The Contentious Politics of Unemployment in Europe: Welfare States and Political Opportunities

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The Contentious Politics of Unemployment in Europe

10.1057/9780230304208 - The Contentious Politics of Unemployment in Europe, Edited by Marco Giugni

Also by Marco Giugni

THE POLITICS OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN EUROPE: State and Civil Society Responses (edited) FROM CONTENTION TO DEMOCRACY (co-edited) HOW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS MATTER (co-edited) POLITICAL ALTRUISM? Solidarity Movements in International Perspective (co-authored) DIALOGUES IN MIGRATION POLICY (co-edited) CONTESTED CITIZENSHIP: Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe (co-authored) NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN WESTERN EUROPE: A Comparative Analysis (co-authored) SOCIAL CAPITAL, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND MIGRATION IN EUROPE: Making Multicultural Democracy Work? (co-edited) (Forthcoming)



SOCIAL PROTEST AND POLICY CHANGE: Ecology, Antinuclear, and Peace Movements in Comparative Perspective

Welfare States and Political Opportunities Edited by

Marco Giugni University of Geneva, Switzerland




Selection and editorial matter © Marco Giugni 2010 Individual chapters © their respective authors 2010

No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2010 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN 978–0–230–23616–5

hardback

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The contentious politics of unemployment in Europe: welfare states and political opportunities/edited by Marco Giugni. p. cm. ISBN 978–0–230–23616–5 1. Europe—Social policy. 2. Welfare state—Europe. 3. Unemployment—Europe. I. Giugni, Marco. HN373.5.C666 2010 331.13'794—dc22 2010027517 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne



All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission.

List of Figures

vii

List of Tables

viii

Acknowledgments

xi

Notes on Contributors

xii

The Contentious Politics of Unemployment in Europe: An Introduction Marco Giugni Part I 1.

Context and Opportunities

Welfare States, Political Opportunities, and Claim Making in the Field of Unemployment Politics Manlio Cinalli and Marco Giugni

2.

The Protest on Unemployment: Forms and Opportunities Donatella della Porta

3.

Networks and Political Contention over Unemployment: A Comparison of Britain, Germany, and Switzerland Manlio Cinalli and Katharina Füglister

Part II 4.

5.

6.

1

19 43

70

Actors and Dynamics

A Precarious Balance of Interests: Unions and the Unemployed in Europe Annulla Linders and Marina Kalander

97

The Role of Civil Society Actors in the Contentious Politics of Unemployment Simone Baglioni

127

Transcending Marginalization: The Mobilization of the Unemployed in France, Germany, and Italy in a Comparative Perspective Simone Baglioni, Britta Baumgarten, Didier Chabanet, and Christian Lahusen

152

v



Contents

Contents

Part III 7.

8.

9.

Unemployment Politics and the European Union

Globalization and the Contentious Politics of Unemployment: Towards Denationalization and Convergence? Christian Lahusen, Marco Giugni, and Michel Berclaz Europeanization and the EU Supranational Multiorganizational Field of Unemployment: Elite-Dominance or New Opportunities? Paul Statham and Manlio Cinalli When the Unemployed Challenge the European Union: The European Marches as a Mode of Externalization of Protest Didier Chabanet

171

198

227

The Contentious Politics of Unemployment in Europe: Some Conclusions Marco Giugni

244

References

253

Index

275



vi

1.1

Location of the six countries within the typology of welfare state regimes

25

8.1

Network of influence in the European supranational multiorganizational field

215

vii



List of Figures

1.1

Summary scores for the political opportunity structures in the six countries

24

1.2

Main objects of claims in unemployment politics by country (%)

27

1.3

Position of claims toward objects (means)

28

1.4

Main forms of claims in unemployment politics by country (%)

29

Main actors of claims in unemployment politics by country (%)

30

Main issues of claims in unemployment politics by country (%)

31

Effects of political opportunity structures on protest actions (odds ratios)

33

Effects of political opportunity structures on unemployed objects (odds ratios)

36

1.9

Effects of political opportunity structures on positive position of claims (odds ratios)

37

2.1

Forms of action by type of actor (%)

55

2.2

Forms of claim making by issue of claims (%)

57

2.3

Forms of claim making by scope of the target (%)

62

2.4

Forms of claim making by country (%)

65

3.1

Cohesion measures of the British, German, and Swiss networks

80

3.2

British cooperation network: Average density for each block

82

3.3

German cooperation network: Average density for each block

82

1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8

3.4

Swiss cooperation network: Average density for each block

82

3.5

Normalized betweenness centrality measures

85

4.1

Summary object of unemployment claims by labor groups (%)

105

viii



List of Tables

4.2

Mean position of major claim makers toward the object of claim by country

106

Form of claims by labor organizations by object of claim and by year (% figures weighted by country)

107

Issue of claims by labor organizations, the unemployed, and all actors combined by country (%)

108

Issue of claims by labor organizations by object of claims and by country (%)

109

Diagnostic frame of claims by the unemployed and labor organizations by object of claims (% figures weighted by country)

110

4.7

Prognostic frame of claims by the unemployed and labor organizations by object of claims (% figures weighted by country)

111

4.8

Union density in six European countries, 1995–2002

113

4.9

Distribution of claims by labor organizations on a number of variables in the dataset that show fairly clear distinctions between the countries

114

4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6

4.10 Proportion of claims delivered in protest form by labor organizations by object of claims and by country (%)

115

4.11 Main actors addressed in claims by labor organizations by country and by object of claims (%)

117

4.12 Main actors criticized in claims by labor organizations by country and by object of claims (%)

118

5.1

Claims by civil society organizations on the overall claims by country (%)

133

5.2

Types of organization by country (%)

135

5.3

Scope of civil society actors by country (%)

138

5.4

Forms of action of claims by civil society organizations (%)

139

5.5

Forms of action of claims by civil society organizations by country (%)

141

5.6

Issues of claims by civil society actors (%)

143

5.7

The first three issues of civil society claims by country

144

5.8

Addressees of claims by civil society organizations by country (%)

145



List of Tables ix

List of Tables

5.9

Criticized actors in claims by civil society organizations by country (%)

5.10 Position of civil society claims toward constituency by country (%) 7.1 7.2

147 148

Distribution of the scope of actors over time (% figures weighted by country)

179

Distribution of the scope of addressees over time (% figures weighted by country)

182

7.3

Distribution of the scope of actors by country over time (%) 184

7.4

Share of actor types in claim making by country over time (%)

186

7.5

Distribution of the scope of issues over time (% figures weighted by country)

190

Distribution of the scope of objects over time (% figures weighted by country)

191

Share of issue areas in claim making by country over time (%)

193

8.1

Share of collective actors in public debates over unemployment by political-level of actor (actor scope) for all and Europeanized debates (% figures weighted by country)

204

8.2

Shares in national domestic, Europeanized and European supranationalized public debates over unemployment, by collective actor type (% figures weighted by country)

207

Collective actors in the supranational European field interviewed (by type, and with acronyms used in text)

214

Networks of influence in the European supranational multiorganizational field: “Influential” actors and actors “Trying to Influence”

216

8.5

“Cliques” of cooperation in the supranational multiorganizational field: Hierarchical clustering of equivalence matrix

219

8.6

“Cliques” of disagreement in the supranational multiorganizational field: Hierarchical clustering of equivalence matrix

220

The distribution of public-domain unemployment claims by actor (%)

231

7.6 7.7

8.3 8.4

9.1



x

The analyses presented in this book are based on data collected by the members of a project entitled “The Contentious Politics of Unemployment in Europe: Political Claim Making, Policy Deliberation and Exclusion from the Labor Market.” The project included the following countries: Britain (Paul Statham, University of Leeds), Switzerland (Marco Giugni, University of Geneva), France (Didier Chabanet, University of Lyon), Italy (Donatella della Porta, University of Florence), Germany (Christian Lahusen, University of Bamberg), and Sweden (Annulla Linders, University of Cincinnati and University of Karlstad). The project was financed by the European Commission (HPSE-CT2001-00053 UNEMPOL) and the Swiss Federal Office for Education and Science through the 5th Framework program of research of the European Union. We thank all the people who have contributed to the UNEMPOL research project in addition to the authors of the chapters in this volume, in particular: Jonas Axelsson, Annerose Baum, Julie Berclaz, Christophe Fay, Petter Forslund, Paolo Graziano, Vibha Mehta, and Herbert Reiter. Several chapters were previously published in a special issue of Mobilization: An International Quarterly, “The Contentious Politics of European Unemployment” (Volume 13, number 3). We thank the editors of Mobilization and San Diego State University for permission to reproduce the following copyrighted material: • Donatella della Porta, “The Protest on Unemployment: Forms and Opportunities,” in Mobilization: An International Quarterly 13(3): 279–96. • Manlio Cinalli and Katharina Füglister, “Networks and Political Contention over Unemployment: A Comparison of Britain, Germany, and Switzerland,” in Mobilization: An International Quarterly 13(3): 259–78. • Simone Baglioni, Britta Baumgarten, Didier Chabanet, and Christian Lahusen, “Transcending Marginalization: The Mobilization of the Unemployed in France, Germany, and Italy,” in Mobilization: An International Quarterly 13(3): 323–36. • Didier Chabanet, “When the Unemployed Challenge the European Union: The European Marches as a Mode of Externalization of Protest,” in Mobilization: An International Quarterly 13(3): 311–22. xi



Acknowledgments

Simone Baglioni is a lecturer of politics at Glasgow Caledonian University and a research associate at Bocconi University in Milan, where he is the principal investigator of the Italian case in the European project “Youth, Unemployment and Exclusion in Europe” (YOUNEX). He teaches “European Public Policy” at Boston College courses in Italy and “International Politics” at Bocconi. He has worked on a number of comparative research projects on issues of unemployment, social exclusion, and civil society. Britta Baumgarten studied sociology at the University of Bielefeld, Germany and at the Instituto Superior de Ciências de Trabalho e da Empresa in Lisbon, Portugal. She worked as a researcher in the UNEMPOL project at University of Bamberg 2001–4 and as a researcher and lecturer at the Centre for Social Policy Research, University of Bremen 2006–8. Since 2008 she is a research fellow of the research group “Civil Society, Citizenship and Political Mobilization.” Her research interests are in social movements, civil society, discourse analysis, political communication, and methods of qualitative inquiry. Michel Berclaz holds a master’s degree in public administration (MPA). He works in the field of public policies evaluation for the state of Geneva. He specializes in the analysis of the effects of social policies and in the role of employers in welfare-to-work policies. Didier Chabanet is a researcher at Triangle (Ecole Normale Supérieure de Lyon) and currently associate research fellow at the University Institute of European Studies (Autonomous University of Barcelona). He has established himself as a well-known international scholar in the field of discrimination, integration, exclusion, and, in particular, unemployment. He has written or (co)-edited a number of reference works in French, English, German, and Japanese. In all, 13 books and edited issues, 20 chapters in edited volumes and 18 articles in scientific journals with peer reviews have been or are about to be published. Manlio Cinalli is associate research professor at Sciences Po Paris. His research focuses on comparative political behavior, the politics of ethnic relations, exclusion and integration, networks, and multi-level public policies. He has published more than 20 articles in scholarly journals xii



Notes on Contributors

Notes on Contributors xiii

Donatella della Porta is professor of sociology in the Department of Political and Social Sciences at the European University Institute. She has written extensively (57 volumes and more than 150 chapters and articles), mainly on social movements, democracy, political corruption, the policing of public order, and methodological issues in the social sciences. Among her recent publications are: (with Manuela Caiani), Social Movements and Europeanization (Oxford University Press, 2009); (ed.) Another Europe (Routledge, 2009); (ed.) Democracy in Social Movements (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); (with Michael Keating) Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences (Cambridge University Press, 2009); (with Gianni Piazza), Voices from the Valley; Voices from the Straits (Berghan, 2008); The Global Justice Movement (Paradigm, 2007); (with Massimiliano Andretta, Lorenzo Mosca and Herbert Reiter), Globalization from Below (The University of Minnesota Press, 2006); (with Abby Peterson and Herbert Reiter), The Policing Transnational Protest (Ashgate, 2006); (with Mario Diani), Social Movements: An Introduction, 2nd edition (Blackwell, 2006); (with Sidney Tarrow), Transnational Protest and Global Activism (Rowman and Littlefield, 2005). Katharina Füglister is a PhD candidate and teaching assistant at the Institute of Political Science at the University of Zurich, Switzerland. Her research interests are comparative politics and welfare states, with a particular focus on policy diffusion and health policies. Marco Giugni is a researcher at the Laboratoire de recherches sociales et politiques appliquées (RESOP) and teaches at the Department of Political Science at the University of Geneva. He has authored or co-authored several books and articles on social movements and contentious politics. He has directed and collaborated in a number of comparative projects on topics relating to social movements and contentious politics, social exclusion, and social and political integration. His research interests include: social movements and collective action, immigration and ethnic relations, unemployment and social exclusion. Marina Kalander has a degree in sociology and in working life science. She works at the County Council of Värmland at the department of Public Health and Social Medicine. Her research interest lies in the area of public health and determinants of health.



and volumes and is currently research director of the French projects for YOUNEX and EURISLAM (EU Framework Seven Programme).

Christian Lahusen is professor sociology at the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences of the University of Siegen, Germany. He studied in Düsseldorf and Madrid, received his PhD at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy, and obtained his habilitation at the University of Bamberg, Germany. His research interests include sociological theories, political sociology, European studies, unemployment, and social exclusion. He has published a book with Britta Baumgarten on the contentious politics of unemployment in Germany titled Das Ende des sozialen Friedens? Politik und Protest in Zeiten der Hartz-Reformen (Campus Verlag, 2010). Annulla Linders is an associate professor of sociology at the University of Cincinnati. Her research interests are located at the intersection of history, culture, social movements, and politics, with a special focus on contentious sociopolitical issues. Her published articles include historical and historical-comparative analyses of abortion, unemployment, and capital punishment. She is currently at work on a book about the historical transformation of the American execution audience. Paul Statham is professor of political sociology and director of EurPolCom, the Centre for European Political Communications, hosted by the School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies at the University of Bristol. His research focuses on European integration, media and political contention, and citizenship and migrants’ political mobilization in Europe. He has published more than 40 articles in scholarly journals and volumes and is co-author of Contested Citizenship: Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe (Minnesota, 2005). He is editor (with Ruud Koopmans) of The Making of a European Public Sphere: Media Discourse and Political Contention (Cambridge University Press, 2010).



xiv Notes on Contributors

Marco Giugni

The challenge of unemployment in Europe There is little doubt that unemployment today is one of the major challenges facing the European democracies. Unemployment rates have grown steadily during the last few decades. In fact, at least since the crisis of the mid-1970s, the dream of full employment has progressively vanished. Although unemployment rates vary strongly from one country to the other, today all the governments in Europe have to deal with large numbers of jobless people. Furthermore, especially since the 1990s, this is increasingly becoming a structural rather than a temporary problem, with larger sectors of the population being excluded from the labor market permanently or at least for longer periods. Also, unemployment more and more affects the younger strata of the population. At the same time, European citizens today consider unemployment as one of the most important problems, if not the most important overall, as constantly witnessed by opinion polls held in different nations at different points in time. Unemployment is both an individual and a collective problem. Surely it is felt as a deprivation by those who are struck by it. In contemporary society paid work is the main source of revenue for most people, and it is also something that structures the everyday life of people. Sociologists have long observed the negative consequences unemployment has for those who lose their job (Jahoda et al. 1972), including its psychological effects (e.g. Gallie and Russell 1998; Jahoda 1982; Kelvin and Jarret 1985; Ouweneel 2002; Whelan et al. 1991; Warr 1987). Therefore, unemployment for the single individual is not only problematic in terms of a lack of economic resources, but also in terms of self-esteem and social recognition. 1



The Contentious Politics of Unemployment in Europe: An Introduction


But unemployment is also a social and political challenge. Our society still rests on the assumption that everybody should have a paid job and should be inserted into the labor market. More precisely, in the still widely accepted, although declining, male breadwinner model (Crompton 1999), the assumption is that all men of adult age should be in the labor market. Therefore, high levels of unemployment cannot be socially and politically accepted and solutions must be found. Faced with this challenge, new responses have thus been sought, both by the state and by the civil society, at all levels of government (local, national, and European). For example, the European Union has set itself the objective of fighting unemployment and social exclusion. This was first done through the long-standing European Social Fund. Since the 1990s, however, new initiatives have been implemented, such as the European Employment Strategy and, more generally, a common European social policy that tries to include both policy actors and civil society actors. The application of the so-called Method of Open Coordination to employment policies is part of this new strategy and is aimed at integrating all kinds of collective actors and stakeholders in the search for more effective solutions. Most importantly, national actors are asked to foster employment and limit the negative consequences of unemployment. National governments are obviously at the forefront of this action. Policy measures have mainly followed two lines of intervention. On the one hand, governments have tried to develop new unemployment regulations. These refer to measures concerning the rights and duties of jobseekers. The most important of such new regulations is probably the widespread introduction in the 1990s of so-called active measures, leading to what some have called the politics of conditionality (Dwyer and Ellison 2009) and others the politics of activation (Maeder and Nadai 2009). In contrast to passive measures, which consist basically in providing financial compensation to the unemployed, active measures aim to maximize the chances of people finding paid work and being (re)inserted into the labor market. This is done through a variety of strategies such as public employment services, training and vocational programs, subsidies to firms, and so forth. On the other hand, governments also intervene in the labor market itself. Here the most relevant shift in the 1990s, but still valid today, is the increasing flexibilization of the labor market, aimed above all to make the entry into the labor market easier, but also to improve the competitiveness of European companies in a time of globalization. It is not our goal here to discuss the benefits and pitfalls of these two main policy shifts. This is to a large extent a matter of ideological



2

3

stance, after all. For example, activation policies can be regarded either as a good way to improve the “employability” of jobless people or as a main avenue toward precariousness and exerting a tighter control over the unemployed. The important point for our present purpose is that such changes provide a new institutional framework with which all the actors who are actively involved or implicated in this field are confronted. It is the relation between such a framework and the intervention of collective actors in the field of unemployment politics that form the main object of this book. Traditionally, scholarly work on unemployment has followed two main directions. On the one side, scholars have dealt with the socioeconomic conditions that give rise to changes in the labor market, such as technological transformations and changes in the structure of the working population. On the other side, they have looked at the policies that national governments have adopted to fight unemployment. This volume addresses the issue from a different angle by considering unemployment as a contested political field. We elaborate on this aspect below and in more detail in Chapter 1. For now it suffices to say that our approach combines two theoretical traditions that so far have followed quite separate tracks: the literature on social movements and contentious politics and the literature on the comparative political economy of the welfare state. We aim to combine these two traditions in order to propose a novel perspective on unemployment politics. Before discussing how this will be done, however, a few words about the context in which the present study took place are in order.

The UNEMPOL project This book originated in a cross-national comparative research project funded by the European commission through the Fifth Framework Program. The UNEMPOL project (The Contentious Politics of Unemployment in Europe: Political Claim-Making, Policy Deliberation and Exclusion from the Labor Market) has been coordinated by Paul Statham and the present author. The main objective of this project—conducted between 2002 and 2005—was to shed light on what we have called the “contentious politics of unemployment,” that is, the relationships between political institutional approaches to employment policy and political conflicts mobilized by collective actors over unemployment in the public domain. In so doing, the project aimed to provide a more integrated approach to the study of unemployment by systematically linking the analysis of policy issues related to labor and employment



Marco Giugni


with the analysis of political contention relating to unemployment in the public domain. The final report (Giugni and Statham 2005) can be downloaded from the project’s website.1 The project began as a smaller study of the mobilization—or rather the lack of mobilization—of the unemployed in Switzerland. That study was financed by the University of Geneva and conducted by the present author. Movements of the unemployed have been largely neglected in the social movement literature; perhaps because scholars have assumed that unemployment is a temporary condition that is not very conducive to political organization and mobilization (see Giugni 2008b for a review of existing works). However, it soon became clear that an analysis of the mobilization of the unemployed should be embedded in a larger framework. The analysis was therefore broadened in four directions. First, we adopted a comparative perspective in order to link variations in the mobilization of the unemployed to differences in the states’ approaches to unemployment and the political opportunities stemming from them. Second, in addition to the mobilization of the unemployed, we took into account the intervention of other actors in the field. These included policy actors in particular, but also civil society actors such as private businesses and trade unions, as well as organizations defending the interests of the unemployed. Third, in addition to actions in the public domain, we took into account less visible forms of intervention in the field, such as “insider lobbying” and, more generally, policy deliberation in the multiorganizational field. Fourth, in addition to the national level, we took into account the role of the European Union in shaping national policy agendas in the field and vice-versa, thus addressing the “multileveling” of the contentious politics of unemployment. This broadening of the scope of the project led its initiator to look for partners in other European countries. A combination of theoretical (variations in welfare regimes) and pragmatic (existing research network) criteria suggested the following countries and scholars for inclusion in the research: France (study led by Didier Chabanet at the University of Lyon 2); Germany (Christian Lahusen at the University of Bamberg); Italy (Donatella della Porta at the University of Florence); Sweden (Annulla Linders at the University of Cincinnati, working with the University of Karlstad); and the UK (Paul Statham at the University of Leeds). The latter was the coordinator of the project, while the present author played the role of scientific coordinator. All the authors of the chapters included in this book have actively collaborated in this research.



4

5

The UNEMPOL project has resulted in a number of published papers and books, which have focused mainly on specific national contexts (e.g. Baglioni et al. 2008a; Berclaz et al. 2004; Linders and Kalander 2007; della Porta and Baglioni 2010; Giugni et al. forthcoming; Lahusen and Baumgarten 2010), including country chapters in a forthcoming edited volume on the mobilization of the unemployed (Chabanet and Faniel, forthcoming). Published works have focused on two-country comparisons (e.g. Lahusen and Baumgarten 2006) as well as the EUlevel (Lahusen 2009). In addition, an edited volume derived from the project’s closing conference has been published (Giugni 2009). The contributions included in this book build on comparative analyses previously published as a chapter in an edited volume (Chabanet and Giugni 2008) as well as in a special issue of a scholarly journal (see Giugni 2008a) and present systematic, cross-national findings. Each provides analyses based on empirical evidence gathered during the course of the project. Before describing this data in greater detail, an overview of its theoretical underpinnings will contextualize the following contributions.

A contentious politics approach to unemployment The UNEMPOL project’s underlying idea is that the prevailing view of the welfare state—and its crystallization in institutional approaches to unemployment—impinge in significant ways upon both the public debates on unemployment and collective mobilizations of the unemployed. Drawing from the literature on political opportunities for collective action (see Kriesi 2004a and Meyer 2004 for reviews), we see dominant conceptions of the welfare state as defining a specific political opportunity structure that enlarges or constrains the options for action available to collective actors intervening in this field (Berclaz and Giugni 2005). In a way, the idea is not new. In fact, the UNEMPOL project took inspiration from a project that had previously engaged several of the authors in this volume: the MERCI project (Mobilization on Ethnic Relations, Citizenship, and Immigration). That project elaborated a theoretical framework for the study of political claim making in the immigration political field (see Giugni and Passy 2006; Koopmans et al. 2005 for detailed analyses and findings). In this perspective, cross-national variations in political contention over immigration and ethnic relations can be explained by the institutional and discursive opportunities stemming from different conceptions of national identity as well as their



Marco Giugni


crystallization in country-specific integration and citizenship policies. The latter determine the rights and duties of immigrants, as well as the institutional resources and channels available to collective actors to address claims to the state and other social actors. Furthermore, cultural notions of citizenship and national identity determine which perspectives on the relations between immigrants and the host society are considered sensible, which constructions of reality are considered realistic, and which claims and collective actors are considered legitimate within the political system (Koopmans et al. 2005). Such institutional and discursive opportunities facilitate the mobilization of certain collective actors with certain kinds of collective identities and specific demands, for example migrants and minorities, while preventing or making more difficult the mobilization of other actors and the expression of other identities and demands. The UNEMPOL project took the challenge of going beyond a general and abstract definition of political opportunities toward a more specific definition. In so doing, it tries to apply it to the field of unemployment politics, focusing on the ways in which institutional approaches to unemployment channel the political claim making of collective actors in this field. Following this neo-institutional perspective, we looked at political conflicts over the sections of the population who suffer from marginalization through the exclusion from the labor market (partial or full, temporary or permanent), on the one side, and the policy measures that are designed to address such issues, on the other. Of course, the contested and negotiated character of this policy field expresses itself both in the public domain and in the institutional arenas for interest mediation. Therefore we looked both at political claim making in the public domain and policy deliberation within the polity. Within this framework, an important aim was to examine the relationship between public claims, collective mobilizations, and policy decisions. We looked at the ways in which the issue of unemployment and related issues are addressed in the public domain by social and political actors, and how this relates to the formulation and implementation of policies and legislation to fight unemployment and promote employment. In addition to the cross-national comparative framework incorporating the six countries mentioned earlier we explore current—alleged or actual—trends toward Europeanization and globalization. This is accomplished by addressing the transnational dimension of the contentious politics of unemployment. In so doing, we aimed to determine to what extent the labor politics field has been Europeanized by the growing influence of European institutions and initiatives, by European



6

7

umbrella associations and NGO-networks, and/or by transnational debates on the issue. Thus, the overall design of the UNEMPOL project has three main components. The first component involves mapping the field of political contention (i.e. the structures of ideological cleavages and actor relationships) over time (1995–2002) in the six countries included in the study. In so doing, we systematically compare the form and contents of political claim making in order to examine the relationship between claim making over unemployment issues and decision making by political elites, and to examine the degree of convergence/divergence in national political issue-fields, and also to look for signs of Europeanization. The second component examines the nature of the multiorganizational field, which extends from the core policy domain to the public domain, that is, networks and channels of political influence between core policy actors, political parties, trade unions and employment associations on the one side, and civil society organizations and social movements representing the unemployed (including the unemployed themselves) on the other. The third and final component focuses on the nature of the interaction between EU-level and national policy making in the political field of unemployment. It aims to determine the nature of channels of political influence that exist between European institutions and national policy domains in the field on the one side, and on the other to examine to what extent there are new political opportunities for the empowerment of citizens’ organizations that represent the interests of the unemployed (including the unemployed themselves) as a consequence of the emergence of the European Union as an actor in the field. The chapters included in this book address all three aspects.

The empirical bases of the book In addition to policy documentation and secondary literature, the UNEMPOL project relied on three sources of primary data: claim-making data gathered through a content analysis of newspapers; semi-structured interviews with relevant policy actors; and more open-ended interviews with organizations of the unemployed. Gathering systematic and comparative data on claim making from newspaper sources was the basis for the analysis of both public discourse and the positions of various collective actors making public demands or mobilizing around unemployment issues. This method allows for analysis of both the shares and positions of different collective actors in national



Marco Giugni


public spheres, of the extent to which collective actors are involved or addressed in this field, and of how issues relating to that field are framed. This method served as the backbone of the project, providing a systematic comparative picture of the general differences between the contentious politics of unemployment in the countries included in the study. This methodological approach follows Koopmans and Statham’s (1999a) work on “political claims analysis.” This analysis extends and complements the more traditional protest event analysis, which has become increasingly popular in work on social movements and contentious politics, especially for comparative studies (e.g. Beissinger 2002; Kriesi et al. 1995; Rucht 1994; Rucht et al. 1998; Tarrow 1989; Tilly 1995, 1997; Tilly et al. 1975). In fact, political claims analysis is an event-based method that builds on the tradition of protest event analysis (see Koopmans 1998; Koopmans and Rucht 2002; Olzak 1989; and Rucht and Ohlemacher 1992 for reviews), but extends the method to include speech acts and public discourse variables highlighted by frame analysis (see Benford and Snow 2000 and Snow 2004 for reviews). More precisely, while protest event analysis, as its name suggests, focuses mainly on protest events and social movement actors from a quantitative point of view (counts of events), political claims analysis extends this in three directions: (1) by focusing on actors outside social movements (e.g. political parties, state and policy actors); (2) by covering non-protest event forms (e.g. verbal statements, policy decisions); and (3) by paying much more attention to the very content of the claims (e.g. thematic foci, objects, policy positions, framing). The main unit of analysis is the claim, which can be defined as “a unit of strategic action in the public sphere that consists of the purposive and public articulation of political demands, calls to action, proposals, criticisms, or physical attacks, which, actually or potentially, affect the interests or integrity of the claimants and/or other collective actors” (Koopmans et al. 2005: 24; emphasis in original). In other words, a claim is any intervention in the public domain whose realization would affect, positively or negatively, the interest, rights, and identity of an object population (which may be the same as the author of the claim). This includes both protest actions and verbal statements. Furthermore, political decisions and policy implementation are defined as special forms of claim making, namely ones that have direct effects on the objects of the claim. This definition, which translate in empirically usable terms the contentious politics approach put forward by McAdam et al. (2001), redirects the attention of scholars toward processes of interaction between actors (coalitions, alliances, and networks) within a multiorganizational field.



8

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Each claim is then broken down into its elementary units. Inspired by Franzosi’s (2004) idea to use the structure of linguistic grammar to code contentious events (see also Tilly 1995, 1997) we have broken down the structure of claims down into seven elements: (1) the location of the claim in time and space; (2) the actor making the claim; (3) the form of the claim; (4) the addressee of the claim; (5) the substantive issue or thematic focus of the claim; (6) the object actor who is or would be affected by the claim; and (7) the justification for the claim. All this information has been coded in machine-readable format and analyzed through standard statistical tools (e.g. SPSS). Our core data on political claims were retrieved from one national newspaper for each country (Neue Zürcher Zeitung for Switzerland, Le Monde for France, La Repubblica for Italy, Süddeutsche Zeitung for Germany, Dagens Nyheter for Sweden, and The Guardian for the UK). These are all independent newspapers of public record with a nationwide scope of coverage and readership. Each is a broadsheet newspaper with a reputation for consistent and detailed coverage of the field of unemployment politics. From these newspapers, the main news sections of each Monday, Wednesday, and Friday issue (Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday in France’s case) were sampled and coded for all political claims that belong thematically to the issue field of unemployment, which is narrowly defined as follows. Specifically, we coded all claims (political decisions, verbal statements, and protest actions) that dealt with the following themes: unemployment, under-employment, joblessness, exclusion from the labor market, and measures and provisions for unemployed people (including training courses, financing of unemployment insurance, and workfare). We also coded claims referring to related fields, but only if they explicitly referred to the issue field of unemployment. Thus, employment policy, economic development policy, and other issues concerning the labor market or the creation of jobs were only included if the claim made an explicit reference to unemployment, under-employment, or joblessness. Finally, given our specific interest in the mobilization of the unemployed, all claims by organized groups of the unemployed were coded, regardless of their thematic focus. The sample includes information on news reports from 1995 to 2002 inclusive. The use of media sources to track protest events and social movement activities has been the object of numerous methodological discussions for many years now (e.g. Danzger 1975; Snyder and Kelly 1977). In particular, the use of newspaper data has raised a number of citicisms and discussions (see Earl et al. 2004 and Ortiz et al. 2005 for



Marco Giugni


overviews; see Franzosi 1987 for a broader discussion of the use of the press in sociohistorical research). Three main sources of bias have been stressed in this regard: selection bias, description bias, and reliability and validity problems (McCarthy et al. 2008). Although some attention has been paid also to the second (e.g. McCarthy et al. 1998) and third (e.g. Barranco and Wisler 1998; Strawn 2008) of these three potential sources of bias, the first—selection bias—is by far the most often discussed in the literature (e.g. Hocke 1998; McCarthy et al. 1996; Myers and Schaefer Caniglia 2004; Oliver and Maney 2000; Oliver and Myers 1999; Mueller 1997). Despite the lack of consensus in the literature on methodology, we maintain that the quality standards of the event-based analysis in comparison to other instruments of data retrieval (such as surveys) score well. Thus, newspapers data can be used effectively so long as certain distortions are known (see McCarthy et al. 1996). Furthermore, the use of additional sources does not seem to lead to fundamentally different results (Myers and Schaefer Caniglia 2004), whereas the choice of a single national quality newspaper provides a more economic and reliable source for cross-national comparative and longitudinal analyses. For example, a test of the representativeness of the newspaper sources for the field of immigration and ethnic relations has shown that while there are important differences across alternative sources in the rate of coverage of relevant claims (especially between national quality papers, on one hand, and tabloid and regional papers, on the other), such differences in coverage rates coincide with strikingly similar distributions of acts on important variables (Koopmans et al. 2005). Yet, on a more fundamental level, the selection bias criticism points to the fact that the method yields a distorted communicative reality rather than a social reality. Newspaper coverage is obviously not an undistorted and complete mirror of reality. From the multitude of claims that are made on a daily basis by a variety of groups in liberal democracies, only a fraction are actually reported in the media. In the final analysis, however, such distortions are not problematic for at least two reasons. First, from the point of view of protest event analysis, it is precisely such communicative reality that is relevant for the population and the political decision makers since, with few exceptions, this is how they learn of protests (Koopmans and Rucht 2002). In this sense, one could say that unreported events remain invisible and have the same impact as no event at all. Without media coverage, they remain largely private events known only to their participants and perhaps their targets and the occasional bystander.



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Second, and perhaps most importantly, political claims analyses such as those highlighted herein actually presuppose that there are strong selection mechanisms in the public sphere that determine the chances of access of specific types of claim making (Koopmans et al. 2005). For example, one of the main thrusts of the UNEMPOL project is that the prevailing conception of the welfare state in a given country and the institutional approach to unemployment stemming from it determine the legitimacy, resonance, and visibility of certain claims and therefore their chances of entering the public domain. Newspaper data—or other media sources, for that matter—captures precisely the communicative reality we want to highlight. In other words, the fact that the newspaper data in such cases is partly the result of media selection processes is not a problem for our approach but, instead, captures precisely what we want to measure. Thus, the aim here is not to provide a full picture of all the attempts at claim making that occur, but to explain the pattern of those claims that are actually able to penetrate the mass media and thereby may become part of the processes of policy making and public debate and deliberation. The information derived from newspapers on political claim making forms the main data source for the project as well as for most of the chapters included in this book (Chapters 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, and partly 8). This type of information, however, is not well suited to grasping certain aspects of the contentious politics of unemployment, such as less visible forms of public campaigning by collective actors within the field under study and their participation in processes of policy deliberation in the national policy domains. We therefore conducted in each country a series of semi-structured interviews with various actors involved in the unemployment political field at the national level: core national policy makers; politicians; leaders of employers’ association and trade union leaders; leaders of civil society and third sector organizations, NGOs, pro-welfare and anti-social exclusion movements; and organizations of the unemployed themselves. These interviews provided crucial information on the structural characteristics, activities, ideological positions, and networks of actors in the multiorganizational field of unemployment politics. The information derived from such interviews is used mainly in two of the chapters in this book (Chapters 3 and 6). In order to study actor relationships and networks at the supra- and transnational European level, we conducted similar interviews with policy, civil society, and NGO actors at the EU level. Two of the chapters in this book draw heavily on these data (Chapters 8 and 9).



Marco Giugni


The questionnaire used in the semi-structured interviews included a set of questions whose answers can be treated through formal network analysis techniques and software (e.g. UCINET). This was done in order to give a more accurate picture of the multiorganizational field of unemployment as well as of the relationships among actors in this field. Specifically, we gathered data concerning three types of network ties: disagreement, cooperation, and influence. These data provide crucial information on the structure of the policy networks in the field of unemployment and allow us to gain a deeper understanding of the nature and type of relationships within unemployment politics, both horizontally (cross-national) and vertically (national to European and vice versa). This kind of data is applied in two of the chapters in this book (Chapters 3 and 8). As said, the semi-structured interviews were also used to gather information on the organization and activities of the unemployed. However, given the unstructured and informal organizational settings in which this group is embedded and also given the lack of knowledge about the unemployed as a political collective actor, we also examined in more detail their organizational structure and campaigns. This was done by conducting open-ended interviews with key activists in unemployed organizations in order to understand better the internal dynamics and strategies of their mobilization. This more qualitative source of information is helpful for any of the chapters in this book, but was used mainly in two of them (Chapters 6 and 9). The specific use and operationalization of the data thus described are presented in each of the chapters included in the volume.2

Outline of the book This book is divided into three main parts. Part I deals with the context and opportunities for contentious politics in the field of unemployment, on the one hand, and the forms and content of collective action in this field, on the other. This part includes three chapters. Chapter 1, by Manlio Cinalli and Marco Giugni, looks at political opportunities for claim making on unemployment. They focus in particular on the mix of specific opportunities stemming from unemployment and labor market regulations, using a typology that crosses these two dimensions and assesses empirically the place of the six countries of the study in the typology. They then provide a comparative analysis of claim making across the six countries, showing the existence of important differences as to the main components of claims: the actors involved, the form of claims, their substantive focus, and their ideological position. They also



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examine the impact of unemployment and labor market regulations as a specific set of political opportunities on the chances that claims take the form of protest action, that they focus on unemployed objects, and that they have a positive stance toward their object. Chapter 2, by Donatella della Porta, zooms in on the forms of claim making. She focuses on the existence and heterogeneity of protest over unemployment, looking at the more sporadic and disruptive outbursts of the long-term unemployed, better structured protest against dismissals, and the intertwining of protest over unemployment with that over other issues during cycles of protest. Using newspaper data and following a political claims analysis approach, she examines different aspects of collective action in the field of unemployment: the political opportunities for the emergence and development of protest in this field, the actors and alliances they establish with each other, the forms of their protest, and the framing of the issues they raise. She looks at the impact of changes in the social structure, the availability of organizational resources, and political and discursive opportunities for collective action to show that, in general, the status of unions as well as the traditional assets of industrial relations will affect the chances of protest in this field. Chapter 3, by Manlio Cinalli and Katharina Füglister, shifts the empirical locus of the analysis from the claim-making data to the interview data. They analyze the exchange networks that are created among collective actors who intervene in this field. In particular, they compare networks of cooperation in three of the countries included in the original project: Britain, Germany, and Switzerland. By applying techniques of network analysis—a method that it is still quite rarely used in research on social movements—to the data stemming from the interviews, the authors show how the mobilization of the unemployed depends on patterns of interorganizational exchanges specific to the field within which they are situated. As such, organizational networks can be seen as part of the political opportunity structure for the mobilization of the unemployed and transforming the conditions for mobilization within a national political field into instances of collective action. Part II focuses on three specific collective actors who play an important role (as actors or as objects of claims) in the contentious politics of unemployment. Chapter 4, by Annulla Linders and Marina Kalander, looks at trade unions. It addresses how the unions responded to the unemployment crisis and, more specifically, seeks to understand how they positioned themselves in relation to the unemployed. In order to sort through conflicting evidence about the role of unions vis-à-vis the unemployed, they employ a systematic cross-national comparison



Marco Giugni


of the unions’ response to the unemployment crisis during the period studied in the six countries. The basic hypothesis guiding the analysis is that, because unions occupy very different positions in the different nations under consideration, both as social movement organizations and as institutional actors, their position vis-à-vis the unemployed should vary systematically between the nations. In other words, the unions in each nation are different in a number of significant respects that influence their ability to negotiate with employers, put pressure on the state, and, by extension, to protect and support both their working members and the unemployed. However, since these different positions place different constraints on and provide different opportunities for the unions’ ability to act, the expectation, which is borne out by the findings, is that unions make somewhat different claims (in words and action) on behalf of employed and unemployed workers. Chapter 5, by Simone Baglioni, examines the contribution that civil society actors give to the public debate about unemployment, paying special attention to the role of non-state welfare organizations and groups. He argues that the access to the debate for civil society actors is influenced by the larger context in which it occurs. Among the most important contextual aspects are not only the political opportunities stemming from the prevailing type of welfare state, but also the presence of neo-corporatist arrangements in industrial relations and the degree of decentralization of the state. Moreover, he shows that the content of claims also depends on the variety of organizations involved in claim making in a given country: research institutes or experts tend to frame unemployment in technical rather than political terms, while social movements or grassroots organizations frame unemployment more as a political phenomenon that requires political solutions. Thus, the claim making by civil society actors in a given country depends not only on the specific socioeconomic and political context, but also on the type of organizations involved. Chapter 6, by Simone Baglioni, Britta Baumgarten, Didier Chabanet, and Christian Lahusen, focuses on the collective actor that is most directly implicated in the contentious politics of unemployment: the unemployed. In a joint effort to understand better the impact of macro-structural factors and political opportunities, they compare the mobilization of the unemployed in France, Germany, and Italy, three countries in which the unemployed were able to organize and mobilize over a sustained period of time. Yet such mobilization remains very fragile and depends on the existence of favorable windows of opportunities. Specifically, the authors show how the unemployed benefited from



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external developments that produced changes in potential mobilizing resources and created new allies and political entrepreneurs. At the same time, however, such opportunities were actively seized and produced by contentious actors, including the unemployed themselves. Part III shifts the locus of the analysis from the national to the supranational level, with a specific focus on the European level. Chapter 7, by Christian Lahusen, Marco Giugni, and Michel Berclaz, deals with the possible changes relating to globalization in the field of unemployment politics. Following a neo-institutional approach, they argue that the impact of globalization on the political claim making in this field is limited by the path dependencies and the strong constraining role of domestic policy arenas and agendas. They look in particular at the types of actors mobilized on these issues, their targets and the content of their claims. Their analysis suggests that supranational pressures are what national actors can make of them. Supranational actors and issues seem only to gain weight in public debates in a conjunctural way or in relation to specific events at the national level that focus on supranational actors and issues. In other words, there is an important cyclical dimension in the importance of the supranational dimension, rather than a structural trend toward an increasing role of the supranational level. Chapter 8 by Paul Statham and Manlio Cinalli addresses some similar issues, but focuses specifically on: first, the Europeanization trends within public policy debates over unemployment and their consequences for the ability of non-state actors to gain access to decision making and discursive power; and, second, the nature of the multiorganizational field that has emerged at the European supranational level. The authors use the claim making data to assess the inclusiveness of Europeanized public policy debates over unemployment toward different actor types. By comparing Europeanized debates to those that remain nationally bounded, they find that Europeanized public debates are less inclusive of legislative and civil society actors than national ones. From this they conclude that the Europeanization of public policy debates over unemployment leads to an empowerment in discursive influence of the already powerful executive actors. The authors then use the network data drawn from interviews with organizations to examine the patterns of relationships of influence, disagreement and cooperation that characterize the multiorganizational field that has emerged at the European supranational level. The type of politics they find operating at the European supranational level is shaped by a highly institutionalized multiorganizational field dominated by executive power in which there is little room for non-governmental actors and



Marco Giugni


social movements to mobilize an autonomous voice. To the extent that they are raised at all, the interests of the unemployed are carried by a small cluster of organizations that depend largely on their connections with the European Trade Unions Confederation to be in a position to make their case even heard at all. Finally, Chapter 9, by Didier Chabanet, looks at the mobilization of the unemployed at the European level. He focuses in particular on an important movement that mobilized especially strongly between 1997 and 1999: the European Marches against Unemployment, Job Insecurity, and Social Exclusion. Chabanet shows how a small number of leaders, despite the weak support of the institutional representative frameworks, succeeded in giving collective and political meaning to the grievances of the unemployed. Focusing on a European agenda, the movement was then able to make itself visible to the media and public opinion, which it used as resources. This led to a new form of Europeanization of collective action: the externalization of protest. In the end, however, the movement was unable to survive the transition to the global justice movement, of which it was one of its first expressions. The conclusion, by Marco Giugni, addresses the role of the welfare state and political opportunities for the contentious politics of unemployment in Europe in the light of the discussions in the preceding chapters. Some of the chapters were previously published in a special issue of the journal Mobilization3 (guest edited by the present author) devoted to the contentious politics of unemployment in Europe. Specifically, Chapters 2, 3, 6, and 9 are reprinted and adapted to the present volume. These previously published papers were then supplemented by a number of additional chapters.

