minh preferred playing tennis and tending his orchids and birds to the tedious government meetings and business. Lodge tried to help Minh rule but concluded that the general was not strong enough to last very long. On the morning of January 30, 1964, General Nguyen Khanh carried out a coup in which he had Nhung executed, made Minh the head of state in name only, and made himself prime minister. Khanh replaced Minh in the summer of 1964 when Khanh promoted himself to the presidency. When Saigon erupted in protest Khanh resigned, and the Military Revolutionary Council met to choose a new president. The council decided to install a compromise triumvirate of Khanh, Minh, and General Tran Thien Khiem, with Khanh as acting prime minister. In the autumn of 1964 Khanh continued his plotting and sent Khiem to Washington as the ambassador for the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) and assigned Minh to a goodwill tour abroad. During this period the Communists dispatched Minh’s younger brother, Duong Thanh Nhat, a People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) officer who in 1960 had been sent to work for the Communists in South Vietnam, to try to influence or recruit Minh. Minh gave his brother sanctuary and allowed Nhat to live with him in Minh’s personal residence until Minh was sent abroad. Minh’s protection of his Communist younger brother became known and raised suspicions about Minh’s loyalties, even though Nhat apparently had no success in trying to win his brother over to the Communist side. After spending several years living in exile in Thailand, Minh returned to South Vietnam in 1969. In the 1971 South Vietnamese presidential election he challenged President Nguyen Van Thieu, but Minh dropped out of the race when he realized that he was unlikely to win. Minh played a final political role during the collapse of the South Vietnamese government. On April 28, 1975, seven days after
Thieu resigned, Minh became the president of South Vietnam. He and his supporters mistakenly thought that he would be an acceptable figure to the Communists. As PAVN forces rolled into Saigon and took the presidential palace, they found Minh and his cabinet waiting in business suits in the reception chamber on the second floor to transfer the government to the Communists. Minh surrendered unconditionally. In 1983 the government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) allowed Minh to move to France. In the late 1990s as his health began to fail, he moved to California to be near his daughter. Minh died on August 6, 2001, in Pasadena, California. MICHAEL R. NICHOLS See also Ba Cut; Conein, Lucien Emile; Hoa Hao; Ho Chi Minh Campaign; Le Quang Tung; Le Van Kim; Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr.; Military Revolutionary Council; Ngo Dinh Diem; Ngo Dinh Diem, Overthrow of; Ngo Dinh Nhu; Nguyen Khanh; Nguyen Van Thieu; Tran Thien Khiem; Tran Van Don References Ahern, Thomas L., Jr. CIA and the Generals: Covert Support to Military Government in South Vietnam. Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1998; declassified 2009. Bain, Chester A. Vietnam: The Roots of Conflict. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1967. Davidson, Phillip A. Vietnam at War: The History, 1946–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1988. Duncanson, Dennis J. Government and Revolution in Vietnam. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. Olson, James S., ed. Dictionary of the Vietnam War. New York: Greenwood, 1988. Tran Bach Dang, ed. Chung Mot Bong Co (Ve Mat Tran Dan Toc Giai Phong Mien Nam Viet Nam) [Under One Flag (The National Liberation Front for South Vietnam)]. Hanoi: National Political Publishing House, 1993.
Dupuis, Jean Birth Date: December 8, 1829 Death Date: November 28, 1912 French explorer, arms merchant, and writer who demonstrated in the early 1870s the navigability of Vietnam’s Red River for trade with China. Born in Saint-Juste-la-Pendue on December 8, 1829, Jean Dupuis learned Chinese, established himself at Hankow, and traveled in 15 of China’s 18 provinces in quest of business. From 1870 to 1871 he was in Yunnan, where he sold salt and rice at Kunming for 30 times their cost in Hanoi. In 1872 Dupuis was in Paris, where he met with French government officials. He may well have worked out a secret arrangement with the French government concerning Tonkin but was warned by the minister of the navy not to expect any assistance from France.
Durbrow, Elbridge Dupuis purchased two former gunboats in Shanghai and secured a steam launch in Hong Kong. He also recruited a force of some 25 Europeans and 150 Asian mercenaries. In late October, 30 cannon and 7,000 rifles arrived from France. In a daring move on December 22, 1872, without the approval of the Vietnamese court, Dupuis and his heavily armed men occupied a section of Hanoi and announced their intention to set up trade in arms and salt, the latter prohibited by Vietnamese law. When Vietnamese government permission was not secured, a frustrated Dupuis started up the Red River from Hanoi. He made the mistake of visiting with the Yellow Flag Chinese bandits, which led Liu Yongfu (Liu Yung-fu), the leader of the rival Black Flags, to refuse to meet with him and also led to fighting between the Black Flags and the French that inflicted a number of casualties on the latter. In March Dupuis’s ships reached Mang Chao, his destination in China. With the navigability of the Red River now proven, French governor-general in Cochin China Admiral Marie-Jules Dupré cabled Paris and urged an immediate French occupation of Tonkin. The French government declined. Fellow Frenchman Francis Garnier then secured approval from the Vietnamese court to lead a small force from Saigon to Hanoi with the stated purpose of removing Dupuis. Garnier then joined forces with Dupuis in an attempt to conquer Tonkin. With Garnier’s death and the failure of this attempt in 1873, Dupuis was obliged to depart Hanoi without his ships and return to France. He died in Monaco on November 28, 1912. ARTHUR J. DOMMEN AND SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Black Flags; Garnier, Marie Joseph François; Vietnam, History of, 938 CE through the French Conquest References Buttinger, Joseph. The Smaller Dragon: A Political History of Vietnam. New York: Praeger, 1958. Chapuis, Oscar. The Last Emperors of Vietnam: From Tu Duc to Bao Dai. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2000.
Durbrow, Elbridge Birth Date: September 21, 1903 Death Date: May 16, 1997 U.S. Foreign Service officer and ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) from March 1957 to April 1961. Born in San Francisco on September 21, 1903, Elbridge Durbrow graduated with a degree in philosophy from Yale University in 1926. He began his career in the Foreign Service in 1930 as a viceconsul in Warsaw. He then served in Bucharest, Moscow, Naples, Rome, and Lisbon. In 1944 he was an American delegate to the Breton Woods Conference that created the World Bank. Durbrow then served briefly as chief of the Eastern European Division of the State Department, and from 1946 to 1948 he suc-
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ceeded George Kennan as deputy chief of mission at Moscow under ambassador to the Soviet Union General Walter Bedell Smith. It was Durbrow’s third tour in Moscow, and he strongly warned of Soviet expansionism and efforts to subvert the West. An instructor at the Naval War College between 1948 and 1950, Durbrow afterward became chief of the Division of Foreign Service Personnel. As ambassador to South Vietnam from 1957, Durbrow urged that military aid be conditioned on Saigon’s progress in political and economic reform, while Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) chief Lieutenant General Samuel T. Williams placed greater emphasis on building the armed forces. Durbrow minimized the guerrilla threat and doubted the need to maintain an army of 150,000 men, but President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s policy of giving priority to military strength remained unchanged. In early 1960 Durbrow told Ngo Dinh Diem that the repressive actions of his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, had damaged his regime. After this, Diem and Durbrow rarely spoke. When Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) forces suffered heavy casualties during Viet Cong (VC) attacks in mid-1960, even Durbrow supported increased military assistance, but he again urged Diem to take measures to increase his public support, including relaxing controls over the press and conducting village elections, and boldly suggested that Nhu be sent out of the country. Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale called Durbrow’s advice “misinformed and unfriendly.” As certain as Durbrow was that without reforms Diem’s government faced disaster, Lansdale was sure that undercutting Diem would be counterproductive. Despite U.S. embassy neutrality during the abortive coup of November 1960, Lansdale, Williams (now at the Pentagon), and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) station chief William Colby spread word that Durbrow welcomed it, thus destroying his effectiveness. Durbrow left South Vietnam in April 1961. His final report to the Eisenhower administration acquiesced in MAAG’s proposal for a 20,000-man increase in ARVN forces but advised withholding funds pending the initiation of reforms. Meanwhile, returning from a Saigon fact-finding trip, Lansdale warned of the imminent danger of a Communist victory. This report alarmed President John F. Kennedy, who even considered appointing Lansdale the new ambassador. When Secretary of State Dean Rusk instructed Durbrow to tell Diem that future aid would depend on reform, Lansdale privately informed Diem that he was being watched and should make token gestures of change. Rusk rejected naming Lansdale as Durbrow’s replacement as well as national security adviser Walt Rostow’s attempt to have Lansdale appointed coordinator of Vietnam policy. To replace Durbrow, Kennedy eventually settled on Frederick E. Nolting, another career Foreign Service officer. From 1961 to 1965 Durbrow served as delegate to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Council in Paris. He was then State Department adviser to the National War College in Washington and the Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. He retired in 1968. He then wrote and lectured on foreign affairs. In
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the 1970s Durbrow was chairman of the American Foreign Policy Institute and advised President Jimmy Carter concerning the Panama Canal Treaty in the late 1970s. Durbrow died at his home in Walnut Creek, California, on May 16, 1997. JOHN D. ROOT See also Colby, William Egan; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Lansdale, Edward Geary; Ngo Dinh Diem; Ngo Dinh Nhu; Nolting, Frederick Earnest, Jr.; Rostow, Walt Whitman; Rusk, David Dean; Williams, Samuel Tankersley References Anderson, David L. Trapped by Success: The Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam, 1953–1961. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991. Newman, John M. JFK and Vietnam: Deception, Intrigue, and the Struggle for Power. New York: Warner Books, 1992.
Dustoff Radio sign call adopted by the U.S. Army’s 57th Medical Detachment (Helicopter Ambulance), which was the first American medical helicopter evacuation unit to operate in Vietnam. The term “dustoff” soon became the sign call for nearly all medical helicopter evacuation units and became synonymous for aerial medical evacuation. Major Charles L. Kelly, who commanded the 57th Medical Detachment, was the foremost proponent of medevac operations. Major Kelly was killed in Vietnam. The 57th Medical Detachment was first deployed to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), in April 1962. The U.S. Navy’s Support Activity Group, which assigned and controlled all sign calls in South Vietnam, permitted the use of the term “dustoff” after a chopper pilot utilized it during one of the 57th Medical Detachment’s first missions, sometime in 1962. Each unit used the radio sign call “dustoff,” which was followed by its specific numerical designation. The only helicopter ambulance service that did not use “dustoff” in Vietnam was the 1st Cavalry Division, which used “medevac.” The medical evacuation UH-1 Iroquois (“Huey”) helicopter had a crew of four, consisting of a pilot, copilot, crew chief, and medic. During most missions, only two casualty patients were airlifted at any given time. Aerial medical evacuation units frequently encountered dangerous conditions, as they often had to fly into combat zones and were fired upon despite their clear markings as a medical transport unit. From 1962 to 1973 (when U.S. forces were entirely withdrawn from South Vietnam), dustoff units evacuated between 850,000 and 900,000 individuals, many of them allied military personnel and Vietnamese civilians. About 45 percent were U.S. casualties; the remainder were Vietnamese, both military and civilian. The year in which the most missions were flown (and the most patients were transported) was 1969, when 145 medevac units were operat-
ing in South Vietnam. In 1965 each helicopter averaged two missions per day, but that increased to four missions per day in 1969. After 1970 the number of missions per unit declined. However, because of mechanical problems with the UH-1 helicopter, which was notorious for its high maintenance, only about 75 percent of the air ambulances were actually operational at any given time. Dustoff crew members, who usually served one-year tours, had a high incidence of casualties and fatalities because of the inherently dangerous nature of their missions. Of the approximately 1,400 men who flew missions during the war, 40 pilots and copilots were killed by hostile fire; an additional 180 were wounded. In addition, 48 others died in crashes and other non–hostile-fire accidents; an additional 200 were injured in non–hostile-fire incidents. The helicopters were frequently operated at night or in poor weather conditions, which greatly increased the chances of accidents and crashes. Indeed, medical evacuation helicopters had a loss rate to hostile fire 3.3 times greater than that of all other helicopters in the Vietnam War. Hoist missions, which involved lowering a stretcher on a cable to the ground and then hoisting the stretcher into the helicopter in midair, were perhaps the most dangerous of all. It is estimated that hoist missions were 7 times more likely to end in a crash that caused deaths or fatalities. Dustoff units made a significant contribution to the war effort despite the inherent dangers of the work and helped keep the number of deaths down among Americans as well as South Vietnamese. In 1980 former staff sergeant Thomas L. Johnson, a member of the 57th Medical Detachment, organized a reunion for all Vietnam medevac pilots and crew. The first reunion of its kind ultimately became the Dustoff Association, dedicated to the veterans of medevac missions in Vietnam. The organization now has more than 1,000 members and meets annually. PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR. See also Brady, Patrick Henry; Helicopters, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Helicopters, Employment of, in Vietnam; Kelly, Charles L.; Medicine, Military; Medics and Corpsmen; Novosel, Michael, Sr. References Bonds, Ray, ed. The Vietnam War: The Illustrated History of the Conflict in Southeast Asia. New York: Salamander, 1999. Neel, Spurgeon. Medical Support of the U.S. Army in Vietnam, 1965– 1972. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1973. Novosel, Michael J. Dustoff: The Memoir of an Army Aviator. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1999.
Duy Tan Birth Date: August 14, 1899 Death Date: December 26, 1945 Eleventh emperor of the Nguyen dynasty (1802–1945) and son of Emperor Thanh Thai. Born on August 14, 1899, Duy Tan (which means “reformism”) was his ruling name; his real name was Vinh
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was sent into exile on Reunion Island. Thai Phien and Tran Cao Van were beheaded. During World War II Duy Tan joined the French Army as a major. After the war he went to Paris. Reportedly the French considered him as a replacement for Emperor Bao Dai. Duy Tan died in a plane crash in Africa on December 26, 1945. PHAM CAO DUONG See also French Indochina, 1860s–1946; Nguyen Dynasty References Chapuis, Oscar. The Last Emperors of Vietnam: From Tu Duc to Bao Dai. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2000. Hoang Trong Thuoc. Ho So Vua Duy Tan (Than The Va Su Nghiep). San Francisco: Nha Xuat Ban Mo Lang, 1993. Le Thanh Khoi. Le Viet-Nam: Histoire et civilisation. Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1955. Nguyen Huyen Anh. Viet Nam Danh Nhan Tu Dien [Dictionary of Vietnamese Great Men and Women]. Houston, TX: Zieleks, 1990. Nguyen The Anh. Viet Nam Duoi Thoi Phap Do Ho [Vietnam under French Domination]. Saigon: Lua Thieng, 1970.
Dylan, Bob Birth Date: May 24, 1941 Duy Tan, the 11th emperor of the Nguyen dynasty, was placed on the throne by the French at age eight but proved to be a staunch Vietnamese patriot and opponent of French rule. (Vietnam Information Service)
San. The French authorities placed Duy Tan on the throne at the age of eight, when they deposed Emperor Thanh Thai and sent him into exile on Reunion Island. During his 9-year reign, Duy Tan proved to be intelligent and a staunch patriot. When he was 13 years old he sent a letter to the French authorities to protest their violation of the 1884 Treaty and requested that it be faithfully carried out. In 1915 with France occupied in World War I, he believed that this was a good opportunity for the Vietnamese to fight for their independence. To do this he secretly contacted leaders of the Viet Nam Quang Phuc Hoi (Association for the Restoration of Viet Nam), among them Thai Phien and Tran Cao Van, and planned an uprising in three provinces: Thua Thien, Quang Nam, and Quang Ngai. The plan was to spread the revolt throughout central Vietnam. The date for the uprising was set for the second day of the fourth month of the lunar calendar, or May 3, 1916. Duy Tan left the palace to meet Thai Phien and Tran Cao Van and followed them to Quang Ngai to lead the movement. The uprising was a failure because a mandarin, Phan Liem of Quang Nam, revealed the plans to the French. The emperor was arrested with his two lieutenants and detained in the Mang Ca prison. Later Duy Tan
Popular American musician, folk singer, and social protester. Born Robert Allen Zimmermann on May 24, 1941, in the mining town of Hibbing, Minnesota, Bob Dylan briefly attended the University of Minnesota where he changed his name in homage to his favorite poet, Dylan Thomas. After Dylan relocated to New York, his music was influenced by the music of legendary folk singer Woody Guthrie and by the Beat generation poetry of Allen Ginsberg. Although lacking a great voice, Dylan succeeded through his charisma and the symbolic poetry of his lyrics. In the 1960s he helped the folkrock style he was inventing gain acceptance and emerged as a symbol of the counterculture movement. Dylan radicalized popular music and underscored domestic tensions. The Civil Rights Movement and groups opposing American involvement in Vietnam adopted as anthems Dylan songs “Blowin’ in the Wind” and “The Times They Are A-Changin’.” These songs and others suggested that the dissatisfied younger generation could find solutions to problems that the older generation could not. Dylan’s songs frequently criticized the Vietnam War. “John Brown,” performed for years but not officially recorded and released until 1995, tells of a young man sent to the war much to the delight of his mother, who represents the Establishment; the soldier returns disabled but with medals to present to his mother. In August 1963 Dylan performed “Masters of War” for hundreds of thousands of civil rights protesters participating in Reverend Martin Luther King Jr.’s March on Washington. This song holds the older generation
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responsible for creating a situation in which military leaders could hide the horrors of war “while young people’s blood runs out of their bodies and into the mud.” In 1965 Dylan unveiled a new blend of folk and rock when he included electric instruments and a broader subject matter. Joan Baez and other folk purists criticized this change, but Dylan overcame the criticism and reached an even larger audience. He emerged as a bona fide rock star, but his songs maintained their social commentary and helped change conceptions about popular rock music. In “Like a Rolling Stone,” Dylan continued the theme of generational conflict. In this song he used a culturally familiar symbol to indicate that the previously outcast generation had supplanted the Establishment. Dylan’s credibility and commercial success paved the way for other protest rock performers to excel in the 1960s and beyond, including Jefferson Airplane; Crosby, Stills, Nash and Young; and the Grateful Dead. Dylan’s 1966 near-fatal motorcycle accident forced a recuperative period of several years, yet he remained a prolific artist, to date producing more than 50 albums (including country-
and-western and gospel efforts), several plays, a novel, and poetry. He is also a painter and has published a compilation of his paintings and drawings. In more recent years, Dylan played a part in protests against the Persian Gulf War (1991) and the Iraq War (2003–). In 2004 he released the first part of his memoirs, Chronicles: Volume One, to critical acclaim. Since the 1990s, Dylan had been engaged in what he has billed as the “Never Ending Tour,” having performed some 100 concerts a year in the United States and abroad. DALLAS COTHRUM See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Baez, Joan Chandos; Students for a Democratic Society; Weathermen References Heylin, Clinton. Bob Dylan: Behind the Shades. New York: Summit Books, 1991. Scadato, Anthony. Bob Dylan. New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1971. Shelton, Robert. No Direction Home: The Life and Music of Bob Dylan. New York: Beech Tree Books, 1986.
E EAGLE PULL,
Operation
Event Date: April 12, 1975 U.S. air evacuation of personnel from Phnom Penh, Cambodia, in April 1975. On June 27, 1973, the U.S. Support Activities Group/ Seventh Air Force (USSAG/7AF), located at Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thailand, published Contingency Plan 5060C (CONPLAN 5060C), code name EAGLE PULL, concerning the evacuation of Phnom Penh. Rescue units received the EAGLE PULL plan as Khmer Rouge units closed in on the capital, and it seemed that Phnom Penh and all of Cambodia would fall. But to the surprise of many, when the U.S. bombing stopped on August 15, 1973, the Cambodian Army repulsed the Khmer Rouge attack. During the next 20 months, the USSAG/7AF changed EAGLE PULL to meet evolving circumstances. When one Cambodian town after another fell to the Khmer Rouge, EAGLE PULL focused only on evacuating Americans and a handful of others from Phnom Penh. A complex prioritization system that classified noncombatant evacuees according to sex, age, and physical condition was developed, and a U.S. Marine Corps ground security force was added to the plan. On April 3, 1975, as Khmer Rouge forces again closed in on Phnom Penh, EAGLE PULL forces were placed on alert. An 11-man marine element flew into the city to prepare for the arrival of the evacuation helicopters. The marines designated a soccer field located a quarter of a mile from the American embassy as Landing Zone (LZ) Hotel. On April 10 Ambassador Gunther Dean asked that EAGLE PULL be executed no later than April 12. At 8:50 a.m. on April 12, an Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service (ARRS) HH-53 landed a four-man U.S. Air Force combat control team to coordinate the operation. Three minutes later, it
guided in a U.S. Marine Corps Sikorsky CH-53 Sea Stallion with the first element of the marine security force. Marine and air force helicopters then carried 276 evacuees, including 82 Americans, 159 Cambodians, and 35 foreign nationals, to the safety of U.S. Navy assault carriers in the Gulf of Thailand. By 10:00 a.m., the marine contingency force, the advanced 11-man element, and the combat control team had been evacuated. There were no casualties in the operation. EARL H. TILFORD JR. See also Cambodia; Search-and-Rescue Operations References Benjamin, Milton R., and Paul Rogers Brinkley. “Farewell to Phnom Penh.” Newsweek, April 2, 1975, 27. Tilford, Earl H., Jr. Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia, 1961–1975. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1980.
Easter Offensive Event Date: 1972 The 1972 Easter or Spring Offensive carried out by the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) is frequently referred to as the Nguyen Hue Campaign, so-named for the Vietnamese ruler who defeated the Chinese in 1789, although technically the term “Nguyen Hue Campaign” was used by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) to refer only to the offensive campaign in the Binh Long–Tay Ninh area northwest of Saigon and not to the entire 1972 offensive. The Easter Offensive consisted of a massive coordinated three-pronged
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Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) soldiers man a checkpoint in Kontum on April 26, 1972, during the successful defense of the city against the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) during the Communist Easter Offensive (Nguyen Hue Campaign). (Bettmann/Corbis)
attack designed to strike a decisive blow against the government and armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Within two weeks of the operation’s beginning on Easter Sunday, large conventional battles were fought simultaneously on three major fronts. The PAVN employed conventional tactics and introduced weaponry beyond that of any previous campaign. This was the largest offensive ever launched by Hanoi and was a radical departure from North Vietnam’s past strategy and methods of warfare historically used in its attempt to conquer South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese leaders decided to employ conventional tactics for this offensive for several reasons. First, they did not believe that the Americans, with only 65,000 troops left in Vietnam, could influence the situation on the ground; Hanoi believed that the political situation in the United States would not permit President Richard M. Nixon to commit any new troops or combat support to assist the ARVN. Hanoi hoped to discredit Nixon’s Vietnamization and pacification programs and cause the remaining U.S. forces to be withdrawn quicker. Additionally, a resounding North Vietnamese military victory would humiliate Nixon, force the Nixon administration to negotiate a peace agreement favorable to Communist forces but that contained terms that might entice Nixon to accept it prior to November 1972 presidential elections, or perhaps even help to defeat Nixon’s reelection bid, opening the White House to a more
moderate Democratic Party president less disposed to further U.S. involvement in Vietnam. PAVN general and North Vietnamese defense minister Vo Nguyen Giap was the reluctant architect of the 1972 Easter Offensive. Despite his own belief that this was not yet the time for an offensive, Giap prepared to carry out the Politburo’s orders. The campaign was designed to destroy as many ARVN forces as possible, thus permitting the Communists to occupy key South Vietnamese cities and enabling PAVN forces to be in position to directly threaten the government of South Vietnamese president Nguyen Van Thieu. Giap hoped to achieve a knockout blow, but if that could not be achieved, he hoped to seize at least enough critical terrain to strengthen the North Vietnamese position in any subsequent negotiations. Throughout 1971 Hanoi requested and received large quantities of modern weapons from the Soviet Union and China. These included MiG-21 jets, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), T-54 medium tanks, 130-millimeter (mm) field guns, 160-mm mortars, 57-mm antiaircraft guns (including self-propelled guns), and for the first time heat-seeking shoulder-fired SA-7 Strella antiaircraft missiles. In addition, other war supplies such as spare parts, ammunition, vehicles, and fuels were shipped to North Vietnam in unprecedented quantities.
Economy, U.S., and the Vietnam War Giap’s offensive plan called for a multidivisional attack across the demilitarized zone (DMZ) toward Hue and Da Nang, with other forces pressing in from the A Shau Valley in the west. Giap wanted to force President Thieu to commit reserves to protect his northern provinces, after which Giap would launch a second assault from Cambodia to threaten the South Vietnamese capital of Saigon (present-day Ho Chi Minh City). Then Giap would launch the third attack in the Central Highlands to take Kontum and aim for the coast in Binh Dinh Province, thus splitting South Vietnam in two and leading to its collapse or, at the very least, a peace agreement on Hanoi’s terms. The North Vietnamese offensive began on Good Friday, March 30, 1972, when three PAVN divisions, reinforced by T-54 medium tanks, attacked south across the DMZ separating North and South Vietnam and along Highway 9 out of Laos toward Quang Tri and Hue in I Corps Tactical Zone. Three days later three additional divisions moved from sanctuaries in Cambodia and pushed into Binh Long Province, capturing Loc Ninh and surrounding An Loc, the provincial capital only 65 miles from the national capital of Saigon. Additional PAVN forces attacked across the Cambodian border in the Central Highlands toward Kontum in the II Corps Tactical Zone. Finally, two more PAVN divisions took control of several districts in Binh Dinh Province, along the coast of the South China Sea. In each case the PAVN assault was characterized by human-wave attacks backed by tanks and massive artillery support. Fourteen PAVN infantry divisions and 26 separate regiments (including more than 120,000 troops and some 500 tanks and other armored vehicles) participated in the offensive. The PAVN thrusts were at first very successful, particularly in northern South Vietnam where they quickly overran the newly formed ARVN 3rd Division in Quang Tri. The PAVN also threatened both Hue and Kontum, but ARVN forces were able to stiffen their defenses 25 miles north of Hue, while defenders at Kontum were also successful in halting the PAVN assault there. ARVN forces at An Loc were besieged by the PAVN and sustained repeated ground attacks and massive artillery and rocket fire; nevertheless, the ARVN forces held out until the siege there was broken in July 1972. President Nixon resumed the bombing of North Vietnam on May 8, 1972 (Operation LINEBACKER I) and ordered the mining of Haiphong Harbor as well as several other North Vietnamese ports. This took some of the pressure off ARVN forces, but intense fighting continued throughout the summer all over South Vietnam. In June, ARVN forces in Military Region I launched a counteroffensive that eventually resulted in the recapture of Quang Tri Province. The Easter Offensive had failed. Although the combat performance of the ARVN had been uneven at best, the ARVN had held, supported by U.S. advisers and massive American airpower, including Boeing B-52 Stratofortress strikes that repeatedly broke up attacking Communist formations and reduced the odds against the ARVN. Estimates placed North Vietnamese casualties at more than 100,000 killed; in addition,
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North Vietnam lost at least half of its large-caliber artillery and tanks. However, the PAVN still controlled more territory in South Vietnam than before, and Hanoi believed that it was in a stronger bargaining position at the Paris negotiations. Nevertheless, the success of South Vietnamese forces in confronting the North Vietnamese onslaught was touted as proof that President Nixon’s Vietnamization policy had worked. JAMES H. WILLBANKS See also An Loc, Battle of; Nguyen Van Thieu; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Pacification; Quang Tri, Battle of; Vietnamization; Vo Nguyen Giap References Andradé, Dale. America’s Last Vietnam Battle: Halting Hanoi’s 1972 Easter Offensive. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001. Clarke, Jeffrey J. Advice and Support: The Final Years; The U.S. Army in Vietnam. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988. Lavalle, A. J. C. Airpower and the 1972 Spring Invasion. U.S. Air Force Southeast Asia Monograph Series, Vol. 2, Monograph 3. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1985. Military Arts Faculty, Military Science Institute. Chien Dich Tien Cong Quang Tri 1972 [1972 Quang Tri Offensive Campaign]. Hanoi: Military Science Institute, 1976. Military History Institute of Vietnam. Chien Dich Tien Cong Nguyen Hue (Nam 1972) [The Nguyen Hue Offensive Campaign (1972)]. Hanoi: Military History Institute, 1988. Ngo Quang Truong. The Easter Offensive of 1972. Indochina Monographs. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1980. Turley, Gerald H. The Easter Offensive: The Last American Advisors, Vietnam, 1972. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985. Willbanks, James H. The Battle of An Loc. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005.
Economy, U.S., and the Vietnam War To fight the Vietnam War, the Lyndon B. Johnson administration had to increase defense expenditures. These expenditures could have been financed by tax increases, by reductions in outlays in other parts of the federal government’s budget, or by deficit spending and borrowing. Tax revenues did not keep pace with expenditure increases, reductions in other spending did not occur, and thus the war was partially financed by deficit spending. From 1965 to 1969, the years in which U.S. involvement in the war increased most dramatically, defense expenditures increased by $31.9 billion while total federal government outlays increased by $65.4 billion, indicating that the defense buildup was not being financed by reductions in other parts of the budget. Furthermore, the increase in tax revenues was not enough to keep pace with the increased spending; thus, the deficit reached $25.2 billion in fiscal year 1968. An increased budget deficit has the following anticipated impacts on the major macroeconomic measures of the economy: an increase in the nation’s overall price level, a decrease in the
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Deficit Spending during the Vietnam War Fiscal Year
Defense Expenditures (in billions)
Total Outlays (in billions)
Tax Revenue (in billions)
Surplus or Deficit (-) (in billions)
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
$50.60 $58.10 $71.40 $81.90 $82.50 $81.70 $78.90 $79.20
$118.20 $134.50 $157.50 $178.10 $183.60 $195.60 $210.20 $230.70
$116.80 $130.80 $148.80 $153.00 $186.90 $192.80 $187.10 $207.30
–$1.4 –$3.7 –$8.6 –$25.2 $3.2 –$2.8 –$23.0 –$23.4
unemployment rate, an increase in the output level, a deterioration in the international trade account, and an increase in interest rates. The impact of the increased deficits was as expected through 1969. The economy did well as measured by the real gross domestic product and the unemployment rate, but the cost was felt in inflation, in an increased international trade deficit, and in higher interest rates. Another aspect to consider would be the impact of the higher interest rates on private-sector spending. Increased interest rates should reduce private-sector expenditures that are financed by borrowing, such as homes, business investments, and consumer durable goods. Construction of new private housing units declined in 1966, 1969, and 1970. Net fixed investment expenditures (in 1987 dollars) decreased in 1967, 1968, and 1970. Expenditures on consumer durable goods decreased in 1970. Thus, there is some evidence that private-sector expenditures were adversely affected by the deficit spending associated with the war. One other interesting aspect of the war’s impact is that a massive rethinking of macroeconomic theory occurred because of the difficulty encountered when the Richard M. Nixon administration embarked on policies to decrease the inflation rate. Examining the data on the price level and unemployment, one observes a steady increase in the price level and a decrease in the unemployment rate from 1965 through 1969. Then something curious happens. The price level continues to rise in 1970, 1971, and 1972, while the unemployment rate also increases. In fact, in 1972 the unemployment rate was 1.1 percentage points (24.4 percent) higher than in 1965, and the price level was still increasing. Consider what one would expect the data to show, given macroeconomic theory at the time. The Vietnam War caused an increase in government expenditures, not fully financed by tax increases. This led to a demand-side expansion during the years 1964–1969. The data for those years completely match what should happen in a demand-side expansion: an increase in the price level and a reduction in unemployment. In response to the increase in inflation, the Nixon administration embarked on the standard policy response of a tight government budget and a tight monetary policy. If all went according to theory, the reduction in inflation would result in some increase in unemployment, but
the increase should match the decrease in unemployment that occurred during the expansionary phase. Thus, a contractionary policy that resulted in an unemployment rate increase to 4.9 percent should have reduced the inflation rate to about 1.4–1.5 percent. If the policy further increased the unemployment rate to 5.9 percent, the inflation rate should have decreased further to under 1 percent. Instead, the inflation rate increased to 5.7 percent and then decreased somewhat to 4.4 percent. (The 1971 inflation rate was a bit misleading, as the Nixon administration’s frustration with the unresponsiveness of the inflation rate resulted in the imposition of price and wage controls on the economy in August 1971.) Something had gone wrong. Economists had thought that they had achieved the ultimate breakthrough in policy making: there was a tradeoff between inflation and unemployment so that an estimate could be made as to how much of each the economy should have. An increase in the inflation rate would be accompanied by a decrease in the unemployment rate, and a decrease in the inflation rate would be accompanied by an increase in the unemployment rate. The first aspect worked fine during the years 1965 through 1969, but the process did not reverse itself in 1970 and 1971. The changes in macroeconomic theory that were spawned by the unreaction of the inflation rate resulted in what economists would dub “stagflation” by the mid-1970s. Stagflation was a situation in which inflation was rising, unemployment was rising, and overall economic growth was either negative or stagnant. Stagflation plagued the U.S. economy for the remainder of the 1970s and into the early 1980s before a tough monetary policy and supplyside policies of the 1980s and 1990s began to reverse the trend. The only way that the inflation rate could continue to increase when unemployment was also increasing was if something was occurring on the supply side as well. The first attempt to analyze these “somethings” was with the role of expectations on labor supply. It was thought that inflation would not be expected when it had been historically low, so wages were slow to catch up to price increases. Once inflation becomes expected, wage increases would immediately match, or even precede, price increases. This would have the effect of increasing costs of production and the unemployment rate. This was called adaptive expectations. It also had the side effect of implying that activist government demand-management policy would be ineffective, which led to the next step in theory revamping. Why would people be slow to catch on to inflation? If it was known that expansionary policy would cause inflation, then as soon as an expansionary policy was discovered, wages and prices would immediately adjust, and no expansion could occur. Even more important, government attempts to stabilize the economy would only result in destabilization; thus, the government must cease all efforts at demand management and move to the supply side of the economy. What could be done on the supply side? Remove the impediments to work efforts and saving. These could be accomplished by lowering taxes and reducing regulations.
Eden, Sir Robert Anthony
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In summary, the deficit financing of the war led to a demand-side expansion that increased the consumer price index, the international trade deficit, unemployment, and interest rates. The increased interest rates decreased some private expenditures. The inflation that occurred did not respond to the traditional demand-side remedy and therefore led to a massive rethinking of macroeconomic theory. It is worth noting, however, that supply-side economic prescriptions demonstrated their own problems, as did deregulation. Under the administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush, inflation was kept in check, and the economy did fairly well. However, massive budget deficits ensued, partly because there were large increases in government spending, especially for defense during the 1980s. Beginning in 2007, the United States entered a prolonged and severe economic downturn, which many blamed on President George W. Bush’s supply-side tax cuts, stratospheric deficit spending, and laissez-affair approach to market regulation. EDWARD M. MCNERTNEY See also Great Society Program; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Nixon, Richard Milhous; United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1965–1968; United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1969–1973; Wage and Price Controls References Matusow, Allen J. The Unraveling of America: A History of Liberalism in the 1960s. New York: Harper and Row, 1984. Stein, Herbert. Presidential Economics: The Making of Economic Policy from Roosevelt to Reagan and Beyond. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984. U.S. Council of Economic Advisors. Economic Report of the President. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964–1972.
Eden, Sir Robert Anthony Birth Date: June 12, 1897 Death Date: January 14, 1977 British Conservative Party politician, foreign secretary who helped negotiate the 1954 Geneva Accords, and prime minister (1955– 1957). Born on June 12, 1897, near Bishop Aukland, County Durham, England, Robert Anthony Eden served in World War I, advancing to brigade major at age 21, the youngest in the British Army. During 1919–1922 he studied at Christ Church, Oxford University, before winning his first election to Parliament in 1923 as a Conservative. Eden served as foreign minister three times: during 1935–1938 under Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain (before resigning in disgust over appeasement policies), during 1940–1945 as part of the wartime coalition, and during 1951–1955 under Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Beginning in 1945, with the Labour Party in office, Eden served as shadow prime minister. In October 1951 after the Conservatives defeated the Labourites, he began serving his third term as foreign secretary.
Anthony Eden, British prime minister during 1955–1957, enjoyed a meteoric political rise in the years surrounding World War II. His dramatic political career ended with the British debacle of the Suez Crisis of 1956. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)
British foreign policy concerns in Southeast Asia centered on the well-being of investments in Thailand and Malaya and the potential threat of the spread of communism. Eden believed as early as 1953 that the so-called domino theory could be halted if Communist control in Vietnam was limited to the north. When the French were defeated at Dien Bien Phu, Eden cochaired the 1954 Geneva Conference and, despite U.S. secretary of state John Foster Dulles’s push for military intervention, worked to forge an alternative to a wider war. Acting as an intermediary among the Soviets, Chinese, and Americans, Eden brokered a political division of the area, temporarily conceding the north to the Communists above the 17th Parallel pending nationwide elections scheduled for 1956. The accords also established neutral governments in Cambodia and Laos to act as a buffer between the Communist states and the rest of Southeast Asia. Eden became prime minister in 1955, but he resigned in January 1957 because of political pressure and ill health following the 1956 Suez Crisis debacle, in which he played a leading role and in which British and French forces were compelled by the United States to end their military intervention in Egypt. Eden retired to the House of Lords and was made the Earl of Avon in 1961. He wrote several volumes of memoirs and died on January 14, 1977, in Alvediston, England. LAURA MATYSEK WOOD
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Eisenhower, Dwight David
See also Dulles, John Foster; French Indochina, 1860s–1946; Geneva Conference and Geneva Accords of 1954; Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich; United Kingdom and the Indochina and Vietnam Wars References Aster, Sidney. Anthony Eden. New York: St. Martin’s, 1976. Dutton, David. Anthony Eden: A Life and Reputation. New York: St. Martin’s, 1997. Rothwell, Victor. Anthony Eden: A Political Biography, 1931–57. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1992.
Eisenhower, Dwight David Birth Date: October 14, 1890 Death Date: March 28, 1969 U.S. Army general and U.S. president (1953–1961). Born in Denison, Texas, on October 14, 1890, Dwight David “Ike” Eisenhower was raised in Kansas. In 1915 he graduated from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, and was commissioned a second lieutenant of infantry. During World War I he commanded the Tank Corps training center at Camp Colt near Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. In the interwar years, Eisenhower graduated first in his class from the Command and General Staff School (1926) and from the Army War College (1928). In a variety of assignments he established himself as a promising young staff officer. Following his return from the Philippines in 1939, he was successively the chief of staff of the 3rd Infantry Division, IX Corps, and Third Army. Eisenhower was promoted to brigadier general in October 1941. Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor two months later, he was called to Washington as deputy head of the War Plans Division of the War Department and then the Operations Division of the General Staff. He was promoted to major general in April 1942. In June, U.S. Army chief of staff General George C. Marshall named him commanding general of the European theater of operations, which brought Eisenhower promotion to lieutenant general in July. Eisenhower then commanded Operation TORCH, the November 1942 Allied invasion of North Africa, and Operation HUSKY, the July 1943 invasion of Sicily. He was promoted to full general in February 1943. In September 1943 Eisenhower’s forces invaded Italy. His success in forging harmonious multinational coalitions brought his appointment as supreme commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, for Operation OVERLORD, the cross-channel invasion of France in June 1944. Eisenhower also assumed direct command of all Allied land forces fighting in Northwestern Europe on September 1, 1944. While there was some criticism at the time and since of Eisenhower’s more cautious broad-front approach, he proved a highly effective manager of the large coalition of forces commanded by generals who were often at odds with one another. In December 1944 he was promoted to general of the army (five-star rank).
Following the war, Eisenhower returned to the United States to serve as U.S. Army chief of staff (1945–1948), president of Columbia University (1948–1950), and the first supreme allied commander, Europe, of the newly formed (1949) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military forces (1950–1952). In 1952 he ran as a Republican against Democrat Adlai Stevenson for the presidency of the United States and was easily elected that November, succeeding Harry S. Truman. Eisenhower served two terms (1953–1961). As president, Eisenhower sought to limit the growth of domestic programs while at the same time retaining the bulk of the New Deal reforms. In his defense policies he placed emphasis on nuclear weapons (massive retaliation, or “more bang for a buck”) at the expense of conventional forces. He did so in an effort to reduce defense spending, in which he was only modestly successful. But at the end of his tenure in office in January 1961, Eisenhower also warned the nation about the cost to society of unbridled military spending and the growth of a “military-industrial complex.” In international affairs Eisenhower endeavored to calm tensions arising from the Cold War. Early in his first term as president an armistice was achieved in Korea, in part by his campaign pledge to “go to Korea” and by hinting about the possible employment of nuclear weapons to end the conflict. The latter so impressed Vice
President Dwight D. Eisenhower. General Eisenhower was supreme commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces, European Theater of Operations, during World War II. He was subsequently the first commander of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces, then president of the United States during 1953–1961. (Library of Congress)
Elections, National, Republic of Vietnam, 1955, 1967, 1971 President Richard Nixon that early in his own presidency he tried the same (“Mad Man”) technique against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) but without success. Eisenhower proclaimed a new U.S. policy (known as the Eisenhower Doctrine) for the Middle East, which endeavored to limit Communist influence and the effects of Arab nationalism in the region. But his efforts to reduce international tensions with the Soviet Union’s Nikita Khrushchev were stymied in part because of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) missteps, such as the May 1, 1960, U-2 incident. Eisenhower’s policies in Indochina were cautious and measured. There he followed the containment doctrine begun by his predecessor, and his administration subscribed to the domino theory, which held that a Viet Minh victory in Vietnam would soon bring Communists to power throughout Southeast Asia. His policies included increasing weapons and logistical support for the French in their war with the Viet Minh in Indochina, and by 1954 the United States was paying as much as 80 percent of the cost of the war there. It was under Eisenhower that the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) was created for Indochina, although the French insisted that all military aid be channeled through them. Publicly the Eisenhower administration supported the French line that they had turned over real political control in Vietnam to the Vietnamese and that the war was a Cold War struggle between democracy and communism rather than a colonial war for independence. Privately it was another matter; as late as 1953 Eisenhower was pushing U.S. ambassador to France C. Douglas Dillon to insist that the French grant real independence to Vietnam. In the spring of 1954 Eisenhower debated active U.S. military intervention in the Indochina War, including the possible use of nuclear weapons, to help rescue the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu. He resisted advocates of intervention, such as Vice President Nixon, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Admiral Arthur Radford, and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, because U.S. Army chief of staff General Matthew B. Ridgway was firmly opposed and because the British government refused to participate. British foreign secretary Anthony Eden believed that the battle was too far gone and placed his hopes for peace with talks in Geneva. Eisenhower was, in any case, thinking only in terms of air strikes and material support rather than ground troops. Eisenhower said that he would not leave his party open to charges of having lost Vietnam, as his party had saddled the Democrats with the loss of China. The State Department participated in the 1954 Geneva talks only as an observer, and the Eisenhower administration came to distance itself from the resulting Geneva Accords. Cold War warrior Dulles led the way in the creation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), which, however, did not prove supportive of U.S. plans to create a separate state in southern Vietnam and, if need be, fight collectively to maintain it. The Eisenhower administration did give unqualified and substantial economic and political support to the government of Ngo Dinh Diem, president of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam)
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and supported Diem in his refusal to hold the elections called for in the Geneva Accords. After leaving office in 1961, Eisenhower retired to his Pennsylvania farm. As a private citizen he continued to support U.S. involvement in Vietnam. He reportedly warned his successor, John F. Kennedy, to stand firm there, although Eisenhower disliked Kennedy’s acceptance of a coalition government in Laos. Eisenhower also disapproved of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s failure to use sufficient military force to bring the war to a successful conclusion but insisted that the Vietnamese would have to do the bulk of the fighting themselves. Eisenhower opposed Johnson’s decision to impose a bombing halt and also considered some demonstrations against the war as tantamount to treason. In 1968 Eisenhower enthusiastically supported Nixon’s run for the presidency. Eisenhower died in Washington, D.C., on March 28, 1969. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Central Intelligence Agency; Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; Dulles, John Foster; Eden, Sir Robert Anthony; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Madman Strategy; Murphy, Robert Daniel; Ngo Dinh Diem; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Radford, Arthur William; Ridgway, Matthew Bunker; Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; Truman, Harry S.; Twining, Nathan Farragut; United States, Involvement in Indochina through 1954; VULTURE, Operation References Alexander, Charles C. Holding the Line: The Eisenhower Era, 1952–1961. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975. Ambrose, Stephen E. Eisenhower, Vol. 2, The President. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984. Billings-Yun, Melanie. Decision against War: Eisenhower and Dien Bien Phu, 1954. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988. Divine, Robert A. Eisenhower and the Cold War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1981. Eisenhower, Dwight D. The White House Years. 2 vols. New York: Doubleday, 1963–1965. Spector, Ronald H. Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941–1960. United States Army in Vietnam Series. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1983.
Elections, National, Republic of Vietnam, 1955, 1967, 1971 Accruing political legitimacy was one of the principal difficulties facing all governments in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). The development of a politically viable electoral system was seen as one way of bolstering support. Such an effort would provide legitimacy, accountability, and stability; it would also help develop participation in the government by interest groups and political parties. Information contained in declassified memos and directives from the U.S. Defense Department, State Department, and various security agencies reveals an ethnocentric pattern that combined desire for true reform and democratic institution building with determination to reject any results indicating that the
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people of South Vietnam favored choices differing from what the U.S. government thought they should seek. There is no doubt that Washington demanded that the people of South Vietnam recast themselves and their government in the U.S. image. Equally without doubt are that the United States helped President Ngo Dinh Diem consolidate his authority, prevented the unifying election called for by the 1954 Geneva Accords, and assisted South Vietnamese president Nguyen Van Thieu in eliminating opponents in 1967 and did the same in 1971.
Election of 1955 In 1954 the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration supported Catholic anti-Communist Ngo Dinh Diem’s efforts in establishing a pro–U.S. government in the southern half of the country. Washington favored Diem over playboy emperor Bao Dai, head of the State of Vietnam that had been established by the French during the Indochina War. The extent of U.S. support for Diem was reflected by the fact that in October 1954 Washington decided to channel all economic and military assistance directly to his government rather than through the French mission. The United States provided not only military and economic assistance but also advice on democratic institution building, including the conduct of elections. Later, critics such as Edward S. Herman and F. Brodhead charged that the election process in South Vietnam produced the appearance of a democracy that did not in fact exist there. Official documents bear out this assessment. An excerpt of National Security Council Draft 5519 of May 17, 1955, provides a good summary of the basic situation in South Vietnam with regard to the all-Vietnam elections called for by the 1954 Geneva Accords. Essentially the United States and the Diem administration weighed the dilemma of appearing undemocratic if they avoided or postponed the elections against the danger of losing to a better-organized Communist Party apparatus should elections be held. In lieu of simply having the elections, Washington recommended a strategy whereby the Diem government would engage in talks with the Viet Minh about preconditions for the elections to ensure their integrity. It is clear from Secretary of State John Foster Dulles’s memo that Washington’s strategy was to make the conditions mirror those supported by the West in other areas. Dulles assumed that such conditions would be so difficult for the Communists that they would be refused. On June 28, 1955, Dulles said that Washington did not fear elections because the Communists could never win a free election. Yet a series of memos from the State Department to the Saigon embassy indicates that Washington was prepared to “review” the entire situation if the Communists managed to win an election. As for the Communists, they sought the elections called for in the accords because they were confident that they would win them. The Communists believed that they held the nationalist card from having led the fight against the Japanese and French. The Communists also believed that they benefited from Diem’s use of force
to silence political opposition. Indeed, in his efforts to crush opposition, Diem abolished local (village-level) elections and installed political friends and supporters. In the end, it was Diem who refused to even discuss the unification election issue. In a radio broadcast on July 16, 1955, he rejected free elections while simultaneously promising freedom for all Vietnam. The implication was that the Communists would have to give up power in North Vietnam before there could be discussions of elections. Finally, instead of an election, Diem arranged a referendum in South Vietnam between himself and Bao Dai, held on October 23, 1955. There was rampant fraud in the process, with Diem receiving some 5.7 million votes to only 63,000 for Bao Dai. Diem would probably have won a free election easily, and the U.S. embassy thought that the winner’s total of 98.9 percent of the vote was excessive. As a developing new nation-state under U.S. tutelage, South Vietnam lacked even the most basic institutional structures. On March 4, 1956, the South Vietnamese elected a national legislative assembly of 123 members. During the year following Diem’s referendum victory, the initial constitution for South Vietnam was developed but was done exclusively by Diem’s close advisers. Diem submitted only a general statement of basic principles to the assembly to provide the appearance that the finished product was of their making. Initially, it was to be ratified by the voting public. Later, Diem thought better of this and had the assembly ratify it. The constitution came into effect on October 26, 1956.
Election of 1967 The development of more meaningful national institutional structures continued after the November 1963 assassination of Diem. The South Vietnamese constitution of 1967, ratified on April 1, 1967, reflected a number of improvements. The original 1956 constitution had called for a separation of powers, but virtually all power went to the executive branch. The legislative branch was extremely weak; its only official lawmaking function was the allocation of budget appropriations. The judiciary was left undefined and attached to the executive branch. Virtually all appointments were made by Diem. He had even dismantled the structure of local government and replaced officials with personal appointments. The 1967 document changed things for the better, at least on paper. The document provided that the judiciary would be equal to the executive and legislative branches. It also called for the addition of an Upper House (commonly referred to as the Senate), to the National Assembly. It acknowledged the acceptability of political parties and opposition to the government, although neither of these two provisions could be taken too far. The complex electoral law involved the use of 10-member slates, and voters in 1967 had to choose from 48 such slates. This ensured that well-organized voting blocks could achieve electoral power. In the September 3, 1967, election, army general Nguyen Van Thieu and air vice marshal and vice president Nguyen Cao Ky
Elections, National, Republic of Vietnam, 1955, 1967, 1971
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Nguyen Van Thieu takes the oath as the elected president of the Republic of Vietnam in Saigon on October 30, 1967. At right is Premier Nguyen Cao Ky, who stepped down to become the vice president. (AP/Wide World Photos)
were able to prevent a few of their most politically threatening opponents from participating as candidates. One of these was General Duong Van (“Big”) Minh, who had directed the coup against Diem in 1963. Another candidate, Au Truong Thanh, advocated an immediate cease-fire and a negotiations platform. The Thieu forces were able to derail these candidacies. Thieu and Ky were able to garner only 34.8 percent of the vote, but this was sufficient for victory because the remaining votes were split among 10 sets of candidates. The runner-up, Saigon attorney Truong Dinh Dzu, advocated a peace effort but only after he was certified as an acceptable candidate. In Region I, the Buddhist vote was solidly in support of General Tran Van Don. His “Worker-Farmer-Soldier” slate included individuals respected by a wide spectrum of the population. Buddhist support also carried the Phan Khac Suu and Phan Quang Dan slate to victory in both Da Nang and Hue. Catholic candidates did very well in Military Regions II, III, and IV.
Election of 1971 One of the more controversial actions of President Thieu’s administration was the passage of an election law requiring candidates
to obtain the support of at least 40 National Assembly members or 100 provincial/municipal councilors. Various minority opposition groups opposed this change, arguing that its sole purpose was to exclude them from participation. Although the Senate rejected the law, it was reinstated by the Lower House. Critics charged that this had occurred only as a result of bribery and intimidation. In the election, President Thieu’s chief rivals were General Duong Van Minh and then-current Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky. General Minh was able to secure enough support to become a certified candidate, but Ky was not. Ky later charged that his efforts had been illegally thwarted by President Thieu’s campaign apparatus. An appeal to the entire Supreme Court resulted in Ky being certified as a candidate. However, shortly afterward both he and General Minh determined that the election would be unfair and decided to withdraw from it. Ky subsequently challenged President Thieu to resign with him in favor of a new election organized by the Senate chairman. Thieu rejected this. He did, however, offer to resign if he did not receive 50 percent of the votes cast. All invalid ballots (blank, torn, improperly marked, etc.) would count as opposing votes in what
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became a referendum. Ky’s efforts to encourage an election boycott were no match for the Thieu administration’s efforts to get out the vote. On October 3, 1971, a purported 87 percent of the electorate cast ballots. Thieu won 90 percent of these in each of the four military regions. He fell below this figure in only two major cities, Hue and Da Nang. Objective assessments of the 1971 election generally concede that it was a brilliant tactical success for Thieu. Unfortunately the election was clearly rigged, but despite that Thieu would have probably won by a good margin even had it been fair. His course of action significantly damaged the legitimacy of the entire election process, the National Assembly as a representative institution, and the government as a whole. It also compromised the South Vietnamese government’s credibility with the population. Both antigovernment and Communist forces were able to capitalize on this. Writer Donald Kirk quoted a deputy of the Lower House, Ly Quy Chung, as saying that had the election been fair and free, the 1972 offensive by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) would have never occurred because the people would have supported the government they freely elected. PAUL R. CAMACHO See also Bao Dai; Dulles, John Foster; Duong Van Minh; Geneva Conference and Geneva Accords of 1954; Ngo Dinh Diem; Nguyen Cao Ky; Nguyen Van Thieu; Tran Van Don; Truong Dinh Dzu; Vietnam, Republic of, 1954–1975 References Buttinger, Joseph. Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled. 2 vols. New York: Praeger, 1967. Herman, Edward S., and F. Brodhead. Demonstration Elections—U.S.: Staged Elections in the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, and El Salvador. Boston: South End, 1984. Kirk, Donald. “Presidential Campaign Politics: The Uncontested 1971 Election.” In Electoral Politics in South Vietnam, edited by John C. Donnell and C. A. Joiner, 53–75. Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1974. Porter, Gareth. Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation of Human Decisions. 2 vols. Stanfordville, NY: Earl M. Coleman Enterprises, 1979. Porter, Gareth. Vietnam: A History in Documents. New York: New American Library, 1981. Scigliano, Robert G. South Vietnam: Nation under Stress. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964. Tull, Theresa. “Broadening the Base: South Vietnamese Elections, 1967–71.” In Electoral Politics in South Vietnam, edited by John C. Donnell and C. A. Joiner, 35–52. Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1974.
Elections, U.S., 1964 The 1964 election in the United States pitted incumbent Democratic president Lyndon B. Johnson, originally from Texas, against Republican U.S. senator Barry Goldwater from Arizona. The election also determined a sizable number of seats in the U.S. Congress, with the Democrats gaining 2 additional Senate seats, giving
them a critical two-thirds majority over the Republicans, the last time either party has enjoyed such dominance in the Senate. In the House of Representatives the Democratic sweep was even more evident, with the Democrats gaining a net 36 seats over the Republicans, giving them a two-thirds majority in that body as well. Johnson won an astoundingly lopsided victory, capturing more than 61 percent of the popular vote in the largest presidential landslide to that point in time. He also garnered 486 electoral votes to Goldwater’s 52. Indeed, the Republican nominee carried just six states: his native Arizona and five states in the Deep South. With such an impressive mandate, Johnson and the Democrats were poised to implement sweeping domestic reforms and were given virtual free rein to handle the growing Vietnam War in any manner they deemed appropriate. Goldwater, a senator since 1953, ran on a traditionally conservative platform. His campaign stressed opposition to big government and welfare programs, defended states’ rights, and advocated a hard-line anti-Communist foreign policy that emphasized the need for a strong military to confront international communism. Johnson, who had become president following President John F. Kennedy’s assassination on November 22, 1963, characterized himself as Kennedy’s heir. Johnson sought to secure the assassinated president’s legacy and implement sweeping liberal-minded reforms that would address the plight of the poor, advance the Civil Rights Movement, and bolster the fortunes of the middle and working classes. Portraying himself as a champion of the poor and the oppressed, Johnson declared war on poverty and called for the implementation of a so-called Great Society by significantly expanding the role of the federal government so that social welfare spending would increase by some 25 percent. Unsurprisingly, Goldwater characterized Johnson’s policies as creeping socialism and denounced the wholesale transfer of money to programs that were as yet untested. Johnson accused Goldwater of being insensitive to the poor, the working class, and minorities. Perhaps the major potential problem for Johnson in 1964 was the Vietnam War. Kennedy, who had sought to bolster the government of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), had increased the U.S. commitment there so that by the time of his assassination there were 16,000 U.S. Special Forces soldiers and military advisers in South Vietnam, many of whom were already involved in combat operations. With the coming election, Johnson faced a difficult dilemma in Vietnam. War is rarely popular with voters, and Johnson certainly knew that. But he had inherited a commitment, which he also shared, from Kennedy to defend South Vietnam against what he perceived as Communist aggression. At the same time, the war in Vietnam was escalating due to increased Communist attacks in South Vietnam. In addition, Johnson’s Republican opponent was a staunch if not militant anti-Communist, and Johnson was very conscious that if voters perceived him and his party as soft on communism, Democratic fortunes would be quickly reversed. Indeed, Johnson recalled with much trepidation the Republicans’ searing
Elections, U.S., 1968 criticism of President Harry S. Truman’s decision not to aid the Nationalists in the Chinese Civil War. When China was “lost” to the Communists in 1949, the Republicans launched vitriolic attacks against Truman and the Democrats. Therefore, Johnson was determined not to “lose” South Vietnam, but fearing a public backlash against a wider war before the November elections, he delayed for as long as possible any escalation in America’s commitment to South Vietnam. Although the August 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution had essentially given Johnson a blank check as far as conduct of the war was concerned, little was made of the resolution at the time, and the president remained noncommittal on the dispatch of more troops to South Vietnam until well after the election. The Resolution did, however, make it appear that Johnson was tough on communism, largely removing that as an issue in the campaign. During the election Johnson sought to position himself as the peace candidate while portraying Goldwater as reckless and a warmonger who, if elected, would not only escalate the Vietnam War by sending thousands of U.S. troops to Southeast Asia but might also precipitate a nuclear war. Johnson deftly exploited Kennedy’s assassination and the nation’s mourning to secure favorable legislation and thus “finish President Kennedy’s work.” Despite a political career that was ambiguous toward civil rights for African Americans, upon becoming president Johnson announced his intention to push Kennedy’s stalled civil rights legislation through Congress, which he did. Although many Republicans in Congress supported civil rights, Goldwater was one of only 6 Republicans and 21 Democrats in the Senate to vote against the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which ended segregation in the South and also outlawed discrimination in employment and education. Goldwater claimed that this act violated private property rights and freedom of speech, religion, and assembly. Johnson, however, skillfully exploited Goldwater’s controversial vote to suggest that he was a racist. Not surprisingly, some 90 percent of African Americans voted for Johnson in 1964, thereby cementing the Democratic Party’s strong support among black Americans. With respect to Vietnam, fortunately for Johnson his opponent’s militant rhetoric, including talk of using nuclear weapons in Vietnam to destroy the thick jungle foliage and jokingly musing about “lobbing a nuke” into the men’s room of the Kremlin, and a series of other political gaffes effectively removed the Vietnam War as a campaign issue. Ironically, on the very eve of the first huge escalation of the Vietnam War, which began in 1965, the conflict was not a priority issue among U.S. voters. Instead, Goldwater and his alleged warmongering became the central issue of the campaign. Goldwater’s perceived extreme anti-Communist rhetoric and talk of employing nuclear weapons along with his hostility to so-called big government and welfare programs alienated many voters, including many Republicans, who regarded Goldwater’s views as extreme and inconsistent with the party’s traditional platform. Thus, Goldwater’s candidacy not only turned off many moderate Republican voters but also alien-
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ated many independent voters, the result of which was Johnson’s stunning victory. As the leader of the Republican right wing, Goldwater’s candidacy was part of a larger struggle for control of the party, which pitted the moderate or progressive wing, which was oftentimes allied with and supportive of liberal Democratic Party positions, against Goldwater’s conservative wing. Conservative Republicans eagerly accepted Goldwater’s challenge to take over the party, and Goldwater’s nomination in 1964 was a triumph for the right wing of the party. The beginning of a shift in the party’s base of support from the more liberal and moderate Northeast and Midwest to the more conservative South and West also occurred. In addition, Goldwater’s perceived hostility toward civil rights and opposition to big government and welfare programs endeared him to disaffected white Southern Democratic voters, thereby allowing him to crack the heretofore solidly Democratic South. Goldwater’s nomination ultimately helped to pave the way for Ronald Reagan’s 1980 presidential win and the implementation of the so-called Reagan Revolution. Unable to run for reelection as a senator while also running for president, Goldwater left the Senate but would return in 1968. That same year after having deployed some 500,000 U.S. troops to South Vietnam and suffering a collapse of his approval ratings over his conduct of the Vietnam War, the formerly invincible Johnson dropped out of the presidential race. STEFAN M. BROOKS See also Civil Rights Movement; Goldwater, Barry Morris; Great Society Program; Gulf of Tonkin Resolution; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; United States Congress and the Vietnam War References Dallek, Robert. Lyndon B. Johnson: Portrait of a President. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. Johnson, Paul. A History of the American People. New York: Harper Perennial, 1999. Middendorff, William II. A Glorious Disaster: Barry Goldwater’s Presidential Campaign and the Origins of the Conservative Movement. New York: Basic Books, 2006.
Elections, U.S., 1968 The 1968 national elections in the United States were among the most contentious in modern history. The January 1968 Tet Offensive was followed by equally startling political developments in the U.S. presidential race, including President Lyndon Johnson’s decision not to seek the Democratic Party’s nomination, riots at the Democratic National Convention, and the election of Republican Richard M. Nixon, who had not expected to return to national politics after losing the 1960 presidential election and a 1962 bid to become governor of California. Opposition to Johnson’s renomination began in late 1967. Allard Lowenstein, who had close ties with college student
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organizations, originated a “Dump Johnson” movement, and Senator Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota, a Vietnam War opponent, announced his candidacy for the nomination in late 1967. Perceiving the first presidential primary (March 12) as an early test, thousands of “Clean for Gene” college students canvassed New Hampshire voters. McCarthy did not win the primary, but his unexpectedly strong showing against a sitting president exposed Johnson’s vulnerability. Johnson received 49.5 percent of the Democratic primary vote to McCarthy’s 42.4 percent. Many polls had predicted that McCarthy would receive only 10 percent of the vote. Johnson’s weakened position was not lost on Senator Robert Kennedy (D-N.Y.), who also opposed Johnson’s war policies; Kennedy declared his candidacy a few days after the New Hampshire primary. In a nationally televised address on the Vietnam War on March 31, Johnson, in an attempt to start peace negotiations, announced a partial bombing halt of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and then stunned the nation by closing with the statement “I shall not seek, and I will not accept, the nomination of my party for another term as your President.” The two major parties held their national nominating conventions in August. The Republicans met first, in Miami Beach, fol-
lowed by the Democrats in Chicago, where violence and massive protests marred the proceedings. Although the New Hampshire primary received considerable media attention, only one-third of the delegates attending both parties’ national conventions were selected at primary elections. The 1968 conventions followed the classic model whereby most delegates were controlled by state party leaders, frequently a governor or big-city mayor, and were selected in state conventions and caucuses rather than primaries. The eventual nominee was determined by candidates bargaining with leaders of state delegations. Nixon had spent much of 1966 cementing his ties with the Republican Party by raising money and campaigning for its candidates for Congress. At the start of 1968, polls of Republican voters showed Nixon as almost a two-to-one favorite over his rivals: Governor Nelson Rockefeller of New York and, with a poor third, Governor George Romney of Michigan. In short, Nixon had the support of party regulars and used the primaries to demonstrate support among Republican voters. Rockefeller’s late-starting campaign never got off the ground. In the Democratic Party, the road to the convention was anything but smooth. Vice President Hubert Humphrey announced his candidacy in late April. Avoiding all the primaries, he preferred to deal directly with delegates and state party leaders. Although
Senator Robert F. Kennedy campaigns for the presidency in Boston on St. Patrick’s Day, March 17, 1968. (AP/Wide World Photos)
Elections, U.S., 1968 McCarthy and Kennedy traded early primary victories, Kennedy won the last one in delegate-rich California, only to be assassinated on June 5, 1968, minutes after his victory speech. Kennedy might have attracted support from party professionals at the convention. His death ensured Humphrey’s nomination. Alabama governor George Wallace formed a third party, the American Independence Party. He was on the ballot in all 50 states but only after considerable work in gathering signatures of registered voters on petitions and occasionally asking and receiving help from federal courts. At the start of the general election campaign, a Gallup Poll showed Nixon (43 percent) with a clear lead over Humphrey (31 percent) and Wallace (19 percent). According to opinion surveys, Americans saw the Vietnam War as the most important problem facing the country (51 percent). A plurality (48–49 percent) thought that the United States had made a mistake in sending troops to fight in Vietnam, and nearly two-thirds disapproved of President Johnson’s handling of the war. The Vietnam War had more than a two-to-one lead over both civil rights and law-andorder issues. In fact, there were few differences between Nixon’s and Humphrey’s Vietnam War positions. Both candidates favored a gradual reduction of U.S. forces by replacing them with soldiers from the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Neither candidate had a timetable in mind, and both opposed invading North Vietnam. Nixon frequently disparaged Johnson’s war policies but avoided discussing specifics for fear that this would undermine efforts to get real negotiations started. In Salt Lake City, Utah, on September 30, Humphrey tried to disassociate himself as much as he could from Johnson’s war policies by proposing a complete bombing halt of North Vietnam to improve the outlook for negotiations. Wallace attracted voters not for his position on the Vietnam War but instead because of his opposition to desegregation and his get-tough stance toward student demonstrations and African American rioting in cities. Not surprisingly, most of Wallace’s support was found among Southern whites. However, Wallace did say that if Vietnam negotiations failed, he would ask the military for a plan to win. Voters’ perceptions of the candidates were reasonably accurate: Humphrey and Nixon were perceived as occupying a middle position between hawk and dove, with Wallace closer to the hawk position. Most voters occupied the middle position, which might be described as “Don’t pull out, but try to end the fighting.” The Nixon campaign’s careful exploitation of what would be called the silent majority clearly helped its candidate gain the votes of white conservative southerners who found Wallace too extreme and incendiary. Indeed, this southern strategy prevented Wallace from siphoning even more votes from the Republicans’ column and became a winning strategy for Republicans for more than a generation. Humphrey’s standing in the polls was improved by the Salt Lake City speech and organized labor’s efforts to bring back to the
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Democratic Party many of its members who were leaning toward Wallace. Mid-October polls showed support for Nixon at 44 percent, Humphrey at 36 percent, and Wallace at 15 percent; 5 percent of those polled declared themselves undecided. Humphrey continued to gain, however. By election day the race was a toss-up between him and Nixon. In the weeks prior to the election, the Johnson administration searched for a way to make progress in peace talks that had begun in Paris in May. In October the North Vietnamese government agreed to South Vietnam’s participation in exchange for a complete bombing halt of North Vietnam. South Vietnamese president Nguyen Van Thieu, at the last minute and with apparent encouragement from members of Nixon’s campaign staff, refused to participate in the negotiations. Johnson announced a complete bombing halt on October 31, five days before the election; South Vietnamese representatives did not attend the Paris negotiations until January 25, 1969. No one can say with certainty if the start of serious negotiations before the election would have affected the outcome. Ultimately it was the voters’ judgment that the policies of Johnson and the Democrats had failed. But with Wallace in the race, Nixon’s victory over Humphrey was extremely close. In the popular vote, Nixon received 31,770,237, Humphrey received 31,270,533, and Wallace received 9,906,141. In the electoral college, Nixon received 301 votes (270 needed to win), Humphrey received 191, and Wallace received 46. In Congress, Nixon’s coattails proved only a modest success. Republicans gained just 4 seats in the House, but the Democrats still had a large majority (243 to 192). In the Senate the Democrats lost 5 seats, with the Republicans gaining 5. But the Democrats held a solid 62 to 38 majority. HARRY BASEHART See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Democratic National Convention of 1968; Humphrey, Hubert Horatio; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, Robert Francis; Lowenstein, Allard Kenneth; McCarthy, Eugene Joseph; Nguyen Van Thieu; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Paris Peace Accords; Rockefeller, Nelson Aldrich; Romney, George Wilcken; Wallace, George Corley, Jr. References Asher, Herbert B. Presidential Elections and American Politics. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1992. Clifford, Clark, with David Holbrooke. Counsel to the President: A Memoir. New York: Random House, 1991. Converse, Philip E., Warren E. Miller, Jerrold G. Rusk, and Arthur C. Wolfe. “Continuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election.” American Political Science Review 63 (December 1969): 1083–1105. Page, Benjamin I., and Richard A. Brody. “Policy Voting and the Electoral Process: The Vietnam War Issue.” American Political Science Review 66 (September 1972): 979–995. White, Theodore H. The Making of the President, 1968. New York: Atheneum, 1969.
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Elections, U.S., 1972 At the beginning of 1972, the landslide reelection of Republican president Richard Nixon was not a foregone conclusion, although Democratic presidential nominee Senator George McGovern of South Dakota was virtually unknown to the American public. A Gallup survey asking voters a “presidential trial heat” question in January found a close contest: Nixon was favored by 43 percent; Senator Edmund Muskie (D-Maine), the likely Democratic nominee, polled at 42 percent; and Alabama Governor George Wallace, running as a third-party candidate, had 12 percent. The remaining 3 percent of voters polled were undecided. By the end of 1971, Nixon’s Vietnam policies had reduced the number of U.S. soldiers in Vietnam to 156,800. In January 1972 Nixon announced that in addition to the ongoing formal peace talks in Paris, secret negotiations between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) had started in August 1969. Neither had made any progress. According to the Gallup Poll and other surveys, voters still identified the Vietnam War as the most important issue facing the country. But the percentage of voters with this view (25 percent) was about half as large as it had been in 1968. A majority of the public approved of Nixon’s handling of the Vietnam War (52
percent approved, 39 percent disapproved, and 9 percent had no opinion). The economy—rising inflation and unemployment— was on voters’ minds as much as the Vietnam War, and the Nixon White House had enjoyed only modest success in dealing with these problems. In early January 1972 Nixon announced that he would seek reelection, and he faced little opposition within his party. He won the New Hampshire primary, the first in the nation, with nearly 70 percent of the vote. Nixon was renominated by the Republican National Convention held in August at Miami Beach. In addition to McGovern and Muskie, serious candidates for the Democratic nomination were Hubert Humphrey, who had lost to Nixon in the 1968 presidential election, and George Wallace, who made a strong showing in 1968 as a third-party candidate. Wallace planned to enter several Democratic primaries and also kept open the option of a third-party candidacy. The road to capturing the nomination at the 1972 Democratic National Convention was much different than previous ones. Almost overlooked at the tumultuous 1968 convention was the adoption of resolutions authorizing the creation of a commission to reform the national convention delegate-selection process. The McGovern-Fraser Commission, as it was informally called, ad-
President Richard Nixon campaigns in Ohio on October 28, 1972. Nixon easily beat Democratic Party candidate George McGovern in November. Less than two years later, however, Nixon was forced to resign the presidency because of the Watergate Scandal. (National Archives)
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Results of the 1972 U.S. Presidential Election Popular Vote Candidate
Party
Richard Milhous Nixon George Stanley McGovern John G. Schmitz Other candidates
Republican Democratic American Independent Various
Electoral Votes
Number
Percentage
520 17 0 1
47,169,911 29,170,383 1,100,868 301,227
60.7% 37.5% 1.4% 0.4%
opted guidelines that made extensive changes. Receiving the most publicity were those that encouraged each state to have minority groups, women, and people between the ages of 18 and 30 in their delegation in “reasonable relationship to their presence in the population of the State.” This was not, the commission said, to be interpreted as a quota system, but it was widely perceived as such. Other changes, less noticed, were also important, such as the elimination of ex officio delegates, which had made it easy for Democratic governors and members of Congress to attend the convention. To comply with the recommendations, many states simply switched to primaries to select delegates. At the 1972 convention, 60 percent of the delegates were chosen in primaries; in 1968 it had been only 38 percent. These new rules angered party regulars who lost influence, as they saw it, to individuals who were committed to a candidate or issue but not the party as a whole. McGovern thundered from obscurity not by beating Muskie in the New Hampshire primary but instead by surprising everyone with a strong second-place finish, much as Eugene McCarthy had done in 1968. Muskie faded in subsequent primaries and ceased to be a viable candidate. Wallace won the Florida primary and went on to win alternating primary victories with Humphrey and McGovern. An assassination attempt on Wallace on May 15 while he was campaigning in Wheaton, Maryland, resulted in him being partially paralyzed and forced him from the race. The showdown between Humphrey and McGovern was in California, where McGovern emerged victorious; because of California’s winner-takesall law, all of the delegates were bound to vote for McGovern. In a crucial procedural vote at the Democratic National Convention in Miami Beach, the unit rule was allowed for California even though it went against commission guidelines. McGovern was selected as the party nominee on the first ballot. The general election campaign began with Nixon well ahead. According to the Gallup Poll, Nixon had 64 percent to McGovern’s 30 percent; only 6 percent remained undecided. Although five men with cameras and electronic surveillance equipment were arrested in June 1972 inside the Watergate headquarters of the Democratic National Committee, the full story of what became known as the Watergate Scandal was contained by the White House, and Nixon’s involvement in the cover-up was kept secret during the election campaign. McGovern was unable to persuade voters to his moral position that the United States should withdraw immediately from Vietnam. Most voters were satisfied with Nixon’s policy of gradual withdrawal. McGovern’s proposals for
cuts in defense spending and for a controversial welfare program were viewed as too extreme. On all but a few issues, voters perceived themselves to be closer to Nixon’s positions than those of McGovern. Voters also questioned McGovern’s competence. This was underscored when the media disclosed that his vice presidential nominee, Senator Thomas Eagleton (D-Mo.), had suffered from mental exhaustion a number of times and had undergone electric-shock treatments. McGovern initially said that he fully backed Eagleton but soon dropped his beleaguered running mate in favor of Sargent Shriver. Still, the election did not end with the Vietnam War as only a backdrop issue. The war dramatically reasserted itself when on October 26 the North Vietnamese government unexpectedly revealed that secret negotiations had produced an agreement to end the war. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, who was having difficulty gaining Saigon’s acceptance of the agreement, nonetheless announced that “Peace is at hand.” Nixon won the 1972 election by a landslide, although it may have been more a rejection of McGovern than a mandate for Nixon. In the popular vote, Nixon received 47,169,911, and McGovern received 29,170,383; the electoral college vote was 521 for Nixon to only 17 for McGovern. In Congress, the Democrats lost 13 seats while the Republicans gained 12, but the Democrats still enjoyed a 242 to 192 advantage. In the Senate, the Democrats lost 2 seats while the Republicans picked up 2, giving the Democrats a 56 to 42 majority. HARRY BASEHART See also Elections, U.S., 1968; Humphrey, Hubert Horatio; Kissinger, Henry Alfred; McGovern, George Stanley; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Wallace, George Corley, Jr.; Watergate Scandal References Asher, Herbert B. Presidential Elections and American Politics. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1992. Isaacs, Arnold R. Without Honor: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983. Miller, Arthur H., Warren E. Miller, Alden S. Raine, and Thad A. Brown. “A Majority Party in Disarray: Policy Polarization in the 1972 Election.” American Political Science Review (September 1976): 753–778. Ranney, Austin. Curing the Mischiefs of Faction. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975. White, Theodore H. The Making of the President, 1972. New York: Atheneum, 1973.
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Elections, U.S., 1976 The elections of 1976, while not a direct referendum on the Vietnam War per se, were certainly a referendum on the legacy of the Watergate Scandal and of the Republican Party, which had suffered from President Richard M. Nixon’s policies and behavior while in office. In many ways, however, Watergate itself had been a by-product of the Vietnam War, particularly given Nixon’s penchant for secrecy and take-no-prisoners politics. Clearly, the Vietnam War was very much on the electorate’s mind in 1976, and the wounds from that conflict had not yet begun to heal. The presidential election was a close one during that bicentennial year, and the American public was searching for an alterative to the increasingly divisive politics that had held sway over the preceding decade. Upon President Nixon’s resignation from office in August 1974, his appointed vice president, Gerald R. Ford, a longtime congressman from Michigan, became president. Ford was a moderate Republican, perhaps a bit more conservative than Nixon had been, and an honest and decent man. He had not sought the presidency but assumed the office because of an unparalleled sequence of high-level resignations: that of Vice President Spiro Agnew in 1973 and Nixon’s resignation the following year. Ford immediately reached out to the Democratically controlled Congress and sought
to put the Watergate Scandal to rest. In so doing he issued a full and unconditional pardon to Nixon, giving him virtual immunity from prosecution. Many decried Ford’s move, with some alleging that Nixon and Ford had “struck a deal” before Ford was named vice president. There was indeed no such deal, and Ford believed that this action was in the nation’s best interest. Since that time, many historians have come to agree that Ford’s pardon likely saved the country from many more months of political turmoil and paralysis had Nixon been brought up on charges. Nevertheless, many Americans held the Nixon pardon against Ford. Ford also had to deal with an economy wracked by recession, high unemployment, and stratospheric inflation that he had inherited from Nixon. Despite numerous attempts to tame inflation and spur economic growth, however, the Ford administration was unable to bring about a meaningful or sustainable economic recovery. As the election year of 1976 loomed, many Americans, including moderate Republicans, saw Ford as ineffectual—rightly or wrongly—and distrusted his motives because of the Nixon pardon. To make matters worse, Ford and his appointed vice president, Nelson Rockefeller, had to fend off a strong challenge for the Republican nomination that year by Ronald Reagan, former governor of California and the darling of the conservative wing of the party.
Democratic presidential candidate Jimmy Carter (left) and his running mate Walter Mondale react to the crowd at the Democratic National Convention in New York City on July 15, 1976. Carter, the governor of Georgia, defeated incumbent president Gerald Ford in the November election. (Library of Congress)
Electronic Intelligence On the Democratic side the field was wide open, and there were no front-runners or incumbents going into the winter 1976 primaries. Alabama governor George Wallace competed in the primaries, as did Senator Henry M. Jackson. In a significant upset, a newcomer with virtually no national name recognition—Georgia governor Jimmy Carter—placed second in the Iowa Caucus and then won the New Hampshire primary. Carter stunned the political pundits by capturing the nomination that summer, running as a “fresh-faced” outsider who would eschew politics as usual. He asked Americans to “trust him,” and trust they did. Carter, a born-again Christian from the Deep South who deplored segregation, was a former naval officer and a successful farmer. Generally speaking, he ran a good campaign and hammered home the message that he would help reform American politics because he was not a Washington insider. Carter was vague on many policy positions, however. After the Democratic National Convention and having chosen Minnesota senator Walter Mondale as a running mate, Carter enjoyed a huge 33-point lead over Ford and his running mate, Senator Bob Dole. That advantage was soon erased, however, as Ford finally found his voice after several missteps on the campaign trail and in televised debates. As the election approached Carter and Ford were in a virtual dead heat, despite the fact that Ford asserted—and rightly so—that Carter lacked any experience in national or international politics. In the end Carter won a bare majority of the vote, 50.1 percent, to Ford’s 48 percent (independent candidate Eugene McCarthy garnered most of the remaining). Carter captured 297 electoral votes, including every southern state except Virginia; Ford won 240 electoral votes, running strongest in states west of the Mississippi River. In the House of Representatives the Democrats gained just one seat from the Republicans. In the Senate the elections were a wash; neither side won or lost seats, and the Democrats retained their preelection 61–38 majority. Had it not been for Watergate, Carter may well never have become president. In this sense, the 1976 elections were a referendum on Nixonian policies and reflected the public’s frustration with the Vietnam War’s troubling legacy, Watergate, political corruption, economic uncertainty, and politics as usual. Carter, a complete outsider, appealed to Americans’ search for a new approach to entrenched problems. As it turned out, however, Carter would be no more successful in easing America’s economic woes than Ford or Nixon, although he did make good on a controversial campaign promise by issuing an amnesty to Vietnam War draft resisters who had shirked their military duty during the war. The amnesty program was lambasted by many conservative groups, but it did bring at least partial resolution to a nagging legacy of the war. PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR. See also Amnesty; Carter, James Earl, Jr.; Economy, U.S., and the Vietnam War; Elections, U.S., 1968; Elections, U.S., 1972; Ford, Gerald Rudolph;
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Nixon, Richard Milhous; Reagan, Ronald Wilson; Rockefeller, Nelson Aldrich; Watergate Scandal References Asher, Herbert B. Presidential Elections and American Politics. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1992. Carter, Jimmy. Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President. New York: Bantam Books, 1982. Greene, John Robert. The Presidency of Gerald R. Ford. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995.
Electronic Intelligence After 1964, the integrated air defense system (IADS) of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) expanded rapidly. With the appearance of new Soviet- and Chinese-supplied antiaircraft weapons (and their associated radars), U.S. military planners needed a more complete picture of the scale and complexity of the IADS. The primary method of obtaining information on types and capabilities of the growing North Vietnamese system was through electronic intelligence (ELINT). ELINT provided the U.S. military an electronic order of battle, listing all known types of North Vietnamese radars, their projected capabilities, and their locations. The United States deployed special ELINT collectors to Southeast Asia to obtain this information. Specially configured U.S. Navy ships, for example, gathered ELINT data on North Vietnamese radars from the Gulf of Tonkin. A variety of aircraft, a common example of which was the Douglas RB-66 or EB-66 (a B-66 destroyer bomber reconfigured for the gathering of ELINT; the designation “RB-66” was changed to “EB-66” in 1966), also performed ELINT duties. Two electronic warfare squadrons of E/RB-66s operated in Southeast Asia throughout most of the Vietnam War. In performing airborne ELINT missions, they typically orbited well beyond the range of North Vietnam’s air defense weapons, high over the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), Laos, or the Gulf of Tonkin. Each E/RB-66 carried specialized avionics, including sensitive antennas, receivers, pulse analyzers, and recorders. As a result, the E/RB-66 could display and record unique radar characteristics, such as the pulse width, scan pattern, frequency, and even the rate at which the North Vietnamese radars sent signals. This information was crucial to the development of U.S. electronic countermeasures. For example, a typical radar jammer, designed to overpower, or blind, a North Vietnamese radar, would have to match its same frequency in order to be effective. Because ELINT data could determine the range of frequencies within which a hostile radar operated, the radar would remain jammed no matter what its transmission frequency. Accurate ELINT was particularly crucial to deceptive jammers that relied on finesse rather than brute strength. These types of jammers were most commonly carried on U.S. Navy fighter-bombers that went to North Vietnam (such as the McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II and A-4 Skyhawk
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and the Grumman A-6 Intruder). By mimicking the enemy’s radar pulse exactly, these jammers would make North Vietnamese radar operators believe that the target aircraft was somewhere other than where it really was. ELINT data gathering was not easy. Six E/RB-66s were shot down by the North Vietnamese during the war (five by SA-2 missiles and one by a MiG-21). A major example of a successful operation was UNITED EFFORT, implemented by the U.S. Air Force to determine the exact frequencies of the SA-2 surface-to-air missile (SAM) radar proximity fuse. Beginning in late 1965, crewless drone aircraft flew at high altitude right over North Vietnamese air defenses in order to provoke SA-2 launches. One of the drones launched in 1966 was able to relay the proximity fuse signal to a nearby orbiting Strategic Air Command Boeing RB-47H Stratojet aircraft seconds before two missiles blew it apart. The collected signal was an important piece to the puzzle of how American electronic countermeasures (ECM) might defeat SA-2 air defenses. ELINT efforts were not always successful, however. During Operation LINEBACKER II in December 1972, U.S. Air Force aircrews—especially those in Boeing B-52 Stratofortress bombers—suffered heavy losses to North Vietnamese SA-2 missiles. Fifteen B-52s were shot down (and more were damaged) during the 11 days of LINEBACKER II. The losses were due in part to new Soviet modifications to the SA-2 missile’s guidance antenna, in part to new North Vietnamese missile procedures that fired several missiles at the same time and then guided them manually toward the aircraft’s electronic jamming signal, and in part to the U.S. Air Force Strategic Air Command’s flawed bombing tactics and failure to upgrade the electronic jamming equipment carried by some of its B-52 models. The Vietnam War drove home to American military aviation the lesson that any advantage it enjoyed on the electronic battlefield was fleeting at best; ELINT capabilities had to be continuously updated to prevent further losses. PATRICK K. BARKER See also Aircraft, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Airpower, Role in War; Antiaircraft Artillery, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam; LINEBACKER II, Operation; Long-Range Electronic Navigation; Surface-to-Air Missiles, Democratic Republic of Vietnam References Eschmann, Karl J. Linebacker: The Untold Story of the Air Raids over North Vietnam. New York: Ivy Books, 1989. Francillon, René, and Mick Roth. Douglas B-66 Destroyer. Arlington, TX: Aerofax, 1988. Michel, Marshall L., III. Clashes: Air Combat over North Vietnam, 1965–1972. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Michel, Marshall L., III. The Eleven Days of Christmas: America’s Last Vietnam Battle. San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2002. Naderveen, Gilles Van. Sparks over Vietnam: The EB-66 and the Early Struggle of Tactical Electronic Warfare. Airpower Research Institute Paper ARI Paper 2000-03. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: U.S. Air Force Air University, 2000.
Ellsberg, Daniel Birth Date: April 7, 1931 RAND Corporation and U.S. government intelligence analyst who helped compile the Defense Department’s secret history of the Vietnam War, later known as the Pentagon Papers, and leaked it to the New York Times in 1971. Born on April 7, 1931, in Chicago, Daniel Ellsberg graduated from Harvard University in 1952 and returned there for a master’s degree before volunteering for the U.S. Marine Corps in 1954. He rose to the rank of first lieutenant and emerged with a view of international affairs that emphasized military solutions. After returning to Harvard to earn a PhD in economics, Ellsberg joined the RAND Corporation in 1959 and consulted with government officials on such matters as the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Incident. Moving to Washington in 1964, he took a staff position within the U.S. Defense Department and maintained a special interest in policy-making decisions related to Vietnam. Ellsberg traveled to Vietnam in July 1965 to evaluate the civilian pacification program and stayed on as assistant to Deputy Ambassador William Porter. The apparent failure of pacification in addition to increasing civilian casualties and widespread corruption within the Saigon government convinced him that the war had reached a stalemate. This began to erode his support for Washington’s Vietnam policy, and he repeatedly communicated with Defense Secretary Robert McNamara about his views. In late 1967 McNamara assigned 36 researchers to document and analyze the history of U.S. involvement in Vietnam since World War II. Ellsberg focused on the early John F. Kennedy years. Ellsberg had assumed that presidents had been misled by overly optimistic advisory reports into accepting an ever-growing commitment that exceeded their expectations; this was known as the quagmire theory. In actuality, the Pentagon Papers revealed the accuracy of many of the antiwar movement’s criticisms: that American policy developed with little concern for Vietnamese desires and that leading U.S. officials had deceived the public about their intent and actions. The Pentagon Papers clearly showed that the government was not the reluctant participant it had often claimed to be. Ellsberg, now opposed to the war’s escalation, returned to RAND in 1968 and worked within the system to influence policy. He drafted Senator Robert Kennedy’s policy statements on Vietnam during the 1968 presidential campaign and later provided National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger with an extensive list of policy options. Using his security clearance, Ellsberg read additional sections of the Pentagon Papers and concluded that American aggression was the primary force behind the war. Ellsberg’s role in policy development weighed heavily on his conscience, and in the autumn of 1969, with the help of RAND colleague Anthony Russo, Ellsberg began copying the Pentagon study
EL PASO II, Operation
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chiatrist’s office, and offered Judge Byrne the directorship of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Ellsberg remained a target of White House animosity until Nixon resigned in August 1974 as a result of the Watergate Scandal. In the post–Watergate Scandal years, Ellsberg became a visible activist who spoke out on a variety of peace, nuclear disarmament, and civil rights issues. These included support for Polish dissidents in 1984, opposition to President Ronald Reagan’s Central American policies in 1985, protest against the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and public dissent with the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. MITCHELL K. HALL See also Adams, Samuel A.; Fulbright, James William; McNamara, Robert Strange; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Pentagon Papers and Trial; RAND Corporation; Russo, Anthony J., Jr.; Sheehan, Cornelius Mahoney; Watergate Scandal
Daniel Ellsberg is an author, economist, and political scientist. He achieved public notoriety in the early 1970s after releasing to the press portions of the top-secret Pentagon file, which became known as the Pentagon Papers, that traced U.S. involvement in the war and its escalations in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. (Getty Images)
in the hope that public knowledge of its conclusions would speed the end of the war. Senator J. William Fulbright refused to act on the copies he received, and Ellsberg had no more success in approaching other government officials. Tormented over the war’s continuation, Ellsberg became increasingly involved in antiwar activities and resigned from RAND in early 1970. Frustrated over the government’s disinterest in the Pentagon study, he leaked the report to Neil Sheehan of the New York Times, which began publishing excerpts on June 13, 1971. After three days the Justice Department under President Richard M. Nixon’s administration temporarily blocked publication of the Pentagon Papers with an injunction, arguing that prior restraint was necessary to prevent damage to national security. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected this claim on June 30, and publication continued. When Ellsberg identified himself as the source of the leak, a grand jury indicted him on various charges, including illegal possession of government documents, conspiracy, theft, and violation of the Espionage Act. After an initial late 1972 mistrial, the second Pentagon Papers trial began on January 18, 1973, in Los Angeles. On May 11, 1973, Judge Matthew Byrne dismissed the charges prior to jury deliberations after government misconduct—the beginning of the Watergate Scandal—became known. Determined to discredit Ellsberg, the White House had conducted illegal wiretapping, ordered a break-in of Ellsberg’s psy-
References Ellsberg, Daniel. Papers on the War. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972. Ellsberg, Daniel. Secrets: A Memoir on Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers. New York: Viking Penguin, 2002. Sheehan, Neil, et al. The Pentagon Papers: As Published by the New York Times. New York: Bantam, 1971. Schrag, Peter. Test of Loyalty: Daniel Ellsberg and the Rituals of Secret Government. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974. Ungar, Sanford J. The Papers & the Papers: An Account of the Legal and Political Battle over the Pentagon Papers. 1972; reprint, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.
EL PASO II,
Operation
Start Date: June 2, 1966 End Date: July 13, 1966 Military operation conducted by the U.S. Army 1st Infantry Division against the Viet Cong (VC) 9th Division in Binh Long Province, War Zone C, from June 2 to July 13, 1966. EL PASO II’s objective was to open Route 13 and deter a VC offensive against An Loc before the monsoon season. The first of four major encounters occurred on June 8 when the VC 272nd Regiment ambushed Troop A, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, north of the Ap Tau O bridge on Route 13 below An Loc, disabling several tanks and armored personnel carriers (APCs). The cavalry underestimated the size of the VC force, and although infantry arrived too late to be a factor, they claimed more than 100 VC. Three days later the 2nd Battalion, 28th Infantry (2-28 Infantry), battled an entrenched VC 273rd Regiment northwest of Loc Ninh. On June 30 the VC 271st Regiment ambushed Troop B, 1st Squadron, at Srok Dong on Route 13 south of Loc Ninh, taking out four tanks and inflicting heavy casualties. Troop C advanced to evacuate the dead and wounded and clear a landing zone (LZ) for the insertion of two companies of the 2nd Battalion, 18th Infantry
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(2-18 Infantry). The VC initially offered stiff resistance but soon broke contact. Despite the killing of 270 VC at Srok Dong, only U.S. air superiority prevented a major Communist victory. Major General William E. DePuy, commanding the 1st Infantry Division, then developed a plan to lure the VC into attacking his armor. Rumors circulated that a large U.S. column would move up Route 13 and a smaller one would move down Minh Thanh Road, running southwest from An Loc. The opposite was true. Potential ambush sites were identified along Minh Thanh Road, and two armored cavalry troops and a company of mechanized infantry prepared to move. Two other companies were airlifted into counterambush positions, and artillery was positioned at Minh Thanh village. Early on July 9 following artillery and air strikes, the task force passed the first checkpoint, but before the task force reached the second checkpoint the VC 272nd Regiment attacked Troop C, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, knocking out its lead tank and destroying two M-113s. VC fire rained down on disabled vehicles as Troop C’s 2nd and 3rd platoons advanced and jockeyed for positions. Air and artillery fire was called for, and Troop B moved forward. When VC forces were found to be west of the road, the prepositioned infantry went into action, attacking the ambush force frontally and from both flanks. Well-timed air strikes ended the ambush. The following day, U.S. troops sweeping the area found 240 dead VC, captured 8 prisoners, and recovered dozens of individual and crew-served weapons. A postwar Vietnamese history lists Communist losses in this battle as 128 killed and 167 wounded. When EL PASO II ended on July 13, the VC had lost 855 dead and had failed to seize An Loc. Although U.S. forces suffered nearly 200 casualties, the operation was termed a success because Route 13 was reopened and secure. Learning from the near disasters of the two engagements prior to the Battle of Minh Thanh Road, the 1st Division had developed an effective counterambush tactic by which armored cavalry with coordinated air and artillery support would be used as a fixing force against a numerically superior enemy until airmobile infantry could be inserted as encircling maneuver elements. The VC 9th Division, rebuilt with People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) replacements, encountered U.S. troops five months later during Operation ATTLEBORO. JOHN D. ROOT See also ATTLEBORO, Operation; DePuy, William Eugene; United States Army; War
Zone C and War Zone D References Nguyen Quoc Dung. Su Doan 9 [9th Division]. Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1990. Stanton, Shelby L. The Rise and Fall of an American Army: The U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985. Starry, Donn A. Armored Combat in Vietnam. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1980.
Ély, Paul Henri Romuald Birth Date: December 17, 1897 Death Date: January 16, 1975 French Army general, army chief of staff (1953–1954, 1956–1958), high commissioner and commander in chief of French forces in Indochina (1954–1955), and chief of the National Defense Staff (1959–1961). Paul Henri Romauld Ély was born on December 17, 1897, in Salonika, Greece, where his father was a French civil servant. Ély spent much of his early childhood in Cyprus, where he learned Greek and developed an interest in the culture and literature. During World War I, in March 1915 Ély enlisted in the French Army. Wounded in battle, he won the Croix de Guerre with two citations for bravery. In 1917 Ély entered the French military academy of Saint-Cyr, from which he graduated in 1919 as a second lieutenant. Assigned to the French Army General Staff, in 1928 he attended the École de Guerre. He was promoted to captain in 1930 and to major in 1939. In June 1940 during the Battle for France, Ély was so severely wounded in his right hand that it became permanently disabled. Again awarded the Croix de Guerre for bravery, he joined the Resistance and in 1942 became a lieutenant colonel and deputy head of the French Forces of the Interior, the military arm of the French underground. In 1944 he was promoted to colonel and served as liaison between the National Resistance Council in France and Charles de Gaulle’s Free French Government, making a number of hazardous trips across the English Channel with military intelligence for the 1944 Normandy Invasion. In 1945 Ély was promoted to brigadier general and then in 1947 to major general in command of Military Region VII. In 1948 he became chief of staff to the inspector general of the French Army, General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny. In 1949 Ély was promoted to lieutenant general and was sent to Washington as the French representative to the three-member Standing Group of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In August 1953 he returned to Paris as chief of staff of the French Army. That December he also became president of the military committee of NATO. In February 1954 Ély and Defense Minister René Pleven undertook a fact-finding mission to Indochina. Convinced that France could not win the war there without massive military assistance, Ély arrived in Washington on March 20, 1954, in an effort to secure that aid. He candidly informed his American counterpart, Admiral Arthur Radford, of the likely fall of Dien Bien Phu and the dire consequences this would have for the Indochina War and perhaps all of Southeast Asia. It quickly became apparent to the Dwight Eisenhower administration that the only way to save the French would be massive U.S. military intervention, possibly including nuclear weapons. With the British government opposed and the battle apparently too far gone, Eisenhower decided against U.S. intervention, although he did agree, after Ély’s return to Paris, to supply 25 additional Douglas B-26 Invader bombers.
Embargo, U.S. Trade After the fall of Dien Bien Phu, Ély again went to Indochina with generals Raoul Salan and Pierre Pélissier to prepare a military report on which the French government might base requests to its allies for aid. Ély returned to France three weeks later to recommend that France immediately evacuate northern Vietnam and replace General Henri Navarre as commander in chief. On June 3, 1954, the French government named Ély to succeed both Navarre as military chief and Maurice Dejean as French high commissioner. On June 11 French and Vietnamese troops in the southern Red River Delta began Operation AUVERGE, the last major battle of the war, in which they fought their way toward the Hanoi-Haiphong lifeline. On June 17, 1954, Ély returned to France to present alternate military plans to the government of Pierre Mendès-France and then returned to Indochina. The July 21, 1954, Geneva Accords brought the Indochina War to an end. The pro-American Ély contributed much to Ngo Dinh Diem’s consolidation of power, and the training of the Vietnamese armed forces came under Ély’s overall authority. But friction between the French and Americans as well as the presence of French troops wounded the nationalist sensibilities of the Diem government. The last French troops departed Vietnam in April 1956. During 1956–1958 Ély was president of the Chief of Staff’s Committee. In 1958 during the Algerian War (1954–1962) when French settlers and army professionals in Algiers made common cause against the French government in order to keep Algeria an integral part of France, Ély resigned as chief of staff in order to resolve his conflict of loyalties. De Gaulle brought Ély back as chief of staff and in 1960 sent him to Algiers to get the reactions of French Army leaders there to the idea of a truce and proclamation of an autonomous Algerian government. Ély retired as chief of staff of the army in 1961, the year before Algeria became independent. He died in Paris on January 16, 1975. Ély was widely respected for his high principles, modesty, ability to work with others, and capacity for hard work. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also De Gaulle, Charles; Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; French Indochina, 1860s–1946; Mendès-France, Pierre; Navarre, Henri Eugène; Ngo Dinh Diem; Radford, Arthur William; Salan, Raoul Albin Louis; VULTURE, Operation References Ély, Paul. Mémoires: L’Indochine dans la Tourmente. Paris: Plon, 1964. Fall, Bernard B. The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis. 2nd rev. ed. New York: Praeger, 1967.
Elysée Agreement Formal treaty signed at Elysée Palace in Paris on March 8, 1949, between French president Vincent Auriol and Emperor Bao Dai whereby France recognized Vietnam as an associated state within the French Union and promised to support its application for
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membership in the United Nations (UN). According to the treaty, formally ratified by the French Chamber of Deputies in January 1950, France promised to incorporate the Republic of Cochin China within the State of Vietnam. Paris lauded the agreement as proof that Vietnam was “independent,” and the agreement no doubt helped convince Washington that the war in Indochina had been transformed into a civil war between Vietnamese democrats and Vietnamese Communists rather than being a colonial conflict. The reality was quite different. Under the constitutional framework of the French Union, Vietnam could not receive full independence; it could only receive autonomy. France recognized Vietnam’s right to have diplomats in only a few specified countries: China, Thailand, and the Vatican. (Because of the subsequent victory of the Communists in China, India was substituted for China, but India did not recognize the Bao Dai regime.) Proof that the new State of Vietnam was not independent was seen in the fact that it recognized Paris’s right to control its army and foreign relations, and French economic domination of Vietnam was preserved. Stanley Karnow quotes Bao Dai as remarking soon after the treaty was signed that “What they call a Bao Dai solution turns out to be just a French solution.” This meant that Bao Dai was unable to offer Vietnamese nationalists any alternative to the Communists. The French had, however, recognized the territorial unity of Vietnam. By the end of 1949 Laos and Cambodia signed treaties similar to the Elysée Agreement. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Bao Dai; French Indochina, 1860s–1946; Indochina War References Buttinger, Joseph. The Smaller Dragon: A Political History of Vietnam. New York: Praeger, 1958. Hammer, Ellen J. The Struggle for Indochina. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1954. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997.
Embargo, U.S. Trade U.S. trade embargo against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and later the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV). U.S. hostility to the Hanoi regime did not end with the fall of Saigon (present-day Ho Chi Minh City) in April 1975. Washington soon extended its trade embargo, formerly affecting only North Vietnam, to include the SRV. Using the 1917 Trading with the Enemy Act for authority, the embargo had originally prohibited trade with or investment in the Communist-controlled portion of Vietnam. With the capitulation of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), Washington strengthened the sanctions to prohibit aid from multilateral organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, the Asian Development Bank, and the World Bank.
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U.S-Vietnam Merchandise Trade, Selected Years 1994–2008 Year
U.S. Imports from Vietnam (in millions)
U.S. Exports to Vietnam (in millions)
Trade Balance (in millions)
1994 2001 2002 2005 2006 2007
$50.5 $1,026.4 $2,391.7 $6,522.3 $8,463.4 $10,541.2
$172.2 $393.8 $551.9 $1,151.3 $988.4 $1,823.3
$121.7 –$632.6 –$1,839.8 –$5,371.0 –$7,475.0 –$8,717.9
2008
$12,610.9
$2,673.0
–$9,937.9
The purpose of the embargo in the immediate postwar years was essentially punitive, and U.S. policy makers had no real expectation of influencing Vietnamese actions. As time passed, however, issues arose that hardened the American position and led to an increase in international support for the embargo. Most important in this regard was the 1978 Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and occupation of that country until 1989. Vietnamese resistance on the lingering prisoners of war/missing in action issue further embittered the Americans. However, persistent frustration over the U.S. failure in Southeast Asia and the need to save face also worked to ensure the embargo’s continuation. The effectiveness of the embargo is difficult to access. Vietnam certainly faced disastrous economic conditions in the years after gaining unification, but the unwise and dogmatic policies pursued by the SRV bore as much responsibility for these problems as did the embargo. Rebuilding the war-torn country under these policies and without significant foreign aid proved slow, and Vietnam faced famine more than once in these years. The most damaging aspect of the trade restrictions was the denial of access to international aid. Postwar Vietnam had little to trade anyway, as its offshore oil deposits remained undeveloped and in dispute. During these years of Vietnamese economic isolation, the Soviet Union proved to be Vietnam’s greatest source of aid. Ironically, the greatest effect of the trade embargo may have been to drive Vietnam closer to the Soviet Union. The Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia drained precious economic resources and was the primary impediment to foreign investment. With the Soviet Union itself teetering on economic collapse and with aid from that country diminishing, the SRV withdrew its troops from Cambodia in September 1989. Foreign aid and investment soon began trickling in. Although trade with the former Soviet Union fell off significantly, new relationships with Singapore, Japan, and Hong Kong proved fruitful. By 1991 these were the top three traders with Vietnam, accounting for an influx of some $2.1 billion. Economic assistance to the SRV also began to grow, amounting to some $600 million in 1992. As foreign investment in the SRV grew, U.S. firms pressed Washington to relax restrictions to prevent American companies from losing more opportunities. Many Americans still smarted from the experience of the war, however, and the trade barriers fell slowly and in piecemeal fash-
Notes Embargo ended Normal trading relations (NTR) status established Permanent normal trading relations (PNTR) status established
ion. In April 1992 the United States allowed the reestablishment of direct telephone service with Vietnam, a useful precursor to doing business. That December the George H. W. Bush administration responded to Hanoi’s increased cooperation in recovering and identifying the remains of American soldiers by allowing U.S. businesses to enter into contracts with Vietnamese businesses and government. Although these contracts could not yet take effect, this action hinted at the imminent further relaxation of restrictions. In July 1993 President Bill Clinton renewed Vietnamese access to international funds, and in February 1994 he formally lifted remaining trade restrictions. American firms such as IBM, General Electric, and Citibank soon entered the newly opened Vietnamese market. U.S. investment in the SRV mushroomed from only $3.3 million in 1993 to $1.2 billion in 1995, although the United States was only the sixth-largest investor, trailing Taiwan, Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea). Complete normalization of relations between the United States and Vietnam occurred in 1997, including the arrival of the first U.S. ambassador in more than 20 years. That same year the SRV agreed to assume debts, the worth about $140 million, incurred by the Saigon government for roads, power stations, and grain shipments before its fall in 1975. Hanoi took this step to help pave the way for most-favored-nation trading status. In the years since the late 1990s Vietnam slowly but steadily moved toward a marketoriented economy, which helped to attract more foreign and U.S. investments. In 2000, Vietnam and the United States concluded a bilateral trade agreement, which strengthened economic ties between the two nations; the agreement went into force in 2001. By 2004 the United States was the SRV’s largest importer of goods, representing about 19 percent of all Vietnamese goods imported by foreign nations. In late 2006 the SRV gained acceptance into the World Trade Organization (WTO), one of the last steps in ending its former economic isolation. MATTHEW A. CRUMP See also Clinton, William Jefferson; United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1975–Present; Vietnam, Socialist Republic of, 1975–Present References Abegglen, James C. Sea Change: Pacific Asia as the New World-Industrial Center. New York: Free Press, 1994.
Enclave Strategy Beresford, Melanie. Vietnam: Politics, Economics and Society. Marxist Regimes Series. New York: Pinter, 1988. Kim, Young C., ed. The Southeast Asian Economic Miracle. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1995. Schultz, Clifford J., II, et al. “American Involvement in Vietnam, Part II: Prospects for U.S. Business in a New Era.” Business Horizons 38(6) (March–April 1995): 21–28. U.S. House Select Committee on Hunger. Three Asian Countries in Crisis: Afghanistan, Vietnam, and the Philippines. 100th Cong., 2nd sess., serial 100-27. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988.
Enclave Strategy The enclave strategy was adopted in early 1965 by the Lyndon B. Johnson administration and restricted the movement of U.S. forces to Vietnam’s coastal areas. The strategy was suggested by U.S. ambassador to Vietnam General Maxwell Taylor, who opposed the introduction of large numbers of American troops. The strategy was considered a go-slow approach that would keep the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) as a key player in the war and was supported by the State Department’s George Ball, Robert Johnson, and Thomas Hughes.
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The strategy was indicative of a larger struggle within the Johnson administration about how far the commitment to Vietnam should go. Inherent in the enclave strategy was the idea that the war had to be won by the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) and that the most effective U.S. role was to aid ARVN forces by controlling the densely populated coast. The ARVN could then fight inland while American troops protected rear areas. State Department advocates pointed out that the Communists were unlikely to adopt a strategy that would increase their vulnerability to U.S. military might and that given the nature of the conflict, U.S. forces could not hope to win the war for South Vietnam. It was also thought that U.S. forces could not be driven out by Communist military action. The enclave strategy seemed to promise the lowest possible cost in American lives. It would allow ARVN forces to recover and take control of the countryside while the government built credibility and legitimacy, secure in the knowledge that Americans held strategic points. The enclave strategy was first applied to the 3,500 U.S. marines who landed in Da Nang in March 1965. The marines were restricted to occupying and defending critical terrain around the airfield and to support and communications facilities. They were not to engage the Viet Cong (VC) in offensive operations.
A U.S. outpost on a hill above the beach at Da Nang in 1965. The enclave strategy called for U.S. forces to restrict their operations to defense of the densely populated coastal areas. (Bettmann/Corbis)
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The enclave strategy never had the support of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), commander General William Westmoreland. He claimed that the strategy would induce a garrison mentality among U.S. troops, who would lose their combat edge and advantages in mobility and firepower if they sat by while the ARVN fought. Increasingly Westmoreland pushed for the introduction of U.S. troops. President Johnson responded with National Security Action Memorandum 328 on April 1, 1965, which reinforced the marines at Da Nang with an additional battalion and 20,000 support troops. The memorandum also allowed the marines to engage in combat as a reserve force in ARVN actions within 50 miles of Da Nang. ARVN’s continued poor performance, coupled with increased Communist attacks in June 1965, convinced U.S. leaders that their strategy was not working. With the Communists seizing one district capital town and destroying at least 1 ARVN infantry battalion each week, Westmoreland on June 7 requested 44 U.S. battalions. He estimated that if this rate continued, South Vietnam could not survive more than six months. On June 27 U.S. forces began to engage the Communists in their own right along the coast and in the Central Highlands, effectively ending the enclave strategy. CLAYTON D. LAURIE
32 UH-1H and 37 CH-47 helicopters, 48 A-37 attack aircraft, 23 AC-119K fixed-wing gunships, additional aircraft, and thousands of other vehicles and weapons. The intent was to replace the equipment that the South Vietnamese had lost in combat during the early days of the Spring (Easter) Offensive in 1972 and also to provide the resources to form new armor, artillery, and air units. In October, Washington launched Operation ENHANCE PLUS to expedite delivery of all items promised from Operation ENHANCE and earlier resupply initiatives, in addition to other matériel that the United States might not be able to send once a cease-fire had taken effect. The result was a massive effort by sea and air between October 23 and December 1972 that brought more than 105,000 major items of military equipment to South Vietnam, about 5,000 tons by air and the rest by sea. The intent was to expand and strengthen South Vietnamese armed forces before any peace agreement went into effect. Unfortunately, South Vietnamese forces were not prepared to handle or maintain the huge influx of equipment, and much of it was still in warehouses when South Vietnam fell to the Communists in April 1975. JAMES H. WILLBANKS
See also Ball, George Wildman; Geography of Indochina and Vietnam; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Taylor, Maxwell Davenport; United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1954–1965; Vietnam, Republic of, Army; Westmoreland, William Childs
References Andradé, Dale. America’s Last Vietnam Battle: Halting Hanoi’s 1972 Easter Offensive. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001. Clarke, Jeffrey J. Advice and Support: The Final Years; The U.S. Army in Vietnam. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988. Willbanks, James H. Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and South Vietnam Lost Its War. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004.
References Herring, George C. America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975. 4th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001. Krepinevich, Andrew F., Jr. The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. Lewy, Guenter. America in Vietnam. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978.
END SWEEP, Operation See Mining and Mine Clearance in North Vietnam
ENHANCE,
Operation
Start Date: May 1972 End Date: October 1972 U.S. effort designed to increase the combat capability of the armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) as U.S. troops withdrew from Vietnam in 1972. The operation began in May 1972 and lasted until December 1972. Operation ENHANCE involved increased weapons and equipment shipments to South Vietnam beginning in May 1972. This resupply effort included shipments of 39 175-millimeter artillery pieces, 120 M-48 tanks,
See also Easter Offensive
ENHANCE PLUS,
Operation
Start Date: October 12, 1972 End Date: December 23, 1972 Massive short-term 1972 logistical aid to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). On October 8, 1972, a delegation from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) to the Paris Peace Conference offered the U.S. representatives a peace proposal, which was timed to coincide with the 1972 U.S. presidential election in which President Richard M. Nixon was running for reelection and to pressure his administration to accept a peace treaty. On October 12 the Nixon administration ordered the U.S. military to supply the South Vietnamese government with billions of dollars in military supplies and equipment. Washington hoped that with replenished military stocks the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) would conduct successful offensive operations to strengthen the South Vietnamese position in negotiations following the signing of the Paris Peace Accords. This massive influx of aid was dubbed Operation ENHANCE PLUS. From October to December 1972 the United States sent by sea and air to South Vietnam more than 105,000 tons of arms, am-
ENHANCE PLUS, Operation
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An M-48 tank, several UH-1 Huey helicopters, and a CH-54B Skycrane helicopter, some of which are still in protective coverings, after being unloaded from U.S. ships in Saigon. The equipment was part of Operation ENHANCE PLUS, which provided massive short-term military assistance to the Republic of Vietnam. (Bettmann/Corbis)
munition, fuel, spare parts, and communications items. ARVN ammunition stockpiles, for example, were increased from 146,000 tons to more than 165,000 tons during ENHANCE PLUS. By January 1973 the United States had provided $2 billion worth of military equipment, and South Vietnam possessed the fourth-largest air force in the world. In 1972 General Creighton Abrams directed that Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), change its emphasis from direct combat support of the ARVN to restructuring its administration, supply, and logistics. U.S. combat units were continuing their phased withdrawal, and the ARVN assumed greater responsibility for the conduct of operations. U.S. advisory teams, while still accompanying ARVN units on combat missions, would be gradually withdrawn, but U.S. advisers would continue to assist in upgrading ARVN command, staff, and logistical functions. Operation ENHANCE PLUS was an outgrowth of Operation ENHANCE, which began in May 1972 after the ARVN successfully blunted the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) Easter Offensive. Originally ENHANCE was the replenishment of all ARVN equipment lost during the Easter Offensive. In addition, Washington directed MACV to provide South Vietnam with new equipment for future increases in ARVN force structure. ENHANCE scheduled for delivery to the ARVN 70,767 individual and crewserved weapons, 382 artillery pieces, 622 tracked vehicles, 2,035
wheeled vehicles, and more than 11,000 major communications items. On October 12, 1972, Operation ENHANCE PLUS commenced to ensure delivery of all Operation ENHANCE items as well as any other outstanding logistical support packages promised by the United States to South Vietnam. On October 19 National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and General Creighton Abrams, who in June had assumed duties as chief of staff of the U.S. Army, arrived in Saigon for consultations with Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and General Frederick C. Weyand, who had replaced Abrams as commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam. Kissinger also presented to South Vietnamese president Nguyen Van Thieu texts of the Paris Peace Accords. Although Thieu torpedoed the agreement, infuriating Kissinger and leading to Operation LINEBACKER II, material provided by ENHANCE and ENHANCE PLUS was important in securing Thieu’s eventual grudging support of the reworked Paris Peace Accords that followed the LINEBACKER II campaign. JULIUS A. MENZOFF See also Abrams, Creighton Williams, Jr.; Bunker, Ellsworth; Kissinger, Henry Alfred; Le Duc Tho; LINEBACKER II, Operation; Nguyen Van Thieu; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Paris Negotiations; United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1973–1975; Vietnamization; Washington Special Actions Group; Weyand, Frederick Carlton
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References Clarke, Jeffrey J. Advice and Support: The Final Years; The U.S. Army in Vietnam. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. Snepp, Frank. Decent Interval: An Insider’s Account of Saigon’s Indecent End. New York: Random House, 1977. Willbanks, James H. Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and South Vietnam Lost Its War. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004.
ENTERPRISE,
Operation
Start Date: February 13, 1967 End Date: March 11, 1968 Military operation initiated south of Saigon in Long An Province during February 13, 1967–March 11, 1968. Operation ENTERPRISE involved the U.S. 9th Infantry Division, Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) units, and Regional Forces and Popular Forces of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). The 3rd Battalion, 39th Infantry—the first of
the 9th Division’s elements to arrive in Vietnam—reached Saigon (present-day Ho Chi Minh City) in January 1967. The 3rd Battalion moved south to Rach Kien the next month. At that time the area was undisputed Viet Cong (VC) territory, and the 3rd Battalion came under harassing fire almost immediately. Platoon- or even company-sized commands venturing outside the camp were certain to meet heavy opposition. Other units of the 9th Infantry Division soon arrived. The entire 3rd Brigade colocated at Rach Kien, while the mechanized 2nd Battalion, 60th Infantry, established itself nearby at Binh Phuoc. On February 13, 1967, these elements initiated Operation ENTERPRISE to clear Long An Province of VC forces. On April 9 the 3rd Battalion, 39th Infantry, was airlifted into battle along the Rach Dia River against the VC 506th Battalion. Reinforced by two battalions of the 60th Infantry and the ARVN 2nd Squadron, 10th Cavalry, the allied troops swept the area through April 11. Despite suffering considerable losses, the bulk of the VC 506th Battalion managed to scatter and escape. Allied operations continued in the province for another six months, inflicting more than 2,000 VC casualties by the time ENTERPRISE finally ended on March 11, 1968. The operation failed,
A Vietnamese peasant leans on a walking stick as American infantrymen search his village during Operation ENTERPRISE in the Mekong Delta of South Vietnam in early 1967. (AP/Wide World Photos)
Enuol, Y Bham however, to clear Long An Province. The VC remained a popular and powerful presence throughout the area even after the events of the 1968 Tet Offensive. EDWARD C. PAGE
349
See also Air Mobility; Attrition; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; McNamara, Robert Strange; Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
See also Clear and Hold; LAM SON 719, Operation; Tet Offensive, Overall Strategy; Tet Offensive and the Saigon Circle; United States Army; Vietnam, Republic of, Army; Vietnamization
References Sheehan, Neil, et al. The Pentagon Papers: As Published by the New York Times. New York: Bantam, 1971. Westmoreland, William C. A Soldier Reports. New York: Doubleday, 1976.
References Stanton, Shelby L. The Rise and Fall of an American Army: The U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985. Westmoreland, William C. A Soldier Reports. New York: Doubleday, 1976.
Enuol, Y Bham Birth Date: 1913 Death Date: ca. 1975
Enthoven, Alain Birth Date: September 10, 1930 U.S. Department of Defense official. Born in Seattle, Washington, on September 10, 1930, Alain Enthoven was educated as an economist at Stanford University (BA, 1952), Oxford University (MPhil, 1954), and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (PhD, 1966). After working for the RAND Corporation from 1956 to 1960, Enthoven served as a systems analyst in the Department of Defense from 1960 to 1969, studying the costs and effectiveness of alternative solutions to defense problems. From 1961 to 1965 he was deputy assistant secretary of defense, and from 1965 to 1969 he was deputy assistant secretary of defense for systems analysis. Enthoven’s early work examined budgetary process and nuclear issues, but in 1961 his office focused on the U.S. Army’s use of its aircraft. Believing that air mobility had merit, Enthoven’s office persuaded the secretary of defense to conduct tests that led to the organization of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) that fought in Vietnam. Beginning in 1966, Enthoven examined the American strategy of attrition in Vietnam and found it wanting. He concluded that Communist forces initiated most firefights and controlled their rate of attrition. Therefore, sending more troops in 1967 would not achieve greater attrition. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and President Lyndon B. Johnson agreed with this conclusion and rejected the request by the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, for 200,000 more troops. By 1968, Enthoven strongly opposed the bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). After leaving the Department of Defense in 1969, Enthoven served in industry and academe. From 1969 to 1971 he directed economic planning for Litton Industries, and from 1971 to 1973 he was president of Litton Medical Products. From 1973 Enthoven held an endowed chair of public and private management at Stanford University; he currently has emeritus status. He has published significant works on public health care and has focused his work on health care issues. JOHN L. BELL JR.
Rhadé Montagnard and activist and president of the Bajaraka movement and of Le Front Unifié de Lutte des Races Opprimées (FULRO, United Struggle Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races). Born in 1913 in the Vietnamese village of Buon-Ale-A, Y Bham Enuol was educated at the Franco-Rhadé School and the Christian and Missionary Alliance Bible School in Buon-Ale-A. He later received advanced agricultural training during a threeyear course of study at the École Nationale d’Agriculture in Tuyen Quang. Upon completion of his studies, he became a technical agent in the Darlac Province Agricultural Service and eventually received civil service status in the Cadre Indochinois of the French colonial administration. Enuol was an activist in the ethnonationalist Bajaraka (a consolidation of Bahnar, Jarai, Rhadé, and Koho) movement created in opposition to President Ngo Dinh Diem’s land development program in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) to resettle Vietnamese refugees on Montagnard lands in the Central Highlands and force the resettlement of Montagnard villagers. For his leadership in the movement, Enuol was imprisoned in 1958 by the South Vietnamese government. Released in 1964, he resumed his work as deputy province chief for Central Highland affairs in Darlac Province as well as his ethnonationalist activities. Bajaraka evolved into FULRO. In 1964 during an uprising at Special Forces camps around Ban Me Thuot, Enuol delivered a FULRO manifesto calling for action to reclaim Montagnard lands taken by the Vietnamese. Again under threat of imprisonment by South Vietnamese authorities, he fled to Mondolkiri Province in Cambodia, where he assumed leadership of a FULRO army of 5,000 to 6,000 soldiers, many of whom had left Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) units, and their 15,000 dependents. There Enuol, as FULRO president, represented the Montagnards in negotiations with the Cambodian and South Vietnamese governments and with the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and the Viet Cong (VC). With the 1968 Tet Offensive and the increasing vulnerability of Montagnard villages in the Central Highlands, Enuol sought to return to Vietnam with his FULRO army to protect Central
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Highlands villages from Communist attack. In negotiations with the Saigon government, he was promised that FULRO army units would be integrated into Regional Force units to protect Central Highlands villages and that FULRO leaders were to receive positions in the government in exchange for their support. FULRO militants overthrew Enuol, however, and exiled him, along with his family and immediate followers, to Phnom Penh, where he was placed under house arrest by the Cambodian government in 1970. With the fall of Phnom Penh to the Khmer Rouge in April 1975, Enuol and some 150 followers took refuge in the French embassy. Forced to evacuate the embassy by French officials, he was last seen leading the Montagnards from the embassy to surrender to the Khmer Rouge. DAVID M. BERMAN See also Ban Me Thuot, Battle of; Cambodia; Civilian Irregular Defense Group; Front Unifié de Lutte des Races Opprimées; Hickey, Gerald Cannon; Khmer Rouge; Mobile Strike Force Commands; Montagnards References Hickey, Gerald Cannon. Free in the Forest: Ethnohistory of the Vietnamese Central Highlands, 1954–1976. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982. Hickey, Gerald Cannon. Shattered World: Adaptation and Survival among Vietnam’s Highland Peoples during the Vietnam War. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993. Wiesner, Louis A. Victims and Survivors: Displaced Persons and Other War Victims in Viet-Nam, 1954–1975. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1988.
Ethnology of Southeast Asia A branch of anthropology, ethnology refers to the study of the origins and distribution of various races, ethnicities, and national boundaries of human beings. While indicators for ethnicity are subjective, ethnicity can usually be identified by certain physical characteristics common in a given population but also by culture, language, and self-identity. Throughout mainland Southeast Asia, most nation-states bear the name of the dominant ethnic group. The Viets, Tais, Malays, Burmans, and Khmers (Cambodians) each gave their own name to the nation-state they dominated or continue to dominate. However, the divisions of ethnicity there have never been precise, and wide overlap and broad dispersions of ethnicities occur throughout the region. The current ethnic distribution in Southeast Asia resulted from the movement of several large tribal groups, beginning with the Khmers who migrated into Southeast Asia from southern China beginning in the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE). The Khmers were followed by the Mons and Burmans, who settled along the Irrawaddy River basin in the area of present-day Myanmar (Burma); the Tais, who dominated the center of the region; and the Viets, who pushed down the east coast of Southeast Asia. Through in-
termarriage, enslavement, assimilation, and cultural exchange, the newcomers also inherited some culture and genes from the indigenous Malayo-Polynesian peoples, creating the basis of most major ethnic groups of modern Southeast Asia. The peoples of Southeast Asia had long been influenced by both Hindu and Chinese cultures. In general, the Khmers, Tais, Mons, and Burmans were more heavily influenced by Indian-Hindu culture, while the Viets were more heavily influenced by Chinese culture. Vietnamese culture includes elements of Confucianism, and to a lesser extent Taoism, as a result of almost a millennium of Chinese rule over Vietnam. The strongest Chinese influence is in religion, where Viets tend to be Mahayana (or “Chinese”) Buddhists, while other peoples of Southeast Asia tend to be Theravada (or Hinayana) Buddhists. The division is also reflected in writing systems. Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and Burma use an alphabetical script adopted from India, while Vietnam used a Chinese-based writing system until it was replaced with the Latin alphabet by the French in the late 18th century. Despite outside influences, the major ethnicities of Southeast Asia each retained their core cultural aspects. Many smaller ethnic groups also live in Southeast Asia. Most of these marginalized people, usually collectively known as “Hill Tribes” (the French referred to the hill peoples in Central Vietnam as Montagnards) occupy less-fertile lands on the margins of society, while the dominant ethnic groups occupy the lowland river valleys. Most hill tribes are remnants of earlier inhabitants of the region who were pushed to the hills by later arrivals or retreated into the highlands to avoid assimilation. However, in some cases they are descendants of groups who came after the dominant peoples. In addition to Hill Tribes, various ethnicities of “overseas Chinese” (Huaqiao) also live throughout Southeast Asia, usually in urban enclaves. The ancestors of most of these overseas Chinese came from Fujian and Guangdong provinces in southern coastal China and were not Mandarin speakers. Most Chinese in Southeast Asia tend to speak and identify themselves as Hokkien or Teochiu, with lesser numbers of Cantonese, Hakka, and Hainanese. Most are descendants of people who first began migrating into Southeast Asia during the Song dynasty (960–1279 CE), with larger numbers migrating in the middle of the 19th century. Most of these Chinese sojourners were men who usually married local women but raised their children as Chinese. Only in Thailand did the Chinese largely assimilate, mostly through force, although even Thailand has its distinct Chinese populations. Malaysia has the largest Chinese population, constituting about a third of the population and largely dominating the economy, while the Malays, who are mostly Muslim, dominate politics. Vietnam is one of the most ethnically homogeneous nations in Southeast Asia, with ethnic minorities found mainly in border areas. While ethnically Viet (Kinh) people make up slightly over 86 percent of the population of Vietnam, Chinese as well as other ethnic groups, collectively referred to as Nguoi Dan Toc (“ethnic people”) by the Vietnamese, dominate certain areas of the nation
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Vietnamese Buddhist monks follow prominent monk Thich Nhat Hanh, unseen, in a procession for a ceremony at Vinh Nghiem Pagoda in Ho Chi Minh City, March 16, 2007. (AP/Wide World Photos)
demographically. The Chinese of Vietnam, mostly Hokkien with lesser numbers of Teochiu, are concentrated in the Cholon (Viet for “Big Market”) section of Ho Chi Minh City, as Saigon was known as until 1975. Cholon, also called Tai-Ngon (Cantonese for “embankment”), is situated on the right bank of the Saigon River, across from Saigon proper. While Cholon remains to this day ethnically Chinese, large numbers of Chinese left Cholon and Vietnam following the fall of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) to the Communists in 1975, contributing significant numbers of boat people, as the refugees who left Vietnam by sea were called. Cholon lost still more of its population to emigration during the run-up to and aftermath of the 1979 war between the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC) and Vietnam. Other ethnic minorities in Vietnam include the Tay, Muong, Khome, Nung, Hmong, and other groups, each of which constitutes less than 2 percent of the population. In general, Viets inhabit the coastal regions and the river valleys. Viet (Viet Kieu) and mixed Viet-Khmer people comprised almost 10 percent of the population of Cambodia, mainly in eastern Cambodia adjacent to Vietnam, until the genocidal policies of the Khmer Rouge, which ruled Cambodia from 1975 until 1979, drastically decreased their numbers. In the far south of Vietnam, in the Mekong Delta and along the southern Cambodian border, live small communities of
Chams, descendants of a people whose kingdoms once controlled all of what is now southern Vietnam. The Viets began migrating into the region from the north by the 16th century and thoroughly dominated southern Vietnam demographically and politically by the early 19th century. Much of the highlands in the inland central region of Vietnam are populated by tribal groups, collectively known as the Degar. Viet people usually refer to the Degar as Nguoi Dan Toc or even as Moi (“savages”). Like many so-called Hill Tribes throughout Southeast Asia, they had originally occupied the coastal areas before being driven into the mountains by the Viets beginning in the ninth century. Most Degars belong to one of about 40 tribes, mostly of Tai, Mon-Khmer, or Malayo-Polynesian origin. The Jarai, Rhade, Bahnar, Koho, Sedand, Bru, Pacoh, Katu, Jeh, Cua, Halang, Rongao, Monom, Roglai, Cru, Mnong, Lat, Sre, Nop, Maa, and Stieng represent the largest of the Degar tribes. Many Degars adopted Christianity in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, with about half professing Protestantism and the remainder divided between Roman Catholicism and traditional beliefs. The Degars were usually referred to by the Americans during the Vietnam War as Montagnards. American soldiers often shortened the term to “Yard” in spoken English, although the term has since become offensive.
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Minority Montagnards, who had fled from Vietnam, await registration by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees in northeastern Cambodia on July 22, 2004. Many Montagnards fled Vietnam’s Central Highlands following massive demonstrations against religious repression and land confiscation. The protests turned violent when Vietnam’s police and security forces clashed with the demonstrators. (AP/Wide World Photos)
Relations between Degars and Viets have often been hostile, with the Degars resisting both the Communists and the South Vietnamese regimes during the Vietnam War. The strategic importance of their lands, on the border area between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and South Vietnam and Laos, brought increased involvement by American Special Forces with the Degars, whose Christianity and hostility to Viets made them natural allies of the Americans. The South Vietnamese government often distrusted American involvement with the Degars, suspecting that American sympathies might lead to support for an independent Degar nation. Their numbers declined after the Vietnam War because of immigration, forced assimilation, and death. The most numerous minority of Vietnam, the Tais, in the far north on the Chinese border, comprise almost 2 percent of the population. In the hills of extreme northwestern Vietnam live the Red Tais and the Black Tais, far more closely related to the Thais of Thailand than to the Viets. The Tais are the most numerous and widespread ethnicity of Southeast Asia. The Tai peoples, also referred to as Siamese, Thai, Shan, and Lowland Lao and by other
names, are settled over large areas of Southeast Asia and parts of southern China. The tonal language of the modern Tais contains several dialects, some of which are not readily mutually intelligible. Tais who remained geographically closer to China, such as those in northwestern Vietnam, remained more Sinoized in their culture. Tais who pushed down the Chao Praya River valley between the Mons and Burmans to the west and Khmers to the east adopted elements of Indian culture, both through contact with the Khmers and by direct Indian involvement in the region. The Tais built several kingdoms in Southeast Asia, culminating in the founding of Siam (called Thailand since 1949), with its capital of Bangkok (Krung Thep) near the mouth of the Chao Praya River, in the late 18th century. The Tais continued to conquer and absorb the indigenous Malayo-Polynesian peoples farther south while confining the Khmers to a rump state of their former empire. This small Khmer kingdom, Cambodia, served as a buffer between Siam and Vietnam and often had to submit to vassal status to both. While Tais account for about 75 percent of the population of Thailand, other Tai people can be found in the Shan states of
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European Defense Community
A Tai-minority girl carries a bundle of local roots used for traditional medicine on May 6, 1999, at a market in Lai Chau Province, where ethnic Tai people sell their goods. Minority groups such as the Tai and Hmong make up some 60 percent of the population in this remote Vietnamese province, some 300 miles from Hanoi and bordering Laos. They live in stilt houses and practice slash and burn wet-rice cultivation. They also enjoy a rich culture, including their own written script. (AFP/Getty Images)
Burma, northern Malaysia, western and north-central Cambodia, and parts of inland central and northern Vietnam. Laos is also dominated by Tai people, with the Lao Loum, or lowland Lao, peoples accounting for about 68 percent of the population. The Lao Loums, also called the Thai Nois (“Little Thais”), are culturally similar to the Isan Thais of northeastern Thailand. The Mekong River that divides the Lao Loum from the Isan Thai is a political border, not a cultural or ethnic division. The Lao Theungs, or upland Laos, account for about 22 percent of the population of Laos. The remaining population of Laos consists of Hmongs, with about 9 percent, and Chinese/Viets, with about 1 percent. While the ethnic groupings of Southeast Asia present complex patterns, with few exceptions the various ethnicities of the region show strong cultural and genetic links to each other. Differences in language or religion are all the more conspicuous given the general similarities of the ethnicities of the region. BARRY M. STENTIFORD See also Vietnam, History of, Prehistory to 938 CE; Vietnam, History of, 938 CE through the French Conquest; Vietnamese Culture
References Bellwood, P. Prehistory of the Indo-Malaysian Archipelago. New York: Academic Press, 1985. Heidhues, Mary Somers. Southeast Asia: A Concise History. New York: Thames and Hudson, 2000. Higham, Charles. The Archaeology of Mainland Southeast Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. SarDesai, D. R. Southeast Asia: Past and Present. 5th ed. Boulder, CO: Westview, 2003. Wang, Gungwu. The Chinese Overseas: From Earthbound China to the Quest for Autonomy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000.
European Defense Community Treaty that attempted to create a unitary West European army of West German, French, Italian, and Benelux (Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg) forces. As the Korean War and the Indochina War raged in Asia, leaving Europe virtually defenseless, pressure mounted for the rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany). In 1950 French premier René Pleven
Ewell, Julian Johnson developed an alternate plan that would allow West Germany to rearm within an international structure. He proposed the creation of a European Army in which there would be no national units larger than battalions or brigades. This would allow a German manpower contribution without the creation of a general staff or armaments industry. Prolonged negotiations resulted in the signing of a treaty on May 27, 1952, for a European Defense Community (EDC). The treaty provided for a structure of about 40 divisions in which no national unit would be larger than a single division. All soldiers, regardless of nationality, would wear the same uniform, and there would be one general staff. The soldiers would take their orders from the supreme commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and a supranational authority. Troops not in the EDC would remain under their own flag. This would allow the signatories, with the exception of West Germany, to retain their national armies. In France there was acrimonious debate over the treaty, as many French citizens had second thoughts about it. Meanwhile, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin died in March 1953, the Korean War ended in July 1953, and there were fears in France that the strength of the West German economy meant that West Germany would dominate the new structure. Washington pushed hard for the EDC, but inevitably the EDC became linked with the war in Indochina. Paris tried to tie French approval of the treaty to increased U.S. aid for the Indochina War, bringing an accusation of blackmail from U.S. secretary of state Dean Acheson. Acheson’s indictment aside, the new Dwight D. Eisenhower administration in 1953 allotted more than $1 billion to support the French in Indochina. The French, who had first proposed the EDC, ultimately scuttled it. On August 30, 1954, Premier Pierre Mendès-France let treaty ratification die in the National Assembly. At the time, defeat of the EDC was seen as a serious setback for the United States and the Atlantic Alliance, but ultimately an arrangement was worked out whereby West Germany was allowed to rearm within the framework of NATO. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Acheson, Dean Gooderham; Faure, Edgar; France and Vietnam, 1954– Present; Mendès-France, Pierre References Cook, Bernard. “European Defense Community.” In Europe Since 1945, Vol. 1, edited by Bernard A. Cook, 347–348. New York: Garland, 2001. Monnet, Jean. Memoirs. Translated by Richard Mayne. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1978.
Ewell, Julian Johnson Birth Date: November 5, 1915 Death Date: July 27, 2009 U.S. Army officer who commanded the 9th Infantry Division in the Mekong Delta region of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South
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Vietnam) during 1968–1969 and II Field Force, Vietnam, during 1969–1970. Born on November 5, 1915, in Stillwater, Oklahoma, Julian Johnson Ewell was the son of a U.S. Army officer. Ewell attended the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, the U.S. Army War College, and the National War College. Upon graduation from West Point in 1939, Ewell was commissioned a second lieutenant. During World War II he took part in the D-Day landings on June 6, 1944, as a battalion commander in the 101st Airborne Division. Later that year he commanded a regiment in the defense of Bastogne during the Battle of the Bulge. During the Korean War (1950–1953), Ewell was a regimental commander in the 2nd Infantry Division. Following promotion to brigadier general on April 8, 1963, he served as assistant division commander of the 8th Infantry Division in Europe during 1963–1965. Between 1965 and 1966 he served as chief of staff of V Corps in Europe. Promoted to major general on April 1, 1966, Ewell served as chief of staff (later deputy commanding general and chief of staff) for the U.S. Army Combat Development Command at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Assigned to Vietnam, Ewell commanded the 9th Infantry Division from 1968 to 1969. Between December 1968 and May 1969 he led Operation SPEEDY EXPRESS. The large-scale operation claimed 10,899 Communist troops killed at a cost of only 267 American lives, and earned Ewell the nickname “the Butcher of the Delta” because of his alleged fixation on body count. Under Ewell’s command, the 9th Infantry Division achieved a purported kill ratio of 76:1, while the average for U.S. forces at the time was 10:1. In April 1969 Ewell assumed command of II Field Force, Vietnam, then the largest U.S. combat command in the world. A month later, on May 15, he was promoted to lieutenant general. In 1970 Ewell left Vietnam to serve as the top U.S. military adviser at the Paris peace talks. Although he retired in 1973, he was invited to work with Ira Hunt (who served with Ewell as chief of staff of the 9th Infantry Division and as the 1st Brigade commander) in detailing their methods utilized during the Vietnam War. In their book Sharpening the Combat Edge, published by the U.S. Army in 1974, Ewell and Hunt had the final word on Operation SPEEDY EXPRESS. Although the name of the operation was absent from the text, the authors roundly defended both the techniques and the operation itself. Ewell died in Falls Church, Virginia, on July 27, 2009. KIRSTY ANNE MONTGOMERY See also Body Count; Paris Peace Accords References Ewell, Julian J., and Ira A. Hunt. Sharpening the Combat Edge: The Use of Analysis to Reinforce Military Judgment. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1973. Martell, Paul, and Grace P. Hayes, eds. World Defence Who’s Who. London: Macdonald & Jane’s, 1974. Who’s Who in America, 1976–1977. Wilmette, IL: Marquis Who’s Who, 1976.
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F FAIRFAX,
Operation
Start Date: November 30, 1966 End Date: December 14, 1967 U.S. military operation to improve security around Saigon (present-day Ho Chi Minh City). In 1966 the Viet Cong (VC) threatened to take over parts of Gia Dinh Province, surrounding the capital of Saigon in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Viet Cong infrastructure (VCI) was especially strong in the Thu Duc and Binh Chanh districts of Gia Dinh. In virtual control of Binh Chanh, the VC could approach Saigon from the west and southwest and cut roads from Long An Province to Gia Dinh. Alarmed by this deterioration in security so near the capital, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), commander General William Westmoreland decided to employ U.S. Army battalions to inspire reluctant South Vietnamese regular and territorial units to take action. He hoped that the Americans would lead by example and induce the Vietnamese to improve security around the capital through small unit actions against the local VC forces and cadres. FAIRFAX began on November 30, 1966. The commander of II Field Force Vietnam, Major General Jonathan Seaman, assigned one U.S. Army battalion to each district in Gia Dinh. The South Vietnamese employed three Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) battalions, each linked to an American unit. For example, Brigadier General John Freund’s 199th Light Infantry Brigade paired up with the ARVN 5th Ranger Group. The plan called for U.S. and South Vietnamese forces to operate jointly and restore security to the point that the South Viet-
namese could manage the province themselves and their forces would operate more aggressively. Security improved in Gia Dinh by the end of 1967, according to MACV’s Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) evaluators. But confusion and duplication in collating intelligence led to little progress in identifying or eliminating the VCI. Poor coordination among the district adviser, the adviser to the Provincial Reconnaissance Units, and the American battalion commander hampered the effort. The various American and South Vietnamese intelligence agencies operating in the province failed to share information on VCI in a timely manner. Although the presence of American troops caused some VC forces to depart and the guerrillas to shift underground, in 1967 the VC were still collecting taxes and recruiting. FAIRFAX did not disrupt the web of interpersonal relations and institutions that allowed the VCI to function in Gia Dinh, and the operations of the Americans achieved a stalemate. A South Vietnamese intelligence officer predicted in May 1967 that if the Americans left Gia Dinh, the VC would go on the offensive in a week’s time. The Americans, especially Robert Komer, later head of the American pacification effort, studied FAIRFAX and concluded that the anti-VCI effort needed better coordination. Consequently, Komer sought a way to bring together at the district level all available intelligence information, a search that culminated in 1967 in the establishment of the Phoenix Program. FAIRFAX ended on December 14, 1967. RICHARD A. HUNT See also Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support; Komer, Robert W.; National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam; Phoenix Program; Westmoreland, William Childs
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References Clarke, Jeffrey J. Advice and Support: The Final Years; The U.S. Army in Vietnam. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988. Hunt, Richard A. Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts and Minds. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995.
Fall, Bernard B. Birth Date: November 11, 1926 Death Date: February 21, 1967 Prominent war correspondent, author, teacher, and keen analyst of the military and political situation in Vietnam. Born in Vienna, Austria, on November 11, 1926, Bernard B. Fall grew up in France. He served in the French Resistance against the Germans from 1942 and then in the French Army. After discharge in 1946, he was a research analyst at the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal. In 1951 he went to the United States as a Fulbright Scholar and the following year earned a master’s degree at Syracuse University. In 1953 Fall traveled to Indochina to do research for his doctorate. There he observed firsthand the end of French rule in Indochina and was allowed to accompany French forces into the field on combat operations. He returned to the United States in 1954 and completed his PhD at Syracuse in 1955. He then began an
academic career as an assistant professor at American University. Later he went to Howard University, attained a full professorship, and remained on the faculty there until his death. Fall wrote seven books and more than 250 magazine articles about Vietnam and Southeast Asia. His 1961 book Street without Joy became a classic account of the Indochina War. In 1966 he also published Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu, a definitive account of that battle. Both books were widely read by American officers and many GIs who served in Vietnam. Fall was deeply critical of both French and U.S. approaches to the Vietnam War. He admitted that America, with its massive mobility and firepower assets, could not be defeated militarily by the Communists. But the Vietnam War, he maintained, was first and foremost political, a fact that neither the Americans nor the French before them fully understood. Because Fall analyzed all sides of an issue with the same degree of penetrating criticism, his writings were often cited by supporters as well as opponents of the war. Fall believed in collecting information firsthand. On February 21, 1967, while accompanying a U.S. Marine Corps patrol near the coast northwest of Hue, he was killed by a Viet Cong (VC) mine. DAVID T. ZABECKI See also Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; Halberstam, David; Salisbury, Harrison Evans References Fall, Bernard B. Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu. New York: Lippincott, 1966. Fall, Bernard B. Last Reflections on a War. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967. Fall, Bernard B. Street without Joy: The French Debacle in Indochina. Rev. ed. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1994. Fall, Bernard B. Vietnam Witness, 1953–66. New York: Praeger, 1966. Fall, Dorothy. Bernard Fall: Memories of a Soldier-Scholar. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2006.
FARM GATE,
Operation
Start Date: 1961 End Date: 1967
Prominent Vietnam analyst Bernard Fall of Howard University in Washington, January 1965. (AP/Wide World Photos)
Extended U.S. air operation in Vietnam. Operation FARM GATE began on October 11, 1961, when President John F. Kennedy ordered the United States Air Force (USAF) to send a combat detachment to assist the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) in its struggle against an increasingly aggressive Communist insurgency. Kennedy earlier had asked the military services to develop a counterinsurgency capability. The USAF had responded by forming the 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron. Nicknamed “Jungle Jim,” the unit relied on older propeller-driven aircraft to both train indigenous air forces and undertake limited combat missions in support of ground forces. Code-named operation FARM GATE, the 155 officers and airmen of Detachment 2A, 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron, arrived at Bien Hoa Air Base—some 10 miles from the South Vietnamese
Faure, Edgar capital of Saigon (present-day Ho Chi Minh City)—in November 1961. Distinctive in their Australian-type bush hats, fatigues, and combat boots, the air commandos (as they were known) initially were restricted to training South Vietnamese airmen. Soon, however, the mission’s eight North American T-28 Trojans, four Douglas A-26 Invaders, and four Douglas C-47 Skytrains became involved in other tasks. FARM GATE’s expanding role in the war began shortly after the detachment’s arrival in Vietnam when it started flying reconnaissance missions and providing logistical support to U.S. Army Special Forces. On December 6, 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) authorized FARM GATE to undertake combat missions, provided that at least one Vietnamese national was carried on board strike aircraft for training purposes. During 1962 the propeller-driven B-26s and T-28s of FARM GATE became the nucleus of an expanding American air effort in Vietnam. The emphasis continued to focus on training South Vietnamese airmen to bear the burden of combat. FARM GATE aircraft also flew air strikes; however, they were restricted by rules of engagement to missions that the Vietnamese were not able to undertake. Poor facilities, inadequate supplies, and the lack of a clearly defined role in the war contributed to morale problems within FARM GATE throughout the year. Ever-increasing requests for air support as the war intensified led President Kennedy on December 31, 1962, to approve an expansion of FARM GATE. Its growth in 1963 brought organizational changes. In July the contingent at Bien Hoa became the 1st Air Commando Squadron (Provisional), part of the Pacific Air Force (PACAF). The squadron contained two strike sections of 10 B-26s and 13 T-28s plus support sections of four Helio Aircraft U-10 Super Couriers (used for psychological warfare) and six C-47s. In addition, there were small detachments of B-26s at Pleiku and Soc Trang. Although the PACAF wanted to drop the code name of FARM GATE, Washington disapproved on grounds that the change might cause confusion for the logistical facilities supporting the operation in Vietnam. Despite the expansion of FARM GATE, the growing intensity of the ground war brought demands for combat operations that the air commandos were unable to fulfill. For example, between May and August 1964, 431 requests for air support went unanswered. The sortie rate for FARM GATE aircraft suffered from shortages of spare parts and structural problems with the wings of the B-26s. Aircraft problems continued to plague FARM GATE during the early months of 1964. Following several structural failures, that spring FARM GATE’s B-26s and T-28s were replaced by more modern Douglas A-1E Skyraiders. The growth of the American role in the war also led to the establishment of a second squadron of A-1Es (the 602nd Fighter Commando Squadron) at Bien Hoa in October. FARM GATE underwent a major change in March 1965. Washington finally dropped the requirement that a South Vietnamese national be carried on combat missions. At the same time, Sec-
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retary of Defense Robert S. McNamara approved the replacement of South Vietnamese markings on the aircraft with regular USAF markings. The two FARM GATE squadrons of A-1Es were now flying 80 percent of all sorties in support of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army). As the USAF presence in South Vietnam increased in 1966, FARM GATE declined in importance. In January the two A-1E squadrons moved out of Bien Hoa. One went to Nha Trang and then transferred to Thailand at the end of the year. The other squadron flew out of Pleiku. The last vestiges of FARM GATE disappeared at the end of 1967, when the squadron at Pleiku redeployed to Thailand. By this time, the war in South Vietnam had long since lost its counterinsurgency character and assumed a more conventional nature. The air commandos would find a more congenial environment for their special talents in Laos, where a different kind of war was being fought. WILLIAM M. LEARY See also Aircraft, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Airpower, Role in War; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; McNamara, Robert Strange; United States Air Force References Futrell, Robert F. The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia: The Advisory Years to 1965. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1981. Schlight, John. The War in South Vietnam: The Years of the Offensive, 1965–1968. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1988.
Faure, Edgar Birth Date: August 18, 1908 Death Date: March 30, 1988 French centrist politician, cabinet minister 11 times, and premier of France twice (1952 and 1955–1956). Born on August 18, 1908, in Béziers, southern France, Edgar Faure studied to become a concert pianist before attending the School of Law in Paris, where he took high honors and became a lawyer at age 19. In November 1942 when the Germans occupied southern France, Faure and his family escaped by boat to Algiers. Faure then joined the government-in-exile headed by General Charles de Gaulle. After the war Faure assisted at the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal. In 1946 Faure was elected to the first regular postwar National Assembly, and the next year he became vice president of a legislative committee investigating war guilt in France during 1933–1945. He first secured full cabinet minister rank in 1950 as budget minister, and he then served in a succession of governments as either justice or finance minister. In January 1952 Faure became premier for the first time, but his ministry lasted only 40 days. Three years later in February 1955, Faure again became premier following the collapse of the government headed by his friend Pierre Mendès-France, holding the
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French premier Edgar Faure answers reporters’ questions following a meeting at the Elysée Palace in Paris, France, November 30, 1955. (AP/Wide World Photos)
position until January 1956. Faure’s major accomplishment was to pass the accords permitting rearmament by the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany), an effort to ease disagreement over the Saar region, which the French had occupied since the end of the war. In May 1955 during a meeting in Paris, Faure had a confrontation with U.S. secretary of state John Foster Dulles regarding French influence in Vietnam. Judging Ngo Dinh Diem, leader of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), to be “not only incapable but mad,” Faure broke with Washington over its support of Diem. This French attitude helped pave the way for unilateral American action in South Vietnam. Lessened French interest in Indochina at this time was also occasioned by unrest in Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria. Defeated for reelection to the National Assembly in November 1958, Faure undertook a series of diplomatic assignments for President de Gaulle, including the establishment of diplomatic relations between France and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In 1968 as education minister, Fauer carried out the reforms that eased tensions following student riots that May.
Faure wrote numerous books on history, law, politics, and international relations. He even published several novels. Faure died in Paris on March 30, 1988. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also De Gaulle, Charles; Dulles, John Foster; European Defense Community; Mendès-France, Pierre; Ngo Dinh Diem References Smith, M. S. “Faure, Edgar.” In Historical Dictionary of the French Fourth and Fifth Republics, 1946–1991, edited by Wayne Northcutt, 172–174. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1992. Spector, Ronald H. Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941–1960. United States Army in Vietnam Series. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1983.
Federal Bureau of Investigation Branch of the U.S. Justice Department responsible for investigating violations of federal law in cases not specifically assigned to
Fellowship of Reconciliation other federal agencies; these include more than 200 categories of federal-level crimes. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) may also act as a de facto domestic intelligence agency. Created in 1908 to bolster Justice Department enforcement capabilities, the FBI evolved into one of the most advanced and respected investigatory agencies in the world. From 1924 to 1972 the FBI operated under the close, almost dictatorial, control of Director J. Edgar Hoover, whose longevity and personal power within the executive branch was unparalleled in American history. But the FBI’s role in law enforcement and its performance have often attracted controversy and criticism. Charged with investigating such activities as bank robbery, kidnapping, organized crime, sabotage, and fraud against the federal government, the FBI during the mid1930s received the additional responsibility of conducting domestic counterintelligence. Beginning with John F. Kennedy, U.S. presidents frequently authorized the use of wiretaps, many of dubious legality, to counter perceived domestic threats. The Civil Rights Movement attracted much attention from the FBI. Dr. Martin Luther King, for example, was subjected to almost constant FBI surveillance for several years, including wiretaps. The FBI devoted much effort in trying to establish a link between King and foreign Communist interests but to no useful end. This unfortunately obscured the FBI’s many positive contributions to the Civil Rights Movement. The anti–Vietnam War movement greatly concerned presidents Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon. Under its domestic counterespionage mandate, the FBI conducted numerous counterintelligence programs (COINTELPROs), including the electronic surveillance, infiltration, and harassment of antiwar groups believed to be supported or encouraged by Communist governments. COINTELPRO initiatives also focused attention on such groups as the Black Panthers and the Ku Klux Klan. For most of the Vietnam War period, Hoover was a willing accomplice of Johnson and Nixon and shared many of their concerns and obsessions. But the relationship changed as Nixon’s paranoia intensified. Nixon extended electronic surveillance to his own administration, especially the State Department and the Defense Department, in an effort to plug information leaks. In 1970 Nixon attempted to create a covert, extralegal intelligence force that would include elements of the FBI, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the National Security Council (NSC). The so-called Huston Plan found some favor in the Nixon administration, but according to former FBI official Cartha D. “Deke” DeLoach, Hoover killed the plan when Nixon refused to provide written authorization. The director also feared the loss of the FBI’s long-standing autonomy in such an arrangement, something he was unwilling to allow. Hoover’s death in 1972 opened the door for a more accommodating director, L. Patrick Gray. But by this time the Watergate Scandal was unfolding, and the FBI was involved in ongoing investigations that Gray could not control. With the bureau making some headway, Nixon, along with Chief of Staff H. R. Haldeman,
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conspired to have the CIA derail the FBI investigation into the Watergate Scandal. Nixon’s resignation in August 1974 largely ended the issue, but in the wake of the Watergate Scandal and the Vietnam War, the FBI faced a major image crisis as a convenient, if not totally deserving, example of governmental excess, a problem that continues to plague the bureau. In more recent years, particularly after the September 11, 2001, terror attacks on the United States, the FBI has reoriented its focus of operations, making counterterrorism one of its highest priorities. DAVID COFFEY AND LEE ANN WOODALL See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Black Panthers; Central Intelligence Agency; Civil Rights Movement; Hoover, John Edgar; Huston Plan; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Kennedy, Robert Francis; King, Martin Luther, Jr.; Nixon, Richard Milhous; United States Department of Justice References DeLoach, Cartha D. “Deke.” Hoover’s FBI: The Inside Story by Hoover’s Trusted Lieutenant. Washington, DC: Regnery, 1995. Kessler, Ronald. The Bureau: The Secret History of the FBI. New York: St. Martin’s, 2002. Ungar, Sanford J. FBI. Boston: Little, Brown, 1976. Woodward, Bob, and Carl Bernstein. The Final Days. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1976.
Fellowship of Reconciliation International peace organization. The Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR) played an important, although not very public, role in the American Civil Rights Movement and antiwar movement. The organization was founded in Great Britain during World War I in 1914, and its American branch opened in 1915. FOR is currently located in Nyack, New York. With organizations in some 50 countries, FOR is an interdenominational religious pacifist organization dedicated to antimilitarism, peace, international reconciliation, domestic social and economic justice, environmental preservation, and racial harmony. FOR has assisted groups such as the War Resisters League, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the National Conference of Christians and Jews, and Another Mother for Peace. During the 1950s FOR conducted workshops on civil disobedience and nonviolence to support the Civil Rights Movement. The leading spokesperson for FOR during most of the 1960s was A. J. Muste (1885–1967), who in 1964 issued the first public statement advocating draft resistance to the Vietnam War. In 1965 antiwar sentiments arose in response to the rapid military buildup in Vietnam. Disparate groups, each with its own agenda, began protesting. FOR provided leadership and organization that helped focus these groups and guide the movement. Throughout the period of the Vietnam War, FOR’s actions remained consistent with its position of a freely elected government
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in Vietnam and a negotiated settlement that would stop killing by both sides. The organization did not debate with or confront radical antiwar leaders. Instead, FOR acted as a moderating influence on radical groups who advocated anti-U.S. demonstrations or who burned American flags or displayed flags or slogans of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). FOR conducted nonviolent demonstrations that stressed education and peaceful solutions. One such activity was the Movement Center established for the November 1969 demonstration in Washington, D.C. The center served as a clearinghouse for information and a forum for discussion of nonviolent means. In 1970 after the shootings at Jackson State College and Kent State University sparked by antiwar protests, FOR assembled an interdenominational group of clergy who asked for an immediate cutoff of military funding and held a Prayer Service for Peace at the White House. President Richard M. Nixon originally blocked the protest but later backed down, a move that antiwar leaders considered a major victory. In 1971 FOR initiated Project Daily Death Toll (also known as Project DDT) in which Americans, every day in November until Thanksgiving Day, gathered in front of the White House and lay down as if dead to illustrate the 2,000 people of Southeast Asia dying each week from the war. Perhaps the most far-reaching contribution of FOR to its objective of peace has been draft-resistance counseling. During the Vietnam War era, as in World War I, World War II, and the Korean War, FOR advised and supported conscientious objectors and those opposed to military service. The organization has also done so for subsequent U.S. conflicts. FOR also assisted Vietnamese victims of the war by raising money for medical aid and assisting Buddhist groups in their peace efforts. For example, FOR sponsored Vietnamese Buddhist monk Thich Nhat Hanh when he visited the United States in 1965. When the Vietnam War ended in 1975, FOR protested the mistreatment of Buddhist pacifists and other antimilitary activists in Vietnam and continued its activities of working for peace. Today FOR remains one of the country’s most active peace organizations, committed to nonviolence and social justice. Before the 1991 Persian Gulf War and again during the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq War, FOR sponsored delegations of peace activists and clergy who traveled to Iraq in an attempt to avert war. CHARLES N. FASANARO See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Buddhism in Vietnam; Civil Rights Movement; Clergy and Laymen Concerned about Vietnam; Conscientious Objectors; Jackson State College Shootings; Kent State University Shootings; Moratorium to End the War in Vietnam; Nixon, Richard Milhous References Dekar, Paul R. Creating the Beloved Community: A Journey with the Fellowship of Reconciliation. Telford, PA: Cascadia Publishing, 2005. Wallis, Jill. Valiant for Peace: A History of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, 1914–1989. London: Fellowship of Reconciliation, 1991.
Felt, Harry Donald Birth Date: June 21, 1902 Death Date: February 25, 1992 U.S. Navy admiral and commander in chief, U.S. Pacific Command, during 1958–1964. Born in Topeka, Kansas, on June 21, 1902, Harry Donald Felt graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, in 1923. After several assignments on battleships and destroyers, in 1929 he earned his wings as a naval aviator. During World War II Felt served in the Pacific theater in squadron, air group, and carrier commands. During the Battle of the Eastern Solomons on August 14, 1942, Commander Felt led Air Group 3 from the carrier Saratoga to attack and sink the Japanese light carrier Ryujo. Felt was promoted to captain in July 1943. In March 1944 he was the first naval aviator to be assigned to the U.S. Military Mission to the Soviet Union. During 1945–1946 he commanded the escort carrier Chenango, participating in the Battle for Okinawa. Following World War II, Felt was assigned to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. He graduated from the Naval War College in 1948 and then assumed command of the carrier USS Franklin D. Roosevelt in the Mediterranean. In January 1951 Felt was promoted to rear admiral and assumed command of the Middle East Force in the Persian Gulf. Promoted to vice admiral in February 1956, he commanded the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean until his promotion in September 1956 to admiral and appointment as vice chief of naval operations. In July 1958 Felt became commander in chief, U.S. Pacific Command (CINCPAC). Because of his strong personality, he was informally known as “CINCFELT.” During his tenure of 1958–1964, he directed the U.S. efforts involving the Taiwan Strait, Laos, and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Felt was an intense officer who had a reputation as a harddriving perfectionist with an abrasive personality. A supporter of the John F. Kennedy administration’s counterinsurgency strategy, Felt oversaw the deployment to Laos and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) of increasing numbers of U.S. Army Special Forces, U.S. Navy SEAL (sea, air, land) teams, and U.S. Air Force Air Commandos. Felt also presided over the employment of the South Vietnamese–crewed fast patrol craft of OPLAN 34A in the coastal waters of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). During Felt’s tour as CINCPAC, U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps helicopter companies, U.S. Navy coastal patrol ships, and U.S. Air Force tactical squadrons operated in support of the South Vietnamese forces. Although he was publicly optimistic about the outcome of the Vietnam War, Felt opposed the dispatch of U.S. ground troops, warning that there was no sound strategy, that it would only lead to a prolonged U.S. presence there, and that it would be perceived throughout Asia as the reintroduction of colonialism. In 1962 he predicted that the Viet Cong (VC) would adopt prolonged attrition warfare in South Vietnam that could not be defeated by purely mil-
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Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command Admiral Harry Felt (right) is greeted on his arrival in Saigon on March 6, 1962, by U.S. ambassador Frederick Nolting. An energetic supporter of the Kennedy administration’s counterinsurgency strategy, Felt oversaw the deployment of increasing numbers of U.S. forces to Laos and South Vietnam. (Naval Historical Center)
itary means. Felt favored U.S. training of Vietnamese and Laotian forces without the introduction of U.S. ground force units. In February 1962 upon the orders of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Felt created the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), headed by General Paul D. Harkins. MACV was subordinate to the CINCPAC, and Felt exercised close control over MACV’s activities, on occasion denying Harkins’s requests for equipment, interfering with MACV strategic planning, and insisting that Harkins communicate with the JCS through CINCPAC. Some observers believed that Felt impeded Harkins’s work. Having reached mandatory retirement age, Felt retired in July 1964. Admiral Ulysses S. Grant Sharp succeeded him as CINCPAC the month before. Felt spent his later years in Hawaii, dying there on February 25, 1992. EDWARD J. MAROLDA AND SPENCER C. TUCKER See also DeSoto Missions; FARM GATE, Operation; Harkins, Paul Donal; Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; Operation Plan 34A; Sharp, Ulysses Simpson Grant, Jr.; United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1954–1965; United States Navy References Marolda, Edward J. By Sea, Air, and Land: An Illustrated History of the U.S. Navy and the War in Southeast Asia. Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 1994.
Marolda, Edward J., and Oscar P. Fitzgerald. The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict: From Military Assistance to Combat, 1959– 1965, Vol. 2. Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 1986. Schreadley, R. L. From the Rivers to the Sea: The United States Navy in Vietnam. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992.
Fernandez, Richard Birth Date: July 1, 1934 Executive director of Clergy and Laymen Concerned about Vietnam (CALCAV), America’s largest religiously based antiwar organization, and an important figure in national antiwar activities. Born on July 1, 1934, in Nutley, New Jersey, Richard Fernandez graduated from Andover-Newton Theological School in 1964 and was ordained in the United Church of Christ. He participated in the Civil Rights Movement and worked as a campus minister prior to joining CALCAV in May 1966. Fernandez strengthened CALCAV by organizing local chapters across the country, planning creative actions against the war, and being a highly effective fund-raiser. Acting as a liaison between CALCAV and the larger antiwar movement, he represented the organization in national meetings and contributed to coalition
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activities. Fernandez joined Lee Webb in 1967 as codirector of Vietnam Summer, an effort to build a grassroots political base for de-escalating the war. Fernandez also involved himself with the Committee of Liaison to facilitate communications between American prisoners of war and their families. Despite his outreach, however, CALCAV rarely established formal ties to the antiwar coalitions out of concern that inflammatory rhetoric or radical leadership might alienate its primary constituency. Fernandez resigned from CALCAV in June 1973 and since 1981 has directed Philadelphia’s Northwest Interfaith Movement. MITCHELL K. HALL See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Clergy and Laymen Concerned about Vietnam; Fellowship of Reconciliation References Hall, Mitchell K. Because of Their Faith: CALCAV and Religious Opposition to the Vietnam War. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990. Wells, Tom. The War Within: America’s Battle over Vietnam. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.
Ferry, Jules Birth Date: April 5, 1832 Death Date: March 18, 1893 French politician, promoter of imperialism and educational reform, and twice premier of France (1880–1881 and 1883–1885). Born into a prosperous family on April 5, 1832, at Saint-Dié (Vosges), Ferry enhanced his financial position through marriage. Following his father in the practice of law, the staunch republican Ferry was influenced by positivism and was also active as a journalist. He gained national attention in 1868 when he published a report detailing financial mismanagement by Baron GeorgesEugène Haussmann in the rebuilding of Paris. In 1869 Ferry won election to the Corps Legislatif (the French parliament) from Paris as a radical republican. During the FrancoPrussian War (1870–1871) he played a leading role in the September 1870 revolution in Paris and the city’s subsequent siege, but these experiences and the Paris Commune turned him toward moderate republicanism, and he became a leader of the so-called Opportunists. From 1871 to 1875 Ferry was a deputy in the National Assembly, and from 1876 to 1889 he was a member of the Chamber of Deputies. As minister of public instruction (1879– 1881 and 1882–1883), he was the prime mover behind the important educational reform and anticlerical legislation known as the Ferry Laws. As premier, Ferry secured his goals by working piecemeal. Largely indifferent to criticism, he had a bland leadership style that helped root the Third Republic’s tradition of premiers dependent on Parliament. To many Frenchmen, Ferry’s chief claim to great-
ness lay in expanding French colonial power, but he showed no interest in supporting imperialism before he came to power and initiated almost none of the colonial enterprises of the 1880s, most of which were the work of officials on the spot. As someone has noted, the French Empire was largely the work of “bored army officers looking for excitement.” Ferry’s own conversion to imperialism seems to have been motivated by the desire to restore French greatness rather than by economics. Apparently he nurtured the hope that France might one day exchange some colonies with Germany for the lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. During Ferry’s first premiership (September 1880–November 1881), the French took Tunis (1881) in North Africa. During both his premierships the French expanded their colonies in Africa and French Oceania and consolidated their hold over Indochina with the establishment of protectorates on Annam and Tonkin. Ferry’s second ministry (1883–1885) provided three years of governmental and political stability. He fell from power in May 1885 when a minor French defeat at Lang Son in March gave his opponents the opportunity to drive “Le Tonkinois,” as Ferry became known, from office. Defeated in an election for the Chamber of Deputies in 1889, Ferry won election to the Senate in 1891. Selected as its president, he never fully recovered from wounds sustained in an assassination attempt (December 10, 1887) by a religious fanatic. Ferry died in Paris on March 18, 1893, and was accorded a state funeral. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also French Indochina, 1860s–1946 References Bailey, Lois Esther. Jules Ferry and French Indo-China. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1946. Gaillard, Jean-Michel. Jules Ferry. Paris: Fayard, 1989. Guilhaume, Philippe. Jules Ferry. Paris: Albin Michel, 1992. Hutton, Patrick H., ed. Historical Dictionary of the Third French Republic, 1870–1940, Vol. 1. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1986. Power, T. Jules Ferry and the Renaissance of French Imperialism. New York: King’s Crown Press, 1944. Reclus, Maurice. Ferry le Tonkinois; récit historique. Paris: Oeuvres Libres, 1946.
Film and the Vietnam Experience The Background Prior to the 1960s, few Americans knew Vietnam’s geographical location or its history. Saigon, an ephemeral 1948 film noir featuring Veronica Lake and Alan Ladd, formed the extent of Hollywood awareness. Americans had little understanding of European colonialism or Asian reactions to it, while communism, in any form, appeared evil. In the exhilaration of his 1961 inauguration, President John F. Kennedy promised to go anywhere and bear any burden in the name of freedom. Yet when young men were called
Film and the Vietnam Experience to fight in a faraway Asian land in a few short years and when they did not believe that their own country was threatened, most showed little enthusiasm for the endeavor. The Vietnam conflict differed from other wars in which Americans had fought, and when major motion pictures inevitably appeared, they reflected these differences. Perhaps only the 1950–1953 Korean War came close to offering an example of the struggle, but even that was a fundamentally different conflict. The self-congratulatory tone of post–World War II films was clearly lacking in Vietnam War film genres. After the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) fell in 1975, it was impossible to perpetuate the myth that Americans did not lose wars. The carnage of the Vietnam War, the first so-called living room war, had been flashed nightly into American homes along with images of frightened children napalmed and young Viet Cong (VC) insurgents bracing for execution. With the Civil Rights Movement heating up at home, the perception grew that minorities and the poor were dying in Vietnam in disproportionate numbers while more affluent youths safely waited out the war in universities and National Guard units. Without time for introspection, Vietnam movies appeared almost immediately in theaters and on television. Of the hundreds of documentaries, television series, and feature films made in several countries, a substantial number have survived, now permanently available through video and DVD. The films benefited from technical advances in special effects, making battle scenes more realistic. Cinematic taboos on sexuality, violence, and profanity, which had made movie soldiers in previous wars seem like Boy Scouts, also evaporated. Since the 1970s, these films have conditioned American perceptions of the Vietnam conflict. Some have been among the most influential motion pictures ever made, winning numerous awards for their directors and actors. A few are now regarded as cinema classics. Because their themes and subjects overlap and although they were made during four separate decades, Vietnam films are best categorized according to type rather than chronology.
The Colonial Period Of the many French films reflecting life in colonial Vietnam, two movies released in 1992 reached wide international audiences. Indochine covers events from 1930 through 1955, providing insight into the colonial oppression against which the Vietnamese revolted. The elegant and cool Catherine Deneuve plays a wealthy plantation owner reared in Vietnam. Her attitude toward the coolies she employs is cruelly patronizing. Even though she entertains a collection of casual lovers, the genuine object of her affections is her adopted Vietnamese daughter. This younger woman soon develops a social conscience, betraying her mother by joining the Communist rebels. Less political but equally revealing of the colonial milieu was The Lover (1992), a fictionalized memoir first published in 1984 by Marguerite Duras, a noted French writer who grew up in Vietnam. Although primarily the love story of a wealthy Chinese bachelor and an adolescent French girl edged into quasi prostitution by her
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impoverished mother, ethnic complexities of colonial society are well depicted. The Lover, despite its French director and actors, was filmed in English. Two movies based on a novel by British author Graham Greene explored the initial American involvement in Vietnam in the late colonial period. The Quiet American (1958), directed by the renowned Joseph L. Mankiewicz, featured a real-life military hero, Audie Murphy, in the title role. Set in 1952 Saigon, Murphy played a naive American equally perturbed by the corrupt colonial administration and the Communist uprising while advocating a vague “Third Force” as a solution. To accommodate American sensibilities the ending of the story was changed, much to the annoyance of Greene, who had little love for Americans. Greene would certainly have preferred the 2002 remake, more faithful to the original novel. Technicolor also made far better use of the lush Vietnamese countryside in the latter. Saigon Year of the Cat (1983), although originally made for British television, reached substantial American audiences. The 1975 fall of Saigon, described as “the old French city soon to become Ho Chi Min City,” is backdrop to a bittersweet love affair between a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employee and a British bank officer, played by Dame Judi Dench. The rendering of the frantic American exodus from the city is especially memorable.
Combat Films The most vivid and enduring of the Vietnam films are those that feature vivid scenes of combat. Not surprisingly, they are as controversial as the war itself. The Green Berets (1968) is one of the few abashedly prowar films. Codirected and acted by John Wayne, that symbol of solid American patriotism who nonetheless never served in the military, the movie was popular with audiences even though it was attacked by critics, who delighted in pointing out its numerous anachronisms. The Rambo franchise (1985–1988), directed and acted by Sylvester Stallone, attracted many of the same fans with its larger-than-life hero, a former Green Beret who returns to Vietnam to free American prisoners of war. Go Tell the Spartans (1978), derived from David Ford’s novel Incident at Muc Wa and starring Burt Lancaster, fared better with the critics, and some veterans acclaimed it as the most authentic of the Vietnam films to date. Hamburger Hill (1987) boasted no big-name actors or pronounced ideology but was capably directed by John Irvin and benefited from his firsthand combat experiences. The movie also was heralded as a realistic depiction of combat. Also released in 1978 was an extraordinary film, The Deer Hunter. The winner of five Academy Awards, it introduced Michael Cimino, an eccentric director widely hailed as a genius. His subsequent career would prove disastrous to his studio, but The Deer Hunter remains a classic. With a languid pace appropriate to theme and subject, the plot concentrates on three friends from a Pennsylvania steel town and follows their adventures in Vietnam and beyond. Before leaving for duty, one marries in a beautifully detailed Russian Orthodox ceremony; he returns home an amputee.
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Robert Duvall, Albert Hall, and Martin Sheen in a scene from the film Apocalypse Now (1979), one of a number of films depicting the brutality of the Vietnam War and the belief that American involvement in the war was a tragic mistake. (AP/Wide World Photos)
A second returns physically whole but emotionally maimed. The third member of the team, effectively played by Christopher Walken, is the most interesting. He dies in a Saigon gambling den during a game of Russian roulette. Although there were no actual reports of Russian roulette sessions in Vietnam, the death made a dramatic cinematic statement and seemed to suggest that the war was as capricious and vapid as a game of Russian roulette. Platoon (1986) was the first entry in director Oliver Stone’s Vietnam trilogy, inspired by his personal experiences in Vietnam. While it was admired by film buffs, veterans’ organizations found the film highly offensive, with its cliché-ridden emphasis on drug use, drinking, open conflicts between officers, and joy in killing. Equally objectionable to veterans was Full Metal Jacket (1987), the work of film auteur Stanley Kubrick, employing as background the 1968 Tet Offensive. Not Kubrick’s best film, the excessive profanity, marine boot camp clichés, and general caricaturing of military personnel as well as the detailed rendering of the brutal killing of a VC girl, led critic Joseph Roquemore to pronounce Full Metal Jacket “an annoying, pretentious movie.” Although developed from rescue accounts of fighter pilots shot down behind enemy lines, Bat 21 (1988) rarely rises above war-movie clichés. Casualties of War (1989), directed by Brian De
Palma with his usual penchant for violence, is also based on a firsthand account. Michael J. Fox portrays a sensitive youth in a squad led by a mentally deranged sergeant, played by Sean Penn. The sergeant leads a violent raid on a Vietnamese village, abducting and gang raping before finally killing a simple country girl. When the young soldier refuses an order to take part in the brutality and plans to report it, he becomes a marked man. One of the most savage of war movies, Casualties of War seems to indict American soldiers as out-of-control, their moral bearings lost in a foreign land. We Were Soldiers, released in 2002, certainly benefited from additional years of reflection on the Vietnam experience. Featuring Mel Gibson on the battlefield and Madeleine Stowe on the home front, the plot alternates battle scenes with cozy domestic ones that could turn traumatic when taxis arrive bringing telegrams of a battlefield casualty. The soldiers portrayed here are disciplined and dedicated, with troopers of the U.S. 1st Air Cavalry Division fighting bravely, against odds, in the Battle of the Ia Drang Valley in October–November 1965. The film, dedicated to all who died in Vietnam, friend and foe, pays tribute to the courage of soldiers while avoiding the politics of the war. The most unusual film to come out of the Vietnam conflict is certainly Apocalypse Now (1979), with the expanded Apocalypse
Film and the Vietnam Experience Now Redux issued in 2001 and perpetuating interest in the film and the war. The trials endured in the making of this epic (in which the Philippines substituted for Vietnam) have become legend: typhoons that destroyed sets, actors drugged out or suffering heart attacks, and the eccentricities of actor Marlon Brando. Yet director Francis Ford Coppola persevered to produce this strange masterpiece. Using the Vietnam War as backdrop, Coppola set to work retelling Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness. Accuracy of Vietnam’s geography and history was sacrificed to the requirements of a gripping narrative of almost absolute evil. The dense atmosphere, fine acting, and several unforgettable scenes make this film a standout. To actor Robert Duvall is given the now famous line “I love the smell of napalm in the morning.” And the helicopter raid he conducts to a recording of Richard Wagner’s “Ride of the Valkyries” has become a part of military lore. The scenario involves the secret upriver mission of a young U.S. officer (played by Martin Sheen) into Cambodia to assassinate a renegade colonel who has established a personal cult and committed war crimes. This journey becomes an excursion into hell when the officer finally confronts the notorious colonel (played by Marlon Brando), who quotes T. S. Eliot in a grim monotone and is surrounded by skulls and corpses hanging from trees. Another outstanding movie, more faithful to history, is The Killing Fields (1984), dramatizing events on the periphery of the main action in Vietnam. It was director Roland Jaffe’s first feature film after earning his reputation making documentaries. His subject was the Khmer Rouge’s genocidal campaign in Cambodia. One-third of Cambodia’s population perished during the rampage in the most deadly holocaust, proportionally, in human history. Haing S. Ngor, a doctor who had never before acted but had personally survived the Cambodian massacre, won an Oscar for his portrayal of the native assistant of an American journalist. Ngor was ironically later murdered in a robbery at his California home. One of the best Vietnam War films made was the sadly overlooked Gardens of Stone, directed by Francis Ford Coppola. Based on the book by Nicholas Proffitt, it accurately portrays what it was like to be a soldier in the U.S. Army during the Vietnam War years.
Comedies Although there was bitter satire in most of the combat movies, actual Vietnam comedies are rare. Three exceptions are notable. Good Morning Vietnam (1988) features Robin Williams in a virtuoso performance as a manic Armed Forces Radio disc jockey who reports the truth, defying his superiors. The disc jockey is relieved of duty, has a frightening adventure in the Vietnamese jungles, and discovers to his sorrow how difficult it is in this land to separate friend from foe. His best friend is revealed to be a VC terrorist. Air America (1990) was Mel Gibson’s first journey into the fray. The film fell short of its stated aim to provide “biting black comedy,” emerging as just another thriller. Its subject was secret operations in Laos, but it did celebrate the courage of American pilots on hazardous missions.
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Forrest Gump (1994), a blockbuster hit, won six Academy Awards, although many critics found it ethically irresponsible. Rather than a war film, it is a picaresque narrative of an innocent, played by Tom Hanks, who always emerges triumphant from momentous events despite his imbecility. In one episode Gump finds himself in combat in Vietnam as a soldier in the 9th Infantry Division’s 47th Infantry, where he instinctively behaves heroically and saves lives. He then returns home, where he is thrown into a protest demonstration. The film is perhaps best remembered for its trick cinematography, which enabled Gump to come face to face with historical personalities such as John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson.
Homecoming Surviving the battlefields and jungles of Vietnam was one feat. Returning home sound of body and mind often turned out to be an even greater challenge, which filmmakers were ready to confront. Dead Presidents (1990) is a so-called ghetto melodrama about African American veterans who resort to crime because of their inability to reconnect with a homeland that denies them equality. Jacob’s Ladder (1990) deals with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), complete with vivid hallucinations. Actor Tim Robbins is convincing as Jacob, the tormented veteran, but the film’s unfounded accusation, that harmful drugs were tested on soldiers in the field, subverts the film’s authenticity. A host of other motion pictures present more convincing pictures of postwar dislocations. In Coming Home (1978) actress Jane Fonda (known to her detractors as “Hanoi Jane”) plays a nursing volunteer in a hellish military hospital, where Jon Voight plays a paraplegic back from Vietnam. With her husband away in service, the volunteer and her charge fall in love. When the husband returns, he is physically whole but so psychologically depleted that he walks into the ocean. In Born on the Fourth of July (1989), another paralyzed veteran, played by Tom Cruise, endures the horrors of military hospitalization. Based on Vietnam War veteran Ron Kovic’s autobiography, it was the second film in Oliver Stone’s acclaimed Vietnam trilogy. With his initial patriotism shattered, the injured veteran joins the antiwar movement and appears at the 1976 Democratic National Convention. Stone’s strident tone alienated many viewers, while others responded favorably to his message. Heaven and Earth (1993) completed Stone’s trilogy. Based on the memoir of Ly Le Hayslip, the film provides plenty of action as well as pleasing scenes of Vietnam village life (filmed again in the Philippines) amid the devastations of war. Strongly propagandistic, the plot borders on sentimental romance. A peasant girl is abused by both the VC and the South Vietnamese before being rescued by an American serviceman (played by Tommy Lee Jones) who marries her, brings her to the United States, and then turns abusive. Hayslip asserts her independence and eventually revisits Vietnam as a successful American businesswoman. Three Seasons (1999), directed by Tony Bui, is the first American film made entirely in Vietnam. In four loosely linked stories,
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actor Harvey Keitel is a former soldier now seeking the daughter he fathered in Vietnam; a young woman, employed tending lotus blossoms, assists her elderly patron, a poet dying of leprosy; a “cyclo” (bicycle rickshaw) driver falls in love with a feisty prostitute; and an engaging street urchin peddles contraband in the pelting rain of Ho Chi Minh City. The Beautiful Country (2004) examines the plight of a halfAmerican orphan in Vietnam. She escapes with difficulty from Saigon after the war as one of the so-called boat people and has many misadventures before locating her natural father in Texas. In a joyful reunion, she learns that her father, now blinded, had not coldly deserted her mother but instead had been unwilling to burden his young bride with a disabled husband. Also inspired by the plight of the boat people was Journey from the Fall (2005), which details the harsh life in reeducation camps where American collaborators were incarcerated. Those who escape fare little better, their families divided by Communist brutality and the difficulties of U.S. immigration. Piracy at sea is only one of many hazards they face. In Country (1989) differs from other Vietnam films in its focus on the home front. Based on a story by Bobbie Ann Mason, this modest gem of cinema is set in a small Kentucky town. Emily Lloyd plays a woman just out of high school who is haunted by the image of her father, who perished in Vietnam a month before her birth. Her mother has moved on with a second family, and her grandmother is consoled by the belief that her son died for his country. The young woman lives with her uncle (played by Bruce Willis), a Vietnam veteran who is angered by the refusal of his community to honor sacrifices made during an unpopular war. Uncle and niece finally come to terms with their losses in a moving visit to the Vietnam War Memorial in Washington, D.C.
The Aftermath The Vietnam experience is now indelibly imprinted on the American psyche. There is even a sort of Vietnam nostalgia, with a proliferation of tourist tours and books about the country. With the emergence of an artistic film industry in the formerly divided country, one talented director has become known in the United States. Three of Anh Hung Tran’s films have appeared in art theatres and on video. They come close to pure cinema, with so little dialogue that the English subtitles are almost superfluous. With their extraordinary visual beauty, they have been called poems in motion. The Scent of Green Papaya (1993) reveals a prosperous Saigon household in the 1950s, with only hints of what is to come, as the camera hovers lovingly over vases and delicate arrangements of food. Cyclo (1996) is a more gritty film, with postwar Ho Chi Minh City revealed, according to critic Kane Kehr, as “a lost circle of hell” where Americans have gone but the dollar is still important. A young man from a good family earns his living as a cycle driver, a human beast of burden, while his sister is forced into prostitution by her lover, an aristocratic poet who now survives by pimping and fencing. Cyclo has been compared, in its
neorealistic style and subject matter, to Vittorio de Sica’s masterpiece The Bicycle Thief (1948) and to Martin Scorsese’s Taxi Driver (1976). Still, there are scenes of great beauty, as flowers, food, and lodgings are arranged by humble people of artistic sensibility. With The Vertical Ray of the Sun (2000), Tran returned to his earlier impressionistic style. Shot on location in Hanoi and the surrounding lakes, countryside, and Buddhist temples, the sensuous images are more important than the scenario. The viewer can almost feel the dampness of Hanoi in the rain or smell the incense in the temple. As in his earlier films, Tran is more indebted to the classic French cinema than to Hollywood.
The Meaning of It All As this selective survey of films indicates, there were a variety of public responses to the Vietnam War. Even when the war itself was condemned, the heroism of servicemen was frequently acknowledged. Yet the films are limited as historical pieces. They are often inaccurate as to chronology and geography, hazy on explanations of political movements and attitudes, and largely indifferent to prisoner-of-war treatment or the well-documented atrocities of the VC and the Communists. Almost no attention is given to the women who assisted in many phases of the war. Unlike the films of World War II, these movies have not glorified America’s military involvement. The Vietnam films seem to contradict the famous observation of French New Wave director François Truffaut that a genuine antiwar film cannot exist because it is impossible not to make combat exciting. Indeed, the wastefulness of battle has never before been so poignantly revealed. And the shadow of Vietnam has continued to fall on the United States, even as newer military engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq have brought renewed attention to these motion pictures. As cinema critic Jamie Russell has observed, these films “aren’t about the war but about America’s attempts to get over defeat and redefine what ‘America’ actually represents.” ALLENE S. PHY-OLSEN See also Art and the Vietnam War; Literature and the Vietnam War; Music and the Vietnam War References Carnes, Mark C., ed. Past Imperfect: History According to the Movies. New York: Henry Holt, 1995. Devine, Jeremy. Vietnam at 24 Frames a Second: A Critical and Thematic Analysis of over 400 Films about the Vietnam War. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1999. Heberie, Mark A., ed. Thirty-Years After: New Essays on Vietnam War; Literature and Film. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009. Roquemore, Joseph. History Goes to the Movies. New York: Doubleday, 1999. Russell, Jamie. Vietnam War Movies. London: Pocket Essentials, 2002. Suid, Lawrence H. Guts and Glory: The Making of the American Military Image in Film. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2002.
Fire-Support Bases
Fire-Support Bases Temporary fortified positions, usually occupied by at least one artillery platoon of two guns and one infantry company, established to support an offensive operation. The early search-anddestroy campaigns in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) demonstrated the need to provide American infantry with maximum artillery and air support while protecting artillery units from Communist attacks. Responding to the widespread enemy threat, the Americans dispersed artillery units in a series of mutually supporting sites capable of assisting ground forces virtually anywhere they operated. Between 1961 and 1973, U.S. forces established more than 8,000 fire-support bases in Southeast Asia, only a fraction of which existed at any given time. The paucity of good, secure roads mandated that most firesupport bases be established by air assault, which required the existence of a suitable landing zone. The bases had to be within range of the ground units they were meant to support. A support base was almost always placed within range of at least one other fire-support base as well as other artillery units (e.g., divisional, corps, and naval) and air support. The site also had to be defensible against infantry assault. Finally, it had to possess a water supply and soil suitable for artillery firing. While the layout of fire-support bases varied, most were constructed with approximately as much depth as width in order to facilitate the quick and accurate delivery of artillery fire in every possible direction. Bases occupied by entire six-gun batteries were usually star-shaped, with one gun emplaced at each point of the star and the sixth in the center. Bases with three-gun or fourgun platoons or batteries were usually arrayed in triangular or diamond formations, respectively. Bases constructed along ridges were often rectangular in shape to conform to the terrain. To warn of possible enemy attacks, base commanders relied on intelligence reports, aerial reconnaissance, trip flares, electronic sensors, radar, and constant patrolling. Standard doctrine was to pair each artillery firing unit with an infantry company to provide for base security. The garrison relied upon multiple layers of defense to defeat an enemy assault. Engineers cleared and leveled ground around the base to establish a killing zone and arrayed barbed wire and Claymore mines to impede attackers. Between the killing zone and artillery pieces lay infantry positions, usually a compact perimeter of mutually supporting bunkers connected by a trench. Behind the infantry positions lay the artillery pieces, each dug in. Some bases featured a central artillery keep, surrounded by an earthen berm. The firebase garrison could deliver or summon an impressive amount of firepower, including artillery support from distant units, air strikes, and fire generated by the base’s own guns. A firedirection center (or fire-support center in bases with more than one battery) coordinated available firepower, while aiming posts, azimuth markers, and sound and digital computers (which almost never worked in Vietnam’s harsh climate) aided in the accurate delivery of fire. Infantrymen covered the killing zone with inter-
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locking fields of fire from machine guns, automatic rifles, grenade launchers, and light antitank weapons. In some bases, antiaircraft guns and armored fighting vehicles supplemented available firepower. While firebase positions were well dug in whenever possible, this could not be accomplished where water tables were high. Here, positions were built aboveground and fortified as much as practicable. In every base certain structures, such as radar installations and barracks, had to be placed aboveground and thus remained vulnerable to enemy fire. The Americans employed a variety of standard and improvised construction and fortification materials, from sandbags and timber to concrete, steel planking, and discarded freight containers. The primary mission of the fire-support base was to provide artillery support to friendly ground forces engaged in offensive operations within range of the so-called artillery umbrella. During such operations, firebases served as assembly points, command and control centers, and landing zones. Following the 1968 Tet Offensive, the Americans pioneered a tactical concept called an artillery raid whereby guns were rapidly deployed, usually by helicopter, to engage Communist units that were otherwise beyond the reach of artillery fire and then withdrawn. Another important mission of the firebase was to help defend other firebases against enemy assault. The constant establishment, maintenance, and redeployment of fire-support bases posed an immense logistical challenge to U.S. ground forces, which never had enough transport, construction equipment and material, and manpower to meet demands. The relatively small garrison size of firebases made them tempting targets for Communist forces, however, and often forced the Americans to divert resources from other missions to firebase defense. On the other hand, the Americans proved capable of establishing firebases almost anywhere, even in the Mekong Delta, where they employed fixed platforms, landing craft, and pontoon barges. While Communist forces did indeed attack many firebases, they never did overrun one and invariably suffered heavy losses. Finally, firebases regularly provided American and South Vietnamese troops with reliable, accurate, and effective artillery support. FRANCIS M. COAN See also Artillery, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Artillery Fire Doctrine; Helicopters, Employment of, in Vietnam; Search and Destroy References Dastrup, Boyd L. King of Battle: A Branch History of the U.S. Army’s Field Artillery. Fort Monroe, VA: Office of the Command Historian, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1992. Foster, Randy E. M. Vietnam Firebases, 1965–73: American and Australian Forces. Oxford, UK: Osprey, 2007. McKenney, Janice E. The Organizational History of Field Artillery, 1775–2003. Washington, DC: United States Army, Center of Military History, 2007. Ott, David E. Field Artillery, 1954–1973. Vietnam Studies Series. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1975.
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Fishel, Wesley Robert
Fishel, Wesley Robert Birth Date: September 8, 1919 Death Date: April 14, 1977 American political science professor and influential adviser to President Ngo Dinh Diem of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Born on September 8, 1919, in Cleveland, Ohio, Wesley Robert Fishel obtained a BS degree from Northwestern University in 1942, did graduate study at the University of Michigan in 1943, and earned a PhD from the University of Chicago in 1948. He served in the U.S. Army from 1942 to 1945 as a lieutenant and military language specialist in the Pacific theater. Fishel’s professional career combined academic pursuits in the United States with work for the U.S. government in the Far East. He first met Ngo Dinh Diem in Japan in 1950. The following year the two men resumed their acquaintance in the United States. When Diem took control of the Saigon government in 1954, he invited Fishel to advise him on governmental reconstruction. Fishel was an instructor in political science at the University of California, Los Angeles, during 1948–1951. He joined the faculty of Michigan State College in 1951 and continued there after it became Michigan State University as assistant professor (1951–1954), associate professor (1954–1957), professor (1957–1967), and finally professor in the affiliated James Madison College (1967–1977). He also filled shorter-term assignments at Johns Hopkins University (1952–1956), American University (1958–1961), and Southern Illinois University (1969), where at the latter he edited Southeast Asia: An International Quarterly. At Diem’s invitation, Fishel arranged for Michigan State University to set up a program under which a faculty resident in South Vietnam would advise Diem’s government on a wide range of issues. This was financed by the U.S. aid program in South Vietnam. Fishel served as chief administrator of the program from 1956 to 1958 and was influential therein until its termination by Diem in 1962. Fishel served as an adviser to the Department of State in the critical weeks of 1963 prior to Diem’s overthrow. Fishel became a member of the American Friends of Vietnam, a public relations lobby for South Vietnam that had been founded in 1954 by historian Joseph Buttinger, and served as its chairman from May 1964 until the spring of 1966. Fishel’s involvement in South Vietnamese affairs as probably the leading academic proponent of American policy there (although he became a strong critic of Diem after 1962) brought him into controversy at home. The Michigan State University program, especially its police training component, was accused of acting as a cover for Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) activities. Fishel’s continued advocacy of American policy, and particularly his attempt to rally support for U.S. military intervention in 1965, made him unpopular with the antiwar movement, and he was pilloried in articles and at campus teach-ins. Fishel died in Lansing, Michigan, on April 14, 1977. ARTHUR J. DOMMEN
See also Michigan State University Advisory Group; Ngo Dinh Diem; United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1954–1965 References Fishel, Wesley R., ed. Problems of Freedom: South Vietnam since Independence. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1961. Fishel, Wesley R., ed. Vietnam: Anatomy of a Conflict. Itasca, IL: Peacock, 1968. Morgan, Joseph G. The Vietnam Lobby: The American Friends of Vietnam, 1955–1975. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997.
Fishhook Name given to a densely forested region in Cambodia across the border from the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), immediately north of Tay Ninh Province and west of Binh Long Province and only 60 miles from Saigon. Viet Cong (VC) and People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) forces, infiltrating into War Zones C and D, maintained semipermanent installations in the Fishhook area, one of which was the location of the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), the headquarters that controlled all Communist political activities and military forces in South Vietnam. Fearful of expanding the war, President Lyndon B. Johnson prohibited American forces from pursuing Communist forces into these Cambodian sanctuaries. Beginning in March 1969, however, President Richard M. Nixon authorized secret Boeing B-52 Stratofortress bombing strikes against Communist locations in Cambodia, especially in the Fishhook. Throughout 1969 and in early 1970, allied forces destroyed a number of storage depots in War Zones C and D and drove mainforce PAVN units across the border into Cambodia, where they regrouped and expanded their support bases. Base Areas 350, 352, and 353, known to be located in the Fishhook area, became the major objectives of the so-called Cambodian Incursion, ordered by President Nixon and begun on May 1, 1970. During the 60-day operation, the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and 25th Infantry Division, supported by the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) Airborne Division, pushed Communist forces deeper inside Cambodia and discovered two huge but abandoned fortified bases, which became known as “The City” and “Rock Island East.” In addition to destroying thousands of bunkers, 1st Cavalry units captured massive amounts of military supplies: 23,000 individual and crew-served weapons, more than 15 million rounds of ammunition, 60,000 grenades, 140,000 rockets, 200,000 antiaircraft rounds, 5,000 mines, hundreds of trucks, and more than 20,000 tons of rice. While the Communists chose retreat over pitched large-scale battles, allied forces experienced significant casualties in continuous skirmishes and, especially during the last weeks, in mortar and rocket attacks on temporary firebases. Although the elusive COSVN was not found, the foray into the Fishhook was successful in that the capture
Five O’Clock Follies or destruction of such huge caches of supplies effectively prevented significant main-force activity in War Zones C and D for more than a year, allowing the planned withdrawal of American combat units to proceed. Nevertheless, when the Cambodian Incursion ended, PAVN and VC units quickly reoccupied the Fishhook and, despite the continuation of secret B-52 bombing, replenished their forces and reestablished their operational and supply bases. In the spring of 1972, War Zones C and D again became bloody battlegrounds. JOHN D. ROOT See also Cambodian Incursion; Central Office for South Vietnam; MENU, Operation; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Parrot’s Beak References Coleman, J. D. Incursion. New York: St. Martin’s, 1991. Stanton, Shelby L. The Rise and Fall of an American Army: The U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985.
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Five O’Clock Follies Derisive epithet appended by the media to daily media briefings by the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), Office of Information (MACOI) at the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) in Saigon. The JUSPAO was essentially a resource and logistics center for newspeople, providing many services to media personnel to assist in their quest for news. The MACOI was the interservice information office located at MACV headquarters at Tan Son Nhut Air Base outside of Saigon. MACOI staff compiled daily communiqués from operational reports received at the MACV operations center and monthly chronologies of U.S. military actions. Each day members of the MACOI staff would travel to the JUSPAO building auditorium to present the military portion of the daily 5:00 p.m. briefing. The Five O’Clock Follies was so-named because of the little trust that reporters had in the information presented by those briefings.
Brigadier General Stan McClellan, chief of staff of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), conducts a press conference in 1973. Daily media briefings by MACV were derisively termed the “Five O’Clock Follies” by many members of the press corps, who believed the briefings were a propaganda exercise and often lacked credibility. (Department of Defense)
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In reality, this distrust of official information provided to the press began in the advisory period during the John F. Kennedy administration, when U.S. information sources in Saigon were obligated to stress the positive side of the conflict. As the war escalated under the Lyndon B. Johnson administration and with the Americanization of the war, pressure to stress damage done to the Communists while limiting the impact of that to the United States and its allies led to what became known as a credibility gap. ARTHUR T. FRAME See also Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office; Media and the Vietnam War; Television and the Vietnam War References Braestrup, Peter. Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1994. Hammond, William M. Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1962–1968. Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1988. Hammond, William M. Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1968–1973. Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2002. Westmoreland, William C. A Soldier Reports. New York: Doubleday, 1976. Wyatt, Clarence R. Paper Soldiers: The American Press and the Vietnam War. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995.
FLAMING DART I
and II, Operations
Event Date: February 1965 Reprisal air raids signaling a sustained bombing campaign against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). Influenced by U.S. ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor in Saigon, the National Security Council proposed on December 1, 1964, a two-sided program for aerial attacks aimed at North Vietnamese targets. President Lyndon Johnson endorsed the first phase that called for reprisals as well as U.S. Air Force raids into Laos (Operation BARREL ROLL). Johnson postponed the start of the second phase, a sustained bombing campaign against North Vietnam. Troubled by the political instability in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) and wanting to assess the effects of Operation BARREL ROLL, Johnson remained unyielding yet was willing to consider retaliatory air strikes, provided they be executed jointly by South Vietnamese and American airmen. Early on Sunday, February 7, 1965, Viet Cong (VC) forces mounted a combined mortar and sapper attack against the U.S. helicopter installation at Camp Holloway and the adjacent Pleiku airfield in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. The attacks killed 8 U.S. servicemen, wounded 109, and destroyed or damaged 20 aircraft. Even before this attack, presidential advisers John T. McNaughton and McGeorge Bundy had favored bombing North Vietnam. Bundy, present in Saigon on a fact-finding mission,
joined with Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), commander General William C. Westmoreland and U.S. ambassador Taylor in urging a retaliatory raid. Johnson agreed. Along with demonstrating U.S. resolve, he hoped that quick and effective retaliation would persuade the North Vietnamese that their leadership could not rely on continual freedom from bombing while persevering in belligerent actions against South Vietnam. Johnson dismissed the possibility that a restricted attack would bring Chinese or Soviet involvement. Carried out with South Vietnamese concurrence and participation under a previously developed Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) contingency plan labeled FLAMING DART, the attack was directed by Rear Admiral Henry L. Miller, commander of Task Force 77 of the U.S. Navy Seventh Fleet. On February 7, 49 Douglas A-4 Skyhawk and Vought F-8 Crusader aircraft from the carriers Coral Sea and Hornet bombed and rocketed North Vietnamese training installations at Dong Hoi, some 40 miles north of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) at the 17th Parallel. One A-4 was lost in the attack. The next day 24 Republic of Vietnam Air Force (VNAF, South Vietnamese Air Force) propeller-driven Douglas A-1 Skyraiders, led in person by Air Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky, hit the Chap Le barracks and communication center at Vinh Linh, 15 miles north of the DMZ. The attackers destroyed 47 buildings and damaged 22 of 500 targeted. The VC quickly retaliated for FLAMING DART I. On February 10 VC operatives smuggled 100 pounds of explosives into the four-story Viet Cuong Hotel in the coastal city of Qui Nhon in Binh Dinh Province. The ensuing blast reduced the building to rubble and killed 23 Americans and wounded another 21. Two VC were slain at the hotel. FLAMING DART II was the retaliation for the Qui Nhon attack. On February 11 Admiral Miller launched 99 sorties from the Coral Sea, Hancock, and Ranger against the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) facilities at Chanh Hoa. At the same time, 28 VNAF A-1 aircraft again struck the Chap Le facility. Three U.S. Navy aircraft were shot down in the attack, and one pilot was taken prisoner. Operation ROLLING THUNDER, the sustained bombing campaign of North Vietnam, began on March 2. RODNEY J. ROSS AND SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Airpower, Role in War; BARREL ROLL, Operation; Bundy, McGeorge; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; McNaughton, John Theodore; Nguyen Cao Ky; ROLLING THUNDER, Operation; Taylor, Maxwell Davenport References Clodfelter, Mark. The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam. New York: Free Press, 1989. Clodfelter, Mark. Vietnam in Military Statistics: A History of the Indochina Wars, 1772–1991. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1995. Frankum, Ronald B., Jr. Like Rolling Thunder: The Air War in Vietnam, 1964–1975. New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005. Johnson, Lyndon B. The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963–1969. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971. Kahin, George McT. Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam. New York: Knopf, 1986.
Fonda, Jane Seymour
Flexible Response U.S. strategic defense policy developed in the early 1960s by retired U.S. Army general Maxwell Taylor that called for the equilibration of nuclear and conventional forces in order to give U.S. war planners more options in the event of a regional or limited war. The policy essentially called for an end to the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration’s policy of massive retaliation, which relied heavily upon U.S. nuclear might rather than large and costly conventional forces to avert war. Massive retaliation, also known as “More Bang for a Buck,” had been contrived to curtail defense expenditures after the Korean War by threatening the Soviet Union with a nuclear response to any potential conflict, whether it be nuclear or conventional in nature. Critics of Eisenhower’s so-called New Look defense posture pointed out that military expenditures were not substantially reduced during the 1950s, and they hastened to point out that massive retaliation increased the likelihood of a nuclear war and provided only two options in a future crisis: surrender or suicide. In 1959 Taylor wrote The Uncertain Trumpet in which he called for a diversified military with broad counterinsurgency capability. He also lamented the growing disparity in spending among the major service branches and the fact that spending on the U.S. Army had fallen precipitously since the mid-1950s. This had occurred principally because the Pentagon had shifted many resources to its nuclear forces, first to the U.S. Air Force and then later in the decade to the U.S. Navy. Taylor hoped to reverse that trend, building up conventional (and special) forces that might be employed in areas where nuclear weapons were not effective or would represent a disproportionate response to a limited crisis. In advocating flexible response, which called for a sizable increase in spending on nonnuclear forces, Taylor essentially rejected the economic tenets upon which the New Look defense policy had rested. While the Eisenhower administration argued that defense outlays should not be more than 10 percent of gross national product (GNP), Taylor and his adherents believed that defense spending could exceed that percentage without harming the economy. In fact, Taylor asserted that tax increases should be enacted to help pay for increased defense budgets. President John F. Kennedy read The Uncertain Trumpet and was influenced by it. In fact, on July 1, 1961, Taylor became the president’s military adviser. Kennedy and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara especially embraced the need for a new defense program, one in large measure shaped by Taylor, who was tired of seeing the army downsized, denigrated in budget considerations, and ill-prepared for a ground war. Kennedy accepted Taylor’s policy of flexible response, namely a sizable increase in armed forces prepared to fight nonnuclear battles or so-called brushfire wars, including wars of counterinsurgency against Communist guerrillas. Key to flexible response was the augmentation of the U.S. Army’s Special Forces and the U.S. Navy’s Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL) teams. The adoption of flexible response helped to facilitate U.S. involvement in Vietnam, especially the military escalations during the Lyndon B. Johnson administration.
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Although the U.S. military was largely discredited in the immediate aftermath of the Vietnam War, flexible response was never completely abandoned. The defeat in Vietnam did compel policy makers to augment the policy of flexible response with other defense approaches during the last 15 years of the Cold War. J. NATHAN CAMPBELL AND PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR. See also Eisenhower, Dwight David; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; McNamara, Robert Strange; Taylor, Maxwell Davenport References Buzzanco, Robert. Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Halberstam, David. The Best and the Brightest. New York: Random House, 1972. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. Kinnard, Douglas. The Certain Triumph: Maxwell Taylor and the American Experience in Vietnam. New York: Brassey’s, 1991. Taylor, General Maxwell D. The Uncertain Trumpet. New York: Harper, 1960.
Fonda, Jane Seymour Birth Date: December 21, 1937 American actor and controversial anti–Vietnam War activist. The daughter of actor Henry Fonda, Jane Seymour Fonda was born in New York City on December 21, 1937, and was educated at Vassar College for two years. She studied acting with Lee Strasberg at the Actors Studio and began her Hollywood career in 1960. Impressed by her all-American good looks, the Pentagon in 1962 named her “Miss Army Recruiting.” Fonda then went to Paris and became an international sex symbol by starring (and virtually disrobing) in Barbarella, a rather silly science-fiction film directed by Roger Vadim in 1968. Fonda was married to Vadim until 1970 and had one child, Vanessa. Fonda became increasingly politicized and outspoken about the Vietnam War, to the extent that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) began to hatch plots to discredit her. She supported Black Panther founder Bobby Seale and was accused of drug smuggling and assaulting a police officer (charges that were later dropped). In 1971 she met Thomas Emmett Hayden at an antiwar rally. Hayden was one of the founders of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and had helped to orchestrate the August 1968 antiwar demonstrations at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago. Fonda and Hayden married in 1972; had a son, Troy; and were divorced in 1989. In 1972 Fonda appeared with actor Donald Sutherland in FTA (“Free the Army” or “Fuck the Army”), a collection of skits that she described as “political vaudeville.” She then returned to Paris to work with the Marxist French director Jean-Luc Godard on a film titled Tout va bien (1972) and became increasingly radicalized.
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American actress and anti–Vietnam War activist Jane Fonda seated at a North Vietnamese antiaircraft gun during a visit to Hanoi in July 1972. Propaganda broadcasts of Fonda’s trip were a coup for the North Vietnamese and an affront to many Americans. Years later, Fonda apologized for her actions. (AP/Wide World Photos)
After winning an Academy Award for Klute (1971), an Oscar she nearly refused as a symbolic protest against the war, in July 1972 she flew to Hanoi, where she made 10 propaganda broadcasts over Radio Hanoi, a decision that she would later regret. To many Americans, Fonda became “Hanoi Jane,” the Vietnam equivalent of Axis Sally and Tokyo Rose. Fonda appeared with eight American prisoners of war (those who refused were allegedly tortured); met with the vice premier of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), Nguyen Duy Trinh; and returned home with a 25-minute film she had made. The U.S. Justice Department decided to ignore Fonda’s actions so as not to make her an antiwar martyr, but her Hollywood career was badly compromised, and she went abroad to make her next film with Joseph Losey, an expatriate American director who had moved to London to escape the Joseph McCarthy witch-hunts of the 1950s. In 1974 after a second trip to Vietnam with Hayden, Fonda made a 60-minute documentary, Introduction to the Enemy. Her last Vietnam-related picture, for which she garnered another Oscar, was Coming Home, directed by Hal Ashby in 1978 and inspired by Ron Kovic, the paraplegic veteran she met in 1972 at an antiwar rally. By 1981 Fonda had reentered the American mainstream with On Golden Pond, a film that costarred her father and
that symbolized reconciliation and earned her a Best Supporting Actress Oscar nomination, but many Americans still despised her for her antiwar activities. In 1984 conservative protesters forced Fonda to cancel appearances at department stores in Miami, New Orleans, and New York as she toured the country promoting a new line of exercise clothing. In 1987 she had problems scouting locations in New England for the film Stanley and Iris when aldermen in Holyoke and Chicopee, Massachusetts, passed resolutions to keep her out of their towns. She also was confronted in Waterbury, Connecticut, with a local campaign, mounted by Gaetano Russo, a retired National Guard officer, to protest her presence there. To counter this backlash, Fonda decided to make a public statement, apologizing for her 1972 actions in a Barbara Walters televised interview titled “Healing Wounds” on ABC’s 20/20, broadcast on June 17, 1988. Fonda admitted to having been “thoughtless and careless” and expressed regret if anyone who had served in Vietnam had been hurt “because of things I said or did.” This performance closed the chapter on Vietnam for Fonda, who after divorcing Hayden in 1989 even put her acting career on hold and married Atlanta media mogul Ted Turner. The two divorced in 2001.
Fontainebleau Conference Fonda’s career reflects the political turmoil of her times and is oddly contradictory, as Christopher Andersen pointed out in his unflattering biography titled Citizen Jane (1990). He described Fonda as “the sex symbol who went on to champion feminism; the Miss Army Recruiting of 1962 who rooted for the enemy during the Vietnam War; the chain-smoking, pill-popping bulimic who became the world’s leading health and fitness advocate.” On the other hand, in her radical days Fonda spoke out courageously against the Vietnam War in defiance of government constraints, risking surveillance and blacklisting and at the expense of alienating her public. She learned that her extreme actions did have consequences, and in a way she too was a victim of Vietnam. Her brother, Peter Fonda, starred in the 1960s’ counterculture film Easy Rider. JAMES MICHAEL WELSH See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Film and the Vietnam Experience; Hayden, Thomas Emmett; Students for a Democratic Society References Andersen, Christopher. Citizen Jane: The Turbulent Life of Jane Fonda. New York: Henry Holt, 1990. Collier, Peter. The Fondas: A Hollywood Dynasty. New York: Putnam, 1990. Guiles, Fred Lawrence. Jane Fonda: The Actress in Her Time. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1982. Herman, Gary, and David Downing. Jane Fonda: All-American AntiHeroine. New York: Quick Fox, 1980.
Fontainebleau Conference Start Date: July 6, 1946 End Date: September 10, 1946 Eight-week conference between political leaders of France and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). This conference at the Chateau of Fontainebleau south of Paris in the summer of 1946 was an effort to work out implementation of the Ho-Sainteny Accord, which was signed in Hanoi on March 6, 1946, between North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh and French government representative Jean Sainteny, and a last chance for the French government to develop a working relationship with the North Vietnamese government. This arrangement was undermined by French high commissioner Georges Thierry d’Argenlieu’s June 2 proclamation of a Republic of Cochin China in southern Vietnam and his efforts afterward and by political developments in France. The two French political parties on which Ho Chi Minh had counted, the Socialists and Communists, failed to support him. Both had lost seats in the June French national elections, and the Communists, then in the government, were trying to prove their French patriotism. The North Vietnamese delegation, led by Ho, departed Vietnam at the end of May 1946 on a French warship; two days after sailing
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they learned of d’Argenlieu’s proclamation. When they reached France the government had fallen, and the delegation was forced to wait while a new cabinet was formed under Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP, Popular Republican Movement) leader Georges Bidault. This represented a political shift to the right. During that time, the Vietnamese delegates were shunted off to Biarritz and did some fishing. One of them remarked later that “the conference was fishy from the start.” The conference finally opened on July 6. The French delegation contained colonial officials and no prominent politicians. Two months of talks between the two sides accomplished nothing. The French would make no meaningful concessions, and in the middle of the conference d’Argenlieu torpedoed the effort by calling his own conference at Da Lat, to which he invited representatives of the Republic of Cochin China and “Southern Annam,” in effect carving another chunk out of Vietnam. The French government delegation at Fontainebleau made no concessions to the North Vietnamese government, and its attitude is best summed up by the remarks made by one French official to delegation head Pham Van Dong. The latter reported the official as saying that “We only need an eight-day police action to clear out all of you.” The sum of the conference’s work was a draft accord reinforcing France’s economic rights in North Vietnam without solving the problem of Cochin China. The conference ended on September 10, and Ho sent the North Vietnamese delegation home. Ho extended his stay in France a bit longer after the conference terminated. He told French diplomat Jean Sainteny, who had returned to Paris with him, “Don’t let me leave this way. Give me some weapon against the extremists. You will not regret it.” Ho also talked with American correspondent David Schoenbrun and forecast an early start for war and predicted how it would be fought. It would be, Ho said, the contest of the lion and elephant. The lion, less powerful than the elephant, could not meet the elephant in open combat, so the lion would lie in wait in the jungle and leap on the elephant’s back, tearing out huge chunks of its flesh. Ultimately the elephant would bleed to death. On September 14 Ho signed the modus vivendi worked out with the French. On September 19 he departed France by ship, never to return. The Indochina War began that December. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also D’Argenlieu, Georges Thierry; Ho Chi Minh; Ho-Sainteny Agreement; Indochina War; Sainteny, Jean References Hammer, Ellen J. The Struggle for Indochina. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1954. Sainteny, Jean. Histoire d’une Paix Manquée: Indochine, 1945–1947. Paris: Amiot-Dumont, 1953. Schoenbrun, David. As France Goes. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957.
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Forces Armées Nationales Khmères Army of the Khmer Republic (République Khmère), 1970–1975. In November 1953 during the Indochina War, Cambodia concluded a convention with France in which Indochina was permitted its own military establishment. Known as the Forces Armées Royale Khmères (FARK, Royal Khmer Armed Forces), it numbered fewer than 35,000 men and was organized in battalions operating under supreme commander of the armed forces and head of state Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Following the overthrow of Sihanouk on March 18, 1970, by pro-U.S. prime minister and defense minister Lon Nol and the establishment of the Khmer Republic, FARK was renamed Forces Armées Nationales Khmères (FANK, Khmer National Armed Forces). Having exploited traditional Cambodian animosity toward the Vietnamese to come to power, Lon Nol now continued to play the nationalist card. He closed the port of Sihanoukville to resupply activities by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) for Communist forces in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), thus shutting down the so-called Sihanouk Trail. He also called for a national effort by FANK against the estimated 40,000–60,000 Vietnamese Communist troops in three eastern Cambodian border provinces. Thousands of young Cambodian men and women enthusiastically joined this crusade against the Yuon, the pejorative Khmer term for Vietnamese. The new government’s policy was entirely legal, for People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) troops were occupying Cambodian territory in violation of its sovereignty. Yet Cambodia’s small military, while its members were enthusiastic, was clearly no match for the PAVN forces. In April 1970 U.S. president Richard M. Nixon authorized military assistance to Cambodia to shore up the Lon Nol regime. A training command staffed by U.S. Army Special Forces personnel was created to train FANK at locations in Vietnam at Chi Lang, Phuoc Thuy, Dong Ba Thien, and Long Hai as well as at sites in Laos and in Cambodia. After the 5th Special Forces departed Vietnam in the spring of 1971, the training sites were retained and redesignated the U.S. Army Individual Training Group in March 1971. During the following months Australian and New Zealand jungle instructors were assigned to the group, and it was redesignated FANK Training Command in May 1972. Renamed the Field Training Command on December 1, 1972, it was closed down at the end of January 1973. As a result of U.S. influence, FANK shifted from the French staff system to that of the U.S. Army, and the staff members were given crash courses by U.S. personnel in Vietnam. The United States also provided small arms and ammunition to FANK, which quickly expanded to more than 100,000 men. Unfortunately, the training was insufficient, and leadership of FANK was inadequate. Whenever the poorly armed and inexperienced Cambodian soldiers engaged in combat with PAVN forces, the Cambodian forces were defeated. The consequences would be catastrophic for Cambodia and its people. FANK was soon driven back into the urban areas.
The Cambodian Incursion beginning in April 1970 was another effort by Nixon to shore up Lon Nol’s regime but also to strike at the Cambodian sanctuaries, a move long sought by the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). During the Cambodian incursion, Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) forces in Cambodia, outraged by FANK murders of hundreds of ethnic Vietnamese, looted several Cambodian towns. Later South Vietnamese president Nguyen Van Thieu ordered his troops to evacuate some 20,000 Vietnamese from Cambodia. In any case, the gains of the Cambodian Incursion were shortlived. The Communists soon reclaimed their sanctuaries and reestablished control in eastern Cambodia. The departure of U.S. troops from Cambodia at the end of June left a void far too great for the ARVN or FANK to fill. This 1970 widening of the battlefield in Indochina eventually left Cambodia the most devastated nation in the region. To avoid massive Boeing B-52 Stratofortress bombings, Communist forces moved into the Cambodian interior. Meanwhile, Lon Nol’s army struggled for the next five years against both the PAVN and the indigenous Cambodian Communists, known as the Khmer Rouge (Red Khmer), which now received increased PAVN military assistance. At the same time, U.S. assistance to FANK was being reduced as the United States wound down its presence in Indochina. When FANK’s war with the Khmer Rouge followed, Lon Nol declared a state of emergency, and FANK’s size was expanded to some 200,000 military personnel organized in brigades and divisions. The increased numbers could not turn the tide. Beginning in November 1973, Khmer Rouge forces blockaded Phnom Penh. At the end of February 1974 Lon Nol’s FANK troops pushed the Khmer Rouge back some distance from the capital. In March the Khmer Rouge captured the old royal capital of Oudong, about 24 miles from Phnom Penh. It was the first provincial capital they had taken since 1970. FANK recaptured Oudong in July. Throughout the second half of 1974 there was a stalemate in Cambodia. The Khmer Rouge, not as well armed or supplied as its adversary, was, however, better led. The Khmer Rouge controlled the countryside but, with only about 70,000 men, lacked the strength for an offensive against the cities. The much larger FANK controlled the towns but, plagued by poor leadership, low morale, and corruption, was in turn unable to undertake aggressive action in the rural areas. FANK resources were also spread thin. FANK’s best troops, numbering some 50,000 men and representing a quarter of its total force, defended Phnom Penh, while the remainder were dispersed throughout the rest of the country. At the end of 1974 U.S. aid to Lon Nol was sharply curtailed. Up to that point Washington had provided him some $1.85 billion in assistance. U.S. bombing counted for an additional $7 billion. In December, however, Congress placed rigid restrictions on U.S. aid. This had both a material effect on FANK’s fighting ability and a great psychological impact on the troops themselves.
Ford, Gerald Rudolph In January 1975 the Khmer Rouge received, according to PAVN records, 4,000 tons of weapons and ammunition shipped to them by PAVN down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. This supply shipment, which represented 80 percent of the total amount of supplies scheduled for delivery to the Khmer Rouge for the entire year, was intended to enable the Khmer Rouge to begin a major offensive against FANK forces; soon the Khmer Rouge controlled the Mekong River access to Phnom Penh. Previously some 80 percent of provisions for the capital had come in by water; now the city could only be resupplied by air. Hunger became a major problem for the city’s 600,000 people. Pursuant to the demands of the Cambodian National Assembly, Lon Nol resigned on March 11, 1975, and left the country on April 1. After the last U.S. personnel left the Cambodian capital on April 12, airborne provisions no longer arrived in Phomn Penh. On April 17 Khmer Rouge troops simply walked into the capital and took control. Five years of war had brought the deaths of some 10 percent of Cambodia’s 7 million people. The economy was in ruins, few schools and hospitals were operating, and half of the population had been uprooted from their homes. But much worse lay ahead. The new leaders renamed the country Kampuchea, emptied the cities of their populations, and tried to take the country back into the Middle Ages, herding the population into agricultural communes and initiating a reign of terror that has few precedents in history. After the fall of the Khmer Republic regime in April 1975, the Khmer Rouge established a new military force called the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea, composed purely of Khmer Rouge fighters. SPENCER C. TUCKER
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14, 1913, Gerald Rudolph Ford’s birth name was Leslie Lynch King Jr. He was reared in Grand Rapids, Michigan, and was adopted by his stepfather, at which time his name was changed. Ford received his bachelor’s degree from the University of Michigan, where he played football, and received his law degree from Yale University in 1941. He served in the U.S. Navy as an ensign during World War II and was elected to the first of 12 consecutive terms in the House of Representatives in 1948. Throughout his years in Congress, a tenure that was highlighted by service as his party’s minority leader (1965–1973), Ford developed an expertise in the area of defense appropriations and became a leader of the moderate Republican bloc. He was a consistent supporter of the U.S. commitment in Vietnam, differing with the Lyndon B. Johnson administration only in that Ford believed that more money and resources should be allocated there. As vice president, a position to which he was appointed by President Richard Nixon in October 1973 after the resignation of Spiro T. Agnew, Ford publicly defended the administration’s record on Vietnam. It was left to Ford, who became president upon Nixon’s resignation on August 9, 1974, to preside over the final stage of the Vietnam War. Ford was also given the unenviable tasks of healing a country ripped apart by Vietnam and the Watergate Scandal, dealing with rampant inflation, and attempting to jump-start a nearly moribund economy.
See also Cambodia; Cambodian Incursion; Khmer Rouge; Nguyen Van Thieu; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Sihanouk, Norodom; United States Special Forces References Isaacs, Arnold R. Without Honor: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983. Nguyen Viet Phuong. Van Tai Quan Su Chien Luoc Tren Duong Ho Chi Minh Trong Khang Chien Chong My [Strategic Military Transportation on the Ho Chi Minh Trail during the Resistance War against the Americans]. Hanoi: People’s Army of Vietnam, General Department of Rear Services, 1988. Shawcross, William. Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979.
Ford, Gerald Rudolph Birth Date: July 14, 1913 Death Date: December 26, 2006 U.S. Republican congressman (1949–1973), vice president (December 1973–August 1974), and president of the United States (August 1974–January 1977). Born in Omaha, Nebraska, on July
Gerald Ford served as a member of the U.S. House of Representatives and vice president. He became president of the United States in August 1974 on the resignation of President Richard M. Nixon. (Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library)
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Perhaps Ford’s most controversial move came only weeks into his presidency when he granted Nixon a full and unconditional pardon on September 8, 1974. Many at the time decried the move, and some claimed that Ford had struck a deal with Nixon before becoming vice president the year before. In retrospect, however, Ford’s decision might well have been for the best, as it spared the nation many more months of acrimonious proceedings related to Watergate. There is no credible evidence to suggest that Ford had made any deal with Nixon, although Ford’s move might well have cost him the presidency in 1976. As president, Ford moderated his earlier, more hawkish views on the Vietnam War. Only two weeks into his presidency, he ignored the advice of those—including Secretary of State Henry Kissinger—who counseled a harsh policy against draft dodgers and combat personnel who were absent without leave (AWOL). Ford formed the Presidential Clemency Board, which reviewed individual cases and assigned specific sanctions or acquittal. In January 1975 Ford faced the final offensives of the Cambodian Khmer Rouge and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). Rather than risk political opposition to an American recommitment in Vietnam, the Ford administration took no serious steps to counter either attack. With no treaty commitment to Cambodia, it was relatively easy for Ford to order Operation EAGLE PULL, the abandonment of the U.S. embassy in Phnom Penh on April 11, 1975. But in a secret correspondence delivered before his resignation, President Nixon had promised Nguyen Van Thieu, president of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), that if North Vietnam violated the 1973 truce, the United States would recommit troops to South Vietnam. Nevertheless, despite the advice of Kissinger and ambassador to South Vietnam Graham Martin, Ford refused to honor that pledge. Instead, after the North Vietnamese began their 1975 Spring Offensive (the Ho Chi Minh Campaign), Ford made only a halfhearted attempt to cajole Congress into appropriating monies for South Vietnam’s defense. When Congress refused, Ford ordered the evacuation of all remaining U.S. military and embassy personnel. The April 29–30 evacuation of Saigon (Operation FREQUENT WIND) removed some 1,400 Americans and 5,600 Vietnamese. The evacuations from Phnom Penh and Saigon as well as the May 1975 Mayaguez Incident, America’s final military engagements of the Vietnam War, were all used against Ford during the 1976 presidential election. The evacuations were cited as evidence that the Ford administration did not adequately support U.S. allies, while the Mayaguez Incident was cited to show that Republican administrations, by choosing force over diplomacy in a crisis, had learned nothing from Vietnam. Ford faced a complete Washington outsider in the 1976 election, former Georgia governor Jimmy Carter. Carter promised honest and transparent government, a foreign policy based on human rights, and a reinvigorated economy. Carter defeated Ford by a razor-thin margin. Ford’s link to Nixon, his inability to resolve the country’s economic problems, and his perceived missteps during
the last throes of the Vietnam War all worked against him. Be that as it may, Ford was a decent and honorable man who brought a modicum of normalcy to a deeply divided and demoralized nation. Ford entered private life in January 1977 and was a member of many corporate boards. He died on December 26, 2006, at his home in Rancho Mirage, California. JOHN ROBERT GREENE See also Agnew, Spiro Theodore; Amnesty; Cambodia; Carter, James Earl, Jr.; EAGLE PULL, Operation; FREQUENT WIND, Operation; Ho Chi Minh Campaign; Kissinger, Henry Alfred; Martin, Graham A.; Mayaguez Incident; Nguyen Van Thieu; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Watergate Scandal References Brinkley, Douglas. Gerald R. Ford. New York: Times Books, 2007. Ford, Gerald R. A Time to Heal: The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford. New York: Harper and Row, 1979. Greene, John Robert. The Presidency of Gerald R. Ford. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995.
Forrestal, Michael Vincent Birth Date: November 26, 1927 Death Date: January 13, 1989 Attorney and head of the Vietnam Coordinating Committee of the National Security Council (NSC) during 1962–1965. Michael Vincent Forrestal was born on November 26, 1927, in New York City, the elder son of James V. Forrestal, the first U.S. secretary of defense. The younger Forrestal briefly attended Princeton University in 1949 and earned a law degree from Harvard University in 1953. That same year he began practicing law with the Shearman & Sterling firm in New York City. In the late 1940s he had served as an aide to W. Averell Harriman in Moscow and Paris. In late 1962 Forrestal and Roger Hilsman, then director of intelligence for the U.S. State Department, visited Vietnam to review the situation there. Although both men were initially committed to U.S. intervention in Vietnam, they produced a mixed report on the war that reinforced growing doubts as to the viability of the government of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). They pointed to ominous increases in Viet Cong (VC) strength that might lead to a lengthier and costlier war than had been predicted. Although agreeing with the Strategic Hamlet Program in principle, they expressed doubts as to the effectiveness of the program. A secret annex to their report recommended that the United States exert additional pressure on South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem to institute reforms and liberalize the “authoritarian political structure.” Both Forrestal and Hilsman were central figures in the hectic maneuverings of late August 1963 when, working with Harriman, they secured presidential approval of the dispatch of a cable recommending the overthrow of the Diem government, which occurred that November.
Fortas, Abraham Forrestal remained in government until mid-1965, but his discontent with official Vietnam policy steadily increased. He believed that military estimates were overly optimistic and, as with Harriman, supported a negotiated settlement, a position that earned Forrestal the disfavor of President Lyndon Johnson. In mid-1965 Forrestal returned to the practice of law in New York City. He died there of a ruptured aneurysm on January 13, 1989. PRISCILLA ROBERTS See also Harriman, William Averell; Hilsman, Roger; Hilsman-Forrestal Report; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Taylor-McNamara Report References Gibbons, William C. The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War. 4 vols. to date. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986–1995. Halberstam, David. The Best and the Brightest. New York: Random House, 1972.
Forrestal, USS, Flight Deck Fire Event Date: July 29, 1967 Massive fire on the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS Forrestal that resulted in one of the U.S. Navy’s worst accidental losses of life in the post–World War II era. On July 29, 1967, the Forrestal was in its first week of combat operations at Yankee Station, an area in the South China Sea from which the naval air war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) was largely conducted. The carrier’s crew totaled almost 6,000 sailors and navy airmen, and the ship had an air wing of 80 aircraft. The evening before, the Forrestal had received 400 tons of bombs from an ammunition ship. Many of the bombs were of World War II vintage and were much more unstable and prone to detonation in a fire than more modern ordnance. At 10:47 a.m. on July 29 the Forrestal’s flight deck was filled with manned, fueled, and armed aircraft being readied for the launch of the day’s second strike. At that moment a Zuni air-to-ground rocket on an F-4 Phantom fighter was accidentally triggered by a stray surge of electricity. The rocket flew across the flight deck and struck an A-4 Skyhawk attack aircraft. Almost instantly the area around the aircraft was awash in flaming jet fuel. Immediately the ship’s well-trained flight deck firefighting crew swung into action, attempting to extinguish the fire and rescue aircrews trapped in their planes. The situation became catastrophic less than two minutes later when one of the old World War II–era bombs detonated in the heat of the fire. The initial explosion killed the firefighters along with many other flight deck crewmen and pilots. It also shredded many of the flight deck’s fire hoses. From this point on the fire would be fought by largely inexperienced firefighters with equipment salvaged or borrowed from other ships in the area. The efforts of the improvised fire crews, while at times disorganized and clumsy,
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were nothing short of heroic. Crewmen also pushed several hundred tons of ordnance and several aircraft over the side and clear of the fire’s path. Before the fire was declared out on the flight deck one hour later, nine bombs (eight of them World War II vintage) had exploded, punching four holes in the deck, killing sailors in compartments below, and dumping burning jet fuel several decks down into the ship. All fires throughout the ship would not be extinguished until the early morning hours of July 30. Among those who narrowly escaped death was Lieutenant Commander John S. McCain III, future U.S. senator from Arizona and 2008 presidential candidate. The final grim casualty report was 134 killed, more than 100 wounded, 21 aircraft destroyed in the fire or pushed over the side, and 31 aircraft damaged. Damage was set at $72 million, excluding the lost or damaged aircraft. After returning to its home port of Norfolk, Virginia, on September 14, 1967, USS Forrestal underwent repairs until April 1968, when it returned to service. An investigation placed blame for the fire on aircraft electrical component malfunctions and dangerously unstable bombs. Lessons learned from the disaster allowed the U.S. Navy to make improvements in aircraft carrier design, firefighting equipment, and training of flight deck personnel. To this day the fire is studied by navy officers and sailors. ROBERT M. BROWN See also Aircraft Carriers; McCain, John Sidney, III References Freeman, Gregory A. Sailors to the End. New York: HarperCollins, 2002. Tillman, John B. On Yankee Station: The Naval Air War over Vietnam. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987.
Fortas, Abraham Birth Date: June 19, 1910 Death Date: April 5, 1982 Adviser to U.S. president Lyndon B. Johnson and associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court during 1965–1969. Born in Memphis, Tennessee, on June 19, 1910, Abraham (Abe) Fortas graduated from Southwestern at Memphis (now Rhodes College) in 1930. He then enrolled at Yale University, where he earned a law degree in 1933. That same year he joined President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal effort as an attorney for the Agriculture Adjustment Administration while holding a faculty position at Yale Law School. After service in several New Deal agencies and developing a distinguished private law practice in Washington, D.C., Fortas was appointed by President Johnson to the Supreme Court in 1965. Officials in the Johnson administration recalled Fortas as having the most influence of any individual on the president’s Vietnam War policies. A progressive with an unsurpassed record of support for social justice and civil liberties, Fortas retained the foreign policy outlook of the 1940s, when New Deal liberals abhorred
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Fort Hood Three duced by his agreement to accept a retainer from the Louis Wolfson Foundation for legal services while serving on the Supreme Court. Returning to his private law practice, Fortas continued to write and speak on U.S. involvement in Vietnam. He died in Washington, D.C., on April 5, 1982. ELIZABETH URBAN ALEXANDER See also Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Wise Men References Barrett, David M. Uncertain Warriors: Lyndon Johnson and His Vietnam Advisers. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993. Kalman, Laura. Abe Fortas: A Biography. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. Murphy, Bruce Allen. Fortas: The Rise and Ruin of a Supreme Court Justice. New York: William Morrow, 1988.
Abraham Fortas was a close adviser to President Lyndon Johnson and an associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court during 1965–1969. He was a staunch supporter of Johnson’s Vietnam War policies. (Library of Congress)
“appeasement.” As a member of the so-called Wise Men, a group of senior advisers convened by Johnson, Fortas at first feared that the costs of war would bankrupt the social programs of the Great Society. Between 1965 and 1967, however, as Johnson’s other advisers became more and more disenchanted with prospects for victory in Vietnam, Fortas hardened his support for U.S. involvement there. The 1968 Tet Offensive intensified Fortas’s commitment to U.S. participation in the war. He believed that policies such as the 1965 Christmas bombing halt had only caused the Communists to increase agitation for a total withdrawal of U.S. troops. Victory in Vietnam, Fortas now reasoned, was essential. He saw no alternative but to proceed with the war until the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) agreed to end the fighting. Fortas’s arguments impressed Johnson but not the president’s other advisers. When the Wise Men met in March 1968 to advise Johnson that the United States should reduce its involvement in Vietnam, Fortas stood almost alone in advocating further expansion of the conflict. A few days later Johnson announced that he would not seek reelection in 1968. Soon after Johnson’s statement, the now lame-duck president nominated Fortas to succeed Earl Warren, who was retiring, as chief justice of the Supreme Court. Republicans saw the appointment as an attempt to replace Warren with another liberal chief justice and prevent Richard M. Nixon, if he won the November 1968 election, from controlling the Court. A filibuster sent the nomination down to defeat. The following year Fortas resigned from the Supreme Court under allegations of impropriety pro-
Fort Hood Three Collective name given U.S. Army privates James Johnson, Dennis Mora, and David Samas. Their case attracted national attention as the first highly publicized refusal of American soldiers to accept duty in Vietnam. The three privates were members of the 142nd Signal Battalion of the 2nd Armored Division stationed at Fort Hood, Texas. When their unit received a 30-day leave and orders to report to Oakland Army Terminal on July 13, 1966, for transportation to Vietnam, Johnson, Mora, and Samas decided to refuse the assignment. To avoid the fate of forced shipment or arrest suffered by earlier military dissidents, they contacted New York’s Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Committee. Supported by the committee, the Fort Hood Three held a June 30, 1966, press conference at New York’s Community Church, indicating their belief that the Vietnam War was immoral, illegal, and unjust. They also filed a lawsuit in a U.S. district court challenging their orders on the grounds that the Vietnam War was illegal and requesting an injunction to prevent the U.S. Army from sending them to Vietnam. Antiwar activists established a Fort Hood Three Defense Committee. As the three made their way to a July 7 meeting with antiwar activists at the New York Community Church, military authorities arrested them for making disloyal statements and placed them in “investigative detention” at Fort Dix, New Jersey, until July 14. On July 11 District Court judge Edward Curran denied their lawsuit, affirming the president’s authority in foreign policy and denying that civilian courts had jurisdiction in such a case. On July 14 Johnson, Mora, and Samas each refused orders to board transportation for Vietnam. They were placed in a maximum security stockade and on August 15 were formally charged with insubordination. Separately court-martialed at Fort Dix in September, all three were convicted. The military court refused to allow the defense to
Four-Party Joint Military Commission argue the war’s illegality. The civilian U.S. Court of Appeals upheld the district court, and on February 6, 1967, the Supreme Court refused to hear the case. Initially Mora received three years in prison, while Johnson and Samas each received five years, but on July 3, 1967, the Army Board of Review reduced Johnson’s and Samas’s sentences to three years. In addition, all suffered forfeiture of pay and upon release received dishonorable discharges. They served most of their sentences at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Following their release, they became active supporters of the antiwar movement. MITCHELL K. HALL See also Antiwar Movement, U.S. References Bannan, John F., and Rosemary S. Bannan. Law, Morality, and Vietnam: The Peace Militants and the Courts. Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1974. Halstead, Fred. Out Now! A Participant’s Account of the American Movement against the Vietnam War. New York: Monad, 1978. Lynd, Alice, ed. We Won’t Go: Personal Accounts of War Objectors. Boston: Beacon, 1968.
Forward Air Controllers Individuals who direct the actions of military aircraft or ground forces from a forward position—either on the ground or in the air—usually during close air support activities. Forward air controllers are the outgrowth of the coordination effected between artillery units and observation aircraft. During World War I the Germans were the first to experiment with ground-support aviation and experimented with techniques for coordination between advancing infantry and attack aircraft. In some instances, primitive cloth signals were laid out to signal aircraft equipped with one-way radios. In World War II both the Allied and Axis powers employed dedicated forward air controllers, both ground-based and occasionally airborne. The Germans used them early on in effective cooperation with their panzer divisions, often placing the controller in a forward tank to oversee the battle and contact aircraft. The Royal Australian Air Force employed the Commonwealth Boomerang (a modified version of the North American Aviation Harvard trainer aircraft, known as the T-6 Texan in its U.S. designation) as a true forward air controller in the New Guinea campaign. The U.S. Army Air Forces created the “Horsefly” system (a possibly pejorative nickname) for the Stinson L-5 liaison aircraft in a forward air control role in Italy. Forward air controllers were especially effective during the Korean War. There the Stinson L-5 and Ryan L-17s were used initially, later supplemented by the T-6s. These operated under the call-sign of “Mosquito.” During the Vietnam War, difficult terrain, heavy jungle vegetation, and innovative Communist tactics made it difficult for
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U.S., Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army), and other allied military forces to easily recognize targets. Toward that end, the U.S. Air Force relied heavily on airborne forward air controllers who flew the Cessna O-1 single engine aircraft, the O-2 push-pull twin engine aircraft, and, during the later years of the war, the OV-10 Bronco. Other services also adopted the technique. The U.S. Marine Corps used the O-1 and the OV-10. The forward air controller became a critical component of U.S. airpower in the Vietnam War for reconnaissance, directing the fire of fighters and fighter-bombers, and even engaging the enemy. The two primary functions of forward air controllers flying in Vietnam were allied visual reconnaissance and air-strike control. Flying alone at low altitudes, often with little or no armament, the vulnerable forward air control aircraft were often at risk, and many were lost. Both the North American F-100 and the McDonnell Douglas F-4 were employed in the fast forward air control role, ranging far behind enemy lines to conduct essential reconnaissance. Forward air controllers worked closely with air and ground commanders and served as vital interfaces between strike aircraft and ground forces. Only forward air controllers were in a position to identify precisely the desired target location in real time and simultaneously warn of friendly ground force positions and then convey that information to the strike aircraft. Forward air controllers were vitally important in rescue operations. Their efforts provided greater air-strike accuracy and effectiveness against Communist forces while also protecting U.S. forces on the ground. TARA K. SIMPSON AND WALTER J. BOYNE See also Airborne Operations; Aircraft, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Aircraft, Bombers; Airpower, Role in War References Lane, John J., Jr. Command and Control and Communications Structures in Southeast Asia. Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 1981. Lavalle, Jack, ed. Air War: Vietnam. Indianapolis: Arno, 1980.
Four-Party Joint Military Commission Created January 27, 1973, by the Paris Peace Accords to monitor the arrangements reached, the Four-Party Joint Military Commission (FPJMC), based in Saigon, consisted of representatives from the United States, the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG, Viet Cong [VC]). Its mission was to establish a cease-fire, supervise the withdrawal of the remaining 23,516 American and 30,449 Free World Military Forces, conduct an exchange of prisoners of war (POWs), and resolve the status of those missing in action (MIA). All of these missions were to be accomplished within 60 days of the signing of the peace accords. On March 29, 1973, the FPJMC was disbanded, with 587 American POWs repatriated and the last of the American/Free World
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Fragging
Members of the Four Party Joint Military Commission delegations meet at Tan Son Nhut Air Base near Saigon on February 2, 1973. The conference was held to finalize details on the release of prisoners held by the four parties (the United States, the Republic of Vietnam, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam). (Department of Defense)
combat forces withdrawn. The only American military personnel remaining in Vietnam were those attached to the Defense Attaché Office in Saigon. Less successful were the efforts to enforce the cease-fire. In its first three weeks more than 3,000 violations of the cease-fire were reported, leaving a total of 17,653 dead on the two sides. More than 200,000 Vietnamese were driven from their homes, 60,000 of them permanently. The MIA issue was not satisfactorily concluded, and this task was turned over to the Four-Power Joint Military Team (FPJMT). The FPJMT had even less success, as the VC and the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army), no longer threatened by the American military presence, refused to cooperate any longer. As a result of the Communist 1975 Spring Offensive, the U.S. delegation to the FPJMT withdrew from Saigon on April 10, 1975. ROBERT G. MANGRUM See also Ho Chi Minh Campaign; HOMECOMING, Operation; Missing in Action, Allied; Missing in Action and Prisoners of War, Communist; Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam References Cao Van Vien. The Final Collapse. Indochina Monographs. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1982.
Schulzinger, Robert D. A Time for War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941–1975. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. Snepp, Frank. Decent Interval: An Insider’s Account of Saigon’s Indecent End. New York: Random House, 1977.
Fragging The term “fragging” is the euphemism introduced during the Vietnam War to describe the intentional causing of friendly casualties from weapons in American hands. This form of homicide gained its name from the use of fragmentation hand grenades (which left no fingerprints) as the weapon of choice. Fragging was directed primarily toward unit leaders, officers, and noncommissioned officers (NCOs). This intentional fratricide was not limited to a single type of weapon; however, it is virtually impossible to determine how many officers and NCOs might have been shot by their own men during engagements with the enemy. Fragging was practically unheard of in the early days of U.S. involvement in ground combat. But leadership declined, and the rapid turnover caused by the one-year rotation policy weakened unit cohesion. Also, the withdrawal of public support led to a questioning of purpose on the battlefield. As discipline declined, incidents of combat refusal (mutiny) and fragging increased.
France, Air Force, 1946–1954 Fragging incidents in combat were attempts to remove leaders perceived to be incompetent and a threat to survival. Most fragging incidents, however, occurred in rear-echelon units and were drug-related. Unit leaders who were perceived as too stringent in their enforcement of discipline or regulations sometimes received warnings via a fragmentation grenade with their name painted on it left on their bunk or a smoke grenade discharged under their bunk. Most understood the message, and intimidation through threat of fragging far exceeded actual incidents. For a time toward the end of American involvement, however, some fraggings took place without any visible provocation or motive. Violence directed toward military superiors was not a phenomenon limited to the Vietnam War, and reliable statistics are far from available for any conflict, including Vietnam. The incidence of fragging took a dramatic upswing in 1969, coincident with the initiation of the policy of Vietnamization, and increased as a percentage of troop strength each year until final withdrawal. ARTHUR T. FRAME See also Attrition; Casualties; Drugs and Drug Use; Fratricide; Hand Grenades References Appi, Christian G. Working Class War: American Combat Soldiers in Vietnam. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993. Neel, Spurgeon. Medical Support of the U.S. Army in Vietnam, 1965– 1972. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1973. Office of Information Management and Statistics. Data on Vietnam Era Veterans. Washington, DC: Veterans Administration, 1983.
France, Air Force, 1946–1954 The French Air Force during the Indochina War was employed primarily as a ground-support force. The air force there was reconstituted in 1946 from personnel and aircraft already in Indochina. The latter were a mixture of captured Japanese aircraft as well as British Spitfire and American-made Bell P-63A Kingcobra fighters, German trimotor Junkers JU-52, and American Douglas C-47 Skytrain (“Gooneybird”) transports. The French built up their air assets as quickly as resources were available. In 1947 additional C-47s and British Mosquito fighterbombers arrived from Europe. The fragile plywood Mosquito proved unsuitable for Indochina’s climate, however, and was replaced with the American-made Douglas B-26 Invader light bomber, which the United States began to supply to the French in Vietnam. Later in the war Washington sent Grumman F6F Hellcat and F8F Bearcat fighters as well as Fairchild C-119 Flying Boxcar transports. The French also purchased aircraft from a variety of sources, such as the Dutchmanufactured Fokker transport. France also introduced its own Bretagne transports, twin-engine planes equipped with auxiliary wing-tip jet engines for short-terrain takeoff assistance. The French Air Force also experimented with helicopters (American-made Sikorsky H-51s) for medical evacuation and observation.
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The French Air Force command was organized into four regional headquarters to support operations throughout Vietnam. Aircraft performed traditional reconnaissance, ground-support bombing and strafing, and airlift activities. Initially aircraft were dispatched in pairs from various air bases to provide limited air support to French units under siege in isolated locations. In 1950 French commander in Indochina General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny reorganized the air force and changed its doctrinal role. French air doctrine now called for increased massed tactical strikes and strategic objectives working in conjunction with the French Army rather than as subordinate to it. From 1950 until the end of the conflict, French fighter-bombers and light bombers flew numerous close air support missions, dropping napalm in support of ground units. French bombers attempted strategic bombing of Viet Minh targets whenever they were identified; however, the French bomber force played only a small role in the war. As the French began to place more reliance on close air support, the Viet Minh began to adopt tactics and acquire antiaircraft weapons that, as in the case of the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, largely negated their opponent’s air superiority. Throughout the conflict, the French suffered a chronic shortage of transport aircraft. Transports, crucial to airborne and logistical missions, were always in short supply. They required longer runways and could not easily take off and land on improvised jungle air strips. The shortage of transports proved to be a factor in the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. The French did not possess sufficient helicopters or have experience in what would later be termed airmobile warfare to conduct effective helicopter operations. Although aircrews and ground-support personnel of the French Air Force attempted to provide the French Army with a capability to win the Indochina War, shortages of equipment, maintenance problems, imperfect facilities, and the considerable distances involved as well as a lack of effective doctrine doomed that effort to failure, despite the bravery of the aircrews and ground-support personnel. JULIUS A. MENZOFF See also Aircraft, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam; France, Army, 1946–1954; Indochina War; Order of Battle Dispute References Beckett, Brian. The Illustrated History of the Viet Nam War. New York: Gallery Books, 1985. Bishop, Chris, and Ian Drury, eds. Combat Guns: An Illustrated Encyclopedia of 20th Century Firearms. Secaucus, NJ: Chartwell Books, 1987. Bonds, Ray, ed. The Vietnam War: The Illustrated History of the Conflict in Southeast Asia. New York: Salamander, 1999. Christienne, Charles, and Pierre Lissarague. A History of French Military Aviation. Translated by Francis Klanka. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Press, 1986. Fall, Bernard B. Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu. New York: Lippincott, 1966.
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Fall, Bernard B. Street without Joy: The French Debacle in Indochina. Rev. ed. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1994. Spector, Ronald H. Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941–1960. United States Army in Vietnam Series. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1983.
France, Army, 1946–1954 In 1940 French Army forces in Indochina numbered 50,000 men, but 38,000 of these were native troops of questionable loyalty. The heart of the French military presence was the 5,000-man 5th Foreign Legion Regiment. Beginning that September, the Japanese sent troops into Indochina. The Japanese left the French authorities in charge, governing through them. With the end of the war approaching and aware that the French were planning a coup against them, the Japanese moved first and decisively. On March 9, 1945, they arrested the French troops in their barracks and placed them in prison camps. Few French escaped and were able to make their way to southern China and safety. With the end of the war, the government in Paris, eager to reestablish its control over its richest colony, ordered the creation of the Far East Expeditionary Force for service in Indochina. The Potsdam Conference in July 1945 called for British troops to disarm Japanese forces in Indochina south of the 16th Parallel; Chinese troops would have a similar responsibility north of that line. France, recovering from the ravages of defeat and German occupation in World War II, would assume control as soon as a colonial administration could be reconstituted. On October 5, 1945, General Jacques-Philippe Leclerc arrived in Saigon. The French also sent out 25,000 reinforcements. French authority was first established in southern Vietnam, where the British cooperated with the French and released the French troops who had been imprisoned by the Japanese. On October 16 after negotiations with the Vietnamese nationalists, the Viet Minh, failed, Leclerc, supported by British and rearmed Japanese soldiers, attacked the Viet Minh and drove them from Saigon. The French then retook the major urban centers of Indochina and sought to reestablish their colonial rule. The chief instrument of that effort was the French Army. French forces in Indochina were composed of Europeans, native peoples of French Indochina, men from France’s colonies in North African and sub-Saharan Africa, and the French Foreign Legion, which included a great many non-French Europeans. After 1948 the French began to raise a colonial army from the indigenous peoples of Vietnam and supplemented this force with troops from other colonial possessions and metropolitan France. French Union Forces, so-named because they were formed from all French territories, were primarily a professional force that served under the direction of the colonial administrator, known as the high commissioner (formerly the governor-general). The commander in chief of the expeditionary force was the military
adviser to the high commissioner, who was responsible to the government in Paris. In March 1949 in an effort to garner support from the Vietnamese people and from the international community, Paris established the State of Vietnam, with Emperor Bao Dai as chief of state. Unfortunately, for the French military effort, in Indochina, however, that did not translate into real independence of action for the State of Vietnam. France continued to run the State of Vietnam’s major affairs to the end. France’s efforts in Indochina suffered from a rapid changeover of military commanders and the lack of a cohesive aggressive strategy. Between 1948 and 1954 French forces in Indochina had eight different commanders: generals Jacques-Philippe Leclerc, Jean-Étienne Valluy, Roger Blaizot, Marcel Carpentier, Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, Raoul Salan, Henri Navarre, and Paul Henri Romuald Ély. This frequent change at the top undoubtedly hurt the overall efficiency and morale of the expeditionary force. Of the French commanders, only de Lattre seemed to be able to infuse a fighting spirit and a successful cohesive military policy. He presented a tough no-nonsense approach to the war, remarking that whatever else, his men would know they had been commanded. De Lattre was unique in that he also held political power as high commissioner. The conventional French Army in Vietnam consisted of infantry, armor, artillery, airborne, and support forces. Major troop concentrations were based throughout Vietnam fairly close to regional urban centers. As the war progressed, to expand their presence throughout the country the French made the battalion rather than the regiment the standard garrison unit. These battalions were then configured into mobile battle groups to respond to Viet Minh attacks throughout the country. At the same time that the French were at war in Indochina, the French Army was being rebuilt, combining Free French and Vichy units into a cohesive fighting machine to defend France and its colonial possessions. The division was the primary unit of organization in the European or metropolitan French Army. The division was built around the regiment, which had been the central military formation in European armies. A typical French infantry division consisted of headquarters and support units, such as antitank, signals, and medical units. The heart of the division was its three infantry regiments of approximately 3,100 officers and soldiers each. Artillery support for the division was provided by two artillery regiments of two to three battalions each, with 75-millimeter (mm) or 105-mm howitzers. The division artillery was enhanced by a battalion of 155-mm howitzers. Other than the initial deployment of a division-sized force with Leclerc in 1945, the French Army reinforced its colonial forces with battalions rather than regiments. French armor was designated as cavalry and included all armored fighting vehicles, such as armored cars. The armor battalion, or cavalry squadron, contained approximately 17 tanks, and an infantry division had one cavalry regiment of nearly 60 tanks.
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Two French soldiers take prisoner a Viet Minh youth with a communist flag in his possession during the Indochina War (1946–1954). (National Archives)
French infantry weapons constituted a wide variety of small arms. The 7.5-mm MAS 36 (Manufacture d’Armes de Saint-Etienne) rifle was the standard-issue small arm. Originally adopted by the French government in 1932, the MAS 36 was a bolt-action 8-pound weapon equipped with a 5-round box magazine. The MAS 36 was the standard French rifle until the 1956 adoption of the semiautomatic MAS 49. Jungle warfare called for weapons capable of delivering high volumes of fire in rather contained areas. For this reason the submachine gun was very popular, and the French 9-mm MAT 49 was an excellent weapon. Weighing 9 pounds with a 20- or 32-round magazine, it was issued in large quantities to the French Union Forces. The MAT 49 was augmented by the British Sten gun. This 9-mm weapon weighed 8 pounds and had an unusual sidemounted 32-round box magazine. As U.S. military aid began to reach Indochina, .30-caliber M-1 and M-2 carbines were distributed in large numbers to French units. The carbine was popular because
it was a magazine-fed (20 or 30 rounds) lightweight (5.2 pounds) weapon with the range and accuracy of a rifle but in its automatic version could produce the volume of fire of a submachine gun. Light automatic weapons used by the expeditionary force were the French Mitrailleuse 1931 7.5-mm light machine gun (26 pounds) or the .303-caliber British Bren gun (22 pounds). These weapons were important because they provided sustained firepower at the small-unit level. Many engagements during the Indochina War took place between forces of 20 men or less. The French used the American .30-caliber light and M-2 .50-caliber heavy Browning machine guns in a number of different roles, such as in fixed defensive positions or mounted on vehicles. French forces used a variety of pistols, but the American M-1911A1 .45-caliber Colt was the official-issue handgun. Because handguns proliferated throughout Southeast Asia, most known types of pistols were in evidence during the Indochina War.
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French Expeditionary Force in Indochina, 1953 French Army Foreign Legion North African troops Allied Vietnamese troops French Air Force French Navy Total
54,000 20,000 30,000 70,000 10,000 5,000 189,000
The expeditionary force’s primary armor was the American M-26 Chaffee light tank, which saw considerable service in Indochina. The French also used the U.S. 81-mm and 4.2-inch mortars. Field artillery weapons were the American-made 105-mm and 155mm howitzers. French artillery battalions were divided and employed as separate batteries supporting isolated garrisons. Artillery batteries were also included as part of French mobile battle groups. On occasion, French artillery was outgunned by the Viet Minh. At Dien Bien Phu, for example, the French deployed 24 105-mm guns and 4 155-mm howitzers. They also had 24 heavy mortars. The Viet Minh, on the other hand, had 24 105-mm howitzers, 25 75-mm howitzers, and 20 120-mm mortars. Later in the siege, they added 12 Soviet-made Katyusha multiple rocket launchers. The Viet Minh also had 36 37-mm antiaircraft guns. The Viet Minh deployed all of these on the high ground surrounding the French garrison and virtually wiped out the French guns. The initial French strategy was to establish a series of forts garrisoned by small forces that would link the major population centers. These forts, or postes, stretched throughout Vietnam, linked by the major highways (Routes Coloniales [RCs]). French dependence upon the road networks led to disaster, however, as conventional mechanized forces were vulnerable to the Viet Minh, who were able to cut highways at will and destroy French convoys as they attempted to resupply and reinforce beleaguered outposts. French airborne forces were unable to offset this, as the French lacked sufficient air transport to employ them in a rapid response role. Conventional airborne doctrine proved ineffective in smallunit actions because parachute troops were widely scattered upon landing; by the time they had consolidated, generally the Viet Minh had already inflicted substantial losses upon their targets and vanished into the jungles. Despite the difficulties inherent in airborne operations with inadequate airlift capacity and general air support, the French placed increasing reliance upon parachute troops, raising a number of colonial parachute battalions. Following the reestablishment of their control of the major cities, the French mounted several operations into Viet Minh strongholds in northern Vietnam in an effort to capture its leadership and destroy the Viet Minh logistical base. These efforts were largely unsuccessful, for the French lacked sufficient manpower to clear and hold large swaths of territory apart from the Red River Delta. During the period 1947–1950 the Viet Minh carried out a concerted offensive to drive the French from their Red River stronghold. In the September 1950 Battle of Dong Khe, the
Viet Minh overwhelmed the French garrison there and forced a general French retreat. The Viet Minh cut the primary road, RC 4, and massacred French relief convoys. The French effort to maintain their outposts was a failure, and by the end of 1950 the Viet Minh controlled most of northern Vietnam, while the French controlled only the cities. To restore French fortunes, Paris sent out the country’s most illustrious army general, Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, to command in Indochina. General de Lattre designed a new doctrine to effectively use French forces in a conventional role. He embarked upon the setpiece battle and established a fortified base, offering Viet Minh commander General Vo Nguyen Giap an irresistible target and an opportunity to destroy the French Army. In the January 14–15, 1951, Battle of Vinh Yen, French massed conventional forces, well supported by airpower, decisively defeated the Viet Minh. French artillery fire and aircraft-dropped napalm turned the tide in favor of the French. This victory, along with that at Mao Khe in the Mekong Delta (June 1951), restored French tactical fortunes and morale. De Lattre’s strategic enclave policy was continued by his successors, generals Raoul Salan and Henri Navarre. This strategy culminated in the Battle of Dien Bien Phu (March 13–May 8, 1954). The Viet Minh was receiving military aid from Communist China, and Giap had built a professional and competent fighting machine, well equipped with modern weapons, that effectively used terrain to negate French airpower. Giap’s victory at Dien Bien Phu was a testament to his battle planning and the extraordinary endurance of Viet Minh soldiers. French mismanagement and command failures also contributed to the defeat. During the Indochina War the French also experimented with new tactics to combat the Viet Minh’s guerrilla warfare. The French raised several commando brigades for raids and other light infantry operations. These forces were multinational and reflected the composition of French Union Forces troops. Perhaps the most effective of the French special forces were the Groupement de commandos mixtes aéroportés (GCMA). The GCMA was similar to U.S. Special Forces in that the GCMA was designed for long-range penetration missions into Viet Minh territory. GCMA missions included intelligence gathering and training, equipping, and leading indigenous peoples in a counterguerrilla campaign against the Viet Minh. GCMA troops were to enter Communist-controlled areas, live in the jungle, and receive supplies by air while carrying out their mission of attacking the Viet Minh where they lived. GCMA troops faced numerous difficulties. The teams lacked sufficient radio communications, and shortages of air support left them virtually isolated in the jungle. The French high command failed to plan for extractions or reinforcements, and the Viet Minh gradually eliminated the GCMA teams. The Communists reserved a special enmity for these French soldiers, few of whom survived the conflict. Many GCMA missions during the Indochina War are still classified by the French government, and after the fall of Dien Bien Phu, some GCMA teams in the field were simply abandoned in the French withdrawal.
France, Navy, 1946–1954 In summary, the French Army attempted to fight an unconventional war with conventional strategy and tactics. The French never convinced the great number of Vietnamese that colonialism was better than independence. The Viet Minh wisely downplayed communism and therefore developed support not only from Vietnamese nationalists but also from many French. Despite its stated determination to hold on to Indochina, the French government never made the commitment in manpower necessary for France to have a chance to win. The war was essentially fought by the professional officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) who led the French Expeditionary Corps. The French government never allowed draftees to be sent to Indochina. The small number of effectives available to French commanders left them very few options as far as strategy was concerned. Shortages of NCOs, a lack of trained intelligence officers and interpreters, and little interest in or knowledge of the mechanics of pacification all hampered the French military effort. As the war dragged on, popular support for the French military effort in Indochina eroded in metropolitan France. Yet the French Expeditionary Force fought well in Indochina. The French experimented with helicopter warfare, counterinsurgency warfare techniques, and psychological warfare (concerted efforts to mix political persuasion with military objectives to convince the Vietnamese people of the rightness of France’s cause). Despite the French Army’s best efforts, after the disaster at Dien Bien Phu the French government negotiated at Geneva an end to the war. French operational doctrine and air employment were too little studied by the United States, which endeavored to improve on these during the subsequent Vietnam War. JULIUS A. MENZOFF See also Aircraft, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Artillery, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Carpentier, Marcel; Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; French Foreign Legion in Indochina; Indochina War; Lattre de Tassigny, Jean de; Leclerc, Jacques-Philippe; Navarre, Henri Eugène; Order of Battle Dispute; Salan, Raoul Albin Louis; Viet Minh; Vo Nguyen Giap References Beckett, Brian. The Illustrated History of the Viet Nam War. New York: Gallery Books, 1985. Bishop, Chris, and Ian Drury, eds. Combat Guns: An Illustrated Encyclopedia of 20th Century Firearms. Secaucus, NJ: Chartwell Books, 1987. Bonds, Ray, ed. The Vietnam War: The Illustrated History of the Conflict in Southeast Asia. New York: Salamander, 1999. Christienne, Charles, and Pierre Lissarague. A History of French Military Aviation. Translated by Francis Klanka. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Press, 1986. Fall, Bernard B. Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu. New York: Lippincott, 1966. Fall, Bernard B. Street without Joy: The French Debacle in Indochina. Rev. ed. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1994. Spector, Ronald H. Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941–1960. United States Army in Vietnam Series. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1983.
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France, Navy, 1946–1954 In August 1945 when the French government decided to send an Expeditionary Corps to Indochina, it also dispatched air and naval units. The naval assets would be a squadron already in the Far East to support the planned invasion of Japan. Commanded by Admiral Philippe Auboyneau, the squadron was centered on the battleship Richelieu, supported by the cruisers Gloire and Suffren, two destroyers, and the old aircraft carrier Bearn, in service since the 1920s and now used as an aircraft transport vessel. Additional naval assets had to be dispatched from France. These were delayed by the refusal of the United States to provide logistical support, and France’s difficult postwar economic situation constrained the size and extent of its naval forces in the Indochina War. In 1945 French Indochina depended heavily upon its river and coastal waters for the movement of people and commerce. The bulk of the region’s population lived either on the rivers or the coast, and most roads were small, primitive, and usable only during the dry season. Controlling those waters thus became critical to both sides during the Indochina War. Unfortunately for the French effort, only the authorities in the south realized that fact, and it was there, with British support, that the French first gained control of the rivers and coastal seas. The French never achieved the same level of naval dominance in the north, where the war was lost. The French Navy began operations in the Indochina War with little in the way of assets conducive to riverine warfare: a handful of converted civilian barges and personnel only recently released from Japanese prisoner of war (POW) camps. Operating with only limited logistics and personnel support, those early units gained control of the lower Mekong Delta and eventually opened the river as far as Phnom Penh. The arrival of reinforcements in late 1945, which included former British landing craft, enabled the navy to conduct amphibious raids, interdict Viet Minh coastal traffic, and penetrate the Red River. Outposts, forts, and cities within the navy’s reach held out against the seemingly invincible Viet Minh forces, even after Communist Chinese forces began to support their cause. Unfortunately for France, however, economic devastation at home limited the resources available to support a land war in Asia. Given the navy’s low priority in the defense budget and lack of American aid to support a war for recolonization, reduction in naval forces was inevitable. In 1950 the Richelieu and all but one cruiser were withdrawn to be decommissioned. Only a single cruiser and a handful of destroyers and sloops remained to carry the coastal war to the enemy, while riverine forces operated inland almost unsupported. This naval downscaling could not have come at a worse time. From 1950 the Viet Minh contested the rivers. The reduced French naval presence was unable to prevent a steady increase in the level of Viet Minh coastal infiltration. Supported by only a handful of seaplanes and not equipped with radar, French coastal units attempted random patrols, then resorted to establishing ambush sites in likely staging areas, and finally turned to coastal sweeps.
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The Indochina War saw the rebirth of French naval aviation. In 1946 the French had only the aircraft transport vessel Bearn. Two modern carriers under construction in 1939 had been destroyed in the war. The only modern carrier available was the Arromanches, which the British transferred in August 1946. In 1951 the United States supplied the light fleet carrier Langley, renamed the Lafayette, and in 1953 its sister ship the Belleau Wood, renamed the Bois Belleau. The effectiveness of the French air arm declined even with the deployment of two French aircraft carriers to the theater. French naval air assets were increasingly committed to supporting fighting ashore, and few resources were left for coastal surveillance. French riverine forces meanwhile enjoyed two more years of success before the Viet Minh’s overall supremacy on land began to be evident. Much of the French success in riverine warfare can be credited to the innovative tactics and leadership of France’s first naval chief in Indochina, Commander François Jaubert, head of the Far East Naval Brigade. He realized the importance of the rivers, and in 1945 he formed the first combined naval-land river units and employed them around Saigon. Jaubert’s objective was to regain control of the critical provincial cities and towns dominating the Mekong and Bassac rivers. His first operation, MOUSSAC (October 1945), used British landing craft and improvised French river gunboats to recapture the provincial capitals of My Tho and Can Tho. Army units, which were to have participated, arrived only after the two cities had been taken. By December, Jaubert had expanded his force by 14 LCAs (landing craft, assault) and 6 LCVPs (landing craft, vehicle and personnel) brought in by the Bearn from Singapore. He also had two companies of naval infantry, supported by landing parties from the Richelieu and the Bearn. His force expanded again when the British withdrew from Saigon in December and transferred their landing craft to the French. One of the French Navy’s first steps in 1946 was to expand its operations into the north. The most important of these was Operation BENTRE, in which 21,700 French troops were landed just outside Hanoi after a brief firefight with Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist) Chinese forces holding the city. The Nationalist Chinese were not convinced to withdraw until October. Soon afterward, the uneasy truce between the French and Ho Chi Minh in the north gave way to open fighting. A French naval bombardment of Haiphong helped to drive Viet Minh forces out of that key coastal city, but the resulting civilian casualties led to much local resentment against the French. French amphibious operations brought coastal towns and the main channel town of Nam Dinh under French control, and later operations opened the Red and Clear rivers to French use, but a lack of resources prevented the French from retaining a continuous presence on those rivers. As 1946 wore on, Jaubert noted that his units were best employed when they operated with army units familiar with naval and riverine operations. That realization led in January 1947 to the first permanent riverine organizations in Indochina. Designated Dinassauts, these units consisted of a variable number of armored and unarmored landing craft, river monitors, gunboats, and approxi-
mately one battalion of either naval or light (army) infantry. Total unit strength was approximately 1,200 men. Two formal Dinassauts were established, one each north and south. At various times in the war, other ad hoc Dinassauts would be formed from local forces. The combined land-naval riverine force was the basis for all French riverine operations from 1947 to the end of the war. The basic patrol craft operating in advance of these units was the 82-foot vedette patrouille, an unarmored motor launch equipped with two 20-millimeter (mm) cannon, two .50-caliber machine guns, a light mortar, and a .30-caliber machine gun. The troops themselves were transported in unarmored landing craft supported by armored landing craft mounting light cannon and heavy machine guns. The French also converted some craft by adding tank turrets and such weapons as the 40-mm Bofors and 20-mm Oerlikon antiaircraft guns. French naval efforts in Indochina reached their peak in 1951 following the introduction of U.S. assets, including landing craft, patrol boats, and carrier aircraft. This U.S. equipment and financial support enabled the French to form four more Dinassauts and employ them against Viet Minh offensives along the Red and Clear rivers. The French also increased surveillance along the coast and intercepted more than 1,500 Viet Minh junks and other transports. For the first time in the war, the Red River and its tributaries were firmly under French control. Facing a logistical shortfall, the Viet Minh withdrew into the mountains and shifted their supply routes to the slower but now safer land lines from China. The French Navy provided critical support to French Army land offensives in late 1951, providing sea-based air support, transporting supplies and units upriver, and conducting amphibious raids against suspected Viet Minh coastal strong points. French casualties mounted on the river routes as convoys faced increasingly more powerful and numerous ambushes as the convoys worked their way north and as enemy strength grew along the waterways. By March 1952 river convoy escort had become the French Navy’s primary mission in the north. River and coastal patrol (and thereby control) remained the primary mission only in the south. The lack of a coordinated French strategy after 1950, a dearth of resources, the reluctance to transfer political control to Vietnamese officials, and a declining will to pursue the war all led to the French defeat. Nothing illustrates this more than the mounting losses sustained by French riverine units as they were increasingly committed to escorting convoys on the Red and Black rivers after 1952. Lacking the resources to conduct both patrol and escort missions, the French essentially surrendered the coastal waters of the north to the Viet Minh, which used them to great effect from mid-1952 until the war’s end. The French Navy’s efforts in Indochina were exemplary and yet ultimately unsuccessful. Growing from a force of 1,200 former POWs to nearly 12,000 men, it successfully transported and supported almost 200,000 troops in-theater. The navy provided strategic and tactical mobility to French forces on the ground prior to
France and Vietnam, 1954–Present the advent of airmobile warfare. Its efforts could never reverse the outcome of the ground war, however. CARL OTIS SCHUSTER See also Dinassauts; French Indochina, 1860s–1946; Geography of Indochina and Vietnam; Indochina War; Order of Battle Dispute; Riverine Warfare References Jenkins, E. F. A History of the French Navy: From Its Beginnings to the Present Day. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1973. Kilian, Robert. History and Memories: Naval Infantryman in Indochina. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1948. Koburger, Charles W., Jr. The French Navy in Indochina. New York: Praeger, 1991. McClintock, Robert. “The River War in Indochina.” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (December 1954): 1303–1311.
France and Vietnam, 1954–Present During the Geneva Conference of 1954 the French government attempted to disengage from the Indochina War, seeking a quick withdrawal from what had become a political quagmire. The cease-fire agreement implied continued French responsibility for the administration in southern Vietnam, but a French conference declaration recognized the independence of Vietnam without specifying the government, Ho Chi Minh’s Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) or Bao Dai’s State of Vietnam. On June 4, 1954, Paris formally granted full independence to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). During Franco-American talks in Washington in September 1954, the French grudgingly reaffirmed official support for State of Vietnam premier Ngo Dinh Diem. Negotiations on December 13, 1954, between U.S. general J. Lawton Collins and French general Paul Ély produced an agreement to officially transfer responsibility for the training and financing of Vietnamese troops from France to the United States. This agreement went into effect on February 12, 1955. Paris then gave formal notice of its withdrawal from Vietnam on April 3, 1956. On April 29, 1963, Paris officially informed Laotian prince Souvanna Phouma of its intention to withdraw immediately from its Seno base in Laos, authorized under terms of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Accords. The French departure gave the United States responsibility for Western military support of the Laotian government, removed the last elements of French military presence in Laos and Vietnam, and permitted French president Charles de Gaulle to play a more independent role in trying to resolve the Vietnam quagmire. On August 29, 1963, in the first of many such pronouncements, de Gaulle indicated French support for eventual neutralization of South Vietnam. In the preceding months it had been asserted that French ambassador to Saigon Roger Lalouette was endeavoring to assist Ngo Dinh Diem and Ho Chi Minh in negotiating a purely Vietnamese solution of the conflict. Following this attempt Lalou-
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ette was recalled to Paris, supposedly for exceeding his official capacity. Lalouette’s contacts may have been the basis for de Gaulle’s statement of August 29. The French president was also undoubtedly influenced by his desire to improve French relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In early January 1964 French minister of defense Pierre Messmer traveled to Phnom Penh and promised the Cambodian government some military equipment, reestablishing a military relationship between the two countries. Washington became concerned when on January 27, 1964, Paris announced that France was opening full diplomatic relations with Beijing. All future French efforts at neutralizing South Vietnam were based on the triangular relationship among Paris, Phnom Penh, and Beijing. In June 1967 de Gaulle informed British prime minister Harold Wilson that Paris had told the United States repeatedly that it should leave Vietnam but that Washington ignored the advice. The longer the United States stayed in Vietnam, he said, the greater the risk of a wider war. Partly for this reason, France had left the military command apparatus of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). U.S. president Lyndon B. Johnson thoroughly resented what he regarded as meddling French diplomacy, and de Gaulle’s statements concerning neutralization were taken as unwanted intrusions. This did not bother the French leader, who continued to insist on the immediate withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam. Relations between the United States and France became more cordial in 1969 with the beginning of Richard M. Nixon’s presidency. De Gaulle and Nixon got along well with each other, and this personal rapport transferred smoothly to Georges Pompidou when he became president of France in June 1969. These improved relations spilled over into France’s attitude toward American involvement in Vietnam. Pompidou and de Gaulle both believed that Nixon intended to withdraw from Vietnam and took U.S. de-escalation efforts as a sign of that. This belief kept France from speaking out against American actions such as the 1970 Cambodian Incursion, which took place during the peace negotiations in Paris. Even when the U.S. bombing of Hanoi in 1972 killed the French delegate general to North Vietnam, Paris issued only routine protests. The French explained this in terms of their responsibility as hosts to the peace talks. Although the government attempted to remain neutral, it could not prevent demonstrations against the United States from taking place in Paris and throughout France. Regardless of these protests, the French government was particularly proud of its ability to keep the first two years of the Henry Kissinger–Le Duc Tho talks secret. Economic and cultural ties between France and Vietnam ran deep after the war’s conclusion. France became the third-largest foreign investor (after Taiwan and Hong Kong) in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), and French aid to Vietnam ran to more than $30 million in 1989. France normalized relations with
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Thousands of protesters march from the Place de la République to the Bastille in Paris, France, on May 1, 1968. The demonstrators carry banners demanding higher wages and peace in Vietnam. (AP/Wide World Photos)
the SRV in 1989 after Hanoi withdrew its troops from Cambodia. In February 1993 French president François Mitterrand led a 200-member delegation to the SRV, the first Western leader to visit Vietnam since 1975. Mitterrand promised to increase French aid to the SRV if the latter would improve human rights. Since the late 1990s, French political and economic exchanges with the SRV have steadily grown, and those connections were further solidified by the normalization of relations between the United States and the SRV during the late 1990s. MICHAEL R. NICHOLS
Sullivan, Marianna P. France’s Vietnam Policy: A Study in FrenchAmerican Relations. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1978. Wilson, Harold K. A Personal Record: The Labour Government, 1964–1970. Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1971.
See also Bao Dai; Cambodia; Cambodian Incursion; Collins, Joseph Lawton; De Gaulle, Charles; Ély, Paul Henri Romuald; Geneva Conference and Geneva Accords of 1954; Ho Chi Minh; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kissinger, Henry Alfred; Laos; Le Duc Tho; Ngo Dinh Diem; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Paris Negotiations; Paris Peace Accords; Sainteny, Jean; Souvanna Phouma
The last in a series of U.S. Army screening operations in 1967 along the Cambodian border of Pleiku Province. Operation FRANCIS MARION was named after American Revolutionary War general Francis Marion, known as the “Swamp Fox,” who gained renown for punishing and eluding British forces in the swamps, bayous, and forests of South Carolina; many consider him one of the fathers of modern guerrilla warfare. Operation FRANCIS MARION was intended to prevent the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) 1st Division from pushing into the Central Highlands.
References Smith, R. B. An International History of the Vietnam War. 3 vols. New York: St. Martin’s, 1983–1991.
