The Development of Trans-Jordan 1929-1939: A History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

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Development of Trans-Jordan 1929–1939 A History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

Also available The Struggle for Independence 1939-1947 A History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Maan Abu Nowar 2001 • 376pp • 235 x 155 mm • Cased £35.00 • ISBN 978-0-86372-283-7

The Jordanian-Israeli War 1948-1951 A History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Maan Abu Nowar 2002 • 528pp • 235 x 155 mm • Cased £35.00 • ISBN 978-0-86372-286-8

Peacemaking The Inside Story of the 1994 Jordanian-Israeli Treaty Abdul Salam A. Majali, Jawad A. Anani and Munther J. Haddadin 2006 • 372pp • 235 x 155 mm • Cased £35.00 • ISBN 978-0-86372-307-0

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Th e

Development of Trans-Jordan 1929–1939 A History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

M aa n A b u N o w a r

ITH ACA P

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRANS-JORDAN 1929–1939 A History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Ithaca Press is an imprint of Garnet Publishing Limited Published by Garnet Publishing Limited 8 Southern Court South Street Reading RG1 4QS UK Copyright © Maan Abu Nowar, 2006 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without permission in writing from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote brief passages in a review. First Edition ISBN-13: 978-0-86372-303-2 ISBN-10: 0-86372-303-9 British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Jacket design by Garnet Publishing Typeset by Samantha Barden Printed in Lebanon

Contents

List of Tables Acknowledgements Preface 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

vii ix xi

Introduction: A Decade of New Nations Democratic Infancy Gratuitous Interference Tribal War in the Desert The Rise of the Opposition Among Arab Neighbours Amendment of the 1928 Treaty The 1936–1939 Revolt in Palestine A Formative Year On the Brink of the Second World War Institutional Development Epilogue

1 17 51 75 117 143 177 189 229 255 285 323

Appendices Bibliography Index

327 381 387

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Tables

2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 3.1 3.2 3.3 4.1 4.2 4.3 5.1 6.1 6.2 7.1 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 9.1 9.2 9.3 10.1 10.2 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 11.5

1934 fiscal land survey Nationalities in the Arab Legion, 1929 Births and deaths, 1928–9 Ministerial salaries, 1929 Deployment of the Arab Legion, 1929 Classification of government officials Receipts from licences and taxes, 1930–5 Civil List 1934/35 Tribal encampments, 1928–9 Deployment of forces in the Southern desert, April 1930 Deployment of the Arab Legion, 1931 Elected members of second Legislative Council, 1931 Industrial licence fees, 1933 Income tax, 1933 Trans-Jordan finances, 1930–5 Population of Palestine, 1922–36 Immigration to Palestine, 1920–36 Jewish immigrants’ countries of origin, 1919–35 Casualties of the Palestinian Revolt, 1936 The strength of the Arab Legion, 1936 Crime in Trans-Jordan, 1934–8 Arab Legion pay, 1936 Arab Legion pay increases, 1937/38 British and Palestinian officials in Jordanian Government, 1938 Revenue and Grant-in-Aid Annual income from Colonial Development Fund Department of Agriculture budget increases/decreases Yields in 1932 Projects funded by Colonial Development Fund [vii]

18 20 21 39 45 64 67 72 82 103 106 129 162 162 186 191 191 192 208 231 232 232 258 268 290 290 291 292 292

THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRANS-JORDAN 1929–1939

11.6 11.7 11.8 11.9 11.10 11.11 11.12 11.13 11.14 11.15 11.16 11.17 11.18 11.19 11.20 11.21 11.22 11.23 11.24 11.25 11.26 11.27 11.28 11.29 11.30

Exports to Syria and Palestine 1935 Production and exports Export prices, 1938 Agricultural production, 1939 State forests, 1938 Partitioned and settled land (dunums), 1933–8 Land distribution in villages, 1934–8 Department of Post and Telegraph accounts, 1928–38 Department of Public Works’ budget, 1929–39 Budget for Department of Antiquities Art and Craft School pupil numbers, 1926–35 Government schools, 1935 Non-government schools, 1935 Matriculation Examination, 1935–9 School, pupil and teacher numbers, 1936 School, pupil and teacher numbers, 1938 Department of Education expenditure, 1929–39 Registered births and deaths, 1929–39 Department of Public Health’s budget, 1929–39 Department of Public Health’s personnel, 1939 Private health sector personnel, 1939 Infectious and communicable diseases, 1935–9 Naturalisation, 1935–8 Arab Legion, 1939 Motor transport, 1926–38

[viii]

294 296 297 298 298 300 300 301 303 306 309 310 310 311 311 312 313 314 314 315 315 317 318 319 320

Acknowledgements

I was lucky to have been able to stay in Oxford from 1988 to 1992 after completing my thesis, The Creation and Development of Trans-Jordan, 1920–1929, for which I was honoured to be admitted to the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Oxford University. During these four years I had the chance to do most of the research for this second volume of the history of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, much of it at St Antony’s College and its Middle East Centre Library, where I always received great help and kind attention. My main research was done at the Public Record Office in London, the University of Jordan library in Amman, the Moatah University library in Karak, the library of the Jordanian Parliament in Amman and the library of the Department of Documents and Libraries in Amman. I acknowledge with much gratitude the support and assistance of the staff of these institutions. I am also grateful to the editorial staff of Garnet Publishing and their manager Ms Emma Hawker for their care and attention. To my wife Sue, I am very thankful for her support and encouragement.

[ix]


Preface

Very little has been written about the history of Trans-Jordan between 1929 and 1939, although this decade is significant in the history of its struggle for independence and sovereignty, its progress and development and its relations with Palestine and neighbouring Arab countries. This decade also witnessed the awakening of Arab nationalism. During the 1930s, whilst still under the mandate of the League of Nations, which was entrusted to Great Britain, Trans-Jordan began to gain its own identity on the international stage. The people of Trans-Jordan remained very poor, and the government was sustained by a Grant-in-Aid from the British Government. The British Resident in Amman, Colonel Henry Cox, used that Grant-in-Aid to justify financial and political control over the new mandated state, which limited its sovereignty. By the early 1930s the world economy had suddenly slipped into a severe depression and the threatening face of insecurity loomed large. The League of Nations was weakened by the lack of interest in its future by Britain, France and the United States. Thus in 1931, when the expansionist Empire of Japan occupied Manchuria, the League of Nations’ protest met with little response from the great powers. In 1933, the beginning of the disturbance of the balance of power in Europe started with Hitler’s rearmament of Germany. In 1935, Mussolini invaded Ethiopia unchallenged by the rest of Europe. Hitler and Mussolini, the two fascist dictators, supported the fascists in the Spanish Civil War. By the middle of 1939, Europe, indeed the world, stood on the brink of the Second World War. Great Britain was the largest empire on earth. Her wealth and power, as well as the survival of her Empire, depended mainly on her ability to defend her trade routes with her overseas colonies, protectorates and mandated territories. Her attitude towards the political competition in Europe was described by Admiral Sir Ernle Chatfield in 1934: ‘We are in the remarkable position of not wanting to quarrel with anybody [xi]


because we have got most of the world already, or the best part of it, and we only want to keep what we have got and prevent others from taking it away from us.’ The Amir Abdullah ibn al-Hussein wanted to take Trans-Jordan from that Great Britain of the 1930s and to develop it into an independent state. This book describes the second decade of that struggle. Maan Abu Nowar

[xii]

1 Introduction: A Decade of New Nations

It is reasonable to assume that the human mind, from the time of Plato and his political society to the time of NATO and its new political alliance, has always been active in stirring new political ideas, and that the human spirit has always been restless for political change and new forms of government. The face of our world has been and continues to be changed by the creation of new political societies, such as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and the disappearance of others, of which the USSR is the latest example; in other words by the fragmentation of great empires into smaller national states and the federation or confederation of national states into larger empires, alliances and other political forms. The history of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is marked as much as any other by that continuous change. This book is the second volume of the history of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and describes the events and developments that took place in Trans-Jordan between 1929 and 1939. Although a mere fragment of the debris of the former Ottoman Empire in 1918, Trans-Jordan became part of the Hashemite King Faisal ibn al-Hussein’s Kingdom of Syria, which was destroyed by the French Empire in 1920. Between 1920 and 1929 it developed from a stateless no man’s land on the fringe of nowhere, which was inhabited by ungovernable tribal societies, into nationhood and an independent state under the British Mandate. Although Trans-Jordan was artificially created during the implementation of the peace settlement after the First World War (as a result of a series of major political accidents), its land was inhabited by some of the most ancient pre-Christian peoples: the Moabites, Edomites, Ammonites and Nabataeans. Trans-Jordan was never directly occupied or administered by Great Britain, which during 1920 attempted to rule it indirectly through local government administrations. With only five British political officers in [1]


place, that system failed miserably. It did not emanate from the consent and free will of the Arab inhabitants of the territory and it lacked the political organisation, central authority and coercive power vital for its cohesion. The various local governments which were established on advice from the British political officers were bereft of the tools to transform a stateless society into a state, such as, ‘men of light and leading’, finance, technological input, essential organs of justice, power of coercion and the provision of vital services. Before the occupation of Trans-Jordan by the Amir Abdullah ibn al-Hussein in March 1921, disorder, crime, and indeed chaos prevailed. The Amir Abdullah ibn al-Hussein occupied Trans-Jordan in response to the appeal made by the majority of its Arab inhabitants represented by their shaikhs and notables, and the Arab nationalists of the Istiqlal Party, who had taken refuge in the country after fleeing from French oppression in Syria. On 3 March 1921, and in accordance with Arab and Muslim customs and traditions, the Amir Abdullah ibn al-Hussein was proclaimed the Amir of Trans-Jordan by the people. That proclamation was the clearest expression of self-determination and common will, founded on the basis of common language, culture, history, and political interests. However, to be accorded the status of a true national state, the inhabitants of Trans-Jordan needed a government, an international identity and presence and a recognised delimited territory. Evidently there were some differences and more often contradictions between the British Government policy towards Trans-Jordan and its implementation by the British officials on the spot. While the British Government concluded an agreement with the Amir Abdullah to rule Trans-Jordan, intending and requiring him to stay in the country, the Zionist and pro-Zionist British officials keenly endeavoured to remove him from the country and annex it to Palestine. Their main aim was to open its land for Zionist immigration and colonisation. Palestine was never Trans-Jordan and Trans-Jordan was never Palestine. The name Palestine was first coined by the ancient Greek and Roman historians, to describe the fertile coastal areas owned by the old Philistines. This name was extended from time to time to include the whole of Palestine as it was known during the British Mandate, but never across the River Jordan to the land east of Palestine. The Jordan line which extended from the Yarmouk to the Dead Sea and south along Ghur al-Safi and Wadi Araba to Aqaba, gradually became known as a [2]

I N T RO D U C T I O N : A D E C A D E O F N E W N AT I O N S

political or administrative boundary during the periods of the Moabites, Edomites and Ammonites, as well as those of the Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Nabataeans, Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, and Muslim Arabs. In AD 640 the Arabs named Palestine ‘Jund Filistin’, and Trans-Jordan ‘Jund al-Urdon’. In fact ‘Jund al-Urdon’ included some parts of Palestine. The Crusaders made no changes in the administrative boundary of the Jordan line, and during the Mamlukes’ period it became a district rather than a provincial boundary. Thus all through history, although Palestine and Jordan were under the same successive foreign occupiers, they were always separate, and the territory which became Trans-Jordan was never part of Palestine. On 28 July 1920 Bonar Law, the British Prime Minister, confirmed this historical fact in the House of Commons when he declared that the authority of the Palestine Government did not extend east of the River Jordan. Another assurance was given to the Amir Abdullah on 28 March 1921 by Winston Churchill, on behalf of the British Government, that Trans-Jordan would not be included in the current administrative system of Palestine and that the Zionist clauses of the Mandate would not apply to Trans-Jordan. Even the Zionist British High Commissioner for Palestine, Sir Herbert Samuel, speaking in Amman on 18 April 1921, declared: ‘The British Government welcomes the opportunity of co-operating in Trans-Jordan with His Highness the Amir Abdullah in whose goodwill and friendship it has every confidence.’1 On 16 September 1922, and in response to a British demand, the Council of the League of Nations, in accordance with international law, confirmed the international status, the separate entity and the independent existence of Trans-Jordan, when it passed a resolution declaring that all the Zionist clauses in the Mandate for Palestine did not apply to Trans-Jordan, and that the British Government accepted full responsibility for a separate Trans-Jordan. On 27 April 1923, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Sir Gilbert Clayton declared: Subject to the approval of the League of Nations, His Britannic Majesty’s Government will recognise the existence of an independent Government in Trans-Jordan under the rule of His Highness Amir Abdullah ibn al-Hussein, provided such Government is constitutional and places His Britannic Majesty’s Government in a position to fulfil their international obligations in respect of the territory by means of an agreement to be concluded between the two Governments.2 [3]


By 1929, the three conditions in that declaration were fulfilled with the ratification by Britain and Trans-Jordan of the 1928 Treaty, and the approval of the League of Nations. During the early stages of its development, Trans-Jordan was handicapped by Zionist attempts to annex it to Palestine to serve the purposes of Zionist immigration and colonisation. The view from the British establishment – notably Churchill, T. E. Lawrence, Major Young and Sir Gilbert Clayton – was clear: British policy and interests in Trans-Jordan must not be made subservient to Zionist aims in Trans-Jordan. However, the British Zionist and pro-Zionist officials in Palestine all too often subordinated British policy and interests to Zionist aims. They endeavoured by every possible means to remove the Amir Abdullah from Trans-Jordan and annex it to Palestine. Meanwhile, the French Government urged Britain to exercise stricter controls over Trans-Jordan in order to prevent the Arab nationalists it harboured from raiding Syria, especially after the attempt made from Trans-Jordan to kill the French High Commissioner in Qunaitrah. Harry St John Philby, who replaced Abramson as British Representative in Amman, made British aims and interests in Trans-Jordan subservient to Saudi Arabian aims and interests. Not only did he create some of the reasons for the rebellion of the Adwan tribe in 1922, he also caused the introduction of stricter British financial control over the government of Trans-Jordan, and went as far as accusing the Amir Abdullah of squandering public funds. (Yet it was he who spent money from the British Grant-in-Aid to entertain the Zionist High Commissioner, his family and his staff in Petra, and awarded gifts to his friends in the desert.) The ensuing financial crisis, caused mainly by Samuel and Philby, crippled Trans-Jordan and the first massive Wahhabi Ikhwan raid which followed nearly destroyed the infant state.3 The first British Labour Government had little experience in the international arena and none in Arab affairs. In particular the Colonial Secretary, J. H. Thomas, showed a lack of vision towards Trans-Jordan and a simplistic approach to international relations. With Churchill and Lawrence out of the way, there was no one in the Colonial Office to withstand Colonel Meinertshagen’s Zionist schemes. Shuckbourgh and Young were already converted to pro-Zionism, and after King al-Hussein ibn Ali’s abdication they realised that the Trans-Jordan card had lost its value. Abdullah and the poor people of Trans-Jordan were alone. [4]


Colonel Henry Cox, who replaced Philby as British Representative in 1924, was a distinctly opinionated soldier and administrator rather than a politician or diplomat. He accepted Samuel’s and Peake’s plan to remove the Amir Abdullah from Trans-Jordan early in his term of office, before he understood how indispensable the Amir was to the country, its cohesion and its law and order. Ridha al-Rikabi, the Jordanian Prime Minister, was Cox’s and Peake’s protégé rather than Abdullah’s prime minister. Henry Cox’s mission coincided with an extremely critical period for Abdullah and the Trans-Jordanians. Within one month, between 8 August and 3 September, the financial crisis created by Philby and further aggravated by Cox crippled Abdullah’s freedom of action and made the poor of Trans-Jordan much poorer. There followed a succession of stunning blows that could have knocked out any man in Abdullah’s position: the sudden breakout of raids from Trans-Jordan against the French in Syria; the British Government ultimatum demanding financial control; the expulsion of certain members of the Arab nationalists’ Istiqlal Party from Trans-Jordan; the tightening of British control over the Arab Legion; the second and more devastating Wahhabi Ikhwan invasion which threatened Abdullah’s capital Amman; the arrival of British troops in Amman; and the Wahhabi invasion against the Hashemite Kingdom of Hijaz. However, even in extremis Abdullah kept his head. Keeping his main aim of the survival and independence of Trans-Jordan within his sights, he consented to the British ultimatum. With wisdom, patience and political acumen, Abdullah was then able to turn the political tide by strict adherence to his political friendship with Britain. The Zionist and pro-Zionist British officials who (against the interests of their own Government) attempted to remove him from Trans-Jordan, failed yet again; and in the covert battle of political wills and principles, Abdullah won his and Trans-Jordan’s survival. He lost financial control over the budget, but gained the continuation of the Grant-in-Aid of about £80,000; he lost the presence of the leaders of the Istiqlal Party, which he did not need, but gained the removal of the British cavalry squadrons from his capital Amman, which he desperately wanted; he gave the right of inspection of the Arab Legion to a British officer of much higher rank and more experience than Peake (who, unknown to him, was plotting to remove him from Trans-Jordan); he gave an extradition agreement to remove criminals from Trans-Jordan, but gained immunity [5]


from extradition for political refugees; he abolished the Department of Tribal Affairs, but replaced it with a better system of tribal courts and Bedouin supervision, which kept him in control of the desert tribes; he gave the right of inspection of antiquities to a British expert, but only because he had no Jordanian experts, and he needed all the help he could get in that field. All that, and the assurance by the British Government of his status and that of his country, as well as their commitment to defend Trans-Jordan against internal and external attack, gave the Amir Abdullah the well-deserved confidence and loyalty of his people. While endeavouring to maintain his presence in Trans-Jordan and protect his newly founded state against annexation to Palestine, Abdullah did not take his political aims for granted. An expert in tribal affairs, he applied the old doctrine of ruling through the shaikhs and notables, and while he allowed his cabinet to run the administration of the country, he directly communicated with the traditional leaders of the people. He kept the shaikhs and notables informed of his wishes and aims and convinced them that they were their own. His camp and later his palace and diwan were visited every day, including Friday, by delegations, shaikhs, notables, senior officials and officers of the Arab Legion. As well as his great hospitality, and his strong presence and personality, Abdullah’s political wisdom was rewarding and his company intellectually informative and entertaining. He also used his discretion in granting generous subventions to the shaikhs and notables who mattered most, without depriving those in need. He bestowed titles, awarded ranks, and controlled the appointments of directors, judges, senior civil servants and officers of the Arab Legion through his Royal Command (Iradah al-Saniyah). Although his powers were to a certain extent limited, he made sure that the main internal reins of power were and appeared to be entirely in his hands. In contrast, successive British Representatives, with the very thin presence of British officials, not exceeding seven, did not and indeed could not communicate directly with the people, or their shaikhs and notables; their channels of communication were restricted to the Amir Abdullah, the Prime Minister, and certain ministers and civil service protégés. That is why their mission remained quasi-ambassadorial. Apart from the few Jordanians who secretly sought out British officials, no Jordanians were in direct communication with them, so they were nearly isolated from the people. [6]


Needless to say that as far as the Jordanians were concerned, Samuel, Deedes, Abramson, Philby, Cox, and Peake were pro-Zionist foreigners who had no right to govern them, while Abdullah was the descendant of the Prophet Mohammad, a member of the most noble Arab tribe, and their Hashemite Amir. The end of the mission of the British High Commissioner for Palestine and Trans-Jordan, Sir Herbert Samuel, also saw the end, at least during that decade, of attempts to annex Trans-Jordan to Palestine for Zionist aims. Lord Plumer, who succeeded Samuel, was not pro-Zionist as far as Trans-Jordan was concerned; he strongly opposed any control by the Palestine Government over the people of Trans-Jordan and their country. Indeed he considered annexation totally unjust and fraught with danger. In Amman, Colonel Cox soon realised that he could not proceed without the Amir Abdullah’s good will and cooperation. As for the British Government’s policy, it could not be implemented across the whole country without the presence of more troops than the British wished to employ. The British Government could not have afforded the high cost of at least one whole brigade of the British Army in Trans-Jordan at that time. Thus Henry Cox saw no alternative and consented to make a U-turn in his attitude towards the Amir Abdullah. During 1926, Lord Plumer dealt a gratuitous and severe blow to the development of the Arab Legion into a military force capable of defending the country against internal and external aggression. With the full agreement of Cox and Peake, and of the Commander of the Arab Legion, and in the face of strong protest from the Amir Abdullah, he reduced the strength of the Arab Legion from 1,472 officers and men to 855. He deprived the Arab Legion of its military character and reduced it to a police force responsible for crime prevention and detection and prison guard duties. Peake did not lift a finger to defend his command and was in fact in favour of supplementing the Legion with an imperial unit, the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force (TJFF). This disloyalty to the future of his command failed the men who were placed in his trust. Furthermore, the vast majority of the TJFF were not Jordanians. Those 617 disbanded men from the Arab Legion and their families, who suffered the loss of their income, were Jordanians. The disbanded men lost an annual income of £37,020 and Trans-Jordan was deprived of 36.7 per cent of the Arab Legion budget; 13.4 per cent of the total national budget was paid to foreigners. [7]


It was not the Arab Legion, the four aeroplanes, the four armoured cars and the TJFF only, which maintained law and order in Trans-Jordan. The Arab Legion was very thinly deployed all over the country and could not provide more than 100 men for a major operation; the aeroplanes and armoured cars could only fight in daylight; and apart from their small number, the armoured cars had no access to the mountains from Um Qais to Petra. The TJFF was a newly established mercenary force with no heart to fight the Wahhabi Ikhwan, a Jordanian rebellion mounted with skill and courage. Without Abdullah and his ability to influence the tribes of Trans-Jordan, both Bedouin and Hadar, a popular rebellion against the British Mandate would have raised no less than 10,000 armed men from the Balqa tribes and Bani Sakhr alone, not to mention at least 20,000 from the rest of the country. It was loyalty and obedience to the Hashemite Amir Abdullah rather than the physical power of the Arab Legion which maintained law and order in the country. So Cox and Peake relied upon Abdullah’s compelling presence and prestige and on the presence of a large British military force. Peake’s claim that the loyalty of the Arab Legion was to him, was a piece of bravado, considering that he was himself arrested by Shaikh Mithqal al-Fayiz of Bani Sakhr who humiliated him by locking him up in a barley store for 48 hours. Moreover, the British Government needed Abdullah for as long as they had the slightest hope of an agreement with his father King al-Hussein ibn Ali of the Hijaz. The abdication of King al-Hussein ibn Ali on 3 October 1924 and later the abdication of his son King Ali ibn al-Hussein on 24 October 1924 diminished Amir Abdullah’s political influence in Arab affairs, and all that remained for him was his own prestige in Trans-Jordan, as well as what moral and political support he could get from his brother King Faisal of Iraq. By the end of 1926, the marginal and indirect control exerted by the British through financial assistance and under the Mandate was superseded by direct political, financial and military control with a substantial reduction in the Grant-in-Aid. Thus Abdullah’s political power was curtailed and a British colonial oligarchy, fully supported by Palestinian Arab officials seconded from the government of Palestine, replaced the Syrian oligarchy. The poor Jordanians had to struggle and compete for the very few minor jobs in the Arab Legion and the civil service of their own country. With the exception of the Department of Education, every other department was headed by a Palestinian or British [8]


official. The people of Trans-Jordan were incensed by their exclusion from their own Government. If lack of access to and representation in jobs in the Civil Service or the Arab Legion was one of the main causes of the Adwan rebellion of 1922, the situation was even worse in 1926.

An agricultural and pastoral country, Trans-Jordan was entirely dependent on variable rainfall. Thus the poor farmers, who constituted the majority of the people, suffered unpredictable fortunes. In good years (sanawat al-ghilal), their supplies were ample, with some reserve for their capital. In bad years (sanawat al-mahl ), they ate their capital and borrowed from greedy moneylenders to survive. In contrast, rich merchants and middlemen, government civil servants, officers and soldiers etc. were not affected by bad years and their share of the economy was constant and invariable. Thus the wide gap of economic and political power between the indigenous people, who made their living from the land, and the Syrian and Palestinian immigrants, who occupied the vast majority of government posts and consequently had nearly full control over the economy, became wider. 1924 was a lean year; 1925 was not good enough to compensate for the losses of 1924; and early in 1926 hot winds destroyed more than 35 per cent of the crop. Two devaluations of the rate of exchange of the Ottoman lira inflicted great losses on the people in 1927, and the introduction of the Palestine pound, also in 1927, hit them hard for the third time within three years. If all that did not completely destroy the economic fortunes of the impoverished Jordanians, the earthquake which shook the whole country on 11 July 1927 for 30 seconds did; 60 people were killed, and 99 others were injured; 472 houses collapsed, and 769 others were seriously damaged. However, instead of helping the Jordanians with an increase in the Grant-in-Aid, Henry Cox, the British Resident, was heartless enough to recommend to the British Government that it be reduced from £66,000 to £45,000. Needless to say the deficit had to be made up from increased and more efficiently collected taxes. The negotiations for the 1928 Treaty and Organic Law were conducted during a critical year for Abdullah. The brutal and treacherous exile of his father King al-Hussein ibn Ali to Cyprus by his supposed allies, reminded him constantly that he too could be exiled. His Cabinet was composed of men who toed Cox’s line; his senior civil servants were [9]


seconded from the Palestine Government, and although they paid lip service to him, he knew that their loyalty was to their British employers. The Arab Legion, though loyal to him, was reduced to a small constabulary very thinly deployed and the TJFF stood primed and ready for action against him if he attempted to struggle for his freedom and that of his new country. The Syrian revolt of 1925, which he secretly supported, was completely crushed by the French Army and Air Force towards the end of 1926, which reminded him of the same fate if he contemplated a Jordanian rebellion. He was under severe personal financial pressure, not only due to his perpetual generosity, but also because of his increased expenses owing to the arrival of his wife and children in Amman; his debts were such that his loyal wife, Um Talal (the mother of Talal), had to sell her jewellery to make ends meet. Amir Abdullah was also aware and could not ignore the possibility that without him Trans-Jordan would have eventually been absorbed by Palestine and included in the Balfour Declaration. He knew that Great Britain, the strongest power at that time, which had excluded Trans-Jordan from the Zionist clauses of the Mandate for Palestine, could have imposed its reinstatement in the clauses. With all but one government department headed by Palestinian officials, many suspected that the absorption would have been an easy alternative for the Amir after his father’s abdication. The fear of Zionist immigration and colonisation persisted. With the Wahhabis’ increased threat to the peace of the desert, which started again with their raid against the Zabin tribe of Bani Sakhr and the killing of their shaikh, Hatmal al-Zabin in 1928, the pressures facing the Amir Abdullah and the Jordanians became extreme. It was in these compelling political and personal circumstances that the treaty between Great Britain and Trans-Jordan of 20 February 1928 was signed, and the Organic Law of 19 April 1928 was promulgated. Perhaps one of the main reasons, among many, for the intense criticism of the 1928 Treaty, which followed immediately after its publication, was its poor wording and consequently the vagueness of its Arabic translation, which amplified the limitations placed upon the Amir’s and Trans-Jordan’s sovereignty. It obscured the real intention of raising military forces in Trans-Jordan, highlighted the negative nature of the political and financial relations between the two countries, and failed to make clear the real facts of British financial assistance to Trans-Jordan. Lord Plumer, who signed the original Arabic copy, retired in July 1928 [10]


and the corrected Arabic translation was signed by him, in his retirement, without the force of law. However, the treaty contained many political advantages and only a few disadvantages for the Amir and Trans-Jordan. Among the advantages, Britain especially recognised Trans-Jordan’s independent government and the Amir Abdullah ibn al-Hussein as its Head of State. The treaty transferred the powers of legislation and administration from His Britannic Majesty to His Highness the Amir; it stated that Britain would not place obstacles in the way of the association of Trans-Jordan for customs or other purposes with neighbouring Arab States, thus recognising the right of Trans-Jordan to conclude international treaties; and it committed Britain to assisting Trans-Jordan with the ordinary expenses of government and the Arab Legion so long as Trans-Jordan’s revenues were insufficient. In several articles there were also implied commitments by Britain to defend Trans-Jordan. Provision was made for periodic revision. By accepting the treaty, the Amir Abdullah had further immunised Trans-Jordan against Zionist immigration and colonisation, and removed even the slightest doubt regarding the absorption of Trans-Jordan by Palestine. For nowhere in the treaty was there the slightest hint of that danger. On the contrary, Article 18 stated that ‘No territory in Trans-Jordan shall be ceded or leased or in any way placed under the control of any foreign power’ and Article 3 stated that ‘No official of other than Trans-Jordanian nationality shall be appointed in Trans-Jordan’. Thus Palestine Government officials were excluded from appointments in the Government of Trans-Jordan. Bearing in mind Trans-Jordan’s internal and external situation, and the political, economic and military threats it was facing during that critical period of its creation, the disadvantages of the 1928 Treaty were few and far less important than the survival of the country. Even the most literal interpretation of the treaty shows clearly that it stopped short of allowing Britain jurisdiction or authority over Trans-Jordanian subjects and government institutions, with one exception: Article 4 stated that the Amir agreed to adopt laws which allowed His Britannic Majesty to discharge his international responsibilities. From a British point of view, however, this was no more than a typical engagement of British policy between the world wars in the Middle East, which provided for what Kirk described as: ‘a gradual yielding up, by treaties negotiated with the moderate national forces, of such attributes of power as were [11]


not vital to Britain’s interests, and at the same time in attempting to entrench herself in those vital positions by means of safeguarding clauses in those same treaties’.4 As for the Organic Law of 1928, an article-by-article examination confirms that it sealed the independence of Trans-Jordan and more or less fulfilled the principles of constitutional government, given the new nation’s stage of political development and the administrative capabilities of its people. The rights of the people were well provided for; the sovereignty of the Head of State, his immunities, as well as the limits of his power and authority were clearly described; legislative power was vested in the Legislative Council with the Amir; the judiciary was independent and the courts were free from interference; the separation of powers, though faintly delimited, was conspicuous; and although government responsibility and accountability was vaguely implied, the ability of the Legislative Council to prevent the promulgation of laws and ordinances that it did not approve was evident. It is ironic to think that Trans-Jordan’s pluralism under the British Mandate in 1928, was far more advanced than the communist systems of Eastern Europe sixty years later. Certain limitations, which were provided for in the treaty, were implied in the Organic Law. This was due to the fact that the British authors of both the treaty and the law were influenced by the English legal principle that international law forms part of the law of the land. But these implied limitations did not diminish the powers of the Legislative Council, although from a political point of view they curtailed the freedom of the Amir and the Executive. His Britannic Majesty had the power to accede when necessary, on behalf of Trans-Jordan, to any commercial or extradition treaty or general convention to which he was party for Great Britain and Northern Ireland; but the power of ratification remained vested in the Amir with the Executive and the Legislative Council. It later became evident that the treaties concerned – such as the Postal Union, Prevention of Slavery, etc. – were beneficial to Trans-Jordan.

Between the two wars, the emergence of the new Arab national states of Trans-Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the Yemen and the establishment of constitutional governments in some of these countries, gave the Arabs some experience of a limited form of pluralism, [12]


either under mandate, or bound by treaties indirectly limiting their sovereignty and independence. Britain and France, each in its sphere of influence or control, negotiated with moderate Arab nationalists to frame these countries’ constitutions, stopping at various points short of granting complete pluralism in terms of constitutional law.5 Not only was there a difference in the attitudes of the mandatory powers towards the countries in their trust, but each power differentiated between the countries in its trust. There was no doubt that Britain and France were guided more by national interest than by the principles of the Covenant of the League of Nations, or the spirit of ‘the trust of civilisation’ it embodied. While Britain was more liberal in her attitude towards Egypt, Iraq and Trans-Jordan, France attempted to control Syria and Lebanon directly. When it came to Palestine, however, Britain’s policy was coloured by Zionism. In the words of Lord Plumer, ‘backward as they [the Trans-Jordanians] are in all these matters, they have been accorded a degree of political autonomy and self government far more advanced than their neighbours in Palestine will attain for some years’.6 During that period, with the exception of Palestine, general elections were held, parliaments were established, national governments were formed, and the judiciary became the pride of these countries, particularly in civil, criminal, and Shariah affairs. More than a hundred newspapers, magazines, and periodicals flourished with some degree of freedom. Many political parties emerged. Some social and economic progress was achieved. Education was the main thrust for development as it spread from the main cities to the rural areas. Trade was reactivated after the peace settlement. A few small industries were created. New roads and transport systems were constructed and old systems were improved. Municipal services were extended to new areas, and such services as health, public works, post and telegraph, land registries and banking were introduced. The peoples of these countries were on their way to modernity and pluralism. Throughout the twenties, during that period of development, the traditional and moderate Arab nationalists, the scions of the shaikhs and notables, reaped the main benefits of modernisation with their allies in the professional merchants, lawyers, doctors, officers, senior civil servants and landed classes. The vast majority of the people, small farmers, workers, junior civil servants and soldiers gained very little if at all. On the contrary, higher inflation and taxation, and the devaluation of the [13]


Ottoman lira by the introduction of the English pound, the French franc and the new Egyptian pound made them poorer. While capital cities flourished, small towns and villages stood still in their poverty. With the spread of education and political awareness from the cities to the countryside came economic and social awakening; grievances became apparent, discontent grew and political agitation followed, not only against the moderate nationalists, but mainly against Britain and France. In Trans-Jordan in particular, the development of central government and district administrations gave the people few immediate benefits and inflicted on them the burden of highly increased costs of government. The growing authority and coercive power of central departments and local administrations which spread from the capital Amman to the countryside, was increasing felt, especially in the determined enforcement of law and order and in the strict collection of the much higher taxes. Before 1920 the highest authority was far away in Istanbul but in 1929 it was there amongst the people, right down to the Mukhtar (leader of the village) and policeman. This process created a new set of administrative, social, economic, and political activities. The people, accustomed to very little government before 1920 and no government during that year, reacted gradually to the new order, with a growing yearning for political power and self-government. The Kurah incident (1921), the Adwan rebellion (1922), the aborted National Party (aborted in 1923), the various delegations, the National Pact (1928), the opposition to the 1928 Treaty, the Karak petition to the League of Nations (1927), the aborted boycotting of the elections, and the opposition group in the Legislative Council were clear expressions of that yearning for political change. Ten years of rapid development of Trans-Jordan, from a group of stateless tribal societies with no cohesion to a national state under the British Mandate, were not enough to transform the newly born political groups into organised political institutions. The shaikhs and notables and the leaders of the various political groups could not translate the popular sympathy they had among the people into effective and permanent political organisations. Thus tribalism remained vibrant and compelling within the infant nation. In spite of the support given by Cox and Peake to the Government to hold elections, and later to gain approval of the treaty from the Legislative Council, neither were achieved until the Amir intervened and persuaded opposition groups to cooperate. Such [14]


became the Amir’s power and influence in Trans-Jordan that nothing could be done without his help, although he himself was constrained by the financial limitations imposed upon him and Trans-Jordan.

The delay in concluding the treaty and promulgating the Organic Law, as well as in the establishment of a constitutional government and a Legislative Council, had the unintended effect of helping to create a Trans-Jordanian identity. This was a time in which that identity could form and develop. In spite of the ties of religion, language, culture, historical experience and origin which bound the Arabs of Trans-Jordan with their immediate Arab neighbours, by 1929, after nine years of separate existence under the Amir’s rule, with a central government, one set of laws, one flag, one delimited territory, shared common advantages, disadvantages, interests, fears and hopes, a common response and sense of togetherness was created in the hearts and minds of the various tribal communities. Their common fear of Zionism drove them to erect a mental barrier against the British Palestine Government, and the threat of their annexation to Palestine evoked a sense of defensive nationalism against the British Mandate. Their concerns for the Arabs of Palestine against Zionism, and for the Arabs of Syria under French oppression, especially after the cruelty with which France crushed the Syrian revolt of 1925, created a protective nationalism. Their fear of Wahhabi raids, which continued to threaten their lives and future security, enhanced a common tribal feeling of Us and Them. In their defensive unity of response to the exigencies of that period and the general situation, whatever feelings Trans-Jordanians had for the wider question of Arab nationalism were to some extent supplemented by local and immediate concerns for survival, freedom and independence for Trans-Jordan. In their national psyche, official boundaries, the imposition of which they had resented, began to separate them from the concept of unity with neighbouring Arab countries. Thus within the context of a larger Arab identity, an infant Trans-Jordanian identity began to develop. This was later termed Al-wattaniyah al-qutriyah (local patriotism). The creation of the new Arab national states in the Arab provinces of the dismantled Ottoman Empire initiated local patriotism rather than Pan-Arab nationalism. By 1928 the kingdom of Iraq was well established; the Lebanese people accepted a chamber of deputies and [15]


the Lebanese constitution of May 1926; the Syrian people accepted a chamber of deputies with a nationalist majority in June 1928; the Seventh Palestine Arab Congress held in Jerusalem on 20 June 1928 demanded a Palestinian parliamentary government for Palestine; the Trans-Jordanians were more concerned with their own survival and endeavoured to achieve their own constitutional government. Arab unity seemed to have been shelved for some time to come. It is still gathering the dust of history.

NOTES 1 PRO. CO 733/3. Speech by Samuel in Amman, 18 April 1921. 2 PRO. CO 733/64. Text of Assurance, Clayton to Samuel, 12 May 1923. 3 Philby’s conduct in Trans-Jordan until 19 April 1924 remains an enigma far more entangled and perplexing than most accounts of it suggest. 4 Kirk, George E., Survey of International Affairs, 1939–1945. The Middle East in the War. 5 Complete pluralism would confer the rights of the people and individual citizens including basic freedoms and human rights, an elected legislative council, government responsibility and accountability, separation of powers, political pluralism, independence of the judiciary and freedom of local government. 6 PRO. FO 371/12989. Plumer to Amery, 29 February 1925.

[16]

2 Democratic Infancy

With all the international frontiers of Trans-Jordan well established during the twenties, it was bounded on the north by Syria and Jabal al-Druze, on the west by Palestine, on the north-east by Iraq and on the south and east by Hijaz and Najd. The country has a desert frontier of about 900 kilometres stretching from north of Um al-Jamal to Aqaba in the south. It has an area of some 90,000 square kilometres of which 4,600 square kilometres are cultivable. The cultivable land is located in a strip of territory running wide in the north and gradually narrowing towards the south and it comprises three main cultivable areas and a desert area: Ghor al-Urdon: the deep valley in which the River Jordan and the Dead Sea are located. This area consists of 550 square kilometres of which only 300,000 dunums are cultivable. The hilly area and the high plateau: this rises sharply from the line of the Jordan Valley, the Dead Sea, Ghor al-Safi and Wadi Araba, running the length of the country from north to south. More than 14 streams flow westward from the plateau to the Jordan Valley and Wadi Araba. This area consists of 6,700 square kilometres of which only 2,000,000 dunums are cultivable. The area which lies between the hilly area and the Hijaz Railway: this area consists of 5,250 square kilometres of which 2,300,000 dunums are cultivable. The desert area: comprising some 72,000 square kilometres in which only two oases are found; one in Azraq 80 kilometres east of the railway line and the other, Jafer, some 45 kilometres from Maan in the south. The fiscal survey carried out by the Department of Land in 1934, which covered 10,000,000 dunums of land, is shown in Table 1.1.

[17]


TABLE 2.1

1934 fiscal land survey Cultivable land 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Dunums

Irrigated land Vineyards Rain-fed cereals Uncultivable land including forests Shara

260,000 80,000 4,150,000 2,800,000 440,000

Subtotal

7,730,000

6. Land bordering the desert and the Jordan Valley slopes Total

2,270,000 10,000,000

During the first decade of the history of Trans-Jordan, nine changes of government and four changes of prime minister were made by the Amir Abdullah. He changed the title of the government three times: on 25 May 1923 he changed it from the original the ‘Council of Advisers’ (Majlis al-Mustasharin) to the ‘Council of Deputies’ (Majlis al-Wukala); on 5 September 1923 to the ‘Council of Directors’ (Majlis al-Nuzzar); and on 26 June 1926 to the ‘Executive Council’ (Majlis al-Tanfithi). The changes of government had very little effect on political or economic policies, and the changes in the title of the government did not affect the jurisdiction or authority of those in power. None of the prime ministers or ministers appointed between 1921 and 1929 had a political background; they were without exception Arab revolutionaries who had never held office, civil servants, or former army officers from the Ottoman period and the time of King Faisal’s (brief ) administration of the kingdom of Syria. None of them had experience in central government and every one of them had to learn through experience within the Trans-Jordan Government. By April 1929, and after three reshuffles instigated by the British Resident, Colonel Cox, and Major General Peake, the Trans-Jordan Cabinet consisted of the following members: 1. 2. 3.

Hasan Khalid Abu al-Huda, Prime Minister Husam Jar Allah, Qadhi Qudhah Ibrahim Hashim, Finance [18]

D E M O C R AT I C I N FA N C Y

4. 5. 6.

Dr Halim Abu Rahmah, Health Tawfiq Abu al-Huda, General Secretary Adib Wahbah, Education

Adib Wahbah was the only indigenous Trans-Jordanian in the new Cabinet. He was born at Salt in 1892, educated in Jerusalem and Istanbul, and joined the Ottoman Army in Iraq in January 1916. He joined the Trans-Jordan Government as Director of Education in August 1921, and was appointed member of the Trans-Jordanian Majlis al-Tanfithi (Cabinet) after interference by General Peake, the Commander of the Arab Legion, who was Acting British Representative at the time. The Prime Minister Hasan Khalid Abu al-Huda, Ibrahim Hashim and Tawfiq Abu al-Huda were naturalised Trans-Jordanians, and the rest were Palestinian officials seconded from the Palestine Government. This fact, amongst others, made the Government unpopular and unacceptable to the political elite, the shaikhs and notables, as well as the vast majority of the people. For it was the ambition of every educated shaikh or notable to take part in the government of his country. Other things added to the Government’s difficulties. Between 20 January and 26 March 1929, the Prime Minister was ill and stayed at home, during which Tawfiq Abu al-Huda, Cox and Peake’s protégé, became the main player in Jordanian politics. Tawfiq Abu al-Huda was the most unpopular departmental director before he became a minister, and continued to be unpopular as minister. When 19 shaikhs and notables from Karak submitted their petition to the British Government and the League of Nations regarding the exclusion of the indigenous Jordanians (‘sons of the country’) from positions of authority in their national institutions and from other important posts, Mr M. Orts of the Council of the League of Nations gave his support to the Karak petitioners. He wrote in a document of the Council: ‘This question would appear to be pertinent when it is considered that at the head of certain Departments, such as those of Finance and Justice, the Ministers are surrounded by British Advisers and themselves are foreigners. The national element is thus entirely excluded from the direction of these Departments.’ The following 13 British officials occupied the most important posts in the administration of Trans-Jordan in 1929:

[19]


• • • • • • • • • • • • •

Financial Adviser Judicial Adviser Director of Customs Director of Lands Director of Surveys Inspector of Surveys Commander of the Arab Legion Second-in-Command of the Arab Legion Inspector of Motor Vehicles Inspector of Antiquities Government Bacteriologist Chief Accountant of the Arab Legion Controller of Stores of the Arab Legion

By 1929 only 64.4 per cent of the officers and men of the Arab Legion were Trans-Jordanians (at least 15 per cent of them naturalised Trans-Jordanians), and 35.6 per cent were foreigners, in accordance with the Nationality Law, as can be seen in Table 2.2. TABLE 2.2

Nationalities in the Arab Legion, 1929 Trans-Jordanians Palestinians Syrians Egyptians Yemenis Turks British Others

553 156 99 9 7 12 5 18

Total

859

There was no moral, administrative, political or security justification whatsoever for the enlistment of foreign nationals in the Arab Legion. Although the political ideals of the vast majority of the Jordanian people were guided by Arab nationalism, their loss of jobs to foreign nationals created strong anti-Government feelings. A total of 306 Arab Legion vacancies went to foreign nationals who had no right at all to be enlisted [20]


in the Arab Legion according to the Organic Law. It was General Peake’s policy to enlist a certain number of non-Trans-Jordanians in the Arab Legion, as well as to exclude Trans-Jordanian Bedouins from enlistment. In this he was motivated by personal reasons, for he never forgot the fact that shaikh Mithqal al-Fayiz, the leader of the Bani Sakhr Bedouin tribe, had arrested him and locked him up in a barley store for 24 hours.

Before the economic depression of 1929, the economy of Trans-Jordan was severely hit by a combination of factors as discussed in the previous chapter. The poor Trans-Jordanians, who constituted the vast majority of the inhabitants of the country, continued to be reduced to poverty, while the merchants and moneylenders of Trans-Jordan, the majority of whom were Syrians and Palestinians, became richer. When the economic depression was spread worldwide during early 1929, economic collapse precipitated commercial failure and high unemployment. The depression did not discriminate between industrial and agricultural countries, and Trans-Jordan was badly affected. The lack of funds for the Health Service, and the poverty of the people, caused a substantial increase in the death rate in 1929, as Table 2.3 shows. TABLE 2.3

Births and deaths, 1928–9 Year

Population

Births

Deaths

Death rate per 1,000

Infant deaths (under 1 year) per 1,000

1928 1929

300,000 300,000

8,400 9,845

5,009 6,573

16.3 23.0

184.8 205.81

Although the British Government allocated £40,000 as a Grant-inAid to Trans-Jordan for the year 1929/30, only £9,450 was awarded to the Trans-Jordanian Government. Of the remainder, £6,888 was allocated to the British Resident, and £23,662 to the British Trans-Jordan Frontier Force, a total of £30,550. The rest of the budget was financed from the purely Trans-Jordanian revenue of £286,410, which was mainly derived from customs and excise, tithes, house and land tax and animal tax. The [21]


British Resident, Colonel Henry Cox, whose actions proved that he was nearly indifferent to the economic and social development of the country, strictly controlled government expenditure. He was insensitive towards the poverty of the people, for while he allocated £99,439, more than one third of the budget, to the Arab Legion, he allocated £186,961 to the various departments of government. (Appendix A shows the actual revenue and expenditure of the budgets of Trans-Jordan between 1925 and 1929.) In the political field, the Jordanian People’s Party (Hizb al-Shaab al-Urdoni) faded away when the majority of its members joined the new party of the Executive Committee of the National Conference (Hizb al-Lajnah al-Tanfithiyah Lil Motamar al-Wattani) which was established on 10 April 1929 and consisted of the following:2 • • • • • • • • • • •

Shaikh Hussein al-Tarawnah, President Hashim Khair, Vice President Tahir al-Juqqah, Secretary Salim al-Bakhit, Treasurer Ayoub Fakhir, Accountant Sulaiman al-Sudi, Member Nimir al-Humud, Member Mustafa al-Muhaisin, Member Adil al-Azmah, Member Dr Subhi Abu Ghanimah, Member Ali al-Kurdi, Member

This party was mainly concerned with achieving the aims of the National Pact, and amending the 1928 Treaty. The fact that two of its members were Arab nationalists of Syrian origin (Adil al-Azmah and Dr Subhi Abu Ghanimah) gave the party a pan-Arab as well as Trans-Jordanian character. It was the only organised opposition in the country at the time, and was outspoken in its criticism of the Government as well as of the British and French Mandates. However, because only one of its members had a seat in the Legislative Council and because it was unable to enlist and organise a large number of supporters beyond the boundaries of tribal loyalty, its political strength was limited. The real political power, though limited by the treaty and Organic Law, was in the Legislative Council, which was convened on 2 April 1929. A detailed study of the attitudes and political behaviour of the [22]


elected and ex-officio members of the Council shows clearly that the elite within the Council were those members elected to two committees: the committee charged with replying to the speech from the throne and the committee responsible for formulating the draft of the Legislative Council Internal Regulations (by-law).3 The former consisted of Najib al-Shraidah (Irbid), Najib Abu al-Shar (Irbid), Audah al-Qusus (Karak), Said al-Mufti (Amman), and Tawfiq Abu al-Huda (Ex Officio); members of the latter were Shams al-Din Sami (Amman), Said al-Mufti (Amman), Mohammad al-Unsi (Amman), Ala al-Din Tuqan (Salt), Audah al-Qusus (Karak), and Najib al-Shraidah (Irbid). As early as the third meeting of the Legislative Council, a fundamental issue of democracy was raised by Audah al-Qusus, who suggested including in the reply to the speech from the throne an appeal to the Amir Abdullah for the transformation of the Legislative Council into a representative council (Majlis Niyabi). By his suggestion, al-Qusus endeavoured to establish the principle of government responsibility and accountability in Parliament. The debate which followed showed that Mohammad al-Unsi, Said al-Mufti and Najib Abu al-Shar supported the Government, which attempted to stop the appeal, while Najib al-Shraidah, Ala al-Din Tuqan, Attallah al-Suhaimat and Shams al-Din Sami supported al-Qusus’s appeal. However, when a vote was taken, the appeal was approved by the majority and the following text of the reply to the speech was accepted: Your Royal Highness We salute Your Highness as the scion of the Master of the Arabs, the symbol of the country and patriotism, and the bearer of the flag of the blessed Great Arab Revolt. We thank Your Highness for your kind congratulations on the occasion of the establishment of the first Legislative Council for the Amarah, and we pray God to guide us to success in the service of the country, relying on the mutual confidence between the throne and the nation. Our Legislative Council appreciates Your Highness’s great blessings of uniting the administration and the various local governments, and all your efforts and wise effective policies to raise the standards of your loyal people in the fields of progress and civilisation. We also assure Your Highness that we will carefully look into the important issues mentioned in the speech from the throne. We hope that the nation will achieve its desire for a representative [23]


life in the next session. We consider this the best way to express the assurance of the nation’s loyalty in this Council to the high throne. We pray God to help our hands to goodness and success, under the aegis of our Amir.4

The British authors of the Trans-Jordan Organic Law may have neglected, or even intended, to preclude provisions for the privileges and immunities of the Legislative Council and its members. They knew that the freedom of Parliament depended on the ability of its members to conduct their own proceedings and debates without interference from the Sovereign, the courts, the executive, or any other institution outside Parliament. They knew that providing Parliament and its members with certain privileges and immunities to maintain the principles of freedom of speech in debates, and freedom from arrest, were an integral and fundamental part of the principle of political freedom. Yet they precluded these principles from the Organic Law. During the debate on the Internal Regulations, Shams al-Din Sami, Najib al-Shraidah, and Najib Abu al-Shar demanded the inclusion of provisions for privileges and immunities in the regulations. In four debates they repeated that demand which was refused by the Government on the basis that there was no provision for them in the Organic Law. Thus the Legislative Council and the Amir approved the regulations on 29 April 1929. Shams al-Din Sami, Najib al-Shraidah, and Najib Abu al-Shar persisted in their opposition and continued to appeal for the establishment of privileges and immunities in the Legislative Council throughout the long debates on the approval of the Treaty of 1928, from 30 April to 4 June 1929.5 During an audience with the Amir, Shams al-Din Sami appealed to him to grant the Council and its members the privileges and immunities required, and the Amir promised to amend the Organic Law. On 9 June 1929, the opposition won and inflicted the first defeat on the Government, when the Amir issued a proclamation in accordance with article 70 of the Organic Law,6 granting members of the Council the following privileges and immunities: No member of the Legislative Council shall be detained or tried during a session, unless the Council declare by decision that there is sufficient reason for his trial, or that he was arrested while committing a crime. [24]


Each member of the Council shall enjoy full freedom of speech within the limits of the Internal Regulations approved by the Council, and no legal action shall be taken against him in respect of any vote or opinion he may give, or a speech he may make during the meetings of the Council. If a member is arrested for any reason while the Council is not in session, the Prime Minister must inform the Council, when it re-assembles, of all the actions taken with the necessary explanation.7 2 Muharram 1348 (9 June 1929) Abdullah

On the same day, Shaikh Refaifan al-Majali, member of the Legislative Council for Karak, referred to several statements by the Prime Minister and the British Resident that after the approval of the treaty the Government would be independent. He then demanded that an appeal should be made to the Amir Abdullah to ‘transform the government from its temporary status to its legitimate constitutional status’.8 He insisted that in accordance with Article 3 of the treaty employment in the Trans-Jordan Civil Service should only be from ‘the sons of the country’. He reminded the Prime Minister of his assurance that Article 3 of the treaty would be applied as soon as it was approved by the Council. He urged that the issue be debated in the Council and that the policy should be strictly applied. Although al-Majali did not mention names, he was obviously directing his demands at two members of the Cabinet: Husam Jar Allah and Halim Abu Rahmah, as well as at the seven directors of departments, and nearly one-third of the Arab Legion and the Civil Service who were not Trans-Jordanian. On 15 June 1929, during the twenty-third meeting of the Legislative Council, al-Majali’s demand was debated. Shams al-Din Sami supported the motion and called for the formation of a constitutional government responsible to the Council in accordance with the principle of government responsibility and accountability. Audah al-Qusus supported the application of Article 3 of the treaty, but suggested that the formation of a new government should be left to the Amir. Najib al-Shraidah insisted that the government should be formed from the elected members of the Legislative Council. However, as soon as the temperature of the debate started to rise, Mohammad al-Unsi, who was in two minds regarding the change of government, suggested an end to the meeting.9 [25]


With the principle of freedom of speech in the Legislative Council well established, the Opposition was encouraged to raise new issues against Abu al-Huda’s Government. Shams al-Din Sami launched his campaign of criticism in order to discredit it and pave the way for its downfall. On 18 June, he raised the issue of the concession granted to the Palestine Electric Corporation and its Jewish Chairman Pinhas Rutenberg.10 In his speech during the twenty-fifth meeting, Shams al-Din Sami declared that the Rutenberg project was purely Zionist, and Trans-Jordan was in no way obliged to accept it. He insisted that the project did not need 6,000 dunums of land, and that the price of three Palestine pounds per dunum (1,000 square metres) attracted deep suspicion. He strongly objected to Zionist flags being raised on the corporation’s plant during Jewish religious occasions. He also repeated some of the rumours which were circulating in Irbid and was obviously referring to Tawfiq Abu al-Huda, without naming him, when he said: ‘One is bound to accept what was said about improper use of power, when one sees that some of those officials connected with the project are now building houses and palaces, considering that they came to this country a few years ago to work for the low salary of twelve pounds a month.’11 He then alluded to the issue of Cabinet approval for the Dead Sea concession to the Crown Agents on behalf of Trans-Jordan on 6 January 1929.12 (The concession was awarded to the British Crown Agents by the High Commissioner for Palestine and Trans-Jordan, and enabled them to produce potash from the Dead Sea.) He suspected that the owners of the project were Zionists, and that the Government knew very little about its details, and concluded: ‘The people must know that the country was ruined, and its fall to that level was because it did not defend its rights, but accepted to leave its destiny to persons who had nothing to do with it. We were told by Tawfiq Abu al-Huda yesterday that this government of Trans-Jordan was a phenomenon of British rule.’ He then suggested that an appeal must be made to the Amir to change the government. Later in the same day he submitted an application addressed to the Amir signed by eight members of the Legislative Council supporting al-Majali’s demand.13 At that stage of the debate a few members left the meeting and the Prime Minister, who was also the President of the Council, was able to postpone the debate. On the following day, Shaikh Mithqal al-Fayiz, Shaikh Salih al-Auran, Shaikh Hamd al-Jazi, Abdullah al-Kulaib al-Shraidah, Najib al-Shraidah, [26]


Adib Wahbah, Shaikh Husam Jar Allah, and Auqlah Mohammad al-Nusair were absent and the meeting was again postponed. On 20 June it became obvious that Mohammad al-Unsi, Audah al-Qusus, and Said al-Mufti wanted to give the Government enough time to reply to Shams al-Din Sami’s accusations. Mohammad al-Unsi criticised Shams al-Din Sami for stirring the issues of the Dead Sea and Rutenberg projects, and Audah al-Qusus attacked him for raising the question of nationality in the Civil Service. Shams al-Din Sami responded by declaring that Halim Abu Rahmah, and Husam Jar Allah, who were members of the Cabinet, were not Trans-Jordanians. They were in fact seconded from the British Government of Palestine. He insisted that it was his duty to raise the problem of ‘selling part of the country to the Zionist Jews for a pittance.’14 He then walked out from the meeting which was postponed according to Said al-Mufti’s suggestion. By 23 June, Tawfiq Abu al-Huda was ready to deliver his reply on behalf of the Government. He severely criticised Shams al-Din Sami for his ‘unfounded accusations’ and explained that he was not a member of the Cabinet which had granted the concession to Rutenberg, but, he said, ‘I was the main official who knew all the details of this case, and the director who implemented the Law.’ In his attempt to defend the Government and himself, Tawfiq committed a grave material inaccuracy and deceived the Council when he stated that: ‘The concession was granted in 1921, when Trans-Jordan was part of Palestine.’15 The truth was that the concession was granted on 5 March 1926 by Lord Plumer, the High Commissioner for Palestine, three years after the declaration of the independent government of Trans-Jordan, and that Trans-Jordan was never in its history part of Palestine. Entrenched in his attitude, Tawfiq repeated the Jewish and Zionist claim that ‘Trans-Jordan was part of Palestine’, even when the British Government had stated in 1920, 1921, 1922, and 1923 that it was not. In his dealings with the Legislative Council, Tawfiq Abu al-Huda attempted to avoid the political issues and concentrated his defence on purely administrative details. He highlighted the question of the price of land and neglected the fact of the Zionist buyer. On the issue of the Dead Sea concession, he claimed that it was granted to a Palestinian and said: ‘I do not know of a Zionist nationality, and many of the Zionists are of Palestinian nationality.’ Abu al-Huda deceived no one but himself. It was well known during that period of political development in Trans-Jordan that Hasan Khalid Abu al-Huda, and Tawfiq Abu al-Huda [27]


acted as surrogates for the British Resident, Colonel Henry Cox, in the Cabinet and the Legislative Council. On several occasions, Tawfiq Abu al-Huda promoted British policy, rather than the interests of Trans-Jordan. He became as unpopular in the country and within the Legislative Council as Hasan Khalid was. In his treatment of Trans-Jordanians, he was considered extremely harsh.16 Hasan Khalid Abu al-Huda allowed the British Resident to interfere in the affairs of the Legislative Council. On one occasion Shams al-Din Sami pointed out that the British Resident attended a meeting of members of the Legislative Council in the house of the Prime Minister, where a law, which was being debated in the Legislative Council, was discussed. He objected against the meeting and considered it an interference by the British Resident in a matter which was essentially within the jurisdiction of the Legislative Council. While Shams al-Din Sami was extremely protective towards the independence of the Legislative Council, Tawfiq Abu al-Huda and Audah al-Qusus, who attended the meeting, dismissed the issue on the basis that the British Resident attended the meeting at the Prime Minister’s residence in his personal capacity. The Arab expression ‘an apology uglier than guilt’ justly describes Abu al-Huda’s answer. On 30 June 1929, the Prime Minister submitted to the Legislative Council a draft law for the dismissal of foreign nationals employed in the Civil Service. The draft law was based on Article 3 of the treaty, which provided that: ‘no official of other than Trans-Jordanian nationality shall be appointed in Trans-Jordan without the concurrence of His Britannic Majesty’. Although the Amir had already approved the publication of the draft law in the Trans-Jordan Official Gazette, the British Resident interfered through Hasan Khalid and Tawfiq Abu al-Huda and prevented the publication of the draft law, on the basis that it was not in the public interest of Trans-Jordan. Hasan Khalid Abu al-Huda, being subservient to the British Resident, agreed with him rather than with the Amir, and withdrew the draft law from the Legislative Council.17 The British Resident had no right to interfere in that affair under the treaty or the Organic Law. By his action he contravened Article 3 of the treaty, and in any case the issue was not within his remit. Shams al-Din Sami, angered by the Prime Minister’s decision, demanded a constitutional government. He insisted that the majority of the members of the Legislative Council approved the 1928 Treaty [28]


subject to the establishment of a constitutional government. Tawfiq Abu al-Huda, as usual, defended the British Resident’s interference on the basis that the treaty ‘was not ratified by Britain’. On 29 July 1929, the Amir prorogued the session of the Council until its next normal session, in accordance with Article 19 of the Organic Law.18 Meanwhile, pressure on the Government to seek amendments to the treaty continued from most members of the Legislative Council. Shaikh Hussein al-Tarawnah, who was in tune with the Amir’s political aims, sent a cable to the British Prime Minister on 21 June 1929. He said: His Excellency the British Prime Minister The vast majority of the Trans-Jordanian people decided to boycott the elections for the Legislative Council and declared on several occasions their protests against assembling that council through pressure and illegal actions carried out during the election with the full knowledge of the British Representative. Electoral success of that form is considered meaningless. Because of the illegal means by which the approval of the treaty was obtained from the members of the council, by bringing them one after the other to the office of the Prime Minister and coercing them to approve the treaty through threats and promises; because one third of the elected members of the Legislative Council objected to this method of approval and withdrew from the meeting, and as two of the non-elected members who approved the treaty are seconded from the Palestine Government and had no right whatsoever to sign the approval; because the present Legislative Council did not assemble on a correct basis and the people decided that if their decisions were contrary to national aspirations, rights of independence and Arab national interests, they will not commit themselves to anything, we repeat our protest against the approval of the treaty, which was done under pressure and coercion against the will of the people, and we appeal in the name of humanity and civilisation to the present Labour Government to sympathise with the legal demands of Trans-Jordan, and to lift the nightmare of colonial and military rule from our poor country by amending that treaty in a way amiable to human justice and the promises of Great Britain to the Arabs. 9 August 1929 Hussein al-Tarawnah

A few days later he sent another appeal to the British Prime Minister: [29]


His Excellency the Prime Minister The Legislative Council, which had approved the British–Trans-Jordan Agreement, does not have the right to do so because it does not represent the Jordanian people. We, the opposition bloc in the Legislative Council, wish to declare our hope in the democratic ways of your party, which proved to be more constitutional and humanitarian. We greatly hope that you remedy the position by amending the agreement in a way that would guarantee the rights and independence of Trans-Jordan under the leadership of H.R.H the Amir Abdullah. President of the Executive Committee of the Jordan League19

Al-Buraq incident Although Trans-Jordan had no direct Jewish problem affecting its security and stability, its people were very sensitive to any incident or crisis in Palestine, which was more often the cause for tension in Trans-Jordan. After the riots in Palestine of May 1921, a quasi-peace existed for eight years between Arabs and Jews. This was severely broken by the violent conflict of August 1929. The first obvious sign of unrest was the tension created by Jewish protests on 24 September 1928 against Muslim rights to al-Buraq Wall in the Holy City of Jerusalem, named by the Jews the ‘Wailing Wall’. The Zionists wanted to attract attention to their cause and used events recorded only vaguely in their religious history to strengthen their claim that they should have free access to what they believed to be the ruins of Solomon’s Temple. The vast majority of historians agree that after the Babylonian captivity the Jews were in the habit of bewailing what they considered the departed glories of Judah on the site of the destroyed Temple. Nineteen centuries earlier, in AD 33, the pilgrim Bordeaux, who visited Jerusalem, reported that the Jews came to what they believed to be the site of the ruins once every year to weep and lament. Over this time, the Jews had no recognised legal right except their own habit of visiting the site. Al-Buraq Wall did not belong to the Jews, nor had its site been under their sovereignty for the previous 21 centuries. From AD 638, when Jerusalem was surrendered in peace (and upon the most generous and just terms) by Patriarch Sophronius to Khalifah [30]


Omar ibn al-Khattab, until today, the sanctity and sacredness of the Western Aqsa Wall and the pavement in front of it, is maintained in the strong belief of all Muslims that it is the site where the Prophet Mohammad tethered al-Buraq on the occasion of Isra and Miraj. This is why the Western Aqsa Wall is still named by Muslims Haitt al-Buraq, not to mention that the Aqsa Mosque, Haram al-Sharif is the first Qiblah, and the third most sacred Haram in Islam. But since AD 638 the Jews were allowed to visit what they believed were the ruins of the Temple. When the Aqsa Mosque was built in an area adjacent to the ruins, not on them, the Jews appealed to the Ottoman Sultan to allow them to carry out their devotions at a part of the Western Wall of the Aqsa Mosque, claiming that it was holy to them. Thus in 1840 an Ottoman decree confirmed the Jewish right to visit that part of the Wall ‘as of old’, but forbade the Jews to pave the passage in front of it, or to make any changes in its structure. Thus by customs and usage as well as law, al-Buraq Wall, which is an inseparable part of the Western wall of Haram al-Sharif, was and still is the property of the Muslims, and a sacred Muslim Waqf. The Jews were allowed to pray at that part of the Wall by sufferance, not by legal or religious right. Under the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine of 24 July 1922, Article 13 provided: All responsibility in connection with the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites in Palestine, including that of preserving existing rights and of securing free access to the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites and the free exercise of worship, while ensuring the requirements of public order and decorum, is assumed by the Mandatory, who shall be responsible solely to the League of Nations in all matters connected herewith . . . Nothing in this Mandate shall be construed as conferring upon the Mandatory authority to interfere with the fabric or the management of purely Muslim sacred shrines, the immunities of which are guaranteed.20

The Palestine Government felt bound by the provisions of Article 14 of the Mandate for Palestine to maintain that status quo.21 There was no doubt whatsoever, then, that by international law al-Buraq Wall, or as the Jews named it, the Wailing Wall, did not belong to the Jews. The holiness of the Aqsa Mosque, including al-Buraq Wall, [31]


was legally recognised. Yet on 24 September 1928, after a worldwide propaganda campaign organised by the Zionist Organisation against the British Palestine Government, the Zionists of Palestine took the unprecedented step of erecting some innovations close to al-Buraq Wall on the eve of the Day of Atonement. The High Muslim Council strongly complained that the Jews were aiming at gradually extending the bounds of the limited rights granted to them by the Muslims, in order to destroy Haram al-Sharif and replace it with a new building of the Temple of Solomon on its debris. The incident engendered very high feelings all round, and the Palestine Government had to remove the innovations on the Day of Atonement.22 Although the Jews never put forward a claim of ownership to that part of al-Buraq Wall which they name the Wailing Wall, they asserted their right of access to the Wall ‘as of old’ as given to them under Ottoman rule. The High Muslim Council and its President, Haj Amin al-Husseini, never disputed the Jews’ right of access to the Wall. They asserted that the Jews were determined to provoke the Arabs by going beyond this right and constructing benches, a screen for separating men and women, an ark with the Scrolls and the Law and ritual lamps which together constituted an open synagogue on Muslim property. On 15 August 1929, the issue of the Wall exploded again when the Jews held a demonstration organised by extremists from Tel Aviv claiming for the first time ever that the Wall belonged to the Jews. On 16 August, crowds of Muslims from Jerusalem, Nablus and Hebron ‘al-Khalil’ held a demonstration in the same place and reaffirmed Muslim rights. Subsequently disturbances started to spread all over Palestine. Violent confrontations between Arabs and Jews broke out in Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa and Hebron. When the violence ended on 30 August, the casualties were many: 133 Jews killed and 339 wounded, and 116 Arabs killed and 232 wounded. In the subsequent trials before the Court of Final Instance, 26 death sentences were confirmed, 25 of them upon Muslim Arabs, and only one upon a Jew. However only three Muslim Arabs were executed, and the remaining sentences were commuted to terms of imprisonment.23 The extremely delicate nature of the issue of al-Buraq Wall, the magnitude of the conflict, the number of casualties suffered by both sides, as well as the religious implications of the confrontation, compelled the British Colonial Office to announce on 14 September 1929 that the [32]


Commission of Enquiry headed by Sir Walter Shaw would proceed to Palestine. The aim of the Commission was to enquire into the immediate causes of the recent outbreak and to make recommendations as to the necessary steps to avoid a recurrence. Among its recommendations, the Commission asserted that it was essential to the peace and security of Palestine that a separate commission should be appointed to determine the rights of both parties at the Wailing Wall. On 15 May 1930, the Council of the League of Nations decided to send out a Commission of Enquiry to Palestine, consisting of three non-British members, headed by a former Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr M. M. Lofgren, Mr. Barde from Switzerland and Mr Van Kempen from the Netherlands. The Commission investigated the whole question of rights and heard evidence from Arabs and Jews in Palestine. Their report, which was submitted to the League Council in December 1930, included the following conclusions: 1.

2.

The Western Wall was an exclusively Muslim Waqf property and part of a Muslim holy place, Haram al-Sharif and its surroundings. The pavement in front of the Wall and between it and the Magharibah quarter was also a Muslim Waqf property and formed part of a legally constituted religious foundation. The Jews had the right of access to the Western Wall for devotions on the pavement, and should be permitted, on specified occasions, to bring specified articles pertaining to acts of Jewish devotion.

The report clearly stated that the Wall and its pavement belonged to the Muslims, but that the Jews had the right of access for religious services, on condition that they did not introduce such appurtenances as to constitute a synagogue. These findings were legally enacted and were enforced by the British Palestine Government throughout the existence of the British Mandate in Palestine. The issue of al-Buraq Wall incensed Arab public opinion in the region. Particularly in Trans-Jordan, a neighbouring country to Palestine, it created high emotions and engendered fear of Zionist intentions as well as resentment against the British Mandate. The fact that the High Commissioner for Palestine sent some units of the imperial TJFF to support the British Army and the Palestine Police in their operations against Muslim Arabs enraged the Trans-Jordanians. Demonstrations [33]


were held in nearly every town including the capital Amman, and the shaikhs of several Bedouin tribes threatened to cross the river Jordan and join the struggle, ‘Jihad’, against the Zionists. The Amir Abdullah, who was paying close attention to the situation in Palestine, wrote to the High Commissioner on 5 October 1929. He expressed his anxiety regarding the political situation in Palestine and Trans-Jordan, and regarding Muslim rights to al-Buraq Wall. He explained: I think I would not be diverting from the subject and would be stating nothing but the whole truth if I say that the Jewish ambitions in Palestine are futile in view of the recent events which put an end to all hopes of the possibility of such aliens living in friendly and neighbourly relations with the Arabs in that country which has constantly been inhabited by Arabs for thirteen consecutive centuries.24

Abdullah also referred to the Zurich Zionist Congress of 1929, in which ‘extreme views, greed, and lack of consideration for the feelings of the inhabitants of Palestine were expressed’, and added: My anxiety has been strengthened when the Jews attempted recently to transgress upon al-Buraq Wall with a view to its expropriation. I fear that should Jewish greed continue to be based on violence and on putting forward demands which exceed the limit of reason, and to arrange provocative demonstrations, a situation will be created which will demand the adoption of such permanent military measures as would make the promoters of the disturbances fear the consequences of their acts.’

In his reply, the High Commissioner stated that some of the speeches made at the Zurich Zionist Congress caused alarm and anxiety among the Arabs as to the ambitions and intentions of the Jews. He informed the Amir that he had issued regulations as to what the Jews were permitted or forbidden to do at al-Buraq Wall, the Wailing Wall. He continued: It has been stated that these regulations are an infringement of the status quo, and that they make concessions to the Jews, but this is not so. I based them entirely on the White Paper of 1928, which I believe gave general satisfaction to the Muslims. I may tell you too, that the Jews have protested strongly against the regulations because [34]


under them they are forbidden to bring screens, benches, carpets, and other appurtenances to the Wall.25

On 15 October, anti-British and anti-Zionist feelings soared high. Pamphlets demanding action against the Zionists were circulated in Amman, Irbid and Salt; one, issued by the Trans-Jordanian people, was addressed to the Amir Abdullah: The people of Trans-Jordan who disapproved of the actions carried out by the British Government of Palestine against the Arabs in enforcing regulations which would help the Jews to establish a synagogue at al-Buraq, are now anxious and agitated. Your Highness is aware that the people were not subdued until they received promises from Your Highness that the Muslims would be accorded their aims and the greed of the Jews would be dispensed with. People have been awaiting a good outcome of these promises and petitions and therefore were pacified until yesterday when they were overwhelmed by the news of the partiality of the Mandatory Power in establishing the said synagogue on the most sacred place of Islam. Public opinion is therefore greatly agitated and annoyed because this is believed to be intentional on the part of the Mandatory Power to instigate Muslims and to provoke them. This is an extreme degree of partiality towards the Jews and Zionism and we fear that if things are allowed to continue in this manner the evil shall become very serious and the fire of rebellion will be kindled in the country and shall bring to the country very regrettable disasters which Your Highness will not be pleased with. Therefore the people of Trans-Jordan consider that they ought to apply to Your Highness once more to signify their protests and disapproval of these encroachments upon the rights of Muslims in their sacred religious affairs and beg Your Highness to convey this their protest to the concerned quarters and to intercede for the last time in order to efface this wrong, and may God protect and preserve you.26

Another declaration, issued by the Muslim Young Men’s Society of Amman and the People’s Party was addressed to the British Prime Minister: Supported by the power of justice and the legal rights of Muslims, we protest against the conduct of the High Commissioner towards the Arabs, and against his recent instructions which are contradictory [35]


to His Britannic Majesty’s proclamations in respect of the ‘Buraq’. We hold him responsible for all the consequences of rousing the religious and national Arab feeling by such unavailing actions which are prejudicial to the rights of Muslims at large and contradictory to the obligations of your Ministry which is wise and sincere to humanity.27

Colonel Henry Cox, though he thought that the vast majority of the people of Trans-Jordan were ‘exceedingly ignorant’, showed a somewhat sympathetic understanding of their attitude towards the British policy in Palestine. In his secret report to the High Commissioner of 27 October 1929, he confirmed that: The Trans-Jordanians loathe the Balfour Declaration and all it means to them, just as much as do the Arabs of Palestine, and even though they themselves are clear of its provisions, they are only too anxious to do all they can to help free their brothers from what they regard as an injustice so gross that the British Government could not continue to support it; they may easily be inflamed and moved to definite action when they are persuaded that their Holy Places are being usurped as well. The people have been persuaded to believe ill of the English during the recent election campaign when the question of religion was not made use of, and it is obvious that this incipient distrust can easily be turned into hatred if the people are told that the British are arranging that their Holy Places be given to the Jews.

In another report Cox once again shows a degree of sympathy for, if not advocacy of, the Jordanian people’s point of view: The Government and people of Trans-Jordan do not object to Jews on the ground of their race, religion or language and do not discriminate against them as nationals of any State Member of the League of Nations as compared with the Mandatory. They believe, however, that the Zionist’s aim is to establish a preponderance of Jews in Trans-Jordan as well as in Palestine. They believe further that every Jew shares this Zionist view and that therefore it is in the interests of the country that Jewish settlement in and penetration into Trans-Jordan should not be encouraged.28

On 16 October a general strike was held all over the country. Royal Air Force vehicles travelling within Trans-Jordan were stoned in Salt, [36]


and shouts of ‘Kill the English’ were heard. Anti-British feelings were so high that RAF vehicles were diverted from the main road through Salt, to avoid attacks by young men and students of the Secondary School. Stones were also thrown at Colonel Cox’s official car. Peake took action to ensure that the stone throwing was stopped, but could not stop the strong defiance of the children of Salt. Cox reported: ‘Lieutenant Colonel Shute told me on the 20th that when approaching Salt from Jerusalem on the main road, a few days earlier, he had seen boys of about 15 years of age standing by the road, pick up stones as if to throw them at his car but in fact they had not thrown them.’29 On 18 October, the Amir allowed the texts of the exchange of letters between himself and the High Commissioner to be published by Jordanian and Arab newspapers. The British Resident in Amman voiced objections to the Amir ‘broadcasting his personal views to the press’. But the Amir professed himself unable to explain how the letters came to be published, although he did not withdraw his permission for publication. Thus no official representation was made. The British political image suffered a severe blow as a result of al-Buraq crisis and Cox was well aware of this fact. He reported to the High Commissioner that when he had arrived in Amman in 1924, the Amir was amongst those who were exasperated with the British Mandate in Palestine and felt that: The best thing for him would be to rid himself of British interference, for he believed that if Trans-Jordan were allied with, or amalgamated in the Hijaz, the two countries would need no European assistance. I well remember him telling me that Westerners could not hope to show Orientals a better way even if they made the brims of their hats a yard wide.30

Cox’s reading of the situation was confirmed when a general strike covering the whole country was held on 31 October 1929 in support of the Arab struggle in Palestine and to mark the occasion of the visit of the High Commissioner to Amman.31 On 2 November the Amir opened the Legislative Council ordinary session with a speech from the throne. Early that morning four flags were hung out on the minaret of al-Hussein Mosque in Amman, bearing the slogan: ‘Palestine for the Arabs . . . down with Zionism’. Hasan Khalid Abu al-Huda, the Prime Minister, without shame and contrary to the [37]


strong feelings of the people of Trans-Jordan, ordered the removal of the flags. Peaceful demonstrations against the Balfour Declaration were held in Amman, Salt, Irbid and Jarash. The High Muslim Council in Jerusalem received messages of support for the struggle of the Palestinian people against Zionist aggression from Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. It soon became obvious that al-Buraq incident rekindled the spirit of Arab nationalism among the Arab masses. A new Arab awakening was on its way.

In the wake of al-Buraq incident, Hasan Khalid Abu al-Huda soon realised that the presence of seconded officials from the Palestine Government in the Cabinet was no longer acceptable to the vast majority of the members of the Legislative Council. Their continued presence was causing much resentment against him and against the Government and it was obvious that he would have little cooperation in the Legislative Council if he continued with his policy. On 16 October 1929 he asked the Amir to approve his plan of replacing Husam Jar Allah and Halim Abu Rahmah, both Palestinian officials seconded from the Palestine Government, with two members of the Legislative Council. The Amir approved the plan and on 17 October, he accepted Abu al-Huda’s resignation, and formed a new government headed by him as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Hasan Khalid Abu al-Huda, Prime Minister Ibrahim Hashim, Justice and Qadhi Qudhah Tawfiq Abu al-Huda, General Secretary Ala al-Din Tuqan, Antiquities Audah al-Qusus, Without Portfolio Said al-Mufti, Without Portfolio

There was no appointment of a minister of finance in the new Cabinet because of Colonel Cox’s policy of maintaining British financial control over Trans-Jordan through a British official. He recommended that the post of treasurer or minister of finance not be filled on the basis of saving £623 in the budget estimate of 1929/30. This was passed off to the Colonial Secretary Lord Passfield by the High Commissioner with the excuse that ‘the post of treasurer has not been filled because there is no suitable candidate available for the post, and the duties of the treasurer [38]


are being discharged by the financial adviser [British official] and the chief revenue officer [Trans-Jordanian]’. Thus Cox maintained complete financial control. Even the salaries of the ministers were decided by him as shown in Table 2.4.32 TABLE 2.4

Ministerial salaries, 1929 (Palestine pound) Post 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Prime Minister Justice & Qadhi Qudhah General Secretary Antiquities Without Portfolio Without Portfolio

Year

Month

1,200 840 697 444 300 300

100.00 70.000 58.08 37.000 25.000 25.000

Judging by their performance in the Legislative Council, Hasan Khalid Abu al-Huda and Tawfiq Abu al-Huda continued to work in close contact with the British Resident and toed his line, while they paid lip service to the Amir. Ibrahim Hashim was independent and one of the Amir’s men. Three members of the Legislative Council were indigenous Trans-Jordanians and loyal to the Amir; Ala al-Din Tuqan was independent; Audah al-Qusus was half-hearted in his opposition to the Government; and Said al-Mufti was a member of the Opposition until he became a member of the Cabinet. The formation of the Government created a certain balance between representation of the people and the Amir’s aims and ambitions. It also kept the door open for relations with Syria through the Prime Minister who was born in a village near Halab, with Palestine through Ibrahim Hashim and Tawfiq Abu al-Huda, with the Christians through Audah al-Qusus, and with the Circassians through Said al-Mufti. Although it seemed that Hasan Khalid Abu al-Huda intended to win maximum support in the Legislative Council by appeasing the indigenous Trans-Jordanians, the vast majority of the Trans-Jordanians were not represented in their own Government. Ala al-Din Tuqan had to resign from the Legislative Council because he accepted the post of Director of the Department of Antiquities as well as his Cabinet post. On 17 October 1929, by-elections were held [39]


for Tuqan’s seat and Nazmi Abd al-Hadi, a naturalised Trans-Jordanian of Palestinian origin, was elected. On 2 November 1929, in his speech from the throne, the Amir Abdullah responded to the popular demand of the people for giving preference to the ‘sons of the country’ in political as well as civil service appointments. He said: You are no doubt aware that my aim in giving preference to the ‘sons of the country’ is to help them to attain the posts they are worthy of, in the service of their country and in supervising the affairs of their people. Three of your honourable members have been appointed to the Executive Council of the Government. Other administrative posts have been also entrusted to the ‘sons of the country’. The well known agreement has become effective as both the contracting parties have ratified it. The wishes you have expressed, and the goals to which the country aspires, are always in my sight and I will work towards their achievement until the country gains these wishes. I am confident that you may fully rely on me in this and leave the matter entirely in my hands. You are aware of the troubles which broke out in Palestine, and you know the attitude I adopted in face of the same. I received a letter from His Excellency the High Commissioner, the most important parts of which are embodied in my proclamation of 18 October, reassuring the people as regard the Aqsa Mosque and the rights of the Arabs in Palestine.33

Towards the middle of November 1929, Captain Gordon Comming, a former British Army officer who served in the Middle East, visited Palestine and Trans-Jordan. When in Trans-Jordan, he sent a telegram to the British Prime Minister praising the welcome he had received from the Arabs ‘with all their renowned inherent hospitality’. He said that they were ‘crying for the noted British Justice, noted through the ages’ and concluded: As an Englishman proud of my country and her power, I say that the present state of affairs is disgraceful, it soils the clear brow [Shakespeare]. I believe it is vital to appreciate the present situation, and would add that it is within our power to ask for aid for all those pronouncers of the Dhadh, (i.e. the Arabs), by which means alone can peace reign, and failing which, peace will never be realised in the future, not even with war and ammunition.34 [40]


In Amman Captain Comming was accompanied by Musa Kazim al-Husseini and Hussein al-Dajani of Palestine. At a lunch given in his honour by the party of the Executive Committee of the National Conference, Najib Abu al-Shar expressed friendly feelings towards those like Captain Comming ‘among the sons of the noble British Nation, our ally of yesterday’. He reminded guests of British pledges and promises made to King al-Hussein ibn Ali, in their hour of need, to support the independence of the Arabs, and added: The Allies have, in the name of the Mandate, divided the country into many small states in spite of the pledges and promises they made. Not only that, but they have further added to it, as another disgraceful and unlawful act, the Balfour Declaration, which lays down the establishment of a national home for the Jews in Arab Palestine.35

He asked Captain Comming to inform the British Government that: ‘Trans-Jordan can do without the British Grant-in-Aid levied on the shoulders of the British Taxpayer if they can see their way clearly to assist us in the formation of a local government of less colossal calibre, the expenditure of which shall not exceed its revenue.’36 Tahir al-Juqqah followed with his welcome to ‘the true friend of the Arabs’ and said: Captain, you have undoubtedly proved, by your fight for the Arabs, that the noble British nation is grand in its character and great in its actions, in spite of the blunders committed by some of its political representatives against nations who, owing to the change of time, have been entrusted to the care of Great Britain, whose policy destroyed their legal rights . . . It was never thought that the great nation of Britain would go back on her word so soon after the disappearance of the shadow of this frightful war, and deny the rights of her allies in Palestine and other Arab countries. Is it logical that our great nation of the glorious past would keep silent, after having lost her great men in trying to achieve her ideal of independence? Should she give way under the heaviness of the chains laid upon her, be it the last treaty which has robbed Trans-Jordan of all signs of freedom and independence, or the Balfour Declaration which would lead to 800,000 Arabs leaving Palestine to find a living elsewhere or remain prey to the remnants of the Jews collected from all parts of the world?37 [41]


Captain Gordon Comming understood Arab ideals and ambitions and justly responded to them: Past history tells us that you are in constant disagreement. This should not happen among you. I hope the Arab countries would become united states, like the United States of America. Many who are familiar with the Arab character state that this is possible, others say it is not feasible, but I say, it is in the interest of Great Britain to create unity among the Arabs and maintain permanent relations with them. In order to remedy the present situation in Palestine I suggest that the two countries of Palestine and Trans-Jordan be united, His Highness the Emir being Emir of Palestine as well; this would be of great benefit.38

While Arab resentment against the Zionist Jews and the British Mandate was very bitter during al-Buraq crisis, Amman became the main centre of political and diplomatic activity. Close relations developed between the Jordanian opposition and opposition groups in Palestine and Syria. Riots, demonstrations, and disturbances were mainly organised and started in Amman and spread to the rest of the country. General Peake kept a close watch on the political situation through the police district commanders, and was well informed on the details of the activities of the shaikhs, notables and political activists. His reports were mainly to the British Resident rather than to the Amir Abdullah and the government who employed him and paid his salary. He reported on 15 November 1929 that the shaikhs and notables of the North held a meeting in the village of Barhah near Irbid, which was attended by the following members of the former Istiqlal Party: • • • • • • • • • • •

Sulaiman al-Sudi (Sirru) Naji al-Azzam (Wastiyah) Mohammad al-Funaish (Bani Aubaid) Salim al-Hindawi (Nuaimah) Rashid al-Khizai (Ajlun) Turki al-Kayid (Kfarat) Mohammad Said al-Ali (Bani Jumhah) Mohammad al-Shibil (Suf ) Mujalli al-Klaib (Khraishah tribe of Bani Sakhr) Mohammad Said al-Shraidah (Kurah) Mohammad Khalid (Irbid) [42]


The mukhtars (local leaders) of ten large villages attended the meeting to represent their communities: Mughayir, Sall, Beshra, Hakama, Huwarah, Kufr Jayiz, Kharja, Samad and Khreiba. It was noticed that the other prominent leaders of the North such as Ali Khulqi, Ibrahim al-Samawi, Ali Niazi and Abd al-Qadir al-Tal did not attend the meeting. The Government allowed the meeting to take place on the basis that it was intended to discuss the economic situation in the country, while the real intention of the participants was to discuss ways and means of supporting the Arab struggle in Palestine. The main suggestion of forming revolutionary bands was not accepted by the majority. It was therefore suggested that a meeting with representatives from the other districts of the country should take place in a future date at Husn to discuss all the issues on the national Trans-Jordanian level. However that meeting did not take place and the issue of forming revolutionary bands was not discussed until a few years later. In the district of Balqa, the Adwan tribe held talks with members of the High Muslim Council of Palestine. Some plans were made for sending weapons, ammunition and men to Palestine, if further disturbances were to take place. In the district of Karak, the main tribes were divided among themselves; some were supporting the Government, others supported the Opposition. Refaifan al-Majali supported the Government, while Shlash al-Majali supported the Opposition; Hussein al-Tarawnah was against Mohammad al-Tarawnah; Audah al-Qusus, a member of the Cabinet, was opposed by Isa al-Mdanat; and in the district of Taffilah the Auran tribe was against the Muhaisin tribe. Peake expected no serious trouble from the district of Ajlun at that stage, but he reported: ‘If disorders break out again in Palestine active assistance from Ajlun may be expected.’39 In the district of Maan, most of the shaikhs and notables were disgruntled owing to high unemployment and extreme poverty. Peake expected some trouble there, if a general uprising broke out in support of the Palestinian people over the question of al-Buraq. There were constant contacts between Mohammad al-Sabahat and Saudi Arabian officials. The rest of the shaikhs and notables in Maan (Ibrahim al-Aagaili, Mohammad al-Deek, Mohammad al-Mshari, Hamid al-Sharari and Ibrahim al-Ruwwad) were loyal to the Amir, although active in opposition against the government of Hasan Khalid Abu al-Huda.40

[43]


The end of the greatest Arab of his time By the beginning of July 1929, King al-Hussein ibn Ali, Hashemite leader of the Great Arab Revolt, former King of Hijaz, and Khalifah of the Muslims, who had been exiled to Cyprus by his ally Great Britain, was suffering from ill health after the death of his beloved wife. His sons, the Amir Abdullah and former King Ali ibn al-Hussein of the Hijaz, visited him for two weeks in Cyprus, and while on their return journey through Jerusalem, the Amir Abdullah called on the High Commissioner for Trans-Jordan and demanded from the British Government to allow his father to reside with him in Amman. It took the British Government until October 1930 (15 months) to free its former ally who, in its hour of need, stepped forward to free his nation and helped Britain to win the war in the Middle East. He lived his last days with his son Abdullah in Amman from October 1930 to June 1931 during which he was visited by his sons Kings Ali and Faisal, and Prince Zaid. At 3 am on 4 June 1931, this most pious muslim King, most noble Arab and most honourable Arab nationalist died peacefully in the land he freed from oppression. His last wish was to be buried in the Haram al-Sharif at Jerusalem, the city of the Isra and Miraj of the Prophet Mohammad, the city of the first Qiblah and the third Haram, for which he sacrificed his throne. King Ali ibn al-Hussein informed Haj Amin al-Husseini, the President of the Supreme Muslim Council in Palestine, who was then in Amman, of his father's wish. The Amir Abdullah requested from the High Commissioner for Palestine that his father’s wish should be granted, and that the official funeral should be held at the Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. Although the High Commissioner for Palestine, Sir John Chancellor, did not attend the funeral, he ordered that all proper facilities be granted for the ceremony. At 10 am on the same day, King al-Hussein ibn Ali’s body left Amman for Jerusalem, escorted by a cortège of his sons, King Ali, the Amir Abdullah and the Amir Zaid, his grandson the Amir Talal, the Amir Shakir, as well as Henry Cox, General Peake, and nearly every shaikh and notable from Trans-Jordan. At 2.20 pm the cortege reached Herod's Gate in the Old City of Jerusalem where a Guard of Honour and the band of the Arab Legion headed the funeral procession en route to the Aqsa Mosque. The procession, which included all the mayors of [44]


the main cities and towns of Palestine, the consular body, delegations of the various Muslim and Christian societies with their banners, and boy scouts and school boys, proceeded to the Haram al-Sharif through the Damascus Gate and into the Old City. Along the route the streets and buildings were crowded with mourners. A Guard of Honour from the Royal Warwickshire Regiment saluted the coffin at the Damascus Gate. The coffin was carried into the Dome of the Rock, and at 4.30 was carried to the Aqsa Mosque for the religious ceremonies and prayer. Very emotional funeral orations were delivered by Haj Amin al-Husseini, Shaikh Abd al-Qadir al-Muzaffar, Isaaf al-Nashashibi and Khalid al-Hakim. At 5 pm, the greatest and most noble Arab Muslim of his time, the champion of Arab awakening and nationalism, King al-Hussein ibn Ali, grandson of the Prophet Mohammad, was buried so far away from his first home in Mohammad’s Maccah, but in his beloved city of Jerusalem and the Aqsa Mosque.41

The Arab Legion By the beginning of the thirties, the Arab Legion, which was reduced to a police force, remained too thin on the ground to be able to achieve a reasonable standard of public security. Table 2.5 shows the deployment of officers and other ranks in the Arab Legion. TABLE 2.5

Deployment of the Arab Legion, 1929 District 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Strength

Ajlun Balqa Karak Maan Amman Police Amman Reserve Headquarters

150 146 142 149 69 173 30

Total

85942

[45]


The detection and prevention of tribal raids in the Jordanian desert, which was neglected by General Peake and which the Arab Legion was not strong enough to deal with, gradually became the responsibility of the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force, supported in the air by the RAF. Recurrence of raiding between Najdian, Syrian and Jordanian tribes continued in 1929, which caused much tension between the three countries, as well as concern in Paris and London. On the Najdian front tension arose from the raid by a section of the Ruallah of Najd on a section of the Zabin of Bani Sakhr. On the Syrian front, problems were caused by the presence of the Druze tribes at Nabik and their raids on the mail cars from Baghdad, as well as raids on Azraq. Internal security was disturbed in Ghor al-Safi because of the extreme poverty which prevailed in the area, and in the Ghor around Majami bridge because of the inveterate hostility between the Ghazzawiyah and Saqr tribes. A few crimes were committed by highwaymen against motor cars on the main road in the areas of Khan al-Zabib, Swaqa, Qatranah, Karak and Maan. The very serious poverty of the fallahin (farmers) in remote villages, owing to the failure of rain during the previous year, caused the recrudescence of crime, mainly petty thefts. Two sections of the Adwan tribe had a serious skirmish in Shunit Nimrin with a few wounded, but firm action by the police put an end to the quarrel, and prevented it from spreading to other sections of the tribe. In the capital Amman, the security problems were necessarily different from the rest of the country, and a specially enlisted and trained police force was in control of the city. During the previous few years many Jordanians, Syrians and Palestinians had drifted to Amman to seek employment. During that period there were not sufficient work opportunities and a certain number of the unemployed attempted to make a living by turning to crime. There were no rescue, firefighting or ambulance services in the city of Amman; police posts kept a small number of tins filled with water or sand for the purposes of firefighting, as well as small first aid needs. By the end of 1929, the Arab Legion was a police force with no military character whatsoever. The police units in the rural areas were armed with rifles and a hundred rounds of ammunition; the police units in the urban areas were armed with pistols, and a small number of rifles were kept in reserve at each police post and district headquarters. All the Arab Legion weapons were old, out of date, and in very bad condition. [46]


The 2.75 BL guns, ammunition, and spare parts, which were issued to the Arab Legion from the RAF at Sarafand in Palestine during 1925, were returned to the RAF in Amman. Four guns were kept for ceremonial salutes, and four unserviceable twelve-pounder guns were kept for nostalgic and decoration purposes. A British Board of Survey condemned the majority of machine guns and their spare parts held in the main stores as unserviceable. Only eight serviceable machine guns made in Germany 1908 were kept in reserve. The organisation of the Arab Legion consisted of the following:43 The Headquarters: The Commander of the Arab Legion was given two assistants; the assistant for administration was responsible for the Finance Department, the Store Department, the Criminal Investigation Department, and the Record and Statistic Office; the assistant for public security was responsible for the Prison Department, the Passport Office and the Legal Adviser Office. Police districts: There were four police districts whose deployment depended on the organisation of the civil administration. The Mutasarrif had at his central office the district headquarters and its commander, whose rank was not below Rais (captain). The Qaim Maqam had with him a sub-district commander with the rank of Mulazim (lieutenant). In the Nahiyah there was a Mulazim or a Wakil (sergeant major). The Amman Police : This unit was reorganised with a director and two assistants; one for traffic, licensing and training; and the other for public security and organisation. The Prison Department: The Inspector of prisons was responsible for the main prison in Mahatta at Amman and the four small detention centres in police districts. The Reserve Force : This unit was located at Amman and was too small to deal with any major situation. Although on paper it consisted of 173 officers and men, Peake admitted that he was only able to retain a very small reserve force at the main station camp, Muaaskar al-Mahattah in Amman. Even that small reserve was not deployed outside Amman.