Notes This chapter is an expanded version of a previous publication (Giugni 2008a). I would like to thank Didier Chabanet, Manlio Cinalli, Annulla Linders, and Jasmine Lorenzini for their careful reading of a previous draft. Although I could not take into account all of their comments, the text has much improved thanks to them. 1. http://www.eurpolcom.eu/unempol. 2. The information used in Chapter 9 was gathered prior to the project on which the book rests and then complemented with data from the project. 3. Volume 13, 2008.



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Context and Opportunities




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Welfare States, Political Opportunities, and Claim Making in the Field of Unemployment Politics Manlio Cinalli and Marco Giugni Introduction The idea that the political context sets the parameters within which political participation and mobilization occur is quite common among scholars of collective action, but it has found only limited space among scholars dealing with the political activities of the unemployed. In this chapter, we assess the extent to which objects, positions, and forms of political claim making in the field of unemployment depend upon institutional approaches to unemployment. Our point of departure is represented by work on the impact of configurations of citizenship, political opportunities, and claim making in the political field of immigration and ethnic relations (Giugni and Passy 2004, 2006; Koopmans et al. 2005), and, more particularly, on first attempts to apply this latter type of work to the unemployment field (Berclaz and Giugni 2005; Berclaz et al. 2004; Giugni et al. 2009). More precisely, we deal with two main dimensions of the political context. We gathered data from the analysis of a large number of political indicators so as to examine the role of unemployment regulations and that of labor market regulations. Different combinations of these two dimensions are then identified so as to discuss the potential impact of specific institutional configurations of opportunities within the unemployment field. We also focus on more general opportunities relating to the institutional setup of a country when dealing with variations of forms of action, since mobilization in the unemployment field may well respond to more general stimuli that exist beyond this specific field. We start by briefly discussing the extant literature in order to build our theoretical framework. We thus fill in the void between the study of contentious politics on the one hand—in particular, works that 19



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Claim Making in the Field of Unemployment Politics

have stressed the impact of political opportunity structures on social protest (see Kriesi 2004a and Meyer 2004 for reviews)—and the comparative political economy of the welfare state on the other hand—in particular, works that have emphasized variations in terms of institutional approaches to social security (see Arts and Gelissen 2002; GreenPierson and Haverland 2002; and Pierson 2000a for reviews). We discuss extensively each dimension of the political opportunities, but we pay particular attention to discussing four ideal-typical national models. We then present empirical data so as to compare the main characteristics of claim making in the field of unemployment across the six countries included in our study. We focus on variations in terms of objects, positions, and forms of claims, while at the same time analyzing the different types of actors who intervene in the public domain, as well as the issues that are raised by political demands and collective action in the field. In the final step, multivariate analyses enable us to appraise whether variations of mobilization in the political field of unemployment can be linked to variations along the dimensions of political opportunities. More precisely, we measure the independent impact of our two main contextual variables (unemployment regulations and labor market regulations) on the forms, object, and position of claims in the field controlling for other potential predictors of collective action such as the type of actors, the issue at stake, and the year in which the claims took place. Ultimately, we show that the way in which unemployment is institutionally thought and regulated has a crucial impact on the actors’ behavior in the unemployment field.

Political opportunities for claim making in the unemployment political field Political opportunities have extensively been used to explain the levels, forms, and outcomes of collective action (Eisinger 1973; Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 1995; McAdam 1999; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978). Recent scholarship, however, has suggested that structures of opportunities vary across different issue-fields (Cinalli 2004; Chabanet and Giugni 2008), arguing that a full analysis of the unemployment field also needs to refer to state welfare approaches to unemployment and to the labor market (Berclaz and Giugni 2005; Berclaz et al. 2004; Giugni et al. 2009). This work has taken into consideration the comparative literature on the welfare state, with its broad models referring to the liberal “Anglo-Saxon” countries, the Bismarckian continental Europe, and the universalist Scandinavian countries (see also Esping-Andersen 1990, although his “welfare state



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regimes” stand out as stable institutional arrangements between market, state, and the private sphere, beyond simple state intervention). While these models cover a large volume of social policies (including pension systems, healthcare systems, and so forth), here we focus more specifically on unemployment. In addition to the works mentioned earlier, our argument thus follows in the footsteps of seminal scholarship on exclusion by Gallie and Paugam (2000), who have focused on the impact of “unemployment-providence regimes” on the experience of unemployment. In particular, these authors have based their models on indicators of policies aimed at fighting unemployment, referring to three main institutional measures: the degree of coverage, the level of financial compensation, and the importance of active measures for employment. Since institutional approaches to unemployment include both state measures directed to the target population of the unemployed (as a part of the welfare state) and those addressing the labor market, we also need consider the latter. Labor market regulations are indeed central to the functioning of the modern welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1996), standing out for their tight relationship with unemployment policies themselves (Bonoli 2003). It is sufficient to mention that the type and level of active measures are just at the crossroads between unemployment legislation and labor market regulations, with flexibility gaining the core of debates about unemployment. For example, looking at the six countries of the UNEMPOL project, scholarly discussions have emphasized the UK and Switzerland as having a flexible labor market combining low levels of unemployment with high levels of wage inequalities; France, Germany, and Italy stand out for their rigid labor market legislation, which privileges the “insiders” against the “outsiders; while Sweden represents an intermediate case, with flexibility being coupled with higher chances for the unemployed to enter the labor market (Giugni et al. 2009). Below we make an attempt to appraising the extent to which our evidence confirms previous characterizations of the welfare models of these countries. Yet we first need to provide more details about the way we measure unemployment regulations and labor market regulations. We have evaluated these two dimensions by translating them into a systematic series of indicators that can be appraised along the continuum between ⫹1 and ⫺1 (see Cinalli and Bozec 2007 for a similar approach). The first dimension of unemployment regulations refers to the continuum inclusion/exclusion (with ⫹1 being inclusion and ⫺1 exclusion). In this case, we refer to conditions of access to rights and



Manlio Cinalli and Marco Giugni 21


welfare provisions for the unemployed, but also to the obligations attached to full enjoyment of rights and provisions. In particular, the average score for this first dimension is based on seven categories of indicators: formal prerequisites for obtaining social provision, level of coverage, extension of coverage, shifting to social aid, the role played by private and public employment agencies, sanctions for abusing the unemployment system, and the number of people receiving unemployment benefits. The second dimension refers to the continuum flexibility/rigidity as a consequence of state intervention in the labor market (with ⫹1 being flexibility and ⫺1 rigidity). In this case, we acknowledge that rights and obligations deriving from unemployment legislation and, more generally, from state welfare, can go hand in hand with labor market arrangements, as the example of active measures shows. It is also important to assess the existence of a clear distinction between protected workers, precarious workers, and the unemployed as a consequence of the type of labor market regulations. Accordingly, the average score for this second dimension is also based on several categories of indicators, including regulations for dismissals, temporary work, unions protection of workers, measures tackling recruitment discrimination of ethnic and geographical forms, externalization of child-care, and amount of flexible workers. There have been two main steps of analysis: (1) collecting information to describe each country across the selected indicators; (2) standardizing information along the continuum ⫺1 to ⫹1 for comparative purposes. The first step has been qualitative in substance, providing the kind of strong basis on which the second quantitative step is grounded. That is, the qualitative treatment of indicators permits translating them into an interval measure along the 3-point scales. As regards the normative dimension that may be built into such an operationalization of indicators, this can be translated into hypotheses to be tested empirically. Take the second dimension of labor market regulations: depending on the ideological stance, flexibility has been viewed either as an effective means to improve the position of the unemployed and advance debate over unemployment, or otherwise as a path leading to the marginalization of the unemployed and the sweeping of the issue away from the public domain. Here we want more simply to establish whether a relationship exists, and in which direction, between labor market regulations, on the one hand, and objects, positions, and forms of claims on the other hand. It should be emphasized that our indicators include not only hard legislation and public policies, but also softer informal aspects for each dimension. The main aim is to unveil



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the effect of hidden constraints or facilitations that may be operating behind the façade of formal regulations. For example, the number of people that receive sanctions for abusing the benefit system is useful to indicate the true application of the formal provision: a strong force of sanction in the rhetoric of law may well be counterbalanced by its weak implementation. All figures refer to the situation in 2001–2, that is, in the mid-point of time span for collection of claims data. Table 1.1 shows the wide variation across countries along each of the two dimensions.1 In addition, we included a third dimension relating to the general (institutional) political opportunity structure. This dimension was operationalized through five main categories of indicators, including the use of referenda, degree of state decentralization, judicial review, number of parties at the parliamentary level, and the index of disproportionality. In this case, figures can be read along the continuum open/closed in terms of general political context (with ⫹1 being open context and ⫺1 being closed). This dimension has been added for two main reasons. First, we want to show that specific field opportunities can depart a long distance from more general opportunities (as in the case of Italy, Germany, and the UK). Second, general opportunities stand out as a necessary variable of control when assessing the impact of the two other dimensions on forms of action, owing to the explanatory role that political opportunities play in many studies about repertoires of action. In particular, the analysis of unemployment regulations shows the large gulf existing between countries that exclude the unemployed, such as Italy and Germany, and countries that are highly inclusive, such as France and Sweden. Variations along the second dimension of labor market regulations are less drastic but still relevant. Italy is the only case of strong rigidity; France is only marginally flexible; Sweden stands out for its highest score of flexibility. Germany, Switzerland, and the UK are somewhere in the middle between marginal and full flexibility. Furthermore, the combinations of the two dimensions broaden the scope of analysis. The crucial point here is that unemployment regulations and labor market regulations can be combined so as to identify a bi-dimensional space for placing countries in a specific position. Conceptually, this space represents a typology that is useful to identify specific opportunities for collective action in the field of unemployment politics relating to “welfare state regimes” (Giugni et al. 2009). Figure 1.1 shows the potential organization of this space into four main ideal-types. The first type couples inclusion of the unemployed with flexibility of the labor market, thus representing the so-called flexicurity




Unemployment regulations Labor market regulations General political opportunity structures

UK

Switzerland

France

Italy

Germany

Sweden

.29 .33 –.10

.29 .33 .60

.71 .17 .40

–.71 –.33 .60

–.14 .33 –.80

.43 .50 .20


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Table 1.1 Summary scores for the political opportunity structures in the six countries

model or social protection. The second, opposite type, the traditional “corporatist model” or “economic protection,” couples exclusion of the unemployed with a high protection of “insiders.” Thirdly, the combination of rigidity on the labor market dimension and inclusion on the unemployment regulations dimension represents a type of “full protection,” where inclusion of the “outsiders” is not negotiated against the loss of rights for protected “insiders.” Finally, the “precarious model” couples the shrinkage of the rights of traditional workers with the exclusion of the unemployed. At the same time, this is to be considered as a conceptual space in which actual countries do not necessarily fit rigidly a given type. In other words, specific countries may be placed in different spaces within a same type and may also travel across space in time, if the analysis were conducted diachronically. We can now place our countries within this typology based on the scores shown earlier. We can see immediately that, according to our data, no country fits with the full protection model. France stands out as the national case that goes closest to this type as it has introduced only minor reforms in terms of the flexibility of its labor market. By contrast, the flexicurity model stands out as the most popular type. Not only does it include France, if only at the margins, but it is taken as a main model of reference by Switzerland, the UK, and Sweden, the latter standing out as the most flexicure country of all. In contrast, Italy

Unemployment regulations

Labour market regulations

1

0.5 UK CH 0 −1

−0.5

0 −0.5

0.5

1

ITA GER FRA SWE

−1 Figure 1.1 Location of the six countries within the typology of welfare state regimes





seems to have done nothing to follow the popular flexicurity trend. This country stands out for its unchanged preference for a corporatist model that grants privileges to the traditional “insiders” while doing little to include the “outsiders.” Finally, the position of Germany is somewhat surprising given the traditional association of the country with the corporatist or “Bismarckian” model. Germany has extensively reformed its own labor market regulations, being second in terms of flexibility only to Sweden at the time to which our data refer. Yet, it seems that it has not matched this process with a number of inclusive regulations that target the unemployed. Our findings need to be considered vis-à-vis the results of other typologies that have been discussed in the literature (Esping-Andersen 1990; Gallie and Paugam 2000). Consistencies aside, it is important to focus on unexpected findings. In particular, Switzerland fits only partially with the liberal/minimal regime to which this country is most usually associated (Bertozzi et al. 2005). Its high flexibility in terms of its labor market is not coupled with restrictive conditions for the unemployed but, rather, with high unemployment compensations and favorable conditions for the low-skill precarious (Bonoli and Mach 2001). The position of Germany has already been singled out. As said, our findings go against the idea of a “Bismarckian” state par excellence, as Germany has introduced a large volume of flexible labor market reforms. Indeed, there are considerable changes going on in Germany due to the labor market and social policy reforms labeled Hartz-Reform, which were passed as a series of laws between 2003 and 2005 (Kemmerling and Bruttel 2006). While there is much dispute about whether this is a break with the past or a gradual and incremental change of policy orientations following development of government policies since the early 1980s, the main point of our findings is that “precariousness” may well be the distinct element of policies directed specifically at the youth, since the latter stands out as a relevant bulk of the unemployed constituency. Indeed, the German approach deals with young jobless in much stricter terms than it does with adult jobless, promoting further “precariousness” owing to the stronger familialistic elements and the educative impetus of the laws for decades.

Comparing claim making in the field of unemployment politics across countries Unemployment has stood out as a crucial political issue across Europe, prompting a number of different national answers concerning both



26

unemployment regulations and labor market regulations. In this context, it is of great interest to provide first of all an overview of the field of unemployment politics in our six countries so as to emphasize the most relevant characteristics of claim making in this field. We start with the description of the three main aspects of claims upon which we focus in this chapter: their main object, their main position toward the object, and the main form by which the claims access the field. The aim of this first step is to single out most relevant variations among countries. We then continue with the description of two potential explanatory factors of these cross-national variations: the type of actors that intervene in the field and the specific issue of their interventions. The aim of this second step is to provide extensive information on the most intuitive predictors of objects, positions, and forms of claims, which can then be used, side by side with our dimensions of political opportunities, in the multivariate analyses. Taken together, these two steps also offer a detailed overview of major articulations of claim making in each country, thus providing a richer background for evaluating the role of various dimensions of political opportunities in the field of unemployment politics. The objects of claims are the beneficiaries to which a claim is addressed. More precisely, they refer to the group that would benefit if the claim would be realized. The object thus stands out as one of the most crucial aspects to be explained as we want to know the extent to which political opportunities in terms of unemployment and labor market regulations influence actors’ decisions to refer their claims specifically to the unemployed constituency. Table 1.2 shows the beneficiaries of claims along the main distinction between workers and the unemployed. Crucial variations are indeed noticeable across different countries. On the one hand, more than half of claims (54.8 % and 56.3 % respectively) in Switzerland and the UK challenge or promote the interests of workers. Within this latter, we find not only the precariously employed as well as workers under threat or facing actual redundancy, but also workers and Table 1.2 Main objects of claims in unemployment politics by country (%)

Workers Unemployed Total N

UK

Switzerland

France

Italy

Germany

Sweden

56.3 43.7 100% 750

54.8 45.2 100% 2019

24.2 75.8 100% 790

31.5 68.5 100% 950

38.4 61.6 100% 3837

10.1 89.9 100% 584

Note: Cramer’s V ⫽ 0.259 (p ⱕ.001)





employees under threat in general and the working poor. By contrast, fewer than half of claims are about the interests of the unemployed (with the young unemployed being prominent). On the other hand, the public debates are especially about unemployed people in France, Germany, and Italy, with just a minor share of claims referring to people who are actually in work (but who are facing the prospects of unemployment in some way). Sweden follows the same pattern, but the extreme unbalance of percentages puts emphasis on the fact that debate leaves nearly no space for the workers’ constituency. An analysis of positions of claims is useful to evaluate for every claim if the intention is positive, negative, or technocratic from the constituency’s point of view, that is, for the objects themselves. Consequently, we can assess the extent to which actors in the field argue in favor or against the interests of the object at hand, in particular the unemployed. Similar to the logic we have followed to measure the contextual factors (political opportunity structures), claims have thus been coded with a score of ⫺1, 0, ⫹1, dependent upon whether, if realized, the political demand is beneficial (⫹1), neutral (0), or harmful (⫺1) to the interests of the two constituencies of workers and the unemployed. The distinction between workers and the unemployed is here relevant for evaluating differences between countries with the same dominant constituencies. Table 1.3 shows average scores with figures between ⫺1 and ⫹1 representing the aggregate position of all actors’ claim making across countries with respect to the interests of workers and the unemployed. A first point to note is that countries that are similar in terms of main constituency at stake are not necessarily similar in terms of the position of claims. Public debates in France, Germany, and Italy can be moderately or extremely favorable to either workers or the unemployed. Switzerland and the UK show the same favorable position vis-à-vis the unemployed, but the British debates are much less favorable vis-à-vis

Table 1.3 Position of claims toward objects (means) UK Workers .06 (422) Unemployed .48 (328) All objects .24 (750)

Switzerland .24 (1106) .48 (913) .35 (2019)

France

Italy

Germany

Sweden

.63 (191) .46 (299) .25 (1475) .54 (59) .60 (599) .91 (650) .33 (2362) .35 (521) .61 (790) .77 (949) .30 (3837) .37 (580)

Notes: Eta ⫽ 0.174 (p ⱕ.05) (workers) Eta ⫽ 0.284 (n.s.) (unemployed) Eta ⫽ 0.225 (p ⱕ.05) (all objects)



28

workers than the Swiss debates. The result is that claims focusing on the unemployed are not necessarily more favorable to the latter than claims focusing on workers and vice versa. At the same time, it is difficult to detect a consistent relationship between the position toward workers and the position toward the unemployed in any one country. Figures show that the two positions can be very favorable, or only moderately favorable, or even go in opposite directions, with some national debates favoring more the unemployed than workers and vice versa. Put simply, our findings confirm that objects and positions are largely independent from each other and, hence, can be considered as two distinct aspects that can be affected by political opportunity structures. Another crucial point of our analysis refers to variations in the forms of claim making. In this case, our engagement with different ways of accessing the public domain touches the core of collective action scholarship on action repertoires (Tilly 1978; Tilly et al. 1975; Traugott 1995). Regression analysis of the following section will thus be crucial to evaluate the impact of labor market and unemployment regulations vis-à-vis the more classic variables that are used in the literature. Table 1.4 show that there is indeed some remarkable variation that awaits explanation. Of course, verbal forms of intervention stand out as the most recurrent way to access the public space in all countries, but countries do differ substantially in the use of protest forms of action. On the one hand, France stands out as the most contentious country, where nearly one claim out of four takes the form of protest. On the other hand, the UK fits well with the idea of a pacified country, where political contention over unemployment issues is generally declining, the unemployed are too weak to access the public space, and debates most likely exist to specify policy alternatives for state and executive actors (Cinalli and Statham 2005). As regards the other countries, Germany and Sweden are very close to the British case. In these countries workers have gained a Table 1.4 Main forms of claims in unemployment politics by country (%) UK Political decisions Verbal statements Protests Total N

Switzerland France

5.2 90.3 4.6 100% 750

10.6 76.1 13.3 100% 2019

11.9 65.1 23.0 100% 790

Italy

Germany

Sweden

12.0 77.9 10.0 100% 950

2.0 92.9 5.0 100% 3837

9.4 85.1 5.5 100% 584






prominent role within the institutional framework of decision making and hence have, for a long time, avoided more direct use of protest action. Switzerland comes at a quite close distance from France, owing to the extensive dynamics of conventional bottom-up participation at the core of the Swiss polity, whereas Italy stands perfectly in the middle between the two extremes. As regards the potential explanatory factors to account for (variations of) objects, positions, and forms, the analysis of the type of actors is extremely useful for gaining an accurate understanding of the actual content of the data. Table 1.5 looks at the collective actors who have made demands or have engaged in collective action over the issue of unemployment in our countries. The table shows the share of claims in unemployment politics by aggregating all the collective actors in the field into five broader categories: state actors, political parties, labor organizations and groups, employers’ organizations and groups, and (other) civil society actors. The latter category also includes organizations and groups of the unemployed themselves. A first point to note from this is the importance of state actors, who make up at least one third of all claims in each country. Scores thus range between 33.2 percent in Germany and 42.2 percent in Switzerland. Beyond these figures, our findings also tell us that only a small number of these claims can be imputed to subnational state actors, or again to EU and transnational state bodies, such as the IMF, ILO and OECD. That is, central governments are by far the most dominant actor in the unemployment field across the six countries under study.

Table 1.5 Main actors of claims in unemployment politics by country (%) UK State actors Labor organizations and groups Employers organizations and groups Civil society actors Total N

Switzerland

France

Italy

Germany

Sweden

35.3 17.3

42.2 8.7

38.2 21.0

38.8 23.1

33.2 18.2

37.8 16.5

25.2

20.7

8.1

15.2

26.0

20.6

17.6

17.3

15.8

8.0

11.8

13.6

100% 750

100% 2019

100% 790

100% 950

100% 3837

100% 584




30

A second point to note, however, is that employers’ organizations account for the largest proportion of claims after the state in three countries, namely Germany, Switzerland, and the UK; by contrast, labor organizations and groups take the lion’s share of non-state claims in France and Italy. This variable presence of the representatives of workers’ interests, in contrast to the representatives of capital and commerce, perhaps gives a first indication of the extent to which debates about unemployment are shaped by economic interests, or alternatively by workers’ interests. Beyond these figures, our data reveal the minor presence of the unemployed and NGOs working on their behalf, which are here included within the broader category of civil society. This suggests that the unemployed may be too weak to mobilize sufficient resources to access the field, thus contributing to a strong pacification in countries where labor organizations and groups are also weak. Put simply, the unemployed themselves often stand out as “stakes,” that is, as objects of the discourse about their condition, but have no role as “protagonists,” that is, as actors of claims. A final crucial aspect of claim making in the political field of unemployment consists of the contents of the claims, more specifically to the issues which are raised by political demands and collective action in this field. Table 1.6 shows the type of issues that claims mobilize across the six countries. Issues are divided into four main macro categories: socioeconomic issues in relation to the labor market; welfare systems and social benefits; insertion into the labor market; and the residual category of other issues, which also includes issues referring to the constituency of the unemployed. The first finding from this table is that claims in unemployment politics are strongly focused on socioeconomic issues, but with

Table 1.6 Main issues of claims in unemployment politics by country (%) UK Socioeconomic issues (labor market) Welfare systems and social benefits Individual insertion into the labor market Other issues Total N

Switzerland France Italy Germany Sweden

77.5

71.0

58.4

89.1

80.0

55.7

7.5

14.9

23.3

3.3

6.8

19.9

12.5

11.9

11.8

4.1

10.6

19.9

2.5 100% 750

2.1 100% 2019

6.6 3.6 100% 100% 790 950

2.6 100% 3837

4.6 100% 584






some relevant variation in percentages between 55.7 percent in Sweden and 77.5 percent in the UK. While only a minor part of claim making mobilizes issues about measures for getting the unemployed back into the labor market, relevant variations are still noticeable, with Italy scoring just over 4 percent and Sweden hitting the highest percentage at nearly 20 percent. Beyond these figures, our data tell us that a large share of the public debates are about economic issues, often centered around dismissal cases, which do not necessarily include state activities and responsibilities. Yet there is still a relevant part concerning the role of the state within the economy, with claims about state regulation of the economy (and its consequences for unemployment) and the labor market.

Explaining the forms and content of claim making in the firld of unemployment politics After having discussed the distributions across countries according to the main components of the structure of claims, we now turn to a more explanatory approach to our subject matter. In this section we show the results of multivariate analyses aimed at assessing the impact of the two dimensions of the specific political opportunity structures (unemployment regulations and labor market regulations) on three key aspects of the claim making in this field: the form taken by the claims, their object, and their ideological or policy position toward the objects. More specifically, we examine the chances that a claim has to take the form of a protest action, to bear on the unemployed as their object, and to have a positive stance toward the object (be it workers threatened of redundancy or unemployed). We do so by means of logistic regressions in which we included among the independent variables our different dimensions of opportunity. In addition, we control our results for the effect of the actors of claims, the issues of claims, and the year. Table 1.7 examines the impact of political opportunity structures on the form of action. More precisely, we aim to predict the likelihood that claims take the form of protest actions as a function of variations in the aforementioned variables. In this and the following tables, the opportunity variables are entered as dummies whereby the value 1 means, respectively, inclusive unemployment regulations and flexible labor market regulations. Political decisions are excluded from the analysis as this form is by definition available only to a given type of actor, namely state actors. The coefficients shown in the tables are odd ratios.2 Both unemployment and labor market regulations are highly significant (at the .001 level), suggesting that the context matters when it comes to



32


Context variables Inclusive unemployment regulations Flexible labor market regulations Open general political opportunity structures

2.583*** .108*** 2.866***

Characteristics of claims (controls) Actor (ref.: state actors) Political parties Labor Employers Civil society Issue (ref.: socioeconomic issues) Welfare systems and social benefits Individual insertion into the labor market Other issues Unemployed object Year

*** .768 19.072*** .193** 20.492*** *** 1.186 .400** 4.418*** .494*** 1.007

Constant Nagelkerke R2 -2 log-likelihood N

.000 .359 2326.119 8336

Notes: * p ⱕ.05, ** p ⱕ.01, *** p ⱕ.001 Political decisions are excluded.

account for the use of protest actions by actors intervening in the political field of unemployment. However, if we look more specifically at the coefficients, we can see that the effects of the two dimensions point in opposing directions. On the one hand, more inclusive unemployment regulations strongly increase the chances that the claims take the form of protests. This can be seen in the chances of the occurrence of protest, which are nearly three times higher than those of exclusive unemployment regulations (reference category). On the other hand, more flexible labor market regulations equally strongly diminish the likelihood of occurrence of protest, as witnessed by the odds of less than 1. These findings are in line with the political opportunity theory as developed by the literature on social movements and contentious politics. Inclusive unemployment regulations offer a more open context and therefore encourage collective actors to intervene in the field through protest activities. In other words, when the state is more protective vis-à-vis the unemployed, claims on unemployment politics



Table 1.7 Effects of political opportunity structures on protest actions (odds ratios)


acquire legitimacy, resonance, and visibility (see Koopmans et al. 2005 for a similar argument applied to immigration and ethnic relations politics), which explains why we observe more protests than in contexts characterized by more exclusive unemployment regulations. By contrast, flexible labor market regulations seem to offer a more closed context constraining recourse to protests. As the social movement literature has repeatedly shown, the presence of protest is strongly influenced by the institutional feature and structure of the state (see Kriesi 2004a and Meyer 2004 for overviews; Kriesi et al. 1995 for a comparative evidence-based analysis). Therefore, for the analysis of protest actions we also included among the contextual variables an indicator of the degree of openness of the general political opportunity structure, operationalized as mentioned earlier. As expected, this variable has a strong effect on the occurrence of protest activities. Indeed, among the contextual variables, this one has the most important effect. Yet we do not include this variable in the following analyses as we cannot reasonably think of the object of claims and their position toward the objects to depend in some way from the general opportunity structure. The table also tells us who is more likely to make use of protest actions in this field. If we look at the effect of the actors’ variable, we can see that two types of actors engage more often in protests than the others: labor organizations and groups, on the one hand, and civil society actors on the other. The odds for these two actors are much higher than for the reference category of state actors and also than political parties (whose effect is not statistically significant). This is hardly surprising, though, as these actors have a narrower access to the institutionalized political system and therefore need to resort to protest if they are to be heard.3 Perhaps more interesting is to note that employers’ associations are less prone to engage in protests that the state, as witnessed by the odds, which are lower than 1. We can also have a look at the variable concerning the content of claims, and more specifically the issues it addresses. Like that of the actors, this variable has a statistically significant effect on the probability of protest. Yet some issues are more “protest-oriented” than others. Specifically, claims relating to the individual’s insertion into the labor market (basically, so-called active measures) are less likely to lead to protest than those addressing socioeconomic issues (reference category). In contrast, there is no significant difference between socioeconomic issues and claims pertaining to welfare systems and social benefits (basically, so-called passive measures). Finally, the most protesting claims are those



34

relating to none of these issue fields, but rather to other issues, as we can see in the strong coefficient. These might include issues relating to the constituency of the unemployed such as, for example, associational life or individual dispositions, claims by the unemployed not relating to unemployment, and other issues such as, for example, illegal work or crime and unemployment. What do these findings about the impact of the issues tell us? In brief, all this suggests that certain issue fields are more contentious than others in the public domain, and in particular that those claims that address individual aspects, such as the insertion of unemployed into the labor market, do not give rise to as much protest as more collective aspects, such as socioeconomic measures and welfare, do. Finally, let us say a few words about the last two control variables that we included in the model. The object of claims is statistically significant and displays a negative effect, meaning that, when claims have the unemployed rather than workers (reference category) as their object, they are less likely to take the form of protest actions. In other words, claim making around workers under threat of becoming unemployed is more contentious than claim making bearing directly on the unemployed. This could suggest that the latter are of less importance in public debates. The real issues pertain to workers, who are at the core of the productive system, not the marginalized and the electorally quite uninteresting group of unemployed persons. As for the year of occurrence of claims, this has no impact whatsoever on the presence of protest, showing that there is no conjunctural effect. We now turn to the second aspect that we would like to investigate through regression analysis in an explanatory mode, namely the object of claims. Table 1.8 shows the odds for the occurrence of claims that focus on unemployed objects. The independent variables are the same as in the previous table, except for the general political opportunity structures, which are left out for the reason mentioned earlier, and the unemployed object variable, which is not included because this is our dependent variable, that is, what we want to explain here. Both unemployment regulations and labor market regulations have a statistically significant effect and show a clear-cut pattern. Most importantly, openings along both dimensions of the specific opportunity structures diminish the chances that claims deal with unemployed objects. In other words, in contexts characterized by inclusive unemployment regulations, claims tend to have workers as their objects rather than the unemployed, as shown by the odds ratio, which is lower than 1. A similar effect can be seen in contexts characterized by flexible labor market regulations.




36


Table 1.8 Effects of political opportunity structures on unemployed objects (odds ratios)

Characteristics of claims (controls) Actor (ref.: state actors) Political parties Labor Employers Civil society Issue (ref.: socioeconomic issues) Welfare systems and social benefits Individual insertion into the labor market Other issues Year Constant Nagelkerke R2 -2 log-likelihood N

.477*** .493*** *** .863 .219*** .172*** .608*** 7.032*** 17.746*** 2.718*** .914*** 1.727E79*** .334 8910.058 8336


As for the three control variables included in this model, we observe a statistically significant effect for all three of them. The most interesting finding about the actors is that all the odds for the various types of actors are lower than 1. This means that state actors, which are the reference category in the model, are more likely to speak on behalf of the unemployed. More precisely, state actors most often make claims whose objects are unemployed rather than workers under threat of redundancy. This contrast is particularly important for worker and employer actors, less so for political party and civil society actors. Labor organizations and groups are quite understandably more interested in defending their own position than that of the unemployed. Similarly easy to understand is the fact that claims dealing with socioeconomic issues have many more chances to be focused on workers rather than the unemployed. It is quite obvious that issues relating to welfare systems and social benefits as well as issues concerning the individual insertion into the labor market have the unemployed as their objects, while socioeconomic issues refer mostly to those people who are currently in the labor market. Finally, the year is also significant, but



Context variables Inclusive unemployment regulations Flexible labor market regulations

its effect not very strong and, in any event, less interesting to comment upon for our present purpose. Our next and final analysis deals with the effects of unemployment regulations and labor market regulations on the position of claims. As already stated, a positive position means that a given claim, if realized, would improve the position and interests of the object (constituency) of the claim. Conversely, a negative position implies a deterioration of the position and interests of the object. Table 1.9 shows the results of the regression analysis on this aspect. In addition to the full model, which includes all the cases in the analysis, here we also analyze the two main objects of claims separately. Thus, the first row in the table refers only to claims whose objects are workers, the second row only to claims whose objects

Table 1.9 Effects of political opportunity structures on positive position of claims (odds ratios) Workers Context variables Inclusive unemployment regulations Flexible labor market regulations Characteristics of claims (controls) Actor (ref.: state actors) Political parties Labor Employers Civil society Issue (ref.: socioeconomic issues) Welfare systems and social benefits Individual insertion into the labor market Other issues Year Constant Nagelkerke R2 -2 log-likelihood N

Unemployed

All objects

2.787***

1.485***

1.837***

.322***

.224***

.240***

***

***

***

1.487 2.927*** .149*** 1.101

1.115 2.083*** .661*** 1.028

1.221* 2.498*** .296*** 1.072

***

***

***

*

***

.648

.615

.575***

2.337*

1.951***

2.026***

.414** .917***

1.691** .914***

1.191 .915***

2.633E75*** .379 3566.372 3420

2.223E78*** .169 6109.556 4912

2.759E77*** .240 9894.399 8332






are unemployed, and the third row shows the full model with all objects included. The control variables are the same as in the previous table. Let us start at the more general level, that is, from the model with all objects (third row). Once again, the two indicators of specific opportunities are statistically significant. The direction as well as the magnitude of the effects is similar to what we found for the presence of protest. On the one hand, contexts characterized by inclusiveness are more likely to be associated with claims in favor of the object (in this case, either workers under threat of redundancy or the unemployed). Thus, the legitimating function of inclusive unemployment regulations seems to encourage collective actors to intervene in a positive way in public debates on unemployment. On the other hand, flexible labor market regulations have the opposite effect of diminishing the chances that claims have a positive position toward the objects. A rigid labor market probably translates into a better situation for workers, reinforcing their rights and organizations, which guarantees more opportunities for their intervention in the public domain. The separate analyses for workers and unemployed objects, respectively (first and second rows) show that it is above all workers who take advantage of inclusiveness in terms of unemployment regulations. We observe a similar difference regarding the dimension of labor market regulations, but in the opposite direction. Here more flexible regulations diminish the chances to make claims that convey a positive position of both objects, but they do so to a greater extent than for the unemployed. This provides further evidence that workers are better off than the unemployed when opportunities for claim making open up in the field. The three variables pertaining to the characteristics of claims all have a statistically significant effect. If we look at the full model, we observe a stronger propensity to make positive claims by political parties and above all workers as compared to state actors, as witnessed by the odds ratios, which are higher than 1. In contrast, employers are much less likely to make positive claims, which is quite understandable given their own interests. These effects point to the same direction when we split the analysis according to the object, although they are stronger when workers are the object. The chances that claims are positive toward the object also vary according to the issues at hand. Specifically, claims dealing with welfare systems and social benefits are less likely to be positive than claims about socioeconomic issues, while claims addressing the individual insertion of the unemployed into the labor market are more likely to be



38

positive. Clearly, the latter are less contentious than issues about welfare and issues about socioeconomic solutions to unemployment. This holds across the two objects. Indeed, the only substantial difference when we compare workers and the unemployed is that claims on other issues have more chances to be positive when they deal with the unemployed, but less chances to be so when they focus on workers. Finally, the year has a significant, but relatively weak effect that does not change if we look at the specific objects.

Conclusion This chapter has dealt with the impact of specific political opportunities on claim making in the field of unemployment politics. Following recent scholarship, we have conceptualized “welfare state regimes” as specific opportunity structures influencing the form, object, and position of claims. To do so, we have engaged with a large number of institutional indicators in the political field of unemployment. Having assessed precise measures of unemployment regulations and labor market regulations across the six countries included in our study, we have discussed their ideal-typical combinations in terms of specific political opportunities. In addition, we have included information about general opportunities so as to gauge the impact of political arrangements outside the unemployment field that may impact upon forms of claim making. We have also provided a description of the main characteristics of claim making across our six countries. In so doing, we have shown that considerable variations do exist in terms of objects, positions, and forms of claims, while at the same time offering an explicit treatment of actors and the issues with which they engage directly so as to obtain valuable figures of control to be used for following multivariate analyses. In the next step, we have turned to a more explanatory approach, appraising specifically the predicting power of unemployment regulations and labor market regulations on forms, objects and positions of claims in the field of unemployment politics. Starting with the explanation of forms, we have found out that unemployment regulations and labor market regulations have both a strong, but opposite, impact. Protest most likely matches combinations of inclusion and rigidity. By contrast, exclusive unemployment regulations and flexible labor market regulations combine into a specific structure that discourages the use of protest. General political opportunities, however, show the strongest impact upon variations of forms, in line with standard teachings





of political opportunity scholarship. As regards the object of claims, we have found that inclusiveness and flexibility increase chances that workers will be taken as the main object in the public debate. To put things differently, the unemployed are most likely to take the stage in contexts of exclusive unemployment regulations and rigid labor market regulations. Finally, our two dimensions of specific opportunities also stand out as significant predictors when accounting for variations of the position of claims. In spite of some key differences when looking at figures for workers and the unemployed respectively, we have found out that inclusiveness on the one hand, and rigidity on the other, are most likely associated with claims in favor of the object, reproducing the same pattern of opposite effects that we found out when explaining variations of forms. Of course, our findings can hardly exhaust discussion about the functioning of specific opportunities in the political field of unemployment. The simple consideration of our six national cases was sufficient to show that, in the real world of policies and institutional arrangements, a variety of combinations are possible at the crossroads between the two dimensions of unemployment regulations and labor market regulations. Yet we found that the impact of one dimension often goes in the opposite direction of the impact of the other dimension. More rigidity in the labor market seems to provide more opportunities for protest and, more broadly, more opportunities for intervening in support of workers and the unemployed. In other words, rigidity (rather than flexibility) may better match inclusive unemployment regulations to make stronger the weak voice of the unemployed. Accordingly, more work is needed to unpack the normative assumptions that may be built into the operationalization of our dimensions. After all, in recent years a large number of actors have converged in their critique of labor policies across national states in Europe, as well as at the supranational level of the European Union, arguing that the development of flexibility, with the creation of a growing number of secondary jobs, does very little to advance the cause of the unemployed. Rather, the argument goes on, flexibility reinforces the precariousness of the most precarious, since secondary jobs will most likely be filled in by the young and other marginalized social groups, weakening the voice of the unemployed and reinforcing ongoing processes of social exclusion. In sum, our analysis has shed light on the ambiguous effects of flexibility, while at the same time opening space for further reflection to be elaborated on the “positive” or “negative” direction of labor market policies. For such policies to be considered “successful,” it is best to deepen knowledge about their implications, so



40

as to assess the extent to which they reduce integration gaps that may divide the old “rigid” workers from their new “flexible” counterparts. However, we can at least be confident that our analysis pinpoints some conclusive results. The simple and strong argument of this chapter is that debates and political action in the field of unemployment politics need to be studied by putting more emphasis on the characteristics of different national contexts and their different policy approaches. Conceptually, we have argued that this political context is also made up of provisions that are specific to the unemployment field. Empirically, we have shown that these specific opportunities play a key role in accounting for the shape of claim making in the field. We have thus shown that political context matters. Too often the contentious politics of unemployment has been tackled with unsystematic reference to the macro-level of the political environment. Yet to be unemployed in one place or another represents a very distinctive condition, even within the tight borders of European neighborhood, since countries differ largely in terms of policy making, and especially when considering unemployment and labor market regulation. Scholars, policy makers, the unemployed, and the citizenry at large should thus be more aware of the driving force of relevant reforms, since these latter are, at least to some important extent, true masters of the game within the field of unemployment politics.

Notes 1. We would like to thank the members of the EU-funded YOUNEX project (Youth, Unemployment, and Exclusion in Europe: A Multidimensional Approach to Understanding the Conditions and Prospects for Social and Political Integration of Young Unemployed) for allowing us to use the data gathered in the context of that project concerning the indicators of unemployment and labor market regulations for France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and Switzerland. The data on the UK was gathered by the present authors, with the help of Jasmine Lorenzini, to whom we are thankful. 2. Odds ratios are the exponential of the B coefficients, which represent the strength of a given effect, and can be interpreted as follows: when the odds ratio is greater than 1, the independent variable has a positive impact on the dependent variable; when the odds ratio is smaller than 1, the effect is negative; finally, when the odds ration equals 1, there is no effect (although it might be statistically significant). The effect can be considered to be multiplicative. For example, a coefficient of 2 means that having the characteristics described by the independent variables doubles the likelihood of having the characteristics described by the dependent variable (in this case, having participates in party activities, demonstrative protest, or confrontational





protest). The same reasoning applies to coefficients lower than 1, but in the opposite direction. 3. Of course, the degree of access to the institutionalized system of organized labor varies very much across countries according to the presence of neocorporatist arrangements (Crouch 1993). For example, in countries such as Germany, Sweden, and to some extent also Switzerland, trade unions and labor organizations have greater institutionalized support of and cooperative political exchange with the state.