FRANCIS MARION,
Operation
Start Date: April 5, 1967 End Date: October 12, 1967
Franco-Thai War Conducted by the 1st and 2nd brigades of the 4th Infantry Division from April 5 to October 12, 1967, FRANCIS MARION followed Operation SAM HOUSTON (January–April 1967). The 1st Brigade patrolled the area north from Duc Co to the Plei D’Jereng Special Forces camp, while the 2nd Brigade worked south toward the Ia Drang Valley. By the end of Operation FRANCIS MARION, there had been eight major military engagements. On April 30 after ambushing a PAVN patrol north of Duc Co and pursuing stragglers into a tree line, Company A, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 8th Infantry (2-8 Infantry), came under withering machine-gun fire from a battalion of the PAVN 95B Regiment. After a harrowing night, U.S. artillery, air strikes, and tanks allowed Company A’s M113s to push through the tree line into a large bunker complex and inflict heavy casualties on PAVN troops surprised by the firepower of 90-millimeter tank rounds. The tables were turned on May 18 when a battalion of the PAVN 32nd Regiment trapped a platoon of Company B, 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry (1-18 Infantry). Its remaining platoons were unable to break through, and the company lost 21 killed, 31 wounded, and 1 missing. Two days later the 1-18 Infantry repulsed a night attack on its hilltop positions by the same PAVN unit, at heavy cost. On May 22 as the 3rd Battalion, 12th Infantry (3-12 Infantry), moved to link up with the 2-8 Infantry near Duc Co, they were caught in a mortar barrage and attacked by the PAVN 66th Regiment. The PAVN troops broke contact only after being battered by artillery and air strikes. On July 12 two companies of the 3-12 Infantry again fought the PAVN 66th Regiment, this time in the hills south of Duc Co. On July 23 in the same area, a battalion of the PAVN 32nd Regiment nearly destroyed a platoon that had become separated from a company of the 3rd Battalion, 8th Infantry (3-8 Infantry). The remaining platoons established a defensive line and managed to repulse two attacks. Slow to retreat, PAVN troops were pulverized by air strikes. Contact with PAVN units in western Pleiku Province diminished by the early autumn, and it became evident that the principal thrust was to be farther north in Kontum Province, where Operation GREELEY was under way. On October 12, 4th Division commander Major General William R. Peers consolidated FRANCIS MARION with GREELEY to create Operation MACARTHUR, which became the context for the pivotal struggle of the Central Highlands campaign, the Battle of Dak To. In 191 days FRANCIS MARION accounted for 1,203 known PAVN dead, but the operation failed to prevent significant PAVN units from moving into the Central Highlands. JOHN D. ROOT See also Armored Warfare; Dak To, Battle of; GREELEY, Operation; Mortars, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Peers, William R.; Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, Army
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References Krepinevich, Andrew F., Jr. The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. Stanton, Shelby L. The Rise and Fall of an American Army: The U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985.
Franco-Thai War Start Date: November 1940 End Date: January 1941 Undeclared war between Vichy France and Thailand during November 1940–January 1941. The Thais began the war to regain the three rich rice-growing provinces of Battambang, Siem Reap (Siemreab), and Sisophon that it had annexed in 1862 from Cambodia but that the French had forced them to restore to Cambodia in 1907. Thailand also claimed territory in Laos, the return of which the French had secured in 1904. Although in early June 1940 Thailand concluded nonaggression pacts with France and Britain, after the defeat of France by Germany the Thais lost interest in ratifying them. Instead, the pro-Japanese military government of Marshal Pibul Songgram (which had renamed the country Thailand, formerly Siam) sought to capitalize on France’s weakness. In 1939 the Thai Army was comprised of some 26,500 soldiers. With reservists, in 1940 it numbered nearly 50,000 men. The Thai Air Force had about 270 planes, 150 of them combat types mostly of U.S. manufacture. The 10,000-sailor Thai Navy had 24 obsolete land-based aircraft, but Japan delivered 93 planes in December 1940. Thai naval vessels consisted of royal yachts, a British-built World War I destroyer, two British-built small gunboats, and eight motor torpedo boats. Italy also supplied nine small torpedo boats, two minesweepers, and nine minelayers. Two light cruisers under construction in Italy for the Thais were not yet available (they were, in fact, sequestered by Italy in 1941). In addition, Japan delivered two armored coast-defense AA vessels, four small submarines, two escort/training ships, and three small torpedo boats. The Thai Navy also had a number of auxiliary vessels. Despite its relatively large number of vessels, the Thai Navy suffered from serious shortcomings. Older vessels were of limited fighting value, the modern Italian torpedo boats were too flimsy for service in rough seas, and the Japanese submarines could not dive. Also, most of the Thai sailors were poorly trained. French Army forces in Indochina numbered 50,000 men, but 38,000 of these were native troops of questionable loyalty. The heart of the French military presence was the 5,000-man 5th Foreign Legion Regiment. The French possessed 30 World War I–vintage tanks, and most of their artillery was also outdated; they were also short of artillery ammunition. The French Air Force had fewer than 100 planes. The French Navy in Indochinese waters consisted of the light cruiser La Motte-Picquet, two gunboats, two sloops, two auxiliary patrol craft, and several noncombatants. Most French
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warships were old and poorly armed and suffered from mechanical problems. The French in Indochina appeared vulnerable militarily and diplomatically. Not only had the Germans defeated France in Europe, but there was military pressure from Japan. In September 1940 Japanese troops invaded Tonkin, killed 800 French troops, and secured occupation concessions and airfields. For all these reasons, Bangkok believed that there was no better time than the present to reassert its claims. Beginning in mid-November 1940, the Thais sent military units across the Mekong River into eastern Cambodia. These incursions led to skirmishes with the French, who were temporarily sidetracked by the November 23 Indochinese Communist Party uprising in Cochin China. The French managed to crush this uprising in the first week of December, however. French high commissioner Admiral Jean Decoux decided to answer the Thai attacks with offensives on land and sea. The land offensive began on January 16, 1941, when a mixed French brigade attacked Thai positions at Yang Dom Koum. This effort failed for lack of manpower and an insufficient number of heavy weapons. The Thais, who had planned an attack for the same day, then counterattacked. Their offensive, supported by tanks, was beaten back by Legionnaires with grenades. Although Bangkok claimed a major victory, both sides then withdrew from the immediate area. Simultaneously, there was fighting at sea. The French Navy planned to attack the Thai Navy detachment at Koh Chang and the principal Thai Navy base at Sattahib. The initial strike was to be carried out by virtually the entire French flotilla: one cruiser, two gunboats, and two sloops. On January 16 this force sailed for the Gulf of Siam to attack Koh Chang, which guarded the passage to Sattahib. The French warships surprised the Thais early on the morning of January 17. In the ensuing 90-minute action, the French sank two Thai torpedo boats and a coast-defense vessel and mortally damaged another coast-defense ship. The French task force escaped with no direct hits or losses and returned to Saigon on January 19. There was little air action during the war, although the Thais did use their Curtiss Hawk III biplanes in a dive-bombing role. The French had a plan, never implemented, to firebomb Bangkok from the air. The indecisive land and naval actions of January 1941 did not end the war. The French triumph at Koh Chang was short-lived; the Japanese applied diplomatic pressure and threatened intervention on the Thai side. On January 31 a Japanese-dictated armistice was signed at Saigon aboard the Japanese cruiser Natori. Also under pressure from Germany, in March the Vichy government agreed to accept Japanese mediation. Negotiations were held in Japan, and by Japanese edict France and Thailand signed on May 9, 1941, in Tokyo, a peace treaty whereby France transferred to Thailand three Cambodian and two Laotian provinces on the right bank of the Mekong, in all some 42,000 square miles of territory. In September 1945 with the reintroduction of significant French military forces into Indochina, Thai officials agreed to return this
ceded territory and accept the Mekong River as the boundary between their country and Laos and Cambodia. That the issue remained unsettled was seen in border skirmishes along the Mekong River in 1946, in clashes during May 1987–February 1988 between Thailand and Laos, and in continuing Thai support of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also French Indochina, 1860s–1946; Japan; Thailand References Decoux, Admiral Jean. A la barre de L’Indochine (1940–1945). Paris: Plon, 1949. Meisler, Jurg. “Koh Chang. The Unknown Battle. Franco-Thai War of 1940–41.” World War II Investigator [London] 2(14) (1989): 26–34. Mordal, Jacques. Marine Indochine. Paris: Amiot-Dumont, 1953. Mordal, Jacques, and Gabriel Auphan. La Marine Française pendant la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale. Paris: Hachette, 1958.
Fratricide Also known as friendly fire or, more correctly, friendly casualties due to friendly fire, fratricide describes the incidence of human deaths incurred by military forces in active combat operations as a result of being fired upon by their own or allied forces. Since the intentional production of friendly casualties (homicide) during the Vietnam War generated a new appellation, “fragging” (from the use of fragmentation grenades as the weapon of choice), only unintentional fratricide is discussed here. In an era of highly mobile forces and weapons of great range, lethality, and complexity, particularly those employed in the indirect fire mode combined with the fear and confusion induced by noise, smoke, tension, and faulty communications (the fog of war) on the modern battlefield, friendly casualties resulting from friendly fire are difficult to prevent. In Vietnam, with the lack of defined front lines and with units operating independently, sometimes overlapping within the same area of operations, in dense jungle and often at night, the incidence of friendly fire casualties might seem to be higher than in past American conflicts. Even when factoring in the fog of war along with sometimes poorly planned or coordinated operations or truly mistaken identity, when friendly forces inadvertently engaged each other with weapons ranging from rifles and hand grenades to artillery and attack aircraft, American losses to friendly fire in Vietnam do not appear to have exceeded those of previous modern wars. However, documented friendly fire cases in Vietnam exist for all forces engaged. It is important to remember that fratricide is, of course, as old as warfare. Fratricide rates in Vietnam were far lower than in previous wars, especially World War I and World War II. There was a lot more attention paid to fratricide in Vietnam because for the first time technology made it more preventable. Even so, exact figures for casualties caused by friendly fire during the Vietnam
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War are not available. This may be explained by the failure of commanders at all levels to report the incidence of casualties produced by friendly fire out of concern for the loss of benefits and honors due the dead and wounded, the desire not to damage the reputation of the unit or personnel involved or the morale of surviving troops, or the inability to prove fratricide or simply not knowing if a casualty was caused by friendly fire. If circumstances permit, in general where fratricide is recognizable a formal investigation and report are required. Casualty statistics published by the Department of Defense for the Vietnam War appear to include friendly fire losses in “Casualties Not the Result of Hostile Forces,” which are made up of “Deaths from aircraft accidents/incidents” and “From ground action,” which totaled some 18 percent of all casualties. ARTHUR T. FRAME See also Attrition; Casualties; Fragging References Neel, Spurgeon. Medical Support of the U.S. Army in Vietnam, 1965– 1972. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1973. Office of Information Management and Statistics. Data on Vietnam Era Veterans. Washington, DC: Veterans Administration, 1983.
FREEDOM PORCH BRAVO,
Operation
Start Date: April 15, 1972 End Date: April 16, 1972 A U.S. air assault against critical military targets in the Democratic People’s Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). Part of Operation FREEDOM TRAIN, the April 15–16, 1972, American attack on North Vietnamese supply stockpiles was a means of thwarting the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) Spring (Easter) Offensive against the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Operation FREEDOM PORCH BRAVO marked the first time that U.S. B-52s attacked petroleum products storage (PPS) areas in one of North Vietnam’s largest cities, Haiphong. The operation also targeted PPS areas in the capital of Hanoi. FREEDOM PORCH BRAVO necessitated the use of B-52s with their 30-ton bomb capacity, and planners expanded the strike area in order to destroy supply depots and disrupt the conventional military onslaught into South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese had launched a conventional threepronged offensive into South Vietnam on March 30, 1972. The U.S. military, despite having recently drawn down significant numbers of its ground, air, and surface forces, had detected the enemy buildup. Indeed, plans for a counterattack against North Vietnam were drafted nearly two months prior to the initial Communist assault. Throughout most of the early years of the Vietnam War, fears of political or military confrontations with North Vietnam’s allies, primarily the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic
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of China (PRC), had severely limited bombing areas north of the demilitarized zone (DMZ). However, North Vietnam’s Easter Offensive led U.S. leaders to lift the bombing restrictions and allow U.S. air strikes on targets from the front line to Hanoi. Operation FREEDOM TRAIN, beginning on April 6, 1972, utilized all available airpower in the region in the first major aerial bombing mission since 1968. President Richard M. Nixon approved of the use of the B-52 sorties, launched from bases in Guam and Thailand, as a swift and effective method of shutting down the supply lines that were necessary to supply North Vietnamese conventional military units in the field. Unlike Operation ROLLING THUNDER, which was a slow-escalation limited bombing campaign, in the spring of 1972 U.S. forces activated a swift, large, and deliberate air campaign. Operation FREEDOM PORCH BRAVO was specifically directed against the PPS areas that would fuel the PAVN tanks and other vehicles in their conventional military operation. U.S. Air Force fighters, stationed at bases in Thailand, and U.S. Navy aircraft from the carriers USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63), USS Constellation (CV-64), and USS Coral Sea (CV-43) worked together with the B-52s. U.S. Air Force McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantoms and U.S. Navy Grumman A-6A Intruders were charged with countering North Vietnamese MiG fighters, the suppression of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and electronic countermeasures to clear the way for the B-52s to strike their targets. In the first attack wave, the aircraft attacked PPS targets in the Haiphong area. The second and third waves of Tactical Air Command then struck 10 other targets in both the Haiphong and Hanoi vicinities. North Vietnamese air defense was largely ineffective. Some 250 SAM launches resulted in the loss of two aircraft. Thirty North Vietnamese MiG fighters were scrambled to try to intercept the American strike aircraft. Not only did the MiGs fail to shoot down any U.S. aircraft, but three MiGs were lost to U.S. fighter escorts. Fires from the burning North Vietnamese PPS areas could be seen more than 100 miles away. The failures of North Vietnam’s MiG fighters and SAM missiles during the FREEDOM PORCH BRAVO attacks stunned the North Vietnamese Air Defense Command and prompted it to conduct a wholesale reevaluation of its tactics and a major redeployment of its air defense forces. TARA K. SIMPSON See also Bombing Halts and Restrictions; Easter Offensive; FREEDOM TRAIN, Operation References Frankum, Ronald B., Jr. Like Rolling Thunder: The Air War in Vietnam, 1964–1975. New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005. Givens, Robert P. Turning the Vertical Flank: Air Power as a Maneuver Force in the Theater Campaign. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2002. Ho Si Huu, Chu Thai, The Ky, Nghiem Dinh Tich, and Dinh Khoi Sy. Lich Su Quan Chung Phong Khong, Tap III [History of the Air Defense Service, Vol. 3]. Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1994.
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Ta Hong, Vu Ngoc, and Nguyen Quoc Dung. Lich Su Khong Quan Nhan Dan Viet Nam (1955–1977) [History of the People’s Air Force of Vietnam (1955–1977)]. Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1993.
FREEDOM TRAIN,
Operation
Start Date: April 6, 1972 End Date: May 10, 1972 Operation FREEDOM TRAIN, a direct response to the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) Easter Offensive of 1972, was the first major U.S. air operation against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) since President Lyndon B. Johnson halted Operation ROLLING THUNDER in 1968. Operating from April 6 to May 10, 1972, FREEDOM TRAIN was the precursor to Operations LINEBACKER I and II. While U.S. authorities were aware in late 1971 that the North Vietnamese had been massing forces along the border of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) as well as infiltrating Laos and Cambodia, the United States was nevertheless proceeding with the program of Vietnamization and withdrawing its combat troops from South Vietnam. Indeed, on January 25, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon stated in a nationally televised address that the number of Americans in South Vietnam would be reduced to 68,000 by May 1, 1972. On February 9, 1972, he announced that American involvement in the war had shifted to a defensive and base-security role. While American ground troops were being withdrawn, U.S. air assets would be largely responsible for providing security. Nonetheless, American airpower in Southeast Asia was woefully ill-prepared for the extent and intensity of the North Vietnamese 1972 Easter Offensive. On March 30, 1972, the North Vietnamese began a massive three-pronged invasion of South Vietnam. In response, Nixon ordered available air assets to the Southeast Asian theater to conduct operations designed to impede North Vietnamese military activity south of the 17th Parallel and to hamper their ability to support the offensive. On April 6 after sufficient aircraft had been redeployed to airfields in South Vietnam, Thailand, and Guam and while U.S. aircraft carriers returned to the theater to support the air effort, Operation FREEDOM TRAIN began. FREEDOM TRAIN air sorties concentrated on targets south of the 20th Parallel. Meanwhile, Operation FREEDOM PORCH BRAVO, a subset of FREEDOM TRAIN, targeted several strategic facilities to the north of that parallel, such as the April 16 B-52 air strike from Guam against petroleum products storage complexes in the area of the port of Haiphong, including several large petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) storage tanks and railroad car transports. In all, 10 major objectives were struck in this attack, which destroyed an estimated 50 percent of the POL storage facilities in the HanoiHaiphong area. Shortly thereafter, carrier aircraft joined U.S. Air
Force fighter-bombers in striking a POL tank farm and warehouse complex on the outskirts of Hanoi. When these attacks did not arrest the PAVN offensive, on May 8 naval aircraft began mining North Vietnamese harbors, and on May 10 the Nixon administration extended the air campaign, now designated LINEBACKER, to include all of North Vietnam. Operation FREEDOM TRAIN/LINEBACKER was unique to the Vietnam War in that it was not based on the gradual escalation approach identified with ROLLING THUNDER. Operation FREEDOM TRAIN was instead a comprehensive effort designed to destroy North Vietnam’s ability to continue its offensive in South Vietnam. FREEDOM TRAIN ended on May 10, to be redesignated Operation LINEBACKER as American air efforts expanded to targets throughout North Vietnam. During FREEDOM TRAIN/LINEBACKER I, U.S. B-52s dropped 155,546 tons of bombs, and U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy tactical aircraft flew 1,216 sorties, dropping an additional 5,000 tons of bombs. RONALD B. FRANKUM JR. See also Easter Offensive; FREEDOM PORCH BRAVO, Operation; LINEBACKER I, Operation; LINEBACKER II, Operation; ROLLING THUNDER, Operation References Head, William P. War from above the Clouds: B-52 Operations during the Second Indochina War. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2002. Smith, John T. The Linebacker Raids: The Bombing of North Vietnam, 1972. London: Arms and Armour, 1998. Thompson, Wayne. To Hanoi and Back: The United States Air Force and North Vietnam, 1966–1973. Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museum Program, 2000.
Free Fire Zones Term used early in the Vietnam War by the U.S. Department of Defense for bombing and artillery fire against purported Viet Cong (VC) personnel and strongholds. In 1965 after critical publicity, the term “free fire zones” was changed to “specified strike zones.” By whatever name, it was a failed tactic. Designated areas were, by definition, supposedly nearly uninhabited by noncombatants. This tactic was an effort to structure the conflict along conventional lines, with Communist and allied forces separated and occupying distinct and identifiable zones. In actuality, such divisions seldom occurred. Vietnam was the first American war in which an effort was made to restrict such zones. Saigon-appointed Vietnamese district and province chiefs charted these zones and authorized the use therein of unrestricted bombing and artillery fires. Often such individuals did not come from the zones for which they approved targets. Following such approval, friendly inhabitants in a designated zone were to be warned that it had now become a specified strike zone. This was done by loudspeaker, leaflet drops from low-flying aircraft, and infantry sweeps. Noncombatants were told to leave their homes immedi-
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one-twelfth that of the United States, comparable American figures for 1968, had this nation been undergoing the same sort of generalized combat, would have been 3.5 million civilian casualties. CECIL B. CURREY See also Artillery Fire Doctrine; Clear and Hold; Pacification; Strategic Hamlet Program References Cincinnatus [Cecil B. Currey]. Self-Destruction: The Disintegration and Decay of the United States Army during the Vietnam Era. New York: Norton, 1981. Gibson, James William. The Perfect War: Technowar in Vietnam. Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986. Littauer, Raphael, and Norman Thomas Uphoff. The Air War in Indochina. Rev. ed. Boston: Beacon, 1971.
Free Khmer See Khmer Serai
Free World Assistance Program A free fire zone was a U.S. military term designating an area in which bombing and artillery fire could be freely employed. Civilians were forcibly removed (as is shown here) and any people remaining were presumed to be Communist troops or sympathizers. (Bettmann/Corbis)
ately to seek safety elsewhere, usually in so-called protected villages. Reluctant to leave the land on which their ancestors were buried, many had to be forcibly evacuated, usually by Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) troops. Others could not read the leaflets that fluttered down to them and thus remained in the zone, soon to become hapless casualties of war. Nor were the often cruel evacuations carried out by the ARVN particularly effective. Wailing people, forced onto trucks at rifle point, saw their crops destroyed, their animals shot, their wells poisoned, and their homes burned. Many of those who were moved to new locations found the facilities either strange or insufficient, so they returned to their homes. These returnees were then viewed by the Saigon government and the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), as VC sympathizers. For the first time the human factor was taken into account. In previous wars if civilians got in the way, it was their problem. Certainly the loss of life among noncombatants was large, as in most other wars in recorded history. A U.S. Senate subcommittee released figures purporting to show that civilian casualties from such actions were 100,000 in 1965 and 300,000 by 1968. Because the population of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) was
To help remove the contention that the Vietnam War was solely an American conflict, the United States and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) requested and received assistance from other free-world nations. In 1964 prior to the buildup of American combat forces, President Lyndon B. Johnson called for “Free World Military Forces” to create an alliance of “Many Flags” to aid South Vietnam, “a beleaguered friend.” This decision to request support was confirmed in National Security Policy Memorandum Number 328 on April 6, 1965. Over time, 39 nations in addition to the United States provided help to South Vietnam under the Free World assistance program. Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) participated with combat forces. The Philippines provided a Civic Action group, and the Republic of China (Taiwan) provided a Military Assistance Advisory Group, consisting primarily of political warfare advisers and medical personnel. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany), Australia, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and the Netherlands established continuing programs of economic, humanitarian, and technical assistance, either as part of bilateral agreements or under the Colombo Plan (a plan drafted in Colombo, Ceylon, in 1951 for the cooperative development of South and Southeast Asia). In all cases, military working agreements were signed between commanders of the various Free World forces and the commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), that placed their combat forces under MACV operational control. The Korean agreement required South Korean forces to operate under parameters established by the Free World Military
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Assistance Council, comprised of the chief of the Vietnamese Joint General Staff (JGS), the senior Korean officer in Vietnam, and the commander of MACV. This council provided operational guidance to, not control of, Free World forces through the annual Combined Campaign Plan, which broke the operational effort down geographically and functionally but did not assign tasks or goals. Although a combined command and staff arrangement was considered, it was rejected because of political sensitivities in both South Korea and South Vietnam to their forces falling under U.S. military command. Coordination of combat operations without the benefit of an integrated command at the top was provided through joint agreements between local Free World commanders and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) ground commanders. While ARVN corps commanders retained overall responsibility for military actions in each corps tactical zone (also known as military regions), U.S. and other Free World commanders accepted responsibility for tactical areas of responsibility, arbitrary geographical areas in which American and Free World units conducted combat operations. ARTHUR T. FRAME See also Australia; Canada; China, Republic of; Civic Action; Germany, Federal Republic of; Japan; Korea, Republic of; Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; New Zealand; Philippines; Thailand; United Kingdom and the Indochina and Vietnam Wars
seven decades, and for most of this period it was the backbone of French military presence in Indochina. The fighting against the Black Flags and the Chinese ended with the June 1885 Treaty of Tianjin (Tientsin) between France and China and recognition of French control of Vietnam. The French Foreign Legion then helped undertake the pacification of the Tonkin region. This new mission set the stage for future conflict in the region, as the legion was forced to fight against insurgent forces opposed to French rule. The geography initially presented tactical and logistical problems, but the general pacification of Tonkin was accomplished by 1897, and the legion then assumed rather routine security duties until the 1930s. Indochina was an extremely popular assignment for Legionnaires. A number claimed it as “a second fatherland” for the French Foreign Legion. The availability of opium attracted some, while officers saw Indochina as an opportunity for career advancement. Because of a high number of volunteers and the importance of the mission, the legion was able to exercise stringent selection criteria. Although there had been periodic uprisings against French rule, by the late 1930s Vietnamese nationalism was increasing. The French Foreign Legion was called out to restore order and quickly earned a deserved reputation for its effective and severe treatment of the rebels.
References Clarke, Jeffrey J. Advice and Support: The Final Years; The U.S. Army in Vietnam. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988. Larsen, Stanley Robert, and James Lawton Collins Jr. Allied Participation in Vietnam. Vietnam Studies Series. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975.
French Foreign Legion in Indochina The French Foreign Legion was created by King Louis Philippe on March 10, 1831, in consequence of a prohibition on foreigners serving in the French Army that followed the July Revolution in 1830. The legion soon developed a reputation as a formidable elite fighting force of strict discipline and iron will. The legion saw its first service in Algeria and was then employed to further French interests abroad, in Spain and in Mexico, before fighting in the Franco-Prussian War. The French Foreign Legion was first sent to Indochina in the autumn of 1883 during the Black Flags/Sino-French Wars (1883– 1885). The legion saw its first action in December 1883 during an operation to seize the town of Son Tay. Two companies of the legion also participated in the celebrated siege of Tuyen Quang (November 1884–March 1885), which greatly enhanced its reputation as an elite fighting force. The legion remained in Indochina for
Members of a French Foreign Legion patrol question a suspected member of the Viet Minh. The French Foreign Legion played a major combat role during the Indochina War. (National Archives)
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In 1940 French Army forces in Indochina numbered 50,000 men, but 38,000 of these were native troops of questionable loyalty. The heart of the French military presence was the 5,000-man French Foreign Legion 5th Regiment. The legion, although short of equipment, distinguished itself in the 1940 Franco-Thai War and also during the November 1940 Indochinese Communist Party uprising in Cochin China. The French managed to crush this uprising by the first week of December. Legionnaires continued to be stationed in Indochina during the Japanese occupation beginning in 1940. When the Japanese rounded up French forces in 1945, the French Foreign Legion alone put up stiff resistance. After the war the legion continued duty in this colonial posting, and when fighting erupted in 1945 and 1946, the legion played a prominent role. The post–World War II French Foreign Legion included a great many non-French. The legion included especially Germans who had fought in World War II (the legion asked no questions as to background, and recruits could assume new identities) but also Russians and other East Europeans who wished to pursue or to continue military careers. For the French Foreign Legion, the Indochina War posed familiar tactical problems. Fighting primarily a guerrilla war, the legion perpetuated its superior combat reputation, participating in the major operations of the war. Legionnaires served with distinction in the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. Despite the hopelessness of the situation, Legionnaires constituted the bulk of the volunteer relief troops parachuted into the valley as reinforcements. The defeat at Dien Bien Phu and the subsequent French withdrawal from Indochina was a severe blow to morale in the French Foreign Legion as well as in the French Army. Although not broken by Indochina, the legion was certainly changed by the experience. Soon, however, it was fighting in Algeria. RICHARD D. STARNES See also Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; France, Army, 1946–1954; French Indochina, 1860s–1946; Indochina War; Order of Battle Dispute; Tianjin, Treaty of References Davidson, Phillip A. Vietnam at War: The History, 1946–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1988. Dunn, Peter M. The First Vietnam War. New York: St. Martin’s, 1985. Porch, Douglas. The French Foreign Legion: A Complete History of the Legendary Fighting Force. New York: HarperCollins, 1991.
French Indochina, 1860s–1946 European powers came to Vietnam in their quest for religious converts, trade, and naval facilities. The first lasting contact between Vietnam and Europe resulted from the 1535 arrival of Portuguese explorer Antonio da Faria at Faifo (present-day Hoi An). Subsequently both the Portuguese and the Dutch established rival trading posts in Vietnam. Although Catholic missionaries might have
come to Vietnam before da Faria, the first permanent Catholic mission was not established there until 1615. French priest Alexandre de Rhodes made Catholicism a cultural as well as religious force in Vietnam. He is generally credited with the creation of quoc ngu, written Vietnamese with a Latin alphabet and diacritical marks. Previously Vietnamese had been written in Chinese ideographs. The French used quoc ngu to eliminate the political and cultural influence of Vietnamese Confucian scholars. Quoc ngu also became a boomerang against the French; with it came the introduction of Western ideas of freedom and democracy. Steadily Southeast Asia began to attract more European attention. The term “Indochina” is attributed to Danish cartographer Konrad Malte-Brun (1775–1826) and was applied collectively to Burma, Thailand, Tonkin, Annam, Cochin China, Laos, and Cambodia. Another Catholic priest, Pierre Pigneau de Béhaine, became influential in Vietnamese history in the late 18th century. He helped secure European mercenaries and military equipment crucial in enabling Nguyen Phuc Anh (from 1802, Emperor Gia Long) to reunify Vietnam. The French mercenaries brought with them numerous Western technological advances, including improved engineering and metallurgical techniques. Emperor Gia Long (r. 1802–1820) may have welcomed Westerners’ military and technological assistance, but he was not interested in advancing their religion. His successors, Minh Mang (r. 1820–1841), Thieu Tri (r. 1841–1847), and Tu Duc (r. 1848– 1883), lacked Gia Long’s flexibility and appreciation of Western strengths and weaknesses. Certainly they were much less successful than he in dealing with Western pressures. In fairness to them, it should also be pointed out that during Gia Long’s reign, the European powers were too embroiled in the Napoleonic Wars to pay much attention to Vietnam. Dealing with reawakened European imperialism fell to Gia Long’s successors; Gia Long himself would probably have been little more successful in resisting European imperialism. The Vietnamese emperors regarded Catholicism as a threat to the Confucian concept of order and harmony. Catholics were not singled out; the imperial court persecuted Buddhists and Taoists as well. Certainly the royal concubines were a powerful source of opposition to the Western religion; they saw Christian opposition to polygamy as a direct threat to their own position. Regardless of the reasons behind it, the attempt by the 19th-century Vietnamese emperors to root out Christian missionaries provided the excuse for French intervention. Unfortunately for the Vietnamese, they, unlike the Japanese, had shown little interest in the vast improvements in armaments that had occurred in the half century since the reunification of their country. This put them at a great disadvantage when the inevitable collision with the West occurred. Missionary fervor was not the only factor pushing the French to intervene in Vietnam. Another more powerful force was trade. In the 1840s the British had taken the lead in obtaining trading concessions in China. The French were fearful of being left out and
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French colonial forces transport a 75-mm gun artillery battery in Indochina around 1930. (Library of Congress)
soon followed suit; their China squadron was the chief military means of applying pressure on Vietnam. The French also hoped that Vietnam might provide access to the interior of China by means of the Mekong and Red rivers. Alleged mistreatment of Catholic missionaries was the excuse for French intervention. In 1845 and again in 1846, French warships were sent to Vietnam to secure the release of Monseigneur Dominique Lefèvre, who had been imprisoned on imperial order for refusing to leave the country. During the second intervention, French warships sank four Vietnamese warships that they regarded as presenting a hostile intent. On August 31, 1858, a Franco-Spanish squadron of 14 ships and 3,000 men (500 of them Spanish troops from the Philippines) commanded by Admiral Charles Rigault de Genouilly arrived at Tourane (Da Nang) and anchored there. The next day a landing party went ashore. Tourane proved no prize, and the expedition soon moved southward. On February 18, 1859, the French took Saigon. At the time a sleepy little fishing village, Saigon had promise of being an excellent deep-water port. In 1862 Emperor Tu Duc was obliged to sign a treaty confirming the French conquest. It was no accident that the French chose to penetrate southern Vietnam first; it was the newest part of the country. In France, those favoring empire building gradually overcame the arguments of those opposed to colonialism. By 1867 the French had conquered all of Cochin China, the southernmost part of Vietnam. From 1862 to 1887 France established control over
Indochina: first Cochin China and then Cambodia, Annam, and Tonkin. Guerrilla warfare continued in parts of the country for a time. The young emperor Ham Nghi led a brief rebellion until he was captured in 1888. One last nationalist leader, De Tham, was killed in 1913. In 1887 Paris formed its conquests into French Indochina. Laos was added in 1893. Technically only Cochin China was an outright colony; the others were merely protectorates. The reality was that all were ruled by a French governor-general responsible to the minister of colonies in Paris. For the next 50 years the French ruled Indochina. It was to be a very influential period in the history of Vietnam, as fateful for the country as the 1,000 years of Chinese domination. French administration in Indochina was haphazard. Both ministers of colonies and governors-general changed frequently, and with each came policy changes. Also, Indochina did not attract the most capable civil servants, and many of those who went there never bothered to learn the local language. French officials were found at all levels, and their salaries consumed what little money was available in the colonial budget. Little was left to spend on education or public works, and life in the countryside was little affected by French rule. The small French community (40,000 to 50,000 people) dominated the economy of what was France’s richest colony. In education the ideal was to turn the Vietnamese into a cultural copy of mainland France, but even after World War I only some 10 percent of Vietnamese of school age were attending
French Indochina, 1860s–1946 Franco-Vietnamese schools. And as late as 1940 there were only 14 secondary schools in all of Vietnam and only 1 university (at Hanoi). This produced a talented but very small native elite aspiring to positions of influence that were closed to them by the colonial regime. Ultimately their frustration drove many of them to turn against France. Vietnamese nationalist hopes were raised due to a victory by an Asian power over a European state in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 and by the Allied victory in World War I, with President Woodrow Wilson’s call for the self-determination of peoples. But at the Paris Peace Conference, Vietnamese patriots and other nationalists found out that this latter doctrine was limited to Europe. Moderate nationalists in Vietnam after World War I took China’s Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist Party of China) as their model. Their organization, the Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang (VNQDD, Vietnamese Nationalist Party), was not well organized. The VNQDD led premature uprisings in 1930–1931, notably at Yen Bai. These were easily crushed by the authorities, but they had the unfortunate effect for the French of opening the way for the more militant Indochinese Communist Party (ICP). By World War II the ICP was the dominant nationalist force in Indochina. World War II brought the Japanese in 1940. Having been crushed militarily by Germany in that year, France was in no position to resist Tokyo’s demands for bases. Ironically, it was Vietnam that brought the United States into the war. Japan’s July 1941 move into southern Indochina meant that Japanese long-range bombers could now reach Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, and the Philippines. The United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands then imposed an embargo on scrap iron and oil to Japan, a decision that caused Tokyo to embark on a war with the United States. During World War II the Japanese left the Vichy French government in Indochina in place, but as the conflict neared its end, the French were determined to liberate themselves. With these plans an open secret, it was hardly a surprise when the Japanese struck first. On March 9, 1945, they arrested virtually all French administrators and military personnel. Tokyo created a further problem for France by declaring Vietnam independent under Emperor Bao Dai. Vietnamese nationalist and Communist leader Ho Chi Minh moved into the vacuum left by the defeat of Japan. On August 16, 1945, in Hanoi, Ho declared himself president of a “free Vietnam,” and on September 2 he proclaimed the independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). Even before the end of the war, the French government had planned to make concessions and grant more freedom to Indochina but only if Paris retained ultimate authority. World War II marked the end of European colonialism. French leaders, however, chose not to see the inevitable and failed to seek accommodation with nationalist leaders. In Indochina the result was a missed opportunity for orderly transition to self-rule and a close relationship with France. The war itself was a principal reason why Paris refused to compromise. It is hard for the weak to be
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generous, and only with its empire could France hope to continue as a Great Power. According to the July 1945 Potsdam Agreement, the British were to take the surrender of Japanese troops south of the 16th Parallel and of Chinese troops north of the parallel. The British released French troops from Japanese camps, and Paris sent reinforcements to reestablish its control over southern Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. The French also arranged a Chinese withdrawal from North Vietnam. In January 1946 Ho carried out elections in the northern part of the country. Although these were not entirely free, there was no doubt that Ho had won. There remained the problem of dealing with France, and in March 1946 Ho worked out an agreement with French diplomat Jean Sainteny. The terms of the agreement had Paris recognizing North Vietnam as a free and independent state within the French Union. France was allowed to send a limited number of troops into North Vietnam to protect its interests there, although all were to be withdrawn over a five-year period. Paris also accepted the principle of a united Vietnam by agreeing to a plebiscite in the southern Vietnam that would allow a vote on whether it would join North Vietnam. French high commissioner for Indochina Georges Thierry d’Argenlieu refused to allow the promised southern plebiscite. In a direct appeal to Paris, Ho led a delegation to France. By the time it had arrived the French government had fallen, and it was weeks before a new one was formed. Unfortunately, the Socialists lost seats in the June elections, and the Communists, who were in the government, were trying to demonstrate their patriotism. As a result, at the Fontainebleau Conference Paris made no concessions to the Vietnamese nationalists. Meanwhile, d’Argenlieu had on his own initiative proclaimed the independence of southern Vietnam as the “Republic of Cochin China.” D’Argenlieu’s action clearly violated the Ho-Sainteny Agreement and left Vietnamese leaders feeling betrayed. Although there is still disagreement on this point, Ho was probably a nationalist before he was a Communist, and, given Vietnam’s long antagonistic relationship with China, he certainly might have become an Asian Tito. In September, Ho left Paris and forecast an early start of war. He also correctly predicted how it would be fought and how it would end. The war began in Hanoi on December 19, 1946, following the November 23 shelling of the port of Haiphong by the French cruiser Suffren on d’Argenlieu’s orders as a show of force. This fighting, including its American phase, would last 29 years and would be the longest war in the 20th century. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Bao Dai; D’Argenlieu, Georges Thierry; De Rhodes, Alexandre; Fontainebleau Conference; Haiphong, Shelling of; Ham Nghi; Ho Chi Minh; Ho-Sainteny Agreement; Minh Mang; Nguyen Phuc Anh; Pigneau de Béhaine, Pierre; Potsdam Conference; Rigault de Genouilly, Charles; Sainteny, Jean; Thieu Tri; Tu Duc; Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang
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FREQUENT WIND, Operation
References Duiker, William J. The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam. 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996. Duiker, William J. The Rise of Nationalism in Vietnam, 1900–1911. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976. Fall, Bernard B. The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis. 2nd rev. ed. New York: Praeger, 1967. Hammer, Ellen J. The Struggle for Indochina. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1954. Lacouture, Jean. Ho Chi Minh: A Political Biography. New York: Random House, 1968. Sainteny, Jean. Ho Chi Minh and His Vietnam: A Personal Memoir. Chicago: Cowles, 1972. Thompson, Virginia. French Indo-China. New York: Octagon Books, 1968.
FREQUENT WIND,
Operation
Start Date: April 29, 1975 End Date: April 30, 1975 The final U.S. evacuation from the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Operation FREQUENT WIND began at 10:51 a.m. Saigon time on April 29, 1975. Before dawn that morning a heavy artillery and rocket barrage on Tan Son Nhut Air Base signaled that the final assault on Saigon was imminent. At first light, with shells still crashing onto the field, South Vietnamese aircrews began fleeing in their planes, leaving jettisoned bombs and fuel tanks strewn on runways. From his headquarters at the air base, Major General Homer D. Smith, head of the U.S. Defense Attaché Office (DAO), reported to Ambassador Graham A. Martin that the runways were unusable and that Americans and endangered South Vietnamese would have to be flown out by helicopter to ships waiting off the Vietnamese coast, Option IV in the evacuation plan. Martin insisted on coming to Tan Son Nhut to see for himself and, even then, waited nearly two more hours before ordering the evacuation. Finally, at 10:51 the message was flashed: “Execute Frequent Wind Option IV.” Before the airlift could begin, however, a complicated series of ship-to-ship flights had to be carried out to load 865 marines who were to provide security for the evacuation. The first Sikorsky CH-53 Sea Stallions landed at the DAO Tan Son Nhut compound at 3:06 p.m. The marines sprinted off, and waiting evacuees scrambled on. Six minutes after landing the helicopters were airborne again, heading back to the fleet through a sky full of woolly clouds. By evening, nearly 4,500 Vietnamese and 395 U.S. citizens had been flown out of the air base. The marines began withdrawing at 10:50 p.m. The last to leave were demolition teams who blew up secret communications gear and then the DAO building itself, along with barrels containing more than $3.6 million in U.S. currency. No large-scale airlift was planned from the U.S. embassy. Accordingly, U.S. Marine Corps commander Brigadier General Richard E. Carey was stunned when shortly before 4:00 p.m., word
came that several thousand people, about half of them Vietnamese, were stranded in the embassy compound, and growing crowds were gathering outside. Carey issued new orders directing helicopters and 130 additional marines to the embassy, where around 5:00 p.m. the first evacuees were lifted out. Only one CH-53 at a time could land in the embassy’s courtyard parking area, while the rooftop pad accommodated only the smaller Boeing CH-46 Sea Knights. Darkness fell, and with it came thunderstorms that dispersed the crowds outside the walls and also made flying hazardous. To guide the CH-53s, an embassy officer used a slide projector to mark the landing area with a brilliant white rectangle of light. A slow but steady stream of flights continued until about 11:00 p.m., paused while the marines were evacuated from the DAO, and then resumed after midnight. The task force commanders and officials in Washington were increasingly anxious to finish the operation, but no one knew how many Vietnamese remained in the embassy. Helicopters kept returning to the fleet with more Vietnamese, leaving an impression, one pilot recalled, that they were trying to empty “a bottomless pit.” Fearing that the operation might go on indefinitely, task force commanders and White House officials ordered the refugee flights stopped. At 4:30 a.m. Carey radioed to his pilots that only Americans were to be flown out from then on. A communications plane over Saigon relayed a presidential message ordering Ambassador Martin to board the next helicopter. Just before 5:00 a.m., Martin climbed onto a CH-46 and left. The handful of remaining Americans followed. About 420 Vietnamese were still waiting on the parking lot. Among them were the embassy’s firemen, who had volunteered to stay until the last flight in case of an emergency. Hundreds of other Vietnamese employed by the U.S. government, including many who worked for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the U.S. Information Agency, were abandoned elsewhere in Saigon because their American superiors failed to get them into the embassy or to Tan Son Nhut. Altogether, 978 Americans and approximately 1,100 Vietnamese were flown out of the embassy. At daybreak only the marine security force remained. Barricading the stairs behind them, they climbed to the roof. One by one the last nine CH-46s dropped down, loaded, and left for the fleet. Master Sergeant Juan Valdez was the last to board. At 7:53 a.m. on April 30, the final helicopter lifted off the roof, turned, and flew eastward. ARNOLD R. ISAACS See also EAGLE PULL, Operation; Gayler, Noel Arthur Meredyth; Ho Chi Minh Cam-
paign; Martin, Graham A.; United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1973–1975 References Herrington, Stuart A. Peace with Honor? Novato, CA: Presidio, 1983. Isaacs, Arnold R. Without Honor: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983.
Fulbright, James William
Friendly Fire See Fratricide
Front Unifié de Lutte des Races Opprimées Indigenous Vietnamese resistance organization. Le Front Unifié de Lutte des Races Opprimées (FULRO, United Struggle Front for the Oppressed Races) was the ethnonationalistic movement of the Front pour la Libération des Montagnards (FLM), Front pour la Libération des Khmer Krom (FLKK), and Front pour la Libération des Chams (FLC). FULRO evolved out of the Bajaraka (a consolidation of Bahnar, Jarai, Rhadé, and Koho) movement created in opposition to President Ngo Dinh Diem’s land development program in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) to resettle Vietnamese refugees on Montagnard lands in the Central Highlands and force the resettlement of Montagnard villagers. FULRO made its presence known in 1964 through a military uprising at Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) camps around Ban Me Thuot where Y Bham Enuol, a Rhadé, offered a FULRO manifesto that called for action to reclaim Montagnard lands taken by the Vietnamese. Although the Ministry for Development of Ethnic Minorities was created by the Saigon government in response to the uprising in efforts to win Montagnard support, Enuol and his followers fled to Mondulkiri Province in Cambodia under threat of imprisonment by the South Vietnamese government. By 1965 FULRO maintained an army of 5,000 to 6,000 men, many of whom had left Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) units for Cambodia, along with some 15,000 of their dependents. As FULRO president, Enuol represented the Montagnards in negotiations with the Cambodian and South Vietnamese governments, the Viet Cong (VC), and the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). Following the January 1968 Tet Offensive and the increasing vulnerability of Montagnard villages to Communist attack, Enuol sought to return to the Central Highlands to protect Montagnard villages from Communist attacks. In negotiations with the Saigon government, he was promised that FULRO army units would be integrated into Regional Force (RF) units to protect Montagnard villages and that FULRO leaders would receive positions within the government. This arrangement upset the more militant FULRO members, who then overthrew Enuol’s leadership in December 1968 and exiled him and his followers to Phnom Penh. The agreement to integrate FULRO forces into RF units was nevertheless upheld, and with the return of FULRO soldiers to Vietnam and the exile of Enuol to Cambodia, FULRO lost its position as an ethnonationalistic movement by early 1969. FULRO resurfaced around 1974–1975 as the Dega Highlands Provisional Government, with its military arm, the Dega Highlands Liberation Front (referred to by Gerald Hickey in 1993 as Dega-
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FULRO), in opposition to Communist rule. Perhaps as many as 2,000 Montagnard soldiers held out against superior Communist forces for 10 years, finally giving up their struggle in 1984. Many of the Montagnards returned to the Central Highlands, but the 200 men who formed the core of the resistance fled to refugee camps along the Thai-Cambodian border in 1985. They were found at Site 2 South by three Americans, Don Scott, Pappy Hicks, and Jim Morris, who arranged their passage to the United States, where they were resettled in North Carolina and South Carolina. The resistance leaders include Pierre Toplui K’Briuh, Nay Rong, R’Mah Dock, Y Pat Buon Ya, Y T’Lur Eban, and Ksor Kok, executive director of the Montagnard Foundation. DAVID M. BERMAN See also Ban Me Thuot, Battle of; Cambodia; Central Highlands; Civilian Irregular Defense Group; Enuol, Y Bham; Hickey, Gerald Cannon; Mobile Strike Force Commands; Montagnards; Territorial Forces References Hickey, Gerald Cannon. Free in the Forest: Ethnohistory of the Vietnamese Central Highlands, 1954–1976. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982. Hickey, Gerald Cannon. Shattered World: Adaptation and Survival among Vietnam’s Highland Peoples during the Vietnam War. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993. Wiesner, Louis A. Victims and Survivors: Displaced Persons and Other War Victims in Viet-Nam, 1954–1975. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1988.
Fulbright, James William Birth Date: April 9, 1905 Death Date: February 9, 1995 U.S. senator and outspoken Vietnam War critic. Born in Sumner, Missouri, on April 9, 1905, James William Fulbright received his BA in history from the University of Arkansas in 1925 and an MA from Oxford University in 1928 before earning a law degree from George Washington University in 1934. He then became an attorney in the antitrust division of the Department of Justice and taught law at the University of Arkansas. In 1939 he was appointed president of the university, a post he held until 1941. An ardent and lifelong Democrat, during 1943–1945 he represented Arkansas in the U.S. House of Representatives, authoring the Fulbright-Connally Resolution that ultimately facilitated the creation of the United Nations (UN). Fulbright then served in the U.S. Senate from 1945 to 1974. In 1945 convinced that education brought out the good in the young and cultivated a desire to preserve the American republic, Fulbright, himself a Rhodes Scholar, took the lead in the establishment of Fulbright Fellowships, an international exchange program. Independent by nature, Fulbright disagreed with aspects of foreign policy of every U.S. president from Harry S. Truman to Richard M. Nixon but especially attacked the Lyndon B. Johnson
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Fulbright, James William Although Fulbright helped shepherd the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution through the Senate, by 1966 he had concluded that the Vietnam War was primarily an insurgency against a corrupt and repressive Saigon government that did not deserve the backing of the United States. He believed that Vietnam had no bearing on the vital interests of the United States and that American involvement was undermining democracy and individual liberty at home as well as overseas. That same year, televised hearings held by Fulbright’s Senate Foreign Relations Committee helped turn popular opinion against the war and endeared him to antiwar activists. Johnson was furious at Fulbright’s scathing criticism, but the senator kept up the pressure until the last American troops left Saigon in 1973. Fulbright was defeated in his 1974 reelection bid and resigned from the Senate in December 1974. After leaving office he joined the law firm of Hogan & Hartson in Washington, D.C. Fulbright also stayed very active in international affairs and national politics. His greatest legacies during his long public service career are certainly his anti–Vietnam War stance and the Fulbright Fellowship, which to date has sponsored more than 250,000 individuals. Fulbright died in Washington, D.C., on February 9, 1995. BRENDA J. TAYLOR
U.S. senator from Arkansas J. William Fulbright. Fulbright initially supported the Vietnam War and helped shepherd the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution through the Senate, but by 1966 he had turned against U.S. involvement and became one of its most outspoken critics. (Library of Congress)
administration on the Vietnam issue. In the early 1950s Fulbright also took a sharp public stand against Senator Joseph R. McCarthy and the excesses of McCarthyism, certainly a risky move at the time.
See also Eisenhower, Dwight David; Gulf of Tonkin Resolution; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Truman, Harry S. References Berman, William C. William Fulbright and the Vietnam War: The Dissent of a Political Realist. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1988. Woods, Randall Bennett. J. William Fulbright, Vietnam, and the Search for a Cold War Foreign Policy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
G Galbraith, John Kenneth Birth Date: October 15, 1908 Death Date: April 29, 2006 Acclaimed economist, government official, diplomat, prolific author, and critic of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Born in Iona Station, Ontario, Canada, on October 15, 1908, John Kenneth Galbraith received a BA from Ontario Agricultural College (University of Toronto) in 1931. He subsequently earned a master’s degree in 1933 and then in 1934 a doctorate in agricultural economics from the University of California at Berkeley. He taught at Berkeley and Princeton University before taking a faculty position at Harvard University in 1948. There he contributed to the so-called dangerously liberal reputation of Cambridge economists in the 1940s and 1950s. Galbraith supported Franklin D. Roosevelt’s reelection in the 1936 presidential campaign and gained U.S. citizenship in 1937. During World War II Galbraith helped write price control policy for the Office of Price Administration. He continued his government service by surveying the effects of strategic bombing on the wartime German economy. During the 1940s Galbraith also wrote for Fortune magazine, developing a friendship with publishing magnate Henry Luce. Galbraith was a campaign adviser and wrote campaign speeches for Democratic presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson in 1952 and 1956 and published The Great Crash in 1955 and The Affluent Society in 1958. During these years Galbraith, having known John F. Kennedy at Harvard as the younger brother of Joe Kennedy, was consulted by the senator on economic legislation. Following his election to the presidency in 1960, John Kennedy appointed Galbraith ambassador to India (1961–1963). As early as the spring of 1961 Galbraith began warning Kennedy of potential
conflict in Vietnam, writing that President Ngo Dinh Diem of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) had alienated his own people. In September, Kennedy sent General Maxwell Taylor and Walt Rostow to Vietnam to investigate the need for armed American intervention, which their subsequent report advocated. Kennedy requested Galbraith, in Washington at the time, to return to India via Saigon and report his findings. Indicting Diem’s regime, Galbraith opposed sending troops. Kennedy concurred and sent only helicopters and advisers. Galbraith became more outspoken against the Vietnam War during the Lyndon B. Johnson administration, supporting Eugene McCarthy’s presidential candidacy in 1968. Galbraith served as the national chairman for Democratic Action (1967–1968) and as president of the American Economic Association (1972). After the defeat of Democrat George McGovern in the 1972 presidential election, Galbraith eschewed active politics in favor of writing and publishing. He officially retired from Harvard in 1975 and produced a film series, The Age of Uncertainty, in 1977. Thereafter Galbraith continued to write, speak, and teach on a variety of subjects well into his nineties. He died in Cambridge, Massachusetts, on April 29, 2006. BRENDA J. TAYLOR See also Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Rostow, Walt Whitman; Taylor, Maxwell Davenport References Galbraith, John Kenneth. A Life in Our Times: Memoirs. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981. Lamson, Peggy. Speaking of Galbraith: A Personal Portrait. New York: Ticknor and Fields, 1991. Parker, Richard. John Kenneth Galbraith: His Life, His Politics, His Economics. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005.
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Galloway, Joseph Lee
Galloway, Joseph Lee Birth Date: November 13, 1941 Newspaper correspondent and writer. Joseph Lee Galloway was born on November 13, 1941, in Refugio, Texas. He became a newspaper reporter at age 17 and within two years was a bureau chief for United Press International (UPI) in the Kansas City office. In early 1965 as U.S. involvement in Vietnam intensified, Galloway undertook the first of his three tours as a war correspondent for UPI in Vietnam. In September 1965 the 1st Cavalry Division departed Fort Benning, Georgia, for its base camp at An Khe in the Central Highlands of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). In late October a large People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) force attacked the Plei Me Special Forces Camp, and U.S. forces then began an effort to locate and destroy the PAVN forces. On November 14 Lieutenant Colonel Harold G. Moore and the lead elements of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry (Airmobile), were airlifted by helicopters into the Ia Drang Valley, initiating the first major battle of the Vietnam War between the U.S. Army and PAVN forces. Soon after Moore’s troopers arrived at Landing Zone (LZ) X-Ray, they were surrounded by 2,000 PAVN regulars. Another 2,000 awaited other U.S. troops as they arrived later. From November 14 to 18, U.S. forces at LZ X-Ray and later LZ Alpha, supported by air strikes, managed to hold their positions. On the evening of November 14 Galloway joined the engagement, intending to gather information for a newspaper article. He soon found himself aiding wounded American soldiers while under heavy fire and returning fire with a borrowed M-16 at PAVN troops attempting to overrun the position. After suffering heavy casualties, the PAVN eventually broke off the attack. In the aftermath of the battle, the surviving Americans withdrew from the area. While Moore considered the battle a draw since the enemy ultimately reoccupied the valley, General William Westmoreland, commander of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), hailed it as a victory. Many believe that this battle set the pattern for U.S. ground operations during most of the war. Galloway spent more than 40 years altogether as a foreign correspondent and bureau chief for UPI and as senior editor and writer for U.S. News & World Report. His reports from Vietnam were invariably accurate, highly informed, and unbiased. Besides his tours in Vietnam, Galloway spent time overseas in Japan, Indonesia, India, Singapore, and the Soviet Union. In 1990–1991 Galloway covered the Persian Gulf War, accompanying the 24th Infantry Division during its famous end-run around Iraqi defenses. Allied commander General H. Norman Schwarzkopf called Galloway “the finest combat correspondent of our generation—a soldier’s reporter and a soldier’s friend.” In 1992 Galloway and Lieutenant General Harold G. Moore coauthored the best-selling book We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young about their experiences in the Ia Drang Valley in 1965. In 2002 the book was made into a popular film with Barry Pepper playing Galloway and Mel Gibson portraying Moore. Both the book
and film received critical acclaim. In 2008 Moore and Galloway published a sequel, We Are Soldiers Still. On May 1, 1998, Galloway received the Bronze Star Medal with V Device for his actions at Ia Drang. He is the only civilian to receive such a medal for the Vietnam War. Shortly thereafter, Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund members created the Joseph L. Galloway Award, presented to war correspondents serving with U.S. troops overseas. In the autumn of 2002 Galloway joined Knight Ridder as its senior military correspondent, working in its Washington Bureau. During this time he also served as a special consultant to Secretary of State Colin L. Powell. More recently, Galloway was an outspoken critic of President George W. Bush and his Iraq War policies. WILLIAM P. HEAD See also Film and the Vietnam Experience; Ia Drang, Battle of; Media and the Vietnam War; Moore, Harold Gregory, Jr.; Search and Destroy; Westmoreland, William Childs References Galloway, Joe. “A Reporter’s Journal From Hell.” In The Greatest U.S. Army Stories Ever Told: Unforgettable Tales of Courage, Honor and Sacrifice, edited by Ian C. Martin, 215–222. Guilford, CT: Lyons, 2006. Moore, Harold G., and Joseph L. Galloway. We Are Soldiers Still: A Journey Back to the Battlefields of Vietnam. New York: Harper, 2008. Moore, Harold G., and Joseph L. Galloway. We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young: Ia Drang—The Battle That Changed the War in Vietnam. New York: Random House, 1992.
GAME WARDEN,
Operation
Start Date: December 1965 End Date: December 1970 U.S. Navy operation in the Mekong Delta to halt Viet Cong (VC) inland waterways logistics and military operations. On December 18, 1965, Rear Admiral Norvell G. Ward, chief of the Naval Advisory Group, formed the River Patrol Force (Task Force 116). Known as Operation GAME WARDEN, it was to conduct patrols along the major rivers of the Mekong Delta to interdict VC activities there. The primary impetus for GAME WARDEN emerged in September 1965 when naval and military representatives from the Naval Advisory Group and Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, as well as the chief of naval operations, and Pacific commander in Chief, and the Pacific Fleet commander in chief decided that the Coastal Surveillance Force (Task Force 115), Operation MARKET TIME, although successful at countering seaborne traffic, could not prevent enemy movement on inland waterways. To accomplish its task, the River Patrol Force required a mission-designed shallow-draft high-speed boat to navigate the inland waterways. From December 1965 to March 1966 the U.S. Navy adopted and procured the fiberglass-hulled river patrol boat (PBR) to
GAME WARDEN, Operation
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A U.S. Navy lieutenant aims a flaming arrow at a hut that conceals a Viet Cong (VC) bunker, December 8, 1967. Operation GAME WARDEN aimed to halt Communist military use of Vietnam’s waterways. (Bettmann/Corbis)
operate in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Upon arrival, PBRs were placed into River Divisions based either around landing ship tanks (LSTs) anchored at the mouths of rivers or at shore installations. In addition to river craft, in 1967 the U.S. Navy allocated 24 Bell UH-1B Iroquois helicopters to provide air support for the PBRs. This air component, designated HAL-3 (Helicopter Attack Light Squadron 3), or “Seawolves,” was stationed aboard the LSTs with their PBR counterparts. Another air component, VAL-4 (Navy Attack Light Squadron 4), which consisted of heavily armed North American Rockwell OV-10 Broncos to bridge the gap between helicopter and jet and known as the “Black Ponies,” arrived in Vietnam in April 1969. VAL-4 provided additional air support for GAME WARDEN and later for Southeast Asia Lake Ocean River Delta Strategy (SEALORDS) forces. Once operational, GAME WARDEN forces conducted day and night patrols. These patrols, usually consisting of two boats, inspected Vietnamese river craft, enforced curfews, established ambushes, and supported allied troops ashore. GAME WARDEN forces also inserted SEALs (Sea Air Land teams, a U.S. Navy special warfare group) to collect intelligence data and assault VC units in the Mekong Delta. Task Force 116 responsibilities also included minesweeping the vital Long Tao shipping channel to Saigon. The Saigon River,
which meandered through the Rung Sat Special Zone, a VC-dominated area also known as the “Forest of Assassins,” provided allied seaborne logistics a direct route to the South Vietnamese capital. After a combined U.S. and Vietnamese operation in the Rung Sat Special Zone in March 1966, U.S. minesweeping boats (MSBs) and converted mechanized landing craft (LCMs) began successful mine-clearing operations. In 1968, the commander of Naval Forces, Vietnam, combined elements of the River Patrol Force with other task forces to create and participate in SEALORDS operations. The same year the Accelerated Turnover to the Vietnamese (ACTOV) program, the U.S. Navy’s Vietnamization program, began. Under this withdrawal policy, GAME WARDEN material shifted to the Republic of Vietnam Navy (VNN, South Vietnamese Navy), and by December 1970 Task Force 116 had been dissolved. R. BLAKE DUNNAVENT See also MARKET TIME, Operation; Mekong Delta; Riverine Craft; Riverine Warfare;
SEALORDS; United States Navy References Cutler, Thomas J. Brown Water, Black Berets: Coastal and Riverine Warfare in Vietnam. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988.
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Garnier, Marie Joseph François
Marolda, Edward J. By Sea, Air, and Land: An Illustrated History of the U.S. Navy and the War in Southeast Asia. Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 1994. Schreadley, R. L. From the Rivers to the Sea: The United States Navy in Vietnam. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992.
Garnier, Marie Joseph François Birth Date: July 25, 1839 Death Date: December 21, 1873 French naval officer, administrator, explorer, and writer. Marie Joseph François Garnier was born on July 25, 1839, in St. Étienne, France. He entered the French Navy and, after service off Brazil, participated in fighting in China. Garnier then secured a position on the staff of Admiral Léonard Victor Joseph Charner, who was appointed French commander in Cochin China in 1861. After a brief period spent in France, Garnier returned to Indochina and had charge of the administration of Cholon, then a suburb of Saigon. Garnier then proposed an expedition to determine the course of the Mekong River. Although he was too young to lead the expedition himself, he was second-in-command under Captain Doudart de Legree. The expedition set out in 1866 and lasted until 1868. Legree died in the course of the enterprise, and Garnier took command. Throughout the long trip, he made a detailed survey buttressed by astronomical observations. The French hoped to be able to secure a commercial route to western China, but Garnier’s report on the expedition showed that the Mekong River was not navigable from the sea to China. The expedition nonetheless earned Garnier the Victoria Medal of the Royal Geographical Society, presented to him in London in 1870. Garnier then fought in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871, distinguishing himself during the siege of Paris and the Commune. After the war Garnier returned to Indochina, but finding no opportunity for further exploration, in 1872 he resigned from the navy and went to China as an explorer and entrepreneur, traveling the Chang Jiang (Yangtze River). In 1873 governor of Cochin China Admiral M. J. Dupré recruited Garnier to lead an expedition to extricate French arms merchant Jean Dupuis from Hanoi and to negotiate freedom of navigation on the Red River in Tonkin. Garnier advised Dupré to obtain the goodwill of Emperor Tu Duc by promising to evict Dupuis. But once he was in Hanoi, Garnier joined forces with Dupuis. Dupuis’s force substantially reinforced Garnier’s tiny army, which consisted of 60 Europeans and the crews of three small ships. Convinced of Tu Duc’s local weakness, Garnier dropped all pretense of negotiation and issued a proclamation on November 15 informing all that the Red River was open for international trade. He also ordered that all Vietnamese customs tariffs be suspended and be replaced by more favorable rates. On November 20, 1873, after receiving small reinforcements from Saigon, Garnier bombarded and stormed the Hanoi Citadel. He then began to use his artillery
against all important and fortified places between the coast and Hanoi. Garnier’s three-week campaign culminated in the capture of Nam Dinh. However, he was killed on December 21, 1873, in an engagement with Black Flag pirates outside Hanoi. ARTHUR J. DOMMEN AND SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Black Flags; Charner, Léonard Victor Joseph; Cochin China; Dupuis, Jean; Vietnam, History of, 938 CE through the French Conquest References Buttinger, Joseph. The Smaller Dragon: A Political History of Vietnam. New York: Praeger, 1958. Garnier, Francis. Voyage d’exploration en Indo-Chine, 1866–68. Paris: Editions la Découverte, 1985. Osborne, Milton. River Road to China: The Mekong River Expedition, 1866–73. New York: Liveright, 1975. Whitfield, Danny J. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Vietnam. Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow, 1976.
Garwood, Robert Russell Birth Date: April 1, 1946 U.S. Marine Corps private, prisoner of war (POW) during 1965–1979, and Vietnam War defector. Born on April 1, 1946, in Greensburg, Indiana, Robert (Bobby) Russell Garwood enlisted in the U.S. Marine Corps at an early age. He was sent to Vietnam, where he was attached to the Headquarters Company, 3rd Marine Division, at Da Nang as a motor pool driver. On September 28, 1965, less than two weeks before he was due to leave Vietnam, Garwood was captured by the Viet Cong (VC) in a village just south of Da Nang. As a prisoner of the VC, Garwood was treated roughly and was moved about from one jungle camp to another over the next few years. However, he had an aptitude for languages and taught himself enough Vietnamese to converse with his guards, which made him useful to them. The example of some other American POWs he had met in these camps who gave up hope and died produced in him a sheer determination to survive. Whether it was this determination to survive or some other motivating factor, Garwood by all accounts began to actively cooperate with the VC and is even alleged to have been allowed by them to carry weapons. Garwood was not released in 1973 along with other POWs. Instead, he was moved to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). After the Communists captured Saigon, he was working as a mechanic in the motor pool of a reeducation camp for South Vietnamese POWs near the border with China. Garwood soon found that he could use the occasional supply trips he made to Hanoi to induce his guards to let him visit the hotels reserved for foreigners so that he could buy candy, cigarettes, and liquor, which he then smuggled back to camp. Garwood made use of one such trip during Tet in 1979 to the Victoria Hotel to hand a hastily scribbled note, identifying himself as an American, to an
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Howes, Craig. Voices of the Vietnam POWs: Witnesses to Their Fight. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. Hubbell, John G., Andrew Jones, and Kenneth Y. Tomlinson. P.O.W.: A Definitive History of the American Prisoner-of-War Experience in Vietnam, 1964–1973. New York: Reader’s Digest, 1976. Jensen-Stevenson, Monika. Spite House: The Last Secret of the War in Vietnam. New York: Norton, 1997. Jensen-Stevenson, Monika, and William Stevenson. Kiss the Boys Goodbye: How the United States Betrayed Its Own POWs in Vietnam. New York: Dutton, 1990. “Report to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence, June 1993.” Defense Intelligence Agency POW/MIA Documents, Hickham Air Force Base, Hawaii.
Gavin, James Maurice Birth Date: March 22, 1907 Death Date: February 23, 1990
U.S. Marine Corps private Robert Garwood. Taken prisoner in South Vietnam in 1965, Garwood was not released until 1979. He was accused of collaboration with the enemy. (Bettmann/Corbis)
English-speaking guest in the snack bar. As promised, the guest, who worked for the World Bank, reported the incident to the U.S. State Department on his return to Washington. Publicity surrounding the case led to Garwood’s release, and he was flown back to the United States in military custody, arriving on March 22, 1979. At a court-martial at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, Garwood was found guilty of serving as a guard for the VC, informing on his comrades, interrogating them on military and other matters, and assaulting a fellow American POW. He was given a dishonorable discharge. Garwood was the only U.S. serviceman to be charged with these crimes from the Vietnam War. He claimed that he had been singled out in order to discredit his claims that there were still American POWs being held in Vietnam, stories that were never corroborated. In 1992 Garwood acted as a consultant for a made-for-television movie titled The Last P.O.W.: The Bobby Garwood Story. ARTHUR J. DOMMEN See also Prisoners of War, Allied References Grant, Zalin. Survivors. New York: Norton, 1975. Groom, Winston, and Duncan Spencer. Conversations with the Enemy: The Story of Pfc. Robert Garwood. New York: Putnam, 1983.
U.S. Army general and outspoken critic of America’s role in Vietnam. Born in Brooklyn, New York, on March 22, 1907, James Maurice Gavin enlisted in the U.S. Army in 1924. Securing an appointment to the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, he graduated in 1929 and was a captain in 1940 when he began his meteoric rise. One of the army’s authentic heroes of World War II, Gavin commanded the first regimental-sized parachute assault in Sicily in July 1943. Promoted to brigadier general that October, he was assistant division commander of the 82nd Airborne Division when it jumped into Normandy on June 6, 1944. In October at age 37, Gavin became the youngest major general in the U.S. Army. He commanded the 82nd Airborne Division during the Battle of the Bulge. Gavin led from the front even as a division commander, preferring to carry the M-1 rifle issued to every common soldier. After World War II Gavin served in a number of key military positions. By 1958 he was a lieutenant general and the army’s chief of Research and Development. Although one of the army’s best battlefield commanders, Gavin was far less successful in the bureaucratic battles at the Pentagon. In 1954 he strongly opposed committing any U.S. forces to Indochina to support the French there. As with his World War II contemporary General Matthew B. Ridgway, Gavin opposed the New Look military policy of President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Defense Secretary Charles E. Wilson. This policy placed high reliance on nuclear weapons and the concept of massive retaliation and reduced reliance on conventional ground forces. Early in 1958 Gavin abruptly retired from the army in frustration. Later that year he joined the consulting firm of Arthur D. Little as a vice president. In 1960 Gavin became the organization’s president, but the following year during the John F. Kennedy administration Gavin accepted appointment as ambassador to France. He held that position for a short time and then returned to Arthur D. Little. Gavin’s experience in France turned him even more strongly against American involvement in Vietnam. In 1965 he wrote an
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article on U.S. Vietnam strategy that Infantry magazine rejected as too controversial. In February 1966 the article was published in Harper’s under the title “General James Gavin vs. Our Vietnam Strategy.” In that article Gavin clearly pointed out that the American leadership had articulated no clear military objective. Gavin spoke out against the war before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in February 1966 and again in February 1967. During his second appearance he stated his belief that at the core of the Vietnam dilemma was internal civil war, which necessitated an American commitment to winning over the goodwill of the Vietnamese people. He further stated that bombing campaigns designed for psychological effect alone, in which civilians are killed or wounded, were wrong. At the invitation of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), commander General William C. Westmoreland, Gavin toured the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), but nothing he saw changed his mind. In 1968 he published the book Crisis Now, and he briefly flirted with the idea of running for president. Political professionals of both parties were unsupportive of him, and he quietly dropped from the public scene. Gavin retired from Arthur D. Little in 1977 and died in Baltimore on February 23, 1990. DAVID T. ZABECKI See also Da Nang; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Ridgway, Matthew Bunker; Westmoreland, William Childs References Booth, Michael T. Paratrooper: The Life of General James M. Gavin. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994. Gavin, James M. On to Berlin: Battles of an Airborne Commander, 1943–1946. New York: Viking, 1978.
Gayler, Noel Arthur Meredyth Birth Date: December 25, 1913 U.S. Navy admiral and commander in chief, Pacific, during the final stages of the Vietnam War. Born on December 25, 1913, son of a navy captain, Noel Arthur Meredyth Gayler attended the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis. After commissioning on graduation in 1935, he was a gunnery and engineering officer. Gayler became a naval aviator in 1940 after graduating from flight training at Naval Air Station Pensacola and served aboard the carriers USS Saratoga and Lexington in the early years of World War II. He became an ace in 1942 by shooting down five Japanese warplanes. While serving as a test pilot in the United States, Gayler received promotions to lieutenant commander and commander. In 1944 he became commander of a fighter group and returned to the Pacific theater with it the following January. He then moved to the Pacific Fleet Air Force Staff and then to the staff of Task Force 38. Prior to his promotion to captain in 1953, Gayler held a variety of posts. In 1959 and 1960 he commanded the carrier USS Ranger.
He was promoted to rear admiral in July 1961 while in London. During the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, Gayler commanded a carrier division in the Atlantic. He then served in Washington in staff positions before being promoted to vice admiral in 1967. He later became deputy director, Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, for nuclear missile and bomber forces. From 1969 to 1972 Gayler was director of the National Security Agency. In September 1972 he received promotion to admiral and was made commander in chief, Pacific, for the final stages of the Vietnam War. In this capacity he directed Operation FREQUENT WIND, the April 1975 airlift of hundreds of Americans and South Vietnamese from Saigon. He was also named U.S. military adviser to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), U.S. military representative to the Australia–New Zealand–United States (ANZUS) Council, and military adviser to the U.S.-Japanese Security Consultative Committee. Admiral Gayler continued in these posts until his retirement from the U.S. Navy in September 1976. LAURA MATYSEK WOOD See also FREQUENT WIND, Operation; United States Navy
Reference Reynolds, Clark G. Famous American Admirals. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1978.
Gelb, Leslie Howard Birth Date: March 4, 1937 Journalist, foreign policy expert, deputy director of the Policy Planning Staff of the U.S. Defense Department, and director of the Defense Department’s Vietnam Task Force during 1967–1968. Leslie Howard Gelb was born on March 4, 1937, in New Rochelle, New York. He pursued undergraduate studies in philosophy at Tufts University, graduating in 1959, and earned master’s and doctoral degrees in government and social science from Harvard University in 1961 and 1964, respectively. Gelb then taught at Harvard and later at Wesleyan University. After spending a year as an assistant to Senator Jacob K. Javits, in 1967 Gelb joined the Department of Defense as deputy director of the Policy Planning Staff. Outgoing secretary of defense Robert S. McNamara, who had come to doubt both the wisdom and morality of the Vietnam War, entrusted Gelb with the responsibility of undertaking a secret comprehensive review of the origins of U.S. military involvement in Vietnam. Gelb and 35 others took 18 months to produce the 47-volume History of the United States Decision-Making Process on Vietnam Policy. Based on Defense Department materials and popularly known as the Pentagon Papers, it traced the deepening American role in Vietnam from 1945 to 1968. Intended as a classified study not to be shared with other government departments, the Pentagon Papers were leaked to the
Geneva Accords of 1962 press in March 1971, and the New York Times and the Washington Post published substantial portions of it. Shortly afterward the U.S. Congress and, within months, the U.S. Government Printing Office each brought out far lengthier editions. The publication of the Pentagon Papers further stoked the heated public debate then in progress as to how the United States had become involved in the Vietnam War and who, if anyone, should shoulder the blame. They revealed that successive presidential administrations from that of Dwight D. Eisenhower onward had all been committed to aiding the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). After several months as acting deputy assistant secretary of defense for Policy Planning and Arms Control, Gelb left the Lyndon B. Johnson administration. Gelb’s subsequent career was divided among academe, journalism, and government service. From 1973 to 1977 he served as a diplomatic correspondent for the New York Times. From 1977 to 1979 he served in the Jimmy Carter administration as director of the State Department’s Bureau of PoliticoMilitary Affairs. Periods at the Brookings Institution and the Carnegie Endowment resulted in several books on American foreign relations including The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked (1979), which suggested that a seriously flawed bureaucratic decision-making process had led U.S. policy makers to deepen their commitment to Vietnam even though they were well aware that success was highly unlikely.
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From 1981 to 1993 Gelb returned to the New York Times, working successively as national security correspondent, editorial page editor, and foreign affairs correspondent. In 1993 he became president of the Council on Foreign Relations, the most prestigious and influential private American think tank on international affairs, a post he held until 2005 at which time he became president emeritus. In 2006 Gelb and Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.) put forth a comprehensive plan, known as the Biden-Gelb Proposal, to extricate the United States from Iraq and end the ongoing insurgency there. The proposal advanced the idea of partitioning Iraq along sectarian and ethnic lines. The idea received much serious scrutiny at the time, but the George W. Bush administration ultimately dismissed it, arguing that it might not end sectarian violence and would invite stronger Middle Eastern powers to wield more influence in newly autonomous regions. PRISCILLA ROBERTS See also McNamara, Robert Strange; Pentagon Papers and Trial References Gelb, Leslie H., with Richard K. Betts. The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1979. Olson, James S., and Randy Roberts. Where the Domino Fell: America and Vietnam, 1945–1990. New York: St. Martin’s, 1991. Rudenstine, David. The Day the Presses Stopped: A History of the Pentagon Papers Case. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996.
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Leslie H. Gelb, director of Policy Planning and Arms Control for International Security Affairs at the Department of Defense (1967–1969), director of the Vietnam Study Task Force, and diplomatic correspondent at The New York Times (1973–1977). (Bettmann/Corbis)
Big-power agreement in 1962 regarding Laos. Laos presented a difficult problem for President John F. Kennedy’s administration. The Communist Pathet Lao, advised and supported by the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) and supplied by the Soviets since 1960, was threatening in 1961 to take Vientiane and convert Laos into a Communist satellite country and conduit for the export of wars of national liberation throughout Southeast Asia, this despite the fact that Laotian neutrality had been guaranteed by the 1954 Geneva Accords. Advised by U.S. assistant secretary of state W. Averell Harriman, who met with Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev in the spring of 1961 and received assurances of cooperation from him, the Kennedy administration rejected military intervention under Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) Plan 5 in favor of neutralization, as suggested by Khrushchev. The Kennedy administration insisted on a cease-fire before convening a 14-nation conference on Laos. In the interim the Pathet Lao engaged in a land grab, seizing key towns such as Tchepone, which subsequently became the center of PAVN supply activity serving the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The Geneva Conference convened on May 6, 1961, but dragged on despite the U.S. concession that provided for a weak International Control Commission
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(ICC), which could inspect only if all three factions in the proposed coalition government for Laos agreed. The Pathet Lao, whose offensive was often spearheaded by PAVN troops, exploited the months of no progress by extending the area under its control to support North Vietnamese use of the trail in southeastern Laos. When the Pathet Lao seized the key town of Nam Tha, Kennedy, in what proved to be a successful bluff, sent 5,000 U.S. troops into northeastern Thailand and sent the Seventh Fleet to the Gulf of Siam. This produced a halt in the Communist advance and permitted the formation of the neutralist government of Souvanna Phouma, recognized in the final accords of July 23, 1962. Although the accords required the removal of all foreign military personnel from Laos under international supervision within 75 days, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) allowed the international inspectors to observe the departure of only 40 personnel, and the Pathet Lao announced that they had no foreign troops. Thus, the North Vietnamese, who then had an estimated 10,000 troops inside Laos at the time the Geneva Accords was signed, continued to exploit southeastern Laos as a corridor to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), and the Soviets deflected U.S. pressure to adhere to their promises and responsibilities to ensure compliance. Vietnamese sources state that while the North Vietnamese allegedly withdrew the bulk of their military personnel from the Plain of Jars and northern Laos, the North Vietnamese in fact did not withdraw their forces stationed along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in central and southern Laos. These Vietnamese histories reveal that during a three-month period following the signing of the Geneva Accord on Laos, Vietnamese Ho Chi Minh Trail forces, which according to Vietnamese statistics totaled almost 5,000 men as of December 1962, transported almost 1,000 tons of supplies, including more than 600 tons of weapons and ammunition, down the Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos to delivery points in South Vietnam. The Kennedy administration removed its military and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) personnel from Laos, accepting a “tacit agreement” that, in effect, conceded southeastern Laos as a corridor for guerrilla infiltration into South Vietnam in return for the continuation of a neutralist government in northeastern Laos. Secretary of State Dean Rusk said that Communist noncompliance “bitterly disappointed” Kennedy and affected his subsequent decision making on Vietnam. In fact, the facade of a neutral Laos during the course of the Vietnam War restricted U.S. strategic options and enabled the transport of some 500,000 troops and 45 million tons of war matériel along the Ho Chi Minh Trail network to South Vietnam. CLAUDE R. SASSO See also Geneva Conference and Geneva Accords of 1954; Harriman, William Averell; Ho Chi Minh Trail; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeyevich; Laos; Rusk, David Dean; Souvanna Phouma
References Hannah, Norman, B. The Key to Failure: Laos and the Vietnam War. New York: Madison Books, 1987. Johnson, U. Alexis, with Jef Olivarius McAllister. The Right Hand of Power. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1984. Nguyen Viet Phuong. Lich Su Bo Doi Truong Son Duong Ho Chi Minh [History of the Annamite Mountain Troops of the Ho Chi Minh Trail]. Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1994. Nguyen Viet Phuong. Van Tai Quan Su Chien Luoc Tren Duong Ho Chi Minh Trong Khang Chien Chong My [Strategic Military Transportation on the Ho Chi Minh Trail during the Resistance War against the Americans]. Hanoi: People’s Army of Vietnam, General Department of Rear Services, 1988. Rusk, Dean. As I Saw It. Edited by Daniel S. Papp. New York: Norton, 1990.
Geneva Conference and Geneva Accords of 1954 International conference held in 1954 that brought to an end the Indochina War. The Geneva Conference had begun on April 26, 1954, with negotiations directed toward converting the previous year’s armistice in Korea into a permanent peace. Negotiations on that issue produced no result, however. Separate negotiations over the ongoing war in Indochina began on May 8, one day after the fall of the French bastion of Dien Bien Phu in northwestern Vietnam to the Viet Minh. The Indochina talks involved representatives— in most cases the foreign ministers—of France, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Britain, Laos, Cambodia, and the State of Vietnam (later the Republic of Vietnam [RVN, South Vietnam]). The United States and the State of Vietnam proposed that North Vietnamese forces (the Viet Minh) be disarmed and that the French-created State of Vietnam be left in control of all of Vietnam. Because North Vietnam was winning the war, while the State of Vietnam was a junior partner on the losing side, this proposal was simply ignored by those who were serious about an agreement, principally the representatives of France, North Vietnam, China, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain. Washington never really believed that there was a chance that its proposals would be accepted. U.S. secretary of state John Foster Dulles was a restive participant in the first few days of the talks on Korea but then left the conference. He saw no likelihood of an agreement on Indochina that Washington could approve, and he disliked the idea of negotiating with Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai), foreign minister and premier of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Washington did not recognize the PRC, and Dulles despised it. Indeed, when Zhou approached Dulles to shake hands during a recess in the first session over the issue of Korea, Dulles simply turned his back. After Dulles’s May 3 departure, the U.S. delegation in Geneva was headed at various times by Undersecretary of State Walter Bedell Smith or by U.S. ambassador to Czechoslovakia U. Alexis
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The delegations of the Republic of Colombia and the Soviet Union listen to discussions at the Geneva Conference on April 28, 1954. Though the focus of the conference was to be a peace settlement for Korea, negotiations centered on ending the Indochina War. (Bettmann/Corbis)
Johnson. Johnson was under orders from Dulles not to participate in the negotiations but instead to sit and listen. On June 17, 1954, Pierre Mendès-France became France’s premier and minister of foreign affairs. In a bold statement on June 20 he threatened to resign if he could not achieve an agreement in one month (i.e., by July 20). The accords were actually completed during the early morning hours of July 21, but the clocks had been stopped to allow a pretense that it was still July 20. During the Geneva Conference, both China and the Soviet Union had put pressure on North Vietnam to conclude a settlement. They were eager to end the fighting in order to reduce world tensions and make it easier for them to break out of their international isolation. This pressure was instrumental in causing North Vietnamese leaders to accept an agreement under which the Viet Minh gave up large amounts of territory and population then under its control in exchange for a promise of later reunification. There have also been assertions that Moscow obtained something more concrete in exchange for its pressure on North Vietnam to accept the Geneva Accords: a promise that France would refuse to join the proposed European Defense Community (EDC), an organization that would have considerably strengthened the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). North Vietnamese foreign minister Pham Van Dong, who was less than certain that reunification of North Vietnam and South Vietnam would actually occur as promised in the accords, submitted to this pressure reluctantly. Some authors have stated that the North Vietnamese leadership believed that reunification would not occur as promised, but evidence for that assertion is questionable. The accords included separate peace agreements for Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos (signed by French, North Vietnamese, and Cambodian officers) and an unsigned declaration of the conference. There were also unilateral declarations by several governments. The Laotian and Cambodian governments associated with the French Union were left in control of their respective countries except for two provinces of northeastern Laos, where the Pathet Lao (Laotian Communists) were to concentrate their forces pending a political settlement. Vietnam was to be temporarily split in approximately equal halves. A demilitarized zone (DMZ) along the 17th Parallel separated the two areas. The portion north of the DMZ was to be governed by the DRV, and the portion south of the DMZ would be
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governed by the French Union until 1956. North Vietnam had slightly more than half the population of Vietnam, but this was also considerably less territory and population than the Viet Minh controlled at the time the agreement was signed. Authorities in each zone were forbidden to take reprisals against people who had supported the other side in the recent war. The two zones were to be reunified following internationally supervised elections in 1956, and most participants at the conference assumed that the Communist leaders of North Vietnam would win such elections if they were held. During the 300-day period that it would take for all North Vietnamese armed forces to leave South Vietnam and for all French Union forces to leave North Vietnam, civilians could also move from one zone to the other if they so chose. Many northerners, mainly Catholics, went south; far fewer southern supporters of the North Vietnamese government moved north. The accords forbade Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia from participating in military alliances; this is why none became members of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) when it was established a few months after the end of the Geneva Conference. The accords also limited the introduction of foreign troops and weapons into Indochina. As the Geneva Accords provisions for Vietnam collapsed over the following years, the restriction on foreign troops eventually became the only important part of the accords still taken seriously, the only issue in regard to which there continued to be at least a pretense of compliance and enforcement. Supervision of the implementation of the Geneva Accords was left to the International Commission for Supervision and Control, usually referred to as the International Control Commission (ICC). India, Canada, and Poland each supplied one-third of the ICC personnel, and India furnished the chairman. Washington was not happy with the Geneva settlement. The widespread belief that the U.S. government pledged not to undermine the accords arises from misreading of a U.S. declaration of July 21, 1954. This stated only that the United States would not go so far as to use force or the threat of force in undermining the accords. Washington certainly hoped to prevent the reunification of Vietnam as called for by the accords but was not sure of its ability to do so. Years later after reunification had indeed been blocked, Washington began claiming that the Geneva Accords had proclaimed South Vietnam an independent country. Ngo Dinh Diem, who in June 1954 became premier of the State of Vietnam, disliked the accords even more than did the Americans, but his position in his early months in office was weak. He did not at first have real control over the Vietnamese National Army or even the Saigon police. His representative at Geneva, Foreign Minister Tran Van Do, was unable to influence the shaping of the accords, and Diem obviously did not have the ability to block their implementation. Before the middle of 1955, however, Diem had attained effective control of most of South Vietnam, and in July of that year he declared his refusal to discuss with North Vietnam the
holding of the 1956 elections. Diem endorsed the idea of reunification—he always said that Vietnam was one nation rather than two—but rejected the procedures established by the accords for achieving reunification. EDWIN E. MOISE See also Canada; Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; Dulles, John Foster; India; Indochina War; Johnson, Ural Alexis; Knowland, William Fife; Mendès-France, Pierre; Ngo Dinh Diem; Pham Van Dong; Poland; Smith, Walter Bedell; Zhou Enlai References Arnold, James R. The First Domino: Eisenhower, the Military, and America’s Intervention in Vietnam. New York: William Morrow, 1991. Randle, Robert F. Geneva 1954: The Settlement of the Indochinese War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969. U.S. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Vol. 16, The Geneva Conference. U.S. Department of State Publication 9167. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981. Young, Kenneth T. The 1954 Geneva Conference. New York: Greenwood, 1968.
Geneva Convention of 1949 The Geneva Convention of 1949 was an enlarged version of the Geneva Convention of 1929, which it replaced. The Geneva Convention dealt with the treatment of prisoners of war (POWs). During the Korean War, controversy centered on the 1949 document’s Convention IV, covering the treatment of POWs, specifically their right to repatriation. The Communists stuck to the literal interpretation of Article 118 of the 1949 convention. Article 118 stated that “Prisoners of War shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.” The United Nations Command (UNC), on the other hand, favored a looser interpretation of the accords and proposed nonforcible repatriation. This difference was present not only during the armistice negotiations but also in the United Nations (UN) General Assembly. The United States emphasized that the 1949 document was to defend the individual, whereas the Communist side argued that the document was meant to ensure the rights of the countries to which the POWs belonged. The U.S. stand arose in part from World War II, during which millions had escaped from the Communist sphere of influence to Western Europe, only to be returned and punished. Washington did not wish to suffer such a political defeat again. Another reason for the UNC stand was that there were about 150,000 Communist POWs, whereas only 10,000 UNC POWs were held by the Communists in their POW camps. Thus, compulsory repatriation would have yielded excessive advantage to the Communist forces. Interestingly, the United States, although among the signatory powers of the 1949 Geneva Convention, never ratified the docu-
Genovese, Eugene Dominick ment. And neither the People’s Republic of China (PRC) nor the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) had signed the convention. Still, both sides professed their intention to adhere to its principles and spirit, although on occasion the Communists articulated that because they had not signed the document, they were not bound by its terms. The Geneva Convention of 1949 required that adequate information regarding the number, location, and general situation of POWs be forwarded to the Red Cross. The Communists repeatedly failed to provide this information in spite of UNC protests. The Chinese held that the return of POWs should be more important than information about them. Because China was not among the Geneva Convention signatory powers, the Chinese took the position that they were not bound by its terms. The Geneva Convention of 1949 also called for marking POW and civilian internee camps. Yet most Communist camps were unmarked, and the loss of prisoner lives during UNC aerial attacks always presented the Communists with a good opportunity for propaganda. POW camps in North Korea were often in close proximity to potential UNC targets. Indeed, UNC POWs were held as human shields against UNC air strikes. Communist propaganda did not fail to exploit the underlying opportunities in having masses of Chinese and North Korean prisoners in the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea). Defying the terms of the Geneva Convention, Communist leaders often encouraged riots in UNC camps. One infamous example was the Koje-do POW uprising of May–June 1953. In the Communist-controlled camps, the Chinese also launched a massive program of indoctrination. In their camps, compulsory political lessons were held every day to prove the superiority of the Communist system and indoctrinate the prisoners for propaganda purposes. To a lesser extent, the United States introduced an educational program for Communist POWs to demonstrate the supremacy of capitalism and Western values. After the most divisive issue of the talks had delayed the armistice by more than a year, the first steps toward a compromise came in early 1953 when, in Operation LITTLE SWITCH under Article 109 of the Geneva Convention, both sides agreed to an exchange of sick and wounded POWs. ZSOLT J. VARGA See also China, People’s Republic of; Japan; Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of; Korea, Republic of; United States, Involvement in Indochina through 1954 References Bailey, Sydney. The Korean Armistice. New York: St. Martin’s, 1992. Clark, Mark W. From the Danube to the Yalu. New York: Harper and Row, 1954. The Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949. Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1949. Hastings, Max. The Korean War. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987. Vatcher, William H., Jr. Panmunjom. New York: Praeger, 1958.
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Genovese, Eugene Dominick Birth Date: May 19, 1930 Noted U.S. historian, educator, and antiwar activist whose Marxist historical interpretations raised much controversy. Born in Brooklyn, New York, on May 19, 1930, the son of Italian immigrants, Eugene Dominick Genovese earned a BA degree from Brooklyn College in 1953 and then attended Columbia University, where he received a master’s degree in 1955 and a PhD in 1959. As a teenager he joined the Communist Party, only to be expelled in 1950. Genovese remained a Marxist, however, reflecting his convictions in his writings on slavery. In April 1965 while an associate professor at Rutgers University, Genovese stirred controversy when he declared at an antiwar teach-in his Marxist/Socialist predilections and further stated that he would neither fear nor regret a Viet Cong (VC) victory in Vietnam. His remarks quickly became an issue in the New Jersey gubernatorial contest. Republican candidate Wayne Dumont demanded Genovese’s dismissal and attacked Democratic incumbent Richard Hughes for refusing to do so on grounds of academic freedom. Richard Nixon, who supported Dumont, also called for Genovese’s ouster. For his part, Genovese wanted a political rather than a military victory by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and had no wish for American troops to die in Vietnam. Nevertheless, conservatives such as 1964 Republican presidential candidate Barry Goldwater denounced Genovese for “treason.” Although Hughes’s victory in the November election defused the issue, Genovese left Rutgers to teach in Canada. He continued to denounce American military involvement, commenting that U.S. forces sought to fight the Vietnamese revolution by destroying the Vietnamese people. In 1969 Genovese returned from his selfimposed exile in Canada to teach at the University of Rochester. He remained there until 1990, when he became a scholar-in-residence at Emory University, Georgia. Genovese is a prolific scholar, having written or cowritten some nine monographs, including his most famous, Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made (1974), which won the prestigious Bancroft Prize. In the 1990s Genovese seemed to move rightward, virtually abandoning his lifelong affinity for Marxism. In 1998 he helped found an alterative professional association for historians known as the Historical Society. With it he hoped to bridge the divide among historians by uniting them around traditional methodologies. His journey toward the Right also saw him reconciled with the Roman Catholic Church and witnessed his critique of classical liberalism shift from a Marxist interpretation to a conservative interpretation. JAMES FRIGUGLIETTI See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Goldwater, Barry Morris; Nixon, Richard Milhous
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References Beichman, Arnold. “Study in Academic Freedom.” New York Times Magazine, December 19, 1965. Linden, Adrianus Arnoldus Maria Van Der. A Revolt Against Liberalism: American Radical Historians, 1959–1976. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1996. Steirer, William F. “Eugene D. Genovese: Marxist-Romantic Historian of the South.” Southern Review 10 (1974): 840–850.
Geography of Indochina and Vietnam Located in the Northern Hemisphere within the Southeast Asian realm between the 8th and 23rd parallels and the 100th and 110th meridians, the Indochinese peninsula acts as a crossroads with India to the west, China to the north, and a large archipelagic extension into the South China Sea to the southeast. A part of Indochina, Vietnam is situated east of Laos and Cambodia along the Gulf of Tonkin and South China Sea littoral. Indochina goes by different names. It is known in the German language as Hinterindien, while the French have for some time referred to the area as I’Inde extérieure, alluding to its Indianized portion to the west. Indochina was actually a political creation of France, a colonial area containing Laos, Cambodia, Tonkin, Annam, and Cochin China, with the latter three reunited in 1975 as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV). Topographically, Indochina’s mountains overlay nearly as much territory as its plains, but the level lands house most of the population. Chinese mountain chains reach into the region and provide threadlike river valleys used as paths by migratory groups entering from the north. Consequently, the Indochinese peninsula has been greatly affected by the contacts and cultures of outside civilizations. Climatically, northern Indochina experiences weather controlled by tropical and polar air masses, creating a noticeable winter season, while the south is regulated by equatorial and tropical air masses, resulting in warm temperatures during the entire year. Rainfall quantity and its seasonal occurrence affect farming intensity, distributions, and limitations. Rice, the primary crop, is grown throughout Indochina because precipitation and summer temperatures are close to perfect for its cultivation. Unfortunately, typhoons threaten recurrently, and with winds surpassing 90 miles per hour, the Vietnamese seacoast in particular is often ravaged. The Indochina peninsula contains seven physical regions. To the southwest in Cambodia, the jagged Cardamom and Elephant Mountains, forested and agriculturally unyielding, are lightly settled and occupied by the tribal Pears. The Tonle Sap Basin, Mekong Lowlands, and Angkor region, a second Cambodian area, is located to the northeast of the Cardamom and Elephant Mountains and is bordered by the Dangrek Range to the north and the Annamite Cordillera to the east. The region houses the ancient Khmer core at Angkor. To the north lie the Upper Mekong Valley and Laos, the heartland of the Lao people. Farther east are the Annamite Cordillera and Northern Mountains and Plateaus, a highland re-
gion situated in parts of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam and a local sanctuary for the Montagnards. The northeastern corner of Indochina, or Tonkin, holds the productive Red River Delta, the center of Vietnamese civilization, while the narrow coastal plains and former Champa area connect the Red River Delta with the mainly Vietnamese region of the Mekong Delta and Funan to the south. Called the “starving seahorse” because of an elongated shape stretching 1,000 miles from north to south, Vietnam is accessible by land and water to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to the north. Vietnam’s extensive coastline means vulnerability to invasion and exposure to typhoons yet contributes to the country’s food supply and promotes national unity via sea communications. Indeed, the Vietnamese, renowned as skillful sailors, draw on their “balcony of the Pacific” for salt and fish to produce the well-known condiment nuoc mam, a fish sauce. Often described as “two rice baskets at the opposite ends of their carrying pole,” Vietnam’s two broad deltas are linked by a long and thin stretch of territory that is no more than 50 miles wide east to west. This central section, called Annam (from the Chinese meaning “Pacified South”) by the French, is interspersed by rivers and mountains, a few touching the shoreline, that inhibit north-south landward transportation. However, this narrow strip yields rice, salt, and fish and possesses Da Nang (Tourane) and Cam Ranh Bays as well as the onetime imperial capital of Hue. The northern Red River Delta is 250 miles wide and bracketed by inland hills and mountains. With fertile alluvium produced by numerous rivers, particularly the Red River, this deltaic agricultural heartland and Hanoi, the national capital, experience temperatures averaging 85 degrees in the summer and 62 degrees in the winter. Rainfall is heavy but variable and is influenced by seasonal winds, or monsoons, that bring forth wet and dry periods with an average six feet of rain in the summer months. Yet uneven precipitation can bring as little as three and as much as more than eight feet of rain during the rainy season. Such extremes portend either aridity or inundation and require the creation of a hydraulic system of dikes, canals, and dams for water control. Designated Tonkin by the French, the north is Vietnam’s core, acting as a market complex, manufacturer drawing on nearby minerals, and transportation hub served by the port of Haiphong at the mouth of the delta. In the south, or what France labeled Cochin China, the Mekong Delta has temperatures averaging 86 degrees in the summer and 80 degrees in the winter. During rainy summer months, mean precipitation is six feet but, like the north, could be less or exceed that amount. The wide and fertile delta, interlaced by streams and canals, is a major rice-growing region despite the existence of extensive forests, swamps, and jungle, or what the Vietnamese refer to as the land of “bad water,” inhabited by beasts they defer to as “mister.” Although there are a number of large cities including the capital of Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City (formerly Saigon) remains the country’s most important urban area. RODNEY J. ROSS
Germany, Federal Republic of
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U.S. soldiers transport a wounded comrade in the Mekong Delta of South Vietnam, an area of great strategic importance throughout the Indochina and Vietnam wars. The Mekong Delta has temperatures averaging 86 degrees Fahrenheit in the summer and 80 degrees Fahrenheit in the winter. Precipitation averages more than six feet of rainfall a year. (National Archives)
See also Annam; Cambodia; Central Highlands; Chams and the Kingdom of Champa; Cochin China; Dikes, Red River Delta; Laos; Mekong Delta; Montagnards; Red River Delta; Tonkin; Vietnam, Climate of References Buttinger, Joseph. Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled. 2 vols. New York: Praeger, 1967. Dutt, Ashok J., ed. Southeast Asia: Realm of Contrasts. 3rd rev. ed. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985. Dwyer, Denis J., ed. South East Asian Development. New York: Wiley/ Longman, 1990. SarDesai, D. R. Southeast Asia: Past and Present. 5th ed. Boulder, CO: Westview, 2003.
Germany, Federal Republic of Central European nation with a 1968 population of 60.16 million people. During the Cold War (1945–1991), the Federal Republic of
Germany (FRG, West Germany) covered 96,019 square miles. West Germany was bordered by the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) and Czechoslovakia to the east; Austria and Switzerland to the south; France, Luxembourg, Belgium, and the Netherlands to the west; and the North Sea to the north. West Germany was a federated representative democracy with a chancellor as head of government who exercised broad executive powers and a president who was head of state and largely handled legislative-related issues. Under Chancellors Ludwig Erhard (1963–1966) and Kurt Kiesinger (1966–1969), the government of West Germany loyally supported U.S. policies in Vietnam. West Germany’s contributions consisted of economic and humanitarian aid. In 1966 the West German government sent the hospital ship SS Helgoland as well as more than 200 medical and technical personnel to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). West Germany also provided approximately $7.5 million annually in foreign aid to South Vietnam. Additionally, the West German government gave $21.3 million in credits for capital projects and commodity imports, constructed
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and staffed nine social centers in Saigon, and donated large quantities of medical supplies and equipment to South Vietnam. In 1969 the West German government financed a 170-bed hospital in Da Nang to replace the SS Helgoland. In March 1967 West Germany’s Maltese Aid Service program for refugees included doctors, dentists, and nurses to provide health care to Vietnamese civilians. German teachers taught at the high school and university level in Vietnam, and scholarships were awarded annually for Vietnamese students to study in West Germany. Three professors, members of the West German Cultural Mission who taught at the Hue Faculty of Medicine, and the wife of one of them were among those people abducted and murdered by Communist forces during the attack on Hue, part of the 1968 Tet Offensive. Although Bonn had supported, albeit reluctantly, Washington in South Vietnam, as the war dragged on the West German public, especially its youths, became critical of American policy there. This was particularly true among university students. The protest movement was centered in the major German cities and reached a peak with the eruption of violent demonstrations in 1968. Although Chancellor Willy Brandt (1969–1974) got along tolerably with President Richard Nixon, the American president was far less popular in West Germany than was Brandt in the United States. In January 1973 Brandt’s finance minister and Social Democratic Party colleague Helmut Schmidt criticized in a speech in Washington the December 1972 bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). The end of the war, however, removed Vietnam as an impediment in U.S.–West German relations. PIA C. HEYN AND SPENCER C. TUCKER
Naomi Levy, a Russian émigré and devoted Marxist. Ginsberg attended Columbia University with the intention of becoming a lawyer but soon switched to literature, graduating in 1948. After college he held a variety of jobs, including stints as a dishwasher, a welder in the Brooklyn Navy Yard, and a merchant sailor. He rose to prominence in the 1950s as a leader of the Beat generation, along with novelist Jack Kerouac and others, and shocked America with his celebration of drugs and alternative lifestyles. Perhaps Ginsberg’s best-known work was Howl! and Other Poems (1956). This profane and graphic work lauded homosexuality, dealt with Ginsberg’s Communist upbringing, and scandalized 1950s America. The poem “Howl!” begins with “I saw the best minds of my generation destroyed by madness, starving hysterical naked.” The work goes on to sharply condemn militarism and materialism, which Ginsberg believed were bankrupting the nation both monetarily and spiritually. Although the poem was carefully and methodically crafted, its style lends to it an air of improvisation, as if it were a mere spontaneous ode to the present. Ginsberg was equally at home in the protests and sexual liberation of the 1960s and in the forefront of whatever movement was in vogue. In 1962 and 1963 he traveled widely in the Far East, where he soon became an adherent of Zen Buddhism. He sought
See also Nguyen Phuc Anh References Brandt, Willy. People and Politics: The Years 1960–1973. Translated by J. Maxwell Brownjohn. Boston: Little, Brown, 1978. Gatzke, Hans W. Germany and the United States: “A Special Relationship?” Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980. Larsen, Stanley Robert, and James Lawton Collins Jr. Allied Participation in Vietnam. Vietnam Studies Series. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975.
Gia Long See Nguyen Phuc Anh
Ginsberg, Allen Birth Date: June 3, 1926 Death Date: April 5, 1997 Counterculture artist and poet of the Beat generation. Born on June 3, 1926, in Newark, New Jersey, Allen Ginsberg was the son of schoolteacher and sometime poet Louis Ginsberg and the former
Poet Allen Ginsberg opposed the Vietnam War. His poems, particularly “Howl” and “Kaddish,” embody the values and aesthetic of the Beat Generation of writers in the 1950s and 1960s. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)
Godley, George McMurtrie the decriminalization of marijuana and marched against the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the shah of Iran. Ginsberg also opposed the Vietnam War and was arrested in 1967 in New York City for protesting against the war and again in Chicago at the protest demonstrations held during the August 1968 Democratic National Convention. Ginsberg testified at the trial of the Chicago Eight. Ginsberg was also a proponent of gay liberation, the drug culture, and pacifism in general. By the 1960s his poetry had evolved to reflect their function as performance pieces, taking on the incantatory quality of Indian mantras. Other notable works by Ginsberg include Airplane Dreams: Compositions from Journals (1968); The Gates of Wrath: Rhymed Poems, 1948–1952 (1972); The Fall of America: Poems of These States (1973), winner of the National Book Award; and White Shroud: Poems, 1980–1985 (1986). Ginsberg continued to write poetry into the 1990s, and in 1995 his Cosmopolitan Greetings: Poems, 1986–1992 was a finalist for the Pulitzer Prize in Poetry. Ginsberg, who had liver cancer, died of a heart attack in New York City on April 5, 1997. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Chicago Eight; Democratic National Convention of 1968 References Kramer, Jane. Allen Ginsberg in America. New York: Random House, 1969. Miles, Barry. Ginsberg: A Biography. Riverside, NJ: Simon and Schuster, 1989.
Godley, George McMurtrie Birth Date: August 23, 1917 Death Date: November 7, 1999 U.S. diplomat. George McMurtrie Godley was born on August 23, 1917, in New York City. He graduated from Yale University in 1939, undertook graduate work at the University of Chicago, and entered the U.S. Foreign Service in 1941. He spent the World War II years in Bern, Switzerland, where he worked closely with Allen Dulles, head of the Office of Strategic Service’s operations in that country and future director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Godley occupied a variety of diplomatic positions in Washington and abroad during the postwar years. His first Asian assignment came in 1955, when he served two years as counselor of the embassy in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. He went on to hold a similar position in Leopoldville, Congo, and then became director of the Office of Central African Affairs in Washington. Godley’s first ambassadorial posting was to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (later Zaire) in 1964. Shortly after his arrival, a rebellion supported by states of the Communist bloc broke out
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against the government of Moise Tshombe. Godley played a key role in suppressing the rebellion, coordinating the air operations that were sponsored by the CIA with the Belgian-paid mercenaries who fought for Tshombe. Godley’s experience in the Congo made him a natural choice for Laos, where he became ambassador in April 1969. By presidential directive, Godley was responsible for “overall direction, coordination, and supervision” of all military operations in Laos. By all accounts, the cigar-smoking, tough-talking, six-foot-tall Godley brought a great deal of enthusiasm to the job. He presided over daily embassy operations meetings, where he received detailed briefings on developments in the war over the preceding 24 hours. During critical periods, Godley would attend evening meetings at the airport in Vientiane, where he would hear directly from CIA case officers who had just returned from the fighting. In January 1970 the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) expanded the war in Laos by sending two People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) divisions to deal with the CIA-led forces there. Godley secured Washington’s approval to use Boeing B-52 Stratofortresses against the PAVN troop concentrations. Although U.S. airpower managed to arrest the Communist offensive, the fighting took a heavy toll on the Hmongs, who shouldered most of the combat burden in Laos. To replace the declining numbers of Hmong soldiers, Godley arranged with Thai officials to recruit “volunteer” battalions to serve in Laos. Led by Thai regular officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs), these units were funded by the U.S. government. The B-52s and CIA-paid Thai troops delayed a Communist victory in Laos, but they could not prevent it. By the time Godley left his post in April 1973, a cease-fire agreement had been signed and a new coalition government formed. Within two years the Communists gained complete control over Laos. Godley was caught in the antiwar sentiment that dominated Congress in the mid-1970s, and his nomination as assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs was rejected by the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee. Committee chairman J. William Fulbright pointedly argued that Godley’s association with failed policies in Southeast Asia made him a poor choice to oversee U.S. diplomacy in the region. Godley went on to serve as ambassador to Lebanon prior to his retirement from the Foreign Service in 1975. In 1992 he was asked to testify at the Senate’s Select Committee on POW-MIA Affairs. At those hearings he stated that the U.S. government had done all in its power to recover prisoners of war (POWs) and that when American forces pulled out of the region in 1973, all had been accounted for. This was in contrast to government reports that as many as 135 American POWs had been left behind. After his retirement, Godley successfully battled a bout with throat cancer and founded the Glimmerglass Opera in Cooperstown, New York, of which he was chairman emeritus at the time of his death in Oneonta, New York, on November 7, 1999. WILLIAM M. LEARY
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See also Central Intelligence Agency; Hmongs; Laos; Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, Army References ”Diplomat with Aggressive Style.” New York Times, July 12, 1973. Healy, Barth. “McMurtrie Godley, 82, Envoy to Laos during Vietnam War.” Washington Post, November 10, 1999. Leary, William M. “The CIA and the ‘Secret’ War in Laos: The Battle for Skyline Ridge, 1971–1972.” Journal of Military History 59 (July 1995): 505–517. “Our Man in Vientiane.” Washington Post, October 1, 1972.
Goldberg, Arthur Joseph Birth Date: August 8, 1908 Death Date: January 20, 1990 U.S. secretary of labor during 1961–1962, U.S. Supreme Court justice during 1962–1965, ambassador to the United Nations (UN) during 1965–1968, and presidential adviser on Vietnam War policy. Born in Chicago, Illinois, on August 8, 1908, Arthur Joseph Goldberg attended De Paul University in Chicago and received his
law degree from Northwestern University in 1929. He then opened a practice specializing in labor law in Chicago. Goldberg served in the U.S. Army during World War II, beginning at the rank of captain and leaving the service in 1945 at the rank of major. Prominent in the field of labor law, Goldberg became general counsel of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) and the United Steelworkers of America in 1948. As such, he was instrumental in the 1955 merging of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and the CIO. As President John Kennedy’s secretary of labor during 1961– 1962, Goldberg was also often consulted on foreign affairs, including the evolving Vietnam War. Kennedy appointed Goldberg to the Supreme Court in 1962, and President Lyndon B. Johnson asked Goldberg to leave the Court for the UN in 1965, which he did only after much prodding from the president. Goldberg was a member of the inner-circle group known as the Wise Men, which Johnson often consulted on Vietnam policy. Goldberg was a consistent critic of the war, often urging Johnson to withdraw from the conflict. Goldberg maintained a good working relationship with UN secretary-general U Thant of Burma, and the two men tried several times to initiate a negotiated peace in Vietnam. After the 1968 Tet Offensive, Goldberg became weary of his attempts at peace and resigned that June. He returned to his law practice, this time in New York City. In 1970 Goldberg ran unsuccessfully for the governorship of New York against popular Republican incumbent Nelson Rockefeller. After Goldberg’s loss, he moved to a farm in northern Virginia and commenced the practice of law in Washington, D.C. In 1977 at the behest of President Jimmy Carter, Goldberg served as U.S. ambassador to the Belgrade Conference on Human Rights, for which service he was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1978. He also served on numerous boards and organizations and authored two books. Goldberg died in New York City on January 20, 1990. DEBRA HALL AND PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR. See also Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Paris Negotiations; U Thant; Wise Men References Frank, John P., Leon Freedman, and Fred L. Israel, eds. The Justices of the United States Supreme Court: Their Lives and Major Opinions. New York: Chelsea House, 1995. Goldberg, Arthur J. Equal Justice: The Supreme Court in the Warren Era. Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1971. The Supreme Court Justices: Illustrated Biographies. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1993.
Goldman, Eric Frederick Arthur Goldberg served as U.S. secretary of labor, associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, and ambassador to the United Nations. A member of the presidential advisory group known as the “Wise Men,” he was a consistent critic of U.S. Vietnam policy. (Harris & Ewing/Collection of the Supreme Court of the United States)
Birth Date: July 15, 1915 Death Date: February 19, 1989 Noted historian, author, commentator, speaker, and special consultant to President Lyndon B. Johnson from February 1964 to
Goldwater, Barry Morris August 1966. Born in Washington, D.C., on July 17, 1915, Eric Frederick Goldman received a PhD in history from Johns Hopkins University in 1937 at just 22 years of age. He then joined the faculty at Princeton University, where he taught American history until his death in 1989. In 1964 President Johnson asked Goldman to join the White House staff. As special consultant, one of his projects was to associate the White House with the blossoming arts community. In June 1966 Goldman organized the White House Festival of the Arts. Artists, writers, photographers, sculptors, musicians, dancers, and filmmakers were selected to participate in the event. Selection was based on talent, with no consideration given to the artist’s political ideology. Days before the festival, Robert Lowell, a prominent writer, sent to Johnson a letter in which he turned down the invitation to participate because he said that it would give the impression that he condoned several of Johnson’s recent foreign policy decisions, including the U.S. bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and intervention in the Dominican Republic. The letter was published in the New York Times. From that point on the festival became a source of tension, as several participants used the opportunity to express antiadministration sentiments. Problems associated with the event ultimately led to Goldman’s resignation in August 1966. After leaving the White House, he returned to Princeton University to teach. Goldman wrote a number of critically acclaimed books, including a study of President Johnson, and also wrote for both scholarly and popular journals and magazines and was a speaker and commentator on both radio and television. Goldman died on February 19, 1989, in Princeton, New Jersey. CYNTHIA NORTHRUP See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Art and the Vietnam War; Johnson, Lyndon Baines References Goldman, Eric F. Crucial Decade: America, 1945–1955. New York: Knopf, 1965. Goldman, Eric F. The Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson. New York: Knopf, 1969. Goodwin, Doris Kearns. Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream. New York: Harper and Row, 1976.
Goldwater, Barry Morris Birth Date: January 1, 1909 Death Date: May 29, 1998 U.S. senator from Arizona (1953–1965, 1969–1987) and Republican Party candidate for president in 1964. Born in Phoenix in the U.S. Territory of Arizona on January 1, 1909, Barry Goldwater graduated from the Staunton Military Academy in Virginia in 1928. He then attended the University of Arizona for one year, leaving to run the family’s department store upon the
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Senator Barry Goldwater was the leader of the conservative wing of the Republican Party in the 1960s and a strong supporter of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. He won his party’s nomination for president in 1964 but lost the general election in a landslide to Democratic Party candidate and sitting president Lyndon B. Johnson. (Library of Congress)
death of his father. Goldwater became president of the company in 1937. During World War II, Goldwater served in the Army Air Forces in the Pacific theater, attaining the rank of lieutenant colonel; he later rose to the rank of major general in the reserves. After the war, in 1949 Goldwater was elected to the Phoenix City Council, and in 1952 he was elected U.S. senator. Among his varied committee assignments, he served as chair of the Armed Services Committee and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. In 1973 he voted against the War Powers Act, arguing that it was improper and probably illegal. During his time in the Senate, Goldwater became an articulate champion of the conservative wing of the Republican Party. He became renowned as a plainspoken advocate of smaller, less intrusive government and the proponent of a hawkish stance visà-vis communism. In 1964 Goldwater ran for the presidency as the Republican nominee. During the campaign he advocated a strong military establishment with a heavy reliance on airpower and a rollback of government-sponsored social welfare programs. He was also steadfast in his commitment to halting the spread of communism, and on more than one occasion he referred to Communist leaders
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as captors of enslaved peoples. Goldwater was very hawkish on the issue of the war in Vietnam. He thought that the United States should do whatever it took, short of nuclear weapons, to support U.S. troops in the field. He also believed that if the United States was not prepared to make a major military commitment, including “carrying the war to North Vietnam,” it should withdraw completely. He talked about the possibility of low-level atomic weapons to defoliate infiltration routes, but he never actually advocated the use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam. Nonetheless, the Democrats easily painted Goldwater as a warmonger, eager to use atomic weapons against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). This was undoubtedly a key factor in his crushing defeat at the hands of Lyndon Johnson, who took about 61 percent of the vote to only 39 percent for Goldwater. The 1964 campaign also witnessed one of the most memorable Cold War–influenced campaign commercials, the so-called Daisy Spot that featured a little girl picking petals from a daisy. She was overshadowed by an ominous countdown followed by a nuclear detonation. As the war wound to a close, Goldwater remained a consistent critic of U.S. command decisions. He blamed America’s defeat in Vietnam on the government bureaucracy and governmental officials who stood in the way of aiding the troops and commanders in the field. In spite of his crushing loss in the 1964 election, Goldwater was credited with reinvigorating the conservative wing of the Republican Party and with greatly influencing Ronald Reagan, who was elected president 16 years later. Goldwater’s campaign also marked the beginning of the end of the Democrats’ dominance in the southern United States. After the election, Republicans made great in-roads in what had previously been referred to as the “Solid South.” During his last year in office, Goldwater cosponsored the Goldwater-Nichols Military Reform Act, which gave military commanders greater flexibility on the battlefield and granted the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) more influence as the president’s principal military adviser. Goldwater did not run for reelection in 1986 and retired from the Senate in 1987. An accomplished photographer, he published several books of his photographs of the landscape and people of the southwestern United States. As he grew older, he came to moderate some of his views and criticized liberals and conservatives alike. Goldwater died in Paradise Valley, Arizona, on May 29, 1998. LAURAINE BUSH AND PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR. See also Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Stevenson, Adlai Ewing, II References Goldberg, Robert Alan. Barry Goldwater. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995. Goldwater, Barry N. The Conscience of a Conservative. New York: Victor, 1960. Perlstein, Rick. Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American Consensus. New York: Hill and Wang, 2001.
Goodpaster, Andrew Jackson Birth Date: February 12, 1915 Death Date: May 16, 2005 U.S. Army general, presidential adviser, delegate to the Paris peace talks in 1968, and deputy commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), during 1968–1969. Born in Granite City, Illinois, on February 12, 1915, Andrew Jackson Goodpaster graduated from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, in 1939. He commanded a combat engineer battalion in North Africa and in Italy during World War II. Twice wounded, Goodpaster was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, the U.S. Army’s secondhighest decoration for valor, as well as a Silver Star and two Purple Hearts. During 1947–1950 Goodpaster attended Princeton University, where he earned a master’s degree in engineering in 1948 and a PhD in international relations in 1950. Goodpaster served on the White House staff from 1954 to 1961 and became one of President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s most trusted advisers and confidants. As White House staff secretary, Goodpaster closely managed the information that went to the president and maintained a careful record of conversations and decisions reached during meetings with the president. Goodpaster assisted the incoming John F. Kennedy administration with the presidential transition in 1960–1961 and then during 1964–1968 served in a representative and advisory capacity to President Lyndon B. Johnson. On several occasions Goodpaster chaired or served as a participant in high-level groups convened to study the conflict in Vietnam. He routinely briefed Eisenhower on the situation in Vietnam and on Johnson’s intended actions and decisions and then relayed Eisenhower’s advice and recommendations back to Johnson. Johnson appointed Goodpaster to be the third-ranking member and the senior military adviser of the U.S. delegation to the negotiations with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) in Paris in the spring of 1968. Goodpaster then became deputy commander of MACV from 1968 to 1969, serving under General Creighton W. Abrams. Goodpaster’s tour in Vietnam coincided with increased efforts to pacify rural areas in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), debates over the bombing of North Vietnam, and planning for Vietnamization, the process of transferring primary responsibility for the war effort to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army). After working with the Richard M. Nixon administration during the presidential transition, in 1969 Goodpaster became commander in chief of the U.S. European Command and supreme allied commander, Europe. He held both positions until his retirement in December 1974 as a full general. Goodpaster was recalled to active duty in June 1977 to become the 51st superintendent of the United States Military Academy. He came out of retirement and accepted the post knowing that it meant a temporary reduction in grade from general to lieutenant
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general. Goodpaster’s competence and integrity were seen as indispensable to leading West Point through the aftermath of a cheating scandal and to continuing the process of integrating women into the corps. Goodpaster retired again in 1981, reverted to four-star rank, and in 1984 received from President Ronald Reagan the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the nation’s highest civilian honor. Goodpaster remained a prolific writer and speaker on national security matters and became an advocate for the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. He died at Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington, D.C., on May 16, 2005. BENJAMIN P. GREENE See also Abrams, Creighton Williams, Jr.; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Pacification; Paris Negotiations; Vietnamization References Ambrose, Stephen E. Eisenhower, Vol. 2, The President. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984. Gibbons, William C. The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War. 4 vols. to date. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986–1995. Goodpaster, Andrew J. Civil-Military Relations: Studies in Defense Policy. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977. Goodpaster, Andrew J. When Diplomacy Is Not Enough: Managing Multinational Military Interventions; A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. New York: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1996. McMaster, H. R. Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam. New York: HarperCollins, 1997.
Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeyevich Birth Date: March 2, 1931 Secretary-general of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) during 1985–1991 and the Soviet Union’s last president (1988–1991). Born on March 2, 1931, on a collective farm in Privolnoye (Stavropol Province), Russia, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev earned degrees in agronomy and law at Moscow State University and joined the CPSU in 1952. He then became the party boss of Stavropol and in 1972 was elected to the Central Committee. By 1980 he had become the youngest and best-educated full member of the Soviet Politburo. His meteoric rise was due in part to his intelligence and political skills but also because of the important connections he made at the top of the Soviet hierarchy. After making a name for himself as an agricultural reformer under Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko, in March 1985 Gorbachev became secretary-general of the CPSU. He tried to bring change to the Soviet Union by adopting a series of reforms based on glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring), but his reform efforts to save the Soviet state backfired, leading instead in
With his policies of glasnost and perestroika, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev attempted to democratize his country’s political system in the 1980s. Although he had hoped to strengthen the Soviet state, he was ultimately forced to resign, and his programs helped bring the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. (Corel)
1991 to the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Russian critics have accused Gorbachev of destroying the very state that nurtured him and brought him to prominence. Some of Gorbachev’s most notable accomplishments were in the field of international relations. Although he continued the Soviet policy of supporting the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), he played a crucial role in persuading the SRV to withdraw from Cambodia in 1989. He withdrew the Red Army from Afghanistan after a disastrous eight-year-long war there and initiated a period of more friendly relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Finally, in 1989 Gorbachev renounced the Brezhnev Doctrine, which had asserted the Soviet Union’s right to intervene militarily to uphold communism where it was already in place. This action in addition to Gorbachev’s insistence that former Soviet satellite states also adopt reforms quickly led to the fall of the East European Communist regimes beginning in the autumn of 1989. For his role in ending the Cold War, Gorbachev was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1990. Once Gorbachev defeated his more conservative opponents at Central Committee plenums in 1988 and 1989, he turned sharply to
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the Right and declared his intention of preserving a Marxist-Leninist government. Following the failure of the August 1991 coup by Communist hard-liners, on December 25, 1991, Gorbachev was forced to resign his position as Soviet president. Boris Yeltsin succeeded him as president of a new Russian federation. Gorbachev continues to play a role in Russia as a political voice, writer, and humanitarian. BRUCE ELLEMAN See also Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich; Cambodia; Reagan, Ronald Wilson; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; Vietnam, Socialist Republic of, 1975–Present References Cohen, Stephen F. Sovieticus. New York: Norton, 1985. Dunlop, John B. The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993. Gorbachev, Mikhail. Memoirs. Translated by Georges Peronansky and Tatjana Varavsky. New York: Doubleday, 1996. Malia, Martin. The Soviet Tragedy. New York: Free Press, 1994. Sakwa, Richard. Gorbachev and His Reforms, 1985–1990. New York: Prentice Hall, 1991. Woodby, Sylvia. Gorbachev and the Decline of Ideology in Soviet Foreign Policy. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989.
Gracey, Douglas David Birth Date: September 3, 1894 Death Date: 1964 British Army general who led Allied land forces that entered Saigon in September 1945 under terms of the Potsdam Agreement to disarm Japanese forces but who instead triggered clashes with the Viet Minh by arming French troops. Douglas David Gracey was born in Mozaffurnagar, India, on September 3, 1894. His father was a member of the Indian Civil Service. Educated at the Royal Military College at Sandhurst, he served in France and the Middle East during World War I. Between 1928 and V-J Day in 1945 he held various commands in India, the Middle East, and Burma, rising to major general. A field officer with limited political experience, Gracey, upon his assignment to Vietnam, was ordered by supreme Allied commander for Southeast Asia Lord Louis Mountbatten to remain neutral in Vietnam, even though Gracey had indicated his support of French aspirations in Indochina before leaving India. Gracey’s first action on reaching Vietnam was to declare martial law on September 12, 1945, an action directed against the Viet Minh, whom he held in disdain. Gracey released and rearmed 1,400 French soldiers imprisoned by the Japanese. They and the Viet Minh clashed, and a number of innocent civilians were killed on both sides. French and British troops along with Japanese forces ordered by Gracey to assist them were unable to prevent bloodshed against Europeans in Saigon, although by October 2 they had crushed Viet Minh resistance there.
Gracey remained in Vietnam to direct British efforts to assist the French in subduing Viet Minh opposition in the countryside. He left Vietnam in March 1946, retired from the British Army in 1951, and died in June 1964. CLAYTON D. LAURIE See also French Indochina, 1860s–1946; Potsdam Conference; United Kingdom and the Indochina and Vietnam Wars; Viet Minh References Boetcher, Thomas D. Vietnam: The Valor and the Sorrow. Boston: Little Brown, 1985. Who Was Who, Vol. 6. New York: St. Martin’s, 1975.
Gravel, Maurice Robert Birth Date: May 13, 1930 U.S. senator from Alaska (1969–1981). Maurice Robert (Mike) Gravel was born in Springfield, Massachusetts, on May 13, 1930. He spent 1951 to 1954 in Europe as a counterintelligence officer in the U.S. Army. In 1956 he moved to Alaska, where he became a real estate developer and was elected to the Alaska House of Representatives in 1962, becoming Speaker of the House in 1965. Three years later he was elected as a Democrat to the U.S. Senate, where he generally aligned himself with the liberal wing of the party. At the time he was considered hawkish, since in the Democratic Party senatorial primary of 1968 he defeated incumbent senator Ernest Gruening, one of the first critics of the Vietnam War. Gravel did not gain major public attention until the spring of 1971, when he placed large portions of the Defense Department study of the Vietnam War, known as the Pentagon Papers, into the Senate record. In June 1971 when a federal grand jury indicted former Defense Department aide Daniel Ellsberg on charges of the theft of those documents, Gravel immediately responded by reading aloud for three hours from the documents in a meeting of the Subcommittee on Public Buildings. Although the U.S. Supreme Court ruled the next day that senatorial immunity did not protect Gravel and his aides from prosecution for acquiring the papers but only for publicizing them, no action was taken against him, and in 1972 he oversaw their publication in a five-volume edition. From then onward Gravel became an increasingly active and vocal opponent of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. In the summer of 1972 he filibustered against the extension of the draft, and he voted against the military appropriations bill of 1971. He opposed President Richard M. Nixon’s 1972 resumption of bombing and the mining of Haiphong Harbor and supported all attempts to cut off further funding for the war. Gravel criticized Vietnamization as a means of extending indefinitely the U.S. commitment to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), and he unsuccessfully attempted to bring to the Senate floor a vote on a declaration of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam).
Gravely, Samuel Lee, Jr. Gravel also called for major cuts in the “warfare state” and the defense budget, from $55 billion to less than $30 billion, and in troop levels from 2.5 million to 1.5 million to sustain a volunteer army as opposed to a conscript army. Such developments would, he claimed, facilitate worldwide U.S. troop withdrawals and discourage future military interventions and adventures unless the president had the strong support of the American people. Gravel argued that the U.S. government had become overly authoritarian and had lost touch with the concerns and desires of the average American and that this development must be reversed. He easily won reelection in 1974, but in 1980 he lost the Democratic senatorial primary to Clark Gruening, his predecessor’s grandson. Gravel had a difficult time transitioning to life as a private citizen, and he engaged in several failed career paths and business concerns, including a real estate venture that forced him into bankruptcy. Gravel now lives in northern Virginia and has regained an interest in politics. In 1989 he founded the Democracy Foundation, which advocates direct democracy. In 2006 in an effort to promote his ideas about direct democracy, he announced his intention to run for president in 2008 on the Democratic ticket, becoming the first declared candidate for that election. He participated in some of the early Democratic debates and remained in the race until March 2008, despite the fact that he was drawing less than 1 percent of the likely vote. That same month he announced his intention to join the Libertarian Party, and at the Libertarian Convention in May 2008 he placed fourth among eight candidates. In addition to direct democracy ideals, Gravel pushed for the elimination of the federal income tax in favor of a national sales tax, a single-payer national health care system, term limits, and an immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq. PRISCILLA ROBERTS See also Ellsberg, Daniel; Gruening, Ernest Henry; Pentagon Papers and Trial; Russo, Anthony J., Jr. References Gravel, Mike. Citizen Power: A People’s Platform. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972. Gravel, Mike. Introduction to the Pentagon Papers: The Senator Gravel Edition. 5 vols. Boston: Beacon, 1972. Schoenebaum, Eleanora W. Political Profiles: The Nixon/Ford Years. New York: Facts on File, 1979.
Gravely, Samuel Lee, Jr. Birth Date: June 4, 1922 Death Date: October 22, 2004 African American naval officer and the first African American to command a U.S. warship and attain flag rank. Samuel Lee Gravely Jr. was born on June 4, 1922, in Richmond, Virginia. After finishing high school in Richmond, he spent two years at Virginia Union
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Captain Samuel L. Gravely Jr. at the 1971 ceremony for his promotion to flag rank on board the guided-missile cruiser Jouett. Gravely was the first African American to command a U.S. warship and to attain flag rank. (Naval Historical Center)
University. On September 15, 1942, he enlisted in the U.S. Naval Reserves and trained as an apprentice fireman. During World War II he took part in the navy’s V-12 program to train naval officers and again attended Virginia Union University but interrupted his studies to attend the Pre-Midshipman School in New Jersey and then the Midshipman School at Columbia University in New York. On December 14, 1944, having completed his training, Gravely became the first African American from the navy’s Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) to be commissioned as an officer. He subsequently served on USS PC-1264, a submarine chaser with a largely African American crew. In April 1946 Gravely returned to Richmond and Virginia Union University to complete a degree in history. Recalled to active duty in 1949, Gravely worked as a naval recruiter to encourage more African Americans to enlist in the navy. At the time the U.S. armed services were attempting to attract more minorities after President Harry S. Truman’s 1948 directive ordering the desegregation of the armed forces. During the Korean War, Gravely served as communications officer on the battleship USS Iowa and then on the cruiser USS Toledo. When he was assigned to command the destroyer USS Theodore E. Chandler, he became the first African American to command a U.S. Navy ship, and he
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was one of the first African Americans to attend the U.S. Naval War College in 1962. Gravely next commanded the large destroyer USS Taussig, and he became the first African American to command a U.S. warship in combat conditions. In 1965 the ship was posted to Yankee Station in the Gulf of Tonkin off the coast of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). Promoted to captain on November 1, 1967, Gravely was subsequently the first African American to command a major naval warship, the guided missile cruiser USS Jouett, which served in the U.S. Pacific Fleet with some of the most modern antisubmarine detection equipment and missile warfare technology in use at the time. In July 1971 while commanding the Jouett, Gravely became the first African American to attain the rank of rear admiral. In 1976 Gravely assumed command, as a vice admiral, of the U.S. Third Fleet, based at Pearl Harbor. Retiring at that rank in 1980, Gravely left active duty to become director of the Defense Communications Agency in Washington, D.C. His responsibilities included overseeing the communications network that linked Washington, D.C., with military bases operated by the United States and its allies around the world. In 2003 Gravely’s reminiscences, based on interviews by Paul Stillwell, were published by the Naval Institute Press. After suffering a stroke, Gravely died on October 22, 2004, at the National Naval Medical Center at Bethesda, Maryland. JUSTIN J. CORFIELD See also African Americans in the U.S. Military; United States Navy; Yankee Station References Gravely, Samuel Lee. The Reminiscences of Vice Admiral Samuel L. Gravely Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired). Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003. Greenfield, Eloise. How They Got Over: African Americans and the Call of the Sea. New York: HarperCollins, 2003. Latty, Yvonne, and Rob Tarver. We Were There: Voices of African American Veterans. New York: HarperCollins, 2005.
racial discrimination. During his retirement Johnson revealed to his biographer, Doris Kearns Goodwin, that he knew he would be crucified no matter his course: “If I left the woman I really loved— the Great Society—in order to get involved with that bitch of a war on the other side of the world, then I would lose everything at home.” The climate that allowed for Johnson’s initial success in domestic reform developed in the aftermath of President John F. Kennedy’s November 1963 assassination along with the emerging Civil Rights Movement, an increasing awareness of poverty, and a lessening of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. Influential men such as Martin Luther King Jr. and Henry Luce supported Johnson’s reforms. Sensing the urgency surrounding his program, Johnson sent 63 messages to Congress (the average number of presidential communications was only 2) that encompassed recommendations from 17 task forces. The resulting legislation included the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, granting federal aid to impoverished children; the Voting Rights Act of 1965, guaranteeing African American prerogatives at the polls; and Medicare, providing government-sponsored medical assistance to the elderly. Despite these early successes, however, all of which occurred prior to 1967, the Great Society ultimately stalled in large part because of Johnson’s decision to escalate the war in Vietnam, a process that began in 1965. Johnson claimed, with some justification, that this was in part necessary to secure Republican approval for his domestic program, but that decision siphoned more and more money away from Great Society programs and soon refocused the nation’s attention from domestic reform to the increasingly unpopular war in Vietnam. By the late 1960s the American economy was straining from ballooning military budgets, which quickly affected funding for social welfare initiatives, and Johnson was loath to increase taxation to make up for growing budget deficits. Ironically, the program for which Johnson had hoped to be best known fell victim to his own policies regarding the Vietnam War. BRENDA J. TAYLOR See also Economy, U.S., and the Vietnam War; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; King, Martin Luther, Jr.; Luce, Henry Robinson
Great National Solidarity Program See Chieu Hoi Program
Cost of the Vietnam War as Compared to Other U.S. Conflicts
Great Society Program President Lyndon B. Johnson’s domestic reform program, enunciated in 1965. Influenced by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal of the 1930s, Johnson sought to fight for social justice, economic equity, and racial equality with legislation. The idea was to build upon earlier New Deal–style programs to bring about sweeping reforms to health care, education, and urban renewal. Johnson hoped to also address rural isolation and poverty as well
Conflict World War I World War II Korean War Vietnam War Persian Gulf War
Cost (in billions of current year $)
Cost (in billions of FY2008 $)
Peak Year of War Spending
War Cost as % of GDP during Peak Year of War Spending
$20 $296 $30 $111 $61
$253 $4,114 $320 $686 $96
1919 1945 1952 1968 1991
13.60% 35.80% 4.20% 2.30% 0.30%
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President Lyndon B. Johnson and his wife Claudia Alta “Lady Bird” leaving the Inez, Kentucky, home of Tom Fletcher, a father of eight who had been unemployed for nearly two years when the Johnsons visited on April 24, 1964. After touring the Appalachian area of eastern Kentucky, Johnson declared the nation’s War on Poverty from the front porch of Fletcher’s home. (AP/Wide World Photos)
References Divine, Robert A., ed. The Johnson Years, Vol. 1. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981. Helsing, Jeffrey W. Johnson’s War/Johnson’s Great Society. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000. Kearns, Doris. Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream. New York: Harper and Row, 1976.
GREELEY,
Operation
Start Date: June 17, 1967 End Date: October 12, 1967 Vietnam War military operation occurring from June 17 to October 12, 1967, and more appropriately identified as the second phase of the Battle of Dak To. Operation GREELEY began on June 17, 1967, when two battalions of the 173rd Airborne Brigade deployed to Kontum Province in anticipation of a People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) attack on the Dak To Special Forces camp. At the time, the 173rd’s 1st and 2nd battalions, 503rd Infantry (1-503 Infantry and 2-503 Infantry), were under the operational control of the 4th Infantry Division.
On June 22 Alpha Company, 2-503 Infantry, met an entrenched battalion of the PAVN 24th Regiment while moving up the thickly wooded Hill 1338 south of Dak To. In one of the bloodiest single battles of the Vietnam War, 76 paratroopers from Alpha Company were killed and another 23 wounded. The after-action report claimed 513 PAVN troops killed, but only 75 bodies were actually counted. With indications that a full PAVN division was present, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), commander General William C. Westmoreland, who arrived at Dak To on June 23, hoped to force a decisive battle for the Central Highlands. That day the 1st Cavalry Division’s 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry (1-12 Infantry), was airlifted from Binh Dinh and immediately thrown into combat south of Dak To. Within three days the 1st Cavalry’s entire 3rd Brigade arrived to begin search-and-destroy missions to the north and northeast. The remaining units of the 173rd Airborne Brigade also moved into Kontum. Augmenting U.S. forces were the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) 5th and 8th Airborne battalions and one battalion from the ARVN 42nd Regiment. To coordinate the expanding operation, Major General William R. Peers established the 4th Infantry Division’s command post in Kontum City.
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On July 10 while approaching the crest of Hill 830 southwest of Dak To, companies of the 4th Battalion, 503rd Infantry (4-503 Infantry), encountered heavy mortar and machine-gun fire and sustained devastating casualties in fighting that continued through the night. The 4-503 Infantry suffered 28 dead and 62 wounded, but at daybreak only 9 PAVN bodies were discovered in the abandoned bunkers. When contact ebbed, the battered remnants of the 4-503 infantry withdrew to Dak To. But in the next two months, both 4th Infantry Division and 173rd Airborne troops continued to suffer heavy casualties while attacking heavily fortified bunker complexes in the triple-canopied jungles. Also in July, the 1st Cavalry’s 3rd Brigade continued airmobile operations north of Kontum, and its artillery supported a Special Forces–Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) force as it successfully ambushed a PAVN unit. By July 25 the 3rd Brigade was recalled to Binh Dinh, but fighting around Dak To continued. At the end of July, PAVN troops mortared isolated CIDG camps to the north of Dak To, and on the night of August 6 the ARVN Airborne battalions withstood no less than five mass attacks by the PAVN 174th Regiment. But just 10 days later the ARVN Airborne also withdrew from Kontum, and by early September contact with the PAVN had so diminished that the bulk of the 173rd Airborne Brigade departed to assume a new mission near the coastal city of Tuy Hoa. It was thought that the 4th Infantry Division, now at full strength, could handle the situation in Kontum. In fact, the Battle of Dak To was not over. On October 12 Operation GREELEY was folded into Operation MACARTHUR, and the decisive battle began. JOHN D. ROOT See also Civilian Irregular Defense Group; Dak To, Battle of; HAWTHORNE, Operation; MACARTHUR, Operation; Peers, William R.; Search and Destroy; Westmoreland, William Childs References Murphy, Edward F. Dak To: The 173rd Airborne Brigade in South Vietnam’s Central Highlands, June–November 1967. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1993. Stanton, Shelby L. The Rise and Fall of an American Army: The U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985.
Greene, Graham Birth Date: October 2, 1904 Death Date: April 3, 1991 British novelist, foreign correspondent, and political activist. Born on October 2, 1904, in Hertfordshire, England, to a well-to-do family, Graham Greene was educated at Baliol College, Oxford. He wrote nine novels between 1929 and 1939. From 1926 to 1930 he was an editor for the Times, and from 1940 to 1941 he was an editor for the Spectator. During World War II Greene served as an intelligence officer for MI6 in Sierra Leone, an experience with war that provided ma-
British novelist Graham Greene (1904–1991) wrote The Quiet American. Published in 1955 and probably his best-known work, it was based on his own observations in Vietnam and chronicled the failures of colonialism. (Bettmann/Corbis)
terial for his book The Heart of the Matter (1948). In the immediate postwar years he became increasingly disenchanted with imperialism. From 1944 to 1948 he was director of Eyre and Spottiswoode Publishers, and from 1958 to 1968 he served as director of Bodley Head Publishers. Greene visited Vietnam four times from 1951 to 1955, filing reports for the Spectator and other magazines. Initially apolitical, Greene’s growing admiration for Ho Chi Minh and his increasing disaffection with General Trinh Minh The, a leader of the Cao Dai army, over his indiscriminate violence in Saigon solidified his disenchantment with colonialism. Greene’s book The Quiet American (1955), perhaps his bestknown work, fictionalizes his observations in Vietnam and chronicles the faults of colonialism. In linking Alden Pyle, a composite character based on Colonel Edward Lansdale and Leo Hochstetter, a member of the American legation in Saigon, with General The, Greene implicated the United States with violent covert operations. Increasingly engaged, the cynical Thomas Fowler, Greene’s alter ego, becomes the novel’s hero when he helps the Viet Minh murder Pyle. Greene’s attraction to the Third World communism of Ho Chi Minh alienated many American readers. Nevertheless, Greene’s blending of fact into fiction, using a method that he called “rapportage,” greatly influenced American writers such as Michael
Grenade Launchers Herr and Gloria Emerson. Greene’s 1957 book Our Man in Havana was a thinly veiled condemnation of British policies toward the corrupt Fulgencio Batista regime in Cuba and the British refusal to acknowledge the popularity of then-rebel Fidel Castro. Greene remained engaged in political activism for the rest of his life, and in 1977 he participated in Panama’s delegation to the Canal Treaty negotiations in Washington, D.C. In addition to his novels Greene also penned several screenplays, most notably for the classic film The Third Man (1949). Greene continued to travel and write until his death in Geneva, Switzerland, on April 3, 1991. CHARLES J. GASPAR AND PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR. See also Cao Dai; Ho Chi Minh; Lansdale, Edward Geary; Literature and the Vietnam War References Adamson, Judith. Graham Greene: The Dangerous Edge. New York: St. Martin’s, 1990. Bergonzi, Bernard. “Graham Greene.” In British Writers, Supplement 1, 1–20. New York: Scribner, 1987. Shelden, Michael. Graham Greene: The Man Within. London: Heinemann, 1994. Sherry, Norman. The Life of Graham Greene. 3 vols. New York: Viking, 2004.
Greene, Wallace Martin Birth Date: December 27, 1907 Death Date: March 8, 2003 U.S. Marine Corps officer and commandant (1964–1967). Born on December 27, 1907, in Waterbury, Vermont, Wallace Martin Greene spent a year at the University of Vermont before entering the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, where he graduated and was commissioned in the U.S. Marine Corps in 1930. In 1937 he served with the 4th Marines in China, and in 1941 he attended the British Amphibious Warfare School and the Royal Engineer Demolition School in London as a special naval observer. In 1943 Lieutenant Colonel Greene was assistant chief of staff for the 5th Amphibious Corps. He helped plan the invasions of the Marshall Islands as well as Saipan and Tinian. In 1953 after his graduation from the National War College, Greene became staff special assistant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) for national security affairs in Washington. Three years later he was promoted to brigadier general and that same year took command of the Recruit Training Command at Parris Island, South Carolina. He was promoted to major general in August 1958. In January 1960 Greene became chief of staff of the U.S. Marine Corps with the rank of lieutenant general. In September 1963 President John F. Kennedy nominated Greene as commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps. Greene was promoted to full (four-star) general upon assuming that post on January 1, 1964. Under Greene, the U.S. Marine Corps perfected its operational readiness, response time, and sustainability as the nation’s pri-
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mary strategic reinforcement outside of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Greene was a staunch advocate of combining new technology with traditional marine tactics to make the U.S. Marine Corps a more effective element of flexible response. He saw the Communist insurgency in Southeast Asia as a direct challenge to U.S. Pacific interests. Greene believed that American military power and political credibility were too committed there to allow withdrawal without victory. He opposed the limited air raids and graduated response of the Lyndon B. Johnson administration and thought that the idea of a negotiated settlement was illusory. Greene believed that 750,000 men (including mobilized reserve forces) and a minimum of five years would be required to defeat the Communists. He was a strong advocate of pacification-andhold operations as the means of conducting the ground war by the marines in the I Corps Tactical Zone. He was also very critical of the micromanagement of the war under Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. By the end of his tour as commandant in 1967, General Greene feared that the war of attrition was not working and that despite the excellent performance of the marines in Vietnam, the war could not be won. Greene retired from the U.S. Marine Corps on December 31, 1967. In his retirement he helped found the Marine Corps Heritage Foundation. Greene died in Alexandria, Virginia, on March 8, 2003. WILL E. FAHEY JR. See also Attrition; McNamara, Robert Strange; Pacification; United States Marine Corps References Herring, George C. LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994. Millett, Allan R. Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps. Rev. and expanded ed. New York: Free Press, 1991.
Grenade Launchers With the first appearance of hand grenades in about the 8th century, soldiers began experimenting with ways to project the explosive weapons farther than they normally could be thrown by a human arm. By World War I most armies had systems for launching hand grenades hundreds of feet using standard rifles. The system had three basic components: the rifle grenade launcher, a tubular device that fixed over the muzzle of the rifle; a grenadeprojection adapter that held a standard hand grenade and had a hollow launching tube that fit over the rifle launcher and was then fired forward carrying the grenade; and a special grenadelaunching rifle cartridge that had no bullet but sufficient powder to produce the gas necessary to launch the grenade and adapter. The grenade-launching cartridge had a crimped end and looked somewhat like a blank cartridge but was much more powerful.
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Major Joseph Flynn of the U.S. 1st Marine Division explains the use of an XM 174 40-mm grenade launcher to generals. Two principal types of launched grenades were used in Vietnam. Those employed by allied forces were based on the 40-mm grenade series, whereas those employed by Communist forces were based on the PG2 (later PG7) grenade series. (National Archives)
During World War II the U.S. M-7 grenade launcher was designed for the M-1 Garand rifle, and the M-8 grenade launcher was designed for the M-1 carbine. Both systems were used by Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) units during the earlier days of the Vietnam War. During the later phases the M-1 rifle and the M-1 carbine and their associated grenade launchers were still used by Local Forces, Regional Forces, and Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) troops. There were two basic rifle-launched grenades. The most widely used was the M-17, which was a standard Mk-II hand grenade mounted on an M-1 grenade-projection adapter. The other was the M-9, a purpose-designed launchable antitank grenade with a shaped-charge warhead. The U.S. M-79 grenade launcher was the first post–World War II weapon specifically developed to launch a family of newly designed 40-millimeter (mm) cartridge grenades. Introduced in 1960 and known to GIs as the “Thump-gun,” the M-79 was a simple but rugged shoulder-fired single-shot weapon that operated exactly like a break-open shotgun. It weighed 5.95 pounds and was only 28.78 inches long. The barrel was 14 inches long. The M-79’s maximum effective range was 492 feet for point targets and 1,148
feet for area targets. A well-trained grenadier could repeatedly put a grenade through a building window 492 feet away. The M-79’s official maximum rate of fire was five to seven rounds per minute, but an experienced grenadier could easily double that rate. Most of the grenades for the M-79 had a minimum arming range of 98 feet. Grenadiers therefore also carried an M-1911A1 .45-caliber pistol for close-in self-defense. The standard U.S. infantry rifle squad had two M-79s, one per fire team. Later in the war ARVN units had the M-79, and captured M-79s were weapons highly prized by the Viet Cong (VC). But as with all captured weapons, ammo supply was always the key challenge. The XM-148 grenade launcher was an attempt to give a single soldier the combined firepower of both the M-79 and the M-16 rifle. The XM-148 weighed only 3 pounds, was 16.5 inches long, and mounted directly under the barrel of the M-16. It was a good concept, but the design was riddled with flaws. The XM-148 was cumbersome and slow to operate. Its complex tangent sight was difficult to use and too fragile for field conditions. Selected U.S. infantry units in Vietnam were issued the XM-148 on a test basis in 1967. Almost all grenadiers who had to give up their M-79s hated the XM-148, and it was withdrawn after only a few months.
Groupement Mobile 100, Destruction of The M-203 grenade launcher was a greatly improved and more robust version of the XM-148. Like its predecessor, the M-203 weighs 3 pounds but is only 15 inches long. It has an easier to use leaf sight that mounts separately on top of the M-16’s barrel. The M-203 has the same maximum effective ranges as the M-79 and the same official maximum rate of fire, but in the case of the M-203 even the most experienced grenadier cannot fire much more than seven rounds per minute. Introduced in 1969, the M-203 eventually replaced the M-79, although many grenadiers continued to swear by the older weapon. The M-203 remains in service today, but replacements are under development. The M-79, XM-148, and M-203 all fired a family of 40-mm by 46-mm low-velocity grenades at 247 feet per second. The M-406 was the basic high-explosive (HE) fragmentation round with a lethal radius of 16 feet and a casualty radius of 49 feet. Introduced later in the war, the M-433 high-explosive dual-purpose (HEDP) round was capable of penetrating 2 inches of armor. The M-576 antipersonnel round was the only one that did not have a minimum arming range and was therefore effective at close quarters. Also called the canister round, the M-576 contained 20 pellets of No. 4 buckshot, in effect a huge shotgun shell. The M-651 riot control round dispersed o-chlorobenzylidene malononitrile tear gas. The M-680 smoke round dispersed white smoke. Other colors were also available. The M-583 parachute star cluster round was used for battlefield illumination at night. Depending on weather conditions, the M-583 produced about 40 seconds of illumination. The M-585 star cluster round was used for signaling and had a descent time of about seven seconds. The M-406 HE round weighs half a pound. Most of the special-purpose rounds weigh somewhat less. During the Vietnam War the United States also used for the first time automatic belt-fed grenade launchers that fired 40-mm by 53-mm high-velocity cartridge grenades at 790 feet per second. The M-75 grenade launcher was introduced in 1958 as a helicopter-mounted weapon. It had a cyclic rate of fire of 230 rounds per minute. The M-129 grenade launcher, introduced in 1963, was an improved version of the M-75. The M-75 was used in the M-5 Armament Subsystem on the UH-1B/C (“Huey”) gunships and the M-8 Armament Subsystem on the OH-6 Cayuse. Both the M-75 and the M-129 grenade launchers were used in the M-28 Armament Subsystem for the AH-1 Cobra gunship. The M-75 and the M-129 remained in service until 1975. Based on the M-75, the Mk-19 grenade launcher was developed by the U.S. Navy and used on river patrol boats in the Mekong Delta. The Mk-19 has a cyclic rate of fire of 325 rounds per minute and a maximum effective range of 4,921 feet. It weighs 72.5 pounds and can be fired from a ground tripod or a vehicle mount. After the Vietnam War the U.S. Army adopted the Mk-19 as a vehiclemounted weapon. The Mk-19 remains in service today and has been used extensively in the Afghanistan War and the Iraq War. Prior to the Mk-19, the U.S. Army experimented with an automatic grenade launcher designed to fire the same 40-mm by 46-mm low-velocity ammunition used by the shoulder-fired
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launchers. The XM-174 was tested briefly in Vietnam in 1968. Mounted on a ground tripod or a vehicular mount, it fed from a 12-round drum and had a cyclic rate of fire of 350 rounds per minute. The 40-mm by 53-mm high-velocity ammunition proved better suited for automatic firing systems. DAVID T. ZABECKI See also Hand Grenades; Helicopters, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam References Hogg, Ian V. The American Arsenal. Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1996. Hogg, Ian V. Jane’s Infantry Weapons, 1991–92. Coulsdon, Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group, 1991. Rottman, Gordon L. U.S. Army Infantryman in Vietnam, 1965–73. Oxford, UK: Osprey, 2005. Rottman, Gordon L. Viet Cong Fighter. Oxford, UK: Osprey, 2007. Smith, W. H. B., and Edward C. Ezell. Small Arms of the World. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1992.
Groupement Mobile 100, Destruction of Event Dates: June 24 and 28, 1954 The last major battle of the Indochina War and a French military defeat. Concerned about the possibility of a disaster similar to Dien Bien Phu, the French high command ordered Groupement Mobile (GM, Mobile Group) 100, a regimental-sized task force of some 2,500 men commanded by Colonel Barrou, to abandon its base at An Khe in the Central Highlands and move to Pleiku some 50 miles distant. GM 100 included the famed Régiment de Corée, an elite formation that had distinguished itself during the Korean War. GM 100 was to come out by means of Route Coloniale 19, which was dominated by People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) troops who soon became aware of the French plans. The plans were an open secret, as some 1,100 civilians and some equipment were evacuated by air. Equipment that could not be moved easily and extra ammunition stacked near the airfield were to be destroyed by French B-26 bombers after withdrawal of the last troops. Following word that a large PAVN force, possibly its entire 803rd Regiment, might be preparing to ambush the French, the evacuation was advanced by one day. GM 100 set out at 3:00 a.m. on June 24, 1954. In the early afternoon GM 100, only about 9 miles from its starting point and after several earlier skirmishes, was ambushed by the 803rd Regiment. The ensuing fighting was fierce. On June 28 those French troops who managed to escape the first ambush were again hit, this time at Dak Ya-Ayun by the PAVN 108th Regiment. Again fighting was heavy. The French who survived both battles reached Pleiku the next day. In the two battles, GM 100 lost all its artillery and almost all its vehicles. Some 900 of its men were killed or captured (Barrou was among the wounded who were taken prisoner), and many of the
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1,593 men who reached Pleiku were walking wounded. Thereafter French control in the Central Highlands was limited to a small area around Ban Me Thuot and Da Lat. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also An Khe; Central Highlands References Fall, Bernard B. Street without Joy: The French Debacle in Indochina. Rev. ed. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1994. Mesko, Jim. Ground War: Vietnam 1945–1965. Carrollton, TX: Squadron Signal Publications, 1990. Moore, Harold G., and Joseph L. Galloway. We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young: Ia Drang—The Battle That Changed the War in Vietnam. New York: Random House, 1992.
Gruening, Ernest Henry Birth Date: February 6, 1887 Death Date: June 26, 1974 Physician, journalist, Democratic U.S. senator (1959–1969), and opponent of the Vietnam War. Born on February 6, 1887, in New York City, Ernest Henry Gruening graduated with an undergraduate degree from Harvard University in 1907 and received an MD degree from there in 1912. That same year he decided to pursue a career in journalism and took a position as a reporter for the Boston American. He held a series of positions with newspapers thereafter and eventually served as the managing editor of the New York Tribune. He also served in World War I in the Field Artillery Corps. He subsequently served as editor of The Nation and the New York Post. In 1934 President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed Gruening as director of U.S. territories and island possessions. He served as territorial governor of Alaska from 1939 to 1953 and was elected Democratic senator from Alaska when it became a state in 1958. He took office in January 1959. As senator, he was among the first critics of the Vietnam War, arguing in a March 10, 1964, Senate speech that the United States should withdraw its military forces. On August 7, 1964, Gruening and Senator Wayne Morse (D-Ore.) were the only two members of Congress to vote against the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. For the remainder of his political career, Gruening voted against appropriations for the Vietnam War. In April 1965 he supported and spoke before antiwar demonstrators in Washington, D.C. He opposed bombing the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and called on President Lyndon B. Johnson to open negotiations with Hanoi. On March 1, 1966, Gruening and Morse were again the only senators to vote for Morse’s proposal to repeal the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and Gruening’s proposal to send only volunteers to Vietnam. Although he lost the Democratic primary in 1968 to fellow Democrat Mike Gravel, the 81-year-old Gruening still received 15 percent of the vote in write-ins as an in-
dependent candidate. In 1972 he supported the antiwar presidential campaign of Senator George McGovern (D-S.Dak.). Gruening continued on as a legislative consultant and president of an investment firm until his death in Washington, D.C., on June 26, 1974. KENNETH R. STEVENS See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Gravel, Maurice Robert; Gulf of Tonkin Resolution; Morse, Wayne Lyman References Gruening, Ernest. Many Battles: The Autobiography of Ernest Gruening. New York: Liveright, 1973. Lichtenstein, Nelson, ed. Political Profiles: The Johnson Years. New York: Facts on File, 1976.
Guam Strategically located island in the western Pacific about 3,700 miles west of Hawaii. With a land area of 212 square miles, Guam is the largest and southernmost of the Mariana Islands. Guam has a tropical marine climate characterized by hot, rainy summers and slightly cooler and drier winters. There is little change in temperature between winter and summer, and the island lies within a region that is vulnerable to tropical storms and typhoons. The U.S. Navy captured Guam in June 1898 during the Spanish-American War and retained it under terms of the Treaty of Paris that ended the war. The navy soon established a naval base on Guam, using it as a coaling station between the Hawaiian Islands and the Philippines. Guam is an unincorporated U.S. territory with an elected governor and a legislature. Its inhabitants are U.S. citizens. Since the end of World War II, the United States has maintained a large military presence on Guam, which has periodically served as a base for the projection of American military power in Asia. During the Vietnam War era, Guam was vital to the American war effort as a depot for American supplies and for B-52 bombers. The U.S. military has in fact been Guam’s largest industry since the end of World War II. The island is the site of two large bases: the U.S. Navy facility at Apra Harbor and Andersen Air Force Base located at the island’s northern tip. Both of these served important functions during the Vietnam War. The U.S. military’s presence on the island grew steadily after direct American intervention in the Vietnam fighting began in March 1965. Between 1965 and 1972, Guam’s principal role in the war was as a maintenance and repair facility. From Guam, the U.S. Air Force flew B-52 Arc Light missions, the bombing of Communist areas in Vietnam and Laos during 1965–1973, but most of those missions were mounted from U-Tapao, Thailand, or Clark Field in the Philippines. It was not until the Easter Offensive by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) beginning in March 1972 and the commencement of Operation LINEBACKER I (May–October 1972) that Guam moved to the forefront of the Vietnam War. The
Guam Conference buildup of B-52 wings that were to carry out the bombings from Andersen Air Force Base actually began in February and initially involved bomb wings from the United States. The buildup and the subsequent operations placed considerable strain on the facilities at Andersen and on the island as a whole. Equipped to accommodate about 3,000 people, Andersen was already over capacity because of ongoing support of the war. The new buildup caused the population to swell to 12,000 people by July 1972. A tent city known as the “Canvas Courts” was constructed to accommodate some of the overflow along with corrugated temporary barracks known as “Tin City.” Many U.S. Air Force personnel were moved into barracks at the island’s naval air station at Agana. The island’s hotels were also requisitioned, a move that disrupted Guam’s tourist industry. When LINEBACKER I ceased in October there was a temporary slackening of demand on the island’s facilities, but the population surged again when the Richard M. Nixon administration launched Operation LINEBACKER II (which became known as the Christmas Bombings) on December 18, 1972. At the height of the LINEBACKER operations, 155 B-52s operated out of Andersen, carrying out 55 percent of the total B-52 raids against North Vietnam. Soviet trawlers took up position in international waters off the island to carry out electronic surveillance and to plot estimated arrival times for the big bombers over Vietnam. Cessation of the bombings in January 1973 brought a return to normalcy on the island. Guam, however, had one more role to play in the war’s denouement. With the sudden collapse of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) in the spring of 1975, hundreds of thousands of non-Communist Vietnamese were evacuated by the United States. Many of these refugees were processed through Guam, and the stress placed on the island’s facilities and people was enormous. Andersen Air Force Base received an estimated 40,000 refugees in the months immediately following the fall of Saigon in April 1975. In the ensuing year, almost 100,000 people were processed for transportation to the United States. To take some of the burden off Andersen, the U.S. Navy constructed a tent city at Guam’s Orote Airfield. Overall, the Vietnam War had only a limited impact on Guam’s government and society. In the post–Vietnam War period, Guam has grown in importance even as the United States has scaled back its military presence in Asia. WALTER F. BELL See also Andersen Air Force Base; Arc Light Missions; Easter Offensive; LINEBACKER I, Operation; LINEBACKER II, Operation; Refugees and Boat People References McCarthy, James R., and George B. Allison. Linebacker II: A View from the Rock. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, U.S. Air Force, 1985. Michel, Marshall L., III. The Eleven Days of Christmas: America’s Last Vietnam Battle. San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2002. Rogers, Robert F. Destiny’s Landfall: A History of Guam. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995.
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Guam Conference Start Date: March 20, 1967 End Date: March 21, 1967 Third summit between leaders of the United States and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). The U.S. territory of Guam, southernmost of the Mariana Islands, was symbolic of U.S. interests and power. From Andersen Air Force Base there, Boeing B-52 Stratofortresses flew missions in Southeast Asia. Guam also presented a safe Pacific location close to Vietnam. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara led the U.S. delegation to the Guam Conference. From Saigon came Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and South Vietnamese leaders, headed by Premier Nguyen Cao Ky and Chief of State Nguyen Van Thieu. In all, 22 U.S. and 10 South Vietnamese principal officials participated in the meeting. President Johnson reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to its ally and personally introduced new appointments: Ellsworth Bunker, assuming Lodge’s responsibilities, would have as his assistant Eugene Locke, Johnson’s friend and ambassador to Pakistan; General Creighton Abrams would become General William Westmoreland’s deputy and eventually take over command from him; and Robert Komer would become Westmoreland’s deputy for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) and, as a civilian under Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), would direct the pacification effort. Seeking to de-emphasize the military dimension, Johnson rejected both Westmoreland’s request for 200,000 additional troops (but agreed to 55,000) and Ky’s proposal to step up bombing raids against People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) and Viet Cong (VC) sanctuaries and supply routes in Cambodia and Laos. South Vietnamese ambassador to the United States Bui Diem wrote that the agenda consisted of a review of the war, United Nations (UN) secretary-general U Thant’s peace proposal, South Vietnamese political developments, and the pacification effort. Although Washington viewed U Thant’s initiative with skepticism, the timing of it—just before the conference—ironically convinced the Vietnamese public that the U.S. government was behind the proposal. U.S. officials reassured their South Vietnamese counterparts by promising full consultation should there be developments. South Vietnamese leaders presented their new constitution to persuade Johnson that they were moving meaningfully toward democracy (which had been promised in February 1966, in Honolulu). Johnson reportedly reacted positively to the constitution. The Vietnamese, concerned about the faltering pacification program, responded positively to Komer’s appointment. Journalists I. F. Stone and Frances FitzGerald reacted with less enthusiasm. Stone criticized not only Komer but also the conference for omitting the issue of South Vietnamese shortcomings, such as land reform and
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Republic of Vietnam (RVN) president Nguyen Van Thieu (left), U.S. president Lyndon B. Johnson (center), and RVN prime minister Nguyen Cao Ky (right) during the playing of the U.S. and RVN national anthems during welcoming ceremonies at Guam’s international airport on March 20, 1967. The Guam Conference was the third summit between U.S. and RVN leaders during the Vietnam War. (National Archives)
freedom of the press. FitzGerald wrote that to put all pacification operations under the military “signified that Washington no longer gave even symbolic importance to the notion of a ‘political’ war waged by the Vietnamese government. The reign of the US military had begun, and with it the strategy of quantity in civilian as well as military affairs.” U.S. officials tried to put a positive light on the conference but indicated privately that it was hastily convened and short on specifics. Johnson pointed out that the United States and South Vietnam faced major and potentially long-lasting problems for which neither side yet had viable solutions. PAUL S. DAUM AND TREVOR CURRAN
See also Abrams, Creighton Williams, Jr.; Bui Diem; Bunker, Ellsworth; Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support; Honolulu Conference; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Komer, Robert W.; Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr.; McNamara, Robert Strange; Nguyen Cao Ky; Nguyen Van Thieu; Pacification; Rusk, David Dean; United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1965–1968; U Thant; Vietnam, Republic of, 1954–1975 References Bui Diem. In The Jaws of History. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987. FitzGerald, Frances. Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam. Boston: Little, Brown, 1972. Stone, I. F. Polemics and Prophecies, 1967–1970: A Non-Conformist History of Our Times. Boston: Little, Brown, 1989.
Gulf of Tonkin Incident
Guizot, François Birth Date: October 4, 1787 Death Date: September 12, 1874 French statesman and historian. Born in Nîmes (Gard Department) on October 4, 1787, François Guizot was the son of a prosperous Protestant lawyer and advocate of federalism. The elder Guizot was executed during the French Revolution of 1789, and his property was confiscated. Educated in Geneva, François Guizot was influenced by English political thought. From 1812 he was professor of modern history at the University of Paris. Guizot held government posts after the restoration, but his moderate views offended ultraroyalists, and he soon lost these posts and his teaching position. He then turned to writing and in the 1820s produced important books treating English history and European and French civilization. An advocate of reform, he won election to the Chamber of Deputies in 1830. In the July Revolution in 1830, Guizot supported the Duc d’Orléans for the throne and then held ministerial posts for 13 of the 18 years of King Louis Philippe’s reign. As minister of public instruction, in 1833 Guizot secured passage of France’s first basic law on primary education. From 1840 to 1848 he was minister of foreign affairs and de facto head of the ministry. A straightforward and effective orator, Guizot advocated conservative policies designed to maintain peace abroad and order at home and to restrict political rights to the wealthy. Under Guizot’s influence, a new French concept of colonialism evolved. Colonies received new military and commercial significance. In the Far East, this began to supplant French traditional interest in missionary activities. More concerned with the restoration of France’s position in Europe than expansion in Asia, Guizot initially resisted suggestions that he send a naval squadron to the Far East. Following the 1841 British acquisition of Hong Kong as a consequence of the Opium War, however, Guizot changed his mind. Two years later he dispatched sizable French naval forces to Asian waters under the command of Admiral Jean-Baptiste Cécille and Captain Léonard Charner. Guizot instructed his naval commanders to acquire positions equal to those that the British enjoyed in Hong Kong and Singapore and that the Portuguese enjoyed in Macao and Manila. But Guizot also wanted the French to avoid operations along the coast of Vietnam. He viewed the country as too unhealthy and the coastal positions there as too difficult to defend. Although he himself disdained wealth (he died poor), Guizot was an adroit practitioner of parliamentary corruption to secure votes. He refused to end this practice or to expand political rights. Despite demands that he do so, Louis Philippe resisted pressure to dismiss his favorite minister until early 1848, too late to save his throne. With the Revolution of 1848, Guizot retired to write. He died at Val Richer in Normandy on September 12, 1874. SPENCER C. TUCKER
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See also French Indochina, 1860s–1946 References Buttinger, Joseph. The Smaller Dragon: A Political History of Vietnam. New York: Praeger, 1958. Guizot, François. Memoires pour servir à l’histoire de mon temps. 8 vols. Paris: Nichel Levy Frères, 1872. Johnson, Douglas W. J. Guizot: Aspects of French History, 1787–1874. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963. Newman, Edgar L. Historical Dictionary of France from the 1815 Restoration to the Second Empire. New York: Greenwood, 1987. Woodward, Ernest L. Three Studies in European Conservatism: Metternich, Guizot, the Catholic Church in the Nineteenth Century. Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1963.
Gulf of Tonkin Incident Event Dates: August 2 and 4, 1964 Major event in the history of U.S. involvement in Vietnam that prompted the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. On July 31, 1964, the U.S. Navy destroyer USS Maddox began a reconnaissance cruise in international waters off the coast of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). The destroyer carried extra radio gear and personnel to monitor North Vietnamese radio communications but not enough of either to give the ship the capabilities of a true electronic espionage vessel. Around the time of the cruise, the United States also scheduled an unusually intense string of covert operations against the North Vietnamese coast. These were carried out by relatively small vessels (mostly Norwegian-built “Nasty” boats) that had Vietnamese crews but operated under American orders, were based in the vicinity of Da Nang, and were part of a program called Operation Plan 34A (OPLAN 34A). Two islands off the North Vietnamese coast were to be attacked on the night of July 30–31, and two points on the North Vietnamese mainland were to be shelled on the night of August 3–4. One island was to be shelled, and the crew of one fishing boat was to be seized and taken south for interrogation on August 5. One of the Maddox’s main missions was to learn about North Vietnamese coastal defenses, and it was apparently believed that more would be learned if those defenses were in an aroused state during the patrol. On the evening of August 1 the Maddox approached within gun range of the island of Hon Me (one of the two islands shelled by OPLAN 34A vessels on the night of July 30–31), and the coastal defense forces became more aroused than the Americans had planned. On the afternoon of August 2 three North Vietnamese torpedo boats came out from the island and attacked the destroyer. The attack was unsuccessful, and the torpedo boats suffered varying degrees of damage and crew casualties from the Maddox’s guns and from strafing by four U.S. Navy aircraft from the carrier USS Ticonderoga, which reached the scene as the torpedo boats were
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retreating from the attack. The American belief that they actually sank one of the torpedo boats was mistaken, as was the Vietnamese belief that they had shot down one of the planes. President Lyndon Johnson was annoyed that the torpedo boats had not all been sunk but decided not to order any further retaliation, partly because he had reason to believe that the attack had been a result of confusion in the North Vietnamese chain of command rather than a deliberate decision by the government in Hanoi. On August 3 the Maddox and another destroyer, USS C. Turner Joy, went back into the Gulf of Tonkin to resume the patrol, operating under orders more cautious than those with which the Maddox had gone into the Gulf of Tonkin on July 31. The new orders kept the destroyers farther from the North Vietnamese coast and completely out of the extreme northern section of the gulf. These limitations seriously reduced the ability of the destroyers to collect useful information. Many sailors on the destroyers, including the patrol commander Captain John Herrick, thought that another attack by North Vietnamese torpedo boats was likely. For about two hours on the night of August 4 such an attack seemed to be in progress, but the situation was very confused. The C. Turner Joy was firing at objects on the radar screens that were invisible to the Maddox’s radar, while the Maddox’s sonar equipment was picking up sounds interpreted as the motors of North Vietnamese torpedoes, which could not be heard by the sonar equipment on the C. Turner Joy. Those who were aboard the destroyers that night are still divided on the issue. Some think that they were attacked by torpedo boats, while others think that what appeared on their radar screens was nothing but weather-generated anomalies, seagulls, foam on the crests of waves, or other natural disturbances. The overall weight of the evidence is with those who deny that an attack occurred. In Washington, after some initial uncertainty it was decided that there had been a genuine attack. Intercepted North Vietnamese radio messages seemed to provide the clinching evidence. The texts of the messages have never been released; it seems likely that they were in fact descriptions of the combat between the Maddox and the three torpedo boats on August 2, being misinterpreted by the Americans as references to a more recent event. Years after the Vietnam War, former U.S. secretary of defense Robert McNamara traveled to Vietnam, where he met with the former North Vietnamese minister of defense, Vo Nguyen Giap, who assured McNamara that no second attack had occurred. President Johnson, believing that an attack had occurred, ordered retaliatory air strikes (Operation PIERCE ARROW), which were carried out on the afternoon of August 5. He also asked for and quickly obtained a congressional resolution (the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution), passed almost unanimously on August 7, authorizing him to do whatever was necessary to deal with Communist aggression in Vietnam. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident was politically very profitable for President Johnson in the short run. Public opinion polls showed not just overwhelming approval of the way he had handled the cri-
sis but a dramatic improvement in the public’s rating of his handling of the Vietnam War as a whole. In the long run, however, the cost to the president’s credibility was considerable. It became plain that Congress and the public had been misled about the administration’s intentions and about the relationship between the OPLAN 34A raids and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. Eventually many people came to doubt that there had been any attack on the night of August 4 and suspected that the report of such an attack had been a deliberate lie rather than the honest mistake that it had been. EDWIN E. MOISE See also DeSoto Missions; Electronic Intelligence; Gulf of Tonkin Resolution; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; McNamara, Robert Strange; Operation Plan 34A; PIERCE ARROW, Operation; Stockdale, James Bond; Vo Nguyen Giap References Herring, George C. America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975. 4th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001. Moise, Edwin E. Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996. Tucker, Spencer C. Vietnam. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1999.
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution Congressional resolution passed in response to the Gulf of Tonkin Incident of August 2 and August 4, 1964. During 1964, senior Lyndon Johnson administration officials became increasingly convinced that an acceptable conclusion of the war in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) would require some form of military attack on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and began to consider obtaining a congressional resolution that would endorse U.S. military action. President Johnson, wary of the prospect of a major war in Vietnam and cognizant of the problems that President Harry S. Truman had faced while waging the Korean War (1950–1953) without explicit congressional approval, was especially determined not to get into such a war without a prior commitment of congressional support. As Johnson put it, “I’m gonna get ’em on the takeoff so they’ll be with me on the landing.” In May and June 1964 senior administration officials produced drafts of a possible resolution. They decided not to present these to Congress, however; there seemed too little chance of such a resolution being passed without a politically damaging debate. On August 2 and again on August 4, it was reported that North Vietnamese torpedo boats had attacked U.S. Navy destroyers on the high seas (the Gulf of Tonkin Incident). A revised draft of the resolution was quickly presented to the Congress on August 5. The crucial passages read: Whereas naval units of the Communist regime in Vietnam, in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, have deliberately and repeatedly at-
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
President Lyndon Johnson signs the August 7, 1964, Gulf of Tonkin Resolution that gave him for all practical purposes a free hand to commit U.S. military resources in Vietnam. (Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library)
tacked United States naval vessels lawfully present in international waters, and have thereby created a serious threat to international peace; and Whereas these attacks are part of a deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression that the Communist regime in Vietnam has been waging against its neighbors and the nations joined with them in the collective defense of their freedom. . . . Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression. . . . [T]he United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom. The members of Congress were given the impression that the heart of the resolution, the aspect that they should consider voting
437
for or against, was the passage about supporting the president in repelling armed attacks on U.S. forces. The congressional members were told that they should not worry about the implications of the next paragraph that authorized the president to do whatever he felt necessary to assist South Vietnam, because the administration had no intention of escalating American involvement in the war. Most members of Congress accepted these assurances, and the resolution passed on August 7, unanimously in the House of Representatives (416 to 0) and with only 2 dissenting votes, by Ernest Gruening (D-Alaska) and Wayne Morse (D-Ore.), in the Senate. In voting in favor of the measure, Congress gave Johnson carte blanche to wage war in Vietnam without a formal declaration of war. There was a very brief debate on the resolution in Congress, but few serious reservations surfaced. After Johnson had sent U.S. combat forces to Vietnam and cited the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution as his authority, many who had voted for the resolution regretted their action, and some began to investigate the circumstances. They found that the first attack (on August 2, 1964) had not been so clearly unprovoked as they had been told, that there was serious reason to doubt that the second attack (on August 4) had ever happened, and that the administration had been working on preliminary drafts of such a resolution, which it wanted precisely because it was considering an escalation of the war long before the incidents had arisen. By 1968 the resulting disillusionment had become a serious liability for the administration. When Senator Morse first proposed in 1966 that Congress repeal the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, there was hardly any support. Sentiment gradually shifted, however, and the resolution was finally repealed by a vote in both houses of Congress at the end of 1970. Furthermore, in November 1973 Congress passed the War Powers Act, which very explicitly laid out the president’s authority to wage war and the role that Congress should play in future conflicts. EDWIN E. MOISE See also Gruening, Ernest Henry; Gulf of Tonkin Incident; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Morse, Wayne Lyman References Herring, George C. America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975. 4th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001. Moise, Edwin E. Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996. Tucker, Spencer C. Vietnam. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1999.
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Index
1st Air Cavalry Division (U.S. [“Airmobile”]), xliii, 30, 50, 158, 160, 254, 276, 283 (image), 312, 349, 370, 461, 474, 517, 519, 527, 528 (image), 593, 771, 893, 1239, 1245, 1324, 1325 1st Armored Cavalry Regiment (ARVN), 160 1st Infantry Division (ARVN), 2, 306, 307, 448, 814 1st Infantry Division (PAVN), 254, 390–391 1st Infantry Division (U.S. [“Big Red One”]), 78, 81, 245, 248, 1029, 1324, 1325 1st Infantry Regiment (VC), 462 1st Marine Field Artillery Group (U.S.), 73 2nd Armored Brigade (U.S.), 160 2nd Infantry Division (ARVN), 312 2nd Infantry Division (PAVN), 1340 2nd Infantry Division (VC), 462 3rd Infantry Division (ARVN), 325 3rd Infantry Regiment (ARVN), 448 3rd Marine Division (U.S.), 290, 306, 485, 591–592 3rd Sapper Battalion (PAVN), 291 4th Air Cavalry Division (U.S.), 180 4th Infantry Division (U.S.), 160, 254, 388, 427, 1324 4th Marine Division (U.S. [“Magnificent Bastards”]), 306, 485 5th Air Cavalry (U.S. [“Airmobile”]), 529 5th Infantry Division (ARVN), 51, 150, 1324 5th Infantry Division (VC/PAVN), 1, 51 5th Infantry Regiment (U.S.), 292, 466 5th Marine Regiment (U.S.), xliv (image) 5th Ranger Group (ARVN), 357 6th Infantry Regiment (PAVN), 291 7th Air Cavalry (U.S. [“Airmobile”]), 406, 527, 528
7th Infantry Division (ARVN), 57, 58, 981 7th Infantry Division (VC/PAVN), 51 9th Infantry Division (ARVN), 981 9th Infantry Division (ROK [“White Horse”]), 163, 602 (image) 9th Infantry Division (U.S.), 348, 467, 981, 983–984 9th Infantry Division (VC/PAVN), 51, 80–81, 107, 342 9th Marine Regiment (U.S.), 57, 139, 448, 485 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (U.S. [“Blackhorse”]), 78, 370 12th Infantry Regiment (U.S.), 391 14th Infantry Regiment (U.S. [“Rangers”]), 470 (image) 16th Infantry Regiment (U.S.), 1 18th Infantry Regiment (U.S.), 391 21st Infantry Division (ARVN), 981 21st Marine Regiment (U.S. [“Gimlets”]), 306 22nd Infantry Division (ARVN), 160, 312, 1326 23rd Infantry Division (ARVN), 160, 608 23rd Infantry Division (U.S. [“Americal Division”]), 119–120, 785, 1340 24th Infantry Regiment (PAVN), 163, 254, 427, 466 25th Infantry Division (U.S. [“Tropic Lightning”]), 78, 81, 208, 249, 370, 457, 1324 26th Infantry Regiment (U.S. [“Blue Spaders”]), 180 26th Marine Regiment (U.S.), 485 29th Infantry Regiment (PAVN), 57, 448 31st Marine Amphibious Unit (U.S.), 48 31st Infantry Regiment (PAVN), 485 32nd Infantry Regiment (PAVN), 485 33rd Infantry Regiment (PAVN), 528 39th Infantry Regiment (U.S.), 348
I-1
42nd Regiment (ARVN), 427, 466 52nd Ranger Battalion (U.S.), 308 57th Medical Detachment (U.S.), 320, 564 66th Infantry Regiment (PAVN), 254 82nd Airborne Division (U.S.), 29, 467 82nd Medical Detachment (U.S.), 853 90th Infantry Regiment (PAVN), 140 101st Airborne Division (U.S. [“Screaming Eagles”]), 15, 50, 57, 276, 292, 349, 448, 464, 474, 546, 803, 1340 101st Aviation Group (U.S.), 292 101st Infantry Regiment (PAVN), 81 173rd Airborne Brigade (U.S. [“Sky Soldiers”]), 15, 50, 180, 245, 248, 254, 427, 428, 693, 1325 (image), 1326 174th Infantry Regiment (PAVN), 254, 428 187th Infantry Regiment (U.S. [“Rakassans”]), 57 196th Light Infantry Brigade (U.S.), 81, 292, 306 199th Light Infantry Brigade (U.S.), 357, 1162 237th Infantry Regiment (VC), 81 271st Infantry Regiment (VC), 107 272nd Infantry Regiment (VC), 81, 107, 341, 342 304B Infantry Division (PAVN), 163, 517, 977 320th Infantry Division (PAVN), 306 320th Infantry Regiment (PAVN), 254 324B Infantry Division (PAVN), 235, 462, 463, 517, 977 325th Infantry Division (PAVN), 77, 235 325C Infantry Division (PAVN), 517, 579, 1244 327th Infantry Regiment (U.S.), 466 502nd Infantry Regiment (U.S.), 466 503rd Infantry Regiment (U.S.), 254, 255 506th Infantry Battalion (VC), 348 675B Artillery Regiment (PAVN), 291
I-2
Index
762nd Infantry Regiment (VC), 308 763rd Infantry Regiment (VC), 308 803rd Infantry Regiment (PAVN), 235 812th Infantry Regiment (PAVN), 485 I Corps (ARVN), 517, 520, 814 I Corps (U.S.), 50, 311 II Corps (ARVN), 161 II Field Force, 875 III Corps (ARVN), 158, 161 III Corps (U.S.), 51 III Marine Amphibious Force (U.S. [MAF]), 31, 312, 704 LXX Corps (PAVN), 617 ABILENE, Operation, 1–2 Abrams, Creighton Williams, Jr., 2–3, 2 (image), 51, 133, 347, 548, 576, 599, 616, 625, 692–693, 814, 847, 872, 875, 934, 970, 1062, 1174, 1175, 1176–1177, 1176–1177, 1188, 1203 (image), 1212, 1215, 1345 (image) analysis of the enemy systems used in the Vietnam War, 3 as commander of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), 3 as overseer of Vietnamization, 747 Abzug, Bella, 4, 187, 712 Accelerated Pacification Campaign, 872–873 Accelerated Turnover to the Vietnamese (ACTOV) program, 407 Acheson, Dean Gooderham, 4–6, 5 (image), 566, 603, 1143, 1168 “defense perimeter” in Asia established by, 5 memorandum of, 1404Doc. press release urging aid for Indochina, 1410Doc. report to the National Security Council, 1416–1417Doc. telegram to Abbot L. Moffat, 1390–1391Doc. telegram to the consulate in France, 1403–1404Doc. telegram to the consulate in Hanoi, 1404Doc. telegram to the embassy in France, 1402–1403Doc. telegram to the embassy in the United Kingdom, 1407–1408Doc. telegram to the legation in Saigon, 1415–1416Doc. telegram to Walter Robertson, 1378–1379Doc. telegrams to David Bruce, 1409–1410Doc., 1412–1413Doc. ACTIV. See Army Team Concept in Vietnam Adams, Eddie, 6–7, 6 (image), 727 Adams, Samuel A., 7–8, 865 Ad Hoc Military Buildup Committee (AHMBC), 8
Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA), 934 Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service (AARS), 1032 African Americans, in the U.S. military, 8–10, 9 (image), 69 effects of the civil rights movement on, 212 Agent Orange. See Defoliation; Herbicides Agnew, Spiro Theodore, 10–11, 11 (image), 45, 338, 457, 464, 465 criticism of the media, 1622–1624Doc. resignation of the vice presidency by, 11, 377 Agricultural reform tribunals, 11–12 Agroville Program, 12, 808, 811, 1061 Aiken, George David, 12–13, 13 (image) Air America, 13–14 Airborne operations, 14–16 Aircraft, allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 16–24, 17 (image), 19 (image), 23 (image), 579 allied bombers, 16–18 Boeing B-52 Stratofortress, 16, 24, 32, 48, 59–60, 60 (image), 79, 97, 108, 125, 142–143, 158, 292, 312, 325, 340, 370, 376, 462, 466, 503, 527, 578, 582, 592, 625, 646, 659 (image), 661, 662, 693, 698, 709, 724, 740, 770, 802, 845, 879, 887, 944, 952, 958, 1001, 1018, 1021, 1034, 1036, 1049, 1053, 1068, 1130, 1154, 1184 Douglas A-1 Skyraider, 16, 17 (image), 24, 27, 77, 300, 372, 578, 838, 911, 917, 1080, 1265, 1356 Douglas A-4 Skyhawk, 16, 24, 27, 35, 41, 300, 339, 372, 379, 679, 713, 911, 930, 1066, 1124, 1205, 1265 Douglas AD-6 Skyraider, 838, 1264 Douglas B-26 Invader, 16, 24, 105, 342, 383, 644 Douglas EB/RB-66 Destroyer, 17, 24–25, 31 (image) Grumman A-6 Intruder, 24, 25, 300, 340, 659, 1206 Martin B-57/RB-57 Canberra, 18, 25, 27, 35, 105, 990 (image) Vought A-7 Corsair II, 18, 25, 27, 35, 300, 659, 758, 1032 allied fighters and fighter-bombers, 18–20 McDonnell Douglas Phantom F4, xliii (image), 18, 19 (image), 27, 28, 35, 121, 226, 233, 300, 339, 379, 1040, 1051, 1079, 1085, 1086, 1119, 1205, 1206, 1248, 1341, 1342 allied trainers, transports, reconnaissance aircraft, and defoliators, 20–23 Democratic Republic of Vietnam aircraft, 23–24 See also Tactical Air Command Aircraft carriers, 25–27, 26 (image) length of individual tours/cruises, 26–27
reconnaissance tasks of, 27 Air defenses, Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 27–29, 28 (image) antiaircraft artillery (AAA), 28, 52–53 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), 28, 28 (image) Air Ground Aid Service (AGAS), 270 AirLand Battle doctrine, 1062 Air mobility, 29–30, 29 (image) Air Naval Gunnery Liaison Company (ANGLICO), 30–31 Airpower, role of in the Vietnam War, 31–32, 33 (map), 34 air operations over Cambodia, 34 amount/tonnage of bombs dropped during the war, 31–32 focus of air operations in South Vietnam, 32 Air War Study Group Report (Cornell University), 36–37 ALA MOANA, Operation, 37 Albert, Carl, 280 Albright, Madeleine K., 1181 Alcatraz Gang, 1066 Alessandri, Marcel, 37–38, 172, 1009 Alexander, Jerome, 1031 (image) Ali, Muhammad, 38, 39 (image), 111, 231 (image) Allen, James, 238 Allied strength in Vietnam, 1964–1972 (table) Alpha Strike, 39–40 Alsop, Joseph Wright, V, 40 Alvarez, Everett, Jr., 41, 41 (image), 931 Amerasians, 41–43, 42 (image) American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 45, 46 American Friends of Vietnam (AFV), 43–44, 861 American Indian Movement (AIM), 798 American Red Cross, 44–45, 45 (image) Supplemental Recreational Activities Overseas (SRAO) program of, 44–45 American Society of Friends (Quakers), 53 Amin, Jamil Abdullah al-. See Brown, Hubert Gerald Amnesty, 45–46 Amphibious Objective Area (AOA), 47 Amphibious warfare, 46–48, 47 (image) amphibious task force of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, 47 brown water versus blue water operations, 47 deployment of the Special Landing Force (SLF), 47 during the period of Vietnamization, 48 marine landings, 47 Andersen, Christopher, 375 Andersen Air Force Base, 48–49 Anderson, Jack, 921 Anderson, William, 927, 1118 Andreotta, Glenn, 786, 1116 Andropov, Yuri, 423 Angell, Joseph, 189
Index Angkor Wat, 49–50, 49 (image), 150–151 ANGLICO. See Air Naval Gunnery Liaison Company An Khe, 50 An Loc, Battle of, 50–51 casualties of, 51 Annam, 51–52 Antiaircraft artillery (AAA), 52–53, 1248 Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems Treaty (ABM Treaty) (1972), 778 Anti-Party Affair, 638, 639, 1043 Anti-Rightist campaign, 1043 Antiwar movement, in the United States, 53–55, 54 (image), 610 bombing of North Vietnam as the catalyst for, 53–54 common denominators among college campuses, 571 spread of beyond college campuses, 54 See also Baltimore Four; Camden 28; Catonsville Nine; Chicago Eight; Fort Hood Three; Jackson State College, shootings at; Kent State University shootings; March on the Pentagon; May Day Tribe; Moratorium to End the War in Vietnam; Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) Antiwar protests, non-U.S., 55–57, 56 (image) APACHE SNOW, Operation, 57, 709 Ap Bac, Battle of, 57–59, 58 (image), 1035, 1261 casualties of, 57 (table) Ap Bia Mountain, Battle of. See Hamburger Hill, Battle of Appeasement policy, 781 Approval ratings, of U.S. presidents during U.S. involvement in Indochina, 569 (table) Appy, Christian, 313 Aptheker, Herbert, 688 Arc Light missions, 59–61, 60 (image), 1069, 1186 ARDMORE, Operation, 579 Armored personnel carriers (APCs), 61–63, 61 (image) characteristics of, 62–63 (table) Armored warfare, 63–64, 63 (image) antitank attack methods, 63–64 lack of armor in North Vietnamese forces, 64 Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV), 64–65 Army of the Republic of Vietnam. See Vietnam, Republic of, Army Arnett, Peter, 65–66, 66 (image), 727, 728, 1078 Arnheiter, Marcus Aurelius, 66–67 Arnold, Henry, 960 Art, and the Vietnam War, 67–70, 69 (image) African American artists’ response to the Vietnam War, 69–70
Artillery, 70–73, 72 (image) antipersonnel “Beehive” rounds, 72–73 high-explosive antitank (HEAT) ammunition, 72 improved conventional munitions (ICM), 73 number of U.S. Army artillery battalions in Vietnam, 73 specific People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) artillery, 71–72, 1251 (table) specific U.S. artillery, 71 (table) use of by the Viet Cong, 71 See also Antiaircraft artillery (AAA) Artillery fire doctrine, 73–76, 75 (image) chain of command for artillery, 74 direct support (DS) and general support (GS) operations, 73–74 and the effectiveness of firebases, 75–76 and fire direction centers (FDCs), 74 specific doctrines for artillery maneuvers, 74–75 Artists and Writers Protest (AWP) group, 67 Aschenbrenner, Michael, 70 A Shau Valley, 76–77, 1239 A Shau Valley Special Forces Camp, Battle for, 77 Ashley, Eugene, Jr., 625 Asselin, Pierre, 490 Assimilation versus association, 77–78 Athenagoras I, Patriarch, 884 Atlantic Charter, 1167–1168 ATLAS WEDGE, Operation, 78–79 casualties of, 79 Atrocities, 79–80, 79 (image) committed by U.S. armed forces, 55, 79–80, 149–150, 481, 521 committed by the Viet Cong (VC), 79, 80, 519, 521–522, 521 (image) committed by Republic of Korea (ROK) allied forces, 80 See also Torture ATTLEBORO, Operation, 80–81 casualties of, 81 Attrition, 82 Aubrac, Raymond, 889, 1016–1017 August Revolution, 82–83, 1010 Au Lac, kingdom of, 83 Ault Report, 1124 Australia, 83–86, 85 (image), 395 casualties suffered by in the Vietnam War, 85, 86 deployment of ground troops to Vietnam, 84 military advisors provided to Vietnam, 83 Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) operations in Vietnam, 84 Royal Australian Navy (RAN) operations in Vietnam, 84–85, 1321 See also CRIMP, Operation Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV), 83 Australian Special Air Services (SAS), 15
I-3
“Awesome foursome,” 961 B-52 raids. See Arc Light missions BABYLIFT, Operation, 87–88, 87 (image)
Bach Dang River, Battle of, 88–89 Ba Cut, 89, 830 Baez, Joan Chandos, 55, 89–90, 90 (image) Baker, Carroll, 1166 (image) Baker, Ella, 1072 Ball, George Wildman, 54, 90–91, 91 (image), 218, 345, 551, 562, 569, 808, 1201, 1345, 1345 (image) memorandum to President Johnson, 1549–1551Doc. telegram to President Johnson and Dean Rusk, 1506–1508Doc. Ball, Roland, 583 Baltimore Four, 91–92 Ban Karai Pass, 92–93 Ban Me Thuot, Battle of, 93–94, 93 (image) Bao Dai, xli, 94–95, 94 (image), 140, 330, 654, 655, 806, 807, 811, 839, 913 (image), 1010, 1258, 1272, 1286, 1287 abdication message of, 1376–1377Doc. Barker, Frank Akeley, Jr., 95–96 BARREL ROLL, Operation, 26, 32, 96–97, 503, 1119 sorties involved in and total ordnance dropped, 97 (table) BARRIER REEF, Operation, 917, 1026 Barrow, Robert, 290–291 Basic Principles of Mutual Relations (1972), 778 Bassford, Christopher, 1077 Batcheller, Gordon, 516 Bates, Carol, 797 Ba Trieu. See Trieu Au Bay of Pigs Invasion (1961), 568 Beau, Jean-Baptiste Paul, 78, 98 BEAU CHARGER, Operation, 47 BEAVER TRACK, Operation, 47, 485 Beckwith, Charles Alvin, 98–100, 99 (image) role of in the formation of Delta Force, 99 Bennett, John, 218 Benson Report (1969), 969 Ben Suc, 100–101, 100 (image) Ben Tre, Battle of, 101–102, 101 (image) BENTRE, Operation, 388 Berger, Samuel David, 102 Berlin Wall, 568 Bernard, Harry V., 270, 862 Bernhardt, Michael, 971 Berrigan, Daniel, 102–104, 103 (image), 178, 179, 217 Berrigan, Philip, 91–92, 103, 104, 178, 179 Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, 537 Betts, Richard K., 491 Bidault, Georges, 104–105, 105 (image), 375, 651–652, 1307 Bien Hoa Air Base, 105–106, 106 (image) Bigeard, Marcel, 174, 295–296 Big Medicine, Joseph, Jr., 799 (image)
I-4
Index
BIG PATCH, Operation, 1325
Binh Gia, Battle of, 106–108, 107 (image) casualties of, 107 BINH TAY I–IV, Operations, 108–109, 157, 160–161 Binh Xuyen, 109, 169, 314, 654, 1010 Bird, William H., 109, 156 Bird & Sons, 109, 156–157, 236 Blackburn, Donald D., 1052 Black Flags, 110–111, 110 (image) BLACKJACK, Operation, 564, 764 Black Muslims, 111–112, 112 (image) Black Panthers, 112–113, 242, 361, 1024–1025 Black Power movement, 212, 591 Black Virgin Mountain. See Nui Ba Den Blair, John D., IV, 77 Blaizot, Roger, 114, 172, 532, 1242 Blassie, Michael Joseph, 114–115, 115 (image) BLU-82/B bomb, 115–116, 1239–1240 Bluechel, Herbert J., 290 BLUE LIGHT, Operation, 116 BLUE MARTIN, Operation, 47 Blum, Léon, 116–117, 117 (image) Boat people. See Refugees and boat people Body armor, 118 Body count, 118–119, 119 (image) Boettcher, Thomas, 313 BOLD MARINER, Operation, 119–121, 120 (image), 1030 Bollaert, Émile, 121 BOLO, Operation, 121–122, 862–863 Bombing, of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, restrictions on, 122, 123 (map), 124–125 Bombs BLU-82 (“Daisy Cutter”) bombs, 115–116, 619, 1239–1240 gravity (cluster bombs), 125 Bon Son Campaign. See MASHER/WHITE WING, Operation Booby traps, 125–127, 126 (image) hand grenades used in, 452 Border Campaign. See LE HONG PHONG II, Operation Boston Five, 1060 Bowles, Chester Bliss, 127–128, 127 (image) Bradley, Mark, 490 Bradley, Omar Nelson, 128–129, 128 (image), 606, 1345 Brady, Patrick Henry, 129, 564 Braestrup, Peter, 1100 Brandt, Willy, 286, 418 BRAVO I–II, Operations, 129–130, 649, 1123 Brechignac, Jean, 174 Breezy Cove, 1026 Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich, 130–132, 131 (image), 286–287, 287 (image), 609, 918 the Brezhnev Doctrine, 131, 423 domestic policy of, 131 relationship with North Vietnam, 131 relationship with the West, 131–132
See also Moscow meeting, Brezhnev and Nixon Brigham, Robert, 490 BRIGHT LIGHT, Operation, 132, 1028 Brindley, Thomas, 580–581 Brodie, Bernard, 960, 1029 BROTHERHOOD, Operation, 907, 1012 Brown, Andrew J., 915 (image) Brown, Earl, 656 Brown, George Scratchley, 132–133 Brown, Hank, 134 Brown, Harold, 196 Brown, H. Rap, 1072 Brown, Hubert Gerald, 133–134, 133 (image) Brown, James, 958–959 Brown, Malcolm, 58 Brown, Rayford, 560 (image) Brown, Samuel Winfred, Jr., 134–135, 773 Brown, Winthrop, 631 Browne, Malcolm Wilde, 135 Browne, Michael W., 1246 Bruce, David Kirkpatrick Este, 135–136, 135 (image) telegram to Dean Acheson, 1420–1421Doc. Brzezinski, Zbigniew Kazimierz, 136–137, 137 (image), 1226 Bucher, Lloyd M., 947 BUCKSKIN, Operation, 245 Buddhism, 137–139, 138 (image) Buddhist protests in Vietnam, 138 introduction of into Vietnam from China, 137 Theravada Buddhism in Cambodia, 151 Buddle, Reggie L., 1299 BUFFALO, Operation, 139–140, 485 Bui Diem, 140–141 Bui Phat, 141 Bui Tin, 141–142, 142 (image), 875 Bui Van Sac, 818 BULLET SHOT, Operation, 142–143 Bundy, McGeorge, 143–144, 143 (image), 372, 797, 871, 917, 1345, 1345 (image) cablegrams to Henry Cabot Lodge, 1499–1501Doc. memorandum to President Johnson, 1514–1515Doc. Bundy, William Putnam, 144–145, 1095 memorandum to Dean Rusk, 1571–1572Doc. Bunker, Ellsworth, 145–146, 145 (image), 302, 347, 496 (image), 576, 599, 872, 1175 Burchell, Don, 949 (image) Burchett, Wilfred, 146, 1145 Burkett, Bernard Gary, 146–147, 1298, 1299 Bush, George Herbert Walker, 147–148, 147 (image), 187, 220, 305, 464, 781, 1280 education of, 147 political career of, 148 service of in World War II, 147 Bush, George W., 148, 595, 715, 1181, 1209– 1210, 1299, 1319–1320
BUTTERCUP, Operation, 1129
Byrne, William Matthew, 341, 1007 Byrnes, James F., note to French ambassador Henri Bonnet, 1382–1383Doc. Byroade, Henry, aide-mémoire to North Vietnamese consul Vu Huu Binh, 1569Doc. CALCAV. See Clergy and Laymen Concerned about Vietnam Calley, William Laws, Jr., 149–150, 150 (image), 608, 785, 786, 886, 971, 1116, 1190 Cambodia, xlv, 49, 128, 150–154, 153 (image), 155, 325, 352, 414, 1246, 1274, 1278 air operations over, 34 bombing of, 151, 370, 594, 740, 802–803, 847–848, 1176 history of, 150–151 neutral status of, 802, 1018 North Vietnamese headquarters in, 557 political stability in, 154 political turmoil and civil war in, 152–154 population of, 1964–1964, 585 (table) Theravada Buddhism in, 151 See also Angkor Wat; Cambodia, Vietnamese invasion of; Cambodian airlift; Cambodian Incursion; Hot pursuit policy; Khmer Rouge Cambodia, Vietnamese invasion of, 152–153, 154–156, 200 background of, 154–155 Cambodian airlift, 156–157 Cambodian Incursion, 157–158, 158 (image), 159 (map), 160–161, 803, 848, 1176 first phase of, 157–158 number and types of troops involved in, 157–158 second phase of, 158, 160 third phase of, 879 Camden 28, 161–162 Cam Lo, 162 CAMPAIGN 275, 93 Camp, Carter, 798 Camp Carroll, 162–163 Campbell, Roger, 581 Cam Ranh Bay, 163–164, 164 (image), 1279 Canada, 164–165, 165 (image) Canines. See K-9 Corps Can Lao Nhan Cach Mang Dang (Revolutionary Personalist Labor Party), 165–167, 803, 811, 967 Cao Bang, 167–168 Cao Dai, 168–170, 169 (image), 314, 654, 1089, 1096 Cao Van Vien, 170–171 Caravelle Group, 171, 903 CARBANADO, Operation, 270 Carmichael, Stokley, 1072 Carpentier, Marcel, 167, 171–172, 532, 545, 642, 643, 998, 1242, 1286
Index Carter, James Earl, Jr., 46, 136, 137, 172–173, 173 (image), 284, 287, 338 (image), 339, 378, 411, 547, 1278, 1318 Case, Clifford Philip, 173–174 Case-Church Amendment (1973), 174 Casey, Aloysius, 635 Casey, Patrick, 635 CASTOR, Operation, 15, 174–175, 800–801, 802 Casualties, of the Vietnam War, 175–176, 175 (table) Australian, 176 French, 175 Republic of Korea (ROK), 176 Republic of Vietnam (RVN), 175 U.S., 175 Viet Cong (VC) and People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN), 176 Catholicism, 176–178, 177 (image) Catonsville Nine, 178–179 Catroux, Georges, 179–180 Cau Nguyen Loi, 1119 (image) CEDAR FALLS, Operation, 81, 100, 101, 180–181, 181 (map), 539, 555, 873 casualties of, 180 target of, 180 Cédile, Jean, 181 Center for Constitutional Rights, 613 Central Highlands, 182, 184, 1015, 1239, 1264 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 43, 182– 184, 186, 190, 223–224, 229, 244, 319, 412, 459, 507, 717, 1050, 1126–1127, 1328 Border Surveillance program of, 244 cablegram on the CIA channel to Henry Cabot Lodge concerning Vietnam, 1498Doc., 1498–1499Doc. intelligence memorandum concerning bombing damage to North Vietnam, 1589–1590Doc. See also Air America Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), 157, 160, 184–185, 1245, 1323 cable from the North Vietnamese Politburo to, 1606Doc. Directive 02/73, 1649–1650Doc. Directive 03/CT 73, 1654–1656Doc. Directive (un-numbered), 1606–1607Doc. Resolution No. 9, 1614–1615Doc. summary of Directive No. 1/CT71, 1627–1629Doc. Chamberlain, Neville, 781 Chams, 185–186, 186 (image), 199 Chandler, David, 920 CHAOS, Operation, 186–187 Chapman, Leonard Fielding, Jr., 187–188, 188 (image) Chappelle, Georgette Meyer, 188–189 Charner, Léonard Victor Joseph, 189 Charton, Pierre, 643 CHECO Project, 189 Chemical warfare. See Defoliation; Herbicides; RANCH HAND, Operation
Cheney, Dick, 187 Chen Geng, 1332 Cheng Heng, 684 Chennault, Anna, 190–191, 190 (image), 192 Chennault, Claire Lee, 191–192, 191 (image), 1009 Chen Yun, 196 Chernenko, Konstantin, 423 Chiang Kai-shek. See Jiang Jieshi Chicago Eight, 192–193, 193 (image), 506, 613, 1329 Chieu Hoi Program, 193–194, 596, 869, 943 China, People’s Republic of (PRC), 156, 172, 194–199, 195 (image), 197 (image), 204, 234, 293, 1241, 1332 domestic policies of, 195 economic development in, 198 formation of after the Chinese Civil War, 195 National People’s Congresses (NPCs) of, 196–197 relations with the Soviet Union, 195, 423 relations with the United States, 195, 196 and the Sino-Soviet split, 195–196 status of following the Korean War, 607 Tiananmen Square uprising in, 197–198 See also China, People’s Republic of (PRC), policy of toward Vietnam; Cultural Revolution; Great Leap Forward; Hundred Flowers campaign China, People’s Republic of (PRC), policy of toward Vietnam, 199–201, 200 (image), 201 (image) amount of foreign aid to North Vietnam, 199 military aid to North Vietnam, 324 post–Vietnam War policy, 200–201, 204 provision of war materiel to the Viet Minh and North Vietnamese, 676 support of the Viet Minh, 293, 532–533, 547–548 China, Republic of, 201–202, 548 China Lobby, 597 Chinese, in Vietnam, 202–204, 203 (image) attacks on the Chinese community, 202 control of South Vietnam’s commerce by the Chinese, 203 expulsion of the Chinese from Vietnam, 204 organization of the Chinese in Vietnam, 202 response of the Chinese to Vietnamese decrees and demands, 203 Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 195, 196, 197 Chin Vinh. See Tran Do Chomsky, Avram Noam, 204–205, 205 (image) Chou En-lai. See Zhou Enlai Christmas Bombings. See LINEBACKER II, Operation Church, Frank Forrester, 173, 174, 205–206, 238–239, 464, 1196 Churchill, Winston, 995, 1143 Chu Van Tan, 206 CIDG. See Civilian Irregular Defense Group
I-5
Civic action, 206–209, 207 (image) combined action platoon (CAP) mission, 208 Helping Hand program, 208 Marine Corps civic action programs, 207–208 medical civic action programs (MEDCAPS), 207 Civil Air Transport (CAT), 13 Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG), 209, 223, 244, 564, 769, 1084, 1213, 1214 Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), 120, 208, 209–210, 223, 357, 433, 509, 872, 873, 909, 934, 1183–1184, 1272 Civil Rights Act (1964), 591 Civil rights movement, 210–212, 211 (image), 607 and the Black Power movement, 212 effect of on African American soldiers in Vietnam, 212 and voter registration of African Americans, 212 (table) Clarey, Bernard Ambrose, 212–213 Clark, Joseph S., 1196 Clark, Mark, 113 Clark, William Ramsey, 213–214, 213 (image), 1198 Clark Air Force Base, 215 Clausewitz, Carl von, 990, 1077 Clay, Cassius. See Ali, Muhammad Claymore Mines. See Armored warfare; Firesupport bases; Mine warfare, land Clear and hold operations, 215 Cleaver, Eldridge, 113 Cleland, Joseph Maxwell, 215–216, 215 (image), 925, 1216 Clemenceau, Georges, 216–217, 216 (image) Clergy and Laymen Concerned about Vietnam (CALCAV), 217–218, 217 (image) Clifford, Clark McAdams, 218–219, 218 (image), 510, 551, 1209, 1318 Clinton, Hillary Rodham, 220 Clinton, William Jefferson, 148, 219–221, 344, 616, 762 lifting of the trade embargo on the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), 1674–1675Doc. normalization of relations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), 1675–1676Doc. Cluster bombs. See Bombs, gravity (cluster bombs) Coalition for a Democratic Majority, 996 Coastal surveillance force. See MARKET TIME, Operation Cochin China, 51–52, 95, 155, 181, 221, 343, 375, 398, 400, 401, 408, 416, 1241 Co Chi tunnels, 245, 248–249 Coffin, William Sloane, 218, 221–222, 222 (image)
I-6
Index
Cogny, René, 222–223, 295, 802 COINTELPRO, 1025 Colburn, Lawrence, 786, 1116 Colby, William Egan, 223–224, 223 (image), 319, 599, 615, 815, 872, 873, 909, 970, 1095, 1175, 1176 Collins, Arthur, 456 Collins, Joseph Lawton, 224–225, 225 (image), 314, 812, 1169 Collins-Ely Agreement, 861 Colvin, John, 1245 Combat Development and Test Center (CDTC), 967–968 Combat Operations Research Center (CORC), 967–968 Combined action platoons. See Marine combined action platoons COMMANDO FLASH, Operation, 225–226 COMMANDO HUNT, Operation, 34, 60, 226–227, 505, 617, 1063, 1185–1186 Committee on the Present Danger, 996 Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), 1244 Concerned Officers Movement (COM), 227–228 CONCORDIA, Operation, 306 “Conduct of the War in Vietnam” report (COWIN Report), 228 Conein, Lucien Emile, 129, 228–229, 674, 808, 809, 970, 1012, 1133 Confucianism, 229–230, 230 (image) Conscientious objectors (COs), 230–232, 231 (image) Conscription. See Selective Service Con Son Island Prison, 232–233, 233 (image), 763 CONSTANT GUARD, Operation, 233–234 Containment policy, 234–235, 566, 569, 781, 945, 1143, 1199 militarization of following the Korean War, 607 Contemporary Historical Examination of Combat Operations. See CHECO Project Con Thien, siege of, 235–236, 236 (image) casualties of, 236 See also BUFFALO, Operation Continental Air Services (CAS), 236–237 Cooper, Chester Lawrence, 237, 871 Cooper, John Sherman, 237–238, 239 (image), 464, 1196 Cooper-Brooke Amendment (1972), 238–239 Cooper-Church Amendment (1970), 239, 617, 849, 1196–1197 CORDS. See Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support CORONADO I–XI, Operations, 983 Corps tactical zones (CTZs), 240–241, 240 (image), 241 (map) Corsi, Jerome E., 1084 Cosell, Howard, 39 (image) COSVN. See Central Office for South Vietnam
Counterculture(s), 241–243, 242 (image) components of, 242 sociological definition of, 241 Counterinsurgency warfare, 243–245 CIA involvement in, 244 U.S. experience with, 243–244 Cousins, Norman, 53 COWIN Report. See “Conduct of the War in Vietnam” report Cranston, Alan, 610 CRIMP, Operation, 245–246 Crittenberger, Willis, 871 CROCKETT, Operation, 579 Croizat, Victor, 1270 Croly, Herbert, 663 Cronauer, Adrian, 246 Cronkite, Walter Leland, 246–247, 247 (image), 1100 criticism of U.S. policy in Vietnam, 1601–1602Doc. Cuba, 155 Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), 568 Cubi Point Naval Air Station, 247–248, 248 (image) Cultural Revolution, 197, 703, 1043 Cunningham, Randall Harold, 249–250, 250 (image), 1124 Cuong De, 250–251 Cushman, Robert Everton, Jr., 48, 251–252, 251 (image), 592, 1203 (image) Dabney, William, 580–581 Da Faria, Antônio, 253 Daisy Cutter. See BLU-82/B bomb Dai Viet Quoc Dan Dang, 253–254 Dak To, Battle of, 254–256, 254 (image), 255 (map), 465–466, 692–693, 1239 casualties of, 254, 255, 693 Da Lat, 256 Da Lat Military Academy, 1269 Daley, Richard Joseph, 256–257, 257 (image) Da Nang, 257–258, 258 (image), 345, 345 (image) See also Hue and Da Nang, fall of Dang Con San Viet Nam. See Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) Dang Lao Dong Viet Nam (Vietnamese Workers’ Party), 1244 Dang Si, 1113 Dang Xuan Khu. See Truong Chinh DANIEL BOONE, Operation, 259 Dao Duy Tung, 259 Daoism. See Taoism D’Argenlieu, Georges Thierry, 95, 259–260, 276, 375, 401, 532, 769, 1168, 1241 Darst, David, 178 Date of Estimated Return from Overseas. See DEROS Dau Tranh strategy, 260–262, 261 (image) Davidson, Carl, 1073 Davidson, Phillip Buford, Jr., 262
Davis, Angela, 113 Davis, Raymond Gilbert, 262–263, 290 Davis, Rennard Cordon, 192, 263–264, 263 (image), 711 Davison, Michael S., 158 Day, George Everett, 265–266, 932–933, 1126 Dean, Arthur, 1345 Dean, John Gunther, 265–266, 265 (image) Débes, Pierre-Louis, 266 ultimatum to the Haiphong Administrative Committee, 1389–1390Doc. De Castries, Christian Marie, 266–268, 267 (image) See also Dien Bien Phu, Battle of Dechaux, Jean, 174 DECKHOUSE I, Operation, 47 DECKHOUSE V, Operation, 268–269, 268 (image) Decoux, Jean, 269–270, 392 Deer Mission, 270 Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP), 270–272, 271 (image) Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS), 272 DEFIANT STAND, Operation, 272–273 Defoliation, 273–275, 274 (image), 1239 amount of herbicides used in, 273 (table), 480 (table) initial results of, 273 long-term effects of, 273–274 See also RANCH HAND, Operation Deforest, Orrin, 1127 De Gaulle, Charles, 105, 269, 275–276, 275 (image), 637, 774, 995, 1014, 1129 DELAWARE-LAM SON 216, Operation, 276–277 casualties of, 277 Dellinger, David, 192, 277–278, 277 (image), 1060 Dellums, Ron V., 1197 DeLoach, Cartha, 511 Delta Force, 99 Demilitarized zone (DMZ), 278–279, 278 (image), 279 (map), 306, 325 establishment of, 413–414 Democratic National Convention (1968 [Chicago]), 55, 113, 134, 178, 218, 264, 278, 279–281, 280 (image) See also Chicago Eight Deng Xiaoping, 196, 198, 1046 Denney, Stephen, 964 Denton, Jeremiah Andrew, Jr., 281, 495 Deo Mu Gia. See Mu Gia Pass DePuy, William Eugene, 1, 281–282, 282 (image), 555, 728 view of pacification, 871 See also Search and destroy De Rhodes, Alexandre, 283 DEROS (Date of Estimated Return from Overseas), 283–284, 283 (image) DESERT SHIELD, Operation, 270–271 DESERT STORM, Operation, 270–271
Index Desertion, 284–285 of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), 284–285 of the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) and the Viet Cong (VC), 285 of U.S. military personnel, 284 DeSoto missions, 285–286, 864 Détente, 286–288, 287 (image), 778 De Tham, 288 Devillers, Philippe, 288–289 Dewey, Albert Peter, 289–290, 289 (image), 310, 862 Dewey, Thomas, 315, 988 DEWEY CANYON I, Operation, 290–292, 291 (image), 617, 1294 casualties of, 291 success of, 292 DEWEY CANYON II, Operation, 292–293, 1294 casualties of, 292 Dewey Canyon III, 657 Diem, overthrow of. See Ngo Dinh Diem, overthrow of Dien Bien Phu, Battle of, 15, 76, 140, 174, 234, 267, 293–296, 294 (image), 295 (map), 342, 535, 675, 1169, 1250 artillery of the French forces, 295 artillery of the Viet Minh, 294–295 casualties of, 295, 296 effects of the French defeat, 296 French rescue plans for (Operation ALBATROSS and Operation CONDOR), 296 See also VULTURE, Operation Dien Triet Lake, Battle of, 296–297 Dikes, on the Red River Delta, 297–298 Diller, Richard W., 276, 887 Dillon, C. Douglas, 329, 1345 telegram to John Foster Dulles, 1433Doc. Dinassauts, 298–299, 764 Dith Pran, 299–300, 299 (image) Dix, Drew, 940 Dixie Station, 300 Doan Khue, 300–301 Dobrynin, Anatoly Fedorovich, 301, 301 (image) Do Cao Tri, 158, 302–303, 302 (image), 827 Dogs. See K-9 Corps Doi Moi, 303, 820, 1278–1279 Domino theory, 303–305, 304 (image), 569, 781, 945 Do Muoi, 305–306 Don Dien, 306 Dong Ap Bia. See Hamburger Hill, Battle of Dong Da, Battle of. See Hanoi, Battle of, and the First Tet Offensive Dong Ha, Battle of, 306–307 casualties of, 307 (table) Dong Quan Pacification Project, 307–308 Dong Xoai, Battle of, 308–309, 308 (image) Don Khoi, 835 Donlon, Roger Hugh C., 309 Donnell, John, 1078
Donovan, Jack, 1341 Donovan, James, 1036 Donovan, William Joseph, 182, 309–310, 310 (image), 861, 862 Dooley, Thomas Anthony, III, 310–311, 880 Do Quang Thang, 311 D’Orlandi, Giovanni, 704 Doubek, Bob, 1295, 1296 DOUBLE EAGLE, Operation, 47, 311–312, 312 (image), 709 Doumer, Paul, 78, 312–313 Dow Chemical Company, 789 Draft, military. See Selective Service Driscoll, William, 250 (image), 1124 Drugs and drug use, 313–314 Duc Thanh Tran. See Tran Huang Dao Duc Tong Anh Hoang De. See Tu Duc Dulles, Allen Welsh, 183, 314–315, 314 (image), 1011 Dulles, John Foster, 183, 315–316, 315 (image), 329, 330, 412, 597, 802, 807, 957, 1011, 1055, 1056, 1169, 1199, 1307 minutes of meeting with Eisenhower, 1437–1439Doc. telegram to the embassy in Saigon, 1452–1453Doc. telegrams to C. Douglas Dillon, 1423Doc., 1423–1424Doc., 1426–1427Doc., 1436– 1437Doc., 1439–1440Doc. Dumb bombs. See Bombs, gravity “Dump Johnson” movement, 685 Duong Hiuu Nghia, 318 Duong Quynh Hoa, 316–317 Duong Thanh Nhat, 318 Duong Van Duc, 317 Duong Van Minh, 129, 317–318, 317 (image), 331, 458, 653, 675, 753, 808, 809, 827, 830, 831 (image), 1134, 1135, 1261, 1263, 1264 Dupré, Marie-Jules, 110 Dupuis, Jean, 110, 318–319 Durbrow, Elbridge, 319–320 assessment of the Diem regime, 1462Doc. telegrams to Christian Herter, 1473– 1475Doc., 1481Doc. Dustoff, 320 Dutton, Frederick, 1195 Duy Tan, 320–321, 321 (image) Dylan, Bob, 55, 89, 90 (image), 321–322 EAGLE CLAW, Operation, 554
EAGLE PULL, Operation, 48, 323 Easter Offensive, xlv, 31, 51, 60, 142, 162, 163, 182, 226, 233, 258, 278, 323–325, 324 (image), 346, 348, 393, 498, 599, 652, 672, 680, 736, 749, 758, 769, 814, 842, 843, 909, 910, 917, 946, 952, 1024, 1029, 1080, 1096, 1140, 1175, 1176, 1186, 1205, 1246, 1251, 1270, 1300, 1304, 1310, 1327, 1364 role of aircraft in, 1069, 1184–1185, 1300 See also Kontum, Battle for
I-7
East Meets West (EMW) Foundation, 1182 Eberhardt, David, 92 Eden, Robert Anthony, 327–328, 327 (image), 767 Edwards, Mel, 67 Egan, David, 1116 Eisenhower, Dwight D., xli, 43, 166, 172, 224, 244, 296, 316, 328–329, 328 (image), 342, 409, 568, 607, 692, 696, 807, 847, 957, 1055, 1056, 1164, 1169, 1169, 1199–1200, 1202, 1259 (image) approval ratings for, 569 (table) belief in the “domino theory,” 304, 305 conversation with Ngo Dinh Diem, 1463Doc. domestic policies of, 328 international policies of, 328–329 letter to Ngo Dinh Diem, 1450–1451Doc. minutes of meeting with Dulles, 1437–1439Doc. news conference notes, 1437Doc. policies of in Southeast Asia, 329 Electronic intelligence (ELINT), 339–340, 864 “Eleven Day War.” See LINEBACKER II, Operation Elleman, Bruce, 1046 Ellis, Randolph, 1151 Ellsberg, Daniel, 7, 340–341, 341 (image), 489–490, 594, 763, 891 (image), 960, 1006, 1035. See also Pentagon Papers and trial EL PASO II, Operation, 341–342 casualties of, 342 Ély, Paul Henri Romuald, 342–343, 532, 957, 1014 Elysée Agreement (1949), 343, 545, 913, 1402Doc. Emerson, Gloria, 662 Emspak, Frank, 793 Enclave strategy, 345–346, 345 (image) END SWEEP, Operation. See Mining and mine clearance in North Vietnam ENHANCE, Operation, 346, 1265 ENHANCE PLUS, Operation, 346–348, 347 (image), 842 ENTERPRISE, Operation, 348–349, 348 (image) Enthoven, Alain C., 349, 722 Enuol, Y Bham, 349–350 Erhard, Ludwig, 417 Erskine, Graves B., 172, 545 European Defense Community (EDC), 354– 355, 413 Ewell, Julian Johnson, 355 EXODUS, Operation, 880 FAIRFAX, Operation, 357–358
Fall, Bernard, 294, 358, 358 (image), 643, 933, 1244 Fancy, Henry F., 655, 656 FARM GATE, Operation, 358–359, 959, 1184 Fatherland Front, 898 Faure, Edgar, 359–360, 360 (image)
I-8
Index
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 190, 360–361, 1327, 1329 Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR), 361–362 and Project Daily Death Toll (DDT), 362 Felt, Harry Donald, 362–363 Fernandez, Richard, 218, 363–364 Ferry, Jules, 78, 364 Fieser, Louis, 788 Film, and the Vietnam experience, 364–368, 366 (image) background of, 364–365 colonial period, 365 combat films, 365–367 comedies, 367 films concerning soldiers returning home, 367–368 films concerning the war’s aftermath, 368 Fire-support bases (FSBs), 290, 369 First National Conference on the Emotional Needs of Vietnam-Era Veterans, 657 Fishel, Wesley Robert, 370, 741 Fisher, Roger, 722 Fishhook, 370–371 FitzGerald, Frances, 433–434 Five O’Clock Follies, 371–372, 371 (image), 553, 554, 1099 FLAMING DART I–II, Operations, 26, 372, 816, 917, 990 Flexible response, 373 Flynn, John, 933 Fonda, Jane Seymour, 373–375, 374 (image), 860, 1293 broadcast of from Hanoi, 1640–1641Doc. Fontainebleau Conference, 375 Food for Peace program, 719 Forces Armées Nationale Khmères (FANK [Khmer National Armed Forces]), 50, 152, 157, 158, 161, 376–377, 585 Ford, Gerald R., 46, 284, 287, 338, 377–378, 377 (image), 1021, 1197, 1319 and the Mayaguez incident, 378, 710–711 pardoning of Nixon by, 378 Forrestal, James, 577 Forrestal, Michael Vincent, 378–379, 1095 Forrestal, USS, flight deck fire of, 379 Fortas, Abraham, 379–380, 380 (image), 1345 Fort Hood Three, 380–381 Forward air controllers, 381 Fosdick, Raymond B., memorandum to Philip Jessup, 1405–1406Doc. “Four Nos” policy, 793–794 Four-Party Joint Military Commission, 381– 382, 382 (image) Fragging, 382–383 France, 15, 1168 involvement of in Southeast Asia, 243, 500 military logistics used in Vietnam, 676–677 nineteenth-century military intervention in Vietnam, 641–642 and Vietnam (1954–present), 389–390, 390 (image), 1240–1242
See also Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; FrancoThai War (1940–1941); Ho-Sainteny Agreement (1946); Indochina War (1946–1954) France, Air Force of, 383–384 France, Army of (1946–1954), 384–387, 385 (image) armor of, 384, 386 French Expeditionary Force in Vietnam, 386 (table) infantry weapons of, 385 initial strategy of in Indochina, 386 makeup of in Vietnam, 384 tactics used by to combat guerilla warfare, 386 France, Navy of, 387–389 lack of a coordinated strategy in Indochina, 388 and riverine warfare, 387–388 FRANCIS MARION, Operation, 390–391, 1015 Franco, Francisco, 1058 Franco-Thai War (1940–1941), 391–392 Franco–Viet Minh Convention, excerpts from, 1382Doc. Franco-Vietnamese Modus Vivendi, 1386–1387Doc. Fraser, Michael Allan, 1299 Fratricide, 392–393 Freedom Company, 907 FREEDOM DEAL, Operation, 1048 FREEDOM PORCH BRAVO, Operation, 393–394 Freedom Rides, 1072 Freedom Summer, 1072 FREEDOM TRAIN, Operation, 393, 394 Free fire zones, 394–395, 395 (image) Free Khmer. See Khmer Serai Free Speech Movement (FSM), 53 Free World Assistance Program, 395–396, 602, 907 Free World Military Assistance Council, 747 French Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité (CRS), 1272 French Foreign Legion, 396, 396 (image), 397 (map), 398 French Indochina, 398, 399 (map), 400–402, 400 (image) missionaries in, 398, 400 nineteenth-century emperors of, 398 FREQUENT WIND, Operation, 27, 48, 402, 708, 755, 965, 1030, 1051 Friendly Fire. See Fratricide Froines, John, 192 Front for National Salvation, 811 Front Unifié de Lutte des Races Opprimées (FULRO [United Struggle Front for the Oppressed Races]), 403 Fulbright, J. William, 235, 238, 403–404, 404 (image), 508, 551, 1195, 1196 Fulbright-Aiken Amendment, 1657Doc. Fuller, J. F. C., 1077 Gabriel, Richard A., 1188
GADSEN, Operation, 556 Galbraith, John Kenneth, 405 Gallieni, Jiseph, 78 Galloway, Joseph Lee, 406, 771 GAME WARDEN, Operation, 406–408, 407 (image), 1030, 1091 Garcia, Rupert, 70 Garnier, Marie Joseph Francis, 110, 408 Garwood, Robert Russell, 408–409, 409 (image), 761, 797, 931, 933 Gavin, James Maurice, 29, 409–410, 1030–1031 Gayler, Noel Arthur Meredyth, 410 GBT intelligence network, 270, 862 Gelb, Leslie Howard, 410–411, 411 (image), 491 Geneva Accords (1954), 411–412, 880, 898, 1050, 1165, 1169, 1271, 1272 Geneva Accords/Agreement (1962), 631, 1245 Geneva Convention (1949), 414–415, 1125 Geneva Convention and Geneva Accords (1954), 165, 330, 343, 412–414, 413 (image), 597, 767 final declaration of, 1445–1446Doc. response of the United States to the Geneva declarations, 1446Doc. Genovese, Eugene Dominick, 415–416 Germany, Federal Republic of (FRG [West Germany]), 417–418 Gia Long. See Nguyen Phuc Anh GIANT SLINGSHOT, Operation, 1025–1026, 1364 Giles, Jean, 174, 791 Gilpatric Task Force Report, 1481–1482Doc. Gilpatrick, Roswell, 808 Ginsberg, Allen, 418–419, 418 (image) Global positioning system (GPS), 681 Godley, George McMurtrie, 419–420 Goff, Dave, 1298–1299 Goldberg, Arthur Joseph, 420, 1345, 1345 (image) Goldman, Eric Frederick, 420–421 Goldwater, Barry, 53, 332–333, 421–422, 421 (image) Golub, Leon, 68–69 Goodacre, Glenna, 857 Goodpaster, Andrew Jackson, 422–423 Go Public Campaign, 796, 1067–1068 Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeyevich, 196, 423– 424, 423 (image), 1158, 1160, 1181, 1279 Gordon, Lawrence, 270, 862 Gracey, Douglas David, 424, 1164, 1240 Gradualism, xliii Graham, James C., 8 Gras, Yves, 643 Gravel, Maurice Robert, 424–425 Gravel, Mike, 892 Gravely, Samuel Lee, Jr., 425–426 Graves Registration. See Mortuary Affairs operations Great Leap Forward, 198, 702–703, 1043–1044
Index Great National Solidarity Program. See Chieu Hoi Program Great Society Program, 426–427, 549 impact of the Vietnam War on, 550–551 GREELEY, Operation, 427–428 Greenblatt, Robert, 1060 Greene, David M., 1030 Greene, Graham, 428–429, 428 (image) Greene, Wallace Martin, 429 Gregory, Dick, 1358 Grenade launchers, 429–431, 430 (image) Grew, Joseph telegram to Ambassador Jefferson Caffery, 1373Doc. telegram to Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley, 1374Doc. Griffin, R. Allen, telegram to Richard Bissell, Jr., 1417–1418Doc. Griswold, Erwin, 890 Gromyko, Andrei, 1225 Groom, John F., 1119 Grossman, Jerome, 773 Groupement Mobile 100, destruction of, 431–432 Gruening, Ernest Henry, 432, 550, 776, 1171, 1195 Guam, 432–433 Guam Conference (1967), 433–434, 434 (image) Guizot, François, 435 Gulf of Tonkin Incident, xlii, 26, 286, 435–436, 864, 1171, 1195 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (1964), 144, 436– 437, 437 (image), 530, 550, 562, 864, 996, 1171, 1195 text of, 1512Doc. Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist), 199, 201, 202, 388 Gurfein, Murray I., 890 Habaib, Philip Charles, 439–440 Hackworth, David Haskell, 75, 440–441, 440 (image), 466, 707, 1077 Hague Convention (1907), 802, 1018 Hai Ba Trung. See Trung Trac and Trung Nhi Haig, Alexander Meigs, Jr., 180, 441–442, 441 (image), 740 Hainan Island, 442–443 Haiphong, 443–444 shelling of, 444–445 Halberstam, David, 58, 445–446, 445 (image), 611, 717, 1035, 1094 Haldeman, H. R., 696 Halperin, Morton H., 446–447 Hamburger Hill, Battle of, 447–448, 447 (image), 448 (map), 1239 Hamilton, Steve, 460 Hamlet Evaluation System (HES), 223, 449, 869 Hammond, William M., 729 Ham Nghi, 449–450 Hampton, Fred, 113
Hand grenades, 450–452 chemical grenades, 451 concussion grenades, 451 fragmentation grenades, 450 hand grenades used in booby traps, 452 incendiary grenades, 451 smoke grenades, 451 sources of grenades used by Communist forces, 450–451 Hanh Lang Truong Son. See Truong Son Corridor Hanoi, 452–453, 452 (image) bombing of, xlv, 453 industry and commerce of, 452–453 population of during the Vietnam War, 452 Hanoi, Battle of, 453–454 Hanoi Hannah, 455 Hanoi Hilton. See Hoa Lo Prison Hanoi March, 977 Harassment and interdiction fires (H&I fires), 455–457, 456 (image) debate concerning the effectiveness of, 456, 457 and the use of remote sensors, 456–457 Hardhats (National Hard Hats of America), 457 HARDNOSE, Operation, 984 Harkin, Thomas, 927, 1118, 1119 (image) Harkins, Paul Donal, 363, 458–459, 458 (image), 569, 674, 809, 851, 1035, 1070, 1095 Harriman, William Averell, 459–460, 459 (image), 562, 631, 876, 1076, 1225 Harris, David, 460 Hart, Frederick, 70, 658, 1296 Hart, Gary, 134 Hartke, Vance Rupert, 460–461 HARVEST MOON, Operation, 461–462, 461 (image) HASTINGS, Operation, 462–463, 463 (image) Hatfield, Mark Odom, 464, 464–465, 720, 1197 Hatfield-McGovern Amendment (1970), 464–465, 720 Hawk, David, 773 Hawkins, Augustus, 927, 1118 Hawkins, Gains, 865 HAWTHORNE, Operation, 465–466, 465 (image) Hay, John H., Jr., 673 Hayden, Thomas, 192, 264, 373, 374, 466–467, 688, 923, 1072 Healy, Michael D., 467–469 Heath, Donald Read, 468, 861 telegram to Dean Acheson, 1420Doc. Heath, Edward, 1165 Hedrick, Wally, 67 Heinl, Robert D., Jr., analysis of the decline of U.S. armed forces, 1632–1635Doc. Helicopters, xlii, xliii, 14, 15, 46, 30, 50, 58, 70, 73, 74, 77, 84, 100, 106 (image), 108, 115, 158, 180, 245, 268, 273, 276, 277, 290, 291, 292, 347 (image), 383, 402, 445, 468–473, 470 (image), 471 (image), 472 (image), 474 (image), 520, 556, 564, 569, 577, 578, 598, 607, 617, 625, 676,
I-9
678–679, 693, 695, 711, 732, 743, 744, 758, 764, 771, 777, 853, 867, 883, 894, 917, 977, 987, 1016, 1030, 1032, 1080, 1107, 1108, 1116, 1118, 1119, 1171, 1177, 1180 (image), 1194, 1205, 1215, 1238, 1249, 1265, 1326, 1340 Democratic Republic of Vietnam helicopters, 473 U.S. and Republic of Vietnam helicopters, 469–473 AH-1 Cobra, 36, 1051 Bell UH-1 Iroquois (“Huey”), 30, 64, 84, 105, 346, 347 (image), 407, 462, 470 (image), 618, 1091, 1265, 1289 (image) Boeing CH-47 Chinook, 1, 65, 105, 346 CH-21 Shawnee, 58 (image), 64 Sikorsky H-34 Choctaw, 30, 77, 473, 1074 See also Helicopters, uses of in the Vietnam War Helicopters, uses of in the Vietnam War, 473–476, 474 (image), 1265 ambulance helicopters, 732 combat and fire support, 473–474 evacuation of casualties (medevac), 32, 308, 320, 323, 473, 475, 564, 592, 726–727, 727 (image) Ground Proximity Extraction System (GPES) run, 679 Low-Altitude Parachute Extraction System (LAPES) run, 679 rescue, 472 (image), 914, 1052–1053, 1215 supply missions, 473, 475, 678–679 total number of helicopter losses in the Vietnam War, 476 total number of helicopter missions in the Vietnam War, 475–476 transport, 180, 475 U.S. Marine Corps helicopter missions, 474–475 See also Air mobility; Landing zone Heller, Lennie, 460 Helms, Jesse, 134 Helms, Richard McGarrah, 14, 476–477, 477 (image) Henderson, Oran K., 477–478, 608, 887 Hendricks, Jon, 68 Hendrix, Jimi, 783 (image) Heng Samrin, 155, 156, 478–479, 478 (image), 561, 586 Hennessy, John J., 977 Herbert, Anthony B., 479, 1126 Herbicides, 479–480, 1239, 1325 Agent Blue, 480 Agent Green, 479, 480 Agent Orange, 480, 1216, 1240 Agent Pink, 479 Agent Purple, 479 Agent White, 480 dioxin content of, 479–480 types of herbicides used in Vietnam, 273 (table), 480 (table)
I-10
Index
Herman, Judith, 925 Herr, Michael, 783 Herring, George, 704 Hersh, Seymour Myron, 481–482, 481 (image), 786 Hershey, Lewis Blaine, 482–483, 1033 Herz, Alice, 483–484, 775 Heschel, Abraham, 217 Hess, Gary, 489, 490 Hickel, Walter, 803 Hickey, Gerald Cannon, 484, 768, 770, 1078 HICKORY-BELT TIGHT-BEAU CHARGER-LAM SON 54, Operation, 484–485 HICKORY II, Operation, 485–486 High National Council (HNC), 486–487 Hilsman, Roger, 244, 487–488, 487 (image), 808, 1070, 1095 “The Situation and Short-Term Prospects in South Vietnam,” 1491–1492Doc. Hilsman-Forrestal Report, 488 Hispanics, in the U.S. military, 488–489 Historiography, of the Vietnam War, 489–491 on history and memory, 491 new historical methodologies, 490–491 on the origins of the Vietnam War, 490 orthodox, revisionist, and neo-orthodox views, 489–490 Hitch, Charles J., 721–722 Hmongs, 491–493, 492 (image) Hoa, 1045 Hoa Binh, Battle of, 493 Hoa Hao, 314, 494, 654 Hoa Lo Prison (the “Hanoi Hilton”), 494–496, 495 (image) deplorable conditions at, 495 improved conditions at after the death of Ho Chi Minh, 496 torture used at, 495 Hoang Cam, 555, 556 Hoang Duc Nha, 496, 496 (image) Hoang Hao Tham. See De Tham HOANG HOA THAM, Operation, 497–498, 634 Hoang Thuy Nam, 537 Hoang Van Hoan, 498 Hoang Van Thai, 498–499 Hoang Xuan Lam, 517, 618, 619, 1220 Ho Chi Minh, xli, xlii, 11, 140, 151, 166, 199, 200 (image), 234, 270, 310, 375, 401, 499–501, 499 (image), 531, 537, 577, 621, 628, 794, 806, 822, 898, 1158, 1168, 1240, 1241–1242, 1241 (image), 1244, 1302 account of meeting with Paul Mus, 1394Doc. answers to the U.S. press regarding U.S. intervention in Indochina, 1411–1412Doc. appeal made on the occasion of the founding of the Communist Party, 1367Doc. death of, 496, 500–501, 1246 declaration of the policy of the Provisional Coalition Government, 1381–1382Doc.
as a diplomat, 500 final statement of, 1615–1616Doc. and the founding of the Indochinese Communist Party, 499 as leader of the Lao Dong, 500 letter from abroad, 1368–1369Doc. letter to compatriots in Nam Bo, 1383Doc. letter to James F. Byrnes, 1379–1380Doc. letter to Léon Archimbaud, 1366Doc. letter to President Johnson, 1581–1582Doc. letter to President Truman, 1379Doc. message to the Chief of State of the Republic of Vietnam, 1456Doc. proclamation to the people after negotiations with France, 1387–1389Doc. replies to an interviewer on Japanese TV, 1573–1574Doc. reply to a foreign correspondent, 1427Doc. reply to Georges Bidault, 1384Doc. report to the National Assembly, 1427–1429Doc. report to the Sixth Plenum of the Party Central Committee, 1442–1443Doc. speech concerning the resistance war in South Vietnam, 1380–1381Doc. speech at the Tours Congress, 1365–1366Doc. talk to a cadres’ meeting concerning draft law, 1472–1473Doc. talk to officers preparing for military campaign, 1421–1422Doc. telegram to Léon Blum, 1392Doc. as a war leader, 500 Ho Chi Minh Campaign, 501–502, 641 Ho Chi Minh City. See Saigon Ho Chi Minh Trail, xli, 225, 226, 377, 412, 502–503, 503 (image), 504 (map), 505, 617, 631, 676, 723–724, 802, 1018, 1063, 1119, 1133, 1245, 1250, 1252, 1324 bombing of, 32, 34, 503, 505, 802, 1018 building of, 502–503 electronic barrier across (the “McNamara Line”), 503, 505 improvements to, 680 in Laos, 505 length of, 503 transport of supplies on, 503 Hochmuth, Bruno Arthur, 505–506, 573, 592 Hoffman, Abbie, 192, 263 (image), 506–507, 506 (image), 1000, 1358–1359, 1359 (image) Hoffman, Julius Jennings, 113, 192, 613, 1000, 1025 Hogan, John, 178 Holbrooke, Richard, 1278 Holder, Stan, 798 Hollingsworth, James F., 51, 1086 Holm, Jeanne, 1346 Holt, Harold, 1056 (image) Holyoake, Keith Jacka, 1056 (image) HOMECOMING, Operation, 507–508, 797, 933, 1177
Hong Nham. See Tu Duc Honolulu Conference (1966), 508–509, 509 (image) Hooper, Joe Ronnie, 509–510 Hoopes, Townsend, 510 Hoover, J. Edgar, 361, 510–512, 511 (image), 1198 calls for the ouster of, 511–512 criticism of, 511 domestic counterintelligence programs of, 511 and the expansion of the role of law enforcement in the United States, 511 Hope, Leslie Townes, 512–513, 512 (image) HOP TAC, Operation, 513–514, 675 Ho-Sainteny Agreement (1946), 514, 637, 1013 Hot pursuit policy, 514–515 Hourglass spraying system, 515 Ho Viet Thang, 621 Hue, 515–516 Hue, Battle of, 516–517, 517 (image), 518 (map), 519 atrocities committed by the Viet Cong (VC) during, 519, 521–522, 521 (image) casualties of, 516 (table) initial Communist attack, 516–517 U.S. air assaults on Communist positions, 517 Hue and Da Nang, fall of, 519–521, 520 (image) Hughes, Thomas, 345 Humanitarian Operation Program, 522 Humphrey, Hubert H., 279, 280, 334–335, 522–524, 523 (image), 571, 1345 Humphrey, Ronald, 1202 Hundred Flowers campaign, 197, 1043 Hung Dao Vuong. See Tran Hung Dao Hun Sen, 153–154, 156, 524–525, 586, 587, 1039 Hurley, Patrick, 195 Hussein, Saddam, 148 Huston, Tom, 1198 Huston Plan, 511, 525, 1198 Huynh Cong Ut. See Ut, Nick Huynh Phu So, 525 Huynh Tan Phat, 526, 941, 941 (image) Huynh Van Cao, 130, 526 Ia Drang, Battle of, xliii, 50, 527–529, 528 (image), 529 (map), 1173, 1239 casualties of, 529, 1173 Imperial presidency, 529–530 India, 530–531 Indochina, geography of, 416–417 Indochina War (1946–1954), xli, 531–535, 533 (image), 534 (map), 621, 675, 978 changes in French commanders during, 532 Chinese support for the Viet Minh during, 532–533 U.S. policy concerning, 533 as the war of the “elephant and tiger,” 531
Index See also Dien Bien Phu, Battle of Indochinese Communist Party. See Lao Dong Party Indonesia, 535–536 Initial Defense Satellite Communication System. See Defense Satellite Communications System Institute for Defense Analysis, 1099 Intelligence, electronic. See Electronic intelligence (ELINT) Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation (ICEX), 909 International Campaign to Ban Landmines, 780 International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS), 919 International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC), 165, 530, 536–537, 919, 1244 International Control Commission (ICC), 165, 411–412, 414 International Rescue Committee (IRC), 537 International Volunteer Service (IVS), 1183 International War Crimes Tribunal, 537–538, 538 (image) Iran-Contra Affair, 962 IRON HAND, Operation. See Wild Weasels Iron Triangle, 180, 539 IRVING, Operation, 539–540 IVORY COAST, Operation, 1052–1053 Jackson, Henry M., 339 Jackson, Joe M., 578 Jackson State College, shootings at, 541, 572 JACKSTAY, Operation, 542, 542 (image) Jacobs, Seth, 490 Jacobson, George D., 543 James, Daniel, Jr., 543–544, 544 (image) Japan, 544–545, 1167 impact of on the Vietnam conflict, 544 as the most important Asian ally of the United States, 545 Jason Study, 725 Jaubert, François, 388 Jaunissement, 545, 634 Javits, Jacob Koppel, 546, 546 (image), 1064 JEFFERSON GLENN, Operation, 546–547 casualties of, 547 Jenkins, Henry, 734 Jiang Jieshi, 547–548, 547 (image), 701, 702, 1163 Jiang Qing, 198 Jiang Zemin, 196 Johns, Jasper, 68 Johnson, Claudia Alta, 427 (image) Johnson, Harold Keith, 1, 548, 933, 1172, 1174 Johnson, James, 380–381 Johnson, Lyndon Baines, xlii–xliii, 43, 53, 54, 124, 124 (image), 144, 145, 165, 173–174, 186, 219, 235, 242, 244, 247, 277, 279, 286, 304 (image), 329, 346, 372, 395, 427
(image), 460, 483, 505, 509 (image), 515, 523, 549–552, 549 (image), 562, 660, 700, 779 (image), 798, 807, 816–817, 846, 884 (image), 889, 903 (image), 1056 (image), 1078, 1143, 1170, 1171, 1172, 1195–1196, 1201, 1261, 1339, 1345, 1345 (image) address in San Antonio, Texas, 1590–1591Doc. announcement of bombing halt over North Vietnam, 1607–1609Doc. approval ratings for, 569 (table) authorization of the DeSoto missions by, 285 belief in the domino theory, 305, 550 message to Congress (1964), 1511–1512Doc. message to Maxwell Taylor, 1548–1549Doc. news conference excerpts (1968), 1592–1593Doc. “Peace without Conquest” address at Johns Hopkins University, 1525–1528Doc. and the presidential election of 1964, 332– 333, 550 (table), 552 and the presidential election of 1968, 333– 334, 551, 571 response to the Pueblo incident, 947–948 revival of pacification, 871 telegram to Henry Cabot Lodge, 1506Doc. television address, 1603–1606Doc. visit to Cam Ranh Bay, 163 See also Great Society Program; Guam Conference (1967); Honolulu Conference (1967); Johnson, Lyndon Baines, Johns Hopkins University Speech; San Antonio Formula; United States Reserve Components, Decision Not to Mobilize Johnson, Lyndon Baines, Johns Hopkins University Speech, 552–553 as the “Mekong Delta Speech,” 552 Johnson, Robert, 345 Johnson, Ural Alexis, 412–413, 553 Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC), 762 Joint Task Force–Full Accounting (JTF-FA), 761 Joint U.S. Public Affairs Organization (JUSPAO), 553–554, 942–945 Jones, David Charles, 554–555, 554 (image) Jones, Kim, 70 Joseph, Cliff, 69 Juin, Alphonse, 774 JUNCTION CITY, Operation, 15, 81, 157, 555–557, 555 (image) casualties of, 556 Phase I, 556 Phase II, 556 Phase III, 556 primary objective of, 555 K-9 Corps, 559–561, 559 (table), 560 (image) the ARVN dog program, 559
I-11
medical histories of the dogs (Howard Hayes’ epidemiological research), 560–561 tributes to the dogs that served, 561 the U.S. Air Force dog program, 559–560, 560 the U.S. Army dog program, 560 the U.S. Marine Corps dog program, 560 the U.S. Navy dog program, 560 Kalergis, H., 456 Kampuchea. See Cambodia Kampuchean National Front, 561–562 Karman, Theodore von, 960 Karnow, Stanley, 1010, 1094 Kattenburg, Paul, 562 Katzenbach, Nicholas deBelleville, 562–563, 563 (image), 1198 Kaufmann, William, 960 Kegler, Maynard, 311 Kelly, Charles L., 563–564 Kelly, Francis J., 564–565, 764 Kennan, George Frost, 234, 551, 565–566, 565 (image), 1199 Long Telegram of February 22, 1946, 566 “X article” of, 566 See also Containment policy Kennedy, Edward Moore, 279, 566–567 Kennedy, John Fitzgerald, xlii, 9, 53, 144, 183, 235, 242, 244, 276, 311, 319, 329, 359, 361, 405, 459, 549, 567–570, 567 (image), 591, 631, 717, 781, 807, 808, 809–810, 851, 864, 1020, 1200–1201, 1202–1203, 1213, 1261 aid to the Republic of Vietnam under his administration, 83 anti-Communist sentiments of, 567–568 approval ratings for, 569 (table) assassination of, 144, 247, 315, 570 belief in the domino theory, 305 health problems of, 568 New Frontier agenda of, 568 policies regarding Vietnam, 569–570, 1170–1171 remarks on the situation in Vietnam, 1495–1496Doc. support for counterinsurgency, 647 See also Bay of Pigs Invasion (1961); Berlin Wall; Cuban Missile Crisis (1962); Geneva Accords/Agreement (1962) Kennedy, Joseph P., 567, 1058 Kennedy, Robert Francis, 54, 334, 334 (image), 335, 459, 551, 567, 570–571, 685, 715, 1020 assassination of, 279, 523, 571 as legal counsel to Senate committees in the 1950s, 570 letter to Ngo Dinh Diem, 1490Doc. and the presidential election of 1968, 571 public opposition of to the Vietnam War, 1595–1597Doc. as U.S. attorney general, 570–571
I-12
Index
Kent State University shootings, 55, 571–573, 572 (image), 594, 610 KENTUCKY, Operation, 573 casualties of, 573 Kep Airfield, 573 Kerr, Clark, 53 Kerrey, Joseph Robert, 573–574, 951 Kerry, John Forbes, 134, 265, 574–576, 575 (image), 760–761, 951, 1083–1084, 1197 antiwar activities of, 574, 1630–1632Doc. and the presidential election of 2004, 575–576 Kerwin, Walter T., Jr., 576–577 Key West Agreement (1948), 577 Khai Dinh, 577–578 Kham Duc Special Forces Camp, fall of, 578–579 Khe Sanh, Battle of, xliii, 72 (image), 576, 579– 583, 580 (image), 581 (map), 1103, 1339 and air resupply, 679 board replica of Khe Sanh at the White House, 581–582, 1103 casualties of, 582 as a Communist ruse, 582 See also Lang Vei Special Forces Camp, Battle for Khieu Samphan, 583–584, 583 (image), 586, 587 Khmer Kampuchea Krom, 584–585, 584 (image) Khmer National Armed Forces. See Forces Armées Nationales Khmères Khmer Republic, 49 Khmer Rouge, 50, 151, 152–153, 154, 378, 585–587, 586 (image), 855, 908–909, 920, 1039, 1247 as the peap prey (“forest army”), 586 See also Cambodia, Vietnamese invasion of Khmers. See Cambodia; Southeast Asia, ethnology of Khmer Serai, 587–588, 1038 Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeyevich, 243, 411, 568, 588–589, 588 (image), 631, 1043–1044, 1159, 1165, 1245 developments leading to the downfall of, 589 See also Berlin Wall; Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) Kien An Airfield, 589 Kienholz, Ed, 68 Kiesinger, Kurt, 417 KILLER, Operation, 972 Kim Il Sung, 600, 603, 604 King, Martin Luther, Jr., 9, 54, 113, 210–211, 218, 361, 511, 590–591, 590 (image), 937, 1060, 1072 antiwar stance of, 591 assassination of, 10, 257, 591, 955 “I Have a Dream” speech, 591 sermon against the Vietnam War, 1582–1589Doc.
KINGFISHER, Operation, 591–593
casualties of, 592 KINGPIN, Operation. See Son Tay Raid Kinnard, Douglas, 118, 119 Kinnard, Harry William Osborn, 29, 593 Kirk, Donald, 332 Kissinger, Henry Alfred, 161, 286, 340, 347, 378, 496 (image), 593–596, 594 (image), 616, 660, 696, 710, 740, 743, 773, 778, 842, 847, 850, 878 (image), 888–889, 989, 1016–1017, 1175, 1178, 1179, 1186, 1200 (image), 1201, 1246, 1247, 1292, 1327 news conference excerpt, 1643–1644Doc. request for emergency aid for South Vietnam, 1660–1662Doc. See also Paris peace negotiations; Paris Peace Accords (1973); Watergate Scandal Kit Carson Scouts, 596 Knight, Hal, Jr., 740 Knowland, William Fife, 596–597, 597 (image) Kohler, Foy, 712 Koh Tang, 597–598 Komer, Robert W., 143, 144, 223, 244, 433, 576, 598–599, 598 (image), 871–873, 909, 934 Kong Le, 599, 630, 631, 1057 Kontum, Battle for, 599–600 casualties of, 600 Kopechne, Mary Jo, 567 Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of (DPRK), 600–601 as an ally of North Vietnam, 600–601 See also Korean War (1950–1953) Korea, Republic of (ROK), xliii, 80, 163, 395, 601–603, 602 (image). See also Korean War (1950–1953) Korea, Republic of, Army (ROKA), 540, 600, 601, 602, 603, 605, 606, 882, 883, 893 Korean War (1950–1953), 195, 304, 355, 530, 533, 600, 601, 603–608, 604 (image), 1168–1169, 1199 aeromedical evacuations during, 726 casualties of, 607 effect of on U.S. foreign policymakers, 607 the Inchon landing, 605 lack of U.S. forces’ preparedness for, 605 results of, 607 Koshiro Iwai, 545 Koster, Samuel William, Sr., 608–609, 785, 786, 886–887, 1340 Kosygin, Aleksei Nikolayevich, 286, 609–610, 609 (image), 917, 1078, 1245, 1343 joint statement of with Pham Van Dong, 1515–1516Doc. Kovic, Ronald, 610–611, 650 Kraft, Joseph, 611 Krassner, Paul, 1000, 1358 Krepinevich, Andre, 490 Kroesen, Frederick, 814 Krulak, Victor H., 207, 244, 611–612, 612 (image), 738, 1095
disagreement with Westmoreland’s strategy and tactics, 612 Ksor Kok, 770 Kuby, Ron, 613 Ku Klux Klan, 361 Kulikov, Viktor, 1247 Kunstler, William Moses, 178, 192, 612–613 Ky Ngoai Hau Cuong De. See Cuong De Lacy, William S. B., 813 Ladd, Jonathan, 625 Lair, James W., 13 Laird, Melvin Robert, 157, 227, 615–616, 616 (image), 921, 939, 989, 1203 (image) Lake, William Anthony Kirsop, 616–617 Lamb, Al, 1341 LAM SON 719, Operation, 48, 226, 505, 617–619, 618 (map), 842, 848, 989, 1018, 1176, 1294 casualties of, 619 objectives of, 617 as a test of Vietnamization, 617 Landing zone (LZ), 619–621, 620 (image), 620 (map) hot LZ, 619 Land reform, Vietnam, 621–622 Diem’s land reform law, 621, 769 Ho’s land reform policy, 628 National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam land reform program, 621–622 Thieu’s land reform law, 622, 841–842 of the Viet Minh, 621 Lane, Mark, 1293 Lane, Sharon, 857 Lang Bac, Battle of, 622–623 La Ngoc Chau, 527 Lang Son, 623–624, 623 (image) Lang Vei Special Forces Camp, Battle for, 624–625 casualties of, 625 Laniel, Joseph, 626, 626 (image) Lansdale, Edward Geary, 183, 229, 310, 319, 626–627, 807, 907, 996, 1010, 1012, 1031 Lao Dong Party (Indochinese Communist Party Politburo [ICP]), 500, 502, 628, 1240, 1244, 1348 phase two of the Politburo Conference, 1659–1660Doc. Secretariat Directive No. 218-CT/TW, 1662–1664Doc. secret cable no. 17-NB to the Cochin China regional party committee, 1478–1479Doc. secret cable no. 160 to the Cochin China regional party committee, 1475–1476Doc. Lao Issara, 630 Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP), 632–633 major issues between the party and the United States, 633
Index Laos, xlii–xliii, 14, 96, 110, 161, 174, 223, 414, 492, 536, 537, 568–569, 629–633, 629 (image), 631 (image), 632 (image), 1246 bombing of, 505, 631 neutral status of, 802, 1018 Latham, Michael, 490 Lattre de Tassigny, Jean de, 172, 222, 225 (image), 386, 493, 532, 545, 633–635, 634 (image), 1286–1287 Lau Ben Kon. See Nuon Chea Lavelle, John Daniel, 635, 938–939, 939 Lavelle Case, 635 Layton, Gilbert, 769 LÉA, Operation, 636 League of Wives of American Prisoners of War, 1067 LEAPING LENA, Operation, 681, 935 Le Chieu Thong, 453, 454 Leclerc, Jacques-Philippe, 276, 384, 531–532, 636–637, 636 (image), 1163 (image) Le Duan, 628, 637–638, 637 (image), 1162, 1244, 1247, 1250, 1303 “Duong Loi Cach Mang Mien Nam” (The Path of Revolution in the South), 1459–1462Doc. letter to the Central Office for South Vietnam, 1553–1567Doc. “Letters to the South,” 1519–1522Doc. speech to the 12th Plenum of the Party Central Committee, 1569–1571Doc. speech in Hanoi celebrating victory, 1665–1668Doc. Le Duc Anh, 638–639 Le Duc Tho, 595, 639–641, 640 (image), 878 (image), 1186, 1278, 1279 Cable No. 119, 1637–1640Doc. See also Paris peace negotiations; Paris Peace Accords (1973) Le dynasty, 641 Lefèbvre, Dominique, 641–642 Le Front Unifié de Lutte des Races Opprimées (FULRO, United Struggle Front for Oppressed Races), 769, 770 LE HONG PHONG I, Operation, 642 LE HONG PHONG II, Operation, 642–643 casualties of, 643 Le Kha Phieu, 643–644, 644 (image) Le Loi, 644–645, 1123 LeMay, Curtis Emerson, 645–646, 645 (image), 960, 1068 Lemnitzer, Lyman Louis, 646–647, 647 (image) Le Myre de Vilers, Charles Marie, 647–648 leng Sary, 586, 587 Le Nguyen Khang, 648 Le Nguyen Vy, 648–649 Lenin, Vladimir, 702, 1286 (image) Lenin Polemics, 1044 Le Quang Trieu, 318, 649 Le Quang Tung, 130, 318, 649, 649 (image), 967
Le Quang Vinh. See Ba Cut Leroy, Catherine, 649–650 Le Thai To. See Le Loi Le Thanh Nghi, 650–651 Le Thanh Tong, 651 Letourneau, Jean, 651–652 Le Trong Tan, 652–653, 1130 Le Van Giac. See Le Duc Anh Le Van Hung, 653, 828 Le Van Kim, 129, 653–654, 809, 827, 1134, 1137 Le Van Nhuan. See Le Duan Le Van Vien, 654–655, 654 (image) Levy, Howard Brett, 655–656, 656 (image) Lewandowski, Janusz, 550, 704, 919 Lewis, Tom, 92, 178, 179 Lewy, Guenter, 490 LEXINGTON III, Operation, 656–657 Le Xuan Phoi, 528 Le Xuan Tau, 625 Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, 490 LIEN KET 22, Operation, 709 Lifton, Robert Jay, 657, 924, 925, 1293, 1294 Lightfoot, George, 1031 (image) Lima Site 85, 657–658 Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963), 568, 589 Lin, Maya Ying, 658, 1296 Lin Biao, 197 LINEBACKER I, Operation, xlv, 31, 32, 60, 325, 659–660, 659 (image), 848, 860, 939, 1069, 1111, 1176, 1186 as the classic air interdiction campaign, 659, 660, 661 operational objectives of, 659 reasons for its success, 660 strategic objectives of, 660 LINEBACKER II, Operation, xlv, 32, 48, 60, 297, 340, 347, 595, 640, 660–663, 849, 860, 877, 1069, 1177, 1186 casualties of, 662 psychological effect of on Hanoi’s leaders, 662 use of LORAN in, 681 Li Peng, 196 Lippmann, Walter, 234, 663–664, 663 (image) Literature and the Vietnam War, 664–672 drama, 669–671 novels, 664–667 poetry, 667–669 prose narrative, 671–672 short stories, 667 Li Zhisui, 702 L’Obervateur, 583 Loc Ninh, military operations near, 672–674, 673 (image) Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr., 129, 459, 570, 674– 675, 674 (image), 704, 808, 809, 871, 970, 1095, 1261, 1345 cablegram to on the CIA channel concerning Vietnam, 1498Doc., 1498–1499Doc.
I-13
cablegram to McGeorge Bundy, 1499–1500Doc. cablegram to from John McCone, 1499Doc. phone conversation with Ngo Dinh Diem, 1502Doc. telegram to Nicholas Katzenbach, 1577Doc. telegrams to Dean Rusk, 1574–1577Doc. Lodge Bill, 1213 Logistics, allied, Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and Vietcong, 675–680 French military logistics, 676–677 physical characteristics of Vietnam affecting military logistics, 676 Viet Minh military logistics, 677–678 Long Binh, 680 Long Chieng, 681 Long-Haired Army (Doi Quan Toc Dai), 835 Long March, 702 Long-range electronic navigation (LORAN), 681 limitations of, 681 Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRPs), 681–682, 682 (image) Lon Nol, xlv, 49–50, 151–152, 156, 157, 158, 161, 265 (image), 376, 682–684, 683 (image), 908, 1048 defeat of by the Khmer Rouge, 155, 909 LORRAINE, Operation, 684–685, 1242 Lowenstein, Allard Kenneth, 333–334, 685, 685 (image) assassination of, 685 Lowndes, David, 580, 581, 582, 583, 625 Lucas, Andre C., 977 Luce, Don, 927, 1118 Luce, Henry Robinson, 686, 686 (image) Luc Luong Dac Biet. See Vietnam, Republic of, Special Forces Lugouqiao (Lukouch’iao) Incident, 702 Lu Han, 686–687 Luong Ngoc Quyen, 687 Lutyens, Edwin, 658 Lyautey, Hubert Gonzalve, 1085 Lyautey, Louis, 78 Ly Bon, 687–688 Lynd, Staughton, 688–689, 688 (image) Ly Quy Chung, 332 MacArthur, Douglas, 604–606, 691–692, 692 (image) MacArthur, Douglas, II, memorandum, 1424–1425Doc. MACARTHUR, Operation, 692–694. See also Dak To, Battle of casualties of, 693 Machine guns, allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 694–696, 694 (table), 695 (image) classifications of (heavy, medium, and light), 694 as crew-served weapons, 694 dominant tactical feature of (rate of fire), 694
I-14
Index
Madman Strategy, 696 Magsaysay, Ramón, 627, 907 Mai Chi Tho, 1279 Mai Huu Xuan, 129, 318 Mailer, Norman, 696–697, 697 (image) Mai Van Bo, 889 Malaysia, 697–698 Malcolm X, 111, 591, 1025 Malenkov, Georgy, 588 MALHEUR I and II, Operations, 698–699 casualties of, 698–699 Maneli, Mieczyslaw, 537 Manila Conference, 699–700, 699 (image) Manor, Leroy J., 1052–1053 Mansfield, Michael Joseph, 238, 700–701, 701 (image), 1195, 1196 report to President Kennedy on Southeast Asia and Vietnam, 1492–1493Doc. Many Flags Program. See Free World Assistance Program Mao Zedong, 195, 195 (image), 196, 199, 287, 547, 604, 605, 701–703, 701 (image), 870, 1043–1044, 1199 contribution to Marxism, 702 See also Cultural Revolution; Great Leap Forward March against Death, 773 March on the Pentagon, 703–704, 703 (image) March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, 1072 March to the South. See Nam Tien Marco Polo Bridge Incident. See Lugouqiao (Lukouch’iao) Incident Marcos, Ferdinand, 907, 907–908, 1056 (image) Marcovich, Herbert, 889, 1016–1017 Maricourt, Alain D. de, 643 MARIGOLD, Operation, 550, 704 Marine combined action platoons (CAPs), 704–705 MARKET TIME, Operation, 676, 705–706, 706 (image), 981, 1029, 1081, 1091, 1207, 1364 patrol system of, 705 Marshall, George C., 195, 968 telegram to the Consul General of Saigon, 1397–1398Doc. telegrams to Jefferson Caffery, 1393– 1394Doc., 1395–1396Doc. Marshall, Samuel Lyman Atwood, 706–707, 1105 Martin, Graham A., 378, 707–708, 1178, 1179 Marx, Karl, 702 Marxism, 702 MASHER/WHITE WING, Operation 67, 708–709, 708 (image) casualties of, 709 Massachusetts Political Action for Peace (MassPax), 773 MASSACHUSETTS STRIKER, Operation, 709–710, 710 (image) Masson, René, 174
Mast, Charles, 969 Mayaguez incident, 378, 597, 710–711, 711 (image), 1206, 1319 casualties of, 711 May Day Trive, 711–712 MAYFLOWER, Operation, 712 McCain, John Sidney, Jr., 712–713 McCain, John Sidney, Sr., 712, 713 McCain, John Sidney, III, 264, 495, 379, 713– 715, 714 (image), 797, 1084, 1127, 1128, 1128 (image), 1128–1129 McCarthy, Eugene, 54, 55, 339, 523, 551, 571, 685, 715 McCarthy, Joseph, 597, 1058 McCarthy, Mary, 977 McCauley, Brian, 759 McChristian, Joseph, 865 McClellan, Stan, 371 (image) McCloy, John Jay, 716, 716 (image), 1345 McClure, Robert A., 1213 McCone, John Alex, 183, 716–717 cablegram to Henry Cabot Lodge, 1499Doc. McConnell, John Paul, 717–718, 718 (image), 1030 McCoy, Alfred, 1126 McDade, Robert, 527–528 McGarr, Lionel Charles, 718–719, 1070 McGee, Gale William, 719 McGovern, George Stanley, 54, 336–337, 405, 465–466, 719–720, 720 (image), 1195, 1196, 1197 McKean, Roland N., 721–722 McMahon, Robert, 491 McNamara, Robert Strange, 29, 39, 124, 219, 503, 505, 551, 562, 563, 599, 720–722, 721 (image), 725, 772, 775, 809, 846, 889, 937, 960, 981, 997, 1017, 1034, 1084, 1093–1094, 1170, 1172, 1188, 1200, 1202, 1203, 1262, 1318, 1345 memoranda to President Johnson, 1504–1506Doc., 1547–1548Doc., 1551– 1553Doc., 1567–1568Doc. memorandum to President Kennedy, 1486–1489Doc. memorandum of with Dean Rusk and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1482–1484Doc. recommendation of for troop escalation in Vietnam, 1512–1514Doc. report of the McNamara-Taylor mission to South Vietnam, 1496–1498Doc. television interview with, 1593–1595Doc. See also McNamara Line; Taylor-McNamara Report McNamara Line, 485, 503, 722–724 the antivehicular barrier in Laos, 723–724 the barrier in Vietnam, 723 and the Jasons, 722 McNaughton, John Theodore, 724–725, 960 McPherson, Harry Cummings, 725–726 Meaney, George, 726 Medevac, 564, 726, 727 (image), 732
Media and the Vietnam War, 727–729, 728 (image) “court journalism,” 728 oversight of by public affairs officers (PAOs), 728 rules imposed on by the MACV, 728 Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP), 734 Medical evacuation. See Medevac Medicine, military, 729–733, 730 (image), 730 (table), 731 (image) division of the military medical system (five echelons), 730–731 drug abuse in Vietnam, 732 major disease problems in Vietnam, 732 psychiatric illnesses, 732 surgical specialists in Vietnam, 732–733 twentieth-century advances in battlefield medicine and surgery, 730 See also Medevac Medics and corpsmen, 733–735, 734 (image) casualty rates among, 733 required test standards for, 733 training classes for, 733 Medina, Ernest Lou, 149, 608, 735, 785 Meisner, Maurice, 702 Mekong Delta, 416, 417 (image), 735–736, 981 Mekong River, 735, 735–736, 736 (image) Mekong River Project, 737 Melby, John F., telegram to Dean Rusk, 1412Doc. Melville, Marjorie Bradford, 178 Melville, Thomas, 178 Mendenhall, Joseph Abraham, 612, 738, 1095 Mendès-France, Pierre, 535, 738–739, 739 (image) Mengel, James L., 92 MENU, Operation, 739–741, 847, 879, 1048, 1197 objectives of, 739–740 Meos. See Hmongs Meshad, Shad, 925 Michigan State University Advisory Group, 741 Midway Island Conference (1969), 741–743, 742 (image) Mien Tong. See Thieu Tri Mildren, Frank T., 455 Military Airlift Command (MAC), 743–744 Military Air Transport Service (MATS), 743 Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG), Vietnam, xlii, 319, 329, 458, 676, 744–746, 745 (image), 861, 1169, 1187, 1270 Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), xlii, 2, 3, 47, 80, 120, 133, 157, 244, 291, 347, 363, 395, 422, 433, 509, 569, 746–747, 746 (image), 981, 1171, 1187, 1213, 1214, 1270, 1272, 1335, 1340 See also Five O’Clock Follies; Order of battle dispute (1967) Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Studies and Observation Group (MACV SOG), 15, 132, 579, 984–985, 1214
Index Military decorations, 747–751, 748 (table), 749 (table), 750 (tables), 751 (table) French, 747 North Vietnamese and NLF, 748–749 South Vietnamese, 747–748 U.S., 749–751 Military regions, 751–753, 752 (image) Military Revolutionary Council, 753–754 Military Sealift Command (MSC), 754–755, 754 (image) Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS), 754 Miller, Henry L., 372 Milloy, Albert E., 1 Mine warfare, land, 755–756, 755 (image) Mine warfare, naval, Communist forces and allied countermining operations, 756–757 Minh Mang, 757 Mining and mine clearance in North Vietnam, 758–759, 758 (image) Mini-Tet Offensive, 759–760, 1121 casualties of, 760 Mische, George, 178 Missiles air-to-air missiles, 34–35 air-to-ground missiles, 35–36 guidance systems for air-to-air missiles, 35 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), 28, 28 (image), 340, 780, 1079–1080, 1248, 1251, 1341–1342 Missing in action, allied (MIAs), 760–762, 761 (table), 1180, 1302 Missing in action and prisoners of war, Communist, 762–763 Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, 1072 Mitchell, John Newton, 763–764, 763 (image), 890, 1198 “Mobe, the,” 773 Mobile Guerrilla Forces, 564, 764 Mobile Riverine Force (MRF), 764–765, 765 (image), 981–984 Mobile Strike Force Commands, 765–766 Mobilization to End the War in Vietnam (MOBE), 277 Moffat, Albert Low, 766, 1168 memorandum to John Carter Vincent, 1384–1386Doc. telegram to the U.S. State Department from Hanoi, 1391Doc. Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich, 767–768, 767 (image) Momyer, William Wallace, 579, 582, 768, 961, 1049 Mondale, Walter, 338 (image), 339 MONGOOSE, Operation, 627 Montagnards, 15, 110, 182, 184, 209, 244, 256, 349–350, 351, 352 (image), 403, 768–770, 769 (image), 943, 1183 tribal groupings of, 768 Montgomery Bus Boycott, 590
Montini, Giovanni Battista Enrico Antonio Maria. See Paul VI, Pope Moore, Harold Gregory, Jr., 406, 527, 770–771, 1173 Moore, Robert Brevard, 771 Moorer, Thomas Hinman, 771–774, 772 (image), 985, 1034, 1203 (image), 1203, 1274 (image) message to Captain John Herrick, 1510–1511Doc. order to all subordinate units, 1509–1510Doc. Mora, Dennis, 380–81 Moratorium to End the War in Vietnam, 773–774, 774 (image), 848 Mordant, Eugène, 774–775, 1009 Morgan, Charles, Jr., 656 Morrill Act (1862), 968 Morrison, Norman, 775 Morse, Wayne Lyman, 550, 775–776, 864, 1195 Mortality rates among soldiers, from the midnineteenth century, 729–730 Mortars, allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 776–777, 776 (image) Mortuary Affairs operations, 777 Moscow meeting, Brezhnev and Nixon, 778 Mountbatten, Louis, 1163 Mournier, Emmanuel, 166, 811 Moyers, Billy Don, 778–780, 779 (image) Moylan, Mary, 178 Mudd, Roger, 610 Mu Gia Pass, 780 Muhammad, Elijah, 111 Mullender, Philippe. See Devillers, Philippe Muller, Robert, 780–781 Munich analogy, 781 Muoi Cuc. See Nguyen Van Linh Murphy, Robert Daniel, 781–782, 1345 Mus, Paul, account of meeting with Ho Chi Minh, 1394Doc. Music and the Vietnam War, 782–783 Muskie, Edmund S., 279, 336–337 Muste, Abraham Johannes, 361, 784, 1060 My Lai Massacre, 55, 149–150, 481, 521, 608, 784–786, 785 (image), 886, 970–971, 1092, 1115–1116. See also Peers Inquiry Nakahara Mitsunobu, 545 Nam Dong, Battle of, 787 casualties of, 787 Nam Dong Publishing House, 833 Nam Tien, 787–788 Nam Viet, 788 NANTUCKET BEACH, Operation. See BOLD MARINER, Operation Napalm, 788–790, 789 (image) Napoleon III, 790–791, 790 (image) Na San, Battle of, 791 casualties of, 791 Nasser, Abdel Gamal, 316
I-15
National Assembly Law 10/59, 791–792 National Bank of Vietnam, 792–793 National Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NCC), 793 National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord (NCNRC), 793–794 National Defense Act (1916), 968 National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (National Liberation Front [NLF]), xli, 178, 261, 794–795, 795 (image), 870, 1162, 1261, 1323, 1348 manifesto of, 1479–1481Doc. See also Viet Cong National Hard Hats of America. See Hardhats National Intelligence Estimate (1954), 1447–1448Doc. National Intelligence Estimate (1956), 1457Doc., 1458–1459Doc. National Leadership Council (NLC), 796, 816, 1270 National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia (NLOF), 796–797 National Mobilization Committee (NMC), 192 National Party of Greater Vietnam. See Dai Viet Quoc Dan Dang National Security Act (1947), 577, 1202 National Security Council (NSC), 182 draft statement and study on U.S. policy toward all-Vietnam elections (NSC 5519), 1454–1456Doc. National Security Action Memorandum Number 52, 1213 National Security Action Memorandum Number 57, 1084 National Security Action Memorandum Number 80, 1484Doc. National Security Action Memorandum Number 111, 1489–1490Doc. National Security Action Memorandum Number 328, 797–798, 1523–1524Doc. National Security Council Memorandum 64 (NCS-64), 744, 1406–1407Doc. National Security Council Memorandum 5429/1 (NSC-5429/1), 744–745, 1202 National Security Council Memorandum 5429/2 (NSC-5429/2), 1448–1450Doc. National Security Council Planning Board Report (No. 1074-A), 1434–1436Doc. National Security Council Report 50 (NSC-50), 314 National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68), 5, 846 National Security Council Report 124/2 (NSC124/2), 304 National Security Council Staff Study (Annex to NSC 48/4), 1418–1420Doc. National Security Study Memorandum 1 (NSSM-1), 594, 1609–1612Doc. National Vietnam Veterans Readjustment Study (NVVRS), 924
I-16
Index
Native Americans in the U.S. military, 798, 799 (image) Naval gunfire support, 799–800 Navarre, Henri Eugène, 174, 267, 293, 386, 532, 534, 535, 626, 652, 800–801, 801 (image), 861, 1242, 1303 See also Navarre Plan Navarre Plan, 652, 801–802 Nedzi, Lucien N., 1197 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 536 Nelson, Deborah, 1126 Nessen, Ron, 711 Neuhaus, Richard, 217 Neutrality, 802–803 NEUTRALIZE, Operation, 235 NEVADA EAGLE, Operation, 803 casualties of, 803 New Jersey, USS, 804–805, 804 (image) New Journalism, 696 NEW LIFE, Operation, 48 New Look policy, 846, 972 New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, 773 Newton, Huey P., 112, 113, 1024 New Zealand, 395, 805 Ngo Dinh Can, 805–806, 1123 Ngo Dinh Diem, xli, 12, 43, 109, 130, 137, 140, 177, 224–225, 314, 316, 319, 330, 370, 414, 458, 488, 500, 537, 569, 569–570, 621, 627, 653, 654–655, 674–675, 791– 792, 806–809, 807 (image), 811, 812, 813, 817, 826, 847, 861, 869–870, 1010, 1012, 1070, 1095, 1123, 1169–1171, 1199, 1258–1262, 1259 (image), 1272 assassination of, 139, 144, 318, 570, 809, 810, 812, 813, 1010 attacks against the Chinese community in Vietnam, 202 conversation with Eisenhower, 1463Doc. rejection of the MSU Advisory Group’s advice, 741 reliance on Can Lao Nhan Cach Mang Dang, 165–166 See also Ngo Dinh Diem, overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem, overthrow of, 129–130, 317– 318, 809–810, 1201 Ngo Dinh Khoi, 806, 810 Ngo Dinh Luyen, 806, 810–811 Ngo Dinh Nhu, xlii, 12, 129, 130, 166, 318, 319, 488, 569–570, 601–602, 627, 674–675, 792, 807, 808, 809, 811–812, 1070, 1079 (image), 1133 assassination of, 570, 809, 810, 812, 813, 1010 Ngo Dinh Nhu, Madame, 808, 809, 812–813 Ngo Dinh Thuc, 138, 166, 806, 808, 813, 813 (image) Ngo Quang Troung, 2, 516, 519, 814 Ngo Quyen, 814–815 Ngo Thi Trinh. See Hanoi Hannah Nguyen Ai Quoc. See Ho Chi Minh
Nguyen Binh, 815 Nguyen Buu Dao. See Khai Dinh Nguyen Cao Ky, 139, 144, 330–331, 331 (image), 331–332, 433, 508, 700, 753, 796, 815–817, 816 (image), 817, 827, 830, 841, 1056 (image), 1262, 1263–1264 Nguyen Chan. See Tran Van Tra Nguyen Chanh Thi, 139, 675, 816, 817–819, 818 (image), 1263 Nguyen Chi Thanh, 794, 819, 1102, 1303 article concerning the Soviet Union and Vietnam, 1493–1494Doc. Nguyen Cong. See Do Muoi Nguyen Co Thach, 819–820, 964 Nguyen Duc Thang, 871 Nguyen Duy Trinh, 820–821, 821 (image) report to Party Central Committee on the new talk-fight strategy, 1577–1581Doc. Nguyen dynasty, 821 Nguyen Hai Than, 687, 822 Nguyen Ha Phan, 822–823 Nguyen Hue, 453–454, 823–824, 823 (image) Nguyen Hue Campaign. See Easter Offensive Nguyen Huu An, 528, 693, 693–694, 824–825 Nguyen Huu Co, 130, 796, 825, 825 (image) Nguyen Huu Tho, 794, 795, 825–826, 941 (image) Nguyen Huu Tri, 826 Nguyen Khac Xung. See Le Thanh Nghi Nguyen Khanh, 139, 318, 513, 648, 653, 675, 753, 818 (image), 827, 1094, 1135, 1261–1262 Nguyen Khoa Nam, 653, 827–828 Nguyen Kim Thanh. See To Huu Nguyen Luong Bang, 828, 1130 Nguyen Manh Cam, 828–829 Nguyen Ngoc Loan, 829–830, 829 (image), 1108, 1272 Nguyen Ngoc Tho, 830–831, 831 (image) Nguyen Phuc Anh, 831–832 Nguyen Phuoc Dom. See Minh Mang Nguyen Phuong Thao. See Nguyen Binh Nguyen Sinh Cung. See Ho Chi Minh Nguyen Sinh Sac, 832–833 Nguyen Thai Hoc, 833–834 Nguyen Thanh Linh, 245 Nguyen Thi Binh, 834–835, 834 (image), 941, 1129 Nguyen Thi Dinh, 835–836, 836 (image) Nguyen Thi Giang, 834 Nguyen Thi Minh Khai, 836–837 Nguyen Ton Hoan, 753 Nguyen Trai, 644 Nguyen Tuong Tam, 837 Nguyen Van, 516 Nguyen Van Binh, 837–838, 838 (image) Nguyen Van Cao. See Van Cao Nguyen Van Coc, 863 Nguyen Van Cu, 838 Nguyen Van Cuc. See Nguyen Van Linh Nguyen Van Hieu, 839
Nguyen Van Hinh, 839, 861 Nguyen Van Linh, 839–840, 840 (image), 1278 Nguyen Van Muoi. See Nguyen Van Linh Nguyen Van Nhung, 318, 649, 1262 Nguyen Van Thang. See Nguyen Hai Than Nguyen Van Thieu, xlii, xlvi, 11, 94, 144, 146, 157, 292, 324, 330–331, 331 (image), 501, 508, 509 (image), 519, 595, 599, 618, 619, 640, 793–794, 796, 817, 827, 840–843, 841 (image), 848, 1056 (image), 1186, 1246, 1263 address to the National Assembly of South Vietnam, 1612Doc. See also Midway Island Conference Nguyen Van Toan, 843 Nguyen Van Vinh, 502 Nguyen Van Vy, 129 Nguyen Van Xuan, 843–844, 843 (image) Nguyen Viet Thanh, 844 Nguyen Xuan Oanh, 1262 Nhan Van Giai Pham, 1224 Nhat Linh. See Nguyen Tuong Tam NIAGARA, Operation, 844–845 casualties of, 845 Nicholas, Fayard, 512 (image) Nicholas, Harold, 512 (image) Nickerson, Herman, Jr., 596 Nitze, Paul Henry, 845–846, 845 (image) Nixon, Richard M., xliv–xlv, 45, 55, 150, 157, 174, 225–226, 239, 297, 325, 326, 338, 380, 418, 464, 483, 523, 553. 571, 615, 617, 619, 640, 660, 660–661, 760, 761, 772, 842, 846–849, 847 (image), 927, 939, 946, 957, 986, 988–989, 1090, 1169, 1196–1197, 1200 (image), 1201, 1246, 1316 (image) address to the nation, 1640Doc. approval ratings for, 569 (table) and the bombing of Cambodia, 151, 370, 802–803, 847–848, 1176 and détente, 286–287 foreign policies developed with Kissinger, 593–595 involvement in the aftermath of My Lai, 887 letter to Pham Van Dong, 1653–1654Doc. letters to Nguyen Van Thieu, 1647–1649Doc. news conference excerpt, 1656Doc. and the opening of China, 200, 595 pardon of by Ford, 378 and the presidential election of 1968, 334– 335, 551 and the presidential election of 1972, 336– 337, 336 (image) resignation of, 361, 849 secret authorization of more aggressive bombing of North Vietnam, 635 “Silent Majority” speech, 773, 848, 946 speech on Cambodia, 1625–1627Doc. speech on Vietnamization, 1617–1622Doc.