[47]


The Commander of the Arab Legion had direct contact with all the various civil institutions as well as district administrations. His direct lines of communication can be seen from the distribution lists in Appendix B, which also shows the detailed organisation of the Government.

NOTES 1 Trans-Jordan Official Gazette (TJOG) (5 March 1929), no. 221. The Law for Animal Tax of 1929 raised the level of tax on animals to the following mil per head: camel 120, cow 120, sheep 50, goat 50. The percentage of revenue collection during 1928/29 was as follows: Amman 90%, Salt 82%, Irbid 91%, Karak 79% Madaba 92%, Jarash 98%, Ajlun 99%, Taffilah 84%, Aqaba 93%. Also, PRO. CO 831/8/5. Report on the administration of Trans-Jordan for 1929. 2 M. Madhi and S. Musa, Tarikh al-Urdon fi al-Qarn al-Ishrin (The History of Jordan in the Twentieth Century) (Amman: Dar al-Muhtasib, 1959), p. 325. 3 Legislative Council Records (LCR) no. 1, 2 April 1929. 4 LCR no. 3, 7 April 1929. 5 See Abu Nowar, M., The History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: The Creation and Development of Trans-Jordan 1920–1929 (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1989), pp. 233–9. 6 This Article allows the Amir, by proclamation, to vary, annul or add to any of the provisions of the Organic Law. 7 LCR no. 22, 9 June 1929, p. 217. 8 Ibid., p. 214. 9 LCR no. 23, 15 June 1929, pp. 237–9. 10 See Abu Nowar, M., The History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: The Creation and Development of Trans-Jordan 1920–1929 (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1989), p. 167. 11 LCR no. 25, 18 June 1929, p. 246. 12 TJOG no. 248, 1 February 1930. 13 The appeal, dated 18 June 1929, was signed by the following members of the Legislative Council: Said al-Sulaibi, Refaifan al-Majali, Said al-Mufti, Najib al-Ibrahim, Ala al-Din Tuqan, Attallah al-Suhaimat, Mohammad al-Unsi, and Shams al-Din Sami. 14 LCR no. 27, 20 June 1929, p. 253. 15 LCR no. 28, 23 June 1929, p. 255. 16 Tawfiq Abu al-Huda referred to a meeting between him and Sami, and said: ‘Sami came to see me and asked to see his son’s file to know why he was discharged from the Civil Service. I refused, and was hard on him in my reply.’ 17 LCR no. 31, 30 June 1929, pp. 299–300. 18 Ibid. 19 PRO. CO 831/6/1.9. From Hussein al-Tarawnah to British Prime Minister, August 1929. 20 League of Nations Mandate for Palestine. [48]


21 Najib Sadaqah, Qadiyat Filistin (The Palestinian Issue) (Jerusalem: np, 1946), p. 113. See also A. L. Tibawi, Jerusalem: Its Place in Islam and Arab History (Jerusalem: np, nd). 22 For more details on the incident, see the British White Paper, Cmd no. 3229. See also Bertram Thomas, The Arabs (London: Thornton Butterworth, 1937). 23 The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great Britain and Palestine 1915–1936 (London, 1937), p. 45. 24 PRO. CO 831/5/9. From Abdullah to Chancellor, 5 October 1929. 25 PRO. CO 831/5/9. From Chancellor to Abdullah, 16 October 1929. 26 PRO. CO 831/5/9. From Cox to Chancellor, 27 October 1929. 27 A copy of the appeal (in Arabic) is in the author’s private papers. 28 Ibid. And PRO. CO 831/8/5. Report on the administration of Trans-Jordan for 1929. 29 Ibid. 30 PRO. CO 831/5/9. From Cox to Chancellor, 27 October 1929. 31 Ibid. Also, PRO. CO 831/6/1. From High Commissioner to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 4 November 1929. 32 PRO. CO 831/6/10. From Chancellor to Lord Passfield, 7 December 1929; From Cox to Chancellor, 12 November 1929. 33 TJOG no. 243, 16 November 1929, pp. 2–4. From the Amir’s speech from the throne to the Legislative Council. 34 Al-Jamiah al-Arabiah newspaper, 13 November 1929. 35 PRO. CO 831/5/9 From Peake to Cox, 17 November 1929. Peake reported the names of those who attended the lunch as: Shams al-Din Sami, Najib Abu al-Shar, Ali al-Kurdi, Ali Saydu al-Kurdi, Ridha al-Hussein, Hamdi Manku, Said al-Isa, Said Ammun, Mustafa Haidar, Khalid al-Khatib, Abd al-Rahim Jardanah, Najib Qubaisi, Mohammad Hijazi, Salim al-Hindawi, Ayoub Fakhir, Mohammad al-Funaish, Abd al-Rahim Sukhn, Sulaiman al-Sudi, Hussein al-Tarawnah, Mohammad al-Khalid, Abd al-Qadir al-Tal, Othman al-Sharabati, Adil al-Azmah, Mohammad al-Rifai, Abu al-Khair al-Mufti, Abu Salah al-Shurbaji. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid. 39 PRO. CO 831/5/9. From Peake to Cox, 17 November 1929. 40 Ibid. 41 CF/4829/29, PRO. Confidential report from the High Commissioner for Palestine, to Lord Passfield, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 11 June 1931. 42 F. J. Peake, Papers of Colonel F. J. Peake, Imperial War Museum. DS/MISC/16, reel 1. From Peake to the Prime Minister, report on the Arab Legion, 13 January 1929. 43 Ibid.

[49]


3 Gratuitous Interference

In spite of the major changes in the political and constitutional structure of Trans-Jordan, in accordance with the 1928 Treaty, and the implementation of the Organic Law of the same year, very little change was effected in the relations between the British Resident and the Amir on the one hand, and between the British Resident and the Jordanian Government on the other. Colonel Cox, the British Resident, was an old-fashioned imperialist set on dominating and controlling Trans-Jordan. He persisted in interfering in all the affairs of the new state. Relying mainly on his complete financial control of the country, all the Palestinian Government officials seconded to the Jordanian Civil Service, and Major General Peake, the Commander of the Arab Legion, he let nothing escape his attention. He had direct access to the Prime Minister and to all the ministers and directors of departments who depended upon him for their jobs. The High Commissioner for Trans-Jordan, who needed Cox’s loyalty and advice, supported him. He knew that he could call upon the imperial Trans-Jordan Frontier Force, which was a quasi-mercenary multinational force stationed in the country. He could also rely on the RAF stationed in Amman, where No. 14 Bomber Squadron with its ‘Fairy Gordon’ general purpose aircraft and No. 2 Armoured Car Squadron with its four six-wheeler armoured cars, were ready to support him.1 Although employed and paid by the Trans-Jordan Government, General Peake acted more in the interests of his own country, the United Kingdom, than those of his employer. Peake did not limit himself to his jurisdiction and his duties in police matters; he extended his domain to political affairs and dabbled freely in local Jordanian politics. As far back as 1926, he was authorised by the British Resident to act for him in his absence; thus wearing two hats at the same time, that of British Resident, representative of the mandatory power, and that of the Commander of the Arab Legion, representing the mandated [51]


country’s police force. Peake’s interference went beyond the incredible. On 9 September 1926, he signed a confidential letter to his employer, the Amir Abdullah, in his capacity as ‘Acting Chief British Representative’, asking him to reshuffle his Government and implement a new major policy. The full text of the letter is important for the student of the history of Trans-Jordan, for it shows to what extent Cox and Peake exceeded their jurisdiction, and demonstrates the nature of their interference in the political life of the people of Trans-Jordan. Not only was such interference contrary to the League of Nations’ Mandate for Trans-Jordan, it also flouted the well known and disciplined code of British diplomacy for a commander of an army or security force to issue instructions to his Head of State to reshuffle his Cabinet. Peake’s letter, which was written by himself, reveals a swashbuckling, arrogant and indeed undiplomatic approach: Your Highness 1. I have the honour to inform Your Highness that I have received instructions that the following designations should be used:Aref El Aref to be Chief Secretary; Mr Kirkbride to be Financial Adviser; Mr Seton to be Judicial Adviser. 2. His Majesty’s Government is of the opinion that the Chief Minister of the Trans-Jordan Government should, in future, also be responsible for the Finance Department, and that Mr. Kirkbride should be his advisor, without a seat in the Executive Council. 3. The alteration in the Council, laid down in the former paragraph, will necessarily make a vacancy in the members, and to fill this vacancy I consider that Adib Eff Wahbah, Director of Education should be appointed. 4. I have the honour to request that Your Highness will agree that advisors have the right to attend the Executive Council meetings at any time, and that they may give advice, but have of course no vote. It should also be accepted that the Legal and Financial advisors must be informed by the Chief Minister of the hour and date of any Council meeting, at which questions affecting their Departments are to be discussed. In the event of an advisor requesting that any subject under discussion be referred to the Chief British Representative, for his opinion before being finally passed by the Council, this request would invariably be acceded to. [52]

G R AT U I TO U S I N T E R F E R E N C E

I should be grateful for Your Highness’s approval of the terms of this letter, and request that the necessary orders may be issued to the Chief Minister for putting it into effect. I have the honour to be, Your Highness’s sincere friend. F. G. Peake A/Chief British Representative.2

In recommending that Adib Wahbah be appointed Director of Education Peake must have been acting in British interests, which suggests that Wahbah was Cox and Peake’s protégé in the Cabinet. In his anniversary lecture at the Royal Central Asian Society of July 1939, a few months after his retirement from the British Army and the Arab Legion, Colonel F. G. Peake, CMG, CBE, retired, insulted the Arabs: The Arab, does not understand the meaning of the expression ‘free election’ quite as we [British] do. For one thing, no self-respecting Arab Government would ever dream of allowing a person professing political views at variance with its own to become a member of parliament. I well remember a defeated candidate complaining bitterly that he had given over £P400 to the voters and yet failed to get elected. I knew, but could not tell him, that he never would be elected until he brought his political views into line with those of the Government in power.3

Judging by his own interference in the Cabinet reshuffle shown in the letter quoted above, Peake had no moral right to accuse the Arabs of not understanding the meaning of ‘free election’. In his meetings with police district commanders, Peake investigated and collected information about the political situation in each district and reported, not to the Jordanian minister concerned, but to the British Resident, who in turn reported to the High Commissioner. Peake would not have dared to dabble in Trans-Jordanian politics without the blessing of Colonel Cox, the British Resident. For according to the British Army Officers List he was only a captain, while Cox was a full colonel, as well as being the British Resident and the representative of the High Commissioner for Palestine and Trans-Jordan. In fact Cox relied on Peake’s information as can be seen from his various reports to the High Commissioner. One such report listed those Trans-Jordanians [53]


‘interested in fomenting political trouble and who, at heart were antiEuropean’: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Tahir al-Juqqah (Has considerable influence) Shams al-Din Sami (Has considerable influence) Saydu al-Kurdi (Has considerable influence) Adil al-Azmah (Syrian affairs) Ismail Abdu (Anti-Government and ‘a man of bad Character’) Mohammad al-Rifai (Same as above) Abu al-Wafa Dajani (Palestine affairs) Ayoub Fakhir (Palestine affairs) Ali al-Kurdi (Palestine affairs) Said al-Aass (Syrian and Palestine affairs) Said Ammun (Syrian and Palestine affairs) Mohammad Hijazi (Communist leanings) Othman al-Sharabati (Syrian and Palestine affairs) Abu al-Khair al-Mufti (Palestine affairs) Abu Salah al-Shurbaji (Syrian and Palestine affairs)4

According to Peake’s instructions of 10 April 1928, the Mutasarrif of Ajlun Ahmad Ramzi placed a number of shaikhs and notables of the North under observation in accordance with the Crime Prevention Law of 7 September 1927, because of their opposition to the 1928 Treaty.5 The following is an example of the instructions issued by Mutasarrif Ahmad Ramzi to those placed under observation: Mustafa Wahbi al-Tell I have reasons to believe that on the occasion of the treaty which was concluded recently, you have taken a course which is dangerous to security and order in Trans-Jordan, and that you have made statements and taken action which disturb the peace of the people, and cause enmity between the people and the Government. In accordance with this written order, and in accordance with the authority vested in me by the Crime Prevention Law of 7 September 1927, I place you under observation by the police for the period of six months. You must conform with the following restrictions: You must reside within the boundaries of Amman. You must not depart from Amman except by a written permit from the District Commander. [54]


You must inform the District Commander of the house in which you reside. You must present yourself to the nearest police station whenever requested. You must remain indoors from one hour after dusk until dawn. 17 April 1928 Ahmad Ramzi Mutasarrif of Ajlun6

Most of the significant steps taken by Cox and Peake were outside their jurisdiction. The scope of their authority was set out in instructions issued by the British Government to the High Commissioner in accordance with the Mandate entrusted to Britain by the League of Nations. These included the following obligations: 1. That the interests of foreigners are adequately protected; 2. That the financial interests of His Britannic Majesty’s Government are safeguarded; 3. That a prudent use is made of the resources of the country; 4. That the administration of the country conforms generally to the traditions and principles of progressive and enlightened government.7

In accordance with the Treaty of 20 February 1928, The Amir Abdullah ibn al-Hussein of Trans-Jordan was recognised as the ruler of Trans-Jordan, and his Government was recognised as an independent government. What is more, it was abundantly clear both in the treaty and in the Organic Law that the powers of administration and legislation entrusted to the Mandatory were to be exercised by His Highness the Amir of Trans-Jordan. After the establishment of the Legislative Council, the only remaining condition which had to be maintained was the ‘placing of His Britannic Majesty in a position to fulfil his international obligations in respect of the country’. The High Commissioner for Trans-Jordan, in his capacity as the representative of His Britannic Majesty, was considered by the British Government as the principal officer for securing the fulfilment of all those obligations. The only real limitation which was embodied in the treaty provided for allowing the British Government to fulfil its international obligations to the League of Nations and to other members of the international community. Other indirect limitations were the acceptance of the Amir [55]


to be guided by Britain’s advice in foreign affairs, British financial obligations, such as the Grant-in-Aid and financial assistance to the Arab Legion, and the contribution of Trans-Jordan to the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force. The instructions issued by the British Government concerned the High Commissioner keeping himself informed of the legislative and financial situation in Trans-Jordan. With the primary objective of protecting the infant state of Trans-Jordan, Abdullah accepted the principle that cost of equipping the Arab Legion to achieve that aim was borne in the tax revenue of Trans-Jordan. This revenue was also made to cover one sixth of the cost of the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force. The British Government expressed the hope that: ‘As soon as the financial resources of the country permit, the territory is to bear the excess of the cost of the British forces stationed in Trans-Jordan over the cost of such forces if stationed in Great Britain so far as these forces are considered by His Majesty’s Government to be stationed in Trans-Jordan on behalf of the interest of Trans-Jordan.’8 Also, as soon as Trans-Jordan’s resources permitted, it would bear the whole cost of any forces deployed for Trans-Jordan alone. As if all these financial burdens were not enough to cripple the infant economy of Trans-Jordan, the High Commissioner was instructed by the British Government to make sure that the salaries and expenses of his representative in Trans-Jordan, the British Resident and his staff, were voted annually by the Legislative Council. Not only that but the High Commissioner was also instructed to see that: ‘the quarters for the accommodation of such officers is provided’. Added to all this was the fact that the administration was to conform to ‘the traditions and principles of progressive and enlightened government’. Of course there was nothing progressive or enlightened about Colonel Cox and General Peake and their continued interference in the government of Trans-Jordan. Other obligations upon the British Government were listed in the instructions to the High Commissioner as follows: 1. The duty of developing self-governing institutions and the safeguarding of the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants, irrespective of race and religion; 2. The duty of encouraging local autonomy; 3. The duty of securing freedom of conscience, free exercise of worship subject to the maintenance of public order and morals and preventing discrimination of any kind between the [56]


4. 5.

6.

7.

inhabitants of Trans-Jordan on the ground of race, religion or language; and the further duty of maintaining the territorial integrity of Trans-Jordan; The control of foreign relations of Trans-Jordan; The duty of safeguarding the interests of foreigners in judicial matters, and the prevention of discrimination against nationals of any state members of the League of Nations and of any state to which by agreement His Britannic Majesty has accorded rights that are the same as those of states members of the League of Nations; The duty of securing respect for the personal status of the various peoples and communities and for their religious interests including the administration of Awqaf in accordance with the religious law and dispositions of the founders; The duty of safeguarding international rights in Trans-Jordan, of adhering on behalf of Trans-Jordan to certain international conventions approved by the League of Nations and of securing the performance of international obligations by Trans-Jordan of which the following are included among those specifically mentioned: A. Freedom of transit across Trans-Jordan territory. B. Non-interference with the enterprise of religious or charitable bodies of all faiths, subject to the measures required for the maintenance of public order and good government. C. The enactment and execution of a Law of Antiquities. D. Co-operation in the execution of any common policy adopted by the League of Nations for preventing and combating disease, including diseases of plants and animals.

It is the duty of the High Commissioner, subject to the direction of HMG to secure the performance of all obligations set out above, which have been undertaken by HMG towards the governments and nationals of other states. Moreover it is the duty of HMG to make the Council of the League of Nations an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council as to the measures taken during the year to carry out the provisions of the Mandate and to communicate with the report copies of all laws and regulations promulgated or issued during the year. The High Commissioner then must cause such annual report to be prepared in such form and containing such information and material as the Council may from time to time properly require and must ensure that copies of all laws and subordinate legislation are furnished with the report.9 [57]


Further instructions to the High Commissioner included that he must make arrangements whereby all draft laws proposed for Trans-Jordan would be ‘scrutinised by him’ so that he could advise His Majesty’s Government if such laws came under the 1928 Treaty. It was also stated that he must submit draft laws to the Colonial Secretary long before they were submitted to the Legislative Council. Such draft laws included: 1. The annual budget law; 2. Any law affecting the currency of Trans-Jordan or relating to the issue of bank notes; 3. Any law imposing differential duties; 4. Liable law for foreign nationals; 5. Succession and a Council of Regency law; 6. Laws regarding the grant of land, money, or other gratuities to the Amir; 7. Any law under which the Amir may assume sovereignty over territory outside Trans-Jordan; 8. Any law concerning the jurisdiction of Civil Courts over foreigners; 9. Any law altering, amending, or adding to the details of the provisions of the Trans-Jordan Organic Law.10

Thus the Amir Abdullah, his Government, the Legislative Council, and the people of Trans-Jordan, had to endure the vast limitations prescribed by these instructions on the one hand, and the extremely heavy financial burdens placed on the revenue collected from the poor people of Trans-Jordan on the other. This, while attempting to develop the economy, build the various national institutions and improve the lot of the people. What is more, despite the considerable power afforded to them by the instructions to the High Commissioner, Cox and Peake exceeded their authority and jurisdiction as has been shown. The sacred trust of civilisation entrusted to Colonel Henry Cox by His Britannic Majesty was not to him as sacred as the League of Nations intended it to be. Towards the end of 1929, the party of the Executive Committee for the National Conference was established under a new name: The Executive Committee for the Jordanian Conference. Its executive council consisted of the following: 1. 2.

Shaikh Hussein al-Tarawnah, President Hashim Khair, Vice President [58]


3. 4. 5.

Tahir al-Juqqah, Secretary Salim al-Bakhit, Treasurer Ayoub Fakhir, Accountant

Among its members were: Subhi Abu Ghanimah, Sulaiman al-Sudi, Nimr al-Humud, Mustafa al-Muhaisin, Adil al-Azmah and Ali Saydu al-Kurdi. On 7 December 1929, the second general meeting of the National Conference was held in Amman with the cooperation of the party of the Executive Committee of the National Conference. Shaikh Hussein al-Tarawnah, the party leader, was elected Chairman of the Conference, which decided to adopt the following resolutions: 1. Loyalty to H. H. the Amir Abdullah ibn al-Hussein and his heirs after him. 2. The achievement of the noble aims for which the Arabs revolted under the leadership of al-Hussein ibn Ali. 3. The formation of a national government which gains the confidence of the people. 4. The reduction of high taxation imposed upon the Jordanian farmers. 5. To spread education. 6. To support members of the Council who defend the rights of the country in the Legislative Council. 7. To achieve the resolutions of the National Pact. 8. To amend bad laws and abolish extraordinary laws and to struggle to amend the Treaty. 9. To protest against the Balfour Declaration. 10. To support the Executive Committee of the National Conference. 11. To achieve a pardon from remaining taxes of previous years as a mercy for the farmers in Trans-Jordan.11

The conference resolutions were truly representative of the wishes of the Jordanian people during that political period, and Hussein al-Tarawnah and his party were gradually gaining ground and becoming important in the political life of Trans-Jordan. But, still at an infant stage of development, the country’s political groupings and parties did not have clear political visions, ideas, doctrines, or ideologies to command a large following. Alliances and political loyalties were mainly tribal and personal, and political behaviour was influenced by approval or otherwise of the conduct of individual ministers, heads of departments [59]


and other members of the Legislative Council. This was also true of elections, in which tribal affiliations agreed to dictated voting rather than individual or party political choice. The Third National Conference was held in Irbid on 25 May 1930 with the participation of the party of the Executive Committee of the National Conference and their leader Hussein al-Tarawnah. The Conference debated the issue of the constitution and criticised the Government for failing to maintain political and economic stability. The main resolutions of the conference were the following: 1. To establish a constitutional government accountable to the Legislative Council. 2. That the nation does not recognise the legality of the Legislative Council, which was formed by the Government. 3. To abolish extraordinary laws, such as the Expulsion and Exile Law, and the Collective Punishment Law. 4. To seek dismissal of non-Jordanian seconded employees. 5. To deal with the bad economic situation. 6. To adopt a financial policy which creates stability. 7. To seek taxation of foreign companies. 8. To prevent the enlargement of government institutions. 9. To demand the return of the hot springs in Hummah from Syria to Jordan. 10. To encourage Arab investment in Jordanian projects. 11. To make the Hijaz Railway an Islamic Waqf. 12. To seek the expansion of elementary education, including schools for Bedouin tribes. 13. To unite all Arab efforts to prevent the dangers of Zionism and colonialism, to achieve the national principles, and to struggle for the establishment of a central Arab union on the basis of agreement between the Arab governments and on the condition that each country should maintain its internal personality and its own form of government.12

Instead of joining the National Conference, and because of competition among the shaikhs and notables who jostled for political positions, Shaikh Refaifan al-Majali of Karak, also al-Tarawnah’s home town, formed a new political party: the Free Moderate Party (Hizb al-Hur al-Muatadil) on 24 June 1930. The founding members and the Central Committee of the party consisted of al-Majali, Hashim Khair, who defected from al-Tarawnah’s party, Said al-Mufti, Mohammad al-Unsi and Nazmi Abd al-Hadi.13 [60]


The Free Moderate Party declared the following principles and aims: The Principles: A. Eternal loyalty to His Highness the Amir and his descendants after him. B. Loyalty in the service of the country and the nation. C. The spreading of the principles of nationalism, social and health, and educating the people on civil democratic politics. The Aims: A. To endeavour to amend the Treaty. B. To achieve the country’s rights in legislation and administration. C. To implement constitutional government with collective responsibility. D. To achieve personal freedoms in agriculture, economics, education and benefits from the natural resources. E. To seek to achieve the party’s principles and aims through legitimate means.14

On the following day, 25 June, Said al-Mufti wrote to the Prime Minister informing him of his resignation from the new party: ‘I refer to the declaration which was presented to Your Excellency yesterday with my signature among the signatures of the members who formed the Free Moderate Party, and I submit to Your Excellency my withdrawal from that Party for personal reasons . . .’15 To fill the vacancy created by al-Mufti’s resignation, Mohammad al-Hussein of Salt was appointed to the Central Committee. However, the party did not last long enough to have any effect in Trans-Jordanian politics. It lost its support among the Circassians because of al-Mufti’s resignation; al-Unsi, Khair, and Abd al-Hadi had no tribal support; and Mohammad al-Hussein, who came from Salt, had little support in Amman or elsewhere in the country. The party faded out towards the end of the year, although its three members in the Legislative Council continued to oppose the government as one group, as can be seen from the debates which took place in November 1930.

[61]


The Administration Trans-Jordan was divided into five administrative districts, based mainly on tribal boundaries of Bedouin, semi-Bedouin, and Hadar affiliations, as well as some geographic considerations. Running from North to South the districts were as follows: Ajlun district: with its capital at Irbid, Ajlun was bounded in the north by the River Yarmouk, and on the south by Wadi al-Zarqa. It was divided into five sub-districts: Irbid, Deir Abu Said, Ajlun, Jarash and Samar. The population of the district was approximately 110,000, of whom 75 per cent were settled farmers and 25 per cent semi-Bedouins, including a small community of Circassians in Jarash. The main agricultural products were wheat, barley, lentils, peas, maize, and sesame. The forest areas of Jabal Ajlun and the high plateau produced grapes, olives, kharrub, figs, and bottom. There were many vegetable gardens around Jarash, Ajlun, Kufranjah and along the streams flowing to the Yarmouk and the Jordan Valley. There were the three semi-Bedouin tribes: Bani Hasan, Bani Khalid and Khraishah, and a branch of Bani Sakhr located east of the high plateau raised sheep, goats and horses. Balqa district: with its capital at Salt, Balqa district was bound in the north by Wadi al-Zarqa, and in the south by Wadi al-Mujib. It was divided into three sub-districts: Amman (rural), Salt, and Madaba. The population of the district was approximately 120,000 of whom 55 per cent were settled farmers, (including a few Circassian communities of approximately 10,000), and 45 per cent were Bedouins and semiBedouins. Most of the land of this district was cultivated producing the same variety as Ajlun. Salt was renowned for its grapes and figs. The vegetable gardens adjacent to the Zarqa river produced a wide variety of fruits and vegetables. The Bani Sakhr and the Adwan were famous for raising pure Arab horses, as well as sheep and camels. Karak district: with its capital at Karak, this was bound in the north by Wadi al-Mujib, and in the south by Taffilah. It included the sub-district of Taffilah. The population of the district was approximately 45,000 of whom 40 per cent were settled farmers living in houses, 30 per cent settled farmers living in tents, and 30 per cent Bedouins and semi-Bedouins. The district was famous for its production of [62]


wheat and barley, out of which the Turks, and later the British, drew considerable supplies during the war. Grapes, figs and olives were produced in Taffilah. Maan district: with its capital at Maan, the district was bound by but did not include Taffilah, Shawbak in the north, and in the south and south-west by the frontier with Hijaz and Najd, and Aqaba included. The population of this district was approximately 20,000 of whom 40 per cent were settled, living mainly in Maan, Aqaba, and villages around Wadi al-Musa, and 60 per cent were Bedouins of the Huwaitat tribe. The former produced wheat and barley on a limited scale, while the Huwaitat raised sheep, goats and camels. Badiyah district: The desert part of these four districts constituted the desert area, the western boundary of which is approximately the railway line. The permanent population of the desert area was approximately 10,000, but increased to approximately 25,000 during the spring and the early part of the Summer, because of the annual move by the tribes to fresh pastures for their livestock. Each district was administered and governed by a Mutasarrif who had no magisterial jurisdiction or powers, except over Bedouins in accordance with the Tribal Court Law of 1936. However, on a recommendation by the Mutasarrif, the Collective Punishment Law and the Crime Prevention Law were brought into operation when needed. The duties of the Mutasarrif included the collection of tax, recommendations for tax remission, the application of relief, the protection of life and property, and the maintenance of law and order. The Mutasarrif carried out his mission with the help of the representatives of the various departments within his district: health, post and telegraph, finance, justice, and agriculture. He was also supported by an Administrative Council chaired by him and composed of two of his officials, and four civil non-official selected members. During the thirties the classified and unclassified officials of the Government of Trans-Jordan excluding the British officials, but including the officers of the Arab Legion (not other ranks), were 683 during 1936, and 927 during 1939, classified as shown in Table 3.1.

[63]


TABLE 3.1

Classification of government officials 1936

1939

Arabs born in Trans-Jordan born outside Trans-Jordan

422 215

539 31316

Circassians born in Trans-Jordan born outside Trans-Jordan

43 1

68 1

1 1

1

European German Yugoslavian Greek Italian

3 1

The officials who were in direct contact with the people were mainly Arabs. Contrary to the situation in Syria and Palestine, where French and British civil staff, police and military personnel dealt directly with the people, no British officials or staff interfaced directly with the people of Trans-Jordan. The British staff in the Government of Jordan were listed in 1939 as follows: 1.

2.

3.

The Judicial Adviser attended all meetings of the Executive Council, drafted all laws and regulations, and supervised their translation into English; advised the Government in legal matters; advised the Minister of Justice; and was a member of the Senior Judicial Council which was concerned with the appointment and discipline of officials of the Judicial Department, as well as a member of the Diwan Khas, the Special Department, which decided questions regarding the interpretations of laws or regulations. The Financial Adviser attended all meetings of the Executive Council, prepared the annual estimates of the revenue and expenditure, advised the Government on matters of revenue collection and expenditure, ensured compliance with the Financial Regulations, and was in close touch with the Treasurer. The Officer Commanding the Arab Legion was in executive command of the Arab Legion and a member of the Tribal Court of Appeal. [64]


4. The Second in Command of the Arab Legion was in charge of the desert area where he had the powers of a Mutasarrif under the Tribal Court Law of 1936, and the powers in regard to nomads granted to the officer Commanding the Arab Legion under the Bedouin Control Law of 1936. 5. The Officer of the Arab Legion in charge of motor transport. 6. The Officer of the Arab Legion in charge of musketry. 7. The Officer of the Arab Legion who was Traffic Inspector and Registrar of Vehicles. 8. The Director of Lands was in charge of land registry, survey, land settlement and partition and state domains and forestry. 9. The Assistant Director of Lands. 10. The Director of Customs, Trade and Industry, who was also President of the Tender Board. 11. The Chief Curator of Antiquities, on whose advice the Director acted in all matters requiring expert technical knowledge. 12. The Chief Audit Examine audited the accounts of the Government, the municipalities and the Agricultural Bank. 13. The Chief Forest Ranger was responsible under the Director of Lands for the conservation of forests. 14. The Bacteriologist acted as Director of Health in the latter’s absence. 15. The Medical Officer was in charge of the desert mobile medical unit.17 In addition to the above-mentioned officers there were three British civil servants who were paid from the Grant-in-Aid made by the Colonial Development Fund: the Director of Development, an English driller, and a British Survey Officer.

Economic deprivation Meanwhile, during the thirties, the Trans-Jordan Government had been so constrained that it was forced to exclude estimates providing for the development of the health and education services from the budget in order to finance the increased strength of the Arab Legion and its equipment, and the maintenance of the Desert Patrol Force. This financial stringency dictated the postponement of other urgently needed [65]


works and services. The succession of disastrous droughts impoverished both the farmers and the Government, whose receipts from the tithe were drastically diminished. Because of the death of nearly one third of the animals in the country, the reduction in the animal tax alone was from £P39,973 in 1930/31 to £P24,807 in 1933/34. Thus the budget for the year 1935–6 was balanced only by the further expedients of deferring all promotions in the Arab Legion and the Civil Service; excluding provisions for necessary departmental works, such as the construction of the telegraph and telephone line between Karak and Taffilah and between Amman and Maan; and postponing the building of a suitable office for the maps and records of the Department of Lands. However, whereas remissions of taxation totalling £P19,000 were calculated for the year 1933, no more than £P6,000 could be predicted in the estimates for 1935/36. With the constant threat of the renewed tribal raiding in the desert, particularly between Jordanian and Najdian tribes, the delay in the reinforcement of the Arab Legion and its Desert Patrol Force, and in the completion of its wireless telegraphic equipment, was most frustrating and deplored. The most serious delay, however, was in the supply of social services for the very poor and in works of development in the backward and impoverished country. The Colonial Secretary in his dispatch of 16 August 1934, expressed: the hope that the Trans-Jordan Government would be in a position to provide more funds for Public Health Services. That the Government, anxious and willing though they are to see this hope realized, can yet accomplish little towards it, is particularly regrettable in view of the necessity which has been revealed, in a careful survey by the Tuberculosis Expert of the Palestine Government of health conditions among the nomadic and semi-nomadic population of Trans-Jordan, for the expenditure of substantial sums on relieving the grave malnutrition and disease which economic circumstances and neglect have induced.18

Every budget since the economic depression of 1929 was very stringent. Even in 1935 it was not possible to include more than the minimum expenditure required to maintain the existing insufficient and rudimentary services in the estimates. All of the British Residents, without exception, since the creation of the country in 1921 until the [66]


end of the thirties, were extremely stringent in their control of the budgets and extremely strict and energetic in the collection of taxes. The reductions they made to the Grant-in-Aid were without real justification. Successive prime ministers and ministers supported them in this, thus proving themselves faithless ‘sons of the country’, neglecting its development. The Bedouin and semi-Bedouin tribes of Trans-Jordan bore the brunt of this neglect. Table 3.2 illustrates the shrinkage during the years 1930 to 1935 in receipts from licences and taxes, of which the latter makes up the bulk of local revenue: TABLE 3.2

Receipts from licences and taxes, 1930–5 1930/31

1931/32

1932/33

1933/34

1934/35

133,381

111,384

117,159

101,612

113,000

Not only that, but during the same period, the British Grant-in-Aid was reduced from £P84,000 to £P60,000. The Trans-Jordan Government only contrived to preserve financial stability by utilising all surplus balances, with the assistance of an increased contribution (on account of their share) from the Palestine customs revenue. Mr J. Hall wrote in his draft for the Colonial Secretary in 1934: The financial straits of the Trans-Jordan Government are not due, however, solely to falling revenue. In relatively large measure, they are due to the assumption by that Government of the liability for a service created as a means to satisfy what may be regarded as largely an Imperial obligation. I allude to the Desert Patrol, which does not directly meet any pressing need of the Trans-Jordan taxpayer nor can reasonably be deemed essential to the interests of the majority of the population. The annual cost of the Desert Patrol during the last five years and the Imperial Grant-in-Aid of the same years were as follows:

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Year

1930/31 1931/32 1932/33 1933/34 1934/35

Ordinary (£P)

Extra (£P)

3,674 16,165 15,810 16,510 16,900

1,815 5,385 2,057 1,998 1,970

Building (£P) – 3,582 – 900 900

Total (£P)

Grant-in-Aid (£P)

5,489 25,132 17,867 19,408 19,770

84,000 84,700 72,000 65,000 60,000

In 1930/31 £P21,120 was spent on the anti-locust campaign in Trans-Jordan; and 1931/32 was the first year in which the Desert Patrol was maintained at full strength. Thus, not only has the cost of the Desert Patrol been met from the local resources of Trans-Jordan, without any additional assistance from Imperial funds, but the Imperial Grant-in-Aid has in fact been very considerably reduced since the Patrol came into being. The protection of Trans-Jordan from external aggression is an obligation of the Mandatory; and with a view to the discharge of this obligation, an attempt was made in 1930 to establish effective control in the Trans-Jordan desert by the use of the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force in cooperation with the Royal Air Force. It soon became apparent that these Imperial Forces were not suited to the type of frontier policing that was required, and the task was therefore entrusted to a special Desert Patrol for which the Trans-Jordan Government were called upon to pay [See Chapter 5]. Admittedly, the Desert Patrol is responsible for holding in check the Trans-Jordan tribesmen along the frontier; but even that duty is directed towards the avoidance of political issues, affecting the foreign relations of His Majesty’s Government, which might follow raiding by Trans-Jordan tribes into neighbouring territory; and the principal task of the Desert Patrol is to protect Trans-Jordan and its tribes from hostile aggression from beyond the frontier. In this connection I invite your attention to Lord Passfield’s Secret Trans-Jordan dispatch of the 29th April, 1930. The recurrent cost to the Trans-Jordan Government of the Desert Patrol is approximately £P20,000 per annum. The Air Officer Commanding Palestine and Trans-Jordan, reckons that the annually recurrent cost of the services performed by the Desert Patrol, if carried out by the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force in cooperation with the Royal Air Force, would be approximately £P32,000. It appears, therefore, that the Trans-Jordan Government, with diminished assistance from Imperial sources, are fulfilling an obligation of the [68]


Mandatory at less cost than the Mandatory would incur upon its direct performance. This, however, as I have shown, has not been without serious detriment to their own scanty resources; it has, in effect, entailed the diversion of available funds from projects or amelioration which an impoverished and neglected territory demands, and which alone can ultimately bring about the permanent replenishment of its resources. Conditions will improve if the agricultural situation is relieved by satisfactory rains; but the restoration of cultivators and flock-owners even to a substantial degree of prosperity will not be accomplished in the most favourable circumstances for three years at least. To supply this gap, it is in my opinion essential that the Imperial Grant-in-Aid should be increased to permit of the inception of essential works of development. I am convinced that, unless these works are undertaken, the progressive decrease and eventual cessation of the financial assistance afforded by His Majesty’s Government to Trans-Jordan must be indefinitely deferred. Other considerations apart, it seems to me that the doubt which I have suggested as to the equity of charging the cost of the Desert Patrol to Trans-Jordan funds may be advanced as a justification for increasing the grant. I, therefore, recommend most strongly that an additional sum of £P20,000 be voted by His Majesty’s Government towards meeting the cost of the Desert Patrol, so that the general revenues of the Trans-Jordan Government may be exclusively applied to expansion of social and agricultural services, public works and development, in the best interests of the Trans-Jordan taxpayer. I do not suggest that the cost of the Desert Patrol should remain a permanent liability of His Majesty’s Government. My proposal is that this commitment should rest upon His Majesty’s Government only so long as the present shrinkage of Trans-Jordan revenue continues, and that one half of any future increase of Trans-Jordan revenue should be devoted to meeting the cost of the Desert Patrol until the whole cost of the patrol is borne by the Trans-Jordan Government.19

The Amir himself could hardly make ends meet and was restricted to a standard of living lower than that of many of his subjects. This was because of his limited income, his perpetual generosity and his obligations towards those who accompanied him from the Hijaz in 1920 and became unemployed in Trans-Jordan. The Amir also had to continue paying subventions to the shaikhs of the Bedouin tribes as of old during Ottoman times. All these expenses had to be met by a very limited Civil List, the size of which was controlled by the British Resident. [69]


The Civil List During the early stages of development in Trans-Jordan the Grant-in-Aid was £150,000 for the year 1923–4 and the Amir’s Civil List was £36,000, which the Amir used during the first half of the year. In spite of this sum the Amir was in debt for the sum of £15,000. St. John Philby, British Resident in Trans-Jordan during 1922–3, used large sums of the Grant-in-Aid on entertaining the High Commissioner and his staff at Petra and elsewhere and on gifts to his friends in the desert, but as soon as he left the country, the whole system of financial control was overhauled by the new British Resident Henry Cox, who drastically reduced the Civil List provision to only £13,000, out of which £3,000 was allocated to pay off the Amir’s debts. This drastic situation continued until 1928–9 and was then re-examined in the budget estimates of 1929–30, when it was found that out of £13,000 (after the £3,000 had been paid in respect of debts, and after various allowances, including £1,000 to the Amir Talal, had been allocated), the Amir’s personal share amounted to only £1,440. However, since no further debts had to be paid off, the British Treasury considered that the Amir’s Civil List could be reduced to £10,000. Even Henry Cox, the mastermind of the reduction of the Civil List, strongly recommended that it should remain at £13,000. His recommendation was summarised in a letter from the Colonial Office to the Treasury as follows: It will also be seen . . . that in order to pay off his debts the Amir has had resort to the sale of certain of his properties, to borrowing, and to obtaining assistance from one of his wives. Clearly, therefore, it is not possible to make a reduction in the amount of the Civil List in 1929–30 approaching the amount which in recent years has been devoted to the redemption of the Amir’s debts. Further more, His Highness’s personal expenditure is bound to show some slight increase in the next few years. For instance, the appointment of a Legislature is certain to make it necessary for His Highness to do more entertaining; so also is the appointment of Consuls for Trans-Jordan or the extension to Trans-Jordan of the consular districts of present Consuls in Palestine. Moreover the education of the Amir’s sons will involve him in additional expenditure. In this connection I am to say that Mr. Amery is anxious that His Highness’s children should be given a good education and should, so far as possible, be imbued with British ideas. To this end the [70]


Amir Talal is being sent to the Royal Military College at Sandhurst at a cost approaching £1,000 per annum.20

The High Commissioner recommended that for the reasons given by the British Resident, the Amir’s Civil List for 1929–30 and for future years should be fixed at £12,000 per annum. The Treasury agreed, subject to revision in five years’ time. From 1930 onwards the British Resident pressed for the inclusion in the Civil List of an allowance to the Amir Talal. The idea was that provision of a specific allowance for the Amir Talal would help his father to meet some of his many liabilities and moreover would place Talal in a position of such financial independence that he would no longer be compelled to look exclusively to his father for support. Perhaps the most offensive and the meanest of Tawfiq Abu al-Huda’s actions as Secretary General of the Cabinet was his breach of promise in March 1932 to the Legislative Council to increase the allowance of the Amir Talal, the Crown Prince. Instead, he agreed with Kirkbride and Cox to allocate only £P410 a year to the Amir Talal, instead of the £P1,000 he had formerly promised. Tawfiq Abu al-Huda allocated £P624 to himself including an increase of £24, the largest pay increase in the budget. The British legal adviser was allocated £P1392, more than twice that of the allocation to the Crown Prince. The whole question was discussed at the Treasury but no improvement was made in the financial position of the Amir. Every pound paid to the Amir’s Civil List was subject to the approval of the British Government. Not only that, every detail of spending from the Civil List by the Amir was also subject to scrutiny and observation by the British Resident. At one point Henry Cox found that the Amir was so affected by these stringent controls that he could not meet his obligation, therefore he suggested that: His Highness should be relieved from repaying to the Government the fourth and final installment of £P250, which falls due in the coming financial year, of the advance made to him in connection with his land transaction at Zizia. At the time when this transaction came to light Lord Passfield was unable to find any justification for the proposal that this advance should be brought to account as a special grant to the Amir. Having regard, however, to the fact that His Highness has duly paid the first three installments, and in view of his actual financial difficulties and the present position regarding his estates . . . [71]


The High Commissioner reached the conclusion that it would be reasonable to grant the Amir the relief suggested. The details of the expenditure from the Amir’s Civil List in 1934/35, as controlled by the British Resident, are given in Table 3.3. TABLE 3.3

Civil List 1934/35 Allowances (£P) 1. His Highness the Amir 2. The Amir Nayif 3. Their Highnesses the Amirahs 4. The Amirah Haya 5. The Amirah Munirah 6. The Amirah Maqbulah 7. The Amirah Badr (HRH’s Sister) 8. Sharif Hashim 9. Mohammad al-Zubbati 10. Hire of cars 11. Miscellaneous 12. Servants and retinue 13. Food and forage 14. Fuel 15. Medicine, mineral waters etc. 16. Maintenance and running of cars 17. Stationery 18. Allowance to accountant 19. Postage, telegrams and telephones 20. Rail transport 21. Hotel expenses (guests) 22. Special provisions for feasts 23. Tentage 24. Teacher for young Amirahs

1,680 180 1,656 120 72 72 120 72 96 600 243 1,998 1,680 70 400 780 25 24 400 60 120 100 50 72

Total

10,680

Debts (£P) 1. Installment of Zizia land advance 2. Installment of additional advance 3. Accommodation in the Palace 4. Over expenditure 5. Abd al-Fattah Malha (cost of a Dodge car) 6. Miscellaneous debts Total

250 2,000 500 150 320 100 12,000

[72]


In the Arab society of the twenties and thirties, money contributed to political power, it enhanced prestige and buttressed influence. In the case of the Amir Abdullah, leading a tribal society, although he did not lack prestige and influence within Trans-Jordan, his political power was limited and controlled by his lack of money, and the small amount of money he had was controlled by a foreign power, not only in public affairs but also in his personal affairs. In one sense the Amir Abdullah’s prestige and influence was more than he or even his country could afford. However, in spite of all the financial controls placed upon him and his Government he managed to survive personally and achieved the survival of his people and country.

NOTES 1 ‘No. 14 Bomber Squadron’, RAF Flight magazine, 18 January 1934. The Article covers the historical accounts and reports of the Bomber and Armoured Car Squadrons stationed in Jordan 1922–34. 2 A copy of the letter is in the author’s private papers, originally from the Hashemite Documents, the Royal Palace, Amman. 3 Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, London, August 1939. 4 PRO. CO 831/5/9. Situation report by Peake to British Resident in Amman, 17 November 1929. Cox forwarded the same to the High Commissioner. 5 Those listed were ‘Ali Khulqi al Sharairi; Sulaiman al Soudi; Rashid al Khizaai; Abdal Qadir al Tell; Najib al Shraidah; Mustafa Wahbi al Tell; Mahmoud al Funaish; Salim al Hindawi; Mohammad al Abdullah; Naji al Azzam; Omar al Malkawi; Falih al Simrin’, Trans-Jordan Cabinet Papers (TJCP) no. 1/19/755, 10 April 1928 and no. 3/7/806, 15 April 1928. 6 TJCP no. 3/7/806, 17 April 1928. 7 PRO. CO 831/6/3. Draft instructions to High Commissioner of Trans-Jordan no. 95, 10 October 1929. 8 PRO. CO 831/6/3. Draft instructions to High Commissioner of Trans-Jordan no. 95, 10 October 1929. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Musa, Sulaiman, Amarat Sharq al-Urdon, Nashatuha wa Tattawuraha fi Ruba Qarn 1921–1946 (Trans-Jordan – Its Creation and Development in a Quarter of a Century) (1990), p. 234. 12 Ibid. 13 TJCP no. C.217, Approval by the Cabinet to form the Party, 24 June 1930. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid.

[73]


16 The 313 Arabs born outside Trans-Jordan included 130 Palestinians, 75 Lebanese, 60 Syrians, 17 Turks, 12 Hijazis, 11 Tripolitanians and 8 Egyptians. PRO. Colonial no. 166. Report on Palestine and Trans-Jordan, 1939, p. 313. 17 Ibid. 18 PRO. CO 831/28/2. From J. Hall to A. Parkinson (enclosing draft dispatch to the Colonial Secretary), 1 December 1934. Among my personal memories of this time, one stands out, I remember a school friend and neighbour, a Christian from the Zaumot family of about nine years of age, on his deathbed, suffering from bouts of shivering and feverishness caused by Malaria. No medical treatment was provided for him, in spite of the presence of the Italian Hospital only a hundred yards away from his house. 19 Ibid. 20 PRO. CO 831/28/2. From High Commissioner for Trans-Jordan to Colonial Office, 10 January 1935.

[74]

4 Tribal War in the Desert

The Bedouin character In spite of the lack of accurate statistics, which made it difficult to ascertain exactly the number of the inhabitants of Trans-Jordan, particularly the number of Bedouins, it was estimated that by 1930 the population of Trans-Jordan was about 300,000 inhabitants, of which 140,000 were Bedouins and semi-Bedouins. The vast majority of Bedouin and semiBedouin communities in Trans-Jordan depended on herds of animals, mainly sheep, goats, horses and camels, for the maintenance of their lives. That was why they were liable to extreme changes in their fortunes. Apart from the shortage of water and the rarity of pastures for grazing, which were to be expected in the desert, variable rainfall exposed their flocks to great losses in bad years, which could not be replaced in good years. Flocks were also liable to be looted by tribal raiding. Thus Bedouin life was at its best fairly unstable, and prospects unpredictable. The Jordanian Bedouins had a well known saying, which accurately described their lot: ‘One day for you and one day against you, only God is eternal.’ The Bedouins of the southern and eastern areas of Trans-Jordan retained their purely nomadic character, perpetually moving from one area to another and rearing sheep and camels as their main occupation in life. Because of the limitations imposed on their freedom of movement, the Bedouins of the western and northern areas had adopted new elements in their economy, and started to farm the quasi-fertile soil. Some of these tribes lost their nomadic character and became semi-Bedouins. Typical of the southern and eastern Bedouin tribes were the Huwaitat, whose economy, traditions and culture were free from the recent influences of the new state of Trans-Jordan. The Balqa Bedouins and semi-Bedouins, the Bani Sakhr, Adwan, Ajaramah, Hadid, Lawzi and the other Balqa tribes, while retaining their nomadic culture and traditions, [75]


were gradually becoming semi-Bedouins. The Bedouins of the north had already transformed their life from nomadic to semi-nomadic, whereas the Bani Hasan and Bani Khalid were true Bedouins. A Bedouin tribe was extremely mobile; within a few hours they could load all their earthly goods, including their shelter (tents), on their camels and travel for thirty or forty miles in one day to a new area where they could build their camp. Their home was the vast open desert, and they were free to inhabit any part of it which was not occupied by another tribe. This freedom of movement, and the repeated changes in their habitation, induced them to adopt an attitude free from attachment to a specific and permanent location or a delimited area. However the occupation of certain pastures during certain seasons of the year was regulated by habits, customs, and intertribal agreements. Living in the wide open desert, an Arab Bedouin moved his home to satisfy his immediate needs. More often than not, he would move his home from one plain to another, changing the scenery and environment amongst which he encamped to suit his comfort, security and pleasure. Apart from watching his animals graze here and there during the day, reciting or listening to poetry or stories of love and chivalry while sipping his tea or coffee during the night, he did as little else as possible. However, all that rough, free and beautiful life was always overshadowed by his constant awareness of the dangers of famine, thirst, hunger, and disease to himself, his family and his animals, and above all by the nagging fear of sudden raids by other tribes. In the year 1929, the Bedouins of Trans-Jordan were still living ‘in the age of chivalry’.1 Among the characteristics of a Bedouin the qualities of pride, honour, dignity, loyalty to family and tribe, and extreme susceptibility, guided his attitudes and behaviour. A Bedouin was extremely protective of his pride and the good name of his family and tribe. More than any other subject, Bedouin poetry and oral history were concerned with personal and tribal pride. Such pride compelled a hungry Bedouin, when offered food, to eat as little as possible so that his host would not notice his hunger. He would fight and kill or be killed if abusive language was directed at him or his own. Lieutenant General Sir John Bagot Glubb, Commander of the Arab Legion 1939–56, thought that a Bedouin had one of the most attractive human qualities, ‘a complete lack of self-consciousness’. He wrote: ‘The Bedouins of thirty or forty years ago were unaware of the existence of [76]

T R I B A L WA R I N T H E D E S E RT

class or race inequalities. As a result, they unconsciously treated all men as equals, without any mental embarrassment or reservations.’2 In spite of his poverty, the Jordanian Bedouin was known for his generosity to his guests. His hospitality was such that he would deprive himself and his family of food, for the honour and pride of being generous. It was a Muslim and Arab tradition to consider the guests of an Arab to be the guests of God, (al-Dhaif Dhaif Allah) and the host himself to be their servant. General Glubb thought the generosity of the Jordanian Bedouins was ‘fantastic’ and their hospitality was ‘proverbial’.3 A Bedouin was very individualistic in his attitudes, hopes and ambitions. In a fight against another tribe he would aim at personal distinction more than fighting in a team to enable his side to win. He tended to seek glory and to distinguish himself with deeds of courage and sacrifice rather than seeking riches in terms of material comfort. Honour in all its aspects and extreme jealousy for its achievement was a very sensitive issue to him, particularly regarding his mother, wife, sister, or any other woman of his tribe; their honour could be the cause for the longest blood feuds and tribal wars. Personal dignity to the Bedouin is as important as honour and pride. To snatch a Bedouin’s rifle, pull his headgear (Iqal and shmagh), moustache or beard, to humiliate him physically or verbally in public, would incite his resentment, indeed his hatred, to the point of committing murder. This was also true of injustice (al-Zulm), which was considered the ultimate humiliation when accepted, and the highest point of honour when rejected. An injustice committed against a Bedouin would often cause a tormenting grievance which would be held deep in his heart until satisfied by justice or blood. However, in spite of his distinct qualities of pride and dignity, a Bedouin had the social graces of humour, play and competition. His wit in jokes and innocent satire was unending. A Bedouin who could raise a laugh without vulgarity or offence to others was popular and respected. If loyalty and dedication to the safety and well-being of his family was to the Bedouin a natural and rational attitude, his loyalty to his tribe was more of an extreme necessity. Collective security, interdependence and mutual assistance between individuals, families and extended families of a tribe, were the only successful systems of survival in the harsh and unpredictable social, economic and political environments of the desert. A Bedouin had a natural and direct susceptibility to kindness and sympathy; he reacted strongly and uncompromisingly to good or bad. [77]


The lack of security and the fickleness of his life in the desert made him rely on comradeship (al-Rafaq), which he cherished immensely. If one could not trust a comrade or a companion in the desert one could trust no one. A good deed (al-Hasanah) was never forgotten by a Bedouin, and he would never hesitate to repay it in kind or more when it was needed. Glubb described the Jordanian Bedouin as: ‘often vain, touchy, fickle, childish and importunate. But he is also very alive to honour or shame, quick, intelligent, humorous and capable of great devotion and courage. He is usually loyal to his comrades, and anyone who can enter that category, will find many true friends.’4 The Jordanian Bedouins were very well armed. Every adult Bedouin had a weapon of some kind. A tribal warrior would carry a rifle, a pistol and a dagger. The shaikh or head of an extended family would add a sword to his arsenal. The rifles were mainly German or Turkish, abandoned or left over from the war. Small numbers of British rifles were carried by those who took part in the Great Arab Revolt. Those who could not afford these expensive weapons would carry an improvised dagger and lance. A young boy of twelve would be considered man enough to be armed. The Trans-Jordanian tribes were highly skilled in the use of all manner of weapons, and the greater part of a young boy’s education was devoted to making him a skilled warrior.

It was mainly when tribal camps were established in close proximity to each other, because of the location of pastures and water, that intertribal raiding became the normal state of relations between them. Particularly in bad years, a hungry tribe had to raid another to survive. The main aim of a Bedouin tribal raid (al-Ghazu) was not to kill or maim members of the raided tribe, but to secure the booty or loot of animals and movable property. It was therefore unnecessary for the defenders to fight a defensive battle to the last man against superior attackers. In any case a surprise attack, which was very rare in the desert, would stampede and disperse the animals, and allow the defenders to save many of them in a rapid retreat. Thus the mobility of attackers and defenders would tend to minimise high casualties as well as loss or gain of animals. Other aims of Bedouin tribal raiding included the achievement of a reputation of prowess, chivalry and glory in battles. These qualities would deter raiders, as well as spread fear amongst the [78]


raided and force them to retreat without having to inflict high casualties upon them. It was well known in the history of Bedouin raiding that high casualties were the main cause for prolonged blood feuds. Raiding was governed by a code of tribal conduct; women and children were protected; the wounded were cared for and treated; prisoners were humanely respected and their honour and dignity were safeguarded; not all the animals were looted, some were left to the tribe to survive; and no attacks would be carried out at night because of the risk of killing women and children. Any contravention of these principles of Bedouin chivalry would tarnish the reputation of the offending tribe, not only in the hearts and minds of its victims, but among all the Arab Bedouin and semi-Bedouin tribes. Before 1928, there was no tendency to regard with more concern than was necessary the various tribal raids which occurred from time to time on the frontiers of Trans-Jordan, Syria, Hijaz and Najd and Iraq, and it was looked upon as little more than a local effusion of high spirits. According to an article by a correspondent of the London Times in Arabia on 27 April 1932: Raiding has been the national pastime of the Arab from time immemorial, and now that he has effectually removed all game from his deserts by indiscriminate use of the rifle, and can no longer hunt with falcon and Saluki, it is his one and only recreation. But because the Maaza tribe, who owe allegiance to King Ibn Saud, make a raid upon the Beni Sakhr, who belong to Trans-Jordan, this does not by any means indicate that the Wahhabi government is about to attack the Emir Abdullah, or that a general advance of a fanatical and proselytising army is about to take place. It probably means, though this does not transpire till later, – for the Arab is naturally secretive about his own misdeeds, – that the Bani Sakhr have previously attacked a party of the Maaza and carried off some of their camels, and the raid that is reported in our newspapers as being a serious invasion calling for the employment of troops is nothing more than the return match being played off, with honours to the visitors. The Wahhabis, of whom one hears so much nowadays, are a puritan sect of the Muslim religion which originated in the Hijaz more than a century ago. Their faith, which is based upon rigid adherence to the laws laid down in the Qurran, demands total abstinence from the use of alcohol and tobacco, and that in every [79]


respect they live up to the high standard set by Mohmmad [the Prophet Mohammad]. The north Arab, generally speaking, observes his religion faithfully and is a God-fearing man, but being also an individual to whom personal freedom is everything he likes a little latitude. He has not much use for alcohol, his natural taste being for very sweet tea or bitter coffee, but he dearly loves tobacco, and practically every tribesman is a devoted adherent of the long Arab Pipe and, more recently, the cigarette. For this reason the Wahhabi faith is none too popular with the Arabs outside the fold and, though a certain amount of forcible proselytising was done during Ibn Saud’s advance northwards in 1924, there is little prospect of the faith spreading by natural conversion, or of its leading to a Holy War. BLOOD–FEUDS

To live at war with one’s neighbours is a natural state of affairs in Arabia. Every tribe in the Peninsula has its blood feud with at least one other tribe and sometimes with several. The situation changes from time to time, and two tribes who have been sworn enemies for decades may ally themselves to each other to attack a third, but once this difference of opinion has been settled it will not be long before the old feud breaks out again through some aggrieved person with a long memory attacking one of his erstwhile enemies to wipe-out an old Insult. It is a mistake to become too much concerned about these raids or to regard them as anything else than a sport in which the Arab engages because he has nothing to amuse him. If he could be persuaded to take up Association football and have a tribal league table it is possible that raiding would wane in popularity, but so far there is no sign of that happening. The Arab has evaded the march of civilization more effectively than any other nation in the world and his mode of life and view of matters generally are precisely the same today as those he held 800 years ago, so that it is impossible to regard him from a present-day standpoint. SURPRISE ATTACK

The Arab raid of which one reads so much, is rather more spectacular than dangerous, as normally there is no real desire to kill on those expeditions. The idea seems to be to have a thoroughly good time with a rifle battle at a thousand yards range, or a little hand-to-hand fighting with the sword, followed by the victorious party driving off as many of the camels of the vanquished as can be collected before reinforcements arrive. Occasionally two or three men may be killed but normally the raider avoids too heavy a casualty list, partly because in killing one’s enemy one is exposed to undue risk of injury to oneself and partly because if the number of slain is too numerous the [80]


Government may feel called upon to make reprisals with armoured cars and aeroplanes, and this is not in the best interests of the sport. Raids are usually carried out on horseback, and the popular system is for the raiding party to ride camels and lead their horses to the scene of action. When the tents of the tribe to be raided are located the attackers get off the camels and mount horses, and after a ragged volley from their rifles charge through the tents with the sword. Surprise is a very necessary element in all raids, as an attack on a neighbouring tribe who were fully prepared would mean a casualty list for the attackers. Also a whole tribe never by any chance camps in one place, but is split up into families, so that it is usually easy for the raiding party to select an encampment which is considerably inferior to them in numbers. Generally speaking the odds are very much in favour of the aggressors, and the enemy, after the raided tribe, realizing this, normally does not attempt a very stout resistance, though when following up an enemy attack, a heavy fire is kept up at long range which might result in casualties if the rifles were in better condition. Although there is no desire for an indiscriminate killing on those occasions, there is the old Arab law of a life for a life to be taken into consideration, and if a raiding party has recently lost a man in a previous battle, it is certain that they will retaliate and see that one at least of their enemies passes out. This sort of thing is apt to increase as the feud goes on, and when the warring tribes have a matter of 10 lives on their debit and credit accounts raiding becomes a serious matter.5

Table 4.1 shows the locations of the encampments of the Jordanian tribes during the winter of 1928–9. There had been no intertribal boundaries between the various major tribes in the Arabian desert during the Ottoman period. The powerful tribes such as the Mutair, Autaibah, Shammar, Inazah, and the Ruallah, Arab al-Jabal, Huwaitat and Bani Sakhr, roamed the desert free, raiding one another, or trading with each other, far from the effective jurisdiction of Ottoman rule. The interprovincial boundaries of Syria, Iraq, Hijaz and Yemen meant nothing to the Bedouin tribes, and did not separate them from one another. After the First World War new states of Hijaz were created, they became Palestine under the British Mandate in 1920; Syria under the French Mandate in the same year; the Hashemite kingdom of Trans-Jordan of Amir Abdullah ibn al-Hussein under the British Mandate in 1921; Iraq of the Hashemite King Faisal ibn al-Hussein under the British Mandate also in 1921; and Hijaz-Najd [81]


of King Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud in 1926. The establishment of new international boundaries for these states inflicted a sudden change upon the Arab Bedouin tribes, from full freedom without limitation on their movement to the restrictions of international frontiers beyond which they were not allowed to move without the permission of their own government, as well as the government to whose land they wished to travel. Thus the background of intertribal customary law, with which they conducted their relations or settled their disputes, was superseded by the laws of their various states. They could no longer ignore their government as they did when their capital was in Istanbul, for their new governments controlled their lives from capitals closer to their locations in Riyadh, Baghdad, Damascus, Amman and Jerusalem. The vague and precarious interprovincial law of the Ottoman Empire was superseded by international law, implemented by strict mandatory powers and jealous national governments. TABLE 4.1

Tribal encampments, 1928–9 Tribe

Location

Bani Sakhr Fayiz Ghubain Hugaish Zabin Khraishah Kaabnah

al-Jizah and al-Tunaib al-Jizah and Shameh, east of Qrayat Shameh Shameh and Jallul Shameh, Ajlun, Wadi al-Bottom, Muwaqqar al-Azraq

Huwaitat Tawaihah Nawasrah Ftinah Jazi

Muhaidir, south east of Qrayat and Muwaqqar Bayir Bayir Makhruq, Bayir, and Jauf

Bani Khalid Sirhan Isa

South east of Qrayat South east of Qrayat North of Um al-Jamal

Ruallah Ibn Moajil Bani Attiyah Saidiyin Taqatqah Zuwaidi

East of al-Harrah, along the Baghdad road Wadi Araba and Ghor al-Mazraah Wadi Araba Betra wells Jabal Rum6 [82]


The British officials in Jerusalem and Amman thought that interfrontier tribal raiding could be ended by negotiations and agreements between the governments concerned. In the conference between officials of the governments of Syria and Trans-Jordan held at Irbid from 7 to 10 November 1928, during which the Amir Shakir ibn Zaid played an important part, it was agreed to settle all claims and cases dated up to 9 November 1928 between the following tribes, as the Acting High Commissioner H. Luke reported: On the one part Trans-Jordan Tribes viz: al Huwaitat, Bani Sakhr, al Issa, al Sirhan and Bani Khalid; On the other part Syrian Tribes viz: (a) al Ruallah, al Rutoob, al Akeedat, Abu Seif and al Seloot and (b) Druze tribes viz: al Hassan, al Sharafat, al Masaeed, al Admat and al Sardiya; exception being made in the following cases, the examination of which has been postponed: 1. al Ruallah versus Bani Sakhr on the 1st of February 1928 at Gharaissa in Nejdian territory. 2. al Ruallah versus al Huwaitat and Bani Sakhr on the 26th of May 1928 at al Manasi N. E. of Azrak. 3. All cases appertaining to Farhan bin Moajjal of the Ashajaa and his tribe and Ibn Jandal of Swalmeh and his tribe both of which have taken in Nejd.7

Article 3 of the agreement provided that: ‘all claims amongst the above mentioned tribes have been settled on the basis of “dig and bury” [Hafr wa Dafn] according to tribal rules and usages’. Thus it was thought that there would be a clean slate of good relations between these tribes of the Northern desert. Following his success with the Northern Jordanian tribes, the Amir Shakir ibn Zaid turned his attention to the Southern desert tribes. He was commanded by the Amir Abdullah to investigate the claims made by the Hijazi-Najdian Foreign Minister of raiding by Jordanian tribes against Hijazi-Najdian tribes. Accompanied by A. S. Kirkbride, he carried out a tour of the Southern Jordanian desert east of the Hijaz Railway line between 15 and 23 December 1928. The Southern tribes were clearly delighted with the first visit of its kind by the Amir Shakir, for they had been left to fend for themselves by the Jordanian Government, which neglected the desert and all the tribes which lived there. With the nearest official who could offer them advice or assistance some three or four [83]


days’ ride away in Maan (and who did not make an effort to visit them), the visit by a Hashemite Amir was a major change and a morale booster. The Amir Shakir soon found out that on the other side of the frontier the Zgurt, the Hijazi-Najdian police force, visited their tribes frequently, and sometimes crossed the frontier into Jordan to collect the religious tax al-Zakah from the Jordanian tribes and to deal with some administrative matters. The collection of Zakah could have been regarded as evidence of jurisdiction or even sovereignty, and was treated by the Amir Shakir as a serious matter. He also found that the Jordanian tribes who encamped close to the frontier with Hijaz-Najd were extremely apprehensive and aware of the threats of massive raids by the Hijazi-Najdian tribes. The extent of their anxiety was obvious from the fact that the warriers of Shararat located at Jabal Haussa did not sleep in their tents, but on the hilltops surrounding the camp to defend their tents against Hijazi-Najdian raids. However this anxiety did not deter the Huwaitat and certain sections from Bani Sakhr who were preparing, even during the Amir Shakir’s visit, to carry out a raid against some tribes in Hijaz-Najd. The Jordanian tribes concerned were sections of the Atun, Zabin, Moor, Hugaish and Jazi, who had recently suffered severely from unprovoked raids by Hijazi-Najdian tribes.8 Collective tribal security in the Southern Jordanian desert became the order of the day even between the Bani Sakhr and the Huwaitat, who had a vibrant blood feud between them. A small spark of Jordanian tribal nationalism was kindled as the threat of a larger opponent from across the international border engendered a new feeling of ‘Us and Them’. Thus the new international boundaries became a very important factor in forging national identity on both sides of the frontier. On his return to Amman from the desert, Kirkbride reported to the British Resident. The schedule which was attached to his report on the Amir Shakir’s visit stated that, of the raids complained of by the Hijazi-Najdian Foreign Minister, it was found that: (a) In three cases the alleged perpetrators are unknown in TransJordan. (b) In four cases raiders are not Trans-Jordan tribes neither do they come under control of the Trans-Jordan Government. (c) In four cases the complaint concerns a theft and not a raid. (d) In 13 cases it is denied that the raid complained of has taken place. [84]


(e) In seven cases the raids complained of have in fact been carried out, the claims however being exaggerated. (f ) In one case the information given is so vague as to make identification and inquiry impossible. (g) In two cases raids complained of have occurred but the looters have returned empty-handed. (h) In twenty-one cases where raids have been carried out the loot has been restored.9

The Amir Shakir continued with his investigations and was informed of the following unreported raids: (a) Salim Ibn Nayif of the Hugaish raided some five or six camels from the Ruallah early in November 1928. (b) Harb Ibn Jaddu of the Zabin raided some fifteen camels from the Ruallah a few days after the Raid by the Hugaish. (c) It was reported that Sinian al Attnah of the Auttun had taken twenty camels about a month ago from the Shararat but, owing to pressure by the Bani Sakhr, subsequently returned them to Ibn Dhbaian of al Shararat. (d) The Hajaya raided the Ruallah late in October 1928 taking fifteen camels. (e) Daghish Abu Tayih raided twenty camels from al Shararat about the end of November 1928.10

Thus the loot outstanding, or not restored, by Jordanian tribes, amounted to 123 camels, 200 Ottoman pounds, 1,000 sheep and the compensation due for 6 men killed. But against this claim, the following claims were made against Hijazi-Najdian tribes on account of raids carried out by them: 13 February 1928: Ruallah on the Zabin at Gharassia 4162 camels, 8590 sheep, 162 persons killed, 4 girls raped, tents, arms and clothing stolen. 5% only of the animals returned. 4 October 1928: At Bayir. The Shararat raided 100 camels from the Huweitat of Mohammad Abu Tayih. 27 October 1928: The Shararat raided 80 camels from the Howeitat from Jafr. 30 October 1928: The Shararat under Bashir Ibn Dobeiaan and Mohammad walad Zabi raided the Tawaiha near Bayir taking 500 camels and killing Mutlaq al Awar.11 [85]


The Amir Shakir had presided over the Bedouin Court and was extremely able in solving the most complicated and highly sensitive of Bedouin disputes and in settling the most tragic blood feuds. He had a quick and sharp appreciation of the salient points in complex and difficult cases. His freedom from bias and nepotism and the soundness of his judgements earned him respect and admiration as a man of justice. In some disputes between tribes from the Sinai Desert and others from Trans-Jordan and Hijaz-Najd, the Amir Shakir decided for the Sinai tribes in his summing-up and findings. The Trans-Jordanian tribes accepted his judgement, though against themselves, not only because they knew they were the offending tribe, but also because they respected the Amir Shakir so highly. As a Hashemite and as an Arab nationalist, the Amir Shakir considered himself to be for all Arab tribes. While the Amir Abdullah took action against the offending Jordanian tribes and approved the imposition of fines against the Huwaitat and Bani Sakhr, King Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud did little or nothing to deal with his offending tribes. In response to a complaint made by the Government of Trans-Jordan of a raid committed by one of his tribes, King ibn Saud replied that he had received no confirmation of that raid and that if it had occurred, the Trans-Jordanian tribes who had committed recent numerous raids on Najd must bear responsibility. Thus the case of the attack on the Zabin of February 1928, which was the main cause for Jordanian raids, was shelved by Shaikh Foad al-Khatib for several months without action.12 Further evidence against Hijaz-Najd was found in the ‘treacherous murder’ of Shaikh Inad ibn Jumaian, committed by the country’s Zgurt police force. That heinous crime roused the greatest indignation amongst the Jordanian section of Bani Attiyah and all the Southern Jordanian tribes. The Amir was informed of the details of that murder on 19 December 1928, while visiting the south. Apparently Shaikh Inad was induced to cross the Trans-Jordanian boundary to join Shaikh Salim Abu Dmaik of the Hijazi-Najdian section of Bani Attiyah. Shaikh Inad was assured of his safety on the basis of a formal safeguard from the officer commanding the detachment of the Zgurt near Shaikh Salim’s camp. He was also assured that he would be under Shaikh Salim’s protection during his visit. Shaikh Inad relied on the custom and tradition of the Arabs and Bedouins of respecting the honour and safety of their guests. However, on Shaikh Inad’s arrival, both he and Shaikh Salim [86]


were asked by the Zgurt to accompany them to Shaikh Mohammad Abu Tayih’s camp of the Huwaitat which was located further east into Hijaz-Najd. There was no honour or chivalry in the behaviour of the Zgurt commander, for as soon as the whole party were a few miles clear of Shaikh Salim’s camp, both Shaikh Salim and Shaikh Inad were disarmed, and Inad’s arms and shoulders were bound by rope. Instead of proceeding to the Huwaitat camp the detachment then turned towards the direction of Tabuk deep in Hijaz-Najd. When the change of direction was observed by one of Inad’s men who became suspicious of the Zgurt’s intentions, he raised the alarm and appealed to Shaikh Salim’s section of the tribe to save Shaikh Inad. It was not known whether Shaikh Salim was in collusion with the Zgurt commander or not, but his men refused to respond to the appeal of rescue, and only eight followers of Shaikh Inad chased the Zgurt to rescue their leader. As soon as the Zgurt became aware of the rescue party, they shot Shaikh Inad in cold blood while being bound and unable to defend himself. In the fight which followed two Zgurt were killed, and Inad’s body was recovered. The Zgurt committed one of the most heinous crimes against Bedouin customs and traditions and against the Bedouin code of conduct in raids.13 Ever since the conclusion of the Haddah Agreement in November 1925, when part of the Wadi al-Sirhan became part of the kingdom of Hijaz-Najd, the officials of the kingdom collected the al-Zakah religious tax from all the Jordanian tribes who encamped in the Wadi al-Sirhan for grazing during the winter. The Jordanian Government, as well as the High Commissioner for Trans-Jordan, protested against that illegal collection, on the basis that it imposed double taxation on the Jordanian tribes on one hand, and that the power to levy Zakah was associated with the power of sovereignty and jurisdiction in the hearts and minds of the Bedouins. The Amir Abdullah protested on the basis that the rights of the Jordanian tribes to encamp in Wadi al-Sirhan for watering and grazing were specifically provided for in Article 4 of the Haddah Agreement, which created the following obligations on the Hijazi-Najdian Government: to maintain all established rights that may be enjoyed in Wadi al Sirhan by tribes not under their jurisdiction, whether such rights appertain to grazing, or to habitation, or to ownership, or the like; it being understood that those tribes, so long as they reside within [87]


Najd territory, will be subject to such internal laws as do not infringe those rights.14

Sir Gilbert Clayton who conducted the negotiations for the Haddah Agreement and George Antonius, who was the interpreter between him and King ibn Saud, confirmed that ibn Saud had said during the negotiations that: ‘the matter of al Zakah could be regulated by conditions and agreements and the rights of tribes would be recognised’.15 The Amir Shakir and Kirkbride were not as optimistic as the British officials in Amman and Jerusalem, and the French officials in Syria, that the steps taken by the governments of the region would end raiding between their respective tribes. The Amir Shakir was an expert in Tribal Customary Law and knew all the Bedouin shaikhs and their tribes well enough not be deceived by a few periods of calm and quiet in the desert. He thought, and Kirkbride agreed, that such optimism showed ignorance of Bedouin customs and traditions and of the mentality of tribesmen roaming the desert free from strict control. Two raids proved them to be correct. During December 1928 Shaikh Fahad ibn Trad al-Zabin led a raid of the Jumaian, a subsection of the Zabin, and a section of Bani Sakhr, into Hijaz-Najd; and in the period following the Irbid Agreement of 10 November 1928, five separate raids by Syrian tribes into Trans-Jordan were carried out. Fahad ibn Trad al-Zabin, who disobeyed the Amir’s orders, and ignored the Amir Shakir’s warning to stop raiding, was fined by the Tribal Court. The Arab Legion, effectively reduced to a police force, was unable to collect the fine because it did not have enough men to force Fahad to pay or to arrest him and bring him to Amman. Therefore the British Officer Commanding Palestine and Trans-Jordan was asked to take action to collect the fine. On 28 December 1938, under the command of Group Captain P. H. L. Playfield, MC, from RAF Amman, a force assembled at the RAF base in Amman for the operation to collect the sum due. It was composed of two Sections of No. 2 Armoured Car Company commanded by Squadron Leader L. F. Forbes (four armoured cars), and a detachment from the TJFF consisting of two British officers, two local officers and 78 men of other ranks under Major Y. R. D. Wigan (transported in eight RAF Morris six-wheel tenders). Accompanied by the Amir Shakir, A. S. Kirkbride and the aide-decamp (ADC) to the Amir Abdullah, the force advanced from Amman [88]


on 29 December, but halfway to Fahad’s camp two tenders broke down and the operation was postponed for a day. On the 30 December, the force moved to a point within 15 miles of Fahad’s camp, only to find that Fahad had left during the previous day with a number of camels, which it was said ‘he intended to sell in Hijaz-Najd’. On 31 December the force reached a point where Fahad’s camp was expected, only to find it was no longer there. Thus aircrafts from the RAF station in Amman were called to help find the invisible camp, and the ADC went to interrogate some Bedouins to find where Fahad had moved to. At noon Fahad’s camp was located and the column was deployed in full view of his tents. The Zabin of Bani Sakhr, who never saw or even heard of such a formidable military threat before, were immediately subdued. But Fahad was not there and it was decided to arrest his son Mansur and take him in his father’s stead to Amman until his father surrendered and reported to the Amir.16 The armoured cars drove the Zabin camels from their grazing area back to the camp in order to collect part of the herd and take it to Amman as a fine. At that point of the action, the women started to wail, cry and appeal for mercy, the men became angry and protested against the unjust action which was being inflicted upon their tribe. They protested that taking their few remaining camels, after the Jordanian Government’s failure to secure the restitution of their herds which were raided and looted by the Hijazi-Najdian tribes, was grossly unfair. The principled and charitable Amir Shakir became emotional and was overwhelmed by the entreaties of the women and the protests of the men. At a critical stage, Kirkbride found it difficult to convince the Amir Shakir to continue with the operation. Kirkbride himself thought that, while the punitive action was necessary, he ‘could not but feel that the tribesmen were not entirely to blame for their disobedience of His Highness’s orders’.17 In the end the Amir adhered to Arab and Bedouin customs and tradition, and, as a compromise, left enough camels to carry the Zabin tents, and those camels with young, as well as a letter to Fahad pointing out that ‘he had been warned against raiding, time and again, and had only himself to blame for what had happened’. In the Northern desert along the frontier with Syria, five separate raids were carried out by Syrian tribes against Jordanian tribes as the High Commissioner reported:

[89]


1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

On or about the 4 December, 1928, a party of Ahl al Jabal tribesmen from Syria attacked a section of the Bani Khalid tribes of Trans-Jordan at Wadi al Rajil near Azraq, and carried off a number of camels. On or about the 15 December, a party of Ahl al Jabal tribesmen from Syria led by Muflih al Anaizan, attacked sections of the Khurshan, Jubur and Sirhan tribes near Azraq and carried off 70 camels. On or about the 2 February, a party of Ahl al Jabal tribesmen from Syria, led by Ibn Sufian looted 89 camels from the Khurshan section of Bani Sakhr at Mshash. On or about the 16 February, a party of Ahl al Jabal tribesmen from Syria, looted 200 sheep and 10 camels from the Hugaish tribe of Bani Sakhr near Qasr Kharranah. On or about the 8 March, a party of Ahl al Jabal tribesmen from Syria raided sections of the Bani Sakhr tribes between Muwaqqar and Azraq, killing two Shaikhs, namely Shaikh Awad Ibn Madi, chief of al Isa section, and Shaikh Hussein al Hasan, chief of the village of Sahab. The raiders also wounded two tribesmen and looted a considerable quantity of camels.18

During the last raid, Shaikh Hadithah al-Khraishah, the shaikh of the Khurshan tribe of Bani Sakhr, his son Ali and a party of Bani Sakhr warriors, carried out a counter-attack against the raiders and pushed them back as far as Wadi al-Bottum, near Qasr Ammrah, the Ummayad desert castle. They recovered a large number of the looted animals and wounded a few of the attackers. Ibn Muhailan, who led the raid, was nearly killed by Ali al-Khraishah, who got him in his sights and was about to pull the trigger, when his father Shaikh Hadithah stopped him and explained that he did not want to have a blood feud against Ahl al-Jabal, and that killing a shaikh, even in battle, was not a matter of pride for the killer.19 Shaikh Hadithah was renowned for his chivalry, courage and generosity among the majority of Jordanian Bedouin and settled tribes. On the Jordanian side two raids into Syria were carried out after the conclusion of the Irbid Agreement of November 1928. In the High Commissioner’s words again: 1.