42

The Protest on Unemployment: Forms and Opportunities Donatella della Porta

In the mid-1990s, France saw the “return of the social question,” with an (uneasy) alliance between public sector workers, the unemployed, and the marginally employed. In 1995, the extended strike of the cheminots (public transport workers) unexpectedly gained large support from public opinion, as it brought millions into the street in remarkable demonstrations of solidarity across the country, and forged direct organizational and symbolic links between the labor movement and various groups of excluded, including illegal immigrants, unemployed workers, and the homeless, as well as the lycée and university students and an intelligentsia that had been widely dismissed as apathetic and uninterested. (Fantasia and Stepan-Norris 2004: 556) Various marginal groups mobilized in the so-called mouvements de sans on behalf of the “have-nots”: migrants without legal residence permits, homeless people, and the unemployed. Analysts described a coalition between the “moral left” of the middle class that defended human rights, and the “social left” that mobilized the workers. In particular, the unemployed protested in 1997 against a reform that reduced the funding for unemployment compensation and centralized its management. Already in 1994, the group Agir contre le Chomage (AC!, Act against Unemployment!) organized five marches converging on Paris from the provinces, asking for a reduction in work hours in order to create new jobs, as well as more investments “against exclusion.” During and after the marches, the unemployed mobilized at both the local and national levels. In the winter of 1995–6, groups of the unemployed staged a 43



2

The Protest on Unemployment

campaign of “job requisitions”: with well-publicized blitz actions, they marched into factories and commercial enterprises having job vacancies and left their résumés. The following winter there were weekly demonstrations and a series of occupations of local employment agencies, the ASSEDICS, as well as of the École Normale Supérieure, the Banque de France, various town halls, and the headquarters of the Socialist Party, demanded the special Christmas doles that a recent law had abolished. In 1997 the unemployed also protested at the European level: French, German, Spanish, and Italian unemployed converged in European marches against unemployment, job insecurity, and exclusion. Two years later, 30,000 people mobilized on the same issues at the European Union (EU) summit in Cologne, united in the European Network of Unemployed (ENU). During this cycle of protest, the French unemployed formed collective resources for mobilization. Although the unemployed are considered politically apathetic, with a very low propensity for collective action, the movement organizations “succeeded in modifying, at least for a certain period, the unemployed’s perception about their own mobilization potential. They encouraged the unemployed to express collective claims and convinced thousands of them to mobilize” (Royall 1998: 362). In fact, they provided a space for aggregation, socializing oftenisolated people (Mauer 2001), and increasing their relational skills and savoir faire (Maurer and Pierru 2001). Mobilization provided a challenge both to the image of unemployment as an individual problem and, consequently, to the social stigma attached to it. Moreover, the unemployed gained broad social support. While the unemployed have traditionally found supporters on the left of the political spectrum, in the French case they mobilized against what was perceived as “treason” by the left—in particular by the Socialist national government elected in May 1997, which was accused of having shifted from “a socialism with a human face to liberalism with humanitarian undertones” (Bourneau and Martin 1993: 172). Nevertheless, the unemployed succeeded in winning the support of public opinion: not only were the Christmas doles reintroduced, but sympathetic media coverage changed the public image of the unemployed from poor people queuing for charity to rebels struggling for their rights (Salmon 1998; Maurer and Pierru 2001: 388). Acting within an institutionalized field, with welfare state institutions focusing on the issue of unemployment (Fillieule 1993), the protestors addressed the issue of the political recognition of the unemployed themselves, winning a symbolic battle when their organization was invited to meet President Francois Mitterrand.



44

This account of a protest campaign on unemployment in France and beyond points to some of the factors structuring the debate over the interaction between societal characteristics and social movements. To begin with, it indicates that a social group that is economically weak and politically isolated can still be mobilized for protest. In American social movement studies criticism of the breakdown theory has for a long time (and with few exceptions, cf. Piven and Cloward 1977, 1992) reduced the attention to structural grievances (Buechler 2004). Likewise, since the 1970s, European social movement scholars have focused on new conflicts in Western democracy: the ecological movement and the women’s movement being the typical objects of this stream of research. Social movements have been considered the bearers of post-materialistic values, while the class cleavage—on which labor movements had mobilized—was declared to be pacified. However, there is no denying that the socioeconomic structure of a society still influences the types of conflicts that develop in it. The “return” of poor people movements thus pushes greater reflection on the relationship between changes in the social structure and collective action. Social change may affect the characteristics of social conflict and collective action in different ways. It may bring about the emergence of social groups with a specific structural location and potential specific interests, and/or reduce the importance of existing ones, as the shift from agriculture to industry and then to the service sector suggests. As the account of the French protest on unemployment indicates, however, structural tensions do not directly translate into mobilization. The misery of the unemployed does more to deter protest than facilitate it, and the unemployed are usually not easily mobilized. Societal conditions also have important influences upon the distribution of resources that are conducive to participation in collective action (such as education). The specific characteristics (gender, age, social position, educational background, etc.) of the unemployed strongly affect their potential to mobilize and their subsequent forms of mobilization. Notwithstanding these difficulties in mobilizing the unemployed, protest on unemployment can and does develop when opportunities and resources are available. First of all, movement organizations are important actors for protest, especially when faced with social bases that are more difficult to mobilize. The resource mobilization approach has considered social movement organizations as often formed by committed activists who take up the concerns of social constituencies to which they do not belong (McCarthy and Zald 1977), but toward which they act out of a sense of solidarity (Giugni and Passy 2001).



Donatella della Porta 45


Given the lack of material and symbolic resources of the unemployed constituency, we might expect that protests on related issues require broad networks of different social movement organizations. Unions have often been mentioned in previous research as the most important promoters of protest on issues of employment and unemployment. For instance, waves of dismissals or cuts in the state budget for the unemployed (as in the French case) tend to produce reactive, union-led waves of protest. However, different collective actors (voluntary associations, social movement organizations, etc.) might support different types of mobilization on unemployment. We might also expect that protest will take different forms according to the characteristics of the actors who promote it. As a political resource for the powerless (Lipsky 1965), protest should be a preferred form of mobilization, especially for those actors who are less endowed with institutional channels of access to policy makers. More resourceful movement actors should be able to attract the attention of the mass media using less disruptive forms of protest, while the claims of the most “powerless” are likely to be covered only if they resort to the most disruptive forms of protest. Finally, protest has been linked to political opportunities, both in terms of institutional assets and the availability of allies (see della Porta and Diani 2006, ch 8 for a summary). The degree and forms of protest at different territorial levels (local, national, and transnational) can be influenced by the opening (either real or imagined) of windows of opportunities: for instance, laws increasing public spending in specific areas (such as the laws addressing the emergence created by a dramatic earthquake in Naples) can stimulate hope for changes, and therefore mobilization. Framing political opportunities as conducive to the claims of the unemployed should also facilitate the emergence of protest, especially through the mobilization of allies. In this chapter, I shall mainly rely upon the data on claims making collected within the UNEMPOL project, as well as on a secondary analysis of existing research, in order to single out the forms of, and opportunities for, protest on the issue of unemployment. For the empirical data collection, the project used the methodology of political claim analysis (see Koopmans and Statham 1999a), a quantitative method that takes individual political claims as units of analysis and uses newspapers as a source for the publicly visible part of this claim making. A claim is defined as an instance of strategic action in the mass media. It consists of the expression of a political opinion by physical or verbal action, regardless of the form this expression may take (statement, violence,



46

repression, decision, demonstration, court ruling, etc.), and regardless of the nature of the actor (media, governments, civil society actors, etc.). The claim analysis approach aims at integrating the two methodological traditions of social movement research: protest event analysis (quantitative) (Tarrow 1989; Franzosi 1994) and frame analysis (qualitative) (Snow et al. 1986; Gamson and Modigliani 1989). By systematically coding discursive dimensions, claim analysis broadens the scope of attention from “protest” to all forms of claim making in the public domain, including conventional and verbal actions. Also, it locates social movement organizations within a larger “multiorganizational field” by including institutional and non-institutional actors. The main actors of claim analysis are no longer “protesters” but claimants, namely the subjects of a strategic action (whether verbal or not) in the massmediated public discourse. Selecting one quality newspaper per country, the UNEMPOL project covered Italy, France, the UK, Switzerland, Germany, and Sweden for the eight years between 1995 and 2002. The sampled issues were read and searched for claims on unemployment that were then coded along dimensions including the claimant, the form of the claim, its target, the issue addressed, and the way in which this was framed. The use of the daily press as the source of information on protest or public discourse has been criticized on the basis of the selection biases introduced by the rules of journalistic coverage.1 The weaker the actors, the more protest tends to remain bounded at the local level, sometimes reaching the regional press, but much more rarely receiving national coverage. Of the weekly marches of the Neapolitan unemployed, only a couple of the most radical ones gained the attention of the national public opinion (Baglioni 2003a). While some of the selection biases (such as greater coverage for events that involve large numbers, use violence, or adopt innovative means) are systematic, and can therefore be taken into account in interpreting the results, others are instead more related to the cycle of issues. Taking all these caveats into account, we shall limit the risk of selection bias by explicitly focusing on public claim making. This means that we shall not consider the protest we find in our newspapers as a reflection of actual existing conflicts, but as an image of those that succeeded in overcoming the threshold of media attention. Focusing on public discourse as represented in printed media does not imply that this is considered to be the only arena where claims are presented. In particular, some actors are less dependent upon mass media, as they enjoy direct access to decision makers; others are less able to





influence the mass media and therefore need to resort to alternative communication channels. However, I assume that the printed media is one of the most important arenas of public claim making, and that most actors will, at one stage or another, try to use it in order to make their views public. Given the mentioned biases, as well as the relatively low number of protests in our database, I will use the data mainly in a descriptive way. My objective here is in fact mapping, more than causally explaining. Given the valuable but scattered information on the protest of the unemployed, I aim at: (1) conceptualizing the different forms that these protests can take; and (2) developing hypotheses on their specific characteristics. In fact, I shall triangulate the information coming from the claim analysis with that coming from different sources. First, I will refer to the small but significant social science literature on this mobilization. Additionally, I present details coming from a qualitative reading of the articles we have coded in the UNEMPOL project. Other information gathered for the UNEMPOL project is presented throughout the chapter, including data collected from interviews with actors active at the local and national levels on issues of labor and employment policies, as well as from case studies of some mobilization campaigns. Finally, I refer to some interviews carried out in Milan with social movement organizations focusing on “precarious workers” (della Porta and Mosca 2005). This emphasis upon triangulation is also related to the aforementioned methodological choice in the use of the data. Although dealing with a quantitative database, I tend not to use causal modeling—or statistical “explanations” in general—instead relying on more “interpretive” forms of understanding (della Porta 2008b). This is due in part to the characteristics of the data: although the database is large, the number of protest claims is too limited for multivariate analysis. Additionally, I thought this was a better strategy in order to control for the shortcomings of a source that is quite limited, especially with regard to information on the most “powerless” actors. In what follows, I shall focus on the protest on unemployment. The categories for “action forms” have been aggregated into the following broad categories: political decisions/executive actions, verbal actions (e.g. communication events such as press releases), and protests/direct democratic actions that were, in turn, distinguished according to their degree of disruptiveness. I will look first at the actors involved, followed by the forms and content of claims, and finally at the political opportunities for the development of protest on unemployment.



48


The French wave of protest on unemployment can be taken as an illustration of the complex nature of protest on unemployment, which involves various actors, takes various forms of action, and targets different institutions. The resources for the aforementioned European marches came from a heterogeneous, transnational coalition involving Trotskyite and Catholic groups, new social movements, and trade unions—among the latter, the French Confederation General du Travail (CGT), the Italian Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL), and the German Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB)). Notwithstanding the high costs of mobilization, this coalition perceived the emerging debate on the social dimension of the EU as a window of opportunity. Additional illustrations of the broad range of actors mobilized against unemployment can be found in our UNEMPOL database. Focusing on the first months of the most recently covered year, 2002, in Italy we recorded: • 20,000 Fiat workers marching in Rome against dismissals • Six casual workers in Termini Imerese occupying a Fiat building, asking to be hired • Fiat workers in Melfi picketing the factory in order to protest against dismissals • 150,000 workers marching in Naples against the proposed reform of a labor rights law that would make dismissals in small factories easier (article 18) • Demonstrators, holding hands (girotondi), encircling the Fiat buildings in Turin in order to protest against the dismissals of Fiat workers • A representative of the Italian union CGIL marching in Barcelona with other European unionists against a proposal that would increase flexibility in the labor market • The Disobedients, a coalition of self-managed youth centers in squatted spaces marching in Rome, side-by-side with Fiat workers, against dismissals • The Neapolitan No Globals marching in solidarity with the Fiat workers • Fiat-Mirafiori workers blocking the Tangenziale road of Turin • The Disobedients launching a boycott campaign named “Robin Hood” against Fiat • The European metal workers proclaiming a Fiat European Day of Action



Who protests against unemployment?


• The Committee of Fiat workers’ wives occupying the Termini railway station in Rome • The mayor of Termini Imerese starting a hunger strike, to be continued until Fiat will rehire the fired workers • The Ivrea bishop calling for a vigil of praying and fasting in order to avoid the dismissals at Fiat • Workers of Termini Imerese blocking the activities of the Melfi Fiat factory In these events, different actors (from workers against dismissals to the long-term unemployed, from the mayors to the bishop) use various forms of action (from traditional union strikes to boycotts, from moderate vigils to road blocks) to put forward the cause of different categories of the unemployed (from the long-term unemployed to those at risk of dismissal). Our quantitative data (see Table 2.1) report on a small percentage of protests—the most radical—organized by the unemployed themselves, or at least by groups that represent the unemployed. A low number of protests led by the unemployed themselves is no surprise. As mentioned in the presentation of the French protest against unemployment, the mobilization of the unemployed is traditionally considered particularly difficult. First, the unemployed are said to have low self-esteem, and therefore to be less inclined to build a collective identity around a condition perceived as stigmatized. As Olivier Fillieule (1993: 128) reminds us, “most research converges in indicating that the loss of a job is translated into a perception of a personal identity considered as shameful, and this jeopardizes the possibility of a collective identification with unemployment (individualizing strategy) as well as the political representation of unemployment (fatalism, sense of guilt, sense of being powerless).” Being that the status of the unemployed is stigmatized and stigmatizing, they lack that positive self-definition of the “us” that facilitates the development of a collective identity (Galland and Louis 1981: 177). The mobilization of the unemployed thus requires the development of a collective identity that “is based exclusively on the symbolic and cognitive work developed during the mobilization, lacking previously existing schemes” (Maurer 2001: 39). In order to mobilize, an injustice frame has to be created, and responsibility for unemployment has to be assigned to a political authority. Mobilization, as noted by one unemployed individual, then becomes an instrument to transform desperation and anger into action: This is what the movement gave me. I was angry, but did not know what to do with it and there I saw other angry people that put their



50


In this sense, activism offers an occasion for not only occupying the “empty” time, but also giving a sense to it: participation has indeed been defined as more social than political (Maurer 2001). The representation offered by the organized unemployed group has a “direct impact on the conditions for the formation of collective action, and this is even more true for unemployed for whom the question of identity stays at the heart of their social situation, social relations in their environment, of their sociability” (Galland and Louis 1981: 175). The difficulty in constructing resources for mobilization among the unemployed accounts for the important role played by potential allies. First of all, our data indicate a strong presence of unions, especially in protest against mass dismissals versus protest against long-term unemployment or even juvenile or female unemployment. Unions have been an important actor in some waves of protest on unemployment. In a comparison of protests in the US and the UK in the 1930s, the very existence of those protests has been explained by the willingness of the unions to mobilize (Richards 2002). Usually, however, unions have an ambivalent attitude toward the unemployed, who are perceived as an element of weakness of the occupied labor force, if not as potential strikebreakers. Unions, therefore, are potentially more available to mobilize against mass dismissals and factory closings than in favor of the long-term unemployed, who have a low propensity to join unions. Nevertheless, when unions do get involved, it is usually in periods of sudden massive unemployment that they appear more active on the issue. For instance, in France in the 1930s the union CGTU (Confédération Génerale du Travail Unitaire)—which claimed to organize 10 percent of the French unemployed—called in 1933 for the 60,000 people “hunger march” from Lille to Paris (Tartakowsky 1997). The Comités chomeurs of the union CGT, founded in 1978 in Marseille after a wave of dismissals of harbor workers, took part in the aforementioned wave of protest in the 1990s. Marginal until 1989, the CGT unemployed committees numbered 500 at the beginning of the 1990s, after the wave of protest against the closure of the docks of the Bouche-du-Rhone. During these struggles there was often a change in the unions’ strategy, with a return to door-to-door mobilization as well as actions



anger together, well, you could do both … and even if we were unemployed, that they told us again and again, had nothing to do in the society, well we showed them that we exist … and that we could organize a movement. (Maurer 2001: 101).


beyond the factory. Indeed, even in groups of the unemployed, former unionized workers play an important role by promoting a work ethic. Not only in France (Maurer 2001), but also in Argentina, leaders of the unemployed were often former industrial workers with experience of organizing (Petras 2003). In these cases, the unemployed perceive themselves to be virtual workers, identifying with their previous condition as workers (Fillieule 1993). Also our database shows that coverage of unemployment protest peaks when there are waves of mobilization against dismissals, especially from large factories or important companies. In 2002 it was especially the Italian Fiat workers who made the news by blocking traffic to a number of locations (the harbor, highway, airports, etc.), occupying factories, and organizing mass sit-ins (for instance, in the Colosseum in Rome). Similar examples emerged in our coverage of other countries as well. Unions are not the only actors that mobilize in solidarity with the unemployed, or that help to mobilize them. Other important organizers of protest against unemployment are non-state welfare organizations and groups. Third-sector organizations, NGOs, and charities are often involved in the support of marginal groups: immigrants, the poor, single mothers, etc. Traditionally, these groups preferred helping poor people through charity. With the welfare state restructuring, however, much first-help relief to poor people has been contracted out (or, simply, left) to a more and more organized third sector. Squeezed between the needs of their constituency and the frustration of budget cuts, these organizations have increasingly resorted to advocacy, even in the vocal forms of protest. An example of this type of organization is the French Syndacat Chomeurs, founded in 1982 by Maurice Pagat, himself unemployed and with experiences in religious associations such as Emmaus. In the beginning, this group had the support of various charity-based and depoliticized religious groups.2 Nevertheless, in the 1990s, the organization would join the more politicized AC!. AC! represents the emergence of yet another type of actor on unemployment issues, namely, other civil society organizations mobilized by left-wing social movement organizers. Since the 1960s, New Left groups started to focus on “powerless” groups, among which are migrants, living at the periphery of the large city.3 Later, left-libertarians started to mobilize against xenophobia as well as various forms and degrees of “marginality” in the large cities. In the example quoted earlier, the “shift to the left” is present especially in AC!, a group founded in 1993 by CFDT unionists that had been expelled by or left that union after its recentrage in 1986 (Béroud, Mouriaux and Vakaloulis 1998; Mouchard



52

2000). By 1996 AC! had 150 local collectives. Asking in the beginning for a reduction of working time (to a weekly 32 hours), AC! moved toward a claim for a “guaranteed salary” after the entrance of the group CARGO (Collective d’Agitation pour une Revenue Garantie Optimal), coming from the autonomous groups of the 1970s and rooted especially among the precariously employed youth. Activists of the New Left parties and groupings have indeed often offered resources of militancy to the mobilization of the homeless (Pechu 1996) and migrants (Siméant 1998). In our research, these types of actors emerged especially in the 2000s. The list of the Italian protests around the Fiat controversy in 2002 points to the convergence, during the wave of protest, of the traditional unionled anti-dismissal mobilization with protests led by the activists of the global justice movement, in particular the youth squatting centers that had indeed networked with the Disoccupati organizzati (groups of the long-term unemployed) in and around Naples (see Baglioni 2003a). The activists of the movement for “another globalization” brought into the protest on unemployment the demand of a “guaranteed salary,” presented as a way to adapt to a new phase of production characterized by high levels of unemployment, but reflecting also a positive attitude toward creative work and non-working time. Members of the Italian group The Disobedients would indeed subscribe to the declaration of one of their French counterparts: “We know some lazy people, more or less allergic to the capitalistic productive discipline, capable of strongly committing themselves to associational, militant, artistic, intellectual activities … Jobs are not the only source of social existence” (quoted in Mouchard 2000: 103). In this area, political mobilization is motivated by political consciousness, not generic solidarity (see also Maurer 2001).

Forms and content of claims: How do people protest? There is the expectation that—in protests of the powerless—the forms of action tend to be quite disruptive. The Italian protesters in 2002 blocked railways and highways, as well as occupied harbors and airports, imitating the piqueteros of Argentina where, in August 2001, 100,000 unemployed shut down 300 highways (Petras 2003). Mobilization of the unemployed follows in part the tradition of direct-action unionism (Chopart et al. 1998: 72): they chain themselves to the gates of major institutions, conduct flash interventions against eviction, hold demonstrations, and occupy public buildings. As for Germany, it has been noted that “the main form in which unemployed actors enter the debate compared to other actors is via protest” (Zorn 2004: 6). All these





forms tend to break with the tradition of modern industrial action by bringing the conflicts outside the factory and involving the community in solidarity strikes and boycotts (Piven and Cloward 2000). The more symbolic forms of protest are also quite innovative, in order to capture the attention of distracted mass media, but also to build upon a long past tradition. In fact, our activists also mimic some repertoires of action of a quite distant past. As mentioned by Herbert Reiter (2002) in his analysis of the protest of the Florentine unemployed after the Second World War, the protestors resorted to a “self-creation of jobs” (or collocamento simbolico), entering into factories and firms and starting to work. This form of action—copied by the French unemployed who distributed their résumés in the FNAC, asking to be hired—follows the tradition of land occupation by jobless peasants. The “star marches” of the French unemployed and the Europe-wide marches, converging on Paris from the provinces, are reminiscent of the hunger marches of the prewar period: processions walked long distances, symbolically representing the hardships of the unemployed and at the same time sensitizing people at the local level. While the data do indicate that most of the action on unemployment is quite conventional, protest on unemployment should not necessarily be considered as a rare event—at least not in all countries and in all periods. As can be observed in Table 2.1, protest accounts for 9.1 percent of all claim making: 4.3 percent in the form of conventional protest, 3.4 percent as disruptive protest, 1.3 percent as confrontational protest, and only 0.1 percent as violent forms of protest. While they represent the minority of claims (the majority being verbal statements), protests over unemployment are still more prominent than protest events in other domains. If we look, for instance, at an Italian database with a similar research design but comprised of different topics (Europub. com), it can be seen that claim makers used protest very rarely over European integration (1.2 percent of the coded claims), monetary policy (1.5 percent), and pensions (1.6 percent), with a slightly higher 3.9 percent of the events coded on agricultural policy and 3.5 percent of those over immigration, with a more significant jump (11.2 percent) over education (della Porta and Caiani 2005). Thus, we can say that, in comparison with other policy issues, there is relatively significant protest. Moreover, protest takes different forms: conventional (such as petitions, referendums, and judicial action), demonstrative (such as marches or sit-ins), confrontational (such as occupations), and even violent. A quick look at Table 2.1 shows that different actors tend to use different forms of actions: the correlation coefficient (Cramer’s V = 0.26)



54

Actor

Action

Political decisions Verbal statements Conventional protests Demonstrative protests Confrontational violent protests Total protests (all forms) Total N

State actors

Parties

Labor

Employers

Unemployed

16.0 79.7 3.6

2.3 91.2 5.7

0.7 78.8 5.7

0.2 96.5 3.1

1.2 23.2 3.7

0.5

0.8

9.3

0.2

0.1

0.0

5.5

4.3

6.5

20.5

3380

1023

1473

Other civil society groups

Total (all actors)

1.6 64.6 10.2

0.1 88.5 4.0

6.7 84.3 4.3

56.1

15.7

5.4

3.4

0.0

15.8

7.9

1.9

1.4

3.3

75.6

33.9

11.3

9.1

1840

82

Welfare associations

127

890

8930

Note: Cramer’s V = 0.26 (significant at 0.001 level)

55



Table 2.1 Forms of action by type of actor (%)

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• The contention on unemployment reported in the press is mainly symbolic: verbal statements dominate with 84.3 percent of all claims; • More powerful actors do not need to protest in order to have their claims covered in the press (see business associations, but also parties): employers and parties focus almost exclusively on verbal statements (respectively, 96.5 percent and 91.2 percent of their claims have this form); • Unions are very relevant actors in protests on unemployment (20.5 percent of their claims are of this type), using forms of action with different degrees of radicalism; • Third-sector associations often act as advocates for the unemployed (33.9 percent of their reported claims are made as protests), and also use disruptive forms of action; • Although protests conducted by the unemployed are rarely covered in the media, protest accounts for by far the most important part of their claims (75.6 percent); moreover, they also use the most disruptive forms of action (at least among the covered events). We can add that the form of claim making changes together with the specific issues addressed in the claims. As we can see in Table 2.2, issues of welfare and social benefits—that is more those issues that are more directly related with the unemployed constituency—are those on which protest forms are more widespread (12.8 percent and 33.3 percent, respectively). Demonstrative forms of protest especially address issues that relate more directly to the constituency of the unemployed: claims for dole payments, housing, and transportation are often voiced during protest marches or sit-ins; although, protests by the unemployed are “far from only mentoring the material well-being of the unemployed” (Zorn 2004: 18, on Germany; Baglioni 2003a, on Naples). Issues of individual insertion into the labor market (active measures, training, formation, etc.), as well as the very broad field of socioeconomic issues, are more often addressed though verbal statements. The correlation between forms of action and issues of claims is, however, weak, even though statistically highly significant (Cramer’s V = 0.12). The French campaign presented above confirms that the content of claims represents difficult strategic choices in the mobilization against unemployment. First of all, there is a tension between long-term



testifies to a statistically significant and relevant association between the two variables. Additionally:

Issue

Form Socioeconomic issues Political decisions Verbal statements Conventional protests Demonstrative protests Confrontational and violent protests Total (all forms) Total N

Welfare and social benefits

Individual insertion into labor market

Issue related to the unemployed constituency

Others

Total (all issues)

4.6 87.0 3.8

15.0 72.3 6.8

12.8 81.5 4.2

3.0 63.0 4.2

8.3 80.7 4.6

6.7 84.3 4.2

3.1

4.2

1.0

25.5

5.5

3.4

1.5

1.7

0.4

3.6

0.9

1.4

8.4 6718

12.8 949

5.7 989

33.3 165

11.0 109

9.0 8930

Cramer’s V = 0.12 (significant at 0.001 level)

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Table 2.2 Forms of claim making by issue of claims (%)


perspectives of economic reform and the need for immediate relief. In AC! a fracture emerged between the more politicized founders, who demanded a 32-hour working week, and the long-term unemployed, who joined the organization later, and demanded immediate relief programs. For instance, one unemployed individual addressed AC! activists, stating: “You are kind, but reducing working time, finding a job, that’s too longterm of a perspective” (quoted in Mouchard 2000: 97). Sentiments such as these pushed the organization to reorient their strategy toward demands for urgent interventions on costs of transportation and lodging. Another difficulty for the development of collective actions by the unemployed is in the process of the cognitive restructuring of the action fields: as the conditions of the unemployed vary, so also do the experiences of the unemployed, with strong tensions in the definition of a collective identity. Indeed, the “unemployed cannot struggle in order to defend their collective identity: the most active among them would indeed refuse it, and those who adapt to it, they would not want to struggle for a job” (Durand 1981). As observed in the Italian case, while the unemployment of male adults is more likely to mobilize attention, especially in welfare states that privilege the breadwinners, the unemployment of young people and women rarely generates social alarm (or protest), being mainly compensated for within the family (Reyneri 1996; Pugliese 1993). Additionally, there is a bureaucratic fragmentation of the category of the unemployed on the basis of the specific policies addressed to them: gender, age, ethnicity, previous labor experience, etc. In fact, the presence of different agencies and policies facilitates splits in an already weak community. As Reiter’s research indicates (2002), the Florentine unemployed protest of the postwar period weakened when the former soldiers parted ways with the “common unemployed” in the hope of getting some special treatment. Regarding these characteristics, the previously employed are those who are usually more protected, especially by welfare states that tend to privilege the male adults as family breadwinners. The first task for those who organize protests on unemployment is indeed offering to all these groups a common collective identity as the unemployed. The success of the French protests was signaled by the capacity of the unemployed, “beyond the diversity of their situations of unemployment, to be able to form a social group capable of challenging any government and break the consensus that dominates the French scene” (Combesque 1998: 187). On the framing of the mobilization, there are also often splits within the “protest milieu” between the previously employed, looking for insertion into the labor market, and a new generation, often of the juve-



58

nile unemployed, who refuse the work ethic. A provocative case is represented by the Glücklichen Arbeitslosen (“happy unemployed”) in Berlin who, at a union march, stressed: “On the occasion of the visit of the Rhenish fundamentalists from Cologne we planned together a ‘coup against the Prussian working morale.’ In the afternoon our unit placed desk chairs in a strategically important point. With drinks and music we started immediately our program: well-being” (information from “tageszeitung,” May 22, 1998, and www.diegluecklichenarbeitslosen.de; quoted in Zorn 2004: 4). Also in the French wave of protest, the younger activists were often characterized by casual work experiences, but also by strong political identities, which helped them avoid the frustration coming from unemployment: “working is, for sure, not my passion”; “working … is just a way to pay for your food and a roof”; “me, the less I work, the better it is” (quoted in Maurer 2001: 75). A similar tension between struggling against unemployment and refusing the traditional ethic of work is present in the mobilization of the young, casual workers organized in the Italian campaign of “San Precario,” the mock saint protector of precarious people, symbol of the protest, as well as the international campaign on May Day (della Porta 2005a). It is especially in this type of protest that the symbolic relationship with labor as a basis for identity-building is challenged. Although this type of approach toward unemployment might affect only a minority, it seems more and more influential, especially in protests that demand rights for the “precarious,” casual workers (Mattoni 2009). This is particularly visible in the organizations that emerge from within the global justice movement, framing labor issues within an emerging discourse on another possible world, involving deep societal changes. As noted by a representative of the Italian Chainworkers, who mobilize on the condition of “precariousness” with the diffusion of temporary work in the commercial chains (Blockbuster, McDonald’s, etc.): We started to talk about social temporariness … The message was extended to all working categories because we realized that this process of increasing job insecurity was involving not only the commercial chains but also the other types of companies, in the sense that the new workers were not hired, but signed Co.Co.Co. [Collaborazioni coordinate e continuative—coordinate and continuous collaborations] contracts, etc. Generally speaking, the persons were between 25 and 30 years old and did not say “I have been hired, I found a job,” but “I have a temporary contract.” (int. 8, p. 1, quoted in della Porta and Mosca 2005)





The action on temporary work spread from labor issues to everyday life: “Saint Precario has five axes of security, which are income, housing, love and friendship, access, and services. So within these five themes there is always a kind of affinity with others, not only in Milan” (della Porta and Mosca 2005: 11). The challenge to the conception of labor is perceived in more traditional organizations as well. For example, as the representative of the Italian metallurgic union Fiom observes, meeting with the “temporary workers” challenges the traditional approach to labor: We used to say that some parties represented the working class or the workers from the point of view of their social rank. Today we must ask ourselves what workers really are. Do they constitute a homogeneous social entity or are they something less than a social entity, a variable status throughout time? … So there is this big problem of what labor is, and this problem is reflected in both labor organization and in trade-union activities … Many of our reference points, especially young people, with whom we are working on these issues, have a different opinion. For them the main question is not fighting temporary work and having a stable job, but rather stable security in a temporary situation, so income becomes even more important than the work. (int. 1, p. 3, quoted in della Porta and Mosca 2005)

Protesting where and when? Political opportunities for unemployment protest In the different forms of protests highlighted above, the strength of the mobilization comes from the networking of the various groups and forms of action, made possible especially during the cycle of protest (Tarrow 1989). In fact, many and various organizations bring to the mobilization “the culture of collective action and the knowledge of the militant rituals and practices” (Maurer 2001), they have themselves to mobilize resources for action. More than from single organizations, the protest on unemployment in France in the 1990s or in Italy in 2002 rose from the networking of different, heterogeneous groups (see also Hannigton 1973, on the British unemployed in the 1920s). In France, the peak of the struggle of unemployment followed two waves of mobilization on the “social question”: the massive strikes of 1995 against the restructuring of the welfare state (followed by the cheminot strike



60

in 1996–7), and the wave of mobilization of the “mouvement de sans” with the sans-papiers (migrants without documents) protest, as well as those of the homeless in various moments during the 1990s (sans-logis and mal-logée, see Maurer and Pierru 2001; Agrikoliansky, Fillieule, and Mayer 2005). In Naples, the first peak in the struggle of the “organized unemployed” coincides with the urban movement of the early 1970s, while another wave followed the recent mobilization of the global justice movement (Remondino 1998). In Argentina, the piqueteros allied with the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo (the mothers of those who were killed during the dictatorship), collectives of university students, and public employees unions (Petras 2003: 133). Considering these examples of collective action over unemployment by heterogeneous groups, it is important to address the question of how opportunities for the development of such networks come to exist. Research on social movements has usually linked the cycle of protest with the opening of windows of opportunity (Tarrow 1989; Kriesi et al. 1995; della Porta 1995). The stress upon political opportunity challenges the “breakdown” approaches that link protest to grievances, assuming instead that—in a complex society in which discontent is always alive— mobilization occurs when resources and opportunities for the aggrieved groups are available. On specific issues such as unemployment, historical research has indicated that, although the amount of protest is not directly correlated with unemployment rates (on the UK in the 1920s and 1930s, see Bagguley 1991: 85; on the US between 1890–1940, see Kerbo and Schaffer 1992),4 mobilization for the unemployed is indeed sensitive to labor market cycles. A first wave of mobilization on unemployment developed during a time of economic depression between the two world wars (see Richards 2002). After the Second World War, there was no mobilization on unemployment in France, as there was a large demand for workers (see Tartakovsky 1997), while the unemployed did mobilize in Italy where unemployment was massive (Reiter 2002). In periods during which unemployment is a major social problem, the degree and forms of mobilization are, however, influenced by the openness of political institutions toward protestors, as well as their capacity to mobilize political allies. Although transnational and local conditions are expected to be more and more relevant due to the phenomena of globalization and Europeanization on the one hand, and of political decentralization and regionalism on the other, national political opportunities are still expected to play the most relevant role. That protest (at least, reported protest) does not much address the supranational level is no surprise. Research on protest events, usually





based on newspaper sources, stresses the scarcity of actions that directly target European institutions on such different issues as migrant rights (Giugni and Passy 2002) or environmental protection (Rootes 2002). Within this background, it is thus remarkable that, compared with other forms of claim making, protest is even more frequently reported at the supranational level (16.8 percent) that at the national (11.8 percent see Table 2.3). Demonstrative forms of protest are especially present at the supranational level—where we have found instances of protest in both of our narratives on France and Italy—but other forms of protest are also present. It is, however, at the regional level that protest is covered the most, but only by a slim margin. Here as well, the statistical association is highly significant, but substantively weak (Cramer’s V = 0.11). Given the low EU competency on employment issues, this attention paid by the protestors to the EU level can be interpreted as a sort of “preemptive” Europeanization. The Europeanization of protest has often taken the form of domestication: pressure on national authorities in order to redress policies at the supranational (EU) level (Imig and Tarrow 2001a, b).5 In our case, instead, a form of externalization dominates, since the mobilizations and communications of national actors target the EU directly in an attempt to place pressure on the groups’ own governments (Chabanet 2002). As Didier Chabanet (2002) suggests, protest on unemployment is indeed an example of externalization: the EU is

Table 2.3 Forms of claim making by scope of the target (%) Form

Scope of Target Supranational

Political decisions Verbal statements Conventional protests Demonstrative protests Confrontational and violent protests Total (all forms) Total N

National

Regional/ Unknown Total Local

6.8 76.4 5.2

5.9 82.3 4.6

14.9 66.0 4.6

2.3 95.7 0.3

6.4 81.7 4.3

8.4

4.8

7.1

1.3

4.9

3.2

2.4

7.5

0.3

2.7

16.8

11.8

19.1

2.0

11.9

250

2683

282

300

3515




62

called upon as an additional level of opportunity in order to address issues that are perceived as no longer under the control of the nation state (see also della Porta 2003; and della Porta and Caiani 2005). With few exceptions, the organizations participating in the march did not reject European integration, but instead asked for a different social and political EU (Chabanet 2002). AC! declared: “A ‘social France’ was never given spontaneously by capitalists and governors … In a similar way, a social Europe will come only from an active and united intervention of European workers” (Salmon 1998: 218). Our data confirm, first of all, that protest is still mainly oriented toward the nation state. As can be seen in Table 2.3, protest is, in absolute terms, a rare event at the supranational level, while it is more frequent at the local and, especially, the national levels. While conventional forms of protest are concentrated at the national level, more disruptive forms of protest target instead the local level, where we also find a relevant number of protest events. This can be explained by the fact that, as was already noted, the most disruptive forms of action are those of the unemployed themselves, who have fewer resources to invest in the construction of national organizations. Moreover, our case studies on the protest of the unemployed indicate the important role of local specific conditions (e.g., the special law for the reconstruction after the earthquake in Naples) in the construction of community-specific organizational resources for the unemployed. In France, notwithstanding the star marches converging upon the capital, the Comité de chomeurs organized at the local level. In Italy, most of the disruptive protest by the unemployed comes from committees of the organized unemployed that are deeply rooted—as their very names often indicate—in specific neighborhoods (such as the historical Comitato di Vico Cinquesanti). Also, research on the unemployed movement in Argentina stresses the role of local communities in supporting the road blocks and city camps organized by the piqueteros in quasi-segregated, relatively homogeneous barrios hit by the massive firing of factory workers and the privatization of mineral and energy centers, accompanied by closures (Petras 2003: 128).6 Our narratives provide some, not mutually exclusive, explanations for this tendency toward a “communitarization” of unemployed struggle. First of all, as Fillieule (1993) observes, protest on unemployment develops in a field that is highly structured by public institutions. And welfare institutions are indeed decentralized at the local level, to a point where in a “dual state” the distribution of subsidies and services is often devolved. In France, the local ASSEDICs have indeed been targets and





stages for the protest of unemployment associations with a focus on immediate needs (Bourneau and Martin 1993: 172). But, as the hunger strike of the Termini Imerese’s mayor illustrates, local politicians can offer support to unemployment protests within the community, using them in a double-level game to put pressure upon national authorities. Successes at the local levels (the rehiring of fired workers, the issuing of special programs for underdeveloped areas, etc.) are important for maintaining and building organizational momentum by showing that protesting helps to achieve material results. This is all the more important for poorly endowed groups. In Naples, the hiring of the first groups of the organized unemployed as public employees in the local administration, of other groups in the public health sector, the organization of courses for professional training, as well as the reform of the mechanism of job distribution (Pugliese 1998), all contributed to the framing of protest as a successful strategy. The mobilizing slogan of the protest has in fact long been “the struggle pays off.” According to a Neapolitan activist, “in the families, it is quite common that fathers tell their children that ‘to get a job you have to join the unemployed organizations’” (Baglioni 2003a: 8). Also, in France, local actions over immediate relief policies have often been successful: in 1994, the occupations of local ASSEDICs resulted in the allocation of a special Christmas dole (Salmon 1998: 206). As Royall (1998: 362) observes, “the association in defense of the unemployed … was able, at least for some time, to modify the perception of the unemployed about their mobilization potential. They encouraged the unemployed to struggle for their rights, and convinced thousands of them to mobilize.” In order for this to happen, “it was necessary to show the unemployed that they had real chances for success.” At the national level, which is by far the most common target of protest on unemployment, we can assume that national opportunities are indeed going to explain the degree and forms of mobilization. A cross-country comparison of protest on unemployment confirms (see Table 2.4), in fact, the relevance of national institutions in orienting the strategies of collective actors (with a highly significant, but not particularly strong, correlation coefficient: Cramer’s V = 0.14). We can observe, first of all, that the degree of attention to the issue of unemployment does not directly affect the coverage of protest in the press. Indeed, even though Germany in the period we cover is a country with dramatically increasing rates of unemployment and strong political controversies over the reform of the welfare state, protest of all types remains limited in a public sphere where verbal declarations are by far the dominant form of claim making. Since at least the 1980s, unions have intervened among



64

Country

Form UK Political decisions Verbal statements Conventional protests Demonstrative protests Confrontational protests Violent protests Total (all forms) Total N

Switzerland

France

Italy

Germany

Sweden

Total

5.2 90.3 2.0

10.6 76.1 7.5

11.9 65.1 8.6

12.0 77.9 2.2

2.0 92.9 2.7

9.4 85.1 3.1

6.7 84.3 4.2

1.9

5.1

9.0

2.7

2.0

2.4

3.4

0.3

0.7

5.3

4.9

0.3

0.0

1.3

0.4 4.5 750

0.0 13.3 2019

0.1 23.0 790

0.2 10.1 950

0.0 5.1 3837

0.0 5.5 583

0.1 9.0 8930


65



Table 2.4 Forms of claim making by country (%)


the unemployed, but more usually in the form of training and other types of help than of protesting (Wolski-Prenger 1998). Similar to that in Germany, although with less dramatic rates of unemployment, is the situation in Sweden. In both countries, neo-corporatist assets in industrial relations might have discouraged politics in the streets. Protest is also low in the UK, where not only the unemployed appear as politically isolated (Bagguley 1998), but also in the period covered the dynamics of the labor market are quite different from those dominating Continental Europe. We find instead much more reported protest in the other three countries. France and Italy are those countries characterized by the highest rates of confrontational protest, while France and Switzerland have the highest rates of conventional and demonstrative protest. The presence of a fragmented union scene in all three countries, with left-wing trade unions especially visible in France (Gallie 1989) and Italy (della Porta 1996), might well explain why protest finds more opportunities to develop in these countries, thanks to the alliance with part of the union movement. While in Switzerland the tradition of inclusiveness moderates the forms of protest (Kriesi et al. 1995), the higher disruptiveness in Italy and France reflects instead the more polarized, exclusive tradition in both countries. Political opportunities can also be considered in terms of the availability of alliances. Traditionally, the parties of the left have supported the mobilization of the unemployed. Although the unemployed have often been stigmatized as lumpenproletariat in some left-wing orthodoxies, left-wing parties have offered resources and support in several waves of protest following mass dismissals and economic depression. This was the case, for instance, in the 1930s in the US, where protests were organized by Unemployed Councils supported by the Communist Party, the Socialist Party, and the Musteite’s Committees, and declined after the desertion of these important allies (Kerbo and Schaffer 1992; Valocchi 1990). In Naples, the temporary decline of the movement of the organized unemployed in the mid-1970s has been explained by the failure to mobilize support on the Left: “There was the need of more stringent forms of collaboration with the labor movements and its organizations as well as other skills in order to negotiate with the institutional counterpart” (Pugliese 1998: 196). A few decades later in Italy, Rifondazione Comunista, the left-wing splinter faction founded after the demise of the Italian Communist Party, supported a reduction of the working day as well as a guaranteed salary. In the French mobilization of the 1990s, a visible role was played by the Association pour l’Emploi, l’Information et la Solidarieté, supported by the PCF, which offered



66

material support to the unemployed in their interactions with welfare institutions (Bourneau and Martin 1993). The hypothesis, present in the social movement literature (della Porta and Diani 2006, ch 8), that mobilization against unemployment would be stronger under right-wing governments (perceived as opponents, and thus weaker) than under left-wing governments (perceived as allies), does not always hold for the mobilization of the 1990s and the 2000s. In fact, protesters often target attempted reforms even by left-wing governments, reacting to a perceived betrayal. This was indeed the case for the protests in France, which were oriented against a leftwing government (elected in 1997) that wanted to reduce the budget for urgent relief policies. If the Socialist-led government was indeed accused of a neoliberal turn (Bourneau and Martin 1993: 172), this is by far not the only example. As protestors often stress, a left-wing government in Italy was likewise responsible for introducing the reform that increased flexibility in the labor market. In fact, more than by the support of left-wing party alliances, the opportunity for protest on unemployment seems more and more related to public opinion support. Again in the French case, a success during the first struggle by the unemployed came from their capacity to address, and convince, public opinion. The appeal to public opinion through a strategy of scandalization is indeed visible in the French illustration, as well as in the Italian one. In France, a leaflet of the organization Partage reads, “against misery, loneliness, desperation that produce suicides always more numerous among unemployed” (in Fillieule 1993: 142), while later an AC! banner would read, “How can you sleep when an unemployed commits suicide?”7 In Italy, the involvement of the wives of the dismissed Fiat workers in the protests against unemployment points to the disruptive effect unemployment has on the moral bases of the society. The support of the community (and public opinion) has been noticed in the evolution of the Argentine piqueteros “from passive sufferers of poverty and social disorganization and clientelistic manipulation [into] activists in a powerful solidarity movement, engaged in autonomous grassroots social organization and independent politics” (Petras 2003: 130). Media coverage also helps in “synchronizing local actions, changing the multitudes of initiatives in a movement with national amplitude” (Maurer and Pierru 2001: 388).