Index success of in foreign affairs (“linkage diplomacy”), 849 televised interview with, 1629–1630Doc. television address, 1612–1614Doc. See also Moscow meeting, Brezhnev and Nixon; Madman Strategy; Midway Island Conference; Nixon Doctrine; Vietnamization; Watergate Scandal Nixon Doctrine, 848, 850, 1175, 1292 Noel, Chris, 850–851, 850 (image) Nolting, Frederick Earnest, Jr., 569, 809, 851–852, 1261 Nong Duc Manh, 852–853, 852 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 5, 23, 104, 172, 214, 220, 234, 276, 315, 319, 355, 413 Novosel, Michael, Jr., 853 Novosel, Michael, Sr., 853–854 Nui Ba Den, 555, 854–855, 854 (image), 1096 Nuon Chea, 855 Nur, Paul, 769 Nurses, U.S., 855–857, 856 (images) Nuttle, David, 769 Oakland Army Base, 859 Obama, Barack, 715 Oberdorfer, Don, 521 Oberg, Jean-Christophe, 859–860 O’Brien, David, 1217 O’Daniel, John Wilson, 860–861, 860 (image) report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1425–1426Doc. Office of Civilian Operations (OCO), 871, 922 Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 182, 183, 223, 229, 289, 309–310, 861–862 See also Deer Mission Ohly, John, memorandum to Dean Acheson, 1413–1414Doc. Oldenburg, Claes, 68 Olds, Robin, 862–863, 863 (image) Olongapo, Philippines, 863–864 O’Neill, John, 1084 Open Arms Program. See Chieu Hoi Program Operation Plan (OPLAN) 34A, 550, 864 Orderly Departure Plan, 1181 Order of battle dispute (1967), 864–866 Oriskany, USS, fire aboard, 26 (image), 866– 867, 866 (image) O’Sullivan, James L., telegrams to George C. Marshall, 1398–1400Doc. Otis, Glenn K., 1107 Pacification, 869–874, 870 (image), 933, 1176. See also Accelerated Pacification Campaign; Phoenix Program Page, Michael, 70 Palme, Olof, 859, 860, 874, 874 (image) Palmer, Bruce, Jr., 81, 303, 603, 674, 722, 814, 875, 1335 Palmer, Dave Richard, 1031
Paracel and Spratley Islands, South China Sea, 875–876 Paris peace negotiations, 551, 639–641, 876–877 document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of South Vietnam concerning the negotiations, 1642–1643Doc. Paris Peace Accords (1973), 760, 793, 842, 877–879, 878 (image), 1165, 1177 failure of, 878–879 text of, 1650–1652Doc. Park Chung Hee, 1056 (image) Parks, Rosa, 211, 211 (image) Parrot’s Beak, 879, 1026 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) (1963), 1044 PASSAGE TO FREEDOM, Operation, 310, 754, 880– 881, 880 (image), 1012, 1170, 1242 Pathet Lao, 411, 412, 630, 631, 632, 881–882, 881 (image), 1054, 1057, 1162, 1250 Patti, Archimedes L. A., 882 Patton, George Smith, IV, 882–883 PAUL REVERE I–IV, Operations, 883, 1015 casualties of, 883 Paul VI, Pope, 838, 883–885, 884 (image), 1959 Peace Corps, 311 Pearson, Lester B., 164, 165, 885, 885 (image) Peers, William R., 118, 608, 786, 886, 886 (image). See also Peers Inquiry Peers Inquiry, 886–887 PEGASUS-LAM SON 207A, Operation, 582, 887–888, 888 (image), 1022 casualties of, 888 Pell, Claiborne, 921 Peng Phongsavan, 1232 (image) PENNSYLVANIA, Operation, 888–889 Pentagon, March on the. See March on the Pentagon Pentagon Papers and trial, 340–341, 341 (image), 889–892, 891 (image), 960, 1006–1007, 1035, 1173, 1174 People’s Anti-Corruption Movement, 842 People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN). See Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, Army People’s Self-Defense Forces (PSDF), 892, 1348 (image) Perot, Henry Ross, 760, 796, 893, 893 (image) PERSHING, Operation, 893–894, 894 (image) casualties of, 894 Peterson, Douglas Brian, 220, 894–895, 1181 Pham Cong Tac, 895, 895 (image) Pham Duy, 895–896 Pham Hong Thai, 833 Pham Hung, 896–897 Pham Ngoc Thao, 129, 897, 897 (image) Pham Phu Quoc, 838 Pham Quynh, 810 Pham The Duyet, 898 Pham Thi Yen, 1129 Pham Van Dinh, 163
I-17
Pham Van Dong, 638, 818 (image), 820, 889, 898–899, 898 (image), 964, 1278 joint statement of with Aleksei Kosygin, 1515–1516Doc. message to the Chief of State of the Republic of Vietnam, 1456Doc. report to the Second Session of the Third National Assembly, 1528–1547Doc. speech delivered on National Day, 1668–1674Doc. Pham Van Phu, 93, 94, 899–900 Pham Van Thien. See Pham Hung Pham Xuan An, 617, 818, 900, 1133 Phan Boi Chau, 499, 833, 900–901 Phan Chu Trinh, 901–902 Phan Dinh Khai. See Le Duc Tho Phan Dinh Phung, 902 Phan Huy Quat, 140, 796, 903–904, 903 (image) Phan Khac Suu, 904 Phan Quang Dan, 904–905 Phan Van Hoa. See Vo Van Kiet Phan Van Khai, 905–906, 905 (image) Philastre, Paul-Louis-Félix, 906 Philippine Civil Action Group (PHILCAG), 907–908 Philippines, 906–908 Phnom Penh, 908–909 Pho Duc Chinh, 834 Phoenix Program, 184, 869, 872, 873, 909–910, 940, 1126, 1176 demise of, 909 success of, 910 Phong Trao Cach Mang Quoc Gia (National Revolutionary Movement), 166 Phoumi Nosavan, 910–911, 910 (image) Phoumi Vongvichit, 1232 (image) Phou Pha Thi. See Lima Site 85 PHU DUNG, Operation. See SHINING BRASS, Operation Pickett, Clarence, 53 PIERCE ARROW, Operation, 26, 911–912, 912 (image) Pigneau de Béhaine, Pierre, 912–913 Pignon, Léon, 913, 913 (image) Pike, Douglas, 1158 PIRANHA, Operation, 914 casualties of, 914 PIRAZ warships, 914–915 Pistols, 915–916, 915 (image) French, 915 U.S., 915–916 Vietnamese, 916 Plain of Jars, 916, 916 (image) Plain of Reeds, 917 Platt, Jonas, 1220 Pleiku, 917–918 POCKET MONEY, Operation, 758 Podgorny, Nikolai Viktorovich, 918 Podhoretz, Norman, 490 Poland, 918–919
I-18
Index
Polgar, Thomas, 919 Pol Pot, 154, 155, 156, 561, 585, 587, 855, 919–921, 920 (image), 1039 trial of, 587, 921 Poola, Pascal, 798 POPEYE, Operation, 921 Porter, Melvin, 189 Porter, William James, 144, 340, 871, 922–923, 922 (image) Port Huron Statement, 53, 923, 1072–1073 Potsdam Conference (1945), 862, 926 Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), 923– 926, 924 (image), 925 (table) Poulo Condore, 926–927 Powell, Colin Luther, 927–929, 928 (image), 1292. See also Powell Doctrine Powell Doctrine, 928, 1292 PRAIRIE I, Operation, 929 casualties of, 929 PRAIRIE II–IV, Operations, 929–930 casualties of, 929, 930 PRAIRIE FIRE, Operation, 163, 503, 985 Precision-guided munitions, 930–931 electro-optical guided bomb (EOGB) program, 930–931 laser-guided bomb (LGB) program, 930, 931 President’s Commission on Campus Unrest, 572 President’s Special Committee, report on Southeast Asia, 1434Doc. Prisoners of war (POWs), 141 repatriation of following the Korean War, 607 See also Four-Party Joint Military Commission; HOMECOMING, Operation; Missing in action and prisoners of war, Communist; Prisoners of war, allied Prisoners of war, allied, 931–933, 932 (image), 1302 Prisoners of war, Communist. See Missing in action and prisoners of war, Communist Program for the Pacification and LongTerm Development of South Vietnam (PROVN), 548, 598, 933–934, 1174, 1175 Programs Evaluation Office (PEO), 1341 Project 100,000, 937–938 Project Agile, 934–935 development of Agent Orange, 935 development of the Armalite AR-15, 935 Project Delta, 681–682, 935–936, 938 Project Dye Marker. See McNamara Line Project Gamma, 682 Project Igloo White, 723–724 Project Illinois City, 485 Project Muscle Shoals, 503 Project Nine, 485, 503 Project Omega, 682, 936–937, 938 Project Practice Nine. See McNamara Line Project Sigma, 682, 938 Protective Reaction Strikes, 938–939 PROUD DEEP ALPHA, Operation, 226, 939–940
Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs), 184, 940 Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG), 941–942, 941 (image) Proxmire, Edward William, 942, 942 (image) Psychological warfare operations (PSYOPS), 942–945 deficiencies of, 944 media used in, 944 military targets of, 943 themes of, 943–944 Public opinion and the war, U.S., 945–947, 946 (table) Pueblo incident, 601, 710, 947–949, 948 (image), 1209, 1212 Puller, Lewis Burwell, Jr., 949 Punji stake, 949–950, 949 (image) Python God movement, 769 Qiao Shi, 196 Quach Tom, 951 Quadrillage/ratissage, 951 Quakers. See American Society of Friends (Quakers) Qualye, Daniel, 1209–1210 Quan Ngai, 952 Quang Tri, Battle of, 952–953, 953 (image) casualties of, 953 Quang Trung. See Nguyen Hue Qui Nhon, 953–954 Quoc Ngu, 954 Racial violence within the U.S. military, 955– 956, 956 (image) Radcliffe, Henry, 139 Radford, Arthur William, 329, 846–847, 957, 957 (image), 1093 Radio direction finding (RDF), 958 ground installations of, 958 mobile capabilities of, 958 signals intelligence activities, 958 Ranariddh, Norodom, 153, 586, 1039 RANCH HAND, Operation, 226, 958–960, 959 (image), 1239 RAND Corporation, 960–961 RANDOLPH GLEN, Operation, 1108–1109 Rangel, Charles, 712 Rangoon Initiative, 1221 Raven Forward Air Controllers, 961 Read, Benjamin Huger, 961–962 Reagan, Ronald Wilson, 137, 760, 850, 962– 963, 962 (image), 1180, 1319 Red River Delta, 963 Red River Fighter Pilots Association, 963–964 Reed, Charles airgram to Dean Acheson, 1396–1397Doc. telegram to James F. Byrnes, 1392–1393Doc. telegrams to George C. Marshall, 1398–1400Doc. Reeducation camps, 964–965
Refugees and boat people, 965–966, 965 (image) Regional forces. See Territorial forces Reinhardt, George Frederick, 166, 966–967 Reissner, Robert, 495 Rejo, Pete, 1151 Republican Youth, 967 Research and development field units, 967– 968. See also Combat Development and Test Center (CDTC); Combat Operations Research Center (CORC) Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC), 968–969 Reston, James, 611 Revers, Georges, 969. See also Revers Report (1949) Revers Report (1949), 969 Revolutionary Development Cadre Training Center. See Vietnam, Republic of, Revolutionary Development Cadre Training Center Revolutionary Personalist Labor Party. See Can Lao Nhan Cach Mang Dang (Revolutionary Personalist Labor Party) Rheault, Robert B., 969–970, 1190 Rhee, Syngman, 601, 603 Richardson, John Hammond, 970 cablegram to CIA director concerning the situation in South Vietnam, 1498Doc. Ridenhour, Ronald L., 150, 785–786, 970–971 Ridgway, Matthew Bunker, 329, 409, 606, 861, 971–972, 971 (image), 1307, 1345 Rifles, 972–976, 973 (image), 974 (image) AK-47, 975–976 Australian, 975 classification of, 972–973 French, 975 New Zealand, 975 U.S., 973–975 Vietnamese, 975 Rigault de Genouilly, Charles, 976 Ripcord Fire-Support Base, Battle for, 976–977 casualties of, 977 Ripley, John, 307 Risner, James Robinson, 977–978 River Assault Flotilla 1, 981–982 River assault groups, 978 Riverine craft, 978–981, 979 (image), 980 (image) armored troop carrier (ATC), 979–980 assault patrol boat (ASPB), 979 command-and-communication boat (CCB), 979–980 fast patrol craft (PCF), 979 France Outre Mere (FOM), 980 patrol air cushion vehicle (PACV), 980 river patrol boat (PBT), 978, 979 river patrol craft (PBC), 980 Riverine warfare, 981–984, 982 (image) RIVER RAIDER I, Operation, 983
Index River Rats. See Red River Fighter Pilots Association Rivers, Lucius Mendel, 984 Road Watch Teams (RWTs), 984–985 Roberts, Elvy, 158 Robinson, James W., 1 Robinson, Rembrandt Cecil, 985 Rockefeller, Nelson Aldrich, 334, 338, 986, 986 (image) Rockets and rocket launchers, 986–988 Chinese, 987, 988 Soviet, 987, 988 U.S., 987, 988 Vietnamese, 987 Rodgers, William, 157 Rodriguez, Felix, 940 Rogers, William Pierce, 553, 849, 988–989 ROLLING THUNDER, Operation, 26, 32, 34, 122, 123 (map), 124, 503, 550, 552, 573, 712, 722, 758, 768, 889, 917, 989–994, 990 (image), 992 (map), 1069, 1150, 1172, 1184–1185, 1248, 1341–1342 casualties of, 989 failure of, 993, 1184 objectives of, 991, 1184 phases of, 991, 993 targets of, 991 Rome Plow, 1239 Romney, George Wilcken, 334, 994 Romney, Mitt, 994 Ronning, Chester A., 820 “Ronning Missions,” 820 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 234, 309, 861, 994–995, 995 (image), 1009, 1168 memorandum to Cordell Hull, 1369Doc. Rosenquist, James, 68 Rosson, William B., 698, 1092, 1340 Rostow, Eugene Victor, 995–996, 1070 Rostow, Walt Whitman, 143, 219, 563, 569, 721, 725, 996–998, 997 (image), 1093, 1170. See also Taylor-Rostow Report ROTC Vitalization Act (1964), 968 Rousselot, Robert E., 236 Route Coloniale 4, Battles for, 998 Route packages, 998–999 Rovere, Richard, 716 Rowe, James Nicholas, 999–1000, 999 (image), 1126, 1155 Rowny, Edward L., 64 Roy, Jules, 626 Rubin, Jerry, 192, 263 (image), 703, 1000, 1000 (image), 1358–1359 Rudd, Mark, 1218 Rules of Engagement (ROE), 1001–1003 purposes of, 1001 Rung Sat, 1028 Rusk, David Dean, 219, 319, 412, 562, 563, 569, 885, 889, 1003–1004, 1004 (image), 1200, 1345 (image) memorandum of with McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1482–1484Doc.
memorandum to President Kennedy, 1487–1489Doc. telegram to Henry Cabot Lodge, 1581Doc. telegram to Maxwell Taylor, 1516Doc. television interview with, 1593–1595Doc. Rusk-Thanat Agreement (1962), 1004–1005 Russell, Richard Brevard, Jr., 1005–1006, 1006 (image), 1209 Russell Amendment, 1209 RUSSELL BEACH, Operation, 873 Russell Tribunal. See International War Crimes Tribunal Russo, Anthony J., Jr., 891, 1006–1007, 1007 (image) Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), 401, 544 Ryan, John D., 1203 (image) Sabattier, Gabriel, 774–775, 1009–1010 SAFESIDE, Operation, 560
Sagan, Ginette, 964 Saigon, 501, 1010–1011, 1011 (image) Saigon Circle. See Tet Offensive and the Saigon Circle Saigon Military Mission (SMM), 1011–1012 Sainteny, Jean, 1012–1013, 1168, 1241 Salan, Raoul Albin Louis, 386, 514, 532, 684, 791, 1013–1014, 1013 (image), 1242 Salisbury, Harrison Evans, 1014–1015, 1015 (image) Saloth Sar. See Pol Pot Samas, David, 380–381 SAM HOUSTON, Operation, 391, 1015–1016 casualties of, 1016 Samphan, Khieu, 155 Sams, Kenneth, 189 San Antonio Formula, 846, 1016–1017 Sanctuaries, 1017–1018 Sarraut, Albert, 1018–1019, 1019 (image) Saul, Peter, 67, 69 Sauvageot, Jean, 705 Savage, Paul L., 1188 Savang Vatthana, 632 Savio, Mario, 53 Schell, Jonathan, 952 Schemmer, Benjamin, 495 Schening, Richard, 139 Schlesinger, Arthur Meier, Jr., 489, 529, 1019– 1020, 1020 (image) Schlesinger, James Rodney, 224, 711, 960, 1020–1021 Schmidt, Helmut, 286, 418 Schumaker, Bob, 494 Schuman, Robert, 652 Schungel, Daniel F., 625 Schweiter, Leo H., 693 SCOTLAND, Operation, 582, 1021–1022 casualties of, 1022 Scranton Commission. See President’s Commission on Campus Unrest Scruggs, Jan Craig, 1022–1023, 1295, 1296 Seabees, 1023
I-19
Seaborn, J. Blair, 537 notes of on meeting with Pham Van Dong, 1508–1509Doc. SEA DRAGON, Operation, 85, 799, 804, 1023– 1024, 1024 (image), 1030, 1207 Sea Float, 1026 Seale, Bobby, 112, 113, 192, 264, 1024–1025 SEALORDS operations, 984, 1025–1027, 1026 (image), 1091 SEAL (Sea, Air, and Land) teams, 574, 1027–1028 Seaman, Jonathan O., 81, 357, 555, 608, 887, 1028–1029 Sea power, role in war, 1029–1030 Search and destroy, 1030–1031, 1031 (image) Search-and-rescue operations, 1031–1032 SEARCH TURN, Operation, 1025 Secret Army Organization, 1014 Seeger, Daniel Andrew, 1218 Seeger v. United States (1965), 1333, 1334 Seek, Locate, Annihilate, and Monitor. See SLAM Selective Service, 242, 482–483, 1032–1032, 1033 (image), 1033 (table) Selective Training and Service Act (1940), 1033 Shanghai Communiqué (1972), 702 Sharon Statement, 923 Sharp, Ulysses Simpson Grant, Jr., 122, 286, 300, 991, 998–999, 1034–1035 Shatan, Chaim, 924 Sheehan, Cornelius Mahoney, 58, 67, 341, 890, 894, 1035–1036 SHENANDOAH II, Operation, 673 Shields, Marvin G., 1023 SHINING BRASS, Operation, 503, 1036 Shinseki, Eric, 1216 Shoup, David Monroe, 1036–1037, 1037 (image) Shulimson, Jack, 582 Shultz, George, 964 Sian (Xi’an) Incident, 702 Sigma I and II, 1037 Sihamoni, Norodom, 154 Sihanouk, Norodom, xlv, 151, 152, 157, 561, 585, 631, 683–684, 908, 918, 1037–1039, 1038 (image), 1048, 1129 Sihanouk Trail, 676 Sijan, Lance Peter, 932–933, 1039–1040 Simons, Arthur David, 893, 1040–1041, 1052–1053 Sinn, Jerry, 1151 Sino-French War (1884–1885), 1041–1043, 1042 (image) Sino-Soviet split, 1043–1044 Sino-Vietnamese War (1979), 1044–1048, 1045 (image), 1047 (map) casualties of, 1046 causes of, 1044–1046 Sisowath Sirik Matak, 683–684, 1048–1049 Sit-ins. See Teach-ins and sit-ins Sitton, Ray B., 740
I-20
Index
Six, Robert, 236 Six-Day War (1967), 550 Skriabin, Vyacheslav. See Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich Slagel, Wayne, 734 SLAM, 579, 1049 Slater, Albert, 139 Sletten, David, 1121 (image) Smart bombs. See Precision-guided munitions Smith, Hedrik, 1035 Smith, K. Wayne, 722 Smith, Walter Bedell, 319, 412, 597, 1049– 1050, 1050 (image) declaration to the Geneva Conference, 1447Doc. telegrams to John Foster Dulles, 1440– 1442Doc., 1143–1445Doc. Snepp, Frank Warren, III, 919, 1050–1051, 1127 SOMERSET PLAIN–LAM SON 246, Operation, 1051– 1052, 1051 (image) casualties of, 1052 Song Be, Battle of, 1052 casualties of, 1052 Son Sen, 587 Son Tay Raid, 132, 1052–1053 Song Thang Incident, 1053–1054 Souphanouvong, 1054–1055, 1055 (image) Southeast Asia, ethnology of, 350–352, 351 (image), 352 (image), 353 (map), 354, 354 (image) ethnic Chinese in Vietnam, 350, 351 ethnic groups within Vietnam, 350–351 highland tribal groups in Vietnam, 351 the Tais people of Vietnam and Thailand, 352, 354, 354 (image) Southeast Asia Lake Ocean River Delta Strategy. See SEALORDS Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 195, 234, 329, 411, 601, 1005, 1055–1057, 1056 (image), 1169, 1200 protocol to the SEATO Treaty, 1450Doc. Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), 590–591 Souvanna Phouma, 631, 632, 1057–1058 Soviet Union. See Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Soviet-Vietnam Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (1978), 610, 638 Soyster, Harry, 1128 Special Forces. See United States Special Forces; Vietnam, Republic of, Special Forces Special Landing Force (SLF), 462, 485 Special National Intelligence Estimate 10-3/65, 1517–1518Doc. Special Technical and Economic Mission (STEM), 307 SPEEDY EXPRESS, Operation, 355 Spellman, Francis Joseph, 806, 813, 1058–1059 Spero, Nancy, 68
Spock, Benjamin McLane, 53, 1059–1060, 1059 (image), 1198 Spratly Islands. See Paracel and Spratly Islands, South China Sea Spring Mobilization to End the War in Vietnam, 784, 1060 Spring Offensive. See Easter Offensive Staley, Eugene, 569, 1061 Stalin, Joseph, 355, 588, 604, 605, 1043, 1158–1159 Stannard, John E., 276–277 STARLITE, Operation, 50, 799, 914, 1061, 1062 (image), 1204 casualties of, 1061 Starry, Donn Albert, 1062–1063, 1174 STEEL TIGER, Operation, 32, 97, 1063, 1119 Stennis, John Cornelius, 1063–1065, 1064 (image) Stephenson, William, 862 Steve Canyon program, 961 Stevenson, Adlai Ewing, II, 1019, 1020, 1065– 1066, 1065 (image), 1221 Stevenson, Charles, 1076 Stilwell, Richard Giles, 1066 Stilwell, Joseph W., 564 Stockdale, James Bond, 495, 796, 932–933, 1066–1067, 1067 (image), 1126 Stockdale, Sybil Bailey, 796, 1067–1068 Stolen Valor Act (2006), 1299 Stone, I. F., 433, 611 Strategic Air Command (SAC), 142, 1068– 1069, 1184 Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement (SALT I Interim Agreement) (1972), 778 Strategic Hamlet Program, 244, 513, 697, 808, 811, 870–871, 952, 1061, 1070–1071, 1071 (image), 1171 failure of, 1071 See also SUNRISE, Operation Stratton, Samuel, 608 Struggle Movement, 675 Stubbe, Ray W., 582 Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), 133, 1072 Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), 53, 192, 242, 373, 923, 1072–1074, 1073 (image) See also Weathermen Studies and Observation Group (MACV-SOG), 1074, 1215 Subic Bay Naval Base, 863 Submachine guns, 1074–1076, 1075 (image) Chinese, 1076 French, 1076 Soviet, 1076 Swedish, 1076 U.S., 1075–1076 Vietnamese, 1076 Sullivan, William Healy, 1076–1077, 1095 Summers, Harry G., Jr., 490, 728, 1077–1078 SUNFLOWER, Operation, 1078
SUNRISE, Operation, 1078–1079, 1079 (image) Surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). See Missiles, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape (SERE) training, 999–1000, 1080–1081 Sutherland, Donald, 373, 1293 Sutherland, James, 292 Suvero, Mark di, 67 Sweeney, Dennis, 460 Swift boats, 1081–1083, 1082 (image) Swift Boat Veterans for Truth, 575, 1083–1084 SWITCHBACK, Operation, 1084, 1214 Symington, Stuart, 1076
Tache d’huile, 1085 Tactical Air Command (TAC), 1085–1086 Tactical air control and navigation (TACAN), 681 Taft, Robert, 46 Taiwan. See China, Republic of Tallman, Richard Joseph, 1086 Tam Dao Mountains. See Thud Ridge Ta Mok, 587 Tam Vu. See Tran Van Giau Tan, Frank, 270, 862 Ta Ngoc Phach. See Tran Do Tanks, allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 63, 1087–1088, 11087 (image), 1252 Tan Son Nhut, 1088–1089 Taoism, 1089–1090 Tarpley, Thomas, 292 Tarr, Curtis W., 1090–1091, 1090 (image) Task Force 116, 1091 Task Force 117. See Mobile Riverine Force Task Force 194. See SEALORDS Task Force Oregon, 698, 699, 1092 Taussig, Charles, memorandum of conversation with Franklin Roosevelt, 1369–1370Doc. Taylor, Maxwell Davenport, 244, 345, 405, 550, 553, 569, 607, 721, 728 (image), 753, 796, 808, 809, 997, 1092–1094, 1093 (image), 1170, 1202, 1203, 1213, 1345 cable to President Kennedy, 1484–1486Doc. telegram to Dean Rusk, 1522–1523Doc. See also Taylor-McNamara Report; TaylorRostow Report Taylor, Rufus, 7–8 Taylor, Telford, 656 Taylor-McNamara Report, 1094–1095 text of, 1496–1498Doc. Taylor-Rostow Report, 1095–1096 Tay Ninh, 1096–1097 Tay Son Rebellion, 1097 Teach-ins and sit-ins, 1072, 1098–1099, 1098 (image) Television and the Vietnam War, 1099–1100, 1100 (image) reporting of the Battle of Khe Sanh, 1099–1100
Index reporting of the Tet Offensive, 1100 Territorial forces, 1101–1102 Tet Offensive, xliii–xliv, xliv (image), 2, 6, 7, 32, 40, 55, 65, 70, 76, 81, 101, 101 (image), 102, 105, 106, 124, 145, 163, 170, 182, 194, 202, 203, 203 (image), 219, 251, 254, 258, 259, 313, 316, 317, 333, 349, 380, 486, 498, 500, 509, 519, 521, 551, 554, 576, 582, 638, 643, 665, 680, 722, 732, 735, 749, 757, 760, 841, 844, 845, 865, 873, 932, 940, 945, 947, 955, 959, 993, 1010–1011, 1023, 1083, 1089, 1092, 1096, 1100, 1117, 1121, 1130, 1138, 1140, 1155, 1162, 1173–1174, 1196, 1204, 1212, 1238, 1245–1246, 1252, 1265, 1270, 1272, 1300, 1303, 1304, 1336, 1337, 1339, 1240 assessment of by Saigon and Washington, 872 casualties of, 317, 1104 Communist Party evaluation of, 1601–1603Doc. failure of, 1010, 1304, 1336 participation of women in, 1348 political impact of, 106, 144, 145 terror tactics used by the Viet Cong (VC) during, 80 See also Ben Tre, Battle of; Hue, Battle of; Khe Sahn, Battle of; Tet Offensive, overall strategy; Tet Offensive and the Saigon Circle Tet Offensive, overall strategy, 1102–1103, 1103 (image), 1104 (image) Tet Offensive and the Saigon Circle, 1105– 1108, 1106 (map) TEXAS, Operation, 1108 casualties of, 1108 TEXAS STAR, Operation, 976, 1108–1109 casualties of, 1109 Thai Khac Chuyen, 970 Thailand, xliii, 14, 16, 18, 22, 24, 48, 59, 70, 96, 110, 150, 156, 223, 234, 269, 305, 343, 352, 395, 1109–1111, 1110 (image) See also Franco-Thai War (1940–1941) Thai Thanh, 896 Thanh Hoa Bridge, 1111 Thanh Nien, 628 Thanh Nien Cong Hoa. See Republican Youth THAN PHONG II, Operation, 709 Thanh Phong Massacre, 574 Thanh Thai, 1111–1112 Thanh To Nhan Hoang De. See Minh Mang THAYER/IRVING, Operation, 709 Thich Quang Duc, 483, 775, 808, 809, 1112– 1113, 1112 (image) Thich Tri Quang, 138, 674, 817, 1113 Thiepval Memorial to the Missing of the Somme, 658 Thieu Tri, 1114 Third Indochina War, 1247 Thomas, Allison Kent, 1114
Thomas, Norman Mattoon, 1114–1115, 1115 (image) Thompson, Floyd James, 931 Thompson, Hugh, Jr., 785, 786, 1115–1117, 1116 (image) Thompson, Sir Robert Grainger Ker, 12, 1061, 1070, 1117 Thud Ridge, 1117 THUNDERHEAD, Operation, 1118 Tianjin, Treaty of (1885), 1118 Tiger cages, 1118–1119, 1119 (image) TIGER HOUND, Operation, 32, 97, 1063, 1119–1120 Tilford, Earl H., Jr., 505 Tinker v. Des Moines (1969), 1120–1121 TOAN THANG, Operation, 1121–1122, 1121 (image) casualties of, 1121 TOAN THANG 3, Operation, 78 TOAN THANG 42, Operation, 157, 158 TOAN THANG 43–46, Operations, 160 Toche, Jean, 68 To Huu, 1122 Tolson, John J., 276, 887–888, 893–894 Ton Duc Thang, 1122 Tonkin, 1122–1123 Ton That Dinh, 129, 130, 649, 808, 1123–1124, 1261, 1263 Ton That Thuyet, 1124 Top Gun School, 1124–1125 Torture, 495, 1125–1129, 1127 (image),1128 (image) Total Force Concept, 1212 Tourison, Sedgwick, 951 Tran Buu Kiem, 1129–1130, 1129 (image) Tran Do, 1105–1106, 1130–1131 Tran dynasty, 1131–1132 Tran Hieu, 1164 Tran Hung Dao, 1132 TRAN HUNG DAO, Operation. See SEALORDS Tran Kim Tuyen, 967, 1133 Tran Le Xuan. See Ngo Dinh Nhu, Madame Tran Ngoc Chau, 940 Tran Quoc Tuan. See Tran Hung Dao Tran Quy Hai, 845 Transportation Group 559, 1133–1134 Tran Thien Khiem, 318, 827, 1133, 1134–1135, 1134 (image) Tran Trong Kim, 140 Tran Van Chuong, 1135–1136, 1136 (image) Tran Van Dac, 1105 Tran Van Do, 1136–1137 Tran Van Don, 129, 130, 331, 649, 653, 808, 809, 827, 1123, 1134, 1137, 1137 (image), 1261 Tran Van Giau, 1137–1138 Tran Van Hai, 1138 Tran Van Huong, 139, 501, 839, 1138–1139, 1139 (image), 1262, 1264 Tran Van Lam, 1139–1140, 1140 (image) Tran Van Tra, 842, 941, 1140–1141, 1141 (image)
I-21
Treaty of Independence of the State of Vietnam, 1439Doc. Trieu Au, 1141 Trieu Da, 1141–1142 Trieu Thi Trinh. See Trieu Au Trieu Vu Vuong. See Trieu Da Trinh lords, 1142 Trinh Van Can, 687 Trinité, Louis de la. See D’Argenlieu, Georges Thierry Trudeau, Pierre Elliot, 165 Truehart, William, 851 Truman, Harry S., 5, 182, 304, 314, 316, 328, 530, 603, 604, 606, 691, 744, 781, 862, 1020, 1143–1144, 1143 (image), 1168, 1199 statement announcing military aid to Indochina, 1410–1411Doc. telegram to Jiang Jieshi, 1376Doc. U.S. State Department memoranda to, 1370–1371Doc., 1371–1373Doc. Trung Nu Vuong. See Trung Trac and Trung Nhi Trung Queens. See Trung Trac and Trung Nhi Trung Trac and Trung Nhi, 1144 Trung Uong Cuc Mien Nam. See Central Office for South Vietnam Truong, David H. D., 1198 Truong Chinh, 621, 628, 638, 1144–1146, 1244, 1278 Truong Dinh Dzu, 1146–1147, 1146 (image) Truong Nhu Tang, 941, 1147 Truong Son Corridor, 1147–1148 Truong Son Mountains, 1148 Truong Van Nghia. See De Tham Truscott, Lucian K., 576 Tsuchihashi, Yuitsu, 1148–1149 TUCSON, Operation, 556 Tu Duc, 1149–1150, 1149 (image) Tuesday Lunch Group, 1150 Tully, Robert, 527 Tu Luc Van Doan (Self-Reliance Literary Group), 837 Tunnel rats, 1151, 1151 (image) Tunnels, 1151–1152. See also Tunnel rats Tun Razak, 698 Turner, Ted, 374 Turse, Nick, 1126 Tu Ve, 1152 Tuyen Quang, siege of, 1152–1153 casualties of, 1153 Twining, Nathan Farragut, 1153–1154, 1154 (image) Two Ladies Trung. See Trung Trac and Trung Nhi Udall, Morris, 786 U Minh Forest, 1155 Underwater demolition teams (UDTs), 1027–1028 Ung Lich. See Ham Nghi
I-22
Index
Uniforms, 1155–1158, 1157 (image) French expeditionary forces, 1155–1156 Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, 1156 U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps, 1157–1158 Viet Minh, People’s Army of Vietnam, and Viet Cong, 1156 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), 195, 234, 243, 1158–1160, 1291 military and economic aid sent to North Vietnam by, 199, 324, 344, 676, 1159– 1160, 1244 and the Sino-Soviet split, 195–196 See also Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) UNION I and II, Operations, 1160–1161, 1161 (image) casualties of, 1161 UNIONTOWN, Operation, 1162 United Buddhist Association (UBA), 827 United front strategy, 1162–1163 United Kingdom and the Indochina and Vietnam wars, 1163–1165, 1163 (image) United Nations (UN), 315. See also United Nations and the Vietnam War United Nations and the Vietnam War, 1165–1166 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 966 United Services Organization (USO), 1166, 1166 (image) Family Support Fund, 1166 Operation Enduring Care, 1166 United States, 1291 message to the North Vietnamese government on the pause in bombing, 1549Doc. military logistics used in Vietnam, 678–679 national elections (1964), 332–333 national elections (1968), 333–335, 334 (image), 848 (table) national elections (1972), 336–337, 336 (image), 337 (table), 346 national elections (1976), 338–339, 338 (image) praise of for the Elysée Agreements, 1402Doc. relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 195, 196 response of to the Geneva declarations, 1446Doc. trade embargo of against North Vietnam, 343–345, 344 (table). See also United States, economy of, and the Vietnam War; United States, involvement in Indochina through 1954; United States, involvement in Vietnam, 1954–1965; United States, involvement in Vietnam, 1965–1968; United States, involvement in Vietnam, 1969–1973; United States, involvement in Vietnam, 1973–1975;
United States, involvement in Vietnam, 1975–present United States, economy of, and the Vietnam War, 325–327 deficit spending during the war, 326 (table) effects on macroeconomic theory, 326 impacts of increased budget deficits, 325–326 and inflation, 326 United States, involvement in Indochina through 1954, 1167–1169, 1167 (image) United States, involvement in Vietnam, 1954– 1965, 1169–1172, 1171 (image) U.S. Army manpower in Vietnam, 1170 (table) United States, involvement in Vietnam, 1965– 1968, 1172–1175, 1172 (image) United States, involvement in Vietnam, 1969– 1973, 1175–1177, 1175 (image) United States, involvement in Vietnam, 1973– 1975, 1177–1179, 1178 (image) United States, involvement in Vietnam, 1975– present, 1179–1181, 1180 (image) United States, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 1954–present, 1181–1182 United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 1182–1184 United States Air Force (USAF), 121–122, 142–143, 156, 226, 300, 780, 1184–1186, 1185 (image) U.S. Air Force Weather Agency (AFWA), 270 U.S. Seventh Air Force, 92 See also Airborne Operations; Aircraft, allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Andersen Air Force Base; FARM GATE, Operation; ROLLING THUNDER, Operation; Wild Weasels United States Army, 1187–1190, 1187 (image), 1238 army units in Vietnam, 1214 (table) casualties during the Vietnam War, 1190 corps tactical zones in South Vietnam, 1189 (map) deaths by Vietnam province, 1097 (table) office corps of, 1188 organization of a typical infantry division, 1188 (table) position on National Security Council Action No. 1074-A, 1432Doc. replacement system of, 1188 See also K-9 Corps United States Army, Vietnam, Installation Stockade (USARVIS), 1190–1191 United States Army Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii (USACILHI), 761, 1191–1192, 1191 (image) United States Army Special Services, 1191–1193 United States Coast Guard, 1193–1194, 1194 (image), 1275
United States Congress and the Vietnam War, 1195–1198 United States Department of Justice, 1198–1199 United States Department of State aide-mémoire to the North Vietnamese government, 1572–1573Doc. and formation of U.S. policy toward Vietnam, 1199–1201, 1201 (image) memorandum of meeting of August 31, 1963, 1494–1495Doc. paper on military aid for Indochina, 1408–1409Doc. paper on U.S. post–World War II policy concerning Asia, 1374–1376Doc. policy statement on Indochina, 1400–1402Doc. telegram to the U.S. State Department from Hanoi, 1391Doc. White paper on Vietnam, 1518–1519Doc. United States Information Agency (USIA), 1201–1202 United States Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 259, 297, 359, 372, 422, 551, 576, 691, 1202– 1204, 1203 (image), 1269, 1292, 1339 memorandum 46-64, 1502–1504Doc. memorandum of with Rusk and McNamara, 1482–1484Doc. memorandum to Charles E. Wilson, 1430–1432Doc. memorandum to George C. Marshall, 1414–1415Doc. See also Key West Agreement (1948) United States Marine Corps (USMC), 207–208, 300, 1204–1205, 1205 (image), 1238, 1263 casualties during the Vietnam War, 1205 use of helicopters by, 474–475 See also JACKSTAY, Operation; Special Landing Force (SLF) United States Merchant Marine, 1205–1206 United States Navy, 780, 1206–1208, 1207 (image), 1275, 1321 (image) adverse effects of the Vietnam War on, 1208 Fleet Numerical Meteorology and Oceanography Center (FNMOC), 270 lack of preparedness for the Vietnam War, 1206 U.S. Seventh Fleet, 268, 268 (image) warships of, 1322–1323, 1321 (image), 1322 (image) See also DeSoto Missions; Dixie Station; Forrestal, USS, flight deck fire of; GAME WARDEN, Operation; Guam; JACKSTAY, Operation; Naval gunfire support; Riverine craft; Riverine warfare; YANKEE TEAM, Operation United States Navy Fighter Weapons School. See Top Gun School United States Navy River Patrol Force. See Task Force 116 United States Reserve Components, 1208–1212
Index calling up of reservists, 1209 categories of reservists, 1209 organization, training, and structure of, 1208–1209 reservists serving in the Vietnam War Air Force Reserve, 1210 Air National Guard, 1210 Army National Guard, 1210–1211 Army Reserve, 1211 Navy Reserve, 1211 See also United States Reserve Components, Decision Not to Mobilize United States Reserve Components, Decision Not to Mobilize, 1211–1212 United States Special Forces (USSF), 1212– 1216, 1213 (image) United States Special Operations Forces (SOF), 579 United States Veterans Administration (VA), 1216 United States v. O’Brien (1968), 1217 United States v. Seeger (1965), 1217–1218 United We Stand, 893 University of Wisconsin bombing, 1218–1219 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 236 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty (1960), 545 U.S. v. U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (1972), 1198 U Thant, 700, 1165, 1221, 1221 (image) Ut, Nick, 1219–1220, 1219 (image) UTAH, Operation, 1220 casualties of, 1220 Valluy, Jean-Étienne, 532, 1223, 1241, 1242 telegram to Pierre-Louis Debès, 1389Doc. Van Ba. See Ho Chi Minh VAN BUREN, Operation, 1223–1224 casualties of, 1224 Van Cao, 1224 Vance, Cyrus, 64, 876, 1224–1226, 1225 (image), 1345 Vance incident, 66–67 Van Devanter, Lynda, 1294 Van Es, Hubert, 1226–1227, 1226 (image) Van Fleet, James A., 606, 972 Vang Pao, 96, 632, 965, 1227 Van Lang, 1228 Vann, John Paul, 65, 467, 600, 1035, 1228– 1229, 1228 (image) Van Tien Dung, 93, 94, 1229–1230, 1229 (image), 1252 Vaught, James B., 276 Versace, Humbert Rocque, 933, 1126, 1230–1231 Vessey, John W., Jr., 73, 761, 820, 1180, 1231– 1232, 1231 (image), 1278 Veteran Outreach Centers (Vet Centers), 657, 925 Veterans for America (VFA), 780, 781
Vientiane Agreement, 1232–1233, 1232 (image) Vientiane Protocol, 1233–1234 Viet Cong (VC), xli, xliv, 15, 75, 77, 78, 141, 157, 163, 169, 171, 183, 184, 215, 244, 319, 372, 394, 537, 638, 795 (image), 1238, 1240, 1245, 1265, 1323 atrocities committed by, 79, 80, 519, 521– 522, 521 (image) effect of the Tet Offensive on, 1104, 1304 infrastructure of, 1234–1235, 1234 (image) military logistics used in Vietnam, 678 use of tunnels by, 245, 248–249 See also Hue, Battle of; Sanctuaries; Tet Offensive Viet Cong Military Region IV, 100, 180 Viet Minh, xli, 140, 174, 199, 243, 289, 298, 307, 310, 386, 412, 493, 497, 500, 536, 544–545, 822, 898, 1162, 1199, 1235, 1236 (map), 1237, 1240, 1244, 1250, 1287, 1332 Chinese support of, 293, 532–533, 1199 contributions of Japanese deserters to, 545 creation of, 628 impact of the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on, 547 land reform of, 621 military logistics used in Vietnam, 677–678 OSS support of, 862, 1167 river warfare of, 387 See also Dien Bien Phu, Battle of Vietnam, climate of, 1237–1238, 1237 (image) impact of climate and terrain on the Vietnam War, 1238–1240 Vietnam, Democratic Republic of (DRV, North Vietnam), 35, 43, 52, 238, 378, 401, 422, 495, 500, 501, 536, 537 bombing of, 122, 123 (map), 124, 325, 1246 declaration of independence, 1377–1378Doc. peace proposal of, 1635–1636Doc. Politburo Resolution No. 194-NQ/TW, 1624–1625Doc. Politburo Resolution No. 236-NQ/TW, 1658–1659Doc. Soviet and Chinese military support for, 324 statement of, 1644–1647Doc. U.S. trade embargo against, 343–345, 344 (table) See also Vietnam, Democratic Republic of (DRV, North Vietnam [1945–1954]); Vietnam, Democratic Republic of (DRV, North Vietnam [1954–1975]) Vietnam, Democratic Republic of (DRV, North Vietnam [1945–1954]), 1240–1242, 1241 (image) national call to arms in, 1242 negotiations with the French, 1241–1242 surrender of the French in, 1242 Vietnam, Democratic Republic of (DRV, North Vietnam [1954–1975]), 1243–1247, 1243 (image), 1245 (image)
I-23
acceptance of the Geneva Accords by, 1245 declaration on normalizing relations between northern and southern zones, 1451–1452Doc. emigration from, 1244 goals of, 1244–1245 people’s courts in, 1244 and reunification, 1244, 1250 role of the peasantry in land reform, 1243–1244 Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, Air Force (Vietnam People’s Air Force [VPAF]), 1247–1249, 1248 (image) air defense system of, 1248 effects of U.S. bombing on, 1248–1249 Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, Armed Forces (Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces [RVNAF]), 1269, 1270 Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, Army (People’s Army of Vietnam [PAVN]), xlii, xliv, xlv, xlvi, 7, 14, 30, 49–50, 51, 77, 78–79, 93, 142, 157, 163, 169, 201 (image), 208, 215, 225, 226, 244, 290, 291, 390–391, 1239, 1240, 1245, 1247, 1249–1253, 1265 artillery used by, 71–72, 1251 (table) defense of the Ho Chi Minh Trail by, 505 in eastern Cambodia, 155 equipment of, 1252 initial lack of organization in, 1249 logistics of, 1251–1252 military logistics used in Vietnam, 679–680 number of personnel in, 1250, 1252 origin of, 167 reunification of Vietnam as driving force behind its strategy, 1250 support of the Pathet Lao by, 411, 412 tanks as prime targets of, 63 use of tanks by, 1252 victories of over the French, 1249–1250 and wartime atrocities, 79–80 women in, 1348–1349 See also Easter Offensive; Ho Chi Minh Campaign; Hue, Battle of; Sanctuaries; Tet Offensive Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, Navy (Vietnam People’s Navy [VPN]), 1321 Vietnam, geography of, 416–417 Vietnam, history of (prehistory to 938 CE), 1252–1254 Chinese domination of, 1253–1254 prehistory, 1253 under the Thuc and the Trieu, 1253 Vietnam, history of (938 CE through the French conquest), 1254–1255, 1255 (image), 1256 (map), 1257–1258, 1257 (image) cultural development during, 1255, 1257 French conquest during, 1257–1258 and the Nam Tien (March to the South), 1257 Vietnamese dynasties, 1254–1255
I-24
Index
Vietnam, Republic of (RVN, South Vietnam), xli, 43, 64, 173, 324, 500, 501, 536, 1238, 1258–1264, 1259 (image), 1260 (image), 1264 (image) aid to under the Kennedy administration, 83 declaration of concerning reunification, 1458Doc. document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Paris Peace Talks, 1642–1643Doc. Law 10/59 of, 1472Doc. national assembly and constitution of, 1260, 1263 national elections in, 329–332, 331 (image) 1955 election, 330 1967 election, 330–331 1971 election, 331–332 opposition to Diem within, 1260–1261, 1262 opposition to the Paris peace agreements, 1264 peace proposal of the provisional revolutionary government of South Vietnam, 1636–1637Doc. prime ministers of, 1955–1975, 1135 (table) protests by students and Buddhist monks in, 1262 statement of the provisional revolutionary government of South Vietnam, 1641–1642Doc. Vietnam, Republic of, Air Force, 1264–1266, 1269 expansion of, 1265 types of U.S. planes used in, 1264–1265 Vietnam, Republic of, Army (Army of the Republic of Vietnam [ARVN]), xli, xlv, 2, 15, 51, 57, 58, 64, 100, 101, 180, 208, 226, 240 (image), 278, 292, 319, 347, 422, 1261, 1266–1268, 1267 (image), 1268 (image) and the Cambodian Incursion, 157–158, 160–161 corruption in, 1266–1267 fighting against the Binh Xuyen, 169 lack of leadership in, 1268 military logistics used in Vietnam, 678, 679 military strength of (1955–1972), 1266 (table) number of personnel in, 1268 organization of, 1268 pacification efforts of, 1246 U.S. training of, 1267 women in, 1348–1349 See also Enclave strategy; Ho Chi Minh Campaign; Hue, Battle of Vietnam, Republic of, Joint General Staff (JGS), 1269–1270 Vietnam, Republic of, Marine Corps (RVNMC), 1270–1271, 1271 (image) Vietnam, Republic of, National Police, 1271–1273 National Police Field Force (NPFF), 1272
Vietnam, Republic of, Navy (VNN), 1273– 1275, 1274 (image), 1321–1322 and the Cambodian Incursion, 1274 deficiencies of, 1273–1274 patrol of the coastal zones by, 1273 River Force of, 1273 Vietnam, Republic of, Revolutionary Development Cadre Training Center, 1275 Vietnam, Republic of, Special Forces, 244, 1276 Vietnam, Socialist Republic of (SRV), 204, 1276–1282, 1277 (image), 1279 (image), 1281 (image), 1286 Doi Moi reform program in, 303, 820, 1278–1279 economic growth in after 2000, 1281–1282 economy of, 1277 farm collectivization in, 1277 liberalization in, 1280 lifting of the trade embargo against, 1674–1675Doc. outside investment in, 1280–1281 PAVN influence in, 1280 political struggles in, 1279–1280 population of, 1281 post–Vietnam War problems faced by, 1276 power of the Communist Party in, 1276–1277 relations with Cambodia, 1278 relations with China, 1278 relations with the United States, 1280, 1675–1676Doc. Vietnam Independence League. See Viet Minh Vietnam Information Group (VIG), 1287–1288 Vietnam Magazine, 1289–1290 Vietnam Nationalist Party. See Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang (VNQDD, Vietnamese National Party) Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang (VNQDD, Vietnamese National Party), 833, 1290–1291 admission of women to, 1347 Vietnam Revolutionary Youth Association. See Viet Nam Thanh Nien Cach Mang Dong Chi Hoi Vietnam Syndrome, 1291–1292 Viet Nam Thanh Nien Cach Mang Dong Chi Hoi, 1292–1293 Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW), 610, 657, 1293–1295, 1294 (image) Vietnam Veterans of America (VVA), 1297–1298 statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1630–1632Doc. Vietnam Veterans Intertribe Association, 798 Vietnam Veterans Memorial, 658, 1022, 1295– 1297, 1296 (image) Vietnam War (1961–1975), xliii (image), xlvi (image), 675 as “America’s first rock-and-roll war,” 782 casualties of, 175–176, 175 (table), 1247 cost of, xlii, 426 (table)
economic indicators during, 1314 (table) effect of on the U.S. economy, 325–327 escalation of, xliii goals of, xliii as the “Helicopter War,” 30 as “Johnson’s War,” 551 as a “living room war,” 728 number of U.S. deaths in, xlii opposition to in the United States, 551 overview of, xli–xlvi as the “television” war, 242, 1099 War Zone C, 555 See also Historiography, of the Vietnam War; Women, in the Vietnam War Vietnam War Crimes Working Group, 1126 Vietnam War frauds and fakes, 1298–1299 Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP), 1276– 1277, 1282–1283 Vietnamese culture, 1283–1286, 1285 (image), 1286 (image) effects of war on, 1285 fine arts of, 1284–1285 influence of Chinese culture on, 1283–1284 literature of, 1284 music of, 1284 under Communism, 1285–1286 Vietnamese National Army, 1286–1287 Vietnamese Workers’ Party Third National Congress on missions and policies, 1476–1478Doc. Vietnamization, xlv, 48, 163, 170, 224, 594, 615, 616, 679, 847, 1074, 1175, 1246, 1265, 1288–1289, 1289 (image). See also Jaunissement Vilers, Le Myre de, 79 Vinh, 1299–1300 Vinh San. See Duy Tan Vinh Yen, Battle of, 497 Vo Bam, 1133 Vo Chi Cong, 1300 Vogt, John W., Jr., 1301, 1301 (image) Voices in Vital America (VIVA), 797, 1301–1302 Vo Nguyen Giap, xli, xlv, 51, 81, 167, 175, 324– 325, 386, 497, 514, 556–557, 579, 582, 618, 634, 638, 642–643, 684, 693, 759, 791, 801, 998, 1046, 1102, 1105, 1249, 1252, 1279, 1302–1304, 1303 (image) initial actions of against the French in Vietnam, 1240–1241, 1242, 1303 issuance of a national call to arms by, 1303 as leader of the military campaign against the Republic of Vietnam, 1303–1304 opposition to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, 1304 “People’s War, People’s Army,” 1463–1472Doc. report on the Dien Bien Phu campaign, 1429–1430Doc. revamping of the Viet Minh’s intelligence organization, 636
Index See also Dau Tranh strategy; Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; Easter Offensive; Indochina War Voting Rights Act (1965), 591 Vo Tran Chi, 1304 Vo Van Ba, 1304–1305 Vo Van Kiet, 1278, 1305–1306, 1305 (image) Vua Duc Tong. See Tu Duc Vua Thanh To. See Minh Mang Vu Hai Thu. See Nguyen Hai Than Vu Hong Khanh, 1307–1307 VULTURE, Operation, 847, 907, 957, 1169, 1307–1308 Vu Ngoc Nha–Huynh Van Trong spy case, 1308 Vung Tau, 1308–1309, 1309 (image) Vung Tau Charter, 827 Vu Oanh, 1309–1310 Vu Quoc Thuc, 1310 Vu Thu Hien, 639 Vu Van Giai, 1310–1311 Vu Van Giang. See Vu Hong Khanh Wage and price controls, 1313–1314, 1314 (table) Waldron, Adelbert F., III, 1314–1315 Walkabout, Billy, 798 Walker, Walton, 605, 606 Wallace, George C., 335, 339, 646, 1315–1316, 1315 (image) Walt, Lewis William, 207, 1316–1317, 1316 (image) Ware, Keith Lincoln, 1106, 1317 Warner, John, 250 (image) Warnke, Paul Culliton, 1317–1319, 1318 (image) War Powers Act (1973), 546, 849, 1064, 1178, 1197, 1319–1320 text of, 1657–1658Doc. War Resisters League, 1320–1321 Warships, allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 1321–1323, 1321 (image), 1322 (image) Wars of national liberation, 1323–1324 War Zones C and D, 1324–1326, 1325 (image) WASHINGTON GREEN, Operation, 873, 1326–1327 Washington Special Actions Group, 1327 Wasiak, Joseph E., 276 Watergate Scandal, 187, 530, 595, 763, 772–773, 847, 849, 892, 1020, 1203, 1327–1329, 1328 (image)
Weathermen, 1218–1219, 1329–1330, 1330 (image) Webb, James Henry, Jr., 1330–1331, 1331 (image) Wei Guoqing, 1331–1332 Weiner, David, 973 (image) Weiner, Lee, 192 Weinglass, Leonard, 192 Weiss, Cora, 1333 Welsh v. United States (1970), 1218, 1333– 1335, 1334 (image) Westmoreland, William C., xliii, 81, 118, 180, 215, 235, 236, 244, 300, 302, 346, 406, 458, 461, 462, 509 (image), 513, 517, 550, 555, 576, 578, 579–580, 596, 599, 608– 609, 625, 693, 700, 723, 728 (image), 771, 844, 845, 872, 887, 934, 1078, 1092, 1204, 1209, 1318, 1335–1337, 1336 (image) accusations against concerning enemy casualty figures, 1336–1337 and the buildup of U.S. troops in Vietnam, 219, 510, 550, 551, 747, 991, 1094, 1105, 1173–1174 difficulties with ROKA forces in Vietnam, 602 lawsuit against CBS, 865–866 National Press Club address, 1591–1592Doc. on the operations in War Zones C and D, 1325–1326 and the Peers Inquiry, 886, 887 reaction to the Tet Offensive, 1136 service of in Korea, 1335 on SLAM, 1049 strategies and tactics employed by, 598, 1335–1336 view of the media, 729, 1100 view of pacification, 871 See also Honolulu Conference (1967); Khe Sanh, Battle of; Search and destroy Weyand, Frederick Carlton, 347, 1103, 1105, 1106, 1177, 1337–1338 Whalen, Charles W., Jr., 1197 Wheeler, Earle Gilmore, 118, 1105, 1174, 1338–1339, 1338 (image), 1345 (image) report on the situation in Vietnam, 1597–1599Doc. Wheeler, Jack, 1295, 1296 WHEELER/WALLOWA, Operation, 784, 1340–1341, 1341 (image) White Star Mobile Training Teams, 1341 Whitley, Glenna, 1298 Wickwire, Peter, 139
I-25
Wiener, Sam, 69 Wild Weasels, 1341–1342 Wilk, David, 1299 Williams, Charles Q., 308 Williams, Samuel Tankersley, 319, 1342–1343 Willoughby, Frank C., 624 Wilson, Charles E., 409 Wilson, George C., 1 Wilson, James Harold, 1078, 1164, 1343–1344, 1343 (image) Wilson, Thomas Woodrow, 1344 Wilson, Woodrow, 315, 401, 663 Winter Soldier Investigation, 574, 657, 1083 Wise Men, 551, 716, 782, 972, 1225, 1344– 1346, 1345 (image) Women, in the Vietnam War U.S. women, 1346–1347, 1346 (image) Vietnamese women, 1347–1349, 1348 (image) Women Strike for Peace, 1349 Women’s Liberation Association (WLA), 1348 Women’s Solidarity League, 967 Woodring, Willard, 139 Woods, Robert, 1151 Woodstock, 1349–1350, 1350 (image) Woodward, Gilbert H., 948 Wyatt, Clarence R., 727 Xa Loi Pagoda Raid, 1351–1352 Xuan Loc, Battle of, 1352 Xuan Thuy, 876, 1352–1353, 1353 (image) XYZ, 820 Yankee Station, 1355 YANKEE TEAM, Operation, 1356–1357, 1356
(image) Yellowing. See Jaunissement YELLOWSTONE, Operation, 1357 Yen Bay (or Yen Bai) Mutiny, 833, 1358 Young, Samuel, 1072 Young Americans for Freedom, 923 Young Turks, 753, 796, 816, 841, 1138, 1262 Youth International Party (Yippies), 192, 506, 1000, 1358–1360, 1359 (image) Zhang Xueliang, 702 Zhou Enlai, 195, 196, 197, 199, 200 (image), 412, 595, 1361–1362, 1362 (image) Zhu De, 196, 702 Zorthian, Barry, 553, 728, 1362–1363 Zumwalt, Elmo R., Jr., 250 (image), 956, 956 (image), 1025, 1203 (image), 1363–1364, 1363 (image)
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THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE VIETNAM WAR Second Edition
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THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE VIETNAM WAR A Political, Social, and Military History, Second Edition
VOLUME II: H–P
Dr. Spencer C. Tucker Editor Dr. Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr. Associate Editor
Merle L. Pribbenow II Dr. James H. Willbanks, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army (retired) Dr. David T. Zabecki, Major General, Army of the United States (retired) Assistant Editors
Santa Barbara, California Denver, Colorado Oxford, England
Copyright 2011 by ABC-CLIO, LLC All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The encyclopedia of the Vietnam War : a political, social, and military history / Spencer C. Tucker, editor. — 2nd ed. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-85109-960-3 (hard back : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-1-85109-961-0 (e-book) 1. Vietnam War, 1961-1975—Encyclopedias. I. Tucker, Spencer, 1937– DS557.7.E53 2011 959.704’3—dc22 2011007604 ISBN: 978-1-85109-960-3 EISBN: 978-1-85109-961-0 14 13 12 11 10 1 2 3 4 5 This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an eBook. Visit www.abc-clio.com for details. ABC-CLIO, LLC 130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911 Santa Barbara, California 93116–1911 This book is printed on acid-free paper Manufactured in the United States of America
To all those who fought in the Indochina and Vietnam Wars
About the Editor
Spencer C. Tucker, PhD, graduated from the Virginia Military Institute and was a Fulbright scholar in France. He was a U.S. Army captain and an intelligence analyst in the Pentagon during the Vietnam War and then taught for 30 years at Texas Christian University before returning to his alma mater for 6 years as the holder of the John Biggs Chair of Military History. He retired from teaching in 2003. He is now Senior Fellow of Military History at ABC-CLIO. Dr. Tucker has written or edited 38 books, including ABC-CLIO’s award-winning The Encyclopedia of the Cold War and The Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli Conflict as well as the comprehensive A Global Chronology of Conflict.
E DITORIAL A DVISORY B OARD M EMBERS Col. Walter J. Boyne
Dr. Carol Reardon
U.S. Air Force (Ret.)
Professor of Military History Department of History Pennsylvania State University
Dr. David Coffey Professor and Chair Department of History and Philosophy University of Tennessee at Martin
Dr. Prisci lla Roberts Professor of History, School of Humanities Honorary Director, Centre of American Studies University of Hong Kong
Shawn Livingston, MLIS Director of Information Service University of Kentucky Libraries
Capt. Carl O. Schuster
Dr. Michael R. Nichols
U.S. Navy (Ret.) Adjunct Professor Hawaii Pacific University
Department of Social Sciences Tarrant County College
Sandra Wittman Library Services Oakton Community College
Nguyen Cong Luan Independent Scholar
Cartographer Internal Mapping Associates
ABC-CLIO M ILITARY H ISTORY A DVISORY B OARD M EMBERS Dr. David Coffey
Dr. Carol Reardon
Professor and Chair Department of History and Philosophy University of Tennessee at Martin
Professor of Military History Department of History Pennsylvania State University
Dr. Don Hickey
Dr. Prisci lla Roberts
Professor of History Department of History Wayne State College (Nebraska)
Associate Professor of History, School of Humanities Honorary Director, Centre of American Studies University of Hong Kong
Dr. James Matray Professor and Chair Department of History California State University, Chico
Dr. James H. Wi llbanks Director, Department of Military History U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth
Dr. Jack McCallum Adjunct Professor Department of History and Geography Texas Christian University
Dr. Steven E. Woodworth Professor of History Department of History Texas Christian University
Dr. Justin D. Murphy Director, Academy of Freedom; Brand Professor of History Department of History, Political Science, and Geography Howard Payne University
Dr. Jim Piecuch Associate Professor of History Department of History Kennesaw State University
Dr. David T. Zabecki Major General Army of the United States, Retired Honory Senior Research Fellow in War Studies University of Birmingham, England
Contents Volume I: A–G List of Entries xi List of Maps xxv Foreword xxvii Preface xxxi General Maps xxxiii Overview of the Vietnam War Entries 1 Index I-1
Volume III: Q–Z List of Entries xi List of Maps xxv General Maps xxvii Entries 951 Index I-1 xli
Volume IV: Documents List of Documents xi Introduction—xvii Documents 1365 Appendix A: Unit Designations 1679 Appendix B: Military Ranks 1683 Appendix C: Order of Battle 1691 Chronology 1731 Glossary 1765 Selected Bibliography 1779 List of Editors and Contributors 1789 Categorical Index 1795 Index I-1
Volume II: H–P List of Entries xi List of Maps xxv General Maps xxvii Entries 439 Index I-1
ix
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List of Entries
VOLUME I
Amerasians American Friends of Vietnam American Red Cross Amnesty Amphibious Warfare Andersen Air Force Base Angkor Wat An Khe An Loc, Battle of Annam Antiaircraft Artillery, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam Antiwar Movement, U.S. Antiwar Protests, Non-U.S. APACHE SNOW, Operation Ap Bac, Battle of Arc Light Missions Armored Personnel Carriers Armored Warfare Army Concept Team in Vietnam Arnett, Peter Arnheiter, Marcus Aurelius Art and the Vietnam War Artillery, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam Artillery Fire Doctrine A Shau Valley A Shau Valley Special Forces Camp, Battle for Assimilation versus Association Association of Foreign Correspondents in Vietnam ATLAS WEDGE, Operation Atrocities during the Vietnam War ATTLEBORO, Operation
ABILENE, Operation
Abrams, Creighton Williams, Jr. Abzug, Bella Acheson, Dean Gooderham Adams, Edward Adams, Samuel A. Ad Hoc Military Buildup Committee African Americans in the U.S. Military Agnew, Spiro Theodore Agricultural Reform Tribunals Agroville Program Aiken, George David Air America Airborne Operations Aircraft, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam Aircraft, Bombers Aircraft Carriers Air Defenses, Democratic Republic of Vietnam Air Mobility Air Naval Gunnery Liaison Company Airpower, Role in War Air-to-Air Missiles Air-to-Ground Missiles Air War Study Group Report, Cornell University ALA MOANA, Operation Alessandri, Marcel Ali, Muhammad Alpha Strike Alsop, Joseph Wright, V Alvarez, Everett, Jr. xi
xii
List of Entries
Attrition August Revolution Au Lac, Kingdom of Australia BABYLIFT, Operation Bach Dang River, Battle of Ba Cut Baez, Joan Chandos Ball, George Wildman Baltimore Four Ban Karai Pass Ban Me Thuot, Battle of Bao Dai Barker, Frank Akeley, Jr. BARREL ROLL, Operation Beau, Jean-Baptiste Paul Beckwith, Charles Alvin Ben Suc Ben Tre, Battle of Berger, Samuel David Berrigan, Daniel Berrigan, Philip Bidault, Georges Bien Hoa Air Base Binh Gia, Battle of BINH TAY I–IV, Operations Binh Xuyen Bird & Sons Black Flags Black Muslims Black Panthers Blaizot, Roger Blassie, Michael Joseph BLU-82/B Bomb BLUE LIGHT, Operation Blum, Léon Body Armor Body Count BOLD MARINER, Operation Bollaert, Émile BOLO, Operation Bombing Halts and Restrictions Bombs, Gravity Booby Traps Bowles, Chester Bliss Bradley, Omar Nelson Brady, Patrick Henry BRAVO I and II, Operations Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich BRIGHT LIGHT, Operation Brown, George Scratchley
Brown, Hubert Gerald Brown, Samuel Winfred, Jr. Browne, Malcolm Wilde Bruce, David Kirkpatrick Este Brzezinski, Zbigniew Kazimierz Buddhism in Vietnam BUFFALO, Operation Bui Diem Bui Phat Bui Tin BULLET SHOT, Operation Bundy, McGeorge Bundy, William Putnam Bunker, Ellsworth Burchett, Wilfred Burkett, Bernard Gary Bush, George Herbert Walker Calley, William Laws, Jr. Cambodia Cambodia, Vietnamese Invasion and Occupation of Cambodian Airlift Cambodian Incursion Camden 28 Cam Lo Camp Carroll Cam Ranh Bay Canada Can Lao Nhan Vi Cach Mang Dang Cao Bang Cao Dai Cao Van Vien Caravelle Group Carpentier, Marcel Carter, James Earl, Jr. Case, Clifford Philip Case-Church Amendment CASTOR, Operation Casualties Catholicism in Vietnam Catonsville Nine Catroux, Georges CEDAR FALLS, Operation Cédile, Jean Central Highlands Central Intelligence Agency Central Office for South Vietnam Chams and the Kingdom of Champa CHAOS, Operation Chapman, Leonard Fielding, Jr. Chappelle, Georgette Meyer Charner, Léonard Victor Joseph
List of Entries CHECO Project Chennault, Anna Chennault, Claire Lee Chicago Eight Chieu Hoi Program China, People’s Republic of China, People’s Republic of, Policy toward Vietnam China, Republic of Chinese in Vietnam Chomsky, Avram Noam Church, Frank Forrester Chu Van Tan Civic Action Civilian Irregular Defense Group Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support Civil Rights Movement Clarey, Bernard Ambrose Clark, William Ramsey Clark Air Force Base Clear and Hold Cleland, Joseph Maxwell Clemenceau, Georges Clergy and Laymen Concerned about Vietnam Clifford, Clark McAdams Clinton, William Jefferson Cochin China Coffin, William Sloane, Jr. Cogny, René Colby, William Egan Collins, Joseph Lawton COMMANDO FLASH, Operation COMMANDO HUNT, Operation Concerned Officers Movement “Conduct of the War in Vietnam” Report Conein, Lucien Emile Confucianism Conscientious Objectors Con Son Island Prison CONSTANT GUARD, Operation Containment Policy Con Thien, Siege of Continental Air Services Cooper, Chester Lawrence Cooper, John Sherman Cooper-Brooke Amendment Cooper-Church Amendment Corps Tactical Zones Counterculture Counterinsurgency Warfare CRIMP, Operation Cronauer, Adrian Cronkite, Walter Leland
Cubi Point Naval Air Station, Philippines Cu Chi Tunnels Cunningham, Randall Harold Cuong De Cushman, Robert Everton, Jr. Da Faria, Antônio Dai Viet Quoc Dan Dang Dak To, Battle of Da Lat Daley, Richard Joseph Da Nang DANIEL BOONE, Operation Dao Duy Tung D’Argenlieu, Georges Thierry Dau Tranh Strategy Davidson, Phillip Buford, Jr. Davis, Raymond Gilbert Davis, Rennard Cordon Day, George Everett Dean, John Gunther Dèbes, Pierre-Louis De Castries, Christian Marie DECKHOUSE V, Operation Decoux, Jean Deer Mission Defense Meteorological Satellite Program Defense Satellite Communications System DEFIANT STAND, Operation Defoliation De Gaulle, Charles DELAWARE–LAM SON 216, Operation Dellinger, David Demilitarized Zone Democratic National Convention of 1968 Denton, Jeremiah Andrew, Jr. DePuy, William Eugene De Rhodes, Alexandre DEROS Desertion, U.S. and Communist DeSoto Missions Détente De Tham Devillers, Philippe Dewey, Albert Peter DEWEY CANYON I, Operation DEWEY CANYON II, Operation Dien Bien Phu, Battle of Dien Triet Lake, Battle of Dikes, Red River Delta Dinassauts Dith Pran
xiii
xiv
List of Entries
Dixie Station Doan Khue Dobrynin, Anatoly Fedorovich Do Cao Tri Doi Moi Domino Theory Do Muoi Don Dien Dong Ha, Battle of Dong Quan Pacification Project Dong Xoai, Battle of Donlon, Roger Hugh C. Donovan, William Joseph Dooley, Thomas Anthony, III Do Quang Thang DOUBLE EAGLE, Operation Doumer, Paul Drugs and Drug Use Dulles, Allen Welsh Dulles, John Foster Duong Quynh Hoa Duong Van Duc Duong Van Minh Dupuis, Jean Durbrow, Elbridge Dustoff Duy Tan Dylan, Bob EAGLE PULL, Operation
Easter Offensive Economy, U.S., and the Vietnam War Eden, Sir Robert Anthony Eisenhower, Dwight David Elections, National, Republic of Vietnam, 1955, 1967, 1971 Elections, U.S., 1964 Elections, U.S., 1968 Elections, U.S., 1972 Elections, U.S., 1976 Electronic Intelligence Ellsberg, Daniel EL PASO II, Operation Ély, Paul Henri Romuald Elysée Agreement Embargo, U.S. Trade Enclave Strategy ENHANCE, Operation ENHANCE PLUS, Operation ENTERPRISE, Operation Enthoven, Alain Enuol, Y Bham Ethnology of Southeast Asia
European Defense Community Ewell, Julian Johnson FAIRFAX, Operation
Fall, Bernard B. FARM GATE, Operation Faure, Edgar Federal Bureau of Investigation Fellowship of Reconciliation Felt, Harry Donald Fernandez, Richard Ferry, Jules Film and the Vietnam Experience Fire-Support Bases Fishel, Wesley Robert Fishhook Five O’Clock Follies FLAMING DART I and II, Operations Flexible Response Fonda, Jane Seymour Fontainebleau Conference Forces Armées Nationales Khmères Ford, Gerald Rudolph Forrestal, Michael Vincent Forrestal, USS, Flight Deck Fire Fortas, Abraham Fort Hood Three Forward Air Controllers Four-Party Joint Military Commission Fragging France, Air Force, 1946–1954 France, Army, 1946–1954 France, Navy, 1946–1954 France and Vietnam, 1954–Present FRANCIS MARION, Operation Franco-Thai War Fratricide FREEDOM PORCH BRAVO, Operation FREEDOM TRAIN, Operation Free Fire Zones Free World Assistance Program French Foreign Legion in Indochina French Indochina, 1860s–1946 FREQUENT WIND, Operation Front Unifié de Lutte des Races Opprimées Fulbright, James William Galbraith, John Kenneth Galloway, Joseph Lee GAME WARDEN, Operation Garnier, Marie Joseph François Garwood, Robert Russell
List of Entries Gavin, James Maurice Gayler, Noel Arthur Meredyth Gelb, Leslie Howard Geneva Accords of 1962 Geneva Conference and Geneva Accords of 1954 Geneva Convention of 1949 Genovese, Eugene Dominick Geography of Indochina and Vietnam Germany, Federal Republic of Ginsberg, Allen Godley, George McMurtrie Goldberg, Arthur Joseph Goldman, Eric Frederick Goldwater, Barry Morris Goodpaster, Andrew Jackson Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gracey, Douglas David Gravel, Maurice Robert Gravely, Samuel Lee, Jr. Great Society Program GREELEY, Operation Greene, Graham Greene, Wallace Martin Grenade Launchers Groupement Mobile 100, Destruction of Gruening, Ernest Henry Guam Guam Conference Guizot, François Gulf of Tonkin Incident Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
VOLUME II Habib, Philip Charles Hackworth, David Haskell Haig, Alexander Meigs, Jr. Hainan Island Haiphong Haiphong, Shelling of Halberstam, David Halperin, Morton H. Hamburger Hill, Battle of Hamlet Evaluation System Ham Nghi Hand Grenades Hanoi Hanoi, Battle of, and the First Tet Offensive Hanoi Hannah Harassment and Interdiction Fires Hardhats Harkins, Paul Donal Harriman, William Averell
Harris, David Hartke, Vance Rupert HARVEST MOON, Operation HASTINGS, Operation Hatfield, Mark Odom Hatfield-McGovern Amendment HAWTHORNE, Operation Hayden, Thomas Emmett Healy, Michael D. Heath, Donald Read Helicopters, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam Helicopters, Employment of, in Vietnam Helms, Richard McGarrah Henderson, Oran K. Heng Samrin Herbert, Anthony Herbicides Hersh, Seymour Myron Hershey, Lewis Blaine Herz, Alice Hickey, Gerald Cannon HICKORY–BELT TIGHT–BEAU CHARGER–LAM SON 54, Operation HICKORY II, Operation High National Council Hilsman, Roger Hilsman-Forrestal Report Hispanics in the U.S. Military Historiography, Vietnam War Hmongs Hoa Binh, Battle of Hoa Hao Hoa Lo Prison Hoang Duc Nha HOANG HOA THAM, Operation Hoang Van Hoan Hoang Van Thai Ho Chi Minh Ho Chi Minh Campaign Ho Chi Minh Trail Hochmuth, Bruno Arthur Hoffman, Abbie HOMECOMING, Operation Honolulu Conference Hooper, Joe Ronnie Hoopes, Townsend Hoover, John Edgar Hope, Leslie Townes HOP TAC, Operation Ho-Sainteny Agreement Hot Pursuit Policy Hourglass Spraying System Hue
xv
xvi
List of Entries
Hue, Battle of Hue and Da Nang, Fall of Hue Massacre Humanitarian Operation Program Humphrey, Hubert Horatio Hun Sen Huston Plan Huynh Phu So Huynh Tan Phat Huynh Van Cao Ia Drang, Battle of Imperial Presidency India Indochina War Indonesia International Commission for Supervision and Control International Rescue Committee International War Crimes Tribunal Iron Triangle IRVING, Operation Jackson State College Shootings JACKSTAY, Operation Jacobson, George D. James, Daniel, Jr. Japan Jaunissement Javits, Jacob Koppel JEFFERSON GLENN, Operation Jiang Jieshi Johnson, Harold Keith Johnson, Lyndon Baines Johnson, Lyndon Baines, Johns Hopkins University Speech Johnson, Ural Alexis Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office Jones, David Charles JUNCTION CITY, Operation K-9 Corps Kampuchean National Front Kattenburg, Paul Katzenbach, Nicholas deBelleville Kelly, Charles L. Kelly, Francis J. Kennan, George Frost Kennedy, Edward Moore Kennedy, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, Robert Francis Kent State University Shootings KENTUCKY, Operation Kep Airfield
Kerrey, Joseph Robert Kerry, John Forbes Kerwin, Walter T., Jr. Key West Agreement Khai Dinh Kham Duc Special Forces Camp, Fall of Khe Sanh, Battle of Khieu Samphan Khmer Kampuchea Krom Khmer Rouge Khmer Serai Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeyevich Kien An Airfield King, Martin Luther, Jr. KINGFISHER, Operation Kinnard, Harry William Osborn Kissinger, Henry Alfred Kit Carson Scouts Knowland, William Fife Koh Tang Komer, Robert W. Kong Le Kontum, Battle for Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Republic of Korean War Koster, Samuel William, Sr. Kosygin, Aleksei Nikolayevich Kovic, Ronald Kraft, Joseph Krulak, Victor H. Kunstler, William Moses Laird, Melvin Robert Lake, William Anthony Kirsop LAM SON 719, Operation Landing Zone Land Reform, Vietnam Lang Bac, Battle of Lang Son Lang Vei Special Forces Camp, Battle for Laniel, Joseph Lansdale, Edward Geary Lao Dong Party Laos Lattre de Tassigny, Jean de Lavelle, John Daniel LÉA, Operation Leclerc, Jacques-Philippe Le Duan Le Duc Anh Le Duc Tho
List of Entries Le Dynasty Lefèbvre, Dominique LE HONG PHONG II, Operation Le Kha Phieu Le Loi LeMay, Curtis Emerson Lemnitzer, Lyman Louis Le Myre de Vilers, Charles Marie Le Nguyen Khang Le Nguyen Vy Le Quang Tung Leroy, Catherine Le Thanh Nghi Le Thanh Tong Letourneau, Jean Le Trong Tan Le Van Hung Le Van Kim Le Van Vien Levy, Howard Brett LEXINGTON III, Operation Lifton, Robert Jay Lima Site 85 Lin, Maya Ying LINEBACKER I, Operation LINEBACKER II, Operation Lippmann, Walter Literature and the Vietnam War Loc Ninh, Military Operations near Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr. Logistics, Allied, Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and Viet Cong Long Binh Long Chieng Long-Range Electronic Navigation Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrols Lon Nol LORRAINE, Operation Lowenstein, Allard Kenneth Luce, Henry Robinson Lu Han Luong Ngoc Quyen Ly Bon Lynd, Staughton MacArthur, Douglas MACARTHUR, Operation Machine Guns, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam Madman Strategy Mailer, Norman Malaysia MALHEUR I and II, Operations Manila Conference
xvii
Mansfield, Michael Joseph Mao Zedong March on the Pentagon MARIGOLD, Operation Marine Combined Action Platoons MARKET TIME, Operation Marshall, Samuel Lyman Atwood Martin, Graham A. MASHER/WHITE WING, Operation MASSACHUSETTS STRIKER, Operation Mayaguez Incident May Day Tribe MAYFLOWER, Operation McCain, John Sidney, Jr. McCain, John Sidney, III McCarthy, Eugene Joseph McCloy, John Jay McCone, John Alex McConnell, John Paul McGarr, Lionel Charles McGee, Gale William McGovern, George Stanley McNamara, Robert Strange McNamara Line McNaughton, John Theodore McPherson, Harry Cummings Meaney, George Medevac Media and the Vietnam War Medicine, Military Medics and Corpsmen Medina, Ernest Lou Mekong Delta Mekong River Mekong River Project Mendenhall, Joseph Abraham Mendès-France, Pierre MENU, Operation Michigan State University Advisory Group Midway Island Conference Military Airlift Command Military Assistance and Advisory Group, Vietnam Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Military Decorations Military Regions Military Revolutionary Council Military Sealift Command Mine Warfare, Land Mine Warfare, Naval, Communist Forces and Allied Countermining Operations Minh Mang Mining and Mine Clearance in North Vietnam
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Mini–Tet Offensive Missing in Action, Allied Missing in Action and Prisoners of War, Communist Mitchell, John Newton Mobile Guerrilla Forces Mobile Riverine Force Mobile Strike Force Commands Moffat, Abbot Low Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich Momyer, William Wallace Montagnards Moore, Harold Gregory, Jr. Moore, Robert Brevard Moorer, Thomas Hinman Moratorium to End the War in Vietnam Mordant, Eugène Morrison, Norman Morse, Wayne Lyman Mortars, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam Mortuary Affairs Operations Moscow Meeting, Brezhnev and Nixon Moyers, Billy Don Mu Gia Pass Muller, Robert Munich Analogy Murphy, Robert Daniel Music and the Vietnam War Muste, Abraham Johannes My Lai Massacre Nam Dong, Battle of Nam Tien Nam Viet Napalm Napoleon III Na San, Battle of National Assembly Law 10/59 National Bank of Vietnam National Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam National Leadership Council National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia National Security Action Memorandum Number 328 Native Americans in the U.S. Military Naval Gunfire Support Navarre, Henri Eugène Navarre Plan Neutrality
NEVADA EAGLE, Operation
New Jersey, USS New Zealand Ngo Dinh Can Ngo Dinh Diem Ngo Dinh Diem, Overthrow of Ngo Dinh Khoi Ngo Dinh Luyen Ngo Dinh Nhu Ngo Dinh Nhu, Madame Ngo Dinh Thuc Ngo Quang Truong Ngo Quyen Nguyen Binh Nguyen Cao Ky Nguyen Chanh Thi Nguyen Chi Thanh Nguyen Co Thach Nguyen Duy Trinh Nguyen Dynasty Nguyen Hai Than Nguyen Ha Phan Nguyen Hue Nguyen Huu An Nguyen Huu Co Nguyen Huu Tho Nguyen Huu Tri Nguyen Khanh Nguyen Khoa Nam Nguyen Luong Bang Nguyen Manh Cam Nguyen Ngoc Loan Nguyen Ngoc Tho Nguyen Phuc Anh Nguyen Sinh Sac Nguyen Thai Hoc Nguyen Thi Binh Nguyen Thi Dinh Nguyen Thi Minh Khai Nguyen Tuong Tam Nguyen Van Binh Nguyen Van Cu Nguyen Van Hieu Nguyen Van Hinh Nguyen Van Linh Nguyen Van Thieu Nguyen Van Toan Nguyen Van Xuan Nguyen Viet Thanh NIAGARA, Operation Nitze, Paul Henry
List of Entries Nixon, Richard Milhous Nixon Doctrine Noel, Chris Nolting, Frederick Earnest, Jr. Nong Duc Manh Novosel, Michael, Sr. Nui Ba Den Nuon Chea Nurses, U.S. Oakland Army Base Oberg, Jean-Christophe O’Daniel, John Wilson Office of Strategic Services Olds, Robin Olongapo, Philippines Operation Plan 34A Order of Battle Dispute Oriskany, USS, Fire aboard Pacification Palme, Olof Palmer, Bruce, Jr. Paracel and Spratly Islands, South China Sea Paris Negotiations Paris Peace Accords Parrot’s Beak PASSAGE TO FREEDOM, Operation Pathet Lao Patti, Archimedes L. A. Patton, George Smith, IV PAUL REVERE I–IV, Operations Paul VI, Pope Pearson, Lester Bowles Peers, William R. Peers Inquiry PEGASUS–LAM SON 207A, Operation PENNSYLVANIA, Operation Pentagon Papers and Trial People’s Self-Defense Forces Perot, Henry Ross PERSHING, Operation Peterson, Douglas Brian Pham Cong Tac Pham Duy Pham Hung Pham Ngoc Thao Pham The Duyet Pham Van Dong Pham Van Phu Pham Xuan An
Phan Boi Chau Phan Chu Trinh Phan Dinh Phung Phan Huy Quat Phan Khac Suu Phan Quang Dan Phan Van Khai Philastre, Paul-Louis-Félix Philippines Phnom Penh Phoenix Program Phoumi Nosavan PIERCE ARROW, Operation Pigneau de Béhaine, Pierre Pignon, Léon PIRANHA, Operation PIRAZ Warships Pistols Plain of Jars Plain of Reeds Pleiku Podgorny, Nikolai Viktorovich Poland Polgar, Thomas Pol Pot POPEYE, Operation Porter, William James Port Huron Statement Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Potsdam Conference Poulo Condore Powell, Colin Luther PRAIRIE I, Operation PRAIRIE II–IV, Operations Precision-Guided Munitions Prisoners of War, Allied Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam Project Agile Project Delta Project Omega Project 100,000 Project Sigma Protective Reaction Strikes PROUD DEEP ALPHA, Operation Provincial Reconnaissance Units Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam Proxmire, Edward William Psychological Warfare Operations Public Opinion and the War, U.S. Pueblo Incident
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List of Entries
Puller, Lewis Burwell, Jr. Punji Stake
VOLUME III Quach Tom Quadrillage/Ratissage Quang Ngai Quang Tri, Battle of Qui Nhon Quoc Ngu Racial Violence within the U.S. Military Radford, Arthur William Radio Direction Finding RANCH HAND, Operation RAND Corporation Raven Forward Air Controllers Read, Benjamin Huger Reagan, Ronald Wilson Red River Delta Red River Fighter Pilots Association Reeducation Camps Refugees and Boat People Reinhardt, George Frederick Republican Youth Research and Development Field Units Reserve Officers’ Training Corps Revers Report Rheault, Robert B. Richardson, John Hammond Ridenhour, Ronald Ridgway, Matthew Bunker Rifles Rigault de Genouilly, Charles Ripcord Fire-Support Base, Battle for Risner, James Robinson River Assault Groups Riverine Craft Riverine Warfare Rivers, Lucius Mendel Road Watch Teams Robinson, Rembrandt Cecil Rockefeller, Nelson Aldrich Rockets and Rocket Launchers Rogers, William Pierce ROLLING THUNDER, Operation Romney, George Wilcken Roosevelt, Franklin Delano Rostow, Eugene Victor Rostow, Walt Whitman Route Coloniale 4, Battles for Route Packages
Rowe, James Nicholas Rubin, Jerry Rules of Engagement Rusk, David Dean Rusk-Thanat Agreement Russell, Richard Brevard, Jr. Russo, Anthony J., Jr. Sabattier, Gabriel Saigon Saigon Military Mission Sainteny, Jean Salan, Raoul Albin Louis Salisbury, Harrison Evans SAM HOUSTON, Operation San Antonio Formula Sanctuaries Sarraut, Albert Schlesinger, Arthur Meier, Jr. Schlesinger, James Rodney SCOTLAND, Operation Scruggs, Jan Craig Seabees SEA DRAGON, Operation Seale, Bobby SEALORDS SEAL Teams Seaman, Jonathan O. Sea Power, Role in War Search and Destroy Search-and-Rescue Operations Selective Service Sharp, Ulysses Simpson Grant, Jr. Sheehan, Cornelius Mahoney SHINING BRASS, Operation Shoup, David Monroe Sigma I and II Sihanouk, Norodom Sijan, Lance Peter Simons, Arthur David Sino-French War Sino-Soviet Split Sino-Vietnamese War Sisowath Sirik Matak SLAM Smith, Walter Bedell Snepp, Frank Warren, III SOMERSET PLAIN–LAM SON 246, Operation Song Be, Battle of Son Tay Raid Son Thang Incident Souphanouvong
List of Entries Southeast Asia Treaty Organization Souvanna Phouma Spellman, Francis Joseph Spock, Benjamin McLane Spring Mobilization to End the War in Vietnam Staley, Eugene STARLITE, Operation Starry, Donn Albert STEEL TIGER, Operation Stennis, John Cornelius Stevenson, Adlai Ewing, II Stilwell, Richard Giles Stockdale, James Bond Stockdale, Sybil Bailey Strategic Air Command Strategic Hamlet Program Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee Students for a Democratic Society Studies and Observation Group Submachine Guns Sullivan, William Healy Summers, Harry G., Jr. SUNFLOWER, Operation SUNRISE, Operation Surface-to-Air Missiles, Democratic Republic of Vietnam Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape Training Swift Boats Swift Boat Veterans for Truth SWITCHBACK, Operation Tache D’Huile Tactical Air Command Tallman, Richard Joseph Tanks, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam Tan Son Nhut Taoism Tarr, Curtis W. Task Force 116 Task Force Oregon Taylor, Maxwell Davenport Taylor-McNamara Report Taylor-Rostow Mission Tay Ninh Tay Son Rebellion Teach-Ins and Sit-Ins Television and the Vietnam War Territorial Forces Tet Offensive, Overall Strategy Tet Offensive and the Saigon Circle TEXAS, Operation TEXAS STAR, Operation Thailand
Thanh Hoa Bridge Thanh Thai Thich Quang Duc Thich Tri Quang Thieu Tri Thomas, Allison Kent Thomas, Norman Mattoon Thompson, Hugh, Jr. Thompson, Sir Robert Grainger Ker Thud Ridge THUNDERHEAD, Operation Tianjin, Treaty of Tiger Cages TIGER HOUND, Operation Tinker v. Des Moines TOAN THANG, Operation To Huu Ton Duc Thang Tonkin Ton That Dinh Ton That Thuyet Top Gun School Torture Tran Buu Kiem Tran Do Tran Dynasty Tran Hung Dao Tran Kim Tuyen Transportation Group 559 Tran Thien Khiem Tran Van Chuong Tran Van Do Tran Van Don Tran Van Giau Tran Van Hai Tran Van Huong Tran Van Lam Tran Van Tra Trieu Au Trieu Da Trinh Lords Truman, Harry S. Trung Trac and Trung Nhi Truong Chinh Truong Dinh Dzu Truong Nhu Tang Truong Son Corridor Truong Son Mountains Tsuchihashi Yuitsu Tu Duc Tuesday Lunch Group Tunnel Rats
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Tunnels Tu Ve Tuyen Quang, Siege of Twining, Nathan Farragut U Minh Forest Uniforms Union of Soviet Socialist Republics UNION I and II, Operations UNIONTOWN, Operation United Front United Kingdom and the Indochina and Vietnam Wars United Nations and the Vietnam War United Services Organization United States, Involvement in Indochina through 1954 United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1954–1965 United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1965–1968 United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1969–1973 United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1973–1975 United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1975–Present United States, Nongovernmental Organizations, 1954–Present United States Agency for International Development United States Air Force United States Army United States Army, Vietnam, Installation Stockade United States Army Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii United States Army Special Services United States Coast Guard United States Congress and the Vietnam War United States Department of Justice United States Department of State and Formation of U.S. Policy toward Vietnam United States Information Agency United States Joint Chiefs of Staff United States Marine Corps United States Merchant Marine United States Navy United States Reserve Components United States Reserve Components, Decision Not to Mobilize United States Special Forces United States Veterans Administration United States v. O’Brien United States v. Seeger University of Wisconsin Bombing Ut, Nick UTAH, Operation U Thant Valluy, Jean-Étienne VAN BUREN, Operation Van Cao Vance, Cyrus Roberts
Van Es, Hubert Vang Pao Van Lang Vann, John Paul Van Tien Dung Versace, Humbert Rocque Vessey, John William, Jr. Vientiane Agreement Vientiane Protocol Viet Cong Infrastructure Viet Minh Vietnam, Climate of Vietnam, Climate and Terrain, Impact of on the Vietnam War Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, 1945–1954 Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, 1954–1975 Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, Air Force Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, Army Vietnam, History of, Prehistory to 938 CE Vietnam, History of, 938 CE through the French Conquest Vietnam, Republic of, 1954–1975 Vietnam, Republic of, Air Force Vietnam, Republic of, Army Vietnam, Republic of, Commandos Vietnam, Republic of, Da Lat Military Academy Vietnam, Republic of, Joint General Staff Vietnam, Republic of, Marine Corps Vietnam, Republic of, National Police Vietnam, Republic of, Navy Vietnam, Republic of, Revolutionary Development Cadre Training Center Vietnam, Republic of, Special Forces Vietnam, Socialist Republic of, 1975–Present Vietnamese Communist Party Vietnamese Culture Vietnamese National Army Vietnam Information Group Vietnamization Vietnam Magazine Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang Vietnam Syndrome Viet Nam Thanh Nien Cach Mang Dong Chi Hoi Vietnam Veterans Against the War Vietnam Veterans Memorial Vietnam Veterans of America Vietnam War Frauds, Fakes, and Wannabes Vinh Vo Chi Cong Vogt, John W., Jr. Voices in Vital America Vo Nguyen Giap Vo Tran Chi Vo Van Ba
List of Entries Vo Van Kiet Vu Hong Khanh VULTURE, Operation Vu Ngoc Nha–Huynh Van Trong Spy Case Vung Tau Vu Oanh Vu Quoc Thuc Vu Van Giai Wage and Price Controls Waldron, Adelbert F., III Wallace, George Corley, Jr. Walt, Lewis William Ware, Keith Lincoln Warnke, Paul Culliton War Powers Act War Resisters League Warships, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam Wars of National Liberation War Zone C and War Zone D WASHINGTON GREEN, Operation Washington Special Actions Group Watergate Scandal Weathermen Webb, James Henry, Jr. Wei Guoqing Weiss, Cora Welsh v. United States
Westmoreland, William Childs Weyand, Frederick Carlton Wheeler, Earle Gilmore WHEELER/WALLOWA, Operation White Star Mobile Training Teams Wild Weasels Williams, Samuel Tankersley Wilson, James Harold Wilson, Thomas Woodrow Wise Men Women in the Vietnam War, U.S. Women in the Vietnam War, Vietnamese Women Strike for Peace Woodstock Xa Loi Pagoda Raid Xuan Loc, Battle of Xuan Thuy Yankee Station YANKEE TEAM, Operation YELLOWSTONE, Operation Yen Bai Mutiny Youth International Party Zhou Enlai Zorthian, Barry Zumwalt, Elmo Russell, Jr.
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List of Maps
General Maps Map Key: xxix French Indochina, 1954: xxx Provinces of North Vietnam: xxxi Provinces of South Vietnam: xxxii Cease-Fire Areas of Control, January 1973: xxxiii Collapse of South Vietnam, March–April 1975: xxxiv
Demilitarized Zone: 279 Ethnology of Vietnam: 353 Expansion of Imperial Vietnam: 1256 French Conquest of Indochina, 1858–1893: 399 French Reoccupation of Indochina, September 1945–August 1946: 397 Indochina War: Situation in 1953: 1236 Indochina War in Northern Vietnam, 1946–1954: 534 Infiltration Routes: 504 Operation CEDAR FALLS, January 8–26, 1967: 181 Operation LAM SON 719, February 8–March 24, 1971: 618 Operation ROLLING THUNDER: Bombing Restrictions: 123 Operation ROLLING THUNDER, March 2, 1965–October 31, 1968: 992 Siege of Khe Sanh, January–April 1968: 581 South Vietnam: 752 Tet Offensive: Battle for Saigon, January–February 1968: 1106 III Corps Tactical Zone in South Vietnam: 241 Vietnamese Invasion of Cambodia and Sino-Vietnamese War, 1978–1979: 1047
Entry Maps Air War in Southeast Asia: 33 Ambush at LZ Albany, November 17, 1965: 620 Battle of Dak To, November 1967: 255 Battle of Dien Bien Phu, March 13–May 7, 1954: 295 Battle of Hamburger Hill, May 11–20, 1969: 448 Battle of Hue, January 31–February 25, 1968: 518 Battle of the Ia Drang Valley, October 19–November 26, 1965: 529 Cambodian Incursion, April 29–July 22, 1970: 159 Corps Tactical Zones in South Vietnam: 1189
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General Maps
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Map Key X
Generic Troops
Brigade III
Cavalry
Regiment II
Forces/Troops/Infantry
Battalion I
Armored
Company
Armored Cavalry
Fortification/Redoubts
Mechanized
Fort/Station/Military Base
Air Assault
Battery/Artillery
International Boundary
Palisade
Major Roads
City
Minefields/Landmines
State Capital
Battle Site
Capital (of country)
Railroad
Bridge/Pass
Army Group
Hills
Army
Military Camp
Corps
Swamp
Division
Surrender
XXXXX
XXXX
XXX
XX
xxix
xxx
General Maps
General Maps
xxxi
xxxii
General Maps
General Maps
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General Maps
H Habib, Philip Charles Birth Date: February 25, 1920 Death Date: May 26, 1992 Career diplomat and U.S. minister-counselor at the Saigon embassy in 1965–1966, subsequently the highest-ranking State Department official specializing in Vietnamese affairs. Philip Charles Habib was born on February 25, 1920, in Brooklyn, New York, to a Lebanese Maronite Christian family. He attended the University of Toledo for a time and received a BA degree in forestry at the University of Idaho in 1942. After serving with the U.S. Army in World War II, he earned a doctorate in agricultural economics at the University of California, Berkeley, in 1952. In 1949 Habib joined the U.S. Foreign Service, where he enjoyed a long career, with service that included numerous posts at the State Department in Washington, D.C., and in the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea). In 1965 he went to Saigon to serve as chief political adviser to Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge. Habib returned to Saigon to participate in talks with officials of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) following President Nguyen Van Thieu’s 1967 election. As deputy assistant secretary of state, Habib accompanied General Earle Wheeler on a fact-finding mission to Saigon following the 1968 Tet Offensive. On March 25, 1968, Habib shocked the so-called Wise Men, President Lyndon Johnson’s senior policy advisers, with the pessimistic assessment that it would take 5 to 10 years to make any substantial progress in Vietnam. This led to President Johnson’s famous remark that “somebody poisoned the well” and ultimately to a significant change in U.S. policy on the war.
Habib was a member of the U.S. delegation to the Paris peace talks, and in November 1969 President Richard Nixon appointed him to head that delegation. In 1974 Habib was appointed assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs and went to Saigon to determine the need for a $300 million supplemental aid package. During the first few months of 1975 Habib worked to obtain military and economic aid for Cambodia. From 1976–1978 during the Jimmy Carter administration Habib was undersecretary of state for political affairs. He retired in 1978 because of a heart attack. In 1981, however, President Ronald Reagan tapped Habib to serve as U.S. special envoy to the Middle East. He was given the unenviable task of brokering a peace agreement in war-torn Lebanon. After grueling negotiations and frantic shuttle diplomacy, Habib successfully arranged a cease-fire and resolved the crisis over control of West Beirut. The peace was soon broken, but Habib received the Presidential Medal of Freedom for his efforts in 1982. In 1986 the Reagan administration again appointed Habib a special envoy, this time to Central America, where he was to mediate the ongoing conflict in Nicaragua. After just five months on the job, however, Habib resigned, apparently because he viewed U.S. objectives in the region as impediments to peace. Habib died while vacationing in Puligny-Montrachet, France, on May 26, 1992. CLAUDE R. SASSO See also Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Paris Peace Accords; Wheeler, Earle Gilmore; Wise Men References Boykin, John. Cursed Is the Peacemaker: The American Diplomat versus the Israeli General, Beirut 1982. Belmont, CA: Applegate, 2002.
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U.S. diplomat Philip C. Habib was chief negotiator for his country at the Paris peace talks to end the Vietnam War. He is shown here in 1970. (AP/Wide World Photos)
Bui Diem. In The Jaws of History. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997.
Hackworth, David Haskell Birth Date: November 11, 1930 Death Date: May 4, 2005 Much-decorated soldier and strong critic of the war in Vietnam; later a defense commentator and journalist. David Haskell Hackworth was born on November 11, 1930, in Santa Monica, California. His family was of modest means, and in 1945 Hackworth enlisted in the U.S. Army at age 15 by falsifying his age. In October 1950 he went to Korea, where he served briefly with the 8th Rangers commanded by Captain John Paul Vann. In May 1951
Hackworth received a battlefield commission. In 1952 he returned to the United States after having been wounded four times. Later he served a second tour in Korea. In Hackworth’s early service, noncommissioned officer (NCO) veterans of World War II and the Korean War taught him the importance of hard training, discipline, unit cohesiveness, and confidence in being able to accomplish a mission. They instilled in him the necessity of being concerned for the welfare of the men and the need for commanders to personally lead and train. After two years as a civilian, Hackworth rejoined the army in December 1955 as a captain. In the early 1960s he was an infantry company commander in Germany, where he became known for training his men under battlefield conditions. He also became an outspoken opponent of the M-16 rifle, the early models of which were susceptible to jamming. In January 1965 Hackworth was assigned to the 101st Airborne Division. Sent to the Infantry Officer Advanced Course, he studied
Haig, Alexander Meigs, Jr. counterinsurgency doctrine. Discussions with Special Forces officers who had served in Vietnam led him to become highly critical of army tactics that, in his view, failed to address basic issues of how to fight and win a guerrilla war. In July 1965 Hackworth, now a major, arrived in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) with the 101st Airborne Division. During his one-year tour he served as brigade operations officer and battalion executive officer. Upon his return to the United States he was assigned to the Pentagon, but he spent much of that assignment accompanying Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall on a research trip to Vietnam. Hackworth then served as commander of a training battalion at Fort Lewis, Washington. This tour convinced him of the ineffectiveness of training being given to soldiers sent to Vietnam. In 1969 Hackworth returned to Vietnam, this time as a lieutenant colonel, and served as an infantry battalion commander. He also served successively as adviser to the operations officer of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) II Corps, to the ARVN Airborne Division, and to the Vietnamese commander of the 44th Special Tactical Zone. Hackworth was wounded four more times. His assignments further strengthened his disenchantment with the U.S. military effort, particularly its emphasis on body count, overly optimistic reports, and the awards system. He was also highly critical of many ARVN officers and the ARVN as a whole. Hackworth departed Vietnam in June 1971, having been promoted to full colonel. Hackworth’s disenchantment erupted in an interview aired on June 27, 1971, on the ABC news program Issues and Answers. This broadcast led to an investigation of his conduct in Vietnam, which Secretary of the Army Robert F. Frohlke eventually directed be dropped. Colonel Hackworth retired from the U.S. Army in September 1971 and subsequently became a frequent commentator on military affairs. Beginning in the mid-1980s, he served as a contributing editor for defense and military issues for Newsweek magazine. He also wrote a syndicated column for newspapers titled “Defending America,” which ran until his death in 2005. Hackworth’s criticisms of the U.S. Army in the Vietnam War, shared by many of his contemporaries, helped bring about substantial military reform. Hackworth lived in Australia for many years, where he made substantial sums of money in real estate, farming, and the restaurant business. When he contracted bladder cancer, many of his friends and supporters alleged that the illness was precipitated by chemical defoliants used in Vietnam. Hackworth died of cancer in Tijuana, Mexico, on May 4, 2005. RICHARD L. KIPER See also Body Count; HAWTHORNE, Operation; Marshall, Samuel Lyman Atwood; Rifles; United States Special Forces; Vann, John Paul References Hackworth, David H., and Eihys England. Steel My Soldiers’ Hearts. New York: Touchstone, 2003.
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Hackworth, Colonel David H., and Julie Sherman. About Face: The Odyssey of an American Warrior. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989. Marshall, S. L. A., and David Hackworth. The Vietnam Primer. Greenwich, CT: Twin Eagles Ink, 2003.
Hai Ba Trung See Trung Trac and Trung Nhi
Haig, Alexander Meigs, Jr. Birth Date: December 2, 1924 Death Date: February 20, 2010 U.S. Army general, deputy assistant to the president for national security affairs (1970–1972), vice chief of staff of the U.S. Army (1972–1973), White House chief of staff (1973–1974), supreme allied commander of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces (1974–1979), and U.S. secretary of state (1981–1982). Born on December 2, 1924, in Bala-Cynwyd, Pennsylvania, Alexander
U.S. Army general Alexander Haig as a lieutenant colonel commanded a battalion in Vietnam. He went on to serve in the administrations of Republican presidents Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Ronald Reagan. He was U.S. secretary of state during 1981–1982. (Department of Defense)
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Hainan Island
Meigs Haig Jr. graduated from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, in 1947. After World War II he served on General Douglas MacArthur’s personal staff in Japan and saw combat duty in the Korean War. Haig studied at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, during 1955–1956 and was logistics staff officer at U.S. Army headquarters in Europe during 1958–1959. He received a master’s degree in international relations from Georgetown University in 1961 and was assigned to the Pentagon. He served as deputy special assistant to the secretary and deputy secretary of defense during 1964–1965. Haig had the reputation of being a diligent administrator, well schooled in both politics and diplomacy. From 1965 to 1967 Haig served in Vietnam with the 1st Infantry Division. As commander of a battalion of the 26th Infantry Regiment, he led a surprise clearing operation against the Communistcontrolled village of Ben Suc; this operation became the subject of a best-selling book by journalist Jonathan Schell titled The Village of Ben Suc. Haig also won acclaim for his performance in commanding his battalion during a desperate but ultimately successful defense of a landing zone near the Cambodian border against a massive attack by Communist forces on April 1, 1967. After his Vietnam War service he was stationed at West Point, where he became deputy commandant of cadets in 1968. When Henry Kissinger reorganized the foreign affairs staff for newly elected president Richard M. Nixon in late 1968, Kissinger sought a capable military adviser with real experience in Vietnam and chose Haig. Colonel Haig became military assistant to the assistant to the president for national security affairs. Although the position was not well defined at first, his work included organizing Kissinger’s staff for the National Security Council, acting as liaison between the Pentagon and the State Department, screening intelligence information, preparing security reports for the president, and running the National Security Council when Kissinger was absent. Haig was promoted to brigadier general in October 1969. In early 1970 Haig went to Vietnam to make a personal assessment of the situation for Nixon and Kissinger and continued these visits every few months. In June 1970 Haig became deputy assistant to the president for national security affairs and thus gained direct access to President Nixon. Haig reportedly had a major role in planning and executing the secret bombing of Cambodia. In early 1972 he headed the advance party to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) that cleared the way for Nixon’s historic February 1972 visit. Haig was promoted to major general in March 1972. In September 1972 Nixon promoted Haig from two-star to four-star rank and to the post of U.S. Army vice chief of staff, bypassing 240 higher-ranking generals with greater seniority and prompting much criticism (Haig had been a lieutenant colonel as late as 1967). Some of these critics believed that Haig was simply a yes-man for the president and had been rewarded for this. In his new position, Haig continued to work with Kissinger on the secret peace negotiations concerning Vietnam and accompanied Kissinger on secret trips to Saigon and Paris. In 1973 Haig retired
from the army to become White House chief of staff for President Nixon. After Nixon’s August 1974 resignation, Haig engineered a smooth transition for President Gerald R. Ford. In 1974 Haig resumed his military career when President Ford named him supreme commander of NATO operations in Europe, a post that Haig held until his second retirement from the army in 1979. During the 1980 presidential election, Haig was a foreign policy and military adviser to Republican candidate Ronald Reagan. After Reagan won the election, Haig served as his first secretary of state (1981–1982). Haig advocated a tough stance against the Soviet Union and supported proposals to help Afghan rebels fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. In March 1981 when President Reagan was shot and seriously wounded, Haig appeared on national television in the chaos that followed, erroneously claiming that he was “in control” pending the return of the vice president. Haig’s performance angered many, including those within the Reagan administration. In 1982 Haig engaged in a spate of shuttle diplomacy, ostensibly designed to head off war between Great Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands. He appeared more supportive of the British, however, and his mismanagement of the crisis led to his resignation on June 25, 1982. Haig ran unsuccessfully for the 1988 Republican Party presidential nomination. He then formed his own consulting business. Haig died on February 20, 2010, at Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore, Maryland. LAURA MATYSEK WOOD See also CEDAR FALLS, Operation; Ford, Gerald Rudolph; JUNCTION CITY, Operation;
Kissinger, Henry Alfred; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Watergate Scandal References Haig, Alexander. Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy. New York: Macmillan, 1984. Haig, Alexander. Inner Circles: How America Changed the World; A Memoir. New York: Warner Books, 1992. MacGarrigle, George L. Combat Operations: Taking the Offensive, October 1966 to October 1967. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1998. Morris, Roger. Haig. New York: Playboy, 1982. Schell, Jonathan. The Village of Ben Suc. New York: Knopf, 1967.
Hainan Island Large tropical island that forms the southernmost uncontested part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Located approximately 30 miles south of Guangdong Province’s Leizhou Peninsula, across the Qiongzhou (Hainan) Strait, Hainan was a part of that province until 1988. It now constitutes a separate province, with its capital at the port city of Haikou on the northern coast. The island is 160 miles long and some 90 miles wide, with mountains in its southern and central zones and foothills and plains in the north and east. Lying in the South China Sea, Hainan
Haiphong is bounded on the west by the Gulf of Tonkin. Because of Hainan’s proximity to northern Vietnam, the island has been a frontline location for China’s involvement with Vietnam. Japanese military forces occupied Hainan in 1939 and intensified the extraction of minerals and lumber while also building a light railway and several airfields. The latter were used, along with airfields in Indochina, as bases for the December 1941–April 1942 attacks across Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. Hainan came under Nationalist Chinese control at the end of World War II, but a strong underground Chinese Communist movement, active since the late 1920s, established and maintained base areas in the mountainous south of the island. In these areas Communist-led militia troops organized and trained, and in early 1950 they assisted in preparations for an amphibious invasion of Hainan by the Fourth Field Army of the Chinese Communist People’s Liberation Army (PLA, Chinese Army). More than 100,000 PLA troops were deployed to the Leizhou Peninsula for the campaign, which resulted in a collapse of the Nationalists’ coastal defense positions during April–May 1950. Almost immediately the victorious Chinese Communists established maritime links from Hainan’s ports to locations in northern Vietnam controlled by the Vietnamese Communist–led Viet Minh. A military supply chain between Hainan and various drop points on the Tonkin coast soon emerged. While overland supply sources remained the most vital to Viet Minh operations against the French in northern Vietnam, the overseas route from Hainan provided locally significant military assistance. Throughout the period of direct American military involvement in the Vietnam War, there were risks that American and Chinese forces would come into direct conflict, thus igniting a wider SinoAmerican war. Both the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the United States actively sought to avoid such a possibility, but for each the air war over northern Vietnam and the Gulf of Tonkin presented serious problems of restraint and policy planning for untoward conflict contingencies. With U.S. land- and carrier-based aircraft flying both bombing and air defense missions near Chinese territory, including Hainan, the risks of infringement of Chinese airspace were substantial. After August 15, 1964, U.S. forces were authorized to conduct hot-pursuit air operations against attacking ships and aircraft of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). This further heightened the potential for direct U.S.-Chinese military conflict, including China’s airspace near and over Hainan. In midApril 1965, for example, North Vietnamese Soviet-supplied MiG fighter aircraft engaged U.S. jets in aerial warfare. To evade them, U.S. aircraft reportedly flew into Chinese airspace over Hainan, whereupon the Chinese Communists scrambled their own MiG fighters, which may even have shot at and damaged American aircraft. Such episodes were rare but remained a daily possibility as long as U.S. aircraft continued their missions over North Vietnam. Hainan also remained important as a transshipment point in nonmilitary trade between North Vietnam and China during
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the Vietnam War era. Trading vessels regularly plied the Gulf of Tonkin between Haikou and Haiphong carrying food, iron ore, steel, farming equipment, fertilizer, and coal. America’s military terms of engagement forbade attacks on civilian shipping, even that of Communist origin. Consequently, bilateral trade between North Vietnam and Hainan’s ports, along with those on the southern coast of the Chinese mainland, remained off limits to American military operations. LAURA M. CALKINS See also Airborne Operations; China, People’s Republic of; China, People’s Republic of, Policy toward Vietnam References Hatcher, Patrick Lloyd. The Suicide of an Elite: American Internationalists and Vietnam. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990. Lawrence, Mark Atwood, and Fredrik Logevall, eds. The First Vietnam War: Colonial Conflict and Cold War Crisis. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007.
Haiphong Principal port and a significant industrial center for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV). Situated along the Cua Cam River on the northeastern edge of the Red River Delta 30 miles inland from the Gulf of Tonkin, Haiphong is about 60 miles east of Hanoi. The city was founded in the 1st century CE but became a major seaport only in the past several hundred years. Following the establishment of French control in Tonkin in the late 19th century, Haiphong became the major French naval base in Indochina. The city was also the southeastern terminus of an important rail line linking northern Vietnam with southwestern China. Following World War II the French reasserted their authority over Indochina, despite a declaration of independence by the Viet Minh political front led by Ho Chi Minh. Following the Ho-Sainteny Agreement of March 1946 and the return of French troops to northern Vietnam, a dispute over control of customs in Haiphong led to the outbreak of violence and the November 1946 French shelling of the Vietnamese section of Haiphong that helped spark the Indochina War. Haiphong remained in French hands throughout the Indochina War. The French made extensive use of Cat Bi Airfield there. Following the 1954 Geneva Accords, Soviet and Chinese economic aid improved Haiphong’s port facilities. The Soviets sent most of their aid to North Vietnam by sea through the port instead of shipping it across China by rail. Although the Lyndon Johnson administration sought to avoid air attacks on Haiphong during Operation ROLLING THUNDER, the city was struck by U.S. bombing during Operation LINEBACKER I and especially Operation LINEBACKER II (also known as the Christmas Bombings) of December 1972, when oil-storage
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and rail yards were hard hit. The port was also mined in May in Operation POCKET MONEY and again in December. Following the cease-fire agreement in January 1973, the U.S. Navy assisted in clearing mines from Haiphong Harbor during Operation END SWEEP to reopen the port. Following the Vietnam War, the SRV built up Haiphong as an industrial center. The city remains an important port and industrial hub and has a current population of about 600,000; the population of the greater Haiphong area is close to 1.5 million. Haiphong is today Vietnam’s third-largest city. JEFFREY D. BASS See also Haiphong, Shelling of; Indochina War; LINEBACKER I, Operation; LINEBACKER II, Operation; Mining and Mine Clearance in North Vietnam; Moorer, Thomas Hinman; Nixon, Richard Milhous; ROLLING THUNDER, Operation References Fall, Bernard B. Street without Joy: The French Debacle in Indochina. Rev. ed. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1994. Grant, Zalin. Over the Beach: The Air War in Vietnam. New York: Norton, 1986. Sherwood, John Darrell. Afterburner: Naval Aviators and the Vietnam War. New York: New York University Press, 2004.
Haiphong, Shelling of Event Date: November 23, 1946 The bombardment of the Vietnamese port city of Haiphong by French naval vessels on November 23, 1946, helped touch off the long Indochina War. In November 1946 a French War Crimes Commission was sent to Lang Son to investigate a mass grave where a number of French troops killed by the Japanese during World War II had been buried. On November 20 an armed clash occurred between French troops escorting the commission and Vietnamese. The French lost six men killed, and each side accused the other of responsibility. This was soon overshadowed by another more ominous event. The French Navy had virtually blockaded northern Vietnam’s principal port of Haiphong, and on November 20 a French patrol vessel seized a Chinese junk attempting to run contraband into the port. Vietnamese soldiers on the shore fired on the French ship, and shooting broke out in the city itself. A subsequent meeting between French and Vietnamese officials resulted in a French promise to respect Vietnamese sovereignty, and both sides agreed to separate their troops within Haiphong. By the afternoon of November 22, the fighting had ended. At the time, French high commissioner Georges Thierry d’Argenlieu was in Paris reporting to the French government. D’Argenlieu proposed using the Haiphong clash to teach the Vietnamese a lesson, and this suggestion was approved. “Even going so far as the use of cannon?” he asked. “Even that,” Premier Georges
Bidault replied, although Bidault probably did not realize that there was a likelihood of immediate action. D’Argenlieu then cabled General Étienne Valluy, his deputy in Saigon, who ordered General Louis Constant Morlière, commander in northern Vietnam, to use force against the Vietnamese. Morlière pointed out that the situation in Haiphong had been stabilized and that any imprudent act might lead to general hostilities. Not satisfied with this reply, Valluy telegraphed directly to Colonel Pierre-Louis Dèbes, commander of French troops at Haiphong: It appears that we are up against premeditated aggressions carefully staged by the Vietnamese regular army, which no longer seems to obey its government’s orders. Under these circumstances, your commendable attempts at conciliation and division of quarters, as well as the inquiry I asked you to make, are out of season. The moment has come to give a severe lesson to those who have treacherously attacked you. Use all the means at your disposal to make yourself complete master of Haiphong and so bring the Vietnamese army around to a better understanding of the situation. Dèbes delivered an ultimatum to the Vietnamese at Haiphong on November 23, ordering them to withdraw from the French section of the city, the Chinese quarter, and the port. He gave them only two hours in which to reply. When that time was up, the French subjected the Vietnamese positions to air, land, and sea bombardment. The bulk of firepower came from the French Navy cruiser Suffren. Commissioned in 1927, its armament consisted of eight 8-inch, eight 3-inch, eight 40-millimeter (mm) antiaircraft (AA), 20 20-mm AA, and 12 13-mm AA guns. The Vietnamese quarter was largely destroyed in the shelling. Estimates of the number killed vary widely. French admiral Robert Marie Joseph Battet later told French sociologist Paul Mus that no more than 6,000 Vietnamese had died; total casualties may have been some 20,000. However, in 1981 Vu Quoc Uy, then chairman of the Haiphong municipal committee, told author Stanley Karnow that the figure was only 500 to 1,000 dead. Although fighting in Haiphong halted on November 28, FrancoVietnamese relations steadily deteriorated after the November 23 incident. Whatever confidence remained on both sides had been shattered. On December 19 the fear and mistrust, fueled by bloodshed and broken promises, erupted into all-out war. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Bidault, Georges; D’Argenlieu, Georges Thierry; Dèbes, Pierre-Louis; French Indochina, 1860s–1946; Indochina War; Valluy, Jean-Étienne References Fall, Bernard B. The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis. 2nd rev. ed. New York: Praeger, 1967. Hammer, Ellen J. The Struggle for Indochina. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1954. Jane’s Fighting Ships of World War II. 1946; reprint, London: Bracken Books, 1969.
Halberstam, David Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997.
Halberstam, David Birth Date: April 10, 1934 Death Date: April 23, 2007 Pulitzer Prize–winning journalist and author. Born in New York City on April 10, 1934, David Halberstam graduated from Harvard University in 1955 and began a career in journalism, covering the early Civil Rights Movement in the American South. Hired by the
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New York Times in 1960, the next year he reported on the bloody civil war in the Congo. In September 1962 the New York Times dispatched Halberstam to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), where his honest, if impressionistic, reporting was criticized by those who wanted only to portray the military situation in positive terms. In January 1963 Halberstam reported that the Battle of Ap Bac had been a shattering defeat for the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army). Although several journalists covered this unexpected debacle, Halberstam’s focus on the loss of American helicopters and his open defiance of General Paul Harkins, then head of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), earned Halberstam the distrust of high-ranking military officials.
Journalist David Halberstam, the New York Times correspondent who was awarded the 1964 Pulitzer Prize for his reporting of the Vietnam War, shown at his desk in New York in 1964. (AP/Wide World Photos)
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In the summer of 1963 Halberstam also covered with unflinching honesty the disintegrating political situation in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). For reporting on the Buddhist dissent against the government, he became hated by President Ngo Dinh Diem and his family, and Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu said publicly that Halberstam ought to be “barbecued.” His reporting of extensive mass arrests contradicted official Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and embassy accounts and thus created a difficult situation for his New York editors, who at the time supported the U.S. war effort. Using the excuse that Halberstam’s reporting was too subjective, President John F. Kennedy asked for his reassignment from Vietnam. Although the New York Times did not honor this request, Halberstam returned to New York in early 1964. For his powerful New Journalism style of reportage, Halberstam shared a 1964 Pulitzer Prize. Disturbed by the deteriorating situation in Vietnam, a country he had come to love, Halberstam continued to write on the subject. The Making of a Quagmire (1965) is an astute early examination of the war and reflects Halberstam’s desire to win a war that he feared was unwinnable. One Very Hot Day (1968) is a novel depicting problems with the ARVN that he had first exposed in writing about Ap Bac. Ho (1971) is a short personalized biography of the charismatic leader Ho Chi Minh. The Best and the Brightest (1972) is Halberstam’s best-known book. It is a lengthy biographical and psychological examination of those in the Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson administrations whose search for power had led America into Southeast Asia. This very popular work won the 1973 National Book Award. Halberstam wrote narratives about other subjects central to American life, such as the power of television (The Powers That Be [1979]) and amateur and professional sports (October 1964 [1994]). Halberstam died in a car accident in Menlo Park, California, on April 23, 2007. His book on the Korean War titled The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War was published a few months after his death. CHARLES J. GASPAR See also Ap Bac, Battle of; Buddhism in Vietnam; Cronkite, Walter Leland; Fall, Bernard B.; Harkins, Paul Donal; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Literature and the Vietnam War; Ngo Dinh Diem; Ngo Dinh Nhu, Madame; Salisbury, Harrison Evans; Sheehan, Cornelius Mahoney References “Halberstam, David.” In World Authors: 1970–1975, edited by John Wakeman, 336–339. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1980. Misra, Kalidas. “Print-Journalism and Vietnam: Shifting Perspectives.” Indian Journal of American Studies 15(2) (1985): 105–111. Prochnau, William. Once upon a Distant War: David Halberstam, Neil Sheehan, Peter Arnett—Young War Correspondents and Their Early Vietnam Battles. New York: Vintage Books, 1995. Straub, Deborah A. “Halberstam, David.” In Contemporary Authors, Vol. 10, edited by Ann Evory and Linda Metzger, 215–218. New Revision Series. Detroit: Gale Research, 1983.
Halperin, Morton H. Birth Date: June 13, 1938 Foreign policy and civil liberties expert, academic, deputy assistant secretary of defense during 1966–1969, senior staff member for planning in the National Security Council (NSC) during 1969, special assistant to the president during 1994–1996, and director of the U.S. State Department’s Policy Planning Staff during 1998– 2001. Born on June 13, 1938, in Brooklyn, New York, Morton H. Halperin earned an undergraduate degree from Columbia University in 1958 and a PhD in political science from Yale University in 1961. A protégé of Henry Kissinger at Harvard, where Kissinger taught in the early 1960s, Halperin specialized in arms control and published several books on the subject during those years. He initially supported U.S. involvement in Vietnam and in December 1965 was one of 190 American academics who signed a petition supporting President Lyndon B. Johnson’s conduct of the war. In 1966 Halperin became deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, responsible for political-military planning and arms control. In January 1969 Halperin followed his former mentor Kissinger to the NSC and became senior staff member for planning. In this capacity Halperin’s knowledge of bureaucratic theory enabled him to devise strategies whereby Kissinger essentially seized control of foreign policy from the Department of State. Other members of President Richard M. Nixon’s administration, however, notably top presidential aide H. R. Haldeman, considered Halperin too liberal and accused him of leaking confidential information to the press. For 21 months Halperin’s telephone was tapped, and in September 1969 he resigned from the NSC and became a senior staff fellow of the Brookings Institution. By the time of his resignation, Halperin had become highly critical of aspects of American involvement in Vietnam, and during the 1970s he expressed these reservations in a series of books and articles. He was particularly scathing as to the manner in which successive administrations’ fears of domestic consequences of appearing soft on communism led to the escalation of the war. He also condemned the manner in which the imperatives of secrecy inhibited or completely precluded public discussion of such initiatives as the bombing of Cambodia and the use of herbicides and chemical weapons. Throughout the 1980s Halperin continued to express his objections to governmental secrecy in the making of controversial foreign policies, which he believed should be subordinated to the public’s right to know. Halperin was also active in the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), heading the Washington, D.C., office from 1984 to 1992. In 1993 President Bill Clinton nominated Halperin as assistant secretary of defense for democracy and peacekeeping, but Republicans in the Senate rejected him, arguing that his past lack of patriotism and judgment rendered him unfit for the position. In compensation, in February 1994 Halperin joined the NSC as a
Hamburger Hill, Battle of special assistant to the president and held that post until 1996. Two years later Clinton tapped Halperin to head the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, considered perhaps the most important position in the department behind that of secretary of state. He remained at the State Department until 2001. Haplerin continues to teach, speak, and write and is active on numerous boards and organizations. He has authored many books and articles and has been an ardent supporter of nuclear disarmament. PRISCILLA ROBERTS See also Clinton, William Jefferson; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kissinger, Henry Alfred; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Watergate Scandal References Halperin, Morton H. Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1974. Halperin, Morton H. National Security Policy-Making. Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1975. Halperin, Morton H., et al. The Lawless State: The Crimes of the U.S. Intelligence Agencies. New York: Penguin Books, 1976. Isaacson, Walter. Kissinger: A Biography. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992.
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Hamburger Hill, Battle of Start Date: May 11, 1969 End Date: May 20, 1969 One of the bloodiest military engagements of the Vietnam War. The Battle of Ap Bia Mountain, also known as the Battle of Hamburger Hill, occurred during May 11–20, 1969, as part of Operation APACHE SNOW (May 10–June 7, 1969). The battle was fought against People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) regulars who were entrenched and who, as they seldom did during the war, decided to stand against repetitive U.S. frontal assaults. This created the bloody meat-grinder battle that led U.S. participants to call the location “Hamburger Hill.” Coming near the time when the first American troop withdrawals were announced, the battle kindled controversy and a public debate over military objectives and tactics in Vietnam. Dong Ap Bia, or Ap Bia Mountain, located in the A Shau Valley in the western I Corps Tactical Zone near the Laotian border southwest of Hue, is known to local Montagnards as “the mountain of the crouching beast.” Not part of a larger chain, as are most other mountains on the western side of the A Shau Valley, Ap Bia stands
A wounded U.S. soldier is rushed to a medical evacuation helicopter amid fierce fighting against People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) forces during the Battle of Ap Bia Mountain on May 18, 1969. Known by its U.S. participants as the Battle of Hamburger Hill, it was one of the bloodiest engagements of the Vietnam War. (UPI-Bettmann/Corbis)
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alone some 3,175 feet above sea level. It sends several large ridges, fingers, and ravines out in all directions, covered by thick doubleand-triple–canopy jungle. Hill 937 on the north and Hill 916 on the southeast are formed from these ridges. Operation APACHE SNOW was designed to keep pressure on PAVN units and base camps in the A Shau Valley, a base area and terminus for replacements and supplies sent south by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The operation involved units from the 3rd Brigade, U.S. 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile); the U.S. 9th Marine Regiment; and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) 3rd Regiment of the 1st Infantry Division. On the second day of the operation, Company B of the 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry (3-187 Infantry), also known as “Rakassans,” came under concentrated PAVN fire by machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades on Hill 937. The units they engaged were the 7th and 8th battalions of the PAVN 29th Regiment, dug into heavily fortified bunker positions on the hill. After several assaults conducted over three days, the 3-187 Infantry was reinforced with two more 101st Airborne Division battalions (the 1-506 Infantry and 2-501 Infantry) and a battalion of the ARVN 3rd Regiment. On May 18 with the ARVN battalion posted to seal off the hill, a two-battalion assault nearly took the summit before a torrential rainstorm forced a withdrawal. Finally, on May 20 after 10 previous tries, a four-battalion assault drove the PAVN from their mountain fortress and into their Laotian sanctuaries.
Because the allied objective was to kill PAVN soldiers and disrupt operations in the valley, once the PAVN withdrew from the mountain, U.S. and ARVN forces abandoned it as well. And as in previous operations, as soon as U.S. and ARVN forces withdrew, PAVN troops moved right back into the area. Official U.S. casualty figures for the whole of Operation APACHE SNOW were 56 American and 5 South Vietnamese killed in action; enemy losses were estimated at 630. However, Samuel Zaffiri in Hamburger Hill (1988) gives American casualties as 70 dead and 372 wounded. Fanned by media attention to the battle, which seemed to symbolize the frustration of winning battles without ever consummating the strategic victory, the debate questioned the cost in American lives of taking the hill only to abandon it for the Communists to reoccupy. The controversy led to the limiting of American military operations in the face of U.S. troop withdrawals and Vietnamization. ARTHUR T. FRAME See also APACHE SNOW, Operation; A Shau Valley; Attrition; United States, Involve-
ment in Vietnam, 1969–1973; Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, Army; Vietnamization References Stanton, Shelby L. The Rise and Fall of an American Army: The U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985. Zaffiri, Samuel. Hamburger Hill: The Brutal Battle for Dong Ap Bia, May 11–20, 1969. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1988.
Ham Nghi
Hamlet Evaluation System Technique to measure the pacification process in Vietnam. The Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) began in January 1967. Some 250 U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), district advisers completed monthly evaluation worksheets for 9,000 of the 13,000 hamlets in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), using a matrix of 18 equally weighted indicators, 9 for security and 9 for development. MACV assigned graduated decimal values (5 to 0) to conditions A (best) through E (worst), respectively, and determined averages. A-, B-, and C-rated hamlets were considered relatively secure, the majority being in the C category (2.50–3.49), while D and E hamlets were considered contested. Approximately 3,000 acknowledged Viet Cong (VC) hamlets were not evaluated. Advisers also indicated the degree of severity of problem areas, but these responses were not included in the scoring system. Beginning in October 1967, results appeared in the form of a “Monthly Pacification Status Report.” Critics noted, however, that high development scores often offset low security scores and that increases in the secure population often were the result of refugees moving to cities rather than an extension of government control into the hamlets. A frequent charge was that favorable HES data was used as propaganda to support the U.S. position in Vietnam. Robert Komer, who became director of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) in May 1967, insisted that HES was designed as a tool for pacification management and analysis, not progress reporting, and never claimed that it could get at the question of “hearts and minds.” But he conceded that Washington officials relied on HES output as an indicator of overall pacification “progress,” thereby contributing to the “credibility gap.” However useful for managing the pacification program, HES was not satisfactory for use in decision making. Simply put, while Washington thought that Vietnam was becoming pacified, the district advisers did not. Despite its data-gathering problems, HES was more accurate than the subjective system it replaced and could identify major pacification trends and problems. At the end of 1967, HES indicated that two-thirds of the population was living in relatively secure areas, although this figure is open to interpretation. Following the Tet Offensive in 1968, the percentage dropped to 60 percent, a smaller setback than expected, and then rose to 63 percent by June 1968. When William Colby replaced Komer as head of MACV’s CORDS in late 1968, he initiated an accelerated pacification program to upgrade all hamlets. In December 1969 HES claimed that 90 percent of hamlets merited C ratings or above, half of those in the A or B categories. By late 1971 this figure reached 97 percent, with most gains in rural areas. Unquestionably, much of this alleged progress was due to a drop in the intensity of the war, increasing the Regional and Popular forces, and the success of the Phoenix Program. Retrospective studies show that HES figures suffered from inflation caused principally by command pressure and undervaluing security. Surveys of former district advisers revealed the existence of so-called gut
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HES parallel reports that were more realistic and pessimistic, but these never made their way into the computer. JOHN D. ROOT See also Civilian Irregular Defense Group; Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support; Colby, William Egan; Komer, Robert W.; Pacification; Phoenix Program; Strategic Hamlet Program; Territorial Forces References Bole, Albert G., Jr., and K. Kobata. An Examination of the Measurements of the Hamlet Evaluation System. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1975. Brigham, Colonel Erwin R. “Pacification Measurement.” Military Review (May 1970): 47–54. Komer, Robert W. “Impact of Pacification on Insurgency in South Vietnam.” Journal of International Affairs 25 (1971): 48–69.
Ham Nghi Birth Date: July 22, 1872 Death Date: January 14, 1943 Seventh emperor of the Nguyen dynasty (1884–1885) and hero of the Vietnamese resistance movement against the French invasion of the late 19th century. His real name was Ung Lich; Ham Nghi was his ruling name. Born on July 22, 1872, in Hue, Ham Nghi at the age of 12 was placed on the throne to succeed his brother, Emperor Kien Phuoc (r. 1883–1884), by regents Nguyen Van Tuong and Ton That Thuyet, who then effectively controlled Ham Nghi. The regents managed to assemble a fair amount of artillery and small arms at the imperial palace. When the French demanded their removal, Thuyet transferred them to a secret location. Believing that French commander General Count Roussel de Coucey intended to crush them, the two regents decided on a desperate surprise attack on the French at their Mang Ca fort near the capital at 1:00 a.m. on July 5, 1885. The French reacted quickly and seized six of the Vietnamese guns, which they then turned against the attackers. The Vietnamese began to disperse before dawn, and Thuyet then forced Ham Nghi to accompany him to the Tan So fortress in Quang Tri Province. Meanwhile, the French seized a considerable number of artillery pieces, small arms, and silver ingots from the imperial palace. From Tan So, Thuyet forced Ham Nghi to issue an appeal to mandarins, scholars, and the people throughout the country asking them to support him in his fight against the French. Many responded to the appeal, which opened a great anti-French movement known as the Phong Trao Can Vuong (Support the King). Betrayed by a local chief and one of his guards, Ham Nghi was captured by the French on November 1, 1888. Although he had been poorly served by Thuyet, Ham Nghi nonetheless refused to reveal Thuyet’s location to the French. Ham Nghi was sent into exile in Algeria that December. There was some discussion about
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returning him to the throne, but he died in Algiers on January 14, 1943, without seeing his homeland again. His tomb is in Thonoc cemetery near Sarlat, Dordogne, France. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) has made efforts to secure the return of the body to Vietnam, where a number of cities have major streets named after Ham Nghi, but the family has thus far refused. PHAM CAO DUONG See also French Indochina, 1860s–1946; Minh Mang; Thieu Tri; Tu Duc; Vietnam, History of, 938 CE through the French Conquest References Chapuis, Oscar. The Last Emperors of Vietnam: From Tu Duc to Bao Dai. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2000. Le Thanh Khoi. Le Viet-Nam: Histoire et civilisation. Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1955. Nguyen Huyen Anh. Viet Nam Danh Nhan Tu Dien [Dictionary of Vietnamese Great Men and Women]. Houston, TX: Zieleks, 1990. Nguyen The Anh. Viet Nam Duoi Thoi Phap Do Ho [Vietnam under French Domination]. Saigon: Lua Thieng, 1970. Phan Tran Chuc. Vua Ham Nghi. Hanoi: Chinh Ky, 1951.
Hand Grenades Hand grenades are short-range infantry weapons used for lethal or nonlethal antipersonnel effect, signaling, screening, or equipment destruction. Rarely weighing more than 1.5 pounds, the usual effective range of a hand grenade is limited by how far it can be thrown by an individual soldier. Singly or in groups, hand grenades also can be rigged into booby traps, or what today are called improvised explosive devices. The French term grenade means “pomegrante,” which is similar in size and shape to the hand grenade. The first primitive explosive grenades appeared in the Byzantine Empire sometime around the 8th century. The prototype of all modern military hand grenades was the Mills Bomb, introduced by the British during World War I. Up until then, grenades were handled only by specialist troops called grenadiers, who usually were very tall and strong and therefore could throw the grenades the greatest distances. Today hand grenades are carried by all ground troops, and soldiers classified as grenadiers carry weapons called grenade launchers, which project specially designed launchable grenades to far greater distances than hand grenades. Hand grenades fall into five basic categories: fragmentation, concussion, incendiary, smoke, and chemical. All hand grenades consist of a body, a filler, and a fuse. The variations in these three basic components are a function of the grenade’s purpose. Although some hand grenade fuses produce detonation on impact, most hand grenade fuses are the delay type. For the most common fuse designs a thin metal lever, called a spoon, holds back the spring-activated trigger on the top of the fuse. The spoon is held in place by a large cotter pin with a ring attached to it. A soldier holding the grenade in his hand also keeps the spoon held
tightly in place against the body of the grenade even when the safety pin has been pulled. When the grenade is thrown, the spoon falls off and the fuse triggers. The three- to five-second delay between triggering and detonation gives the grenade the time to fly its maximum throwable distance of about 131 feet before it goes off. If the grenade is thrown for a shorter distance, an enemy might have enough time to pick the grenade up and throw it back. To counter this tactic, American GIs in Vietnam sometimes used the very risky procedure of cooking-off the grenade. When the pin was pulled, the thrower released the spoon but still held onto the grenade for two to three seconds before throwing it. Fragmentation grenades are lethal antipersonnel weapons designed to produce casualties primarily through fragmentation rather than blast effect. The standard American hand grenade of World War II, the Mk-II fragmentation grenade, was widely used in Vietnam up through the late 1960s. Known to GIs as “Frag” and a direct descendent of the British No. 36 Mills Bomb, the Mk-II was nicknamed the “pineapple” because of its shape and its heavily serrated cast iron body. The outer serrations did not actually improve fragmentation effect, but they did make the grenade easier to hold. The Mk-II weighed 1.5 pounds and had 2 ounces of explosive Composition B (TNT) filler. When the grenade exploded, its lethal radius was about 16 feet, and its wounding radius was about 49 feet. In the late 1960s the Mk-II was replaced by the M-26. Nicknamed the “lemon,” it was roughly the same size and shape as the Mk-II, but its outer body was smooth. A prenotched fragmentation coil inside the body produced the primary fragmentation. The M-26 weighed 1 pound and had 5.8 ounces of Composition B filler. A variant designated the M-61 had a so-called jungle safety clip that kept the spoon in place if the pin accidentally became disengaged. Late in the war the M-26 was replaced by the M-33. Weighing only 14 ounces and spherically shaped, it was nicknamed the “baseball.” Rather than having a prenotched fragmentation coil inside the grenade, the interior of the M-33 body itself was prescored, producing an even more efficient fragmentation effect. The lighter weight and spherical shape also made it easier to throw farther. After the Vietnam War, further modifications led to the currentissue standard fragmentation grenade, the M-67. The Communist forces in Vietnam used hand grenades from a wide variety of sources, including Soviet, Chinese, North Korean, East European, French, Japanese, and especially captured U.S. grenades. The grenade most widely used by the Viet Cong (VC) was the Chinese Type 67. Universally called the “Chicom,” it was a crude and low-quality copy of the Soviet RGD-33 grenade, which in turn was based on the German Stielhandgranate 24, the infamous “potato masher” hand grenade of World War II. The Type 67 was a stick grenade consisting of an explosive charge encased in a metal can and mounted on a wooden shaft to facilitate throwing. Fortunately for many American and Allied troops, the Chicom’s poor quality often resulted in duds, and when it did detonate it
Hand Grenades produced a relatively weak blast but was nonetheless deadly within a radius of about 6.5 feet. The Soviet F-1 (Chinese Type 1) was a World War II fragmentation grenade similar in appearance to the U.S. Mk-II and the British No. 36 Mills. The F-1 weighed 1.3 pounds, had 2.1 ounces of TNT filler, and had a fragmentation radius of 49 to 65 feet. The post–World War II RGD-5 (Chinese Type 59) had a smooth body and weighed only .7 of a pound but had 3.9 ounces of TNT filler, producing a 65-foot fragmentation radius. The Chinese Type 42 was a copy of the Soviet RG-42 hand grenade, a cheaply made World War II expedient that had 3.9 ounces of TNT filler but a bursting radius of only 6.5 to 16 feet. The standard American concussion grenade was the Mk-IIIA2, originally introduced in World War II. Unlike a fragmentation grenade, the primary casualty-producing effect of a concussion grenade is the blast and resulting overpressure. The MK-IIIA2’s cylindrical body was about the same diameter and just slightly longer than a standard soft drink can and was made from laminated cartridge paper. The grenade weighed .88 of a pound, of which 6.83 ounces was Composition B filler. The Mk-IIIA2 was especially effective inside bunkers and other enclosed spaces. It was also used underwater against VC combat swimmers operating against bridges, docks, and riverine barges. The Soviet RKG-3 shaped-charge hand grenade was technically neither a fragmentation nor a concussion grenade, but it was closer to a concussion weapon because its primary effect came from its blast. The RKG-3 was a favorite weapon of VC sappers. Similar in appearance but larger than the Chinese Type 67, the RKG-3 was a stick grenade originally designed as an antitank weapon. The VC used the RKG-3 against bunkers and other fortified positions. It weighed 2.4 pounds and had 20 ounces of explosive filler. It was detonated by an impact fuse that was activated when the safety pin was pulled. As soon as the RKG-3 was thrown, a small drogue chute deployed from the base of the handle to stabilize the grenade and keep the fuse properly oriented to the surface of the target. Smoke grenades are used for screening, signaling, and marking targets and landing zones (LZs). All American smoke grenades had cylindrical bodies that were 5.7 inches long and were roughly the same diameter as the Mk-IIIA2 concussion grenade. The smoke grenade bodies are made of thin sheet steel with emission holes at the top and bottom for the smoke. The fuse mechanism is similar to that used on fragmentation grenades, but the delay time is only about one to two seconds. The American M-8 smoke grenade produced white smoke, while the M-18 produced one of four different colors (yellow, red, green, and purple). The colored smoke was used primarily for signaling and marking LZs and targets; the white smoke was used for screening friendly movements and positions and obscuring enemy observation. The M-8 weighs 1.5 pounds and burns for 105 to 150 seconds, producing a thick smoke screen. The smoke produced by the M-8 filler, hexachloroethane (HC), is toxic, and long-term exposure can produce serious health effects. The M-18 weighs 1.2
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pounds and burns for 50 to 90 seconds. Its smoke dissipates more rapidly than that produced by the M-8. Communist forces in Vietnam used the two standard Soviet smoke grenades, the RGD-1 and RGD-2. In design and construction both were quite different from their American equivalents. The bodies of both grenades were molded cardboard cylinders weighing about 1.1 pounds. They functioned similar to a roadside emergency flare. The RGD-1 had a burning time of 80 seconds and produced either white or black smoke. It was waterproof and floated, making it ideal to screen water-crossing operations. The RGD-2 was not waterproof, produced only white smoke, and had a burning time of 1.5 minutes. Incendiary grenades are used to start fires and damage equipment. The M-14 thermite grenade is similar in size and shape to the American smoke grenades. Its 32 ounces of filler burns for 30 seconds at 4,000 degrees Fahrenheit. It burns underwater and can melt through an engine block. The most effective way to neutralize a captured artillery piece or one that is about to be captured by the enemy is to set off a thermite grenade in the breech and then close the breechblock. Technically classified as a smoke grenade, the M-34 white phosphorus (WP) grenade also produced a significant incendiary effect. Its 15 ounces of filler burned for 60 seconds at 5,000 degrees Fahrenheit. Like thermite, white phosphorus burns underwater, but unlike thermite, “Willy Pete,” as the GIs called it, also produced a cloud of thick white smoke. The smoke buildup was much faster than HC smoke. A standard tactic was to initiate the smoke screen with WP and then maintain it for the required period with HC. The M-34 was a very dangerous weapon to use, however. Its bursting radius was 114 feet, requiring a thrower with a very good arm and access to immediate cover once the grenade was in the air. Depending on their filler, chemical hand grenades produce a wide range of antipersonnel effects from irritating to debilitating to lethal. No lethal antipersonnel chemical agents were used in Vietnam. Those antipersonnel chemical agents used were generally classified as riot-control agents. American forces used riot-control hand grenades to clear enemy tunnels and bunker complexes. North Vietnamese forces reportedly used such weapons during their 1972 and 1975 offensives. The three primary fillers used for American chemical grenades were diphenylaminochloarsine (DM), chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile (CS), and chloroacetophenone (CN). DM is commonly called vomiting gas. CS and CN are commonly called tear gas, with CN being the stronger of the two. All of the American chemical hand grenades were similar to the M-8 and M-18 smoke grenades in size, shape, weight, and function. The M-6 and M-6A1 grenades had a mixed CN/DN filler and a 20- to 60-second burn time. The M-7 and M-7A1 had a CN filler and a similar burn time. The M-7A3 had a CS filler and a burn time of only 15 to 35 seconds. The United States no longer uses grenades filled with either CN or DM.
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The VC made extensive use of hand grenades in booby traps and other innovative homemade weapons. The pole charge was an improvised sapper weapon for bunker assaults, consisting of an 8to 10-foot-long bamboo pole with any combination of two to four hand grenades mounted on one end. When the sapper pulled the safety pins on the grenades, he thrust the business end of the pole charge into an entrance or a firing port of a bunker, almost always with deadly results. The VC also were masters of fabricating hand grenades from almost any material available. They produced homemade incendiary grenades using sodium, which ignites upon contact with water. Following firefights, the VC scoured the battlefields collecting expended American M-8 and M-18 smoke grenade bodies and took them back to clandestine armament workshops deep in the jungles. There the burnt residue was scraped out of the canisters, which were then refilled with TNT or C-4 plastic explosive with nails or any other hard objects packed in to produce a fragmentation effect. The refurbished grenades were completed with improvised fuses fabricated from blasting caps and rifle cartridge cases. In the absence of expended smoke grenades, discarded soft drink or beer cans worked almost as well. DAVID T. ZABECKI See also Booby Traps; Cu Chi Tunnels; Grenade Launchers References Baud, Jacques F. Warsaw Pact Weapons Handbook. Boulder, CO: Paladin, 1989. Emering, Edward J. Weapons and Field Gear of the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing, 1998. Hogg, Ian V. Jane’s Infantry Weapons 1991–92. Coulsdon, Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group, 1991. Rottman, Gordon L. U.S. Army Infantryman in Vietnam, 1965–73. Oxford, UK: Osprey, 2005. Rottman, Gordon L. Viet Cong Fighter. Oxford, UK: Osprey, 2007. U.S. Army. FM 23-30 Grenades and Pyrotechnic Signals. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988.
Hanh Lang Truong Son See Truong Son Corridor
Hanoi Capital of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) during the Vietnam War and now the capital of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV). Throughout much of modern Vietnamese history, Hanoi, known as Thang Long from the early 11th century, served as the capital of Vietnam. The Nguyen dynasty moved the capital south to Hue in 1802 and renamed the city Hanoi in 1831. Hanoi was again the capital of Vietnam with the establishment of French Indochina in 1887.
A view of Hanoi, the capital city of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2010. (Michalakis Ppalis/Dreamstime.com)
Centered on the western bank of the Red River within the Red River Delta, Hanoi is Vietnam’s second-largest city; Ho Chi Minh City (the former Saigon) is the largest metropolitan area. The city of Hanoi covers 71.9 square miles, while the metropolitan areas cover 1,291.4 square miles. Over the centuries Hanoi expanded in size, incorporating various villages within the city’s boundaries. Numerous lakes, both natural and artificially created, are located throughout the city. Hanoi’s 2007 population was just over 6.25 million people, with a population density of approximately 4,800 individuals per square mile. Among its ethnic groups, the Vietnamese are the most significant group in Hanoi. The Chinese, Khmer, and Cham peoples are the next largest groups, with other minority groups making up a relatively tiny percentage of the population. Hanoi’s climate is classified as humid tropical. Winter temperatures range from lows of 58 degrees to a high of 66 degrees Fahrenheit, and summer temperatures range from lows of 80 degrees to highs of 90-plus degrees. The city averages anywhere from 7.5 to 13.5 inches of rain per month during the rainy season (May–October). During the Vietnam War era, Hanoi’s population ranged from 415,000 in 1960 to about 645,000 in 1968. As American bombing raids targeted Hanoi, government officials ordered long-term temporary evacuations, resulting in 50–75 percent of the population being required to depart. Economically the city is primarily focused on light industry, such as apparel and food processing, with some heavy industries such as tool shops. Additionally, the
Hanoi, Battle of, and the First Tet Offensive region includes some agricultural production. Hanoi has served as a central transportation hub for northern Vietnam since its founding and especially since the French built a railway system in Vietnam. Located upriver from Haiphong, Hanoi was also able to act as a transshipment point for the interior. Because flooding constituted a major threat to Hanoi, dikes and levees were constructed along the riverbanks to protect the city from the Red River. King Ly Thai To’s construction of a royal citadel in 1010 CE became the basis for the founding and establishment of his new capital city of Thang Long. Since its founding, the city has been known by several different names, including Dong Kinh and Tong King. Throughout its long history, Hanoi has seen considerable warfare and occupation by the Chinese, the French, and the Japanese. The Vietnamese expelled the Chinese from Hanoi in 1789 only to see the French take control of the city a century later. Japanese troops occupied Hanoi during World War II. In the aftermath of the war, the Viet Minh seized control of the capital and there established the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), led by Ho Chi Minh. The French were finally able to return in strength, and fighting broke out in nearby Haiphong at the end of 1946, leading to the Indochina War (1946–1954). During that war, Hanoi was the ultimate objective for a series of offensives mounted by Viet Minh commander General Vo Nguyen Giap. Following the 1954 Geneva Accords, the North Vietnamese government established itself in Hanoi and controlled all of northern Vietnam down to the 17th Parallel. In the subsequent Vietnam War, America’s military policy regarding operations against Hanoi varied through the course of the conflict. Throughout most of the war, Hanoi, despite being a major military target, was largely off limits for bombing. U.S. president Lyndon Johnson initially removed Hanoi and Haiphong from bombing target lists for political reasons. On occasion, however, U.S. forces were authorized to attack Hanoi’s railroad bridges or electrical plants. President Richard Nixon approved punishing raids against Hanoi in an attempt to force concessions during the Paris peace talks. Operation LINEBACKER II, the so-called Christmas Bombings of December 18–29, 1972, particularly targeted Hanoi and its air defense system. During the war, Hanoi boasted the most powerful air defense system of any world capital, including antiaircraft guns, interceptor aircraft, and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). Several different groups of Americans were in Hanoi during the Vietnam War. American prisoners of war came to be housed in the Hoa Lo Prison (also known as the “Hanoi Hilton”). A few U.S. reporters visited Hanoi, as did a number of prominent U.S. antiwar protestors such as Jane Fonda and Ramsey Clark. Certainly the North Vietnamese government made every effort to convince the world that U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy aircraft were attacking civilian targets in the city, including its dikes. Although Hanoi suffered significant damage during the war, especially to its airfields, rail yards, and bridges, it was apparent after the conflict that the
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North Vietnamese government had grossly exaggerated the damage sustained. Reconstruction of Hanoi began in the immediate aftermath of the war. Although a few buildings remain as they were at the end of the war as war memorials, the vast majority of the city has been reconstructed. Since 1975 the city has steadily increased its area by incorporating suburbs and other nearby regions into its boundaries. Much of the building boom in the city has been financed by lucrative deals that have benefited the Communist Party hierarchy. Among prominent tourist attractions in the city today are the Old Quarter, the Temple of Literature, the One Pillar Pagoda, the Presidential Palace (formerly the residence of the French governor-general for Indochina), the many picturesque lakes, Ho Chi Minh’s mausoleum and his personal residence, the Opera House, the Military Museum, and the Ho Chi Minh Trail Museum. WYNDHAM E. WHYNOT See also Bombing Halts and Restrictions; Hanoi, Battle of, and the First Tet Offensive; Hoa Lo Prison; Ho Chi Minh; Indochina War; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; LINEBACKER II, Operation; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Red River Delta; ROLLING THUNDER, Operation; Saigon; Vo Nguyen Giap References Doyle, Edward, Samuel Lipsman, and Terrence Maitland. The North: The Communist Struggle for Vietnam. The Vietnam Experience Series. Boston: Boston Publishing, 1986. Logan, William S. Hanoi: Biography of a City. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001. Michel, Marshall L., III. The Eleven Days of Christmas: America’s Last Vietnam Battle. San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2002.
Hanoi, Battle of, and the First Tet Offensive Event Date: January 30, 1789 Culminating military engagement of the 1771–1789 Tay Son Rebellion, regarded as one of the greatest victories in Vietnamese history. What might be called the first Tet Offensive, the January 30, 1789, Battle of Hanoi (also known as the Battle of Dong Da) is worth remembering, because just as the 1940 Japanese strike at Port Arthur, Russia, foreshadowed the 1941 Japanese attack without declaration of war at Pearl Harbor, the Battle of Hanoi was proof that the Tet holiday had not always been peacefully observed by warring Vietnamese. In a brilliant two-month campaign between May and July 1786, Nguyen Hue, the military genius of the three Tay Son brothers, defeated the Trinh lords in northern Vietnam and brought Emperor Le Chieu Thong under his control. After Nguyen Hue’s victory, he returned to southern Vietnam to consolidate his authority there. Nguyen Hue’s lieutenant in northern Vietnam, together with the emperor, then attempted to fortify the region against Nguyen
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Hue’s return. Before Nguyen Hue could arrive with his army, the emperor lost his nerve and fled to China. Once again Nguyen Hue returned to the south. The Le emperor’s only hope of reclaiming his throne was by Chinese assistance. Sun Shiyi, the Chinese governor of territory bordering Vietnam, advised military intervention as an opportunity to assert Chinese influence in an area weakened by civil war. The Chinese emperor agreed, and in November 1788 an expeditionary force commanded by Sun crossed the frontier at three points. Faced with overwhelming Chinese strength, Nguyen Hue’s generals sent ships with provisions south to Thanh Hoa, while the remainder of the troops retired overland. The Chinese took the capital of Hanoi in late December 1788 after a campaign of less than two months, but events worked to undermine their authority. They treated Vietnam as if it were captured territory and forced Le Chieu Thong to issue pronouncements in the name of the Chinese emperor. Many Vietnamese resented reprisals against imperial officials who had earlier rallied to the Tay Son. Typhoons and disastrous harvests also led many northerners to believe that the emperor had lost the so-called Mandate of Heaven. On December 22, 1788, after learning of the Chinese invasion, Nguyen Hue proclaimed himself Emperor Quang Trung. He then raised an army. To widen his appeal, he played to Vietnamese nationalism, stressing the long history of Chinese efforts to subjugate Vietnam. The key to his military success was careful planning. As historian Le Thanh Khoi noted, in the course of a 40-day campaign Quang Trung devoted 35 days to preparations and only 5 to actual battle. Quang Trung ordered his soldiers to celebrate the Tet holiday early. He then sent a delegation to Sun with a request that the Chinese withdraw from Vietnam. Sun tore up the appeal and put the head of the delegation to death, boasting that he would soon take Quang Trung himself. Quang Trung ordered the main military effort to be made against the principal Chinese line, where he concentrated his elite troops and elephants (which transported his heavy artillery on their backs). At the same time, he sent a part of his fleet north as a feint against the capital to prevent the Chinese from concentrating all their reserves on the main front. His plan to attack on the eve of the Tet holiday was a brilliant stroke, catching the Chinese off guard celebrating the lunar new year. Quang Trung’s offensive, once launched, went forward both day and night (especially the latter) for five days. Each attack was mounted rapidly to prevent the enemy from bringing up reserves. Tay Son forces covered nearly 50 miles and took six forts defending access to the capital, a rate of 10 miles and more than one fort a day. At dawn on the fifth day of Tet (January 30, 1789), Tay Son forces approached the fort of Ngoc Hoi and came under heavy enemy fire. Elite commandos assaulted the fortress in groups of
20 men, protected under wooden shields covered by straw soaked in water. From atop an elephant, Quang Trung exhorted his troops. When the assault force had reached the fort’s ramparts, the troops discarded their protective shields. Following intense fighting, the Tay Son emerged victorious; large numbers of Chinese, including general officers, died in the attack. Sun learned of the disaster that same night. With fires visible in the distance, he fled north across the Red River, not bothering to put on his armor or saddle his horse. Chinese horsemen and then infantry soon joined the flight, but the bridge they used was soon overburdened and collapsed. According to Vietnamese accounts thousands drowned, and the Red River was filled with bodies. Le Chieu Thong also fled and found refuge in China, ending the 300-year-old Le dynasty. True to his word, on the afternoon of the seventh day of the new year Quang Trung entered Hanoi. His generals continued to pursue the Chinese to the frontier. The victory is still celebrated in Vietnam as one of the nation’s greatest military achievements. Mobility and concentration of force, rather than numbers, were the keys in the Tay Son victory. The attackers were motivated by a desire to free their country from foreign domination. Tens of thousands of civilians had joined the Tay Son army as it moved north. Quang Trung also profited from Chinese errors. Sun had taken virtually his entire army to Hanoi. Although he had encountered little resistance, he halted there instead of continuing his offensive against the Tay Son. Confident in his superior numbers, Sun had underestimated his adversary and thus had relaxed discipline. Quang Trung became one of Vietnam’s greatest kings. Unfortunately, his reign was short. He died in the spring of 1792, so he did not have the “dozen years” he believed necessary to build a strong kingdom. Many Vietnamese believe that had Quang Trung lived a decade longer, their subsequent history would have been different. Quang Trung’s brothers also died in the early 1790s, and his son was only six years old in 1792. Within a decade the surviving Nguyen lord, Nguyen Anh, had come to power, and the Nguyen dynasty was dominant throughout Vietnam. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Nguyen Dynasty; Nguyen Hue; Tay Son Rebellion; Trinh Lords References Buttinger, Joseph. The Smaller Dragon: A Political History of Vietnam. New York: Praeger, 1958. Déveria, G. Histoire des Relations de la Chine avec L’Annam-Vietnam du XVIe au XIXe Siècle. Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1880. Le Thanh Khoi. Histoire de Viet Nam des origines à 1858. Paris: Sudestasie, 1981. Truong Buu Lam. Resistance, Rebellion, and Revolution: Popular Movements in Vietnamese History. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984. Viet Chung. “Recent Findings on the Tay Son Insurgency.” Vietnamese Studies 81 (1985): 30–62.
Harassment and Interdiction Fires
Hanoi Hannah Birth Date: ca. 1929 U.S. GI nickname for Ngo Thi Trinh, a broadcaster who was part of the Voice of Vietnam, a propaganda vehicle that was broadcast by radio in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). Several broadcasters were known by the name “Hanoi Hannah,” but Trinh was the most important. She chose as a professional name the more lyrical Thu Huong (“Autumn Fragrance”). Raised in Hanoi amid a wealthy family, she learned English in school and from American cinema; her parents reportedly secured for her private lessons in English. She joined the Voice of Vietnam in 1955 because, as she said, “It was a good opportunity to help my country.” Known to the Americans as Hanoi Hannah (in the tradition of Tokyo Rose in World War II and Seoul City Sue in the Korean War), Trinh hosted an English-language program as part of the psychological war waged to discourage U.S. troops. She would report news, including the names of Americans who had died in battle; criticize the U.S. war effort and praise the antiwar movement; appeal to class and racial differences to sow discord; utilize tapes of Americans whose comments she thought helpful; and play music in half-hour segments at times convenient for listening American GIs. There is little evidence that the broadcasts achieved their purpose; to the contrary, reportedly they either amused or angered their audience. American prisoners of war at times found her broadcasts helpful as a connection to the outside world and as a source of occasional good news. Radio Hanoi’s transmitters and antennas were located in a suburb south of Hanoi and were not attacked until the December 1972 bombing, when bombs damaged the antennas. Signals received in Saigon were very weak for several weeks thereafter. Made less meaningful by the 1973 Paris Peace Accords, the show was canceled. In 1976 Trinh and her husband moved to Ho Chi Minh City (formerly Saigon), where she worked for a number of years in Vietnamese television. PAUL S. DAUM AND B. J. ROGERS See also Prisoners of War, Allied; Psychological Warfare Operations References Doyle, Edward, Samuel Lipsman, and Terrence Maitland. The North: The Communist Struggle for Vietnam. The Vietnam Experience Series. Boston: Boston Publishing, 1986. Hanoi Hannah. Audiotape of interview by Janet Gardner and Paul Camacho, Ho Chi Minh City, June 1987. Boston: William F. Joiner Center for the Study of War and Its Social Consequences. Shenon, Philip. “Air Warfare: The Broadcaster Once Known to GIs as Hanoi Hannah Has No Regrets.” Fort-Worth Star Telegram, November 26, 1994. Vietnam Revisited. Videotape of interview with Ngo Thi Trinh, “Hanoi Hannah on Vietnam.” Day 1, tape 1.21 minutes. Washington, DC:
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C-SPAN; West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University, Public Affairs Video Archives, 1992 (19 videocassettes).
Hanoi Hilton See Hoa Lo Prison
Harassment and Interdiction Fires U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 6-40, Field Artillery Cannon Gunnery, defines harassment fires as “fires delivered for the purpose of disturbing rest, curtailing the movement and lowering the morale of enemy troops by the threat of casualties or losses in material.” The same publication defines interdiction fire as “fire delivered for the purpose of denying the enemy the unrestricted use of an area or point. Interdiction fire is usually of less intensity than neutralization fire.” These two types of missions are usually tactically combined and are known as harassment and interdiction (H&I) fires. The use of H&I by field artillery units regardless of nationality has been employed since the late 19th century with the advent of indirect fire. H&I fires are usually unobserved, of short duration, and delivered against likely enemy troop concentrations or routes of supply. In 1965 U.S. field artillery doctrine changed from a conventional emphasis to maximize the role of fire support in a limited war as America became more committed to the war in Vietnam. By 1967 firebases, semipermanent fortified locations that contained one or two batteries of artillery and supporting infantry, dotted the Vietnamese landscape. These firebases were an attempt to provide responsive artillery fires in support of ongoing maneuver operations or Special Forces camps or to provide mutual support if one of them came under attack. Massive employment of field artillery in conjunction with airpower was an essential American strategy for keeping casualties to a minimum while inflicting maximum losses on the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) or the Viet Cong (VC). H&I fires were unobserved, and therefore targets were mainly determined by map, aerial reconnaissance, or intelligence gathered by ground forces. Communist troops proved to be elusive, frustrating attempts to contain them in fixed locations. Despite the tremendous amounts of ammunition expended by artillery units during H&I missions, there was little confirmation of success when target areas were swept by infantry. In most cases, H&I missions were planned and executed without efforts to confirm targets. In 1969 U.S. Army, Vietnam (USARV), deputy commander General Frank T. Mildren stated that H&I fires in Vietnam were having little effect and were not damaging the enemy. Mildren recommended that all units in the USARV drastically reduce H&I missions. Mildren was not alone. U.S. 4th Infantry Division
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A young Vietnamese girl joins U.S. artillerymen in covering their ears as a self-propelled 8-inch howitzer blasts Viet Cong positions from the 25th Division base at Cu Chi, 20 miles northwest of Saigon, September 19, 1966. (AP/Wide World Photos)
commander General Arthur “Ace” Collins was awakened one night by a 700-round H&I mission. He promptly decreased the ammunition allocation by half, and within one week the 4th Division artillery was prohibited from firing H&I missions. Collins did, however, institute a program that he labeled intelligence and interdiction (I&I) whereby those missions were permitted only if targets were confirmed by intelligence sources. Collins, like Mildren, questioned the effectiveness of H&I against suspect locations, especially when the threat of collateral damage to the civilian population was high. Collins was also concerned that his division was substituting massive artillery fire for infantry closing with and destroying Communist units. In 1970 General H. Kalergis, the commander of II Field Force Artillery, concluded that H&I missions did not achieve results in proportion to ammunition expended. He directed that artillery batteries relocate to areas of known contact rather than continue to conduct high numbers of H&I missions. Most field commanders disagreed with the sentiments expressed by Mildren, Collins, and Kalergis and enthusiastically
supported active H&I programs. Infantry and armored forces conducting search-and-destroy operations believed that H&I fires helped deter ambushes or were effective in hitting VC or PAVN staging areas before those forces could mass against allied forces. H&I did prove effective when enhanced by technology. U.S. division artillery headquarters, artillery brigade headquarters, and field force headquarters batteries were equipped with the AN/ TPQ-4 countermortar radar. This was capable of locating mortar fire by tracking the projectiles in flight back to their points of origin. In addition, the AN/TPS-25 ground surveillance radar was able to detect movement of vehicles and troops at a six-mile range within its sectors of search. If firing elements could respond to radar sightings within approximately five minutes, the effectiveness of H&I fires was greatly enhanced. Radar platoons supporting U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps field artillery units significantly enhanced target-acquisition capabilities. In 1968 remote sensors were introduced into Southeast Asia as part of the Igloo White program, which also increased the effect of H&I missions. Sensors, fired by artillery or dropped by aircraft,
Hardhats were battery-powered and could be activated by individual footprints. Army sensors were radio-linked with fire-direction centers at numerous firebases, giving artillery units almost immediate response to confirmed targets. On September 24, 1968, U.S. 25th Infantry Division artillery engaged PAVN troops using sensor-acquired targets near Tay Ninh. Sensors detected movement near a crossroads upon a known infiltration route, and this information was received at firebase French Fort. In immediate response, four 175-millimeter (mm) guns engaged targets at the edge of the sensor field. The division’s light (105-mm) and medium (155-mm) howitzer battalions fired at positions to block PAVN movements, while all medium (81-mm) mortars within range fired directly upon the intersection of the trails. The next day infantry patrols reported at least seven PAVN soldiers killed, with evidence of numerous wounded being evacuated from the field. Radars, sensors, and aerial reconnaissance did in fact increase the effects of H&I over the traditional method of mapspotting and routine intelligence dissemination. Yet there were insufficient radar and other target-acquisition assets to increase the overall effect of daily H&I missions fired throughout Vietnam. Despite the misgivings of certain senior American commanders, H&I could be an effective tool when certain conditions were met: confirmed or fixed-target locations and observed and adjusted artillery fires. In most cases the U.S. use of H&I met neither of the above parameters. Additionally, H&I accounted for approximately 50 percent of all missions fired by American field artillery units, resulting in almost 70 percent of all ammunition expenditures. In Vietnam, H&I did not achieve the kill ratios that it might have but produced a morale-building factor for American and allied forces engaged in ground operations. Ironically, the PAVN began its 1972 offensive with H&I missions against the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) from positions across the demilitarized zone (DMZ). The textbook use of H&I occurred during the 1982 Falklands War when ships of the British Royal Navy fired rounds, adjusted by British Army observers, at Argentine positions around Port Stanley. The results were devastating, with targets destroyed and Argentine morale shattered. The British indeed learned from the mistakes of the American experience in the Vietnam War. H&I fires were a controversial element of the artillery war in Vietnam. The political climate of the war encouraged the use of H&I in addition to massive amounts of ground and air-delivered ordnance in support of operations. Artillery was used in lieu of extended ground combat in an attempt to lessen American casualties. The fire-support coordination measures peculiar to Southeast Asia such as no-fire zones, free-fire zones, and restricted fire zones also forced artillery commanders to expend ammunition in H&I missions in support of maneuver forces. H&I was not totally effective, but it was a significant tool in an attempt to inflict maximum damage upon Communist forces. JULIUS A. MENZOFF
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See also Artillery Fire Doctrine References Dastrup, Boyd L. King of Battle: A Branch History of the U.S. Army’s Field Artillery. Fort Monroe, VA: Office of the Command Historian, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1992. Ott, David E. Field Artillery, 1954–1973. Vietnam Studies Series. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1975. Scales, Robert H., Jr. Firepower in Limited War. 2nd ed. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1995. U.S. Government. Field Artillery Cannon Gunnery. Field Manual 6-40. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1965.
Hardhats National Hard Hats of America, construction workers organized to support President Richard M. Nixon’s Vietnam War policies. The Hardhats mounted several often brutal counterdemonstrations against antiwar protests. In New York City on May 8, 1970, only 10 days after Vice President Spiro T. Agnew invited Americans to view protesters as Nazi storm troopers or Ku Klux Klan members and to “act accordingly,” 200 Hardhats attacked a group of peaceful student demonstrators who were protesting the deaths at Kent State University and the Cambodian Incursion. Using fists, crowbars, and metal wrenches, the construction workers forced the student protesters to disperse and then marched on city hall to raise the flag that had been lowered to half-staff in mourning for the Kent State victims. Seventy demonstrators were injured. During the noontime melee two men in gray business suits were seen directing the well-organized attack, which came from four directions. One construction worker revealed that workers were offered a monetary bonus by at least one contractor if they would take time off to “break some heads.” Some New York City police officers were also included in the assault and cheered the workers on. President Nixon told New York union leaders that he found their expressions of the support for the war “very meaningful,” which fueled speculation that the White House had helped to engineer Hardhat activities, although there is no clear evidence to support such an allegation. J. NATHAN CAMPBELL See also Agnew, Spiro Theodore; Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Cambodian Incursion; Kent State University Shootings; Nixon, Richard Milhous References Dougan, Clark, and Samuel Lipsman. A Nation Divided. The Vietnam Experience Series. Boston: Boston Publishing, 1984. Wells, Tom. The War Within: America’s Battle over Vietnam. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994. Zaroulis, N. C., and Gerald Sullivan. Who Spoke Up? American Protest against the War in Vietnam, 1963–1975. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1984.
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Harkins, Paul Donal Birth Date: May 15, 1904 Death Date: August 21, 1984 U.S. Army general and commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), during 1962–1964. Born in Boston, Massachusetts, on May 15, 1904, Paul Donal Harkins graduated from the United States Military Academy, West Point, in 1929. Promoted to captain in June 1939, he served during World War II in Lieutenant General George S. Patton’s Third Army. Harkins was promoted to major in June 1946 and to lieutenant colonel in July 1948. In March 1952 he was promoted to colonel, and in May 1952 he was promoted to brigadier general. At the end of the Korean War in 1953 Harkins was chief of staff of Eighth Army, then in Korea. He subsequently served as commandant of cadets at West Point. During 1954–1957 he was stationed at the Pentagon. Promoted to major general in April 1957 and lieutenant general that July, he was deputy commander, chief of staff of U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, between 1960 and 1962 before being appointed the initial commander of MACV. Promoted to full general, Harkins arrived in Saigon on February 13, 1962.
U.S. Army general Paul D. Harkins, commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), during an inspection tour of an Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) training camp in 1963. Harkins expressed great confidence about the war’s course and firmly supported RVN president Ngo Dinh Diem. (National Archives)
As part of Project Beefup in 1962, President John F. Kennedy’s administration replaced the Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) with the expanded and remodeled MACV, situated in Saigon and commanded by Harkins. There he expressed confidence about the war’s course and stood firmly behind President Ngo Dinh Diem. Harkins favored postponing political and social improvements until the military had subdued the Communist insurgents, the Viet Cong (VC), and secured the countryside. He endorsed the use of napalm against villages housing the VC, regardless of its political effects, and he supported the version given by the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) of the disastrous Battle of Ap Bac in the Mekong Delta on January 2, 1963. Harkins also believed that the Strategic Hamlet Program was conceptually valid and impressive in implementation. In fact, he was so optimistic about an eventual victory over the insurgents that he told a group of high-level policy makers in Honolulu that the conflict might well peter out by the end of 1963. General Harkins’s tenacious support for President Diem nearly caused South Vietnamese generals to hesitate in a coup attempt against Diem, which nonetheless occurred in early November 1963. Harkins approved of deposing Ngo Dinh Nhu and his wife but at no time consented to Diem’s ouster. Harkins’s insistence on retaining Diem while eliminating the Nhus brought him into disagreement with U.S. ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, who supported the South Vietnamese president’s removal. From the beginning Harkins and his aides were on bad terms with the successor junta headed by Duong Van Minh. MACV became uneasy with the new administration’s endeavors to assert its independence and to restrict the U.S. advisory functions. When the junta’s leadership demonstrated little initiative against the Communists, Harkins, who admired General Nguyen Khanh and was aware of his plot against Minh, promoted Khanh’s coup, a move labeled “Harkins’ Revenge” by some in the South Vietnamese military. In March 1964 President Lyndon Baines Johnson replaced Harkins with General William C. Westmoreland. Harkins retired from the U.S. Army and lived in Dallas, Texas, before his death there on August 21, 1984. In retirement he authored a book titled When the Third Cracked Europe: The Story of Patton’s Incredible Army (1969), a largely autobiographical work, and he served as a technical consultant to the 1970 biographical film Patton, which starred George C. Scott as General Patton. RODNEY J. ROSS See also Duong Van Minh; Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr.; Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; Ngo Dinh Diem; Ngo Dinh Diem, Overthrow of; Ngo Dinh Nhu; Nguyen Khanh; Strategic Hamlet Program References Hammer, Ellen J. A Death in November: America in Vietnam, 1963. New York: Dutton, 1987.
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Kahin, George McT. Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam. New York: Knopf, 1986. Sheehan, Neil. A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam. New York: Random House, 1988.
Harriman, William Averell Birth Date: November 15, 1891 Death Date: July 26, 1986 Businessman, diplomat, Democratic Party politician, U.S. secretary of commerce (1946–1948), governor of New York (1955–1958), U.S. ambassador-at-large (1960–1961), assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs (1962–1963), undersecretary of state for political affairs (1963–1964), and ambassador-at-large (1965–1969). William Averell Harriman was born in New York City on November 15, 1891, the son of railroad magnate E. H. Harriman. When the Vietnam War erupted, the younger Harriman was one of the most senior Democratic Party figures within the foreign policy establishment, widely regarded as a leading architect of Cold War policy. Following his graduation from Yale University in 1913, Harriman inherited the massive fortune of his father. During World War II he served as President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s special envoy to Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin (1941–1943) and then as U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union (1943–1946). Under President Harry S Truman, Harriman was ambassador to Great Britain (1946), secretary of commerce (1946–1948), special representative in Europe for the Marshall Plan’s Economic Cooperation Administration (1948–1950), special assistant to the president (1950–1951), and head of the Mutual Security Administration (1951–1953). In 1954 Harriman was elected governor of New York and served one four-year term, beginning in 1955. Although not initially close to John F. Kennedy, in 1960 the ambitious Harriman made strenuous efforts to win a foreign policy position within the newly elected administration. In March 1963 he worked his way up to undersecretary of state for political affairs, the third-ranking position in the Department of State. Harriman’s involvement with Indochina initially centered upon his 1961 and 1962 attempts to broker a settlement between warring factions in Laos that would effectively have neutralized that country and prevented the passage through it to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) of people and supplies to aid the Viet Cong (VC) insurgency there. Hawks in the Kennedy administration harshly criticized Harriman’s efforts as unrealistic, but after protracted negotiations at Geneva involving the United States and the three warring Laotian factions in 1962, an agreement was reached. In practice this understanding was not honored by the Communist Pathet Lao and their allies in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). In later years Harriman claimed that he had always opposed U.S. intervention in Vietnam, which is an exaggeration. In 1954 he had
W. Averell Harriman, U.S. politician, businessman, and diplomat. Widely regarded as an expert on the Soviet Union and Asia, Harriman was one of the most influential figures in the shaping of U.S. Cold War policy. (National Archives)
called for the commitment of U.S. troops to Indochina to forestall the region’s possible loss to communism. Later, however, he was to become the most senior leader of the Vietnam doves, favoring reforms in Vietnam and a negotiated settlement. As the U.S. military commitment to Vietnam developed in the early 1960s, Harriman visited Vietnam and warned that President Ngo Dinh Diem’s government was corrupt and unstable. In the summer of 1963 Harriman urged that Diem be pressured to accept the demands of Buddhist monks for punishment of government soldiers who had fired on Buddhist demonstrators in Hue that spring or lose U.S. support. In late August 1963 over a weekend when most U.S. government officials were absent from Washington, Harriman, working with Roger Hilsman, his successor as assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs, and National Security Council staffer Michael V. Forrestal, drafted and dispatched a cable to U.S. ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge that implicitly authorized U.S. support for a coup against Diem. Although this cable provoked bitter recriminations within the State Department, the Defense Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), whose secretaries and director had not seen it before its dispatch, it was never revoked. Harriman never developed the close relationship with President Lyndon B. Johnson that he had come to enjoy with President John F. Kennedy and his brother Robert. In March 1964 Harriman was given charge of African affairs, and in February 1965 he was once more named ambassador-at-large. In this capacity he vigorously defended the Johnson administration’s Vietnam policy,
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while privately he continually urged a bombing halt and the opening of negotiations with North Vietnam. Harriman was excluded from operational meetings on Vietnam and the Tuesday White House discussion luncheons of top policy makers. Harriman was generally restrained in expressing his criticism directly to Johnson, an omission that distressed many of those closest to him, who ascribed his reticence to his fear of losing office. Even so, at a November 1967 meeting of the president’s most senior advisers, the so-called Wise Men, Harriman dissented from the consensus that favored Johnson’s bombing policy and instead called for the opening of negotiations. After the Tet Offensive and the consequent reassessment of U.S. policy goals in Vietnam, Johnson named Harriman his representative in peace negotiations at Paris. Several months of lengthy discussions, both open and secret, finally succeeded in establishing procedural guidelines for the talks, at which the Soviet Union, the United States, North Vietnam, the VC, and South Vietnam were to be represented. At this stage Richard M. Nixon took office, and Harriman returned to Washington, completing his last formal government assignment. He died in New York City on July 26, 1986. PRISCILLA ROBERTS See also Acheson, Dean Gooderham; Forrestal, Michael Vincent; Hilsman, Roger; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennan, George Frost; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr.; Ngo Dinh Diem; Ngo Dinh Diem, Overthrow of; Paris Negotiations; Truman, Harry S.; Wise Men References Abramson, Rudy. Spanning the Century: The Life of W. Averell Harriman, 1891–1986. New York: William Morrow, 1992. Halberstam, David. The Best and the Brightest. New York: Random House, 1972. Isaacson, Walter, and Evan Thomas. The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986.
more than 2,000 men returned their draft cards. The Resistance conducted three more national draft card returns by the end of 1968. Harris delivered hundreds of speeches promoting draft resistance, sometimes appearing with activist folksinger Joan Baez, whom he married on March 26, 1968. Two months later a jury convicted Harris for refusing draft induction, a verdict upheld on appeal. He spent nearly two years in federal prison before being paroled on March 15, 1971. Divorced from Baez shortly after his release, Harris pursued a career in journalism, interrupted by an unsuccessful run for the 1976 Democratic nomination in California’s 12th congressional district. Harris is a regular contributor to such publications as Rolling Stone and the New York Times Magazine. His 1996 book Our War: What We Did in Vietnam and What It Did to Us was a well-received account of the Vietnam War and the antiwar movement. His latest book, The President, the Prophet, and the Shah, published in 2004, examined the 1979–1981 Iranian Hostage Crisis based on extensive interviews with the hostages and the hostage takers. MITCHELL K. HALL See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Baez, Joan Chandos; Conscientious Objectors; Selective Service References Ferber, Michael, and Staughton Lynd. The Resistance. Boston: Beacon, 1971. Harris, David. Dreams Die Hard. New York: St. Martin’s, 1982. Harris, David. I Shoulda Been Home Yesterday. New York: Delacorte, 1976.
Hartke, Vance Rupert Birth Date: May 31, 1919 Death Date: July 27, 2003
Harris, David Birth Date: February 28, 1946 Political activist, journalist, and author who cofounded and spearheaded the antidraft movement known as The Resistance. David Harris was born on February 28, 1946, in Fresno, California. He entered Stanford University in the autumn of 1963 and was elected student body president three years later. His relatively radical campaign platform and counterculture style attracted national notoriety. Increasingly disturbed by the Vietnam War, in August 1966 Harris renounced his student draft deferment and indicated his intent to refuse induction. With Dennis Sweeney, Lennie Heller, and Steve Hamilton, in March 1967 Harris founded The Resistance to encourage opposition to the Selective Service System. They organized approximately three dozen chapters across the country, and on October 16, 1967,
Attorney, Democratic Party politician, and U.S. senator (1959– 1976). Born in Stendal, Indiana, on May 31, 1919, Vance Rupert Hartke received his undergraduate degree from Evansville College (University of Evansville). In 1940 and during 1942–1946 he served in the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard. In 1948 he earned a law degree from Indiana University, and he practiced law in Evansville from 1948 to 1958. In 1958 Hartke won election to the U.S. Senate from Indiana as a Democrat. He was an avid supporter of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society programs, and Johnson counted Hartke as one of his most loyal supporters in Congress until early 1966, when Hartke began questioning American involvement in Vietnam. In January 1966 Hartke drafted a letter, cosigned by 15 other senators, urging President Johnson not to resume the bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). In February, Hartke delivered his first major speech opposing escala-
HARVEST MOON, Operation
tion of the war. He did, however, vote for a $13 billion arms appropriations bill that included funding for the war. In 1967 Hartke wrote The American Crisis in Vietnam, but he withheld publication for a year to prevent it from damaging the Democratic Party in Indiana during a presidential election year. Hartke continued as a vocal critic of U.S. Vietnam involvement, however. Political opponents charged that Hartke was guilty of conflict of interest because in his 1964 campaign for reelection he accepted large cash contributions from a Chicago-based mail-order firm. Hartke had received an appointment to the Senate Post Office Committee, where he worked to stall postal increases for thirdclass mail. He won reelection to the Senate from Indiana in 1970 but lost six years later to Republican Richard Lugar. Hartke ran unsuccessfully for the 1972 Democratic presidential nomination. He subsequently moved to northern Virginia, where he practiced law. He died on July 27, 2003, in Falls Church, Virginia. CHARLOTTE A. POWER See also Case, Clifford Philip; Church, Frank Forrester; Cooper, John Sherman; Fulbright, James William; Great Society Program; Hatfield, Mark Odom; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, Edward Moore; McGee, Gale William; McGovern, George Stanley; Proxmire, Edward William
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References Lichtenstein, Nelson, ed. Political Profiles: The Johnson Years. New York: Facts on File, 1976. Who’s Who in American Politics, 1996. New Providence, NJ: R. R. Bowker, 1995.
HARVEST MOON,
Operation
Start Date: December 8, 1965 End Date: December 20, 1965 Military operation in December 1965 and the largest U.S. Marine Corps combat effort in the Vietnam War to that point. Operation HARVEST MOON came about as a result of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s decision in March 1965 to send U.S. ground troops to Vietnam. The operation was also an early test of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), commander General William Westmoseland’s strategy of attrition through search-and-destroy missions. Although often overshadowed by the U.S. Army’s 1st Cavalry Division campaign in the Ia Drang Valley (October–November 1965), HARVEST MOON was a violent and frustrating test of U.S.
U.S. marines on the banks of a dike in a rice paddy on December 15, 1965, during Operation HARVEST MOON, south of Da Nang in what was the largest combat operation for the marines in the war to that point. A house is on fire across the dike. (AP/Wide World Photos)
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Marine Corps tactics and equipment. The operation was carried out during December 8–20, 1965, and was carried out during the monsoon season, a situation that added significantly to the operation’s problems and to the misery of its participants. HARVEST MOON was intended to find and attack Viet Cong (VC) units in the Phuoc Ha Valley, a Communist base area southwest of Da Nang. The operation was a combined U.S. Marine Corps and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) expedition to trap the VC in the valley. However, the ARVN units involved were attacked by the VC 2nd Division’s 70th Battalion on December 8 while en route to the valley and sustained heavy casualties. On December 9 the marines moved into the area under a temporary command structure known as Task Force Delta. Originally the plan called for the marines to trap the VC from the flank and rear; now they also had to come to the aid of ARVN forces. On December 10 the marines counterattacked overland in the face of stiff resistance from VC local forces and three battalions of the VC 2nd Division’s 1st Regiment. The Special Landing Force (SLF), a newly created unit stationed in reserve aboard an aircraft carrier off the coast, was brought in by helicopter. When the SLF reached the battlefield, it came under heavy Communist fire. The SLF had a difficult time securing its landing zones before the VC withdrew into the Phuoc Ha Valley. During December 12–24 Boeing B-52 Stratofortress bombers attacked VC positions in the valley, but the VC had already pulled out. On December 18 one last battle took place in the southern margin of the HARVEST MOON operating area. After being ambushed by the entire 1st Regiment of the VC 2nd Division, a marine battalion employed superior firepower in defeating the attackers. HARVEST MOON was the U.S. Marine Corps’ last battle of 1965. The Marine Corps learned a number of lessons, including the necessity for better air-to-ground coordination and the need for more advanced planning. The technique of search and destroy had brought only mixed results, as did the use of B-52 bombers, the SLF, and UH-1E (“Huey”) helicopters. Marine casualties numbered 51 dead and 256 wounded. VC dead were estimated at 407. Although the VC proved aggressive and skillful both in attack and in their ability to elude entrapment, the marines had been able to defeat them in open firefights. Still, following the operation the marines returned to their enclave base area, meaning that the Phuoc Ha Valley would be the scene of future battles. ERIC JARVIS See also Ia Drang, Battle of; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Search and Destroy; United States Marine Corps; Westmoreland, William Childs References Ngo Quy Nhon, Pham Hong Nhan, and Tran Thuc. Su Doan 2, Tap 1 [2nd Division, Vol. 1]. Da Nang, Vietnam: Da Nang Publishing House, 1989.
Shulimson, Jack, and Charles M. Johnson. U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Landing and the Buildup. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1977. Stanton, Shelby L. The Rise and Fall of an American Army: The U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985. Walt, Lewis W. Strange War, Strange Strategy: A General’s Report on Vietnam. New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1976.
HASTINGS,
Operation
Start Date: July 7, 1966 End Date: August 3, 1966 U.S. Marine Corps reconnaissance operation in Quang Tri Province. U.S. marines in Vietnam were deployed in the I Corps Tactical Zone, the northernmost of the four military regions in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). South Vietnam’s five provinces contained some 2.6 million people as well as the important cities of Da Nang and Hue. Prior to Operation HASTINGS, the marines in the I Corps Tactical Zone were primarily engaged in counterguerrilla warfare against the Viet Cong (VC) political and guerrilla infrastructure. Most marine activities took place in the southern part of the I Corps Tactical Zone. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), commander General William Westmoreland did not approve of the marine emphasis on counterinsurgency. He wanted them to conduct largeunit operations against Communist main forces. Westmoreland was convinced that the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) was building up its strength in northern South Vietnam for a major offensive, possibly including an attack on Hue. In the spring of 1966 the marines, at Westmoreland’s insistence, began conducting reconnaissance operations in Quang Tri Province to determine the extent of the PAVN buildup. On July 7, 1966, the code name Operation HASTINGS was given to these reconnaissance operations. Fighting during HASTINGS took place across a broad front between Route 9, the major regional east-west highway, and the demilitarized zone (DMZ). The marines’ adversaries were not local VC guerrillas but rather well-armed and well-trained members of the PAVN 324B Division, which frequently ambushed marine patrols from strongly fortified positions. These light infantry forces were equipped with Chinese assault rifles, automatic weapons, and mortars. The heaviest fighting took place during July 12–25, and the operation officially ended on August 3. HASTINGS was the largest and most violent operation of the war to that point. Boeing B-52 Stratofortress bombers from Guam carried out strikes to support the marines, bombing the DMZ for the first time. In addition, marine artillery fired nearly 34,500 rounds in support. Eight thousand marines and 3,000 troops of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese army) took
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U.S. marines fording a stream at Dong Ha, South Vietnam, as they move to join other elements of their battalion during Operation HASTINGS in July 1966. HASTINGS was the largest and most violent U.S. operation of the war to that point. (National Archives)
part in HASTINGS. Marine casualties were 126 killed in action and 498 wounded in action. MACV reported more than 800 PAVN dead. Fighting in the area continued after the conclusion of HASTINGS as the marines continued their reconnaissance of the area and established permanent bases. The marine command was uncertain as to the tactical goals of the PAVN 324B Division. Perhaps the division sought to shorten the long march down the Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos, but the division might also have wanted to disrupt successful marine pacification programs in the southern I Corps Tactical Zone by drawing U.S. forces farther north, away from the more heavily populated areas. Postwar Vietnamese Communist sources, quoting from a 1966 high-level Communist Party document on military strategy, reveal that one of the purposes of the North Vietnamese operation was indeed to divert U.S. forces away from the heavily populated areas to the south to ease the pressure on VC forces there. However, the April 1966 party document also says that another goal of this operation was to seize the offensive initiative in the northern I Corps Tactical Zone in order to prevent U.S. forces from conducting ground attacks into the southern panhandle of North Vietnam, where the hub of North Vietnam’s troop infiltration and supply operations down the Ho Chi Minh Trail was located.
HASTINGS did bring a realignment of marine forces in the I Corps Tactical Zone. No longer would primary emphasis be on pacification. The North Vietnamese had expanded the war, and the U.S. military believed that it had little choice but to respond. In March 1965 marine strength in Vietnam was 5,000 men. By the end of the following year there would be 70,000 marines in the I Corps Tactical Zone. PETER W. BRUSH
See also Clear and Hold; Pacification; PRAIRIE I, Operation; United States Marine Corps; Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, Army; Westmoreland, William Childs References Nguyen Van Minh, ed. Lich Su Khang Chien Chong My Cuu Nuoc, 1954– 1975, Tap IV, Cuoc Dung Dau Lich Su [History of the Resistance War against the Americans to Save the Nation, 1954–1975, Vol. 4, A Historic Confrontation]. Hanoi: National Political Publishing House, 1999. Pearson, Willard. The War in the Northern Provinces, 1966–1968. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1975. Shulimson, Jack. U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1966: An Expanding War. Marine Corps Vietnam Series. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Marine Corps Historical Center, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters, 1982.
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Hatfield, Mark Odom
Hatfield, Mark Odom Birth Date: July 22, 1922 Educator, politician, and Republican U.S. senator (1967–1997) who was a steady critic of American involvement in Vietnam. Mark Odom Hatfield was born in Dallas, Oregon, on July 22, 1922. He graduated from Willamette University in 1943 and served in the U.S. Navy in the Pacific theater during World War II. Receiving a master’s degree in political science from Stanford University in 1948, Hatfield joined the faculty at Willamette University, where he held a position until 1959. During his time there he also served as dean of students (1950–1956). Running as a Republican, Hatfield served in the Oregon House of Representatives from 1950 to 1955 and in the Oregon Senate from 1955 to 1957. Hatfield was Oregon’s secretary of state from 1957 to 1959, at which time he became governor. He served an eight-year term until he was elected to the U.S. Senate and took his seat in January 1967. Hatfield was elected to the Senate essentially on an antiwar platform in 1966. During Richard M. Nixon’s presidency, Hatfield was one of the major doves in the Senate. In June 1970 he proposed replacing the Nixon administration because it had failed to deliver on its 1968 campaign promise to end the war. Following the American incursion into Cambodia in May 1970, Hatfield cosponsored with Democratic senator George McGovern from South Dakota an amendment to the arms appropriations bill calling for a cutoff of funds for the war after December 31, 1970. Although defeated twice by the Senate, the Hatfield-McGovern Amendment became the rallying point for many antiwar activists. Hatfield also proposed an end of the military draft by replacing it with an all-volunteer force. Although this bill never passed, Nixon eventually ended the draft in 1973. Quite liberal for a Republican, Hatfield championed other traditionally leftist causes, including that of civil rights. Indeed, in the early 1950s while still in the Oregon House of Representatives, he successfully guided a bill through the House that ended racial discrimination in public places well before such an effort was successful at the national level. During his U.S. Senate career he favored moderate positions for his party and was not supportive of many of the causes embraced by its conservative wing. Hatfield was prochoice on the abortion issue and was against the death penalty. In 1981 he was the only Republican senator to vote against the Ronald Reagan administration’s budget increases for the Pentagon. A decade later Hatfield voted against empowering the George H. W. Bush administration to wage war on Iraq (Hatfield was one of only two Republican senators to cast a nay vote). Throughout his long senatorial career, Hatfield earned a reputation as a man of great principle who was unwilling to sacrifice his beliefs for political gain. In 1990 Hatfield was reelected to his fifth term in the Senate, but he chose to retire from public life in 1996. He returned to Oregon and began teaching political science and history at several colleges and universities in his home state. Hatfield has also au-
thored several books and was the subject of an entire chapter in Tom Brokaw’s popular book The Greatest Generation (1998). ROBERT G. MANGRUM AND PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR. See also Case, Clifford Philip; Case-Church Amendment; Church, Frank Forrester; Cooper, John Sherman; Cooper-Church Amendment; Hatfield-McGovern Amendment; McGovern, George Stanley References Hatfield, Mark, and Diane L. Soloman. Against the Grain: Reflections of a Rebel Republican. Ashland, OR: White Cloud, 2001. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. Summers, Harry G., Jr. The Vietnam War Almanac. New York: Ballantine, 1985.
Hatfield-McGovern Amendment The most significant defiance in the U.S. Senate of executive power between 1965 and 1970. Before President Richard M. Nixon ordered the Cambodian Incursion in April 1970, he conferred with only a few supportive lawmakers. Many senators, upset with his secrecy and enraged at his expansion of the conflict in Southeast Asia, bestirred themselves to a symbolic challenge of presidential authority. They revoked the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and ratified a proposal by John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) and Frank Church (D-Idaho) calling for severing all financing for U.S. military activity in Cambodia beyond June 30, 1970. More restrictive was an amendment affixed to military procurement legislation sponsored by Senators George S. McGovern (D-S. Dak.) and Mark O. Hatfield (R-Ore.) known as the “amendment to end the war.” This amendment required the termination of U.S. military operations in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) by December 31, 1970, and the withdrawal of American forces by mid-1971. Soon rewritten to garner more favor, the revised version set the maximum U.S. troop level at 280,000 men by April 30, 1971, and changed the removal deadline to the end of 1971. The revised amendment also urged the Nixon administration to tender information concerning the difficulties of implementing disengagement. The White House, joined by its congressional allies, pounced upon the Hatfield-McGovern Amendment. Accusing domestic critics of protracting the conflict, Nixon warned the legislative leadership that if lawmakers checked him, Congress would have to live with the unfortunate result. Vice President Spiro T. Agnew, charging the amendment’s partisans with being isolationists, asserted that the proposal would undermine the Paris negotiations, cause America’s first defeat, and open South Vietnam and the rest of Indochina to communism. Senators John C. Stennis (D-Miss.) and Cooper backed the administration, arguing that the amendment would impede the president’s role as chief diplomat as well as the U.S. position at the Paris peace talks. McGovern and Hatfield responded to the Nixon administration’s accusations, censuring Agnew for his failure to understand
HAWTHORNE, Operation
the constitutional obligation of joint accountability for cessation of the war. McGovern added that “If the Cambodian invasion was ‘the finest hour in the Nixon presidency,’” as Agnew claimed, “God save us from whatever may be the worst hour.” McGovern likewise held each senator partially answerable for the thousands dead and wounded as a result of the conflict. The Hatfield-McGovern Amendment suffered defeat on September 1, 1970, by a vote of 55 to 39, with 34 Republicans and 21 Democrats opposed and 32 Democrats and 7 Republicans in favor. RODNEY J. ROSS See also Agnew, Spiro Theodore; Church, Frank Forrester; Cooper, John Sherman; Cooper-Church Amendment; Hatfield, Mark Odom; McGovern, George Stanley; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Stennis, John Cornelius
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References Ambrose, Stephen E. Nixon. 3 vols. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987, 1989, 1991. Herring, George C. America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975. 4th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001. Sobel, Lester A., ed. South Vietnam: U.S.-Communist Confrontation in Southeast Asia, Vol. 5, 1970. New York: Facts on File, 1973.
HAWTHORNE,
Operation
Start Date: June 2, 1966 End Date: June 20, 1966 The first phase in the Battle of Dak To, an outpost in northern Kontum Province. Operation HAWTHORNE began on June 2, 1966, with the mission to rescue Vietnamese irregulars at the Tou Morong
A U.S. infantry patrol moves into position to assault a Communist position after an attempted Communist effort to overrun a U.S. fire base during Operation HAWTHORNE at Dak To in South Vietnam in June 1966. (National Archives)
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Special Forces camp, near Dak To, that was surrounded by units of the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) 24th Regiment. The 101st Airborne Division’s 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment (1-327 Infantry), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel David H. Hackworth, and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) 1st Battalion of the 42nd Regiment fought through moderate resistance to reach the hilltop garrison and evacuate its 150 inhabitants. The 1-327 Infantry then pursued the PAVN forces into the surrounding valleys. On the night of June 6, 1966, a large PAVN force attacked and partially overran a U.S. artillery position. American casualties were 4 killed and 10 wounded; a sweep of the perimeter revealed 86 PAVN dead. The next day a company of the 1-327 Infantry was mauled as it wandered into the middle of a PAVN base camp and was saved only by artillery fire and the insertion of additional infantry. As a second company maintained contact with the Communists for 10 days, it was apparent that a major PAVN force was present, and the 101st Airborne Division’s 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry (2-502 Infantry) joined the fray. In a famous and tragic episode, waves of PAVN attackers surrounded and nearly overran the night position of one of the companies. Headlines were generated at home when it was learned that the company commander, Captain William S. Carpenter, well known as an all-American football player at West Point, bravely called in napalm strikes on his own position to repel the attack. Carpenter’s company suffered 6 killed and 25 seriously wounded, many from napalm burns, but at daybreak very few PAVN dead were found around the hilltop. Soon afterward, the remaining company of the 1-327 Infantry moved out of Tou Morong and encountered well-entrenched PAVN positions. Companies of the 2-502 Infantry immediately air assaulted from Dak To as a blocking force. Hoping to trap the entire PAVN 24th Regiment, II Corps command flew in the 1st Cavalry Division’s 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry (1-5 Infantry), from An Khe and a company of the 2-327 Infantry from Tuy Hoa. U.S. forces were supported by 463 air strikes and 36 Boeing B-52 Stratofortress sorties that sometimes cut safety margins to a minimum but accounted for more than 200 PAVN casualties. HAWTHORNE was nearing termination when, on June 17, a company of the 1-327 Infantry engaged a small PAVN force in dense terrain. Responding to a call for support, 1st Cavalry gunships hit the company position itself, killing 1 and wounding 29. Finally on June 20 the remaining PAVN forces withdrew, having suffered more than 500 dead. U.S. casualties during the 19 days of Operation HAWTHORNE were more than 50 dead and 200 wounded. JOHN D. ROOT See also Air Mobility; Dak To, Battle of; Fratricide; Hackworth, David Haskell References Hackworth, David H., and Eihys England. Steel My Soldiers’ Hearts. New York: Touchstone, 2003.
Hackworth, Colonel David H., and Julie Sherman. About Face: The Odyssey of an American Warrior. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989. Marshall, S. L. A. Battles in the Monsoon: Campaigning in the Central Highlands, South Vietnam, Summer, 1966. New York: William Morrow, 1967. Stanton, Shelby L. The Rise and Fall of an American Army: The U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985.
Hayden, Thomas Emmett Birth Date: December 11, 1939 Influential early leader of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), antiwar activist associated with the August 1968 demonstrations during the Democratic National Convention in Chicago, and later Democratic politician. Born on December 11, 1939, in Royal Oak, Michigan, Thomas Emmett Hayden entered the University of Michigan in 1957 and, as editor of the student newspaper, advocated liberal social causes. Student demonstrations against the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) and civil rights sit-ins galvanized his political activism. After graduation he worked with the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) to register voters in the southern United States. Returning to Ann Arbor, Hayden was among the founders of the SDS, an organization calling for social changes to align America with its often unrealized ideals. He served as SDS president during 1962–1963 and was the primary author of the 1962 Port Huron Statement. This extensive critique of U.S. society called for individuals to share in making the decisions that affected their lives and proved to be one of the defining documents of the New Left. From 1964 to 1967 Hayden headed the SDS Economic Research and Action Project in Newark, New Jersey, one of several efforts to organize the poor in northern cities. Finding government response to racism, poverty, and militarism inadequate, Hayden sought increasingly radical solutions to America’s social problems. Hayden’s opposition to the Vietnam War twice took him to Indochina. In December 1965, he visited the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) with Herbert Aptheker and Staughton Lynd, and in 1967 Hayden accompanied three released American prisoners of war from Cambodia. As a leader of the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Hayden acted as a key planner of demonstrations during the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago. These often violent confrontations between police and protesters, labeled a “police riot” by investigators, led the government to charge Hayden and several others with conspiracy to riot. As a defendant in the highly publicized trial of the Chicago Eight, later known as the Chicago Seven after defendant Bobby Seale’s trial was separated, Hayden and six others initially were convicted in February 1970, but an appeals court overturned the verdict in November 1972 because of Judge Julius Hoffman’s improper and antagonistic conduct.
Healy, Michael D. Following the trial Hayden continued to speak and write against the war, but a period of intense introspection tempered his radicalism. Although still critical of the nation’s flaws, he moved his dissent back into the mainstream. With actor Jane Fonda, whom he married and later divorced, he organized the Indochina Peace Campaign (IPC) in 1972. The IPC toured the country during that year’s presidential campaign with speeches, visual displays, pamphlets, and music to reinvigorate the war issue and register antiwar voters. After the war Californians elected Hayden to the state legislature in 1982, where he continued to serve until 2000. During his tenure he mounted an unsuccessful gubernatorial bid in 1994 and ran unsuccessfully for mayor of Los Angeles in 1997. In 1999 he was a featured speaker at protests surrounding the World Trade Organization’s meeting in Seattle, Washington. Hayden has also taught courses at Occidental College and at Pitzer College and has authored numerous books. He remains active in the progressive wing of the Democratic Party, and he supported and actively campaigned for President Barack Obama’s 2008 presidential campaign. MITCHELL K. HALL See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Chicago Eight; Democratic National Convention of 1968; Fonda, Jane Seymour; Seale, Bobby; Students for a Democratic Society References Gitlin, Todd. The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage. New York: Bantam, 1987. Hayden, Tom. Reunion: A Memoir. New York: Random House, 1988. Miller, James. Democracy Is in the Streets: From Port Huron to the Siege of Chicago. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987. Sale, Kirkpatrick. SDS. New York: Random House, 1973.
Healy, Michael D. Birth Date: June 13, 1926 U.S. Army officer and last commander of the 5th Special Forces Group in Vietnam. Born in Chicago, Illinois, on June 13, 1926, Michael “Iron Mike” D. Healy entered the U.S. Army in June 1945 at Fort Sheridan, Illinois, as an enlisted man. Commissioned in the infantry in December 1946 and reassigned to Japan, he served in a number of troop assignments with the 1st Cavalry Division in the U.S. occupation forces there until 1949. With the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, Healy joined the 4th Ranger Infantry Company in Korea, where he participated in four major campaigns involving extensive behind-the-lines special operations including the parachute assault on Musan-Ni in March 1951, when his Ranger company was attached to the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team. After the war he joined the 11th Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, Kentucky.
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In 1953 Healy volunteered for the newly formed 77th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, where he served as operational detachment commander, operations officer, and instructor in guerrilla warfare. He attended the Marine Corps School at Quantico, Virginia, and was assigned to the European-based 10th Special Forces Group in January 1957. After attending the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in 1960, Healy was assigned to the Pentagon. In July 1963 he was reassigned to Headquarters, U.S. Army Special Forces, Vietnam, with duty initially as the operations officer and then as senior adviser to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) Special Forces. In August 1964 Healy returned to the United States and assumed command of the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 501st Infantry, 101st Infantry Division. After almost two years in command he elected to deploy to Vietnam with his battalion, which was redesignated as the 4th Battalion (Airborne), 503rd Infantry, 173rd Airborne Brigade (Separate). After 30 consecutive months in command, he returned to the United States to attend the U.S. Army War College. In March 1969 Colonel Healy returned for his third tour of duty in Vietnam, where he became commander of Special Troops and assistant chief of staff, G-1, XXIV Corps. In August 1969 he assumed command of the 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, and redeployed the brigade to Hawaii. After only three weeks in Hawaii, he was recalled to Vietnam to take over the 5th Special Forces Group, which he commanded for 20 months. Healy supervised the conversion of the South Vietnamese Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) to Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) rangers and the subsequent phase down of the 5th Special Forces Group. This involved the conversion of the 38 remaining A-detachment camps to ARVN ranger battalions by the end of 1970; Special Forces strength in support of the CIDG program was reduced to zero by March 31, 1971. Colonel Healy presided over the last 5th Special Forces Group formation on February 28, 1971. The Department of the Army officially closed the 5th Special Forces Group out of South Vietnam effective March 3, 1971. Healy returned to the United States, where he was assigned to Headquarters, Department of the Army. He later became the assistant division commander, 82nd Airborne Division, at Fort Bragg. In May 1972 Healy was once again recalled to Vietnam, where he initially served as the deputy commanding general, 3rd Regional Assistance Command, Military Region III and III Corps. In June 1972 when John Paul Vann was killed in a helicopter crash near Kontum, Healy replaced him and became commanding general, 2nd Regional Assistance Command, Military Region II and II Corps. He remained in command until all U.S. forces were withdrawn in 1973. Upon his return to the United States, General Healy assumed command of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Center and Institute for Military Assistance at Fort Bragg. He was promoted to major general and remained in command until
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October 1975. After a number of other important assignments, General Healy retired from the army in 1981. He now resides in Jacksonville, Florida. JAMES H. WILLBANKS See also Civilian Irregular Defense Group; United States Special Forces; Vann, John Paul; Vietnam, Republic of, Special Forces References Krepinevich, Andrew F., Jr. The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. Stanton, Shelby L. Green Berets at War: U.S. Army Special Forces in Southeast Asia, 1956–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985.
Heath, Donald Read Birth Date: August 12, 1894 Death Date: October 15, 1981 U.S. career diplomat and minister to the Associated States of Indochina (Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam) from 1950 to 1952; ambassador to Vietnam and Cambodia from 1952 to 1955. Born in Topeka, Kansas, on August 12, 1894, Donald Read Heath attended Topeka’s Washburn College and the University of Montpellier in France. After serving in the U.S. Army during World War I, he entered the Foreign Service in 1920. From 1921 until 1950 Heath held a variety of posts in Europe and Latin America, becoming minister to Bulgaria in 1947. In 1950 he was expelled from Bulgaria on accusations of interference in that nation’s internal affairs. Later that year he was named U.S. minister to the Associated States of Indochina. In 1952 Heath became the first U.S. ambassador to Vietnam and Cambodia. Although supportive of the French cause in Southeast Asia, he met stern resistance from French officials who resented U.S. interference. When Ngo Dinh Diem emerged as the de facto leader of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) in 1954, Heath argued in favor of prompt U.S. support for the Diem regime. Heath was sustained in his opinion by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and soon massive amounts of U.S. aid were pouring into Saigon. In 1955 Heath left Vietnam to become ambassador to Lebanon. Two years later he assumed the same post in Saudi Arabia, where he remained until his retirement from government service in 1961. He subsequently held a professorship at the University of California, Los Angeles, and worked for a private company that sought to receive payment by foreign governments on defaulted bonds held by Americans. Heath died on October 15, 1981, in Orinda, California. DAVID COFFEY See also Dulles, John Foster; Ngo Dinh Diem
References Findling, John E. Dictionary of American Diplomatic History. 2nd ed. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1989. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. Who Was Who in America with World Notables, Vol. 9, 1985–1989. Wilmette, IL: Macmillan Directory Division, 1989.
Helicopters, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam The Vietnam War has become known as the “Helicopter War.” More helicopters were used for more purposes in the Vietnam War than in any previous war. For many reasons, hardly an operation was executed without them. Poor roads and dense jungles made Vietnam ideal for guerrilla ambushes and difficult for ground transport. Guerrillas could easily attack outlying bases, ambush the rescuers, and then vanish into the trackless bush. Troop-carrying helicopters avoided ambushes by avoiding roads. This was one factor that led the United States to send helicopters to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) in 1961. As the French discovered by 1950, helicopters could also quickly evacuate the wounded and were also ideal for reconnaissance because of their good crew visibility and maneuverability. Still in their infancy in the 1950s, helicopters improved greatly in the 1960s. Most important was the change from piston to turboshaft engines and from wooden to composition rotor blades. Other improved parts led to longer runs between overhauls, less downtime, and higher availability rates. Better helicopters led the U.S. Army in the 1960s to experiment with the concept of air mobility, and Vietnam provided the laboratory. Air mobility involved flying troops into battle and supporting them with an air line of fire support and supply. American forces used air mobility repeatedly. Air mobility was not possible unless helicopters proved survivable in combat. From the first, they were survivable against small-arms fire. The U.S. Air Force and the Republic of Vietnam Air Force (VNAF, South Vietnamese Air Force) enjoyed complete air superiority in South Vietnam, and allied helicopters thus flew under a friendly air umbrella. Helicopters were survivable also because initially Viet Cong (VC) and People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) units lacked antiaircraft weapons. Later in the war when they did have these weapons, as in Operations DELAWARE–LAM SON 261 and LAM SON 719, Communist forces shot down many helicopters. Defensive techniques such as treetop flying and suppressive fire at the landing zone (LZ) improved helicopters’ survivability. The following are the various types of helicopters used in the Vietnam War.
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United States and Republic of Vietnam Westland Sikorsky S-51 (R-6) Manufactured in Great Britain under license from Sikorsky, the R-6 was an improved version of the R-4. The French used it for medical evacuation and supply before 1954. Specifications are crew consisting of one pilot; power plant, one 240-horsepower (hp) Franklin 0-405-9 radial piston engine; length, 38 feet 3 inches; rotor diameter, 38 feet; loaded weight, 2,590 pounds; maximum speed, 96 miles per hour (mph); and service ceiling, 10,000 feet.
Hiller H-23 Raven Utilized by the French for medical evacuation, observation, and supply before 1954, the H-23 was also used by Americans for observation before it was replaced by the Hughes OH-6A Cayuse about 1968. Specifications are crew consisting of one pilot and one copilot; power plant, one 323-hp Lycoming VO-540-A1B piston engine; length, 40 feet 8 inches; height, 9 feet 9.5 inches; rotor diameter, 35 feet 5 inches; empty weight, 1,755 pounds; maximum weight, 2,800 pounds; maximum speed, 96 mph; service ceiling, 16,200 feet; and range, 225 miles.
Bell H-13 Sioux First used by the French before 1954, the H-13 was the main American light observation helicopter in Vietnam until it was replaced by the Hughes OH-6A Cayuse around 1968. Specifications are crew consisting of one pilot; power plant, one 240-hp Lycoming 0-435-6 piston engine; length, 32 feet 4 inches; height, 9 feet 6 inches; rotor diameter, 37 feet 2 inches; empty weight, 1,652 pounds; maximum weight, 2,700 pounds; maximum speed, 100 mph; and range, 300 miles.
Sikorsky H-19 Chickasaw Employed by the French for troop movement and supply before 1954, the H-19 found use as a utility helicopter in the early days of American involvement. Specifications are crew consisting of one pilot and one copilot; power plant, one 600-hp Pratt & Whitney R-1340-57 Wasp radial piston engine; length, 42 feet 2 inches; height, 13 feet 4 inches; rotor diameter, 53 feet; empty weight, 4,795 pounds; maximum weight, 7,900 pounds; maximum speed, 101 mph; service ceiling, 10,500 feet; and range, 405 miles.
Piasecki CH-21C Shawnee Employed by the first U.S. Army units in Vietnam in 1961 as a troop carrier and for search-and-rescue operations, the CH-21C’s laminated wooden rotor blades often came apart in the humid heat, and the small exits made troop debarkation difficult. To afford better protection at LZs, some Shawnees were armed with machine guns and rockets. By 1964 the Shawnee was replaced as a troop carrier by the UH-1 Iroquois.
Specifications are crew consisting of pilot, copilot, and gunners; power plant, one 1,425-hp Wright R-1820-103 radial piston engine; length, 52 feet 6 inches; height, 15 feet 5 inches; rotors, two in tandem, 44 feet 6 inches in diameter; empty weight, 8,000 pounds; maximum weight, 15,000 pounds; maximum speed, 131 mph; and service ceiling, 9,450 feet.
Sikorsky H-34 Choctaw The United States sent H-34s to Vietnam in 1961 for use in an Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) strike force, but President Ngo Dinh Diem used them for administrative purposes. The U.S. Marine Corps sent an aviation unit of H-34s to Vietnam in 1962. The unit was moved to the mountains below the demilitarized zone (DMZ) because the H-34 had more lifting power at high altitude than the CH-21C. The H-34 was utilized for troop movement, supply, and artillery emplacement. In 1966 the Boeing-Vertol CH-46A Sea Knight replaced the H-34. Specifications are crew consisting of pilot, copilot, and two crewmen; power plant, one 1,525-hp Wright R-1820-84 radial piston engine; length, 46 feet 9 inches; height, 15 feet 11 inches; rotor diameter, 56 feet; empty weight, 8,400 pounds; maximum weight, 13,300 pounds; maximum speed, 123 mph; service ceiling, 9,500 feet; and range, 182 miles.
Sikorsky CH-37 Mojave The U.S. Army used the Mojave in Vietnam from 1962 until the late 1960s largely for recovering downed aircraft and for heavy lift. The Boeing-Vertol CH-47 Chinook replaced the Mojave. Specifications are crew consisting of pilot, copilot, and crew chief; power plant, two 2,100-hp Pratt & Whitney R-2800-54 radial piston engines; length, 88 feet; height, 22 feet; rotors, two, one on either side of the fuselage, with a diameter of 72 feet; empty weight, 20,831 pounds; maximum weight, 31,000 pounds; maximum speed, 130 mph; service ceiling, 8,700 feet; and range, 145 miles.
Bell UH-1H Iroquois Known as the “Huey,” the UH-1 went through several design changes from 1962 until the end of the war. Especially notable were the A, B, and D models. The UH-1 was the principal helicopter used by all allied forces in Vietnam for many missions: troop carrying, gunship escort, supply, command and control, medical evacuation, rocket artillery, radio relay, reconnaissance, rescue, base security, and psychological warfare. Specifications for the H model are crew consisting of pilot, copilot, and crew chief/door gunner; power plant, one 1,400shaft horsepower (shp) Lycoming T-53-L-13 turboshaft engine; length, 44 feet 7 inches; height, 13 feet 5 inches; rotor, 48 feet; empty weight, 5,090 pounds; maximum weight, 9,500 pounds; maximum speed, 130 mph; service ceiling, 12,700 feet; and range, 357 miles.
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U.S. Army Bell UH-1D helicopters airlift members of the 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment, from the Filhol Rubber Plantation area to a new staging area during Operation WAHIAWA, a search and destroy mission conducted by the 25th Infantry Division, northeast of Cu Chi, South Vietnam, May 16, 1966. (National Archives)
Boeing-Vertol CH-47 Chinook Irreverently referred to as the “Shithook” by troops, the Chinook was the U.S. Army’s primary medium-lift helicopter in Vietnam starting in 1965. ARVN forces also employed the Chinook. Its major missions included troop transport, medical evacuation, artillery emplacement, aircraft retrieval, and supply. An external sling allowed transport of heavy objects. Specifications are crew consisting of pilot, copilot, and crew chief; power plant, two 3,750-shp Lycoming T55-L-11A turboshaft engines; length, 99 feet; height, 18 feet 8 inches; rotors, two in tandem, 60 feet in diameter; empty weight, 21,464 pounds; maximum weight, 33,000 pounds; maximum speed, 189 mph; service ceiling, 15,000 feet; and range, 230 miles.
Sikorsky CH-54 Tarhe The CH-54 provided heavy lift capability for the U.S. Army in Vietnam beginning in 1965. Known as the “Flying Crane” or “Skycrane,” the CH-54 could lift externally slung objects weighing up to 12.5 tons. These included vehicles, 155-mm artillery, disabled aircraft, and special command and troop transport modules. Downdraft from its blades could easily blow away tents and similar objects.
Specifications are crew consisting of pilot, copilot, and freight master; power plant, two 4,500-shp Pratt & Whitney JFTD12-4A turboshaft engines; length, 88 feet 6 inches; height, 25 feet 5 inches; rotor diameter, 72 feet; empty weight, 19,234 pounds; maximum weight, 42,000 pounds; maximum speed, 126 mph; service ceiling, 9,000 feet; and range, 230 miles.
Bell AH-1 Huey Cobra The Cobra was designed and developed by Bell Helicopter around UH-1 Iroquois components. Its two crew members had tandem seats in the sleek fuselage, and they controlled mixes of armaments to include 7.62-mm miniguns, 40-mm grenade launcher, 20-mm cannon, and various rockets. The AH-1 was designed to replace the slower armed UH-1B, called a “Hog,” for suppressive fire at the LZ. Coming into service in 1967, the Cobra proved very versatile in fire support for U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps troops. Specifications are crew consisting of pilot and copilot/gunner; power plant, 1,800-shp Lycoming T53-L-703 turboshaft engine; length, 44 feet 7 inches; height, 13 feet 6 inches; rotor diameter, 44 feet; empty weight, 6,479 pounds; maximum weight, 10,000 pounds; maximum speed, 141 mph; service ceiling, 12,200 feet; and range, 315 miles.
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A Sikorsky CH-54A Tarhe, known as the “Skycrane,” of the U.S. Army’s 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). The twin-engine, heavy-lift Skycrane, which had a payload of 20,000 pounds, performed highly effective service during the Vietnam War. (National Archives)
Hughes OH-6A Cayuse This helicopter was also called a “Loach” because it won the 1962 U.S. Army Light Observation Helicopter (LOH) competition. Coming into service in 1967, the Hughes OH-6A Cayuse replaced the Bell H-13 and Hiller H-23 observation helicopters. The U.S. Marine Corps also used the Cayuse beginning in 1969. A major tactic was to fly low to draw and then pinpoint enemy fire. Specifications are crew consisting of pilot and copilot; power plant, 317-shp Allison T63-A-5A turboshaft engine; length, 30 feet 31 inches; height, 8 feet 1.5 inches; rotor diameter, 26 feet 4 inches; empty weight, 1,229 pounds; maximum weight, 2,400 pounds; maximum speed, 150 mph; service ceiling, 15,800 feet; and range, 380 miles.
Bell OH-58 Kiowa The Kiowa, which won the 1968 U.S. Army LOH competition, replaced the OH-6A Cayuse.
Specifications are crew consisting of pilot and copilot; power plant, 317-shp Allison T63-A-700 turboshaft engine; length, 32 feet 7 inches; height, 9 feet 6.5 inches; rotor diameter, 35 feet 4 inches; empty weight, 1,464 pounds; maximum weight, 3,000 pounds; maximum speed, 138 mph; service ceiling, 18,900 feet; and range, 298 miles.
Kaman H-43 Husky Introduced in 1958, the Husky was used by the U.S. Air Force mainly for air base crash-and-rescue functions in Vietnam. The Husky had two counterrotating rotors and tail fins on twin booms but no tail rotor. Specifications are crew consisting of pilot, copilot, and two firefighters; power plant, one 825-shp Lycoming T53-L-1B turboshaft engine; diameter of rotors, 47 feet; fuselage length, 25 feet 2 inches; height, 15 feet 6 inches; empty weight, 4,469 pounds; maximum weight, 9,150 pounds; maximum speed, 130 mph; service ceiling, 25,000 feet; and range, 235 miles.
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Kaman UH-2 Seasprite
Sikorsky H-3 Sea King
The U.S. Navy used the Seasprite mainly for rescue, firefighting, and antisubmarine warfare after its introduction in 1962. Specifications are crew consisting of pilot, copilot, and sensor operator; power plant, two 1,350-shp General Electric T58-GE-8F turboshaft engines; single rotor diameter, 44 feet; length, 52 feet 7 inches; height, 15 feet 6 inches; empty weight, 7,040 pounds; maximum weight, 12,800 pounds; maximum speed, 165 mph; service ceiling, 22,500 feet; and range, 422 miles.
The U.S. Air Force used the Sea King for search and rescue, while the U.S. Navy used it mainly for antisubmarine warfare. The air force HH-3E model was called the “Jolly Green Giant.” By 1967 the Sea King had air-refueling capability. Specifications are crew consisting of pilot, copilot, and two sensor operators (maximum crew); power plant, two 1,400-shp General Electric T58-GE-10 turboshaft engines; length, 72 feet 8 inches; height, 16 feet 10 inches; single rotor diameter, 62 feet; empty weight, 11,865 pounds; maximum weight, 21,000 pounds; maximum speed, 166 mph; service ceiling, 14,700 feet; and range, 625 miles.
Boeing-Vertol CH-46 Sea Knight The U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps used the Sea Knight for troop transport. During 1966 the Sea Knight replaced the H-34 Choctaw. The Sea Knight is similar in design to the CH-47 Chinook, having tandem rotors. Specifications are crew consisting of pilot, copilot, and crew chief; power plant, two 1,400-shp General Electric T58-GE-10 turboshaft engines; length, 84 feet 4 inches; height, 16 feet 8 inches; diameter of rotors, 51 feet; empty weight, 13,342 pounds; maximum weight, 23,000 pounds; maximum speed, 166 mph; service ceiling, 14,000 feet; and range, 237 miles.
Sikorsky HH-53B Sea Stallion Known as the “Super Jolly Green Giant” or “Buff” (for “Big Ugly Fat Fellow”), the Sea Stallion replaced the Sea King in search and rescue. The U.S. Navy used one model for minesweeping, and the U.S. Marine Corps used another model for assault. To build the Sea Stallion, designers stretched the Sea King fuselage and used CH-54 Tarhe components. Specifications are crew consisting of pilot, copilot, and crew chief; power plant, two 3,925-shp General Electric T-64-GE-3 tur-
Sikorsky HH-3E “Jolly Green Giant” helicopters were often employed in search-and-rescue operations to locate pilots downed in Vietnam or in the South China Sea. (Department of Defense)
Helicopters, Employment of, in Vietnam boshaft engines; length, 88 feet 3 inches; height, 24 feet 11 inches; single rotor diameter, 72 feet 3 inches; empty weight, 23,485 pounds; maximum weight, 42,000 pounds; maximum speed, 196 mph; service ceiling, 21,000 feet; and range, 257 miles.
Democratic Republic of Vietnam Mil Mi-4 Hound The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) used this Soviet helicopter for transporting troops and cargo and carrying crews to repair damaged roads and bridges. The Mi-4 was first produced in 1953. Specifications are crew consisting of pilot and copilot; power plant, one 1,700-hp Shvestov ASh 82V radial piston engine; length, 55 feet 1 inch; height, 17 feet; rotor diameter, 68 feet 11 inch; empty weight, 11,614 pounds; maximum weight, 17,196 pounds; maximum speed, 130 mph; service ceiling, 18,040 feet; and range, 370 miles.
Mil Mi-6 Hook Introduced by the Soviets in 1960, the Hook was used by North Vietnam as a heavy lift helicopter for emplacing heavy artillery, antiaircraft guns, and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and for transporting MiG jet fighters back and forth from distant dispersal areas to airfield runways. Specifications are crew consisting of pilot, copilot, and three crew members; power plant, two 5,500-shp Soloviev D-25V turboshaft engines; length, 108 feet 10 inches; height, 32 feet 4 inches; rotor diameter, 114 feet 10 inches; empty weight, 60,053 pounds; maximum weight, 93,695 pounds; maximum speed, 186 mph; service ceiling, 14,750 feet; and range, 385 miles. JOHN L. BELL JR. See also Air Mobility; DELAWARE–LAM SON 216, Operation; Helicopters, Employment of, in Vietnam; LAM SON 719, Operation References Bell, Dana. Vietnam Warbirds in Action. London: Arms and Armour, 1986. Dunstan, Simon. Vietnam Choppers: Helicopters in Battle 1950–1975. Rev. ed. Oxford, UK: Osprey, 2003. McGowen, Stanley S. Helicopters: An Illustrated History of Their Impact. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2005. Polmar, Norman, and Floyd D. Kennedy, Jr. Military Helicopters of the World: Military Rotary-Wing Aircraft since 1917. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1981.
Helicopters, Employment of, in Vietnam The French introduced the first helicopters in Indochina, using them primarily in medical evacuation. These small Hiller 360s proved too underpowered, and soon Sikorsky H-5s and H-19s bolstered the French helicopter forces. By 1954, 42 American-built helicopters served with French troops in Indochina, where they
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compiled an impressive record in medical evacuation and in supplying isolated units. Several helicopters received hits from ground fire, but none had been shot down. French pilots usually flew along secured roads, and fighter aircraft accompanied them on missions where Viet Minh resistance could be expected. Helicopters made their real mark in Indochina during the Vietnam War, however. On December 11, 1961, two companies of Piasecki CH-21 Shawnees arrived by carrier in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Twelve days later they lifted more than 1,000 Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) paratroopers in the first helicopter combat assault in Vietnam. From late 1961 to early 1965, American helicopter crews, expanding their knowledge by trial and error, taught ARVN commanders tactical employment of helicopters. U.S. Army CH-21 and U.S. Marine Corps Sikorsky CH-34 Choctaws evacuated casualties, supplied outlying camps, and provided rapid disposition of units to meet Communist threats. By the end of 1964 the United States had more than 250 helicopters in Vietnam. The success of these units was one factor forcing the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) to supply insurgent forces in South Vietnam with modern weapons and to escalate movement of regular People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) troops and supplies south by the Ho Chi Minh Trail network. Tactical helicopter-borne transportation initially received little artillery or tactical air support, and U.S. advisers realized that they needed additional firepower to conduct airmobile operations. In September 1962, 15 Bell UH-1 Iroquois “Hueys,” modified to fire 2.75-inch folding fin aerial rockets and 7.62-millimeter (mm) forward-firing machine guns, deployed to Tan Son Nhut. By experimentation in actual combat, pilots developed tactical concepts governing gunship employment. Air assault operations included three phases: en route, approach, and landing. Armed helicopters proved most effective during the landing phase. After a few missions, hits on transport helicopters dropped from .011 hits per flying hour to .0074 for escorted aircraft. Hits on unescorted helicopters doubled during the same period. Suppressive fire delivered by armed helicopters proved very effective in reducing the amount and effectiveness of fire on transport helicopters. As a result of initial combat experience, a platoon of 5 to 7 armed helicopters formed an escort for 20 to 25 troop-carrying helicopters. As transportation helicopters approached a landing zone (LZ), gunships began racetrack or similar patterns on each side of landing helicopters. Gunships directed rocket and machine-gun fire on hostile concentrations while their door gunners covered their breakaway from these positions. U.S. forces also instituted Eagle Flights. These included an armed Huey piloted by the American aviation commander and carrying the ARVN troop commander. This command and control aircraft flew at a safe altitude and directed 7–10 transport helicopters
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Piasecki CH-21C Shawnee/Workhorse (“Flying Banana”) helicopters returning from a mission.These helicopters were deployed to Vietnam in December 1961 by the Kennedy administration with American crews and support personnel to provide the Army of the Republic of Vietnam with air mobility. (U.S. Army Historical Foundation)
(“slicks”) escorted by 5 gunships to provide fire support for the insertion. A medevac helicopter trailed the formation to extract any casualties. Eagle Flights provided immediate response to targets of opportunity and could easily be melded into one large airmobile operation. These became the basis for airmobile concepts employed by American combat units arriving in Vietnam in 1965. In August and September 1965 elements of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) began to arrive at An Khe. The 1st Cavalry Division organization departed radically from a standard infantry division. The first such division in the U.S. Army, it contained 434 helicopters divided into two battalions of assault helicopters, a battalion of attack helicopters, a battalion of assault support helicopters, an aerial rocket artillery (ARA) battalion (the first one in the army), and an air cavalry squadron. The division had the capability of moving one-third of its combat power at one time into terrain inaccessible to normal infantry vehicles. To support the large number of aircraft in the division, an aviation maintenance battalion augmented normal division support command. In June 1968 the 101st Airborne Division, in Vietnam since 1965, received a change of organization and became the second airmobile division in the U.S. Army. ARA units, in contrast to other gunships, operated under direction of artillery officers. Divisional or separate artillery commanders used these helicopters as an adjunct to tube (field) artillery. When called, ARA platoons communicated on fire-direction frequencies, and their fires were adjusted much the same as with conventional artillery. ARA’s great advantage lay in its long-range and heavy firepower; ARA provided rocket support to units beyond the range of conventional artillery. The Bell AH1G Cobra carried up to 76 rockets. With 17-pound warheads, these could deliver the same initial firepower as a battalion of 105-mm artillery.
Boeing CH-47 Chinooks and Sikorsky CH-54 Tarhees (“Skycranes”) expanded the combat versatility of ground units in Vietnam. Chinooks lifted artillery pieces to forward positions to provide fire support for units moving into contact. Towed 155mm and 8-inch artillery pieces could be transported by the huge Skycrane. Chinooks unloaded large numbers of infantrymen on precarious mountaintop LZs and, employing a long rope ladder that dangled down through the trees, delivered infantrymen into triple-canopy jungle. Outlying firebases and Special Forces camps relied on frequent resupply from these workhorse helicopters. Airmobile units used the CH-47 to preposition fuel and ammunition for future operations. Forward-area refueling points cut down turnaround time for helicopters to return to their missions. The excellent lift capabilities of the CH-47 and CH-54 allowed U.S. forces to recover aircraft that would have been lost in other circumstances. They could sling-load downed aircraft back to be repaired. U.S. Marine Corps helicopter operations followed much the same pattern with a few exceptions. Beginning in March 1966, Boeing CH-46 Sea Knights and Sikorsky CH-53 “Super Jolly Green Giants” replaced older CH-34 and CH-37 Mojave helicopters. UH1Es provided the marines with gunships throughout their service in Vietnam. AH-1s began to augment the Hueys in April 1969. Despite visibility limitations, U.S. Marine Corps helicopter crewmen conducted several night operations. In August 1965 they flew the first night assault in Vietnam, using CH-34s to insert infantry into the Elephant Valley northwest of Da Nang. During the Vietnam War, U.S. Marine Corps medevacs extracted several severely wounded men during night operations. Radar operators guided the pilots to the wounded, while other aircraft dropped
Helicopters, Employment of, in Vietnam flares to illuminate LZs long enough for the medevac to quickly evacuate casualties. Radar guidance allowed the U.S. Marine Corps to resupply units under inclement weather conditions. During the siege of Khe Sanh and 1969 operations in the A Shau Valley, CH-46s and CH53s made instrument climbs through the overcast skies at Quang Tri and Da Nang and with radar directions flew to the beleaguered marines. When an opening in the clouds appeared, they spiraled down to drop their external loads of water, rations, ammunition, and medical supplies into small LZs hacked into the cloud-covered rain forests of the Central Highlands. Because of thick triple-canopy jungle, helicopters could not accomplish conventional resupply or insertion of troops. Innovative commanders soon remedied this problem by adopting tactics used by Special Forces. They trained their men to rappel from long ropes dangling from hovering Hueys. If time permitted, ground units used engineer demolitions to blast openings in the jungle. Some of these clearings were so small that pilots could only hover over them and drop supplies to the waiting infantry. In some areas, the U.S. Air Force dropped a special 15,000-pound bomb (the BLU-82, or “Daisy Cutter”) to blast clearings in the dense tropical foliage large enough to accommodate several Hueys. The Republic of Vietnam Air Force (VNAF, South Vietnamese Air Force) controlled all South Vietnamese helicopters. In 1963 the United States began supplying the Vietnamese with H-34s and upgraded VNAF utility and transport helicopters as newer types became available. VNAF pilots also received training by American advisers on the same tactics and procedures implemented by U.S. forces. Because of U.S. requirements for helicopters, VNAF units did not acquire enough aircraft to institute airmobile operations to any large degree. Despite American equipment and training, Vietnamese units on the whole did not deliver the same results as U.S. units. Interservice rivalry between VNAF and ARVN commands decisively hampered cooperation with and support to ARVN ground units. Many VNAF pilots seemed reluctant to press combat operations in support of their own ground troops in the face of heavy ground fire. Often they refused to reinforce or resupply government troops caught in ambushes or hot LZs. In most cases, ARVN troops received much better support from U.S. aviators. Initially, transportation helicopter companies doubled medical evacuation aircraft. In April 1962 the first five UH-1s arrived in South Vietnam. These Hueys were expressly modified for medical evacuation. The ARVN never established its own medevac organization. Each medevac helicopter carried trained medics, up to nine litters, and medical supplies to care for critically wounded soldiers. Crews waited on alert for a mission. When called, they could be airborne in less than three minutes. Because Viet Cong (VC) and PAVN troops ignored the large red crosses painted on medevac helicopters (the U.S. Army even tried all-white helicopters in late 1972) and fired on helicopters attempting to extract wounded from
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combat zones, armed helicopters were requested to provide suppressive fire for medevacs going into hot LZs. In many instances, medevac pilots violated standard operating procedure by going into hot LZs without gunship cover. They flew day or night and in inclement weather conditions, sometimes hovering just over the trees to locate casualties. Extracting wounded from the 200-foot-tall triple-canopy jungle proved almost impossible until the 1966 introduction of a rescue hoist and a so-called jungle penetrator. The penetrator could be lowered to the jungle floor, and casualties were strapped to the device and hoisted up to the hovering medevac. Daring crews endured heavy enemy fire while executing rescue hoist operations. Dedicated medevac crewmen accomplished hundreds of nearly impossible day and night rescues during the Vietnam War. Wounded soldiers could expect to arrive at a hospital within 15 minutes of being lifted out of a pickup zone. Only 1 percent of the wounded died if they survived the first 24 hours after being injured. Hueys carried specialized equipment to perform distinctive missions. Some carried radio consoles to intercept communications and locate PAVN or VC headquarters. Others known as “people sniffers” flew low over the jungle with chemical equipment that collected air samples and measured concentrations of uric acid. High concentrations of uric acid supposedly indicated latrines, but rumors abounded about water buffalo bombed because of sniffer reports. Psychological warfare units used Hueys to drop leaflets and to broadcast with large loudspeakers Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) amnesty program messages to VC and PAVN troops. Search-and-rescue tactics evolved around an operational plan developed by the German Luftwaffe during the Battle of Britain. Four A-1E or A-7 fixed-wing fighters, broken into a high and low section of two aircraft each, escorted two HH-3 or, after 1967, HH-53 rescue helicopters into the pickup zone. The helicopters and two escorts orbited out of range of antiaircraft fire. The high section of fighters reconnoitered the site to determine resistance and attacked antiaircraft weapons in the vicinity. With hostile fire diminished sufficiently, the leader then called in the first helicopter with its two escorts. The second helicopter remained available to act as a recovery vehicle if the first helicopter was shot down or damaged. Many times the alternate helicopter swooped in to rescue both the downed helicopter crew and the object of the rescue mission. However, on numerous occasions several American aircraft and men were lost attempting to rescue downed airmen. From administrative assignments (so-called ash-and-trash missions) to combat and service operations, helicopters changed American military doctrine forever. Used properly, helicopters proved much less fragile than some critics had predicted and flew thousands of hours for every aircraft lost or damaged. Many of those listed as destroyed in combat were lost to mortar and rocket fire as they sat in revetments. During the Vietnam War, U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Air Force, and U.S. Navy helicopters flew some 36.125 million sorties (a sortie being one individual flight by one aircraft): 3.932
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million attack sorties, 7.547 million assault (troop landing) sorties, 3.548 million cargo sorties, and 21.098 million observation, reconnaissance, search-and-rescue, command, and other sorties. U.S. forces lost 10 helicopters over North Vietnam and 2,066 in South Vietnam. An additional 2,566 were lost to nonhostile causes. Pilots killed in action totaled 564 for the U.S. Army, 74 for the U.S. Marine Corps, 17 for the U.S. Air Force, 12 for the U.S. Navy, and 1 for the U.S. Coast Guard; 1,471 aircrew members were also killed in action. An additional 401 pilots and 994 aircrew died from noncombat-related accidents. U.S. Army aviators suffered the highest per capita ratio of casualties of any contingent of American combat troops participating in the Vietnam War. STANLEY S. MCGOWEN See also Air Mobility; Aircraft, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Airpower, Role in War; Antiaircraft Artillery, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Brady, Patrick Henry; Chieu Hoi Program; Helicopters, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Kelly, Charles L.; Medevac; Psychological Warfare Operations; Rockets and Rocket Launchers; Search-and-Rescue Operations; Surface-to-Air Missiles, Democratic Republic of Vietnam References Galvin, John R. Air Assault: The Development of Airmobile Warfare. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1969. Gregory, Barry. Vietnam Helicopter Handbook. Wellingborough, Northants, UK: Patrick Stephens, 1988. Gurney, Gene. Vietnam: The War in the Air. New York: Crown, 1985. Johnson, Lawrence H., III. Winged Sabers: The Air Cavalry in Vietnam, 1965–1973. Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, 1990. McGowen, Stanley S. Helicopters: An Illustrated History of Their Impact. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2005. Summers, Harry G., Jr. The Vietnam War Almanac. New York: Ballantine, 1985. Tilford, Earl H., Jr. Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia, 1961–1975. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1980.
Helms, Richard McGarrah Birth Date: May 13, 1913 Death Date: October 22, 2002 U.S. journalist, intelligence officer, ambassador, director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) during 1966–1973, and consultant. Richard McGarrah Helms was born in St. David’s, Pennsylvania, on May 13, 1913. After attending high schools in Germany, Switzerland, and the United States, he graduated from Williams College in 1935. Soon afterward the United Press sent him to Europe as a correspondent. Initially stationed in London, he then moved to Berlin. In 1937 Helms returned to the United States to accept a management position with the Indianapolis Times, which he left to accept a naval commission in 1942. Helms’s newspaper experience and German-language fluency landed him an August 1943 assignment with the Office of Strategic
Services (OSS), which sent him to Europe. By the end of the war he was serving in Germany. Discharged from the navy as a lieutenant commander in 1946, he joined the fledgling Central Intelligence Group, which became the CIA in 1947. Helms specialized in organizing and managing covert operations in Europe, and he progressed steadily through the ranks of the Directorate of Plans. In 1962 he succeeded Richard Bissell as its director in the wake of the 1961 Bay of Pigs debacle, an operation that Helms had opposed. In June 1966 President Lyndon B. Johnson appointed Helms director of the CIA, a position that made him an extremely important and controversial figure during America’s involvement in Vietnam. As CIA director, Helms was no firebrand with regard to U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. On the contrary, he was extremely skeptical about the potential for U.S. success there. Helms did not directly formulate U.S. policy, but it was often based on information that the CIA provided. As the CIA’s advocate at the highest levels of government, Helms often clashed with the military services over the accuracy of intelligence. He battled the military establishment over issues such as the effectiveness of the bombing campaign in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), control of covert operations, and the 1970 Cambodian Incursion. The most important controversy occurred in 1967 when the CIA estimated Viet Cong (VC) and People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) order of battle at nearly 600,000 troops. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), put it at only 270,000. To avoid a schism within the American intelligence community, Helms forwarded the document to President Johnson with a compromise figure of 334,000. Following the January 1968 Tet Offensive, the original report resurfaced and, after debate, was adopted as the official U.S. estimate. Helms’s capitulation on this and other estimates caused him to become increasingly unpopular within his own agency. During Helms’s directorship, the CIA engaged in domestic surveillance operations. Although a serious violation of the CIA charter, Helms launched Operation CHAOS, which was designed to investigate the relationships between American dissidents and foreign governments. Also in 1967 the CIA launched Project Merrimack and Project Resistance, which targeted Washington-based peace movements and radical college organizations, respectively. These lasted until American combat troops were withdrawn from Vietnam in 1973. Helms also presided over various CIA paramilitary and intelligence operations, such as Air America, and supported active CIA covert action in Southeast Asia. Helms enjoyed the confidence of President Johnson, especially after the CIA correctly predicted an Israeli victory in the 1967 SixDay War. However, the president considered Helms a bearer of information rather than a member of the inner circle. President Richard M. Nixon believed that the CIA had an overt liberal bias and was always skeptical of information that Helms brought him. As a result, Helms had limited access to Nixon and in 1973 was
Henderson, Oran K.
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Former CIA director Richard Helms appears in Washington D.C., before a closed hearing of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee that investigated government intelligence operations during the Vietnam War, May 16, 1973. (AP/Wide World Photos)
not reappointed to the directorship, allegedly because he refused to involve the CIA in the Watergate cover-up. Helms then served as ambassador to Iran from 1973 to 1976. In 1977 Helms pled guilty to perjury for his answer to a question about CIA attempts to overthrow the government of Salvador Allende in Chile during his ambassadorship confirmation hearing in the U.S. Senate. Helms testified that the agency had not played a role in Allende’s ouster, which was not true. He was fined and given a suspended prison sentence, although he wore the charge as a badge of honor, insisting that he had done the right thing in his answers to Senate inquirers by protecting the secrets with which he has been entrusted. Beginning in 1977 Helms worked as an international business consultant. In 1983 President Ronald Reagan awarded him with the National Security Medal, but in the eyes of Helms’s detractors this honor did not negate his actions as CIA director. Helms died in Washington, D.C., on October 22, 2002. RICHARD D. STARNES See also Air America; Central Intelligence Agency; Colby, William Egan; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Pacification; Phoenix Program; Studies and Observation Group; Watergate Scandal; Wise Men
References Ameringer, Charles D. U.S. Foreign Intelligence: The Secret Side of American History. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990. Powers, Thomas. The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA. New York: Knopf, 1979. Ranelegh, John. The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986. Weiner, Tim. Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA. New York: Doubleday, 2007.
Henderson, Oran K. Birth Date: August 20, 1920 Death Date: June 2, 1998 Highest-ranking U.S. Army officer to stand trial for the 1968 My Lai Massacre. Oran K. Henderson was born on August 20, 1920, in Indianapolis, Indiana. A career army officer, he saw service in World War II, in the Korean War, and in the Vietnam War. March 16, 1968, the day of the My Lai Massacre, was Colonel Henderson’s first day as commander of the newly formed 11th Infantry Brigade, which included Lieutenant William Calley’s platoon of Company
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C, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment. Henderson observed the operation from a helicopter circling over My Lai. After the My Lai Massacre became public, charges were brought against 25 officers and enlisted men, either as participants in the event or as part of the effort to cover it up. Henderson was the highest-ranking officer among them, and his was the last case to be heard. Charged with willful dereliction of duty for not having carried out an adequate investigation into the events at My Lai, Henderson’s court-martial at Fort Meade, Maryland, at the end of 1971 lasted 62 days, tying the Calley case as the longest courtmartial in U.S. history. The prosecution argued that with the information available to Henderson, it was inconceivable that he could have reported to his commander that only 20 civilians died at My Lai and that they had been killed “inadvertently” by artillery fire. The defense claimed that subordinates had lied to Henderson and pointed to his excellent military record to that point. The jury acquitted him. Henderson returned to active duty as commandant of the Indiantown Gap Military Reservation in Pennsylvania, retired from the army in 1974, and then became Pennsylvania’s director of civil defense. He died of cancer on June 2, 1998, in Lebanon, Pennsylvania. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Calley, William Laws, Jr.; My Lai Massacre; Peers Inquiry
Eastern Zone, where Khmer Rouge policies were less draconian than in the rest of the country. The growing anti-Vietnamese line followed by the top Khmer Rouge leaders in Phnom Penh, which resulted in purges of those suspected of pro-Vietnamese sentiments and the outbreak of hostilities on the border in 1977, induced Samrin and a number of other leaders to defect to the relative safety of Vietnam. They reappeared on December 2, 1978, with the announcement of the formation of the Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation. Samrin was the president of its Central Committee. This front served as cover for the invasion of Cambodia by Vietnamese “volunteer forces,” and Samrin became president of the Revolutionary People’s Council, the new government formed after the January 7, 1979, capture of Phnom Penh by the Vietnamese. This was formalized in 1981 in the People’s Republic of Kampuchea, with a State Council with Samrin as president. On December 5, 1981, he also assumed the top post of secretary of the ruling Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Party (KPRP). Samrin remained as head of state and the party until the changes made necessary by the Paris Agreement of 1991 that finally ended the continuing guerrilla war against coalition forces including the Khmer Rouge. This agreement brought withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia and interim institutions pending elections, which were held in May 1993.
References Belknap, Michael R. The Vietnam War on Trial: The My Lai Massacre and the Court-Martial of Lieutenant Calley. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002. Hersh, Seymour M. Cover-Up: The Army’s Secret Investigation of the Massacre at My Lai 4. New York: Random House, 1972. Hersh, Seymour M. My Lai 4: A Report on the Massacre and Its Aftermath. New York: Random House, 1970.
Heng Samrin Birth Date: May 25, 1934 Cambodian Communist leader who became head of state of the Vietnamese-installed government in Phnom Penh after Vietnamese troops invaded in 1979 and occupied Cambodia, driving out the Khmer Rouge. Heng Samrin was born on May 25, 1934, in Anlong Kres, a village in Kompong Cham Province near the border with Vietnam. A man of little formal education, he became involved in cattle smuggling across the border in the 1950s, which brought him into contact with Vietnamese Communist revolutionaries. He took up the revolutionary cause in 1959, when Prince Norodom Sihanouk was at the height of his power in Phnom Penh. As with many Cambodian Communists, Samrin joined the Khmer Rouge when it began organizing resistance to Sihanouk from rural bases in 1967. Samrin rose to second-echelon leadership in the Khmer Rouge during its war against the Lon Nol government (1970–1975) and became one of the top figures in the
President of Cambodia Heng Samrin at the fifth anniversary celebrations of the arrival of Vietnamese troops in Phnom Penh, January 7, 1984. (Pascal Manoukian/Sygma/Corbis)
Herbicides Abandoning its revolutionary name, the KPRP transformed itself into the Cambodian People’s Party and contested the elections in which Prince Sihanouk’s party won a narrow plurality over the Cambodian People’s Party. When Hun Sen became prime minister in 1985 and Vietnamese influence in Cambodian affairs declined, Samrin began to lose his government posts. He remains honorary chairman of the party but does not wield any real power. However, he has been chairman of the Cambodian National Assembly since 2006. ARTHUR J. DOMMEN See also Cambodia; Cambodia, Vietnamese Invasion and Occupation of; Hun Sen; Khmer Rouge; Lon Nol; Sihanouk, Norodom References Becker, Elizabeth. When the War Was Over: The Voices of Cambodia’s Revolution and Its People. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986. Kiernan, Ben. How Pol Pot Came to Power. London: Verso Books, 1985.
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ment with private corporations in the marketing of high-technology weapons. The issue at the heart of the lawsuit was perhaps even more celebrated than the original charges. The presumption in the case was the notion that in libel issues a person could question a reporter’s state of mind, thoughts, and opinions at the time the story was written and thereby establish bias and/or intentions of malice. Although restricting its opinion to the Herbert case, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the editing process of the newsroom was open to inquiry. Herbert later was an associate professor of humanities and psychology at the Fitzsimmons Army Hospital. PAUL R. CAMACHO See also Media and the Vietnam War; United States Army References Herbert, Anthony B., with James T. Wooten. Soldier. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973. Zito, Tom. “Old Soldier’s Media Battle: Colonel Herbert’s War with CBS.” Washington Post, October 1, 1979.
Herbert, Anthony Birth Date: April 17, 1930
Herbicides
U.S. Army officer. Born April 17, 1930, in Herminie, Pennsylvania, Anthony Herbert joined the U.S. Army as an enlisted man in 1947. He was one of the most decorated U.S. soldiers of the Korean War (1950–1953). Herbert earned a BA from the University of Pittsburgh in 1956 and a PhD from the University of Georgia in 1968. He won promotion to lieutenant colonel in August 1968 and volunteered for Vietnam War service, becoming a battalion commander in the 173rd Airborne Brigade. Herbert was later sharply critical of the wasteful employment of the brigade. He charged that the 10,000-man brigade was sending, at most, only 800 men into the field. In 1970 Herbert publicly accused two of his immediate superiors in Vietnam, Major General John Barnes and Colonel J. Ross Franklin, of ignoring and subsequently covering up acts by U.S. soldiers in Vietnam that were in violation of the Geneva Convention. The official U.S. Army response was that there was no documentary evidence to support Herbert’s claims of war crimes. Sometime later, however, at least two of Herbert’s charges were verified. Claiming that the army was harassing him, Herbert retired from the army in February 1972 at the rank of lieutenant colonel amid a storm of controversy. Herbert went on to publish his version of these events in a military autobiographical memoir, Soldier, in 1973. That same year, CBS Television in a 60 Minutes program questioned the veracity of Herbert’s claims. In retaliation, Herbert sued CBS. His attorneys pointed out that CBS selected the weakest of Herbert’s claims and used it to attack all the claims as well as Herbert’s credibility. In addition, the attorneys claimed that CBS was offering Herbert as a sacrifice to offset an earlier scathing exposé on military involve-
Chemicals designed to inhibit or destroy plant life. Technically herbicides act in one of five ways: by inhibiting further growth, by prematurely removing leaves, as desiccants (drying the foliage), as sterilants (neutralizing the soil of its plant nutrients), and as active surface agents, causing chemicals to adhere to various parts of the plants. In using herbicides in Vietnam, the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) and U.S. governments wanted to deny the Communists a natural environment in which to hide and also wanted to deny easy access to locally available food crops. Beginning with a small test program in July 1961, more than 30 herbicidal chemicals were tested or used in Vietnam during the succeeding nine years. Most of these were employed in only very small quantities. Each of the six major herbicides was given a military code name based on the color of the bands around the 55-gallon drums used as shipping containers. Although each of these chemicals was slightly different and usage data vary slightly depending on the source, certain important patterns emerge. From 1962 to 1964 three herbicides—Agent Purple, Agent Pink, and Agent Green—were applied in relatively modest amounts. Less than 9,000 gallons of Agent Green were used, while about 123,000 gallons of Agent Pink and 145,000 gallons of Agent Purple were employed on defoliation missions. Mixed with oil or diesel fuel, these agents were generally used to attack jungle vegetation. Tragically, unknown to those applying the chemicals or apparently to anyone in the Department of Defense, these herbicides shared a common deadly characteristic: each contained significant amounts of dioxin (also known by its chemical names of 2,3,7,8TCDD or 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin), an extremely toxic chemical. Dioxin, which existed in Agent Purple, Agent Pink, and
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Herbicides Used by the U.S. Military in Vietnam
Herbicide
Active Ingredient(s)
Agent Orange Agent White Agent Blue Agent Purple Agent Pink Agent Green Total
2,4-dichlorophenoxyacetic acid and 2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetic acid 2,4-dichlorophenoxyacetic acid and Picloram sodium cacodylate and cacodylic acid 2,4-dichlorophenoxyacetic acid and 2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetic acid 2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetic acid 2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetic acid
Agent Green as an unintended contaminant in the manufacture of one of the active components of the agents, 2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetic acid, was later discovered to be highly toxic to humans and wildlife even in minuscule amounts. Two other herbicides that did not contain dioxin were also used. Agent Blue, the preferred chemical for crop-denial missions, was manufactured in two varieties. Between 1962 and 1964 only 5,200 gallons of the first type of Agent Blue were used; between 1965 and 1971 approximately 1 million gallons of a second variety were employed. About half of that amount was used on defoliation missions. Agent White, another herbicide without dioxin, was employed fairly extensively after 1966, and when Agent Orange missions were stopped after the toxic effects of that chemical became known, Agent White continued in use in its stead. About 5.2 million gallons of Agent White were used. Because both Agent Blue and Agent White were water soluble, they were not particularly effective against the thickest jungle canopies, nor were they effective during the rainy season. The military began using Agent Orange in the middle of 1965 and continued its use through 1970. Soluble in diesel fuel and organic compounds, Agent Orange was employed primarily on jungle-defoliation missions. Toxicologically, Agent Orange was much less potent than Agent Purple, Agent Pink, and Agent Green. These three agents contained dioxin at a rate of between 32 and 66 parts per million, while the two versions of Agent Orange were contaminated with only 1 or 2 parts per million. Nevertheless, the extensive use of Agent Orange as well as its employment at the time when the awareness of the toxicity of these herbicides became known made this chemical the most notorious of the group. In all, about 11.22 million gallons of Agent Orange were used in Vietnam. A number of studies on American veterans have been conducted by, among others, the U.S. Air Force, the National Cancer Institute, and the Centers for Disease Control. In 1992 after much controversy, the Department of Defense decided to officially accept that the following diseases could be caused by exposure to dioxin in herbicides: Hodgkin’s disease, Non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma, softtissue sarcoma, chloracne, and birth defects.
Level of Dioxin Contamination (parts per million)
Obtained by Military (gallons)
Used by Military (gallons)
1.77 to 40 None None 32.8 to 45 65.6 65.6
13,927,985 5,600,000 2,166,656 145,000 122,792 8,208 21,970,641
11,712,860 5,239,853 2,166,656 145,000 122,792 8,208 19,395,369
This decision began closure for a legal debate that had begun in the late 1970s as Vietnam veterans attempted to obtain medical treatment and disability compensation for a number of illnesses of unknown origin. As the pattern of certain ailments recurred and as the media brought increased attention to the plight of these individuals and their families, Dow Chemical Company along with several other manufacturers of Agent Orange agreed to an out-ofcourt settlement in 1984. To conclude this agreement, the manufacturers established a $180 million trust fund, administered by Aetna Life and Casualty Company. Despite the size of this fund, each affected veteran (or affected child of a veteran) would receive only a relatively small compensation, ranging from $3,400 to $12,800. The fund was largely depleted by the early 2000s, and when a group of veterans filed suit against several defoliant manufacturers, including Dow, their charges were dismissed; an appeals court upheld the dismissal. As of the end of 1999, some 120,000 individuals had requested claims application packages. In Vietnam itself the medical effects of herbicide use are more difficult to verify, but the impact on the ecology is beginning to be understood. In all, about 19 million gallons of herbicides were sprayed over approximately 10 percent of the landmass of South Vietnam. Although in the short term these defoliation missions affected all aspects of the ecosystem, studies in the late 1980s and early 1990s demonstrated some significant recovery in this area. CHARLES J. GASPAR See also Defoliation; International War Crimes Tribunal; RANCH HAND, Operation References Berman, Harvey P. “The Agent Orange Payment Program.” Law and Contemporary Problems (Autumn 1990): 49–60. Carlson, Elof Axel. “International Symposium on Herbicides in the Vietnam War.” Bioscience (September 1983): 507–512. Verger, Paul, et al. “Correlation between Dioxin Levels in Adipose Tissue and Estimated Exposure to Agent Orange in South Vietnamese Residents.” Environmental Research (May 1994): 226–243. Young, A. L., and G. M. Reggiani, eds. Agent Orange and Its Associated Dioxin. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1988.
Hersh, Seymour Myron
Hersh, Seymour Myron Birth Date: April 8, 1937 Controversial Pulitzer Prize–winning journalist. Seymour Myron Hersh was born in Chicago on April 8, 1937, the son of Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe, and grew up in a working-class inner-city neighborhood. Hersh graduated from the University of Chicago in 1959 and began his long journalism career as a police reporter in Chicago. In 1962 he joined United Press International (UPI) and by 1963 had become a UPI correspondent covering both Washington, D.C., and Chicago. Hersh soon earned the reputation as a hard-driving investigative reporter. In 1968 he served as Senator Eugene McCarthy’s press secretary during his unsuccessful bid for the 1968 Democratic presidential nomination. In November 1969 it was Hersh who first revealed the story of the March 1968 My Lai Massacre in Vietnam, perpetrated by U.S. soldiers against South Vietnamese civilians. His scoop, which appeared in the New York Times, also included the bombshell that the Pentagon had engaged in a purposeful campaign to cover up the massacre to ensure that it did not become public knowledge. For his reporting of the incident and its aftermath, Hersh received the Pulitzer Prize in International Reporting for 1970.
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That same year he published his well-read book on the subject, My Lai 4: A Report on the Massacre and Its Aftermath, the first of many books he would author. In his follow-up book, Cover-Up: The Army’s Secret Investigation of the Massacre at My Lai (1972), he detailed the investigation of the incident and the trial of Lieutenant William Calley, the perpetrator of the massacre. Hersh continued his investigative reporting, often working independently of any publication or news agency so that he could be free to pursue those stories that most interested him. He did, however, develop a long-standing relationship with New Yorker magazine, for which he has frequently written articles and opinion pieces. Another incendiary book, The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House (1983), excoriated Henry Kissinger for his foreign and military policy adventures. Hersh’s reports also detailed the secret bombings of Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and the clandestine military incursion into Cambodia during the Nixon years. Hersh made it his business to seek out stories that he knew would be hard to break and that would generate a maximum amount of attention. In 1986 three years after a Korean Air Lines Boeing 747 jetliner was blasted out of the sky by Soviet jet fighters, Hersh published The Target Is Destroyed: What Really Happened to
Investigative journalist Seymour Hersh revealed to the American public the March 1968 My Lai Massacre. He also detailed the attempted coverup of the massacre by the U.S. military. His reporting won Hersh the Pulitzer Prize in International Reporting for 1970. (Wally McNamee/Corbis)
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Flight 007 and What America Knew about It, a book in which he alleged that the incident, coming as it did at the height of the renewed Cold War, was caused by Soviet stupidity and provocative U.S. intelligence operations that had been sanctioned by the Ronald Reagan administration. Hersh’s critics on the Right were outraged by his allegation that the tragedy had been brought about by U.S. policy. Perhaps nothing else has attracted Hersh’s attention and scrutiny more than the Iraq War, which began in March 2003. Since that time he has launched numerous in-depth investigations into various events and developments in Iraq. In the spring of 2004 Hersh published a series of articles illuminating the extent of the prisoner-abuse scandal in Iraq’s Abu Ghraib Prison. This unleashed a torrent of media attention, the release of photos showing prisoner abuse, and a major congressional investigation. Hersh also alleged that prisoners had been tortured in other holding facilities, including those in Afghanistan and at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. That same year he also wrote in Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib that the invasion of Iraq in 2003 had been based on faulty intelligence about Iraq and that Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had purposely misused prewar intelligence to manufacture a justification of war. In March 2007 Hersh excoriated the Bush administration’s surge strategy, alleging that it would only embolden Sunni extremists in Iraq. Beginning in January 2005, Hersh began publishing a series of articles in which he alleged that the U.S. government was clandestinely preparing to launch preemptive air strikes against suspected nuclear weapons facilities in Iran. The Bush administration denied that such plans were in place but did not deny that they existed. In 2006 Hersh wrote that the United States was preparing to use a nuclear bunker-busting bomb against Iranian nuclear facilities. This provoked a vehement denial from the White House and the Pentagon. Hersh’s journalism and writing have traditionally been designed to cause maximum shock value for the reading public. He has been a sharp critic of both Democratic and Republican administrations, so he appears not to be politically partisan. But his detractors—and there are many, both inside and outside the Fourth Estate—have faulted him for one-sided reporting and the use of myriad anonymous sources, which they say raise questions about his evidence and accuracy. In 1997 Hersh was lambasted for a book he published on President John F. Kennedy both for its evidentiary value and its dubious allegations that Kennedy had been married before he wed Jacqueline Bouvier and that the president had a long-standing relationship with Chicago mob boss Sam Giancana. PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR. See also Calley, William Laws, Jr.; Kissinger, Henry Alfred; McCarthy, Eugene Joseph; Media and the Vietnam War; My Lai Massacre; Nixon, Richard Milhous References Hallin, Daniel C. The “Uncensored War”: The Media and Vietnam War. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986.
Hersh, Seymour M. Cover-Up: The Army’s Secret Investigation of the Massacre at My Lai 4. New York: Random House, 1972. Hersh, Seymour M. My Lai 4: A Report on the Massacre and Its Aftermath. New York: Random House, 1970.
Hershey, Lewis Blaine Birth Date: September 12, 1893 Death Date: May 20, 1977 Career U.S. Army officer and during 1941–1970 director of the U.S. Selective Service System, the federal agency responsible for managing military conscription. Lewis Blaine Hershey was born near Angola in Steuben County, Indiana, on September 12, 1893. He graduated with honors in 1914 from Tri-State College (now Trine University) in Angola. His long military career began when he joined the Indiana National Guard in 1911. He was promoted to first lieutenant in 1916. As a member of the National Guard, Hershey received his first deployment orders to the U.S.-Mexican border in 1917. He then served with the artillery in the U.S. Army during World War I and was promoted to captain but did not see combat. After the hostilities ended, he worked as a transportation officer at the French port of Brest, where American soldiers returning home were processed. He returned to the United States in September 1919 and secured a regular army commission in July 1920. Hershey graduated from the Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, in 1923; the General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1931; and the Army War College in Washington, D.C., in 1933. He was promoted to major in 1935. Hershey’s career in manpower policy and procurement began in 1936 when he received an appointment as secretary of the Joint Army-Navy Selective Service Committee. After the passage of the Selective Service Act of 1940, Hershey became the deputy director of the Selective Service System under Clarence Dykstra, then president of the University of Wisconsin. While deputy director, Hershey was advanced to brigadier general in October 1940. He was appointed major general in April 1942. Dykstra resigned in 1941, and in July Hershey became director. As a result of this promotion, Hershey was responsible for overseeing the entire conscription apparatus during World War II. He remained in this post for almost 29 years. Hershey’s ideology and actions shaped the Selective Service System and the draft throughout its existence. He fervently believed in the decentralization of the administration of conscription and was a proponent of the idea that local communities represented the true America. Because of that, some 6,400 local draft boards dominated the dynamics of the system. Consisting of local civic, business, and patriotic leaders, such boards in communities across the nation were responsible for the operations of conscription (classifying eligible young men), while the Selective Service
Herz, Alice System headquarters in Washington, D.C., set policy and handled appeals cases. Hershey saw himself as equal part civilian bureaucrat and soldier, and he often appeared publicly in civilian dress. Although the original Selective Service Act expired in 1947, the coming of the Cold War led to its reinstatement the next year, and President Harry S. Truman reappointed Hershey as director of the Selective Service System. Hershey thus administered the draft during the Korean War (1950–1953). He was promoted to lieutenant general in June 1956. Although well known nationally and respected in Congress as a longtime public servant, Hershey became a controversial figure during the Vietnam War years. As involvement in that conflict became increasingly unpopular in the United States, the draft and Hershey became focal points for the antiwar movement. Hershey, with the support of President Lyndon B. Johnson, began to limit student draft deferments in the late 1960s, and that coupled with Hershey’s age made him seem out of touch with the young generation eligible for the draft. When Richard Nixon won the 1968 presidential election, he believed that one of the ways to quell the antiwar protests, particularly among students, was to remove Hershey as director of the Selective Service System. Nixon could not openly fire Hershey, however, because that might have appeared that he was giving in to the protesters. Yet Hershey did not resign under pressure, either. In 1969 Hershey agreed to a reassignment and became a special adviser on manpower to Nixon beginning in February 1970. In return, Nixon awarded him his fourth star, making him a full general in November 1970. Nixon’s desires and Hershey’s removal from the Selective Service System led directly to the federal government’s adoption of a draft lottery, a system that Hershey had resisted for years. His role as a manpower adviser was largely ceremonial, and he found his advice largely ignored by the Nixon administration. After the last draft calls in 1973, Hershey was forced into retirement. During his years as director of the Selective Service System, Hershey oversaw the induction of about 14.555 million men into the armed forces of the United States. He served under six presidents and controlled manpower classification for three wars of conscription (World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War). Because of the prevalence of the draft during the years of those conflicts, he had a more personal effect on individual men eligible for service than any other military officer of his generation. Hershey died of a heart attack on May 20, 1977, while on a trip to his boyhood home of Angola, Indiana. NICHOLAS A. KREHBIEL See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Truman, Harry S. References Flynn, George Q. The Draft, 1940–1973. Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1993. Flynn, George Q. Lewis B. Hershey, Mr. Selective Service. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985.
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Gerhardt, James M. The Draft and Public Policy. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1971. Seiverling, R. E. Lewis B. Hershey: A Pictorial and Documentary Biography. Hershey, PA: Keystone Enterprises, 1969. Small, Melvin. Antiwarriors: The Vietnam War and the Battle for America’s Hearts and Minds. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2002.
Herz, Alice Birth Date: 1883 Death Date: March 26, 1965 German-born U.S. peace activist who immolated herself in 1965 to protest the escalating war in Vietnam. This action led to seven other antiwar protestors committing the same act. Born in Germany in 1883 (the exact date of her birth is unknown), Alice Herz, a widow and a Jew, fled Germany with her daughter Helga in 1933 when the Nazis seized power. Herz and her daughter first relocated to France, living there until the German invasion of that country in 1940. Both mother and daughter were temporarily forced to live in an internment camp near the Spanish border. In 1942 Herz and her daughter were able to immigrate to the United States. They settled in Detroit, where Herz managed to secure work as an adjunct instructor of German at Wayne State University. Herz’s experience in an internment camp and the grim realities of Nazi persecution of Jews and World War II in general convinced her to join the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF). After World War II the increasing threat of nuclear war and the arms race between the world’s two superpowers increased her pacifist activities. At first she was denied U.S. citizenship because of her role in the WILPF, which was considered a radical organization. She later reapplied and was granted citizenship in 1954. Thereafter her hopes for a world without war and the abolition of nuclear weapons motivated her increasing involvement in local peace activities in the Detroit area. By the mid-1960s mounting U.S. military involvement in Vietnam spurred Herz to consider committing a dramatic act of civil disobedience. Linking the peace movement and the Civil Rights Movement of the era as part of the growing social justice movement in America, Herz took to heart President Lyndon B. Johnson’s speech before Congress urging passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act. It was at that point, however, that Herz decided to publicly protest the Vietnam War. She was prompted to take the drastic measure of self-immolation by the example set by Buddhist monk Thich Quang Duc, who had burned himself to death in June 1963 in protest of the oppression of Buddhists by the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). The Buddhists in South Vietnam opposed violence and publicly criticized the U.S.-backed government there. Prior to her dramatic act, Herz wrote a note to friends and fellow activists stating that “I choose the illuminating death of a
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Buddhist to protest against a great country trying to wipe out a small country for no reason.” Herz commented that she had exhausted all the traditional methods of protests such as marching, civil disobedience, and writing numerous articles and letters. On March 16, 1965, at a busy intersection in Detroit, the 82-year-old Herz set herself on fire. Passersby in an automobile stopped and put out the flames, but Herz died 10 days later on March 26, 1965. Herz’s decision to follow the protest methods of Vietnamese Buddhist monks was designed to attract national attention. Her actions were soon followed by pacifists Norman Morrison and Roger Allen LaPorte as well as five others. Herz is considered the first American martyr of the anti–Vietnam War movement. CHARLES FRANCIS HOWLETT See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Morrison, Norman; Thich Quang Duc References Cooney, Robert, and Helen Michalowski. The Power of the People: Active Nonviolence in the United States. Philadelphia: New Society Publishers, 1987. DeBenedetti, Charles, with Charles Chatfield. An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1990. Shibata, Shingo. Phoenix: Letters and Documents of Alice Herz. New York: Bruce Publishing, 1969.