A few days after the Irbid Conference, an attack by the Zabin section of Bani Sakhr on sections of the Ruwallah tribes, about 20 [90]


2.

kilometres to the east of Rhuba, resulting in the looting of 62 camels. On 20 December 1928, a raid by Druze rebels from Nabk, led by Shaikh Shakib Abd al Wahhab, and accompanied by certain Trans-Jordan tribesmen, on sections of the Masaid tribes of Syria, resulted in the looting of 3,000 sheep and goats, 6 donkeys and one rifle.20

As a direct result of these raids, tension, indeed belligerence, prevailed amongst the tribes on both sides of the Jordanian and Syrian frontiers. On 13 March 1929, some sections of the Ahl al-Jabal tribes – the Masaid raiders were located at Qahati in Jordanian territory. A detachment of the TJFF near the area was ordered to recover some animals which had been taken as loot a few days earlier by the same raiders. On being approached by the detachment the raiders opened fire on them and started to move away at speed across the plain. Aircrafts were summoned from RAF Amman and in the action that followed, 11 bombs were dropped. Twenty raiders were killed, and more than thirty wounded, including four women. On 29 March 1929, a very serious incident took place at Um al-Jamal, within Jordanian territory, and very close to the Syrian border. General Peake, Commander of the Arab Legion, neglected to take an escort to protect himself when he went to meet a French officer whose detachment was occupying Um al-Jamal to deter Bedouin raids from Jordan. A raiding party from the Masaid tribe that had been targeted by the punitive action on 13 March and was loitering in that area, ambushed General Peake’s car and opened fire on it, capturing Peake and his driver. The assailants disarmed them, beat them, and chased them out of the area.21 That incident and the punitive action which followed did not deter the Masaid from raiding. The whole episode showed clearly that the TJFF were unsuitably mounted, equipped and trained for successful operations against the extremely mobile, daring and belligerent Bedouin tribes of the desert. It also showed Peake’s failure to appreciate the size and magnitude of intertribal raiding. The humiliation of being seized and beaten by the Bedouins tarnished his reputation as the Commander of the Arab Legion.

[91]


The politics of tribal wars and raiding in the desert areas adjacent to the Iraqi, Hijazi-Najdian and Kuwaiti frontiers was more active than that in the desert adjacent to Syria, Trans-Jordan and Hijaz-Najd. In the former, for the nine years between 1920 and 1929, the two largest Hijazi-Najdian tribes, the Mutair and the Autaibah, had plundered and slaughtered across the southern deserts of Iraq and Kuwait. Captain John Bagot Glubb, serving with the RAF in Iraq during the second half of the decade, created a system of tribal defence against the Autaibah and Mutair which ultimately deterred them from raiding. He established police posts around which the Iraqi tribes concentrated for defence and counter-attacks, instead of mounting punitive operations against Iraqi tribes who had carried out retaliatory raids into Hijaz-Najd. He also established a system of intelligence which gave early warning of raids. On 17 February 1929 one of his agents brought him information that Shaikh Faisal al-Duwish of the Mutair tribe was advancing against some Iraqi tribes, and that he would attack with many thousands of Mutair warriors at dawn on 20 February. Glubb sent his cars immediately to the various tribes near the area where the attack was expected and called them to concentrate in his camp. On 19 February all the tribes responded and joined the desert police which he had formed. During that night the Iraqi tribes held a war dance to warm up their courage. When Shaikh Faisal heard about the concentration of tribes and their belligerent mood, he realised that he had lost the element of surprise and decided not to attack.23 Meanwhile, King Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud, who was aware of the rebellious intentions of the Mutair and Autaibah, launched an attack against the Mutair at Sibilla on 29 March 1929 and defeated them. During July 1929, the Autaibah surrendered to him and thus his control over that part of the desert was undisputed. By April 1929 the situation in the desert had deteriorated to such an extent that a bitter and long-standing blood feud between the Bani Sakhr and the Huwaitat tribes, which was ended by reconciliation (Sulh) effected by the Amir Abdullah during 1926, was rekindled early in April 1929, when a section of the Huwaitat withdrew to an area of Bani Sakhr for safety against a raid. The Nawasrah of the Huwaitat, who were encamped in an area near Zizia, were attacked by a party of Bani Sakhr who continued to feel certain antagonism towards the Huwaitat and whose predatory instincts overcame their respect for the reconciliation [92]


of 1926. In the conflict that followed, a minor shaikh of the Bani Sakhr was killed. The Huwaitat lost a few camels and sheep, but did not suffer any casualties. Bani Sakhr and Huwaitat warriors gathered immediately, feelings were running very high and a local tribal war, which could have revived the old enmity between the two major and largest Jordanian Bedouin tribes, became imminent. Because the Arab Legion was unable to provide a force to deter the tribes (and in that case Peake was completely redundant), the Amir himself proceeded immediately to Zizia, with support from the RAF and the TJFF, and settled the dispute without any further fighting. All looted animals were restored to the Huwaitat and peace was restored.24 The deteriorating situation in the desert compelled the High Commissioner, Sir J. R. Chancellor, to hold a conference in Amman on 10 April 1929, attended by the British Resident, the Commander of the RAF in Amman and the Commander of the Arab Legion, to review the situation. He also held comprehensive talks with the Amir Abdullah on Bedouin raiding in the desert and on other subjects. Sir Chancellor agreed with Henry Cox’s assessment that the Jordanian Government: have no force with which to police the desert and no funds with which to obtain information in regard to what is happening there. To make matters worse, the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force which should have been in touch with happenings in the desert has been entirely ignorant. The fact must be faced that in every case where punishment has to be inflicted on a section of the badu, be it large or small, and even when a single man has to be arrested, the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force, and possibly the R.A.F. as well, will have to perform the task until the government prestige is firmly re-established.25

Instead of a system of defence, like the one set up in Iraq by Glubb, they devised a system of punishments for the victims of raids. Chancellor described the main effects of the prevailing system of control over Jordanian Bedouins as follows: (i) that the control of tribal affairs is to all intents and purposes vested exclusively in the Amir; (ii) that the Amir has lost much of his influence over the tribes, and there is reason to think that he has not always used such influence as he possesses to discourage raids; [93]


(iii) that on account of the reduction of the establishment of the Arab Legion, the Government of Trans-Jordan has no force at its disposal to control the tribes without asking for the assistance of the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force or the Royal Air Force; (iv) that the Frontier Force on account of its insufficient mobility and experience in tribal work, is not always able to render effective support in punitive operations against the tribes; (v) that the intelligence service is inadequate and its several branches are not co-ordinated.26

The High Commissioner proposed that in order to establish some measure of control over the behaviour of the Bedouins, a number of the leading shaikhs, who were to be nominated by the Tribal Control Board, should be paid a monthly salary as had been the custom under Turkish rule, at a total cost of £960 per year. He thought that it was not practicable to remove the Bedouins from the Amir’s control, or to object to his policy of conciliation and favour with the shaikhs and tribes. He suggested that the Arab Legion should be increased by a platoon of thirty (1 sergeant, 2 corporals and 27 men). This would serve as a mobile reserve force stationed at the headquarters of the Arab Legion, with the tasks of enforcing government orders to the tribes and of conducting minor punitive operations, at a total cost of £2,982 per year. He also recommended the appointment of two Arab lieutenants for tribal intelligence duties at a cost of £260 per year. On 14 April, Chancellor had a conversation with the Amir at the Raghdan Palace in Amman, during which the Amir pointed out that when he came to Jordan in 1921 the eastern and southern frontiers of Jordan were safe, because the Hijaz was within the kingdom of his father, King al-Hussein ibn Ali, and northern Najd was under his friend Shaikh Ibn Rashid. Now, he said, ‘both these territories were under Ibn Saud who was bitterly hostile to him, and Trans-Jordan was in constant danger of attack from that quarter’.27 The Amir reminded Sir Chancellor that in 1921 he had an irregular force of Bedouin warriors to keep order among the tribes, but when his Civil List was reduced he was compelled, for reasons of economy, to disband that force. With the weakened Arab Legion, he had no force at all with which to control the tribes. The High Commissioner noted his views: In the case of the recent fight between the Huwaitat and Bani Sakhr, for example, owing to a considerable number of them being [94]


engaged on the locust campaign, only three or four men of the Arab Legion were available to accompany him to the scene of the disturbance, and he had to ask that a company of the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force should be placed at his disposal for that purpose.

He requested that the Arab Legion should be increased by a company of one hundred men as a reserve force. The Amir also asked that the urban police should be a separate unit from the Arab Legion, removed from Peake’s command and placed under the command of local district governors. It was obvious that the Amir had lost confidence in Peake, but polite as he always was, he added that ‘[h]is proposal did not imply any criticism of colonel Peake of whom he had a high opinion.’28 He was also ‘very grateful to the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force . . . but he considered it desirable that the Force should be kept entirely apart from police duties and from work of a political character and reserved entirely for military service’. The Amir was trying to protect his rule and jurisdiction from interference by the British who seemed to wish to control the Bedouins, of whom he was extremely protective. This was why he referred to the intelligence service and requested that the duties of the RAF Intelligence Officer ‘should be strictly confined to the collection of information about the dangers of external aggression on Trans-Jordan, and that he should not concern himself with the affairs of the tribes’. He expressed his concern that if it was decided to appoint an additional intelligence officer, he should be under his own control as he was responsible for tribal affairs. The Amir Abdullah had a great love for Bedouins and their way of life. He told Colonel C. E. Vickery in 1920, ‘By Allah, it would break my heart to leave these Bedouins’. He believed the Bedouins were probably ‘the only section of the population of Trans-Jordan upon whose support he could count in time of emergency’, and that he himself possessed ‘a greater knowledge of tribal codes and customs than anyone else’ in Jordan (with the exception of the Amir Shakir). For these reasons he insisted that: ‘the tribes must remain directly under him. No Shaikh should be shown special favour by the intelligence officers. He had himself personally undertaken the control of the tribes, and he did not want any one else to interfere in tribal matters.’29 The Amir also argued that while the raids from Jordan were small acts of petty brigandage, those from Hijaz-Najd were ‘undertaken by large [95]


bodies of men headed by banners which showed the seriousness of their intentions’. Sir Chancellor expressed the view that it was time for the Amir to recognise Ibn Saud as the King of Hijaz-Najd; the British Government had recognised him and the Amir should follow suit. The Amir was exceedingly ‘touchy’ on the subject, and showed signs of great perturbation, although he intimated to Chancellor that he might do so later. (It was left to Colonel Cox, the British Resident in Amman, to seek a favourable opportunity to approach the Amir again.)30 Meanwhile, requests from the Jordanian Government for the restitution of looted animals and properties by the Arab al-Jabal tribes of Syria to the Jordanian tribes, and the demands addressed to the French mandatory authorities to take preventive measures against raiding, did not meet with effective responses. On 13 May 1929, Cox, Peake and Flight Lieutenant Elliot from RAF Amman, visited Daraa to lunch with Captain Bonnet and thence went to Suwaida where they were the guests of Colonel Clement Grandcourt. There was considerable friction and ill feeling between the French officers in Daraa and Suwaida, of which the British officers had previous knowledge. Thus on the question of communications for early warning of Bedouin raids between the mandatory powers in Syria and Jordan, the French officers were divided, Daraa against Suwaida. No specific cases of raiding were dealt with during the meetings, but a draft of an agreement which provided for the establishment of a commission composed of two government representatives from each country who should meet once every two months to judge on cases of Bedouin raids, was approved. It was also agreed that the decisions of the commission should be final and should not require confirmation by the two Governments. However two further drafts were not confirmed by the High Commissioners.31 On 20 May 1929, information was received by the Amir Abdullah that a large party of Jordanian raiders was concentrated at Bayir in the Southern desert under Shaikh Zaal ibn Mutlaq of the Tawaihah section of the Huwaitat, with the intention of raiding Hijazi-Najdian territories. The Amir Shakir proceeded to Bayir on the same day in order to prevent the raid and disperse the concentration. On 21 May an aeroplane which was sent to Bayir to contact Shakir, brought back the news that he thought he would succeed in his mission, but would like another plane on the following day to carry his recommendations to the Amir. But the [96]


Amir Abdullah, in consultation with the British Resident, decided to dispatch a force accompanied by Shaikh Mithqal al-Fayiz and his ADC Hamid al-Wadi, to support Shakir on the same day. Captain Stafford of the Arab Legion, Flight Lieutenant Walker of the RAF Armoured Cars Squadron, four Rolls-Royce armoured cars and two six-wheel Morris tenders left Amman to meet Shakir at Jabal al-Hadi at 0230 hours on 22 May. On finding no sign of Shakir there, the force moved to Bayir on the same day and found it deserted except for a few young Huwaitat men who informed Stafford that the raiders had dispersed, and that they themselves were going home. Stafford disarmed them and let them go. Shaikh Hamd ibn Jazi, one of the most prominent shaikhs of the Huwaitat, arrived as the force were about to start on their way back to Amman. He informed Stafford that the Amir Shakir had effected the dispersal of the concentration and left for Amman. He confirmed that the names of the shaikhs involved in the concentration were: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Zaal ibn Mutlaq (Huwaitat Tawaihah) Mohammad ibn Qasim (Huwaitat Tawaihah) Salim Abu Abtan (Huwaitat al-Jazi) Kurayim ibn Zaal (Bani Attiyah) Athub al-Zabin (Bani Sakhr al-Zabin) Fahad ibn Trad al-Zabin (Bani Sakhr al-Zabin) Turki ibn Muflih (Bani Sakhr al-Zabin) Humaidah Abu Tayih (Huwaitat Tawaihah) Qasim Abu Rubaiah (Huwaitat Tawaihah)32

At Zizia, the Amir Shakir sent certain well respected shaikhs of the Huwaitat and Bani Sakhr to inform the nine shaikhs who led the concentration of raiders to come to him before sundown on 22 May. Instead of waiting until sundown Captain Stafford, who was known to be of aggressive character, without justification or care, arrived at 1700 hours at Zaal ibn Mutlaq’s camp and threatened his servants. At 0415 on 23 May he moved the force to Shaikh Zaal’s camp, took his tents and effects and handed them to the Arab Legion police post at Zizia. It was then that the Amir Shakir informed Stafford that Zaal had reported him to the Amir Abdullah. The Amir himself sent a message to Stafford commanding him to return Zaal’s tents, but Stafford lied when he said: [97]


‘I regret that this could not be done as it had been handed over to the Royal Air Force and was therefore no longer at my disposal.’33 It was only with the help of the shaikhs of the Huwaitat and Bani Sakhr that Captain Stafford was able to bring seven of the wanted shaikhs to Amman and hand them over to the central jail. The Tribal Courts held more than twenty sessions between May and July 1929 and sentenced 28 Bedouins to periods of imprisonment or fines. Among those sentenced during the year were the following shaikhs of various importance: 14 January Fahad ibn Trad (Bani Sakhr) was fined £P64. 4 May Falah ibn Madaam (Zuwaidi) was imprisoned for two months. 4 May Qasim ibn Awad (Taqatqah) was imprisoned for two months. 4 May Hamd al-Taqiqi (Taqatqah) was fined £P30. 4 May Mohammad ibn Mutlaq (Zuwaidi) was fined £P30. 17 June Zaal ibn Mutlaq (Huwaitat) was imprisoned for two months and two weeks and fined £P60. 17 June Humaidi Abu Tayih (Huwaitat) was imprisoned for two months. 17 June Qasim ibn Rubaiah (Huwaitat) was imprisoned for two months and fined £P60. 17 June Turki ibn Muflih (Bani Sakhr) was imprisoned for two months and fined £P17. 17 June Athub al-Zabin (Bani Sakhr) was imprisoned for two months and fined £P17. 6 July Hamd ibn Abtan (Hasaya) was imprisoned for one month. 6 July Jumaian ibn Jumaian (Bani Attiyah) was imprisoned for two months. 20 July Daghish Abu Tayih (Huwaitat) was imprisoned for two months.34 In spite of the punitive actions, the penalties imposed on the Jordanian shaikhs, and the measures taken by the Bedouin Control Board established by the Jordanian Government on 16 June 1929, retaliatory raids between the desert tribes continued. Between 1 July and [98]


30 September 1929, more than 38 raids were carried out, including: 17 raids against Jordanian tribes by foreign tribes; 9 raids by Jordanian tribes against foreign tribes; and 12 raids By Jordanian tribes against each other. The High Commissioner for Trans-Jordan thought that to prevent raiding from Trans-Jordan without effecting the restitution of looted properties was creating a strong feeling among the Jordanian tribes, and that the Syrian and Hijazi-Najdian Governments were ‘not doing all they should to curb the activities of their subjects and restore loot. There is a danger of this feeling assuming troublesome dimensions, unless neighbouring Governments show more readiness to restore looted property.’35 At the Air Ministry in London, the Air Council concurred that the plans proposed by the High Commissioner for Trans-Jordan might help to mitigate the unsatisfactory state of affairs in Trans-Jordan. It advised the Colonial Office that Sir John Chancellor placed too much reliance upon the Amir Abdullah, ‘the sincerity of whose attitude in regard to raids is doubted by the High Commissioner himself ’.36 It pointed out that the Amir’s policy of conciliation towards the Bedouins had led to ‘a situation of extreme difficulty not only affecting the relations of His Majesty’s Government with Ibn Saud, but also involving the frequent employment of Imperial forces [the RAF and the TJFF] in operations which should only be necessary in the last resort’. It noted with satisfaction the proposal for the increase in the strength of the Arab Legion, but insisted that some permanent administration should be established in the Jordanian desert, as had been accomplished in the Iraqi desert. This suggestion was accepted later in 1930 and led to the employment of Captain John Bagot Glubb in the Arab Legion. It also drew the attention of the Colonial Office to ‘a memorandum on desert administration recently prepared by Captain Glubb with the tenor of which they are in complete agreement, and which they consider might be applied to the desert areas of Trans-Jordan’.37 During October 1929, tribal raids across the southern frontiers of Jordan from Hijaz-Najd increased in number and size as the Jordanian tribes moved out into their customary habitations and encampments east of the Hijaz Railway. In that part of Jordan they were more exposed to raiding than in their summer camps west of the railway. It also became more evident that the Hijazi-Najdian authorities were either unable or did not intend to control or punish their offending tribes. Meanwhile, the Jordanian tribes became increasingly restive under the prevailing [99]


conditions, whereby they were severely punished and forced to disgorge their loot if convicted of raiding, whereas the Hijazi-Najdian tribes were free to raid them and keep their loot undeterred. They appealed to the Jordanian Government to protect them against raids and take action to restore their looted animals and properties from previous raids. The British Resident supported the idea of implementing Glubb’s system of having detachments of Bedouin police in vehicles armed with machine guns and stationed among the tribes in the desert. However, instead of creating a purely Jordanian Bedouin police force, he suggested that the task should be undertaken by the TJFF.38 Towards the end of October 1929, Shaikh Sultan ibn Dawshan of Shaikh Sultan al-Faqir’s camp led a large raid of Anizah warriors against the camp of Shaikh Musallam al-Ubaidi of the Damanya near Tubaiq as well as against a Druze tribe near Hassida and took fifty camels. On their way back through Busaitah near Wadi al-Sirhan the raiders divided themselves into two groups; one composed of more than thirty camelmen led by Ibn Dawshan passed through Busaitah and the second composed of more than 150 camelmen led by Shaikh Sulaiman al-Awaji of Anizah proceeded to Tima, from where the raiders started. During his passage through Busaitah, Ibn Dawshan looted a herd of camels owned by Shaikh Arbilan the nephew of Shaikh Sayah Abu Nuwayir of the Huwaitat, and proceeded to Tubaiq. When the news of the raid reached Arbilan, he immediately led a group of the Huwaitat, among whom were two famous warriors, Saqir ibn Abtan, and Ithnayan al-Attnah, in hot pursuit. When they found Ibn Dawshan and the looted animals, they attacked his group, captured him and a few of his men and recovered all Arbilan’s animals. On the following day Ibn Dawshan and his men were released. A few days later Sultan ibn Dawshan reorganised his men and carried out a successful raid against the camp of Shaikh Musallam al-Ubaidi at Mughur near Tubaiq and looted his herd of camels.39 On 4 November Shaikh Sulaiman al-Awaji carried out a raid against the Damanya and looted all their animals. By the end of 1929, the British Government became anxious that all possible measures should be taken to put an end to the deteriorating situation between the desert tribes of Jordan and Hijaz-Najd, because the continued raiding between them impacted unfavourably upon relations between them and Ibn Saud on the one hand and, between the RAF and the TJFF and the Jordanian tribes on the other. They asked the [100]


High Commissioner for Trans-Jordan to submit a report regarding the measures to be taken to establish better control over the Bedouin tribes of eastern and southern Trans-Jordan. The High Commissioner reported that the main causes of the unsatisfactory situation were: ‘1. the weakness strategically of the South Eastern frontier of Trans-Jordan; 2. the absence of any effective control over the tribesmen in the Hijaz and Najd; and 3. the fact that a number of the Trans-Jordan tribes spend a considerable portion of the year in the Wadi Sirhan which is in Najd territory.’40 Air Vice Marshal Dowding, Commander of the RAF in Palestine and Trans-Jordan, appreciated the situation regarding the frontier between Hijaz-Najd and Trans-Jordan as ‘strategically the worst that could possibly have been chosen’, because it was established along a line more than fifty miles from the nearest permanent water within Jordanian territory. On the other side of that frontier there was an abundance of water, a few miles into Hijazi-Najdian territory. Thus Hijazi-Najdian raiders were not confined to any particular access of attack across the frontier, and were able to carry out a surprise raid from any area or direction along Wadi al-Sirhan. Vice Marshal Dowding further explained: Tribal control along the frontier of Trans-Jordan is a problem which is exactly the inverse of the problem of the southern frontier of Iraq, for whereas in the latter the tribes from Najd move away from their perennial water bases across or up to the Iraqi frontier, in Trans-Jordan it is our own tribes which move away from the water base across the Najd frontier. I consider that there are strong grounds for the rectification of the frontier for strategic reasons. If it is impossible to acquire and control the Wadi Sirhan, there is much to be said for the withdrawal of the frontier to a line roughly 30 miles East of the Hejaz Railway.41

The south-eastern frontier of Jordan had been fixed by King Ibn Saud and Sir Gilbert Clayton as part of the Haddah Agreement of 1925, without consultation with the Amir or the Government of Trans-Jordan. The Agreement inflicted a grave injustice against the Trans-Jordanian tribes, who for centuries had the right to use the whole of Wadi al-Sirhan and some parts of Kaff and Jauf, which were handed over to King Ibn Saud for political reasons. Both the Amir Abdullah and the British Resident protested against the unjust handing over of Wadi al-Sirhan to Hijaz-Najd and gave warnings of the consequences of its separation from Trans-Jordan. While Dowding suggested depriving the Jordanian [101]


tribes of more of their land, the High Commissioner proposed the restoration of Wadi al-Sirhan to Trans-Jordan. The Amir Abdullah was in complete control of the Trans-Jordanian tribes, but by the end of 1929 it became clear that although King Ibn Saud had strict control over his tribes after he defeated the Autaibah and Mutair, he allowed them to raid into Trans-Jordan either by neglect or intent. Sir Chancellor, High Commissioner for Trans-Jordan, thought that: From the time of the big raid from Najd on the Bani Sakhr in February 1928, the Najd authorities appear to have had neither the desire nor the power to control their tribes; and they have turned a deaf ear to all the complaints of the Trans-Jordan Government; and the Bedouins, having learned the limitations of the radius of action of horse and camel companies of the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force continue to raid into Trans-Jordan territory almost with impunity.42

Vice Marshal Dowding, who was well acquainted with the Haddah Agreement, referred to Article 3, which provided for communications between the British Resident in Trans-Jordan and the Governor of Wadi al-Sirhan and explained: Yet, when Colonel Cox sent a messenger to Jauf, the latter was imprisoned and colonel Cox’s letter was returned with a curt note to the effect that there was no complaint. Ibn Saud subsequently made an official objection to this attempt of communication on the ridiculous pretext that the Hadda Agreement had stipulated communication with the Governor of the Wadi Sirhan, and Colonel Cox had communicated with the Governor of Jauf. Actually at the time there was no such official as the Governor of the Wadi Sirhan and one has not been appointed.43

On the other hand, in Trans-Jordan the Tribal Control Board continued to punish Jordanian raiders during the first half of 1930 as can be seen from the following sentences: 2/2/1930 Four leaders of raid on 15/11/1929 against Tihamah and Billi Arabs, each imprisoned for four months. 2/2/1930 One leader of raid on 15/3/1929 against Billi Arabs and Tabuk soldiers, imprisoned for two months. 20/5/1930 Bakhit al-Darawshah imprisoned for one year and fined six camels and one mare for leading a raid on 8/4/1930. [102]


31/5/1930 52 camels belonging to Falah al-Himish of the Sharari have been seized against the return loot for leading a raid on 7/4/1930. 29/6/1930 18 persons of Bani Attiyah, Huwaitat, Jazi and Rukaibat, each imprisoned for seven months for participation in raids on 17/5/1930 and early in June 1930. 29/6/1930 Rataan ibn Thiab, was detained pending restoration of 35 camels looted during a raid on 1/11/1929. 30/6/1930 Kurayim ibn Zaal imprisoned for seven months for leading a raid on 12/11/1929. 30/6/1930 Filio al-Sharari imprisoned for seven months and fined 14 camels for leading a raid on 15/3/1929.44 At the end of April 1930 special efforts were made by the RAF and the TJFF to put an end to interfrontier raiding. Detachments of armoured cars and infantry supported by aircrafts were deployed at the main water points in the Southern desert as shown in Table 4.2. TABLE 4.2

Deployment of forces in the Southern desert, April 1930 Al Mudawarah Bir Naam Bayir Qasr Tubah Hausa Maan

1 aircraft + 1 camel detachment 1 aircraft + car detachment 1 aircraft + car detachment 1 air craft 1 aircraft + camel detachment 2 aircraft + 1 car troop + 2 camel troops

Intensive air reconnaissance and land patrols were carried out with the result that the situation was much improved, though not entirely brought under control. Between April and August 1930, the imperial forces with their superior weapons and mobility captured a number of raiders, recovered considerable loot and turned back two raiding parties. They seemed to have won the physical action against the raiders on the Jordanian side, leaving the Hijazi-Najdian tribes free to raid as they wished; thus they lost the battle for Jordanian hearts and minds. On 26 June 1930 the High Commissioner had recommended the appointment of a British intelligence officer of the Arab Legion and the creation of an Arab Legion desert patrol. On 20 June a meeting was held [103]


between Trans-Jordanian and Palestinian officers in Beersheba to settle all the cases of raiding between Bedouin tribes. Two hundred cases were discussed. All cases of blood feuds after 1 April 1921 and all cases of theft and brigandage were settled on the principle of ‘Dig and Bury’ (Hafar wa Dafan).45 On 14 July, the wing commander in charge of the operation recommended that the Bedouin Control Board should declare the area lying between the eastern and southern frontier and Bayir, Jafer and Tal Shahim closed for Bedouin movement, and should announce that any Bedouin found within this area would be liable to be fired upon. The recommendation was accepted by the Board. The Amir Abdullah reiterated that order in the following statement: ‘We shall not be held responsible before Allah for any punishment which may befall tribes should they raid or instigate others to raid or withhold information about raiding. Whoever is found in the closed area shall be fired upon and previous orders issued by the Bedouin Control Board must be respected.’46 In spite of all the actions taken by the Trans-Jordan Government and the British Mandate officials, King Ibn Saud continued to accuse Trans-Jordan of inciting its tribes to attack his tribes. He said to Sir Andrew Ryan on 1 August 1930: ‘Certain Trans-Jordan tribes who have lately come to the neighbourhood of my territory report that they and others have received through Sharif Shaker incitements to attack Najd tribes but that, being friendly to us and unwilling to play into the hands of the Sharifs, they have become impatient and have come over to us.’47 It became obvious that King Ibn Saud was continuing his policy of trying to discredit the Amir Abdullah and his Government, while paying lip service to the British Government. Cox made it clear that ‘Ibn Saud has made no restitution for all the damage done by his tribesmen, he has declared his inability to trust anything or anybody including the British officials connected with Trans-Jordan.’ There was no peace for the Trans-Jordanian tribes, threatened as they were by the imperial TJFF, which was not concerned with justice and the continuation of raids by the Hijazi-Najdian tribes. On 18 September the Shararat of Najd raided the Nawasrah of Huwaitat and looted 450 camels. The TJFF with its aircrafts and armoured cars failed to protect the Huwaitat against Ibn Saud’s tribes. In their anger, the shaikhs of the Huwaitat requested a declaration of immunity for anyone able to recover his rights for himself.48 The tribal wars along the frontiers [104]


of the Jordanian desert continued. Table 4.3 shows the deployment of the Arab Legion by 1931. Seven police posts were located along the borders with Palestine, while only one post was located on the border with Syria and none were established along the borders with Iraq and Hijaz-Najd. In the event of a major security problem, the reserve force of one mounted squadron was not enough, and the country had to rely on the TJFF for external and internal security. Although General Peake considered himself an expert in tribal matters, to the extent that he wrote a book containing comprehensive information about the Jordanian tribes, Bedouins, semiBedouins and Hadar, he neglected and could not maintain security in the Jordanian desert. During 1930, the men of the Arab Legion were nearly demoralised. Their weapons were outdated and in bad condition; their discipline rigid and reactionary; and their salaries hardly adequate to cover their personal needs not to mention those of their families, in one of the worst drought years. On top of this they were suffering the psychological impact of the reduction of their Legion to half its strength in favour of the TJFF, a foreign, imperial force. Their Commander, General Peake, nicknamed ‘Bogus Pasha’ by the Black and Tans (TJFF), spent more time learning to fly, on personal leave, and on visits to Palestine, Egypt and England, than on the security and development of the Arab Legion.49 The year 1930 saw the miserable failure of Lord Plumer’s TJFF policy in Trans-Jordan. Peake’s inadequate security in the desert and the fact that the TJFF was alien to the Bedouin tribes and their law and administration, aggravated an already chaotic situation. The TJFF failed in its main task, that of defending Trans-Jordan against internal and external raids or aggression by the Ikhwan of Najd-Hijaz. In their frustration, the soldiers of the TJFF persisted in persecuting and oppressing the Jordanian tribes of the South, instead of deterring aggression by the Ikhwan of Hijaz-Najd. The Huwaitat, the heroes of the capture of Aqaba during the Great Arab Revolt, who had supported their allies in the British Army in the advance to Damascus, became the particular victims of British neglect. They were constantly harassed and unjustly treated by the foreign mercenaries of the TJFF, the new ‘Black and Tans’. The Ikhwan of Hijaz-Najd, who had not lifted a finger to support Britain during the war, continued their raids. As each successive raid resulted in a counter-raid, the Huwaitat began to despair. [105]


TABLE 4.3

Deployment of the Arab Legion, 1931 Headquarters Arab Legion reserves Amman Police Headquarters Police posts

Amman Amman Amman Zarqa Muhajreen Mahatta Irbid Jabal Ajlun Police post Abu Aubaidah Irbid Deir Abu Said Jisr al-Majamia Shaikh Hussein Ramtha Mafraq Jarash Mudawar Malka Salt Amman (rural) Wadi al-Sir Naur Zarqa Sahab Yadudah Madaba Thiban Zizia Salt Rumman Jisir Damya Shunit Nimrin Karak Karak Qatranah Mazar Qasir Ghor al-Mazraah Ghor al-Safi Taffilah Wadi al-Hasa Jurf al-Darawish Maan Maan Wadi al-Musa Petra Shawbak Aqaba Quwairah50

Ajlun district 1. Subdistrict 2.

Subdistrict Police posts

3.


Balqa district 1. Subdistrict Police posts

2.


3.


Karak district 1. Subdistrict Police posts

2.


Maan district 1. Subdistrict Police posts 2.

Subdistrict Police post

[106]


Enter Captain John Bagot Glubb Meanwhile, Captain John Bagot Glubb arrived in Amman from Iraq during early November 1930. He was invited by the British Resident Colonel Cox to advise him on a plan to end interfrontier Bedouin raiding in the desert of Trans-Jordan. During his stay with Cox, Glubb discussed the situation with the Amir Abdullah, Amir Shakir ibn Zaid, and the Commander of the TJFF, but no discussion took place between him and Peake, the Commander of the Arab Legion. As a result of his talks with the Amir, Glubb was invited by him to accept an appointment in the Arab Legion with the rank of brigadier and the mission of establishing law and order in the Jordanian desert. Glubb accepted and as soon as he was appointed he asked Cox, not Peake, for the authority to enlist one hundred men and to form the Desert Patrol Force as follows: • • • • •

70 camel men. 30 machine gunners mounted in trucks. 8 miscellaneous vehicles, 2 of them with Vickers medium machine guns. 4 Ford trucks with Vickers medium machine guns. 2 wireless vans.

Although Glubb was appointed to the Arab Legion and the Desert Patrol Force was one of its units, Peake had no previous knowledge of the arrangements made before he was commanded by the Amir and later by Cox to take action. According to Glubb ‘Cox and Peake did not work closely together and their relations were not particularly cordial’.51 Glubb’s appointment and the manner in which it was decided shows that Peake had lost all his political influence in the Royal Palace and the British Residency. Glubb started his mission with a long reconnaissance in the Southern desert during November and December 1930. He drove round all the camps of the Huwaitat tribe and enjoyed their hospitality. He was dumbfounded by the Huwaitat hatred and anger against the Ikhwan of Hijaz-Najd, the TJFF, and the British and Jordanian Governments. He found them ‘starving and in rags, but inspired with the bitterest hatred of their Government and of the troops’. They were convinced that the British were the allies of Ibn Saud in destroying them.52 But although [107]


uninvited, Glubb was offered food, shelter and friendly talks by the Huwaitat wherever he went, which was typical of Arab Bedouin hospitality and generosity. In spite of their deeply ‘embedded hatred and prejudices’ against the British TJFF and the Jordan Government, Glubb thought that he was slowly gaining their friendship and confidence. He took the approach that they could not simultaneously fight against the Hijazi-Najdian tribes and their government, as well as against their own Government and the TJFF. He was able to convince them that if they continued on that course, it would lead to their extermination. On his return to Amman for Christmas, Glubb reported to the British Resident, not to Peake, on the Huwaitat situation and included the following confession: I must confess that, as an Englishman, I was utterly ashamed to discover the complete absence of prestige of Great Britain on both sides of the frontier. This lamentable situation is due to the impression that, in fining and imprisoning their tribes and returning loot to Ibn Saud, while the latter’s governor in Jauf is openly urging the Najd tribes to raid Trans-Jordan, His Majesty’s Government is willing to descend to any depths of civility to placate Ibn Saud. I am aware that this is strong language, but it is almost verbatim the language used by the Bedouins.53

Perhaps Glubb’s feeling of shame emanated from his knowledge that amongst the Huwaitat, who were suffering from the unjust treatment by the mercenaries of the imperial TJFF, were some of the heroes of the Arab Revolt. In particular the Tawaihah section of the tribe, led by the famous hero Shaikh Audah Abu Tayih and under King Faisal’s command, carried out many victorious operations against the Turks in the desert during the First World War. In fact it was Cox, Peake, Stafford, and the Commander of the TJFF, who should have been ashamed, for not accepting the policy of conciliation adopted by the Amir Abdullah and the Amir Shakir, whose knowledge and long experience in Bedouin customs and traditions were very well known. By 1 January 1931, Glubb was able to enlist eight Bedouins in the Desert Patrol Force. He insisted that the TJFF should withdraw from the Southern desert and by 1 February the Government agreed to adopt his plan, which was modelled on the one he carried out in the Iraqi desert. The TJFF withdrew on the same day and Glubb, with his force [108]


of eight men, took over responsibility for the pacification of more than 40,000 Bedouins of the desert tribes. Glubb offered the Bedouin tribes, particularly the Huwaitat, the opportunity to enlist their sons in their own Arab Legion Desert Patrol Force, thus reversing Peake’s vindictive and foolish policy of precluding Bedouins from enlistment in the Arab Legion. Reluctant, but extremely intrigued, the Huwaitat shyly trickled one after the other to join the few Iraqi Bedouins who joined the Force. The trucks arrived by the end of February and training on the Lewis and Vickers machine guns was on its way. The Force was increased to twenty men including some Huwaitat and Bani Sakhr tribesmen and some former members of the Iraqi Desert Police who followed Glubb to Jordan. On 30 May 1931, the Amir Abdullah issued a special command for the prohibition of tribal raiding, the text of which was distributed among the tribal shaikhs all over the country: A meeting will soon be held in Wadi al-Sirhan between Captain Glubb, the Intelligence Officer attached to the Security Department in Trans-Jordan and Shaikh Abd al-Aziz ibn Zaid, the Inspector of Tribes in Hijaz-Najd. During this meeting all claims and demands regarding raids which took place between Trans-Jordan and Hijaz-Najd since 1 August 1930, will be dealt with in a final settlement, and for the purpose of laying the basis for immediate cooperation between the appropriate authorities in Trans-Jordan and Hijaz-Najd so that further raiding will be prevented. As a gesture of good will that the Trans-Jordan Government intends to make a success of the meeting, and for the sake of practical cooperation in maintaining law and order on the frontier, I accordingly prohibit and forbid all forms of raiding by the Trans-Jordanian tribes during that meeting and at all times after, and declare hereby that I will punish any person who disobeys this order and will make him an example to others. I command you to inform all the tribes in your area as soon as possible, and tell them that His Majesty King Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud has already issued a command like this to his subjects.

Brigadier Glubb, who was also appointed as the Frontier Inspector for Trans-Jordan, described the meeting between him and Abd al-Aziz ibn Zaid as follows: [109]


I was appointed by the Trans-Jordan Government as their frontier inspector, while the Saudis nominated Abd al-Aziz Ibn Zaid, a professional government servant, but not a man in high social standing. The choice was apparently made because Ibn Saud was in doubt as to what kind of reception his representative would receive. At our first meeting, the Saudi representative produced his list of claims. Happily, I was inspired to say: ‘I do not know how we can ever judge all these demands, but as I know Your Excellency to be a man of honour, I will accept any claims which you decide are just’. His manner changed instantly, and he replied that he could not make unilateral decisions, but that he would accept whatever I decided. In a few minutes, we were both urging each other to make a unilateral settlement. The ice was broken, we both agreed to abandon all claims, and parted warm friends.55

By the end of 1931, the Desert Patrol Force was well established. It constituted the nucleus of the reborn Arab (military) Legion. The Amir Abdullah who supported Glubb was delighted, and the Amir Shakir gave him every possible support and help. Peake, who was against Glubb’s plans, but had no plan of his own, was compelled to accept. By the beginning of the following year, the Mobile Desert Patrol, as it came to be known, was attracting the best youth of the Bedouin tribes including sons of shaikhs. It became a very proud and well disciplined unit and formed the nucleus of the reborn (military) Arab Legion. Meanwhile, by July 1932, the last interfrontier Bedouin raids which came from Hijaz-Najd were dealt with efficiently, and the end of that year marked the end of tribal wars and raiding. It was due to the complete understanding between the Amir Shakir and Glubb on the principle of conciliation as well as the defensive deterrent that peace prevailed in the Jordanian desert. Major Stafford was dismissed and Glubb was appointed Assistant Commander of the Arab Legion as well as Commander of the Desert Patrol Force. The force completed its training and was provided with weapons, vehicles, wireless sets and equipment. Police posts were built and manned in Bayir, Mudawarah, and Azraq, and education for the force was provided for the first time in the desert. The Amir Abdullah praised the keenness of Glubb and the fighting capabilities of the Bedouins of the Desert Force in a manner ‘which called for pride’.56 Glubb’s plan was simple and down to earth. He realised that all through their history, the Bedouins resisted taxation, harassment and [110]


pursuit by successive foreign occupiers, who were not of their kind. As far as the Huwaitat were concerned the TJFF were the worst they knew. The Bedouins eluded officialdom and military authority, because they believed they harmed them and interfered with their freedom and way of life. Glubb explained to them that they would have their own military authority, manned by their own sons, who would be very well paid, far stronger, more mobile, and better trained to maintain their own peace and security. Considering their insecure state, Glubb’s offer was irresistible. Also, his behaviour pleased the Bedouins; for he spoke, wrote and read Arabic well, conformed to the Arab code of conduct and ethics as well as to their customs and traditions, possessed calm and pleasant manners, and spoke softly and carefully.57 The establishment of law, order, peace and security in the TransJordanian desert, encouraged the Bedouin and semi-Bedouin tribes to cultivate land, raise camels and sheep, breed horses, dig wells, build permanent houses with walled gardens and travel to sell their products to towns and villages, as well as to purchase necessities.58 Gradually they broke the isolation imposed upon them by Peake’s neglect and refusal to allow them to enlist in the Arab Legion, and came into full and peaceful contact with the rest of the people of Trans-Jordan. Contact lead to understanding, to confidence, to stability, and indeed to permanent settlement. In time economic and social development eliminated the need for raiding. The establishment of Badiyah police posts hand in hand with schools for Bedouin children, telephone and wireless communications, and regular visits by the Mobile Medical Clinic, as well as by the Amir Shakir and Glubb, enhanced the prestige of the Arab Legion and the Trans-Jordan Government. But above all, Lord Plumer’s policy to deprive the Amir of a military force was reversed, the Amir had regained a military force as well as a police force.

On the administrative and legal level, the Tribal Courts Law of 1924 was never effectively executed, in spite of all the efforts exerted by the President of the Bedouin Control Board, the Amir Shakir, a leader of outstanding personality as well as a comprehensive knowledge of tribal law, custom and traditions. In 1929 the Bedouin Control Law was enacted to provide the Bedouin Control Board with the power to deal with cases and take action within the jurisdiction of the Tribal Courts, [111]


to determine the locations in which nomad Bedouins could camp, and to investigate raids and other breaches of the peace. The period of the Bedouin Control Board saw a great deal of useful work, and the Amir Shakir’s reputation as a just and impartial judge was such that many cases in which he had no jurisdiction were nevertheless brought to him for settlement. The Amir Shakir died on 8 December 1934, and it became nearly impossible to replace him adequately. This is why a new set of Tribal Laws were enacted in February 1936, as follows: 1.

2.

3.

The Tribal Courts Law of 1936 established a Tribal Court in each of the districts of Ajlun, Balqa, Karak, Maan and the Badiyah. A Tribal Court was composed of one to three judges selected by the parties to the case (or dispute) from a list of Bedouin shaikhs named by the Mutasarrif and approved by His Highness the Amir. The courts had jurisdiction in all cases or disputes between individuals or tribes of nomad Bedouins, with the exception of cases of ownership of immovable property and cases which the Mutasarrif referred to the Civil Courts. They also had jurisdiction in all cases of compensation for blood, honour, and syndicate ownership of horses. The Tribal Court of Appeal Law of 1936 provided that judgements by the Tribal Courts should be sent to the Mutasarrif who should either order their execution by the Arab Legion or refer them to the Tribal Court of Appeal. The Bedouin Control Law of 1936 allowed the officer of the Arab Legion in charge of the Badiyah district to control the movements of the nomad Bedouins as a measure to prevent raids, and to deal summarily with all cases of raiding.59

By the end of 1939 great progress had been made in changing some of the attitudes of the nomad Bedouins and in transforming their economic life into more cultivation of the land. During 1937 and 1938, the majority of the Jordanian Bedouins became quasi-cultivators as well as experts in the breeding of livestock, mainly sheep, goats, horses and camels. Because of the fickle fortunes of breeding of livestock in the desert, cultivation broadened the basis of the Bedouin economy and gave an alternative means of living. Most importantly, cultivation gave the nomad Bedouins a fixed stake in immovable property. This served [112]


not only as a form of economic insurance, but also as social anchorage. This is why, by the end of 1939, every Jordanian tribe, as well as every section of every tribe, had a delimited piece of land which was put into their possession and used for a certain amount of cultivation.60 The justice that the Bedouins of Trans-Jordan had gained was due to the efforts and wisdom of three men: the Amir Abdullah, the Amir Shakir and Glubb.

NOTES 1 From Sir Gawain Bell’s Private Papers, personally given to the author. Arab Legion Documents no. ALCO/1/3/1068. Notes on Desert Units by General J. B. Glubb, 15 August 1942. 2 J. B. Glubb, War in the Desert (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1969), p. 95. 3 Arab Legion Documents no. ALCO/1/3/1068. Dated 15 August 1942. 4 Ibid. See also Ahmad Auwaidi Abbadi, Al-Munasabat al-Badawiyah (Amman: np, 1979) and Min al-Qiam wa al-Adab al-Badawiyah; Rocks ibn Zayid Uzaizi, Maalamah Lilturath al-Urdoni (Amman: The Tourist Authority, 1984). 5 PRO. FO 371/16013. ‘Arab Border Raids’, The Times, 27 April 1932. 6 PRO. CO 831/5/9. Situation report, Commander of the Arab Legion to British Resident, 17 November 1929. 7 PRO. FO 371/13075. From H. Luke, Acting High Commissioner for Trans-Jordan to L. S. Amery, Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies, 22 November 1928. 8 PRO. CO 831/5/1. Report on visit to tribes east of the Hijaz Railway 15–23 December 1928, by the Amir Shakir and A. S. Kirkbride, 27 December 1928. 9 PRO. CO 831/5/1. From British Resident in Amman to High Commissioner for Trans-Jordan, 7 January 1929. 10 PRO. CO 831/5/1. Report by A. S. Kirkbride to British Resident, 27 December 1928. 11 PRO. CO 831/5/1. From British Resident in Amman to High Commissioner for Trans-Jordan, 7 January 1929. 12 PRO. CO 831/5/1. Mr Jakin’s letter to Shaikh Foad Hamzah, no. 2428/438/88, 28 October 1928; Jaddah telegram, no. 208, 23 December 1928. 13 PRO. CO 831/5/1. Report by A. S. Kirkbride to British Resident, 27 December 1928. 14 PRO. CO 831/5/1. (Confidential) From J. R. Chancellor to L. S. Amery, Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies, 5 February 1929. 15 Ibid. 16 PRO. CO 831/5/1. Group Captain P. H. L. Playfair, confidential report on operation carried out against Fahad ibn Trad al-Zabin, 28 December 1928 to 6 January 1929. 17 PRO. CO 831/5/1. Report by A. S. Kirkbride on action against Fahad ibn Trad al-Zabin, 3 January 1929. [113]


18 PRO. CO 831/4/8. From High Commissioner for Trans-Jordan to High Commissioner for Syria and Lebanon, 14 March 1929. 19 Interview with Shaikh Nayif, Jamal, Mijhim, and Turki al-Khraishah, sons of Shaikh Hadithah al-Khraishah, during August 1991. 20 PRO. CO 831/4/8. From High Commissioner for Trans-Jordan to High Commissioner for Syria and Lebanon, 14 March 1929. 21 PRO. CO 831/5/9. Situation report on Trans-Jordan by British Resident, 4 April 1929. Also, oral account given to the author in 1978 by Shaikh Saud al-Qadi of Bani Khalid. And PRO. CO 831/4/8. From British Resident to High Commissioner for Trans-Jordan, 14 March 1929. 22 Further evidence of Peake’s neglect and mismanagement of his command was revealed in the comment made seven years after he assumed his post by the British Resident: ‘A very large percentage of arms of the Arab Legion are unserviceable, and the force must be rearmed’. Ibid. 23 J. B. Glubb, The Changing Scenes of Life: An Autobiography. (London: Quartet, 1983), pp. 86–91. 24 PRO. CO 831/5/9. From British Resident in Amman to High Commissioner for Trans-Jordan, 15 June 1929. 25 PRO. CO 831/5/1. From J. R. Chancellor to L. S. Amery, 31 May 1929. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. Enclosure 1. Notes of conversation of High Commissioner with the Amir Abdullah at Amman on 14 April 1929. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. Also PRO. CO 831/5/1. From O. R. Williams at 10 Downing Street to G. W. Rendel at the Foreign Office, 3 August 1929. 31 PRO. CO 831/5/9. Situation report on Trans-Jordan by Acting British Resident, 5 July 1929. Also PRO. CO 831/4/8. From Cox to Chancellor, 15 May 1929. 32 PRO. CO 831/5/9. From Captain Stafford, Acting Commander of the Arab Legion, to British Resident, 28 May 1929; From Cox to Chancellor, 29 May 1929; From Cox to the Officer Commanding R.A.F. Trans-Jordan and Palestine, 21 May 1929. 33 Ibid. 34 PRO. CO 831/7/8. From High Commissioner to Lord Passfield, Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies, 25 January 1929. 35 PRO. CO 831/5/9. Situation report on Trans-Jordan by British Resident, 4 October 1929. 36 PRO. CO 831/5/1. Air Ministry to the Under Secretary of State at the Colonial Office, 10 July 1929. 37 Ibid. 38 PRO. CO 831/7/8. From British Resident to High Commissioner for TransJordan, 8 October 1929. 39 PRO. CO 831/7/8. Report by Lt. Sulaiman Subhi al-Umari, Assistant Officer Commanding Maan District, to Commander of the Arab Legion, 18 November 1929. 40 PRO. CO 831/7/8. Report by High Commissioner for Trans-Jordan to Lord Passfield, 25 January 1930. 41 PRO. CO 831/7/8. Air Vice Marshal Dowding, report on the raiding situation on the Trans-Jordan – Najd frontier, 25 January 1929. [114]


42 PRO. CO 831/7/8. Report from High Commissioner of Trans-Jordan to Lord Passfield, 25 January 1930. 43 Ibid. 44 PRO. CO 831/7/8. (Confidential) Acting High Commissioner for Trans-Jordan to Colonial Office, 19 August 1930. 45 TJCP no. 21/72/2518. Letter from Peake to Abu al-Huda, 29 June 1930. 46 PRO. CO 831/7/8. From British Resident to Acting High Commissioner for Trans-Jordan, 19 August 1930. 47 Ibid. 48 PRO. CO 831/7/8. Appeal by the Huwaitat shaikhs, 24 September 1930. 49 Colonel R. F. G. Jayne, Private Papers, British Imperial War Museum. Letter to his mother, 5 December 1931. He described Peake’s plane crash during training: ‘They were just near the ground when the “joy stick” became detached from its socket: he (the instructor) waved it in the air and shouted to Peake to take control. Poor old Peake leant forward and said “What”, at that moment they hit the ground at 80 MPH. So “Bogus Pasha” as “P” is called has had to buy a new moth.’ See also the Papers of Colonel F. J. Peake in the British Imperial War Museum, where Peake’s flight log book shows 1,138 hours flying between 3 May 1929 and 30 April 1937. 50 F. J. Peake, Private Papers. British Imperial War Museum, DS/Misc/16, reel 1. 51 Major General James Lunt, Glubb Pasha: A Biography (London: Constable, 1984), p. 70, note 12. 52 Glubb, The Changing Scenes of Life, p. 100. 53 Lunt, Glubb Pasha, p. 72. and J. B. Glubb, situation report, December 1930. 54 Musa Sulaiman, Private Papers (translated into English by the author), 30 May 1931. 55 Glubb, The Changing Scenes of Life, p. 117. 56 Amin Abu al-Shaar, King Abdullah Ibn al-Hussein’s Memoirs (Amman: The Hashemite Press, 1970), p. 185. 57 Sir Hugh Foot (Lord Caradon), A Start in Freedom (London: np, 1966), p. 66: ‘His [Glubb’s] knowledge of Arabic and Arabs was far superior to Lawrence’s.’ 58 J. B. Glubb, ‘The Economic Situation of the Trans-Jordan Tribes’, Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society (July 1938), vol. 25, p. 458. 59 PRO. Colonial no. 129, 1937, pp. 319–21 and Colonial no. 166, 1939, pp. 316–19. Reports on Palestine and Trans-Jordan. 60 PRO. Colonial no. 166, 1939, pp. 318–19.

[115]


5 The Rise of the Opposition

Conflict in the Legislative Council The first extraordinary session of the Legislative Council, was opened on 9 March 1930 with a debate on the 1930/31 budget and its approval. During the several meetings most heads of revenue and expenditure were examined and amended. Shams al-Din Sami, Najib Abu al-Shar, and Nazmi Abd al-Hadi took the lead in opposing the Government and showed keen interest in defending the interests of the people against the high cost of government, high taxation and high expenditure by the administrative departments. The 1930/31 budget was approved in the last meeting of the session on 27 April 1930 as shown in Appendix A.1 As can be seen from the revenue, only 17.4 per cent of the budget was from the British Grant-in-Aid. But out of the £60,000 Grant, £23,838 was allocated to the TJFF and £6,995 to the British Resident. Only £29,167 was allocated to the Jordanian Government. What is more, while 38.2 per cent of the budget was allocated to the Arab Legion and the TJFF, which is more than one third of the expenditure, only 3.1 per cent was allocated to health, 7.8 per cent to education, and 2.7 per cent to agriculture, where it was much needed. Considering that the economy of Jordan was based on agriculture, economic development could not have been of major concern to the British Resident who controlled the budget. During the thirties, the vast majority of the people of Trans-Jordan remained poor. Nearly half of the population, particularly those living in the desert and the southern areas of the country, were very poor. Members of the Civil Service and the Arab Legion were hardly able to make ends meet. Meanwhile a rich merchant class emerged at the beginning of the thirties through trading with Europe, Syria and Palestine. The leading merchants were Idilbi and Malas, Mithqal and Shawkat Asfour, Sabri al-Tabbaa, Ali Budair, Said al-Sayiqh, Haj Yasin Thiyab, [117]


Farid and Hussein Khirfan, Rifai and Abduh, Michael Qawar, Tawfiq al-Jundi, Mahmoud al-Shamma, Hamdi and Ibrahim Manqu, Adil al-Safadi, Jumaian and Shatan, Fraih and Sabillah, Tawfiq Qattan and Shafiq al-Qadi.2 Although the rich merchant class was able to reap the largest share of the benefits of the economy, and the wealthiest merchants were often richer than any shaikh, notable or landed gentry, they were without any serious influence on the political scene of Trans-Jordan. For, with the exception of Jumaian, a Christian from Madaba and an indigenous Trans-Jordanian, the richest and indeed most merchants were Jordanians naturalised after 1923. Prestige and influence were more the privileges of ministers, members of the Legislative Council, judges, Arab Legion senior officers, senior civil servants, shaikhs, and notables. The second ordinary session of the Legislative Council was opened by the Amir Abdullah on 1 November 1930, with the following speech from the throne: Honourable Members I thank God for his blessings and, thereafter I congratulate you for your return to your Council, after your rest in your constituencies for a period during which you have been able to know the opinion of the nation and its needs. I am confident that you will do your best to address the issues that you found. You will go ahead in loyal service to the country. It is a good sign that you start your session with the news that we have been able to clear the country of the locust attack. The people who joined the campaign against the attack deserve our thanks. In accordance with our aim of maintaining peace and security in the country, we have increased our support to the Tribal Courts adjudicating between Trans-Jordan and neighbouring Arab countries and the results have been excellent. Raiding on the Syrian–Trans-Jordanian frontier is nearly eradicated, and all fear of raiding has been prevented by the alertness and co-operation of both governments, and I hope the same will be established in our southern frontier. We are glad to have hope for the future because of our Government’s efforts towards progress and development. You have seen discipline and accuracy in action. I mention with gladness the provision of water to houses in the capital. Above all is the construction of roads connecting all parts of the country, and to [118]

THE RISE OF THE OPPOSITION

that end we thank many of the sons of the country who volunteered to work in many road projects. Thus, trade has developed communication; care and attention have been paid to education and the education curriculum has been decided on a nationalist foundation. Support for industrial training has been given and plans have been made to establish an industrial college next year. We have sent some sons of the country to industrial high schools and universities in other countries fully paid by the Government and we hope that we will send a few more to European countries in the future. I am glad that care and attention have been paid to the health of the nation in the rural and badiyah [desert] areas by measures of illness prevention and the protection of water wells from pollution, thus the number of cases of illness have been sharply reduced. Internal and external communications have been established by post, telegraph and wireless, and daily post to Palestine has been maintained. The administration of finance, justice, agriculture, customs and excise, antiquities, land survey and security have been successful, in spite of the economic crisis which has affected the whole world. We want to deal with that situation, and gain welfare for the nation, and we have instructed our Government to that end. I thank God for close relations with neighbouring kingdoms and countries and for close relations with His Britannic Majesty’s Government on the bases of loyalty and friendship. I have promised you, when I spoke with my brother the King of Iraq, to conclude a treaty between us; we now have exchanged the text of the treaty which will be ratified soon. I hereby open this Ordinary Session of the Legislative Council, may God help our hands to achieve the hopes of his blessing and the support of his greatest Messenger, God have peace and mercy upon him.3

During the first meeting, on 2 November, four committees were elected: the committee for the reply to the speech from the throne, and the administrative, legal, and financial committees. During the second meeting, on 5 November, Shams al-Din Sami raised the question of the adoption of Palestinian laws by the Legislative Council for application in Trans-Jordan. He referred to the Palestinian law concerning bank transactions, which was submitted to the Legislative Council as a draft law on the basis that it was requested by the President of the Amman Chamber of Commerce. He said the Government was forcing the [119]


Legislative Council to adopt a law only because it was applied in Palestine. Najib Abu al-Shar, a Christian member from Huson, pointed out that there were three religions in Palestine – Islam, Christianity and Judaism – and the Government of Palestine had no official religion. But in Jordan, he said, ‘we have an independent government and the official religion of the State is Islam. We do not need this law, because offices close only on Friday and during official holidays.’ Audah al-Qusus, a Christian member from Karak, supported the Government with the simplistic argument that government offices and banks closed on Fridays, banks also closed on Sundays, and added ‘there is a gap between Friday and Sunday, that is Saturday, and those who must pay their debts on Friday cannot do so except on Saturday, and those who must pay on Saturday cannot do so except on Monday’. Najib al-Shraidah criticised Audah al-Qusus and said that the Organic Law provided that the religion of the State was Islam. He added: The Legislative Council does not recognise the Rutenburg Project or the presence of even one Jew in Trans-Jordan. Therefore, I call the attention of honourable colleagues to reject the draft law, for there is no justification for its adoption except that it is being implemented in Palestine. The acceptance of every Palestinian law as it comes means that Trans-Jordan was part of Palestine, and the meaning of that is that the Balfour Declaration applies to it.

He insisted on opposing the draft law, which was rejected later in the day and sent back to the Government.4 The vote was clear evidence of the extreme jealousy of the majority regarding Jordanian sovereignty, and of the fear of the Balfour Declaration being applied to Trans-Jordan. On a similar theme, Nazmi Abd al-Hadi asked the Government why had it accepted a Palestinian official to carry out an investigation of an alleged crime committed by some Arab Legion officers. This, he argued, was a contravention of the Organic Law. The Government replied, during the sixth meeting, on 17 November, that ‘the investigation started on 8 November; that the investigator, Judge Baker, was appointed as Attorney General by the High Judicial Council, in accordance with a suggestion by the Acting Commander of the Arab Legion, Captain Stafford, and that the action was legal’. The Government’s reply was a self-inflicted insult to its dignity and sovereignty, for no government with the slightest self-respect would allow its army commander to interfere in matters [120]


within the jurisdiction of its judiciary. The debate that followed tested the principle of freedom of speech in the Legislative Council. Nazmi Abd al-Hadi criticised the Government for using the High Judicial Council as a cover-up for its political mistake regarding national sovereignty. He explained that the appointed judge was still the President of the Central Court of Jerusalem, and Jordanian law forbids the appointment of non-Jordanians. He said that it was an insult to the Jordanian judiciary, which already had a British Adviser, and suggested that a complaint should be presented to the Amir. Najib al-Shraidah pointed out that Nazmi Abd al-Hadi presented his question on 5 November, the decision of the High Judicial Council was on 6 November, and the British Judge Baker came to Amman on 7 November, which showed how the cover-up was ‘cooked’. He argued that bringing in a foreign judge to deal with a Jordanian case revealed the Government’s lack of confidence in Jordanian judges. He further criticised the Government for failing to import agricultural machines, for not reducing the burden of debt on the farmers, for high taxation, excise duties, and unemployment. He questioned: ‘Which of you brothers does not see the hundreds of people devastated by hunger and sickness in the streets? Where is mercy for the Jordanian taxpayer to reduce the tithe which was paid in the Turkish piastre [qirsh] at 20 qirsh for a Majidi [an Ottoman coin equal to 20 Ottoman piasters] and now paid in Palestinian qirsh in spite of the great difference in their value?’ He gave an example of a tax collector who demanded one shilling from a woman in a village who had to sell her dress to pay the tax; the collector had mercy on her and paid it on her behalf. He appealed to the Government: Do not compare the farmers with those who are comfortable in their fancy suits, who show their pride and vanity, who enjoy the most delicious food and drink, who inhabit the beautiful skyscrapers. You, the Government, have mercy on the poor farmers who are dressed in rags, who eat the bread of corn and barley, who drink murky water and live in dirty huts. Allahu Akbar [God is Great]. A few individuals live a high life and a whole nation dies.5

Sami supported Nazmi Abd al-Hadi and al-Shraidah in criticising the appointment of a foreign judge and asked who among the Jordanian judges was going to decide whether Judge Baker’s findings were legal. [121]


He added: ‘If they were not trusted to investigate the case of the two officers, who is the judge who will give the final decision?’ The whole debate was an embarrassment to the Government and just before it got out of hand the Prime Minister, who was also the Speaker of the Legislative Council, changed the subject of the debate. During the eighth meeting of the Legislative Council, on 22 November, the first appointment of the Amir’s Deputy occurred. The Amir was leaving for Cyprus to visit his father, King al-Hussein ibn Ali, who was in exile there. The following Iradah al-Saniyah (Royal Command) was announced: We Abdullah ibn al-Hussein the Amir of Trans-Jordan, because of our travel to Cyprus, and in accordance with provisions added to the Organic Law on 1 July 1929, and in accordance with the decision of the Executive Council, command the following: The Amir Shakir is appointed as our Deputy during our absence. Our Deputy shall have all the rights regarding the throne, except dealing with treaties, signing them, the approval of the inheritance law provided for in Article 16 of the Organic Law, the dismissal of the Prime Minister and the members of the Executive Council or accepting their resignation, or the dismissal of officials who are appointed or dismissed by High Iradah or accepting their resignation. On condition that our said Deputy proceeds in accordance with the plan that we followed completely. Raghdan 21 October 1930 Abdullah

The Amir Shakir swore the oath of loyalty: ‘I swear by Allah to protect the Constitution and be loyal to the Nation and the Country.’ During the eleventh meeting, on 29 November 1930, the Government introduced a draft of a special temporary budget law for 1930/31. Nazmi Abd al-Hadi protested that the draft was part of the law approved by the Legislative Council several months ago and that he was unofficially told that the law would not be implemented except after approval by the British Government. He said: ‘what is the meaning of sending every list of the budget to be approved by His Majesty’s Government and find seven months later that we have another law?’ He asked: ‘does any of us know where is the budget which we approved in [122]


its details and entirety?’ Sami said that the details in the draft law were rejected by the Legislative Council during the budget debate in April, but the Government spent the money and wanted the Legislative Council to approve. He demanded that the discussion on the draft should be postponed until the approval of the general budget. Abu al-Shar asked the Government if the 1930/31 budget was approved by the Amir. Tawfiq Abu al-Huda replied that it was not. Abu al-Shar said: ‘therefore the Government should have sent it back to the Legislative Council with the reasons why it was not approved’. Najib al-Shraidah insisted that: ‘the rights of legislation and administration have been transferred from His Majesty’s Government to the Jordanian Government by the 1928 Treaty and the Organic Law; and thus the approval of the budget in consultation with His Majesty’s Government needs further interpretation’. During the third meeting, on 8 November, Shaikh Refaifan al-Majali asked the Government to report on what action it had taken for the dismissal of non-Jordanian government employees. Under pressure from the majority, the Government promulgated the Law for the Dismissal of Non-Jordanian Employees on 16 December 1929, and a committee was established to make its recommendations on the issue. Tawfiq Abu al-Huda replied for the Government during the sixteenth meeting, on 10 December 1930, that the committee had decided to dismiss forty employees. He said that nine of them had proved their Jordanian nationality, that another ten were considered by the directors of their departments to be specialists and therefore could not be dismissed, and only 21 were dismissed. Refaifan al-Majali protested that the people of the country did not benefit from the law for dismissing non-Jordanian employees because the directors of departments, the majority of whom were of non-Jordanian origin, refused to employ them on the pretence that they were not suitable for service. Because the issue of nationality was extremely sensitive to the majority of Jordanians, and had been raised several times with the British Government and the League of Nations as well as with the Amir and the Jordanian Government, the Opposition took the issue as an opportunity to attack the Government. Shams al-Din Sami said that the law was the result of bad management by the Government and the directors of departments. In his view the people of Trans-Jordan had shown their strength of character and loyalty to the cause of Arab unity. In spite of [123]


all the problems they were facing, they welcomed every Arab immigrant, looked upon him as a brother and gave him the right to run the country. But, he said: What can the son of Jordan say to his brother if he sees that he has harmed the nation and nationalism? The man who does not honour his people and does not respect his country must never be respected by the sons of Trans-Jordan. The country of Trans-Jordan has been hit by some who undertook to kill Arab chivalry in the hearts of the Arabs under the guise of Arabism.

He then directed his attack at the directors of departments and said: ‘They treat us like the white man treats the African; such people came to the country brandishing the flag of nationalism, but then manifested colonialism far more strongly than the original colonialists, and have divided the one nation in that law which harmed Syrian unity.’6 Abu al-Shar continued with the attack against the Prime Minister and the whole Government when he said: It is not appropriate to criticise the Prime Minister while we know that what we demand is beyond his capability. There is no moral person that we can call government; they are different governments without collective responsibility. There is no way to correct the present situation except by the amendment of the constitution in harmony with national sovereignty and modern constitutional principles and thereafter by the formation of a responsible and accountable national government.

Najib al-Shraidah maintained the momentum of the attack by blaming those directors of departments who practised nepotism and did not dismiss their relatives. He said: ‘If our brothers from Syria want the price of nationalism from us to be in employment, that Arabness is damnable. Tawfiq Abu al-Huda said that nine of the dismissed had gained Jordanian nationality, these are fraudulent, and based only on nepotism. I still remember the 150 employees who were naturalised without justification.’ Shams al-Din Sami interrupted: ‘We must remember that the official who interpreted the law was not a Jordanian.’ Najib al-Shraidah continued: ‘If you enter a government office in Amman, you think you are in Astanah or Damascus as you see so many employees, although the [124]


whole population of Jordan does not equal half the population of Damascus.’ Attallah al-Suhaimat blamed the Prime Minister for neglect of the law and resigned from the committee; Najib al-Shraidah said that he was ready to resign in protest against the Government, which did not respect the wish of the people. Bakhit al-Ibrahim added his threat of resignation. Audah al-Qusus tried to save the Prime Minister when he agreed with the Opposition that the people’s suffering had not been alleviated. He called for an appeal to be presented to the Amir to deal with the situation. However, although the Government was seriously wounded, it survived that very aggressive debate.7 During the seventeenth meeting, on 13 December, Attallah al-Suhaimat demanded that an appeal should be presented to the Amir against the Prime Minister’s contravention of the law in the dismissal of employees. Shams al-Din Sami said that a government which did not respect the law should not itself be respected. Refaifan al-Majali added in anger: ‘Allahu Akbar [God is Great]. The shepherds of sheep respect the laws, why is it that ministers and directors of departments, who are responsible for the implementation of the laws, do not respect them?’ Tawfiq Abu al-Huda agreed with presenting the issue to the Amir. Refaifan al-Majali concluded that ‘all governments care for and think of their people, except this Government’ which, he believed, took every opportunity to oppress its people. However when the appeal to the Amir was voted upon, it was rejected by the Legislative Council. Attallah al-Suhaimat repeated some earlier words of Shams al-Din Sami: ‘It is true we are the catastrophes [Nawayib] against the people, not the representatives [Nuwab] of the people.’8 When the 1930/31 budget was returned by the Government to the Legislative Council with suggested amendments by the British Government (to cancel some heads, reduce others, and to add £P4,700 to the head of the Arab Legion for the formation of the Desert Patrol Force), Sami opposed the amendments. During the twenty-ninth meeting, on 26 January 1931, he accused His Majesty’s Government of interference in the small details of the budget, which he considered an insult to the people. He said that accepting the budget would mean accepting direct rule by Britain. He concluded: ‘We are facing an important historic decision, we either surrender in the name of the nation to the will of the British Resident, and damage the honour of our nation, or be steadfast and refuse the amendments.’9 [125]


During the thirtieth meeting, on 28 January 1931, Nazmi Abd al-Hadi maintained the momentum of the attack against the Government by opposing the amendment of the budget. He criticised the Colonial Office for its interference in the details of the budget and accused it of refusing to approve the establishment of an agricultural school which was much needed by Jordan. He claimed that it refused to increase any head of expenditure needed by any department with an Arab director, but approved every increase to every foreign director. He further attacked the Colonial Office for interfering in the will of the nation to allocate £P1,000 to Crown Prince Talal ibn Abdullah and continued: They want to allocate, from this poor government’s money, £P4,700 to establish a new force. But why? To control the desert, to oppress the freedom of the miserable Bedouin and to protect the railway and the oil pipes. Our poor nation, in great need of help, is forced to allocate a large amount of its money to protect the money of the rich Iraqi Petroleum Company. No Arab can accept this.10

Order broke down in the Legislative Council, as tempers flared and anger prevailed. Members started to shout at each other as well as at the Government, which compelled the President to suspend the meeting. The Government was severely wounded for the second time, but again managed to survive. During the thirty-first meeting, on 31 January 1931, Shams al-Din Sami included the British Resident in his criticism. He asked the Council not to forget that: ‘our present situation is the result of the collusion of some directors of departments with the British Resident against us and the nation. We will not accept any amendment.’ Tawfiq Abu al-Huda attempted to defend the amendments by agreeing with the objection to the cancellation of allocation of £P1,000 to the Crown Prince, the Amir Talal, and thought that it was either a mistake or a misunderstanding by the British Government. He said that the allocation was made in the 1931/32 budget. He ignored the issue of interference by the British Government and said that the wishes of the Council would be included in the next budget. While Abu al-Huda’s defence was financial, the attack by the Opposition was political and financial, and when the rejection of the amendments was voted upon, the Government was defeated. The session of the Legislative Council was suspended by the Amir on the same day. [126]


It became obvious to the Amir that cooperation between the Government and the majority of the members of the Legislative Council was nearly impossible. On 9 February 1931 he dissolved the Legislative Council, one year before the end of its complete term, in accordance with the following Iradah: Because the need and interest made it necessary to add new allocations to the two parts revenue and expenditure of the 1930/31 budget, which the Legislative Council have debated; to add £P24,000 as an increase to the Grant-in-Aid from the British Government; to make an increase of £P10,000 for the operations against locust, more than the previous allocation in the budget; to increase the allocation for the cost of arbitration between Hijaz-Najd and Trans-Jordan, which was not presented to the Council before. Because the Legislative Council refused to consider these new matters and whatever notes have been sent to them after the budget in its final form, and because the Council did not accept the Government’s request to postpone the debate to the extraordinary session. Because of what the Prime Minister has presented to us. We Abdullah ibn al-Hussein, the Amir of Trans-Jordan, in accordance with our rights, dissolve the Legislative Council and command for the general elections.11

A new Legislative Council On 21 February 1931, Hassan Khalid Abu al-Huda resigned and the Amir formed a new Government on 22 February as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Shaikh Abdullah Sraj, Prime Minister, Chief Judge, Interior and Finance Minister Tawfiq Abu al-Huda, General Secretary Omar Hikmat, Minister of Justice Shukri Shashaah, Director of the Treasury Adib al-Kayid al-Awamlah, Director of Antiquities Audah al-Qusus, Attorney General

The programme of the new Government included the commitment to collective responsibility in accordance with the Organic Law, to the amendment of the 1928 Treaty, to free elections for the Legislative Council [127]


without unlawful interference, to the implementation of the rights provided for in the organic law and the 1928 Treaty, and to general reform and improvement. Adib al-Kayid al-Awamlah was born in Salt 1882. He represented the Qada of Salt in the National Assembly in Damascus in 1919, and returned to Trans-Jordan in July 1920 as a member of the Court of First Instance in Salt. Omar Hikmat was a Circassian lawyer of a very prominent family. Audah al-Qusus was a Christian from Karak and a member of the Legislative Council. Shukri Shashaah was born in Gaza in Palestine, and during 1919 was appointed as accountant for Salt, and in 1921 was made a financial inspector for the Government of Trans-Jordan. The formation of the Cabinet without ministries for education, health, agriculture, and public works, was further evidence of the neglect of social and economic development. Priority was given to finance and law and order. Although the department of antiquities, which was allocated only £P2,216 or 0.6 per cent of expenditure, was represented in the Cabinet, the departments of health, education and agriculture, which were allocated 13.6 per cent of expenditure, were not. The British Financial Adviser continued to control the ministry of finance, although the post was under the Prime Minister. Thus direct control by the mandatory power on the budget and the financial management of the country was maintained. In preparation for the general elections for the second Legislative Council, the Amir appointed a number of shaikhs to elect two Bedouin members of the Council. The electors were, from amongst the northern Bedouins: Hadithah al-Khraisha, Mithqal al-Fayiz, Zahir al-Thiyab, Salamah al-Duraibi, Fahad al-Tradh al-Zabin, Mohammad ibn Zuhair, Nasir al-Mur, Mansur al-Qadi, Hindi ibn Kua’aibir, and Uabaid al-Nowfal. Amongst the southern Bedouins were: Hamd ibn Jazi, Sayah Abu Nuwayir, Mohammad ibn Duhailan, Bakhit ibn Darwish, Huwaimil al-Aatnah, Ghaith ibn Hidayah, Hasn ibn Jadd, Mitib ibn Abtan, Sulaiman Abu Jifnain, and Dabbur al Rahis. The elections were held on 1 June 1931 and the following 16 members were elected:

[128]


TABLE 5.1

Elected members of second Legislative Council, 1931 Balqa district Muslim Shaikh Majid al-Adwan Said al-Mufti Hashim Khair Adil al-Azmah

Christian Said Abu Jabir

Ajlun district Muslim Qasim al-Hindawi Mohammad al-Saad al-Batainah Naji al-Azzam

Christian Salti al-Ibrahim

Karak district Muslim Shaikh Refaifan al-Majali Shaikh Hussein al-Tarawnah Shaikh Salih al-Auran

Christian Mitri al-Zuraiqat

Bedouin members Southern Shaikh Hamd ibn Jazi

Circassian Hussein Yousef Khawaja

Northern Shaikh Hadithah al-Khraishah

Most of the members of the previous Legislative Council lost their seats: Ala al-Din Tuqan, Shams al-Din Sami, Said al-Sulaibi, Mohammad al-Unsi, Bakhit al-Ibrahim, Attallah al-Suhaimat, Audah al-Qusus, Abdullah al-Kulaib al-Shraidah, Najib al-Shraidah, Najib Abu al-Shar, and Auqlah Mohammad al-Nusair. The Opposition did not boycott the elections and their President, al-Tarawnah won in Karak, but they lost some of their most active and eloquent spokesmen: Shams al-Din Sami, Attallah Suhaimat, Najib al-Shraidah and Najib Abu al-Shar. The new opposition in the Legislative Council consisted of three members: Hussein al-Tarawnah, Qasim al-Hindawi and Adil al-Azmah. [129]


The extraordinary session of the second Legislative Council was opened by the Amir Abdullah on 10 June 1931. Just before the speech from the throne, Adil al-Azmah suggested that the members should stand for five minutes as a tribute to the memory of ‘the great departed His Late Majesty King al-Hussein ibn Ali, the mercy of Allah be upon him’. At the end of the five minutes the Amir delivered the speech from the throne, in which he praised the participation of the people in the elections to fulfil their constitutional rights. He thanked the Arab Nation and the people of Jordan for their sincere condolences. He said: ‘His Hashemite Majesty’ my father the King departed from this perishable world to the everlasting world, may Allah have taken him to his dwelling place, and chosen him for his mercy.12 In their reply to the speech from the throne, the members of the Legislative Council asked the Government to amend the 1928 Treaty and to deal with the economic crisis. They commended the prevention of raiding between the tribes of Hijaz-Najd and Jordan and cooperation between Arab countries. The Opposition took the initiative during the third meeting, with an attack on the previous government. Hussein al-Tarawnah commented on the fact that Hasan Khalid Abu al-Huda had held a meeting with the Colonial Secretary in London to discuss the affairs of Jordan. Hussein al-Tarawnah asked whether the Government had delegated him to discuss Jordanian affairs in that capacity or if it had been interference by him without justification? Tawfiq Abu al-Huda replied that the Government did not authorise Hassan Khalid to conduct any negotiations and that he did not have the right to do so. Adil al-Azmah said: ‘The General Secretary spoke in the name of the Government and explained that the previous Prime Minister had not the slightest official authority in his discussions with the Colonial Secretary. I hereby declare that Hassan Khalid does not represent the Jordanian people.’13 The session was suspended by the Amir on the same day.

A significant meeting Meanwhile, on 3 July 1931, the High Commissioner for Trans-Jordan Sir J. R. Chancellor, visited Amman and had an interview with the Amir. The Amir made two points. First, he had asked for arrangements to be made for him to visit London, but he had not received any further [130]


information on the matter. Secondly, because Chancellor was very shortly leaving for London at the end of his mission as High Commissioner, he, the Amir, wished to make some observations about Jordan. One of the most significant of these was that the first Trans-Jordanian Legislative Council had passed and approved the 1928 Treaty on the understanding that some of its articles would be amended. For this reason the present Council and the Government had certain proposals to submit to the High Commissioner for the amendment of the treaty. The Executive Council of Trans-Jordan should be separated from the Legislative Council. This did not mean that the Legislative Council would be converted into a Parliament with the power to defeat the Government; the main objective was to render the legislative power independent of the executive power. Also, the people of Trans-Jordan wished to be represented in London, like the people of Iraq, and they also wished that their Prime Minister could be granted the British post of Minister of Foreign Affairs. It was not, however, intended that Trans-Jordan should be represented in any foreign country. The Amir Abdullah’s aim was to establish the democratic principle of separation of powers and enhance the sovereign status of the country. Although Chancellor represented the power known to be the model of modern democracy, he ignored the first request for the principle of separation of powers. He responded to the second with a vague generality that the High Commissioner was ‘the representative of Trans-Jordan vis-à-vis His Majesty’s Government, but that there would be no objection in case of need to the Trans-Jordan Government sending delegates to London on special missions, if it wished’. The exchange between the two men shows the nature of relations between the British and the Trans-Jordanian Government during that period. While the Amir was attempting to achieve the enhancement of his country’s independence, sovereignty and international presence, in accordance with democratic and institutional principles, the High Commissioner was seeking to maintain British control. The Amir persisted that: ‘the intention of Trans-Jordan was not to diminish the power of the High Commissioner or to display any distrust in him. Even if Trans-Jordan had a representative in London, the High Commissioner would continue to give his directions to the Trans-Jordan Government, in the same way as does the High Commissioner in Iraq.’ The High Commissioner, unable to respond with a politically logical reply, played the financial card: [131]


His Majesty’s Treasury would express the opinion that the post of a Trans-Jordan representative in London would entail unnecessary expense; and as long as His Majesty’s Government granted financial assistance to Trans-Jordan the finance of the country must be controlled by His Majesty’s Treasury. A representative might be appointed to London when Trans-Jordan became self-supporting and no longer stood in need of financial assistance.14

The Amir assured Chancellor that Trans-Jordan would not oppose financial control by His Majesty’s Treasury and, ‘would acquiesce in the continuance of such control until the country had reached the stage of being able to regulate its own finances’. He reminded the High Commissioner of the fact that: ‘Trans-Jordan had rendered valuable services during the war and with other Arab countries had been promised independence by degrees.’ He then expressed the wishes of the Jordanians and his own when he said that: ‘[t]he people of Trans-Jordan refused to remain stationary when Iraq and Syria had advanced politically. He wished to preserve the peaceful spirit which now prevailed in Trans-Jordan. If, however, Syria were granted a constitutional status like Iraq and the status of Trans-Jordan did not change, it would certainly affect the people and create discontent.’ He continued with a demand that the Arab Legion should regain its military character and be charged with the maintenance of the internal as well as the external security of the country. He insisted that ‘[i]t had now sunk to the level of a Police Force, a decline which offended the dignity of the people of Trans-Jordan’. The Amir raised his major complaint towards the end of the meeting, when he turned to the fact that he had seen no change between the period preceding and that following the 1928 Treaty. He explained that he was tired of not being in direct contact with the High Commissioner. He said that he had appointed Shaikh Sraj Prime Minister because he had been told that ‘it was His Excellency’s desire’. He revealed that ‘he was very often told that it was His Excellency’s wish that this or that should be done, no consultation taking place’. When the High Commissioner replied that he thought Cox was in constant touch with him, the Amir agreed but added that under the constitution he had the power of choosing his Prime Minister and the Prime Minister had the power of choosing his [132]


colleagues. In practice, however, things were different. The Prime Minister was suggested to him and the other Ministers were suggested to the Prime Minister. What he would like would be that when a new Prime Minister was to be appointed, the Amir should himself see the High Commissioner, discuss the matter directly with him, and appoint his Prime Minister without the intervention of any other person. He very much esteemed the British Resident, but Colonel Cox had been there for a long time and had grown accustomed to calling the Ministers to his office and giving them directions, so that he was now unable to change his attitude.15

It was obvious that the Amir was being isolated by Colonel Cox and his protégé and Tawfiq Abu al-Huda, who on many occasions since he became General Secretary of the Cabinet had defended the policies and interests of the British Government rather than those of Trans-Jordan. The Amir explained that All the directions of the British Resident were given to the Prime Minister through Tawfiq Abu al Huda who was the Secretary of the Council and he himself as well as his Prime Minister were excluded from the management of affairs. He had said to Colonel Cox that if the latter had such great confidence in Tawfiq Abu al Huda he was prepared to appoint him as Prime Minister so that he would be a responsible person. Colonel Cox however objected that Tawfiq Abu al Huda was a permanent official and the office of Prime Minister was temporary.

It was in fact Colonel Cox who interfered in the elections for the second Legislative Council, not the Amir Abdullah as some papers at the time suggested, for the Amir also complained to the High Commissioner that During the elections to the Legislative Council the British Resident called the Ministers to see him and informed them that the Amir was interfering with the elections and endeavouring to secure the election of Shams al Din Sami, Nazmi Abd al Hadi and Mohammad al Unsi. Colonel Cox declared that these three persons ought not to be elected. The Prime Minister had reported this to the Amir who asked these three persons to withdraw their candidature.

Such was the practice of democracy by the representative of the ‘Mother of Parliaments’. There is no record of authority, or instructions, being [133]


given to Colonel Cox to act in such an undemocratic and politically immoral manner. The Amir was extremely frustrated by the continued interference in matters not included in the treaty. He intimated to the High Commissioner that: ‘If one person was to remain permanently in Trans-Jordan as British Resident he should either become a friend of the Amir or be replaced.’16 That statement spoke volumes about the suspicion that existed between the Amir and Cox on the one hand, and between the Amir and Abu al-Huda on the other. Abu al-Huda was more loyal to Cox and his oppressive policies than to his sovereign the Amir. From a nationalist point of view Tawfiq Abu al-Huda’s behaviour could have been regarded as treason. On 16 July 1931, big clouds of locust settled in the Southern desert areas of Trans-Jordan. The Department of Agriculture, supported by the Arab Legion and a company of the TJFF, dealt with the attack. During August 1931, the mission of the High Commissioner for TransJordan, Sir John R. Chancellor, came to an end. He was succeeded by General Sir Arthur Grenfell Wauchope, who arrived in Jerusalem on 19 November 1931.

Land for the Amir On 18 August 1931, The Legislative Council approved unanimously the Law for the Grant of Land to the Amir Abdullah ibn al-Hussein of 1931. The gift consisted of 2,000 dunums in Zur al-Katar in the Jordan Valley, 3,000 dunums in Hummah near Amman and 60,000 in Ghor Kibid. The idea to grant the Amir Abdullah an estate of land to improve his income and to provide a small appanage for his sons Talal and Nayif was suggested by Mr Pirie Gordon, who was The Times newspaper correspondent in Jerusalem. In a personal letter which he wrote to his friend Shuckbrough of the Colonial Office on 11 December 1929, after a weekend visit to Amman, Gordon explained that the Civil List of the Amir had been successively reduced from £P60,000 a year, which was promised and given to him when he first came to Jordan in 1921, to £P13,000, of which £P3,000 a year had for some time been deducted for the payment of the Amir’s debts. He added: [134]


The greater part of the rest is carefully allocated and of the exiguous sum left for his Privy Purse the Amir is bound by his own inclination, by common decency and by public opinion to provide pensions for a variety of old relatives, friends and servants who have lost their all with the fall of the Hashemite Dynasty in the Hijaz. Then the Amir has had to meet Talal’s expenses at Sandhurst. The result has been that the Amir has only had in the neighbourhood of £P1,000 a year for himself out of the poor remnant of his official allowance. He has, moreover, no personal property in his own Emirate.17

Mr Gordon referred to the fact that King Faisal of Iraq and King Ali were granted estates of land by the Iraqi Parliament, and suggested that a similar grant should be given to the Amir from state land in Trans-Jordan, which was nominally owned by him in his official capacity, in order that ‘he might actually possess it, as a Sandringham or Balmoral, of his own and thereby in course of time augment his income’. On 2 May 1931, after 17 months of consultations between the British Government, the High Commissioner for Trans-Jordan, and the TransJordan Government, the British Government approved the grant of three pieces of land to the Amir. In his comments during the meeting of the Legislative Council, Said al-Mufti said: The nation will be very happy this day to do their duty to their beloved Amir. I say that His Highness was blamed by all the leaders of the country for not having some of the Mawat land until now. Firstly, His Highness will now act as a good example to the people in the use of modern agricultural methods. Secondly, he will be able to cover even a small part of his financial needs when every one know his generosity. I say this for the nation who is bound with love and loyalty to the Amir. I say this because some hateful newspapers have criticised this blessed project which does not repay more than a small fraction to the Amir, who has performed great services for this Jordanian and neighbouring countries. The Amir is here to stand as a strong deterrent against the tide of Zionism. They forgot that our Amir is the son of the one who sacrificed all and never was concerned about his crown in the interest of the Arab countries.18

Jerusalem conferences On 3 December 1931, Qasim al-Hindawi suggested sending a delegation to the Muslim Conference in Jerusalem between 7 and 17 December. [135]


The Prime Minister refused to accept the suggestion on the basis that it should have been presented in writing. Hussein al-Tarawnah intervened, saying: ‘As the President of the Jordanian Executive Committee I had an audience with His Highness the Amir regarding this issue and he approved sending a delegation from the Jordanian Executive Committee. I have already formed the delegation to the General Islamic Conference in Holy Jerusalem. Such was the understanding between the Opposition and the Amir on major issues. The conference was attended by a delegation consisting of Hussein al-Tarawnah, Refaifan al-Majali, Sulaiman al-Sudi, Salim al-Hindawi, Hamid al-Sharari, Adil al-Azmah, Subhi Abu Ghanimah, Tahir al-Juqqah, Said al-Mufti, Nimr al-Humud, Abdullah al-Daoud, Hamd ibn Jazi, Faris ibn Jazi, Naji al-Azzam, Salih al-Auran, Mohammad Zuhdi al-Daghistani and Ibrahim Hashim. They were the true representatives of the majority of the Jordanian people. The main resolutions adopted by the conference were: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Demanding the handover of the Hijaz Railway to the Muslims, and that it should be protected as Awqaf. Rejecting the decisions of the Buraq Committee. Protesting against the cruel treatment of the leaders of Tripoli and Burqah in Lybia. Protesting against the attempt by France to convert the Muslim Berbers to Christianity. Protesting against colonialism in any Muslim country.19

The conference was attended by a large number of delegations, representing the Muslims of Palestine, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq, Tunisia, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Aden, Algeria, Jawa, Nigeria, Syalon, Iran, India, Albania, Bosnia, Qufqasia and Yugoslavia. It was the first expression of the deep concern of Muslims all over the world about the Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem and Islam in general. The attendance of a large Muslim delegation from Trans-Jordan did enhance the country’s Arab and international identity. It also showed the strength of sympathy and support for the Palestinians by the Jordanian people and the Amir. On 13 December 1931, Arab delegates from Trans-Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, Libya, [136]


and Tunisia attended the Arab National Conference, also held in Jerusalem. The Jordanian delegation consisted of the same members who had attended the Muslim Conference. This conference declared: 1.