Conclusion Although rare, protest on unemployment nevertheless does exist. This chapter has focused on the existence and the heterogeneity of protest





on unemployment, from the more sporadic and disruptive outbursts of the long-time unemployed, to the better-structured protest against dismissals. It has also focused on the intertwining of protest on unemployment with other issues during cycles of protest. Linking observations made in different parts of this chapter, three different constellations emerge that future research can address more systematically: • Protest actions on long-term unemployment: these are community-based forms of protest that involve NGOs (secular and religious) and leftwing political activists that make use of direct action (road blocks, etc.) and highly symbolic forms of protest (hunger strikes, etc.), and that are oriented toward obtaining policies of immediate relief for their constituency; • Protest actions against massive dismissals: these tend to involve the unions, to use a mix of mass protest (marches) and traditional forms of industrial action (from strikes to occupations), and to be oriented toward political exchange (ad-hoc solutions); • Protest actions on unemployment (and labor policies) within more general cycles of protest: these are forms linked to general cycles of protest (at national or local levels) that involve not only left-wing social movement organizations, but also unions and parties, and that use a variety of direct forms of action to push for political solutions to labor market problems (reduce flexibility, reduce working time, etc.). Organizations of the unemployed might collaborate in different forms in the different constellations. I have stressed, in particular, that protest is the only resource through which the unemployed themselves occasionally enter the public sphere. Moreover, protest on unemployment is often carried out by unions (especially on dismissals), welfare organizations, and voluntary associations, as well as by allied social movements. I have also pointed at some peculiarities of these different forms vis-à-vis protest on other issues, as well as actions other than protest on the issue of unemployment. Organizationally, protests on unemployment involve loose local alliances of unemployed organizations with unions, left-wing political groups and social movement organizations, or various types of voluntary associations. As for their repertoires, protests on unemployment tend to assume some typical forms: occupations of working places; occupations of welfare institutions dealing with unemployment; long marches; hunger strikes; and other forms of action with high symbolic impact, oriented to stress the “absolute injustice” of the position of the unemployed. Additionally, the framing of the issues of



68

labor changes, together with the evolution of the labor market, restates the importance of social dynamics for political protest. Opportunities for protest on unemployment are influenced by some political characteristics as well. In general, the status of unions, as well as the traditional assets of industrial relations, will affect the chances of protest. Finally, as left-wing parties move decisively to the center-right, the unemployed turn to public opinion as a potential ally for their cause. Other allies do emerge, however, especially during cycles of protest.

Notes This chapter is reprinted from a previous publication (della Porta 2008a) and adapted for the present book. 1. Protest event analysis is also criticized because of its description bias (McCarthy et al. 1996). In order to reduce this bias, in addition to focusing on quality newspapers (which have to protect their reputation), we based our coding only on the factual coverage of events in newspaper articles, without taking into consideration any potential comments or evaluation made by the journalist. 2. Notably, these same groups had helped with the creation of a Comité chréien de solidarité avec les chomeurs (Fillieule 1993). 3. The role of the activists of the social movements of the 1970s was also noticed in Germany (Rein 1997). 4. I am grateful to Herbert Reiter for this information. 5. The typology of Europeanized protest, proposed by Doug Imig and Sidney Tarrow (2001a), combines the national–international dimension both in terms of the actors engaging in protest and their targets. 6. An example is the wave of road blocks and camps organized in Salta following the closure of the petrol company General Mosconi, where 5000 of the 15,000 inhabitants were not only employed, but they had also had built a sort of semi-private welfare state (Dinerstein 2001). 7. Indeed, in France in 1995, as many as 62 percent of people asked wanted a greater investment in the struggle against exclusions, and the media coverage of the wave of protest in 19978 will help to further change the public image of the unemployed: from poor souls waiting in front of the Restos du Coer to demonstrators holding flags—he rebellious unemployed (Salmon 1998).




Networks and Political Contention over Unemployment: A Comparison of Britain, Germany, and Switzerland Manlio Cinalli and Katharina Füglister In 2006, more than half a million Germans took part in about 500 May Day parades organized throughout their country. Leaders of the main trade unions mobilized mass support against the “reforms” of the Merkel government of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats: the reorganization of the public health system, the raising of the national retirement age, and the extension of the trial period of six months for young employees to two years. The unemployed played a crucial role in this mobilization, as they were the first to challenge the overhaul of the German welfare system, set in progress by the previous Social Democrat government. Since the summer of 2004, the unemployed have engaged in widespread demonstrations, opposing closures of state-run enterprises, provisions for a more flexible labor market, and plans to cut public spending on healthcare and pensions. In Switzerland, by contrast, the unemployed have voiced their claims through more conventional forms of action. In this case, there has been virtually no recourse to public protest, highly symbolic initiatives, and/or direct mobilizations in the streets for challenging national and subnational governments. Policy makers have paid increased attention to the unemployed, at least since the latter won a 1996 referendum on unemployment legislation. In particular, the Swiss unemployed have gained access to pre-parliamentary consultation procedures. Groups of unemployed people and pro-unemployed organizations have also used the courts to intervene with regard to reductions and/or suspensions of compensation. In Britain, finally, political contention over unemployment has been very low and increasingly pacified throughout the last decade, with no recourse to unified mobilization and direct action. Unemployment issues have only become contentious in industrial disputes. At the same time, instances of conventional actions have hardly 70



3

had the same force, impact, and political implications that they have in Switzerland. British actors in the field of unemployment have joined rarely in public and collective efforts; rather, they have preferred to make recourse to “hidden” actions such as lobbying and pressure on an individual basis and far from the public space. This chapter asks a number of questions. What accounts for the recourse to large mobilizations in Germany in recent years? Why is there hardly any recourse to public collective action in the British field of unemployment? Why are conventional forms of collective action so widespread in Switzerland? In addressing these questions, this chapter begins by presenting a brief summary of some relevant literature for studying political contention over unemployment. Having set out the main criteria underpinning the comparison between Britain, Germany, and Switzerland, the chapter draws on network analysis. In particular, it assesses the extent to which contention over unemployment is linked to patterns of exchanges specific to the field within which mobilization takes place. Widespread mobilization is expected to be matched by the presence of extensive and far-reaching exchanges between different actors in the field,1 including pro-unemployed organizations and the unemployed themselves. The main argument is that exchanges between different actors translate into distinct “network patterns,” which then impact (and are modified by) the development of collective action in the field. A significant portion of the chapter is dedicated to discussing detailed empirical evidence in order to assess points of strength and weaknesses in this argument. This chapter is based on qualitative and quantitative analysis. Numerous interviews (115) have been conducted with policy makers, civil society organizations, and groups of the unemployed in Britain (38), Germany (35), and Switzerland (42). The interview schedule for each category of actors has been strictly comparative, and specifically designed to analyze where these actors locate themselves in relation to others in the same field. That is, part of the interview schedule has been conceived for the specific treatment of network analysis.2 Interviews have included sets of standardized questions so as to investigate the presence and content of ties among actors. While data have been gathered on various types of relationships, quantitative treatment in this chapter is exclusively run along the binary distinction between presence/absence of cooperation so as to perform a series of more sophisticated analyses using the UCINET software package. The selection of actors began with the systematic examination of newspaper coverage in the UNEMPOL database comprising articles coded for analysis on claim making.3 Since



Manlio Cinalli and Katharina Füglister 71

Networks and Political Contention over Unemployment

this effort could only target certain types of actors (and only in their phases of visibility), the selection has been completed through analysis of practitioners’ publications, access to online primary sources, and, in particular, “snowballing” leads from interviewees themselves. Having mapped the web of cooperative ties for each national field, the analysis aims to offer a comprehensive evaluation that extends from the holistic appraisal of national unemployment fields to the individual assessment of specific actors within them. Attention has thus been focused on the unemployed themselves, while at the same time dealing with subgroups of actors and with the whole web for each national case. Hence, this chapter is based on the analysis of relational data. Relationships of cooperation are seen as connecting pairs of actors into the broader relational system that constitutes each national unemployment field under study. Since borders of these fields could reasonably be seized, direct sociometric choice data about actors’ cooperation have been collected in a direct case-by-case form, with information immediately being organized in adjacent matrices. As regards the level of measurement, the analysis has been based on binary relational data, both directed and undirected, so as to rely on the widest application of all the techniques of social network analysis. Relational data have been handled in matrix form: there has been no recourse to complex visual graphs owing to the high number of points and intersecting lines. Despite the lack of graphs this chapter conceives each national unemployment field in terms of networks of ties between units: that is, as a set of nodes maintained by actors who, through their reciprocal interactions, shape the overall space within which they are rooted. Each actor is a center point from which lines radiate to other nodes (i.e., other actors with whom ties of cooperation are forged). Clearly, influence travels in two directions: actors forge the overall relational structure while the latter impacts upon the actors themselves. The detailed investigation of each direction is beyond the scope of this chapter, however. Here, the challenge is to shed light on the role of networks between processes of mobilization and main sets of causal conditions as taken in standard scholarship of social movements and collective action.

Setting up the comparison: unemployment in Britain, Germany, and Switzerland Since the early 1990s, unemployment has stood out as a crucial and controversial political issue across different European states, which have promoted significant reforms to the labor market so as to move more



72

people from welfare to work. In Britain the government has introduced tax credits for families, a national minimum wage, and a “New Deal”: that is, a set of specific provisions directed at the insertion of the unemployed into the labor market. The New Deal was launched to persuade people to accept available work. Training programs were offered along with the prospect of stable employment. Although it has been extended to older people, to single parents, and to the disabled, the New Deal was originally targeted at young people through compulsory guidance to improve job searches, training and education to improve participants’ skills, as well as provision of work experience in environmental task forces, in voluntary service, or in subsidized private employment (Cinalli and Statham 2005). In Germany unemployment has been a top priority since at least 1998, when the newly elected government of Social Democrats engaged in a broad discussion of the issue and implemented necessary reforms. Since then, almost all instruments and strategies traditionally used to fight unemployment have been reviewed. In some cases these reviews have been followed by crucial shifts in fundamental principles and policy orientations. In particular, the so-called Agenda 2010 and the subsequent Hartz reforms I–IV have introduced major changes in unemployment insurance and social assistance by limiting entitlements, curtailing the amount and duration of financial help for jobless people, and introducing the “principle of neediness”: that is, the obligation for recipients to provide evidence of their poverty and their critical need of benefits. A series of restrictive measures have been elaborated to pressure the long-term unemployed into accepting available jobs. At the same time, reforms include new active labor market measures such as the reorientation of individual insertion procedures, the promotion of a secondary labor market consisting of mini-jobs and short-term contracts that aim to improve the employability of the unemployed, and the reinforcement of other mechanisms for employment creation (Baum et al. 2005). The Swiss labor market was characterized by nearly full employment until the early 1990s, when the situation changed owing to a sudden economic recession. Since anticyclical employment strategies—which had previously pushed women and foreign laborers out of the labor market during economic downturns—were no longer applicable (Bonoli and Mach 2001), unemployment emerged as a top political priority in the country. This new situation thus led to several reforms that have especially focused on the amount and duration of social benefits. As in the case of Britain and Germany, active labor market measures and





financial support for additional training have been crucial markers of this major shift in unemployment policy, putting a definitive end to “passive” unemployment allowances while aiming at “active” professional integration. In addition, regional job placement offices have been set up, enabling harmonization in terms of implementation of federal law and application of sanctions against the unemployed in case of abuses of unemployment law (Giugni et al. 2005). Put simply, groups of unemployed people, pro-unemployed organizations, and, more broadly, actors who mobilize on the issue of unemployment4 have faced common challenges and common pressures for reform across different national fields. While labor market mechanisms, social protection systems, and social services continue to be specific to each nation state, the specific issue of unemployment fosters the development of individual national agendas that are similarly restrictive toward the unemployed. In each of these countries the unemployed are told that their grievances should not be seen in the context of “old” conflicts between capital and work, but rather it is the effect of market rigidities that impede the otherwise sound growth of employment rates. Instead of a political debate in which actors engage publicly to find solutions, this approach frames the issue as a technical problem. The unemployed are not seen as a distinct collective group in terms of identities, interests, and claims but, rather, as a simple sum of individuals who could easily enjoy full wealth if the “correct” labor market decisions were implemented. In general, policy makers appear to be charged with the main task to elaborate and implement sound active labor market provisions, while each jobless person is explicitly called to make a personal effort to resolve “her own” situation.

Conceptual framework: Networks and mobilization The common political context in Britain, Germany, and Switzerland in terms of their main reforms and policy provisions offers a unique chance to control for factors at the core of the scholarly tradition of “political opportunities structures” (POS) (Eisinger 1973; Kriesi et al. 1995; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978). In line with arguments emphasizing that unemployment rates are insufficient to account for the “importance” of unemployment as a political claim (Baxandall 2001 and 2002), POS scholars have studied the key role of the political environment within which collective action takes place, focusing on exogenous political variables that affect the possibility that groups, organizations, and movements will mobilize for collective action (Giugni 2005; Giugni and Berclaz



74

2003). Yet it should be noted that similar political contexts in Britain, Germany, and Switzerland have also been matched by the similar presence of endogenous constraints that hinder the mobilization of the unemployed. Scholars have emphasized the increasing dependence of the unemployed upon other civil society organizations to compensate for a lack of resources (Cinalli 2004; Giugni and Passy 2001), as well as the stigmatizing and negative consequences of unemployment at the individual level in terms of identity (Jahoda et al. 1971; Schnapper 1981; Demazière and Pignoni 1998). Accordingly, the specific comparisons of this chapter also enable us to control for factors grounded in “resources mobilization” (Oberschall 1973; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Edwards and McCarthy 2004) and “culture” in its broadest meaning.5 The main argument is that different network patterns, as they are built among different actors in each national field, are dynamically intertwined with cross-national variations of collective action. Interactions between actors build a relational structure that has an impact upon their subsequent decisions: it is the location of actors across lines, together with the characteristics of their whole web, that make certain developments more likely than others. Of course, this structure of exchanges is not fixed once and for all. But neither is it volatile. Albeit modifiable by further mobilization, a single actor can hardly change it substantially by itself. It follows that a main research effort needs to address the analysis of networks between actors in the field of unemployment. Since these actors are not isolated units, but they interact via an extensive set of ties, networks are as worthy of analysis as the actors which they connect. The most relevant questions on the mobilization of the unemployed can thus be developed within the framework of network analysis: to what extent are exchanges different in Britain, Germany, and Switzerland? Is unemployment still a politicized issue that separates certain types of actors, such as policy makers from the unemployed? Or, alternatively, do actors of different types foster extensive relationships that reduce the traditional distance between them? What is the specific part that is played by pro-unemployed organizations and groups of the unemployed themselves—that is, the expected protagonists of any mobilization within the field? Hence, the gap between networks analysis and research on mobilization needs to be bridged in order to combine these two traditions into a framework that can give significant results in terms of its application (Diani 1992; Diani and McAdam 2003; Gould 1993). The unemployment field—and indeed any other political and issue field—can be defined in terms of networks of ties between units: that is, “a set of nodes which are





entrusted to actors who, through their reciprocal interactions, contribute to shape the overall set of constraints and opportunities incumbent upon them, access specific resources, and produce part of their own orientations” (Cinalli 2007a: 6). The study of networks encompasses the analysis of “resources,” since exchanges provide actors with channels for sharing valuable assets so as to balance scarce control of alternative resources. Networks can thus be evaluated in their intermediating role between resources and mobilization. In line with cultural approaches, networks are crucial for sharing common interpretations of the issue, as well as building mutual trust, common values, and cohesive identities. The redefinition of orientations—within which the issue of unemployment is politically built in different countries—rests on specific network patterns that the unemployed forge in order to forward their demands, access the public domain, and achieve satisfaction of their claims. Lastly, following the POS approach, networks intermediate between mobilization and the (facilitating or constraining) context within which the unemployed operate. This definition, however, fits only partially with “top-down” approaches focusing on structures of alliances. Notions of “policy domains” with their “networks” and “coalitions,” influencing processes of deliberation and competing for “monopoly” (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Kingdon 1995; Sabatier 1988), are here broadened to include “bottom-up” processes of interorganizational interaction occurring within and across the public domain (Cinalli 2004, 2007b). Put simply, the disproportionate attention to elite transactions within policy networks leaves no space to assess the impact that social movements, voluntary organizations, and more broadly, civil society can have on final policy decisions. As this chapter shows, interaction and exchanges also involve excluded groups such as the unemployed. What follows is a systematic evaluation of cooperative ties. These ties facilitate flows of information otherwise not available for the mobilization of the unemployed; they enable actors in the field to seize opportunities from policy makers and institutions; they reinforce internal identity and values; and they lead to recognition, support, public acknowledgment, and legitimization. Cooperation includes ties grounded in overlapping memberships, as well as shared work in common organizational structures. Thus defined cooperation is based on long-term social bonds and not only ad hoc alliances. Since it is not volatile, cooperation can be matched against cross-national variations of unemployed mobilization. Three main steps are essential for assessing the relationship between network patterns in the unemployment field and collective action over



76

unemployment. These three steps investigate: (1) comprehensive patterns for the whole web of exchanges; (2) specific patterns of networks between and within different subgroups of actors; and (3) the specific situation of organizations of the unemployed. Step by step, the research can thus proceed from a global appraisal of fields of unemployment to the punctual examination of individual actors within them, while at the same time shedding light at the meso-level of subgroups. With regard to the chapter’s main focus and tools of analysis, the first step aims to evaluate the extent to which different actors forge a cohesive field through their exchanges. This first step can be divided into successive stages, each using established measures of network analysis. The initial stage consists in the computation of the “average distance” between actors: that is, the average length of the shortest path that connects two actors. The shorter the average distance, the more cohesive a given network. The analysis of average distance can then be integrated with the analysis of the most popular cohesion measure in network analysis, namely, “density.” This measure expresses the ratio of existing lines in the network to the total number of possible lines. The values of density range between 0 and 1, with 1 indicating an ideal field where each actor is tied to any other actor and 0 an ideal field with no ties at all (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 181). Yet the use of density can be problematic when examining networks of different sizes, since larger networks are characterized by lower density rates. Hence, in the final stage, the appraisal of network cohesion is refined through the measure of “average degree” of all actors: that is, the average number of exchanges that each actor has forged in the overall network. The measure can be computed by dividing the total number of ties by the total number of actors. A higher average degree is the ultimate evidence of higher cohesion within the network. In the most intuitive fashion, this situation is ideal to overcome differences among actors and to foster unified mobilization. The second step of the investigation aims to assess the importance of relationships between three main subgroups of actors in the networks: namely, policy makers, civil society, and the unemployed movement. Of course, this differentiation is somewhat arbitrary, and indeed subgroups could have been selected according to other shared characteristics (for example, grouping together actors that are structurally equivalent), or split into additional subgroups (for example, allocating pressure groups and NGOs in two different subgroups rather than under the same label of “civil society”). This differentiation, however, fits with scholarly applications of mobilization theory; it also allows for





simplifying statistics while paying conceptual attention to notions such as “bridges,” “weak ties,” or “structural holes” (Burt 1992; Granovetter 1973; Lin et al. 1981). Indeed, the root of forging different combinations of networks lies in actors’ motives and concerns. Thus, it is important to analyze under what conditions and with what outcomes key ties are built across different subgroups or, alternatively, within the same subgroups. Finally, the third step of the investigation focuses on the unemployed, given that they are at the core of any instance of collective action in the field. In this case, it is crucial to appraise whether the unemployed are politically marginalized or highly mobilized. Network analysis offers a host of specific measures to assess the “importance” of actors within a network; yet the notion of “betweenness” can be singled out as the most promising to develop the previous steps of analysis. “Betweenness” measures the extent to which a given actor stays in between other actors who are not connected between them (Scott 2000: 86). Rather than focusing on the simple number of exchanges to evaluate actors’ centrality, this measure assumes that actors play a key role when they guarantee communication between other actors who would otherwise be disconnected. The function of “broker” or “gatekeeper” (Freeman 1979) empowers an actor, since they can now control whether or not exchanges occur between other actors. At times, it is not just the communication between two other actors that is at stake but, rather, key exchanges between two or more sectors of a network, which may be divided by deep functional, political, or ideological cleavages (Cinalli 2007a; Diani 2003).

Framework application: Network patterns in Britain, Germany, and Switzerland The detailed description of different forms and degrees of collective action in the field of unemployment in Britain, Germany, and Switzerland is beyond the scope of this chapter.6 With regard to Britain, it is sufficient to notice that there is an increasing recourse to a broad repertoire for targeting policy makers. This effort includes lobbying, cooperation with public officials, and research provision for policy consultation. Yet there is no effort to join collectively in direct actions and mobilize the general public. The “movement” in the field consists of hidden interventions of organizations acting on a stand-alone basis and far from the public space. Political contention over unemployment is very low and increasingly pacified. Facing increasing political marginalization,



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the organizations of the unemployed have often focused on providing services for the unemployed, rather than offering them the means to organize and mobilize per se (Bagguley 1991, 1998). Together with their allies from civil society (for example, think tanks, unions, and other independent groups), the organizations of the unemployed aim to access policy makers rather than challenge them. The salience of unemployment has declined not just as a simple result of shorter jobless spells, but through processes that have weakened the unemployed’s ability to mobilize directly. Policy-makers welcome, and benefit from, the support that a wide range of organizations offers in terms of individual initiative about welfare services, production of knowledge, and sharing of expertise (Cinalli and Statham 2005). Although protests of all forms usually remain limited in Germany (della Porta 2005b), collective contention has recently increased in the field of unemployment. Unions have engaged in sustaining mass mobilizations, reversing their traditional decision to limit their intervention to the provision of training and other services for the unemployed (Wolski-Prenger 1998). The mobilization of the unemployed is thus higher in Germany than both Britain and Switzerland (Giugni 2005), with the unemployed increasing protesting in order to mobilize the general public (Baum et al. 2005). In particular, demonstrative actions have been reactivated through “Monday Demonstrations” held in various German cities. Drawing upon the immense symbolic force of the old Montagsdemonstrationen,7 the unemployed have initiated mass demonstrations to protest the “Agenda 2010.” Agenda 2010 is a set of measures that have made the labor market more flexible, cut jobless benefits, forced unemployed people to take any available job, and, more generally, opened the way for cutbacks in social benefits. Put simply, the unemployed have recently played a leading role in the German field of unemployment through the work of strong national organizations mobilizing the general public. Lastly, Switzerland provides another distinct case in terms of mobilization variation. In contrast to the British case, there are public mobilizations within the Swiss field of unemployment. Yet, contrary to their German neighbors, the Swiss unemployed rely for the most part on conventional action forms, which imply neither mass demonstrations in the streets nor the use of strong expressive gestures against the government. Public consultations and delegations are widely used. The unemployed have mainly privileged the search for consensus, relying extensively on many consociational provisions, which the Swiss institutions put at their disposal. At the same time, policy actors pay full attention to





the organizations of the unemployed through the available public consultation procedures. In 1996 the unemployed successfully launched a referendum against the introduction of restrictive provisions in the unemployment law. This was followed by the integration of the unemployed organizations into the pre-parliamentary consultation process. Groups of unemployed people and pro-unemployed organizations also make extensive use of court actions to defend individuals from reduction or suspension of their benefits (Giugni et al. 2005). These remarkable differences between Britain, Germany, and Switzerland call for an application of the three-step framework that has been discussed in the previous section. We now turn to the question: Can these differences be linked to variations of network patterns? Cohesion in the field of unemployment As has been argued, the study of average distance, density, and average degree provides some valuable information to evaluate variations of cohesion across different national fields of unemployment. Table 3.1 allows for a comparison of these measures, indicating a relevant gap between Britain and Switzerland on the one hand, and Germany on the other. Britain and Switzerland have a much less cohesive field, with similar scores across the three measures. In Germany the scores are indeed different. The average distance is substantially lower than in the other two cases, while density is considerably higher. As regards the computation of average degree, each actor in the German field of unemployment has established nine ties of cooperation with other actors. By contrast, British actors have built approximately four ties of cooperation, while in Switzerland the same score increases only to five. Put simply, these findings speak to several key issues. Higher public mobilization of the unemployed in Germany and their more

Table 3.1 Cohesion measures of the British, German, and Swiss networks Cohesion Measure (in network lines)

Number of actors Average distance Density Average degree

Country Britain

Switzerland

Germany

38 2.227 0.1266 4.684

42 2.381 0.1336 5.476

35 1.854 0.2672 9.086

Note: Density indicates the number of lines expressed as a proportion of the maximum possible number of lines



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extensive recourse to street demonstrations match a cohesive field of unemployment that is characterized by extensive networks. Higher mobilization is linked to stronger interorganizational cohesion. In this case, resources can more easily be shared, a common culture can more easily be built, and opportunities can more quickly be seized. Nevertheless, other findings still contradict the argument. In particular, network patterns are far too similar in Britain and Switzerland to be linked to their remarkable variation in terms of mobilization of the unemployed. Policy makers, civil society, and the unemployed The second step of investigation focuses on cooperative lines within and between three main subgroups of actors, namely: policy actors, civil society organizations, and groups that mobilize over unemployment. The objective is to measure in further detail cross-national variations of network patterns in the field of unemployment. Britain and Switzerland scored similar measures of cohesion; yet these overall measures might hide important differences in terms of concentration of networks within and across subgroups. Network patterns can hardly be taken as similar if, say, in one case cooperation is concentrated within a single subgroup while in another case cooperation is evenly spread between various subgroups. Hence, it is crucial to analyze the dynamic relationship between decisions taken at the subgroup level and variations of collective action. Widespread protest, for example, is expected to be linked to the creation of extensive networks among the unemployed, whereas far-reaching exchanges with policy makers might well be linked to processes of co-optation in the field. Clearly, network patterns at the subgroup level can be assessed by measuring their density. As it has been said, this measure is dependent on total size and thus needs to be considered with caution when comparing the three national fields. Tables 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 provide measures of density within and across the main subgroups in Britain, Germany, and Switzerland. These three tables are in the form of matrices with aggregated, rather than individual, actors in the rows and columns.8 It should be emphasized that these measures take into account the direction of lines: that is, the computation considers whether only one or both of two actors acknowledge a tie of cooperation. The impact of numerous small organizations in a field is thus controlled for, since they are likely to put emphasis on instances of cooperation with large organizations (while the latter might well neglect the same exchanges). Put simply, asymmetric data in Tables 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 refer only to relationships that have been explicitly acknowledged by actors themselves.




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Policy actors Civil society actors Unemployed Organizations

Policy actors

Civil society actors

Unemployed Organizations

0.5000 0.3148 0.2971

0.1481 0.2361 0.0676

0.0942 0.1014 0.0632

Table 3.3 German cooperation network: Average density for each block


Policy actors



0.4000 0.2471 0.2615

0.1529 0.3971 0.2443

0.1563 0.1810 0.3013

Table 3.4 Swiss cooperation network: Average density for each block


Policy actors



0.4286 0.1250 0.0917

0.1250 0.1959 0.0807

0.1083 0.0702 0.1619

The data seem to confirm the findings of the previous section. When compared with the same data in Britain and Switzerland, the German field is characterized by more extensive ties of cooperation within and across the main subgroups. In particular, the unemployed in Germany have built an extensive set of exchanges not only among themselves but also with organizations from civil society and main policy actors. This situation—which is confirmed even if reading asymmetric data from the viewpoint of policy actors and civil society—seems to match mainstream mobilization scholarship. Processes of mobilization are indeed stronger where unity is found among the unemployed (allowing for the easier flow of resources and common culture) on the one hand, while political opportunities (through interactions with policy elites) are relatively open for their collective action on the other hand. Figures for Germany also show that mobilization of the unemployed



Table 3.2 British cooperation network: Average density for each block

can benefit significantly from the protagonist role of crucial allies within civil society, which may offer resources that would otherwise be unavailable. At the same time, the data shed light on two crucial differences between Britain and Switzerland, thereby adding nuance to the analysis conducted in the last section. First, the organizations of the unemployed in Britain have only forged loose networks among themselves, whereas internal cooperation within the unemployed subgroup is considerably higher in Switzerland. Second, the British unemployed have extensively engaged in building a large set of cooperative ties with policy makers, while in Switzerland there is only some minor cooperative interaction between these two subgroups. In fact, the particular importance that the British unemployed attach to this specific type of exchange is confirmed by the remarkable asymmetry of the data. Policy makers in Britain tend to put much less emphasis on the same instances of cooperation. Their dominance in the field, along with their tendency to neglect established exchanges with other actors, is also confirmed when analyzing their cooperative ties with civil society. In spite of similar measures of cohesion noted in the last section, network patterns are not similar in Britain and Switzerland. The Swiss unemployed can rely on many internal ties of cooperation that channel resources and culture, thus increasing their capacity to mobilize. Exchanges are very weak across the subgroup of the unemployed as well as of civil society and policy makers. Yet this is only in seeming contradiction with mainstream literature (which emphasizes the importance of open channels with institutions and other allies), considering the ubiquitous role of consociational provisions in Swiss political life. Since the unemployed can rely on established political opportunities and some institutional channels that are permanently open, there is no evident reason to engage in the building of extensive ties of cooperation with policy makers. At the same time, the consociational provisions make the organizations of the unemployed less weak than they would be in other national contexts, and thereby less needy of allies from civil society. Furthermore, exchanges within the subgroup of the unemployed should be considered with extra attention. The unemployed do not build a high degree of unity for mobilizing but, rather, seem satisfied to achieve a broad entente, which then enables organizations to proceed by themselves through those institutional channels at their disposal. This is an ideal situation for the development of conventional forms of action. The unemployed have had a large space to express their positions





during the consultation procedures before any major reform attempts. As stated previously, the influence of single organizations was clearly seen in the referendum against the revision of labor legislation in 1996 as they rejected the introduction of more restrictive provisions concerning the unemployed. This significant instance of contention over unemployment was initially sustained by a simple committee of the unemployed, with no crucial support from other organizations. Main trade unions and other actors from civil society joined in only later, playing an important role for the final success of the unemployed. Lastly, Britain scores the lowest figures when examining both internal exchanges among the organizations of the unemployed and their cooperative ties with other organizations from civil society. The most interesting finding is that organizations of the unemployed have built far-reaching exchanges with policy actors. Clearly, the fact that the unemployed have forged only loose ties of cooperation among themselves and with potential allies from civil society is linked to their low engagement in the process of direct mobilization and protest. At the same time, the traditional lack of mechanisms of bottom-up consensus in the Westminster “majoritarian” model (Lijphart 1984) can hardly lead to the promotion of institutional forms of collective action. It follows that the field of unemployment in Britain is characterized by the predominance of hidden lobbying efforts conducted by individual initiatives of single organizations and are conducted far from public view through the individual initiatives of single organizations. The crucial differences between Britain and Switzerland could hardly be more evident after the second round of analysis. In fact, similar measures of network cohesion in the previous section were hiding very different network patterns in terms of exchanges across policy makers, civil society, and the unemployed. The positions of the unemployed in Britain, Germany, and Switzerland The third and final step of analysis focuses on the specific position that the unemployed occupy in their respective national fields. As has been said, the notion of “betweenness” is here used to assess whether the unemployed do occupy an “important” position within the network. Importance, in this case, is the capacity of the unemployed to control communication between other actors. To compare fully the different measures of betweenness, reference is made to the normalized betweenness centrality: that is, the betweenness divided by the maximum possible betweenness expressed as a percentage (Borgatti et al. 2002). In this



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Manlio Cinalli and Katharina Füglister 85 Table 3.5 Normalized betweenness centrality measures Country Britain

Switzerland

Germany

Policy actors

4.415

6.595

1.913


2.842

3.095

2.986

Unemployed organizations

0.889

1.997

1.948

case, high levels of mobilization over unemployment are expected to be linked to a valuable position of the unemployed within the overall network. By contrast, if the unemployed are not important, it is more likely that their grievances will stay silent. Table 3.5 displays precise measures of average normalized betweenness centrality for policy makers, civil society, and the unemployed in Britain, Germany, and Switzerland.9 The data confirm the previous findings of the first and second steps of the investigation. While establishing that network patterns in the German field are conducive to the mobilization of the unemployed, they suggest further points of difference between the British and Swiss cases. The argument here is that the unemployed themselves are more likely to mobilize when they control the exchanges among other actors. Hence, it is interesting to notice that within the German field the unemployed betweenness score is very high; even higher than the same measure for policy makers. The German field is also characterized by the highest betweenness of civil society. The important position of control that is held by the unemployed and their crucial allies from the broader civil society match broader processes of direct mobilization and mass protest. By contrast, the key position of policy makers is a common characteristic in Britain and Switzerland. These actors are by far the most frequent brokers and control the flow of exchanges among the other actors in the field. Betweenness is particularly high in the Swiss case as policy makers and institutions have prioritized the implementation of public consultation procedures in support of reforms in the field. Nevertheless, the analysis of the specific position of the unemployed reveals some crucial cross-national differences. In particular, the unemployed play only a marginal role of brokerage within the British field. This is indeed the most crucial point of contrast with Switzerland, since the Swiss unemployed score the highest measure of betweenness, even higher than the unemployed in Germany. Put simply, the Swiss unemployed have an influential position that enables them to control the flow of



Actor


exchanges among other actors, whereas the British unemployed occupy only a very marginal position within their own national field. This third, and final, step of analysis has confirmed the differences between Britain and Switzerland in terms of network patterns, reinforcing the overall argument of the previous sections. The findings show that the organizations of the unemployed do not mobilize when they have a marginal position in the field. In the British case, the unemployed can hardly sustain a process of widespread mobilization owing to their lack of control over exchanges among other actors. Facing extremely influential policy makers, the British unemployed rely on lobbying and other hidden actions for redressing, at least partially, their own grievances. In Switzerland, by contrast, the unemployed occupy an important position of control, which enables them to rely upon key channels with institutions and policy makers to make full recourse to conventional forms of collective action.

Conclusion This chapter has compared network patterns across three national fields of unemployment, namely in Britain, Germany, and Switzerland. In particular, it has focused on cooperative exchanges among the various organizations at work in these fields. These include specific institutions and policy makers, political parties and trade unions, and some pressure groups and NGOs, as well as pro-unemployed organizations and groups of the unemployed themselves. The primary aim of this comparison has been to assess the extent to which different network patterns—as they are built among different actors in each specific national field—are dynamically intertwined with cross-national variations of collective action over unemployment. The main findings show that such a dynamic relationship is indeed at work. Although the investigation of the precise direction of this relationship is beyond the scope of analysis, it is nonetheless clear that network patterns do intermediate between the process of mobilization itself and the main sets of causal conditions as taken in standard scholarship. On the one hand, networks are fundamental for channeling political opportunities, increasing control of strategic assets, and producing orientations and identities. On the other hand, important variations of opportunities, resources, and culture will most likely impact upon actors’ decisions and preferences when forging their networks. This relationship, however, is dynamic but not volatile as cooperation is based on long-term social bonds and not only on contingent alliances.



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The analysis has identified three network patterns, each in a distinct relationship with the mobilization of the unemployed. The field of unemployment in Germany is characterized by: (a) strong global cohesion; (b) extensive exchanges across and within policy makers, civil society, and the unemployed; and (c) a key position of control occupied by the unemployed. This has resulted in the use of mass protest, which the unemployed have used to mobilize the general public against restrictive provisions, cutbacks in social benefits, and a host of government measures to make the labor market more flexible. However, reading the relationship between networks and mobilization from an opposite direction, one could argue that the strength of conflict has fostered close alliances between unemployed organizations, which, in turn, reinforce interaction between other actors that mobilize against, or for, the unemployed. The field of unemployment in Britain is characterized by: (a) weaker global cohesion; (b) stronger cooperation between policy makers and the unemployed alongside looser internal exchanges among the organizations of the unemployed; and (c) a marginal position of control of the unemployed. This specific pattern of networks accounts for the increasing pacification of contention over unemployment. In Britain there is increasing recourse to lobbying, cooperation with public officials, and research provision for policy consultation, but no effort to join collectively in direct demonstrative actions against restrictive reforms of government. Reading the relationship between networks and mobilization from an opposite direction, one could argue that the lack of conflict has led the unemployed to search for contacts with policy actors, while these latter do not need to acknowledge the unemployed due to the limited challenges that they pose. In Switzerland, finally, the field of unemployment is not characterized by strong global cohesion, nor is it based on strong cooperation between the unemployed and other relevant actors. Yet the unemployed do have an influential position that enables them to control the flow of exchanges between other actors. That is, the Swiss case offers the occasion to study the impact of another distinct pattern of networks. The organizations of the unemployed have forged many ties of cooperation among themselves but only some minor exchanges with policy makers. Since they are themselves endowed with institutional control, the Swiss unemployed have made the most of their internal unity to sustain a wide range of conventional action forms such as public consultations, delegations, and court actions. Reading the relationship between networks and mobilization from an opposite direction, one could argue





that occasional conflicts over unemployment are sufficient to foster network patterns that are relatively extensive; but the low pressure to engage in far-reaching interactions produce a field which is segmented in disconnected components. Ultimately, this chapter has aimed to bridge the theoretical gap between network analysis and research on collective action, combining their respective insights into a framework that can give significant results in terms of theoretical development and empirical testing. This chapter has not tackled processes of mobilization by focusing exclusively on actors per se, but it has suggested that exchanges are as important as the actors that they connect. At the same time, this chapter has not aimed to find some universal patterns at the level of complete structures but has aimed, rather, to prompt discussion on the elaboration of a framework that combines theoretical insights from different scholarly approaches. The treatment of information on cooperation in terms of snapshots of static network patterns has aimed to increase data elaboration and replication of similar studies for further systematic comparison. Of course, this chapter has neither been concerned with the question of how specific network patterns come into being in the first instance, nor has it argued that these network patterns explain mobilization by themselves. This chapter’s primary argument is that networks are a necessary dimension of any investigation of collective action.