Hickey, Gerald Cannon Birth Date: December 27, 1925 Anthropologist and principal ethnographer of the Montagnards of the Central Highlands of Vietnam. Born on December 17, 1925, in Chicago, Illinois, Gerald Cannon Hickey first went to Vietnam in 1956 to conduct research on the Vietnamese village for the Michigan State University Vietnam Advisory Group. He received his doctorate from the University of Chicago in 1958. Hickey’s first book, Village in Vietnam (1964), was the ethnographic study of Khanh Hau village in the Thu Thua District of Long An Province in the Mekong Delta. His primary research interest, however, was the Montagnard tribes of the Vietnamese Central Highlands. He spent more than 13 years in their villages, living among them and describing their cultural patterns and charting the course of their destruction through the fall of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) in 1975. In addition to his academic interests, Hickey became the principal advocate for the Montagnard peoples in the face of impending threats to their traditional homelands. He wrote working papers on the effects of herbicides in the Central Highlands, spoke on the plight of refugees before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, worked with government officials to protect Montagnard land rights, and intervened with military commanders to protect Montagnard villages. As a visiting researcher at Nam Dong Special Forces camp during July 1964, Hickey became an
honorary member of Special Forces Team A-726 for his service during an assault there. Hickey taught at several universities both during and after the Vietnam War, first at Monteith College of Wayne State University and then at Yale University and Cornell University. He also taught at the National Institute of Administration (NIA) in Saigon, where civil servants were trained for public administration; the NIA was modeled after the École Nationale d’Administration in Paris. For working in Vietnam, Hickey was ostracized by some academicians and effectively blackballed at several institutions. Hickey’s works include the two-part ethnohistory of the Vietnamese Central Highlands Sons of the Mountains (1982), an ethnohistory through 1954, and Free in the Forest (1982), charting the war years of 1954–1976. A more recent book, Shattered World: Adaptation and Survival among Vietnam’s Highland Peoples during the Vietnam War (1993), charts the destruction of indigenous Montagnard culture during the war. Hickey remains the foremost authority on the Montagnard tribes of the Vietnamese Central Highlands. In 2002 he published Window on a War: An Anthropologist in the Vietnam Conflict. Hickey now lives in Chicago, where he continues to write and occasionally lecture on the Montagnards and his personal experiences in Vietnam. DAVID M. BERMAN See also Civic Action; Civilian Irregular Defense Group; Defoliation; Herbicides; Michigan State University Advisory Group; Montagnards; Nam Dong, Battle of; Refugees and Boat People References Hickey, Gerald Cannon. Free in the Forest: Ethnohistory of the Vietnamese Central Highlands, 1954–1976. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982. Hickey, Gerald Cannon. Shattered World: Adaptation and Survival among Vietnam’s Highland Peoples during the Vietnam War. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993. Hickey, Gerald Cannon. Sons of the Mountains: Ethnohistory of the Vietnamese Central Highlands to 1954. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982. Hickey, Gerald Cannon. Village in Vietnam. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1964. Hickey, Gerald Cannon. Window on a War: An Anthropologist in the Vietnam Conflict. Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 2002. Wiesner, Louis A. Victims and Survivors: Displaced Persons and Other War Victims in Viet-Nam, 1954–1975. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1988.
HICKORY–BELT TIGHT–BEAU CHARGER–LAM SON
54,
Operation
Start Date: May 18, 1967 End Date: May 28, 1967 The spring of 1967 saw heightened People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) military operations, to include heavy artillery, mortar, and rocket attacks just south of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) in Quang Tri Province in the Republic of
HICKORY II, Operation
Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). These were directed against U.S. Marine Corps bases running east-west along Route 9. In response, marines initiated Operations PRAIRIE I–IV; U.S. Army 175-millimeter heavy artillery had fired into the DMZ for the first time on February 18 to silence PAVN artillery there. During the course of Operation PRAIRIE IV (April 20–May 31), on May 18 as part of Operation HICKORY–BELT TIGHT–BEAU CHARGER–LAM SON 54, for the first time other U.S. marines and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) forces moved in multibattalion strength into the DMZ as far north as the Ben Hai River. This joint operation was designed to relieve PAVN pressure on marine positions along Route 9 and to clear areas for the installation of anti-infiltration barrier mines and electronic sensors, dubbed Project Practice Nine but most commonly known as the McNamara Line for its chief proponent, U.S. secretary of defense Robert S. McNamara. The barrier was to stretch west from the sea into Laos. The timing was conditioned by intelligence reports of a major PAVN offensive planned either for March 19, the birthday of Ho Chi Minh, leader of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), or prior to a scheduled cease-fire set for Buddha’s birthday on May 23. The allies hoped to break up PAVN preparations and destroy facilities and supplies. Operation HICKORY, as all the disparate operations are sometime known, was to cover the entire eastern portion of the DMZ. In HICKORY itself, three marine battalions—the 2nd Battalion of the 9th Marine Regiment, the 2nd Battalion of the 26th Marine Regiment, and the 3rd Battalion of the 4th Marine Regiment—accompanied by tanks and armored vehicles moved into the DMZ by helicopter and overland from Con Thien. At the same time in Operation LAM SON 54, five battalions of the ARVN 1st Division moved into the DMZ from Gio Linh. Two battalions moved east, while three battalions moved west. In Operations BEAU CHARGER and BELT TIGHT, the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 3rd Marine Regiment of the Special Landing Force struck into the DMZ from their ships in the East China Sea. The four operations involved a total of more than 5,500 U.S. and South Vietnamese forces. The allied forces encountered immediate heavy resistance from the PAVN 31st, 32nd, and 812th regiments, forcing the commitment of three additional marine battalions: the 1st Battalion of the 4th Regiment and the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 9th Regiment. Heavy fighting occurred between the advancing marines and PAVN forces on both May 20–21 and May 25. The incursion into the DMZ did not last long. Ten days later on May 28 the allies withdrew, taking with them some 11,000 civilians who were sent to the Cam Lo refugee center to be relocated, thus creating a free-fire zone for allied forces in the area north of Cua Viet. PAVN casualties in the operation were given as 789 killed and 37 captured; 187 weapons were recovered. The marines had accounted for 447 of the total, most of them in HICKORY. Marine casualties were 142 killed and 896 wounded. ARVN forces claimed to have killed 342 PAVN soldiers while losing 22 killed and 122 wounded. SPENCER C. TUCKER
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See also Demilitarized Zone; McNamara, Robert Strange; McNamara Line; PRAIRIE I, Operation; PRAIRIE II–IV, Operations References Clodfelter, Michael. Vietnam in Military Statistics: A History of the Indochina Wars, 1772–1991. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1995. Pearson, Willard. The War in the Northern Provinces, 1966–1968. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1975. Stanton, Shelby L. Vietnam Order of Battle. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2003. Telfer, Gary L. U.S. Marines in Vietnam: Fighting the North Vietnamese, 1967. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1984.
HICKORY II,
Operation
Start Date: July 14, 1967 End Date: July 16, 1967 Search and destroy operations carried out during July 14–16, 1967, south of the Ben Hai River by U.S. marines to destroy People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) weapons positions and fortifications in the southern half of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) east of Con Thien in Quang Tri Province, I Corps Tactical Zone, in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). The area of operations was nicknamed “Leatherneck Square” by the marines. Operation HICKORY II followed Operations HICKORY I (May 15–29), BUFFALO (July 2–14) and BEAVER TRACK (July 5–12) but was much smaller in size than those operations, utilizing seven maneuver battalions and four blocking battalions. HICKORY I employed 13 battalions during its sweep in May. The marine units involved in HICKORY II were the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marine Division; the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines; Marine Special Landing Forces (SLF) Alpha (1st Battalion, 3rd Marines); and Bravo (2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines). All HICKORY II battalions came under the operational control of the 9th Marines with the exception of SLF Bravo, which served the 3rd Marines as a blocking force on the western edge of the sweep zone. Operation HICKORY II was one operation in a series of American operations in 1967 with the overall objective of clearing the southern side of the DMZ of all enemy forces and fortifications in order to construct an electronic infiltration barrier across the country, from the South China Sea to the Lao border. The plan to construct the barrier was called Project Practice Nine, later renamed Project Illinois City and then Project Dye Maker, and was nicknamed the “Electric Fence” and the “McNamara Line.” The Department of Defense believed that a barrier consisting of a strip of bulldozed jungle fortified with mines, obstacles, booby traps, and electronic sensors would help block movement across the border between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and South Vietnam and reduce the need for larger troop reinforcements in the I Corps Tactical Zone. In May 1967 the Defense Department assigned the task of constructing the
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barrier to the 3rd Marine Division. Shortly thereafter the marines launched Operation HICKORY I to clear the area. The goal of HICKORY II was to sweep through a designated area of operations south of the DMZ, locate and destroy all PAVN fortifications and weapons, and engage and defeat those PAVN forces with which the marines came in contact. This action would clear the area for the commencement of construction of the barrier. The ground forces were supported by U.S. tanks, artillery, and air support. There was not a significant amount of contact with the North Vietnamese during HICKORY II, unlike HICKORY I in which there was intense combat between PAVN forces and U.S. and South Vietnamese forces. When contact did come in HICKORY II, it occurred in bursts in the form of mortar and small-arms fire. Perhaps most troublesome to the marines on the ground were the antipersonnel devices in the form of grenades rigged as booby traps. In general, U.S. ground operations near the DMZ were bloody affairs. In HICKORY II, in two days 39 PAVN personnel were killed and an unknown number wounded. Four marines were killed and 90 wounded. Although the American ground operations in the spring and summer of 1967 were successful in terms of achieving objectives on the ground, the DMZ remained porous and was an area under great contention. Only test areas of the electronic barrier across Vietnam were ever constructed. Despite their losses during this time period, PAVN forces were far from defeated and in the coming months, in conjunction with the Viet Cong (VC), would launch the siege of the Khe Sanh base and the 1968 Tet Offensive, the largest coordinated offensive action by North Vietnam of the Vietnam War. RICHARD B. VERRONE See also Demilitarized Zone; HICKORY–BELT TIGHT–BEAU CHARGER–LAM SON 54, Operation; McNamara Line; United States Marine Corps References McNab, Chris, and Andy Weist. The Illustrated History of the Vietnam War. San Diego: Thunder Bay, 2000. Stanton, Shelby L. The Rise and Fall of an American Army: The U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985. Telfer, Gary L. U.S. Marines in Vietnam: Fighting the North Vietnamese, 1967. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1984.
High National Council Political body created in 1964 to govern the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). On January 30, 1964, Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) general Nguyen Khanh overthrew the regime headed by General Duong Van Minh. Minh and his supporters had failed to rally public support following the November 1963 overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem; they had also failed to deal effectively with the growing Communist insurgency. General Minh, as a figurehead, was retained as head of state, and Khanh became premier.
In August 1964 after months of delay, Khanh moved to rid himself of his rival Duong Van Minh. On August 16 Khanh secured approval from the Military Revolutionary Council (MRC) for a new constitution that abolished the office of head of state and, in effect, made him president. This move triggered opposition and protests in the cities, especially from students and Buddhists. The MRC then reversed its decision, revoking the new constitution and announcing that a National Provisional Steering Committee comprised of generals Khanh, Minh, and Tran Thien Khiem would direct national affairs until a National Congress was established to elect a head of state. Khanh would continue as premier of an interim government. Confronted with another attempted coup led by younger army officers, Khanh found it difficult to regain the power he had lost earlier, and a 17-member High National Council (HNC) was established, with members chosen by General Duong Van Minh from among elderly personages. The High National Council earned from Saigon cynics the label “High National Museum.” The HNC proved more assertive than expected. It insisted on making Minh head of state with strong constitutional powers and chose a civilian premier. U.S. ambassador Maxwell Taylor, who supported Khanh, blocked this. With an energy belying its collective image, at the end of September the HNC produced a new constitution. Failing to get Minh to accept the office with reduced powers, the HNC nominated as president Phan Khac Suu, an agricultural engineer and officeholder under Bao Dai and Diem who had been imprisoned briefly by Diem. Suu then nominated Tran Van Huong, a former teacher, as premier. Khanh had to be content with the consolation prize of ARVN commander in chief. The HNC’s attempt to promote civilian rule in South Vietnam after a succession of military governments did not stabilize the political situation. The new government was divided and weak, the military threatened another coup against civilian rule, and there were popular demonstrations. The Huong government had to resort to martial law and government by decree. When Buddhist leaders called on the HNC for a vote of no confidence in Huong, the government reacted by relying more heavily on the military and instituted repressive measures. Younger officers (known as the Young Turks) meanwhile demanded that the HNC retire all officers with 25 years or more of service, including Duong Van Minh. When the HNC refused, on December 20, 1964, the Young Turks arrested 5 HNC members and nearly 20 other politicians, student leaders, and government officials. They also formed a new Armed Forces Council. Nguyen Khanh, privy to the conflict between the HNC and the younger officers, attempted his own coup by announcing the dissolution of the HNC. The Huong government tried to hang on and insisted on carrying out repressive measures to keep order. After further student demonstrations, U.S. authorities concluded that increased military participation in the government was needed to restore order. Huong was then forced to accept General Nguyen Van Thieu, head of the Armed Forces Council (AFC), and General
Hilsman, Roger Linh Quang Vien as deputy premiers, along with U.S.-educated economist Nguyen Xuan Oanh. This was in fact a step toward a complete military takeover. As Buddhists demonstrated in major cities on January 27, the AFC called for ARVN commander General Khanh to restore order. After this was accomplished Suu remained as head of state, but Nguyen Xuan Oanh replaced Huong as acting premier. HO DIEU ANH AND SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Duong Van Minh; Ngo Dinh Diem; Ngo Dinh Diem, Overthrow of; Nguyen Khanh; Taylor, Maxwell Davenport; Tran Thien Khiem; Vietnam, Republic of, 1954–1975 References FitzGerald, Frances. Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam. Boston: Little, Brown, 1972. Nguyen Cao Ky. Twenty Years and Twenty Days. New York: Stein and Day, 1976. Westmoreland, William C. A Soldier Reports. New York: Doubleday, 1976.
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Hilsman, Roger Birth Date: November 23, 1919 U.S. State Department official, adviser on Vietnam policy, political scientist, and author. Born in Waco, Texas, on November 23, 1919, Roger Hilsman graduated from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, in 1943 and briefly served with Merrill’s Marauders in the China-Burma-India theater before being wounded. After recovering he joined the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and remained with that organization until 1946. In August 1945 he parachuted into Manchuria to free prisoners of war (POWs) being held by the Japanese. Among the POWs was his father, who had been captured several years earlier. Hilsman subsequently received his doctorate in international relations from Yale University in 1951. In 1961 President John F. Kennedy appointed him director of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Charged with analyzing current foreign
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Roger Hilsman on March 13, 1963. Hilsman saw the Vietnam War as essentially a political struggle and believed that winning the support of the rural population was the key. He was a strong advocate of the Strategic Hamlet Program. (AP/Wide World Photos)
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developments in order to allow for long-term planning, Hilsman was one of the principal early architects of U.S. Vietnam policy. In January 1962 Hilsman presented a plan titled “A Strategic Concept for South Vietnam.” This plan, which defined the war as a political struggle, proposed policies aimed at the rural Vietnamese as the key to victory and led to the Strategic Hamlet Program. The report also recommended that the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) adopt guerrilla warfare tactics. In December 1962 Hilsman and Michael Forrestal, head of the National Security Council’s Vietnam Coordinating Committee, were sent on a fact-finding mission to Vietnam. In July 1963 following attacks on Buddhist dissidents by Ngo Dinh Nhu’s police in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), Hilsman recommended, along with Forrestal and W. Averell Harriman, that new instructions be relayed to U.S. ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge in Saigon. These led to at least tacit approval by the United States of the military coup that was carried out against South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem and Nhu in November 1963. Increasingly at odds with President Lyndon B. Johnson and Secretary of State Dean Rusk over U.S. Vietnam policy, Hilsman resigned in February 1964. He then joined the political science faculty at Columbia University. In 1967 Hilsman wrote To Move a Nation, which praised the process of foreign policy formulation under President Kennedy while criticizing President Johnson’s escalation of the war. Among nearly a dozen of Hilsman’s books on 20th-century American foreign policy are The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs (1971), To Govern America (1979), The Politics of Policy Making (1986), George Bush vs Saddam Hussein: Military Success, Political Failure (1992), and American Guerilla: My War behind Japanese Lines (2005). As professor emeritus of government and international relations, Hilsman was associated with the Institute for War and Peace Studies at Columbia. In 1994 President Bill Clinton named Hilsman a member of the National Security Education Board. ROBERT G. MANGRUM See also Forrestal, Michael Vincent; Harriman, William Averell; HilsmanForrestal Report; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr.; Ngo Dinh Diem, Overthrow of; Rusk, David Dean; Strategic Hamlet Program; Taylor-McNamara Report References Herring, George C. America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975. 4th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997.
Hilsman-Forrestal Report Report submitted to President John F. Kennedy on January 25, 1963, concerning the viability of Ngo Dinh Diem’s regime in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). President Kennedy,
concerned about contradictory reports from the news media and the American military, sent a fact-finding mission to South Vietnam in December 1962. Director of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research Roger Hilsman and presidential aide Michael Forrestal were charged with determining whether the South Vietnamese government could be salvaged. While arguing that American policies in Southeast Asia should be continued, the Hilsman-Forrestal Report exposed the weaknesses of the South Vietnamese government, which the report contended were caused in part by corruption within the Ngo Dinh Diem government. The report further asserted that Diem was increasingly isolated from his own people and that only those with close ties to the Diem family actually supported Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu. The report especially criticized the Strategic Hamlet Program as it was being administered by Nhu. Although the report raised doubts about Diem’s viability and concluded that America’s commitment to South Vietnam would be much longer than originally anticipated and that the war would be long and costly, it had an overall optimistic tone and thus contributed to a continued escalation of American war efforts. The report also served to provide tacit support for the overthrow of the Diem government in November 1963. ROBERT G. MANGRUM See also Forrestal, Michael Vincent; Hilsman, Roger; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Ngo Dinh Diem; Ngo Dinh Nhu; Strategic Hamlet Program References Herring, George C. America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975. 4th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997.
Hispanics in the U.S. Military During the Vietnam War era, the U.S. Department of Defense did not separate information on Hispanics from that regarding other ethnic groups or races. In consequence, evidence of distinctive military experiences concerning Hispanics is relatively difficult to ascertain and gather. Nonetheless, some generalizations are possible, thanks in particular to several analyses resulting from the determined research of both individuals and organizations. William F. Abbott, a Vietnam War veteran, has conducted extensive research in an effort to provide a portrait of Hispanic involvement in the war. Based on a comprehensive review of Pentagon data, he estimates that 5–6 percent of all soldiers who served had Hispanic surnames. Most of these individuals were from California and Texas. Other states represented were Arizona, Colorado, Florida, New Mexico, and New York, with considerably smaller numbers from other states. A similar review of 1970 U.S. Census data revealed that 4.5 percent of the population had Hispanic names.
Historiography, Vietnam War Frederick P. Aguirre, president of Latino Advocates for Education, Inc., has done research on Hispanic veterans in California and supports the conclusion that this population group was overrepresented in the military during the Vietnam War. A total of 15 percent of military casualties in Vietnam among residents of California were Hispanics, even though that ethnic group comprised only 7 percent of the total population. A total of 321 servicemen from Orange County, one of the largest and most diverse counties in California, died in the conflict. Of those, 27 servicemen, or 9 percent, were Hispanic at a time when this ethnic population was only 5 percent of the total in the county. Hispanics also are heavily represented among those receiving distinguished awards for combat service. A total of 15 received the Congressional Medal of Honor for service in Vietnam, while 49 received the Distinguished Service Cross and 23 received the Navy Cross. Reuben Treviso, a Vietnam War veteran, served as staff coordinator for the Forum of National Hispanic Organizations and the associate editor of the publication Hispanic Link. He conducted a survey of U.S. Census and draft board information from the state of New Mexico in 1970. This analysis concluded that Hispanics accounted for 27 percent of the population of the state but 69 percent of the young men drafted into the military. Treviso echoes other sources in estimating that approximately 20 percent of the Hispanics who served became casualties. Retired U.S. Navy commander Everett Alvarez Jr. received his commission in 1960 at a time when very few Hispanics were going to flight school. On August 5, 1964, he became the first American aviator shot down over the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and the first to be incarcerated in the notorious Hoa Lo (“Hanoi Hilton”) prison. He had been participating in a bombing raid in retaliation for alleged attacks by North Vietnamese torpedo boats against the U.S. destroyers Maddox and Turner Joy during the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. Alvarez was released along with 575 prisoners of war on February 12, 1973. George Mariscal, a professor of literature at the University of California–San Diego and a Vietnam War veteran, has captured various aspects of the Hispanic experience during the War in the book Aztlàn and Viet Nam: Chicano and Chicana Experiences of the War (1999). The book is a collection of more than 60 articles, essays, poems, short stories, and speeches and represents the first anthology of Chicano/Chicana writings about the war. The volume encompasses both the experiences of soldiers and the antiwar movement at home. In general, the Hispanic experience during the war mirrored that of the African American community. Hispanics served in numbers disproportionate to their percentage of the total population and had a higher-than-average casualty rate. This was chiefly because of their lower socioeconomic level, which did not lend itself to large numbers of college deferments and reflected endemic poverty levels. The Hispanic population, like other groups at home, was involved in protests and other anti–Vietnam War activities. During a
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demonstration against the war on August 29, 1970, Reuben Salazar was killed when he was hit in the head by a tear-gas canister fired by a deputy of the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department. Salazar, a prominent Hispanic journalist, had been covering the demonstration. Salazar Park in East Los Angeles is now named for him, and a U.S. postage stamp was also issued in his honor. ARTHUR I. CYR See also African Americans in the U.S. Military; Antiwar Movement, U.S. References Mariscal, George, ed. Aztlàn and Vietnam: Chicano and Chicana Experiences of the War. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. Treviso, Ruben. “Hispanics and the Vietnam War.” In Vietnam Reconsidered, edited by Harrison E. Salisbury, 135–156. New York: Harper and Row, 1984.
Historiography, Vietnam War Historiography generally refers to the body of historical literature on a given subject and the study of how it has evolved over time. The historiography of the Vietnam War is complex and often contains conflicting elements. The conflict’s historiography has differed because of the politics and socioeconomic milieu in which some of the works were written, the political predilections of the various authors, and the proximity of a book’s publication date to the end of the conflict. The historiography has also been affected by the various historical methods, or methodologies, used to produce the studies. The following paragraphs briefly consider some important emphases and debates within the historiography of the Vietnam War.
Orthodoxy, Revisionism, and Neo-Orthodoxy Several important articles analyze the historiography of the Vietnam War, including Robert Divine’s of 1988, Robert McMahon’s of 1996, and Gary Hess’s of 1994. In the first of these articles, Divine argues for the existence of an orthodox interpretation of the war in which analysts criticized U.S. policy before and during the Vietnam War. Divine discusses three kinds of orthodox interpretations. The first is referred to as the “liberal internationalist interpretation,” characterized by the 1969 work of Arthur Schlesinger Jr., historian and presidential adviser to John F. Kennedy. Schlesinger’s quagmire theory contended that American leaders had accidentally embroiled the United States in the war owing to a chain of small decisions, each of which further deepened the American commitment. The second orthodox interpretation identified by Divine is the stalemate theory, which is most clearly represented in the 1972 work of the journalist Daniel Ellsberg. Ellsberg argued that domestic politicians, still reeling from the loss of China to communism in 1949, could not appear to be weak on communism and thus involved the United States in an
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unnecessary war. The third pillar of orthodoxy, Divine writes, deals with the flaws of Cold War containment policy. This theory, elucidated in the many writings of the leftist Gabriel Kolko, shifts the onus of the war from politicians to the blind anti-Communist ideology that set the United States against any actors in the international system that opposed liberal capitalist internationalism. Revisionist interpreters soon began to argue against these criticisms of the Vietnam War, however. This interpretation, Hess contends, began to emerge with the publication in 1971 of the Pentagon Papers and continued to gain credibility in the late 1970s as the military victory by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) brought about a series of introspective analyses of the Vietnam War. Early revisionists, importantly including Guenter Lewy and Norman Podhoretz, contended in 1978 and 1982, respectively, that the United States made a moral decision in defending the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) from communism, although they disagreed on whether the war was winnable or not. Hess separates the progeny of the early revisionists into three categories. The first group, represented by Harry Summers Jr. in 1982, employs Karl von Clausewitz’s On War to hold U.S. civilian leaders responsible for defeat because they neither declared war nor invaded North Vietnam, instead misusing time and energy in the extended counterinsurgency against the Viet Cong (VC). The second group, labeled “Hearts and Minders” by Hess, also based their revisionism on a criticism of American military strategy. In 1986, historians such as Andre Krepinevich Jr. believed that U.S. leadership should have understood the new challenge of counterinsurgency and sought to pacify the Vietnamese countryside rather than searching and destroying enemy units. The third set of revisionists considered U.S. security a justifiable motive for intervention in Vietnam and contended that the United States should have given greater support to the nationalist Ngo Dinh Diem government in the early 1960s. R. B. Smith, writing in 1983, supports this position by underscoring the threat of growing Chinese and Soviet interests in the region. Hess contends that neo-orthodox scholarship responded to revisionism. This scholarship found its strongest voice in the historian George Herring, who recentered the emphasis on the shortcomings of Communist containment as an international policy. In America’s Longest War (1979), Herring posits that policy makers developed containment to respond to the needs of Western Europe immediately following World War II. The application of containment policy to Southeast Asia was thus invalid and was doomed because the cultural and temporal contexts were poles apart from Soviet containment in Europe. The Vietnam War, from this stilldominant perspective, was a heartbreaking catastrophe that could have been avoided if American leaders had exercised objectivity instead of monolithic containment. Since the late 1980s, new scholarship has moved beyond this standardized historiographical structure. The following sections discuss the most important developments within the field over the last 20 years.
Origins of the Vietnam War What factors led to the U.S. involvement in Vietnam and to the war between North Vietnam and South Vietnam? Similarly, how did other countries become interested in Vietnam before and after World War II? To answer these two questions, historians have examined the different goals of the principal political actors in the region, namely the governments of France, China, the Soviet Union, and the United States, as well as international bodies such as the United Nations (UN). This literature examines the effects of European and Japanese imperialism, the Communist victory in China in 1949, and World War II on Vietnamese nationalist thought. In one example, Mark Atwood Lawrence in 2005 examined the diplomatic details of the French departure from Indochina through a comparative approach that examines the relationship between U.S. international power and European decolonization and how the connection between the two elevated the importance of Vietnam for Cold War warriors. In a 1987 argument, Andrew Rotter discussed containment and the origins of American involvement in Vietnam as both a foreign policy strategy and a domestic ideology against communism. Recent work by Michael Latham (2000) builds on this dual emphasis through an examination of policy making based on the principles of liberal capitalism and global anticommunism, effectively connecting policy makers to the ideology of modernization. Simplistic notions about advocating progress in the decolonizing world drove U.S. policy in this early period of the Cold War, ultimately pointing toward greater U.S. involvement amid the competing demands of the colonizers and the colonized.
New Historical Methodologies and New Documents Recently the historical debate has also gained considerable nuance for two reasons: new available documents and new methodologies. The recent opening of international archival repositories has helped to illuminate Vietnamese, Soviet, and Chinese policies during the Vietnam War. For example, the literature holding the Viet Minh as operating under the auspices of Beijing or Moscow has been eclipsed by a more thorough and nuanced examination of the motives for nationalism, most importantly through the work of historians Mark Bradley, Pierre Asselin, and Lien-Hang T. Nguyen and Southeast Asian scholar Truong Buu Lam, among others. In the same way, these authors have elucidated Vietnamese methods and philosophies of protracted warfare. Just as important, close studies of North Vietnamese and Chinese policy, especially studies by William Duiker in 2000, Hue-Tam Ho Tai in 2001, and Robert Brigham in 2006, demonstrate the close attention paid by the North Vietnamese government to the needs of the people and the importance of family ties in Vietnamese culture. New historical methodology also has made the debate over the Vietnam War more complex. In particular, the introduction of culture and ideology into the study of diplomacy further questions the sufficiency of hard matters of policy in explaining the greater trends of the war. In 2004 Seth Jacobs examined American policy
Hmongs toward Diem within the domestic racial and political climate of the 1950s. In 2000 Mark Philip Bradley combined the approaches of culture and transnational history to examine the local context of Vietnam.
History and Memory The new studies continue to prod the fire of the orthodox-revisionist debate. Although general agreement exists that the protracted and costly effort in South Vietnam was a failure, historians invariably call attention to different causes. For this reason, the study of the memory of the Vietnam War merits attention. In their important book titled The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked (1979), Leslie H. Gelb and Richard K. Betts categorized nine orthodox explanations for the American failure in Vietnam, demonstrating that analysts have varied on the reasons for failure and the relative magnitude of the different causes of American involvement. What lessons should Americans learn from defeat in Southeast Asia? How and how well have the deep fractures in American society opened by the war been closed? And most importantly, how should the traumatic episode be presented within the greater narrative of American and international history? Several historians of American foreign relations, including Robert McMahon in 1999 and Robert Schulzinger in 2006, have emphasized how the legacy of Vietnam has affected U.S. foreign policy and domestic politics. The application of the increasing sophistication of thought regarding the Vietnam War clearly illustrates the utility in possessing a knowledgeable historical memory in finding meaning in the conflict. The Vietnam War’s comparative value has been utilized during the current U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, including a 2008 workshop conducted by the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations. CHRISTOPHER R. W. DIETRICH See also Ellsberg, Daniel; Literature and the Vietnam War; Pentagon Papers and Trial; Schlesinger, Arthur Meier, Jr. References Bradley, Mark. Imagining Vietnam and America: The Making of Postcolonial Vietnam, 1919–1950. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000. Brigham, Robert K. ARVN: Life and Death in the South Vietnamese Army. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006. Divine, Robert. “Vietnam Reconsidered.” Diplomatic History 12 (1988): 79–93. Duiker, William J. Ho Chi Minh: A Life. New York: Hyperion, 2000. Ellsberg, Daniel. Papers on the War. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972. Gaiduk, Ilya V. Confronting Vietnam: Soviet Policy toward the Indochina Conflict, 1954–1963. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003. Gelb, Leslie H., with Richard K. Betts. The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1979. Herring, George C. America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975. 4th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001. Hess, Gary. “The Unending Debate: Historians and the Vietnam War.” Diplomatic History 18 (1994): 239–264.
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Hess, Gary. Vietnam: Explaining America’s Lost War. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008. Jacobs, Seth. America’s Miracle Man in Vietnam: Ngo Dinh Diem, Religion, Race, and U.S. Intervention in Southeast Asia. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004. Jian, Chen. Mao’s China and the Cold War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001. Kolko, Gabriel. Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States, and the Modern Historical Experience. New York: Pantheon, 1985. Krepinevich, Andrew F., Jr. The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. Latham, Michael A. Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and Nation Building in the Kennedy Era. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000. Lawrence, Mark Atwood. Assuming the Burden: Europe and the American Commitment to War in Vietnam. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005. Lewy, Guenter. America in Vietnam. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978. McMahon, Robert. The Limits of Empire: The United States and Southeast Asia since World War II. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999. McMahon, Robert. “U.S.-Vietnamese Relations: A Historiographical Survey.” In Pacific Passage: The Study of American East-Asian Relations on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century, edited by Warren I. Cohen, 313–336. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996. Podhoretz, Norman. Why We Were in Vietnam. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982. Rotter, Andrew J. The Path to Vietnam: Origins of the American Commitment to Southeast Asia. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987. Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. The Crisis of Confidence: Ideas, Power, and Violence in America. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969. Schulzinger, Robert D. A Time for Peace: The Legacy of the Vietnam War. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. Smith, R. B. An International History of the Vietnam War. 3 vols. New York: St. Martin’s, 1983–1991. Summers, Harry G. On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War. Novato, CA: Presidio Press 1995. Tai, Hue-Tam Ho. The Country of Memory: Remaking the Past in Late Socialist Vietnam. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001. Tucker, Spencer C. Vietnam. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1999. United States Department of Defense. United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: Study Prepared by the Department of Defense. 12 vols. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971. Zhai, Qiang. China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000.
Hmongs One of the principal ethnic minorities of Laos, the Hmongs live in the mountains surrounding the Plain of Jars. They migrated there from China in the 19th century. China still has the largest numbers of Hmongs. Hmong native speakers are estimated at up to 3 million people. The Hmong population in Laos is estimated at some 500,000 people. Vietnam has more than 800,000 Hmongs, while the Hmong population of Thailand is perhaps 150,000 people. The
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A “Black” Hmong woman in traditional dress in northern Vietnam, near the border with China. (Corel)
largest Hmong population outside of Asia is in the United States, with as many as 300,000 people. The Hmong swidden (slash-and-burn) farming system is based on growing white (nonglutinous) rice and corn, with tubers, vegetables, and occasionally meat to round out the diet. The Hmongs are excellent hunters, using crossbows as well as firearms. The Hmongs have traditionally grown opium in small quantities for medicinal and ritual purposes. Opium poppies are a cold-season crop and are typically planted in cornfields after the corn crop has been harvested. Being of high value and low bulk and also being nonperishable, opium makes an excellent cash crop and has always found ready buyers, whether these were the traditional caravans from Yunnan, the French opium monopoly, or, in more recent times, heroin processors and smugglers supplying international markets. The Hmongs were traditionally paid in silver for their opium. Hmongs regard kinship patrilineally and identify 15 or 16 patrilineal exogamous clans, each tracing its descent to a common mythical ancestor. There are several subdivisions in Hmong society, usually named according to features of traditional dress. The White Hmongs, the Striped Hmongs, and the Green Hmongs (sometimes called the Blue Hmongs) are the most numerous.
Their languages are somewhat different but mutually comprehensible. The Hmongs practiced polygamy; divorce is possible but discouraged. Gender roles are strongly differentiated. Women are responsible for child care and all household chores, including cooking, grinding corn, and husking rice. Farming tasks are the responsibility of both men and women. Only men fell trees in the swidden-clearing operation, although both sexes are involved in clearing grass and light brush. During planting, men drilled holes in the ground with a sharp stick and were followed by women, who placed and covered the seeds. Weeding, harvesting, and threshing are shared tasks. Women care for small animals, while men care for large animals. In Laos, the Hmongs live in houses built directly on the ground that have bamboo or wood planking walls, thatch roofs, and a stamped earthen floor. In size the houses range from about 16 by 23 feet to 33 by 49 feet. The interior is divided into a kitchen/ cooking alcove at one end and several sleeping alcoves at the other, with beds or sleeping benches raised 12 to 16 inches above the dirt floor. Rice and unhusked corn are stored in large woven bamboo baskets inside the house. Furnishings are minimal and consist of a low table, stools of wood or bamboo, and a large clay stove for cooking. Almost every house has a simple altar mounted on one wall for offerings and ceremonies associated with ancestral spirits. In contrast with the lowland Lao, the Hmongs share no temple or common house in their village. Hmong cultural norms are individualistic, and the household is more important than the village. Most of the Hmongs supported the French, first against the Japanese and then against the Viet Minh. In 1961 Hmong leaders were enlisted by the United States and Thailand to fight against the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese. At their request, the Hmongs received modern weapons that enabled them to defend their villages as the Plain of Jars became a major battleground. As a result, many Hmong men were fighting almost continuously from 1961 until the 1973 cease-fire, and Hmong casualties were heavy. The main Hmong base was Long Chieng, situated in a valley surrounded by karst mountains. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) provided support for the anti-Communist Hmongs because of the prohibition against U.S. military personnel on the ground in Laos. Throughout their wars, the French and the Americans called the Hmongs the Meos, a term later judged by some to be derogatory. After 1975 the Hmongs were left on their own. Many fled to Thailand, eluding the patrols of the Communist regime. Others organized resistance in their old mountain bases but were relentlessly pursued by the new government, which accused them of having committed “crimes against the people.” Many ended up in refugee camps in Thailand, where they spent up to a decade or more. Some were accepted to begin new lives in the United States, France, Australia, and other countries. ARTHUR J. DOMMEN See also Central Intelligence Agency; Laos; Long Chieng; Vang Pao
Hoa Binh, Battle of References Chan, Sucheng. Hmong Means Free: Life in Laos and America. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994. Hamilton-Merritt, Jane. Tragic Mountains: The Hmong, the Americans, and the Secret Wars for Laos, 1942–1992. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993. Quincy, Keith. Hmong: History of a People. Cheney: Eastern Washington University Press, 1988. Savada, Andrea Matles, ed. Laos: A Country Study. Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1995. Warner, Roger. Back Fire: The CIA’s Secret War in Laos and Its Link to the War in Vietnam. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995. Yang Dao. Hmong at the Turning Point. Minneapolis: WorldBridge Associates, 1993.
Hoa Binh, Battle of Start Date: November 14, 1951 End Date: February 24, 1952 Key Indochina War battle initiated by the French. Following the French victories in battles provoked by Viet Minh Operations HOANG HOA THAM and HA NAM NINH, French military commander in Indochina General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny decided to go on the offensive. This was made possible by increasing U.S. military aid and was influenced by the success of meat-grinder battles in the Korean War and the need to secure a victory to influence the French National Assembly debate over the 1952–1953 Indochina budget. De Lattre chose as his objective the major Viet Minh road connecting northeastern Viet Minh strongholds on the southern edge of the Red River Delta redoubt with Viet Minh–controlled areas north of central Vietnam. The battle’s focus was the city of Hoa Binh (which ironically means “peace”) on the Black River. Another important consideration for de Lattre in choosing Hoa Binh was maintaining the support of Muong Montagnards of the area, who thus far had remained staunch French supporters. The Battle of Hoa Binh began on November 14, 1951, when three French paratroop battalions dropped on Hoa Binh, the last operation in which the French used trimotor JU-52 transports for their paratroop and resupply operations. The French occupied the city with almost no resistance. At the same time, 15 infantry battalions, 7 artillery battalions, and 2 armored groups, all supported by 2 Dinassauts (naval assault divisions) and engineering forces, worked their way into the Black River Valley. After his defeats in Operations HOANG HOA THAM and HA NAM NINH, Viet Minh commander General Vo Nguyen Giap had been avoiding battle with the French except in conditions of his choosing; thus, the Viet Minh at Hoa Binh simply melted away. But the French position there seemed to offer an excellent opportunity for Giap to repeat his 1950 successes along Route Coloniale 4. Therefore, against the advice of his Chinese Communist military advisers, who for the first time refused to accompany into battle the Viet
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Minh units they advised, Giap ordered south the 304th, 308th, and 312th Infantry divisions, along with artillery, antiaircraft, and engineer troops, and he called in Viet Minh regional forces stationed to the west of the Red River Delta. Giap also ordered his 316th and 320th divisions to infiltrate French lines and disrupt their lines of communication feeding Hoa Binh. French land access to Hoa Binh was by means of Route Coloniale 6. This road, which had been in disrepair since 1940 and was now little more than a trail, wound for 25 miles through difficult terrain marked by underbrush and high cliffs on either side, making it ideal for ambushes. The French now worked to improve Route Coloniale 6. Communication with Hoa Binh by means of the Day River was almost three times as long as by Route Coloniale 6, but it was much more secure; however, the thin-skinned French landing craft were vulnerable to Viet Minh recoilless rifle and bazooka fire. This led the French, as in the case of Route Coloniale 6, to develop a string of forts and strong points that helped secure the river but at high cost in manpower and equipment. Hoa Binh became a meat-grinder battle for both sides. De Lattre, consumed by the cancer that was to kill him early the next year, left Indochina in December 1951 before the battle was over. But before his departure, he stripped French outposts as far as Laos and Cambodia of manpower, making these more vulnerable to Viet Minh attack. The Battle of Hoa Binh thus clearly showed the limitations imposed by the paucity of French manpower resources. Although the French held Hoa Binh, it was to no advantage. The Viet Minh simply built a bypass road around the town, and by the end of the battle on February 24, 1952, they had succeeded in penetrating the Red River Delta as never before. French participants remembered the battle as “the hell of Hoa Binh.” There the French lost 894 killed or missing. Although the Viet Minh paid a heavy price in the battle, sustaining perhaps 12,000 casualties, all of their divisions gained firsthand experience in fighting the French and learned enemy strengths and weaknesses. This would be of immense benefit in the battles to come. Giap rotated units in and out of the fighting, and those that were bloodied merely had to withdraw into the jungle free from French pursuit to rest and regroup. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Dinassauts; France, Air Force, 1946–1954; France, Army, 1946–1954; HOANG HOA THAM, Operation; Indochina War; Lattre de Tassigny, Jean de; Vo Nguyen Giap References Fall, Bernard B. Street without Joy: The French Debacle in Indochina. Rev. ed. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1994. Fall, Bernard B. The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis. 2nd rev. ed. New York: Praeger, 1967. Gras, Yves. Histoire de la Guerre d’Indochine. Paris: Éditions Denoël, 1992. Vo Nguyen Giap and Huu Mai. Duong Toi Dien Bien Phu [The Road to Dien Bien Phu]. Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 2001.
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Hoa Hao Religious sect in southern Vietnam. The Hoa Hao was founded in 1939 by Huynh Phu So in the hamlet in southern Vietnam that gave the religion its name. So, a native of Hoa Hao, preached a revised Buddhism targeting the impoverished peasantry. Greatly influenced by the ideas of Phat Thay Tay An, the so-called Buddha of Western Peace, So claimed that his adherents made contact with God, believing that they could call upon him whenever and wherever they chose. So conveyed his teachings through a dialectal poetry and charismatic appeal. As his sermons circulated orally from village to village, his flock increased to some 2 million people prior to World War II. He prophesied global conflict, French defeat, and Japan’s occupation of Indochina. In contrast to the Cao Dai, the Hoa Hao’s worldly message placed greater emphasis on millenarianism, nationalism, and human equality. Without a formal ruling body of clergy or edifices for religious exercises, the Hoa Hao was less a church and more an impassioned sectarian crusade. Desiring to create a Buddhist community on earth rather than in heaven, So criticized the populace’s extravagance, ceremony, and irrational beliefs. Stressing inner reliance instead of external display, his instructions limited gift giving to ancestors, patriots, and Buddha only. Therefore, donations to supernatural beings and bronzes were unnecessary, and sacrifices to deities went unsolicited. So called for four daily prayers at home, unarranged marital unions without dickering and dealing, and ungarnished observances for the dead. He also urged renunciation of drugs, alcohol, and gambling. The Hoa Hao established committees in the hamlets of its followers. Above these was organized a secular-sectarian tier preoccupied with social programs, proselytization, and community protection. Structurally, the Hoa Hao operated out of hamlet and provincial councils and a tiny national council and through the four regional military leaders. The latter, hoping to increase the people’s independence from the influential gentry, provided aid regarding taxation, property rights, and social services. Philosophically, the Hoa Hao blamed Westernization for afflicting the Vietnamese with an immoderate urban lifestyle. Harking back to a simpler time, the sect longed for a less sophisticated and more earnest peasantry. Scoffing at upper-class assimilation of French culture, So sympathized with the impoverished and favored an end to class differences. Despite a program promoting equal treatment and the termination of special privilege, he opposed Marxism and class struggle. In fact, the Hoa Hao imposed heavy taxes upon its converts for payments of welfare benefits and for military protection. The growing anticolonial Hoa Hao soon menaced France’s authority. In 1940 So, apprehended and institutionalized, managed to proselytize his doctrine. He was freed but confined to the town of Bac Lieu, where he received pilgrims through whom he circulated religious inspiration and anti-French propaganda. In effect, the Hoa Hao subverted imperial administration in areas under its in-
fluence. The Hoa Hoa replaced colonial courts, converted Frenchled native soldiers, and later provisioned Japanese forces with rice. So created the Dan Xa Dang (Social Democratic Party), which called for common land ownership on a voluntary basis. He continued to reject Marxist ideology and waged a brutal war against the Viet Minh after 1945. So eventually died at the hands of the Communists two years later. Following So’s death the sect fragmented into four parts, each commanded by one of his former military subordinates. Thereafter hamlet and provincial tiers administered welfare, while the military regions controlled political matters. The Hoa Hao engaged in a power struggle with the Cao Dai and other nationalist groups even while it participated in various national coalitions and united fronts. The sect fought the efforts of Emperor Bao Dai and later President Ngo Dinh Diem to assert central government authority over its autonomous domain northwest of Saigon. Despite the Hoa Hao’s 1 million supporters and 20,000 troops, Diem, through a combination of military action and bribery, finally broke the back of its resistance in 1954. RODNEY J. ROSS See also Bao Dai; Buddhism in Vietnam; Cao Dai; Huynh Phu So; Ngo Dinh Diem References Buttinger, Joseph. Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled. 2 vols. New York: Praeger, 1967. Kahin, George McT. Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam. New York: Knopf, 1986. Popkin, Samuel L. The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979. Woodside, Alexander B. Community and Revolution in Modern Vietnam. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976.
Hoa Lo Prison The best-known and most notorious of the camps or prisons housing U.S. prisoners of war (POWs) in the Hanoi area. Hoa Lo Prison, dubbed the “Hanoi Hilton” by Bob Schumaker, the second U.S. POW there, was a large fortress covering a city block in the heart of Hanoi. Built by the French in 1886, its original name was Prison Centrale; later it was known as the Maison Centrale. Hoa Lo, which means “fiery furnace” or “fiery crucible,” was taken from the location of the prison on Hoa Lo Street, where earthen coal stoves were once made and sold. Some called the prison “the Devil’s Island of Southeast Asia.” Hoa Lo’s 4-foot thick walls were 20 feet high, but electrified barbed wire extended them an additional 5 feet. The prison was a series of beige stucco-walled cell blocks and administration buildings. It had glass-embedded walls and red-tiled roofs. Some POWs said that it reminded them of the description of the Bastille in Charles Dickens’s A Tale of Two Cities. Formerly a place of incarceration for high-ranking Vietnamese government officials, the Hanoi Hilton was one of a number
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North Vietnamese guards talk to American prisoners of war at the infamous “Hanoi Hilton” during the Vietnam War. The prison, officially known as Hoa Lo, was built by the French at the turn of the 20th century when Vietnam was still part of French Indochina. (Bettmann/Corbis)
of prisons located in or near Hanoi, including those known as the Zoo, Alcatraz, the Briarpatch, and Camp Hope (Son Tay). Some 700 American POWs were housed in these camps between August 1964 and February 1973, when Operation HOMECOMING began their release. There are no exact U.S. figures on the total number of POWs who were held in the Hanoi Hilton, but it is estimated that by late 1970 as many as 360 POWs were housed in the so-called Camp Unity, one of its cellblocks. This prison of concrete and mortar was a forbidding structure. A dry moat separated the prison’s tall walls from the surrounding area. The prison itself was divided into sections, and each of these cell blocks was further divided. The POWs gave each cell block different names, such as “New Guy Village,” “Heartbreak Hotel,” “Little Vegas,” and “Camp Unity.” Almost all new POWs were housed temporarily in “New Guy Village.” Sanitation was poor, and the cells were infested with insects and rodents. Much of the food was inedible, and medical treatment was poor to nonexistent. Torture and isolation were commonplace. Benjamin Schemmer, a POW, recalls that prisoners “were crowded 40 to 60 men in each room, some of them only 22 by 45 or 60 feet long.” Most of our knowledge of Hoa Lo Prison and other POW camps comes from prisoner debriefings and numerous published personal accounts. These are testimonials of faith and courage. Robert Reissner, shot down on September 16, 1965, stated that “I guess
if there was any one thing that happened to many of us in prison, it was that we were no longer embarrassed talking about God or religion. We gained a lot of faith not only from private prayers but also from sharing our feelings about God with each other.” The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) constantly used various means to break captives psychologically, mostly to gain confessions or information for propaganda purposes. Prisoners were isolated and prohibited from communicating and were tortured in specially designed interrogation rooms. Other deprivations included beatings, extended darkness, shacklings, and not being permitted to bathe. In spite of deplorable conditions and inhumane treatment, prisoners managed to maintain communication with each other and to get news from the outside. The prisoners organized, held regular church services, taught each other foreign languages and math, and reenacted their favorite movies. At one time Hoa Lo held such notable POWs as Jeremiah A. Denton Jr., John S. McCain III, and James B. Stockdale. Some POWs had been held there since as early as 1967. Two factors contributed to the increase in the POW population at Hoa Lo. A November 21, 1970, attempt to rescue POWs at Son Tay camp caused the North Vietnamese to move more than 200 American aircrew members there. And in 1972 as bombing raids of Hanoi continued, the North Vietnamese rounded up POWs from camps scattered throughout North Vietnam and moved them to
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downtown Hanoi. The prison was poorly equipped to handle the increasing number of American POWs, however. Even before the Son Tay Raid and the bombing of Hanoi, conditions at the Hanoi Hilton improved. Some attribute this to a letter-writing campaign by Americans demanding more humane treatment of the POWs. Others attribute the change to the death of Ho Chi Minh in September of 1969 or to propaganda statements by North Vietnamese that backfired. Whatever the reasons, torture sessions to gain military information abated, and POWs were even allowed to write and receive letters. Captives were given new clothes, were allowed to exercise and bathe regularly, and were given much-needed medical treatment and food. With the signing of the Paris Peace Accords on January 23, 1973, the release of the POWs began. The first 116 of the 566 American POWs released landed at Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines on February 12, 1973. The first man off the plane was U.S. Navy captain Jeremiah Denton, who after seven and a half years in captivity saluted the American flag. In 1997 a Singapore company began turning most of what had been the Hanoi Hilton into a block of luxury apartments and stores. GARY KERLEY AND SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Denton, Jeremiah Andrew, Jr.; HOMECOMING, Operation; McCain, John Sidney, III; Missing in Action, Allied; Prisoners of War, Allied; Son Tay Raid; Stockdale, James Bond References Gargus, John. The Son Tay Raid: American POWs in Vietnam Were Not Forgotten. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2007. Routledge, Howard, and Phyllis Routledge. In the Presence of Mine Enemies, 1965–1973: A Prisoner at War. London: Collins, 1974. Rowan, Stephen A. They Wouldn’t Let Us Die: The Prisoners of War Tell Their Story. Middle Village, NY: Jonathan David, 1973. Risner, Robinson. The Passing of the Night: My Seven Years as a Prisoner of the North Vietnamese. New York: Random House, 1973. Schemmer, Benjamin F. The Raid. New York: Harper and Row, 1976.
Nha was unqualified for the positions he held and owed them to his close links to Thieu. As the author of the 007 Decree, which required all newspapers and magazines in South Vietnam to pay at least 10 million dong (20 million was the actual required amount) to the government if they wanted to continue publication, he earned widespread scorn. This measure, which eliminated many critics who were too poor to pay, was correctly perceived as censorship. Nha also used his influence to place many of his cronies, who were also young and unqualified, in important positions within the government. Nha did more harm than good to the Thieu government. As a source of mounting public disfavor, Nha was forced to leave office in October 1974. Reportedly U.S. ambassador Graham Martin made Nha’s dismissal a condition for continued aid to the Thieu government. When the South Vietnamese government collapsed in 1975, Nha fled to the United States, where he settled permanently. HO DIEU ANH See also Nguyen Van Thieu; Vietnam, Republic of, 1954–1975 References Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. Kiem Dat. Chien Tranh Viet Nam [The Vietnam War]. Glendale, CA: Dai Nam, 1982. Nguyen Khac Ngu. Nhung Ngay Cuoi Cung Cua Viet Nam Cong Hoa [The Last Days of the Republic of Vietnam]. Montreal: Nhom Nghien Cuu Su Dia, 1979.
Hoang Duc Nha Birth Date: 1941 Minister of information for the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) during 1973–1974. Hoang Duc Nha was born at Phu Yen in central Vietnam in 1941 and was a cousin of Nguyen Van Thieu, who served as president of South Vietnam during 1967– 1975. Nha was educated at the French Lycée Yersin in Da Lat and the School of Commerce in Saigon before receiving a scholarship to study civil engineering in the United States at the University of Pittsburgh. After graduation he returned to Vietnam in 1968 and began to work with Thieu, then chairman of the National Leadership Council. Nha became an influential special adviser to Thieu after 1972 and then in 1973 he was appointed minister of information.
Hoang Duc Nha (right), Republic of Vietnam president Nguyen Van Thieu’s press secretary and confidant, shakes hands with U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam Ellsworth Bunker (left) at the start of a meeting between Thieu and National Security Adviser Henry A. Kissinger (center). (AP/Wide World Photos)
HOANG HOA THAM, Operation
Hoang Hoa Tham See De Tham
HOANG HOA THAM,
Operation
Start Date: January 1951 End Date: June 1951 First set-piece battles of the Indochina War. Following his 1950 victories that wrested northeastern Tonkin from the French, Viet Minh commander General Vo Nguyen Giap believed that the time had come for a general counteroffensive against the main French defensive line in the flatlands of the Red River Delta. The prize was Hanoi itself, and Viet Minh propagandists began to post leaflets with the inscription “Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi for Tet.” By mid-January 1951 Giap had assembled 81 battalions, including 8 of engineers and 12 of heavy weapons. On January 13 he struck with two divisions from the Tam Dao Massif at the end of the Red River Delta against two French groupes mobiles (mobile groups [GM], equivalent to a U.S. regimental combat team) defending the approaches to Vinh Yen, some 30 miles from Hanoi. This operation was known as HOANG HOA THAM for Vietnamese guerrilla leader De Tham, who had held out against the French from 1887 to 1913. The Battle of Vinh Yen initially favored the Viet Minh, but on January 14 French commander General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny took personal charge, flying there in a small liaison plane and immediately ordering the airlift of reserve battalions from the south. On January 16 for the first time in the war, the French experienced human-wave assaults by much of the Viet Minh 308th Division. De Lattre ordered all available fighter aircraft, even transport planes capable of dropping bombs, to Vinh Yen. In what became the most massive aerial bombardment of the Indochina War, the French dropped large quantities of napalm on their attackers. On January 17 de Lattre committed his last reserves, and by the end of the day the Viet Minh withdrew. Airpower and artillery were the keys to the French victory. Giap lost some 6,000 dead and 500 captured in the battle. Giap was not prepared to concede defeat, and in Operation HOANG HOA THAM II he employed three divisions to try to cut the French in Hanoi from the port of Haiphong, which handled the bulk of French military sea lift in the north. De Lattre misread Giap’s intentions, believing that he would next strike at Viet Tri, northwest of Hanoi. As a result, de Lattre had the bulk of his heavy forces to the west of the capital. The attack began on the night of March 23–24, 1951. General Raoul Salan was commanding for de Lattre, who was in France. Salan immediately dispatched French reinforcements eastward, including naval units. The deep water of the Da Bach River allowed the cruiser Duguay-Trouin, two destroyers, and two landing ships to provide supporting fire. One of the most incredible
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incidents of the Indochina War occurred during the fight for Mao Khe, the location of a large coal mine, when a company of 95 Tho (Tay) tribesmen, commanded by Vietnamese lieutenant Nghiem Xuan Toan and three French noncommissioned officers, managed to hold off a Viet Minh division for an entire day. Again Giap had failed to pierce the French defensive Red River Delta ring. In the offensive Giap lost another 3,000 men. In his memoirs he claims that his forces lost only about 2,000 men dead or wounded in this offensive, but he acknowledges that these losses were the heaviest that the Viet Minh had ever suffered up to that point in the war. Undaunted, Giap tried again when three Viet Minh divisions attacked from the south in an effort to secure important riceproducing areas of the southern part of the delta. One important Viet Minh innovation in this battle was the coordination of the frontal attack with the infiltration beforehand of two entire regiments within the French battle line. This offensive, known as HA NAM NINH for its objective of Ha Nam and Ninh Binh provinces, resulted in major battles at Ninh Binh and Phat Diem. Giap failed to realize the great demands of supplying conventional forces in battle, and the French were again able to bring superior firepower to bear, especially from the air and from along the Day River, where they were able to employ a naval assault division, or Dinassaut. The Viet Minh offensive began on May 29 and, as usual, achieved surprise, but by June 18 it too had ground to a halt largely because the French had been able to disrupt Viet Minh supply lines along the Day River. The Viet Minh had suffered another 10,000 dead. Giap then withdrew his forces into the mountains. He stated that while his Chinese advisers viewed his losses in the Ha Nam Ninh campaign as relatively small, he personally considered his losses so high that they were “difficult to accept.” These battles helped restore some French confidence and allowed General de Lattre to go to Washington and press the case for additional U.S. assistance. They also revealed French shortcomings such as inadequate cross-country mobility and the lack of sufficient airpower and manpower to exploit local victories. On the Viet Minh side, the battles caused Giap to go back to phase-two guerrilla strategies. He would refuse to accept battle unless it was on his own terms while seeking out vulnerable French peripheral units and working to undermine French authority. He and the Viet Minh leadership believed that a combination of factors would ultimately force the French to quit Indochina. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also De Tham; Dinassauts; France, Air Force, 1946–1954; France, Army, 1946–1954; Indochina War; Lattre de Tassigny, Jean de; Viet Minh; Vo Nguyen Giap References Currey, Cecil B. Victory at Any Cost: The Genius of Viet Nam’s General Vo Nguyen Giap. Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1997. Fall, Bernard B. Street without Joy: The French Debacle in Indochina. Rev. ed. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1994.
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Fall, Bernard B. The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis. 2nd rev. ed. New York: Praeger, 1967. Gras, Yves. Histoire de la Guerre d’Indochine. Paris: Éditions Denoël, 1992. Vo Nguyen Giap and Huu Mai. Duong Toi Dien Bien Phu [The Road to Dien Bien Phu]. Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 2001.
Hoang Van Hoan Birth Date: 1905 Death Date: 1991 Vietnamese revolutionary and influential official of the Lao Dong Party. Born in Nghe An Province in central Vietnam in 1905, Hoang Van Hoan joined the Viet Nam Thanh Nien Cach Menh Dong Chi Hoi (Vietnamese Revolutionary Youth Association) in 1926 and became a founding member of the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) in 1930. He joined the party’s Central Committee shortly after the August Revolution (1945). During the 1950s Hoan served as ambassador of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and in 1956 he was elected to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party, as the Communist Party was then renamed. In 1958 the delegates of North Vietnam’s National Assembly elected Hoan as vice chairman of the Standing Committee, a position he held throughout the Vietnam War. In 1976 at the Fourth National Party Congress after bitter political disputes, Hoan’s colleagues voted him out of the Political Bureau and the Central Committee. He had openly criticized the leadership of powerful Lao Dong secretary-general Le Duan, and as a result in 1979 Hoan defected to China. He was the highestranking Vietnamese Communist official to leave Vietnam. Hoan died in China in 1991. ROBERT K. BRIGHAM See also Lao Dong Party; Le Duan; Viet Nam Thanh Nien Cach Mang Dong Chi Hoi References Garver, John W. Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993. Hoang Van Hoan. A Drop in the Ocean: Hoang Van Hoan’s Revolutionary Reminiscences. Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1988.
Hoang Van Thai Birth Date: 1915 Death Date: July 2, 1986 Prominent Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) official and People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) general. Born into a poor peasant family in 1915 in Tay An village, Tien
Hai District, Thai Binh Province, Hoang Van Xiem as a young man worked first in the coal mines at Hon Gai and then in the tin mines at Cao Bang. In 1936 he returned to Tien Hai to join the antiFrench movement. At that time, he took the alias of Thai. In 1938 Thai joined the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) and worked to establish its first cells in his hometown. Arrested by French authorities in September 1940, he was released a month later. He then went underground, continuing anti-French activities in Lang Giang and Hiep Hoa. In March 1941 Thai was appointed commander of the National Salvation Army (predecessor of the PAVN) in Bac Son and was sent to China for military training. In October 1944 he returned to Vietnam and joined the Viet Minh as a staff officer. In April 1945 he was in charge of Truong Quan Chinh Khang Nhat (Military and Political School for the Anti-Japanese Cause). Thai held a series of important posts in the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). These included chief of the General Staff of the PAVN, member of the Military Central Party Committee, director general of the Military Training General Department, commander and commissar of Military Zone V, secretary of the Military Zone V Party Committee, commander of Armed Forces for the Liberation of South Vietnam, deputy secretary of the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) Party Committee, and deputy secretary of the Southern Region Party Committee. Thai also played a major role in the Indochina War and the Vietnam War and participated in most of the major military campaigns and battles. In the Indochina War, as the commander of the Viet Minh army’s General Staff, Thai participated in the 1950 Border Campaign as well as the northeastern Ha Nam Ninh and Hoa Binh and northwestern region campaigns. He served as General Vo Nguyen Giap’s chief of staff in the Battle of Dien Bien Phu. During the Vietnam War, Thai commanded Communist forces in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) from 1967 to 1973, seeing action during the 1968 Tet Offensive, the battle against the U.S.–South Vietnamese incursion into Cambodia in the spring of 1970, the Chen-la I and Chen-la II campaigns in Cambodia during 1970–1971, and the 1972 Easter Offensive. General Thai returned to North Vietnam in 1973 and served as the deputy chief of the PAVN’s General Staff during the 1975 Ho Chi Minh Campaign that resulted in the fall of Saigon and the conquest of South Vietnam. After 1975 Thai, an in-law of Minister of Defense Vo Nguyen Giap, became deputy minister of defense with responsibility for training and military technology research. Thai served as a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party from 1960 onward and later was elected as a member of parliament. He died suddenly in Hanoi on July 2, 1986. NGO NGOC TRUNG See also Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; Hoa Binh, Battle of; Ho Chi Minh Campaign; Lao Dong Party; Tet Offensive, Overall Strategy; Tet Offensive and the Saigon Circle; Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, Army; Vietnam, Socialist Republic of, 1975–Present; Vo Nguyen Giap
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References Fall, Bernard B. The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis. 2nd rev. ed. New York: Praeger, 1967. Ministry of Defense. Tu Dien Bach Khoa Quan Su Viet Nam [Vietnamese Military History Encyclopedia]. Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1996.
Ho Chi Minh Birth Date: May 19, 1890 Death Date: September 2, 1969 Leading Vietnamese revolutionary and president of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) from 1945 until his death in 1969. Born Nguyen Sinh Cung in Nghe An Province on May 19, 1890, Ho Chi Minh was the son of Nguyen Sinh Sac, a mandarin and itinerant teacher. Ho received his formal education in Hue at the Quoc Hoc school. After graduation, he taught school in a number of southern Vietnamese towns, including Saigon. In 1911 Ho, now called Van Ba, hired on to a French ship as a galley helper and traveled to France and the United States and then back to Europe. While in the United States during 1912–1913, Ho supposedly was interested in the American concepts of political rights outlined in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. During his years abroad he held a variety of jobs, working as a gardener, a waiter, and a photography assistant before settling on more permanent work in London as a dishwasher and an assistant pastry chef at the Carlton Hotel. When World War I erupted Ho moved from London to Paris, joining many Vietnamese nationals and changing his name to Nguyen Ai Quoc (Nguyen the Patriot). In France he accepted Marxist Leninism because of its anticolonial stance and position on national liberation. Ho argued that the true path to liberation for Vietnam rested in the writings of Lenin, and as a result Ho joined the French Socialist Party and founded the Association of Vietnamese Patriots. In 1920 after the Paris Peace Conference failed to address Indochinese independence, he helped found the French Communist Party, claiming that anticolonial nationalism and class revolution were inseparable. In 1923 and 1924 Ho traveled to Moscow to attend the Fourth and Fifth Comintern congresses and to receive formal theoretical and revolutionary training. While in Moscow he utilized his extensive foreign-language training, writing Marxist critiques of the Indochina problem in several languages. In late 1924 Ho traveled to China, where he visited one of the most important Vietnamese nationalists of the modern period, Phan Boi Chau. Ho stayed in Canton for two years, organizing what would become the first Vietnamese Communist Party and writing his highly influential Duong Cach Mang (Revolutionary Path). In 1925 he founded the Viet Nam Thanh Nien Cach Menh Dong Chi Hoi (Vietnam Revolutionary Youth League), commonly known as the Thanh Nien. The Thanh Nien was an anticolonial organization
Ho Chi Minh was the most prominent Vietnamese revolutionary leader of the 1930s and 1940s and the president of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam from 1945 until his death in 1969. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)
that attempted to unite political and social issues for the ultimate liberation of Vietnam. Ho’s efforts within the Thanh Nien led to the founding of the Indochinese Communist Party in 1929, and Ho spent much of 1930 recruiting skilled organizers and strategists. He also managed to carry out a fusion of three Communist parties that had emerged in Vietnam. Ho attracted the attention of the British police in Hong Kong, and in June 1931 they arrested him. After release from a British prison, Ho returned to Moscow for more revolutionary training at Lenin University. By the early 1940s Nguyen Ai Quoc had changed his name to Ho Chi Minh (Ho the Bringer of Light or Ho the Enlightened One). With the Japanese invasion of Vietnam during World War II, he moved his revolutionary group to the caves of Pac Bo in the northernmost reaches of Vietnam. In Pac Bo at the Eighth Plenum of the Indochinese Communist Party in May 1941, Ho supervised the organization of the Viet Minh, a nationalist and Communist front organization created to mobilize the citizenry to meet party objectives.
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During World War II the Viet Minh entered into an alliance with the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS), providing the allies with tactical and logistical support and helping to rescue downed American pilots. Some scholars have suggested that Ho’s revolutionary army even received financial and military support from the OSS and that Ho himself was an official agent. After the Japanese surrender in 1945, the Viet Minh seized power in Hanoi during the August Revolution. On September 2, 1945, with several Americans present, Ho declared Vietnamese independence from French colonial rule and announced the formation of the DRV. On March 2, 1946, he became president of the newly formed North Vietnam. Not surprisingly, France and North Vietnam soon clashed, and a nine-year war began. Most of the Soviet-bloc countries had quickly recognized the North Vietnamese government, and it was therefore easy for the French to cast their colonial reconquest of Vietnam in Cold War terms. After years of bloody stalemate, in 1954 the French suffered a humiliating defeat at Dien Bien Phu and accepted the subsequent 1954 Geneva Accords that recognized the supremacy of Ho’s Communists north of the 17th Parallel. The Geneva Accords called for nationwide elections in 1956 to reunify the country, but these elections never took place. Instead, the United States and southern Vietnamese nationals tried to build a non-Communist counterrevolutionary alternative south of the 17th Parallel. The end result was the creation of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), with Ngo Dinh Diem as its president. Diem quickly went on the offensive, rounding up thousands of suspected Communists and sending them to prison. His anti-Communist sweeps devastated the party and led to a sharp decrease in the number of cadres operating in South Vietnam. Ho called these “the darkest days” for the revolutionary movement. He vowed to reunify the country and called the South Vietnamese government a historical aberration because “Vietnam is one country, and we are one people with four thousand years of history.” In 1960 after six years of trying to unify the country through political means, the Lao Dong, a national united Communist party under Ho’s leadership, approved the use of armed violence to overthrow Diem and liberate Vietnam south of the 17th Parallel. In December 1960 the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (National Liberation Front [NLF]) was established to unite former Viet Minh activists with elements of southern society who opposed the U.S.-backed Diem regime. The character and nature of the NLF and its relationship to the government in Hanoi remains one of the most controversial issues from the war. Some scholars have suggested that Ho and the Lao Dong Party (as the Communist Party was renamed in 1951) had little influence over the NLF and that the conflict in South Vietnam was essentially a civil war. Policy makers in Washington claimed that Ho himself had presided over the birth of the NLF and that the insurgency was an invasion by North Vietnam against South Vietnam. This provided the rationale for U.S. involvement in Vietnam. It appears
that both explanations are wanting, since Ho’s Communist party was a nationwide national organization with representation from all regions of Vietnam. In March 1965 the United States intervened militarily in Vietnam, presenting Ho with the most difficult challenge of his life. He remained steadfast in his determination to see Vietnam reunified and refused to discuss any settlement with the United States that did not recognize this objective. In addition, Ho demanded that any settlement of the war must recognize the political and military supremacy of the NLF in South Vietnam. Because the second of these two goals was not compatible with Washington’s rationale for fighting the war, Ho was clearly outlining the parameters of a struggle with no clear or easy solution. Ho was a skillful leader who knew how to adapt revolutionary strategy to meet changing conditions. In 1965 he supervised the transition from total battlefield victory to victory through a protracted war strategy. He believed from his experience with the French that Westerners had little patience for a long and indecisive conflict. Supposedly Ho once remarked that “you can kill ten of our people for every one I kill of yours, but eventually you will grow tired and go home and I will win.” From late 1965 until his death in 1969, Ho supervised the protracted war strategy that offered neither side a quick or decisive victory. As the war dragged on, Ho used his considerable leadership gifts to mobilize the Vietnamese population. As preparations for the 1968 general offensive and uprising, known in the West as the Tet Offensive, were being made, Ho threw his enormous prestige behind the effort. He made his first public appearance in many months just weeks before the offensive to ensure universal support. Many scholars also credit Ho with ending several bitter inner-party disputes throughout the arduous conflict with the United States. He was especially skillful at managing the conflict between Le Duan, secretary-general of the Lao Dong Party, and his political rivals Truong Chinh, leader of the National Assembly, and Vo Nguyen Giap, commander in chief of the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army). Ho proved to be an able diplomat in the international arena as well. Beginning in 1956 the Soviets and the Chinese began a period of intense rivalry caused in part by Moscow’s strategy of peaceful coexistence with the West and Beijing’s adamant support of wars of national liberation. For years Ho skillfully managed to avoid taking sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute and had successfully played one against the other to secure increased aid. Eventually the Lao Dong Party moved closer to Moscow, and Ho accepted the Soviet-supported strategy of fighting while negotiating. During the last year of his life, Ho worked closely with the Vietnamese negotiators in Paris, outlining the nuanced differences in the Lao Dong Party’s strategy. Despite his indefatigable drive for Vietnamese liberation, Ho never lived to see his country reunified. He died on September 2, 1969, of a heart attack on the anniversary of his independence speech. His death inspired a tremendous emotional outpouring in Vietnam, adding significantly to the powerful imagery surround-
Ho Chi Minh Campaign ing his name. Throughout the war, the Lao Dong Party cultivated the image of Ho as the protector of the Vietnamese people, and the label “Uncle Ho” was exploited to its fullest potential. Following the Communist victory in South Vietnam, the former South Vietnamese capital of Saigon was renamed Ho Chi Minh City in his honor. Today Ho’s remains are enshrined in central Hanoi in a public mausoleum that attracts throngs of visitors each year. ROBERT K. BRIGHAM See also Agricultural Reform Tribunals; August Revolution; Dau Tranh Strategy; Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; Lao Dong Party; Le Duan; Ngo Dinh Diem; Office of Strategic Services; San Antonio Formula; Truong Chinh; United Front; Viet Minh; Viet Nam Thanh Nien Cach Mang Dong Chi Hoi References Duiker, William J. The Rise of Nationalism in Vietnam, 1900–1911. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976. Fenn, Charles. Ho Chi Minh: A Biographical Introduction. New York: Scribner, 1973. Halberstam, David. Ho. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007. Hemery, Daniel. Ho Chi Minh: De l’Indochine au Vietnam. Paris: Gallimard, 1990. Herring, George C. America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975. 4th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001. Ho Chi Minh. Ho Chi Minh on Revolution: Selected Writings, 1920–1966. New York: Signet Books, 1967. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. Lacouture, Jean. Ho Chi Minh: A Political Biography. New York: Vintage Books, 1968. Sainteny, Jean. Ho Chi Minh and His Vietnam: A Personal Memoir. Chicago: Cowles, 1972. Woodside, Alexander B. Community and Revolution in Modern Vietnam. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976. Young, Marilyn B. The Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990. New York: HarperCollins, 1991.
Ho Chi Minh Campaign Event Date: April 1975 The Ho Chi Minh Campaign culminated in the April 1975 attack on Saigon, which gave the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) the decisive victory over the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) that North Vietnam had fought so long to achieve. Encouraged by the collapse of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) in early 1975 in Military Regions I and II, the Hanoi Politburo revised its timetable, deciding late in March that Saigon should be taken before the beginning of the 1975 rainy season rather than the following year. The plan was to achieve victory in what became known as the Ho Chi Minh Campaign before their dead leader’s birthday (May 19). In early April, People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) units engaged ARVN forces around Saigon, block-
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ing roads and shelling Bien Hoa Air Base. While cadres moved into the city to augment their already significant organization there, sappers positioned themselves to interrupt river transportation and attack Bien Hoa. At Xuan Loc, some 35 miles northeast of Saigon, a hard-fought battle began on April 8, the same day that a Republic of Vietnam Air Force (VNAF, South Vietnamese Air Force) pilot attacked the presidential palace and then defected. The U.S. evacuation of Cambodia on April 12 further reinforced the North Vietnamese assessment that Washington would do nothing to prevent the collapse of the South Vietnamese government, although some members of the Saigon government could not bring themselves to believe that they would be abandoned. Even after the fall of Military Regions I and II, U.S. officials in Vietnam and visitors from Washington continued to act as if the Saigon government could successfully defend itself or, at worst, achieve some kind of negotiated settlement. Among South Vietnamese, however, opposition to President Nguyen Van Thieu was growing, and talk of a coup was widespread. As PAVN forces cut Route 1 to the east and prepared to prevent reinforcement from the Mekong Delta by blocking Route 4 and from Vung Tau by interdicting Route 15 and the Long Tau River, the ARVN engaged in some maneuvering of its own. On April 21 President Thieu resigned in favor of Vice President Tran Van Huong, but all attempts by Washington to support the Saigon regime with increased aid failed in Congress. Thieu’s resignation did nothing to stall the PAVN offensive or buoy South Vietnamese morale. While some ARVN units fought on, leaders such as Thieu began sending personal goods and money out of the country. Banks and foreign embassies began closing, and a steady stream of foreign nationals, including many Americans, left the country, often with their Vietnamese employees. Xuan Loc fell on April 21, and by April 25 ARVN forces around Saigon were under pressure from all sides. The PAVN attack on Saigon proper began on April 26 with artillery bombardments and a ground assault in the east, where troops had to move early to be in position to coordinate their final assault with units attacking from other directions. PAVN forces also occupied Nhon Trach, southeast of Saigon, enabling them to bring 130-millimeter artillery to bear on the Tan Son Nhut airport. On April 27 they cut Route 4, but ARVN forces fought back, counterattacking sappers who had seized bridges and putting up stiff resistance, particularly against PAVN units attacking from the east. As an increasing number of ARVN military and civilian officials abandoned their posts, on April 28 President Huong resigned in favor of Duong Van Minh. That same day a flight of captured Cessna A-37 Dragonfly aircraft struck the Tan Son Nhut airfield, and the Communists pushed forward their attack, positioning units for the final assault and successfully attacking ARVN units in bases surrounding the city. U.S. ambassador Graham Martin delayed beginning a full evacuation, fearing its negative impact on morale. When the evacuation did begin on April 29, the final U.S. pullout was chaotic, a poorly organized swirl of vehicles and
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crowds trying to connect with helicopters, ships, and planes. In the confusion the Americans left many Vietnamese employees behind, and as few as a third of the individuals and families deemed to be at risk were evacuated or managed to escape. Units around the Saigon perimeter came under heavy attack on April 29. While some PAVN units held outlying ARVN garrisons in check, other elements of General Van Tien Dung’s large force moved toward the center of the city and key targets, including the presidential palace. Although some ARVN units continued to resist, they could not slow the PAVN advance. On April 30 President Minh ordered ARVN forces to cease fighting. The Ho Chi Minh Campaign had achieved its goal. The Vietnam War ended just as students of revolutionary warfare theory had expected. Drawing upon the power developed in their North Vietnamese base area, the Communists combined five corps-sized regular army units with southern guerrillas and cadres in a final offensive that grew in strength as it piled victory upon victory against a demoralized opposition. PAVN forces could sustain their momentum in part because they did not have to detach a significant portion of their strength to administer conquered areas. That task could be left to local forces and the political infrastructure already in place before the final offensive began. Against such a strong opponent, the Saigon government proved incapable of continued resistance without active U.S. support. JOHN M. GATES See also Bui Tin; Duong Van Minh; FREQUENT WIND, Operation; Martin, Graham A.; Nguyen Van Thieu; Tran Van Tra; Van Tien Dung; Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, Army; Vietnam, Republic of, Army; Xuan Loc, Battle of References Dougan, Clark, and David Fulghum. The Fall of the South. The Vietnam Experience Series. Boston: Boston Publishing, 1984. Hosmer, Stephen T., Konrad Kellen, and Brian M. Jenkins. The Fall of South Vietnam: Statements by Vietnamese Military and Civilian Leaders. New York: Crane, Russak, 1980. Isaacs, Arnold R. Without Honor: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983. Le Gro, William E. Vietnam from Cease-Fire to Capitulation. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1981. Van Tien Dung. Our Great Spring Victory. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977.
Ho Chi Minh City See Saigon
Ho Chi Minh Trail A network of roads, paths, and waterways that stretched from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) through eastern Laos and Cambodia to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN,
South Vietnam), forming the main supply route for troops and matériel that supported the North Vietnamese war against the South Vietnamese government. At its greatest extent, the Ho Chi Minh Trail consisted of some 12,700 miles of paths, trails, roads, and waterways that often traversed extraordinarily difficult terrain. Indeed, the trail represents one of history’s great military engineering feats. The United States recognized the importance of this vital logistics link for the Communist forces in South Vietnam and waged a massive air interdiction campaign against it. This represented one of the central struggles of the Vietnam War. On May 19, 1959, Ho Chi Minh’s birthday, Major General Nguyen Van Vinh of Hanoi’s Central Military Committee instructed Major Vo Ban to open a supply route to South Vietnam. The Lao Dong Party’s (Worker’s Party or Communist Party) Central Committee had decided to support the Communist insurgency in South Vietnam, and men and matériel would have to be moved south to support this new phase of the struggle against the South Vietnamese government. Assigned 500 troops for the task, Major Ban set to work building the necessary staging areas, depots, and command posts along the ancient system of footpaths and roads that connected North and South Vietnam. In August, Ban’s Unit 559 (so-named because it was formed during the fifth month of 1959) delivered the first supplies—20 boxes of rifles and ammunition—to Viet Cong (VC) insurgents in Thua Thien Province. By the end of the year some 1,800 men had used the trail to infiltrate South Vietnam. The need for secrecy led in 1960 to the development of a new route along the western side of the rugged Truong Son Range in Laos. The trail’s segments gradually were widened during the year, and bicycles were introduced to transport supplies along the roads. With strengthened frames, each bicycle could handle loads averaging 220 to 330 pounds, with loads in excess of 700 pounds on occasion. The use of bicycles meant that three or four times the load of backpacking porters could move along the trail at 1.5 times the speed of porters on foot. Hanoi continued to expand the trail during the next two years. Infiltration training centers were established at Son Tay and Xuan Mai, where soldiers underwent rigorous physical training and instruction in the use of camouflage. Once en route, infiltrators would average six miles a day along the trail. Major Ban spent 26 days on the trail at the end of 1962 observing conditions along the route. He came away impressed. He saw soldiers who were carrying loads that weighed more than 200 pounds. Not just soldiers but civilians living along the Truong Son Range helped transport supplies to South Vietnam, and although many civilians were themselves short of food, they continually offered sustenance to the soldiers. By the winter of 1962–1963 North Vietnam had some 5,000 troops plus an engineering regiment assigned to the trail. The road complex now stretched for more than 600 miles, nearly all of it well hidden from aerial observation. Engineers had widened segments of the roads, enabling trucks to begin using portions of the route in
Ho Chi Minh Trail the summer of 1962. Some 100 tons of supplies now moved weekly along the trail, transported by trucks, bicycles, elephants, and porters. An estimated 10,000 to 20,000 men had made the long journey to South Vietnam since the opening of the trail in 1959. In October 1964 following a decision in Hanoi to expand the war in South Vietnam, the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) 95th Regiment completed its infiltration training and departed for Laos. This first large PAVN unit to move down the trail intact arrived in Kontum Province in South Vietnam’s Central Highlands in December. Two additional regiments reached South Vietnam in January and February 1965. The North Vietnamese in 1965 undertook a massive effort to improve the trail to handle the increased traffic. Engineers, assisted by North Korean, Russian, and Chinese advisers, widened footpaths into roads, strengthened bridges, and piled rocks in streams and rivers to create fords. Truck convoys, covering 50 to 75 miles during night, moved increasing amounts of matériel to South Vietnam. Despite the beginning of heavy U.S. air attacks, the number of infiltrators increased from 12,000 in 1964 to 33,000, while truck traffic quadrupled, reaching 300 to 400 tons per week. The tremendous expansion of the supply route led to a reorganization of the trail command. Unit 559’s area of operation was redesignated a military zone under the authority of the Lao Dong Party’s Central Committee. Brigadier General Phan Trong Tue took charge of the new zone, with the veteran Ban as his deputy. In December 1966 General Dong Sy Nguyen was assigned to replace Phan Trong Tue as the commander of Group 559 and the Ho Chi Minh Trail zone, a position he held until the war ended in 1975. The war in South Vietnam during 1966 and 1967 saw heavy fighting between PAVN regular army units and U.S. forces that increased from 180,000 to 500,000 during the period. The trail ultimately became a sprawling network of hundreds of roads, paths, streams, rivers, passes, caves, and tunnels. It wound through bamboo thickets and heavy undergrowth in river valleys and under the layered canopies of tall trees in tropical rain forests at higher elevations. Supplies were generally transported at night as trucks moved between stations 6–18 miles apart, with a PAVN officer at each station to ascertain if a convoy could reach the next station before daybreak. Trucks were hidden or camouflaged during daylight hours. Thirty to 60 PAVN soldiers manned each station, while PAVN personnel and civilian road repair crews, armed with tools and material to repair or maintain the trail, were positioned at vulnerable points between stations. Refueling facilities were located at every third to fifth station, all linked by field telephones. Convoys generally moved between three to seven shelter areas and returned to their starting point to familiarize drivers with the run and mechanics with particular trucks. This system lessened the likelihood of a large number of trucks piling up at bottlenecks and presenting a lucrative target. By the end of 1966 according to U.S. intelligence estimates, the Ho Chi Minh Trail consisted of some 820 miles of well-hidden fair-
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Communist porters transport supplies along a section of the Ho Chi Minh Trail network, a system of roads and trails stretching from North Vietnam through eastern Laos to South Vietnam. Heavily bombed by U.S. aircraft, the trail was the main supply route for Communist troops and equipment into South Vietnam. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)
weather roads. Supplies moved mainly during the dry season in southern Laos, which extended from November to April. It was becoming increasingly clear to U.S. planners that a major effort had to be undertaken to cut this essential supply route to South Vietnam. In September 1966 Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara wrote to President Lyndon B. Johnson that the task of stopping the flow of troops and supplies from North Vietnam represented “one of our most serious unsolved problems.” Attempts to use small ground units to disrupt the flow of supplies—Operation LEAPING LENA in 1964, Operation PRAIRIE FIRE in 1965, and Operation SHINING BRASS in 1966—had proved ineffective. The U.S. Air Force had first attacked the trail in 1964 as part of Operation BARREL ROLL. Although air attacks had increased in 1965 with ROLLING THUNDER, operations against the trail remained secondary to the air war against North Vietnam. In any event, the bombing—including the introduction of Boeing B-52 Stratofortress strikes in December 1965—had not slowed the rate of infiltration. A new study by the Jason Division of the Institute of Defense Analysis recommended the placement of an electronic barrier across the infiltration routes in Laos. McNamara warmed to this suggestion and ordered the construction of what became the McNamara Line (also known as Project Practice Nine, Project Dye Marker, and Project Muscle Shoals). In December 1967 the electronic barrier,
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Hochmuth, Bruno Arthur with its 20,000 sensors linked to computer arrays and mines, was placed into operation. The sensors were designed to detect motion and sound and were used to call in air strikes. The appearance of the McNamara Line coincided with a shift in the air campaign from North Vietnam to Laos. On April 1, 1968, President Johnson announced a limitation on bombing North Vietnam. When the air war against North Vietnam ended in November, American air assets focused on interdiction. Operation COMMANDO HUNT formally began on November 15, 1968. Over the next five years, U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps aircraft would drop more than 3 million tons of bombs on Laos in what historian Earl H. Tilford Jr. has described as the largest aerial interdiction campaign ever undertaken to that date. The air campaign was directed in part against the trail itself. Mountainsides were bombed so that landslides would block key passes, cumulus clouds were seeded with silver iodide in an effort to extend the rainy season, and chemicals were used to defoliate the jungle. None of these tactics proved effective, however. COMMANDO HUNT’s main target was the truck traffic along the trail. Initially, propeller-driven fighter-bombers and jets had been used against the growing number of trucks that carried supplies to South Vietnam. As time passed, however, the offensive burden shifted to gunships. By the late 1960s Lockheed AC-130 Spectres had replaced the earlier Douglas AC-47 Spookys and Fairchild AC119K Stingers. Equipped with 20-millimeter (mm) Gatling guns and 40-mm Bofors guns (later computer-aimed 105-mm howitzers) that were combined with low-light television and infrared and ignition detection systems, the AC-130s proved a formidable truck killer, at least until the North Vietnamese introduced surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) in the early 1970s. The U.S. Air Force generated impressive numbers during COMMANDO HUNT. In 1969 the air campaign claimed 9,012 trucks destroyed. This number grew to 12,368 the following year. At the same time, however, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimated the total number of trucks in all of North Vietnam at only 6,000. In the end, none of the U.S. efforts to sever the trail or even sharply curtail the flow of matériel along it was successful. This failure meant that the war could not be won. By late 1970 some 70,000 PAVN soldiers defended the trail in Laos. An estimated 8,000 men marched southward every month during the year, while more than 10,000 tons of war matériel moved monthly along the roads. Even the closure of the port of Sihanoukville in March 1970 (which since 1966 had been a major source of supplies, carried through Cambodia on the Sihanouk Trail to link up with the Ho Chi Minh Trail) failed to stem the tide of troops and matériel flowing south. In 1971 following an abortive attempt by the United States to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail at Tchepone in Laos (Operation LAM SON 719), the North Vietnamese seized Attopeu and Saravane in southern Laos, widening the trail to the west. It now included 14 major relay stations in Laos and 3 in South Vietnam. Each station, with attached transportation and engineering battalions, served as a pe-
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troleum-oil-lubricants (POL) storage facility, supply depot, truck park, and workshop. Soviet ZIL trucks, with a capacity of five to six tons, now traveled by day and night on all-weather roads. Protected by nature and sophisticated antiaircraft defenses, the PAVN thoroughly dominated a vast network of roads, trails, paths, and rivers stretching more than 12,700 miles in length. On March 31, 1972, COMMANDO HUNT VII ended. It proved to be the last of the interdiction efforts waged by the U.S. Air Force against the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Following the Paris Peace Accords, the trail was extensively improved. By 1973 it had become a twolane highway that ran from the mountain passes of North Vietnam to the Chu Pong Massif in South Vietnam. By 1974 the trail was a four-lane route from the Central Highlands to Tay Ninh Province, northwest of Saigon. The trail also boasted four oil pipelines. Reportedly from 1965 to 1975, the North Vietnamese government moved 1.777 million tons of supplies down the trail. The North Vietnamese had won the battle of supply, a victory that spelled defeat for South Vietnam and its U.S. ally. There is a museum in Hanoi devoted exclusively to the Ho Chi Minh Trail and its important role in the Communist victory. WILLIAM M. LEARY See also Air Defenses, Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Airpower, Role in War; BARREL ROLL, Operation; COMMANDO HUNT, Operation; Defoliation; Geography of Indochina and Vietnam; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Logistics, Allied, Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and Viet Cong; McNamara, Robert Strange; ROLLING THUNDER, Operation; SHINING BRASS, Operation; Surface-to-Air Missiles, Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Transportation Group 559; Vietnam, Climate of; Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, Army References Prados, John. The Blood Road: The Ho Chi Minh Trail and the Vietnam War. New York: Wiley, 1999. Staaveren, Jacob Van. The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia: Interdiction in Southern Laos, 1960–1968. Washington, DC: Center for Air Force History, 1993. Stevens, Richard Linn. The Trail: A History of the Ho Chi Minh Trail and the Role of Nature in the War in Viet Nam. New York: Garland, 1993. Tilford, Earl H., Jr. Crosswinds: The Air Force’s Setup in Vietnam. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1993.
Hochmuth, Bruno Arthur Birth Date: May 10, 1911 Death Date: November 14, 1967 U.S. Marine Corps officer and the first U.S. general officer to be killed in Vietnam. Bruno Arthur Hochmuth was born in Houston, Texas, on May 10, 1911. Hochmuth graduated from Texas A&M University in 1935 and was commissioned a second lieutenant in the U.S. Army. Later that same year he resigned his army commission to take a commission in the U.S. Marine Corps as a second lieutenant. From 1936 to 1940 he served with the 4th Marines and
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the 6th Marines in China. He remained in the Pacific until 1943, at which point he returned to the United States. In May 1944 Hochmuth returned to the Pacific theater, where he served in the 3rd Marine Amphibious Corps, taking part in both the Saipan and Tinian campaigns. During the Okinawa Campaign he commanded the 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines. In 1947 Hochmuth returned stateside and held a series of increasingly responsible staff and command positions. He was promoted to brigadier general in 1961. From 1963 to 1967 during which time he was promoted to major general, he was commanding general of the Marine Corps Recruit Depot at San Diego. Hochmuth was regarded as a soft-spoken amiable man who commanded the respect of those serving under him as well as his peers. In early 1967 Hochmuth went to Vietnam as commander of the 3rd Marine Division (some 26,000 personnel). His men performed well in a series of battles and campaigns around Khe Sanh, Con Thien, and Cam Lo. In May 1967 he conducted a sweep of the demilitarized zone (DMZ), during which some 1,500 People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnam Army) soldiers were killed and tons of supplies were either seized or destroyed. Hochmuth died on November 14, 1967, on the outskirts of Hue when the Bell UH-1E Iroquois (“Huey”) helicopter in which he was a passenger exploded and crashed to the ground shortly after takeoff. The North Vietnamese claimed to have downed the helicopter with small-arms fire. That has never been confirmed, however, and numerous witnesses claim that the aircraft was beyond effective range of most hostile small-arms fire when it burst into flames. Five other individuals also died in the crash. PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR.
Hoffman viewed himself as an artist who created images that subverted conventional politics and promoted revolution. He designed protest demonstrations as entertainment so that the media would cover them and disseminate radical images to a mass audience. Hoffman organized the “exorcism” of the Pentagon in 1967. In 1968 under Hoffman’s leadership, the Youth International Party nominated a pig for president. Following his indictment for activities during the August 1968 Democratic National Convention, Hoffman transformed the Chicago Eight conspiracy trial of antiwar leaders into a piece of guerrilla theater that ridiculed the government by depicting the trial as a sporting event, “the Chicago Conspiracy versus the Washington Kangaroos.” Hoffman was convicted of crossing state lines for the purposes of inciting a riot and was also convicted of contempt of court; the convictions were subsequently overturned on appeal. Hoffman remained a radical until his death. In 1986 he was arrested along with several other protesters, including Amy Carter, daughter of former president Jimmy Carter, for trespassing on the University of Massachusetts–Amherst campus. He was there to
See also Demilitarized Zone; United States Marine Corps References Millett, Allan R. Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps. Rev. and expanded ed. New York: Free Press, 1991. Simmons, Edwin H., ed. The Marines in Vietnam, 1954–1973: An Anthology and Annotated Bibliography. 2nd ed. Marine Corps Vietnam Series. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters, 1985.
Hoffman, Abbie Birth Date: November 30, 1936 Death Date: April 12, 1989 Anarchist, social and political activist, and cofounder of the Youth International Party (Yippies) who developed a theory, applied in demonstrations against the Vietnam War, of political protest as theater. Abbie Hoffman was born on November 30, 1936, in Worcester, Massachusetts. He was educated at Brandeis University and the University of California, Berkeley, and from 1964 to 1966 was an organizer in the Civil Rights Movement.
During the 1960s, Abbie Hoffman led the Youth International Party (known as Yippies). He became a standard-bearer for the radical youth of the counterculture, often resorting to outrageous behavior to dramatize causes to which he was committed. (AP/Wide World Photos)
HOMECOMING, Operation
protest against on-campus recruiting efforts by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). During his trial, Hoffman acted as his own attorney; he was eventually found not guilty. Hoffman’s body was found on April 12, 1989, at his home in New Hope, Pennsylvania. His death, caused by an overdose of phenobarbital, was ruled a suicide. DONALD WHALEY See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Chicago Eight; Dellinger, David; Democratic National Convention of 1968; Hayden, Thomas Emmett; Rubin, Jerry; Youth International Party References Hoffman, Abbie. Revolution for the Hell of It. New York: Dial, 1968. Hoffman, Abbie. Soon to Be a Major Motion Picture. New York: Perigee, 1980. Whitfield, Stephen J. “The Stunt Man: Abbie Hoffman (1936–1989).” In Sights on the Sixties, edited by Barbara L. Tischler, 103–119. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1992.
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Start Date: February 12, 1973 End Date: March 29, 1973 Return of U.S. prisoners of war (POWs) who had been held in Southeast Asia, an event that generated a homecoming never before seen during a POW repatriation effort. In August 1972 a final planning conference for Operation HOMECOMING occurred in Honolulu. A month later the 9th Aeromedical Evacuation Group, heading the recovery operation, had a rehearsal opportunity when the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) released three POWs early. On January 27, 1973, the “Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam” (the Paris Agreement) called for both the release of U.S. POWs (591 men) and the simultaneous final reduction in active U.S. forces (24,000 troops) within 60 days. The parties agreed to four stages, the first on February 12 and the last, which included 9 Americans captured in Laos,
Former American prisoners of war (POWs) cheer as their aircraft takes off during Operation HOMECOMING in 1973. The operation represented a publicrelations event orchestrated by the White House and Pentagon. The POWs were among the few popularly recognized heroes of the Vietnam War. (National Archives)
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ending on March 29 (one day late). The operation consisted of three phases. First, after initial reception at Saigon (for those imprisoned by the Viet Cong [VC], the political arm of which was known as the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam [PRG]), Hanoi (for those imprisoned by North Vietnam), and Hong Kong (for the 3 to be freed from China), all U.S. POWs would be flown to Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines. Second, at the Joint Homecoming Reception Center at Clark, the former POWs would go through processing, debriefing, and medical examinations. Third, those released could go to any of 31 U.S. military hospitals for recovery. Of the 591 U.S. POWs returned, 566 were military personnel (497 officers, 69 enlisted) and 25 were civilians. Not only had some of these former POWs survived the longest captivity of any POWs in U.S. military history, but many had become, from reports of their courage, the focus of widespread affection and respect. This important event gave many Americans, on a personal level, a successful final closure to the story of the POWs, whose increasing publicity they had followed for so long. On the other hand, Operation HOMECOMING also represented a major public relations event orchestrated by the White House and the Pentagon. The POWs were among the few popularly recognized heroes of the war, and their release represented possibly the only positive result of negotiations in Paris. After elaborate receptions at each stop along their journey home, POWs arrived in the United States to a hero’s welcome. Although President Richard M. Nixon proudly spoke of the return of “all” POWs, and Walter Cronkite, CBS news anchor, thought that the United States was ending one of the most difficult periods in its history, the joy that Operation HOMECOMING generated for some still left the door ajar for questions by others. Had any men been left behind, and when would there be an accounting of those missing in action? It would take many more years to answer these questions, and for some the answers that were eventually provided never did satisfy completely. PAUL S. DAUM AND JOSEPH RATNER See also Casualties; Denton, Jeremiah Andrew, Jr.; Hoa Lo Prison; McCain, John Sidney, III; Missing in Action, Allied; Paris Peace Accords; Prisoners of War, Allied; Stockdale, James Bond References Berger, Carl, ed. The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, 1961– 1973: An Illustrated Account. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1977. Franklin, H. Bruce. M.I.A. or Mythmaking in America: How and Why Belief in Live POWs Has Possessed a Nation. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1993. Gruner, Elliott. Prisoners of Culture: Representing the Vietnam POW. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1993. Isaacs, Arnold R. Without Honor: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983. Lipsman, Samuel, Stephen Weiss, and the Editors of Boston Publishing. The False Peace, 1972–1974. Boston: Boston Publishing, 1985.
Hong Nham See Tu Duc
Honolulu Conference Start Date: February 7, 1966 End Date: February 9, 1966 Meeting between leaders of the U.S. and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) during February 7–9, 1966, in Honolulu, Hawaii. In January 1966 the United States had more than 184,000 soldiers in South Vietnam, yet neither a military victory nor a victory in what President Lyndon Johnson termed “the other war” was in sight. On January 31, 1966, the United States resumed bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). That same day Johnson’s staff recommended that he meet with South Vietnamese leaders to discuss the economic and political future of South Vietnam. Johnson believed that a renewed pacification and rural development program, coupled with the creation of a viable democratic South Vietnamese government (“the other war”), were keys to the future security of South Vietnam. Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee J. William Fulbright had already turned against the war and had scheduled congressional hearings for early 1966. Among the charges was that the South Vietnamese government was corrupt, authoritarian, and unconcerned with the welfare of its people. Johnson believed that a meeting between himself and South Vietnamese leaders to discuss economic and political stability would defuse some of the criticism being leveled by Fulbright and others. Accompanying Johnson to Honolulu were the secretaries of the State Department, the Defense Department, the Agriculture Department, and the Health, Education, and Welfare Department as well as the director of the Agency for International Development. They were joined in Honolulu by U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge and commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), General William Westmoreland. The South Vietnamese delegation included Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky and General Nguyen Van Thieu. Meetings involving the participants began on February 7 and concluded with a joint communiqué on February 9. Johnson referred to the latter as a “kind of bible.” From his cabinet officers he expected not promises but progress. Social, political, and economic goals were to be as important as those for the military. Ky and Thieu pledged to defeat the Viet Cong (VC), eradicate social injustice, establish a stable economy, and build a true democracy, to include the writing of a constitution and the holding of elections. They also planned to offer incentives to those who defected from the Communists and joined the South Vietnamese camp. Westmoreland was directed to continue efforts to destroy Communist forces and was assigned percentage goals for securing
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Opening ceremony of the February 7–9, 1966, Honolulu Conference. From left to right are U.S. president Lyndon B. Johnson, U.S. Army general William Westmoreland, and Republic of Vietnam president Nguyen Van Thieu. (Yoichi R. Okamoto/Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library)
the population and geographic areas of the country. To achieve these, two of Johnson’s principal assistants developed a plan to increase U.S. troop strength in South Vietnam. As a result of the conference, Johnson established a White House office to coordinate the pacification program in South Vietnam. More than a year later that office would become Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), under the direction of MACV headquarters. Ky returned to Vietnam to face a crisis with the Buddhists, during which he had to dispatch soldiers to suppress the dissidents. Nevertheless, in 1967 the South Vietnamese government drafted a new constitution and held elections that September. Despite this, lack of coordination among U.S. and South Vietnamese military and civilian agencies precluded substantive progress in the rural pacification effort. RICHARD L. KIPER See also Civic Action; Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support; Fulbright, James William; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr.; Nguyen Cao Ky; Nguyen Van Thieu; Pacification; Westmoreland, William Childs References Herring, George C. America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975. 4th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001. Johnson, Lyndon B. The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963–1969. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971.
Hooper, Joe Ronnie Birth Date: August 8, 1938 Death Date: May 6, 1979 Highly decorated Vietnam War veteran who received the Medal of Honor for his actions in the 1968 Battle of Hue. Born in Piedmont, South Carolina, on August 8, 1938, Joe Ronnie Hooper moved as a boy to Washington state with his family. There he attended but did not complete high school. In 1956 he enlisted in the U.S. Navy, serving a three-year tour of duty. Serving on the aircraft carriers Hancock and Wasp, he left the navy in 1959 with the rank of petty officer 3rd class. Less than a year later in May 1960, Hooper enlisted in the U.S. Army and was trained as a paratrooper with the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. After a tour of duty in the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea), he was stationed at Fort Hood, Texas, and Fort Campbell, Kentucky. Promoted to platoon sergeant, he also served with the 508th Infantry Regiment in the Panama Canal Zone. By the summer of 1967, however, Hooper had been demoted to corporal because of his penchant for getting into trouble. In October of that year he was advanced to staff sergeant and was deployed to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) as a squad leader in the 501st Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division. During the Tet Offensive on February 21, 1968, in the Battle of Hue, Hooper was credited with having killed 22 enemy combatants;
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in the process of the vicious fire fight, he was wounded seven times. Despite his injuries he left a field hospital still badly injured to rejoin his outfit, as he was concerned about the welfare of the young recruits under his charge. Returning stateside in June 1968, he was discharged from the service but promptly reenlisted in the army in September 1968. On March 7, 1969, President Richard M. Nixon presented him with the Medal of Honor for his gallantry at Hue. Hooper subsequently served as a public relations specialist and served another tour of duty in Panama before returning to Vietnam for a second time, a posting that he himself requested. Hooper was commissioned a second lieutenant in December 1970 while in Vietnam, a highly unusual advancement for an enlisted man who had not yet attained a top noncommissioned officer’s rank. He then served out the remainder of his tour as a platoon leader in the 101st Airborne Division. In April 1971 he returned to the United States. It is estimated that by this point he had 115 enemy kills, including the 22 in the Battle of Hue. Among his many decorations were the Medal of Honor, two Silver Stars, six Bronze Stars, and eight Purple Hearts. Back home, Hooper was restless and had grown disillusioned by the lack of discipline in the army and American policy toward the Vietnam War. In 1972 he resigned his commission; two years later he left the service. Hooper stayed active by giving speeches and granting interviews about his combat experiences, and he also joined an Army Reserve outfit in Washington state. In March 1977 he attained the rank of captain, but his absences and infrequent presence at drills did not endear him to his superiors. In September 1978 he left the Army Reserves. This ended his military career, during which he had received 37 citations. Unable to adjust fully to civilian life— some say that he suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)—Hooper became increasingly despondent. He was certainly disillusioned over the defeat of South Vietnam in 1975 and the vicious antiwar politics of the 1970s. He held a succession of civilian jobs and began to drink heavily. Hooper died of a stroke on May 6, 1979, at the age of 40, in Louisville, Kentucky. Many have argued, with considerable justification, that Hooper fell victim to the poisonous atmosphere that greeted returning Vietnam veterans; other have argued with similar justification that Hooper never gained the celebrity status enjoyed by someone such as Audie Murphy, a highly decorated World War II veteran, because the Vietnam War was an unpopular conflict that most Americans wanted to forget. PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR. See also Hue, Battle of; Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder; Tet Offensive, Overall Strategy References Krohn, Charles F. The Lost Battalion: Controversy and Casualties in the Battle of Hue. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993. Maslowski, Peter, and Don Winslow. Looking for a Hero: Staff Sergeant Joe Ronnie Hooper and the Vietnam War. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005.
Hoopes, Townsend Birth Date: April 28, 1922 Death Date: September 20, 2004 U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs (1965–1967), undersecretary of the U.S. Air Force (1967– 1969), and prolific scholar and author. Townsend Hoopes was born in Duluth, Minnesota, on April 28, 1922. He earned an AB degree from Yale University in 1944. During the latter stages of World War II he served in the Pacific as a marine lieutenant. From 1948 to 1953 he served on the staffs of four successive secretaries of defense, and during the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration Hoopes was an occasional consultant on foreign policy issues to the White House, the State Department, and the Defense Department. After joining the Lyndon B. Johnson administration in 1965, Hoopes became convinced that the Vietnam War was unwinnable and turned against it. In 1968 he put these views forcefully to Clark Clifford after the latter succeeded Robert McNamara as secretary of defense. Hoopes also recommended a bombing pause and a less aggressive ground strategy. He helped convince Clifford that the United States must reverse its Vietnam policy. Hoopes was also a source for the New York Times article of March 22, 1968, that revealed that General William C. Westmoreland was requesting 206,000 more troops for Vietnam, a demand that Hoopes personally opposed and that was promptly refused by President Johnson. After Hoopes left government service in 1969, he served as president of the Association of American Publishers (1973–1986) and then held several university faculty positions. He wrote biographies of John Foster Dulles and James V. Forrestal along with numerous other books, including one of fiction. Hoopes died on September 20, 2004, in Baja California, Mexico, where he was undergoing cancer treatment. He had made his home in Chestertown, Maryland. PRISCILLA ROBERTS See also Clifford, Clark McAdams; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; McNamara, Robert Strange; McNaughton, John Theodore; Media and the Vietnam War; Warnke, Paul Culliton; Westmoreland, William Childs References Clifford, Clark, with David Holbrooke. Counsel to the President: A Memoir. New York: Random House, 1991. Hoopes, Townsend. The Limits of Intervention. New York: David McKay, 1969. Schandler, Herbert Y. Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam: The Unmaking of a President. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977.
Hoover, John Edgar Birth Date: January 1, 1895 Death Date: May 2, 1972 Controversial director of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) during 1924–1972. Born in Washington, D.C., on January
Hoover, John Edgar 1, 1895, John Edgar (J. Edgar) Hoover attended night classes at George Washington University Law School while working days at the Library of Congress. An excellent student, he received an LLB in 1916 and an LLM the following year. In 1917 he joined the U.S. Department of Justice, handling alien enemy cases. Hoover soon developed staunch anti-Communist credentials through his zealous leadership in numerous crackdowns on suspected Communists. He rose rapidly in the Justice Department, becoming assistant director of the department’s Bureau of Investigation in 1921. In 1924 he was appointed director, a position that he would hold for the next 48 years. Although the Bureau of Investigation had limited jurisdiction, Hoover worked tirelessly to expand its law enforcement role while emphasizing professionalism and scientific investigation methods. He mandated college education for special agents and crime laboratory personnel. He also carefully cultivated for his agency a public image of integrity, patriotism, and devotion to crime fighting that made heroes of agents in newsreel footage and motion pictures and on radio. High-profile cases such as the Lindbergh baby kidnapping and attacks on gangsters such as John Dillinger made “G-man” (government man) a household word. Under Hoover’s single-minded direction, his agency established itself as arguably the finest investigative police agency in the world, employing advanced training and techniques, state-of-the-art equipment and facilities, and highly qualified personnel. In 1935 Congress redesignated the Justice Department’s law enforcement division as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with Hoover firmly at the helm. The next year the FBI’s jurisdiction was expanded to include domestic counterintelligence, a function that Hoover and the presidents he served interpreted quite loosely. Under this mandate, the FBI investigated not only threats to national security but also political enemies, real or imagined, using electronic surveillance equipment such as wiretaps. Indeed, behind the publicity-grabbing crime-fighting efforts was an extremely effective information-gathering operation whose power proved irresistible to presidents and Hoover himself. The director controlled thousands of special files that included potentially damaging information on politicians, government officials, and celebrities, not to mention suspected Communists and subversives. Such information, coupled with great public support, helped Hoover create for himself a power position within the executive branch that was unique in American history. Hoover appeared untouchable, as no president or Congress would challenge him publicly or, apparently, privately. But in the turbulent 1960s, Hoover and the FBI began to draw criticism from a number of fronts: the Civil Rights Movement, antiwar activists, a more inquisitive Congress, and a more restrictive U.S. Supreme Court. Regarding civil rights issues, Hoover believed that the FBI lacked clear jurisdiction, but nonetheless he willingly involved the bureau when directed to do so. Unfortunately, the FBI’s many positive efforts in the civil rights arena went mostly unnoticed because of Hoover’s personal and often public
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J. Edgar Hoover was director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and created a powerful federal government crime-fighting agency. He served in that post from 1924 until his death in 1972. Hoover and the FBI drew criticism for a number of actions in the 1960s, including those against Vietnam War protests. (Yoichi R. Okamoto/Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library)
attacks on Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., whom Hoover believed to be immoral and supported by Communist interests. The director devoted substantial resources to discrediting King, something that Hoover was largely unable to accomplish. King was but one of numerous targets of domestic counterintelligence programs (COINTELPROs) launched by the FBI during the 1960s and early 1970s. Other targets included antiwar groups, the Black Power movement, the Ku Klux Klan, and government employees. President John F. Kennedy and his brother Attorney General Robert Kennedy strongly advocated wiretapping as a means of exposing domestic foes, and presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon authorized massive FBI surveillance and infiltration of antiwar groups. But Hoover apparently recognized some limits. Former FBI assistant director Cartha “Deke” DeLoach credited Hoover with torpedoing the Nixon administration’s socalled Huston Plan, which would have created under White House direction a special (and highly illegal) multiagency intelligence organization to attack perceived threats to domestic security such as the antiwar movement and information leaks within the government. This notwithstanding, Hoover’s heavy-handed approach to domestic dissent was viewed by many as an attack on civil liberties and constitutional rights. During his final years Hoover faced repeated calls for his ouster, saw his methods curtailed by the Supreme Court, and dealt with an increasingly hostile Congress. Still, his power and public prestige
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held sway. Presidents Johnson and Nixon waved mandatory retirement after Hoover reached 70 years of age and continually sustained him in office, although some evidence suggests that Nixon had planned to force him out after the 1972 presidential election. Hoover’s death from natural causes at his Washington, D.C., home on May 2, 1972, freed Nixon to appoint a more cooperative director. Hoover’s death sparked an outpouring of accolades and more than a few condemnations. Chief Justice Warren Burger referred to him as an “American Legend”; President Nixon cited his “courage, patriotism, dedication to his country and a granite-like honesty and integrity.” But Dr. Benjamin Spock, himself a target of FBI action, called Hoover’s death “a great relief, especially if his replacement is a man who better understands democratic institutions.” In death Hoover received an honor bestowed on only a select few Americans; by congressional order, his body was placed in state in the Capitol rotunda, where it was viewed by thousands of mourners. His funeral, attended by a who’s who of Washington, featured a eulogy delivered by Nixon himself. Hoover remains a controversial figure. Admirers point to the director’s devotion to law enforcement, personal integrity, and patriotism, while critics see a man of enormous unchecked power who used his position to assail civil liberties and conduct personal vendettas against those he did not like. Well after his death, his personal life came under increasing scrutiny when allegations surfaced of a homosexual relationship with his longtime friend and confidant, FBI assistant director Clyde Tolson, allegations that Deloach maintains are erroneous but that nonetheless persist. DAVID COFFEY
graduation from high school, Hope took a job at a local automobile manufacturer and also tried to become a professional boxer. Hope’s first real experience with show business began in Cleveland, where he and a partner secured a job as a dancing act. They then went on the road and by 1927 were appearing on Broadway. In 1929 Hope went it alone as a comedian, taking the name Bob Hope and honing his routine in nightclubs and small theaters around Ohio. After some lean times he formed his own vaudeville company and ultimately returned to Broadway as a headliner at a major theater. From 1932 to 1936 he appeared in a number of Broadway shows. In 1933 he married Dolores Reade, with whom he adopted four children over the years. Hope first appeared on radio in 1935. He worked on several different shows before Paramount Studios asked him to appear with other radio performers in the movie The Big Broadcast in 1938. Although he was not able to do any of his comedy routines in the film, he sang the song “Thanks for the Memories,” which would later become his theme song. The tune was an immediate hit, winning the Oscar for best song of the year, and this led to more work. Other movies followed. Hope teamed with his new golfing friend Bing Crosby to make a movie with Dorothy Lamour, Road to Singapore. That was the first of the new comedy team’s
See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Central Intelligence Agency; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Huston Plan; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Kennedy, Robert Francis; King, Martin Luther, Jr.; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Spock, Benjamin McLane References DeLoach, Cartha D. “Deke.” Hoover’s FBI: The Inside Story by Hoover’s Trusted Lieutenant. Washington, DC: Regnery, 1995. Jackson, Kenneth T., ed. Dictionary of American Biography. Suppl. 9, 1971–1975. New York: Scribner, 1994. Powers, Richard Gid. Secrecy and Power: The Life of J. Edgar Hoover. New York: Free Press, 1988. Ungar, Sanford J. FBI. Boston: Little, Brown, 1976.
Hope, Leslie Townes Birth Date: May 29, 1903 Death Date: July 27, 2003 American comedian and actor. Leslie Townes “Bob” Hope was born in Eltham, Kent, England, on May 29, 1903, and moved with his family to Cleveland, Ohio, in 1907. His father was a stonemason, and his mother had been a concert singer in Wales. On
Hollywood comedian Bob Hope (right) joins dancers Harold and Fayard Nicholas in a dance routine aboard the carrier Ticonderoga during a United Services Organizations (USO)–sponsored show. Hope was later awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom for his generosity and selflessness in entertaining U.S. troops overseas. (National Archives)
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many road movies in which they played bungling crime solvers in exotic locales. When the United States entered World War II Hope tried to enlist, but army staffers said that he could best serve the nation’s war effort by entertaining the troops. Hope assembled a troupe of entertainers and set off to cover as many overseas bases as he could, traveling to Africa, Britain, Sicily, Alaska, the Aleutians, and the Pacific theater. Despite a grueling schedule for the military, Hope also managed to make half a dozen films during the war years. When the war ended in 1945, Hope continued his radio show and starred in more films. He also began a tradition of entertaining American troops stationed overseas at Christmas. Hope made his first appearance on television in 1950 and, as he grew older, began to do more television shows and fewer movies. As one of the most revered entertainers in the United States, his presence on a television special virtually guaranteed its success. During the 1952–1953 television season Hope served as one of the hosts of The Colgate Comedy Hour, and from 1963 to 1967 he was involved with the production of Bob Hope Presents the Chrysler Theatre, which won several Emmy awards and nominations. Chrysler also sponsored Hope’s annual Christmas shows during the 1960s, which were 90-minute telecasts that highlighted his shows before military audiences in Vietnam. Hope was especially beloved for his entertainment of U.S. troops, often traveling to within just miles of the front. He almost always performed in fatigues to demonstrate his support for the troops, and his schedule of shows was grueling. Hope attempted to reach as many soldiers as possible, frequently employing music and shapely women as part of a show that went well beyond comedy and his legendary one-liners. Although some anti–Vietnam War protesters believed that Hope was supporting government policies in Vietnam, Hope saw his task strictly as providing a morale booster for the troops. His generosity and selflessness were rewarded with a Congressional Gold Medal (1962) and a Presidential Medal of Freedom (1969). In 1997 the U.S. Congress passed a resolution, signed by President Bill Clinton, that proclaimed Hope an “honorary U.S. veteran.” At the age of 88 Hope insisted on performing for troops during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. He received four special Academy Awards, an Emmy, and three People’s Choice Awards as well as 44 honorary degrees from universities and colleges. He also wrote 10 books. After a period of declining health, Hope died at age 100 at his longtime residence of Toluca Lake, California, on July 27, 2003. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Film and the Vietnam Experience References Hope, Bob. Have Tux, Will Travel: Bob Hope’s Own Story. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2003. Morella, Joe, Edward Epstein, and Eleanor Clark. The Amazing Careers of Bob Hope. New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1973. Thompson, Charles. Bob Hope. London: Thames Methuen, 1981.
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Event Date: 1964 Code name for a U.S.-sponsored combined military-political pacification plan for the Saigon area. At a June 1964 Honolulu meeting, top U.S. political and military policy makers endorsed a plan presented by Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), commander General William C. Westmoreland, who took charge of U.S. forces in Vietnam that same month. Code-named HOP TAC (the Vietnamese term for “cooperation”), the scheme called for pacification of guerrilla-held areas in six provinces around the city of Saigon. Colonel Wilbur Wilson, adviser to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) commander of III Corps, developed the concept and organization; his successor, Colonel Jasper Wilson, worked out the details. Under HOP TAC, military forces were to drive Viet Cong (VC) guerrillas from the selected provinces. Aggressive patrolling and ambushes would follow until such time as security could be entrusted to local militia or an expanded police force. Civilian officials would then establish government agencies in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) and provide protection, services, and amenities. Westmoreland explained that the goal was to offer a standard of living better than that provided by the VC. Westmoreland’s staff expressed the plan’s essence with the terms “clearing,” “securing,” and “search and destroy.” As Westmoreland admitted, HOP TAC incorporated elements of the French tache d’huile (“oil slick”) pacification method pursued during the Indochina War. This involved dividing the territory to be pacified into grids, or squares. Once this gridding (quadrillage) had been accomplished, each square was then to be raked (ratissage) by pacification forces, who knew the area well. If accomplished in smaller areas, the program could be expanded over a much larger area, much the way an oil slick spreads on water. Westmoreland saw HOP TAC as an experiment in pacification that, if successful, could be duplicated around other large cities, at which point they might converge. HOP TAC also sought to incorporate lessons learned in the Strategic Hamlet Program. Under HOP TAC, the Vietnamese would carry the brunt of the effort against the VC. To coordinate the military and political agencies, the South Vietnamese government established a HOP TAC council that included General Westmoreland and South Vietnam premier General Nguyen Khanh as well as local officials and representatives from the ministry of the interior, the national police, and intelligence agencies. HOP TAC got off to a slow start in September 1964. Determined at this stage to keep the ARVN at the center of efforts against the VC, Westmoreland informed the South Vietnamese government that the United States would contribute only advice and commodities. He persuaded the ARVN to transfer its 25th Division from Quang Ngai Province in the I Corps Tactical Zone to join the operation. This proved to be a mistake. Many of the division’s soldiers, faced with separation from their families and having to fight the VC,
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deserted. As Westmoreland admitted, it was three full years before the 25th Division regrouped and became proficient at the task. Political instability in Saigon was another negative factor. General Khanh became so involved in political concerns that he was little interested in HOP TAC. He seemed more concerned with holding back troops to prevent a possible coup than with allowing them to participate in the project. The South Vietnamese police failed to do their job, and the South Vietnamese government also did not deliver the American supplies that were to be the economic leverage. HOP TAC did give the ARVN experience in pacification. The operation increased the National Police by several thousand and made the capital more secure. But these positives did not outweigh the negatives, and the South Vietnamese government formally ended HOP TAC in 1965. Even Westmoreland admitted that it was a failure. Westmoreland claimed that the HOP TAC prevented the Communists from seizing control around the capital. The operation probably also removed some illusions that Westmoreland may have had about the ARVN and weakened his commitment to pacification. In 1965 he would rely increasingly on U.S. troops to carry the war. HO DIEU ANH AND SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Desertion, U.S. and Communist; Pacification; Quadrillage/Ratissage; Strategic Hamlet Program; Westmoreland, William Childs References Cable, Larry E. Conflict of Myths: The Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War. New York: New York University Press, 1988. FitzGerald, Frances. Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam. Boston: Little, Brown, 1972. Westmoreland, William C. A Soldier Reports. New York: Doubleday, 1976.
Ho-Sainteny Agreement Important agreement between the French and Vietnamese nationalists that, had it been effectively implemented, would most likely have prevented the Indochina War (1946–1954). The agreement was signed in Hanoi on March 6, 1946, by President Ho Chi Minh of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang (VNQDD, Vietnamese Nationalist Party) leader Vo Hong Khanh for the Vietnamese and by French diplomat Jean Sainteny for France to set the future relationship between North Vietnam and France. Abandoned at the end of World War II by both the United States and the Soviet Union and under pressure from China, the North Vietnamese leadership reluctantly agreed to a French military presence in North Vietnam. Under the terms of the agreement, France was allowed to introduce 15,000 French and 10,000 Vietnamese troops under unified French command (the first French troops returned to Hanoi on March 16, 1946) to protect French lives and property, but France promised to withdraw 3,000 of them
each year. All were to be gone by the end of 1951, with the possible exception of those guarding bases. In return, France agreed to recognize the North Vietnamese government, which it had thus far refused to do. North Vietnam was to be a “free state with its own government, parliament, army and finances, forming part of the Indo-Chinese Federation of the French Union.” In a key provision, France also agreed to the holding of a plebiscite in southern Vietnam to see whether it wanted to join North Vietnam in a unified state; however, no date for the vote was specified. France also agreed to train and equip units of the new Vietnamese army. In April general staff accords were signed by generals Vo Nguyen Giap for North Vietnam and Raoul Salan for France, setting the location and size of troop garrisons. The Ho-Sainteny Agreement, although much less than the Viet Minh wanted, was a framework that might have led to a working and positive relationship between France and North Vietnam had it been allowed to stand. The agreement was undermined, however, by French high commissioner Georges Thierry d’Argenlieu’s proclamation in Saigon on June 2, 1946, of the “Republic of Cochin China,” announced just after Ho Chi Minh’s departure for Paris to negotiate with the French government on issues to implement the Ho-Sainteny Agreement. With an “independent” Republic of Cochin China, there would be no need of a plebiscite in southern Vietnam. D’Argenlieu’s pronouncement and the intransigence of French negotiators in the ensuing Fontainebleau Conference helped produce the Vietnamese nationalist frustration that led to bloodshed and the beginning of the Indochina War that December. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also D’Argenlieu, Georges Thierry; French Indochina, 1860s–1946; Ho Chi Minh; Indochina War; Salan, Raoul Albin Louis; Vo Nguyen Giap References Hammer, Ellen J. The Struggle for Indochina. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1954. Sainteny, Jean. Histoire d’une Paix Manquée: Indochine, 1945–1947. Paris: Amiot-Dumont, 1953.
Hot Pursuit Policy Designation for 1965 U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), requests for authority to pursue Communist forces withdrawing across the border from the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) into sanctuaries in Cambodia. Hot Pursuit was to be used in conjunction with a proposed blockade of the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville. The U.S. State Department opposed such plans, stating in a memorandum that “It would seem at least necessary to show Cambodian government connivance in the use of its territory as a base for armed attack before the RVN (and the U.S.) would be justified in using armed force against Cambodian territory.” Also,
Hue President Lyndon Johnson was reluctant to widen the conflict because Cambodia, then led by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, was officially neutral. Nonetheless, small allied units did occasionally cross the border without official sanction. Although the Hot Pursuit debate continued, it ultimately became academic in May 1970 when President Richard M. Nixon ordered the military incursion into Cambodia. EDWARD C. PAGE See also Cambodia; Cambodian Incursion; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Sihanouk, Norodom References Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. Maitland, Terrence, and Peter McInerney. A Contagion of War. The Vietnam Experience Series. Boston: Boston Publishing, 1984. Stanton, Shelby L. The Rise and Fall of an American Army: The U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985.
Hourglass Spraying System A 1,000-gallon tank that was part of the aerial spraying system aboard U.S. Air Force cargo aircraft employed to drop herbicides in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). The Hourglass, nicknamed after the speed with which the system was developed and produced, was used as part of Operation RANCH HAND, the American mission to defoliate the South Vietnamese jungle between 1962 and 1971 in an effort to deny enemy forces the use of jungle cover and access to food crops. The Hourglass MC-1 spraying system was first developed in the early 1950s at Fort Detrick, Maryland, home of the U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command. The system was developed after the U.S. Air Force determined that it needed a large spraying system that Boeing B-29 Superfortress, Boeing B-50 Superfortress, and Fairchild C-119 Flying Boxcar aircraft could carry for purposes of large-scale defoliation. Originally developed for spraying missions in the Korean War, the Hourglass system became a standard item in the U.S. Air Force inventory and was used extensively in South Vietnam. The system was manufactured by the Hayes Aircraft Corporation of Birmingham, Alabama, and was originally made for C-119s, but during the Vietnam War the system was retrofitted to Chase Fairchild C-123 Providers. The MC-1 system itself included a 1,000-gallon cylindrical aluminum tank, which was insulated with a fiberglass blanket; a centrifugal pump; a control valve between the pump and tank; a pipe assembly with fittings for six spray nozzles; an opening for emergency chemical dumps; an outlet for connection with a heating and recirculating unit; and a dual set of instruments and controls. RICHARD B. VERRONE
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See also Defoliation; Herbicides; RANCH HAND, Operation References Buckingham, William A., Jr. Operation RANCH HAND: The Air Force and Herbicides in Southeast Asia, 1961–1971. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, United States Air Force, 1982. Cecil, Paul F. Herbicidal Warfare: The Ranch Hand Project in Vietnam. New York: Praeger, 1986.
Hue Capital city of Thua Thien Province in the northern portion of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) during the Vietnam War and today located in the center of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam some 700 miles south of the capital of Hanoi and an equal distance north of Ho Chi Minh City (formerly Saigon). Situated on the Huong (Perfume) River and originally known as Phu Xuan, during 1802–1945 Hue was the imperial capital for the Nguyen dynasty rulers. The climate is both hot and wet. Hue experiences an average rainfall of 120 inches per year. Hue rose to prominence as the capital of the Nguyen Lords, who dominated southern Vietnam beginning in the 17th century. In 1801 Nguyen Phuc Anh (who later became known as Emperor Gia Long), captured Phu Xuan and the next year established his control over all of Vietnam. He moved the capital from Hanoi (then Thang Long) to Phu Xuan, which became Hue. The city remained the national capital until 1945 and the abdication of the last of the Nguyen emperors, Bao Dai. Hanoi then became the capital of the new Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), headed by Ho Chi Minh, while Saigon in southern Vietnam became the capital city of the new State of Vietnam supported by the French, which in 1955 became the Republic of Vietnam. Hue saw Buddhist protests against the South Vietnamese government in 1966. The city’s location near the border between North and South Vietnam and its important cultural and historic status led the Communists to make a major investment of resources there during the 1968 Tet Offensive. Fighting was house to house and reminiscent of the street fighting in Europe during the latter stages of World War II. In the 25 days that it took to retake Hue, perhaps 50 percent of the city was destroyed, and 116,000 civilians out of a population of some 140,000 were left homeless, largely as a consequence of American bombing, artillery, and tank fire necessary to root out Communist forces. Hue also suffered in that as many as 7,000 people held to be “enemies of the people,” including students, teachers, and government officials, were summarily executed by the Communists during their occupation of the city and were buried in unmarked graves, an event that goes unrecognized in the War Remnants Museum in Ho Chi Minh City. A major urban center with a 2009 population of some 340,000 people, Hue is now an important tourist site. Its historic monuments have earned it United Nations Educational, Scientific and
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Cultural Organization (UNESCO) designation as a World Heritage Site. Attractions in the city include the Thsi Hoa imperial palace, which has been restored after the heavy damage of the Tet Offensive. Efforts are also ongoing to rebuild portions of the Forbidden City patterned after that of China. Other popular sites include the tombs of Nguyen emperors Minh Mang, Tu Duc, and others and the Thien Mu Pagoda, the official symbol of Hue. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Bao Dai; Hue, Battle of; Hue and Da Nang, Fall of; Hue Massacre; Minh Mang; Nguyen Phuc Anh; Tet Offensive, Overall Strategy; Tu Duc References Corfield, Justin. The History of Vietnam. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2008. Tucker, Spencer C. Vietnam. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1999. Warr, Nicholas. Phase Line Green: The Battle for Hue, 1968. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997.
Hue, Battle of Start Date: January 31, 1968 End Date: February 25, 1968 Longest and bloodiest of all the Tet Offensive battles. The old imperial city of Hue, astride Highway 1 and situated about 6 miles from the coast and some 60 miles south of the demilitarized zone (DMZ), was a cultural and intellectual center of Vietnam. The city’s Quoc Hoc school boasted among its alumni Ngo Dinh Diem, Ho Chi Minh, and Vo Nguyen Giap. The third largest city in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) in 1968, Hue was a complex metropolis divided by the Perfume River. North of the river, the 2-square-mile Citadel formed the interior of the city, with the tightly packed district of Gia Hoi outside the Citadel’s walls to the east. South of the river lay the hospital, the prison, the Catholic cathedral, many of the city’s modern structures, and the newer residential districts. The imposing Citadel was constructed in 1802. The fortress was surrounded by a zigzag moat and protected by an outer wall 30 feet high and 20 feet thick. The heart of the Citadel was the imposing Imperial Palace of Peace. There were two key allied military installations in Hue: the headquarters of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN,
Estimated Casualties at the Battle of Hue, January 31–February 25, 1968 U.S. Army U.S. Marines ARVN PAVN and VC
Killed
Wounded
Captured
74 147 384 5,000+
507 857 1,830 Unknown
Unknown Unknown Unknown 89
South Vietnamese Army) 1st Division at the northwest corner of the Citadel and the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), compound on the south side of the river, near the city’s eastern edge. On the morning of January 30, 1968, Brigadier General Ngo Quang Truong, commander of the ARVN 1st Division, put his headquarters on alert after receiving reports of the premature Tet Offensive attacks against the cities to the south. Truong’s move was critical in preventing a complete Communist takeover of Hue. Inside Hue, Communist supporters had been preparing for several months. Two days before the actual attack, elements of the Viet Cong (VC) 12th and Hue City Sapper battalions slipped into Hue and began their own preparations. At 2:00 a.m. on January 31, ARVN patrols reported battalionsized People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) elements advancing on the city from the west. Aided by dense fog, these forces made their approach march unhindered. Less than two hours after the first reports, the 1st Division headquarters compound came under attack from 122-millimeter (mm) rocket fire. The main attack on Hue was made by two regiments. The PAVN 6th Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Trong Dan, attacked north of the river from the west. The 6th Regiment’s objective was the Citadel. The PAVN 4th Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Van, approached Hue from the south and east. Initially delayed by an ARVN ambush, the 4th Regiment finally attacked the southern part of the city and the MACV compound. By dawn, Communist forces held much of Hue south of the river, all of Gia Hoi, and the southern half of the Citadel. At 8:00 a.m. they hoisted the VC flag on the huge flagpole in front of the Palace of Peace. ARVN troops, however, still held the northern half of the Citadel, while inside the MACV compound approximately 200 Americans and a handful of Australian advisers continued to hold out. These two unexpected allied enclaves completely unhinged the Communist plans. Some eight miles south of Hue, the U.S. Marine Corps base at Phu Bai received the distress call from the MACV compound and dispatched a relief column. Unfortunately, this force, Company A, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, commanded by Captain Gordon Batcheller, was far too small to accomplish the mission. With additional augmentation, the marines eventually reached the MACV compound. They were then ordered to move across the river and link up with General Truong’s ARVN forces. The marines still did not have sufficient combat power to accomplish that mission and were beaten back. Over the next few days, the 1st Marine Division continued to send units piecemeal into the action, all without achieving the desired effect of clearing the city. When the Communists first stormed the city, they captured the jail and freed some 2,500 inmates, about 500 of whom joined the attacking forces. The PAVN troops also captured an ARVN depot that was well stocked with American-made weapons and ammunition. For most of the next three weeks the main Communist sup-
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A U.S. marine carries a Vietnamese woman to safety during the Battle of Hue, the longest and bloodiest of all the Tet Offensive battles. The old imperial city of Hue, ravaged during the war, was a cultural and intellectual center of Vietnam. (National Archives)
ply line into the city from the A Shau Valley, 30 miles to the west, remained open, ensuring that the attackers were well armed and well supplied. Eventually five PAVN reinforcing battalions joined the nine constituting the initial assault. Believing that the situation in Hue required only local mopping-up action, the American high command underestimated the size and nature of the PAVN threat until well into the battle. MACV commander General William Westmoreland also continued to believe that the Communists would attempt to overrun Khe Sanh, and thus for several weeks he kept a tight rein on allied strategic reserve forces in that area. The nature of the urban fighting also considerably neutralized U.S. advantages in mobility, and the desire to minimize the damage to Hue itself hamstrung the allies’ enormous firepower assets. As the fighting dragged on, however, on February 12 ARVN I Corps commander Lieutenant General Hoang Xuan Lam finally authorized allied forces to use whatever weapons necessary to dislodge the Communists. In an attempt to cut the Communist supply lines into Hue, on February 2 the 2nd Battalion, 12th Cavalry, of the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division began an air assault into a landing zone six miles northwest of the city. Instead of cutting the supply lines, the Americans ran into a strong Communist blocking force. After three days of fighting, the 12th Cavalry was still four miles from the city. Meanwhile, another unit from the 1st Cavalry Division, the 5th Battal-
ion, 7th Cavalry, approached from the west and attempted to link up with its sister battalion but was prevented from doing so until February 9. PAVN blocking forces were much stronger than the allies had anticipated. In fact, the units opposing the 1st Cavalry Division consisted of elements of the PAVN 304th, 325C, and 324B divisions, all of which U.S. intelligence had placed at Khe Sanh massing to overrun the U.S. Marine Corps base there. As Communist forces fighting inside Hue City came under increasing pressure, the local front headquarters recommended that Communist forces be withdrawn before they were destroyed. The PAVN high command in Hanoi, however, instructed them to hold on and to continue to fight in order to encourage and support the Communist offensive throughout the rest of South Vietnam. The high command also informed them that it was sending reinforcements to Hue. In view of the desperate situation and despite bad weather and total U.S. air supremacy, the Vietnam People’s Air Force (VPAF, North Vietnamese Air Force) sent a number of Soviet-built twin-engined IL-14 transport aircraft down from Hanoi to drop ammunition and weapons by parachute to Communist forces attacking the ARVN 1st Division headquarters on the outskirts of the city. Between February 7 and February 12, a total of four IL-14 aircraft and their crews were lost while attempting to resupply Communist forces in Hue City.
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Hue and Da Nang, Fall of By the second week in February, Westmoreland had committed six battalions to cutting off Hue. The 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (reinforced to a strength of four battalions), attacked from the west and north, and two battalions of the 101st Airborne Division attacked from the south. The marines also continued to feed forces into the fight. By the time the south bank of the city was cleared on February 10, elements of the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, and 1st and 2nd battalions, 5th Marines, were in the fight. Late on February 11 the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, crossed the river and joined the fight for the Citadel. ARVN forces, which now had close to 11 battalions in the city, had cleared about three-quarters of the Citadel, but Communist forces stubbornly held on to the southernmost section against the river. For another two weeks the bitter house-to-house fighting continued. In one of the few such instances in the Vietnam War, both sides used tear gas. Sometimes allied progress was as slow as 220 yards per day. On February 21 the 1st Cavalry Division finally closed off the last Communist supply route into Hue. Three days later the ARVN 2nd Battalion, 3rd Regiment, overran the defenders on the south wall of the Citadel. On February 25 ARVN troops swept into the Imperial Palace, only to find that the few surviving Communist troops there had slipped away during the night. The Battle of Hue was for all practical purposes over, although Hue was not declared secure until March 2. On February 26 the allies unearthed the first of the mass graves containing civilian victims of the Communist occupation. This systematic slaughter, which apparently was carried out by local VC cadres rather than PAVN regular troops, had begun as soon as the Communists had moved into Hue. Entire classes of people were purged, including foreigners, intellectuals, religious and political leaders, and other “cruel tyrants and reactionary elements.” Searchers eventually found 2,810 bodies, while thousands more remained missing. Vietnamese scholar Douglas Pike has estimated that the Communists may have assassinated as many as 5,700 people. Hue was a costly battle. Through February 26 the U.S. Army suffered 74 dead and 507 wounded, the U.S. Marine Corps lost 147 dead and 857 wounded, and ARVN losses totaled 384 dead and more than 1,830 wounded. The allies claimed PAVN and VC losses in excess of 5,000 dead, 89 captured, and countless more wounded. In addition to the civilians executed by the Communists, many others died or were hurt in the cross fire between the opposing forces. The intense fighting had destroyed upwards of half of the city, leaving 116,000 civilians homeless of a pre–Tet Offensive population of approximately 140,000. The experience did produce a sharp change in the attitude of the population there against the Communists, even from among Communist sympathizers. DAVID T. ZABECKI See also Hue and Da Nang, Fall of; Hue Massacre; Ngo Quang Truong; Tet Offensive, Overall Strategy; Tet Offensive and the Saigon Circle; Westmoreland, William Childs
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References Braestrup, Peter. Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1994. Ho Ban, ed. Huong Tien Cong va Noi Day Tet Mau Than o Tri-Thien-Hue (nam 1968) [The 1968 Tet Offensive and Uprisings in Tri-Thien Hue]. Hanoi: Military History Institute of Vietnam, 1988. Hoang Ngoc Lung, Colonel. The General Offensives of 1968–69. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1981. Oberdorfer, Don. TET! The Turning Point in the Vietnam War. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001. Palmer, Dave R. Summons of the Trumpet: U.S.-Vietnam in Perspective. San Rafael, CA: Presidio, 1995. Pearson, Willard. The War in the Northern Provinces, 1966–1968. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1975. Pike, Douglas. The Viet-Cong Strategy of Terror. Saigon: U.S. Mission South Vietnam, 1971. Stanton, Shelby L. The Rise and Fall of an American Army: The U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985. Ta Hong, Vu Ngoc, and Nguyen Quoc Dung. Lich Su Khong Quan Nhan Dan Viet Nam (1955–1977) [History of the People’s Air Force of Vietnam (1955–1977)]. Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1993.
Hue and Da Nang, Fall of Start Date: March 19, 1975 End Date: March 29, 1975 The fall of Hue and Da Nang to the Communists compounded the disaster created by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) withdrawal from the Central Highlands. Although not directly assaulted, Hue was threatened in early March by attacks on all sides. On March 19, 1975, to prevent the orderly withdrawal of ARVN forces from Hue to Da Nang, Communist forces attacked aggressively, particularly in Quang Tri Province. The fighting prompted a massive refugee exodus. In Hue the frightening memory of Communist massacres during the 1968 Tet Offensive heightened civilian fears, and Hue residents joined the refugee throng moving south from Quang Tri toward Da Nang. President Nguyen Van Thieu’s decision to withdraw the airborne division to bolster the defenses of Saigon further complicated the rapidly deteriorating situation, leaving I Corps commander General Ngo Quang Truong with insufficient troops to defend both Hue and Da Nang. Although Thieu had told Truong to defend Hue, he changed his mind when Truong protested that he needed the 1st Division there to defend Da Nang. Thieu then led Truong to believe that he was to defend Hue only as long as he could still withdraw the unit, but in a taped televised address Thieu also publicly committed himself to the city’s defense. As Communist units moved on Hue, the level of anxiety in the demoralized city increased. News of the total collapse of ARVN resistance in the Central Highlands had already spread, and fearing for the safety of their families, troops in Hue began to desert,
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Overburdened trucks and buses in a traffic jam between Hue and Da Nang on March 23, 1975. Thousands of civilians and military personnel fled Hue, Vietnam’s old imperial capital, following a government decision not to defend the city against advancing Communist forces. (AP/Wide World Photos)
many joining refugees trying to leave the city. By March 23 the situation was too chaotic for a defense or an orderly withdrawal. Communist forces had cut Route 1 to Da Nang, and their artillery bombarded Hue’s airfield and the roads out of the city. Civilians, mixed with troops and equipment, panicked as evacuation became more difficult. Many people attempting to leave by sea drowned when overloaded boats capsized in rough water. Unopposed, Communist troops occupied Hue on March 24. As the pressure on Hue increased, Communist units also encircled Da Nang, cutting Route 1 south of the city on March 21, taking Tam Ky on March 24, and occupying Quang Ngai the following day. As refugees poured into Da Nang the airport became a scene of constant activity, as both the government and the U.S. embassy in Saigon attempted to relieve the pressure by significantly increasing the number of flights out of the city. Initially the airlift proceeded in an orderly fashion, but after March 25 as Communist forces pressed toward the city from all three sides, the situation became chaotic. By March 27 desperate crowds at the airport rushed each plane as it landed, and more than one aircraft took off with people clinging to its landing gear. At the deepwater pier people crowded onto tugs and barges, and ships arriving offshore were quickly surrounded by small craft filled with
refugees, some of whom fell into the sea or were crushed by the crowds as they fought to board the larger ships. The situation deteriorated as the city, the airport, and the docks came under fire from Communist artillery. Looting soldiers and civilians rampaged through the streets, while the Communist troops held back their advance, allowing panic to destroy any semblance of order among defenders in the city. The Communists occupied Da Nang on March 29. In less than a month the Communist offensive had destroyed virtually all ARVN forces in I Corps. Combined with the disaster in the Central Highlands, the losses were significant. Twelve of 44 provinces in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) had fallen to the Communists, as had 150,000 regular soldiers and militia and roughly $1 billion of equipment, including some 400 airplanes and helicopters, approximately half of the Saigon government’s inventory. Despite predictions in some quarters of a bloodbath, in the immediate days following the Communist victory only a few hundred people were killed. On April 1 Qui Nhon and Nha Trang fell. The following day ARVN forces evacuated Tuy Hoa. Communist forces then prepared to move against the South Vietnamese capital of Saigon. JOHN M. GATES
Hue Massacre See also Ban Me Thuot, Battle of; Ho Chi Minh Campaign; Hue, Battle of; Ngo Quang Truong; Nguyen Van Thieu References Dougan, Clark, and David Fulghum. The Fall of the South. The Vietnam Experience Series. Boston: Boston Publishing, 1984. Hosmer, Stephen T., Konrad Kellen, and Brian M. Jenkins. The Fall of South Vietnam: Statements by Vietnamese Military and Civilian Leaders. New York: Crane, Russak, 1980. Isaacs, Arnold R. Without Honor: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983. Le Gro, William E. Vietnam from Cease-Fire to Capitulation. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1981. Van Tien Dung. Our Great Spring Victory. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977.
Hue Massacre Event Date: February 1968 More than four decades after its occurrence, the massacre of civilians and military personnel in Hue during the Communist occupation of the city in the January–February 1968 Tet Offensive remains a murky episode. Conflicting interpretations of this incident reflect the political debates regarding the Vietnam War. In late January 1968 People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) forces, assisted by the Viet Cong (VC), seized the former imperial capital of Hue. This operation was part of a Communist offensive throughout the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) that took place during the Vietnamese lunar New Year holiday, known as Tet. Hue was only one of many cities and towns struck, but it and the South Vietnamese capital of Saigon were two of the principal targets. Hue saw some of the most bitter fighting of the entire offensive. Nearly a month passed before U.S. marines and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) troops recaptured what remained of the largely destroyed city. Once Hue had been secured on February 25, 1968, reports of the disappearance and execution of South Vietnamese civilians proliferated. Indeed, on February 26 allied forces uncovered the first of a number of mass graves. Eventually searchers unearthed 2,810 bodies, but many more of the missing were never found. Estimates of the dead range as high as 7,000. One possible explanation for the bloodbath is that it was a desperate attempt to eliminate witnesses once the VC faced a return to clandestine operations. But clearly the VC had long possessed lists of assassination targets, including bureaucrats, teachers, intellectuals, ARVN soldiers, and foreigners, all of whom were presumed to oppose Communist rule. Journalist Don Oberdorfer, who conducted an extensive investigation of the massacre in 1969, maintains that there were two classifications for those murdered in Hue. Among the first were politicians, civil servants and their families, and collaborators with
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U.S. forces. Among the second were civilians who tried to flee or refused to submit to questioning, those who spoke against the occupation, and those who spoke ill of or displayed a poor attitude toward the occupiers. In the Catholic section of Hue the Communists killed virtually every able-bodied male over the age of 15, many of whom had taken refuge in the cathedral there. After some of the details of the massacre became public, the Saigon government suggested that a similar fate lay in store for other communities should the Communists win. American officials subsequently echoed this in later public statements. Fears of a bloodbath became a justification for the continued U.S. presence. Some compared the massacre at Hue with the slaughter of civilians by U.S. Army forces at My Lai in March 1968. Although the atrocity at My Lai was on a much smaller scale, the media proved more eager to investigate the My Lai Massacre. The killings at Hue elicited much less media coverage, in part because of the widespread nature of debate over the Tet Offensive and its consequences, and they brought only a tepid response from the U.S. public. A precise accounting of the cost of the massacre at Hue was impossible because of the great destruction in the city and the
A young widow carrying a photograph of her missing Army of the Republic of Vietnam soldier husband at a mass funeral service in Hue in 1968. Although searchers eventually located 2,810 bodies, thousands more remained missing. The Communists may have assassinated as many as 5,700 people during their occupation of Hue. (National Archives)
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large number of civilian casualties that occurred as a consequence of the actual fighting. Not surprisingly, Hanoi denied any complicity, arguing that some Hue residents must have risen up against their oppressors in an opportunity for justice. If the executions had been conducted spontaneously rather than having been the result of meticulous planning, it would have strengthened the case that the conflict in Vietnam amounted to more of a civil war than a conventional conflict. It does appear that the massacre was solely the work of the VC rather than PAVN regular forces. JEFFREY D. BASS See also Hue, Battle of; Tet Offensive, Overall Strategy; Tet Offensive and the Saigon Circle References Braestrup, Peter. Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1994. Oberdorfer, Don. TET! The Turning Point in the Vietnam War. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001. Pike, Douglas. The Viet-Cong Strategy of Terror. Saigon: U.S. Mission South Vietnam, 1971.
Humanitarian Operation Program Resettlement program in the United States of military officers, officials, and political leaders of the former Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) after they were detained by the new Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) in so-called reeducation camps. The Humanitarian Operation Program was begun in 1989 and worked in tandem with the Orderly Departure Program, begun in 1979. Although there had been rumors of such a program since the early 1980s, the U.S. and SRV governments did not begin to exchange proposals until April 1984, and not until late 1988 were there official negotiations that produced an agreement on the resettlement program. The Humanitarian Operation Program was a part of the larger Orderly Departure Program to assist in family reunification and resettlement of political refugees, including former political prisoners, sponsored by their relatives in the West. Since October 1988, applicants who had been imprisoned in reeducation camps for three or more years were put on separate lists numbered with the prefix “H” (e.g., H-01, H-09, or H-15). These were misinterpreted with the designation “H.O.,” which in fact stood for “Humanitarian Operation.” Under the Humanitarian Operation Program, former South Vietnamese political prisoners were sponsored by their relatives, if any, or by private organizations involved in the Orderly Departure Program, and the U.S. government provided assistance in the form of social security programs. By 2002 this program had provided assistance in the immigration of more than 70,000 Vietnamese to the United States. Most former political prisoners averaged 50 years
of age, and many faced difficulties in finding jobs. Their children have proven much more adaptable in securing a higher education and employment. NGUYEN CONG LUAN See also Reeducation Camps Reference Segal, Uma. A Framework for Immigration: Asians in the United States. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002.
Humphrey, Hubert Horatio Birth Date: May 27, 1911 Death Date: January 13, 1978 U.S. senator (1949–1964, 1971–1978), vice president (1965– 1969), and Democratic Party candidate for president (1968). Born on May 27, 1911, in Wallace, South Dakota, Hubert Horatio Humphrey earned a BA from the University of Minnesota in 1939 and an MA from Louisiana State University in 1940. He taught for a year at the University of Minnesota, and in 1941 he began his public career as head of the Minnesota branch of the Federal War Production Administration. Later he taught in the U.S. Army Air Force training program at Macalester College in Minneapolis. Humphrey became involved in politics and in 1943 was an unsuccessful candidate for mayor of Minneapolis. The next year he worked to merge the state’s Democratic Party and Farm Labor Party. He helped manage President Franklin Roosevelt’s 1944 reelection campaign in Minnesota and was elected mayor of Minneapolis on the Democratic–Farm Labor ticket, a post to which he was reelected by a large plurality in 1947. In 1948 Humphrey attracted national attention by advocating a strong civil rights plank at the Democratic National Convention. That autumn he was elected U.S. senator from Minnesota, and he was reelected in 1954 and 1960, becoming one of the most important members of that body in the 20th century. In 1964 President Lyndon B. Johnson chose Humphrey as his vice presidential running mate, and he was vice president of the United States from 1965 to 1969. It was one of the many ironies of 1968 that the New Left repudiated Humphrey until the closing days of the presidential campaign. Throughout his public life, Humphrey was one of the chief voices of the liberal wing of the Democratic Party. With an unabashedly liberal record, the exuberant, loquacious Humphrey helped found the Americans for Democratic Action and was most proud of his success in the Senate in passage of Medicare, prolabor, and civil rights legislation, especially his floor management of the epochmaking 1964 Civil Rights Act. After he became vice president, Humphrey irritated Johnson by arguing against expansion of the Vietnam War. In 1966, however, Johnson sent Humphrey on a fact-finding trip to Asia, including
Humphrey, Hubert Horatio
U.S. vice president and Democrat Hubert H. Humphrey ran against Republican Richard M. Nixon for the presidency in 1968. Late in the campaign, Humphrey distanced himself from President Lyndon Johnson’s Vietnam policies, narrowly losing the election. (Library of Congress)
the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Humphrey returned full of praise for administration policies, a stance that then angered many liberals and intellectuals. The Vietnam War ultimately undid Humphrey. After Johnson announced his withdrawal from the 1968 presidential campaign, Humphrey entered the race as the administration candidate. Johnson endeavored to keep Humphrey on a short leash, but Humphrey’s dilemma was that he needed to distance himself from the president’s unpopular Vietnam War policies while at the same time maintaining the support of the party apparatus. Candidate Humphrey called for making equal opportunity and social justice realities in American life and for completing the “unfinished peaceful American revolution” with its goal of “equal freedom for all.” The June 1968 assassination of Senator Robert Kennedy, who was also competing for the Democratic nomination, ensured Humphrey of the Democratic Party’s nomination, although the August party convention in Chicago was divisive, bitter, and bloody. Unfortunately for Humphrey’s campaign, the public tended to associate him with this chaos and vented on him its dissatisfaction with the war. Some observers thought that if one factor cost Humphrey the election, it was his loyalty to President Johnson that
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prevented him from reasserting his own liberal identity early in the campaign. Some of Humphrey’s advisers urged him to break completely from Johnson, but Humphrey refused. He said later that “I did what I thought was right. And I don’t give a damn if I lost the election. I know that I would have been a scoundrel. I never would have felt good in my heart had I broken with him.” During the campaign Humphrey was constantly heckled by antiwar protesters, a number of them shouting “Dump the Hump.” Ironically, they left more hawkish Republican presidential nominee Richard Nixon largely alone. At Salt Lake City on September 30, 1968, Humphrey finally distanced himself a bit from Johnson when he announced that “As President I would stop the bombing of the North as an acceptable risk for peace because I believe it could lead to success in the negotiations and thereby shorten the war.” Now energized, Humphrey began picking up support as the peace candidate. He also attacked Nixon’s refusal to debate and tore into American Independence candidate George Wallace for his appeals to racism and intolerance. On October 31 Johnson announced a halt in the bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). Humphrey’s reaction was that “I have been hoping for months that it would happen.” Undoubtedly the bombing halt helped Humphrey, but it also came too late. Momentum was on his side, and many political observers believe that with only a few more days he would have won the election. Nixon’s victory margin was only 500,000 votes: 43.3 percent for Nixon, 42.7 percent for Humphrey, and 13.5 percent for third-party candidate Wallace. Nixon’s margin in the Electoral College was much larger, however (302, 191, and 5, respectively). One thing is reasonably certain: had Humphrey been elected president, the United States would have departed Vietnam earlier than it did under Nixon. In 1970 Humphrey was reelected to the Senate after winning the seat vacated by Eugene McCarthy and was reelected in 1976. Looking back on the Vietnam War from a 1974 vantage point, Humphrey said that “Like many things in our national life, we miscalculated. We overestimated our ability to control events, which is one of the great dangers of a great power. Power tends to be a substitute for judgment and wisdom.” Shortly before his death, he said that he wanted “to be known in the history books as an effective man in government.” Humphrey died of cancer in Waverly, Minnesota, on January 13, 1978. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Democratic National Convention of 1968; Elections, U.S., 1968; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, Robert Francis; McCarthy, Eugene Joseph; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Read, Benjamin Huger; Wallace, George Corley, Jr. References Eisle, Albert. Almost to the Presidency: A Biography of Two American Politicians. Blue Earth, MN: Piper, 1972. Humphrey, Hubert H. Beyond Civil Rights: A New Day of Equality. New York: Random House, 1968.
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Humphrey, Hubert H. The Education of a Public Man: My Life and Politics. New York: Doubleday, 1976. Solberg, Carl. Hubert Humphrey: A Biography. New York: Norton, 1984.
Hung Dao Vuong See Tran Hung Dao
Hun Sen Birth Date: April 4, 1951 Cambodian military commander, party leader, cabinet minister, and prime minister since 1998. Hun Sen was born in Kompong Cham Province on April 4, 1951. He was the third of six children in a family of peasant farmers. Sen left home at age 13 to live in a pagoda in Phnom Penh. At age 19 he went into the bush to join the guerrillas who opposed the ouster of Prince Norodom Sihanouk by Lon Nol. During the fighting against the Lon Nol regime (1970–1975), Sen was wounded five times. The last time, the day before the capture of Phnom Penh, was the most serious. According to Sen, he commanded a battalion that was preparing to take a major position near the Mekong River. Amid the noise of heavy weapons’ firing, he did not pay attention to incoming fire and was wounded by an exploding mortar shell. He was unconscious for 10 days and lost sight in his left eye. He remained with the guerrillas, the Khmer Rouge, after their capture of Phnom Penh on April 17, 1975, until he defected to Vietnam in June 1977. Again according to Hun Sen, he was forced to marry at one of Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot’s mass wedding ceremonies on January 5, 1976. He and his wife, Bun Sam Hieng, lost their first child in 1976 when a Khmer Rouge nurse dropped him. This occurred in the period when the Khmer Rouge regime, known as Democratic Kampuchea, emptied the cities and forced everyone to live in the countryside. In June 1977 with relations between Democratic Kampuchea and Vietnam deteriorating, Sen defected along with 200 of his men in the Eastern Zone after they had been ordered to attack Vietnamese villagers. When the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia and expelled the Khmer Rouge from Phnom Penh, in January 1979 Hun Sen became foreign minister of the new pro-Vietnamese regime known as the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). At an unknown date, he became a member of the governing Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Party (KPRP), which traces its founding to 1951 and claims to be a direct descendant of the old Indochinese Communist Party founded by Ho Chi Minh in 1930. Sen became prime minister (called chairman of the Council of Ministers) in January 1985. He continued the war against the Khmer Rouge, then holed up in western Cambodia on the border with Thailand, and their nonCommunist allies led by Prince Sihanouk and Son Sann.
As a consequence of international peace negotiations, the PRK changed its name to the State of Cambodia (SOC). At a plenum in Phnom Penh on October 19, 1991, four days before the Paris Peace Agreement was signed ending the Cambodian fighting, Sen became vice chairman of the KPRP, which was renamed the Cambodian People’s Party at the same plenum. The new party platform endorsed a multiparty political system, free enterprise, and freedom of religion (Buddhism as the state religion). The party’s symbol of the hammer and sickle was replaced by Angkor Wat and rice sheaves, and red was replaced by blue and white in its banners. A United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force entered Cambodia to supervise implementation of the Paris Peace Agreement, and during May 23–28, 1993, elections were held throughout Cambodia for a Constituent Assembly. Sen’s Cambodian People’s Party won 51 seats with 38.22 percent of the popular vote, compared with the royalist United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC, from its French initials) party’s 58 seats and 45.47 percent of the vote. In an arrangement brokered by Prince Sihanouk (who then took the position of king), Sen and Prince Norodom Ranariddh (Sihanouk’s son) agreed to form a coalition government and became co–prime ministers of the new Kingdom of Cambodia. Sen, as second prime minister, wielded more effective power, however, because the SOC had controlled the administrative machinery and armed forces over most of the country, compared with FUNCINPEC’s control of relatively small areas of the country and limited armed forces. Relations between Sen and Ranariddh gradually deteriorated, with mutual accusations of corruption and power wielding. The rivalry between the two men finally came to a head over the opening of negotiations in the late summer of 1996 with Khmer Rouge remnants on the Thailand border for their reintegration into Cambodia’s political life. Efforts by Cambodian political figures to form third parties also contributed to the rising tension, with some grenade-throwing incidents in Phnom Penh. On July 5 and 6, 1997, forces loyal to Sen moved against Ranariddh, who was forced to leave the country. Sen, claiming that FUNCINPEC had voted to remove Ranariddh and replace him as co–prime minister, had the Constituent Assembly vote into office a replacement who was much more amenable to manipulation by the Cambodian People’s Party. Some 40 of Ranariddh’s close lieutenants were reportedly killed in this action, which some (although not the U.S. Department of State) called a coup d’état. In November 1998 Sen consolidated his power, becoming Cambodia’s only prime minister, a post he continues to hold. Critics have charged his regime with corruption, and his land policies have led to wholesale land transfers to foreigners at bargain-basement prices, which has led to the displacement of thousands of Cambodians. ARTHUR J. DOMMEN AND STEPHEN DENNEY See also Heng Samrin; Pol Pot
Huynh Phu So References Human Rights Watch. Cambodia: Aftermath of the Coup. New York: Human Rights Watch, August 1997. Mehta, Harish C., and Julie B. Mehta. Hun Sen: Strongman of Cambodia. Singapore: Graham Brash Pte, 1999.
Huston Plan Plan advanced by the Richard M. Nixon administration to coordinate intelligence-gathering agencies in order to control so-called subversive elements within the United States during the Vietnam War. The plan was named for one of its sponsors, administration staffer Tom Huston. Formally known as the “Domestic Intelligence Gathering Plan: Analysis and Strategy,” the Huston Plan was developed in June 1970 in response to the antiwar demonstrations that erupted in the wake of the U.S. incursion into Cambodia. The plan called for the formation of a permanent interagency intelligence committee to coordinate domestic intelligence gathering by elements of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the National Security Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. A variety of methods were to be used to carry out unrestricted domestic surveillance, including wiretaps, infiltration of subversive groups, mail opening, electronic surveillance, and break-ins, to gather information on individuals and groups believed to be an internal threat to the United States. Although the plan was highly illegal, President Richard M. Nixon initially approved it on July 14. After FBI director J. Edgar Hoover and Attorney General John Mitchell voiced their objections to the plan’s illegality, Nixon withdrew his approval. Although the Huston Plan was never implemented, a new Intelligence Evaluation Committee as well as the CIA’s Operation CHAOS were later established for the purpose of gathering internal intelligence. The Huston Plan offered a preview of things to come. Illegal efforts to stamp out criticism of Nixon’s Vietnam policy and plug information leaks ultimately resulted in the Watergate Scandal and the president’s downfall in 1974. CYNTHIA NORTHRUP See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Central Intelligence Agency; CHAOS, Operation; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Hoover, John Edgar; Mitchell, John Newton; United States Department of Justice; Watergate Scandal References Genovese, Michael A. The Nixon Presidency: Power and Politics in Turbulent Times. New York: Greenwood, 1990. Haldeman, H. R. The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House. New York: Putnam, 1994.
Huynh Cong Ut See Ut, Nick
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Huynh Phu So Birth Date: 1919 Death Date: April 1947 Founder of Hoa Hao Buddhism, one of the most important religious sects in southern Vietnam. Born in 1919 in Hoa Hao village, Chau Doc Province, to a well-to-do family, Huynh Phu So (also known as Huynh Giao Chu) led a tranquil life until age 15. From then until age 21 he was affected by a persistent illness. In 1939 while visiting Mounts That Son and Ta Lon, he underwent a religious experience and began to found and preach a new religion based on the teachings of Buddha and Confucius and other Vietnamese traditional beliefs. Combining preaching with curing diseases by simple means such as green leaves and pure water, So achieved his first conversions among modern and traditional doctors, other intellectuals, and peasants. His followers grew rapidly to some 2 million people, and his popularity soon attracted French concern. The French placed So under house arrest at Nghia village in Can Tho Province and then under administrative surveillance at Cho Quan Hospital (a mental medical facility) and finally in the town of Bac Lieu. When Japanese troops occupied Indochina during World War II, they forced the French to transfer So to their Kempetai’s headquarters in Saigon, hoping that through him they could reach the huge mass of his followers. After the Japanese surrender, So called on the leaders of political parties and religious groups to set up a National Unified Front (NUF) to confront the new situation. The NUF was later integrated into the Viet Minh Front, and So was the representative of southern Vietnam. Following the signing of the March 6, 1946, Ho-Sainteny Agreement, So joined other nationalist leaders to create the Front for National Union and became commissioner of the Administrative Committee of southern Vietnam. In September of that year he founded the Dan Xa Dang (Social Democratic Party). All of So’s activities, according to later Hoa Hao leaders, were to save his people from the “threat of extermination” by the Communists. Because he was thought to be a considerable threat to them, the Communists ambushed and captured So in April 1947 at Doc Vang. So was reportedly killed and his body dismembered so that it could not be found and turned into an object of veneration. Many of his followers, however, continued to believe that So could not be harmed and would some day return. PHAM CAO DUONG See also Buddhism in Vietnam; Confucianism; Hoa Hao; Ho-Sainteny Agreement References Fall, Bernard B. The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis. 2nd rev. ed. New York: Praeger, 1967. Hoa Hao Buddhism. Bibliography and Teaching of Prophet HuynhPhu-So. Santa Fe Spring, CA: Overseas Office, Hoa Hao Buddhism Church, 1983. Nguyen Long Thanh Nam. Phat Giao Hoa Hao Trong Dong Lich Su Dan Toc [Hoa Hao Buddhism in Our Nation’s History]. Santa Fe Spring, CA: Tap San Duoc Tu Bi, 1991.
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Huynh Tan Phat Birth Date: 1913 Death Date: September 30, 1989 Southern Vietnamese revolutionary, secretary-general of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (National Liberation Front [NLF]) during 1964–1969, and president of the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG). Born in 1913 at My Tho in Dinh Tuong Province in the Mekong Delta, Huynh Tan Phat attended Hanoi University, earned a degree in architecture, and then joined the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) in 1936. Arrested twice by the French, Phat returned to southern Vietnam after the August Revolution (1945) and helped organize the local resistance movement. During the Indochina War, Phat led the Information Service of the Southern Revolutionary Region and served as a member of the Administrative and Resistance Committee of the Saigon–Gia Dinh area. After the end of the Indochina War in 1954 he opened an architecture office in Saigon but remained active in politics. In 1960 he was one of the founding members of the NLF and in 1964 assumed its top leadership post. He was considered the NLF’s chief theorist. In 1969 he became president of the PRG in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Following the end of the Vietnam War, Phat was one of the few southern Communists who maintained a key political position, serving as a vice minister to the central government from 1976 to 1982. In 1982 he became a vice president on the Council of State, a post he held until his death on September 30, 1989, in Ho Chi Minh City. ROBERT K. BRIGHAM See also National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam; Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam References Personalities of the South Vietnam Liberation Movement. New York: Commission for Foreign Relations of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation, 1965. Thayer, Carlyle A. War by Other Means: National Liberation and Revolution in Viet-Nam, 1954–60. Sydney, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1989. Truong Nhu Tang, with David Charnoff and Doan Van Toai. A Viet Cong Memoir: An Inside Account of the Vietnam War and Its Aftermath. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985.
Huynh Van Cao Birth Date: September 26, 1927 Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) general and commander of IV Corps during the disastrous Battle of Ap Bac in the Mekong Delta (January 2, 1963). Born on September 26, 1927, in Quang Tri Province, the Catholic Huynh
Van Cao is said to be an adopted son of Ngo Dinh Diem, president of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), and a nephew of a Buddhist leader, the Venerable Thich Tri Thu. Cao’s devotion to Diem led the latter to promote him over more competent officers. Cao was a political general who preferred to involve himself in Saigon political intrigue rather than engage in military action. He also belonged to Ngo Dinh Nhu’s secret political organization, the Can Lao. Cao appointed Colonel Bui Dinh Dam, his protégé and a Catholic favorite of Diem, to control his 7th Division, which was under his nominal command and was the principal South Vietnamese unit in the area of Ap Bac. In December 1962 intelligence reported three Viet Cong (VC) companies in the neighborhood of Ap Bac. This was the situation that U.S. military adviser Lieutenant Colonel John Paul Vann had been waiting for in which the VC would be forced to stand and fight. He believed that the insurgents could not win such a battle. The Battle of Ap Bac opened when the VC defeated two prongs of an ARVN attack from the north and south. Vann advised Cao to send paratroopers to block the VC avenue of retreat. Cao, however, did not want to commit more troops when he had already lost many. He finally agreed to send them but to the west, where they would be practically useless. Disastrously, the troops arrived at twilight and were dropped at the wrong location, right in front of VC troops waiting in dug-in positions. The paratroopers suffered significant losses. Following this battle, the VC were able to slip away safely under the cover of darkness. During the planning of the Diem coup in 1963, the plotters believed that the weakest link to their plans was dealing with Cao’s troops in the Mekong Delta. The plotters devised a strategy in which Colonel Nguyen Huu Co would take charge of the nearest division to Cao at My Tho and move these soldiers to block Cao’s forces from moving into Saigon. This maneuver proved successful. Following the coup against Diem, Cao was forced to retire from the army. He went into politics and eventually was elected as a senator in the South Vietnamese parliament. After the April 1975 collapse of the South Vietnamese government, Cao spent several years in reeducation camps before leaving for the United States in the early 1990s. He subsequently settled in Virginia and has contributed articles to Vietnam Magazine. MICHAEL R. NICHOLS See also Ap Bac, Battle of; Can Lao Nhan Vi Cach Mang Dang; Ngo Dinh Diem; Ngo Dinh Diem, Overthrow of; Ngo Dinh Nhu; Nguyen Huu Co; Vann, John Paul References Fishel, Wesley R., ed. Vietnam: Anatomy of a Conflict. Itasca, IL: Peacock, 1968. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. Smith, R. B. An International History of the Vietnam War. 3 vols. New York: St. Martin’s, 1983–1991.
I Ia Drang, Battle of Start Date: October 19, 1965 End Date: November 26, 1965 Battle between U.S. and People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) forces, significant because it prevented the PAVN from seizing control of the Central Highlands and cutting the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) in two. The battle also demonstrated the effectiveness of air mobility against regular army units. On October 19, 1965, PAVN troops attacked the Plei Me Special Forces camp southwest of Pleiku. Initially, troopers from the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) helped Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) troops relieve Plei Me. On October 27 Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), commander General William Westmoreland ordered the 1st Cavalry Division to seek out and destroy the PAVN 32nd, 33rd, and 66th regiments commanded by Brigadier General Chu Huy Man. General Man also sought battle to learn how to fight the 1st Cavalry Division, whose base at An Khe blocked his route of advance to the coast. The location of PAVN units was unclear until November 1, when the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry (1-9 Cavalry), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John B. Stockton, located and captured a PAVN hospital area five miles west of Plei Me, killing or capturing 135 PAVN troops. Further reconnaissance indicated a PAVN presence in the Ia Drang Valley and on the Chu Pong Massif. The 1-9 Cavalry sprang a night ambush and developed contacts that were turned over to the infantry. The heaviest contact developed on November 14 as Lieutenant Colonel Harold G. Moore’s 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry (1-7 Cavalry),
assaulted landing zone (LZ) X-Ray on Chu Pong. Elephant grass, scrub trees, and tall anthills obstructed fields of fire. Moore made heavy contact with the PAVN 9th Battalion, 66th Regiment, before his whole understrength battalion could be landed. The American attack threw the PAVN 66th Regiment, which had just arrived in the area after a long trek down the Ho Chi Minh Trail, into total confusion. The 66th Regiment commander was away from his headquarters, leaving command of the regiment in the hands of Regiment Political Commissar La Ngoc Chau. The overall commander of all PAVN forces in the Ia Drang Valley was Colonel Nguyen Huu An, whose small forward headquarters arrived on the scene in the middle of the first day’s fighting. Under intense artillery fire and bombardment by the U.S. Air Force, Chau’s 9th Battalion tried to outflank LZ X-Ray to the south, but Moore was able to get his companies in line just in time. One of Moore’s platoons advanced too far and was cut off and almost destroyed, but it delayed Chau in locating the main American line. His line fully extended to the south, Moore called for help and received Company B, 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, which he used as a reserve during the night. At first light on November 15 Chau resumed the attack using his previously uncommitted 7th Battalion, and Lieutenant Colonel Robert Tully’s 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry (2-5 Cavalry), marched in to give much-needed support. Chau’s vicious attacks were all repulsed. The lost platoon’s survivors were pulled to safety, and Boeing B-52 Stratofortresses began the first of six days of strikes on Chu Pong. Two additional batteries of artillery arrived at LZ Columbus to provide a total of 24 pieces in support. During the night the PAVN 66th Regiment withdrew. Early on November 16 Chau launched a last attack, which was easily repulsed. Lieutenant Colonel Robert McDade’s 2nd
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Ia Drang, Battle of
U.S. Army second lieutenant C. R. Rescorla of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) prepares to engage People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) snipers on November 17, 1965, during the Battle of the Ia Drang Valley. (AP/Wide World Photos)
Battalion, 7th Cavalry (2-7 Cavalry), arrived, and the 1st Cavalry Division troops located their dead and counted the dead of the PAVN 66th Regiment. By body count PAVN losses were 634, but U.S. estimates placed the number at 1,215 killed, more than 10 times the losses of the 1st Cavalry. During the day Moore’s battalion was lifted to Camp Holloway at Pleiku, but Tully’s 2-5 Cavalry and McDade’s 2-7 Cavalry remained to secure LZ X-Ray. On November 17 continued B-52 sorties against the Chu Pong Massif made it necessary for Tully and McDade to move from LZ X-Ray and seek PAVN forces elsewhere. McDade’s 2-7 Cavalry, with Company A of the 1-7 Cavalry attached, was ordered to march toward LZ Albany two miles away to try to regain contact with PAVN units. Tully’s unit was ordered to march to the firebase at LZ Columbus. Having little combat experience and not yet working together as a cohesive unit, McDade’s men, who were strung out in a 500-yard column in high elephant grass and jungle, blundered into a PAVN ambush, and a savage battle ensued. The head of the column had just reached LZ Albany when McDade halted it and assembled his company commanders for a council. The previous night Colonel Nguyen Huu An, not knowing that the U.S. troops planned to abandon LZ X-Ray the next morning,
had ordered the 66th Regiment’s 8th Battalion, which was some distance away and had not yet been engaged in the battle, to move to LZ X-Ray to attack the American units there. As he marched toward LZ X-Ray, 8th Battalion commander Le Xuan Phoi, who had no communications with either the 66th Regiment or Front Headquarters, learned of the presence of American forces in the area (McDade’s 2-7 Cavalry). Phoi quickly deployed his battalion to attack McDade’s men and requested assistance from nearby troops of the PAVN 1st Battalion, 33rd Regiment, who were in the area preparing to attack the U.S. artillery position at LZ Columbus. Phoi ordered his men to chop the American column into many pieces and to hug it as closely as possible in order to avoid U.S. artillery fire and air bombardment. Bunched up at rest, McDade’s men were easy targets for PAVN mortars and grenades. All unit cohesion was lost as the commanders were separated from their companies and the battle devolved into many individual combats. PAVN troops moved about killing the wounded. No artillery fire or air support was possible until McDade’s men could mark their positions. After two hours of close combat, the survivors threw smoke grenades, and artillery fire and napalm rained down on the attacking PAVN troops, killing the commanders of both PAVN battalions.
Imperial Presidency
By late afternoon, Company B of the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry (1-5 Cavalry), was ordered to help McDade’s men. Marching from LZ Columbus, Company B of the 1-5 Cavalry fought its way into LZ Albany and collected the wounded into one of two perimeters for evacuation by helicopter. At dusk, Company B of the 2-7 Cavalry also reinforced McDade. PAVN troops withdrew during the predawn hours of November 18. PAVN losses were heavy, but McDade’s unit lost 151 men killed, 121 wounded, and 4 missing in action. When the Battle of Ia Drang ended on November 26, the 1st Cavalry Division had successfully spoiled the PAVN attack along Route 19 to the sea. The battle demonstrated the effectiveness of a new kind of warfare, that of air mobility. In the entire campaign U.S. losses were 305 killed, while PAVN killed were estimated at 3,561. Vietnamese postwar sources give much lower figures of PAVN losses: 559 killed and 669 wounded. These figures have been questioned by some PAVN veterans, and Vietnamese histories note that PAVN units involved in the battle suffered severe morale problems immediately following the battle. While acknowledging that its forces made many mistakes during the battle, PAVN commanders viewed the results of the battle, especially the heavy American casualties, as vindicating their new close-quarter battle tactics. JOHN L. BELL JR. See also Air Mobility; Central Highlands; United States Army; Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, Army
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References General Dang Vu Hiep, with Le Hai Trieu and Ngo Vinh Binh. Ky Uc Tay Nguyen [Highland Memories]. Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 2002. Kinnard, Harry W. O. “A Victory in the Ia Drang: The Triumph of a Concept.” Army 17 (September 1967): 71–91. Military History Institute of Vietnam. Chien Thang Play Me: Ba Muoi Nam Sau Nhin Lai [Plei Me Victory: Looking Back after Thirty Years]. Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1995. Moore, Harold G., and Joseph L. Galloway. We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young: Ia Drang—The Battle That Changed the War in Vietnam. New York: Random House, 1992. Pribbenow, Merle L. “The Fog of War: The Vietnamese View of the Ia Drang Battle.” Military Review (January 2001): 93–97. Stanton, Shelby L. Anatomy of a Division: The 1st Cav in Vietnam. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1987. Tolson, John J. Airmobility, 1961–1971. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1973.
Imperial Presidency A term coined by historian and presidential adviser Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. in the late 1960s to describe the modern American presidency. The term “imperial presidency” implies the steady increase in and concentration of power in the office of the president since the 1930s. The term can also describe the increased secrecy and isolation revolving around the executive branch and
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its decision-making process. According to Schlesinger’s usage and theory, the late 1960s and early 1970s witnessed the apogee of the imperial presidency. Indeed, the failures in Vietnam and the 1973–1974 Watergate Scandal that brought down President Richard M. Nixon appeared to lend credence to the idea of an imperial presidency. Throughout most of American history, Congress was the predominant power in the U.S. government. In the 1930s, however, owing first to the Great Depression and then to World War II, the power and responsibility of the president increased dramatically and eclipsed that of Congress, particularly in foreign affairs. This trend became even more pronounced with the coming of the Cold War in the late 1940s. Congress increasingly seemed to defer to the actions and policies of the president with little, if any, critical debate or oversight. President Harry S. Truman broke new ground by committing U.S. troops to the Korean War in 1950 with no prior congressional approval or debate and no formal declaration of war. This acquiescence to presidential power reached its zenith during the Vietnam War, a war to which President Lyndon B. Johnson had committed half a million U.S. troops by 1968. Expansion of the war was achieved largely without much congressional involvement. Certainly there was virtually no congressional oversight leading up to escalation of the war in 1965, and for the remainder of the war the Johnson and Nixon administrations either misled or lied to both Congress and the American people regarding their conduct of the war. We also now know that the August 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, the only congressional authorization for President Johnson to wage war in Vietnam, was based on the false premise of a second attack on U.S. destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin. President Nixon misled the American people about U.S. involvement in Cambodia, widening the war in Vietnam to include that country. Believing that presidents Johnson and Nixon had usurped the power to declare war and seeking to reassert its traditional role in foreign policy decisions, Congress passed the War Powers Act in 1973. This law limited the ability of the president to dispatch U.S. troops into hostilities, mandated that the president advise Congress regarding such deployments, and stipulated that the president must remove troops from a foreign conflict if Congress did not approve or no longer approved of the deployment. It was not, however, simply in foreign policy that the imperial presidency was an operative assumption. The growth in the staff and bureaucracy of the White House and the executive branch in general has also been cited as another example of the imperial presidency. Indeed, the size of these bureaucracies had increased exponentially. Until the 1930s the White House had few staff members. Beginning with the Franklin Roosevelt administration, the number of White House staffers increased significantly, as did bureaucracies and agencies within the White House. The creation of the Executive Office of the President in 1939 formalized by law this expansion in personnel working for the president. These personnel
included political advisers, such as the chief of staff, who with few exceptions do not require Senate confirmation and are thus free of most congressional oversight. More recently, some observers have suggested that because of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States and the subsequent War on Terror, the 2001 Patriot Act, revelations of domestic surveillance by the National Security Agency (NSA), and the Iraq War (2003–2010), President George W. Bush resurrected the imperial presidency. In 2006 there were 17 separate offices, consisting of more than 1,500 individuals, that comprised the Executive Office of the President. STEFAN M. BROOKS See also Gulf of Tonkin Incident; Gulf of Tonkin Resolution; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Schlesinger, Arthur Meier, Jr.; War Powers Act References Fisher, Louis. Presidential War Power. Rev. ed. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004. Gould, Lewis. The Modern American Presidency. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2003. Irons, Peter. War Powers: How the Imperial Presidency Hijacked the Constitution. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2005. Schlesinger, Arthur M. The Imperial Presidency. New York: Mariner, 2004. Schlesinger, Arthur M. War and the American Presidency. New York: Norton, 2005. Siff, Ezra. Why the Senate Slept: The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and the Beginning of America’s War in Vietnam. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999.
India South Asian nation encompassing an area of 1.269 million square miles. The Republic of India became an independent nation in 1947. India is bordered by Bangladesh and Myanmar (Burma) to the east; Pakistan to the west; Bhutan, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and Nepal to the north; and the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal to the south. With 529.362 million people in 1968, India was the world’s most populous democracy and second in world population only to China. India’s government is a mixed parliamentary-presidential system in which the president is elected indirectly by an electoral college for five-year terms. The president is head of state. The head of government is the prime minister, appointed by the president based upon the parliamentary majority in power; most executive power is invested with the prime minister. During the 1960s and 1970s India’s politics were dominated by the Indian National Congress (INC), which held a parliamentary majority from 1950 to 1990 except for a brief period in the late 1970s. India was a member of the International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC). As a formerly colonized state and a leading nonaligned nation, India had a keen interest in events in Southeast Asia. From
Indochina War the beginning of war in Vietnam, both official Indian policy and public opinion generally favored Ho Chi Minh’s government, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), against the French and, later, it and the Viet Cong (VC) against the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) and the United States. In the 1950s India resisted U.S. pressure to join the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). The Sino-Indian War of 1962 and continuing tension with China to some extent lessened India’s sympathy for the North Vietnamese government, an ally of China. Even so, the Indian government resisted appeals from successive U.S. administrations to take a more favorable view of U.S. policies in Vietnam. After the 1954 Geneva Conference, India was one of the three neutral nations (along with Poland and Canada) that formed the ICSC, charged with supervision of the implementation of the Geneva Accords. India chaired this body and furnished its personnel. The ICSC was to oversee the cease-fire, elections, and reunification of Vietnam envisaged in the Geneva Accords. Over time the ICSC became badly fractured, as India and Poland tended to support North Vietnamese positions, while Canada took a more pro-U.S. position. India withdrew from the ICSC in 1973. Over almost 20 years, the Indian stance on the ICSC generally contributed to the continuing tension between India and the United States. In turn, from 1965 onward Indian criticism of U.S. policies led the United States under presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon to adopt restrictive policies on American food shipments to India, further exacerbating a difficult relationship. In 1965 the Indian Ministry of External Affairs issued a report calling for an end to U.S. bombing of North Vietnam and the convening of an international conference to reach a solution of the Vietnam imbroglio based on the withdrawal of all troops from South Vietnam and the reunification of Vietnam. The report also largely rejected the prospect of a military solution of the war. In the early 1970s relations between India and the United States reached a nadir when the United States leaned toward Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistani crisis that ultimately resulted in the creation of an independent Bangladesh. In 1970 Indian foreign minister Swaran Singh called for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam, and in 1972 the Indian consulate in Hanoi was upgraded to an embassy, whereas the consulate in Saigon remained such. Upon the fall of Saigon in 1975, India promptly recognized the Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam. Relations between India and Vietnam have remained close since, with bilateral cooperation in trade, energy (nuclear power), and regional security issues such as combating drug trafficking and terrorism. Vietnam has supported India’s effort to secure a permanent seat on the United Nations (UN) Security Council and has backed a closer relationship between India and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), to which Vietnam belongs. PRISCILLA ROBERTS
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See also Canada; Geneva Conference and Geneva Accords of 1954; International Commission for Supervision and Control; Poland References Brands, H. W. India and the United States: The Cold Peace. Boston: Twayne, 1990. Chary, M. Srinivas. The Eagle and the Peacock: U.S. Foreign Policy toward India since Independence. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1995. Kux, Dennis. Estranged Democracies, 1941–1991: India and the United States. Washington, DC: Sage, 1994. McMahon, Robert J. Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994. SarDesai, D. R. Indian Foreign Policy in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam 1947–1964. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968. Sharma, Geetesh. India-Vietnam Relations: First to Twenty-First Century. Kolkata: Dialogue Society, 2004. Sridharan, Kripa. The ASEAN Region in India’s Foreign Policy. Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth, 1996. Thakur, Ramesh. Peacekeeping in Vietnam: Canada, India, Poland, and the International Commission. Edmonton, Alberta, Canada: University of Alberta Press, 1984.
Indochina War Start Date: 1946 End Date: 1954 Although there were other explosions of nationalist sentiment in the French Empire after World War II (most notably in Algeria in 1945 and Madagascar in 1947), that in Indochina was by far the most damaging. The Indochina War lasted eight years, from 1946 to 1954. The failure of the French government to realize that the days of colonialism were over collided with Vietnamese nationalist sentiment. The French fought the Indochina War not so much for economic reasons (by 1950 French military expenditures surpassed the total value of all French investments there) but rather for political and psychological reasons. Perhaps only with its empire could France be counted a great power. Colonial advocates also argued that if France let go of Indochina, the rest of its overseas possessions, including those in North Africa, would soon follow. This idea bore some similarity to the domino theory that was widely believed in the United States during the Vietnam War. The Indochina War began in December 1946. Ho Chi Minh, leader of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), predicted how it would be fought. It would be, he said, the war of the tiger and the elephant. The tiger could not meet the elephant in an equal contest, so tiger would lay in wait for the elephant, drop on his back from the jungle, and rip huge hunks of flesh with his claws. Eventually the elephant would bleed to death. The war played out very much along those lines. Initially the war did not appear to proceed that way. After the defeat of Japan in World War II, French general Jacques-Philippe Leclerc arrived in Indochina with reinforcements. He used his
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small yet mobile force of about 40,000 men to dash through the country and secure southern Vietnam and Cambodia. The nationalist Viet Minh were quickly forced out into the countryside, and life returned to normal or almost so. There were those who dreaded the Viet Minh’s retreat into the jungle. Leclerc was one; he was convinced that the Viet Minh represented a nationalist movement that France could not subdue militarily. Unlike most of his compatriots, he was aware of the great difficulties of jungle warfare and favored negotiations. In a secret report to Paris, Leclerc said that there would be no solution through force in Indochina. Although the French Socialist Party showed interest in ending the war through peace talks, the steady drift of the coalition government to the Right and increasing bloodshed prevented this. French high commissioner to Indochina Admiral Georges Thierry d’Argenlieu and other French colonial administrators opposed meaningful concessions to the nationalists, and in the summer of 1946 Leclerc departed Indochina in frustration. Leclerc was but the first in a succession of French military commanders. He was followed by generals Jean-Etienne Valluy, Roger Blaizot, Marcel Carpentier, Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, Raoul Salan, Henri Navarre, and Paul Henri Romuald Ély. This frequent change in commanders undoubtedly affected the overall efficiency and morale of the Expeditionary Force. Most French leaders assumed that the conflict would be little more than a classic colonial reconquest, securing the population centers and then expanding outward in the classic oil slick (tache d’huile) method they had practiced so effectively in Morocco and Algeria. Meanwhile the Viet Minh, led by General Vo Nguyen Giap, steadily grew in strength and controlled more and more territory. In May 1947 the French did make a stab at settling the war peacefully when Paul Mus traveled from Hanoi to meet with Ho Chi Minh in the latter’s jungle headquarters. Mus was an Asian scholar sympathetic to the Vietnamese nationalist point of view and a personal adviser to Émile Bollaert, who had replaced d’Argenlieu as high commissioner. Mus told Ho that France would agree to a cease-fire on the condition that the Viet Minh lay down some of their arms, permit French troops freedom of movement in their zones, and turn over some deserters from the French Foreign Legion. Ho rejected this offer, which was tantamount to surrender. In May, Bollaert declared that “France will remain in Indochina.” Despite its stated determination to hold on to Indochina, the French government never made the commitment in manpower necessary to have a chance to win. The war was essentially fought by the professional soldiers: officers and noncommissioned officers who led the French Expeditionary Corps. The French government never allowed draftees to be sent to Indochina. The small number of effectives available to French commanders left them very few options as far as strategy was concerned. Shortages of noncommissioned officers, a lack of trained intelligence officers and interpreters, and little interest in or knowledge of the mechanics of pacification all hampered the French military effort.
The French held much of Cochin China in large part because the powerful religious sects and Buddhists there opposed the Viet Minh. The French also controlled the Red River Delta in the north along with the capital, Hanoi. But the Viet Minh controlled much of the countryside, and the area they dominated grew as time went on. Initially the Viet Minh largely withdrew into the jungle to indoctrinate and train their troops. The French invested little attention and resources in pacification efforts, and their heavyhandedness alienated many Vietnamese. The French scenario had the Viet Minh eventually tiring of their cause and giving up. It never played out that way. To increase available manpower, attract Vietnamese nationalist support, and quiet critics at home and in the United States, Paris sought to provide at least the facade of an indigenous Vietnamese regime as a competitor to the Viet Minh. After several years of negotiations, in March 1949 the French government concluded the Elysée Agreements with former emperor Bao Dai. These created the State of Vietnam, and Paris made a key concession that Vietnam was in fact one country. The State of Vietnam allowed the French government to portray the war as a conflict between a free Vietnam and the Communists and thus not a colonial war at all. Washington, which supported France in Indochina because the United States needed French military support in Europe, claimed to be convinced. The problem for Vietnamese nationalists was that the State of Vietnam never truly became established. The French continued to control all of its institutions, and its promised army never really materialized. France simply took the recruited soldiers and added them to its own Expeditionary Corps, in which they were commanded by French officers. In effect there were only two choices for the Vietnamese: either the Viet Minh or the French. The French therefore pushed Vietnamese nationalists into the Viet Minh camp. In October 1947 the French mounted Operation LÉA. Involving some 15,000 men and conducted over a three-week period, it was devoted almost exclusively to the capture of Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh leadership and the destruction of their main battle units. LÉA involved 17 French battalions, and while it succeeded in taking Thai Nguyen and some other Viet Minh–controlled cities, it failed to both capture the Viet Minh leadership and destroy the main Communist units. It also showed the paucity of French resources in Indochina. The troops in LÉA were badly needed elsewhere, and their employment in the operation opened up much of the countryside to Viet Minh penetration. As time went on, the military situation continued to deteriorate for the French, despite the fact that by the end of 1949 Paris had expended $1.5 billion on the war. The Indochina War changed dramatically in the autumn of 1949 when the Communists came to power in China. While that event and the recognition of the North Vietnamese government by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) helped change Washington’s attitude toward the war, in effect the war was lost for the French then and there. The long Chinese-Vietnam border allowed the Chi-
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Vietnamese villagers in Ba Tri perform training drills with makeshift bamboo rifles during the Indochina War in 1951. (Library of Congress)
nese to supply arms and equipment to the Viet Minh across their common border and provided sanctuaries in China in which the Viet Minh could train and replenish their troops. And there were plenty of arms available from the substantial stocks of weapons, including artillery, that the United States had previously supplied to the Chinese Nationalists. The Korean War, which began in June 1950, also profoundly affected the U.S. attitude toward the war in Indochina. Korea and Vietnam came to be viewed as mutually dependent theaters in a common Western struggle against communism. Washington recognized the State of Vietnam and changed its policy of providing only indirect aid to the French effort in Indochina. In June 1950 President Harry S. Truman announced that the United States would provide direct military aid to French forces in Indochina and establish a military assistance and advisory group there. By the end of the Indochina War in 1954, the United States had provided a total of $2.5 billion in military aid to the French. The French insisted that all U.S. military assistance be given directly to them rather than channeled through the State of Vietnam. Although a Vietnamese National Army was established in 1951, it
remained effectively under French control, and France continued to dominate the State of Vietnam down to the 1954 Geneva Conference. Regardless, the Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower administrations assured the American people that real authority in Vietnam had been handed over to the Vietnamese. With Paris refusing to concede real authority to the State of Vietnam, Vietnamese nationalists had no other recourse but the Viet Minh. In the end, Vietnamese nationalism was completely usurped by communism. The Indochina War became an endless quagmire. By 1950 it was costing France 40–45 percent of its entire military budget and more than 10 percent of the national budget. That same year, Giap and the Viet Minh won control of Route Coloniale 4. Located in the far north, the highway paralleled the Chinese frontier and ran from the Gulf of Tonkin to Cao Bang. With the loss of this critical China frontier section, for all practical purposes the war was over for France. The Viet Minh now had ready access to China. That the war was allowed to drag on past this point is proof of the dearth of political leadership in Paris. In 1951 Giap, who believed that the circumstances were ripe for conventional large-unit warfare, went on the offensive in Operations
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HOANG HOA THAM and HA NAM NINH. His divisions were stopped cold by
French forces led by General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, probably the most capable of French commanders in the war. After these rebuffs, Giap simply shifted back to his phase-two strategy of engaging the French in circumstances of his own choosing. In November 1951 de Lattre initiated a battle outside the important Red River Delta area. What became the Battle of Hoa Binh was a meat-grinder battle as de Lattre envisioned but for both sides. By the end of the battle in February 1952 the Viet Minh had paid a heavy price, but they had learned how to deal with French tactics and weapons and had penetrated the French defensive ring as never before. Giap now undertook the conquest of the Thai Highlands in northwestern Vietnam. By the end of November 1952 Viet Minh units had penetrated to the Lao border. New French commander General Raoul Salan tried to halt this offensive by striking at Viet Minh supply lines. But Giap refused to take the bait, and Operation LORRAINE, which involved 30,000 French troops in special airborne, commando, and support formations, was soon in reverse. By December, Viet Minh units were still at the Lao border, and the French were back within their heavily fortified “de Lattre” defensive line of the Red River Delta. The Viet Minh also made significant gains in central Vietnam. French control in the plateau area of the Central Highlands was narrowed to a few beachheads around Hue, Da Nang, and Nha Trang. The only areas where the French enjoyed real success were in Cochin China and in neighboring Cambodia.
In the spring of 1953 Giap assembled a powerful force to invade Laos. That country had an army of only 10,000 men supported by 3,000 French regulars. Giap employed four divisions totaling 40,000 men, and he had the assistance of 4,000 Communist Pathet Lao troops. Once more the French were compelled to disperse their slender resources. They were, however, successful in preventing the Communists from overrunning the Plain of Jars, and in late April the French halted the Viet Minh and inflicted heavy casualties on them. The onset of the rainy season forced the Viet Minh to fall back on their bases, and Laos was saved for another summer. In July 1953 new French commander General Henri Navarre arrived in Indochina. Buoyed by promises of increased U.S. military aid, Navarre attempted a general counteroffensive. The press in both France and the United States gave much attention to the so-called Navarre Plan. Unknown to the public, however, was Navarre’s own secret pessimistic assessment to his government that the war could not be won militarily and that the best that could be hoped for was a draw. Using his increased resources (French forces now numbered about 517,000 men, while the Viet Minh had perhaps 120,000 men), Navarre vowed to go over to the offensive. He ordered the evacuation of a series of small posts, and this was accomplished successfully. At the same time, the State of Vietnam’s army was given more responsibility, although this was a case of too little, too late. Concurrently, Giap was gathering additional resources for a larger invasion of Laos. With five divisions he hoped to overrun all
Indonesia of Laos and perhaps Cambodia, then join up with Viet Minh units in the south for an assault on Saigon itself. In the meantime, some 60,000 guerrillas and five regular regiments would tie down the French in the north. In December 1953 and January 1954 the Viet Minh overran much of southern and central Laos. Navarre’s response was the establishment of an airhead in far northwestern Vietnam astride the main Viet Minh invasion route into Laos. Navarre envisioned this either as a blocking position or as bait to draw some enemy forces into a set-piece conventional battle, in which they would be destroyed by French artillery and airpower. The location that Navarre selected, the village of Dien Bien Phu, was in a large valley, and the French conceded the high ground around it to the Viet Minh. When he was asked later how he got into this position, Navarre said that at the time the French arrived there the Viet Minh did not have artillery, so there was no danger from the heights. It was an astonishing statement. Dien Bien Phu was also a considerable distance, some 200 miles by air, from Hanoi, and the French had only a very limited transport airlift capability (approximately 100 aircraft). Giap took the bait, but he sent four divisions rather than the one that Navarre had envisioned to engage the French at Dien Bien Phu. The siege of the French fortress lasted from March 13 to May 7, 1954. The battle’s outcome was largely decided by two key factors: the Viet Minh’s ability to bring Chinese-supplied artillery to the heights by means of an extensive supply network of coolies (the “People’s Porters,” Giap called them) and the inadequacy of French air support. On May 7 the French garrison surrendered. Although there was some debate in Washington over possible U.S. military intervention (Operation VULTURE), President Dwight D. Eisenhower rejected it because the British refused to go along. The French defeat at Dien Bien Phu allowed political leaders in Paris to shift the blame to the generals and at last bring the war to an end. Attention now turned to a conference previously scheduled in Geneva to deal with a variety of Asian problems. New French premier Pierre Mendès-France imposed a 60-day timetable for an agreement, threatening to resign if one was not reached. The Geneva Accords were signed on the last day of the deadline. The Vietnamese were pressured by China and the Soviet Union into an agreement that gave them less than they had won on the battlefield. Cambodia and Laos were declared independent, but the key provision was recognition of the unity of Vietnam. Pending unification, there were to be an armistice and a temporary dividing line at the 17th Parallel. The agreements also provided for the compulsory regroupment of troops and, if they desired, civilians. Nationwide elections were to be held in two years. Ultimately the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), headed by Ngo Dinh Diem, refused to permit the elections, and the United States supported Diem in his stand. This led to a renewal of the war in an American phase. In the Indochina War, the French and their allies sustained 172,708 casualties: 94,581 dead or missing and 78,127 wounded. These are broken down as 140,992 French Union casualties (75,867 dead or missing and 65,125 wounded), with allied Indochina states
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losing 31,716 (18,714 dead or missing and 13,002 wounded). Viet Minh losses were perhaps three times those of the French and their allies. Some 25,000 Vietnamese civilians also died. For France, the struggle had been a distant one. Paris had not dared send draftees to Indochina, and the conflict had been fought largely by the professionals. The French government almost immediately transferred these men to Algeria, where another insurrection had broken out. The soldiers pledged that this time there would be no betrayal. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Bao Dai; CASTOR, Operation; Casualties; Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Elysée Agreement; Geneva Conference and Geneva Accords of 1954; Haiphong, Shelling of; Hoa Binh, Battle of; HOANG HOA THAM, Operation; Ho Chi Minh; Lattre de Tassigny, Jean de; LÉA, Operation; Leclerc, Jacques-Philippe; LE HONG PHONG II, Operation; LORRAINE, Operation; Mendès-France, Pierre; Na San, Battle of; Navarre, Henri Eugène; Ngo Dinh Diem; Truman, Harry S.; Vo Nguyen Giap; VULTURE, Operation References Duiker, William J. The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam. 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996. Dunn, Peter M. The First Vietnam War. New York: St. Martin’s, 1985. Fall, Bernard B. Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu. New York: Lippincott, 1966. Fall, Bernard B. Street without Joy: The French Debacle in Indochina. Rev. ed. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1994. Gras, Yves. Histoire de la Guerre d’Indochine. Paris: Éditions Denoël, 1992. Hammer, Ellen J. The Struggle for Indochina. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1954. Kelly, George A. Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire in Crisis, 1947–1962. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965. Maneli, Mieczyslaw. The War of the Vanquished. New York: Harper and Row, 1969. Porch, Douglas. The French Foreign Legion: A Complete History of the Legendary Fighting Force. New York: HarperCollins, 1991.
Indochinese Communist Party See Lao Dong Party
Indonesia Predominantly Southeast Asian nation, formerly a Dutch possession, straddling the equator. Indonesia, which had a 1968 population of 117.530 million, is an archipelago of some 17,000 islands (of which only 6,000 are inhabited) and covers 741,096 square miles. It is located amid the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea, and the Pacific Ocean south of the Philippines and the Indochinese Peninsula and north of Australia. Indonesia was a member of the International Commission for Control and Supervision, replacing India in 1973.
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As a former colonial possession and regional power, the Republic of Indonesia (previously the Dutch East Indies) was necessarily interested in the events of Southeast Asia. Beginning in 1920, the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI) led several minor revolts against the Dutch. Other anti-Dutch parties soon followed, including the Indonesian Nationalist Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia) founded by Sukarno in 1927. During World War II, the Japanese conquered the Dutch East Indies. Following the defeat of Japan, Sukarno and other Indonesian nationalists declared independence on August 17, 1945. Fighting between them and the Dutch and British ensued. The Dutch did not formally surrender their rule until December 1949. Indonesia joined the United Nations (UN) the following year. Relations with the United States deteriorated, and Indonesia moved closer to China. In January 1965 Indonesia withdrew from the UN. Under Sukarno the Indonesian government was critical of U.S. policy in Vietnam, in part because much of Indonesia’s national debt was owed to Communist states. After a bloody 1966 coup, General Suharto seized formal power in 1967. He had commanded troops that had crushed PKI-led uprisings against the continued economic chaos in Indonesia that the government had blamed on the United States. Suharto helped stabilize the economy and moved the country closer to the West, but his long tenure in power was marked by rampant corruption, intimidation, fraud, and rigged elections. In September 1966 Indonesia rejoined the UN. The government even attempted without success to play a peacemaking role in Vietnam. In 1973 Indonesia replaced India as a member of the International Commission for Control and Supervision, a revamped version of the International Commission for Supervision and Control that was mandated in the Paris Peace Accords of 1973. LESLIE-RAHYE STRICKLAND See also Paris Peace Accords References Crouch, Harold. The Army and Politics in Indonesia. Rev. ed. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988. Osborne, Milton. Southeast Asia: An Illustrated History. 5th ed. Sydney, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1990. Sievers, Allen M. The Mystical World of Indochina: Culture and Economic Development in Conflict. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974.
Initial Defense Satellite Communications System See Defense Satellite Communications System
Intelligence, Electronic See Electronic Intelligence
International Commission for Supervision and Control Watchdog body established by the 1954 Geneva Conference to oversee implementation of the armistice agreements in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. The International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC) is frequently referred to simply as the International Control Commission (ICC). Although having largely the same mandate and rules of procedure in the three countries, the ICSC in fact operated independently in each, having its own staff of military and political experts, means of transportation, and offices and housing. The ICSC was made up of India as chair and Canada and Poland as members. A major weakness was that it had no enforcement powers other than sending reports on any armistice violations to the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union in their continuing role as cochairs of the 1954 Geneva Conference. In Laos the ICSC, although facing a nearly impossible task of verifying the withdrawal of Viet Minh “volunteer” forces across the long and rugged jungle border in accordance with the 1954 provisions, played a useful role in encouraging the Royal Lao Government and the rebel Pathet Lao to open negotiations for reintegration of the latter. The 1957 agreement for a coalition government and full restoration of royal authority in Sam Neua and Phong Saly provinces, where the Pathet Lao had regrouped after the armistice, was due in no small part to the ICSC’s facilitating role of ensuring communications between the two sides and providing security guarantees to Pathet Lao representatives in Vientiane. After Prince Souvanna Phouma declared that the May 1958 elections had fulfilled the obligations assumed by the royal government at Geneva, the ICSC adjourned sine die on July 20, 1958. The ICSC published four interim reports on its activities. The peaceful respite was to be brief. When fighting resumed on a large scale in the spring of 1961, the ICSC was reactivated at the suggestion of Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, thereby meeting a demand of the Communist powers. ICSC delegates were present at the truce talks among the three Laotian factions at Ban Namone and thereafter remained in Laos in accordance with new provisions in the 1962 Geneva Protocol on the Neutrality of Laos. After 1964, however, when it had to remove its field teams from the embattled Plain of Jars, the ICSC played a declining role in the escalating war in Laos. The ICSC finally left Laos following the 1975 Communist takeover there. In Vietnam the ICSC operated under the close surveillance of the rival governments in Saigon and Hanoi. The ICSC was so unpopular that demonstrators ransacked its hotel in Saigon on one occasion, some claimed at the instigation of the government of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). The major question with which the ICSC grappled was to what extent the escalating guerrilla war in South Vietnam was the result of the intervention of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) in South Vietnam. The ICSC’s most decisive answer to
International War Crimes Tribunal this question was a special report that it issued, over Polish objections, in June 1962 in which the ICSC accused the Hanoi government of violations of the 1954 agreement with respect to its actions in South Vietnam over and above propaganda broadcasts on Radio Hanoi. On October 17, 1961, Colonel Hoang Thuy Nam, the South Vietnamese officer in charge of liaison with the ICSC, was found assassinated, although Hanoi denied responsibility for the crime. In 1963 the Polish delegate, Mieczyslaw Maneli, was active in a diplomatic move never envisioned in the ICSC mandate. ICSC delegates traveled periodically between Saigon and Hanoi by way of Vientiane, the only diplomats to have such freedom. The Polish delegate acted as an intermediary between South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem and North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh when Diem wished to sound out Ho about restoring peace. Nothing came of these soundings, however, before Diem was killed in a November 1963 coup. The ICSC remained in Vietnam until the war escalated beyond retrieval except by negotiations involving the United States, which in 1964 unsuccessfully attempted to use the Canadian delegate, J. Blair Seaborn, as a channel to open talks with Hanoi. In Cambodia the ICSC presence was always at the pleasure of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, who fitted it into his overall policy of seeking to maintain a precarious neutrality between more powerful neighbors. The country was at peace, and there was no thorny problem of reintegrating Communist insurgents left over from the Indochina War because they had all departed for the safety of Hanoi. The ICSC was revived from a largely inactive role by Sihanouk’s insistence that it investigate bombings of Cambodian border villages by South Vietnamese and U.S. aircraft (which became more frequent in the 1960s) and condemn them. However, ICSC investigations in the eastern border regions of Cambodia carried the risk of stumbling onto military installations of People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) and Viet Cong (VC) troops, and some believe that it was mainly for this reason that Sihanouk demanded the withdrawal of the ICSC from Cambodia at the end of 1969. Although the ICSC was an integral part of the 1954 Geneva settlement, the overall role of the ICSC in the Vietnam War can be characterized as marginal. Some histories of the war omit mention of it altogether. ARTHUR J. DOMMEN See also Cambodia; Canada; Geneva Conference and Geneva Accords of 1954; India; Laos; Poland; Sihanouk, Norodom; Souvanna Phouma; Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, 1954–1975; Vietnam, Republic of, 1954–1975 References Randle, Robert F. Geneva 1954: The Settlement of the Indochinese War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969. Young, Kenneth T. The 1954 Geneva Conference. New York: Greenwood, 1968.
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International Rescue Committee Humanitarian organization concerned with resettlement of Vietnamese refugees during and after the Vietnam War. The International Rescue Committee (IRC) was organized during World War II for the purpose of assisting the escape and resettlement of intellectuals from Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Although the IRC’s primary focus had been Europe, its board of directors recognized the need for humanitarian assistance in Vietnam after the temporary division of the country by the 1954 Geneva Accords resulted in some 40,000–50,000 civilians daily fleeing the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) for the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). The IRC was the first organization to assist these refugees by rushing food, clothing, and medical supplies to refugee camps. After the initial crisis, the IRC focused on education, literacy programs, rural self-help programs, day care centers, orphanages, public sanitation, the establishment of medical facilities, and the coordination of volunteer medical teams. These volunteer medical teams began the Medical International Cooperation Organization (MEDICO), which has also sent teams to Africa, Latin America, South Asia, and the Middle East. With the withdrawal of American troops and the fall of Saigon in 1975, the IRC began locating sponsors and finding employment for the 150,000 Vietnamese refugees who had fled their country within the first 10 weeks of the end of the war. IRC efforts resulted in the relocation of the refugees within a few months. The organization continues to assist refugees around the world. CYNTHIA NORTHRUP See also PASSAGE TO FREEDOM, Operation; Refugees and Boat People
References Buttinger, Joseph. Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled. 2 vols. New York: Praeger, 1967. Frankum, Ronald B., Jr. Operation Passage to Freedom: The United States Navy in Vietnam, 1954–1955. Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 2007. Kahin, George McT. Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam. New York: Knopf, 1986. Wiesner, Louis A. Victims and Survivors: Displaced Persons and Other War Victims in Viet-Nam, 1954–1975. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1988.
International War Crimes Tribunal Antiwar organization sponsored by the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation. The International War Crimes Tribunal, also known as the Russell Tribunal, met in May and November 1967 under the direction of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation. The tribunal was constituted in 1966 and featured representatives from 18 countries. Among the participants were 25 internationally renowned individuals, including French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre and French writer and philosopher Simone de Beauvoir. Most were from leftist peace organizations, and several were Nobel Prize winners. During the first session in Stockholm, Sweden, the
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International War Crimes Tribunal
The anti–Vietnam War International War Crimes Tribunal met in Roskilde, Denmark, and on December 1, 1967, announced that it had found the United States guilty of “numerous war crimes” in Vietnam. Here, tribunal president and French writer Jean-Paul Sartre, left, explains the decision. Other jury members shown are, from left to right, Vladimir Dedijer, Laurent Schwartz, and David Dellinger. (AP/Wide World Photos)
panel accused U.S. forces in Vietnam of aggression, waging war against civilians, use of experimental weapons, torture and mutilation of prisoners, and genocide. The second meeting, held in Copenhagen, Denmark, addressed the use of herbicides, chemicals, poison gas, and phosphorus weapons. The conferees also condemned the use of napalm and cluster bombs (CBUs). The tribunal indicted the United States for “genocide” and violations of various international treaties, including the 1907 Hague Convention, the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, the 1949 Geneva Convention, and the United Nations (UN) Charter. Although the tribunal found the U.S. government guilty of criminal warfare on all charges, its rulings received scant worldwide attention and had minimal impact on U.S. foreign policy. Indeed, the U.S. State Department refused to dignify the proceedings with an official response. The tribunal meetings did not include any members from the United States or Vietnam. The tribunal was revived for meetings in 1974, 1975, and 1976 that dealt chiefly with human rights abuses in Brazil and Chile. In the late 1970s and
early to mid-1980s, other tribunals were held to investigate human rights violations in various parts of the world. The World Tribunal on Iraq, formed after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, was modeled directly after the Russell-sponsored tribunals. LACIE BALLINGER AND PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR. See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Defoliation; Herbicides; Napalm References Clark, Ronald. The Life of Bertrand Russell. London: Jonathan Cape, 1975. Zaroulis, N. C., and Gerald Sullivan. Who Spoke Up? American Protest against the War in Vietnam, 1963–1975. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1984.
IRON HAND, Operation See Wild Weasels
IRVING, Operation
Iron Triangle The Iron Triangle was a Viet Cong (VC) base area and sanctuary located 15 miles north of Saigon (present-day Ho Chi Minh City). Comprising about 125 square miles of scrub jungle and rice paddies, the triangle was bounded on the east by National Highway 13 and the Thi Thanh River and on the southwest by the Saigon River. The thick jungle area nicknamed the Trapezoid west and north of Ben Cat and the Thanh Dien forest lay across the northern side of the triangle. The villages of Ben Suc at the northwest corner, Ben Cat at the northeast corner, and Phu Cuong at the southeast corner marked the points of the triangle. Ben Suc was for a time the location of the VC’s Military Region IV headquarters, which was responsible for the area in and around the city of Saigon. In January 1967 Operation CEDAR FALLS was launched to eliminate the Iron Triangle as a VC base area. The native residents were evacuated, villages were razed, hundreds of acres of jungle were cut back by Rome plows, and the tunnel systems lying underneath were destroyed. The Iron Triangle became a wasteland under the surveillance of U.S. bombers and artillery. This did not keep the Communists from returning there, however.
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By 1995 the Iron Triangle area had been resettled, the village of Ben Suc on the Saigon River was again a thriving fishing and agricultural area, and the jungle had reclaimed the wasteland. JOHN F. VOTAW See also Ben Suc; CEDAR FALLS, Operation; Geography of Indochina and Vietnam; National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam References Schulzinger, Robert D. A Time for War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941–1975. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. Summers, Harry G., Jr. The Vietnam War Almanac. New York: Ballantine, 1985. Westmoreland, William C. A Soldier Reports. New York: Doubleday, 1976.
IRVING,
Operation
Start Date: October 1, 1966 End Date: October 24, 1966 Military operation in October 1966 between U.S. Army and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army)
Troops check for Communist soldiers during a patrol in Qui Nhon, South Vietnam. More than 1,000 People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) troops and members of the Viet Cong infrastructure were captured by U.S. and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) soldiers during Operation IRVING in October 1966. (National Archives)
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IRVING, Operation
forces and the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army). Operation IRVING occurred during October 1–24 in an area of southeastern Binh Dinh Province bounded by the South China Sea, the Phu Cat Mountains to the south, and the Mieu Mountains to the north. Technically an extension of Operation THAYER I, which began in September, IRVING developed as units of the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) forced the 18th Regiment of the PAVN 3rd Division to retreat from the Kim Son Valley east to the densely populated coastal plain. As elements of the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA, South Korean Army) Capital Division and the ARVN 22nd Division moved into blocking positions from the south, a reconnaissance team of the U.S. 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry (1-9 Cavalry), discovered an unknown number of entrenched PAVN forces. Supported by artillery, helicopter gunships, and naval gunfire, five battalions of the 1st Cavalry Division’s 1st and 3rd brigades were inserted by air from the west and north. They immediately found themselves engaged in pitched battles with heavily armed soldiers of the PAVN 18th Regiment and a local Viet Cong (VC) force. The heaviest fighting occurred when Lieutenant Colonel James T. Root Jr.’s 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry (1-12 Infantry), entrapped several companies of the 7th and 8th battalions of the PAVN 18th Regiment in the coastal village of Hoa Hoi. As the 1st Cavalry Division’s 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry (1-5 Cavalry), was inserted to complete the encirclement, hundreds of civilians were permitted to exit the village safely. In the ensuing battle, 1st Cavalry infantry and artillery killed more than 200 Communist troops while themselves suffering only 3 dead and 29 wounded.
During its 23-day duration, IRVING produced 681 known Communist casualties and more than 1,000 prisoners identified as PAVN regulars or members of the VC infrastructure, the first time in a 1st Cavalry operation that the number of captured outnumbered those killed. Remarkably, 1st Cavalry forces suffered fewer than 40 killed or wounded. An intensive psychological warfare effort by civic action teams generated more than 10,000 refugees, while only 10 civilians died. At the time, IRVING was recognized as a brilliant display of air mobility. To that date, it was the most successful combined operation for the 1st Cavalry Division working with allied forces. Nevertheless, the remaining units of the PAVN 18th Regiment were able to exfiltrate to the Kim Son and Suoi Ca areas. During Operation THAYER II that followed, 1st Cavalry Division troops failed to track down these units, but they did uncover caches of nearly 100 weapons, 170,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition, and several tons of rice. JOHN D. ROOT See also Air Mobility; Korea, Republic of; MASHER/WHITE WING, Operation; PERSHING, Operation; Psychological Warfare Operations; Vietnam, Republic of, Army References Marshall, S. L. A. The Fields of Bamboo. New York: Dial, 1967. Stanton, Shelby L. Anatomy of a Division: The 1st Cav in Vietnam. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1987. Tolson, John J. Airmobility, 1961–1971. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1973.
J Jackson State College Shootings Event Date: May 14, 1970 Predominant African American academic institution and site of unrest that resulted in the deaths of two students. On May 14, 1970, 10 days after the tragic killings at Kent State University, a similar incident took place at Jackson State College, located in Jackson, Mississippi. Jackson State College had been founded in 1877 as a private seminary for African Americans. In 1940 the State of Mississippi assumed control of the school, and its chief mission became one of educating primary and secondary school teachers. In the 1950s its curriculum was broadened to include numerous other disciplines and a graduate program. The school officially became Jackson State College in 1956. In 1974 its name again changed to Jackson State University in acknowledgment of its wider curriculum and numerous graduate programs. Since 1965 there had been instability each spring at Jackson State. The issues were antiwar protests, racial injustice, and alleged harassment of students by white motorists on Lynch Street, the major thoroughfare that divided the campus and linked western Jackson to downtown. During May 14–15, 1970, Jackson State students were protesting these issues as well as the May 4, 1970, tragedy at Kent State University in Ohio. After two nights of campus demonstrations, a violent confrontation occurred on May 14, 1970, sparked by a rumor that Fayette, Mississippi, mayor Charles Evers (brother of slain civil rights activist Medgar Evers) and his wife had been shot and killed. A group of nonstudents began throwing rocks at white motorists on Lynch Street, which bisected the campus. Student demonstrators then set several fires and overturned a dump truck left on campus during a construction project. Jackson firefighters extinguishing the fires
requested police backup support when they were harangued by demonstrators. Claiming that they had come under fire from a sniper, police and state highway patrolmen fired into a dormitory, killing 2 students and wounding 12 others. Twenty-eight seconds of gunfire left Phillip Gibbs, a married 20-year-old junior and father of an 18-month-old son, dead from a shotgun blast, while James Earl Green, a high school student, was slain after trying to escape across nearby Lynch Street. No warning had been given, and despite a thorough investigation by the Commission on Campus Unrest, no evidence was ever found of student sniping that might have justified the killings. This incident at Jackson State, coupled with the Kent State shootings and protests on other college campuses across the country, exacerbated an already tumultuous situation. Although students at Jackson State were concerned about racial injustice and the war in Vietnam, according to the college’s president there were no large-scale civil rights or antiwar organizations on the campus. The Jackson State incident is significant because it evoked little national attention, unlike Kent State. More importantly, the shootings at Jackson State had a long-term effect, as many Americans believed that the killing of black students was not taken as seriously as that of whites. J. NATHAN CAMPBELL See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Kent State University Shootings References President’s Commission on Campus Unrest. Report of the President’s Commission on Campus Unrest. New York: Arno, 1970. Spofford, Tim. Lynch Street: The May 1970 Slayings at Jackson State College. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1988.
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JACKSTAY, Operation
JACKSTAY,
Operation
Start Date: March 26, 1966 End Date: April 7, 1966 Major U.S. Navy and Marine Corps amphibious operation and the first involving forces of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Operation JACKSTAY occurred in the Rung Sat Special Zone during March 26–April 7, 1966. The Rung Sat Special Zone was an area of some 300 square miles of swampy land and canals on either side of the Saigon River, the vital logistics link between the city of Saigon (present-day Ho Chi Minh City) and the sea. The Rung Sat was largely inundated at high tide. The operation involved the Seventh Fleet’s Special Landing Force as well as other U.S. marine, navy, army units and South Vietnamese navy and marine units. In early 1966 the Communists secured practical control of the Rung Sat Special Zone, as was demonstrated in attacks against merchant shipping en route to Saigon in the Saigon River in late February and early March. The last of these occurred on March 2, when the Panamanian transport Paloma was attacked and set afire. As a result of the attacks, the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), requested that the Seventh Fleet’s Special Landing Force be committed to an operation in the Rung Sat Special Zone for a duration of about 10 days. Planning for the operation began on March 10, 1966, at the Naval Advisory Group headquarters at MACV. The operation commenced on March 26 with a landing on the Long Thanh peninsula some 30 miles southeast of Saigon. The naval force assigned was the Seventh Fleet’s Ready Amphibious Force consisting of the flagship USS Princeton (the former aircraft carrier CV-37 and now designated helicopter carrier LPH5), the Alamo (LSD-33), and the Pickaway (APA-222). Supporting were the Weiss (APD-135), with an underwater demolition team embarked; the Merrick (AKA-97); the Henry County (LST-824); the Washoe County (LST-1165); and the Reclaimer (ARS-42). The guided missile destroyer Robinson (DDG-12) provided naval gunfire support, while aircraft from the carrier Hancock (CVA-19) provided regular air support. Following the initial landing, U.S. forces carried out a large number of helicopter and surface landings in the Rung Sat. Ships in the river and coastal patrol craft supported these. JACKSTAY was the most southerly commitment of U.S. forces in Vietnam to that point. The operation is also significant as the first joint U.S.–South Vietnamese amphibious operation of the war, for on March 31 Republic of Vietnam Navy (VNN, South Vietnamese Navy) River Assault Groups provided screening and minesweeping escort for U.S. marines in landing craft in a 24-boat convoy that worked its way seven miles down the narrow Vam Sat River in what was JACKSTAY’s deepest penetration. The extraction of the U.S. marines on April 7 effectively signaled the end of JACKSTAY. The operation resulted in the capture and destruction of three Communist base areas serving a reported
A U.S. Navy gunner mans his .50-caliber machine gun on a utility boat during a patrol in the Rung Sat Special Zone southeast of Saigon during Operation JACKSTAY, March 26, 1966. (National Archives)
1,000 Viet Cong (VC). Sixty-six weapons were recovered along with stocks of rice and fresh water. Announced casualties were 63 VC dead against U.S. casualties of 5 killed, 2 missing, and 25 wounded. Although the Rung Sat was only temporarily cleared and not held, the marines had demonstrated their ability to move freely in the area and thus reduced the threat to the river lifeline to Saigon. Following Operation JACKSTAY, allied river craft maintained a regular presence and carried out patrols in the Rung Sat. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Riverine Warfare; United States Marine Corps; United States Navy; Vietnam, Republic of, Marine Corps References Christopher, Ralph. Duty Honor Sacrifice: Brown Water Sailors and Army River Raiders. Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2007. Shulimson, Jack. U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1966: An Expanding War. Marine Corps Vietnam Series. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Marine Corps Historical Center, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters, 1982.
James, Daniel, Jr.
Jacobson, George D. Birth Date: 1913 Death Date: May 18, 1989 U.S. Army officer and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) official. George D. Jacobson joined the U.S. Army in 1941 and served with an armored cavalry unit in France and Germany during World War II. He arrived in Vietnam in 1954 as a special assistant to U.S. Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) commander Major General John W. (“Iron Mike”) O’Daniel, and by 1962 Jacobson headed MAAG’s Organization and Training Division under Lieutenant General Charles J. Timmes. Jacobson retired from the army as a colonel in 1964 and arranged the following year to work for USAID on pacification projects. At the time of the 1968 Tet Offensive, he was coordinator of the Mission Council. After the Tet Offensive, Jacobson held a key position in the pacification program as assistant chief of staff for CORDS under William Colby. Jacobson succeeded Colby as head of CORDS in 1971. After the Paris Peace Accords of 1973, Jacobson served as special assistant to the ambassador for Field Operations, the successor organization to CORDS. Jacobson was known for his coolness under pressure. During the Tet Offensive, a Viet Cong (VC) raiding party entered the U.S. embassy compound in Saigon, trapping him alone in his residence on the embassy grounds. With a pistol that a military police officer tossed to him through a window, Jacobson, in an exchange of gunfire at point-blank range, shot and killed the VC guerrilla who was stalking him. Jacobson was one of the last Americans to leave Saigon in April 1975. He died in Washington, D.C., on May 18, 1989. RICHARD A. HUNT See also Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support; Colby, William Egan; Military Assistance and Advisory Group, Vietnam; O’Daniel, John Wilson; Pacification; Tet Offensive, Overall Strategy; Tet Offensive and the Saigon Circle; United States Agency for International Development References Hunt, Richard A. Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts and Minds. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995. Oberdorfer, Don. TET! The Turning Point in the Vietnam War. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001. Sheehan, Neil. A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam. New York: Random House, 1988.
James, Daniel, Jr. Birth Date: February 11, 1920 Death Date: February 25, 1978 U.S. Air Force combat pilot in Korea and Vietnam and America’s first African American full (four-star) general. Born the last in a
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family of 17 children in Pensacola, Florida, on February 11, 1920, Daniel “Chappie” James Jr. graduated from Washington High School in 1937. He earned a bachelor’s degree from Tuskegee Institute in Alabama in 1942 along with his pilot’s license under the Civilian Pilot Training Program. He served as a flight instructor for Army Air Corps cadets until being accepted into the Army Aviation Cadet program in January 1943. Commissioned a second lieutenant in the U.S. Army in July 1943, James received fighter pilot training. During the last two years of World War II he trained fighter pilots. He also participated in a black officers’ civil rights sit-in at the white officers’ club at Freeman Field in Seymour, Indiana, in April 1945. In 1949 James became flight leader in the 12th Fighter Bomber Squadron in the Philippines. Captain James flew 101 combat missions during the Korean War before being assigned in July 1951 to a fighter squadron in Massachusetts; he was also promoted to major. James then attended the Air Command and Staff School at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, during 1956–1957. In 1957 he moved to Washington as a staff officer in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. This was followed by a succession of command and staff appointments. In 1967 James, as vice commander of the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing in Thailand, flew 78 combat missions over the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). He returned to the United States briefly in 1969, but in August he took command of Wheelus Air Force Base in Libya, the largest American air base outside of the United States. He proved adept at handling relations with the military junta that had just seized control of the country. In March 1970 James, by then a brigadier general, was assigned to the Pentagon as deputy assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, a job that required him to talk to students on college campuses throughout the country during the height of the Vietnam War protests. James’s rhetoric and booming voice made him an eloquent spokesman. He was promoted to three-star rank and in 1974 became vice commander of the Military Airlift Command at Scott Air Base in Illinois. In 1975 James was promoted to fourstar general and was assigned as commander in chief of the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) at Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado, where he was responsible for the operational command of all U.S. and Canadian strategic aerospace defense forces. James retired from the U.S. Air Force in early February 1978 and shortly thereafter suffered a fatal heart attack in Colorado Springs, Colorado, on February 25, 1978. LAURA MATYSEK WOOD See also African Americans in the U.S. Military References Berger, Carl, ed. The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, 1961– 1973: An Illustrated Account. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1977.
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Japan
U.S. Air Force general Daniel “Chappie” James Jr. was the first African American to achieve the rank of full (four-star) general. Throughout his long career, sometimes laced with racism, James never swerved from what he deemed the 11th Commandment: “Thou shalt not quit.” James is shown here in the Cheyenne Mountain command post in 1976. (Department of Defense)
Phelps, J. Alfred. Chappie, America’s First Black Four Star General: The Life and Times of Daniel James, Jr. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1991.
Japan East Asian nation with a 1968 population of 101,961 million people. Japan encompasses 145,883 square miles and is an archipelago separated from the east coast of Asia by the Sea of Japan. The island nation also borders the Pacific Ocean to the east and the Philippine Sea and the East China Sea to the south and southwest. Japan is a constitutional monarchy; however, the emperor’s function is largely symbolic and ceremonial. The head of government, the prime minister, wields most of the executive power. He is selected by the emperor based upon the makeup of political power in the Diet (Japanese parliament). The Japanese political landscape features a multiparty system in which the major political parties either seek a majority in the Diet or form alliances to attain a working majority. Japan had a considerable impact on the Vietnam conflict both before and during the critical years of U.S. involvement. The Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) forever de-
molished the image of European military invincibility and inspired Asian nationalists everywhere, including those in Vietnam. During their occupation of Vietnam in World War II, the Japanese provided an additional, if unintentional, boost to Vietnamese nationalism. Also, protection of Japan and its access to markets was a major factor in the U.S. decision to intervene in Vietnam after the French withdrawal. Finally, Japan served as a critical staging area for U.S. forces in the prosecution of the Vietnam War, while Japanese companies provided U.S. armed forces with supplies, ranging from body bags to chewing gum, that averaged $1 billion per year between 1966 and 1971. The Viet Minh formed as a nationalistic front in the wake of Japan’s seizure of Southeast Asia in 1940. Although many Vietnamese nationalists welcomed the Japanese as liberators, Ho Chi Minh and the Vietnamese Communists were as wary of Japanese imperialism as they were of French colonialism. The Viet Minh deliberately masked its Communist roots to appeal to the broad patriotic feelings stirred up in the Vietnamese people by the Japanese. As a result, the Viet Minh established itself as the principal organ of Vietnamese resistance and nationalism during World War II and after. The Viet Minh gathered popular support, gained experience as the de facto government of several provinces, and sharpened
Jaunissement guerrilla techniques that later proved successful against the French and the Americans. Although the well-disciplined Japanese soldiers rarely committed crimes against individual Vietnamese, many Vietnamese blamed the Japanese Army for the 1945 famine in Tonkin that killed an estimated several million people. Indeed, the famine resulted in large part from the Japanese requisitions of large amounts of rice and ordering farmers to grow jute instead of rice. Following Japan’s surrender at the end of World War II in 1945, hundreds of Japanese soldiers joined the victorious Viet Minh forces rather than surrender to Allied forces. Japanese deserters made important contributions to the fledgling Viet Minh armed forces by serving as military trainers, tactical advisers, and reconnaissance and heavy weapons specialists up through 1950, when Chinese Communist military advisers began arriving to assist Viet Minh forces. After the signing of the 1954 Geneva Accords, those who survived were repatriated to Japan, where several (including Koshiro Iwai and Nakahara Mitsunobu) became prominent supporters of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). After World War II, Japan became the most important Asian ally of the United States and as such also provided a major rationale for U.S. intervention. During the Cold War, the U.S. antiSoviet containment policy predicted that Southeast Asian states would fall like dominoes if only one went the way of China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea). American leaders argued that intervention was necessary to protect Japan and to maintain access—for both the United States and Japan—to neighboring resources and markets. Japan served as a vital staging area for U.S. forces in Vietnam, providing ports, repair and rebuild facilities, supply dumps, airports, and hospitals critical to the U.S. military effort. Despite a growing Japanese protest movement, the United States used the bases provided by the 1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty to dispatch troops and supplies to the war zone. The United States interpreted the terms of the security treaty as broadly as possible to support almost unrestricted operations out of the 88 U.S. bases in Japan. Although Article IX of the Japanese Constitution prohibited direct Japanese involvement in the Vietnam War, Tokyo tolerated Washington’s approach because Japanese businesses reaped huge profits by supplying U.S. forces both directly, with a broad range of supplies, and indirectly, with weapon components and ammunition. NOEL D. FULTON See also Domino Theory; Korea, Republic of; Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; United States, Involvement in Indochina through 1954; United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1954–1965; United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1965–1968; United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1969–1973; United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1973–1975; United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1975–Present; Viet Minh
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References Blaker, Michael, ed. Development Assistance to Southeast Asia: The U.S. and Japanese Approaches. New York: Columbia University Press, East Asian Institute, 1984. Gordon, Andrew, ed. Postwar Japan as History. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993. Goscha, Christopher E. “Belated Allies: The Technical and Military Contributions of Japanese Deserters to the Viet Minh (1945–1950).” In A Companion to the Vietnam War, edited by Marilyn B. Young and Robert Buzzanco, 37–64. Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2006. Havens, Thomas R. Fire across the Sea: The Vietnam War and Japan 1965–1975. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987. Ministry of Defense. Tu Dien Bach Khoa Quan Su Viet Nam [Vietnamese Military History Encyclopedia]. Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1996.
Jaunissement French term used to describe the Vietnamization of the 1946– 1954 Indochina War. The Elysée Agreements of March 8, 1949, had called for the creation of a Vietnamese National Army. Paris lauded this as proof that Vietnam was independent, and the agreement helped convince Washington that the war in Indochina had been transformed into a civil war between Vietnamese democrats and Vietnamese Communists rather than being a colonial conflict. Proof that the new State of Vietnam was not independent is evident in the fact that the Vietnamese National Army was completely controlled and officered by the French. The French attitude was shown by French commander in chief in Indochina General Marcel Carpentier when he told U.S. major general Graves B. Erskine that Vietnamese troops would not make good soldiers and were not to be trusted on their own. Erskine said that he replied, “General Carpentier, who in hell are you fighting but Vietnamese?” The French also insisted that all U.S. military support be channeled only to the French. Carpentier said that if this was not done he would resign within 24 hours. Carpentier’s successor, General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, pushed le jaunissement, creating wholly Vietnamese units commanded by Vietnamese officers. At the same time, however, he was adamant that France retain overall authority and that the United States channel all aid through the French authorities in Indochina. Perhaps it was already too late. Hopes of the French attracting nationalists to their cause had already been lost, as most Vietnamese nationalists rallied to the Viet Minh. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Carpentier, Marcel; France, Army, 1946–1954; French Indochina, 1860s–1946; Lattre de Tassigny, Jean de References Hammer, Ellen J. The Struggle for Indochina. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1954. Spector, Ronald H. Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941–1960. United States Army in Vietnam Series. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1983.
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Javits, Jacob Koppel Birth Date: May 18, 1904 Death Date: March 7, 1986 U.S. senator and sponsor of the 1973 War Powers Act that restricted presidential war-making authority. Born in New York City on May 18, 1904, Jacob Koppel Javits received a law degree from New York City University in 1927 and then practiced law. He served with the U.S. Army in World War II and afterward won election to the U.S. House of Representatives from New York City as a Republican in 1946. In 1954 he was elected New York State attorney general. In 1956 Javits won election to the U.S. Senate from New York. A skillful politician, a natural negotiator, and a liberal when it was acceptable within the Republican Party, Javits relied on solid support in New York City. Two of his favorite issues were civil rights and presidential war-making powers. Javits was the leading Senate Republican critic of the Vietnam War. He voted for both the Cooper-Church Amendment and the Hatfield-McGovern Amendment. In 1970 following the allied incursion into Cambodia, Javits sponsored legislation to restrict presidential war-making authority. What became known as the War Powers Act, passed on November 7, 1973, over President Richard M. Nixon’s veto, requires
that the president consult with Congress before military forces are sent into combat abroad or to areas where hostilities are likely and to report in writing within 48 hours after troops are deployed. The president must then terminate the use of military force within 60 to 90 days. Deployment can continue for another 60 days and for an additional 30 days beyond that if the president certifies to Congress in writing that the safety of the force so requires. Unless Congress authorizes a continuation, through a declaration of war, a concurrent resolution, or other appropriate legislation, the deployment cannot be continued beyond 90 days. Javits explained the reasons behind the act in his 1970 book Who Makes War: The President versus Congress. In 1980 Javits lost his reelection bid in the New York Republican primary. He died in West Palm Beach, Florida, on March 7, 1986, of a heart attack brought on by amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (Lou Gehrig’s disease). SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Church, Frank Forrester; Cooper, John Sherman; Cooper-Church Amendment; Fulbright, James William; Hatfield, Mark Odom; Hatfield-McGovern Amendment; Kennedy, Edward Moore; Mansfield, Michael Joseph; McGovern, George Stanley; Morse, Wayne Lyman References Fisher, Louis. Presidential War Power. Rev. ed. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004. Javits, Jacob K., with Donald Kellerman. Who Makes War: The President versus Congress. New York: William Morrow, 1973. Javits, Jacob K., with Rafael Steinberg. Javits: The Autobiography of a Public Man. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981. Stern, Gary M., and Morton Halperin, ed. The U.S. Constitution and the Power to Go to War: Historical and Current Perspectives. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1994.
JEFFERSON GLENN,
Operation
Start Date: September 5, 1970 End Date: October 8, 1971
Jacob Javits served longer in the U.S. Senate than any other New York congressman, from 1956 to 1981. He was the leading Republican critic of the Vietnam War in the Senate and introduced the War Powers Resolution in 1970. (U.S. Senate)
Last major U.S. ground combat operation of the Vietnam War. Following the early 1971 failure of Operation LAM SON 719, the U.S. 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) gradually disengaged from aggressive field operations in accordance with the decreasing combat role of U.S. ground forces. On September 5, 1970, however, three battalions from the 101st Airborne Division inaugurated Operation JEFFERSON GLENN, establishing fire-support bases in the coastal lowlands of Thua Thien Province. Their objective was to shield both Thua Thien and Quang Tri provinces by patrolling the so-called Communist rocket belts that threatened critical installations. As JEFFERSON GLENN continued, the 101st Airborne Division gradually disengaged and turned the fighting over to Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) troops. The 101st
Jiang Jieshi
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Airborne Division and the ARVN 1st Infantry Division claimed a total of 2,026 casualties inflicted on People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) and Viet Cong (VC) forces before JEFFERSON GLENN was finally terminated on October 8, 1971. EDWARD C. PAGE See also Airborne Operations; Air Mobility; LAM SON 719, Operation; Vietnamization References Fulghum, David, and Terrence Maitland. South Vietnam on Trial, Mid-1970 to 1972. The Vietnam Experience Series. Boston: Boston Publishing, 1984. Stanton, Shelby L. The Rise and Fall of an American Army: The U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985.
Jiang Jieshi Birth Date: October 30, 1887 Death Date: April 5, 1975 Chinese general, leader of the Guomindang (GMD, Nationalists), and president of the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan). Born to a merchant family on October 30, 1887, at Xikou, Fenghua County, Zhejiang Province, in eastern China, Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) was determined to become a military officer. He passed the competitive entrance examinations and began his military instruction in 1906 at China’s prestigious Baoding (Paoting) Military Academy in Hebei Province. He was then selected by the faculty to go to Japan to attend the Preparatory Military Academy in Tokyo. While in Tokyo, Jiang met several key members of China’s revolutionary party, the Tongmenghui (Dongmenghui, Alliance Society or United League), and developed the political and military associations that would involve him over the next several years in the founding and consolidation of the ROC in the aftermath of the 1911 revolution. His military prowess and political sense eventually led to his leadership role in the military arm of the GMD. In 1924 Jiang became the commandant of the GMD’s Whampoa Military Academy in Guangzhou (Canton). Upon the death of GMD leader Sun Yixian (Sun Yat-sen) in 1925, Jiang’s influence in the party increased, and he became the leader of the GMD. He purged the Communists from the GMD, culminating in the 1927 Shanghai Massacre. With the success of his Northern Expedition during 1926 and 1927 against the weak government in Beijing (Peking) and various powerful warlords, Jiang not only consolidated his power as the leader of the GMD but in 1928 also reunited northern and southern China and established a republican government in Nanjing. Jiang then worked to cement his power. After the 1937 beginning of the Sino-Japanese War, Jiang’s government was forced by the Japanese to retreat from Nanjing to the more defensible city of Chongqing in Sichuan Province. Jiang then formed a temporary anti-Japanese United Front with Mao Zedong,
Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), the pre-Communist leader of China. Jiang and his Nationalist Party supporters were forced to flee the mainland for Taiwan in 1949 when the Communists came to power under Mao Zedong. Jieshi ruled Taiwan until his death in 1975. (Library of Congress)
leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). With the end of World War II, however, civil war erupted in 1945 between the two parties. Jiang’s refusal to institute reforms until after the war was won was a major factor in the Communist victory in the autumn of 1949. The Nationalists fled mainland China to the island of Taiwan, where Jiang served as president of the rump ROC government until his death in 1975. The October 1949 proclamation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) had a direct impact on the Viet Minh’s struggle for Vietnam because China could now provide the Vietnamese nationalists with a secure base area and a steady stream of supplies. After the Korean War began in June 1950, the United States took measures to safeguard Jiang’s regime on Taiwan and thereafter sold it substantial quantities of military hardware. The Americans also pledged to protect Taiwan from Chinese aggression into the early 1970s until warming relations between Beijing and Washington forced at least a rhetorical change in U.S. policy. Thereafter the United States attempted to distance itself from Taiwan, and in 1979 President Jimmy Carter terminated official U.S. recognition of the ROC. In August 1958 fierce fighting broke out between China and Taiwan over the tiny islands of Quemoy and Matsu, located in the Taiwan Strait. These islands were the Nationalist government’s
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closest military strongholds to the Chinese mainland. Although this struggle quickly ended in stalemate, it proved that China was willing to support a more aggressive military policy against Taiwan. This military confrontation increased concern in the United States that China might also adopt a more expansionist foreign policy in Southeast Asia. When China increased its aid to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) during the 1960s, Jiang publicly accused Mao Zedong of trying to use the Vietnamese conflict to divert U.S. military forces away from China. According to Jiang, final resolution of the Vietnam War could only be brought about if the United States helped the Nationalists take mainland China from the Communists, of which Washington wanted no part. Jiang also embraced the socalled domino theory, warning that if Vietnam fell to the Communists, other Southeast Asian countries would soon follow. Meanwhile, thanks to U.S. aid and support, Jiang was able to build a modern and prosperous free-market economy, which permitted him to put in place political and agricultural reforms that earned him renewed credibility in the international arena. Regardless, Jiang’s rule still bordered on dictatorial, and true political freedom on Taiwan did not blossom until after his death. Although Jiang did not play a direct political or military role in the Vietnam War, Taiwan became an important Pacific base for the United States. Taiwanese industry provided essential goods and services to the American military. Finally, Taiwan was a popular rest and relaxation (R&R) destination for GIs on leave from Vietnam. Jiang died in Taipei, Taiwan, on April 5, 1975. BRUCE ELLEMAN See also Carter, James Earl, Jr.; China, People’s Republic of; China, Republic of; Chinese in Vietnam; Domino Theory; Mao Zedong References Chiang Kai-shek. Soviet Russia in China. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1957. Crozier, Brian. The Man Who Lost China: The First Full Biography of Chiang Kai-shek. New York: Scribner, 1976. Fenby, Jonathan. Chiang Kai-Shek: China’s Generalissimo and the Nation He Lost. New York: Da Capo, 2005. Fenby, Jonathan. Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-Shek and the China He Lost. London: Free Press, 2003. Hu Pu-yu. The Military Exploits and Deeds of President Chiang Kai-shek. Taipei, Taiwan: Chung Wu Publishing, 1971. Loh, Pichon. The Early Chiang Kai-shek. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971.
Johnson, Harold Keith Birth Date: February 22, 1912 Death Date: September 24, 1983 U.S. Army chief of staff (1964–1968). Born on February 22, 1912, in Bowesmont, North Dakota, Harold Keith Johnson graduated from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, in 1933 and was
commissioned a second lieutenant of infantry. In 1938 he graduated from the Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia. On the eve of World War II, he was stationed in the Philippines with a regiment of Philippine Scouts. He assumed battalion command shortly before U.S. and Filipino forces there were overwhelmed by the invading Japanese. Taken prisoner, Johnson survived the infamous Bataan Death March. He then spent three and a half years in a succession of prison camps and was close to death when liberation came. After World War II Johnson fought his way back to professional prominence, earning the Distinguished Service Cross as a regimental commander early in the Korean War. In 1953 he graduated from the Naval War College and in 1956 was promoted to brigadier general. He held a series of successively more responsible positions and in 1959 was promoted to major general. After serving as commandant of the Command and General Staff College for three years, in 1963 he was promoted to lieutenant general. In 1964 Johnson was selected from far down the list of lieutenant generals for promotion to four stars and assignment as army chief of staff at a most critical point, when American involvement in Vietnam began to accelerate. It fell to Johnson to manage a huge and rapid expansion of the army for the war. To do this without resorting to the mobilization of reserve forces proved a daunting task that he handled with characteristic energy and conscientiousness. Publicly, Johnson supported General William Westmoreland’s tactics and repeated requests for additional troops, but negative findings in a study that Johnson had ordered in the spring of 1965—the Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam (PROVN)—reinforced his own misgivings about how the war was being conducted, and he worked behind the scenes to get the tactics changed, the commander replaced, or both. When General Creighton Abrams took over the top post in Vietnam in 1968, he essentially put into effect PROVN’s findings, with results that vindicated Johnson’s judgment. Widely admired for his dedication and ethical standards, Johnson retired from military service in 1968 and for several years headed the Freedoms Foundation at Valley Forge, Pennsylvania. He died of cancer in Washington, D.C., on September 24, 1983. LEWIS SORLEY See also Abrams, Creighton Williams, Jr.; United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1965–1968; Westmoreland, William Childs References Johnson, Harold K. Challenge: Compendium of Army Accomplishment; A Report by the Chief of Staff, July 1964–April 1968. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, July 1, 1968. McMaster, H. R. Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam. New York: HarperCollins, 1997. Sorley, Lewis. Honorable Warrior: General Harold K. Johnson and the Ethics of Command. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998. Sorley, Lewis. Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times. 2nd ed. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008.
Johnson, Lyndon Baines
Johnson, Lyndon Baines Birth Date: August 27, 1908 Death Date: January 22, 1973 Congressman, senator, vice president, and president (1963–1969) of the United States. Born in Stonewall in the Texas Hill country near Austin on August 27, 1908, Lyndon Baines Johnson became secretary to Texas congressman Richard Kleburg following graduation from Southwest Texas State Teachers College in 1930. President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed Johnson Texas administrator of the National Youth Administration in 1935. Two years later he won election to the U.S. House of Representatives. He served very briefly in the U.S. Navy during World War II and in 1948 was elected to the U.S. Senate. In 1953 he became Senate minority leader and in 1955 became Senate majority leader. As minority leader during the 1954 Dien Bien Phu crisis, Johnson opposed unilateral U.S. intervention. Later, despite opposition from other southerners in the Senate, he was instrumental in securing passage of the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960. He sought the Democratic nomination for the 1960 presidential election but lost to Massachusetts senator John F. Kennedy, who chose Johnson as his vice presidential running mate largely to help balance the
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ticket. Following Kennedy’s assassination on November 22, 1963, Johnson took the oath of office aboard the presidential plane, Air Force One. As president Johnson tried to establish what he termed “the Great Society,” an ambitious program of civil rights legislation and social welfare programs. Using his considerable legislative skill and the reverence attached to the memory of the slain Kennedy, Johnson won passage of the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964. He declared a “War on Poverty” and secured passage of the Economic Opportunity Act. Soundly defeating Republican senator Barry Goldwater in the 1964 presidential race, Johnson used his popularity and the large Democratic majority in Congress to push through the Medicare Act of 1965, federal aid to education, increased funds for the War on Poverty, and enactment of consumer protection laws and environmental protection laws. In 1965 Johnson personally appeared before Congress to urge passage of the Voting Rights Act. The act became law that same year. Johnson was less deft and less successful in foreign relations, however. In January 1964 Panamanians rioted against the U.S. presence there and demanded U.S. withdrawal. Skirmishes with U.S. soldiers resulted in the deaths of 4 U.S. soldiers and 20 Panamanians. The Panamanian government then broke relations with
U.S. president Lyndon B. Johnson greets American troops in Vietnam in 1966. The Vietnam War shaped Johnson’s entire presidency and overshadowed his considerable achievements in domestic policy. (National Archives)
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Results of the 1964 U.S. Presidential Election Popular Vote Candidate Lyndon Baines Johnson Barry Morris Goldwater Eric Hass Other candidates
Party
Electoral Votes
Number
Percentage
Democratic Republican Socialist Labor Various
486 52 0 0
43,127,041 27,175,754 45,189 303,314
61.1% 38.5% 0.0% 0.4%
the United States for three months. In April 1965 Johnson ordered the landing of 20,000 U.S. troops in the Dominican Republic, fearing that Dominican internal strife posed a danger to Americans there and might result in a Communist takeover. During the June 1967 Six-Day War, Israeli jets attacked the U.S. intelligence ship USS Liberty off the Sinai coast, killing 10 crew members and wounding 100. The Six-Day War also produced strained relations with the Soviet Union, which supported the Arab states. Johnson made an effort to thaw the Cold War in a meeting to discuss nuclear weapons and other issues with Soviet premier Aleksei Kosygin in Glassboro, New Jersey, in June 1967, but Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia led to postponement of substantive follow-up negotiations. It was the war in Vietnam, however, that consumed Johnson’s energy and ultimately his presidency. Johnson, who fervently believed in containment and the domino theory, saw Vietnam as a test of national resolve. His foreign policy advisers (many of them retained from the Kennedy administration) shared his views. Moreover, Johnson had been in Congress when China became Communist in 1949, and he vividly recalled the domestic political turmoil that followed as Republicans attacked Democrats for “losing” China. He informed one biographer that the fall of China to the Communists ended the effectiveness of the Harry S. Truman administration and was a factor in the rise of McCarthyism. Johnson would not, he vowed, “be the President who saw Southeast Asia go the way China went.” Soon after taking office, Johnson began escalating the war in Vietnam. In February 1964 he authorized Operation Plan (OPLAN) 34A, providing U.S. support for raids by forces of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). In April he appointed General William C. Westmoreland as U.S. commander in Vietnam. In June, Johnson replaced Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge with General Maxwell Taylor. Both Westmoreland and Taylor favored increased troop levels in Vietnam. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident of August 1964 was a crucial event in the war’s escalation. In retaliation for reported attacks on U.S. destroyers, President Johnson ordered bombing of North Vietnamese naval bases and oil depots. He also asked Congress to pass the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, authorizing him to take “all necessary measures to repel any armed attacks against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.” The measure passed the House by a vote of 416 to 0 and the Senate by a vote of 88
to 2, with dissenting votes by Democratic senators Ernest Gruening of Alaska and Wayne Morse of Oregon. There was virtually no floor debate on the resolution. In the years that followed, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was used to justify presidential war making in Vietnam. In February 1965 Johnson ordered retaliatory bombing of North Vietnam after Communist forces attacked U.S. military posts at Pleiku and Qui Nhon. When presidential adviser McGeorge Bundy, after a visit to Vietnam, warned Johnson that without increased U.S. action defeat appeared inevitable within a year, Johnson commenced Operation ROLLING THUNDER, regular (rather than reprisal) air strikes on North Vietnam. Along with intensified bombing came increased troop commitments. The same month that ROLLING THUNDER began, Westmoreland requested and received troop increases. In April 1965 Johnson approved Westmoreland’s request to use U.S. forces for offensive operations anywhere in South Vietnam. An important turning point came in July 1965, when Johnson announced that U.S. forces there would be increased from 75,000 to 125,000 men, with additional troops to be provided as Westmoreland requested them. The war now became increasingly Americanized. Before the close of Johnson’s presidency in January 1969, there were more than 500,000 U.S. troops in Vietnam. Johnson frequently expressed desire for peace. In a speech at Johns Hopkins University on April 7, 1965, he offered to open discussions and suggested a Southeast Asia economic development plan that would include North Vietnam. On May 10 he called the first of several bombing halts, but when Hanoi did not respond, air strikes resumed. In 1966 an attempt by Polish diplomat Janusz Lewandowski to initiate discussions between the countries, code-named Operation MARIGOLD, failed after several months’ effort. Speaking in San Antonio on September 29, 1967, Johnson offered to stop air and naval attacks on North Vietnam in exchange for a promise not to take advantage of the halt to infiltrate men and supplies into South Vietnam. Hanoi refused, insisting that discussions could not take place until the United States stopped bombing without conditions. The war had a devastating impact on Johnson’s Great Society program and the U.S. economy as a whole. The cost of the war forced steady cutbacks in programs and promoted inflation. Johnson agreed to a $6 billion budget reduction in nondefense spending in 1967 and the next year imposed a 10 percent tax surcharge. The U.S. international balance-of-payments deficit, not caused but rather aggravated by the war, and devaluation of the British pound in November 1967 contributed to a run on the U.S. dollar and a
Johnson, Lyndon Baines gold crisis in March 1968. The federal deficit grew from $8.7 billion in 1967 to $25.2 billion in 1968. By 1968, the Johnson administration suffered from a credibility gap resulting from public disillusion produced by falsely optimistic statements about the war. Opposition to the Vietnam War soon developed at home. College students and faculty members began teach-ins against the war in 1964, and they were joined by others as the war continued. Democratic senator J. William Fulbright of Arkansas, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, began hearings on the war in 1966. George F. Kennan, father of the containment doctrine, was among those who appeared before the committee to criticize the war. In October 1967, 100,000 war protestors gathered in Washington, D.C. Passionate debate also swirled inside the Johnson administration. Undersecretary of State George W. Ball opposed the war early on, informing Johnson in a meeting on July 21, 1965, that it would be “long and protracted with heavy casualties.” Ball continued to argue against escalation until he resigned in 1966. Presidential adviser Clark Clifford, in a letter dated May 17, 1965, cautioned Johnson to keep ground forces in Vietnam to a minimum and warned that the U.S. presence there could turn into a “quagmire.” In a conference at the presidential retreat at Camp David, Maryland, on July 25, 1965, Clifford argued that the United States could lose 50,000 troops and spend hundreds of billions of dollars in a war that could not be won. By the spring of 1967, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, once a proponent of escalation, recommended restricting bombing and limiting troop levels. He soon resigned in protest. These war critics were opposed by General Westmoreland and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), who continued to press for a more intensive ground war involving additional troops and increased bombing. It was during this period, in November 1967, that Johnson asked Clifford to arrange a meeting of a group of elder statesmen headed by Dean Acheson, subsequently dubbed the “Wise Men,” to advise him on Vietnam policy. In their meeting with the president on November 21, they offered divided opinions that bolstered Johnson’s determination to continue the war. The January 1968 Tet Offensive caused Johnson to reevaluate the war. When General Westmoreland requested another 205,000 troops after Tet to take the offensive against Communist forces, the president asked Clifford—who had just replaced McNamara as secretary of defense—to head a task force examining the request. The task force offered a dramatic reassessment of Vietnam, recommending only a 20,000-man increase there and urging increased responsibility for the war effort by the South Vietnamese government and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army). Johnson’s acceptance of the task force’s recommendations marked the first change in policy since escalation began in 1964. Preliminaries to the 1968 presidential election demonstrated the additional political costs of the Vietnam War. In the March 13, 1968, New Hampshire primary election, Senator Eugene McCarthy
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of Minnesota, running on an antiwar platform, won 42 percent of the Democratic vote, which was regarded as a defeat for the president (who was not officially entered in the primary). Soon afterward Senator Robert F. Kennedy entered the nomination race as an antiwar candidate. In a television address to the nation on March 31, Johnson announced a halt to naval and air attacks against North Vietnam except in the area just north of the demilitarized zone (DMZ). At the end of his speech he made the stunning announcement that he would neither seek nor accept the Democratic nomination for president. North Vietnam expressed willingness to enter peace talks, which began in May 1968 in Paris with the United States represented by W. Averell Harriman. On October 31 Johnson ordered a complete cessation of air and naval attacks on North Vietnam. The Paris talks, which bogged down in disagreements about the shape of the negotiating tables, proved inconclusive through the end of Johnson’s presidency. In the November presidential election, Richard Nixon narrowly defeated Vice President Hubert Humphrey in a decision that was seen as a referendum on “Johnson’s War.” Johnson retired to his Texas ranch following Nixon’s inauguration in January 1969. Vietnam continued to trouble him deeply. He told biographer Doris Kearns Goodwin that “I knew from the start that I was bound to be crucified either way I moved. If I left the woman I really loved—the Great Society—in order to get involved in that bitch of a war on the other side of the world, then I would lose everything at home. . . . But if I left that war and let the Communists take over South Vietnam, then I would be seen as a coward and my nation would be seen as an appeaser and we would both find it impossible to accomplish anything for anybody anywhere on the entire globe.” He also stated that part of his rationale for escalating the war was to win over the support of hawks, especially Republicans, for his Great Society legislation. Johnson died of a heart attack at his ranch near Stonewall, Texas, on January 22, 1973. KENNETH R. STEVENS See also Acheson, Dean Gooderham; Bundy, McGeorge; Clifford, Clark McAdams; Containment Policy; Domino Theory; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Fortas, Abraham; Fulbright, James William; Goldwater, Barry Morris; Gruening, Ernest Henry; Gulf of Tonkin Incident; Gulf of Tonkin Resolution; Humphrey, Hubert Horatio; Johnson, Lyndon Baines, Johns Hopkins University Speech; Kennan, George Frost; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Kennedy, Robert Francis; Kosygin, Aleksei Nikolayevich; Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr.; Manila Conference; MARIGOLD, Operation; McCarthy, Eugene Joseph; McCone, John Alex; McNamara, Robert Strange; Morse, Wayne Lyman; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Pearson, Lester Bowles; Project 100,000; ROLLING THUNDER, Operation; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; San Antonio Formula; Stevenson, Adlai Ewing, II; Taylor, Maxwell Davenport; Tet Offensive, Overall Strategy; Tet Offensive and the Saigon Circle; United Nations and the Vietnam War; United States Department of Justice; United States Joint Chiefs of Staff; Vietnam Information Group; Vietnamization; Westmoreland, William Childs; Wise Men
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References Barrett, David M. Uncertain Warriors: Lyndon Johnson and His Vietnam Advisers. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993. Berman, Larry. Lyndon Johnson’s War: The Road to Stalemate in Vietnam. New York: Norton, 1989. Berman, Larry. Planning a Tragedy: The Americanization of the War in Vietnam. New York: Norton, 1982. Gardner, Lloyd C. Pay Any Price: Lyndon Johnson and the Wars for Vietnam. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1995. Goldman, Eric F. The Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson. New York: Knopf, 1969. Goodwin, Doris Kearns. Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream. New York: Harper and Row, 1976. Herring, George C. LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994. Johnson, Lyndon B. The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963–1969. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971. Schandler, Herbert Y. The Unmaking of a President: Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977. VanDeMark, Brian. Into the Quagmire: Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation of the Vietnam War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.
Johnson, Lyndon Baines, Johns Hopkins University Speech Event Date: April 7, 1965 Televised address, sometimes referred to as the “Mekong Delta Speech,” by President Lyndon B. Johnson on April 7, 1965, that explained the U.S. military escalation in Vietnam. Johnson also offered to participate in discussions toward a peaceful resolution of the conflict and pledged $1 billion in aid for the development of the Mekong Delta. He had won a landslide victory in the November 1964 presidential election in part by depicting himself as a peaceful candidate running against a reckless warmonger, Republican senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona. Following attacks in early 1965 on a base at Pleiku in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) that killed eight American service members, Johnson approved Operation ROLLING THUNDER (March 1965–October 1968), a program of gradually intensifying air attacks against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). He also sent, for the first time, U.S. ground combat units to South Vietnam to protect airfields against reprisal attacks. These actions prompted criticism from abroad that Johnson had spurned proposals for a negotiated settlement to end the conflict in Vietnam. At home, critics in Congress, in the press, and on university campuses charged Johnson with moving recklessly beyond his predecessors’ more limited commitments. In their view, Johnson was getting the U.S. deeply involved in a civil war in South Vietnam, a country that was not vital to America’s national security. Moreover, they charged Johnson with needlessly provoking the People’s Republic of China (PRC) by sending U.S. troops close to its border. For Johnson, criticism of his Vietnam policy threat-
ened the political unity required to advance his cherished domestic reform agenda known as the Great Society. The president thus directed his staff to draft a speech that would either disarm or silence his critics. In his view, avoiding a domestic political debate over the escalation in Vietnam was essential to securing the passage of his proposed legislation. President Johnson delivered the speech on April 7, 1965, to a packed auditorium at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland, and a national audience on television estimated at more than 60 million people. In it he emphasized his determination to stand up to North Vietnamese aggression and asserted that he was not expanding the nation’s commitments abroad. He was, he insisted, merely keeping the promise made by his predecessors. Failing to uphold this promise, Johnson claimed, would embolden the nation’s enemies and shake the confidence of the nation’s friends and allies across the world. Johnson followed his pledge to defend South Vietnam with an offer to enter unconditional discussions with North Vietnam. Although he declared a willingness to enter talks, he also made it clear that he was unwilling to compromise on his fundamental objective of an independent non-Communist South Vietnam. Unsurprisingly, his offer was quickly rejected by the North Vietnamese government, which sought to unify the country under its rule. Significantly, the North Vietnamese rejection of what appeared to be a genuine offer of peace made escalation more palatable to the American public. Johnson’s speech included another proposal that linked his efforts abroad with his domestic political experience of using government aid as a positive force for economic change. He pledged $1 billion toward a Mekong River project. The project was an international program for the development of the Mekong Delta, an impoverished region in southwestern Vietnam that lacked electrification, clean water supplies, and industrial infrastructure. Johnson claimed that such a program could dwarf the Tennessee Valley Authority, an economic development agency created during the New Deal to use federal experts and electricity to rapidly modernize the region’s economy and society. The offer clearly reflected Johnson’s experience during the New Deal and his belief that electrification and rural development could reduce poverty and improve lives. His proposal for developing the Mekong Delta included pledges of medical and educational assistance along with the possibility of improved food sources, water, and power for the entire region. Although the North Vietnamese quickly rejected Johnson’s offer of negotiations without conditions and his economic development program for the Mekong Delta, the speech succeeded in temporarily reducing domestic and foreign criticism of the ongoing military escalation. For Johnson, the speech provided him broader approval to fight a wider war. The gradual military escalations continued in Vietnam without an extensive domestic political debate, allowing the administration to focus its attention and political capital on securing the passage of Great Society legislation.
Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office While the speech at Johns Hopkins provided short-term gains, it proved counterproductive in the long run, for it began the erosion of Johnson’s credibility, which eventually derailed his presidency. His gradual escalation of the American military role in Vietnam, designed to avoid a domestic political debate, has been criticized as a deceptive way to operate in a democracy and an irresponsible and ineffective way to defeat a determined enemy abroad. By the end of 1965 the number of U.S. combat troops in Vietnam would increase to more than 180,000 men, up from just 16,000 when Johnson took office in November 1963. BENJAMIN P. GREENE See also Bundy, McGeorge; Great Society Program; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Mekong Delta; National Security Action Memorandum Number 328; ROLLING THUNDER, Operation References Carter, James M. Inventing Vietnam: The United States & State-Building, 1954–1968. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Dallek, Robert. Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1961– 1973. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. Gardner, Lloyd C. Pay Any Price: Lyndon Johnson and the Wars for Vietnam. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1995. Nguyen, Thi Dieu. The Mekong River and the Struggle for Indochina: Water, War, and Peace. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999. VanDeMark, Brian. Into the Quagmire: Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation of the Vietnam War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. Yuravlivker, Dror. “‘Peace without Conquest’: Lyndon Johnson’s Speech of April 7, 1965.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 36 (September 2006): 457–481.
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of State William Rogers, was largely excluded from major decisions on Vietnam, a result of President Richard M. Nixon’s desire to keep foreign policy formulation within the West Wing under the coordination of National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger. In June 1969 Johnson believed that it was unwise to withdraw American troops, as Hanoi would interpret this as a failure of U.S. resolve. Johnson believed that Vietnamization of the war was too hastily implemented to be successful and that the United States should have been more generous in supplying the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) with military advisers and equipment. Johnson retired from the State Department in 1977, and in 1983 he became vice chairman of the Atlantic Council of the United States and chairman of the Washington Institute of Foreign Affairs. He died in Raleigh, North Carolina, on March 24, 1997. PRISCILLA ROBERTS See also Rogers, William Pierce; Taylor, Maxwell Davenport; United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1954–1965; United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1965–1968; United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1969–1973; Vietnamization; Washington Special Actions Group References Gibbons, William C. The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War. 4 vols. to date. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986–1995. Johnson, U. Alexis, with Jef Olivarius McAllister. The Right Hand of Power. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1984.
Joint Chiefs of Staff See United States Joint Chiefs of Staff
Johnson, Ural Alexis Birth Date: October 17, 1908 Death Date: March 24, 1997 U.S. career diplomat and State Department official. Born in Falun, Kansas, on October 17, 1908, Ural Alexis (known as U. Alexis) Johnson graduated from Occidental College in 1931. He attended the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service during 1931 and 1932 and joined the State Department in 1935. He served as U.S. ambassador to Czechoslovakia (1953–1958), Thailand (1958–1961), and Japan (1966–1969). Johnson’s 1964 appointment as deputy ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) under General Maxwell D. Taylor was intended to underscore the importance of the Saigon embassy. In 1965 the two men initially opposed the commitment of U.S. ground troops to Vietnam, but once the commitment was made they believed that the United States should not retreat from it. Johnson opposed any bombing halt or attempt to open negotiations with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). As undersecretary of state for political affairs (1969–1973), Johnson, like other State Department officials, including Secretary
Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office Office handling both relations with the news media and psychological warfare operations against the enemy. The Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) was created in 1965 under the direction of Barry Zorthian, who remained its director until July 1968. JUSPAO coordinated a huge propaganda campaign, but it is best remembered for becoming a quasi-military/civilian ministry of information. For many in the news media, daily briefings by information officers of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), at JUSPAO’s six-story headquarters in Saigon became the main source of hard news about U.S. military activities. These briefings became known pejoratively as the Five O’Clock Follies because of the extensive use of charts and statistics and the reliance on fragmentary, inevitably inaccurate field reports. Each Thursday JUSPAO released weekly casualty figures, or body counts, that the media routinely passed on without comment. Prior to the Tet Offensive of 1968, the press usually took claims of impending victory at face value, but reporters coming from the scenes of action would sometimes rise to tell what really happened.
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Jones, David Charles
JUSPAO’s more than 600 employees provided abundant services to reporters. JUSPAO employees facilitated accreditation, arranged in-country flights, and provided compilations of news clippings and other handouts. By late 1967, JUSPAO had become an indispensable logistics headquarters for war correspondents. The confusion of the Tet Offensive nullified an extensive campaign to counteract negative reporting of the pacification effort, and JUSPAO made major public relations errors. Optimistic early descriptions at the Five O’Clock Follies about the combat situation in Saigon and Hue and the soaring statistics on Communist casualties denied realities observed by reporters. Certainly the daily fragmentary communiqués were inadequate for providing overviews of countrywide trends or of the performance of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army), conspicuously excluded from MACV reports. Efforts by JUSPAO to inculcate a sense of the importance of public relations among leaders of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) and its armed forces were largely unsuccessful. JUSPAO was operational until 1972. JOHN D. ROOT
planning and operations, including air missions over the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and Cambodia. With promotions to lieutenant general in 1969 and to full general in 1971, Jones held various assignments in the United States and Europe, where he established the integrated air headquarters in the Central Region (Allied Air Force, Central Europe) of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In 1974 Jones became chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force, and in 1978 he was appointed chairman of the JCS. In April 1980 he oversaw the unsuccessful rescue mission, Operation EAGLE CLAW, designed to retrieve 52 American hostages being held by radical Iranian students in Tehran. General Jones was roundly criticized for its failure. He retired from the U.S. Air Force in June 1982. CYNTHIA NORTHRUP See also Airpower, Role in War; United States Air Force
See also Body Count; Five O’Clock Follies; Media and the Vietnam War; Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; Tet Offensive, Overall Strategy; Tet Offensive and the Saigon Circle; Zorthian, Barry References Braestrup, Peter. Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1994. Hallin, Daniel C. The “Uncensored War”: The Media and Vietnam War. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986. Hammond, William M. Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1962–1968. Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1988.
Jones, David Charles Birth Date: July 9, 1921 U.S. Air Force general, deputy commander for operations and vice commander of the U.S. Seventh Air Force in Vietnam in 1969, and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) from 1978 to 1982. Born in Aberdeen, South Dakota, on July 9, 1921, David Charles Jones completed high school in Minot, North Dakota, and then attended the University of North Dakota and Minot State College. He entered the Army Air Force in 1942 and received his pilot’s wings in February 1943. During the Korean War, Jones flew 300 mission hours with a bomber squadron. Following the war, he held various assignments within the United States and overseas before being assigned in 1969 during the Vietnam War to Tim Son Nhut Air Base in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). As deputy commander of operations and vice commander of the Seventh Air Force in Vietnam, Jones coordinated mission
U.S. Air Force major general David C. Jones was deputy commander for operations and vice commander of the Seventh Air Force in Vietnam in 1969. As such, he coordinated mission planning and operations, including air missions over North Vietnam and Cambodia. As a full general, in 1974, he became chief of staff of the air force, and in 1978 he was appointed chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Department of Defense)
JUNCTION CITY, Operation
References Cole, Robert H., Lorna S. Jaffe, Walter S. Poole, and Willard J. Webb. The Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995. Tilford, Earl H., Jr. Crosswinds: The Air Force’s Setup in Vietnam. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1993.
JUNCTION CITY,
Operation
Start Date: February 22, 1967 End Date: May 4, 1967 Second corps-sized operation of the Vietnam War and one of the largest offensive operations conducted by allied forces. Lasting from February 22 to May 14, 1967, Operation JUNCTION CITY involved 4 Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) and 22 U.S. battalions, including elements of the U.S. 1st, 4th, 9th, and 25th Infantry divisions; the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment; and the 196th Infantry and 173rd Airborne brigades. JUNCTION CITY followed by one month Operation CEDAR FALLS, the first corps-sized operation of the war. Actually, JUNCTION CITY was planned first, in late 1966. At the last minute, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), intelligence located a Communist regional headquarters along the Saigon River in the area of the Iron
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Triangle. Major General Jonathan O. Seaman, commander of U.S. II Field Force, wanted to delay JUNCTION CITY and launch an immediate attack into the Iron Triangle, and this operation became CEDAR FALLS. Commander of the U.S. 1st Infantry Division Major General William E. DePuy opposed the delay, but MACV commander General William Westmoreland sided with Seaman. According to the revised schedule, JUNCTION CITY was to be launched immediately following CEDAR FALLS. It was delayed another month, however, to allow planners to correct some of the operational problems that surfaced during the first operation. The primary objective of Operation JUNCTION CITY was the elimination of the elusive Viet Cong (VC) 9th Division, commanded by Colonel Hoang Cam, a native of northern Vietnam who commanded a Viet Minh regiment at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. The area of operations was War Zone C, a Communistcontrolled sanctuary from which the VC 9th Division had long operated freely. War Zone C was a 50- by 30-mile flat, marshy area along the Cambodian border northwest of Saigon. The region was checkered with open areas of rice paddies and thick patches of heavy jungle. Dominating War Zone C was Nui Ba Den (“Black Virgin Mountain”). This 3,235-foot-high landmass rose straight up from the flat surrounding countryside. Honeycombed with caves, Nui Ba Den was long suspected of being the forward headquarters of the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN).
U.S. infantrymen in the high grass of a clearing in War Zone C, 80 miles northeast of Saigon and near the Cambodian border on February 24, 1967, during Operation JUNCTION CITY. The soldiers are advancing on snipers who had fired on helicopters bringing in the troops. (AP/Wide World Photos)
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JUNCTION CITY, Operation
The JUNCTION CITY plan called for the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, and the 196th Infantry Brigade to take up a western blocking position along the Cambodian border, roughly four to five miles east of Highway 22 and Highway 246. The 1st Infantry Division would block the east, along Highway 4. The 173rd Airborne Brigade and the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, would seal off the northern section. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment on the right and the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, on the left would then sweep into this giant inverted horseshoe from the south. Twenty days before the start of JUNCTION CITY the 25th Infantry Division launched Operation GADSDEN. Twelve days later, on February 14, the 1st Infantry Division launched Operation TUCSON. The objective of both operations was to position the western and eastern flank forces. JUNCTION CITY commenced on February 22 with the north envelopment. The 173rd Airborne Brigade’s 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry, parachuted into drop zones near Ca Tum, only seven miles from Cambodia. The unopposed drop was the only major U.S. combat jump of the war. Simultaneously, 249 helicopters inserted eight infantry battalions into the north side in one of the largest mass helicopter lifts of the war. The following day the southern forces positioned along Highway 247 started sweeping north into the horseshoe. On February 28 units of the 173rd Airborne Brigade discovered the VC’s Central Information Office, including an underground photographic laboratory complete with film. That same day near the eastern tip of the horseshoe, the 1st Division’s 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry, engaged the PAVN’s 2nd Battalion, 101st Regiment, at Prek Klok. Twelve days later, on March 10, the VC 272nd Regiment attacked the U.S. 168th Engineer Battalion, which was building a Special Forces base camp at Prek Klok. The engineers were defended by the mechanized 2nd Battalion, 2nd Infantry, and the 2nd Battalion, 33rd Artillery, firing howitzers point-blank into the attackers. On March 18 JUNCTION CITY entered its Phase II, which focused on clearing the eastern sector of War Zone C. The 173rd Airborne Brigade pulled out of the operation and was replaced by the 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division. During the course of the next two weeks, the three major engagements of Operation JUNCTION CITY followed in rapid succession. During the night of March 19 the VC 273rd Regiment attacked and almost overran the 9th Infantry Division’s Troop A, 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry, in its defensive perimeter at Ap Bau Bang. At one point the cavalry troopers were buttoned up inside their armored personnel carriers while artillery inside the perimeter fired antipersonnel beehive rounds directly at the vehicles to sweep off the attackers. While Troop A continued grimly to hold on, the 5th Cavalry’s Troop B and Troop C fought their way into the beleaguered perimeter to assist their comrades. Throughout the night, U.S. Air Force planes carried out 87 close air support runs under flare illumination.