2.

3.

Arab countries are one complete indivisible unit and all forms of division which have occurred are not accepted by the Nation and not recognised by it. Efforts should be directed in every Arab country to one aim, complete independence and unity, and the rejection of every idea which aims at the limitation of political action to local and regional issues. Because colonialism in all its forms is completely contradictory to Arab dignity and its great aims, the Arab Nation rejects it and will struggle against it with all its powers.20

It was obvious that none of the Jordanian delegates, or indeed the whole delegation, would have participated in the Muslim or Arab conferences without the approval and consent of the Amir Abdullah. The Amir’s highest goal was Arab unity and his immediate aim was to reunite Syria, divided by Britain and France into four small states (Syria, Palestine, Lebanon and Trans-Jordan), in a united Arab Kingdom. His support for both conferences was of a piece with his policy and ambitions. He was in contact with the other Arab delegates from Syria, Palestine, Lebanon and Iraq, most of whom were traditional Arab nationalists of the former Istiqlal Party, or Arab revolutionaries who took part in the Great Arab Revolt.

The fear of expanding Zionist colonialism was closely related to the cause of Arab unity, and this fear was clearly expressed by Adil al-Azmah’s speech in the Legislative Council on 18 February 1932, during the debate about state land: ‘We all know that world Zionism does not content itself with Palestine and the attack on its land and people, to occupy this country is included in its programme.’ He suggested the promulgation of a special law placing an absolute prohibition on the sale of land to any Zionist in the world.21

[137]


Debating the budget As usual the most pressing question facing the Legislative Council was a financial one. It took until 2 June 1932, for the approval of the 1931/32 budget by the Legislative Council and the British Government, as Appendix A shows. The total of the British Grant-in-Aid was £P119,150, and the total of local revenue was £P229,540. More than 32 per cent of the local revenue came from the farmers in the form of animal and tithe taxes. These made up a total of £P73,700, while only £P6,250 (or 2 per cent) was allocated in the budget for agriculture. During a year of drought, animal sickness, and an attack of rats, there seems to have been little or no concern for agriculture, ordinarily the most productive sector of the economy. With the value of the Palestine pound reduced and the price of grain at its lowest for many years past, poverty prevailed in the Jordanian farming community.22 Many members of the Legislative Council criticised the Department of Agriculture during the budget debate and Hussein al-Tarawnah condemned the ‘useless government’. In spite of the continued economic crisis, and the second drought year in succession, no significant changes were made in the budget of 1932/33. To add to the predicament and the poverty of the people, the Government increased the estimate of local revenue in order to provide for the expansion of the Civil Service and the increase of its salaries. No major investment in development was made, as can be seen from the expenditure detailed in Appendix A. Local revenue did indeed increase from £P229,540 in 1932 to £P251,160 in 1933, a sum of £P21,620, most of which was collected from the poor farmers. Yet only 1.8 per cent of the budget was allocated to the Department of Agriculture and most of that was paid in salaries to the staff, with only 10 per cent spent on development. Considering that agriculture provided the main source of national income, the allocation shows how inefficient the Government was, and how uncaring Colonel Cox and his staff. Further proof in the fact that 3.4 per cent of the budget was allocated to health, and 6.7 per cent to education, the two services most needed by the people, whilst more than 42 per cent was allocated to police and prisons (the Arab Legion) and the TJFF. This included the increase of the strength of the Arab Legion by 3 officers, 13 non-commissioned officers, and 82 men of the Desert Patrol Force at a cost of £P16,688. Little attention was paid by the British to the real mission entrusted to them by the League of Nations, ‘that the well being [138]


and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation’. The British Grant-in-Aid to Trans-Jordan was reduced by £P12,700 from £P84,700 in 1931/32, to £P72,000 in 1932/33. During the budget debate in the Legislative Council, some members called for the increase of Prince Talal’s allowance to the sum of £P1,000 as promised by the Government. Tawfiq Abu al-Huda refused this increase because of the economic crisis but defended the allocation of £P1,500 to the secret fund of the Desert Patrol Force against the criticism by Adil al-Azmah on the grounds that the sum was for expenditure on the Bedouin tribes.24 During the third meeting of the second ordinary session of the Legislative Council, the maturing Opposition tried its strength. Said al-Mufti, on behalf of twelve members, presented an entreaty signed by them on 7 November 1932, appealing to the Prime Minister to save the country from the economic crisis: It is not unknown to the Government that the country has been occupied with a devastating economic crisis to the extent that life has been limited in the eyes of the people. The continuance of this situation without paying attention to it will take the country to the abyss which will be the last stage of her life. Therefore, we the representatives of this miserable nation present our entreaty to you demanding that immediate action be taken to save this nation from certain death . . .

The twelve signatories were Shaikh Hadithah al-Khraishah, Shaikh Hamd ibn Jazi, Shaikh Hussein al-Tarawnah, Naji al-Azzam, Qasim al-Hindawi, Adil al-Azmah, Said al-Mufti, Mohammad al-Saad al Batainah, Hussein al-Yousef, Hashim Khair, Salti al-Ibrahim and Mitri al-Zuraiqat. The serious political crisis which was created by the entreaty compelled the Government to take certain measures to help the people in facing the economic crisis. The sum of £P15,000 was allocated for loans to needy farmers from the Agricultural Bank. A special pardon exempting needy people in Madaba, Maan, Salt, Taffilah, Irbid, Amman, Jarash, Karak and Aqaba from taxation, amounting to £P75,483, was promulgated and approved by the Legislative Council.25 But in spite of these measures, the implementation of which was considered to be a victory for the Opposition, the economic crisis persisted. [139]


NOTES 1 TJOG no. 21, 26 June 1930. LCR no. 21, 26 June 1930, meeting, 27 April 1930. 2 Madhi and Musa, Tarikh al-Urdon, pp. 329–30. 3 TJOG no. 22, 5 November 1930. LCR no. 22, 5 November 1930, meeting, 2 November 1930. 4 Ibid. 5 TJOG no. 27, 17 November 1930. LCR no. 27, 17 November 1930. Sixth meeting, on 17 November 1930. Najib al-Shraidah was not exaggerating, for I well remember that most pupils in my class were dressed in shabby and cheap clothes and had no pocket money, while the sons of those who were rich enjoyed far better clothes and appeared to be what they were, the sons of the merchant class or high officials. There was no middle class in Trans-Jordan during the thirties, only the rich, the poor, and the very poor. 6 TJOG no. 37, 1 January 1931. LCR no. 37, 1 January 1931, sixteenth meeting, 10 December 1930. 7 Ibid. 8 LCR no. 38, Seventeenth meeting, 13 December 1930. Shams al-Din Sami persisted in his attack against the Government raising questions regarding the case of the smuggling of weapons from Syria, through Jordan, to the Zionists of Palestine, in which Mr David Witch, a Jewish employee in the TJFF, stationed in Zarqa, was involved. The Arab Legion headquarters asked the Commander of the TJFF to remove him from Jordan, but the TJFF refused the demand. Tawfiq Abu al-Huda failed to respond to these questions. LCR no. 37, twentyfifth meeting, 14 January 1931. The imperial force included smugglers and mercenaries in its ranks. 9 LCR no. 50, Twenty-ninth meeting, 26 January 1931. 10 LCR no. 51, Thirtieth meeting, 28 January 1931. 11 Ibid. no. 52, Thirty-first meeting, 31 January 1931. See also TJOG no. 292, 9 February 1931. 12 TJOG/LCR no. 53, 13 June 1931. 13 Ibid. Also LCR no. 55, 17 June 1931 (Third meeting, 15 June 1931). 14 A. de L. Rush, Ruling Families of Arabia: Jordan (London: Pedwood Press Ltd., 1991), vol. 1 of two, Minute of meeting between the Amir and Chancellor, p. 127. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 PRO. CO 831/6/15. Mr Pirie Gordon to Shuckbrough, 11 December 1929. 18 TJOG/LCR no. 57, second meeting, 18 August 1931. 19 Ibid. Also LCR no. 67, Meeting on 3 December 1931. Also, Bayan Nuwaihidh Hut, Al-Qiyadat Wa Muassasat al-Syasiyah fi Filistin 1917–1948, p. 246; Khairiyah Qasimiyah, Al-Rail al-Arabi al-Awal (Beirut: 1991), p. 52. 20 Ibid. And Mohammad Abd al-Qadir Khraisat, Al-Urdinion wa al-Qadhiyah al-Wattaniyah (Amman: np, 1992), p. 283. As well as the document published by Shaikh Hussein al-Tarawnah immediately after the conference in Amman, the following signed the National Arab Charter: (the committee) Mohammad Izzat Darwazah, Asad Daghir, Ajaj Nuwaihid, Subhi al-Khadra, Khair al-Din al-Zirakli, and Awni Abd al-Hadi; (from Syria) Mohammad Rashid Ridha, Shukri [140]


21 22 23 24 25

al-Quwattli, Ali Aubaid, Mohammad Said Abd al-Qadir al-Jazairi, Ahmad Hilmi Pasha, Omar al-Tibi, Abd al-Qadir al-Kailani, Nabih al-Azmah, Yahay Khankan, Mohammad Tariq, and Sami al-Sarraj; (from Iraq) Mohammad Bahjat al-Athari, Ibrahim al-Waaith, Majid al-Farghuli, Hasan Ridha, and Said Thabit; (from Hijaz-Najd) Mohammad Hussein al-Dabbagh and Sharif Abdullah ibn Faisal; (from Trans-Jordan) Salim al-Hindawi, Mohammad Tahir al-Juqqah, Salih al-Auran, Shaikh Hussein al-Tarawnah, Abdullah al-Daoud, Khalil al-Talhuni, Sulaiman al-Sudi al-Rusan, Ala al-Din Tuqan, Adil al-Azmah, and Said al-Mufti; (from Lebanon) Ibrahim al-Khatib, Ali Nasir al-Din, Salah Othman Baiham, Riyadh al-Solh, Mohammad Ali Baiham, and Mustafa al-Ghalayini; (from Palestine) Mohammad Ishaq Darwish, Mohammad al-Afifi, Raghib Abu al-Saud, Muin al-Madi, Rashid al-Haj Ibrahim, Ahmad al-Imam, Mohammad Ali al-Tahir, Kamil al-Dajani, Isaaf al-Nashashibi, and Amin al-Tamimi; (from Egypt) Abd al-Rahman Azzam; (from Libya) Bashir al-Saadawi; (from Morocco) Mohammad Makki al-Nasiri. TJOG/LCR no. 74, sixteenth meeting, 18 February 1932. TJOG/LCR no. 88, seventh meeting of the third extraordinary session of the Legislative Council, 2 June 1932. Also, PRO. Colonial no. 112. Report on Palestine and Trans-Jordan, 1936, pp. 329–30. TJOG/LCR no. 93, first meeting, fifth extraordinary session, 1 November 1932. TJOG/LCR no. 97, fifth meeting, 17 September 1932. TJOG/LCR no. 109, twelfth meeting, 12 December 1932.

[141]


6 Among Arab Neighbours

The opposition to the 1928 Treaty, and the demand for its amendment, which started even before its ratification by the Legislative Council in 1929, continued until 1932. The main reasons for amendment were set out clearly by the Amir to the High Commissioner and other British officials during the High Commissioner’s visit to Amman on 3 July 1931. The Amir followed up with a memorandum to the High Commissioner for Trans-Jordan on 15 August 1931 in which he gave reasons for the much demanded amendment and appealed to him to ask the British Government to give the matter serious consideration. The amendment became the main subject of several debates in the Legislative Council; it was demanded by every political party and by the resolutions of all the meetings of the National Conference. The Amir Abdullah maintained the pressure on the High Commissioner and kept the issue of the amendment alive. On 5 March 1932, he reminded him of the need to respond to the demands and aspirations of the people for a constitutional and responsible government. Ten days later the Amir’s view was fully supported by the fourth meeting of the National Conference held in Amman on 15 March 1932. Among its resolutions were the following: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

The rejection of the 1928 Treaty, and the demand for its amendment. The establishment of a constitutional government responsible to the people. The reduction of taxation to an acceptable level under the present conditions. The dismissal of seconded foreign civil servants. The abrogation of all emergency laws. The prohibition of the entry of Jews to the country. Cooperation with Arab countries. [143]


Relations with Hijaz-Najd On 13 May the High Commissioner regretted that he could not accept the reasons for the amendment. Although the British Government was sympathetic to the Amir’s demand, it had its own reasons for the delay in responding to it, and to the strong and sincere wish of all Trans-Jordanian people for the amendment of the 1928 Treaty. The British knew that the Amir could not forget that his father’s kingdom of Hijaz was usurped by the Saudi King Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud in 1925. Thus they suspected that he was supporting a rebellion against the Saudi royal family by some Hijazi tribes who continued to be loyal to the Hashemite royal family. During the second half of May 1932 the Bedouin rebellion by the Hijazi Shaikh Hamid ibn Rifadah took place in the north of Hijaz. The shaikh led a foray southwards towards Maccah and Madinah, but was soon located and suppressed by Najdian forces. It was claimed by King Ibn Saud that the revolt was at the instigation of the Amir Abdullah.1 The Amir issued an order to Peake on 27 May 1932 to prevent any suspicious movements through the land of Trans-Jordan, and on 14 July he specifically named Shaikh Hamid ibn Rifadah and prohibited any cooperation with him or his men.2 Even so, by August 1932 the British Government grew more suspicious that the Amir had given some assistance to Shaikh ibn Rifadah’s rebellion against King Ibn Saud and planned to delay the amendment of the treaty in order to deter the Amir from further interference in Saudi affairs. On 12 August 1932, one year after the Amir’s letter of 15 August 1931, the High Commissioner replied that he found no justification for the amendment of the treaty. While King Faisal ibn al-Hussein of Iraq had achieved settlement of all his and his country’s disputes with Hijaz-Najd and King Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud in 1931, the Amir Abdullah was unable to do the same, because of Ibn Saud’s policy towards him and the Jordanian tribes. Thus the peace of the Jordanian desert was threatened again by the possibility of renewed raiding between Najdian and Jordanian tribes. Ibn Saud sought to remove the Amir Abdullah from Trans-Jordan by blaming him for Ibn Rifadah’s rebellion, while the Amir Abdullah aimed to weaken Ibn Saud’s hold on the Hijazi tribes and create as many problems for him as possible. The British Government wanted better relations between TransJordan and Hijaz-Najd. The initiative came from Sir Andrew Ryan, the [144]

AMONG ARAB NEIGHBOURS

British Minister at Jaddah, during his meeting with Shaikh Yousef Yasin, one of Ibn Saud’s ministers, on 31 July 1932. Sir Ryan reported: I had begun to think seriously, I said, of the possibility of a settlement between Hijaz-Najd and Trans-Jordan when the very difficult task of a settlement between Hijaz-Najd and Iraq had been completed in the spring of last year. I did not then know what the views of Ibn Saud would be, but when the Hijazi Government had first expressed a wish for a similar settlement with Trans-Jordan last autumn, I had considered the matter further, had seen the difficulties and had concluded that such a settlement should be regarded as a definite objective though it might take time. The visit of the Hijazi mission to London had given the matter a new impetus. The Ibn Rifadah affair had given it a further impetus, because, while His Majesty’s Government had insisted that it was independent of the immediate issues created by that affair, it had intensified the study which had been promised in London. I added that the Ibn Rifadah affair had also had a disadvantage. It had caused the Hijazi Government to press very hard a question of responsibility, with special reference to the Amir Abdullah. I had told Sheikh Yussef Yasin and I told him again that in my opinion insistence on the question of responsibility might prejudice the chances of a general settlement. If two rulers (and the Amir was a ruler, though not so great a one as Ibn Saud or his brother Faisal) were to be brought together, it was a very bad beginning for one of them to bring accusations, however justified he might himself consider them, against the other. In any case, I thought that a pursuit of the question of responsibilities would lead nowhere, if only because every public act of the Amir Abdullah throughout the Ibn Rifadah business had been eminently correct and because there were many people who might like to upset the present régime in this country without wanting to bring the Sherifs back to it. Sheikh Yussuf Yasin listened with great care, thanked me and promised to lay all I had said before the King.3

Meanwhile, the High Commissioner for Iraq, Sir F. Humphrys, asked King Faisal to intervene with his brother the Amir Abdullah to complete a settlement with Ibn Saud. King Faisal invited the Amir Shakir ibn Zaid, whom the King thought would be able to persuade Abdullah, to visit him in Baghdad on 26 July 1932. During his visit the Amir Shakir had two meetings with Sir Humphrys, who reported:

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During the talks which I had with the Amir Shakir when he called on me and when I returned his call, his Highness explained to me that, while it could be expected that the Hashemites could ever in their hearts become the real friends of Ibn Saud, they were willing, when necessary, to set aside personal family feelings in the common interests of the Arab peoples. The Amir Abdullah was, he explained, hot-headed and somewhat embittered, but he was confident that he would yield to the wishes of his brother and to the advice of the British Government. The Amir also spoke to me about the frontier between TransJordan and Hijaz-Najd, the demarcation of which has recently been finished. He said that the alignment had given much satisfaction in Trans-Jordan, where it was appreciated that many of the modifications effected by the final settlement of this question were of considerable advantage to the country. Our conversations also touched on the Ibn Rifadah revolt in the Hijaz. The Amir’s view was that, while no one could be certain how this affair would end, present circumstances were favourable to the insurgents. The Hijaz was impoverished and oppressed, and the Bedouins were angry at the attempt which Ibn Saud was making to replenish his depleted treasury by means of a poll-tax of 1 Riyal. Discontent was consequently rife, and there was every chance that the revolt would spread. King Faisal has also spoken to me a good deal recently about the situation in the Arabian peninsula. He professes to have reliable information of a wide-spread and well-organised movement aiming at overthrowing Ibn Saud. He considers that Ibn Rifadah’s incursion into Northern Hijaz is only part of a big plan, and that the lack of general response to Ibn Rifadah’s lead should be attributed to his having come forward prematurely and not to any lack of sympathy with his aims. His Majesty believes that in about a month’s time serious disturbances will break out, not only in the Hijaz but also in Najd, where the tribes, including the Ataibah, are secretly in the plot to overthrow Ibn Saud. Only the Harb are still loyal, but even the Harb sections living in the Hijaz would not stand by him in a crisis. I asked His Majesty what he thought would happen in Arabia if Ibn Saud’s power collapsed. He said that complete anarchy would ensue, and feared that the Iraqi frontier would be exposed to serious raiding by the Najdi tribes. What, he asked, should be the policy of the Iraqi Government in such circumstances? I replied that the Iraqi Government would of course have to do all they could to defend their territory from incursions of Najdi raiders, but I thought it would be a great mistake for them to [146]


attempt to meddle in any way in the internal affairs of Najd or the Hijaz . . .4

Sir Andrew Ryan had done his best to persuade King Ibn Saud to accept the mediation of King Faisal of Iraq between him and the Amir Abdullah, but did not succeed. He found that King Ibn Saud’s ‘assertion of invincible enmity and mistrust towards the Amir Abdullah and his insistence that nothing would satisfy him except formal guarantees by His Majesty’s Government’. By 6 August it seemed to Sir Ryan that the attitude of King Ibn Saud towards the Amir Abdullah had ‘hardened, not inexplicably, into a vindictiveness so extreme as to ruin any immediate hope of a settlement satisfactory to all parties’. On 6 August Sir Ryan reported that situation to the Foreign Office with a memorandum by King Ibn Saud, which included the following (translation): We wish to set forth hereby, in a personal and private manner, our position vis-à-vis of the Sharif Abdullah in Trans-Jordan, from the beginning until now, and we should also like to set forth the ways we think fit for the solution of the difficulty between us and Trans-Jordan. Since we came to the Hijaz, the Sharif Ahdullah has provided a base for preparing forces and dispatching them to Jeddah to fight against us when his brother the Sharif Ali was fighting us there, and Trans-Jordan was used for his [Ali’s] sake as a base for hostile actions against us. The Sharif Abdullah did not spare any pains in causing disturbances and insurrections against us in the Hijaz and even in Najd too. He used to urge the tribes in the name of Britain and Egypt, and declare that he acted in accordance with their advice and help as he used to induce the Bedouins to rebel against us. He has gathered about him some of the people who work against our country and rule, like the sons of al Dabbagh, al Sabbans and other Hijazis who have established for themselves a political centre in Amman with a view to committing hostile acts against us. We send you herewith a copy of a letter addressed to the Sharif Shaker by Muhammad Tahir of Yemen showing the strength of those evil acts and the endeavours made to spite us and to harm our country. He used to promise the Bedouins that he was ready to send out a force from his side so that they could assemble around it and revolt against our rule. We, on our part, used to disbelieve that rumour, believing that he could not do such a thing so long as the [147]


British Government was directing Trans-Jordan, and the British Government is friendly with us and there are treaties of friendship between us. On finding that those rumours had some truth, we communicated them to the British Government, but in the first instance it did not pay any attention to them. It then ascertained the news and informed us of the occurrence of the incident. The suspicion we previously had concerning the actions of the Sharif Abdullah against us had become an established belief and an actual fact. The British Government may say that these activities are not those of the Sharif Abdullah. If it has proof of his innocence of these activities and will inform us of them, and if it can fix the accusation on another person, then we may be somewhat reassured as to the disposition of the Sharif Abdullah. It should be borne in mind, however, that a person like Ibn Rifadah, who has not sufficient money to pay for the clothes he wears, cannot undertake such a movement nor gather round himself such a number of people. It has, in effect, been proved that Ibn Rifadah received some assistance from Trans-Jordan, which he could not have obtained without the help of a capable and able person, very different from himself. The British Government informed us that Ibn Rifadah, when he first entered Aqaba, was able to purchase supplies and arms before it [HMG] took measures to prevent his making purchases. It has also been proved that someone in Trans-Jordan helped him in the matter of the dhow [boat] which was arrested by the British warship and which, there is no doubt, was carrying supplies for Ibn Rifadah. There is also the question of Al Kabariti, of which we have already informed you. This is a proof of the kind of assistance afforded to Ibn Rifadah. In addition to all that has been mentioned there is the matter of the dhow that went to Suez to bring supplies for him, but was prevented from doing so. All these incidents prove one thing clearly which cannot be doubted, namely, that Ibn Rifadah, the fugitive, cannot have arranged all these things, and that the matter was planned and arranged by someone else. It is evident from what we have mentioned, from frequent statements published in newspapers as emanating from him, and also from the conversations exchanged between him and those people he received, to the effect that he is our enemy, that all this was planned by the Sharif Abdullah and had his knowledge and encouragement. We do not blame the Sharif Abdullah because he is our enemy and there is no agreement or covenant between us. The agreements and covenants are between us and the British Government, for whose [148]


sake we have refrained from much and overlooked more of what we feel in our heart against him. We say with complete confidence that if the British Government desires complete stability such as will ensure the maintenance of its interests in Trans-Jordan without costing it anything and without disturbance or trouble from us or anyone else, and such as will ensure our being in agreement with Trans-Jordan, they will not be able to find the true means for this so long as the Sharif Abdullah is in Trans-Jordan. Our opinion, as sincere friends of the British Government who are desirous of helping it and preserving the best and most friendly relations and understanding with it, is that one of two things should be done. First, it is more in the interests of England herself than it is in ours that the Sharif Abdullah should be removed, and that a trustworthy person, whether English or Arab or TransJordanian or another, having its [HMG’s] interests at heart, should be appointed by the British Government. Such a person would not seek to pick a quarrel with us and would have no intention of interfering in our internal affairs. He might not be a person agreeable to us, but still in any case he would safeguard British and Trans-Jordan interests. In the event of such a change we could give the British Government a promise to fulfil its wishes with regard to keeping peace on the frontier and to afford all possible assistance to that official, inside or outside Trans-Jordan, as British interests may require.5

On 1 September, 1932, the High Commissioner visited Amman and had a meeting with the Amir, in the presence of Henry Cox, and Shaikh Foad al-Khatib who acted as interpreter. Sir A. G. Wauchope began the conversations reminding the Amir of the 1928 Treaty in which he agreed to be guided by the advice of His Majesty, tendered through the High Commissioner, in all matters concerning the foreign relations of Trans-Jordan, as well as in all important matters affecting the international obligations of His Majesty, in respect of Trans-Jordan. He reminded the Amir of their meeting on 7 July, during which he insisted that it was the Amir’s duty not only to act loyally, but to convince others that he was not giving support to His Majesty’s enemies. Sir Wauchope revealed the real intention of his visit when he said: As Ibn Rifadah’s object had been to destroy Ibn Saud, who had a treaty with His Majesty’s Government, I look on Ibn Rifadah and all who helped him as people who worked against His Majesty’s [149]


Government. At that talk [7 July] the Amir had promised me that he would take measures to convince everyone that he was not instigating rebellion against Ibn Saud. I considered that the measures which he had taken so far had not produced the required conviction, and I said that I must now ask him to give me a clear promise to recognise Ibn Saud as soon as His Majesty’s Government called upon him to do so. I made it clear to His Highness that the question of recognition of Ibn Saud and the question of a treaty of friendship must be treated as entirely separate.6

Since Ibn Saud’s occupation of the Hijaz, the Amir had refused to recognise him as sovereign of that country. When he was approached by the British Government to do so he insisted that before making such a promise he must be assured of Ibn Saud’s simultaneous recognition of himself as the Amir of Trans-Jordan, and that a treaty of friendship should be concluded between Trans-Jordan and Hijaz-Najd. The Amir suggested that the treaty should include an apology for Ibn Saud’s insult in saying that he had only entered the Hijaz to rid it of King Hussein and his sons. He wanted the treaty to oblige Ibn Saud to recognise the de facto southern frontiers of Trans-Jordan, to put in order the section of the Hijaz Railway lying in his territory, to open the way of pilgrimage to the Amir and the Hashemite family as was his religious duty, and to give the heirs of King al-Hussein ibn Ali the right to appoint an agent of their own choice to look after their properties in the Hijaz. The Amir reminded the High Commissioner that the district of Maan was recognised as being within Trans-Jordan territory by his brother King Ali ibn al-Hussein when he was the King of Hijaz, and that Ibn Saud should accept that de facto recognition. The High Commissioner promised to inform His Majesty’s Government of the Amir’s wishes, upon the granting of which the Amir promised that he would recognise Ibn Saud. The High Commissioner returned to the question of Ibn Rifadah’s rebellion in Hijaz again and assured the Amir that it was a total failure. He reported: I then turned the conversation on to the rebellion of Ibn Rifadah and its total failure. I told the Amir that the refugee rebels all said that he had encouraged the rebellion of Ibn Rifadah. The Amir drew attention to the fact that defeated rebels always say that they were given every sort of promises by important leaders. He said that Ibn Rifadah had only gone to the Hijaz because he thought that [150]


many leaders in Hijaz would join him. This they would have done, owing to the misgovernment of Ibn Saud, but when the leaders learned that the British troops, supported by aeroplanes, were placed all along the frontier, they realised that no rebellion had any chance of success, and, though they hated Ibn Saud, decided not to rebel against him. Consequently Ibn Rifadah was easily crushed. The Amir expressed his anxiety to know what we intended to do with the survivors who had crossed our border and were now in Trans-Jordan. I replied that we were at present feeding them and had not yet reached a final decision. The Amir replied it would be unthinkable to turn them back into the Hijaz, as they were political offenders; and should they be thrust back into the Hijaz, then, without doubt, everyone of them would be slain by the Wahhabis.7

On 18 September 1932, a Royal Order (no. 2716) was issued by the kingdom of Hijaz and Najd which changed its name to that of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia. On 22 September 1932 Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud was proclaimed King of Saudi Arabia, and Riyadh was proclaimed the capital of the kingdom. With every recognition by Arab and foreign countries of the new Saudi kingdom, it became gradually obvious to the Amir Abdullah that he could not regain his father’s usurped Hashemite kingdom. He asked King Faisal of Iraq to intervene on his behalf and settle the problem of Ibn Rifadah with the High Commissioner. He also wrote to the High Commissioner asking him to entertain King Faisal in Jerusalem and asked to be excluded from the meeting. King Faisal spent the night of 18 September 1932 at Government House in Jerusalem during which he explained to the High Commissioner that ‘the Amir Abdullah had not given any definite assistance to Ibn Rifadah’. He supported the Amir in his demand for the amendment of the treaty and said: ‘The Amir Abdullah should be given a little more show of power and more responsibility. The Agreement of 1928 should be modified, so that the chain of responsibility was direct from His Majesty’s Government, through me (the High Commissioner) to the Amir Abdullah who should be the real ruler of Trans-Jordan.’ He also suggested that ‘the Amir Abdullah should have full power to choose or dismiss his ministers and officials’.8 On 30 September 1932, after many consultations between the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office, the British Government issued the following statement:

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His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, who have consistently pursued the policy of promoting good relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, towards which they entertain sentiments of sincere friendship, and Trans-Jordan, in regard to which they occupy a special position, have given the most careful consideration to the proposals for bringing about an improvement in the present unhappy relations between the two countries, which were put forward in the memorandum of the 6th August from His Majesty King Abd al Aziz. His Majesty’s Government desire to make it clear at the outset that they are unable to contemplate any change in the present situation as regards the person of the ruler of Trans-Jordan. They consider that many of the difficulties which have arisen in the past are due to the fact that the rulers of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and of Trans-Jordan have not hitherto recognised each others’ status. His Majesty’s Government are now happy to state that the Amir Abdullah is prepared to recognise the position of His Majesty King Abd al Aziz as King of Saudi Arabia, subject to similar recognition by His Majesty of the Amir’s own position as Ruler of Trans-Jordan. His Majesty’s Government suggests therefore that, as the first step in the process of bringing about an improvement in the relations between the two countries, the question of mutual recognition should be settled as soon as possible. Independently of any other question affecting the relations between Saudi Arabia and Trans-Jordan, but on the definite understanding that negotiations will thereafter be undertaken with the least possible delay with a view to the establishment of treaty relations between the two states. They consider that such a treaty should be concluded directly between the rulers of the two Arab states concerned. Nevertheless, mindful of the success of the ‘Lupin’ meeting they are prepared, having regard to their own special position, to take part in the negotiations with a view to promoting the conclusion of an agreement safeguarding on honourable terms the interests of both the countries immediately concerned. They consider that they can in this way best contribute to the fulfilment of the wish so often expressed by His Majesty King Abd al Aziz and his Government, that the relations between Saudi Arabia and Trans-Jordan should form the subject of a settlement similar to that so happily achieved last year in the case of Saudi Arabia and Iraq. If the proposed treaty is concluded His Majesty’s Government will use their best endeavours to secure the loyal execution of its terms in accordance with their desire that the treaty should be a factor of stability in Arabia, and a means whereby disputes, which have unhappily arisen [152]


in the past, more especially in regard to questions arising on the common frontier between the two States, may be obviated in the future.9

During his visit to Baghdad from 16–21 November 1932, the Amir Abdullah was entertained by the British ambassador to Iraq. During the dinner party given by the ambassador in his honour, the Amir informed his host ‘with a twinkle in his eye, that he understood from his brother [King Faisal] that I disliked raiding in the desert, and assured me that he made up his mind to cultivate better relations in the future with his neighbours’. The ambassador reported that diplomatic twinkle to the Foreign Secretary.10 On 29 November 1932, the Legislative Council persisted in its demand for the amendment of the treaty, and the Amir used that demand to put more pressure on the High Commissioner. He sent a memorandum to Sir Wauchope on 22 December in which he suggested certain amendments to the treaty. The High Commissioner replied that he would soon send the Amir’s suggestions to the Colonial Secretary.11 The political competition between Saudi Arabia and Trans-Jordan and the series of representations regarding claims of interference by both countries in each others’ internal affairs continued until January 1933. At the same time an internal debate within the British Government between 10 Downing Street, the Colonial Office, and the Foreign Office, to find a solution to the problem seemed to have reached a dead end. The Foreign Office did accept the Saudi Arabian allegation that the British Government had tolerated the intrigues in Trans-Jordan against the peace and stability of Saudi Arabia. The Under Secretary at the Colonial Office thought, on the contrary, that in addition to the action taken to prevent assistance from Trans-Jordan reaching the insurgents under Ibn Rifadah, active measures had been taken to prevent, so far as possible, the participation of persons in Trans-Jordan in further movements against Saudi Arabia. These measures had included the expulsion, with the agreement of King Ibn Saud, from Trans-Jordan into Hijaz of certain sections of the Bani Attiyah which took part in raids into Hijaz at the time of Ibn Rifadah’s rebellion; the imprisonment of Shaikh Mohammad ibn Farhan; the dismissal of Abd al-Raouf al-Sabban, a former member of the Amir Abdullah’s entourage; and the exclusion of Tahir ibn Massoud al-Dabbagh, Hussein Abdullah [153]


al-Dabbagh, Ahmad Abdullah Aishan and Abd al-Aziz al-Tayar from Trans-Jordan. The Foreign Office had suggested: 1.

2.

3. 4.

That the High Commissioner for Trans-Jordan should not miss the opportunity for taking an entirely different and more forceful attitude regarding the Amir’s suspected complicity; That the Amir Shakir should be dismissed from the post of President of the Bedouin Control Board and appointed to no other post, and preferably that he should be ordered to absent himself from Trans-Jordan; That similar action should be taken against Hamid Pasha al Wadi; That Hamid al Kabariti should be dismissed from the post of Mayor of Aqaba.12

The Colonial Office was not as colonial as the Foreign Office and wisely thought that: As regards the first suggestion, no doubt that if adequate grounds should be afforded for the suspicion that the Amir, in spite of the warnings which he has received, is actively concerned in intrigues against Ibn Saud, the High Commissioner will lose no time in taking such steps as he may consider likely to be most effective in the circumstances. Sir John Simon will, of course, appreciate that so long as the view is accepted that there can be no question of deposing the Amir, it would be impolitic for the High Commissioner to use language suggesting a threat of deposition. This consideration must be taken into account in forming any judgment upon the methods adopted by Sir Arthur Wauchope in his conversations and relations with the Amir. While the High Commissioner may think that in present circumstances courteous consideration for the Amir’s position may have a better effect upon the Amir than blunt and uncompromising speech, the Secretary of State knows that he can count upon the High Commissioner taking up a more forceful attitude if and when he feels that this would further the end in view. As regards the suggested dismissal of the Amir Shakir and of Hamid Pasha, the Secretary of State understands that the High Commissioner feels that the evidence hitherto produced is inadequate for the action proposed. In the case of Shakir, there is the further objection that dismissal from the post of President of the Bedouin Control Board might involve the abolition of the Board for lack of a suitable successor. This would be regrettable, as it is [154]


admitted that the Board serves a useful purpose, and it is anticipated that when the reorganisation now contemplated is completed, its usefulness will be enhanced; and at the same time Shakir’s power, especially with regard to affairs which concern relations with the tribes of Saudi Arabia, will be considerably restricted. If, however, it were considered necessary to take action against either of these persons the Secretary of State considers that it would be wrong to proceed with their dismissal without confronting them with a statement of the charges brought against them and giving them an opportunity of answering those charges. As regards the Mayor of Aqaba, Hamid al Kabariti, he would appear to be of minor importance, and it is understood that the question of his dismissal was raised last summer by the High Commissioner, but that the Air Officer Commanding considered that the Mayor was a valuable source of information, and this remains true today.13

In fact mutual recognition between the Amir Abdullah ibn alHussein of Trans-Jordan and King Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia was not far off. On 21 March, the Prime Minister of Trans-Jordan Shaikh Abdullah Sraj wrote to the High Commissioner for Trans-Jordan asking him to inform His Britannic Majesty that The Amir Abdullah ibn al-Hussein recognised King Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud as King of Saudi Arabia. On 31 March, the Amir Faisal ibn Abd al-Aziz, the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, wrote to the British Minister Resident in Jaddah asking him to inform His Britannic Majesty that King Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud recognized the Amir Abdullah ibn al-Hussein as the Amir of Trans-Jordan. On the same day the King and the Amir exchanged cordial and courteous messages. On 5 May 1933 a delegation headed by the General Secretary Tawfiq Abu al-Huda, and accompanied by Brigadier Glubb, Commander of the Desert Area, arrived at Jaddah for negotiations with Saudi Arabia, in an endeavour to settle all pending disputes between the two countries. On 6 May a joint statement was issued declaring that a complete agreement was achieved on starting negotiations for a treaty of friendship and good neighbourliness, between Trans-Jordan and Saudi Arabia. The delegation returned to Amman on 11 May with the intention of resuming negotiations in Jerusalem. On 27 July, the Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourliness between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Amarah of Trans-Jordan, [155]


was signed at Jerusalem. The treaty consisted of 14 articles providing for permanent peace and friendship between the two countries. It provided for cooperation in the prevention of raiding and other illegal acts; it included provisions for the movement of tribes and the allocation of areas for grazing; and it provided for the settlement of some problems of nationality and other issues. Meanwhile, an agreement was concluded to identify the Bedouin tribes living in areas adjacent to the borders between Saudi Arabia and Trans-Jordan. It was agreed that the following tribes were under the sovereignty of Trans-Jordan: Northern Huwaitat (Ibn Jazi) including al Uttoon; Bani Sakhr; Isa; the Duboor section of the Umran; Bani Khalid; Hasaya; and Bani Hasan. Under Saudi Arabian sovereignty were: Billi; Hathim; Inazah of Hijaz; Shammar of Najd; the Umran, with the exception of the Duboor al-Rabiyin.14

The Jewish question During the month of January 1933, Henry Cox, the British Resident in Trans-Jordan reported: Considerable excitement was caused by the rumours which have been enlarged on in the Press that the Amir has entered into an agreement to lease his land in the Ghor al Kibid [an area of some 60,000 dunums situated in the Jordan Valley] to Jews. Deputations to dissuade His Highness from this have waited on him in Amman and a declaration that the reports that the Amir had leased his land to the Jews were entirely without foundation was issued under His Highness’s instructions for publication in the Press.15

At that time the people of Trans-Jordan were suffering a very bad drought year, thousands of their livestock perished and the majority of the people were extremely poor. The High Commissioner for TransJordan and Henry Cox the British Resident had neglected the economic development of the country and were more interested in the security problem and reducing the Grant-in-Aid rather than maintaining it at the level necessary for economic development, especially in agriculture. Henry Cox reported:

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A good deal is being written and said of the poverty of the people in Trans-Jordan, a state of affairs which is attributed to the present maladministration of the country and which could be cured if the land were fertilised by placing Jews thereon. The country is of course poor, having no resources other than agriculture, but this poverty is due to world conditions and to a succession of years of drought. The people will be prosperous again as soon as the rains are sufficient to make their crops grow.16

Two or three Jordanian shaikhs who visited Palestine in 1930 saw some Arab and Jewish farming communities using modern agricultural methods and machines and were impressed by the agricultural development and prosperity in Palestine. These shaikhs and the Amir thought that developing Jordanian agriculture with the help of the Jews would save Trans-Jordan from starvation. A few Jews visited some land in Karak, the desert adjacent to Balqa and Ghor Kibid in the Jordan Valley, to study the possibility of development and leasing some land for that purpose. With the hue and cry that overwhelmed the country in immediate response to the rumours of land being leased to Jews, the students of Salt demonstrated against the Amir, thinking that the rumours were true. The district commander ordered the arrest of a few students, but soon after, all the notables of Salt called on the Amir and appealed on their behalf. The Amir commanded their release. There is no doubt that the Amir Abdullah and some shaikhs (amongst them Mithqal al-Fayiz, Hussein al-Tarawnah, Refaifan al-Majali and others) were desperate and most eager to overcome the devastating poverty in Trans-Jordan during 1933, and thought that bringing Jewish help into certain areas of the country would benefit its poor people. But it never crossed their minds that Jewish settlements would be established in Trans-Jordan as they did in Palestine. Help was needed for a limited period and that was the intention. While the British Resident and the High Commissioner declined to help Trans-Jordan overcome its poverty, they nevertheless asked the Amir not to lease Ghor Kibid to the Jews. The Amir assured both, as Cox reported: ‘he has recently told me that it is not and never has been his intention to allow the Jews to settle in Trans-Jordan’.17 Although the Amir and the shaikhs thought about it, they did not give away an inch of land. All this while there was not one single Jew settled in Trans-Jordan, while in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and the Yemen there were whole Jewish communities who [157]


worked in every walk of life in full freedom. Yet the press in some of these Arab countries attacked Trans-Jordan for an intention to defend the country against impoverishment and hunger. Some historians, such as Avi Chlaim in his Collusion Across the Jordan, made an important issue of that very brief episode and excitement in Trans-Jordan during 1933.18 The truth is that not an inch of the Amir Abdullah’s or the shaikhs’ land in Trans-Jordan was leased to the Jews. The whole story soon died down, and shortly after no Jews were allowed to enter Trans-Jordan. Of course events on the world stage would soon bring this issue back into the foreground. By the end of January 1933 Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany and started his campaign against the Jews. This led in turn to an increase in Jewish immigration to Palestine being permitted by the British Mandatory Government during that year. As the British continued to issue unlimited permits for Jewish immigration to their country, Palestinian Arabs began to resist. During March the Arab Executive Council of Palestine declared that the British mandatory power was the enemy of Palestine, and that it must be resisted by all possible means. In Trans-Jordan Shaikh Hussein al-Tarawnah, Chairman of the Executive Committee, issued a declaration on 23 March, supporting the Palestinians against Zionist immigration. In fact the antagonism against the British Mandate and its Zionist policy in Palestine continued well into 1933. On 8 October the Arab Executive Committee called for a general strike on 13 October, to protest against the British Government’s Zionist policy, the sale of land to Jews, and Jewish immigration to Palestine. The Arab press launched a campaign against immigration, and Arab spokesmen gave press statements about the arrival of Jewish immigrants in Palestinian ports. On that day Musa Kazim al-Husseini and his comrades led a demonstration in Jerusalem, which was attacked by a Palestine police force, who wounded thirty Arab demonstrators. Musa Kazim al-Husseini’s death in the spring of 1934 was almost certainly hastened by the treatment he received at the hands of the police. The Committee also decided to hold demonstrations in Jaffa, Haifa, and Nablus on 27 October. The demonstrations were attacked by armed police who killed thirty Arab demonstrators and wounded more than ninety others. On 28 of October strikes and demonstrations took place in Amman and Salt to express sympathy with their Palestinian brothers, protesting against the cruelty with which the [158]


Palestine police handled the Palestinian Arabs’ peaceful demonstrations and condemning Jewish immigration to their country. Particularly in Amman demonstrations and tension continued until 31 October when a minor riot exploded in the main street near the Hussein Mosque. The riot, which had some repercussions among the Bedouin tribes, was directed against the British Mandate; and in anger the rioters threw stones at any European who happened to be in the centre of the city at the time. Glubb was there to face some of the anger of the crowd, and if it was not for one policeman who endeavoured to calm the rioters, for a short time, Glubb would have been seriously injured or indeed killed. However, at a critical stage of the incident the Amir Shakir ibn Zaid rode through the rioters on his horse accompanied by a few of his followers, and prevented an attack on Glubb. A few minutes later the Amir Shakir’s car arrived and Glubb was taken by Shakir to his office unharmed.

During the twentieth meeting of the Legislative Council on 27 February 1933, the leading member of the Opposition, Shaikh Hussein al-Tarawnah, asserted that the Amir, the Legislative Council, the Cabinet, all the political parties and the people of Trans-Jordan wanted an amendment to the treaty, and had been demanding it for the last three years. He said: We have proved that we are worthy of the amendment by being capable of maintaining security and order in the whole country. The delay makes us suspicious of our friend Great Britain. We want to be her faithful friends for a long time to come in reciprocal loyalty. I do not think that an amendment of the Treaty will harm the interests of our British friend, and it is not difficult for her to amend the Treaty, if she has good faith towards us.

Qasim al-Hindawi of Irbid reminded the Government that the amendment of the treaty was part of its programme. He supported al-Tarawnah and said: ‘Yes Britain is our friend and we respect her if she respects us. But what I mean is not ceremonial friendship, I mean the respect that gives rights. What do we say to those noble allies and friends who promised us to amend the treaty? Is it not timely to amend the treaty?’ [159]


Qasim al-Hindawi persisted in his attack against the Government, reminding them during the twenty-second meeting of the Legislative Council that it took two years to communicate between Jerusalem and Amman on the negotiations for an amendment, and adding: ‘We do not blame His Majesty’s Government for not approving our wishes after two years of negotiations, we must blame our Government.’19

Hizb al-Tadhamun al-Urdoni The political competition between the main shaikhs of Karak, Refaifan al-Majali and Hussein al-Tarawnah became heated during 1933. AlTarawnah seemed to have been converted to the ideas of the remnants of the Istiqlal Party, such as Subhi Abu Ghanimah and Adil al-Azmah, who were the main players in his opposition. With his connections in Palestine and Syria, particularly with the Arab press in these two countries, al-Tarawnah had an edge on al-Majali. However because of the poverty of the people, and the ongoing economic crisis, the main concern of the majority of the people and of the leaders of public opinion in the country was more for internal affairs than for Arab or foreign affairs. The situation changed in Shaikh Refaifan al-Majali’s favour, who regained the political initiative by establishing a new political party. On 24 March 1933, he announced the establishment of the Jordanian Solidarity Party (Hizb al-Tadhamun al-Urdoni) whose founding members raised the patriotic slogan ‘Jordan is for the Jordanians’. The founding members included the two main shaikhs of Bani Sakhr, Mithqal al-Fayiz and Hadithah al-Khraishah of Bani Sakhr; Mohammad al-Saad al-Batainah of Irbid; Said Abu Jabir of Salt; Salti al-Ibrahim of Irbid; Qasim al-Hindawi of Irbid20; Najib Abu al-Shar of Husn; Shams al-Din Sami of Amman; Salih al-Auran of Taffilah; Mitri al-Zuraiqat of Karak; Hashim Khair of Amman; and Ahmad al-Saub of Karak. The main aim of the party was ‘[t]o protect the entity of the sons of Trans-Jordan and achieve their rights’. The party’s character was more inclined towards Jordanian patriotism than Arab nationalism, for in its founding regulations membership of the party was made exclusive to the Jordanians born and residing in Trans-Jordan before the year 1922.21 On 1 July 1933, Hizb al-Tadhamun held its conference in Amman. Its leader, Shaikh Mithqal al-Fayiz, chaired the conference which was [160]


attended by sixty party members and produced a set of resolutions reported as follows by Kirkbride: ‘(a) that the Government should collect no taxes from farmers in respect of the current year; or attempt to demand arrears out of the starving people and, (b) that the Government should take steps to introduce foreign capital into the country to stave off stagnation or starvation’.22 Although the yearning for political participation overwhelmed the whole country, the Jordanian Solidarity Party, like all the other political parties, failed to increase its membership, and was later unable to maintain the initial support of its early days. This was mainly due to the fact that, as with other political parties, its leaders lacked the experience and qualities of political leadership and organisation needed to persuade the Jordanians to transfer their loyalty from their tribal bonds and interests. There was also the fact that most of the educated elite capable of persuading the people to join political parties were in the Civil Service and thus prohibited from party political activities.

Following the failure of Hizb al-Tadhamun to raise any enthusiastic response, the Amir proceeded to prepare for another Congress to be constituted of shaikhs and notables and organised by Shaikh Hussein al-Tarawnah, Naji al-Azzam and others. The Amir’s chief concern was to produce sensible political and economic plans to reform the administration of the country and to affirm the complete trust of all the leaders of the native born Trans-Jordanians, ‘the sons of the country’, and their loyalty to him. Life in Trans-Jordan was extremely boring to the intellectual segment of the people, particularly those who were educated in Cairo, Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad or Jerusalem. There was nothing much to do beside work except watching the occasional football match, attending the Manshiyah coffee garden, the Petra cinema showing tedious films such as Flash Gordon, Tarzan etc. and visiting friends and neighbours. This is why most Jordanians adopted the sport of spreading rumours. During July 1933, shortly after King Faisal’s departure for Europe, rumours became rife of schemes to annex Trans-Jordan to Iraq. The wicked rumours also insinuated that the Amir Shakir ibn Zaid was supportive of that alleged scheme; were it not for the very close ties between him and the Amir, a rift could have been created by these rumours. Kirkbride reported: [161]


The Amir was upset by these rumours which may partly explain an unusually conciliatory attitude evident on his part of late in dealing with British officials. In the course of the visit by Foad Bey Hamzah to Amman, His Highness suggested the desirability of his cooperating with King Abd al Aziz Ibn Saud in the matter of enlarging His Highness’s dominions to the north and to the west, that is to say, at the expense of Syria and Palestine. Whether Ibn Saud in fact welcomes any extension of the Hashemite power is questionable.23

Meanwhile, a complete reorganisation of the revenue system was implemented by April 1933. The Law of Land Tax of 1933, provided for a land tax of 6 per cent on the revenue from land. The Turkish Wairko (land tax), tithe and road fees were abolished.24 The Law of Industrial Licences of 1933, provided for a licence fee to be paid annually by any business or industry as shown in Table 6.1. TABLE 6.1

Industrial licence fees, 1933 Type of Industry

£P (000)

Bank Transport and trade Retail trade Hotel Baths and bars Electricity Company Factories Bakeries

36 18 12 9 6 36 12 125

The Income Tax Law of 1933 provided for a tax to be collected on the basis of annual income as shown in Table 6.2. TABLE 6.2

Income tax, 1933 Annual income (£P)

Tax (%)

60–156 106–372 372–552 552 and above

1.5 2 2.5 326 [162]


The National Conference and the Jordanian People’s Conference Encouraged by the Amir, the fifth meeting of the National Conference, chaired by Hussein al-Tarawnah, was held in Amman on 6 June 1933. It was attended by delegations from the following countries: From Syria: Hashim al-Atasi, Ibrahim Hananu, Yousif al-Issa, Musa Shamiyah, Amir Said al-Jazairi, and Shukri al-Quwtli. From Palestine: Yaqoub al-Ghusain, Admoun Rook, Salim Abd al-Rahman, Saliba Aridah, Said al-Khalil, Abdullah Samarah, Mohammad Ali al-Ghusain, Nimr al-Masri, Yousif Fransis and Arif al-Azooni. From Trans-Jordan: 500 prominent Jordanian shaikhs and notables from all areas of the country. From Salt came Said al-Sulaibi, Bakhit al-Ibrahim, Mohammad al-Hussein, Nimr al-Humud, Mutlaq al-Miflih, Tahir Mohammad Abu al-Samin and Falah al-Hamd al-Khraisat; from Ajlun there was Salti Bsharah, Ali Khulqi, Naji al-Azzam, Salim al-Hindawi, Mohammad al-Saad, Kulaib al-Shraidah, Bashir al-Hasan, Sulaiman al-Sudi, Najib al-Shraidah, Najib Abu al-Shar, and Subhi Abu Ghanimah; representing the Abbadi tribe was Nimir al-Ariq; and from the Bani Sakhr, Hadithah al-Khraishah. The meeting was boycotted by Mithqal al-Fayiz, Rashid al-Khizai, Refaifan al-Majali, and Majid al-Adwan. At the end of the meeting, which was held at the Kamal Hotel in Amman, the following resolutions were adopted: 1. 2. 3.

4.

The establishment of a national government with collective responsibility, efficiency and general confidence. The Government must negotiate with the British Government to amend the treaty so that the rights of the country can be guaranteed. The rejection of Zionist propaganda aiming at denying the rights of Trans-Jordan for their own greedy ends. A decisive law must be established to prohibit the sale of land to Jews, or any dealings with them, and to prohibit their residency in Trans-Jordan. The abolition of the Emergency Law because it contravenes the spirit of legislation such as the Law for Expulsion and Exile, the [163]


5. 6.

7. 8. 9.

Law for the Prevention of Crimes, and the Law for Collective Punishment. The dismissal of the seconded foreign civil servants. Action to be taken to rectify the bad economic situation in the country through the following measures: A. Exemption of all remainders of outstanding taxes and charges until 1933. B. Exemption of all drought villages from taxation. C. Collection of tax according to ability to pay. D. Postponement of payment of debts owed to the Agricultural Bank. E. Increase of the Agricultural Bank’s capital. F. Amendment of the licence fees. G. Increased employment for workers and farmers. H. Development of the Jordan Valley. I. Opening of new markets for Jordanian products. J. Establishment of forests in suitable lands. K. Improvement in financial stability. L. Collection of taxes from foreign companies. M. Prevention of the expansion of the Civil Service. N. Return of Himmah to Jordanian sovereignty. O. Encouragement of Arab investment in development projects. P. Hijaz Railway to be considered an Islamic Waqf. Q. Payment of fees for secondary education. R. Expansion of elementary education and establishment of schools for Bedouin tribes. Uniting of efforts with Arab countries to repel Zionist dangers. Establishment of a committee in each district to implement the resolutions. Publication of Al-Mithaq newspaper.27

On 6 August 1933, a new political party was born. The Executive Committee for the Jordanian People’s Conference Party held its first and last conference in Amman. The following members were elected to the Executive Council: • •

Naji al-Azzam, President Said al-Sulaibi, Vice President [164]


• • •

Mustafa al-Muhaisin, Vice President Said al-Mufti, Secretary Najib al-Shraidah, Secretary

At the end of the conference the following resolutions were adopted: 1. The members of the Jordanian People’s Conference assembled on this day and who truly represent the country of the Amarah, declare their loyalty to His Highness the Amir of the country and his scions after him. 2. Because the press has written much about the subject of Zionism in Trans-Jordan, the Jordanian People’s Conference, which has been convened on the basis of resisting Zionism, rejects Zionism, will oppose it and will maintain the heritage of our grandfathers. 3. We will endeavour to reform government status and to establish a national government with collective responsibility. 4. We will endeavour to pardon the remainder of taxes for the year 1932 without exceptions. 5. We will seek to pardon drought villages from taxation this year in accordance with their losses. 6. We will endeavour to amend the British-Jordanian Treaty. 7. We will endeavour to reduce taxes and fees to a level harmonious with the economic condition of the country. 8. We demand the amendment of the Law of Licences, which does not conform to the spirit of justice. 9. We seek the postponement of the debts of the Agricultural Bank for a long period so that farmers can pay without harming their livelihood. 10. We demand that the Iraqi Petroleum Company should adhere to the Agreement and make labour exclusive to the sons of the country. 11. We demand the expansion of the Department of Agriculture so that it can develop agriculture according to modern methods. 12. We seek to spread elementary education and send students to gain agricultural knowledge. 13. We seek the provision of Arab investments to support Jordanian farmers with reasonable rates of interest. 14. We shall endeavour to establish a secondary boarding college and two schools in Jafer and Azraq to educate the sons of Bedouin tribes. [165]


15. The Conference calls upon all the Jordanian People to unite. 16. We demand the election of the Executive Committee for the Jordanian People’s Conference assembled today in place of the existing Executive Committee which has naturally been disbanded by the withdrawal of the majority of its members, and by the forming by its remaining member of a new party, the Party of the Jordanian Executive Committee. The existing Executive Committee is also invalidated because the second National Conference did not approve its existence, and did not elect another in its place; because this Conference is attended by the majority of the first conference and all the prominent personalities in the country, who did not attend the first conference; because the same members of the previous conference are those who established the first Executive Committee; and because they also have the right to disband the Committee, which they formed when it was an elected committee, they are exercising this right and declaring the dissolution of the present Executive Committee, some members of which have no right to membership as they were not elected.28

Death of King Faisal On 8 September 1933 the Hashemite royal family, the people of Iraq and the Arab Nation suffered another great loss when one of the great champions of the Arab Revolt, His Majesty King Faisal ibn al-Hussein ibn Ali died suddenly from a heart attack in his hotel at Berne, Switzerland, where he was undergoing medical treatment. His son, the twenty-one-year-old Amir Ghazi ibn Faisal was proclaimed and crowned King of Iraq two hours after the announcement of his father’s death by the Iraqi Government. The late King’s body was brought to Haifa in Palestine on Thursday 14 September. His brother King Ali, the Amirs Talal and Nayif, sons of the Amir Abdullah, escorted the coffin to an aeroplane which flew the body to Baghdad on the same day. Many thousands of Palestinian Arabs gathered that early morning and escorted the coffin in the funeral procession from the port to the airport, while the High Commissioner and Palestinian Government officials, as well as units of the British Army in Palestine, attended the funeral parade. [166]


The Amir Abdullah left Amman by road to Baghdad on 14 September to attend King Faisal’s funeral. He took with him Adil al-Azmah, Awni Abd al-Hadi and Mohammad Izzat Darwazah as members of his suite. Even then he was looking ahead to a reconciliation with the Istiqlal Party which King Faisal had supported. To begin with the Amir gave all the advice he could to the young King Ghazi. He was instrumental in arranging his marriage to Princess Alia Bint Ali, the second daughter of King Ali ibn al-Hussein. The Amir returned to Amman on 23 September, and three days later Kirkbride, Acting British Resident in Trans-Jordan, reported in confidence to the High Commissioner: Your Excellency 1. I have the honour to report that I had a talk yesterday with His Highness the Amir regarding affairs in Iraq and the effect of King Faisal’s death on the Arab World in general. 2. His Highness’s immediate reaction on the receipt of the news of King Faisal’s death had been to indicate his intention of taking his deceased brother’s place as the acknowledged leader of the Arab nationalists of Iraq, Syria, Trans-Jordan and Palestine. His Highness’s first step in that direction was a reconciliation with the members of the Istiqlal Party with whom he had been in open opposition immediately previously . . . 3. I know that it had been His Highness’s hope that there would be a general discussion at Baghdad of political questions of interest to the Arab countries but I gathered yesterday that any such discussion failed to materialize and that the Iraqi politicians had been too concerned for the moment with the local reactions to King Faisal’s death to interest themselves in the affairs of adjacent Arab countries. 4. His Highness was at pains to impress upon me the trouble he had taken to induce his nephew King Ghazi and the Iraqi ministers to follow a policy of friendship and understanding with Great Britain, not only in matters concerning Iraq but also in matters concerning the question nearest to the hearts of all Arab patriots, that is to say the union of Iraq, Syria, Palestine and Trans-Jordan. His Highness said that he had received a pressing invitation from the Iraqi ministers to visit Iraq at frequent intervals in order to give the new King the benefit of his advice. His Highness’s reply, according to his own report, was to the effect that he could only accept the invitation if encouraged to do so by His Majesty’s Government. [167]


5. I saw King Ali later in the day and he spoke to me at some length on the necessity of the Anglo-Arab cooperation in Iraq in particular and in the Near East in general. King Ali informed me that he had obtained solemn promises from all political leaders in Iraq to give their support to King Ghazi and to abstain from inter-party strife at least until after he, King Ali, returned from Europe when he would be able to advise the young King. 6. I am informed reliably that the Istiqlal party have not really decided whether to take King Ghazi as their new leader in his father’s stead or to encourage the claims of His Highness to Arab Leadership. They hope that a more definite lead will be forthcoming from the Iraqi politicians after the memorial service for King Faisal which will take place forty days after the late King’s death. A. S. Kirkbride. Acting British Resident.29

Arab unity Although not organised or formally connected with wider Arab political bodies, Arab nationalism, and the yearning for full independence and Arab unity remained vibrant in the hearts and minds of Jordanian intellectuals and leaders of public opinion. The British Government had been aware of the new desire for Arab unity since the beginning of the thirties. A memorandum by G. W. Rendel of the British Foreign Office in June 1933 reveals the attitude of the British Government. The opening paragraph attempts to belittle the strength of the yearning for Arab unity: It is generally most in evidence on such occasions as Arab or Muslim congresses, and was freely bandied about during the Muslim congress at Jerusalem in the autumn of 1931. On such occasions it is generally used extremely loosely as a popular rallying cry against either ‘Western Imperialism’ or the Zionist Movement: but in actual fact it seldom amounts to much more than a rather undigested idea of co-operation between Arabic-speaking people in matters of education and propaganda, and possibly also in such politico-religious questions as that of the Hijaz Railway, the future of the Holy Places, and Arab unity in this sense is something rather akin to pan-Arabism, and appears to have no practical significance [168]


than the rather shadowy pan-Islamic movement of which so much was heard some twenty years ago. From the political and practical point of view ‘Arab Unity’ should mean the union, either in a single State or in a confederation of autonomous States, of all former Ottoman territories, such as present-day Turkey, which have a predominantly Arab population. This would limit the application of the idea to the north-western half of Arabia, i.e., to the Arabic-speaking territories north-west of a line drawn from the middle of the Persian Gulf to the southern end of the Red Sea. The idea of Arab unity, as applied to the former Ottoman territories i.e., to the Arabic-speaking areas north-west of the line mentioned in the preceding paragraph, was the ultimate aim of the Arab revolt during the war, and was the ideal for which the Hashemites, under Hussein and Colonel Lawrence strove during the war and armistice periods. There is no doubt that the remaining members of the Hashemite family, Faisal, Ali and Abdullah have never abandoned this dream, although subsequent developments have rendered it impracticable.30

The memorandum mentioned the ‘subsequent developments’ as the coming to power of King Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud in Hijaz and Najd; competition between the Hashemite and Saudi families; the treaties between Britain and Ibn Saud, Faisal and Abdullah; the quarrelsome attitude of the Yemen Kingdom; the extreme jealousy of the shaikhs of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the Gulf Arabs of their independence and of each other; and the various policies of the mandatory powers, French in Syria and Lebanon and British in Iraq, Palestine and Trans-Jordan. The memorandum continued: As regards Trans-Jordan (the union or combination of which with Iraq would at first sight seem easiest, since Trans-Jordan is at present a purely Arab State, and since its ruler is the brother of King Faisal), an initial difficulty is presented by the fact that Trans-Jordan is covered by the mandate for Palestine of which it technically forms an integral part. It would be therefore necessary before any effective combination between Trans-Jordan and Iraq would be brought about, that His Majesty’s Government should arrange for the release of Trans-Jordan from the mandate. Trans-Jordan does not, however, at present fulfil any of the conditions which have been laid down by the League of Nations as justifying the release of the territory from the mandatory regime. Even if Trans-Jordan did to some extent fulfil these conditions a factor which might mitigate against [169]


her liberation from the mandate is the possibility that there is likely at no distant date to be a Jewish settlement in Trans-Jordan. While there can be no question of extending to Trans-Jordan the Articles of the Palestine mandate which relate to the establishment of the Jewish national home, the existence of a Jewish minority in Trans-Jordan would certainly increase the difficulties in the way of bringing the mandatory regime in the territory to an end.31

Rendel’s words show that, as ever, the British were more concerned with maintaining their own interests in the region than with promoting Arab interests. This had been made clear in the conclusions of the ministerial Middle East sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence meeting on 17 November 1931, which included the following: 1. That the outcome most likely to be to the advantage of His Majesty’s Government would be the constitution of Syria as a republic with a Syrian President; 2. That a single individual to hold the crowns both of Syria and Iraq would be most undesirable, and would, in any case be likely to prove unworkable; 3. That any attempt by King Faisal to transfer his crown from Iraq to Syria would be contrary to British Interests.32

Acting in the spirit of the Arab Nationalist Conference in Jerusalem in 1931, which had revived the principles of the Great Arab Revolt, and called for the achievement of its aim, the young Arab elite of Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine had established the Association for Nationalist Action (Isbat al-Aamal al-Qawmi) in the village of Qirnayil in Lebanon between 20 and 24 August 1933. The founding members of the Association had decided that their aims were: 1. To endeavour to achieve progress in the Arab World, by opposing tribalism, sectarianism, and division of the Arab Nation. 2. To free women from the prejudice imposed upon them and to abolish Bedouinism. 3. To consider all the Arab countries as one economic unit.33

While the leaders of public opinion and the intellectual elite in every colonised or mandated Arab country were engaged in the patriotic struggle for full independence, only marginal attention and effort were directed towards the spread of Arab nationalism and unity. [170]


The third ordinary session of the second Legislative Council was opened on 1 November 1933 with the following speech from the throne by the Amir Abdullah: Honourable Members; I Thank God for his blessing, and pray for the last of his Prophets, his family and his companions. Thereafter, it is with God’s blessing that you open your third ordinary session, following your Council’s progress during the first year, for which we thank you for your efficiency and keenness, that initiated hope for the future of representative life in Trans-Jordan. I hope that this session will be as its previous sisters in good service and results. We have been gravely saddened by the great loss of our brother the King [Faisal], may God have mercy on him. We thank God for the sadness, sorrow and condolences we have seen from the Arab Nation which is a blessing of the nation’s loyalty to this House [the Hashemite House]. From this dais I declare my praise. I am very glad to inform you that an understanding has been reached to conclude a Treaty between us and His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia, and we hope that this will be a blessing for the two countries and for all the Arabs. We have commanded that an economic committee shall be formed to deal with the infrastructure of the country, and I am glad that three of your members are with that committee. It is the duty of us all to cooperate for the welfare of the people and to deal with the economic crisis and to help achieve happiness and blessing for them all. We are, thank God, in the best of relations with the neighbouring countries over and above the loyalty and cooperation with His Britannic Majesty. It pleases me to mention what my Government has accomplished during the last year in the fields of economics, agriculture and construction to deal with economic crisis. It was able to exempt the payment of fifteen thousand pounds to the public money, to allocate money for relief aid, to postpone payments of debts of twenty five thousand pounds to the Agricultural Bank, to issue loans of fifteen thousand pounds to farmers, and to continue with providing loans up to the total of fifty two thousand pounds. The Government continued to create jobs for the unemployed, and completed the land settlement in large areas. In the field of communications and post, direct telegraph and wireless communications with Syria have been achieved and telegraph and wireless [171]


communications with Iraq are under study and we hope will be completed soon. I trust that the other duties of Government are still carried out with accuracy and regularity. I mention the thirty agricultural school gardens where farmers and pupils learn the theory and application of agriculture and planting trees; the introduction of the subject of agriculture in the education curriculum; sending students to graduate in agriculture; and establishing schools in Azraq and Bayir to educate soldiers and the sons of the tribes. The transit road between Iraq and Palestine through Trans-Jordan has been opened; this will allow postal services from and to Iraq. The share of the customs revenue due to Trans-Jordan has been increased by 7,500 pounds annually, so that the total will be 33,000 pounds. It is also of interest to your Council to know that great efforts have been made by the Department of Agriculture to encourage the planting of trees, by distributing great numbers of seedlings and endeavouring to bring new improved seeds to the country. In the name of God, I hereby open the ordinary session of your Legislative Council, and we pray God to achieve our hopes and guide our steps to what may please him in his generosity and for the support of his greatest Messenger, May God’s prayer and peace be upon him.34

In spite of the positive note of the Amir’s speech, the continued antagonism between the majority of the Legislative Council and the Government of Shaikh Abdullah Sraj meant that the Amir saw no hope of reasonable cooperation between them. During the elections for the various committees, none of the members of the Executive Council were elected to any committee. With a policy of non-cooperation with the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, members prevented the transaction of any business at subsequent meetings of the Legislative Council by absenting themselves so that there was no quorum. The British Resident reported: This procedure was adopted at the instigation of the Amir who had finally decided to drop the Hizb el Istiqlal [the Independence Party], with which he had been flirting, and pin his faith to the Hizb el Shaab [the People’s Party] which he had formed months ago to break the Istiqlalists and resist the plan supported by them and King Faisal of amalgamating Trans-Jordan with Iraq. Of the 16 elected members of the Legislative Council 14 are members of Hizb el Shaab and the Amir had determined by their [172]


help to render the task of the Government impossible and bring about its fall.35

After many conversations with the British Resident, who did not wish the Government to be changed, and a visit to the High Commissioner during which he warned him of the consequences of failure, the Amir finally decided to change the Government. On 17 November the Amir sent his ADC Captain Said Ishaqat, a tough Circassian, to the Prime Minister’s office, bearing two letters. The first called upon the Prime Minister to tender his resignation and that of the Executive Council. The Prime Minister, when the letter was presented to him, said he must call the ministers together before he could do anything. In strict obedience with the Amir’s instructions, the ADC then presented him with the second letter, which informed the Prime Minister that he was dismissed.36 So on the same day, 17 November 1933, Shaikh Sraj resigned and a new Government was formed as follows: • • • • • •

Ibrahim Hashim, Prime Minister, Minister of Justice and Qadi Qudah Shukri Shashaah, Director of the Treasury Audah al-Qusus, Attorney General Said al-Mufti, Administrative Inspector Hashim Khair, Director of Archaeology Qasim al-Hindawi, Without Portfolio.

On 14 December 1933, Adil al-Azmah raised the issue at the heart of the nation’s emerging autonomy – the amendment of the 1928 Treaty. He pointed out to the Government that: The Legislative Council had on several occasions expressed the strong wish of the Nation for the amendment of the Treaty, and the achievement of their rights of independence, freedom and sovereignty, and to lift the heavy limitations imposed on the Nation by that Treaty. The fact that the Government’s statement of its programme did not include any mention of the Treaty made the People anxious about the future of the country.37

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NOTES 1 Robert Lacey, The Kingdom of Arabia and the House of Saud (London: Fontana, 1983), p. 245. 2 Musa, Sulaiman, Private Papers. Letters between King Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud and the Amir Abdullah. 3 PRO. FO 371/16024. From Sir A. Ryan, Jeddah, to Sir F. Humphrys, High Commissioner for Iraq, 2 August 1932. 4 PRO. FO 371/16024. From Sir F. Humphrys, High Commissioner for Iraq, to Sir P. Cunliffe-Lister, 2 August 1932. 5 PRO. FO 371/16025. Memorandum from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Saudi Arabia, to HMG, 6 August 1932. 6 PRO. FO 371/16024. From Sir A. G. Wauchope to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 3 September 1932. 7 Ibid. 8 PRO. FO No. TC/76/32. From Sir A. G. Wauchope, High Commissioner to Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister, Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies, 24 September 1932. 9 PRO. FO 371/16025. Telegram from Secretary of State for the Colonies to High Commissioner for Trans-Jordan, 30 September 1932. 10 PRO. FO No. 1106. From F. H. Humphreys to the Rt Hon Sir John Simon etc., 24 November 1932. 11 TJOG/LCR no. 117, Twentieth meeting, on 27 February 1933. 12 PRO. FO 371/16858. From Mr O. Williams to Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office, 6 January 1933. 13 Ibid. 14 TJOG no. 415, 21 December 1933. 15 PRO. FO 371/16926. Monthly situation report for January 1933, 3 February 1933. 16 PRO. FO 371/16926. Monthly situation report for March 1933, 5 April 1933. 17 Ibid. 18 Chlaim, Avi, Collusion Across the Jordan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), pp. 50–4. 19 TJOG/LCR no. 119, Twenty-second meeting, on 6 March 1933. 20 Qasim al-Hindawi, a prominent member of the Jordanian Solidarity Party, presented his resignation from the Party to the Prime Minister on 8 June 1933. Cabinet Papers. no. S/1151/2/21, 8 June 1933; Qasim al-Hindawi, Private Papers, no. 45/2. Department of Libraries and National Documents. 21 Musa, Amarat Sharq al-Urdon, p. 237. 22 PRO. FO 371/16926. A. S. Kirkbride, Acting British Resident, Monthly situation report for July 1933, 2 August 1933. 23 Ibid. 24 TJOG no. 384, 1 April 1933. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 Madhi and Musa, Tarikh al-Urdon, p. 339; Filistin newspaper no. 83, 7 June 1933, p. 5; Khraisat, Al-Urdinion, p. 245. 28 Madhi and Musa, pp. 333–4. [174]


29 Rush, Ruling Families of Arabia: Jordan, pp. 170–1. 30 PRO. FO 371/16855. Memorandum by G. W. Rendel on the attitude of HMG towards the question of Arab unity, 13 June 1933. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid. 33 T. H. Qarqut, The Development of the Nationalist Movement in Syria (1975), p. 179. See also Maan Abu Nowar, Between Nationalism and Patriotism (London: Dar al Lam, 1991), p. 137. 34 Translated into English by the author. 35 PRO. FO 371/16927. Monthly situation report for November 1933, 4 December 1933. 36 Ibid. 37 TJOG no. 134, Eighth meeting, on 14 December 1933.

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7 Amendment of the 1928 Treaty

By the beginning of 1934, after five years of waiting by the Amir, the Legislative Council and indeed the Jordanian people, for the amendment of the treaty, and after the conclusion of the Saudi Arabian– Trans-Jordanian Treaty, the British Government ran out of apologies for further delay, and started the process of amendment. On 31 January 1934, His Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies, Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister, sent a proposal to the High Commissioner for Trans-Jordan regarding the amendment of certain articles of the 1928 Treaty for final considerations. On 5 April 1934, after many discussions at Government House in Jerusalem, and at the Colonial and Foreign Offices in London, the final draft was accepted. G. W. Rendel at the Foreign Office wrote on 26 April: I feel it is hopeless to attempt to be strictly logical in regard to our relations with the Amir of Trans-Jordan. From the local point of view the Amir is an independent Sovereign with whom we are in a special treaty relations and it is important for political reasons both in Palestine and in Arabia that this ‘façade’ should be maintained. From the general international point of view and particularly from that of the League [of Nations], the Amir is merely part of the British Administration of the Mandated territory of Palestine and Trans-Jordan, and we do not of course want to make any formal arrangements which would in fact be contrary to that principle. But it must be remembered that a great deal of what the High Commissioner is now proposing to concede to the Amir has already been conceded to him. According to the Organic Law or Constitution of Trans-Jordan, the Amir ‘makes treaties’ with foreign Powers (of. E 6334/1933-Flag K). He has already done so on several occasions e.g. with Iraq and with Saudi Arabia. As Mr. Helm points out in his minute of April 26th, we are also committed to the principle of Trans-Jordan consular representation, by the exchange of notes attached to the Saudi–Trans-Jordanian treaty. Iraq of course retained the right not only of consular, but of diplomatic [177]


representation, while she was still under the full mandatory régime, and I believe the question of allowing certain of the Syrian States under French Mandate to send and to receive Consular and possibly even diplomatic representatives has more than once been favourably considered. In these circumstances I feel that while the insertion suggested by Mr. Beckett in sub-paragraph 2 of the revised first paragraph of Article 1 of the Agreement may be logically right and proper, we shall be creating no new precedent in omitting it, while by insisting on its insertion we shall obviously, in Sir A. Wauchope’s opinion, undo all the good that the revision of the agreement is intended to achieve. I should personally prefer therefore merely to cut out from the first paragraph of the revised text the words ‘subject to the terms of the second paragraph of this Article’ and leave the second paragraph itself unchanged. As regards Article 7, I think that here again it is a case of ‘eye-wash’ intended for purely local consumption. It seems clear that the High Commissioner proposes in practice to retain the right to fix the Trans-Jordan tariff and if so he will no doubt make sure that it does not in fact seriously differ from that of Palestine. But I confess that I am less easy in regard to this Article than in regard to Article 1 and I think we should certainly put to the Colonial Office the considerations advanced in Mr. Reckett’s minute above.1

If there was the slightest doubt that Trans-Jordan enjoyed an international personality, the Agreement between His Majesty in respect of the United Kingdom and His Highness the Amir of Trans-Jordan signed at Jerusalem on 2 June 1934, which was supplementary to the Agreement signed on 20 February 1928, left no doubt whatsoever that relations between the two countries were conducted between two subjects of international law. A careful study of the 1934 Agreement shows further evidence of this fact: Article I Article I of the Agreement signed on the 20th February, 1928, is hereby cancelled and the following provisions are substituted in lieu thereof:‘His Highness the Amir agrees that His Britannic Majesty shall be represented in Trans-Jordan by a British Resident acting on behalf of the High Commissioner for Trans-Jordan, and that communications between His Britannic Majesty and all other Powers on the one hand and the Trans-Jordan Government on the other, shall [178]

A M E N D M E N T O F T H E 1 9 2 8 T R E AT Y

be made through the British Resident and the High Commissioner aforesaid. His Britannic Majesty agrees that His Highness the Amir may appoint consular representatives in such neighbouring Arab States as may be considered necessary. His Highness the Amir agrees that the ordinary expenses of civil government and administration will be borne entirely by Trans-Jordan.’ Article II The first paragraph of Article 7 of the Agreement signed on 20 February, 1928, is hereby cancelled and the following provision is substituted in lieu thereof:‘Except by agreement between the two countries there shall be no Customs barrier between Palestine and Trans-Jordan.’ Article III The present Agreement shall be ratified and the ratification shall be exchanged as soon as possible. It shall come into force immediately upon ratification. Article IV The present Agreement has been drawn up in two languages: English and Arabic, and the Plenipotentiaries of each of the High Contracting Parties have signed two English copies and two Arabic copies. Both texts shall have the same validity, but in case of divergence between the two in the interpretation of one or other of the Articles of the present Agreement; The English text shall prevail.2

During January 1934, the Amir Abdullah had received an invitation by the British Government to visit the United Kingdom in June of that year. On 17 May, the High Commissioner for Trans-Jordan wrote to Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister at the Colonial Office to confirm that: ‘In accordance with the terms of your Secret dispatch of 26 April, I have informed Abdullah that his visit is regarded as purely one of courtesy and that it is not the intention of His Majesty’s Government to embark upon political discussions or negotiations with him during his visit.’3 On 29 May 1934 Buckingham Palace informed the Colonial Office that the King would receive the Amir Abdullah at 10.45 am on Monday 11 June.4 On 7 June, the King approved ‘the same honours being paid to the Amir of Trans-Jordan upon his arrival on the 9th of June, and his [179]


departure on the 7th July next, as were accorded to His Highness when he visited this country in 1922.’ The honours referred to were ‘A salute of 21 guns at Dover; a guard of honour of 50 rank and file with Regimental Colours and band at Dover; and Royal Carriages to convey His Highness from and to the Railway Station in London and his Hotel.’5 All these honours were typical of those awarded to heads of state. On 2 June 1934, The Amir, accompanied by his personal adviser Shaikh Foad al-Khatib, his doctor Jamil al-Totunji and his servant Mohammad al-Zabbati, left Amman for London via Jerusalem, Port Said, Marseilles, Paris, and Calais, where courtesies and assistance were afforded to him. The Amir arrived at London on 9 June and was met by Lord Plymouth, Sir John Maffey, Rear Admiral A. Bromley and Mr Williams from the Colonial Office.6 He was received by the King at Buckingham Palace, and a dinner was given in his honour, at which the Secretary of State for the Colonies made an official welcoming speech. He laid a wreath on the Cenotaph at his own request. He made an entertaining and informative tour to Oxford, Stratford, the Lake District, Edinburgh and back to London through York and Cambridge. The Amir was a renowned horseman and a great admirer of horses, thus he was entertained at Ascot, the British Empire Polo Trophy Meeting and the International Horse Show. He visited the House of Commons and saw a debate from the distinguished strangers’ gallery, and attended the air show at Hendon. The British Government could not have done more to please him.7 The visit enhanced the Amir’s prestige, and gave him more reasons to have confidence in his own future and that of Trans-Jordan. On 30 July 1934, the Trans-Jordan Government was shaken by the resignation of one of its important ministers, Qasim al-Hindawi, who explained the reason for his resignation as follows: When I had the honour of your good faith, to be a member of your glorious Cabinet, the principle by which the Government reached the chairs of governing was what the Jordanian People’s Party approved: loyalty to His Highness the Amir the Exalted and to achieve for the country and its sons the high aim of complete and comprehensive happiness. That, and because the plan which your respected Government has adopted since the second week, followed the personal tendencies, and distanced itself from the real public interest completely, I see my duty calls upon me not to add to the catastrophe of the Nation by walking with you, therefore I present my resignation.8 [180]


Qasim al-Hindawi was a renowned political and tribal leader in the north of the country. Although his resignation damaged the prestige of the Government, it did not destroy it. On 26 November 1934, the Amir Talal was married to the Hashemite Sharifah Zain al-Sharaf. His Highness the Amir Talal ibn Abdullah had been sent to England in 1926 by his father to prepare him for his future responsibilities. From a purely Arab background, with no basic knowledge of the English language, the Amir Talal was thrown into a completely different culture and civilization. As soon as he attained a grasp of basic English, he joined the Royal Military College at Sandhurst. After three years of English education and military training, Talal joined the civil staff of Sir Ronald Storrs, the High Commissioner for Cyprus, who was an old friend of the Amir Abdullah since the days of the Great Arab Revolt. He was then sent to the Iraqi Military College, where he stayed for six months. Talal was a very popular Hashemite Prince and the celebrations that took place in the capital Amman were witness to that. I still remember the singing and dancing in the streets of Amman, the Hijazi drums and chants, the Syrian ‘stick and glove’ as well as ‘sword and shield’ dances, the Jordanian Bedouin ‘chant and dance’ and the hadhari (city dweller) dabkah dance in the Roman Theatre and in the square opposite the Hussein Mosque. The Amir Abdullah, who had the right to grant pardons and reduce prison sentences passed by the criminal courts, according to Article 23 of the Organic Law, issued a proclamation on 24 November 1934 deducting a third from limited period sentences finalised by 26 November and converting life sentences into 15 years’ hard labour. The pardon did not apply to offences of murder under brutal circumstances, highway robbery and offences against decency. The total number of prisoners who were released or whose sentences were reduced under the proclamation was 819. During October 1934, the general elections for the third Legislative Council were held, and the following members were elected: Ajlun district: Mohammad al-Funaish, Abdullah al-Kulaib al-Shraidah, Falah al-Zahir, Sulaiman al-Khalil. Balqa district: Fawzi al-Nabulsi, Majid al-Adwan, Nazmi Abd al-Hadi, Asaad al-Khalil, Fawzi al-Mufti, Wasif al-Bisharat. [181]


Karak and Maan districts: Refaifan al-Majali, Salih al-Auran, Mahmoud Kuraishan, Mitri al-Zuraiqat. Bedouins: Shaikh Mithqal al-Fayiz, Shaikh Hamd ibn Jazi. The Prime Minister, Ibrahim Hashim read the speech from the throne on behalf of the Amir, when he opened the first ordinary session of the third Legislative Council on 1 November 1934. The Amir congratulated the Members for their election and the confidence shown in them by the people. He praised the previous Council for its achievements, and the Government for taking measures in aid of the needy during the economic crisis. He thanked the Sultan of Musqat for his gift of palm trees and praised Arab countries for cooperating in aid of their mutual development. He assured members that efforts would be made in land survey, settlement, valuation and demarcation; in the operation of water-boring rigs in areas in need of water, especially in the desert; in the health service; and in communications by wireless, telephone and postal service with Iraq and Palestine. He praised the Government for the state of security, of which he was proud. He added: I mention with pleasure the relations accomplished between us and His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia, the ratification of the Treaty of Good Neighbourliness, and the removal of the causes of anxiety. I also add the other victory of amending the British-Jordanian Treaty, and we will continue to employ every effort to enhance the status of the country. You have been informed of our visit to London, and our meeting with His Britannic Majesty. That visit, in spite of its short duration, was blessed with success because of the information about our country, and the winning of new supporters for her among statesmen, party leaders and journalists, over and above explaining her issues.9

On 13 February 1935, King Ali ibn al-Hussein, the former King of Hijaz and one of the champions of the Great Arab Revolt, died in Baghdad, where he resided with his nephew and son-in-law, King Ghazi ibn Faisal of Iraq. It was known among leading Arab nationalists that the Amir Abdullah was always consulted by both Kings Faisal and Ali in matters concerning the Hashemite family. With the death of King Ali, only the Amir Abdullah and the Amir Zaid ibn al-Hussein, who also [182]


resided in Iraq, were left to face the future. The Amir Abdullah attended the funeral on 14 February. He later held talks with his nephew King Ghazi ibn Faisal. The 1934/35 budget was approved by the Legislative Council as can be seen in Appendix A. The extraordinary expenditure of £P14,824 under relief measures was to help distressed farmers and Bedouins who suffered crop failure and losses of livestock during 1934/35. The main beneficiaries of the measures were the Bani Hasan and the southern areas of Trans-Jordan including the desert.10 The budget for the 1935/36 was also approved by the Legislative Council as Appendix A shows.11 The Trans-Jordan Defence Law of 1935 was to come into effect when the Amir declared its implementation necessary in cases of emergency to defend Trans-Jordan, or in cases of danger to the security of the country or His Majesty’s Armed Forces present in Trans-Jordan. The Amir was authorised to issue any regulations for the organisation and maintenance of security and the defence of Trans-Jordan including: 1. Censorship of publications, books, maps, photos, films, means of communication and radios. 2. Powers of arrest, expulsion, deportation, search of person or property of those whose actions were considered harmful to the security of the country. 3. Observation of ports and national waters and movement of ships. 4. Observation of airports and air traffic. 5. Observation of transport by land, air, or sea. 6. Observation of imports and exports. 7. Control of money. 8. Dealing with gold and currencies. 9. Control of mines. 10. Any orders by HH the Amir in accordance with Article 5 of the Law. 11. Any organisation ordered by HH the Amir. 12. Punishment against crimes committed against Defence Regulations, and the system of trials.12 On 14 November 1935, the first grandson of the Amir Abdullah, the first son of the Amir Talal, the Amir al-Hussein ibn Talal was born in Amman. The announcement was made through a published letter from the Amir to the Prime Minister: [183]


It is the blessing of Allah and a gift, that our son Talal was endowed with a son during this blessed night the 18th of Shaaban in the fifty-forth year, after the three hundred and one thousand of the Hijrah of the proud and honoured. Because it is customary to pronounce happiness for the blessing of Allah upon us, we inform you so that you may announce this and take the usual action. I pray to Allah to make him a blessed one born for the country and people and for us from his generosity.13

On 26 November 1935, the Prime Minister announced that the Amir Abdullah named the new prince al-Hussein ibn Talal.