Appendix A: List of actors in Britain Acronym

Name

ASI BTEG CAB CABloc CBI CC C.Ch.loc Ch CESI CFE CP Cploc CUG DTI DWP EO

Adam Smith Institute Black Training and Enterprise Group Citizens Advice Bureau Citizens Advice Bureau – Barnsley Confederation British Industry Network of Unemployed Centres Combine Catholic Hallam Church of England Centre for Economic and Social Inclusion Centre for Full Employment Conservative Party Conservative Party – Barnsley Churches Unemployment Group Department for Trade and Industry Department for Work and Pensions Employment Opportunities (continued)



88

Acronym

Name

FS FSB IEA IES JCPloc JRF LD Ldloc LocCoun Lploc NPI NYA OPF PAULO PSI TfR TP Treas. TUC TUCloc WF YF

Fabian Society Federation of Small Businesses Institute of Economic Affairs Institute of Employment Studies Jobcentre Plus – Barnsley Joseph Rowntree Foundation Liberal Democrats Liberal Democrats – Barnsley Barnsley Council Labour Party New Policy Institute National Youth Agency One Parent Family National Training Organization PAULO Policy Studies Institute Together for Regeneration Tomorrow’s People Treasury Trade Unions Congress TUC Yorkshire Work Foundation Yorkshire Forward

Appendix B: List of actors in Germany Acronym

Name (and English translation)

AGAB

Aktionsgemeinschaft arbeitsloser Bürgerinnen und Bürger e.V. (Action Group of Unemployed, Bremen) Arbeiterwohlfahrt (Worker’s Organization) Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (Federal Labor Office) Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft Erbwerbslose (Federal Committee of Independent Initiatives of Unemployed) Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände (Confederation of German Employers’ Associations) Bundesverband der deutschen Industrie (Federation of German Industries) Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit (Federal Ministry of Economics and Labor) Arbeitsamt Bremen (Job Centre Bremen) Bremer Arbeit (Bremen centre for supervision of projects for unemployed and distribution of funds) Senator für Arbeit, Frauen, Gesundheit, Jugend und Soziales, Bremen (Senator for Labor, Women, Health, Youth and Social Welfare, Bremen)

AWO BA BAG-E BDA BDI BMWA

(continued)



Appendix A: Continued

Appendix B: Acronym

Continued Name (and English translation)

Bundesgeschäftsstelle der CDU/CSU (Headquarters of the Christian Democratic Party) DGB Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (Federation of German Trade Unions) DV Deutscher Verein für öffentliche und private Fürsorge (German Association of Public and Private Welfare Organizations) FDP Bundesgeschäftsstelle der FDP (Headquarter of the Liberal Democratic Party) GEW Gewerkschaft Erziehung und Wissenschaft, Bremen (Union of education and research, Bremen) IAB Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (Institute for Employment Research) If o Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (Institute for Economic Research) IG Bremen Arbeitskreis Erwerbslose in der IG Metall (Unemployed working committee, Metal workers’ union, Bremen) IGM IG Metall (Metal Union) KAB Katholische Arbeitnehmer Bewegung (Catholic Workers’ Movement) KDA Kirchlicher Dienst in der Arbeitswelt, Bremen (Program of the Protestant Church against Unemployment, Bremen) KOS Koordinierungsstelle gewerkschaftlicher Arbeitslosenarbeit e.V. (Coordination of the union activities on behalf of the unemployed) Paritätischer Wohlfahrtsverband (Welfare Organization) Diakonisches Werk der EKD (Association of the Protestant Church) Kolpingwerk Deutschland (Action group of the Catholic Church) Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft Soziale Brennpunkte (Federal Committee of independent welfare initiatives) Arbeitslosenzentrum Tenever, Bremen (Information centre and meeting point for unemployed, Bremen) Arbeit und Zukunft für Bremen-Nord e.V. - Beratungszentrum für Arbeitslose, Arbeitssuchende und ihre Angehörigen (Information centre and meeting point for unemployed, Bremen) PDS Bundesgeschäftsstelle der PDS (Headquarters of the Party of Democratic Socialism) SPD Bundesgeschäftsstelle der SPD (Headquarters of the Social Democratic Party) ver.di Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft (Combined Union of the Tertiary Sector) WSI Wirtschafts- und sozialwisschaftliches Institut der Hans Böckler Stiftung (Institut for Social Research of the Hans Böckler Foundation) ZDH Zentralverband des Deutschen Handwerks (Confederation of Skilled Craft and Small Business) Bundesgeschäftsstelle Bündnis 90/ Die Grünen (Headquarters of the Green Party) Arbeitskreis für Arbeitslose im DGB Kreis Bremen (Working Committee for Unemployed Unionists, Bremen)



CDU/CSU

Acronym


ADC Basel ADC GE

Arbeitslosenkomitee beider Basel (Unemployed association Basel) Association de défense des chômeurs Genève (Unemployed association Geneva) Association de défense des chômeurs, La Chaux-de-Fonds (Unemployed association La Chaux-de-Fonds) Association des demandeurs d’emploi Lausanne (Unemployed association Lausanne) Observatoire du marché de travail de la Suisse orientale, Argovie et Zoug (Observatory of the labor market, German part of Switzerland) Association des Organisation des Mesures du marche du travail en Suisse (Association of providers of active labor market measures) Association romande et tessinoise des institutions d’action sociale (Association of social aid institutions, French and Italian part of Switzerland) Association des offices suisses du travail (Association of the work offices in Switzerland) Centre de Bilan, Genève (Professional competences assessment center, Geneva) Conférence des directrices et directeurs cantonaux des affaires sociales (Conference of the directors of social affairs) Communauté genevoise d’action syndicale (Community of Geneva trade unions) Conférence Suisse des Institutions d’Action Sociale (Swiss Conference of Social Aid Institutions) Centre social protestant, Genève (Protestant social center) Département de l’action Sociale et de la santé du canton de Genève (Department for social affairs and health of Geneva) Département de l’économie, de l’emploi et des affaires extérieures GE (Department for economic, work and foreign affairs of Geneva) Fédération des travailleurs de la métallurgie et de l’horlogerie (Federation of metal and clock making workers). Office cantonal de l’emploi GE (Regional Labor Office, Geneva) Office de l’Orientation et de la Formation Professionnelle (Office for professional training, Geneva) L’Orangerie, Genève (L’Orangerie, Geneva) Oeuvre Suisse d’Entraide Ouvrière (Swiss workers relief organization) Parti Démocrate-Chrétien Suisse (Christian Democratic Party of Switzerland) Parti du Travail Genève (Labor Party of Geneva) Parti radical-démocratique Suisse (Liberal Democratic Party of Switzerland) Parti radical-démocratique Genève (Liberal Democratic Party of Geneva) Parti socialiste Genève (Social-Democrat Party of Geneva)

ADC NE ADE VD AMOSA

AOMAS ARTIAS

AOST Cebig CDAS CGAS CISAS CSP DASS DEEAE

FTMH OCE OOFP Orangerie OSEO PDC PdT PRD PRD GE PS GE

(continued)



Appendix C: List of actors in Switzerland

Continued

Acronym


PSS Réalise Stellennetz SECO

Parti socialiste Suisse (Swiss Social-Democrat Party ) Association réalise, Genève (Association Realize, Geneva) Berner Stellennetz (Jobnetwork Bern) Secrétariat d’Etat à l’économie (State Secretariat for Economic Affairs) Syndicat de l’Industrie et du Bâtiment (Trade Union for Industries and Construction) Surprise Strassenmagazin (Street magazine Surprise) Maison du Trialogue, Genève (House of the Trialogue, Geneva) Caritas (Caritas) Hospice général RMCAS, Genève (Social Aid and Minimal Income Services, Geneva) Croix-Rouge genevoise (Red Cross Geneva) Union des associations patronales genevoises (Union of employers’ association of Geneva) Union démocratique du centre (Switzerland’s People’s Party) Union patronale Suisse (Swiss employers’ association ) Union Suisse des Arts et Métiers (Swiss industry union) Union Syndicale Suisse (Swiss Labor Union) Solidarités Genève (Solidarity Party of Geneva) Economiesuisse (Swiss Economy)

SIB Surprise Trialogue

UAPG UDC UPS USAM USS

Appendix D: Standard deviations for density tables Table A British cooperation network: Standard deviation of average density for each block

Policy Actors Civil Society Actors Unemployed Organizations

Policy Actors

Civil Society Actors


0.5 0.4644 0.457

0.3552 0.4247 0.2511

0.2921 0.3019 0.2434

Table B German cooperation network: Standard deviation of average density for each block


Policy Actors



0.4899 0.4313 0.4395

0.3599 0.4893 0.4297

0.3631 0.385 0.4588



Appendix C:



Policy Actors



0.4949 0.3307 0.2886

0.3307 0.3969 0.2724

0.3108 0.2554 0.3684

Notes This chapter is reprinted from a previous publication (Cinalli and Füglister 2008) and adapted for the present book. 1. For a complete list of actors in the three countries see appendixes A, B, and C 2. For an introduction to network analysis, see Scott (2000); for a detailed treatment, see Wasserman and Faust (1994). 3. See the UNEMPOL website at http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/eurpolcom/unempol, accessed on August 9, 2010. 4. Throughout the research, it was often difficult to operate a clear-cut distinction between pro-beneficiary action of organizations that mobilize on behalf of the unemployed on the one hand, and collective action of the unemployed themselves on the other hand. Hence, the expression “mobilization of the unemployed” refers here to various collective actions that are sustained by: (a) groups of unemployed people; and (b) pro-beneficiary organizations whose main raison d’être is to mobilize on behalf of the unemployed, even if the unemployed themselves are scarce among their members and supporters. 5. The synthetic expression of “culture” is used here to refer to a federation of different perspectives focusing on a “new” system of values (Offe 1985; Touraine 1981; Melucci 1989), and processes of interpretation (Benford and Snow 2000; Gamson 1992; Snow et al. 1986). 6. For detailed findings, see the UNEMPOL research project, cf. footnote 2. 7. The term “Monday Demonstrations” refers to the famous mass rallies of 1989 in East Germany, which were regularly organized on Mondays to demand more freedoms and rights. Obviously, the symbolic reference that the unemployed have made to the past demonstrations against the undemocratic regime of the East has increased the force, meaning, and impact of their mobilizations, showing their full disaffection with government and its “authoritarian” reforms. These mass rallies have gained full visibility in the media, not only in Germany. See the article “It’s Those People, All Over Again” in The Economist, August 12, 2004. 8. Standard deviations are evenly spread among the subgroups. See the standard deviations for each density table in Appendix D. 9. These measures are computed on matrices that also include “isolates.” In Germany, the only isolate in the field is a policy actor, thus decreasing the average value for all policy actors. By contrast, in the British field all isolates are unemployed organizations.



Table C Swiss cooperation network: Standard deviation of average density for each block





Part II

Actors and Dynamics





A Precarious Balance of Interests: Unions and the Unemployed in Europe Annulla Linders and Marina Kalander

This chapter addresses the unions’ responses to the European unemployment crisis in the 1990s, with a specific focus on the relationship between unions and the unemployed. In most nations the unions were actively involved in the efforts to weather the crisis; they lobbied policy makers and parties, they sought to influence public opinion, and they worked directly with the unemployed, both in terms of service provision and political action, and in some cases they provided organizational vehicles for the mobilization of the unemployed as independent actors. But the intensity and scope of such collaborative efforts varied considerably during the crisis years, both across and within the nations. Considering what we know about the relationship between unions and the unemployed, such variations are not altogether surprising. That is, empirical studies reveal a diverse set of relationships between unions and the unemployed, ranging from close collaborations to open hostility. However, the conditions under which such varied relationships take shape and develop are as of yet underspecified, as are the processes whereby unions and/or the unemployed negotiate interests and arrive at particular strategic positions vis-à-vis each other. Using data from six European nations, we undertake a systematic examination of how the unions responded to the unemployment crisis especially pertaining to actions taken on behalf of the unemployed. Based on the findings generated from the study we conclude that the unions, generally speaking, appear in every nation as fairly persistent supporters of the unemployed, at least rhetorically, and also as political mediators of sorts for the interests and concerns of the unemployed. This is especially so in comparison with other actors with a stake in the unemployment crisis who, as a whole, are less likely to align themselves with the unemployed or to represent their interests. In light of the 97



4

A Precarious Balance of Interests

extensive variation across the nations, however, it is readily evident that the context in which the unions make decisions about which issues to pursue and which strategies to employ matters for how they respond to the unemployment crisis. But this context, as the findings demonstrate, is identical to neither the political-institutional characteristics of the welfare state nor the organizational environment of unions. We are not suggesting that such institutional and organizational characteristics are not important—they clearly are, as the data demonstrate—but rather that the influences they exert point in multiple directions, thus complicating our ability to identify coherent patterns (Crouch 2001, Molina 2006; Ross and Martin 1999b). Hence we conclude that the unions’ approaches to both unemployment and the unemployed, at least under the high-unemployment conditions examined here, were more dynamic and open-ended than might have been expected considering the institutionalization of the labor movement. This is so, we suggest, for five different reasons. First, the institutional environment itself was destabilized by the challenges brought about by the unemployment crisis; second, and related, the unions in all nations, albeit in somewhat different ways, were struggling against dwindling membership and organizational fragmentation; third, the dual role of unions as both established organizations/interest groups (reinforcing stability) and social movements (promoting protest and opposition) pushed their strategic responses in different directions at different times and in different places; fourth, the unemployed themselves were not simply recipients of union action but also instigators in their own right, thus in different ways and at different times forcing unions to respond to their actions and initiatives; and finally, throughout the period, the unions as well as other actors negotiated interests and developed strategies in a highly contested and shifting public arena, which means that the potential divergence and convergence of interests between the unions and the unemployed cannot be derived a priori from the institutional and organizational positions they occupy but instead must be examined over time, on a case-by-case basis. In what follows we first review the pertinent literature on the relationship between unions and the unemployed; this review focuses especially on the ability and/or willingness of unions to mobilize resources on behalf of the unemployed. We then introduce the present study, which draws on data collected on union claim making in the different nations, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. The three-part analysis addresses, first, the relationship between the unions and the unemployed in relation to other actors; the effort here is to



98

determine the extent to which the unions, taken as a whole, emerge as an ally of the unemployed. On the basis of the findings, we conclude that the unions do appear as fairly persistent supporters of the unemployed, but the extensive variations across the nations make it clear that the unions’ responses to the unemployment crisis were far from uniform. The second part of the analysis addresses theses variations in union action and seeks to understand the extent to which the different claim making patterns are linked to the institutional constraints and opportunities provided by the different contexts in which unions operate. Despite the fairly clear differences among the nations regarding both the organization of union movement and the larger industrial relations complex the findings from this analysis were surprisingly weak. Therefore, in the third part we seek to understand the varied and shifting findings by focusing on the more specific environments of concerns and constraints that influenced union claim making in each nation. These brief nation snapshots are far from conclusive, but nonetheless provide an analytical guide for how to understand the extensive variations in union claim making that the comparative data reveal.

Mobilizing against unemployment: Together or apart? There can be no doubt that, historically speaking, unions at various times have served as buffers against the hardships associated with unemployment, have extended organizational resources to the unemployed (Gamson and Schmeidler 1984; Valocchi 1990), and, from a political perspective, have enabled the working class not only to temper employer oppression (Meidner 1997; Ross and Martin 1999a), but also to press for labor market policies that keep unemployment under control (cf. Boeri et al. 2001; Compston 1997). In so far as unions are approached as the vanguard of working class organization and the carriers of working class interests, the potential conflicts among those who are employed, precariously employed and unemployed become subordinate to all that which joins variously positioned workers into a meaningful political constituency (e.g. Korpi 1978; Tait 2005). However, the historically grounded assumption that the union movement represents the coming together of the laboring classes against the interests and conditions that place them in a situation of disadvantage, has been challenged, or at least qualified, by a number of scholars (Piven and Cloward 1977). Viewed from the perspective of the unemployed themselves, moreover, the picture of the relationship gets even more complicated and there



Annulla Linders and Marina Kalander 99


is at least some evidence to suggest that the unemployed neither benefit from, at least not in the short-term, nor always desire collaborations with unions (cf. Aronowitz 1973; Bagguley 1991; Faue 1991; Keyssar 1986; Marshall et al. 1988; Piven and Cloward 1977). This is so, research has shown, for a few different reasons. First, as formal political organizations, unions are reluctant to jeopardize their institutionally protected insider status, and hence have lost much of their original radical promise (Lorence 1996). Second, the primary task of unions is to serve and protect their working members, which means that they are not always able to extend resources to those who for various reasons are excluded from the labor market (Richards 2000). Finally, because the unions and the unemployed occupy such different positions, the interests they might share vis-à-vis powerful capitalist interests are increasingly divergent as the unions become increasingly institutionalized (Penney 2004; Richards 2000; Tait 2005). It is for reasons like these that the unemployed frequently try to mobilize on their own behalf. And yet independent mobilization is not always an option. Approached from either an organizational/political or individual/psychological vantage point, numerous studies have documented the difficulties faced by the unemployed when it comes to effective political mobilization (Bagguley 1991; Faniel 2009; Forrester and Ward 1990; Keyssar 1986; Linders and Kalander 2007; Lorence 1996; Marshall et al. 1988; Ness 1998; Richards 2002, 2009). Despite these difficulties, however, the unemployed occasionally do emerge as a highly visible political force in their own right, often in direct opposition to the unions (Baglioni 2003a; Folsom 1991). How can we account for such varied empirical findings, and what do they tell us about the prospects for productive coalition building against unemployment between unions and the unemployed? Generally speaking, studies examining the relationship between unions and the unemployed have identified two broad factors that influence the willingness and/or ability of unions to support, and act on behalf of, the unemployed. First, as numerous studies have demonstrated, the larger political and institutional context in which unions operate can facilitate or constrain their ability to act effectively, including against unemployment (e.g. Boeri et al. 2001; Clasen and Gould 1995; Compston 1997). Already before the crisis in the 1990s, the unions were fighting an uphill battle against increasingly hostile employers, industrial reorganization, and economic globalization (Ebbinghaus 2002a; Waddington 2000). In this environment, the unions’ ability to protect the working class, let alone extend support to the unemployed, was greatly impaired, even as the



100

crisis played out somewhat differently in different nations (Waddington 2000). Moreover, studies suggest that the political environment in which unions operate is more or less conducive to their claims, both in terms of the relatively stable institutional arrangements that govern unemployment policy on the one hand (Esping-Andersen 1990; Gallie and Paugam 2000; Therborn 1986; Wood 2001) and industrial relations on the other hand (Crouch 2001; Molina 2006), and the shifting ideological context surrounding party politics (Compston 1995a, 1995b; Western 1995; Wood 2001). Hence, although findings are far from consistent across studies, it is reasonable to assume that the ability of unions to impact unemployment policy generally, and the political response to the unemployment crisis more specifically, was shaped at least in part by institutional-level factors not immediately under their control. Exactly how such factors might influence union claim making during the unemployment crisis is not altogether clear, however. Second, studies focusing more specifically on the structure and organization of the union movement have shown that the ability of unions to mobilize against unemployment and/or on behalf of the unemployed is linked to their access to, and involvement in, labor market institutions and the policy-making apparatus (Wallerstein, Golden and Lange 1997; Western 1995). For example, the organization of collective bargaining, union access to the workplace, and union control of unemployment insurance all matter for the general ability of unions to both exert influence and resist pressure. Moreover, a range of organizational features, including membership, autonomy, centralization, and organizational stability and fragmentation influence the positioning of unions vis-àvis the unemployed (Calmfors et al. 2001; Minchin 1997; Ness 1998). In general, then, the unions in different European nations entered the crisis from very different vantage points, both in terms of organizational strength and political clout, thus suggesting that the unions were differently able to navigate the challenges associated with the crisis. These observations also suggest that the ways in which the unions responded to the unemployment crisis—in terms of strategic action, the formulation of interests, and the development of goals—were developed in response to the particular challenges faced by the union movement in different nations (Baxandall 2002; Linders and Kalander 2007; Richards 2002; Rose 1992; Sewell 1980). And yet it is far from easy to predict how union structure influences their response to the unemployment crisis. In other words, given such varied findings the analytical challenges involved in a comparison of union responses to the unemployment crisis in six different nations are





far from negligible. The European unions entered the unemployment crisis in the 1990s from very different positions (in terms of strength, resources, clout, organizational structure, etc.); the crisis itself took different forms in different nations (in terms of the magnitude of unemployment, the rate of change over time, the particular groups most vulnerable to unemployment, etc.); the policy field varied extensively across nations, as did the particular shape of the industrial relations complex, even as the European Union was increasingly pushing for a more uniform labor market approach in its member states; finally, the relationships between unions and the unemployed were quite varied across nations, in both organizational (e.g. unemployed union membership, unemployed insurance) and historical terms (the trajectory of past relationships and practices). Taken together, these observations suggest that neither the magnitude of the crisis nor the objective consequences of economic restructuring determined how the unions responded to the unemployment crisis; rather, it was a combination of opportunities (both organizational and political), past practices, and interactions with other actors, including the unemployed, that guided the unions along the way. The present study, which compares union claim making around unemployment in six different nations, is a first attempt to address these issues systematically. As such, it can obviously not address all these issues simultaneously, but it can provide some initial comparative findings that, in turn, can inform future studies.

Methodology The analysis presented here is based on the claims data derived from newspapers and focuses on the extent, organization, and character of union mobilization against unemployment in the six nations. More specifically, we base the analysis on a set of variables that designate (1) the actors implicated in claims, either directly as claim makers or indirectly as objects and targets; (2) the forms of claims (e.g. press release, petition campaign, demonstration); and (3) the contents of claims (the issues of claims, the framing of the problem of unemployment). These three sets of variables, in different ways, capture how the unions situated themselves in relation to the unemployed. The actor variables not only provide an overview of the participation of different collective actors in the public debate (including unions and the unemployed), but also contain information about the objects of claims (on whose behalf actors make claims: workers, the precariously employed, and/or various unemployed groups), the targets of claims (who are called upon



102

to do something), and actors singled out for criticism. The form variable details the kinds of activities that different claim makers engage in, ranging from behind-the-scene lobbying to violent street protests, and hence provides insights into the unions’ ability and/or willingness to expend various resources on workers and the unemployed respectively. Finally the variables tapping into the substantive concerns of claim makers (issues and frames) provide opportunities to compare and contrast the concerns and understandings of unions and the unemployed. More specifically, the issue variable captures the substantive content of claims and was coded with the help of some 80 items organized into the following three distinct categories: socioeconomic issues, social welfare issues, and issues addressing individual insertion into the labor market. Frames refer to the meanings and understandings that guide the substantive concerns of actors, and were coded in terms of both diagnostic (claims about the causes of unemployment) and prognostic (claims about the solution to the unemployment problem) statements. For each set of variables,1 we analyze, first, unions in relation to other actors; this analysis has bearings on the question of the extent to which unions take political action on behalf of the unemployed in ways that align them with the unemployed, especially vis-à-vis other stakeholders. Using the object of claims, moreover, we compare union claims across different working class groups in an effort to determine whether, and if so how, the unions use different claim-making strategies on behalf of the unemployed than on behalf of their working members/constituents. This first set of analyses, in other words, combines union claim making in all six nations and compares it to other actors in an effort to evaluate theories that approach unions as the vanguard of working class interests. Second, we examine variations in union claim making across the six nations in order to understand how the larger institutional context, and the position of unions therein, impact upon how the unions situate themselves in relation to the unemployed in terms of political action. This set of analyses addresses theories that view union activity in relation to the constraints and opportunities provided by the unions’ positions in the larger sociopolitical environment. Finally, we examine variations in union action within each nation in an attempt to capture how unions respond to the unfolding of the unemployment crisis and how they adjust their actions in relation to the activities of other stakeholders (e.g. legislative decisions; unemployed mobilization) as well as critical events (e.g. a factory closing). This final set of analyses, given the limitations of the data, is more tentative than definitive, but still provides important insights.




104


Unions and the unemployed in Europe, 1995–2002

The findings reported in this section provide some tentative support for theories that view unions as important allies of the unemployed. In all nations, organizations of the unemployed generate only a small portion of the claims circulating in the public debate (1.2 percent). Unions, however, are significantly more visible (17.1 percent) and, taken together, are the second most visible claim maker after the state (40.4 percent), which dominates the claim-making picture in all nations. Thus, insofar as public visibility signals an ability to influence the terms of the public debate, then the unemployed themselves occupy a distinctly disadvantageous position from which to pursue their interests, whereas the unions are much better situated. However, the unions’ advantageous claim making position obviously does not in itself constitute evidence of union support for the unemployed. On the contrary, it is quite possible that union claim making is centered on the concerns of employed as opposed to unemployed workers. A few of our findings address this question. First, in an analysis of the objects of claims, it is evident that unions divide their attention to employed and unemployed workers (Table 4.1); that is, a fairly sizeable portion of union claims (45%) are made on behalf of the unemployed. Moreover, the unions are significantly more likely than other actors, save the unemployed themselves, to place the unemployed in a positive light, thus indicating that, at least rhetorically, the unions fairly persistently side with the unemployed in the public debate (Table 4.2). Furthermore, given that unions are no more likely to place worker objects in a positive light than unemployed objects (Table 4.2), there is no cause on the basis of these findings to suggest that unions pit the unemployed against workers in the public debate. In comparison with other major actors, in other words, the claims of unions appear quite supportive—from both a strategic and interpretive perspective—of the unemployed. While the unemployed stand out as the only actor that delivers most of its claims in protest form, unions too engage in quite a bit of protest (e.g. petition campaigns, demonstrations, strikes, boycotts), and they do so almost as readily on behalf of the unemployed as on behalf of workers (Table 4.3). In comparison with other major actors, in other words, the claims of unions appear quite supportive of the unemployed. Thus, the findings give at least some credence to theories pointing to the larger socioeconomic conditions that push the interests of unions



Unions in comparison with other actors

Annulla Linders and Marina Kalander 105 Table 4.1 Summary object of unemployment claims by labor groups (%) Country of study UK Worker objects Working poor Precarious workers Workers of same company Illegal workers Other workers Workers advisory council Peak unions Branch unions Other unions Total percentage Unemployed objects Young unemployed Old-age unemployed Women unemployed Migrant unemployed Disabled unemployed Long-term unemployed Recent unemployed Social welfare recipients Unspecified unemployed Total percentage Total percentage

Switzerland France

Italy Germany Sweden

0.8 0.0 49.2

1.1 2.8 59.1

0.0 4.2 22.2

0.0 4.6 21.5

0.9 0.4 20.4

0.0 7.2 1.2

0.0 26.9 0.0

0.0 17.0 0.0

0.1 8.4 0.4

0.0 27.9 0.0

1.4 30.2 0.0

0.0 2.4 0.0

0.0 0.0 0.0 76.9

0.0 1.1 0.0 81.3

0.6 6.0 0.0 41.3

0.0 0.0 0.0 55.3

0.0 0.4 0.4 53.4

12.0 10.8 1.2 34.9

3.8

0.6

4.8

2.7

10.4

6.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.3

3.6

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.7

1.2

1.5

0.6

0.0

0.0

0.1

3.6

1.5

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.4

0.0

0.0

0.6

0.6

0.0

1.4

3.6

0.0

8.5

4.2

0.0

0.3

0.0

0.0

0.0

4.8

0.0

1.7

0.0

16.2

8.5

44.3

42.0

31.2

47.0

23.1 100

18.8 100

58.7 100

44.7 100

46.6 100

65.1 100

and the members of the working class, including the unemployed, in a similar direction (Meidner 1997; Tait 2005). However, it is also evident that the unions perform a balancing act when it comes to their representation of worker and unemployed interests. That is, even as the unions appear as fairly persistent supporters of



Object

Actor

Country of study / Object of claims UK

State actors Parties Labor Employers Unemployed Other actors Total

Switzerland

France

Italy

Germany

Sweden

U

W

U

W

U

W

U

W

U

W

U

W

0.40 0.53 0.77 0.14 —* 0.60 0.48

0.36 0.79 0.73 –0.73 —* 0.54 0.06

0.41 0.37 0.79 0.63 1.00 0.62 0.48

0.46 0.59 0.80 –0.53 —* 0.59 0.24

0.62 0.53 0.72 –0.02 0.91 0.70 0.60

0.57 0.50 0.81 0.27 —* 0.72 0.63

0.88 0.94 0.96 0.88 1.00 0.91 0.91

0.18 0.70 0.95 –0.72 —* 0.78 0.46

0.30 0.38 0.58 0.21 0.81 0.21 0.33

0.33 0.40 0.55 0.05 —* 0.20 0.25

0.37 0.34 0.56 –0.23 0.90 0.23 0.35

0.40 —* 0.59 0.50 —* 0.80 0.54

Notes: 1=positive, 0=neutral, and -1=negative. U=unemployed objects; W=worker objects * The number of claims from which the mean position is calculated is one or less



106

Table 4.2 Mean position of major claim makers toward the object of claim by country

Annulla Linders and Marina Kalander 107 Table 4.3 Form of claims by labor organizations by object of claim and by year (% figures weighted by country) Year of claims 1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

Worker objects Verbal statement Protest action Total percentage Weighted N

84.4 15.6 100 64

81.9 18.1 100 83

71.3 28.8 100 80

76.3 86.1 23.7 13.9 100 100 76 115

47.6 52.4 100 82

74.0 26.0 100 150

59.6 40.4 100 188

Unemployed objects Verbal statement Protest action Total percentage Weighted N

88.5 11.5 100 87

83.5 16.5 100 103

74.6 25.4 100 114

76.8 82.9 23.2 17.1 100 100 99 70

69.6 30.4 100 79

76.9 23.1 100 52

79.7 20.3 100 69

Note: All countries combined

the unemployed, especially in comparison with other actors, they also make clear distinctions between employed and unemployed workers, and as such reveal a potential conflict of interest between these two constituencies. Although unions refer to the unemployed and workers in equally favorable terms, as a whole they deliver fewer claims in the debate over unemployment on behalf of the unemployed than on behalf of workers (Table 4.1). Moreover, as the employment picture improves over time the unions devote an increasing proportion of their claims to workers, at the expense of the remaining and increasingly marginalized unemployed (Table 4.3). Finally, when it comes to the content of claims (issues and frames) the data reveal a fairly clear divergence between the unemployed and other actors, including unions. Three broad categories of issues capture the claim-making field of unemployment: socioeconomic issues (for example, macroeconomic development, labor market policy, job creation, state subsidies, work conditions), welfare and social benefits (for example, unemployment insurance, social assistance, non-state welfare system), and individual insertion into the labor market (for example, training, education, workfare). According to our findings, and not surprisingly, the unemployed are distinctly less likely to raise concerns around socioeconomic issues and more likely to raise concerns around issues of welfare and social benefits (especially unemployment insurance) than unions are (Table 4.4). When it comes to the distribution



Object/Form of claims

108


Table 4.4 Issue of claims by labor organizations, the unemployed, and all actors combined by country (%) Country of study UK

Switzerland

France

Italy

Germany

Sweden

Socioeconomic issues Labor Unemployed All actors

91.5 0.0 77.5

88.1 0.0 71.0

58.4 13.0 58.4

93.1 85.7 91.0

84.8 18.5 80.0

56.6 30.0 55.7

Welfare and social benefits Labor Unemployed All actors

3.8 0.0 7.5

8.0 66.7 14.9

27.1 52.2 23.3

3.2 0.0 3.3

4.0 3.7 6.8

27.7 30.0 19.9

Individual insertion Labor Unemployed All actors

1.5 0.0 12.5

1.7 16.7 11.9

10.2 0.0 11.8

2.8 7.1 4.2

9.0 0.0 10.6

10.8 30.0 19.9

Other issues Labor Unemployed All actors

3.1 0.0 2.5

2.3 16.7 2.1

4.2 34.8 6.6

0.9 7.1 1.5

2.1 77.8 2.6

4.8 10.0 4.6

Total N Labor Unemployed All actors

130 0 750

176 6 2019

166 23 790

217 14 930

699 27 3837

83 10 584

Note: Because there is only one unemployed claim maker in the British data, it has been omitted from this table

of the issues of claims, in other words, the unions look more like other actors than they do the unemployed. However, the data also reveal that the unions focus more on issues of concern to the unemployed themselves when the objects of their claims are unemployed as opposed to employed workers, thus indicating that the unions are well aware of the issues of concern to the unemployed and also that the interests of unemployed and employed workers do not always coincide (Table 4.5). A similar pattern is evident in relation to the framing of claims, both in terms of the causes of unemployment (diagnostic frames) and its solutions (prognostic frames). Frames designating the causes of unemployment



Issue category/ actor

Annulla Linders and Marina Kalander 109 Table 4.5 Issue of claims by labor organizations by object of claims and by country (%) Country of study UK Socioeconomic issues Worker objects Unemployed objects Welfare and social benefits Worker objects Unemployed objects Individual insertion Worker objects Unemployed objects Other issues Worker objects Unemployed objects Total N Worker objects Unemployed objects

Switzerland

France

Italy

Germany

Sweden

95.0 80.0

94.4 60.6

73.5 48.0

98.3 86.7

95.5 72.6

51.7 59.3

1.0 13.3

2.8 30.3

19.1 32.7

0.0 7.1

1.6 6.8

34.5 24.1

0.0 6.7

0.0 9.1

4.4 14.3

1.7 4.1

1.3 17.8

10.3 11.1

4.0 0.0

2.8 0.0

2.9 5.1

0.0 2.0

1.6 2.8

3.4 5.6

100 34

143 33

68 98

119 98

374 325

29 54

fall into five major categories, including economic/ technological causes, political/administrative causes, social/distributive causes, educational causes, and individual/psychological causes. The most significant finding here is that the unions are much more likely to frame the unemployment crisis as a result of large-scale economic/technological causes than the unemployed, but do so much less persistently in relation to unemployed objects (Table 4.6). A further analysis of diagnostic frames shows the unions almost never link the unemployment crisis to social causes (e.g. education and training, segregation, immigration) when they speak on behalf of workers, but do so more readily on behalf of the unemployed, albeit not to the same extent as the unemployed themselves (Table 4.6). The findings regarding prognostic frames—that is, how actors define solutions to the unemployment problem—are less persuasive, even



Issue category/ Object

110


Table 4.6 Diagnostic frame of claims by the unemployed and labor organizations by object of claims (% figures weighted by country) Claim makers Labor organizations

Unemployed

Worker objects Unemployed objects Economic/ technological causes Political/administrative causes Social/distributive causes Educational causes Individual/ psychological causes Other causes Total percentage Weighted N

51.8

26.1

12.4

36.6

49.4

43.0

0.0

8.2

8.3

0.0 0.0

2.9 0.0

16.8 5.6

10.5

13.2 100

5.9 100

100 322

207

46


though some differences are discernible. Generally speaking, very few actors claim that the unemployment problem can be resolved without the active intervention of the state (although employers are more likely to say so than other actors). When it comes to what kinds of interventions, however, actors do not always agree. For example, while both unions and the unemployed primarily call for political/institutional solutions (for example, change in political leadership, new rules and regulations) to the unemployment crisis, the unions are slightly less likely to do so than the unemployed, albeit more so when the objects of claims are the unemployed. Moreover, the unions are more likely than the unemployed to see solutions in economic policy, whereas the unemployed are somewhat more likely than the unions to refer to cultural solutions (Table 4.7). Taken together, the analysis of frames shows some differences, albeit quite modest ones, between unions and the unemployed when it comes to understanding what caused the unemployment crisis and how to solve it, and hence provides some tentative support for theories that point to a divergence of interests between employed and unemployed workers and, accordingly, to the strategic difficulties facing unions in times of mass unemployment (Faniel 2009; Richards 2009). While these kinds of tensions mark the actions of unions in all nations it is nevertheless the case that they take somewhat different shapes in different



Diagnostic frame

Annulla Linders and Marina Kalander 111 Table 4.7 Prognostic frame of claims by the unemployed and labor organizations by object of claims (% figures weighted by country) Claim makers Labor organizations

Unemployed

Worker objects Unemployed objects Economic/ technological solutions Political/institutional solutions Cultural/individual solutions Societal solutions External solutions Other solutions Total percentage Weighted N

19.9

18.7

6.6

66.1

71.7

78.6

0.9

0.3

9.8

9.8 0.3 3.0 100

5.6 3.1 3.1 100

4.9 0.0 0.0 100

337

325

52


nations, thus pointing to the importance of the national context for understanding variations in union action. Cross-national variation in union support of the unemployed This section provides an analysis of the variations across the six nations when it comes to union action in the field of unemployment. Even a cursory glance at our findings makes it clear that there are significant variations among the six nations with regard to union action. Thus, even though the labor movement in all six nations was adversely affected by the larger and increasingly hostile labor market context and the unions in all nations took various actions in support of not only its own members but also the unemployed and precariously employed, they did so from different positions of strength and in relation to different institutional and policy arrangements. These variations not only affected how unions acted to protect their own interests but also produced different patterns of union–unemployed relationships in the different nations. Hence the extent to which the unions use their resources to lend support to the unemployed, to their working members, or some combination thereof is linked, at least in part, to the different positions they occupy in the field of unemployment. These positions are determined by a range of factors associated with the institutionalization of union



Prognostic frame


influence, on the one hand, and the relationships unions have with their members and potential members, on the other. Exactly how these factors combine to produce union action is not altogether self-evident, however. This is so, in part at least, because labor unions occupy a hybrid position as both insiders and outsiders. As members of the industrial relations complex (together with employers and the state), unions approach insider status, but as protest organizations they take on outsider status. Hence, different factors are likely to facilitate/constrain different kinds of union action. Moreover, since different institutional arrangements guide the relationship between unions and the unemployed in the nations under consideration, unions that take action on behalf of the unemployed in some cases help their own members and in other cases extend a hand to unrepresented members of the working class. In what follows we present the findings regarding cross-national variation in union claim making and try to make sense of them in relation to the larger social context in which the unions make strategic decisions. This context includes both the organizational capacities of unions (strength, membership, position in the industrial relations complex) and the larger sociopolitical context that presumably constrains and facilitates union action in various ways. The extensive literature on unions points to the importance of organizational strength for the ability of unions both to impact policy and resist employer oppression (Boeri et al. 2001; Ebbinghaus 2002a; Fahlbeck 2002; Goetschy 1998; Locke and Baccaro 1999; Visser 2002, 2006). It is therefore reasonable to assume that union claim making around unemployment is linked in various ways to union strength. The most common measure of union strength is union density, which refers to the proportion of wage earners and salaried employees who are union members. By this measure there are huge differences across the nations, with Sweden occupying the high end and France the low end (Table 4.8). Although the unions in all six nations lost some ground during the period of the study the relative strength of each union movement remained fairly stable, thus indicating that the membership losses of the previous few decades (especially in Italy and the UK) had leveled out. Thus, if union strength matters for union mobilization around unemployment there is enough variation across nations and enough stability within nations to make a proper comparison. And yet, it is not altogether clear how union strength might influence claim making in relation to the unemployed, either in terms of content (issues, frames) or form (protest, for example). Are strong unions more supportive because they can afford to be so, or are they perhaps less



112

Annulla Linders and Marina Kalander 113 Table 4.8 Union density in six European countries, 1995–2002

Sweden Italy UK Germany Switzerland France

Year 1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

80 38 33 29 23 9

80 37 32 28 23 8

80 36 31 27 23 8

78 36 30 26 22 8

76 36 30 26 21 8

75 35 30 25 19 8

74 35 29 23 18 8

75 34 29 23 20 8

Source: Visser (2006) Notes: Other sources show an increase in union density in Sweden throughout the 1990s; for example, Boeri and his colleagues (2001) put the 1998 figure at 88. The 2002 figure for Switzerland comes from OECD (http://stats.oecd.org, accessed on August 3, 2010.)

supportive? Are weak unions less supportive because they lack resources, or more supportive because they need allies? Whichever the case, there ought to be a clearly distinguishable pattern of union claim making in Sweden in comparison with the other nations. By almost any measure the Swedish union movement represents the strong end of the spectrum (Fahlbeck 2002; Hammarström, Huzzard and Nilsson 2004; Kjellberg 1998; Mahon 1999; Thörnqvist 1999); it had the highest density rate by far of all the nations; as the only nation in our sample with a Ghent-like system, it remained (for the most part) in control of the disbursement of the unemployment insurance and hence was in a much better position to retain unemployed members; it retained a fairly stable structure of branch and peak unions organized into stable federations, even if there were signs of fragmentation; it participated in a highly developed system of collective bargaining, even as employers were pulling back toward the end of the period; and, for almost the entire period, the Swedish unions had an ally in the governing social democratic party, notwithstanding some pointed disagreements. Thus, if there is a direct and unequivocal link between union strength and mobilization against unemployment, it ought to be displayed in the Swedish case. The findings in this regard are mixed, however, and therefore provide only modest support of the notion that the unions’ response to the unemployment crisis is directly associated with organizational strength. In other words, although the data reveal fairly extensive variations in union claim making across the nations, those variations do not yield a simple pattern linked to union strength. Table 4.9 provides a heuristic overview of the variations in union claim making.