In the early morning hours of March 21 under the direct command of VC 9th Division commander Hoang Cam, two Communist regiments, the 273rd Regiment, 9th Division, and the PAVN 16th Regiment (also known as the 70th Guards Regiment) attacked the 4th Infantry Division’s 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry, and 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery, at Fire Support Base (FSB) Gold near Suoi Tre. As that battle wore on, a relief force from the 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry, fought its way into FSB Gold. Fighting there continued into the daylight hours, when FSB Gold was finally relieved by elements of the 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor Regiment. In his postwar memoirs General Hoang Cam, while still claiming victory, acknowledged that his forces suffered heavy losses during this battle. The last big fight of JUNCTION CITY took place near Ap Gu at Landing Zone (LZ) George. The 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Alexander M. Haig, had occupied LZ George on March 26. Five days later the battalion was moving east from LZ George when Company B came under heavy attack and was pinned down. Haig had to commit his Company A to break Company B free. Near the end of the day both companies were able to withdraw to the defensive perimeter near the LZ, which had been reinforced by elements of the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry. In the early morning hours of April 1, the VC 271st Regiment and the VC 1st Battalion, 70th Guards Regiment, attacked in force. A combination of artillery fire, helicopter gunships, and tactical air support finally drove them off. Although Operation JUNCTION CITY was originally planned to have only two phases, Phase III kicked off on April 15. A floating brigade of one mechanized battalion from the 25th Infantry Division and an ARVN battalion made constant sweeps through War Zone C. Meanwhile, the 196th Infantry Brigade was sent north to the I Corps Tactical Zone. Units from the 9th Infantry Division temporarily moved into the 196th Infantry Brigade’s former area of operations in the shadow of Nui Ba Den. For the most part, the Phase III sweeps turned up only empty countryside. On the tactical level, Operation JUNCTION CITY was a success. Although Communist propaganda organs claimed that the U.S. and the ARVN lost 13,500 killed, 800 armored vehicles, and 119 artillery pieces, actual tallies were 282 killed and 1,576 wounded. Three tanks, 4 helicopters, 5 howitzers, and 21 armored personnel carriers were also lost. MACV claimed Communist forces dead at 2,728, with an undetermined number of wounded. The allies also seized 490 weapons, 850 tons of rations, 500,000 pages of documents, and more than 5,000 bunkers and other military structures. Despite the tactical results, JUNCTION CITY, as with so many other American efforts in the war, failed to yield long-term strategic leverage. Although the three regiments of the VC 9th Division were temporarily shattered, they would be back in force less than a year later for the 1968 Tet Offensive. War Zone C was far from neutralized, but JUNCTION CITY made General Vo Nguyen Giap
JUNCTION CITY, Operation
painfully aware that the major VC operating and supply bases in South Vietnam were vulnerable to the vastly superior U.S. mobility and firepower. As a result, the Communists moved their headquarters across the border into Cambodia, where North Vietnamese regular forces were already based. With the United States (for a wide variety of reasons) unwilling to expand largescale offensive operations into Cambodia, American military planners were left with little choice but to pursue a defensive campaign with the objective of wearing down the VC and the PAVN through attrition. DAVID T. ZABECKI
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See also CEDAR FALLS, Operation; Central Office for South Vietnam; DePuy, William
Eugene; Haig, Alexander Meigs, Jr.; Iron Triangle; Vo Nguyen Giap; War Zone C and War Zone D; Westmoreland, William Childs References Hoang Cam and Nhat Tien. Chang Duong Muoi Nghin Ngay [The Ten Thousand-Day Journey]. Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 2001. Rogers, Bernard W. Cedar Falls Junction City: A Turning Point. Vietnam Studies Series. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1974. Stanton, Shelby L. The Rise and Fall of an American Army: The U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985.
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K K-9 Corps Continuing the tradition of World War II and the Korean War, the U.S. military employed dogs during the Vietnam War. The K-9 Corps consisted of handlers with mainly German shepherds and several crossbreeds that performed sentry, scout, and mine and tunnel duty and with Labrador retrievers that served as trackers. The recommendation in 1960 by the Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG), Vietnam, to establish a military dog program for the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) led the following year to the arrival of 300 dogs from Germany. In April 1962 four U.S. instructors arrived to provide tactical training for the ARVN at Go Vap, the old French dog compound near Saigon. Later they moved to the new ARVN dog training center built at Thanh Tuy Ha.
Because of a shortage of Vietnamese veterinarians, none of whom had any experience with dogs, the next month saw the establishment of a six-member U.S. veterinary support group. By 1966 the ARVN dog program, although authorized at 1,000 dogs, had only 130. Cultural differences, such as Vietnamese unfamiliarity with working dogs, and practical problems, including accidents and disease, continued to thwart U.S.-ARVN plans. U.S. canine efforts met with greater success. Following Communist penetration at the Da Nang Air Base in July 1965, the U.S. Air Force quickly launched Project Top Dog, which called for the deployment of 40 handlers and a like number of dogs for a fourmonth period. These sentry dog teams, sent to the Tan Son Nhut, Bien Hoa, and Da Nang air bases, proved an effective deterrent against attacks and led to a program involving hundreds of dogs
Vietnam War Dogs1 Branch of Service3 Occupation/Work Type2 4
Sentry Scout4 Mine/tunnel4 Tracker5 Water dog4 Unknown Totals 1
Air Force
Army
Marines
710 14
767 1,129 49 103
48 70 5
172 2,220
42 165
724
All procured for and used by U.S. troops. First occupation qualified for. 3 First branch of service entered. 4 German shepherds. 5 Labradors (with a few shepherds early in the program). 6 U.S. Army or U.S. Marine Corps. 2
Navy
Unknown
Total
37 2266
1,562 1,439 54 103 4 234 3,396
4
20
41
246
560
K-9 Corps
Specialist Rayford Brown of Florence, South Carolina, and his tracker dog relax at Fire Base Alpha Four, a U.S. outpost near the DMZ in South Vietnam, on January 2, 1971. Such dogs were used to track enemy troops and locate booby traps and mines. (AP/Wide World Photos)
and thousands of handlers. In January 1967 the number of dogs at U.S. air bases in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) peaked at 476. In August 1965 the U.S. Army began deploying its sentry dogs to Vietnam. Organized in 1966, the 212th Military Police Company (Sentry Dog), along with the 981st and 595th Military Police companies (Sentry Dog), which arrived in Vietnam in November 1967 and January 1970, respectively, brought the total number of sentry dogs to about 300, a wartime high. Also in 1965, the U.S. Army reactivated its program of scout dogs trained to give a silent alert based on airborne scent. In the summer of 1966 the first opportunity to employ scout dogs occurred when the 25th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog) (IPSD) near Phuoc Vinh and the 38th IPSD near Cu Chi both engaged Communist forces in III Corps, the location of nearly half the scout dog platoons. By the end of 1967 there were 17 IPSDs and more than 1,000 scout dogs. The U.S. Marine Corps began tactical dog training in the winter of 1965 and deployed two scout dog platoons to Vietnam in February 1966. Kenneled near Da Nang at Camp Kaiser (named for the
first U.S. Marine Corps scout dog killed in action), by November the two platoons had participated in 11 major operations. The U.S. Navy, with the smallest canine program, had 37 sentry dogs and four aqua (water, swimmer) dogs. Begun in October and November 1969 as an air force project, the aqua dog program aimed at interdicting enemy swimmers and scuba divers. Although the program received a positive evaluation in 1970, Vietnamization prevented any further use in Vietnam. The U.S. Air Force, in its effort to develop a quick-reaction force that included scout dogs, in 1966 created Operation SAFESIDE, which never developed beyond an interim program utilizing only 14 dogs. In 1969 in spite of a positive evaluation, the air force, either as a result of interservice rivalry or Vietnamization or both, discarded the entire Combat Security Police concept. The U.S. Army expanded its use of dogs to include trackers. Using ground scent, the teams sought the reestablishment of contact with a fleeing enemy. In 1966 the United States made use of the British Jungle Warfare School in Malaysia for training the first teams. Designated the 63rd Infantry Platoon–Combat Tracker (IPCT), 23rd Infantry “Americal” Division, and the 65th IPCT, 9th Infantry Division, each platoon consisted of three teams of five men and a single tracker dog each, mainly black and golden Labrador retrievers. In November 1967 the U.S. Army opened its own Combat Tracking Team Center at Fort Gordon, Georgia. The army deployed 10 teams to Vietnam in 1968 and a final team in 1969. The Australians also employed two combat tracker teams located near Vung Tau and Nui Dat. In 1968 the U.S. Army contracted with Behavior Systems, Inc., a civilian company, to develop dogs to detect booby traps, mines, trip wires, and tunnels. A positive initial evaluation of these MDogs led to the 1968 activation of the 60th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog) (Mine/Tunnel Detector Dog), which arrived at Cu Chi in April 1969. The U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps were the only two U.S. service branches to use dogs with this occupational specialty. The K-9 programs saw service as far as Camp Evans near Hue and as far south as Soc Trang. The best estimate of the number of dogs that served with U.S. forces is between 3,500 and 4,000, with an additional 639 procured and delivered directly to the ARVN. At Tan Son Nhut, the U.S. Army’s 936th Medical Detachment and the Seventh Air Force Hospital both served as war dog hospitals. There were also veterinary detachments in each corps. Yet alarmingly only about 500 dogs survived, with 190 of these returned to the United States. Hostile action accounted for fewer than 3 percent of canine deaths. A large number fell victim to accidents, but probably most died from illnesses endemic to the region. Finally, the U.S. military adopted policies that guaranteed that very few dogs would come home. Under Vietnamization, the military either euthanized the dogs or handed over to the ARVN hundreds of the animals, whose final disposition remains unknown. Dr. Howard Hayes, a veterinary epidemiologist at the National Cancer Institute, has done extensive research into the medical his-
Kampuchean National Front tories of Vietnam War dogs and the exposures common to both the dogs and their handlers, such as to infectious agents, pesticides, herbicides, and therapeutic drugs. Among his findings is that these dogs showed much higher than normal rates of both testicular seminoma and testicular dysfunction. The best estimate on the number of U.S. Army handlers is 12,000 to 14,000 men. Poor U.S. Marine Corps record keeping and missing U.S. Army reports make it difficult to determine exact totals. Army after-action reports reveal 83,740 missions, but undoubtedly there were many others. The same documents credited the scout and mine/tunnel dog teams with more than 4,000 Communist troops killed and 1,000 captured, more than 1 million pounds of rice and corn recovered, 3,000 mortars located, and at least 2,000 tunnels and bunkers exposed. Such successes led the enemy to place bounties on the handlers and their dogs. The Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, D.C., includes the names of at least 211 dog handlers. Not officially part of the record-keeping procedure and therefore more difficult to determine, the number of allied lives saved certainly was in the thousands. Sentry dogs prevented penetration of allied perimeters, frequently because the enemy specifically avoided facilities with these assets. Unlike many other countries, the United States does not have specific military decorations, a museum, or a national memorial for canines. In June 1964 the only war dog memorial in the country was dedicated in Lincoln, Nebraska. Although not about working dogs, Kenn Miller’s Vietnam novel Tiger the Lurp Dog (1983) remains a moving account of a five-man long-range reconnaissance patrol team and its mascot. The Vietnam Dog Handlers Association and the Military Police–Vietnam–Sentry Dogs Alumni, both founded in 1993, honor this military occupational specialty and stand as testimony to the lasting relationships between these men and their dogs. PAUL S. DAUM AND ELIZABETH DAUM See also Cu Chi Tunnels; Tunnels References Lemish, Michael G. War Dogs: Canines in Combat. Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1996. Miller, Kenn. Tiger the Lurp Dog. Boston: Little, Brown, 1983. Mitchell, Tom, ed. DogMan [Vietnam Dog Handlers Association Newsletter] 1(1) (March 1994); 3(2) (March 1996).
Kampuchea See Cambodia
Kampuchean National Front Organization sponsored by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) and formed in 1978 to combat the Khmer Rouge regime
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in Kampuchea. On April 17, 1975, the Khmer Rouge ousted the Cambodian government of Lon Nol, and the following January the Khmer Rouge proclaimed a new constitution and renamed the country Democratic Kampuchea. Prince Norodom Sihanouk served briefly as head of state, but real power rested with Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot, who instigated a ruthless resettlement policy that devastated the country. The Khmer Rouge was also hostile to Vietnam. This occurred because of what the Khmer Rouge perceived as an earlier lack of support for its cause by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), disputes over the common border between Kampuchea and Vietnam and over the sovereignty of a number of small islands in the Gulf of Thailand, and the position of Khmer peoples living in southern Vietnam. These clashes soon escalated into open conflict. Pol Pot’s army, equipped with a mixture of American, Chinese, and Soviet weapons and organized chiefly into more than a dozen small divisions, numbered probably around 100,000 men. In the spring of 1977 there were several serious clashes along Cambodia’s border with Vietnam, and in September 1977 the SRV claimed that four Kampuchean divisions had invaded its Tay Ninh Province and massacred hundreds of Vietnamese civilians. In October and again in December Vietnam retaliated. In December 60,000 Vietnamese troops, supported by tanks and artillery, struck as far as the outskirts of Svay Rieng and Kompong Cham. After the Vietnamese withdrew from Kampuchea in early January 1978, the Khmer Rouge carried out a purge centered on its armed forces in the eastern part of the country that were supposed to defend the regime from the Vietnamese. Up to 100,000 Cambodians were executed. Many Khmer Rouge fled into Vietnam to avoid being arrested and killed. Later they formed the backbone of the SRVsponsored anti–Khmer Rouge resistance. In December 1978 the Vietnamese government assisted in the formation of the Kampuchean National Front from several Kampuchean dissident groups opposed to the Pol Pot regime. Led by Heng Samrin, a Khmer Rouge defector, their forces numbered about 20,000 men. Most were former Khmer Rouge. On December 25, 1978, 18 regular Vietnamese infantry divisions, numbering more than 120,000 men and soon increased to more than 200,000 men, invaded Kampuchea on a wide front. The overmatched Khmer Rouge, seeking to continue guerrilla warfare against the invaders, withdrew into the country’s western hinterlands. Powerful Vietnamese armored columns, accompanied by Heng Samrin’s small army, drove into Phnom Penh with little opposition on January 7, 1979. A pro-Vietnamese government known as the People’s Republic of Kampuchea was then installed, with Heng Samrin as president. Vietnamese troops occupied Cambodia for the next 10 years against opposition by Khmer Rouge and nonCommunist Cambodian guerrilla forces. Fighting in Kampuchea continued, however, even after the September 1989 withdrawal of the SRV. EDWARD C. PAGE
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See also Cambodia; Heng Samrin; Khmer Rouge; Lon Nol; Pol Pot; Sihanouk, Norodom; Vietnam, Socialist Republic of, 1975–Present
of public affairs at the University of South Carolina. He died on June 12, 2004, aboard a cruise ship at Moscow. PRISCILLA ROBERTS
References Becker, Elizabeth. When the War Was Over: The Voices of Cambodia’s Revolution and Its People. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986. Chanda, Nayan. Brother Enemy: The War after the War. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986. Etcheson, Craig. The Rise and Fall of Democratic Kampuchea. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1984. Hardy, Gordon, Arnold R. Isaacs, and MacAlister Brown. Pawns of War: Cambodia and Laos. Boston: Boston Publishing, 1987. Isaacs, Arnold R. Without Honor: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983. O’Ballance, Edgar. The Wars in Vietnam, 1954–1980. Rev. ed. New York: Hippocrene Books, 1981.
See also Harriman, William Averell; McNamara, Robert Strange; Ngo Dinh Diem; Rusk, David Dean; United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1954–1965 References Gibbons, William C. The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War. 4 vols. to date. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986–1995. Kattenburg, Paul. The Vietnam Trauma in American Foreign Policy, 1945–75. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1980.
Katzenbach, Nicholas deBelleville Birth Date: January 17, 1922
Kattenburg, Paul Birth Date: 1922 Death Date: June 12, 2004 U.S. diplomat and State Department desk officer on Vietnam during 1963–1964. Born in Austria in 1922, Paul Kattenburg immigrated to the United States in 1940. He pursued undergraduate work at the University of North Carolina and obtained a master’s degree from Georgetown University and a doctorate from Yale in 1949. A career diplomat, Kattenburg was one of relatively few U.S. policy makers on Vietnam with long experience in the area. As an Indochina research analyst from 1952 to 1956, Kattenburg opposed Dean Rusk and others in the State Department who pushed for U.S. assistance to the French in Indochina. Kattenburg frequently visited the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) and came to believe that the Ngo Dinh Diem government could not survive and that the Viet Cong (VC) would ultimately win the conflict. In the early 1960s Kattenburg became one of a group of skeptics, centered on W. Averell Harriman within the State Department, about the course of the war. At an August 31, 1963, meeting of the National Security Council, Kattenburg, then head of the Interdepartmental Working Group on Vietnam, expressed doubts about U.S. involvement in Vietnam and recommended American withdrawal, the first time that a U.S. government official had done so. A subsequent trip to Vietnam in January 1964 further convinced him that the war could not be won, even with massive U.S. military assistance and American casualties of 5,000 annually over a decade. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara rejected Kattenburg’s recommendations. Shortly afterward Kattenburg was transferred to the less sensitive position of director of regional planning, where he concentrated on peace negotiation scenarios. He was deliberately excluded from all Vietnam-related issues from late 1964 until his 1972 retirement from government, when he became a professor
U.S. attorney general (1965–1966) and undersecretary of state (1966–1969). Nicholas deBelleville Katzenbach was born in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on January 17, 1922. A graduate of Princeton University and Yale University, a Rhodes Scholar, and a lawyer, Katzenbach fought in World War II and spent much of it as a prisoner of war of the Germans and Italians. For eight years during the 1950s he taught law at Yale University and the University of Chicago Law School. In 1961 Katzenbach joined the John F. Kennedy administration as assistant attorney general specializing in civil rights issues. Katzenbach won a reputation for tough-minded realism particularly after the April 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco, when he handled negotiations with Cuba for the return of American prisoners. In 1964 he succeeded Robert F. Kennedy as attorney general on the latter’s resignation. In June 1965 President Lyndon Johnson and his close advisers sought Katzenbach’s professional opinion as to the legality of committing U.S. military forces in Vietnam under the August 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. Then and in later congressional hearings Katzenbach stated that the resolution was sufficiently broad to encompass such action and that the president need seek no further authority from Congress to increase the number of American troops in Vietnam to 95,000 men. Katzenbach also warned that should Johnson consult Congress once more on this issue, the legislature might attach conditions to any troop commitment that would restrain presidential independence of action. Despite his lack of training or expertise in foreign affairs, Katzenbach in September 1966 was appointed undersecretary of state, succeeding George W. Ball, an outspoken opponent of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Katzenbach’s legal background initially led him to adopt a rather narrow and hesitant conception of his role as that of an advocate and representative of his client, defending the administration’s policies, rather than of an active shaper of alternative options. Before congressional committees he continued to justify the government’s troop commitment of 1965. Privately he came to believe that the war was unwinnable, and by May 1967
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Nicholas Katzenbach was attorney general of the United States in President Lyndon B. Johnson’s administration. He defended the Tonkin Gulf Resolution as sufficiently broad to permit the president to commit substantial military resources to Southeast Asia. (Yoichi R. Okamoto/Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library)
he joined those in the administration, notably Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, who favored negotiating a compromise peace plan and American withdrawal. In November 1967 Katzenbach, together with McNamara, argued that the government should resist any further increases in U.S. troop levels in Vietnam and move toward the stabilization of the existing government of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) and an American withdrawal, advice rejected by Secretary of State Dean Rusk and National Security Advisor Walt Rostow. In mid-October 1967 and again in 1968 Katzenbach argued in favor of a bombing pause to allow negotiations to proceed. As acting secretary of state, Katzenbach attended the crucial meetings of the president’s senior advisers in late March 1968 that concluded that the United States should withdraw from Vietnam, a decision that contributed to President Johnson’s decision not to seek reelection. Katzenbach then helped to develop potential U.S. negotiating positions for use in anticipated peace talks with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). Upon leaving government in 1969, Katzenbach became a senior vice president and general counsel for IBM and later practiced law with a New Jersey–based firm. PRISCILLA ROBERTS
See also Clark, William Ramsey; Gulf of Tonkin Resolution; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Kennedy, Robert Francis; McNamara, Robert Strange; Rostow, Walt Whitman; Rusk, David Dean; United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1965–1968; United States Department of Justice References Berman, Larry. Lyndon Johnson’s War: The Road to Stalemate in Vietnam. New York: Norton, 1989. Gibbons, William C. The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War. 4 vols. to date. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986–1995. Halberstam, David. The Best and the Brightest. New York: Random House, 1972.
Kelly, Charles L. Birth Date: April 10, 1925 Death Date: July 1, 1964 U.S. Army officer and the Vietnam War’s foremost exponent of aeromedical evacuation (medevac). Born on April 10, 1925, in Warm Springs, Georgia, Charles L. Kelly went into the military
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at an early age. Vietnam was his third war, and he was widely believed to be the only American soldier entitled to wear the Combat Infantryman Badge, the Combat Medic Badge, Parachutist Wings, and Aviator Wings. On January 11, 1964, Major Kelly assumed command of the 57th Medical Detachment (Helicopter Ambulance). Although he was the unit’s third commander, he quickly instilled in his pilots his own philosophy of putting the patient before all else. This applied to all wounded soldiers, American, South Vietnamese, and even Viet Cong (VC). Kelly’s standard was “No compromise. No rationalization. No hesitation. Fly the mission. Now!” Kelly aggressively pushed his pilots and pioneered new techniques in dangerous night evacuations. He also fought a running bureaucratic battle with the U.S. Army Surgeon General’s Office in Washington and with Saigon-based U.S. Army Support Command chief Brigadier General Joseph W. Stilwell. Medevac was still in its infancy, and many commanders such as Stilwell believed that the valuable helicopters should be used for general duties and should be fitted with removable red crosses only when they were actually needed for medevac missions. Kelly fought hard to keep his five UH-1 Iroquois “Hueys” dedicated to his unit’s primary mission. Kelly led by example and flew as many missions as his pilots. On July 1, 1964, near Soc Trang in the Mekong Delta, Kelly was taking on wounded from a supposedly secure area when he came under fire. Troops on the ground screamed for Kelly to leave immediately. He quietly replied, “When I have your wounded.” An instant later, he was killed by a single bullet through the heart. Kelly was awarded a posthumous Distinguished Service Cross. After Kelly’s death, there was no more talk of using medevac helicopters for other missions. As other medevac units arrived in Vietnam, they adopted the Kelly philosophy and tradition, although few of those units ever reached the standards of the 57th Medical Detachment. According to Patrick Brady, one of Kelly’s pilots at the time, all medevac units also eventually adopted the 57th Medical Detachment’s radio call sign, which originally had been selected at random from a code-word list. The term “dustoff” still means aeromedical evacuation in the U.S. Army. DAVID T. ZABECKI See also Dustoff; Helicopters, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Helicopters, Employment of, in Vietnam; Medevac; Medicine, Military References Brady, Patrick H. “When I Have Your Wounded.” ARMY (June 1989): 64–72. Dorland, Peter, and James Nanney. Dust Off: Army Aeromedical Evacuation in Vietnam. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1982.
Kelly, Francis J. Birth Date: February 18, 1919 Death Date: December 26, 1997 U.S. Army officer who devised plans for unconventional warfare in the early 1960s and commanded the U.S. 5th Special Forces Group in Vietnam during June 1966–June 1967. Francis J. Kelly was born in New York City on February 18, 1919. He enlisted in the U.S. Army in 1941 and served during World War II. Commissioned the next year, he participated in the Allied invasion of Normandy in the summer of 1944. After briefly serving in the New York City Police Department following the war, Kelly returned to the army. He earned a bachelor’s degree from the University of Maryland and a master’s degree from Georgetown University. After commanding a tank battalion, in 1963 at the age of 44 Kelly underwent airborne training and joined the Special Forces. He then commanded a Special Forces group in Okinawa during 1964–1966. In June 1966 Colonel Kelly assumed command of the 5th Special Forces Group in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Disappointed with previous efforts by the United States and South Vietnamese Special Forces to utilize indigenous peoples against the Viet Cong (VC), Kelly overhauled the American approach to this issue. Reflecting the growing U.S. involvement in Vietnam, Kelly increased the role of U.S. Special Forces working with various ethnic and tribal paramilitary groups, known as Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG), and shifted their operations from those of a defensive and intelligence-gathering nature to one that was much more aggressive, teaching them to seek out and destroy enemy forces. To help pursue this new mission, Kelly encouraged the creation of more mobile forces and brought about a much greater level of coordination and cooperation with the CIDG. He insisted on a more flexible system of logistics as well as a close and highly integrated system of intelligence gathering among the CIDG, U.S. Special Forces, and South Vietnamese Special Forces. Kelly’s most significant contribution to counterinsurgency warfare was his creation of the Mobile Guerrilla Forces. These units consisted of small bands of CIDG who were led by U.S. Special Forces soldiers. Usually numbering between 150 and 180 men, these units were intended to operate independently away from base camp for up to 60 days, although three weeks was often the norm because of resupply problems. Taking part in so-called Blackjack operations, these highly trained units roved throughout their areas of responsibility to locate, harass, and engage the VC and to provide intelligence on enemy location and unit strength. Upon leaving Vietnam in 1967, Kelly returned to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, where he assumed command of the Institute of Strategic and Special Operations. In 1970 he became the senior military adviser to the State of Colorado, a position he held until his retirement from the U.S. Army in 1972 as a colonel. Kelly also
Kennan, George Frost authored U.S. Army Special Forces, 1961–1971, a comprehensive history of Special Forces operations in Vietnam. Later he became a professor of political science and economics at Loretto Heights College in Denver, Colorado. Kelly died in Aurora, Colorado, on December 26, 1997. KELLY E. CRAGER See also Civilian Irregular Defense Group; Counterinsurgency Warfare; Mobile Guerrilla Forces; United States Special Forces; Vietnam, Republic of, Special Forces References Donahue, James C. Mobile Guerrilla Force: With the Special Forces in War Zone D. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996. Kelly, Francis John. U.S. Army Special Forces, 1961–1971. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985. Rottman, Gordon L. U.S. Army Special Forces, 1952–1984. London: Osprey, 1985. Stanton, Shelby L. Green Berets at War: U.S. Army Special Forces in Southeast Asia, 1956–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985.
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Kennan, George Frost Birth Date: February 16, 1904 Death Date: March 17, 2005 U.S. career diplomat, historian, author, articulator of the policy of containment, and realist critic of American foreign policy. Born on February 16, 1904, in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, George Frost Kennan entered the newly established U.S. Foreign Service following his graduation from Princeton University in 1925. Trained by the State Department in Russian history, language, and culture, he became part of the first U.S. embassy to the Soviet Union in 1933. He returned to Washington in 1937, where he headed the State Department’s Russian desk. Between 1938 and 1944 Kennan performed various assignments in Europe (he was interned by the Germans from December 1941 to May 1942) until ambassador to the Soviet Union W. Averell Harriman chose him as embassy counselor in July 1944. Despite their wartime alliance, the United States and the Soviet Union had strained diplomatic relations. While serving in Moscow,
George F. Kennan, U.S. diplomat and historian, was the energetic architect of a containment policy against Communist expansion. He was among the most influential shapers of American foreign policy in the post–World War II era. (Library of Congress)
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Kennan sent his well-known Long Telegram of February 22, 1946, an 8,000-word analysis and critique of Soviet behavior. Kennan asserted that the Soviet Union was driven by a combination of Communist messianic ideology and historic Russian insecurity. The message was well received by U.S. officials and contributed to Kennan’s reputation as a Soviet expert. He was appointed instructor in foreign relations at the National War College in 1946 and the next year became head of the State Department’s newly formed Policy Planning Staff (PPS). As head of the PPS, Kennan was instrumental in drafting a report on the European postwar economic crisis that resulted in the 1947 Marshall Plan. In July 1947 Foreign Affairs published Kennan’s essay “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” under the pseudonym “Mr. X” (although it soon became known that Kennan was the author). The “X article,” as it came to be known, reiterated points made in the Long Telegram and advocated “patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.” Thus, Kennan became known as the “father” of the containment doctrine. Kennan briefly served as counselor of the State Department in 1950, but he disagreed with Dean Acheson’s desire to enlarge the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), with the rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany), with the development of the hydrogen bomb, and with the decision to send U.S. troops beyond the 38th Parallel in Korea. Kennan took a leave of absence from the State Department in August 1950 to join the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton. In 1952 Kennan became U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, but he found the post stifling. His service there came to an abrupt end when he told a reporter in Berlin that the Soviets treated U.S. officials as badly as had the Nazis. The Soviet government declared him persona non grata in October 1952. Kennan returned to the Institute for Advanced Study, which had provided an intellectual home for him since his first fellowship there in 1950. During the John F. Kennedy administration, Kennan held the post of ambassador to Yugoslavia from May 1961 through July 1963. He also achieved a notable record as a scholar of foreign policy. His book American Diplomacy, 1900–1950 (1951) critiqued America’s “legalistic-moralistic” approach to foreign relations and urged realism in U.S. foreign policy. Russia Leaves the War (1956) and Memoirs: 1925–1950 (1967) both won Pulitzer Prizes. Kennan’s reputation as a diplomat and scholar made his views on the Vietnam War important. He believed that the war was based on a flawed understanding of his containment doctrine, overemphasis on the domino theory, and an unrealistic assessment of U.S. interests. In February 1965 he testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that a Communist Vietnam posed no probable threat to U.S. security and would likely adopt a foreign policy independent of Moscow or Beijing. The United States should not precipitately leave Vietnam, he asserted, but should gradually withdraw, leaving the effort to the South Vietnamese themselves. He denied that withdrawal would weaken U.S. credibility.
In 1968 Kennan supported Senator Eugene McCarthy’s effort to replace Lyndon Johnson as the Democratic candidate for the upcoming election, although Kennan remained a social conservative who also criticized the behavior of the student antiwar movement. He remained at the Institute for Advanced Study for many years. Periodically Kennan would comment and critique U.S. foreign policy right up to the end of his life. In the late 1970s and early 1980s he condemned the renewed nuclear arms race that resulted from the end of Soviet-U.S. détente, and he stated and wrote on numerous occasions that his thoughts on the containment policy had been subjected to long-term misinterpretation. He had not, he claimed, advocated the rampant militarization of U.S. foreign policy that had transpired beginning in 1950. As he neared his 100th birthday, Kennan opposed a U.S. invasion of Iraq and presciently predicted that doing so would bring unforeseen consequences. He rejected the George W. Bush administration’s claim of links between Al Qaeda and Iraq and argued that undertaking another war would dilute the War on Terror and take America’s eyes off Afghanistan. Kennan died in Princeton, New Jersey, on March 17, 2005. KENNETH R. STEVENS See also Acheson, Dean Gooderham; Containment Policy; Domino Theory; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; McCarthy, Eugene Joseph References Hixson, Walter L. George F. Kennan: Cold War Iconoclast. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990. Kennan, George F. American Diplomacy 1900–1950. Chicago: University Press of Chicago, 1951. Kennan, George F. Memoirs, 1925–1950. Boston: Little, Brown, 1967. Kennan, George F. Memoirs, 1950–1963. New York: Pantheon, 1983. Kennan, George F. “The Sources of Soviet Conduct.” Foreign Affairs 25 (July 1947): 566–582. Mayers, David. George Kennan and the Dilemmas of US Foreign Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. Miscamble, Wilson D. George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947–1950. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992. Stephanson, Anders. George Kennan and the Art of Foreign Policy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989.
Kennedy, Edward Moore Birth Date: February 22, 1932 Death Date: August 25, 2009 Longtime U.S. senator from Massachusetts who vocally opposed the war in Vietnam. Born on February 22, 1932, in Brookline, Massachusetts, the last child of Rose and Joseph Kennedy, Edward Moore (“Ted”) Kennedy graduated from Harvard University in 1956 with a degree in history and government. He earned a law degree from the University of Virginia in 1959. After helping manage his brother John Fitzgerald Kennedy’s 1958 Senate and 1960 presidential primary campaigns, Ted Ken-
Kennedy, John Fitzgerald nedy worked as an assistant district attorney in Suffolk County, Massachusetts. In 1962 he won John Kennedy’s abandoned Senate seat and was serving in the Senate when the president was assassinated in November 1963. Ted Kennedy won election to his first full Senate term in 1964, the youngest senator ever elected. Although initially supportive of American involvement in Southeast Asia, Kennedy turned against the war as American participation escalated and casualties increased. He began to speak out against the war with his brother Senator Robert F. Kennedy (D-N.Y.), who was assassinated in June 1968 as he ran for the Democratic presidential nomination. Ted, who was devastated by this event and withdrew from public life for a short time, vowed to help end the war in Vietnam. He introduced a four-point plan that included an unconditional halt of the bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and a unilateral reduction of American forces. He spoke out across the country, supported resolutions against the war, condemned President Richard M. Nixon’s Vietnamization policy, and used Senate hearings to focus on the plight of Vietnamese refugees. Kennedy became Senate majority whip in 1969. However, his image was marred by an incident at Chappaquiddick, Massachusetts, that July in which Mary Jo Kopechne, a young female staffer who had worked on his brother’s 1968 campaign, was killed in a car wreck while riding with him. Also, Kennedy’s 1976 challenge for the Democratic presidential nomination was unsuccessful. Despite the negative publicity, his conviction on a misdemeanor charge, and constant threats, Kennedy retained his Senate seat and continued to speak frankly as a pragmatic liberal with special interests in social welfare legislation, in particular health care. He was critical of the U.S.-led invasion and occupation of Iraq and early on embraced fellow Democratic senator Barack Obama’s presidential bid in 2008. Kennedy was diagnosed with a brain tumor in May 2008 and, after a courageous struggle, died on August 25, 2009. LAURA MATYSEK WOOD
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was born in Brookline, Massachusetts, on May 29, 1917, into a large and wealthy Irish Catholic family. His father, Joseph P. Kennedy, was a multimillionaire with presidential aspirations, and his mother, Rose Fitzgerald Kennedy, came from a prominent and politically active Boston family. After attending the elite Choate Preparatory School in Wallingford, Connecticut, Kennedy earned his bachelor’s degree from Harvard University in 1940. He also spent six months of his junior year working in the U.S. London embassy while his father was U.S. ambassador to Great Britain. John Kennedy’s observations during this time inspired his senior honors thesis on British foreign policies, which was published the year he graduated under the title Why England Slept. During World War II Kennedy served four years in the U.S. Navy. He was awarded the Navy and Marine Corps Medal and the Purple Heart for action as commander of PT-109, which was rammed and sunk by a Japanese destroyer in the South Pacific. Kennedy worked for a brief time as a newspaper correspondent before entering national politics at the age of 29, winning election as Democratic congressman from Massachusetts in 1946. In Congress, Kennedy backed social legislation that benefited his largely working-class constituents and criticized what he considered to be the Truman administration’s “weak stand” against Communist
See also Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Kennedy, Robert Francis; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Vietnamization References Burner, David. The Torch Is Passed. New York: Atheneum, 1984. Canellos, Peter S., ed. The Last Lion: The Fall and Rise of Ted Kennedy. New York: St. Martin’s, 2009. Clymer, Adam. Edward M. Kennedy: A Biography. New York: William Morrow, 1999. Sherrill, Robert. The Last Kennedy. New York: Dial, 1976.
Kennedy, John Fitzgerald Birth Date: May 29, 1917 Death Date: November 22, 1963 U.S. congressman (1946–1952), senator (1953–1961), and president of the United States (1961–1963). John Fitzgerald Kennedy
Democrat John F. Kennedy was elected president in November 1960. He ushered in a new era in U.S. history. Kennedy escalated the U.S. military presence in South Vietnam but was reportedly contemplating a withdrawal of U.S. forces when he was assassinated in Dallas, Texas, on November 22, 1963. (John F. Kennedy Presidential Library)
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China. Throughout his career, in fact, Kennedy was known for his strong anti-Communist sentiments. Kennedy won election to the U.S. Senate in 1952. In 1953 he wed the New York socialite Jacqueline Bouvier. Kennedy had a relatively undistinguished Senate career. Never a well man, he suffered from several serious health problems, including a back operation in 1955 that nearly killed him. His illnesses limited his ability to become an activist senator. While he recuperated from his back surgery, Kennedy wrote—with the assistance of his wife—his second book, Profiles in Courage, that won the 1957 Pulitzer Prize for History. Despite his fragile health and lackluster performance in the Senate, Kennedy nonetheless was reelected in 1958 after losing a close contest for the vice presidential nomination at the Democratic National Convention in 1956. He now set his sights on the presidency. In 1960 he won the Democratic nomination for president on the first ballot. As a northerner and a Roman Catholic, he recognized his weakness in the South and shrewdly chose Senator Lyndon Baines Johnson of Texas as his running mate. As a candidate Kennedy promised more aggressive defense policies, health care reform, and housing and civil rights programs. He also proposed his New Frontier agenda, designed to revitalize the flagging U.S. economy and to bring young people into government and humanitarian service. Kennedy also charged the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration with allowing the Soviet Union to secure superiority in ballistics missiles over the United States. Winning by the narrowest of margins, Kennedy became the nation’s first Roman Catholic president. Only 42 years old, he was also the youngest man ever to be elected to that office. In his inaugural address Kennedy spoke of the need for Americans to be active citizens and to sacrifice for the common good. His address, which in some respects was a rather bellicose call to arms, ended with the now-famous exhortation “ask not what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country.” As president, Kennedy set out to fulfill his campaign pledges. Once in office, he was forced to respond to the ever-more-urgent demands of civil rights advocates, although he did so rather reluctantly and tardily. By establishing both the Alliance for Progress and the Peace Corps, Kennedy delivered American idealism and goodwill to aid developing countries. Despite Kennedy’s idealism, no amount of enthusiasm could blunt the growing tension of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War rivalry. One of Kennedy’s first attempts to stanch the perceived Communist threat was to authorize American-supported Cuban exiles to invade the Communist island in an attempt to overthrow Fidel Castro in April 1961. The Bay of Pigs Invasion, which turned into an embarrassing debacle for the president, had been planned by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) under the Eisenhower administration. Although Kennedy harbored reservations about the operation, he had nonetheless approved it. The failure heightened already-high Cold War tensions with the Soviets and ultimately set the stage for the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.
Cold War confrontation was not limited to Cuba. In the spring of 1961 the Soviet Union renewed its campaign to control West Berlin. Kennedy spent two days in Vienna in June 1961 discussing this hot-button issue with Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev. In the months that followed, the crisis over Berlin intensified with construction of the Berlin Wall, which prevented East Germans from escaping to the West. Kennedy responded to the provocation by reinforcing troops in West Germany and announcing an increase in the nation’s military strength. The Berlin Wall, unwittingly perhaps, eased tensions in Central Europe that had nearly resulted in a superpower conflagration. With the focus directed away from Europe, the Soviets began to clandestinely install nuclear missiles in Cuba. On October 14, 1962, U.S. spy planes photographed the construction of missilelaunching sites in Cuba. The placement of nuclear missiles only 90 miles from America’s shores threatened to destabilize the Western Hemisphere and undermine the uneasy Cold War nuclear deterrent. Kennedy imposed a naval quarantine on Cuba that was designed to interdict any offensive weapons bound for the island. The world held its collective breath as the two Cold War superpowers appeared perched on the abyss of thermonuclear war, but after 13 harrowing days of fear and nuclear threat, the Soviet Union agreed to remove the missiles. In return the United States pledged not to preemptively invade Cuba and to remove its obsolete nuclear missiles from Turkey. Both Kennedy and Khrushchev had been sobered by the Cuban Missile Crisis, realizing that the world had come as close as it ever had to a full-scale nuclear war. Cold War tensions were diminished when the Soviets, British, and Americans signed the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty on August 5, 1963, forbidding atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons. In October 1963 the same three nations agreed to refrain from placing nuclear weapons in outer space. To avoid potential misunderstandings and miscalculations in a future crisis, a hot line was installed that directly linked the Oval Office with the Kremlin. The situation in Southeast Asia proved intractable, however. Throughout much of the Kennedy administration, Vietnam yielded place to Laos, the immediate Indochina problem. Eisenhower had told Kennedy that Laos was the key to Southeast Asia, for if Laos fell the Communists would bring “unbelievable pressure” on Thailand, Cambodia, and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). By the end of 1960 Washington had already provided the Laotian government with $300 million in assistance, of which 85 percent was military. Civil war in Laos flared anew. A military coup had overthrown the rightist government of Laos in August 1960, and civil war had broken out. Both the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and the Soviet Union actively intervened with troops and transport aircraft, but Kennedy decided not to send U.S. troops. In contrast to the Eisenhower administration, Kennedy was not averse to a neutralist solution. After much diplomatic activity, a 14-nation conference convened in Geneva in June 1961. During
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Approval Ratings for Past Presidents during the United States’ Involvement in Indochina President Dwight D. Eisenhower John F. Kennedy Lyndon B. Johnson Richard M. Nixon
Term
Average Approval Rating
Highest Approval Rating
Lowest Approval Rating
1953–1961 1961–1963 1963–1969 1969–1974
65.0% 70.1% 55.1% 49.1%
79% (December 1956) 83% (March 1962) 79% (February 1964) 67% (January 1973)
48% (March 1958) 56% (September 1963) 35% (August 1968) 24% (August 1974)
the next year the conference hammered out a solution in the form of a tripartite coalition government, which proved short-lived. It was clear that the North Vietnamese government wanted to partition Laos in order to secure its vital Ho Chi Ming Trail network by which it supplied the Communist insurgents, known in South Vietnam as the Viet Cong (VC). The failure of the Communists to live up to the Geneva Accords concerning the neutralization of Laos greatly angered Kennedy and strongly influenced his policies regarding Vietnam, precluding an administration retreat there. Kennedy continued the previous administration’s policy of maintaining the South Vietnamese government. Indeed, well before he was president he had been a strong supporter of future South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem. In 1961 Kennedy sent Frederick Nolting to Saigon as the U.S. ambassador. Nolting had no Asian experience and deferred to Diem, meaning that there was no pressure on the South Vietnamese leader to institute meaningful reforms. Kennedy also escalated U.S. involvement, prompted by the long-standing U.S. commitment to battle communism as enunciated in the Containment Doctrine. Many in Washington professed to seeing South Vietnam as part of a larger fabric of Communist expansion. While Kennedy and many of his advisers tended to regard the fighting in Vietnam as a civil war, this position was not shared by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who held to the belief in “aggression from the North” in Vietnam. The so-called domino theory also held sway. This was the belief that if South Vietnam fell to the Communists, then the rest of Southeast Asia would surely follow. There was also the argument that U.S. prestige was on trial. If the United States failed in Vietnam, other nations would lose confidence in Washington’s willingness to project power. Also at stake was the matter of whether the West could respond to what was regarded as a new Communist strategy of wars of national liberation. Domestic political considerations also played a role. Kennedy was sensitive to Republican charges that the Democrats had “lost” China, and he had suffered rebuffs in the failure of the Bay of Pigs Invasion and in the erection of the Berlin Wall. Another “retreat” before communism could have serious political repercussions. In May 1961 Kennedy dispatched Vice President Johnson to Saigon, and less than a week after his return Kennedy agreed to an increase in the size of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) from 170,000 to 270,000 men. The ARVN, however, continued to be indifferently led, inadequately equipped, and ineffective in combat. Kennedy then sent two fact-finding missions to Vietnam. Economist Dr. Eugene
Staley led the first in June and July 1961. His findings stressed that military action alone would not work, and he called for substantial social and political reform. He also pointed out the necessity for greater security and called for the construction of a network of strategic hamlets to protect the peasants. This belated South Vietnamese effort at counterinsurgency, run by Diem’s brother Ngo Dinh Nhu, was plagued by inefficiency and corruption and proved to be a failure. In October 1961 Kennedy’s chief military adviser General Maxwell D. Taylor and his special assistant for national security affairs Walt W. Rostow led another fact-finding mission to Vietnam. They saw the situation primarily in military terms and, among other recommendations, urged a large increase in airplanes, helicopters, and support personnel. They even recommended the deployment of 8,000 American combat troops under the guise of a flood-control team. Undersecretary of State George W. Ball argued against any escalation in the U.S. role. He met privately with Kennedy to express his opposition to the Taylor-Rostow proposals and predicted that if the United States accepted these recommendations, in five years it would have 300,000 men in Vietnam. Kennedy responded, “George, you’re just crazier than hell. That isn’t going to happen.” Kennedy accepted the Taylor-Rostow recommendations except for the introduction of U.S. troops, which Diem, prescient in this at least, opposed as a potential propaganda bonanza for the Communists. To coordinate this increased aid, however, in February 1962 Washington opened a new military headquarters in Saigon. Known as the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), it was headed by General Paul D. Harkins. U.S. helicopter pilots were soon at work supporting ARVN troops in the field, and by the end of 1962 the number of American military personnel in South Vietnam had quadrupled to 11,326. The U.S. military infusion may have helped prevent an outright VC victory in 1962, but the advantage was only temporary. The North Vietnamese government was also escalating its support in the south, and increasingly large numbers of troops, along with weapons and ammunition, were arriving in South Vietnam. The war was not the only thing going badly for the Diem government. Buddhist displeasure with Diem’s government, which was heavily staffed with Catholics, led to demonstrations throughout the country and to the self-immolation of Buddhist monks. Diem’s Brother Nhu, who directed the secret police, greatly embarrassed the Kennedy administration with his raids on Buddhist pagodas and the arrest of some 1,400 people. Diem saw only the
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Communist threat and was quite oblivious to the fact that his regime’s oppression was feeding the insurgency. His response was more oppression. Increasing numbers of South Vietnamese saw Diem as isolated and out of touch with the people. Henry Cabot Lodge replaced Nolting in August 1963 and came to the conclusion that the war could not be won with Diem. The CIA had already reported that an influential faction of South Vietnamese generals wanted to overthrow Diem. Washington was initially opposed to a coup and favored a purge of Diem’s close advisers, but Diem refused to part with his brother and other loyal supporters, and the Kennedy administration then assured the generals that it would not intervene. Meanwhile, further outrages against the Buddhists led the Kennedy administration on October 2, 1963, to suspend economic subsidies and cut off financial support of Nhu’s Special Forces. This was a further encouragement to the plotters, who struck early on November 1, 1963. The next day both Diem and Nhu, who Washington had assumed would be given safe passage out of the country, were murdered. Diem’s death did not bring political stability, for Washington never could find a worthy successor to him. The United States, which could not win the war with Diem, apparently could not win the war without him either. Kennedy’s position on the war was by now ambiguous. In the spring of 1963 he told close advisers that he planned to use optimistic reports from Harkins and Taylor to justify a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces, something that he intended to keep secret until after the 1964 presidential elections. Kennedy’s last statement on Vietnam, made in Fort Worth, Texas, on November 22, 1963, reveals the dilemma he faced: “Without the United States, South Vietnam would collapse overnight.” While there is simply no way of knowing what Kennedy would have done about Vietnam had he lived, his statements about withdrawal were made when the United States was seen to be winning the war. In an effort to solidify political support in Texas, in November 1963 Kennedy embarked on a whirlwind tour of the state with his wife and vice president. On November 22, 1963, in Dallas, Texas, Kennedy, who was riding in an open car, was instantly killed by an assassin’s bullet. In the hours immediately after the murder, Lee Harvey Oswald was arrested for the assassination of the president. Two days later as the president’s body lay in state at the U.S. Capitol, Jack Ruby fatally shot Oswald in the basement of the Dallas police station as millions of Americans watched on television. In a great national outpouring of grief, Kennedy was laid to rest in Arlington National Cemetery on November 25, 1963. LACIE A. BALLINGER AND SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Ball, George Wildman; Containment Policy; Domino Theory; Harkins, Paul Donal; Ho Chi Minh Trail; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeyevich; Ngo Dinh Diem; Ngo Dinh Diem, Overthrow of; Ngo Dinh Nhu; Nolting, Frederick Earnest, Jr.; Rostow, Walt Whitman; Rusk, David Dean; Staley, Eugene; Taylor, Maxwell Davenport
References Beschloss, Michael R. The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960–1963. New York: HarperCollins, 1991. Bradlee, Benjamin C. Conversations with Kennedy. New York: Norton, 1975. Dallek, Robert. An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy, 1917–1963. Boston: Little, Brown, 2003. Freedman, Lawrence. Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Schlesinger, Arthur M. A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1965. Sidey, Hugh. John F. Kennedy, President. New York: Atheneum, 1964.
Kennedy, Robert Francis Birth Date: November 20, 1925 Death Date: June 6, 1968 U.S. attorney general, 1961–1964; U.S. senator, 1965–1968; and presidential candidate, 1968. Born in Brookline, Massachusetts, on November 20, 1925, Robert Francis Kennedy enlisted in the Naval Reserve and attended the V-12 training program at Harvard University. After a period of active duty during which he served on a destroyer, he received his honorable discharge in May 1946 and returned to Harvard, where he graduated in 1948. In 1951 he received a law degree from the University of Virginia and was admitted to the bar. The following year he managed his brother John F. Kennedy’s successful senatorial campaign. In September 1951 Robert Kennedy covered the proceedings surrounding the U.S.-Japan Peace Treaty in San Francisco for the Boston Post. As legal counsel to several Senate committees in the 1950s, Kennedy served on Republican senator Joseph McCarthy’s Senate Subcommittee on Investigations. In 1957 as head counsel and staff director on the committee investigating racketeering in U.S. labor unions, Kennedy engaged in a high-profile confrontation with Teamster boss James (Jimmy) Hoffa, which earned Kennedy national notoriety. He also played a peripheral role in the famous Army-McCarthy Hearings of 1954, although he allegedly professed a continued fondness for his former mentor. In 1960 Kennedy managed his brother’s successful campaign for the presidency. The president-elect soon selected his brother as attorney general of the United States. Not surprisingly, the move resulted in charges of nepotism among Kennedy’s detractors. At the Justice Department, Kennedy made civil rights and organized crime his top priorities. Indeed, he placed the full weight of the Justice Department behind the growing civil rights effort, while also keeping close tabs on civil rights leader Martin Luther King Jr. But Kennedy’s influence extended beyond the Justice Department. As his brother’s closest adviser, he became increasingly involved in foreign policy and national security issues and played
Kent State University Shootings a significant role in the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. He also supported U.S. initiatives in Southeast Asia, including those in Indochina. Following his brother’s assassination in November 1963, Kennedy stayed on as attorney general under President Lyndon B. Johnson but in 1964 resigned to run for the U.S. Senate from New York. Indeed, Johnson and Kennedy had little in common and little use for one another. In the Senate, Kennedy continued to support U.S. efforts in Vietnam, at least initially. He did lament the toll that the war took upon his brother’s Alliance for Progress and Johnson’s Great Society programs and criticized the 1965 U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic. Despite his growing apprehension toward the Vietnam War, especially the massive bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), Kennedy refrained from openly opposing administration policy. He was also acutely aware of the appearance of opportunism and the public perception of his political motives. But as racial strife and urban violence convulsed the country along with mounting antiwar sentiment and massive protests, Kennedy found it increasingly difficult to support the war or to refrain from criticizing the Johnson administration. The presidential campaign of 1968 opened the door for Kennedy, but he held back, refusing at first to jump into the fray. After antiwar senator Eugene McCarthy’s unexpectedly strong performance in the New Hampshire primary, which essentially was a repudiation of Johnson, Kennedy entered the race. In March 1968 when President Johnson announced that he would not seek reelection, Vice President Hubert Humphrey became the administration’s presidential candidate. In addition to his stated desire to end the fighting in Southeast Asia, Kennedy also sought to bridge the many rifts within American society. He quickly emerged as a serious contender for the presidency and became the darling of many in the antiwar Left. On June 4, 1968, he won the all-important California primary, thereby becoming his party’s front-runner. In the early morning hours of June 5 after addressing his supporters at the Ambassador Hotel in Los Angeles, he was shot by Sirhan Sirhan. Kennedy died the following day at the age of 42. Kennedy’s assassination, less than five years after that of his brother and only two months after that of King, devastated the nation and added sad punctuation to the divisive era. DAVID COFFEY See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Democratic National Convention of 1968; Humphrey, Hubert Horatio; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; King, Martin Luther, Jr.; McCarthy, Eugene Joseph References Palermo, Joseph A. In His Own Right: The Political Odyssey of Senator John F. Kennedy. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001. Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. Robert Kennedy and His Times. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978.
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Kent State University Shootings Event Date: May 4, 1970 Site of an incident on May 4, 1970, involving members of the Ohio National Guard and antiwar demonstrators that left four students dead and nine wounded. The incident at Kent State University in Ohio was perhaps the climax of both protests against the war in Vietnam and student unrest on campuses across the nation. The protests at Kent State were part of a widespread spontaneous reaction to the announcement by President Richard M. Nixon of the U.S. incursion into Cambodia, which had begun only days earlier. Other universities, Princeton University among them, voted at this time to strike in protest against the war. A strike center was established at Brandeis University, and by May 4 nearly 100 campuses were on strike or planning to do so. At Kent State, demonstrations began on May 1. Whether actually political in motivation or just an example of the rites of spring, property was damaged, and the mayor of Kent called for the National Guard. On May 2 a large rally took place on campus. After the rally, although not necessarily because of it, the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) building on campus was set alight and burned down. The following day, a Sunday, the Ohio National Guard took up positions on campus. That evening students gathered on the Commons were tear-gassed and dispersed. On May 4 a rally was scheduled for noon. The National Guard attempted to disperse a crowd of perhaps 2,000 people. After some unsuccessful efforts, the National Guard suddenly began firing from the top of a small rise called Blanket Hill at students gathered in a parking lot below. The firing, which began at 12:25 p.m., lasted for 13 seconds. It was estimated that 61 rounds were fired. Four people were killed: Allison Krause, Jeffrey Miller, Sandra Scheuer, and William Schroeder. Only Krause and Miller had been active participants in the rally. The university was closed by court order later that day, but the National Guard remained on duty until May 8. As a result of what had transpired, hundreds more campuses went on strike or experienced demonstrations against the war and the killings at Kent State. Estimates vary, but it is likely that at least 500 campuses either went on strike or experienced serious disruption after the Kent State shootings. The nature of the strikes and demonstrations varied from campus to campus, but a few common denominators were evident. In addition to events held on campuses to protest the war and the incident at Kent State, students often attempted to influence public opinion in nearby communities. Plans were also made to take an active role in the congressional campaign that autumn (the Movement for a New Congress, or the Princeton Plan), the idea being to elect as many peace candidates as possible. Finally, some students formed committees to support the Nixon administration. A few students traveled from campus to campus to encourage strikes, but strike movements were almost always spontaneous reactions to events and were locally organized.
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A Kent State University student lies on the ground after National Guardsmen fired into a crowd of demonstrators on May 4, 1970, in Kent, Ohio. Four students were killed and nine were wounded when the Guard opened fire during a campus protest against the U.S. “incursion” into Cambodia. (AP/Wide World Photos)
Ten days after the shootings at Kent State, 2 students were killed and 12 wounded when police opened fire on a women’s dormitory at Jackson State College in Mississippi in the aftermath of another student antiwar rally. Although many saw the Jackson State incident as another sign of disturbing trends, reaction to that event was relatively muted, and it has never been given the same attention as the Kent State incident. Some have argued that race played a role in that, as Jackson State was historically African American, and the students killed were black. The President’s Commission on Campus Unrest (also known as the Scranton Commission) issued its report on the Kent State shootings in September 1970. Although criticizing violent protest, the report condemned the actions of the National Guard as “unnecessary, unwarranted, and inexcusable.” The report also called on President Nixon to provide “compassionate, reconciling moral leadership . . . [to] bring the country together again.”
Although protests against the war in Vietnam continued with some impressive events in the early 1970s, campus-based protest lost most of its momentum after the Kent State shootings. The Movement for a New Congress had little effect on the autumn campaigns. Other initiatives produced in reaction to the Cambodia Incursion and the Kent State shootings had a similar lack of impact. The Kent State shootings marked the end of an era. MICHAEL RICHARDS See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Cambodia; Cambodian Incursion; Jackson State College Shootings; Media and the Vietnam War; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Television and the Vietnam War References Anderson, Maggie, and Alex Gildzen, eds. A Gathering of Poets. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1992.
Kerrey, Joseph Robert Bills, Scott L., ed. Kent State/May 4: Echoes through a Decade. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1982. Gordon, William A. The Fourth of May: Killings and Coverups at Kent State. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1990. Morgan, Edward P. The 60s Experience: Hard Lessons about Modern America. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991. Zaroulis, N. C., and Gerald Sullivan. Who Spoke Up? American Protest against the War in Vietnam, 1963–1975. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1984.
KENTUCKY,
Operation
Start Date: November 1, 1967 End Date: February 28, 1969 U.S. Marine Corps operation, part of the bloody fighting along the demilitarized zone (DMZ). This 16th-month-long operation involving the 3rd Marine Division began on November 1, 1967, with the goal of securing territory to permit additional construction on the Con Thien–Gio Linh area of the electronic barrier known as the McNamara Line. On November 14 two weeks into the operation, the 3rd Marine Division commander, Major General Bruno A. Hochmuth, was killed when the helicopter in which he was flying from Hue to Dong Ha crashed five miles from Hue. Operation KENTUCKY continued until February 28, 1969. Casualty totals were 3,921 People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) troops and Viet Cong (VC) killed in action. U.S. losses were 478 killed and 2,698 wounded. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Con Thien, Siege of; Demilitarized Zone; Hochmuth, Bruno Arthur; McNamara Line References Clodfelter, Michael. Vietnam in Military Statistics: A History of the Indochina Wars, 1772–1991. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1995. Coan, James P. Con Thien: The Hill of Angels. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2004. Pearson, Willard. The War in the Northern Provinces, 1966–1968. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1975. Shulimson, Jack, Leonard A. Blasiol, Charles R. Smith, and David A. Dawson. U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Defining Year, 1968. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1997. Telfer, Gary L. U.S. Marines in Vietnam: Fighting the North Vietnamese, 1967. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1984.
Kep Airfield Communist-held airfield located approximately 40 miles northeast of Hanoi in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). During the Vietnam War, Kep Airfield served as one of the principal air bases for North Vietnamese Soviet-built MiG
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fighters. The airfield was located within U.S. Route Package VI (a strike zone for both U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy air operations). The site for Kep Airfield lay just east of the American-named “Thud Ridge” along an important transportation network. Aircraft based at Kep could challenge American fighter-bombers attempting to interdict rail lines and roads that extended north from Hanoi to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The North Vietnamese upgraded and expanded the existing airfield at Kep during the summer and autumn of 1965 in order to make it capable of supporting MiG fighters. North Vietnamese MiGs began transferring to Kep from Phuc Yen Airfield in April 1966, although the 923rd Fighter Regiment was not officially established at Kep until September 1966. Throughout 1966 and part of 1967, the United States imposed a bombing restriction on Kep and other airfields, which allowed the MiGs to utilize these bases as refuges from American aircraft. The United States ended this restriction in 1967, however, and attacks against Kep occurred until the end of Operation ROLLING THUNDER on November 1, 1968. The United States renewed attacks on Kep in Operation LINEBACKER I during May–October 1972. Despite the American attacks, the North Vietnamese were able to quickly repair damages and put the airfield back into operation after each raid. TERRY M. MAYS See also Kien An Airfield; LINEBACKER I, Operation; ROLLING THUNDER, Operation; Route Packages; Thud Ridge References Staaveren, Jacob Van. Gradual Failure: The Air War over North Vietnam, 1965–1966. Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 2002. Thompson, Wayne. To Hanoi and Back: The United States Air Force and North Vietnam, 1966–1973. Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museum Program, 2000. Toperczer, Istvan. MiG-17 and MiG-19 Units of the Vietnam War. Oxford, UK: Osprey, 2001. Toperczer, Istvan. MiG-21 Units of the Vietnam War. Oxford, UK: Osprey, 2001.
Kerrey, Joseph Robert Birth Date: August 27, 1943 Businessman, politician, U.S. senator (1989–2001), and Vietnam veteran who earned the Medal of Honor. Joseph Robert (Bob) Kerrey was born in Lincoln, Nebraska, on August 27, 1943. He attended the Nebraska public school system, graduating from the University of Nebraska at Lincoln with a degree in pharmacology in 1966. In spite of health problems, Kerrey was drawn to follow the family tradition of military service, and he volunteered for the U.S. Navy’s Officer Candidate School (OCS). Attendance at OCS was followed by additional training in the rigorous underwater demolition school at Coronado Island, California. After completing the challenging underwater program, Kerrey went on to more
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advanced training, ultimately becoming a member of the elite fighting force known as the Navy SEALS (Sea, Air, and Land). In 1968 Lieutenant Kerrey was assigned to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) in SEAL Team 1. He and his men patrolled the Mekong Delta, where he led his men on an attack of a suspected Viet Cong (VC) meeting at Thanh Phong on February 29, 1969. However, as was often the case, by the time Kerrey’s unit arrived, the enemy was no longer present. Nonetheless, the SEAL attack at night on the village resulted in a number of civilian causalities. In recent years Kerrey has been criticized for his role in what some have called the Thanh Phong Massacre. Awarded the Bronze Star Medal for his actions, Kerrey has said that he deeply regrets what occurred at Thanh Phong and the loss of innocent lives. Some villagers later charged that civilians there had been rounded up after dark and summarily shot, something that Kerrey and his team adamantly deny. Kerrey’s unit carried out another attack, at Nha Thang, on March 14, 1969, capturing local political leaders there. Kerrey and his unit scaled a 350-foot cliff to drop unnoticed into the village, but during the descent the team’s cover was compromised, and the unit came under fire. Kerrey sustained a serious leg wound when a grenade exploded at his feet. In spite of his grave injuries, he continued to direct his unit until he was transported from the field of battle. The raid was hailed as a success, with several of the captured VC leaders providing vital intelligence. Kerrey meanwhile was treated for his wounds, which resulted in the amputation of the lower part of one of his legs. Returned to the United States for recuperation, Kerrey was awarded the Medal of Honor by President Richard M. Nixon in May 1970. After receiving a medical discharge from the U.S. Navy, Kerrey went into business, operating a chain of restaurants and fitness facilities. His success in business was soon matched by his achievements in politics. Kerrey, a political novice, came from nowhere to challenge incumbent Republican governor Charles Thone of Nebraska in the 1982 gubernatorial election. Kerrey waged an effective campaign and won the election. He took office in January 1983. After serving one four-year term as governor, Kerrey ran successfully for the U.S. Senate in 1988, taking office in 1989. Kerrey distinguished himself in the Senate, and in 1992 he campaigned to secure the Democratic presidential nomination. He lost to former governor William J. Clinton from Arkansas, who went on to win the presidential election. Kerrey left the Senate in 2001. This did not mean an end to his public service, however. He subsequently served on the 9/11 Commission and, as a longtime advocate of higher education, accepted the presidency of the New School University in New York in 2001. JEFFERY B. COOK See also Viet Cong Infrastructure References Caldwell, Christopher. “Review of When I Was a Young Man.” Financial Times, May 31, 2002, 19.
Kerrey, Robert. When I Was a Young Man: A Memoir. New York: Harcourt, 2002. Malcolm, Andrew. “Democrats Gain Five Governors.” New York Times, November 4, 1982.
Kerry, John Forbes Birth Date: December 11, 1943 Vietnam War veteran, U.S. senator (1985–), and 2004 Democratic presidential nominee. John Forbes Kerry was born in Aurora, Colorado, on December 11, 1943, the son of a World War II Army Air Force test pilot, foreign service officer, and attorney. His mother, a nurse, was a member of the distinguished and wealthy Forbes family of Boston. As a child, Kerry lived abroad for a time and also attended an exclusive college preparatory school in New Hampshire. Kerry attended Yale University, graduating in 1966. That same year he joined the U.S. Navy, serving on a destroyer off the coast of Vietnam. During 1968–1969 he volunteered to command a Swift (navy patrol) boat; he was stationed first at Cam Ranh Bay and then on the island of Phu Quoc. He was wounded three times in combat, awarded the Silver Star, the Bronze Star Medal, and three Purple Hearts. Kerry returned to the United States in the spring of 1969, and he left the navy on March 1, 1970. Upon his return Kerry, who was proud of his service in the Vietnam War, nevertheless dedicated much energy to opposing the war and to speaking out on policies that he believed had failed the U.S. mission in Vietnam. Some of his actions were not without controversy. His antiwar activity included membership in several antiwar organizations, writings against the war, testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and participation in numerous demonstrations, including one in which he and nearly 1,000 fellow Vietnam veterans threw down their service medals on the steps of the U.S. Capitol while television reporters filmed the event. In 1971 he was a participant in the controversial Winter Soldier Investigation, during which more than 100 veterans gave testimony about war crimes they had seen or participated in. During testimony before the U.S. Senate, he asked a memorably rhetorical question: “How do you ask a man to be the last man to die for a mistake?” In 1972 Kerry decided to run for a U.S. House of Representatives seat, representing northeastern Massachusetts as a Democrat. He lost the race and decided to attend law school at Boston College, from which he earned a degree in 1976. He then became a fulltime prosecutor in Middlesex County. He left that post in 1979 to establish his own law firm, which was a modest success. In 1982 he successfully ran for the post of lieutenant governor in Massachusetts and served under Governor Michael Dukakis. Two years later Kerry ran for a U.S. Senate seat and won. He has remained in the Senate since January 1985.
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John Kerry, then a 27-year-old former navy lieutenant who headed the Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW), receives support from a gallery of peace demonstrators and tourists as he testifies before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in Washington, D.C., on April 22, 1971. (AP/Wide World Photos)
In the Senate, Kerry earned a reputation for his earnestness, deep grasp of issues, and ability to reach across the aisle when necessary to effect bipartisan legislative compromises. He is considered a moderate to Left-leaning Democrat. From 1991 to 1993 Kerry chaired the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. The committee’s final report, issued in 1993, stated that there was no clear evidence to suggest that any Americans remained alive and in captivity in Southeast Asia. However, the report also concluded that it was possible that some detainees may have survived beyond Operation HOMECOMING. Kerry decided to run for president in 2004, and he soon established himself as one of the front-runners in an unusually crowded slate of Democratic hopefuls. After winning the January 2004 Iowa Caucus, Kerry went on to win a string of state primaries, and by the early spring he was the presumptive Democratic presidential nominee. After choosing North Carolina senator John Edwards as his vice presidential running mate, Kerry was formally nominated at the Democratic National Convention that summer and began a hard-fought campaign to unseat incumbent George W. Bush. Kerry’s main platform in the election was his opposition to the war in Iraq and the administration’s handling of the War on Terror after the September 11, 2001, terror attacks. He also took issue with Bush’s economic policies, which had caused huge budget defi-
cits and an uneven economy and had skewed income toward the already wealthy. Kerry also made vague promises of health care reform. Without a doubt, however, the Iraq War was the most important subject of debate. In this Kerry’s past voting record did not serve him well, as he strongly backed the October 2002 joint congressional resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq. After the March 2003 invasion of Iraq and the subsequent revelation that Iraq did not have weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), Kerry turned sharply against the war and became an outspoken critic of the Bush administration. Not surprisingly, the Bush campaign jumped on Kerry’s position vis-à-vis the Iraq War, labeling him a “flip-flopper.” Over the course of the late summer and into the autumn, Bush campaign operatives planted seeds of doubt into the electorate as to Kerry’s competence, decisiveness, and ability to handle national security issues. The Kerry campaign was sometimes slow and tepid in its reactions to these attacks, which only compounded the damage. The Vietnam War also entered the campaign in the form of a series of searing television ads by the right-wing Swift Boat Veterans for Truth. Among other things, the group accused Kerry of dishonorable conduct during and after his Vietnam War service and charged that he had lied or greatly exaggerated his role in the war. The commercials were without merit or substantiation, but Kerry
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was too slow to respond to them. He went on to lose the 2004 election. The incumbent Bush bested him by less than 3 percent of the popular vote. Remaining in the U.S. Senate, Kerry continued to criticize the Bush administration’s policies, especially those toward the Iraq War. PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR. See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; HOMECOMING, Operation; Riverine Warfare; Swift Boat; Swift Boat Veterans for Truth References Kerry, John. A Call to Service: My Vision for a Better America. New York: Viking Books, 2003. Kimmery, Anthony. “John Kerry: The Senate’s Rising Voice for Veterans.” VVA Veteran 10(10) (October 1990): 1, 13–16. Kranish, Michael, Brian C. Mooney, and Nina J. Easton. John F. Kerry: The Complete Biography. New York: PublicAffairs, 2004.
Kerwin, Walter T., Jr. Birth Date: June 14, 1917 Death Date: July 11, 2008 U.S. Army officer; chief of staff of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), at the time of the Tet Offensive; and later commanding general of II Field Force. Walter T. “Dutch” Kerwin Jr. was born in West Chester, Pennsylvania, on June 14, 1917. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, in 1939 and was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Field Artillery. Throughout most of World War II he served with the 3rd Infantry Division in North Africa, Sicily, Italy, and southern France. During the critical fighting for the Anzio beachhead in 1944, the commander of the U.S. VI Corps, Major General Lucian K. Truscott, placed Kerwin, then only a major, in charge of the corps’ counterbattery efforts to silence the German guns. Later in southern France, Kerwin was seriously wounded near Mutzig and almost lost a leg. Following the war and a lengthy period of recovery from his wounds, Kerwin progressed steadily through a series of service schools and command and staff assignments. In 1957 he was assigned as commander of the 56th Field Artillery Group, a unit of the Corps Artillery of the XVIII Airborne Corps. His first assignment as a brigadier general was command of the Divisional Artillery of the 3rd Armored Division in Germany in August 1961. The division commander was Major General Creighton Abrams. Kerwin assumed command of the 3rd Armored Division in March 1965. In May 1967 Kerwin, now a major general, and Abrams, now a full general, flew to Vietnam together. Abrams had been assigned as MACV deputy commanding general and was scheduled to replace General William C. Westmoreland shortly as commanding general. Abrams personally selected Kerwin to be his chief of staff. At the wish of President Lyndon B. Johnson, however, Westmoreland remained at MACV far longer than originally planned, and
Kerwin served as his chief of staff until Westmoreland relinquished command in June 1968. Rather than the traditional chief of staff’s role of answering only to the commander, Kerwin found himself in a position where he had to serve not only Westmoreland and Abrams but also U.S. ambassador to Vietnam Ellsworth Bunker and Robert W. Komer, MACV’s civilian deputy commander for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS). It was a difficult position that required great tact and diplomatic skill as well as the traditional organizational and directional talents of a successful chief of staff. During the 1968 Tet Offensive, Kerwin was responsible for making sense out of the overwhelming flood of conflicting and incomplete information that poured into MACV headquarters at the start of the attack on January 31. Simultaneously, he had to handle all the frantic demands for situation reports coming from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in Washington. It was the classic job of a military staff officer to bring order out of chaos. As the situation slowly clarified, Westmoreland was most concerned about the vulnerability of the northern provinces of Vietnam. At Kerwin’s suggestion, Westmoreland made the decision to establish a MACV Forward Headquarters at Phu Bai, just south of Hue, and to send Abrams north to assume direct tactical control of the fighting. The siege of Khe Sanh had begun before the countrywide attacks of the Tet Offensive, and as the main Tet attacks were beaten back, Khe Sanh assumed an even greater political and psychological significance. One of the biggest operational problems was the lack of coordination between the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Air Force for air support of the beleaguered base. Remembering Kerwin’s performance at the Anzio beachhead, Abrams recommended to Westmoreland that he send his chief of staff north to untangle the situation. Kerwin finally secured a resolution to the problem by holding the representatives from the various services in a tent and refusing to let them leave until they hammered out an agreement. Kerwin later remembered that solving the fire-support problem at Anzio had been much simpler. After Westmoreland finally turned command over to Abrams, Kerwin continued to serve as MACV chief of staff for only about a month. In August 1968 Kerwin assumed command of II Field Force, a corps-level command. In April 1969 Kerwin left Vietnam and returned to an assignment on the Army Staff at the Pentagon. Over the course of the next nine years he was one of the key architects of the rebuilding of the U.S. Army following the devastating experience of Vietnam and its transition to an all-volunteer force. He served successively as the army’s deputy chief of staff for personnel, commanding general of the Continental Army Command, commanding general of U.S. Army Forces Command, and finally as vice chief of staff of the U.S. Army, retiring in 1978 as a full (four-star) general. Kerwin was for many years a consultant for defense contractors Martin Marietta and Lockheed Martin. He was also active in the Army and Air Force Mutual Aid Association and was its chairman
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from 1982 to 1997. In addition, he was actively involved in the Association of the United States Army and other service-related organizations. Kerwin died in Alexandria, Virginia, on July 11, 2008. DAVID T. ZABECKI
See also Helicopters, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Helicopters, Employment of, in Vietnam; United States Air Force; United States Army; United States Marine Corps; United States Navy
See also Abrams, Creighton Williams, Jr.; Bunker, Ellsworth; Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Khe Sanh, Battle of; Komer, Robert W.; Tet Offensive, Overall Strategy; Westmoreland, William Childs
References Condit, Kenneth W. The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Vol. 2, 1947–1949. Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, 1979. Wolf, Richard I., ed. The United States Air Force Basic Documents on Roles and Missions. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1987.
References Carafano, James Jay. “Walter T. Kerwin, Jr.” In Chief of Staff: The Principal Officers behind History’s Great Commanders, Vol. 2, edited by David T. Zabecki, 205–223. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008. Sorley, Lewis. Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times. 2nd ed. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008.
Key West Agreement Agreement made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and Secretary of Defense James Forrestal during a March 11–14, 1948, meeting at the Key West Naval Base. Forrestal called the meeting because the JCS could not agree on certain specific roles and missions. Confusion over roles and missions arose because the National Security Act of 1947 had failed to specify the contingencies in which one service might operate in another’s primary area of responsibility. These primary areas were the land for the U.S. Army, the sea for the U.S. Navy, and the air for the U.S. Air Force. Disputes arose when the U.S. Navy proposed building a large aircraft carrier to be used in launching nuclear attacks on land targets. The U.S. Air Force claimed this mission. The U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force were also in conflict over air defense of land areas. The army opposed the navy’s marine corps as a duplication of its own mission. The JCS could not resolve their differences, so Forrestal called the Key West meeting, where they hammered out an agreement. It included these points: (1) the navy would retain its aviation but would not develop a strategic air arm; (2) naval aviation should be used over land for interdiction and close air support but only with air force concurrence; (3) the U.S. Marine Corps would be limited in size to four divisions and one field corps; and (4) the air force and army would divide responsibility for air defense of land. The Key West Agreement gave the U.S. Air Force control of all land-based armed aircraft but allowed the U.S. Army to keep its small aircraft and helicopters for artillery spotting and a few other missions. In the 1950s the U.S. Army expanded this aviation charter to include the transportation of troops into battle and supplying them inside the combat zone. The army also armed its helicopters for defense. The Key West Agreement was the charter that ultimately made possible U.S. Army air mobility in Vietnam. JOHN L. BELL JR.
Khai Dinh Birth Date: October 8, 1885 Death Date: November 6, 1925 Vietnamese emperor. The 12th emperor of the Nguyen dynasty, Khai Dinh was born Prince Nguyen Buu Dao on October 8, 1885, in Hue. He was a son of Emperor Dong Khanh in Hue and was also the younger brother of acclaimed Vietnamese nationalist emperor Ham Nghi (r. 1884–1885). In 1916 the 18-year-old Emperor Duy Tan led an unsuccessful uprising against French rule. The French exiled him to Réunion Island and decided to install Nguyen Buu Dao as emperor. His father, Emperor Dong Khanh, had been the most pliable of recent Nguyen emperors, and the French hoped that Nguyen Buu Dao would prove the same. Assuming the throne on May 17, 1916, he took the name of Khai Dinh, meaning “auger of peace and stability.” As the French had hoped, Khai Dinh proved subservient to the colonial administration. Because he had the reputation of being a tool of the French, Khai Dinh was unpopular with most Vietnamese. Young nationalist Nguyen Ai Quoc (later known as Ho Chi Minh) wrote a play about Khai Dinh, “The Bamboo Dragon,” that ridiculed him as all show and no substance. Khai Dinh’s unpopularity peaked in 1923 when he authorized an increase in taxes on the peasantry proposed by the French, part of the income from which was used for the building of his own large, elaborate tomb. Khai Dinh also signed arrest warrants for a number of Vietnamese nationalist leaders. In 1922 Khai Dinh traveled to France to view the Marseille Colonial Exhibition. His second wife, Tu Cung, whom he married in 1913, gave birth to Nguyen Phuoc Thien, who on Khai Dinh’s death became, at age 12, the last Vietnamese emperor, Bao Dai. Frail and suffering from poor health, Khai Dinh ultimately became a drug addict. Although his 9-year reign was generally peaceful, during this time Vietnamese nationalist sentiment solidified. Khai Dinh died in Hue on November 6, 1925. His large tomb, located on the slopes of Chau Chu Mountain six miles from Hue, is today a tourist attraction. Begun in 1920 and completed in 1931, it is chiefly of reinforced concrete with statues of stone and is a blend of traditional Vietnamese and modern architectural styles. SPENCER C. TUCKER
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See also Bao Dai; French Indochina, 1860s–1946; Ham Nghi; Ho Chi Minh References Chapuis, Oscar. The Last Emperors of Vietnam: From Tu Duc to Bao Dai. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2000. Nguyen Khac Vien. The Long Resistance, 1858–1975. Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1975. Nguyen Khac Vien. Vietnam: A Long History. Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1987.
Kham Duc Special Forces Camp, Fall of Start Date: May 11, 1968 End Date: May 12, 1968 Kham Duc Special Forces Camp was located in northwestern Quang Tin Province, 10 miles from the Laotian border and 90 miles southwest of Da Nang. Named for a small village about half a mile from its defense compound, the camp was situated midway along a 3.4-mile paved runway dominated by jungle-covered hills. The base was a launch site for cross-border Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), Studies and Observation Group (SOG) reconnaissance teams engaged in special operations along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The garrison included U.S. and Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) Special Forces, Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) soldiers, and U.S. Army engineers. A satellite camp located at Ngoc Tavak, on the site of an old French fort, was 3 miles closer to the Laotian border. Its defenders included 173 CIDG troops, 8 U.S. Army Special Forces personnel, 3 Australian advisers, and 33 U.S. marines. Kham Duc took on added significance when it became the only remaining Special Forces camp along the Laotian border in the I Corps Tactical Zone after the fall of Lang Vei during the 1968 Tet Offensive. Throughout April 1968 Communist units were noted to be concentrating in the vicinity of Kham Duc. According to postwar Vietnamese sources, the goal in the Kham Duc area was to clear a way to build a supply road usable by trucks to transport supplies and heavy equipment from the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos down to the lowlands outside of Da Nang to support the next wave of the 1968 Tet Offensive. Because of the growing threat to the camp, 632 troops, primarily from the 23rd Infantry (Americal) Division, were flown in on May 10 and 11, nearly doubling the size of the defending force. Early on the morning of May 10, Ngoc Tavak was assaulted by the 1st and 21st regiments of the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) 2nd Division. After fierce resistance, the camp was abandoned later that day. Subsequent Boeing B-52 Stratofortress strikes apparently had little effect on PAVN forces approaching Kham Duc from the direction of Ngoc Tavak, and the Communist troops encircled and brought Kham Duc under heavy fire during May 10 and 11.
On May 11 General William Westmoreland ordered the camp evacuated. That night, despite artillery and Douglas AC-47 Spooky gunship support, PAVN forces overran all seven allied hilltop outposts overlooking Kham Duc. During the morning of May 12, massive ground assaults were launched against the camp perimeter. At 6:05 a.m. Seventh Air Force was notified of the decision to evacuate the camp. All in-country and out-country air force units were ordered to make a maximum effort to support the evacuation. Tankers for air refueling as well as forward air controllers (FACs) were to provide continuous coverage. FACs were responsible for preparing a corridor for transport aircraft and keeping PAVN forces away from the defense perimeter by directing tactical air support. The first helicopter to land was hit by Communist fire and exploded, temporarily blocking the runway. Meanwhile, a U.S. Air Force Douglas A-1E Skyraider ground support aircraft was shot down, although this loss did not discourage the continuous stream of aircraft remaining overhead. After the runway was cleared, a Lockheed C-130 Hercules was crippled by gunfire while landing but subsequently managed to take off. Meanwhile, U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Army helicopters brought in ammunition and carried out wounded. Four of the helicopters were shot down, and virtually all helicopters participating were damaged. At 11:05 a.m. a Chase/Fairchild C-123 Provider picked up a load of personnel. The next fixed-wing aircraft to land was a C-130. At 1:30 p.m. the C-130 took off with a crew of five and at least 150 CIDG personnel and their dependents. Struck by antiaircraft fire, it exploded in a fireball off the end of the runway; there were no survivors. The next C-130 was hit by ground fire but managed to evacuate a load of passengers. The fourth C-130 was raked by enemy fire and crash-landed, fortunately not blocking the runway. Four more C-130s landed during the afternoon, with the last flight picking up the remaining evacuees but, because of error, dropping off a three-man airlift Combat Control Team. Knowing that his crew was probably landing on an enemy-controlled field, Lieutenant Colonel Joe M. Jackson, piloting a C-123, landed in a rescue attempt. The aircraft, on the ground for 40 seconds, was surrounded by exploding ammunition dumps and was under rocket and mortar fire. Hundreds of tracers crisscrossed in front of the aircraft, which during takeoff swerved around a dud 122-millimeter rocket on the runway. For the daring rescue, Jackson received the Medal of Honor. At 2:26 p.m. with the three airmen safely airborne, the evacuation of nearly 1,500 personnel was complete. Two days later, on May 14, a helicopter rescued three U.S. Army personnel who had escaped from an outpost overrun on the night of May 11. GLENN E. HELM See also Airpower, Role in War; Civilian Irregular Defense Group; United States Special Forces; Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, Army; Vietnam, Republic of, Special Forces
Khe Sanh, Battle of References Gropman, Alan L. Airpower and the Airlift Evacuation of Kham Duc. Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2005. Singlaub, John K., with Malcolm McConnell. Hazardous Duty: An American Soldier in the Twentieth Century. New York: Summit Books, 1991. Spector, Ronald H. After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam. New York: Free Press, 1993. Vu Anh Tai, Le Minh Tan, and Phan Van Tich. Su Doan 2 (Tap 1) [2nd Division (Volume 1)]. Da Nang, Vietnam: Da Nang Publishing House, 1989.
Khe Sanh, Battle of Event Dates: April–October 1967 and January–March 1968 There were two distinct phases in the Battle of Khe Sanh. The first phase in the battle for the Khe Sanh base occurred in 1967 and evolved from U.S. and People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) engagements in the northern region of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). As part of his overall strategy, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), commander General William Westmoreland ordered the construction of interconnected bases along the supposedly demilitarized zone (DMZ) between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and South Vietnam to act as an infiltration barrier, later using sensors and motion detectors to alert these bases to Communist troop movements. The outposts were designed not to stop PAVN infiltration but instead to funnel the troop movements to areas where bombers could easily strike them. One such outpost was Khe Sanh, a base camp on high ground surrounded by dense tree-canopied heights of up to 3,000 feet. It was some 6 miles from Laos to the west and 14 miles from the DMZ to the north. The village of Khe Sanh, inhabited by Vietnamese and Montagnards, was surrounded by smaller villages and French coffee plantations in a majestic landscape of emerald-green jungles, piercing mountains, and mist-shrouded waterfalls. Westmoreland hoped that Khe Sanh could be used as a patrol base for arresting PAVN infiltration from Laos along Route 9, a long-range patrol base for operations in Laos, an airstrip for reconnaissance planes scanning the Ho Chi Minh Trail, an anchor for defenses south of the DMZ in the west, and a stepping-off point for ground operations against the Ho Chi Minh Trail. In August 1962 MACV had ordered U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) and allied troops to establish the camp near the village of Khe Sanh. SOF units, called Study and Observation Groups (SOGs), used it to launch extended long-range reconnaissance operations into Laos to observe PAVN infiltration. If they located a large enemy concentration, they would call in air strikes. In April 1966 a single marine battalion temporarily occupied the base. Six months later General Westmoreland directed the U.S. Marine Corps, over its objections, to build a single-battalion base
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immediately above the SOG base. In October one battalion of marines occupied the base. By the spring of 1967 the battalion had been reinforced to regimental strength by the III Marine Amphibious Force. Soon afterward SOGs observed marked increases in traffic on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, as did observation posts along the DMZ. Westmoreland believed that the Communists were planning a siege at Khe Sanh reminiscent of that at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. In September he directed Seabees to upgrade the Khe Sanh landing strip to accommodate Lockheed C-130 Hercules aircraft. Moreover, 175-millimeter (mm) guns with a 20-mile range were placed in a more secure area at Camp Carroll, 12 miles distant. In the spring of 1967 as part of the PAVN plan to open up a new battlefront along South Vietnam’s northern border to draw U.S. forces away from the heavily populated lowlands to the south and to inflict heavy U.S. losses by luring American units into terrain favorable to PAVN forces, the PAVN sent a reinforced regiment (95C Regiment, 325C Division, plus a battalion from the division’s 18C Regiment) south to the Khe Sanh area to attack U.S. forces there. In April 1967 a marine patrol was ambushed near one of the surrounding hills west of Khe Sanh. A large rescue patrol suffered heavy casualties when many of its M16 rifles jammed. This incident led to congressional hearings and army modifications that improved M16 reliability. From April 24 to May 12, 1967, the 3rd Marines initiated several major assaults on three Communist-occupied hills surrounding Khe Sanh. These so-called Hill Fights produced fierce hand-tohand fighting that left 160 marines dead and 700 wounded, but the Americans destroyed one entire PAVN regiment and a large artillery emplacement in progress. At the end of this period the 3rd Marines were replaced by the 26th Marines, which left its 1st Battalion at Khe Sanh. The above operations were part of Operations CROCKETT (April–July 1967) and ARDMORE (July–October 1967). Both were supported by a massive bombing campaign (SLAM, for Seek, Locate, Annihilate, and Monitor) planned by U.S. Seventh Air Force commander General William Momyer. These 1967 engagements convinced Westmoreland that with adequate bombing and aerial resupply, U.S. outposts could survive even when outnumbered, a notion that he sold to the Lyndon B. Johnson administration. Thus, U.S. military planning called for maintaining and enlarging DMZ outposts, especially Khe Sanh. This led to the 1968 Battle of Khe Sanh. Between October and December 1967 PAVN commander General Vo Nguyen Giap greatly built up PAVN strength near Khe Sanh. U.S. marines, reluctant to garrison the base in the first place, were now ordered to fortify their defensive positions. At 8:30 p.m. on January 2, 1968, a marine reconnaissance patrol spotted six shadowy figures on a slope near the base’s outer defenses. The marines opened fire and killed five PAVN officers who were apparently on a reconnaissance mission. The incident convinced General Westmoreland that several thousand enemy soldiers were near Khe Sanh and that Giap hoped to repeat his
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A medical corpsman attempts to calm a wounded U.S. marine, January 26, 1968. The marine was wounded in a North Vietnamese rocket and artillery attack on the marine base at Khe Sanh in far northwestern South Vietnam. (AP/Wide World Photos)
Dien Bien Phu victory at Khe Sanh. Westmoreland, who was clearly using the marines as bait to draw out the PAVN units, saw this as an opportunity for a decisive engagement. Indeed, two regiments of the PAVN 325C Division that had fought at Dien Bien Phu had crossed into South Vietnam from Laos and were then located northwest of Khe Sanh. Two regiments of the 320th Division had crossed the DMZ and were 20 miles northeast. They were supported by an armored regiment, two artillery regiments, and the 304th Division in Laos. PAVN forces totaled between 20,000 and 30,000 men, many of whom were actually support or reserve forces. Route 9, the only road to Khe Sanh, had been cut by Communist forces months earlier, so Westmoreland poured in supplies and reinforcements by air. Included on the flights were numerous reporters anxious for a big story. By mid-January, 6,000 marines defended the main plateau and four surrounding hills named for their height: Hill 950, Hill 881, Hill 861, and Hill 558. Approximately 3,000 marines defended the Khe Sanh base itself, and the
same number were split among the hill positions. Infantry at each garrison were supported by 105-mm howitzers and mortars. At 5:30 a.m. on January 20, Captain William Dabney and 185 men of Company I launched a patrol from Hill 881 South to Hill 881 North. Although such patrols were common practice, Dabney sensed that he would make contact that day and requested additional support. Colonel David Lownds, commander of the 26th Marines, deployed 200 additional men to support the patrol. Dabney divided his group, sending one platoon up one ridge and another two platoons up the other. As they ascended, the marines were preceded by a rolling artillery barrage. Dabney hoped that the Communist troops would respond and give away their positions. Instead, the PAVN veterans waited until a platoon led by Lieutenant Thomas Brindley came within close range and opened up with automatic rifles, machine guns, and rocket-propelled grenades. The point man was killed immediately, and several other platoon members were hit. Dabney sent a second platoon to flank the PAVN position, while Brindley called in artillery directly on his position. The second unit
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was hit as it advanced, and a massive firefight followed. Brindley ordered his men to make a dash for the PAVN position. Even though Brindley was killed and dozens of his men were wounded, with the support of fighter-bombers dropping napalm the marines took the position. Lownds concluded early the same morning that a larger attack would ensue, and he ordered Dabney to withdraw. Already the marines had lost 7 killed and 35 wounded. By nightfall Dabney’s men were back on Hill 881 South, and the Khe Sanh combat base was on maximum alert. (Years later Dabney was awarded the Navy Cross for his heroic leadership.) That night the marines received information from an apparent Communist deserter that a major attack was planned on Hill 881 South and Hill 861 at 12:30 a.m. on January 21. The marines brought up several special weapons, including two Ontos assault vehicles capable of firing fléchette rounds, each with thousands of steel darts. They also set out several layers of razor-sharp concertina wire, hundreds of Claymore mines, and trip flares. PAVN forces attacked Hill 861 on schedule using bangalore torpedoes to break through marine defenses. The marines’ initial position was overrun, but at 5:00 a.m., supported by mortars, they
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counterattacked with success. At 5:30 a.m. PAVN forces commenced an intense rocket and artillery attack against Khe Sanh proper. The main ammunition dump took a direct hit, resulting in a succession of explosions that left the defenders with barely enough ordnance to return fire. Artillery officer Major Roger Campbell measured craters caused by enemy shells to target the distance and direction of the PAVN guns. Despite heavy damage to the landing strip, that afternoon six C-130 planes arrived. Their 24 tons of cargo was mostly artillery shells, but Colonel Lownds estimated that he would need 160 tons of supplies per day to hold out. At 6:30 a.m. the PAVN attacked the village of Khe Sanh. Allied troops utilized air and artillery support to repel the attack, but thousands of local villagers fled their homes to seek refuge with the marines. The marines did not allow them into their lines for fear of sabotage. Nearly 3,000 tried to escape down Route 9 to Dong Ha, but only 1,432 arrived. Despite setbacks, marine defenses remained strong. The ammunition dump explosion did produce wild headlines that fed public concerns about U.S. involvement in Vietnam. President Johnson became so concerned that he had hourly reports sent
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to him and a map room set up in the White House basement with a large board replica of Khe Sanh. Westmoreland controlled air operations, personally picking targets based on advice from General Momyer. For several days after the first attacks, Boeing B-52 Stratofortresses bombed targets every three hours. By March 31 they had dropped between 60,000 and 75,000 tons of bombs. In addition, U.S. fighter-bombers flew an average of 300 sorties daily. B-52s also struck PAVN command center caves in Laos. On occasion the B-52s dropped bombs within 1,000 yards of the Khe Sanh perimeter even though the marines were unable to see the high-flying bombers. Still, regular PAVN rocket attacks continued, making life on the plateau both difficult and dangerous. Hygiene and psychological strains were also a problem. Sniper duels were commonplace and became macabre games of life and death. Despite tensions, morale at Khe Sanh remained high throughout the siege. Between January 21 and February 5, PAVN forces mounted several small attacks against new marine positions on Hill 861A near a quarry just outside the perimeter. On February 5 PAVN troops overran a portion of Hill 861, killing seven marines. The marines retook the position using tear gas and air and artillery support. Mortar crews on Hill 881 South fired 1,100 rounds into PAVN positions. The fighting ended in hand-to-hand combat. Early on February 7 PAVN forces overran the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp about five miles southwest of Khe Sanh and only a mile from Laos. Early on February 8 three PAVN companies struck a platoon of about 50 members of A Company, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, holding little Hill 64 just outside the combat base. The assaulting troops knocked out the marine bunkers with satchel charges and rocket-propelled grenades. When marines reinforcements arrived at about 9:00 a.m., they found 21 marines dead, 26 badly wounded, and 4 missing in action. Only 1 of the defenders was unscathed. On February 25 a 29-man marine patrol looking for a Communist mortar position stumbled on a PAVN bunker and was overwhelmed. Unable to rescue the marines, Lownds ordered the men to escape the best way they could. Only 3 got away. Corporal Roland Ball, a Sioux Native American, carried out the body of his commanding officer, Lieutenant Dan Jacques. Dead marines lay on the field unburied for another month until the siege ended. On March 6 Communist forces began their withdrawal. By March 9 only a few thousand rear-guard units remained. Operation SCOTLAND, the final part of the siege at Khe Sanh, ended on April 1, officially terminating the battle. The same day allied units began Operation PEGASUS to reopen Route 9. On April 8 they linked up with Khe Sanh. The next day was the first since January 21 that no PAVN shells struck the marine base. Two months later, on June 26, 1968, U.S. forces abandoned the Khe Sanh base. The official casualty count for the second phase of the Battle of Khe Sanh was 205 marines killed in action and more than 1,600 wounded; however, base chaplain Ray W. Stubbe placed the death toll closer to 475. This does not include Americans killed in collateral actions, Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South
Vietnamese Army) Ranger casualties on the southwest perimeter, 1,000 to 1,500 Montagnards who died during the fighting, or the 97 U.S. and 33 ARVN troops killed in the relief operation. MACV estimated PAVN losses at 10,000 to 15,000 men. Most of these casualties occurred as a result of U.S. B-52 Arc Light bombing raids and other aerial and artillery support. The official body count was 1,602. PAVN sources list a total of 2,270 PAVN troops killed during the siege of Khe Sanh, although it is not clear whether this total includes soldiers missing in action. The siege of Khe Sanh in particular and the Tet Offensive in general disheartened the American public, which began to question the cost and worth of the Vietnam War to America. Indeed, Khe Sanh and the Tet Offensive marked the beginning of the end for America’s involvement in Southeast Asia. Who won the second phase of the Battle of Khe Sanh? U.S. Marine Corps historian Jack Shulimson observed that is not clear if North Vietnamese forces actually intended to seize Khe Sanh or merely used the assault as a way to draw American forces away from cities. General Giap claimed victory for the PAVN. According to him, the Communists never intended to overrun the marine base. Communist documents and histories that have become available since the war ended do not entirely support General Giap’s claim. These records state that the 1968 attacks on Khe Sanh and the rest of northern Quang Tri Province had two objectives: to draw U.S. and South Vietnamese forces away from the populated areas of South Vietnam and to inflict massive casualties on opposing forces (specific goals set were to kill 20,000–30,000 “enemy,” primarily American, soldiers and to “totally annihilate five to seven U.S. battalions”). These documents also reveal that while the primary PAVN plan was to lure U.S. forces out of their dug-in fortified positions and into the open so that they could be killed in large numbers, there was a provision in the plan to “attack and liberate [overrun] Khe Sanh” if that was possible. If the siege of Khe Sanh was meant to be only a Communist ruse, then it was a successful one. Significant U.S. military assets were diverted to this isolated area of South Vietnam, permitting Communist forces to attack many key cities in South Vietnam during the Tet Offensive. Looking back after the war while congratulating itself for important successes in the Khe Sanh campaign, the PAVN also admitted to a number of failures and “shortcomings.” In an internal battle study conducted 20 years after the Battle of Khe Sanh, PAVN historians concluded that “we did not draw U.S. relief forces out to the Route 9–Khe Sanh area as quickly as we should have” and that the PAVN had failed to reach its goals for killing U.S. troops and “annihilating” entire U.S. battalions. The battle study faulted the PAVN high command and the Khe Sanh Campaign Headquarters for their incorrect analysis of the probable U.S. reaction to the attack, for overestimating the PAVN’s own capabilities, for inadequate preparations, for failing to mass adequate forces to mount “annihilation attacks,” and for their “failure to direct the campaign with clarity.”
Khieu Samphan For the Americans, the Battle of Khe Sanh was meant to be the best opportunity to implement the strategy of attrition, to destroy Communist military forces at a rate above which they could be replaced. In the battle U.S. forces achieved one of their most satisfying victories. Colonel Lownds was convinced that they destroyed two entire PAVN divisions. Thus, if Khe Sanh was intended as another Dien Bien Phu, it had failed. WILLIAM P. HEAD AND PETER W. BRUSH See also Arc Light Missions; Demilitarized Zone; Ho Chi Minh Trail; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Lang Vei Special Forces Camp, Battle for; Momyer, William Wallace; PEGASUS–LAM SON 207A, Operation; SCOTLAND, Operation; Tet Offensive, Overall Strategy; Tet Offensive and the Saigon Circle; United States Marine Corps; United States Special Forces; Vo Nguyen Giap; Westmoreland, William Childs References Head, William, and Lawrence Grinter, eds. Looking Back on the Vietnam War: A 1990s Perspective on the Decisions, Combat, and Legacies. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1993. Military History Institute of Vietnam. Chien Dich Tien Cong Duong So 9–Khe Sanh, Xuan He 1968 [The Route 9–Khe Sanh Offensive Campaign, Spring–Summer 1968]. Hanoi: Ministry of Defense, 1987. Momyer, William W. Airpower in Three Wars: World War II, Korea and Vietnam. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978. Murphy, Edward F. The Hill Fights: The First Battle of Khe Sanh. New York: Random House, 2003. Nalty, Bernard C. Air Power and the Fight for Khe Sanh. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, U.S. Air Force, 1973. Nguyen Viet Phuong, Le Van Bien, and Tu Quy. Cong Tac Hau Can Chien Dich Duong 9 Khe Sanh Xuan He 1968 (Mat) [Rear Services Operations during the Route 9–Khe Sanh Campaign, Spring–Summer 1968 (Secret)]. Hanoi: General Department of Rear Services, 1988. Pham Gia Duc. Su Doan 325, 1954–1975, Tap II [325th Division, 1954–1975, Vol. 2]. Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1986. Pisor, Robert. The End of the Line: The Siege of Khe Sanh. New York: Norton, 1982. Prados, John, and Ray W. Stubbe. Valley of Decision: The Siege of Khe Sanh. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991. Shulimson, Jack. U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1966: An Expanding War. Marine Corps Vietnam Series. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Marine Corps Historical Center, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters, 1982.
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opment,” is a classical Marxist analysis of Cambodia’s backwardness and its agricultural and industrial problems. On returning to Phnom Penh in 1959, Khieu opened the biweekly French newspaper L’Observateur, which mixed praise of Cuba, China, and the Soviet Union with articles on Cambodia. He drew the attention of Prince Norodom Sihanouk’s security police, who on one occasion beat him in public. By 1962, however, Khieu had joined Sihanouk’s government and had been elected to the National Assembly. He served as secretary of state for commerce from October 1962 to July 1963. Reelected to the National Assembly in 1966, he fled to the countryside the following year when the Samlaut Uprising provoked Sihanouk to denounce the Khmer Rouge. After Sihanouk’s deposition in 1970, Khieu reappeared as deputy prime minister and defense minister in Sihanouk’s resistance government and then as commander in chief of the resistance forces. Khieu also became a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. After 1976 he was the chairman of the State Presidium, the head of state of Democratic Kampuchea. Following the Vietnamese invasion in 1979, which ousted the Khmer Rouge from governance, he returned to the jungle, where his forces continued to be supplied arms by China. All the while, Khieu was reportedly very close and doggedly loyal to Pol Pot.
Khieu Samphan Birth Date: July 27, 1931 Khmer Rouge leader. Born in Svay Rieng, Cambodia, on July 27, 1931, Khieu Samphan was the son of a minor civil servant. He attended a lycée in Cambodia and then went to France in 1954 under a government scholarship to study law and economics. In 1959 he received a doctorate in economics from the University of Paris. While in France, Khieu already showed left-wing tendencies. He served as secretary-general of the Khmer student union, a center for left-wing agitation among young Cambodians in France. His doctoral dissertation, “Cambodia’s Economy and Industrial Devel-
Khieu Samphan was a leader of Cambodia’s infamous Khmer Rouge and president of Kampuchea (Cambodia) during 1976–1979. Arrested in November 2007, he underwent trial by a United Nations–sponsored tribunal in Cambodia for crimes against humanity but has insisted that he was not directly responsible for the deaths of millions of his people during the period of Khmer Rouge rule. (AFP/Getty Images)
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Under the 1991 peace agreement implemented under United Nations (UN) auspices, Khieu became the senior Khmer Rouge member of the Supreme National Council, composed of two representatives of each faction under the chairmanship of Sihanouk. Khieu’s return to Phnom Penh was marked by a violent demonstration thought to have been organized by the security services of the Phnom Penh government faction, which forced him to temporarily flee for his safety to Bangkok. After the Khmer Rouge withdrew from the peace agreement, Khieu resurfaced in 1994 as prime minister and minister of the national army of the clandestine Provisional Government of National Union and National Salvation opposed to the Phnom Penh coalition government. By now he was the de facto head of the Khmer Rouge. In December 1998 after the Khmer Rouge broke apart, he surrendered to government forces. He was then allowed to live at government expense in a semiautonomous region of Cambodia. In November 2007 Khieu Khieu allegedly suffered a stroke one day after the Khmer Rouge’s deputy prime minister and foreign minister, Ieng Sary, and his wife were arrested and charged with crimes against humanity. Upon his release from the hospital in early 2008, Khieu was himself arrested and charged by the Cambodia Tribunal for war crimes and crimes against humanity. His first appearance in court was in April 2008; the trial is ongoing. He
has steadfastly denied that Khmer policies were aimed at genocide and stated that Pol Pot’s intention was to build a modern Cambodia, not tear it down. Khieu’s attorney has argued that as head of state, Khieu was not responsible for policies carried out poorly or incorrectly by subordinates. ARTHUR J. DOMMEN See also Cambodia; Khmer Rouge; Pol Pot; Sihanouk, Norodom References Carney, Timothy Michael. Communist Party Power in Kampuchea (Cambodia). Data Paper No. 106. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, January 1977. Khieu Samphan. Cambodia’s Economy and Industrial Development. Data Paper No. 111. Translated by Laura Summers. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, March 1979.
Khmer Kampuchea Krom Anti-Communist faction, loosely allied with the Khmer Serai, that sought autonomy for Khmer Krom (ethnic Cambodian) people living in the Mekong Delta of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) in return for their military services. During the 1960s
Mercenary troops fighting Communist forces in South Vietnam en route to a raid along the Cambodian border in September 1969. The Khmer Kampuchea Krom, an anti-Communist group, sought autonomy for the Khmer Krom people of the Mekong Delta in return for military assistance. (UPI-Bettmann/Corbis)
Khmer Rouge a number of U.S. Special Forces–led Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) and Mobile Strike Force (“Mike Force”) units were composed of Khmer Krom soldiers. After Cambodian general Lon Nol’s March 17, 1970, coup against Prince Norodom Sihanouk, a number of Khmer Krom units were sent from South Vietnam to Phnom Penh to strengthen the newly organized Forces Armées Nationale Khmer (FANK, Khmer National Armed Forces). Traditionally aggressive, Khmer Krom soldiers were highly experienced from years of fighting in South Vietnam. By February 1972 they made up a high percentage of FANK’s effective military strength, serving in some 13 infantry brigades and the Khmer Special Forces. However, extensive casualties in largely unsuccessful operations as well as increasing disaffection among some units at being kept in Cambodia past their promised return dates led to an increase of nonethnic replacements and a dilution of the best Khmer Krom formations. By March 1972 only the Khmer Krom 7th, 44th, and 51st brigades were still highly regarded. Six months later a mutiny in a Khmer Krom battalion led to an end in recruitment in South Vietnam, and the reputation of Khmer Krom military prowess came to an ignominious end. EDWARD C. PAGE See also Cambodia; Forces Armées Nationales Khmères; Khmer Serai; Lon Nol; Sihanouk, Norodom References Caldwell, Malcolm, and Lek Tan. Cambodia in the Southeast Asian War. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973. Conboy, Kenneth, and Kenneth Bowra. The War in Cambodia, 1970–75. Men-at-Arms Series. London: Osprey, 1989.
Khmer National Armed Forces See Forces Armées Nationales Khmères
Khmer Rouge The name most commonly used for the most extreme and violent faction of Cambodian Communists. While the Khmer Rouge (“Red Khmer”) held power in Cambodia between 1975 and 1979, they herded millions of Cambodians into slave labor camps, executed hundreds of thousands, and were responsible for many more deaths from starvation, exhaustion, and disease. After being driven out of Phnom Penh by Vietnamese forces in early 1979, the Khmer Rouge waged a guerrilla resistance that was still active in large areas of the country more than 15 years later, despite an agreement sponsored by the United Nations (UN) that was supposed to bring peace to Cambodia after more than two decades of war.
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The origins of the Khmer Rouge date to the early 1960s, when a small group of revolutionaries launched a rebellion against Cambodian ruler Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Among the leaders was a French-educated Communist, Saloth Sar. Sar would become known to history as Pol Pot, the pseudonym he adopted as leader of the Khmer Rouge after it came to power. The uprising remained small during the 1960s, while the war in neighboring Vietnam exploded. Khmer insurgents received no help from the Vietnamese Communists, who had reached an accommodation with Sihanouk that allowed them to resupply and rest their troops on Cambodian territory and who refrained, in return, from aiding Sihanouk’s enemies. To Saloth Sar and his colleagues this branded the Vietnamese as enemies of their own struggle, even though both groups were Communist. Making a virtue of their isolation, they nurtured an increasingly extreme and violent vision of a pure revolution, which would succeed through sheer ideological zeal and utter indifference to sacrifice and suffering. After Sihanouk’s overthrow by rightist military leaders in March 1970, the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese Communists became partners, though mistrustful ones. Both were also now allied with Sihanouk, whose injured pride and thirst for revenge led him to join forces with his former enemies. Beside the Khmer Rouge there appeared a Vietnamese-sponsored Cambodian resistance force led mainly by a cadre of Cambodians who had fought with the Viet Minh against the French and had lived in Vietnam since the 1950s. Old antagonisms were submerged for several years, but around the beginning of 1973 the Khmer Rouge moved to seize full control of the revolution. Hundreds of Vietnamese-trained cadres were secretly executed, as were resistance leaders associated with Sihanouk, even while the prince himself, living in China, remained the figurehead leader of the revolutionaries’ exile government. Outside Cambodia throughout the war, almost nothing was known of the Khmer Rouge. The very name of the Communist Party of Kampuchea was kept secret (remaining so for two years after the war, history’s only case of a Communist party remaining clandestine even after it had won power). The insurgents were hardly less shadowy to the Cambodians themselves, who commonly referred
Estimated Population of Cambodia, 1964–1974 Year
Estimated Population
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
7,919,000 8,110,000 8,280,000 6,780,000 6,590,000 6,450,000 6,400,000 6,682,000 6,650,000 6,890,000 7,110,000
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With a skull on the muzzle of his M-16 rifle, a Khmer Rouge soldier waits with his comrades for word to move out from Dei Kraham, south of Phnom Penh along Highway 2, on September 5, 1973. (Bettmann/ Corbis)
to them only as the peap prey (“forest army”). But behind their veil of secrecy as they consolidated their power and pressed ever more heavily against Lon Nol’s increasingly decrepit regime, the revolutionaries nursed their hatred of the Vietnamese and their fantasies of a revolution so sweeping that it would obliterate every trace of Cambodia’s past. April 17, 1975, the date when Lon Nol’s hapless army surrendered and the victorious guerrillas marched into Phnom Penh, was for the Khmer Rouge the first day of “Year Zero,” the beginning of the total transformation of Cambodian society. Within hours the new rulers issued an astonishing order: the entire population of Phnom Penh was to be expelled to the countryside, at once and with no exceptions. Teenaged revolutionary soldiers, remembered by one witness as “grim, robotlike, brutal,” herded swarms of dazed civilians onto the roads leading out of the capital city. Sick and wounded hospital patients were turned out of their beds and forced to join the exodus. An estimated 2 million to 3 million people were marched out of Phnom Penh, and 600,000 to 750,000 more, in similar brutal fashion, were marched from other towns and cities, altogether about half of the country’s entire population.
In the countryside former city dwellers were put to work in slave labor camps, while the new regime, identifying itself only as Angka Loeu (“Organization on High”), embarked on a murderous purge of its former enemies and everyone else considered to represent the old society. Soldiers and civil servants of the former government were slaughtered, as were teachers, Buddhist priests and monks, intellectuals, and professionals. The party’s frenzied search for enemies inexorably led to fantasies of traitors in its own ranks. In waves of purges, hundreds of high-ranking leaders and thousands of their followers were killed, usually after gruesome torture. At Tuol Sleng, a Phnom Penh school converted into an interrogation center, a grisly archive documented approximately 20,000 executions there alone. Meanwhile, the Khmer Rouge were also engaged in increasingly violent clashes with their former allies, the Vietnamese. Finally, on Christmas Day 1978, 100,000 Vietnamese troops invaded Cambodia, capturing Phnom Penh two weeks later. The city was still virtually empty, however, and after the Khmer Rouge fled, residents began trickling back, “all in black pajamas,” a Vietnamese official recalled, “and thin, like ghosts.” The Vietnamese installed a new government headed by a former Khmer Rouge commander, Heng Samrin, but they were unable to quell continued resistance from Khmer Rouge soldiers who had regrouped in the countryside. Vietnamese forces withdrew in 1989 after a 10-year occupation. Two years later the Khmer Rouge and two smaller rebel factions signed a peace agreement with the Phnom Penh regime, now led by Hun Sen, but despite the pact the Khmer Rouge never disarmed. Nor did the Khmer Rouge take part in the May 1993 election for a new government. For several years Khmer Rouge guerrillas harassed government forces in widespread areas of the country. Beginning in 1996, however, the movement began to splinter. In August 1996 Ieng Sary, Pol Pot’s former brother-in-law and one of his closest collaborators while the Khmer Rouge was in power, defected to the government side, bringing with him about 4,000 guerrillas who had been operating in western Cambodia. In return Sary requested a royal amnesty, despite the fact that he had been under a death sentence since 1979 for the bloodshed committed by the Khmer Rouge regime. Reluctantly King Sihanouk granted his request. The following spring while increasingly violent conflict between the rival co–prime ministers Hun Sen and Prince Norodom Ranariddh all but paralyzed the government in Phnom Penh, a new split opened up among Khmer Rouge leaders in their remaining stronghold in northern Cambodia. Dissident Khmer Rouge officials led by Khieu Samphan, the nominal prime minister, held a series of meetings with negotiators representing Prince Ranariddh in which they discussed terms for a cease-fire and the eventual reintegration of Khmer Rouge troops and territory under the national government. As part of the deal, the Khmer Rouge would overthrow Pol Pot, symbolically shedding its bloody past, and join Ranariddh’s National United Front, a multiparty alliance organized to oppose
Khmer Serai Hun Sen’s Cambodian People’s Party. Their guerrillas would not be disarmed or disbanded and would remain in control of the territory they occupied. The talks led to a last spasm of bloodletting within the Khmer Rouge in June 1997 as Pol Pot and his supporters sought to block an agreement. On Pol Pot’s orders, longtime Khmer Rouge defense minister Son Sen was executed along with about a dozen family members. Shortly afterward Pol Pot’s group seized Khieu Samphan and the other senior members of the Khmer Rouge negotiating team. By this point, however, nearly all of Pol Pot’s comrades, including his old colleague Ta Mok, the Khmer Rouge military commander, had turned against him. Replenishing their supplies with weapons and ammunition flown in on government helicopters, anti–Pol Pot forces pursued their former “Brother No. 1” through the jungles near the Khmer Rouge base at Anlong Veng. On June 19, 1997, the 72-year-old leader, sick and exhausted and being carried on a stretcher, was captured. With Pol Pot’s arrest, the bloody history of the Khmer Rouge should have reached its final page. However, the bargaining between his former comrades and Prince Ranariddh’s negotiators had not only divided the Khmer Rouge but had also fatally split the unstable coalition in Phnom Penh. On July 6, 1997, just a day before an agreement with the new Khmer Rouge leaders was to be announced, Hun Sen seized power, forestalling the alliance between the Khmer Rouge and Ranariddh’s forces. The prince fled the country, and the Khmer Rouge melted back into their forest camps. Several weeks later in an open-air meeting hall at their Anlong Veng headquarters, the Khmer Rouge staged an extraordinary show trial to condemn Pol Pot, not for the hundreds of thousands of murders carried out under his rule in the 1970s but rather for plotting against his fellow executioners Son Sen and Ta Mok during the final breakup of the movement. At his trial Pol Pot sat silent and seemingly dazed, leaning on a cane and holding a small rattan fan, while several hundred former followers chanted “Crush! Crush! Crush! Pol Pot and his murderous clique!” After the charges against him were read out, the tribunal announced a sentence of life imprisonment; however, he was under only in-house detainment. In April 1998 some of Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge followers reportedly agreed to turn him over for trial in an international war crimes tribunal. The very same day that the news was leaked to the press, Pol Pot was found dead. His handlers quickly cremated the body before an autopsy could be performed, leading many to believe that he had either committed suicide or had been poisoned. Instead of being peacefully reabsorbed into Cambodian life, however, the Khmer Rouge and its new leaders were again engaged—in alliance with military units that had remained loyal to Prince Ranariddh—in armed resistance against the pursuing government army. But Ieng Sary, Khieu Samphan, Ta Mok, and others with a good deal of blood on their own hands continued to play their part in a sorrowful cycle of vengeance and violence that had already lasted more than 30 years and had begun to seem to be
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Cambodia’s permanent destiny. By 1999 most of the Khmer Rouge leaders, including Ta Mok and Khieu Samphan, had surrendered, and the Khmer Rouge all but dissolved, leaving only nightmares in its wake. Most surviving Khmer Rouge leaders live in the area of Pailin or anonymously in Phnom Penh. Today Cambodia has largely recovered from the Khmer Rouge era. The nation has a very young population, with three-quarters of them too young to remember the time when the Khmer Rouge was in power. In 2009, however, the Cambodian Ministry of Education began requiring instruction in the schools regarding Khmer Rouge atrocities. ARNOLD R. ISAACS See also Cambodia; Heng Samrin; Hun Sen; Khieu Samphan; Lon Nol; Parrot’s Beak; Pol Pot; Sihanouk, Norodom; Vietnam, Socialist Republic of, 1975–Present References Becker, Elizabeth. When the War Was Over: The Voices of Cambodia’s Revolution and Its People. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986. Chanda, Nayan. Brother Enemy: The War after the War. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986. Deac, Wilfred P. Road to the Killing Fields: The Cambodian War of 1970–1975. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1997. Ponchaud, François. Cambodia Year Zero. Translated by Nancy Amphoux. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1978.
Khmers See Cambodia; Ethnology of Southeast Asia
Khmer Serai Anti-Communist Cambodian resistance group led by nationalist Son Ngoc Thanh. Throughout the 1960s the Khmer Serai (Free Khmer) waged an intermittent struggle against both the Communists and the Cambodian government of Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Loosely allied with the ethnic Khmer Kampuchea Krom (KKK) of the Mekong Delta in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), the Khmer Serai could not always depend on assistance from the South Vietnamese government. Many Khmer Serai members, however, served in unconventional warfare units organized and run by U.S. Army Special Forces. The Khmer Serai operated from two main base areas. The first was in Cambodia’s Dongrek Mountains along its border with Thailand. Dongrek Serai soldiers wore identifying yellow or blue scarves and regular Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) field uniforms and were armed with AK-47 rifles to enable them to utilize captured Communist ammunition. The second Khmer Serai base area was in the Mekong Delta within the ARVN IV Corps operational area. These soldiers wore red scarves and South Vietnamese police field uniforms. They were
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armed with U.S. weapons to prevent them from being mistaken for Communist insurgents. Khmer Serai soldiers also commonly wore Buddhist amulets on gold chains around their necks. To petition divine protection, they frequently carried the amulets in their mouths during combat. On March 17, 1970, Khmer Serai rebel forces participated in General Lon Nol’s ouster of Prince Sihanouk. Dongrek Serai troops, after retraining in Thailand, then formed the core of the Siem Reap Special Brigade. This brigade later became the highly regarded 9th Brigade Group of the Forces Armées Nationale Khmer (FANK, Khmer National Armed Forces). EDWARD C. PAGE See also Forces Armées Nationales Khmères; Khmer Kampuchea Krom; Lon Nol; Sihanouk, Norodom; United States Special Forces; Vietnam, Republic of, Army References Caldwell, Malcolm, and Lek Tan. Cambodia in the Southeast Asian War. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973. Conboy, Kenneth, and Kenneth Bowra. The War in Cambodia, 1970–75. Men-at-Arms Series. London: Osprey, 1989.
Union. At the 20th Party Congress in 1956, Khrushchev formally denounced Stalinism and its personality cult. In 1957 a failed attempt by Malenkov and his supporters to push aside Khrushchev ended the struggle, and Malenkov was purged from the party apparatus. Khrushchev was now poised to become the Soviet Union’s undisputed leader. Khrushchev’s tenure was marked by inconsistent policies, toofrequent shifts in high-level personnel, and poorly conceptualized ideas. Nevertheless, he did enjoy some success, especially in the Soviet space program and with some economic and industrial policies. In the international arena he tried to engage in détente with the West, but his frequent outbursts and bellicose policies often made that effort a difficult one. Certainly his initiation of the 1958 Berlin Crisis, his support of the decision to erect the Berlin Wall in 1961, and his reckless placement of intermediaterange ballistic missiles in Cuba that led to the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis all worked against a more cordial relationship with the West. Although Khrushchev never visited Vietnam, he was the first Soviet leader to show sustained interest in Southeast Asia. The Soviet Union’s influence with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) declined in the beginning of the 1960s as
Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeyevich Birth Date: April 17, 1894 Death Date: September 11, 1971 Soviet politician, first secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), and premier of the Soviet Union during 1958–1964. Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev was born in the village of Kalinovka near Kursk on April 17, 1894, to a peasant family. He spent the first half of his life in the Ukraine. He had little formal education, and the CPSU became his vehicle for social mobility. Joining the CPSU in 1918, Khrushchev rose rapidly in the hierarchy. In 1939, he became a full member of the Politburo, the party’s supreme policy-making body. He was among the few upper-echelon party officials to escape Soviet leader Joseph Stalin’s Great Purges. After the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, Stalin named Khrushchev a lieutenant general and put him in charge of suppressing the Ukrainian resistance; he was also tasked with moving heavy Soviet industry farther to the east. After the war Khrushchev ran afoul of Stalin, who demoted him for a time, although by 1949 Khrushchev was again in Stalin’s good graces as chief party organizer in Moscow. In 1952 Stalin tasked Khrushchev with reorganizing the CPSU’s hierarchy. Upon the death of Joseph Stalin in March 1953, Khrushchev succeeded him as the first secretary of the CPSU. For the next four years Khrushchev was locked in a power struggle with Georgy Malenkov over who would dominate the CPSU and the Soviet
Rising to the position of leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1953 after the death of Joseph Stalin, the mercurial Nikita Khrushchev led the Soviet Union through some of the tensest years of the Cold War before being ousted in 1964. (Library of Congress)
Kien An Airfield Hanoi increasingly sided with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the rivalry between the two Communist giants. Khrushchev’s policy regarding Vietnam was marked by two chief considerations. On one hand, the growing prospects of war between the United States and North Vietnam presented the Soviet Union with great opportunities. An American failure could reduce the influence of the West in Asia, which could improve the Soviet bargaining position vis-à-vis the United States. Soviet assistance to North Vietnam would also project a vitalized image of Soviet-style communism to counter the growing appeal of Maoism within the Third World. On the other hand, Vietnam offered a greater danger of a possible military confrontation with the United States. Following the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, Khrushchev again sought better relations with the United States and signed the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, along with President John F. Kennedy, in 1963. Therefore, Khrushchev would tread very carefully in Vietnam. Yet this policy meant that he was trying to ride two horses at the same time: to achieve détente with the United States and to support North Vietnam in its war. As time passed Khrushchev became more disillusioned with the idea that Vietnam presented great opportunities. By 1964 he seemed essentially ready to disengage. In fact, U.S. intelligence agents believed that Khrushchev favored only minimal Soviet involvement in the region. Khrushchev recognized the trap posed for the Soviet Union by Vietnam. His souring on Vietnam was a significant factor in his removal from power in October 1964. His perceived weak response following the August 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Incident made him appear indecisive and badly weakened his political base. Certainly North Vietnamese leaders disliked Khrushchev. They understood that he was willing to sacrifice Vietnam for the sake of peaceful coexistence with the West, which would allow him to reduce defense spending and to concentrate on economic improvements for the Soviet Union. Khrushchev’s efforts to decentralize the Soviet economy alienated the entrenched bureaucracy, and his agricultural policies were a dismal failure. Furthermore, his colleagues came to distrust his aggressive personalized leadership. In October 1964 while Khrushchev was on holiday, they seized the opportunity to conduct a palace coup and remove him from power. After this Khrushchev essentially became a persona non grata. Indeed, a host of developments led to Khrushchev’s downfall: failed domestic policies, the Sino-Soviet split, inconsistent policies toward North Vietnam, the disastrous Cuban Missile Crisis, and the leader’s increasingly unstable behavior. Although he managed to write his memoirs in this period, Khrushchev remained in obscure retirement until his death on September 11, 1971, in Moscow. MICHAEL SHARE AND PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR. See also Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; United Nations and the Vietnam War; Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, 1954–1975
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References Cohen, Steven, ed. The Soviet Union since Stalin. Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1980. Gaiduk, Ilya V. The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War. Chicago, IL: Ivan R. Dee, 1996. Khrushchev, Nikita S. Khrushchev Remembers. Boston: Little, Brown, 1971. Medvedev, R. A., and A. A. Medvedev. Khrushchev. New York: Norton, 1978. Taubman, William C. Khrushchev: The Man and His Era. New York: Norton, 2003.
Kien An Airfield Airfield located southwest of Haiphong in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), prior to 1975. During the Vietnam War, Kien An Airfield served as an important base for MiG fighters in the defense of the port of Haiphong and other potential American targets along the coast. Located within Route Package VI, aircraft based at Kien An could challenge U.S. Navy aircraft approaching from aircraft carriers located in the Gulf of Tonkin or U.S. Air Force planes flying from the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) or Thailand against eastern North Vietnam. The North Vietnamese upgraded and expanded the existing airfield at Kien An during the second half of 1965, ensuring that it was ready to accommodate Soviet-made MiG fighters by the end of the year. Throughout 1966 and part of 1967, the United States imposed a bombing restriction on Kien An and other North Vietnamese airfields, allowing the MiG fighters to operate from them with impunity. This restriction was lifted in March 1967, and Kien An Airfield experienced its first bombing raid on April 23, 1967. Although the airfield suffered considerable damage in the attack, a combined military and civilian labor force managed to put it back into operation within 36 hours. Attacks against Kien An continued until the end of Operation ROLLING THUNDER in November 1968 and were briefly renewed during Operations LINEBACKER I and LINEBACKER II in 1972. Nevertheless, following each raid the North Vietnamese were able quickly to repair damage and restore the facility to operation. TERRY M. MAYS See also Airpower, Role in War; Haiphong; LINEBACKER I, Operation; LINEBACKER II, Operation; ROLLING THUNDER, Operation; Route Packages; Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, Air Force References Staaveren, Jacob Van. Gradual Failure: The Air War over North Vietnam, 1965–1966. Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 2002. Thompson, Wayne. To Hanoi and Back: The United States Air Force and North Vietnam, 1966–1973. Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museum Program, 2000. Toperczer, Istvan. MiG-17 and MiG-19 Units of the Vietnam War. Oxford, UK: Osprey, 2001. Toperczer, Istvan. MiG-21 Units of the Vietnam War. Oxford, UK: Osprey, 2001.
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King, Martin Luther, Jr. Birth Date: January 15, 1929 Death Date: April 4, 1968 Ordained minister, U.S. civil rights leader, political activist, and critic of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. Born on January 15, 1929, in Atlanta, Georgia, Martin Luther King Jr. graduated from high school at the age of 15 and attended Morehouse College, graduating in 1948. Two years later he earned a BA in divinity from Crozer Theological Seminary, and in 1955 he received a PhD from Boston University. Following in his father’s footsteps, King was ordained a minister in 1947. He was in the forefront of the fledgling Civil Rights Movement in the mid-1950s after he moved to Montgomery, Ala-
bama, as minister at the Dexter Avenue Baptist Church. Under his direction, the Montgomery Bus Boycott, which began in December 1955, attracted national attention. The boycott was designed to end racial segregation on city buses and spoke to the larger problem of segregated public facilities nationwide but especially in the South. The boycott ultimately succeeded in its goal. In 1957 King cofounded the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) to promote civil and voting rights. A strong advocate of nonviolent protest, King followed the example of India’s Mahatma Gandhi by urging civil disobedience instead of violence or intimidation to effect change. For the next several years the SCLC remained largely on the sidelines as African American students organized sit-ins to force the desegregation of lunch counters and restaurants in the South. In 1962 King and the SCLC launched
Reverend Martin Luther King Jr. at a press conference in Birmingham, Alabama, on May 16, 1963. King led the African American struggle to achieve the full rights of U.S. citizenship and eloquently voiced the hopes and grievances of African Americans and the poor before he was assassinated in 1968. King was a strong opponent of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. (Library of Congress)
KINGFISHER, Operation
a failed protest campaign in Albany, Georgia. The following year the SCLC began a successful protest campaign in Birmingham, Alabama, but police brutality at the hands of white officers toward the protesters shook the nation and caused much embarrassment internationally. King, however, knew that the violence in Birmingham helped showcase the nation’s archaic and disturbing policies toward race and, more importantly, highlighted the hypocrisy of U.S. foreign policy, which championed human rights abroad but glossed over civil rights abuses at home. Following the spectacular success of his August 1963 March on Washington, during which he delivered his stirring “I Have a Dream” speech, King reached the pinnacle of his career. The impact of the event, which attracted more than 250,000 people and was televised nationally, helped convince President John F. Kennedy, a somewhat reluctant promoter of the civil rights cause, that the federal government had to do more to promote desegregation and civil rights. In 1964 King received the Nobel Peace Prize and an honorary doctorate from Yale University, but, more importantly, he became a major player on the national political scene, with access to the White House and Congress. After Kennedy’s November 1963 assassination, King became an enthusiastic supporter of President Lyndon Johnson and his Great Society program. Indeed, the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act, which Johnson lobbied hard to enact, implemented many of King’s goals. As early as mid-1965 King began to grow increasingly concerned over U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and as his concerns became increasingly public, his relationship with the Johnson administration deteriorated. King viewed U.S. intervention in Southeast Asia as little more than U.S. imperialism carried out under the banner of fighting communism. He also lamented the fact that a disproportionate share of draftees were African Americans and that as the conflict escalated they made up an equally disproportionate share of battle casualties. On numerous occasions he referred to the conflict as a “poor man’s war” fought for rich men. But chief among King’s concerns was his belief that an enlarged U.S. commitment to Vietnam seriously threatened hardwon civil rights and social gains in the United States, including the Great Society. In 1967 King began to devote entire speeches to Vietnam. He called for a cessation of bombing in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and for meaningful negotiations, offering himself as a moderator. King’s antiwar stance drew widespread criticism. Civil rights advocates implored him not to endanger the movement by linking it with the growing but controversial antiwar struggle. But to King the two were inseparable. Although most Americans still supported the war, King resolved to make it a major issue in the 1968 presidential election. By this time the rift between King and the Johnson administration had reached open hostility, and King and his followers were subjected to Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) surveillance and government smear tactics. That same year the Civil Rights Movement began to splin-
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ter, with some former King supporters abandoning his nonviolent tactics. Others advocated Black Power, a militant form of African American advancement that borrowed from the philosophy of slain black separatist Malcolm X. By 1968 King had lost the support of significant segments of the black population, and his anti–Vietnam War posture had alienated many whites. Rising racial tensions, rioting, and concerted opposition threatened to thwart much of what had been achieved, but despite serious challenges from both black and white critics, King elevated to new heights his campaign against the war, poverty, and inequality. In the midst of this, his most ambitious campaign to date, King was assassinated on April 4, 1968, in Memphis, Tennessee, while organizing a strike of sanitation workers. His murderer was James Earl Ray, a longtime criminal who abhorred King’s attempts to achieve desegregation. Ray was eventually apprehended, tried, and convicted. He spent the remainder of his life in prison. DAVID COFFEY See also African Americans in the U.S. Military; Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Civil Rights Movement; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Great Society Program; Hoover, John Edgar; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, Robert Francis; Project 100,000 References Dougan, Clark, and Samuel Lipsman. A Nation Divided. The Vietnam Experience Series. Boston: Boston Publishing, 1984. King, Martin Luther, Jr. and Clayborne Carson, ed. The Autobiography of Martin Luther King, Jr. New York: Warner Books, 1998. Oates, Stephen B. Let the Trumpet Sound: The Life of Martin Luther King, Jr. New York: Signet, 1991.
KINGFISHER,
Operation
Start Date: July 16, 1967 End Date: October 31, 1967 Military operation conducted in the demilitarized zone (DMZ) area by the 3rd Marine Division beginning in July 1967. Its mission was to stop entry of People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) troops into Quang Tri Province. Five battalions from the 3rd Marine Division and the 9th Marines initiated the early stages of the operation. The operation began on July 16, 1967. Through July 28 there was minimal contact with the PAVN. On July 28 the 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines, reinforced with tanks, went into the DMZ along Route 606. On the morning of July 29 the battalion began its withdrawal south of the DMZ when it came under fire from PAVN units in prepared positions along Route 606. Marine tanks and armored personnel carriers came under fire from small arms and machine guns, mortars, and command-detonated mines. Air strikes were then ordered to provide support for the marines. Company M, 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines, which had been ordered to move up from Con Thien, assisted the command group
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in breaking through PAVN lines and setting up a defensive position. The number of casualties in the other companies of the 2nd Battalion prevented further movement south until perimeter defenses were strengthened and medevac helicopters could evacuate wounded personnel. On July 30 helicopters evacuated all of the casualties. Prior to 2nd Battalion’s movement into the DMZ, what appeared to be a minor incident occurred that would later have significant tactical impact in the northern I Corps Tactical Zone. On July 21 a resupply vehicle convoy from Dong Ha left for Khe Sanh. A portion of its route ran through the tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) of Lieutenant Colonel Robert Needham’s 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines, which had responsibility for security over part of Route 9. During an assigned sweep from Ca Lu, one of Needham’s platoons became engaged with a PAVN battalion. Intense PAVN fire necessitated air strikes and artillery fire before the platoon could disengage and return to Ca Lu. The next day elements of both the 3rd Marine Division and the 9th Marines moved along Route 9 toward Khe Sanh. Later that day the marines uncovered a PAVN base camp, fighting holes, four-man log bunkers, and ambush sites along the road. PAVN forces had also rigged antipersonnel mines with trip wires to catch the marines seeking cover from the ambush site. This discovery led to the end of vehicle convoys into Khe Sanh; until Operation PEGASUS (April 1–15, 1968) the Khe Sanh base relied on air resupply. With elections in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) scheduled for September 3, 1967, the Communists were determined to achieve victory at Con Thien. The most effective of enemy attacks took place on election day with the destruction of the ammunition storage area and bulk fuel farm at Dong Ha. Con Thien became the primary PAVN target; PAVN forces fired 200 rounds almost daily on marine positions there. On September 10 the 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines, engaged a major element of the PAVN 812th Regiment around Con Thien and suffered more than 200 casualties. Following this attack the battalion moved back near Phu Bai to refit. The battalion was replaced by Lieutenant Colonel James Hammond Jr.’s 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines. On September 21 Hammond’s 2nd Battalion started a searchand-destroy operation some 2,000 yards east of Con Thien, and by the end of the day elements of the battalion were locked in a fierce firefight with part of the PAVN 90th Regiment. At dusk the battalion was forced to pull back inside its main perimeter. The PAVN had killed 16 marines and wounded 118; 15 bodies remained on the battlefield until October 10, when the 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines, returned to recover its dead. Before the end of September the PAVN mounted three failed attacks from three directions on Con Thien. More than 3,000 mortar, artillery, and rocket rounds were fired on Con Thien during September 19–27. Vietnamese sources confirm this figure, stating that during this 12-day period a total of 2,787 85-millimeter (mm), 100-mm, 105-mm, and 130-mm field artillery rounds and
1,051 82-mm mortar rounds were fired into the U.S. Marine Corps base. The Americans retaliated by massing one of the greatest concentrations of firepower in support of a single division in the Vietnam War. Artillery units of the III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) fired 12,577 rounds, ships of the Seventh Fleet fired 6,148 rounds, U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Air Force fighter pilots flew more than 5,200 close air support sorties, and Boeing B-52 Stratofortress bombers dropped tons of ordnance on PAVN positions in and north of the DMZ as well as around the Con Thien perimeter. Nonetheless, by the early part of October the 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines, had been reduced from 952 to 462 men. On the early morning of October 14 while defending a recently built bridge south of Con Thien, the 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines, was taken under attack by a large PAVN force. By late morning the battalion had managed to push the attackers back. The PAVN had been attempting to destroy the only supply line to Con Thien. Again the 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines, had sustained heavy casualties: 21 dead (including 5 officers) and 23 wounded. That afternoon Lieutenant General Robert Cushman, commanding general of III MAF, and Major General Bruno Hochmuth, commanding general of the 3rd Marine Division, visited the bridge. They granted Lieutenant Colonel Hammond’s request to name it “Bastards’ Bridge” in honor of the 21 dead marines. The last major action of Operation KINGFISHER took place between October 25 and 28. During this period the 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines, lost 8 killed and 45 wounded, resulting in the battalion strength dropping to fewer than 300 men. On October 28 the 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines, moved back to Dong Ha and assumed the role of regimental reserve. The U.S. Marine Corps reported that Operation KINGFISHER had resulted in 1,117 PAVN deaths, but a total of 340 marines had been killed in action, and 1,461 were wounded. A message from General Cushman to the 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines, summed up the opinion of all concerning the heroic fighting around Con Thien. The last part read “2/4 has met and beaten the best the enemy had to offer. Well done.” WILL E. FAHEY JR. See also Con Thien, Siege of; Demilitarized Zone; Khe Sanh, Battle of; United States Marine Corps; Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, Army References Coan, James P. Con Thien: The Hill of Angels. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2004. Command After Action Report. “Kingfisher.” Headquarters, 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines, 3rd Marine Division, September–October 1967. Washington, DC: History and Museum Division, Marine Corps Historical Center. Nguyen Khac Tinh, Tran Quang Hau, Phung Luan, and Bui Thanh Hung. Phao Binh Nhan Dan Viet Nam: Nhung Chang Duong Chien Dau, Tap II [People’s Artillery of Vietnam: Combat History, Vol. 2]. Hanoi: Artillery Command, 1986. Telfer, Gary L. U.S. Marines in Vietnam: Fighting the North Vietnamese, 1967. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1984.
Kissinger, Henry Alfred KINGPIN, Operation See Son Tay Raid
Kinnard, Harry William Osborn Birth Date: May 7, 1915 Death Date: January 5, 2009 U.S. Army general and commander of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) in Vietnam. Born in Dallas, Texas, on May 7, 1915, Harry William Osborn Kinnard graduated from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, in 1939. While a lieutenant colonel and assistant chief of staff of the 101st Airborne Division at Bastogne, Belgium, during the Battle of the Bulge, Kinnard suggested the reply of “Nuts!” to the German demand for surrender. Kinnard remained in the army after the war. From 1963 to 1965 he was at Fort Benning, Georgia, commanding the 11th Air Assault Division that mastered the air mobility concept. In 1965 the 11th Air Assault Division was renamed the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), and Major General Kinnard took it to Vietnam. He lobbied unsuccessfully to locate the 1st Cavalry Division in Thailand for greater base security and as a staging area for raids on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Instead, the 1st Cavalry Division was located at An Khe in the Central Highlands. Its mission was to seek and destroy People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) units that might cut the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) in half along Route 19. The 1st Cavalry Division’s hard-fought and successful Ia Drang campaign in 1965 demonstrated the effectiveness of air mobility in crippling PAVN forces in their secure areas. Kinnard wanted to pursue fleeing PAVN troops into Cambodia, but the White House would not allow it. Kinnard believed that this restriction would cost the Americans the war. Early in 1966 the 1st Cavalry Division moved to the coast to seek out Viet Cong (VC) and PAVN units and deny them access to the rice harvest. More hard fighting proved the division’s abilities in pursuit. Departing the 1st Cavalry Division in May 1966, Kinnard retired from the army as a lieutenant general in 1969. His greatest achievement was to demonstrate the effectiveness of air mobility. Following retirement, Kinnard was a consultant and an adviser and served as president for both the 1st Cavalry Division Association and the 101st Airborne Division Association. He died in Arlington, Virginia, on January 5, 2009. JOHN L. BELL JR. See also Air Mobility; Ia Drang, Battle of; United States Army References Kinnard, Harry W. O. “A Victory in the Ia Drang: The Triumph of a Concept.” ARMY 17 (September 1967): 71–91. Stanton, Shelby L. Anatomy of a Division: The 1st Cav in Vietnam. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1987.
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Kissinger, Henry Alfred Birth Date: May 27, 1923 Academic, foreign policy consultant, national security adviser to presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford (1969–1975), and secretary of state (1973–1977). Henry Alfred Kissinger was born in Fuerth, Germany, on May 27, 1923. His family immigrated to New York in 1938 to escape the Nazi regime. After becoming a U.S. citizen, Kissinger was drafted into the U.S. Army in 1943. He returned to his birthplace as a member of the 84th Infantry Division. After discharge, he completed his undergraduate education at Harvard University in 1950 and entered the graduate program in government, completing a PhD there in 1954. Kissinger’s doctoral dissertation on Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Congress of Vienna, a study of how statesmen sought to preserve world order by maintaining a geopolitical balance of power, became a theme that has occupied him ever since. In 1955 Kissinger headed a Council on Foreign Relations study group on weapons and foreign policy, and the next year he directed a Rockefeller Fund project to examine the critical issues facing the United States. In reports for the two panels, he suggested that limited nuclear war was preferable to all-out nuclear war or surrender and recommended the construction of home bomb shelters. In 1957 Kissinger accepted a joint appointment as lecturer in the Government Department at Harvard and associate director of the university’s Center for International Affairs. He continued at Harvard until 1968 while also acting as an independent foreign policy consultant. A skilled politician in his own right, Kissinger used his Harvard credentials and growing name recognition to form relationships with influential Republicans, including New York governor Nelson A. Rockefeller and former vice president Richard M. Nixon. When Nixon was elected president in 1968, he named Kissinger as his national security adviser. Kissinger retained this post until 1975, and from 1973 to 1975 he was the only person ever to hold the posts of national security adviser and secretary of state concurrently. The two men shared a suspicion of the traditional, bureaucratic diplomacy found in the State Department, which they considered uncreative and slow moving. Nixon intended to keep control of foreign relations in the White House, with Kissinger as a more important adviser than Secretary of State William P. Rogers. Nixon and Kissinger also agreed that foreign policy should be based on realism rather than wishful idealism or moralism. Selfinterest required that foreign policy should rely on strength and the willingness to use force and that other nations understand this. In developing their realist policies, Kissinger and Nixon perceived a shift from the bipolar balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union to a more multipolar world that also included the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Working together although often not harmoniously, Nixon and Kissinger eventually brought an end to U.S. participation in the Vietnam War, reached a détente with the Soviet Union that culminated in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreement, established diplomatic
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Henry Alfred Kissinger, U.S. national security adviser (1969–1975) and secretary of state (1973–1977). (Library of Congress)
relations with the PRC, and helped achieve stability in the Middle East following the October 1973 Yom Kippur (Ramadan) War. In engaging both the Chinese and Soviets concurrently, Kissinger and Nixon hoped to take advantage of the Sino-Soviet split and perhaps play one power off the other. They certainly hoped to shape policy in Vietnam by engaging both the Chinese and Soviets in meaningful diplomacy, as both nations considered the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) as a client state. The war in Vietnam was probably the most difficult issue Kissinger faced. His concern about the conflict predated his service in the Nixon administration. During Lyndon Johnson’s presidency, Kissinger visited Vietnam in October 1965 and July 1966 as a government consultant. He concluded that U.S. military victory was unlikely, and in 1967, using French contacts, he acted as an intermediary between the North Vietnamese government and the Johnson administration in a fruitless effort to start negotiations. In a critique of the Vietnam War written before he became national security adviser but published in the January 1969 issue of Foreign Affairs, Kissinger argued that the United States could not win the war “within a period or with force levels politically acceptable to the American people” but could not precipitately withdraw without damaging its “credibility.” Soon after taking office in 1969, Kissinger ordered a study of the Vietnam problem from the RAND Corporation. The resulting Na-
tional Security Study Memorandum 1 (NSSM-1), headed by Daniel Ellsberg, collected responses from government departments and agencies to 78 queries about the war. The responses demonstrated the differences that had developed within the government over the prospect of a satisfactory end to the war, with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the State Department generally more pessimistic than the military. Peace talks between the United States and North Vietnam—initiated on March 31, 1968, when Lyndon Johnson announced that he would not seek another presidential term—had stalled by the time Nixon took office. Before his inauguration Nixon, with Kissinger’s encouragement, sent a message to the North Vietnamese government indicating the new administration’s desire for serious discussions. The North Vietnamese reply of December 31, 1968, insisted on two points: unilateral withdrawal of U.S. forces and removal of the government of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). These demands, which Nixon and Kissinger found unacceptable, were repeated in the first substantive private meeting between U.S. and North Vietnamese officials on March 22, 1969, and remained constant until nearly the end of negotiations in 1973. Negotiations were further hindered by events in Cambodia. In March 1969 Nixon ordered the secret bombing of Cambodia (Operation MENU), which continued until May 1970. When news of this was leaked to the New York Times in May 1969, Nixon—with Kissinger’s knowledge—initiated wiretaps on a number of government officials and reporters. In a press conference on May 14, 1969, Nixon unveiled his Vietnam policy, known as Vietnamization. He proposed simultaneous mutual withdrawal of U.S. and North Vietnamese forces, supervised free elections in South Vietnam with participation by the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (National Liberation Front [NLF]), and a cease-fire. The following month on June 8 during a meeting with South Vietnamese president Nguyen Van Thieu at Midway Island, Nixon announced U.S. troop withdrawals. Kissinger questioned Vietnamization in a memorandum to the president, arguing that unilateral troop withdrawals would encourage North Vietnamese intransigence in negotiations, demoralize troops remaining in Vietnam, and result in further demands for troop reductions in the United States. Kissinger began intermittent secret peace talks with North Vietnamese representatives in Paris in August 1969. The negotiations deadlocked on North Vietnam’s insistence that the United States unilaterally withdraw its forces and that the Thieu government in Saigon be removed. On May 1, 1970, U.S. and South Vietnamese troops invaded Cambodia. Antiwar demonstrations erupted in the United States and climaxed when Ohio National Guardsmen fired on protesters at Kent State University in Ohio on May 4, killing four students. Several of Kissinger’s longtime aides resigned over the Cambodian Incursion. In the aftermath of the Cambodian invasion, Nixon and Kissinger developed a proposal to restart negotiations with North Viet-
Kissinger, Henry Alfred nam. In a press conference on October 7, 1970, Nixon suggested a cease-fire in place (meaning that North Vietnamese troops then in South Vietnam would remain there). In a session in Paris on May 31, 1971, Kissinger spelled out the offer in detail, agreeing to unilateral withdrawal of U.S. troops according to a timetable, with an understanding that there would be no further infiltration of “outside forces” into Vietnam; there would be a cease-fire in place throughout Indochina, guarantees for the neutrality and territorial integrity of Laos and Cambodia, release of prisoners of war, and an agreement to leave the political future of South Vietnam up to its people. Although these provisions signaled significant concessions from the United States, North Vietnam rejected them, probably because it thought that it could yet win greater concessions regarding the political settlement in South Vietnam. The Nixon administration’s simultaneous overtures to China and the Soviet Union likely had some impact on the Vietnam negotiations. In July 1971 following a series of preliminary contacts, Kissinger secretly traveled to Beijing, where he and Chinese leader Zhou Enlai arranged for an official presidential visit to China. The historic summit, which took place in February 1972, reversed a policy of nearly 25 years during which the United States denied the legitimacy of the PRC. Following Nixon’s trip, China moderated its protests against American action in Vietnam. In August 1972 following Nixon’s May summit meeting with Soviet premier Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow, the Hanoi Politburo authorized a negotiated settlement with the United States. In a meeting with Kissinger on October 8, 1972, North Vietnamese representative Le Duc Tho proposed an accord settling military questions—a cease-fire, withdrawal of U.S. forces, acceptance of continuing U.S. aid to South Vietnam, and return of prisoners of war—while leaving political matters, namely the future of the South Vietnamese government, to an “Administration of National Concord” representing the Saigon government and South Vietnamese Communists. These terms were agreed to on October 11, with details to be worked out later. On his return to the United States, Kissinger announced in a press conference on October 26 that “We believe that peace is at hand.” On November 7 Richard Nixon easily won reelection as president over Democratic challenger George McGovern. Peace was not at hand, however. President Thieu refused to accede to the terms. Discussions with North Vietnam bogged down in disagreements about changes demanded by Thieu, details of prisoner exchanges, withdrawals, and other matters. Talks broke off on December 13. This interruption led to one of the most controversial acts of Nixon’s presidency. Although Kissinger urged Nixon to sign the agreement without Thieu, Nixon refused. Blaming Hanoi for the impasses, Nixon initiated Operation LINEBACKER II, the so-called Christmas Bombings of North Vietnam, on December 18, 1973. For the first time in the war, the United States employed Boeing B-52 Stratofortresses over Hanoi and Haiphong. The raids proved costly for the United States as well as North Vietnam, and they met
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with outrage in the United States and throughout the world. Nixon halted them on December 30 after Hanoi, having exhausted its supply of surface-to-air missiles, indicated its willingness to return to negotiations. Kissinger and Le Duc Tho reached a final agreement on January 9, 1973. The terms were substantially the same as those reached the previous October and close to those discussed in 1969 except for provisions regarding the continuance of the South Vietnamese government. President Nixon announced the agreement on inauguration day, January 20, 1973. Ending U.S. involvement in the war in Vietnam was the capstone of Kissinger’s diplomacy and earned him wide acclaim. In December 1972 Time magazine named Nixon and Kissinger “Men of the Year,” and a 1973 Gallup Poll rated Kissinger first in a list of most-admired Americans. In September 1973 Kissinger replaced William P. Rogers as secretary of state, a position that Kissinger retained through the end of the Gerald Ford administration in 1977. In October, Kissinger and Le Duc Tho were jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for their Vietnam settlement. The North Vietnamese representative rejected the prize and his share of the $130,000 award. Kissinger accepted but donated the prize money to a scholarship fund for children of military personnel killed in Vietnam. In fact, Kissinger had achieved only what became known as a “decent interval” between removal of U.S. forces and a Communist takeover. Within a few months of the peace accord the Watergate Scandal began to unravel Nixon’s presidency, and the Vietnam peace accords came apart. Nixon resigned on August 9, 1974; Saigon fell to the Communists on April 30, 1975. Kissinger has remained active as a presidential adviser, consultant, commentator, and speaker on international affairs. For many, however, Kissinger remains a deeply polarizing figure. Among the Left he has been vilified, and some have called for his trial for war crimes in association with his Indochina policies. For much of the 1980s and 1990s, Republicans and neoconservatives paid him little attention because they disagreed with his policies of détente with the Soviets and Chinese. In the new century, however, Kissinger has enjoyed renewed visibility, at least among Republicans. He reportedly met frequently with President George W. Bush about the Iraq War especially after the insurgency became critical, telling the president that a complete defeat of the insurgents was the only acceptable exit strategy. From 2001 to 2005 Kissinger also served as the chancellor of the College of William and Mary. KENNETH R. STEVENS See also Elections, U.S., 1968; Elections, U.S., 1972; Ellsberg, Daniel; Ford, Gerald Rudolph; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kent State University Shootings; Lake, William Anthony Kirsop; Le Duc Tho; LINEBACKER II, Operation; Madman Strategy; McGovern, George Stanley; Midway Island Conference; Nguyen Van Thieu; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Paris Negotiations; Paris Peace Accords; Perot, Henry Ross; Rogers, William Pierce; San Antonio Formula; Vietnamization; Washington Special Actions Group
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References Herring, George C., ed. The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983. Hersh, Seymour. The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House. New York: Summit, 1983. Isaacson, Walter. Kissinger: A Biography. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992. Schulzinger, Robert. Henry Kissinger: Doctor of Diplomacy. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989. Stoessinger, John. Henry Kissinger: The Anguish of Power. New York: Norton, 1976. Kalb, Marvin, and Bernard Kalb. Kissinger. Boston: Little, Brown, 1974. Kissinger, Henry. White House Years. Boston: Little, Brown, 1979. Kissinger, Henry. Years of Upheaval. Boston: Little, Brown, 1982. Morris, Roger. Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy. New York: Harper and Row, 1977.
Kit Carson Scouts Former Vietnamese Communists, both military and political, who had defected to the allied side and then agreed to serve in combat units with U.S., Australian, and Thai military forces, primarily as scouts but also as soldiers, interpreters, and intelligence agents. According to the official U.S. Marine Corps history, the idea of using former Communists to aid U.S. military efforts began in May 1966 when a group of Viet Cong (VC) soldiers surrendered to units of the 9th Marines in the I Corps Tactical Zone and asked for asylum. The Communists immediately began a rumor among peasants of the area that the marines had tortured and killed a defector by the name of Ngo Van Bay. In response the marine regimental commander asked Bay and two of his fellow defectors to return to the village, talk to the peasants, and put the atrocity rumor to rest. The three agreed to do so and had such a positive effect on the local population that it was decided that other VC defectors brought under control of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) through the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) Program could be used to aid American military and pacification efforts. Soon other marine units at Da Nang, and eventually all marine commands in tactical areas, began using small numbers of rallied VC for a variety of combat and pacification tasks. The Kit Carson Scout program was officially established in October 1966. The choice of name is generally attributed to Major General Herman Nickerson Jr., commanding general of the 1st Marine Division, who was part American Indian and was also a Western history buff. He selected the name because the former VC working with the marines were good scouts in the tradition of Kit Carson, the famed 19th-century American frontiersman, Indian agent, and soldier. From October to December 1966 alone, the III Marine Amphibious Force credited their Kit Carson Scout units with killing 47 VC, capturing 16 weapons, and uncovering 18 mines and tunnels. The units proved so effective in their work for the U.S. Marine Corps that Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), commander General William Westmoreland soon encouraged all
American units to create similar units. By mid-1968 more than 700 former VC were serving with U.S. forces in South Vietnam. Many of these former Communists operated with or supplemented U.S. Army Special Forces long-range reconnaissance patrols, while others were responsible for leading American units to numerous VC and People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) caches, camps, and trails during search-and-destroy operations. In the area of pacification support, Kit Carson Scouts repeatedly proved themselves a valuable propaganda tool when working with villagers who were far more willing to listen to and cooperate with fellow peasants who had defected from the Communists than they were representatives of the South Vietnamese government. When U.S. combat units withdrew from South Vietnam, most of the scouts volunteered to serve in ARVN units. After April 1975 when the North Vietnamese took control of South Vietnam, most of the scouts were imprisoned. CLAYTON D. LAURIE See also Chieu Hoi Program; Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrols; Pacification; United States Marine Corps; United States Special Forces References Shulimson, Jack. U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1966: An Expanding War. Marine Corps Vietnam Series. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Marine Corps Historical Center, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters, 1982. Westmoreland, General William C. Report on the War in Vietnam, Section II, Report on Operations in South Vietnam, January 1964– June 1968. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969.
Knowland, William Fife Birth Date: June 26, 1908 Death Date: February 23, 1974 Republican U.S. senator from California and leader of the socalled China Lobby. Born in Alameda, California, on June 26, 1908, William Fife Knowland was the son of former congressman Joseph Russell Knowland. The younger Knowland graduated from the University of California–Berkeley in 1929 and soon thereafter became politically active. After serving one term in the California State Legislature and one term in the California State Senate, he entered national politics. In 1941 the Republican National Committee chose Knowland to be chairman of its Executive Committee. In 1945 while Knowland was still serving in World War II, California governor Earl Warren appointed him to finish the term of the late Republican senator Hiram Johnson. Knowland was elected to a full term in the U.S. Senate in 1946 and was reelected in 1952. Knowland quickly became a major force in the Senate and was known as an ardent anti-Communist and leader of the right wing of the Republican Party. He gained notoriety as leader of the China Lobby during the Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower
Koh Tang administrations. Although Knowland personally liked Truman, who himself was a former senator, Knowland decried the “loss” of China to the Communists in 1949 and was an outspoken critic of Truman’s Korean War policies. The China Lobby, a group of congressmen who shared Knowland’s beliefs on the subject, were staunch defenders of the Republic of China (ROC, Nationalist China) on Taiwan (then known as Formosa) and vehemently opposed the admission of Communist China to the United Nations (UN) following the 1949 Communist victory. The China Lobby also urged increased U.S. intervention to stop the spread of communism in Korea and Vietnam as well as in China. Knowland was such an ardent supporter of the Nationalists that his nickname became “the senator from Formosa.” Knowland was an especially vocal supporter of Ngo Dinh Diem, leader of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Knowland’s influence affected the 1954 Geneva Conference, for the senator and his supporters believed that any negotiations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) would amount to U.S. recognition of the Communist regime, and they pressured Secretary of State John Foster Dulles into refusing to recognize Chinese foreign minister Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) while in Geneva. Knowland, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, also prevailed on Dulles to downgrade the U.S. delegation to observer status, and thus Undersecretary of State Walter B. Smith took no part in negotiations. Knowland considered Geneva a “Communist victory.”
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Not surprisingly, Knowland stood behind Senator Joseph McCarthy during the latter’s rise and fall and was among the minority voting against the condemnation of the Wisconsin Republican for his anti-Communist hysterics that had brought about McCarthyism. In domestic affairs Knowland, although one of the most conservative Republicans in Congress, also supported several civil rights initiatives. Knowland became majority leader after the 1953 health-related resignation of Republican senator Robert Taft of Ohio. Knowland also served two terms as minority leader, beginning in 1955. In 1958 he ran unsuccessfully for governor of California, losing to Democrat Edmund “Pat” Brown. Knowland then returned to his family’s Oakland Tribune newspaper and publishing business. He later served on Republican senator Barry Goldwater’s 1964 presidential campaign staff and supported Ronald Reagan for California governor in 1968. Knowland committed suicide in Guerneville, California, on February 23, 1974. JOHN M. BARCUS See also China, People’s Republic of; China, Republic of; Dulles, John Foster; Geneva Conference and Geneva Accords of 1954; Ngo Dinh Diem; Smith, Walter Bedell; Zhou Enlai References Montgomery, Gayle B., and James W. Johnson. One Step Away from the White House: The Rise and Fall of Senator William F. Knowland. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. Randle, Robert F. Geneva 1954: The Settlement of the Indochinese War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969.
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Republican senator William F. Knowland of California was a leading member of the so-called “China Lobby” and one of the strongest critics of the Truman administration’s Asian policies. Not surprisingly, Knowland was a staunch supporter of Republic of Vietnam president Ngo Dinh Diem. (Library of Congress)
Island located about 60 miles off the coast of Cambodia in the Gulf of Thailand. Koh is the Cambodian word for “island.” On May 14, 1975, during the Mayaguez Incident, some 175 U.S. marines were transported by helicopters to Koh Tang. At the time the island was home to only several dozen Cambodian families. The marines were in search of the crew of the Mayaguez, a U.S.-registered cargo ship that on May 12 had been seized by the Khmer Rouge, who claimed that it had violated Cambodian territorial waters. The Cambodian Khmer Rouge took the Mayaguez crew members prisoner and were holding them on Koh Tang. However, by the time the marines arrived, the crew had been removed from the island via a fishing boat. Instead of finding the imprisoned Americans, the marines faced stiff opposition from as many as 200 Khmer Rouge fighters who were dug in on Koh Tang. In the fighting the marines faced heavy fire. The operation claimed 40 Americans dead and 50 wounded. Eight helicopters were also shot down. At least 60 Khmer Rouge also died. Between 1995 and 2001 concerted efforts were made to locate the bodies of the U.S. servicemen on Koh Tang, but only small bone fragments were recovered. The island is now occupied only
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by Cambodian military personnel, but tourists occasionally visit to dive on the nearby coral reefs. JUSTIN J. CORFIELD See also Mayaguez Incident References Guilmartin, John F. A Very Short War: The Mayaguez and the Battle of Koh Tang. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1995. Rowan, Roy. The Four Days of Mayaguez. New York: Norton, 1975. Wetterhahn, Ralph. The Last Battle: The Mayaguez Incident and the End of the Vietnam War. New York: Carroll and Graf, 2001.
Komer, Robert W. Birth Date: February 23, 1922 Death Date: April 9, 2000 Deputy to the commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) during 1967–1968. Born on February 23, 1922, in Chicago, Robert W. Komer graduated from Harvard in 1942 and, following World War II army duty, received an MBA at Harvard in 1947. He worked for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
as an analyst during 1947–1960 and then moved to the National Security Council (NSC) as a senior staff member during 1961–1965. As a deputy special assistant to the president for national security affairs (1965–1966) and special assistant (1966–1967), Komer became increasingly involved with the pacification program in Vietnam. In February 1966 President Lyndon Johnson appointed him Washington coordinator for pacification activities. Komer’s office became useful to young army officers trying to overcome institutional resistance to results of the Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam (PROVN) study, which had concluded that the attrition strategy and search-and-destroy tactics being employed by General William Westmoreland were not working and could not work. The key to success, the study held, was concentration on population security and pacification. Komer was sympathetic to that viewpoint and helped advance such ideas. Meanwhile, reporting on a June 1966 trip to Vietnam, Komer told President Johnson that the pacification effort was lagging: “Until we can get rolling on pacification in its widest sense—securing the villages, flushing out the local VC [Viet Cong] (not just the main force) and giving the peasant both security and hope for a better future,” he wrote, “we cannot assure a victory.” Soon Komer drafted a proposal that responsibility for support of pacification be assigned to the U.S. military establishment in the
Robert Komer, deputy to the commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), meets with President Lyndon B. Johnson, November 16, 1967. (Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library)
Kontum, Battle for Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), with a civilian deputy running it. He had in effect written his own job description, although it took Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s backing for the idea to gain acceptance. In March 1967 the decision was announced to put the CORDS program under Westmoreland, with Komer as his deputy. In May 1967 Komer, given the personal rank of ambassador, headed for Vietnam to undertake his new duties. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker recalled in his oral history that Komer was both very able and very abrasive, thereby staking out the spectrum of viewpoints on Komer’s contribution, adding that he could be too pushy. In fact, Komer maintained that it was necessary to prod people aggressively if anything was going to be accomplished. He also took pride in his own incorrigible optimism. Once on the job Komer had been given his way by General Westmoreland who, according to William Colby in Lost Victory, did so with some relief that Westmoreland could let Komer do it while the general continued to conduct the military war that he saw as his primary responsibility. Colby credited Komer with an overdue effort to build up the territorial forces and with pulling together disparate elements of the American advisory effort at the province level. Komer’s overall influence on the pacification program remains uncertain. McNamara accords him a single mention, indeed a single sentence, in his memoirs, hardly an indication of substantial impact. The record shows that it was only after the Communists suffered disastrous losses during the 1968 Tet Offensive, after General Creighton Abrams assumed command of MACV and William Colby took over as deputy for CORDS and after President Nguyen Van Thieu personally launched and pushed the Accelerated Pacification Campaign in November 1968, that pacification really began to show results. Komer meanwhile had become ambassador to Turkey, an appointment that proved short-lived when the White House changed parties soon after he was nominated. He then spent a number of years at the RAND Corporation (1969–1977) and as a Pentagon official working on North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) affairs (1977–1979) and as undersecretary of defense for policy (1979–1981). Komer died of a stroke in Arlington, Virginia, on April 9, 2000. LEWIS SORLEY See also Abrams, Creighton Williams, Jr.; Bunker, Ellsworth; Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support; Colby, William Egan; McNamara, Robert Strange; Nguyen Van Thieu; Pacification; Westmoreland, William Childs References Clarke, Jeffrey J. Advice and Support: The Final Years; The U.S. Army in Vietnam. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988. Komer, Robert W. Bureaucracy at War: U.S. Performance in the Vietnam Conflict. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986. Scoville, Thomas W. Reorganizing for Pacification Support. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1982.
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Kong Le Birth Date: March 6, 1934 Laotian Army officer. Born on March 6, 1934, at Muong Phalane in Savannakhet Province, Laos, the son of Chantha and Nang Deng, Kong Le joined the army and underwent paratroop training in the Philippines and Thailand. His unit, the 2nd Paratroop Battalion, took part in the fighting against the Pathet Lao in Sam Neua in the summer of 1959. As a captain, Kong led his paratroop battalion in the August 1960 coup d’état that overthrew the pro-Western government in Vientiane, hoping to put an end to the civil war in Laos. Driven out of Vientiane by Phoumi Nosavan’s troops in December 1960, Kong took the Plain of Jars from Phoumi’s troops in January 1961 with assistance from the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army). A neutralist at heart, Kong grew disillusioned by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) intervention in Laos and by the summer of 1963 was again on the side of Phoumi in supporting Prince Souvanna Phouma’s efforts to neutralize Laos with international backing. Promoted to general, Kong fought the Pathet Lao and PAVN forces in Laos as commander of the neutralist army. As a result of intrigues within the neutralist and rightist armies, Kong was discredited and, fearing for his life, took refuge in the Indonesian embassy in Vientiane in 1966. He later moved to France and eventually to the United States. A fierce opponent of Vietnamese communism, Kong visited the People’s Republic of China (PRC) at the time of the SinoVietnamese War in 1979 in an attempt to gain Chinese support for liberating Laos from the Pathet Lao regime. He continues to advocate armed resistance to the Lao People’s Democratic Republic. ARTHUR J. DOMMEN See also Laos; Phoumi Nosavan; Souvanna Phouma References Dommen, Arthur J. Conflict in Laos: The Politics of Neutralization. Rev. ed. New York: Praeger, 1971. Savada, Andrea Matles, ed. Laos: A Country Study. Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1995.
Kontum, Battle for Start Date: May 2, 1972 End Date: July 1, 1972 Kontum, the capital city of Kontum Province in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), is located in the Central Highlands near the Laotian-Cambodian border. The Battle for Kontum occurred during the People’s Army of Vietnam’s (PAVN, North Vietnamese) Easter Offensive of 1972. Two PAVN divisions, the 2nd and the 320th, were allocated to the attack. Both were well
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equipped and supplied with artillery and armor support, chiefly the Soviet-made T-54 main battle tank. Kontum was defended by Major General Ly Tong Ba’s Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) 23rd Division, with support provided by former lieutenant colonel John Paul Vann, the senior American adviser in the Central Highlands. During March and April 1972, ARVN fire-support bases and outposts north of Kontum came under relentless PAVN attack. ARVN troops defending these outposts were overrun or forced to abandon them, leaving behind a number of 105-millimeter howitzers. On May 2, 1972, PAVN forces began their assault at Kontum City itself, opening with a deadly rocket-fire and artillery barrage. The ARVN’s lighter U.S.-made M-41 tanks proved no match for the Soviet-supplied T-54s, and most were soon abandoned. Fighting waxed and waned throughout the month of May, but by May 30 PAVN forces appeared on the verge of overrunning Kontum. ARVN forces rallied, however, under the direction of Vann, who also called in some 300 B-52 strikes in a single three-week period. By mid-June, ARVN troops had rallied and were rooting out the remaining enemy soldiers on the outskirts of the city. By July 1 the Battle for Kontum was over. ARVN losses were heavy, probably on the order of several hundred dead with more than 100 killed on May 20 alone. PAVN deaths were probably several thousand. On July 9 only days after the battle had ended, Vann died in the crash of his helicopter. PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR. See also Easter Offensive; Fire-Support Bases; Tanks, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Vann, John Paul References Andradé, Dale. America’s Last Vietnam Battle: Halting Hanoi’s 1972 Easter Offensive. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001. Ngo Quang Truong. The Easter Offensive of 1972. Indochina Monographs. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1980. Sheehan, Neil. A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam. New York: Random House, 1988. Turley, Gerald H. The Easter Offensive: The Last American Advisors, Vietnam, 1972. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985.
Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of East Asian nation with a 1968 population of approximately 13.1 million. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) was officially formed on September 9, 1948. The rigidly Communist country was the immediate by-product of World War II and the ensuing Cold War, which had left the Korean Peninsula artificially divided roughly along the 38th Parallel. North Korea occupied the Korean Peninsula north of that latitude. Covering 47,950 square miles, North Korea is bordered by the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) to the south, the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) and Russia to the north, the Yellow Sea to the west, and the Sea of Japan to the east. By 1948, Communist hard-liner Kim Il Sung, with the help of the Soviets, had consolidated his power in northern Korea and in September officially declared the establishment of the DPRK. When the Communists came to power in China the following year, Kim received even more aid and support so that by 1950 he was able to launch a massive invasion of South Korea. His intention was to unify all of Korea under Communist control. His move precipitated a bloody three-year-long war that eventually involved both the United States and China. The Korean War ended in a stalemate, however, with the border between the two Koreas remaining virtually unchanged. Although Kim’s Korean People’s Army (KPA, North Korean Army) and the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army (CPVA) had fought the United Nations Command (UNC) forces to a draw, North Korea was devastated by the conflict, having lost almost 300,000 soldiers and hundreds of thousands of civilians. Its industry was wrecked, and its agricultural output was severely crippled. However, thanks to massive aid from both the Soviets and the Chinese, by the end of the 1950s North Korea’s economic output exceeded its prewar levels. Well into the 1970s, North Korea’s economy fared relatively well, driven by Kim’s desire to make his nation self-sufficient and a beacon of command-style Communist achievement. The friendly relationship between North Korea and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) was not a product of the Vietnam War. Indeed, by 1965 North Korea was a well-established ally of North Vietnam. Fifteen years earlier, in January 1950, North Korea had formally recognized the DRV as the legitimate government of all Vietnam. North Korea was a staunch supporter of North Vietnam, being linked by Communist ideology and opposition to U.S. influence in Asia following the Korean War. Kim believed that unity among all Communist nations in Asia was vital to expelling the United States from the region. This is evidenced by North Korean participation in the Asian Communist Summit of October 1959. North Korean aid to the Communist forces of Vietnam was mostly of an indirect nature, being largely technical and financial. Numerous agreements promised assistance and provided terms for reciprocal trade between the two countries, but the exact nature and extent of this are somewhat ambiguous. North Korea sent teams of technicians to North Vietnam as early as 1960 and undoubtedly continued the practice throughout the war. Events such as the arrival of the North Korean defense minister in Hanoi on December 18, 1964, pointed strongly to military aid from Pyongyang. North Korea never did provide large-scale direct military aid to North Vietnam. Kim did advocate this, spurred by the deployment of Republic of Korea Army (ROKA, South Korean Army) units to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) in October 1965. Pyongyang pledged to Hanoi that it would match South Korea’s troop contribution to South Vietnam, but the North Vietnamese
Korea, Republic of government rejected the offer, preferring aid agreements of a more ambiguous nature. North Korea did provide a small amount of direct military support to the war. Postwar Vietnamese, Soviet, and North Korean sources have confirmed that during 1967 and 1968 a regimentalsized group of North Korean pilots flew combat missions over North Vietnam against U.S. aircraft and that North Korean propaganda specialists worked alongside Vietnamese Communist forces fighting against South Korean troops stationed in South Vietnam. Fourteen North Koreans died while fighting alongside Vietnamese Communist forces during the Vietnam War. North Korea provided indirect assistance to North Vietnam with the North Korean attack on and capture of the U.S. spy ship Pueblo in international waters off the eastern North Korean coast on January 23, 1968, although this was undoubtedly motivated by reasons other than the war in Vietnam. This action by Pyongyang did, however, force the redeployment of some U.S. military assets to South Korea. Thus, although North Korea did not achieve the level of participation that Kim desired, North Korea was by no means a passive observer of the Vietnam War. ERIC W. OSBORNE See also Korea, Republic of; Pueblo Incident; United States Reserve Components References Buzo, Adrian. The Making of Modern Korea. New York: Routledge, 2002. Defense Prisoner and Missing Office. 1992–1996 Findings of the Vietnam War Working Group. Washington DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 1996. Fishel, Wesley R., ed. Vietnam: Anatomy of a Conflict. Itasca, IL: Peacock, 1968. Hart-Landsberg, Martin. Korea: Division, Reunification, and U.S. Foreign Policy. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1998. Koh, Byung Chul. The Foreign Policy of North Korea. New York: Praeger, 1969. Nguyen Van Minh, ed. Lich Su Khang Chien Chong My Cuu Nuoc, 1954–1975, Tap V, Tong Tien Cong va Noi Day Nam 1968 [History of the Resistance War against the Americans to Save the Nation, 1954–1975, Vol. 5, The 1968 General Offensive and Uprisings]. Hanoi: National Political Publishing House, 2001. Smith, R. B. An International History of the Vietnam War. 3 vols. New York: St. Martin’s, 1983–1991. Wintle, Justin. The Vietnam Wars. New York: St. Martin’s, 1991.
Korea, Republic of East Asian nation with a 1968 population of 30.834 million. Formed on August 15, 1948, the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) was a direct result of World War II and the ensuing Cold War, which had left the Korean Peninsula artificially divided along the 38th Parallel. South Korea took root south of that latitude and featured a government that was nominally democratic and fiercely anti-Communist. President Syngman Rhee governed South Korea from 1948 to 1960. South Korea is bordered by the
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Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) to the north, the Sea of Japan to the east, the Korea Strait to the south, and the Yellow Sea to the west. Until North Korea mounted a massive invasion of South Korea in June 1950, sparking the Korean War (1950–1953), the United States had only hesitantly supported Rhee’s regime, refusing to provide it with offensive weaponry out of fear that Rhee would launch a war against North Korea in an effort to reunify the peninsula. The Korean War changed that. By the autumn of 1950, the United States was deeply involved in the ground war in Korea and began funneling massive aid to the Seoul regime. When the war ended in 1953, Washington made major defense and economic aid commitments to South Korea, and from the 1950s to the present day, the United States has maintained an average troop deployment of 36,000 in South Korea. Until the 1980s, South Korea was governed by a succession of military-style juntas that only vaguely resembled democratic regimes. Government repression could be severe during these years, and South Koreans enjoyed limited economic freedoms and little political freedom. Nevertheless, the once-impoverished country began an economic takeoff beginning in the 1970s. Since then it has enjoyed one of the fastest-growing economies in the world and has joined Japan and China as Asian economic powerhouses. The United States often defended its commitment in Vietnam because of obligations incurred under the 1954 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) pact. In fact, two major signatories of that treaty, France and Great Britain, felt no such obligation after 1954. Ironically, South Korea, the country that contributed the most troops to Vietnam after the United States, was not a SEATO member. From the beginning, the United States eagerly sought the participation of the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA, South Korean Army), noted for its fighting ability. The ROKA had also benefited from three years of combat alongside the Americans during the Korean War and had undergone rigorous training instituted by the U.S. military thereafter. As early as 1953, President Rhee suggested to the United States that he would furnish troops to aid the French in Vietnam. The Dwight D. Eisenhower administration carefully studied the offer but took no action. In 1953 the American people were unlikely to accept the use of South Korean troops in Vietnam while U.S. troops were still stationed in Korea. In addition, U.S. policy makers reacted negatively to Rhee’s demand for a significant increase in American aid to South Korea. In June 1954, however, with events going poorly at the Geneva Conference, the idea resurfaced. Although Rhee’s offer was more favorably considered on that occasion, the French rejected it. Throughout the remainder of the 1950s, the United States was engaged in the difficult task of attempting to establish a democratic non-Communist government in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). The United States strongly supported South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem. By the early autumn of 1963,
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A Republic of Korea (ROK) soldier of the White Horse Division during an assault on a Communist position. The ROK sent 50,000 troops to Vietnam as part of U.S. president Lyndon B. Johnson’s effort to gain the support of other nations in his Many Flags program. (Tim Page/Corbis)
however, the experiment in nation building was foundering. Diem’s stubborn refusal to heed American advice to institute reforms and his unpopular campaign against Vietnamese Buddhists led to his November 1963 overthrow and subsequent assassination. The virtual anarchy that followed Diem’s fall led in 1964 to renewed calls for the introduction of third-country troops. The Lyndon B. Johnson administration was obsessed with the need to widen participation from other countries to support the unstable Saigon government. The ensuing attempt to attract other nations was called the Many Flags program. Armies from South Korea provided the largest contingent to that program. South Korean troops began to arrive in Vietnam on February 26, 1965. In March of that year the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) recommended the deployment of two U.S. divisions and one South Korean division to South Vietnam for ground combat operations, the first such recommendation for an open-ended commitment to combat. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), commander General William Westmoreland decided that South Korean troops would be deployed in the II Corps Tactical Zone on Vietnam’s east coast and dispersed between Nha Trang north to an area just below Da Nang. Westmoreland wanted troops from each third country to operate under its own command. With this administrative structure, he
hoped to avoid any resemblance to French colonialism and at the same time eliminate the complications inherent in a multinational operation. He assumed, however, that these forces would follow orders from the United States. The assumption proved correct for most of the militaries of the other countries involved, but not for the ROKA. From the first, its commanders operated as if on the same level as Westmoreland. In October 1965 the pride of the ROKA, the Capital Division, arrived in South Vietnam. By March 1966 there were 23,000 thirdcountry troops involved, the bulk of them South Korean. At the close of 1969 there were 47,872 South Korean troops in Vietnam, the maximum number deployed at any one time. However, the Many Flags program never included more than four other nations: Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand. With the exception of Australia and New Zealand, all demanded and received remuneration for their service. None, however, demanded as much or received more than did South Korea. In addition to funds designed to upgrade the ROKA in Korea, the United States paid Korean officers and enlisted men more for their services in Vietnam than the South Korean government paid their counterparts at home. Also, many South Korean firms were awarded civil contracts in Vietnam. For example, one such firm received a lucrative contract to collect garbage in the city of Saigon.
Korean War Financed by the United States, the task could have been handled as efficiently, and certainly cheaper, by unemployed Vietnamese in the capital. Between 1966 and 1970, Washington doled out more than $900 million to the Seoul government, and the figure grew as the Richard M. Nixon administration added additional millions to persuade South Korea to leave two divisions in place until 1973. In that regard, forces from South Korea were mercenaries, not allies, and there is serious doubt that the United States received adequate dividends for such an enormous investment. Although the ROKA was certainly a capable and well-trained fighting force, its soldiers were under orders from Seoul to take as few casualties as possible. Hence, they were hesitant to move without significant support from U.S. air and ground forces. Also, reports of atrocities committed by South Korean troops against Vietnamese civilians are far too numerous to overlook. In the final analysis, Colonel Bruce Palmer was correct when he stated that “we never did get our full ‘money’s worth’ from the ‘ROKs.’ Although their troops fought bravely, carrying out their responsibilities in their assigned areas in a generally commendable way, their leaders were loath to move very far away from their whitewashed base camps.” FRANCIS H. THOMPSON See also Australia; IRVING, Operation; Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of; New Zealand; Ngo Dinh Diem; Order of Battle Dispute; Philippines; Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; Thailand; Westmoreland, William Childs References Kahin, George McT. Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam. New York: Knopf, 1986. Palmer, General Bruce, Jr. The 25-Year War: America’s Military Role in Vietnam. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1984. Palmer, Dave R. Summons of the Trumpet: U.S.-Vietnam in Perspective. San Rafael, CA: Presidio, 1995. Sheehan, Neil. A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam. New York: Random House, 1988.
Korean War Start Date: 1950 End Date: 1953 The Korean War was a watershed conflict within the Cold War. The first shooting war of the Cold War, the Korean War was also the first limited war of the nuclear age. In many ways, the war foreshadowed American involvement in Vietnam, another artificially divided Asian nation. Indeed, the outbreak of the war in June 1950 prompted the Harry S. Truman administration to increase substantially its aid to the French in the Indochina War of 1946– 1954. As the Korean War progressed, American aid to the French increased, gradually raising the U.S. stakes in Vietnam. Korea was long the scene of confrontation among China, Japan, and Russia. Controlled by either China or Japan for most
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of its modern history, Korea was divided in half after World War II. Wartime agreements called for the United States to temporarily occupy southern Korea up to the 38th Parallel, while the Soviet Union did the same north of that line. The Cold War brought the permanent division of Korea into two states. Efforts to establish a unified Korea failed, and in September 1947 the United States referred the issue to the United Nations (UN), which called for a unified Korean government and the withdrawal of occupation forces. In January 1948 Soviet authorities refused to permit a UN commission to oversee elections in northern Korea, but elections for an assembly proceeded in southern Korea that spring. By August 1948 the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) had officially formed, with its capital at Seoul and headed by 70-year-old Syngman Rhee, a staunch conservative. Washington then terminated its military government and agreed to train the South Korean armed forces. In September 1948 the Communists formed the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea), with its capital at Pyongyang and led by veteran Communist Kim Il Sung. Both Korean governments claimed authority over the entire peninsula, but in December 1948 the UN General Assembly endorsed the South Korean government as the only lawfully elected government. That same month the Soviet Union announced that it had withdrawn its forces from North Korea. The United States withdrew all its troops from South Korea by June 1949. In May 1948 sporadic fighting began along the 38th Parallel. Washington, fearful that the United States might be drawn into a civil war, purposely distanced itself from these clashes. President Harry S. Truman announced that fighting in Korea would not automatically lead to U.S. military intervention. In January 1950 Secretary of State Dean Acheson excluded Korea from the U.S. strategic Asian defensive perimeter. Such pronouncements undoubtedly encouraged Kim to believe that the United States would not fight for Korea. For many years North Korea, the Soviet Union, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) maintained that the Korean War began with a South Korean attack on North Korea. This was propaganda. Beginning in late 1949, North Korea prepared for fullscale war. Its Korean People’s Army (KPA, North Korean Army) was well armed with Soviet weapons, including such modern offensive arms as heavy artillery, T-34 tanks, trucks, automatic weapons, and about 180 new aircraft. The KPA numbered about 135,000 men in 10 divisions. South Korea’s military situation was far different. The Republic of Korea Army (ROKA, South Korean Army) lacked equipment and trained leaders because of Washington’s unwillingness to fight in Korea and because the meager U.S. defense budget would not allow it. ROKA training was incomplete, and the ROKA lacked heavy artillery, tanks, and antitank weapons. South Korea had no air force apart from trainers and liaison aircraft. The South Korean military numbered 95,000 men in eight divisions, only four of which were at full strength.
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United Nations forces withdraw from North Korea and recross the 38th Parallel that marks the boundary line between North and South Korea in early December 1950 during the Korean War. (National Archives)
Washington was aware of the North Korean military buildup but believed that the Communist powers would not risk war. Limited war was still a foreign concept to U.S. planners. The U.S. military was also woefully unprepared and ill-equipped. The U.S. Army numbered only nine divisions and 630,000 men. Kim planned to use his military superiority to invade and quickly conquer South Korea. Twice he consulted Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, promising him victory in a matter of weeks, assuring him that there would be a Communist revolution in South Korea, and insisting that Washington would not intervene. Moscow and Beijing were actively preparing for the invasion as early as the spring of 1949, and Russian military advisers assisted in its planning. Stalin concluded that even if the United States were to decide to intervene, it would come too late. Stalin pledged military assistance but not direct Soviet military involvement. He also insisted that Kim meet with PRC leader Mao Zedong and secure his assent to the plans. In late 1949 Mao released the People’s Liberation Army (PLA, Chinese Army) 164th and 166th divisions of Korean volunteers who had fought against
the Japanese and in the Chinese Civil War, providing North Korea with about 30,000–40,000 seasoned troops. On June 25, 1950, KPA forces launched a massive invasion of South Korea. The UN Security Council called for an immediate cease-fire and the withdrawal of North Korean forces, a resolution that went unchallenged because of a Soviet UN boycott. On June 27 the Security Council asked UN member states to furnish “assistance” to South Korea. President Truman also extended U.S. air and naval operations to include North Korea, authorized U.S. Army troops to protect the port of Pusan, and ordered the U.S. Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait. Upon General Douglas MacArthur’s recommendation, President Truman committed U.S. Far Eastern ground forces to Korea on June 30. The invasion caught both MacArthur and Washington by surprise. Yet U.S. intervention was almost certain, given the Truman Doctrine, domestic political fallout from the Communist victory in China in 1949, and the belief that success in Korea would embolden the Communists elsewhere. During the three-year conflict, no war was ever formally declared; Truman labeled it a “police action.”
Korean War At the time of the invasion, the United States had four poorly trained and equipped divisions in Japan. By cannibalizing his 7th Infantry Division, MacArthur was able to dispatch the 24th and 25th Infantry divisions and the 1st Cavalry Division to Korea within two weeks. Meanwhile, Seoul fell on June 28. Most of the ROKA’s equipment was lost when the bridges spanning the Han River were prematurely blown. On July 5 the first American units battled the KPA at Osan, 50 miles south of Seoul. Expected to stop a KPA division, Task Force Smith consisted of only 540 men in two rifle companies and an artillery battery. The KPA, spearheaded by T-34 tanks, easily swept it aside. At the request of the UN Security Council, the UN set up a military command in Korea. Washington insisted on a U.S. commander, and on July 10 Truman appointed MacArthur to head the United Nations Command (UNC). Seventeen nations contributed military assistance, and at peak strength UNC forces numbered about 400,000 ROKA, 250,000 U.S., and 35,000 from other nations. Two British and Canadian units formed the bulk of the 1st Commonwealth Division, which also included Australian infantry, New Zealand artillery, and Indian medical units. Turkey provided a brigade, and there were troops from Australia, Thailand, the Philippines, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and New Zealand. Other nations provided medical units. U.S. forces were unprepared for the fighting. Difficult terrain, primitive logistics, poor communication, and refugees did as much to delay the North Korean offensive as did the defenders. By midJuly, UNC troops had been pushed back into the so-called Pusan Perimeter, an area of 30–50 miles around the vital port of Pusan on the southeastern coast of Korea. Here U.S. and ROKA forces bought valuable time and ultimately held. This success was attributable to UNC artillery, control of the skies, and Eighth Army (EUSAK, Eighth U.S. Army, Korea) commander Lieutenant General Walton Walker’s brilliant mobile defense. The KPA also failed to employ its early manpower advantage to mount simultaneous attacks along the entire perimeter. Even as the battle for the Pusan Perimeter raged, MacArthur was planning an amphibious assault behind enemy lines. Confident that he could hold Pusan, he deliberately weakened EUSAK to build up an invasion force. MacArthur selected Inchon as the invasion site. As Korea’s second-largest port and only 15 miles from Seoul, Inchon was close to the KPA’s main supply line south. Seizing it would cut off KPA troops to the south. MacArthur also knew that he could deal North Korea a major political blow if Seoul was promptly recaptured. The Inchon landing was a risky venture, and few besides MacArthur favored it. Inchon posed the daunting problems of a 32-foot tidal range that allowed only 6 hours in 24 for sea resupply, a narrow winding channel, and high seawalls. On September 15 Major General Edward Almond’s X Corps of the 1st Marine Division and the 7th Infantry Division commenced the invasion. Supported by naval gunfire and air attacks, the marines secured Inchon with relatively few casualties. UNC forces reentered Seoul on September 24.
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At the same time, EUSAK broke out of the Pusan Perimeter and drove north, linking up with X Corps on September 26. Only one-quarter to one-third of the KPA escaped north of the 38th Parallel. Pyongyang ignored MacArthur’s call for surrender, and on October 1 ROKA troops crossed into North Korea. On October 7 the UN General Assembly passed a resolution calling for a unified, independent, and democratic Korea, and two days later MacArthur ordered U.S. forces across the 38th Parallel. Pyongyang fell on October 19 as stunned KPA forces fled north. MacArthur then divided his forces for the drive to the Yalu River. He ordered X Corps transported by sea around the Korean Peninsula to the east coast port of Wonsan. Almond would then clear northeastern Korea. EUSAK would remain on the west coast and drive into northwestern Korea. The two commands would be separated by a gap of between 20 and 50 miles. MacArthur believed, falsely as it turned out, that the north-south Taebaek mountain range would obviate large-scale Communist operations there. EUSAK crossed the Chongchon River at Sinanju, and by November 1 elements of the 24th Division were only 18 miles from the Yalu. Several days earlier a South Korean unit reached the Yalu, the only UNC unit to get there. China now entered the war but unofficially. Alarmed over possible U.S. bases adjacent to Manchuria, Mao had issued warnings about potential Chinese military intervention. He believed that the United States would be unable to counter the Chinese numerical advantage and viewed American troops as soft and unused to night fighting. On October 2 Mao informed Stalin that China would enter the war. Stalin agreed to move Soviet MiG-15 fighters already in China to the Korean border. In this position they could cover the Chinese military buildup and prevent U.S. air attacks on Manchuria. Soviet pilots began flying missions against UNC forces on November 1 and bore the brunt of the Communists’ air war. Stalin also ordered other Soviet air units to deploy to China, train Chinese pilots, and then turn over aircraft to them. Although Russian and Chinese sources disagree on what the Soviet leader promised Mao, Stalin clearly had no intention of using his air units for anything other than defensive purposes. China later claimed that Stalin had promised complete air support for its ground forces, but this never materialized. On October 25 regular Chinese troops, formed into the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army (CPVA), entered the fighting in northwestern Korea, and Walker wisely brought the bulk of EUSAK back behind the Chongchon River. Positions then stabilized, and the Chinese offensive slackened. The Chinese also attacked in northeastern Korea before halting operations and breaking contact. On November 8 the first jet battle in history occurred when an American Lockheed F-80 Shooting Star shot down a MiG-15 over Sinanju. The initial CPVA incursion ended on November 7. In a nowfamous meeting with President Truman at Wake Island on October 15, General MacArthur assured the president that the war was all but won, but if the Chinese intervened, their forces would be
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slaughtered. UNC airpower, he believed, would nullify any Chinese threat. Yet from November 1, 1950, to October 1951, MiGs so dominated the Yalu River area that U.S. Boeing B-29 Superfortress bombers had to cease daylight operations. The initial Chinese intervention had consisted of 18 divisions. In early November they moved an additional 12 divisions, totaling some 300,000 men, into Korea. MacArthur responded by ordering the air force to destroy the bridges over the Yalu. Washington revoked the order, but MacArthur complained that this threatened his command, and Washington gave in. On November 8, 79 B-29s and 300 fighter-bombers struck bridges and towns on either side of the Yalu. The bombing had little effect. Most of the Chinese were then in North Korea, and the Yalu was soon frozen. Meanwhile, Washington debated how to proceed. The political leadership and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) under its chairman General Omar Bradley believed that Europe was the top priority. Washington decided that while Manchuria would remain off limits, MacArthur could take other military steps that he deemed advisable, including resumption of the offensive. The Democrats were reluctant to show weakness in regard to Korea, and the Republicans had gained seats in the November 1950 congressional elections. While much was being made in the United States about the prohibitions of strikes on Manchuria, the Communist side also exercised restraint. With the exception of a few ancient biplanes that sometimes bombed UNC positions at night, Communist airpower was restricted to north of Pyongyang. No effort was made to strike Pusan, and UNC convoys traveled without fear of air attack. Nor did Communist forces attempt to disrupt allied sea communications. MacArthur had made X Corps dependent logistically on EUSAK instead of on Japan, and Walker insisted on delaying resumption of the offensive until he could build up supplies. Weather also played a factor, with temperatures already below zero. Finally, Walker agreed to resume the offensive on November 24. To the east, X Corps was widely dispersed. MacArthur seemed oblivious to any problems, seeing the advance as an occupation rather than an offensive. The advance went well on the first day, but on the night of November 25–26, 1951, the Chinese attacked EUSAK in force. The Americans held, but on November 26 the ROKA II Corps disintegrated, exposing EUSAK’s right flank. The Chinese poured 18 divisions into the gap, endangering the whole of EUSAK. In a brilliant delaying action at Kunuri, the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division bought time for the other EUSAK divisions to recross the Chongchon. MacArthur now ordered a retirement just below the 38th Parallel to protect Seoul. Washington directed MacArthur to pull X Corps out of northeastern Korea to prevent it from being flanked. Under heavy CPVA attack, X Corps withdrew to the east coast for seaborne evacuation along with the ROKA I Corps. The retreat to the coast of the 1st Marine Division and some army elements from the Chanjin Reservoir was one of the most masterly withdrawals in military history.
X Corps was redeployed to Pusan by sea. On December 10 Wonsan was evacuated. At Hungnam through December 24, 105,000 officers and men were taken off, along with about 91,000 Korean refugees who did not want to remain in North Korea. The Korean War had entered a new phase: in effect the UNC was now fighting China. MacArthur refused to accept a limited war and publicized his views to his supporters in the United States, making reference to “inhibitions” placed on his conduct of the war. UNC morale plummeted, especially with General Walker’s death in a jeep accident on December 22. Not until Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgway arrived to replace Walker did the situation improve. In the United States, Truman found himself under heavy pressure from Republicans to vigorously pursue the war. But the administration reduced its goal in Korea to restoring the status quo ante bellum. UNC troops were again forced to retreat when the Chinese launched a New Year’s offensive, retaking Seoul on January 4. But the CPVA outran its supply lines, and Ridgway took the offensive. Ridgway’s methodical, limited advance was designed to inflict maximum punishment rather than to secure territory. Nonetheless, by the end of March UNC forces recaptured Seoul, and by the end of April they were again north of the 38th Parallel. On April 11, 1951, President Truman relieved MacArthur of command, appointing Ridgway in his stead. Lieutenant General James Van Fleet took over command of EUSAK. Although widely unpopular at the time, MacArthur’s removal was fully supported by the JCS, as MacArthur had publicly expressed his disdain of limited war. He returned home to a hero’s welcome, but much to his dismay, political support for him promptly faded. On April 22 the Chinese counterattacked in Korea. Rather than expend his troops in a defensive stand, Van Fleet ordered a methodical withdrawal with maximum artillery and air strikes against Communist forces. The Chinese pushed the UNC south of the 38th Parallel, but the offensive was halted by May 19. UNC forces then counterpunched, and by the end of May the front stabilized just above the 38th Parallel. The JCS generally limited EUSAK to that line, allowing only small local advances to gain more favorable terrain. The war was now stalemated, and a diplomatic settlement seemed expedient. On June 23, 1951, the Soviets proposed a ceasefire. With the Chinese expressing interest, Truman authorized Ridgway to negotiate. Meetings began on July 10 at Kaesong, although hostilities would continue until an armistice was signed. UNC operations from this point were essentially designed to minimize friendly casualties. Each side had built deep defensive lines that would be costly to break through. In August armistice talks broke down, and later that month the Battle of Bloody Ridge began, developing into the Battle of Heartbreak Ridge that lasted until mid-October. In late October negotiations resumed, this time at Panmunjom, although the fighting continued. Half of the war’s casualties occurred during the period of armistice negotiations. On November 12, 1951, Ridgway ordered Van Fleet to cease offensive operations. Fighting now devolved into raids, local at-
Korean War tacks, patrols, and artillery fire. In February 1953 Van Fleet was succeeded as EUSAK commander by Lieutenant General Maxwell D. Taylor. Meanwhile, UNC air operations intensified to choke off Communist supply lines and reduce the likelihood of Communist offensives. In November 1952 General Dwight Eisenhower was elected president of the United States largely on a mandate to end the war. With U.S. casualties running 2,500 a month, the war had become a political time bomb. Eisenhower instructed the JCS to draw up plans to end the war militarily including the possible use of nuclear weapons, which was made known to the Communist side. More important in ending the conflict, however, was Stalin’s death on March 5, 1953. As the armistice negotiations entered their final phase in May, the Chinese stepped up military action, initiating attacks in June and July to remove bulges in the line. UNC forces gave up some ground but inflicted heavy casualties. The chief stumbling block to peace was the repatriation of prisoners of war (POWs). Truman was determined that no POW be repatriated against his will. This stance prolonged the war, but some U.S. officials saw a moral and propaganda victory in the Chinese and North Korean defections. The Communist side rejected the UNC position out of hand. Following intense UNC air strikes on North Korean hydroelectric facilities and the capital of Pyongyang, the Communists accepted a face-saving formula whereby a neutral commission would deal with POW repatriation. On July 27 an armistice was signed at Panmunjom, and the guns finally fell silent. Of 132,000 North Korean and Chinese military POWs, fewer than 90,000 chose to return home. Twenty-two Americans held by the Communists also elected not to return home. Of 10,218 Americans captured by the Communists, only 3,746 returned. The remainder were murdered or died in captivity. American losses were 142,091 (33,686 killed in action). South Korea sustained 300,000 casualties (70,000 killed in action). Other UNC casualties came to 17,260 (3,194 killed in action). North Korean casualties are estimated at 523,400 and Chinese losses at more than 1 million. Perhaps 3 million Korean civilians also died during the war. The war devastated Korea and hardened the divisions between North Korea and South Korea. It was also a sobering experience for the United States. After the war, the U.S. military establishment remained strong. For America, the Korean War institutionalized the Cold War national security state. The war also accelerated the racial integration of the armed forces, which in turn encouraged a much wider U.S. Civil Rights Movement. China gained greatly from the war in that it came to be regarded as the preponderant military power in Asia. This is ironic, because the Chinese Army in Korea was in many respects a primitive and inefficient force. Nonetheless, throughout the following decades exaggeration of Chinese military strength was woven into the fabric of American foreign policy, influencing subsequent U.S. policy in regard to Vietnam.
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The Korean War effectively militarized the containment policy. Before the war, Marshall Plan aid had been almost entirely nonmilitary. U.S. aid now shifted heavily toward military rearmament. The war also marked a sustained militarization of American foreign policy, with the Vietnam War a logical consequence. Additionally, the Korean War solidified the role of the United States as the world’s policeman and strengthened the country’s relationship with its West European allies and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The war facilitated the rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany). In addition, the war impacted Japan and was a major factor fueling that nation’s economy. Militarily, the Korean War saw the extensive use of helicopters and jet aircraft. The conflict was also a reminder that airpower alone cannot win wars and showed the importance of command of the sea. No formal peace has ever been concluded in Korea. Technically the two Koreas remain at war, and the 38th Parallel remains one of the Cold War’s lone outposts. From the French perspective, the July 1953 cease-fire seemed to be a breach of faith on the part of Washington, which had previously viewed the Indochina War and the Korean War as “two fronts against communism.” The French also realized that with the Korean War over, the Chinese could now shift more resources to the Viet Minh. The Korean War appeared to have vindicated the concepts of a conventional war with set-piece battles. This led the United States to its first major military mistake in Vietnam, to insist that the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) create a conventional military establishment along U.S. lines to meet a possible invasion by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) across the DMZ, just as the North Koreans had invaded South Korea. The resulting Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) was thus ill-suited for the guerrilla warfare that would be waged by the Communist side in South Vietnam. Many American military personnel who served in Vietnam had also served in Korea. These individuals were once again subjected to an unpopular limited war with hazy and changeable war aims. Perhaps in part influenced by Truman’s firing of MacArthur in 1951, U.S. military officials were reluctant to challenge presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon regarding their Vietnam policies. Clearly the Korean War experience loomed large for U.S. policy makers. The Chinese were considered an omnipresent threat, and Washington refused to consider an invasion of North Vietnam, fearing another Chinese intervention and a wider war in Asia. Indeed, President Johnson was acutely aware of the problems that faced President Truman in the early 1950s and hoped to avoid them at all costs. In the end, although the mode and style of warfare in Vietnam differed greatly from that in Korea, both wars were waged with political rather than military motives as their driving force. SPENCER C. TUCKER
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See also Containment Policy; Dulles, John Foster; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of; Korea, Republic of; MacArthur, Douglas; Mao Zedong; Ridgway, Matthew Bunker; Taylor, Maxwell Davenport; Truman, Harry S. References Blair, Clay. The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950–1953. New York: Times Books, 1987. Crane, Conrad C. American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950–1953. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000. Donovan, Robert J. Nemesis: Truman and Johnson in the Coils of War in Asia. New York: St. Martin’s/Marek, 1984. Ent, Uzal. Fighting on the Brink: Defense of the Pusan Perimeter. Paducah, KY: Turner Publishing, 1996. Field, James A. United States Naval Operations: Korea. Washington, DC: Director of Naval History, U.S. Navy, 1962. Korea Institute of Military History. The Korean War. 3 vols. Seoul: Korea Institute of Military History, 1997. Pierpaoli, Paul G. Jr. Truman and Korea: The Political Culture of the Early Cold War. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1999.
Koster, Samuel William, Sr. Birth Date: December 29, 1919 Death Date: January 23, 2006 U.S. Army general and the highest-ranking officer implicated in the March 16, 1968, My Lai Massacre. Born on December 29, 1919, in West Liberty, Iowa, Samuel William Koster was a 1942 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, and saw combat service in Europe during World War II (1939–1945) and in the Korean War (1950–1953). He held a series of staff and command posts and rose steadily in rank and responsibility. On September 22 Koster assumed command of Task Force Oregon in Vietnam. On October 26 the 23rd Infantry Division was officially activated, and Koster was promoted to major general. More commonly known as the Americal Division (for the American, New Caledonia Division, one of only two unnumbered U.S. Army divisions in World War II), the 23rd Division was formed from Task Force Oregon, which had been established in February 1967 and consisted of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade, the 1st Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division, and the 3rd Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division to provide a strong U.S. military presence in Quang Tri Province in the northern region of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). The Americal, which was made up of the 11th, 196th, and 198th Light Infantry brigades, earned a negative reputation in the Vietnam War in part because its 11th and 198th brigades arrived as the division was being formed and were inadequately trained with no prior combat experience. On March 16, 1968, Lieutenant William L. Calley’s platoon from C Company, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry, 11th Infantry Brigade, of the 23rd Infantry Division was ordered into the village of My Lai 4 by Captain Ernest L. Medina. Subsequent investigations eventually de-
termined that Calley’s men murdered perhaps as many as 500 Vietnamese civilians, many of whom were women and small children. General Koster was one of several commanders circling over the battlefield in his observation helicopter above My Lai. Based on his own observations and immediate reports, Koster stated that he believed that at least 20 civilians had been killed from friendly artillery fire, a number that automatically required him to launch an inquiry. Only after receiving believable reports of the massacre did Koster order that the required investigation be conducted. The April 24, 1968, report of investigation, which should have been conducted by a disinterested officer, was instead submitted by the commander of the 11th Infantry Brigade, Colonel Oran Henderson. The report was never forwarded to higher command. This ultimately led to Koster’s implication in the My Lai cover-up. Ironically, Koster himself later testified that he thought the Henderson report was unacceptable. In June 1968 Koster rotated out of Vietnam to become superintendent at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point. In November 1969 the Department of the Army ordered Lieutenant General William R. Peers to conduct a complete investigation of all events concerning the My Lai Massacre. When the Peers Inquiry was issued on March 17, 1970, Koster was one of 14 officers charged with participating in the cover-up. The inquiry accused him of failure to obey lawful regulations and with dereliction of duty, charges that were based on Koster’s failure to ensure the conduct of a proper investigation. In 1970 Koster was relieved as West Point superintendent and was reassigned to First Army Headquarters. He reportedly received a standing ovation from West Point cadets during his farewell ceremony. Koster had worked hard during his short tenure to end the harsh hazing that had become a part of West Point’s culture. The subsequent Article 32 investigation into the charges against Koster acknowledged his failure to report the 20 known civilian casualties and his failure to order a proper investigation. However, the investigating officer recommended that all charges be dismissed because of the general’s reputed fine character and his outstanding service record. On January 29, 1971, Lieutenant General Jonathan Seamen, Koster’s immediate superior at First Army, nullified all of Koster’s reported errors and ordered all charges dropped on the grounds that Koster had not intentionally intended to cover up the massacre. Widespread outrage over these actions soon reached Washington. Congressman Samuel Stratton, a member of the House Armed Services Investigative Subcommittee that had looked into My Lai, bitterly attacked both the U.S. Army and unnamed officers in the Pentagon for whitewashing the massacre and covering up what he characterized as a total command failure. Eventually Koster received non–court-martial punishment. Scheduled for three-star rank, his name was struck from the promotion list. On May 19, 1971, General William Westmoreland ordered Koster stripped of the Distinguished Service Medal awarded to him for his command of the Americal Division and also ordered
Kosygin, Aleksei Nikolayevich his demotion to brigadier general. Koster also received a letter of censure from the secretary of the army. Koster retired from the service on January 1, 1973, and entered private business. Believing that the charges against him were unjust, he made a great effort to clear his name but lost his appeal before the Army Board for Correction of Military Records. Koster died on January 23, 2006, at his home in Annapolis, Maryland. THOMAS D. VEVE See also Barker, Frank Akeley, Jr.; Calley, William Laws, Jr.; “Conduct of the War in Vietnam” Report; Hersh, Seymour Myron; Medina, Ernest Lou; My Lai Massacre; Peers Inquiry References Beidler, Philip D. “Calley’s Ghost.” Virginia Quarterly Review (Winter 2003): 30–50. Belknap, Michael R. The Vietnam War on Trial: The My Lai Massacre and the Court-Martial of Lieutenant Calley. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002. Goldstein, Joseph, Burke Marshall, and Jack Schwartz. The My Lai Massacre and Its Cover-Up: Beyond the Reach of the Law? New York: Free Press, 1976. Peers, William R. The My Lai Inquiry. New York: Norton, 1979.
Although Soviet funding made possible a full-scale conflict in the region, it is difficult to assess Kosygin’s own attitude toward escalation of the war. China accused him of being too moderate, and yet it was after Kosygin’s trip to North Vietnam that the war escalated with major offensives in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) and direct attacks on American military personnel. It may well be that these were unilateral decisions by the North Vietnamese leadership to thwart any attempt by Kosygin to force negotiations. In his speeches Kosygin consistently urged Communist unity against U.S. actions in Vietnam. In mid-May 1965 in Moscow he gave a strongly anti-American speech at a rally welcoming the arrival of the Indian prime minister. In an internal Kremlin power struggle in 1965, Kosygin appeared to lose ground to Brezhnev; however, Kosygin still enjoyed considerable authority, particularly within governmental affairs, until the late 1970s. Kosygin returned to North Vietnam in February 1966 and again discussed military strategy. In June 1967 he met President Lyndon B. Johnson at Glassboro, New Jersey, and urged that the United States stop its bombing of North Vietnam. Kosygin told Johnson
Kosygin, Aleksei Nikolayevich Birth Date: February 21, 1904 Death Date: December 18, 1980 Soviet premier. Born in St. Petersburg, Russia, on February 21, 1904, Aleksei Nikolayevich Kosygin was educated there, joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1937, and became head of the Soviet textile industry in 1939. He served on the CPSU’s Central Committee (1939–1960) and then in the supreme policymaking Politburo (1946–1952). Holding numerous economic and industrial posts, Kosygin became first deputy prime minister in 1960, specializing in economic affairs. In the October 1964 palace coup that unseated Nikita Khrushchev, Kosygin succeeded Khrushchev as chairman of the Council of Ministers (premier). Many of Kosygin’s attempts at modest economic reforms and decentralization were blocked by party conservatives and the Soviet bureaucracy, however. After the coup Kosygin was initially considered to be equal to Leonid Brezhnev, then the first secretary of the CPSU. In November 1964 Kosygin sent a message of support to the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (National Liberation Front [NLF]), the first by a Soviet leader. In February 1965 he also became the first Soviet premier to visit the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). Seeking to restore Soviet influence in Hanoi, he promised financial aid and signed a defense pact. The latter proved to be the start of a long military alliance between the two states. Kosygin also discussed overall military strategy and future military needs.
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Aleksei Nikolayevich Kosygin was premier of the Soviet Union from 1964 to 1980, although he shared leadership with Leonid Brezhnev and Nikolai Podgorny for much of that period. Kosygin visited the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) on several occasions to coordinate Soviet aid. (AP/Wide World Photos)
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that once the bombing stopped, North Vietnam would begin negotiations to end the war. In September 1969 Kosygin headed the Soviet delegation at the funeral of Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi. When President Richard Nixon went to Moscow in May 1972, he met Kosygin, who bluntly told Nixon that the Americans were trying to solve the Vietnamese question solely on a military basis. Kosygin was a signatory to the Soviet-Vietnam Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed in Moscow in November 1978. That treaty renewed the close military and economic links between the two countries. As a reward for his support, the North Vietnamese government presented Kosygin its Order of the Golden Star, the country’s highest decoration. Suffering from poor health, Kosygin resigned all his government and party posts in 1980. He died shortly thereafter in Moscow on December 18, 1980. MICHAEL SHARE See also Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich; Bruce, David Kirkpatrick Este; Ho Chi Minh; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeyevich; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, 1954–1975; Vietnam, Socialist Republic of, 1975–Present References Edmonds, Robin. Soviet Foreign Policy: The Brezhnev Years. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983. Gaiduk, Ilya V. The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War. Chicago, IL: Ivan R. Dee, 1996. Longmire, R. A. Soviet Relations with South-East Asia: An Historical Survey. London: Keegan Paul International, 1989. Pike, Douglas. Vietnam and the Soviet Union: Anatomy of an Alliance. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1987. Taubman, William C. Khrushchev: The Man and His Era. New York: Norton, 2003.
Kovic, Ronald Birth Date: July 4, 1946 Vietnam War veteran, antiwar activist, and author. Ronald (Ron) Kovic was born on July 4, 1946, in Ladysmith, Wisconsin, but was reared in Massapequa (Long Island), New York. In 1964 at age 18, he enlisted in the U.S. Marine Corps. He was eventually sent to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), where he fought in the Vietnam War. Early in his tour he accidentally shot and killed a comrade whom he had mistaken for the enemy, an experience that traumatized him greatly. He was further troubled when his unit attacked a South Vietnamese village that was believed to be defended by Viet Cong (VC) guerrillas. After the village was fired upon and taken, Kovic was horrified to find that women, children, and elderly men had been wounded or killed during the assault. On January 20, 1968, Kovic was seriously wounded when a shell exploded at his feet, shattering his heel and sending shrapnel into
his back. Several pieces of shrapnel pierced his spinal cord, and he was rendered a paraplegic. After his condition had been stabilized, he was flown to the United States and given an honorable medical discharge later that year. He was subsequently awarded the Bronze Star and the Purple Heart. Kovic undertook college studies for a time, but an accident sent him to a veteran’s hospital, where conditions were appalling and he received poor medical care. The experience left him enraged and bitter, and he now began to question both the Vietnam War itself and the way in which the U.S. government treated its veterans. Kovic refused to allow bitterness to control his life and instead channeled his energy and intellect into the antiwar movement. After the 1970 Kent State University shootings that had left four students dead and another nine wounded, he joined the antiwar organization Vietnam Veterans Against the War and began a lifelong commitment to antiwar and peace activism. Thereafter he was a regular feature at antiwar protests and demonstrations, and he went on a nationwide speaking tour addressing high school and college students. In 1972, Kovic along with several other Vietnam veterans in wheelchairs, interrupted President Richard M. Nixon’s acceptance speech at the Republic National Convention, being televised on national television. Kovic was quickly silenced by security personnel, but he made such an impression at the otherwise staid and predictable affair that CBS news correspondent Roger Mudd granted him a two-minute interview during one of the breaks in the coverage. This incident catapulted Kovic into the forefront of the antiwar movement, especially among veterans. In 1974 Kovic and other disabled Vietnam veterans staged a 17-day hunger strike at U.S. senator Alan Cranston’s Los Angeles, California, office. The strike ended only after the chief of Veterans Affairs agreed to fly to Los Angeles to meet with the protesters and listen to their grievances. In 1976 in a piece of fitting symbolism, the Democratic Party invited Kovic to speak at the Democratic National Convention. There he showcased his literary talents and also made a plea for veterans’ rights. That same year he published his highly regarded memoir, Born on the Fourth of July, in which he relates his Vietnam War experiences and the difficulties he faced after he returned home. Kovic also explains in the book how he came to be an antiwar activist. The book was well received, and in 1989 it was adapted into a Hollywood film of the same name starring actor Tom Cruise as Kovic. The 1978 film Coming Home, which starred Jane Fonda and Bruce Dern, is also said to have been loosely modeled on Kovic’s experiences. Kovic has been involved in numerous antiwar movements and protests since the 1970s. Prior to the beginning of the 1991 Persian Gulf War he led an antiwar protest march in California. He has also protested against the 2003 Iraq War. In 2006 and 2007 when substandard conditions were found at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Kovic decried the continued poor treatment of U.S. veterans and appeared on numerous television programs as an inter-
Krulak, Victor H. viewee. Kovic, who lives in Redondo Beach, California, has stayed active in politics, and in the early 1990s California’s Democrats pressed him to run for Congress, but he declined. PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR. See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Vietnam Veterans Against the War References Kovic, Ron. Born on the Fourth of July. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976. Moss, Nathaniel. Ron Kovic: Antiwar Activist. New York: Chelsea House, 1994.
Kraft, Joseph Birth Date: September 4, 1924 Death Date: January 10, 1986 Influential American journalist, syndicated columnist, and author. Joseph Kraft was born on September 4, 1924, in South Orange, New Jersey. He began writing for newspapers at the age of 14, covering school sports events for the New York World Telegram. In 1947 he received an AB degree from Columbia University. He attended Princeton University during 1948–1949 and the Institute for Advanced Study in 1950. Kraft served in the U.S. Army as a cryptographer from 1943 to 1946. Kraft became an editorial writer for the Washington Post in 1951, and he was a writer for the New York Times from 1952 until 1957. He was Washington correspondent for Harper’s magazine from 1962 to 1965, and he wrote a syndicated column that was distributed widely by the Field Newspaper Syndicate until 1980, when he joined the Los Angeles Times Syndicate, which represented approximately 200 newspapers. He wrote for the syndicate until his death in 1986. During the 1960 presidential campaign, Kraft served as a speech writer for Democratic presidential nominee John F. Kennedy. By the early 1970s Kraft was on President Richard M. Nixon’s “enemies list” because of his journalistic endeavors, which were often critical of Nixon’s policies. In the 1976 presidential campaign, Kraft served as one of three panelists in the third presidential debate. Kraft’s numerous books include The Struggle for Algeria (1961), The Grand Design: From Common Market to Atlantic Partnership (1962), The Chinese Difference (1973), and The Mexico Rescue (1984). Kraft’s strengths as an author and journalist included extensive field research and placing developments in their historical context. For example, his celebrated article “A Way Out in Viet-Nam” in the December 1964 issue of Harper’s was preceded by an extended stay in Southeast Asia. His feeling for the indigenous culture and society of the regions was always a strong suit, along with his understanding of the complex historical relationships between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and the
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People’s Republic of China (PRC). He also exhibited a keen grasp of the relationship of these two nations to the Soviet Union. Kraft was one of the first analysts to recognize the growing importance of civilian counterinsurgency and guerrilla warfare experts and their influence on Vietnam War policy during the Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson administrations. Journalist and author David Halberstam credited Kraft with being an influential trendsetter in historical and investigative journalism, while James Reston, the distinguished senior columnist for the New York Times, described Kraft as equaled perhaps only by the legendary investigative journalist I. F. Stone in his commitment to factual research. Kraft’s analyses of the Vietnam War are among the best contemporary studies of that conflict. Suffering from a heart condition, Kraft died suddenly in Washington, D.C., on January 10, 1986. ARTHUR I. CYR See also Halberstam, David; Media and the Vietnam War References Halberstam, David. The Best and the Brightest. New York: Random House, 1972. Hallin, Daniel C. The “Uncensored War”: The Media and Vietnam War. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986.
Krulak, Victor H. Birth Date: January 7, 1913 Death Date: December 29, 2008 U.S. Marine Corps general and commanding general, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, from March 1964 to May 1968. Born in Denver, Colorado, on January 7, 1913, Victor H. (“Brute”) Krulak graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, in 1934. His fellow midshipmen nicknamed him “Brute” in an ironical reference to his diminutive size; he was just 5 feet 4 inches tall and weighed 120 pounds. His early service included sea duty, a tour at the Naval Academy, and assignments with the 6th Marines, the 4th Marines, and the Fleet Marine Force. In March 1943 Krulak, now a lieutenant colonel, took command in the Pacific of a parachute battalion of the I Marine Amphibious Corps at New Caledonia. That October he commanded the diversionary landing on Choiseul to cover the Bougainville invasion. Krulak assisted in the planning and execution of the Okinawa campaign. At the end of the war he helped negotiate the surrender of Japanese forces in the Tsingato, China, area. During the Korean War (1950–1953) Colonel Krulak was chief of staff of the 1st Marine Division. In June 1956 he was promoted to brigadier general and assistant division commander, 3rd Marine Division, on Okinawa. In November 1959 he was promoted to major general, and a month later he assumed command of the Marine Corps Recruit Depot at San Diego. In February 1962 he became spe-
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Kunstler, William Moses people from the guerrillas; concentrating airpower on rail lines, power, fuel, and heavy industry in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam); and placing maximum effort in pacification. Krulak believed that the Americans were far more efficient than the South Vietnamese government at civic action. The Vietnamese people were the key to victory, and if the Communists could be denied access to the bulk of them, the war could be won. Thus, the first order of business had to be to protect the civilian population. Krulak constantly pointed out to his superiors that the manpower necessary to protect the villages was sapped by the requirements of a war of attrition. Krulak retired from the U.S. Marine Corps in June 1968 and settled in San Diego, where he became a manager and writer for Copley newspapers. In 1984 he published his memoirs, First to Fight. Krulak died on December 29, 2008, in San Diego. WILL E. FAHEY JR. See also Attrition; Mendenhall, Joseph Abraham; Pacification; Search and Destroy; Taylor-McNamara Report; United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1954–1965; United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1965–1968; United States Marine Corps; Westmoreland, William Childs
U.S. Marine Corps lieutenant general Victor H. Krulak, who commanded the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, during 1964–1968. Krulak believed strongly that major effort should be placed on pacification, rather than search and destroy operations, as the key to victory in Vietnam. (Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images)
cial assistant for counterinsurgency and activities of the Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Over the course of the next two years much of his time was spent gathering information regarding the developing conflict in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). After a fact-finding mission to Vietnam, Krulak held that the war was winnable if the John F. Kennedy administration firmly supported the Ngo Dinh Diem government. Krulak’s findings contradicted those of State Department official Joseph Mendenhall, who accompanied Krulak to Vietnam. In March 1964 Lieutenant General Krulak assumed command of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, and served in that post until he retired from active duty in May 1968. While he was commander of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, Krulak disagreed with Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), commander General William Westmoreland on several key points. First, Krulak strongly opposed Westmoreland’s search-anddestroy strategy. Krulak believed that attrition of forces favored the enemy. He saw search and destroy as a complete waste of time and effort that reduced the effectiveness of air and artillery support. He believed that guerrillas constituted the main threat. His three-cornered strategy included protecting the South Vietnamese
References Coram, Robert. The Life of Victor Krulak, U.S. Marine. New York: Little, Brown, 2010. Krulak, Victor H. First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984. Zaffiri, Samuel. Westmoreland: A Biography of General William C. Westmoreland. New York: William Morrow, 1994.
Kunstler, William Moses Birth Date: July 7, 1919 Death Date: September 24, 1995 Prominent but controversial attorney and civil rights activist who defended the Chicago Eight during 1969–1970. William Moses Kunstler was born in New York City on July 7, 1919, the eldest of three children. Always a voracious reader, he graduated with a BA in French from Yale University in 1941. He served in the U.S. Army as a cryptographer during World War II in the Pacific theater, advancing to the rank of major and winning a Bronze Star. In 1948 he graduated from the Columbia Law School. In 1949 Kunstler and his brother Michael opened a law practice. Kunstler taught at various institutions in the 1950s and 1960s, including the New York Law School and the New School for Social Research. In addition to hosting a radio interview show, he also wrote for the New York Times book review section and wrote a volume on corporate tax law. In the mid-1950s Kunstler began to focus on civil rights issues. In 1956 the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) asked him to defend an African American who had been accused of violating a
Kunstler, William Moses ban on travel to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). After winning the trial, Kunstler worked on a number of important cases, including the defense of the Freedom Riders in Mississippi who were fighting against racial segregation. Kunstler would later become the director of the ACLU during 1964–1972. He represented many of the leading figures of the Civil Rights Movement, including the Reverend Martin Luther King Jr., Malcolm X, and Stokeley Carmichael. In 1969 Kunstler represented seven anti–Vietnam War protestors, including Tom Hayden, Abbey Hoffman, and Jerry Rubin, who were accused of inciting a riot outside the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in August 1968. The so-called Chicago Seven (originally the Chicago Eight) were charged with violating the Anti-Riot Statute, which was a rider appended to the Civil Rights Act of 1968 in an effort to curb unrest and civil disobedience in the nation. The trial began on September 24, 1969, before District Court judge Julius Jennings Hoffman. The trial was well publicized and was filled with repeated disruptions and clashes involving the judge, the defendants, and their attorneys. To keep civil unrest outside the courtroom in check, National Guard units patrolled the area. Kunstler and Judge Hoffman had numerous heated exchanges during the trial. One of the more dramatic moments came when Judge Hoffman ordered defendant Bobby Seale to be gagged and bound hand and foot to a metal stool. The trial ended on February 20, 1970. The jury cleared all defendants of the conspiracy charges but found five of the seven guilty of having incited a riot while crossing state lines. The judge then issued contempt of court citations to the defendants and their attorneys. Kunstler received more than 150 charges of criminal contempt and was given the longest sentence of all involved, four years and 13 days. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed all the contempt convictions on November 21, 1972. In 1966 Kunstler cofounded the Center for Constitutional Rights, a public interest and educational organization committed
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to the creative use of law as a tool for social change. In the 1970s he was involved in attempts to reform New York’s infamous Attica Prison. He also defended leading figures in the American Indian Movement, including Russell Means. In 1976 Kunstler was involved in the successful struggle to have the site of the 1970 Kent State Massacre declared a national landmark. In the 1980s and 1990s Kunstler and his protégé Ron Kuby took on a number of high-profiles case, including the defense of reputed mobster John Gotti; the terrorist Sheikh Omar Abdel, convicted of a plot to blow up the World Trade Center in 1993; and Long Island Railroad gunman Colin Ferguson. During the 1991 Persian Gulf War Kunstler and Kuby represented numerous American soldiers who refused to fight and claimed conscientious objector status. Over the course of his career Kunstler authored a dozen books, including And Justice for All (1963) and his memoir My Life as Radical Lawyer (1994). He also appeared in numerous television and film productions, sometimes portraying himself. Kunstler died in New York City on September 4, 1995. BRIAN GURIAN See also Chicago Eight; Civil Rights Movement; Democratic National Convention of 1968; Hayden, Thomas Emmett; Hoffman, Abbie; Rubin, Jerry References Kunstler, William. My Life as a Radical Lawyer. Secaucus, NJ: Carol Publishing Group, 1996. Langum, David. The Most Hated Lawyer in America. New York: New York University Press, 1999. Schultz, John. Motion Will Be Denied: A New Report on the Chicago Conspiracy Trial. New York: Morrow, 1972.
Ky Ngoai Hau Cuong De See Cuong De
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L Laird, Melvin Robert Birth Date: September 1, 1922 Republican politician and U.S. secretary of defense (1969–1973). Born in Omaha, Nebraska, on September 1, 1922, Melvin Robert (“Bom”) Laird graduated from Carleton College in 1942 and served in the U.S. Navy during World War II. After the war he won election to the Wisconsin State Senate as a Republican and served there until his 1952 election to the U.S. House of Representatives from Wisconsin’s 7th Congressional District, a seat he held continuously until President Richard Nixon named him his first secretary of defense in 1969. As secretary of defense, Laird faced daunting problems in formulating policy, budgets, and force structure during a period of declining resources and shrinking manpower committed to defense. He gave the service secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) more of a role in these matters than had his predecessor, a welcome development from their standpoint. As a former congressman, he also proved effective in dealing with Congress. Sensitive to declining congressional support for the war in Vietnam, Laird pushed hard for rapid withdrawal of American ground forces. This put him frequently at odds with National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger on such issues as the 1970 cross-border incursion into Cambodia. Indeed, a later analysis found that Laird had been bypassed on the planning for that operation, an extreme example of the Byzantine workings of the Nixon White House. Laird frequently attempted to change or countermand White House instructions. Nixon noted in his memoirs that “it was largely on the basis of Laird’s enthusiastic advocacy that we undertook the policy of Vietnamization.” Although this program of handing off more responsibility for the war to forces of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South
Melvin R. Laird was a long-time U.S. congressman who served as secretary of defense under President Richard Nixon during the Vietnam War from 1969 to 1973. (Library of Congress)
Vietnam) had actually begun in the Lyndon Johnson administration, Laird was committed to making it work, so much so that in his book Lost Victory, William Colby, who headed American support for pacification in South Vietnam, called Laird “the unsung hero of the whole war effort.”
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Laird was also supportive of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), commander General Creighton Abrams and greatly admired his stoicism in fighting on even as his forces were progressively being taken from him. It was Laird who insisted that Abrams be named army chief of staff when he returned from Vietnam. Then the two men devised and promulgated a total-force policy that sought to ensure that reserve forces would be utilized in any future conflicts. In his final report as secretary of defense, Laird stated his view that “as a consequence of the success of the military aspects of Vietnamization, the South Vietnamese people today . . . are fully capable of providing for their own in-country security against the North Vietnamese.” However dubious that view was at the time, Laird had accomplished his major objective of withdrawing U.S. forces from Vietnam. Laird had stated at the outset that he intended to serve only four years as defense secretary. Leaving that post in January 1973, he later served briefly as counselor to the president for domestic affairs before returning to the private sector in February 1974. He later had a long association with Reader’s Digest as senior counselor for national and international affairs. In January 2006 Laird participated in a White House meeting that gathered current and past secretaries of defense and state to discuss the George W. Bush administration’s foreign and military policies, including the vexing war in Iraq. LEWIS SORLEY See also Abrams, Creighton Williams, Jr.; Cambodian Incursion; Kissinger, Henry Alfred; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Palmer, Bruce, Jr.; United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1969–1973 References Kissinger, Henry. White House Years. Boston: Little, Brown, 1979. Nixon, Richard M. RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon. New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978. Van Atta, Dale. With Honor: Melvin Laird in War, Peace, and Politics. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2008.
Lake, William Anthony Kirsop Birth Date: April 2, 1939 Diplomat, academic, special assistant to National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger during 1969–1970, and national security adviser to President Bill Clinton during 1993–1997. Born in New York City on April 2, 1939, William Anthony Kirsop Lake grew up in New Haven, Connecticut. After earning a BA in history from Harvard University in 1961, he spent one year as a Fiske Scholar at Cambridge University in England studying international economics. Lake joined the Foreign Service in 1962 and was assigned in 1963 to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) as staff assistant to Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. Lake then became
vice-consul in Hue during 1964–1965, where he saw firsthand the bloodshed and destruction caused by the war and became dismayed by the incongruity he observed in the optimistic military briefings that passed across his desk and the more realistic reporting from the field by journalists. Lake returned to the United States to become a staff assistant in the Far Eastern bureau of the U.S. State Department from 1965 to 1967. After a two-year leave of absence from work, Lake received an MA in public affairs from Princeton University in 1969. He became convinced that the Vietnam War not only was wrong but was being lost by the United States. Hoping to convince President Richard Nixon to end U.S. involvement in the war, in 1969 Lake accepted the job as special assistant to National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger. Lake accompanied Kissinger to secret negotiations with representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) in Paris. When U.S. forces invaded Cambodia in April 1970 Lake resigned in protest, believing that American policy was misguided and out of touch with the reality of the war. Lake subsequently worked as a foreign policy coordinator for Democratic senator Edmund Muskie for two years, directed projects for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace during 1972–1973, and directed International Voluntary Services during 1974–1976. He earned a doctorate from Princeton in 1974. In 1977 he became director of policy planning for Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. In 1980 Lake left government service and returned to academia as a professor of international relations at Amherst College (1981–1984) and later at Mount Holyoke College (1984–1992). In 1993 Lake was appointed national security adviser by President Bill Clinton. Perhaps Lake’s greatest contribution in this capacity was his role in the resolution of the 1992–1995 Bosnian War. After Clinton won reelection in 1996 he tapped Lake to become director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), but Republicans in Congress balked, and the appointment was eventually withdrawn. Many saw the Republican rebuke as a purely partisan move. Lake resigned from his post as national security adviser in 1997. The following year Clinton appointed Lake as a White House special envoy, a position he held until 2000. In this role he helped broker an agreement that ended the 1998–2000 Eritrean-Ethiopian War. Meanwhile, Lake remained on the faculty of Georgetown University, a post he continues to hold. In 2000 Lake cofounded Intellibridge Corporation, a strategic analysis firm; the company was sold in 2005. In 2008 Lake decided to support Barack Obama’s presidential campaign and reportedly advised the campaign on national security matters. When Obama was elected, Lake was among those considered for the secretary of state post, which ultimately went to Senator Hillary Clinton. LAURA MATYSEK WOOD See also Cambodian Incursion; Clinton, William Jefferson; Kissinger, Henry Alfred; Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr.; Nixon, Richard Milhous
LAM SON 719, Operation
References Lake, Anthony, ed. The Vietnam Legacy: The War, American Society and the Future of American Foreign Policy. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1976. Lake, Anthony, I. M. Destler, and Leslie H. Gelb. Our Own Worst Enemy: The Unmaking of American Foreign Policy. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984.
LAM SON
719, Operation
Start Date: February 8, 1971 End Date: March 24, 1971 Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) campaign to curtail southbound Communist supply shipments on the Ho Chi Minh Trail network. The operation occurred during February 8–March 24, 1971. In 1971, with Vietnamization under way and the withdrawal of American forces proceeding, troops and supplies continued to flow down the Ho Chi Minh Trail from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and into the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), U.S. Air Force claims of having destroyed legions of trucks in its COMMANDO HUNT campaigns notwithstanding. Operation LAM SON 719 had two objectives. The first was to capture Tchepone in Laos, a key transshipment point on Route 9 some 25 miles west of Khe Sanh. As a part of this effort, the ARVN was to destroy supplies in nearby Base Area 604 and in Base Area 611 south of Route 9, an area adjacent to the South Vietnamese border. The second, and more optimistic, objective was to sever the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the long logistical corridor running through eastern Laos with several hundred miles of paved roads and thousands of miles of dirt roads, tracks, pathways, and waterways down which supplies could be funneled to South Vietnam. This logistical network was vital to North Vietnam’s ongoing war inside South Vietnam. The Cooper-Church Amendment, passed by the U.S. Congress on December 29, 1970, forbade the use of American ground forces in Laos. However, U.S. forces played a key part in LAM SON 719. American helicopters ferried ARVN troops into Laos, and U.S. fighter-bombers and Boeing B-52 Stratofortresses were available to provide air cover. On the ground in South Vietnam, the 1st Brigade of the 5th Infantry Division led the way back into Khe Sanh as a part of Operation DEWEY CANYON II. From Khe Sanh and from surrounding fire-support bases inside South Vietnam, some 9,000 U.S. troops gave logistical support to the ARVN and provided artillery fire into Laos. From Khe Sanh and other fire-support bases, some 2,600 helicopters carried ARVN troops into and, later, out of Laos. The ARVN plan had the full support of U.S. president Richard Nixon, who fully expected it to show the success of Vietnamization, the turning over of the war to the South Vietnamese. On February 8, 1971, a task force of 15,000 ARVN troops invaded Laos. The main thrust was along Route 9, a single-lane
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dirt road leading from the Lao-Vietnamese border westward to Tchepone. At first the troops moved easily through the low hills that, within miles, turned more rugged and then changed to jungle as the road wound toward Tchepone. In imitation of the Americans, the ARVN built fire-support bases to serve as base camps and placed 105-millimeter (mm) and 155-mm howitzers in them to provide artillery support. The camps were also supposed to serve as bases from which patrols and raids could be mounted into the surrounding countryside. LAM SON 719 was a major test of Vietnamization. Because of the Cooper-Church Amendment, the ARVN was on its own. There were no U.S. advisers with the South Vietnamese and no American forward air controllers. The ARVN had only a few Englishspeaking soldiers who could serve in that capacity, and they were not very proficient. Intelligence estimates indicated that 11,000 to 12,000 People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) troops would be present. About half of those were thought to be workers assigned to running daily activities along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, including managing the truck depots, cooking food for the troops and truck drivers, attending infirmaries, and repairing roads. The other half were security forces used to patrol the trail and to man the 1,400–2,000 heavy machine guns and antiaircraft artillery (AAA) in the area. In one of the greater intelligence miscalculations of the war, it was thought that it would take up to a month for the PAVN to move one division from the panhandle of North Vietnam into the LAM SON 719 area of operations. In fact, within two weeks as many as five PAVN divisions, including the fabled 304th, 308th, and 320th divisions, were engaging the ARVN. Postwar Vietnamese sources reveal that the North Vietnamese Politburo concluded as early as the summer of 1970, shortly after the U.S.–South Vietnamese Cambodian Incursion in May 1970, that the next U.S. move would be an attack aimed at cutting the PAVN supply route along Ho Chi Minh Trail, although they were not sure precisely where along the trail such an attack would be made. To defend against such an attack, which the PAVN anticipated would occur in the autumn of 1970, the PAVN formed LXX Corps, which included the 304th, 308th, and 320th divisions along with supporting artillery, armor, engineer, and antiaircraft units. The provisional corps and its subordinate units conducted extensive reconnaissance, planning, and logistics preparations to prepare for the anticipated attack. Even though the ARVN operation began several months later than the PAVN anticipated that it would, these advance preparations made it possible for PAVN forces to quickly move into position to block the ARVN operation. Famed Communist spy and Time magazine correspondent Pham Xuan An claimed to have provided the PAVN high command with advance warning of the LAM SON 719 operation. However, it is not clear just how important this intelligence was to the outcome of the battle.
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By the third week of LAM SON 719, the ARVN advance had stalled at A Luoi, a fire-support base 12 miles inside Laos. ARVN armor was bottled up along Route 9, and other ARVN units had holed up inside A Luoi and other fire-support bases in the area. PAVN forces attacked these bases, first pounding them with 122-mm and 130mm artillery, Soviet-built guns with range superior to the 105-mm and 155-mm howitzers used by the ARVN. After the artillery had softened the ARVN positions, PAVN infantry, supported by PT-76 light tanks and, for the first time, heavier T-34 and T-54 tanks, attacked the fire-support bases. One after another, the bases fell to the counterattacking PAVN. Conventional wisdom held that U.S. airpower would be the pivotal, if not the deciding, factor. This was another miscalculation. As the PAVN counterattack commenced, the weather deteriorated. Low clouds prevented the use of American fighter-bomber jets. B-52s, which could bomb through the cloud cover, were useful against large-area targets, but PAVN leaders knew that the big bombers would not be employed against targets closer than about 1.8 miles from friendly forces except in the most dire circumstances. Accordingly, the PAVN adopted General Vo Nguyen Giap’s dictum of “clinging to the cartridge belts” of the ARVN and, by staying close to them, negated the effective use of B-52s. When the weather cleared, there was North Vietnamese antiaircraft fire with which to contend. As they did in North Vietnam, the PAVN relied on AAA and heavy machine guns to deny the
Americans effective use of the air. Heavy machine guns, supplemented by 23-mm and 37-mm AAA guns, covered virtually every potential helicopter landing zone. The 23-mm and 37-mm guns blanketed the area, and SA-2 surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites were placed in Ban Raving Pass. These threatened B-52s bombing within 17 miles of the pass and fighter-bombers flying above 1,500 feet in the same area. During LAM SON 719, the U.S. Air Force directed 1,285 sorties against AAA guns, reportedly destroying 70 of them. In support of LAM SON 719, B-52s flew 1,358 sorties and dropped 32,000 tons of bombs, with most missions directed against suspected supply dumps in Base Area 604, well away from Ban Raving Pass. Despite increasingly heavy opposition from the PAVN, President Nguyen Van Thieu ordered the commander of Operation LAM SON 719, General Hoang Xuan Lam, to launch an airborne assault on Tchepone. By March 1 Tchepone had been abandoned by the PAVN and had little military value. But its psychological and political value seemed significant to Thieu. On March 6, 120 U.S. Army Bell UH-1 Iroquois (“Huey”) helicopters, protected by Bell AH-1G Cobra helicopter gunships and U.S. Air Force fighter-bombers, lifted two ARVN battalions from the U.S. Marine Corps base at Khe Sanh into Tchepone. Only one helicopter was lost to AAA en route. Two days later another two ARVN battalions reached Tchepone on foot. The South Vietnamese troops spent the next two weeks ferreting out PAVN supply caches around the village.
Landing Zone The capture of Tchepone achieved one of LAM SON 719’s primary objectives. President Thieu then ordered General Lam to begin withdrawing the ARVN from Laos. Retreats are, however, among the most difficult of operational maneuvers. Even fine armies have disintegrated during withdrawals, especially if harried by enemy forces. By 1971 the best ARVN units were as good as many PAVN units, but they were not well enough trained, led, or disciplined to conduct an orderly retreat in the face of vigorous attack. The PAVN intensified its attacks on the withdrawing ARVN. Again, poor weather hampered effective air operations. But when the weather cleared, devastating AAA fire and the inability of U.S. Air Force pilots to coordinate their attacks with ground units diminished the effectiveness of airpower. The retreat turned into a rout. Meanwhile, almost 60,000 PAVN troops, including three armored battalions, five artillery regiments, and four antiaircraft regiments, hammered home their attacks on a massively outnumbered and increasingly demoralized South Vietnamese force. In large part due to the selflessness and bravery of U.S. Army helicopter pilots, about half of the original ARVN force of 15,000 troops managed to make its way to safety. At least 5,000 ARVN troops were killed or wounded, and more than 2,500 were unaccounted for and listed as missing. Additionally, 253 Americans were killed and another 1,149 wounded during LAM SON 719, although no Americans fought on the ground inside Laos. Many American troops were killed or wounded when the PAVN counterattack spilled into South Vietnam and when Khe Sanh came under a fierce artillery attack on March 15. In operations over Laos, at least 108 U.S. Army helicopters were destroyed and another 618 were damaged, many so badly that they were scrapped. Seven U.S. Air Force fixed-wing aircraft were also shot down. Despite the outcome and the losses, the allies declared victory. President Richard M. Nixon, in a televised address to the nation on April 7, 1971, stated that “Tonight I can report Vietnamization has succeeded.” President Thieu dubbed LAM SON 719 “the biggest victory ever.” In North Vietnam, however, Radio Hanoi proclaimed that “The Route 9–Southern Laos Victory” (as they called it) was “the heaviest defeat ever for Nixon and Company.” In retrospect, North Vietnam’s claim seems the correct one. The ARVN had suffered grievous losses, particularly among its junior officers. EARL H. TILFORD JR. See also Airpower, Role in War; Cao Van Vien; COMMANDO HUNT, Operation; Cooper-Church Amendment; DEWEY CANYON II, Operation; Ho Chi Minh Trail; Laos; Nguyen Van Thieu; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, Army; Vietnam, Republic of, Army; Vietnamization References Berman, Larry. Perfect Spy: The Incredible Double Life of Pham Xuan An, Time Magazine Reporter and Vietnamese Communist Agent. New York: HarperCollins, 2007.
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Fulghum, David, and Terrence Maitland. South Vietnam on Trial, Mid-1970 to 1972. The Vietnam Experience Series. Boston: Boston Publishing, 1984. Ho De, Tran Hanh, and Hung Dat. Chien Dich Phan Cong Duong So 9–Nam Lao, Nam 1971 [The Route 9–Southern Laos Counteroffensive Campaign, 1971]. Hanoi: Military History Institute of Vietnam, 1987. Military History Institute of Vietnam. Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People’s Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002. Nolan, Keith William. Into Laos: The Story of Dewey Canyon II/Lam Son 719, Vietnam 1971. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1986. Palmer, Dave R. Summons of the Trumpet: U.S.-Vietnam in Perspective. San Rafael, CA: Presidio, 1995.
Landing Zone Landing area for helicopters during the Vietnam War. In traditional military lexicon, a landing zone (LZ) would normally designate an area slated for an amphibious invasion. However, during the Vietnam War, the term “landing zone” became exclusively associated with helicopters. LZs were both temporary and permanent and were often the site of major battles during the Vietnam conflict. Although employed in the Korean War (1950–1953) for various purposes, including medical evacuations, helicopters in the Vietnam War were employed to ferry considerable numbers of troops into and out of combat. Much of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) was heavily forested, with dense canopies. Where LZs were unavailable, teams would frequently clear them by dropping large drums of gasoline and jellied gasoline (napalm) from nets suspended from helicopters. Special explosives were also developed for this purpose, the best known being the 15,000-pound BLU-82 (“Daisy Cutter”) bombs. LZs allowed the U.S. military to insert forces immediately into a remote area. Occasionally LZs served as bait for enemy forces. More often, LZs were contested by Communist forces and were the sites of fierce battles. Where there was hostile fire, an LZ would be known as a “hot LZ.” Certainly, likely LZs were frequently targeted by the Viet Cong (VC) and the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) for ambushes, booby traps, and massed assaults. The battle for LZ X-Ray in the Ia Drang Valley, part of the wider Battle of the Ia Drang in November 1965, is one of the best-known examples of a hot LZ. LZs were used, abandoned, and reoccupied throughout the conflict. Likely LZs were usually prepped by machine-gun fire. If an LZ was held by friendly forces, they would employ different colors of smoke grenades to signal incoming helicopters, which would often hover just off the ground. Troops would then move quickly to and from the helicopters, often ferrying supplies from the helicopters and carrying wounded comrades to them. Flying in and out of LZs required much of the crews involved, was extraordinarily
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Two U.S. paratroopers alerted by enemy sniper fire during landing operations in Vietnam’s D Zone north of Saigon on November 8, 1965. (AP/Wide World Photos)
Land Reform, Vietnam dangerous work, and resulted in the loss of many pilots and their machines during the war. RANDAL SCOTT BEEMAN See also BLU-82/B Bomb; Helicopters, Employment of, in Vietnam; Ia Drang, Battle of; Medevac References Mesko, James. Airmobile: The Helicopter War in Vietnam. New York: Signal, 1984. Robert, Mason. Chickenhawk: A Shattering Account of the Helicopter War in Vietnam. New York: Penguin Books, 1984.
Land Reform, Vietnam Land reform generally refers to the confiscation of land from wealthy landlords for redistribution to poor peasants. In southern Vietnam, the impact of land reform would be greatest in the Mekong Delta, where most of the land was owned by large landlords and worked by tenant farmers. Tenancy was not unknown in central and northern Vietnam, but it was much less prevalent. During most of the Indochina War (1946–1954), the Viet Minh compromised its doctrines of class struggle to some extent in order to gain greater support against the French. Land reform, however, was the most important way that Communist principles of class struggle could be applied to Vietnam. Initially the Viet Minh confiscated land from landlords who supported the French, but those who supported the Viet Minh only had to reduce the level of rent they collected. In 1953 this compromise was rejected, and a very radical campaign of land reform was begun. Beginning in a pilot phase in Thai Nguyen Province north of the Red River, land reform was more brutal in Thanh Hoa and Ninh Binh provinces. The land reform campaign led thousands of non-Communist cadres in northern Vietnam to defect from the Viet Minh. The campaign paused after the 1954 Geneva Accords but was restored from mid-1955 to September 1956 on a larger scale and spread through all ethnically Vietnamese areas of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). Land reform became more radical as it spread, both economically, with far more people being classified as “landlords” than actually met the official definition of the term, and politically, with an increasingly frenzied search for landlords and landlord agents within the Viet Minh village leadership. Many who owned as little as 18 acres of land were classified as landlords. On average, two landlords or “reactionaries” from each village were executed. Victims were put to death by firing squads and stoning; some were even starved to death. As the campaign was carried out in some 3,653 villages, probably fewer than 8,000 landlords and would-be opponents of the regime were put to death. Many others, however, were sent to reeducation camps.
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On November 2, 1956, a revolt broke out against the land reform policies in Nghe An. This particularly shocked Ho Chi Minh, as it was his birthplace province and a supposed bastion of communism. The government had to call out the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) 325th Division to crush the rebels. Ho now concluded that it was easier to change the policy than the peasants. The North Vietnamese leadership now initiated a correction of errors in which Viet Minh village leaders who had been falsely accused of being enemy agents were rehabilitated and people who had been wrongly classified as landlords had part of their confiscated land returned to them. Ho admitted no responsibility, but Ho Viet Thang, deputy minister for land reform, was sent to a reeducation camp, and Truong Chinh resigned as Vietnamese Communist Party secretary-general to become chairman of the parliament. In June 1958 the party affirmed that the purpose of the campaign was not only to confiscate land for the poor but also phat dong quan chung (“to motivate the masses”). According to Communist ideology, the landlord class was a threat, and through 1997 children and grandchildren of landlords were considered untrustworthy of party membership until proven otherwise by investigation. Certainly the land reform campaign was one of the greatest events in the history of the North Vietnamese government, second only to the Vietnam War. The need to repair the damage that this land reform had done to Communist political power in North Vietnam was one of the reasons that there was so little North Vietnamese pressure on Ngo Dinh Diem’s government in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) from 1956 to 1958. Diem meanwhile was making South Vietnam an ally of the landlord class. In the Mekong Delta where most landlords were closely associated with the French, the Viet Minh had redistributed large amounts of land even before 1953. The South Vietnamese government nullified this redistribution and assisted the former landlords in resuming rent collection, averaging probably between one-fourth and one-third of crops. At American urging, Diem passed a land reform law of his own, Ordinance 57 of October 22, 1956, but his program was much less generous to the peasants than that of the Communists in three ways: it asked tenants to pay for land they received, it did not promise a thorough resolution of the tenancy problem (landlords were entitled to retain much of their land), and corruption and apathy on the part of officials kept the ordinance from being thoroughly implemented. The law specified accurate land surveys and ownership certificates, thus creating vast amounts of paperwork. The amount of land actually distributed to the peasants was far less even than the limited amount that under law was supposed to be distributed. The result was that when the Vietnam War began, the South Vietnamese government was still basically allied with absentee landlords. The National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (National Liberation Front [NLF]) land reform program, which dramatically reduced rent levels or simply gave land to tenant
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farmers, was an important part of the NLF political appeal, especially in the Mekong Delta. Only late in the war did the South Vietnamese government become truly serious about bidding against the Communists for the allegiance of tenant farmers. The land reform law signed by President Nguyen Van Thieu on March 26, 1970, was far more radical than that of Diem. This law redistributed almost all landlord land to tenants and did not ask that the tenants pay for it. Furthermore, Thieu’s land reform law was actually carried out in a reasonably thorough fashion. Land reforms of the Viet Minh and the NLF had considerably reduced tenancy in South Vietnam. Thieu’s land reform abolished almost all of what remained. EDWIN E. MOISE See also Agricultural Reform Tribunals; Ho Chi Minh; Mekong Delta; National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam; Ngo Dinh Diem; Nguyen Van Thieu; Viet Minh; Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, 1945–1954 References Callison, Charles S. Land-to-the-Tiller in the Mekong Delta: Economic, Social and Political Effects of Land Reform in Four Villages of South Vietnam. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1983. Hoang Van Chi. From Colonialism to Communism: A Case History of North Vietnam. New York: Praeger, 1964. Moise, Edwin E. Land Reform in China and North Vietnam: Consolidating the Revolution at the Village Level. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983. Sansom, Robert L. The Economics of Insurgency in the Mekong Delta. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1970.
Lang Bac, Battle of Event Date: 42 CE Important Chinese military victory in Vietnam. At the beginning of the first century, the Chinese imposed their culture on the Vietnamese, to include veneration of the emperor, the use of Chinese ideographic writing, and Confucianism. The latter taught a hierarchical structure for society with a tightly woven system of obligations that bound subject to ruler, son to father, and wife to husband. The most important element was absolute loyalty to the emperor. At the same time, Chinese officials seized land from local nobles to distribute to Chinese settlers. This policy reached culmination under the corrupt Prefect Su Ting (To Dinh). Opposition to this policy along with the the belief that they were losing their national identity led the Lac lords in Giao Chi to revolt. In 39 CE Thi Sach, the Lac lord of Chu-dien, and his wife Trung Trac, daughter of the Lac lord of Me-linh, led a revolt against the Chinese. Apparently Trung Trac was the true leader of the revolt. In the spring of 40 CE the Vietnamese rebel forces successfully laid siege to the Chinese garrisons and ultimately secured all the territory from Cuu Chan to Hop Pho (Kwang Tung). Su Ting fled to Guangzhou (Canton), and the Vietnamese were independent for the first time in 150 years.
Trung Trac established a court at Me-linh, northwest of present-day Hanoi, and most of Giao Chi and Cuu Chan recognized Trung Trac as queen. Reportedly she abolished imperial taxes imposed by the Han in favor of gift exchanges based on hereditary rights and mutual benefits. Trung Trac and her sister Trung Nhi, apparently her constant companion, are today revered by Vietnamese as the Hai Ba Trung (the Two Trung Ladies or the Trung Sisters). The fact that many women took leadership roles in the revolt influenced later women’s rights in Vietnam. In 41 CE the Han Court appointed one of its best generals, Ma Yuan (Ma Vien), to command an invasion army. Given the title of “Tamer of Waters,” Ma Yuan moved south with 8,000 regular troops and some 12,000 militiamen from southern China. With an invasion fleet insufficient to transport his troops, Ma Yuan proceeded by land. In the spring of 42 CE Vietnamese forces halted the Chinese advance before Co-loa, and Ma Yuan withdrew eastward to high ground at Lang Bac, overlooking the southern shore of Lake Lang Ba. The Chinese were probably resupplied by ships sailing up the Cau River to the lake. The rainy season had begun, and Ma Yuan apparently decided to wait for dry weather before resuming the offensive. But with a number of the Lac lords losing heart and fearful that waiting would only encourage further disaffection, Trung Trac ordered an attack. We do not know anything about the Battle of Lang Bac except that it ended with the Chinese easily defeating their poorly disciplined opponents. Some 10,000 Vietnamese surrendered, and reportedly the Chinese beheaded several thousand of them. Trung Trac and some loyalists fled to her ancestral estates at Me-linh, where the Chinese sources assert that the Trung sisters were captured and executed, their heads sent to the Han court. Vietnamese tradition holds that the sisters committed suicide after the battle by leaping into the Day (Hat) River. General Ma Yuan spent 43 CE establishing direct Han rule in the Red River Delta. Near the end of that year he moved to the south in some 2,000 ships against Cuu Chan where some of the rebellious Lac lords had relocated, reaching as far as present-day Nghe Anh Province. After pacifying the area, in the spring of 44 CE Ma Yuan returned to a hero’s welcome at the Han court. The Han deprived the Vietnamese of their traditional ruling class. The Lac lords disappeared forever, and the Han established direct Chinese rule. They also gradually extended their control southward to include the area of Nhat Nam, immediately south of Cuu Chan. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Trung Trac and Trung Nhi; Vietnam, History of, Prehistory to 938 CE References Chapuis, Oscar M. A History of Vietnam: From Hong Bang to Tu Duc. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1995. Nguyen Khac Vien. Vietnam: A Long History. Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1987.
Lang Son Taylor, Keith Weller. The Birth of Vietnam. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983. Tucker, Spencer C. Vietnam. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1999.
Lang Son Province and city in northeastern Vietnam. Lang Son Province, encompassing some 4,900 square miles, shares a 152-mile-long border with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Some 80 percent mountains, the province contains a large minority population to include Kinh, Tay, Nung, Dao, and Ngai peoples. The city of Lang Son is situated close to the Chinese border on the left bank of the Ky Cung River. It is linked with Hanoi, some 92 miles to the south, by National Highway 1A and by rail. Highway 4B runs from Lang Son northwest to Cao Bang, while Highway 4A runs from Lang Son to Loc Binh and beyond to the southeast. Lang Son is a major transshipment point for trade between China and Vietnam. As a Chinese invasion route into Vietnam, Lang Son occupies an important strategic position, and the city and its citadel have seen many significant battles.
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In 1427, 100,000 Ming dynasty troops invaded and took Lang Son on their way to the Vietnamese western capital of Thanh Hoa (present-day Hanoi). Lang Son was occupied by Qing dynasty forces just before the 1884–1885 Sino-French War and was then taken by the French, who raised their flag over its citadel on February 13, 1885. The French were subsequently obliged to retreat through Lang Son following a failed attack into China. The Chinese retook Lang Son on March 29. On September 24, 1940, during World War II, the Japanese 5th Division attacked the French garrison at Lang Son, which surrendered following two days of fighting. Guerrilla groups were active in Lang Son Province against both the French and Japanese during World War II, and by 1943 the Viet Minh had gained firm control of the province. After the war the French again established an important garrison in the city of Lang Son, which became the major base area for the French forts on Route Coloniale 4 along the China border. During the Indochina War, Lang Son was a major base for Operation LÉA in October 1947. Lang Son fell to the Viet Minh in the course of the 1950 Battle for Route Coloniale 4. Many consider this to be the turning point of the Indochina War because it enabled the Viet Minh to establish a supply route from the PRC. The French
The rural village of Na Lia, Lang Son Province, in northern Vietnam, 2007. (AFP/Getty Images)
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returned to Lang Son only once, briefly, in Operation HIRONDELLE (SWALLOW) in July 1953. Some 2,000 paratroopers retook the city in what proved to be more a psychological boost for the French than any military advantage. Lang Son was again the scene of fighting during the brief 1979 war between Vietnam and China, when Lang Son fell to Chinese forces in early March but was evacuated by them shortly thereafter. Today the economy of Lang Son Province is centered on agriculture, mining, and foreign trade, but with its picturesque nearby Vong Phu Mountain, grottoes, and pagodas, the city of Lang Son and its environs are becoming a major tourist area. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Indochina War; Vietnam, History of, 938 CE through the French Conquest References Chapuis, Oscar M. A History of Vietnam: From Hong Bang to Tu Duc. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1995. Chapuis, Oscar M. The Last Emperors of Vietnam: From Tu Duc to Bao Dai. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2000. Tucker, Spencer C. Vietnam. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1999.
Lang Vei Special Forces Camp, Battle for Start Date: February 6, 1968 End Date: February 7, 1968 The most significant ground assault by the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) during the Second Battle of Khe Sanh. The Lang Vei Special Forces camp was located along Route 9 in northwestern Quang Tri Province, about 5 miles southwest of the Khe Sanh Combat Base, about 1 mile from the border with Laos to the southwest, and 21 miles south of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) separating the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). The Lang Vei camp was one of 10 Special Forces A-Detachment camps of the 5th Special Forces Group. The camp had been established as a base for operations by Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) against the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos. The original Lang Vei camp had come under PAVN attack in early May 1967. Communist infiltrators among the CIDG recruits had cut the wire on the south part of the camp and identified the location of mines there. These actions enabled PAVN forces to infiltrate the camp and use satchel charges and B-40 rockets to destroy the bunkers. A relief force found only one American alive. Following the successful PAVN attack, the Lang Vei camp was moved some 800 yards to the west. U.S. Army Special Forces captain Frank C. Willoughby commanded the Lang Vei camp. Its location meant that if PAVN forces wanted to mount a large-scale attack on Khe Sanh, they would first have to take Lang Vei.
Earlier in January, Company C augmented Willoughby’s small A-Detachment and Bru Montagnard with a Mobile Strike Force (“Mike Force”) company of Hre tribesmen along with six Green Beret advisers. Subsequent Mike Force patrols reported the presence in Laos of an empty tank park and fresh tank tracks, and a PAVN deserter at Khe Sanh confirmed that he had heard tanks. These reports were greeted with skepticism in Khe Sanh and Saigon, but some 100 M-72 66-millimeter (mm) light antitank weapons (LAWs) were delivered to Lang Vei. After live-fire training by a limited number of the camp defenders, 75 of the LAWs remained at the time of the battle. PAVN histories reveal that a company of PT-76 tanks had in fact moved into an assembly area only two miles from the Lang Vei camp 12 days before the attack. On January 24, 1968, Captain Willoughby learned that PAVN forces supported by tanks had taken Camp BV-33, just across the border in Laos. Its garrison—the indigenous Ca Royal Laotian Army 33rd Infantry Battalion, commonly known as the Elephant Battalion—had fled east into South Vietnam to Lang Vei. Willoughby accepted the more than 500 Laotian troops into the camp and settled their 2,200 dependents in Lang Vei village. Willoughby now radioed Da Nang for assistance, and a 6-man Special Forces augmentation team arrived with medical aid and food. Willoughby assigned them to work with the Laotians, and they all set to work to refortify the old Lang Vei camp, where the Elephant Battalion was established. Willoughby’s request for antitank mines was denied. To defend the Lang Vei camp, Willoughby now had 24 U.S. Special Forces members of Operational Detachment A-101, 5th Special Forces Group; 14 Luc Luong Dac Biet (LLDB, South Vietnamese Special Forces); 161 Mike Force members who had been running patrols into Laos; 282 CIDG Bru Montagnard personnel; and 6 interpreters. The camp had crew-served automatic weapons and two 4.2-inch mortars as well as several dozen 81-mm and 60-mm mortars and two 106-mm and four 57-mm recoilless rifles. Nearby U.S. artillery available to act in support of the camp included 16 175-mm guns, 16 155-mm howitzers, and 18 105-mm howitzers at Khe Sanh and at nearby Camp Carroll and Thon San Lam. Willoughby had conducted registration fire on likely approach routes and possible staging areas. First contact between Lang Vei’s defenders and the approaching PAVN troops occurred a week later on January 31, when a patrol from the camp engaged in a firefight with an estimated battalion-sized PAVN force. With the addition of the recently arrived 520 Laotians of the Elephant Battalion, the Lang Vei area now had 1,007 defenders. PAVN activity and contacts increased in early February, and Willoughby sensed that an attack was imminent. On the morning of February 6 the camp came under PAVN mortar fire; the defenders replied in kind. That evening, however, the camp received some 50 rounds of PAVN 122-mm artillery fire. Marine artillery from Khe Sanh returned counterbattery fire. The PAVN ground assault began just before 1:00 a.m. on February 7, when the outpost was struck by the 4th and 5th battalions
Lang Vei Special Forces Camp, Battle for of the 24th Regiment, 304th Division; the 3rd Battalion, 101st Regiment, 325th Division; two companies of tanks of the PAVN 198th Battalion, 203rd Armored Regiment; two sapper companies; and a flamethrower team. It was the first PAVN use of tanks in the Vietnam War. The attack, which came from three directions, was led by 11 Soviet light (15-ton) PT-76 amphibious tanks mounting a 76-mm gun (Vietnamese sources state that 16 PT-76 tanks were employed in the attack). The defenders employed a 106-mm recoilless rifle fire to knock out two tanks. Special Forces lieutenant colonel Daniel F. Schungel, in the camp to serve as liaison with the Laotian commander, also a lieutenant colonel, organized antitank teams, but the LAWs proved largely ineffective. Some launchers failed to fire, and some rockets failed to detonate on impact. The defenders subsequently destroyed 5 other tanks for a total of 7, but the others were able to overrun the camp’s perimeter. The attacking PAVN infantry had been specially equipped with satchel charges, flamethrowers, and tear gas. By 3:00 a.m., several PT-76s had rolled atop the concrete reinforced tactical operations center, now held by 8 Special Forces troops and 40 indigenous soldiers. During the battle, supporting artillery fired 2,476 artillery rounds, while 12 Boeing B-52 Stratofortress and 67 U.S. Marine Corps air sorties delivered some 120 tons of ordnance. The defenders at the tactical operations center now requested that Khe Sanh execute the previously agreed-upon contingency plan for ground reinforcements. Khe Sanh’s commander, U.S. Marine Corps colonel David Lownds, concerned about a possible PAVN ambush, refused the request. U.S. Army colonel Jonathan Ladd, commander of the 5th Special Force Group that was at Khe Sanh, expressed surprise at the decision, which was, however, supported by the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). Lownds also refused requests for a helicopter evacuation. Although MACV commander General William Westmoreland stated that he ordered the marines to provide helicopters to evacuate the Americans, Ladd later reported that he had difficulty securing approval from Westmoreland and had to appeal to his deputy, General Creighton Abrams, who immediately ordered the 3rd Marine Division air commander to evacuate the remaining defenders of Lang Vei. This operation, believed at the time to be a sure suicide mission, proceeded in midafternoon and was carried out by MACV-SOG (Special Operations Group) personnel in U.S. Marine Corps CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters. The CH-46s carried out the seriously wounded, while the remainder of the defenders, supported by air strikes, were able to move overland to Khe Sanh, which they reached on the morning of February 8. Special Forces personnel were infuriated when Colonel Lownds, fearing infiltrators, refused to allow the indigenous survivors of Lang Vei and their families as well as civilian refugees into Khe Sanh. The indigenous troops were disarmed and, to the chagrin of Special Forces personnel, were held under armed guard in shell craters. Without food or water, many of the Laotians simply turned around and walked down Route 9 toward Laos, while the Bru were
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forced to trek in the opposite direction on Route 9 to Cam Lo, some 17 miles to the east. The commander of ARVN I Corps rejected any evacuation of the Bru, who he said could not be permitted to move into the lowlands. U.S. casualties in the Battle of Lang Vei were 3 killed, 10 missing or taken prisoner (only 3 were later repatriated), and 11 wounded. Only 1 American was not wounded in the battle. The 24 U.S. defenders were awarded 1 Medal of Honor (posthumously to Sergeant 1st Class Eugene Ashley Jr.), 1 Distinguished Service Cross, 19 Silver Stars, and 3 Bronze Star Medals with V Device for valor. Other medals were awarded to the army rescue team. Indigenous Vietnamese and Laotian losses were reported as 209 killed and 64 wounded. PAVN sources claim 400 killed and 253 taken prisoner. The official history is silent on PAVN losses, but they may have been as high as 250 dead; seven tanks were also destroyed. Vietnamese sources list PAVN losses as 80 killed, 190 wounded, and three tanks destroyed. The capture of Lang Vei was the only PAVN military victory during the siege of Khe Sanh. Although the attackers secured a considerable quantity of weapons and ammunition, they suffered heavy losses themselves, and it is unclear what effect the battle had on PAVN plans to strike Khe Sanh. The PAVN official history reports it as “the first combined-arms operation” of the war and “a new step forward in the growth of the combat capabilities of our mobile main force troops.” The site of the Lang Vei camp is today marked by the remains of concrete bunker walls and a PT-76 tank. Le Xuan Tau, who commanded one of the PT-76 tank platoons that fought at Lang Vei, was later awarded the title “Hero of the People’s Armed Forces.” Le Xuan Tau rose to the rank of major general and served as the commander of the PAVN’s Armored Command from 2002 to 2005. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Civilian Irregular Defense Group; Khe Sanh, Battle of; United States Special Forces References Clark, Bruce B. Expendable Warriors: The Battle of Khe Sanh and the Vietnam War. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007. Military History Institute of Vietnam. Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People’s Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002. Nguyen Huy Toan and Pham Quan Dinh. Su Doan 304, Tap Hai [304th Division, Vol. 2]. Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1990. Phillips, William R. Night of Silver Stars: The Battle of Lang Vei. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Stockwell, David B. Tanks in the Wire! The First Use of Enemy Armor in Vietnam. New York: Jove Publications, 1990. 304th Division History Element. “Tran Tien Cong Cu Diem Lang Vay Cua E24(-)/FBB304” [Attack Against the Lang Vei Strong-Point by 24th Regiment (minus)/304th Division]. In Quan Doan 2: Nhung Tran Danh Trong Chien Tranh Giai Phong (1945–1975), Tap II [II Corps: Battles during the War of Liberation (1945–1975), Vol. 2], edited by Nguyen Tu Lap and Pham Dinh Bay, 19–35. Hanoi: II Corps Headquarters, 1992.
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Laniel, Joseph
Laniel, Joseph Birth Date: October 12, 1889 Death Date: April 8, 1975 French conservative politician and premier during the 1954 Battle of Dien Bien Phu. Joseph Laniel was born at Vimoutiers in Normandy on October 12, 1889. He distinguished himself during World War I and, at age 19, was the youngest officer in the French Army. At the end of the war he enjoyed great success with the family textile business. In 1932 Laniel was elected a deputy from Calvados to the National Assembly. In the assembly he showed more ideological flexibility than most of his fellow conservatives. In March 1940 he joined the Paul Reynaud government as undersecretary of finance. Following the defeat of France by the Germans, Laniel was one of the few right-wing politicians active in the Resistance, and he became a vice president of the National Resistance Council. Continuously elected to the National Assembly from 1945 through 1958, Laniel in 1946 founded the Parti Républicain de la Liberté, a moderate right-center party that was absorbed by the Centre Nationale des Indépendents et Paysans in 1951. Known for his financial acumen, Laniel served as undersecretary of finance (1948); minister of posts, telegraph, and telephones (1951); and minister of state (1951–1952). Laniel became premier in June 1953 following a parliamentary crisis over domestic policies and foreign policy matters including
the European Defense Community (EDC), the Indochina War, and North African policies. He was elected in part because of his anonymity. Laniel’s government had considerable success in stabilizing the franc and in encouraging economic modernization, but he was regarded as lacking imagination in foreign affairs. Laniel was premier when the 1954 Geneva Conference opened, but its apparent lack of progress haunted his government. Not kept informed by General Henri Navarre, his commander in Indochina, of military plans, Laniel was nonetheless forced to share blame for the debacle of Dien Bien Phu. Laniel’s government failed to secure last-ditch U.S. military aid, and Laniel, dressed in black, announced the fall of the fortress to the National Assembly. His government fell three days later on June 12, 1954. Laniel was followed as premier by Pierre Mendès-France. Laniel’s defenders have pointed out that his government was close to a breakthrough in talks with the Viet Minh and that his resignation helped preserve the peace process. Laniel was reelected to the National Assembly in 1956. He took no part in the politics of the Fifth Republic, although he welcomed the return to power of General Charles de Gaulle as the best means to keep Algeria in French hands. Laniel died in Paris on April 8, 1975. Jules Roy wrote that Laniel was “An honest weaver and a man who stood loyally by his friends. Never understood anything about politics, Indochina and Dienbienphu and went bravely to the slaughterhouse.” SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; Geneva Conference and Geneva Accords of 1954; Indochina War; Mendès-France, Pierre References David S. Bell, Douglas Johnson, and Peter Morris, eds. Biographical Dictionary of French Political Leaders since 1870. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990. Laniel, Joseph. Le Drame Indochinois, de Dien Bien Phu au pari de Genève. Paris: Plon, 1957. Laniel, Joseph. Jours de Gloire et Jours Cruels (1908–1958). 1971. Roy, Jules. The Battle of Dienbienphu. New York: Harper and Row, 1965.
Lansdale, Edward Geary Birth Date: February 6, 1908 Death Date: February 23, 1987
Joseph Laniel was premier of France at the time of the Battle of Dien Bien Phu and announced the fall of the French fortress to the National Assembly. Forced to share the blame for the disaster, his government was driven from power shortly thereafter. (Getty Images)
U.S. intelligence operative and father of the modern American counterinsurgency doctrine. Born in Detroit, Michigan, on February 6, 1908, Edward Geary Lansdale grew up in Michigan and California. In 1931 only a few credit hours short of graduation, he dropped out of the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), where he was a journalism student. Working in New York City during the next four years, he married in 1932 and three years later moved with his wife to Los Angeles, where he began work as an advertising agent. In 1937 he moved to San Francisco.
Lansdale, Edward Geary Following the December 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Lansdale entered the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). In 1943 the U.S. Army reinstated his UCLA Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) commission and assigned him to military intelligence. At the end of the war in the Pacific, Major Lansdale was in Manila. In 1947 Lansdale transferred to the newly established U.S. Air Force. After assignments in the United States, he returned to the Philippines in 1951, this time on loan to a new governmental intelligence and covert action group, the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), successor to the OSS and forerunner to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Lansdale’s responsibilities were to revitalize the Philippine Army in its struggle with a Communistinspired rebellion and to help that country’s new secretary of defense, Ramón Magsaysay, become president in upcoming national elections. Through his patient ingenuity and assisted by considerable funds supplied by the OPC, Lansdale succeeded on both counts. Lieutenant Colonel Lansdale’s next assignment, now under CIA authority, took him to the newly divided Vietnam in June 1954. As chief of the covert-action Saigon Military Mission (SMM), he was tasked with weakening Ho Chi Minh’s Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) through any means available while helping to strengthen Bao Dai’s southern State of Vietnam as a separate and non-Communist nation. Within weeks Lansdale became a principal adviser to Ngo Dinh Diem, who was simultaneously premier, defense minister, and commander of the military. Diem accepted many of Lansdale’s ideas, including urging northerners to move south (ultimately some 1.25 million did so), bribing sect leaders to merge their private armies into Diem’s or face battle with him, instituting service organizations and a government bureaucracy, planning reforms, and in October 1955 offering himself and a new constitution as an alternative to the tired administration of Bao Dai. A lopsided and manipulated vote for Diem ensued. While Lansdale worked with Diem in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), part of his SMM team labored in North Vietnam, with largely mixed and insignificant results, to carry out sabotage and to effect a psychological warfare campaign against the Communist government there. Lansdale became a close personal friend of Diem and was one of the very few men, outside of his own family, to whom Diem listened. Certainly Diem had great respect for Lansdale’s ideas and enthusiasm. Most Westerners found Diem aloof, unresponsive, boring, and given to oppressively lengthy lectures. Not Lansdale. Their unofficial relationship bypassed normal channels of diplomatic relations, causing many diplomatic, military, CIA, and other civilian leaders in the U.S. government to view Lansdale with distrust. They resented his presence and wondered what this “loose cannon” might do next. Yet Lansdale’s record of success in the Philippines, his early accomplishments in Vietnam, and his own network of friends and contacts in high places prevented his enemies from dismissing either the man or his ideas.
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With his influence lessened by Diem’s growing reliance on his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, Lansdale returned to the United States in early 1957 and served both the Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy administrations as deputy director of the Office of Special Operations, Office of the Secretary of Defense. Lansdale also sat as a member of the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB). Whereas he had formerly carried out missions assigned by others, he was now one of those who formulated national covert intelligence policy. On occasional visits to Vietnam, he maintained his friendship with Diem. Lansdale’s views often conflicted with the findings of others who were ready to give up on Diem and were contesting vigorously on behalf of their own government agencies in Vietnam. In the declining days of the Eisenhower administration Lansdale, now a brigadier general, worked with the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) of the USIB that oversaw CIA efforts to overthrow Fidel Castro in Cuba. Lansdale argued against such actions. President John F. Kennedy briefly considered naming Lansdale as ambassador to Vietnam, but the new president’s secretary of state, Dean Rusk, and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara vetoed the idea. In 1961 and 1963 as assistant to the secretary of defense for special operations, Lansdale served as executive officer for the president’s Special Group, Augmented (SGA), charged with freeing Cuba from Castro, a plan known as Operation MONGOOSE. Lansdale regarded with dismay the CIA-sponsored invasion of the Bay of Pigs, Cuba, by Cuban Brigade 2506 in April 1961, considering it illtimed and ill-planned. After several intelligence forays to Central and South American countries, he retired from the U.S. Air Force in October 1963 as a major general. President Lyndon B. Johnson recalled Lansdale to government service between 1965 and 1968, sending him to Vietnam with the rank of minister to work on pacification problems. His influence was less than in previous years, and his authority was not clearly defined. He accomplished little, and those years were for Lansdale a time of great frustration. He published his memoirs in 1972. Lansdale’s career was extolled (or lambasted) in two major novels: Eugene Burdick and William Lederer’s The Ugly American (1958) and Graham Greene’s The Quiet American (1955). Plagued by ill health while living quietly in retirement, Lansdale died on February 23, 1987, in McLean, Virginia. CECIL B. CURREY See also Central Intelligence Agency; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Greene, Graham; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; McNamara, Robert Strange; Ngo Dinh Diem; Ngo Dinh Nhu; Office of Strategic Services; Pacification; Rusk, David Dean References Currey, Cecil B. Edward Lansdale: The Unquiet American. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1988. Lansdale, Edward Geary. In the Midst of Wars: An American’s Mission to Southeast Asia. New York: Harper and Row, 1972.