The young elite and the nationalist cause During the second half of the thirties, a new generation of politically minded young Trans-Jordanians emerged as a direct result of the spread of education and political awareness. Educated by mainly Palestinian and Syrian nationalists who took refuge in the country, and motivated by the struggle for independence in Syria, Palestine and Lebanon, they became active in opposition to the division of the original Syria into mandated territories and against the British Zionist policy in Palestine. In regard to Trans-Jordan, they opposed the 1928 Treaty and demanded its amendment. The majority of the new young elite were employed in the Civil Service, particularly in education, both private and public schools. They did not rebel against the Government, but lobbied it through social and political networks. The more active among them cooperated secretly with the opposition parties. They were well known and respected both locally and in the country as a whole for various reasons: higher education, Civil Service status, tribal influence, wealth, etc. Considering the demographics of Trans-Jordan, they could be regarded as the young intellectual elite of the middle thirties and early forties.14 There were about 300 politically minded young teachers, civil servants, professionals and merchants who supported the intellectual elite on district and tribal bases. Together they constituted some unorganised pockets of independent influence and pressure groups critical of the government of the day and of the British Mandate. Pressure was applied through open and verbal criticism in social meetings and private [184]


gatherings. In a few situations, especially during the Palestinian Revolt of 1936–9, leaflets were distributed and demonstrations were organised by the extreme factions of the elite. The young political elite were instrumental in achieving a certain level of modernisation for the national institutions of the country and their obvious success gave them some moral authority as they created benefits for their districts and tribal communities. The status of the young elite was further enhanced by the extremely thin presence in the country of British expatriates, who acted as advisers for the modernisation of national institutions. Thus the young elite had a functional role within the institutions they served and conducted affairs between the people and the Government. Even the shaikhs and notables themselves had to go through senior civil servants (the new elite) to finalise dealings with the Government. At the same time the gap in social and political attitudes between the young elite and their traditionalist fathers became wider, for they could no longer tolerate their fathers’ compromises as they pressed for modernity, independence and Arab unity. It is during the late thirties that the shaikhs’ and notables’ traditional authority and their status within the hierarchy of the society began to diminish gradually and gave some leeway to the young, urbanised, educated and quasi-modern politically minded elite. There was no compelling evidence to suggest that this nationalist movement was more than a very small ineffective group in the political life of Trans-Jordan. Society was still tribal and agricultural, with no sizeable urban centre in which to incubate nationalist politics. Nor were there universities, colleges of further education, or religious academies to breed large numbers of nationalist politicians. The idea of Arab nationalism and unity was kept alive by the Harakah al-Arabiyah al-Sirriyah (Secret Arab Movement), which was established in 1935. The Movement formed a committee of three of its prominent members, Kazim al-Solh, Qustantin Zuraiq and Foad Khalil Mufarraj, to write a manifesto based on ideas and pronouncements accepted in their meetings. The Movement approved the manifesto produced by the committee and considered it to be the constitution for the Arab Nationalist Movement.15 A new awakening of Arab identity and national sentiment started to spread all over the Arab world.

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By 1935 Trans-Jordan’s population of 300,000 was estimated to be distributed as follows: 130,000 settled in towns and villages; 120,000 semi-nomadic tribes; and 50,000 nomadic tribes. The financial situation of the country during the years 1930–5 was as shown in Table 7.1. TABLE 7.1

Trans-Jordan finances, 1930–5 Financial year 1930/31 1931/32 1932/33 1933/34 1934/35 1935/36

Expenditure (£P)

Revenue (£P)

Grant-in-Aid (£P)

250,064 222,902 253,749 261,507 270,589 272,876

84,000 84,700 72,000 65,000 60,000 60,000

317,080 315,945 311,744 320,048 345,731 340,026

The British Government had to contribute a substantial sum annually to bridge the gap between expenditure and revenue, and it became increasingly obvious that unless some extraordinary measures were taken, there was little prospect, for some years to come, of Trans-Jordan achieving a balanced budget. Several factors had contributed to this situation. The Colonial Office reported in July 1935: Even in normal times the water supply of Trans-Jordan is meagre, and in the desert areas the population depend upon a very small number of permanent watering holes. With the aid of a grant from the Colonial Development Fund a search for water in likely places has been initiated, but much remains to be done in this direction. A series of drought years has gravely aggravated the water shortage with the result that harvests have failed year after year and heavy losses of live-stock have been sustained. Happily, the prospects for this year’s harvest have somewhat improved, but the resources of the inhabitants have been so reduced that, without assistance from outside sources, they cannot hope to recover the lost ground. At one time serious locust invasions added to the distress of the country. Every effort was made to combat this scourge and recently the country has not suffered in this manner, but the danger is always threatening. Misfortune has also overtaken Trans-Jordan in the form of earthquake and flood. [186]


Another cause of loss to certain tribes was the constant raiding by hostile tribes on the borders between Trans-Jordan and Saudi Arabia. The Trans-Jordan tribes which for geographical reasons were most exposed to this kind of attack suffered heavy losses in camels and other live-stock, one tribe indeed, being reduced almost to destitution by these depredations. To combat this form of aggression, a special desert patrol was formed and raiding on any appreciable scale is now non-existent. Nevertheless, the tribes that suffered were deprived to a large extent of their means of livelihood and have never recovered their former comparative prosperity. Constant efforts have been made to relieve the distress caused by this accumulation of misfortunes. Large sums of money have been spent on relief works, and in cases of extreme destitution free rations have been issued to the tribesmen. Successive crop failures have necessitated large remissions of taxation and have seriously reduced revenue from this source. But these measures are palliative: what is required is development.16

NOTES 1 PRO. FO 371/17877. Minute by G. W. Rendel, 26 April 1934. 2 PRO. FO Treaty Series no. 34, 1935. Cmd 4999. 3 PRO. CO 831/27. From Arthur Wauchope to Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister, 17 May 1934. 4 PRO. CO 831/27. From A. H. I. Harding to Rear Admiral A. Bromley, Colonial Office, 29 May 1934. 5 PRO. CO 831/27. From Lord Chamberlain to the Colonial Office, 7 June 1934. 6 Ibid. Programme for the Amir’s visit. 7 PRO. CO 831/28. The Amir’s programme of visit to the UK. 8 Qasim al-Hindawi, Private Papers. 9 TJOG Special Edition, 1 November 1934. 10 PRO. Colonial no. 112. Report on Palestine and Trans-Jordan, 1936, p. 329. 11 PRO. Colonial no. 166. Report on Palestine and Trans-Jordan, 1939, p. 377. 12 TJOG no. 473, 19 March 1935. 13 TJOG no. 504, 1 December 1935. 14 The following were the intellectual elite, including active university students, between 1935 and 1942: Abd al-Halim al-Nimir, Abd al-Rahim al-Khatib, Abd al-Qadir al-Tal, Abd al-Rahim al-Wakid, Abd al-Munim al-Rifai, Abd al-Razaq Khalifah, Abd al-Wahab al-Majali, Abd al-Rahman Khalifah, Abd al-Halim Abbas, Abd al-Karim al-Gharaybah, Abd al-Karim Abu Nowar, Adil al-Shamailah, Ahmad al-Tarawnah, Ahmad al-Tal, Aqab al-Khasawnah, Ali Mismar, Ali al-Hindawi, Amin al-Khasawnah, Baha al-Din Tuqan, Bashir Khair, Bahjat al-Talhouni, Bisharah Ghasib, Dhaif Allah al-Humud, Farhan al-Shubailat, [187]


Fakhri Musa al-Maani, Hazza al-Majali, Hamad al-Farhan, Hamdi al-Sakit, Husni Fariz, Ibrahim Qattan, Ishaq Ali Ridha, Khalil al-Salim, Mohammad al-Shuraiqi, Mustafa Khalifah, Mustafa Wahbi al-Tal, Mohammad al-Muhaisin, Mohammad Audah al-Quraan, Madhat Jumaah, Munib al-Madi, Michael Halsah, Michael Fakhouri, Munif al-Razzaz, Mohammad Hijazi, Mohammad Nahar al-Rifai, Mohammad Nazal Armouti, Majid Ghanmah, Mohammad al-Mitlaq, Naji Abu Nowar, Saad Jumaah, Said al Nassir Salah Tuqan, Said Malhas, Sulaiman al-Hadidi, Sulaiman al-Nabulsi, Subhi al-Qutub, Subhi Zaid, Shafiq Rushaidat, Sayah al-Rousan, and Wasfi al-Tal. 15 Among its members: Kazim al-Solh, Qustantin Zuraiq, Taqi al-Din al-Solh, Mohammad Ali Hamadah, Rashad al-Shawa, Izz al-Din al-Shawa, Anis al-Saghir, Foad Khalil Mufarraj, Ramiz Shawqi, Jubran Shamiyah, Farid Zain al-Din, Siddiq Shanshal, Said Fattah al-Imam, Younis al-Sabaawi, Allal al-Fasi, Wasif Kamal, Foad al-Saadi, Khulousi al-Khairi, Mohammad Salah al-Din, Ahmad Belfraij, Akram Zuaitir, Mohammad Shuqair. 16 PRO. CO 831/31/13. Colonial Office memorandum on the application of Trans-Jordan for assistance from the Development Fund, 15 July 1935.

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8 The 1936–1939 Revolt in Palestine

The yearning for Arab independence and unity which spread across the Arab world, was clearly expressed in Cairo. After many anti-British demonstrations during the first week of November 1935, the situation developed into riots on 13 November; two Egyptians were killed and more than ninety wounded. Thereafter anti-British and anti-French feelings soared high. The year 1936 was an eventful one in the political development of the Middle East. Towards the end of February Shaikh Taj al-Din, the Syrian Prime Minister, resigned and was replaced by Atta al-Ayoubi. A few days later strikes, demonstrations and violent political disturbances led by Syrian Arab nationalists broke out in Damascus and the other main towns and cities in Syria. After six weeks of a crippling economic strike, the Syrian nationalists were invited to visit Paris for negotiations. On 5 March Lebanese Arab nationalists, heartened by the actions of their Syrian neighbours, demanded from the French High Commissioner: the restoration of the Lebanese constitution, a treaty between France and Lebanon, and membership of the League of Nations. On 17 March the Lebanese Government issued a decree dissolving the Syrian National Party in Lebanon for demanding unity between Syria and Lebanon. On 28 March the Amir Abdullah sent a message to the British High Commissioner for Trans-Jordan calling for unity between Syria and Trans-Jordan, a union between Palestine and Trans-Jordan, and a treaty with Iraq. As if that was not enough to disturb the quiet of the British and French Governments, Palestine was on the brink of the 1936–9 Revolt. The root cause of the 1936 Palestinian Revolt was the British Balfour Declaration and all that it declared or implied. Also, every action of the British Government since that declaration in 1917 had created more Arab suspicion and fear that Britain was helping the Zionists to occupy the whole of Palestine with Zionist Jews from the rest of the world. In his letter to the chairman of the Royal Commission for Palestine of 18 [189]


January 1937, Akram Zuaitir, a leading Arab nationalist from Nablus, clearly expressed the thoughts and feelings of the Palestinians: The British occupation of this country has been disastrous in many respects, the following two being the most: 1. It gave rise to a Government under a mandate the articles of which were drawn by the British Government, in a manner calculated to render the country fit for the execution of an unjust imperialist policy, and; 2. It brought with it Zionism which has been seeking to establish a Jewish National Home in Palestine by creating a Jewish majority. For 18 years we have continuously been expressing our discontent, complaining against many injustices and protesting in various ways; memorandums and reports were sent to all concerned, commissions of inquiry were sent, all this was found to be in vain. The policy of the Government of Palestine has ignored our rights and interests and had the effect of provoking us. Every Arab in this country became convinced that all measures taken to convince the Government of our rights failed. The Arabs lost all hope of Justice. Despair became so deep-rooted that they were obliged to take a position of self-defence, a position which has long been recognised lawful by all systems of law. It is this feeling of despair that made them revolt preferring to meet death rather than witness the day when their country becomes Jewish and their entire existence annihilated.1

The most important cause of the revolt was the inordinate number of Jewish legal and illegal immigrants which had been allowed to enter Palestine during the previous fifteen years. Particularly during the previous three years, the volume of Jewish immigration exceeded all the numbers feared, which caused much anger amongst the Arabs, Christian and Muslim alike. To be able to understand the extent of the Arabs’ fear, the number of immigrants must be considered in relation to the total population and to the natural rate of population increase, as can be seen from Table 8.1. The table shows that while the Muslim and Christian populations expanded by 44 per cent and 49 per cent respectively, the Jewish population expanded by no less than 343 per cent between 1922 and 1936. The increase in population from 752,048 to 1,336,518 represented an increase of 78 per cent. Recorded Jewish immigration to Palestine between 1920 and 1936 is shown in Table 8.2.

[190]

T H E 1 9 3 6 – 1 9 3 9 R E V O LT I N P A L E S T I N E

TABLE 8.1

Population of Palestine, 1922–36 Year

Total

Muslims

Jews

Christians

Other

1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936

752,048 778,989 804,962 847,238 898,902 917,315 935,951 960,043 992,559 1,035,821 1,052,872 1,104,884 1,171,158 1,261,082 1,336,518

589,177 609,331 627,660 641,494 663,613 680,725 695,280 712,343 733,149 759,712 771,174 789,980 807,180 826,457 848,342

83,790 89,660 94,945 121,725 150,040 149,789 151,656 156,481 164,796 164,610 180,793 209,207 253,700 320,358 370,483

71,464 72,090 74,094 75,512 76,467 77,880 79,812 81,776 84,986 91,398 90,624 95,165 99,532 103,371 106,474

7,617 7,908 8,263 8,507 8,782 8,921 9,203 9,443 9,628 10,101 10,281 10,532 10,746 10,896 11,2192

TABLE 8.2

Immigration to Palestine, 1920–36 Year

Immigrants Jews

1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936

5,514 9,149 7,844 7,421 12,856 33,801 13,081 2,713 2,178 5,249 4,944 4,075 9,553 30,327 42,359 61,293 21,738

[191]

Non-Jews 202 190 284 570 697 840 829 882 902 1,317 1,489 1,458 1,736 1,650 1,784 2,293 1,252 (January to August)3


The High Commissioner for Palestine put the enormous increase in the number of Jewish immigrants during the years 1933–5 down to the persecution of the German Jews. That explanation was considered unrealistic and unacceptable by the Arabs, for out of the 30,327 Jewish immigrants in 1934, only 5,000 were German Jews, and the rest were from other East European countries. Furthermore, out of the 260,000 Jewish immigrants who entered Palestine between 1919 and 1935, only 22,000 came from Germany, as can be seen from Table 8.3, which shows the countries from which Jews emigrated to Palestine. TABLE 8.3

Jewish immigrants’ countries of origin, 1919–35 Nationality

Number

Per cent

Poland USSR Germany Rumania Lithuania Yemen USA Greece Iraq Latvia Czechoslovakia Austria Turkey Others Total

110,000 30,000 22,000 13,000 9,000 8,000 8,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 3,500 3,500 3,500 34,500 260,000

42 12 9 5 3 3 3 3 2 1.5 1 1 1 13.5 1004

The other main reason for the Palestine Revolt was the enormous increase in the sale of Arab land to Jews. In December 1934, a delegation representing all the political parties and other Arab movements visited the High Commissioner for Palestine, Sir Arthur Wauchope, and protested to him that the sale of Arab land to the Jews, and the enormous increase in the number of Jewish immigrants, had reached such an extent as to be contrary to the promises given by the mandatory power to preserve Arab rights. The High Commissioner replied with a statement that 36,000 [192]


Jewish immigrants in one month was not excessive. The delegation, knowing well that the United Kingdom did not allow one Jewish immigrant to enter its land, was extremely disappointed and angry. Worried about the future, and to defend their land and rights, Palestinian Arab political organisations started to crystallise into political parties. By October 1935, the following parties were active in Palestine: • • • • • •

The Palestine Arab Party, led by Jamal al-Husseini. The National Defence Party, led by Raghib al-Nashashibi. The Reform Party, led by Dr Hussein Fakhri al-Khalidi. The National Bloc, led by Abd al-Latif Salah. The Congress Executive of Nationalist Youth, led by Yaqoub al-Ghusain. The Istiqlal (Independence) Party, led by Awni Abd al-Hadi.

In November 1935 the leaders of these parties united to present a memorandum to the High Commissioner for Palestine demanding the following: 1. The establishment of a democratic Government; 2. Prohibition of the transfer of land to Jews and enactment of a law similar to the Five Faddan Law in Egypt.5 3. (a) The immediate cessation of Jewish immigration and formation of a competent committee to determine the absorptive capacity of the country and to lay down a principle for immigration; (b) Legislation to require all lawful residents to obtain and carry identity cards; (c) Immediate and effective investigation into illicit immigration.6

On 20 November 1935, the Qassam revolutionary group was located north of Nablus by the Palestine Police. A large police force was sent to arrest the group, but in a battle which took place at Shaikh Zaid village, a few miles north of Yaabad, Shaikh al-Qassam and his brothers were killed. On the following day, the funeral which took place in their city of Haifa was attended by delegations from every city and town of Palestine. Many thousands from Haifa and the surrounding villages were present. Nothing moves the feelings of a Muslim community more [193]


than the blood of martyrs, for martyrdom is the highest and most revered status in Islam. The blood of Shaikh Izz al-Din al-Qassam and his martyred brothers, Shaikh Yousef Abdullah, Ahmad al-Shaikh Said, Said Atiyah Ahmad and Shaikh Nimir Hasan al-Saadi, created the highest possible feelings against the British Palestine Government and the Zionist Jews of Palestine. In December 1935, the High Commissioner presented a new draft constitution for Palestine, which would provide for a Legislative Council with a large unofficial majority. The Council, which would have consisted of 28 members, headed by an impartial president from outside Palestine who would neither participate in debates nor have a vote, was to have been made up as follows. The Muslims were to have a total of 18 members, comprising 5 officials, 2 commercial representatives, 8 elected members and 3 nominated members. The Christians would have 3 members, 1 elected and 2 nominated. Of the total of 7 Jewish members, there were to be 3 elected and 4 nominated. On 1 February 1936, the British Government replied to the demands made by the Palestinian Arab Delegation in November 1935, confirming the offer of a constitution and a Legislative Council as a first practical step towards democratic government. It agreed to enact a law prohibiting the sale of land to Jews unless the Arab landowner retained a ‘viable minimum’, and that the rate of Jewish immigration would be ‘carefully gauged according to the country’s capacity’. However, the Arabs were divided in their attitude; some accepted the proposals, while others demanded major alterations. The Jews were united in refusing and condemning the proposed constitution, and the British Government’s reply to the Arabs. While the Arabs of Palestine had no means of defending themselves or their rights politically, and had no one to speak on their behalf in London, the Jews had the strongest allies in London and all over the world. George Antonius wrote, in his book The Arab Awakening: Zionist propaganda is active, highly organized and widespread: the world press, at any rate in the democratic West, is largely amenable to it; it commands many of the available channels for the dissemination of news, and more particularly those of the English-speaking world. Arab propaganda is, in comparison, primitive and less successful . . . The result is that, for a score of years or so, the world has been looking at Palestine mainly through Zionist [194]


spectacles and has unconsciously acquired the habit of reasoning on Zionist premises.7

The Zionist lobby in London were able to arouse strong feelings in England against the British Government’s proposals. The question was debated in the House of Lords on 28 February 1936, and in the House of Commons on 25 March. Opposition to the Government’s reply to the Arabs of Palestine forced J. H. Thomas, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, to defend the High Commissioner for Palestine against criticism levelled from all sides of the House. The Arabs of Palestine were extremely disappointed with the two debates in Parliament, and by the beginning of April feelings against the Zionists Jews and the British soared very high. On 15 April 1936, a group of Arabs held up some cars on the main road between Nablus and Tulkarm. They robbed Arabs as well as Jews, but killed one Greek Jewish immigrant and wounded another. On the following day the Jews killed two Arabs in their hut at a Jewish colony where they worked. On 17 April, during the funeral of the Greek immigrant, serious Jewish riots broke out in Jaffa and Tel Aviv. On 19 April, clashes between Arabs and Jews followed around Tel Aviv, where 7 Jews were killed and 35 wounded, and 4 Arabs were killed and 15 wounded.8 It became gradually obvious that the disturbances were not of the normal occasional type, which the Mandatory was accustomed to and able to handle. On 20 April a large Arab demonstration in Jaffa was dispersed by the Palestine police, killing 2 Arab demonstrators and wounding 50 others. In the clashes that followed between Arabs and Jews, 5 Jews were killed and 26 others were wounded. Two Arab National Committees which were established in Jaffa and Nablus called for a general strike. On 26 April all the Arab party leaders met and united themselves in one organisation under a Higher Arab Committee which was constituted as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Haj Amin al-Husseini, President Jamal al-Husseini Raghib al-Nashashibi Ahmad Hilmi Abd al-Baqi Dr Hussein Fakhri al-Khalidi [195]


6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

Yaqoub Farraj Alfred Rock Awni Abd al-Hadi Abd al-Latif Salah Haj Yaqoub al-Ghusain

The Higher Committee again formulated the same demands as in November 1935 and made a statement to the press regarding their presentation to the High Commissioner. They accepted the principle of a general strike and set up a strike committee for its organisation and execution. They declared the general strike on the same day, 26 April. Palestinian local committees representing all shades of Arab political opinion were established all over the country, pledging loyalty and support to the Higher Arab Committee and giving it the authority to maintain the strike pending the acceptance of their national demands. On 27 April Haj Amin al-Husseini, the President of the Higher Arab Committee, sent a cable to the Amir Abdullah appealing to him to support the Palestine cause: His Highness the Amir Abdullah the Exalted Arab Palestine is on strike since a week ago in protest against the British Zionist policy which annihilates the Arab People. The Nation, united in all its parties, are determined to maintain the strike until this policy is changed so that the Arab entity and rights are secured. Help! Your Highness to save this Holy country and achieve her demands. Amin al-Husseini The President of the Arab High Committee.

On the following day, 28 April, the Amir replied: His Grace Haj Amin al-Husseini The President of the Arab High Committee, Jerusalem I have read your cable with concern, and I will as in the past do what I must do, God willing, and God Is the Helper for all. Abdullah

The Amir Abdullah attempted to persuade the members of the Higher Arab Committee in Palestine to call off the strike and to lose no [196]


time in accepting the invitation extended to them by the British Government to send a deputation to London to discuss the problem, but his efforts failed. Again on 18 May, when he learned of the British Government’s intention to send a Royal Commission to Palestine as soon as normal conditions had been restored, the Amir did his utmost to persuade the Palestinian leaders to end the strike and invited Awni Abd al-Hadi and Jamal al-Husseini to visit him for talks in Amman. The British Resident in Amman reported: Being convinced of the genuineness of the Palestine Leader’s statement that they had not the necessary authority to stop the strike unless they were put in a position to tell the people that Jewish immigration would be suspended till delegates had been to England or the Royal Commission had come and gone, His Highness strongly recommended that immigration should be suspended and has anxiously sought for any solution which would enable discussion between His Majesty’s Government and the Arabs to be joined and would avoid deterioration of the situation to the level of force. His Highness argued that to thus suspend immigration would not be a capitulation to violence because, although there had been some unwished for acts of violence, the strike was a peaceful one and was the obvious way for the Arabs, whose demands during the past 18 years for the limitation of Jewish immigration had borne no fruit, to show their determination not to accept the way in which His Majesty’s Government is interpreting the policy laid down in the mandate. His Highness’s major policy is that there should be friendship between the Arabs and the English and the victory of the Italians in Abyssinia has further encouraged his belief in this policy. In these circumstances the Amir, who has done his best to convince the Arab High Council that all violence must be avoided so that this major factor of friendship between Arabs and British should not be destroyed, has been bewildered by Mr. Thomas’ declaration that immigration will not be stopped and by the recent publication of the Jewish Immigration Schedule for the next six months.9

Meanwhile the Amir Abdullah did not neglect the situation in Trans-Jordan. He visited both the north and the south of the country to maintain quiet and prevent disturbances emanating from the high emotions felt by the people in support of their brothers in Palestine. He told every audience throughout his visits that he was doing his best to help find a peaceful solution to the problems in Palestine. [197]


On 30 April the Amir wrote to the High Commissioner expressing his anxiety about the situation in Palestine, which could have repercussions in Trans-Jordan, and urging him to find a solution to the immediate Palestinian demands: Your Excellency My hopes and heart’s wishes are directed to one aim, which is important and desired by me and by every Arab who loves his country and appreciates his situation, that is, to solve the Zionist problem in Palestine in a way which will not deny the Arabs their rights, or deny the Jews their gains. There is a belief that your trusted personality has the ability to find such a solution, because of your honour, courage and love for good, and especially that destiny wills Your Excellency’s time to be the time during which the cup is full to the brim. As Your Excellency’s personal friend, who likes His Britannic Majesty, I would like to offer all my influence among the sons of my nation, to regain peace and quiet before harm overwhelms Palestine and Trans-Jordan. But I am sure that any solution which does not penetrate to the heart of the problem will not succeed, whatever its source may be. I have in the past written to your respected predecessors with my feelings about this problem. But because it was destined that Your Excellency should today deal with, in Palestine, the most critical question any responsible man may face, the ties of true friendship urge me to offer whatever help possible to Your Excellency in these critical circumstances. I have received, two days ago, a cable from the President of the Arab High Committee al-Sayid Amin al-Husseini informing me of the situation of the Arabs of Palestine, and asking for my help. I have learnt that similar cables have been sent to their Majesties the Kings of the Arabs. I considered it my duty to respond with what may help to bring calm to their hearts, until the situation becomes clear to you so that you can solve the problem in a way which secures permanent stability in Palestine and the rights of everyone. I have no doubt that Your Excellency appreciates that the attitude of Trans-Jordan towards Palestine can be measured by the attitude of any other Arab country, and that the neighbourliness, unity of feelings, and similarity of trade and economic interests, as well as other relations which tie the two countries with strong bonds, mean that treatment of one affects the other. In particular, the issue has developed recently to a situation whereby it is influenced by [198]


religious sensitivities of all classes of Muslims of whatever social or intellectual status. This letter will not suffice to expound the discussion in this question further; this is why you will find me ready to discuss with you whatever you think I can contribute to help in these difficult circumstances. But this will not stop me from saying that Your Excellency knows, as does everyone who reads the covenant of the Mandate for Palestine, that the Balfour Declaration aimed to create a national home in Palestine, and there is nothing to provide for making the whole of Palestine the national home for the Jews. At the same time the Declaration deals with a second matter, which is the maintenance of the rights of the original population of Palestine, and not to harm them or their interests. This understanding, which has been supported by the statements of His Majesty’s Government representatives in various circumstances, means that the solution of the Palestine problem at your hands is not far from being achieved, because of what you are known for, determination and good will. In that you will find a way to eradicate the fear of the Arab people of Palestine as a result of the said Declaration and what may follow from its policy. Finally I will not hide from Your Excellency the anxiety that I have for this country as a result of the present situation in Palestine; and in spite of my feeling that the unity of emotions between the Arabs of Palestine and Trans-Jordan is getting stronger against the Zionist movement and Jewish demands, I will endeavour to secure the safety of this country from the strike and the disturbances, and reaffirm my readiness to help Your Excellency at any time. Abdullah

While the dissenting voices of the politicians were not loud enough to be heard, the chants of the voices of pupils of nearly all ages including elementary level were loud and clear all over the country. The new generations of Jordanian youth were showing their nationalist feelings and support towards their brothers in Palestine by holding demonstrations in Amman, Irbid, Karak and Salt. The Minister of Education, the Minister of the Interior and even the Chief of the Royal Palace were sent by the Amir to visit schools and explain to the pupils the attitude of the Amir. To add to the Amir’s problems, the year 1936 was the worst agricultural year suffered by Trans-Jordan since the details of the country’s situation had been recorded. Some parts of the country, particularly in the south and the desert areas, had been badly hit by the drought and no [199]


casual work for labour was available. Henry Cox reported on the general situation: The senior seconded Palestine officials, of whom the Chief Minister is the head, whilst in sympathy with their Arab compatriots have loyally done their duty here. But the feeling is general, from the Amir downwards, that the trouble cannot be ended by repressive measures and that some loophole for negotiation, and finally for agreement, must be found quickly so that the risk of Trans-Jordan getting out of hand may be avoided.10

In Palestine the limited strike, which began in Jaffa and Nablus, immediately spread to Jerusalem, Haifa and all the major towns and cities of Palestine. Soon, it became obvious that a general strike had covered the whole country. Anticipating a major showdown between the Palestine Government and the Higher Arab Committee, the High Commissioner asked the British Government for military reinforcement for the Palestine Garrison. On 11 May, a battalion of the Royal Scots Fusiliers, supported by one squadron of the Royal Tank Corps, and one Armoured Cars squadron, arrived from Egypt. In July the 2nd Battalion of the Lincolnshire Regiment, the 2nd Battalion of the South Wales Borderers Regiment and the Kings Own Scottish Borderers Regiment arrived from Malta. Meanwhile, on 15 May, The Higher Arab Committee called on all the Arabs not to pay taxes to the Palestine Government. On the following day a large Arab demonstration in Jaffa was dispersed by police, killing 2 demonstrators and wounding 25 others. By 20 May, the revolt had already covered the whole country; sporadic attacks were launched against British troops, Palestine policemen and Jewish colonies. Guerrilla warfare was conducted in small groups raiding from the hills. Weapons and ammunitions were smuggled from Trans-Jordan to Palestine. Attacks on and destruction of crops, property, telephone lines, railway tracks and small bridges, and the ambushing of means of transport, became the order of the day. On 24 May, when the Seaforth Highlanders were stoned at Nablus, they opened fire on Arab rioters killing 5 and wounding 17 others. On 22 May 1936, the Amir wrote to the High Commissioner for Palestine, Sir Arthur Wauchope, warning him that the Arabs believed the British Government to be completely under the influence of the Jews. He explained that he was in touch with the Committee of Ten (the [200]


Higher Arab Committee) and that he accepted the idea of a Royal Commission. He said that he had met with Awni Abd al-Hadi and Jamal al-Husseini, who had thanked him for his endeavours and informed him that the ten and other notables ‘will be pleased to co-operate with the Government to achieve an acceptable solution’. He assured the High Commissioner that ‘to restore peace and order, and to receive the Royal Commission is in your hands if you declare a stop to immigration, as Samuel and Chancellor did in the recent past’.11 He urged the High Commissioner: Your Excellency, think with me of a people afraid for their country against a people who overwhelmed them by imposition and who are nearly taking their country from them; their country in which they lived from the dawn of Islam, to the Crusades, to the Ottomans and to the Hashemite Arab Revolt. Now they see their country taken from them piece by piece . . . I must be frank with you, the offer of the Royal Commission to the Arabs was accompanied with new permits for Jewish immigration.12

However, the large and formidable presence of British troops, the imposition of curfews, arrests on suspicion, collective punishment, interning suspects in concentration camps, demolition of houses by explosives and imposing the death penalty for Arabs owning or carrying weapons, as well as many other emergency measures, including the spreading of propaganda leaflets by air, all that and more, did not succeed in restoring order to the country. Instead of heeding the Amir’s warning Sir Wauchope increased his extremely cruel pressure on the Palestinian people. Towards the end of May, without trials, he interned fifty of the best known Arab intellectual elite in a concentration camp at Aujah al-Hafir in the Sinai Desert.13 By the beginning of June the whole country was in a state of full rebellion. The British Government declared the general strike illegal and issued emergency regulations to deal with it. On 4 June, another infantry battalion was sent from Egypt to reinforce the British garrison in Palestine. In London, on 18 May 1936, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in a reply to a question in the House of Commons, stated that the Government had decided that as soon as order was restored in Palestine, a Royal Commission would investigate the causes of unrest. This statement was emphasised on June 16 and 20 and on 2 July. The [201]


Amir Abdullah, who could no longer accept the suffering of the people of Palestine, attempted on 4 June to mediate between the British Government and the Higher Arab Committee, but that attempt failed. On 7 June, the Amir discussed the whole situation in the country and the region with Haj Amin al-Husseini, the President of the Higher Arab Committee, and two of its prominent members, Dr Hussein Fakhri al-Khalidi and Raghib al-Nashashibi. On 12 July, King Ibn Saud sent a letter to the Amir Abdullah suggesting that the two rulers, together with King Ghazi of Iraq and the Imam Yahya of the Yemen, appeal to the Palestinian people to end the strike and allow the British Government to give them justice.14 On 16 June, another meeting was held between the Amir and members of the Higher Arab Committee in which they discussed the possibility of ending the strike and accepting the offer of the Royal Commission. Meanwhile, the general strike and the violent rebellion continued. On 27 July 1936, the Palestinian people celebrated the 100th day of the revolt with peaceful demonstrations in the main towns and cities, while the armed revolutionaries attacked military positions and police posts at Balaah, Ein Door, Ararah, Assirah, and the environs of Jenin and Tulkarm. On 29 July, the new Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr Ormsby-Gore, announced the members of the Royal Commission and its terms of reference as follows: The Right Hon. Earl Peal; The Right Hon. Sir Horace Rumbold; Sir Laurie Hammond; Sir Morris Carter; Sir Harold Morris; Professor Reginald Coupland. To ascertain the underlying causes of the disturbances which broke out in Palestine in the middle of April; to inquire into the manner in which the Mandate for Palestine is being implemented in relation to the obligations of the Mandatory towards the Arabs and the Jews respectively; and to ascertain whether, upon a proper construction of the terms of the Mandate, either the Arabs or the Jews have any legitimate grievances upon account of the way in which the Mandate has been, or is being implemented; and if the Commission is satisfied that any such grievances are well founded, to make recommendations for their removal and for the prevention of their recurrence.15 [202]


On 4 August, the President and members of the Higher Arab Committee, the mayors of the main cities, and 26 Arab notables, went to Amman to consult the Amir Abdullah before taking action on the question of accepting the offer of the Royal Commission. The Amir Abdullah endeavoured to persuade them to end the strike, hoping that this gesture might urge the British Government to take action concerning immigration. An intelligence report by the Palestine police, who were monitoring the Amir’s efforts, reported: The Supreme Committee has met on a number of occasions to discuss the situation. On 5 August the Committee after certain deliberations proceeded to Amman on the invitation or the Amir Abdullah. The members of the Committee and their following cherished a hope that His Highness would make known certain concessions it was believed the Government was prepared to make as an inducement for them to use their influence to restore order (and call off the strike). Prior to the meeting, it being realized that probably the strongest opponent to any such capitulation would be Haj Amin Husseini supported by the Istiqlalists, a number of persons other than members of the Supreme Committee were invited, quite a number of those being supporters of the Nashashibi faction, headed by Ragheb Bey Nashashibi, President of the National Defence Party, a bitter opponent of Haj Amin Husseini for some years past. It became evident to the Mufti that some intriguing was going on behind his back to ensure that many persons would be present who would favour Ragheb Bey Nashashibi rather than himself, and it was, therefore, in a bad mood that Haj Amin attended and listened to the discussions. The Amir represented to those invited that it would be possible for them, were they so desirous, to have an end put to acts of violence, etc., when he would be able to approach the Government and submit to them the Supreme Committee’s demands of which the following were mentioned: 1. The stoppage of Jewish immigration. 2. The release of political prisoners. 3. The pardon of prisoners convicted of offences arising from the disorders. 4. The remission of collective fines imposed on the villages. The Amir was requested to produce written guarantees from the Government as to concessions, but this he was unable to do, and the delegates, therefore, left the conference unsatisfied, probably the most annoyed being Haj Amin Husseini, who formed the [203]


conviction that some solution to the present situation had been considered in which he was not himself the prime mover, and which, if successful, would undoubtedly have affected his prestige as the most important Arab personality in the country. The result of this was an immediate breaking out of disorders throughout the country. Determined efforts were made to bring about a general strike in Haifa. A campaign of ‘terrorism’ was intensified, and the action of armed hands in the hills became stimulated, particularly in the Nablus District, followed by Tiberias, Safad, Beisan and elsewhere. More determination to adhere to national demands became apparent and there were discussions anent boycotting the Royal Commission when it should arrive. The breach between the Nashashibi and Husseini factions, which during the disorders had been bridged, began again to widen. The Amir Abdullah is persisting in endeavouring to influence the various members of the Supreme Committee and other nationalists and politicians to assist in restoring order in the country to a degree that will admit of the presence here of the Royal Commission. A meeting of the National Committees under the guidance of the Supreme Committee is to be held in Jerusalem on 20 August. Meanwhile every effort is being made to influence various members and there would not appear to be any reason for optimism, there being indications that the dissenting faction (Nashashibis) will have to fall into line with the advocates of continuation of the strike with its various consequences, such as banditry and ‘terrorism’, with the strong possibility that many Government officials will be forced to stay away from their usual duties. An eleventh hour effort is being exploited to ensure the presence of a number of villagers at the meeting. Jamal al Husseini, Dr. Tannous and Shibli Jamal, who acompanied Emil al Ghuri on the unofficial delegation to London, are on their way back to Palestine. They received sympathetic hearing from many people in England, including a number of Members of Parliament, and they have enlisted. a great deal of support for the Arab cause. At one time it was intended that the meeting of the 20th was to welcome them, opportunity to be taken at the same time to discuss the situation and their success, or otherwise, in England. Their belated return, however, made it impossible for them to be present at this meeting and it may be that after certain deliberations the meeting will be postponed so that the delegates may be heard before any final decisions are made.16

The Amir sent the Prime Minister Ibrahim Hashim to Jerusalem on 15 August to persuade the Palestinian leaders to accept his proposals. [204]


But after interviewing a number of people and explaining to them the Amir’s position he reported on the following day that the propertied classes were most anxious to put an end to the existing state of disorder. However, he thought that no one was willing openly to advocate a return to peace unless he could do so under the protection of a guarantee that something had been gained for the Arabs, and that the request for concessions asked for by the Amir after the meeting in Amman on 4 August had hardened to the extent that before violence could be stopped a declaration must be made that immigration would be stopped. On 21 August, the Amir regretted that he could not accept the invitation of the High Commissioner to meet with him and Nuri al-Said of Iraq at Government House in Jerusalem. Instead he asked why Nuri al-Said was asked to intervene. The High Commissioner informed him that Nuri was passing through Palestine and it was a matter of courtesy. The Amir was much annoyed with Nuri’s visit and the fact that he was at the same time used as mediator with the Arab leaders of Palestine. As expected by the Amir, Nuri achieved nothing. On 24 August, Nuri al-Said had lunch with Amir and suggested to him that he and King Ghazi should issue a joint call to the Palestinians asking them to end the strike and accept the Royal Commission and promising them that should they do so the rulers would accept responsibility for a satisfactory solution of the Arab case in Palestine. But the Amir refused the suggestion and became more determined that he could only be a party to such an appeal if authorised by the British Government to make the required promise to the Arab leaders of Palestine. The Amir knew the Arab leaders of Palestine far more than Nuri al-Said or any other Arab leader. He was proved right when on 31 August the Higher Arab Committee published a statement to the effect that Nuri al-Said, on behalf of the Iraqi Government and the Arab Kings and Amirs, had been accepted by the Arabs as a mediator and that until such time as he should bring the negotiations to the desired conclusion the strike would continue. The Amir was disappointed. Henry Cox reported: His Highness is despondent because he believes that the acceptance by His Majesty’s Government of mediation on these terms will make the settlement of the trouble much more difficult than before, for His Majesty’s Government will have placed herself in argument with all the Arabs of the Peninsular instead of with those of Palestine only. He is despondent as well because the leaders of the moderates [205]


in Palestine have encouraged the mediation of Nuri Pasha and he is apprehensive of the increased difficulties he will have in keeping Trans-Jordan out of it now that reinforcements are coming to the bandsmen in Palestine from Syria and from Iraq. His Highness’s reaction to the solution of the problem on the lines suggested by Mr. Amery, Mr. Bentwich, and Mr. Shertok that the two races should enjoy political equality irrespective of their numbers in Palestine, whilst the number of Jews entering Palestine should only be limited by the economic capacity of the country to absorb them is that the Arabs cannot on any account accept that the Jews should be in any other relations to them than as a minority. A delegate sent by the Amir to see Mr. Shertok of the Zionist Executive was, in answer to a question put to him, told by Mr. Shertok that although the Jews could never agree to the suspension of immigration and although they would condemn such a step were it taken, nevertheless it might be the best step for the Government to take. The same delegate was informed by as responsible a person as the Secretary of the Managing Director of the Palestine Electric Corporation that, in his opinion, the British are keeping the disturbances in Palestine going so that they may increase their garrison in the country and keep it there at Palestine’s expense.17

Meanwhile Trans-Jordan remained peaceful and quiet in August and the only incidents of sabotage were the planting of a home-made bomb in the railway station at Mahatta in Amman which failed to explode, and another bomb which exploded one afternoon between the Chief Minister’s Office and a neighbouring police station. On 3 September, the largest battle since the outbreak of the rebellion took place near Tulkarm between British troops and Arab revolutionaries. Most of the Arab casualties suffered in that battle were Syrian and Trans-Jordanian volunteers. Fawzi al-Din al-Qawiqji who had entered Palestine towards the middle of August with a quasi-battalion of volunteers from Syria and Trans-Jordan, was responsible for that British defeat.18 However, that battle prompted the British Government to appoint Lt General J. G. Dill, who was until then Director General of Military Intelligence at the War Office, to the Supreme Military Command of the British Forces in Palestine, and to reinforce the already large British garrison with the 1st Division, which arrived at Palestine during the last week in September. That significant step did not escape the Amir’s attention, and in an endeavour to prevent a blood-bath, he wrote to King Ibn Saud informing [206]


him that he was in close touch with the Higher Arab Committee in Palestine and he was certain that: ‘Any appeal which does not satisfy the Arabs to guarantee their rights and entity is doomed to failure’; that he had written the text of an appeal which might ‘satisfy the Arabs’; and that he was endeavouring to persuade the British Government to accept the text of the appeal, which he would send to the King for his approval.19 The Amir described to King Ibn Saud the stalemate in which the British Government and the Higher Arab Committee found themselves. The Government was determined not to make a new political move without an end to violence and the strike, and the Higher Arab Committee was not prepared to, and could not, end violence or the strike without an end to Jewish immigration. He said that he had supported the Palestine Rebellion at its early stages, but the Government had formidably reinforced the British forces to an extent that the Arabs of Palestine could not confront them. He insisted that the next stage of the Arab struggle should be political and continued: In any event, the people of Palestine are the trust of Allah, and Your Majesty must take the place of the noble departed [King al-Hussein ibn Ali] who led all the Arabs towards their legitimate aims which were the trust of his hands until he died on that path. Do what you will, and no one will disobey you. Wisdom must be followed in the present circumstances.20

By the end of the month, the strength of the British Garrison in Palestine was 30,000 men, with all their modern weapons including two RAF squadrons, with wireless communications, and with the benefit of their excellent individual and collective training. In contrast, the strength of Arab revolutionary forces, who came under al-Qawiqji’s command, was around 2,000 civilians in arms, with outdated weapons, without communications and with hardly any training compared with that of the British Army. Instead of an underground guerrilla warfare, al-Qawiqji conducted military operations on the scale of large fighting patrols, just as Lt General Dill hoped he would. The clashes in Tarshiha, Jaunah, Halhul, Beit Imrin, Jabba, Khidir and Kufr Sur, exemplified that strategy. By October the longest general strike in history had completely exhausted the Palestine Arab economy. The number of Arab casualties increased every day. The number of casualties was announced in the House of Commons on 29 October 1936, as detailed in Table 8.4. [207]


TABLE 8.4

Casualties of the Palestinian Revolt, 1936 Casualties

Killed

Wounded

A. Civilians Muslims Christians Total Jews

187 10 197 80

768 55 823 308

21

104

7 8 – 1

40 41 13 9

27

207

B. British forces C. Palestine police and TJFF British Muslims Christians Jews Total

The announcement was incorrect as far as Arab casualties were concerned, for the recorded list of Arabs killed exceeded 800. What was needed above all was an excuse to end the strike. That came on 11 October with an appeal to the Arabs of Palestine, by the Kings and Princes of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Trans-Jordan and the Yemen: Our sons the Arabs of Palestine; Through the President of the Arab Higher Committee; We have been deeply pained by the present state of affairs in Palestine. For this reason we have agreed with our brothers the Kings and the Amir to call upon to resolve for peace in order to save further shedding of blood. In doing this, we rely on the good intentions of our friend Great Britain, who has declared that she will do justice. You must be confident that we will continue our efforts to assist you.21

On Monday 12 October 1936, the general strike came to an end. On 13 October Fawzi al-Qawiqji announced the cessation of action, but under the guise of military exercises, units of the 1st Division of the British Army attacked al-Qawiqji and 170 of his volunteers, mainly [208]


Iraqis and Syrians, and drove them across the River Jordan on 26 October 1936. On the following day Fawzi and his men moved to Kufr Asad, a village in the Wastiyah sub-district. On 31 October what was left of Fawzi’s men were disbanded and dispersed by him, and he departed from Trans-Jordan to Iraq. Thus, from the British point of view, the improvement of the security situation in Palestine made it possible for the Royal Commission to start its mission. Its members left London for Palestine on 5 November. It was in fact the British Government who caused more trouble in Palestine by allowing immigration to continue at that critical stage. The Amir Abdullah wrote to King Ibn Saud on 7 November 1936: The Colonial Office have issued new permits for Jewish immigration to Palestine, the Colonial Secretary made a statement which antagonised the Arabs of Palestine. The High Arab Committee decided not to co-operate with the British Royal Commission. I find that decision harmful to the Arab interest and the correct way is to protest to the Commission when it arrives. I have asked the Arab Committee to think again of their decision, until they receive your Majesty’s recommendations.22

The Amir Abdullah was the first Arab leader to communicate with the Commission. On 17 November he wrote to Lord Peel expressing his warm welcome and wishes for the success of the Royal Commission; he said: ‘I am aware of the onerous duty which is yours and of the hardship which you may encounter; but I feel in the depth of my soul that you will be successful and attain your desire by establishing peace in the land of peace.’ On 9 January 1937, the Amir was the first Arab leader to talk with the Royal Commission.23 On 10 January the Amir presented a memorandum to the Royal Commission representing the Arab point of view. (See Appendix C.) It took the (Peel) Royal Commission seven months to present its report to the British Government. On 7 July 1937, it recommended the partitioning of Palestine into three separate parts. A Jewish state of some 5,000 square kilometres would occupy the north of Palestine; namely the whole of Galilee, the Jerzeel Valley, and a strip of the coastal plain between Acre and Tel Aviv. An enclave in the form of corridor to the sea, including Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Jaffa, would remain a permanent British Mandate. An Arab state of Palestine would make up the rest of [209]


the country. (For the full text of the Summary of the Report of the Palestine Royal Commission, see Appendix E). The Commission recommended taking the historic step of an exchange of population between the proposed Arab and Jewish states to put an end to the strife between them. It was also suggested that the Arab state of Palestine should be unified with Trans-Jordan to establish a United Arab Kingdom under the Amir Abdullah. The Commission’s recommendations were criticised even at the Foreign Office in London. The Preliminary Departmental Comments presented by G. W. Rendel on 23 June 1937 made the following criticism: The first and most obvious criticism is that the particular method of partition proposed would completely cut off the new Arab state from any reasonable access to the sea. It is true that the Port of Jaffa is to remain Arab. But it is to be entirely cut off from the Arab state by territory under British mandate, and it is to be hemmed in on the north and south by parts of the independent and sovereign Jewish state. Moreover, Jaffa is an open roadstead, and is obviously inadequate as the principal port of so large an Arab state as that which would be constituted under the Commission’s proposals. Secondly, while it is true, as will be seen from Map No. 4 in the Commission’s Report, that the proposed Jewish state approximately corresponds to the areas already colonized by the Jews, it is also true that the effect of the partition, as may be seen from Map No. 6, will be to give practically all the cultivable plain country to the Jews, leaving to the Arabs little more than sand and rock. The portions of fertile plain south of Beisan, north of Jenin and round Tulkarem will be a comparatively small compensation for the amount of fertile country which will be incorporated in the Jewish state. Thirdly, the partition proposals of the Commission seem open to the serious objection of principle – so frequently illustrated by the history of post-war Europe – to any kind of system or corridors. The proposed corridor, with its double exit on each side of Jaffa, for the British mandated area of Jerusalem and Bethlehem, looks from the map as though it might easily prove a geographical anomaly which would lead to endless trouble in future; while the isolated portion of the Jewish state south of the corridor looks as though it might well prove as awkward and embarrassing a phenomenon in future as East Prussia. Fourthly, the permanent or temporary continuance of British responsibility in respect of Nazareth, Haifa, Acre, Safad and Tiberias may well create a new problem almost as difficult in its own way as [210]


some of those with which we are already faced under the Mandate. These places are to remain under British control, and we are to continue, presumably, to administer them and maintain order in them, while at the same time recognizing the complete sovereignty and independence of the territory in which they are situated. It seems almost too much to hope that the new Jewish state, once it has become powerful and prosperous, will regard with equanimity the presence of British civil and military (or police) authorities in those places. At the same time, it would clearly be most difficult and open to serious objection, to hand over such places as Nazareth (which is wholly Christian) and Haifa (which is of great strategical importance and contains the British controlled mouth of the Iraq pipe line) unreservedly to a new independent sovereign state consisting largely of immigrants from Central Europe and Germany, who may well in future tend to look towards Germany or Central Europe rather than towards this country. Finally, the proposal that the new Arab state should be incorporated in Trans-Jordan, while no doubt sound in principle is open to the somewhat accidental objection that this will presumably mean that it will come under the rule of the Amir Abdullah, who is regarded by most of the Arab world as very doubtfully loyal to the Arab cause, and who has further quite recently compromised his position by the close relations which he has established with the Turks. The Amir Abdullah, though possessing many virtues, is politically short sighted, and a good deal given to petty intrigue. It may be then that to hand over large areas of Palestine to a new state under his rule will lead to difficulties of a new type between Trans-Jordan on the one hand and other Arab states, such as Syria and Saudi Arabia, on the other. This aspect of the problem will need careful consideration, and may make it desirable to impose severe conditions on the Amir Abdullah before the Arab areas are definitely handed over to him.24

On 1 July 1937, the War Office in London circulated extracts from a report by the General Officer Commanding the British Forces in Palestine and Trans-Jordan, Lt General J. G. Dill, in which he commented on the Royal Commission and matters arising. He thought that the Arabs should be forcibly disarmed, requiring reinforcements amounting to two infantry brigades in addition to units already earmarked from Egypt; that ‘by partition, offset of Arab gains to losses is likely to dispose Arabs, especially Trans-Jordanians, to favour acceptance’; that financial assistance and prospects of high office in a new Arab kingdom, would be attractive [211]


enough to induce many if not to support, at least not violently to resist the recommended solution. He said: Mufti of Jerusalem and his followers, however, stand to lose everything and will consequently be disposed to resist. How far Mufti could carry any other Arabs with him to resist by force of arms impossible to say yet, but by present indications widespread Arab revolt in near future unlikely. In any case, should he succeed in raising rebellion, it is probable that removal of him and his immediate adherents would cause its early collapse. As Arab Kings were brought into Palestine affairs last year, Palestinians likely to look to them again. If Kings and particularly Ibn Saud come down firmly in favour of report, likelihood of serious trouble will be remote. Report so cuts across Zionist aspirations that Jewish resistance to it will be strenuous. Long-sighted Doctor Weizmann may be willing to accept and bide his time, but if he does he is unlikely to carry world Jewry with him. Although Jewish opposition to report may be frantic, consider unlikely to take the form of armed resistance. Nevertheless Jewish restraint on reprisals is likely to weaken. To summarize. Report likely to split Arabs, larger proportion being in favour of acceptance while Mufti and dangerous elements being against. Report likely also to split Jewry, larger proportion being against and very few in favour. Period of discussion among Arabs likely before any armed outbreak, though political assassinations may take place immediately. In event of armed rebellion removal of Mufti likely to cause early collapse. Jews likely to turn every political stone to undermine Report, but unlikely to use force. Do not consider any immediate change in strength or disposition of present force necessary.25

The impression of Sir A. Clerk Kerr, the British Envoy in Baghdad, was that the Iraqis were against the report. The Iraqi Prime Minister told him on 10 July that he much regretted that he was obliged to make a formal protest against the proposed partition recommendations for Palestine. The Prime Minister said that no one in Iraq could accept this decision, which was everywhere regarded as unjust and unfortunate. He foresaw that public opinion, which was already excited, would find expression in meetings and demonstrations and while he ‘in no way wished to embarrass His Majesty’s Government, his Government would be obliged to show that they fully shared popular feeling in this matter, for if they did not, everyone would be against them and they would not [212]


be able to control the situation’. The Prime Minster was fully alive to the responsibility of keeping order and especially for the protection of the Jewish community in Iraq. He reassured Kerr that he would use all the resources at his command for this purpose and that he need have no fears on that score. Sir Clerk Kerr reported: He told me that King Ghazi had received an appeal for support and guidance from Arab higher committee and he was much puzzled what reply should be made. He did not wish it to be in conflict with the policy of His Majesty’s Government but in view of unanimous opinion of the country, he saw nothing for it but to express sympathy with the Arabs of Palestine. Moreover he felt bound to tell me frankly that Iraqi Government would feel it to be their duty to bring about concerted action by Moslem countries, members of the League of Nations, to put pressure on His Majesty’s Government to reconsider their decision. He expected to be consulted by Ibn Saud and foresaw that Ibn Saud would readily support their scheme. All the more so because reports seemed to suggest that new Arab State might be under the rule of Amir Abdullah. He added that by his acceptance of partition scheme, Abdullah had brought himself into contempt. The Prime Minister went on to express astonishment at the decision of His Majesty’s Government which could not fail to damage their whole position in the Arab world. He was moreover convinced that it would prove to be impossible to put through the scheme to which His Majesty’s Government had given their approval. The Prime Minister spoke sadly and it was clear that his task was unwelcome to him but all arguments about the merits of the Report were unavailing.26

Sir Reader Bullard, the British minister in Jaddah, reported the attitude of King Ibn Saud towards the proposed partition plan before he heard of the response of the Palestinian Arabs. Ibn Saud’s view was that because the British Government had made up its mind, he was bound to think of his own interests which he considered were affected very unfavourably by the prospect of ending the British Mandate over Trans-Jordan. He wrote: So long as mandate lasted he says, he knew Abdullah’s intrigues would be held in check, that Saudi claim to Aqaba and Maan would not lapse, and that tribes would be able to travel without hindrance between Saudi Arabia and Syria. If Abdullah is to be [213]


independent Ibn Saud wants two towns and a corridor (not a mere right of way) to Syria. In spite of his bitterness about Abdullah Ibn Saud was very friendly. He gave me the impression that he felt helpless and greatly dependent upon Great Britain. He again showed some distrust of Italy. He described financial assistance he had requested as urgently required for internal reasons. (I had not then received your telegram No. 108 and my explanation of proposed two million pounds grant to new Arab State elicited comment) ‘All very well but do not let me go bankrupt either.’ Fuad Bey who was present at all conversations accompanied me from Riyadh to Khubar. By the time we reached Hufof, Ibn Saud had received telegrams from Palestine Arabs asking for advice and assistance and was asked by Fuad to suggest a reply. Fuad, who is himself very hostile to proposals of His Majesty’s Government, said with obvious regret that whatever happened Ibn Saud would never support a policy opposed to that of His Majesty’s Government and I understand he drafted reply in such a way as not to encourage the Palestine Arabs to count on help of Ibn Saud against us.27

In a meeting between Shaikh Hafiz Wahbah and G. W. Rendel on 14 July 1937, the former said that King Ibn Saud thought he was not asked to express an opinion about the Royal Commission’s Report or the conclusions of the British Government on it, but the King felt bound to make three points: The first that he was much preoccupied over the situation which would develop if the Amir Abdullah became King of Arab Palestine, since the King regarded him as untrustworthy and ill-disposed towards Saudi Arabia; secondly that the King would not be able to continue to leave his claim to Aqaba and Maan in abeyance if we [the British] withdrew from Trans-Jordan; and thirdly that, if we the British) withdrew from Trans-Jordan, he (Ibn Saud) desired to have direct communication with Syria.

Rendel reported: I said that I could not of course discuss these points at this stage. But I felt bound to say that, if the King pressed them, it might lead to considerable difficulty. I did not know what was likely to be decided on as regards the Amir Abdullah, but, although we were familiar with King Ibn Saud’s views about the Amir, the fact remained that His Highness had been very loyal to us, and that we were [214]


under certain definite obligations towards him. These clearly could not be ignored. As regards Aqaba and Maan, it was unfortunately one of the few questions where we did not agree with King Ibn Saud’s views. As he knew, we could not accept his claim to these places, and a glance at the map would show how necessary they were to the future prosperity of Trans-Jordan. As regards the corridor to Syria, it might well be answered that it was equally necessary for Trans-Jordan to have a corridor to Iraq.28

However, by the end of November 1937, the Committee of Imperial Defence concluded their discussions on the claim of King Ibn Saud to Aqaba and Maan, and for the corridor from Saudi Arabia through Trans-Jordan to Syria. They saw clearly that from the general strategical point of view, the cession of the Aqaba and Maan area to King Ibn Saud would seriously prejudice the external defence problem of both Palestine and Trans-Jordan. Prominent in their thoughts were the air facilities in the area which included an aerdrome at Maan and operational landing grounds at Aqaba, Quwairah and Gaa al-Diseh. Amongst their conclusions were the following: (a) On strategical grounds, the maintenance of the existing ties of friendship between His Majesty’s Government and King Ibn Saud is of great importance. (b) In its relation to Palestine and Trans-Jordan, and to the Red Sea, areas in which we have important ~ strategical interests, the Gulf of Aqaba would be of considerable strategic value to us. (c) As regards the specific claim of Ibn Saud to Aqaba, we agree with the view expressed in paragraph 4 of the Foreign Office letter dated 12 August (Enclosure No. 1) that the claim is in itself unjustified. Aqaba is the only existing outlet to the sea at present available to Trans-Jordan. On the other hand, Ibn Saud already has the whole of the East Coast of the Gulf of Aqaba and of the Red Sea and could develop a suitable port at no great cost at Omeider, about 20 miles south of Aqaba, where an excellent anchorage already exists. (d) From the strategical and tactical point of view the concession of the Aqaba–Maan area or even of Aqaba alone to Ibn Saud would seriously prejudice the external defence problems of both Palestine and Trans-Jordan, and would entirely alter the time and space factor in the defence of these territories. This is already a delicate problem, even with the present boundaries and by full exploitation of the mobility of air forces. [215]


(e) As regards Ibn Saud’s demand for a corridor through TransJordan to Syria, this question is inextricably bound up with the security of the Iraq–Haifa pipe-line and the projected road and railway from Baghdad to Haifa. On this point we have consistently held the view that it is of the greatest importance that the pipe-line and railway (if it materializes) should be run through British territory. It is, therefore, most undesirable that a foreign State, however friendly, should obtain access to the area through which the pipe-line, road or railway (if it materializes) passes.29

It did not take long for the Higher Arab Committee to reject the Royal Commission’s Report. On 12 July 1937, a proclamation written by the mufti of Jerusalem and signed by 150 of the imams of Palestine declared that the acceptance of the partition of Palestine would be considered treason under Shariah Law. On 25 July, the Higher Arab Committee, Egypt, Syria and Iraq rejected the partition plan. A few days later, Palestinian revolutionary forces launched their second bout of guerrilla warfare, with larger forces, better weapons and ample supplies of ammunitions. Meanwhile, in the rest of the Arab world, feelings were high and opposition to the partition plan was gaining momentum. On 8 September 1937, more than 450 Arab leaders and notables held a two-day conference in Bludan, near Damascus. There were 119 delegates from Palestine, 35 from Trans-Jordan, 75 from Syria, 60 from Lebanon, 13 from Iraq, 4 from Egypt and one from Saudi Arabia and there were representatives of political parties and Arab associations.30 The conference, the Arab National Congress, adopted the following resolutions: The Arab National Congress, held in Bludan on 8 September 1937, represents all the Arab lands, has seen the report and examined the solution suggested by the Royal Commission and the plans that have been made by the British Government, especially the subject pertaining to the partition of Palestine and they find the solutions, especially respecting the partition of Palestine, to be entirely contrary to Arab rights, and likely to expose Palestine, as well as all the Arab world, to great political, social, national and economic dangers. In consequence, the Congress decides absolutely to reject these solutions which are an undoubted trespass on Arab rights. It also decides that the means suggested by England can never bring peace and tranquillity in this land but, on the contrary, they are likely to [216]


cause a continuation of violence and fights. The Congress declares that the just and natural solution of the problem is to consider Palestine a one complete entity, and that the mandate, which has ultimately proved to be a failure, should terminate. It is decided that a treaty should be concluded to enable the people to have an independent state and sovereignty, as has already been done in the case of Egypt, Iraq and Syria, within which the rights of the Jews – who are a minority – shall be safeguarded. The Congress expresses to Their Majesties the Arab Kings and Princes its unbounded gratitude for the great sympathy which they have shown and their endeavours in connection with the catastrophe that has befallen Palestine during these last twenty years. The Congress urges that the Kings and Princes continue to save the Arab population of Palestine before the troubles arrive. They are besought, in the name of the Arab nation, to bear the heavy responsibilities of rescuing Palestine. The Congress finds the report of the Royal Commission and especially the idea of partition most strange, and it affirms that the Palestine problem can never be solved unless the English admit that the following bases are the obvious means of meeting the lawful Arab desiderata: 1) To annul the Mandate which has been proven a failure in Palestine. 2) To conclude a treaty between Britain and the lawful representatives of the Arab nation on the basis or the Anglo–Iraqian treaty, which will allow the Arabs to be free and independent. 3) Speedily and entirely to prohibit the Jewish immigration and issue an unequivocal law which will prevent sales of land except to Arabs. 4) To cease all methods conducive to tyranny and oppression. 5) To annul the declaration of Balfour. The Arabs decline to stretch out their hands to anyone who seeks to make peace, unless the Jews acknowledge that their political and material claim to Palestine or any other Arab territory is null and of no value. Upon their doing this the Arabs will agree that the Jews, who will be within the Arab state in Palestine, shall be treated in the same way as are minorities the world over. The Arab National Congress, held in Bludan, which represents all the Arab lands, affirms that Palestine is Arab territory, and that it has always been and shall ever be a part of the Arab home; that the Palestine problem is not only that of Palestine but of the Arab world. It is the duty of the Arabs and the Moslems everywhere to fight as one man for the liberty, deliverance and the unification of [217]


Palestine with the Arab lands, and to bring to naught the colonizing and Zionist endeavours to establish a Jewish state. The Congress observes that the British government has adopted a colonizing policy and has supported the Zionist greed at the expense of the Arabs. It hereby proclaims that the patience of the Arab nation in the face of these endeavours has come to an end, and that the friendship or the alliance which exists between them and Britain is on the verge of declension. If the British nation does not compel its government to stop these endeavours the Arabs will once for all cease all co-operation and alliance with it, and openly declare that they will take all necessary measures to safeguard their rights as a nation which is entitled to live. The Palestine Defence Committee is thanked, as well as all the committees and persona throughout all the Arab lands and Moslem countries, whether in Syria or abroad, for the very great sympathy they have shown in the great catastrophe which threatens to tear Palestine into shreds and to Hebraize and colonize it. Gratitude, too, is expressed for the precious help they extended to the refugees and to the widows and the orphans of the martyrs. The Congress asks them to continue their activities in their countries for the purpose of liberating Palestine. The Congress greets the Arab nation of Palestine and expresses its gratitude for the sacrifices they have made and the pains they have been to in sustaining their nationalism thus defending their liberty and independence, all of which the Congress highly appreciates. The Congress is quite confident that the warriors [Mujahideen] and the members of the Higher Arab Committee cannot fail to understand the laudable desires the accomplishment of which they march, well surrounded by the support of the Arab nation, which looks upon the Palestine problem as one of the Arab nation at large. The Covenant The Congress members hereby promises before Allah, before history, before the Arab nation and before the Muslim world, to continue the fight and struggle for the Arab cause in Palestine, until the latter is duly won and the Arab sovereignty is secured.31

These resolutions were concluded with the following warning and appeal: The conference declares, that the continued friendship between the Arab and British nations will depend on the achievement of the conference demands, and that the persistence of Britain in her policy in Palestine will compel all the Arabs to take other new directions, [218]


and amity between Arabs and Jews cannot be achieved except on these foundations.

The British Government had decided to postpone any negotiations pending the end of the revolt. Orders were issued for the arrest of Haj Amin al-Husseini and the members of the Higher Arab Committee; Haj Amin and Jamal al-Husseini escaped to Lebanon, while Foad Saba, Yaqoub al-Ghusain, Ahmad Hilmi, Dr Hussein al-Khalidi and Rashid al-Haj were arrested and exiled to the Seychelles in the West Indian Ocean on 5 October. On 16 October, the Muslim Awqaf were placed under a committee composed of two Christian officials, Justice Greene, and Mr Kirkbride, and one Muslim shaikh, Husam al-Din Jar Allah. On 18 October, military courts were established with power to impose the death penalty. On 24 November the first trial by one of these courts condemned Shaikh Farhan al-Saadi of Haifa to death for carrying a pistol; al-Saadi, an old man in his seventy-fifth year, was hanged three days later on 27 November 1937. News of the hanging enraged the people of Palestine as well as the peoples of the neighbouring Arab countries. By the beginning of January 1938, an act of sabotage was directed at the Iraqi Petroleum Company pipeline at a point near the Jordan Valley Pumping Station. The saboteur, who worked alone, crossed the River Jordan from and returned to Palestine. The slight damage to the pipeline was quickly repaired. Although many reports of actual or intended movement of revolutionary units between Syria and Palestine through Trans-Jordan were received by the Arab Legion, there was no evidence of such movements taking place at the time. However, the Government of Trans-Jordan was not able to deter such movements because of the lack of troops and funds available for the necessary operations.32 After six years as High Commissioner for Palestine, and High Commissioner for Trans-Jordan, Sir Arthur Grenfell Wauchope resigned on 1 March 1938. On 3 March 1938, Sir Harold Alfred MacMichael, the new High Commissioner for Palestine and Trans-Jordan, arrived in Jerusalem. In Amman, R. S. Champion, Financial Adviser to the Government, was appointed Assistant British Resident, and G. H. Shelswell-White was appointed Financial Adviser. On 27 April, the Partition Commission which was established under Sir John Woodhead arrived in Haifa to look into the facts on the [219]


ground. The Arabs boycotted the Commission, and declared a general strike on that day. Demonstrations protesting against the Commission took place in Palestine, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq. Two attacks by the revolutionary forces were carried out in Safad and Tulkarm, where nine Arab Palestine policemen and six Tulkarm notables were killed. In Trans-Jordan the arrival of the Commission was marked by the closure of shops in Amman, Salt and Irbid, as well as by students’ demonstrations in Salt and Irbid. On the same day a harmless bomb exploded in an Amman side street. Meanwhile, the Amir continued to take an active interest in Palestinian affairs and during April sent emissaries to the leaders of the Arabs of Palestine to gauge the general situation. Tawfiq Abu al-Huda, one of the emissaries, intimated his conclusion to the British Resident that ‘in the general fear of assassination, no moderate is willing to declare himself and a decision should be imposed either on the lines of a continuation of the Mandate with modified immigration or on the basis of partition with a modified Jewish State’. Henry Cox thought the Amir was inclining to ‘a form of cantonization whilst the opinion of many is that partition would be a good thing for Trans-Jordan’.33 On 2 May, the Amir visited Jerusalem and was the guest of the High Commissioner at Government House, where he endeavoured to persuade him to accept a compromise with the Palestinian leadership. On 29 May, Filistin newspaper published an article which included what it described as proposals by the Amir Abdullah for the settlement of the Palestine problem. The so-called proposals included the creation of a united state of Palestine and Trans-Jordan; an autonomous administration for the Jews within the Jewish areas in the partition plan; proportional representation in the Legislature and the Executive; and a reasonable volume of immigration. The British Resident in Amman advised the Amir to ‘prevent’ Prime Minister Ibrahim from publishing a statement to the effect that ‘the Chief Minister and the Government were wholeheartedly in favour of the Amir’s scheme for solving the Palestine problem’.34 The statement would also have included a denial of that part in the Filistin article which said that the scheme was supported by the Amir alone. The Amir was annoyed with the British Resident, but had to accept his advice. The Partition Commission members visited Trans-Jordan between 1 and 9 June, during which they made an extensive tour of the country [220]


and were able to see every type of land of which it is composed. Their tour encompassed the area from Um al-Quttain in the North to Naqib Shtar in the South and from the irrigated Ghors in the Jordan Valley and Wadi Araba in the West to the Hijaz Railway line in the East. Towards the end of their visit, the members of the Commission had an audience with the Amir and held a formal conversation with him on 8 June. Although the Amir wanted them to meet certain Arab notables and hear their points of view, the Commission did not accept the offer. Instead they had conversations with the British officials: the British Resident; Peake, the Commander of the Arab Legion; the Acting Financial Adviser; and the Director of Land Development. During the Commission’s visit a protest took place in the form of the closing of shops in Amman, Salt and Maan.35 The violence which continued from January to July 1938 compelled the British Government to send one infantry brigade from England and another infantry brigade from Egypt to Palestine. The Colonial Secretary Malcolm MacDonald arrived in Palestine on 7 August and had several meetings with the High Commissioner and General Robert Haining the General Officer Commanding (GOC) Palestine. On 16 September large-scale rebel operations were launched and continued until the end of November.36 The failure of these Arab operations, during which many casualties were suffered, compelled them to revert back to smaller operations and raids by groups of men called Isabah gangs. With this new approach, the rebels took to the mountains were they were more mobile than the British Army and could use the ‘hit and run’ technique. The British Army lost control of the vast mountainous areas of Palestine and was restricted to protecting the main cities, strategic points and main roads, and to defending its own men in their camps and positions. The Palestinian revolutionaries soon realised the advantages of night operations. They could lay ambushes here and there and use the cover of darkness to conceal movements on and off the main roads. Police and army units refrained from using the main roads at night to avoid falling into Arab ambushes. Captain Orde Wingate of the British Army, known to be an expert on guerrilla warfare, reported on the situation: The initiative was in the hands of the rebels. They are free to visit the villages at night without any risk, and could move without fear [221]


off the main roads. In general, the police and the army do not move at night, and when they do, they normally move by vehicles on the main roads. The element of surprise is in the hands of the rebels.37

On 28 October 1938, Major General Bernard Law Montgomery left England to take up his new post in Palestine, where he was appointed Commander of the 8th Division in the north of the country; Lt General ‘Bob’ Haining, the former Director of Military Operations and Intelligence at the War Office, was GOC in Palestine; Major General ‘Dick’ O’Connor, a former instructor at the Staff College, Camberly, was the Commander of the 7th Division in the south of Palestine. It became obvious after the Second World War that the War Office had appointed three of the best generals in the British Army to deal with the situation in Palestine; for those three generals became among the most famous generals of the Second World War. To compare the revolutionary forces with the British forces in Palestine would have been unjust, but to compare the commanders of both sides would have been illogical and nearly impossible. In his report of 4 December 1938, to the Deputy Chief of Imperial General Staff (CIGS) at the War Office, Montgomery described the Arab forces: The campaign against us is being waged by gangs of professional bandits; these constitute an Army, with definite though somewhat crude organization. There are three army commanders and they take their orders from Damascus; there is little cohesion in the rebel forces and the esprit-de-corps is a ‘gang’ one. A gang is any thing from 50 to 150 men, and each army commander controls the gangs in his area by means of sub-area commanders. There is no higher organization than the gang as far as is known. The army commanders are very elusive and it will be difficult to catch them. The gangs live in the country and operate in the hill areas. They move about from place to place and conscript local peasants – against their will – and force them to take up arms against us; the peasants have to comply, since refusal means death and the destruction of their houses. The gang leaders also have agents in towns, and by means of them they carry out assassinations and commit other acts of terrorism; this is very difficult to combat, especially in large places like Haifa with a population of over 100,000. The net result is that the British Army in Palestine is at war with a rebel army which is one hundred per cent Arab.38 [222]


While an Arab would have been certainly hanged for possessing a pistol or rifle, as in the case of al-Saadi, General Montgomery noted that ‘the Jewish population go on with their work as if there was no war on but they defend their own colonies stoutly with arms which we allow them to have for that purpose’. He explained his strategy in order of importance as follows: To hunt down and destroy the rebel armed gangs. They must be hunted relentlessly; when engaged in battle with them we must shoot to kill. We must not be on the defensive and act only when attacked; we must take the offensive and impose our will on the rebels. The next few weeks, before the winter rains set in, is an opportunity and during them we may well smash the rebel movement given a little luck. We must put forward our maximum effort now and concentrate on killing armed rebels in battle; this is the surest way to end the war. To get the dwellers in urban areas, and the peasantry, on our side. To do this we must be scrupulously fair in our dealings with them. We want them to realize that they will always get a fair deal from the British Army; but if they assist the rebels in any way expect to be treated as rebels; and any one who takes up arms against us will certainly lose his life. To prepare the police to take over from us when the rebellion is crushed. The police are working as soldiers. Large reinforcements are coming and those are practically all ex-soldiers; they are fitted out in Jerusalem and then drafted straight out to their districts (I am referring to the British police, of whom there are to be some 3000).39

General Montgomery’s strategy was intended to launch total war against the Arab revolutionary forces and their supporters, the people of Palestine. Because the leader of the Arab Revolutionary Council of Palestine, Arif Abd al-Razzaq, was anticipating that war and the major operations by the British Army to come, he issued a statement in the form of an appeal on 1 November 1938: AWAKE HUMANITY Awake humanity, if not Christianity, and see what England does in Palestine. The Age of Chivalry has gone only to be replaced by an age of barbarous actions. We were expecting to see the civilised English Army stop offending the child, the old man and the peaceful citizen; but alas! we have seen it stop facing its opponent, the armed [223]


man, only to kill a child, as happened in Nablus, or peaceful citizens, as is happening daily, thinking that this will terrify the Arab nation to stop struggling for independence. Awake humanity, for the souls of these innocent martyrs are hovering in the sky in the land of Christ who brought peace to the World. Yet the English army is increasing their numbers daily by spilling the blood of new victims. Hattab is the victim of this last week of October, only to be followed by two innocent men in Essileh, Jenin, then two others from Kafr Masr, Beisan and lately yesterday two old men in Biddia, Nablus. They had been taken from their peaceful houses as suspects; then shot savagely and without mercy. Eviction, dynamiting, machine-gunning, bayonetting, tanks, planes, gas, bombs and starvation are all incomparable with the barbaric daily incidents of killing innocent children, women or old men whose bodies you can find thrown on the road side. Let the world look at the thousands of photographs of the English authorities in Palestine, then ask England if it can deny.40

With the arrival of additional troops in the country, major operations were launched in the new year, 1939, by Montgomery in the north and O’Connor in the south of Palestine. According to Montgomery, by 1 February 1939, the British forces had smashed the backbone of the Palestinian armed rebellion, and the activities of their forces were no longer organised and controlled as they had been some weeks before the major operations. The main three leaders of the armed rebellion left the country for Damascus. Although there were a few small bands who were resisting, large armed bands no longer existed. There were 2,500 prisoners in the detention camp at Acre. Thus from a military point of view the British Army was maintaining a good level of law and order. Montgomery concluded his appreciation of this new situation with the warning: On the other hand there is no doubt that below the surface, Arab feeling generally is seething with discontent on account of the propaganda of the Mufti; the atmosphere is still charged with electricity. If we weaken at all now, or relax our military pressure it will put new heart into the rebel cause; the chief leaders would return from Damascus and the whole rebellion would be liable to flare up again.41 [224]


While the rebellion in Palestine grew, with increased casualties on both sides, the situation in Trans-Jordan became more difficult. Feelings of anger were noticed all over the country in sympathy with the Palestinian people and their rebellion. Particularly, whenever news about the large number of Arab casualties reached the country, demonstrations and prayers in mosques and churches took place in the main towns and large villages. A few hundred Trans-Jordanians joined the rebel operations against the British Army in Palestine, supplied the rebels with weapons and ammunition, and gave the wanted or wounded rebels refuge in their homes and villages. Many of the doctors who attended the wounded were from the Jordanian Department of Health. The greatest recognition was given to martyrs of the revolt with very large funerals, attendance of wakes and obituaries in the press. Among the martyrs were Jamal al-Juqqah, son of the Mayor of Amman Tahir al-Juqqah and a famous football player of the Hashimi Club; Abd al-Rahman al-Najdawi; Yaqoub al-Najdawi; Ali al-Aabwaini; and Ahmad al-Nuaman al-Attiyat. The Palestinian freedom fighters were lead by armed civilians, the majority of whom had no military training. The men, only 2,000 of them,42 were mainly farmers in arms with rudimentary training, leadership and administration; their weapons were outdated with very meagre supplies of ammunition; they had no communications and no strategy. Their main strength was in their morale and their belief in the justice of their cause and their complete willingness to give their lives for it. The oppressive measures imposed by the British Army against the Palestinian people between 1936 and 1939 were more aggressive than those imposed in Ireland during the twenties. Particularly in 1939 when the European crisis was approaching its final showdown. British public opinion, which was normally sensitive to such measures, concentrated more on Hitler’s intentions and the expectations of war. Thus the generals had a free hand in Palestine. The 1936–9 Palestinian Revolt ended with honour to the Palestinians and a new awakening for the rest of the Arab world. On 15 January 1939, a Palestinian delegation arrived in London to attend a conference aiming at achieving a settlement to the Palestinian problem. The delegation consisted of Musa al-Alami, Jamal al-Husseini, Awni Abd al-Hadi, Hussein Fakhri al-Khalidi, Alfred Rock and George Antonius. The conference was opened on 7 February 1939 and continued [225]


until 17 March without achieving an acceptable solution to the Palestine problem.

NOTES 1 Akram Zuaitir, Documents of the Palestinian National Movement, 1918–1939 (Beirut: Institute of Palestinian Studies, 1984), p. 466. 2 Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great Britain and Palestine, 1915–1936 (1937), p. 61. 3 Ibid. p. 62. 4 Ibid. p. 65. 5 The Egyptian law gave protection against land expropriation for the payment of debts. 6 Ibid. p. 80. 7 Antonius, George, Arab Awakening (Beirut: Dar al-Ilm Lilmalayin, 1982), p. 513, in Arabic. This quote was translated by the author. 8 Ibid. p. 82. The High Commissioner’s official communiqué regarding the event of 19 April was as follows: ‘Owing to false rumours, which were at once officially contradicted, that Arabs had been killed, crowds assembled about 11 o’clock in the Manshia quarter of Jaffa, and disturbances arose, in the course of which several attacks were made upon Jews.’ 9 PRO. CO 831/37/1. Monthly situation report for May 1936, 1 June 1936. 10 Ibid. 11 Zuaitir, The Documents of the Palestinian Movement, 1918–1939, p. 430. 12 Ibid. 13 Among them: Fayiz Haddad, Subhi al-Khadra, Hasan Sudqi al-Dajani, Akram Zuaitir, Tahir Hannun, Abd al-Qadir Yousef, Shaikh Sabri Abdin, Jamil Wahbah, Salih Abduh, Rashid al-Jayousi, Mohammad Nimr Audah, Michael Mitri, Mamduh al-Sukhun, Hikmat al-Nimli, Jamal Hamid, Qadri Tuqan, Rafiq al-Shaikh Najib. 14 Musa, Private Papers. A study in the history of King Abd Al Aziz Ibn Saud, Riyadh, 3 December 1985. 15 The Times, 30 July 1936. 16 PRO. FO 371/20018. Extract from Palestine police summary no. 14, 18 August 1936. 17 PRO. CO 831/37/1. Henry Cox, monthly situation report for August 1936, 2 September 1936. 18 Al-Qawiqji was a Syrian who served in the Ottoman Army during the First World War. He became a French Intelligence Officer in the French occupation army in Syria. He joined the Druze rebellion and escaped to Hijaz-Najd to be appointed military adviser to King Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud. He later obtained a commission in the Iraqi Army and became an instructor in the Iraqi Staff College. He resigned his commission in June 1936 in order to join the rebellion in Palestine.

[226]


19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

31 32 33 34 35 36

Musa, Private Papers. Ibid. The Times, 12 October 1936. Musa, Private Papers. Musa, Private Papers. Minutes of the meeting in Arabic, translated into English by the author. PRO. FO 371/20807. Memorandum by G. W. Rendel of the Foreign Office, 23 June 1937. PRO. FO 371/20808. From General Dill to War Office, 29 June 1937. PRO. FO 371/20808. From Baghdad to Foreign Office, 10 July 1937. PRO. FO 371/20808. From Bahrain to Jaddah, 14 July 1937. PRO. FO 371/20809. Memorandum by G. W. Rendel, 16 July 1937. PRO. FO 371/20820. Paper by Committee of Imperial Defence, 15 November 1937. The conference elected the following members as an executive committee: Mohammad Allubah (President), Amir Shakib Arislan (Vice President), Mutran Huraikah (Vice President), Izzat Darwazah (Secretary), Riyadh al-Solh (General Observer), Sabri al-Aasali (Deputy Secretary), and Foad Khalil Mufarraj (Second Secretary). PRO. FO 371/20814. Summary of conclusions of the Arab National Congress, Bludan in Syria, 18 September 1937. PRO. CO 831/46. Monthly situation report for January 1938. PRO. CO 831/46. (Confidential) monthly situation report for April 1938 by the British Resident in Amman, 30 April 1938. PRO. CO 831/46. Monthly situation report for May 1938 by the British Resident in Amman. Ibid. Some of the rebel operations were as follows: (i) On 31 January 1938 Shaikh Attiyah of Balad al-Shaikh attacked a British Army convoy near Um al-Fahim. The RAF were employed to save the convoy and inflicted a large number of casualties on the rebels. On 28 February Shaikh Attiyah attacked Tirat Tsvi, a Jewish settlement. (ii) On 3 March a battle took place between a British Army brigade unit (2,000 men) and Palestinians, near Yamoun. The Palestinians suffered many casualties, including Shaikh Attiyah. (iii) On 13 May a battle took place in Akka in which 40 Palestinians were killed and 75 wounded. On 20 May the British Army occupied 25 villages in the north of Palestine including the Nablus district. (iv) Fighting broke out between Palestinians and Jews in Jerusalem and Haifa in the wake of an explosion on 6 July set off by Jews in Haifa, which killed 40 Arabs and 27 Jews and wounded 92 Arabs and 32 Jews. (v) On 11 July a major battle between British forces and Palestinian revolutionaries took place in the mountains of Tulkarm. (vi) On 13 July a battle between British forces and Palestinians took place in Kawkab al-Hawa. (vii) On 15 July 10 Arabs were killed by a Jewish bomb in the vegetable market in Haifa. Seven Jewish shops were burned down by Arabs in a neighbouring street. (viii) On 24 July 50 Arab were killed by a Jewish bomb in Jerusalem, and a major battle took place between British and Arab forces in the mountains of Hebron. Sixty-one Palestinian revolutionaries were killed. (ix) A British bank was attacked in Nablus on 10 August, £15,000 was taken by rebels. (x) On 13 August a train [227]


37

38

39 40 41 42

was destroyed by Arabs between Tulkarm and Khadairah. (xi) On 20 August Palestinian revolutionaries entered Hebron and destroyed some government buildings and a bank. Soon after a battle took place between them and British forces, in which armoured cars and aeroplanes were deployed. The revolutionaries suffered very heavy casualties. (xii) On 26 August 48 Arabs were killed by a Jewish bomb in Jaffa. (xiii) Between September and November many battles took place in the mountains of Nablus, Jenin, Jerusalem, Hebron, and Beir al-Sabaa. (xiv) On 15 October an attack by Palestinians in Jerusalem killed Hasan Sudqi al-Dajani. Moshe Dayan, The Story of My Life (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1976), p. 28. Captain Wingate had become an ardent supporter of Zionism and strongly recommended British cooperation with the Haganah. He summed up the situation by saying: ‘The British control the roads, while the rebels control the mountains, a new partition plan: daylight for the Government and night for the rebels.’ Hamilton, Nigel, Monty: The Making of a General, 1887–1942 (London: Allen Lane, 1981), pp. 292–3. At that period in fact there were 17 Palestinian Commanders: Abd al-Qadir al-Husseini from Jerusalem, Arif Abd al-Razzaq from Taibah, Haj Abdullah Khanfar from Nablus, Haj Abd al-Ghani al-Qanbeer, Abd al-Rahim al-Haj Mohammad from Thinnabah, Shaikh Yousef Abu Durrah from Silit al-Harithiyah, Hasan Salamah from Qulah, Abd al-Halim al-Julani, Said al-Aass, Easa al-Battat, Musa Abu Shiban from Khan Yunis, Mohammad Omar al-Nawbani, Mohammad al-Salih from Silit al-Zahir, Yousef Hamdan from Um al-Fahim, Abdullah al-Statiyah, Nuh Ibrahim, Shaikh Attiyah Ahmad Awadd from Balad al-Shaikh. It was estimated that the total of the Palestinian forces in 1938–9 was 2,000 men, of whom 1,138 were killed and 50 were hanged. Ibid. pp. 293–4. Quote taken from a pamphlet given to the author by Sir Gawain Bell, the District Commander in Palestine at that time. Ibid. pp. 303–4. The author, Private Papers. Confidential. A note on the Future of the Arab Legion, Part 2, n.d. but refers to situations immediately after the Second World War: ‘In 1939 it took more than two British divisions in Palestine to suppress an estimated strength of 2,000 Arab rebels.’