Nation

114


Table 4.9 Distribution of claims by labor organizations on a number of variables in the dataset that show fairly clear distinctions between the countries Country of study UK Labor claims as proportion of all claims Proportion unemployed objects of labor claims Proportion socioeconomic issues of labor claims Proportion social welfare issues of labor claims Proportion of labor claims that criticize the state Proportion of labor claims that criticize employers Proportion of labor claims that address the state Labor protest on behalf of workers Labor protest on behalf of the unemployed Positive position of labor claims, workers Positive position of labor claims, unemployed

Lo

Switzerland

Lo

Hi

Lo

Lo

France

Italy

Hi

Hi

Hi

Lo

Hi

Hi

Lo

Lo

Lo

Hi

Lo

Hi

Lo

Lo

Hi

Hi

Lo

Hi Hi

Sweden Lo

Hi

Hi

Lo

Germany

Hi

Lo Lo

Lo

Hi

Lo

Lo

Hi

Lo

Lo

Note: Hi = a high number of claims/incidents that is clearly distinguishable; Lo = a low number of claims/incidents that is clearly distinguishable

In some respects, the Swedish unions do seem to act in distinct ways, but in other respects they do not. Moreover, looking across the nations the unions diverge and converge in different ways across different variables (Table 4.9). For instance, the unions in Sweden (with the highest density) and France (with the lowest density) are similar in that they devote



Variable

a higher portion of their claims to the unemployed than to workers (Table 4.1). This is especially so in comparison with Switzerland and the UK, where only about 20 percent of all union claims are made on behalf of the unemployed. This finding indicates that the unemployment crisis in Switzerland and the UK was conceived by the unions as a problem intricately linked to mass layoffs, factory closings and, more generally, a reorganization of blue-collar work. Considering, furthermore, that employers play a larger role in the public debate in Switzerland and the UK (and to a lesser extent Germany) than in Sweden and France, it is reasonable to conclude that the unions in the former nations face a more hostile climate, which impacts upon their ability and/or willingness to extend significant resources to the unemployed. In Sweden and France, in contrast, the industrial conflicts pitting employers against workers are less clearly implicated in the union claims about unemployment. The unions themselves, however, are more directly inserted into union claims in France and, especially, Sweden, where about two thirds of the claims with worker objects are made on behalf of labor organizations (Table 4.1). Looking at the forms of claims, there are marked differences regarding the likelihood of unions to engage in protest activity (Table 4.10). While the unions in all nations took to the streets in response to the unemployment crisis, the two weakest union movements (by density), France and Switzerland, were significantly more likely to engage in protest activity, especially on behalf of workers. This could indicate that other options for exerting influence are less available in these nations but considering that the French unions are not nearly as weak as the membership figures indicate—that is, for France especially, union density is a poor proxy of union influence—which suggest that factors other than union strength influence the inclination for protest. Moreover, the strong Swedish unions engaged in somewhat more protest than some of Table 4.10 Proportion of claims delivered in protest form by labor organizations by object of claims and by country (%) Country of study

UK Switzerland France Italy Germany Sweden

Object of claims Worker objects

Unemployed objects

10.0 45.5 54.4 38.0 12.0 17.2

13.3 24.2 45.9 4.1 6.8 20.4





their weaker counterparts, whereas the unions in Germany and Britain, which otherwise have relatively little in common, were the least likely to engage in protest overall. A particularly noteworthy finding is that the unions in Italy and Switzerland, which otherwise protest quite a bit, were the least likely to engage in protest on behalf of the unemployed (to be further discussed below). Taken together, these findings demonstrate that protest activity is not a strategy that clearly distinguishes strong and weak unions (however defined). When it comes to the issues of claims, it is clear that socioeconomic issues dominate the debate in all nations and in relation to all actors, albeit less clearly so for the unemployed themselves, who are more likely than other actors to pursue social welfare issues, except in Germany and Italy (Table 4.3). Here, the French and Swedish unions are somewhat more likely to pursue social welfare issues and somewhat less likely to pursue larger socioeconomic issues than their counterparts in the other nations (Table 4.3), which could indicate that the Swedish and French unions are more likely to support issues of concern to the unemployed than unions in other nations, especially in Switzerland, where the difference between unions and the unemployed is particularly stark when it comes to social welfare issues. But this conclusion is less persuasive when examined in relation to the objects of claims (Table 4.5); for example, in Sweden the unions are more likely to pursue social welfare issues in relation to workers than the unemployed, whereas the Swiss unions make a clear distinction between workers and the unemployed in such a way that they are considerably more likely to engage issues of concern for the unemployed when the unemployed are the objects of their claims. A final set of analyses refer to the unions’ engagement with other actors in the public debate. Most claims, either directly or indirectly, have an addressee, or a target, that is implicated in the claim. The two main targets in union claims, in all nations, are state actors and employers, but the distribution of claims across these targets varies quite a bit from nation to nation (Table 4.11). Moreover, the distribution within nations varies according to the object of claims. Generally speaking, and not surprisingly, unions (except in Switzerland) are more likely to target employers when they make claims on behalf of workers, and state actors when they make claims on behalf of the unemployed, but the tendencies to do so are quite variable. A very small portion of claims by Swedish unions target employers whereas in most other nations half or more of union claims address employers. Looking at actors that are criticized in union claims reveals a similar but, due to fewer data points, more tentative conclusion (Table 4.12). Again,



116

Annulla Linders and Marina Kalander 117 Table 4.11 Main actors addressed in claims by labor organizations by country and by object of claims (%) Object of claims Worker objects

Unemployed objects

UK State actors Employers Other addressees Total N

48.8 42.5 8.9 80

86.4 9.1 4.5 22

Switzerland State actors Employers Other addressees Total N

49.2 34.4 16.3 61

30.0 60.0 10.0 10

France State actors Employers Other addressees Total N

51.6 46.9 1.6 64

77.0 14.9 8.0 87

Italy State actors Employers Other addressees Total N

46.4 53.6 0.0 69

91.2 2.9 5.8 34

Germany State actors Employers Other addressees Total N

30.2 64.0 5.9 86

55.3 36.9 7.7 103

Sweden State actors Employers Other addressees Total N

75.0 10.7 14.3 28

87.8 8.2 4.0 49

state actors and employers are the two actors most likely to be criticized in union claims, and again unions (except in Sweden) are more likely to criticize state actors when they make claims on behalf of the unemployed, and more likely to criticize employers when workers are the objects of claims. Taken together, these varied findings clearly demonstrate that there are differences in union claim making across the six nations, but they do not add up to a particularly coherent picture in terms of the impact of union strength. This is so, we suspect, not because union strength (however



Country of study/Addressee

118


Table 4.12 Main actors criticized in claims by labor organizations by country and by object of claims (%) The object of claims Worker objects

Unemployed objects

UK State actors Employers Other criticized actors Total N

38.1 52.4 9.5 63

94.4 5.6 0.0 18

Switzerland State actors Employers Other criticized actors Total N

48.6 (18) 48.6 (18) 2.7 37

25.0 75.0 0.0 4

France State actors Employers Other criticized actors Total N

37.7 62.3 0.0 61

70.8 23.6 5.6 89

Italy State actors Employers Other criticized actors Total N

50.0 47.2 2.8 72

84.4 0.0 12.6 32

Germany State actors Employers Other criticized actors Total N

26.5 68.4 5.1 155

53.3 40.0 6.7 105

Sweden State actors Employers Other criticized actors Total N

84.2 10.5 5.3 19

85.3 11.8 2.9 34

measured) does not matter for union claim making, but instead because unions make strategic decisions in relation to the larger sociopolitical context, which varies across the nations. Another possible explanation for cross-national variation in union claim making, in other words, is that union action is constrained by some aspects of the larger political landscape that are not clearly implicated in the structural and organizational arrangements that produce variations in union strength. The literature on the welfare state, for example, has demonstrated how different



Country of study/Criticized actor

political conceptions of the welfare state have wide-ranging affects on the formation and implementation of policies (Esping-Andersen 1990; Gallie and Paugam 2000). While employment policies do not consume the entire field of welfare policies, they occupy a central position in the distribution of resources and hence play a significant role in the state’s efforts to enhance the welfare of its citizens. However, the organization of such efforts does not follow the same trajectory in all Western societies, but instead combine to produce a few distinct welfare state regimes. These different regimes have obvious implications for how states respond to unemployment and, in turn, how the union movement situates itself in relation to state action. That is, the different regime types not only provide different institutional arrangements and opportunities but also equip potential contenders, including unions, with different sets of expectations and different interpretive ammunition for their claims. Of the nations considered in this study, Sweden represents the social democratic, or universalist, regime type (characterized by a decommodification of social rights, active state interventions in the market and, in terms of unemployment policy, good protection and broad coverage); France, Germany, and, to a lesser extent, Switzerland the corporatist, employment-centered regimes (fairly good protection but incomplete coverage); Britain the liberal regime type (characterized by a liberal ethos, limited entitlements, and a strong reliance on the market); and Italy a sub-protective regime (protection for the unemployed below subsistence levels). Just as with union strength, Sweden occupies a position at one end of a continuum. At the other end, however, France and Switzerland have been replaced by Italy and Britain. Although not developed to account for union action, the different policy environments that the regime type categories aim to capture—especially in terms of employment and welfare policies—have evident implications for unions, both in terms of the mobilization of interests and general position in the policy apparatus. It is therefore surprising that this reordering of nations in terms of the larger policy environment does not greatly enhance our ability to explain the different patterns of union claim making in the six nations. It does help account for the fact that the French unions, despite paltry membership rates, do not appear any more embattled and/or incapacitated than the unions in other nations. It also provides some insights into the distribution of issues pursued by the unions, especially the predominance of socioeconomic issues in Italy, the UK, and Switzerland and the greater proportion of social welfare issues in France and Sweden. But, taken as a whole, the findings presented here provide only limited support for the notion that the larger policy and institutional environments that, in





different combinations, characterize the six nations steered union claim making during the unemployment crisis in clearly discernible directions. Moreover, as the analysis in the next section shows, there is extensive variation in union action within each nation (measured across both time and region), thus indicating that, at least in the field of unemployment, unions (as well as other actors) operate in a more open-ended and interactive environment than is suggested by the relative stability of the institutional arrangements. This is not to suggest that institutional arrangements are unimportant for understanding union action, but instead that such arrangements are contextualized in different ways in different nations (different historical legacies, different traditions, different critical events, etc.), thus influencing unions as well as other actors in seemingly unpredictable ways. Within-nation variation in union support of the unemployed In this section we address variations in union claim making within each nation. Because the number of union claims per year in each nation is quite small, we can draw no more than tentative conclusions from these data. Moreover, since the data are derived from newspapers—which are geared towards news rather than routine activities—it is possible that some of the discernible claim-making variations across time are consequences of media practices rather than union strategy (e.g. demonstrations are more likely to receive press coverage than routine lobbying). Nonetheless, it is readily evident that, in the case of the unemployment crisis of the 1990s, the public claim-making realm was far from stable. This is so not only in terms of the distribution of claims over time but also when it comes to the form and content of claims. In order to understand such variations, alongside patterns not easily explained by either union strength or institutional arrangements (see above), it is necessary to examine union action in light of the more dynamic and interactional contexts that influenced union decisions during the unemployment crisis. Not only were the unions fighting to protect jobs and working conditions as the economic conditions worsened, but they also had to contend with a fluctuating political landscape (e.g. election campaigns, new governments, new policy initiatives) and intermittent unemployed mobilization, which demanded attention. Moreover, because the unemployment crisis was not evenly distributed across regions and groups of workers, there was also extensive, if intermittent, local mobilization around unemployment. In what follows, we briefly discuss some of the unique characteristics of the crisis in each nation in an effort to better explain the varied claim making picture that the analyses above revealed.



120

In Sweden, the unemployment crisis hit when the Conservatives were in government (1993–4), with the result that the labor movement as a whole, including both unemployed and employed workers, initially saw the problem primarily in political terms and mobilized to oust the government. Moreover, the high retention rate of unemployed members in the unions initially served to suppress the distinction—and competition— between employed and unemployed workers. Once the Social Democrats regained power, however, the unified labor front started to crack, both in term of the relationship between organized labor and the party (the government’s fumbling of the unemployment insurance was a major source of contention here), and the relationship between unions and the unemployed (the unions were not attentive enough to the unemployed) (Alm 2001; Linders and Kalander 2007). Taken together, these development help explain not only the initial strong oppositional response by the unions to the unemployment crisis and the early attempts by the unions to organize the unemployed, but also the subsequent tension that emerged between the unions and the unemployed that produced a shortlived attempt by the unemployed to organize independently (1997–8), which in turn temporarily subdued union claim making. They also help explain the relatively high portion of claims made on behalf of the unemployed in Sweden, the prominence of issues relating to welfare and social benefits (dominated by the unemployment insurance), the much greater inclination by labor organizations in Sweden to criticize the state rather than employers, and the greater tendency to frame the solution to the unemployment crisis in political rather than economic terms. The unions in Germany, France, and Switzerland, while all operating in corporatist, employment-centered environments, experienced and responded to the unemployment crisis in vastly different ways. In Germany, the response by the unions to the unemployment crisis was inextricably linked to the unification of the eastern and western parts of the country, which after its initial boost to the labor movement led to endemic tensions between the high unemployment East and the low unemployment West (Silva 1999). Moreover, both unions and employer associations lost members and fought increasing fragmentation, especially in the East, with the result that the previously well-oiled collective bargaining machinery started to crack (Jacobi et al. 1998). In addition to these challenges, the political climate grew increasingly hostile as the governing parties, including the social democrats, placed increasing pressures on the unions to make concessions. And yet the basic contours of a traditional and highly centralized system of industrial relations remained essentially intact throughout the period (Keller 2004). With





this background, the fairly modest claim-making effort made by the German unions on behalf of the unemployed and the lower inclination to engage in protest on behalf of the unemployed become more understandable, as does the tendency for German unions to single out employers for criticism. Switzerland, in contrast, entered the 1990s with the lowest record of unemployment among all the nations and, although the unemployment rate climbed rapidly, the proportion of unemployed workers remained low throughout the period (never exceeding 4 percent, but with extensive regional variation). In response, the state in 1995 revamped its approach to unemployment and, for the first time, introduced active labor market measures. Nevertheless, the crisis clearly signaled a worsened economic climate that placed considerable strain, especially from the perspective of unions, on the consensus-oriented system of industrial relations as well as the relatively newly organized system of social welfare (Fluder and Hotz-Hart 1998). Considering that the Swiss unions are much less organized than the employers, have more fragmented organizations, and have managed to secure much less coverage for collectively bargained contracts than most of their counterparts in other nations (Kriesi et al. 1995), it is not surprising that the unions, generally speaking, were ill-prepared to handle the unemployment crisis (Giugni and Berclaz 2003), and hence had more difficulties than some of their counterparts in other nations to expand their mobilization efforts from the precariously employed to the unemployed and were significantly less inclined to protest on behalf of the unemployed than the employed. Moreover, the unemployed themselves, without assistance from the unions, managed to launch a successful referendum campaign in 1997 against a proposal to cut back unemployment insurance (Berclaz, Füglister and Giugni 2010), which can account for a brief increase in the number of claims that the unions made on behalf of the unemployed following the referendum. From the perspective of union membership, France is obviously an exceptional case in many ways—the lowest union density among the OECD countries coupled with a strong and institutionally-protected bargaining position—but also stands as a caution against the assumption that the ability of unions to impact either policy or the terms of the public debate is directly related to their density (Daley 1999). Nevertheless, alongside membership decline, the French unions are plagued with weakened organizations and high levels of inter-union competition (Daley 1999). Moreover, the unemployment crisis in France started earlier and was more severe than in most other Western European nations, thus putting additional pressures on the unions. Add to this the election



122

of a conservative government in 1995, and the picture looks gloomy indeed. Despite this dismal beginning, however, the employment picture subsequently improved somewhat and the unions remained in a fairly strong position to bargain collectively and to influence public policy (Goetschy 1998). This position, however, is more a result of active state intervention in industrial relations than of the organizational capacity of the unions. In fact, from a historical perspective, the French labor movement has been more intent on retaining its radical edge than on building stable organizations (Goetschy and Jobert 2004). That radical edge was frequently put to work throughout the period of study, both on behalf of workers and the unemployed. Meanwhile, the unemployed themselves were more active and protest-prone in France than in any of the other nations, often joining forces with the unions in their protest actions, including at the European level. It is for some of these reasons that the French unions devote a substantial number of claims to unemployed objects, are particularly prone to protest, and focus considerably more on issues of social welfare than their counterparts in other nations, except Sweden, albeit for different reasons, as already discussed. In the UK, with a traditionally strong and feisty labor movement, the unions had been hit hard by, and never quite recovered from, the combination of the economic downturn and a hostile political environment during the 1980s (Howell 1999). In the 1990s, in the context of weakened unions, stronger employers, and an eroded system of collective bargaining, but also a slowly improving employment picture, the unions turned their energies toward protecting their increasingly precarious position at individual workplaces (Edwards et al. 1998; Marchington, Goodman and Berridge 2004). Moreover, the experiences during the 1980s had demonstrated that the unions’ capacity to mobilize the unemployed at a scale large enough to improve their collective standing was severely limited by the new labor market environment (Bagguley 1991). And yet with the entry of a New Labour government in 1997 the policy environment in the field of unemployment changed in the direction of more programs and benefits and, possibly, a greater responsiveness to the hardships of unemployment. With this background, the seeming acquiescence of the British unions in terms of protest, as well as their preoccupation with socioeconomic issues, becomes understandable as a set of responses intricately linked to a more hostile environment in which both employers and the state work actively against the unions. Moreover, the general trend over time in union claim making signals a reorientation of the unions as the employment picture improved away from the unemployed and toward the precariously employed.





Italy presents yet another picture of how the unions responded to the unemployment crisis. In the early 1990s, the unemployment rate in Italy was among the highest in Western Europe, and both the industrial relations complex and the organized labor movement were characterized by volatility, conflict, and fragmentation (Negrelli and Sheldon 2004; Regalia and Regini 1998). In the 1990s, however, after a severe slump the previous decade, the Italian unions reemerged with renewed strength and energy; the membership decline was halted, union conflicts reduced, and the unions once again engaged in collective bargaining and took part in economic policy negotiations (Locke and Baccaro 1999). Moreover, in part because the rights and responsibilities of both unions and employer associations are less regulated in Italy than elsewhere, employers were less inclined than in other nations to try to erode union influence at the policy level, which contributed to a localization of not only industrial conflicts (Regalia and Regini 1998), but also protest alliances (Baglioni 2003b). The localization of conflict in Italy could, in part at least, have suppressed press coverage of union protest with or on behalf of the unemployed, thus explaining why the Italian unions appear significantly less inclined to protest on behalf of the unemployed in the claim making data. The period under study was far from stable, however; the already high unemployment rate kept going up until about 2000, and the conditions were particularly dire in the South. In 2001 the Conservatives won the election and immediately started to erode union influence. Meanwhile, the massive lay-offs in the car industry prompted lots of protest actions, especially by the affected workers but also by unions and other allies. These developments help account for the preoccupation by unions with socioeconomic issues (few benefits going into the crisis, so not much to defend) and the fairly extensive protest activity on behalf of workers, especially after 2000.

Conclusion Generally speaking, while all the nations in the study experienced an unemployment crisis during the period considered here and while the unions in all nations took an active role in the efforts to solve the crisis, the unions’ responses to the crisis—in terms of issues discussed, framing of issues, policies proposed, and protest mobilization—nevertheless varied extensively across the nations. Thus, despite the evidence that at least some of the dynamics in the relationship between unions and the unemployed can be understood in terms of the historical role of unions as the organizational center of the working class, it is also clear



124

that each nation provides a distinct context for stakeholders trying to influence the debate and/or policy direction. This context, as we have tried to demonstrate, has several different components that, in different configurations, influence different aspects of the unions’ claim making around unemployment. Some of these components are tied to the larger institutional arrangements that characterize the different nations, even if the evidence here is not very strong. Other components are more directly linked to the particular arrangements that constitute each nation’s approach to unemployment and hence have more immediate relevance for the question about the links between union and unemployed interests. More specifically, different models of social welfare in conjunction with different institutional arrangements to deal with unemployment impact not only upon the definitions and boundaries around differently situated groups, and thus their ability to find common ground, but also the kinds of expectations and experiences that different actors bring to this policy field. But, again, the evidence is too varied and unstable to clearly distinguish the unions in the different nations in these regards. The findings also provide only weak evidence that the strength and/or the institutional position of unions directly influence their position toward the unemployed and their ability and/ or willingness to mobilize on behalf of the unemployed. Taken together, then, the findings are too mixed to provide unequivocal support of any one theoretical tradition and also yield numerous variations that are not readily accounted for in the examination of the more stable context variations. Rather than taking these findings as evidence that the larger context in which unions operate is unimportant for understanding union action, we conclude instead that the contextual influences, at least during the unemployment crisis, were multidirectional and hence produced more open-ended union action than we had initially anticipated. This is so for several different reasons: the institutional environment itself, especially the industrial relations complex, was destabilized during the crisis; employers saw new opportunities to influence employment policy; state and party actors were put on the defensive by the conflicts on the labor market; and the unions were struggling to sustain membership and prevent fragmentation. The crisis also brought into being a new collective actor—the unemployed—that in various ways challenged the position of unions as the most significant organizational expression of working class interests. What are the implications of this study for our understanding of the precarious balance of interests between unions and the unemployed?





Most importantly, while the data provide strong support for the marginalization of the unemployed in the public debate, they do not support a conclusion that the interests of the unions and the unemployed are therefore necessarily divergent (or convergent for that matter). On the contrary, the union movement appears as a fairly steadfast supporter of the unemployed in every nation. But it is also readily evident that the more particular challenges and struggles that the unions were faced with in their respective nations influenced their ability, and in some cases their inclination, to expend resources on the mobilization against unemployment, especially as it pertained to the unemployed themselves.

Note 1. Most analyses in this chapter are based on data that are weighted to correct for the biases that the different number of claims in each nation would otherwise introduce. The weights do not affect within-nation distributions of claims, only the number of claims on which the distributions are based.



126

The Role of Civil Society Actors in the Contentious Politics of Unemployment Simone Baglioni

Introduction In the early 2000s, an Italian priest organized a hunger strike to protest against the dismissals of a factory in Ivrea, Northern Italy; in the same period, some thousands kilometers away, in the UK, the Archbishop of Canterbury called on the British government for a tougher action against unemployment. Contemporarily, in France, a group of activists organized the so-called requisitions d’emplois (jobs kidnappings), and in Switzerland groups of organized citizens protested against job reduction at the post office. These are examples of how various organizations and institutions of the European society can intervene with diverse types of actions and frames in the contentious politics of unemployment that is, “the relationships between political institutional approaches to employment policy and political conflicts mobilized by collective actors over unemployment in the public domain” (Giugni 2008a: 249). But beyond these examples, what is the contribution that civil society actors give to the public debate about unemployment? How does civil society intervene in claim making and how different are such interventions across European countries? Which contextual (institutional-political) dimensions affect such a debate, and how do they do so? These are the questions this chapter addresses. The focus on the public discourse of civil society actors filtered by the media reflects an interest in the discursive interactions between societal actors and their social, economic and political environments. Despite the fact that unemployment has been, and still is, a major policy issue and a never ending societal worry, analyses about the contentious politics of unemployment focused on civil society actors are rare. Scholars have focused on the traditional participants to the “tripartite-style” 127



5

The Role of Civil Society

policy making (employers organizations, unions and the state) or on the unemployed organizations themselves (Demazière and Pignoni 1998; Maurer 2001; Baglioni et al. 2008a; 2008b; Chabanet 2008). But, even in countries where the “iron triangle” made of employers, workers and governmental representatives monopolizes unemployment policy and policy debates, civil society organizations may have something to say (or to do) about unemployment. By civil society organizations we here refer to not-for-profit societal organizations that are out of the control of the state and that are voluntarily joined by people. Such a broad definition of civil society allows us to include in claim making a vast set of actors who publicly intervened in the policy field of unemployment, a set of actors ranging from local and informal grassroots associations to more organized social movements’ organizations and branches of religious organizations. This chapter aims to present a contextual analysis of civil society claims. It first discusses how contextual aspects are considered by the literature as relevant predictors of civil society action. It then presents an overview of the different types of societal organizations making claims on unemployment across the six countries of the study this book is based on. The chapter continues by analyzing the diverse range of actions organizations can use to make claims, and how such repertoire varies across countries. The analysis then shifts to the content of the claims, including an overview of the actors that are claims objects and addressees. Finally, in the concluding remarks, the chapter summarizes how societal actors intervene in such an important policy debate according to the context they are embedded in.

Civil society and contextual opportunities in unemployed politics Societal actors are important in the claim-making analysis for several reasons, especially in the field of unemployment. Firstly, together with unemployed organizations, other types of civil society organizations represent the “society,” that is, the “other public voice” in contrast with institutional actors such as state representatives, employers’ organizations or trade unions. Civil society actors are very often important allies of unemployed organizations in claim making. As argued by recent as well as by the classical literature on the unemployed movement, organizations with low resources need to rely on a robust network of societal allies to have their voices heard in the public domain (Baglioni et al. 2008a; 2008b; Chabanet 2008; della Porta 2008a).



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Secondly, in many countries civil society organizations play a key role in (un)employment policy implementation and, in some countries, also in policy making in this field. An evidence of this is the increased portion of public funding that in the past couple of decades has been allocated to civil society organizations for their implementing role in social policies, but also by the growing importance of third sector organizations in social policy making even at the European level (for an overview see Kendall 2009; Evers and Zimmer 2010). Thirdly, it is worth considering claim making of civil society organizations also because they fulfill a relevant role of “inclusion” of unemployed in the rest of the society. The social and political inclusion of unemployed depends, among other factors, on the capacity of civil society actors to involve in their activities people at risk of exclusion like unemployed or persons with fewer opportunities. In fact, through participation in such organizations, people may develop what has been called “social capital”: the capital residing in human relationships, in civil society associations where people start generating “the habits of cooperation, solidarity, and public spiritedness” (Putnam 1993: 89–90; see also Lin 2001; Warren 2001). Therefore, civil society organizations offer opportunities that increase social connections and counteract feelings of social isolation, stimulate the development of democratic competencies and inculcate civic and moral virtues in members. In short, and in common parlance, participation in groups produces social capital. (Maloney and Rossteutscher 2007: 6, emphasis added). Moreover, networks of civil society organizations generate social cohesion by embedding citizens in their communities and empowering them via political or social participation. Hence, studying civil society claims also allows a more in-depth understanding of how inclusive or exclusive a public debate is with regard to specific subjects, as, in our case, active citizens and individuals interested by unemployment. However, since the path opening work of Alexis de Tocqueville on democracy in America (1961 [1835–40]), civil society scholars have elaborated various theories, supported by copious evidence, stressing the importance of contextualizing civil society action. Scholars have argued that, in particular, the different political-institutional configurations of the state have an impact on civil society formation and action (Birnbaum 1988; Kitschelt 1986; Gamson and Meyer 1996; Kriesi 1996; Skocpol and Fiorina 1999). Studies have shown that ‘strong’ centralized



Simone Baglioni


states are likely accompanied by ‘weak’ societal actors, dominated by the state, whereas decentralized or ‘weak’ states will tend to develop a more active and autonomous civil society (Schofer and FourcandeGourinchas 2001; Kriesi and Baglioni 2003). Other analyses have further investigated the multiple opportunities that states have to influence civil society by adopting ad hoc policies that can either impede or develop societal infrastructures (Skocpol et al. 2000; Warren 2001). Furthermore, scholars have also argued that specific state structures and decision-making models are favorable to civil society: for example, participatory democracies promote the development of civic involvement and civil society more than representative democracies do (Wernli 1998; Baglioni 2007; Zittel and Fuchs 2007). The former, in fact, request a constant and frequent engagement of its citizens about collective issues, an engagement that increase citizens’ political awareness as well as their capacity to join groups and organizations. Considering this literature about contexts and civil society, while analyzing the public discourse of civil society actors about a specific policy (unemployment), it is important to focus on some aspects of the context that more than others affect the policy process and the policy discourse. First of all, we should consider the type of policy system. As we know from previous studies, not all policy systems allow the same space to civil society actors in policy making and in policy debates. Some are more open to societal organizations, others are less permeable and allow only a few actors to enter the political arena and the public sphere. If we use the classical model of policy system opposing pluralist societies to corporatist ones we may find different outcomes in terms of civil society capacity to intervene publicly on the topic of unemployment. In particular, we can expect that a pluralist policy-making context where multiple actors and interests aim at influencing a permeable and malleable government (Dahl 1961; Polsby 1963; Lindblom 1977) will likely encourage the participation of a broader spectrum of associational types. On the contrary, we can assume that in a more corporatist policy-making system (Schmitter 1977) where only the few traditionally recognized organizations (unions and employers associations) are called to take part to labor policy making, the other types of societal actors will be relegated to a residual position. If the previous characters of the political-institutional context have been introduced as relevant indicators for predicting a certain degree of involvement of civil society actors in claim making over unemployment, further aspects of the context may affect other dimensions of civil society. For example, as we know from previous studies, civil



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society tends to replicate the formal structure of its state. Federal states will encourage the formation of civil society organized on local chapters of a single multilayered organization, whereas centralized states will promote the creation of centralized, hierarchical societal organizations (Skocpol et al. 2000; Kriesi and Baglioni 2003). In centralized states civil society organizations with a national scope of action will prevail, whereas in decentralized or federal countries there will be space also for subnational and local organizations to intervene in the public sphere. Recent literature suggests considering also the specific type of unemployment and unemployment policy-welfare regime if one wishes to understand claim making in this policy field (Giugni 2008b; Baglioni et al. 2008b). A country-specific unemployment structure may determine the saliency of an issue in the debate. If unemployment is concentrated in some specific regions, issues of economic development policies will likely be popular in public discourses, whereas if unemployment is more a matter of lack of skills of the active population, education or insertion policies will be debated. Concerning the type of unemployment policy regime, a minimalist conception of welfare regime will favor claims dealing with access to social benefits, while claims made in a more inclusive model of welfare regime will likely focus on the situation of the unemployed (Giugni 2008b: 304). Depending on the type of civil society organization addressing those issues, then, they will be turned into a more technical issue (if claims are made by universities, research institutes, experts) or into a rather political question (if claims are made by social movements’ organizations, grassroots associations, religious organizations). Finally, the context can also affect the very form claims assume. As argued by the social movements literature, societal actors may be pushed toward the radicalization of their repertoire of action by a closed (exclusive) set of political opportunity structures, where challengers are left with only one means to promote their interests and ideas: the protest. On the contrary, a receptive or inclusive political-institutional context, that is a context open to civil society proposals and activities in a specific field, may result in less radical and more cooperative behavior by civil society itself (Kriesi 1995; Tarrow 1996).

Civil society organizations in political claim making over unemployment: An overview The public discourse on unemployment is structured primarily by institutional actors like governments, employers’ organizations and trade



Simone Baglioni


unions that dispose of the relevant material and relational resources necessary to make their voices heard. However, the predominance of institutional actors reflects more general national policy-making systems. In neo-corporatist states, like most of those studied here, where weakly institutionalized non-governmental actors have little space to intervene in policy making because of these countries’ political and economic configurations, civil society public claims too will likely be weak (apart from those of organizations that belong to the “iron triangle”). In fact, all countries included, civil society actors intervene with few claims in the debate on unemployment: about only 10 percent of all claims are made by these actors. To understand how they do it, it is useful to begin by unpacking the box “civil society actors” in claim making over unemployment. A first distinction among organizations’ families is based on their principal field of activity. Those specializing in employment/labor policy can be defined non-state welfare organizations, whereas the rest can be named other policy fields organizations because their primary area of action is not employment. The latter can thus be identified also as “multi-issue organizations,” whereas the former are “single-issue.” Such a difference may have an impact on these organizations’ capacity for claiming in this field. On the one hand, specialized organizations may have a tougher capacity to argue about unemployment because of their specific knowledge of the issue, but, on the other hand, non-specialized organizations, that is, organizations active on a multiplicity of issues, may dispose of more and more differentiated resources and this might positively impact on their capacity to put a claim in the public space. Hence, it is interesting to consider which of these two types of organizations are more active in our claim making. Table 5.1 presents the distribution of claims of the two types of organizations across countries. Multi-issue organizations (other policy fields organizations) make more claims than those that specialize in unemployment (with the exception of organizations in France). This suggests, firstly, that in European countries unemployment has been perceived by all types of civil society organizations as an important issue, no matter what their most important field of activity was or is. Secondly, such a result suggests that multi-issue organizations are likely more capable than single-issue ones in making their arguments or their actions visible in the public domain. Thirdly, Table 5.1 also reveals that not all countries are alike in terms of their diffusion of claims. If we make the sum of the claims of both types of organizations (see the row of Total of Table 5.1) we see that the UK and Switzerland have



132

UK Non-state welfare organizations and groups Other civil society organizations Total N

Switzerland

France

Italy

Germany

Sweden

1.5

2.2

6.5

0.0

0.4

0.7

15.7 17.2 129

12.7 14.9 301

4.4 10.9 86

5.9 5.9 56

9.5 9.9 382

10.1 10.8 63

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Table 5.1 Claims by civil society organizations on the overall claims by country (%)


almost three times more civil society claims than Italy, but they also have a higher percentage of civil society organizations’ claims than Germany. As our introductory hypotheses stated, this is explained by the different policy regimes of these countries: a more pluralistic policy system, like the British one, or a very weak corporatist model like Switzerland, which has also a strong subsidiarity tradition in welfare state provision (Kriesi 1998; Parri 1987), have fostered the inclusion of civil society actors in the political debate. On the contrary, more corporatist policy environments, like the German, the Swedish and the Italian ones, have limited the presence of societal actors in the political game to institutional organizations (employers and trade unions) and have led to the exclusion of less organized and “less recognized” organizations. France is interesting, for it has the highest number of claims made by civil society organizations working specifically in the field of (un)employment and, in particular, among them there are several pro-unemployed and movements-like organizations more prone to protest-oriented activities and claims. As we will see more in details below, in this sense, France confirms previous research on social movements associating the French closed structure of opportunity for conventional political participation with the diffusion of radical protest activities by societal actors (Kriesi 1995). Furthermore if we focus on the specific type of actor having made claims in a single country, we see that ‘expert views’ that are promoted by research centers, universities and think tanks give an important contribution in claim making over unemployment in all countries (Table 5.2). Hence, in general, although with slightly different degrees, civil society organizations intervene in European countries’ public debate with competent voices. If we use the degree of diffusion of expert-driven claims as an indicator of the type of debate that will likely prevail in one country (rather ‘technical’ versus more ‘political’) we could say that in countries where research centers and universities prevail as civil society actors (the UK, Germany and Sweden) there will be a more “scientific” rather than political general discourse on unemployment. A couple of examples taken from UK help clarify this argument: “Institute for Public Policy Research says that joining the single currency would lead to unemployment” or “Oxford researchers suggest that investing in training is for EU Governments a better route against unemployment than job creation.” However, in addition to types of welfare models that refer to unemployment provisions, country specific historical-political configurations also still play a role in predicting the type of actors and claims that will



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UK Organizations dealing with specific types of unemployed* Other organizations dealing with unemployment in general Other welfare organizations Research institutes, Universities, think tanks Churches, religious organizations Media, journalists Other professional organizations Other organizations Total N

Switzerland

France

Italy

Germany

Sweden

2.4

4.6

2.4

0.0

0.6

3.2

2.3

1.0

41.9

0.0

1.6

3.2

3.9 71.3

9.0 20.9

15.1 25.6

0.0 48.2

2.4 83.0

0.0 79.4

3.9 1.6 0.0 14.7 100.0 129

0.7 41.9 8.0 14.0 100.0 301

2.3 7.0 5.8 0.0 100.0 86

28.6 5.4 1.8 16.1 100.0 56

5.0 0.8 4.5 2.4 100.0 382

0.0 1.6 6.3 6.3 100.0 63

Note: *Organizations dealing with: young unemployed; women unemployed; disabled unemployed; migrant unemployed

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Table 5.2 Types of organization by country (%)


be made in a single country. In fact, if we consider the Italian case, although research centers and experts occupy a relevant space in the public debate (almost half of all claims), other actors are more visible: for example, the Catholic Church alone accounts for one third of all claims. The Church intervenes through a public discussion of the social consequences of unemployment at its highest levels (the Pope and several well-known bishops) as well as through unconventional actions at the local level, as is shown in the next section. This is explained by the weak welfare provisions for the unemployed that leave a large space of action for societal organizations, who need to fill the gap between the needs of the unemployed and a lack of governmental action. Such organizations acting to meet people’s needs are—in this field, like in many others—in primis Catholic, as the cultural and institutional origins of Italian civil society implies (Ranci 1999; Magatti 2005). On the contrary, in respect of its strong secular tradition but also its inclusive welfare state model concerning unemployment provisions, in France religious organizations, including the Catholic Church, occupy a residual position in claim making. French civil society is largely represented by pro-unemployed organizations much more than in the other countries: more than 40 percent of all French societal claims are made by organizations dealing specifically with unemployment and 15 percent by organizations active on welfare issues. Furthermore, in France, but also in Italy, the predominance of “political” organizations in the claims will likely push for the politicization of the issue rather than it being framed “scientifically” (see infra). In Switzerland, civil society speaks with a diversity of voices: journalists and media play a relevant role in claim making over unemployment but also a variety of other organizations make claims, such as organizations dealing specifically with welfare, those dealing with the disabled unemployed, research centers and think tanks. This is a reflection of the country’s model of policy making (weakly corporatist) and, more specifically, of its being a direct democratic system with a strong tradition of subsidiarity implying that it is up to civil society to act first, the state intervening only if the former fails (Kriesi 1998; Lane 2001). There may hardly be policy without the direct involvement of societal actors. As already mentioned above, different aspects of the context influence the way social collective actors intervene in the political debate about a specific issue. This can also be grasped by focusing on the territorial level at which civil society actors intervene. In countries where policy making is centralized at the national level, there will likely be an overwhelming presence of claims from civil society organizations with a national scope



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of action, whereas in strongly decentralized or in federal countries, subnational or local actors will prevail. That societal organizations replicate state structures is due not only to the principle of isomorphism between society and political institutions but also to the fact that, by taking the same organizational level, civil society is better capable of influencing policy makers and public opinion (Skocpol et al. 2000; Kriesi and Baglioni 2003). However, this hypothesis must be combined with those previously introduced, like the corporatist versus pluralist models of policy making. Neo-corporatist policy making requires well-organized societal organizations, for they have to be able to gain, maintain and assure representation of a full category of interests or workers, and they must also be able to bargain with strong organizations, like employers and the state. Whereas more pluralist contexts foster the diffusion of a broader spectrum of associations, there will not be a single organization speaking on behalf of the entire civil society about a single issue, but there will be various ones. In the former context, national or sector hegemonic organizations will largely prevail in claim making, while in the latter smaller and locally based organizations may also be able to make public claims. We can confront these hypotheses with the data by considering Table 5.3 that presents the scope (i.e. territorial level of activities) of civil society organizations having carried out claims on unemployment. National civil society organizations are more active in centralized countries, like France, whereas countries with a tradition of federalism, like Switzerland, show a more active intervention of local or regional organizations. Italy stands in between these two poles: there is a strong presence of national organizations (more then 60%), as it is still a rather centralized and neo-corporatist country, but there are also local organizations making claims due both to the geographical concentration of unemployment in some specific southern areas and to the opportunities offered to local organizations by local governments that manage parts of the country’s employment policy. In Germany, national organizations seem more capable of intervening in public claim making than local ones, despite the country’s federal structure. But Germany’s strong corporatist nature places great importance in national “pillarized” policy making on (un)employment, explaining this result. A common trend across all countries is the residual role of European civil society: if we focus on this specific aspect, we would say that although EU labor policies affect national ones, civil society discourses on unemployment still remain heavily in the hands of national and subnational organizations (Table 5.3). Despite the multiple networks existing among civil society organizations in Europe, it seems national



Simone Baglioni

Supranational EU National Regional Local Total N

UK

Switzerland

France

Italy

Germany

Sweden

0.8 1.6 90.7 3.1 1.6 100.0 129

0.3 0.7 51.5 23.6 16.9 100.0 301

5.8 2.3 82.6 2.3 5.8 100.0 86

5.4 0.0 69.6 0.0 25.0 100.0 56

4.7 2.9 81.4 2.1 1.6 100.0 382

3.2 1.6 50.8 4.8 31.7 100.0 63



138

Table 5.3 Scope of civil society actors by country (%)

139

discourses do not reach supranational actors, and only few organizations active at the European level are able to intervene efficaciously in national policy-relevant discourses. These are primarily: research centers with a supranational range of action and audience, or societal organizations involved with the “European marches against unemployment” that are particularly active in France. Unemployment policy remains strongly “national” in its configurations instead of supranational, as confirmed also by the Lisbon Treaty where, as an evidence of Member States’ reluctance to cede power, employment is not among the policy fields where the EU has an exclusive competence but among those where the EU and Member States share their competencies: civil society political claiming reflects such a situation. This overall picture is also confirmed if we consider the scope of the issues that civil society actors speak or act about. In fact, almost 80 percent of all claims on unemployment have a national-focused issue, 15 percent are issues locally rooted and only 3.5 percent of claims have a European issue at their center (data are not shown here).

Action repertoire There are different ways to make claims. However, civil society actors, like all other types of actors, usually resort to verbal statements such as declarations in the media, written statements and direct information to the public (see Table 5.4). Civil society organizations’ activities are reported in the media also through the use of protest actions. In fact, protest actions represent 14.2 percent of all civil society claims. In particular, 6.7 percent of these protest actions are demonstrative (public rallies, protest marches), 4.8 percent are conventional (referenda, petitions, political pressure), 2.6 percent are confrontational (occupation, boycott, self-imposed constraints, perturbation of action by others), Table 5.4 Forms of action of claims by civil society organizations (%) Verbal statements Protest actions Demonstrative protest actions Conventional protest actions Confrontational protest actions Violent protest actions Total N

85.8 14.2 6.7 4.8 2.6 0.1 100.0 1017



Simone Baglioni


and very few (0.1 percent) are violent (violent demonstrations, limited destruction of property). If it is not a surprise to find unemployed organizations and groups of workers among those who protest, it is less expected to find church representatives carrying out such strong acts of dissent as local radical citizens’ groups. As mentioned above, priests and bishops not only often support unemployed and precarious workers but they also lead protests against dismissals in Italy and in the UK. In both countries, there are claims made by religious authorities ranging from collective marches to hunger strikes, as witnessed by some examples taken from the Italian database: “The bishop of Ivrea organizes a collective fasting against dismissals at Fiat” or “the priest of the Kalsa parish in Palermo begins an hunger strike for solidarity with precarious workers of the local public school.” Moreover, in Italy and in the UK the main Church authorities, respectively the Pope and the Archbishop of Canterbury, have made several claims to support the unemployed or to push political authorities to find durable solutions for them. As the literature on social movements argues, the occurrence of collective protest depends on several contextual dimensions, such as a country’s political-institutional setting (McAdam 1982; Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi 1995). Challengers will likely radicalize their action in countries offering scarce opportunities for their claims to be accepted by state authorities. In fact, since they are not heard if they use ordinary and conventional political actions, challengers will tend to use protest and unconventional forms of political actions instead. Whereas, in countries where political authorities are ready to include challengers’ claims in their policy-making activities, by virtue of their open and participatory decision-making system, the radicalization of social actors will be hampered. That is why social movements’ research has argued that the closed and centralized French political system was prone to develop popular dissent (Duyvendak 1995; Kriesi et al. 1995). If we now consider the diffusion of protest-driven claims across civil society actors we see that protest is not homogeneously diffused among our countries. As suggested by the literature, France is by far the country where civil society tends to protest more (Table 5.5). In France, almost half (47.8 percent) of these organizations’ claims are made through protest, as occupations, sit-ins and even the so-called requisitions d’emplois (job kidnappings). In a job kidnapping, people occupy a job place and pretend that place is being shared between the current employee and an unemployed as a form of “solidarity” or “collective burden sharing” between unemployed and workers.



140

Verbal statements Conventional protest Demonstrative protest Confrontational protest Violent protest Total N

UK

Switzerland

France

Italy

Germany

Sweden

96.1 0.0 3.1 0.0 0.8 100.0 129

77.7 10.3 11.0 1.0 0.0 100.0 301

52.4 4.7 23.3 19.8 0.0 100.0 86

80.4 0.0 8.9 10.7 0.0 100.0 56

95.8 2.9 1.3 0.0 0.0 100.0 382

93.7 4.8 1.6 0.0 0.0 100.0 63

141



Table 5.5 Forms of action of claims by civil society organizations by country (%)


However, civil society’s protest claims also emerge as significant in Italy, where opportunities for influencing policy making with conventional political participatory tools are scarce. In Italy, one fifth of all claims are carried out by means of demonstrative or confrontational actions: there are several cases of occupation. Most of these concern workplaces but there are also few symbolic occupations. For instance, as a form of protest against announced dismissals by Fiat, the car maker, a pro-unemployed organization occupied the museum of fine arts of the Agnelli family, the owner of Fiat.