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Lao Dong Party
Lao Dong Party Ruling party formed in 1951 in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and in existence until 1976. Its formal name was Dang Lao Dong Viet Nam (Vietnamese Workers’ Party). The Lao Dong Party was in fact synonymous with the Indochinese Communist Party, which underwent a number of 20th-century metamorphoses. The failure of moderate nationalism in Vietnam in the 1920s provided an opportunity for the more radical Communists. In 1925 in Canton, China, Ho Chi Minh (then known as Nguyen Ai Quoc) formed the Viet Nam Thanh Nien Cach Menh Dong Chi Hoi (Vietnam Revolutionary Youth Association), commonly known as Thanh Nien. Thanh Nien was an anticolonial organization that attempted to unite political and social issues for the ultimate liberation of Vietnam. Thanh Nien trained Vietnamese young people from Vietnam and from Siam in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In March 1929 the Communists organized their first cell in Hanoi. Two months later at a national congress of Thanh Nien, delegates from Tonkin proposed the establishment of a national Communist party. The majority postponed a decision in order to study its implementation, whereupon the Tonkin delegation acted on its own to found the Dong Duong Cong San Dang (Indochinese Communist Party). Meanwhile, the Thanh Nien Central Committee formed the Annam Cong San Dang (Annam Communist Party), and a Marxist party, the Tan Viet (New Vietnam), transformed itself into the Dong Duong Cong San Lien Doan (Indochinese Communist League). Thus, there were three Communist parties within Vietnam. In February 1930 Ho presided over a conference in Hong Kong of delegates from the three Vietnamese Communist parties. On February 3 the three agreed to merge into one party and to form common institutions, including labor unions and youth, women’s, and peasants’ organizations. In October 1930 at the first plenum of the new Central Committee, the party took the name of Dang Cong San Dong Duong (Indochinese Communist Party, ICP). Tran Phu was named its first secretary-general. The party adopted two basic goals: to achieve national independence by expelling the French and “to struggle against feudalism, and give the land to the tillers.” Crop failures in Vietnam in 1930 and 1931 gave the peasants additional reason for unrest and led to a series of rebellions in northern Annam that were led by leaders of the ICP. The French military put these down, and the party suffered an additional setback in 1931 when British authorities arrested Ho in Hong Kong. Following a period of political amnesty during the Popular Front in France (1936–1938) in which the French Communists participated, the ICP suffered further repression. Despite these setbacks, by World War II the Communists were the best organized of the nationalist groups opposing French rule in Indochina. In 1940 the Japanese moved into Indochina, and the ICP undertook resistance against them as well. The ICP soon was the focal
point for resistance against the Japanese, and in November 1940 the ICP led an abortive uprising in Cochin China that was crushed by the French military. In May 1941 Ho and his lieutenants met in southern China near the border with Vietnam to create the Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi (Vietnamese Independence League, popularly known as the Viet Minh), a nationalist front organization in which the Communists were the leading faction. The Viet Minh represented Ho’s fusion of nationalism and communism. Although scholars differ on this point, Ho maintained that he was first a nationalist. Although there are some doubts as to Ho’s sincerity in doing so, in November 1945 he nominally dissolved the ICP. This was a bid to enlarge his support within Vietnam; to win Chinese departure from North Vietnam, where they had taken the Japanese surrender; and to secure support from the United States and other Western nations. In February 1951 Ho changed the name of the ICP to the Dang Lao Dong Viet Nam. Again the intention was to play down communism and widen nationalist support throughout Vietnam. Pressure from the PRC may also have played a part. At the same time, separate national parties were founded for Laos and Cambodia. It was through the Lao Dong Party that Ho carried out his policies. The most controversial of these was land reform that lasted into the autumn of 1956. The land reform policy led to the execution of at least 15,000 “landlords” and also led to open revolt on the part of some peasants that required intervention by the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army). Truong Chinh was made the scapegoat, and Le Duan replaced him as head of the party, a position he continued to hold until his death in 1986. In June 1991 Do Muoi was elected party secretary-general. In December 1997 Le Kha Phieu replaced him. In December 1976 at the Fourth National Congress, the Lao Dong renamed itself the Dang Cong San Viet Nam (Vietnamese Communist Party, VCP). The Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) remains very much a one-party state, with the 1.5 millionmember VCP the only legal political party and dominating its political life. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Agricultural Reform Tribunals; Annam; Cochin China; Le Duan; Tonkin; Truong Chinh; Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, 1954–1975; Vietnam, Socialist Republic of, 1975–Present; Vietnamese Communist Party; Women in the Vietnam War, Vietnamese References Nguyen Khac Vien. Vietnam: A Long History. Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1987. An Outline History of the Vietnam Workers’ Party, 1930–1975. Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1978. Patti, Archimedes L. A. Why Viet Nam? Prelude to America’s Albatross. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980. Pike, Douglas. A History of Vietnamese Communism, 1923–1978. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institute Press, 1978.
Laos
Laos Landlocked Southeast Asian nation with a 1968 population of 2.73 million people. Laos is bordered by China and Burma (Myanmar) to the northwest, Vietnam to the east, Cambodia to the south, and Thailand to the west. Laos covers approximately 91,429 square miles. The northern part of the country is very mountainous, with steep river valleys leading to the Mekong River, which in this region is tumultuous and unnavigable except by small craft. The Plain of Jars is a distinctive rolling plain. The center is notable for its karst formations stretching from the Mekong Valley to the Annamite Mountains to the east. The topography of the south is more even and uniform, with broad river valleys suitable for rice cultivation and the high Bolovens Plateau. The Mekong flows into Cambodia over a series of waterfalls known as the Khong Falls. In 1968 as now, the Lao economy was primarily agricultural. The country was inhabited by lowland rice cultivators, mostly Lao, and by highlanders from dozens of tribes who grew rice in forest clearings, raised a variety of other crops, and tended animals. Although the Lao are Theravada Buddhists, the highlanders are mainly animists. In the towns there are minority Chinese, Vietnamese, and Indian populations who are mainly traders and
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shopkeepers. Some 85 percent of the Laotian population still reside in rural areas. The original inhabitants of Laos were Austroasiatic peoples who lived by hunting and gathering before the advent of agriculture. Trade developed at an early date, and the Laotians were skilled canoe navigators. The first political entities identified in what is today Laos were princely fiefdoms exercising power over their neighbors by expanding and contracting spheres of influence known as mandalas. From the 1st century CE through the 13th century, Laos was influenced by the Chams, the Khmers, the Yunnanese, the Thais, and the Mongols. It was as a result of Mongol interference at Luang Prabang that the first kingdom to encompass all the territory of present-day Laos, known as the Kingdom of Lan Xang, was founded in 1353 by the warrior king Fa Ngum. After fending off invasions from Vietnam (1478–1479), Siam (1536), and Burma (1571–1621), Fa Ngum’s successors fell to squabbling, and their kingdom split in 1690 into Luang Prabang, Vientiane, and Champassak. Siam assumed ever-greater ascendancy over Laos, defeating the Vientiane kingdom and razing the capital in 1828. The court at Bangkok established outposts on the left bank of the Mekong all the way up to the Annamite Cordillera and treated the kings of Luang Prabang and Champassak as
The town of Vang Vieng in Vientiane Province, northern Laos, 2009. During the Vietnam War, Air America aircraft flew from its airstrip, then known as Lima Site 6. (Worakit/Dreamstime.com)
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vassals. Siamese military expeditions were actively involved in suppressing bands of pillagers, known as Haws, from Yunnan. When the French signed a protectorate agreement in 1884 with the Vietnamese court at Hue, which had been worried about Siamese expansion, they saw themselves as being entitled to establish a presence on the left bank of the Mekong in the name of the Vietnamese emperor by right of historic claims and proceeded to expel the Siamese garrisons. However, instead of claiming the left bank, the French established direct rule over southern Laos and signed a protectorate treaty with the king of Luang Prabang. French rule in Laos was consolidated by the treaty of October 3, 1893, signed with the king of Siam. The French ruled Laos with a generally light hand. They established hospitals, schools, and a unified civil service. They also levied taxes and imposed work on public road construction projects, which led to sporadic revolts in the provinces. Vientiane remained a sleepy town on the bank of the Mekong, and the French restored a number of ancient monuments, including Buddhist temples. Laos was hardly affected by World War II until March 9, 1945, when the Japanese suddenly ousted the French administration and made a brief but brutal appearance. In the wake of the Japanese surrender in August 1945, a group of nationalist-minded Laotians led by Prince Phetsarath, the viceroy of the kingdom of Luang Prabang, took the opportunity to seize power and form an independent government, ignoring the king’s proclamation that the French protectorate had been restored. The advocates of independence, known as the Lao Issara, received support from the Viet Minh in neighboring Vietnam and prepared to oppose the return of the French. The French received significant support, however, from some of the highlanders, particularly the Hmongs, and with the approval of the king and Prince Boun Oum na Champassak, the most influential figure in the south, succeeded in reimposing their presence in Laos by mid-1946. The Lao Issara fled across the river to Thailand, where they continued to agitate for opposition to France. The French progressively granted the attributes of independence to the royal government in Vientiane and in 1947 unified the country under the rule of the king of Luang Prabang, who became the king of Laos. A three-headed white elephant on a red background became the kingdom’s flag. Elections were held, a constitution was promulgated, and political parties flourished. Complete independence, including foreign affairs and defense, was granted by France in October 1953. Laos also took part in the 1954 Geneva Conference that ended the Indochina War. The major problem facing the royal government was the reintegration of the Pathet Lao rebels, some of them ex–Lao Issara, who had fought alongside the Viet Minh during the war. By the terms of the cease-fire agreement, the Pathet Lao had been awarded two northern provinces in which to regroup while the Viet Minh regular units withdrew from Laos into the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). Difficulties soon arose in the operations of the joint armistice commission and the International
Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC) that consisted of representatives from India, Canada, and Poland. Higher-level negotiations between the royal government and the Pathet Lao led to the formation of a coalition government in 1957, a move supported by the powers that had been represented at Geneva. The United States, however, deeply suspicious of the Communist ties of the Pathet Lao and worried that Congress would cut off aid to Laos for having Communists in its government, maneuvered behind the scenes to bring down the coalition in 1958, when partial elections revealed the popular strength of the party formed by the Pathet Lao, the Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS). The Pathet Lao, for their part, had not given up their arms and now, having rejected integration into the royal army on their own terms, resumed military action against the U.S.-backed royal army in the two northern provinces. A series of attacks against royal army outposts in Sam Neua during the monsoon season of 1959 produced an international crisis in which the royal government charged that North Vietnam was aiding the insurgents and appealed for help to the United Nations (UN). The NLHS deputies to the National Assembly in Vientiane were imprisoned on charges of sedition but were never tried. Postwar Vietnamese historical documents now admit that the Royal Lao Government’s charges were true. The Vietnamese provided logistical and training support, advisers, and Vietnamese “volunteer army” units to support the Pathet Lao for two months during the late summer of 1959 before pulling their forces back to avoid giving their opponents an excuse to further complicate the situation. The United States stepped up aid to the royal army, which was channeled through a clandestine military aid mission, the Programs Evaluation Office (PEO). Following the establishment of a rightist government, excluding the NLHS, and the escape from prison of the NLHS deputies, on August 9, 1960, a young army captain, Kong Le, staged a coup d’état in Vientiane and demanded the resignation of the government and an end to the civil war. A new government was formed that vowed to end the fighting and renew negotiations for a peaceful settlement with the Pathet Lao. Not surprisingly, this initiative met with the overt hostility of Thailand, which instituted a blockade of Vientiane, and the more camouflaged opposition of the United States, which maintained its aid to the Laotian army outside Vientiane in view of the threat posed by the Pathet Lao. Attempts to find grounds for compromise proved unavailing, and even the king, Savang Vatthana, was completely ineffectual in steering the country away from disaster. Rightist forces under General Phoumi Nosavan, with U.S. arms, attacked Vientiane in mid-December 1960 and after three days of artillery and tank shelling drove Kong Le’s paratroop battalion out. However, Kong Le had received arms, ammunition, and a small Vietnamese advisory group led by General Chu Huy Man that included a small artillery unit equipped with 105-millimeter (mm) howitzers and 120mm mortars flown into Vientiane by Soviet aircraft from Hanoi. As Kong Le’s troops retreated northward along the road toward
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A Laotian woman and child in Vientiane are lifted by stretcher onto a truck for transport to a hospital in December 1960 during fighting that saw rightist forces led by General Phoumi Nosavan regain control of the capital city. (AP/Wide World Photos)
Luang Prabang, Soviet aircraft continued to drop supplies. After the leftist troops captured the Plain of Jars on January 1, 1961, they were supplied by Soviet aircraft flying into the airfield there. The entry of the Soviet Union into the Laos crisis led to U.S. protests to Moscow. Furthermore, North Vietnamese troops were now openly involved as “volunteers” fighting on the side of the Pathet Lao– Kong Le alliance. Prime minister Prince Souvanna Phouma, who had fled to Phnom Penh before the battle, proclaimed the continued legitimacy of his government and began a campaign to drum up international support for a neutral Laos. The new administration of President John F. Kennedy had decided not to intervene with U.S. troops and was not averse to any plan to neutralize Laos, a solution propounded in January by the U.S. ambassador in Vientiane, Winthrop Brown. Kennedy asked roving ambassador W. Averell Harriman to meet with Souvanna Phouma in New Delhi and see whether a non-Communist outcome to the crisis could be salvaged. The two men got on well at their first meeting. From that point on the Kennedy administration worked for a new international conference on Laos of the Geneva type, a plan that had already been suggested by Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia. After much diplomatic activity on all sides, a 14-nation conference convened in Geneva in June 1961 and during the next year worked on a solution by coalition government. In the spring of 1961 the Vietnamese exploited the unsettled situation to seize a large area along the Vietnamese border in central and southern Laos through which they could build roads (the famed Ho Chi Minh Trail) in order to send troops and supplies to the Vietnamese Communist insurgency in the Republic of Vietnam
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(RVN, South Vietnam). Vietnamese regular army military units maintained control of this area from this time to the end of the war in 1975. Several factors favored the tripartite coalition that emerged in June 1962. One was the growing disinterest of Soviet premier Nikita S. Khrushchev in the Laos affair. His actions had been dictated by Moscow’s rivalry with Beijing, but by 1962 the Sino-Soviet split had grown so wide that he no longer had any leverage to compete with Beijing’s radical line. He admitted as much in his June 1961 meeting with Kennedy in Vienna, where the two leaders agreed that a neutral Laos without involvement of either power was in their mutual interest. The North Vietnamese, while receiving pledges of militant solidarity from Beijing, were finding their campaign to seize South Vietnam much more difficult than they had expected. Since they now controlled the section of Laos needed for them to send assistance to the insurgency in South Vietnam, their interest in the revolution in Laos accordingly diminished, at least temporarily. The North Vietnamese government did not, however, withdraw its troops from Laos as outlined under the 1962 Geneva Agreement, leaving them instead to revive the effort at a later date. After 1963 the second coalition existed in name only. Ignoring the cease-fire, both sides resumed military operations. The North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao subverted a section of Kong Le’s army, compelling Kong Le to withdraw from the Plain of Jars and ally himself with the rightists once again. Among the most effective forces against the renewed North Vietnamese–Pathet Lao offensive became the irregular Meo (Hmong) troops of General Vang Pao. These troops stayed in the field, thanks to a large-scale resupply effort mounted by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Another important factor in keeping the Communists at bay was bombing by the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy during 1964–1973. The war seesawed back and forth, with the Hmongs capturing the Plain of Jars only to have to abandon it again. By 1973 Laos was in effect divided, with the Communists holding the entire east from China to the Cambodian border. This was the area through which the Ho Chi Minh Trail, built and maintained at great cost by the North Vietnamese beginning in 1959, passed. The trail was defended by regular People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) units in complete mockery of Lao sovereignty and the royal government, with which Hanoi nevertheless maintained diplomatic relations. The lowlands along the Mekong, on the other hand, were held by the royal government. The mountainous area between Vientiane and the Plain of Jars was held by the Hmongs. Under an agreement signed in Vientiane on February 21, 1973, a new cease-fire was declared that was to take effect on the following day and gave the Pathet Lao equal status with the royal government for the first time. The U.S. bombing, which had dropped almost 2.1 million tons of ordnance on Laos (more than the total tonnage dropped by the United States in the European and Pacific theaters in World War II), came to a halt at noon on February 22.
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Laotian students demonstrate their support for the cease-fire signed in Vientiane on February 22, 1973. They carry banners reading “let this cease-fire be permanent.” (AP/Wide World Photos)
The new coalition government took office on April 5, 1974, and each ministry had a minister from one side and a vice minister from the opposite side. Although the 1973 cease-fire left some 300 U.S. personnel unaccounted for in Laos, no U.S. prisoners of war (POWs) were returned by the Pathet Lao, with the exception of 8 who had been held in North Vietnam and were released in Hanoi. On April 27, 1975, North Vietnamese–Pathet Lao forces launched a strong attack against General Vang Pao’s Hmong troops at the strategic road junction of Sala Phou Khoun and drove southward toward Vientiane. Wishing to avoid a resumption of the war, Souvanna Phouma ordered Vang Pao to defend himself as best he could but without the benefit of air strikes by the small Royal Laotian Air Force. Feeling himself abandoned, Vang Pao had a last stormy meeting in Vientiane with the prime minister and then appealed to the CIA for evacuation of his troops and their families to safe haven in Thailand. On May 10 Vang Pao and 12 Hmong leaders signed a treaty reminding the United States of past pledges and agreeing to leave Laos and never return. The CIA refused an airlift, the only possible exit by that stage, although it did evacuate Vang Pao and his wives on May 14 as the North Vietnamese Pathet Lao closed in on his base at Long Chieng, which they captured without a fight and where they found the personnel files of Vang Pao’s Hmong soldiers intact.
Meanwhile, a campaign of intimidation against the non–Pathet Lao members of the coalition government gathered momentum in Vientiane. Key ministers, including the defense minister, fled across the Mekong. Demonstrators occupied the compound of the U.S. aid mission, forcing termination of the large aid program and the evacuation of its U.S. employees. Orchestrated demonstrations and the takeover of government offices led to the entry of the Pathet Lao into the other major towns of Laos, without their being damaged by fighting. The Pathet Lao seizure of power was completed on August 23, 1975. Military units belonging to the royal army were said to have requested Pathet Lao “advisers,” thereby facilitating the integration of the army. Officers and high-ranking government officials who remained in Vientiane, hoping for the best, were sent to attend “seminars” at camps in Sam Neua, where many of them died. At the beginning of December 1975 the Pathet Lao did away with the last facade of the coalition government and abolished the 600-year-old monarchy. A republic, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (LPDR), was proclaimed. Political parties were prohibited. King Savang Vatthana was named an adviser to the new president, but the king in fact played no role after his abdication. He died in a seminar camp in 1978 along with the queen and their eldest son. The December 1975 events also saw the emergence of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP), the Communist party
Lattre de Tassigny, Jean de behind the Pathet Lao front. The LPRP acknowledged its lineage from the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP), founded by Ho Chi Minh in 1930, that had been divided into three national parties for Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in 1951. The LPRP declared itself a Marxist-Leninist party and, as the sole ruling party in the LPDR, began elaborating policies. For the first decade these policies were centered on state control of every aspect of life, although efforts to collectivize agriculture amounted to little more than rhetoric. A constitution was not elaborated until 1991. Meanwhile, the party’s propaganda organs extolled the heroic deeds of the victorious “people’s army” against the superior forces of the United States. Surprisingly, through all of this the U.S. embassy in Vientiane, manned by a skeleton staff since the departure of the last ambassador to the royal government in May 1975, was untouched, and the United States maintained diplomatic relations with the LPDR. The LPRP counted 60,000 members by March 1996, when the party held its Sixth Congress. Party leadership continued to be dominated by the veteran leaders of the 30-year struggle against the French and the Americans. Eight of the 9 Politburo members named in 1996 were military officers. The 49-member Central Committee, however, included several younger figures more in keeping with economic reforms enacted between 1986 and 1996. Overall, the degree of stability of leadership that the party has exercised during its three decades of being the only legal political party in the country has been remarkable. The lingering effect of the war also manifested itself in two of the major issues between the LPDR and the United States. These were the issue of POWs and those missing in action and the LPDR’s demand for U.S. humanitarian aid to help cope with the hundreds of thousands of unexploded bombs that were left scattered about the countryside and continued to cause injuries and death for civilians, particularly in the north, more than two decades after the end of hostilities. By the mid to late 1990s the LPDR had begun to open its economy and move somewhat haltingly toward a more market-oriented system. In recognition of this, the United States in 2005 normalized trade relations with Laos, ending years of punitive import duties on Laotian goods. Normalized relations between Vietnam and the United States, which occurred in the 1990s, also helped repair U.S.Laotian ties. Nevertheless, Laos remains a one-party state, and the LPDR is the only legal political entity, which governs via an allpowerful 9-member Politburo. Since 1992 Laos has had an 85-seat national assembly, but only LPDR members can be elected to it, and it is a body that largely rubber-stamps LPDR policies. Faced with the problems of economic opening coupled with political repression, lack of government funding for development projects, and leftovers from the war, Laos continues to be an impoverished nation with an economy more akin to the 19th century rather than the 21st century. Laos has practically no modern infrastructure and has only one railway, which links Vientiane with Thailand. There are few paved roads, and the existing road net-
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work that connects the nation’s many remote villages is antiquated and frequently impassable. Communication networks are sparse and marginally reliable at best, which is a large disadvantage in a modern era of instantaneous communications. It will likely be some time before Laos frees itself from the ranks of the world’s least-developed countries and catches up with the other nonCommunist Southeast Asian countries. ARTHUR J. DOMMEN See also Harriman, William Averell; Hmongs; International Commission for Supervision and Control; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeyevich; Kong Le; Pathet Lao; Phoumi Nosavan; Plain of Jars; Souphanouvong; Souvanna Phouma; Vang Pao; Vientiane Agreement; Vientiane Protocol References Cordell, Helen, comp. Laos. World Bibliographical Series, Vol. 133. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 1991. Lewis, Judy, ed. Minority Cultures of Laos: Kammu, Lua’, Lahu, Hmong, and Iu-Mien. Rancho Cordova, CA: Folsom Cordova Unified School District, 1992. Military History Institute of Vietnam. Lich Su Quan Tinh Nguyen Va Cac Doan Chuyen Gia Quan Su Viet Nam Tai Lao (1945–1975) [History of the Vietnamese Volunteer Army Forces and Vietnamese Military Advisory Units in Laos (1945–1975)]. Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1999. Military History Institute of Vietnam. Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People’s Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002. Savada, Andrea Matles, ed. Laos: A Country Study. Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1995. Stuart-Fox, Martin, and Mary Kooyman. Historical Dictionary of Laos. Asian Historical Dictionaries No. 6. Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow, 1992. Zasloff, Joseph J., and Leonard Unger, eds. Laos: Beyond the Revolution. London: Macmillan, 1991.
Lattre de Tassigny, Jean de Birth Date: February 2, 1889 Death Date: January 11, 1952 French general and high commissioner and commander of French forces in Indochina (1950–1951). Born at Mouilleron-en-Pareds in the Vendée on February 2, 1889, Jean Joseph Marie Gabriel de Lattre de Tassigny graduated in 1910 from the French military academy of Saint-Cyr. In September 1914 as a cavalry lieutenant, he received the first of his six wounds during World War I. Transferred to the infantry, he rose to command a battalion, and during the war he received eight citations for bravery. Following the war, de Lattre fought in Morocco and was seriously wounded in the 1925 Rif Campaign. A breveted officer of the École Supérieure de Guerre, he served as General Maxime Weygand’s chief of cabinet and then as chief of staff of Fifth Army. On the eve of World War II de Lattre commanded an infantry regiment.
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General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny was France’s most distinguished military figure when he served as both high commissioner and commander of French military forces in Indochina during 1950–1951. He died in early 1952 of cancer. This photograph was taken in Washington, D.C., on September 24, 1951. (National Archives)
During the 1940 German invasion of France de Lattre commanded the 14th Infantry Division, which had an excellent combat record. After the armistice, he endeavored to retrain what remained of the French Army. In September 1941 the Vichy government reassigned him to command French forces in Tunisia. In fighting between British–Free French and German forces in Libya, de Lattre positioned his forces to cut off a German retreat. Alarmed, in January 1942 the Vichy government reassigned him to France to command an infantry division. After the November 1942 Allied landings in North Africa, de Lattre deployed his troops to prevent German units from quickly reaching the Mediterranean coast, enabling many anti-German French to escape by sea. This led to his arrest and trial by the Vichy government on charges of “attempting a putsch,” for which he was sentenced to 10 years in prison. Although heavily guarded, in September 1943 de Lattre escaped from Riom Prison and made his way to England. After several months in a hospital, de Lattre joined Charles de Gaulle’s Free French government in Algiers. Given charge of training French troops, de Lattre commanded French forces in the June 1944 invasion of Elba. Two months later he commanded the Free French First Army in southern France;
the Free French First Army and the U.S. Seventh Army made up the Allied 6th Army Group. De Lattre’s army scored numerous successes, most notably inflicting 53,000 German casualties along the southern French coast and capturing the fortress of Belfort at a cost of only 1,000 French casualties. By the end of the war his troops had fought all the way to the Austrian border. His accomplishments earned him an invitation to witness the May 9, 1945, German surrender. Later he served on the Allied Control Commission for Germany. After the war de Lattre worked to restore the prestige of the French military. In 1945 he was appointed inspector general of the French Army and took charge of its retraining and modernization. From 1948 to 1950 he was commander of West European land forces. In December 1950 in a gesture of determination, the French government sent de Lattre, its greatest living soldier, to Indochina to replace General Marcel Carpentier. De Lattre was made high commissioner as well as commander of French forces. A handsome man with visible facial scars from his war wounds, de Lattre had panache and great personal magnetism. Known within the French Army as “le roi Jean” (King John) for his insistence on military ceremony, de Lattre was a tough, no-nonsense commander who promised little except that his men would know they had been commanded. In an effort to get the Vietnamese to fight on the French side, he created wholly Vietnamese units. Unfortunately for France, this policy, known as Jaunissement (Yellowing), came too late in the war to succeed. Viet Minh commander Vo Nguyen Giap played into de Lattre’s hands by initiating Operation HOANG HOA THAM, which sought conventional battle with French forces. Defeat of the Viet Minh in a series of battles in the first half of 1951 enabled de Lattre to make a forceful appeal for additional U.S. military assistance, a plea that he delivered in the course of a much-publicized September 1951 trip to Washington. In meetings with President Harry S. Truman and at the Pentagon, de Lattre stressed the interdependence of fronts in Vietnam and Korea against communism. The United States did increase economic aid to the French but was unwilling to offer any direct military assistance. Ignoring warnings from his Chinese advisers, Giap now shifted his attention to the Thai Highlands. The resulting December 1951–February 1952 fighting at Hoa Binh initiated by de Lattre became an inconclusive battle of attrition with high casualties for both sides. In December 1951 de Lattre left Indochina. Already consumed by cancer, he entered a Paris clinic that same month and died on January 11, 1952. His last audible word was the name of his only son Bernard, a French Army lieutenant who had died the previous May in the battle at Ninh Binh during the Day River Campaign. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also French Indochina, 1860s–1946; Hoa Binh, Battle of; Indochina War; Jaunissement; Truman, Harry S.; Vo Nguyen Giap
Lavelle, John Daniel References Clayton, Anthony. Three Marshals Who Saved France: Leadership after Trauma. London: Brassey’s, 1992. Fall, Bernard B. The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis. 2nd rev. ed. New York: Praeger, 1967. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. Vo Nguyen Giap and Huu Mai. Duong Toi Dien Bien Phu [The Road to Dien Bien Phu]. Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 2001.
Lau Ben Kon See Nuon Chea
Lavelle, John Daniel Birth Date: September 9, 1916 Death Date: July 10, 1979 U.S. Air Force general and commander, Seventh Air Force (1971– 1972). Born in Cleveland, Ohio, on September 9, 1916, John Daniel Lavelle graduated from John Carroll University in 1938, enlisted in the Army Air Corps as an aviation cadet, and was commissioned in 1940. During World War II he served with a fighter squadron in the European theater, flying almost 80 combat missions as a P-47 pilot. Subsequently he served in Japan, where during the Korean War (1950–1953) he commanded a supply depot. He then commanded McGuire Air Force Base and the 568th Air Defense Group and after that a Military Air Transport Service airlift wing. After graduation from the Air War College in 1957, he began a five-year stint at the Pentagon, ending up as deputy director of programs for the U.S. Air Force. Following a term of duty with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in West Germany, Lavelle returned to U.S. Air Force headquarters as director of aerospace programs. In 1966 he took command of the Seventeenth Air Force in Germany, and then in late 1967 he was assigned to the Defense Communications Planning Group in Washington, subsequently becoming its director. In 1970 he was assigned as vice commander of Pacific Air Forces in Hawaii. In July 1971 he was promoted to four-star (full general) rank and given command of the Seventh Air Force in Southeast Asia. Lavelle soon became quite concerned for the safety of his pilots. Forced to operate under very complex and strict rules of engagement during missions over the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), they were permitted to strike targets only in cases where “protective reaction” could be claimed. What came to be known as the Lavelle Case stemmed from charges that on occasion Lavelle directed preplanned strikes against certain targets, a violation of those rules of engagement. Furthermore, returning
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aircrews were found to be fabricating enemy actions in an effort to justify these strikes. Lavelle offered the rationale that a wide-area radar network operated by the North Vietnamese was being used to alert targetacquisition radars and missile sites, giving aircrews little or no warning or reaction time and greatly increasing their risk, and that this in itself constituted hostile action. Lavelle argued that his superiors had encouraged him to interpret his rules of engagement as aggressively as possible. During the congressional hearings into the matter Lavelle was subjected to a firestorm of media criticism, with national periodicals such as Time and Newsweek accusing him of waging a “private war” and ignoring direct orders from the White House. Lavelle was subsequently determined to have acted improperly, including leading his subordinates in an attempted cover-up. He was relieved of command and retired in April 1972 as a major general, a rank two grades below that which he had held. General Lavelle died on July 10, 1979, in Arlington, Virginia. In 2007 in an article in Air Force Magazine, retired U.S. Air Force lieutenant general Aloysius Casey and his son Patrick Casey revealed that declassified documents and transcripts from the Nixon White House show conclusively that Lavelle was acting under secret orders from Nixon, who in February 1972 had authorized more aggressive bombing of North Vietnam. The transcripts also reveal that Nixon and his chief advisers were all aware that Lavelle had been scapegoated and yet took no steps to reveal the truth. Lavelle’s family petitioned the U.S. Air Force to correct his record and restore his rank. The Air Force Board for the Correction of Military Records found no evidence that Lavelle had caused the falsification of records or that he was even aware of their existence and that the White House, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had all withheld important information in the case. In August 2010 more than 30 years after Lavelle’s death, President Barack Obama exonerated him of charges that he had violated presidential restrictions regarding the bombing of North Vietnam and requested that the U.S. Senate restore him posthumously to four-star rank. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Airpower, Role in War; Hersh, Seymour Myron; Nixon, Richard Milhous; United States Air Force References Ginsburg, Gordon A. The Lavelle Case: Crisis in Integrity. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University, 1974. Sorley, Lewis. Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times. 2nd ed. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008. Thompson, Wayne. To Hanoi and Back: The United States Air Force and North Vietnam, 1966–1973. Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museum Program, 2000.
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Operation
Event Date: October 1947 French military operation during the Indochina War mounted over a three-week period beginning in October 1947. Devoted almost exclusively to the capture of Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh leadership and the destruction of main Viet Minh battle units, Operation LÉA involved 17 French battalions, including 3 airborne and 3 armor. The operation succeeded in taking Thai Nguyen and some other Viet Minh–controlled cities, but it failed to capture the Viet Minh leadership or destroy main Viet Minh units. Ho escaped in disguise, but the French shot to death a well-known scholar, Nguyen Va To, whose white beard made him resemble Ho. The operation revealed the difficulty of the French military position in Indochina, especially the paucity of resources. Troops involved in Operation LÉA were badly needed elsewhere, and their employment in the operation opened up much of the countryside of Vietnam to Viet Minh penetration. Operation LÉA did, however, have a significant effect on the Viet Minh leadership. Stunned that his intelligence had not provided advance warning of the attack, enabling French paratroopers to come very close to capturing a number of senior Viet Minh leaders, General Vo Nguyen Giap completely revamped the Viet Minh’s military intelligence organization. SPENCER C. TUCKER
articles on social issues to the Revue Catholique. Wounded in June 1940 during the Battle of France, Leclerc was taken prisoner. The Germans believed him to be too weak to move and placed him at a chateau belonging to some of his friends, from which he escaped to join Charles de Gaulle’s Committee of National Liberation in London. After his recuperation, Leclerc went to Nigeria and gathered scattered groups of French colonial soldiers. In a daring campaign begun with only about 20 men, he won over garrisons and with them control of the Cameroons. By 1941 Free French forces controlled all of French Equatorial Africa. Leclerc, by now a colonel, commanded the Desert Army, made up of veteran colonial troops, Chad sharpshooters, an Arab camel corps, a few British officers, and some young Free Frenchmen. With this force and a few obsolete aircraft, Leclerc conducted successful raids against Italian outposts in the Sahara. In the late spring of 1942 Leclerc decided on a march from Lake Chad to the Mediterranean; de Gaulle sent both supplies and reinforcements. Begun on December 22, the march covered 2,000 miles in 39 days. On January 25, 1943, Leclerc’s force entered Tripoli concurrent with the British Eighth Army. In June 1944 Leclerc,
See also France, Army, 1946–1954; Ho Chi Minh; Indochina War References Goscha, Christopher E. “Overview: The Early Development of Vietnamese Intelligence Services, 1945–50.” In Exploring Intelligence Archives: Enquiries into the Secret State, edited by R. Gerald Hughes, Peter Jackson, and Len Scott, 103–115. London: Routledge, 2008. Fall, Bernard B. Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu. New York: Lippincott, 1966. Fall, Bernard B. The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis. 2nd rev. ed. New York: Praeger, 1967. Gras, Yves. Histoire de la Guerre d’Indochine. Paris: Éditions Denoël, 1992.
Leclerc, Jacques-Philippe Birth Date: November 28, 1902 Death Date: November 28, 1947 French Army general and commander of French Far Eastern forces (1945–1946). Born into an aristocratic family near Amiens on November 28, 1902, Count Jacques-Philippe de Hauteclocque took the nom de guerre of Leclerc during World War II to avoid reprisals against his family in France. After his 1924 graduation from the French military academy at Saint-Cyr, he distinguished himself the next year as a second lieutenant fighting Moroccan rebels. He returned to teach at Saint-Cyr and also contributed
French general Philippe Leclerc compiled an outstanding combat record with the Free French during World War II. During 1945–1946 he commanded French forces in the Far East, charged with restoring French rule in Indochina. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)
Le Duan now commanding the French 2nd Armored Division (Frenchmen, Arabs, and Africans manning U.S. tanks), landed at Normandy. His division captured Alençon, the first French city retaken by French troops. General Dwight D. Eisenhower allowed Leclerc’s division to be the first to liberate Paris, and the division also liberated Strasbourg and Bordeaux. With the end of fighting in Europe, in June 1945 de Gaulle appointed Leclerc to command the French Expeditionary Corps to restore French sovereignty in Indochina. Leclerc was unenthusiastic. “Send me to Morocco,” he reportedly said. De Gaulle claimed that he replied, “You will go to Indo-China because that is more difficult.” Leclerc signed the formal Japanese surrender document for France, and on October 5, 1945, he arrived in Saigon. Leclerc achieved an agreement with the British that preserved France’s position in southern Vietnam, and on October 25 he began the reconquest of Indochina for France, predicting it would take about a month for “mopping-up operations” to be concluded. Leclerc’s highly mobile mechanized forces quickly established French authority over southern Vietnam and Cambodia, but because they numbered only 40,000 men, they controlled little beyond the cities and main routes of communication. Leclerc became convinced that the Viet Minh was a nationalist movement that France could not subdue militarily, and he supported the talks that resulted in the March 1946 Ho-Sainteny Agreement with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). Unlike most of his compatriots, Leclerc was aware of the great difficulties of jungle warfare and favored a course of negotiations that would mean abandoning the attempt to create an independent Cochin China. In a secret report to Paris on March 27, 1946, he said that there would be no solution through force in Indochina. The return of French high commissioner to Indochina Admiral Georges Thierry d’Argenlieu to assume political control relegated Leclerc to military functions. D’Argenlieu and other French colonial administrators opposed meaningful concessions to the nationalists, and at his own request Leclerc departed Indochina in frustration. On July 14, 1946, he was named inspector general of French forces in North Africa and was promoted to full general. Leclerc died in a military plane crash in Algeria at age 45 on November 28, 1947. SPENCER C. TUCKER
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Le Duan Birth Date: April 7, 1907 Death Date: July 10, 1986 Secretary-general of the Communist Party of Vietnam and de facto leader of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) following the 1969 death of Ho Chi Minh. Born Le Van Nhuan on April 7, 1907, in Trieu Phong District, Quang Tri Province, Le Duan developed an early and active devotion to revolutionary politics. During the 1920s he worked as a clerk for French Railways in Hanoi and during that time cultivated his Marxist interests. He first joined the Vietnam Revolutionary Youth League and then in 1930 became a charter member of the Indochinese Communist Party. He was elected to membership in the Communist Party Central Committee in 1939. An ardent opponent of French rule, Le Duan was twice imprisoned, from 1931 to 1936 and again from 1940 to 1945, on charges of political subversion. In the years following World War II Le Duan emerged as a trusted lieutenant of Ho Chi Minh and a key figure in the Viet Minh challenge to continued French rule. A capable strategist and tactician, Le Duan directed Viet Minh efforts in Cochin China from 1946 until 1952, when he was sent to North Vietnam to work at
See also D’Argenlieu, Georges Thierry; De Gaulle, Charles; French Indochina, 1860s–1946; Ho-Sainteny Agreement; Indochina War References Clayton, Anthony. Three Marshals Who Saved France: Leadership after Trauma. London: Brassey’s, 1992. De Gaulle, Charles. The War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle, Vol. 3, Salvation, 1944–1946. Translated by Richard Howard. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960. Hammer, Ellen J. The Struggle for Indochina. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1954.
Le Duan, the general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam, was one of the most powerful figures in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and its de facto ruler after the 1969 death of Ho Chi Minh. (Getty Images)
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party headquarters. Le Duan was elected to membership in the Communist Party Politburo in 1951. Although the 1954 Viet Minh victory at Dien Bien Phu brought an end to French rule in Vietnam, the brokered agreement at the 1954 Geneva Conference left the country divided. Le Duan, who clung to the nationalist ideal of a united (as well as an independent) Vietnam, openly opposed the agreement. He nonetheless worked with Ho Chi Minh to secure Communist control in North Viet. Le Duan’s long service resulted in his continued upward advance within the party. In 1954 he was sent to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), where he again served as secretary of the Lao Dong (Workers’ Party, or the Communist Party) Central Committee for the Southern Region until 1957. In 1956 Le Duan wrote the “Tenets of the Revolution in South Vietnam,” which became the foundation of the Communist struggle in South Vietnam. In 1957 Le Duan was recalled to North Vietnam, where he was entrusted with the leadership of the party following the removal of Truong Chinh as party secretary-general as the result of the disastrous Land Reform Program in North Vietnam. In 1959 Le Duan was elected as party first secretary, a position he held for the next decade. A member of the Lao Dong Politburo as well as the Central Committee and Secretariat, he moved to the top echelon of the North Vietnamese power structure. In 1958 Le Duan secretly revisited South Vietnam to observe the situation there. He returned with recommendations for a dramatic escalation. Hanoi-supported Viet Cong (VC) guerrillas operating against the U.S.-backed government of Ngo Dinh Diem faced total destruction, Le Duan warned, unless the effort was prosecuted vigorously. Over the course of the next three years, largely under Le Duan’s direction, the VC launched a sweeping program of assassinations and urban terrorism while stepping up more conventional forms of military confrontation. Le Duan continued to play an important role in Hanoi’s prosecution of the conflict. A consistent advocate of the offensive, he supported the infusion of People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) forces to South Vietnam as well as stronger support for the VC. In 1965 as U.S. involvement in the war increased, he advocated the move to conventional warfare, joining other North Vietnamese leaders in shunning Chinese advice to deescalate. He maintained that only through conventional offensive warfare, as practiced against the French, could Vietnam expel the foreign invaders. Le Duan reportedly had frequent clashes with North Vietnam’s military commander General Vo Nguyen Giap and other party leaders over war strategy and political ideology, culminating in a dispute during the summer of 1967 over the plan for the 1968 Tet Offensive. At around the same time Le Duan also presided over what was called the Anti-Party Affair, a purge of senior party and military figures including a number of General Giap’s closest supporters. With Ho Chi Minh’s death in September 1969, Le Duan became the undisputed leader of the party and the North Vietnamese gov-
ernment. He continued to press the war and maintained a hard line during cease-fire negotiations with the United States. He viewed a continued division of Vietnam as unacceptable; the conflict would be pressed until the invaders withdrew and unity was achieved. Under the leadership of Le Duan, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Prime Minister Pham Van Dong, Communist forces cemented their victory over South Vietnam with the capture of Saigon in 1975. As the leader of a united Vietnam, Le Duan faced the mammoth task of rebuilding a country ravaged by 35 years of almost continuous war. Reconciling opposing ideologies, restoring the economy, and feeding the people of Vietnam all posed major obstacles, with which he dealt with varying degrees of success. A devoted Marxist, he maintained close ties with the Soviet Union, a relationship that he solidified with the signing of the Friendship Treaty in 1978. Le Duan died in Hanoi on July 10, 1986. Le Duan continues to be a controversial figure in Vietnamese Communist Party circles because of his abrasive and autocratic personality and his clashes with other party leaders. In the summer of 2006 a leading Vietnamese newspaper published a series of articles revealing the long-rumored but never-before officially confirmed fact that contrary to party regulations, Le Duan had taken two wives and had two separate families. DAVID COFFEY See also Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; Geneva Conference and Geneva Accords of 1954; Ho Chi Minh; Lao Dong Party; Pham Van Dong; United Front; Viet Minh; Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, 1945–1954; Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, 1954–1975; Vietnam, Socialist Republic of, 1975–Present; Vo Nguyen Giap References Burgess, Patricia, ed. The Annual Obituary, 1986. Chicago: St. James, 1989. Duiker, William J. The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam. 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. Military History Institute of Vietnam. Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People’s Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002. Pribbenow, Merle. “General Vo Nguyen Giap and the Mysterious Evolution of the Plan for the 1968 Tet Offensive.” Journal of Vietnam Studies 3(2) (Summer 2008): 1–33. Quinn-Judge, Sophie. “The Ideological Debate in the DRV and the Significance of the Anti-Party Affair, 1967–1968.” Cold War History 5(4) (November 2006): 479–500. Who’s Who in the World, 1984–1985. Chicago: Marquis Who’s Who, 1989.
Le Duc Anh Birth Date: December 1, 1920 Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) official, People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) general, and from
Le Duc Tho 1992 to 1997 president of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV). Born as Le Van Giac on December 1, 1920, in Truong Ha village, Phu Vang District, Thua Thien Province, he took the name Le Duc Anh when he first began his revolutionary career. He was admitted into membership in the Indochinese Communist Party in 1938. In the war against the French during 1948–1954, Anh served in Cochin China (southern Vietnam), rising through the ranks as a political officer and headquarters staff officer to become deputy chief of staff of the Southern Region in the early 1950s. After regrouping to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) following the 1954 Geneva Peace Agreement, from 1955 to 1964 he served successively as deputy chief of the Operations Department and then deputy chief of the General Staff, rising to the rank of colonel. In 1964 Anh was sent to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), where he served as chief of staff and later deputy commander of Communist forces in South Vietnam. In 1969 he was appointed commander of Military Region IX, which covered the southern half of the Mekong Delta. Immediately after the signing of the 1973 Paris Peace Accords, Anh continued aggressive military action in spite of the cease-fire, defying orders from the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN). Anh’s actions were later vindicated by the VCP leadership. In 1974 he was promoted and transferred back to the post of deputy commander of Communist Forces in South Vietnam. In 1975 Anh served as deputy commander of the PAVN Ho Chi Minh Campaign and led one of the attack columns that took Saigon on April 30, 1975. The next year he was elected as a member of the VCP Central Committee during the VCP Fourth Congress. After serving as commander of the high command’s Forward Headquarters during the December 1978 Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, Anh was promoted to deputy minister of defense and served as commander of all Vietnamese forces in Cambodia from 1981 to 1986. He was elected to membership in the VCP Politburo in 1982, and in 1984 he was promoted to the rank of full general. In December 1986 Anh was appointed as minister of defense and vice secretary of the Central Military Party Committee. During the Ninth National Assembly in September 1992 he was elected president of the SRV. During his long career, Anh gained a reputation for being the VCP’s troubleshooter. He was credited with the 1989 Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia and for resolving vexing issues with the United States regarding soldiers missing in action. A conservative, he insisted on relatively tight party control over domestic policies during his tenure in office. In 1996 Anh suffered a serious stroke, and he resigned his post as president in October 1997. He was succeeded by Tran Duc Luong. NGO NGOC TRUNG See also Ho Chi Minh Campaign; Lao Dong Party; Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, Army; Vietnam, Socialist Republic of, 1975–Present
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References Duiker, William J. The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam. 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996. Khuat Bien Hoa. Dai Tuong Le Duc Anh [General Le Duc Anh]. Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 2005. Ministry of Defense. Tu Dien Bach Khoa Quan Su Viet Nam [Vietnamese Military History Encyclopedia]. Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1996.
Le Duc Tho Birth Date: October 14, 1911 Death Date: October 13, 1990 Vietnamese revolutionary and influential member of the Lao Dong (or Communist) Party Political Bureau and Secretariat and chief negotiator for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) at the Paris peace talks. Born in Dich Le village, My Loc District, Nam Dinh Province, on October 14, 1911, into a mandarin family (his uncle was province governor Phan Dinh Hoe), Le Duc Tho (real name, Phan Dinh Khai) was the eldest of five brothers, three of whom became important figures in the Vietnamese Communist Party. Tho was one of the founders of the Indochinese Communist Party. As with many of his revolutionary compatriots, he was arrested and spent much of the 1930s in the French island prison of Poulo Condore. During much of the war with France he served as the party’s chief commissar for the Nam Bo (southern) region of Vietnam. In the 1950s Tho gained the reputation of a skilled theoretician and was often called upon to guide party directives. From the late 1950s until the beginning of the peace talks in Paris, he played a major role in directing the war in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Tho became a close ally of Communist Party first secretary Le Duan, and Vietnamese author Vu Thu Hien contends that on occasion Tho’s views overrode those of Ho Chi Minh. Tho was a key figure in the 1967–1968 round of arrests and purges of a number of party and military officials that became known as the Anti-Party Affair. When the Paris peace talks opened on May 13, 1968, Tho was the actual, although not the titular, head of the North Vietnamese negotiating team. The Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party had given Tho considerable latitude for discussion but insisted that no serious negotiations could take place unless the United States stopped bombing North Vietnam unconditionally and accepted a coalition government in South Vietnam in accordance with the platform of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (National Liberation Front [NLF]). Furthermore, they demanded that any settlement address the political and military struggles together, beginning with the dismantling of Nguyen Van Thieu’s Saigon regime. U.S. negotiators, namely Henry Kissinger, balked at these demands. Beginning on February 21, 1970, Kissinger and Tho met secretly in Paris to discuss a way out of the stalemate.
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Le Duc Tho
Communist revolutionary and tough-minded peace negotiator Le Duc Tho was a member of the Politburo of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and that country’s chief negotiator at the Paris peace talks. (Central Press/Getty Images)
The talks produced little substantive results, however, and in the spring of 1972 following the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) invasion of South Vietnam across the demilitarized zone (DMZ), President Richard Nixon resumed the bombing campaign against North Vietnam. By the early summer of 1972, Kissinger and Tho had both made substantial compromises. The United States now suggested that North Vietnamese troops could remain in South Vietnam after a cease-fire and supported a tripartite electoral commission in South Vietnam that represented a major step away from absolute U.S. support of the Saigon regime. Tho dropped his insistence on Thieu’s ouster, accepting a cease-fire that would leave Thieu in partial control. These compromises angered allies of both the United States and North Vietnam within South Vietnam when in October 1972 they learned of the terms of the draft peace agreement that had been reached during the secret negotiations between Tho and Kissinger. The Saigon regime called the compromise a sellout, and the indigenous Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) questioned the wisdom of leaving Thieu in control. In ad-
dition, the PRG worried that the freedom of South Vietnamese political prisoners was no longer linked with the release of American prisoners of war. When South Vietnamese president Thieu rejected the settlement and Hanoi refused to revisit the terms already agreed to and publicized the secret agreement, Nixon blamed the North Vietnamese government and ordered renewed air strikes against North Vietnam to force an agreement. These attacks, known as Operation LINEBACKER II (the so-called Christmas Bombings), struck Hanoi and Haiphong and were among the most devastating of the war. The negotiations between Kissinger and Tho resumed on January 8, 1973, and following some cosmetic changes, a final agreement was signed on January 27. Differing little from the October draft, the final peace accord left Thieu in power temporarily and allowed North Vietnamese troops to remain in South Vietnam. In addition, the PRG was accorded meaningful status and the possibility of obtaining broader political power. Ironically, the major question over which the war had been fought, the political future of South Vietnam, was left undecided. The Nixon administration
Lefèbvre, Dominique and Hanoi both claimed victory, and each side violated the spirit and nature of the agreement, causing the war to drag on for two more years until the Communists forced Saigon’s collapse in 1975. Meanwhile, late in 1973 the Nobel Peace Committee awarded Kissinger and Tho its Peace Prize. Tho refused to accept the award because the war continued. In 1975 Tho returned to South Vietnam to oversee the final stages of the Communist offensive against Saigon (the Ho Chi Minh Campaign). Between 1975 and 1986 Tho remained an active member of the Vietnamese Communist Party Central Committee and helped direct the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. During this time he was also the director of the powerful Party Organization Department, the bureau that oversaw the assignment of cadres in both party and state organs. Tho’s power diminished in the mid-1980s, however, and after the sweeping economic reforms introduced at the 1986 Sixth Party Congress, he resigned his post and retired from public life. He died in Hanoi on October 13, 1990. ROBERT K. BRIGHAM See also Cambodia, Vietnamese Invasion and Occupation of; Ho Chi Minh Campaign; Kissinger, Henry Alfred; Lao Dong Party; Missing in Action and Prisoners of War, Communist; Nguyen Van Thieu; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Paris Negotiations; Paris Peace Accords; Poulo Condore; Prisoners of War, Allied; Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam References Boudarel, Georges, ed. La bureaucratie au Vietnam. Paris: L’Hartmattan, 1983. Herring, George C. America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975. 4th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001. Herring, George C., ed. The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983. Kalb, Marvin, and Bernard Kalb. Kissinger. Boston: Little, Brown, 1974. Porter, Gareth. A Peace Denied: The United States, Vietnam, and the Paris Agreement. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975. Young, Marilyn B. The Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990. New York: HarperCollins, 1991.
Le Dynasty Longest dynasty in Vietnamese history. The Le dynasty (in Vietnamese, Nha Le or Nha Hau Le) ruled Vietnam from 1428, when its founder Le Loi drove the Minhs out of the country, until 1788, when it was ended by the Tay Son Rebellion. This long era was divided into two periods: the direct and unified Le government period that lasted for nearly 100 years (1428–1527) and the NorthSouth period (1527–1788) during which the Trinh lords controlled the north and the Nguyen lords controlled the south, both in the name of the Le kings. It was under the Le that the Vietnamese completed their Nam Tien (March to the South) in 1470 at the expense of the Chams and in the middle of the 18th century at the expense of Chenla (Cam-
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bodia). Indeed, by the end of this dynastic era the kingdom had expanded practically to the modern borders of Vietnam. In culture and education, neo-Confucianism became the country’s main ideology, replacing Buddhism. The triennial competitive examinations were reorganized. Court examination laureates were covered with honors, including the vinh qui (“glorious homecoming”) and the engraving of names on stone stele housed in the Van Mieu (Temple of Literature). The dynasty’s civil service sector was consistently reviewed and reformed, as was the legal system. Many of the changes were modeled after those of the Chinese. In literature and poetry, besides the many works of Nguyen Trai, the most important scholar, strategist, writer, and poet in Vietnamese history, authors such as Ly Tu Tan, Phan Phu Tien, Nguyen Binh Khiem, Doan Thi Diem, On Nhu Hau, Nguyen Gia Thieu, Ngo Si Lien, and Le Qui Don marked this long era with a great number of works both in classical Chinese characters and in Nom, the vulgar or demotic language of Vietnam. Le Thanh Tong (1460–1497), the most important king of this dynasty next to its founder, Le Thai To, was also a writer and poet. His Hoi Tao Dan gathered 28 scholar-dignitaries into a kind of literary academy. It was also under Le Thanh Tong that a law code, known as the Luat Hong Duc (Hong Duc Code), one of the most important such codes in Vietnamese history, was promulgated. The Le dynasty was replaced by the Tay Son dynasty in 1786 following the Tay Son Rebellion. PHAM CAO DUONG See also Le Loi; Le Thanh Tong; Nguyen Dynasty; Trinh Lords; Vietnam, History of, 938 CE through the French Conquest References Chapuis, Oscar M. A History of Vietnam: From Hong Bang to Tu Duc. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1995. Le Kim Ngan. To Chuc Chinh Quyen Trung Uong Duoi Trieu Le Thanh Tong, 1460–1497 [Organization of the Central Government under Le Thanh Tong, 1460–1497]. Saigon: Bo Quoc Gia Giao Duc, 1963. Le Thanh Khoi. Le Viet-Nam: Histoire et civilisation. Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1955. Tran Trong Kim. Viet Nam Su Luoc [Outline of Vietnamese History]. Saigon: Bo Giao Duc, 1971. Uy Ban Khoa Hoc Xa Hoi Viet Nam. Lich Su Viet Nam, Tap I [History of Vietnam, Vol. 1]. Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Khoa Hoc Xa Hoi, 1971.
Lefèbvre, Dominique Birth Date: ca. 1810 Death Date: ca. 1865 Nineteenth-century Catholic priest and missionary to Vietnam who set in motion a chain of events that brought French military intervention in Vietnam. French missionaries who went to Asia in the 1820s aggressively pursued their proselytizing efforts in the conviction that doing so was strongly supported in France.
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LE HONG PHONG II, Operation
Indeed, persecution of French missionaries in Vietnam during the reign of Emperor Minh Mang (r. 1820–1841) aroused considerable popular anger in a France that was experiencing a Catholic resurgence following the Napoleonic Wars. In 1843 French premier François Guizot sent a sizable squadron to the Far East to further French interests there, although he instructed its commander, Admiral Jean-Baptiste Cécille, not to undertake any action along the Vietnamese coast. Meanwhile, young French Catholic missionary Dominique Lefèbvre, who had arrived in Vietnam in 1835, had learned the language and had begun converting Vietnamese to Catholicism. He and other French missionaries had also been intriguing on behalf of the Le pretender to the throne. In 1845 Lefèbvre was arrested and sentenced to death. From his prison at Hue he managed to smuggle out a message to the captain of a foreign warship that had anchored at Tourane (present-day Da Nang). That warship was the U.S. frigate Constitution, commanded by Captain John Percival. Percival informed Cécille of Lefèbvre’s plight, and the admiral immediately dispatched a French warship, the Alcmène, commanded by Captain Fornier-Duplan, to Tourane. Emperor Thieu Tri (r. 1841–1847) not only released Lefèbvre but also presented gifts to Captain Fornier-Duplan. Thieu Tri’s intention was not to persecute foreign missionaries but rather to see them and French warships gone from Vietnam. The matter did not end there, for once again Lefèbvre provided the excuse for French armed intervention in Vietnam. Not easily put off, in May 1846 he and another priest, Duclos, tried to reenter Vietnam by bribing border guards. Promptly apprehended by the authorities, Lefèbvre was again sentenced to death. He may or may not have died in prison the following month. Historian John Cady contends that he did, but this view seems to be in the minority; most books on the period have Lefèbvre expelled from Vietnam for a second time some weeks before the arrival of captains Lapierre and Charles Rigault de Genouilly and then later returning there to continue missionary activities. In any case, Cécille now sent two warships, the Gloire and the Victorieuse, to Tourane, there to demand not only the priests’ release but freedom of worship for Catholics in Vietnam. The two French Navy commanders, captains Lapierre and Rigault de Genouilly, arrived at Tourane in the early spring of 1847. As a precaution, the French captains demanded that Vietnamese vessels at Tourane be stripped of their sails. After several weeks of waiting for a reply to their demands, the French became impatient. On April 15, 1847, four Vietnamese vessels approached the French warships, shots were fired, and within 70 minutes three of the Vietnamese ships were sunk. The French warships then sailed away without ever finding out what had become of Lefèbvre. Later the two French ships ran aground off the Korean coast. Lapierre and Rigault de Genouilly escaped punishment for this, and when he returned to France from the Far East in 1847, Admiral Cécille called for France to talk to Vietnam in the future “only with guns.” SPENCER C. TUCKER
See also Guizot, François; Rigault de Genouilly, Charles; Vietnam, History of, 938 CE through the French Conquest References Buttinger, Joseph. The Smaller Dragon: A Political History of Vietnam. New York: Praeger, 1958. Cady, John F. The Roots of French Imperialism in Eastern Asia. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1954. Chapuis, Oscar. The Last Emperors of Vietnam: From Tu Duc to Bao Dai. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2000. Tucker, Spencer C. Vietnam. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1999.
LE HONG PHONG II,
Operation
Start Date: September 1950 End Date: October 1950 Important Viet Minh campaign along Route Coloniale 4 that in effect ended the Indochina War for the French, although the conflict dragged on for four more years. In 1949 the French lost the initiative in the Indochina War; when the Communist People’s Republic of China (PRC) came to power in China that October, the entire frontier between northern Vietnam and China became available for secure Communist training camps, firing ranges, and logistics support. At the same time, French political leaders in Paris had come to believe that pacification was the key to victory. Not only would the French government not order reinforcements to Indochina, but the government also directed French commander General Marcel Carpentier to relocate troops from Tonkin to pacification duties elsewhere. In early 1950 Viet Minh forces penetrated deep into the Frenchcontrolled Red River Delta defensive belt, and in Operation LE HONG PHONG I they took the key frontier post of Lao Cai. By the end of the offensive the Viet Minh controlled virtually the entire northeastern corner of Tonkin except for a string of border outposts along the border with China on Route Coloniale 4 from Cao Bang via Dong Khe, That Khe, and Lang Son to the Gulf of Tonkin. His army now well trained and equipped by the Chinese, Viet Minh commander General Vo Nguyen Giap was ready for a major offensive against French forts along the China border. Three hundred miles of jungle held by the Viet Minh separated the 10,000 French troops manning these outposts from the main French lines. In late May 1950 the Viet Minh, supplied by the PRC with U.S. howitzers captured from the Nationalists and supported by a small group of Chinese military advisers, took the key outpost of Dong Khe. Although the French retook it a few days later by airborne assault, the supply run to Cao Bang from Lang Son became a costly matter for the French. In fact, their convoys got no farther than That Khe, and after January 1950 Cao Bang and Dong Khe had to be resupplied by air. On September 16, 1950, Giap launched LE HONG PHONG II (also known as the Border Campaign), ordering 15 of his battalions,
Le Kha Phieu supported by an artillery regiment, to take Dong Khe, which was held by 2 Foreign Legion companies. The Viet Minh also pressed attacks at other French-held positions, including those in Laos. Despite French air strikes by Bell P-63A Kingcobra fighters and Junkers Ju-52 transports converted into bombers, Dong Khe fell two days later, cutting communications with Cao Bang and French garrisons to the northwest. On September 24 with much time already lost, General Carpentier ordered the evacuation of Cao Bang. The garrison there, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Pierre Charton, consisted of a reinforced battalion of Foreign Legionnaires and a battalion of Tho (Tay) partisans. There were also the latter’s families and several hundred Vietnamese and Chinese merchants. The roads from Cao Bang, Route Coloniale 3 and Route Coloniale 4, were through Viet Minh–controlled territory, and the terrain was difficult, so Carpentier ordered the commanding officer at Cao Bang to destroy his heavy equipment and motor transport and bring out his 2,600 men and 500 civilians via foot trails. At the same time, a relief force of some 3,500 men commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Marcel Le Page was to move from That Khe northwest to Dong Khe and retake that post long enough for the Cao Bang garrison to join it there on the morning of October 2. Another possibility existed: evacuation by air. The runway at Cao Bang was 2,950 feet long and thus accessible to Ju-52 and Douglas C-47 Dakota aircraft. Colonel Alain D. de Maricourt, French air commander in Tonkin, believed that the entire garrison could have been withdrawn in two days. Carpentier was unwilling to abandon the civilians, however. If they were included in the air operation, it would be more lengthy and considerably more dangerous. But Carpentier’s decision to order the garrison to retreat on Route Coloniale 4 rather than Route Coloniale 3 led to a disaster. Although Route Coloniale 3 was a longer route to the French main defensive line, it was safer, as there were fewer Viet Minh along the way. Route Coloniale 4, while only 45 miles to Dong Khe and 15 miles farther to That Khe, ran close to the Chinese border and was marked by very difficult terrain. In any case, no one in the high command seems to have anticipated a Viet Minh reaction, and no intervention force (to be used if needed) had been organized. As it turned out, the Viet Minh were far more numerous than the French forces. Carpentier’s plan nonetheless probably would have worked except for the fact that Lieutenant Colonel Charton failed to follow orders. With a profound disdain for his adversary and convinced that he could bring out his vehicles, he used the road, which was well covered by the Viet Minh. Progress was very slow, and by the time he decided to follow the original plan, it was too late. Remnants of the two French forces met in the hills around Dong Khe, only to be wiped out on October 7, 1950. Only 12 officers and 475 men managed to make it to That Khe. The French high command now panicked. On October 17 it ordered the evacuation of Lang Son, which had not been under attack and whose good airfield and excellent fields of fire would have
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allowed a protracted defense. Most of its 1,300 tons of supplies fell into Viet Minh hands. By the end of October 1950 most of northeastern Vietnam was thus a Viet Minh stronghold, with the French largely forced back into their Red River Delta bastion. With the exception of a brief paratroop raid on Lang Son in July 1953, the French did not penetrate this area again. The debacle from Cao Bang cost the French at least 5,000 killed or missing, and at Lang Son alone the French lost 10,000 weapons, enough to supply an entire Viet Minh division. Bernard Fall believed that this was France’s “greatest colonial defeat since Montcalm had died at Quebec,” while General Yves Gras wrote that Cao Bang was comparable in its influence to the 1808 French defeat at Bailen for Napoleon. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; France, Air Force, 1946–1954; France, Army, 1946–1954; Indochina War; Viet Minh; Vo Nguyen Giap References Charton, Pierre. RC4, La tragédie de Cao Bang. Paris: Editions Albatros, 1975. Fall, Bernard B. Street without Joy: The French Debacle in Indochina. Rev. ed. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1994. Fall, Bernard B. The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis. 2nd rev. ed. New York: Praeger, 1967. Gras, Yves. Histoire de la Guerre d’Indochine. Paris: Éditions Denoël, 1992. Porch, Douglas. The French Foreign Legion: A Complete History of the Legendary Fighting Force. New York: HarperCollins, 1991.
Le Kha Phieu Birth Date: December 27, 1931 Prominent People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) general, Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) official, and secretary-general of the VCP from 1997 to 2001. Born on December 27, 1931, at Dong Khe village, Dong Son District, Thanh Hoa Province, Le Kha Phieu rose through the ranks as a political officer in the PAVN 304th Division. During the 1968 Tet Offensive he participated in the fighting in Hue City while serving as a regimental political commissar. His first important post was that of deputy commander of the Vietnam Volunteer Army in Cambodia. He proved his political mettle during Vietnam’s long involvement in Cambodia in the 1980s. After Vietnamese troops left Cambodia in 1989, Phieu was promoted to lieutenant general. In 1989 he also became deputy chief of the Political Department of the PAVN, and in September 1991 he was promoted to chief of that department, making him one of the top figures in the military hierarchy. Phieu and new defense minister General Doan Khue faced a formidable challenge in dealing with financial cutbacks and
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Le Loi References Ministry of Defense. Tu Dien Bach Khoa Quan Su Viet Nam [Vietnamese Military History Encyclopedia]. Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1996. Who’s Who in the World, 1999–2000. Chicago: Marquis Who’s Who, 2003.
Le Loi Birth Date: 1385 Death Date: 1433
Vietnamese Communist Party secretary general General Le Kha Phieu during an official ceremony in Hanoi to mark the 55th anniversary of the Communist regime. (AFP/Getty Images)
lowered military morale following the Cambodian withdrawal. Phieu appeared to be successful; he was promoted to colonel general in July 1992. Phieu also rose up rapidly in the VCP hierarchy. He became a new full member of the VCP Central Committee at the July 1991 VCP Seventh Congress. At a party plenum in mid-1992 he was added to the VCP Central Committee Secretariat as an additional representative from the Central Military Party Committee. In January 1994 he was promoted to the Politburo. Phieu was also elected a deputy to the National Assembly from Thanh Hoa Province in July 1992. In January 1994 he was appointed vice minister of defense in charge of politics. Although the PAVN is widely seen as being overwhelmingly loyal to the ruling VCP, Phieu is a younger-generation general who seemed to adapt more easily to the changing situation in Vietnam than the aging core of veteran guerrilla fighters. In December 1997 he replaced Do Muoi as secretary-general of the VCP. Phieu’s public pronouncements revealed a concern that free markets and outside influences might undermine party rule, but he also vowed to fight party corruption. Despite his concerns, Vietnam continued to embrace limited free-market mechanisms during his tenure in office. Phieu stepped down as secretary-general in April 2001. NGO NGOC TRUNG See also Cambodia, Vietnamese Invasion and Occupation of; Lao Dong Party; Vietnam, Socialist Republic of, 1975–Present
Founder of the later Le dynasty (1428–1788) and exemplar of Vietnamese resistance to foreign domination. Le Loi (Le Thai To) was born in 1385. Although he was the son of a wealthy landowner in the Lam Son village of Thanh Hoa Province, he possessed a deep sympathy for the common man that he took with him into government service as an imperial bureaucrat. Angered at the willingness of his fellow officials to accept and participate in the imposition of Chinese rule in 1407, he raised the standard of revolt that attracted the support of Nguyen Trai, Vietnam’s preeminent scholar-poet and military strategist. The harshness of the Chinese occupation and his own populist sympathies led Le Loi to mount a prolonged guerrilla campaign, during which he claimed the title of binh dinh vuong (“the pacifying king”) while pursuing Nguyen Trai’s dictum that “it is better to win hearts than conquer citadels.” Le Loi’s protracted war strategy laid the foundation for more conventional operations that ultimately forced a withdrawal of the exhausted Minh forces in 1428 via ships provided by the magnanimous Vietnamese leader. Le Loi won the peace as well as the war. His decision to attempt to discourage further Chinese intervention by offering Peking (present-day Beijing) the traditional vassal-state tribute while proclaiming the complete independence of Vietnam on the home front was both pragmatic and effective. After considering the costs of resuming the offensive in Vietnam, China’s Minh rulers chose Le Loi’s face-saving alternative. This arrangement led to more than 300 years of Sino-Vietnamese amity. After ascending to the throne in his own right as Le Thai To, the new emperor addressed the ever-vexing problem of landlessness by resuming the early Le dynasty’s equal-field system. He also introduced a nationwide sliding-scale land redistribution program, albeit one that acknowledged the claims of age, rank, and wealth. The emperor also instituted an extensive public works program to include the construction of roads, canals, and bridges. Le Loi’s patriotism, his hearts-and-minds approach to war and politics, and his pragmatic military and diplomatic strategies served as models for modern Vietnamese revolutionary nationalists. Nguyen Trai, in his famous “Proclamation of Victory over the Invader” (1428), wrote that Vietnam was fortunate in that it had never lacked heroes. Le Loi certainly is one of Vietnam’s greatest
LeMay, Curtis Emerson heroes, and almost every Vietnamese city has a street named for him. Le Loi died in 1433 and was followed as emperor by his second son, who ruled as Le Thai Tong. MARC J. GILBERT See also Le Dynasty; Nguyen Dynasty; Trinh Lords; Vietnam, History of, 938 CE through the French Conquest References Buttinger, Joseph. The Smaller Dragon: A Political History of Vietnam. New York: Praeger, 1958. Chapuis, Oscar M. A History of Vietnam: From Hong Bang to Tu Duc. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1995. Nguyen Khac Vien. Vietnam: A Long History. Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1987. Whitmore, John W. “The Development of the Le Government in Fifteenth Century Vietnam.” Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Cornell University, 1968.
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LeMay, Curtis Emerson Birth Date: November 15, 1906 Death Date: October 1, 1990 U.S. Air Force general and candidate for the office of vice president of the United States. Born in Columbus, Ohio, on November 15, 1906, Curtis Emerson LeMay was commissioned in the U.S. Army through the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) program at Ohio State University in 1928. Both a navigator and a pilot, he was a navigator on the first mass flight of Boeing B-17 Flying Fortresses to South America in 1938. During World War II while commanding the 3rd Bombardment Division, LeMay led the raid on Regensburg, Germany. In the Pacific theater in 1944, he directed Boeing B-29 Superfortress raids on Japan as commander of the Twentieth Air Force. By the end of the war he had the reputation for being a daring and innovative commander and tactician.
U.S. Air Force general Curtis E. LeMay was one of the 20th century’s greatest proponents of air power. He transformed the Strategic Air Command (SAC) into the world’s most lethal attack force. A political conservative, in 1968 he was a candidate for vice president on Alabama governor George C. Wallace’s American Independent Party ticket. (AP/Wide World Photos)
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Indeed, it was LeMay who developed the highly effective low-level nighttime fire-bombing techniques that reduced Japanese cities to charred rubble while keeping B-29 losses to a minimum. He was promoted to brigadier general in September 1943 and to major general in March 1944, making him the youngest U.S. major general since Ulysses S. Grant. After the war, General LeMay commanded the newly established U.S. Air Force in Europe in 1947 and headed the Strategic Air Command (SAC) from 1948 until 1957, when he was named U.S. Air Force vice chief of staff. He was promoted to full general in 1951. As SAC commander, LeMay greatly expanded SAC’s manpower and inventory of aircraft, adding Boeing B-47 Stratojet bombers, Boeing B-52 Stratofortress bombers, and Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker jet tankers. In 1961 President John F. Kennedy appointed LeMay chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force, a position he held until retiring on January 31, 1965. LeMay was at odds with both the Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson administrations over a variety of issues, including the switch from massive retaliation to flexible response as the focus of U.S. defense policy, whether or not to develop the XB-70 experimental bomber, and the conduct of the Vietnam War. During the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, LeMay advocated a tough response including the bombing of Soviet missile sites in Cuba, which might well have sparked war between the superpowers. Concerning the Vietnam War, LeMay said that “Instead of swatting flies we should be going after the manure pile.” The general’s background and experience had led him to believe that the concept of limited war was an oxymoron. He also believed that the policy of gradual escalation in Vietnam was antithetical to U.S. interests. In his book America Is in Danger (1968), he maintained that in Vietnam victory was the only recourse for the United States. He believe that to attain victory “We must return to the strategic bombing doctrine that was tried and proved in World War II.” After retiring from the U.S. Air Force, LeMay joined a California electronics firm as a senior executive. In 1968 LeMay was a candidate for vice president on Alabama governor George C. Wallace’s American Independent Party ticket. When LeMay stated that in Vietnam “I would use any weapon in the arsenal that is necessary,” the press and the opposing candidates depicted Wallace and LeMay as reckless and unstable warmongers. Wallace responded by sending LeMay on a fact-finding trip to Vietnam, a trip devised to keep the general out of the country until after the election. A member of Wallace’s entourage reportedly quipped that “I understand LeMay will be flying over and sailing back on a slow boat.” As a result of his association with the segregationist Wallace, LeMay lost his post with the electronics firm where he had been employed since leaving the air force. In occasional lectures at U.S. Air Force schools, he continued to argue that strategic bombing could have won the war in Vietnam “in any two-week period you
care to mention.” LeMay died of a heart attack at March Air Force Base, California, on October 1, 1990. EARL H. TILFORD JR. See also Airpower, Role in War; Elections, U.S., 1968; Flexible Response; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; RAND Corporation; United States Air Force; Wallace, George Corley, Jr. References Clodfelter, Mark. The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam. New York: Free Press, 1989. Coffee, Thomas M. Iron Eagle: The Turbulent Life of General Curtis E. LeMay. New York: Crown, 1986. LeMay, Curtis E. America Is in Danger. New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1968. LeMay, Curtis E., with MacKinlay Kantor. Mission with LeMay: My Story. New York: Doubleday, 1965.
Lemnitzer, Lyman Louis Birth Date: August 29, 1899 Death Date: November 12, 1988 U.S. Army general and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) during 1960–1962. Born in Honesdale, Pennsylvania, on August 29, 1899, Lyman Louis Lemnitzer graduated from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, in 1921 with a commission in the coast artillery. He served in the Philippines before returning to West Point as an instructor (1926–1930). He then returned to the Philippines, was again an instructor at West Point, and in 1936 graduated from the Command and General Staff College. Lemnitzer then was an instructor at the Coast Artillery School, and in 1940 he graduated from the Army War College. In early 1941 he joined the War Plans Division of the War Department. Promoted to brigadier general in June 1942, Lemnitzer commanded an antiaircraft brigade before joining General Dwight Eisenhower’s staff in Britain. Lemnitzer participated in planning the November 1942 Allied invasion of North Africa and in that connection accompanied Lieutenant General Mark Clark to a secret meeting in Algeria to confer with Vichy officials before the actual landings. Lemnitzer then commanded the same antiaircraft brigade during the Allied invasion of Sicily. He next was deputy chief of staff of the 15th Army Group and was promoted to major general in November 1944. He participated in secret talks in Switzerland that led to the surrender of German forces in Italy and southern Austria in May 1945. Following the end of World War II, Lemnitzer held a variety of staff assignments before undergoing parachute training and taking command of the 11th Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, in 1950. In November 1951 he took command of the 7th Infantry Division in Korea. Promoted to lieutenant general in August 1952, he became deputy chief of staff for plans and research.
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the ability of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) to defeat a conventional-style attack from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). Lemnitzer believed that the American public would not support guerrilla war, and in early 1961 when Kennedy was considering intervention in Laos, Lemnitzer and the other members of the JCS warned the president not to do so with anything less than a substantial military force. Lemnitzer’s views clearly clashed with Kennedy’s own support for counterinsurgency as opposed to conventional war. In November 1962 Kennedy appointed Lemnitzer commander of U.S. Forces in Europe. He became supreme allied commander, Europe, in January 1963, and retired from the army in July 1969. In 1975 President Gerald R. Ford appointed Lemnitzer to a panel investigating domestic activities of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Lemnitzer died at Walter Reed Hospital in Washington, D.C., on November 12, 1988. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Laos; Military Assistance and Advisory Group, Vietnam; Taylor, Maxwell Davenport
U.S. Army general Lyman Lemnitzer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, arrives at the White House in Washington, D.C., on July 18, 1961. (AP/Wide World Photos)
In March 1955 he was promoted to general and given command of Eighth Army and U.S. forces in the Far East. In July 1957 Lemnitzer became U.S. Army vice chief of staff, and in July 1959 he succeeded General Maxwell Taylor as chief of staff. In that capacity Lemnitzer supported the development of a mobile, hard-hitting, and flexible U.S. Army with more manpower and airlift resources. In September 1960 Lemnitzer became chairman of the JCS and pushed for strengthening U.S. forces in Europe in response to the erection of the Berlin Wall. Regarding Vietnam, in May 1961 Lemnitzer and the JCS pressed President John F. Kennedy to increase U.S. military strength in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) in the belief that if the Communists were successful there, this would encourage similar insurgencies elsewhere. As Lemnitzer put it, the “loss” of South Vietnam would be a serious setback for the United States and would result in the Free World losing Asia all the way to Singapore. Lemnitzer continued to believe that the major military threat to South Vietnam was not guerrillas but rather an invasion by conventional forces across the demilitarized zone (DMZ). After a trip to Vietnam in the spring of 1961, he expressed the opinion that too much emphasis on counterinsurgency measures would impair
References Hilsman, Roger. To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967. Kellner, Kathleen. “Broker of Power: General Lyman L. Lemnitzer.” PhD dissertation, Kent State University, 1987. Korb, Lawrence J. The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The First Twenty-Five Years. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976. Walton, Richard J. Cold War and Counter-Revolution: The Foreign Policy of John F. Kennedy. New York: Viking, 1972.
Le Myre de Vilers, Charles Marie Birth Date: February 17, 1833 Death Date: 1918 Nineteenth-century French colonial administrator. Born in Vendöme on February 17, 1833, the son of an officer of the Napoleonic Empire, Charles Marie Le Myre de Vilers was the first civilian governor of Cochin China, succeeding a line of admirals. Although he attended the École Navale between 1850 and 1851 and reached the rank of ensign after service in the Baltic and Black seas, he left the navy in May 1861 and entered the civil service. Appointed governor of Cochin China in 1879, Le Myre de Vilers was generally in favor of a policy of peaceful integration. It is therefore ironic that it was he who ordered Captain Henri Rivière to attack Tonkin in 1883, setting off the chain of events connected to French-Chinese rivalry for hegemony over Vietnam that culminated in the signing of the 1885 Treaty of Tianjin (Tientsin) between France and China. Le Myre de Vilers went on to complete an illustrious administrative career, with service in Madagascar and Siam. Following his
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retirement he was elected a deputy to the National Assembly from Cochin China in 1889 and was reelected in 1893 and 1898. Le Myre de Vilers was also president of the Geographical Society from 1906 to 1908. He died in 1918. ARTHUR J. DOMMEN See also Black Flags; French Indochina, 1860s–1946; Tianjin, Treaty of References Chapuis, Oscar. The Last Emperors of Vietnam: From Tu Duc to Bao Dai. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2000. Dupuis, Jean. Les Origines de la Question du Tonkin. Paris: Challamel, 1886. McAleavy, Henry. Black Flags in Vietnam: The Story of a Chinese Intervention. New York: Macmillan, 1968.
See also Ngo Dinh Diem; Ngo Dinh Diem, Overthrow of; Nguyen Khanh; Nguyen Van Thieu References Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. Palmer, General Bruce, Jr. The 25-Year War: America’s Military Role in Vietnam. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1984. Pham Phong Dinh. Thien Hung Ca Quan Luc Viet Nam Cong Hoa [The Valiant Saga of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam]. Winnipeg: Tu Sach Vinh Danh, 2004.
Le Nguyen Vy Le Nguyen Khang Birth Date: June 11, 1931 Death Date: November 12, 1996 Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) general. Born in Son Tay Province in northern Vietnam on June 11, 1931, Le Nguyen Khang attended the Nam Dinh Reserve Officers School, graduated from the U.S. Army Infantry School (Fort Benning, Georgia) in 1956, and studied at the U.S. Marine Corps School at Quantico, Virginia, in 1958. Khang was instrumental in developing the Republic of Vietnam Marine Brigade (RVNMB, South Vietnamese Marine Brigade), later expanded into a division (RVNMD). A favorite of President Ngo Dinh Diem, Khang commanded the RVNMB during 1960– 1963. He did not participate in the November 1963 coup that resulted in Diem’s ouster and assassination. In December 1963 the new government headed by General Duong Van Minh appointed Khang the military attaché the the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) to the Republic of the Philippines. Following General Nguyen Khanh’s assumption of power in February 1964, Khang returned to resume command of the RVNMB. He also had the confidence of President Nguyen Van Thieu. In 1968 in addition to his marine duties, Khang became commander of the Capital Military District, military governor of Saigon, commander of III Corps, governor-delegate for the III Corps Tactical Zone, and a member of the National Leadership Council. Khang was relieved of his duties as III Corps commander in 1968 and reverted to commanding the RVNMD. He retained this command until May 1972, when he was appointed assistant to the commander of the Joint General Staff. Khang remained in this position until 1975. Following the fall of Saigon in April 1975, Khang settled in the United States. Khang’s younger brother, ARVN brigadier general Le Nguyen Vy, committed suicide on April 30, 1975, rather than surrender to Communist forces. Khang died in Hope, California, on November 12, 1996. ROBERT G. MANGRUM
Birth Date: 1933 Death Date: April 30, 1975 Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) brigadier general. Born in 1933 in Son Tay Province in northern Vietnam, Le Nguyen Vy graduated in 1951 from the officers’ candidate course in the Regional Military School, Military Region II, at Dap Da near Hue. After graduation he served with a battalion in the Mekong Delta. He then attended an airborne course at the Parachutists Training Center at Pau, France. Later he was in the 6th Airborne Battalion. After 1960 he was assigned to the 5th Infantry Division. In 1969 Vy attended the Command and General Staff Officer course at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He then returned to the 5th Division and was its deputy commander during the bloody Battle of An Loc in the summer of 1972. After a year as deputy commander of the 21st Infantry Division, Vy returned to the 5th Division in 1973 as its commander. In the spring of 1975 General Vy was with the 5th Division at Lai Khe. Upon receiving an order to surrender, he shot himself to death on the morning of April 30, 1975, at the division headquarters at Lai Khe. Vy’s older brother was ARVN lieutenant general Le Nguyen Khang. NGUYEN CONG LUAN See also An Loc, Battle of; Vietnam, Republic of, Army References Davidson, Phillip A. Vietnam at War: The History, 1946–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1988. Ha Mai Viet. Steel and Blood: South Vietnamese Armor and the War for Southeast Asia. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008. Pham Phong Dinh. Chien Su QLVNCH [ARVN War History]. 4th ed. Winnipeg: Pham Khac Thoai, 2008. Pham Phong Dinh. Chien Su Quan Luc Viet Nam Cong Hoa [The Combat History of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam]. Winnipeg: Self-published, 2001. Truong Dong. Doi Chien Binh [The Warrior’s Life]. Westminster, CA: Tu Quynh, 1998.
Leroy, Catherine Tran Van Nhut. An Loc: The Unfinished War. Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 2009.
Le Quang Tung Birth Date: 1923 Death Date: November 1, 1963 Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) colonel. Born in 1923 in Quang Binh Province and trained by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the United States, Le Quang Tung was a Catholic who commanded the Luc Luong Dac Biet (LLDB, South Vietnamese Special Forces) under Ngo Dinh Diem, president of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Tung was in overall command of a program secretly run jointly with the CIA in which ARVN volunteers were parachuted into the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) to establish espionage networks and to carry out sabotage operations there. The program was a total failure. Tung’s forces were also later criticized, even in the United States,
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as having been Ngo Dinh Nhu’s tool for repressing Buddhist dissidents. Tung was one of the most dangerous opponents of the coup plotters against Diem. Tung’s Special Forces could be counted on to defend the Ngo brothers, and this led the conspirators to decide early in the planning that Tung would have to be eliminated. In September 1963 coup planners convinced Washington to cut off U.S. funding of Tung’s forces unless they were deployed outside Saigon. Unfortunately for the Ngo brothers, Nhu relied heavily on Tung’s forces in the planning of Operations BRAVO I and II, the Ngo pseudocoup. BRAVO I called for a fake revolt in Saigon led by soldiers and police disguised as insurgents. BRAVO II would then have Tung’s Special Forces enter the city to quell the “disturbance.” The plan was flawed in that it relied heavily on General Ton That Dinh, one of the coup leaders. On October 29, 1963, however, Dinh ordered Tung’s troops out of Saigon. On the afternoon of November 1, 1963, a group of generals and senior officers, including Tung, met at the officers’ club inside staff headquarters near Tan Son Nhut Airport. At 1:30 p.m. General Tran Van Don announced that a military revolutionary council was taking power. All but Colonel Tung stood up to applaud. Captain Nguyen Van Nhung then took Tung to another room in the building. As he was being led away, Tung shouted, “Remember who gave you your stars!” Later that same day Nhung supervised the execution of Tung and his brother, Major Le Quang Trieu, at a spot outside the headquarters. MICHAEL R. NICHOLS See also BRAVO I and II, Operations; Buddhism in Vietnam; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Ngo Dinh Diem; Ngo Dinh Diem, Overthrow of; Ngo Dinh Nhu; Ton That Dinh; Tran Van Don; Viet Minh; Vietnam, Republic of, Special Forces References Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. Smith, R. B. An International History of the Vietnam War. 3 vols. New York: St. Martin’s, 1983–1991.
Le Quang Vinh See Ba Cut
Leroy, Catherine Birth Date: 1945 Death Date: July 7, 2006 Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) colonel Le Quang Tung commanded the ARVN Special Forces under President Ngo Dinh Diem, which were widely criticized for their suppression of Vietnamese Buddhist dissidents. (AP/Wide World Photos)
Pioneering female photojournalist and combat photographer. Born in Paris, France, in 1945, Catherine Leroy was raised in a convent in the city. She arrived in Vietnam in February 1966 on a
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one-way ticket with only her camera and $100 to pursue a career in photojournalism but without having yet published a single photograph. She was hired by the Associate Press after falsely presenting herself to its Saigon office as having had experience in combat photography. The diminutive Leroy—she stood less than five feet tall and weighed less than 100 pounds—was soon accompanying U.S. units, such as the 173rd Airborne Brigade, in the field. She was the only known accredited journalist, male or female, to have made a combat jump. Armed only with her Leica camera and admired by the soldiers for her pluck and courage, she took part in such major operations as Operation ATTLEBORO and documented some of the war’s fiercest fighting. Leroy remarked in the late 1980s that she found it “exhilarating to be shot at without result.” She was, however, wounded by a mortar round when on a patrol with the marines. Leroy’s photographs were soon appearing in such leading magazines as Life and Look. Perhaps her most famous photograph is “Corpsman in Anguish, 1967.” The image shows a kneeling marine corpsman, Vernon Wike, as he realizes that a comrade he had been attempting to save has just died of his wounds. The photograph was taken during the spring 1967 battle for Hill 881 near Khe Sanh. Leroy’s book Under Fire: Great Photographers and Writers in Vietnam (2006) presented her own work along with that of other well-known photographers coupled with short essays by equally distinguished writers. Most often, these pairings dealt with the perspective of soldiers on the ground. Leroy left Vietnam in March 1969, acclaimed as the best-known woman photographer of the Vietnam War. She subsequently covered the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. In 1972 she directed a documentary film, Operation Lost Patrol, about Ron Kovic and other anti–Vietnam War veterans. She returned to Vietnam in 1975 to document the fall of Saigon to the Communists. Leroy then covered civil strife in Lebanon for several years. Her book God Cried is about the Israeli siege of Beirut in 1982. By the late 1980s the strain of two decades of combat photography had taken a toll, and Leroy tried to move into other projects but with little success in finding support for them. She won numerous awards for her work, including the Robert Capa Gold Medal for conflict photography from the Overseas Press Club in New York in 1976, the first woman to be so honored. Leroy died of cancer in Los Angeles, California, on July 7, 2006. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also ATTLEBORO, Operation; Khe Sanh, Battle of; Kovic, Ronald; Media and the
Vietnam War References Clifton, Tony, and Catherine Leroy. God Cried. London: Quartet Books, 1983. Leroy, Catherine. Under Fire: Great Photographers and Writers in Vietnam. New York: Random House, 2006.
Le Thai To See Le Loi
Le Thanh Nghi Birth Date: March 6, 1911 Death Date: August 16, 1989 Prominent leader in the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP), the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV). Born on March 6, 1911, in Thuong Coc village, Tu Loc District, Hai Hung Province, into a poor scholar family, Le Thanh Nghi (real name Nguyen Khac Xung) worked as an electrician. From 1925 to 1930 he worked at the power stations of Cua Cam (Hai Phong) and Coc Nam (Hon Gai) and at the Vang Danh mineral depot. From 1928 Nghi was active in the workers’ movement against the French authorities and mine owners. He later joined the Viet Nam Thanh Nien Cach Menh Dong Chi Hoi (Vietnam Revolutionary Youth Association) and then the Indochinese Communist Party. In May 1930 he was arrested by the French and sent to Con Dao Prison. After being released in mid-1936 he returned to Hanoi, where he actively participated in the labor and union movements, setting up Communist Party cells and becoming a member of the Hanoi City Party Committee. In 1937 Nghi was sent back to his hometown in Hai Duong, where he continued his party activities and was a member of the Northern Region Party Committee. In 1940 he was again arrested and was exiled to Son La. After his release in early 1945 he returned to Hanoi and was assigned to the Northern Region Party Standing Committee. After the Japanese coup d’état of March 9, 1945, Nghi was assigned to lead the revolutionary movement in the Hoang Hoa Tham War Zone. A member of the Northern Region Military Committee, Nghi was a prominent commander of the II Military Zone. Following the August 1945 revolution, Nghi was a member of the Northern Region Party Committee in charge of coastal provinces. During the Indochina War he was one of the key leaders of the III Military Zone. He held a number of important party and governmental posts, including member of the Standing Committee of the Northern Region Party Committee, secretary of the Zone III Party Committee, chairman of the Zone III Resistance Committee, deputy secretary of the Interzone III Party Committee, and chief of staff of the Executive Committee of the VCP Central Committee. In 1951 the Indochinese Communist Party split into national branches, and the Vietnamese party was renamed the Lao Dong (Workers’) Party. At the party’s 1951 Second Congress, Nghi was elected a member of its Executive Committee. He was also a member of the Central Committee, secretary of the Interzone III
Letourneau, Jean Resistance Movement, chairman of the Interzone III Resistance Movement Party Committee, political commissar of Military Interzone III, and secretary of the Hanoi Party Committee. After the 1954 Geneva Accords, Nghi kept his post as chief of staff of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee, and in October 1956 he was elected to the Politburo. At the party’s 1960 Third Congress and 1976 Fourth Congress, Nghi was reelected to the party Central Committee and Politburo. His positions included head of the Industry Central Committee (1967) and secretary of the Central Committee Secretariat (1980). Within the government, Nghi was minister of industry (1955), vice premier and chairman of the Industry Commission (1969), chairman of the State Planning Commission (1967), and vice chairman and secretary-general of the State Council (1982). He also served as a deputy in the Second National Assembly through the Sixth National Assembly. Nghi coordinated all foreign assistance to North Vietnam during the Vietnam War and later, until his death, to the SRV. Shortly after having been named the SRV’s economic czar, Nghi died on August 16, 1989, in Hanoi. NGO NGOC TRUNG See also Lao Dong Party; Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, 1954–1975; Vietnam, Socialist Republic of, 1975–Present Reference Duiker, William J. The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam. 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996.
Le Thanh Tong Birth Date: 1442 Death Date: 1497 Vietnamese emperor. Born in Thang Long in 1442, Le Thanh Tong came to the Vietnamese throne in 1460 and ruled for 37 years in what was a Golden Age for Vietnam. His key reform was to restructure the administration along Confucian lines. This system continued until the French conquest 400 years later. The administrative system consisted of a complex hierarchy beginning with six ministries ruling 13 provinces. The provincial headquarters had charge of district offices that oversaw 8,000 communes. The whole system was designed to ensure the authority of the central government yet allow the local administrations some flexibility. Emperor Le Thanh Tong also assembled a standing army of almost 200,000 men. Its officers had to pass competitive examinations designed by the emperor himself. Le Thanh Tong was also devoted to the advancement of learning. He encouraged literature through poetry contests, and he supported the development of scientific and mathematical treatises as well as a journal of his own reign. He also promoted the expansion of the national university
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to include lecture halls and a new library. His reign also saw the compilation of the first complete map of Vietnam. Le Thanh Tong’s most important contribution was a comprehensive legal code, the Hong Duc code. Unusually liberal for its day, the code allowed women to own property brought into the wedding. If divorced without children, such women might reclaim their property. If the couple had children, common property passed to the possession of the children after the divorce. Severe punishments, such as banishment and strangulation, were retained for crimes threatening stability and order. These legalities reflected the sometimes precarious conditions under which Vietnamese emperors ruled but were no more cruel than many contemporary punishments in Europe. Le Thanh Tong died in 1497. MICHAEL R. NICHOLS See also Le Dynasty; Vietnam, History of, 938 CE through the French Conquest References Chapuis, Oscar M. A History of Vietnam: From Hong Bang to Tu Duc. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1995. Nguyen Huyen Anh. Viet Nam Danh Nhan Tu Dien [Dictionary of Vietnamese Great Men and Women]. Houston, TX: Zieleks, 1990. Nguyen Khac Vien. Vietnam: A Long History. Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1987.
Letourneau, Jean Birth Date: September 18, 1907 Death Date: March 16, 1986 Influential French politician. Born on September 18, 1907, in Lude (Sarthe), France, Jean Letourneau trained in law at the University of Paris. Between 1946 and 1953 he held 13 ministry- and/ or cabinet-level posts and as such had a significant impact on the Indochina War (1946–1954). He entered politics in 1933, joining the small and declining Parti Démocrate Populaire (PDP, Democratic People’s Party), which attempted to fuse politics and Christian (mainly Catholic) social democracy. During World War II Letourneau helped run resistance newspapers in occupied France. In 1944 he joined the newly formed Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP, Popular Republican Movement), which essentially replaced the PDP. In 1944 he was director of the press at the Ministry of Information. Elected in 1946 as an MRP deputy from Sarthe, he served in that position until 1956. Named in November 1950 as minister for the associated states in the cabinet of Prime Minister René Pleven, Letourneau took charge of French policy in the Indochina War. He steadfastly defended the conflict as a fight against global communism, and he advanced the belief that the French Union, France’s colonial empire, was indispensable to the country’s international standing and long-term prosperity. Accordingly, he sided with the Georges Bidault wing of the MRP, which stressed the importance of the
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French Union, instead of the Europe-centered wing of the party represented by Robert Schuman. Following the death on January 11, 1952, of French military commander and high commissioner of Indochina General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, Letourneau, then still the minister for the associated states, added the post of high commissioner to his portfolio on April 1, 1952. On April 27, 1953, he also became commissionergeneral. These positions gave Letourneau such latitude in shaping France’s Indochina policy that in May 1953 a French parliamentary mission of inquiry accused him of dictatorship. Responding to American demands that France develop a wellplanned strategy to secure Indochina before the United States would provide additional aid, Letourneau hastily proposed a plan in March 1953. First, he vowed to pacify southern Vietnam and expand the Vietnamese Army to hold that area. Second, he hoped to deliver a definitive blow in northern Vietnam by 1955. Unimpressed, U.S. officials rejected Letourneau’s idea in favor of the Navarre Plan, devised by the new French military commander in Indochina General Henri Navarrre. Under Navarre’s plan, the French Army would shift from the defensive to the offensive. To carry out the plan, Navarre established an airhead at Dien Bien Phu, a remote valley in northwestern Vietnam. Launched in late 1953, the Navarre Plan failed miserably, and Dien Bien Phu surrendered to the Viet Minh on May 7, 1954, ultimately prompting France to negotiate an end to the war. Meanwhile, Letourneau was forced from office in the aftermath of the Piastre Affair, a scandal over illegal currency exchanges that was exposed in late April 1953. Replaced as minister of overseas France on June 28, 1953, by Independent Republican Louis Jacquinot, Letourneau’s exclusion from Prime Minister Joseph Laniel’s cabinet (1953–1954) meant that for the first time in almost a decade, France’s Indochina policy was not in the hands of the MRP. This exclusion presaged a shift in national policy to achieving a rapid withdrawal from Indochina. Letourneau ended his political career as the mayor of Chevillé (1953–1963), a commune located in Sarthe, and as a member of the Assembly of the French Union (1956–1958). He died in Paris, France, on March 16, 1986. MICHAEL H. CRESWELL See also Bidault, Georges; Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; Laniel, Joseph; Lattre de Tassigny, Jean de; Navarre, Henri Eugène; Navarre Plan; Viet Minh References Cesari, Laurent. “The Declining Value of Indochina: France and the Economics of Empire.” In The First Vietnam War: Colonial Conflict and Cold War Crisis, edited by Mark Atwood Lawrence and Fredrik Logevall, 175–195. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007. “U.S. Involvement in the Franco-Viet Minh War, 1950–1954.” In The Pentagon Papers, Vol. 1, The Defense Department History of United States Decision-making on Vietnam: The Senator Gravel Edition, 53–75. Boston: Beacon, 1971.
Le Trong Tan Birth Date: October 1914 Death Date: 1986 General in the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army). Born in October 1914 to a peasant family in Yen Nghia village (a suburb of Hanoi), Hoai Duc District, Ha Dong Province, Le Trong Tan’s real name was Le Trong To. He studied in Hanoi, where he became involved in revolutionary activities. A member of the Viet Minh since 1944, Tan was responsible for military recruiting in Bach Mai Ward, Hanoi City. In March 1945 he took charge of building up revolutionary bases and training selfdefense militia units in Ung Hoa District, Ha Dong Province. In June 1945 he helped command the attack and destruction of military posts at Dong Quan. He was also a member of the Ha Dong Uprising Committee, in charge of military affairs during efforts to take over that province. In December 1945 Tan became a member of the Indochinese Communist Party. During the Indochina War he held various important positions and worked to build up and train the armed forces. He served as commander of the Viet Minh 312th Division from its formation in December 1950 until the end of the war against France in 1954 and commanded the division during the siege of Dien Bien Phu. During the Vietnam War, Tan was one of the PAVN generals commanding units in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). He was sent to South Vietnam in 1964, where he served as deputy commander of the Liberation Armed Forces of South Vietnam during 1964–1979. He then returned north to serve as deputy commander of the General Staff. In this position Tan commanded all PAVN forces in the counteroffensive against Operation LAM SON 719 in southern Laos in early 1971, commanded PAVN forces in the Quang Tri–Thua Thien area during the 1972 Easter Offensive, commanded the PAVN offensive that captured the cities of Hue and Da Nang in March 1975, and was one of the deputy commanders of the 1975 Ho Chi Minh Campaign that captured Saigon in April 1975. In December 1978 Tan directed the successful Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia that ousted the Khmer Rouge regime from power. Tan held many important military and government posts, including commander of the PAVN General Staff, director of the Military Academy, member of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) Central Military Party Committee, deputy minister of defense, deputy to the Seventh National Congress (1981), and a member of the VCP Central Committee of the Fifth Congress and Sixth Congress. He was promoted to full general in December 1984. Tan died in Hanoi in 1986. NGO NGOC TRUNG See also Ho Chi Minh Campaign; Hue and Da Nang, Fall of; Indochina War; Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, Army; Vietnam, Socialist Republic of, 1975–Present
Le Van Kim References Ministry of Defense. Tu Dien Bach Khoa Quan Su Viet Nam [Vietnamese Military History Encyclopedia]. Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1996. Van Tien Dung. Our Great Spring Victory. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977.
Le Van Giac See Le Duc Anh
See also An Loc, Battle of References Pham Phong Dinh, Chien Su QLVNCH [ARVN War History]. 4th ed. Winnipeg: Pham Khac Thoai, 2008. Tran Van Nhut. An Loc: The Unfinished War. Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 2009. Truong Dong. Doi Chien Binh [The Warrior’s Life]. Westminster, CA: Tu Quynh, 1998. Willbanks, James H. The Battle of An Loc. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005.
Le Van Hung
Le Van Kim
Birth Date: 1933 Death Date: April 30, 1975
Birth Date: 1918
Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) brigadier general. Le Van Hung was born in 1933 in Gia Dinh Province near Saigon. Drafted in 1954, he received training in the Thu Duc Reserve Officers School, from which he graduated as a second lieutenant in 1955. In January 1959 First Lieutenant Hung was the 32nd Infantry Regiment S-2 when the Viet Cong (VC) attacked its base camp in Trang Sup, Tay Ninh Province, and captured a large number of weapons. As duty officer at headquarters, Hung took command of the reconnaissance platoon to defend the building and prevent equipment there from being destroyed or captured. In 1961 Hung became chief of police in Vinh Binh Province. In 1964 he commanded a battalion, and in 1967 he commanded the 31st Infantry Regiment. He was then assigned as province chief of Phong Dinh (at Can Thu). In June 1971 Hung took command of the 5th Infantry Division. He was promoted to brigadier general in March 1972. Hung proved to be a talented and brave infantry commander in the bloody Battle of An Loc in April 1972. His men held the city despite fierce People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) attacks over a two-month period. Hung then became assistant commander, III Corps/Military Region III; commander of the 21st Infantry Division; and finally deputy commander, IV Corps/Military Region IV. When Communist forces captured Saigon on April 30, 1975, Hung’s troops still held the city of Can Thu. A delegation of citizens convinced him that his forces should not prolong the fight because that would lead to a bloodbath and destruction of the city, as the Communist high command had vowed to do in Saigon. General Hung and his commander, General Nguyen Khoa Nam, decided not to fight to the end as had been their intention. Hung then bid farewell to his men, his wife, and his children and committed suicide by shooting himself with a pistol on the evening of April 30, 1975. NGUYEN CONG LUAN
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Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) general and leading figure in the November 1963 coup against Ngo Dinh Diem. Born in 1918, Le Van Kim was raised in France and, after having worked as an assistant film director in Paris, joined the French Army. He served in Indochina as an aide to Admiral Georges Thierry d’Argenlieu and attended the 1954 Geneva Conference as a representative of Vietnamese colonial forces. Brigadier General Kim came to be recognized as one of the most capable soldiers of the ARVN. President Ngo Dinh Diem of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) respected Kim’s talent but did not trust him and in 1959 appointed him to head the ARVN military academy. With unrest growing over Diem’s ineffective rule, in November 1960 the leaders of the Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang (VNQDD, Vietnamese Nationalist Party) sought to replace Diem with Kim. This mutiny of military officers collapsed as a result of indecision and internal problems, however. After the failed coup Diem removed Kim from his military academy post, and he held various unimportant jobs until November 1963. In 1963 Kim became involved, with his brother-in-law General Tran Van Don, in another coup attempt against Diem. Together they recruited other discontented military officers. Following their successful November 1, 1963, coup, Kim, Don, and General Duong Van Minh held power. On January 30, 1964, General Nguyen Khanh seized control of Saigon and placed the three generals under arrest. He then accused Don and Kim of conspiring with the French to neutralize the South Vietnamese government and moved them to Dalat. In the courtmartial that followed, Khanh was not able to produce any evidence against the two. This made him look foolish, and he tried to repair the damage by appointing both generals to advisory positions. Kim retired from the ARVN in 1965 and entered business in Saigon. MICHAEL R. NICHOLS See also Duong Van Minh; Ngo Dinh Diem; Ngo Dinh Diem, Overthrow of; Nguyen Khanh; Tran Van Don; Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang
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References Bain, Chester A. Vietnam: The Roots of Conflict. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1967. Duncanson, Dennis J. Government and Revolution in Vietnam. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. Smith, R. B. An International History of the Vietnam War. 3 vols. New York: St. Martin’s, 1983–1991.
Le Van Nhuan See Le Duan
Le Van Vien Birth Date: 1904 Death Date: 1970 Leader of the bandit group Binh Xuyen in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Before World War II, Le Van “Bay” Vien escaped from Poulo Condore (Con Son), the French prison island in the Gulf of Siam, and made his way to the Mekong Delta area, where he joined a band of river pirates. The pirates called themselves the Binh Xuyen, after a tiny village that for a time served as their base of operations. In the 1930s and 1940s the Binh Xuyen raided commerce on the Saigon River and elsewhere. Bay Vien rose within the ranks of this group until, by the end of World War II, this illiterate man had become its chief. Under his tutelage, the Binh Xuyen expanded the scope of their operations. In the chaotic days that marked the close of the war, many factions in Vietnam were competing for power, and Vien seized the opportunity. He moved his headquarters to the Cholon District of Saigon, raised a private army, and for a time collaborated with the Viet Minh in their efforts to establish themselves as the legitimate government of all of Vietnam. Appreciative of his help, Viet Minh officials named him deputy commander of their military forces in Cochin China. In one instance Vien ordered the slaying of some 150 French civilians, including women and children. By 1947, however, with Viet Minh prospects in southern Vietnam very dim, Vien opened negotiations with the French and agreed to shift his allegiance when they offered to recognize the Binh Xuyen gang as a sect similar to the reformed Cao Dai and Buddhist Hoa Hao religious groups, each of which by this time also had its own private army. Now holding a commission as a colonel in the Vietnamese National Army, Vien led his own soldiers in attacks against his former Viet Minh allies. Soon Vien was a very rich man in control of all vice activities in Cholon and much of the surrounding area. The huge gambling complex in Cholon, Le Grande Monde, as well as many riverboat
gambling dens belonged to him, as did the Hall of Mirrors, the largest brothel in Asia. He owned or controlled most of the opium trade in southern Indochina and ran his own factory to provide his outlets with the supplies they needed. Such enterprises led Vien into gold smuggling, currency manipulation, and other enterprises. He was now a vice lord with whom to be reckoned, with millions of piasters flowing into his coffers. Since all of his funds were illegal, Vien laundered his money by buying up some of Saigon’s best department stores as well as many private villas and other real estate. In an effort to find funds necessary to sustain his foundering State of Vietnam, Bao Dai promoted Vien to general and sold him control of the national police. In this way Vien secured complete and official control over all racketeering in southern Vietnam. He shared a portion of his profits with Bao Dai. To protect his lucrative tourist business in Vung Tau that included hotels and a crosscountry bus company, Vien deployed his Cong An Xung Phong (Assault Police) to ensure the security of the highway from Saigon to Vung Tau. After becoming prime minister in South Vietnam in 1954, Ngo Dinh Diem recognized Vien as the most immediate threat
An envoy from the pope of the Cao Dai—a religious movement with its own army—presents a flag to Le Van Vien, leader of the Binh Xuyen, at the latter’s quarters near Saigon in 1955. Republic of Vietnam president Ngo Dinh Diem demanded the religious sects disarm and, when they refused, there was fighting in Saigon. Diem eventually crushed both the sects and the Binh Xuyen. (Bettmann/Corbis)
Levy, Howard Brett to his authority and a major stumbling block to gaining effective control. By then Vien had an army of more than 40,000 men. Diem instigated a showdown on April 27, 1955, when he ordered Vien to remove his troops from Saigon. Vien refused, and Diem’s soldiers attacked. A battle raged inside the city, killing more than 500 people and leaving 25,000 homeless. Both the French and Bao Dai tried to assist Vien, but Diem prevailed. By the end of May the National Army pushed the Binh Xuyen forces out of Saigon and into the swamps of the Mekong Delta. Many later joined the Viet Cong (VC). Le Van Vien escaped to France with much of his fortune, never to return to Vietnam. He died in 1970. CECIL B. CURREY See also Bao Dai; Binh Xuyen; Ngo Dinh Diem; Viet Minh; Vietnam, Republic of, 1954–1975 References Currey, Cecil B. Edward Lansdale: The Unquiet American. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1988. Fall, Bernard. “The Political-Religious Sects of Viet-Nam.” Pacific Affairs 28 (September 1955): 235–253.
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Levy, Howard Brett Birth Date: April 10, 1937 Physician and U.S. Army officer tried in one of the first antiwar courts-martial of the Vietnam War era. Born in Brooklyn, New York, on April 10, 1937, Howard Brett Levy graduated from New York University in 1957; two years later he received his MD from the State University of New York Downstate Medical Center. Following a one-year internship, Levy accepted a commission in the Army Medical Corps that allowed him to complete specialty training in dermatology at the New York University Medical Center rather than be immediately drafted. During his residency Levy became involved in civil rights issues, and by 1965 he came to oppose the expanding Vietnam War. He was posted to Fort Jackson, South Carolina, in 1965, and one of his duties there was to provide dermatological training for Special Forces personnel about to leave for Vietnam. After several months Captain Levy refused to participate further, despite a direct order from his commanding officer, Colonel Henry F. Fancy. Long before this incident, however, Levy had been placed under surveillance because of off-duty activities that included operating a
Dr. Howard Levy, shown here with another anti–Vietnam War activist, the actress Jane Fonda, during a press conference in New York City on February 16, 1971. Levy, a former army captain, had been court-martialed and served two years in prison for refusing to fulfill his duties in training U.S. Army Special Forces personnel. (AP/Wide World Photos)
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free clinic and promoting black voter registration. Levy later would claim that he was prosecuted in order to punish him for his civil rights activities. Indeed, a secret intelligence dossier described him as appearing “to think more of the Negroid race than of the White race.” After reading the dossier, Colonel Fancy decided against an administrative reprimand and formally charged Levy with not only willful disobedience but also “intent to create disloyalty and disaffection among enlisted men.” The general court-martial, which convened in May 1967, attracted widespread public attention when Levy invoked the socalled Nuremberg defense, justifying his refusal to instruct Special Forces troops on the grounds that they would use the training for criminal purposes. In a precedent-setting decision, Colonel Earl Brown, the army’s chief law officer, sent from Washington as the judge, ruled that the Nuremberg principles could be a standard and allowed Levy’s civilian attorney, Charles Morgan Jr. (provided by the American Civil Liberties Union), to offer evidence of criminal actions by Special Forces personnel in Vietnam. But Morgan was unable to satisfy Brown that there was proof of a criminal command practice. According to writer Telford Taylor, the defense’s argument was fraught with difficulties because nothing decided at Nuremberg suggested that “a soldier is entitled to disobey an intrinsically legal order . . . because other soldiers, halfway around the world, are given illegal orders.” Levy also argued that training the Green Berets compelled him to violate canons of medical ethics. Being soldiers first and aidmen second, the Green Berets’ provision of medical treatment (other than first aid) to civilians in order to make friends was illegitimate, for it could be taken away as easily as it was given. The court was not persuaded. Although the prosecution tried but failed to prove that a single person was made disloyal or disaffected by Levy’s words or actions, the 10-officer jury found him guilty on all charges and sentenced him to three years at hard labor and dismissal from the service. Viewed by many as a martyr, Levy became a widely admired figure in the GI antiwar movement. He was released in August 1969 after serving 26 months at Fort Jackson in South Carolina, Fort Leavenworth in Kansas, and Lewisburg Penitentiary in Pennsylvania, and his experience left him a committed radical who immediately became active in the so-called GI coffeehouse protests in army towns across the United States. Morgan appealed Levy’s case on constitutional grounds for several years and also accused the army of suppressing most of Levy’s classified security dossier. In 1973 a U.S. Court of Appeals ruled that Levy had been wrongfully convicted on two of the charges, but in 1974 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the convictions. By then Levy had resumed his medical career. Since 1976 he has been a member of the teaching staff at Lincoln Hospital in the Bronx and is currently also an associate professor of dermatology at Cornell University Medical School. He remains a social activist. JOHN D. ROOT
See also Antiwar Movement, U.S. References Di Mona, Joseph. Great Court-Martial Cases. New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1972. Hayes, James R. “The War Within: Dissent in the Military with an Emphasis on Vietnam.” PhD dissertation, University of Connecticut, 1975. Strassfeld, Robert. “The Vietnam War on Trial: The Court-Martial of Dr. Howard B. Levy.” Wisconsin Law Review (1994): 839–963. Taylor, Telford. Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970.
LEXINGTON III,
Operation
Start Date: April 17, 1966 End Date: June 9, 1966 U.S. Army 1st Infantry Division operation in the Rung Sat Special Zone. On April 17, 1966, the 1st Battalion of the 18th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade, of the U.S. Army’s 1st Infantry Division (“Big Red One”) was ordered into the Rung Sat Special Zone, a thick mangrove swamp located south of Saigon in the coastal region of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Long considered impenetrable by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) command, it was a haven for main-force Viet Cong (VC) and People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) units operating in the Capital Military District that posed a direct threat to Saigon. The 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, detached from the 1st Division, conducted operations with the objective of finding and engaging sizable Communist forces. Assuming that no major action occurred, the 1st Battalion was to conduct search-and-clear operations within the zone. The soldiers found the swamps extremely difficult in which to maneuver and often had to wade in hip-deep mud. The battalion’s rifle companies were rotated every 48 hours to minimize trench foot and other ailments and to allow troops to rest and replenish their supplies. LEXINGTON III produced no major fighting. There were, however, numerous small-unit actions along the Rung Sat’s waterways as American ambush patrols engaged VC sampans and small boats. On June 9, the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, was ordered to rejoin the division near Loc Ninh, where 1st Infantry Division commander Major General William DuPuy was planning division-sized operations (EL PASO I and EL PASO II) against known concentrations of PAVN forces. JULIUS A. MENZOFF See also EL PASO II, Operation; United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1965–1968; United States Army; Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, Army
Lima Site 85 References Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. Stanton, Shelby L. The Rise and Fall of an American Army: The U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985.
Lifton, Robert Jay Birth Date: May 16, 1926 Psychiatrist, prolific author, psychohistorian, critic of modern war, and in terms of Vietnam War issues, best known for his work on post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in the 1970s. Born in New York City on May 16, 1926, Robert Jay Lifton, the son of a physicist, attended Cornell University and obtained his MD degree from New York Medical College in 1948. He interned at the Jewish Hospital in Brooklyn (1948–1949) and performed his residency in psychiatry at the Downstate Medical Center (1949–1951). Lifton served in the U.S. Air Force from 1951 through 1953, six months of which he served in the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea). His study of prisoners of war (POWs) who had been allegedly subjected to brainwashing during the Korean War led to further research on the subject and his first book, Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism: A Study of “Brainwashing” in China (1961). On his return to the United States in 1953, Lifton worked on the faculty of the Washington School of Psychiatry in the District of Columbia during 1954–1955. During 1956–1961 he was an associate in psychiatry and in East Asian studies at Harvard University. In 1961 he was appointed to the Foundation Fund for Psychiatric Research professorship at Yale University, and in 1985 he became distinguished professor of psychiatry and psychology as well as director of the Center on Violence and Human Survival at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York. Lifton is well known for his work in the 1970s on PTSD. He had previously studied survivors of the World War II Holocaust, the 1945 Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, and POWs in prison camps in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea). During the Vietnam War he participated in a number of antiwar activities, including the 1970 Winter Soldier Investigation, a media event in Detroit at which members of Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) attested to atrocities that they claimed to have committed or witnessed, and the 1971 Dewey Canyon III, at which veterans discarded their medals on the Capitol steps in Washington, D.C. In December 1970 Lifton began a series of rap groups, or group therapy sessions, with members of the New York chapter of the VVAW. From these sessions grew most of the subsequent definitions and treatment methods for PTSD, including the Vietnam Outreach Centers (Vet Centers) established in 1979 as part of the Veterans Administration (VA) system. In 1972 with the National Council of Churches, Lifton sponsored the First National Conference on the Emotional Needs of Vietnam-Era Veterans, attended by national VA officials. In 1973
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he published his landmark book on the subject, Home from the War, based on his work with the New York rap groups. The book has since been reissued several times and is frequently cited not only in professional literature but also in the popular media. In 1976 Lifton headed the American Psychiatric Association’s task force to develop a description of PTSD for the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual. The task force’s work, also based on Lifton’s own work with the New York rap groups, was published in 1980. A consistent critic of modern war and the ideology behind it, Lifton next turned his attention to the study of state-sponsored euthanasia and genocide. His 1986 book The Nazi Doctors was the first in-depth study of how German medical professionals were able to rationalize and justify their roles in medical experimentation and the Holocaust during the 1930s and 1940s. The book was well received and was widely read by both experts and the general public. Lifton also became a vocal opponent of nuclear weapons and nuclear war-fighting strategy, arguing that nuclear war makes mass genocide banal and thus conceivable, raising the likelihood of an actual nuclear exchange. After the September 11, 2001, terror attacks on the United States, Lifton rejected the term “War on Terror” as one that has little meaning and that destroys “all vulnerability.” At the same time he acknowledges that terrorism in the 21st century is a serious concern, especially with nuclear proliferation, and he has posited in his 1999 book Destroying the World to Save It that the possibility exists for the rise of an apocalyptic terrorist cult steeped in totalist ideologies that could hold most or all of the world hostage. Lifton has spoken out repeatedly against the Iraq War (2003–2010), arguing that it, like the Vietnam War, was driven by an irrational and aggressive strain in U.S. foreign policy that uses the politics of fear to rationalize wars in which the nation’s vital interests are not at stake. His 2003 book Superpower Syndrome: America’s Apocalyptic Confrontation with the World takes up these very themes. PHOEBE S. SPINRAD See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder; Vietnam Veterans Against the War References Kimnel, Michael S. “Prophet of Survival.” Psychology Today (June 1988): 44. Lifton, Robert J. Death in Life: Survivors of Hiroshima. New York: Random House, 1968. Lifton, Robert J. Home from the War: Vietnam Veterans, Neither Victims nor Executioners. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973. Lifton, Robert J. Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism: A Study of “Brainwashing” in China. New York: Norton, 1961.
Lima Site 85 A distinctive mountain in Sam Neua Province, Laos. Phou Pha Thi was prized during the Vietnam War as a stronghold near the border of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North
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Vietnam). Phou Pha Thi Mountain has almost sheer cliffs on three sides but has a flat summit. It was used as a landing site for helicopters during the war and was code-named Lima Site 85. Its principal importance was as the location of a tactical air control and navigation (TACAN) beacon that guided U.S. jet aircraft to targets in the Red River Delta of North Vietnam. Employing the beacon, jets were able to fly into the areas of Hanoi and Haiphong in all weather and deliver their bomb loads with accuracy. In March 1968 during the course of a combined military action involving People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) and Communist Pathet Lao forces, the TACAN station was overrun by a PAVN sapper squad, and several Americans on-station there were killed. The TACAN equipment was permanently put out of action, and the mountain and its commanding terrain were lost to the United States and its allies. ARTHUR J. DOMMEN See also Airpower, Role in War; Laos; Pathet Lao References Castle, Timothy. One Day Too Long: Top Secret Site 85 and the Bombing of North Vietnam. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999. Frankum, Ronald B., Jr. Like Rolling Thunder: The Air War in Vietnam, 1964–1975. New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005. Hamilton-Merritt, Jane. Tragic Mountains: The Hmong, the Americans, and the Secret Wars for Laos, 1942–1992. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993.
Lin, Maya Ying Birth Date: October 5, 1959 Acclaimed U.S. artist and architect, best known for her sculpture and landscape work, who designed the Vietnam Veterans Memorial (1982) in Washington, D.C. The monument has become the most popular monument in the nation’s capital. Maya Ying Lin was born in Athens, Ohio, on October 5, 1959. She earned both undergraduate (1981) and graduate degrees (1986) in architecture from Yale University. Following the Vietnam War, the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial Fund sponsored a competition to design a Vietnam memorial. The members of the organization sought to both commemorate the war dead and help the nation recover from the politically divisive war. The competition was open to all, not just professional architects. Lin’s design grew out of a senior class project at Yale and was selected in 1981 from among 1,421 entries. Lin’s stark design initially proved enormously controversial. Some of the controversy centered on Lin’s Chinese ethnicity, but most of it focused on the design itself. The monument broke sharply from the traditional design of past memorial sculptures, adhering only to the obligation to pay tribute to the dead. Instead
of displaying a figure or figures, it is a low 450-foot V-shaped veneered black granite wall that is partially submerged in the manner of ancient burial sites. The names of all service members who died or were missing in the Vietnam War are listed on the wall in the order in which they perished, from 1959 to 1975. The viewer recognizes the singularity of each name but also grasps the enormity of the number who perished. Lin’s overall intent was to create “a very psychological memorial” to help bring out the “realization of loss and a cathartic healing process.” In her work she acknowledged a debt to Edwin Lutyens’s Thiepval Memorial to the Missing of the Somme, unveiled in 1932. This great abstract geometric form, located near the village of Thiepval in Picardie, France, has more than 72,000 names inscribed. Lin’s minimalist design for the Vietnam War memorial immediately provoked demands for a more traditional monument. Frederick Hart’s sculpture, showing three American servicemen, was subsequently added to the site not far from the Vietnam Veterans Memorial. Lin has since gained considerable acclaim as seamlessly blending sculpture with architecture. She began exhibiting as a professional artist in 1984, the same year that she won both the Honor Award of the American Institute of Architects and the Henry Bacon Memorial Award for her architectural work. She prefers to work with materials that are not considered inherently artistic in a traditional sense and has acknowledged a fascination with rocks. She is known for drawing forms in the landscape, as she did with the Vietnam Veterans Memorial. With the completion of the Civil Rights Memorial in 1989, Lin retired from memorial making. Having addressed the two main emotional events of the 1960s, she was no longer interest in working on memorials. Lin subsequently completed the Women’s Table in 1993 for Yale University and Groundswell in 1993 for The Ohio State University. In 1986 she began making studio sculptures and has also received a number of architectural commissions. She was admitted to the International Women’s Hall of Fame in 1990. In 2003 she served on the board of the World Trade Center Site Memorial Competition, charged with selecting a design for the memorial to the victims of the September 11, 2001, terror attacks. The chosen design, quite minimalist and stark in design, was likely influenced by Lin’s service on the board. In 2005 she was inducted into the American Academy of Arts and Letters. She currently owns and operates Maya Lin Studio in New York City. CARYN E. NEUMANN See also Vietnam Veterans Memorial References Morrissey, Thomas F. Between the Lines: Photographs from the National Vietnam Memorial. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2000. Rogers, Sarah J. Maya Lin: Private/Public. Columbus: Wexner Center for the Arts, Ohio State University, 1994. Scruggs, Jan C., and Joel L. Swerdlow. To Heal a Nation: The Vietnam Veterans Memorial. New York: Harper and Row, 1985.
LINEBACKER I, Operation
LINEBACKER I,
Operation
Start Date: May 10, 1972 End Date: October 23, 1972 U.S. airpower response to the 1972 Nguyen Hue Offensive (Spring Offensive) carried out by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). Operation LINEBACKER I is notable for three reasons. First, it remains a classic aerial interdiction operation. Second, it was arguably the most effective use of airpower in the Vietnam War. And third, it was the first modern air campaign in which precision-guided munitions (laser-guided bombs, LGBs) and electro-optically guided bombs (EOGBs) played a key role. What made LINEBACKER I effective was the use of conventional airpower against North Vietnam to stop a conventional invasion by 14 divisions of the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army). By the spring of 1972 the war involved two modern and relatively well-equipped armies, the PAVN and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army), locked in combat. U.S. airpower provided close air support for the ARVN while simultaneously attacking the transportation system, military installations, and other vital military targets inside North Vietnam. LINEBACKER I had three operational objectives: to destroy military supplies inside North Vietnam, to isolate North Vietnam from
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outside sources of supply, and to interdict the flow of supplies and troops to the battlefields of South Vietnam. The targets were basically the same as those attacked during Operation ROLLING THUNDER: highways, railroads, bridges, warehouses, petroleum storage facilities, barracks, and power-generating plants. Operationally, two things were different. First, military commanders were given more latitude to select targets and to determine the best combination of tactics and weapons. Second, technological advances such as LGBs, EOGBs, and the introduction of the long-range electronic navigation (LORAN) bombing system made it possible to attack a greater variety of targets with the kind of precision that minimized collateral damage and civilian casualties. Operation LINEBACKER I commenced on May 10, 1972, when 32 U.S. Air Force McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantoms attacked Long Bien Bridge (formerly Paul Doumer Bridge) and the Yen Vien railroad yard in Hanoi. The Phantoms successfully dropped 29 LGBs on the bridge and 84 conventional bombs on the railroad marshaling yard. Two days earlier, U.S. Navy Grumman A-6 Intruder and Ling-Temco-Vought A-7 Corsair II fighter-bombers had sown 2,000-pound mines at the entrance to Haiphong Harbor, initiating the isolation of North Vietnam from outside sources of supply. During the next few days LGBs and EOGBs were used to destroy bridges and tunnels along the northwest and northeast highways
Rows of B-52D Stratofortress aircraft at Andersen Air Force Base in Guam on December 15, 1972. B-52s of the Strategic Air Command fleet were employed largely over South Vietnam in Arc Light missions but were used effectively over North Vietnam during operations LINEBACKER I and II. (Department of Defense)
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and railroads leading from Hanoi to the Chinese border. Because the bridges spanned gorges in the rugged Annamite Mountains, they were not as easily repaired as those that crossed the sandy streams of North Vietnam’s southern panhandle. Supplies, stacked up while North Vietnamese workers tried to repair the bridges and tunnels, were susceptible to attack by fighter-bombers using conventional munitions. By the end of June more than 400 bridges and tunnels had been destroyed, including the infamous Thanh Hoa and Long Bien bridges. Once the bridges were down and the railroads and highways had been interdicted, LINEBACKER I focused on petroleum-storage facilities, power-generating plants, military barracks, training camps, and air-defense facilities. Again, precision-guided munitions made it possible to attack targets proscribed during ROLLING THUNDER because of their proximity to civilian structures. For instance, on May 26 a flight of four F-4s used LGBs to destroy the three main buildings of the Son Tay warehouse complex, located in the middle of a residential area. All bombs hit their targets without causing collateral damage to the surrounding dwellings. Furthermore, because truck-repair facilities, often no larger than a neighborhood service station in the United States, were located in the middle of housing areas, these had been off limits during ROLLING THUNDER. During LINEBACKER I, however, LGBs destroyed many such repair facilities. By September, it was evident that LINEBACKER I was having an effect. Imports into North Vietnam dropped to half what they had been in May. The PAVN offensive inside South Vietnam stalled, and the ARVN regained much of the territory lost in the initial onslaughts of April and May. American airpower continued to pummel PAVN units inside South Vietnam while LINEBACKER missions pounded North Vietnam. Although LINEBACKER I was a classic interdiction campaign, it was one with a strategic effect. There were two strategic objectives. The first was to prevent North Vietnam from using military force to win the war. By June, it was clear the offensive would not succeed. Second, the bombing was intended to force North Vietnam to negotiate seriously so that an acceptable peace agreement could be obtained by the end of the year. Peace talks, which had been suspended on May 2, 1972, resumed 10 days later, just as the first LINEBACKER strikes hit North Vietnam. But the North Vietnamese did not negotiate seriously until September, when some 27,500 tons of bombs fell on their country. Between October 8 and 23, a peace agreement acceptable to Washington and Hanoi took shape. And on October 23, 1972, President Richard Nixon ordered a halt to bombing north of 20 degrees latitude, but South Vietnamese president Nguyen Van Thieu balked at the peace terms. Still, LINEBACKER I had achieved its stated objectives. From March 31 to October 23, 1972, some 155,548 tons of bombs fell on North Vietnam. LINEBACKER I had indeed succeeded where ROLLING THUNDER had failed. There were four reasons for its success. First, President Nixon used airpower more decisively than his predecessor. President Lyndon Johnson had worried about Chinese or Soviet inter-
vention; he had also fretted about the domestic political reaction to bombing and was constantly searching for political consensus among his advisers. By 1972, Henry Kissinger’s diplomacy had exploited the Sino-Soviet split, and intervention was no longer a major concern. Furthermore, Nixon’s primary political concern was with the Republican Right, which trusted him and wanted an end to the war. He was comparatively unconcerned with the political Left. Second, the nature of the war had changed. The 14 PAVN divisions attacking South Vietnam included hundreds of tanks and trucks that needed fuel. PAVN troops needed food as well as medical supplies to treat the considerable casualties they were sustaining. Their tank and artillery tubes required ammunition. This force required about 1,000 tons of supplies a day to sustain its offensive. Third, Nixon provided the military more latitude in deciding what targets should be struck and when. Finally, the employment of LGBs, EOGBs, and LORAN bombing techniques made precision strikes possible and helped limit collateral damage. These factors combined to make LINEBACKER I the most effective use of airpower in the Vietnam War. It remains the classic air interdiction campaign. EARL H. TILFORD JR. See also Aircraft, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Airpower, Role in War; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kissinger, Henry Alfred; LINEBACKER II, Operation; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Precision-Guided Munitions; ROLLING THUNDER, Operation References Clodfelter, Mark. The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam. New York: Free Press, 1989. Frankum, Ronald B., Jr. Like Rolling Thunder: The Air War in Vietnam, 1964–1975. New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005. Momyer, William W. Airpower in Three Wars: World War II, Korea and Vietnam. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978. Morrocco, John. Rain of Fire: Air War, 1969–1973. The Vietnam Experience Series. Boston: Boston Publishing, 1985. Sharp, Ulysses S. Grant. Strategy for Defeat: Vietnam in Retrospect. San Rafael, CA: Presidio, 1978. Tilford, Earl H., Jr. Crosswinds: The Air Force’s Setup in Vietnam. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1993.
LINEBACKER II,
Operation
Start Date: December 18, 1972 End Date: December 29, 1972 U.S. bombing campaign over the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). On December 13, 1972, the Paris negotiations, which had resumed in early November, broke down. Nguyen Van Thieu, president of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), had rejected the original terms agreed to in Paris, and the North Vietnamese government refused to make significant changes in a document already signed and, indeed, published the peace terms. When negotiations resumed and reached an impasse, President Richard M. Nixon blamed North Vietnam
LINEBACKER II, Operation
and issued an ultimatum that North Vietnamese representatives return to the conference table within 72 hours “or else.” Hanoi rejected Nixon’s demand. Nixon proved better than his word when he turned to airpower to enforce his ultimatum. Plans already existed for a winter phase of the original LINEBACKER campaign. The wintry skies over North Vietnam were overcast with a drizzle reminiscent of Germany or England at the same time of year. Such weather precluded operations focused on the use of laser-guided bombs (LGBs) or electro-optically guided bombs (EOGBs). The only planes in the U.S. military inventory capable of all-weather bombing operations were the U.S. Air Force’s Boeing B-52 Stratofortresses and General Dynamics F-111 Aardvark fighter-bombers and the U.S. Navy’s Grumman A-6 Intruders. Although A-6s and F-111s were capable of bombing almost any target with relative precision, there simply were not enough of them to continue the bombing of North Vietnam at the desired intensity. Targets suitable for B-52 attacks were those generally defined as area targets: airfields, petroleum-storage facilities, warehouse complexes, and railroad marshaling yards. A comprehensive list of those kinds of targets had been drawn up in August. On December 14 Nixon ordered mines resown in Haiphong Harbor. Meanwhile, the evacuation of Hanoi and Haiphong proceeded in anticipation of what was to come. On December 18 Operation LINEBACKER II, originally conceived as a three-day maximum-effort strategic bombing campaign, commenced. By that time more than half of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) B-52 force was in the theater with 150 bombers at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, and 60 B-52s based at U-Tapao Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thailand. Flying in three-ship cells, each designated by a different color (e.g., red, blue, brown, cobalt, etc.), the B-52s carried the brunt of what airmen dubbed the “Eleven-Day War” and peace activists called the “Christmas Bombings.” On December 18 just after dark at 7:45 p.m., the first wave of 48 B-52s struck the Kinh No storage complex, the Yen Vien rail yard, and three airfields around Hanoi. An SA-2 surface-to-air missile (SAM) claimed one B-52 over Yen Vien. At midnight, 30 Guam-based B-52s bombed additional targets around Hanoi. A second B-52 was severely damaged by a SAM but limped back to Thailand before crashing. The third wave struck just before dawn, and a third B-52 went down. A total of 129 B-52 sorties had taken off, and 3 bombers had been lost. The 3 percent loss rate, while regrettable, was also predictable and acceptable. The second night was a rerun of the first. Ninety-three B-52s struck the Thai Nguyen thermal power plant and the Yen Vien rail yard. Although SAMs damaged 2 bombers, there were no losses. The old saying “If it ain’t broke don’t fix it” seemed to apply. On the night of December 21, the same basic attack plan was used when three waves of 33 B-52s each returned to the Yen Vien rail yard and the Thai Nguyen thermal power plant while oil-storage areas at Kinh No and other storage facilities around Hanoi were also struck. This time 6 B-52s were lost, and 1 B-52 was heavily damaged.
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Although a 6 percent loss rate was acceptable for World War II B-17 missions over Germany, such a loss rate could not be sustained for long given the relatively small number of B-52s in the SAC inventory. The fault, however, lay squarely with the U.S. Air Force and SAC. Years of jungle-bashing missions in the relatively safe skies over South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia had lulled SAC planners into a false sense of security. The result was mission planning more suitable to raids on Schweinfurt or Dresden, Germany, nearly 30 years earlier. Furthermore, whereas LINEBACKER I had been a truly modern air campaign, LINEBACKER II was a throwback to the long bomber streams of B-17s and B-29s that ambled over their targets during World War II. The B-52 bomber streams during those first three nights were up to 70 miles long. The three-plane cells lumbered along toward their targets at more or less the same altitude, speed, and heading. The turn points were uniform and predictable, and the losses were inevitable. SAC now was forced to revamp its planning. The result was a switch in both force packaging and strategy. Over the next two nights the number of bombers scheduled dropped from the 100plus raids of the first three nights to 33 raids. On the night of December 21 the air defense support system took top priority as B-52s bombed SAM storage facilities. But because 2 more B-52s were lost on December 21, missions in the immediate vicinity of Hanoi were curtailed. On the following night, B-52s pounded petroleum-storage areas and rail yards around the port of Haiphong. There were no losses. One B-52 was shot down on raids over each of the next two nights before bombing was suspended for a 36-hour period to mark Christmas. At that point, 11 B-52s had been shot down. By Christmas, most of the legitimate targets in North Vietnam had been reduced to rubble. In fact, it was LINEBACKER I that had devastated North Vietnam. The so-called Christmas Bombings mostly just rearranged the rubble. The differences in the two campaigns, however, were in their objectives and in their intensity. During LINEBACKER I the primary objective was to stop a massive, conventional invasion. LINEBACKER I was an interdiction campaign that had the strategic effect of compelling North Vietnam to negotiate seriously for the first time in the war. LINEBACKER II, on the other hand, was a strategic bombing campaign aimed at the will of the North Vietnamese leadership. The campaign’s sole objective was to force the Hanoi government to quickly come to an agreement on a cease-fire. The fact that most of the targets constituted parts of the transportation system was simply because these targets, along with airfields and storage complexes, were suitable for area bombing. Furthermore, other than the Thai Nguyen steelworks, North Vietnam had no war-making industries. Most of the destruction wreaked on North Vietnam during LINEBACKER I had been inflicted by fighter-bombers, and while the bombing was substantial, it had taken place over a period of several months. North Vietnam had plenty of time to adjust and to get used to the bombing. LINEBACKER II was much more focused and intensive, meaning that more bombs fell on North Vietnam in a shorter period of time. The attacks by the B-52s were therefore
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psychologically more devastating if for no other reason than that a three-plane cell of B-52s could drop more than 300 bombs into an area the size of a railroad marshaling yard or an airfield in less than a minute. Although the effect could be mind-numbing, by Christmas the Hanoi leadership had given no indication that it was ready to negotiate seriously. The bombing resumed at dawn the day after Christmas. The objective at that point was to make the Politburo feel desperate by rendering North Vietnam defenseless. The Hanoi leadership would certainly notice that virtually every military target had been obliterated and that only the dike system and neighborhoods remained unscathed. Whether or not these would have been attacked is open to conjecture, but with no defenses the risk was not worth taking. At dawn on December 26 “Ironhand” Republic F-105 Thunderchief and McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom fighter-bombers, planes specially modified to attack SAM sites and their guidance radars, pummeled North Vietnam’s air defense system. During the day, although the weather was overcast, 16 U.S. Air Force F-4 Phantoms used the long-range electronic navigation (LORAN) bombing technique to blast the main SAM assembly area in Hanoi. When the remaining operational SAM sites fired the missiles they had on hand, there would be no resupply. At dusk, U.S. Air Force General Dynamics F-111 Aardvark swing-wing fighter-bombers swooped in low over the major airfields to crater the runways so that MiG interceptors could not take off. By dark, North Vietnam lay almost defenseless before the most concerted B-52 attack in history. That night’s B-52 assault was overwhelming. Instead of bombing throughout the night, 120 B-52s struck 10 different targets in a 15-minute period. Surviving SAM sites still had missiles, and 2 B-52s were lost. But the 1.66 percent loss rate was acceptable, especially since those seasoned in the art of aerial warfare knew that the end game was at hand. The bombing on the night after Christmas got the Politburo’s attention. Hanoi cabled Washington asking if January 8, 1973, would be an acceptable date to reopen negotiations. Nixon replied that negotiations must begin on January 2 and that there would a time limit for reaching an acceptable agreement. Until Hanoi acknowledged and accepted these terms, the bombing would continue. On December 27, 60 B-52s struck airfields and warehouses around Hanoi and Vinh. A number of B-52s bombed the Lang Dang rail yard near the Chinese border. SAMs knocked down 2 more B-52s, but returning pilots noted that missile firings were more random and that the entire North Vietnamese defense effort seemed uncoordinated and sporadic. No more B-52s were lost during LINEBACKER II. Sixty B-52 sorties were flown during each of the next two nights. Virtually no SAM firings were recorded, and B-52 crews were confident that they could fly over North Vietnam with impunity. On December 28 Hanoi agreed to all of President Nixon’s provisions for reopening negotiations. The next day Nixon limited the bombing to targets south of the 20th Parallel, and LINEBACKER II came to an end.
Even though Operation LINEBACKER II ended, the bombing did not. B-52s and fighter-bombers continued to pound North Vietnamese troops, supply lines, roads, bridges, and other military facilities in North Vietnam’s southern panhandle. People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) troops inside South Vietnam were bombed up until the cease-fire agreement was signed. This continued bombing was meant to encourage the North Vietnamese to negotiate quickly, seriously, and in good faith. For airmen, the “Eleven-Day War” took on special meaning. Airpower enthusiasts claimed that if given the opportunity, bombing on the scale of LINEBACKER II could have ended the war just as quickly at any time. It became an article of faith within the U.S. Air Force that LINEBACKER II had forced the enemy to capitulate. Likewise, antiwar activists held that the raids constituted another Dresden, referencing the destruction of that German city by Allied bombers in February 1945. Gloria Emerson, in her book Winners and Losers, quoted an unnamed Vietnamese official who claimed that 100,000 tons of bombs had fallen on Hanoi alone during the 11-day campaign. Both interpretations, although overly simplistic, took on mythological proportions among their proponents, and both were wrong. During LINEBACKER II, 739 B-52 sorties struck North Vietnam, dropping 15,237 tons of bombs. U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy fighter-bombers added another 5,000 tons. The North Vietnamese launched virtually every SAM in their inventory to shoot down 15 B-52s, 9 fighter-bombers, 1 U.S. Navy R-5A reconnaissance plane, and a U.S. Air Force CH-53 Sea Stallion “Jolly Green Giant” rescue helicopter. Damage inflicted on targets inside North Vietnam was significant, but the country was far from devastated. Although spent SAMs falling back to earth, crashing B-52s, and an occasional stray bomb caused some damage to neighborhoods in Hanoi, Haiphong, Vinh, and elsewhere, most were left virtually unscathed. According to Hanoi’s own figures, 1,312 people perished in the capital, and 300 more were killed in Haiphong. This is hardly comparable to the 100,000 people who perished in Dresden on the night of February 13–14, 1945. What LINEBACKER II did was to have a psychological effect on Hanoi’s leaders. With their air defense in shambles and virtually all the military targets left in rubble, they did not need to take the risk that the neighborhoods and dike system might be next. Accordingly, peace talks moved ahead expeditiously until January 23, 1973, when the United States, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and the Viet Cong (VC) signed a cease-fire agreement, little different from its predecessor, that took effect five days later. EARL H. TILFORD JR. See also Air Defenses, Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Aircraft, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Airpower, Role in War; LINEBACKER I, Operation; Long-Range Electronic Navigation; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Paris Negotiations; Surface-to-Air Missiles, Democratic Republic of Vietnam
Lippmann, Walter References Clodfelter, Mark. The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam. New York: Free Press, 1989. Eschmann, Karl J. Linebacker: The Untold Story of the Air Raids over North Vietnam. New York: Ivy Books, 1989. Michel, Marshall L., III. The Eleven Days of Christmas: America’s Last Vietnam Battle. San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2002. Momyer, William W. Airpower in Three Wars: World War II, Korea and Vietnam. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978. Morrocco, John. Rain of Fire: Air War, 1969–1973. The Vietnam Experience Series. Boston: Boston Publishing, 1985. Tilford, Earl H., Jr. Crosswinds: The Air Force’s Setup in Vietnam. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1993.
Lippmann, Walter Birth Date: September 23, 1889 Death Date: December 14, 1974 American journalist, intellectual, and influential adviser to key U.S. policy makers, especially in matters of foreign policy. Walter Lippmann was born in New York City on September 23, 1889. He attended Harvard University, where he studied under influential writer and philosopher George Santayana and became a Socialist. Lippmann graduated in 1909. Always attuned to politics and international affairs, he soon became interested in journalism. In 1911 he was hired by the renowned muckraking journalist Lincoln Steffens, for whom Lippmann worked as an assistant. In 1913 the young Lippmann published a well-received book titled A Preface to Politics in which he analyzed popular prejudices in the United States and how they affected the political process. The book garnered much attention. That same year journalist Herbert Croly personally recruited Lippmann as one of the founding editors of the new liberal weekly publication the New Republic. Lippmann’s cogent essays and articles in the New Republic caught the eye of President Woodrow Wilson, and in 1916 Lippmann joined the Wilson administration as assistant secretary of war. He subsequently contributed to the drafting of Wilson’s Fourteen Points and the League of Nation’s covenant. Lippmann also attended the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, where he continued to offer advice to Wilson. After the war Lippmann expanded his writing to include columns and articles in the New York World and the New York Herald Tribune. He also became a critic of modern American journalism, arguing that many journalists, contrary to their stated goal of unbiased reporting, often wrote news articles that were based on preconceived notions of people and situations. Journalism was not, he opined, the best way to educate or inform the public. For their part, readers, he asserted, were often too self-absorbed and myopic to understand the nuances of national or international policy. Having lost faith in Americans’ capability of taking an active role in democracy, Lippmann came to believe that the United State had to, by necessity, be governed by a class of bureaucratic intellectual
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elites who were specially trained to understand and overcome the biases and complexities of the modern industrialized world. In 1931 when the New York World closed its doors, Lippmann moved to the New York Herald Tribune. Besides his editing responsibilities there, he also authored a nationally syndicated column called “Today and Tomorrow,” which was carried in more than 250 newspapers. The column lasted for 30 years. Lippmann also contributed regularly to Newsweek magazine and the Washington Post and won two Pulitzer Prizes. He was not a doctrinaire politically and in fact took a very pragmatic, realist approach to politics and foreign policy. In the aftermath of World War II Lippmann wrote a book titled The Cold War, and he is generally credited with having coined the phrase “Cold War.” In the book he recognized the state of belligerency between the United States and the Soviet Union but recommended that Western economic and political integration would be better defenses against the Soviet threat than military power alone. Although considered a foreign policy realist, Lippmann did not support the containment policy, believing it to be an overreaction to the Soviet threat. He asserted that the United States should not support regimes that were either unpredictable or undemocratic
Walter Lippmann, a profound political thinker and an astute commentator on national and international events, influenced U.S. presidents for nearly 60 years. (Library of Congress)
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just because they claimed to be anti-Communist. Lippmann dismayed politicians on both sides of the aisle by objecting to the Korean War, McCarthyism, and, most pointedly, the Vietnam War. Lippmann strongly opposed American military intervention in Vietnam, claiming that the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) was an unsustainable, undemocratic regime that had little chance of attracting support from its own people. He warned as early as 1965–1966, quite presciently, that Lyndon Johnson’s systematic escalation of the war in Vietnam would turn it into an American war of attrition that would ultimately divide the nation. Lippmann’s opposition to the war was a boon to the early antiwar writers and protesters, and by 1968, when much of the mainstream media began to question the war, Lippmann was hailed for his earlier foresight. Retiring in 1967, Lippmann continued to write op-ed pieces for Newsweek and grant interviews. He died in New York City on December 14, 1974. PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR. See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Containment Policy; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Media and the Vietnam War References Blum, D. Steven. Walter Lippmann: Cosmopolitanism in the Century of Total War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984. Steel, Ronald. Walter Lippmann and the American Century. Boston: Little, Brown, 1980.
Literature and the Vietnam War For the United States, the Vietnam War era represented a 20thcentury “crisis of consciousness” perhaps equaled only by the American Civil War in the previous century. It is thus fitting to recall Walt Whitman’s statement about the earlier conflict that “the real war will never get in the books” (Specimen Days, 1882). Both conflicts were controversial from the outset, and both have inspired a huge body of study and literature in an attempt to come closer to the “real war.” In this context, literary responses work together with historiography and other media in the ongoing discourse about the war in Vietnam, one of the numerous hot conflicts of the Cold War (1945–1991). From all fronts, the war continues to be refought and reassessed. While literary texts may not serve as the most accurate sources to determine the who, where, when, what, why, and how of history, they are nevertheless an essential means of holding a finger to the pulse of an era, reflecting shifts in public attitudes and subjectively depicting the effects of conflict on the lives of multitudes of people, both on the battlefronts and at home. This entry traces shifting literary responses to the Vietnam War from its beginnings to the present, examining varied media including novels, short stories, poetry, drama, and personal narratives and, where possible, adopts a mainly chronological rather
than thematic approach. The focus is on the date of appearance of individual works and how they represent the lively public controversies that preceded, accompanied, and succeeded the war. A study of this type demonstrates how writers in different genres and in different eras viewed the war from highly diverse vantage points. For instance, while dramatists and poets took an overridingly critical or negative approach from the onset, a considerable amount of time elapsed before strongly discordant voices emerged among published works in popular prose genres, both fiction and nonfiction.
Prose Fiction Intimidating in its sheer volume and range, prose fiction about the Vietnam War covers a huge gamut, ranging from Harlequin-style nurse romances to pornography to potboiler suspense to a handful of works that stand out for their literary merit.
Novels American Involvement in Indochina, Pre-1960. The Geneva Conference (1954) officially ended French rule in Indochina and confirmed the ostensibly temporary partitioning of Vietnam at the 17th Parallel, developments that led to the separate governments of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) and an everincreasing American presence in the region in an attempt to stem the spread of indigenous as well as Soviet and Chinese-backed communism. Prominent among early novels associated with the prewar era are Graham Greene’s The Quiet American (1955) and Eugene Burdick and William Lederer’s The Ugly American (1958). Both novels lodge outspoken criticism of the American advisory presence in Indochina and obliquely predict the disasters of direct military intervention. Greene’s novel focuses on the conflict between Fowler, a British journalist, and Pyle, an initially idealistic young American agent. Not only does Pyle steal Fowler’s mistress—a cynical commentary on the ongoing shift from old to new foreign influences—but Pyle’s involvement in subversive political activities to support the nationalist fight against Communist insurgents leads to his murder. Similarly, The Ugly American foresees a losing struggle against communism. Set in the fictional nation of Sarkhan, an allegory for Vietnam, the novel traces the failure of an American agent, Homer Atkins (possibly based on technician Otto Hunerwadel), and other officials to understand or address the needs of the local populace. Another major character, Colonel Hillandale, is more sympathetically drawn and is thought to be based on U.S. Air Force lieutenant general Edward Lansdale. The War Years, Post-1960. Adventure is the key word characterizing early novels of the American military involvement, and all but a handful glorify the war. Of these, Robin Moore’s account of Special Forces adventures in Green Berets (1965) is perhaps the best known, chiefly because of the 1968 movie by the same title starring John Wayne. Similar tales include Peter Derrig’s Pride of the Green Berets (1966), Jacob McCroskey’s Operation Axe-Handle (1967),
Literature and the Vietnam War and Con Sellers’s Where Have All the Soldiers Gone? (1969), a novel about how a war protester changes his attitude when he encounters professional soldiers in Vietnam. Chiefly addressing an adolescent readership, Suzanne Roberts’s Vietnam Nurse (1966) and Nell Dean’s Nurse in Vietnam (1969) represent another popular subgenre, the nurse narrative with a romantic focus. A spattering of further works with either romantic or pornographic themes reflects the general mediocrity of the early Vietnam War novel. A few early novels, however, modify the predominantly prowar stance of the early years of engagement. These include William Wilson’s LBJ Brigade (1966) and David Halberstam’s One Very Hot Day (1967), the latter of which, like The Quiet American and The Ugly American, is set before extensive deployment of American forces. Abraham Rothberg’s The Other Man’s Shoes (1968) moves from Saigon to California, where the central character encounters antiwar protesters and black revolutionaries. Lion Heart (1969), by British writer Alan Clark, emphasizes South Vietnamese corruption as opposed to Viet Cong (VC) commitment. In what is perhaps the first important literary novel of the early years of the war, William Eastlake’s Bamboo Bed (1969) symbolically represents Vietnam as the “bed” of the title and reflects the chaos and absurdity of the war, using dark humor in a surrealistic series of disconnected episodes. With the advent of the 1970s, new themes began to energize the war novel, even though the bulk of publications continued to address a readership eager for fast-moving plots that often showed little familiarity with military practice. Asa Baber’s Land of a Million Elephants (1970) adopts the genre of the fairy tale to create a might-have-been picture of Vietnam, wherein its inhabitants escape to a “Plain of Elephants” to avoid military advisers, diplomats, spies, Russian tanks, and American bombs. Reality, however, is the focus of Bill Williams’s Wasters (1971), a fictionalized account of the 1968 My Lai Massacre. The classic theme of conflict between officers and troops is at the core of Josiah Bunting’s The Lionheads (1972), set in the Mekong Delta in 1968. In The Lionheads, a general advances his career in a battle that decimates his troops, who struggle to use unreliable equipment against an enemy wise to jungle warfare. Predictably, prisoner-of-war narratives began to surface, as with William Crawford’s Marine (1972). Moreover, a number of novels set in battle zones begin to reflect raging controversies on the home front. Joe Haldeman’s War Year (1972) traces the experiences of a young draftee, initially a supply clerk, who fails to salute a senior officer and is sent on a suicidal assignment with little training. Similarly, William Pelfrey’s Big V (1972) deals with draftees who, in spite of poor morale, take some pride in their fighting ability. Corrine Ward’s Body Shop (1973) takes the war back home to the amputation ward of a California army hospital. William Huggett’s Body Count (1973), praised as one of the best U.S. Marine Corps–based novels of the conflict, addresses ongoing problems of the conflict, such as morale, race relations, and an unfamiliar countryside, while narcotic use among both fighting forces
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and veterans is a prominent theme in Robert Stone’s Dog Soldiers (1974), later filmed as Who’ll Stop the Rain? (1978). As the conflict neared its inconclusive end in 1975, antiwar themes became more strident. For instance, Peter Van Greenaway’s bizarre Take the War to Washington (1975) traces the movements of some 500 disenchanted soldiers who turn the war on their own country, eventually capturing the president and burning the White House. The Postwar Years: 1975 to the Twenty-First Century. Although a relative lull in publication appears to have followed in the years immediately after the American withdrawal, subsequent years demonstrated that the war in Vietnam was still very much on the minds of writers and the reading public, particularly as its aftereffects became increasingly evident. While many of the postwar novels focused chiefly on adventure, as did those published during the conflict, and others appeared only to land in a literary dustbin, this was also the era when most of the so-called classics of the conflict emerged. Many of these expand their focus to address not only the war but also its aftermath as it affected veterans and the general public. Among the genre introduced above, Larry Heinemann’s Close Quarters (1977), set in the claustrophobic isolation of an armored personnel carrier (APC) unit just before the 1968 Tet Offensive, portrays disenchanted young men who find meaning only in their own camaraderie of drugs, sex, and harassment of the indigenous population. Upon the central character’s return to the United States, he is unable to adapt to civilian society but remains trapped in his Vietnam combat experiences. On a similar note, James Webb’s Fields of Fire (1978) follows a U.S. Marine Corps infantry platoon in 1968 through its actions against both VC and North Vietnamese regulars. Base camp reveals hostilities between enlisted men and officers as well as racial tensions. By the end of the novel, many of the characters are dead or badly wounded. Also set in 1968, Gustav Hasford’s Short Timers (1979), which focuses on U.S. Marine Corps infantry during the Tet Offensive, inspired Full Metal Jacket (1987), one of the major movies based on the war. Adopting a less realist and more surrealist approach, Tim O’Brien’s celebrated Going after Cacciato (1978) centers upon an infantry member, Cacciato, who deserts and heads toward Paris, pursued by his unit. The novel interlaces the reflections of the central character, Paul Berlin, on what happened as opposed to what might have happened during the course of one night on sentry duty; concurrently, it traces his reflections of experiences both before and after Cacciato’s desertion and his concoction of the story of the men’s journey to Paris via foot, oxcart, rail, van, and VC tunnels in pursuit of the elusive deserter. A Southeast Asian woman whom the group meets early in the journey tries unsuccessfully to persuade Berlin to follow Cacciato’s example in deserting from this senseless war. Nevertheless, Berlin’s response echoes O’Brien’s earlier statement in his memoir If I Die in a Combat Zone (1973) and a short story in his 1990 collection The Things They Carried: young men go to war not out of idealism but because of a fear of
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being scorned by their families and friends. A vision of the unreality and futility of the Vietnam War emerges from O’Brien’s novel, which won a National Book Award in 1978. David Alexander’s When the Buffalo Fight (1980) serves as a reminder that all foreign troops deployed in Vietnam were not American. Centering on an experienced battalion of Australian infantry consisting of professional soldiers during 1965 and 1966, the novel depicts Australian troops scandalized by the inexperience and lack of professionalism among American soldiers they encounter, a view that John Del Vecchio’s The 13th Valley (1982) indirectly counters. Infantry and group cohesion are central to this novel, which follows a U.S. Army unit through a mission based on Khe Ta Laou Valley operations in 1970. In what could well be dubbed a documentary novel, The 13th Valley includes maps, a glossary, and a chronology of Vietnamese history. Depicted in a mainly positive light in spite of internal conflicts and a few jaded members, the unit finally manages to take a hill that other units have failed to capture but at the price of the deaths of three central characters in a freak helicopter accident. Unlike many other prominent postwar novels, Del Vecchio’s work thus takes a positive view of the war and combat troops. Predictably, the end of conflict brought the veteran experience to the fore, highlighting the well-known picture of the traumatized, guilt-ridden soldier who, upon his discharge, receives little welcome at home. Philip Caputo’s Indian Country (1987) is typical of this mode. In a classic American wilderness motif, the central figure must go into the wild to repair his shattered spirits, led through a spiritual healing process by a wise Native American. Less positively, the central character in Larry Heinemann’s Paco’s Story (1986) is both physically and psychologically scarred by his wartime experience. A suffering mentally deranged outsider, he drifts around the country, taking odd jobs. He is never entirely accepted by the civilian populace, to whom he is an ugly reminder of what the United States has suffered through during the war. On a more positive note, John Del Vecchio’s Carry Me Home (1994) depicts veterans who, in spite of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), criminal tendencies, and stigmatization upon their return, regain a sense of purpose and pride in what they have done and what they still can do. Less idealistically, Larry Brown’s Dirty Work (1989) focuses on two patients in a Veterans Administration (VA) hospital, one black, the other white. It is clear that the only future they have lies in their dreams. Not surprisingly, a substantial number of juvenile novels also focus on veteran adjustment, the refugee experience, and the social consequences of the war. For instance, Bobbie Ann Mason’s In Country (1985) is about a young woman whose father has died in the war. She attempts to help her uncle, a veteran with emotional and physical problems that include exposure to Agent Orange, recover from his experiences. Initially idealistic about the war, the heroine is disillusioned when she reads her father’s war diary. This experience allows her to empathize with her uncle, and the novel culminates in a scene of mutual healing during a visit to the
Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington. Cynthia Rylant’s A Blue-Eyed Daisy (1987) deals with a family’s refusal to confront the meaning of war when the central character’s uncle returns from Vietnam. In Mary Hahn’s December Stillness (1990), a teenage girl befriends a homeless traumatized veteran and eventually assists her father, another veteran, in coming to terms with the war. Similarly, Kathryn Jensen’s Pocket Change (1990) deals with the devastating effects of PTSD on veterans and families alike, as does Candy Boyd’s Charlie Pippin (1987), which also highlights the role of African American soldiers in the war. Other juvenile novels such as Maureen Wartski’s Boat to Nowhere (1981), Jack Bennett’s Voyage of Lucky Dragon (1985), Jamie Gilson’s Hello, My Name Is Scrambled Eggs (1988), and Lan Cao’s Monkey Bridge (1997) deal with the experiences of Vietnamese refugees both at home and in their adoptive country. As the 20th century neared its end, North Vietnamese voices representing the experience of the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) expanded the predominantly Anglo-American focus of previous novels, and two works are particularly significant in this context: Duong Thu Huong’s Novel without a Name (1990; trans. 1995) and Bao Ninh’s Sorrow of War (1994; trans. 1995). Like their American counterparts, these two writers deal with disillusionment, ethnic conflicts, drug use, desertion, conflicts among ranks, and breakdown of discipline leading to rape and massacre. In Novel without a Name, Quan, a North Vietnamese soldier fighting in South Vietnam, has seen one of his childhood friends promoted in the command hierarchy, while the other friend has gone insane. Embarking on a perilous journey northward to his home village, he discovers that the state that was to have been transformed into “humanity’s paradise” by communism has become a site of death, misery, and corruption. Nevertheless, he doggedly continues to fight for a cause in which he no longer believes. On a similar theme but in a more fragmentary mode, The Sorrow of War follows Kien, the sole survivor of his platoon who currently collects bodies in a remains-gathering truck, through his painful military and personal memories. With the onset of the 21st century, readers may well have echoed the question of a recent reviewer: “Does anyone really need another Vietnam War novel?” The apparent answer is yes, for the past decade or so has seen a number of publications that may well rank among the best. In 1999 Sergeant Dickinson, written by Jerome Gold, a former Special Forces sergeant, was hailed as a first-rate novel about battlefield experience. In Don Lomax’s Vietnam Journal: A Graphic Novel (2003), a journalist discovers that “the real story was in the bush with the slime, the stink, the constant fear and frustration.” Only partially about the Vietnam conflict, Peter Pouncey’s Rules for Old Men Waiting (2005) focuses on a father who, after losing his own father to World War I and his son to the Vietnam War, strives to write a fiction about men at war. In 2007, Denis Johnson’s Tree of Smoke, a lengthy novel featuring an array of intelligence officers and American and Vietnamese troops, was awarded the National Book Award. Another recent
Literature and the Vietnam War novel, Karl Marlantes’s Matterhorn (2009), offers a panoramic depiction of the battle zone at an American fire-support base in Quang Tri Province.
Short Stories While short stories, apart from a few by Tim O’Brien and Robert Butler, are far less prominent than novels, the tense conflictridden era of the war, both on the battlefronts and at home, lends itself to treatment in short fiction. Unlike the novel, however, the short story adopts a largely critical stance toward the Vietnamese conflict from the outset. The enemy is not only outside of but also within the American ranks. For instance, Raymond Steiber’s “Lost Indemnity” (1964) highlights enmity among the ranks when an incompetent enlisted man leaves his lieutenant to die behind enemy barbed wire. On a similar theme, Thomas Parker’s “Troop Withdrawal—The Initial Step” (1969) relates how a specialist fourth class manipulates forms and regulations to have his old enemy, a lieutenant, declared dead. Racial conflicts are highlighted, as in George Davis’s “Coming Home” (1970) and Clarence Major’s “We Is Grunts” (1970). Other short stories address strategic failures, as when in David Huddle’s “Interrogation of the Prisoner Bung by Mister Hawkins and Sergeant Tree” (1971), a VC suspect is beaten by American and Vietnamese interrogators, only to return to his village, happy that he has acquired valuable information for his unit. Even during the conflict, veterans sound discordant voices. For instance, Michael McCusker’s “The Old Man,” in Wayne Karlin et al.’s Free Fire Zone: Short Stories by Vietnam Veterans (1973), recounts how an American infantryman amuses himself by killing an old man. In the same collection, James Dorris’s “The Accident” recounts how a sergeant, after a Vietnamese civilian is accidentally killed by a jeep that his major is driving, reports the accident to their commanding officer, who ignores the matter. The most celebrated name among short story writers of the Vietnam conflict is, however, Tim O’Brien, whose ironic gutwrenching stories appeared in a number of periodicals from 1975 onward. “The Things They Carried,” his best-known story, first appeared in 1985 and later served as the title of his award-winning 1990 collection. Featuring a group of hapless young enlistees, the title story graphically itemizes the physical weight that an infantryman was expected to carry in Vietnam. More burdensome than the physical weight, however, are the weights of memory and conscience, as when Lieutenant Jimmy Cross, blaming his obsession with a girl back home, realizes that his laxity of command has led to the death of one of his men, Ted Lavender. Tellingly, the story also implies that the unit’s rage at the death of their comrade leads to the burning of a Vietnam village. Other quality short stories also emerged, chiefly once the conflict had ended. For instance, W. D. Ehrhart, better known as a poet, is the author of “I Drink My Coffee Black” (1979). Like Jimmy Cross, his main character suffers a lapse of attention as he prepares a cup of coffee and allows his mind to wander homeward. This in-
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attention results in his death when he unthinkingly fires twice from the same place in the building where he has taken refuge. The next major name emerged with Robert Butler in a number of stories, later collected in A Good Scent from a Strange Mountain (1992; rereleased with additions in 2001). The collection won the Pulitzer Prize for Fiction in 1993. The South Vietnamese experience is at the core of his narratives, with each story narrated by an émigré or refugee transplanted from the Mekong Delta and now living in Louisiana. In “The American Couple,” the longest story in the collection, a Vietnamese immigrant couple meets American counterparts during a Mexican holiday. It so happens that the two husbands are veterans: one is a former major in South Vietnam, and the other is a veteran of the U.S. Army. Even though the Vietnamese man has struggled to Americanize himself while the American remains obsessed with the war, the two end up staging a mock battle, which culminates in a fistfight while their wives chat idly or look on uncomprehendingly. In the title story of the collection, an old Vietnamese man near death sees the vision of Ho Chi Minh. In short, the past is never truly dead. The first decade of the 21st century further demonstrates that the Vietnam War is still part of the present in the genre of the short story. The female voice has become more prominent, as in Diana Dell’s Saigon Party (1999) and Susan O’Neill’s Don’t Mean Nothing (2002). Saigon Party, a collection of stories inspired by the writer’s time in Vietnam as a civilian worker, covers an array of characters, ranging from Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agents to prostitutes and aid workers. Don’t Mean Nothing is inspired by the writer’s experiences as a nurse in Vietnam, which leads to stories about the harrowing reality of hospitals, causalities, and sexually hungry soldiers. In Kregg Jorgenson’s Very Crazy, G.I.: Strange but True Stories of the Vietnam War (2001), the writer demonstrates that truth is stranger than fiction in events ranging from the Central Highlands to the Mekong Delta. Other recent collections include Touring Nam: Vietnam War Stories (1997), edited by Martin Greenberg and Augustus Norton; H. Lee Barnes’s Gunning for Ho (2000); Bryon Tetrick’s In the Shadow of the Wall (2002); and Douglas Neralich’s Dear Donna, It’s Only 45 Hours from Bien Hoa (2002).
Poetry As with prose fiction, poetry has also extensively documented responses to the Vietnam War throughout the years preceding, during, and following the conflict. Even more than in prose fiction, Vietnamese voices attack American action during the war, and one of these, Thanh Hai’s Faithful Comrades (1962), is among the earliest voicing resistance to the American-backed South Vietnamese government. Faithful Comrades tells the stories of protesters who disappeared or were tortured, imprisoned, or killed. The next major Vietnamese voice in the English-language world emerged with Xuan Viet’s Nine Dragons Hymn (1966). In this collection, one poem memorably refers to the war as “a dagger . . . plunged into the heart of
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my country.” In another notable collection, Thich Nhat Hanh’s Cry of Vietnam (1968), a Buddhist leader laments the destruction of villages and mounting hunger and destitution alongside the breakdown of traditional social values. Similarly, The Poetry of Viet Nam (1969), translated by Nguyen Ngoc Bich, contains a number of poems that attack the war and the motives of American propaganda. On a parallel note, Eleven Poems of Political Prisoners (1973), edited by Minh Duc et al., contains poems that depict the torture and cruel living conditions of political prisoners held by the South Vietnamese government. In addition, a number of poems by other Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Lao refugee poets appeared in the numerous volumes of the Viet Nam Forum Series and the Lac-Viet Series published after 1983 by the Council on Southeast Asia Studies at Yale University. In Viet Nam Forum 14 (1994), for instance, Viet Thanh Nguyen, then a PhD candidate at the University of California, Berkeley, wrote in a moving poem about a burning ash heap that he was “yearning to find a clue / in the ash to my people, / severed from me with the finality of a butcher’s cleaver.” In addressing a more limited intellectual group of readers than prose fiction, American poetry voices ring protests to the Vietnam War from the outset. Apart from often bawdy ballads sung by American fighter pilots, collected in Joseph F. Tuso’s Singing the Vietnam Blues (1990), and the short and sometimes humorous verses published in publications such as the satiric Grunt magazine or the Pacific Stars and Stripes, a constellation of major poets addressed the conflict. During the war years alone, these include John Berryman, “66” (1964); Lawrence Ferlinghetti, “Where Is Vietnam?” (1965); Allen Ginsberg, Wichita Vortex Sutra (1966) and Collected Poems (1947–1980, 1984); Denise Levertov, Sorrow Dance (1967), her anthology titled Out of the War Shadow (1968), To Stay Alive (1987), and The Freeing of the Dust (1975); May Sarton, “We’ll to the Woods No More, the Laurels Are Cut Down” (1971); Muriel Rukeyser, Breaking Open (1973); and Adrienne Rich, “Dien Bien Phu” (1974). The first significant protest volume was A Poetry Reading against the Vietnam War (1966), edited by Robert Bly and David Ray. The next year, Walter Lowenfels edited the anthology Where Is Vietnam? in which the 87 contributing poets include James Dickey, Lawrence Ferlinghetti, and Denise Levertov. Two more collections followed: Out of the Shadow of War (1968) and Poetry against the War (1972). Although a few poems are set in Southeast Asia, most of the works presented in these anthologies reflect the writers’ attitudes toward U.S. involvement in Vietnam through references to the political scene, the war as seen on television or reported in the newspapers, or antiwar themes in general. These anthologies and the numerous individual poems that were published served to define and sustain the general intellectual opposition to the war. Of the verse novels, three stand out: Vietnam Simply (1967) by Dick Shea, How Audie Murphy Died in Vietnam (1972) by McAvoy Layne, and Interrogations (1990) by Leroy Quintana. In discursive, often sardonic selections, Shea presents the observations of a U.S. Navy lieutenant about the entrance of U.S. marines into the war
and other scenes and events in 1965 Vietnam. By means of short staccato verses, Layne’s book traces a marine recruit, who bears the name of the legendary American war hero, through basic training and combat. The narrative then becomes allegorically fanciful as “Audie” is captured by the VC and holds telephone conversations from Hanoi with the president of the United States yet still hums “The Theme from Marlboro Country.” Quintana, the only Hispanic veteran to publish a major collection of poetry, shows how a young army draftee experiences training, combat, and the aftermath of the war, where even “on city streets, in restaurants, bars” he “still walk[s] the jungle in camouflage,” his “M-16 mind still on recon patrol.” Each of these verse novels presents young men who shift from innocent acceptance to experienced disillusion about the American presence in Vietnam. This theme of the movement from innocence to experience was perhaps the most universal one explored by American poets, most of whom served in Vietnam either in the military or in noncombat roles as conscientious objectors. Many of them interrupted their college educations to go to war and then returned to earn graduate degrees in various writing programs and teach in universities. Before the April 1975 fall of Saigon, many poet-veterans joined protest organizations such as the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, using their poems to substantiate their opposition not only to war in general but also to the Vietnam War in particular. What characterizes the majority of these poems is their specificity. Presenting much more shattering detail than did World War I poets such as Rupert Brooke, Siegfried Sassoon, and Wilfred Owen, these poets wrote about immediate wartime experiences: firefights, the death of a friend, smells of the jungle, rocket attacks, being wounded, seeing Vietnamese women and children killed, corpses in body bags, rape, arrival into and departure from Vietnam, street scenes, the beauty of the countryside, memories of the war after ending their tours, bombing missions, and letters from home. Brutally frank, much of the language of these poems represents the actuality of the discourse that prevailed, filled with the soldiers’ jargon and profanity and often requiring the use of a glossary because of the many references to historical events as well as specific people and place-names. The themes of the poems are both universal and particularly modern. Many show the horrors of war, the deaths of innocent civilians, the tragic ending of youthful lives, and the general sundering of moral and ethical values. Reflecting the consciousness of the 1960s and 1970s, however, a large number of poems mirror the feelings of all participants as America’s longest war began to seem more and more unwinnable: the sense of loss of individuality, the feeling of guilt at having participated, the impossibility of anyone understanding the totality of the experience, the realization of having been betrayed by higher authority, and, most often, the anger and bitterness at feeling like what fiction writer Larry Heinemann called not a cog in a mighty machine but merely “a slab of meat on the table.” There are also many poems that contain racial and ethnic themes, using both black versus white and white versus Asian conflicts.
Literature and the Vietnam War Of the hundreds of war veteran poets, a few achieved literary prominence. In 1994, U.S. Army veteran Yusef Komunyaka won the Pulitzer Prize for his Neon Vernacular: New and Selected Poems (1993). All of the selections in one of his earlier books, Dien Cai Dau (1988), are about the war and not only present richly metaphoric poems about Hanoi Hannah, Bob Hope, and night patrols but also offer the acute vision of a black soldier. Another major prizewinning poet is former marine W. D. Ehrhart, whose numerous collections of poetry, four nonfiction books, and many edited anthologies make him one of the most prolific and widely known Vietnam War writers. In A Generation of Peace (1977), his poem “A Relative Thing,” which details the feelings of many returned veterans, reminds America that “We are your sons” and that “When you awake, we will still be here.” The oldest of the major poets was Walter McDonald, a career officer teaching at the Air Force Academy when he was assigned to Vietnam in 1969. An editor as well as a fiction writer, McDonald was best known for his many volumes of poems, such as After the Noise of Saigon (1988). Bruce Weigl’s 1967–1968 army service in Vietnam sparked a number of collections such as Song of Napalm (1988), in which most of his war poems appear. The title poem is a haunting testament to his wife as he confesses his inability to forget aspects of the war. Also a college instructor, John Balaban spent three years in Vietnam, the first two as a conscientious objector. He published fiction and numerous translations of Vietnamese poetry, and his collections After Our War (1974), nominated for a National Book Award, and Blue Mountain (1982) contain memorable poems such as “The Guard at the Binh Thuy Bridge” and “April 30, 1975,” a poem written about the last day of the war. Among the other poets and their major books are Michael Casey, Obscenities (1972); David Huddle, Stopping by Home (1988); Kevin Bowen, Playing Basketball with the Viet Cong (1994); D. F. Brown, Returning Fire (1984); Horace Coleman, Between a Rock and a Hard Place, in Four Black Poets (1977); Gerald McCarthy, War Story (1977); Bill Shields, Nam Poems (1987); Steve Mason, Warrior for Peace, with an introduction by Oliver Stone (1988); Bryan Alec Floyd, The Long War Dead (1976); Perry Oldham, Vinh Long (1976); and D. C. Berry, Saigon Cemetery (1972). Individual works by most of these and other poets can be found in the following anthologies: Winning Hearts and Minds, edited by Larry Rottman, Jan Barry, and Basil T. Paquet (1972); Listen: The War, edited by Fred Kiley and Tony Dater (1973); Demilitarized Zones, edited by Jan Barry and W. D. Ehrhart (1976); Carrying the Darkness, edited by W. D. Ehrhart (1985, 1989); Shallow Graves: Two Women in Vietnam, by Wendy Wilder Larsen and Tran Thi Nga (1986); and Unaccustomed Mercy, edited by W. D. Ehrhart, with an introduction and bibliography by John Clark Pratt (1989). The dedication of The Wall, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, D.C., marked the first major gathering of Vietnam War creative writers and their public readings, held in New York City on March 23, 1984. There, W. D. Ehrhart defined what became apparent in most of the poetry that had been and was to
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be published. Although most veteran-poets did write about many other subjects, it was the war that consumed them in their art and inspired their best poems because, according to Ehrhart, that was “the single most important experience of [one’s] life.” Accordingly, the poetry of the Vietnam War provides a historical, intellectual, and emotional chronology of men and women at war that is indeed unique. More recently, a number of new works are worthy of mention. Of particular interest is Philip Mahony’s From Both Sides Now: The Poetry of the Vietnam War and Its Aftermath (1998), a collection of Vietnamese and American poems arranged in 10 parts to follow the progression of the conflict. In 2002, Rick St. John, a West Point graduate who served with distinction with the 101st Airborne Division in Vietnam in 1968, published his Circle of Helmets, a collection of letters and poems chronicling his tour, followed by W. H. McDonald Jr.’s Purple Hearts (2004).
Drama Much like other creative artists, playwrights of the Vietnam War used noticeably similar subjects, themes, and techniques. Often using the war as a metaphor for the problems of the world of the 1960s and 1970s, more than 200 plays (some full-length and a few as short as five minutes) considered such common subjects as the loss of identity, the use of drugs, the role of the individual, the morality of war, the draft, the returned veteran, the power of government, sexuality, the roles of men and women, and the race issue. As does most of the American poetry about the war, these plays present no traditional heroes and virtually nothing heroic. They all contain, with the one possible exception of the television drama The Final War of Ollie Winter (1967), definite and sometimes strident antiwar themes. With their dramatic styles varying widely, most of the plays use expressionistic or absurdist techniques and incorporate innovative character roles and narrators, sparse sets, music (both choral and background), and even puppets. Only about one-fourth to onethird of these plays were eventually published, with many, such as David Jones’s Saigon, Mon Ami Vieille (Denver, Colorado, 1979) receiving a onetime production and then disappearing from public availability. Many plays were products of the burgeoning street theater scene in cities such as San Francisco and New York and were written as protest statements in reaction to specific events that occurred during the war. Although most of the plays were written and produced in the United States, four foreign titles deserve notice. From Australia came Rob George’s Sandy Lee Live at Nui Dat (1983), which attacks the actions not only of some Australian soldiers but also entertainers, the antiwar movement, and elements of Australian society itself. Equally sardonic is Peter Brook’s US (London, 1968), which condemns British citizens and institutions that supported what is portrayed as the imperialistic venture of the United States in Vietnam. David Hare’s Saigon: Year of the Cat (London, 1983) is set during the 1975 fall of Saigon and shows the humanity and
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confusion of that time. And in a Soviet stage version unavailable in English, Graham Greene’s The Quiet American (1955) was produced later in the Soviet Union. In a 1982 letter, Greene, who saw it in Moscow, called the actors “very funny because of the out-of-date gestures . . . and the kind of costumes that they wore. It was a fairly honest version but terribly long[,] running to nearly four hours.” Many of the major plays fall into three categories: those set in Vietnam, those that focus on racial issues, and those that feature returned veterans. Obviously unable to emulate the graphic visual realism of the movies, many playwrights nevertheless used settings such as firebases, medical trauma rooms, or unspecified locations in Vietnam. In-country plays include The Secret War of Olly Winter (1967), Botticelli (1968), The Dramatization of 365 Days (1972), G. R. Point (1975), How I Got That Story (1979), Back to Back (1981), Dustoff (1982), Eleven Zulu (1983), Tracers (1986), and Five in the Killing Zone (1989). Dramas that emphasize racial issues are Indians (1969), Soldado Raso (1971), Vietnam Campesino (1971), Medal of Honor Rag (1975), Streamers (1976), Back to Back (1981), Dustoff (1982), Eleven Zulu (1983), and Wasted (1983). Among those that feature the returned veteran are Sticks and Bones (1969), Kennedy’s Children (1973), Medal of Honor Rag (1975), Still Life (1980), Strange Snow (1980), and Tracers (1983). Unquestionably, the most distinguished playwright of the Vietnam War was David Rabe, who served with the U.S. Army for 11 months in Vietnam and then received his MA in theater from Villanova University. His first Vietnam-related play, Sticks and Bones, was produced in 1969, followed by The Basic Training of Pavlo Hummel in 1971. The next year, Sticks and Bones was produced on Broadway and won the 1972 Tony Award for Best Play. In 1976 Streamers, produced by Mike Nichols, won the New York Drama Critics Circle Award for the best American play. Hurlyburly, also first produced in Chicago by Nichols, moved to Broadway in the mid-1980s and enjoyed a successful run. Rabe also authored numerous other plays and screenplays and was the winner of many other distinguished drama awards. One of the many ironies of the Vietnam War is that the first major play, Viet Rock (1966) by Megan Terry, can be seen as an avant-garde musical, and the most popularly acclaimed later production, Miss Saigon (1988) by Alain Boublil and Claude-Michel Schoenberg, is a more traditional albeit high-tech Broadway musical. Both use striking expressionistic, dramatic, and musical effects. In Viet Rock, actors play multiple roles in often surrealistic scenes that include basic military training, U.S. Senate committee room proceedings, combat and death in Vietnam, and life in a VC prison. There are numerous solo and choral numbers as well as symbolic group dance scenes in this production that use the Vietnam War as a modern example of the senselessness of all wars. Miss Saigon, a loose retelling of the story line of Puccini’s opera Madame Butterfly, features a simulated helicopter evacuation during the fall of Saigon, numerous choral and dance production scenes, and dazzling sets and special effects. Miss Saigon tells the story of an American war veteran who discovers that he has fathered a child
in Vietnam and then returns just before his former lover commits suicide so that their child can be brought to America. Most of these plays should be appreciated more as social rather than historical documents, and the following list (with brief plot summaries and arranged in order of performance) describes some of the significant plays that are available in print for production or reading: Megan Terry, Viet Rock (1966), in Viet Rock: Four Plays by Megan Terry (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967), 21–110. Described above. Terrence McNally, Botticelli (1968), in Coming to Terms: American Plays and the Vietnam War (New York: Theatre Communications Group, 1985), 67–76; hereafter Coming to Terms. While waiting for a VC soldier to emerge from a tunnel, two American soldiers engage in an intellectual discussion that resembles the television show Jeopardy. After perfunctorily shooting their enemy, they return to their banter. Arthur Kopit, Indians (1968) (New York: Hill and Wang, 1969). An allegory that compares the decimating of Native American tribes with the U.S. actions in Vietnam. David Rabe, Sticks and Bones (1969) and The Basic Training of Pavlo Hummel (1971), in David Rabe, The Vietnam Plays, Vol. 1 (New York: Grove, 1993). Sticks and Bones portrays the traditional American parents Ozzie and Harriet (from the television series) unable to understand or accept their son who has returned as a blinded war veteran. Pavlo Hummel traces a young recruit whose naïveté changes into coarse insensitivity and who is killed by another American soldier in a Vietnamese house of prostitution. Luis Valdez, Soldado Razo (1971) and Vietnam Campesino (1971), in Luis Valdez—Early Works (Houston, TX: Arte Publico, 1990), 98–133. Both protest plays are allegorical and expressionistic. Soldado Razo predicts the death in combat of a Hispanic young man, and Vietnam Campesino, not unlike Kopit’s Indians, parallels the problems of California migrant farm workers with those of Vietnamese peasants. H. Wesley Balk, The Dramatization of 365 Days (1972) (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1972). A stage rendering of Dr. Ronald J. Glasser’s memoir about treating wounded soldiers during the war, The Dramatization of 365 Days is frank and brutal in its depiction of the effects of combat. David Berry, G. R. Point (1975) (New York: Dramatists’ Play Service, 1980). Set in a Graves Registration unit in Vietnam, this play shows the movement from innocence to experience of an intelligent draftee as he witnesses bodies being prepared for return to the United States. David Rabe, Streamers (1976), in Coming to Terms, 1–76. In the realistic setting of a cadre room, black and white
Literature and the Vietnam War soldiers are awaiting assignment to Vietnam. Tensions between the races as well as between young and older soldiers produce a violent ending that becomes a metaphor for the entire war. Streamers was also made into a movie by Robert Altman. Amlin Gray, How I Got That Story (1979), in Coming to Terms, 77–118. Set in “Ambo Land” (Vietnam), a reporter encounters some 21 American and Vietnamese characters (all played by the one other actor) and tries but fails “to understand one person who’s involved in all this.” How I Got That Story represents one of the best depictions of the feelings of bewilderment and loss held by so many Americans. Stephen Metcalf, Strange Snow (1982), in Coming to Terms, 275–312. Unique in that it shows a chance for resolution, this moving, realistic play is about two Vietnam veterans and the sister of one of them. The dramatic tension is acute, the dialogue is convincing, and the ending is satisfying. John DiFusco and others, Tracers (1983) (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986). One of the most panoramic of the expressionist works, this play was conceived and written by New York’s Vietnam Veterans Ensemble. The play traces the experiences of one army squad from training through combat to postwar attitudes and feelings. Shirley Lauro, A Piece of My Heart (New York: Samuel French, 1992). From Keith Walker’s 1985 book of the same title that contains interviews with female veterans and civilians, A Piece of My Heart presents the comments and experiences of nurses, a Red Cross worker, an entertainer, and an army intelligence officer. Since the 1990s, a modest number of new dramatic productions serve as reminders that the Vietnam War continues to live in the theater, often as a parallel to new military conflicts of recent years. For instance, Shirley Lauro’s A Piece of My Heart (1992) reopened in San Diego in 2005, with a focus on the context of the Iraq War. From the Australian experience, Minefields and Mini-skirts (2004), adapted by Terence O’Connell from a book by Siobhan McHugh, toured theaters in Australia. Blending the stories of 35 women who went to Vietnam as nurses, journalists, entertainers, volunteers, and consular staff with those of wives or mothers on the home front, this play demonstrates the increasing focus on women’s experiences in recent Vietnam War literature. In addition, Naomi Wallace’s In the Heart of America (2008), which juxtaposes the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the Vietnam War in 1969, opened on Broadway in 2009 to mixed reviews.
Prose Narrative Nonfiction prose narrative dealing with the American involvement in Vietnam takes a number of different forms: biography, memoir, combat narrative, oral history collections, and journalistic
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reporting. Sometimes the categories blur, not only among themselves but also between fiction and nonfiction as well as memoir and formal history. Of the thousands of titles that have been published, this overview concentrates on the most often referenced books within the various subgenres. The most prevalent type of prose narrative is, of course, the combat narrative, usually written by a former combatant and often indistinguishable from memoir. Most of these narratives take the following pattern: A new recruit arrives in-country, usually with high ideals of what the war is about and what service entails. He is immediately faced with the severe physical hardships and danger of combat conditions and may either become disillusioned or grow to admire the fortitude of the other troops. In any case, the pattern is essentially the traditional one of a coming of age. The focus is normally on the narrator’s own development, and other individuals presented in the narrative tend to be standard types. However, even where serious attempts are made to create accurate portraits of people with whom the narrator has served, we generally do not see any development in them; they remain background for the narrator’s own development and are very often sounding boards for his opinions. Vietnamese people, both South Vietnamese and North Vietnamese, are also normally portrayed as background figures. As might be expected, the chief events in these combat narratives are military engagements: usually two or more minor engagements and finally one major battle in which the narrator’s views are solidified. But in some narratives, the culminating event is not a battle but rather an atrocity event: a rape, the killing of a civilian, the desecration of an enemy’s body, the destruction of a village, and so on. This is particularly true of Philip Caputo’s A Rumor of War (1977), perhaps one of the most famous books of its kind. Caputo, a marine who was in fact charged with ordering the killing of two Vietnamese civilians (the charges were subsequently dropped), shapes his narrative around the attitudes and events leading up to the event in question in an attempt to explain how such things happen and, of course, implying that they happened with great frequency. The narrator of such books emerges from the experience with an understanding of the destructive influence of war, particularly the Vietnam War, on combatant and noncombatant alike. Interestingly enough, even the nondisillusioned narratives of this type might include an atrocity. In David Christian’s Victor Six (1991), for example, actually a celebration of a particular unit’s prowess in combat, members of the unit at one point desecrate the body of a dead enemy just for the experience of doing so. This event is held up as an evil omen for the unit. And surely enough, shortly afterward the unit meets its first defeat, and most of its members are killed or wounded. The heroes have ceased to be heroic and so must be defeated; they have betrayed the cause and must be punished. In Craig Roberts and Charles W. Sass’s The Walking Dead (1989), also a fairly positive memoir of the war, there is another variation on this theme. One member of a unit who has killed a
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suspected VC collaborator in anger later talks another man out of doing the same thing, telling him that the momentary anger is not justifiable and that the deed will haunt him afterward. Other motifs in these narratives are the loss of a best friend in combat and the first encounter with the gruesome carnage of war. In the disillusioned narrative, such scenes often become almost inverted conversion experiences, causing a loss rather than a gaining of faith. A Rumor of War contains a typical scene of this sort, as does Lynda Van Devanter’s Home before Morning (1983), one of the few such narratives by a woman. Van Devanter’s repeated question “Why, why, why?” about the maimed and dying soldiers she has seen as a combat nurse remains unanswered, implying that the war itself has no purpose. Among other disillusioned memoirs and combat narratives are W. D. Ehrhart’s Vietnam-Perkasie (1983), Tim O’Brien’s If I Die in a Combat Zone (1973), and Ron Kovic’s Born on the Fourth of July (1976). Later made into a film, Kovic’s book follows a paralyzed veteran home and through the peace movement and has sometimes been said to overlap into the fiction category. Combat narratives that focus on the positive development of the individual and the unit mission and assume a more positive view of military service and often of the war itself include Michael Lee Lanning’s The Only War We Had: A Platoon Leader’s Journal of Vietnam (1987) and its sequel, Vietnam, 1969–1970: A Company Commander’s Journal (1988); Larry Chambers’s Recondo: LRRPs in the 101st Airborne (1992); Lynn Hampton’s The Fighting Strength: Memoirs of a Combat Nurse in Vietnam (1990), an interesting counterview to Van Devanter’s more jaundiced one; Eric Bergerud’s Red Thunder, Tropic Lightning (1993); and Otto J. Lehrack’s No Shining Armor: The Marines at War in Vietnam (1992). Oral histories are particularly pervasive forms of narrative emerging from the Vietnam conflict, perhaps more than in any other American overseas engagement. The most widely read of these are Mark Baker’s Nam (1981), which is unfortunately marred by its failure to document the speakers’ identities and units of service so that the accuracy of the accounts cannot be verified, and Al Santoli’s Everything We Had (1981), which is more extensively documented but includes at least one questionable narrative. Women’s experiences have been assembled in such collections as Catherine Marshall’s In the Combat Zone (1987) and Keith Walker’s A Piece of My Heart (1985), and the African American experience has been documented in Wallace Terry’s Bloods (1982). Al Santoli’s To Bear Any Burden (1985) supplements his earlier collection and presents numerous accounts of Southeast Asian experiences both during and after the war. The fall of Saigon in 1975 and the flight of refugees from South Vietnam is further presented in the oral histories collected by Larry Engelmann in Tears before the Rain: An Oral History of the Fall of South Vietnam (1990). And Bob Greene’s Homecoming (1989) addresses the experiences of troops returning from the war in a collection that is not specifically oral history but rather letters written by veterans in response to questions he posed in one of his newspaper columns.
Particularly difficult to categorize is Michael Herr’s Dispatches (1977), an account of his experience as a journalist in the field and in his bureau’s Saigon headquarters. Originally written as a series of travel pieces for Esquire and revised for book publication, this narrative describes the journalists’ milieu as strongly as it does that of the soldier in the field. The accuracy of some of the episodes has been questioned, particularly where the book versions differ from the original magazine texts, but on the whole Herr presents a view of the American involvement that has become pervasive in all the literature: Vietnam not only as event but also as metaphor, the shaping influence of post-1965 American society, and at the same time a reflection of what it shaped. His closing statement is one of the most often quoted in all of Vietnam literature: “Vietnam, Vietnam, Vietnam, we’ve all been there.” ANNA M. WITTMANN See also Film and the Vietnam Experience; Historiography, Vietnam War References Bibby, Michael. Hearts and Minds: Bodies, Poetry, and Resistance in the Vietnam Era. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1996. Jason, Philip K., ed. Acts and Shadows: The Vietnam War in American Literary Culture. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000. Neilson, Jim. Warring Fictions: American Literary Culture and the Vietnam War Narrative. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1998. Newman, John. Vietnam War Literature: An Annotated Bibliography of Imaginative Works about Americans Fighting in Vietnam. 3rd ed. Lanham, NJ: Scarecrow, 1996. Ringnalda, Don. Fighting and Writing the Vietnam War. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1994. Ryan, Maureen. The Other Side of Grief: The Home Front and the Aftermath in American Narratives of the Vietnam War. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2008. Wittman, Sandra M. Writing about Vietnam: The Literature of the Vietnam Conflict. Boston: G. K. Hall, 1989.
Loc Ninh, Military Operations near Start Date: 1967 End Date: 1968 Loc Ninh, a village with a 1967 population of fewer than 10,000 people located about 80 miles north of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) capital of Saigon (present-day Ho Chi Minh City), lies at the northern limit of National Route 13 (“Thunder Road”), only a few miles from the Cambodian border. The village was the focal point of major People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) infiltrations into present-day Song Be and Tay Ninh provinces. During the April 1972 Easter Offensive, PAVN forces overran Loc Ninh as part of their unsuccessful attempt to seize the provincial capital at An Loc (Binh Long Province). But from that point forward the PAVN occupied Loc Ninh and designated it as the cap-
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The allied base at Loc Ninh, about 80 miles north of Saigon, after fighting there in November 1967. A key location, Loc Ninh was the site of many serious clashes in 1967 and 1968. (Bettmann/Corbis)
ital of the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) of South Vietnam. During the 1975 Spring Offensive, the PAVN launched one of its major attacks from Loc Ninh, funneling its armored columns south like a dagger pointed at the heart of the faltering South Vietnamese government. In 1967 and 1968 Loc Ninh was the site of many serious clashes. In October 1967 the 1st Brigade of the U.S. 1st Infantry (“Big Red One”) Division, participating in Operation SHENANDOAH II, fought one of the major engagements of the Vietnam War at Loc Ninh. In the early morning hours of October 29, the U.S. Special Forces and Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) camps were hit by heavy Communist mortar fire. Within three hours the first assault had been repulsed, but a Communist attack at 5:15 a.m. succeeded in breaching the perimeter defenses. Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) Recondo troops with U.S. Special Forces advisers arrived at the Loc Ninh airfield shortly thereafter and were joined by Company C, 2nd Battalion, 28th Infantry (2–28th), of the Big Red One, which had set up a fire-support base with an artillery battery at the south end of the runway. The allied counterattack succeeded in ejecting the Communists from their positions after a fierce firefight. The commander of the U.S. 1st Infantry Division, Major General John H. Hay Jr., decided to post four night defensive positions (NDPs) in the jungle behind the attacking Communist units to
intercept them as they made their way back to their Cambodian sanctuaries. In November the Communists attacked these battalion NDPs arrayed around Loc Ninh in Song Be Province, each time with disastrous results. In the fighting around Loc Ninh five PAVN regiments were engaged, with two (the 271st and 273rd) rendered combat ineffective with nearly 1,000 soldiers killed. Operation SHENANDOAH II concluded on November 19, 1967. In the autumn of 1968 Loc Ninh was the scene of more fierce combat actions between the 1st Infantry Division and the PAVN. In October the 2nd Battalion (mechanized) of the 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, and an infantry battalion of the ARVN 5th Division were under operational control of the 1st Cavalry (“First Team”) Division near Loc Ninh. There had been two previous battles around the town in August and September, and the air cavalrymen were brought in from the northern part of South Vietnam to increase efforts to interdict the flow of Communist troops from Cambodia. On Thanksgiving Day, November 28, Company C, 2nd Battalion, 2nd Infantry (2–2nd), was responding to mortar fire received on their NDP just north of the junction of National Highways 13 and 14a. As its armored personnel carriers (APCs) moved through the rubber trees, the company came under attack by automatic weapons and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) fire from a line of PAVN bunkers. At the end of the action Company C had lost one APC (“track”) but had killed 70 PAVN soldiers. The
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next day, joined by Company A, the mechanized infantry swept through the previous day’s battle area and again contacted PAVN forces just to the north, a battalion falling back on its bunkers. Following air strikes and intense artillery fire on the bunker complex, the infantry swept through the area against light resistance. PAVN losses there brought their two-day total to 148, while the two U.S. companies had lost 7 killed in action. As General Bruce Palmer Jr. observed in The 25-Year War, “Our greatest battle successes occurred when the enemy chose to attack a U.S. unit well dug in and prepared to defend its position.” The NDPs proved that point, but the reverse was not always true for the PAVN. Even when heavily entrenched, they could be rooted out or destroyed in place with heavy fire from allied artillery and aircraft. The superior mobility of U.S. infantry and artillery units was a major innovation of the battles for Loc Ninh. JOHN F. VOTAW See also Civilian Irregular Defense Group; Song Be, Battle of; United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1965–1968; United States Army; United States Special Forces; Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, Army
A firm believer in the domino theory regarding Southeast Asia, Lodge thought that Vietnam could be kept free of Communist control with sufficient time purchased by the presence of U.S. troops. When he became convinced that the United States could not win with President Ngo Dinh Diem as an ally, Lodge acted to undermine that regime. He saw to it that Buddhist dissidents, including Thich Tri Quang, received refuge in the U.S. embassy, and opposition South Vietnamese generals were contacted through Lucien Conein, a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operative. Lodge circumvented the pro-Diem General Paul Harkins, head of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), by withholding U.S. State Department communications from Harkins’s purview and by undercutting his upbeat assessments. In late August 1963 the State Department instructed Lodge to give Diem an opportunity to oust Ngo Dinh Nhu, his controversial brother. Nhu controlled Colonel Le Quang Tung’s Special Forces and used them to suppress protestors in Saigon. If Diem proved unwilling, Lodge was directed to tell the dissident generals that the Kennedy administration was ready to desert Diem and back a successor regime. Fearing that the Ngo family’s repressive rule might affect the military situation in the countryside, Lodge wanted to
References Haldane, Robert, ed. The First Infantry Division in Vietnam, 1965–1970. Paducah, KY: Turner, 1993. Hay, John H. Tactical and Materiel Innovations. U.S. Army Vietnam Studies Series. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974. Palmer, General Bruce, Jr. The 25-Year War: America’s Military Role in Vietnam. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1984. Summers, Harry G., Jr. The Vietnam War Almanac. New York: Ballantine, 1985.
Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr. Birth Date: July 5, 1902 Death Date: February 27, 1985 Republican politician, U.S. senator during 1937–1944 and 1947– 1953, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations (UN) during 1953– 1960, and U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) during 1963–1964 and 1965–1967. Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. was born in Nahant, Massachusetts, on July 5, 1902, to a politically prominent and wealthy family. A 1924 graduate of Harvard University, he undertook a career in newspapers and was elected to the state legislature in 1932. In 1936 he was elected to the U.S. Senate as a Republican before completing two years of military service during World War II. Reelected to the Senate in 1946, he served in that body until 1953. That same year he was named ambassador to the UN, and in 1960 he was nominated as the Republican vice presidential candidate. President John F. Kennedy appointed Lodge ambassador to South Vietnam following the 1963 recall of Frederick Nolting Jr.
First a U.S. senator, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. served as U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) during 1963–1964 and 1965–1967. Lodge supported the coup by RVN generals against RVN President Ngo Dinh Diem. (Yoichi R. Okamoto/Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library)
Logistics, Allied, Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and Viet Cong 675 temporarily withhold economic and military assistance, especially to Tung’s unit, hoping to exert leverage and to force a change in policy. Such actions would also demonstrate support for the conspiring officers, and by October 5, 1963, President Kennedy endorsed Lodge’s proposals. After a number of confrontations with Diem, Lodge advocated a coup. Convinced that the South Vietnamese leader was unchangeable and loyal to his family, the ambassador gave tacit support to the generals’ planned overthrow of the Ngos. The coup against Diem began at 1:30 p.m. on November 1, 1963. Three hours later Diem phoned Lodge from the besieged Gia Long Palace and inquired as to the U.S. attitude about the uprising. Lodge, feigning ignorance, pretended to be alarmed for the safety of Diem and Nhu and offered them safe conduct out of the country or sanctuary in the embassy. Diem, determined to restore order and stay in power, refused. Diem and his brother were later apprehended and murdered by the putschists. Ambassador Lodge soon lost confidence in the languid military leadership of General Duong Van Minh, one of the anti-Diem coup leaders. By early 1964 Lodge supported Minh’s overthrow by Lieutenant General Nguyen Khanh. That summer Lodge resigned as ambassador and was replaced by General Maxwell Taylor. Ostensibly, Lodge returned to the United States to run against Senator Barry Goldwater for the 1964 Republican presidential nomination. In reality, Lodge was weary and disappointed with Saigon politics, had no fresh thoughts on policy, and was ready to recommend that the United States launch an aerial bombing campaign against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). Succeeding General Taylor for a second tour as ambassador to South Vietnam in 1965, Lodge expressed qualms about holding free elections that might result in a neutralist regime that would seek to halt the war on less than satisfactory terms and remove U.S. forces. When Buddhists launched the Struggle Movement against the Saigon government of Nguyen Cao Ky and Nguyen Van Thieu in 1966, Lodge supported the regime’s actions in overcoming the dissidents and their ally General Nguyen Chanh Thi, who was discharged from the command of I Corps. Prior to leaving his post in 1967 Ambassador Lodge drafted a pacification scheme that he labeled Operation HOP TAC (the Vietnamese term for “cooperation”), which emphasized subduing the areas around Saigon. Lodge served as one of the Lyndon B. Johnson administration’s so-called Wise Men in 1968 and advocated the termination of search-and-destroy missions. From 1968 to 1969 Lodge was U.S. ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany). In early 1969 President Richard M. Nixon assigned Lodge as a negotiator to the Paris peace talks, but he resigned because of a lack of progress. From 1970 to 1977 he served as special U.S. envoy to the Vatican. Lodge died in Beverly, Massachusetts, on February 27, 1985. RODNEY J. ROSS
See also BRAVO I and II, Operations; Conein, Lucien Emile; Domino Theory; Duong Van Minh; Goldwater, Barry Morris; Harkins, Paul Donal; HOP TAC, Operation; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Lake, William Anthony Kirsop; Le Quang Tung; Ngo Dinh Diem; Ngo Dinh Diem, Overthrow of; Ngo Dinh Nhu; Nguyen Cao Ky; Nguyen Chanh Thi; Nguyen Khanh; Nguyen Van Thieu; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Nolting, Frederick Earnest, Jr.; Paris Negotiations; Richardson, John Hammond; Sheehan, Cornelius Mahoney; Taylor, Maxwell Davenport; Taylor-McNamara Report; United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1954–1965 References Blair, Anne E. Lodge in Vietnam: A Patriot Abroad. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995. Halberstam, David. The Best and the Brightest. New York: Random House, 1972. Hammer, Ellen J. A Death in November: America in Vietnam, 1963. New York: Dutton, 1987. Herring, George C. America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975. 4th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001.
Logistics, Allied, Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and Viet Cong The equipping, supplying, quartering, and transporting of troops. The long war in Vietnam had two phases: the Indochina War (1946–1954), between the Viet Minh and the French, and the Vietnam War (1961–1975), fought by Viet Cong (VC) forces in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) against South Vietnam, the United States, and other allies. Logistics ultimately played a crucial role in deciding both conflicts. During the Indochina War, French forces, with massive assistance from the United States, were generally well supplied and equipped, but they were never strong enough logistically to win. Although possessing the supplies and much of the equipment necessary for victory, the French lacked both the manpower and the logistical means to deliver the supplies to sustain their forces during battle when and where they were most needed. The French lacked sufficient airlift capacity, and thanks to the jungle and primitive road and rail systems, transport by land was often very difficult. The Viet Minh, however, were able to make good use of human transport (the “People’s Porters,” North Vietnamese defense minister Vo Nguyen Giap called them) but also bicycles and some trucks in the resupply of Communist forces. The 1954 Battle of Dien Bien Phu provides an excellent example of the logistics strengths and limitations on both sides. In contrast, during the Vietnam War the United States possessed both the equipment and the means to employ it effectively. Despite their logistical strength, the Americans played into their enemy’s hands by utilizing tactics designed for a long war without the necessary domestic support for such a protracted strategy. The Viet Minh and their successors, the VC and the People’s Army of
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Vietnam (PAVN, the North Vietnamese army), were able to dictate the pace of the conflict, successfully tailoring operations to their own inferior resources and often crude, although not ineffective, logistical abilities. The most important physical characteristics of Vietnam from a logistical standpoint are its tropical climate, vast forests and jungles, and rugged mountainous areas. Two monsoon seasons each year hampered military operations. The southwest monsoon starts in the middle of May and ends in the middle of October; the northeast monsoon lasts from mid-September to the end of December. Whereas the latter affects only areas along the central coast, the southwest monsoon brings rain, and in some places drizzle and fog, to the entire country, so the southwest monsoon has by far the greater impact on military operations. The dry season occurs between early January and mid-May. Most military operations in both phases of the war took place during the dry season. The triple-canopy jungle covering much of Vietnam provided cover for troop movements, concealment for supply lines and depots, and excellent defensive positions that the Viet Minh, the VC, and the PAVN all used to great advantage. Even in the more open areas, bamboo, shrubs, marshy ground, and high grass restricted the movement of modern motorized forces to the underdeveloped road system. Composed mostly of unsurfaced tracks that were overgrown and potholed nearly everywhere, roads were subject to frequent disruption. Demolished bridges, ambushes, and landslides exacerbated the situation. Wet weather turned most of Vietnam’s roads into quagmires. Rain produced floods in low-lying areas that made cross-country movement impossible by wheeled transport and precarious even for tracked vehicles. Dry weather brought great clouds of dust. Churned up by ground traffic, aircraft, and helicopters, the dust permeated everything, clogging engine intakes and damaging machinery and equipment. Vietnam had only one main railway line. Built by the French, it ran from Saigon through Hanoi and into China. Extremely vulnerable to sabotage, rail transportation proved unreliable at best. Although Vietnam featured a number of ports, most were underdeveloped and unprotected from the elements. Typhoons often endangered berthed vessels, snapped ship-to-shore lines, and halted unloading. Vietnam’s most important port complexes, Haiphong in North Vietnam and Saigon in South Vietnam, played vital roles in both phases of the conflict. During the Vietnam War, the United States developed other installations at great effort and expense. Strategically, the near proximity of Laos, Cambodia, and China to Vietnam offered the Vietnamese Communists invaluable logistical advantages over both their French and American adversaries. The inability of Cambodia and Laos to deny the use of their territory permitted the construction of two main lines of communication that carried huge quantities of personnel, war matériel, and supplies throughout the conflict. The first and best-known route, the Ho Chi Minh Trail (begun in 1959), ran south down the eastern side of Laos into northern Cambodia. The second, the Sihanouk
Trail, started at the port of Sihanoukville in Cambodia, where neutral ships unloaded supplies in safety, and ran via Phnom Penh to extensive base sanctuaries just across the border from South Vietnam. During 1962–1965 there was a third supply line consisting of small cargo vessels disguised as fishing trawlers that carried weapons and ammunition covertly from North Vietnamese ports to secret landing points along the South Vietnamese coast, but the U.S. Navy’s Operation MARKET TIME effectively choked off that supply line in early 1965. North Vietnam’s most important geographic feature became its common border with China. The 1949 Communist victory in China enabled the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to provide logistical assistance to the Viet Minh. Although China and Vietnam were traditional rivals, the PRC’s opposition to the West, particularly to the United States, prompted it to supply first the Viet Minh and later the North Vietnamese with all manner of war matériel. The Soviet Union, motivated in part by the desire to offset Chinese influence, followed suit. French soldiers were well trained, experienced, and led by battle-seasoned veterans. The condition of their equipment, however, was parlous at best. U.S. delivery of equipment, especially military vehicles, was often slow, and French maintenance techniques were inadequate. Poor French maintenance procedures became a constant theme in U.S. Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) reports from September 1950 on. U.S. observers were especially critical of French aircraft technicians for habitually ignoring safety precautions, for a perpetual lack of appreciation for preventive maintenance, and for drinking on the job. The French logistics system was similarly chaotic. Staffers seldom knew what they had received or sent forward because there was no effective stock control system. Furthermore, because most deliveries in Vietnam had to be made by armed convoy, either by water or by road, stocks tended to accumulate in forward areas in compensation for the hazardous and intermittent resupply cycle. Under such conditions, MAAG concluded in 1951 that no amount of American logistical support would greatly reduce the difficulties experienced by the French in maintaining their forces at high operational levels. Also contributing to French logistical problems was the enormously long line of communications—9,000 to 11,000 miles— that stretched across the Pacific from Haiphong and Saigon to the United States. To help alleviate the delays that such lengthy transport entailed, MAAG advisers suggested to the French that they manufacture simple articles for themselves in Vietnam. Native workers could easily produce many items, including small-arms ammunition, webbing equipment, tinned rations, cartridge clips, tire tubes, and camouflage netting, at a lower cost than American imports. The French, however, rejected the idea of a local military equipment industry. They feared that it would forfeit their control over the distribution of military materials, permit at least some to fall into enemy hands, and weaken the dependence of the indigenous population on France.
Logistics, Allied, Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and Viet Cong 677 Between October 1951 and February 1952 the United States delivered more than 130,000 tons of military equipment to French forces in Indochina. The shipments included 53 million rounds of ammunition, 8,000 vehicles, 650 combat vehicles, 200 aircraft, 3,500 radio sets, and 14,000 automatic weapons. By early 1953 another 137,000 tons of American military equipment reached the French, including 900 armored fighting vehicles, 15,000 other vehicles, 99,000 small-arms and automatic weapons, and about 900 radios. During this period the French Air Force also took delivery of 160 Grumman F-6F Hellcat and Grumman F-8F Bearcat fighters, 41 Martin B-26 Marauder light bombers, and 28 Douglas C-47 Dakota transport planes. The latter increased the all-important French air transport fleet available to support the 1954 defense of Dien Bien Phu to a maximum of 75 to 100 aircraft, of which no more than an estimated 56 to 75 were serviceable at any one time. Events proved these air assets totally inadequate. The French Air Force was able to deliver no more than 120 tons on average of the calculated 200 tons of supplies needed per day by the doomed garrison at Dien Bien Phu. In the end, logistics decided the battle. At the start of their conflict against the French, Viet Minh units at all levels possessed a hodgepodge of captured French or Japanese equipment, supplemented by American supplies parachuted in by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II. The Viet Minh, short of all classes of supplies, had only a handful of trucks with no means to maintain them. Unlike the French, the Viet Minh at once set up cottage industry factories to help fill their needs. These produced by hand simple items such as rifle ammunition, mines, grenades, light machine guns, and eventually some 120-millimeter (mm) mortars. Heavy equipment, including trucks and large-caliber guns and ammunition, remained beyond their capabilities. Had the Chinese not provided resources, the Indochina War might have ended differently. From late 1949 the PRC supplied the bulk of the Viet Minh’s equipment and ammunition but only as far as the border. Distribution farther south was up to the Vietnamese. The Viet Minh solved the distribution problem with their system of human porters, the supply of which, if not inexhaustible, was large enough to meet their needs. Later when the Viet Minh had a number of trucks, porters still contributed greatly to the defeat of the French, especially in the 1954 Battle of Dien Bien Phu. Later they supplied VC and PAVN units that fought the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) and U.S. forces. There were disadvantages to the porter system. Food was a problem. Large numbers of porters seeking sustenance might betray their presence to the enemy or antagonize villagers, whose goodwill, or at least passivity, was essential. Thus, porters carried their own rations; on long trips, as much as 90 percent of their loads would be their own food. It has been estimated that 40,000 porters were required to supply one 10,000-man Viet Minh division in the field (4 porters to 1 soldier). It has also been calculated
that it took about one month to stock the logistic base for one attacking Viet Minh division. A time-consuming process that could not respond to unexpected changes at short notice, this supply cycle was responsible for the typical attack-lull-attack-lull pattern of Viet Minh and later VC and PAVN attacks. Nevertheless, the porter system worked and to an extent that was never fully understood by the more conventionally minded French and Americans. The one commodity absolutely indispensable to the Viet Minh was rice. Not only was it the main food staple of their soldiers and porters, it was also the currency in which they were paid. Goods and services provided by local communities were also reimbursed in rice. It was their source of strength and the key ingredient around which many of their operations revolved. It was also their Achilles’ heel. Perhaps the closest the French ever came to winning the war was their occupation and near pacification of the Red River Delta in late 1949 and early 1950. The move denied the Viet Minh reinforcements, taxes, and, most importantly, rice. As a result Viet Minh supplies were halved, and their forces dwindled; some units faced virtual starvation. But by the end of 1950 the French had lost or abandoned all their posts separating Vietnam’s northern border from the PRC. In so doing they opened the way for Chinese assistance and yielded to their enemy an invaluable logistical prize. The Viet Minh gained quantities of food, clothing, medical supplies, and ammunition as well as enough equipment to outfit a complete division. The Chinese connection provided other items that proved essential to eventual Viet Minh victory: large amounts of artillery, heavy mortars, antiaircraft guns, and some 600 trucks, most with Chinese drivers. Reequipped and resupplied, Viet Minh main-force units grew to the offensive equivalent of eight or nine divisions. In addition, irregular forces tied down about 100,000 of the 175,000 French troops in Indochina, leaving them with the equivalent of only three divisions for mobile operations. The Viet Minh also greatly enhanced their logistical capabilities during this period. They improved roads from their main base areas and expanded their porter force into hundreds of thousands of people. By the early part of 1953 the Viet Minh logistics system, although lacking the flexibility conferred by airpower, had actually become more flexible and better suited to the terrain than that of the French. Whereas French logistics were largely road- or riverbound and thus highly vulnerable to attack, the Viet Minh porter system could operate unimpeded and largely undetected. The Viet Minh supply system at Dien Bien Phu was comprised of about 1,000 trucks, all of 2.5-ton capacity, and 260,000 porters. Trucks transported heavier items: artillery, most of the ammunition, and larger spare parts. The porters mostly carried rice, an estimated 76 percent of which was hauled overland for distances up to 400 miles from Thanh Hoa Province. The line of communication to Dien Bien Phu, which crossed nearly 100 small and large streams and negotiated numerous steep gradients, ran from crossing points on the Vietnamese-Chinese border to the forward base at Tuan Giao. To support trucks, the route needed to
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be completely rebuilt. This effort employed some 10,000 coolies, two main-force engineer regiments, one infantry regiment, and 7,000 army recruits. Once completed, the route supplied a force of 49,000 combat troops and some 40,000 to 50,000 logistical troops deployed along its length. In the end the Viet Minh emerged victorious at Dien Bien Phu because they were able to supply their forces, whereas the French were not. The 11 years following the 1954 Geneva Conference and Geneva Accords saw the withdrawal of the French from Indochina, the establishment of separate and rival governments in both North and South Vietnam, and the deployment of American forces in support of South Vietnam. During this time North Vietnam undertook a complete restructuring of its logistical system. The North Vietnamese successfully replaced their army’s mixture of French, Japanese, Chinese, and U.S. weapons and equipment with more standardized types, simplifying the supply of spares and ammunition. They increased their numbers of trucks and native drivers, and they rebuilt and improved their roads, railways, and ports, chiefly Haiphong, Hon Gai, and Ben Thuy. The Communist forces were not, however, as successful in restructuring their battlefield support system. The great mobility and airpower of their new adversary, the United States, precluded a conventional logistics system. Although the North Vietnamese had little trouble stockpiling supplies in protected areas, moving them forward quickly enough and in amounts sufficient to support major battles without disruption from the air remained beyond their ability. The same problem impaired attempts to rapidly regroup or switch directions of emphasis. Therefore, attacks were followed by pauses during which stocks were either redirected or rebuilt. This logistical weakness largely accounted for the spasmodic pattern of VC and PAVN offensives that prevailed until the final stages of the war. In South Vietnam the new government was attempting to equip and train the ARVN. This task, initially envisioned as a joint French-U.S. venture, ran into immediate difficulty. French bitterness triggered by their defeat coupled with their resentment of the Americans prompted a conflict over the disposition of military equipment previously supplied to the French Army. The terms of the contract stipulated that all equipment would revert to U.S. control when the French left. Determined to keep the best material for their own use, the French instead took it, along with most of the spares. From the moment of its formation, the rudimentary ARVN logistical system was overwhelmed with huge quantities of inferior and unserviceable equipment. The ARVN was thus disorganized, ill-supplied, and poorly equipped and was unprepared to meet the growing attacks on its country by the VC, the successors of the Viet Minh. By early 1961 with the prospect of an imminent South Vietnamese collapse and the complete loss of an estimated $500 million investment, President John F. Kennedy committed U.S. helicopter units in support of the faltering ARVN.
Initially the introduction of helicopters befuddled the VC, who had little experience with them. Although their use reflected the most primitive of airmobile operations, employed only as battle taxis with no heavy-lift or offensive capacities, helicopters contributed to a resurgence of ARVN fortunes. The VC soon learned that helicopters were highly vulnerable to ground fire, adjusted their tactics accordingly, and reversed the trend. By mid-June 1965 the VC appeared once again on the verge of victory. With American prestige again at stake, U.S. ground troops were introduced in large numbers. By the end of 1965 there were 184,300 U.S. soldiers in South Vietnam, the first wave of a commitment that would ultimately reach more than half a million men. Even the traditionally lavish American logistic system was swamped by such a huge and sudden upsurge in manpower. Vietnam presented the United States with logistics contingencies drastically different from those of World War II or the Korean War. With no front or rear lines in the normal military sense—the conventional differentiation between combat and communication zones being nonexistent—no secure areas existed for the establishment of logistical installations. With few fixed-terrain objectives and most operations mounted from isolated base camps, there were no linear axes along which supplies could flow. The troop buildup was also unbalanced. Anxious to bolster the sagging ARVN, the initial proportions of combat troops to logistics personnel were abnormally high. As a consequence, transport, storage, and distribution arrangements were overwhelmed, and supplies accumulated chaotically. Supplies streamed into Vietnam faster than they could be inventoried or stored and in most cases came in far greater quantity than needed. In September 1968 the surplus was estimated at more than 2 million tons. For example, the authorized stock of electronic repair parts alone at one point numbered more than 50,000 items; later analysis showed that only 5,000 of these were actually necessary. The same situation existed across the board. Consequently, huge backlog snarls—the most infamous being the so-called Saigon “fish market”—accumulated across the country. At the height of the buildup, deep-draft ships waited up to 20 days for a berth to unload at any of the 10 ports used by U.S. forces in Vietnam. Because of the sheer volume of supplies, there are no recorded instances of U.S. operations being constrained by insufficient logistical support. Despite a high cost in waste and inefficiency, at no time did American strategy hinge on logistical feasibility. Indeed, supplies were lavish. Soldiers at some fire-support bases enjoyed such rations as fresh roast beef, ice cream, and eggs to order on an almost routine basis. This was made possible by the lift ability of the helicopter and tactical transport aircraft, most notably the U.S. Army DeHavilland C-7A Caribou and the U.S. Air Force Chase/Fairchild C-123 Provider and Lockheed C-130 Hercules. During the war these aircraft lifted only slightly less tonnage to troops in the field than all
Logistics, Allied, Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and Viet Cong 679 U.S. helicopters combined. By 1966 scarcely a site existed that was not within 25 miles of an airstrip capable of handling C-130s. Operations once logistically impossible for the French became almost commonplace for the Americans. Roads and railroads also played vital logistical roles. In 1968, for example, road transport delivered nearly 10 times the supply tonnage as helicopters. American efforts to repair the heavily damaged Vietnamese railway system proved successful enough to enable the movement of hundreds of thousands of tons of rock and gravel to road, airfield, and port construction and improvement sites. U.S. logistics were not without problems. The worst of these, at least early on, was ammunition supply. From April to July 1965, ammunition delivery methods created a troublesome situation. Ammunition, like most other commodities, was supplied in push packages. Containing a mixture of ammunition types based on predetermined expenditure rates, these were pushed forward to meet anticipated demands (calculated largely on World War II and Korean War usage rates). The assortment often proved inappropriate for the peculiar demands confronted in Vietnam. Shortages inevitably arose as expenditure exceeded supply of the most-used types, while sites were inundated with huge quantities of the less crucial items. Stocks also accumulated when anticipated consumers were diverted from predesignated disembarkation points. Only with the establishment of Headquarters, U.S. Army Vietnam, in July 1965 did order finally take root. One of the most impressive examples of U.S. logistical resource application came in the 1968 siege of Khe Sanh. Whereas the French had failed under similar circumstances at Dien Bien Phu, U.S. forces at Khe Sanh were never seriously endangered, thanks to enhanced techniques of air resupply. In addition to normal supply by parachute, fixed-wing transports, and helicopters, supplies were delivered by the Low-Altitude Parachute Extraction System (LAPES) and the Ground Proximity Extraction System (GPES). A LAPES run involved a C-130 flying with tailgate down only five feet over the runway. At the desired time a drogue parachute extracted roller-mounted cargo pallets from the aircraft, allowing the supplies to skid to a stop on the runway. A GPES run involved the use of a long hook attached to the cargo that caught an arrester wire, similar to that on aircraft carriers, on the runway. Deliveries made in this manner ultimately became so sophisticated that loads containing 30 dozen eggs were successfully made without a single egg being cracked. Fifty-two LAPES and 15 GPES deliveries arrived during the siege. Altogether, 17,091 tons of supplies reached U.S. forces at Khe Sanh: 8,120 by paradrop, LAPES, and GPES; 4,310 by aircraft landing at the strip; and 4,661 by helicopter. Additionally, helicopters delivered supplies directly to hill outposts around Khe Sanh using a close-cooperation air technique called the Super-Gaggle. A typical mission involved 12 Boeing CH-46 Sea knight helicopters, each underslung with 4,000 pounds of supplies; 12 Douglas A-4 Skyhawk ground attack jets for flak suppression; 4 Bell UH-1E Iroquois helicopter gunships flying
shotgun behind the CH-46s; and 1 TA-4 for overhead coordination. So successful were Super-Gaggle missions that despite their colorful description as “flying madhouses,” only two CH-46 helicopters were shot down during the siege. The Vietnamization program, initiated after the 1968 Tet Offensive, sought to enable the ARVN to take over from the Americans the actual fighting of the war. This effort encountered immediate logistic difficulties. Although there was no shortage of military equipment with which to supply the ARVN, the Vietnamese possessed neither sufficient training for its use nor the expertise necessary to store, maintain, or repair it. Complex equipment required a sophisticated logistical system, something that the ARVN never attained. In fact, ARVN training standards never evolved substantially from mid-1950s’ levels. ARVN armored forces were typical. Although supplied by the United States with the most advanced equipment, armored units suffered a lack of fuel, few spare parts, and a minimal forwardrepair capability that seriously impaired fighting effectiveness. Serviceable vehicles were used to tow damaged pieces out of action, reducing the number available for fighting and often damaging the towing vehicle. The situation soon went from bad to worse. Having followed the American example of lavish consumption, the ARVN encountered enormous problems when it was faced with deep cutbacks in U.S. military assistance. The ARVN saw its training reduced to practically nothing, its use of helicopters and transport aircraft cut by up to 70 percent, its aircraft grounded, and its vehicles cannibalized for spare parts. Depleted fuel stocks could not be replenished. Ammunition supplies were also reduced; even hand grenades were rationed. Boots and clothing supplies also ran short. All manner of medical supplies dwindled, and on the verge of malaria season there was no insect repellent. The effects of these logistical shortfalls on ARVN morale was devastating. Ammunition shortages inevitably contributed to more casualties. Less fuel meant that casualty evacuation grew haphazard at best, including on Honda motorbikes or strings of fuel-less ambulances towed by trucks or, in some cases, by sampans. Without bandages, medicines, antibiotics, or intravenous fluids, hospitals could not provide adequate care even for those soldiers who reached facilities. When inflation destroyed military pay, desertions grew to a staggering 15,000 to 20,000 per month. Seeking to support their families, some soldiers sold their equipment, others turned to graft, and still more avoided their duties in order to moonlight. In short, as the supply situation deteriorated, defeatism and corruption spread through all levels of the disintegrating ARVN. Meanwhile the PAVN, supplied with massive amounts of Russian T-34 and T-54 tanks, surface-to-air missiles, and 130-mm artillery pieces, underwent a much more successful transition. One by one, units were recalled from South Vietnam, reequipped, retrained, and returned to their former positions. By the spring of
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1972 the PAVN was able to deploy a conventional army of 120,000 men in 14 divisions and 26 independent regiments, a force equivalent of 20 divisions with masses of tanks and artillery. PAVN logistical systems, however, remained inflexible and incapable of supporting an attack by the whole of PAVN forces on a single front, especially in the face of American airpower. Consequently, despite substantial territorial gains, the objectives of the 1972 Easter Offensive were not achieved. In 1973 and 1974 the PAVN leaders, realizing that supplies had long been their Achilles’ heel, took the steps necessary to improve their logistical system to support a large mobile conventional army. Not only was the Ho Chi Minh Trail widened and given a hard surface, but a new all-weather road, running down the east side of the Annamite Mountain chain from Khe Sanh to Loc Ninh, was constructed. An oil pipeline also ran down the trail. Altogether, PAVN crews built 12,000 miles of new roads in areas they controlled in South Vietnam as well as a fuel pipeline from North Vietnam to Loc Ninh. They also installed a military telephone system involving nearly 12,500 miles of telephone lines and built or expanded huge supply depots, complete with hospitals, training centers, repair facilities, and airfields. On December 26, 1974, PAVN forces mounted their final offensive against South Vietnam. With a force equal to 18 fully equipped divisions organized into five army corps, supported by engineers, artillery, tanks, flak units, and even a new rudimentary tactical air force, they swept all opposition before them and took Saigon on April 30, 1975. In the end the PAVN logistic system, laboriously built and adapted over years, proved the key to their success. EDWARD C. PAGE See also Airpower, Role in War; France, Air Force, 1946–1954; France, Army, 1946–1954; Geography of Indochina and Vietnam; Ho Chi Minh Trail; Indochina War; Transportation Group 559; United States Army; Viet Minh; Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, Army; Vietnam, Republic of, Army; Vo Nguyen Giap References Fall, Bernard B. Street without Joy: The French Debacle in Indochina. Rev. ed. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1994. Heiser, Joseph M., Jr. A Soldier Supporting Soldiers. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1991. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. Kinnard, Douglas. The War Managers. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1977. Thompson, Julian. The Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflict. London: Brassey’s, 1991.
Long Binh Principal U.S. Army base in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). In 1967 the U.S. Army established a headquarters and combat support complex in South Vietnam at Long Binh, 20 miles
north of Saigon near the Bien Hoa Air Base. Eventually the base covered more than 25 square miles and was the largest base in South Vietnam, capable of housing 50,000 men at a cost of more than $100 million. Enhanced by both paved roads and a rail line, Long Binh became the center for command, administration, logistics, and medical support for troops operating in South Vietnam’s southern provinces. The II Field Force had its headquarters there. By the end of the war, Long Binh contained major surgical hospitals, numerous restaurants, several movie theaters, 12 Olympicsized swimming pools, a like number of tennis courts, 2 bowling alleys, and a variety of other establishments. Post exchanges, also known as PXs, offered many amenities enjoyed in the United States. The 18th Engineer Brigade also constructed six cargo barge unloading points on the Saigon River near the Long Binh Depot. Vast amounts of war supplies, from ammunition to petroleum products and Zippo lighters, flowed through the redistribution facilities at Long Binh. A large number of military and civilian personnel and associated equipment were required for these support facilities. The base also served as a replacement depot and transit base for personnel arriving in or departing from Vietnam. In addition, Long Binh contained the U.S. Army prison for Vietnam. Known by troops as LBJ (for Long Binh Jail), the facility had a reputation for uncompromising discipline and harsh living conditions. On August 29, 1968, hundreds of prisoners there rioted, and military police ruthlessly crushed the insurrection. Long Binh epitomized the dichotomy of the war in Vietnam. Freshly showered support troops lounged in air-conditioned barracks while combat troops fought and died in the steamy jungles and rice paddies. Throughout the war, the Viet Cong (VC) targeted Long Binh for rocket and mortar attacks, as they did all U.S. bases. As part of the Communist 1968 Tet Offensive, a VC regiment attacked the base but was repelled with heavy losses during a counterattack by the 199th Light Infantry Brigade. VC sappers, however, did manage to penetrate the ammo dump at Long Binh and blow up several pallets of ammunition. In 1975 People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) forces destroyed the base during the Ho Chi Minh Campaign. STANLEY S. MCGOWEN See also United States Army, Vietnam, Installation Stockade References Clarke, Jeffrey J. Advice and Support: The Final Years; The U.S. Army in Vietnam. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988. Dunn, Lieutenant General Carroll H. Vietnam Studies: Base Development in South Vietnam, 1965–1970. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1972. Sheehan, Neil. A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam. New York: Random House, 1988. Stanton, Shelby L. The Rise and Fall of an American Army: The U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985. Westmoreland, William C. A Soldier Reports. New York: Doubleday, 1976.
Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrols
Long Chieng Main military base of the anti-Communist Hmong irregular forces in Laos, located in a valley in the southwestern corner of Xieng Khouang Province. Long Chieng was off-limits to the press because of sensitivity on the part of the U.S. embassy in Vientiane to the presence of Americans on the ground supporting the Hmong troops and their T-28 aircraft as well as other Americans flying in light aircraft as forward air controllers. Late in the Vietnam War, however, journalists managed to visit Long Chieng, incurring the wrath of Hmong commander General Vang Pao. ARTHUR J. DOMMEN See also Laos; Vang Pao References Hamilton-Merritt, Jane. Tragic Mountains: The Hmong, the Americans, and the Secret Wars for Laos, 1942–1992. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993. Savada, Andrea Matles, ed. Laos: A Country Study. Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1995.
Long-Range Electronic Navigation Navigation system that uses two or more pairs of ground-based transmitting stations to allow the crew of an aircraft (or ship) to find their position. Long-range Electronic Navigation (LORAN) was developed by the United States during World War II and was based on the British GEE Radio Navigation System. The U.S.developed system had a range of up to three times as far as the GEE system and thus became the standard for such navigation applications. The master unit of each pair of ground-transmitting stations transmits a series of pulses, each repeated by the slave station located several hundred miles away. Because the period between the signals of the two stations is fixed and known, the length of time between the reception of each signal can be used to determine how much closer the aircraft is to one station than to the other. This time difference is determined either by computer or by plotting the signal on an oscilloscope. A second pair of stations allows the crew to triangulate to derive its precise position. The system operates at ranges up to several thousand miles, but accuracy deteriorates at longer distances. Under ideal conditions, LORAN systems can be accurate to within 100 yards. The Vietnam War was the first conflict in which fighter-bomber aircraft attempted to strike with precision under adverse weather conditions and at night. The advent of electronic navigation aids such as LORAN and Tactical Air Control and Navigation (TACAN) systems made these attempts possible. LORAN was the more useful system because its signals were impossible to corrupt and because, unlike TACAN, it allowed the aircraft to remain electronically “quiet.” This radio silence made the incoming aircraft more difficult to track and defend against, improving survivability.
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LORAN-guided strikes were less accurate than visual navigation and bombing, however. Employed extensively during Operation LINEBACKER II (December 1972) against storage facilities and power transformers, such strikes proved only marginally effective. LORAN does have some limitations. Its signals can be affected by certain adverse weather conditions and the ionospeheric effects that occur around sunup and sundown. Magnetic storms as well as strong sunspots can also interfere with the system’s functions. LORAN systems remain in use, but they are being quickly rendered obsolete by far more sophisticated navigational devices, especially Global Navigation Satellite Systems, which rely on the highly accurate and fast Global Positioning System (GPS). Indeed, in 2009 the U.S. Office of Management and Budget identified the current LORAN system as outdated and recommended that its support be discontinued, resulting in a savings of some $40 million per year. MATTHEW A. CRUMP AND PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR. See also Airpower, Role in War; Electronic Intelligence; LINEBACKER II, Operation References Glister, Herman L. The Air War in Southeast Asia: Case Studies of Selected Campaigns. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1993. Pierce, J. A., et al., eds. LORAN: Long Range Navigation. Massachusetts Institute of Technology Radiation Laboratory Series. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1948. Williams, J. E. D. From Sails to Satellites: The Origin and Development of Navigational Science. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.
Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrols Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRPs) were a tactical innovation developed by U.S. forces and their allies. LRRP teams were a response to the type of war being fought in Vietnam—in which front lines were nonexistent and enemy locations were unknown—and to the rugged terrain, most of which was mountainous jungle that provided easy concealment of staging and base areas and supply routes. The first LRRP teams consisted of special reconnaissance units organized by the U.S. Army Special Forces as part of Operation LEAPING LENA. Detachment B-52 was organized under this program in May 1964 and eventually grew to include 93 Special Forces soldiers and more than 1,200 personnel from the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Detachment B-52 was initially responsible for training South Vietnamese Special Forces as well as the South Vietnamese belonging to the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) in long-range reconnaissance patrolling and intelligence gathering. In June 1964 Operation LEAPING LENA was transferred to U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), and became Project Delta, with its own LRRP and intelligence-gathering mission. Organized into three parts—a reconnaissance component, a reaction
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Members of a Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) team exit a Boeing CH-46 Chinook helicopter, January 1967. (National Archives)
force, and a command section—Project Delta consisted of 600 personnel. The typical reconnaissance element contained eight patrol teams of 4 Vietnamese or ethnic members and 16 reconnaissance teams of 2 Special Forces soldiers and 4 indigenous personnel. The reaction force was usually a battalion equivalent. For Project Delta, this force was an Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) Ranger battalion, while other units used Montagnards. The reaction force was organized into 12 reconnaissance teams, the mission of which was to collect intelligence on Communist troop movements, assess bomb damage, coordinate artillery and air strikes, and conduct special operations. Project Delta also had 12 so-called Roadrunner teams that conducted reconnaissance along trail networks. Based at Nha Trang, Project Delta was under the control of MACV and was used throughout South Vietnam. In September 1966 Project Delta received the additional duty of training LRRP teams being organized by other U.S. Army units. In August 1966 an additional Special Forces LRRP unit, Detachment B-50 (Project Omega), was formed at Ban Me Thuot in the II Corps Tactical Zone. The detachment consisted of 127 Special Forces soldiers and 894 ethnic troops. Similar in organization to Project Delta, it was placed under the control of I Field Force Vietnam. At the same time a third unit, Detachment B-56 (Project Sigma), was formed at Ho Ngoc Tao, near Saigon, and was under the control of II Field Force Vietnam. In November 1967 Omega and Sigma were taken over by the MACV Special Operations Group. The Special Forces had other highly classified intelligence collection units such as Detachment B-57 (Project Gamma), which
conducted LRRP missions into Cambodia. Another highly classified unit was MACV’s Studies and Observation Group, which included U.S. Army Special Forces, U.S. Navy SEALs (Sea Air Land teams), and U.S. Marine Corps reconnaissance personnel who conducted cross-border patrols and other tasks. The early success of the LRRP concept prompted MACV commander General William C. Westmoreland in 1966 to order all divisions and separate brigades to form their own LRRP units on a priority basis, even while formal Department of the Army approval was still pending. The shortage of trained soldiers, however, prevented this order from being immediately carried out. The 196th Infantry Brigade, for example, arrived in Vietnam in August 1966 but did not form LRRP teams until January 1967. As a result, many LRRP teams were raised informally before specially trained men became available. By the time of the first American troop withdrawals in 1969, most units had created LRRP teams. LRRPs raised outside of the Special Forces generally consisted of a platoon organized by a division’s cavalry squadron, which had always had reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering missions. Beginning in 1967 several separate LRRP companies were organized, including the only U.S. Army National Guard rifle company to serve in Vietnam, Indiana’s Company D, 151st Infantry. Later converted to Companies C through I and K through P, 75th Infantry (Ranger), these soldiers were assigned to U.S. Army divisions and separate infantry brigades as LRRPs. Allied contingents created their own LRRP units. The Australians, for example, deployed a Special Air Service squadron to South Vietnam in April 1966 to perform LRRP functions in Phuoc Tuy Province in the III Corps Tactical Zone. CLAYTON D. LAURIE See also Australia; Civilian Irregular Defense Group; Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; Montagnards; Project Delta; Project Omega; Project Sigma; Studies and Observation Group; United States Special Forces; Westmoreland, William Childs References Keely, Francis J. U.S. Army Special Forces, 1961–1971. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973. Stanton, Shelby L. Rangers at War: Combat Recon in Vietnam. New York: Orion, 1992. Stanton, Shelby L. U.S. Army and Allied Ground Forces in Vietnam Order of Battle. Washington, DC: U.S. News Books, 1981.
Lon Nol Birth Date: November 13, 1913 Death Date: November 17, 1985 Cambodian Army officer; prime minister (1966–1967, 1969– 1972); and after the overthrow of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, president of the short-lived Khmer Republic (1972–1975) prior to the takeover by the Khmer Rouge. Born in Prey Veng Province,
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General Lon Nol, the president of Cambodia’s new Salvation Government, addresses a rally in Phnom Penh, April 11, 1970. (AP/Wide World Photos)
Cambodia, on November 13, 1913, Lon Nol was the grandson of a Khmer Krom (ethnic Cambodian resident of Vietnam) official from Tay Ninh and the son of a district chief in the Cambodian civil service. Lon Nol was educated at the Lycée Chasseloup Laubat in Saigon from 1928 to 1934. Starting as a magistrate, he rose through the ranks to become a deputy governor in 1945. He held important posts, notably in the armed forces, throughout the Sihanouk period. Lon Nol was sufficiently popular with the Cambodian elite that at a National Congress convoked by Sihanouk in August 1969 Lon Nol received the highest number of votes (115) among 10 possible candidates to head a “national salvation” government to deal with mounting economic and foreign problems. Prince Sisowath Sirik Matak received the second-highest number of votes (99). These were the two men who were to emerge within months as Cambodia’s leaders. However, they were extraordinarily reluctant leaders. Both declined the offer by the Cambodian National Assembly to form the new government, and it was only on Sihanouk’s virtual order that Lon Nol finally agreed to become prime minister. Lon Nol has often been accused of plotting Sihanouk’s overthrow, but during most of the crucial period preceding the National Assembly’s vote of no confidence on Sihanouk, Lon Nol was not even in Cambodia. From October 30, 1969, to February 18, 1970, he was undergoing medical treatment in France, having left
Sirik Matak in charge in Phnom Penh. Whatever ambitions Lon Nol may have harbored at that point, his actions were hardly those of a coup plotter. Lon Nol met with Sihanouk when the latter arrived in Europe on one of his regular annual foreign tours at the beginning of January 1970 and reportedly persuaded the prince to sanction tougher measures against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and the Viet Cong (VC) in their operations inside Cambodia, notably denying them the requisitioning of rice and other supplies and the use of base camps opposite the border of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) to support offensives against the Saigon government. In February 1970 the small Cambodian Army began artillery bombardments against People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) and VC positions on Cambodian soil, and in one of his first moves on returning to Phnom Penh, Lon Nol called in all outstanding 500-riel notes, thereby creating chaos with the Communist Vietnamese rice-purchasing operations. On March 8, 1970, the first of a series of anti-Vietnamese demonstrations occurred in Svay Rieng, a province containing large North Vietnamese base areas. Four days later Lon Nol sent Sihanouk a telegram through the Cambodian embassy in Paris demanding that Cambodia’s military forces be increased to 100,000 men. Sihanouk was outraged by publication of the message and
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shouted threats of execution against his ministers, which were reported back to Phnom Penh, so frightening Lon Nol that he decided to join with Sirik Matak in ousting Sihanouk. However, on the night before the decisive vote in the National Assembly, Lon Nol reportedly had to be persuaded at gunpoint by Sirik Matak to sign a document authorizing the ouster. The next day, March 18, after a debate in which Sihanouk’s conduct was criticized by all speakers, Sihanouk was voted out. Cheng Heng, chairman of the National Assembly, became head of state pending election of a new head of state under the constitution. Lon Nol and Sirik Matak remained as prime minister and deputy prime minister, respectively. The deputies’ anger against Sihanouk had been further stoked by news of an abortive attempt by the head of the national police, Colonel Oum Manorine, a half brother of Sihanouk’s wife, Monique, to arrest Lon Nol. Faced with the determination of PAVN and VC forces to hang on to their valuable Cambodian sanctuaries and sources of supply in addition to the growing threat posed by an indigenous Khmer Communist movement headed by Pol Pot, whose forces increasingly took over the fighting from the Vietnamese, the government in Phnom Penh blundered from one failure to another. Its rapid loss of control of most of the provinces was not helped by massive military maneuvers along the main roads, and Phnom Penh itself became a beleaguered city crowded with refugees. The country’s economy, already seriously strained, collapsed. A pogrom against Vietnamese residents resulted in many thousands of civilian deaths. The Chinese merchant class fled. Some foreign journalists disappeared a few miles outside the capital, and it was later discovered that they had been executed by the xenophobic guerrillas. In this crisis Lon Nol showed a definite and surprising lack of leadership. Despite the fact that in March 1972 he announced that he was taking over from Cheng Heng as head of state in a new Khmer Republic to be approved by popular referendum, Lon Nol relied increasingly on mystical solutions. Always a superstitious man, he called the Vietnamese thmil, the Khmer word for the evil spirits that lurked in the forests. He consulted astrologers with increasing frequency. Resisting suggestions that he step down to pave the way for a negotiated armistice with Sihanouk in Beijing, he stayed on doggedly. But Lon Nol faced real health problems, and a few weeks before the Khmer Rouge entered Phnom Penh in 1975 he departed for Hawaii to receive medical treatment. He then moved to California and died there in Fullerton on November 17, 1985. ARTHUR J. DOMMEN See also Cambodia; Khmer Rouge; Pol Pot; Sihanouk, Norodom References Chandler, David P. The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution since 1945. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991. Hamel, Bernard. Sihanouk et le Drame Cambodgien. Paris: Editions L’Harmattan, 1993.
Kirk, Donald. Wider War: The Struggle for Cambodia, Thailand, and Laos. New York: Praeger, 1971.
LORRAINE,
Operation
Start Date: October 1952 End Date: November 1952 French military operation mounted in some haste against Viet Minh base areas in order to compel Viet Minh commander General Vo Nguyen Giap to return divisions to their defense and abandon his campaign to conquer the Thai Highlands. Giap, aware of the limitations of French heavy equipment in the earlier battles around the Red River Delta, had decided to attack across the top of the Indochinese peninsula. This would force the French to fight at long range in difficult terrain, and Giap reasoned that the French would find it difficult, if not impossible, to bring their heavy equipment to bear against his forces there. French military commander in Indochina General Raoul Salan committed more than 30,000 men to Operation LORRAINE. The largest French operation of the Indochina War, LORRAINE involved four motorized or armored regimental combat teams, three airborne battalions, five commando formations, two tank-destroyer squadrons, two naval assault divisions (Dinassauts), and assorted support groups. Operation LORRAINE began on October 29, 1952, and started out well. The French penetrated about 100 miles and took Phu Doan and Phu Yen Binh, two important Viet Minh supply centers west of Hanoi, capturing large amounts of arms, ammunition, and equipment (including Soviet-built trucks). The French never did reach the vital Viet Minh depots at Yen Bai, however. The operation bogged down on its long and precarious supply lines and was soon in reverse. On November 14 Salan halted LORRAINE, and the French began their withdrawal. Now fully alerted, the Viet Minh attacked retreating French units. Their 36th Regiment ambushed French Mobile Group 12 and Mobile Group 4 at Chan Muong. By December 1 the French had returned to their defensive positions along the so-called De Lattre Line, and Giap’s forces were still on the Laos border. Operation LORRAINE failed because Giap refused to abandon his strategy of leaving small units to fend for themselves, even if it meant sacrificing his 36th and 176th Infantry regiments. He was certain that such French operations would sooner or later come to an end. In fact, the larger the operation, the more likely it would be of short duration, for its component units, drafted just for the operation at hand, would soon be required elsewhere. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also CASTOR, Operation; Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; Dinassauts; Salan, Raoul Albin Louis; Vo Nguyen Giap
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References Davidson, Phillip A. Vietnam at War: The History, 1946–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1988. Fall, Bernard B. Street without Joy: The French Debacle in Indochina. Rev. ed. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1994. Fall, Bernard B. The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis. 2nd rev. ed. New York: Praeger, 1967. Gras, Yves. Histoire de la Guerre d’Indochine. Paris: Éditions Denoël, 1992.
Lowenstein, Allard Kenneth Birth Date: January 26, 1929 Death Date: March 14, 1980 Attorney, academic, liberal activist, and U.S. congressman who was best known for leading the challenge to President Lyndon B. Johnson’s renomination in 1968. Born on January 16, 1929, in Newark, New Jersey, Allard Kenneth Lowenstein graduated from the University of North Carolina in 1949 and from Yale University Law School in 1954. Perpetually active in liberal causes, he criticized South African apartheid, participated in the U.S. Civil Rights Movement, and actively opposed the Vietnam War. Lowenstein taught at Stanford University, North Carolina State University, and City College of New York. He also served as special assistant to U.S. senator Frank Porter Graham and in 1959 served on the staff of Senator Hubert H. Humphrey as a foreign policy assistant. The following year Lowenstein was a delegate to the Democratic National Convention. Convinced that President Johnson would not de-escalate in Vietnam, Lowenstein and Curtis Gans organized what some called the “Dump Johnson” movement to replace Johnson as the 1968 Democratic presidential candidate. They enticed Senator Eugene McCarthy to run and helped mobilize younger campaign workers, who propelled McCarthy to a shocking near defeat of Johnson in the New Hampshire primary. This showing convinced Senator Robert Kennedy to enter the Democratic race and helped persuade Johnson to withdraw. Lowenstein was an official delegate to the raucous 1968 Democratic National Convention in 1968. That same year Lowenstein won election to the U.S. House of Representatives from New York. However, he served only one term, which ended in January 1971. He lost subsequent congressional campaigns in 1972, 1974, 1976, and 1978. He also served as national chair of the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) during 1971–1973. As head of the ADA he organized a “Dump Nixon” campaign. Although Nixon went on to win reelection in 1972, Lowenstein’s efforts to torpedo Nixon’s reelection bid reportedly resulted in his being placed on the president’s infamous “Enemies List.” In 1977 President Jimmy Carter appointed Lowenstein to lead the American delegation to the United Nations (UN) Commission
Democratic congressman from New York Allard Lowenstein was an outspoken critic of U.S. involvement in Vietnam and a leader in the movement to oppose President Lyndon Johnson’s renomination in 1968. (AP/Wide World Photos)
on Human Rights. From August 1978 he was the alternate U.S. representative for Special Political Affairs at the UN with the rank of ambassador. Lowenstein was shot to death in his New York City office by Dennis Sweeney, a former student, on March 14, 1980. Sweeney, who was mentally ill, had come to believe that Lowenstein was plotting to kill him. MITCHELL K. HALL See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Elections, U.S., 1968; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, Robert Francis; McCarthy, Eugene Joseph; Nixon, Richard Milhous References Chafe, William H. Never Stop Running: Allard Lowenstein and the Struggle to Save American Liberalism. New York: Basic Books, 1993. Cummings, Richard. The Pied Piper: Allard K. Lowenstein and the Liberal Dream. New York: Grove, 1985. Harris, David. Dreams Die Hard. New York: St. Martin’s, 1982.
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Luce, Henry Robinson Birth Date: April 3, 1898 Death Date: February 28, 1967 U.S. publishing magnate, influential opinion maker, and prominent internationalist. Born on April 3, 1898, in Dengzhou (Tengchow), Shandong (Shantung) Province, China, the son of a Presbyterian missionary, Henry Robinson Luce enrolled at the elite Hotchkiss Preparatory School in Connecticut, graduated from Yale University in 1920, and studied at Oxford during 1920– 1921. A brilliant student, Luce edited Yale’s newspaper with fellow publishing enthusiast Briton Hadden. In 1923 Hadden and Luce launched Time magazine, which quickly became a major success. When Hadden died in 1928, Luce became head of the burgeoning publishing empire. Luce married playwright and future Republican politician Clare Booth in 1935. The next year he brought out Life, the first successful photojournalism magazine. Keenly attuned to popular trends, in 1954 Luce launched Sports Illustrated, appealing to Americans’ love of entertainment sports. Luce believed that Americans knew too little about the outside world, so he emphasized international news coverage in many of his magazines. Luce’s pro-American, procapitalist reading of global events strongly influenced the American public’s percep-
tions of the larger world. In the 1920s and early 1930s Luce was attracted to fascism; his magazines published admiring portrayals of Italy’s Benito Mussolini and Spain’s Francisco Franco. Later, however, Luce opposed the Axis powers in World War II. In an influential February 1941 editorial in Life magazine titled “The American Century,” he called for U.S. entry into World War II and the need to accept global responsibilities. Luce’s strong anticommunism, devotion to the Republican Party, and youthful experiences in China shaped his support for Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) and the Nationalist cause. Jiang appeared on more Time magazine covers than any other world leader. Like the so-called China Lobby, Luce refused to recognize the 1949 success of the Chinese Revolution, and his enormous influence helped preclude any alternative U.S. policy toward China for a generation. In the 1950s and early 1960s Luce promoted President Ngo Dinh Diem of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) as America’s new democratic champion in Asia. Luce and his publications backed both the Korean War and the Vietnam War. Luce died on February 28, 1967, in Phoenix, Arizona. MICHAEL E. DONOGHUE See also China, People’s Republic of; Containment Policy; Jiang Jieshi; Mao Zedong; Ngo Dinh Diem References Baughman, James L. Henry R. Luce and the Rise of the American News Media. Boston: Twayne, 1987. Herzstein, Robert Edwin. Henry R. Luce: A Political Portrait of the Man Who Created the American Century. New York: Scribner, 1994.
Luc Luong Dac Biet See Vietnam, Republic of, Special Forces
Lu Han Birth Date: ca. 1895 Death Date: 1974
Henry R. Luce (1898–1967) was a publishing magnate. He helped found Time magazine, published Life, and founded Sports Illustrated. Luce emphasized international news coverage in many of his magazines and helped shape American perceptions of the world. (Library of Congress)
General commanding Chinese troops who in 1945 occupied northern Vietnam. A member of the ethnic Lolo minority, Lu Han was born in China either in 1895 or 1896 and was considered the key lieutenant of Long Van, governor of the Chinese province of Yunnan. In August 1945 Lu commanded Chinese armed forces that accepted the Japanese surrender in northern Indochina. Lu arrived in Hanoi on September 14, 1945. At a news conference the next day at Don Thuy, Hanoi, Lu announced that China was sending 200,000 men to enter Vietnam by Lang Son, Lao Cai, Lai Chau, Ha Giang, and Mong Cay and that they would be stationed throughout the region north of the 16th Parallel. He stated that the Chinese mission was to disarm the Japa-
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nese and not to interfere in the internal affairs of Vietnam. But in fact the Chinese brought with them Nguyen Hai Than, an exiled Vietnamese and leader of the Vietnam National Party (Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang) with the plan of installing a government led by Than to replace that of Ho Chi Minh. In October 1945 Lu was appointed governor of Yunnan but remained commander of Chinese Armed Forces in northern Indochina. He left Hanoi in 1946 and surrendered to the Chinese Communist forces in 1949. Little is known about his activities or whereabouts after that time. Lu died in 1974, presumably in China. NGO NGOC TRUNG
during his imprisonment, Quyen committed suicide to make it easier for the revolutionary troops to withdraw. NGO NGOC TRUNG
See also China, People’s Republic of; Ho Chi Minh; Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, 1945–1954; Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang
Birth Date: Unknown Death Date: 547
References Hsu, Immanuel C. Y. The Rise of Modern China. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997.
Luong Ngoc Quyen Birth Date: 1890 Death Date: August 31, 1917 Prominent Vietnamese nationalist and leader of an uprising against the French in 1917. Born in 1890 at Nhi Khue village, Thuong Tin District, Ha Dong Province, a suburb of Hanoi, Luong Ngoc Quyen (also known as Luong Lap Nham) was the son of Luong Van Can, a famous patriotic scholar who founded Dong Kinh Nghia Thuc, the first public school established by Vietnamese in Hanoi. In 1905 Quyen went to Japan, where he was introduced to Phan Boi Chau and enrolled in the Chan Vo Military Academy. Quyen, his younger brother Luong Nghi Khanh, and friends Nguyen Dien and Nguyen Thuc Canh were the first four Vietnamese students to study in Japan. Quyen also attended military training schools in Canton and Peking (Beijing), China. In December 1915 British police in Hong Kong arrested Quyen and handed him over to French authorities. Returned to Hanoi, he was then tried and sentenced to life in prison. Held in Thai Nguyen Prison, he was brutally tortured there. His staunch patriotism, however, led to the recruitment of numerous Vietnamese soldiers in the French colonial administration, including Trinh Van Can (also known as Doi Can). On the night of August 31, 1917, an uprising occurred in Thai Nguyen Province led by Doi Can. Some 300 soldiers participated, and Quyen was released and became adviser and deputy commander. The rebels managed to control the province for one week until French reinforcements arrived from Hanoi and forced them to retreat into the jungle. Handicapped by the torture he endured
See also French Indochina, 1860s–1946; Phan Boi Chau Reference Le Thanh Khoi. Le Viet-Nam: Histoire et civilisation. Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1955.
Ly Bon
Ly Bon (also known as Ly Bi) was a military official of Chinese ancestry in Duc Province who in 541 CE led a sizable rebellion against Chinese rule. Duc Province was located at the mouth of the Ca River. The rebellion followed the introduction of higher taxes by Xiao Zi (Hsiao Tzu), the Chinese governor of Giao Chi (northern Tonkin). Bon joined another Chinese official, Tinh Thieu, to lead the revolt and also secured the support of Trieu Tuc, the leader of Chu-dien between the Day and Han rivers. Bon probably moved north from Duc into Ai. Tuc’s adherence to the revolt opened Chu-dien, allowing Bon’s forces to advance into the Red River Delta to Bi. Recognizing the hopelessness of their position, the Chinese withdrew. Reportedly, Hsiao Tzu was forced to bribe his way to freedom. The Chinese response was swift. Emperor Wu of the Liang dynasty ordered Sun Qiong (Sun Ch’iung) of Gao (Kao) and Lu Zixiong (Lu Tzu-hsiung) of Xin (Hsin), governors of the two provinces west of Guangdong (Canton), to subdue the revolt. With the rainy season about to begin and with it the heightened possibility of malaria, the two governors requested a postponement. With this denied, their army moved against the rebels. The army reached Hepu (Ho-p’u), but the reported cost was 60–70 percent of its numbers dead. It is not clear whether the casualties were from disease, rebel military action, or a combination of the two. What remained of the Chinese forces now withdrew. Qiong and Zixiong were then made scapegoats and were falsely accused of being in league with the rebels. Summoned to Guang (Kuang), the two were executed. In 543 the king of Lin-i invaded Duc, but it is not clear whether this was at the instigation of Liang dynasty officials. Bon dispatched a Bi official and general, Pham Tu, against the Lin-i army. Defeated, the Lin-i then withdrew. At the beginning of 544, Bon proclaimed himself the emperor of Nam Viet. He called his new state Van Xuan (“Ten Thousand Springs”). He took the reigning name of Thieu-duc (“Heavenly Virtue”). Bon’s base of operations was probably Gia Ninh at the head of the Red River Delta where the river is joined by its two principal tributaries, but his territory reportedly included virtually the entire Red River Delta area from Lang Son to the border with
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Lin Yi (the Champa kingdom). He built a palace called Van Tho (“Ten Thousand Life Spans”). Bon organized his court along traditional Chinese lines. He may have provided support to the Buddhist religion, and it is believed that he erected a temple to the memory of Trieu Au (Lady Trieu), leader of the 248 CE Vietnamese uprising against Chinese rule. Bon’s chief preoccupations were to keep peace at home and prevent foreign invasion, including attacks by the mountain tribes known as the Lao. In 545 another Chinese army invaded, this one led by Chen Baxian (Ch’en Pa-hsien) that most likely came by sea. Baxian defeated Bon in the lower Red River Delta, and Bon withdrew to near present-day Hanoi, where he was again defeated. He then withdrew to his citadel at Gia Ninh, which Baxian besieged and captured early in 546. Bon escaped into the nearby mountains, where he rallied what remained of his army. Winning the support of some of the Lao, by autumn he had put together an army of some 20,000 men on the shores of Dien Triet Lake and began the construction of boats to cross the lake and attack the Chinese. The Chinese attacked first, caught Bon by surprise, and defeated him in the Battle of Dien Triet Lake of 546. Bon escaped into the mountains, but he was killed the next year by the Lao, who sent his head sent to the Chinese to collect the bounty placed on it. Resistance continued against the Chinese for a time under Bon’s elder brother Ly Thien Bao, who reportedly raised as many as 20,000 men and again secured control of Bac. Bao then marched on Ai, but Baxian returned and defeated him and drove him back into the mountains. Despite strong Tang rule, Vietnamese revolts against the Chinese continued to occur sporadically thereafter. Baxian subsequently took power in China, becoming Emperor Wu, founder of the Chen dynasty that ruled over parts of China roughly south of the Huai River from 557 to 589. SPENCER C. TUCKER
Staughton Lynd was born on November 22, 1929, in Philadelphia to the noted sociologists Robert and Helen Lynd, authors of the classic sociological study Middletown. In 1951 Staughton Lynd graduated from Harvard University and married Alice Niles. Inducted into the U.S. Army in 1953 as a noncombatant conscientious objector, Lynd later received a discharge for his leftist politics at Harvard. He earned a PhD in history from Columbia University in 1962 and, while teaching at Atlanta’s Spelman College in the early 1960s, became active in the Civil Rights Movement. Indeed, Lynd directed the Freedom Schools during the Mississippi Freedom Summer in 1964 before moving to a position at Yale University. An early participant in the Vietnam antiwar movement, Lynd chaired the April 1965 Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) march in Washington and spoke that spring at a teach-in in Berkeley, California. In August 1965 he helped organize the Assembly of Unrepresented People, which dealt with Vietnam and domestic social issues, and he was among the founders of the National Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam. His greatest notoriety came when he traveled to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) in December 1965 with fellow activists Tom Hayden and Herbert Aptheker to hear North Vietnamese terms for peace and encourage a negotiated settlement of the war. The trip violated federal law and temporarily resulted in the cancellation of Lynd’s passport, although the courts restored it on appeal.
See also Dien Triet Lake, Battle of; Trieu Au; Vietnam, History of, Prehistory to 938 CE References Chapuis, Oscar M. A History of Vietnam: From Hong Bang to Tu Duc. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1995. Taylor, Keith Weller. The Birth of Vietnam. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983. Tucker, Spencer C. Vietnam. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1999.
Lynd, Staughton Birth Date: November 22, 1929 American attorney, author, historian, teacher, radical Quaker pacifist, and New Left intellectual who operated at the center of antiwar activism throughout most of the Vietnam War era.
Longtime American civil rights activist and pacifist Staughton Lynd here poses with his cancelled passport after he defied a ban on travel to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) in January 1966. (Bettmann/Corbis)
Lynd, Staughton Lynd’s radicalism revealed itself in his stance for nonexclusion of Marxists in coalition activities and his endorsement of nonviolent civil disobedience. He also preferred attacking the system from without rather than through electoral politics, which he believed diverted the movement away from fundamental change. Lynd’s continued antiwar protests included partial income tax refusal, vigorous support for draft resistance, and sponsorship of the 1967 Spring Mobilization. He rejected, however, an offer to sit with the Bertrand Russell International War Crimes Tribunal in 1967 because Lynd believed that the tribunal accepted an ideological double standard regarding violence. His political activities seriously damaged his academic career. Yale denied him tenure in 1968, and other colleges refused him positions despite support from their history faculties. Disillusioned with the militant drift of the younger New Left, by 1971 Lynd became increasingly involved with economic issues and organizing steelworkers. He and his wife moved to Chicago and undertook community organizing in the inner city. With his academic career limited, he graduated from the University of Chicago Law School in 1976 and pursued labor law, most notably with the steel industry of northeastern Ohio. Lynd has written several books
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and numerous articles on both scholarly and political subjects. His latest book, Stepping Stones: Memoir of a Life Together was released in 2009 and is a memoir that covers both his life and that of his wife Alice. Lynd still maintains his law license in Ohio, and he and his wife are still activists in the Youngstown, Ohio, area. MITCHELL K. HALL See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Hayden, Thomas Emmett; National Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam; Selective Service; Spring Mobilization to End the War in Vietnam References Finn, James. Protest: Pacifism and Politics. New York: Random House, 1967. Hayden, Tom. Reunion: A Memoir. New York: Random House, 1988. Lynd, Staughton. Stepping Stones: Memoir of a Life Together. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009. Lyttle, Bradford. The Chicago Anti-Vietnam War Movement. Chicago: Midwest Pacifist Center, 1988. Moritz, Charles, ed. Current Biography Yearbook. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1983. Zaroulis, N. C., and Gerald Sullivan. Who Spoke Up? American Protest against the War in Vietnam, 1963–1975. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1984.
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M MacArthur, Douglas Birth Date: January 26, 1880 Death Date: April 5, 1964 U.S. Army general. Born on January 26, 1880, at Little Rock Barracks, Arkansas, the son of U.S. Army lieutenant general Arthur MacArthur, Douglas MacArthur graduated from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, in 1903. He then served in the Philippines and Mexico (where he won the Medal of Honor). In World War I he helped organize the 42nd Division (“Rainbow”) and was its first chief of staff. Later he commanded the division in battle. After the war he was superintendent of West Point (1919–1922), commander of the Philippines Department (1928–1930), and chief of staff of the U.S. Army (1930–1935). In 1936 the Philippines government appointed him field marshal to reorganize its military; he retired from the U.S. Army in 1937. With war imminent, MacArthur was recalled to active U.S. service as a lieutenant general and named commander of U.S. forces in the Far East. He has been roundly criticized for his role in the 1941 loss of the Philippines, but for a variety of reasons he was retained and was made supreme commander of Allied forces in the southwestern Pacific. MacArthur convinced President Franklin Roosevelt of the need to retake the Philippines, and MacArthur’s handling of that campaign was highly praised. Promoted to the rank of general of the army, after the war MacArthur was military governor and virtual dictator of Japan. He also commanded the U.S. Far Eastern Command. After the June 25, 1950, invasion of the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea), MacArthur became supreme commander of United Nations (UN) forces in Korea. He may have
actually encouraged the North Korean invasion of South Korea by specifically excluding Korea from the U.S. defense perimeter, but he responded energetically to the invasion, and his plan for an amphibious landing at Inchon worked out just as planned in September 1950 and helped bring about the collapse of North Korean forces. MacArthur’s subsequent strategic dispositions afterward were unsound, however, and he completely underestimated the intent and scale of the Chinese military intervention. In October 1950 during a meeting with President Harry S. Truman on Wake Island, MacArthur virtually guaranteed that the Chinese would not intervene in the war and that if they did they would be annihilated. Ignoring warning probes by the Chinese into North Korea in October 1950, MacArthur was caught completely off guard by the massive Chinese intervention that came in late November. Believing that there was “no substitute for victory,” the general clashed with the concept of limited war now advocated by President Harry S. Truman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), who thought that primary U.S. attention should reside in Europe and the threat posed there by the Soviet Union. In late March 1951 after a series of moves and statements that were at odds with the administration’s directives, MacArthur communicated critical views regarding the conduct of the war directly to members of Congress. President Truman dismissed him on April 11. MacArthur returned to a hero’s welcome and then retired. A bid for a presidential nomination collapsed because of his imperious personality, and General Dwight D. Eisenhower became the 1952 Republican presidential nominee and in November was elected president. MacArthur strongly advocated U.S. policies that would lead to military defeat of the Chinese armies in Korea. When he learned of the July 1953 armistice there, he said that it was the “death
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General Douglas MacArthur addresses a crowd of some 50,000 people at Soldier Field, Chicago, in April 1951, after his relief from command by President Harry Truman. Although a staunch anti-Communist, shortly before his death in 1964, MacArthur warned President Lyndon B. Johnson not to commit U.S. ground forces to Vietnam. (National Archives)
warrant” for French Indochina. He frequently expressed the view that the United States should avoid becoming involved in a nonnuclear land war in Asia. He reportedly told President John F. Kennedy that there was no end of Asian manpower; even if the United States sent 1 million men there, they would still be outnumbered on every side. MacArthur is also reported as having told Kennedy that solving U.S. domestic problems should have a higher priority than the war in Vietnam. Shortly before his death, MacArthur also warned President Lyndon B. Johnson not to commit U.S. ground forces to Vietnam or anywhere else on the Asian mainland. It is thus indeed ironic that MacArthur was regarded as a prophet by those who argued for an unremitting anti-Communist Asian crusade. MacArthur died at Walter Reed Hospital in Washington, D.C., on April 5, 1964. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Korean War; Truman, Harry S. References James, D. Clayton. The Years of MacArthur, Vol. 3, Triumph and Disaster, 1945–1964. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985.
Manchester, William. American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur, 1880–1964. London: Arrow Books, 1978. Schaller, Michael. Douglas MacArthur: Far Eastern General. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.
MACARTHUR,
Operation
Start Date: October 13, 1967 End Date: January 31, 1969 Military operation beginning on October 13, 1967, by the U.S. 4th Infantry Division in the western Central Highlands. In its 1967 phase, it became commonly known as the Battle of Dak To. When Operation GREELEY ended on October 12, 1967, only a single 4th Infantry Division battalion remained in Kontum Province until a reinforced People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) division again threatened the Dak To Special Forces camp, hoping to draw in allied troops and destroy an American brigade. Acting Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), commander General Creighton Abrams (General William Westmoreland was in Washington) countered by deploying 16 maneuver battalions, including the 4th Infantry Division, the 173rd Airborne,
MACARTHUR, Operation
the 1st Cavalry Division’s 1st Brigade, six Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) battalions, an aviation battalion, artillery batteries, and logistical units. Completely undetected, PAVN forces under the command of 1st Division Commander Nguyen Huu An, who had commanded PAVN forces in the Battle of the Ia Drang Valley in November 1965, had spent months establishing well-fortified positions on the peaks and ridgelines overlooking Dak To. During November 3–4, companies of the 4th Infantry Division’s 3rd Battalion, 12th Infantry (3-12 Infantry), and 3rd Battalion, 8th Infantry (3-8 Infantry), successfully cleared out PAVN positions on hills south and southwest of Dak To, but on November 6 Task Force Black of the 173rd Airborne’s 4th Battalion, 503rd Infantry (4-503 Infantry) took heavy casualties while attempting to establish a firebase on Hill 823 south of Ban Het. Though reinforced by companies of the 4-503 Infantry and the 1st Battalion, 503rd Infantry (1-503 Infantry), the American paratroopers were caught in a deadly U-shaped ambush on November 11 by the PAVN 66th Regiment. The jungle canopy made artillery and tactical air support ineffective. A lone helicopter took 35 hits while its crew attempted to drop a pallet of ammunition, only to see it fall outside the perimeter. By the time another company from the 4-503 Infantry landed in a prepared landing zone (LZ) north of the site and linked up with the stranded task force, U.S. losses were 20 killed, 154 wounded, and 2 missing. The PAVN lost at least 117 soldiers. Beginning on November 14, five ARVN battalions fought the PAVN 24th Regiment at Hill 1416 northeast of Dak To for four days before taking the hill, killing 247 PAVN soldiers. On November 15 PAVN mortar fire hit the Dak To airfield, touching off the ammunition dump and destroying two Lockheed C-130 Hercules cargo planes but causing only light personnel casualties. As more allied troops poured in, the PAVN 32nd and 66th regiments withdrew to entrenched positions to the southwest. The 3rd Battalion, 12th Infantry (3-12 Infantry), engaged the 32nd Regiment on Hill 1338 for two days, taking the summit after furious fighting. Meanwhile, the PAVN 174th Regiment occupied Hill 875, some 10 miles west of Dak To near the Cambodian border. On November 19, 173nd Airborne Brigade commander Brigadier General Leo H. Schweiter ordered the 2-503 Infantry to assault Hill 875. This would be the climax of the Battle of Dak To. Following artillery and air strikes, Companies C and D started up the northern slope but were stopped by automatic weapons and grenade fire coming from an intact system of interconnected bunkers. Waves of PAVN soldiers counterattacked and enveloped the Americans, virtually annihilating two platoons. In reserve 650 feet back, Company A was decimated by fire from the rear. With dozens already dead and hundreds wounded, the shattered battalion established an emergency perimeter. PAVN gunners shot down six helicopters, but one managed to drop pallets of ammunition inside the shrinking perimeter. Still, the battalion was left without food or water for 50 hours.
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Compounding the tragedy, an errant U.S. bomb fell inside the perimeter, instantly killing 42 men, including several officers, and horribly wounding 45 more. On November 20 companies of the 4-503 Infantry moved up the hill but did not reach the survivors’ perimeter until evening. At daybreak they cut an LZ from the jungle, and helicopters extracted the wounded. On November 22 helicopters brought in food and removed the dead, and following a seven-hour air and artillery barrage, the 4-503 Infantry resumed the attack up Hill 875. The advance reduced to a crawl as PAVN bunkers remained nearly impregnable and the defenders countered with mortar, rifle, and grenade fire. Despite dozens of casualties, the battalion captured two trench lines before digging in 250 feet from the crest. More air strikes turned the top of Hill 875 into a wasteland, and on November 23, Thanksgiving Day, the 1st Cavalry Division’s 1-12 Infantry joined the remaining troops of the 4-503 Infantry for a final attack. These reached the summit by noon, but the battered PAVN regiments already had decamped, leaving behind their dead and weapons, to descend the western slope into their Cambodian sanctuary. The battle for Hill 875 was over and essentially so was the Battle of Dak To. While the PAVN body count on Hill 875 was more than 300, the 2-503 Infantry lost 87 killed, more than 200 wounded, and 3 missing; the 4-503 Infantry lost 28 dead, nearly 200 wounded, and 4 missing. Throughout November, U.S. forces fired more than 170,000 artillery rounds into the mountains surrounding Dak To and flew more than 2,000 tactical air strikes and 300 Boeing B-52 Stratofortress sorties. At least 40 U.S. helicopters were lost. MACV reported PAVN losses as 1,644 dead, their costliest battle since the Ia Drang Valley campaign. The debate over whether the fight for Hill 875 was worth it continues. The cost of the Battle of Dak To was staggering: at least 73 ARVN lives in addition to the official count of 376 Americans killed and 1,441 wounded. Actual U.S. battle deaths probably exceeded 700, but this number was reported only in the context of the larger Operation MACARTHUR. The 173rd Airborne Brigade received a Presidential Unit Citation but was so decimated that it was never again deployed as a complete combat unit. Although shocked by the extent of U.S. casualties, General Westmoreland proclaimed that the Battle of Dak To signaled “the beginning of a great defeat for the enemy.” General Vo Nguyen Giap, defense minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), probably thought otherwise. Despite their heroism, U.S. forces, especially on Hill 875, were completely outmaneuvered by the PAVN troops who chose the time and place for the decisive engagement. They lured U.S. forces into the most rugged terrain in Vietnam, where the relative strengths of the opposing forces favored them. Although it is true that only the PAVN 24th Regiment would take part in the coming 1968 Tet Offensive, the other three PAVN regiments were not, as MACV claimed, “virtually destroyed.” However, in his postwar memoirs PAVN 1st Division commander Nguyen Huu An conceded that his division had been severely weakened by the losses it suffered during this
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battle and that these losses significantly affected its performance during the 1968 Tet Offensive. The 4th Infantry Division and assorted military units of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) continued to pursue the elusive Communist troops in Kontum and Pleiku, but there were no memorable battles throughout 1968. MACARTHUR became an undefined border-watch operation to inhibit PAVN infiltration. At the formal end of Operation MACARTHUR on January 31, 1969, MACV claimed a total of 5,731 PAVN/Viet Cong (VC) casualties. JOHN D. ROOT See also Abrams, Creighton Williams, Jr.; Body Count; Casualties; Dak To, Battle of; Fratricide; GREELEY, Operation; Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1965–1968; United States Army; Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, Army; Westmoreland, William Childs References Maitland, Terrence, and Peter McInerney. A Contagion of War. The Vietnam Experience Series. Boston: Boston Publishing, 1984. Murphy, Edward F. Dak To: The 173rd Airborne Brigade in South Vietnam’s Central Highlands, June–November 1967. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1993. Nguyen Huu An and Nguyen Tu Duong. Chien Truong Moi [New Battlefields]. Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 2002. Stanton, Shelby L. The Rise and Fall of an American Army: The U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985.