[228]

9 A Formative Year

The budget for the financial year 1936/37, having been debated in the Legislative Council, was approved during March 1937, as can be seen in Appendix A. The £P19,145 allocated for relief measures were spent on assistance to the Huwaitat, Bani Hamidah, Bani Hasan and Bani Sakhr to alleviate the distress caused by crop failure during 1934/35 and 1936/37.1 The increase in expenditure on the Police Department was mainly due to the establishment of a small Reserve Force of an infantry company of 115 officers and men, and the increase in the activities of the Police Department during the disturbances in Palestine. A further Supplementary Reserve Force of 200 men was enlisted on 12 September 1936, but was disbanded in December after four months’ training. At the same time the 115 reservists left the colours, but continued to be paid a retaining fee of one pound a month while engaged in their normal civil occupations, on condition that they were liable to be called up for one month’s training, during which their salaries would have been five pounds a month.

The nation’s security Because of the presence of the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force (TJFF) and the RAF Station in Amman, the development of the Arab Legion during the decade between 1926, when the TJFF was established, and 1936, when it was much needed for the security of the country, was slow, aimless and without any consideration for the future security of the country. Peake was hardly capable of handling what he had, let alone having a vision for the future. Although named the Arab Legion, it remained the police force of Trans-Jordan. It was responsible to the Amir and the Government in the following duties: [229]


1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

The security of the general public. The maintenance of law and order. Crime prevention and detection. The custody of prisoners. Immigration. Control and issue of passports. The licensing of vehicles.

The Arab Legion was organised so that it could serve the administrative divisions of the country. Each liwa (administrative district) had a mantiqah (police district) to serve it. Each liwa was divided into qadhas (sub-districts), and each qadha was divided into nahiyahs (areas). In each qadha and nahiyah a police post or station was located. The deployment of the Arab Legion during 1936 was as follows: Amman: Arab Legion headquarters; Amman City Police; Arab Legion recruiting, training and stores depot; Arab Legion workshops and garage; and the Central Jail. Ajlun district: headquarters and 13 police stations. Balqa district: headquarters and 19 police stations. Karak district: headquarters and 10 police stations. Maan district: headquarters and 9 police stations. Desert district: headquarters and 10 police stations. The Arab Legion had 22 vehicles, one for each district, thirteen for the Desert district and three for the Amman Police. There were nine permanent wireless stations, and one mobile wireless station mounted on a Ford tender with the Desert Patrol. All districts and police stations were connected with telephones. The Legion was not well armed though; its pistols and rifles were outdated and most of them unserviceable. There were 12 machine guns used by the Desert Force, but no artillery of any kind. Apart from the Arab Legion Law of 1936 and the standing orders issued from time to time by the headquarters of the Arab Legion, there were no internal regulations to cover the various activities of the personnel. Major Bahjat Tabbarah wrote the regulations for the police and gendarmerie, which were adopted as a training pamphlet rather than an [230]

A F O R M AT I V E Y E A R

official document. The vast majority of the officers of the Arab Legion were enlisted, trained and served in the Ottoman Army. They joined the Arab Legion immediately after the War, when the Amir came to Jordan. None of them were trained as policemen, and this is why they had to adapt themselves to police work. The strength of the Arab Legion in 1936 is given in Table 9.1. TABLE 9.1

The strength of the Arab Legion, 1936 Units

Officers

Other ranks

Dismounted Mounted Desert Prison staff Clerical staff

25 11 3 – –

420 299 106 98 23

Total

39

946

Police paid for by Iraq Petroleum Company Total Arab Legion

61 39

1,007

The police duties along the Iraq Petroleum Company’s pipeline and at the pumping stations were carried out by extra personnel specially enrolled for that purpose. They were paid, clothed and equipped at the expense of the company.2 During the years 1932 and 1933 there had been a high incidence of crime in the country, because of the bad economic conditions prevailing in the rural areas and the desert, due to drought and failure of most kinds of crops. Highway robbery had increased, with fifty cases reported in 1933. The amendment of Article 219 of the Ottoman Penal Code was passed so that severe punishments could be inflicted for the crime of highway robbery. Highway robbery at night carried a life prison sentence; the punishment for robbery during the day was imprisonment for ten years.3 In 1935 the sentence for highway robbery was reduced to 13 years, and in 1936 only 12 cases were reported. The principal crimes reported during the years 1934–8 are shown in Table 9.2. [231]


TABLE 9.2

Crime in Trans-Jordan, 1934–8 Nature of Crime

1934

1935

1936

1937

1938

Murder Highway robbery Wounding Abduction Theft Car accident Smuggling Drunkenness

47 43 444 45 1,646 118 37 70

19 13 346 43 715 111 7 60

29 12 308 29 882 112 13 55

21 – 260 55 942 101 20 77

25 – 133 36 801 83 25 804

The improvement of security in the desert was due to the improved relations between Brigadier Glubb, Commander of the Desert district, and the Saudi Amirs of Kaf and Tebuk. Several meetings took place between them to achieve cooperation in the prevention of crime, and the maintenance of law and order in the Southern desert. The same friendly relationship existed between Glubb and French Syrian officers of the Jabal Druze Government. Relations with the Iraqi Bedouins were greatly improved by allowing the Iraqi Amarat tribe to enter Trans-Jordan. The Amarat had been in a blood feud with some Trans-Jordanian tribes for centuries, and never before had they been able to enter the Dirah (lands) of the Trans-Jordanian tribes. On 16 February 1936, the amendment of the 1930 Arab Legion Law was implemented. It provided for an increase in pay for the Arab Legion non-officer ranks as shown in Table 9.3. TABLE 9.3

Arab Legion pay, 1936 Rank

Monthly Pay (£P)

Sergeant Major Staff Sergeant Sergeant Corporal Lance Corporal Private Soldier

10.00 8.50 7.00 6.25 6.00 5.00 [232]


At General Peake’s suggestion, he being the only man in the country to own a private aeroplane, an amendment of the 1936 Transfer and Travel Law was approved, adding the following to Article 8: The employee who owns an aeroplane, when he travels during an official mission in that aeroplane, shall be paid a transport fee of 30 mil and one quarter of a mil, for every kilometre he travels in his aeroplane, on the basis of the distance recorded by the Royal Air Force and in case there is no record of the distance, it will be measured in a straight line on the most up-to-date map available in Trans-Jordan. The fee for every official travel by the aeroplane during the period previous to the implementation of this law will be 30 mils for every kilometre calculated on the basis of the distance by road.5

Considering the very bad economic situation in the country, and the fact that not even the Amir let alone the people of Trans-Jordan could afford to buy one aeroplane, that regulation and Peake’s part in suggesting it was witness to his lack of credibility. On 14 April 1936, the Prime Minister Ibrahim Hashim submitted his resignation to the Amir, in which he said: Your Highness Since Your High Iradah appointing me as Prime Minister I have been carrying out my large responsibilities in a manner which fulfils Your Highness’s expectations. But new circumstances make me feel some change in Your Highness’s confidence in me, which until today was my main support in dealing with the affairs of the Government in the correct way. Because no Prime Minister can succeed in dealing with the said difficult affairs unless he has the utmost confidence, I now believe that it is my duty of loyalty to Your Highness to submit my resignation, so Your Highness can deal with the present situation in the way that will bring, God willing, success, correctness and blessing. I am always Your Highness’s follower and loyal servant, may God support you. Ibrahim Hashim 14 April 1936

In the same letter of resignation the Amir wrote to Ibrahim that very day: [233]


Dear Ibrahim Pasha There is no need for this, my confidence in you is still as in the first day you assumed the responsibility of Prime Minister. It is not expected from your loyalty to surprise me without any previous knowledge or cause. If there are any other reasons I am ready to help you to deal with them, God willing. Please withdraw what you have submitted. With all my best wishes. Abdullah6

On 1 November 1936, the Amir opened the third ordinary session of the third Legislative Council with the following speech from the throne: Honourable Members I am delighted that you are resuming your session of work and service in this your Legislative Council, after a period during which you have been able to look into the affairs of the nation. You have increased your knowledge and you are now more determined. I have been informed of the bad effects of the agricultural season last year. I must inform you of what my Government did to help overcome those effects: tax exemptions of £P76,000, the allocation of £P20,000 for agricultural loans, a further £P15,000 for the same purpose, and the postponement of payment of loans in needy areas. Other sums of money were spent on the construction of roads and the improvement of water resources to support areas in need. Efforts continue to be made for the propagation of selected seeds and their distribution to farmers. Also, a large number of young fruit trees have been distributed and there have been improvements to the agricultural experiment and demonstration station between Amman and Suwailih. Work has been carried out in poultry rearing, the protection of forests, and the mining of phosphate from the area of Rusaifa. Progress has been made in the survey, registration and division of land. A new rate of customs duties based on the rate of the League of Nations has been implemented. Arrangements have been made to offer grapes and raisins in foreign markets, and it is intended to open a general market in Amman so that the capital can regain its previous trade status. The project for sinking artesian bores in the desert area was successful, and the project for bringing water to Salt and Wadi al-Sir is underway. A mobile health clinic for Bedouins has been created and healthcare in towns and villages has improved public health. [234]


Telegraph and wireless communications have connected the country together for the benefit of all. I am delighted to say that public security has been stable in the country during a difficult time. And I thank all the sons of Trans-Jordan Bedouins and Hadar on their self-control, strong determination and obedience during that crisis. I am glad to point out that there is good friendship and loyalty between us and His Britannic Majesty’s Government, and our relations with all nations are based on loyalty and understanding.7

On 5 November 1936, the members of the Legislative Council presented to the Amir at Raghadan Palace the following reply to the speech from the throne, regarding the opening of the third ordinary session: Your Highness The Legislative Council has the honour and pride to note Your Highness’s pleasure on the resumption of their work at the third Ordinary Session. The Council tenders great thanks for the care and efforts made to mitigate distress and to dispel hardships. The Council hopes that efforts will continue to be exercised to increase the means of development and happiness to the people during Your Highness’s flourishing reign. In connection with the reference to the self-restraint and obedience manifested by the Trans-Jordan people and the good effect such traits had in safeguarding peace and security during the last critical days, our Council cannot but express the desire of Your Highness’s people to attain the rights acquired by the Brother Arab countries and that Trans-Jordan would shortly become an active member in the League of Nations. In presenting this desire the Council is supported by what so far has been accomplished in Trans-Jordan through Your Highness’s efforts with reference to becoming acquainted with legislative life, the progress in civilization and means of modern education as well as realizing the advantages of cooperation which the member States of the League of Nations render for the sake of world Peace. The Council solicits the country’s lord and its beloved Amir to proceed with his commendable efforts which, by God’s grace, will be successful, to realize this desire and may the Almighty preserve you and support you with His Spirit.8

[235]


Workers’ rights Except for a limited number of professionals, artisan classes, civil servants and members of the Arab Legion, the Trans-Jordanians of the thirties were mainly dependent for their livelihood on agriculture. Although the land was not intensively cultivated, there was a considerable landless class; except for the handful of very rich landowners, the vast majority had small or medium pieces of land which could be cultivated by two or three men. Landless people who could not be employed in cultivation during bad years sought employment in road construction, the Iraqi Petroleum Company, building houses and other forms of manual labour. The average daily wage of the unskilled manual labourer was approximately 250 mil (25 piastres) each day. Women and girls did not work in any industrial undertaking or manual labour of any kind; their activities were limited to work on their father’s or husband’s land in light agricultural undertakings. Young men and boys, above 12 years of age, worked with their families in agriculture or in other sectors of manual labour during bad years. A very limited number were employed by the two tobacco factories. When in 1936, six boys under 12 years old were found working in the two factories, the Government ordered their discharge and an undertaking was given by the owners to adhere to the following: (a) No child under 12 years of age shall be employed. (b) No child shall be employed in cleaning machinery while it is in motion. (c) No child shall be allowed to work for a period exceeding eight hours, excluding rest, in any period of twenty-four hours, and no child shall be allowed to work for more than five hours continuously. (d) Every child employed shall be allowed one day of rest in every seven days. (e) No child shall be employed between the hours of 19.00 and 06.00.9 Although the Government of Trans-Jordan gave effect to the international convention concerning forced or compulsory labour, it did not declare the terms of International Labour Conventions applicable to Trans-Jordan. Care had been taken, though, to ensure that Trans-Jordanian legislation was in no way contradictory or even repugnant to the provisions [236]


of the International Labour Conventions. That policy was adopted because the people of Trans-Jordan and their economy were mainly pastoral and agricultural; society was still tribal and constructed on patriarchal lines. Industries did not exist and there was no indication that industrial development was imminent. Although there were chambers of commerce for Amman and Irbid, the first national trade union was established for agriculture by Government approval in Command no. 25/1/1/63, 7 October 1929. The executive committee were, Ibrahim al Samawi, Said Halawah, Ibrahim Farouq, Bsharah al-Bsharat, Zaki al-Idilbi, Said Ammoun, Michael Qawar and Shakir al-Tuaaimah. On 20 January 1937, a group of workers represented by Yousef al-Saudi submitted an entreaty to the President and members of the Legislative Council complaining about the neglect with which workers were treated, and demanded the enactment of a law to protect their trades. They requested that the Government should emulate governments of the West by being on the side of the workers. They insisted that the Trans-Jordanian workers did not enjoy their rights because they did not have trade unions to protect them. They gave as an example the agreement between the Government and the Iraqi Petroleum Company, in which the company undertook to employ Trans-Jordanians only from within the country. In fact, they said: ‘The Company has employed labour from other countries.’10 The entreaty was presented on 31 January 1937, during the seventh meeting of the third normal session of the Legislative Council, and in the debate that followed Said al-Mufti, chairman of the administrative committee, took up the workers’ cause and suggested the enactment of a law to protect them and to establish their own unions. Nazmi Abd al-Hadi, Mitri al-Sharaihah and Abdullah al-Kulaib al-Shraidah strongly criticised the Company, but did not mention trade unions. During the same meeting, the Iradah to end the normal session was read by the President. The first attempt at establishing a labour trade union had failed.11 During the short extraordinary session of the third Legislative Council in March 1937, the Amir Abdullah expressed his wish to lay before the Council a draft law to provide for his control of the members of the Hashemite royal family of Trans-Jordan. The draft law, which was modelled on a similar law in Egypt, was published in the Trans-Jordan Official Gazette 12 and was passed by the Legislative Council on 25 April 1937. (See Appendix D.) [237]


During March, attempts were made by some of the Opposition in the Legislative Council and other political leaders to hold a conference with the view of calling for a new government composed entirely of native-born Trans-Jordanians, ‘sons of the country’. The promoters of the movement such as Refaifan al-Majali of Karak, Mithqal al-Fayiz of Bani Sakhr and Hussein al-Tarawnah of Karak and others, would, if they formed a government, dispense with the services of all officials who were not ‘sons of the country’. One of the supporters of the movement, Dr Subhi Abu Ghanimah, who claimed to be an Arab nationalist, went as far as attacking the Amir in the Syrian press, and called for the exclusion from office of all persons not of Trans-Jordan origin. He also attacked the Amir for his alleged readiness to admit Jews to Trans-Jordan, and the repressive measures taken by the Government against its opponents.

Royal travels Another opportunity was extended to the Amir Abdullah to visit England and develop better relations with the United Kingdom.13 With the Amir Talal acting as Regent, the Amir Abdullah left Amman on 25 April 1937 for England to attend the coronation of their Majesties King George and Queen Elizabeth. His Highness was accompanied by Jamil al-Totunji, his personal physician; Samir al-Rifai, his personal secretary; Mohammad al-Zubbati, his personal attendant; and Major E. W. Northfield from the Arab Legion acting as his ADC. During his visit he was invited by the Right Honourable Baron Lamington of Lamington to spend a weekend as his guest in Scotland and the Royal Central Asian Society held a reception in his honour. The Amir took the opportunity as well as the initiative to discuss some of the issues which were previously presented by the High Commissioner for Trans-Jordan. He talked with officials at the Colonial Office and used every opportunity to establish good relations with other senior officials, Lords or members of the House of Commons. He managed to achieve a decision to increase the Grant-in-Aid, and persisted in his demand for the amendment of the 1928 Treaty with Britain.14 While in London the Amir had a meeting with the Turkish Prime Minister and expressed to him his desire to revisit Turkey, where he had spent 17 years of his life. The Turkish Prime Minister extended the invitation immediately. On his way back to Amman the Amir arrived at [238]


Istanbul on 30 May 1937, and was received by the civil and military authority with the usual ceremony for a Head of State. On the same day he received the representatives of the Turkish press and said to them that he hoped to see Turkey in the vanguard of oriental nations and all these nations united by good neighbourly relations. He expressed his joy at the settlement of the Sanjak of Alexandrette, a question which he had always considered as a dispute between two brothers. He was pleased to see that Turkey, the elder of the brothers, had behaved with becoming consideration towards its younger brother, Syria. The Amir was asked about the question of Palestine. He replied that ‘the idea of a partition of Palestine between Arabs and Jews was not new, but . . . it pleased neither of them. In regard to Trans-Jordan, any change in its status was dependent on the issue and events in Palestine and the relations of Trans-Jordan with the British Government were of the friendliest.’ On 31 May, the Amir arrived at Ankara and was received by the Foreign Minister, who accompanied him to meet the President of Turkey, Kamal Ataturk. The British Ambassador to Turkey, who was not informed of these meetings, reported: I was not advised of these two visits, nor was I present at them, and therefore drew the attention of the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to the seeming impropriety of conduct of the Turkish authorities. He assured me that no slight had been intended and that, on the Turkish side, the emphasis of the conversations with His Highness had been on the existing Anglo-Turkish friendship, and on the wisdom of the maintenance by Trans-Jordan of friendship with His Majesty’s Government. This statement was subsequently confirmed by His Highness the Amir. As a result of my remarks to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, I was invited to be present at banquets given to His Highness by the President of the Grand National Assembly and by the Prime Minister. To the first of these functions no other foreign representatives were invited; the Minister of Iraq attended at the second. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs were also present in force at a tea party at His Majesty’s Embassy. His Highness left Ankara on June 2 for Istanbul, where he will stay for about a week as the personal guest of the President of the Republic. The palace of Beylerbey has been assigned to him for his use during his stay. His Highness has been given a very friendly reception by the Government, the public and the Press, and has left the general impression in Angora of a man of personal charm and good sense.15 [239]


The Amir had stirred speculations at the Foreign and Colonial Offices by his visit to Turkey and returned to Amman on 13 June 1937. During his absence, the Regent Amir Talal had the experience of seven weeks as acting head of state and did very well during that period. The Government addressed a letter to the Amir Abdullah on his return expressing its gratitude for the support and assistance they had received from the Regent. On the night of his return the Amir commanded that a speech be read on his behalf from the municipality of Amman to the people expressing ‘his pleasure at being restored to his people; his gratification at the friendly reception he was accorded in the United Kingdom; the fact that he knew no more about the Palestine question than when he left Trans-Jordan: and an explanatory passage in connection with his visit to Turkey and the question of the Sanjak of Alexandrette’. On the following day the Amir issued a letter of confidence in the Prime Minister. Henry Cox reported: His Highness’s next action was to issue a letter expressing his confidence in the Chief Minister and authorising the latter to make any changes which he saw fit in the membership of the Executive Council recommending, at the same time, that advantage should be taken of the services of any able locally born Trans-Jordanians. A number of locally born Trans-Jordanians (referred to locally as ‘sons of the territory’) confidently expected that the return of His Highness would be the occasion of the dismissal of the present Executive Council and its replacement by a Council constituted solely by ‘sons of the country’. Once in the saddle the new administration intended to endeavour to remove from office all Arab officials seconded from Palestine and all locally engaged Arab officials of other than Trans-Jordanian birth. His Highness seriously considered proposing a reshuffle of Executive Councillors, leaving the present Chief Minister in office and introducing additional ‘sons of the country’ into the Government. At this juncture, however, His Highness received a telegram from Dr. Subhi Abu Ghanimah recommending him to dispense with the band of thieves with whom he had surrounded himself, and the next day a further telegram arrived, demanding in abrupt terms a change of Government, emanating from a self-styled ‘Congress’ which sat at Tiberias and which was constituted by the least desirable elements of the ‘sons of the country’. His Highness’s reaction was unfavourable to the new party; he sent for the more extreme and irresponsible leaders and, after giving them a thorough scolding, [240]


ordered them to return to their villages: an order which was obeyed immediately. To the more moderates His Highness explained that he could not consider any immediate change in view of the objectionable tone in which their colleagues had seen fit to make their request. At the end of the month, considerable disagreement was evident between the various ‘sons of the country’ and a number of the leading shaikhs of the country petitioned His Highness asking him to deal severely with those who had sought to sow dissension between the Arabs by differentiating between those born locally and others. On the 29th instant, in order to put an end to rumours of changes, the Chief Minister addressed a letter to the Amir stating that there was no truth in the statements made to the effect that discord existed between the members of the Executive Council, that he had every trust in the present members and was working with them in complete agreement.16

During July 1937, Sir A. Henry McMahon marked himself out from the debris of history by spreading more deception against the Arabs. While the debate about the Royal Commission’s Report was progressing in both Houses of Parliament, as well as in the press, he saw fit to continue his deceit against the Arabs by issuing the following statement to The Times on 23 July 1937: Sir Many references have been made in the Palestine Royal Commission Report and in the course of the recent debates in both Houses of Parliament to the ‘McMahon Pledge’, especially to that portion of the pledge which concerns Palestine and of which one interpretation has been claimed by the Jews and another by the Arabs. It has been suggested to me that continued silence on the part of the giver of that pledge may itself be misunderstood. I feel, therefore, called upon to make some statement on the subject, but I will confine myself in doing so to the point now at issue, i.e., whether that portion of Syria now known as Palestine was or was not intended to be included in the territories in which the independence of the Arabs was guaranteed in my pledge. I feel it my duty to state, and I do so definitely and emphatically, that it was not intended by me in giving this pledge to King Hussein to include Palestine in the area in which Arab independence was promised. [241]


I also had every reason to believe at the time that the fact that Palestine was not included in my pledge was well understood by King Hussein. Yours faithfully Henry McMahon.17

As soon as the Amir Abdullah heard of McMahon’s letter, he wrote a letter to the High Commissioner containing the whole truth regarding the Hussein–McMahon correspondence during the First World War. The Amir was witness to all the events leading to and emanating from the correspondence of which he had the original copies. He wrote on 25 July 1937: The Honourable Sir Arthur Wauchope The High Commissioner for Trans-Jordan My dear Excellency Never did I think that anyone would ever venture to express the opinion of my late father the King after his move from this evanescent home to the neighbourhood of God the glorified. Yesterday I heard in a broadcast on behalf of Sir Henry McMahon that the pledges given to my father do not cover Palestine and that my late father was himself aware of this. As this imputation has its importance and as I am the only living son of the King, it is only right on my part to defend him and to justify myself speaking for him and to state that those pledges included Palestine and that my late father together with those in his company were firmly of that belief beyond any shadow of doubt and this was known to me about him in his life time. The communications of my father with Sir McMahon which I have in my possession confirm this statement and support its truthfulness, and moreover at that time I was his secretary and the person who was in charge of those discussions until the revolution ended. After reading this statement please arrange for the broadcast in question to be rectified by a similar broadcast, the broadcast for the sake of truth and history and for the sake of loyalty to a great man, to whom, although he is removed from this world, those who remain of his family and his friends, such as ourselves, owe the duty of refuting any statement wrongly attributed to him, in particular one which relates to his national honour. In confirmation of the foregoing I mention the following points: The mention of the ‘boundaries’ was a distressing difficulty in the communications which took place between my late father and [242]


Sir Henry McMahon on behalf of Great Britain and despite attempts made to persuade him to modify his attitude my father persisted in adhering to it to the end, and Sir Henry McMahon says in his letter transmitted to Sherif Hussein on 19 Shawal 1333 (3 August 1915) as under: ‘As regards the boundaries our discussion of such details while the time is short and the war is raging, may be immature particularly since Turkey still fully occupies a great part of the lands to which you refer in your suggestion.’ As for the ‘lands’ to which Sir McMahon refers, they are the lands contained in my father’s letter to Sir McMahon in the first section of which is concerned, as follows: ‘That England will recognise the independence of the Arab countries from Mersin-Adana until the Persian Gulf in the north; from (Iran) Persia to Basra Gulf in the East; from the Indian Ocean to the Jezira in the South; Aden to be excluded and shall remain as at present and from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean Sea until Sinai in the West.’ But my father’s reply to Sir McMahon’s previous letter was in 29 Shawal 1333 (9 September 1915) and states: ‘The interests of the sons of our religion claim the boundaries I mention above to you.’ In his letter His Majesty then remarked with severe accents on the ‘coolness’ and ‘reluctance’ which appeared in Sir Henry McMahon’s letter with regard to the boundaries. He went on to say: ‘The boundaries claimed are not for a single person so that you may be able to satisfy him and negotiate with him but they are the demands of a people who believe that their life lies within these boundaries and who are all in agreement as to this belief.’ After dwelling on this subject in regard to the ‘belief ’ of the Arabs so that thereafter ‘England or any of its Allies may not object to them’, His Majesty said the following: ‘We therefore deem it our duty to assure you that we shall ask you on the first opportunity after the War ends for that which we now leave for France, namely Beirut and its coasts.’ Colonel Sir Henry McMahon replied to that by his letter dated 18 Zil Hijjah 1333 (24 October 1915) and said ‘I regret you observed in my last letter and talk in connection with the boundaries some “coolness” and “reluctance”.’ And after apologizing for that His Excellency said: ‘I have transmitted the contents of your letter to the British Government and I am happy to send you the following statements which, I am absolutely confident, will win your satisfaction. Mersin, [243]


Alexandretta, and other Syrian ports westward of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo cannot be considered as purely Arabic.’ His Excellency then said: ‘But as to the lands with which England can deal with full freedom without causing any harm to her Ally France, I am fully authorised to give you in the name of His Majesty’s Government the following assurance in reply to your letter: England is ready, on the basis of these modifications, to recognise the independence of the Arabs and to afford them assistance in regard to the boundaries suggested by the sherif of Mecca etc., to the end of such pledges.’ Your Excellency will see from this that what is meant by such areas on ‘Lebanon coasts’ which ‘we shall leave for France’ in Beirut and its coasts ‘with the hope that we shall claim the same for certain after the war ends’. Sir Henry McMahon agreed to postpone the discussion in this respect until another occasion and thanked the Arab King for the care he disclosed for the continuance of the alliance of the Allies, and he said in his letter dated 9 Safar 1334 (13 December 1915) as under: ‘As regards the Provinces (Wilayets) of Aleppo and Beirut, the British Government understands all you have mentioned in respect thereof and have recorded the same carefully but as the interests of her Ally, France, are included therein the matter requires careful consideration, and, we shall communicate again with you in due course.’ His Majesty confirms this fact in his letter dated 25 Safer 1334 (1 December 1916) to which Sir Henry McMahon replied on 24 Rabi El Akher 1334 (30 January 1916) by saying: ‘As regards the northern parts a remark has been written as to your wish to avoid all that may harm the alliance of England and France.’ From this you will see that there was no doubt as to the Arab status of Palestine which fact has not been ignored by any one and that France was not claiming the same. In addition Palestine is ‘of the countries in which England can deal with full liberty without causing any harm to her Ally, France’. I hope that these clear proofs which I have displayed shall be convincing that Palestine was included in the Arab boundaries suggested by the Sherif of Mecca and that the dispute with regard to the boundaries was in respect of Beirut and its coasts in favour of France. The settlement of this matter was postponed to another occasion because the area was not purely Arab in the opinion of Sir Henry McMahon as was the case with Mersin and Alexandretta. [244]


Furthermore, there are proofs other than the correspondence under reference. These are official declarations made by His Majesty’s Government and others made by His Majesty’s Government and their Allies. I refer to the joint declaration made on 8 November 1917, with regard to the objects of Britain and France from the War. I also refer to the telegram dated 8 February 1918 from Great Britain to His Majesty my father in reply to the written correspondence sent by the Turkish leader in Syria to my brother the late King Faisal and to myself and which my father sent to His Majesty’s Government who much appreciated his fidelity and repeated their promises to support the Arabs and their independence. The Turkish leader reproached the Arabs for helping General Allenby to conquer the country which Salah Eddin had defended and for taking it out of the hands of the Muslims. On receipt of these Turkish letters the Arab Army and their officers flared up and discontinued to fight until they received the assurance contained in the telegram in question. This is part of its contents: ‘It is not necessary to prove that the policy adopted by Turkey is to create suspicion and doubt between the Allied Powers and the Arabs who are under Your Highness’s command and guidance and who have exerted their best efforts towards regaining their national freedom.’ The telegram continued: ‘The Government of His Majesty the King of Great Britain and their Allies still maintain their attitude towards every movement that may lead to liberating oppressed nations. They are determined to stand by the Arab nations in their fight to build an Arab world in which the law and Shariah will prevail instead of the Ottoman despotism.’ The telegram further continued: ‘The Government of Great Britain repeat their aforesaid promise with regard to liberating the Arab nations and that the Government of His Majesty the King of Great Britain have followed a liberating attitude and intend to so continue with honesty and determination by guarding the Arabs who have been liberated from falling into the abyss of devastation and to help those who are still under the yoke of the tyrants so that they may obtain their freedom.’ There is also a telegram transmitted by the Government of His Majesty King of Great Britain to His Majesty through his delegate in Egypt who was Sheikh Fuad el Khatib on 8 June 1918, when he protested on behalf of His Majesty against the Sykes-Picot Convention which the Bolsheviks made public immediately they succeeded to govern Russia. This is the text of the telegram: [245]


‘The Bolsheviks did not find in the Foreign Ministry at Petrograd a concluded agreement but they found temporary debates and conversations between England, France and Russia which took place in the beginning of the War with the purpose of obviating any difficulties among the Powers during the continuance of the war against the Turks. This was done prior to the Arab Revolt, and either through ignorance or wickedness Jamal Pasha changed the basic intentions and omitted the terms which provided for the acceptance of the inhabitants and for the safeguarding of their interests He ignored what happened later on: that the rise of the Arab Movement and its splendid success together with the withdrawal of Russia had created another state of affairs was which entirely different to that which had existed for sometime before.’ Further still when Colonel Lawrence came to Jeddah for the purpose of concluding an agreement with His Majesty my late father, the Palestine cause was the subject under review, and there is in the British Legation in Jeddah the record of the negotiations which took place between my late brother King Ali on behalf of his father and Colonel Lawrence under file no. 1521 M-51, in which the Amir Ali raised the question of Palestine and when Colonel Lawrence replied that the Muslim-Christian Delegation were at that moment, December 1921, discussing with the British Government the question of their political future and that he could not make any declaration about Palestine until the result of the discussions appear, and that if the Delegation arrived at a satisfactory solution ‘there would remain no responsibility on King Hussein’. The Amir agreed as to this and said: ‘If the Delegation failed King Hussein will continue to defend the Arab national claims in that country, i.e. Palestine.’ This is what I thought to put down in this letter just to say that the right of the Arabs in their country Palestine is clear and does not need a document or a promise. They are its inhabitants from centuries past and have been permanent residents therein. In spite of the War that swept over them and the calamities that distressed them they did not waste nor did they abandon a hand span of it. What I now beg Your Excellency to be sure of the inaccuracy of the statement made on the broadcast to the effect that the pledges given to my father did not include Palestine and that he (my father) was himself aware of this fact. The truth beyond any doubt is that which I have stated and proved to be, namely, Palestine was included in the pledges given to my father and that he did not think otherwise. I beg Your Excellency to rectify in one way or other the broadcast against which I protest or to advise me to do so myself in honour of the dead and for the preservation of the facts of history. Abdullah18 [246]


By the end of July, the debate regarding the partition plan for Palestine was still as heated as it was in Amman, but elsewhere in the country, particularly amongst the Bedouins and semi-Bedouins, it found no appeal. Brigadier Glubb, the Commander of the Badiyah district, who had arrived in Trans-Jordan in 1930, had acquainted himself well with the facts of life of the country by July 1937. Although he had nothing much to do with the sedentary part of the population and had little interest in them, he knew personally all the shaikhs and leaders of the Bedouins and semi-Bedouins, their attitudes, their needs and hopes, and their reactions to whatever events were taking place in the country. With the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Palestine at the back of his mind he reported thus on the Southern desert of Trans-Jordan: The burning question of partition did not really pentrate to the tribes during July, although it caused a good deal of heated discussion in Amman. Excellent as the proposals seem to be, as offering at least a hope of final peace some day, it is yet remarkable how many pitfalls seem to lie in their way. Although Palestine and Trans-Jordan are often said to be one country, these statements usually come from interested parties trying to support ambitions of their own. In practice, even before the war, they were not one administration, Trans-Jordan being under Damascus. But we may perhaps say that, before the war, the mentality and culture of the two were not irrevocably separated. But in the last 17 years, the two countries have followed entirely opposite paths. With the exception of Amman town, Trans-Jordan is still tribal, old fashioned, Muslim and Arab. In Palestine, the influx of Jews and foreigners, and seventeen years of direct British Administration, have made the country Levantine or Mediterranean, rather than Arab. Trans-Jordan already contains three codes of law courts, (the civil, the Sheria, and the tribal), all of which are vastly different from the legal system in force in Palestine. Considerable feeling will arise between the existing TransJordanians and the Palestinians who are to be attached to Trans-Jordan. Especially will this be so in the intellectual classes. The Palestinians can produce much better educated government officials, doctors and lawyers. The Trans-Jordanians already realize that, if their country is joined to Palestine, the Palestinians are likely to monopolize all the lucrative appointments. [247]


Perhaps an even more difficult problem will be the question of transferring the cultivators whose lands will fall inside the new Jewish state. Peasants are notoriously attached to their native soil, and refuse to leave it, even if better land is available elsewhere. This is a sentiment deep in their character, and not to be argued away by reason. But the difficulty here will not be only in evicting the Arabs from Palestine, but in planting them in Trans-Jordan or elsewhere. Although much of the land in Trans-Jordan could produce much more and support a larger population, yet it all belongs to somebody, according to Arab ideas. The fact that government may spend money to make this land more productive will not immediately reconcile the Trans-Jordanians to the importation of Palestinian settlements (many of them differing somewhat in culture) into their country. The decision regarding the site of the future capital is likely to be a difficult one, as between the rival claims of Nablus and Amman. The attitude of Ibn Saud is still a doubtful quality. It is quite possible that the creation of a new independent Sherifian Kingdom on his northern border might be anything but welcomed. But perhaps most difficult of all will be the clash of certain personalities inside the two States. The new constitution appears to reduce the Mufti to insignificance, and exalt his enemy, the Amir Abdullah. But even if the Mufti were eliminated it is difficult to foresee how His Highness, in an independent Arab state, would consent to be a constitutional monarch with a Parliament of Palestinian lawyers. But while the Palestinians would be the intellectuals of new state, the Trans-Jordanians would probably supply the fighting men, the raw material for rebellions. Plenty of disturbances will probably lie in the path of the Arab state. At the same time, however, it must be realized that such incidents cannot necessarily render an Arab state unstable. The Arabs are adicted to turmoil, but, although they quarrel with each other, they are not incapable of unity against outside threat. After all, the Arabs have always shown these characteristics – they conquered half the world and carried on a succession of civil wars amongst themselves at the same time. ‘To come to Arabia to make war’, T. E. Lawrence said, is bringing coals to Newcastle, or as the Arabs have it, hawking dates to the people of Khaibar. But we cannot help feeling that when the politicians from Palestine are turned loose on the tribes of Trans-Jordan, neutrals who value their lives do well to ‘stand from under’.19 [248]


The Amir was extremely concerned at the unpopularity of his private approval of the partition plan for Palestine. His vision was to limit the damage that might be caused to Arab rights and future in Palestine. He knew how powerful Britain was and could visualise how many troops Britain could bring into Palestine to destroy any future rebellion. However, he also was aware of his unpopularity in neighbouring Arab countries as well as among the extreme faction of the Palestinian people. In order to enhance his position he gave a copy of his letter to the High Commissioner regarding McMahon’s letter to The Times to Shaikh Foad al-Khatib, which was then widely published in Palestinian and other Arab newspapers. There was anger at Government House in Jerusalem and the British Residence in Amman, and the Amir was asked to promise not to repeat the publication of any correspondence with the High Commissioner. The Amir then decided that something must be done to stem the tide of criticism running so strongly against him. His plan of action was, as reported by the British Resident, the following: Steps must be taken, whatever happens to Palestine, to consolidate Trans-Jordan’s admitted right to independence. Steps must be taken to bring about a friendlier outlook towards him in neighbouring Arab countries, and to this end visits of friendship should be paid, a Consul should be appointed in Damascus and money should be spent on propaganda. Extremist Trans-Jordanians should be silenced by giving them Government jobs. All members of the Executive Council should be changed with the exception of the Chief Minister and the Treasurer who should be retained for the present.20

The Amir consulted the British Resident, Henry Cox, regarding the proposed changes in the membership of the Executive Council and considerable sifting of the suggested candidates for appointment was carried out. At the end of the consultations the Amir decided to postpone the reshuffle. He was more worried about his unpopularity in the neighbouring Arab countries because of his support for the partition recommendations. He asked his Prime Minister to exert all his energies to remedy that situation. But although Ibrahim Hashim did his best, he [249]


failed to achieve anything and the criticism from Syrian, Lebanese and Palestinian newspapers continued. Hashim recommended to the Amir a period of silence regarding foreign affairs and to divert all the energies of Government to the good administration of the country. The Amir thought that Ibrahim Hashim was unwilling to take action and started thinking of Tawfiq Abu al-Huda as Prime Minister. The British Resident reported: In this, however, His Highness is quite mistaken, for Ibrahim Hashim has much the greater influence and prestige of the two and the failure of a recent mission, carried out by Tawfiq in Syria on behalf of the Amir, has given His Highness a glimpse of the truth. Presumably most of the lies about unrest and revolution in Trans-Jordan, and of invasion from Saudi Arabia, are invented in the countries which broadcast them, but at least one such propagandist in the person of the local correspondent of Havas and Agence d’Egypte and d’Orient telegraphic agencies has been marked down and, it is hoped, effectively silenced.21

Hizb al-Ikha al-Urdoni Between October 1934 and August 1937 little impact was made on the political life of the country by the political parties; the Opposition seemed to have lost the vigour of the first three years of the Legislative Council. On 25 September 1937 the shaikhs and notables of the time took the initiative and established Hizb al-Ikha al-Urdoni (Jordanian Brotherhood Party) to fill the political vacuum.22 The party held its first conference on the 23 December 1937, and declared its aims: • • • •

to achieve the national interests of Trans-Jordan; to establish full independence of the country; to achieve unity; to endeavour to improve the political, economic and cultural conditions of the country on the basis of respect and loyalty to the Amir.

In the party’s declaration the leadership warned against dangers that threatened the Arab entity, and announced the party to be the first to [250]


represent a classless people.23 The party was established by the following founding members, who represented the vast majority of Bedouin and settled tribes in the country: Shaikh Refaifan al-Majali, Shaikh Majid al-Adwan, Shaikh Mithqal al-Fayiz, Salih al-Auran, Musa al-Maaitah, Mahmoud Kuraishan, Abdullah al-Kulaib al-Shraidah, Falah al-Zahir, Shaikh Hamd ibn Jazi, Mohammad Audah al-Quraan, Hasan al-Autaiwi, Jamil al-Majali, Salim al-Aarar, Aatiwi Aawajan, Khashman Abu Karaki, Sabri al-Tabbaa, Yousef al-Bilbaisi. It was a pro-Government party of rich notables and shaikhs with tribal affiliations. Although the majority of its members were at one time or another members of the Opposition, they defected to Government support. Through their tribal influence and the rich notables amongst them, seven of their members were elected to the fourth Legislative Council. The general elections for the fourth Legislative Council were held on 16 October 1937, and the following results published in the official gazette: First Constituency: Ajlun district (excluding Jarash). Muslims: Mahmoud al-Funaish, Abdullah al-Kulaib al-Shraidah, and Mohammad al-Awad. Christian: Salti al-Ibrahim. Second Constituency: Balqa district (including Jarash). Muslims: Shaikh Majid al-Adwan, Sabri al-Tabbaa, and Saud al-Nabulsi. Circassian: Shawkat Hamid (appointed Mutasarrif ), Omar Hikmat (elected later), and Hussein Khawaja. Christian: Khalil al-Sukkar. Third Constituency: Karak and Maan districts. Muslims: Shaikh Refaifan al-Majali, Salih al-Auran, and Mahmoud Kuraishan. Christian: Ibrahim al-Sharaihah. Bedouin Constituency. Northern Bedouins: Shaikh Hadithah al-Khraishah. Southern Bedouins: Shaikh Hamd ibn Jazi.24 On 1 November 1937, the first ordinary session of the fourth Legislative Council was opened by the Amir with the following speech from the throne:

[251]


Honourable Deputies After thanking Allah and praising his mercy, it pleases me to open the first ordinary session of the fourth Legislative Council and congratulate you on your election, you the notables, leaders, merchants, farmers; congratulations which emanate from a deep wish for the sons of the nation, wherever they are, and for their service to the areas where they live, in order to enhance brotherhood and the maintenance of the high aim of the Arabs, which is the unity for which the great Arab renaissance began. Thank Allah for success, and on this occasion I thank the Jordanian people for their courage in thought and loyalty to Allah and in every crisis that has struck the neighbouring countries which surround us. Our country has set an example in patience and prudence, which achieve the aims of those who have them, without any loss or harm. Because the national and religious ties, and the relations of neighbourliness and mutual interests between us and dear Palestine, are many and strong, we cannot but feel pain with anxiety for what is happening to her. We hope all the blessings for her. We have, Allah is our witness, done our duty towards her, and we still adhere to this policy without publicity. We have informed our sons in Holy Palestine, and we pray Allah for peace and success for her, us, and all the Arab countries. It has pleased Government during the previous year to fulfil its duties. It exempted those who could not pay their taxes from paying the outstanding money, it gave agricultural loans, as well as postponing the payment of previous loans; it distributed selected seeds and seedlings of fruit trees; it succeeded in mining, road construction, building border posts, expansion of post and telegraph, archaeology, boring artesian wells, mobile medical clinics for the desert, increasing the number of schools and teachers, and establishing schools in the Badiyah among the nomad Bedouins. Security is established and the finances of the state are balanced, affairs are proceeding towards success and progress with the blessing of Allah. It also pleases me to mention the friendship and mutual loyalty and cooperation between us and His Britannic Majesty’s Government, and that relations with other states are based on understanding and commitment.

A considerable number of arrests were made in the northern district of Irbid following some attempts to cause trouble in the area. More than 14 men were placed under forced residence in the south and others were bound over to keep the peace. A few shooting attacks were directed at [252]


police posts in Jarash, Shaikh Hussein bridge, and Ajlun on the night of 15/16 November but no one was hurt. One man who fired a shot at Jarash police station was apprehended by the police and confessed that he opened fire, as well as giving evidence against some of his friends, including a former officer of the Arab Legion. The TJFF squadron which was sent to Irbid was joined by a company of the Arab Legion Reserve. An endeavour to enhance the political influence of the United Kingdom in the Arab World was launched by the BBC on 3 January 1938, when it made its inaugural Arabic Service broadcast. The duration of the daily broadcast from Daventry was between 19.15 and 20.20 hours Middle East local time. It was beamed to a region that included Egypt, Palestine, Trans-Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Aden, the Arab Gulf and the Sudan. The inaugural transmission was well received in Trans-Jordan. Cox reported: The Amir, to avoid answering awkward questions, gave out that he was busy at the time and did not hear it, a point that was not missed in the press. The subsequent daily Arabic transmissions have been favourably commented on; but it is probable that other parts of the programme are not greatly appreciated.25

There was cooperation between the Egyptian Broadcasting Service and the British Mandatory Palestine Broadcasting Service in Jerusalem, at an early stage of development. That cooperation was necessary because of the need of the BBC for Arab music, songs (by Abd al-Wahab and Um Kalthum of Egypt), and readings from the Quran (by Shaikh Mohammad Abdu of Egypt). The whole programme was planned to attract listeners drawn almost entirely from government officials, school teachers, the professional class of doctors, lawyers and so on, students, and men and women of leisure and means. The BBC aimed at influencing the men and women who had the destinies of their countries in their hands.26

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NOTES 1 PRO. Colonial no. 166. Report on Palestine and Trans-Jordan, 1939. pp. 377–9. 2 PRO. Colonial no. 129. Report on Palestine and Trans-Jordan, 1937, p. 346–9. See also Palestine and Trans-Jordan Administration Reports, 1918–48, vol 5, 1934–5. 3 TJOG no. 414, 16 October 1933. 4 PRO. Colonial no. 129. Report on Palestine and Trans-Jordan, 1937, p. 348. 5 TJOG no. 516, 16 February 1936. 6 Ibrahim Hashim, Private Papers. 7 TJOG/LCR, no. 170, November 1936. A translation from the Arabic by the author. 8 PRO. CO 831/35/1. Reply to the speech from the throne, 12 November 1936. 9 PRO. Colonial no. 112. Report on Palestine and Trans-Jordan, 1936, p. 315. 10 TJOG no. 188, 18 February 1937. 11 Ibid. 12 TJOG no. 556, 21 March 1937. 13 The Amir was asked by Dr Tesio, the director of the Italian Hospital in Amman, on behalf of the Italian Government, whether he would accept an official invitation to visit Italy when returning from his visit to England. Aware of Italian oppression in Abyssinia, their annihilation of 1,000 Abyssinians, and the execution of Haile Selassie’s son-in-law Desta Demtu (February 1937), the Amir replied that any such invitation would have to reach him through the British Government which was responsible for Trans-Jordan’s foreign relations. PRO. CO 831/41/8. Monthly situation report for March 1937, 3 April 1937. 14 PRO. CO 831/41/8. Interview with Sir C. Parkinson in London, May 1937. 15 PRO. FO 371/20826. From J. Morgan to A. Eden, 5 June 1937. See also PRO. CO 831/44. From British Embassy, Ankara, to Foreign Office, 5 June 1937. 16 PRO. CO 831/41/8. Monthly situation report for June 1937, 3 July 1937. 17 PRO. FO 371/ 20810. Sir McMahon’s letter to The Times, 23 July 1937. 18 PRO. FO 371/20813. From the Amir Abdullah to High Commissioner, 25 July 1937. 19 PRO. CO 831/41/11. Extract from report on Southern Jordanian Desert, by Brigadier Glubb, July 1937. 20 PRO. CO 831/41/8. Monthly situation report for August 1937, 3 September 1937. 21 Ibid. 22 TJCP no. 21/30/6924. Approval of the Party by the Cabinet, 26 September 1937. 23 Ibid. From a copy of the declaration of the party, 28 September 1937. 24 TJOG no. 578, 20 October 1937. 25 PRO. CO 831. Monthly situation report for January 1938, 1 February 1938. 26 Peter Partner, Arab Voices: The BBC Arabic Service 1938–1988 (London: BBC Consumer Publishing, 1988), pp. 28–31.

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10 On the Brink of the Second World War

By the beginning of 1938 there were Municipal Councils at Irbid, Ajlun, Jarash, Salt, Amman, Zarqa, Madaba, Karak, Taffilah and Maan. On 1 February, law no. 9, the Municipal Law of 1938, was published and came into effect on 1 April.1 It provided that each Municipal Council should consist of a majority of elected members, and a certain number of appointed members (including the President of the Council) selected by the Prime Minister in accordance with the needs of the municipality, such as a medical officer, engineer etc. According to Colonel Cox: that procedure was made necessary by the dearth of prospective candidates for election who have adequate technical knowledge or experience in municipal administration, and by the consideration that the Presidents of the Councils thus chosen, and being independent of the electorate, will be able to act more energetically in the performance of their duties.2

Proportional representation was taken into account in the system of municipal election. Following the example of the Electoral Law for the Legislative Council, Article 15 of the new Municipal Law provided that the number of seats for the elected members should be allocated between Muslims, Christians, and Circassians in proportion to the male adult population for each community. The Municipal Councils had no judicial powers, although their executive duties were considerable and extended to nearly every aspect of local concern. The new law provided for a general municipal rate in the form of tax on land and buildings within the boundaries of municipalities. The rate was fixed at 5 per cent by the Executive Council, and was made subject to change from time to time by them, provided it did not exceed 5 per cent of the rental value of the property. In the Trans-Jordan desert, the end of the year 1937 saw the first application of the Tribal Courts Law of 1936. The Trans-Jordan Government, when originally formed, contained no provision for trying [255]


tribal cases. Eventually certain modifications were made to allow district governors to form a court to award blood money in cases of murder. Subsequently the inability of government to control the Bedouins without tribal judicial machinery led to the improvisation of the socalled Bedouin Control Board in Amman, under the Presidency of the Amir Shakir, who was an excellent tribal judge. However, a single court in Amman was quite inadequate to deal with tribal cases all over the desert of Trans-Jordan. Brigadier Glubb reported in January 1938: The situation had, in any case, to be reviewed with the death of the Amir Shakir, and the 1936 Tribal Courts Laws were the result. These laws regularized tribal Courts procedure, by appointing a tribal court in each of the four settled districts and a fifth in the desert. A tribal Court of Appeal was appointed in Amman. Apart from this systemization, a new departure was made in that civil cases between tribesmen were in future to be tried by tribal shaikhs themselves. This idea was not entirely welcome to government officials, many of whom are rather jealous of tribal chiefs and desire to monopolize power themselves. In the desert, the new system has been an unqualified success, as is shown by the fact that no less than 205 civil cases between tribesmen were settled by the Desert Area Tribal Court during 1937.3

During February 1938, the investigation in the case of the Trans-Jordanian ‘troublemakers’ in Syria had been completed and a request had been forwarded for the extradition of Mohammad Ali al-Ajluni, Shaikh Sulaiman al-Sudi, Dr Mohammad Hijazi, Dr Subhi Abu Ghanimah, Mahmoud al-Khalidi and Ali al-Hindawi. Apart from a few articles in the Syrian press against the Amir, the activities of that group were of little importance to Trans-Jordan or the Amir. On 2 April, the Law for the Amendment of the Organic Law of 1938 was enacted and published. Article 1 provided for the repeal of Article 41 and its substitution as follows: His Highness the Amir-in-Council shall have power when the Legislative Council is not sitting to enact such ordinances as may be necessary on any subject. These ordinances which shall not contravene the terms of the Organic Law shall have the force of law and shall be submitted to the Legislative Council at the beginning of the next session. Provided, however, that the ordinances passed for the purpose of securing the fulfilment of the treaty obligations of His Highness the Amir shall not be so submitted. [256]

O N T H E B R I N K O F T H E S E C O N D W O R L D WA R

If the Legislative Council shall not pass at its said session any such ordinance so submitted, the same shall, unless His Highnessin-Council shall decide to withdraw the same, again be submitted at the beginning of the subsequent session. In the event of an ordinance being so withdrawn, or if at such subsequent session the Legislative Council shall again not pass the same, His Highness the Amir-in-Council shall forthwith notify the cessation thereof and from the date such ordinance shall cease to be in force. In the event of the Legislative Council proposing at any session amendments to an ordinance and of His Highness the Amir-inCouncil agreeing to such amendment, the ordinance as amended shall have the force of Law. In the event of the Legislative Council refusing to pass any Law placed before it with a view to securing the fulfilment of the treaty obligations of His Highness the Amir, His Highness-in-Council shall have the power to enact the necessary legislation in the form of an ordinance which shall not be submitted to the Legislative Council. Ordinances shall take effect in the same way as laws as provided in Article 38 hereof.4

It also provided for the following sentence to be added to the end of Article 48.1 of the Organic Law: ‘Matters regarding personal status are those matters which in the case of the Muslims are assigned to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Muslim Courts. The last paragraph of Article 50 of the Organic Law was repealed. Articles 52, 53, and 54 of the Organic Law were also repealed and the following Articles substituted: 52. Religious Community Councils shall be the Councils of such non-Moslem Religious Communities as are or shall be recognised by the Government as being established in Trans-Jordan. 53. Religious Community Councils shall be composed in the manner provided in special Laws regulating the same. Such laws shall define their jurisdiction whether exclusive or otherwise regarding such matters of personal status as may be assigned to them by the said laws, and regarding Waqfs constituted for the exclusive benefit of the community concerned. Matters of personal status are matters which in the case of Muslims are assigned to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Moslem Courts. 54. Such laws shall also determine the procedure to be followed and the fees to be levied by the Religious Community Councils.5

The budget for the year 1937/38 was approved by the Legislative Council as can be seen in Appendix A. The expenditure of £P2,275, [257]


assigned to the Desert Mobile Medical Unit, which was established in the second half of 1936/37, was allocated to care for the Bedouins of the South. The £P2,000 allocated to the Amir covered the expenses of his visit to the United Kingdom to attend the coronation of King George VI. In a very critical year for the economic life of Jordan, the British Government decided to reduce the Grant-in-Aid. Henry Cox reported: The decision that the Grant-in-Aid for 1937/38 has been reduced from £P63,000 to £P19,000 has been received and means that the estimated surplus at 31.1.1939 is reduced to £P2,800, with Revenue no longer estimated on conservative lines. It is difficult to reconcile this with the general policy laid down in 1936 that the right way to approach the object of making Trans-Jordan self supporting is to apply expansion in Revenue not only to administrative development but also in part to a progressive reduction in the Grant-in-Aid. The Amir’s view on hearing of the first reduction which was ordered of £P23,000 was that if the country were more disturbed there could be a better chance of having the Grant paid in full. He does not, as yet, know of the farther reduction of £P21,000.6

The increase in the pay of the officers and other ranks of the Arab Legion allocated in the budget is shown in Table 10.1. TABLE 10.1

Arab Legion pay increases, 1937/38 Rank

£P per month

Commander, Arab Legion Assistant Commander and Commander, Desert Force 2nd-in-Command, Desert Force British Officer Brigadier Colonel Lt Colonel Major Captain Lieutenant Second Lieutenant Officer Cadet Sergeant Major Staff Sergeant Sergeant Corporal Lance Corporal Soldier

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104.165 91.660 39.990 37.490 48.000 46.000 37.000 31.000 25.000 20.000 16.000 10.000 11.660 8.500 7.000 6.250 6.000 5.000


Meanwhile the Palestinian Revolt continued during 1938 and sympathy with the Palestinian people in the Arab world was at its highest. As predicted by the Amir, the peace of Trans-Jordan was disturbed. Two cases of highway robbery occurred on the nights of 23 and 24 March respectively, but it was not thought by Henry Cox that any political significance could be attached to this. However, the capture by the Arab Legion of 10 rifles, 200 bombs, and a considerable amount of ammunition, and the nearby arrest of a Palestinian from Jaffa found to be in possession of £P650 made him change his mind. The broadcast by the Palestine Broadcasting Station of a report about the incidents stirred the nationalist elements in Palestine and Trans-Jordan further. Henry Cox reported: It is alleged that inquiries have been made from Damascus as to why the money sent to supporters in Amman of the Arab Cause has been used to such small advantage and that the attempts to set fire to the Amir’s Office building (which is situated in the town) and to the Headquarters of the Arab Legion by throwing a petrol soaked bundle of rags through a window of each of these offices, as well as the exploding of a bomb (filled with black powder) in the Chief Minister’s garden may be attributed to a spurt of energy on the part of these supporters. It is reported, though still unconfirmed, that the Palestinians in Syria, and the Istiqlalists of the Syrian Government having found Trans-Jordan so unready to assist the prosecution of violence in Palestine are going to make a further attempt to stir up trouble in the northern district so that armed men may pass with freedom to and from Syria and Palestine. The non-Istiqlalist members of the Syrian Government are said to be in opposition to such a move. Steps are being taken to ascertain the reliability of this story. Much sympathy is said to have been aroused for their co-religionists in Palestine among the devout in Iraq and very considerable sums are said to be forthcoming from that country. Though there is no specific sign of disturbance in Trans-Jordan or of a wish to send armed men to Palestine, the atmosphere is less tranquil than of late. People coming back from Syria and Palestine are infected by the anti-British talk they have heard and the considerable loss of life and in the absence of a speedy solution to the impasse in Palestine there seems a real danger that a very definite hatred of the British will be borne.

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There are as well 76 boys and young men receiving secondary or university education abroad and these become imbued with strong political ideas which cannot be controlled as well as in the schools in Trans-Jordan. The number of these boys getting their education abroad goes to show that the recently created Bishop’s School in Amman should expand along secondary rather than on technical lines.7

During April the Amir took a more active interest in Palestinian affairs and sent a few emissaries to study the situation, hold talks with the Palestinian leadership and gauge the trends of public opinion. Prominent among his emissaries was Tawfiq Abu al-Huda, who also reported to the British Resident on his return to Amman. Henry Cox reported that: His conclusion that in the general fear of assassination no moderate is willing to declare himself and a decision should be imposed either on the lines of a continuation of the mandate with modified immigration or the basis of partition with a modified Jewish state. It was surprising to hear one official (who inclines to a dictatorial form of Government) express the opinion that a continuation of the killing of villagers by the bandits and the bandits by the Government was not undesirable as it would lead the villagers to a state of mind wherein a modified form of Partition would prove acceptable. It is repeatedly reported that money has been sent to Syria for the Palestine cause from Iraq and Saudi Arabia and the rumours of the transit of arms across the corridor from Saudi Arabia to Syria are so persistent that permission to call up a further 30 men of the Arab Legion Reserve to better police that area is being sought.8

Meanwhile, the security situation in Trans-Jordan was affected by the campaign launched by the British Army against the Palestinian revolutionaries in the Jordan Valley. On the night of 27/28 May 1938, a Palestinian guerrilla band of about 23 men crossed the River Jordan from Palestine and attacked the Arab Legion police post of Kraimah in the east bank of the Jordan Valley. The police post was manned by only four men of the Arab Legion, one of whom was killed while attempting to take cover in the fortified roof of the police post. The remaining three defended their post until the guerrillas withdrew, taking with them the deceased policeman’s rifle and his 80 rounds of ammunition. They killed two horses and turned loose the other two. A sabre half-squadron from the TJFF was rushed to the area and deterred further strikes in that part [260]


of the Jordan Valley. With this new development, permission was given by the High Commissioner for Trans-Jordan to increase the strength of the Arab Legion by a call-up of 45 men from the Iraqi Petroleum Company Reserve, and the enlistment of 50 additional men.9 On 7 June 1938, the Jewish newspaper, the Jerusalem Post, published the alleged outlines of the Amir Abdullah’s proposals for a solution to the Palestine problem. It is only fair to quote the whole article: To the surprise of many of those who considered themselves familiar with Arab feeling, the Emir Abdullah has declared that he is opposed to the partition of this country, even though, as the scheme now stands, it would have meant a considerable augmenting of his territory. Instead, His Highness has put forward a proposal of his own which it would be churlish to dismiss out of hand. Whether, as some think, his reluctance to come out in favour of partition is due to the pressure upon him of extremist Arab opinion, or to his own deduction that it is not a workable or desirable scheme, is immaterial. The Emir has now adumbrated a scheme that does not dismember the country, and it is apparently an arrangement which he is quite evidently prepared to champion among his own people. The main points of the proposal are that the 1922 partition of Palestine is to be annulled and the country on both sides of the Jordan become again one united kingdom. It should be ruled by an Arab Monarch sufficiently experienced and responsible to be able to carry out his undertakings and obligations. The Mandate would remain, but it would have more of a moral than an administrative character, and the British garrison would be entitled to be in the country for a period of ten years, the last two of which would be devoted to the working out of a permanent independent status of the united state. AUTONOMOUS JEWISH AREAS As for the Jews, they would be granted autonomy in their own areas, which would be delimited by a Commission of British, Jewish and Arab members. Within those areas immigration could proceed to a reasonable extent, but the penetration of Jews into other parts would be conditional solely upon the wish of the Arabs. It is suggested in the proposal that, should the Arabs become convinced of the peaceful and friendly intentions of the Jews, and their ability to ‘harmonize’, immigration would be permitted into other parts of the country also. Jews would be given representation in proportion to their numbers in the Legislative Assembly to be set up, including places in the Cabinet. [261]


It is of interest to note the reception of His Highness’s scheme in the Arab press. Even the ‘Falastin’, which is closest to the Emir, assailed it. The other journals were more extreme in their denunciation. Some writers have been at pains to point out that it meant eventual partition, when the Jews have filled up the areas allotted to them. Others pointed to the ‘danger’ when, after ten years, the Jews will have grown in numbers to equal the Arab population and then demand further rights. Some critics appeared to think that the Jews had never asked for more than the autonomy which the ruler of Trans-Jordan offers them. But what chiefly rankled among the extremists was the fact that under the scheme the hated Mandate would continue with its vital clauses governing the development of the Jewish National Home. EMIR’S REPLY TO CRITICS The Emir has not been deterred by the wholesale protest. In a very adroit manner he has replied to an attack of a Committee in Damascus which masquerades as a protector of Arab Palestine. The dangers inherent in partition, which his plan seeks to avert, is his defence. He emphasises that Jewish immigration would be restricted by the area to which it would be assigned, and the country would be compensated by representative institutions with the prospect of full independence within a limited period. Finally, he asked his critics to submit a better scheme unless they were prepared to allow partition to go through. If the Emir really desired partition, the refusal by the Arabs of his compromise would give him an excuse to accept it. The Partition Commission has not accepted His Highness’s memorandum, for it was held to be outside the Commission’s terms of reference and it is said to have hinted that the scheme might be sent to the British Government. As for Jewish reaction, there has not been wanting an appreciation of the step forward which the Emir has made, in striking contrast to the barren attitude of all other Arab representatives. The retention and recognition of the Mandate on the part of the Arab ruler is important, for the ‘responsible King’ to whom the Emir refers would be expected to carry out its provisions. He offers autonomy in the Jewish areas which he does not arbitrarily define, and which might be juster than those of the Peel Commission, seeing that the united state would be so much larger. JEWISH SETTLEMENT IN UNDIVIDED COUNTRY He also definitely holds out the promise of Jewish settlement in the whole of the undivided country. The rock on which any negotiations with the Jews, which might take place on the Emir’s proposal, [262]


would split, is the implication that Palestine must always be an Arab country with an Arab majority. The Emir must, of course, be aware of the lack of all prospect of getting the Jews to agree in advance to remain a permanent minority. He does not, indeed, expressly demand this, and at all events, if his proposal is a feeler, it must obviously be regarded as a minimum rather than a maximum offer. There have been references in circles not at all unfriendly to Jewish aspirations in Palestine to the Herodian epoch in Palestine’s history which, though not on all fours with the Emir’s situation, might have served as a model for Abdullah’s present scheme. It is far too soon, and the plan as it has appeared in the press, is still too sketchy for any considered Jewish opinion to be formulated. But if out of the kernel which has been revealed, there should grow a sound Jewish–Arab understanding, not the least significant conclusion of the Royal Commission will have been shown to be without foundation in fact.10

The text of the Amir Abdullah’s proposal to which the Jerusalem Post referred was as follows: I.

The formation of a United Arab State (from Palestine and Trans-Jordan) under an Arab Sovereign who is capable of carrying out his duties and executing his obligations. II. This State (The United Arab State) will grant the Jews the right of self-government (autonomy) in the Jewish areas which will be appointed and indicated on a map drawn up by a committee composed of British, Arabs and Jews. III. The Jews will enjoy full rights similar to those enjoyed by any other local self-governing administration. IV. The Jews will be represented in the United Arab State Parliament in proportion to their numbers (population) and the cabinet of the United Arab State will include a Jewish Minister. V. Jewish immigration will be limited in reasonable proportion to those areas which will granted the right of local selfgovernment. VI. The Jews shall not be entitled to purchase land, or to introduce any immigrants outside the appointed Jewish areas. VII. The scheme shall be applicable for a period of 10 years of which eight years shall be probationary and the remaining two years shall be occupied in considering the final resolution governing the future of the two peoples. Then the country will declare its independence and the termination of the Mandate (See Para XII). [263]


VIII. Should the Arabs experience good faith and willingness on the part of the Jews to combine with them and should they see no harm in the immigration of a suitable number to the lands of the United Arab State (outside the Jewish areas) the decision on such a question will be left to the discretion of the Arabs. IX. During the aforementioned period (of 19 years) the mandate should remain in force but purely in ADVISORY CAPACITY which would not exceed watching and advising on the development of the Government of the United Arab State. X. There is no objection to the British Forces remaining in the United Arab State during the said ten years. XI. At the expiration of the 8th year and the commencement of the 9th year the Government of the United Arab State and its Parliament shall declare their final decision and execute their choice. XII. Negotiations with Great Britain relative to its interests should commence forthwith and be drawn up in the form of a Treaty. This Treaty should be concluded and ratified at the end of the 10 (ten) years’ period which date also will coincide with the Declaration of the Country’s independence. But schemes of general reforms in Finance, Irrigation, Army, Means of Communications and other Government departmental projects shall proceed at an even pace and under one direction.11

On 12 June 1938, a few shots were fired at the police post in Tell Abu al-Qamil near the Iraqi Petroleum Company’s relief station on the banks of the Jordan. On the night of 27 June a shop was looted near the Damiyah bridge on the River Jordan. Large guerrilla groups were seen in the Valley and two rifles were taken from the shaikh of the Mashalihah tribe. Soon after these attacks all the police posts in the Jordan Valley were reinforced and protected by barbed wire and sand bags. The area was further protected by a mobile reserve from the TJFF stationed at the Majami bridge. The whole situation in the Ghor presented a just cause for the Amir to demand a further increase in the strength of the Arab Legion.12 On 27 September 1938, the Amir wrote to the Prime Minister Ibrahim Hashim suggesting that he should rest: With my many thanks for your loyalty, and my full appreciation for your services, and my belief in friendship, and my heartfelt desire that you should not be separated from the position of capability, I [264]


see, to gain the benefits of your great talents and your administrative efficiency in future days, God willing, that it is my duty to advise you of the need for rest and recreation. Present circumstances have compelled this suggestion, but I will benefit, God willing, from your opinions in every necessary consultation with you in important matters as it was my custom in the past and I will take care of your son Hani’s continued education.13

The Amir accepted the resignation of Ibrahim Hashim on the same day, and on the following day, 28 September, he issued an Iradah for the formation of the new Government as follows: • • • • • •

Tawfiq Abu al-Huda, Prime Minister and Minister of Justice Shaikh Ahmad Alawi al-Saqqaf, Chief Judge Abdullah Nimir al-Humud, Treasurer Khalaf al-Tal, Administrative Inspector Niquala Ghanmah, Attorney General Hashim Khair, Antiquities

Abu al-Huda chose his team of ministers from the Civil Service. His Government’s programme was mainly concerned with loyalty and obedience to His Highness the Amir; endeavouring to achieve a role for the country among the Arab states with dignity and pride; upholding the principles of the Arab struggle as declared by the great leader al-Hussein ibn Ali until the achievement of the Arab aim of national unity; the maintenance of law and order and security; improvement of the economy; lowering the burden of taxation in difficult times; improvement of education and other important institutions; and maintaining discipline and order in government departments.14 Five years of Ibrahim Hashim’s Government, in spite of its achievements, had caused some sort of boredom in the internal life of Trans-Jordan. People were eager for a change and welcomed the new Government. The general improvement in the political situation which prevailed at the end of September continued to the end of October. Externally, it appeared as if there was no intention in Palestine, Syria, or Iraq to make things unpleasant for Tawfiq Abu al-Huda, or to make an attempt to stir up trouble in Trans-Jordan. The Amir maintained some contacts from time to time with the leaders of the Revolt in Palestine and Syria, but had little influence over their actions in Palestine or [265]


Trans-Jordan. One of the Palestinian leaders in the south of the country had expressed to the Amir his readiness to cease active operations if he could be assured that he would be left in peace by the Palestine Government. Henry Cox reported: His Highness said that he had called on the leader, in evidence of his good faith, to cease interfering with communications between Jerusalem and Jericho. Interference, none the less, seems to have continued without abatement, and it is probable that the Amir’s call to the rebels, which he tells me he has made, to cease their activities during Ramadan will prove equally ineffective. His Highness has been asked on more than one occasion to give no promises to Rebel leaders and to give them no encouragement to take refuge in Trans-Jordan, and the Chief Minister who played with the idea of meeting some of the leaders has been strongly advised to avoid compromising himself by doing so. Early in the month two Rebel leaders: Khamis al Aqrabawi and Turki appeared in Trans-Jordan accompanied by two or three of their followers. The former visited the Adwan near Amman, the Bisharat farm between Amman and Madaba, Shaikh Mithqal Pasha Fayiz’s headquarters at Um el Amad (the Sheikh himself was away) and returned via Mahis village to Palestine. Sheikh Majid El Adwan told me that Khamis had hinted that he could lay land mines to blow up the R.A.F. armoured cars which are looking after the Allenby Bridge, but that he had warned Khamis that he must do nothing of the sort and had had Khamis told that he should get back to Palestine without delay. Turki appeared to only have visited the village of Faheis.15

During December 1938, it was reported to the Amir that the Royal Palace Broadcasting Station in Baghdad had transmitted some news and commentaries hostile to him and the Government of Trans-Jordan regarding their policy towards Palestine. The Amir was exceedingly angry not only with King Ghazi and his government but also with the British Government which prevented the broadcast of a denial by himself against the hostile propaganda directed against him. The Amir protested to the British Resident, who was able to persuade him that his best course was to make representations to King Ghazi through the British Ambassador in Baghdad. The representations were followed by the arrival by air from Baghdad of Sharif Hussein ibn Nasser as a messenger of peace between the two parts of the Hashemite family. This [266]


was immediately followed by a telephone call from King Ghazi to his uncle the Amir and the whole matter was settled by the conversation between them. Tawfiq Abu al-Huda did not let the quarrel die in peace; he sent a strong telegram to the Prime Minister of Iraq protesting against these attacks by the Iraqi Palace radio, and received a cordial reply expressing regret and disclaiming responsibility for the attacks, since the Palace station was not under his control. The Amir was able to publish the exchange of telegrams in Syrian and Lebanese newspapers before the British Resident had a chance to prevent it. The publication of the telegrams led to the fall of the Iraqi Government and the formation of the new government of Nuri al-Said. As soon as the new government assumed office, the Amir maintained good contacts with his nephew King Ghazi and real peace prevailed within the Hashemite family as well as between Iraq and Trans-Jordan. Although the external situation of Trans-Jordan had improved, the internal situation remained fragile during December 1938. Henry Cox reported: A meeting was held in the Amir’s office on the 3rd. at the request of the Chief Minister to decide on the policy in regard to demonstrations. An attempt was at first made to draw up a set of rules to meet various situations and to apportion responsibility, but in the end it was decided that demonstrations are anathema and that the responsibility for knowing of any intentions to hold them and for arranging their prevention rests with the Chief Minister. The Treasurer (Abdullah al Humoud) and the Administrative Inspector (Khalaf al Tal) are both sons of the country, and whose heads have become swollen with their recent promotion and elevation to the Executive Council, have both blotted their copy-books with the Amir and with the Chief Minister. These men, and particularly the Administrative Inspector, have been encouraging the demand for the ejection of all non-Trans-Jordanians from government posts. The Chief Minister has been annoyed by numerous applicants for posts which don’t at present exist; two junior officials have tendered their resignations, one of which was promptly accepted whilst the other, being couched in disrespectful terms, the writer was tried by a Council of discipline and discharged, and by five discharged officials pretending to be beggars outside the Legislative Council building. The Administrative Inspector was also guilty of a very indiscreet statement to representatives of the Press in Damascus [267]


about the Chief Minister’s intentions when visiting Syria on his way to the London Conference on Palestine. These two officials have also opposed in the Executive Council proposals made by the Director of Education for taking a firmer line with politically minded school boys. These events together with the apprehensions of his friends at the line he was taking have convinced the Chief Minister that the time has come for him to take a firmer hold and this he has begun. The Director of Education has been authorised by the Executive Council to rusticate or expel boys who absent themselves from school for political reasons and regulations for improving the management of staff and pupils in the schools, to which there was strong opposition, have now been approved by the Executive Council.16

Meanwhile, the presence of the seconded civil servants from the Palestine Government in the most important departments of TransJordan continued. Although opposed by the majority of members of the Legislative Council, their presence was supported by Henry Cox. The British and Palestinian official oligarchy appointed by the Trans-Jordan Government or seconded from the Palestine Government are listed in Table 10.2, together with their annual salaries, paid from the revenue of both Trans-Jordan and of the Palestine Government. TABLE 10.2

British and Palestinian officials in Jordanian Government, 1938 Name

Mr S. White Peake Pasha J. B. Glubb Mr Mitchell Mr Davies Mr Howes H. A. Rahmah A. R. Gharib Baz Qawar S. Astraghlis Ilyas Aazar

Post

Salary

Financial Adviser CO Arab Legion CO Badiyah Land Department Land Survey Audit Board Health Department Public Works Post & Telegraph A/Treasury Stores

[268]

Jordan

Palestine

1,100 1,172 1,100 1,100 570 696 750 713 552 396 324

– 1,010 750 900 446 446 650 600 276 276 16817


The budget for the year 1938/39 was approved by the Legislative Council, as can be seen in Appendix A. On 13 January 1939, Prime Minister Tawfiq Abu al-Huda arrived in London, to take part in the Palestine Conference. He had rounds of talks with the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Malcolm MacDonald, on 16, 19 and 25 January. Instead of pressing for the independence of the country of which he was Prime Minister, Tawfiq Abu al-Huda promised that Trans-Jordan would not seek full independence while it was unable to support itself financially. He suggested that the country ought to be united with Syria and Palestine to enable it to be selfsufficient and viable. Meanwhile he reported to the Amir Abdullah on 17 February: It is now certain that there is no space whatsoever for those with aims in Palestine – even in Trans-Jordan – to do anything. Last week, I discussed with the Colonial Secretary what Your Highness had told the High Commissioner on the question of the impossibility of appending our country to Iraq and Egypt. I heard from him that the High Commissioner did not tell him of that until now, but he expects to learn of it by post soon. He, in any event, considers that he heard about the situation from me, and assured me that nothing of what we fear may occur. Yesterday, I had a meeting with the said Minister according to his invitation, and after the general meeting of the conference we met alone. He intimated secretly to me and said that he informs me because he relies on me and to put me in the picture about the British Government’s attitude towards the question of Palestine. I can summarise the talk as follows: 1. The Government will not accept the establishment of an Arab Government in Palestine, but will accept the establishment of a Palestinian Government without Arab control over the Jews, or Jewish control over the Arabs, and that it will declare officially that there is no intention at all to establish a Jewish State there. That is to say that the Balfour Declaration does not mean the establishment of a Jewish State in all Palestine or in part of it. 2. The Mandate will remain for a long time with this independent Government or before its establishment, because the nations, particularly America, do not consent to leave the Jews subject to danger, the evidence of which was the events of last two years. 3. Immigration cannot be stopped completely, but can be limited. 4. There can be methods to limit the sale of land. [269]


5. If the Palestinian Government is established, it is desired that representation should not be in the Executive, as far as numbers are concerned, but there must be methods to establish a balance between the Executive and the Legislative, so that the minority does not control the majority. I have explained to the Minister that Trans-Jordan, although it has shown moderation, and although we realise that it is difficult to meet all the demands that you see as extreme, led by His Highness the Exalted Amir we insist on maintaining Palestine as Arab, that is to say the majority must be always Arab, so that a permanent percentage can be decided for the Jews which cannot be exceeded, and that other factors emanating from this principle can be dealt with by future negotiations with the Palestinians and representatives of the other Arab countries. Your Highness has been the most informed of what is hidden in the future, and here are the English wanting to maintain the Mandate over and control of Palestine by placing the two nations there in a situation compelling each of them to refer to them and obtain the balance from them, not from constitutional arrangements. They are still very far from thinking of giving Palestine anything new as expected. In spite of this the Minister’s talk may be intended to demoralise. But I suggest that it is wise not to enter or negotiate, to start with, the issue of unity between Trans-Jordan and Palestine, except if Palestine appear to have some form of independence which is not less than our situation. I am waiting for your orders my Master by cable regarding this my opinion. If I can obtain that matter before this entreaty reaches you for immediate needs, I will send a cable to Your Highness and explain, but I do not think that will be, because reaching that point of discussion needs many days, as I can see from the progress of negotiations and arrangements. The appointment of Mr Kirkbride as British Resident in Amman was announced officially yesterday; I knew this from the Ministry a short while ago. If I knew that before then I would have not attacked Cox during my talks and meetings with the Colonial Secretary, so that it will not be said that I attacked a person who was leaving. I was your servant under the impression that his service was going to be extended for two more years, and I heard this from the Bishop of Jerusalem who is here. I hope the new Resident will proceed according to Your Highness’s guidance and acceptance. As far as Peake Pasha is concerned, I know my Master’s opinion as to whom shall succeed him, but I inform you that Northfield visited me twice and showed his wish to return to Amman in the service of my Master, not as Commander of the Arab Legion, but he accepts to be Assistant as before if it is decided that Major Glubb [270]


is to be appointed Commander, and he thinks that is preferable and acceptable to him, because Glubb is senior to him, and he can work well with him. The opinion of your servant is that we should seek another Englishman to take Peake’s place, but if that is not possible, we take Northfield, and he is better than another, and he will be assistant to Glubb. In any case Your Highness is the point of reference, and what our Master finds wise and correct. I just wanted to express what I thought. I conclude my entreaty with kissing the hands and pray God to prolong the life of my Master.

The concessions made by the British Government as a result of the talks included the right of appointment of consular representatives to neighbouring Arab countries; the right of the Amir to raise and maintain a military force; the thinning out of certain financial and administrative controls; the replacement of seconded civil servants by Trans-Jordanians; and the increase of the Civil List to £P18,000 a year.18 On 17 March 1939, the Palestine Conference ended in a complete deadlock. On 19 March, the British Government’s concessions to Trans-Jordan were announced in London. On 20 March the British Government issued the Palestine White Paper. Towards the end of the Palestinian Revolt, the remaining Palestinian leaders and those evicted from their land took refuge in Syria. The French Mandatory ignored their activities in Damascus as well as along the border with Trans-Jordan. Thus the leaders of the Revolt were able to plan and attempt to raise a Trans-Jordanian rebellion, in the hope that British troops would be sent from Palestine to Trans-Jordan leaving the way clear for the rebellion in Palestine to be revived, and so that the line of communication between Syria and Palestine across the Jordan could be maintained. Because of the new developments of the rebellion in Palestine, and because of the great need for the increase in the strength of the Arab Legion, which was continually demanded by the Amir, towards the end of 1938 and early in 1939, the strength of the Arab Legion was increased by two squadrons of horsed cavalry (200 officers and men) and by 350 Bedouin officers and men from the newly established infantry, mounted in open trucks with machine guns, under the title of the Desert Mechanised Force. Thus the total strength of the Arab Legion, including the Police Force, was 1,953 officers and men.19 [271]


By the beginning of 1939, and after nearly two decades of separate existence with an independent entity under mandate, the Amir Abdullah approved the new National Anthem with a poem written by the young poet Abd al-Munim al-Rifai, and music written by Abd al-Qadir al-Tannir, an inspector in the Department of Education. The Amir was so pleased with the anthem that he awarded the writers the Istiqlal medal.20 The Jordanian identity was being enhanced psychologically in the hearts and minds of the young generation of pupils, through the custom of singing the National Anthem together before lessons at the start of every school day. I myself remember that at the age of eleven we started singing the National Anthem every morning at school. Long live the Amir Long Live the Amir His status high His flags flying in the summit.

On 15 February 1939, the British Colonial Office announced that A. S. Kirkbride, who was then a District Commissioner in Palestine, had been selected for the appointment of British Resident in Trans-Jordan. He succeeded Colonel Sir Henry Cox, who had been British Resident for 16 years between 1924 and 1939. Kirkbride took his post in March and Cox retired from government service on 20 June 1939. The Amir was delighted with the change; for he thought Henry Cox had ‘an administrative personality, and did not like to work with people he was not comfortable with, and he stayed for a long period. If it was not for patience and wisdom, which God endowed us with, mixing with him would have been impossible.’ He felt differently towards Kirkbride, ‘one of the Arabs’ old friends, who saw the last war in the Arab Northern Army with brother King Faisal. He is one of our dearest friends personally.’ Early in March 1939, a large force of guerrilla groups from Syria infiltrated the Syrian–Jordanian border and were deployed well concealed in the forest area of the mountains of Ajlun, and gorge of the adjacent River Yarmouk, where, for the next four months, the centre of rebel activities was based. The success of the guerrilla groups depended mainly on what support they could find from the local civilian population. Unlike the situation in Palestine where the British Army was the enemy [272]


of the Palestinian revolutionaries, those who were defending the security and peace in Trans-Jordan were the Arab Legion cavalry and the Arab Legion Desert Mechanised Force, which were mainly recruited from Arab and Trans-Jordanian tribes. Although the TJFF took part in the main operations against the guerrilla groups, some of their officers and men were Palestinians and Trans-Jordanians. Furthermore, although the people of Ajlun and the surrounding areas sympathised with the Palestinians, they had no quarrel with their own Government, the Arab Legion, or the Amir. It was a very bad strategy and a miscalculated move by the Palestinian leadership, because they placed their guerrillas at a great disadvantage. For while in Palestine the population supported the rebellion against a foreign government and its soldiers, in Ajlun the people supported their own Government and their own sons and soldiers. A few skirmishes took place in the mountains of Ajlun and the Yarmouk gorge between the end of February and the first week of March. On 11 March, a large guerrilla group was located 15 miles south of the road between Irbid and Majami bridge. A squadron of the Arab Legion cavalry, a troop of armoured cars from the Desert Mechanised Force, and a sabre squadron of the TJFF, supported by a flight of the RAF from its station in Amman, engaged the guerrilla group. The operation, in which the guerrillas had no chance to win, resulted in their complete defeat. During the action, Lieutenant Macadam, who was seconded from the Palestine Police to the Arab Legion, one sergeant and three men from the Arab Legion Desert Mechanised Force were killed.21 During the rest of March, the complete strength of the Desert Mechanised Force was deployed in the Ajlun district north of the country as well as along the northern border with Syria. The attempt to raise a rebellion in Trans-Jordan failed miserably. On 16 March, a group calling itself ‘The General Headquarters of the Great Arab Revolt in Trans-Jordan’ issued its first statement in Damascus, describing the operation in the Irbid area; it claimed that 25 men from the Arab Legion cavalry ‘were annihilated’, and that 6 men from the Arab Legion Desert Mechanised Force, and Lieutenant Macadam were killed by the rebels.22 On 21 March 1939, Brigadier J. B. Glubb took over command of the Arab Legion from Lt Colone Peake, who left the country on 26 March. Glubb was promoted to the rank of Major General and an Iradah for his appointment as Commander of the Arab Legion was [273]


issued on 25 June 1939.23 (See the discussion of Glubb’s role in Chapter 4.) A few hours before he assumed command, Glubb had an audience with the Amir Abdullah during which the following conversation, as described by Glubb, took place: ‘You are English’, said the Amir, motioning to me to sit down, ‘and this is an Arab country, and an Arab army. Before you take over command, I want you to pledge me your word, that, as long as you remain in this appointment, you will act always as if you had been born a Trans-Jordanian. I know you would not wish to fight your own countrymen. If it should ever come to fighting between us and the English, I will hold you excused. You may leave us then and stand aside. But if, by God’s will, this does not happen, I want you to be one of the people of Trans-Jordan.’ ‘Sir’, I answered, ‘I give you my word of honour. From now onwards I am a Trans-Jordanian, except under the conditions you mentioned, and which I pray God may never come.’24

In spite of their defeat the guerrilla groups continued to strike here and there in the mountains of Ajlun and the Yarmouk gorge. Towards the end of March two sabre and mechanised squadrons from the TJFF were sent to reinforce the Arab Legion in the Ajlun district. Reports were received by the Arab Legion that a guerrilla group headed by Yusuf Abu Durrah, one of the four main commanders of the Palestinian Revolt, had established a base in the Ajlun forest and intended to foment trouble in the area. On 12 April other reports were received that Arif Abd al-Razzaq had entered Trans-Jordan. All available troops were deployed to capture him, but he eluded them and gave himself up to the French authorities at Fiq in Syria on 13 April. On 24 July Yusuf Abu Durrah was captured in the Jordan Valley near Shunah bridge by an Arab Legion patrol.25 On 1 May, Glubb enlisted Major Norman Oliver Lash in the Arab Legion and appointed him Commander of the Desert Mechanised Force, as well as his assistant in the Badiyah district.26 During August Brigadier R. J. C. Broadhurst was seconded from the Palestine Police to the Arab Legion, and was appointed Assistant Commander. The Arab Legion Officers List for 1939 can be seen in Appendix G.27 On 3 April 1939, His Majesty King Ghazi ibn Faisal of Iraq died in a car accident. Sadness overwhelmed the people of Trans-Jordan as [274]


soon as the news reached the country. But sadness became anger when a rumour was spread that King Ghazi an Arab nationalist with a vision for Arab full independence and unity, had been killed by a British conspiracy. Student demonstrations took place in Amman, Irbid and Salt, while anti-British feelings soared high. King Faisal ibn Ghazi, then a child of only three years, was proclaimed King of Iraq on 4 April, and his uncle Prince Abd al-Ilah ibn Ali was appointed Prince Regent. Was it merely a coincidence that Kirkbride, the British Resident in Amman, wrote to the High Commissioner for Trans-Jordan on the same day, as can be seen from the following top-secret letter from the High Commissioner to Sir Cosmo Parkinson on 6 April? The following was sent to me on 3rd April by Kirkbride from Amman. The facts were told to him in strict confidence by the Amir, but I think you and the Foreign Office should know of them even though subsequent developments have brought about a big change in the background. It is of course very important that the Amir should not learn that the story has been communicated to anyone. Kirkbride writes as follows:‘. . . Talal paid a flying visit to Baghdad and brought back letters to his father from Ghazi and Nuri. These letters which I have seen, propose that the King and Nuri Said should come to Amman in the near future in order to elaborate details of a scheme for establishing a Hashemite Kingdom in Syria and so uniting Iraq, Syria, Trans-Jordan and ultimately Palestine also under the same Royal House. Nuri al Said hinted that Ghazi as the King of an independent kingdom was the most obvious candidate for the head of this federation although the present status of Trans-Jordan would not be changed. Ghazi in his letter suggested that he would of course yield the right of first place to his uncle if the latter desired it. The Amir’s first reaction was that he was not to be duped by a boy (Ghazi) and crook (Nuri) but that he would like them to come to Amman in order that he might have an opportunity of using the scheme for his own ends. I pointed out that if the visit took place HH would be committed in the eyes of the world, HMG and the French to any wild scheme the other two might ultimately adopt: that the Palace broadcasts from Baghdad hailing Ghazi as the future Emperor of the Arabs and abusing everything French and British showed which way their thoughts tended and he might compromise himself [275]


seriously with the Mandatory Powers of Trans-Jordan and Syria with no prospect of gain to himself. The upshot of the matter was that two letters were despatched by His Highness today expressing his appreciation of their interest in the Arab nation; thanking Nuri for being good enough to leave Trans-Jordan in its present state and suggesting that they might meet on the common frontier of both states to talk matters over some time soon. HH said that he would always receive Ghazi at Amman as a nephew but that he was not prepared to agree to any political discussions of the nature suggested in Trans-Jordan. I think that HH realises that he is to be used as a pawn and I hope that I have removed the danger of his doing anything rash.’28

In Syria Jamil Mardam’s Government became most unpopular, and was accused of nepotism, corruption and extreme appeasement with the French Mandatory. The decentralisation of the Syrian administration, the division of the people into ethnic and religious communities, the encouragement of tribalism and the oppressive security measures against the press and the political elite, created much uncertainty and instability. The Amir Abdullah, who never let Syria out of his sight and his political vision, maintained close relations with a group of Arab nationalists of the Revolt period, the Bakri family and the popular leader Abd al-Rahman al-Shahbander, who took refuge with the Khurshan in Muaqar during the 1925–7 Syrian Revolt against the French Mandate. Shahbander, who opposed Mardam and the Syrian National Bloc, believed that the Amir Abdullah embodied his vision of Arab and Islamic traditions. He thought that with Abdullah’s relations with Iraq he might have strong allies against the French and the National Bloc. He bitterly criticised them for the separation of Alexandretta and for ceding it to Turkey. Al-Shahbander held a meeting in his Damascus house on 13 May 1939, which was attended by a prominent group of Arab nationalists and leaders of public opinion. They decided to organise a nationalist movement to achieve internal reforms and foreign relations, including the achievement of Arab union.29 On 10 June 1939, al-Shahbander and his group visited Amman and had an audience with the Amir Abdullah. During the public meeting which followed later that day at the Philadelphia Hotel, al-Shahbander proposed unity between Syria and Trans-Jordan: ‘We have come here to offer the throne of Syria, and the crown of Bani Murwan to the person of Your Highness, and to [276]


declare the acclamation of Syria to Your person as the protector of the Arab cause, and the Heir to the National Renaissance.’30 The Amir Abdullah was delighted and expressed his agreement by thanking the Syrian delegation for their visit and their offer of Arab unity. On 2 July 1939, the new French High Commissioner in Syria, Gabriel Puaux, made the districts of Lathiqiyah, Jabal al-Druze, and Jazirah independent from the Government of Syria, and on 10 July he suspended the Syrian constitution and dissolved the Syrian Chamber of Deputies. That colonialist action caused extreme anger in the Arab Middle East, particularly in Trans-Jordan where anti-French demonstrations took place in all the towns including the capital Amman. The Amir Abdullah had more reasons to call for the unity of the fertile crescent of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Trans-Jordan and Iraq. By the end of July General A. P. Wavell was appointed Commanderin-Chief of the British forces in the Middle East. Lt General R. H. Haining relinquished his command in Palestine and was replaced by General Barker. On 5 August 1939 the Government published Law no. 19 of 1939, the Amendment of the Organic Law of Trans-Jordan. The law provided for the repeal of Paragraph 1 of Article 19 of the original law and replaced it with the following: ‘The Amir is the Head of State and the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces; he approves all the Laws; enact them and execute them; he may not amend the laws or delay or allow their effect except in the circumstance and manner prescribed by the law.’ It also repealed Articles 20, 21, and 24 and replaced them as follows: Article 20 (1) A Council of Ministers is formed by a Prime Minister as Chairman, and by Ministers, the number of whom does not exceed five. (2) The Amir appoints the Prime Minister. He may appoint him to a Department or more. The Ministers are appointed by the Amir on recommendation by the Prime Minister and he may appoint each of them to a Department or more in accordance with the Iradah of formation of the Government. (3) The powers of the Prime Minister and Ministers and the Cabinet are authorised in accordance with regulations promulgated by [277]


the Cabinet and approved by the Amir. The Cabinet is charged with the administration of all the internal and foreign affairs of Trans-Jordan, except those which were charged from these affairs by this Law or by any other law or regulation based on it to any other person or institution. (4) The Minister is responsible for the administration of all that is connected with his department or departments of the affairs within his jurisdiction. He must inform the Prime Minister of any matter which is not included in his jurisdiction. The Prime Minister deals with what is within his jurisdiction and must refer other matters to the Cabinet. (5) The Members of the Cabinet shall sign the Cabinet decisions, and those decisions which in accordance with this law or any other law or regulations must be referred to the Amir for his approval. Such decisions are executed by the Prime Minister. Article 21 (1) The Prime Minister with the Ministers are responsible to the Amir in a collective responsibility regarding the general policy of the State, moreover every Minister is responsible to the Amir regarding his Department or Departments. (2) The Amir dismisses or accepts the resignation of the Prime Minister. (3) The Amir dismisses the Ministers or accepts their resignation in accordance with a recommendation by the Prime Minister. (4) If the Prime Minister is dismissed or his resignation is accepted, then all the Ministers are considered naturally dismissed or resigned. Article 24 The Amir exercises his powers by Iradah. The Iradahs are issued in accordance with recommendations by the Minister or Ministers responsible with approval by the Prime Minister and signed by them. The Amir expresses his approval by placing his signature above theirs.