What is civil society talking about when dealing with unemployment? The way different actors address the issue of unemployment can vary according to the structure of unemployment typical of a given country: whether it is more concentrated on youth or more concerns the older part of the working population; whether it is regional or diffused across the whole country; whether it is more focused on certain economic sectors or rather cross-sectoral. Consequently, in countries where unemployment is limited to areas considered underdeveloped or poor in terms of infrastructure for economic production, public discourse will likely focus on development policies. In countries where unemployment is strongly gendered or generationally shaped, claim making will likely emphasize specific gender- or generational-related aspects of the issue. Recent literature suggests also considering the specific type of unemployment policy-welfare regime while studying claim making in this field (Berclaz et al. 2004, Giugni et al. 2009). According to these studies, a minimalist conception of welfare regime will favor claims dealing with access to social benefits. On the contrary, claims made in a more inclusive model of welfare regime will likely focus on the situation of the unemployed (Giugni 2008b: 304). We can use this hypothesis to analyse the different contents of claim making across countries. Let us start with the issues that have structured the claims of civil society actors (Table 5.6). Macroeconomic issues (e.g. issues of competitiveness of national economy, competitiveness of national specific production sector, social dialogue, dismissals, etc.) represent one third of all claims. “Dismissals” is the most common theme of civil society claims in three out of the six countries (Italy, Switzerland and the UK). Linked to macroeconomic issues there are also claims focused on economic development or promotion policy (e.g. general evaluations of economic



142

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Socioeconomic issues relating to the situation of the labor market Welfare system and social benefits Individual insertion Issues relating to the constituency of the unemployed Actor-claims of the unemployed Other issues Total N

70.7 10.9 12.6 3.6 0.2 2.1 100.0 1017

policy but also policy about flexibility, social subsidies, help to companies, etc.) and state policies relating to the labor market (e.g. creation of jobs by the state, part-time employment, reduction of labor time, cheap labor, state action against dismissals). Finally, claims focused on specific aspects of unemployment, such as unemployment subsidies or other welfare measures, education issues or health issues, are marginal categories in the public discourse of these actors (as well of the other actors). In sum, civil society organizations prefer approaching unemployment in broader economic or political-economy terms instead of focussing on the specific situation of the unemployed themselves. But, as this chapter’s hypotheses suggest, the frequency of a single issue may change between countries (Table 5.7). Specific national economic configurations may determine the saliency of an issue in a country’s debate. In nations where unemployment is heavily concentrated in some particular areas (e.g. in the South of Italy; in Eastern Germany; in Northern areas of the UK) issues of economic development policies are popular in public discourses. But also the type of unemployment policy, as stated in the hypotheses, proved to have influenced the debate: in countries with an inclusive welfare state, like Sweden or France, debates on unemployment focus on the defense by civil society actors of unemployment benefits, or on issues of expansion of their coverage, etc. But the issues of claims also depend on specific countries’ policy debates. In Italy, the introduction of flexibility in the labor market has become a highly polarized and polarizing issue (with center-right parties, part of the center-left parties and employers’ organizations in favor, and extreme-left parties and some of the trade unions against it). Italian political entrepreneurs on both sides of the political spectrum have tried to capitalize on this issue (Baglioni et al. 2008a; della Porta and Baglioni 2010) and, as a consequence, civil society actors as well speak a lot about flexibility. As a result, in Italy, flexibility is an object of claims



Table 5.6 Issues of claims by civil society actors (%)

144


UK

Switzerland

France

Italy

Germany

Sweden

Macro-economic Economic development Active measures/insertion measures State policy re labor market Macro-economic Active measures/insertion measures Social aid/assistance Unemployment insurance system State policy re labor market Macro-economic Economic development State policies re labor market Macro-economic Economic development State policies re labor market State policies re labor market Unemployment insurance system Active measures/insertion measures

eight times larger than in Germany and in Sweden, but also twice than in Switzerland and in the UK, where there were not equivalent political entrepreneurs addressing this issue.

To whom is civil society speaking? When they make a public claim, actors tend to address their requests to specific institutions or organizations. In the case of unemployment, civil society organizations target not only state actors, political parties, labor organizations and employers’ organizations, but also the unemployed themselves or other civil society organizations. State representatives are the most common addressee in all countries (see Table 5.8) as civil society asks for a solution to the specific problems of unemployment, or it claims access to benefits or macro-policy solutions. Notwithstanding this, state institutions are not equally requested as addressees in all countries, and secondly there are also variations among countries concerning the other types of addressees. In this respect there is a clear distinction between neo-corporatist states and pluralist or weakly corporatist ones. In the latter, like France for example, more than three quarters of claims are addressed to state actors, as well as in Britain where the state’s representatives are addressed in more than 85 percent



Table 5.7 The first three issues of civil society claims by country

State actors Political parties Labor organizations Employers’ organizations Unemployed organizations Other civil society actors Other actors Total N

UK

Switzerland

France

Italy

Germany

Sweden

86.5 4.5 0.0 4.5 0.0 4.5 0.0 100.0 67

45.0 2.5 2.5 30 0.0 20.0 0.0 100.0 40

76.7 1.2 1.2 5.8 1.2 2.3 11.6 100.0 86

70 4.3 4.3 26.1 4.3 0.0 0.0 100.0 23

69.5 1.7 8.5 11.9 0.0 1.7 6.7 100.0 59

65.1 1.6 1.6 1.6 3.2 1.6 25.4 100.0 63

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Table 5.8 Addressees of claims by civil society organizations by country (%)


of claims. On the contrary, in neo-corporatist states, like Germany, employers’ organizations and trade unions account for 20 percent of claims’ addressees. Similarly, in Italy, where employment policies are the object of tripartite agreements (Gualmini 1998), employers’ organizations and trade unions together account for more than one third of claims (with the former more often addressed than the latter, for civil society actors tend to address claims to actors able to change either their behavior considered unjust or a specific working situation). Civil society organizations rarely address similar or fellow organizations, apart from the Swiss case, where 20 percent of claims are civil society-to-civil society made, as a further evidence of the active involvement in policy making that the Swiss democracy requires to its civil society. Claims made in the unemployment policy field often include the expression of a critical opinion of some of the actors of the policy process. The more an actor is considered responsible for a particular situation in the labor market, the more they are exposed to criticism by civil society. In countries where employment policy is primarily in the hands of the national government, then state actors will likely be targeted by the critical view of civil society organizations. Whereas in neo-corporatist countries, where unions and employers clearly share responsibility for labor policy with state institutions, they will all potentially become objects of criticism. Our data confirm these hypotheses (Table 5.9). Although state actors are by and large the most criticized actors, in countries like Italy, Switzerland and Germany there is also marked criticism vis-à-vis employers’ organizations, and in Switzerland and in Germany also vis-à-vis unions and political parties. In Italy, the strongest criticized actor is the employers’ organization Confindustria, which is considered an actor powerful enough to heavily influence policy making in this field, especially when the government is run by center-right parties (della Porta and Baglioni 2010). It is not surprising, therefore, that welfare or pro-unemployed organizations criticized Confindustria’s strong campaign in favor of flexibility in the labor market, or its support to companies announcing dismissals. In addition to criticized actors, claims analysis allows considering the overall position of the claim vis-à-vis its constituency (either unemployed or workers/employees). In the dataset used for this chapter there is a variable allowing for the analysis of civil society’s public attitude concerning these constituencies. In fact, each time a claim implied an improvement of the rights and positions of the constituency group or an enlargement of its benefits and opportunities it was coded as “positive.” Whereas claims implying a deterioration of the rights and



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State actors Political parties Labor organizations Employers’ organizations Unemployed organizations Other civil society actors Total N

UK

Switzerland

France

Italy

Germany

Sweden

80.4 5.4 0.0 3.6 0.0 8.9 100.0 56

38.5 15.4 7.7 38.5 0.0 0.0 100.0 13

80.0 0 0.0 14.3 0.0 2.9 100.0 70

39.0 0 0.0 61 0.0 0.0 100.0 18

75.4 1.4 4.3 5.8 1.4 4.3 100.0 69

89.2 2.7 2.7 0.0 0.0 5.4 100.0 37

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Table 5.9 Criticized actors in claims by civil society organizations by country (%)

Negative Neutral Positive Total N

UK

Switzerland

France

Italy

Germany

Sweden

2.3 38.0 59.7 100.0 129

11.3 18.6 70.1 100.0 301

9.3 10.5 80.2 100.0 86

3.6 5.4 90.1 100.0 56

2.6 75.9 2.5 100.0 169

14.3 49.2 36.5 100.0 63



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Table 5.10 Position of civil society claims toward constituency by country (%)

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position of the constituency group or a restriction of their benefits and opportunities were coded as “negative.” Finally, all neutral, ambivalent or technocratic claims were considered as “neutral”. Considering the previous figures about criticism toward government institutions, one might think that such criticism would automatically translate into an overall positive (supportive) evaluation of unemployed and workers’ activities or interests by civil society. However, the outcome of this claim analysis tells a different story (Table 5.10). In fact, if there is a clear trend favorable to the unemployed and workers in some countries (Italy, France and Switzerland), in others the situation is more nuanced. In fact, in the UK almost 40 percent of the claims adopt a neutral position toward constituencies, in Sweden such a neutral position concerns almost half of the claims, and in Germany more than two thirds of claims do not take a clear position for or against the unemployed and workers. This is due to the different types of civil society actors intervening in the public debate on the issue: in countries with more nuanced positions toward constituencies, the most diffuse civil society actors are research institutes, think tanks and individual experts (as was shown by Table 5.2). These actors tend to address their claims as technical opinions about policies, macro-economic aspects and so on. Hence their aim is not to support collective mobilization of the unemployed or workers per se, but to provide solutions or to stimulate state action in the policy field. In countries where civil society appears more favorable to constituencies, civil society is represented by different voices than “technical or expert” ones. In France, for instance, civil society claims are primarily made by supportive or pro-unemployed organizations and movements, and in Italy, as presented above, though research institutes and other experts’ views are diffuse, there is also a relevant presence of church and religious organizations that always intervene in favor of unemployed and struggling workers.

Conclusion Civil society claim making about unemployment takes the different forms civil society has: from pro-unemployed to religious organizations, from research institutes and think tanks to radical movements’ organizations. Each of them gives voice to a peculiar way of addressing the issue in its respective public space, some stress the importance of new policy solutions whereas others contest the scarce action of governmental actors and challenge policy makers to act differently.



Simone Baglioni


However, like all public discourses, also civil society one is prestructured by prevailing contextual characteristics such as the type of policy system, the form of the state, the traditional arrangements between state and civil society in welfare provisions. Concerning the first aspect of the political-institutional context, the type of policy regime, it has proved to be a good predictor of civil society involvement in claim making on unemployment. In particular, neocorporatist contexts (Sweden, Germany and Italy) have favored more traditional and organized societal actors like employers and unions and have obstructed claim making by other, less-organized, organizations. On the contrary, weakly corporative (France, Switzerland) or pluralist (the UK) settings have paved the way for the development of a richer variety of civil actors speaking about unemployment. Other political-institutional dimensions, like federalism or the degree of decentralization of the state, are proved to affect the type of organizations intervening in the debate, with federal states opening the floor also to subnational and local associations (that often are also those with fewer resources) and national-centered ones preferring national organizations. Finally the type of unemployment (e.g. concentrated in few areas of a country; affecting mainly dismissed workers) and the type of welfareunemployment policy (universalist versus minimalist in terms of coverage), together with country-specific policy debates polarizing around a single issue (like flexibility in Italy), have made a difference in the content of civil society claims. Issues of economic development have become popular in Italy, Germany and the UK where unemployment was highly diffuse in specific geographical areas (respectively the South, the East and the North of those countries); issues of insertion/activation of dismissed workers and social security have also occupied a relevant place in the agenda of Swedish and French civil societies. The variety of organizations involved in claim making in one country will affect the content of the claim itself: research institutes or experts tend to frame unemployment in “technical” rather than political terms. On the contrary, social movements, grassroots associations and religious organizations have framed more as a political phenomenon that needs political solutions. The overall claim making in a country will then depend not only on the country’s peculiar socioeconomic and political settings but also on the type of organizations giving voice to civil society in this field. The plurality of arguments diffused through civil society represents an opportunity of improvement for a democratic public debate: in fact,



150

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very often the so called “poor” people, like the unemployed, need to rely on fellow civil society organizations in order to have their own voices heard in the public debate. By fostering the debate about such a crucial issue, civil society organizations fulfil a relevant role in our democracies that is, however, far from being fully exploited because of the prevailing—often cumbersome—presence of more institutionalized organizations participating in “tri-partite” style policy making.



Simone Baglioni

Transcending Marginalization: The Mobilization of the Unemployed in France, Germany, and Italy in a Comparative Perspective Simone Baglioni, Britta Baumgarten, Didier Chabanet, and Christian Lahusen

Mobilization by the unemployed was long considered highly improbable. The obstacles have been abundantly outlined in the literature and related to powerful forces of social and political atomization (Richards 2002). First of all, we are dealing with a very heterogeneous group of people with different biographies, diverse interests, and a range of identities and belief-systems. Mobilization is further hindered by the public stigmatization of the unemployed (Piven and Cloward 1977). This stigma impedes the formation of collective mobilizations and leads rather to social isolation (Wolski-Prenger 1996). Moreover, the job insecurity of the unemployed complicates the formation of stable networks, memberships, and organizations. Finally, scholars tend to argue since the path-breaking Marienthal study (Jahoda, Lazarsfeld and Zeisel 1971 [1933]) that unemployment, particularly long-term joblessness, drives individuals into apathy and fatalism, and leads to the erosion of social capital (e.g. trust, personal contacts, and organizational memberships). Most scholars have taken these sociological and psychological features and consequences of unemployment for granted and have thus tended to argue that the collective mobilization of the jobless is either improbable or even impossible. However, at least in the light of the recent rise of collective action by the unemployed in Europe, such analyses require substantial qualification. For this reason, we want to engage in a more timely and differentiated analysis of unemployed mobilization, its conditions, structures, and dynamics. For this purpose, we aim to study comparatively the protest waves since the late 1990s in three European countries—France, Germany, and Italy—where the unemployed succeeded in organizing themselves and acting on their own behalf for a 152



6

significant period of time. Our study is geared primarily to developing explanatory hypotheses and presenting comparative empirical data for a subject that remains understudied in social movement analysis.1 Although we do not claim the analysis to be fully systematic or representative of all unemployed mobilizations in Europe, we hope that it helps to decipher the macrostructural environments and conditions impinging on unemployed mobilization—leaving microfoundations to other studies.

Contemporary unemployed protests In all three countries under analysis, collective action by the jobless is undoubtedly connected to pressing local deprivations and grievances rooted in social marginalization and exclusion. Moreover, this unrest benefits from an organizational infrastructure that consists of long-standing charitable organizations and newly founded and more politically outspoken groups, which were finally engaged in setting up national networks and coalitions during the 1980s. Hence, even if protests had a specific geographical origin, the developments of the last 20 years give testimony of an increasingly dense web of local and national organizations and coalitions, which were actively committed to instigating local actions and coordinate national protest campaigns. In Italy, for instance, the mobilization of the unemployed is geographically limited. The phenomenon is concentrated in certain urban areas in the south, primarily Naples and the surrounding region, where an unemployment rate of over 30 percent has been endemic for some decades. Moreover, Naples has a long tradition of sociopolitical radicalism dating back to the nineteenth century (Hobsbawm 1959), comprised of social, political, and labor-related struggles, which largely escape the control of the unions and other institutional actors. Thus, the unemployed movement is a component of a set of social claims (housing, health, environment) originating from different events (the protest wave of 1968, the outbreak of cholera in 1973, the earthquake in 1980), which constituted an excellent seedbed for organized protest (Baglioni, forthcoming). A crucial date for the Neapolitan unemployed movement is June 1975, when almost 2000 jobless people—wearied by more than a year of protest in Naples organized by the Committee of Vico Cinquesanti (named after the street on which it was based)— marched to Rome and were received by the government. At this meeting a promise was made to create 10,500 new jobs for the mobilized unemployed; and the same day the city of Naples offered 700 mobilized



Baglioni, Baumgarten, Chabanet, and Lahusen 153

Transcending Marginalization

unemployed persons a one-year work contract financed by a state assistance fund (Ferrara 1997; Ginsborg 1989). This success led in Naples to the creation of numerous committees of the unemployed, like the Comitato Banchi Nuovi or the Unione Disoccupati Napoletani, active in the 1970s and 1980s, or the more recent Movimento di Lotta per il Lavoro and the Disoccupati Autorganizzati di Acerra, active in the 1990s and 2000s, which negotiated hiring terms with the local and national authorities for their members. In France, the mobilization of the unemployed is a more large-scale phenomenon. France is unquestionably the European Union country in which the unemployed have achieved the greatest visibility. Over the last 20 years they have mobilized massively on several occasions and shown a certain capacity for ongoing action (for instance, occupation of local bureaus of ASSEDIC, the insurance unemployment system, or of financially prosperous enterprises announcing dismissals). Their organizations have built up a network, which, while more active in some regions than in others, enjoys both a national presence and alliances with trade unions and far-left bodies thus reducing their political isolation. Despite its limited resources, the French unemployed movement has succeeded in maintaining certain autonomy of action. The first-ever National Union of Unemployed People (SCN) was formed in 1982 at the instigation of a handful of leftist Catholic militants. On May 30, 1985, it was the driving force behind a protest march in Paris that gathered together some 5000 unemployed. Weakened by internal divisions, the SCN split in 1985 and gave rise to the National Movement of Unemployed and Precarious Workers (MNCP). Two years later Communist Party leaders from the Paris suburbs formed the Association for Employment, Information, and Solidarity for unemployed and precarious workers (APEIS). In 1993, Act Together Against Unemployment (AC!) was jointly launched by unionists, unemployed association leaders, and intellectuals. Also important is the General Confederation of Work (CGT) trade union’s unemployed defense section, founded in 1983, which plays a vital role in southern France. All these organizations were formed in the course of only one decade beginning in 1982, a period marked by mass unemployment, the emergence of the new poverty, the failure of the Left in promoting employment, and the acceleration of the process of European integration, which, since the ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht, prohibits any expansive policies. In Germany, too, the mobilization and organization of the unemployed took a clearer shape from the early 1980s onwards. Unemployment groups and organizations proliferated locally, and gradually became



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structured around a number of national associations. In 1982 the West German BAG-Erwerbslose, as it was later known, was founded to coordinate the work of the independent organizations of the unemployed, and the Koordinierungsstelle (KOS) was established in 1986 to represent the organizations affiliated with the unions (Rein and Scherer 1993). Moreover, after reunification in 1990, the Arbeitlosenverband (ALV) was set up as an association of the jobless in East Germany (Grehn 1996).2 These organizations had a perceivable impact on mobilization dynamics. While smaller protest events were reported in individual localities, nationally coordinated mobilization began in the mid-1990s, when demonstrations by the unemployed in many cities brought together several thousand people. Actions peaked in 1998 with national elections in view, yet soon disappeared from the national arena as the coalition of Social Democrats and the Green Party came into government. It was not until 2004 that a second wave was triggered, particularly in eastern Germany, where protests opposed parts of the government reform program Agenda 2010. The Agenda aimed to establish restrictions in social security, retirement, sickness, and disability insurance, and rules regarding payment and job assignment for the unemployed. In the same year more than one million people protested in 230 cities—predominantly in eastern Germany—against the upcoming installment of the labor market reform Hartz IV (Roth 2005).3 These brief descriptions suggest that the various protest waves exhibit similar patterns. In order to understand better and more systematically the conditions and dynamics of protests by the unemployed, it is thus necessary to take a closer look both at exogenous and endogenous factors. We will argue that the mobilization of the unemployed depended heavily on very specific patterns in the social and institutional environment. At the same time, however, the comparative analysis of these three countries will show that unemployed action also builds on the availability of mobilizing resources, such as organizations.

Deprivations Reflecting upon our observations, we perceive that high levels of mobilization tend to correspond to high unemployment phases, even if the relationship is neither direct nor automatic. In fact, France, Germany, and Italy have all been characterized by outstanding levels of mass unemployment, particularly since the late 1970s: the standardized unemployment rate rose in France from 4.9 percent in 1975 to 11.2 percent in 1995, in Italy from 4.7 percent to 11.2 percent, and in





Germany from 3.3 percent to 8.5 percent. In all three countries, from the early 1980s and throughout the 1990s, there has been a deep and dismantling process of industrial change that has led to a dramatic reassessment of the country’s labor configuration. These developments were centered in specific regions, which were thus particularly affected by mass unemployment. In Italy, the strong cleavage between the southern and northern parts of the country reproduced itself in the field of unemployment. A similar observation can be made for Germany, where the economy and labor market of the former German Democratic Republic crumbled after reunification and has experienced deindustrialization ever since. In spite of significant financial investment, economic recovery in the new Länder only focuses on a couple of prosperous, urban areas. In France strong regional inequalities persist as well. In particular, the departments of Bouches-du-Rhône and of Nord-Pas-de-Calais are most heavily affected by the dismantling of the steel industry and dockyards. Not surprisingly, these regions were strongholds of the emerging protest movement of the unemployed. At first sight, the relation between unemployment rates and collective action by the unemployed seems plausible, because unemployment is linked quite obviously with individual material deprivation, which should provide enough motivation for personal unrest. Moreover, in regard to the emergence of collective action, we might expect that mass unemployment gives more public recognition to the problem (BustBartels 1989). Finally, rising figures should have a favorable influence on mobilization because “blaming the victim” strategies should become less persuasive (Gallas 1996). Deprivations, however, do not translate into protest automatically, as classic social movement research has argued (Zald and McCarthy 1987). In order to arouse discontent, deprivations need to be subjectively perceived as unjust when compared with the situation of others (Runciman 1972). This insight translates into two propositions that find evidence in our countries. First, it can be argued that the mobilization of the unemployed benefited from regional hotspots of joblessness. This “regionalization” implies not only a higher concentration of jobless people “per capita,” and thus more potential constituents. Deprivations also translate more easily into shared, collective grievances when interpreted in terms of regional inequalities, such as when obviously contradicting the claims of territorial unity and homogeneity enshrined in French Republicanism, and/or ritually stated by governments in Italy and, particularly after reunification, in Germany. The public awareness of regional inequalities is more probable in long-lasting historical economic and social



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cleavages, like the divide between the north and south of Italy and the east and west in Germany. Second, feelings of relative deprivation will arise when events occur that imply a deterioration of the situation of the jobless (Walsh 1981). This signaling effect does not stem from macroeconomic developments and the deteriorating situation of the labor market, because these creeping changes affect jobholders and do not directly alter individual grievances of those already without jobs. The latter are much more directly dependent on public policies and services. Hence, feelings of deprivation will emerge if the state administration is unable to respond effectively to the needs of the unemployed in specific moments of crisis (e.g. in Naples, during the cholera outbreak in 1973 and the earthquake in 1980). Relative deprivations also become apparent when social provisions and administrative services are modified in the wake of government reforms. The chance that these policy changes are perceived as relative deprivations are high, since the reforms qualify social rights, to which the unemployed were previously legally and morally entitled (Böhnisch and Cremer-Schäfer 2003). In France, for instance, the movement began on the eve of 1983, when the perspective of a decrease of unemployment became unrealistic and when the leftist government, which had been in power for the past two years, abandoned neo-Keynesian policies in favor of the monetarist orthodoxy. Subsequent protests in late 1997 centered on a demand for a “Christmas bonus” of an amount equivalent to approximately 250 euros for every unemployed person. The same is true for Germany, where protests during national election campaigns in 1998 contributed to the termination of a government that was blamed for promoting labor market and social policies hostile to the unemployed. Protests surged again in 2004 when the leftist government announced implementation of the unpopular Hartz IV reforms. In Italy, the mobilization of the jobless remained strongly attached to Naples. Protests grew out of frustration over the quality and reliability of local public services and public employment; moreover, they were nurtured by the general perception among the unemployed, radical-left parties, and unions that the center-left government they supported was not able to find the promised solutions to unemployment (Baglioni, della Porta, and Graziano 2005). Interestingly enough, however, leftist governments of that time (e.g. the first Romano Prodi administration) were unable to develop a consistent reform program, which could have aroused dissent and/or opposition by the jobless on a national scale, thus following the example of the other two countries.





In sum, de Tocqueville’s law, which holds that the subjective dynamic of a social phenomenon counts more than its objective gravity (de Tocqueville 1969 [1840]), is a key element to understanding the transformation of grievances into collective action, because grievances have to be perceived subjectively and interpreted collectively as unjustified deprivations. Hence, local protests are driven by feelings of frustration and anger, generated by the spread of mass unemployment and the inability of local authorities to respond to the immediate needs of a growing constituency of jobless. National protests seem to require additionally a collectively shared feeling of being deprived by the national government, which is perceived to be either unable to improve the situation of the jobless or even committed to introduce more adverse policy reforms. Frustrations are aggravated by the fact that expectations in some cases have been high (Gurr 1971). Indeed, it is noteworthy that the late 1990s had brought leftist parties into government in all three countries, on which the jobless and their allies had pinned their hopes.

Political opportunity structures Collective action by the jobless is not only marked by grievances and relative deprivations, as described thus far, but is also strongly dependent on the opportunity structure of the surrounding political system. These opportunities are not merely external and immutable factors in protest development, but, as McAdam has shown (1982), often reflect the interaction between the immediate political environment and the actions of different policy actors—even if some of them may be particularly marginalized in social and political terms. Political opportunity theorists predict collective action is more probable in a political environment that (a) provides easier access to the political institutions, (b) is characterized by instable electoral constituencies, and (c) is marked by heterogeneous elites, thus providing influential allies (Kitschelt 1986; McAdam 1996; Tarrow 1996). These elements work as “pull” and “push” factors on protest mobilization. On the one hand, they can create room to maneuver for social movement actors and encourage them to mobilize for their cause. On the other hand, they may encourage “insiders” to become interested in forming and mobilizing political opposition—both inside and outside political institutions—and further stimulate protest actions by “outsiders.” In its original wording, the conception of political opportunity structures is strongly state-centered. Theoretically and empirically speaking, however, it is not so easy to determine which actors belong to the



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system that provides opportunities (the “insiders”) and those trying to capitalize on them (the “outsiders”). This is particularly true for European politics in the realm of social and labor market policies. Here, industrial relations are heavily institutionalized, albeit in very different forms in different countries, generating “private-interest governments” (Streeck and Schmitter 1985) and/or consensual patterns of policy formation and implementation, often subsumed under the catchphrase of neo-corporatism (Lijphart and Crepaz 1991). Thus, at the edges of the political system, unstable and porous borders appear that are responsible for the ambivalent position of unions. On the one hand, unions tend to belong to (and support) institutionalized politics, such as in the early 1990s when the unions in all three countries acted as political parties and provided governments with the social consensus necessary to initiate unpopular labor policies and welfare reforms (Mania and Sateriale 2002). In France this phenomenon is particularly marked through the national unemployment compensation system, which is managed by social dialogue between the state and the social partners. On the other hand, the unions are strongly committed to their role as representatives of workers’ interests, including unemployed workers. This means that unions are simultaneously privileged partners with and challengers of the government. This ambiguous form of unionism gives rise to contradictory relations between unions and the unemployed, especially when unemployed workers mobilize to protest. As Lahusen and Baumgarten (2006) argue, it is the specific structure of national unionism and the particular form of institutional inclusion in each country that seems to condition political opportunities. We expect that higher levels of unionization and stronger union centralization into branch-specific or national unions will be less conducive to protests by the unemployed. This is because these organizational variations create a representational monopoly that tends to pacify social and political unrest by providing institutionalized patterns of interest representation and policy deliberation. Conversely, we assume that collective action by unemployed workers is more probable when the unionization and/or centralization of unionism is lower or in the process of eroding. This is because an organizationally and ideologically fragmented landscape of unions should provide a seemingly beneficial environment for protest. As more unions enter into contestation over policy reforms, it becomes more likely that some will choose protest tactics. Also it is likely that more forceful political dissidents, who can play particularly important roles in unemployed mobilization as political entrepreneurs or sponsors, will arise.





Empirical evidence suggests that the political opportunity structure in all three countries became more permissive for protest by the jobless during the 1980s and 1990s. Rates of unionization are on the decline: in France, membership decreased from 25 percent to around 7 percent between the mid-1970s and 2004 (Béroud and Mouriaux 2005); in Italy, it diminished from 50 percent in 1980 to 38 percent in 1998 (Carrieri 2003); and in Germany, in only nine years (1991–2000), unionization strongly decreased since German reunification from 38 percent to 27 percent. This decline was particularly strong within eastern Germany, where figures decreased in the same period of time from 50 percent to 27 percent (Ebbinghaus 2002b). We also observe a dramatic increase in dissent within national unions. These conflicts were caused by the conservative shift in social and the labor market policies beginning in the 1980s, and especially when leftist parties governed during the so-called Social Democratic era of the late 1990s (Germany, 1998–2005; France, 1981–6, 1988–93, 1997–2002; Italy, 1996–2001). Within this constellation of power, unionists in the three countries were torn between loyalties toward leftist governments and an outspoken criticism of the administrations’ neoliberal policy reforms. Conflicts were particularly pronounced in France and Italy, given the fact that unionism in these countries is structured by ideological orientation and not by industrial branches, as with German unions, leaving French and Italian unions more exposed to sectarian tendencies. For example, the French trade union landscape was both unified and divided. Certain confederations, like CFDT, changed their political line, forsaking trade unionism in some disputes. In the early 1990s, they adopted a clearly reformist line, more or less in line with economic liberalism. New organizations (like the trade unions SUD), or new coalitions (for example the Group of the Ten), were created in response, embracing a combative, extreme-left, and anti-capitalist form of trade unionism. Similarly, in the early 1980s, Italian school workers created a more radical and social-movement oriented unionism (known by the acronym of Cobas, that, is Comitati di base, base committees) as an act of dissent toward the traditional Italian unionism. Traditional unions were accused of being part of the political-consociational system and thus neglecting to defend the rights of many workers and unemployed (Bernocchi 1993). Also, the center-right Berlusconi government in the early 2000s provoked the reemergence of the historical politicalideological division in national unionism (a split between Communists, Socialists, and Christian Democrats), when only two (the Catholic and Christian Democratic-oriented CISL and the former socialist UIL) out of



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the three major unions agreed to sign the Patto per l’Italia, a national agreement for employment, thus isolating the largest leftist union, CGIL. In Germany, where unionism is less exposed to political fragmentation and sectarianism, there has nevertheless always been dissent. Some union branches are traditionally more militant (e.g. the IG Metall, ver. di), and many local branches and activists within the unions have been involved in supporting and/or organizing local unrest, especially by establishing unemployment groups and the related umbrella organization (the KOS). These groups of activists were successful in winning the support of their national leaders and functionaries until the elections of 1998, when the Social Democrats came into power. Torn between loyalty and criticism, cleavages within German unionism deepened, particularly between the national leadership and local unionists. The national leaders ultimately endorsed the reform program of the Schröder government and dissociated themselves from collective action in early 2004, but local unionists remained attached to the cause of local protests, partly with the silent support of their national organizations (Baumgarten 2004; Lahusen and Baumgarten 2006). These observations show that political opportunities for jobless protest were created in the 1990s. Severe conflicts over the future of the welfare state in general and labor markets and social policies in particular, led to dramatic controversies and cleavages within elite political circles. This made the “political establishment” more vulnerable to collective action from the streets and generated political entrepreneurs within their own ranks, primarily amongst the unions, which actively seized opportunities and allies in order to boost their political weight in institutional bargaining. Consequently, “outsiders” like the jobless became important political stakeholders and were able to influence public policy debates. Hence, scholars are correct to note that “[o]pportunities open the way for political action, but movements also make opportunities” (Gamson and Meyer 1996: 276). This means that social movement development, even a movement of dispossessed citizens, occurs through the interaction of movement groups and the sociopolitical environment they try to change (McAdam 1982: 40; Kriesi 1995; Kitschelt 1986).

Generating and using “windows of opportunity”: Mobilizing structures and strategies While objective grievances, subjectively perceived relative deprivations, and political opportunities are crucial to understanding the emergence





of political protest action, they do not explain how deprivations and opportunities are successfully transformed into collective action. This question is particularly pertinent to our case because we are speaking about marginalized people who are affected by social exclusion, apathy, and a lack of resources. In this regard, resource mobilization theory proposes a focus on organizations as an explanatory factor (Zald and McCarthy 1987), insofar as they tend to pool resources (e.g. funds, knowledge, contacts), offer selective incentives, build constituencies, construct webs of solidarity, and formulate collective identities, both within individual organizations and interorganizational fields (e.g. networks, coalitions, alliances). Organization is thus a strategic resource that helps to translate social and political opportunities in collective action, by defining common objectives and targets, constituencies and memberships, means, and action forms. In this sense, we have to clarify in this final section whether the organizational structure of the unemployment movement helps us understand the upsurge of collective action during the later 1990s. The answer to this question is not self-evident, given the “weakness” of the movement, especially in regard to available resources, political weight, and public visibility. Social exclusion and unemployment engenders a situation of (shared) precariousness, which creates very specific organizational problems: a higher dependency on external resources might endanger the movement’s autonomy; the greater dependency on available access points into the political arena might detach the movement from its grassroots; and the higher need for public awareness might induce the movement to opt for more striking action forms that are difficult to stabilize and scale up. As we will see, the protest waves of the late 1990s demonstrate that activists learned quite successfully to develop an organizational structure that was able to solve these problems. Their organizational adaptations helped to explain why the jobless successfully mobilized in a very specific social and political context. In this regard, our thesis is that the organizational solution consisted in the building of broad coalitions with a low level of formalization and institutionalization. However, while these organizational patterns were able to generate and stabilize collective protest for a certain period of time, the price of this pattern was a sustained fragility (Lahusen and Baumgarten 2006), which is responsible for the transitory nature of the protest waves under analysis. Beginning in the 1980s, the unemployed in our three countries established and stabilized a dense web of associations that centered on mutual aid and political awareness, and thus established an important



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lever for the transition to action (Maurer 2001). The specific structure of this web suggests that mobilization of the unemployed is boosted by a low level of institutionalization of their organizations (Piven and Cloward 1977). Indeed, in our three countries, this organizational web was fragile and fragmented, because it lacked logistic and financial resources, and because it was pervaded by ideological and geographical divisions. In France, cleavages were strong, particularly between a militant tradition of the extreme left, often close to Trotskyist milieus, and a socially inspired Catholicism of varying radicalism. In Italy, these organizations were created along the right-left political divide: the oldest ones like the Movimento per il Lavoro, the Disoccupati Autorganizzati di Acerra, and the Sedile di Porto belong to the radical left wing, whereas a new generation of small associations like Forza Lavoro Disponibile or Lista Flegrea took inspiration from post-fascist ideologies and iconography and found political allies in the right-wing parties. The ideological differences between German unemployed organizations were less marked, however, groups and initiatives were tied either to churches and unions or are explicitly independent, moreover, significant differences persist between organizations from the East and from the West (Gallas 1994). In all countries, activists and groups began to develop more conciliatory and strategic behavior. This shift was dictated by the immediate need of weak actors to fuse their energies and strengths during the 1980s. Consequently, a number of national or local organizations and coalitions of the unemployed were set up (for Germany: BAG-Erwerbslose and KOS; for Italy: Coordinamento per il Lavoro di Napoli), which neither replaced the polycentric structure at the grassroots level (Gerlach 1999) with a hierarchical pattern, nor contributed to overcoming geographical and ideological fragmentations. In most cases, they merely provided some formalized instruments of coordination, brokerage, and public representation. This complex structure was conducive for the organization of the unemployed, because it was built upon a grassroots web of local groups. These latter were much more effective in activating and sustaining constituencies, as they required fewer resources, provided more incentives for participation and generated more control over their members (Olsen 1965). Additionally, collective actions like those discussed here could not occur without close connections between persons sharing the same problems and hopes, a relation that was nurtured primarily in a local context. The organizational resources mobilized by the unemployed were thus varied and diffuse. They were often grounded in daily routine activities like mutual aid, which provided a basis for the development of socialization and a more specifically political engagement (Maurer 2001).





This organizational web was an indispensable precondition for collective action by the jobless. In particular, it enabled the emergence of political entrepreneurs within unions and sponsors, corroborating Michael Lipsky’s dictum: “The ‘problem of the powerless’ in protest activity is to activate third parties to enter the implicit or explicit bargaining arena in ways favorable to protesters” (1970: 2). While it remains true that unions were uncertain and ambivalent allies, union support enabled unemployed mobilization, insofar as unions’ fragmentation offered a greater scope for action to unemployed groups, which played on rivalries and found room to maneuver in a host of possible alliances. The building of broad and loose coalitions was an effective organizational strategy both to activate the complex web of unemployment groups and preserve their autonomy in view of friendly, but more powerful allies. Additionally, they turned out to be effective in helping to overcome the political weakness of the jobless. While protests remained a largely local phenomenon until the early 1990s, this situation changed when activists started mobilizing protest movements in order to increase their own political weight. Particularly in Germany and France, activists could capitalize on controversial debates about national policy reforms directed at changing the face of the traditional welfare state. This move to the national level had beneficial impacts on the local level. It lent legitimacy to local unrest and thus contributed to long-term stability. Moreover, as in the case of Naples, the pressures on the national government could generate “boomerang effects” (Keck and Sikkink 1998) on local authorities (e.g. in increasing their willingness to respond to the needs of the unemployed). This “externalization” exposed, however, the protest to a new set of pressures derived from electoral politics and institutional policy deliberations, which the jobless could hardly control. Moreover, there was the real danger of dislocating protest resources and activities from the local environment, where resources and motivations are generated, as argued earlier.4 The less institutionalized pattern of coalition building proved to be beneficial in this respect as well, because it limited the mandate of national associations and coalitions to tasks of coordination and brokerage, while maintaining the real focus of action on the local level. These less-institutionalized patterns of coalition building remained fragile, however, and were determined by contingent contextual factors. In France, unemployed associations established strong links to militants located close to the extreme left. Leaders commonly made statements that were strongly anti-capitalist, although disassociated from communist ideology. Some of these militants had roots in social



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Catholicism—for example, Christian Working Youth—but more frequently they came from trade unions, generally Trotskyist organizations, but sometimes the French Communist Party or the CGT. These organizational bonds were discrete but effective because they enabled unemployed organizations to preserve the autonomy of their actions, while taking advantage of the experience and material resources of senior activists (who thus became true political entrepreneurs). At the same time, this strategy of coalition building was instable and fragile, as illustrated by the example of AC!. Initially, this coalition gathered intellectuals, trade unionists, and unemployed people, but today the group is almost exclusively composed of the unemployed—demonstrating their capacity to act independently. Unemployed groups in Germany also relied heavily on external support. While they were active in local activities and events, the national protest campaign during the summer of 1998 was instigated and coordinated mainly by the union-funded KOS. Close relations to the unions turned out to be ambivalent, however, given the fact that protest dwindled significantly after national unions discontinued their support over concerns about maintaining good relations with the newly elected Social Democrats. The selective and self-interested support of the unions during the following years aroused much discontent among the unemployed groups, which started from 2002 onwards to build up local “Anti-Agenda 2010,” “Anti-Hartz IV,” and other social forums and round tables throughout German cities. These consisted of welfare organizations, local parishes, ATTAC groups, and some local union branches. They provided a fertile ground for the spread of socalled Monday demonstrations throughout eastern Germany during the summer of 2004. Pragmatic and broad coalitions thus proved to be successful, even though activists struggled to exclude the extreme-right groups who tried to co-opt the demonstrations for their own purposes (Lahusen and Baumgarten 2006; Baumgarten 2003 and 2004). In the Italian case, the unemployed, instead of establishing alliances with the traditional and stronger unions, created a strong network including other unemployed organizations, the radical-left party Rifondazione Comunista, the new radical union Cobas, and other social organizations such as antiglobalization groups. The density of the networks established by organizations of the unemployed depended on the organizations’ nature and composition. In fact there were groups that developed an intense net of contacts, whereas others were more isolated. The latter were those that conceived of their struggle essentially as a pure dispute engaged with public institutions to obtain a





job for their own members. Hence they cooperated with other social actors at best only sporadically. More relevant were groups endowed with social links and whose members approached the organization not only as a means to get a job, but as a “movement” whose claims, while encompassing the basic request for work, embraced a richer range of issues (safe homes, respect for the environment, workers’ rights). In this perspective, the struggle of the unemployed was seen as a component of the larger struggle against social exclusion that needed to be reinforced through the establishment of links with other groups and other experiences. The majority of unemployed groups belonged to this kind of organization. Two of them (Movimento Disoccupati Autorganizzati di Acerra and Coordinamento per il Lavoro di Napoli) were part of the new global network: they were connected with a vast range of social actors, such as squats (centri sociali), communist groups, and critical unions (Cobas and SINCOBAS). These networks were robust to the point that they considered themselves as two branches of the same movement of the unemployed. In sum, we see that growing networks of organizations and groups provided an essential precondition for the mobilization of the unemployed, and the process activated during the 1990s by militants and political entrepreneurs. The poorly institutionalized patterns of coalition building were efficacious to solve specific mobilization problems related to the weakness of this constituency. In fact, such a low level of institutionalization allowed the integration of a highly fragmented area of activists and groups, the neutralization of friendly or unfriendly “takeovers,” and the maintenance of a grassroots focus.