Machine Guns, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam The forerunner of the modern machine gun was the 1862 Gatling gun, a multibarreled weapon operated and fired by means of a hand-cranked mechanism. In 1883 the American Hiram Maxim invented the first true machine gun, a single-barrel weapon that used the recoil of each round to operate the action and fire the next round. The machine gun raised the rate of infantry firepower to unprecedented levels. By World War I the machine gun, known
as “the devil’s paintbrush,” had become the dominant weapon in ground combat. Modern machine guns are classified as heavy, medium, or light. Heavy machine guns are designed to be fired from an aircraft or a ground vehicle from either a fixed or flexible mount. Light machine guns are designed to be carried by infantry. Most are fired from a bipod or a light tripod but can be fired from the hip by a standing soldier in an emergency situation. Medium machine guns are usually vehicle-mounted, but they can be used by infantry on the ground if necessary. Almost all machine guns are fed by either a fabric or a disintegrating metal link belt that holds the bullets. Some light machine guns (mostly East European designs) are fed from a drum. All machine guns are classified as crew-served weapons (requiring more than one soldier to operate and service the weapon). The dominant tactical feature of the machine gun is its high rate of fire. The maximum rate at which a machine gun can fire is called the cyclic rate of fire. In actual combat operations, however, machine guns cannot fire at their cyclic rate for extended periods because of heat buildup and wear. The barrel is the part of the machine gun that heats up the fastest, and most machine guns are designed with easily changeable barrels and issued with at least one spare. The rate at which a machine gun can fire for extended periods is called the sustained rate of fire, which is much lower than the cyclic rate. The most effective machine gunners discipline themselves to fire their weapons in a rapid series of three- to sixround bursts. Almost all the machine guns employed during the Vietnam War were of either American or Soviet design. Although the Viet Cong (VC) and the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) used any weapons available, most of their machine guns were either Soviet-made or Chinese-manufactured from Soviet designs. The Communists also used weapons captured from the French during the Indochina War and U.S. weapons taken from the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) or from the Americans. Two of the most widely used Soviet designs were the 7.62-millimeter (mm) Goryunov SG-43 and the heavy 12.7-mm Degtyarev DShK. With the proper
Machine Guns Used during the Vietnam War Model Degtyarev Degtyarev Goryunov Kalashnikov Browning Browning Browning M-60 M-134 M-61
Country of Production
Caliber
Length (inches)
Weight (pounds)
Feed
Cyclic Rate of Fire (rounds per minute)
Muzzle Velocity (feet per second)
Soviet Union Soviet Union Soviet Union Soviet Union United States United States United States United States United States United States
7.62-mm 12.7-mm 7.62-mm 7.62-mm .30in .30in .50in 7.62-mm 7.62-mm 20-mm
50.8 62.6 44.1 41 41 53 65.1 43.75 31.5 73.8
20.5 78.5 30.25 10.5 31 32.5 84 23 67 264
Drum Belt Belt Drum Belt Belt Belt Belt Belt Belt
550 550 600 600 550 500 450 600 6,000 6,600
2,760 2,825 2,440 2,400 2,800 2,800 2,930 2,800 2,850 3,450
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An American soldier readies his M-60 machine gun in preparation for an assault during the Vietnam War. The M-60 was generally operated by a crew of two to three men: a gunner, assistant gunner, and ammunition bearer. (U.S. Army Center of Military History)
mount the DShK was an effective antiaircraft gun, especially against helicopters. During the early years of the war, ARVN units were equipped with older-model but still highly effective U.S. machine guns. Their primary vehicle-mounted machine gun was the Browning M-1919A4, which had been an American mainstay in World War II. The Browning M-1919A6 was the infantry version of the same gun, equipped with a bipod on the front of the barrel and a shoulder stock that permitted the gun to be fired from the prone position. Both of these weapons fired the .30-06 bullet, the same round fired by the M-1 rifle, also issued to the ARVN in large numbers. In U.S. service, both the M1919A4 and M1919A6 were replaced during the early 1960s by the M60 machine gun. This truly outstanding weapon was modeled closely after the World War II German MG-42 machine gun. Instead of the traditional American .30-06 round, the M-60 fired the 7.62-mm North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) standard round. The M-14 rifle also fired the 7.62-mm NATO standard, but most American troops in Vietnam carried the M16 rifle, which fired the much smaller 5.56-mm
round. Thus, for the first time in the 20th century, American units did not have rifles and machine guns that fired the same ammunition. The M-60 was used in every conceivable role for a machine gun. It was mounted on trucks, jeeps, armored personnel carriers (APCs), and other vehicles; on tripods inside fortifications; and on aircraft and boats. A version designated the M-60D was fitted with a rear trigger mechanism and handles (called spade grips) for use by helicopter door gunners. The M-60 saw by far its widest use on the ground with the infantry. An infantry machine-gun section officially consisted of three soldiers: the gunner, the assistant gunner, and the ammunition carrier. In practice, all members of a patrol carried extra machine-gun ammunition, which was passed up to the gun crew when needed. This accounts for the ubiquitous photographs of American infantrymen with belts of machine-gun ammunition draped around their bodies. That was the easiest way to carry the heavy load and left the soldier’s hands free to use his own weapon.
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The standard American heavy machine gun was one of the oldest weapons in the inventory. The basic model of the Browning .50-caliber M-2 was introduced in 1921 and slightly modified in 1933. It was and still is the best heavy machine gun ever designed. During World War II the M-2 was used in a wide variety of versions. In its lighter-barreled variant, it was used on almost all American aircraft. In Vietnam the heavy-barrel version, designated the M-2(HB), was mounted on larger trucks, tanks, APCs, and occasionally tripods on the ground. The gun delivered withering firepower in the form of a massive half-inch–diameter bullet. The M-2 was highly prized by the VC, who thought nothing of sacrificing many of their own troops in an attempt to capture one troop. The M-2 tended to be a little cranky at times, and a well-trained gunner was needed to operate it effectively. M-2 gunners tended to specialize in their job. The troops loved the guns, which they called the “Mod Deuce” or “Ma Deuce.” Both the M-60 and the M-2 were expected to remain in the U.S. military inventory well into the 21st century. During the Vietnam War, modern technology resurrected the Gatling gun, which had been obsolete for almost 100 years. This time, instead of a hand crank the drive mechanism operated by an electric motor. These modern Gatling guns had tremendous rates of fire, but they generally were too large and bulky for general infantry use. They did, however, make ideal aircraft-mounted weapons. The M-61 Vulcan fired a massive 20-mm round at the cyclic rate of 6,600 rounds per minute. Vulcans were initially designed for air force fighter aircraft. In the mid-1960s they were mounted on old World War II–era Douglas C-47 Skytrain/Dakota transports and rigged to fire sideways, out the cargo door. The result was the Douglas AC-47 Spooky, also known as “Puff the Magic Dragon.” The M-134 minigun was a scaled-down version of the Vulcan, firing as many as 6,000 7.62-mm rounds per minute. The much lighter minigun was designed for helicopters and became one of the primary weapons of the helicopter gunship. Both the Vulcanfiring AC-47 and the minigun-firing Bell AH-1 Cobra helicopter were feared and respected by VC and PAVN troops. DAVID T. ZABECKI See also Aircraft, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Armored Personnel Carriers; Helicopters, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Rifles References Hobart, F. W. A. Pictorial History of the Machinegun. New York: Drake, 1972. Hogg, Ian V. The Complete Machinegun, 1885 to the Present. New York: Exeter, 1979. Smith, W. H. B., and Edward C. Ezell. Small Arms of the World. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1992. Willbanks, James H. Machine Guns: An Illustrated History of Their Impact. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2004.
Madman Strategy President Richard Nixon’s plan to bluff leaders of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) into ending the Vietnam War. Nixon had been vice president under President Dwight Eisenhower and now sought to employ the same tactic that Eisenhower used in 1953 during the Korean War. Shortly after he had become president, Eisenhower had let it be known that if the Korean stalemate continued, he would seek to win the war militarily, even with nuclear weapons. An armistice was concluded three months later. Just what actual impact this had on bringing the war to an end is unclear, however. Nixon called this the “Madman Theory.” According to his aide H. R. “Bob” Haldeman in The Ends of Power, the president told him that “I want the North Vietnamese to believe I’ve reached the point where I might do anything to stop the war. We’ll just slip the word to them that, ‘for God’s sake, you know Nixon is obsessed about Communism. We can’t restrain him when he’s angry—and he has his hand on the nuclear button’—and Ho Chi Minh himself will be in Paris in two days begging for peace.” This approach did not work with Hanoi, and ultimately Nixon fell back on and intensified the same failed Johnson policies, especially the use of airpower. As Henry Kissinger noted later in White House Years, “unfortunately, alternatives to bombing the North were hard to come by.” SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Eisenhower, Dwight David; Kissinger, Henry Alfred; Nixon, Richard Milhous References Haldeman, H. R., with Joseph DiMona. The Ends of Power. New York: Times Books, 1978. Kissinger, Henry. White House Years. Boston: Little, Brown, 1979.
Mailer, Norman Birth Date: January 31, 1923 Death Date: November 10, 2007 Influential American author, novelist, playwright, and political activist. Norman Mailer became well known for his narrative nonfiction, sometimes referred to as the New Journalism. Among the practitioners of this style were such luminaries as Tom Wolfe, Truman Capote, and Joan Didion. Born in Long Branch, New Jersey, on January 31, 1923, Mailer graduated from Harvard University in 1943. He was drafted into the military and served in the Pacific theater during World War II. Following publication of The Naked and the Dead (1948), a novel about his wartime experiences, Mailer struggled as a writer. A cofounder of the Village Voice, Mailer became increasingly radicalized against totalitarianism and America’s technocratic society.
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“Mailer, Norman.” In Reference Guide to American Literature, 3rd ed., 558–560. Detroit: St. James, 1994. Wenke, Joseph. Mailer’s America. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1987.
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American author, novelist, playwright, and political activist Norman Mailer is best known for his novel The Naked and the Dead, relating his experiences in the Pacific during World War II. Mailer wrote several novels critical of the Vietnam War. (AP/Wide World Photos)
Invited by Jerry Rubin to the Vietnam Day Protest in Berkeley, California, on May 2, 1965, Mailer spoke against President Lyndon Johnson’s policies. Mailer developed his antiwar ideas in two novels. Why Are We in Vietnam? (1967) allegorically insinuates, through a hipster narrator, that America’s use of technology is cowardly. The Armies of the Night (1968) recounts Mailer’s personal experiences at the antiwar march against the Pentagon in October 1967. Employing the methods of New Journalism, Mailer demonstrated the power of subjective histories in understanding wartime experiences. Mailer, a prolific writer, authored numerous other narratives on contemporary American society including Some Honorable Men (1976), essays on politics, and Harlot’s Ghost (1991), a novel about the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Beginning in the 1980s his views became somewhat less radical. He remained a staunch supporter of the Democratic Party. In 2003 he criticized the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq both in speeches and in written form. Mailer’s private life was scarred by not-infrequent bouts with drug abuse and alcoholism, and in the early 1960s he was involuntarily committed to a psychiatric hospital for a short time after stabbing his wife at a party, which nearly resulted in her death. Mailer died in New York City on November 10, 2007. CHARLES J. GASPAR See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Central Intelligence Agency; Greene, Graham; Literature and the Vietnam War; Rubin, Jerry References Lennon, J. Michael, and Donna P. Norman Mailer: Works and Days. Westport, MA: Sligo, 2000. Louvre, Alf. “The Reluctant Historians: Sontag, Mailer, and American Culture Critics in the 1960’s.” Prose Studies (May 1986): 47–61.
Southeast Asian nation formed in 1963 as an independent Asian federation of former British possessions. Malaysia is located on the Malay Peninsula but also includes the northern portion of Borneo (Sarawak and Sabah). Covering 127,316 square miles, Malaysia is bordered by Thailand to the north, the South China Sea to the south and east, and the Strait of Malacca to the west. The nation’s 1968 population was 10.409 million. Malaysia’s government is a parliamentary-style constitutional monarchy. During the first 25 years of Malaysia’s existence, Malaysians experienced several secessionist movements; in 1965 Singapore, which is largely Chinese in ethnic makeup, broke away and formed its own republic. Race riots among Malaysia’s population also occurred with frequency; those in 1969 were particularly destructive. Nevertheless, in 1965 Malaysia secured an elected seat on the United Nations (UN) Security Council, and in 1967 the nation cofounded the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), signs that the country was coming into its own. Malaysia’s significance to the Vietnam War lies both in its role as a model of a successful counterinsurgency and in its later aid to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). In 1946 in what was then Malaya, which was still a British protectorate, an insurrection began. The large ethnic Chinese minority played a major role in this Communist uprising, which gained inspiration from the increasing success of Mao Zedong in China. The Malayan Communist Party also may have been the first foreign Communist party to send military assistance to the Communist insurgents in Vietnam. In early 1947 the Malayan Communist Party shipped 150 tons of weapons, ammunition, and military gear by sea to the fledgling Viet Minh movement in southern Vietnam. Supplied with equipment by the Indonesian Army, the Malaysian Communist guerrillas numbered at their peak some 14,500. The British sent some 40,000 troops to control the situation and received military equipment and economic support from the United States. The British and the Malaysian government largely subdued the rebels by 1963, using both direct military measures and social programs such as the establishment of new fortified villages for the Chinese peasants. The latter program formed the model for the unsuccessful South Vietnamese Strategic Hamlet Program. The British experience in Malaysia seemed to prove that counterinsurgency operations were winnable. Those who used this argument in defense of intervention in Vietnam frequently overlooked vital differences in the two countries, including the relative populations and level of outside support for the Communists.
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Malaysia also contributed to the anti-Communist effort in Vietnam, training more than 3,000 South Vietnamese military and police officers between 1961 and 1966 and providing matériel support. In 1966 Malaysian deputy premier Tun Razak offered to send combat troops, but this was not accepted. In 1967 Malaysia sent a team of experts to Vietnam to confer on matters of village pacification and psychological warfare, but the South Vietnamese government largely disregarded its advice. MATTHEW A. CRUMP See also Strategic Hamlet Program; Thompson, Sir Robert Grainger Ker References Gould, James W. The United States and Malaysia. The American Foreign Policy Library Series. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969. Larsen, Stanley Robert, and James Lawton Collins Jr. Allied Participation in Vietnam. Vietnam Studies Series. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975. Smith, R. B. An International History of the Vietnam War. 3 vols. New York: St. Martin’s, 1983–1991.
MALHEUR I
and II, Operations
Start Date: May 11, 1967 End Date: August 2, 1967 A series of search-and-destroy operations conducted by U.S. Army forces during a three-month period between May 11 and August 2, 1967, in the Duc Pho District of Quang Ngai Province. In the spring of 1967 increased Communist activity in the five northernmost provinces of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) prompted the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), to shift north two U.S. Army units, totaling some 7,500 men, to assist U.S. Marine Corps and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) forces already in the area. These reinforcements consisted of 3,000 men of the 2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, who began moving north into Quang Ngai Province from neighboring Binh Dinh Province on April 8, and the 4,500 troops of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade that was moved from its Tay Ninh Province base north of Saigon to Chu Lai in Quang Tin Province. On April 22, 1967, MACV announced the creation of the 15,000man Task Force Oregon in the five-province area that would include the troops sent already, plus a provisional headquarters, division support troops borrowed from other units, the 1st Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division, and the 3rd Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division. General William Westmoreland’s chief of staff, Major General William B. Rosson, commanded the task force, which was ordered to provide security along the coast, open Highway 1, and relieve Communist pressure in northern Binh Dinh, Quang Ngai, and southern Quang Tin provinces. As Task Force Oregon deployed, it permitted the marines to move units north to the demilitarized zone (DMZ) that divided the Democratic Republic
of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and South Vietnam and eased the efforts of the 1st Cavalry Division in its ongoing operations in Binh Dinh Province. On May 11, five U.S. Army battalions of Task Force Oregon began Operation MALHEUR I in the area immediately north of what had been the U.S. Marine Corps DeSoto tactical area of responsibility in the I Corps Tactical Zone near Duc Pho, south of Quang Ngai City. Many hamlets in this area were heavily fortified with bunkers, air raid tunnels, communications trenches, booby traps, and punji pits. Physical destruction was enormous in this densely populated coastal region, and Communist forces would often allow patrolling U.S. troops to enter a village before opening fire. In the ensuing firefights, U.S. forces would call in massive naval gunfire, artillery, and tactical air support, often destroying many of the houses next to the spider holes and fortified bunkers they were seeking to reduce. During MALHEUR I, for example, paratroopers of the 101st Airborne Division fought at least 18 separate major firefights and uncovered large food and ammunition caches. By the end of May troops participating in Operation MALHEUR I, largely through a series of helicopter air assaults and search-anddestroy operations, announced that they had killed 392 Communist troops and captured 64 while clearing significant sections of Highway 1 from northern Quang Ngai Province to southern Quang Nam Province. Light fighting, consisting of ambushes and intense patrolling, continued through July 1967. Operation MALHEUR II immediately followed the close of MALHEUR I, and the troops of Task Force Oregon again experienced almost daily contact. Under continued heavy pressure from American mechanized and helicopter units and from naval gunfire and Boeing B-52 Stratofortress bomber strikes, Viet Cong (VC) and People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) troops in Quang Ngai Province were forced to disperse into the jungle-covered mountains farther inland. Both MALHEUR operations concentrated first upon eliminating regular Communist formations in order to reduce the pressure upon the local populace. Once this was accomplished, the emphasis of the campaign shifted to eliminating VC infrastructure. During the operations, the Communists found it increasingly difficult to operate among the people in the countryside. Task Force Oregon distributed more than 23 million leaflets to the population of the Duc Pho District, which, like the rest of the province, had been under Communist domination for decades. Such appeals had little effect, however, because many villagers were VC members, while others helped them either by choice or out of fear for themselves or their families. Because allied forces were not sufficiently numerous to leave detachments in the villages they searched, the VC would often return only hours after the Americans had departed. At the end of the MALHEUR operations on August 2, 1967, Task Force Oregon reported 869 VC and PAVN soldiers killed at a cost of 81 American dead, a kill ratio of 10.73 to 1. The force also reported the evacuation of 8,885 villagers and the burning of their houses
Manila Conference to deny the use of these facilities to VC troops in the area and to discourage the peasants from returning. The extensive use of artillery and air strikes with high explosives and napalm helped keep down American casualties but also resulted in large-scale destruction and the deaths of villagers and refugees. According to the U.S. Agency for International Development, more than 6,400 civilian casualties were admitted to Quang Ngai hospitals in 1967, half of whom were women and children. The operations of Task Force Oregon in Quang Ngai Province destroyed or drove away Communist main-force units, although in the process the American forces contributed materially to the depopulation and destruction of large portions of the province. The operations concluded without having fully eradicated the VC 2nd Regiment or the PAVN 2nd Division, both known to be operating in the area. According to U.S. intelligence reports, the VC were soon moving freely again in broad daylight, were continuing to disrupt travel on Highway 1, and were still ready to fight. CLAYTON D. LAURIE See also Air Mobility; Booby Traps; Search and Destroy; Task Force Oregon; United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1965–1968; United States Agency for International Development; United States Army; United
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States Marine Corps; Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, Army; Vietnam, Republic of, Army References Stanton, Shelby L. The Rise and Fall of an American Army: The U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985. Telfer, Gary L. U.S. Marines in Vietnam: Fighting the North Vietnamese, 1967. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1984. Westmoreland, General William C. Report on the War in Vietnam, Section II, Report on Operations in South Vietnam, January 1964–June 1968. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969.
Manila Conference Start Date: October 24, 1966 End Date: October 25, 1966 Meeting attended by representatives of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea), and the Philippines to discuss the Vietnam War. The conference, which took
Leaders at the Manila Conference, October 24, 1966. The meeting, held in the Philippine capital, included representatives of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and the Philippines. It was called to discuss the Vietnam War. (Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library)
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place in the Philippine capital of Manila during October 24–25, 1966, has been viewed as a response to several international efforts by the United Nations (UN) as well as by both Communist and nonaligned nations over the previous two years to gain a settlement of the growing conflict in Southeast Asia. The Lyndon B. Johnson administration was also involved in secret talks to deescalate the conflict. UN secretary-general U Thant wanted to reconvene the Geneva Conference in 1964, and the leaders of France, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), and the Soviet Union all called for its reconvening in Laos. The Johnson administration had rejected this, however. One group of researchers argue that on nine occasions calls to formulate a political settlement through negotiations of one form or another were not only rejected but were also thwarted by Washington through military escalations. This may be a moot point, however, since recently released Vietnamese Communist Party documents indicate that during the 1965–1966 period, the North Vietnamese government was not ready to enter into negotiations with the United States. In press communiqués following the conference, South Vietnamese premier Nguyen Cao Ky promised economic and political reforms to create “a truly representative government.” President Johnson responded enthusiastically to this pledge and stated that the war would be settled either through negotiations or on the battlefield. U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), head General William Westmoreland added that the South Vietnamese were bearing the brunt of the fighting and helping to secure victory. The Manila Conference was one of several attempts to publicly offer a program for a negotiated settlement of the war in terms impossible for the North Vietnamese government to accept. Following that line of reasoning, the entire affair was staged largely for U.S. and South Vietnamese public and political consumption. PAUL R. CAMACHO
Mansfield, Michael Joseph Birth Date: March 16, 1903 Death Date: October 5, 2001 Educator, historian, U.S. congressman (1943–1953), U.S. senator (1953–1977), and critic of the Vietnam War. Michael Joseph (Mike) Mansfield was born in New York City on March 16, 1903, and grew up in Great Falls, Montana. After service in the armed forces during 1918–1922, he received a bachelor’s degree from the University of Montana in 1933 and a master’s degree from the same institution in 1934. From 1933 to 1942 he was professor of Latin American and Far Eastern history at the University of Montana. First elected as a Democrat to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1942, where he built his reputation as a hardworking honest broker and liberal Democrat, Mansfield was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1952. There he established a liberal voting record and became majority leader in 1961, a position he held until 1977. Mansfield was the longest-serving majority leader in Senate history.
See also Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Nguyen Cao Ky; U Thant; Westmoreland, William Childs References Frankel, Max. “Ky Tells 6 Allies at Manila Talks Civil Rule Is Near.” New York Times, October 25, 1966. Frankel, Max. “Manila Talks End.” New York Times, October 26, 1966. (See same issue for text of the communiqué and declarations.) Kahin, George McTurnan, and John W. Lewis. The United States in Vietnam. New York: Dial, 1966. Kraslow, David, and Stuart H. Loory. The Secret Search for Peace in Vietnam. New York: Vintage Books, 1968. Pham Thi Vinh, ed. Van Kien Dang Toan Tap, Tap 24, 1965 [Collected Party Documents, Vol. 24, 1965]. Hanoi: National Political Publishing House, 2003. Schurmann, Franz, P. D. Scott, and R. Zelnik. The Politics of Escalation in Vietnam. New York: Fawcett, 1966.
Democratic senator from Montana Mike Mansfield is widely considered to be one of the most influential congressmen of the 20th century. The longest-serving majority leader in U.S. history, he became an outspoken critic of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. (Library of Congress)
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Although initially supportive of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Vietnam policies, Mansfield became disillusioned and counseled against deployment of ground troops in 1965. In 1966 he went to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) on a fact-finding mission and, upon his return, privately tried to persuade Johnson that a military solution to the conflict was impossible. Rebuffed by Johnson, Mansfield openly criticized the war. Mansfield’s criticism continued during President Richard M. Nixon’s first term in office, when Mansfield supported the CooperChurch and Hatfield-McGovern Amendments. In 1971 Mansfield introduced his own “end-the-war” amendment, which called for the withdrawal of all American military forces within nine months subject to the release of all prisoners of war. Although it passed the Senate, the amendment was defeated by the House of Representatives. Mansfield retired from the Senate after the 1976 election. In 1977 President Jimmy Carter appointed him ambassador to Japan, a post he held until 1988. In 1989 Mansfield received the Presidential Medal of Freedom for his long service to his country. He later became senior adviser on East Asian affairs at Goldman Sachs & Co., New York. Mansfield died at the age of 98 in Washington, D.C., on October 5, 2001. ROBERT G. MANGRUM See also Church, Frank Forrester; Cooper, John Sherman; Cooper-Church Amendment; Hatfield, Mark Odom; Hatfield-McGovern Amendment; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; McGovern, George Stanley; Nixon, Richard Milhous; United States Congress and the Vietnam War References Herring, George C. America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975. 4th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. Lewy, Guenter. America in Vietnam. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978. Oberdorfer, Don. Senator Mansfield: The Extraordinary Life of a Great American Statesman and Diplomat. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Books, 2003. Summers, Harry G., Jr. The Vietnam War Almanac. New York: Ballantine, 1985. Valeo, Francis R. Mike Mansfield, Majority Leader: A Different Kind of Senate, 1961–1977. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999.
Mao Zedong Birth Date: December 26, 1893 Death Date: September 9, 1976 Chinese political and military leader. Born on December 26, 1893, to a prosperous peasant family in Shaoshan, Hunan Province, Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) graduated from the Fourth Teacher’s Training School in Changhs, Hunan. He studied Marxism under Li
Mao Zedong led the Communists to victory in the Chinese Civil War after World War II, orchestrated China’s intervention in the Korean War, and supplied assistance to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) during the Indochina and Vietnam wars. Domestically, his policies included the disastrous Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, both of which claimed the lives of millions of Chinese. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)
Dazhao at Beijing University, and in July 1921 in Shanghai he was a founding member of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Mao became a labor organizer, and in the mid-1920s he and other Chinese Communists cooperated with the Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist) party of President Sun Yixian (Sun Yat-sen). Mao held several posts in the GMD, including secretary of its propaganda department in 1925. After Sun’s death in 1925, Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), head of the Huangpu (Whampoa) Military Academy, won control of the GMD. Jiang soon began to eliminate rival political groupings and purge Communists from GMD positions. He also launched the Northern Expedition of 1925–1927 against assorted warlords. In 1927 he turned against the Communists who had escaped his purge, established a base in Jiangxi (Kiangsi) Province, and suppressed several Communist insurrections, including the Autumn Harvest Uprising of peasants and guerrillas led by Mao. Joined by renegade GMD army officers Zhu De (Chu Teh) and Lin Biao (Lin Piao) and their troops, Mao founded the Jiangxi Soviet Republic in the province’s southeast, becoming its chairman in October 1931.
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Along with Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin, Mao was considered one of the three main theorists of Marxism. Mao’s most important contribution was in explaining how to tap the discontented peasant masses in China to bring about a Communist revolution there. Mao’s philosophy was in sharp contrast to that of both Marx and Lenin, who had emphasized the primary role of the industrial working classes, the proletariat, in bringing about such a revolution. Mao had to develop an ancillary strategy, because China was not industrialized and had virtually no industrial working-class upon which to draw support. His greatest revolutionary contribution was to synthesize a Communist-led guerrilla military force with agrarian revolution. Mao and Zhu had an army of 200,000 by 1933. The Communists launched several uprisings in major Chinese cities, a threat to the authority of Jiang, who took Beijing (Peking), unifying all China south of the Great Wall and heading a new GMD government in 1928. Jiang mounted annual campaigns against the Communist Soviet. This ranked higher in his priorities than opposing the establishment by Japan of a puppet government in China’s northeastern region of Manchuria in 1932. When GMD forces encircled the Jiangxi Soviet in 1934, Mao and Zhu broke out, leading more than 100,000 followers on the epic Long March of 6,000 miles to Yenan (Yan’an) in northern Shaanxi (Shensi), during which heavy fighting and harsh conditions reduced their numbers to 7,000 and Mao was forced to abandon two of his own children. He was then elected CCP chairman in 1935. In the Sian (Xi’an) Incident in Shaanxi of December 1936, northern Manchurian warlord Zhang Xueliang (Chang Hsüehliang) rejected Jiang’s orders to attack the Communists and urged all Chinese to join forces against the Japanese. Zhang kidnapped Jiang, forcing him to agree to a united anti-Japanese front with the Communists. With the Lugouqiao (Lukouch’iao) Incident, also known as the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, in July 1937, full-scale war began between Chinese and Japanese troops. GMD forces retreated to Chongqing (Chungking) in the southwestern province of Sichuan (Szechwan) in 1938. From their Yenan base, Mao and the Communists effectively controlled northwestern China, while the GMD controlled the southwest. Mao’s Red Army, rechristened the Eighth Route Army, participated in fighting against Japanese troops, as did Communist guerrilla forces. Meanwhile, in 1945 the CCP adopted a constitution accepting Mao’s teachings as its official ideology. The Communist-Nationalist front had largely broken down in early 1941 after Nationalist units defeated the Communist New Fourth Army near the Changjiang (Yangzi River) Valley. From then until the end of the war, the Communists concentrated their energies on establishing guerrilla bases and peasant support behind Japanese lines, efforts that also helped to ensure them of ultimate postwar control of these areas. Mao also became famous, along with General Zhu De, for successfully leading the Communists’ guerrilla army against much larger and better-armed opponents. Mao’s strategic principles were largely based on China’s traditional
military texts, such as Sun Tzu’s The Art of War, and were codified during 1944 in the following saying: “Enemy advances, we retreat; enemy halts, we harass; enemy tires, we attack; enemy retreats, we pursue.” When World War II ended in August 1945, incoming Soviet troops facilitated Chinese Communist moves to take control of much of Manchuria. Fighting resumed between GMD and Communist forces in early 1946, and American attempts to negotiate a truce foundered on both sides’ deep-rooted antagonism. Civil war continued until January 1949, and Mao proclaimed the new People’s Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949. Mao made several attempts to foster friendly relations with the United States during the late 1940s. When these failed, he allied China more closely with the Soviet Union. The PRC also provided substantial arms, equipment, and base areas for training to the Viet Minh in its fight against the French during the Indochina War. Given the long Sino-Vietnamese border, the ability of France to halt this flow of assistance became impossible. Until his death Mao remained China’s supreme leader, dominating the country’s politics. He was responsible for the decision that launched Chinese forces against United Nations (UN) forces in Korea in October 1950. Some historians, such as Maurice Meisner, have tried to show that Mao did not initially support the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) in its struggle to conquer the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) and reunite Vietnam. But according to a 1994 account written by Li Zhisui, Mao’s private physician, during August 1964 Mao heard that the United States intended to send additional troops to South Vietnam. Li Zhisui claimed that in response Mao secretly ordered Chinese troops to wear Vietnamese uniforms and fight alongside the Viet Cong (VC). There is no evidence to support this claim, but China did provide arms, money, and technical support to North Vietnam, and during 1966–1969 hundreds of thousands of Chinese air defense troops and combat engineers served in North Vietnam, where they helped to defend against American air attacks north of Hanoi. Soon after the PRC engaged in a series of bitter border disputes with the Soviet Union during 1969, however, Mao turned to the United States as a means of balancing Beijing’s worsening relations with Moscow. In February 1972 Mao met with U.S. president Richard M. Nixon, and the two nations signed the Shanghai Communiqué, a document that not only opened diplomatic relations between China and the United States but also helped lead to the end of America’s involvement in the Vietnam War. In 1973 Washington and North Vietnam arranged a cease-fire, and the last American troops were withdrawn from Vietnam. Domestically, Mao Zedong’s policies were almost uniformly disastrous. In February 1958 he initiated the Great Leap Forward, calling on China to catch up to Great Britain industrially in just 15 years. Instead, overly rapid industrialization and the uncontrolled growth of the commune system in agriculture led to a 20 percent drop in China’s gross national product between 1958 and 1961.
March on the Pentagon The Great Leap Forward had to be abandoned. To offset criticism, in May 1966 Mao initiated the Cultural Revolution. This movement lasted until October 1976, the month after Mao’s death in Beijing on September 9. In addition to contributing to the general stagnation of the Chinese economy, the Cultural Revolution purged tens of millions of Chinese and led to the deaths of a great many of them in corrective labor camps. In 1981 the Central Committee of the CCP officially denounced the so-called Cult of Mao when it determined that he had been personally responsible for initiating and leading the Cultural Revolution. BRUCE ELLEMAN AND PRISCILLA ROBERTS See also China, People’s Republic of; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, 1945–1954; Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, 1954–1975; Zhou Enlai References Chang Jung and Jon Halliday. Mao: The Unknown Story. New York: Knopf, 2005. Chen Jian. Mao’s China and the Cold War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001. Li Zhisui, Dr. The Private Life of Chairman Mao. New York: Random House, 1994. Meisner, Maurice. Mao’s China: A History of the People’s Republic. New York: Free Press, 1977.
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Short, Philip. Mao: A Life. New York: Henry Holt, 2000. Spence, Jonathan D. Mao Zedong. New York: Viking, 1999. Terrill, Ross. Mao: A Biography. Rev. and expanded ed. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999. Zhai, Qiang. China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000.
March on the Pentagon Event Date: October 21, 1967 Among the most significant national antiwar demonstrations, the March on the Pentagon of October 21, 1967, represented for many a shift from protest to resistance. The Student Mobilization Committee and the National Mobilization Committee cosponsored the demonstration in Washington, D.C., and project director Jerry Rubin focused on the Pentagon as a symbol of American militarism. Federal officials attacked the event with misleading accusations of Communist domination, and the government mobilized thousands of troops for its protection. The event began with a rally at the Lincoln Memorial that drew perhaps 100,000 people, followed by a march to the Pentagon across the Arlington Memorial Bridge by about 35,000 people.
Antiwar protesters, including a large contingent of veterans, in a march on the Pentagon in October 1967 in condemnation of the Johnson administration’s Vietnam policy. (Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library)
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Although most participants acted peacefully and legally, several hundred sat down near the Pentagon and awaited arrest. Protesters often appealed to the troops to join them. As the crowd dwindled over the next 24 hours, taunts by radicals and clubbings by federal marshals punctuated the confrontation. Officials made 647 arrests, and hospitals treated 47 injured people. Government and media reactions were overwhelmingly unsympathetic. The apparent ineffectiveness of peaceful and legal protests made civil disobedience and more confrontational tactics increasingly attractive options within the antiwar movement. MITCHELL K. HALL
noi’s refusal to participate. Administration officials insisted that North Vietnam did not want to negotiate seriously. Vietnamese histories are vague about North Vietnam’s response to MARIGOLD. While North Vietnamese leaders were clearly willing to meet with a U.S. representative, it appears that they intended to demand, as they did during the initial stage of the 1968 Paris peace talks, the unconditional cessation of all U.S. bombing of North Vietnam before they would begin substantive discussions. In the final analysis, Lewandowski’s inept diplomacy and American skepticism thwarted the possibility of substantial results. PAUL S. DAUM AND JOSEPH RATNER
See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Rubin, Jerry
See also International Commission for Supervision and Control; Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr.; Paris Negotiations; Poland; Read, Benjamin Huger; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; United States Marine Corps; Vietnam, Republic of, Marine Corps
References Halstead, Fred. Out Now! A Participant’s Account of the American Movement against the Vietnam War. New York: Monad, 1978. Mailer, Norman. Armies of the Night: History as a Novel, the Novel as History. New York: New American Library, 1968. Wells, Tom. The War Within: America’s Battle over Vietnam. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.
March to the South See Nam Tien
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References Cooper, Chester L. The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam. Rev. and updated edition. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1973. Herring, George C. LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994. Kraslow, David, and Stuart H. Loory. The Secret Search for Peace in Vietnam. New York: Vintage Books, 1968. Luu Van Loi and Nguyen Anh Vu. Tiep Xuc Bi Mat Viet Nam-Hoa Ky Truoc Hoi Nghi Pa-ri [Secret U.S.-Vietnamese Contacts before the Paris Conference]. Hanoi: International Relations Institute, 1990. Radvanyi, Janos. Delusion and Reality: Gambits, Hoaxes, and Diplomatic One-Upmanship in Vietnam. South Bend, IN: Gateway Editions, 1978. Radvanyi, Janos, ed. The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983.
Start Date: June 1966 End Date: December 1966 Code name for a peace initiative centered around U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. and Polish representative on the International Control Commission Janusz Lewandowski, with Italian ambassador to South Vietnam Giovanni D’Orlandi acting as go-between. Lewandowski’s claim to have a “very specific peace offer” from Hanoi led to secret talks and a proposed meeting between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) in December 1966 in Warsaw. Historian George Herring notes that with Operation MARIGOLD, Moscow made its first effort in the “diplomacy of peacemaking.” But the Soviet and Polish roles were unclear. Furthermore, Lewandowski proved enigmatic; his unorthodox diplomatic approach led to misunderstanding. The U.S. government thought that the “Ten Points”—Lewandowski’s draft of U.S. views—misrepresented its de-escalation bargaining position. MARIGOLD remains controversial. President Lyndon Johnson’s critics emphasize that his administration failed to take advantage of South Vietnam’s desire for direct talks and that the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam that December was the reason behind Ha-
Marine Combined Action Platoons U.S. Marine Corps pacification initiative. The tactical area of responsibility assigned to the U.S. Marine Corps in Vietnam lay in the northernmost portion of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), designated as the I Corps Tactical Zone. More than most U.S. military forces, the marines took countryside pacification seriously. Marine officers realized that they had to gain the confidence of villagers if they were to deny the Viet Cong (VC) local support and bases of operations. Called at various times by such names as internal defense and development, rural reconstruction, stability operations, revolutionary development, internal security, nation building, and neutralization operations, pacification was not “the other war,” as General William Westmoreland and many others thought of it. It was the supporter of military combat operations and at least as important. Based on earlier experiences in the Caribbean and in Central America, III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) formed combined action platoons (CAPs) in the autumn of 1965 as a means of support for South Vietnam’s Revolutionary Development Program.
MARKET TIME, Operation
Administered by the G-5 Civil Affairs section based in Da Nang, III MAF fielded four battalions of CAPs between October 1967 and July 1970. Each consisted of one marine rifle squad and one navy corpsman plus one platoon of South Vietnamese Regional Force/ Popular Force (RF/PF) soldiers. These men were assigned to a particular village, often one that was home to the RF/PF members of the unit, and made it their base of operations for extended periods. Marines got to know villagers as individuals, helped in civic and health projects, and taught locals the arts of booby-trapping, entrapment, ambush, and self-defense. As Jean Sauvageot, a U.S. Army officer who spent several years in Vietnamese pacification projects, noted in a personal interview, “There was absolutely no comparison between CAP and what most Army units were doing. For example, if CAP killed 15 enemy soldiers, they usually had 15 weapons to show for it. At the same time Army units were killing 15 or 5 or 50 enemies and might not have a single weapon to show when the firing stopped, not one! In other words, they were killing noncombatants and claiming them as dead enemy soldiers.” In 1970 the program changed to combined action groups, using a marine company and an RF/PF battalion. The last such unit was withdrawn in the spring of 1971. CECIL B. CURREY See also Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support; Pacification; Territorial Forces; United States Marine Corps References Cincinnatus [Cecil B. Currey]. Self-Destruction: The Disintegration and Decay of the United States Army during the Vietnam Era. New York: Norton, 1981. Corson, William. The Betrayal. New York: Norton, 1968. Peterson, Michael E. The Combined Action Platoons: The U.S. Marines’ Other War in Vietnam. New York: Praeger, 1989.
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Start Date: 1965 End Date: 1972 Long-term allied naval operation to conduct surveillance of the 1,200-mile coastline of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) and halt seaborne infiltration of supplies to Communist forces. Initially the U.S. Seventh Fleet had charge of the American operation, which was designated the Vietnam Patrol Force, or Task Force 71. Weeks later naval leaders code-named the operation MARKET TIME. On July 31, 1965, operational command transferred from the Seventh Fleet to the Naval Advisory Group, and the Vietnam Patrol Force became the Coastal Surveillance Force, or Task Force 115. On April 1, 1966, the newly created Naval Forces, Vietnam (NAVFORV), assumed command of Operation MARKET TIME. In order to ensure the success of the Coastal Surveillance Force, NAVFORV created a three-pronged patrol system consisting of
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outer and inner ship barriers and an air barrier, which comprised the farthest outer barrier. Using Dixie Station (located in the South China Sea, southeast of Cam Ranh Bay) for Task Force 77 strikes against Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam, propeller-driven Douglas A-1 Skyraiders operated for a short time in 1965 but soon were replaced by Lockheed P-3 Orions. Other aircraft of Operation MARKET TIME included Lockheed P-2 Neptunes and Martin P-5 Marlins. The P-2s and P-3s operated from several bases, including Cam Ranh Bay, Tan Son Nhut, U-Tapao in Thailand, and Sangley Point in the Philippines. The P-5s, before their withdrawal in 1967, operated out of Sangley Point and had seaplane tenders at Cam Ranh Bay, Poulo Condore, and the Cham Islands. Air surveillance duties included identifying suspicious vessels, photographing them, and then reporting them to one of five Coastal Surveillance Centers located along the South Vietnamese coastline to disseminate and pass on information to other aircraft and surface ships for further investigation. The outer ship barrier operated within 40 miles of the South Vietnamese coast, stretching from the 17th Parallel to the Cambodian border in the Gulf of Thailand. Ships included high-endurance Coast Guard cutters, destroyer escorts, radar picket escort ships, ocean and coastal minesweepers, and patrol gunboats. Their mission was the interdiction of seaborne supplies carried by trawlertype vessels. Throughout the history of the operation, MARKET TIME forces neutralized more than 50 infiltrating vessels. The inner ship barrier operated in the shallow waters along the South Vietnamese coastline, where Communists, using wooden junks to transport men and supplies, could easily intermingle with thousands of innocent junks and sampans. Thus, the South Vietnamese government authorized American MARKET TIME forces to stop, search, and seize any vessel involved in fishing or trade within a 12-mile limit. U.S. naval leaders realized that the South Vietnamese Junk Force needed to be phased into the Republic of Vietnam Navy (VNN, South Vietnamese Navy) in order to investigate junk traffic sailing close to shore. In July 1965 the Junk Force integrated into the VNN. Yet U.S. Navy leaders believed that without American supervision, the Junk Force would be ineffective. To augment the junks, the U.S. Navy adopted the fast patrol craft, or Swift Boats, originally used by oil companies in the Gulf of Mexico to transport crews to and from offshore rigs. Additional duties of MARKET TIME forces included fire support for ground troops. And in 1968, elements of Task Force 115 became MARKET TIME Raiders, which operated with the newly created Southeast Asia Lake Ocean River Delta Strategy (SEALORDS) forces to conduct river raiding operations. As the American withdrawal began, under Vietnamization MARKET TIME forces slowly shifted matériel to the VNN, while U.S. sailors transferred to other duties. Postwar Vietnamese histories attest to the effectiveness of the U.S. Navy’s Operation MARKET TIME. During the two-year period from the end of 1962 to the end of 1964, North Vietnamese vessels disguised as fishing boats delivered more than 4,000 tons of
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Launched in March 1965, Operation MARKET TIME consisted of U.S.–South Vietnamese coastal patrols charged with ending North Vietnamese infiltration of the South by water. Crews of the patrol craft performed routine inspections of the papers and cargo of civilian vessels. (Klebe, Gene, Operation Market Time, 1965, Naval Historical Center)
weapons and ammunition to Communist forces in South Vietnam, while during the next seven years, from early 1965 to early 1972, less than 500 tons of supplies successfully made it through MARKET TIME’s maritime gauntlet. R. BLAKE DUNNAVENT See also Aircraft, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Dixie Station; Riverine Craft; Riverine Warfare; SEALORDS; Sea Power, Role in War; United States Coast Guard; United States Navy; Vietnam, Republic of, Navy References Cutler, Thomas J. Brown Water, Black Berets: Coastal and Riverine Warfare in Vietnam. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988. Marolda, Edward J. By Sea, Air, and Land: An Illustrated History of the U.S. Navy and the War in Southeast Asia. Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 1994. Schreadley, R. L. From the Rivers to the Sea: The United States Navy in Vietnam. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992. Vietnamese People’s Navy Political Department. 35 Nam Duong Ho Chi Minh Tren Bien va Thanh Lap Lu Doan 125 Hai Quan [The 35th Anniversary of the Ho Chi Minh Trail at Sea and of the Formation of
the 125th Naval Brigade]. Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1996. Wunderlin, Clarence E., Jr. “Paradox of Power: Infiltration, Coastal Surveillance, and the United States Navy in Vietnam, 1965–1968.” Journal of Military History 53 (July 1989): 275–290.
Marshall, Samuel Lyman Atwood Birth Date: July 18, 1900 Death Date: December 17, 1977 U.S. Army reserve officer and one of the most influential, albeit controversial, military historians of the 20th century. Born on July 18, 1900, in Catskill, New York, Samuel Lyman Atwood Marshall spent his entire military career as a reservist, first receiving his commission from the ranks during World War I at age 17. For the next 60 years he pursued parallel careers as a reserve officer, a journalist, and a writer. S. L. A. Marshall (known universally as “Slam”) covered most of the world’s major wars during that period. He was a military columnist for the Detroit News for many years.
Martin, Graham A. During World War II Marshall was chief historian of the U.S.European theater of operations. He recruited many of the historians and initiated the work that led to the widely respected series U.S. Army in World War II. Marshall emphasized conducting direct interviews with participants of combat actions as soon as possible after the event. As a result of these interviews, in 1947 he wrote Men against Fire, a penetrating analysis of the American infantryman and small-unit cohesion and effectiveness. He pointed out many problems with U.S. combat performance and offered recommendations to correct them. The U.S. Army later adopted many of his recommendations. Marshall also served as an army historian in the Korean War (1950–1953). He wrote numerous newspaper articles on that conflict and gathered a mountain of material that he would later use to write several well-received books on the Korean War. Pork Chop Hill, published in 1956, was turned into a Hollywood film by the same name and starred Gregory Peck. During the Vietnam War, as a retired brigadier general Marshall made several tours to the war zone under U.S. Army sponsorship. Together with Colonel David H. Hackworth, Marshall wrote Vietnam Primer, which the army published as DA Pamphlet 525–2. More than 2 million copies of the lessons-learned manual were printed. Marshall also wrote five other books on Vietnam War battles. Marshall worked hard to cultivate his image as the nation’s preeminent combat historian, and he rarely failed to present the army in the best possible light. That in turn opened many doors to him, which he exploited for interviews and data gathering. Marshall also clearly relished his close associations with the great and near-great commanders of his day. In recent years, some historians have criticized Marshall’s work by exposing flaws and inconsistencies in his data. A disillusioned Hackworth referred to him as “the Howard Cosell of combat” and “the Army’s top apologist.” Marshall nonetheless had a profound impact on the U.S. Army. Many veterans of infantry combat continue to agree that regardless of the flaws in Marshall’s data or data-collection methods, his conclusions in Men against Fire were correct. Marshall died in San Antonio, Texas, on December 17, 1977. DAVID T. ZABECKI See also Hackworth, David Haskell; Literature and the Vietnam War; Media and the Vietnam War References Marshall, S. L. A. Battles in the Monsoon: Campaigning in the Central Highlands, South Vietnam, Summer, 1966. New York: William Morrow, 1967. Marshall, S. L. A. Bird: The Christmastide Battle. New York: Cowles, 1968. Marshall, S. L. A. Bringing Up the Rear: A Memoir. San Raphael, CA: Presidio, 1979. Marshall, S. L. A. Men against Fire. New York: William Morrow, 1947. Marshall, S. L. A. Vietnam: Three Battles. New York: Da Capo, 1982.
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Williams, Frederick D. SLAM: The Influence of S. L. A. Marshall on the United States Army. Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1990.
Martin, Graham A. Birth Date: September 12, 1912 Death Date: March 13, 1990 U.S. diplomat and ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), 1973–1975. Born at Mars Hill, North Carolina, on September 12, 1912, Graham A. Martin graduated from Wake Forest University in 1932. The following year he joined the National Recovery Administration as an aide to W. Averell Harriman. Martin spent the next few years in a variety of governmental positions, and during World War II he was an officer in the U.S. Army Air Corps. In 1947 Martin joined the U.S. State Department as a Foreign Service officer. Assigned to the Paris mission, he held numerous posts, including assistant chief. After eight years in Paris he joined the Air War College in 1955 and two years later became a special assistant to Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs C. Douglas Dillon. In 1963 Martin was named ambassador to Thailand, where he fostered strong military ties with the United States and served as a U.S. representative to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). In 1969 he became ambassador to Italy and as such allegedly attempted to manipulate that nation’s national elections. A staunch anti-Communist, Martin was selected in 1973 to replace Ellsworth Bunker as ambassador to South Vietnam. Martin was ill-suited for the tenuous situation he inherited. His wife’s son had been killed during the war, and injuries that Martin received in an automobile accident left him incapable of travel around the country. Furthermore, Martin’s no-nonsense personality rendered problematic his relationship with South Vietnamese president Nguyen Van Thieu, who required constant nurturing. Martin also drastically underestimated the seriousness of the situation in Vietnam and ignored the rampant corruption within Thieu’s government and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) that had eroded local support. Martin believed until the end that Saigon would be held. Despite drastic cuts in U.S. aid and the U.S. military presence in South Vietnam, he remained confident that Saigon could withstand the spring 1975 offensive by the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) and the Viet Cong (VC). So convinced was he in this belief that he refused to order rescue operations until it was almost too late. Finally as Communist forces prepared to overrun Saigon, Martin ordered an emergency evacuation.
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On April 29, 1975, Option IV (Operation FREQUENT WIND), the largest helicopter extraction in history, went into effect. Over an 18-hour span, some 1,400 Americans and 5,600 Vietnamese were airlifted to U.S. warships in the South China Sea. Thousands of others had to be left behind. Martin, carrying the embassy flag, led his wife to the embassy’s roof, where they boarded a U.S. Marine Corps helicopter, leaving behind his personal belongings that he had refused to remove earlier. On returning to the United States, Martin served as special assistant to Henry Kissinger and in 1976 became ambassador-atlarge for the Pacific region. After retiring from the Foreign Service, Martin returned to North Carolina. He died in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, on March 13, 1990. DAVID COFFEY See also Bunker, Ellsworth; EAGLE PULL, Operation; FREQUENT WIND, Operation; Harriman, William Averell; Kissinger, Henry Alfred; Nguyen Van Thieu References Engelmann, Larry. Tears before the Rain: An Oral History of the Fall of South Vietnam. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.
Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. Snepp, Frank. Decent Interval: An Insider’s Account of Saigon’s Indecent End. New York: Random House, 1977.
MASHER/WHITE WING,
Operation
Start Date: January 24, 1966 End Date: March 6, 1966 The first major search-and-destroy operation of the Vietnam War. Operation MASHER/WHITE WING, also known as the Bong Son Campaign, entailed a 42-day sweep over 2,000 square miles of forested mountains and rugged valleys in northern Binh Dinh Province in the II Corps Tactical Zone. The operation was conducted by 20,000 soldiers of the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) 22nd Division and Airborne Brigade, and the 1st Regiment of the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) Army Capitol Division. The operation was renamed WHITE WING on February 4
Members of the U.S. 1st Air Cavalry Division take cover in the hills near An Thi, along the central coast of South Vietnam, after day-long fighting in Operation MASHER, January 29, 1966. MASHER was the first allied search-and-destroy mission of the Vietnam War. It was renamed WHITE WING shortly after it began out of concern over adverse public reaction to the name “Masher.” (AP/Wide World Photos)
MASSACHUSETTS STRIKER, Operation
because of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s concern over public reaction to the name “MASHER.” This operation was also the first major campaign to cross corps boundaries. During the same period, the 3rd Marine Division conducted Operation DOUBLE EAGLE in the I Corps Tactical Zone and entered Binh Dinh Province to join the 1st Cavalry. The American sweeps were supported by two ARVN operations, THAN PHONG II and LIEN KET 22. Operation MASHER/WHITE WING opened when four battalions of the 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, began helicopter assaults eight miles north of Bong Son against the 8,000 soldiers of the Communist 3rd “Yellow Star” Division, made up of the Viet Cong (VC) 2nd Regiment and the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) 12th and 22nd regiments. Contact was established early, and major firefights occurred on January 28 and 29 at Phung Du and An Thoi. Employing massive air support, the Americans forced the Communists to retreat north into the ARVN Airborne Brigade’s tactical area of responsibility. The 3rd Brigade reported killing more than 600 VC and PAVN troops while in turn suffering 75 killed and 240 wounded. After being reinforced by the 2nd Brigade, on February 6 the 3rd Brigade moved into the An Lao Valley to destroy any remaining Communist forces and to link up with the marines. The 1st Brigade meanwhile conducted a series of actions south of Bong Son on Highway 1, while the 2nd Brigade drove a Communist battalion from the Cay Giep Mountains into a blocking force of the ARVN 22nd Division. Most of the VC and PAVN units had already fled the area, however, having been severely mauled in the actions on the coast. The operation ended on March 6, 1966, as the 1st Cavalry Division completed its full circle of airmobile assaults around Bong Son to arrive back in the Cay Giep Mountains. In six weeks the division claimed nearly 1,350 VC and PAVN soldiers killed. The operation was aided by Boeing B-52 Stratofortress strikes coupled with 1,126 fighter-bomber sorties that delivered 750 tons of bombs and 146 tons of napalm and by artillery that fired more than 141,000 rounds. Officially the operation was said to have returned 140,000 people to government control and to have ended the threat to Bong Son, Quang Ngai, and Qui Nhon. Yet critics charged that the lavish use of firepower caused a major increase in refugees without providing additional security. Only limited pacification efforts were undertaken, and because the Communists soon returned, the 1st Cavalry had to launch Operation THAYER/IRVING in the same area later in the year. CLAYTON D. LAURIE See also Air Mobility; DOUBLE EAGLE, Operation; IRVING, Operation; Search and Destroy; United States Army; United States Marine Corps; Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, Army; Vietnam, Republic of, Army
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References Carland, John M. The United States Army in Vietnam: Stemming the Tide, May 1965 to October 1966. Washington DC: Center of Military History, 2000. Hymoff, Edward. The First Air Cavalry Division: Vietnam. New York: M. M. Lads, 1967. Westmoreland, General William C. Report on the War in Vietnam, Section II, Report on Operations in South Vietnam, January 1964–June 1968. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969.
MASSACHUSETTS STRIKER,
Operation
Start Date: March 1, 1969 End Date: May 8, 1969 Assault by the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) into the A Shau Valley. On March 1, 1969, the U.S. 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) began operations in response to Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), intelligence reports of increased People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) logistical activity in the A Shau Valley. The division’s first objective was to build two fire-support bases (FSBs) at the southern edge of the valley. This was soon accomplished, but bad weather prevented aviation and infantry units from conducting airmobile operations until later that day. On their initial sweep that day, soldiers of a rifle company of the 1st Battalion, 502nd Infantry, encountered immediate resistance. In anticipation of a major engagement, the 101st Airborne Division’s 2nd Brigade immediately airlifted an additional four infantry battalions into the area. Although there was little contact with Viet Cong (VC) or PAVN forces because they immediately broke contact, the so-called Screaming Eagles began to uncover massive amounts of supplies. Throughout April 1969 the units of the 101st Airborne Division destroyed numerous caches of weapons, ammunition, equipment, and food. On May 1 the 1st Battalion discovered a major PAVN supply base that contained trucks, signal equipment, and foodstuffs as well as a complete field hospital and a heavy-machine repair facility. On May 8 the operation concluded. MASSACHUSETTS STRIKER did not produce any major battles, but it did disrupt the Communist logistics system. In response to the PAVN buildup, MACV launched a more ambitious operation, APACHE SNOW, in the A Shau Valley. JULIUS A. MENZOFF See also Air Mobility; APACHE SNOW, Operation; Logistics, Allied, Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and Viet Cong References Krepinevich, Andrew F., Jr. The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.
710 Mayaguez Incident
Men of the U.S. 101st Airborne Division in the A Shau Valley on March 23, 1969, take part in Operation MASSACHUSETTS STRIKER. The operation was mounted in response to reports of increased People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) logistical activity there. The operation did not produce any major battles, but it did disrupt the Communist Ho Chi Minh Trail logistics system. (Bettmann/Corbis) Stanton, Shelby L. The Rise and Fall of an American Army: The U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985.
Mayaguez Incident Start Date: May 12, 1975 End Date: May 15, 1975 Confrontation resulting from the capture of a U.S. merchant vessel, the Mayaguez, by Cambodian Khmer Rouge forces. On May 12, 1975, some two weeks after the abandonment of the U.S. embassy in Saigon, the Cambodian Khmer Rouge fired upon the Mayaguez steaming in the Gulf of Siam. Arguing that the ship, which was en route to Thailand, had entered Cambodian territorial waters, armed Khmer Rouge boarded it and took the crew prisoner. When President Gerald R. Ford was notified of the capture, intelligence sources reported that the ship was being taken to Kompong Som, a port on the Cambodian mainland. The whereabouts of the crew was unclear. Negotiating with the Khmer Rouge was never seriously considered as an option. Ford refused to accede to another hostage situation such as the one that the nation had faced in the 1968 seizure of the Pueblo by the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea (DPRK, North Korea). Advisers to the president also suggested that this was an opportunity for his administration to retrieve its sagging public opinion ratings by showing strength in a crisis. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said, “Let’s look ferocious.” As a result, Ford decided to use force to retrieve the crew. Late in the afternoon of May 12, the Mayaguez weighed anchor and appeared to be headed for the Cambodian city of Kompong Som. Unsure whether or not the crew was still aboard the ship, Ford nevertheless ordered Thai-based F-4 fighters to intercept the ship and fire across its bow. This forced the vessel to alter course to the island of Koh Tang, just off the shore of Cambodia. Even after the ship halted its progress, intelligence reports could not confirm whether or not the crew of the Mayaguez had been transferred to Koh Tang. Early the next day, May 13, Ford gave the order that any ship leaving Koh Tang was to be stopped “in order to prevent the Americans from being taken to the mainland.” Late that evening the Cambodians tried to sail away from the island, but American fire stopped them. The attempted Cambodian escape from Koh Tang seems to have convinced Ford that the crew of the Mayaguez was being held there. At 10:40 a.m. on May 13 Ford ordered the U.S. military to develop a three-pronged plan of action to consist of a helicopter assault on the Mayaguez to secure control of the ship, an amphibious invasion of Koh Tang to retrieve the crew, and a series of air
May Day Tribe strikes on Kompong Som so that Koh Tang could not be reinforced. During preparations for the assault on the ship, 18 air police and 5 crewmen died in an aircraft crash in Thailand. Throughout the next day, May 14, U.S. troops began to move into position. The main assault force numbered some 175 marines. At 7:09 p.m. U.S. Marines landed on Koh Tang. Informed by intelligence reports that they would encounter no more than 20 Cambodians and their families, the marines were surprised to find between 150 and 200 dug-in Khmer Rouge troops. In the first hour, 15 marines died and eight helicopters were shot down. Cambodian resistance continued for almost an hour before the American command, still not in possession of the crew of the Mayaguez, declared the mission a success. At approximately 9:00 p.m. the first air strike was conducted against Kompong Som. Ten minutes later the destroyer Holt pulled alongside the Mayaguez, but the American crew was not aboard. With the entire mission in danger of failure, the Ford administration decided to send a message directly to the Cambodian government. At 9:24 p.m. Press Secretary Ron Nessen read a statement indicating that the United States would cease its military operation if and when the crew was completely and unconditionally released. One hour later a U.S. Navy reconnaissance pilot saw 30 Caucasians waving from the bow of a fishing boat. It was the crew of the Mayaguez. The men were quickly retrieved by the destroyer Wilson. The bombing of Kompong Som continued until midnight. However, it would have gone on longer had a fourth strike, ordered by Ford, not been countermanded. According to Ford in his memoirs, it was Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, who had been opposed to using force to retrieve the Mayaguez, who countermanded the order. The cost of retrieving the crew of the Mayaguez was 40 Americans dead and 50 wounded in addition to the equipment losses. JOHN ROBERT GREENE See also Cambodia; Ford, Gerald Rudolph; Khmer Rouge; Schlesinger, James Rodney References Greene, John Robert. The Presidency of Gerald R. Ford. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995. Guilmartin, John F. A Very Short War: The Mayaguez and the Battle of Koh Tang. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1995. Lamb, Christopher Jon. Belief Systems and Decision Making in the Mayaguez Crisis. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1988.
May Day Tribe Radical anti–Vietnam War protesters. Led by Rennard Condon (Rennie) Davis, this group was composed largely of members from the Youth International Party (also known as Yippies). The May Day Tribe staged an attempted shutdown of Washington, D.C., and the federal government for three days beginning on May
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On May 12, 1975, Cambodian forces seized the U.S. merchant ship Mayaguez. Trying to secure the release of the crew, U.S. forces attacked Koh Tang Island in the Gulf of Siam, suffering significant casualties in the process. The members of the crew were released, however. Here they disembark at Singapore on May 18, 1975. (AP/Wide World Photos)
3, 1971. Davis, one of the so-called Chicago Eight, proposed the idea of a massive nonviolent act of civil disobedience at a National Student Association (NSA) conference in Ann Arbor, Michigan, in early 1971. He called for blocking roads, bridges, and federal buildings, saying that “unless the government of the United States stops the war in Vietnam, we will stop the government of the United States.” Although his proposal was not endorsed by the NSA, Davis carried his ideas to college campuses, where he gathered supporters. Davis and his group came to be known as the May Day Tribe. Supported by the People’s Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ), the May Day Tribe presented the government with an ultimatum: adopt the People’s Peace Treaty or the May Day Tribe would try to immobilize the capital city. The Richard Nixon administration was determined to prevent any dislocations in Washington and thus prepared for virtually any eventuality. The protests, although unsuccessful in their aim of shutting down the city, are remembered as having led to more than 12,000 arrests, the largest number from any type of demonstration in U.S.
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history. On May 3 alone 7,000 people were arrested; the rest were controlled by a massive conglomeration of peacekeeping forces, including several thousand federal troops. Those arrested were held in the Robert F. Kennedy Stadium and were detained for up to 48 hours. On May 5 the remaining demonstrators heard speeches from congressional members opposed to the war, including New York representatives Bella Abzug and Charles Rangel. This gathering resulted in more arrests, effectively ending the May Day Tribe protests. JOHN M. BARCUS See also Abzug, Bella; Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Chicago Eight; Davis, Rennard Cordon; Students for a Democratic Society; Youth International Party References DeBenedetti, Charles, with Charles Chatfield. An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1990. Wells, Tom. The War Within: America’s Battle over Vietnam. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994. Zaroulis, N. C., and Gerald Sullivan. Who Spoke Up? American Protest against the War in Vietnam, 1963–1975. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1984.
MAYFLOWER,
Operation
Start Date: May 12, 1965 End Date: May 18, 1965 The first of several diplomatic initiatives, code-named after flowers, to end the war in Vietnam via bombing halts. Operation MAYFLOWER was the first deliberate bombing pause by the United States since the start of Operation ROLLING THUNDER, the sustained aerial campaign against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) that began in March 1965. As with most of the diplomatic efforts toward peace in the Vietnam War, MAYFLOWER ended in failure. In the months before Operation MAYFLOWER, the Lyndon B. Johnson administration was under increasing pressure from domestic and international critics to halt the bombing campaign. Moreover, the North Vietnamese government repeatedly called for an end to the bombing as a precursor to any negotiated peace. The White House developed a peace initiative centered on a limited bombing pause. Washington hoped that the pause would defuse criticism, expose the fallacy of posturing by the North Vietnamese government, and set the stage for a resumption of even larger air strikes. Operation MAYFLOWER proceeded in secrecy. U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union Foy Kohler tried to deliver a communiqué to the North Vietnamese ambassador in Moscow. The document announced that the United States would suspend air attacks against North Vietnam starting on May 12. The cessation of air strikes
would then continue into the following week. The communiqué noted that if armed action against the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) also declined, devolution of the war could occur in the future. However, both the North Vietnamese ambassador and the Soviet foreign minister rebuffed Kohler, and the document delivered to the Vietnamese embassy was returned, apparently unopened. On May 15 Radio Hanoi characterized the bombing halt as “a trick.” After additional attempts to deliver the Washington communiqué through other channels met with failure, President Johnson ordered a resumption of bombing missions on May 18. Although the North Vietnamese government then responded somewhat belatedly through the French, this initiative also faltered. Despite the actual and perceived failure of Operation MAYFLOWER, it ultimately allowed the Johnson administration to temporarily deflect criticism of its policies in Vietnam by pointing out the North Vietnamese government’s refusal to negotiate. Operation MAYFLOWER also served as a cover and a justification for the subsequent escalation of ROLLING THUNDER. JOHN G. TERINO JR. See also Airpower, Role in War; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; ROLLING THUNDER, Operation References Goodman, Allan E. The Search for a Negotiated Settlement of the Vietnam War. Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1986. Herring, George C. LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994. Herring, George C, ed. The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997.
McCain, John Sidney, Jr. Birth Date: January 17, 1911 Death Date: March 22, 1981 U.S. Navy admiral and commander in chief, Pacific Command, during July 1968–September 1972. Born on January 17, 1911, at Council Bluffs, Iowa, John Sidney McCain Jr. graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1931 and was a submariner during World War II. His father, John Sidney McCain Sr., was a career navy man and a four-star admiral. In the 1950s the junior McCain held a variety of positions, including director of Navy Undersea Warfare Research and Development, director of Progress Analysis in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and chief legislative liaison for the secretary of the U.S. Navy. McCain was promoted to rear admiral in November 1958 and to vice admiral in 1963. As commander of the entire Amphibious Force, McCain led the April 1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic as commander of
McCain, John Sidney, III Task Force 124. Advanced to full admiral in May 1967, he became commander in chief of U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, and in July 1968 he became commander in chief, Pacific Command. As commander in chief of the Pacific Command, Admiral McCain officially commanded all U.S. forces in the Pacific, including those in Vietnam. An inveterate Cold War warrior, he believed that the Vietnamese conflict was a prologue to further Communist expansion in Asia. He also believed that China was the major longterm threat and that Vietnam was only one piece of the puzzle. McCain was a vigorous supporter of President Richard Nixon’s Vietnamization program and a vocal advocate of renewed bombardment in 1972. Admiral McCain saw communism as a spreading “disease.” He was known as the “Red Arrow Man” because he used maps that showed big red arrows (and claws) thrusting menacingly from Indochina toward Malaysia and Thailand. His briefings were replete with references to “Reds,” “Commies,” and “Chicoms”; he clearly was a fervent believer in the domino theory. McCain’s strong anticommunism helped complicate command and control of U.S. forces in Vietnam. As overall commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, McCain not only had an impact on the disposition of local units, but his headquarters acted as a superfluous command layer between Washington and General Creighton Abrams, commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). McCain saw this as necessary, but U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force commanders accused the U.S. Navy (and the U.S. Air Force) of “fighting its own war,” such as conducting “strategic” air strikes independent of the war effort in South Vietnam. McCain was neither directly responsible for making policy nor always for implementing it, yet at the same time he exercised a measure of control and influence that affected the outcome of the war. This was particularly true in 1972 when he successfully advocated the mining of ports in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and the resumption of strategic air attacks to bring Hanoi back to the negotiating table. McCain retired from the navy in 1972 and became president of the U.S. Strategic Institute. He died on March 22, 1981, of a heart attack in a military aircraft over the Atlantic while returning to the United States from Europe. His son, U.S. Navy aviator Lieutenant Commander John S. McCain III, was shot down over Vietnam, held captive by the North Vietnamese for six years, and became a U.S. senator from Arizona in 1987. In 2008 McCain III ran unsuccessfully for the U.S. presidency on the Republican ticket. JOEL E. HIGLEY See also Abrams, Creighton Williams, Jr.; Domino Theory; McCain, John Sidney, III; Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; United States Navy References McCain, John, with Mark Salter. Faith of My Fathers. New York: Random House, 1999. Momyer, William W. Airpower in Three Wars: World War II, Korea and Vietnam. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978.
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Olson, James S., and Randy Roberts. Where the Domino Fell: America and Vietnam, 1945–1990. New York: St. Martin’s, 1991. Sorley, Lewis. Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times. 2nd ed. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008. A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam, Vol. 6, The Conduct of the War. McLean, VA: BDM Corp., 1980.
McCain, John Sidney, III Birth Date: August 29, 1936 U.S. Navy pilot, prisoner of war (POW) during the Vietnam War (1967–1973), U.S. congressman (1983–1987), U.S. senator (1987– present), advocate of normalized U.S. relations with Vietnam, and Republican presidential nominee in 2008. Born on August 29, 1936, in the Panama Canal Zone, John Sidney McCain III was descended from a long line of U.S. Navy admirals. His father, Admiral John S. McCain Jr., was commander in chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC), from 1968 to 1972; his grandfather, John S. McCain Sr., was also a four-star admiral who served in both World War I and World War II. The younger McCain was something of a rebel and graduated fifth from the bottom of his class at the United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, in 1958. His devil-may-care attitude and leadership skills made him a highly effective pilot, however. McCain soon became proficient in ground-attack aircraft. Posted to the aircraft carrier Forrestal, he narrowly escaped death during a fire aboard the ship in July 1967. On October 26, 1967, Lieutenant Commander McCain was piloting a Douglas A-4 Skyhawk when he was shot down and crashed in Western Lake in the middle of Hanoi in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). The Vietnamese made the site and plane into a military shrine, which McCain visited on his return to Hanoi in 1992. With two broken arms, a broken leg, a broken shoulder, and a deep wound in his foot, McCain was probably the most seriously injured pilot to enter the Hoa Lo Prison (also known as the “Hanoi Hilton”). “The crown prince,” as the Vietnamese guards called McCain because of his father’s high position, was a tough and highly respected POW who, despite his serious condition, refused the opportunity to be sent home in June 1968. Despite the horrendous conditions with which he had to deal— including periodic torture, beatings, and solitary confinement for more than two years—McCain helped motivate his fellow POWs to persevere. He also steadfastly refused to cooperate with his captors and resisted their efforts to coerce information from him. His improperly treated wounds and the torture he endured left him unable to raise either of his arms above his head. Released at the end of the war on March 14, 1973, McCain retired from the navy. In 1980 he divorced his first wife and married Cindy Lou Hensley, the daughter of a wealthy beer distributor. For a time he worked in the family business, but he seemed destined for political office. In 1982 he was elected to the House of
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John S. McCain III during an interview on April 24, 1973, shortly after his release by the North Vietnamese. McCain, the son and grandson of navy admirals, was a navy pilot during the Vietnam War. Lieutenant Commander McCain was shot down over Hanoi and held prisoner for five-and-a-half years. He retired from the navy after his release and went on to become a United States senator and the Republican Party nominee for president in 2008. (Library of Congress)
Representatives from Arizona’s 1st District, and in 1986 he was elected a U.S. senator as a Republican, taking office in January 1987. McCain had a generally distinguished record in the Senate and on several occasions was on the short list as a vice presidential nominee. He naturally gravitated toward foreign, military, and national security matters. The only blight on his record was his involvement in the mid-1980s in a scandal involving Charles Keating and the Lincoln Savings and Loan Association, which had bilked depositors and investors out of millions of dollars. Although McCain had been involved with Keating without knowing of his nefarious dealings, McCain nonetheless admitted that he had used poor judgment in accepting contributions and other perks from him. McCain traveled to Vietnam after he reached Congress, including a visit to his former prison in Hanoi. The first visit was in 1985; the second one came in 1992 as part of his work on the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. McCain met with some of his former captors in 1992 during what was an emotion-filled visit. McCain, along with other committee members, concluded in 1993 that there were no known POWs or troops missing in action (MIA) still residing in Vietnam. McCain was vilified at the time by some who strongly believed that Americans were indeed still being held by the Vietnamese.
Following his second visit, McCain became a strong supporter of normalized relations with Vietnam and an end to economic sanctions, which was realized beginning in 1995. In 2000 McCain again returned to Vietnam, this time with his young son, showing him the prison in which he had been held for almost seven years. In 2000 McCain ran for the Republican presidential primary, ultimately losing to George W. Bush in a fairly close contest. McCain’s allure was that he was not an ideologue and was not afraid to go against his own party. McCain generally backed the Bush administration’s War on Terror after the September 11, 2001, terror attacks but parted company with Bush on several issues, including the use of torture against enemy combatants, tax cuts for the wealthy, gun legislation, and climate change. McCain backed the Iraq War from the beginning but by 2004 had begun to question the prosecution of that conflict. He openly challenged Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to put more boots on the ground to deal with the mounting Iraqi insurgency. McCain repeatedly urged the Bush administration to prosecute the Iraq War with more zeal and greater commitment, so it is no surprise that he strongly backed the troop surge strategy implemented in 2007.
McCarthy, Eugene Joseph In 2008 McCain sought and gained the Republican presidential nomination. From the start, however, he was hobbled by his relatively close association with President Bush, who by then was wildly unpopular; his own stance toward the Iraq War; and a failing U.S. economy. McCain’s campaign began strongly but fell victim to repeated verbal and strategic gaffes. He seemed to bounce aimlessly from one issue to another while his opponent, Senator Barack Obama, ran a highly disciplined on-message campaign that successfully portrayed McCain as Bush redux. McCain’s choice of the unknown and inexperienced Sarah Palin, governor of Alaska, was also thought to have doomed his candidacy. In the end, McCain lost by a large margin in both the popular vote and the electoral vote, but he opted to remain in the Senate as one of its most senior and most seasoned members. JOE P. DUNN AND PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR. See also Forrestal, USS, Flight Deck Fire; Hoa Lo Prison; McCain, John Sidney, Jr.; Prisoners of War, Allied; United States Navy; Vietnam, Socialist Republic of, 1975–Present References Howes, Craig. Voices of the Vietnam POWs: Witnesses to Their Fight. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. Hubbell, John G., Andrew Jones, and Kenneth Y. Tomlinson. P.O.W.: A Definitive History of the American Prisoner-of-War Experience in Vietnam, 1964–1973. New York: Reader’s Digest, 1976. McCain, John, with Mark Salter. Faith of My Fathers. New York: Random House, 1999. McCain, John, with Mark Salter. Worth the Fighting For: A Memoir. New York: Random House, 2002. Rowan, Stephan A. They Wouldn’t Let Us Die: The Prisoners of War Tell Their Story. Middle Village, NY: Jonathan David, 1973. Timberg, Robert. The Nightingale’s Song. New York: Touchstone, Simon and Schuster, 1996.
McCarthy, Eugene Joseph Birth Date: March 29, 1916 Death Date: December 10, 2005 U.S. senator, Democratic candidate for president in 1968, and leading critic of American involvement in Vietnam. Convinced that many Americans shared his frustration over Vietnam, McCarthy attempted to merge the antiwar movement with politics, and his early success helped bring down President Lyndon B. Johnson’s presidency. Born in Watkins, Minnesota, on March 29, 1916, Eugene McCarthy graduated from St. John’s University (Minnesota) in 1935 and earned a master’s degree from the University of Minnesota in 1939. He worked as a high school teacher and college professor at St. John’s University and the College of St. Thomas (Minnesota) and was a civilian technical assistant in the War Department’s Military Intelligence Division for a time during World War II. In 1948 he was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives as a Democrat. He was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1958.
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A member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, McCarthy voted for the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, but he considered it a vote for a holding action rather than a vote for an open-ended war. In McCarthy’s view, the Vietnam War escalated in 1966 into a war of conquest. His opposition began to be evident in that year. He believed that the Johnson administration was moving from a policy of nation building in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) to an effort to save all of Southeast Asia from communism. McCarthy was also disturbed by the U.S. bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). On November 30, 1967, McCarthy announced his bid for the 1968 presidential nomination as a candidate committed to bringing about a negotiated settlement of the war. He believed that the American people should be given the “opportunity to make an intellectual and moral determination on the war in Vietnam.” Large numbers of idealistic antiwar students flocked to his campaign, as they had to his earlier speaking engagements on major college campuses. McCarthy’s surprisingly strong showing in the March 12, 1968, New Hampshire Democratic primary (although later shown to be primarily an anti-Johnson vote rather than a vote for McCarthy’s program per se) prompted Senator Robert F. Kennedy (D-N.Y.) to join the presidential race. By month’s end, President Johnson announced that he would not seek reelection. At the same time, Johnson announced a partial bombing halt and authorized presidential emissary W. Averell Harriman to open negotiations with North Vietnam. Kennedy’s campaign soon eclipsed that of McCarthy, although McCarthy remained in the race. Kennedy’s assassination in June 1968 again changed the dynamics of the presidential race. At the violence-marred August 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago, Vice President Hubert Humphrey received the nomination, ending McCarthy’s idealistic antiwar political crusade. In 1969 McCarthy resigned from the Foreign Relations Committee, and he left the Senate on completion of his second term in 1970. After his retirement from the Senate, his involvement in politics consisted primarily of writing and making speeches. He also worked in the publishing industry and authored a syndicated newspaper column for a number of years. In 1976 and again in 1988 he made unsuccessful bids for the presidency as an independent candidate. McCarthy died on December 10, 2005, in Washington, D.C. JAMES E. SOUTHERLAND See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Democratic National Convention of 1968; Elections, U.S., 1968; Harriman, William Averell; Humphrey, Hubert Horatio; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, Robert Francis; Knowland, William Fife; Gulf of Tonkin Resolution References Eisele, Albert. Almost to the Presidency: A Biography of Two American Politicians. Blue Earth, MN: Piper, 1972. Herzog, Arthur. McCarthy for President. New York: Viking, 1969. McCarthy, Eugene. The Year of the People. New York: Doubleday, 1969. White, Theodore H. The Making of the President, 1968. New York: Atheneum, 1969.
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McCloy, John Jay Birth Date: March 31, 1895 Death Date: March 11, 1989 U.S. assistant secretary of war (1941–1945), president of the World Bank (1946–1948), U.S. high commissioner for Germany (1949–1952), and prominent adviser to U.S. presidents. Born in Philadelphia on March 31, 1895, John Jay McCloy earned an undergraduate degree from Amherst College and a law degree from Harvard University in 1921. He then entered private law practice before becoming assistant secretary of war in 1941. In 1946 McCloy assumed the presidency of the World Bank and then served as U.S. high commissioner for Germany from 1949 to 1952. As high commissioner he actively participated in transforming the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) from an occupied nation to a sovereign state closely allied with the West. McCloy later advised presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy on disarmament issues. From 1953 to 1960 McCloy served as president of the Chase Manhattan Bank. He then returned to the practice of law. In 1963 President Lyndon B. Johnson asked McCloy to serve on the Warren Commission investigating the November 1963 assassination of Kennedy.
With his Ivy League education and years of government service, McCloy typified the Washington Establishment figure; in fact, the journalist Richard Rovere termed him the “chairman” of the Establishment. McCloy was one of the so-called Wise Men who counseled President Johnson on Vietnam policy. Although McCloy did not attend the meeting of senior advisers that counseled Johnson in March 1968 to withdraw U.S. forces from Vietnam, by that time McCloy was clearly dissatisfied with existing policy regarding Vietnam, and his views were made known to the president. McCloy later served as chairman of the influential Council on Foreign Relations and remained a valuable adviser to presidents Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan. McCloy died on March 11, 1989, in Stamford, Connecticut. MARK BARRINGER See also Eisenhower, Dwight David; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Wise Men References Bird, Kai. The Chairman: John J. McCloy and the Making of the American Establishment. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992. Isaacson, Walter, and Evan Thomas. The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986. McCloy, John J. The Challenge to American Foreign Policy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953.
McCone, John Alex Birth Date: January 4, 1902 Death Date: February 14, 1991
John J. McCloy was one of the “Wise Men” who advised President Lyndon Johnson. McCloy made known his opposition to the president’s Vietnam policies. (Yoichi R. Okamoto/Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library)
Industrialist and director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) during 1961–1965. Born in San Francisco, California, on January 4, 1902, John Alex McCone graduated from the University of California at Berkeley in 1922. A successful businessman who advanced from riveter to vice president of the Consolidated Steel Corporation in the 1920s, McCone had considerable management experience. He went on to make a fortune in the steel and shipbuilding industries during World War II under the banner of the Bechtel-McCone engineering firm. In 1947 President Harry S. Truman appointed McCone to the Air Policy Commission. The following year McCone was named a special deputy to Secretary of Defense James Forrestal. In 1950 McCone became undersecretary of the U.S. Air Force and in that position urged President Truman to begin a program of building guided missiles, which was not immediately done. In 1951 McCone returned to private business but continued to serve Washington in special missions. In 1958 President Dwight D. Eisenhower appointed McCone head of the Atomic Energy Commission. On September 27, 1961, several months after the abortive Bay of Pigs Invasion of Cuba, President John F. Kennedy appointed McCone, a conservative Republican, to head the CIA, succeeding Allen Dulles. McCone had virtually no intelligence experience, and
McConnell, John Paul journalist David Halberstam believed that Kennedy was motivated to make the appointment because of a perceived need for Establishment acceptance of his administration. Kennedy believed that he needed protection from attack by the political Right, which McCone’s appointment would provide. In any case, McCone inherited an agency in considerable turmoil. McCone proceeded to restore CIA credibility. He immediately convened a study group to identify the duties of the director and submit suggestions about reorganization of the agency. Previously, the CIA had been an association of three directorates desperately in need of centralized planning and organization to achieve unity. The endeavor under McCone, the third reorganization study undertaken by the agency in an eight-year period, took two years to complete. The reorganization substantially improved scientific and technological research and development capabilities, added a cost-analysis system, and created a position of comptroller. In addition, President Kennedy publicly strengthened the agency by announcing that the director would be charged with developing policies and coordinating procedures at all levels across the intelligence community. The announcement came less than a month after the president’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board recommended dismantling the CIA. Kennedy’s stance strengthened McCone’s immediate position but fueled resentment among other agencies and White House and cabinet figures, such as Secretary of State Robert McNamara. Furthermore, McCone’s aggressive and confident style irked many of his peers. His access to the president waned after he successfully predicted and gave warning about the Soviet attempt to place nuclear missiles in Cuba because he bragged too loudly for too long. Although McCone was considered a hard-line massive retaliation advocate who could help the president deflect pressure from the political Right, he was apparently not one to take political and military risks lightly. McCone argued against the coup to oust Ngo Dinh Diem, president of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), in November 1963. In spite of opposition, McCone remained CIA director after President Kennedy’s November 1963 assassination. However, McCone may have initiated his own demise under President Lyndon B. Johnson by criticizing escalation of the war in Vietnam. Early on McCone noted that Operation ROLLING THUNDER, the bombing of North Vietnam, was not working and that escalation would fail because it could not change the odds. McCone believed that Hanoi would match any U.S. escalation. In 1965 he left the CIA, apparently convinced that President Johnson did not hold the agency in the same esteem as did his predecessor. After retiring from the CIA, McCone served on the boards of several major corporations, including ITT. He died on February 14, 1991, in Pebble Beach, California. PAUL R. CAMACHO See also Central Intelligence Agency; Dulles, Allen Welsh; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; McNamara, Robert Strange; Ngo Dinh Diem, Overthrow of; ROLLING THUNDER, Operation
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References Halberstam, David. The Best and the Brightest. New York: Random House, 1972. Hersh, Burton. The Old Boys: The American Elite and the Origins of the CIA. New York: Scribner, 1992. Kirkpatrick, Lyman D., Jr. The Real CIA. New York: Macmillan, 1968. Powers, Thomas. The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA. New York: Knopf, 1979.
McConnell, John Paul Birth Date: February 7, 1908 Death Date: November 21, 1986 U.S. Air Force general and air force chief of staff during 1965– 1969. Born in Booneville, Arkansas, on February 7, 1908, John Paul McConnell graduated from Henderson Brown College in Arkadelphia in 1927. He then attended the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, graduating in 1932. Following flight training, McConnell earned his wings in 1933. He served four years in a pursuit squadron, being promoted to first lieutenant in 1935. During 1939–1942 when he was assigned to staff and training duties at Maxwell Field, Alabama, he rose rapidly in rank, achieving captain in 1939, major in 1941, and lieutenant colonel in 1942. He served briefly with the office of the chief of the Army Air Force and became deputy chief of staff and then was chief of staff at the Army Air Force technical training center in North Carolina during 1942–1943. He became a colonel in December 1942. The next year he moved to Texas as deputy chief of staff for the Army Air Force Training Command.
U.S. Air Force general John Paul McConnell was chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force during 1965–1969 and advocated full-scale unrestricted bombing of North Vietnam. (Department of Defense)
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In 1943 and 1944 McConnell served as chief of staff of the Tenth Air Force Training Command in Karachi, India, before becoming deputy commander of the Third Tactical Air Force in India. With his promotion to brigadier general in August 1944, McConnell became senior air staff officer of the Southeast Asia Air Command in Sri Lanka until June 1945. He then spent two years as senior air adviser to the Chinese government and commander of the Air Division, Nanking Headquarters Command. McConnell returned to the United States in 1947 to serve as chief of the Reserve and National Guard Division, and in 1948 he was appointed chief of the U.S. Air Force Civilian Components Group. He was promoted to major general in 1950 and then commanded the 3rd Air Division and later the Third Air Force. In 1953 McConnell became director of plans at Strategic Air Command (SAC) headquarters in Nebraska, where he served for four years, before commanding SAC’s Second Air Force during 1957–1961. He achieved the rank of lieutenant general in 1959. McConnell then returned to SAC headquarters as vice commander. With his promotion to four-star rank in 1962, McConnell became deputy commander of the U.S. European Command (1962–1964). In 1964 McConnell was made vice chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force. The next year he succeeded General Curtis LeMay as U.S. Air Force chief of staff, a position that McConnell held until his retirement in 1969. As chief of staff during the Vietnam War, he advocated full-scale unrestricted bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). He believed in the ability of the U.S. Air Force to destroy through strategic bombing both the willingness and capability of North Vietnam to continue the war. Following his retirement, McConnell worked with the Civil Air Patrol in the 1970s. He died in Bethesda, Maryland, on November 21, 1986. LAURA MATYSEK WOOD See also United States Air Force References Clodfelter, Mark. The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam. New York: Free Press, 1989. Dupuy, Trevor N., Curt Johnson, and David L. Bongard. The Harper Encyclopedia of Military Biography. New York: HarperCollins, 1992.
McGarr, Lionel Charles Birth Date: March 5, 1904 Death Date: November 3, 1988 U.S. Army officer. Born in Yuma, Arizona, on March 5, 1904, Lionel Charles McGarr graduated from the United States Military Academy, West Point, in 1928. He was commissioned in the infantry, and his early postings were with the 25th Infantry and the 21st Infantry in Hawaii. He graduated from the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, and then returned to Hawaii, serving as an
instructor with the National Guard until it was activated in 1940. He was reassigned to headquarters in Hawaii but returned to the mainland in mid-1941 to join the 3rd Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Washington. After the United States entered World War II, McGarr saw action in North Africa, Sicily, Italy, and southern France. By the end of the war McGarr had participated in four major amphibious assaults and had been wounded on five occasions. Promoted to colonel in 1945, he became chief of staff of the 3rd Infantry Division, a post he held until returning to the United States in 1946. McGarr was then assigned to Fort Myer, Virginia, and he graduated from the National War College in June 1947. He was then assigned to the Intelligence Division of the U.S. Army staff. McGarr held several commands over the next few years in the United States and abroad, but the beginning of the Korean War (1950–1953) led to his assignment in Korea. Advanced to brigadier general, McGarr served as assistant division commander of the 2nd Infantry Division. He then took command of the United Nations Command (UNC) prison camp system in Korea, presiding over 13 island and mainland camps that housed some 120,000 North Korean and Chinese prisoners of war. Following the war, McGarr held a variety of commands and was promoted to major general. He served as the commanding general in the Panama Canal Zone in 1954 before returning to the United States to command the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Promoted to lieutenant general in 1960, McGarr served as chief of the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Vietnam. McGarr was responsible for the U.S. effort in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) to advise and train the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) to deal with the Communist insurgency. In contrast to his predecessor, Lieutenant General Samuel T. Williams, McGarr saw counterinsurgency as a different type of warfare. When he had headed the Command and General Staff College, McGarr had called for studies on counterinsurgency warfare, and he now ordered the preparation of a study titled “Tactics and Techniques of CounterInsurgency Operations.” McGarr’s recommendations called for the clear, rational ARVN chain of command structure (urged by all American officials since 1957); improvements in intelligence gathering; transferring the Civil Guard to the Ministry of Defense; heightened border surveillance; increases in civic action programs; and an increase in ARVN strength by 20,000 men, to include ranger companies. McGarr strongly supported the increase in troop strength, believing that the Communist insurgency had reached the point where this was mandatory even if it had to come at the expense of social and political reforms. He also urged the dispatch to South Vietnam of U.S. helicopters and the personnel to man and maintain them. McGarr retired from the army in 1962. He settled in Lafayette, California, where he died on November 3, 1988. JEFFREY B. COOK
McGovern, George Stanley
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See also Military Assistance and Advisory Group, Vietnam; Williams, Samuel Tankersley
from public life in 1981. McGee died in Bethesda, Maryland, on April 9, 1992. DAVID COFFEY
References ”Lionel Charles McGarr.” Assembly: Association of Graduates, United States Military Academy, May 1990, 131–132. Spector, Ronald H. Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941–1960. United States Army in Vietnam Series. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1983.
See also Domino Theory; Goldwater, Barry Morris; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Mansfield, Michael Joseph; McCarthy, Eugene Joseph; Stennis, John Cornelius; United States Congress and the Vietnam War
McGee, Gale William Birth Date: March 17, 1915 Death Date: April 9, 1992 Academic, Democratic politician, and U.S. senator (1958–1977). Born in Lincoln, Nebraska, on March 17, 1915, Gale William McGee devoted much of his early life to education. He attended Nebraska State Teachers College before earning a BA in history at Iowa State College (now Iowa State University), an MA in history from the University of Notre Dame, and in 1946 a PhD from the University of Chicago. McGee taught at numerous universities until 1946, when he secured a professorship at the University of Wyoming, a position he held for the next 12 years. McGee’s first exposure to national politics came in 1955 when he joined U.S. senator Joseph O’Mahoney’s staff as a legislative aide. In 1958, running as a Democrat in his first bid for public office, McGee won election to the U.S. Senate from his adopted state of Wyoming. His campaign benefited from high-profile appearances by the powerful senator Lyndon Baines Johnson, a political debt that McGee would repay when Johnson became president. Long before U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia was a matter of public debate, McGee established himself as an ardent Cold War warrior. A firm devotee of the domino theory, he viewed a U.S. stand in Vietnam as essential to the promotion of democracy worldwide. He frequently drew upon his previous experience, evoking historical lessons in articulate speeches on the Senate floor. McGee staunchly supported U.S. efforts in Southeast Asia. As congressional and public criticism mounted, he continued to back military approaches to the Vietnam conflict. Although something of an independent, McGee was one of President Johnson’s chief congressional allies, remaining loyal despite major defections by many previous Johnson supporters. McGee’s Senate career included important membership on the Foreign Relations Committee and the Appropriations Committee and the chairmanship of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee. He also authored a book, The Responsibilities of World Power, published in 1968. In 1976 he lost his bid for reelection to Republican Malcolm Wallop. Thereafter McGee served as ambassador to the Organization of American States (OAS) until his retirement
References Dallek, Robert. Lone Star Rising: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1908–1960. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. McGee, Gale W. The Responsibilities of World Power. Washington, DC: National Press, 1968. Mooney, Louise, ed. The Annual Obituary 1992. Detroit: St. James, 1993.
McGovern, George Stanley Birth Date: July 19, 1922 Democratic politician, U.S. congressman (1957–1961), U.S. senator (1963–1981), and Democratic Party presidential candidate (1972). Born on July 19, 1922, in Avon, South Dakota, George Stanley McGovern grew up in Mitchell and there entered Dakota Wesleyan University in 1940. In 1942 he joined the Army Air Force as an air cadet. Then, as a B-24 pilot, he flew more than 30 combat missions in the European theater of operations, earning the Distinguished Flying Cross and the Air Medal with three Oak Leaf Clusters. Discharged in 1945 as a first lieutenant, McGovern returned to Dakota Wesleyan and was graduated with a BA in 1946. He received an MA from Northwestern University in 1949 and taught history and political science at Dakota Wesleyan. In 1953 he received a PhD in history from Northwestern University. Also that year, he resigned his teaching position to become executive secretary of the South Dakota Democratic Party and led that party’s revitalization in the state. In 1956 McGovern ran successfully for the U.S. House of Representatives. He quickly established himself as a liberal, supporting federal assistance for agriculture and education and medical care for the elderly. He also backed labor reform. After an unsuccessful bid for the Senate in 1960, he was selected by President John F. Kennedy to head the Food for Peace program, an initiative to use U.S. food surpluses to fight world hunger. McGovern resigned that position in 1962 to seek South Dakota’s other senatorial seat. By a slim margin of less than 600 votes, McGovern won election to the U.S. Senate. In the Senate, McGovern supported Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress and President Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society programs. McGovern also backed the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and called for reductions in military spending. He long criticized Cold War policies and anti-Communist obsessions, including what he considered a misguided preoccupation with Fidel Castro and Cuba. McGovern also warned against U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia
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U.S. senator George McGovern secured the Democratic Party’s nomination for president in 1972. A decorated bomber pilot in World War II and opponent of the Vietnam War, McGovern was overwhelmingly defeated by President Richard Nixon in the general election. (Library of Congress)
and considered the achievement of world peace the greatest challenge to be confronted. Although he supported Johnson’s call for military force to protect the independence of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) and the August 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, McGovern soon became a leader in the congressional opposition to U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. Following a 1965 visit to South Vietnam, McGovern pressed for a political rather than military approach to a situation that he viewed as civil war. He maintained that U.S. anti-Communist fervor resulted in support for corrupt and ineffective dictatorships. He called for improved relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and staunchly opposed offensive operations against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). Briefly a candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1968, McGovern continued to oppose the war effort during Richard M. Nixon’s presidency. In 1970 McGovern introduced with Senator Mark Hatfield (R-Ore.) the Hatfield-McGovern Amendment that called for the removal of U.S. forces from Southeast Asia by the end of 1971 and an end to all funding for the Vietnam War. The amendment did not pass. In 1972 McGovern secured the Democratic Party presidential nomination largely on the strength of his antiwar position. Despite his efforts to embrace mainstream antiwar sentiments and avoid
radical elements, McGovern’s candidacy was hampered by the very stigma that he sought to avoid. The Nixon campaign capitalized on this to cast McGovern as an out-of-touch leftist radical and draw moderate Democrats to its camp. McGovern’s criticism of Nixon’s prosecution of the war and White House corruption (the emerging Watergate Scandal) largely was ignored. McGovern’s campaign was further damaged by vice presidential running mate Thomas Eagleton’s admission that he had been treated for mental illness. McGovern’s second choice for vice president, Sargent Shriver, brought little to the ticket. Finally, McGovern’s controversial platform, including amnesty for draft resistors, the decriminalization of abortion, and drastic cuts in defense spending, proved too liberal even for many Democrats. Nixon won the November election by one of the largest margins in American history. McGovern continued in the Senate and won reelection in 1974 but as a well-established liberal lost his seat in the conservative resurgence led by Ronald Reagan in 1980. McGovern remained active in Democratic Party politics and ran unsuccessfully for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1984. He has written numerous books and articles, including Against Want: America’s Food for Peace Program, Agricultural Thought in the Twentieth Century and Grassroots: The Autobiography of George S. McGovern. He has also been actively involved in worldwide antihunger and antipoverty campaigns and speaks widely throughout the United States. McGovern lives in Washington, D.C. DAVID COFFEY See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Church, Frank Forrester; Elections, U.S., 1968; Elections, U.S., 1972; Hatfield, Mark Odom; Hatfield-McGovern Amendment; Humphrey, Hubert Horatio; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, Edward Moore; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Nixon, Richard Milhous; United States Congress and the Vietnam War; Watergate Scandal References Anson, Robert S. McGovern: A Biography. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972. Marano, Richard Michael. Vote Your Conscience: The Last Campaign of George McGovern. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004. McGovern, George. Grassroots: The Autobiography of George McGovern. New York: Random House, 1978. Watson, Robert P., ed. George McGovern: A Political Life, a Political Legacy. Pierre: South Dakota State Historical Society Press, 2004. Who’s Who in American Politics, 1995–1996. New Providence, NJ: R. R. Bowker, 1995.
McNamara, Robert Strange Birth Date: June 9, 1916 Death Date: July 6, 2009 Businessman, auto executive, secretary of defense (1961–1968), and president of the World Bank (1968–1982). Born on June 9, 1916, in San Francisco, Robert Strange McNamara studied
McNamara, Robert Strange economics at the University of California at Berkeley. He next earned a master’s degree in business administration at Harvard University and then soon joined the faculty. During World War II he was a U.S. Army Air Force statistical control officer. Following the war he went to work for the Ford Motor Company, where he rose to president in 1960 at the age of 44. A few weeks later, President John F. Kennedy appointed him secretary of defense. McNamara came to the job determined to take control of the Pentagon bureaucracy. Among his early initiatives were the installation of a programming-planning-budgeting system, the introduction of systems analysis into the department’s decision-making process, and the revitalization of conventional forces, neglected under the prior administration’s defense policy based on massive retaliation. The Kennedy administration’s new approach became known as flexible response. McNamara also evinced a continuing concern for the control of nuclear weapons, a subject that continued high on his personal agenda even after he had left his Pentagon post. McNamara embraced the fiasco that became the Bay of Pigs Invasion in April 1961, but in October 1962 during the Cuban Missile Crisis, he favored the moderate position of a naval quarantine around Cuba, advice that President Kennedy followed. Within a year of heading the Pentagon, McNamara had also gone on record as supporting the recommendations of General Maxwell Taylor and Walt Rostow that the United States should commit itself to preventing the fall of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) to communism, although he later wrote that within days he realized that “the complexity of the situation and the uncertainties of our ability to deal with it by military means became apparent” and that supporting further American involvement “had been a bad idea.” During successive levels of increasing U.S. commitment, including the deployment of increasingly more ground combat forces to Vietnam, McNamara supported meeting the field commander’s requirements, at the same time insisting on a “graduated response” to “aggression” by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), particularly with regard to the air war against North Vietnam. By the end of 1965, however, McNamara had begun to doubt the possibility of achieving a military solution in Vietnam, a view he expressed to President Lyndon B. Johnson. Nevertheless, a month later McNamara recommended adding 200,000 men to forces in Vietnam and expanding air operations. At the same time, he suggested that the odds were even that the result would be “a military standoff at a much higher level.” In the autumn of that same year, McNamara advised Johnson that he saw no palatable way to end the war quickly, and by May 1967 McNamara had advised the president in writing that the United States should alter its objectives in Vietnam and the means to achieve them. McNamara refused to support General William Westmoreland’s most recent request for 200,000 more troops and argued instead that his approach “could lead to a major national disaster.” But then in July 1967, back from a trip to Vietnam, McNamara told the president that there was not a stalemate in the war,
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As secretary of defense during 1961–1968, Robert S. McNamara was one of the chief architects of U.S. policy in Vietnam under presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. He began to have doubts about the war only late in his tenure but did not voice them publicly, much to the anger of many. McNamara spent his retirement writing about the lessons to be learned from the conflict. (Yoichi R. Okamoto/Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library)
and indeed, according to Tom Johnson’s notes of the meeting, “he felt that if we follow the same program we will win the war and end the fighting.” Faced with this pervasive inconsistency on the part of his war minister, Johnson soon decided to replace him. Later McNamara would recall the “loose assumptions, unasked questions, and thin analyses underlying our military strategy in Vietnam” and admit that he “misunderstood the nature of the conflict.” In their book The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, Charles J. Hitch, who had been McNamara’s comptroller in the Defense Department, and Roland N. McKean observed that “there are excellent reasons for making most decisions at lower levels. Officials on the spot have far better technical information; they can act more quickly; giving them authority will utilize and develop the reservoir of ingenuity and initiative in the whole organization.” McNamara meanwhile brought an unprecedented degree of centralization to the management of the Defense Department, even though, as Hitch and McKean also observed, “if large numbers of detailed decisions are attempted at a high level . . . the higher
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levels will become swamped in detail, decisions will be delayed, the organization will become muscle-bound, and the higher levels will have neither time nor energy for their essential functions of policymaking.” The accuracy of this analysis became clear when McNamara, in his book In Retrospect, offered the observation that he was just too busy to deal with the Vietnam War, that “an orderly, rational approach was precluded by the ‘crowding out’ which resulted from the fact that Vietnam was but one of a multitude of problems we confronted.” Under McNamara, there were huge gaps between the rhetoric and the reality. As late as 1971, for example, more than three years after McNamara had left the Pentagon, Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith argued in How Much Is Enough? that one of the strengths of McNamara’s regime was that he “insisted on integrating and balancing the nation’s foreign policy, military strategy, force requirements, and defense budget.” Instead, he had so ineptly managed the requirements of the war in Vietnam and competing commitments elsewhere that the U.S. Army in Europe was virtually destroyed to make up for Vietnam War shortfalls, while reserve forces were similarly ravaged. By the time McNamara was through, wrote General Bruce Palmer Jr. in The 25-Year War, “the proud, combat-ready Seventh Army ceased to be a field army and became a large training and replacement depot for Vietnam.” The result was that it “became singularly unready, incapable of fulfilling its NATO mission.” McNamara left office at the end of February 1968, in the midst of the debate over Vietnam policy precipitated by the Tet Offensive, to become president of the World Bank, a post he held until 1982. His 1995 book In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam reignited Vietnam War passions but did little to rebuild his reputation. McNamara died in Washington, D.C., on July 6, 2009. LEWIS SORLEY See also Bundy, McGeorge; Bundy, William Putnam; Clifford, Clark McAdams; Gelb, Leslie Howard; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; McNamara Line; Project 100,000; RAND Corporation; Read, Benjamin Huger; Rostow, Walt Whitman; San Antonio Formula; Taylor, Maxwell Davenport; Taylor-McNamara Report; United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1965–1968; United States Joint Chiefs of Staff; Westmoreland, William Childs; Wise Men References Enthoven, Alain C., and K. Wayne Smith. How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961–69. New York: Harper and Row, 1971. Hitch, Charles J. Decision Making for Defense. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965. McNamara, Robert S., with Brian VanDeMark. In Retrospect, the Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam. New York: Vintage Books, 1995. Palmer, Gregory. The McNamara Strategy and the Vietnam War: Program Budgeting in the Pentagon, 1960–1968. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1978. Shapley, Deborah. Promise and Power: The Life and Times of Robert McNamara. Boston: Little, Brown, 1993.
McNamara Line On September 7, 1967, U.S. secretary of defense Robert McNamara announced plans for the construction of an electronic anti-infiltration barrier below the demilitarized zone (DMZ) in Vietnam. The principal purpose of the so-called McNamara Line was to alert U.S. forces when People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) forces crossed the barrier. Allied air and artillery strikes would then be brought to bear to curb infiltration from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). By early 1965 it became clear to the Americans that the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) was at the point of collapse. The U.S. response was to increase troop levels in South Vietnam and to initiate Operation ROLLING THUNDER, the sustained bombing of North Vietnam. By mid-1966 it became evident that these strategies were not working as hoped. U.S. troop increases were matched by enhanced PAVN infiltration into South Vietnam. U.S. military leaders wanted to sharply step up the air war and mobilize reserve forces. They urged President Lyndon Johnson to consider invading Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam to force Hanoi to cease its support for the war in South Vietnam. Secretary McNamara believed that such a widening of the war would only result in a continuation of the present stalemate at higher levels and might trigger intervention by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), as in the Korean War. In 1966 Harvard professor Roger Fisher presented a plan for dealing with infiltration down the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos and across the DMZ. Fisher’s proposal was to install a high-technology barrier. In April 1966 McNamara turned the Fisher proposal over to the Jason Division, a group of scientists formed in 1959 by the Institute for Defense Analyses and known as Jasons. Fisher’s proposal would have depended on technology in the form of mines, pits, barbed wire, and other physical devices. The task for the Jasons was to develop a plan for the installation of a barrier laden with state-of-the-art electronic devices. The Jasons reported that the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam had no measurable effect on Hanoi’s ability to support military operations in South Vietnam. Their report went further, claiming that an expanded air campaign in the future would not prohibit PAVN forces from infiltrating into South Vietnam at the then-current rate or even an increased rate. The Jasons proposed an infiltration barrier of two components: an antipersonnel barrier, staffed by troops across the southern side of the DMZ from the South China Sea to Laos, and an antivehicular barrier, primarily an aerial operation, emplaced in and over the Laotian panhandle to interdict traffic along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. There were certain features common to both barriers, including the employment of new technology such as remote sensors (button bomblets, which were tiny mines that made noise when stepped on, thereby alerting the acoustic sensors) and Gravel mines (small cloth-covered squares designed to wound legs and feet when stepped on).
McNamara Line The purpose of these sensors was to facilitate the acquisition of targets for U.S. aircraft. The target-acquisition sensors would be monitored by aircraft that would relay data to a central computer site in Thailand, which would then guide attack aircraft to their targets. Requirements for both barriers included 240 million Gravel mines, 300 million button bomblets, 120,000 Sadeye cluster bombs, 19,200 acoustic sensors, 68 patrol planes, and 50 aircraft to drop the mines. The estimated total cost for these components was $800 million per year.
The Barrier in Vietnam The U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), modified the original Jason proposal for an antipersonnel barrier. In its final form the MACV plan called for a linear barrier consisting of a stretch of cleared ground 650 to 1,100 yards wide containing barbed wire, minefields, sensors, and watchtowers backed by a series of manned strong points. Behind these points would be a series of artillery bases to provide an interlocking pattern of artillery fire. This part of the system would begin at the coast of South Vietnam below the DMZ and continue westward for about 18.5 miles. From this point to the Laotian border, the barrier would be less comprehensive. Infiltration routes would be marked and blocked by minefields and barbed-wire obstacles. Artillery bases would provide fire support and sites for the deployment of reaction forces to seek out and destroy PAVN infiltrators. Construction of the barrier began in the summer of 1967. The McNamara Line was originally given the code name Project Practice Nine; later it was renamed Project Dye Marker. U.S. marines and U.S. Navy Seabees quickly ran into difficulty in their efforts to construct Dye Marker. In September 1967 the PAVN launched Phase I of their General Offensive, General Uprising. In the I Corps Tactical Zone, Phase I began with heavy attacks on marine positions along the DMZ. Phase II of the offensive took place during the Tet Offensive in 1968. By January, when the McNamara Line should have been operational, it became clear that the North Vietnamese were massing around the marine base at Khe Sanh in the northwestern corner of the I Corps Tactical Zone. These circumstances led General William Westmoreland to give top priority to the defense of Khe Sanh. All sensors and related equipment slated to be installed along the DMZ were instead given to the defenders of Khe Sanh. Aircraft dropped seismic and acoustic sensors on likely approaches. Almost immediately the sensors began indicating PAVN activity. The siege at Khe Sanh ended in April, and sensors that had been deployed in its defense were highly praised. But the fighting at Khe Sanh effectively stopped further construction on the McNamara Line. The defenders at Khe Sanh did not face their enemy across a broad front; rather, they were almost surrounded by them. The fighting there showed that sensor technology worked in 360-degree applications. There was no compelling evidence that the barrier technique would work in a linear application, as envisioned by the McNa-
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The Antivehicular Barrier in Laos The Ho Chi Minh Trail supply line was a series of trails, roads, and waterways that began in North Vietnam and entered Laos through various mountain passes. Continuing south through the Laotian panhandle, the trail penetrated South Vietnam in Military Regions I and II. Other branches of the trail continued south into Cambodia and then entered South Vietnam in Military Region III. At its greatest extent, the Ho Chi Minh Trail traversed approximately 12,700 miles. The flow of matériel on the Ho Chi Minh Trail was primarily by truck convoy. This could be reduced by either the destruction of the vehicles or destruction of the trail itself. To destroy the trucks, the United States deployed aircraft gunships equipped with nightviewing devices. These devices could detect people, cooking fires, recently stopped vehicles, or foxholes inhabited by troops. Another sensor contained a cathode-ray tube that reacted to ignition systems found in vehicles. Targets acquired by these devices would be destroyed by aerial cannon capable of firing up to 6,000 rounds per minute. Other improvements in the methods of weapons delivery included automation of the release process. Computers could carry out calculations to direct the aircraft’s approach run as well as the automatic release of munitions at the appropriate time. The munitions themselves were modified to increase accuracy. Laser-guided bombs were conventional bombs fitted with a laser-guidance unit. The target was illuminated by shining a beam of laser light on it, allowing the bomb to follow the beam to its target. In addition to devices that would locate targets from the air, a variety of ground sensors were developed and deployed on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Dropped from aircraft, these sensors either landed on the ground or hung from foliage. Battery-operated sensors that were located and tampered with would self-destruct. Some sensors detected motion or sound, while others were sensitive to metallic objects or to chemicals emanating from the bodies of mammals. Data produced by these sensors were transmitted via radio to receivers located at ground stations or aboard orbiting aircraft. From these stations the data was relayed to a central processing base in Thailand. The Infiltration Surveillance Center (ISC) was the heart of this antivehicular system, which was code-named Project Igloo White. After the data was sorted by computer it was passed to analysts, who would send their assessments to the strike aircraft and direct them to their targets. ISC computers contained extensive mapping of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. They were used to predict the expected path and speed of truck convoys by sensor readout. Aircraft were guided to a particular point, and munitions were automatically released at a time that would coincide with the arrival of the truck
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convoy in the kill zone. This interdiction system had all-weather capability and required no ground forces. Project Igloo White was in operation from 1968 until the end of 1972. U.S. Air Force figures claimed that the bombing campaign destroyed a great number of trucks: 5,500 in 1968, 6,000 in 1969, 12,000 in 1970, and 12,000 in 1971, the last full year of Igloo White’s operation. Such figures were invariably greater than Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) figures for all of North Vietnam and Laos, however. Official Vietnamese figures list approximately 800 trucks destroyed in 1968, 1,300 in 1969, 1,800 in 1970, and 2,800 in 1971 (Vietnamese records are based on a slightly different time frame, so exact figures for the calendar year are not available). Still, the U.S. Air Force estimated that in 1971 only 20 percent of the supplies entering the Ho Chi Minh Trail system made it to their destination. Vietnamese records indicate losses of 13.7 percent of the total quantity of supplies shipped down the trail in 1971. Igloo White operations began shutting down in December 1972. The last U.S. bombing raid on the Ho Chi Minh Trail was a Boeing B-52 Stratofortress strike in April 1973. The antipersonnel barrier across the DMZ was never constructed as planned. Much of the proposed barrier was within range of PAVN artillery situated just north of the DMZ, and the entire area was the object of frequent PAVN probes. U.S. military forces were never of sufficient strength to adequately construct and run the barrier while fighting at the same time. Had the barrier been built in the early years of U.S. involvement, it would have faced much less opposition. Until the North Vietnamese escalated the fighting to high levels in the mid-1960s, however, the perceived need for a barrier was insufficient to order its construction. Had an effective barrier been constructed, the PAVN would undoubtedly have chosen to go around it. PAVN units being sent to Military Regions II, III, and IV clearly would have had an easier time outflanking the barrier via the Ho Chi Minh Trail than fighting their way through hundreds of thousands of U.S. and ARVN soldiers located in the I Corps Tactical Zone. Such fighting as did occur in the I Corps Tactical Zone was usually initiated by the enemy for the purpose of tying up American and South Vietnamese military assets. Unlike the antipersonnel barrier, the antivehicular barrier across the Laotian panhandle was a thorough implementation of the Jason plan. The antivehicular barrier was successful in destroying a great quantity of military supplies. Undoubtedly many PAVN soldiers were killed as well; more than 1 million tons of bombs were dropped on the Ho Chi Minh Trail by the United States and its allies between 1965 and 1971. But the trail network was too extensive to be shut down by any amount of bombing. The PAVN was largely successful in controlling the level of fighting during the war. When supplies were inadequate to support military activity at high levels, Hanoi reduced operations until sufficient matériel became available. Between 1966 and 1971 the Ho Chi Minh Trail was used to infiltrate some 630,000 troops, 100,000 tons of food, 400,000 weap-
ons, and 50,000 tons of ammunition into South Vietnam (postwar Vietnamese Communist statistics give the total troop infiltration during the same period as approximately 550,000 men and the total amount of supplies delivered during the same period as almost 180,000 tons). The harder the United States tried to interdict the trail, the more sophisticated it became. In the early days most infiltration on the trail was by human porters walking on narrow paths. By 1972 the trail contained paved roads capable of handling armored vehicles and a petroleum pipeline. PETER W. BRUSH See also Airpower, Role in War; COMMANDO HUNT, Operation; Demilitarized Zone; Ho Chi Minh Trail; McNamara, Robert Strange; Mine Warfare, Land; Precision-Guided Munitions; ROLLING THUNDER, Operation References Dickson, Paul. The Electronic Battlefield. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976. Littauer, Raphael, and Norman Thomas Uphoff. The Air War in Indochina. Rev. ed. Boston: Beacon, 1971. Nguyen Viet Phuong. Van Tai Quan Su Chien Luoc Tren Duong Ho Chi Minh Trong Khang Chien Chong My [Strategic Military Transportation on the Ho Chi Minh Trail during the Resistance War against the Americans]. Hanoi: People’s Army of Vietnam, General Department of Rear Services, 1988. Prados, John, and Ray W. Stubbe. Valley of Decision: The Siege of Khe Sanh. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991.
McNaughton, John Theodore Birth Date: November 21, 1921 Death Date: July 19, 1967 Attorney, newspaper editor, teacher, U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs (1961–1962), general counsel to the Department of Defense (1962–1964), and assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs (1964–1967). John Theodore McNaughton was born in Bicknell, Indiana, on November 21, 1921. He graduated from Depauw University in Greencastle, Indiana, in 1942. Upon graduation he served in the U.S. Navy as a lieutenant during World War II. Returning to civilian life after the war, in 1948 McNaughton graduated from the Harvard University School of Law. He won a Rhodes Scholarship to Oxford, where he earned a LittB degree. He then had a varied career as a newspaper editor, lawyer, and Harvard Law School professor. In 1961 McNaughton became assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs. He had studied bargaining and escalation theories of war, and this approach to war as a logical business between rational adversaries was reflected in memoranda that he drafted for his superior, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. Historians have differed as to McNaughton’s exact posture on Vietnam and precisely when he turned against American intervention. To liberal friends and colleagues who opposed American actions in
McPherson, Harry Cummings Vietnam, McNaughton often presented himself as a closet dove who personally sympathized with their viewpoint. Yet after the passage of the August 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, he was a strong supporter of forceful U.S. action against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). In 1964 and 1965 he drafted many of the memoranda, later presented to President Lyndon B. Johnson by McNamara, that argued most strongly in favor of committing substantial U.S. forces to support the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). McNaughton was a major architect of the strategy of limited air war, which resulted in ROLLING THUNDER bombings of 1965, and argued that even if the United States ultimately had to abandon South Vietnam, it should not do so before demonstrating its resolve. He also recommended the commitment of combat units and the construction of air bases in South Vietnam. McNaughton’s memoranda to McNamara at this time made it clear that he viewed the situation in Vietnam primarily as a test of U.S. international credibility and that he was not much concerned about the Vietnamese per se. Even in July 1965 McNaughton was skeptical as to whether the United States would be able to win the war in the sense of preserving South Vietnam as an independent country, and he made these doubts plain to McNamara. They were not, however, aired elsewhere, and McNaughton believed that the effort should still be made. By 1966 McNaughton had more serious reservations as to the wisdom of American intervention in Vietnam. Privately he now suggested to McNamara that the United States extricate itself from the war and negotiate a compromise peace, perhaps facilitating this by bombing the dikes in North Vietnam and thus starving the population. In the summer of 1966 McNaughton helped to draft the Jason Study, which argued that far from destroying North Vietnamese morale and will to resist, American intervention and air raids had inflicted little damage on the North Vietnamese economy but had reinforced nationalistic determination and encouraged increased infiltration into South Vietnam. By 1967 McNaughton and his staff in the International Security Affairs section of the Pentagon were among the strongest advocates of a U.S. withdrawal. Alarmed by growing public sentiment against the war, McNaughton, in conversations with McNamara that summer, warned that Vietnam “could cause the worst split in our people in more than a century.” In public both men still supported administration policy and claimed that the war could still be won, but ultimately McNaughton’s arguments seem to have influenced McNamara, who by 1967 also privately urged that the U.S. government had made a mistake and should change course. In 1967 President Johnson appointed McNaughton secretary of the U.S. Navy, effective August 1. Before he could assume the post, however, McNaughton died in a commercial air crash on July 19, 1967, near Hendersonville, North Carolina. The accident was caused when the Piedmont Airlines Boeing 727 in which McNaughton was a passenger collided in midair with a private aircraft. The crash killed all aboard both planes, including McNaughton’s wife and son. PRISCILLA ROBERTS
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See also Clifford, Clark McAdams; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; McNamara, Robert Strange; McPherson, Harry Cummings; RAND Corporation; ROLLING THUNDER, Operation; Warnke, Paul Culliton References Berman, Larry. Planning a Tragedy: The Americanization of the War in Vietnam. New York: Norton, 1982. Gibbons, William C. The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War. 4 vols. to date. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986–1995. Halberstam, David. The Best and the Brightest. New York: Random House, 1972. Kahin, George McT. Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam. New York: Knopf, 1986.
McPherson, Harry Cummings Birth Date: August 22, 1929 Deputy secretary of the U.S. Army (1963), assistant secretary of state (1964), and special assistant to the president (1965–1969). Harry Cummings McPherson, born in Tyler, Texas, on August 22, 1929, was a 1949 graduate of the University of the South and received a law degree from the University of Texas in 1956. He worked for Senate Democrats from 1956 to 1963, when he was appointed deputy secretary of the U.S. Army. His close relationship to President Lyndon B. Johnson won him an appointment as assistant secretary of state in 1964 and as a special assistant to the president in 1965. As a White House aide and speech writer, McPherson was a witness to many decisions concerning Vietnam. The 1968 Tet Offensive convinced him that the Vietnam War was futile. Working with Secretary of State Clark Clifford, McPherson attempted to change Johnson’s mind concerning de-escalation. McPherson later related that the president had become greatly shaken by the media reports, although the official intelligence reports offered by Walt Rostow directly refuted the media. The chance to take a new tack came at the end of March 1968 when Johnson told McPherson and others that he wanted a speech that made a peace pronouncement, not Churchillian prose. McPherson was the first of Johnson’s aides to realize that the president intended to announce at the end of that speech that he would not seek reelection in 1968. Following the election, McPherson entered private law practice in Washington, D.C. ROBERT G. MANGRUM See also Clifford, Clark McAdams; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; McNamara, Robert Strange; McNaughton, John Theodore; Media and the Vietnam War; Rostow, Walt Whitman References Davidson, Phillip A. Vietnam at War: The History, 1946–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1988. Herring, George C. America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975. 4th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001.
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Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. Who’s Who in America, 1980–1981. Chicago: Marquis.
Halberstam, David. The Best and the Brightest. New York: Random House, 1972. Johnson, Lyndon B. The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963–1969. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997.
Meaney, George Birth Date: August 8, 1894 Death Date: January 10, 1980 Labor leader, political activist, ardent anti-Communist, and president of the American Federation of Labor–Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) from 1955 to 1979. Born in New York City on August 8, 1894, George Meaney apprenticed as a plumber, joined the local United Association of Plumbers and Pipe Fitters, and worked as a plumber for a number of years in the New York City area. Beginning in 1920 he held several administrative positions within his local union before becoming secretary and treasurer of the AFL in 1939. In this post he was second only to William Greene, who was the president. Ferociously anti-Communist, Meaney helped purge the AFL of radicals and leftist member unions including the United Electrical Workers, which was expelled from the AFL. Meaney was elected president of the AFL in 1952 upon Greene’s death and was heavily involved in labor and industrial mobilization efforts during the Korean War (1950–1953). During 1954–1955 Meaney directed the merger of the AFL and the CIO. That same year the members elected him president of the new confederation, a position he held until 1979. Meaney supported Lyndon B. Johnson’s domestic policies and the Vietnam War. When Johnson became president in 1963, he contacted Meaney and solicited his cooperation and advice regarding labor and domestic issues. With the concurrence of the Johnson administration, Meaney sent labor consultants to Vietnam, where they established the Confederation of Vietnamese Trade Unions. When the war became unpopular and threatened economic and social destabilization, Meaney continued to support Johnson despite criticism from other labor leaders. Meaney disapproved of President Richard M. Nixon but defended his administration’s efforts in Southeast Asia. Meaney also publicly supported the 1970 invasion of Cambodia, explaining that Nixon, as commander in chief, had a responsibility to pursue any means necessary to end the war. During the Watergate Scandal, however, Meaney advocated Nixon’s impeachment. In 1979 Meaney retired as president of the AFL-CIO. He died on January 10, 1980, in Washington, D.C. DEAN BRUMLEY See also Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Watergate Scandal References Goulden, Joseph C. Meaney. New York: Atheneum, 1972.
Medevac The term “medevac,” an acronym combining the words “medical” and “evacuation,” refers to the movement of casualties from the battlefield to more secure locations for immediate medical attention. Although evacuation from the battlefield for medical attention had been practiced for some time, the frontless nature of the guerrilla war in Vietnam called for exploitation of a Korean War innovation: casualty evacuation via helicopter. The U.S. Army experimented with aeromedical evacuation from the introduction of crewed flight, but this did not come into its own until the 1950–1953 Korean War. Korea’s rugged mountainous terrain and poor road network made overland movement extremely difficult. By war’s end, medical evacuation helicopters had evacuated 17,700 casualties, and nonmedical helicopters supplemented that number with many more. Although the Korean War made the potential of helicopter medical evacuation obvious, the Vietnam War proved its worth. Vietnam added dense jungle, tropical heat, and a frontless battlefield to the problems that medical evacuation faced in Korea. Although general-use helicopters provided aeromedical evacuation prior to and after their arrival, U.S. Army Medical Department air ambulance units were introduced into Vietnam in April 1962. Expanding with the surge of American ground troops, they remained in Vietnam until total U.S. troop withdrawal in 1973. Nicknamed dustoff missions, air ambulance evacuations lifted between 850,000 and 900,000 allied military and Vietnamese civilian casualties during their period of service. With their crews landing virtually almost anywhere without consideration of the dangers, medevacs provided rapid response and reduced time from injury to treatment; this helped reduce the rate of deaths as a percentage of hits from 29.3 percent in World War II and 26.3 percent in Korea to 19 percent in Vietnam. ARTHUR T. FRAME See also Attrition; Casualties; Dustoff; Helicopters, Employment of, in Vietnam; Kelly, Charles L.; Medicine, Military; Medics and Corpsmen References Dorland, Peter, and James Nanney. Dustoff: Army Aeromedical Evacuation in Vietnam. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1982. Neel, Spurgeon. Medical Support of the U.S. Army in Vietnam, 1965– 1972. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1973.
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After a firefight, two soldiers of the U.S. 173rd Airborne Brigade wait for a helicopter to evacuate them and a dead companion. (National Archives)
Media and the Vietnam War For some veterans of the Vietnam War, the word “media” was a pejorative term that even today evokes feelings of anger and hostility. For those military people, the print and broadcast journalists were as much the “enemy” as the Communist forces. In Paper Soldiers, Clarence R. Wyatt has written that the U.S. government successfully manipulated the media to its own ends during the war, concluding that “The press was more a paper soldier than an antiwar, antigovernment crusader.” How did the fourth estate, which enjoyed a reputation of faithful support and discretion during World War II, arrive at such an unenviable position? As with most strongly held views, the truth lies somewhere between the stereotypical extremes: journalists who see military officers obstructing truth by unwarranted restrictions in the name of operational security and officers who see journalists tilting at personal windmills seeking fame at the expense of the military mission. On the one hand, the patriotism of most U.S. journalists covering the Vietnam War was every bit as intense as that of their predecessors, but, on the other hand, some viewed their constituency as international, not parochially national.
Accountability was to the parent news agency, not necessarily a national government. For example, in Live from the Battlefield, Peter Arnett related a story about newsmen being “pushed around” by U.S. military policemen in 1966. The reporters were trying to cover the Buddhist demonstrations and were ordered off the street by the military police. Arnett identified himself as a New Zealander, and another reporter, Eddie Adams, said, “You have no right to order American newsmen off the streets, you have no jurisdiction over us.” Adams was technically correct, but the implication of not being accountable to government authority in a war zone was present in his assertion as well, and that was a new twist. For many military professionals, who had been taught not to reveal intentions to the enemy by careless statements to the press, journalists were to be tolerated, not embraced. They were an obstacle to smooth military operations, not an adjunct. They were independent of military jurisdiction but depended on the military for the transportation to get to the sites of their stories. However, those military commanders who made the effort to gain the confidence of journalists usually received an important payoff in terms of reciprocated trust. Those journalists who looked exclusively for the story that featured only mistakes, casualties, and the aura of
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disaster often missed the human drama that was being played out every day in the jungle by ordinary soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen. Genuinely important news stories from the battlefield received the most accurate reporting when journalists and military commanders cooperated, even when the story was not completely favorable to the military. Press coverage of the Vietnam War was carried out within an often fragile alliance between the military establishment and the journalists. Some components of the alliance worked more smoothly than others. “Court journalism” was produced by the Stars and Stripes, Armed Forces Radio and Television Network, and a host of military unit publications designed mostly to inform troops and to bolster morale, although the soldiers who worked in those ranks would claim that their freedom of expression was not constrained. In juxtaposition to those producing official news were the television and radio network reporters and the newspaper and news magazine specialists sent to the war zone to get the story before the competition. These on-the-scene journalists often had superior modes of communication with their offices in the United States and around the world so that a combat action on some remote battlefield in War Zone C in Vietnam in the morning could be on the evening news that night in the United States, even with the lag imposed by 12 or 13 hours of time zones and the International Date Line. Vietnam was America’s first “living room war,” as one writer aptly put it. The down side of this nearly instantaneous reporting was that the thoughtful, deliberate process of review and editing that used to take place in the newspaper offices prior to publication often took place in minutes or hours in the television newsroom so that the story did not lose its freshness or urgency in getting to the viewers. Television and news magazine journalism was a business with a bottom line and keen competition. As a partial result, as viewers were sitting down to dinner they often saw young soldiers lying in pools of blood on distant battlefields. The local rules imposed by the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), discouraged close-ups of wounded or dead soldiers and interviews with wounded troops without the attending medical officer’s permission. There were very few violations, according to Barry Zorthian, the U.S. Mission spokesman in Vietnam, and those few offending journalists who violated the rules quickly lost their credentials. Major General William E. DePuy, General William Westmoreland’s operations officer at MACV and later commander of the 1st Infantry Division, wrote in Changing an Army that journalists “who worked with the combat troops were fine. I liked them, and I thought they were fair enough, and very brave, and as good as combat reporters have ever been.” If there was a problem in interpreting the news, he said, it lay with “the editors back in the United States,” who seemed to have a social agenda that romanticized the Vietnamese freedom fighters. In Vietnam War Almanac, Colonel Harry Summers agrees that the correspondents in Vietnam, “by and large, accurately reported what they saw,” but the
Members of the press question Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), commander U.S. general William Westmoreland and U.S. ambassador Maxwell Taylor (speaking into the microphone). Unlike the military, which often sought to “sugar coat” events, most members of the press sought to take an independent stance. For many veterans of the Vietnam War, however, print and broadcast journalists were seen in an adversarial light. (National Archives)
“editors and producers . . . were not always able to keep their own political agendas and their awareness of shifts in American public opinion out of the editing process.” Censorship of the media was considered and discussed by government officials in 1965, but it was never imposed in Vietnam, probably because of the enormous impracticalities. Peter Arnett captured the essence of the journalist at war in his book Live from the Battlefield. Commenting on the booklet he was given by Malcolm Browne, the bureau chief, upon arrival at the Saigon bureau in 1962, Arnett read the advice, which stated in part that “Figures on casualties and reports of military engagements are especially subject to distortion. In covering a military engagement you must make every effort to count the bodies yourself before accepting any tabulation of results.” The guide also named “certain officials . . . and their relative credibility indices” as sources not to be accepted at face value. Journalists in Vietnam were managed, not controlled, by public affairs officers (PAOs) at MACV headquarters and major combat units. The job of the PAO was to respond to the journalists’ requests for information and to facilitate the movement of journalists to the sites of stories they wanted to cover. At peak strength there were some 500 accredited news people in the war zone, representing more than 130 organizations. Only about one-third worked as reporters. The remainder were hangers-on or support personnel.
Medicine, Military The process of covering the war was understood differently by the military command and the major media organizations. General Westmoreland, who in 1982 sued CBS Television over its documentary The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception, explained in an interview in December 1994: We had intelligence that the Viet Cong . . . were going to mount a major attack to the south [during Tet 1968]. Now intelligence was good and it turned out to be quite accurate. I redeployed troops and I put out appropriate orders for everybody to be on the alert. But I made a mistake; I should have called a press conference and made known to the world that we knew this attack was coming. . . . But it would have been unprecedented because the commander on the battlefield . . . wants to protect that information. He does not want the enemy to know what he knows. . . . In retrospect, if I had to do it over again I would do just that, because it was that [perception of] surprise that did the psychological damage. Information officers naturally wanted to influence the news product in a positive way, that is, one favorable to the allied war effort. Unfortunately, hyperbole and unrestrained optimism during information briefings at MACV headquarters early in the war tended to jaundice even the most receptive journalist. There was an abundance of information available to the reporters that seemed to be in direct contradiction to what they were hearing in their official briefings. In this regard William M. Hammond noted in the U.S. Army publication Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1962–1968: Most of the public affairs problems that confronted the United States in South Vietnam stemmed from the contradictions implicit in Lyndon Johnson’s strategy for the war. . . . As the war progressed, information officers found themselves caught between the president’s efforts to bolster support and their own judgment that the military should remain above politics. Other players in the information sweepstakes were the members of the U.S. embassy in Saigon; members of other U.S. agencies, such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); and representatives of other foreign governments, including the government of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). News coverage of the Vietnam War was a collision of technology and ethics on the modern battlefield. Competitive reporters, young novices and old hands alike, knew that like General Nathan Bedford Forrest of the American Civil War, “getting there first with the most” was an essential element of success. Whether operational security of the armed forces engaged in combat—which always was measured in terms of missions accomplished and casualties incurred—was ever compromised by the lack of censorship and control of the media remains an open question deserving of further study. Some of that thoughtful examination has begun because of the different approaches taken to military-media relations in the post–Vietnam War era. The press
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pool concept was used in the Persian Gulf War of 1990–1991 with less than universal acceptance by all concerned. Nonetheless, the presence of the world’s media on future modern battlefields, equipped with the most sophisticated communications gear, is certain. It is in the best interests of the military and the media to learn better methods of cooperation in attaining what sometimes are diverging objectives. JOHN F. VOTAW See also Arnett, Peter; Art and the Vietnam War; Association of Foreign Correspondents in Vietnam; Burchett, Wilfred; Cronkite, Walter Leland; Five O’Clock Follies; Halberstam, David; Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office; Luce, Henry Robinson; Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; Moyers, Billy Don; Order of Battle Dispute; Vietnam Information Group; Westmoreland, William Childs References Arnett, Peter. Live from the Battle Field: From Vietnam to Baghdad, 35 Years in the World’s War Zones. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994. Braestrup, Peter. Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1994. Hammond, William M. Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1962–1968. Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1988. Hammond, William M. Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1968–1973. Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2002. Moeller, Susan D. Shooting War: Photography and the American Experience of Combat. New York: Basic Books, 1989. Summers, Harry G., Jr. Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1968–1973. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1996. Summers, Harry G., Jr. The Vietnam War Almanac. New York: Ballantine, 1985. Trotta, Liz. Fighting for Air: In the Trenches with Television News. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1991. Wyatt, Clarence R. Paper Soldiers: The American Press and the Vietnam War. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995.
Medical Evacuation See Medevac
Medicine, Military Medical advances during the Vietnam War were the culmination of a century of progress in treating trauma and controlling infectious diseases. Additionally, the nature of the conflict engendered a unique spectrum of psychiatric, medical, and traumatic problems. Mortality rates among the soldiers in wars since the mid-19th century have generally declined: 15 percent in the Mexican-American War (United States only), 20 percent in the Crimean War (all participants), 14 percent in the American Civil War (Union only), 8 percent in World War I (United States only), 4.5 percent in World War II (United States only), and 2.5 percent in the Korean War (United States only). In Vietnam, the mortality rate among U.S.
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Prevalence of Amputation during the Vietnam War as Compared to Other U.S. Conflicts Conflict World War I World War II Korean War Vietnam War
Total Number of Amputations
Ratio of Amputations to Total Wounded
2,610 7,489 1,477 5,283
1 to 78.2 1 to 89.7 1 to 69.9 1 to 29.0
military personnel from all causes was 2.7 percent. Because a higher proportion of soldiers in the latter conflict were hospitalized, the slight rise in mortality actually represents an improvement in overall survival. The 20th century was one of dramatic advances in battlefield medicine and surgery. Effective debridement of wounds and the use of intravenous fluids and whole blood to resuscitate wounded soldiers became standards of practice during World War I. During World War II penicillin and sulfa drugs became available, and techniques were developed for management of some thoracic and vascular injuries. Better vascular surgery and more liberal use of whole blood accounted for most of the improved survival in the Korean War. Helicopter evacuation, more rapid resuscitation, and
readily available specialty surgery characterized military medicine in Vietnam. In 1965 the U.S. Army had a single 100-bed hospital at Nha Trang. At the war’s peak in 1968, the U.S. Department of Defense operated 5,283 beds at 19 fixed sites and MUSTs (medical unit self-contained, transportable). Because there was no clearly defined front, medical facilities were geographically dispersed throughout the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) and tended to remain in the same locations rather than follow troop movements, as in previous wars. By June 1969 the Army Medical Corps in Vietnam comprised 16,000 physicians, 15,000 nurses, and 19,000 other officers. The military medical system was divided into five echelons. The first echelon began with the aidman, usually called a medic, who initiated emergency care and evacuation from the battlefield. He was responsible for arresting hemorrhage, securing an airway, dressing wounds, splinting fractures, relieving pain, and positioning the patient safely for transport. The physician at the battlefield aid station began more definitive resuscitation, including starting an intravenous line (by cut-down, if necessary), doing thoracentesis or tracheostomy, beginning positive pressure ventilation, ligating small bleeding vessels, and starting either salt solutions, plasma expanders (dextran, albumin, or Plasmanate), or uncrossmatched whole blood.
A U.S. Army medic searches the sky for a medevac helicopter to evacuate a wounded soldier, June 1967. Medical advances during the Vietnam War included progress in treating medical, psychiatric, and traumatic problems, as well as improvements in evacuation and operative care, which led to fewer and shorter hospitalizations and improved chances of survival. (National Archives)
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U.S. Army medical personnel treat incoming wounded at the 2nd Surgical Hospital, Lai Khe, South Vietnam. (Army Nurse Corps)
The second echelon was the division clearing station, which had a larger staff of physicians, a better supply of whole blood, and oxygen. Antibiotics were begun, and tetanus antitoxin was given at this level. The third echelon was the mobile surgical or evacuation hospital. Here major hemorrhage could be controlled and patency of difficult airways ensured. Whole blood and bicarbonate to correct acid-base imbalance were used. A major difference in resuscitative practices between the Vietnam War and earlier conflicts was the more liberal use of either uncross-matched or type-specific whole blood. The fourth echelon was the general hospitals located in Okinawa and Japan. These had facilities for specialty medical and surgical services and psychiatric treatment. Okinawa was 1,800
miles from Vietnam, and the first fully equipped hospital was 2,700 miles away in Japan. Soldiers who were expected to return to duty in Southeast Asia were treated at one of these facilities or in the Philippines. The fifth echelon comprised military and Veterans Administration (VA) hospitals in the United States. The nearest of these was at Travis Air Force Base, California (7,800 miles from Vietnam), although a significant number of casualties went on to Andrews Air Force Base near Washington, D.C. (9,000 miles from Vietnam). Soldiers who were not expected to return to duty in Vietnam were transferred to these facilities. Besides active duty facilities, the VA hospitals were a major resource for reconstructive and rehabilitative services. Between 1965 and 1969, 11,584 patients were transferred into the VA system.
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Vietnam’s climate favored development of a variety of tropical diseases, and the 12-month rotation schedule ensured a constant supply of nonimmune military targets for such diseases. Realizing this threat, military physicians instituted preventive measures (vaccination and prophylaxis) from the beginning of the war. Consequently, whereas disease had accounted for 90 percent of hospitalizations in the China-Burma-India theater during World War II, it accounted for only approximately 70 percent of hospitalizations of active duty personnel in Vietnam. Although the diseaseto-injury admission rate for Vietnam was 4 to 1, it was 25 percent lower than that in Korea and half that of the European theater of operations after D day. Major disease problems were malaria, viral hepatitis, infectious diarrhea, fungal and other diseases of the skin, and venereal disease (usually gonorrhea or other urethritis-related diseases). Less common problems included melioidosis, dengue, scrub typhus, murine typhus, and leptospirosis. Although plague and rabies were endemic to Vietnam, they never appeared in American military personnel. Because of its severity and its high incidence of resistance to standard drug therapy, falciparum malaria—the most common type in Vietnam—was a major medical problem compounded by the soldiers’ reluctance to take necessary prophylactic medications. A second problem (which received publicity out of proportion to its clinical import) was drug-resistant gonococcus. Parasitic disease as a cause of discharge from military service was five times as common in the Pacific theater during World War II as during the Vietnam War. In fact, cancer was almost twice as common a cause of medical discharge as infectious disease in the latter conflict. The World War I term “shell shock” became war neurosis, which after Vietnam became post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). PTSD was characterized by nightmares, flashbacks, excessive startle response, hyperalertness, sleep disorders, and detachment from one’s surroundings and stayed with the patient long after the return to civilian life. World War II’s 10 percent psychiatric casualty rate dropped to 4 percent in Korea and was only 1 percent in Vietnam. During World War II, 33.1 percent of medical discharges were for psychiatric reasons. During the Korean War this dropped to 23.9 percent, and during the Vietnam War it was 13.7 percent. This surprisingly low rate was initially attributed to modern methods of combat psychiatry but in retrospect may have been factitious, as a number of veterans developed incapacitating psychiatric illnesses after discharge from the service. Although only 70,000 workdays were lost to psychiatric illness in 1965, that number rose to an impressive 175,510 by 1970, making PTSD the second-worst disease in terms of lost work. Drug abuse was widespread in Vietnam. In one study, 23 percent of soldiers interviewed said that they had used marijuana, 10 percent admitted amphetamine use, 7 percent used LSD (lysergic acid diethylamide), and 1.6 percent used heroin. In addition, there were disturbingly widespread reports of violence against both
Vietnamese civilians and American officers as well as acts of disobedience, ranging from refusal to take antimalarial pills to frank insubordination during combat. In spite of the higher hospitalization rates for medical diseases, the majority of deaths in the Vietnam War were battle related. In the European theater of operations between June 1944 and May 1945, the battle death rate was 51.9 per 1,000 average troop strength. In Korea it was 43.2 per 1,000, and in Vietnam between July 1965 and June 1969 it was 21.9 per 1,000. The ratio of wounded to killed in action was 3.1 to 1 during World War II to, 4 to 1 during the Korean War, and 5.6 to 1 during the Vietnam War. Although some of this might be due to a change in types of weapons, much of the improvement can be credited to better battlefield medicine and surgery. Partial support for this statement can be found in the fact that mortality after arrival at a hospital was 4.5 percent during World War II and 2.5 percent during the Vietnam War in spite of improvements in transport that brought many more severely wounded but still living soldiers to the hospitals. Indeed, improved evacuation of the wounded was a hallmark of military medicine in Vietnam. Lack of roads, difficult jungle terrain (some helicopters were equipped with spring-loaded penetrators to make holes in the forest canopy), and the strategic situation made helicopter evacuation uniquely suited to Southeast Asian warfare. At its height of activity, the Army Medical Corps operated 116 air ambulances, each capable of carrying six to nine litters. During World War II the average time to treatment had been 10.5 hours, during the Korean War it was 6.3 hours, and during the Vietnam War it was 2.8 hours, with many patients being hospitalized within 20 minutes of injury. During the 1968 Tet Offensive, helicopter ambulances evacuated an average of 8,000 casualties a month. A second hallmark of Vietnam War military medicine was an abundance of well-trained surgical specialists. American residency programs were producing large numbers of surgeons capable of complex procedures that had not been available in previous wars. Vascular surgery typifies this improvement. During World War II, only 81 attempts were made to repair major blood vessels. That number rose to 300 in Korea, but the procedure had become standard in Vietnam, where several thousand such repairs were done. Survival in patients burned over less than 60 percent of their bodies improved dramatically. The number of amputations during the Vietnam War was less than half that of World War II or the Korean War. Part of the improved surgical results during the Vietnam War can be attributed to a difference in ordnance in that war compared with ordnance in previous conflicts. Unsophisticated weapons and the more common use of mines resulted in more extremity wounds than in previous wars, and the environment made the wounds more likely to be contaminated. The type of wound changed as the war evolved. Whereas 42.7 percent of wounds were from small arms in 1966, that number had decreased to 17 percent by 1970. In 1966, 42.6 percent of the wounds were from mines and booby
Medics and Corpsmen traps, a number that had increased to 80 percent by 1970. Artillery and mortar injuries accounted for 75 percent of casualties during World War II and the Korean War but were never that common in Vietnam. Injuries from purposely contaminated punji sticks were unique to the Southeast Asian war. Medical and surgical improvements also decreased morbidity during the Vietnam War. Average duration of treatment was 129 days during World War II, 93 days during the Korean War, and 65 days during the Vietnam War. Of the 194,716 wounded during the Vietnam War, 31 percent (61,269) were treated and released. Of those hospitalized for injury, 75.3 percent returned to duty in some capacity, although only 42 percent returned to duty in Vietnam. Only 3.3 percent of those injured in battle died. Of nonbattlerelated hospitalizations, 77.8 percent returned to duty, and only .3 percent died. In all, improvements in evacuation and medical, perioperative, and intraoperative care led to fewer and shorter hospitalizations and improved survival in Vietnam War soldiers as compared with survival of soldiers of earlier conflicts. JACK MCCALLUM See also Booby Traps; Casualties; Drugs and Drug Use; Helicopters, Employment of, in Vietnam; Medevac; Medics and Corpsmen References Drapanas, Theodore, and Martin Litwin. “Trauma: Management of the Acutely Injured Patient.” In Textbook of Surgery: The Biological Basis of Modern Surgical Practice, edited by David Sabiston, 351–397. Philadelphia, PA: W. B. Saunders, 1973. United States Veterans Administration, Department of Medicine and Surgery. The Vietnam Veteran in Contemporary Society: Collected Materials Pertaining to Young Veterans. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972. Heaton, Leonard, Carl Hughes, Harold Rosegay, George Fisher, and Robert E. Feighny. “Military Surgical Practices of the United States Army in Viet Nam.” Current Problems in Surgery 3(1) (November 1966): 3–59. McCallum, Jack E. Military Medicine: From Ancient Times to the 21st Century. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2003. Mullins, William S., ed. A Decade of Progress: The United States Army Medical Department, 1959–1969. Washington, DC: Office of the Surgeon General, 1971. Neel, Spurgeon. Medical Support of the U.S. Army in Vietnam, 1965– 1972. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1973. Sonnenberg, Stephen M., Arthur S. Blank Jr., and John A. Talbott, eds. The Trauma of War: Stress and Recovery in Vietnam Veterans. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Press, 1985.
Medics and Corpsmen Medics and corpsmen have been designated as noncombatants by the military and by the rules of war in international law. In the Vietnam War, however, medics frequently carried weapons to protect their wounded and themselves, and this invalidated their noncombatant status and Geneva Convention protection. In many
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cases, conscientious objectors (COs) lost their status when they chose to carry a gun. By 1969, 90 percent of U.S. Army medics serving in Vietnam were draftees. The U.S. Navy, which provided corpsmen for the U.S. Marine Corps, did not have draftees, but at least 33 percent of its recruits were motivated by the draft to join the military. In both the U.S. Army and the U.S. Navy, medics and corpsmen had to meet required test standards. These tests were normally administered during basic training. In some cases recruits requested and received a medical military occupational specialty (MOS), but in most cases recruits were handed their medical MOS according to army or navy needs. In the army, the MOS for combat medics was 91A10 for those of rank E-4 and below. In the navy, the MOS for corpsmen was HM or HN; a digit placed after the initials indicated rank. Combat corpsmen also ranked E-4 and below. Medics and corpsmen differed from the average draftees. They usually had some college background and were considered to be highly motivated. Army medics were trained at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, in a 10week, 480-hour course. Recruits were instructed in communicable diseases, sterilization, anatomy, physiology, and emergency treatment. Medics receiving orders for Vietnam were given 14 hours of battle preparedness training outside the classroom. Basic naval medical training classes for enlisted personnel were held at Hospital Corps schools at San Diego, California, and Great Lakes Naval Training Station, Illinois. The navy’s basic medical course lasted four months and comprised human biology, pharmacology, and basic patient care, with practical experience in hospital wards. At the end of the basic course, some students took specialized training work. Others were sent to the Fleet Marine Force (FMF), which usually meant Vietnam. Those in the U.S. Marine Corps received four to five weeks of battlefield training at either Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, or Camp Pendleton, California, where they went on forced marches with full packs, fired weapons, and navigated cross-country without a compass. They also received additional training in managing battlefield casualties, triage (deciding who should receive treatment and in what order and which of the wounded were less likely to survive even if treated), and direct patient care. Combat medics and corpsmen, once in Vietnam, were normally assigned to infantry units. Under ideal conditions, each line platoon had two medics or corpsmen assigned to it. Because of the heavy casualty rate among medics and corpsmen, however, most units were understaffed. Most FMF corpsmen spent their tour of duty in the I Corps Tactical Zone, the northernmost provinces of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) and the U.S. Marine Corps area of operation. Army medics were sent wherever infantry units operated in Vietnam. The highest death rates for Americans occurred in the northern provinces of the I Corps Tactical Zone, the northern II Corps Tactical Zone, and Tay Ninh and Binh Duong provinces in the III Corps Tactical Zone. U.S. search-and-destroy tactics in Vietnam normally were centered on platoons, and line medics and corpsmen accompanied
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A medic treats an American soldier wounded during fighting at Hue in February 1968. Medics, who provided psychological and emotional support as well as medical aid, were widely respected by the troops and were a vital element of the U.S. military effort in Vietnam. (National Archives)
these missions. While on patrol, medics and corpsmen carried out many of the same responsibilities as the infantry. Their basic responsibility was to care for the wounded; however, medics also stood perimeter guard and participated in firefights. Mines and booby traps accounted for 65 percent of wounds and 36 percent of fatalities sustained by Americans in Vietnam. Small arms accounted for 16 percent of wounds and 51 percent of the fatalities sustained. Because of the threat of shock, treatment during the first few minutes after injury was most critical to the survival of the wounded. Medics and corpsmen contributed to the fact that the mortality rate for wounded (1–2.5 percent) was less than in any prior American war. Medical kits used in the field contained various battlefield dressings as well as splints, tape, tweezers, safety pins, plastic airways, aspirin, intravenous fluids, and morphine. When a man was injured, medics evaluated the wound and began treatment. If there were multiple casualties, corpsmen had to triage their patients. The corpsmen also arranged for evacuation and determined who should be evacuated first. Medics provided psychological and emotional as well as medical support and were widely respected by the troops. The U.S. Army assigned combat medics to seven-month rotations, with the remainder of their tour in rear areas and noncombat
assignments. This policy was based on studies of the psychological effect of combat on the medics. Time between patrols was normally spent at a base camp. Corpsmen performed sick call or were involved with the Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP), providing medical care to the rural populations at nearby villages or hamlets. MEDCAP was a part of the pacification program. Medics and corpsmen also managed base sanitation and water purification. During the Vietnam War, medics were among the most respected soldiers on the battlefield. Of 238 Medals of Honor awarded in the war, 12 went to U.S. Army medics, and 4 went to U.S. Navy corpsmen. An estimated 1,300 medics and 690 corpsmen died in the war. Army medics were recognized with the Combat Medical Badge (CMB), an award equal in prestige to the Combat Infantry Badge. Only two U.S. Army medics, Sergeant First Class Wayne Slagel and Master Sergeant Henry Jenkins, received the CMB with two stars, recognizing their service as combat medics in three wars: World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. PIA C. HEYN See also Casualties; Conscientious Objectors; Helicopters, Employment of, in Vietnam; Medevac; Medicine, Military
Mekong Delta References Heyn, Pia Christine. “The Role of Army Combat Medics in the Viet Nam War, 1965–1971.” Master’s thesis, Georgia State University, 1994. McCallum, Jack E. Military Medicine: From Ancient Times to the 21st Century. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2003. Mullins, William S., ed. A Decade of Progress: The United States Army Medical Department, 1959–1969. Washington, DC: Office of the Surgeon General, 1971.
Medina, Ernest Lou Birth Date: August 27, 1936 U.S. Army captain and a principal figure in the My Lai Massacre of March 16, 1968. Born in Springer, New Mexico, on August 27, 1936, to a Mexican American family, Ernest Lou Medina was raised by his grandparents in Colorado after the death of his mother when he was only a few months old. Medina worked odd jobs to help supplement his grandparents’ income. When he was just 16 years old he lied about his age and enlisted in the National Guard, where he served until 1956. That same year he enlisted in the U.S. Army as a private. By the time he was 21 years old he had advanced to the rank of staff sergeant. In 1964 Medina graduated from Officer Candidate School (OCS) at Fort Benning, Georgia, fourth in his class of 200, and was commissioned a second lieutenant. His superiors praised him as a “tough, able soldier.” He subsequently taught at the OCS for two years. In 1966 Medina was promoted to captain and given command of Company C, 1st Battalion, 20th Regiment, 11th Brigade, 23rd Infantry (Americal) Division, which in the autumn of 1967 was activated in Vietnam. Medina won both the Bronze Star and the Silver Star for valor while serving in Vietnam. He commanded Charlie Company during the March 16, 1968, action, later known as the My Lai Massacre. Subsequently Medina was court-martialed and charged with murder, manslaughter, and assault. On September 22, 1971, he was acquitted, the result of flawed instructions by the military judge to the court-martial. The prosecution originally wanted to charge Medina with commanding a homicide but, uncertain of evidence on this charge, went instead to involuntary manslaughter, or the failure to exercise sufficient control over men engaged in a homicide. The military judge instructed the jury that to convict Medina on this charge it would have to be convinced that he had actual knowledge of the events as well as wrongfully refused to act, and the jury believed that this was not sufficiently proven. Had the jury been instructed instead on the general guidelines of proper command responsibility, it might have convicted him. Medina was also acquitted on the charge of aggravated assault stemming from his interrogation of a suspected Viet Cong (VC). Although Medina admitted hitting the prisoner and firing pistol shots into a tree about eight inches from the suspect’s head to get
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him to talk, the jury found that there was no explicit written prohibition of such interrogation methods. On October 15, 1971, Medina resigned his commission, explaining that “I cannot wear the uniform with the same pride I had before.” After leaving the service Medina moved to Michigan, where he worked in a helicopter-manufacturing company. His defense attorney, the famed F. Lee Bailey, reportedly owned a stake in the company. Later Medina acknowledged that he had been aware of what was happening at My Lai but had not been entirely candid about the affair in an attempt to spare the army, his country, and his family further disgrace. CHARLOTTE A. POWER See also Atrocities during the Vietnam War; Calley, William Laws, Jr.; My Lai Massacre; Peers Inquiry References Belknap, Michael R. The Vietnam War on Trial: The My Lai Massacre and the Court-Martial of Lieutenant Calley. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002. Bilton, Michael, and Kevin Sim. Four Hours in My Lai. New York: Penguin, 1992. Goldstein, Joseph, Burke Marshall, and Jack Schwartz. The My Lai Massacre and Its Cover-Up: Beyond the Reach of the Law? New York: Free Press, 1976. Hersh, Seymour M. My Lai 4: A Report on the Massacre and Its Aftermath. New York: Random House, 1970. Lewy, Guenter. America in Vietnam. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978.
Mekong Delta The Mekong Delta drains more than 15,000 square miles of land in far southern Vietnam. The delta’s principal river, the Mekong, flows down from China through Laos and Cambodia into Vietnam and then enters the South China Sea, forming the Mekong Delta south and southwest of Ho Chi Minh City (formerly Saigon) in southern Vietnam. The tropical climate of the Mekong Delta region features a monsoon season from July to October and a dry season beginning in November. The landscape of the Mekong Delta is flat with narrow dikes to trap water for rice paddies. The canal banks of the delta are lined with strands of bamboo and water palms that stand 20 feet high. During the Vietnam War, vegetation of this nature provided excellent cover for Viet Cong (VC) guerrillas to prey on U.S. military vehicles traveling the roads from My Tho to Saigon. Because of its dense population and its rich rice harvests, the Mekong Delta was of great strategic importance during both the French and the American involvement in Vietnam. As a result, the delta saw some of the heaviest fighting of the Indochina War and the Vietnam War. From 1962 to 1966, the VC maintained control of most of the northern half of the delta. Pacification efforts after the 1968 Tet Offensive widened the area of control by the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), although the VC continued a strong presence.
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The VC benefited from the presence of some 2,000 People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) regulars in Mekong Delta provinces such as Long An and An Xuyen. Many urban targets of the 1968 Tet Offensive were in the delta. During the 1972 Easter Offensive, efforts by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) in the southern half of South Vietnam concentrated on capturing Route 13, a main road down from the Cambodian border to Saigon. However, during the 1972 offensive the Communists also made a significant effort to recapture portions of the Mekong Delta, most of which had been taken and secured by South Vietnamese forces following the 1968 Tet Offensive. By 1974 the VC controlled some 500 of the strategic hamlets in the delta, and the region saw much fighting during the Ho Chi Minh Offensive in 1975. JUSTIN MARKS See also Easter Offensive; Geography of Indochina and Vietnam; Ho Chi Minh Campaign; Tet Offensive, Overall Strategy; Tet Offensive and the Saigon Circle; Vietnam, Climate of
References FitzGerald, Frances. Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam. Boston: Little, Brown, 1972. Ho De, Tran Hanh, and Ho Ban. Chien Dich Tien Cong Tong Hop Quan Khu 8 (Dong Bang Song Cuu Long) Nam 1972 [Combined Offensive Campaign in Military Region 8 (Mekong Delta) 1972]. Hau Giang, Vietnam: Military History Institute, 1987. Jamieson, Neil R. Understanding Vietnam. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.
Mekong River Some 2,700 miles in length, the Mekong River is Asia’s 7th-longest river and the world’s 12th-longest river. Originating at the Tibetan Plateau, the Mekong River runs south through Yunnan Province in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The river forms much of the boundary between Thailand and Laos, bisects Cambodia, and then exits through southern Vietnam into the South China Sea.
Vietnamese fisherman at dusk on the Mekong River in South Vietnam. (Pcruciatti/Dreamstime.com)
Mekong River Project Although it is known in English as the Mekong, the river is called by other names in other languages. Seasonal rainfall extremes and rapids and waterfalls preclude navigation on much of the river. Fishing is a major industry, with the river home to at least 1,200 different species. Some fish are quite large; for example, river carp can grow to upwards of five feet in length and weigh as much as 150 pounds. As with many other rivers, overfishing, dams, and efforts at flood control have all led to a sharp decline in production. Because of the difficulty of navigation, the river has tended to divide rather than unify the peoples of the region. Early on, Europeans explored the Mekong in the hopes that it would be navigable and provide a new trade route to western China. Portuguese Antônio da Faria, who in 1535 was the first to establish a permanent European settlement in Vietnam, may have been the first European to explore a portion of the Mekong. During 1641–1642 Dutchman Gerrit van Wuysthoff led an expedition up the Mekong and reached as far as Vientiane, Laos. France took control of Cochin China in 1861, and five years later a French expedition proposed by the young Lieutenant Marie Joseph François Garnier set out under Captain Doudart de Legree, with Garnier second-in-command. The expedition lasted into 1868. Legree died in the course of the enterprise, and Garnier took command. He made the first detailed survey of the river, supported by astronomical observations. But Garnier also showed that the river was not navigable for its full course into China. The expedition nonetheless garnered Garnier the Victoria Medal of the Royal Geographical Society, presented in 1870. Two major bridges across the Mekong connect Laos and Thailand. Three other bridges are located only in Laos, while Cambodia has a bridge over the Mekong near Kompong Cham. Today there are some eight dams on the river producing hydroelectric power. The construction of dams and the destruction of the river rapids remain very controversial, primarily for the threats they pose to the environment and to populations living along the river. Pollution is a major concern. China has some dozen dams under construction on the upper Mekong. Today Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam all belong to the Mekong River Commission, which has accused the PRC (the PRC and Myanmar are not members) of blatant disregard of the needs of those people who depend on the Mekong downriver. Chinese dams have substantially impacted the fishing industry and the river flow. Cambodia, which greatly depends on the river, is perhaps the most threatened of the states along the Mekong by the Chinese engineering projects. SPENCER C. TUCKER
Mekong River Project
See also Mekong Delta; Mekong River Project
See also Geography of Indochina and Vietnam; Mekong Delta
References Fredenburg, Peter, and Bob Hill. Sharing Rice for Peace and Prosperity in the Greater Mekong Subregion. Victoria: Sid Harta Publishers, 2006. Osborne, Milton. The Mekong: Turbulent Past, Uncertain Future. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2000.
References Jamieson, Neil R. Understanding Vietnam. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993. Ortiz, Elizabeth. “The Mekong Project of Vietnam.” Far Eastern Economic Review 25 (November 6, 1958): 596–597.
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Project initiated in 1957 by the United Nations (UN) Economic Commission for Asia and the Ear East (ECAFE). Known officially as the Mekong River Basin Development Project, its goal was to develop the irrigation, navigational, and hydroelectric potentials of the Mekong River. Based on the successful Tennessee Valley Authority in the United States and the Snowy River Project in Australia, the Mekong River Project was larger in its scope than these and was expected to take 20 years to complete. In 1957 ECAFE issued a report titled “Development of Water Resources in the Lower Mekong Basin” that was centered around the potential benefits to the 17 million people living along the Mekong River. The report also dealt with upgrading their standard of living as well as increasing the prosperity of the nations in the area. In response to this report, four of the six nations included in the Mekong basin area—Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam)—formed a committee headquartered in Bangkok to coordinate investigations of the lower Mekong basin. Burma (present-day Myanmar) and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) rejected participation in the project. The committee then set a five-year goal to achieve the necessary development information needed for the project. One of the many problems that the committee faced was the simple fact that no human-made structure crossed the river in its entire 2,625-mile length. Basic hydrological information, vital to dam building, was also virtually nonexistent. There was no accurate profile of the river. Maps and aerial and boat surveys were all lacking. The South Vietnamese government in particular was concerned that excessive damming, irrigation, and flood control might reduce the river level to the point where the sea would flow into the river mouth and contaminate the rich agricultural lands in the Mekong Delta. Most of these concerns were eventually put to rest. Funding was another problem that had to be addressed. Project planners hoped that during the five-year assessment by the fournation committee, other nations would help fund the project. This goal was fulfilled, and by 1970, 26 nations outside the Mekong basin area as well as some UN agencies and private organizations (such as the World Bank and the Ford Foundation) had supplied funds or technical assistance for the project. Three multipurpose dams (the Pa Mong, Sambor, and Tonle Sap dams) were to be built. The Mekong basin could furnish more than 40 billion kilowatt hours of electricity. After the Vietnam War the project continued, with virtually the same participating countries. GEORGE J. GABERA
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Mendenhall, Joseph Abraham
Mendenhall, Joseph Abraham Birth Date: January 15, 1920 U.S. State Department official and director of the U.S. Agency for International Development’s Laos Mission. Born in Calvert, Maryland, on January 15, 1920, Joseph Abraham Mendenhall received a BA from the University of Delaware in 1940 and attended Harvard University Law School and the University of Pennsylvania before entering the U.S. Army in 1941. Commissioned a lieutenant in the Army Air Forces the following year, he later served with the War Department’s Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Honorably discharged as a captain in 1946, he joined the U.S. State Department as a Foreign Service officer. Mendenhall served as vice-consul at Istanbul, Turkey, from 1946 to 1949. He spent the next two years as assistant chief of the Marshall Plan mission in Iceland before transferring to the embassy at Bern, Switzerland, in 1952. Assigned to the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs in 1955, he began a lengthy association with that region. He served as economic officer for Burma and Thailand before becoming officer-in-charge for Vietnamese Affairs. In 1959 he became political counselor for the U.S. embassy in Saigon. Returning to the United States in 1962, Mendenhall studied at the National War College and became deputy director of the Office of Far Eastern Regional Affairs. In 1963 President John F. Kennedy dispatched Mendenhall and U.S. Marine Corps general Victor Krulak on a whirlwind fact-finding mission to Vietnam. Arriving in Saigon on September 8, the two officials, who wanted little to do with each other, separated immediately to conduct individual appraisals. Krulak spent most of the 36-hour visit speaking with U.S. military and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) officers at isolated installations, while Mendenhall concentrated on urban areas, where he interviewed both South Vietnamese and American civilians. Mendenhall’s previous experience in Vietnam enabled him to speak with people he knew and valued for their objectivity. Mendenhall and Krulak spoke little on their return trip and apparently kept their individual findings to themselves. On September 10 the two men presented their findings at the White House. Addressing the president and his national security advisers, Krulak reported that the war against the Viet Cong (VC) was being waged effectively despite political unrest in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). He maintained that the war would be won if U.S. military and social programs were continued. Mendenhall presented a starkly contrasting view. He suggested that the Ngo Dinh Diem regime was dangerously close to collapse and that an important segment of the population seemed more interested in ousting Diem than in defeating the VC. He also pointed out the possibility of a major religious war between the Catholics and Buddhists. Mendenhall concluded that the war could not be won under the present circumstances. At the very least, Diem’s unpopular brother Nhu and his even more unpopular wife had
to be removed from influence before real progress was possible. Krulak’s and Mendenhall’s reports differed to such an extent that President Kennedy reportedly asked the two men if they had visited the same country. In January 1964 Mendenhall became director of the State Department’s Vietnam Working Group and then in July became director of the Office of Far Eastern Regional Affairs. In 1965 he was named director of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) mission in Laos, then the second-largest USAID mission in the world. In 1968 he returned to Washington as deputy director of the USAID Vietnam Bureau, of which he later became head. He resumed his Foreign Service duties in 1970 as inspector of embassies and consular posts, concentrating on Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. In 1972, Mendenhall was named ambassador to Madagascar, a post he held until his retirement in 1975. After living in Italy for 17 years, he returned to the United States in 1992. DAVID COFFEY See also Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Krulak, Victor H.; Ngo Dinh Diem; Ngo Dinh Nhu; Ngo Dinh Nhu, Madame; Taylor-McNamara Report; United States Agency for International Development References Newman, John M. JFK and Vietnam: Deception, Intrigue, and the Struggle for Power. New York: Warner Books, 1992. Rust, William J., et al. Kennedy in Vietnam: American Vietnam Policy, 1960–1963. New York: Scribner, 1985.
Mendès-France, Pierre Birth Date: January 11, 1907 Death Date: October 18, 1982 French politician and premier (1954–1955). Born in Paris on January 11, 1907, Pierre Mendès-France was the only son of a moderately prosperous Jewish clothing manufacturer. A brilliant student, Mendès-France obtained a diploma from the École Libre des Sciences Politiques and a doctorate from the Faculty of Law. He was admitted to the bar at age 21 and was then the youngest lawyer in France. Elected to the Chamber of Deputies as a radical Socialist in 1932, Mendès-France was the youngest member of the National Assembly. He served as undersecretary for finance in Prime Minister Léon Blum’s second government. On the outbreak of World War II, Mendès-France became a lieutenant in the French Air Force. He flew as a pilot first in Syria and then in France. Briefly imprisoned by the Vichy government after the defeat of France by Germany, he escaped to London to join the Free French. He was serving as a captain in a bomber squadron in November 1943 when Charles de Gaulle appointed him minister of finance in the Free French government at Algiers. As minister for national economy in de Gaulle’s provisional government at the end of the war, Mendès-France argued for cur-
MENU, Operation
rency reforms and an austerity program. De Gaulle rejected both, and Mendès-France resigned. He later became executive director for France in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in Washington, D.C., and then French administrator to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and representative to the United Nations (UN) Economic and Social Council. Over the next two decades he also often found himself in opposition to government policies. Playing a Cassandra-like role in the National Assembly, Mendès-France hammered on the dangers of drift (immobilisme) and failure to deal with the Fourth Republic’s problems. He was critical of France’s failure to move toward independence for the protectorates of Morocco and Tunisia and of the war in Indochina, of which he said that France had “nothing to win but everything to lose.” After the May 1954 French defeat at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, the government headed by Joseph Laniel fell. Mendès-France assumed the premiership on June 17. His goal was to reinvigorate and modernize the French economy, but he was forced to spend most of his premiership concentrating on foreign affairs. On June 20 Mendès-France electrified the National Assembly with a star-
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tling proposal to end the war in Indochina within 30 days or resign as premier. The Geneva Conference was already in session, but he won his gamble on the last day of the deadline (but only because the clocks had been stopped on July 20; the agreement was actually signed on July 21). With the war terminated, Mendès-France set in motion events that led in 1956 to independence for Morocco and Tunisia. Also controversial was his failure to fight for the European Defense Community (EDC), which the Chamber of Deputies defeated while he was premier. When he attempted to bring about reform on the domestic front, Mendès-France ran into a wall of opposition. Hated by many as a Jew, a reformer, an opponent of the EDC, and as “the gravedigger of the French Empire,” Mendès-France was overthrown by the Chamber of Deputies on February 5, 1955. After his fall the Radical Party split, and Mendès-France lost his post as party leader. Although brief, the Mendès-France premiership was one of the notable episodes in the history of the Fourth Republic. Its failure disillusioned many young reformers and helped pave the way for the 1958 return to power of de Gaulle. Mendès-France remained in the Chamber of Deputies until defeated for reelection in 1958. Reelected in 1967, he was defeated the next year in the Gaullist landslide. Mendès-France died in Paris on October 18, 1982. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also De Gaulle, Charles; Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; European Defense Community; Faure, Edgar; Geneva Conference and Geneva Accords of 1954; Indochina War; Laniel, Joseph References Fauvet, Jacques. La Quatrième République. Paris: Fayard, 1959. Lacouture, Jean. Pierre Mendès-France. Translated by George Holoch. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1984. Matthews, Ronald. The Death of the Fourth Republic. New York: Praeger, 1954. Mendès-France, Pierre, and Gabriel Ardant. Economics and Action. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. Werth, Alexander. The Strange History of Mendès-France and the Great Struggle over French North Africa. London: Barrie Books, 1957.
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Operation
Start Date: March 18, 1969 End Date: May 26, 1970
Pierre Mendès-France was a French socialist who became prime minister in June 1954, immediately following France’s defeat in the Battle of Dien Bien Phu. A staunch critic of his nation’s colonial policies, he extricated France from Indochina in the Geneva Accords that July. (Library of Congress)
Code name for the secret U.S. bombing of Cambodia. Operation MENU had three objectives. Tactically, its first objective was the destruction of supplies and the disruption of People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) and Viet Cong (VC) base camps in the border area between Cambodia and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). The U.S. intelligence community believed, correctly as postwar Communist sources have revealed, that the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), thought to
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be a massive Communist headquarters, was also located in that region. Its destruction was the second objective. At the strategic level, U.S. president Richard M. Nixon’s plan for disengagement would have been imperiled had the Communists launched another attack on the scale of the 1968 Tet Offensive before Vietnamization and the withdrawal of American troops were complete, or nearly so. Thus, the third objective was to prevent such an attack. Bombing in the border region was nothing new, even in 1969. The boundary between South Vietnam and Cambodia was ambiguous and ill-defined. But since Cambodia had declared its neutrality, bombing targets inside that country was inappropriate if not illegal. From 1965 on, whenever bombs were dropped on base areas or supply caches in extreme western South Vietnam, the mission reports always indicated that the bombs fell on Vietnam’s side of the border. Between October 1967 and March 1969, the buildup of PAVN forces and supplies in the border region increased as Hanoi stepped up the infiltration of troops down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Supplies were brought by ship into the harbor at Sihanoukville and hauled over Friendship Highway, a road built with U.S. foreign aid funds, to the sanctuaries along the border. The first Boeing B-52 Stratofortress missions into Cambodia were flown on March 18, 1969. The target was Base Area 353, a network of supply caches and staging points just west of the border. The Pentagon assigned the code name BREAKFAST to this mission. Additional missions to other base areas were code-named SUPPER, LUNCH, DESSERT, and SNACK. The series was dubbed Operation MENU. Only a handful of people knew the truth about the bombing. The president, White House chief of staff Brigadier General Alexander Haig, National Security Advisor Henry A. Kissinger, key members of Congress, and a select few military and civilian defense officials were among those who knew that the targets were actually in Cambodia. As for the aircrews actually flying the B-52s, only the pilots and navigators, not the rest of the crew members, were informed that their targets were actually in Cambodia. Secretary of the U.S. Air Force Dr. Robert Seamans and U.S. Air Force chief of staff General John D. Ryan were not advised. U.S. Air Force colonel Ray B. Sitton, who had a background in the Strategic Air Command (SAC), worked out a system that used Arc Light (B-52) strikes in South Vietnam as a cover for the secret bombing. Radar bomb navigators in the B-52s controlled the heading input for the plane in the final moments before the bombs were dropped. The rest of the flight crew would be unaware of the change in heading. Because the actual targets in Cambodia were, at most, only a few miles from the targets originally briefed to the aircrews, the crew members would not know the difference. After the routine mission briefings, radar navigators were told that when they neared their drop points, new sets of coordinates would be secretly forwarded to them by U.S. Air Force radar operators inside South Vietnam. The bombs would be dropped on the new coordinates rather than the designated targets. Poststrike reports would indicate that the original targets had been struck. A top-
secret back-channel communications network that was used to pass sensitive intelligence information would then transmit the actual target information to the handful of civilian and military officials cleared for MENU bombing intelligence. The secrecy began unraveling just before the bombing came to an end. On May 2, 1970, the New York Times ran a brief article on the bombing. By that time, 3,630 B-52 sorties had dropped close to 100,000 tons of bombs inside Cambodia. The need for secrecy passed after General Lon Nol deposed Prince Norodom Sihanouk on March 18, 1970. Two days later, a Cambodian commander asked South Vietnamese spotter planes and artillery to help repulse a VC attack on his outpost. Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) operations inside Cambodia began in earnest a week later. On April 29, U.S. aircraft supported 6,000 ARVN troops when they launched an attack into the Parrot’s Beak area of Cambodia. Covert MENU bombing continued until May 26, 1970. After that, until a congressionally mandated end to all U.S. air strikes took effect on August 15, 1973, bombing in Cambodia, although still classified, was no longer covert. Even after May, missions into the base areas struck during the secret bombing were still referred to as “MENU Bombing” by SAC, but the veil of deception was lifted. The covert passing of coordinates to radar bomb navigators stopped, as did the double reporting. The extent of the secret bombing of Cambodia was revealed by retired U.S. Air Force major Hal Knight Jr., a former Combat Skyspot radar site operator, in a January 1973 letter to Senator William Proxmire. As a result of this letter, in July and August 1973 the Senate Armed Services Committee held hearings on the MENU bombing. By exposing the extent of the secrecy, the hearings further damaged the credibility of the Nixon administration, already under increasing pressure from unfolding revelations that became the Watergate Scandal. Between March 1969 and August 1973, some 500,000 tons of bombs fell on Cambodia. The MENU bombing accounted for about 100,000 tons of bombs. The extent to which the bombing disrupted Communist military operations can only be speculated. Undoubtedly supply caches were hit and some base camps were destroyed, but COSVN’s operations were never seriously disrupted. On the other hand, Vietnamization continued, and the withdrawal of American ground forces was nearly complete before North Vietnam launched its Easter Offensive on March 31, 1972. EARL H. TILFORD JR. See also Airpower, Role in War; Arc Light Missions; Cambodia; Central Office for South Vietnam; Easter Offensive; Fishhook; Haig, Alexander Meigs, Jr.; Kissinger, Henry Alfred; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Proxmire, Edward William References Berger, Carl, ed. The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, 1961– 1973: An Illustrated Account. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1977.
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Littauer, Raphael, and Norman Thomas Uphoff. The Air War in Indochina. Rev. ed. Boston: Beacon, 1971. Nalty, Bernard C. Air War over South Vietnam, 1968–1975. Washington DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 2000. Shawcross, William. Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979.
it in fact remained corrupt, inefficient, and unable to support itself. Ultimately the MSU Advisory Group failed in its efforts to build a self-sustaining government in South Vietnam. JOHN E. GRENIER
Meos
References FitzGerald, Frances. Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam. Boston: Little, Brown, 1972. Herring, George C. America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975. 4th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001.
See Hmongs
See also American Friends of Vietnam; Fishel, Wesley Robert; Military Assistance and Advisory Group, Vietnam; Ngo Dinh Diem; Ngo Dinh Nhu; Territorial Forces; United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1954–1965
Michigan State University Advisory Group A team of American public administration experts, sociologists, and other academics who, under U.S. government sponsorship, went to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) in 1955 to help organize South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem’s newly installed government. Led by Professor Wesley Fishel, a charter member of the American Friends of Vietnam, the Michigan State University (MSU) Advisory Group guided the South Vietnamese government in developing prototypes for both the Popular Forces, which were to challenge the Viet Cong (VC) in the countryside, and the 50,000-man Civil Guard, which would perform provincial defense. However, President Ngo Dinh Diem, with the support of the U.S. Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG), resisted the MSU Advisory Group’s suggestion for a lightly armed Civil Guard to defend the countryside. He preferred a force trained for smallscale military operations rather than police duties. Ultimately Diem rejected the MSU Advisory Group plan and used the Civil Guard as a dumping ground for incompetent military officers. The result was a regional defense force armed with .38-caliber revolvers, old shotguns, and bolt-action rifles and assigned the impossible task of defending the countryside against better-armed VC guerrillas. Meanwhile, public administration experts from the MSU Advisory Group had similar difficulties in developing an honest and efficient civil service in South Vietnam. Although Dr. Fishel defended Diem’s authoritarian rule as necessary given Vietnam’s lack of experience with democratic government, other members of the MSU Advisory Group became increasingly critical of the South Vietnamese leader. When members of the group returned to the United States in 1962 and published articles critical of Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu, Diem annulled the contract between the South Vietnamese government and the MSU advisers. In providing academic and administrative assistance to Diem’s government, both the U.S. government and the MSU Advisory Group hoped to stabilize South Vietnam politically. Unfortunately, they did not succeed. Although Diem’s regime superficially appeared to be a well-organized and well-administered government,
Midway Island Conference Event Date: June 8, 1969 First meeting between Nguyen Van Thieu, president of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), and U.S. president Richard M. Nixon that occurred on Midway Island on June 8, 1969. Having found President Lyndon Johnson difficult and fearing American betrayal in the war with the Communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and Viet Cong (VC), Thieu hoped for more assistance from the incoming U.S. president Nixon. Nixon had decided on the course of Vietnamization of the war and hoped to reduce protests at home. In addition, he talked of strengthening armed forces in the South Vietnamese armed forces so that they could better defend themselves. Nixon wanted to forge a political solution with North Vietnam, one that would allow him to withdraw most American troops while leaving the military solution to the South Vietnamese. The South Vietnamese government had resisted a similar plan proposed by Johnson, fearing defeat if left to fend for themselves. Thieu, however, believed that the historically anti-Communist Nixon would never abandon the South Vietnamese and had thrown his support behind him in the 1968 U.S. presidential election. Thieu looked forward to meeting with Nixon and had requested that the meeting take place in Honolulu, Hawaii. Nixon, however, wishing to avoid antiwar demonstrations, chose instead Midway Island, a lonely, desolate refueling stop in the middle of the Pacific Ocean. The meeting took place on June 8, 1969, but arrangements for the meeting hit several snags. Nixon wanted Thieu to arrive first, but Thieu refused, believing that Nixon, as host, should be at Midway awaiting him. Although presidential press secretary Ronald Ziegler assured Thieu’s aides that Nixon would land first, Thieu arrived and discovered that Nixon’s plane was still 15 minutes from the island. In this Nixon sought to demonstrate that the United States would not be dictated to by its ally. In the meeting room Thieu was angered to discover that the chair reserved for Nixon was a taller, higher-backed one. Thieu
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U.S. president Richard Nixon and Republic of Vietnam president Nguyen Van Thieu say goodbye on June 8, 1969, following their Midway Island meeting to discuss the Vietnam War. (AP/Wide World Photos)
proceeded into the dining room to grab an identical chair and place it directly opposite that of the U.S. president. Also, while Thieu had hoped to meet with Nixon alone, the U.S. president insisted on having National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger remain with him, so Thieu kept his special assistant for foreign affairs Nguyen Phu Duc in the room as well. Thieu had anticipated that Nixon would propose beginning U.S. withdrawals, so Thieu preempted him by suggesting a redeployment of American and South Vietnamese forces. Nixon agreed but stated that he needed time to develop his strategy. Thieu sought to buy time and avoid agreeing to a total U.S. withdrawal; he apparently hoped for a Korean War–type solution in Vietnam with a demilitarized zone (DMZ) occupied by American troops separating North and South Vietnam. Nixon sought Thieu’s acquiescence to begin secret talks with the government of the North Vietnam concerning American and North Vietnamese troop withdrawals. Nixon suggested private bilateral talks between the United States and North Vietnam, and
Thieu agreed but with the provision that he be kept informed of any discussion of political issues. Thieu apparently believed that these talks were to set the stage for a conference between North Vietnam and South Vietnam, while Nixon wanted Thieu’s approval for the United States to act on behalf of the South Vietnamese government in negotiations with North Vietnam. After their private talks Nixon and Thieu held a short press conference, with each answering questions from White House correspondents traveling with Nixon. The questions and answers were all in English, which annoyed Thieu. Nixon believed that the meeting had been a success. Elated that U.S. troops would immediately begin withdrawing from Vietnam, he hoped that this would gain him favor with the antiwar protesters at home and provide time to negotiate a complete American withdrawal on U.S. terms. Thieu, on the other hand, believed that he had been promised continued American support and that he would have a staunch anti-Communist ally. He liked Nixon and believed him to be forthright. Although angered and annoyed by
Military Airlift Command what he saw as slights at the conference, Thieu attributed these to Kissinger rather than to Nixon. Although Thieu feared American betrayal and a unilateral withdrawal of troops, he remained confident in his ally. Nixon and Kissinger, however, had already decided that the United States would withdraw from Vietnam, with or without South Vietnamese consent. LAURA MATYSEK WOOD See also Kissinger, Henry Alfred; Nguyen Van Thieu; Nixon, Richard Milhous References Ambrose, Stephen E. Nixon. 3 vols. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987, 1989, 1991. Keefer, Edward, and Carolyn Yee, eds. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Vol. 6, Vietnam, January 1969–July 1970. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006. Nguyen Tien Hung and Jerrold L. Schechter. The Palace File. New York: Harper and Row, 1986.
Mien Tong See Thieu Tri
Military Airlift Command U.S. Air Force command conducting tactical (intratheater) and strategic (intertheater) air movements. The Military Airlift Command (MAC), which was established in 1966, combined the assets from the existing Military Air Transport Service (MATS) and incorporated the airlift components then assigned to Strategic Air Command (SAC) and Tactical Air Command (TAC). MAC was given the mission of operating the entire spectrum of airlift and airdrop missions, deployment and redeployment operations, operation of a single-passenger and reservation system for intercontinental travel, and aerial port management. In addition, MAC was tasked with air weather operations, aeromedical evacuation, and aerospace search and rescue. The secretary of the Air Force and the MAC commander were responsible for interfacing with all government agencies on matters pertaining to airlift. MAC’s charter included a combat role with the inclusion of search and rescue and all-inclusive airlift missions. Prior to 1966, search-and-rescue and tactical airlift missions were assigned to the TAC. During the initial buildup in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), MATS was the primary air movement agency. It committed virtually all of its aircraft and crews to the Southeast Asian deployment. The mission in South Vietnam forced MATS to augment regular U.S. Air Force squadrons with selected Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard units. In addition, Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard units undertook missions previously flown by regular U.S. Air Force units so that these additional squadrons would be available for the buildup in Southeast Asia. Because U.S.
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president Lyndon Johnson had not declared a national emergency, federal law prohibited the activation of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet. MATS also contracted with several commercial airlines for passenger service to South Vietnam, most notably Pan American and World Airways. These civilian flight crews faced the same risks as their military counterparts in traveling to airports in the major cities of South Vietnam. With MAC’s establishment in 1966, the new command acquired additional and new aircraft, thereby expanding the airlift mission to South Vietnam. In 1965 the average monthly traffic was approximately 34,000 passengers and 10,000 tons of cargo. In 1967 the average monthly traffic increased to 66,000 passengers and 43,000 tons of cargo. MAC operated all aerial ports, established forward weather stations, and supervised all tactical airlift missions within South Vietnam, including search-and-rescue operations throughout the Southeast Asian theater of operations. As the U.S. presence expanded to countries such as Thailand, MAC elements colocated with its TAC and SAC counterparts. Additionally, MAC flew all aeromedical evacuations out of South Vietnam to hospitals located in Japan, the Philippines, and the continental United States. MAC also participated in several strategic combat deployments of entire troop units from the United States directly to South Vietnam. Between December 23, 1965, and January 23, 1966, MATS/ MAC ferried the entire 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, from its home station in Hawaii to Pleiku in South Vietnam. Operation BLUE LIGHT included approximately 90 aircraft transporting 3,000 soldiers and 5,000 tons of cargo. Only hours after their arrival, soldiers of the “Tropic Lightning” division engaged in combat. In November 1967 during Operation EAGLE THRUST, MAC airlifted almost the entire 101st Airborne Division from Fort Campbell, Kentucky, directly to Bien Hoa in South Vietnam. In the arena of tactical airlifts, MAC flew virtually all intratheater missions. These ranged from airborne operations involving both U.S. and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) forces to regularly scheduled cargo and resupply operations throughout South Vietnam. During Operation JUNCTION CITY, MAC pilots flew all transport aircraft involved in the only major U.S. airborne operation of the Vietnam War, dropping a battalion of the U.S. Army’s 173rd Airborne Brigade. MAC was the controlling air agency during the Khe Sanh airlift as well as the major command that directed all search-and-rescue operations throughout Southeast Asia. MAC HH-3E helicopters, specially modified to a gunship configuration, transported U.S. Army Special Forces troops on the abortive Son Tay Raid in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). To accomplish its many missions, MAC flew a variety of aircraft. From 1963 to 1964 the primary aircraft assigned to MATS/MAC for strategic lift were the Douglas C-124 Globemaster, the Douglas C-133 Cargomaster (military version of the Boeing 707), and the Boeing C-135 Stratolifter. During 1964–1965 the U.S. Air Force acquired the jet-powered Lockheed C-141 Starlifter, significantly increasing MAC’s ability to conduct long-distance airlifts in reduced time. The
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C-141 served as the backbone of MAC’s intertheater forces throughout the remainder of the conflict. In 1969 the giant Lockheed C-5A Galaxy entered service and the next year made its maiden flight to South Vietnam. The C-5A increased the average cargo capacity by 600 percent and proved itself able to withstand the rigors of service in Southeast Asia. This aircraft was responsible for providing most of the tonnage delivered during Operation ENHANCE PLUS. The aircraft assigned the missions of tactical airlift were the Chase/Fairchild C-123 Provider, the Douglas C-47 Skytrain “Gooneybird,” the De Havilland Canada C-7 Caribou, and the work-horse of the conflict, the Lockheed C-130 Hercules. For search-and-rescue missions MAC used helicopters, which had the ability to land in small spaces or hover while downed pilots were extracted from jungle locations using cables and winches. The Bell UH-1 Iroquois (“Huey”), the Kaman HH-43 Masher, and the Sikorsky HH-3E “Jolly Green Giant” were the most common types of aircraft employed. Aeromedical evacuations required specially configured Douglas C-133 Cargomaster aircraft. MAC refueled strike aircraft during operations and transports during longdistance flights. The Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker and the Lockheed KC-130 Hercules were tanker versions of the cargo aircraft. The Vietnam War revolutionized the doctrine of airlift. The principal emphasis in airlift doctrine changed from a purely logistical role to an all-inclusive combat support function. MAC’s intertheater lift changed from propeller-driven aircraft to jets, allowing the United States to rapidly project power throughout the world. MAC also gave a theater commander the means to sustain ground forces engaged in prolonged combat. In the post–Vietnam War era, MAC became a specified command directly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and became the sole proponent of airlift operations within the U.S. military. JULIUS A. MENZOFF See also Airborne Operations; Aircraft, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam; BLUE LIGHT, Operation; ENHANCE PLUS, Operation; Helicopters, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Helicopters, Employment of, in Vietnam; JUNCTION CITY, Operation; Medevac; Search-andRescue Operations; Son Tay Raid References Berger, Carl, ed. The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, 1961– 1973: An Illustrated Account. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1977. Smith, Jay H. Anything, Anywhere, Anytime: An Illustrated History of the Military Airlift Command, 1941–1991. Scott Air Force Base, IL: Headquarters, Military Airlift Command, Office of History, 1991.
Military Assistance and Advisory Group, Vietnam Organization formed to channel U.S. military assistance against Communist forces in Indochina. The U.S. Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG), Vietnam, was initially established
in September 1950 as MAAG, Indochina. In March 1950 President Harry S. Truman approved National Security Council (NSC) Memorandum 64 (NSC-64), which proclaimed French Indochina (Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos) as a key area of Southeast Asia and suggested that its fall to the Communists would place the rest of the region in serious jeopardy. But while NSC-64 argued for U.S. support against Communist aggression, it did not answer the question of to whom the support should go, the French or their Vietnamese subjects/allies. Hesitant to appear to support colonialism, the United States favored providing aid directly to the Vietnamese chief of state, former emperor Bao Dai. Despite their need, the French threatened to reject any direct aid to Vietnam and initially opposed even the presence of a U.S. advisory group. While Washington policy makers debated what to do, in July 1950 a joint Defense Department–State Department survey team was dispatched to Saigon to determine the long-term nature and objectives of the aid program and the best organization for implementing it. Meanwhile, the Korean War had broken out in June, significantly raising U.S. stakes throughout East Asia. Focusing on the urgent French need for more supplies and equipment, the military members of the team recommended the establishment of an American military assistance advisory group. The French initially balked, but the United States argued that the military advisory group would be necessary to ensure proper requisitioning, procurement, and receipt of supplies and equipment. Based on that recommendation, MAAG, Indochina, consisting of inspection teams with the mission to observe the distribution and use by the French and Vietnamese of American-supplied equipment, but with no training or advisory role, was established in September. From the arrival of MAAG, Indochina, through May 1954 and the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, the United States encouraged the creation of an independent, indigenous Vietnamese army with a U.S. role in its development and training. The French parried the American pressure for this by developing indigenous Vietnamese units commanded and led by French officers and sergeants, but they steadfastly rejected any American role in training the Vietnamese National Army (VNA) until the spring of 1954, when their military position became more precarious. As the fall of Dien Bien Phu approached, the French agreed to allow Americans to participate in training and advising Vietnamese units. At the beginning of June 1954, they formally requested that the United States join France in organizing and training the VNA. Concerned that the French now intended to draw the United States into the war, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) recommended that America not assume the mission of training the VNA until a stable Vietnamese government formally requested that help. On the other hand, the State Department reasoned that one of the ways to strengthen and stabilize that government would be to reorganize and train its army. The NSC and President Dwight D. Eisenhower agreed with the State Department, and on August 12, 1954, NSC-5429/1 was approved, providing U.S. assistance in creating indigenous military
Military Assistance and Advisory Group, Vietnam
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A U.S. Army member of the Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) plans a mission with an Army of the Republic of Vietnam captain in the early 1960s. (U.S. Army)
forces for internal security in Vietnam, and the MAAG increased its personnel by 90 spaces. However, NSC-5429/1 said nothing about training the VNA, and on October 22, 1954, the State Department, with JCS acquiescence, directed the American mission in Saigon to develop and implement a military training program. By June 1955 with the withdrawal of French forces, the experiment of creating and training an army in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) became an entirely American task. Under the direction and tutelage of the American MAAG, the new 150,000-man Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) gradually took shape. Although thousands of Vietnamese had served with the French, very few had any leadership or staff experience or had received any technical training. Despite the guerrilla-style war that had characterized the French experience and renewed insurgency initiated by the Viet Cong (VC) in 1956, American officials misread this activity and believed it to be a diversion for a conventional attack across the demilitarized zone (DMZ). Thus, the new army’s mission and training centered on repelling a more conventional Korean War– style invasion from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam).
Prior to 1960, American advisers were primarily involved in training and high-level staff work. In 1960 they began advising ground combat units at regimental level in the field. In 1961 advisers were at the battalion level, and by 1964 they were with the paramilitary forces. Gradually American advisers became involved in combat, but by then MAAG, Vietnam, had been replaced by Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). ARTHUR T. FRAME See also Eisenhower, Dwight David; Korean War; Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; O’Daniel, John Wilson; Truman, Harry S.; Vietnam, Republic of, Army; Vietnamese National Army; Williams, Samuel Tankersley References Cao Van Vien, General, et al. The U.S. Advisor. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1980. Collins, Brigadier General James Lawton, Jr. The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army, 1950–1972. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975. Eckhardt, George S. Command and Control, 1950–1969. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1974.
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Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
Herring, George C. America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975. 4th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001. Spector, Ronald H. Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941–1960. United States Army in Vietnam Series. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1983.
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam U.S. joint service headquarters that coordinated all American military activities in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). The Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), was subordinate to the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) in Hawaii, but the MACV commander worked closely with the U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in the Pentagon. The MACV area of responsibility was limited to operations within the territory of South Vietnam, while the USPACOM commander controlled sea operations beyond
the territorial waters and air operations against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). Between 1960 and 1964, the size of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF, South Vietnamese Armed Forces) grew from 150,000 to 250,000 men in an effort to meet the American and Vietnamese prescription to counter the Viet Cong (VC) insurgency. U.S. personnel support also grew during this period from just over 500 advisers in 1960 to more than 23,000 in 1964. This consisted not only of advisers but also units providing aviation, signal, medical, engineer, and intelligence support. MACV was established on February 6, 1962, in response to the expanding U.S. advisory and support activities in order to control all U.S. Army support units in Vietnam in addition to the Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) program. In May 1964 MAAG missions and functions were integrated into those of the MACV staff, the MAAG was disestablished, and the advisory effort ceased to have a separate command and support organization.
Chief of Staff of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), Brigadier General Stan McClellan (right, foreground) meets with Viet Cong negotiators in February 1973 to discuss the pending release of prisoners by both sides. MACV was the U.S. joint-service headquarters that coordinated all American military activities in the Republic of Vietnam during the Vietnam War. (Department of Defense)
Military Decorations
U.S. Troop Commitment and Casualties during the Vietnam War by Branch of Service U.S. Army Serving in Southeast Asia Serving in South Vietnam Hostile Deaths Non-Hostile Deaths Wounded
U.S. Navy
2,276,000 229,000 1,736,000 174,000 30,963 1,631 7,261 935 96,802 4,178
U.S. U.S. Air Force Marines 385,000 293,000 1,745 841 931
513,000 391,000 13,095 1,749 51,392
MACV also worked closely with the South Vietnamese government and RVNAF Joint General Staff (JGS) on overall military plans and operations. Although a combined command and staff arrangement was suggested to the JGS, the South Vietnamese rejected it because of their political sensitivity to the charge advanced by Communist propaganda that they were puppets of the United States. Instead, the Free World Military Assistance Council, composed of the chief of the JGS, the senior Korean officer in Vietnam, and the commander of MACV provided operational guidance to, not control of, Free World Forces through the annual Combined Campaign Plan. First published at the end of 1965, the Combined Campaign Plan was not a true operational plan; rather, it broke the operational effort down geographically and assigned no tasks or goals. Coordination of combat operations without the benefit of an integrated command at the top was provided through joint agreements between local Free World commanders and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) ground commanders. While ARVN corps commanders retained overall responsibility for military actions in each corps tactical zone (CTZ), also known as military regions, American and other Free World force commanders accepted responsibility for tactical areas of responsibility, arbitrary geographical areas in which American and Free World units conducted combat operations. In addition to U.S. Army, Vietnam (USARV)—which was primarily an administrative and logistics headquarters—Naval Forces, Vietnam, and the Seventh Air Force operational ground commands that were subordinate to MACV included the 5th Special Forces Group, the III Marine Amphibious Force, I Field Force, II Field Force, and IV Corps Advisory Group. The latter four controlled American combat units as well as field advisory teams within their areas of responsibility that coincided with the ARVN CTZs (initially, no American combat units operated in the IV Corps area, only advisory teams). The commanders of these four American operational commands, as with their MACV superior, were the senior advisers to the respective ARVN CTZ commander. Each of the four MACV commanders, General Paul D. Harkins (February 1962–June 1964), General William C. Westmoreland (June 1964–June 1968), General Creighton W. Abrams Jr. (June 1968–June 1972), and General Frederick C. Weyand (June 1972– March 1973), in addition to commanding all U.S. forces in South
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Vietnam, was also senior adviser to the JGS. He also commanded the MACV army component, USARV. As MACV commander between 1965 and 1968, General Westmoreland oversaw the buildup of American forces to more than 550,000 men. Likewise, it was General Abrams as commander of MACV who was the primary overseer of Vietnamization between 1969 and 1972. The bulk of U.S. combat operations took place under the command of these two men. ARTHUR T. FRAME See also Abrams, Creighton Williams, Jr.; Free World Assistance Program; Harkins, Paul Donal; Military Assistance and Advisory Group, Vietnam; Military Regions; Westmoreland, William Childs; Weyand, Frederick Carlton References Clarke, Jeffrey J. Advice and Support: The Final Years; The U.S. Army in Vietnam. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988. Eckhardt, George S. Command and Control, 1950–1969. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1974. Herring, George C. America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975. 4th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. Stanton, Shelby L. The Rise and Fall of an American Army: The U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985.
Military Decorations The first medal awarded for military service in Vietnam was the French Tonkin Medal, which covered the period 1883 to 1895. From then until World War II, participation in the various military operations in the area was recognized with the Colonial Medal and a silver clasp identifying the campaign. These included Cochinchine, Haut-Mekong, and Tonkin. For service during World War II, French soldiers and colonial troops received the 1939 to 1945 Commemorative Medal with the Extreme-Orient bar. For the period 1945 to 1954, the French awarded the Indochina Medal, with a ribbon almost identical to that of the old Tonkin Medal. The Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) had a wide array of military decorations and medals, some of which were derived from previous French colonial awards. Partially following the British system, some South Vietnamese awards were specifically reserved for officers, while others were reserved for noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and enlisted soldiers. Also following European (but not British) practice, most South Vietnamese awards could be earned for either battlefield heroism or for exceptional service. South Vietnam’s highest decoration was the National Order of the Republic of Vietnam. It had five classes and was patterned very closely after the French colonial Order of the Green Dragon of Annam. Both orders were strongly influenced by the French Légion
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Military Decorations
Table 1. Relative Precedence of American Military Decorations during the Vietnam War 1. Navy Medal of Honor (1861) Army Medal of Honor (1862) Air Force Medal of Honor (1960) 2. Distinguished Service Cross (1918) Navy Cross (1919) Air Force Cross (1960) 3. Defense Distinguished Service Medal (1970) 4. Army Distinguished Service Medal (1918) Navy Distinguished Service Medal (1918) Coast Guard Distinguished Service Medal (1949) Air Force Distinguished Service Medal (1960) 5. Silver Star (1918) 6. Legion of Merit (1942) 7. Distinguished Flying Cross (1926) 8. Soldier’s Medal (1926) Navy and Marine Corps Medal (1942) Airman’s Medal (1960) Coast Guard Medal (1961) 9. Bronze Star (1942) 10. Meritorious Service Medal (1969) 11. Air Medal (1942) 12. Joint Service Commendation Medal (1963) 13. Navy Commendation Medal (1944) Army Commendation Medal (1945) Coast Guard Commendation Medal (1951) Air Force Commendation Medal (1958) 14. Purple Heart (1932)* *
Note: After the Vietnam War, the precedence of the Purple Heart was elevated to just beneath the Bronze Star.
d’Honneur. South Vietnam’s second-highest decoration was the Military Merit Medal. Like its French counterpart, the Médaille Militaire, the Military Merit Medal was awarded only to enlisted men and NCOs. The Army, Navy, and Air Force Distinguished Service Orders were for officers only, while the Army, Navy, and Air Force Meritorious Service Medals were for NCOs and enlisted men. The Gallantry Cross, patterned after the French Croix de Guerre, was one of the most significant of South Vietnamese decorations and was something of an exception in the South Vietnamese system. The Gallantry Cross could be awarded to officers, enlisted men, whole units, and even civilians and only for acts of combat valor. It was awarded at four levels, indicated by a device affixed to the ribbon: at the brigade and regimental level, a bronze star; at the divisional level, a silver star; at the corps level, a gold star; and at the national level, a bronze palm. The Armed Forces Honor Medal, awarded in two classes, was a special decoration for those individuals making significant contributions to the training, organization, and development of the armed forces. Other significant decorations (also in two classes each) were the Staff Service Medal, the Technical Service Medal, the Training Service Medal, and the Civil Actions Medal. The South Vietnamese also awarded a Campaign Medal with separate scroll clasps to indicate participation in either the Indochina War or the Vietnam War. As in virtually all Western armies, most South Vietnamese military decorations were worn over the left breast.
For many years, very little was known about the military decoration systems of either the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) or the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (National Liberation Front [NLF]). A recently translated but undated document issued by the Institute of Orders in Hanoi, titled Orders and Decorations, describes the military awards of the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) as well as those NLF awards authorized for wear by PAVN soldiers who served in Viet Cong (VC) units. The DRV/NLF (after 1975, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam [SRV]) military awards system was strongly influenced by the system of the old Soviet Union, with a sharp distinction between orders and decorations. For the most part, orders are suspended from Soviet-style pentagonal ribbons, and decorations are suspended from short Soviet-style “hero ribbons.” Orders are worn over the left breast, and most but not all decorations are worn over the right breast. Most orders are awarded in classes, indicated by the number of gold stars attached to the suspension ribbon. Most decorations come in only one class, but there are exceptions to this rule as well. The highest DRV/NLF award was the Gold Star Order, the equivalent of the Hero of the Soviet Union that the Gold Star Order closely resembles. Although the Gold Star is an order, it is suspended from a hero-style ribbon, as with its Soviet counterpart. The Gold Star Order has only one class and has been awarded only 16 times. Known recipients include Ho Chi Minh, Ton Duc Thang, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Soviet leaders Leonid Brezhnev and Aleksei Kosygin. The Ho Chi Minh Order, which also has only one class, appears to be the SRV’s equivalent of the Soviet Union’s Order of Lenin. The Ho Chi Minh Order has been awarded only 144 times. The Independence Order, which has three classes, has been awarded to 538 individuals. The highest North Vietnamese decoration was the People’s Armed Forces Hero. Its NLF equivalent was the Liberation Armed Forces Hero. Unlike other decorations, these two are worn on the left breast, above all other orders, and on the same level with the Gold Star Order. Many NLF orders and decorations are the equivalents of similar North Vietnamese awards. Its Exploit Order is the equivalent of the North Vietnamese Military Exploit Order, and the Soldier of Liberation Order is the equivalent of the Soldier of Glory Order. A number of NLF decorations used during the war itself are now apparently considered obsolete and are not authorized for wear on PAVN uniforms. Among these are the series of NLF Hero decorations, which included Heroes Who Destroy Americans, Heroes Determined for Victory, Heroes Who Destroy Mechanized Equipment, Heroes Who Destroy Communications, Heroes Who Destroy Aircraft, and Valiant Soldier Assault. Instead of Western-style campaign medals, North Vietnam and the NLF mostly issued commemorative campaign badges for participation in key battles. PAVN fighter pilots who scored air-to-air kills also received a special Ho Chi Minh Badge, worn on the left breast. Campaign badges are known to exist for the 1954 Battle of
Military Decorations Dien Bien Phu, the 1968 Tet Offensive, the 1972 Spring (Easter) Offensive, the 1975 Spring Offensive, and the Ho Chi Minh Campaign that led to the final fall of Saigon in 1975. Perhaps the most unusual of these badges is the one for the fighting that resulted from Operation JUNCTION CITY. The badge reads “Chien Thang” (Victory) and “U.S. Junction City.” The basic system of U.S. military decorations came into being during World War I. Until that time the only U.S. decoration was the Medal of Honor, first established during the American Civil War. With the establishment of additional decorations in 1918, Congress created the concept of the Pyramid of Honor. For the first time in American history degrees of service to the nation were acknowledged, each worthy of its own level of recognition. At the apex of the Pyramid of Honor is the Medal of Honor (often erroneously called the Congressional Medal of Honor). The highest American military award for battlefield heroism, the Medal of Honor is awarded by the president in the name of Congress to those members of the U.S. Armed Forces who distinguish themselves by gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of their lives above and beyond the call of duty while engaged in combat against an armed enemy of the United States. American troops sometimes irreverently referred to it as the “Big Sticker” or the “Blue Max,” a reference to the old imperial German Pour le Mérite and the Medal of Honor’s blue ribbon. During the Vietnam War the Medal of Honor was awarded to 155 soldiers, 57 marines, 15 sailors, 12 airmen, and to the Unknown Soldier of the Vietnam War era. Unlike many European systems of decorations, both officers and enlisted men are eligible for all American military awards. Some awards, such as the Medal of Honor, the Distinguished Service Cross, and the Silver Star, are only for combat heroism. Others, such as the Distinguished Service Medal, are only for exceptional service. Some American decorations, such as the Bronze Star and the Army, Navy, and Air Force Commendation Medals, can be awarded for either service or valor. Awards made for valor are indicated by a bronze “V” device attached to the medal’s ribbon. Most American heroism decorations are for combat actions only. An exception is the Soldier’s Medal, which is the highest award for noncombat heroism. The Distinguished Flying Cross is awarded for heroism in flight during either combat or noncombat situations. The Bronze Star is awarded for either heroic or meritorious action. Technically the Bronze Star can be awarded for noncombat service, but in practice it is almost always awarded for wartime service. The Meritorious Service Medal, established in 1969, is supposed to be the peacetime equivalent of the Bronze Star. The Purple Heart, established by George Washington in 1782, was America’s first standing military decoration. It lapsed after the Revolutionary War but was reestablished in 1932 as a decoration for wounds received in combat. The Legion of Merit is unique in the American system because it exists in four classes. Originally established in 1942 as a decoration for high-ranking foreigners, the lowest class (Legionnaire) also is awarded to Americans.
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Table 2. Campaigns Authorized for Wearing of the Star Device on the U.S. Vietnam Service Medal 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.
Vietnam Advisory (March 16, 1962–March 7, 1965) Vietnam Defense (March 8, 1965–December 24, 1965) Vietnam Counteroffensive (December 25, 1965–June 30, 1966) Vietnam Counteroffensive Phase II (July 1, 1966–May 31, 1967) Vietnam Counteroffensive Phase III (June 1, 1967–January 29, 1968) Tet Counteroffensive (January 30, 1968–April 1, 1968) Vietnam Counteroffensive Phase IV (April 2, 1968–June 30, 1968) Vietnam Counteroffensive Phase V (July 1, 1968–November 1, 1968) Vietnam Counteroffensive Phase VI (November 2, 1968–February 22, 1969) Tet 69 Counteroffensive (February 23, 1969–June 8, 1969) Vietnam Summer–Fall (June 9, 1969–October 31, 1969) Vietnam Winter–Spring (November 1, 1969–April 30, 1970) Sanctuary Counteroffensive (May 1, 1970–June 30, 1970) Vietnam Counteroffensive Phase VII (July 1, 1970–June 30, 1971) Consolidation I (July 1, 1971–November 30, 1971) Consolidation II (December 1, 1971–March 29, 1972) Vietnam Cease-Fire (March 30, 1972–January 28, 1973)
Some levels of the Pyramid of Honor have more than one decoration because each branch of the service has its own unique award. Thus, there are specific U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Air Force designs for the Medal of Honor. At the next level down the decorations even have slightly different names, but the Distinguished Service Cross, Navy Cross, and Air Force Cross are all equivalent. Some decorations, including the Silver Star, Distinguished Flying Cross, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, Air Medal, and Purple Heart, are awarded by all branches of the service. Awards such as the Defense Distinguished Service Medal and the Joint Services Commendation Medal are awarded by the Defense Department to members of all services. In some countries such as the former Soviet Union, soldiers wear multiple medals or ribbons for subsequent awards of the same decoration. The U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force designate subsequent awards by affixing a bronze oak leaf cluster to the medal’s ribbon. The U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps use a small bronze star device. Fifth subsequent awards are indicated by a silver oak leaf cluster (U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force) or a silver star device (U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps). Although not a military decoration in the strictest sense, one of the most highly prized American military awards is the Combat Infantryman Badge (CIB). A silver rifle on a blue bar backed by a silver oak wreath, the CIB was first authorized in World War II to distinguish U.S. Army infantrymen actively engaged in ground combat. During the Vietnam War, eligibility for the award was extended to Special Forces troops and to noninfantrymen assigned as advisers to ARVN infantry units. Second and third awards of the CIB are indicated by one or two stars at the open top of the oak wreath. An individual can earn only one CIB per war; thus, soldiers in Vietnam with two stars on their CIBs were infantry veterans of World War II and the Korean War as well. Very few CIBs with two stars have ever been awarded. An equally prestigious award is the
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Military Decorations
Table 3. Relative Precedence of Military Decorations of the Republic of Vietnam 1. National Order of Vietnam (1950) a. First Class, Grand Cross b. Second Class, Grand Officer c. Third Class, Commander d. Fourth Class, Officer e. Fifth Class, Knight 2. Military Merit Medal (1950) 3. Army Distinguished Service Order (1964) Air Force Distinguished Service Order (1964) Navy Distinguished Service Order (1964) 4. Army Meritorious Service Medal (1964) Air Force Meritorious Service Medal (1964) Navy Meritorious Service Medal (1964) 5. Special Service Medal (1964) 6. Gallantry Cross (1950) Air Gallantry Cross (1964) Navy Gallantry Cross (1964) 7. Hazardous Service Medal (1964) 8. Life Saving Medal (1964) 9. Loyalty Medal (1964) 10. Wound Medal (1953) 11. Armed Forces Honor Medal (1953) 12. Leadership Medal (1964) 13. Staff Service Medal (1964) 14. Technical Service Medal (1964) 15. Training Service Medal (1964) 16. Civil Actions Medal (1964)
Combat Field Medic Badge (CFMB), which distinguishes medics who directly supported U.S. Army infantry units. Both the CIB and the CFMB are worn on the left breast above the decorations, service medals, and all other qualification badges. In 1969 the secretary of the U.S. Navy authorized the creation of a Combat Action Ribbon for all U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Coast Guard (when operating under U.S. Navy control) personnel who actively participate in ground or surface combat. The key difference between the Combat Action Ribbon and the CIB is that all navy and marine personnel who come under fire are eligible for the Combat Action Ribbon, while only army infantrymen who participate in infantry combat are eligible for the CIB. Given the nature of the subsequent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, in 2005 the U.S. army authorized the Combat Action Badge for soldiers who were personally present and actively engaging with or were engaged by the enemy in a combat zone while serving in a unit that was not authorized to award the CIB. Among the American military services, the U.S. Army has a unique way of recognizing overseas service in a combat zone. Every U.S. Army soldier wears the patch of his current unit of assignment on his left shoulder (the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Marine Corps do not use unit shoulder patches). A soldier who serves overseas in a combat zone with a unit is entitled to wear that unit’s patch permanently on his right shoulder. Often erroneously called a “combat patch,” its proper designation is Overseas Service Patch. Well into the 1990s, U.S. Army soldiers could still be seen wearing
patches on the right shoulder from Vietnam War service. In many cases, the units indicated no longer existed. All American military personnel who served during the Vietnam War period (January 1, 1961–August 14, 1974) received the National Defense Service Medal. Those who actually served in Vietnam or its contiguous airspace or waters between July 4, 1965, and March 28, 1973, received the Vietnam Service Medal. American troops who served in Vietnam between July 1, 1958, and July 4, 1965, originally were authorized the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal but later were allowed to exchange those medals for the Vietnam Service Medal. As in previous wars, participation in each specific campaign entitled the soldier to wear a small bronze star device on the medal’s ribbon. Every fifth campaign was indicated with a small silver star device. Seventeen campaigns were conducted between March 15, 1962, and January 28, 1973. In 1967 the U.S. State Department authorized the Civilian Service in Vietnam Medal for all U.S. government civilian employees who served in Vietnam after January 1, 1962. Although a civilian award, it is authorized to be worn on U.S. military uniforms. In 1967 the U.S. Maritime Administration authorized the Merchant Marine Vietnam Service Medal for crew members who served aboard ships flying the American flag in Vietnamese waters. In September 1983 the U.S. Congress established the Commemorative Medal for Families of American Personnel Missing in Southeast Asia. A nonmilitary award, it is suspended from a neck ribbon identical in color and design to the Vietnam Service Medal. In 1986 Congress authorized the creation of the Prisoner of War Medal for all American servicemen held captive by an enemy force after April 5, 1917, thus making award of the medal retroactive to World War I. The United States also recognizes entire units with military decorations. The Presidential Unit Citation is the equivalent of a Distinguished Service Cross for a unit; the Valorous Unit Citation is the unit equivalent of a Silver Star. If an individual is a member of the unit at the time the award is won, he is entitled to wear the unit award permanently on his uniform. An individual joining a
Table 4. Relative Precedence of Military Decorations of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.
Gold Star Order (1947) Ho Chi Minh Order (1947) Independence Order (1947) People’s Armed Forces Hero (1952) Military Exploit Order (1947) Resistance Order (1948) Resistance Decoration (1948) Combatant Order (1947) Soldier of Glory Order (1961) Soldier of Glory Decoration (1961) Victory Order (1958) Victory Decoration (1958) Liberation Army Order (1958) Liberation Army Decoration (1958) Fatherland Commemorative Decoration (1946)
Military Regions
Table 5. Relative Precedence of National Liberation Front Military Decorations Recognized by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.
Liberation Armed Forces Hero (1963) Liberation Exploit Order (1963) Liberation War Exploit Order (1963) Brass Fortress Order (1963) Fatherland Order (1963) Liberation Order (1965) Liberation Decoration (1965) Resolution for Victory Order (1965) Resolution for Victory Decoration (1965) Soldier of Liberation Order (1966) Soldier of Liberation Decoration (1966)
decorated unit at a later time can wear the unit award only while assigned to the unit. Most (but not all) U.S. unit awards are easily identifiable by the gold frame around the ribbon. Members of the U.S. Army wear unit awards over their right pockets. Members of the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Air Force, and the U.S. Marine Corps wear unit awards over their left pockets, integrated with their individual awards. During service in Vietnam, many Americans (especially advisers to the ARVN) were awarded various South Vietnamese decorations. The most common were the Gallantry Cross, the Armed Forces Honor Medal, the Staff Service Medal, the Technical Service Medal, and the Civil Actions Medal. The Gallantry Cross and the Civil Actions Medal also were awarded to many U.S. units, whose personnel wore them in the gold frame indicating unit awards. The Australian and New Zealand Service Medal Vietnam was awarded to Australian and New Zealand soldiers who served at least 30 days in Vietnam between May 29, 1964, and January 27, 1973. The medal also was awarded to a very small handful of British officers who served in Vietnam while seconded to those units. For service in Vietnam between December 24, 1962, and May 28, 1964, members of the Australian Army Training Team were awarded the Commonwealth’s Campaign Service Medal with South Vietnam clasp. In 1992 the Australian government established the Vietnam Logistics and Support Medal for military and naval personnel who had supported operations in Vietnam but did not qualify for the Service Medal Vietnam. While serving in Vietnam four Australian soldiers earned the Victoria Cross, the British Commonwealth’s highest decoration for combat valor. Other allied countries with military units in Vietnam also awarded service medals for that war. These medals include the Republic of Korea’s Vietnam Participation Medal, the Kingdom of Thailand’s Vietnam Combat Service Medal, the Republic of the Philippines’ Republic of Vietnam Service Medal, and the Republic of China’s (Taiwan) Memorial Medal of Honor of the Republic of China Military Assistance Group to the Republic of Vietnam. All allied soldiers serving in Vietnam were awarded the South Vietnamese government’s Vietnam Campaign Medal in addition to
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campaign or service medals of their own nations. The ribbon has seven alternating green and white vertical stripes. Mounted on the ribbon is a small silver scroll clasp with what are supposed to be the dates of the Vietnam War. Medals awarded to the Americans had the date “1960–73,” while those awarded to ARVN bear a scroll dated “1960–____.” DAVID T. ZABECKI See also Uniforms References Emering, Edward. Orders, Decorations and Badges of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam. Atglen, PA: Schiffer, 1997. Kerrigan, Evans. American Medals and Decorations. London: Apple, 1990. Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs. Medal of Honor Recipients, 1863–1978. 96th Cong. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979. Sylvester, John, and Frank Foster. The Decorations and Medals of the Republic of Vietnam. Fountain Inn, SC: MOA Press, 1995.
Military Regions Name given by the U.S. military to geographical and operational divisions of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) that coincided exactly with the four Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF, South Vietnamese Armed Forces) corps tactical zones (CTZs). Before 1954, the State of Vietnam was divided into four military regions (MRs): MR I, former Cochin China; MR II, Central Vietnam; MR III, former Tonkin; and MR IV, the Central Highlands. In 1961 each Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) corps took responsibility for a former MR, called a corps tactical zone. These were numbered I to IV: CTZ I, five provinces from Quang Tri to Quang Ngai; CTZ II, the Central Highlands and five provinces south of Quang Ngai; CTZ III, 11 provinces north of the Mekong; and CTZ IV, the remainder of the Mekong Delta. Each infantry division took charge of an area within a CTZ, known as a division tactical area (DTA). Each DTA had several sectors and the provincial military headquarters. In the American phase of the war the DTAs were done away with, and the CTZs became MRs until the Communist victory of April 1975. There was no single combined headquarters to provide for unified operations within the four MRs. Although the United States suggested a combined command and staff arrangement to the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff (JGS), the latter rejected it for political reasons. Instead, operational guidance was provided through an annual Combined Campaign Plan, produced by the Free World Military Assistance Council comprised of the chief of the JGS, the senior RVNAF officer in Vietnam, and the commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV).
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Military Revolutionary Council The Combined Campaign Plan was not a true operational plan. It assigned no tasks or goals; rather, it broke the operational effort down geographically. Coordination of combat operations without the benefit of an integrated command at the top was provided through joint agreements between local Free World Military Force commanders and ARVN ground commanders. While ARVN corps commanders retained overall responsibility for military actions in each CTZ, American and other Free World force commanders accepted responsibility for tactical areas of responsibility (TAORs). These TAORs, like the larger MRs/CTZs, were arbitrary geographical areas in which American and Free World units conducted combat operations. U.S. operational ground force commands subordinate to MACV that controlled American combat units as well as field advisory teams within each MR (actually no American combat units operated in the IV MR/CTZ area, only advisory teams and special forces units) included, from north to south, the III Marine Amphibious Force, I Field Force, II Field Force, and IV Corps Advisory Group. All corps operated with equivalent command levels and with lieutenant generals commanding. As with their MACV superior, commanders of these four operational American commands were the senior advisers to the respective RVNAF CTZ commander. ARTHUR T. FRAME See also Free World Assistance Program; Military Assistance Command, Vietnam References Clarke, Jeffrey J. Advice and Support: The Final Years; The U.S. Army in Vietnam. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988. Eckhardt, George S. Command and Control, 1950–1969. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1974. Herring, George C. America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975. 4th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001. Larsen, Stanley Robert, and James Lawton Collins Jr. Allied Participation in Vietnam. Vietnam Studies Series. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975. Stanton, Shelby L. The Rise and Fall of an American Army: The U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985.
Military Revolutionary Council A group of senior generals who dominated political affairs in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) behind the scenes from early November 1963 to mid-December 1964. After the overthrow of President Ngo Dinh Diem in November 1963, a 12-member military junta, the Military Revolutionary Council, took power, with General Duong Van Minh as chief of state. The new regime was no more responsive to the people of South Vietnam than Diem had been, however, and had the added disadvantage of political instability. Members of the Military Revolutionary Council soon fell to quarreling among themselves. Minh had boasted that the collec-
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tive leadership would ensure that no one else would have Diem’s power. But nominal leader Minh showed no inclination to govern and preferred to play tennis, tend to his orchids, and pursue an interest in exotic birds. On January 30, 1964, another coup took place, this time against Minh, led by Major General Nguyen Khanh. U.S. officials, caught by surprise, hailed Khanh because he promised to rule with a strong hand. Although he was shrewd and energetic, Khanh showed no more aptitude for governing than had Minh, and Khanh’s own history of changing sides hardly engendered trust. Khanh purged some generals, although he allowed Minh to remain on as titular head of state. Militant Buddhists were again active. To increase their influence, the heads of different Buddhist sects formed a political alliance. Many South Vietnamese officers also turned against Khanh for his attempt to try several rival generals on trumped-up charges. Khanh persuaded Dai Viet leader and Catholic physician Dr. Nguyen Ton Hoan to return from exile in Paris and serve as premier. When it was clear that the Dai Viet was hopelessly splintered, Khanh named himself as premier, with Hoan as his deputy. Hoan then began to conspire with Buddhists and other opposition groups against Khanh. Political instability in South Vietnam was now rampant, and that year there were seven changes of government. By the summer of 1964 Khanh was in serious difficulty. He announced a national emergency, imposed censorship and other controls, and hastily put together a new constitution, promoting himself to the presidency and dismissing former figurehead and chief of state Duong Van Minh. In August students took to the Saigon streets and were soon joined by Buddhists. U.S. ambassador Maxwell Taylor urged Khanh not to yield to minority pressure. On August 25 Khanh quit, and the Military Revolutionary Council met to choose a new head of state. After lengthy political maneuvering, a triumvirate emerged of generals Khanh, Minh, and Tran Thien Khiem. Khanh retained the premiership but left the capital as chaos took hold there. Order was restored after two days of rioting. Khanh meanwhile named economist Nguyen Xuan Oanh to be prime minister in his absence. Turbulence continued, and the government was threatened by dissident army units in the Mekong Delta and militant Buddhists from Hue. In November 1964 new riots in Saigon protested Khanh’s rule, and Taylor urged Khanh to leave the country. By this time a faction of younger military officers had come to the fore. Known as the Young Turks, they were headed by Nguyen Cao Ky, one of the younger officers in the coup against Diem. Ky had been promoted to major general and was given charge of the Republic of Vietnam Air Force (VNAF, South Vietnamese Air Force). The group also included Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) major general Nguyen Van Thieu. Disillusioned by the ineffective national government, in mid-December 1964 the Young Turks overthrew the Military Revolutionary Council. SPENCER C. TUCKER
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Military Sealift Command
See also Duong Van Minh; Ngo Dinh Diem, Overthrow of; Nguyen Cao Ky; Nguyen Khanh; Nguyen Van Thieu; Taylor, Maxwell Davenport; Tran Thien Khiem; Vietnam, Republic of, 1954–1975 References Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. Nguyen Cao Ky. Twenty Years and Twenty Days. New York: Stein and Day, 1976.
Military Sealift Command U.S. Navy command responsible for logistical support to the U.S. military effort in Vietnam. The U.S. Navy’s Military Sealift Command (MSC), designated in September 1970, and its predecessor, the Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS), supported U.S. forces throughout the conflict in Southeast Asia. Beginning in Operation PASSAGE TO FREEDOM from August 1954 to May 1955, 39 MSTS transports carried many of the 292,000 Vietnamese who migrated by sea from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). During the early 1960s, MSTS ships Core (T-AKV 13) and Card (T-AKV 40) transported U.S. Army helicopter units to South Vietnam. From 1965 to 1973 the MSTS maintained the massive military buildup in Indochina, delivering more than 40,000 U.S. and allied troops, 99 percent of the ammunition and fuel, and 95 percent of
the supplies, vehicles, and construction materials dispatched to the combat theater. At the height of the war, the MSTS operated a fleet of 527 reactivated World War II ships and chartered vessels, managed by offices in the United States, Japan, and South Vietnam. Many types of ships sailed in the MSTS fleet, including aircraft ferries, a helicopter repair ship, standard cargo hulls, ships that carried cargo stowed in easily handled containers, roll-on/roll-off ships that could swiftly load and unload vehicles, tankers able to hold between 30,000 and 190,000 barrels of fuel, troop transports, tank landing ships, tugs, and barges. The navy’s sea-lift effort ensured that the 500,000-strong U.S. contingent in South Vietnam was well supplied and armed. In March and April 1975 when North Vietnam launched its major conventional offensive against South Vietnam, the U.S. Navy called on MSC to evacuate friendly Vietnamese troops and civilians from the northern and central regions of the country. On March 27 a fleet of 10 cargo/transport ships, 5 tugs, and 6 barges began rescuing an increasingly desperate horde of soldiers and civilians from Da Nang and other ports to the south. Crowding, the lack of sufficient food, and displeasure that isolated Phu Quoc island instead of Vung Tau had been selected as the disembarkation point led some armed passengers to threaten the American crews. As a result, the navy deployed 50-man U.S. Marine Corps security detachments to the ships. By April 10, the MSC had transported to Phu Quoc 130,000 American and Vietnamese refugees. At the end of April 1975, Saigon gave way in the face of a powerful People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army)
Vietnamese refugees cover every available space on the deck and superstructure of the Military Sealift Command’s SS Pioneer Contender, en route to Phu Quoc Island. (Naval Historical Center)
Mine Warfare, Land offensive. With the defeat of South Vietnam now virtually certain, President Gerald R. Ford ordered Operation FREQUENT WIND, the final evacuation of Saigon. Anticipating such an order, during the month the MSC had filled its ships with food, water, and medicine and stationed U.S. Marine Corps security detachments on board. In concert with the U.S. Seventh Fleet, which began lifting refugees by helicopter from Saigon to the offshore flotilla, the MSC took on board a growing flood of refugees. Between April 29 and May 2 when the operation ceased, MSC ships had embarked more than 50,000 evacuees. The MSC ships, the Seventh Fleet contingent, and a flotilla of 26 Republic of Vietnam Navy (VNN, South Vietnamese Navy) ships, after embarking an additional 30,000 evacuees and their families, then set sail for the Philippines. EDWARD J. MAROLDA See also Ford, Gerald Rudolph; FREQUENT WIND, Operation; PASSAGE TO FREEDOM, Operation; United States Navy References Marolda, Edward J. By Sea, Air, and Land: An Illustrated History of the U.S. Navy and the War in Southeast Asia. Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 1994.
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Schreadley, R. L. From the Rivers to the Sea: The United States Navy in Vietnam. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992.
Mine Warfare, Land The art of mining was deftly practiced by Viet Cong (VC) and People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) forces. Mines, along with rockets and mortars, substituted for the Communists’ lack of artillery resources and were well integrated into basic tactical perspectives. Both trip-wire/pressure-contact and command-detonated mines were employed. In unison, they provided the basis of devastating ambushes unmatched by U.S. artillery barrages. American mining centered on area denial and was based on dropping tens of millions of antipersonnel mines (XM48 “Button Bomblets,” BLU43 “Short Dragontooth,” BLU44 “Long Dragontooth,” and XM41E1 “Gravel” mines) from aircraft deep behind Communist lines. Mines were effectively employed by Communist forces against both military personnel and armored vehicles. Antipersonnel mines were made from such items as pipes, cement, artillery and
Members of the Viet Cong construct antipersonnel mines. These homemade mines utilized pipes, cartridge cases, and artillery and mortar shells. Such mines inflicted significant numbers of casualties during the Vietnam War. (U.S. Army Center of Military History)
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Mine Warfare, Naval, Communist Forces and Allied Countermining Operations
mortar shells, and cartridge cases. While ground-placed mines were predominately used by the VC, the U.S. Claymore (M-18 series) was standard issue to U.S. and Army of the Republic Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) forces. This mine sprayed steel fragments in a fan-shaped pattern 2 yards in height and some 55 yards in width (with a 95 percent casualty probability) and was both command- and trip-wire detonated. American casualties resulting from antipersonnel mines were significant. Reportedly, 22.8 percent of marines wounded in action during the period from July 1965 through December 1966 were from mines and booby traps. The lethality of these homemade devices was low, however, because of their makeshift nature and the emphasis placed on using larger mines in an antitank role. Antitank and anti–armored personnel carrier (anti-APC) mines represented a considerable danger in Vietnam. Because they were more lightly armored, APCs (of which the U.S. Army M-113 was the standard type) were extremely vulnerable to large mines constructed from such items as TNT demolition blocks, explosivefilled five-gallon cans, and modified large-caliber mortar shells as well as conventional Soviet and Chinese antitank mines deployed in far smaller numbers. Antitank mines were sometimes placed in random patterns for nuisance purposes. Mine placement could also be where armored vehicles would be channeled onto road networks because of dense vegetation and wet terrain obstacles. Favorite VC tactics were to place mines in the seemingly safe road tracks of an armored fighting vehicle that had passed by earlier and in likely night laager positions. The effectiveness of these tactics is apparent, considering that an estimated 70 percent of American armor losses in Vietnam were attributed to mines. Earlier comparable French losses were calculated at 85 percent. Another form of mining, antihelicopter mining, had its origins in this war. The Communists mined likely landing zones during Operation JUNCTION CITY with an assortment of command-detonated artillery rounds, TNT, and directional DH10 devices (much like Claymore mines). Unexploded mines, bombs, and other ordnance continue to be a major problem in Vietnam today. A July 2009 report by the Ministry of Defense of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam estimated that 116.3 million acres of land in the country remain to be cleared and that a third of the acreage in six central Vietnamese provinces remains contaminated by mines and other unexploded ordnance. Since the end of the war through mid-2009, more than 42,000 people have been killed by leftover explosives. ROBERT J. BUNKER See also Armored Personnel Carriers; Armored Warfare; Booby Traps; JUNCTION CITY, Operation; Mine Warfare, Naval, Communist Forces and Allied Countermining Operations References Doleman, Edgar C. Tools of War. The Vietnam Experience Series. Boston: Boston Publishing, 1984.
Smith, Herbert L. Landmine and Countermine Warfare: Vietnam, 1964–1969, Vol. 9. Washington, DC: Engineer Agency for Resource Inventories, 1972. Stolfi, Russel H. Mine and Countermine Warfare in Recent History. Report No. 1582. Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD: U.S. Army Ballistic Research Laboratories, 1972. U.S. Marine Corps. Vietcong Mine Warfare. Quantico, VA: Department of the Navy, 1966.
Mine Warfare, Naval, Communist Forces and Allied Countermining Operations The Viet Cong (VC) and People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) employed thousands of mines against U.S. and allied naval forces in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) throughout the conflict in Vietnam, much as they had against the French during the Indochina War. Between 1959 and 1964 VC mines, often homemade devices, took an increasing toll of naval vessels and civilian craft on the many rivers and canals of South Vietnam. This threat affected commercial traffic on some of the country’s primary waterways. As U.S. naval forces deployed to South Vietnam in the mid1960s, moving into the watery environment of the Mekong Delta west and south of Saigon, they took steps to counter the mine threat. The danger was especially acute on the waterways near Saigon, South Vietnam’s most important port. VC closure of the Long Tao River, which followed a meandering 45-mile course through the Rung Sat swamp on its way to the capital, would have put an enormous strain on allied logistic resources in the southern regions of South Vietnam. As a result, on May 20, 1966, the U.S. Navy established Mine Squadron 11, Detachment Alpha (Mine Division 112 after May 1968), at Nha Be. The minesweeping detachment operated 12 or 13 57-foot fiberglass-hulled minesweeping boats (MSBs). The MSBs fought with machine guns and grenade launchers and carried surface radars and minesweeping gear for clearing explosives from the rivers. The navy also set up 3-boat sections at Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay. Detachment Alpha’s strength increased in July 1967, when the first of 6 mechanized landing craft, minesweeping (LCM[M]), reached Nha Be. Despite the presence on the Long Tao of Mine Squadron 11 and other river warfare forces, in the second half of 1966 and in early 1967 the enemy mounted a serious effort to interdict the waterway. The VC employed mines, 122-millimeter rockets, rocketpropelled grenades, recoilless rifles, machine guns, and small arms against American and South Vietnamese naval forces and merchant ships. In August 1966 VC mines severely damaged the SS Baton Rouge Victory as well as a Republic of Vietnam Navy (RVNN, South Vietnamese Navy) vessel and the MSB 54. That November the VC sank the MSB 54. In February 1967 Communist direct-fire weapons and mines destroyed the MSB 45 and heavily damaged the MSB 49.
Minh Mang By the spring of 1967, allied naval units moved in force into the Rung Sat area, refined their mine countermeasures tactics, and brought better weapons and equipment into play against the VC sappers. Vietnamese Regional Forces, U.S. Army 9th Infantry Division troops, and Navy SEAL (sea, air, land) commandos, working with helicopter, river patrol boat, MSB, and LCM(M) units, scoured the shorelines. During the next year, Communist guerrillas periodically ambushed ships on the Long Tao, but the fast and devastating reaction by allied forces kept casualties and damage to vessels relatively light. Often the minesweeping force swept up mines before they could do damage, while river patrol boat and SEAL patrols disrupted enemy attack plans. The upshot was that the VC were unable to cut or even seriously slow logistic traffic on the Long Tao, even when their comrades were fighting for their lives in Saigon during the 1968 Tet Offensive. During 1968 and 1969 the U.S. Navy deployed strong mine countermeasures forces to the Cua Viet River, just south of the demilitarized zone (DMZ), and defeated the PAVN’s attempt to cut that vital waterway. EDWARD J. MAROLDA See also Mining and Mine Clearance in North Vietnam; Riverine Craft; Riverine Warfare; SEAL Teams; United States Navy References Marolda, Edward J. By Sea, Air, and Land: An Illustrated History of the U.S. Navy and the War in Southeast Asia. Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 1994. Schreadley, R. L. From the Rivers to the Sea: The United States Navy in Vietnam. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992.
Minh Mang Birth Date: 1791 Death Date: January 20, 1841 Second emperor (r. 1820–1841) of the Nguyen dynasty. Minh Mang’s real name was Nguyen Phuoc Dom (Dam); Minh Mang (or Minh Menh) was his ruling name. He is also known as Thanh To Nhan Hoang De and Vua Thanh To. Minh Mang was born in 1791; he became crown prince in 1816 and emperor in 1820 after the death of his father, Gia Long (r. 1802–1820). As a ruler, Minh Mang was intelligent, dedicated, hardworking, and deeply influenced by Confucianism. Under him the administration of all of Vietnam was reorganized to make it both centralized and sophisticated. He eliminated the two positions of tong tran Bac Thanh (governor-general of the north) and tong tran Gia Dinh Thanh (governor-general of Gia Dinh). The country was divided into 31 tinh (provinces), the governors of which reported directly to the emperor and the court. At the capital of Hue, Minh Mang established the Noi Cac Vien (Grand Secretariat) and the Co
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Mat Vien (Privy Council). The rest of the bureaucracy was also reorganized with the creation of a nine-rank mandarin corps. It was also under Minh Mang that the Vietnamese empire was greatly enlarged to cover most of the territories of Cambodia and Laos. To provide able people for the new government system, Minh Mang paid special attention to education and reorganized the Quoc Tu Giam (National College). Civil service examinations were held regularly, not only at the regional (thi huong) level but also at the capital (thi hoi) and in the palace (thi dinh) to select the doctors (tien si) and the doctors of subordinate list (pho bang). For the education of the common people, Minh Mang wrote the Huan Dich Thap Dieu (Ten Moral Maxims), later translated into Chu Nom by Emperor Tu Duc. Minh Mang also wrote seven collections of poems. Minh Mang’s concern for the moral and cultural protection of Vietnamese society led to the prohibition of Christianity and the persecution of Christians, which included missionaries. He rejected all French proposals for permanent diplomatic relations but was receptive to commerce as regulated by Vietnamese laws. He was also receptive to but did not admire Western technology. It was also under Minh Mang’s reign that the United States for the first time officially attempted to establish diplomatic and commercial relations with Vietnam. President Andrew Jackson sent Edmund Roberts as his envoy to the Minh Mang court as early as 1832. However, differences in diplomatic customs that could not be reconciled led Roberts to leave Vietnam without seeing the emperor. During Minh Mang’s reign the forces of Western imperialism became stronger, although he tried valiantly to keep them at bay. This pressure increased under his son and successor, Thieu Tri. Minh Mang died on January 20, 1841. PHAM CAO DUONG See also Nguyen Phuc Anh; Thieu Tri; Vietnam, History of, 938 CE through the French Conquest References Chapuis, Oscar M. A History of Vietnam: From Hong Bang to Tu Duc. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1995. Le Huu Muc. Huan Dich Thap Dieu: Thanh Du Cua Vua Thanh To, Dien Nghia Cua Vua Duc Tong [Ten Moral Maxims: Imperial Teachings by Emperor Thanh To and Translation into Nom by Emperor Tu Duc]. Saigon: Phu Quoc Vu Khanh Dac Trach Van Hoa, 1971. Le Thanh Khoi. Le Viet-Nam: Histoire et civilisation. Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1955. Nguyen Huyen Anh. Viet Nam Danh Nhan Tu Dien [Dictionary of Vietnamese Great Men and Women]. Houston, TX: Zieleks, 1990. Quoc Su Quan. Quoc Trieu Chanh Bien Toat Yeu [A Summary of the History of Our Current Dynasty]. Saigon: Nhom Nghien Cuu Su Dia, 1971. Tran Trong Kim. Viet Nam Su Luoc [Outline of Vietnamese History]. Saigon: Bo Giao Duc, 1971. Woodside, Alexander B. Vietnam and the Chinese Model: A Comparative Study of Nguyen and Ch’ing Government in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971.
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Mining and Mine Clearance in North Vietnam
Mining and Mine Clearance in North Vietnam During the Operation ROLLING THUNDER bombing campaign (1965– 1968), the U.S. Navy’s carrier air squadrons released thousands of mines along the key Communist supply routes in the panhandle area of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). The object of the operation was to make difficult, if not prohibitive, all vehicular and other movement around ferry crossing sites, railway and highway bridges, storage areas, truck parks, and fuel dumps. Carrier attack aircraft also seeded inland waterways and roads used by the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) to transport munitions into Laos and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). The weapons used were Mark 36 Destructors, which contained 500 pounds of explosives and detonated when trucks, tanks, or other metal objects disturbed their magnetic fields. Neither the U.S. Navy’s mining effort nor the overall bombing campaign stopped the flow of munitions to the fighting front, but they forced the Communists to devote scarce resources to the defense of their supply lines. Another mining effort known as Operation POCKET MONEY, which the navy carried out during 1972 and early 1973, had an even greater impact on the war. Early on the morning of May 8, 1972, the aircraft carrier USS Coral Sea (CVA-43) launched three U.S. Marine Corps Grumman A-6 Intruders and six U.S. Navy Ling-Temco-Vought A-7 Corsair attack planes toward the coast of North Vietnam. Shortly afterward, the naval aircraft laid strings of 36 1,000-pound Mark 52 mines in the water approaches to the port of Haiphong, through which most of North Vietnam’s imported war matériel and all of its fuel supply passed. During succeeding months, other carrier aircraft dropped thousands of mines and 500-pound Mark 36 Destructors in the seaways of North Vietnam’s secondary ports and reseeded the Haiphong approaches. For the remainder of 1972, 27 Soviet and People’s Republic of China (PRC) merchant ships chose to remain immobile in Haiphong rather than risk a transit of the mined waters. The mining campaign, along with U.S. air attacks on North Vietnamese supply lines ashore, helped shorten the PAVN Easter Offensive in South Vietnam. Eventually the mining operation and the LINEBACKER bombing campaign induced the North Vietnamese to negotiate an end to the war. On January 27, 1973, American and North Vietnamese officials signed a protocol to the Paris agreement that called for the United States to neutralize the mines that the U.S. Navy had dropped in North Vietnam’s coastal and inland waterways. On January 28 following months of preparation, Rear Admiral Brian McCauley’s Mine Countermeasures Force (Task Force 78) of the Seventh Fleet deployed from Subic Bay in the Philippines to Haiphong. To coordinate actions, on February 5 the commander of Task Force 78 met in the city with his North Vietnamese counterpart, Colonel Hoang Huu Thai. Operation END SWEEP began the next day when the ocean minesweepers Engage (MSO-433), Force (MSO-445), Fortify (MSO-
The U.S. Navy ocean minesweepers (front to back) Force, Engage, Impervious, and Fortify depart Subic Bay in the Philippines to participate in Operation END SWEEP in Vietnam, February 1973. (U.S. Navy)
446), and Impervious (MSO-449) swept waters off the coast near Haiphong. The guided missile frigate USS Worden (DLG-18) and the destroyer USS Epperson (DD-719) stood by to prevent any interference with the effort. Later that month, the amphibious ships New Orleans (LPH-11), Dubuque (LPD-8), Odgen (LPD-5), Cleveland (LPD-7), and Inchon (LPH-12) joined the task force. On board the newly arriving ships were 31 Sikorsky CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopters from the U.S. Navy’s Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 12 and from the U.S. Marine Corps helicopter squadrons HMM-165 and HMH-463. The Sea Stallions towed minesweeping sleds and other devices. During the six months of Operation END SWEEP, 10 ocean minesweepers, 9 amphibious ships, 6 fleet tugs, 3 salvage ships, and 19 destroyer types operated in Task Force 78. The helicopters swept the main shipping channel to Haiphong on February 27 and the ports of Hon Gai and Cam Pha on March 17. In early April, Task Force 78 deployed to the formerly mined waters the MSS-2, a decommissioned landing ship tank filled with buffer material and crewed by volunteers. The ship carried out eight passages of the Haiphong channel to make sure no mines remained active in the vital waterway. Elsewhere in North Vietnam, U.S. Navy technical personnel prepared 50 North Vietnamese sailors to conduct their own minesweeping operations. While this was taking place, a number of U.S. Lockheed C-130 Hercules transport aircraft delivered minesweeping gear to Cat Bi airfield outside the city. Until April 17, the U.S. Navy task force continued its mission.
Mini–Tet Offensive Then because Washington believed that Hanoi had failed to carry out its obligations under the Paris agreement, it ordered a suspension of minesweeping operations. END SWEEP resumed on June 18 after U.S. leaders were persuaded that the North Vietnamese would once again act in good faith. Shortly afterward, Admiral McCauley notified the North Vietnamese that the ports of Haiphong, Hon Gai, and Cam Pha were free from the threat of American-laid mines. Next, Task Force 78 concentrated on the coastal areas off Vinh. Finally, on July 18, 1973, McCauley led his flotilla out to sea, officially ending Operation END SWEEP. EDWARD J. MAROLDA See also Aircraft Carriers; Mine Warfare, Naval, Communist Forces and Allied Countermining Operations; United States Navy References Marolda, Edward J. By Sea, Air, and Land: An Illustrated History of the U.S. Navy and the War in Southeast Asia. Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 1994. Marolda, Edward J. Operation End Sweep: A History of Minesweeping Operations in North Vietnam. Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 1993. Schreadley, R. L. From the Rivers to the Sea: The United States Navy in Vietnam. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992.
Mini–Tet Offensive Event Date: May 1968 A large-scale Viet Cong (VC) and People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) military offensive against the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) launched during May 1968. Mini-Tet was the second offensive in a multiphased campaign of four offensives in late January 1968, May 1968, August 1968, and February 1969. Mini-Tet consisted of two major surges of widespread coordinated attacks commencing on May 5 and May 25. The primary target of the offensive was the South Vietnamese capital of Saigon, although scattered attacks were conducted across the country, particularly in the far northern coastal region. The objectives of the offensive, directed by PAVN General Vo Nguyen Giap, defense minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), were to maintain constant pressure on Saigon, inflict casualties on the South Vietnamese and U.S. forces, and pursue a talk-fight strategy to influence the commencement of the Paris peace talks. U.S. and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) commanders received warning prior to the first surge, thanks to widespread and insecure dissemination of Communist attack plans prior to the offensive. VC and PAVN forces launched attacks during May 1–3 to screen units assembling west of Saigon. Moving at night through unpopulated jungles and swamps, many attacking units approached to within five miles of
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Saigon before being intercepted during May 3–5 as they moved into their final assembly areas near the city. As a preparatory signal for the offensive, a taxi filled with explosives detonated in front of the Saigon Television and Radio compound one day before Mini-Tet began. The first surge began on May 5, when VC and PAVN units carried out widespread attacks in and around Saigon. An attempt to capture the two major bridges east of Saigon failed. Between May 6 and 10, heavy contact occurred west of Saigon as VC and PAVN units arriving from that direction seized portions of the city before eventually being defeated by infantry, armor, artillery, and air attacks. During May 7–13 fighting raged on the southern side of Saigon and then dropped off. By May 15, most attackers had withdrawn. A wave of rocket attacks on Saigon commenced on Ho Chi Minh’s birthday, May 19, and continued through June 21. During this first surge, widespread Communist shelling and limited ground probes were also launched in northern South Vietnam, threatening Hue, Quang Tri, Dong Ha, and Khe Sanh. On May 10 near the Laotian border, attacking PAVN regiments forced the abandonment of a patrol base at Ngok Tavak. Two days later the nearby Special Forces camp at Kham Duc was evacuated after experiencing massive ground assaults. Elsewhere attacks generally consisted of harassing small-arms fire and small-unit probes, although a significant number of attacks peaked in the Mekong Delta region during May 5–11. The second surge of Mini-Tet was presaged by the destruction of two bridges on Highway 4 in the Mekong Delta on May 24. Attacks occurred the next day and achieved some tactical surprise in Saigon. Some small units managed to enter the city from the south and east, but these were soon isolated by the defenders. Fighting continued for several days on the southern edge of the city in the vicinity of the “Y” Bridge over the Kinh Doi Canal. Elsewhere in the city, primarily in the ethnic Chinese suburb of Cholon, small bands, typically consisting of four or five VC or PAVN soldiers, spread out and dug in. These soldiers conducted holding actions against South Vietnamese police and army units and occasionally launched fierce assaults. Communist attempts to infiltrate Saigon ceased around May 29. Major fighting in Mini-Tet continued until the end of the month and was followed by urban mopping-up operations against pockets of PAVN and VC soldiers for several weeks. On June 2 a rocket fired by a U.S. helicopter accidentally struck an ARVN command post in Cholon, killing and wounding 10 senior officers, supporters of Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky. Supporters of President Nguyen Van Thieu replaced them, thus contributing to Nguyen Cao Ky’s political eclipse. Communist rocket attacks against Saigon reached a high point when 102 rockets pounded the city throughout June, killing 58 civilians and four Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF, South Vietnamese Armed Forces) personnel. Other rocket attacks around Saigon targeted Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Bien Hoa, and Cu Chi.
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Missing in Action, Allied
Elsewhere in South Vietnam the second surge generally saw light contact consisting of shelling and small-scale assaults, although serious attacks were launched against Fire Support Base 29 near Ben Het and the South Vietnamese National Military Academy at Dalat. Mini-Tet claimed some 30,000 VC and PAVN soldiers killed. More than 2,000 U.S. and thousands of RVNAF personnel were also slain. Countrywide, VC and PAVN forces had launched 433 shelling attacks consisting of 10,369 mortar rounds and rockets. These represented a significant increase over the original Tet Offensive, when infantry attacks were more prevalent. In Saigon, U.S. and ARVN firepower was largely responsible for damaging or destroying nearly 20,000 homes, leaving 130,000 civilians in need of assistance. When the offensive ended in mid-June, most VC and PAVN units withdrew to their base areas or to sanctuaries in Cambodia to reequip and reorganize. Postwar Vietnamese historical assessments and internal PAVN studies of the second wave of the 1968 offensive are almost unanimous in concluding that Mini-Tet was a mistake. As one Vietnamese military history puts it, “After the first wave of the 1968 Tet Offensive [January 31 through February 1968], we decided to mount a second round of attacks against the cities, even though our opportunity had now disappeared. This left our rural areas exposed and undefended. After the first wave of the Tet Offensive was over, we should have turned our attention back to the rural countryside. . . . If we had done so, our successes would have been greater and our losses would have been less.” GLENN E. HELM See also Nguyen Cao Ky; Nguyen Van Thieu; Tet Offensive, Overall Strategy; Tet Offensive and the Saigon Circle References Cosmas, Graham A. MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of Withdrawal, 1968–1973. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2007. Hoang Ngoc Lung, Colonel. The General Offensives of 1968–69. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1981. Military History Institute of Vietnam. Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People’s Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002. Nguyen Van Minh, ed. Lich Su Khang Chien Chong My Cuu Nuoc, 1954–1975, Tap V, Tong Tien Cong va Noi Day Nam 1968 [History of the Resistance War against the Americans to Save the Nation, 1954–1975, Vol. 5, The 1968 General Offensive and Uprisings]. Hanoi: National Political Publishing House, 2001. Nolan, Keith. House to House: Playing the Enemy’s Game in Saigon, May 1968. St. Paul, MN: Zenith, 2006. Spector, Ronald H. After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam. New York: Free Press, 1993. Tap Chi Lich Su Quan Su, So Dac Biet 20 Nam Tet Mau Than [Military History Magazine, Special Issue Commemorating the 20th Anniversary of the Tet Offensive], Issue 2, 1988. Willbanks, James H. The Tet Offensive: A Concise History. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.
Missing in Action, Allied Term applied to military personnel whose fate remains unclear. The term “missing in action” (MIA) is sometimes known in the United States as the term “prisoner of war/missing in action” (POW/MIA). There are no reliable figures of how many Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) soldiers are missing—some estimates are as high as 330,000 for both the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam)—and the number of missing from other allied nations is minuscule. The term has thus normally been applied to approximately 2,500 missing Americans, the exact number and fate of whom has long been the source of major political disputes. Under the Paris Peace Accords signed in January 1973, the North Vietnamese government and the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (National Liberation Front [NLF]) agreed to return all U.S. POWs and, under Article 8b, to make every effort to provide information on the fate of MIAs. Following the agreement, the North Vietnamese returned 591 Americans POWs, and President Richard M. Nixon announced on March 29, 1973, that “All our American POWs are on their way home.” Questions were immediately raised, however, about why the number of POWs was so low, but various executive and congressional studies concluded that there was no credible evidence that any of the missing Americans were still alive. In 1977 under President Jimmy Carter, the Pentagon declared that more than 1,000 of this number were to be reclassified from MIA to killed in action/body not recovered (KIA/BNR), that is, definitely dead, while the rest should be presumed dead. Only U.S. Air Force colonel Charles Shelton was now listed, apparently simply to keep the issue active, as a possible POW. Under pressure from, among other organizations, the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia, in 1979 Congress changed the status of soldiers considered KIA/BNR back to POW/MIA. This action both restored higher benefits to family members (some of whom offered to return the money so as not to cloud the issue) and kept the hopes of loved ones alive. After 1982 President Ronald Reagan repeatedly stated that he believed that some Americans might still be held against their will in Indochina. Under his direction, a black-andwhite POW/MIA flag designed by the National League has flown at the White House one day per year as the only other flag ever hoisted there. By 1990 a law required the POW/MIA flag to be flown on at least one municipal building in every Massachusetts community, and all 50 states had an officially recognized National POW/MIA Recognition Day. Similarly, in the 1992 presidential campaign independent candidate Ross Perot not only stated his belief that Americans were still alive but also made clear that he had funded previous efforts to retrieve them. Yet another congressional committee was then founded under the direction of Vietnam War veteran and Medal of Honor recipient Senator John F.
Missing in Action, Allied
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Americans Unaccounted for in Southeast Asia Service U.S. Army U.S. Navy U.S. Marine Corps U.S. Air Force U.S. Coast Guard American civilians Total
Country of Loss North Vietnam
South Vietnam
Laos
Cambodia
China
Total
9 274 23 217 0 1 524
479 90 195 160 1 20 945
101 28 16 254 0 12 411
28 1 8 18 0 5 60
0 8 0 0 0 0 8
617 401 242 649 1 3 1,948
Kerry of Massachusetts, and the U.S. Postal Service issued a POW/ MIA stamp. Meanwhile, a number of popular movies showed live Americans being rescued. The belief that there were live American POWs in Vietnam was partly fueled by Bobby Garwood, an American marine POW and alleged Communist collaborator with the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) who returned to the United States in 1978. He claimed to have seen up to 70 Americans held against their will. Additional evidence included reports that the Vietnamese had held thousands of French soldiers against their will after the 1954 Geneva agreement, reports by literally thousands of Vietnamese of “live sightings,” photos or dog tags (military identification tags) of alleged POWs, and allegedly genuine documents from the former Soviet Union that suggested that American airmen had been sent to the Soviet Union. Behind evidence of this sort lay deep suspicions of the credibility of both the U.S. and Indochinese governments. On the American side, the fact that President Richard Nixon was inquiring about the fate of certain so-called discrepancy cases (Americans known to have been captured alive but not returned) when he stated publicly that all U.S. POWs were returning home suggested that he had not been completely candid. Subsequent anger over the allegedly confused and insensitive handling of this issue added to the problem. By the 1990s the POW/MIA issue had for many become part of a larger criticism of the federal government. Those who believed that the POW/MIA issue was not being properly handled were further angered by the fact that hardliners within the Vietnamese government had initially linked the fulfillment of their obligations under Article 8a of the Paris Peace Accords to the U.S. promise (under Article 25) to provide reconstruction aid. Ironically, even after the Vietnamese government recognized that the POW/MIA issue was humanitarian rather than political and agreed in 1987 to let a U.S. mission headed by retired U.S. general John Vessey work in Vietnam on the issue, the Vietnamese tendency to produce information that they once claimed not to have only fueled the worst suspicions of its critics. In Cambodia, neither the murderous Khmer Rouge regime, still in effective control of parts of the country, nor its generally ineffective successors were much help. Similarly, neither the Laotian nor Vietnamese governments have been willing to pursue the fate of
the relatively large number of Americans lost in Laos. Compounding the problem is the suspicion held by many that the exact location of where some of the Americans were lost may have been altered because they were on illegal missions. Here again, deep distrust inflamed an already highly emotional issue. Countering all of this were the arguments of those who believe that at least in recent years both governments have done all they could to resolve an inherently tragic issue. Supporters of this position point out that roughly 80,000 U.S. citizens are still listed as missing from World War II, and about 8,000, or three times the relative percentage of the armed forces who served, are still unaccounted for from the Korean War. They point to the continued fighting and grave difficulties that the North Vietnamese and the NLF had after 1973 and conclude that it was extremely difficult for the Vietnamese to tackle the MIA question during the initial years when bodies might most likely have been recovered, and they see no reason why Vietnam could possibly want to hold Americans captive for so long. Some critics even charged that the POW/MIA issue has been kept alive for unsavory reasons. In their view, too many Southeast Asians reported sightings and manufacture photos or dog tags to make money, and too many POW/MIA advocates did so out of anger at having lost the war, the wish to avoid paying reconstruction costs, and/or simply to advance their own fortunes. In the view of these critics, an alliance of the noble, the gullible, and the unsavory had for too long kept alive the sad hopes of the families of the missing. In an effort to address the POW/MIA issue, the U.S. government opened the Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii (CILHI), the largest forensic anthropology laboratory in the world, located on the Hawaiian island of Oahu to assist in searching for, recovering, and identifying Americans still missing in Southeast Asia. In 1992 this effort was expanded with the establishment of Joint Task Force–Full Accounting (JTF-FA), which was formed to work in concert with the CILHI to achieve the fullest possible accounting of Americans missing as a result of the Vietnam War. The JTF-FA maintained three permanent overseas attachments (in Bangkok, Hanoi, and Vientiane, Laos) to assist with command and control, logistics, and in-country support during investigation and recovery operations.
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Missing in Action and Prisoners of War, Communist
By 1995, President Bill Clinton believed that sufficient progress had been made, particularly on the so-called discrepancy cases (the 100 to 300 Americans reportedly seen alive), to justify the diplomatic recognition of Vietnam. Yet the sad search continued, as did the mistrust by conservatives of both the U.S. and Vietnamese governments. As late as September 1996, U.S. officials listed 2,143 Americans still missing in action in Southeast Asia. More than 1,600 of the total were in Vietnam. In 2003 the Department of Defense determined that POW/MIA accounting efforts would be best served by combining the JTF-FA and the CILHI to form the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC), which was activated on October 1 of that year. JPAC remains the Defense Department’s operational agency for worldwide investigations, recoveries, and identification of Americans still missing from World War II, the Korean War, the Cold War, and the Vietnam War. To date, more than 1,500 individuals have been identified and returned to their families for burial. PETER K. FROST See also Casualties; Clinton, William Jefferson; Garwood, Robert Russell; Kerry, John Forbes; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Paris Peace Accords; Perot, Henry Ross; Prisoners of War, Allied; Vessey, John William, Jr. References Groom, Winston, and Duncan Spencer. Conversations with the Enemy: The Story of Pfc. Robert Garwood. New York: Putnam, 1983. Jensen-Stevenson, Monika, and William Stevenson. Kiss the Boys Goodbye: How the United States Betrayed Its Own POWs in Vietnam. New York: Dutton, 1990. Keating, Susan Katz. Prisoners of Hope: Exploiting the POW/MIA Myth in America. New York: Random House, 1994. McConnell, Malcolm. Inside the Hanoi Secret Archives: Solving the MIA Mystery. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995. Swift, Earl. Where They Lay: Searching for America’s Lost Soldiers. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2003. U.S. Senate. Report of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, 103 Cong., 1st Sess., January 13, 1993. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993.
Missing in Action and Prisoners of War, Communist After the Vietnam War, America’s attention centered on its own military personnel missing in action (MIA). This is understandable, but most Americans were not much interested in or even aware of the much larger number of Communist MIAs in the war. Many Vietnamese families had only red-bordered Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) government certificates that proclaimed their loved one as a “Vietnamese martyr in the struggle against America.” According to the SRV government, more than 300,000 Vietnamese are missing and presumed dead from the Vietnam War. The largest number of these—more than three-quarters of the total—are from the central or north-central provinces of Vietnam.
The figure includes Viet Cong (VC) and People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) presumed dead as well as tens of thousands of Vietnamese who served in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army). In talks to normalize relations between the SRV and the United States in the 1990s, Hanoi officials never did make a major issue of Vietnamese MIAs, but they did point out in subtle ways that at least 150 times as many Vietnamese are missing than are Americans. Also, very few northerners killed in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) have been returned to northern Vietnam for reburial. In a country in which ancestor worship dominates the spiritual life, many people believe that it is essential that remains be located and properly buried. Vietnamese endeavoring to locate remains of their loved ones have virtually no leads, apart from the terse government announcement that they received announcing a relative’s death in the war. These provided no information on where a body might be buried, and on many occasions years passed before a surviving relative was notified. Soldiers killed in battle were usually hastily buried in unmarked graves, and no identifiable remains exist of many who died in Boeing B-52 Superfortress strikes. Even if bodies are recovered, problems of identification are far more daunting because the SRV does not have the technological means to identify them. Dental records, a key in recognizing individual Americans who died in the war, are usually not available for Vietnamese, few of whom ever had the luxury of a dental X-ray. Vietnam’s military cemeteries contain many empty graves with markers that include no death date. No effective government assistance is available to locate MIAs. Those Vietnamese who embark on this quest must do it almost entirely on their own. The Vietnamese military does have an active remains recovery program, but this program seems to be centered primarily on recovering the remains of Vietnamese “volunteer” soldiers killed in Laos and Cambodia. The Vietnamese military has no central personnel registry that can assist in locating missing loved ones, and because of Vietnamese wartime secrecy regulations and the confusion and vagaries of war, many Vietnamese families do not even know the unit in which their family member was serving when he or she disappeared. Some U.S. help has come forward. In September 1996 representatives of the American Vietnam Veterans’ Association handed over to Hanoi information on mass graves in which 600 Vietnamese servicemen were believed buried. To that point the association had provided information on the burial sites of an estimated 6,000 Vietnamese. Prisoners of war (POWs) were another matter. After 1954, those who fought as Viet Cong (VC) against the South Vietnamese government were considered to be Communist rebels, and those who were captured were incarcerated in many prisons known as Communist rebel camps. These were under the control of the ARVN and were run by the ARVN Military Police. VC political operatives were kept in regular prisons, known as Trung Tam Cai Huan (correctional centers). These were controlled by the Ministry of the Interior.
Mitchell, John Newton From 1961, the Communist rebel camps were renamed prisoners of war camps. There were four such camps, one in each military region. The largest camp was on Phu Quoc Island. Others were located at Tam Hiep, Can Tho, and Da Nang. After initial interrogation, all Communist POWs came under South Vietnamese rather than U.S. jurisdiction. Just prior to the 1973 Paris Peace Accords, more than 40,000 Communist prisoners were being held. In 1960 there were about 126 prison camps of all kinds. The most infamous was the correctional center at Con Son (Poulo Condore Island). This prison had been notorious since the French built it and detained thousands of Vietnamese political prisoners there. Before 1975 Communists who were not members of the VC armed forces, and thus not protected by the Geneva Convention, were sent to Con Son after sentencing. Also sent there were non-Communist opponents of the South Vietnamese government. Except for some POWs guilty of murder in POW camps, no PAVN POWs were held at Con Son. Conditions in most of the civilian prisons were rather harsh compared with conditions in Western jails. In the early 1970s Con Son became notorious for its so-called tiger cages, where prisoners who violated regulations would be held incommunicado. GARY KERLEY, NGUYEN CONG LUAN, AND SPENCER C. TUCKER
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Controversy filled Mitchell’s tenure in the position. He advocated prosecution of antiwar demonstrators and labeled them Communists. Fearing further erosion of support for the Vietnam War, Mitchell unsuccessfully sought to stop the New York Times from publishing the Pentagon Papers, first with a simple request and then with a restraining order. He also approved the conspiracy indictment of Daniel Ellsberg, who had surreptitiously revealed the existence of the documents. Beginning in 1972, the political fortunes of Mitchell began to wane. He resigned his cabinet position in February to head the Committee to Re-elect the President; the actual acronym for the organization was “CRP,” but the organization was later nicknamed with the acronym “CREEP.” On March 1, 1974, he faced indictment—and eventual conviction—for his role in the Watergate Scandal and cover-up. The charges against Mitchell included conspiracy, obstruction of justice, and perjury. Secret White House tapes included Mitchell’s voice in the spring of 1972 plotting the break-in at the office of the Democratic National Committee in the Watergate complex in Washington, D.C. Evidence also showed that Mitchell had met with Nixon at least three times in an attempt to cover up White House involvement in the burglary. Mitchell spent 19 months in prison,
See also Casualties; Missing in Action, Allied; Poulo Condore; Prisoners of War, Allied; Tiger Cages; Vietnam, Socialist Republic of, 1975–Present References Gerassi, John. North Vietnam: A Documentary. Indianapolis: BobbsMerrill, 1968. Vu Thu Hien. Dem Giua Ban Ngay. Westminster, CA: Van Nghe, 1997.
Mitchell, John Newton Birth Date: September 15, 1913 Death Date: November 9, 1988 Lawyer, U.S. attorney general (1969–1972), and central figure in the Watergate Scandal that forced President Richard M. Nixon from office. Born in Detroit, Michigan, on September 15, 1913, John Newton Mitchell attended law school at Fordham University, graduating in 1938. During World War II he served in the Pacific as a patrol torpedo (PT) boat squadron commander. After the war he practiced law and became an expert in public finance. Except for his World War II service, he worked continuously as an attorney in New York City from 1938 to 1968, earning high marks as a municipal bond lawyer. In 1967 the law firm for which Mitchell worked merged with the one that employed Nixon; the consolidation led to a lasting political relationship between the two men. In 1968 after much urging on Nixon’s part, Mitchell managed Nixon’s successful 1968 presidential campaign. The following year the president appointed Mitchell attorney general of the United States.
John Mitchell was U.S. attorney general during 1969–1972 and the first to hold that office who was ever convicted of illegal activities and imprisoned—a result of his involvement in the Watergate Scandal. (AP/Wide World Photos)
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becoming the first U.S. attorney general to serve a prison term. He lived in relative obscurity thereafter and died in Washington, D.C., on November 9, 1988. DEAN BRUMLEY See also Ellsberg, Daniel; Huston Plan; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Pentagon Papers and Trial; United States Department of Justice; Watergate Scandal References Haldeman, H. R. The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House. New York: Putnam, 1994. Harris, Richard. Justice: The Crisis of Law, Order, and Freedom in America. New York: Dutton, 1970. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. Schoenebaum, Eleanora W. Political Profiles: The Nixon/Ford Years. New York: Facts on File, 1979. Sheehan, Neil, et al. The Pentagon Papers: As Published by the New York Times. New York: Bantam, 1971.
Mobile Guerrilla Forces Counterinsurgency force in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). With active U.S. military involvement in Vietnam, U.S. Army Special Forces experimented with using indigenous troops in various capacities. Vietnamese recruits were trained for a variety of military tasks that focused on reconnaissance and camp defense as part of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG). In the autumn of 1966 Special Forces commanders began experimenting with deploying indigenous troops on extended offensive combat operations. The result was the Mobile Guerrilla Forces (MGF), company-sized units trained and led by a Special Forces detachment. Envisioned by Colonel Francis J. Kelly, then commanding the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), these units were to deploy on intensive combat operations for up to 60 days. Following approximately five weeks of training in offensive tactics and surveillance, Vietnamese volunteers were normally deployed by helicopter to attack remote Viet Cong (VC) outposts and supply routes. These missions were normally labeled Operation BLACKJACK, a named derived from Colonel Kelly’s radio call sign. First deployed in November 1966 as Task Force 777, MGF units immediately proved to be an excellent counterinsurgency asset. By January 1967 these operations were experiencing tactical successes and becoming more widespread throughout South Vietnam. Despite their success, MGF units faced many problems. In the first place, they were not true guerrilla forces. Although the soldiers were themselves indigenous troops, they were seldom natives of the region where they operated. This lack of firsthand intelligence hampered effectiveness. Also, resupply of the MGF units was such a problem that deployments seldom lasted longer than two weeks. Another limitation of these units was the rudimentary training
given to the soldiers. Although MGF units were given more training than regular CIDG soldiers, the MGF units had neither the tactical proficiency nor the unit cohesion needed for extended field operations. Nevertheless, MGF units were a successful experiment for the Special Forces. Not only did these units greatly aid intelligence gathering, they also proved adept at search-and-destroy and other offensive operations in remote sections of South Vietnam. In May 1968 the MGF was merged with the Mobile Strike Force (“Mike Force”) to form Mobile Strike Force Commands. The decision to form these new units was based to some degree on the tactical success of the MGF. RICHARD D. STARNES See also ATTLEBORO, Operation; Civilian Irregular Defense Group; Mobile Strike
Force Commands; Search and Destroy; United States Special Forces References Kelly, Francis John. U.S. Army Special Forces, 1961–1971. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985. Krepinevich, Andrew F., Jr. The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. Stanton, Shelby L. Green Berets at War: U.S. Army Special Forces in Southeast Asia, 1956–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985.
Mobile Riverine Force Joint U.S. Army–U.S. Navy force created in mid-1966 for searchand-destroy operations in the Mekong Delta. In early 1967 this operation was designated Task Force 117, or the Mekong Delta Mobile Riverine Force (MRF). The concept for the MRF developed from a close study of the French experiences with Dinassauts (integrated French tactical units comprised of naval and army forces for riverine warfare during the Indochina War). Similar to the French operation, the MRF required a ground element to deploy from the naval component. Because U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), commander General William Westmoreland had deployed the U.S. Marines to the I Corps Tactical Zone (I CTZ) in 1965, the MRF relied on a specially trained U.S. Army force that consisted of the 2nd Brigade of the 9th Infantry Division. The MRF’s naval arm, River Assault Flotilla 1, consisted of troop-carrying and support boats divided into four river squadrons. The key boats were 26 armored troop carriers (ATCs), or converted mechanized landing craft (LCM-6s), which had a variety of armament and could carry 40 combat troops. Specially converted ATCs served as the Brown Water (Riverine) Fleet’s refuelers, landing pads for helicopters, and medical aid stations. The River Assault Squadrons’ flagships were two commandand-control boats, also converted LCM-6s, that had radar and radio equipment to keep in contact with all of the boats and served as headquarters for the ground and naval force commanders. A
Mobile Strike Force Commands
765
With the tall buildings of Saigon in the distance, vessels of the U.S. Navy Mobile Riverine Force transport troops down the Saigon River in the Rung Sat Special Zone, an area in which the Viet Cong were especially active. (AP/Wide World Photos)
spoon-bowed LCM-6 conversion, the monitor, became the battleship of the Brown Water Fleet. Each squadron had five of these heavily armed units at their disposal. A modified monitor, dubbed a “Zippo,” mounted two flamethrowers forward. All of the aforementioned boats were equipped with a wide assortment of weapons, and all carried upgraded armor as well as standoff armor to predetonate incoming rockets. The destroyer/minesweeper of the fleet was the assault support patrol boat. Each squadron had 16 of these boats, which were mission-designed and built for the MRF. From its inception, the MRF had bases ashore as well as those afloat. The MRF’s principal land base was Dong Tam, located northwest of My Tho. The afloat element consisted of the mobile riverine base (MRB), which could move anywhere on large waterways throughout the delta. The MRB included one barracks barge, two barracks ships, two tugs, one landing craft repair ship, two landing ship tanks, and one salvage craft. A different type of base, the mobile support base, built on four pontoons, included a helicopter landing pad, crews quarters, and a mess area. When the commander of Naval Forces, Vietnam, launched Southeast Asia Lake Ocean River Delta Strategy (SEALORDS) in 1968, elements of the MRF contributed to the campaign. Also in
1968 Vietnamization began, and by August 1969 Task Force 117 was disestablished. R. BLAKE DUNNAVENT See also Dinassauts; Mekong Delta; Riverine Craft; Riverine Warfare; SEALORDS; United States Navy; Westmoreland, William Childs References Cutler, Thomas J. Brown Water, Black Berets: Coastal and Riverine Warfare in Vietnam. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988. Marolda, Edward J. By Sea, Air, and Land: An Illustrated History of the U.S. Navy and the War in Southeast Asia. Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 1994. Schreadley, R. L. From the Rivers to the Sea: The United States Navy in Vietnam. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992.
Mobile Strike Force Commands Indigenous Vietnamese forces employed by the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) in counterinsurgency operations. From the beginning of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, indigenous forces played a role in attempts to defeat Communist insurgents. Organized, trained, and usually led by U.S. Army Special Forces
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Moffat, Abbot Low
advisers, native irregulars began as village defenders tasked with local security missions. As time passed the Special Forces organized indigenous battalions capable of projecting combat power throughout Vietnam in many different ways. By 1968 brigade-sized elements known as Mobile Strike Force Commands were activated, first in Pleiku and later in each Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ). To understand the significance of the Mobile Strike Force Commands, the evolution of indigenous forces must first be considered. Success with strike forces in the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) program led Special Forces advisers to use highly trained native troops in offensive operations. In October 1964 the Eagle Flight platoon was formed at Pleiku. The platoon consisted of highly trained Rhadé troops and was used for reconnaissance and limited combat operations. By June 1965 the success of Eagle Flight led U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), to authorize the creation of similar units in each CTZ. Known as Mobile Strike Forces, these company-sized units were used for reconnaissance and camp defense missions. They also had success against both Viet Cong (VC) and People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) forces. The Mobile Strike Forces were normally deployed by helicopter and were designed to be airborne, a goal never fully achieved. They received the appellation “Mike Forces” because the letter “M” (for Mobile) is expressed as “Mike” in the military phonetic alphabet. Mobile Guerrilla Forces were another stage in this evolutionary process. Originated as Operation BLACKJACK, company-sized units were inserted into VC areas for combat operations lasting up to two weeks. This successful offensive use of indigenous forces led to the May 26, 1968, merger of Mike Forces and Mobile Guerrilla Forces. The new units were known as Mobile Strike Force Commands. With the creation of the Mobile Strike Force Commands, the use of U.S.-led indigenous troops reached its most significant level. Not only were the Mobile Strike Force Commands now of brigade strength, but they were often deployed in joint offensive operations with regular U.S. and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) forces. Beyond this use, the new formations gave Special Forces advisers an important capability for attacking VC strongholds without relying on support from sometimes reluctant U.S. commanders. Disbanded on December 31, 1970, these effective forces played an important role in subsequent combat operations in South Vietnam. RICHARD D. STARNES See also ATTLEBORO, Operation; Civilian Irregular Defense Group; Military Assis-
tance Command, Vietnam; Mobile Guerrilla Forces; United States Special Forces References Kelly, Francis John. U.S. Army Special Forces, 1961–1971. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985. Krepinevich, Andrew F., Jr. The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.
Stanton, Shelby L. Green Berets at War: U.S. Army Special Forces in Southeast Asia, 1956–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985.
Moffat, Abbot Low Birth Date: May 12, 1901 Death Date: April 17, 1996 New York politician and midlevel diplomat. Abbot Low Moffatt was born on May 12, 1901, in New York City. He attended the elite Groton preparatory school and received a BA degree from Harvard University in 1923; he later earned a law degree from Columbia University. As a young man he traveled extensively, including a 25-day junket through Indochina on an ox-drawn cart. In 1929 at age 28, he entered politics when he was elected to the New York State Assembly as a Republican. He stayed in the Assembly for many years, amassing a considerable amount of power during a time in which the legislature in New York wielded much influence. He remained in state politics until 1943 and changed his affiliation to the Democratic Party in the 1950s at the urging of his wife. In 1943 Moffat decided to pursue a career in the U.S. foreign service, where he became an expert on Asia. In 1946 he met personally with Vietnamese Communist leader Ho Chi Minh. The cables that Moffat sent to Washington after his meeting portrayed Ho as first and foremost a dedicated nationalist whose message of self-determination and economic betterment for the Vietnamese people resonated deeply with his supporters. In Moffat’s transmissions to Washington, he presciently warned against U.S. involvement in the growing civil and anticolonial war in Indochina. Indeed, he warned his superiors at the State Department to be leery of hard-line policies against nationalist movements in Asia. Moffat believed that the U.S. fixation on anticommunism was obscuring its true interests in Southeast Asia. Despite his warnings, U.S. policy makers adhered to hard-line containment policies. Moffat was especially critical of French colonial policy toward Indochina. Years after leaving the foreign service, he lamented that he was “bitterly disappointed” with U.S. policy in the region. In 1962 Moffatt retired from government service and moved to Princeton, New Jersey, where he was quite active in civic and political happenings. He died in Highstown, New Jersey, on April 17, 1996. PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR. See also Containment Policy; Ho Chi Minh References Duiker, William J. The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam. 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996. Duiker, William J. U.S. Containment Policy and the Conflict in Indochina. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994.