It was also included in that law that the terms Majlis al-Wuzara (Cabinet) and Wazir (Minister) were to replace Majlis al-Tanfithi (Cabinet) and Adhu al-Majlis al-Tanfithi (Member of the Cabinet) in the Organic Law or any other law.31 On the following day, 6 August, Tawfiq Abu al-Huda’s second Cabinet was sworn in as the new Government, constituted as follows: [278]


• • • • • •

Tawfiq Abu al-Huda, Prime Minister and Minister of Justice and Foreign Affairs Ahmad Alawi al-Saqqaf, Chief Judge and Education Minister Rashid al-Madfaai, Internal Affairs and Defence Minister Abdullah Nimir al-Humud, Finance and Economic Affairs Minister Niquala Ghanmah, Trade and Agriculture Minister Ali al-Kayid, Communications Minister

The Government’s programme included the upholding of the Palestinian Revolt, and cooperation with those loyal to it until the Arab nation achieved its hopes and unity and maintaining brotherly relations and cooperation with other parts of the Arab world for the benefit of all.32 The reorganisation of the ministries and departments was as follows: 1.

2.

3.

4. 5. 6.

7.

8.

The Prime Minister’s Office • Department of the Chief Audits • Department of the Civil Service The Ministry of Internal Affairs • Department of Health33 • Department of Passports 34 • Department of Municipal Affairs and the Capital, Amman • District Administration The Ministry of Defence • The Arab Legion • The Police • Department of Traffic and Licensing • The Badiyah (Desert) District The Ministry for Foreign Affairs The Ministry of Education • Department of Antiquities 35 The Ministry of Justice • The Courts • Department of Shariah Affairs The Ministry of Finance and Economics • Department of Finance • Department of Land and Surveys 36 The Ministry of Agriculture and Trade • Department of Agriculture, Forests and Mines [279]


9.

• Department of Customs and Trade • The Agricultural Bank The Ministry of Communications • Department of Post and Telegraph • Department of Public Works 37

The last action of the TJFF against the rebels in Trans-Jordan was on 13 August, when a detachment found their headquarters in a location between Mukhaibeh and the River Jordan, and captured Abd al-Qadir, their leader. The Amir Abdullah kept himself informed of events in Europe, and was in close touch with the British Government in anticipation of the Second World War. On 30 August, he approved seven Defence Regulations in preparation for the defence of Trans-Jordan: No. 1 of 1939: Jurisdiction No. 2 of 1939: General Defence No. 3 of 1939: Observation of the Press No. 4 of 1939: Control of Foreign Residence No. 5 of 1939: Precautions against Air Raids No. 6 of 1939: Economic Security No. 7 of 1939: Civil Aviation No. 9 of 1939: Trading with the Enemy No. 10. of 1939: A List of German Firms 38 On 1 September 1939, German armoured divisions invaded Poland, and two days later on 3 September, to the ‘stunned surprise’ of the Nazi leaders Hitler and Mussolini, Britain and France honoured their guarantee to Poland, and declared war on Germany. On the same day, the Amir sent his historic cable to HM King George: His Britannic Majesty King George VI, London In the same spirit with which my father participated with His Majesty King George V in the previous war, thus my people and I also we stand firmly on your side. We take this opportunity to declare our support for your just cause. I present to Your Majesty my loyalty and feelings in this decisive hour.

On 16 September, HM the King replied: [280]


His Royal Highness the Amir Abdullah Ibn al Hussein, Amman I have received with deep appreciation Your Highness’s message in which you expressed your loyalty and support in this difficult time. I am well aware that the traditions of friendship towards the British people, and loyalty to the high principles which the British Empire endeavours to defend, are the traditions of your Highness’s House. I assure your Highness and the Jordanian people that Great Britain will continue to uphold these high principles.

The Amir Abdullah, speaking at Amman on Independence Day said: ‘Our people stand on the side of democracy in the struggle against aggression. Freedom must be respected and protected.’ On 21 September 1939 the Government of Trans-Jordan declared war on Germany, and issued the following command in Council: ‘In accordance with Article 2 of the Defence Regulation No. 4 of 1939, it is declared that the State of Germany is considered an Enemy State.’39 By October 1939, certain departments of the Government were well established and did not need to be run by Palestinian officials seconded from the Palestine Government. Thus the secondment of the following officials was ended and they returned to Palestine: on 1 October, Ispiro Astraghalis, Ilyas Azar, and Baz Qawar; on 1 November, Halim Abu Rahmah; and on 15 November, Abd al-Rahman Gharib. Trans-Jordan started to take the final few steps towards freedom, full independence and sovereignty.

NOTES 1 TJOG no. 586, 1 February 1938. 2 PRO. Colonial no. 166. Report on Palestine and Trans-Jordan, 1939, p. 332. The Trans-Jordan report was usually presented by the British Resident. 3 PRO. CO 831/47/2. Monthly report on administration of Trans-Jordan desert, January 1938. 4 TJOG no. 594, 2 April 1938. See also PRO. Colonial no. 166, 1939. 5 TJOG no. 583, 1 January 1938. Named the religious communities: Roman Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Armenian, Latin, Protestant Anglican. 6 PRO. CO 831/46/6. Monthly situation report for March 1938. 7 PRO. CO 831/46/6. Monthly situation report for March, 3 April 1937. 8 PRO. CO 831/46/6. Monthly situation report for April 1937, 2 May 1937. 9 PRO. CO 831/46/6. (Confidential) monthly situation report for May 1938. [281]


10 PRO. CO 733/381/8. Article from Jerusalem Post, 7 June 1938. 11 PRO. CO 733/381/8. Text of a proposal for the solution of the Palestine problem presented by the Amir Abdullah to the Partition Commission. 12 PRO. FO 831/46/6. (Confidential) monthly situation report for June 1938, 2 July 1938. 13 Ibrahim Hashim, Private Papers. 14 King Abdullah ibn al-Hussein, Al-Athar al-Kamilah (Beirut: Al-Dar al-Muttahidah Lilnashir, 1985), p. 183. Also Madi and Musa, Tarikh al-Urdon, p. 362. 15 PRO. CO 831/46/6. Monthly situation report for October 1938, 2 November 1938. 16 PRO. CO 831/46/6. Monthly situation report for December 1938, 3 December 1938. 17 Documents of Jordan, no. RW/210/13/11304. From Tawfiq Abu al-Huda to the Royal Palace, 21 December 1938. Copy of original in the hand of Tawfiq Abu al-Huda on four pages of Dorchester Hotel headed paper is in the author’s Private Papers. 18 PRO. FO 371/23247. Malcom MacDonald to Tawfiq Abu al-Huda, 6 April 1939; Colonial Office to the High Commissioner, 12 May 1939. 19 A Note on the Future of the Arab Legion (Top Secret) part 1, p. 2. See also Glubb, The Changing Scenes of Life, p. 120. 20 TJOG no. 624, 4 February 1939. 21 Peake, Private Papers. Report on the TJFF for 1939. 22 Zuaitir, Documents of the Palestinian National Movement, 1918–1939, pp. 642–5. According to reports published in Zuaitir’s book, a few more skirmishes took place between March and April 1939, but no casualties were reported. 23 TJOG no. 639, 1 August 1939. 24 J. B. Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs (1957), p. 19. 25 Peake, Private Papers. Report on the TJFF, 1939. 26 Lunt, Glubb Pasha, p. 87. Lash was a graduate of St John’s College, Oxford. He joined the Palestine Police as a constable in 1932 where he learnt Arabic. He joined the Arab Legion in 1934 and left in 1938 to join the RAF. He was again enlisted in the Palestine Police as a Deputy Superintendent and seconded to the Arab Legion in the rank of Wakil Qayid (Major). See also TJOG no. 635, 1 June 1939. 27 TJOG no. 648, 16 September 1939. Also no. 590, 1 March 1938; no. 594, 2 April 1938; no. 602, 2 July 1938; no. 607, 1 September 1938; no. 614, 16 October; and no. 616, 1 November 1938. 28 Rush, Ruling Families of Arabia: Jordan, pp. 341–2. 29 Nasuh Babil, Sihafah wa-siyasah: Suriyah fi ‘al-qarn ‘al-ishrin (Journalism and Politics in Syria in the Twentieth Century) (London: Riad el-Rayyes Books, 1987), p. 118. Those attending were: Zaki al-Khatib, Munir Ajlani, Nasuh Babil, Sami Kubbarah, Ali Buzu, Kamil Hananu, Taysir Zubyan, Amin Said, Hani Jallad, and others. 30 Edited by Alan de L. Rush, ed, Records of the Hashemite Dynasties (1991), Vol. 7, pp. 112–13. Letter from George Wadeworth, the American Consul General, Jerusalem, to the Secretary of State, Washington, 10 July 1939. See also PRO. FO 371/23280. From Kirkbride to the High Commissioner for Trans-Jordan, 10 June 1939. [282]


31 TJOG no. 640, 5 August 1939. 32 Abu al-Shaar, Amin, King Abdullah ibn al-Hussein’s, Memoirs (Amman: The Hashemite Press, 1970), p. 178. 33 TJOG no. 643, 19 August 1939. 34 Ibid. no. 720, 1 October 1939. 35 Ibid. no. 643, 19 August 1939. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid. no. 646, dated 30 August 1939. 39 Ibid. no. 650, dated 21 September 1939.

[283]


11 Institutional Development

The Amir By 1939, the Amir Abdullah ibn al-Hussein had gained five years experience, 1915–20, as Foreign Minister to his father King al-Hussein ibn Ali, and nineteen years as the Amir of Trans-Jordan. His experience as deputy in the Turkish Parliament; of preparing for the Great Arab Revolt; in his negotiations with the British before, during and after the Revolt; and of extracting Trans-Jordan from the Balfour Declaration; and his endurance, perseverance, and wisdom in building a state which was on its way to full independence, was unmatched by any other Arab leader of his time. Considering the obstacles and challenges he had to surmount, and the local difficulties and constraints he had to overcome, he has rightly earned respect and affection for his achievements for the people of Trans-Jordan. Indeed his vision and ambition exceeded the limited resources of Trans-Jordan. The Amir Abdullah was able, in his heart and mind, to find that extremely sensitive point of equilibrium between Arab nationalism and Islam. Thus he was able to maintain a balance between the old traditionalist doctrine of Islamic rule and modern concepts of emerging modern states. For he believed: Rule belonged to Allah alone . . . and the Qumran and the Sunnah [the way of the Prophet] constituted the basis of all conduct, and Allah’s authority alone was sovereign over men. Islam constituted the pillars of both the religious and secular life of the Arab State. The Arabs are a nation formed in the mould of absolute freedom; the freedom of the Bedouin; the liberty to do as one likes without any outside restriction. Islam bound the Arabs with its traditions and way of life and prepared them to serve humanity with a spiritual culture based on a law that confirmed, completed and protected the divinely given laws which had preceded it. [285]


Islam is the summarisation of all the divinely given faiths and it has liberated man from the bonds and shackles with which he was fettered before the coming of Islam. Democracy in all its perfections and values is found in Islam; but is it the fault of Islam if the Muslims have ignored and abandoned it?1

The Amir was open minded, indeed progressive, in his attitude towards modernisation; he pressed for development and progress in all government services and institutions, but insisted on maintaining strict adherence to Islam and Arab traditions. He believed that Islam and Arab traditions directed the Nation (al-Ummah) towards the attitude of moderation in every aspect of private and public life. Moderation and advancing on the middle road between fundamentalism and modernity shaped Abdullah’s style and doctrine in politics and leadership. In his approach of maintaining the loyalty of those who supported his rule, he gave due attention to the shaikhs and notables without neglecting the new intellectual elite, and kept the latter within the bounds of moderation. Early in 1939, the Amir Abdullah was able to see clearly the importance of the Middle East to Western Europe, where an explosive and critical political situation was in the making. He soon realised that Hitler was endeavouring to dominate Europe, and that by his endeavours he was pushing the British and French Empires to the brink of war. By the beginning of 1939 Hitler was poised to attack Czechoslovakia and Poland. Britain, the only power capable of deterring his expansionist aims, was still trying to gain time for her own military preparations by delaying tactics and appeasement. Europe was divided and Italy seemed ready and willing to be on Hitler’s side. The Amir understood well the strategic importance of TransJordan within the region of the Middle East, as well as his own religious importance as a Hashemite Amir to the Muslim part of the British Empire. If Britain and France were to go to war against Germany and Italy, he thought they would need every Muslim soldier they could muster; that at a time when there was turmoil and sporadic rebellions against France in Syria and Lebanon and against Britain in Palestine and Iraq. The Amir realised more than any other Arab leader that the Allies would be victorious in the new war. Thus he intended to maintain his policy of Khuth Wa Talib (take and demand) in which he became an expert, and of loyal friendship and cooperation with Britain. [286]

INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The Judiciary The main reorganisation of the Justice Department was carried out in accordance with the provisions of Part 4 of the Organic Law of TransJordan. For reasons of economy Cox was able to impose the reduction of membership of the Court of Appeal from five to three members and that of the Courts of First Instance from three to two members, though the latter reverted back to three members in 1936. The Organisation of the Courts Law was promulgated in 1929,2 and a gradual process of development was carried out until 1939 when the restructuring was completed as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Magistrate Courts in Amman, Salt, Madaba, Irbid, Ajlun, Jarash, Karak, Taffilah and Maan. Courts of First Instance in Amman, Irbid and Karak. Shariah Courts in Irbid, Jarash, Salt, Taffilah, Ajlun, Aqaba, Amman, Karak and Maan. Tribal Courts in Amman, Irbid, Karak and the Jordanian Desert. Religious Community Council Courts in Amman, Huson and Salt. Court of Appeal in Amman. Shariah Court of Appeal in Amman. Tribal Court of Appeal in Amman. The Diwan Khas for the interpretation of Laws and Regulations in Amman.3

The organisation of the Trans-Jordanian judiciary in all its aspects followed the Ottoman model of a Court of First Instance with the jurisdiction to deal with all criminal matters which exceeded a maximum punishment of one year or a fine of more than £P90, and all civil matters above the value of £P50. Any cases below these punishments or values were dealt with by Magistrates Courts, or Courts of the Justice of the Peace (Mahkamat al-Sulh). Shariah Courts were established in accordance with the provisions of the Ottoman Law of Procedure of the Muslim Religious Courts (of 25 October 1915 or 17/12/1333 Hijriyah). Their exclusive jurisdiction was to deal with matters of personal status, such as marriage, divorce, alimony, maintenance, guardianship of children, wills and legacies etc. The Shariah Courts dealt with all matters of Awqaf (religious endowments) established by or belonging to Muslims and [287]


Waqf (a charitable trust in the form of a pious foundation, intended and established by the founder from and for pious and religious motives). Even during the early weeks and months of the establishment of Trans-Jordan, it was decided to adopt and maintain Ottoman laws existing before 1914, when the country was still part of the Ottoman Empire. Article 58 of the Trans-Jordan Organic Law confirmed that: Except in so far as they may have been amended or repealed by the proclamations, rules and laws mentioned in the succeeding Articles, the Ottoman laws promulgated on or before the 1st of November 1914, and the laws which were promulgated after that date and declared by Public Notice to be in force, remain in force, as far as circumstances permit, until the legislative authority established by this Organic Law shall repeal or alter them.4

However the Ottoman legal system had developed mainly from the Muslim Law which formed the basis of the foundation of the Ottoman Empire. The main sources of Muslim Law are the Qurran al-Karim as applied by the Prophet Mohammad and the Prophet’s Hadith al-Sharif (judicial and religious decisions or precepts). The principles derived from these sources were later developed by the most prominent Muslim jurists into the Ottoman formal legal system. While very little alteration was made in the laws governing the personal status of Muslims and Awqaf, developments in other areas led to amendments or even changes in the Muslim laws which governed them. During the thirties a new elite of lawyers dominated the legal and judicial establishment in Trans-Jordan.5 Justice played the most important role in the maintenance of internal security, law and order in Trans-Jordan. For without justice, especially in a country dominated by tribal power and interests, internal security would have been extremely difficult to maintain. It was also due to the status of pride and honour of being a judge or lawyer that the best brains in the country joined the judicial institutions at a very early stage of their development. Graduates of Turkish, Egyptian, Syrian and British law schools were the early founders and developers of the Jordanian judicial system. The Diwan Khas for the Interpretation of Laws and Regulations, which was established in accordance with the terms of an addendum to the Trans-Jordan Organic Law, was regulated further by the Amendment of 1938. The Diwan, which acted as a grand committee or a high court [288]


of interpretation, met in response to requests from the Prime Minister for the interpretation of points of law not already interpreted by the Courts. Decisions of the Diwan had the force of law as soon as they were published in the Trans-Jordan Official Gazette; but decisions regarding any provision of the Organic Law became valid only after confirmation by the Amir. The Diwan was composed as follows: • • •

The Minister of Justice, President Two Senior Administrative officials Two Ministry of Justice Senior officials

The general supervision and control of the administration of the civil courts was vested in the Ministry of Justice. Attached to the Minister of Justice was a British Judicial Adviser, who was responsible for the drafting of all new laws and regulations (not Shariah laws). He attended the meetings of the Executive and Legislative Councils; but he gave his advice on legal points in the Executive Council only. He was an appointed member of the Diwan Khas.

The Department of Finance Ever since the creation of Trans-Jordan as a separate entity in 1920, its institutional development was constrained by the lack of financial resources; its revenue and the British Grant-in-Aid were not sufficient to meet the costs of its administration and security. Although the British Government agreed to provide a Grant-in-Aid to Trans-Jordan so that the Government could cover expenditure beyond its own resources, economic and institutional development was very slow and restricted. Furthermore, when Colonel Henry Cox became British Resident in Amman on 21 April 1924, he established and continued to maintain strict financial control over the administration of Trans-Jordan. This was more effective during the thirties when the system and regulations of finance were completed. The annual increase in expenditure was steady, because of the need to build the infrastructure, to establish or improve the various services, and to maintain security, law and order. Inflation also caused the costs of government to rise. The increase or decrease of the Grant-in-Aid from the British Government depended largely on the [289]


policy covering the budget deficit considering local revenue. Table 11.1 shows revenue and Grant-in-Aid during the thirties. The large increase in the Grant-in-Aid in 1939 was due to the increase in the strength of the Arab Legion because of the Second World War. Also, an annual gift was given to the Trans-Jordan Government from the Colonial Development Fund on a separate account from 1933 as shown in Table 11.2. TABLE 11.1

Revenue and Grant-in-Aid (£P) Year

Revenue

Grant-in-Aid

Total

1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939

214,663 249,516 222,902 253,749 261,507 276,258 313,847 288,140 358,160 356,220 578,140

102,484 118,000 84,700 72,000 65,000 60,000 42,000 55,000 19,000 90,000 235,901

317,147 367,516 307,602 325,749 326,507 336,258 355,847 343,140 377,160 446,220 814,041

TABLE 11.2

Annual income from Colonial Development Fund Year

Income (£P)

1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938

24,006 9,300 8,172 22,000 14,531 12,981

On 1 August 1938, the first ever economic strike was carried out by car and garage owners in protest against ‘the disproportionate high burden of taxation borne by the industry’. The strike was ended when the Government promised to consider the grievances presented to them [290]


by the strikers. Negotiations between the Government and the leaders of the car traders and garage owners, which continued throughout the year, resulted in the reduction of various fees, estimated at £P2,500 a year.

The Department of Agriculture By the end of the twenties and nearly all through the thirties the Department of Agriculture and Forests remained handicapped by the lack of adequate funds. It was not able to foster real development in agricultural methods during the twenties, which remained quasi-primitive throughout the country. The thirties saw little improvement, but in spite of the fact that the national income was mainly derived from agriculture, the annual increase in the Department’s budget was far less than its real needs. The annual increases enacted in the budget between 1930 and 1938 are given in Table 11.3. TABLE 11.3

Department of Agriculture budget increases/decreases Year 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938

Budget (£P) 6,121 5,479 5,861 7,151 7,411 8,506 9,633 6,800

Increase (£P) – - 642 382 1,290 260 1,095 1,127 - 2,833

The harvest of 1935 was the first which could be described as a good harvest in a cycle of drought years which started in 1928. The years 1930–4 were lean ones which caused much damage to the economy of Trans-Jordan. The years 1932 and 1933 were, according to J. B. Glubb, record drought years, and thousands of sheep, goats and other animals died.6 During 1932 yields fell to a record low as shown in Table 11.4.

[291]


TABLE 11.4

Yields in 1932 Yield

Ton

Wheat Barley Lentils Karsanneh Millet Maize Raisins Sesame

41,723 11,000 2,400 1,950 5,000 295 100 40

After another year of record drought in 1933, the Amir Abdullah appointed a Special Committee to study the economic situation and submit recommendations for recovery and development, with particular reference to agriculture. Chaired by Said al-Mufti, the Committee had the following members: Qasim al-Hindawi, Salih al-Auran, Ali Tabbarah, Baz Qawar, and Nusair Nusair. It submitted its report towards the end of 1933 and recommended three projects for the agricultural sector. The report and the projects were accepted by the British Colonial Development Fund, which granted the Trans-Jordan Government the money needed to cover the cost of the three projects detailed in Table 11.5. TABLE 11.5

Projects funded by Colonial Development Fund Project

Cost (£P)

1. Establish Agricultural Experimental and Demonstration Station at Jubaihah, north of Amman 2. Propagate selected seeds 3. Sink artesian bores in desert Total

6,740 3,060 5,693 15,493

Although the year 1934 was not a drought year for the whole of Trans-Jordan, it was the third drought year in succession for the very poor Bani Hasan tribe. The Amir Abdullah, who was very sensitive to [292]


the well being of the Bedouins, had to intervene on behalf of the Bani Hasan, and on 3 October 1934 he asked Prime Minister Shaikh Abdullah Sraj and the British Resident Colonel Henry Cox to send some relief assistance. It was Tawfiq Abu al-Huda who stalled the application for loans from the Agricultural Bank to Bani Hasan and did not respond to the dire needs of the tribe. Four months later, in his letter of January 1934, the Amir insisted on sending aid to Bani Hasan and bitterly criticised Tawfiq Abu al-Huda and some members of the Istiqlal Party for their misuse of power (see Appendix F). The Amir asked Cox again, in a letter dated 12 February 1934, for British help and support for the tribe. While the Bani Hasan were suffering the catastrophe of the worst famine in the history of Trans-Jordan, Cox endeavoured to defend his trusted protégé Tawfiq Abu al-Huda, the Government and himself with an apology which could be described by the Arabic expression ‘an apology uglier than guilt’. In his secret letter to the Amir of 16 February 1934, he blamed the Qaim Maqam of Jarash for excluding from his report, in which he described the great distress of Bani Hasan, the fact that the Iraq Petroleum Company had given priority of employment to the members of the Bani Hasan tribe and that from March 1933 to January 1934 the sum of £P12,456 was expended on the employment of members of the Bani Hasan who benefited from the salaries and rations given to them.7 Cox considered the £P12,456 to have been a charitable donation to the Bani Hasan, although they were entitled to the salaries and rations for the work they did. He neglected to say that the number of employees was halved after August 1933, when money was most desperately needed in a severe drought and famine year. In order to defend Tawfiq Abu al-Huda, Cox, without any concrete proof, went as far as accusing the shaikhs of Bani Hasan of taking bribes from their own tribe. Cox mentioned that only £P1,000 was allocated by the Trans-Jordan Government to Bani Hasan during 1933 as assistance to the impoverished tribe. However the Amir was able to persuade the British Resident and the Government to provide loans to Bani Hasan in the North, to Bani Sakhr and Bani Hamidah in the Balqa district, and to the Huwaitat of the South who were affected by the drought year of 1934. (For Cox’s letter see Appendix F.) The year 1935 began with good rain in Irbid, Ajlun, and Balqa, but with very little rain in the south of the country, where record drought shrouded the region, causing the death of a great number of animals. In [293]


the Irbid, Ajlun and Balqa areas, rain storms caused huge floods: 200 houses in Amman, Salt and surrounding villages were destroyed; vegetable gardens adjacent to the Zarqa river were swept by floods and two bridges were washed away. However, there were good crops of olives, grapes, figs and other fruits and vegetables which caused imports from Syria to diminish and exports to Palestine to increase. The tobacco crops exceeded the needs of the two tobacco factories. Overall, exports to Syria and Palestine were below average, as Table 11.6 shows. TABLE 11.6

Exports to Syria and Palestine 1935, in tons Item Wheat Barley Corn Lentils Karsanneh Other cereals

To Syria

To Palestine

76 14 81 351 2 22

12,590 7,529 395 53 143 155

In spite of their innate conservatism and loyalty to their customs and traditions, the people of Trans-Jordan gradually improved their very old and rudimentary methods of cultivation. The areas of reclaimed land which were placed under cultivation continued to increase. This was because public security was well established all over the country, and because of the advice and good example given by the Department of Agriculture and Forests, as well as the good results achieved in the use of modern methods in Palestine. During 1935, and in cooperation with the Department of Education, the Department of Agriculture started a project of school gardening to promote modern agriculture and develop its methods. Thirty schools began with two dunums each, which they planted with trees and vegetables. Six schools were provided with poultry houses in which selected types of fowl – turkeys, ducks, geese and chickens – were kept.8 As in the past, even during ancient times, the Palestine markets absorbed the greater part of the surplus agricultural produce of the territories which became Trans-Jordan. Exports during those times were [294]


mainly wheat and other cereals, grapes and figs as well as sheep and goats. A certain amount of cereal was exported to the Arab Peninsula. In 1935 export of grapes to Palestine reached the total of 3,775 tons and exports to Saudi Arabia were well established during 1934 and 1935. In spite of the limited resources allocated to the Department of Agriculture and Forests, it was able to achieve some important improvements which were introduced to and encouraged by farmers. The following improvements were among those implemented by the end of 1935: 1.

2.

3.

4.

Thirty-nine villages had adopted a three-year crop rotation instead of the previously general system of two-year rotation which, in the absence of fertilisers, was exhausting the land. The introduction and propagation of selected seeds had been expanded owing to the recent grant from the Colonial Development Fund of £P1,020 a year for three years. The cultivation of tobacco had developed to such an extent that the crop for 1935 was greater than the needs of the two local tobacco factories. Large numbers of deciduous fruit trees were raised in four government nurseries and distributed after grafting. The number of trees issued during 1935 was 30,420. The Government established a nursery of 100 dunums for the production of grafted carob trees.

The year 1936 was a lean year for two main reasons: first, the inadequacy and adverse distribution of rain caused a bad harvest and second, the general strike in Palestine prevented the export of agricultural products between April and October of that year. Another ill effect of the Palestinian Revolt on the general economic situation in Trans-Jordan was the inability of agricultural workers left unemployed because of the crop failure to find employment in Palestine. Olive and grape yields fell far below average and tobacco was restricted to 4,850 kg by the two tobacco factories. The Department, however, managed to have a good year’s work: the Experimental and Demonstration Station in Jubaihah was established; the seed propagation project began with distribution of 132 tons of selected seeds to farmers; the school gardens were a great success; and 13,100 eggs for hatching and issue to villagers were produced.9 Perhaps the most refreshing development of 1936 was the import, by Shaikh Mithqal al-Fayiz of Bani Sakhr, of the first mechanical tractor [295]


and plough in the history of Trans-Jordan. As soon as the tractor was seen working so well by Mithqal’s friends and neighbours, agricultural mechanisation began in Trans-Jordan. Large numbers of tractors, ploughs and harvesters were imported. The result of that development can be seen from the increase in production and exports between 1936 and 1938 (Table 11.7). TABLE 11.7

Production and exports (000 tons) Item

1936

1937

1938

Produce Export Produce Export Produce Export Wheat Barley Lentils Karsanneh Corn

40 16 3 4 –

12 1.5 0.6 0.65 0.4

113 53 5 7 11

26.5 8 1.2 1.8 2.4

85 45 4.6 7.5 8.9

33 4 1 1.2 0.810

Another important development was made by a local Jordanian company endeavouring to exploit the large deposits of phosphates located in the environs of Amman, near Rusaifa. Although considerable exploratory work had been accomplished, the success or failure of that project depended on the cost of transporting the raw material to the rest of the world. During May 1937, the Department of Development was established under the charge of a British director, and was maintained by a grant from the Colonial Development Fund. Supported by £P15,000 at the outset, a hydrographic survey of the country and a contour survey of the Jordan Valley were carried out by the Department of Land and Surveys from that fund. The project absorbed most of the activities of the Department during 1937 and 1938. The 1938 season was good with ample rain, but the yields of wheat and barley were most disappointing because of the irregularity of rainfall. Olive, grape, fig and other fruit tree yields were good. Approximately 45,000 dunums were cultivated with vegetables and 7,400 with tobacco. The Department continued to distribute selected seeds to farmers for the propagation of good [296]


seed projects; 187,700 kg of wheat, 21,200 kg of barley, 13,700 kg of karsanneh, 14,300 kg of jilibbaneh and 28,800 kg of lentils were distributed in the seed project.11 During the year the Experimental and Demonstration Station at Jubaihah was fully functional, and apart from the nursery the Department maintained three horticultural stations in Rusaifa near Amman, Baqurah in the Jordan Valley and Jarash in the north of the country. Hundreds of thousands of fruit trees and other young trees were distributed to farmers and were planted under the supervision of the Department. Forests were well kept and guarded against intruders, and more trees were planted. The values of the principal items exported during 1938 are shown in the average prices given in Table 11.8. TABLE 11.8

Export prices, 1938 Item

Amount

Price (£P)

Per head

Per head

Sheep Goats Cattle

Vegetables Peas Fruits Raisins Grapes Wheat Barley Corn Wool

28,602 7,769 0.679

1.143 1.554 3.936

Kg

Per kg

2,853,317 1,118,401 1,557,045 354,817 1,213,795 32,619,405 4,015,106 842,252 33,157

0.0039 0.0074 0.0105 0.0131 0.0033 0.0099 0.0050 0.0053 0.0346

Total value in £P

Total Value (£P)

32,692.086 12,065.257 2,672.544

11,127.936 8,276.167 16,348.972 4,648.102 4,005.523 322,932.109 20,075.530 4,463.935 1,147.232 440,455.39312

The following year, agricultural production was nearly doubled, as shown in Table 11.9. [297]


TABLE 11.9

Agricultural production, 1939 Item

Yield

Wheat Barley Tobacco Olives Grapes Other crops

1,684,000 tons 983,000 tons 30 tons 2,200 tons 19,200 tons 33,700 tons

Because of the need for the transfer of all the forests of Trans-Jordan to be the property of the Government, the Forestry Section of the Department of Agriculture was transferred to the Department of Land and Surveys on 1 April 1938. However the Director of the Department of Agriculture remained responsible for the control of private forests, while state forests became under the control of the Director of Land and Surveys. The attitude of Jordanian landowners towards forests was that trees were valueless, and hence the price of wood was mainly determined by the cost of transporting it from the forest to the place of consumption. The main reason for wood cutting was to convert forest land into cultivable land. During the thirties, owing to good management and control over the forest lands of the country, the price of fuel and timber rose and the economic value of trees was gradually stabilised. An appreciable number of landowners sowed pine seeds and acorns in waste patches within their properties, for their own personal use and for sale to the public. By 1938 Government ownership of state forest lands, which had been secured during the land settlement operations, were as follows: TABLE 11.10

State forests, 1938 Size of reserves (dunums)

Number

Area (dunums)

Over 1,000 500–1,000 100–500

12 27 217

26,043 18,375 50,686

Total

727

112,814

[298]


The Department of Land and Surveys The Law of Land Delimitation, Survey and Evaluation of 12 November 1930 updated the provisions of the abrogated law of 1927 and provided for a detailed system of evaluation, including appeals.13 In accordance with that law, between 1930 and 1935 an area of 243,389 dunums was delimited and transferred. In the Jordan Valley around the village of Shunah 108,000 dunums claimed by the Adwan tribe, but registered to the Miri, were returned to the tribe. In the northern part of the Jordan Valley, 46,000 dunums around Ghor al-Arbain were transferred to the Ghazzawiyah tribe. In 1931 the Law for the Distribution of the Bani Hasan Tribal Land was enacted with specific delimitation and allocation of land among 31 subdivisions of the tribe. Meanwhile the Law of Land Expropriation of the same year provided for the owners of expropriated land to be awarded adequate compensation14 and the Law for Registration Fees was enacted in 1932 to encourage landowners and those in possession of land to register their ownership. Registration fees were reduced in order to make them within the capabilities of the farmers. So by the end of 1935 and in accordance with the Land Settlement Law of 1933, the Department was able to register 728,000 dunums in 27 villages.15 An important milestone in the development of the role of the Land and Surveys Department was the appointment of its new Director, J. F. Walpole, on 1 August 1936,16 for he and A. F. Mitchell were the British officials who inaugurated the system of land settlement and registration in Trans-Jordan. Land settlement and registration of ownership provided the strongest incentive to the better use of land, better farming and full security of tenure. In particular, the division among shareholders of Masha’a land, was of great significance in encouraging farmers to cultivate their newly defined and delimited lands. As the implementation of the new law progressed, the level of litigation and court cases declined, local law and order was improved, and a better standard of living was achieved. For those who benefited from land settlement and registration, a sense of permanent stability, the strongest tie with the land and its free ownership, was established. Land became the most precious possession, as a farmer once told me: ‘It does not grow or diminish, and it loves you if you love it.’ The areas partitioned and settled during 1933–8 are shown in Table 11.11. [299]


TABLE 11.11

Partitioned and settled land (dunums), 1933–8 Year

Masha’a

Mafruzah

Total

1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938

17,540 155,070 268,954 269,809 291,225 337,735

18,363 39,139 31,006 48,352 61,237 74,685

35,903 194,209 299,960 318,161 352,462 412,420

Total

1,337,333

272,782

1,610,11517

The Land Settlement Law of 1933, was replaced by the Land Settlement Law of 1937.18 The new law provided for the settlement of all disputes or differences in regard to ‘any estate of land, or title thereto, or interest therein or any rights connected therewith’. Such rights as Mulk (Freehold), Tasarruf (Use) and Manfaah (Benefit), were recorded in the schedule of rights and subsequently transferred to the Land Register. Landowning status was recorded on completion of settlement in each village and kept up-to-date on changes in registration. Table 11.12 shows the distribution of land in villages where settlements were completed between 1934–8. TABLE 11.12

Land distribution in villages, 1934–8 Year of settlement 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938

Number of owners

Average holdings (dunums)

2,769 2,221 3,946 6,190 15,366

69 97 29 40 22919

The land settlement operations which were carried out between 1933 and 1939 brought about other important benefits to the country, including the demarcation of forest lands and their registration in the [300]


name of the Government of Trans-Jordan and the demarcation of public lands and their registration in the name of the Government, ‘on behalf of those who have interest therein’.20

The Department of Post and Telegraph A small band of dedicated men developed the Department of Post and Telegraph during the thirties, from a dependent service to a self-sufficient establishment. There were a total of 64 classified officers at the end of 1938. The unclassified employees comprised 34 linemen, 14 postmen, 3 apprentices and 4 orderlies. In spite of continued investment in new telephone lines and the establishment of new post offices during the twenties, losses continued to occur. During the thirties the Department accounts showed an increase in profits, compared with the losses of the twenties. With a profit of £P10,663 between 1929 and 1938 it became self-sufficient, as can be seen from Table 11.13. TABLE 11.13

Department of Post and Telegraph accounts, 1928–38 Year

Expenditure

Revenue

Profit/loss

1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938

10,707 12,239 12,122 12,887 12,637 14,937 14,573 16,094 16,300 18,150

11,370 15,310 11,027 14,417 12,623 15,739 17,016 15,222 20,405 18,180

+ 0,663 + 3,071 - 1,095 + 1,530 - 0,014 + 0,802 + 2,443 - 0,872 + 4,105 + 0,030

Total

140,646

151,309

+ 10,66321

Airmail letters were introduced in 1932. The number of post offices was increased to 16 in 1935. Animal transport was replaced by motor transport throughout the country except for mail from Karak and [301]


Taffilah to the surrounding villages. With the only bank in the country (the Ottoman Bank) located in Amman, the inland money order service established by the Department in 1934 showed considerable increase in the use of this facility during 1935 by merchants and wage earners. Telephone communications between Amman, Karak, Taffilah and Maan were constructed; thus the total length of telegraphic routes was extended to 998 kilometres of metallic circuit and 181 kilometres of earth-return circuit as well as 92 kilometres of earth-return circuit constructed on the Hijaz Railway route. The last of the mail transported by animals was replaced by motor transport during 1936. Early in that year mail between Amman, Karak, Taffilah and Maan was carried on the new road. Mail items managed by the Department increased to 588,844. During March the telegraph line between Karak and Taffilah (about 70 kilometres) was completed. The line between Amman and Maan was completed by the end of the year.

The Department of Public Works During the thirties, the responsibilities of the Department of Public Works were extended to include engineering works for the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force (TJFF), municipalities, boring for water in the desert, supply of pumped water to towns and large villages and construction of irrigation systems. Projects of public works were allocated on equitable bases between the various districts by the Cabinet whenever possible in order to create a balanced development and an equitable distribution of social and economic benefit. The Department’s budget continued to enjoy third priority after the Arab Legion and education, and its resources were often diverted, particularly in drought years, to relief works (see Table 11.14). By the end of 1934 the following roads were opened for motor transport: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Amman–Qatranah–Maan–Quwairah–Aqaba Amman–Madaba–Zizia Amman–Zarqa–Khirbit al-Samra–Mafraq–Ramtha Amman–Wadi al-Sir–Suwailih Amman–Naur–Hesban–Madaba [302]


6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

Mafraq–Rihab–Jarash Jarash–Ajlun–Kufranjah Ajlun–Aidun–Irbid Irbid–Jisir al-Majami Qatranah–Karak Jurf al-Darawish–Taffilah Taffilah–Showbak–Othruh–Maan Qalat Anaizah–Showbak Maan Bastah–Wadi al-Musa–Petra TABLE 11.14

Department of Public Works’ budget, 1929–39 Year

Budget (£P)

1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939

29,005 21,375 33,395 32,596 32,111 32,069 36,455 29,096 51,253 36,250 30,850

By the end of 1935, a total of 1,438 kilometres of roads throughout the country were used by motor transport; 19 kilometres were first class bituminous macadam roads, 65 kilometres were water-bound macadam roads, and 1,345 kilometres were mainly earth roads passable in dry weather. The main road between Amman and the Allenby bridge leading to Palestine was progressively macadamised and made passable, a task completed by March 1939. More than 53 government buildings of various sizes, seven village schools and two secondary schools were constructed. Extensive repairs and maintenance works were carried out every year for public buildings. The Department cooperated with the concerned municipalities to establish pumped and piped water supplies for Amman, Zarqa, Madaba, Karak, Irbid and Jarash. It also constructed [303]


three submerged weirs at Baqurah and Ghor al-Majami for water distribution to the cultivated land in the Jordan Valley.22 The year 1936 was a bad year for farmers, especially in the south of the country and the desert area. The Government allocated an extra £P1,600 for relief works under the control of the Department of Public Works, which acquired the nickname ‘al Nafaah’, the benefactor. That money was spent on constructing the Karak–Taffilah–Shawbak–Wadi al-Musa–Petra road; areas where people suffered most from the severe drought. However, these were two sections of the main road under construction, Amman–Madaba–Wadi al-Walah–Wadi al-Mujib–Karak– Taffilah–Showbak–Wadi al-Musa–Maan, along the same route as the King’s Highway.23 In the North, the road between Deir Abu Said and Jisir al-Shaikh Hussein was opened. In cooperation with the Government of Palestine, the Mafraq–Irbid–Jisir al-Majami road was under construction, as part of the Baghdad–Haifa highway, at the expense of the British Government. Thus thousands of Trans-Jordanian workers were employed during that drought year. During 1937 and 1938, the construction of the Baghdad–Haifa highway continued, and the construction of the King’s Highway, started partially as a relief work in 1936, was continued by the Department. The construction of these roads as well as that between Deir Abu Said and Jisir al-Shaikh Hussein was completed in 1939. The building of government offices was also completed: the new Department of Land building; the Customs Bonded Warehouse; the Arab Legion stables, barracks, garage and workshops; and the extension of the Arab Legion Depot at Mahatta.24

The Department of Antiquities Any lover of antiquities will not fail to be extremely impressed by the great presence of antiquities from every age in Trans-Jordan. The German scholar Jasper Seetzen was the first European to rediscover Jarash in 1806.25 He wrote in his famous diary: ‘I had the satisfaction of seeing the important ruins of Jarash . . . It is impossible to explain how this place, formerly of such manifest celebrity, can have so long escaped the notice of all lovers of antiquities.’ Six years later John Lewis Burckhardt visited Jarash on 2 May 1812 and went on to Amman, Karak and Wadi [304]


al-Musa, where in August he rediscovered Petra,26 ‘A rose red city half as old as time.’27 Since these two rediscoveries many scholars and travellers have visited these ancient cities; prominent among them are: James Silk Buckingham, 1816 Commander C. L. Ibry, Royal Navy, and J. Mangles, 1818 Monsieur le Marquis and Leon de Laborde, 1826 The Reverend Edward Robinson, 1836 David Roberts, 1839 Henry Layard, 1840 Harriet Martineau, 1847 Charles M. Doughty, 1876 HRH Prince Albert and Prince George, sons of the Prince of Wales (Edward VII), 1882 Professor Alois Musil, 1896 R. E. Brunnow and Von Domaszewski, 1910 G. Dalman, 191128 By the year 1860 reports by scholars and travellers who visited the territory which became Trans-Jordan, particularly Jarash and Petra, stimulated great interest in these cities throughout Europe and the United States. Charitable and religious institutions and societies were established: the Palestine Exploration Fund was founded in London during 1865; the American Exploration Society followed in 1870; the German Orient Company; the British School of Archaeology; the American School of Archaeology; the French Biblical School; and others were established towards the end of the nineteenth century. From 1921 until June 1923 there was only little attention directed to antiquities by the Trans-Jordan Government. The Department of Antiquities was established towards the end of 1923, and most of its efforts, during the rest of twenties, were concentrated on protecting antiquities against encroachment and damage to archaeological sites and ruins as well as preserving endangered monuments. In spite of very limited budgets, the Department was able to carry out various programmes of clearing, conserving, rebuilding and buttressing ruins in Jarash, Petra, Karak and Rabudh Castle in Ajlun. During 1929–30, the Department continued to carry out conservation works in Amman, Karak, Jarash, and Ajlun. A small expedition [305]


was established by Yale University and the British School of Archaeology to excavate a few sites in 1929, and the American Expedition carried out excavations in the area of the South Tebrakionia in 1930. The famous British archaeologist, Professor George Horsefield was appointed the Chief Curator of Antiquities as well as adviser to the Trans-Jordan Government in matters of antiquities. The budget for antiquities was the lowest priority during the thirties (see Table 11.15). The reasons for this low priority were that until the end of 1934 the American Expedition and the British School of Archaeology had covered their expenses during their work in Jarash and that very little work was undertaken by the Department during the Palestine Revolt. However most of the finds by excavations were catalogued, housed, displayed and properly cared for in the Palestine Museum in Jerusalem, where they were held in trust in the title and name of the Government of Trans-Jordan.29 TABLE 11.15

Budget for Department of Antiquities Year

Expenditure (£P)

1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939

2,216 2,610 2,630 2,642 2,500 2,558 2,389 2,676 2,590 2,500

During 1933–4 the American School of Oriental Research continued to carry out excavations in Jarash, and the British School of Archaeology and the Palestine Department of Archaeology continued to provide advisers and experts to assist the Department. In 1935, the Antiquities Law was promulgated to replace the old Law of 1925.30 The new law stated that [306]


Antiquities means any building or object made by man before 1700 AD, be it above ground or below ground, transferable or untransferable, and includes the remains of any man or any animal before 600 AD. Antiquities especially means any building or museum or remains or things which have any relation to or constitute evidence in any way on history, religion, culture, customs, art, knowledge or industry.

It also declared that all antiquities discovered after 24 July 1922 belonged to the Trans-Jordan Government and that no person or public institution or any foreign government were allowed to dispense with it. The law provided for the duties and functions of the Department of Antiquities and its director, regulated excavations and discovery, the purchase or acquisition of land of or for antiquities, digs and trading. The Franciscan Bible School of the Flagellation continued its excavations in the buildings and around the outside walls of the church at Siyaghah, near Madaba. Some of the finest mosaics in the world were found there.31 The first volume of a survey of Trans-Jordan antiquities was published by Dr Nelson Glueck as the annual report of the American School of Oriental Research.32 Professor George Horsefield retired on 1 April 1936 and was replaced by G. W. Lankestar-Harding, who took up the post of Director and Chief Curator of Antiquities on 1 August 1936.33 In his ‘faithful Ford V8, bought new in 1936 and still going strong when he left in 1956,34 he visited most parts of the country and found that the amount of encroachment and damage to antiquity sites was very small. He noticed that the promptness of officials in taking action whenever a case was reported had greatly discouraged offenders.35 In Petra, a private donation enabled the Department to clear the Royal Tombs, the Tomb of the Roman Governor and complete the excavation of the oldest high place. A royal inscription, lost for thirty years, was rediscovered and many loose pieces of sculpture were brought together and buried for protection. During October 1934, Mr Winston Churchill and his wife Clementine visited Petra and spent a night at Nazal camp near Qasr Bint.36 Pere Robert Koppel, of the Pontifical Biblical Institute in Jerusalem, led an excavation team at Talailat al-Ghusul in the Jordan Valley during 1936 and 1937. Dr Glueck of the American School completed a first [307]


season of work at Tell al-Khalaifah; his excavation revealed that the site was an important centre for smelting and refining copper. He also began his survey in the district of Irbid in 1937. In 1938 he continued his investigation of the capital Amman and the Balqa district.37 Conservation work continued by the Department in Jarash during 1938. The Forum was almost completely cleared of debris. In other areas of the ancient city much clearing, restoration and repair was carried out. The mosaic floor of the Church of Ss Cosmos and Damian was completely lifted, relaid and repaired.38

The Department of Education The Department of Education was responsible for the direction, supervision and inspection of all government schools, and the supervision and inspection of non-government schools. A few minor improvements were achieved between 1929 and 1934 because the Department was restricted by lack of money. By 1935, the Department’s Central Office in Amman consisted of a director, a first inspector, a second inspector, a chief clerk, an accountant, a store keeper and one clerk. There were five types of schools: 1. 2.

3.

4.

Secondary: there was one complete secondary school at Salt with four secondary classes. Incomplete Secondary Schools: there were three incomplete secondary schools consisting of two secondary classes at Irbid, Amman, and Karak. There were no secondary schools for girls, but all secondary schools included six primary classes. Complete Primary Schools: there were 11 primary schools for boys in Ramtha, Huson, Deir Abu Said, Kufranjah, Ajlun, Jarash, Amman, Suwailih, Madaba, Taffilah, and Maan, and six complete primary schools for girls in Irbid, Jarash, Salt, Amman, Karak and Maan. Complete primary schools consisted of two preparatory classes and six elementary classes. Incomplete Primary Schools: these consisted of two preparatory classes and three to five elementary classes. They were located in smaller towns and followed the same curriculum as the complete primary schools. There were six incomplete primary schools for boys and six for girls.39 [308]


5.

Village and Bedouin Schools: there were 38 village schools each consisting of two preparatory and two to three elementary classes. Most of these schools had vegetable and fruit gardens, and six of them kept poultry. Four Bedouin schools were established by cooperation between the Education Department and the Arab Legion at Mudawarah, Azraq, Wadi al-Rum and Bayir. The aims of these schools were to encourage the Bedouins to educate their children and to prepare those who wished to join the Arab Legion by teaching them how to read and write. They were located within the compounds of the Arab Legion desert forts and most pupils who reached the age of maturity joined the Arab Legion.

The Art and Craft School in Amman was well established during the twenties. Pupils were accepted if they passed the fourth elementary class. A boarding section was established in the school to accommodate pupils from districts other than Amman. Training consisted of a one-year course in a trade selected by the pupil. The course in every trade was increased to two years in 1932. During 1935 there were 44 boarders and 11 day boys learning to be blacksmiths, carpenters, and leather workers. In the nine years following its establishment in 1926 a total of 101 pupils graduated from the school (see Table 11.16). Tables 11.17 and 11.18 show the numbers of schools, teachers and pupils in government and non-government schools in 1935. About 24 teachers, men and women, were graduates from universities or teacher-training colleges. Most of the rest were graduates from Salt Secondary School. TABLE 11.16

Art and Craft School pupil numbers, 1926–35 Year

Blacksmith

Carpenter

Leather worker

Total

One year course 1927 2 1928 4 1929 7 1930 4

7 7 10 3

7 3 2 5

16 14 19 12

Two year course 1933 11 1935 4

18 7

– –

29 11

Total

10140 [309]


TABLE 11.17

Government schools, 1935 Type of school Number

Pupils Boys

Girls

Teachers Total

Men Women Total

Secondary Primary Girls Village Desert Kindergarten Arts and Crafts

4 17 12 38 2 1 1

116 2,459 – 1,987 34 – 55

– 116 – 2,459 907 907 18 2,005 – 34 266 266 – 55

15 59 – 39 2 – 7

– – 26 – – 6 –

15 59 26 39 2 6 7

Total

75

4,651 1,191 5,842

122

32

154

TABLE 11.18

Non-government schools, 1935 Type of school Number

Pupils Boys

Kuttab Latin Orthodox Catholic CMS Anglican American Sabbatarian Bahai TJFF Armenian Total

60 17 12 19 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 118

1,946 928 528 555 79 50 82 21 22 26 20

Girls

Teachers Total

Men Women Total

165 2,111 771 1,699 111 639 50 605 60 139 – 50 136 218 3 24 24 46 17 43 18 38

62 46 15 24 2 2 – 1 – – –

7 29 5 1 8 – 7 – 1 1 3

69 75 20 25 10 2 7 1 1 1 3

4,257 1,355 5,612

152

62

214

The Matriculation Examination was introduced by the Department in 1934 for pupils completing the fourth secondary class. The examination was exactly the same as that adopted by England and Palestine. Pupils who passed that examination were accepted in the freshman year of the American University of Beirut, the Syrian University of Damascus, the [310]


Egyptian Universities of Azhar and Cairo and the University of Baghdad, where most of Trans-Jordanian students graduated. During 1935–9 84 pupils passed the Matriculation Examination (Table 11.19). Most of those awarded the Matriculation Certificate were employed in the Civil Service of Trans-Jordan as teachers, clerks, etc., some joined the Arab Legion as cadet officers. The best among the graduates were awarded scholarships to Arab Universities at the Government’s expense. In 1934 three graduates from Salt were awarded scholarships at the American University of Beirut. The few who could afford it paid their own way through university.41 TABLE 11.19

Matriculation Examination, 1935–9 Year

Examined

Passed

1935 1936 1937 1938 1939

21 10 20 27 28

15 6 18 20 25

Total

106

84

The number of schools, pupils, and teachers in government and non-government schools by 1936 is shown in Table 11.20. TABLE 11.20

School, pupil and teacher numbers, 1936 Government Schools Pupils, boys Pupils, girls Teachers, men Teachers, women

Non-Government

68 5,205 1,310 122 32

102 3,391 1,319 125 47

[311]

Total 170 8,596 2,629 247 7942


Among the government schools, village schools for boys had nearly half the population of boy pupils. Out of a total of 2,221 pupils in 38 village schools the following number of pupils were in the various classes: 916 in preparatory classes, 553 in first classes, 463 in second classes and 289 in third classes. The Law for Municipal Education Duty no. 21 was promulgated on 1 May 1937. It provided for the collection of a 3 per cent duty on every building in the municipal areas to cover expenditure on new school buildings, furniture, general maintenance and salaries for teachers. The Director of the Department of Education was made responsible in law to supervise expenditure from this source.43 In 1938, the number of schools, pupils and teachers in government and non-government schools increased considerably compared with the year 1936 as can be seen from Table 11.21. TABLE 11.21

School, pupil and teacher numbers, 1938

Schools Pupils, boys Pupils, girls Teachers, men Teachers, women

Government

Non-government

Total

Increase on 1936

74 6,832 1,680 146 35

117 3,571 1,771 160 59

191 10,403 3,451 306 94

21 1,807 822 59 15

During the early thirties a number of pupils were sponsored by the Government to study in the following universities. Amongst those sponsored, some went on to distinguished careers, such as, at Damascus University: Musa al-Sakit, Ali Mismar, Abd al-Rahim al-Wakid and Ahmad al-Zahir, who went on to become High Court judges; Mohammad al-Zahir, who became Governor of Amman; Dhaifullah al-Humud, who served as a government minister; and Mohammad Audah al-Quraan, who was later a senator. Those at Cairo University included Hasan al-Kayid, later a government minister and Madhat Jumaah, who was to become an ambassador. Illustrious graduates of Beirut University sponsored for their degrees by the Government were: Farhan al-Shubailat, later Minister of Defence; Baha al-Din Tuqan, ambassador; Sulaiman al-Nabulsi, Prime [312]


Minister; and Sulaiman al-Sukkar, Minister of Finance. During the thirties the Department of Education continued to occupy second place in the prioritising of the budget, after the Arab Legion, but its expenditure was increased annually (Table 11.22). TABLE 11.22

Department of Education expenditure, 1929–39 Year

Expenditure (£P)

1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939

22,274 22,200 21,744 22,388 23,028 23,324 24,207 23,373 24,232 26,443 27,874

The Department of Education was one of the very few institutions free from interference by the British Resident and the British Mandate. Although some financial pressure was imposed by Henry Cox when he was counting the piastres, the Amir managed to keep education under his personal care and control.

Public Health Before the introduction of the recording of births and deaths in 1926, the estimates of the population of Trans-Jordan were based on the accounts of shaikhs, notables, mukhtars and district governors. After births and deaths started to be recorded by the Department of Public Health the estimates became more accurate. The increase in the population of Trans-Jordan during the thirties is shown in Table 11.23.

[313]


TABLE 11.23

Registered births and deaths, 1929–39 Year

Births

Deaths

Increase

Population

1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939

9,845 10,340 10,697 10,871 10,900 10,742 11,284 12,234 11,496 12,746 13,969

6,574 6,661 5,648 5,152 7,354 7,925 6,832 6,652 6,342 5,627 5,473

3,272 3,679 5,049 4,719 3,546 2,817 4,452 5,582 5,154 7,119 8,496

276,918 280,190 283,869 288,918 293,637 297,183 300,000 305,582 310,736 317,855 326,35144

By the end of 1930 the Department of Public Health was well organised and provided the people of Jordan with a caring and efficient health service. Because the money allocated to public health in the budget was below the Department’s need, fees were charged in 1934 to patients who could afford them. Those who could not pay were treated free of charge. Table 11.24 shows the Department’s budget and revenue from fees between 1929 and 1939. TABLE 11.24

Department of Public Health’s budget, 1929–39 Year 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939

Expenditure 10,922 11,034 11,292 11,960 11,960 12,118 12,762 13,763 15,212 15,186 16,801 [314]

Fees 000 000 000 000 000 750 640 640 580 820 82045


The Department’s doctors, nurses, and other personnel were increased gradually with the expansion of the health service and the availability of money. Although some forms of local rudimentary medicine were still practised in rural and remote areas, the demand for medical care in clinics and hospitals was increasing rapidly. By the end of 1939 the number and distribution of licensed members of the medical professions in the Department of Public Health and the private sector consisted of the following: TABLE 11.25

Department of Public Health’s personnel, 1939 Area Amman Irbid Jarash Ajlun Salt Madaba Karak Taffilah Mafraq Maan Desert Total

Doctors

Dentists

1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 12

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Chemists Midwives 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Nurses 0 4 1 1 2 1 2 1 0 2 1 15

TABLE 11.26

Private health sector personnel, 1939 Area Amman Irbid Jarash Ajlun Salt Madaba Karak Taffilah Mafraq Zarqa Maan Total

Doctors

Dentists

Chemists

Midwives

10 3 1 1 3 0 4 0 1 0 0 23

4 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 6

4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 5

3 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 9

[315]


For some reason a question was asked at the thirty-fourth session of the Permanent Mandate Commission regarding the nationality of the personnel of the Department of Health. Their nationalities were as follows (for a list of names see Appendix F): Director: 1 Palestinian. Doctors: 7 Trans-Jordanians, 2 British, 2 Syrians and 2 Lebanese. Others: 57 Trans-Jordanians, 3 Lebanese and 7 Palestinians. The Government hospital at Irbid and the Desert mobile clinic were established in April 1935. The Department of Health maintained eight-bedded posts at Irbid, Amman, Karak and Maan, as well as four-bedded posts at Jarash, Taffilah and Aqaba, for the treatment of infectious and communicable diseases. A mobile epidemic unit of forty beds was also maintained as a reserve unit and support for the various posts. By the end of 1939 the following medical centres were well established in the country: • • • • • • • •

Government hospital at Amman. Government hospital at Irbid. English hospital at Amman. Church Missionary Society (CMS) hospital at Salt. Italian hospital at Amman. Italian hospital at Karak. Desert mobile clinic in the Badiyah district. Dr Macleane’s clinic at Ajlun.46

Table 11.27 shows the incidence of infections and communicable diseases during the years 1935–9. Measles was the worst enemy with 6,486 cases and 631 deaths, mostly among children. Tuberculosis was prevalent amongst Bedouins in the desert area, but most cases occurred in Amman, Irbid, Jarash, Ajlun, Salt, Madaba, Karak, Taffilah and Maan; out of 3,553 cases there were 242 deaths. Although only 31 people died of malaria out of 19,935 cases, the disease was demoralising and caused great loss of labour, especially among the farming community and workers who were constructing roads in the Jordan Valley. After 1934, the anti-malarial campaign continued with considerable effort by the Department of Health, but pools and streams swollen by heavy rain [316]


during the thirties did not dry up before the season of mosquito breeding. It was nearly impossible with the technical and financial resources available to combat the spread of the disease. TABLE 11.27

Infectious and communicable diseases, 1935–9 Disease

1935

1936

1937

1938

1939

Anthrax Chickenpox Diptheria Dysentery Erysipelas Influenza Measles Mumps Pneumonia Puerperal Fever Relapsing Fever Scarlet Fever Smallpox Paratyphoid Typhus Whooping Cough Malaria Tuberculosis Venereal Diseases

29 42 8 185 42 254 1,208 12 101 8 8 4 – 27 55 157 5,452 532 226

7 29 10 303 37 1,365 1,102 112 171 9 6 – – 26 35 96 2,791 595 411

59 64 16 219 29 648 538 130 156 10 9 – – 43 14 350 2,791 634 600

29 63 11 216 22 369 688 153 164 10 8 – – 29 11 481 2,212 482 639

39 50 5 203 29 319 1,670 95 163 8 – – – 15 19 306 1,914 273 546

Nationality and Naturalisation As far as nationality and naturalisation were concerned, the Government and the people of Trans-Jordan, as well as the Amir, believed and practised the idea of Arab nationalism, and welcomed those Arabs who took refuge in the country. The only exception was in the attitude of the unemployed who saw other Arabs as a threat to their chances of finding work. In accordance with Article 1 of the Trans-Jordan Nationality Law, all Ottoman subjects habitually resident in Trans-Jordan on 6 August 1924, including any person who had his usual place of residence in the country [317]


for the period of 12 months preceding 6 August 1924, were entitled to Trans-Jordan nationality. For those who applied for naturalisation after that date, it was granted at the discretion of the Prime Minister, providing they fulfilled the following conditions: 1. 2. 3. 4.

That the applicant should have resided in Trans-Jordan for two years immediately prior to the application for naturalisation. That the applicant was of good character. That the applicant intended to reside in Trans-Jordan. That the applicant knew the Arabic language.

The number and previous nationality of those who acquired TransJordan nationality by naturalisation between 1935 and 1938 are shown in Table 11.28. TABLE 11.28

Naturalisation, 1935–8 Nationality

1935

1936

1937

1938

Syrian Iraqi Lebanese Palestinian Turkish Egyptian Russian Persian Greek Afghani American Saudi Arabian Chinese Yemeni Italian

42 2 4 3 35 – 1 – 2 – 1 – – – –

54 3 6 3 49 – – – – – – 1 – – 1

17 – 4 1 11 – 1 – – – – 5 1 2 –

13 – 4 3 3 1 – 1 – 1 – – – – –

Total

90

117

42

2647

[318]


The Arab Legion By 1939, and because of the expected crisis in Europe, as well as the continued crisis in Palestine, the strength of the Arab Legion was increased to the levels shown in Table 11.29. By the middle of the year the total strength reached 1,624 officers and men, comprising the regular establishment of 1,130, a reserve of 160 and a supplementary force of 334. Owing to the security situation two new police districts were created in the Jordan Valley and the Arab Legion was restructured as follows: capital, Amman: Arab Legion Headquarters, Amman City Police, Arab Legion depot (recruiting and training), Arab Legion motor transport and workshops, and the Central Jail. Ajlun district: Headquarters at Irbid and 8 police stations. Jordan Valley district (North): Headquarters at Kraimah and 6 police stations. Balqa district: Headquarters at Salt, and 11 police stations. Jordan Valley district (South): Headquarters at Jisir Damya and 3 police stations. Karak district: Headquarters at Karak and 11 police stations. Maan district: Headquarters at Maan, and 5 police stations. Desert area: Headquarters at Amman, 10 police stations, and Motor Transport Repair Sub-Depot at Jafer.48 TABLE 11.29

Arab Legion, 1939 Formation

Officers

Cadets

Mounted Infantry Desert Force Prison staff Clerical staff Reserve

25 15 2 2 – –

3 – – – – –

680 381 299 98 40 79

Total

44

3

1,577

[319]

Other ranks


The vast majority of police stations were in telephone and wireless communication with their headquarters and neighbouring districts. The Arab Legion operated 14 wireless stations of which 13 were fixed and one a mobile set mounted on a Ford tender. In 1939 a group of Bedouin pupils completed a course of training in wireless telegraphy and joined the desert area. The mobility of the Arab Legion was also increased by a total of 47 new vehicles: 13 for the desert area, 6 for the districts, and 28 for the depot and reserve.49 The Arab Legion was responsible for the testing and licensing of vehicles and drivers and its licensing section recorded a progressive increase in motor transport in Trans-Jordan between 1926 and 1938 (Table 11.30). TABLE 11.30

Motor transport, 1926–38 Year

Cars

Buses

Lorries

Cycles

Total

1926 1934 1937 1938

110 269 300 335

4 19 38 24

16 109 133 230

5 7 14 18

135 404 585 607

The increase in the strength of the Arab Legion was not designed or intended to be organised to develop the quality or standard of training as for a military unit. None of the British officers who served in the Arab Legion were up to date with European military developments. There were no military units or formations – platoons, companies, regiments or brigades – and the basic organisation of the cavalry was that of the First World War. Thus until 1939 and the beginning of the Second World War, the Arab Legion remained a police force with a small desert force. With the exception of the senior Arab officers who were trained in the Ottoman tradition at the Ottoman Military Academy and who joined the Ottoman Army as cadet officers, all junior officers and noncommissioned officers were promoted through the ranks as follows:

[320]


Jundi Jundi Awal Arif Nayib Naqib Wakil Mulazim Thani Mulazim Awal Rais Wakil Qayid Qayid Aaqid Zaim Amir Liwa

Soldier Lance Corporal Corporal Sergeant Staff Sergeant Sergeant Major Second Lieutenant First Lieutenant Captain Major Lieutenant Colonel Colonel Brigadier Major General

The rank of cadet officer was introduced in the Arab Legion in 1936. However the first Arab officer to join a military academy from Trans-Jordan was the Amir Talal ibn Abdullah, who was trained at the Royal Military College at Sandhurst at a cost approaching £1,000 per annum.

NOTES 1 Abu Al-Shaar, Amin, King Abdullah ibn al-Hussein’s Memoirs (Amman: The Hashemite Press, 1970), pp. 4–5. 2 TJOG no. 221, 5 March 1929. 3 This Diwan was established by an addendum to the Organic Law in 1930. See TJOG no. 252, 5 March 1930. 4 Article 58, Trans-Jordan Organic Law, TJOG no. 188, 19 April 1928. 5 The following registered lawyers were practising in the Law Courts of TransJordan in 1937: Mohammad al-Quraan, Ahmad al-Abd al-Qadir, Zuhdi Khalil al-Mughrabi, Salih al-Mustafa, Nazmi Abd al-Hadi, Ismail Zuhdi, Bahjat al-Talhuni, Mohammad al-Muhtadi, Foad Abd al-Hadi, Shams al-Din Sami, Fayiz Niqula, Musa Niqula, Yousef al-Audah, Munir Abd al-Hadi, Nuri Jaafar, Abd al-Rahim al-Wakid, Aayid al-Karshah, Rafiq Salah, Shaikh Nadim al-Mallah, Fayiz Saba al-Aish, Barham Samawi, Rashid al-Hasan, Abdullah al-Aakashah, Mamduh al-Majali, Yousef al-Aakashah, Salih al-Qusus, Aarif al-Aanabtawi and Abd al-Aziz al-Rashid. TJOG no. 555, 16 March 1937. 6 Glubb, ‘Economic Situation of the Trans-Jordan Tribes’, p. 448. 7 Secret letter in Arabic from Cox to the Amir numbered 86, 16 February 1934. A photocopy of the letter is in the author’s Private Papers obtained from the Royal Palace, Amman. See Appendix F. [321]


8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49

PRO. Colonial no. 112, p. 280. PRO. Colonial no. 129, p. 398. PRO. Colonial nos. 112, 129, and 166. PRO. Colonial no. 166, p. 404. Ibid. TJOG no. 287, 16 December 1930. TJOG no. 293, 16 February 1931. PRO. Colonial no. 112, p. 287. TJOG no. 524, 1 June 1936. PRO. Colonial no. 166, p. 324. TJOG no. 553, 1 March 1937. PRO. Colonial no. 166, p. 326. Ibid., p. 329. PRO. Colonial nos. 30, 31, 36, 40 and 112. Reports on Palestine and Trans-Jordan. PRO. Colonial no. 112, pp. 354–5. G. W. Lankester Harding, The Antiquities of Jordan (London: Lutterworth Press, 1974), p. 35. PRO. Colonial no. 166, p. 405. J. Maxwell Miller, ‘Recent Archaeological Developments Relevant to Ancient Moab’ Studies in the History and Archaeology of Jordan, 1 (1982), p. 169. J. L. Burckhardt, Travels in Syria and the Holy Land (1822). From Dean Burgon’s Newdigate Prize Poem ‘Petra’. Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities, Studies in the History and Archaeology of Jordan, 1–2 (1982), and elsewhere. PRO. Colonial no. 112, p. 313. TJOG no. 507, 17 December 1935. PRO. Colonial no. 112, p. 313. Ibid. TJOG no. 524, 1 June 1936. Lankester Harding, The Antiquities of Jordan, p. xi. PRO. Colonial no. 129, p. 335. Martin Gilbert, Churchill: A Life (London: Heinemann, 1991), p. 532. PRO. Colonial no. 166, p. 357. Ibid. PRO. Colonial. no. 112, p. 316. Ibid. PRO. Colonial no. 112. PRO. Colonial no. 129, pp. 363–4. TJOG no. 560, 1 May 1937. Department of Public Health Annual Report, 1940. Copy obtained by the author from Dr Zuhair Malhas. PRO. Colonial nos. 112, 129, and 166. PRO. Colonial no. 166, pp. 372–3. PRO. Colonial no. 166, Palestine and Trans-Jordan Administration Reports, 1937–8, p. 772. Ibid., p. 788. Ibid., p. 789.

[322]

Epilogue

The painful and damaging failure of Great Britain and France to fulfil their promises to the leader of the Great Arab Revolt 1916–18, His Majesty King al-Hussein ibn Ali, though very disappointing, was the main reason for a new Arab awakening between the two world wars. During the twenties and the thirties, the growing lack of confidence and trust in Britain and France, and Arab aspirations for freedom and independence, fostered strong feelings of patriotism and Arab nationalism in the hearts and minds of the Arab peoples. The frustrations which overshadowed the Arab world after the implementation of the Sykes-Picot Agreement; the implementation of the British and French mandatory powers in 1922, exerted by Britain and France as quasi-colonial powers, with full control over the mandated territories; the increasing waves of authorised and unauthorised Jewish immigration to Palestine; the Libyan resistance against the Italians in 1923, which was commanded by the Libyan leader Omar al-Mukhtar, and continued until 1932; the Sudanese resistance against the British in 1924; the Syrian Revolt against the French in 1925–6; the resistance by the Star of Africa Society against the French in Algeria in 1926; the rebellion of the Maghribi leader Mohammad Abd al-Karim al-Khattabi; and the 1929 Buraq rebellion in Palestine against the British Zionist policy, were all witness to the struggle for independence in the Arab world. During the second part of the thirties, the general mood of the people of Trans-Jordan was against the Zionist Jews and against the British Government of Palestine. Particularly in the hearts and minds of pupils of elementary and secondary schools, a strong feeling of Arab nationalism and Arab identity was planted and nourished by their teachers. I myself remember that in 1936, when I was only eight years old, I was extremely impressed with the Arab revolt in Palestine. My teachers (mainly Syrians and Palestinians) at an Amman school for boys encouraged pupils to save some of their pocket money and contribute to support the revolutionaries (al-Thuwar) in Palestine. [323]


The following year, as a child of nine years, I remember escorting my step-grandmother, the late Hazaah Qutaish, wife of Yousef Abu Nowar, to visit her brother Yousef Qutaish from Salt in a Jerusalem prison, awaiting execution by hanging for participating in the 1936–9 Palestinian Revolt. Yousef was heavily chained around his neck, hands and feet, as he came to see his sister. Seeing him in that state, his sister was extremely upset and started to cry. Instead of trying to reassure her, Yousef seemed angry with her and told her to stop crying and instead sing a Zaghrutah and be happy for him because he was going to be a martyr. Hazaah did her best to sing a Zaghrutah, but in the midst of her tears her voice failed her and she continued to cry. After a few minutes Hazaah was able to control herself and, armed only with her Zaghrutah, she sang for her brother. Many Jordanian families were affected by the Palestinian Revolt. Yousef Qutaish was not hanged, he was released in 1948. However, by the middle of the thirties, the international boundaries which separated the Arab countries along mandatory, protectorate or colonial lines became the psychological boundaries between each of them and their Arab neighbours. Until 1935, the political and more often violent struggle for independence had been motivated by local Arab patriotism: Syrian, Iraqi, Palestinian, Libyan, Algerian. etc. Meanwhile, an inseparable and strong belief in Arabism and Islam, as well as a pride in the history and traditions of the Arab nation, urged the Arab intellectuals of two generations, the leaders of the Istiqlal Party, and the generation after them, to rekindle Arab nationalism in the cause of independence and unity. The participation of all the Arab countries in the Islamic Conference of Jerusalem of 1931 and the Arab Conference of Jerusalem of the same year, gave a clear indication of the attitude of the vast majority of the Arab peoples towards Arab nationalism. Arab support for the Palestinian Revolt was true evidence of that fact. The thirties saw the slow and gradual progress of Trans-Jordan towards full independence; the persistent struggle of the Amir and the loyalty and support he had from all the political parties, shaikhs and notables, for the amendments of the 1928 Treaty and the Organic Law and their success, enhanced Trans-Jordan’s international presence. The end of Colonel Henry Cox’s term as British Resident in Amman loosened the extremely tight financial and political control of the British Resident over the actions of the Government; a new situation of friendship and [324]

EPILOGUE

good understanding grew between the Amir and the new British Resident, A. S. Kirkbride. The retirement of Peake, the Commander of the Arab Legion, and the appointment of Glubb in his place enhanced the transformation of the Arab Legion from a police force, which was much restricted by Peake’s old-fashioned attitudes, into a military force capable of maintaining peace and order in the country. The participation of Trans-Jordan in the Second World War as an ally of Great Britain and the free world, gave the people of Jordan the moral and political right to become the fully independent Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in 1946.

[325]


Appendix A BUDGETS

Revenue and Expenditure of the Budgets 1925–29 A 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

9.

Revenue (£P) Head Customs and Excise Licences and Taxes Fees and Receipts Post and Telegraph Government property Interest Miscellaneous Sale of Government land

1925/26 1926/27 1927/28 1928/29 47,740 54,123 61,237 66,486 98,775 138,688 138,197 135,850 16,933 19,556 22,335 23,620 5,516 4,563 8,400 7,500 2,578 4,025 4,134 5,500 42 1,412 1,875 760 2,454 852 493 700 – 13,297 382 500

Total revenue

174,038 236,516 237,073 240,916

Grant-in-Aid

101,358

Total revenue

275,396 302,516 282,073 280,916

66,000

45,000

40,000

B

Ordinary expenditure (£P)

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

Head 1925/26 1926/27 1927/28 1928/29 Civil List 13,000 16,635 16,836 16,266 Debts – – – 550 Legislature – – – 1,631 Pensions and gratuities 1,386 3,794 4,301 3,000 Prime Minister and Interior 5,703 6,900 5,593 5,423 District administration 7,534 7,372 7,355 7,654 Legal Department 11,026 14,347 16,119 16,956 Shariah Courts 2,806 3,017 3,024 3,554 Finance 9,135 14,738 17,207 17,369 Customs and Excise 4,602 3,722 3,616 6,632 Health Department 6,935 8,957 10,309 10,922 Maan quarantine – 468 303 233 Education 14,304 18,232 19,738 22,274 Agriculture, Forests and Veterinary 1,461 3,609 6,338 6,705

[327]


15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

Antiquities Land Registry Public Works Printing Press Post and Telegraph Land Demarcation and Surveys Arab Legion Miscellaneous British Resident Audit office

4,369 1,180 22,046 1,274 6,816 – 136,723 7,665 9,735 –

Total ordinary expenditure

267,700 259,302 287,849 283,568

C

Extraordinary expenditure (£P)

25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

Head Public Works Post and Telegraph British Resident Finance (House and Land Tax) Antiquities

5,863 5,328 2,132 2,017 2,560 3,545 16,972 17,697 20,580 803 – – 7,490 8,344 10,721 580 1,375 6,539 106,087 102,856 100,412 8,179 31,249 11,203 9,520 7,425 7,073 – 276 2,194

1925/26 1926/27 1927/28 1928/29 – 13,377 11,929 7,810 – 1,052 3,393 800 – 213 9,096 1,000 – – 535 – – – – 3,804

Total extraordinary expenditure

–

14,642

24,953

13,414

Budgets for the years 1929/30 and 1930/31 (in £P) A

Revenue

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

Head Customs and Excise Licences and Taxes Fees and Receipts Post and Telegraph Government property Interests Miscellaneous Sale of Government land Returned payments, TJFF Grant-in-Aid Returned from cost of Anti-Locust Campaign

1929/30 1930/31 74,000 76,000 140,000 134,440 25,420 27,370 11,370 15,310 4,700 4,600 1,000 930 558 600 450 800 24,012 24,695 40,000 60,000 5,000 –

Total

326,410 344,745 [328]

APPENDICES

B

Ordinary expenditure

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

Head Civil list Debts Legislative Council Pensions and gratuities Prime Minister and Interior District administration Ministry of Justice Shariah Courts Ministry of Finance Customs and Excise Public Health Maan quarantine Education Agriculture and Forests Antiquities Public Works Public Works recurrent Post and Telegraph Land and Surveys Arab Legion Miscellaneous British Resident Audit Office Bedouin Control Board TJFF

1929/30 1930/31 15,610 14,572 590 590 3,616 4,076 4,500 4,200 4,834 4,007 7,760 7,421 15,835 15,934 3,250 3,809 17,400 15,498 7,071 7,730 11,034 10,770 15 115 22,200 27,009 6,516 9,549 1,879 2,216 4,350 4,531 19,790 16,350 10,707 12,239 10,937 12,384 99,439 102,711 12,107 8,638 6,888 6,995 3,455 370 – 1,260 23,662 23,015


313,445 315,989

C

Extraordinary expenditure

26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

Head Antiquities TJFF British Resident Public Works Post and Telegraph Public Health Anti-Locust Campaign Arab Legion Arbitration Total extraordinary expenditure

1929/30 1930/31 2,000 200 350 823 260 – 9,215 5,025 2,300 – 250 – 10,000 12,000 – 5,530 – 1,000 24,375 [329]

24,578


Budget for the year 1931/32 (in £P) A

Revenue

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

Head as approved Customs and Excise Licences and Taxes Fees and Receipts Post and Telegraph Government property Interest Miscellaneous Sale of state domains Grant-in-Aid to TJFF British Grant-in-Aid

By Legislative Council 64,000 118,100 24,700 12,000 2,400 840 5,200 1,300 34,450 84,700

By HMG 65,039 111,384 24,508 11,027 3,317 835 5,215 1,577 30,444 84,700

348,690

338,046

Total revenue

B 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 15a. 16. 17. 18.

Ordinary expenditure Head as approved By Legislative Council Royal Palace 14,020 Debts 590 Legislative Council 3,780 Pensions and gratuities 4,750 Prime Minister and Interior 3,750 District administration 7,100 Ministry of Justice 15,470 Shariah Courts 3,820 Finance 14,700 Customs and Excise 7,420 Public Health 11,530 Education 21,700 Agriculture, Forests and Veterinary 6,250 Antiquities 2,650 Public Works 4,340 Public Works recurrent 18,000 Post and Telegraph 12,500 Land and Survey 13,380 Police and prisons (a) Police 83,435 (b) Prisons 11,102 (c) Intelligence – [330]

By HMG 13,997 590 3,730 4,758 3,685 6,885 15,355 3,672 14,612 7,229 11,292 21,744 6,121 2,610 4,339 16,873 12,122 12,864 81,872 10,702 –

APPENDICES

19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

(d) Royal Guards (e) Desert Patrol Miscellaneous British Resident Audit Office Bedouin Control Board Sixth of TJFF expenditure Total ordinary expenditure

– 16,463 9,358 6,450 3,400 1,250 30,909

– 16,166 9,305 6,507 3,422 1,198 29,039

328,117

320,689

C


24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 34.

Head as approved By Legislative Council Public Works 12,500 Post and Telegraph 1,960 British Resident 300 The Amir (land development) 3,000 Sixth of TJFF 3,541 Police and Prisons 7,210 Syria/Jordan Boundary Commission 400 Total extraordinary expenditure

28,911

By HMG 12,183 1,959 315 3,000 1,405 5,385 47 24,294

Budget for the year 1932/33 (in £P) A

Revenue

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

Head as approved Customs and Excise Licences and Taxes Fees and Receipts Post and Telegraph Government property Interest Miscellaneous Sale of state domains Grant-in-Aid to TJFF British Grant-in-Aid

By Legislative Council 62,500 135,300 28,700 15,240 3,450 1,090 3,880 1,000 30,567 65,500

By HMG 82,397 117,159 29,804 14,416 3,495 863 4,794 821 29,139 72,000

347,227

354,888

Total revenue

[331]


B 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 11a. 12. 13. 14. 15. 15a. 16. 17. 18.

19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

Ordinary expenditure Head as approved By Legislative Council Royal Palace 14,454 Public debt 591 Legislative Council 3,788 Pensions and gratuities 5,500 Prime Minister and Interior 3,837 District administration 7,070 Ministry of Justice 15,168 Shariah Courts 3,815 Finance 14,916 Customs and Excise 7,784 Public Health 12,135 Maan quarantine 95 Education 23,429 Agriculture, Forests and Veterinary 6,543 Antiquities 2,700 Public Works 4,540 Public Works recurrent 17,500 Post and Telegraph 12,952 Land and Surveys 14,164 Police and Prisons (a) Police 100,916 (b) Prisons 12,752 Miscellaneous 8,958 British Resident 6,562 Audit Office 3,483 Bedouin Control Board 1,266 Sixth of TJFF budget 29,815 Total ordinary expenditure

334,733

C


24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

Head as approved By Legislative Council Public Works 6,242 Post and Telegraph 1,200 TJFF 752 Police and Prisons 1,700 Anti-Locust Campaign 1,000 Syria/Jordan Boundary Commission 3,000 Total extraordinary expenditure

13,894

[332]

By HMG 14,481 590 3,871 5,430 3,745 6,913 15,676 3,726 14,696 7,409 11,960 – 22,338 5,479 2,630 4,487 16,868 12,887 13,400 98,124 12,401 8,561 6,472 3,295 968 28,284 324,691

By HMG 11,241 867 855 – 981 – 13,944

APPENDICES

Budget for the year 1933/34 A 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

9. 10. 11.

Revenue Head Customs and Excise Licences and Taxes Fees and Receipts Post and Telegraph Government property Interest Miscellaneous Sale of state domains

£P 103,530 101,611 30,220 12,622 2,972 609 8,906 1,037

Total local revenue

261,507

Grant-in-Aid to TJFF Grant-in-Aid to Jordan Government Grant from Colonial Development Fund Total grants Total revenue

30,899 65,000 24,006 119,905 381,412

B


1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

Head Civil List Public debt and loan charges Legislative Council Pensions and gratuities Chief Minister and Interior District administration Ministry of Justice Shariah Courts Finance Customs and Excise Public Health Education Agriculture, Forests and Veterinary Antiquities Public Works Public Works recurrent Post and Telegraph Land and Surveys [333]

£P 14,560 1,775 3,733 7,154 3,944 10,001 16,238 3,877 11,420 7,831 12,118 23,028 5,861 2,642 4,544 17,977 12,637 12,668


19.

20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

Police and Prisons (a) Police (b) Prisons (c) Desert Car Patrol Miscellaneous British Resident Audit Office Bedouin Control Board TJFF

99,639 11,930 – 8,528 6,616 3,385 1,091 28,720


331,917

B


25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35.