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Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich Birth Date: March 9, 1890 Death Date: November 8, 1986 Soviet diplomat and foreign minister of the Soviet Union (1939– 1949 and 1953–1956). Born Vyacheslav Skriabin on March 9, 1890, in Kukarka, Viatsk Province, Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich Molotov made his reputation as Soviet leader Joseph Stalin’s right-hand man during the 1920s and 1930s. Molotov attended the Polytechnic Institute in St. Petersburg and joined the Bolshevik faction of the Social Democratic Party in 1905, at which time he changed his name to Molotov, which means “hammer.” After taking part in the abortive 1905 Revolution, in 1909 he was arrested and sentenced to two years in internal exile. After he was released he went to St. Petersburg and became a staffer for Pravda, the official Bolshevik newspaper. He also became a close friend and confidant to Stalin. Arrested and detained several more times, Molotov escaped from prison and was at large during the successful November 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. Thereafter he held a series of important posts and oversaw the new Soviet Union’s nationalization policies. By 1926 he was a full member of the Politburo, and in 1930 he became Soviet premier. Molotov was doggedly loyal to Stalin and played a major role in the political purges of the 1930s. Appointed foreign minister in mid-1939, Molotov quickly gained international recognition for concluding the German-Soviet Pact in August of that year, an essential prelude to the German invasion of Poland that began World War II. After the Germans reneged on the pact and attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, Molotov played a key role in assembling the wartime alliance among the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union. Despite being removed from his official post by Stalin in 1948 and possibly being marked for inclusion in the Doctor’s Plot purge of 1952–1953, Molotov remained a staunch defender of Stalinism. In the immediate postwar years Molotov was a driving force behind the Soviet Union’s systematic takeover of Eastern Europe. He also took a tough stance toward the West. His hard-ball tactics and tenaciousness earned him the nicknames “Stonebottom” and “Old Iron Pants” in many Western capitals. Indeed, his famous clash with President Harry S. Truman in 1945 helped set the stage for the coming Cold War. Although the Soviet Union paid scant attention to Indochina before 1950, Molotov played a central role in the 1954 Geneva Conference. Having initiated the conference with his offer to broker a cease-fire in February 1954, the Soviet foreign minister served as cochair with British foreign secretary Anthony Eden. Despite his hardline reputation, Molotov engineered several key compromises that found their way into the final agreement. Under Soviet influence, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) agreed to the exclusion of the Cambodian and Laotian resistance movements from the conference while also accepting a two-year delay in holding elections in Vietnam. The tactic of pressing concessions on North Vietnamese representatives at Geneva, however, led to accusations
Vyacheslav M. Molotov (1890–1986) was a loyal supporter of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. Molotov was foreign minister of the Soviet Union during 1939–1949. This photograph was taken around 1955. (Library of Congress)
that Molotov had deceived the Viet Minh and made a personal deal with French premier Pierre Mendès-France to keep France from joining the European Defense Community (EDC). However, there is little indication that the Soviets took seriously the concessions made at Geneva. In any case, Molotov privately told Western diplomats that there would never be free elections in Vietnam. In 1956 Molotov was removed as Soviet foreign minister for his continued adherence to hard-line policies. The next year he was expelled from the Politburo and exiled. Once considered second only to Stalin, Molotov served as Soviet ambassador to the Mongolian People’s Republic (1957–1960) and as the Soviet representative to the International Atomic Energy Commission (1960–1961). In 1962 he was expelled from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. He continually petitioned for reinstatement, and in 1984 his membership was retroactively restored, making him its longest-standing member. Molotov died in Moscow on November 8, 1986, exactly 69 years after standing next to Lenin when the Bolshevik seizure of power was proclaimed there. TIMOTHY C. DOWLING See also Eden, Sir Robert Anthony; European Defense Community; Geneva Conference and Geneva Accords of 1954; Mendès-France, Pierre; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
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References Bromage, Bernard. Molotov: The Story of an Era. London: Peter Owen, 1961. Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Paris: YMCA Press, 1980. Conquest, Robert. Stalin: Breaker of Nations. London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 2000. Fishel, Wesley R., ed. Vietnam: Anatomy of a Conflict. Itasca, IL: Peacock, 1968.
Momyer, William Wallace Birth Date: September 23, 1916 U.S. Air Force general. William Wallace “Spike” Momyer was born in Muskogee, Oklahoma, on September 23, 1916. After graduating from the University of Washington in 1937, he joined the U.S. Army Air Corps. During World War II while commanding the 33rd Fighter Group in Tunisia, Momyer shot down eight Axis aircraft, four of them on one mission. He remained in the U.S. Air Force after the war and served in a variety of assignments in the Tactical Air Command before graduating from the Air War College in 1950. Promoted to brigadier general in December 1955, that same year Momyer established the 314th Air Division in Korea and had charge of all U.S. Air Force units there. Later he commanded two North American F-100D Super Sabre fighter-bomber wings in the United States before assignments as director of Operational Requirements and then as assistant deputy chief of staff, Programs and Requirements, at U.S. Air Force Headquarters. He was promoted to major general in September 1959 and to lieutenant general in August 1964, when he became commander of the Air Training Command. Promoted to full general (four-star) rank in December 1967, Momyer became commander of the Seventh Air Force and deputy commander for air operations in the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). As such, he was responsible for Operation ROLLING THUNDER, the prolonged bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), as well as the massive air effort in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Momyer always believed that airpower could have done more if political restraints had been lifted, but he also maintained that the air force did all that it was asked to do. In 1968 General Momyer assumed command of the Tactical Air Command, a position he held until his retirement in 1973. Throughout his career, he was known as a no-nonsense commander and an ardent advocate of airpower. His book Airpower in Three Wars (1978) provides a detailed description of the application of tactical and strategic airpower in World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. EARL H. TILFORD JR. See also Airpower, Role in War; ROLLING THUNDER, Operation; United States Air Force
References Clodfelter, Mark. The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam. New York: Free Press, 1989. Momyer, William W. Airpower in Three Wars: World War II, Korea and Vietnam. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978. Schlight, John. The War in South Vietnam: The Years of the Offensive, 1965–1968. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1988. Tilford, Earl H., Jr. Crosswinds: The Air Force’s Setup in Vietnam. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1993.
Montagnards Indigenous peoples of the Vietnamese Central Highlands. Known to both the French and the Americans as Montagnards (mountain people or mountaineers), these peoples have referred to themselves in recent years as Dega (from the Rhadé) or Ana Chu (from the Jarai). According to Gerald C. Hickey, their principal ethnographer, both terms mean “Sons of the Mountains.” The Montagnards were often referred to as moi (“savages”) by the Vietnamese but officially became “highland compatriots,” “Dong Bao Thuong,” or “Sac Toc Thieu So” to the people of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) and “Dan Toc It Nguoi” to the people of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), all in attempts to win the allegiance of the Montagnards. The Montagnard population numbered perhaps 1 million people just prior to the 1968 Tet Offensive. Traditionally organized into perhaps 30 distinct tribal groupings, the largest were the Jarai, located in the Pleiku–Cheo Reo area; the Rhadé, in the Ban Me Thuot area; and the Bahnar, in the Kontum–An Khe area. Other distinct groupings include the Chru, Roglai, Bru, Pacoh, Katu, Rengao, Sedang, Halang, Jeh, Monom, Cua, Hre, Stieng, Mnong, Koho, Chil, Sre, Lat, Maa, Nop, Tring, and Chrau, many of whom are referred to by other names or similar names with different spellings. Many of these groups are also divided into subgroups, often identified by outsiders as distinct groups in themselves. The subsistence base of the highlanders has traditionally been dry rice farming in swidden cultivation plots commonly known as slash-burn agriculture, but in some areas wet rice or paddy cultivation has been practiced. Hunting and gathering have supplemented the diet. Traditional settlements were in villages that varied in size, depending upon the particular tribe, from 5 to 50 to perhaps 100 longhouses. These longhouses were usually shared by extended families organized along kinship lines with unilineal (patrilineal and matrilineal) and bilateral descent patterns. A prominent feature of most villages is the men’s house, with a distinct high and steeply sloped roof decorated with symbolic carvings and located in the village center. Animistic spirits reflect the intense attachment of the Montagnards to the land. The Montagnards have lived in the Central Highlands as a distinct cultural grouping at least since the Kingdom of Champa. Their physical separation from the Vietnamese, who settled primarily in
Montagnards the coastal lowlands and river valleys where they practiced wet rice cultivation, enabled the Montagnards to retain their distinct cultural identity. Until the more recent events of the colonial era when first the French and then the Americans, along with their Vietnamese allies, encroached upon the Central Highlands and disrupted their traditional cultural patterns, the Montagnards existed in relative independence. In response to these threats, politically active highlanders envisioned an area comprising the Central Highlands of Vietnam and the eastern mountains of Laos and Cambodia as an independent homeland, Ana Chu Chiang. The development of a common ethnic identity among the 30odd tribal groups was spurred by French colonial practices of land appropriations, labor corvées, and head taxes. During 1937–1938 when the Python God movement appeared, taking the Python God as the symbol of traditional Jarai beliefs, it had the aim of freeing the Central Highlands of French and Vietnamese outsiders. On May 27, 1946, in return for Montagnard support in the struggle against the Viet Minh, French Indochina high commissioner Admiral Thierry d’Argenlieu issued an ordinance that declared that the Central Highland provinces of Darlac, Haut Donnai, Lang Bian, Pleiku, and Kontum would be formed into a Special Administrative Circumscription, with its administrative center at Ban Me Thuot. On June 1, 1946, d’Argenlieu proclaimed the area as the Autonomous Republic of Cochinchina. By July 25, 1950, a Special Administrative Division, referred to as the Crown Domain of the Southern Highlander Country, was created under the direct authority of Emperor Bao Dai. By 1954 the Geneva Accords, the departure of the French, and the division of Vietnam brought the Montagnards under the authority of the South Vietnamese government, which classified them as ethnic minorities. Thus, the Montagnards saw their dreams of a homeland shattered at a conference where they had no representation. South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem’s land development program to resettle Vietnamese refugees from densely populated areas along the coast of central Vietnam resulted in the forced resettlement of Montagnard villages and the confiscation of tribal lands. In opposition to these policies, the highlanders formed Le Front pour la Liberation des Montagnards in 1955, which evolved into Bajaraka (a consolidation of Bahnar, Jarai, Rhadé, and Koho) in 1958, with a Rhadé, Y Bham Enuol, as president. The Bajaraka made a formal request to the Vietnamese government for highland autonomy. By 1964 the Bajaraka had evolved into Le Front Unifié de Lutte des Races Opprimées (FULRO, United Struggle Front for Oppressed Races), the ethnonationalistic movement of Montagnard, Khmer Krom, and Cham. With uprisings at Special Forces camps around Ban Me Thuot during September 1964, FULRO attempted to reclaim Montagnard lands taken by the Vietnamese. In response, the Saigon government created the Ministry for Development of Ethnic Minorities, with Paul Nur, a Bahnar, as minister, to implement social and economic programs and improve Montagnard conditions. By 1971 Nay Luett (Jarai), Touneh Han Tho (Chru), and Pierre-Marie
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A U.S. Army medical specialist examines a child in a Montagnard village in 1963. The impact of the war on the Montagnards, an ethnic group from the highlands distinct from the Vietnamese, was catastrophic. Thousands of villagers were killed, and the designation of much of their territory as free fire zones destroyed the fabric of their culture by forcing the resettlement of traditional villages. (National Archives)
K’Briuh (Sre) had assumed leadership roles within the ministry, but with the 1972 Easter Offensive by the Communists, programs collapsed, and the Montagnards could only struggle to survive on their own. During the Vietnam War, Montagnards were recruited by both sides but became known to Americans primarily through the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) that operated out of Special Forces camps. The CIDG originated with David Nuttle of the International Volunteer Service. Working with the Rhadé in the Ban Me Thuot area, he became concerned about their protection from the Viet Cong (VC). Nuttle’s idea of a village defense program was developed by Gilbert Layton of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) into a project combining self-defense capabilities with social and economic programs to gain the allegiance of the highland peoples. The Special Forces would implement the project. In February 1962 the Rhadé village of Buon Enao, five miles east of Ban Me Thuot, became the first fortified village in the village defense program under a Special Forces detachment. Within 18 months some 27 CIDG camps with 40,000 militia and 11,000 strike force troops operated across the Central Highlands. The Montagnards saw this service as an opportunity to arm themselves
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in defense of their mountain homelands against Vietnamese encroachment. In addition to American Special Forces detachments, Luc Luong Dac Biet (LLDB, South Vietnamese Special Forces) were also assigned to the camps. At the same time, given the historical enmity between the two peoples, the Vietnamese became alarmed at the Montagnards’ military capacity. FULRO uprisings during 1964–1965 exacerbated the tensions and resulted in the elimination of the village defense program by disbanding the militia. The CIDG strike force, now under the military chain of command in lieu of CIA control, was concentrated in some 25 camps along the Laotian and Cambodian borders, where the mission was to seal the border and infiltrate the Ho Chi Minh Trail. From CIDG camps, Montagnard strikers, with their American counterparts and the LLDB, operated on familiar highland terrain, patrolling the border area and into Cambodia and Laos. With Vietnamization during the latter years of American involvement, however, the U.S. Fifth Special Forces Group relinquished operations to the LLDB, and the CIDG units were integrated into South Vietnamese Ranger battalions or were disbanded. The war proved catastrophic to the highland peoples. The high casualty rates among Montagnard strikers were devastating, and modern technological warfare, from long-range artillery to Boeing B-52 Stratofortress and fighter-bombing runs, killed thousands of villagers. The creation of free-fire zones destroyed the very fabric of Montagnard culture by forcing resettlement of traditional villages. Gerald C. Hickey estimated that by the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, approximately one-third of the 1 million Montagnards were casualties, while some 85 percent of their villages were forcibly evacuated or abandoned. More than 200,000 Montagnards had died, approximately one-fifth of their entire population. The Montagnards charge that the expropriation of traditional Montagnard lands to resettle Vietnamese in new highland economic zones and the resettlement of Montagnard villagers to integrate them into the government is but a continuation of the policies begun before the war by Ngo Dinh Diem and continued after the war by the Communist government. Even after the American military withdrawal in 1973 and the fall of Saigon in 1975, the Montagnards continued to resist Vietnamese domination. Formed around 1974, the Dega Highlands Provisional Government, with its military arm, the Dega Highlands Liberation Front, held out against superior Vietnamese forces for 10 years before ending their struggle in 1984. Many of the fighters returned to the Central Highlands, but the leaders of the movement, some 200 men who formed the core of resistance against the Vietnamese, fled to the refugee camps on the Thai-Cambodian border in 1985. There they were found in Site 2 South by three Americans, Don Scott, Pappy Hicks, and Jim Morris, who arranged for their passage to the United States. Armed resistance against the Vietnamese in the Central Highlands continued at least through 1993, when another 400 Montagnards were found in Cambodia and demobilized prior to their resettlement in the United States. Under the leadership of Ksor Kok, executive director of the Montagnard Founda-
tion, they continue to represent the Montagnard peoples in their struggle for cultural survival. DAVID M. BERMAN See also Ban Me Thuot, Battle of; Bao Dai; Central Highlands; Central Intelligence Agency; Civilian Irregular Defense Group; Cochin China; D’Argenlieu, Georges Thierry; Enuol, Y Bham; Front Unifié de Lutte des Races Opprimées; Hickey, Gerald Cannon; Mobile Strike Force Commands; Ngo Dinh Diem; United States Special Forces; Vietnam, Republic of, Special Forces References Condominas, George. We Have Eaten the Forest: The Story of a Montagnard Village in the Central Highlands of Vietnam. Translated by Adrienne Foulke. New York: Hill and Wang, 1977. Hickey, Gerald Cannon. Free in the Forest: Ethnohistory of the Vietnamese Central Highlands, 1954–1976. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982. Hickey, Gerald Cannon. Shattered World: Adaptation and Survival among Vietnam’s Highland Peoples during the Vietnam War. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993. Hickey, Gerald Cannon. Sons of the Mountains: Ethnohistory of the Vietnamese Central Highlands to 1954. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982. Lebar, Frank C., Gerald C. Hickey, and John Musgrave. Ethnic Groups of Mainland Southeast Asia. New Haven, CT: Human Relations Area Files Press, 1964. Rubin, Jonathan. The Barking Deer. New York: George Braziller, 1974. Wiesner, Louis A. Victims and Survivors: Displaced Persons and Other War Victims in Viet-Nam, 1954–1975. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1988.
Montini, Giovanni Battista Enrico Antonio Maria See Paul VI, Pope
Moore, Harold Gregory, Jr. Birth Date: February 13, 1922 U.S. Army officer and author. Harold (Hal) Gregory Moore Jr. was born in Bardstown, Kentucky, on February 13, 1922. Early in life he decided to pursue a career in the military, but he was unable to secure an appointment to the U.S. Military Academy, West Point. In 1940 Moore moved with his family to Washington, D.C., where he finished high school and then completed two years of study at George Washington University. In 1942 in order to meet the urgent need for officers during World War II, Congress doubled the size of the West Point Corps of Cadets, and Moore secured admission to the U.S. Military Academy. He graduated in 1945. Moore was commissioned in the infantry and served with the 187th Regimental Combat Team (Airborne) in Japan until 1948. He then served with the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. With the beginning of the Korean War in June 1950,
Moorer, Thomas Hinman Moore, now a captain, was assigned to the 7th Infantry Division and commanded a rifle company in Korea. Following 14 months in Korea, Moore, promoted to major in 1953, was assigned to West Point as an instructor of infantry tactics in 1954. He subsequently studied at the Armed Forces Staff College and at the Naval War College and earned a master’s degree in international relations from George Washington University. Assigned to Fort Benning, Georgia, in 1964, Lieutenant Colonel Moore assumed command of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). A new concept in air mobility, the entire division could be moved by its helicopters, although it would take several lifts to accomplish this. Moore trained his men for 14 months and then led his battalion with the remainder of the 1st Cavalry Division to Vietnam. The division established itself at An Khe in the Central Highlands. With intelligence indicating a buildup of People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) forces near the Plei Mei Special Forces Camp, U.S. general William Westmoreland, head of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), decided to employ the 1st Cavalry Division to seek out and destroy the PAVN forces. On November 1, 1965, another battalion of the 1st Cavalry Division made contact with PAVN forces, and on November 14 Moore’s battalion was committed to join the search for PAVN forces. As it worked out, Moore’s understrength battalion was inserted into Landing Zone (LZ) X-Ray on the Chu Pong Massif, in the midst of a PAVN regiment. Desperate fighting ensued, with Moore able to save his unit because of superb leadership, his thorough training of his men, and U.S. air support. His leadership in the battle for LZ X-Ray earned him the Distinguished Service Cross. Moore advanced steadily through the officer ranks. He subsequently commanded a brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division; commanded the 7th Infantry Division in Korea and then at Fort Ord, California; and served as the U.S. Army deputy chief of staff for personnel. Moore retired from the military in 1977 as a lieutenant general. In 1992 Moore published with Joseph Galloway, a correspondent who took part in the battle, We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young. This highly acclaimed book treats the Battle of the Ia Drang Valley. The book was made into a popular movie of the same title starring Mel Gibson as Moore in 2002. In 2008 Moore and Galloway published a follow-on book titled We Are Soldiers Still: A Journey Back to the Battlefields of Vietnam. JEFFERY B. COOK See also Ia Drang, Battle of References Galloway, Joseph L. “Fatal Victory.” U.S. News and World Report, October 29, 1990, 32. Hesenauer, Heike. “A Commander Remembers.” Soldiers 57 (March 2002): 36–37. Hesenauer, Heike. “We Were Soldiers. . . .” Soldiers 57 (March 2002): 26–35.
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Moore, Harold G., and Joseph L. Galloway. We Are Soldiers Still: A Journey Back to the Battlefields of Vietnam. New York: Harper, 2008. Moore, Harold G., and Joseph L. Galloway. We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young: Ia Drang—The Battle That Changed the War in Vietnam. New York: Random House, 1992.
Moore, Robert Brevard Birth Date: October 21, 1909 U.S. Navy rear admiral. Born on October 21, 1909, in Charlotte, North Carolina, Robert Brevard Moore graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, in 1932. Four years later he completed flight training and served as a naval aviator and flight instructor. During World War II Moore saw action first with the Atlantic Fleet and then in the Pacific theater. After the war he held a variety of assignments, most of them administrative posts. In 1955 Moore took command of the escort carrier USS Siboney, and in 1956 he took command of the fleet carrier USS Saratoga. After further assignments ashore, in 1961 Moore commanded the Iceland Defense Force. In June 1963 he assumed command of Carrier Division 5, then deployed in the western Pacific with his flag in the Constellation. Following the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, Moore directed the retaliatory air strikes on August 5, 1964, against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) from the carriers Constellation and Ticonderoga in Operation PIERCE ARROW. Two months later Moore assumed command of naval air operations at San Diego. He retired from the navy in March 1967. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also DeSoto Missions; Gulf of Tonkin Incident; Operation Plan 34A; PIERCE ARROW, Operation References Moise, Edwin E. Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996.
Moorer, Thomas Hinman Birth Date: February 9, 1912 Death Date: February 5, 2004 U.S. Navy admiral who commanded or directed U.S. military forces during much of the Vietnam War. Born on February 9, 1912, in Mount Willing, Alabama, Thomas Hinman Moorer was a 1933 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis. A gruff straight-talking combat veteran of World War II, he first exerted influence on U.S. actions in Southeast Asia during October 1962– March 1965, when he served as Commander of the Seventh Fleet and then as commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Moorer was a strong advocate of using U.S. naval and airpower to dissuade the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North
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Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Thomas H. Moorer listens intently during a briefing at U.S. Navy River Patrol Force headquarters in Binh Thuy in the Republic of Vietnam, August 1969. (Naval Historical Center)
Vietnam) from its support of insurgents in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) and Laos. In 1964 his aircraft carriers sent reconnaissance and escort planes over the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos. The admiral also called for extension of the DeSoto Patrol maritime reconnaissance program to include the Gulf of Tonkin off North Vietnam and the use of the resulting intelligence in support of Washington’s covert Operation Plan 34A. On August 2, 1964, when North Vietnamese torpedo boats unsuccessfully attacked the U.S. Navy DeSoto patrol destroyer USS Maddox (DD-731), Moorer responded by immediately ordering the Maddox and another destroyer, USS Turner Joy (DD-950), to resume the operation in international waters along North Vietnam’s coastline. Convinced that Communist naval vessels carried out a second attack on the night of August 4, Moorer helped persuade Washington to launch retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam the following day. Before departing the theater for another command in March 1965, Moorer strongly endorsed the use of American warships to stop Communist seaborne infiltration, the deployment of U.S. ma-
rines to Da Nang, and the start of systematic bombing operations in Laos and North Vietnam. He was an early critic of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s efforts to micromanage the U.S. Navy–U.S. Air Force bombing campaign from Washington. In 1967 Moorer again assumed a leading role in the Vietnam War when President Lyndon Johnson appointed him chief of naval operations. Between July 1970 and July 1974 Moorer assumed even greater responsibility as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Although unable to persuade President Richard Nixon to slow the pace of the U.S. military withdrawal from Southeast Asia, Moorer did convince the president to resume the bombing of North Vietnam and to mine its ports in the spring of 1972, actions that helped cause Hanoi to agree to cease hostilities in Southeast Asia. Moorer retired in 1974 but remained critical of U.S. conduct of the Vietnam War, stating his belief that the United States should have invaded North Vietnam. In 1974 Admiral Moorer became briefly involved in the Watergate Scandal when his role in a military spying operation targeted
Moratorium to End the War in Vietnam against Henry Kissinger was disclosed. A navy yeoman detailed to Kissinger’s office was discovered to have secretly supplied to Moorer and the JCS top-secret information on Kissinger and Nixon’s Vietnam strategy and other sensitive subjects. While both Moorer and Kissinger tried to downplay the significance of this incident, Moorer’s “military spy ring” later became the subject of conspiracy theories about the Watergate Scandal. In his retirement, Moorer remained active in military and national security affairs, testified before Congress several times, and sat on the boards of several corporations, including that of Texaco and CACI International. He died on February 5, 2004, at the National Naval Medical Center in Bethesda, Maryland. EDWARD J. MAROLDA See also DeSoto Missions; Gulf of Tonkin Incident; LINEBACKER II, Operation; McNamara, Robert Strange; Mining and Mine Clearance in North Vietnam; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Operation Plan 34A; United States Navy References Colodny, Len, and Robert Gettlin. Silent Coup: The Removal of a President. New York: St. Martin’s, 1991. Isaacson, Walter. Kissinger: A Biography. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992. Marolda, Edward J. By Sea, Air, and Land: An Illustrated History of the U.S. Navy and the War in Southeast Asia. Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 1994. Marolda, Edward J., and Oscar P. Fitzgerald. The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict: From Military Assistance to Combat, 1959– 1965, Vol. 2. Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 1986. Schreadley, R. L. From the Rivers to the Sea: The United States Navy in Vietnam. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992.
Moratorium to End the War in Vietnam Event Date: October 15, 1969 The largest nationwide protest against American involvement in the Vietnam War. The origins of the Moratorium to End the War in Vietnam can be traced to a presentation by Jerome Grossman at a meeting of the Massachusetts Political Action for Peace (MassPax) on April 20, 1969. Grossman, the chairman of MassPax, called for a nationwide general strike in October if the war had not ended by then. Each succeeding month the strike would be extended by one day. Grossman found only limited interest at the meeting in something as radical as a general strike. David Hawk, an antiwar activist, and Sam Brown, a friend and fellow veteran of the Eugene McCarthy presidential campaign in 1968, liked Grossman’s idea, but they suggested changing the term “strike” to “moratorium.” MassPax put $25,000 behind the idea, and on June 30 Hawk and Brown opened an eighth-floor moratorium office in Washington, D.C. The target date for the moratorium was October 15. The goal was to bring together and express a
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broad, moderate, and majority position against the war. The initial campaign was planned as a massive house-to-house canvass by college students. Each month, the campaign would escalate. Working with Hawk and Brown were Marge Sklencar, a former student leader, and David Mixner, on leave from Senator George McGovern’s commission for the reform of the Democratic Party. The moratorium originally aimed at organizing some 300 college campuses, but the idea caught on and spread beyond colleges and universities. In part this was because of the efforts of the New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, a successor organization to the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam that had been left isolated and ineffective by the events of 1968 and early 1969 (both organizations were referred to as “the Mobe”). Word was also spread by an editorial in the New Republic. The day itself was an overwhelming success. Many people who had not protested before participated in the Mobilization to End the War in Vietnam. The largest turnout was in Boston, where 100,000 people gathered to hear Senator McGovern. The Boston Globe headline read “POLITICAL WOODSTOCK ON THE COMMON.” A great variety of events took place: silent vigils, readings of the names of those killed in the war, candlelight processions, church services, teach-ins, marches, discussions, rallies, and other events. Millions participated, with very little violence. Millions of other Americans considered the participants to be traitors, however. In November a follow-up to the moratorium was organized by the New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam. The Moratorium to End the War in Vietnam group hesitated to associate itself with the Mobe’s plans until President Richard Nixon’s “Silent Majority” speech on November 3, 1969. The moratorium group was also led to participate by plans for the March against Death, which began at 6:00 p.m. on November 13, 1969. The march, congenial to the style of the moratorium, involved some 45,000 participants, each with a placard bearing the name of a soldier who had died in Vietnam. The 45,000 marched past the White House, calling out the names of the dead for two nights and into Saturday morning, November 15, 1969. On November 15 perhaps as many as 750,000 people converged on the Washington Monument for an antiwar rally. Although the speeches were not that memorable, the music was. Using a sound system by William Hanley similar to the one used at Woodstock, Pete Seeger, Arlo Guthrie, and Peter, Paul, and Mary as well as four different touring casts of the musical Hair kept the rally going. A rally in San Francisco that same day drew perhaps as many as 250,000 people. The events of October and November were a high point for the antiwar movement. Hundreds of thousands who had not demonstrated before took part. It was not possible to sustain the momentum, however. The Mobe ran into serious difficulties at a meeting of the coordinating committee in December, but the Moratorium to End the War in Vietnam had already far exceeded expectations. Both played a part in the events of 1970 but were overwhelmed by
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Peace activists organize at their headquarters in preparation for the Moratorium to End the War in Vietnam. Held on October 15, 1969, the rally at the Washington Monument was the largest nationwide protest to date against U.S. involvement in Vietnam. (Library of Congress)
the massive and basically spontaneous reactions to the invasion of Cambodia that spring. MICHAEL RICHARDS See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Brown, Samuel Winfred, Jr.; Kent State University Shootings; McGovern, George Stanley References Halstead, Fred. Out Now! A Participant’s Account of the American Movement against the Vietnam War. New York: Monad, 1978. Morgan, Edward P. The 60s Experience: Hard Lessons about Modern America. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991. Zaroulis, N. C., and Gerald Sullivan. Who Spoke Up? American Protest against the War in Vietnam, 1963–1975. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1984.
Mordant, Eugène Birth Date: 1885 Death Date: Unknown French Army general and commander of French forces in Indochina (1941–1944). General Eugène Mordant retired in June 1944, and that July he met in Hanoi with Gaullist agent François de Langlade, who had been parachuted into Tonkin by a
British aircraft from Ceylon (present-day Sri Lanka). Mordant had secretly switched his allegiance from the collaborationist Vichy government to General Charles de Gaulle and the Free French in October 1943. De Gaulle had charged Mordant with organizing a Free French movement in Indochina and in August appointed him delegate general of the French government for Indochina and vice president of the secret Indochinese Council. In effect Mordant, nominally responsible to Vichy sympathizer Admiral Jean Decoux, became de facto head of the French government in Indochina. It proved to be an unfortunate choice for the French. In late January 1945 de Gaulle and General Alphonse Juin, French Army chief of staff, sent Mordant a sobering report to the effect that no Allied intervention in Indochina would occur for at least six months yet ordering him to resist any Japanese attack. In the event of the latter, French forces were to regroup in mountain redoubts to the interior, chiefly the Tonkin highlands. No thought was given as to how they would be supplied with food and ammunition. Fearful of alerting the Japanese, Mordant was reluctant to begin preparations. When Lieutenant General Gabriel Sabattier, French Army commander in Tonkin, sought permission to begin establishing caches in the mountains for future action, Mordant refused him both porters and pack animals. On March 8 Sabattier, alarmed by reports of Japanese movements, placed his troops on armed-exercise status. The next day
Morse, Wayne Lyman Mordant canceled the order. On the following day Japanese forces under Lieutenant General Tsuchihashi Yuitsu carried out a coup in which they captured most of the French military and administration in Indochina, although Sabattier and some 6,000 of his men escaped, 5,000 of whom made it to refuge in China. The Japanese imprisoned Mordant in Hanoi; he was released from there by the Chinese at the end of the war. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Decoux, Jean; De Gaulle, Charles; Sabattier, Gabriel; Tsuchihashi Yuitsu References Dalloz, Jacques. The War in Indo-China, 1945–54. Savage, MD: Barnes and Noble, 1990. De Folin, Jacques. Indochine, 1940–1955: La fin d’un rève. Paris: Perrin, 1993. Marr, David G. Vietnam 1945: The Quest for Power. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995. Mordant, Eugène. Au Service de la France en Indochine, 1941–1945. Saigon: IFOM, 1950. Patti, Archimedes L. A. Why Viet Nam? Prelude to America’s Albatross. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.
Morrison, Norman Birth Date: December 29, 1933 Death Date: November 2, 1965 Peace activist and Vietnam War protester who doused himself with kerosene, set himself on fire, and committed suicide on November 2, 1965, to protest U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Norman Morrison was born on December 29, 1933, in Erie, Pennsylvania. He attended the College of Wooster, majoring in religion, and graduated with a BA degree in 1956 before turning to Quakerism. In 1959 he received a bachelor of divinity degree from the Pittsburgh Presbyterian Seminary. In 1962 Morrison moved to Baltimore, Maryland, where he served as the executive secretary of the Stony Run Meeting, a Quaker organization. In the early 1960s he became involved in various antiwar activities. The day Morrison died, he had read an article in a popular antiwar paper, I. F. Stone’s Weekly, titled “A Priest Tells How Our Bombers Razed His Church and Killed His People.” The article recounted the bombing of a village near Saigon by U.S. aircraft. The essay included an account of a French priest wounded in the bombing and the suffering that ensued. Morrison included this article in a letter mailed to his wife before his ultimate act of protest. In the letter, Morrison stated that he felt that he “must act for the children of the priest’s village.” On November 2, 1965, Morrison, the father of three, drove to the Pentagon with his nearly one-year-old daughter, Emily. Morrison’s decision to kill himself by self-immolation may well have been inspired by the actions of Buddhist monk Thich Quang Duc, who set himself afire in Saigon on June 16, 1963, or Alice Herz, who
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attempted self-immolation in Detroit on March 16, 1965, to protest the war. Herz died from massive burns 10 days later. At approximately 5:20 p.m., Morrison walked to a point about 50 yards from Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s third-floor office, doused his body with kerosene, struck a match, and was instantly engulfed. Pentagon workers scurried to grab Morrison’s child before she could be injured. Morrison was taken by a military ambulance to nearby Fort Meyer Hospital, where he was declared dead on arrival. The headline of the Washington Post on November 3, 1965, read “Man Burns Self to Death at Pentagon, Baby in His Arms Saved from the Fire before Hundreds.” This was one of eight acts of immolation that occurred in the United States during the Vietnam War. McNamara later wrote about the event in his book In Retrospect (1995) and stated that “Morrison’s death was a tragedy not only for his family but also for me and the country. It was an outcry against the killing that was destroying the lives of so many Vietnamese and American youth.” On May 9, 1967, a vigil was held to honor Morrison as part of a Pentagon camp-in protest. Morrison’s act of sacrifice received much attention in Vietnam, especially in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). Indeed, there is a street named for him near Hanoi, a postage stamp displaying his image was issued, and several well-known Vietnamese poems are dedicated to his memory. BRIAN GURIAN See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Herz, Alice; McNamara, Robert Strange; Thich Quang Duc References Appy, Christian G. Patriots: The Vietnam War Remembered from All Sides. New York: Viking, 2003. DeBenedetti, Charles, with Charles Chatfield. An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1990. McNamara, Robert S., with Brian VanDeMark. In Retrospect, the Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam. New York: Vintage Books, 1995.
Morse, Wayne Lyman Birth Date: October 20, 1900 Death Date: July 22, 1974 Attorney, teacher, U.S. senator (1945–1969), and outspoken critic of the Vietnam War. Wayne Lyman Morse was born in Madison, Wisconsin, on October 20, 1900. He graduated from the University of Wisconsin in 1923 with a BA degree and the next year earned an MA degree from the same institution. In 1928 Morse graduated from the University of Minnesota–Minneapolis with a law degree; he also began to teach there. In 1929 Morse joined the law faculty at the University of Oregon, where he later became dean of the college of law. In 1932 he received a doctorate in law from Columbia University.
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During World War II Morse held several positions with the U.S. Department of Labor, and during 1943–1944 he was a member of the National War Labor Board. Morse was first elected to represent Oregon in the U.S. Senate as a Republican in 1944. Gaining a reputation as a maverick who did not shy away from confronting his party’s leadership, he resigned from the Republican Party in 1952 and remained an independent until 1955, when he became a Democrat, principally at the urging of then-Senator Lyndon B. Johnson. While an independent in 1953, Morse staged the longest one-person filibuster in U.S. Senate history (22 hours, 26 minutes). In 1960 Morse ran unsuccessfully for the Democratic presidential nomination. Even after Morse had switched political parties, however, he proved no more malleable to the Democratic leadership. Indeed, he was one of the earliest opponents of U.S. military involvement in Vietnam. In August 1964 Morse and Senator Ernest Gruening (D-Alaska) cast the only two votes against the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. Morse denounced both the launching of air strikes against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and the deployment of U.S. ground troops to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Morse believed that the conflict in Vietnam was a civil war that did not warrant American involvement, especially because the Saigon regime was despotic and corrupt. In February 1966 he condemned the Lyndon Johnson administration for pursuing an illegal war, as Congress had not formally declared war. In March 1966 the Senate defeated Morse’s proposal to repeal the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. Morse was defeated for reelection in 1968. In 1972 he mounted an unsuccessful campaign to regain his Senate seat. In 1974 he ran again for his old Senate seat but became ill and died in Eugene, Oregon, on July 22, 1974. ROBERT G. MANGRUM AND PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR.
or barrel, the base plate, the supporting bipod, and the sight. They are smaller, lighter, and easier to move than artillery. Mortars used by allied troops in Vietnam varied in size from the 4.2-inch mortar, which had a maximum range of about 3.5 miles and was usually mounted on vehicles or emplaced at firebases, to the smaller troop-carried 81-millimeter (mm) and 60-mm mortars at the battalion and company levels, respectively. Commonly used mortar ammunition included high explosive (either impact or proximity fused) for use against troops and light material; white phosphorus (“willy pete”) for screening, signaling, and incendiary action; illumination; and tactical gas rounds. Viet Cong (VC) and People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) forces used primarily Soviet- and Chinesesupplied 82-mm and 120-mm mortars. The 120-mm mortar was very heavy; consequently, the most commonly used mortar in Communist service was the 82-mm, which was lighter than the 122-mm and would also fire U.S.-made 81-mm rounds. The effective range of the 82-mm mortar was approximately 1.8 miles. PAVN and VC soldiers were very capable mortar operators who were repeatedly able to place accurate fire and displace quickly before effective counterbattery fire could be brought to bear. They did this by hanging several rounds in the air toward a target and then quickly disassembling and moving the mortars before allied radar could be used to spot their mortar positions by tracking the trajectory of the projectiles. Communist forces often used their mortars in place of artillery, almost always preceding any ground attack with a mortar barrage. JAMES H. WILLBANKS
See also Gruening, Ernest Henry; Gulf of Tonkin Resolution; Johnson, Lyndon Baines References Austin, Anthony. The President’s War: The Story of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution and How the Nation Was Trapped in Vietnam. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1971. Summers, Harry G., Jr. The Vietnam War Almanac. New York: Ballantine, 1985. Wilkins, Lee. Wayne Morse: A Bio-Bibliography. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1985.
Mortars, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam Portable muzzle-loaded smooth- or rifle-bored infantry weapons used to fire shells at low velocities, short ranges, and high-angle trajectories. Mortars consist primarily of four main parts: a tube
A U.S. Marine Corps 81-mm mortar crew near Vandegrift Combat Base on Route 9 near Khe Sanh in far northwestern South Vietnam. (National Archives)
Mortuary Affairs Operations See also Artillery, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Grenade Launchers; Hand Grenades; Rockets and Rocket Launchers References Doleman, Edgar C. Tools of War. The Vietnam Experience Series. Boston: Boston Publishing, 1984. Scales, Robert H., Jr. Firepower in Limited War. 2nd ed. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1995.
Mortuary Affairs Operations The provision of services relating to deceased military personnel including the recovery, collection, evacuation, escort, and temporary interment of remains and the inventory, safeguard, and evacuation of personal effects of deceased personnel. The Quartermaster Corps of the U.S. Army has had charge of deceased military personnel since the American Civil War (1861–1865), during which Quartermaster officers interred the dead in marked graves and kept a record of the burials. After reorganization in 1912, the Quartermaster Department became the Quartermaster Corps, a full-fledged branch of the service (as it is today). Specialized troops now replaced the role of caring for the dead previously undertaken by civilians. Mortuary Affairs (which is also known as Graves Registration) has come to include not only the search and recovery of remains but also responding to any mass fatality situation. As such, army Mortuary Affairs specialists have deployed around the world to assist with the care of deceased military personnel. The army’s Mortuary Affairs specialists are trained at the Quartermaster School at Fort Lee, Virginia. The 54th and 111th Quartermaster companies, the U.S. Army’s only active Mortuary Affairs units, deploy from Fort Lee when activated. During the Vietnam War, significant improvements were made in the army’s protocols concerning care for its dead. The nature of the conflict, especially the use of high-mobility small-unit tactics, lessened the number of unaccounted-for dead. In addition, better communications and transportation to and from the battlefield (particularly the use of helicopters) facilitated the rapid recovery of remains. During January 1961–July 1965 in the early years of the Vietnam War, the U.S. Air Force provided mortuary services. By 1963 the death rate among American forces had increased to the point that full-time staffing of the mortuary became necessary. In addition, the U.S. Air Force expanded the mortuary facility to accommodate the increase in workload. In early 1965 the need for qualified graves registration (GRREG) soldiers in Vietnam was recognized. In the meantime, military activity continued to increase, thereby escalating the number of deceased personnel. The increase necessitated another expansion of the mortuary facility and the addition of more staff; several army
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GRREG personnel and an embalmer from the United States were then assigned to the facility. By mid-1965 the military leadership in Vietnam recognized the need for a single comprehensive service responsible for mortuary operations. Consequently, the U.S. Air Force transferred mortuary responsibility in Vietnam to the U.S. Army. The preponderance of deaths among U.S. forces in Vietnam came from U.S. Army, not U.S. Air Force, losses, and therefore it made practical sense that the army should assume responsibility for all mortuary operations in Vietnam and Thailand. On July 1, 1966, the U.S. Air Force transferred operational control of the mortuary at Tan Son Nhut Air Base to the U.S. Army. As the war in Vietnam progressed and the number of fatalities continued to rise, the deficiencies of the mortuary at Tan Son Nhut became apparent. Thus, a second mortuary opened at Da Nang Air Base on June 20, 1967, to process all remains recovered in the I Corps Tactical Zone. The Tet Offensive of 1968 made evident the need to again expand mortuary operations in Vietnam. During February 1968, for example, the mortuaries processed 3,000 remains, more than any comparable period during the conflict. With both mortuary facilities overstretched, the army constructed a new 20-table facility in Tan Son Nhut, allowing the storage and processing of additional remains. This mortuary became operational in August 1968. Toward the end of the war as the U.S. withdrawal began in the northern provinces of Vietnam in early 1972, it became necessary to deactivate the Da Nang mortuary. In February 1972 the Da Nang mortuary closed, with operational responsibility and personnel transferred to the Tan Son Nhut facility. In early 1973 decreased activity by the Viet Cong (VC) in the Saigon area created a similar situation for the Tan Son Nhut mortuary, and it too became inactive. Henceforth the U.S. military worked with government officials of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) until that government fell in 1975. Ultimately the remains of 96 percent of U.S. military personnel who fell in Vietnam were recovered. This compares to a 78 percent recovery rate for both World War II and the Korean War. The 4 percent not accounted for translates to about 2,300 soldiers. KIRSTY ANNE MONTGOMERY See also Casualties; Tet Offensive, Overall Strategy References Hockey, Jenny, Jeanne Katz, and Neil Smalls, eds. Grief, Mourning and Death Ritual. Buckingham, UK: Open University Press, 2001. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations. Washington, DC: August 28, 1996. U.S. Army Field Manual 4-20.64: Mortuary Affairs Operations. Washington DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, January 2007. U.S. Army Field Manual 10-1: Quartermaster Principles. “Mortuary Affairs,” chap. 18. Washington DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, August 11, 1994.
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Moscow Meeting, Brezhnev and Nixon Start Date: May 22, 1972 End Date: May 30, 1972 Summit meeting between U.S. president Richard Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev during May 22–30, 1972, marking a historic turning point in U.S.-Soviet relations with the first presidential visit to the Soviet Union since the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Nixon’s nine-day summit meeting with Brezhnev solidified the superpower détente, under way since the late 1960s. Among the numerous agreements signed during the summit, the most important were the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) and the accompanying Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons (Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement, SALT I Interim Agreement). These agreements completed the first stages of the larger SALT discussions. Crucial to understanding the nature of the Moscow summit is the international situation in which it occurred. In the early 1970s, relations between America and the Soviet Union had improved dramatically because of the relaxation of tensions in Europe in the aftermath of the Soviet suppression of the 1968 Prague uprising in Czechoslovakia. In the spirit of détente, the Nixon administration embarked on a policy of multilateral disarmament agreements, such as the 1971 signing of the Seabed Treaty. Détente ultimately served not only U.S. interests but also Soviet security interests. Despite relaxed tensions in Europe, Asian events might have had a damaging effect on U.S.-Soviet relations. The Vietnam War and the 1971 India-Pakistan War were certainly additional irritants. To the Soviets, however, détente outweighed these concerns, and a secret trip to Moscow by Nixon’s national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, in April 1972 finalized the summit plans. At the same time that the Americans were engaging the Soviets in détente they were also opening relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). By engaging both Communist nations simultaneously, the Nixon administration hoped to play one power against the other and additionally hoped that the Soviets and Chinese would pressure the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) to negotiate an end to the Vietnam War. In addition to the fruitful Moscow discussions and daily signatures of agreements between the conferees, Nixon made trips to Leningrad and Kiev and gave a live radio-television address to the Soviet people. His address highlighted the shared historical struggles of the two nations and reiterated their mutual responsibilities as global superpowers. During the summit Nixon and Brezhnev discussed the status of the international community and a plethora of bilateral issues in hopes of continuing and furthering détente, despite the differing ideologies of the two superpowers. The two leaders agreed that smaller third-party states, including Vietnam, should not interfere with maintaining détente. Bilateral negotiations included the limitation of strategic armaments; commercial and economic agreements; cooperation
in health issues; environmental cooperation; scientific, educational, and cultural cooperation and exchanges; and cooperation in space exploration. The results of these negotiations provided the necessary framework for a joint space venture in 1975, large U.S. grain sales to the Soviets, and, most importantly, the SALT agreements. The majority of the summit concentrated on the SALT agreements. The Nixon administration had inherited a legacy of outdated doctrines pertaining to U.S. nuclear strategy. The antiquated policy of maintaining nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union was no longer practical because the Soviets had already achieved nuclear parity. Thus, through détente it was now possible to conduct negotiations limiting the growth of the superpower nuclear arsenals. In a first step toward the realization of SALT, on May 26 Nixon and Brezhnev signed the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement. The ABM Treaty limited the deployment of antiballistic missiles for each nation to two sites. The SALT Interim Agreement froze the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles possessed by each country. In a move to reaffirm both American and Soviet commitments to détente, the two powers signed the Basic Principles of Mutual Relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This document contained 12 principles and served to encapsulate the spirit of the Moscow summit and the evolving superpower détente. Some of the more important principles included the notion of peaceful coexistence and the promise of future summit meetings. By engaging the Soviets through détente, the Nixon administration also hoped to keep Soviet involvement in Vietnam to a minimum and to gain a potential upper hand in peace negotiations with North Vietnam. JONATHAN H. L’HOMMEDIEU See also Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich; Détente; Kissinger, Henry Alfred; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics References Loth,Wilfried. Overcoming the Cold War: A History of Détente, 1950– 1991. Translated by Robert F. Hogg. New York: Palgrave, 2002. Stebbins, Richard B., and Elaine P. Adams, eds. American Foreign Relations, 1972: A Documentary Record. New York: New York University Press, 1976. Stevenson, Richard William. The Rise and Fall of Détente: Relaxations of Tensions in US-Soviet Relations, 1953–1984. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1985.
Moyers, Billy Don Birth Date: June 5, 1934 Journalist, ordained minister, deputy director of the Peace Corps (1962–1963), presidential aide/adviser, and press secretary to President Lyndon B. Johnson (1965–1966). Born on June 5, 1934, at Hugo, Oklahoma, Billy Don (Bill) Moyers grew up in Marshall,
Moyers, Billy Don
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Bill Moyers was presidential press secretary during 1965–1966. He is shown here with President Lyndon B. Johnson on August 24, 1965. (Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library)
Texas. While attending the University of Texas, in 1954 he worked in Washington for Lyndon Johnson’s Senate campaign. Moyers graduated in 1956 and began working as a news editor for a Texas radio station owned by Lady Bird Johnson. In 1959 Moyers earned a divinity degree and worked as a minister in Texas. He then rejoined Lyndon Johnson’s staff, serving as executive assistant in charge of scheduling personal appearances, writing speeches, and coordinating Johnson’s 1960 vice presidential campaign. In 1961 Moyers became associate director for public affairs at the Peace Corps and then in 1962 became its deputy director. Immediately after President John F. Kennedy’s assassination in November 1963, Moyers served as a liaison for Kennedy administration officials and helped write President Johnson’s speeches. As one of Johnson’s chief domestic advisers, Moyers helped draft and oversee the Great Society legislation. He served as the de facto White House chief of staff beginning in October 1964 and encouraged Johnson to seek peaceful solutions in Southeast Asia. Moyers also managed the president’s 1964 television advertising campaign.
Becoming press secretary in July 1965, Moyers worked hard to mend Johnson’s relations with the press corps. He also hoped to influence Johnson’s foreign policy by becoming national security adviser but was denied the post. Believing that the president had become too engrossed with the Vietnam War and was turning away from his domestic reforms, Moyers resigned in December 1966. As editor of Newsday, Moyers defended the peace marches and antiwar demonstrations of the late 1960s. He resigned that editorship in 1970 and since 1972 has been a successful television correspondent and commentator. He has been the host of several news-journal programs, particularly on the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), and has narrated or collaborated on myriad other television programs. From 1976 to 1980 he was the editor and chief correspondent for CBS Reports. In recent years Moyers has become a vocal critic of the rightwing Republican Party and has alleged that U.S. journalists had done a poor job reporting on and investigating the run-up to the 2003 Iraq War. Moyers has authored or edited numerous books. LAURA MATYSEK WOOD
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See also Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Media and the Vietnam War
Muller, Robert
References Moyers, Bill D. Listening to America: A Traveler Rediscovers His Country. New York: Harper’s Magazine Press, 1971. Moyers, Bill D. Moyers on America: A Journalist and His Times. New York: Anchor, 2005.
Influential Vietnam War veteran and peace advocate. Born in Nassau County, Long Island, New York, on July 29, 1945, Robert (Bobby) Muller received his undergraduate degree from Hofstra University and was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the U.S. Marine Corps upon graduation in 1968. In September 1968 he went to Vietnam, where he served as a combat officer commanding a marine infantry platoon. In April 1969 while he was leading an assault near the demilitarized zone (DMZ), a bullet ripped through his chest and severed his spinal cord. He was quickly transported by helicopter to the hospital ship Repose, and this action ultimately saved his life. Paralyzed from the chest down, Muller endured many months of rehabilitation at the Veterans Administration (VA) hospital in the Bronx, New York. While undergoing rehabilitation he saw firsthand the problems of inadequate care faced by numerous Vietnam War veterans. He then became a leader in the antiwar movement and an advocate for the fair treatment of all Vietnam War veterans. He soon founded a local chapter of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) in Nassau County, New York. Muller’s primary thrust became fighting for the rights of all veterans, regardless of their views on the war. In the early 1970s he attended law school at Hofstra and graduated with honors in 1974. That same year he appeared in the antiwar documentary film Hearts and Minds in which he discussed his life growing up on Long Island, his experiences in Vietnam, and his role in the antiwar movement. In 1978 while serving as legal counsel for the Eastern Paralyzed Veterans Association, he founded Vietnam Veterans of America (VVA), which subsequently was renamed Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF) two years later and is now known as Veterans for America (VFA). As president of this organization during 1978–1987, Muller witnessed the passage of landmark legislation granting veterans compensation for Vietnam War–related injuries, including posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and exposure to Agent Orange. His organization’s challenge to VA policies led to a major transformation in the way in which the U.S. government treats veterans. In 1981 Muller led the first delegation of American veterans to return to Vietnam since the end of the war. The trip of reconciliation ultimately paved the way for the lifting of the economic embargo against Vietnam by the United States and the normalization of relations between the two nations in the 1990s. Muller spent much of the 1980s traveling throughout the United States raising money for his organization, speaking about his experiences in Vietnam, and meeting with former veterans. In 1984 Muller traveled to Cambodia, where he saw the chilling effects of genocide. This experience led him to work for land-mine victims throughout the world. With the VFA he cofounded the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, which received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997.
Mu Gia Pass The most important of three mountain passes through the rugged Truong Son Mountains (Chaîne Annamitique, or Annamite Cordillera) along the southern border between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and Laos. The mountain range stretches for some 700 miles, from slightly south of the Red River Delta down to about 60 miles north of Saigon (presentday Ho Chi Minh City). During the Vietnam War the Mu Gia Pass (Deo Mu Gia), a key artery of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, was used by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) primarily to move war matériel, typically during the dry season (November–April), in support of its struggle to defeat the forces of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). After passing through the North Vietnamese city of Vinh, vehicles and personnel traveled in a south-southwesterly direction along Route 15 and then through the Mu Gia Pass on Route 12 into Laos before typically continuing southward on routes 23 and 911 toward Tchepone (Muang Xepon) and then east or southeast into South Vietnam. As the war progressed the road surface was improved, and petroleum pipelines were installed through the pass that were defended by hundreds of antiaircraft guns and, later, by surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and jet fighters. U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force air strikes, which included B-52 bombers and AC-130 gunships and were supported by electronic sensors and groundroad watch teams, took a huge toll on forces transiting the pass, but they were never able to entirely choke off the southbound traffic. GLENN E. HELM See also Ho Chi Minh Trail; Truong Son Mountains References Nalty, Bernard C. The War against Trucks: Aerial Interdiction in Southern Laos, 1968–1972. Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, U.S. Air Force, 2005. Prados, John. The Blood Road: The Ho Chi Minh Trail and the Vietnam War. New York: Wiley, 1999. Van Staaveren, Jacob. Interdiction in Southern Laos, 1960–1968: The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia. Washington, DC: Center for Air Force History, 1993.
Mullender, Philippe See Devillers, Philippe
Birth Date: July 29, 1945
Murphy, Robert Daniel Continuing to promote world peace and to assist innocent civilian victims in war-ravaged countries, Muller has been involved in other campaigns and programs, such as the Nuclear Threat Reduction Campaign and the Information Management and Mine Action Programs. Presently his work with the VFA focuses on ensuring that military members and their families who have served in the Iraq War and the Afghanistan War receive the best-quality care for postcombat psychological and neurological needs. He is also active in Operation Truth, an organization critical of the Iraq War. Muller continues to advance public discourse on the causes and consequences of war and the quality treatment for all veterans. CHARLES FRANCIS HOWLETT See also United States Veterans Administration; Vietnam Veterans Against the War; Vietnam Veterans of America References Behrens, David. “Vietnam War Deep Wounds.” In Long Island: Our Story, 357–358. Melville, NY: Newsday, 1998. Howlett, Charles F. “Long Island Confronts the Vietnam War: A Review of the Anti-war Movement,” Parts 1 and 2. Long Island Historical Journal 7 (Spring 1995): 144–165; 8 (Fall 1995): 56–75. Hunt, Andrew. The Turning: A History of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War. New York: New York University Press, 1999. MacPherson, Myra. Long Time Passing: Vietnam and the Haunted Generation. New York: Doubleday, 1984.
Munich Analogy A historical analogy suggesting that appeasement of aggressor or expansionist nations will only encourage further aggressive behavior. This analogy was widely used during the Cold War and compared attitudes toward the expansion of communism to the 1930s policy of appeasement championed by the British and French toward the expansion of Nazi Germany. British prime minister Neville Chamberlain, the chief architect of appeasement, believed that war could be averted by acquiescing to the more reasonable territorial demands being made by German leader Adolf Hitler. The culmination of this policy came in the September 1938 Munich Conference during which Chamberlain and French premier Édouard Daladier ceded German-speaking portions of Czechoslovakia to Germany. This policy failed to check Hitler’s desire for territorial aggrandizement, however, and led to his seizure of the remainder of Czechoslovakia six months later. Germany’s seizure of Czechoslovakia greatly benefited the German war machine, as the Germans made good use of Czechoslovak aircraft, artillery, and tanks as well as Czechoslovak industry. Indeed, this greatly aided the German invasion of Poland in September 1939, which sparked World War II. Cold War politicians often used the Munich analogy to justify military actions and tough stances against aggressors. For example, the Harry S. Truman administration used the analogy to justify the 1947 Truman Doctrine and the 1950 decision to enter
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the Korean War. Many political leaders believed that such actions were necessary to prevent a third world war. During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, President John F. Kennedy used the lessons of 1930s appeasement to suggest that firm pressure had to be applied against the Soviets for their emplacement of nuclear-tipped missiles in Cuba. The Munich analogy also dominated the thinking of American policy makers toward Vietnam. Leading U.S. policy makers remembered events preceding World War II and resolved not to repeat these mistakes in Indochina. They believed that the Communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), if given the opportunity to take over the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), would continue to widen its influence throughout Indochina. This led to the mistaken conclusion that Ho Chi Minh was a bully who would back down if confronted with military force. The combination of this analogy, the principle of containment, and the domino theory formed the foundation of U.S. policy toward Vietnam and also served as a justification to escalate the Vietnam War beginning in 1965. Unfortunately, the analogy seemed to suggest that Germany in the 1930s was akin to North Vietnam in the 1960s, which was entirely without merit. In the run-up to the 1991 Persian Gulf War, President George H. W. Bush seemed to resurrect the Munich analogy when he compared Iraqi president Saddam Hussein to Hitler. ERIC W. OSBORNE AND PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR. See also Containment Policy; Domino Theory References Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. Khong, Yuen Foong. Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992. Olson, James S., and Randy Roberts. Where the Domino Fell: America and Vietnam, 1945–1990. New York: St. Martin’s, 1991.
Muoi Cuc See Nguyen Van Linh
Murphy, Robert Daniel Birth Date: October 28, 1894 Death Date: January 9, 1978 Diplomat, undersecretary of state for political affairs (1953–1959), and a member of the so-called Wise Men. Robert Daniel Murphy was among the most distinguished of American 20th-century career diplomats whose State Department career spanned 42 years, from 1917 to 1959. He was born in Milwaukee, Wisconsin,
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on October 28, 1894, and was educated at Marquette University and George Washington University. Until 1952 when Murphy was appointed as the first postwar U.S. ambassador to Japan, he was almost exclusively concerned with European affairs, serving in France and Germany between the wars and as U.S. envoy to the French military leadership in North Africa in the early 1940s. Attached to General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s staff from 1943 onward, in 1944 Murphy became political adviser on German affairs and until 1949 was the chief diplomatic adviser to the U.S. High Commission in Germany. From 1949 to 1952 he served as ambassador to Belgium. A Cold War warrior, Murphy by the late 1940s was deeply suspicious of the Soviet Union and other Communist states. Priding himself on his strong military connections and emphasizing the importance of force, strength, and power in international relations, he generally advocated taking an extremely hard line toward American opponents. Murphy believed that U.S. policy in both the 1948 Berlin Crisis and in the Korean War (1950–1953) was insufficiently firm and that the United States should have insisted upon land access to Berlin in the first instance and gone for all-out victory in the second, regardless of the consequences. Returning to the State Department in 1953 to work under John Foster Dulles, first as assistant secretary of state for United Nations (UN) affairs and later that year as deputy undersecretary of state, a position he held until he retired in 1959, Murphy enjoyed a congenial relationship with both the secretary and with President Eisenhower, his old wartime associate. In this capacity Murphy fully supported the American decisions of the mid-1950s to resist the spread of communism in Indochina by supporting non-Communist regimes in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), Cambodia, and Laos. After he retired Murphy became one of the group of senior advisers known as the Wise Men whom Lyndon B. Johnson from time to time consulted on Vietnam issues. Predictably, given his previous attitudes on the importance of demonstrating military might, Murphy firmly supported the gradual expansion of the U.S. commitment to Vietnam, believing that any other course would signal U.S. weakness and lack of resolve. In early 1968 after the Tet Offensive, Johnson requested that the Wise Men undertake a major reassessment of U.S. policy toward Vietnam. While the group as a whole argued that the war could not be won and recommended that the United States seek a negotiated peace, advice that Johnson accepted, Murphy strongly dissented from its recommendations, arguing that the United States should not abandon its commitment to the war but instead should press the war to a successful conclusion whatever the cost. In 1969 he advised incoming president Richard M. Nixon on his major diplomatic appointments and in 1976 served on the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. On January 9, 1978, Murphy died of heart failure at his home in New York City. PRISCILLA ROBERTS See also Dulles, John Foster; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Wise Men
References Berman, Larry. Lyndon Johnson’s War: The Road to Stalemate in Vietnam. New York: Norton, 1989. Brands, H. W. Cold Warriors: Eisenhower’s Generation and American Foreign Policy. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988. Murphy, Robert D. Diplomat among Warriors. New York: Doubleday, 1964. Schandler, Herbert Y. The Unmaking of a President: Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977.
Music and the Vietnam War The Vietnam conflict has been called “America’s first rock-androll war” because of the predominance of rock music that permeated the American experience there. As draft quotas were raised and deferment and exemption loopholes closed, an overwhelming number of military personnel belonged to one generation. The average age of combat soldiers was 19, and according to some figures 90 percent were under 23 years of age. Many of these young conscripts did not want to be in Vietnam, and no one wanted to be alienated from his own generation back home. Therefore, many GIs imported their tastes in music into the war zone. Rock music was the most popular genre, and beads and peace symbols were worn with and on many uniforms. Among the military branches, there was not much deviation in musical preference. There was a great rift between officers and enlisted men, however. According to an interview in Rolling Stone, most enlisted men preferred hard rock or psychedelic music, 30 percent enjoyed rhythm and blues, 10 percent enjoyed country, 5 percent enjoyed classical, and 10 percent enjoyed folk. The men often complained that Armed Forces Radio Vietnam broadcasts were geared to officers, with light classical music scattered among what the soldiers called “lame,” “teenybopperish,” “polka party,” or “bubble-gum” music. One soldier, who spoke anonymously in Rolling Stone, called Armed Forces Radio “the world’s shittiest, small-town midwest old-woman right-wing plastic useless propagandizing bummer unturned-on controlled low-fidelity non-stereo.” Some of the constraints on the type of music allowed on the airwaves came from the government of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), which prohibited from being played, among other songs, the Animals’ rock hit “We Gotta Get Outa This Place.” Most of the radio programs were prerecorded in Los Angeles and included Top 40 hits. Because radio in the war zone did not reflect the preferences of most soldiers, a key status symbol among GIs was the tape recorder. Cassette tapes, either brought from home or purchased on leave, were the most popular medium for music in Vietnam. The tape players were small, battery operated, and highly portable and were therefore easily carried into the field. The rhythms, raw energy, and screaming guitars of rock music mirrored the confusion of war and firefights, and because music
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Jimi Hendrix was acclaimed for his work with the electric guitar. Though his superb, highly amplified guitar playing was often upstaged by theatrics, his brief, explosive career was a quest to expand the horizons of music and sound. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)
helps define a generation, music helped define the Vietnam War. Snatches from lyrics of popular songs were used in the context of the war. “Rock-and-roll” substituted for “lock and load,” referring to the procedure for readying the M-16 for firing or for switching the weapon from semiautomatic to automatic fire. Songs were written alluding to Vietnam, or those connections were assumed. “Purple Haze” by Jimi Hendrix, a former “Screaming Eagles” paratrooper, had references to the purple smoke used at landing zones. Phrases from the Beatles’ “Magical Mystery Tour,” such as “Coming to take you away, dying to take you away,” had special meaning for marines at Khe Sanh. Popular among the enlisted men were Filipino, Korean, Vietnamese, and other Asian bands that could imitate British and American rock groups and their hits with uncanny accuracy, even though band members could not speak English. These groups played in enlisted men’s clubs and civilian bars in Vietnam. Some of the more popular songs performed were “Simon Says,” “Black Is Black,” “Unchained Melody,” “Gloria,” “San Francisco (Wear Flowers in Your Hair),” “Sky Pilot,” and “Hey Jude.” According to writer Michael Herr, “sounds were as precious as water.” Some GIs even tried to form
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bands, but the effort often proved futile because of troop movements and a general distrust of rock music by the officers. The 1960s generation’s catchphrase “sex, drugs, and rock-androll” was also nurtured in Vietnam, partly because of the black market and prostitution that inevitably spring up on the outskirts of war and groups of soldiers. Psychedelic rock music praised the virtues of drug use and being stoned. The Beatles’ “Lucy in the Sky with Diamonds” was perceived as a thinly disguised paean to LSD (lysergic acid diethylamide). Music has always provided needed relief during wartime, but in World War II and the Korean War there was generally not the separation in musical preference between enlisted men and officers that occurred during the Vietnam War. World War II was different from the Vietnam War in that the 1940s witnessed a unified mission of fighting fascism and Nazism. In the later stages of the Vietnam War there was no such unity of purpose. This was the first war in which the GIs listened to antiwar and protest songs while fighting in the conflict. In previous wars the music had always been supportive. To be sure, however, the gap between music tastes among enlisted men and officers was much the same as the socalled generation gap that had developed between the youth generation and their elders on the home front during the 1960s. As rock and roll progressed and became both a symbol and an outlet for the younger generation in the United States, there developed marked differences in musical tastes between the generations. In general, those in their mid-twenties and up preferred mellower pop music that had predominated during the 1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s. Those in their teens and early twenties, however, tended to listen to rock and roll. In the late 1980s Claude Michel-Schönberg’s and Alain Boubil’s musical Miss Saigon created a new musical venue for the Vietnam War, one with the added bonus of nearly two decades of distance between itself and the conflict. Premiering in London in September 1989, the musical ran continuously for 10 years at Theater Royal, Drury Lane. In New York the show opened in 1991 and ran until 2001 (4,092 performances). Miss Saigon is Broadway’s 10th-longest–running musical. Based on Giacomo Puccini’s opera Madame Butterfly, the show follows the tragedies of a Vietnamese woman abandoned by her American GI lover and is set in Saigon in the 1970s, at the end of the Vietnam War. A highlight of the show is a re-creation of the evacuation of the U.S. embassy in April 1975. The music is at once poignant, uplifting, and contemporary. CHARLES N. FASANARO See also Baez, Joan Chandos; Drugs and Drug Use; Dylan, Bob; Media and the Vietnam War; Selective Service References Herr, Michael. Dispatches. New York: Knopf, 1977. Romanowski, Patricia, and Holly George-Warren. The New Rolling Stone Encyclopedia of Rock & Roll. New York: Fireside, 1995. Whitburn, Joel, ed. Billboard Book to Top 40 Hits. New York: WatsonGuptill, 2004.
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Muste, Abraham Johannes Birth Date: January 8, 1885 Death Date: February 11, 1967 Quaker minister, union organizer, radical, pacifist, and antiwar activist. Abraham Johannes Muste was born in Zierikzee, the Netherlands, on January 8, 1885. At the age of six he moved with his family to Grand Rapids, Michigan, where he spent much of his youth. From 1909 to 1914 he was a minister in the Dutch Reformed Church. In 1914 he joined the Congregational Church, and from 1918 to 1926 he was a member of the Society of Friends (Quakers). He was a dedicated pacifist during World War I. As a Quaker minister, he also became involved in union organizing. During the 1920s and 1930s Muste largely eschewed religion and became more radicalized as he continued to agitate for the labor agenda. He actually conferred with Leon Trotsky in Norway in 1936 but had a sudden change of heart upon his return to the United States that same year. Muste now rejected radical Marxism and dedicated his efforts to nonviolent pacifism, mainly through the peace organization Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR). In 1940 he became executive secretary of FOR, a position he who would hold for the remainder of his life. During World War II Muste was outspoken in his criticism of the war, arguing that waging war against the Axis powers only encouraged them to resort to even more brutality. He also actively promoted conscientious objection and draft evasion as a way to register personal contempt for warfare. Muste and FOR pioneered the concept of peaceful passive resistance, which would soon be taken up by Mohandas Gandhi in India and the U.S. Civil Rights Movement that began in the mid-1950s. As the Cold War settled in during the late 1940s, Muste became even more dedicated to peace, arguing that the horror of modern warfare and atomic weapons necessitated a step back from the precipice and demanded the implementation of worldwide disarmament. Muste soon became involved in the War Resisters’ League and had made opposition to the nuclear arms race one of his signature causes. Muste vociferously opposed the Korean War, once again imploring Americans not to support the war effort and to resist the draft, much as he had during World War II. As a show of his distaste for what he termed U.S. militarism, he refused to pay federal income taxes from 1948 to 1952 because he believed that the taxes would be used for military purposes. In 1960 he was compelled to pay his back taxes, with interest and penalties, under threat of imprisonment. He paid the taxes unwillingly. By the 1950s Muste had come to be admired by many for his dedication to pacifism and his intellectual prowess that linked nonviolent civil disobedience with modern religion and theology. During the 1960s Muste became one of the first individuals to speak out against the U.S. war effort in Vietnam. He attended numerous antiwar demonstrations and was a major presence in
New York’s antiwar organization Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Committee. Despite his advanced age, in 1966 Muste was chosen to head up the Spring Mobilization to End the War in Vietnam, a nationwide movement that planned mass antiwar demonstrations for April 1967. Muste’s unique background as a one-time political radical, labor organizer, minister, and peace activist allowed him to act as a highly effective mediator among the competing antiwar factions. In April 1966 he traveled to Saigon to advance the peace agenda, and in January 1967 he went to Hanoi. The following month on February 11, 1967, Muste died of a heart attack in New York City. PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR. See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Spring Mobilization to End the War in Vietnam References Hentoff, Nat. Peace Agitator: The Story of A. J. Muste. New York: Macmillan, 1963. Robinson, Jo Ann. Abraham Went Out: A Biography of A. J. Muste. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1981.
My Lai Massacre Event Date: March 16, 1968 Most notorious U.S. military atrocity of the Vietnam War. On March 16, 1968, between 347 and 504 Vietnamese civilians were massacred by U.S. soldiers of Company C, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry, 11th Infantry Brigade (Light) of the 23rd Infantry (Americal) Division. Equally infamous was the cover-up of the incident perpetrated by the brigade and division staffs. My Lai 4 was a cluster of hamlets, part of Son My village of Son Tinh District in the coastal lowlands of Quang Ngai Province, I Corps Tactical Zone, in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). The broad range in numbers of civilian deaths was the result of varying reports on the massacre, including the testimony of participants and observers. The high figure of 504 is that of the government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. In some instances, reports included the related massacre in the nearby hamlet of My Khe 4 by Company B, 4th Battalion, 3rd Infantry. Because of false reporting and the subsequent cover-up, actual casualty figures are difficult to substantiate. While the Americal Division’s primary operation was the yearlong WHEELER/WALLOWA (November 1967–November 1968), numerous side operations were also conducted. The operation in the hamlets of Son My village, nicknamed “Pinkville” by the division’s soldiers because of the concentration of Communist sympathizers and Viet Cong (VC) activity in the area, was one of those side operations. It was to be a classic search-and-destroy sweep intended to snare some of the estimated 250 VC operat-
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Former residents of My Lai who were killed by U.S. soldiers. During the most notorious publicly acknowledged military atrocity of the Vietnam War, between 200 and 500 Vietnamese civilians were massacred by U.S. soldiers at My Lai on March 16, 1968. A cover-up kept the massacre a secret for a year, after which 14 soldiers were charged with the crime. Only one, Lieutenant William L. Calley, was found guilty and sentenced to prison, and he served little more than a year. (Ronald S. Haeberle/Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images)
ing in the area as part of the VC 48th Local Force Battalion. Prior to the operation, sweeps such as this were characterized by only lightly scattered direct VC contact but a high rate of friendly losses to snipers, mines, and booby-trap incidents. The My Lai operation was no different. Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry, was organized as part of an ad hoc battalion known as Task Force Barker (named for its commander, Lieutenant Colonel Frank A. Barker Jr.), reinforcing the 11th Infantry Brigade. The Americal Division was itself initially an ad hoc organization of separate infantry brigades put together during the U.S. military buildup and, by many accounts, suffered from poor training and weak leadership. Major General Samuel H. Koster commanded the division. Some elements of the 11th Infantry Brigade, commanded at the time by Colonel Oran K. Henderson, have been described as little more than “organized bands of thugs” and had been ordained the “Butcher Brigade” by its soldiers in the field. The airmobile assault into My Lai was timed to arrive shortly after the local women had departed for market. The soldiers had been briefed to expect an engagement with elements of the VC 48th Local Force Battalion, one of the most successful units in
the area. Instead they found only women, children, and mostly old men still cooking breakfast. The soldiers of Charlie Company, commanded by Captain Ernest Medina, ran wild, particularly the men of the 1st Platoon, commanded by 1st Lieutenant William Laws Calley Jr. They indiscriminately shot people as they ran from their huts and then systematically rounded up survivors, allegedly led them to a nearby ditch, and executed them. More villagers were killed as huts and bunkers were destroyed by fire and explosives as the unit continued its sweep of the hamlet. The killing was brought to a halt some time later when Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson, an aero-scout pilot supporting the operation, landed his helicopter between the Americans and some fleeing Vietnamese and confronted the soldiers. The massacre was brought to light a year later, thanks to the efforts of former soldier Ronald Ridenhour who had served in the 11th Infantry Brigade in Vietnam and had learned of the events by talking to members of Charlie Company, who had participated in it. On his return to the United States, in March 1969 (a full year after the event) Ridenhour sent letters detailing it to President Richard M. Nixon, officials in the Defense Department and the State Department, and members of Congress. Most of those
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who received the letter chose to ignore it, with the exception of Congressman Morris Udall (D-Ariz.). Independent investigative journalist Seymour Hersh interviewed Calley and broke the story on November 12, 1969. Within a week Time, Life, and Newsweek magazines all covered the story. The Cleveland Plain Dealer newspaper also published photographs of the villagers killed at My Lai. The U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division and an army board of inquiry, headed by Lieutenant General William Peers, then investigated the incident. Although the findings and recommendations of the board of inquiry did not attempt to ascribe causes for the massacre, many others have cited the frustrations of soldiers too long faced with unanswerable losses of comrades to snipers, mines, and booby traps; the lack of experience of junior leaders and poor leadership from the division commander on down the ranks; and the confusion of the war’s measurement of success by the statistical yardstick of body count, which became objectives in place of the occupation of the enemy’s terrain. The Peers Inquiry report produced a list of 30 persons, mostly officers (including Koster), who knew of the atrocities; however, only 14 were charged with crimes. All eventually had their charges dismissed or were acquitted by courts-martial except for the most junior officer, Lieutenant Calley, whose platoon allegedly killed some 200 innocents. Calley was found guilty of murdering 22 civilians and sentenced to life imprisonment. The sentence was reduced to 20 years by the Court of Military Appeals and then later reduced to 10 years by the secretary of the U.S. Army. Proclaimed by much of the public as a “scapegoat,” Calley was paroled by Pres-
ident Nixon in November 1974 after he had served about a third of his 10-year sentence. On March 6, 1998, the army belatedly recognized Thompson, his former gunner Lawrence Colburn, and his crew chief Glenn Andreatta (who was killed in April 1968) with the Soldier’s Medal for Gallantry. ARTHUR T. FRAME See also Atrocities during the Vietnam War; Barker, Frank Akeley, Jr.; Body Count; Calley, William Laws, Jr.; “Conduct of the War in Vietnam” Report; Hersh, Seymour Myron; Medina, Ernest Lou; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Peers Inquiry; Ridenhour, Ronald; WHEELER/WALLOWA, Operation References Angers, Trent. The Forgotten Hero of My Lai: The Hugh Thompson Story. Lafayette, LA: Acadian House Publishing, 1999. Belknap, Michael R. The Vietnam War on Trial: The My Lai Massacre and the Court-Martial of Lieutenant Calley. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002. Bilton, Michael, and Kevin Sim. Four Hours in My Lai. New York: Penguin, 1992. Goldstein, Joseph, Burke Marshall, and Jack Schwartz. The My Lai Massacre and Its Cover-Up: Beyond the Reach of the Law? New York: Free Press, 1976. Hersh, Seymour M. Cover-Up: The Army’s Secret Investigation of the Massacre at My Lai 4. New York: Random House, 1972. Hersh, Seymour M. My Lai 4: A Report on the Massacre and Its Aftermath. New York: Random House, 1970. Peers, William R. The My Lai Inquiry. New York: Norton, 1979.
N Nam Dong, Battle of Event Date: July 6, 1964 Battle at the Nam Dong Special Forces camp near the border of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) with Laos and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). The 12 Americans, 1 Australian, and 311 South Vietnamese soldiers at the camp were there to provide security and improve living conditions for about 5,000 Vietnamese civilians in the area. Captain Roger Donlon commanded a U.S. Army Special Forces “A” Detachment that advised Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) Special Forces and Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) companies in the camp. At 2:26 a.m. on July 6, 1964, the camp was subjected to an intense mortar barrage followed by a ground attack by 800 to 900 Viet Cong (VC) soldiers. All camp buildings and most radios were soon destroyed. The defenders were able to send a quick message that they were under attack, but it was not until 4:00 a.m. that air support reached them. By dawn the fighting was over. In the battle, the defenders suffered 55 killed (including 2 Americans and 1 Australian) and 65 wounded. Sixty-two VC bodies were found in and around the camp. On December 5, 1964, for his actions in the Battle of Nam Dong, Captain Donlon was awarded the first Medal of Honor since the Korean War (1950–1953). RICHARD L. KIPER See also Civilian Irregular Defense Group; United States Special Forces; Vietnam, Republic of, Special Forces References Donlon, Roger H. C., with Warren Rogers. Outpost of Freedom. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965.
Kelly, Francis J. The Green Berets in Vietnam, 1961–71. New York: Brassey’s, 1991.
Nam Tien Even as the Vietnamese were seeking to maintain their independence, they were actively engaged in expanding the territory of Dai Viet. “Resisting the North” (Bac cu) and “Conquering the South” (Nam chinh) became major themes of Vietnamese history, as did the development of an original culture and civilization. When Vietnam secured its independence from China in the mid-10th century, its southern boundaries did not extend past Deo Ngang (Ngang Pass). Nam Tien (March to the South) was a constant for much of Vietnamese history, much as Manifest Destiny has been in American history. Nam Tien came at the expense of the Cham and the Khmer peoples, however. The Indianized Kingdom of Champa had been founded in 192 CE. Its capital of Indrapura was located near present-day Hoi An on the central Vietnamese coast at about 16 degrees latitude. Champa flourished as a seaborne trading state supported by powerful battle fleets. One Cham raid even reached up the Mekong River to cross the Great Lake (Tonlé Sap) of Cambodia and capture and sack the city of Angkor in 1177. As with their European contemporaries the Norsemen, the Chams were essentially raiders who lived off plunder but failed to build up their economic base at home by agricultural settlement. As a result, they fell prey to slow but steady encroachments by Vietnamese settlers, who were often invited by the Chams to settle vacant agricultural lands. Once the Vietnamese had settled a particular area, however, the Vietnamese
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state undertook to protect its citizens there. Thus, bit by bit the Vietnamese whittled away at the Cham state. In 1069 after a successful military campaign, King Ly Thai Tong seized the Cham capital and took the Cham king prisoner, relocating him to Dai Viet. The Cham king was able to secure his freedom only by ceding the Cham provinces of Dia Ly, Ma Linh, and Bo Chinh. These became the Vietnamese provinces of Quang Binh and Quang Tri. In the early 14th century two more Cham districts, the O and the Ri, were given to Dai Viet in exchange for Vietnamese princess Huyen Tran’s hand in marriage. In the 15th century the Chams had to give up all their territory north of the present-day province of Quang Nam. These 14th- and 15th-century additions became the future Tha Thien Province, with its imperial capital of Hue. Finally in 1471 the Vietnamese took the second Cham capital of Vijaya. This proved critical, because once the Vietnamese had secured a permanent foothold south of Hai Van Pass, the remaining Cham country was quickly subdued. In the 17th century the remnants of the old Kingdom of Champa were definitively absorbed, although a petty Cham king retained nominal independence in the Phan Rang region until 1822. The Vietnamese Nam Tien did not end with the elimination of Champa. In 1481 the government created the Don Dien agricultural settlements. The Dai Viet government granted lands to Vietnamese settlers, who were usually ex-soldiers, on the condition that they defend it. It did not matter to the Vietnamese that these grants were usually in territory belonging to the crumbling Khmer empire. Repeated border incidents led to Vietnamese armed intervention and additional territorial acquisitions. This process brought the Vietnamese into the Mekong Delta. By 1658 the Vietnamese had taken all of southern Vietnam north of the future Saigon (then known as the sleepy fishing village of Prey Kor). Saigon itself fell to the Vietnamese in 1672. The lower plain of the future Cochin China came under virtual Vietnamese control in the last decades of the 18th century, and Vietnam had expanded to the full extent of its present-day shoreline. In 1945 the Viet Minh used the term “Nam Tien” to describe their dispatch of military forces from northern Vietnam to central and southern Vietnam to aid in the conflict against returning French forces who were fighting to wrest control of Vietnam from Ho Chi Minh’s new government. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Chams and the Kingdom of Champa References Buttinger, Joseph. The Smaller Dragon: A Political History of Vietnam. New York: Praeger, 1958. Chapuis, Oscar M. A History of Vietnam: From Hong Bang to Tu Duc. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1995. Fall, Bernard B. The Two Viet Nams. Rev. ed. New York: Praeger, 1964. Tucker, Spencer C. Vietnam. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1999.
Nam Viet Vietnamese kingdom. In 207 BCE, Chinese general Zhao Tuo (Chao To; Trieu Da in Vietnamese), who had broken with the Qin dynasty emperor, defeated King An Duong Vuong and conquered the Kingdom of Au Lac. Zhao Tuo killed all Chinese loyal to the emperor and divided the conquered territory into two prefectures: Giao-chi and Cuu-chan. The newly conquered territory and his previously held territory of Guangdong and Guangxi in presentday southern China formed the new kingdom of Nam Viet (Nanyue or Nan Yue, for southern country of the Viet or Yue). For the first time, the Vietnamese people were part of a kingdom that included southern China. Its capital was Phien Ngu (later Canton and today Guangzhou) and included not only part of southern China but all of later Tonkin (northern Vietnam) and part of Annam (central Vietnam). Meanwhile, the Han dynasty was unifying China, a task that it accomplished in the third century BCE. In the second century BCE the Han pushed south. Zhao Tuo and his successors ruled Nam Viet until 111 BCE, when the Han sent an expeditionary corps into the kingdom and added it to their empire. For the next thousand years except for a few brief but glorious rebellions, present-day northern Vietnam was a Chinese province. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Au Lac, Kingdom of; Vietnam, History of, Prehistory to 938 CE References Buttinger, Joseph. The Smaller Dragon: A Political History of Vietnam. New York: Praeger, 1958. Taylor, Keith Weller. The Birth of Vietnam. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983.
NANTUCKET BEACH, Operation See BOLD MARINER, Operation
Napalm One of the U.S. military’s primary incendiary weapons during the Vietnam War; its use also attracted public protest as a weapon of terror. The napalm compound is gasoline thickened to a gel-like consistency and named for two of its original thickening agents, aluminum naphthenate and aluminum palmitate, although the ingredients changed over time. Harvard professor Louis Fieser directed the research that developed this petroleum gel, applying for a patent on November 1, 1943. Its advantages over unthickened fuel included longer burning time of up to several minutes and more effective spreading, which increased the probability of igniting targeted materials. The U.S. military first used napalm toward the end of World War II in bombs
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In this Pulitzer Prize–winning photograph taken by Nick Ut, terrified children run from South Vietnamese soldiers after an aerial napalm attack on June 8, 1972. The girl in the center, nine-year-old Phan Thi Kim Phuc, had ripped off her burning clothes while fleeing. An allied pilot intending to attack suspected Viet Cong hiding places had mistakenly bombed South Vietnamese troops and civilians. (AP/Wide World Photos)
and flamethrowers. Napalm bombs required igniting, generally by a high-explosive rod such as TNT surrounded by white phosphorus. Napalm-B, the napalm used during the Vietnam War, retained the name, although the composition changed. Made up of 50 percent polystyrene thickener, 25 percent benzene, and 25 percent gasoline, it was a thick, sticky liquid that was developed at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, by the Dow Chemical Company. NapalmB burns at a higher temperature, about 850 degrees Centigrade (1,562 degrees Fahrenheit) and burns up to 15 minutes, two to three times longer than ordinary napalm. Napalm-B also doubled the coverage area to 218 yards long by 36 yards wide, making possible much greater destruction to targets. The jellied mixture sticks to virtually everything it touches and is almost impossible to remove. These characteristics led the U.S. Air Force to adopt napalm-B as its main incendiary weapon in 1966. During the Vietnam War, napalm bombs constituted roughly 10 percent, or nearly 400,000 tons, of all fighter-bomber muni-
tions. Individual bombs typically weighed between 250 and 750 pounds. Humans caught in the open by napalm attacks have little defense. Death occurs not only by burning but also from asphyxiation caused by carbon monoxide poisoning. Only those on the perimeter of the strike zone usually survive, although many suffer severe burns from heat that is hot enough to melt their flesh. The brutal effects of napalm led many antiwar activists to protest its use in Vietnam. Dow Chemical Company was the nation’s major napalm manufacturer during the war years. The company faced a boycott of consumer products and an organized effort to persuade shareholders to sell their stock as well as pickets and demonstrations at Dow offices and against campus recruiters. The protests affected Dow’s image and profits, and in 1969, whether deliberately or not, Dow lost the government contract for napalm to another company. The production and use of napalm, however, continued for the war’s duration. MITCHELL K. HALL
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See also Airpower, Role in War; Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Bombs, Gravity; International War Crimes Tribunal References Dreyfus, Gilbert. “Napalm and Its Effects on Human Beings.” In Against the Crime of Silence, edited by John Duffett, 374–381. Flanders, NJ: O’Hare Books, 1968. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Incendiary Weapons. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1975. United Nations. Napalm and Other Incendiary Weapons and All Aspects of Their Possible Use: Report of the Secretary-General. New York: United Nations, 1973.
Napoleon III Birth Date: April 20, 1808 Death Date: January 9, 1873 President of the Second French Republic (1849–1852) and emperor of France (1852–1870). Born in Paris on April 20, 1808, and raised in Switzerland, the son of Napoleon Bonaparte’s younger brother Louis, Charles Louis Napoleon Bonaparte made unsuccessful attempts to seize power in France in 1836 and 1840. Following the second attempt, he was tried and sentenced to perpetual imprisonment. In 1846 he escaped from the Fortress of Ham and fled to Britain. He returned to France following the 1848 June Days and was elected to the Constituent Assembly. In December 1849 he was elected president, largely on the magic of his name and a national vote. He seized complete power in a coup on December 2, 1851, and was crowned emperor as Napoleon III on December 2, 1852. Until the early 1860s Napoleon III’s rule was decidedly authoritarian, but he certainly had the best interests of the French in mind when he began a series of sweeping social and administrative reforms aimed at modernizing France’s economy and governmental bureaucracy. In the 1860s Napoleon, responding to liberal pressures, moved away from autocratic rule while continuing to press for internal modernization and a meritocratic society. He also began to liberalize the French political process. Napoleon used the Crimean War (1854–1856) to secure French influence in Europe and to build an alliance with Great Britain. When that war ended he was determined to maintain cooperation with the British. This entailed supporting British endeavors in China, where French troops often fought alongside British soldiers. But Napoleon also sought to secure territorial gains for France. As early as 1853 the French Foreign Office had urged the acquisition of a port in Indochina. French missionaries, who were being persecuted by Emperor Tu Duc, appealed to Napoleon, and in 1857 he ordered the French China squadron to intervene there in hopes of obtaining a Vietnamese port in the fashion of Hong Kong and establishing a protectorate over Cochin China.
On August 31, 1857, French admiral Rigault de Genouilly’s squadron of 14 vessels and 3,000 men, including troops sent by Spain from Manila, appeared off Tourane (present-day Da Nang). The troops soon took the Tourane forts and the port, inaugurating the first phase of the French conquest of Indochina. Within a few months, however, the French were forced from Tourane. De Genouilly shifted operations southward to the fishing village of Saigon, which fell to the French on February 17, 1859. In 1861 Tu Duc agreed to cede to France three of the eastern provinces of Cochin China, allow the free practice of Catholic worship in the dominions, and accept a French protectorate. The remainder of Cochin China was taken from Annam during 1866–1867. In the end, it was Napoleon’s foreign policies that ultimately led to his downfall. He became ensnared in the political intrigues of Italy, which was then divided into rival nation-states, and in an ill-conceived attempt to install a French-controlled monarchy in Mexico under Austrian Archduke Maximilian. Napoleon’s seeming willingness to embrace the Confederate cause during the American Civil War had also rankled Washington. Napoleon was also outwitted by Prussian minister president Otto von Bismarck in the diplomacy of Central Europe, even fomenting war between
Napoleon III, the nephew of the great emperor Napoleon I, came to power as president of the Second Republic in 1849. In 1852, he seized power in a coup d’état and became emperor, ruling until 1870. It was during his reign that the French first established themselves in Indochina, but his expansive foreign policies were in large part responsible for his downfall. (Library of Congress)
National Assembly Law 10/59 Austria and Prussia in 1866, which ended in the triumph of Prussia and a dramatic shift in the European balance of power. In ill health, Napoleon again allowed himself to be outmaneuvered diplomatically by Bismarck, leading to war between France and Prussia for which Napoleon’s nation was woefully unprepared. Proceeding with his army in the field, Napoleon was among those taken prisoner by the Germans following their victory in the Battle of Sedan of September 1, 1870. Napoleon was roundly condemned by his countrymen for the disastrous defeat in the FrancoPrussian War, and his government was overthrown, to be replaced by a republic. Napoleon III went into unlamented exile and died at Chislehurst in England on January 9, 1873. MICHAEL R. NICHOLS See also Annam; Cochin China; French Indochina, 1860s–1946; Rigault de Genouilly, Charles; Tu Duc; Vietnam, History of, 938 CE through the French Conquest References Bury, J. P. T. Napoleon III and the Second Empire. London: English Universities Press, 1964. MacMillan, James F. Napoleon III. London: Longman, 1991. Smith, W. H. C. Napoleon III. New York: St. Martin’s, 1972.
Na San, Battle of Start Date: November 1953 End Date: December 1953 French military operation in late 1952 that foreshadowed the 1954 Battle of Dien Bien Phu. Commander of French forces in Indochina General Raoul Salan believed that at the conclusion of the rainy season in August 1952, Viet Minh commander General Vo Nguyen Giap intended to resume the offensive in the mountains of northwestern Vietnam. Hoping to forestall that, Salan established a base deep inside Viet Minh–held territory in the mountain-ringed Na San Valley. He planned this to be the meeting point for garrisons from the scattered French border posts and as a base to protect Laos and the Thai Highlands. The French planned to construct an airstrip at Na San, less than 50 minutes by air from Hanoi. Salan hoped to tempt Giap into frontal assaults at the base, attacks that Salan planned to smash with artillery and airpower. Colonel Jean Giles, a tough one-eyed paratroop officer, commanded French forces at Na San. The first phase of the operation went well. Most of the scattered French garrisons were extracted to Na San, and both the airfield and base fortifications were constructed in record time. On November 30 and December 1, 1952, the Viet Minh 308th and 312th divisions attacked the French garrison but were repulsed. On December 2 the Viet Minh attackers withdrew after suffering between 500 and 1,000 dead. On the surface, the battle
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seemed to be a great success for the French. Little noticed at the time was the loss to the Viet Minh on November 30 of the small French post and airfield at Dien Bien Phu, then held by a Laotian infantry unit. After putting a deception plan into effect, the French evacuated Na San by air without incident on August 11, 1953. They also removed about 1,500 Thai peasants and local officials who had cooperated with them. The Na San operation should have demonstrated convincingly to French commanders the great difficulty of supplying a distant garrison with an inadequate airlift capacity. The French occupation of Na San also was little obstacle to Viet Minh military operations in the area, which simply flowed through the jungle around the French base. Giap later remarked that the Battle of Na San taught him that a fortified enemy camp supplied by air could be taken only by bringing the landing strip under heavy artillery fire. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; LORRAINE, Operation; Salan, Raoul Albin Louis; Vo Nguyen Giap References Fall, Bernard B. Street without Joy: The French Debacle in Indochina. Rev. ed. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1994. Roy, Jules. The Battle of Dienbienphu. New York: Harper and Row, 1965. Simpson, Howard R. Dien Bien Phu: The Epic Battle America Forgot. Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1994. Windrow, Martin. The Last Valley: Dien Bien Phu and the French Defeat in Vietnam. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2004.
National Assembly Law 10/59 Repressive legislation aimed at the Communists and enacted by the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) in October 1959. National Assembly Law 10/59 was in response to Hanoi’s March 1959 decision to increase support for the insurgency in South Vietnam. South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem’s response to the insurgency was increased military raids, acceleration of the relocation program, and anti-Communist legislative measures. Beginning in February 1959, a series of articles were published in Diem’s mouthpiece, the Cach Mang Quoc Gia (National Revolution) daily. These outlined a new program of intensified repression by means of an organized Viet Cong (VC) watch system and concentrated military and police raids on villages based on secret informers’ reports. As a part of Diem’s Cach Mang Quoc Gia plan, the South Vietnamese National Assembly passed Law 10/59 on May 6, 1959. This legislation legalized courts-martial and executions of individuals convicted of working with the VC, the name arbitrarily given at that time to anyone who opposed the regime.
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The government set up special courts to be run by military personnel only. Proceedings could take place without any preliminary inquiry. A summons was served 24 hours before the court sat if the accused “commits or intends to commit crimes with the aim of sabotage, or of infringing upon the security of the State, or of injuring the life or the property of the people.” Trials lacked any formalities, with the courts preferring a straight-out denunciation, a quick verdict, and immediate execution. There were only two types of punishment: death or life imprisonment. In theory, there was an appeal to President Diem against the death sentence; there was none against life imprisonment. About half of those condemned to death were actually executed, many of these on the spot by mobile guillotines. Apart from arming, financing, and advising these anti-Communist operations, the U.S. government provided specialized help by training Diem police agents in the United States and sending a special mission to Saigon to reorganize police methods, especially to improve the system of dossiers and control lists. Diem ultimately closed this system down after some of the specialists returned to the United States and wrote anti-Diem articles. In October 1959 the National Assembly passed another law ordering not only VC and former Viet Minh to be executed but also their friends, relatives, and “associates.” Both laws reflected the determination of Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu to forcefully handle the Communist threat. The National Assembly itself was not a decision-making legislative body but instead was a rubber stamp for the Diem regime. These repressive measures were counterproductive. They helped provoke popular uprisings in Quang Ngai Province in August 1959 and another in Ban Tre in January 1960. Although Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) troops suppressed these uprisings, loyalty to the Saigon government was never successfully restored in the countryside. Although Law 10/59 imposed brutal measures, it must be understood against the backdrop of brutal and rampant Communist terrorist activities in the remote areas between 1957 and 1959. These included blowing up bridges, schools, and dispensaries and assassinating unarmed village committee members, antimalaria spray teams, and even military dependents. At the time there was no effective legislation to cope with this situation. After Diem’s November 1963 assassination, however, Law 10/59 was quietly done away with. ZSOLT J. VARGA
Scigliano, Robert G. South Vietnam: Nation under Stress. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964. Wintle, Justin. The Vietnam Wars. New York: St. Martin’s, 1991.
See also Ngo Dinh Diem; Ngo Dinh Nhu; Vietnam, Republic of, 1954–1975
See also Vietnam, Republic of, 1954–1975
References Burchett, Wilfred G. The Furtive War: The United States in Vietnam and Laos. New York: International Publishers, 1963. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. Moss, George. Vietnam: An American Ordeal. 2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1994.
References Dacy, Douglas C. The Fiscal System of Wartime Vietnam. Arlington, VA: Institute for Defense Analysis, 1969. Davies, S. Gethyn. Central Banking in South and East Asia. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960. Emery, Robert F. The Financial Institutions of Southeast Asia. New York: Praeger, 1970.
National Bank of Vietnam Name of the state banks of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). The National Bank of Vietnam was established on December 31, 1954, by Republic Ordinance Number 48 and superseded the Bank of Indochina that had served the states of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. After the 1954 division of Vietnam, the National Bank became the official state bank of North Vietnam. After 1960 all foreign currency and business profits were deposited in the National Bank, and within five years 95 percent of North Vietnam’s economy was state owned. In South Vietnam in 1955, President Ngo Dinh Diem created another National Bank of Vietnam and named his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu as chairman. To receive U.S. imports, local merchants contributed national currency called piasters into the bank’s counterpart fund. Under the Commercial Import Program, $1.9 billion in economic aid was directed to South Vietnam by 1964. Although the aid appeared to be extensive, the imports were largely luxury goods for the Saigon upper class and did little to assist the South Vietnamese economy as a whole. In 1975 after the fall of Saigon, the North Vietnamese bank assumed control of South Vietnam’s economy by requiring residents to exchange their piasters for dong at a rate of 500 to 1. In an attempt to squelch the capitalists, every household was given a form to declare the amount of old money in its possession. Despite garnering some money for the government treasury and creating a certain amount of socioeconomic leveling, the currency exchange scheme affected most of the population in southern Vietnam by causing distrust and loss of confidence in the central government, its banking system, and the value of its currency. Partly as a result of this distrust, the new currency steadily lost value and was reluctantly floated by the National Bank of Vietnam in 1989. By destroying the economic power of the moneyed class, the Communist government left no avenue for the huge amounts of governmentissued money to make its way back to the central banks, which added to the already spiraling postwar inflation. J. NATHAN CAMPBELL
National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord Honey, P. J. Communism in North Vietnam. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1962. Lansdale, Edward Geary. In the Midst of Wars: An American’s Mission to Southeast Asia. New York: Harper and Row, 1972. Ngo Vinh Hai. “Postwar Vietnam: Political Economy.” In Coming to Terms: Indochina, the United States, and the War, edited by Douglas Allen and Ngo Vinh Long, 65–88. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991. Taylor, Milton C. “South Vietnam: Lavish Aid, Limited Progress.” Pacific Affairs 34 (1961): 242–256.
National Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam The first effort to build a national coalition of organizations in the United States opposed to the Vietnam War. Organized in Washington, D.C., from discussions at the August 1965 Assembly of Unrepresented People, the original purpose of the National Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NCC) was to help coordinate the October 15–16, 1965, International Days of Protest announced by Berkeley’s Vietnam Day Committee. Delegates selected Frank Emspak as coordinator and set up offices in Madison, Wisconsin. The NCC lacked any decision-making authority for its 33 affiliated organizations but provided a central location for receiving and distributing information about antiwar activities. Initiative for the demonstrations remained primarily with local groups. The NCC generated broad support, although some liberal groups such as the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) opposed close cooperation with radicals and rejected formal affiliation. The October protests attracted roughly 100,000 participants in 80 cities and several nations. The first NCC convention, held during November 25–29, 1965, in Washington, drew more than 1,500 delegates from about 100 antiwar and civil rights organizations. Efforts to develop an ongoing antiwar program failed as the meeting degenerated into factional disputes, largely between the Communist Party and the Socialist Workers Party (SWP). The Communists favored a multiissue organization and electoral activity, while the SWP demanded immediate withdrawal from Vietnam and proposed a separate organization of independent committees against the war. For the majority of delegates, inexperienced in leftist ideological struggles, the conference proved demoralizing. Indeed, the spectacle pushed some activists out of the movement, while others’ doubts about cooperation with Marxists were reaffirmed. The conference’s only accomplishment was to set a date for demonstrations in the spring. An NCC standing committee meeting during January 8–9, 1966, in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, brought no resolution. Divided over whether to call for immediate withdrawal or a negotiated settlement, the Milwaukee meeting proved to be the NCC’s last. The organization continued as a clearinghouse and formally sponsored the Second International Days of Protest of March 25–26, 1966, but
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local groups again carried the burden of planning and conducting antiwar demonstrations. The results exceeded the previous effort, attracting more than 100,000 demonstrators in perhaps 100 cities and several foreign countries. With the organization in disarray, NCC leadership resisted planning summer demonstrations. Activists dissatisfied with this hesitation bypassed the NCC staff. A series of antiwar conferences in Cleveland during 1966 produced a temporary coalition to organize protests, the November 5–8 Mobilization Committee, that was in turn succeeded by the Spring Mobilization Committee. The NCC continued to operate but forfeited its leadership role in the antiwar movement. Within months the NCC declined as a national body and functioned as a local Wisconsin organization that remained active within the larger coalition. MITCHELL K. HALL See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Spring Mobilization to End the War in Vietnam References DeBenedetti, Charles, with Charles Chatfield. An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1990. Halstead, Fred. Out Now! A Participant’s Account of the American Movement against the Vietnam War. New York: Monad, 1978. Wells, Tom. The War Within: America’s Battle over Vietnam. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.
National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord Organization established to implement political provisions of the 1973 Paris Peace Accords within the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). The Paris Peace Accords went into effect at midnight Greenwich mean time (GMT) on January 27, 1973. On the political side, the South Vietnamese people were to decide their future through “genuinely free and democratic elections under international supervision.” These elections were to be organized by the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord (NCNRC), composed of representatives of the South Vietnamese government; the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG), the Communists; and the neutralists. The NCNRC was to operate on the basis of unanimity, which in effect gave each party a veto. The NCNRC was to promote observance of the agreement and the democratic liberties that it guaranteed as well as national reconciliation and concord. The country was to be reunified step by step by mutual agreement. In the meantime the demilitarized zone (DMZ) was to be reestablished as in 1954, and relations between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and South Vietnam were to be normalized. South Vietnamese president Nguyen Van Thieu had proclaimed before the Paris Peace Accords a national policy known as the
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“Four Nos”: no negotiating, no Communist activity in South Vietnam, no coalition, and no surrender of territory. Thieu objected to the tripartite NCNRC structure because he saw the neutralists as favoring the Communists and the NCNRC as a stalking horse for a coalition government. He also feared that he would be maneuvered into a position in which the South Vietnamese government would be seen as blocking a peaceful solution. In fact little came of the NCNRC, as Thieu and the Communists opted to renew the war. Both sides strengthened and resupplied their forces and conducted sporadic attacks on the other. On January 6, 1975, Communist forces overran Phuoc Binh, the capital city of Phuoc Long Province, 60 miles north of Saigon. The Communists launched the attack in part to test the reaction of the U.S. government, and much to their relief, Washington did not intervene. Leftist opposition circles continued to demand the adoption of the NCNRC up until President Thieu’s government collapsed in April 1975, but it was on the battlefield that the Vietnam War was decided. HO DIEU ANH AND SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Nguyen Van Thieu; Paris Peace Accords References Isaacs, Arnold R. Without Honor: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983. Le Gro, William E. Vietnam from Cease-Fire to Capitulation. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1981. Porter, D. Gareth. A Peace Denied: The United States, Vietnam, and the Paris Agreement. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975.
National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam The National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (National Liberation Front [NLF]) was formed on December 20, 1960. The establishment of the NLF was a standard Communist tactic designed to broaden the base of the revolutionary struggle by providing a vehicle that could attract non-Communist elements opposed to the pro-American Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Ho Chi Minh, leader of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), had used a similar tactic during the war against the French when he formed his ostensibly broadbased Viet Minh front organization. In addition, the formation of the NLF was also aimed at concealing North Vietnam’s involvement in the struggle in South Vietnam. The origins of the NLF and the extent of its dependence on Hanoi have long been a source of vigorous debate among Western scholars and U.S. government officials, but recently declassified Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) documents and a flood of Vietnamese histories and memoirs have shed new light on the NLF’s origins. According to this new information, the formation
of a broad-based front movement had been an integral part of the Communist strategy for South Vietnam ever since early 1959, when the VCP Central Committee in Hanoi passed Resolution 15 authorizing the use of armed force in South Vietnam. However, the Communists in South Vietnam had to first assemble a group of prominent and nominally non-Communist South Vietnamese figures to head such a front. This task initially proved difficult, especially since Nguyen Huu Tho, the man chosen to lead the front, was then being held under house arrest by the South Vietnamese government. In late 1961 he finally escaped to the jungle to join the NLF. According to newly declassified VCP documents, the failed November 1960 coup attempt against South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem caused the Communist leadership to expedite the formation of the NLF. The VCP leaders in Hanoi decided to exploit this opportunity by announcing the formation of the NLF in December 1960, just one month after the coup attempt, to make it appear that the NLF had been formed as a result of widespread non-Communist South Vietnamese political opposition to President Diem’s regime. The newly declassified VCP documents also reveal that the NLF manifesto, announced at the time of the NLF’s formation, was in fact written and approved in Hanoi. All of this does not mean that there were no tensions or disagreements between the northern and southern wings of the VCP or between the non-Communist and Communist elements of the NLF. One of the most significant of these seems to have been the reluctance of some southern Communist leaders to agree to Hanoi’s 1964 decision to shift from the small-unit protracted guerrilla war strategy that they had followed during the early years of the conflict to a big-unit conventional warfare strategy. However, this reluctance was quickly overcome as North Vietnamese General Nguyen Chi Thanh and other senior Communist officers from North Vietnam arrived in South Vietnam to take over direction of the war effort. It also should be noted that for all the claims that the NLF’s armed forces constituted an independent southern army separate from the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) command structure, when they were first formed every one of the so-called NLF divisions was in fact commanded by a PAVN officer who was a native of northern Vietnam, not southern Vietnam. Over the years the NLF became increasingly identified, both in South Vietnam and internationally, with the North Vietnamese regime. For this reason, at Hanoi’s direction a second and outwardly more independent front group was formed in 1968, the National Alliance of National, Democratic, and Peace Forces. The formation of the new front somewhat diluted the NLF’s ostensible leadership role, and that role was further diluted in 1969 with the formation of the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) of South Vietnam. A PRG delegation quickly replaced the NLF delegation as the representative of the South Vietnamese revolution in the peace talks in Paris. In spite of these changes, the NLF continued to serve as the primary umbrella front organization for the Communist effort in South Vietnam right up to the end of the war. When Communist
National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam
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A prisoner, suspected of being a Viet Cong, awaits interrogation. Provincial Reconnaissance Units assigned to conduct “special missions” killed and captured many Viet Cong political operatives and intelligence agents during the Vietnam War. (National Archives)
military forces overran the last South Vietnamese defense lines on April 30, 1975, and then captured the South Vietnamese Presidential Palace in Saigon and tore down the South Vietnamese national flag, the victory flag that they raised in its place was the NLF flag, half-red and half-blue with a large yellow star in its center. Just one year later in 1976 when South Vietnam was officially merged with North Vietnam to form the new Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), the NLF was dissolved and merged with North Vietnam’s own front organization, the Vietnamese Fatherland Front. Few of the senior NLF figureheads went on to attain positions of power in the newly unified Vietnamese government and the VCP, although NLF chairman Nguyen Huu Tho was given the ceremonial post of vice president of the SRV. MERLE L. PRIBBENOW II See also Ngo Dinh Diem; Nguyen Chanh Thi; Nguyen Chi Thanh; Nguyen Huu Tho; Paris Negotiations; Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam; United Front References Brigham, Robert K. Guerrilla Diplomacy: The NLF’s Foreign Relations and the Viet Nam War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999.
Dao Trong Cang, ed. Van Kien Dang Toan Tap, Tap 29, 1968 [Collected Party Documents, Vol. 29, 1968]. Hanoi: National Political Publishing House, 2004. Ha Huu Khieu, ed. Dai Tuong Nguyen Chi Thanh, nha chinh tri quan su loi lac [General Nguyen Chi Thanh, an Outstanding Military and Political Figure]. Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1997. Military History Institute of Vietnam. Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People’s Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002. Pike, Douglas. Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1966. Tran Bach Dang, ed. Chung Mot Bong Co (Ve Mat Tran Dan Toc Giai Phong Mien Nam Viet Nam) [Under One Flag (The National Liberation Front for South Vietnam)]. Hanoi: National Political Publishing House, 1993. Trinh Muu, ed. Van Kien Dang Toan Tap, Tap 37, 1976 [Collected Party Documents, Vol. 37, 1976]. Hanoi: National Political Publishing House 2004. Trinh Nhu, ed. Van Kien Dang Toan Tap, Tap 21, 1960 [Collected Party Documents, Vol. 21, 1960]. Hanoi: National Political Publishing House, 2002. Truong Nhu Tang, with David Charnoff and Doan Van Toai. A Viet Cong Memoir: An Inside Account of the Vietnam War and Its Aftermath. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985.
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National Hard Hats of America See Hardhats
References FitzGerald, Frances. Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam. Boston: Little, Brown, 1972. Nguyen Cao Ky. Twenty Years and Twenty Days. New York: Stein and Day, 1976.
National Leadership Council Governing political body in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) established in June 1965. Following the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem in November 1963, South Vietnam underwent a period of chronic political instability. On February 17, 1965, a new civilian government was installed in Saigon with Phan Huy Quat as premier. The military was still strongly represented, however, with three generals holding ministerial positions. The civilian government maintained an uneasy relationship with younger Army of the Republic of Vietnam (Army, South Vietnamese Army) generals known as the Young Turks, and a series of threatened or attempted coups imperiled political stability. On June 9, 1965, Premier Phan Huy Quat turned to the Armed Forces Council to settle a dispute with Head of State Phan Khac Suu and was told to resign. After Quat stepped aside, on June 12 a triumvirate of Young Turks—generals Nguyen Cao Ky, Nguyen Van Thieu, and Nguyen Huu Co—announced the formation of a National Leadership Council to rule South Vietnam. The youngest and least experienced government to date, the National Leadership Council was subsequently expanded to include 10 members. This body was in effect an inner circle of the 50-member Armed Forces Council, which much to U.S. ambassador Maxwell Taylor’s chagrin then elected Ky as chairman of the Central Executive Committee, or premier, charged with conducting the day-to-day government operations. Nguyen Van Thieu occupied the relatively powerless position of chairman of the National Leadership Council (chief of state). Ky recalled in his memoirs that Thieu, who was senior to him and the army chief of staff, at that time declined the top post. Nonetheless, the two men were soon locked in a bitter rivalry for power. This was the ninth South Vietnamese government in less than two years, but it proved to be the most durable since that of Diem. In September 1966 South Vietnam elected a Constituent Assembly, which had as its task the drafting of a new constitution. This document came into effect in April 1967. On September 3 presidential and senatorial elections were held under the auspices of the new constitution. Thieu and Ky were nominated by the Armed Forces Council to run for the presidency on the same slate, with Ky forced to yield the top spot to Thieu on the grounds of military seniority. This slate won only 34.8 percent of the votes but was sufficient for victory, as the remainder of the votes were split among 10 other slates. The new government, still militarily dominated, then assumed power. HO DIEU ANH AND SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Elections, National, Republic of Vietnam, 1955, 1967, 1971; Ngo Dinh Diem; Nguyen Cao Ky; Nguyen Van Thieu; Phan Huy Quat; Taylor, Maxwell Davenport
National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia Organization founded in 1969 to help identify and repatriate Vietnam prisoners of war (POWs). In response to growing concerns over the issue of U.S. POWs held by the Communists during the Vietnam War, the Lyndon B. Johnson administration maintained that the humane treatment and eventual release of POWs would be best achieved by not condemning or confronting publicly the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) regarding its POW policies. The Richard M. Nixon administration, which took office in January 1969, changed that approach and initiated the Go Public Campaign in the spring of 1969. The goals of the Go Public Campaign were to obtain a complete list of POWs in captivity, effect the release of infirm POWs, institute third-party inspections of prison camps, and force compliance by North Vietnam with the Geneva Conventions regarding POW treatment. The Nixon administration also encouraged individual citizens and private organizations to promote the objectives of the campaign. In the wake of the Go Public Campaign, several organizations were founded to bring the plight of POWs to the forefront. The largest of the family-led POW organizations was the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia (NLOF). The group, comprised primarily of the wives of POWs, was formed in June 1969 and incorporated in May 1970 and opened a national headquarters in Washington, D.C., in June 1970. Local branches in military communities such as Norfolk– Virginia Beach and San Diego, California, were key to the NLOF’s work. Original leaders of the NLOF included Sybil Stockdale, whose husband U.S. Navy officer James B. Stockdale was being held captive in North Vietnam. She was the first chair of the board of directors. Iris R. Powers was the first full-time national coordinator. Louise Mulligan and Jane Denton were active members, as were Doris Day, Anne Purcell, Carol O. North (who succeeded Stockdale as chair), Maureen Dunn, Phyllis Galanti, and Valerie Kushner. At the international level, NLOF representatives met with North Vietnamese representatives in Paris on several occasions. Texas billionaire businessman and U.S. Naval Academy graduate H. Ross Perot sponsored one of the largest NLOF visits to Paris. In December 1969, 58 wives and 94 children of Vietnam War POWs boarded a Perot-chartered aircraft dubbed “The Spirit of Christmas” for Paris. Only 3 wives were allowed to meet with the 4-member North
National Security Action Memorandum Number 328 Vietnamese delegation, however, and the meeting produced no concessions. Members of the NLOF also testified before the U.S. Congress on several occasions. Other NLOF activities involved petition drives, presentations to various civic groups, letter-writing campaigns, and POW bracelet sales. With the release of the POWs during Operation HOMECOMING (February–March 1973), the primary goal of the NLOF changed to one that focused on a full accounting of all servicemen listed as missing in action (MIA) in Southeast Asia. After the war, the membership changed as well. Most family members of returning POWs left the organization, and a number of members of Voices in Vital America (VIVA) joined the NLOF. Founded in 1967 as Victory in Vietnam Association, this California-based organization gained notoriety for the creation of POW/MIA wrist bracelets, which included a serviceman’s name, rank, and date of loss. In the summer of 1976 Carol Bates, formerly of VIVA, became the executive director of the NLOF. The reconstituted NLOF began a lobbying campaign to oppose U.S. adherence to Article 21 of the Paris Peace Accords, which required U.S. funding for reconstruction efforts in Vietnam, until a full accounting of MIAs could be completed. Following the completion of Operation HOMECOMING, the NLOF embraced and advanced the argument that POWs were still being held in Southeast Asia and that the U.S. government was not attempting to secure their release. Several factors contributed to this. The Department of Defense had released on more than one occasion conflicting reports regarding the numbers, albeit by small margins, of Americans classified at one time as POWs, MIAs, or killed in action in Indochina. The case of U.S. Marine Corps private first class Robert Garwood aided conspiracy theorists. Garwood was captured by the Communist Viet Cong (VC) in September 1965 but was not released with other U.S. POWs in 1973. He was not repatriated until March 1979, when he returned to the United States to face a courtmartial. During his trial he denied an earlier report that he had made to a foreign journalist that he had seen other live American POWs in Vietnam. One of Garwood’s defense attorneys was former NLOF attorney Dermot Foley. In the early 1980s through a variety of efforts, including those of President Ronald Reagan and the Republican National Committee, the NLOF became the principal liaison between the Department of Defense and MIA activists. In 1993 a U.S. Senate select committee, which included former Vietnam POW and U.S. senator John S. McCain III, stated that “there is no proof that U.S. POWs survive, but neither is there proof that all of those who did not return have died. There is evidence, moreover, that indicates the possibility of survival, at least for a small number, after Operation HOMECOMING.” The committee concluded that there were no surviving POWs in Vietnam as of 1993. In 2008 the Pentagon and the NLOF listed more than 1,700 Americans as unaccounted for and missing from the Vietnam War. GLENN M. ROBINS
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See also HOMECOMING, Operation; McCain, John Sidney, III; Prisoners of War,
Allied; Stockdale, Sybil Bailey References Davis, Vernon. The Long Road Home: U.S. Prisoner of War Policy and Planning in Southeast Asia. Washington, DC: Historical Office, Secretary of Defense, 2000. Franklin, H. Bruce. M.I.A. or Mythmaking in America: How and Why Belief in Live POWs Has Possessed a Nation. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1993. U.S. Senate. Report of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, 103 Cong., 1st Sess., January 13, 1993. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993.
National Party of Greater Vietnam See Dai Viet Quoc Dan Dang
National Security Action Memorandum Number 328 Memorandum generated by the National Security Council directing the first major U.S. escalation in the Vietnam War via the deployment of large numbers of ground troops to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Memorandum Number 328 was signed by National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy on April 6, 1965, and was in reference to President Lyndon B. Johnson’s April 1 decision to increase American participation in the Vietnam War; it was sent to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of State Robert McNamara, and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director William Raborn. Bundy, who had first become national security adviser under President John F. Kennedy in 1961, was an early proponent of aggressive action against Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). Just two months earlier he had suggested U.S. bombing strikes against select targets in North Vietnam. Bundy later came to regret his hawkish views on the war, and he was among the first of Kennedy’s and Johnson’s advisers to publicly distance himself from the escalatory spiral in the conflict. The memorandum first stated Johnson’s approval of a 41step program of nonmilitary actions to be taken in Vietnam that were designed to bolster South Vietnam while punishing North Vietnam. Second, the memo stated the president’s authorization to pursue as many as 12 covert actions to be taken against North Vietnam, as recommended by the CIA. Third, the memo directed the secretary of defense to deploy 18,000–20,000 additional U.S. ground troops to South Vietnam, to include two additional marine battalions and a marine air squadron. Fourth, the memo made clear that Johnson was authorizing all U.S. Marine Corps battalions in Vietnam to employ force in the struggle against the Viet Cong (VC) and People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) regulars.
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Memorandum Number 328 marked the beginning of a long series of escalations in the Vietnam War by nearly doubling the number of American troops and military advisers on the ground. The remainder of 1965 saw large and steady increases in ground forces in Vietnam so that by year’s end there were some 180,000 U.S. troops there. By 1968 the Johnson administration had deployed more than 500,000 troops to fight in the conflict. On the evening of April 7, 1965, Johnson gave a televised address from Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore announcing his administration’s determination to increase American involvement in Vietnam, although he did not mention specific numbers of troops to be deployed. PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR. See also Bundy, McGeorge; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Johnson, Lyndon Baines, Johns Hopkins University Speech References Hunt, Michael H. Lyndon Johnson’s War: America’s Cold War Crusade in Vietnam, 1945–1968. New York: Hill and Wang, 1996. VanDeMark, Brian. Into the Quagmire: Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation of the Vietnam War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.
Native Americans in the U.S. Military As in previous 20th-century conflicts, Native Americans who served during the Vietnam War compiled an enviable record of bravery and courage, continuing a warrior tradition deeply entrenched in their cultures. In the midst of a war that became deeply unpopular in mainstream America, thousands of Native Americans volunteered for military service at a much higher percentage than whites or African Americans (some studies suggest that 80–90 percent volunteered). In numerous cases the volunteers had parents, grandparents, and other family members who had served in World War I, World War II, and the Korean War. Once in the military, Native Americans were much more likely to serve, either as volunteers or by assignment, in active combat. In part because of their perceived or assumed skills in scouting and tracking, many ended up in Special Forces or Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRPS) units. Others worked in Laos and Vietnam with the Hmongs and Montagnards, Indochina’s tribal peoples. Native American veterans often reported a special affinity with the Montagnards, Vietnam’s indigenous people. Native American veterans often volunteered to serve multiple tours; it was not uncommon for some to reenlist for two or more combat tours. Native Americans who saw combat in Vietnam were, like their predecessors in prior wars, often placed in situations where their bravery was put to the test. Some, such as Cherokee serviceman Billy Walkabout, were highly decorated, receiving the Distinguished Service Cross. Sergeant Pascal Poola, a Kiowa who also served in World War II and the Korean War and was wounded in those wars as well as in Vietnam War, earned many medals but
earned the last of his five Bronze Star Medals in an action that cost him his life. Poola was mortally wounded as he pulled his fellow soldiers to safety. Like many Vietnam War veterans, Native Americans faced numerous problems adjusting to life when they returned from the war. These problems included substance abuse and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) at levels higher than the general Vietnam War veteran population. This can be partly explained by the fact that so many Native Americans had seen combat and repeated tours during the war. In the case of Native American veterans, they returned to America at a time when the Civil Rights Movement was having a major impact on many Native American communities. For example, the American Indian Movement (AIM) occupied the village of Wounded Knee, South Dakota, in 1973 to protest against the tribal government on the Pine Ridge Reservation. The confrontation between AIM and local law enforcement and U.S. military forces became known as Wounded Knee II. Two AIM leaders, Carter Camp and Stan Holder, both Vietnam War veterans, directed construction of fortified bunkers and blockades to defend the village. Other Native American veterans became active in Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW). In the years since the war, many Native Americans have joined the American Legion, the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW), and Vietnam Veterans of America (VVA). Vietnam War veterans are regularly honored at powwows and celebrations and participate in tribal ceremonies across the United States. The Vietnam Veterans Intertribe Association represents the interests of many Native American veterans. By war’s end more than 85,000 Native Americans had seen Vietnam War–era service in the U.S. military, with perhaps as many as 90 percent of them volunteers. More than half that number served in combat. More than 42,000 served in Indochina alone, and 226 died there. These figures indicate that Native Americans had the highest per capita service rate of any ethnic group in the United States. STEVE POTTS See also Civil Rights Movement; Hmongs; Montagnards; Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder; Vietnam Veterans Against the War; Vietnam Veterans of America References Carroll, Al. Medicine Bags & Dog Tags: American Indian Veterans from Colonial Times to the Second Iraq War. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008. Holm, Tom. Strong Hearts, Wounded Souls: Native American Veterans of the Vietnam War. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996. “The National Survey of Indian Vietnam Veterans.” American Indian and Alaska Native Mental Health Research 6(1) (1994): 18–28. Robinson, Gary, and Phil Lucas. From Warriors to Soldiers: The History of Native American Service in the United States Military. New York: iUniverse, 2008. St. Pierre, Mark. Of Uncommon Birth: Dakota Sons in Vietnam. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2003.
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Private First Class Joseph Big Medicine Jr., a Cheyenne Indian, writes a letter to his family. He is a member of the 1st Marine Regiment on a search-anddestroy mission near the marine base at An Hoa, South Vietnam, July 21, 1969. (National Archives)
Naval Gunfire Support Naval bombardment during the Vietnam War can be divided between the SEA DRAGON interdiction and harassment operations directed against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) from 1966 to 1968 and gunnery support for friendly troops in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). In the latter role, U.S. warships fired their first missions in 1965 and would continue to do so until the end of active U.S. naval operations in 1972. With its 1,200-mile coastline, South Vietnam offered the U.S. Navy an ideal theater for its gunships. Cruisers, frigates, and destroyers could cover one-third of the land area of I Corps Tactical Zone and large portions of II and III Corps Tactical Zones. Planning for naval gunfire support began at a joint U.S. Navy– U.S. Air Force conference in Saigon during May 3–5, 1965. The Seventh Fleet tasked its gunfire-support ships with delivering two types of artillery fire: unobserved saturation bombardment of preselected areas and call fire controlled by ground or aerial spotters.
Targets included Communist forces opposing amphibious landings and People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) artillery batteries that fired across the demilitarized zone (DMZ). The first U.S. naval bombardment occurred in mid-May 1965, when the 8-inch gun cruiser Canberra and 5 destroyers fired at Viet Cong (VC) assembly areas, caches, and troops on the move. Operation STARLITE in August 1965 clearly demonstrated the effectiveness of naval gunfire support. By the spring of 1966 escorts, rocket landing ships, and the inshore fire-support ship Carronade had joined the effort and were joined in 1968 by the battleship New Jersey for one tour. Ammunition expenditure increased from 90,000 rounds for all of 1965 to 40,000 rounds monthly by late 1966. In 1967 the ships fired half a million projectiles. During the 1968 Tet Offensive, 22 gunships—2 cruisers, 18 destroyers, and 2 rocket ships—were in action at once, firing more than 100,000 rounds monthly and providing key support in the defeat of Communist forces at Hue.
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This aspect of the war was not totally one-sided. On occasion the gunships came to close quarters with Communist forces. For example, the destroyer Ozbourn was damaged by mortar fire when steaming only two miles offshore. Additionally, the large number of gunfire-support missions wore on equipment and thus necessitated regunning, which was usually accomplished at Subic Bay in the Philippines. Some of the newer pieces of ordnance also proved liable to malfunction, with the first such instance occurring in May 1965 with an in-bore 5-inch gun explosion on the destroyer Somers. By 1969 seven additional ships suffered such accidents, some of which killed crewmen. From its high point in the spring of 1968, the gunfire-support mission decreased as the war wound down. By 1971 an average of only 3 ships patrolled the gunline. Ordnance expenditures fell from 454,000 rounds in 1969 to 114,000 in 1971. A last surge of activity came during the 1972 PAVN Easter Offensive, when as many as 20 warships fired against PAVN forces in Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces and were a key force in staving off attacks on Hue. MALCOLM MUIR JR. See also New Jersey, USS; SEA DRAGON, Operation; STARLITE, Operation; United States Navy; Warships, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam References Marolda, Edward J. By Sea, Air, and Land: An Illustrated History of the U.S. Navy and the War in Southeast Asia. Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 1994. Muir, Malcolm, Jr. Black Shoes and Blue Water: Surface Warfare in the United States Navy, 1945–1975. Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 1996. Shulimson, Jack. U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1966: An Expanding War. Marine Corps Vietnam Series. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Marine Corps Historical Center, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters, 1982.
Navarre, Henri Eugène Birth Date: July 31, 1898 Death Date: June 21, 1983 French Army general and commander of French forces in Indochina (1953–1954), chiefly remembered as the architect of the 1954 Dien Bien Phu debacle. Henri Eugène Navarre was born on July 31, 1898, at Villefranche de Rouergue in Aveyron; his father was a Greek scholar and dean of the Faculty of Letters at the University of Toulouse. In 1916 during World War I, Navarre enlisted in the army to secure admittance to the French military academy of Saint-Cyr the next year. He was commissioned a second lieutenant of Hussars in November 1918. Following the war, Navarre served in Syria, Morocco, and Germany. His years in Germany (1922–1926) led to him being regarded as a specialist in that country’s affairs. Study at the Cavalry School at Saumur fostered Navarre’s conviction that the future of
warfare rested on mechanized forces, and he transferred to the armored branch. He fought in the Rif War in Morocco during 1925– 1926, for which he was awarded the Legion of Honor. From 1928 to 1930 he attended the École Supérieure de Guerre. From 1936 to 1939 he headed the German Section of the Deuxième Bureau (army intelligence). Promoted to major in October 1939, he became an intelligence officer on the staff of General Maxime Weygand. In 1940 Navarre helped organize military intelligence in occupied France, and until 1942 he headed army intelligence in North Africa. He then commanded a heavy cavalry regiment. In November 1942 Navarre was recalled to France, where he became active in organizing Resistance intelligence operations. In late 1944 he joined Allied forces invading southern France and was promoted to colonel. In 1945 he commanded a regiment of Moroccan Spahis that helped capture Colmar and Karlsruhe. Navarre’s war record and knowledge of Germany led to his appointment as chief of staff to the French military commander in Germany. Advanced to brigadier general in October 1945, he then became inspector general of French occupation forces in occupied Germany. In 1948 he commanded a division in Algeria, and after study at the Institute of Advanced Studies for the National Defense, in 1950 he was promoted to major general and returned to Germany for two years to command the 5th Armored Division. Promoted to lieutenant general in April 1952, he served as chief of staff to Marshal Alphonse Juin, commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Central European forces. On May 8, 1953, the René Mayer government named Navarre to replace General Raoul Salan as commander of French Union forces in Indochina with the task of finding an honorable way out of the war. Navarre did not receive the post of commissioner general, which the Paris government thought should go to a civilian to negotiate a peace settlement. Navarre, who made his decisions in isolation, soon changed the French tactics from largely static defense to fluid offensive operations. Determined to take the war to the Viet Minh, he ended up hastening the French military defeat. Navarre withdrew forces from various defensive positions to create a large mobile strike force. In July, Navarre flew to Paris to present French leaders with his plans to step up the war. These included negotiations with the Indochinese states that would grant them greater independence but secure their support for a wider war. He also proposed the deployment of an additional 20,000 French troops and 108 native Indochinese battalions. Navarre stated that if he received the requested reinforcements, if independence was granted to the Indochinese states, and if China did not step up aid to the Viet Minh, the war could be ended in 18 months. He later claimed that he never thought he could win the war and only hoped to restore the military situation in a coup nul (“draw”). Navarre’s decision to send significant military resources to occupy the remote outpost of Dien Bien Phu, as the key element of Operation CASTOR, was prompted by his desire to secure a blocking position on the main Viet Minh invasion route into Laos. He also
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General Henri Navarre, pictured here in 1953 when he was named commander of French forces in Indochina. Navarre was the architect of the strategy that led to the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu. (Bettmann/Corbis)
hoped to draw limited Viet Minh resources into a pitched battle, where they might be destroyed. His plan rested on the assumption that the French would enjoy absolute superiority in airpower and artillery. However, Dien Bien Phu was too far removed from French air bases in Hanoi and Haiphong, and in any case French air assets were insufficient. Navarre was also guilty of seriously underestimating his enemy. Viet Minh commander General Vo Nguyen Giap took up the challenge and committed all available resources in hopes of administering a resounding defeat. The fact that Dien Bien Phu is in a valley made its French defenders vulnerable targets for heavy artillery, which Viet Minh porters dragged over the mountains to the battlefield, something that Navarre had thought impossible. An embittered Navarre retired from the army in 1956 to run a brick factory and write his memoirs (Agonie de Indochine) free from military censorship. Although he took responsibility for Dien Bien Phu, he blamed the politicians, who he said “entangled France in the Geneva Conference,” for the ultimate French defeat in Indochina. Navarre died in Paris on June 21, 1983. SPENCER C. TUCKER
See also CASTOR, Operation; Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; Indochina War; Navarre Plan; Salan, Raoul Albin Louis; Vo Nguyen Giap References Fall, Bernard B. Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu. New York: Lippincott, 1966. Navarre, General Henri. Agonie de l’Indochine, 1953–1954. Paris: Plon, 1956. Roy, Jules. The Battle of Dienbienphu. New York: Harper and Row, 1965. Windrow, Martin. The Last Valley: Dien Bien Phu and the French Defeat in Vietnam. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2004.
Navarre Plan Plan developed by French commander in Indochina Lieutenant General Henri Navarre to find an honorable way for France out of the Indochina War. Following his May 1953 appointment to command in Indochina, Navarre and his deputy, Major General
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René Cogny, developed what became known as the Navarre Plan. Navarre, who made his decisions in isolation, changed French tactics from what had been a largely static defense to fluid offensive operations and withdrew forces from various defensive positions in order to create a mobile strike force. In July he flew to Paris to present French leaders his plans to step up the war. The Navarre Plan included negotiations with the Indochina states that would grant them greater independence in exchange for their support for a wider war. He also proposed deploying an additional 20,000 French troops and raising 108 native Indochinese battalions. Navarre was quoted as telling the Paris press that if he received the requested reinforcements, if the Indochinese states were granted independence, and if China did not increase its aid to the Viet Minh, the war could be ended in 18 months. Navarre later claimed that he did not think he could win the war but only hoped to restore the military situation and secure a coup nul (“draw”). The U.S. government supported the Navarre Plan in 1953 with nearly $400 million in assistance. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles described the plan to a Senate committee as designed to “break the organized body of Communist aggression by the end of the 1955 fighting season.” Navarre’s decision to send significant military resources to occupy the remote outpost of Dien Bien Phu as the key element of Operation CASTOR was prompted by his desire to secure a blocking position on the main Viet Minh invasion route into Laos. CASTOR led to the most important battle of the war and hastened the French defeat in Indochina. SPENCER C. TUCKER See also CASTOR, Operation; Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; Dulles, John Foster; Indochina War; Navarre, Henri Eugène References Fall, Bernard B. Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu. New York: Lippincott, 1966. Navarre, General Henri. Agonie de l’Indochine, 1953–1954. Paris: Plon, 1956. Roy, Jules. The Battle of Dienbienphu. New York: Harper and Row, 1965. Simpson, Howard R. Dien Bien Phu: The Epic Battle America Forgot. Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1994. Windrow, Martin. The Last Valley: Dien Bien Phu and the French Defeat in Vietnam. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2004.
Neutrality Under international law, regimes declaring themselves neutral in wartime are required to live up to that pledge. The 1907 Hague Convention states that “A neutral country has the obligation not to allow its territory to be used by a belligerent. If the neutral country is unwilling or unable to prevent this, the other belligerent has the right to take appropriate counteraction.”
During the Vietnam War, this neutrality-belligerency issue involved both Laos and Cambodia. Beginning in 1959, their neutral status was compromised as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) began covertly using their territories for supply routes into the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). The Ho Chi Minh Trail supply route evolved from a network of footpaths through eastern Laos and Cambodia to a major supply artery, moving personnel and arms from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. By the early to mid-1960s, Viet Cong (VC) and People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) troops were using Laotian and Cambodian territories as rest, resupply, and retraining sanctuaries. As early as 1964, the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), the North Vietnamese headquarters directing operations in South Vietnam, was located in Cambodia. The fragile governments of Laos and Cambodia were unable to prevent these violations of their neutrality. Prince Norodom Sihanouk’s Cambodian government, however, actively violated its own proclaimed neutrality when in 1966 it authorized and supported the establishment of a North Vietnamese covert maritime supply route through Cambodia. The Cambodian government secretly allowed foreign ships carrying weapons and ammunition intended for Vietnamese Communist forces to dock at the main Cambodian port of Sihanoukville (present-day Kompong Som). After being loaded onto trucks at the port, the supplies were then transported under Cambodian Army escort to Vietnamese Communist base areas along the Vietnamese-Cambodian border for delivery. Postwar Vietnamese records reveal that from 1966 through 1969 North Vietnam shipped more than 21,000 tons of weapons and ammunition through the port of Sihanoukville to its forces fighting in South Vietnam. Although covert Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operations directed at aiding anti-Communist forces in Laos dated back to the early 1950s, covert responses by the U.S. military began with the introduction of Special Forces teams into Laos in 1959. These teams of advisers trained Hmongs to attack Vietnamese moving along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, but political sensitivities over the neutral status of Laos led to their withdrawal in 1962. Thereafter, unannounced U.S. bombing and artillery attacks began targeting Laotian portions of the trail in 1963 and Cambodian positions by 1966. Reflecting Cambodia’s growing importance to the North Vietnamese war effort in South Vietnam, some 3,600 Boeing B-52 Stratofortress bombing missions were flown over Cambodia from March 1969 through May 1970. The watershed of this activity came on April 28, 1970, when U.S. and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) troops invaded Cambodia. Militarily, the short-term impact of this operation was mixed at best. Valuable North Vietnamese intelligence documents were captured, as were large stocks of military equipment and other supplies. Because many North Vietnamese units and headquarters and logistics elements had withdrawn from the area prior to the invasion, however, North Vietnamese person-
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nel losses were relatively small. Their forces lived to fight another day, and their equipment loss was easily resupplied by the Chinese and the Soviets. The long-term military impact was somewhat more significant, as much of the ground fighting after 1970 involved battles between the PAVN and the ARVN battles in Cambodia. Thus, the military scope of ground operations widened considerably. On the other hand, the political fallout of this operation was both immediate and substantial. When President Richard M. Nixon revealed the Cambodian Incursion to the nation in a televised address on April 30, 1970, domestic opposition to the war exploded over this invasion of a “neutral” country. Inside the Nixon administration, Interior Secretary Walter Hickel publicly denounced the invasion, as did 200 State Department employees in a public petition. The New York Times and the Wall Street Journal, longtime bastions of elite support in the eastern United States of U.S. foreign policy, published editorials condemning this expansion of the war. Antiwar demonstrations resulted in the deaths of four students at Kent State University and two at Jackson State University and briefly shut down more than 400 college campuses. Nearly 100,000 students marched on the nation’s capital. Reacting to this public outrage, the U.S. Senate passed an amendment prohibiting U.S. operations in Cambodia after July 1, 1970. Ironically, Laotian and Cambodian neutrality had long been a myth. However, the public reaction to the Cambodian Incursion dramatically increased pressures within the Nixon administration to find a negotiated peace in Vietnam and also fostered congressional attempts to legislate an end to U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia by prohibiting the expenditure of public funds for such purposes. In short, the violation of Cambodia’s “neutrality” by U.S. forces helped speed the termination of the American phase of the Vietnam War. RALPH G. CARTER See also Antiwar Movement, U.S.; Cambodia; Cambodian Incursion; Central Office for South Vietnam; Ho Chi Minh Trail; Kent State University Shootings; Laos; Nixon, Richard Milhous References Ambrose, Stephen E. Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy since 1938. 6th rev. ed. New York: Penguin Books, 1991. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. Lomperis, Timothy J. The War Everyone Lost—and Won: America’s Intervention in Viet Nam’s Twin Struggles. Rev. ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1993. Spanier, John, and Steven W. Hook. American Foreign Policy since World War II. 13th ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1995. Summers, Harry G. On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War. Novato, CA: Presidio Press 1995. Tran Van Quang, ed. Tong Ket Cuoc Khang Chien Chong My Cuu Nuoc: Thang Loi va Bai Hoc (Luu Hanh Noi Bo) [Review of the Resistance War against the Americans to Save the Nation: Victories and Lessons (Internal Distribution Only)]. Hanoi: National Political Publishing House, 1995.
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Start Date: May 17, 1968 End Date: February 28, 1969 Military operation involving the U.S. 101st Airmobile Division (Airmobile) conducted during counteroffensive in response to the 1968 Tet Offensive. On May 17, 1968, the 101st launched NEVADA EAGLE as part of the overall allied counteroffensive. The operation was one of many battalion-sized forays designed to smash Viet Cong (VC) and People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) forces throughout South Vietnam. Except for some sharp engagements during airmobile sweeps in the mountains of Thua Thien Province, NEVADA EAGLE made little contact with Communist units in the field. The 101st Airborne Division’s primary mission became keeping open major road networks that protected rice harvest in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). The division aggressively engaged in combat and ambush patrols, road-clearing sweeps, and small operations to try to bring VC/PAVN units into open battle. Communist forces refused, however, to be drawn into a major conflict and used mines and booby traps to inflict a number of U.S. casualties. NEVADA EAGLE revealed an alarming trend: the PAVN ability to entice U.S. helicopter pilots into ambushes. The PAVN used small groups of personnel to present an obvious target; then, as the helicopters came in low to engage, Communist troops would open fire with carefully concealed machine guns. U.S. forces responded with increased use of artillery fire in support of their aviation assets. The one major engagement of Operation NEVADA EAGLE occurred on May 21, 1968. While most of the 101st Airborne Division’s combat elements were dispersed on sweeps, a PAVN battalion struck the division base camp near Hue. The PAVN troops managed to break through the outer perimeter, pushing the defending 1st Brigade back to its final defensive bunkers. Helicopter gunships and artillery, employed in direct-fire mode, used beehive rounds to break up the attack. By dawn on May 22 what remained of the PAVN battalion broke contact and retreated. Operation NEVADA EAGLE was officially terminated on February 28, 1969. Total U.S. casualties for NEVADA EAGLE were 175 killed and 1,161 wounded. The Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), gave VC/PAVN losses as 3,299 killed and 853 taken prisoner. JULIUS A. MENZOFF See also Air Mobility; Artillery, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Helicopters, Employment of, in Vietnam; Search and Destroy; United States Army References Hoang Ngoc Lung, Colonel. The General Offensives of 1968–69. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1981. Olson, James S., ed. Dictionary of the Vietnam War. New York: Greenwood, 1988. Stanton, Shelby L. The Rise and Fall of an American Army: The U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985.
804 New Jersey, USS
New Jersey, USS The only U.S. battleship to serve in the Vietnam War, USS New Jersey was the second of the four-ship Iowa-class ships. The New Jersey was commissioned at Philadelphia in May 1943. With minor variations, all four Iowa-class ships had a 45,000-ton design standard but displaced about 48,000 tons standard and 57,500 tons fully loaded. These ships measured 887 feet 7 inches in length overall with a maximum beam of 108 feet 2 inches and draft of 38 feet. Their main armament was three 16-inch 50-caliber guns in each of three turrets. They also had 20 5-inch–gun dual turrets. The Iowas-class ships had a top speed of 33 knots and crews of 1,921 officers and sailors, although they could accommodate more. In January 1944 the New Jersey (BB-62) joined the Fifth Fleet in the Pacific for the assault on the Marshall Islands. The ship also served alternatively as the flagship of the Third Fleet. The New Jersey participated in the Marianas invasion, the Battle of Philippine Sea, the Battle of Leyte Gulf, and the invasions of Iowa Jima and the Ryukyus. Following an overhaul, the ship again became the Fifth Fleet flagship. After additional service in the Far East and the Atlantic, the New Jersey was decommissioned in June 1948. Recommissioned in November 1950 for the Korean War, the New Jersey served two tours in Korean waters, in 1951 and 1953.
Then after service in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and European waters, it was again decommissioned in August 1957. The battleship New Jersey was brought back into service in April 1968 for Vietnam War service to augment the few cruisers operating in Southeast Asian waters. A Pacific Fleet gunfire-support review in May 1967 concluded that certain key targets in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) such as the Thanh Hoa Bridge and the Song Giang–Kien Giang logistic bottleneck would be vulnerable to the battleship’s 16-inch guns that fired shells weighing up to 2,700 pounds over 22 miles. Other important advantages included the battleship’s superior endurance and resistance to damage. The principal objection to returning the New Jersey to service was the cost of supporting a one-of-a-kind ship. At the direction of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, the New Jersey, originally commissioned in 1943, underwent an austere modernization costing $21.5 million, about as much as the price of four jet fighters. Arriving in Vietnamese waters on September 29, 1968, the battleship found many of the most lucrative targets in North Vietnam removed from its reach by President Lyndon Johnson’s order forbidding SEA DRAGON operations above the 19th Parallel. After November 1, when SEA DRAGON was cancelled altogether, the New Jersey engaged in gunfire-support missions south of the demilitarized zone (DMZ), where its performance
The 16-inch guns of the battleship New Jersey (BB-62) fire on coastal targets in Vietnam. The New Jersey was the only U.S. battleship to serve in the Vietnam War. (U.S. Naval Institute)
Ngo Dinh Can earned accolades from hard-pressed troops ashore and won for the ship the Navy Unit Commendation “for exceptionally meritorious service.” Leaving the gun line on March 31, 1969, the New Jersey returned to the United States for upkeep. Although originally scheduled for a second tour, the ship was again deactivated and decommissioned in December 1969, when the Richard M. Nixon administration scaled down America’s participation in the war. The New Jersey was again placed in service in the early 1980s during the defense buildup by the Ronald Reagan administration and saw action during the deployment of U.S. marines as peacekeeping forces during the Lebanese Civil War. The ship underwent modernization at this time and was outfitted to carry missiles. In 2001 it became a floating museum in Camden, New Jersey. The New Jersey earned 15 battle stars for its service in World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. MALCOLM MUIR JR. See also McNamara, Robert Strange; Naval Gunfire Support; SEA DRAGON, Operation; United States Navy; Warships, Allied and Democratic Republic of Vietnam References Muir, Malcolm, Jr. The Iowa Class Battleships: Iowa, New Jersey, Missouri, & Wisconsin. Poole, Dorset, UK: Blandford, 1987. Stillwell, Paul. Battleship New Jersey: An Illustrated History. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1986. Sumrall, Robert F. Iowa Class Battleships: Their Design, Weapons & Equipment. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988.
New Zealand English-speaking nation in the southern Pacific Ocean located about 1,000 miles to the southeast of Australia. New Zealand, which encompasses an area of 104,454 square miles and had a 1968 population of 2.759 million people, was a close partner with the United States and other Western democracies throughout the Cold War. New Zealand is a constitutional monarchy with close ties to Great Britain. Queen Elizabeth II has been its recognized monarch since 1953. Its form of government is parliamentary, with a prime minister as head of government. From 1960 to 1972 New Zealand’s government was led by Prime Minister Keith Holyoake of the New Zealand National Party, a center-right conservative political group. New Zealand was among the first governments to send troops to the Korean War (1950–1953) and it also dispatched troops to the 1948–1960 Malayan Emergency. In the early 1960s New Zealand sent troops to Borneo during Indonesia’s konfrontasi policy, which lasted until late 1965. New Zealand sent both military and nonmilitary assistance to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). New Zealand’s rationale for the aid was that the decline of British power made New Zealand’s security dependent upon the United States and
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that communism in Southeast Asia threatened New Zealand’s vital interests. New Zealanders in Vietnam served with Australian forces. A New Zealand civic action contingent arrived in 1964 and was replaced with an artillery battery the following year that supported the Australian task force in Phuoc Tuy Province. In May 1967 a New Zealand rifle company was transferred from Malaysia to Vietnam. Later that year additional infantry, reconnaissance, and engineer troops were dispatched and integrated with the Australians to form an Australian–New Zealand battalion. New Zealand’s peak troop strength was 543 men in January 1969, and its financial aid to South Vietnam was $350,000 annually. Nonmilitary assistance included health teams to support refugee camps, vocational experts, surgical personnel, and funding for universities in Hue and Saigon. As domestic opposition to the war in Vietnam grew in the United States, the same occurred in New Zealand. In 1970, concomitant with the American policy of Vietnamization, New Zealand proposed replacing one rifle company with a 25-man army training team. Prime Minister Holyoake, in tandem with the Australian government, announced that his nation’s combat troops would be withdrawn from Vietnam by the end of 1971. In all, some 3,900 New Zealanders served in Vietnam during 1962–1971. Thirty-eight were killed in the war. PETER W. BRUSH See also Australia; Civic Action; Free World Assistance Program; Order of Battle Dispute; Southeast Asia Treaty Organization References Denoon, Donald, et al. History of Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2000. Larsen, Stanley Robert, and James Lawton Collins Jr. Allied Participation in Vietnam. Vietnam Studies Series. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975. McGibbon, Ian. Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Ngo Dinh Can Birth Date: ca. 1911 Death Date: May 9, 1964 Younger brother of President Ngo Dinh Diem of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) and proconsul of northern South Vietnam. Born in Vietnam probably in 1911, Ngo Dinh Can was poorly educated and the only one of the Ngo brothers without a Western-style education. He never traveled abroad or even very far from his home and spent most of his time living as a recluse in Hue with his widowed mother. Because of his family relationship with Diem and the trust given to him by his brother, Can came to be, in effect, the warlord of central Vietnam from Phan Thiet Province north to the 17th Parallel.
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Ngo Dinh Diem
Although he held no official position within the South Vietnamese government, Can exercised significant, almost untrammeled power, ruling his area as if it were a feudal satrapy. He had both his own army and secret police and used them to fight the Viet Cong (VC), terrify opponents, and enforce his will. As a result, although he personally lived simply enough, he became a very rich man. Among his other enterprises, he sought out lucrative American aid contracts. There were even rumors that he also headed a smuggling ring that shipped rice to Hanoi and distributed opium across Asia. Undeterred by stories of the corruption, Diem referred to Can in matters relating to Can’s area of control. Sometimes at odds with Diem’s policies, Can nevertheless was a staunch supporter of his brother’s regime. Following the 1963 assassination of his brothers, Diem and Nhu, Can was himself seized by the new administration. Brought to trial, he was executed in Saigon on May 9, 1964. CECIL B. CURREY See also Ngo Dinh Diem; Ngo Dinh Khoi; Ngo Dinh Luyen; Ngo Dinh Nhu; Ngo Dinh Nhu, Madame; Ngo Dinh Thuc References Baritz, Loren. Backfire: A History of How American Culture Led Us into Vietnam and Made Us Fight the Way We Did. New York: Morrow, 1985. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997.
Ngo Dinh Diem Birth Date: January 3, 1901 Death Date: November 2, 1963 President of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) from October 1955 to November 1963. Ngo Dinh Diem was born in Quang Binh Province on January 3, 1901. His father, Ngo Dinh Kha, an official in the imperial court at Hue, rose to the rank of counselor to Emperor Thanh Thai. Seventeenth-century Portuguese missionaries converted the Ngo Dinh clan to Catholicism. When the French deposed the emperor in 1907, Ngo Dinh Kha protested by refusing to sign the French-supported court resolution against Thanh Thai and returned to his village of Phu Cam to teach and farm. Ngo Dinh Diem was one of nine children and the third of six sons. He attended his father’s private school and French Catholic schools in Hue. As a teenager he considered becoming a priest like his older brother Ngo Dinh Thuc, who later became archbishop of Hue. Instead, Diem entered the School of Law and Public Administration in Hanoi, graduating four years later at the top of his class. His first assignment was to the bureaucracy in Annam. At age 25 he became a provincial governor. Diem was very popular, personally riding on horseback throughout the province to carry out land reforms and ensure jus-
tice for even the poorest peasants. In 1929 he uncovered a Communist-led uprising and crushed it. This event deeply affected Diem, who now became an ardent anti-Communist. In 1932 the 18-year-old Bao Dai returned from France to take the throne as emperor. Early in 1933 upon French advice, he appointed Diem as interior minister and chief of the newly formed Commission for Administrative Reforms. Diem soon discovered that the positions were powerless. After only three months he resigned, and French authorities stripped him of his decorations and rank and threatened to arrest him. For the next 10 years Diem lived in seclusion in Hue with his mother and younger brother, Ngo Dinh Can. Diem met regularly with nationalist comrades even though the French closely watched him. French authorities even dismissed his older brother, Ngo Dinh Khoi, as governor of Quang Nam Province. In early 1942, not long after the Japanese took over in Vietnam, Diem tried to persuade them to grant independence. Instead, the Japanese operated through the Vichy French colonial bureaucracy. In September 1945 with the Japanese surrender and fearing that Bao Dai’s puppet government might side with the powerful Viet Minh forces of Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap, Diem set out for Hanoi to convince the emperor otherwise. On the way Diem was kidnapped by Viet Minh agents and taken to a remote village near the Chinese border, where he contracted malaria. When he recovered, he discovered that the Viet Minh had shot and killed his brother Ngo Dinh Khoi. After six months Diem was taken to Hanoi, where he met Ho Chi Minh, who asked him to join the Communists. Diem refused even though he expected that this would cost him his life. Instead, Ho released him. Communist leaders later realized that this had been a mistake and sentenced Diem to death in absentia. Over the next four years Diem traveled in Vietnam trying to gain political support. An attempt on his life in 1950 convinced him to leave the country. In 1950 Diem went to the Vatican and had an audience with Pope Pius XII. The next year Diem traveled to the United States, where he spent two years at Maryknoll seminaries in New Jersey and New York as a novice, performing menial jobs and meditating. While in the United States he met prominent individuals such as Francis Cardinal Spellman, U.S. Supreme Court justice William O. Douglas, and Senator John F. Kennedy. Diem effectively argued his case, declaring that he opposed both the French and Communists and represented the only real nationalist course. As a result of his devout Catholicism he and Spellman became close friends, and the cardinal soon became Diem’s greatest American promoter. In May 1953, frustrated by the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration’s support of the French, Diem went to a Benedictine monastery in Belgium. From there he regularly traveled to Paris, where he met with the large community of Vietnamese exiles, including his youngest brother, Ngo Dinh Luyen, a prominent engineer. Through Luyen, Diem finally began to gain supporters and real political power.
Ngo Dinh Diem In 1954 delegates at the Geneva Conference settled the first Indochina War, restoring Indochina as three nations: Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Vietnam was temporarily divided at the 17th Parallel, with national elections set for 1956. At this time Bao Dai was in Cannes, France, fearful that his future as emperor was in jeopardy. Diem needed Bao Dai to legitimate his rise to power, and Bao Dai needed the support of Diem’s powerful allies, including his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu who had set up the influential Front for National Salvation in Saigon as an alternative to Ho Chi Minh. Because of Diem’s time in the United States and meetings with American leaders, Bao Dai believed that the U.S. government backed Diem. On June 18, 1954, Bao Dai summoned Diem to his chateau in Cannes and appointed him prime minister. With growing American support, Diem returned to Saigon on June 26 and then on July 7 officially formed his new government, technically for all of Vietnam. Fearing that the Communists would overrun this fledgling Asian “domino,” President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles began sending aid to the new regime. Unfortunately, Diem’s power base was largely limited to minority Catholics, rich and powerful Vietnamese, and foreigners. But his earlier trip to the United States meant that Diem was the only non-Communist Vietnamese whom U.S. officials knew. Washington dispatched Colonel Edward Lansdale, the successful architect of the Philippine antiCommunist counterinsurgency, to council Diem. After the 1954 Geneva Accords, the United States pressured France to withdraw all its remaining forces from Vietnam, the last leaving on April 28, 1956. In early 1955 Diem moved to consolidate his power. Employing five loyal army battalions, Diem moved against his opponents, culminating the action on May 6, 1955, when his forces defeated those of the Binh Xuyen in Saigon. Diem also moved against the political cadres of the Viet Minh, allowed in South Vietnam by the Geneva Convention. In 1955 he ignored an effort by Bao Dai (then in France) to remove him from office; instead, Diem called an October election for the people to choose between them. Clearly Diem would have won any honest election, but he ignored appeals of U.S. officials for such and managed the results so that the announced vote in his favor was 98.2 percent. On October 26, 1955, using the referendum as justification, Diem proclaimed the new government of South Vietnam with himself as president. Washington, prompted by Lansdale, officially recognized him in this position and withdrew its support for Bao Dai. During Eisenhower’s last six years as U.S. president, material aid from Washington to South Vietnam totaled $1.8 billion. In an effort to bolster Diem’s image, Eisenhower arranged state visits to South Vietnam by Dulles in 1955 and Vice President Richard Nixon in 1956. In 1957 Diem traveled to the United States and spoke to a joint session of Congress. By 1960 the situation in South Vietnam had deteriorated. The Viet Minh had resumed guerrilla activities, and in spite of massive U.S. aid to fight communism, Diem used 8 of every 10 aid dollars for internal security. Worse, he estranged himself from the peas-
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When the Geneva Accords temporarily divided Vietnam in two in 1954, Ngo Dinh Diem, a fiercely anti-Communist Catholic in a traditionally Buddhist nation, became prime minister of South Vietnam. Although Lyndon Johnson had private reservations about Diem, he publicly called him the “Winston Churchill of Southeast Asia.” Diem was president of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) from October 1955 until his assassination in November 1963. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)
ants. Little was done to carry out land reform, and by 1961, 75 percent of the land in South Vietnam was owned by 15 percent of the population. Diem also isolated himself in Saigon, choosing to rely only on his family members for advice and making loyalty to him rather than ability the test for appointments to political office or military command. When John F. Kennedy became president in 1961, he reexamined U.S. policy in Vietnam and demanded that Diem institute domestic reforms. But seeing no alternative to Diem, Kennedy also sent 400 Special Operations military advisers to Vietnam to bolster America’s sagging ally. He also dispatched Vice President Lyndon Johnson to Vietnam on a fact-finding mission. Although Johnson had private reservations, he publicly called Diem the “Winston Churchill of Southeast Asia.” Less than a week after Johnson returned, Kennedy agreed to increase the size of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) from 170,000 to 270,000 men. ARVN forces as a rule did not perform well, and by October 1963 U.S. forces in Vietnam had increased to 16,732 men. Concurrently, despite constant pleading by Lansdale, Diem’s oppression of the Buddhist majority and his political opponents
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Ngo Dinh Diem
Presidents of the Republic of Vietnam, 1955–1975 Name
Party or Association
Start Date
End Date
Ngo Dinh Diem Duong Van Minh Nguyen Khanh Duong Van Minh Nguyen Khanh Provisional Leadership Committee Duong Van Minh Phan Khac Suu Nguyen Van Thieu Tran Van Huong Duong Van Minh
Can Lao Military junta Military junta Military junta Military junta Military junta Military junta Appointed by military junta Military junta (National Social Democratic Front after 1968) National Social Democratic Front Appointed by National Assembly
October 26, 1955 November 2, 1963 January 30, 1964 February 8, 1964 March 16, 1964 August 27, 1964 September 8, 1964 October 26, 1964 June 14, 1965 April 21, 1975 April 28, 1975
November 2, 1963 January 30, 1964 February 8, 1964 March 16, 1964 August 27, 1964 September 8, 1964 October 26, 1964 June 14, 1965 April 21, 1975 April 28, 1975 April 30, 1975
grew. To U.S. officials, it seemed that internal opposition to Diem rivaled opposition to the Communists. Diem threw hundreds of political adversaries, real or imagined, into hellish prison camps. Hundreds were tortured and assassinated. His family and friends (mostly Catholics) held all the senior government positions. Most influential were his brother Nhu and his wife, Madame Nhu. Diem himself was celibate. His oldest brother, Archbishop Thuc, controlled Catholic property in South Vietnam that included 370,000 acres of nontaxable farmland exempt from redistribution. Nhu was particularly embarrassing. He set up the Personalist Labor Party, which used totalitarian techniques such as self-criticism sessions, storm troops, and mass rallies. He was also the leading advocate of the Agroville and Strategic Hamlet programs that forcibly resettled whole villages into armed compounds to “protect” them from the Viet Cong (VC). The rampant corruption in the program soon alienated the majority of peasants from the regime. Madame Nhu used her position as state host to enrich herself and influence her brother-in-law to violent acts against the Buddhist majority. She also undertook morality campaigns, persuading Diem to outlaw divorce, dancing, beauty contests, gambling, fortune-telling, boxing, kung fu, cockfighting, prostitution, contraception, and adultery. The harsh punishments that accompanied these excessive rules eventually antagonized large sections of the South Vietnamese population. In the summer of 1963 Buddhist protests and rallies became more frequent and intense. On June 11 the elderly Buddhist monk Thich Quang Duc publicly burned himself alive. By November, six more monks had followed suit. Madame Nhu exacerbated the crisis by calling these self-immolations “barbecues.” In late August 1963 Henry Cabot Lodge replaced Frederick Nolting as U.S. ambassador. On August 24 Lodge reported to Washington that an influential faction of South Vietnamese generals wanted to overthrow Diem. With the president and most senior officials out of Washington, Acting Secretary of State George Ball, Acting Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatrick, and General Maxwell Taylor formulated a reply. After a phone consultation with Kennedy and Secretary of State Dean Rusk, they cabled Lodge and informed him that while they wanted to afford Diem a reasonable time to remove the Nhus, the United States was “prepared to ac-
cept the obvious implications that we can no longer support Diem . . . [and] to tell the appropriate military commanders we will give them direct support in any interim period of breakdown of the central government mechanism.” Lodge immediately met with senior U.S. officials in Vietnam and then cabled Washington that Diem would never replace Nhu and that to ask him to do so would only alert Nhu and lead to a bloodbath, because Nhu had loyal troops in Saigon. Lodge recommended going straight to the generals, bypassing Diem, and leaving it up to them if they wanted to keep Diem. Ball and Roger Hilsman agreed. Kennedy later affirmed their instructions. On August 25 Lodge immediately called another meeting. He decided to distance the United States from the proposed coup and expressed support for the generals through lower-ranking Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officers, specifically Lieutenant Colonel Lucien Conein, the former World War II Office of Strategic Services (OSS) agent who had a long-standing friendship with many of the conspiring generals. By September 1963 most U.S. administration officials began to have second thoughts, especially General Taylor. At his urging, Kennedy called a meeting of the National Security Council. It was hopelessly divided, with the State Department favoring the coup and Taylor, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and especially Johnson vehemently opposed. Kennedy, although coy about the matter, never acted to prevent the coup or to restrain Lodge. On October 2 Kennedy suspended economic subsidies for South Vietnamese commercial imports, froze loans for Saigon waterworks and electrical power plant projects, and cut off financial support of Nhu’s Vietnamese Special Forces units. Just over an hour after midnight on November 1, 1963 (All Soul’s Day for Catholics), the generals, led by major generals Duong Van “Big” Minh, military governor of Saigon Ton That Dinh, and Tran Van Don, began their coup. Upon learning of the coup, Diem phoned Lodge to ask “what is the attitude of the U.S.?” Lodge feigned ignorance and replied, “I do not feel well enough informed to be able to tell you.” He assured Diem that he would do anything possible to guarantee Diem’s personal safety. Diem and Nhu fled the presidential palace through a tunnel and took refuge in Cho Lon, the Chinese section of Saigon. At about 6:00 a.m. the next morning, the two men agreed to sur-
Ngo Dinh Diem, Overthrow of render. The generals leading the coup guaranteed them safe passage out of the country. While negotiations for their flight dragged on, they were discovered by troops commanded by a longtime foe. The brothers were ordered into the rear of an armored personnel carrier and shot to death. Nhu’s body was repeatedly stabbed. Madame Nhu was in Los Angeles, California, at the time. Washington never did find a viable alternative to Ngo Dinh Diem. Certainly no subsequent leader of South Vietnam had his air of legitimacy. As a result, U.S. leaders, who had seen Diem as an alternative to Ho Chi Minh and an agent to stop the spread of communism, soon found themselves taking direct control of the war in Vietnam. WILLIAM P. HEAD See also Bao Dai; Caravelle Group; Conein, Lucien Emile; Dulles, John Foster; Duong Van Minh; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Faure, Edgar; Fishel, Wesley Robert; Heath, Donald Read; Hilsman, Roger; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Lansdale, Edward Geary; National Assembly Law 10/59; National Bank of Vietnam; Ngo Dinh Can; Ngo Dinh Diem, Overthrow of; Ngo Dinh Khoi; Ngo Dinh Luyen; Ngo Dinh Nhu; Ngo Dinh Nhu, Madame; Ngo Dinh Thuc; Richardson, John Hammond; Spellman, Francis Joseph; Taylor, Maxwell Davenport; Taylor-McNamara Report; Ton That Dinh; Tran Van Don; Vietnam, Republic of, Joint General Staff; Vietnam, Republic of, National Police; Vietnamization References Jacobs, Seth. Cold War Mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America’s War in Vietnam, 1950–1963. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. U.S. Involvement in the Overthrow of Diem, 1963. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972. Warner, Denis. The Last Confucian. London: Angus and Robertson, 1964.
Ngo Dinh Diem, Overthrow of Event Date: November 1, 1963 Ever since the Great Migration of 1954 in Vietnam when northern refugees flooded to the south, the Ngo Dinh Diem government tended to favor the newly arrived Roman Catholics over the predominately Buddhist population of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Catholics received lands, business favors, military and government jobs, and other special rewards even though they were a distinct minority. Over the years, egged on by his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu, Diem’s predilection toward the Catholic citizens increased. On May 8, 1963, Buddhists gathered in Hue to honor the 2,527th birthday of Buddha. The deputy province chief, a Catholic, prohibited the Buddhists from displaying their flag. This was in accordance with a Diem decree requiring that flags of religions, associations, and other countries be displayed
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outside only in company with the national flag. When the protesters gathered at the radio station, a concussion hand grenade thrown by a Regional Force soldier to break up the crowd killed several people and wounded others. Diem blamed the situation, as he often did, on the Communists. The Buddhists speedily organized, coordinating strikes and protests and making certain that the American news media were kept fully informed of developments. The Buddhists met with U.S. officials and urged the United States to get rid of Diem or at least force reforms from him. U.S. ambassador Frederick Nolting urged Diem to act more responsibly, but the president refused to modify his stance. Then on June 11, 1963, 60-year-old Thich Quang Duc, a Buddhist monk, went to one of Saigon’s busy intersections and committed self-immolation as a protest against Diem and his policies. Other self-immolations by Buddhists followed, and unrest grew. In August, Nolting was replaced by Henry Cabot Lodge. Members of Diem’s own military—generals Tran Van Don, Le Van Kim, Duong Van Minh, and others—began questioning whether he should be allowed to continue in office. Diem had long favored loyalty to him over ability in the appointment of general officers, and there were myriad problems in the prosecution of the war against the Viet Cong (VC). Dissident generals began meeting secretly with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agent Lucien Conein, supposedly serving as an adviser to South Vietnam’s Ministry of the Interior but in reality the conduit between the generals and Ambassador Lodge. The generals wanted assurance that American aid would continue if they were to overthrow Diem. On August 21 the Diem government mounted another raid on the Buddhists, this time in Saigon, arresting hundreds and beating and clubbing others as they ran. More voices in the John F. Kennedy administration began calling for Diem to be replaced; others, just as strident, claimed that doing so would only help the Communists. Lodge supported a coup. General Paul Harkins, head of the U.S. Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) in Vietnam, demurred and informed General Tran Van Don that any coup would be a grave mistake. Don then told Conein that he was postponing the coup despite Conein’s insistence that the MAAG chief did not speak for the U.S. government. President Kennedy waffled regarding a possible coup, torn by these conflicting crosscurrents. Ngo Dinh Nhu, aware of the plotting against his brother, considered an accommodation with Hanoi as a means of blackmailing U.S. support for his brother’s government. Unwilling to give up on the struggle in Vietnam, Kennedy sent Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and General Maxwell Taylor to Saigon on a fact-finding mission. Their report did little to ease the president’s mind. CIA station chief in Saigon John Richardson told Lodge that he doubted that General Minh could conduct a successful coup. Lodge then dismissed Richardson and informed Kennedy that the plotters were now ready to act. Conein told General Tran Van Don that America would not stand in the way. On October 29 during a meeting of the National Security Council, General Taylor spoke out strongly on behalf of Diem.
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At the last minute President Kennedy sought a way to postpone any coup. He cabled Lodge to order the generals to postpone any action. Lodge never delivered the message. The coup went ahead as scheduled, culminating on November 1 when rebels seized the radio station and police headquarters and besieged the presidential palace. Diem telephoned Lodge asking for help. It was not forthcoming. Diem and Nhu secretly left the palace early in the evening and sought refuge in Cho Lon at St. Francis Xavier Church. Early the next morning Diem telephoned General Duong Van Minh and asked for negotiations. The plotters had already informed Lodge that Diem’s life would be spared if he and Nhu agreed to go into exile. Although Nhu would never be allowed to return, Diem might be invited back one day to serve in some figurehead capacity. By now Minh had changed his mind and rejected Diem’s telephoned plea. Then Diem called General Tran Van Don, offered to surrender, and revealed his hiding place. The two brothers were arrested by General Mai Huu Xuan, who arrived at the church with an M-113 armored personnel carrier (APC) and four jeeps full of soldiers. Among his entourage were Major Duong Hiuu Nghia and Captain Nguyen Van Nhung, General Minh’s bodyguard. The captors ordered Diem and Nhu into the APC. Nghia and Nhung drove them away. On the road back to Saigon they stopped near a railroad crossing and murdered their prisoners, spraying them with bullets and stabbing them. The Diem regime had ended. CECIL B. CURREY See also Conein, Lucien Emile; Duong Van Minh; Harkins, Paul Donal; Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr.; McCone, John Alex; Military Revolutionary Council; Ngo Dinh Diem; Ngo Dinh Nhu; Nolting, Frederick Earnest, Jr.; Richardson, John Hammond; Thich Quang Duc; Tran Van Don References Jacobs, Seth. Cold War Mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America’s War in Vietnam, 1950–1963. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. U.S. Involvement in the Overthrow of Diem, 1963. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972.
Ngo Dinh Khoi Birth Date: Unknown Death Date: August 1945 Eldest brother of President Ngo Dinh Diem of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) and prominent figure in the government of Annam. Born into a mandarin family in central Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Khoi attended the Imperial Court School in Hue. In 1910 he was assigned to the Ministry of Defense as a protégé of Minister Nguyen Huu Bai. In 1916 Khoi was promoted to chief of staff of the Regency Council.
In 1917 Khoi was appointed chief of Phu Cat District, Binh Dinh Province, and then chief of Tuy An in Phu Yen Province. In the same year Nguyen Huu Bai was promoted head of the cabinet as minister of administration. Khoi’s political advancement was rapid. He became presiding judge of Phu Yen in 1919, financial chief of Binh Dinh in 1920, chief of Quang Ngai Province in 1926, governor of Quang Nam Province in 1930, and governor in charge of the provinces south of central Vietnam in 1933. During the early 1940s Khoi reportedly had some personal disagreements with Pham Quynh, a famous scholar and high mandarin, and retired from the administration in 1943. In August 1945 the Communists killed Khoi as part of their plan to remove all potential rivals for power. His death was a principal factor in causing Ngo Dinh Diem to reject Ho Chi Minh’s offer of a cabinet post in the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) in 1945. NGO NGOC TRUNG See also French Indochina, 1860s–1946; Ho Chi Minh; Ngo Dinh Can; Ngo Dinh Diem; Ngo Dinh Luyen; Ngo Dinh Nhu; Ngo Dinh Thuc References Jacobs, Seth. Cold War Mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America’s War in Vietnam, 1950–1963. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997.
Ngo Dinh Luyen Birth Date: 1914 Death Date: 1990 Youngest brother of President Ngo Dinh Diem and prominent political figure in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Born in 1914 in Hue, from 1923 to 1926 Ngo Dinh Luyen attended Pellerin School at Hue and then from 1926 to 1931 attended the College of Seine et Marne. He continued his studies in mathematics at College Stanista from 1931 to 1933, and from 1933 to 1936 he studied at the École Centrale des Arts et Manufactures de Paris. Returning to Vietnam, from 1937 to 1938 Luyen worked at the Land Survey Service of Binh Dinh and Quang Ngai provinces. In 1939 he was a land surveyor in Cambodia and later at the Hoi An Land Survey Service. In 1942 he became deputy chief of the Central Land Survey Directorate and the next year moved to the Land Survey Service of Phan Thiet Province, remaining there until 1955. After his brother Diem became president of South Vietnam, Luyen held the important post of South Vietnamese ambassador to the United Kingdom (1955–1963). Luyen was said to be the most liberal person in Diem’s immediate family. During the early days of his administration, Diem considered Luyen his most trusted adviser, but Luyen was supplanted by his very conservative brother Ngo Dinh Nhu.
Ngo Dinh Nhu Following his brother’s November 1963 overthrow and assassination, Luyen went into exile in Great Britain. He visited the United States a few times after the fall of South Vietnam in 1975 and met with Vietnamese émigré friends. He was the only family member who attended the 1984 funeral of Archbishop Ngo Dinh Thuc in Missouri. Luyen died in London in 1990. NGO NGOC TRUNG See also Ngo Dinh Diem; Ngo Dinh Nhu; Ngo Dinh Thuc; Vietnam, Republic of, 1954–1975 References Jacobs, Seth. Cold War Mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America’s War in Vietnam, 1950–1963. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006. Warner, Denis. The Last Confucian. London: Angus and Robertson, 1964.
Ngo Dinh Nhu Birth Date: October 7, 1910 Death Date: November 2, 1963 Younger brother of President Ngo Dinh Diem of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) and chief of South Vietnam’s internal police, security, and intelligence apparatus from 1955 to 1963. Ngo Dinh Nhu was born on October 7, 1910, into the prominent Catholic Ngo family near Hue in central Vietnam. He was educated at the École des Chartes, a school for archivists in Paris. He then worked in the National Library in Hanoi until he was removed from his post as punishment for his brother’s nationalist activities. A capable organizer, Nhu organized the Can Lao Nhan Vi Cach Mang Dang (Revolutionary Personalist Labor Party), a party based on the obscure French philosophy of personalism, conceived in the 1930s by Emmanuel Mounier. Copying Communist organizations and using the Can Lao Party as a basis, Nhu organized a system of covert political, security, and labor groups structured in fiveman cells that reported on opponents of the regime and allowed the Diem brothers to maintain their power rather than establish democracy or build national unity. The party never held a convention and never voiced a public stand on any issue, and its controlling body never met as a group. Nhu’s appearance on the Vietnamese nationalist political scene occurred in Saigon in September 1953, when he organized demonstrations against the French and Communists and masterminded the early phases of the revolution in the south against Emperor Bao Dai. It was Nhu’s aim, during a national congress organized as a demonstration of anti–Viet Minh and anti-French sentiment, to support a new government headed by his brother Diem. To accomplish this, Nhu formed the National Union for Independence and Peace and enlisted the support of the leadership of the Cao Dai, the Hoa Hao, and the Binh Xuyen. This too-open effort to oust Bao Dai
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came before the time was judicious and resulted in failure. A recently declassified U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) study reveals that these early political activities brought Nhu to the attention of the CIA, which initiated a relationship with him as early as 1951. The French defeat in the 1954 Battle of Dien Bien Phu made the anti–Viet Minh nationalists, and even Bao Dai, realize that their future depended upon a break with the French and the formation of a new government not subject to any French control. In Saigon, Nhu formed another coalition called the Front for National Salvation, comprised of the political-religious sects, the organized Catholics, the Dai Viet, and other nationalist groups. These “Front” groups, some that Nhu and his brother would soon move to destroy, now called for Diem to head a new regime to fight communism. Many did so believing that the task would destroy anyone who tried, a fate that they wished on Ngo Dinh Diem. On June 16, 1954, Bao Dai invited Diem, the most prominent nationalist to oppose the French “Bao Dai experiment,” to form a new government as prime minister. For the new government to survive, it was necessary to gain control of the army, take control of the police from the Binh Xuyen, and consolidate areas controlled by the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects into the national administration. With the assistance of the United States, the army was brought into line in late 1954. However, in the spring of 1955 when the Binh Xuyen and the sects refused to cooperate, Diem took the only road open to him. Nhu believed that the only path to power was through intrigue, and with Nhu’s able assistance Diem maneuvered to divide the sects from the Binh Xuyen and then from each other and then use the army to crush each one separately. In the midst of this struggle to consolidate power, Nhu allegedly hatched the final scheme to oust Bao Dai. On April 30, 1955, a group of some 200 people, representing 18 political parties, gathered at the Saigon town hall. Constituting itself as the “General Assembly of Democratic and Revolutionary Forces of the Nation,” the gathering, after the symbolic act of throwing Bao Dai’s picture out a window, called for the emperor’s abdication and the formation of a new government under Ngo Dinh Diem. On July 7, 1955, Diem announced that a national referendum would be held on October 23 to decide the future form of Vietnam’s government. As his brother’s chief political adviser and head of all of the national secret service organizations, Nhu used his secret police to control the election, and on October 26, 1955, Diem was declared president of the new Republic of Vietnam. Throughout his brother’s reign, Nhu used his Can Lao party and secret service apparatus to keep the family in power. As head of the secret police, he created 13 intelligence units and even commanded the Vietnamese Special Forces, his own personal army. Nhu helped administer the Khu Tru Mat farm communities known as Agrovilles and recommended and administered the later Strategic Hamlet Program, both designed to isolate the rural population from the Communists. Both were poorly administered, hampered by corruption, and easily subverted by the Viet Cong (VC).
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Viewing internal dissent as just as dangerous as the Communists and with his control of secret police forces, Nhu thwarted several attempts to depose his brother. However, the intrigue, corruption, and brutality of the regime caught up with Nhu in 1963, when he used his forces to suppress Buddhist demonstrations against the Diem government. Because of the brutal nature of the suppression and inflammatory statements by him and his wife, Madame Nhu, the United States demanded Nhu’s removal. When Diem refused, U.S. officials notified plotting Vietnamese generals that Washington would not oppose a coup. The coup began on November 1, 1963, and the next day Nhu and Diem were both assassinated. ARTHUR T. FRAME See also Can Lao Nhan Vi Cach Mang Dang; Cao Dai; Collins, Joseph Lawton; Conein, Lucien Emile; Duong Van Minh; Elections, National, Republic of Vietnam, 1955, 1967, 1971; Geneva Conference and Geneva Accords of 1954; Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr.; National Assembly Law 10/59; National Bank of Vietnam; Ngo Dinh Diem; Ngo Dinh Diem, Overthrow of; Ngo Dinh Nhu, Madame; Richardson, John Hammond; Sheehan, Cornelius Mahoney; Taylor-McNamara Report; Thich Quang Duc; United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1954–1965; Vietnam, Republic of, National Police References Ahern, Thomas L. CIA and the House of Ngo: Covert Action in South Vietnam, 1954–1963. Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2000. Boetcher, Thomas D. Vietnam: The Valor and the Sorrow. Boston: Little Brown, 1985. Buttinger, Joseph. Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled. 2 vols. New York: Praeger, 1967. Collins, General J. Lawton. Lightning Joe: An Autobiography. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997.
Ngo Dinh Nhu, Madame Birth Date: 1924 Death Date: April 24, 2011 Wife of Ngo Dinh Nhu and sister-in-law of Ngo Dinh Diem. Tran Le Xuan (“Beautiful Spring”) was born in 1924 in Hanoi, the second of three children. Although Vietnamese, her family was thoroughly Gallicized and had amassed a fortune while in service to the French colonial administration. Her father, Tran Van Chuong, had earned a law degree in Paris before returning to Vietnam to practice law and marry a member of the imperial family. Madame Chuong, a renowned beauty, entertained the French and Francophile Vietnamese lavishly in the family’s Hanoi villa. Le Xuan dropped out of the prestigious French high school in Hanoi, the Lycée Albert Sarraut. A mediocre student, she was fluent in French but never learned to write her native Vietnamese. Le Xuan married Nhu, 14 years her senior, in 1943. When the French dismissed Nhu from his job in the National Library because
of his brother Diem’s nationalist activities, the couple moved to Da Lat. There she gave birth to their four children while he edited a newspaper and dabbled in politics. Upon Ngo Dinh Diem’s ascendancy to the presidency in 1955, the Nhus moved into the presidential palace in Saigon. Because Diem never married, Madame Nhu acted as official host and became, in effect, the first lady of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) and was an outspoken and powerful force in her own right. In addition to the couple’s formal and official roles in the Diem government, Madame Nhu’s father was appointed ambassador to the United States, and her mother became an observer at the United Nations (UN). Also, two of Madame Nhu’s uncles were cabinet ministers. As official host for her bachelor brother-in-law, Madame Nhu quickly adopted an imperious manner and began to display the insensitivity and uncaring attitude toward anyone or anything outside the ruling family clique that earned her the sobriquet the “Dragon Lady.” It was not long into the Diem regime before U.S. ambassador General J. Lawton Collins encouraged Diem to get rid of her because she was a “troublemaker.” Diem, however, opted to keep the family together. Remembering this attempt to send her away caused Madame Nhu to heap reproach upon the United States during the following years, often claiming that Americans were aiding Vietnamese factions attempting to topple the Diem regime. Overlooking her own family’s decadence and her brother-inlaw’s brutal, inept, and corrupt administration as well as being impervious to the suffering of the Vietnamese people, Madame Nhu issued decrees backed by the force of law. Her edicts abolished divorce and banned abortions, contraceptives, prostitution, dancing, beauty contests, fortune-telling, and boxing matches. She made adultery a crime. Fancying herself a feminist, she lectured on women’s issues and even formed her own paramilitary force, the Women’s Solidarity Movement. Madame Nhu often embarrassed and infuriated her brother-in-law with provocative remarks, but he tolerated her out of family fidelity. As the Diem regime faced increasing dissent from within and doubt from without, Madame Nhu contributed to its decay with her vitriolic remarks. When Buddhist protests brought Nhu’s brutal repressions and led to several Buddhist self-immolations, Madame Nhu accused the United States of manipulating the Buddhists. She later referred to these events as Buddhist “barbecues,” and her husband followed suit by declaring that “if the Buddhists want to have another barbecue, I will be glad to supply the gasoline.” These statements helped to turn American public opinion and the John F. Kennedy administration against the Diem regime, and even Madame Nhu’s father and mother resigned their posts in response. When Diem refused to get rid of the Nhus and their negative impact on his regime, this paved the way for the November 1963 coup that cost Diem and Nhu their lives. At that time Madame Nhu was on a propaganda tour that took her to Belgrade, Rome, Paris, and the United States. When Diem and Madame Nhu’s husband were assassinated on November 2,
Ngo Dinh Thuc 1963, she was in Los Angeles. With the death of her husband and his benefactor, Madame Nhu withdrew into exile in Rome. She died there on April 24, 2011. ARTHUR T. FRAME See also Collins, Joseph Lawton; Conein, Lucien Emile; Duong Van Minh; Elections, National, Republic of Vietnam, 1955, 1967, 1971; Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr.; Ngo Dinh Diem; Ngo Dinh Diem, Overthrow of; Ngo Dinh Nhu; Thich Quang Duc; United States, Involvement in Vietnam, 1954–1965; Women in the Vietnam War, Vietnamese References Boetcher, Thomas D. Vietnam: The Valor and the Sorrow. Boston: Little Brown, 1985. Buttinger, Joseph. Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled. 2 vols. New York: Praeger, 1967. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997.
Ngo Dinh Thuc Birth Date: October 6, 1897 Death Date: December 13, 1984 Roman Catholic archbishop and older brother of President Ngo Dinh Diem of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Ngo Dinh Thuc was an important bridge between Diem and the American political circle that supported him. Born into a traditional Catholic family in Hue on October 6, 1897, Thuc became a priest in 1929 and also pursued theological and ecclesiastical studies in Rome. In 1938 he was named bishop of the Vinh Long Diocese in the Mekong Delta. In October 1945 French police arrested Thuc at Bien Hoa while he was on his way to northern Vietnam to attend the induction of Bishop Le Huu Tu. Thuc admitted that he had encouraged some young people to join the Thanh Nien Tien Phong (Pioneer Youth League), a Communist youth organization in Vinh Long, but he feared increased Communist influence. Thuc wanted a truly independent Vietnamese state. In 1950 in Saigon, Thuc met Cardinal Francis Spellman of New York, Catholic chaplain of the U.S. Armed Forces. In June 1950 Thuc applied for a visa to stop in the United States on his way to Rome. Traveling with Thuc were his younger brother Ngo Dinh Diem and Nguyen Viet Canh. In August 1950 Thuc and Diem stopped in Tokyo, Japan, where they met Prince Cuong De to discuss the establishment of an antiCommunist Vietnamese government. Thuc and Diem arrived in the United States in September and met with Cardinal Spellman and William S. B. Lacy, head of Philippines and Southeast Asia affairs in the Department of State. Thuc raised the issue of building a Vietnam centered on Catholics. This idea would later be supported by the U.S. Department of State. On October 15, 1950, Thuc and Diem left for Europe, and Thuc returned to Vietnam at the end of that year. Diem stayed for a
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while in Paris but returned to the United States in January 1951. In mid-1954 Emperor Bao Dai named Diem premier, so he returned to Vietnam that July to assume the post. During the first years of Diem’s government, Thuc’s diocese became a training base for the cadre of the Can Lao Nhan Vi Cach Mang Dang (Revolutionary Personalist Labor Party) headed by Ngo Dinh Nhu, another younger brother of Thuc. In 1961 Thuc became archbishop of Hue, where in 1963 he intervened to forbid display of the Buddhist flag during the celebration of Buddha’s birthday. This unfortunate incident began a chain of events that led to the November 1, 1963, coup d’état that overthrew Diem; both Diem and Nhu died in the coup. Archbishop Thuc survived the coup, having been recalled to Rome in September 1963. He was living in France when he was excommunicated for investing priests without permission from Rome. In 1983 he moved to a monastery in Missouri. Thuc died of cancer on December 13, 1984, in Carthage, Missouri. NGO NGOC TRUNG See also Bao Dai; Buddhism in Vietnam; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Mansfield, Michael Joseph; Ngo Dinh Diem; Ngo Dinh Nhu; Spellman, Francis Joseph References Jacobs, Seth. Cold War Mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America’s War in Vietnam, 1950–1963. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997.
Ngo Dinh Thuc, Roman Catholic archbishop of Hue and brother of Republic of Vietnam president Ngo Dinh Diem, during a press conference in January 1962. (Bettmann/Corbis)
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Ngo Quang Truong
Ngo Quang Truong Birth Date: December 19, 1929 Death Date: January 22, 2007 Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) general who commanded, successively, the ARVN 1st Division, IV Corps, and I Corps. Ngo Quang Truong was born on December 19, 1929, in the South Vietnamese delta province of Kien Hoa. After graduating from My Tho College, he attended the reserve officer school at Thu Duc, from which he was commissioned into the ARVN in 1954. He worked his way up through battalion and regimental command in the Airborne Division and in June 1966 took command of the ARVN 1st Division. His American adviser wrote to General Harold K. Johnson that Truong was “dedicated, humble, imaginative and tactically sound.” That assessment was validated when Truong and his division played a key role in the most difficult and protracted fighting of the 1968 Tet Offensive in the battle for Hue. Truong’s division was well regarded by American commanders in Vietnam. General Creighton Abrams reported that “the 1st ARVN Division does better in the jungle than we do. They’re really better than any of the enemy they’re dealing with up there—NVA [North Vietnamese Army or People’s Army of Vietnam, PAVN] or VC [Viet Cong].” Early in 1971, the austere and capable Truong took command of IV Corps in the Mekong Delta. There he was so successful that he voluntarily offered up forces for redeployment to other more threatened regions of the country. When the PAVN 1972 Easter Offensive erupted and initially made serious inroads in I Corps, Truong was assigned command of I Corps. With characteristic directness, he began by issuing an order, broadcast throughout the region, that all military deserters who had not returned to their units within 24 hours would be shot on sight. Truong then went on television himself and promised that he would hold Hue and repulse the Communist thrust. Truong’s arrival had a remarkable effect on the I Corps staff. General Frederick Kroesen recalled that “Sober grimaces, frowns, gloom gave way to smiles, enthusiasm and a rebirth of hope. General Truong was back, all would be well, and the assembled soldiers were immediately ready to serve him in whatever capacity he asked.” Truong organized and fought a stubborn defense, halting further PAVN advances. He then successfully counterattacked with three divisions against six PAVN divisions to retake Quang Tri City. Once again, Truong had given evidence that he was, as General Bruce Palmer Jr. styled him in The 25-Year War, “probably the best field commander in South Vietnam.” Truong remained in command of I Corps until it was overrun by Communist forces during the 1975 Communist offensive. “General Truong had fought a tremendous fight against insuperable odds,” wrote Palmer. “This fine soldier deserved a better fate.” Subsequent to the final collapse of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), General Truong made his way to the United
States, where he lived after 1975. He died on January 22, 2007, in Falls Church, Virginia. LEWIS SORLEY See also Easter Offensive; Ho Chi Minh Campaign; Hue, Battle of; Tet Offensive, Overall Strategy; Tet Offensive and the Saigon Circle; Vietnam, Republic of, Army References Andradé, Dale. America’s Last Vietnam Battle: Halting Hanoi’s 1972 Easter Offensive. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001. Hoang Ngoc Lung, Colonel. The General Offensives of 1968–69. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1981. Jones, James. Viet Journal. New York: Delacorte, 1973. Warner, Denis. Certain Victory: How Hanoi Won the War. Kansas City, MO: Sheed Andrews and McMeel, 1978.
Ngo Quyen Birth Date: 898 Death Date: 944 Vietnamese national hero whose victory over the Southern Han (Nam Han in Vietnamese) on the Bach Dang River in 938 CE marked the end of 1,000 years of Chinese domination. Born in 898 to a noble family in Duong Lam (Son Tay), Ngo Quyen was the sonin-law of Duong Dien Nghe (Duong Dinh Nghe), who defeated the Nam Han army of Ly Tien, Ly Khac Chinh, and Tran Bao in 931 and regained autonomy for Giao Chau. In 937 when Duong Dien Nghe was assassinated by Kieu Cong Tien, Ngo Quyen was the governor of Ai Chau (Thanh Hoa). To secure revenge, Ngo Quyen moved back to Tong Binh, the capital. Kieu Cong Tien called on the Nam Han (southern Chinese empire) for support, and a Chinese army led by Prince Hoang Thao was sent to Giao Chau. In 938 on the Bach Dang River, using the tactic of planting iron-tipped poles under the water, Ngo Quyen won a famous victory that ended the long period of Chinese rule and opened a new era in Vietnamese history. After the victory Ngo Quyen declared himself king and moved the capital to Co Loa, the ancient capital of the Thuc, a Vietnamese independent dynasty that ruled the country long before the Chinese invasion (257–207 BCE). The selection of Co Loa as capital was to show Ngo Quyen’s willingness to build a new nation completely independent from China. Ngo Quyen died in 944 at the age of 47. The dynasty he founded did not last long, however. After being usurped for five years by Duong Tam Kha, Ngo Quyen’s brother-in-law, the throne was regained by the hero’s two sons, Ngo Xuong Van and Ngo Xuong Ngap. These younger kings, however, were unable to control the situation. In 965 Ngo Xuong Van was killed in a battle against a local lord, and the newly independent country fell into the hands of 12 local lords and was reunified only in 968 by Dinh Bo Linh. PHAM CAO DUONG
Nguyen Cao Ky See also Vietnam, History of, 938 CE through the French Conquest References Le Thanh Khoi. Histoire du Viet-Nam des origines à 1858. Paris: Sudestasie, 1981. Pham Cao Duong. Lich Su Dan Toc Viet Nam, Quyen I, Thoi K Lap Quoc [History of the Vietnamese People, Vol. I, The Making of the Nation]. Fountain Valley, CA: Truyen Thong Viet, 1987. Phan Huy Le, Tran Quoc Vuong, Ha Van Tan, and Luong Minh. Lich Su Viet Nam, Tap I [History of Vietnam, Vol. 1]. Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Dai Hoc Va Giao Duc Chuyen Nghiep, 1991. Taylor, Keith Weller. The Birth of Vietnam. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983.
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killed by the French on his way to northern Vietnam to attend a conference. NGO NGOC TRUNG See also Ho Chi Minh; Indochina War; Viet Minh References Duiker, William J. The Rise of Nationalism in Vietnam, 1900–1911. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976. Young, Marilyn B. The Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990. New York: HarperCollins, 1991.
Nguyen Buu Dao Ngo Thi Trinh
See Khai Dinh
See Hanoi Hannah
Nguyen Cao Ky Nguyen Ai Quoc
Birth Date: September 8, 1930
See Ho Chi Minh
Republic of Vietnam Air Force (VNAF, South Vietnamese Air Force) air vice marshal, premier of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) during 1965–1967, and vice president during 1967–1971. Born September 8, 1930, in Son Tay, 25 miles northwest of Hanoi, Nguyen Cao Ky was the only son of a conservative schoolteacher father. Ky attended local primary school in Son Tay and high school in Hanoi. He was about to enter college when in 1951 he was drafted into the Vietnamese National Army (VNA). After six months of officer training, he was commissioned an infantry lieutenant. Ky commanded a platoon at a Red River Delta outpost but within a few weeks volunteered for pilot training. He spent a year training in Morocco, two years in France learning to fly Douglas C-47 Skytrains, and six months in Algeria for bombing and strafing training. In 1954 he graduated as a fully qualified pilot and returned to Vietnam. By the time Ky arrived in Vietnam, the Indochina War was over. He then flew from Haiphong to southern Vietnam and settled there. Promotion was rapid in the infant VNAF. Ky flew C-47s, and in 1959, as a major, he took command of the VNAF 43rd Air Transport Group. In 1960 he assumed command at Tan Son Nhut Air Base outside of Saigon. That same year Ky began working with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) station chief in Saigon William Colby, flying agents into the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), an operation that Ky publicly disclosed to the world in July 1964. He was involved in the November 1963 coup that led to the overthrow and assassination of President Ngo Dinh Diem; Ky played the key role in securing VNAF support and was immediately promoted to full colonel afterward. Ten days after the coup, new chief of state General Duong Van Minh promoted Ky to brigadier general and
Nguyen Binh Birth Date: 1906 Death Date: September 29, 1951 Viet Minh lieutenant general. Born in 1906 at Ban Yen Nhan, My Van District, Hai Hung Province, Nguyen Binh (his real name was Nguyen Phuong Thao) joined the Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang (Vietnam National Party) and participated in the abortive 1930 uprising of the party. Arrested by French authorities, Binh was sentenced to five years’ exile on Poulo Condore (Con Son) penal island. In early 1936 Binh was freed and returned to his hometown to continue his revolutionary activities. At the beginning of 1945 he moved to Haiphong to prepare for an uprising against the French. In June 1945 after attacking military posts at Bi Cho and Mao Khe, Binh attempted to establish the Dong Trieu Resistance Zone under his command. In July 1945 his forces occupied Quang Yen, the capital of Quang Ninh Province. On August 23, 1945, Binh led his troops to Hanoi to participate in the Communist revolution. In October 1945 Ho Chi Minh named Binh a member of the Southern Region Military Committee and commander of the southern front. Binh apparently contributed to the unification of factions in southern Vietnam against the French, and in November 1947 he was promoted to lieutenant general. He was best known for his commando attack on the French ammunition depot at Thi Nghe, Saigon. Tradition has it that he warned the French beforehand. On September 29, 1951, Binh was ambushed and
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Nguyen Cao Ky
Nguyen Cao Ky served as the Republic of Vietnam’s air force air vice marshal, premier from 1965 to 1967, and vice president from 1967 to 1971. (Corbis)
named him commander of the VNAF, and Ky held this post until June 1965. Members of the Military Revolutionary Council that had carried out the coup against Diem soon fell to quarreling among themselves. In January 1964 Ky supported Major General Nguyen Khanh in another coup, this time against General Minh. That year saw seven changes of government. Khanh promoted Ky to major general and then named him air vice marshal. By this time Ky was the leader in a faction of young officers known as the Young Turks that included Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) major general Nguyen Van Thieu. Disillusioned by the ineffective national government, in mid-December 1964 they overthrew the Military Revolutionary Council of older officers. In late January 1965 the new Armed Forces Council decided that Premier Tran Van Huong would have to be replaced. Khanh, who replaced him as premier, was in turn ousted in February in a coup led by General Lam Van Phat. Ky was not involved in this coup, but his threat to bomb headquarters toppled Phat. Phan Huy Quat then became premier, with Phan Khac Suu as chief of state.
On February 8, 1965, the flamboyant Ky led a flight of VNAF planes in Operation FLAMING DART I, the reprisal air strike ordered by President Lyndon B. Johnson against the Dong Hoi military barracks north of the demilitarized zone (DMZ). In June 1965 the new South Vietnamese government collapsed, and on June 12 a triumvirate of generals Nguyen Cao Ky, Nguyen Van Thieu, and Nguyen Huu Co announced the formation of a National Leadership Council to rule South Vietnam. It was subsequently expanded to include 10 members. This body was an inner circle of the 50-member Armed Forces Council, which then elected Ky as chief executive of the council, or premier, charged with conducting the day-to-day government operations. Nguyen Van Thieu occupied the relatively powerless position of chief of state. It was the ninth government in less than two years. When U.S. ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge asked him about his program, Ky replied with the words “social justice.” He took steps to strengthen the armed forces but also instituted needed land reforms, programs for the construction of schools and hospitals, and price controls. In addition, his government launched a campaign to remove corrupt officials. But Ky also instituted a number of unpopular repressive actions against civilians, including a ban on newspapers. The new government was soon embroiled in controversy with the Buddhists. A problem developed regarding ARVN I Corps commander General Nguyen Chanh Thi. Ky and others in the government believed that Thi was too powerful and posed a threat to the government. In early March 1966 the government had secured Thi’s agreement to resign and go into exile in the United States. Buddhist leaders seized on this and began demonstrations. On March 14 Da Nang workers began a two-day general strike that seriously affected American activities. Buddhist students in Hue also began protests. Thi took advantage of this and refused to relinquish command of I Corps. He also attended rallies in Hue and Da Nang to address supporters. Thi’s removal was soon no longer the central issue, as Buddhist leaders sought a complete change of government. The Buddhists took control of radio stations in Hue and Da Nang, and it was evident that there was growing sympathy for the movement among the civil service and many ARVN units. On April 3 Ky announced that “Da Nang is in Communist hands,” but it is by no means clear what role, if any, the Communists played in events. Ky tried to control the situation by appointing General Ton That Dinh as the new commander of I Corps on April 10, but Dinh could not assert his authority with Thi still in Hue. After a significant military operation to suppress the Buddhists and rebel ARVN units, Thi accepted his dismissal on May 24 and, following a “reconciliation” with Ky, went into exile in the United States. In June Ky’s troops, supported by U.S. forces, crushed opposition in Hue. Ky’s popularity and political clout were enhanced in February 1966 as a result of a two-day conference with President Lyndon Johnson in Hawaii. The two men agreed on social and economic
Nguyen Chanh Thi reforms and on the need for national elections. In May 1966 a government decree set up a committee to draft election laws and procedures. In October 117 delegates met in Saigon to begin drafting a constitution, which was completed in March 1967. The constitution provided for a president with wide powers and a premier and cabinet responsible to a two-chamber house. Local elections were held in May 1967, and elections for the lower house were held in October. Tensions were high between Ky and Thieu. At first the two men got along fairly well, but then both openly vied for control of the government. In his memoir Twenty Years and Twenty Days (1976), Ky was sharply critical of Thieu, who “wanted power and glory but . . . did not want to have to do the dirty work.” Ky also accused Thieu of corruption and involvement in heroin trafficking. Although the more senior Thieu had stepped aside in 1965 to allow Ky to take the premier’s post (Ky claimed that Thieu had said at the time that he “did not want the responsibility”), Thieu’s determination to challenge Ky for the highest office in the September 3, 1967, elections led the Armed Forces Council to force Ky and Thieu onto a joint ticket, giving the presidential nomination to Thieu and the vice presidential nomination to Ky simply on the basis of seniority. The Thieu-Ky ticket won the election with 34.8 percent of the vote against 10 other slates. Following the election Ky’s influence was gradually eclipsed by Thieu’s consolidation of power, although Ky tried to suppress Thieu’s followers in the military. In 1971 Thieu engineered an election law to disqualify his major opponents, Ky and Duong Van Minh. Although the South Vietnamese Supreme Court said that Ky, who had charged Thieu’s government with corruption, could run, he chose not to do so. Thieu’s election made one-person rule a reality and did serious injury to the image of the South Vietnamese government. In his memoirs Ky was sharply critical of Thieu’s handling of the 1975 Communist Ho Chi Minh Offensive and his abandonment of the Central Highlands. As Ky put it, “Thieu’s strategic error turned a tactical withdrawal into a rout and the eventual disintegration of our entire armed forces.” In early April 1975 Ky led a well-publicized demonstration during which he and several hundred other officers promised never to leave Vietnam. On April 29, however, Ky commandeered a helicopter and flew it to the aircraft carrier Midway. Ky went to the United States, where he opened a liquor store in Los Angeles. In 1985 he filed for bankruptcy; his liabilities included the loan to buy the liquor store and a $20,000 gambling debt. In 2004 Ky made headlines as the first senior-ranking former South Vietnamese official to travel to Vietnam since the end of the Vietnam War. Some in the Vietnamese American community decried the visit as akin to collaborating with the enemy. Nevertheless, Ky made another trip to Vietnam in 2005, this time with his third wife. SPENCER C. TUCKER
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See also Da Nang; Duong Van Minh; Elections, National, Republic of Vietnam, 1955, 1967, 1971; FLAMING DART I and II, Operations; Honolulu Conference; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr.; Manila Conference; Military Revolutionary Council; Ngo Dinh Diem, Overthrow of; Nguyen Khanh; Nguyen Van Thieu; Tran Van Huong; Vietnam, Republic of, 1954–1975 References Nguyen Cao Ky. Twenty Years and Twenty Days. New York: Stein and Day, 1976. Schulzinger, Robert D. A Time for War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941–1975. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.
Nguyen Chan See Tran Van Tra
Nguyen Chanh Thi Birth Date: February 23, 1923 Death Date: June 23, 2007 Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) general and commander of I Corps whose removal sparked countrywide Buddhist protests. Born in Hue on February 23, 1923, Nguyen Chanh Thi was a devout Buddhist. In 1955 he helped Ngo Dinh Diem, president of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), defeat the Binh Xuyen gangsters. Thi rose to the rank of colonel and commanded ARVN paratroopers. Resenting Diem’s favoritism toward the Catholics, Thi participated in the November 1960 coup attempt against Diem. Thi claimed that he did not want a neutralist government but instead wanted to change the corrupt and incompetent nature of the existing central government. The coup failed after Diem stalled for time by promising to reform his administration while secretly bringing in reinforcements. Immediately after the coup collapse, Thi fled to Cambodia. Following Diem’s November 1963 assassination, Thi returned to South Vietnam and received command of I Corps, which had the cities of Hue and Da Nang in its area of responsibility. As corps commander, he exercised significant control over the region. Premier Nguyen Cao Ky and others in the government believed that Thi was too powerful and posed a threat to the government. Ky had heard rumors in March 1966 that some of the older generals were trying to form an alliance with Thi because of his strong Buddhist support, which included Thich Tri Quang, militant leader of the Central Vietnamese Buddhist movement. On March 4, 1966, Ky confronted Thi about this and then on March 10 convinced the National Leadership Council in Saigon to dismiss Thi from I Corps command.
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Nguyen Chanh Thi
Republic of Vietnam general Nguyen Chanh Thi commanded I Corps in northern South Vietnam. His removal in 1966 sparked Buddhist protests. Thi is shown here during a press conference in Saigon on September 14, 1964. From left to right: Prime Minister Nguyen Khanh; General Thi (then deputy commander of I Corps), and General Pham Van Dong. (Bettmann/Corbis)
At first Thi appeared to accept the decision and to be willing to depart for exile in the United States. On March 11 the Armed Forces Council confirmed the decision to remove Thi from command, but it was then clear that some form of protest by the Buddhists would occur in Da Nang and Saigon. On March 14 workers in Da Nang went on a two-day general strike that affected American activities. Buddhist students in Hue had also initiated protests. Thi sought to use the situation to his own advantage; he now refused to relinquish command of I Corps and leave for the United States. On March 17 and 18 he spoke to his supporters in rallies in Hue and Da Nang. Buddhist leaders also took advantage of the situation to try to bring about a change of government. They seized control of radio stations in Hue and Da Nang. With support for the movement growing among civil servants and the ARVN, on April 3 Ky announced that “Da Nang is in Communist hands.” The Communist role in events is unclear, but the Communists certainly sought to take advantage of the situation to try to turn public opinion against the Americans. Postwar Communist histories state that the Communists were not behind the initial Buddhist protests but that their organizers had worked to “incite the masses to rise up to take control of the cities” after the protests began.
On April 10 Ky appointed General Ton That Dinh as commander of I Corps, but Dinh was unable to take command with Thi still in Hue. After a government-mounted operation to suppress the Buddhists and the rebel ARVN units, on May 24 Thi agreed to step down. Following a reconciliation with Ky at Chu Lai on May 27, Thi left for exile in the United States and settled in Washington, D.C. Rumors of General Thi’s alleged Communist connections were further fueled when in 1970 South Vietnamese police arrested Bui Van Sac, General Thi’s “butler” and confidant who was caring for Thi’s home in Saigon during Thi’s exile in the United States, on charges of being a Communist spy. Statements made by famed Communist spy Pham Xuan An after the war appear to confirm that Sac was indeed working for the Communists. In 1972 Thi attempted to return to South Vietnam, but ARVN troops surrounded his plane on the tarmac and refused to let him disembark. After a stand-off of several hours Thi’s plane took off, and Thi never again returned to Vietnam. Back in the United States, he lived for a time in Arkansas and then in Lancaster, Pennsylvania. He worked a series of odd jobs and lectured to college students and Vietnamese expatriates, who held him in high esteem. Thi died in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, on June 23, 2007. MICHAEL R. NICHOLS
Nguyen Co Thach See also Buddhism in Vietnam; Ngo Dinh Diem; Nguyen Cao Ky; Thich Tri Quang; Ton That Dinh References Bain, Chester A. Vietnam: The Roots of Conflict. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1967. Berman, Larry. Perfect Spy: The Incredible Double Life of Pham Xuan An, Time Magazine Reporter and Vietnamese Communist Agent. New York: HarperCollins, 2007. Duncanson, Dennis J. Government and Revolution in Vietnam. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968. FitzGerald, Frances. Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam. Boston: Little, Brown, 1972. Harrison, James P. The Endless War: Vietnam’s Struggle for Independence. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989. Nguyen Van Minh, ed. Lich Su Khang Chien Chong My Cuu Nuoc, 1954– 1975, Tap IV, Cuoc Dung Dau Lich Su [History of the Resistance War against the Americans to Save the Nation, 1954–1975, Vol. 4, A Historic Confrontation]. Hanoi: National Political Publishing House, 1999. Pham Van Lieu. Tra Ta Song Nui: Hoi Ky, Tap I [Give Us Our Country Back: A Memoir, Vol. 1]. Houston, TX: Van Hoa Publishers, 2002. Smith, R. B. An International History of the Vietnam War. 3 vols. New York: St. Martin’s, 1983–1991.
Nguyen Chi Thanh Birth Date: January 1, 1914 Death Date: July 6, 1967 Senior general in the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) and director of the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) during 1965–1967. Born on January 1, 1914, at Nghiem Pho village, Thua Thien Province, Nguyen Chi Thanh joined the Communist Party in 1937 and quickly rose through its ranks. French authorities arrested him in 1938 and again in 1939. During the early 1940s Thanh worked closely with the Youth Union. After the formation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) in 1945, Thanh was given a series of party posts, including a seat in the secretariat of the important Thua Thien Province Central Committee and membership in the national Central Committee. In 1950 he became a member of the Military Central Committee and director of the PAVN General Political Department, a move that paved his way for a leadership position with the PAVN. Following the Communist victory at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, Thanh spent a good deal of time traveling in the Communist world, one of the few PAVN leaders to do so. Trips to Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) highlighted his considerable political and diplomatic talents. In 1960 Thanh was elected to the Politburo of the Vietnamese Communist Party, and from 1961 to 1964 he supervised North Vietnam’s effort to improve agricultural production. However, Thanh was first a warrior and second a politician. In 1964 General Thanh was sent to lead the Communist insurgency in the
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Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) as the head of the Party’s Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN). During the Vietnam War, he advocated a battlefield victory at all costs. When some in Hanoi suggested adopting a pragmatic approach more in line with Moscow’s thinking in the early 1960s, Thanh openly rebelled. He strongly opposed the protracted war strategy advocated by some party leaders. His leadership of COSVN was extremely controversial, and many scholars have suggested that Thanh’s view of military matters made him a candidate for conflict with General Vo Nguyen Giap. The circumstances surrounding Thanh’s death are in some dispute. His official obituary states that he died of a heart attack in Hanoi on July 6, 1967. Postwar Communist publications state that Thanh’s heart attack was brought on by stress and overindulgence during a round of farewell parties in Hanoi prior to his departure to return to the battlefield in South Vietnam. However, rumors circulated during the war that Thanh died during a U.S. bombing raid. ROBERT K. BRIGHAM See also Central Office for South Vietnam; Le Duan; National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam; Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, Army; Vo Nguyen Giap References Duiker, William J. “Waging Revolutionary War: The Evolution of Hanoi’s Strategy in the South, 1959–1965.” In The Vietnam War: Vietnamese and American Perspectives, edited by Jayne S. Werner and Luu Doan Huynh, 24–36. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1993. Ha Huu Khieu, ed. Dai Tuong Nguyen Chi Thanh, nha chinh tri quan su loi lac [General Nguyen Chi Thanh, an Outstanding Military and Political Figure]. Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1997. Herring, George C. America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975. 4th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001. Lockhart, Greg. Nation in Arms: The Origins of the People’s Army of Vietnam. Sydney, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1989. Ministry of Defense. Tu Dien Bach Khoa Quan Su Viet Nam [Vietnamese Military History Encyclopedia]. Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1996. Pike, Douglas. PAVN: People’s Army of Vietnam. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1986. Thies, Wallace J. When Governments Collide: Coercion and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict, 1964–1968. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.
Nguyen Cong See Do Muoi
Nguyen Co Thach Birth Date: 1923 Death Date: April 10, 1998 Vietnamese revolutionary, ambassador from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) to India during
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Nguyen Duy Trinh
1956–1960, head of the North Vietnamese delegation to the 1962 Geneva Conference, and minister of foreign affairs of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) during 1975–1991. Born on August 15, 1923, Nguyen Co Thach was educated in Hanoi and Moscow. He joined the Communist Party in the early 1950s and quickly rose through the North Vietnamese diplomatic corps, serving as North Vietnam’s ambassador to India from 1956 to 1960 and as head of the North Vietnamese delegation to the 1962 Geneva Conference. In 1966 he chaired the Vietnamese delegation to the Conference to Investigate U.S. War Crimes. During the American phase of the Vietnam War, Thach was best remembered for his role in what became known as the “Ronning Missions,” secret peace initiatives spearheaded by retired Canadian diplomat Chester A. Ronning. In March 1966 Ronning spent five days in Hanoi meeting with Thach, Nguyen Duy Trinh, and Pham Van Dong. Ronning believed that he had been party to a major change in North Vietnamese policy when Dong assured him that if the United States stopped the bombings, the North Vietnamese government was prepared to enter into talks. The Lyndon B. Johnson administration flatly rejected this proposal brought back by Ronning, instead calling for a reciprocal de-escalation in return for a bombing halt. Thach and Ronning met again in June 1966, but ultimately their talks produced little results. Thach played a pivotal role in the 1973 Paris Peace Accords, and in 1975 he became minister of foreign affairs. In 1976 he became a member of the Vietnamese Communist Party’s Central Committee and was elected as an alternative member to the Political Bureau in 1981. During the 1986 Sixth Party Congress, Thach was instrumental in moving the party toward economic reform (doi moi), advocating a more international outlook. Working closely with U.S. presidential emissary John W. Vessey Jr., Thach also supervised the return of the remains of U.S. servicemen killed in action. Thach had hoped to improve relations with the United States during the 1980s, but Vietnam’s involvement in Cambodia largely blocked this. In 1991 there was a period of backlash against doi moi and what some party leaders called “too much cooperation with Western capitalist countries.” Some of Thach’s colleagues believed that he was too intellectual and too liberal in his outlook. Many Vietnamese policy makers also feared the repercussions of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a fellow Communist nation. As a result, Thach was removed from the Political Bureau and the Foreign Ministry at the Seventh Party Congress that June. Thereafter, Hanoi moved to improve relations with China. Thach died on April 10, 1998, in Hanoi. ROBERT K. BRIGHAM See also Doi Moi; Missing in Action, Allied; Paris Negotiations; Vietnam, Socialist Republic of, 1975–Present References Herring, George C., ed. The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983.
Marr, David G., and Christine White, eds. Postwar Vietnam: Dilemmas in Socialist Development. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Studies Program, 1988. Nguyen Van Canh. Vietnam under Communism, 1975–1982. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1983. Porter, Gareth. Vietnam: The Politics of Bureaucratic Socialism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993. Thayer, Carlyle A. “Political Reform in Viet Nam: Doi Moi and the Emergence of Civil Society.” In The Development of Civil Society in Communist Systems, edited by Robert F. Miller, 110–129. Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1992.
Nguyen Duy Trinh Birth Date: July 15, 1910 Death Date: April 20, 1985 Member of the Lao Dong (Communist Party of Vietnam) Central Committee and foreign minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) during 1965–1975. Nguyen Duy Trinh was born in the village of Nghi Loc, Nghe An Province, in central Vietnam on July 15, 1910. After years of resistance work in the New Vietnam Revolutionary Party, he was arrested in 1928 for his revolutionary activities in Saigon. When the French released him in 1930, Trinh joined the Indochinese Communist Party and was active in the Nghe Tinh Soviet Movement between 1930 and 1931. The following year the French arrested him again, and he remained in a colonial prison until 1945. In 1951 Trinh was selected as a member of the Lao Dong Central Committee. After the 1954 victory over the French, he became secretary of the Lao Dong’s Central Committee, one of the most powerful positions within the party. In 1960 Trinh became the deputy prime minister of North Vietnam, a post he held until the end of the Vietnam War. From 1965 to 1975 Trinh gained international recognition as North Vietnam’s minister of foreign affairs. He participated in North Vietnam’s secret contacts with the United States through third parties before the Paris peace talks began and played a key role in the Aspen and Pennsylvania peace initiatives. He also supervised the first secret contact in Paris between North Vietnamese delegate Mai Van Bo and American Edmund Gullion, known in the West as XYZ. Trinh is perhaps best known for his statement of December 29, 1967, in which he declared that serious peace talks “will begin” when the United States stopped bombing North Vietnam unconditionally. Earlier in the year he had announced that substantive talks “could begin” if the United States called a bombing halt. The December statement was portrayed as a dramatic shift in Hanoi’s negotiating stance, and some suggested that this compromise would lead to a quick settlement. In the end Trinh’s comment produced little, and the war continued with few prospects for peace. As the war dragged on, Trinh’s role in the peace talks diminished. He remained an active deputy prime minister, and after the fall of Saigon in 1975 he became of member of the Lao Dong’s Politi-
Nguyen Dynasty
Nguyen Duy Trinh, foreign minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), signs the Paris Peace Agreement to end the Vietnam War, January 17, 1973. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)
cal Bureau. Also in 1975 the second generation of Communist Party leaders began to succeed the first, and Nguyen Co Thach replaced the elderly Trinh as foreign minister. Trinh died on April 20, 1985. ROBERT K. BRIGHAM See also Lao Dong Party; Nguyen Co Thach; Paris Negotiations; Paris Peace Accords References Herring, George C., ed. The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983. Huynh Kim Khanh. Vietnamese Communism, 1925–1945. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982. Porter, Gareth. Vietnam: The Politics of Bureaucratic Socialism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993. Thies, Wallace J. When Governments Collide: Coercion and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict, 1964–1968. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.
Nguyen Dynasty Ruling family in Vietnam from 1802 to 1945. In the 17th century, Vietnam was divided in two. The Trinh lords ruled the north, while the Nguyen lords came to control the south from their fortress city
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of Phu Xuan (present-day Hue). Each family hated the other, but both ruled in the name of the powerless Le kings at Thang Long (present-day Hanoi). The Trinh tried to conquer the south, but their armies were unable to penetrate walls that the Nguyen constructed near the 17th Parallel. By 1700 the Nguyen had extended their influence in the south to include parts of Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand. In 1771, however, Nguyen power came under attack in the Tay Son Rebellion. The Tay Son were on the verge of overthrowing the Nguyen altogether when in 1775 a Trinh army moved south and took Phu Xuan. The Tay Son managed to avoid being crushed between their enemies by reaching accommodation with the Trinh until the latter tired of their southern involvement and withdrew into the north. In 1776 the Tay Son attacked the Nguyen stronghold in Gia Dinh Province and took Sai Con (later Saigon and present-day Ho Chi Minh City). Only one Nguyen prince, Nguyen Phuc Anh, managed to escape; he and some supporters fled into the swamps of the western Mekong Delta. In 1783 Tay Son troops led by the youngest Tay Son brother, Nguyen Hue, again defeated Nguyen Anh, forcing him into refuge on the island of Phu Quoc. Nguyen Anh then called in the Siamese, and in 1784 a Siamese army invaded the western Mekong Delta. In 1785 Nguyen Hue defeated the invaders, and the remainder of Nguyen Anh’s family fled to Siam. Nguyen Hue succeeded in establishing his control over northern Vietnam and then the whole country by defeating the Trinh, the Le, and an intervening Chinese army. He then ruled the country as Emperor Quang Trung. He died in 1792, however, before he had a chance to establish his dynasty. Nguyen Anh had not given up. He made friends with French missionary Pigneau de Béhaine, who supported his cause and secured military assistance in the form of French mercenary troops from India. With Western advisers and weaponry, Nguyen Anh launched a military campaign to establish his rule over all of Vietnam, something he accomplished in 1802. Nguyen Anh then founded the Nguyen dynasty. He took the dynastic name Gia Long (Gia from “Gia Dinh,” the customary name for Saigon, and Long from “Thang Long”). Gia Long moved the capital from Hanoi in the north to Hue in the central part of the country. He died in 1820 and was followed by Minh Mang (r. 1820–1841), Thieu Tri (r. 1841–1847), Tu Duc (r. 1847–1883), Duc Du’c (r. July 1883), Hiep Hoa (r. August– November 1883), Kien Phuc (r. 1883–1884), Ham Nghi (r. 1884– 1888), Dong Khanh (r. 1885–1888), Thanh Thai (r. 1889–1907), Duy Tan (r. 1907–1916), Khai Dinh (r. 1916–1925), and Bao Dai (r. 1925–1945). Gia Long’s successors lacked his understanding of Western strengths and weaknesses. Perhaps they would have been unable to resist Western military technology in any case, but it was under them that the French conquered the country and established their authority. The Nguyen dynasty lasted in Vietnam until the 1945 abdication of Bao Dai. SPENCER C. TUCKER
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Nguyen Hai Than
See also Bao Dai; Duy Tan; Ham Nghi; Minh Mang; Nguyen Hue; Nguyen Phuc Anh; Tay Son Rebellion; Thieu Tri; Tu Duc References Le Thanh Khoi. Histoire de Viet Nam des Origines à 1858. Paris: Sudestasie, 1981. Nguyen Khac Vien. Vietnam: A Long History. Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1987.
Nguyen Hai Than Birth Date: 1869 Death Date: 1951 Nationalist Vietnamese leader who opposed Ho Chi Minh. Born in 1869 in Dai Tu village, Thuong Tin District, Ha Dong Province, Nguyen Hai Than (real name Nguyen Van Thang or Vu Hai Thu) in 1891 earned the degree of Tu Tai in the mandarin examinations. Sometime around 1905 he went to China in Phan Boi Chau’s Exodus to the East movement that encouraged Vietnamese to study abroad. In China, Than graduated from the Whampoa Military Academy. Years later he became a close friend of Sun Yixian (Sun Yatsen) and was highly respected by Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek). For a time Than taught at Whampoa. In 1942 Than helped found the Viet Nam Cach Menh Dong Minh Hoi (VNCMDMH) with help from Chinese general Chang Fa Kwei. When the latter imprisoned Ho, Vietnamese nationalist leaders in southern China, who thought of Ho as a compatriot rather than a Communist, urged Than to intercede with Jiang for Ho’s freedom, which he did, obtaining Ho’s release. Ho then became a member of the VNCMDMH, of which Than was chairman. Ho’s new Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi (VNDLDMH, or Viet Minh) party joined the umbrella VNCMDMH organization. Within the VNCMDMH, Ho was assigned the task of observing the situation in Vietnam and determining the right time for the league to attempt a general uprising in which all member parties were to participate. After pledging full allegiance to the league, Ho returned to Vietnam. But in August 1945 Ho’s Viet Minh seized power in Hanoi. Although the other league-affiliated nationalist parties, especially the Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang (VNQDD, Vietnamese Nationalist Party), were more powerful than the Viet Minh, they were not prepared for the imminent defeat of the Japanese. Aware of the Viet Minh betrayal, the nationalist parties held an emergency meeting on August 18, 1945, in Hanoi to decide whether they should try to drive the Viet Minh from power. The majority concluded that because the Viet Minh were fighting for independence, a civil war should be avoided. Too late, Than returned to Hanoi. The nationalist parties formed a front, with the major element in it the VNQDD. Than became the front’s leader. Although supported by Jiang, Than did not get full assistance from commander of Chinese forces in north-
ern Vietnam General Lu Han, undoubtedly a consequence of Ho’s having bought Lu off with gold contributed by the people in the so-called Gold Week. Meanwhile, Ho maneuvered skillfully to marginalize Than and minimize nationalist influence, essential because the nationalist forces were more powerful than the Viet Minh. Ho practiced every stratagem to fool Than and finally went to see him at VNCMDMH headquarters to secure an agreement. They spent an entire day in discussions, with Ho warning Than that if he refused a coalition and civil war broke out, the Vietnamese people and history would condemn him. That was what Than most feared, and so he finally agreed to accept the vice presidency and place his supporters in cabinet posts, including foreign affairs, treasury, public health, and agriculture. Ho also offered 70 of 350 parliamentary seats to parties allied with Than. Of this number, the VNQDD received 50 seats, and the others shared the remaining 20. This meant that the two sides agreed to rig the January 6, 1946, elections. After the preliminary agreement with the French on March 6, 1946, the nationalist forces were routed by an all-out surprise Viet Minh offensive (ironically during the Great Solidarity Campaign). In many places in northern Vietnam, French forces also attacked nationalist strongholds. Than soon left Vietnam for China. Subsequently he was blamed for the failure to overthrow the Viet Minh when this was still possible. He stayed on in China after the defeat of the Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist) party in 1949 and died in Nanning, southern China, in 1951. Although Than was a virtuous leader of unquestioned morality, he was not a talented politician, especially when faced with the likes of Ho Chi Minh. NGUYEN CONG LUAN See also August Revolution; French Indochina, 1860s–1946; Ho Chi Minh; HoSainteny Agreement; Jiang Jieshi References Dommen, Arthur J. The Indochinese Experience of the French and Americans: Nationalism and Communism in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001. Hoang Van Dao. Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang. Saigon: Published by the author, 1970; reprinted in the United States. Marr, David G. Vietnam 1945: The Quest for Power. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.
Nguyen Ha Phan Birth Date: February 2, 1933 Prominent leader in the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV). Nguyen Ha Phan was born on February 2, 1933, in Chau Hoa village, Giong Trom District, Ben Tre Province. His background is obscure except that he was educated in northern Vietnam. Phan was an alternate member
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of the Central Committee at the December 1986 VCP Sixth Congress. Elevated to full member at the VCP Seventh Congress, he became head of the Department of Economics. In June 1991, he became secretary of the VCP Central Committee’s Secretariat and in January 1994 was promoted to the political bureau of the VCP Central Committee. Phan was also active in the government. In 1981 he was chairman of the Hau Giang Province People’s Committee. He was also a deputy to the National Assembly from that province and a member of that body’s Economics, Planning, and Budget Committee. After the division of Hau Giang Province into two provinces, he was elected as a deputy to the National Assembly from Can Tho Province, and in July 1992 he became deputy chairman of the National Assembly. Regarded as one of the likely candidates to replace Vo Van Kiet as premier, Phan in April 1996 was suddenly removed both from the Politburo and the National Assembly, apparently over his opposition to a more open economy. He was the highestlevel party official expelled in more than a decade. NGO NGOC TRUNG See also Vietnam, Socialist Republic of, 1975–Present Reference Porter, Gareth. Vietnam: The Politics of Bureaucratic Socialism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993.
Nguyen Hue Birth Date: 1752 Death Date: March or April 1792 Also known as Vua Quang Trung (King Quang Trung) or Quang Trung Hoang De (Emperor Quang Trung), Nguyen Hue was probably the most important military strategist and national hero in Vietnamese history. With 100,000 men, he successfully defeated a Chinese army of 200,000 in January 1789. Nguyen Hue was born in 1752, the youngest and most capable of the three brothers from the village of Tay Son in Binh Dinh Province (the others were Nguyen Nhac and Nguyen Lu). The three brothers revolted against the Nguyen lords in southern Vietnam in the early 1770s. After 15 years they defeated both the Nguyen in the south and the Trinh in the north, and to a certain extent, reunified the country after 150 years of division. Thanks to this success, King Hien Tong of the Le regained power. After the death of Hien Tong, his grandson Chieu Thong was unable to maintain order. This situation led Nguyen Hue to move back to the capital at Thang Long (present-day Hanoi). Le Chieu Thong then fled to China and asked for Qing dynasty assistance in regaining his throne. Sun Shiyi, the governor of Guangdong and Guangxi provinces bordering Vietnam, recommended military intervention, which would provide Chinese emperor Can Long (Kien Lung) with an excellent opportunity to reconquer his
Men perform a dragon dance during a ceremony marking the 221st anniversary of the victory of King Quang Trung’s troops over the Chinese who had invaded Vietnam, Hanoi, February 18, 2010. (AFP/Getty Images)
country’s former colony. To accomplish this, in 1788 the emperor placed Sun Shiyi at the head of a Chinese army of 200,000 men. Being no match for the huge Chinese army, Ngo Van So, the Tay Son general, decided to abandon Thang Long and move farther southward to await Nguyen Hue’s orders. It was at this time that Nguyen Hue decided to proclaim himself king, now known as Quang Trung, and prepared to move north. He left Phu Xuan (Hue) on the 22nd day of the 11th month of the Mau Than Year (December 22, 1788) and arrived in Nghe An on December 26. There he recruited more men for his army. Before continuing his march he ordered the army to celebrate Tet ahead of time. Following a series of battles, including those at Phu Xuyen, Ha Hoi, and Ngoc Hoi, the Tay Son troops won a decisive victory at Khuong Thuong. Sam Nghi Dong, the Chinese commander, hanged himself at Dong Da Hill. Sun Shiyi and his lieutenants fled. On the 5th day of Tet, Quang Trung entered the capital. His campaign had lasted 40 days, with 35 of them in preparation and only
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5 days in battle. Nguyen Hue’s victory at Dong Da on the 5th day of Tet Ky Dau became a national holiday in the official calendar of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) before 1975. The holiday is still celebrated by Vietnamese throughout the world. Quang Trung’s lightning victory over the Chinese was not his only military achievement. In 1784 Nguyen Phuc Anh called in the Siamese to help him against the Tay Son, and a Siamese force of between 20,000 and 50,000 men with 300 ships invaded the western Mekong Delta area. On January 19, 1785, in another important military victory in Vietnamese history, Quang Trung lured the Siamese into an ambush on the My Tho River in the Rach Gam–Xoai Mut area of Dinh Tuong Province and defeated them. According to Vietnamese sources, only 2,000 Siamese escaped. The remaining Nguyen family members then fled to Siam. The battle halted Siamese expansion into southern Vietnam. In addition to these two great military victories, Quang Trung did much domestically for Vietnam. He showed himself willing to work with capable individuals regardless of their past loyalties. This helped attract the best men to his service. He reorganized the army and carried out fiscal reforms. He also redistributed unused lands, mainly to the peasants; promoted the crafts and trade; and pushed for reforms in education, stating that in building a country nothing was more important than educating the people. Quang Trung also believed in the importance of studying history; he had his own tutors lecture to him on Vietnamese history and culture six times a month. He wanted to open trade with the countries of the West, and Western missionaries in Vietnam at the time noted the safe conditions in which they were able to carry out their religious activities with more freedom than before. Quang Trung was the first Vietnamese leader to stress the importance of science, insisting that it be added to requirements for the mandarinate examinations. He also introduced a Vietnamese currency and insisted that Chu Nom, the demotic writing system combining Chinese characters with Vietnamese, be used exclusively, rather than Chinese, in court documents. Unfortunately, Quang Trung’s reign was short; he was not to have the 10 years he believed necessary. He died of an unknown illness in March or April 1792. Many Vietnamese hold that had he lived a decade longer, their history would have developed quite differently. His son, Quang Toan, ascended the throne, but he was then only 10 years old. Within a decade Nguyen Anh, the surviving Nguyen lord, came to power and proclaimed himself king as Gia Long, establishing the Nguyen dynasty. PHAM CAO DUONG AND SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Hanoi, Battle of, and the First Tet Offensive; Nguyen Dynasty; Nguyen Phuc Anh; Vietnam, History of, 938 CE through the French Conquest References Hoa Bang. Quang Trung Nguyen Hue: Anh Hùng Dan Toc (1788–1792). [Quang Trung Nguyen Hue, Our National Hero]. Saigon: Bon Phuong Tai Ban, 1950.
Le Thanh Khoi. Le Viet-Nam: Histoire et civilisation. Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1955. Nguyen Huyen Anh. Viet Nam Danh Nhan Tu Dien [Dictionary of Vietnamese Great Men and Women]. Houston, TX: Zieleks, 1990. Tran Trong Kim. Viet Nam Su Luoc [Outline of Vietnamese History]. Saigon: Bo Giao Duc, 1971.
Nguyen Hue Campaign See Easter Offensive
Nguyen Huu An Birth Date: 1926 Death Date: 1995 Perhaps the People’s Army of Vietnam’s (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) finest combat commander and the commander of PAVN forces in two of the bloodiest battles of the Vietnam War. Nguyen Huu An was born in Ninh Binh Province in northern Vietnam in 1926. He joined the Viet Minh armed forces in 1945 and rose rapidly through the ranks as an infantry leader. He commanded a regiment of the 316th Division during the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. After commanding troops during the 1961–1962 PAVN intervention in Laos, he was given command of the PAVN 325th Division. In late 1964 An led the three regiments of the 325th Division down the Ho Chi Minh Trail to the Central Highlands of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), where he was appointed deputy commander of the Central Highlands (B3) Front. In November 1965 he was the frontline commander of the PAVN forces that fought the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) in the Battle of the Ia Drang Valley. In the 2002 movie We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young, starring Mel Gibson, Vietnamese actor Don Duong played the role of An. As commander of the PAVN 1st Division from 1966 to 1968, An commanded numerous offensives against U.S. forces in the Central Highlands, culminating in the Battle of Dak To in November 1967. After returning to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) in 1968, An was given command of the famed PAVN 308th Division. He commanded it during the battle against the Army of the Republic of Vietnam’s (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) incursion into Laos (Operation LAM SON 719) in early 1971. After serving as deputy commander of a PAVN offensive in the Plain of Jars in Laos in early 1972, in the summer of 1972 An reassumed command of the 308th Division and led it in a desperate battle against the ARVN counteroffensive to retake Quang Tri Province. Following the January 1973 Paris Peace Accords, An was sent to the Soviet Union for advanced combined arms military training. Upon his return he became commander of PAVN’s new II Corps
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and led it in the March 1975 offensive that captured Hue and Da Nang. During the April 1975 Ho Chi Minh Campaign the II Corps captured the South Vietnamese Presidential Palace in Saigon and accepted the surrender of President Duong Van Minh. In December 1979 An, still commanding II Corps, led his troops in an attack across southeastern Cambodia that captured the key Cambodian seaport of Kompong Som (Sihanoukville). As deputy commander of Military Region II during 1984–1987, An directed PAVN troops in vicious border fighting against Chinese forces in Ha Giang Province on Vietnam’s northern border. An retired from the PAVN in 1991 with the rank of colonel general. He died in 1995. MERLE L. PRIBBENOW II See also Cambodia, Vietnamese Invasion and Occupation of; Dak To, Battle of; Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; Easter Offensive; Ho Chi Minh Campaign; Hue and Da Nang, Fall of; Ia Drang, Battle of; LAM SON 719, Operation; MACARTHUR, Operation; Moore, Harold Gregory, Jr. References Ministry of Defense. Tu Dien Bach Khoa Quan Su Viet Nam [Vietnamese Military History Encyclopedia]. Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1996. Nguyen Huu An and Nguyen Tu Duong. Chien Truong Moi [New Battlefields]. Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 2002.
Nguyen Huu Co Birth Date: February 23, 1923 Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) general and in 1966 defense minister for the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Nguyen Huu Co was born on February 23, 1923, in My Tho in southern Vietnam. Co’s first public appearance came during the coup that overthrew South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem in November 1963. As one of General Ton That Dinh’s deputies, Co, then a colonel, was in charge of preventing Diem loyalists in the Mekong Delta from getting to Saigon to rescue the Ngo brothers, a task that Co successfully fulfilled. After the coup Co was promoted to lieutenant general, and in 1965 he became chief of the ARVN Joint General Staff. In 1966 he became deputy prime minister and minister of defense. In this turbulent period in South Vietnamese politics, with five governments in three months, there was little that Co could do in his position. Reportedly he was more interested in making money in real estate than he was in national affairs. Following the 1975 Communist victory, Co stayed in Vietnam and was sent to a prison (reeducation) camp along with many other ARVN officers. When he was released in 1990, he chose to remain in Vietnam instead of immigrating to the United States. In March 2005 General Co and two other former senior South Vietnamese officers participated in a press conference held to commemorate
Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) general Nguyen Huu Co became chief of the ARVN Joint General Staff in 1965 and the next year was deputy prime minister and minister of defense. He is shown here at a press conference in 1965. (Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images)
the 30th anniversary of the Communist victory in South Vietnam. During the press conference Co told foreign reporters that he had decided not to immigrate to the United States following his release from prison after U.S. officials told him that only he and his wife, not the rest of his extended family, would be accepted for resettlement in the United States. HO DIEU ANH See also Ngo Dinh Diem, Overthrow of; Ton That Dinh; Vietnam, Republic of, 1954–1975 References Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. Who’s Who in Vietnam. Saigon: Vietnam Press Agency, 1974.
Nguyen Huu Tho Birth Date: July 10, 1910 Death Date: December 24, 1996 Southern Vietnamese Communist revolutionary and first president of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam
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(National Liberation Front [NLF]). Born on July 10, 1910, in Cholon, Nguyen Huu Tho attended law school in France and worked as a lawyer in Saigon during the 1940s. In 1949 he helped organize a successful anti-French protest in Saigon and caught the attention of colonial officials. In 1950 the French arrested Tho and deported him to Lai Chau in northwestern Vietnam, where he remained until the signing of the Geneva Accords in 1954. Tho returned to Saigon in 1954 and resumed his resistance activities. He founded the Saigon–Choo Lon Peace Movement and was elected as its vice president in 1955. Although Tho never officially joined the Communist Party, Ngo Dinh Diem, the president of the newly created Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), claimed that Tho was a party member and had him arrested. Tho served several years in South Vietnamese jails before Diem placed him under house arrest in Phu Yen in central Vietnam. At the organizational meeting of the NLF on December 20, 1960, Tho was the delegates’ choice as the NLF’s first president. During a commando raid, South Vietnamese revolutionaries liberated Tho and brought him to NLF headquarters in Tay Ninh Province. From 1961 through 1968 Tho served as the president of the Presidium of the NLF’s Central Committee. He insisted in his public statements that the NLF was independent and autonomous from the Communists in Hanoi and that the NLF had come into being in response to South Vietnamese demands. From 1962 to 1968 he was the international spokesperson for the NLF, granting interviews to hundreds of reporters worldwide. In 1969 Huynh Tan Phat replaced Tho as the titular head of the revolutionary movement in South Vietnam when Phat was named as the president of the newly formed Provisional Revolutionary Government. Tho continued as chairman of the NLF’s Central Committee and in 1976 was named to the purely ceremonial position of acting vice president of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV). Tho’s powerlessness after the fall of Saigon became symbolic of the difficulties and tensions between northern and southern Communists after the war. In 1980–1981 he was acting president of the SRV, and throughout much of the 1980s he was also a member of the Council of State. Tho died in Ho Chi Minh City on December 24, 1996. ROBERT K. BRIGHAM See also Huynh Tan Phat; National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam; Ngo Dinh Diem; Nguyen Thi Binh; Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam; Tran Buu Kiem; Truong Nhu Tang; Vietnam, Republic of, 1954–1975 References Kahin, George McTurnan, and John W. Lewis. The United States in Vietnam. New York: Dial, 1966. Personalities of the South Vietnam Liberation Movement. New York: Commission for Foreign Relations of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation, 1965. Porter, Gareth. Vietnam: The Politics of Bureaucratic Socialism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993.
Truong Nhu Tang, with David Charnoff and Doan Van Toai. A Viet Cong Memoir: An Inside Account of the Vietnam War and Its Aftermath. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985.
Nguyen Huu Tri Birth Date: ca. 1903 Death Date: 1954 Leader of the Dai Viet Quoc Dan Dang (National Party of Greater Vietnam) and nationalist governor of northern Vietnam for the State of Vietnam during much of the Indochina War. The date and place of Nguyen Huu Tri’s birth are uncertain; he may have been born in 1903. When the Dai Viet Quoc Dan Dang announced its support for former emperor Bao Dai’s government in June 1949, Tri was appointed chief magistrate of northern Vietnam. Initially he presided only over the municipalities, as the countryside was controlled by the Viet Minh. The nationalist cause was hurt when in 1951 French general Jean de Lattre de Tassigny ordered Tri removed from office. Subsequently reappointed governor, Tri was considered by the American Special and Economic Technical Mission (Mutual Security Agency) in northern Vietnam as the most competent of the Vietnamese administrators. He pressed the French for real independence and organized the Dong Quan pacification project south of Hanoi. Tri worked closely with the Americans and the French to create other pacification centers in order to protect the population from Viet Minh infiltration in the Red River Delta. He was disappointed by the success of Viet Minh terror and by the scant support received from the French. The pacification centers that Tri organized with U.S. funding became mostly refugee centers to accommodate the tens of thousands of Vietnamese fleeing Viet Minh–controlled areas. Tri was called to Saigon by the government in mid-1954 and died there under mysterious circumstances. CLAUDE R. SASSO See also Dai Viet Quoc Dan Dang; Dong Quan Pacification Project; Lattre de Tassigny, Jean de; United States, Involvement in Indochina through 1954; Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, 1945–1954 References Buttinger, Joseph. Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled. 2 vols. New York: Praeger, 1967. James P. Hendrick Papers. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Nguyen Khac Xung See Le Thanh Nghi
Nguyen Khoa Nam
Nguyen Khanh Birth Date: November 8, 1927 Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) general whose political ambitions led him through two coups, eventually to become premier of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) for a brief period in 1965. Born on November 8, 1927, in Tra Vinh in southern Vietnam, Nguyen Khanh lived with his father, who was a wealthy landowner, and was raised by his father’s lover, a popular Vietnamese singer and actor. Khanh left his Saigon school at age 16 in 1943 to join the Viet Minh effort against the Japanese and French. Expelled by the Viet Minh for poor discipline, he joined the French, who trained him to be an officer in the Vietnamese National Army (VNA). Khanh supported President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1954 and successfully defended the presidential palace during the attempted coup of November 1960. But as the commander of II Corps, Khanh was a key player in the November 1963 coup against Diem. In a move essential to the coup’s success, principal plotters generals Tran Van Don, Duong Van Minh, and Le Van Kim secured the support of Khanh and I Corps commander General Do Cao Tri. In the months following the coup, the new government leaders failed to capitalize on their initial popularity by not asserting the leadership that the nation and the situation demanded. Before General Minh could begin a reform program, generals Khanh, Do Mau, and Tran Thien Khiem carried out a bloodless coup on January 31, 1965, on the pretext that others in the new government were preparing to institute a neutralist program. Khanh asked Minh to remain as chief of state while Khanh became premier and chairman of the Military Revolutionary Council. The Americans were impressed with Khanh’s promises, which called for urban and rural development as well as the renewal of the Strategic Hamlet Program under the new name of New Rural Life Hamlets. Khanh also vowed to institute a civilian government with a constitution. The South Vietnamese were less impressed with their new premier, however. One of the many reasons for Khanh’s unpopularity was that he had ousted the popular General Minh. Intellectuals did not like Khanh’s common background (his mother had run a bar in Da Lat) and found that when they asked for an all-civilian cabinet, Khanh declared that the army alone could lead the country. Many were demoralized by the purge that he instituted as well as the rapid turnover of chiefs at the provincial and district levels. Most South Vietnamese Buddhist organizations and sects joined together in the United Buddhist Association (UBA). Khanh, himself a Buddhist, tried to appease the UBA by recognizing it and donating land for a national pagoda. He also removed the favored legal status of Catholics and endorsed the use of a Buddhist chaplain corps for the armed forces. Despite these moves, Buddhists still complained of repression, and many military commanders were not happy with the new chaplains. The Viet Cong (VC) took advantage of these disruptions by increasing their activities.
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Thinking that this was an opportune moment to begin a dictatorship, Khanh declared a national emergency and instituted a new constitution, the Vung Tau Charter, giving the president nearly absolute powers. The Military Revolutionary Council then elected Khanh president. Protests broke out in Saigon, Da Nang, and Hue as Communists infiltrated many demonstrations to aggravate the religious tension. Khanh then withdrew the charter and resigned. The Military Revolutionary Council elected a triumvirate of Khanh, Minh, and Khiem as an interim government to restore some order. Khanh remained commander in chief of the new government but was ousted in February 1965 by generals Nguyen Cao Ky and Nguyen Van Thieu. Khanh then was given an at-large ambassadorial post, with the understanding that he would leave the country. He lived in France for a number of years and was engaged in private business after the fall of South Vietnam in 1975. In 1977 Khanh and his family immigrated to the United States, where he has lived ever since. He held a number of positions with private companies and has lectured extensively at colleges and universities, both military and civilian. MICHAEL R. NICHOLS See also Buddhism in Vietnam; Do Cao Tri; Duong Van Minh; Le Van Kim; Military Revolutionary Council; National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam; Ngo Dinh Diem; Ngo Dinh Diem, Overthrow of; Nguyen Cao Ky; Nguyen Van Thieu; Tran Thien Khiem; Tran Van Don; Viet Minh; Vietnamese National Army References Bain, Chester A. Vietnam: The Roots of Conflict. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1967. Davidson, Phillip A. Vietnam at War: The History, 1946–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1988. Duncanson, Dennis J. Government and Revolution in Vietnam. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968. Fishel, Wesley R., ed. Vietnam: Anatomy of a Conflict. Itasca, IL: Peacock, 1968. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. Smith, R. B. An International History of the Vietnam War. 3 vols. New York: St. Martin’s, 1983–1991.
Nguyen Khoa Nam Birth Date: September 23, 1927 Death Date: April 30, 1975 Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) major general. Born in Da Nang, Quang Nam Province, on September 23, 1927, Nguyen Khoa Nam graduated from high school in 1946 and later graduated from the College of Administration in Hue. Drafted into the army, he graduated from the Thu Duc Reserve Officers School in 1953.
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After October 1953 Nam held a succession of airborne posts. He graduated from the Parachutists Training Center in Pau, France, in 1953; was at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in 1962; and attended the Infantry Officer Advanced Course at Fort Benning, Georgia, in 1963. Nam assumed command of the 5th Airborne Battalion in 1965 and the 3rd Airborne Brigade in 1968. In September 1969 he was promoted to brigadier general and command of the 7th Infantry Division. He was promoted to major general in November 1972, and after November 1974 he commanded IV Corps. After the fall of Saigon, General Nam committed suicide on the night of April 30, 1975, near Saigon after bidding goodbye to his staff and talking by telephone with General Le Van Hung, who also committed suicide. NGUYEN CONG LUAN See also Le Van Hung References Davidson, Phillip A. Vietnam at War: The History, 1946–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1988. Ha Mai Viet. Steel and Blood: South Vietnamese Armor and the War for Southeast Asia. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008. Pham Phong Dinh. Chien Su Quan Luc Viet Nam Cong Hoa [The Combat History of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam]. Winnipeg: Self-published, 2001. Truong Dong. Doi Chien Binh [The Warrior’s Life]. Westminster, CA: Tu Quynh, 1998.
was arrested several times by the French authorities and twice escaped from prison, first from Hoa Lo, Hanoi, in 1932 and then from Son La in 1943. In 1941 Bang was president of the Viet Minh and head of the Financial Department of the Viet Minh. In October 1943 he became an alternate member of the Vietnamese Communist Party Central Committee in charge of financial affairs and military recruiting. In 1945 he was elected a full member of the ICP Central Committee. After the August 1945 revolution, Bang held important party and state posts and was a member of the ICP Central Committee and vice president of North Vietnam (1969). In 1976 he became vice president of the SRV, a post he held until his death in Hanoi on July 20, 1979. NGO NGOC TRUNG See also Ho Chi Minh; Lao Dong Party; Viet Minh; Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, 1954–1975; Vietnam, Socialist Republic of, 1975–Present References Duiker, William J. The Rise of Nationalism in Vietnam, 1900–1911. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2nd rev. and updated ed. New York: Penguin, 1997.
Nguyen Manh Cam Nguyen Kim Thanh See To Huu
Nguyen Luong Bang Birth Date: April 2, 1904 Death Date: July 20, 1979 Prominent leader in the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP), the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV). Born on April 2, 1904, in Doan Lam village, Thanh Mien District, Hai Duong Province, to a poor scholar’s family, Nguyen Luong Bang spent his youth as a maritime worker. In 1925 he met Nguyen Ai Quoc (Ho Chi Minh) in Guangzhouwan (Kwang-Chou-Wan), China, and became active in revolutionary activities. Later Bang joined the Viet Nam Thanh Nien Cach Menh Dong Chi Hoi (Vietnamese Revolutionary Youth Association), predecessor of the ICP, and attended political training classes taught by Nguyen Ai Quoc at Kwang Chou. Bang was assigned to work in the labor movement in Hai Phong and later in Saigon. In 1928 Bang was sent to take part in revolutionary activities abroad and became a member of the ICP. During 1930–1943 he
Birth Date: September 15, 1929 Leader in the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) and minister of foreign affairs of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV). Born on September 15, 1929, at Hung Dung village, Hung Nguyen District, Nghe An Province, and a graduate of Hanoi’s College of Foreign Languages, Nguyen Manh Cam joined the anti-French struggle in 1945 in his hometown area and the Indochinese Communist Party in 1946. From 1947 he was assigned various tasks in Interzone IV. On the state level, in 1952 Cam joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and was assigned to various departments of the ministry, such as the Soviet Union and East Europe departments, the Office of the Foreign Ministry, the Department of General Services, and the department involved in monitoring the Paris peace talks and Paris Agreement Implementation. Cam was in the Soviet Union as a junior embassy official from 1952 to 1956. A Soviet specialist who studied Russian in China and the Soviet Union, Cam returned to his Moscow station during 1962–1966, when he was embassy first secretary. From 1973 to 1977 he served concurrently as the North Vietnamese ambassador to Hungary, Austria, and Iran. In 1977 he was appointed ambassador concurrently to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany), Switzerland, and Iran.
Nguyen Ngoc Loan In 1981 Cam returned to Vietnam and became vice minister of the Ministry of Foreign Trade. In December 1986 he became an alternate member of the VCP Central Committee before returning to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1987 as ambassador to Moscow. In June 1991 he was made a full member of VCP Central Committee. Cam became minister of foreign affairs in August 1991, a post he apparently accepted with reluctance. He was elected as a National Assembly deputy from Nghe An Province in July 1992 and then a member of Vietnam’s National Defense and Security Council. In January 1994 he was rewarded with a Politburo post. A career diplomat with a reputation for integrity, Cam is credited with normalizing relations with the United States in July 1995. NGO NGOC TRUNG See also Lao Dong Party; Vietnam, Socialist Republic of, 1975–Present References Duiker, William J. The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam. 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996. Nguyen Khac Vien. Vietnam: A Long History. Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1987.
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Nguyen Ngoc Loan Birth Date: 1931 Death Date: July 14, 1998 Republic of Vietnam Air Force (VNAF, South Vietnamese Air Force) brigadier general and director of National Police (1966– 1968). Born in 1931 in Hue, 1 of 11 children of a prosperous mechanical engineer, Nguyen Ngoc Loan graduated near the top of his class at the University of Hue and became a VNAF pilot. He advanced rapidly and became commander of the Light Observation Group and then assistant commander of the Tactical Operations Center. An old classmate and close friend of Nguyen Cao Ky, Loan served as deputy commander of the VNAF in the aftermath of the November 1963 coup against Ngo Dinh Diem. In June 1965 when Ky became premier of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), he appointed Loan director of the Military Security Service. A few months later Loan became director of the Central Intelligence Organization and then in April 1966 became the director of the National Police. Not even under Diem had one man directed so many police and intelligence agencies.
Nguyen Ngoc Loan (left), Republic of Vietnam Air Force (VNAF) brigadier general and director of the National Police from 1966–1968, is best known for his execution of a member of the Viet Cong during the 1968 Tet Offensive. This well-known photograph, which earned numerous awards, undermined Loan’s career and gave an unfavorable image of the Republic of Vietnam government. (AP/Wide World Photos)
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U.S. officials were pleased to see Loan take control of the police and intelligence services and improve stability in South Vietnam, particularly in Saigon. A U.S. embassy official favorably reported that from October 1966 to January 1968 not a single terrorist incident or National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (National Liberation Front [NLF]) meeting was recorded in districts 7, 8, or 9 of Saigon, whereas before that period daytime meetings were occurring in the same areas, and there were more than 40 terrorist incidents a month. Loan had always been known for his ability to deal by extralegal means with political rivals; he once marched armed guards into the National Assembly to break a legislative logjam. But Loan received international attention when on February 1 during the 1968 Tet Offensive he shot a Viet Cong (VC) suspect in the head with a revolver on a Saigon street. The slain man was reportedly a member of a death squad that had killed the family of one of Loan’s deputy commanders. AP photographer Eddie Adams recorded the event, and his photograph undermined Loan’s career and presented an unfavorable image abroad of the South Vietnamese government. In Twenty Years and Twenty Days, Ky bitterly remarked that Loan’s act was wrongly taken as a war crime and that it was simply “an isolated incident of the cruelty of war.” Nonetheless, the execution drew immediate rebukes from U.S. officials. Adams later expressed regret over the way his photo adversely affected Loan. On May 5, 1968, Loan was severely wounded while leading an attack on a VC hideout in a suburb north of Saigon. He was forced to resign his posts to undergo surgery and extended hospitalization, first in Australia and then in the United States, where he was denounced in Congress. General Loan was removed from influence in a purge of Ky loyalists, replaced by supporters of President Nguyen Van Thieu. On June 6 General Tran Van Hai, a Thieu follower, became director of the National Police, and Loan soon disappeared from the political arena. On his return to Saigon he seemed changed and devoted his time to working with orphans. When Saigon fell in 1975, American officials ignored Loan’s appeal for assistance, but he managed to escape in a South Vietnamese plane. He then traveled to the United States and settled in northern Virginia, where he opened a pizzeria. He operated it until 1991, when publicity about his past led to a sharp decline in business. Loan died of cancer at his home in Burke, Virginia, on July 14, 1998. HO DIEU ANH AND SPENCER C. TUCKER See also Adams, Edward; Media and the Vietnam War; Nguyen Cao Ky; Tet Offensive, Overall Strategy References Oberdorfer, Don. TET! The Turning Point in the Vietnam War. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001. Westmoreland, William C. A Soldier Reports. New York: Doubleday, 1976. Wirtz, James J. The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991.
Nguyen Ngoc Tho Birth Date: May 26, 1908 Death Date: Unknown Vice president (1956–1963) and prime minister of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) from November 1963 to January 1964. Nguyen Ngoc Tho was born on May 26, 1908, in Long Xuyen Province in the Mekong Delta of southern Vietnam, a member of a wealthy landowning family that had held provincial administrative positions during the period of French colonial rule. In 1949 the French established the State of Vietnam. Working with the French, in 1953 Tho served as its interior minister. As such, he had charge of the police. During this period the police were heavily involved in tracking down Communists and their sympathizers in Vietnam as well as members of criminal gangs. Following the establishment of the Republic of Vietnam in 1955, Tho briefly served as its first ambassador to Japan (1955– 1956). In May 1956 South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem recalled Tho to South Vietnam and tasked him with crushing the Hoa Hao religious sect, which was active in the Mekong Delta. Tho worked closely with the local army commander, General Duong Van Minh, to track down Hoa Hao leader Ba Cut, who was eventually captured and executed. In mid-1956 Tho took over the post of secretary of state for the national economy, gaining a reputation as a relatively competent economist. In November 1956 he became vice president. However, Tho had little real power, as President Diem controlled the country through his extensive family and political appointees. Tho took charge of the land reform program introduced in 1957, which was largely a failure. Tho, although loyal to the Roman Catholic Diem, was a devout Buddhist, and differences between the two men surfaced during the Buddhist Crisis of June 1963, when Buddhist monks began burning themselves to death in public as a protest against the Diem regime. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the crisis when several monks at Hue had been killed, it was Tho who presided over the superficial inquiry that blamed their deaths on the Viet Cong (VC), and he initially supported the crackdown. Later, however, he expressed to American officials his displeasure with Diem. Duong Van Minh and other army conspirators overthrew Diem on November 1, 1963. The military junta appointed Tho prime minister on November 4, and he was invested with the position of minister of finance and the economy several days later. The 12 generals constituting the Military Revolutionary Council held real power; Tho was little more than a figurehead. He had a particularly hard task in attempting to remove Diem loyalists from the military. Tho fell victim to yet another coup on January 29, 1964, when General Nguyen Khanh seized power. Tho then retired from politics, apparently benefiting from substantial wealth secured during his time in office. Nothing is known of Tho thereafter. JUSTIN J. CORFIELD
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New Republic of Vietnam prime minister Nguyen Ngoc Tho (right) with Major General Duong Van Minh (left) at a news conference in Saigon on November 6, 1963, following the overthrow of President Ngo Dinh Diem. (AP/Wide World Photos) See also Ba Cut; Buddhism in Vietnam; Duong Van Minh; Hoa Hao; Military Revolutionary Council; Ngo Dinh Diem; Nguyen Khanh References Jacobs, Seth. Cold War Mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America’s War in Vietnam, 1950–1963. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006. Shaplen, Robert. The Lost Revolution: Vietnam, 1945–1965. London: André Deutsch, 1965.
Nguyen Phuc Anh Birth Date: February 8, 1762 Death Date: 1820 Vietnamese emperor during 1802–1820. Nguyen Phuc Anh (Gia Long) was born on February 8, 1762, in Phu Xuan (present-day Hue). In 1527 Mac Dang Dung, a notable at the court of the later Le dynasty (1428–1788), began a revolt against the ruling emperor and proclaimed himself founding emperor of a new royal family, the Mac. The Macs were never able to establish themselves as the single legitimate rulers possessing the Mandate of Heaven. The Le family resisted their usurpation and in 1591, with the help of
a powerful clan, the Trinh lords, captured Thang Long (presentday Hanoi) and the reigning Mac emperor and drove the remainder of the Mac family into exile. This did not mean the return of Le authority, however, for that family was now dependent on the Trinh lords, who became the primary court faction. Their political manipulations determined the rise and fall of puppet Le emperors, and only the most pliant remained on the throne. Trinh influence continued at the Le court until the dynasty was at last overthrown in 1788. Even after restoration of Le power, that weak dynasty was unable to affirm its control over all of the land. The Le dynasty also faced a rival family in southern Vietnam. These were the Nguyens, known as Nguyen lords. Although they ruled in the name of the Le dynasty, in actuality they were independent of its authority, ruling repressively from their seat of power in the city of Phu Xuan (Hue). Unrest and competition among the Le, Trinh, and Nguyen families weakened government authority throughout Vietnam. Rural dissatisfaction in southern Vietnam throughout the 1760s brought forth a rebellion in 1771, when three brothers from the village of Tay Son began a struggle to depose the Nguyens. This they accomplished in 1785 with broad-based support from many segments of the population. The Tay Son rebels then turned to northern Vietnam and attacked and defeated the Trinh lords there, seizing Hanoi in 1786.
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When the Le emperor called on China for help, the Tay Son rebels defeated its armies and forced the reigning Le to flee into exile in Beijing. Thereupon a new dynasty came into being when, in 1788, Nguyen Hue, leader of the Tay Sons, declared himself Emperor Quang Trung. From the rise of the Mac dynasty in 1527 to the overthrow of the Trinh lords and the Le family in 1788, Vietnam had been saddled with unstable government and was wracked with strife and disorder. Nguyen Phuc Anh, pretender to the throne, was one of the few surviving members of the Nguyen family that had ruled in southern Vietnam since the 16th century. He had been forced to flee into the marshes and swamps of the Mekong Delta when Gia Dinh (Saigon), the only important territory left under the Nguyen lords, fell to the Tay Son in 1778. From the delta he proclaimed himself emperor but was again defeated by the Tay Son in 1783. He then fled to Phu Quoc, an island in the Gulf of Siam, where he continued his struggle. Nguyen Anh was dedicated to his goal of prevailing over the Tay Son dynasty, but the outlook was bleak. Then he met French missionary Pierre Pigneau de Béhaine, later bishop of Adran in India, who strongly supported Nguyen Anh’s cause. Pigneau de Béhaine arranged for Nguyen Anh’s son, Nguyen Canh, to visit France in 1787 to seek help from the government. In return for financial support and the use of French naval craft and troops to defeat his rivals, the Nguyens agreed to the Treaty of Versailles with King Louis XVI. This granted France commercial and missionary rights, the city of Da Nang (renamed Tourane by the French), and the island of Con Son (renamed Poulo Condore by the French), a small dot of land in the South China Sea about 50 miles from the southern coast that the French later turned into a prison colony for Vietnamese political activists. The promised French governmental help failed to materialize. Consequently, France did not achieve control of Tourane or Poulo Condore until a new treaty was made with Tu Duc in June 1862. In any case, Pigneau de Béhaine was able to raise the armed forces necessary for Nguyen Anh to overcome his enemies. Nguyen Anh then launched a campaign against those who resisted his rule. After years of struggle, by 1802 the Tay Son were either dead or in exile. Nguyen Anh then founded the Nguyen dynasty (1802–1945), which lasted until the abdication of Bao Dai in 1945. Nguyen Anh took the dynastic name Gia Long (Gia from the customary name for Saigon, Gia Dinh; Long from Thang Long, the ancient name of Hanoi) and, after an official investiture by China, declared himself emperor, thus uniting the land for the first time in centuries. Gia Long transferred the capital from Thang Long to Hue and changed the name of his nation from Dai Viet to Vietnam. Enamored of Vietnam’s giant neighbor to the north, the new emperor promulgated his Gia Long Penal Code, based on the one used by the Chinese Qing dynasty. This new system of law took less note of local and village customs and strengthened the hand of the emperor. He replaced Chu Nom, the written form of Vietnamese then in use, with Chinese as the official written language and insisted upon an orthodox interpretation of Confucianism. He or-
dered the construction of public granaries, developed an effective postal service, gathered in Cambodia (Kampuchea) as a client state, and spent government funds repairing the Old Mandarin Road. Gia Long allowed a measure of toleration toward French missionary activity, but he resisted any increase in French commercial growth. Gia Long died in Hue in 1820 and was succeeded by his son, Chi Dam, who assumed the dynastic name of Minh Mang. CECIL B. CURREY See also Minh Mang; Nguyen Dynasty; Nguyen Hue; Pigneau de Béhaine, Pierre; Vietnam, History of, 938 CE through the French Conquest References Buttinger, Joseph. The Smaller Dragon: A Political History of Vietnam. New York: Praeger, 1958. Duiker, William J., ed. Historical Dictionary of Vietnam. Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow, 1989. Olson, James S., ed. Dictionary of the Vietnam War. New York: Greenwood, 1988.
Nguyen Phuoc Dom See Minh Mang
Nguyen Phuong Thao See Nguyen Binh
Nguyen Sinh Cung See Ho Chi Minh
Nguyen Sinh Sac Birth Date: 1863 Death Date: November 1929 Vietnamese government official under French colonial rule, nationalist, and the father of Vietnamese revolutionary Ho Chi Minh. Nguyen Sinh Sac was born the son of a farmer sometime in 1863 near Vinh, capital of Nghe An Province, in northern Vietnam. Much of his early life was taken up with helping the family on their small holding. From boyhood he wanted to become a scholar, and when he was 15 years old he began studying the Confucian classics. When he was 20 he married Hoang Thi Loan, the daughter of his teacher. They would have three children, including Ho Chi Minh. It was not until 1891 that Sac was able to travel to Vinh to sit for the civil service exam. He failed on his first attempt but retook it three years later, passing it and then moving to Hue where, in 1898, on his second attempt he passed the senior examination and
Nguyen Thai Hoc became a teacher in a nearby village. Two years later he was promoted and made a clerk for the provincial examinations for Thanh Hoa Province in northern Vietnam. By this time the French had effectively taken over the administration for Vietnam. Sac viewed this as a national humiliation. Initially he had hoped to be a moderating influence on the colonial authorities, holding a position at the Ministry of Rites in Hue. In May 1906 he finally decided that he would accept a position as a district mandarin and magistrate. It was at this point that he took his two surviving sons to the Quoc Hoc School in Hue. In January 1910 Sac became the center of a local cause célèbre. That month he had sentenced a wealthy local farmer to 100 strokes of the cane for a misdemeanor. It was an attempt to show that not even those with connections or money were above the law. However, the farmer died from the caning, and his friends complained to the higher authorities. Sac was dismissed. Sac then moved to Saigon. There he taught for a while and held a variety of jobs, including as an overseer of a rubber plantation and as an itinerant traditional doctor. It was a somewhat aimless existence, but he continued to harbor resentment against the French, with his children becoming active in the resistance to the French. The French meanwhile believed that Sac was using his travels as a doctor to liaise among various nationalist groups. Sac died in November 1929 and was buried at Cao Lanh in the Mekong Delta. By that time his youngest son, Ho Chi Minh, was the leader of the clandestine Communist movement in Vietnam, founding the Indochinese Communist Party the following year. JUSTIN J. CORFIELD See also Ho Chi Minh References Brocheux, Pierre. Ho Chi Minh: From Revolutionary to Icon. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Duiker, William J. Ho Chi Minh: A Life. New York: Hyperion, 2000. Quinn-Judge, Sophie. Ho Chi Minh: The Missing Years, 1919–1941. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002.
Nguyen Thai Hoc Birth Date: 1902 Death Date: June 17, 1930 Vietnamese nationalist and leader of the Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang (VNQDD, Vietnamese Nationalist Party). Born in 1902 into a middle-class farmer’s family in Tho Tang village, Vinh Tuong District, Vinh Yen Province, Nguyen Thai Hoc in 1921 was admitted into the new Teachers School in Hanoi. The attitude of the French instructors and their Vietnamese underlings toward their Vietnamese students made Hoc a nationalist. He was expelled at the end of his third year after quarreling with an instructor over what he considered to be her improper treatment of his classmates. Later he enrolled in
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the School of Commerce before devoting all his attention to revolution. His close friends described him as a man of simple tastes who was calm, intelligent, decisive, and brave. The mid-1925s saw many events that heightened Vietnamese patriotism. Among these were the failed June 18, 1924, attempt by Pham Hong Thai to assassinate French Indochina governor-general Martial Henri Merlin in Hong Kong and the public reaction when Phan Boi Chau was kidnapped in Shanghai and returned to Vietnam. Nguyen Thai Hoc made use of the Nam Dong Publishing House, founded by friends in 1925, that published books promoting Vietnamese patriotism. The publishing house became so popular that the colonial government closed it down and confiscated its publications. Hoc wrote to French governor-general Alexandre Varenne proposing political, economic, and social reforms but received no response. Hoc was already on the colonial government’s blacklist. As his name became known among nationalist activists, several anticolonialist groups urged Hoc to found a revolutionary organization. On December 25, 1927, 36 representatives from 14 provinces in northern Vietnam (Tonkin) met secretly in Hanoi and established the VNQDD. The party’s name reflected the influence of Sun Yixian (Sun Yat-sen) and the 1911 Chinese Revolution and the fact that a party of that same name had been organized by respected nationalist activist Phan Boi Chau in 1923 but had been inactive since Chau’s arrest in Shanghai in 1925. The VNQDD was the first well-organized Vietnamese revolutionary party to advocate armed revolt to achieve independence. Drawing the bulk of its members from the middle class, it was also the largest such party. Not long after Hoc was elected chairman in late 1927, Chau became VNQDD honorary chairman. The French soon launched a large-scale campaign to eradicate the VNQDD. Rather than see the party destroyed, Hoc and his staff resolved to act even if their attempt was not successful. As Hoc put it, “If we do not succeed, we still do the right thing.” The party leadership approved Hoc’s call for an uprising, and during February 10–15, 1930, the VNQDD struck major French military bases around Hanoi, although communication failures prevented these from being simultaneous. Collectively these are known in Vietnamese history as the Yen Bay (or Yen Bai) Uprising. The French soon put down the uprising. Hundreds of VNQDD members were killed or subsequently executed, and thousands of others ended up in prisons. Hoc refused his comrades’ appeals that he flee to China and was arrested on February 20, 1930. On March 23, 1930, Hoc and 82 party members whom the French thought were the most dangerous were tried in a special court (Commission Criminelle). They included a woman, Nguyen Thi Bac, elder sister of Hoc’s fiancee Nguyen Thi Giang. The next morning Hoc and 38 comrades were sentenced to death; the others received prison terms. In early June 1930 the president of France approved 27 death sentences, including that of Hoc. Before Hoc’s execution, his family was allowed to see him for the last time during which time he begged his mother’s forgiveness for not fulfilling his filial obligation. Early on June 17, 1930, Hoc and 18
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comrades were moved to Yen Bai, and that same morning all were guillotined. Reportedly all met their deaths bravely. One of those executed, Pho Duc Chinh, asked the headsman to let him lie on his back so that he could see the blade fall. Reportedly each shouted “Long live Viet Nam” before the blade fell. Hoc was the last to die. Hoc had been romantically linked with Nguyen Thi Giang. She assisted him as a liaison officer, conveying his orders when he frequently changed his whereabouts. One of the first female members of the VNQDD, she opened the way for many hundreds to follow. The women helped distribute weapons, ran propaganda, and collected intelligence. On the day of Hoc’s death, Giang was part of the crowd watching the executions. That afternoon she went to Hoc’s home village to visit his mother and pay her regards, and then she committed suicide with a pistol. Hoc was the eldest child in his family and left a sister and three brothers. One of the brothers joined the VNQDD and was later sentenced to death by the French. Another brother was killed by French soldiers in a raid on his village in November 1947 when he refused to surrender. Although Hoc and his comrades had not won the decisive victory they sought for their country and people, their revolutionary activity and uprising boosted Vietnamese nationalism. NGUYEN CONG LUAN
See also Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang References Cao The Dung. Viet Nam Huyet Le Su. New Orleans: Dong Huong, 1996. Hoang Van Dao. Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang. Saigon: Published by the author, 1970; reprinted in the United States. Pham Kim Vinh. The Vietnamese Culture. Solana Beach, CA: PM Enterprises, 1994.
Nguyen Thi Binh Birth Date: 1927 Southern Vietnamese Communist revolutionary who served as a diplomat for the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (National Liberation Front [NLF]) and as foreign minister of the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG). Born in Saigon in 1927, Nguyen Thi Binh (birth name Nguyen Thi Chau Sa) was the grandniece of one of Vietnam’s most famous patriots, Phan Chu Trinh. During the 1950s Madame Binh was one leader of a Saigon rebellion of students and intellectuals known as the Tran Van On Movement. The French arrested Binh in 1951, and she remained in jail until the signing of the 1954 Geneva Accords.
Madame Nguyen Thi Binh, deputy head of the National Liberation Front delegation to the Paris peace talks, waves to a crowd gathered in London’s Trafalgar Square on April 7, 1969. (AP/Wide World Photos)
Nguyen Thi Dinh After her release from prison, Binh joined several resistance groups in Saigon and was elected to the NLF’s Central Committee in 1962. From 1962 until 1969 she served in the NLF’s diplomatic corps, accepting assignments to Africa and Europe. She led the NLF delegation to the Third Congress of the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization in 1963, and in 1965 she headed the NLF’s legation in Algiers. Throughout the mid-1960s Binh toured the world, offering interviews to hundreds of reporters. For many in the West, Madame Binh became the symbol of the NLF and its most important spokesperson. Once the Paris peace talks opened in 1968, Binh assumed the role of chief negotiator for the NLF, although official recognition of the NLF was one of the major stumbling blocks to successful talks. In 1969 the PRG appointed her as its foreign minister, sending her to Paris as its official representative. As a negotiator, Binh was steadfast in her determination to exact a settlement that diminished Nguyen Van Thieu’s monopoly on political power in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) and that coupled the freedom of South Vietnamese political prisoners with the release of American prisoners of war. During the autumn 1972 negotiations, Madame Binh criticized the Le Duc Tho–Henry Kissinger accord because it did not deal adequately with the prisoner-of-war issue. Eventually Madame Binh signed the final accord on behalf of the PRG. After the Vietnam War, Binh served in a variety of governmental positions in Hanoi, and in 1992 she assumed the vice presidency of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV). ROBERT K. BRIGHAM See also National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam; Ngo Dinh Diem; Ngo Dinh Nhu; Nguyen Cao Ky; Nguyen Huu Tho; Nguyen Van Thieu; Paris Negotiations; Paris Peace Accords; Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam; Tran Buu Kiem References Pike, Douglas. Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1966. Porter, Gareth. A Peace Denied: The United States, Vietnam, and the Paris Agreement. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975. Tran Van Giau and Le Van Chat. The South Vietnam Liberation National Front. Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1962.
Nguyen Thi Dinh Birth Date: 1920 Death Date: August 26, 1992 Military leader of the Armed Forces for the Liberation of South Vietnam and leader of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (National Liberation Front [NLF]) Women’s Union during the Vietnam War. Nguyen Thi Dinh was born in 1920 in Ben Tre Province in southern Vietnam into a poor family of 10 children. Influenced by her older brother who was involved
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in revolutionary activities against the French in the early 1930s, Madame Dinh began her participation in the movement as a liaison when she was 16 years old and also helped with propaganda work. In 1938 she married a member of the Ben Tre Central Committee of the Indochinese Communist Party and gave birth to her first child in 1939. That same year the French authorities arrested her husband and exiled him. Dinh herself was arrested and exiled in Ba Ra in southern Vietnam in 1940. Released in 1943 because of a heart ailment, Dinh joined the Viet Minh movement in 1944, the same year that her husband died in prison. After participating in the 1945 uprising in Ben Tre, the next year she was elected to the Executive Committee of the Ben Tre Women’s Union and was sent to northern Vietnam in a delegation of southern revolutionaries to visit Ho Chi Minh and request assistance in waging war against the French in southern Vietnam. Dinh was in charge of the first shipload of weapons and financial assistance sent to southern Vietnam in November 1946. She continued Viet Minh activities, charged with mobilization, and remarried. After the 1954 Geneva Accords she chose to stay in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) instead of joining her son by her first marriage in moving to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). After 1954 Dinh took charge of rebuilding the revolutionary movement and coordinating Viet Minh cadres remaining in Ben Tre. Later she had charge of disrupting the Ngo Dinh Diem government’s Agroville Campaign in Chau Thanh and Mo Cay. In early 1960 Dinh was elected secretary of the Ben Tre Province Party Committee. She was also a leading organizer of the Dong Khoi (Simultaneous Insurrection) in Ben Tre Province. The Dong Khoi was a Communist-organized popular uprising in many rural areas of South Vietnam during late 1959–early 1960 designed to seize power from Diem administration officials at the village level. Dinh’s actions during the Dong Khoi in Ben Tre Province resulted in her being credited with being the founder of the so-called Long-Haired Army (Doi Quan Toc Dai), a term that the southern insurgents used to describe female cadres and sympathizers who conducted mass protest demonstrations against the Diem government and tried to persuade Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) soldiers to desert. These actions were part of the Communist political struggle that was conducted in parallel with military operations. Dinh became one of the founders of the NLF and helped build its armed forces. She was later appointed general and vice commander in chief of the Armed Forces for the Liberation of South Vietnam and was also a member of the NLF Central Committee and chair of the Women’s Union for the Liberation of South Vietnam. When the People’s Revolutionary Party, the southern branch