Head British Resident Public Works Finance Post and Telegraph TJFF Public Health Police and Prisons Write-off of public money Syrian/Jordan Boundary Commission Agriculture, Forests and Veterinary Colonial Development Fund Total extraordinary expenditure Total expenditure

£P – 9,590 236 1,692 2,179 357 2,934 863 965 214 23,852 42,852 374,769



£P 98,627 113,057 32,812 12,982 3,198 1,523 11,935 2,124

Total local revenue

276,258 [334]

APPENDICES

9. 10. 11.

Grant-in-Aid to TJFF Grant-in-Aid to Jordan Government Grant from Colonial Development Fund Total grants Total revenue

B 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

20. 21. 22. 23.

31,959 60,000 9,300 101,259 377,517

Ordinary expenditure Head Civil List Public debt and loan charges Legislative Council Pensions and gratuities Chief Minister and Interior District administration Ministry of Justice Shariah Courts Finance Customs and Excise Public Health Education Agriculture, Forests and Veterinary Antiquities Public Works Public Works recurrent Post and Telegraph Land and Surveys Police and Prisons (a) Police (b) Prisons (c) Desert Car Patrol Miscellaneous Audit Office Bedouin Control Board TJFF Total ordinary expenditure

C


24. 25.

Head Public Works Finance

£P 14,534 1,340 1,986 9,479 3,753 10,035 15,827 3,869 11,032 7,543 12,762 23,324 7,151 2,500 4,584 18,918 13,903 13,509 99,721 11,549 – 9,560 3,253 766 27,527 328,425

£P 8,567 1,987 [335]


26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32.

Post and Telegraph TJFF Public Health Agriculture, Forests and Veterinary The Amir Relief measures Colonial Development Fund Total extraordinary expenditure Total expenditure

4,432 2,818 252 289 2,957 14,824 4,844 40,970 369,395


9. 10. 11.


£P 104,567 140,637 37,026 13,798 7,184 827 7,198 2,610

Total local revenue

313,847

Grant-in-Aid to Trans-Jordan Grant-in-Aid to TJFF Grant from Colonial Development Fund Total grants Total revenue

B 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

42,000 31,611 8,172 81,783 395,630

Ordinary expenditure Head Civil List Public debt and loan charges Legislative Council Pensions and gratuities Prime Minister and Interior District administration

£P 15,329 1,148 3,699 11,064 3,899 9,667

[336]

APPENDICES

7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

15. 16. 17. 18.

Education Agriculture, Forests and Veterinary Antiquities Public Works Public Works recurrent Post and Telegraph Land and Surveys Police and Prisons (a) Police (b) Prisons Miscellaneous Audit Office Bedouin Court of Appeal TJFF

101,998 11,004 9,682 3,672 181 28,531


343,809

C


19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

Head Public Finance Post and Telegraph Public Health Police and Prisons Relief measures TJFF

24,207 7,411 2,558 4,637 23,308 13,661 15,617

£P 19,796 453 6,906 225 2,571 150 3,079

Total extraordinary expenditure Total expenditure

37,491 381,300

Budget for the year 1936/37 A 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Revenue Head Customs and Excise Licences and Taxes Fees and Receipts Post and Telegraph Government property Interest

£P 133,884 89,121 36,462 15,222 1,659 382 [337]


7. 8.

Miscellaneous Sale of state domains

9,435 1,975

Total local revenue 9. 10. 11. 12.

288,140

Grant-in-Aid to Trans-Jordan Grant-in-Aid to TJFF Grant from Colonial Development Fund Grant-in-Aid to Trans-Jordan for repayment of its share of Ottoman public debt Total grants Total revenue

B 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

20. 21. 22. 23.

55,000 31,534 12,904 31,072 130,510 418,650

Ordinary expenditure Head Civil List Public debt and loan charges Legislative Council Pensions and gratuities Prime Minister and Interior District administration Ministry of Justice Shariah Courts Finance Custom, Trade and Industry Public Health Education Agriculture, Forests and Veterinary Antiquities Public Works Public Works recurrent Post and Telegraph Land and Surveys Police and Prisons (a) Police (b) Prisons (c) Supplementary Reserve Miscellaneous Audit Office Bedouin Court of Appeal TJFF

108,394 10,707 4,603 8,729 3,878 760 29,876


357,430

[338]

£P 15,706 241 3,722 11,941 4,132 9,786 15,497 3,815 11,138 8,232 15,212 23,373 8,506 2,839 4,691 20,285 16,094 15,723

APPENDICES

C


24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

Head Public Works Police and Prisons Relief measures Colonial Development Fund TJFF Trans-Jordan’s share of Ottoman public debt Total extraordinary expenditure Total expenditure

£P 16,072 1,254 19,145 8,409 1,658 31,072 77,610 435,040


9. 10. 11. 12. 13.


£P 125,351 149,397 42,416 16,715 4,357 1,017 14,342 4,565

Total local revenue

358,160

Grant-in Aid to Trans-Jordan Grant-in-Aid to TJFF Grant from Colonial Development Fund Grant-in-Aid to Trans-Jordan for payment of its share of Ottoman Public Debt Grant for hydrographic survey of Trans-Jordan Total grants Total revenue

B 1. 2.

19,000 31,335 14,532 31,008 5,115 110,990 459,150

Ordinary expenditure Head Civil List Public debt and loan charges

£P 15,142 646 [339]


3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

21. 22. 23. 24.

Legislative Council Pensions and gratuities Prime Minister and Interior District administration Ministry of Justice Shariah Courts Finance Customs, Trade and Industry Public Health Desert medical mobile unit Education Agriculture, Forests and Veterinary Antiquities Public Works Public Works recurrent Post and Telegraph Land and Surveys Police and Prisons (a) Police (b) Prisons Miscellaneous Audit Office Bedouin Court of Appeal TJFF

107,737 11,080 8,791 4,005 830 29,197


365,284

C


25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36.

Head Public Works Finance Post and Telegraph Public Health Police and Prisons The Amir Relief measures Antiquities Colonial Development Fund TJFF Hydrographic Survey of Trans-Jordan Trans-Jordan’s share of Ottoman public debt Total extraordinary expenditure Total expenditure

3,705 11,589 4,688 10,152 16,691 3,884 11,225 10,810 15,186 2,275 24,232 9,633 2,676 4,959 23,327 15,163 17,661

£P 22,967 8,775 2,962 189 10,419 2,000 997 824 10,032 2,138 5,114 31,009 97,426 462,710

[340]

APPENDICES

Budget for the year 1938/39 A 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

Revenue Head Customs and Excise Licences and Taxes Fees and Receipts Post and Telegraph Government property Interest Miscellaneous Sale of state domains Advances recovered

£P 130,620 141,430 46,500 18,180 4,000 500 10,510 4,200 280

Total local revenue

356,220

Grant-in-Aid to Trans-Jordan Grant-in-Aid to TJFF Grant from Colonial Development Fund Grant-in-Aid to Trans-Jordan (Ottoman public debt) Grant-in-Aid (hydrographic survey) Grant-in-Aid for Haifa–Baghdad road Revenue from Loans

14,886 200,000 4,113

Total of grants Total revenue

386,386 742,606

B


1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

Head Civil List Public debt and loan charges Legislative Council Pensions and gratuities Prime Minister and Interior District administration Ministry of Justice Shariah Courts Finance Customs, Trade and Industry Public Health Desert medical mobile unit

90,000 33,397 12,981 31,009

£P 16,800 320 3,780 15,000 4,440 15,540 18,500 4,400 12,600 12,600 15,800 2,500 [341]


13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

22. 23. 24. 25.

Education Agriculture, Forests and Veterinary Development recurrent Antiquities Public Works Public Works recurrent Post and Telegraph Land and Surveys Police and Prisons (a) Police (b) Prison (c) Supplementary Reserve Miscellaneous Audit Office Bedouin Court of Appeal Advances other than temporary

26,000 6,800 200 2,590 6,850 24,000 18,150 24,700 120,210 11,200 21,000 9,000 4,030 910 4,300


397,220

C


26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35.

Head Public Works Police and Prisons Antiquities Education Post and Telegraph Customs, Trade and Industry Development (water boring) Public Health Finance Expenses of delegate to London Conference on Palestine

£P 232,000 9,000 850 710 1,450 200 1,800 230 1,410 700

Total extraordinary expenditure Total expenditure

248,350 645,570

[342]

Appendix B GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS

Arab Distribution List Prime Minister Chief Justice Director of Education Director of Public Works Director of Public Health Director of Agriculture Director of Land and Surveys Director of Antiquities Postmaster General Treasurer Mutasarrif of Ajlun Mutasarrif of Balqa Mutasarrif of Karak Mutasarrif of Maan Governor of Amman Auditor President of the Court of Appeal President of the Court of First Instance Qaim Maqam of Ajlun Qaim Maqam of Jarash Qaim Maqam of Madaba Qaim Maqam of Taffilah Qaim Maqam of Aqaba Commander of the District of Ajlun Commander of the District of Balqa Commander of the District of Karak Commander of the District of Maan [343]


Commander of the Amman Police Inspector of Prisons Commander of the Reserve Force Commander of the Subdistrict of Ajlun Commander of the Subdistrict of Jarash Commander of the Subdistrict of Balqa Commander of the Subdistrict of Amman Commander of the Subdistrict of Zizia Commander of the Subdistrict of Taffilah Commander of the Subdistrict of Wadi al-Musa Commander of the Subdistrict of Aqaba Arab Legion Legal Adviser

English Distribution List British Resident Financial Adviser Judicial Adviser Director of Customs Inspector of Antiquities Director of the Department of Survey Amir Liwa (Major General) Russell Inspector General of Police and Prisons, Jerusalem Commander of the RAF in Palestine and Trans-Jordan Commanding Officer of 14 (B) Squadron, RAF Amman Flight Commander Strange, RAF Commander of the TJFF Zarqa Commander of the TJFF Maan Divisional Superintendent, HRT Amman Air Commodore Gordon, RAF Group Captain MacEwan, RAF Group Captain Rees, RAF, VC Mr Brain, Jerusalem Financial Secretary of the Arab Legion Controller of Arab Legion Stores H. Peake, Esq [344]

Appendix C MINUTES OF THE MEETING BETWEEN HRH THE AMIR ABDULLAH AND THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON 9 JANUARY 1937 IN AMMAN

THE AMIR: Naturally time is short, this is why I ask you, please start the talks; and if there are any questions the commission wishes to ask me please do. LORD PEEL: In their evidence the Jews claimed that they are poor and persecuted everywhere, and they pleaded that they should have a place to inhabit in security. If the Palestine question is settled, would your Highness accept a number of Jews in Trans-Jordan? THE AMIR: This is a question I was not expecting, and on this occasion I want to say: that during the disturbances in Palestine, the High Commissioner wrote to me in one of his letters, ‘the Arabs must not put the carriage in front of the horses’, and I think the answer of the High Commissioner is the best answer to your question. Laughter by all……! LORD PEEL: I did not intend to ask your Highness a question similar to the saying you mentioned but the reality is that our time is very short, and we like to take this opportunity to have your Highness’s opinion on the subject, on the assumption that the Palestinian question was settled. THE AMIR: On the basis that the Palestinian question has been finally settled in a way that no problems will occur in the future, the question of Jewish entry to Trans-Jordan must be looked into differently. This is because there is a difference between an entry and another entry. If the Jews want to enter into Trans-Jordan as subjects of the country enjoying government protection and obey its laws, and do not ask for special privileges or political rights, there will be no objection to the entry of a certain number of them who will benefit and give benefit, on condition that this will be accepted by the people of the country, the Government and the Mandatory Power. [345]


LORD PEEL: What happened in Palestine between the Jews and the Muslims, I mean the Arabs, is a situation complained about by the two sides, and it is said: if there was those who represent the Arabs, and those who represent the Jews, and they meet each other, it is possible that a solution might be achieved between them. What does Your Highness think? THE AMIR: You must tell me who gave this opinion so that my answer could be based on that knowledge. LORD PEEL: That was among other suggestions. THE AMIR: I can not oblige you to name the suggesters of that opinion, but I would say: if you remain impartial, and leave the Arabs and the Jews to solve their problems by themselves that will be useless, and there will never be agreement. PROFESSOR COUPLAND: What is your Highness’s suggestion for a solution to the question. Among my duties, I travel, and I travelled in some parts of the Empire and came in contact with a group of enlightened Muslims whom I found to be moderates in their thought, and I have no doubt that this spirit is embodied in the Muslim religion. I refer back to the first question by Lord Peel, and say: if the Palestinian question was settled, is it possible to accept some Jews in Trans-Jordan?, and will this acceptance be unlimited or applicable to certain classes of them? THE AMIR: I have answered the first part of your question, and say: naturally, entry must be allowed to certain classes of Jews, but how to solve the Palestinian problem, I must first be informed of the suggested solutions that you think of, and then I will give my opinion. LORD PEEL: We really want to know your Highness’s opinion. THE AMIR: The manner of a solution is found in the Mandate for Palestine itself, which provided for a Local Government in Palestine. If that Local Government is established in Palestine, it will protect the duties of the general administration, and it will execute the Mandate without harm to the rights of the original population of Palestine. The present Government of Palestine, is His Majesty’s Government, represented by the Government of Palestine, and every time the Jews create a problem, they appeal to the Jews of the world to help them, and the Arabs also [346]

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appeal to the Arab World to help them if they fall in a problem, and the Mandatory Government is standing between the two parties endeavouring to please them as much as she could. The opinion is to establish a Local Government, under the supervision of the Mandatory Power, which can carry out the general administration and does not leave any opportunity to any influence from the outside as are allowed now. LORD PEEL: If a Local Government is established to be given the responsibility to govern, the majority would naturally be Arab and they would expel all the Jews who entered the country. THE AMIR: The Lord must not forget that I said: the establishment of a Local Government responsible for the implementation of the Mandate under the supervision of the Mandatory Power. The Mandate provided for the facilitation of Jewish immigration on condition that it will not harm the rights of the original inhabitants. The Local Government can govern more accurately in fulfilling that obligation as well as maintaining that condition. LORD PEEL: The Mandate was given to His Majesty’s Government from the League of Nations according to certain known conditions. If a Local Government is established in Palestine to take action for the implementation of the Mandate, it will take action contrary to the Mandate itself. THE AMIR: I do not agree with the Lord on this opinion; we have seen a Mandate in Syria, another in Iraq, and like that in Trans-Jordan, and the local governments of these countries did not take actions contrary to the provision of the Mandate. LORD PEEL: Then, Your Highness means that the local government should be limited with conditions, and that Jewish immigration should be limited to a certain number; what is the number you think of? The Jews now are a few more than 400 thousand, and they and the Arabs are naturally increasing. THE AMIR: Yes, I mean that the Mandate must be interpreted clearly, because in its present context it is not conditioned by any limit, and if this situation continues, the time will come when the whole of Palestine will be Jewish, because immigration is not limited either by a certain number or the speed in which it is implemented. As for the number [347]


of Jews in Palestine, I think it has now reached the limit where it must stop. HENRY COX: What is the percentage your Highness thinks should be for the Jews of the whole population of Palestine? THE AMIR: In my opinion it must not exceed 35 per cent of the whole population. PROFESSOR COUPLAND: We have heard among the suggestions that if representatives of the Arabs and the Jews join the Executive Council in equal numbers, this will be considered that they have participated in the Government of the country. That is to say two Arabs and two Jews in the Executive Council which will remain under the presidency of the High Commissioner. THE AMIR: Whatever the numbers are, if the presidency remains for the High Commissioner, no hope can be expected. SIR RUMBOLD: We have seen the Arabs of Palestine appeal to the Kings of the Arabs on two different occasions, the first when the strike was ended, and the other, when they decided to contact the Royal Commission. Do you think your Highness that the Kings of the Arabs and their peoples will continue to support the Arabs of Palestine, and the Arabs of Palestine will always ask for their help in such matters? THE AMIR: The Arabs appealed according to their will in the first and the second, and you should not be concerned with the persons of the Kings, because we notice that the Monarchies in the present time lose a great deal of its authorities, and matters are in the hands of the peoples. The whole Arab Nation has religious, economic and national relations with Palestine which cannot be deserted. Public opinion is the owner of the word in the subject. Now if Ibn Saud goes, there will be no Ibn Saud like him after him. There will be no person like Faisal after him in Iraq, but the people are in command. The Arabs of Palestine have decided to rebel by themselves to defend themselves. If their Kings ordered them to rebel a few years ago, I do not think they would have obeyed. You have seen the Palestine people hold a strike for six months without any hesitation, men and women, young and old, were unanimous in their decision. What if the whole Arab peninsula decides to go on a strike in support of Palestine, how would the conditions of their Kings be then? [348]

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LORD PEEL: There is no doubt that this is the reality in all countries of the world, but Kings do express the wishes of their peoples by what they do. THE AMIR: This is why first priority must go to the wishes of peoples, and there is not one Arab who accepts Palestine to be Jewish. LORD PEEL: Then Your Highness’s suggestion for solving the problem would place His Majesty’s Government in a difficult situation where she finds herself having to take one of two actions; either to go back to the League of Nations and say that she is not able to implement the Mandate as it is now and ask to abolish it, or ask to amend the Mandate. If His Majesty’s Government takes the first course of action what picture does Your Highness visualise will then occur in Palestine? The Jews did not come to Palestine except with reliance on that Mandate which the League of Nations gave to England. It is not logical then that the League of Nations will accept to leave Palestine alone, where the Jews would be in danger. If the League of Nations accept that America will not accept. In that case the League of Nations will give the Mandate to another State. Who will accept the Mandate? Is it Italy? THE AMIR: I have suggested a method to solve the problem according to your question, but how that method could be implemented, and what His Majesty’s Government must do to achieve that aim, is none of my concern, it is your concern. I do not say that England should desert her Mandate, but how to achieve the aim I say that the Mandate should either be amended or interpreted so that it does not leave room for any uncertainty. LORD PEEL: Then Your Highness you see that the British Mandate should remain. THE AMIR: I see that Britain must implement her obligations to the Arabs. LORD PEEL: Then Your Highness says that it is necessary to amend or interpret the Mandate. THE AMIR: This is what I say: Britain is tied with the Arabs by promises before the Balfour Declaration, and I cannot see why the latter promise was implemented and no concern has been given to the first promises. There were ties and relations between the Arabs and Britain before the [349]


establishment of the League of Nations, and Britain had undertaken to my father not to agree to any peace treaty before the Arabs achieve their freedom. How can Britain desert that written promise which I have. If the Mandate was limited to concern with the English Jews, then we could say that there is an excuse, but I cannot understand why should Britain have the responsibility of creating a national home for the Jews of the world who are scattered all over the world, and do that on the expense of the Arab Palestinian People? LORD PEEL: (looked to his colleagues and said) We have taken much of His Highness’s time, and we present our thanks for the frankness with which you spoke. THE AMIR: I hope that the Commission will know that they are with a man who appreciates her mission and presence, and he is concerned with the Arab situation, as well as maintaining the friendship which connect them with Great Britain, this is why you will never hear from me except the truth constantly without hesitation. Trans-Jordan who maintained her friendship with Britain during the recent disturbances in Palestine, hopes that Britain will solve the Palestine problem by maintaining her interest and does not bring danger to her in the future. It is the duty of her Amir to guide you to what he sees as better to achieve that aim. I have prepared a memorandum which contains the opinion of all the Arabs in the question of Palestine, if you wish to see it, I will send it to you tomorrow. LORD PEEL: We will be grateful to Your Highness if you could send it, and we knew of all the difficulties you faced during the disturbances in Palestine, and we appreciate fully the efficiency with which you controlled the situation, and we wish after the discretion of your difficult situation, that you will appreciate how is our situation, we who are requested to enter into the same problem, at the same time we hope that nothing may occur in the future which will add to your problems. THE AMIR: To prevent my problems in the future will depend on your report. (Laughter by all.) I will send my memorandum to you tomorrow.

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MEMORANDUM SENT BY THE AMIR ABDULLAH TO THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON 4 MARCH 1937 (A TRANSLATION)

Honourable Members I can feel the heavy weight of responsibility which has been cast upon you and the mighty obstacles with which you have to deal. I have thought it expedient however, to lay before you the gist of various opinions entertained by the Arabs, their preoccupations and discussions concerning the Palestine case. When I say the Arabs and refer particularly to the Arabs in Palestine, I do not overlook their brothers in neighbouring countries, including the farthest boundaries of Arab Kingdoms and Principalities (Emirates). All these people are keeping a careful and vigilant watch over the situation in Palestine owing to the unity of their feelings, their national and religious ties as well as the bond which they believe to unite their future destiny. I hope to be the most accurate commentator on the Arabs and the most candid interpreter of their desires. As to my personal opinion I would prefer to postpone the expression thereof until some other opportunity. I do, however, wish at the outset to draw the attention of the Honourable Royal Commission to the manner in which the Arabs defined their own country and to say that this definition dates back by over 1300 years; I cannot think that any nation under the sun has inherited such a written demarcation of their countries and a definition of their various parts from such a remote period. The clearest proof which the Arabs submit as to the authenticity of their statements is found in the description of Arabia by Abdullah Ibn Abbas who was one of the Prophet’s Companions, his blood cousin and Jurist of the Muslim Nation. Ibn Abbas said: Arabia has been called a peninsula because it is surrounded by rivers and seas from all sides and formed into the likeness of one of the sea islands. The Euphrates springs from the country of the ‘Rum’ and appears in the district of Kinsarreen and flows down on the edge of al-Jezeera and most of Iraq until it reaches Basra, thence to Abbadan. From that place the sea proceeds in a westerly direction surrounding [351]


Arabia touching its coast such as Safwan, which lies at a distance of one stage from Bab al-Mirbid at Basra, thence to Kazima, al-Kateef, Hagar, Asyaf al-Bahrain, Oman and al-Shahar. A section of the sea extends to Hadramout and the neighbourhood of Ibbein and then turns to the west towards Dahlak from which it continues and passes through Tahaim al-Yemen, the country of Hakam, the Ashareein and ’Ak, next continuing to Jedda, the coast of Mecca, and to al-Jar, the coast of Medina, the coast of al-Tor the Gulf of Esla, and the Raya coast until it reaches the Red Sea of Egypt which joins that country. The Nile comes in on the west of this branch of the sea, running from the Upper Sudan parallel with the sea until it flows into the sea of Egypt and Syria; thence the sea extends from Egypt until it reaches Palestine at the environs of Ascalan, thence to Tyre and the coast of the Jordan, Beirut and other places of the coast of Damascus continuing to the Littoral of Homs and Kansarreen until it reaches the point from which the Euphrates flows down along the edges of Kansarreen and al Jezira.

I do not wish to go beyond this limitation and to quote what the Arab historians of old said about Palestine in that it was the dwelling place of the Amalakites and their tribes and even the Hyksos Kings who conquered and occupied Egypt for sometime; I would only say that ever since the foundation of the Arab Kingdom in its true sense as defined by Ibn Abbas, the Arabs were settled in and never left their country, Palestine. Subsequent wars which raged for hundreds of years could not deprive them of Palestine nor terminate their existence therefrom. On the contrary they continued to live in that country for ages without interruption. A nation whose belief in their country is thus with such a history and period of occupation cannot admit the claims of any alien to rights therein, whoever they may be. The Jews did not originate in Palestine neither was it their birth place; they invaded it from outside as did other foreign invaders, they fought the Philistines from whom they wrenched a portion of the land on which they settled for a limited period. They were later expelled from the country by the sword in the same way as they entered it, and the conquering nations occupied the land until the rightful people restored the land. Therefore the Arabs cannot find any historical justification for the claims of the Jews to reside in Palestine as of right. [352]

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The Arabs regained the country from the Romans and remained in possession thereof, uninterruptedly, until the present day; they will never move an inch therefrom. Moreover, the Arabs cannot understand how a claim could be made to a country in which the Jews settled in the manner I have explained above and from which they were expelled about two thousand years ago, and then comes the recent policy which states that such a claim is legal. I wonder what international law would admit the legality of such a remote claim and how the nations of the world would fare if this theory was adopted, including the British Empire itself and the nations which form the League of Nations. Should the Arabs pass from the historical to the social aspect, there is no intelligent individual amongst them who would not express disapproval of the conduct of the Jews who were persecuted at all times and yet failed to take a lesson or benefit from experience. The Arabs have before them the examples of the events which have befallen the Jews recently in Germany and Poland and what other Great Nations are about to do in that respect. Therefore, since the Jews failed to assimilate with the civilised and educated nations with which they lived for hundreds of years, speaking their languages and even interbreeding and, despite all this, remained a unit detached from the community as a whole as a result of which persecution befell them and their co-patriots compelled them to seek another Home, why then should the Arabs accept that which others have rejected and what others found intolerable. Moreover, how could the Jews mix with the Arabs and associate with them after it had been proved to each nation amongst which the Jews lived that it was useless to be in close relations with them and that fraternisation with them was impossible. The Jews contend that the Balfour Declaration accords them a national Home in Palestine. This might have been admissible legally and reasonably had Palestine been an uninhabited desert; but Palestine was inhabited when that Declaration was made and had ‘its original inhabitants’ as stated in the Declaration. Therefore what right has any nation to decide arbitrarily the fate of another country and grant it to others when the original inhabitants are yet alive? The World War was waged on the principle that ‘Right is Might’, not ‘Might is Right’. I do not know how the nations would receive in [353]


future the declaration of the Great Powers regarding their objects in waging any new war which may take place, and what the attitude of those people would be in regard to such declarations after they had such a cruel experience. Balfour did not limit the extent of his Declaration at all, but left it free from any time limit. It appears that he intended that it should continue to be applied for ever or until such time as there would remain not a single Arab in Palestine, as the Jews say, when they will be able to drive the Arabs from their country and to establish a Jewish Kingdom on their ruins. All this is due to the bounty of Balfour who was charitable out of another’s possessions without the other party being aware or having a say in the matter. The reasonable Arab politicians believe that the Balfour Declaration is the chief obstacle to the possibility of an association between the Arabs and the Jews. The fact is that the Jews became conceited through that Declaration and this led them to exceed all reasonable bounds and fill the world with threats against the Arabs vaunting their Zionist dreams, basing themselves on the Balfour Declaration and on the fact that the spears of England are at the disposal of the Jews which they can use to stab the Arabs and so establish their alleged Kingdom. Those Jews have forgotten that there is another nation in Palestine, that is the Arab Nation, and which has its own honour, religion and history, and that those privileges which Balfour gave them in charity cannot wipe out the Arabs from Palestine, no matter what magic or power they attribute to them. The Jews should have sought to be friendly to that nation and to win its confidence and not alarm it by their screaming. They ought to have appreciated, from the humane and logical point of view, the heavy blow aimed at the Arabs by the competition in their own country of the Jews; the Jews should not have become arrogant and frozen every feeling in the Arabs. Arab politicians believe that had it not been for the Balfour Declaration the Jews would have been nearer to an understanding and some of their desires might have been nearer to realisation. At this point I would call the attention of the Honourable Commission to the fact that the hatred with which the Jews were met in European countries was not so common in either the Islamic or Arab world where they had a welcome place; but after the Balfour Declaration was issued followed by certain of their statements, the Jews lost the sympathy which the Arabs [354]

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felt towards them. That was due to the ill-effects of the Balfour Declaration. This is really a regrettable and painful result. It is strange that the Balfour Declaration was made in favour of a people which had no previous political status in Palestine; it was similar to a birth certificate issued before the child was born. Only the Arabs were in Palestine and, in the circumstances, how could it be justifiable to make a declaration in favour of a strange (alien) people and in respect to a land in which they were not settled and, at the same time, to deprive the legitimate owner of that land of his rights. At the time of the Declaration, Palestine was considered to be an Occupied Enemy Territory, a title which could not be granted heedlessly and which in Arab eyes is inconsistent with such a queer and irregular Declaration. Here also it behoves me to remind the Members of the Royal Commission of a serious matter and that is: the Arabs demand the fulfilment of the written pledges which were given to them through my late father, the King, in accordance with which they shed their blood in the Great War from the furthest corners of the Hijaz to Aleppo and facilitated to the Army of Lord Allemby the free and undisturbed advance in a country where his Forces were secure and not obliged to contend with the conditions which Armies usually have to face when in enemy territory. The Arabs still believe that Great Britain has many obligations to discharge and that over and above the Balfour Declaration a commitment, arising from active co-operation from the beginning of the war until Armistice, was incurred. Moreover, this pledge preceded the Balfour Declaration and was confirmed later, through the Joint Declaration which was given by Great Britain and France in 1918. Therefore, the Balfour Declaration falls between two groups of pledges, preceding and succeeding it, and the Arabs are at a loss to know how it has been destined to remain in existence, since it falls between two mill stones. The Arabs believe, and circumstances strengthen their belief, that the British Government in the Administration of Palestine considers only one aspect of its pledges and that is ‘to place the country in a political, administrative and economic situation which will secure the establishment of a Jewish National Home therein’. What existence then remains for the Arabs, so menaced, as we have seen, in their political, administrative and economic affairs? [355]


If the Arabs look back to their position in Palestine before the War and to what they had attained after the War and note this great influx of Jews which in 14 years attained a number which took the Arabs 14 centuries to reach, they could be entitled to tremble before this sudden death which threatens them and to wonder what would become of them in future. That part of the Mandate to which I have referred is one which the Government has by act and by deed carried out and adopted various means for its fulfilment, but the provisions of the Mandate regarding the original inhabitants are still ‘ink on paper’. The Mandate, for example, refers to the establishment of a Government independent of the Mandatory Power under the title of the Government of the country. Where is this Government which should make arrangements with the Mandatory Power regarding several matters (vide Article 13)? Let us see then what Article 17 says about this Government regarding the Army and Air Force, for example. Has the Mandatory Power encouraged local autonomy and self government provided for in the Mandate, in as much as it has encouraged immigration in all its categories and phases? Then again, Article 6 of the Mandate provides that the Palestine Government should guarantee that the rights and position of all sections of the population should not be prejudiced and that the Jewish immigration should be under ‘suitable conditions’. Has the Government given any regard to this Article, in so far as the prejudicing of the people’s rights and position and the introduction of ‘suitable conditions’ are concerned? The Mandatory Power, in the opinion of the Arabs, has been extremely partial in protecting the interests of the Jews, whom it called Palestinians by force and gave them Palestine citizenship when they are far away in their respective countries and before their feet touched or their eyes saw Palestine, whether they were Poles, Russians or of other countries. The Mandatory still continues to exert itself in their favour beyond even the limit of the Balfour Declaration; it invented a new principle which was added to that Declaration and which it called ‘the absorptive capacity’. As it took upon itself to invent this principle it also took upon itself its interpretation without the consultation of the Arabs, as it considers itself bound by the opinion of the Jewish Agency which recognised as [356]

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representing the Jews. As to the Arabs, the Administration never gave a thought as to who should represent them or state their opinion, but left them to the mercy of fate! The Arabs give the following proof to show that the Mandatory Power only concerns itself with the Jewish case; the number of Jewish immigrants which entered Palestine during 14 years was 100,000 or a little more and the country was groaning under this influx. When the Arabs complained and three British Commissions investigated the reasons which led the Arabs to act as they did and the Commissions returned to England and submitted their reports in favour of the original inhabitants, the Government did nothing and allowed the influx of immigration into Palestine to continue to the extent that in the course of only four years 300,000 Jewish immigrants entered Palestine in addition to the previous 100,000. Then again, the immigration which the Government calls ‘illegal immigration’ and by which it means those Jews who enter Palestine clandestinely and without its knowledge, has also exceeded all reasonable limits and was almost equal to the ‘legal immigration’. What did the Government do in the circumstances? Did it diminish the number of permits to balance the two kind of immigration, or did it deport those who entered illegally? No, it magnanimously increased the number of permits, and immigration, both legal and illegal, continued to flow into the country. How then could the Arabs be asked to be reassured or have confidence that they are not on the threshold of their country and that in a very short period they will be ejected from the threshold out of the door into the open air? The Arabs have very often called the attention of the British Government, especially before the recent disturbances in Palestine, to the recommendations which the British experts and British Enquiry Commissions unanimously made and to the necessity of respecting British obligations towards the Arabs, even those prescribed in the Mandate, and to remember that the Arabs have a natural right in their own country and a national existence which has become menaced with extinction. Furthermore, the Arabs believe that the Balfour Declaration has been fulfilled in Palestine as the Jews have already their own towns and villages as well as their language and a great number of officials in the various Government Departments. To exceed this means making Palestine all Jewish and not making a National Home in it for the Jews. [357]


Therefore, no Arab, no matter how reasonable and moderate he may be and no matter how far he participates with those who support the Balfour Declaration in their sympathy towards the Jews, can but advise that a ‘halt’ should be called and that not one step further should be attempted. During the World War and afterwards the Arabs proved that they were loyal friends to Great Britain. The latter vicissitudes have increased their belief in this and their loyalty to the British Empire has become a traditional and firm policy in their Kingdom of Iraq, their Emirate in Trans-Jordan, the Kingdoms of Arabia and the Yemen as well as in all other Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, and other Arab Chieftainships. On the Mediterranean and Red Sea littorals, surrounded as they are by millions of the Islamic world, they look up to Great Britain with reliance and confidence; they believe that this Empire would not lose all these relations by sacrificing Palestine to the Jews, who have already attained their desire by establishing a National Home in Palestine in the shortest possible time, and thus open a deep wound in the breasts of both the Arab and Moslem Worlds. In doing so Great Britain would be tampering with Moslems’ sensitive nerve. As to the possible danger to Great Britain’s interests from Jewish power and Jewish deceits there is no better proof against such sophistry than the fact that the Jews have not been able to take any effective step against any other nation which has ejected them from its country and is still scattering them all over the world. Imperial interests are beyond being affected by them and the proof is apparent everywhere. When however the Arabs refer to Imperial interests, they include themselves as well since they are tied to the British Empire by firm bonds and they stand, in accordance with alliance, geographical position and mutual interests, with the Empire in this world, which is full of anxiety and unrest, on the verge of life and death. As for me I will continue to work for the maintenance of friendly relations between Great Britain and the Arab and Moslem world as I desire them to be, and as they should be; firm, loyal and free from blemish. I call upon the Arabs to safeguard these relations and in doing so I do not exclude their friends, the British, from my appeal.

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Appendix D LAW TO PROVIDE FOR AND TO REGULATE THE CONTROL OF MEMBERS OF THE ROYAL FAMILY BY HIS HIGHNESS THE AMIR

1.

2. 3.

This law shall be called ‘The Royal Family Law, 1937’, and shall come into force one month from the date of its publication in the official Gazette. His Highness the Amir as head of the Royal Family shall exercise powers of control over it. The following only shall be considered members of the Royal Family: (1) The descendants of His Highness the Amir Abdullah Ibn al Husain save that the descendants of females who have married persons other than members of the Royal Family shall not be included. (2) The children of His Majesty King al Husain whether male or female and the descendants of his male children who are habitual residents in Trans-Jordan and whom His Highness the Amir Abdullah Ibn al Husain shall by Iradah admit to the Royal Family. (3) The wives of the members of the Royal Family as above defined and their widows until they marry.

4. 5.

6.

Members of the Royal Family shall bear the title of Prince or Princess. Save as provided in the present Law, members of the Royal Family are governed by the Shariah Law and by other laws in force in Trans-Jordan. A member of the Royal Family who wishes to marry, and any person who intends to contract a marriage on behalf of a member of the Royal Family who is under his paternal authority must, before so doing, obtain the permission of His Highness the Amir. Such permission shall be recorded by the Prime Minister in a special register, and shall be communicated by him in writing to the person seeking the permission. [359]


7.

8.

In the case of the marriage of a female of the Royal Family, such permission may be given subject to the condition that it shall be provided in the marriage contract that the right of divorce is given to her, which same shall be exercised either by her, or by the person named in the said permission. A member of the Royal Family who marries without such permission may be declared by Iradah of His Highness the Amir with the advice of the Council mentioned below to have ceased to be a member of the Royal Family and to have forfeited all privileges and titles as such. His Highness may extend this exclusion and forfeiture to the children of the marriage contracted without permission, or he may limit the same to the children of the said marriage, or he may merely deprive the other party to the marriage of the rank and title which the person would otherwise have obtained by marriage. A member of the Royal Family who contracts a marriage on behalf of another member of the Royal Family without the permission above mentioned may also in like manner be declared to have ceased to be a member of the Royal Family and to have forfeited all privileges and titles as such. His Highness the Amir shall have the right to control the expenditure by any member of the Royal Family of any sum provided for that member in the budget. He may cancel such provision wholly or in part, permanently or for a stated period. To assist His Highness the Amir in exercising his authority under this law a council is constituted, composed as follows: (1) A member of the Royal Family appointed by His Highness the Amir. (2) The Prime Minister. (3) A member of the Government appointed by the Prime Minister. (4) Qadi al Qudah (The Chief Judge). (5) The President of the Court of Appeal.

9.

Members of the Council must be Muslims. In the event of the person occupying any of the offices above named not being a Muslim, the Muslim who occupies the office nearest to him shall be appointed by His Highness in his place. The President of the Council shall be the member of the Royal Family mentioned in the above Article, or in his absence the other members in the order named therein. [360]

APPENDICES

Three of the five members of the Council shall form a quorum, provided that the Prime Minister is one of them. In the event that the matter for consideration being a matter of personal status within the meaning of the Organic Law the Qadi al Qudah must also be present. The Council shall decide by a majority vote, the President having a casting vote. In cases where there is a question of pronouncing an inhibition of a member of the Royal Family, or of removing the same, the Council shall co-opt in any advisory capacity, one of the nearest relations of the member in question. The duties of Secretary of the Council shall be performed by an official appointed by His Highness the Amir. The Archives of the Council shall be preserved in the Palace. 10. A member of the Royal Family who wishes to divorce his or her wife or husband, or the other party to such marriage who is not a member of the Royal Family and who desires such divorce, must before so doing inform His Highness the Amir in writing. If His Highness considers that an attempt should be made to conciliate the parties, but does not wish to make the same himself, he may refer the matter to the Council. The Council shall hear the person desiring the divorce, and shall attempt in every way possible to effect a conciliation, and may if it thinks fit call the parties before it. If no conciliation is possible and a divorce takes place, the Council shall officially record the fact. 11. In matters of personal status within the meaning of the Organic Law in which any party directly affected is a member of the Royal Family, the Council shall exercise without appeal all the powers of the Court or Courts which would otherwise be competent to deal with the matter; and the said Court or Courts shall be incompetent to deal with the same, unless His Highness orders that the matter be decided by them and not by the Council. The Council shall not be competent to deal with any matter affecting a Waqf. 12. His Highness the Amir with the advice of the Council shall give orders for and control the education of members of the Royal Family who are under age, and who are near to the succession to the Throne, although the parental authority over such person may [361]


13.

14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

19.

be vested in some other person. In such case such other person shall if possible be consulted by the Council before it gives its opinion. If a member of the Royal Family is guilty of conduct which is gravely unbecoming to his or her royal rank, His Highness the Amir may with the advice of the Council order that he or she is unworthy to belong to the Royal Family and that he or she shall no longer be a member of the same. In the event of a male member being so degraded, his wife shall also cease to be a member of the Royal Family, to which she became related by reason of her marriage, but his descendants however shall continue to belong to the Royal Family unless it is expressly ordered otherwise. His Highness the Amir has full power to restore to the Royal Family any member who has been excluded therefrom. The Council shall on the request of His Highness the Amir give its opinion on any matter affecting the Royal Family. His Highness with the advice of the Council may make rules for the procedure to be followed in matters coming before the Council. Decisions of the Council in matters within their competence shall be executed by the Minister of Justice. Declarations of the birth or of the death of a member of the Royal Family will be made to the Prime Minister and on his orders will be registered by the secretary of the Council in a special register. The Prime Minister will also notify the Department of Public Health thereof. Declarations of births shall be made by the father, or in his absence by a relative residing in the house where the birth took place. Declarations of death shall be made by the relatives who are living with the deceased. The provisions of this Law shall cease to apply to the members of the Royal Family who have been declared by His Highness the Amir to be no longer members of the same.

[362]

Appendix E SHORT SUMMARY OF THE MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PALESTINE ROYAL COMMISSION

I. Recommendations under the Mandate Administration There should be no hesitation in dispensing with the services of Palestinian officers whose loyalty or impartiality is uncertain. There should be more decentralization. A British Senior Government Advocate should be appointed. The Gaff–Haifa road should be completed as speedily as possible.

Public security Should disorders break out again of such a nature as to require the intervention of the military, there should be no hesitation in enforcing martial law. In such an event the disarmament first of the Arabs and then of the Jews should be enforced. In mixed areas British District Officers should be appointed. Central and local police reserves are necessary. A large mobile mounted force is also essential. A more rigorous Press Ordinance should be adopted.

Financial and fiscal questions Negotiations should be opened to amend the provisions of Article 18 of the Mandate and put the trade of Palestine on a fairer basis.

Land The High Commissioner should be empowered to prohibit the transfer of land in any stated area to Jews. (The amendment of the Mandate may first be necessary.) [363]


Until survey and settlement are complete the sale of isolated and comparatively small plots of land to Jews should be prohibited. The Commission favour a proposal for the creation of special Public Utility Companies to undertake development schemes. An expert Committee should be appointed to draw up a Land Code. Settlement should be expedited. In the event of further sales of land by Arabs to Jews, the rights of any Arab tenants or cultivators must be preserved. Legislation vesting surface water in the High Commissioner is essential. Possibilities of irrigation should be explored. The scheme for the development of the Huleh district is commended. Measures of afforestation are recommended.

Immigration The volume of Jewish immigration should continue to be restricted in the first instance by the economic absorptive capacity of Palestine, but it should be subject to a political high level, covering Jewish immigration of all categories. This high level should be fixed for the next five years at 12,000 per annum. Amendments in the categories under the Immigration Ordinance and in the definition of ‘dependency’ are proposed.

Education The Administration should regard the claims on the revenue of Arab education as second in importance only to those of public security. The present proportion between the grant to Jewish education and the amount spent on the Arabs should not be altered: an increase in the grant to the Jews should result from an increase in the total expenditure on education. In any further discussion of the project of a British University in the Near East, the possibility should be considered of locating it in the neighbourhood of Jerusalem or Haifa.

[364]

APPENDICES

Local government An attempt should be made to strengthen those few local councils which still exist in Arab rural areas, but not to revivify councils which have broken down, or to create new ones unless there is a genuine demand for them. The more important local councils and all the municipalities should be reclassified. by means of a new Ordinance, into groups according to their respective size and importance. The services of an expert on local government should be obtained to assist in drafting the new ordinance and improving the relations between Government and the municipalities. The need of Tel Aviv for a substantial loan should be promptly and sympathetically reconsidered.

Self-governing institutions The Commission do not recommend that any attempt be made to revive the proposal of a Legislative Council, but they would welcome an enlargement of the Advisory Council by the addition of unofficial members.

Conclusion The above recommendations for dealing with Arab and Jewish grievances under the Mandate will not remove them or prevent their recurrence. They are the best palliatives the Commission can devise, but they will not solve the problem.

II. Recommendations for termination of the present Mandate on a basis of Partition Having reached the conclusion that there is no possibility of solving the Palestine problem under the existing Mandate (or even under a scheme of Cantonisation), the Commission recommend the termination of the present Mandate on the basis of partition and put forward a definite scheme which they consider to be practicable, honourable and just. The scheme is as follows. [365]


The Mandate for Palestine should terminate and be replaced by a treaty system in accordance with the precedent set in Iraq and Syria. Under Treaties to be negotiated by the Mandatory with the Government of Trans-Jordan and representatives of the Arabs of Palestine on the one hand and with the Zionist Organisation on the other it would be declared that two sovereign independent States would shortly be established, (l) an Arab State consisting of Trans-Jordan united with that part of Palestine allotted to the Arabs, (2) a Jewish State consisting of that part of Palestine allotted to the Jews. The Mandatory would undertake to support any requests for admission to the League of Nations made by the Governments of the Arab and Jewish States. The Treaties would include strict guarantees by the protection of minorities. Military conventions would be attached to the treaties. A new Mandate should be instituted to execute the trust of maintaining the sanctity of Jerusalem and Bethlehem and ensuring free and safe access to them for all the world. An enclave should be demarcated to which this Mandate should apply, extending from a point north of Jerusalem to a point south of Bethlehem, and access to the sea should be provided by a corridor extending from Jerusalem to Jaffa. The policy of the Balfour Declaration would not apply to the Mandated Area. The Mandatory should also be entrusted with the administration of Nazareth and with full powers to safeguard the sanctity of the waters and shores of Lake Tiberias, and similarly with the protection of religious endowments and of such buildings, monuments and places in the Arab and Jewish States as are sacred to the Jews and the Arabs respectively. The frontier between the Arab and Jewish States recommended is as follows. Starting from Ras an Naqura, it follows the existing northern and eastern frontier of Palestine to Lake Tiberias and crosses the Lake to the outflow of the River Jordan, whence it continues down the river to a point rather north of Beisan. It then cuts across the Beisan Plain and runs along the southern edge of the Valley of Jezreel to a point near Megiddo, whence it crosses the Carmel Ridge in the neighbourhood of the Megiddo road. It then runs southwards down the eastern edge of the Maritime Plain, curving west to avoid Tulkarm, until it reaches the Jerusalem–Jaffa Corridor near Lydda. South of the Corridor it continues [366]

APPENDICES

down the edge of the Plain to a point about ten miles south of Rehovot, whence it turns west to the sea. Haifa, Tiberias, Safad and Acre should be kept for a period under Mandatory administration. Jaffa should form an outlying part of the Arab State, narrow belts of land being acquired and cleared on the north and south sides of the town to provide access from the Mandatory Corridor to the sea. The Jewish treaty should provide for free transit of goods in bond between the Arab State and Haifa. In view of possible commercial developments in the future, an enclave on the north-west coast of the Gulf of Aqaba should be under administration, and the Arab treaty should provide for free transit of goods between the Jewish State and this enclave as also to the Egyptian frontier at Rafah. The treaty should provide for similar facilities for the transit of goods between the Mandated Area of Haifa, Rafah, and the Gulf of Aqaba. The Jewish State should pay a subvention to the Arab State. A Finance Commission should be appointed to advise as to its amount and as to the division of the public debt of Palestine and other financial questions. In view of the backwardness of Trans-Jordan, Parliament should be asked to make a grant of £2,000,000 to the Arab State. As part of the proposed Treaty System, a Commercial Convention should be concluded with a view to establishing a common tariff over the widest possible range of imported articles and facilitating the freest possible interchange of goods between the three territories. The rights of all existing Civil Servants, including rights to pensions or gratuities, should be fully honoured. Agreements entered into by the Government of Palestine for the development and security of industries, e.g., that with the Palestine Potash Company, should be taken over and carried out by the Governments of the Arab and Jewish States. Guarantees to that effect should be given in the Treaties. The security of the Power Station at Jisr el Majami should be similarly guaranteed. [367]


The treaties should provide that if Arab owners of land in the Jewish State or Jewish owners in the Arab State wish to sell their land, the Government of the State concerned should be responsible for purchase at a price to be fixed, if required, by the Mandatory Government. An immediate enquiry should be undertaken into the possibilities of irrigation and development in Trans-Jordan, the Beersheba District and the Jordan Valley. If it becomes clear that a substantial amount of land could be made available for the resettlement of Arabs living in the Jewish Area, strenuous efforts should be made to obtain an agreement, in the interests of both parties concerned, for an exchange of land and population. To facilitate such an agreement the United Kingdom Parliament should be asked to make a grant to meet the cost of the necessary development scheme. For the transition period which would intervene before the treaties came into force, the Commissions recommendations are as follows. Land purchase by Jews within the Arab Area or by Arabs within the Jewish Area should be prohibited. No Jewish immigration into the Arab Area should be permitted. The volume of Jewish immigration should be determined by the economic absorptive capacity of Palestine less the Arab Area. Negotiations should be opened without delay to secure amendment of Article 18 of the Mandate and place the external trade of Palestine on a fairer basis. The Advisory Council should, if possible, be enlarged by the nomination of Arab and Jewish representatives. The municipal system should be re-formed on expert advice, as recommended. A vigorous effort should be made to increase the number of Arab schools. The Commission point out that, while these proposals do not offer either the Arabs or the Jews all they want, they offer each party what it wants most, namely, freedom and security. The advantages to the Arabs of Palestine may be summarized as follows: (i) They obtain their national independence and can co-operate on an equal footing with the Arabs of the neighbouring countries in the cause of Arab unity and progress. (ii) They are finally delivered from the fear of being swamped by the Jews and from the possibility of ultimate subjection to Jewish rule. [368]

APPENDICES

(iii) In particular, the final limitation of the Jewish National Home within a fixed frontier and the enactment of a new Mandate for the protection of the Holy Places, solemnly guaranteed by the League of Nations, removes all anxiety lest the Holy Places should ever come under Jewish control. (iv) As a set-off to the loss of territory the Arabs regard as theirs, the Arab State will receive a subvention from the Jewish State. It will also, in view of the backwardness of Trans-Jordan, offer a grant of £2,000,000 from the British Treasury; and, if an agreement can be reached as to the exchange of land and population, a further grant will be made for the conversion, as far as may prove possible, of uncultivable land in the Arab State into productive land from which the cultivators and the State alike will profit. The advantages to the Jews are: (i) Partition secures the establishment of the Jewish National Home and relieves it from the possibility of its being subjected in the future to Arab rule. (ii) Partition enables the Jews in the fullest sense to call their National Home their own for it converts it into a Jewish State. Its citizens will be able to admit as many Jews into it as they themselves believe can be absorbed. They will attain the primary objective of Zionism: a Jewish nation planted in Palestine, giving its nationals the same status in the world as other nations give theirs. They will cease at last to live a minority life.

[369]


Appendix F LETTER FROM THE AMIR ABDULLAH TO THE BRITISH RESIDENT, JANUARY 1934 (TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH FROM ARABIC BY THE AUTHOR)

Your Excellency I am very sorry for the problem of the Director of the Agricultural Bank [Tawfiq Abu al-Huda] in the third month of the new Jordanian Government. I thought the Director would have used his new post as a course of separation in which he would train himself in accordance with his own criteria to weigh his new situation, the term of the Government of Ibrahim Hashim, and the two terms of the previous Governments of Hasan Khalid Abu al-Huda, and Shaikh Abdullah Sraj, during which he was the Secretary General. He could then see the advantages and the disadvantages, and record all that, so that he would be ready for a new post which would be given to him one day. I did not think he would continue in his known party politics and appear in that picture. You remember, Your Excellency, that when we decided to change in Jerusalem, you came to my room and asked me about the candidate for a new Prime Minister; I told you that the People’s Party and public opinion as I knew it were inclined towards Ibrahim Hashim. But after the return of Hasan Pasha, Ibrahim Hashim was put out. You said: ‘No, no. Hasan must not be Prime Minister.’ You showed so much rejection it caused me to withdraw my recommendation and name Ibrahim Hashim. You accepted under condition that al-Madfaai should be appointed Secretary General. You then left my room and came back and asked me what will happen to Tawfiq Abu al-Huda. I understood your intention and named him to be Director of the Agricultural Bank; then you thanked me and the situation was settled. You remember all that, and now I would like to send to Your Excellency the following notes before I receive your reply, regarding the friction caused by the Director of the Agricultural Bank, which has the largest effect on the general administration: Firstly, I have not named Hasan Pasha to be Prime Minister because I knew that he walks with the time as it changes and turns, and that he is not one of the men who [371]


remains committed to their responsibilities and are proud of them. Secondly, I nominated Tawfiq Abu al-Huda to the Agricultural Bank only because I knew him to be your retainer and that you did not want him to be outside the service, and because I do not wish to disagree with you, until we reach a point whereby either you will accept my opinion according to evidence, or I will accept your opinion. Thirdly, I hope Tawfiq will be wiser than he showed recently. We had to face the following new points: Ibrahim Hashim agreed to appoint Tawfiq, but he did not want to appoint Rashid Pasha al-Madfaai as Secretary General, because he is who accepts responsibility and knows what it means. He wanted to have his position made very clear. He wants to have Tawfiq so that he could reform him and prepare him for the future. After all that, Tawfiq started, under orders from the Istiqlal Party, to launch press campaigns with items of news that only one in Tawfiq’s position of Secretary General would know about. I informed Your Excellency of this and I was told that you had warned him that you will not be pleased with his behaviour if he continues with it. Then he started to confront the question of the agricultural loan in every way. I know that you know that the Agricultural Bank is in the hands of the men of the Istiqlal Party; Tawfiq is one of them, and members of the Board of Directors are also of them. They are Adib al-Kayid, Abdullah al-Nimir, Tahir al-Juqqah, and his well known brother-in-law Naaim Irfan. As a result of this situation, the Istiqlal Party are strongly opposing this Government, which Your Excellency promised to help in every way. The Party are opposing them in an important department of the Administration which has direct and major relations with the people. Thus the Prime Minister cannot deal with this situation except by one of two courses: either render his resignation, or save the Agricultural Bank from the Istiqlal Party and its men. It appears to me that His Excellency the Prime Minister prefers the first course, so that no conflict will occur with a person Your Excellency likes to protect. As far as I am concerned, what is important to me is my loyalty to my country, and my endeavour to develop her in accordance with her rights, and maintaining the treaty obligations of His Majesty’s Government. I am, after reading the administrative reports which I found, confident that either by neglect or by measures, the previous Government was intent on annihilating or dispersing the Bani Hasan tribe. I feel that [372]

APPENDICES

while the Government is facing a painful catastrophe, it is not loyal to the country and its people to retain the men who caused it and look upon them with forgiveness. I have no doubt that Your Excellency sees exactly what I see. Look with attention at the reports by the Qaim Maqam of Jarash, which warned the Government a year before the catastrophe. Look at the replies by the Director of the Treasury to these reports. The wickedness will become clear to you in its cruellest paradox, which is to entrap the present Government in the worst famine of all famines which will lead to general weakness, disorder, insecurity and a frightening inability to feed the victims of the famine. It is Tawfiq Abu al-Huda, Secretary General in the Governments of Hasan Pasha and Shaikh Sraj, former President of the Board of Directors of the Agricultural Bank, and its present Director, who is alone responsible for that catastrophe, by his intentional neglect, and by his recent opposition to the issue of loans. I will ask for an investigation of this charge, with all the attention it deserves, and I ask Your Excellency to fulfil your promise to help this present Government in their duties, and the main point in this promise is to give them full freedom to get rid of their political and personal opponents. Or else the Government are serious in presenting their resignation, and they are right, and I do not know who can form the Government after them, under these difficult conditions. Please accept my highest respect, Abdullah LETTER FROM THE BRITISH RESIDENT COLONEL HENRY COX TO HIS HIGHNESS THE AMIR ABDULLAH IBN AL-HUSSEIN, 16 FEBRUARY 1934 (TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH FROM ARABIC BY THE AUTHOR)

CONFIDENTIAL Your Highness I have the honour to refer to Your Highness’s letter dated the 12th of February 1934. The selection of letters which His Excellency the Prime Minister showed me, may paradoxically prove that no action had been taken by [373]


the previous Government to provide aid to Bani Hasan, whom according to the reports by the Qaim Maqam of Jarash were in great need, except a recommendation by the Ministry of Finance to exempt them from paying tax for this year, and a pardon from paying the remaining taxes from previous years which they could not pay, and that the administrative authorities should investigate their conditions so that some seasonal aid could be given to them. But these letters do not refer to the other side of the picture. For according to the request by the previous Government the Iraqi Petroleum Company gave priority to Bani Hasan in labour employment, and the number of those employed from the mentioned tribe and the sums paid to them including rations since March 1933 and until January 1934 are as follows: Month

Workers

Rations (£P) Salaries (£P)

Total (£P)

1933 March April May June July August September October November December

400 340 263 250 240 250 200 205 205 200

600 510 394 375 360 375 300 307 307 300

1,240 1,020 815 750 744 750 600 635 635 600

1,840 1,530 1,209 1,125 1,104 1,125 900 942 942 900

1934 January

202

303

626

929

4,131

8,415

12,456

Total

This shows that during the eleven months the members of the tribe were paid the sum of £P8,415 in cash and the sum of £P4,131 in food rations, and it is possible numbers were double these in previous years. Those sums were a great aid to this tribe, and it is far more than the Government could afford from its own revenue, but it was able to allocate to Bani Hasan the sum of £P1,000 out of the £P3,000 which were allocated for relief aid projects. The Economic Committee which was established by the previous Government has been somewhat slow in submitting their report, but [374]

APPENDICES

have recently recommended to this Government that they should issue the sum of £P38,000 in agricultural loans. In their recommendations, the Committee named the villages and tribes, and they did not name individuals who should receive these sums, or how much each loan should be without guarantee. Because it was very necessary to obtain the money without delay before 15 January, the date which, the Director of Agriculture and the experienced farmers say, ends the benefit from the loan, and because no one could say how much money was needed for loans without guarantee, a loan of the sum of £P30,000 was requested from the High Commissioner, and his approval to lend £P3,800 without guarantee. In previous years when loans without guarantee were given the Ministry of Finance use to issue the loans, because the Board of Directors of the Agricultural Bank insisted that the duty of the Bank is to issue loans with guarantees to protect the capital of the Bank. But this year, and before consulting with the Director of the Bank, it was decided that the Bank should issue the loans in order to benefit from the services of the Bank staff. A committee was established to discuss the best way to achieve this aim, composed of His Excellency the Prime Minister, the Director of the Treasury, the Director of the Agricultural Bank, the Financial Adviser, the Secretary of the Prime Minister and the Assistant of the British Resident. To begin with the Director of the Bank did not accept the responsibility of the issue of loans, or to divert from the accepted principles, but when he found there was no other way, he accepted on condition that the Government will guarantee all the loans that have no guarantee. The Committee decided that Governors should submit the names of those in need of loans in accordance with recommendations from the Economic Committee. On 28 December 1933 it was found that 10 per cent, which should be lent without guarantee, was not enough, so it was requested that the sum should be increased to £P5,700, which was approved on 10 January 1934. On 4 January 1934, a meeting of the committee was held to discuss the report submitted by the Director of the Bank after receiving the list of names of those deserving loans from the administrative governors. I attach herewith a copy of the said list and a copy of the decisions taken by the Committee. Your Highness will notice that instead of the sum of [375]


£P5,700 being enough to cover the loans needed, it was found that the sum of £P14,240 was needed. That is to say 37 per cent of the total of loans or £P8,540 more than the sum approved by the High Commissioner for that purpose. The Minutes of the meeting of the Committee shows the method by which the excess should be handled, and the recommended sum to be allocated to Bani Hasan, was reduced as it did to Bani Sakhr and Bani Hamidah. Apart from all the arrangements for aid to Bani Hasan, the Board of Directors of the Agricultural Bank issued instructions a few months ago to postpone the payment of debts by Bani Hasan and the other tribes. The previous Government made special arrangements for the tribe by allowing them to cut trees and make charcoal from woods protected by the Government. It is thus clear to Your Highness that Tawfiq Abu al-Huda, the Director of the Agricultural Bank, was no more responsible than the other members of the committee for recommending the return of the sum of £P9,000 from the sum of £P30,000 borrowed from the Government of Palestine, and it is also clear that the previous Government did not neglect Bani Hasan, but, on the contrary, has given much care and practical and moral aid. I would like to bring to Your Highness’s notice especially to the behaviour of the shaikhs of Bani Hasan, who were taking bribes from members of their tribe whom they recommended to work with the Iraqi Petroleum Company; and in many cases recommended some people from Horan as if they were from Bani Hasan, because the Horanies gave larger bribes. The sum of £P5,000 was sent back to Palestine because those who asked for loans equal to that sum were either not satisfied, or unable to present the required guarantee. It was not felt that the Trans-Jordan Government was in a position to guarantee to the Bank the cover of any losses from unguaranteed loans. In spite of the fact that there is no evidence in this season that loans taken after 15 January are without benefit, I think the time has passed to bring back the sum of £P9,000 to buy seeds for this season. Instead of that, I have asked the High Commissioner to approve the spending of £P1,400 as relief for the needy of Bani Hasan, and the sum of £P5,760 to facilitate employment for them; I also asked the High [376]

APPENDICES

Commissioner to approve the allocation of £P3,840 as relief projects for them in the budget of 1934/35. I am sure that these methods for helping the poor people will suffice more than giving them loans which will be like a millstone around their necks. I am sending a copy of Your Highness’s letter and a copy of this letter to His Excellency the High Commissioner. I have the honour to be Your Highness’s loyal friend, C. H. F. COX British Resident

[377]


Appendix G ARAB LEGION OFFICERS LIST, 1939

Major General J. B. Glubb

Brigadier Abd al-Qadir al-Jundi

R. J. C. Broadhurst

Lieutenant Colonel Bahjat Tabbarah

Sudqi al-Qasim

Major Stewart Ahmad Ramzi Aahid al-Sukhun

Mohammad Jan Beq Radi Innab N. O. Lash

Captain Tariq al-Jundi Said Ishaqat Abdullah al-Rihani Said Sabah al-Aamili

Sulaiman Subhi al-Omari Aarif Salim Ahmad Sudqi al-Jundi

Lieutenant Abd al-Rahman al-Jamal Omar al-Omari Idris Sultan Mustafa Hikmat

Hikmat Nuri Said al-Yousef Macadam Nasri Salim

[379]


Second Lieutenant Habis Refaifan al-Majali Sari al-Funaish Yaaqoub Qaqish Khalil Mohammad

Mohammad Nadim Lutfi Wasfi Mirza Sharaf al-Din Yahya

Cadet Anwar al-Haj Abdullah Ahmad Mohammad al-Hussein Mohammad al-Haj Kulaib al-Shraidah

Mohammad Musa al-Maaitah Abdullah Attallah al-Tarawnah Tariq Salih al-Auran

Sergeant Major Yousef Abu Shahout Abd al-Rahman Ilawi Abd al-Rahman Zaarour Abd al-Halim al-Sakit Barakat al-Trad al-Khraishah Faris al-Aabid Khalil Haimour Jbarah

Nadim al-Samman Sulaiman Masaud Yaqoub al-Salti Mohammad Hashim Salim al-Karadsheh Abd al-Razzaq Abdullah

[380]

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[381]


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Trans-Jordan Official Gazette TJOG no. 188, 19 April 1928 TJOG no. 221, 5 March 1929 TJOG no. 243, 16 November 1929 TJOG no. 248, 1 February 1930 TJOG no. 252, 5 March 1930 TJOG no. 21, 26 June 1930 TJOG no. 22, 5 November 1930 TJOG no. 27, 17 November 1930 TJOG no. 287, 16 December 1930 TJOG no. 37, 1 January 1931 TJOG no. 293, 16 February 1931 TJOG no. 292, 17 June 1931 TJOG no. 384, 1 April 1933 TJOG no. 414, 16 October 1933 TJOG no. 134, 14 December 1933 TJOG no. 415, 21 December 1933 TJOG, Special Edition, 1 November 1934 TJOG no. 473, 19 March 1935 TJOG no. 504, 1 December 1935 [382]

BIBLIOGRAPHY

TJOG no. 507, 17 December 1935 TJOG no. 516, 16 February 1936 TJOG no. 524, 1 June 1936 TJOG no. 553, 1 March 1937 TJOG no. 555, 16 March 1937 TJOG no. 560, 1 May 1937 TJOG no. 578, 20 October 1937 TJOG no. 583, 1 January 1938 TJOG no. 586, 1 February 1938 TJOG no. 590, 1 March 1938 TJOG no. 594, 2 April 1938 TJOG no. 602, 2 July 1938 TJOG no. 604, 4 August 1938 TJOG no. 607, 1 September 1938 TJOG no. 614, 16 October 1938 TJOG no. 616, 1 November 1938 TJOG no. 624, 4 February 1939 TJOG no. 635, 1 June 1939 TJOG no. 639, 1 August 1939 TJOG no. 640, 5 August 1939 TJOG no. 643, 19 August 1939 TJOG no. 646, 30 August 1939 TJOG no. 648, 16 September 1939 TJOG no. 650, 21 September 1939 TJOG no. 720, 1 October 1939 Trans-Jordan Cabinet Papers TJCP no. 1/19/755, 10 April 1928 TJCP no. 3/7/806, 15 April 1928 TJCP no. C/217, 24 June 1930 TJCP no. 21/72/2518, 29 June 1929 TJCP no. 21/30/6924, 26 September 1937 TJCP no. RW/210/13/11304, 21 December 1938

[383]


Official reports Arab Legion Documents no. ALCO/1/3/1068. Notes on Desert Units by General J. B. Glubb, 15 August 1942 Department of Public Health Annual Report, 1940 (copy obtained by the author from Dr Zuhair Malhas) Records of the Hashemite Dynasties, vols 5, 6 and 7, ed. Alan de L. Rush (1995) Report by the International Commission on the Buraq Wall in the Aqsa Mosque of Jerusalem, Council of the League of Nations, 1930

Private papers The author Bell, Sir Gawain Hashim, Ibrahim, Department of Libraries and National Documents, Amman, no. 11/12 al-Hindawi, Qasim, Department of Libraries and National Documents. no. 45/1,2 Jayne, Colonel R. F. G., British Imperial War Museum Musa, Sulaiman al-Tarawnah Hussein, photocopies given to the author by his son Abd al-Wahab Tarawnah Peake, Colonel F. J., British Imperial War Museum, DS/Misc/16, reel 1

Interviews Author with Shaikh Saud al-Qadi of Bani Khalid, 1972 Author with Shaikh Nayif al-Khraishah, and Jamal, Mijhim and Turki, sons of Shaikh Hadithah al-Khraishah, 1982

[384]

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Newspapers and periodicals Filistin newspaper, no. 83, 7 June 1933 Great Britain and Palestine 1915–1936, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1937 Al-Jamiah al-Arabiyah, 13 November 1929 Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, August 1939 RAF Flight magazine, 18 January 1934 The Times, London, 30 July 1936, 12 October 1936

Selected published books Abbadi, Ahmad Auwaidi, Min al-Qiam wa al-Adab al-Badawiyah (Amman, np, 1976). —Al-Munasabat al-Badawiyah (Amman, np, 1979). Abu Nowar, Maan, The History of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: The Creation and Development of Trans-Jordan 1920–1929 (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1989). —Bain al-Wattaniyah wa al-Qawmiyah (Between Nationalism and Patriotism) (London: Dar al Lam, 1991). Abu al-Shaar, Amin, King Abdullah ibn al-Hussein’s Memoirs (Amman: The Hashemite Press, 1970). Antonius, George, Yaqthat al-Arab (Arab Awakening) (Beirut: Dar al-Ilm Lilmalayin, 1982). Babil, Nasuh, Sihafah wa-siyasah: Suriyah fi ‘al-qarn ‘al-ishrin (Journalism and Politics in Syria in the Twentieth Century) (London: Riad el-Rayyes Books, 1987). Burckhardt, J. L., Travels in Syria and the Holy Land (London: np, 1822). Chlaim, Avi, Collusion Across the Jordan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988). Dayan, Moshe, The Story of My Life (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1976). Foot, Sir Hugh (Lord Caradon), A Start in Freedom (London: np, 1966). Gilbert, Martin, Churchill, A Life (London: Heinemann, 1991). Glubb, J. B., ‘The Economic Situation of the Trans-Jordan Tribes’, Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society (July 1938), vol. 25. —A Soldier with the Arabs (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1957). —War in the Desert (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1969). —The Changing Scenes of Life: An Autobiography (London: Quartet, 1983). [385]


Hamilton, Nigel, Monty: The Making of a General, 1887–1942 (London: Allen Lane, 1981). Harding, G. W. Lankester, The Antiquities of Jordan (London: Lutterworth Press, 1974). Hut, Bayan Nuwaihidh, Al-Qiyadat wa al-Muassasast al-Siyasiyah fi Filistin: 1917–1948. Khraisat, Mohammad Abd al-Qadir, Al-Urdinion wa al-Qadhiyah al-Wattaniyah (Amman: np, 1992). ibn al-Hussein, King Abdullah, Al-Athar al-Kamilah (Beirut: Al-Dar al-Muttahidah Lilnashir, 1985). Lacey, Robert, The Kingdom of Arabia and the House of Saud (London: Fontana, 1983). Lunt, James, Glubb Pasha: A Biography (London: Constable, 1984). Madhi, M. and Musa, S., Tarikh al-Urdon fi al-Qarn al-Ishrin (Amman: Dar al-Muhtasib, 1959). Maxwell Miller, J., ‘Recent Archaeological Developments Relevant to Ancient Moab’, Studies in the History and Archaeology of Jordan. Vol. I. ed. Adnan Hadidi (Amman: Department of Antiquities, 1982). Musa, Sulaiman, Amarat Sharq al-Urdon, Nashatuha wa Tattawuraha fi Ruba Qarn: 1921–1946 (Amman: Jordan Labour Press, 1990). Partner, Peter, Arab Voices: The BBC Arabic Service, 1938–1988 (London: BBC Consumer Publishing, 1988). Qasimiyah, Khairiyah, Al-Rail al-Arabi al-Awal (Beirut: 1991). Qarqut, T. H., The Development of the Nationalist Movement in Syria (np, 1975). Rush, A. de L., ed. Records of the Hashemite Dynasties (1991). —Ruling Families of Arabia: Jordan 2 volumes (London: Redwood Press Ltd., 1991). Sadaqah, Najib, Qadhiyat Filistin (The Palestinian Issue) (Jerusalem: np, 1946). Tibawi, A. L., Jerusalem: Its Place in Islam and Arab History (Jerusalem: np, nd). Thomas, B., The Arabs (London: Thornton Butterworth, 1937). Uzaizi, Rocks ibn Zayid, Maalamah Lilturath al-Urdoni (Amman: The Tourist Authority, 1984). Zuaitir, Akram, Documents of the Palestinian National Movement, 1918–1939 (Wathaiq al-Harakah al-Wataniyah al-Filistiniyah) (Beirut: Institute of Palestinian Studies, 1984). [386]

Index A Abd al-Aziz, Faisal, Amir 155 Abd al-Hadi, Awni 197, 201 Abd al-Hadi, Nazmi 40, 117, 120–2, 126 Abd al-Ilah ibn Ali, Prince 275 Abd al-Qadir al-Muzaffar, Shaikh 45, 280 Abd al-Razzaq, Arif 223–4, 274 Abdullah ibn al-Hussein, Amir of Trans-Jordan 2–15, 18, 23–9, 34–40, 44, 51–2, 55–8, 69, 81–7, 92–6, 101–13, 118–19, 122–3, 127–37, 143–73, 177–84, 189, 196–214, 220–1, 233–52, 258–81, 285–6, 292–3 Abu Dmaik, Salim, Shaikh 86–7 Abu Durrah, Yusuf 274 Abu Ghanimah, Subhi 22, 160, 238, 240 Abu al-Huda, Hasan Khalid 19, 27–8, 37–9, 127, 130 Abu al-Huda, Tawfiq 19, 26–9, 39, 71, 123–6, 130–4, 139, 155, 220, 250, 260, 265–9, 278, 293 Abu Rahmah, Halim 25, 27, 38 Abu al-Shar, Najib 23–4, 41, 117, 120, 123 Abu Tayih, Audah, Shaikh 108 Abu Tayih, Mohammad, Shaikh 87 Adwan rebellion 4, 9, 14 agricultural development 157, 291–9 Ajlun district 62 Ali ibn al-Hussein, King of Hijaz 44, 135, 166–9, 182, 246 Alia Bint Ali, Princess 167 Allenby, E. H. H. 245 antiquities of Trans-Jordan 304–8 Antonius, George 88, 194–5 Aqsa Mosque 31–2, 44–5, 136 Arab Legion 5–11, 19–22, 25, 44–8, 56, 63–6, 88–99, 103–12, 117–20, 125, 132, 134, 138, 219, 229–36, 251,

258–61, 264, 271–4, 290, 302, 304, 309, 319–21 Arab National Congress (1937, Bludan) 216–19 Arab nationalism 4–5, 12–15, 20, 137, 168, 185, 189, 238, 285, 317 Arab Nationalist Conference (1931, Jerusalem) 136–7, 170 Arab unity 16, 137, 168–70, 185, 248, 275–7 Arbilan, Shaikh 100 Association for Nationalist Action 170 al-Attnah, Ithnayan 100 al-Awaji, Sulaiman, Shaikh 100 al-Awamlah, Adib al-Kayid 128 al-Ayoubi, Atta 189 al-Azmah, Adil 22, 130, 137, 139, 160, 173 al-Azzam, Naji 161 B Badiyah district 63 Balfour Declaration 10, 38, 189, 199, 269, 285 Balqa district 62 Bedouin character, customs and traditions 75–9, 88–9, 108–11 Bedouin Control Board 98, 102–4, 111–12, 154, 256 Bedouin Control Law (1929) 111 Bedouin Control Law (1936) 112 Bedouin schools 309 births, statistics of 314 blood-feuds 80, 86, 104 Bonnet, Captain 96 British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) 251 British Crown Agents 26 British Mandate in Trans-Jordan 1–15, 21–2, 33, 37, 42, 52, 55, 81, 138–9,

[387]

THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRANS-JORDAN 1929–1939 diseases, incidence of 316–17 Diwan Khas 288–9 Dowding, Hugh 101–2 al-Duwish, Faisal, Shaikh 92

158–9, 184, 213, 220, 262–4, 269–70, 313 British School of Archaeology 305–6 Broadhurst, R. J. C. 274 Bromley, A. 180 Bullard, Sir Reader 213 al-Buraq incident 30–43 Burckhardt, John Lewis 304–5 C Champion, R. S. 219 Chancellor, Sir John 44, 93–6, 99, 102, 130–4, 201 chivalric tradition 78–9, 87, 90, 124, 223 Chlaim, Avi 158 Churchill, Winston 3–4, 307 Civil List 69–73, 94, 134, 271 Clayton, Sir Gilbert 3–4, 88, 101 Comming, Gordon 40–2 Committee of Imperial Defence, British 170, 215 Cox, Henry 5–9, 14, 18–19, 22, 28, 36–9, 44, 51–8, 70–2, 93, 96, 102, 104, 107–8, 132–4, 138, 149, 156–7, 205–6, 200, 220, 240–1, 249–51, 255, 258–60, 266–72, 287, 289, 293, 313 crime in Trans-Jordan 231–2 Cunliffe-Lister, Sir Philip 177, 179 D al-Dajani, Hussein 41 Dead Sea concessions 26–7 deaths, statistics of 314 Defence Law (1935) 183 Defence Regulations (1939) 280 democratic principles 131–4, 286 Department of Agriculture 291–9 Department of Antiquities 304–8 Department of Education 308–13 Department of Finance 289–91 Department of Land and Surveys 299–301 Department of Post and Telegraph 301–2 Department of Public Works 302–4 Desert Mechanised Force 271–4 Desert Patrol Force 65–6, 107–10, 125, 138–9, 230 devaluations of currency 9 Dill, J. G. 206–7, 211–12

E earthquake damage 9 economic deprivation 65–9, 138, 160 education in Trans-Jordan 308–13 Elliott, Flight Lieutenant 96 Executive Committee of the National (Jordanian) Conference 22, 58–60, 131 F Faisal ibn Ghazi, King of Iraq 272, 275 Faisal ibn al-Hussein, King of Iraq 8, 18, 81, 108, 135, 144–7, 151–3, 166–9, 245 al-Fayiz, Mithqal, Shaikh 8, 21, 97, 160–1, 295–6 First World War 108, 242 Forbes, L. F. 88 forestry 297–8 France 4, 10, 13–15, 22, 81, 96, 137, 189, 271, 275–7 Free Moderate Party 60–1 Fuad el Khatib, Sheikh 245 G George V, King 179–80 George VI, King 238, 280–1 Ghazi ibn Faisal, King of Iraq 166–8, 182–3, 202, 205, 213, 266–7, 274–6 Glubb, Sir John 76–8, 92, 99–100, 107–13, 155, 159, 232, 247–8, 256, 270–4, 291 Glueck, Nelson 307 Gordon, Pirie 134–5 Grandcourt, Clement 96 H Haddah Agreement (1925) 87, 101–2 Haining, Robert 221–2, 277 al-Hakim, Khalid 45 Hall, J. 67–9 Hamd ibn Jazi, Shaikh 97 Hamzah, Fouad 162

[388]

INDEX Hashim, Ibrahim 19, 39, 182, 204, 220, 233–4, 249–50, 264–5 health services 313–17 High Muslim Council 32, 38, 44 Hijaz 5, 8, 81 Hijaz Railway 150, 168 Hikmat, Omar 128 al-Hindawi, Qasim 135, 159–60, 180–1 Hitler, Adolf 158, 225, 280, 286 Horsefield, George 306–7 al-Humoud, Abdullah 267–8 Humphrys, Sir F. 145–7 al-Hussein, Mohammad 61 al-Hussein ibn Ali, King 8–9, 41, 44–5, 94, 122, 130, 150, 169 al-Hussein ibn Nasser, Sharif 266 al-Hussein ibn Talal, Amir 183–4 al-Husseini, Haj Amin 32, 44–5, 196, 202–3, 219 al-Husseini, Jamal 197, 201, 219 al-Husseini, Musa Kazim 41, 158 al-Husseini, al-Sayid Amin 198 I Ibn Abtan, Saqir 100 Ibn Dawshan, Shaikh Sultan 100 Ibn Farhan, Mohammad, Shaikh 153 Ibn al-Khattab, Omar 31 Ibn Muhailan 90 Ibn Rashid, Shaikh 94 Ibn Rifadah, Hamid, Shaikh 144–53 Ibn Saud, King of Saudi Arabia 81–2, 88, 92, 94, 96, 99–104, 107, 144–55, 162, 169, 171, 182, 202, 206–9, 212–16, 248 Ibn Zaid, Abd al-Aziz 109 al-Ibrahim, Bakhit 125 Inad ibn Jumaian, Shaikh 86–7 industrial licence fees 162 International Labour Conventions 236–7 international law 12, 178 Iraq 15, 81, 161, 267 Iraqi Petroleum Company 231, 236–7, 261, 264, 293 Ishaqat, Said 173 Islam 120, 136, 285–6 Istiqlal Party 2, 5, 42, 137, 160, 167–8, 293

J Jar Allah, Husam al-Din 25, 27, 38, 219 Jerusalem Post 261 Jewish immigration and settlement 157, 190–5, 220, 247, 261–3, 270 Jordanian Brotherhood Party 250–1 Jordanian People’s Conference Party 164–6 Jordanian People’s Party 22 Jordanian Solidarity Party 160–1 judiciary of Trans-Jordan 287–9 al-Juqqah, Jamal 225 al-Juqqah, Tahir 41 K al-Kabariti, Hamid 154–5 Kamal Ataturk 239 Karak district 62–3 Karak petition 14, 19 Kerr, Sir Clerk 212–13 al-Khalidi, Hussein Fakhri 202 al-Khatib, Foad, Shaikh 86, 149, 180, 249 al-Khraishah, Ali 90 al-Khraishah, Hadithah, Shaikh 90 Kirk, George E. 11–12 Kirkbride, A. S. 71, 83–5, 88–9, 161–2, 167–8, 219, 270, 272, 275 Koppel, Robert 307 Kurah incident 14 L Lamington, Baron 238 land settlement 299–300 Lankestar-Harding, G. W. 307 Lash, Norman Oliver 274 Law, Andrew Bonar 3 Lawrence, T. E. 4, 169, 246, 248 League of Nations 3–4, 14, 19, 31, 33, 52, 55–8, 123, 138–9, 189, 234 Lebanon 15–16, 189 legal system of Trans-Jordan 287–9 Legislative Council 12–15, 22–9, 37–40, 55–61, 71, 117–39, 143, 153, 159–60, 171–3, 177, 181–3, 229, 234–8, 250–1, 257, 268–9 Lofgren, M. M. 33 Luke, H. 83

[389]

THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRANS-JORDAN 1929–1939 partition of 209–20, 247–9, 261–2 Palestine Conference (1939) 269–71 Palestine Electric Corporation 26 Palestinian Revolt (1936–9) 185, 189–208, 219–26, 259–60, 265, 270–4, 279, 295, 306 Parkinson, Sir Cosmo 275 Passfield, Lord 38 Peake, F. G. 5–8, 14, 18–21, 37, 42–7, 51–8, 91–6, 105–11, 144, 221, 229, 233, 270, 273 Peel Commission 209–11, 214–17, 247, 262–3 Philby, Harry St John 4–7, 70 Playfield, P. H. L. 88 Plumer, Lord 7, 10–13, 27, 105, 111 pluralism 12–13 Plymouth, Lord 180 population of Trans-Jordan 75, 186, 313–14 Puaux, Gabriel 277

M Maan district 63 Macadam, Lieutenant 273 MacDonald, Malcolm 221, 269 McMahon, Sir Henry 241–4, 249 MacMichael, Sir Harold 219 Maffey, Sir John 180 al-Majali, Refaifan, Shaikh 25–6, 43, 60, 123, 125, 160 al-Majali, Shlash 43 Mardam, Jamil 276 al-Mdanat, Isa 43 Meinertshagen, Colonel 4 merchant class 117–18 Mitchell, A. F. 299 Mobile Desert Patrol 110 see also Desert Patrol Force Mohammad the Prophet 31, 79–80, 288 Montgomery, Bernard 222–4 Mufarraji, Foad Khalil 185 al-Mufti, Said 23, 27, 39, 61, 135, 139, 237, 292 Municipal Law (1938) 255 Muslim Conference (1931, Jerusalem) 135–6, 168 Muslim Law 288 Musqat, Sultan of 182 Mussolini, Benito 280

Q al-Qassam, Izz, Shaikh 193–4 al-Qawiqji, Fawzi al-Din 206–9 al-Qusus, Audah 23–8, 39, 43, 120, 125, 128 R raiding 78–112, 130 see also Wahhabi raids Ramzi, Ajlun Ahmad 54–5 Rendel, G. W. 168–70, 177–8, 210–11, 214–15 al-Rifai, Abd al-Munim 272 al-Rifai, Samir 238 rights of workers 236–8 al-Rikabi, Ridha 5 road improvements 302–4 Rutenberg, Pinhas 26–7 Ryan, Sir Andrew 104, 144–7

N al-Nashashibi, Isaaf 45 al-Nashashibi, Raghib 202–3 National Anthem of Trans-Jordan 272 National Conference (1933, Amman) 163–6 nationalism 15, 199, 276 see also Arab nationalism nationality and naturalisation 317–18 nepotism 124, 276 Northfield, E. W. 238, 270–1 O O’Connor, Dick 222, 224 Ormsby-Gore, W. G. A. 202 Orts, M. 19 P Palestine 2–4, 7–16, 30, 38, 42–3, 64, 81, 157–9, 184, 244–6

S al-Saadi, Farhan, Shaikh 219 al-Sabahat, Mohammad 43 al-Sabban, Abd al-Raouf 153 al-Said, Nuri 205, 267, 275–6 Sami, Shams al-Din 23–8, 117–26 Samuel, Sir Herbert 3–7, 201

[390]

INDEX al-Saudi, Yousef 237 Saudi Arabia 4, 144, 151–5 school system 308–12 Second World War 222, 225, 280–1, 286, 290, 320 separation of powers 131 al-Shahbander, Abd al-Rahman 276 Shakir ibn Zaid, Amir 83–9, 95–7, 107–13, 122, 145–6, 154–5, 159–61, 256 al-Sharaf, Zain, Sharifah 181 Shariah Courts 287–8 Shashaah, Shukri 128 Shaw, Sir Walter 33 Shelswell-White, G. H. 219 al-Shraidah, Najib 23–5, 120–5 Shute, Lieutenant Colonel 37 Simon, Sir John 154 al-Solh, Kazim 185 Sophronius, Patriarch 30 Sraj, Abdullah, Shaikh 132, 136, 155, 172–3, 293 Stafford, Captain (later Major) 97–8, 108–10, 120 Stetzen, Jasper 304 Storrs, Sir Ronald 181 al-Suhaimat, Attallah 23, 125 surprise attacks 80–1 Syria 1–5, 8, 10, 13–16, 18, 39, 42, 64, 81, 137, 184, 189, 276–7

national identity in 15 political status of 3–4, 11–12, 25 Trans-Jordan Frontier Force (TJFF) 7–10, 21, 33, 36, 51, 56, 88–111, 117, 134, 138, 229, 251, 260, 264, 273, 302 Treaty with Britain and Organic Law (1928) 4, 9–15, 20–4, 28–9, 51, 55, 58, 123, 127, 131, 143–4, 149–53, 159, 173, 177, 182, 184 Treaty with Britain (1934) 178 Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourliness with Saudi Arabia 155–6, 177–8, 182 Tribal Courts Law (1924) 111 Tribal Courts Law (1936) 112, 255–6 tribal encampments 82 tribalism and tribal affairs 6, 14, 46, 59, 62, 81–110, 276 Tuqan, Ala al-Din 23, 39–40 Turkey 238–40

T Tabbarah, Bahjat 230 Taj al-Din, Shaikh 189 al-Tal, Khalaf 267–8 Talal ibn Abdullah, Crown Prince 70–1, 126, 134, 139, 166, 181–4, 238–40, 275 Tamir, Abd al-Qadir 272 al-Tarawnah, Hussein, Shaikh 29, 43, 59–60, 129–30, 136, 158–61 al-Tarawnah, Mohammad 43 Thomas, J. H. 4, 195, 197 al-Totunji, Jamil 180, 238 Trans-Jordan administration of 62–5 geography of 17–18 government structure in 18–25, 52–7, 265, 277–9

W al-Wadi, Hamid 97, 154 Wahbah, Adib 19, 53 Wahbah, Hafiz, Shaikh 214 Wahhabi raids 4–5, 8, 10, 15, 79 Wailing Wall see al-Buraq incident Walker, Flight Lieutenant 97 Walpole, J. F. 299 war, declaration of 281 Wauchope, Sir Arthur 134, 149–54, 192, 200–1, 219, 242 Wavell, A. P. 277 Wigan, Y. R. D. 88 Wingate, Orde 221–2 Woodhead, Sir John 219 workers’ rights 236–8

U al-Ubaidi, Musallam, Shaikh 100 Um Talal 10 United Arab State proposal 263–4 al-Unsi, Mohammad 23, 25, 27 V Vickery, C. E.

[391]

95

THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRANS-JORDAN 1929–1939 Y Yasin, Yousef, Shaikh Young, Major 4

144–5

Z Zaal ibn Mutlaq, Shaikh 96 al-Zabbati, Mohammad 180 al-Zabin, Fahad ibnTrad, Shaikh 88–9 Zabin tribe 10 Zaid ibn al-Hussein, Amir 182–3 Zgurt police force 86–7 Zionism 2–7, 10–15, 26, 30–8, 42, 137, 158, 163–5, 168, 184, 189, 194–5, 198, 218 Zuaitir, Akram 189–90 al-Zubbati, Mohammad 238 Zuraiq, Qustantin 185 Zurich Zionist Conference (1929) 34

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