Discussion and conclusions Despite the peaks of mobilization in the three countries, what is most clearly seen is the sporadic—if not to say marginal—character of actions taken. In one of the European democracies’ most relevant problems, the most vulnerable fringe of the population is unable to organize on a lasting basis or to give structured, enduring expression to the main social ill that has been gnawing at it for decades now. Nevertheless, we have discussed several conditions that are conducive to protests by the unemployed: (1) when those affected by joblessness experience the loss of formerly granted rights or goods, (2) when organizations are available to establish a latent protest infrastructure, (3) when political allies and entrepreneurs are recruited to stimulate action, (4) when mass media and public opinion is sympathetic for their quest, and (5) when activists



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engage in empowerment and collective learning with regard to the best way of working the system of available opportunities and constraints. These three countries share similar experiences in this regard, yet they show variations in the interplay between these various explanatory factors. If the mobilization of the marginalized can occur under certain beneficial conditions, what can we say about the future? On the one hand, we might assume that collective action by the jobless is becoming a more normal aspect of political life. In fact, we have argued that a significant structural development is under way, one that facilitates mobilization: the erosion of unionism and of consensual patterns of social partnership and/or neo-corporatism. This trend open the way for more pluralistic contentions fuelled also by political entrepreneurs and minority groups. Moreover, the establishment of an interorganizational network either within countries or across borders reduces the costs of mobilization and facilitates the diffusion of future protests. Finally, we might also assume a collective learning process is under way, according to which activists learn how to mobilize “weak interests” and to capitalize on situational windows of opportunities. On the other hand, these structural changes may not increase protest mobilization if the structural barriers discussed in the chapter remain in place: the effects of social exclusion on atomization and political passivity, the scarcity of resources and the political weakness of the constituency, the heterogeneity of the organizational fields and the fragility of strategic coalitions, and dependency on powerful allies and sympathetic public opinion. In the final analysis, we might assume that structural developments do strengthen latent mobilization potentials, but that collective action still depends on favorable situational factors that the jobless cannot influence themselves. In this sense, the mobilization of the unemployed will remain rare and fragile; yet, this is not so because they are intrinsically reluctant to act collectively, but because they have to surmount significant hurdles in the organization of collective action.

Notes This chapter is reprinted from a previous publication (Baglioni et al. 2008b) and adapted for the present book. 1. The empirical data of this chapter have been gathered primarily by means of semi-structured interviews with key informants. A total number of 117 interviews in the three countries (in Italy 39, in Germany 38, and in France 40 interviews) have been carried out with local and national representatives of





trade unions, employers’ associations, political parties, governmental bodies, organizations of the unemployed, and other civil society groups active in the field. Moreover, organizational ethnography and life history interviews have been carried out specifically with the unemployed organizations and their leaders. Finally, labor policy-related documents of governmental bodies, research agencies, and think tanks, as well as policy actors, have provided an additional empirical database. 2. Unemployment officially did not exist in the former German Democratic Republic, thus there are neither unemployment figures nor reports on any kind of organization of the unemployed. 3. The so-called Monday demonstrations started with about 600 participants in Magdeburg on Monday, July 26, 2004, and went on once a week at a high level of around 80,000 participants in more than 100 cities. About 45,000 participants came to a central demonstration in Berlin on October 2, 2004 (ATTAC, http://www.attac.de/genug-fuer-alle/neuauflage/seiten/veranstaltungen_alt. php (accessed October 29, 2004)). 4. Externalization pressures were weakest in Italy. This was partly due to missed opportunities, and thus a lack of pull-factors (i.e., the lack of wide-ranging government reforms and a related oppositional nationwide protest movement). Moreover, local authorities not only provide social benefits for the unemployed, but also maintain clientelistic relations with jobseekers. Hence, the local responsibility for the delivery of unemployment benefits and job allocation helps to explain why the mobilization of the jobless remained much more strongly attached to the local level in Italy than in the other countries.



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Unemployment Politics and the European Union



Part III




Globalization and the Contentious Politics of Unemployment: Towards Denationalization and Convergence? Christian Lahusen, Marco Giugni, and Michel Berclaz

Introduction We are all inclined to think today that processes of globalization have a strong impact on national political structures and processes. Most commonly, we refer to a gradual transnationalization of economic, political and cultural reality at the national and local level that poses a challenge to national political institutions and public policies, political contentions and national identities. As scholarly literature in sociology and political science has argued recurrently, these processes do not necessarily threaten established nation-states as such, but undermine their political autonomy and power. The nation-state seems to lose its ability to set policy agendas and to define, formulate and implement related public policies, due to the increasing importance of international institutions and regimes on the global and European level (e.g. the United Nations, the World Trade Organization or the World Bank, or the European Union). This development entails a trend toward increasing similarities across countries in certain political fields. The former issue can be referred to as the denationalization thesis, the latter as the convergence thesis. Both issues are assumed to be aspects of a more general trend toward the transnationalization of political processes and structures at the national level. This chapter aims to evaluate these assumptions by analyzing the impact of globalization in the field of unemployment politics in six European countries. This policy field is an interesting case because it remains strictly tied to the national welfare state and its labor market and social policies, yet it is increasingly exposed to global and European discussions about economic competitiveness, better labor market 171



7

Towards Denationalization and Convergence?

performance, new employment strategies and related policy reforms (e.g. activation and flexibilization, employability and flexicurity, lifelong learning), spearheaded among others by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD 1996, 2006) and the European Union (European Commission 1993, European Council 2005). Hence, we should expect moderate, yet perceivable transnationalization effects, particularly because we center on the political dimension within the field of unemployment measures and programs. In fact, it is plausible to assume that national politics are exposed more strongly to global and European debates and reform pressures, and respond more readily to them when compared to public policies, and even more so to national polities, which should be slower to adapt or more reluctant to denationalize and converge. We focus in particular on public debates and collective mobilizations concerning unemployment and the development of these over time. Following a neo-institutional perspective, we argue that the impact of globalization on political claim making in this field is limited by the path dependencies and the strong constraining role of domestic policy arenas and agendas. In order to support this argument, we look at the types of actors mobilized on these issues, their targets and the content of their claims. This general objective divides into two specific goals, related to the two assumptions outlined before. On the one hand, we wish to assess the denationalization thesis. This is done by measuring whether the national arena of political contentions becomes more permeable for supranational actors and thus more determined by a transnational circle of stakeholders. At the same time, we aim to verify whether public issues and policy problems are gradually reframed on a supranational level, implying shifting common societal causes and political responsibilities. On the other hand, we need to assess the possible convergence of national politics in the field of unemployment policies. We need to verify whether national public debates converge over time by strengthening certain stakeholders and mainstreaming the structure of contentious politics in this field. At the same time, we wish to ascertain whether public problems and policy issues converge across countries, for example, following the debates and pressures on the global and European level.1 Our empirical analysis is based on the claim making data gathered in the UNEMPOL research project. One type of information is particularly important for our present purpose: the scope variables. These refer to the political, administrative and/or territorial level to which either the actor of the claim, the addressee of the claim, the issue or thematic



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focus of the claim or the object of the claim refer. Our data distinguishes between the local, regional, national, European and supranational levels. These variables give us a simple but valuable indicator of the scope of claim making in the field of unemployment, thus allowing us to test the hypothesis of a loss of relevance of the national level for public debates in this field and that of an increasing convergence of such debates. The data allows to empirically assess the impact of globalization on the contentious politics of unemployment by looking at the degree of denationalization and convergence of public debates in this field following a longitudinal and comparative research design. Undoubtedly, newspaper data have their limitations, because we are dealing with massmediated, publicized debates. At the same time, however, the mass media are an important arena of political debates and contentions. Therefore, quality newspapers are a good source for the coverage of news of national scope and significance (see Koopmans 1998). Moreover, we are most interested in comparing developments across time, and here we can assume that news coverage provides a consistent and thus reliable picture of discursive developments in the six countries under analysis.

Denationalization and convergence in the field of unemployment politics As with any other large-scale social process, globalization has a number of consequences on the nature and characteristics of social relations. One of its major consequences concerns the nation state. That globalization threatens the importance and autonomy of the nation state can hardly be disputed. The historical process of state formation, which has characterized the past five or six centuries, consisted mainly in the concentration of power and resources within a bounded territory and in the consolidation of this territory. The end result of this process is an increasingly integrated population and an increasingly structured politics within the bounded territory that forms a nation. Its corollary is a strong autonomy of and divergence among the various nations. Mentioning only two studies, Rokkan’s (1970) work attests to this structuring process at the national level, as much as Tilly’s (1990) study of European states shows the divergent paths of state formation. Today, in an era of increasing interconnectedness of cultural, economic and political relations between nations, the question of whether this process has come to an end is a legitimate one. The issue at stake, more specifically, is to know (1) whether and to what extent the national state has lost or is losing its power, autonomy and sovereignty



Christian Lahusen, Marco Giugni, and Michel Berclaz 173


in favor of other (supranational and/or intergovernmental) political entities, and (2) whether and to what extent policy deliberations and policy making within various nation-states have converged or are in the process of converging in those areas where transnational policy agendas have developed. In other words, does globalization lead to a decline in the political sovereignty of European nation-states in regard to national policy deliberations and policy making? Scholarly writing has been ready to concede that globalization processes have some impact on the nation state. However, positions diverge as to the extent of this impact.2 They differ most notably as regards the political impact, the degree of autonomy and the identity of national states (Goldmann 2002). In general, we can distinguish three different scenarios. First, there are many scholars who argue for a significant weakening of the nation state and a notable policy convergence (Mishra 1999). Globalization processes increase the economic, social and cultural interconnectedness of societies and local communities throughout the world, constraining the nation state in various respects: they generate a growing number of common challenges, problems and risks; they promote transnational “epistemic communities” and civil societies that advocate for joint responsibilities; and they push for intergovernmental and/or supranational regimes and institutions (Held et al. 1999). Some herald a global era (Albrow 1996) with a new cosmopolitanism (Archibugi and Held 1995). The process of European integration is part and parcel of these developments, because European nation states agree to tackle global challenges and problems (e.g., competitiveness, migration, climate change etc.) jointly, by committing to an institutional order with a global “European mission” that increasingly affects national policy agendas and legislations by defining problems, setting issues, providing incentives and strengthening political constraints (Beck and Grande 2007; Delanty and Rumford 2005). This scenario stresses the growing ability of intergovernmental and supranational institutions to set policy agendas, thus weakening nation states and their autonomy in defining, formulating and implementing public policies. Hence, they assume processes of denationalization and convergence. A second scenario follows the above-stated assumptions about the causes and processes of globalization, but comes to different conclusions. It argues that globalization does not abandon the idea of the nation state, but rather endorses it as the only universal model of organizing political entities and of addressing societal problems politically (Meyer et al. 1997). The world polity consists of international organizations and regimes, but resides ultimately on nation states.



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This means that globalization might even increase the importance of nation states, because new global issues, challenges and risks call for policy interventions by nation states and for new bargains between them, hence widening the scope of their responsibility and activity. However, while this scenario denies a strong denationalization, it does not exclude the possibility of political convergence. On the contrary, in a globalized world with its international institutions, transnational epistemic communities, professional groups and civil societies we see a steadily increasing diffusion of political ideas, organizational role models, policy ideas and practices, which tend to streamline the political structures and processes across nation states (Meyer 2000; Ramirez et al. 1997). These scholars thus disapprove the denationalization thesis, but endorse fully the convergence thesis. This scenario illustrates that denationalization and convergence are not necessarily complementary processes. One the one hand, there might be denationalization without convergence. Proponents of the concept of “multi-level governance” within the European Union (Marks et al. 1996) argue that European integration has weakened the nationstate by establishing shared competencies and responsibilities between local, regional, national and European institutions. Policy domains and the policy field are thus exposed to processes of Europeanization and regionalization at the same time, implying more supranational coordination and harmonization, but at the same time also more complexity, fragmentation and variety on the national and/or subnational level (Bache and Flinders 2004). On the other hand, we might assume that there is convergence without denationalization. This argument has been proposed by the concept of vertical and horizontal Europeanization of public policies (Radaelli 2000; Schmidt and Radaelli 2004). These scholars aim to understand processes of policy transfer and diffusion and argue for the persistent importance of the nation state (see also Jessop 2004). The nation state is actively involved in designing and diffusing European policies by vertically downloading and uploading policy ideas, regulations and practices. Convergence is even possible in policy fields where the EU has few competencies and little denationalization is to be assumed. In these cases, convergence requires regulatory competition and/or policy learning, thus involving nation-states in a “horizontal” Europeanization of policies, that is, into the crossnational diffusion of ideas, norms, rules and practices (Radaelli 2000). This process is fuelled by intergovernmental negotiations and deliberations within European institutions and policy networks, in particular by the Open Method of Coordination, which puts an emphasis on





benchmarking and policy learning and strives to increase policy coordination and convergence between the participating member states (de la Porte and Pochet 2004). A third scenario argues for the persistent importance of nation states and their respective peculiarities and differences. This position does not ignore globalization processes, but assumes that nation states remain key players both in shaping the transnational order and in politically processing any consequences. Two quite different approaches can be mentioned in this regard. For a neo-realist school, international regimes and European institutions are the product of intergovernmental negotiations that are determined by national interests and bargains (Keohane et al. 1993; Moravcsik 1993). The construction of international institutions and the formulation of transnational policies thus require the consent of sovereign states furthering their specific interests. Moreover, supranational institutions may have a constraining impact on the nation state; however, they remain toothless as long as nation states do not adopt and implement their regulations and policies. The adoption of policy ideas, regulations and measures is thus dependant on national preferences and interests, although policy convergence is possible in case of overlapping national interests or package deals. The second, neo-institutionalist approach questions policy convergence even more, because it points to path-dependencies on both the European and national level (Pierson 1996; Pollack 2004). According to this approach, the European institutions will develop policy ideas and practices that are consistent with previous decisions, established institutional routines and needs, but that might well, however, prove incompatible with national policy agendas, administrative structures, political traditions and cultures prevalent in the various countries. Policy change and convergence is thus strongly dependent on the institutional structure at the national (and subnational) level (Jupille and Caporaso 1999; see also Radaelli 2000). Hence this position does not refute the existence of globalization processes, but denies a significant denationalization of politics and a systematic convergence of policies across countries. These general debates are directly linked to our topic, because research in the social sciences has tried to answer the question whether a specifically European social model is emerging, as promoted by the European Commission since its White Paper on social policy (1994). Social policy is still in the hands of European nation states, but the EU has developed a legal and institutional framework that resides on a common citizenship with basic rights (e.g. the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, drafted in 2000 and in force since the Lisbon Treaty at



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the end of 2009), and shared labor regulations (e.g. in the realm of antidiscrimination and freedom of movement). The Amsterdam Summit of 1997 was an important milestone in this regard because it integrated a chapter on social policy into the European Treaty, thus introducing new policy objectives. Moreover, it gave birth to the Social Dialogue between Employers’ Associations and Unions and to the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), which were adopted as new governance instruments in order to promote cooperation and shared efforts in these fields of action (de la Porte et al. 2001). As a reaction, the European Employment Strategy (EES) was agreed upon at the Luxembourg (1997) and Lisbon (2000) summits in order to develop a more integrated approach in the realm of social and labor market policies. The EES adopted the OMC by committing member states to “bench-marking” and “management by objectives,” and thus to an iterative learning process based on annual monitoring reports, national action plans, policy recommendations by EU institutions and regular evaluation processes. Scholars have discussed the consequences of these developments and their effects on national social and labor market policies (Palier 2000). Still, disagreement prevails. We have skeptics, who stress the weakness of the European Union and see soft governance instruments merely as signs of a new political voluntarism between autonomous nation states (Streeck 1995). And we have proponents, who argue that the Social Charters and social chapters within the European Treaty created a new situation that grants a considerable political authority to the EU in the field of social policies (Pierson and Leibfried 1995). Moreover, we have disagreement in regard to the effects of globalization on the convergence of welfare regimes and social policies. We have scholars who argue for a significant convergence (e.g. Mishra 1999), speaking either about a race to the bottom (Scharpf 2000; Scharpf and Schmidt 2000) or a race to the middle (Alber and Standing 2000), and there are authors who argue that the differences between welfare regimes prevail (e.g. Castels 2004). There is thus little consensus with regard to our research question. This lack of clarity might be due to the fact that scholars focus on a rather wide field of analysis when formulating their conclusions, thus having different aspects and elements in mind. In fact, as soon as we take a closer look at specific policies and measures, the available evidence is more clear. Research on the European Employment Strategy has replicated the above-mentioned dispute (de la Porte and Pochet 2004); however, it has provided more evidence for the skeptical view on the denationalization and convergence of national social and labor market policies. It is argued that the EES has had some impact on the European member states, when





addressing the cognitive dimension of policy goals, ideas and measures, but has had little effect on the level of legal norms and the structure of the political field (Heidenreich and Bischoff 2008; Zeitlin 2005). Moreover, nation states have adopted measures and recommendations, yet in a quite selective way, thus mirroring the specific policy agendas and political structures of each country (Preunkert and Zirra 2009). Hence, we find institutionalist arguments that stress the importance of path dependency and its constraining impact on political change (Jupille and Caporaso 1999; Palier and Bonoli 1999; Pierson 1996, 1998). In sum, scholarly writing has developed a series of assumptions about the effects of globalization on national politics. These need to be assessed in the light of our own data. Indeed, we are able to verify whether globalization and Europeanization has promoted the denationalization and convergence of national politics in the realm of unemployment policies in Europe by looking at the political arenas and policy deliberations within a number of European states. We will be able to verify all three scenarios, because the latter combine the two indicators (i.e. denationalization and convergence) in a specific way: a first position argues for a significant denationalization and convergence of politics and policies in the field of labor market and social welfare; a second sees no marked denationalization, but a significant convergence; and a third denies that denationalization and convergence are relevant process at all, arguing for the persistence of nationally distinct policy domains and political processes. Recent research on the Europeanization of social and labor market policies tends to corroborate this third position. The following analysis will show if this conclusion is correct for the field of unemployment politics.

Actor-level analysis: Actors and addressees We can assess the denationalization thesis by measuring the importance of foreign, intergovernmental and supranational actors within national policy debates in the six countries under analysis. Table 7.1 shows the distribution of claims on unemployment politics according to their scope and by year.3 The scope refers to the territorial extension of the organization or institution making the claim.4 In general, the results point to the weak presence of supranational actors in the public domain. European actors are responsible for merely 3 percent of all public interventions, and other supranational organizations have a similar share. However, more than two thirds of these latter interventions are related to multinational companies and their decisions affecting



178

Supranational (non-EU) European Bilateral or multilateral National Regional Local Total N (unweighted)

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

3.3 3.0 0.3 74.6 5.3 13.5 100% 1026

2.5 1.8 0.2 81.7 7.8 6.0 100% 1350

2.6 6.1 0.1 77.3 5.9 8.0 100% 1223

3.6 5.0 0.1 77.0 6.4 7.9 100% 1252

5.4 3.8 0.7 77.3 7.6 5.2 100% 883

5.9 5.3 0.5 73.9 8.0 6.4 100% 689

4.2 3.3 0.3 77.8 6.7 7.7 100% 968

3.1 2.5 0.6 73.4 8.0 12.4 100% 1399

179



Table 7.1 Distribution of the scope of actors over time (% figures weighted by country)


unemployment at the national level (e.g. relocation, restructuration, dismissals). Very rarely do international institutions (e.g. the OECD, the International Monetary Fund, the International Labor Organization, the World Bank) make their appearance. Moreover, there are important shifts in the distribution of claims over time. Specifically, the presence in the public domain of both categories of supranational actors (European and other supranational) has gone through ebbs and flows. However, it is not possible to discern any significant trend in this respect. Overall, we perceive that European actors were more present within national debates between 1997 and 2000, thus reflecting the policy initiatives taken by the EU to combat unemployment and its negative consequences: the European Employment Strategy in 1997, the European Employment Pact in 1999 and the Lisbon Strategy of 2000. In contrast, nationally bounded actors have largely dominated the political debates on unemployment during the period under study. National actors are, by and large, the principal claim makers in this field, displaying percentages that are on average constantly above 70 percent. The figures do not display any development over time that would indicate a denationalization. Finally, we see that subnational actors play an important, but secondary role within the national public debates. And here again, there is no evidence for a stronger participation of regional and/or local actors. These findings thus corroborate the impression of a strong persistence of national policy domains over time. So far we have centered on the claim-maker organizations, disregarding the other side, that of the actors who are the targets or addressees of claims. This side is of importance for our analysis as well: policy debates might change in the conviction that governance levels are responsible or should take responsibility for the solution of unemployment. If the denationalization thesis is correct, then not only the presence of supranational actors in the public domain should increase at the expense of national ones—which, as we have seen, does not occur—but also, at the same time, public interventions should be increasingly addressed to actors located beyond the national borders. This development would be in line with the European initiatives mentioned above, which claim that the struggle against unemployment requires more transnational coordination and agency. Our data allows an assessment of this thesis because it includes information on the “scope” of targets and addressees. Table 7.2 presents this information broken down by year. Addressees are those actors who are held responsible for acting with regard to the claim or at whom the claim is directly addressed as a call to act.5 In other words, this is the actor at



180

whom a demand is explicitly addressed. This is usually a state actor. The results show once again the centrality of the national level in this field. With only one exception in 2000, 80 percent to 90 percent of the claims target a national actor. All other scopes are rarely mentioned. If we look at the distributions over time, we can see that in some years supranational addressees have played a more important role. Specifically, claims targeting European actors went up significantly between 1997 and 2000. Again, this can be attributed to the European Employment Strategy and the Luxembourg process initiated at the EUlevel in this period. However, it is important to stress that European addressees lose weight after 2000, demonstrating that there is no sustained Europeanization of political responsibilities. Claims addressed to other supranational actors are even less common if we disregard the peak in 2000, which is due primarily to debates about the responsibility of transnational corporations in preventing dismissals and increased unemployment. That same year, the share of nationally addressed claims diminished significantly also due to the sudden increase in claims targeting regional and local actors and calling them to act against unemployment. In general, however, these figures endorse the findings of our previous analysis, because they demonstrate that political debates privilege the nation state as the main responsible entity in regard to the problem of unemployment. Other territorial entities are addressed only temporarily, thus reflecting specific (European, regional and local) problems and/or initiatives. Our data thus disprove the thesis of a denationalization of unemployment politics when looking at policy actors and addressees in political claim making. But this does not exclude the possibility of a gradual convergence, as our theoretical discussion of transnationalization scenarios has illustrated. Assessing this thesis is less straightforward in regard to policy actors because scholarly writing has tended to argue that convergence is related more strongly to the potential diffusion of policy ideas and practices, and less to the structure of public debates. However, the concept of vertical and horizontal Europeanization implies that policy convergence resides on common learning processes, assuming a streamlining of national policy deliberations and a synchronization of national policy arenas. Moreover, we have seen that European (soft and multilevel) governance strives to activate social partners and the regions as important stakeholders and policy brokers. This should strengthen their role within national policy deliberations and mainstream the structure of public debates across countries. Our data allow us to ascertain these assumptions, albeit in a tentative manner.





1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

0.8 2.8 0.4 89.9 1.6 4.5

0.7 2.8 0.4 91.4 2.8 1.9

1.9 13.0 0.0 81.4 0.7 3.0

2.0 6.9 0.1 80.1 3.8 7.1

1.5 9.9 0.9 82.8 3.1 1.8

5.3 6.3 1.4 72.8 6.7 7.5

3.8 4.1 0.3 83.5 3.2 5.1

1.2 2.8 0.3 85.9 2.5 7.3

100% 397

100% 419

100% 489

100% 388

100% 311

100% 413

100% 407

100% 392



182

Table 7.2 Distribution of the scope of addressees over time (% figures weighted by country)

Let us take a closer look at the data provided above. For this purpose, Table 7.3 replicates the findings about the scope of the claim making organizations presented in Table 7.1, but breaks them up by country. It demonstrates that there is not only a very limited and short-lived Europeanization of national public debates, but also that European and supranational actors increase their presence in the public domain in quite different years. European actors are more present in the UK, France and Sweden than in Germany, Italy or Switzerland. Moreover, their presence peaks in very different years: in 1995 they are strong in the UK and Sweden; in 1996 in Italy; in 1997 in France and Sweden; in 1998 in the UK, Italy and Sweden; in 1999 in France, Italy and Germany; in 2000 in Switzerland, France and Sweden; and in 2001 and 2002 in the UK and Italy. The public domain in the various countries seems to open itself up only temporarily to supranational and European organizations, and it does so at different times. This does not mean that there are no common policy deliberations and learning processes across countries, because our data only provide us with a quantitative and not a qualitative picture of national policy deliberations. However, we can exclude the possibility of a structurally synchronized Europeanization of national policy domains, because this would be palpable in a stronger numerical presence of European actors on the national scene in a more sustained and synchronized way. Quite on the contrary, a closer look at the various claims illustrates that interventions of supranational and European actors address most often issues and recommendations of direct relevance to the member state. Hence the presence of supranational organizations in national deliberations seems to require that their interventions resonate with ongoing policy debates and agendas at the national level. The table provides further evidence for a weak convergence of policy domains, if we look at the importance of the regional and local level when compared to the national one. The numbers demonstrate that the structure of the polity makes a big difference. Regional and local actors are more present in national policy debates in federal systems, and less important in unitary systems. More importantly, we do not perceive any consistent changes over time, particularly no significant increase of regional and local actors within the more centralized countries. Only the Italian case seems to indicate a strengthening of regional actors from 2001 onwards. However, this might rather reflect a general pattern within national policy domains: the presence of subnational actors follows cyclical and/or temporal ups and downs, reflecting the specific grievances and initiatives of regions and localities more affected




Supranational (non-EU) UK Switzerland France Italy Germany Sweden European UK Switzerland France Italy Germany Sweden Bilateral or multilateral UK Switzerland France Italy Germany Sweden National UK Switzerland France Italy Germany Sweden

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

3.3

2.5

2.6

3.6

5.4

5.9

4.2

3.1

3.9 2.5 0.0 0.0 11.5 1.9 3.0 6.9 0.0 1.1 1.4 1.7 4.9 0.3 0.0 0.4 1.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 74.6 73.5 58.8 93.8 84.1 77.0 67.0

Regional

5.3

UK Switzerland France Italy Germany Sweden

1.0 17.1 1.0 0.0 8.2 3.9

Local

13.5

UK Switzerland France Italy Germany Sweden Total N

5.9 0.4 1.1 1.9 6.6 0.7 1.8 0.0 0.7 0.0 4.6 1.6 2.9 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 81.7 90.2 57.9 88.2 87.0 74.9 93.6 7.8 3.9 18.6 9.6 1.9 11.9 0.7 6.0

10.6 0.0 1.1 3.8 1.0 0.0

9.5 0.4 1.1 3.7 4.3 0.0

6.1

5.0

4.3 0.0 14.4 3.0 3.4 6.0

12.6 1.3 2.3 4.7 1.6 10.5

0.1

0.1

11.1 2.4 1.3 3.3 3.6 2.3 3.8 3.1 1.8 7.5 4.4 3.7 2.3 0.7

0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.2 0.0

0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0

0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.3 4.7

77.3

77.0

77.3

77.7 56.7 83.3 85.6 83.2 71.6

70.5 57.4 88.5 83.2 79.3 71.1

5.9

6.4

5.3 20.9 0.0 0.0 8.2 4.5

4.2 20.5 3.5 1.5 8.5 7.9

8.0

7.9

75.9 51.8 87.5 87.9 85.4 72.1 7.6 8.0 21.4 1.3 2.2 5.3 9.3 5.2

7.4 5.6 6.4 5.6 12.4 0.0 5.3 1.8 5.1 7.5 0.0 3.1 10.0 0.5 0.0 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 73.9 85.2 49.5 82.8 88.9 70.9 75.0 8.0 5.6 20.1 2.2 1.8 8.5 6.7 6.4

8.6 3.0 0.0 0.0 6.5 2.0 3.3 5.0 3.0 1.1 5.2 1.5 4.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 77.8 74.1 58.9 93.6 82.8 86.2 76.0 6.7 5.8 15.7 4.2 3.4 1.9 8.0 7.7

5.4 1.6 1.1 1.2 10.5 0.0 2.5 9.1 0.7 1.1 4.2 2.2 1.2 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.6 73.4 78.2 52.8 85.4 78.7 78.9 80.9 8.0 0.0 18.9 2.3 4.1 7.9 4.8 12.4

14.7 21.2 3.1 14.5 1.4 22.3

0.0 22.1 1.1 4.6 4.5 2.1

2.1 22.4 1.2 6.8 4.0 17.9

3.2 20.0 4.6 6.9 6.1 10.5

1.9 22.6 1.2 2.2 1.7 9.3

0.0 17.3 1.1 3.7 5.1 8.3

6.5 19.6 1.1 8.6 1.9 10.0

7.3 26.0 10.1 11.8 0.5 9.5

100% 1042

100% 1375

100% 1259

100% 1298

100% 900

100% 733

100% 989

100% 1420



Table 7.3 Distribution of the scope of actors by country over time (%)

by unemployment. Hence we cannot conclude that there is a structural regionalization and/or localization of policy deliberations, in spite of the attention the EU pays to regional development and social cohesion. Another way to verify the convergence thesis is to look at specific policy actors. According to the instruments and concepts of European soft governance, the EU puts a particular emphasis on social and civil dialogue in order to promote policy learning and coordination between countries (European Commission 1993, 1994; de la Porte et al. 2001). Moreover, scholars of transnationalization have repeatedly argued that civil societies, epistemic communities and professional groups are the main promoters of globalization and Europeanization processes, because they organize and orient themselves more transnationally (Meyer et al. 1997; Meyer 2000), thus exposing the nation state to processes of transnationalization and convergence. The simplest way to assess these developments is to look at the presence of state actors (government, legislative, judiciary, public administration) in the public domain. Policy domains should converge in limiting the presence of the nation state, when compared with non-state actors (e.g. social partners, welfare associations, professional and epistemic groups). The centrality of state actors is measured by their relative weight in claim making on issues pertaining to unemployment politics. Table 7.4 shows the distribution of actors in claim making on unemployment politics for each year of the period under study. A cursory look at the table suggests that convergence in this field was far from occurring between 1995 and 2002. What we observe is a series of distinct country-specific evolutions rather than a common pattern or trend. For example, while in France the share of state actors almost halves from 1997 onwards, it increases significantly during 1998 and 1999 in Sweden. More generally, while in some of the countries state actors are more important at the beginning than at the end of the period under study, in other countries the reverse is true. The share of public claims made by political parties diverges as well between the various countries: they are stronger in Sweden in 1995 and 1996, in the UK in 1996 and in Switzerland in 1995, 1997 and 2001, while being more important in 1998 and 1999 in France, from 1997 until 1998 in Italy, and in 1997 and 2002 in Germany. Similar ups and downs apply to the other actor types of relevance here, when calculating the presence for them separately. Our data expose, for instance, that social partners were able to dominate national deliberations with a significant share of claim making at quite different times: in the UK they were particularly strong between 1998 and 1999, in




Share of actor types in claim making by country over time (%) 1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

45.9 3.7 26.6 18.3 5.5 100% 109

20.0 20.0 43.6 16.4 0.0 100% 55

33.0 10.0 23.0 24.0 10.0 100% 100

34.7 0.0 60.0 3.2 2.1 100% 95

25.1 3.8 51.9 10.4 8.8 100% 183

33.3 5.6 44.4 7.4 9.3 100% 54

39.9 2.1 46.1 7.0 4.9 100% 143

53.7 0.0 31.5 13.0 1.8 100% 54

47.2 14.0 21.4 1.8 15.6 100% 271

48.1 8.8 23.2 3.4 16.5 100% 297

44.3 14.6 20.9 3.5 16.7 100% 287

51.5 11.7 19.0 1.3 16.5 100% 231

48.1 8.0 24.1 2.7 17.1 100% 187

43.1 8.7 27.4 10.4 10.4 100% 241

31.8 13.5 46.4 2.0 6.3 100% 252

29.5 10.1 42.6 2.8 15.0 100% 467

50.0 19.8 16.0 1.9 12.3 100% 106

43.1 7.9 29.4 4.9 14.7 100% 102

38.3 17.6 29.8 2.1 12.2 100% 188

24.0 24.0 21.9 1.0 29.1 100% 96

28.6 20.2 34.5 0.0 16.7 100% 84

23.3 12.6 44.7 0.0 19.4 100% 103

32.4 15.2 34.3 12.4 5.7 100% 105

39.3 19.1 33.7 0.0 7.9 100% 89

UK State actors Parties Social partners Experts, think tanks Others Total N Switzerland State actors Parties Social partners Experts, think tanks Others Total N France State actors Parties Social partners Experts, think tanks Others Total N



186

Table 7.4

State actors Parties Social partners Experts, think tanks Others Total N

26.1 5.8 50.7 13.0 4.4 100% 69

39.8 13.0 38.0 3.7 5.5 100% 108

40.1 16.7 31.1 4.5 7.6 100% 132

41.0 20.9 31.7 1.4 5.0 100% 278

51.6 9.7 35.5 0.0 3.2 100% 93

40.3 10.5 43.9 1.8 3.5 100% 57

41.4 15.5 36.2 3.4 3.5 100% 58

28.8 11.8 51.2 0.6 7.6 100% 170

31.0 5.8 54.5 5.4 3.3 100% 448

32.1 11.8 46.1 7.0 3.0 100% 713

31.1 16.4 39.7 7.6 5.2 100% 541

31.8 11.8 40.4 7.7 8.3 100% 601

39.4 6.3 41.3 10.5 2.5 100% 363

36.3 5.6 44.8 8.1 5.2 100% 270

34.5 9.0 47.3 7.1 2.1 100% 423

32.0 15.7 39.1 11.9 1.3 100% 613

45.3 21.7 15.1 13.2 4.7 100% 106

43.9 17.6 27.7 5.4 5.4 100% 148

47.9 7.0 29.6 5.6 9.9 100% 71

81.6 0.0 7.9 7.9 2.6 100% 38

70.2 10.6 12.8 4.3 2.1 100% 47

63.5 4.8 20.6 6.3 4.8 100% 63

54.7 15.1 15.1 11.3 3.8 100% 53

54.1 10.6 17.6 11.8 5.9 100% 85

Germany State actors Parties Social partners Experts, think tanks Others Total N Sweden State actors Parties Social partners Experts, think tanks Others Total N


187

Notes: The two highest scores are highlighted in each row, unless the second score is less than half of the highest one. Other actors include, among others: welfare associations, churches, media, journalists and other professional groups, unemployed organizations, unorganized unemployed and other unorganized collectivities


Italy


Switzerland in 2001 and 2002, in France in 2000, in Italy in 1995 and 2002, in Germany in 1995 and 2001, and in Sweden in 1996 and 1997, where they made one out of three claims. A similar observation applies to the role of experts and think tanks: they were particularly present in the UK during 1995–7, in Switzerland in 2000, in France in 2001, in Italy in 1995, in Germany in 1999 and 2002, and in Sweden in 1995 and 2002. In sum, we see that actor types (states, parties, social partners, experts) play a different role in each of the countries under study, when considering the differing share of these actors within public policy debates. Moreover, their appearance within the public sphere varies quite strongly between the countries. These observations suggest that the distinctive presence of policy actors does not follow common learning processes and policy deliberations across countries, but rather country-specific policy cycles (e.g. problem definition, program formulation, implementation, evaluation etc.). Overall, the actor-level analysis casts some serious doubts on the denationalization and convergence theses, at least in the field of unemployment politics. First of all, national actors remain solidly at the center of public debates on issues pertaining to employment and unemployment politics. Secondly, no consistent shift from the national to the supranational level can be discerned. When changes do occur, they seem related to specific circumstances rather than to an impact of globalization and changes in the international context that would displace the locus of the political process in this field. Finally, the convergence thesis could not be verified, as country-specific patterns of the policy domain remain in place. Moreover, the presence of policy actors in political claim making seems to follow country-specific policy cycles rather than transnational or pan-European policy deliberations and learning processes.

Content-level analysis: Issues and objects The findings concerning actors and addressees do not reveal any consistent pattern of denationalization and convergence in the field of unemployment politics. The question now is whether the same conclusion applies when we move from the actor-level to the level of the policy agendas, that is, the issues and objects of claims. In this respect, the denationalization thesis would suggest that, while the actors involved in claim making might remain firmly located at the national level, the very content of claims might be shifting to the supranational one. Table 7.5 shows the distribution of claims over time according to the scope of the issues they address. This refers to the geographical and/or



188

political scope of the issue: it demonstrates in principle whether policy actors talk about unemployment as a local, regional, national, European or worldwide phenomenon. The results largely reflect those found for the scope of actors and addresses. The national level is, by and large, the most important one, whereas supranational issues never reach 10 percent of all claims overall. Most importantly, we do not observe any trend toward an increase in supranational issues or, conversely, a decline of national or subnational ones. The distribution of nationallybounded claims, in particular, displays strong stability over time. Once again, claims with a European scope show the pattern observed for actors and addresses; that is, a more important role played between 1997 and 2000, as compared to the remainder of the period. One out of five claims address the topic of unemployment and unemployment policies as a regional and local reality, most often mirroring the regional disparities in regard to economic performance and exclusion from the labor market. Very similar patterns can be observed when we look at the objects of claims on unemployment politics. While the issues refer to the thematic focus of claims (e.g. economic performance, youth unemployment, social benefits), the object refers to the constituency to which the claim is addressed. More precisely, the object is the actors or groups whose interests are at stake and are affected by the realization of the claim. Basically, most actors make claims on behalf of the unemployed (e.g. jobless in general or more specific groups, such as youth, migrants, women, elderly) or on behalf of workers and employees who are threatened with job losses. If the denationalization of public debates is true on the level of public agendas and issues, then this should also modify this aspect of claim making by privileging supranational and/or transnational objects (e.g. the workforce of a multinational company, the European labor force and jobless population) at the expense of national, regional or local ones. Table 7.6 shows the distribution of claims according to the scope of their objects. Unsurprisingly, we find once again that national objects are most often implied by the claims, followed by subnational ones. Similarly to what we found for actors, addressees and issues, supranational objects play only a marginal, although not totally insignificant role, hence casting further doubts on the argument that globalization and Europeanization changes the scope of political processes and debates, which so far were firmly anchored in the nation state. Furthermore, the longitudinal look does not provide more support to the denationalization thesis. Once more, no trend can be discerned from the data. If any change occurred at all, this consists in an increase of European objects




1995 Supranational (non-EU) European Bilateral or multilateral National Regional Local Total N (unweighted)

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

1.2 4.9 0.7 72.3 8.6 12.3

0.8 4.9 0.5 76.7 10.9 6.2

1.0 9.5 0.3 73.4 5.3 10.5

2.0 6.3 0.6 67.2 13.9 10.0

2.7 8.1 0.6 68.5 8.4 11.7

2.4 5.1 0.1 72.3 10.9 9.2

1.3 2.4 0.5 69.9 8.7 17.2

1.9 2.4 0.0 74.0 8.8 12.9

100% 1044

100% 1357

100% 1231

100% 1265

100% 891

100% 703

100% 973

100% 1413



190

Table 7.5 Distribution of the scope of issues over time (% figures weighted by country)


1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

1.6

1.0

0.6

0.7

0.6

2.6

1.5

1.7

5.0 0.5 73.5 8.0 11.4 100% 1037

4.7 0.5 75.8 12.0 6.0 100% 1335

10.0 0.3 75.0 5.5 8.6 100% 1228

5.9 0.3 68.8 14.0 10.3 100% 1220

7.1 0.8 71.8 8.2 11.5 100% 890

5.0 0.1 72.9 10.3 9.1 100% 702

2.5 0.9 70.8 8.2 16.1 100% 951

2.6 0.2 75.6 7.9 12.0 100% 1405

191



Table 7.6 Distribution of the scope of objects over time (% figures weighted by country)


from 1996 onward, but then a decrease in the last two years of the period under study that brought the share of claims with a European object back to a level even lower than in the mid 1990s. Here again, we see that the employment initiatives of the EU had only a temporary effect on national policy deliberations. In a way similar to what was done earlier for the actor-level analysis, we can test the convergence thesis by looking at the issues raised in public debates on unemployment. Table 7.7 shows the development over time of the debates in our six countries separately for the three main issue areas: socioeconomic issues (e.g. economic performance, economic and labor market policies), welfare systems and social benefits (e.g. insurance systems, social assistance) and individual insertion into the labor market (e.g. activation, training, education). The figures do not give any hints as to a potential convergence of policy deliberations across countries. In regard to socioeconomic issues, the debates do not change within most countries and, while the debate is increasingly important in Switzerland, it is less important in Sweden toward the end of our period under analysis. In regard to the other two groups of issues, we do not perceive any rapprochement as well. For sure, there are strong ups and downs in the related public debates. However, national debates rarely devote themselves with more attention to the same issue group at the same time. Moreover, we still can differentiate between the countries by the importance they accord to passive and/or active labor market issues, for example, distinguishing Italy on the one hand, and Sweden on the other. These findings mirror the policy priorities of the welfare regimes (Esping-Anderson 1996) in these countries: the residual role of the welfare state in Italy; the proactive role of the universalistic welfare state in Sweden with its strong focus on labor market insertion; the stronger focus of the liberal welfare system on active measures in the UK; and the concern of the conservative welfare system in France for social insurances and benefits. Our data therefore illustrates that political debates follow country-specific agendas tied back to the specificities of the various welfare systems involved, rather than reflecting transnational policy deliberations and learning processes. In sum, the findings concerning the issues and objects largely reflect those found for the actors and addresses. The results provide little support for the denationalization and convergence thesis and, more generally, to arguments that point to a substantial impact of globalization processes on national politics. Claims dealing with issues concerning the nation state dominate the public debates, whereas supranational issues are relatively marginally addressed, except in some specific and



192

Socioeconomic issues 1995 UK Switzerland France Italy Germany Sweden

76.7 68.3 60.8 87.0 80.7 68.6

1996 86.3 70.0 62.6 89.8 81.4 68.1

1997 76.6 60.9 79.3 84.6 83.7 60.9

1998 85.4 63.0 49.4 93.0 87.1 52.8

1999

2000

2001

2002

84.0 71.8 76.9 89.0 86.2 59.1

72.5 85.3 48.9 90.7 89.1 56.9

85.6 87.1 82.4 91.4 84.4 53.8

1999

2000

2001

8.9 8.6 16.7 4.4 7.3 25.0

13.7 21.3 50.0 11.1 8.9 22.4

5.8 12.0 13.2 1.7 12.0 34.6

1999

2000

2001

2002

12.4 26.4 10.3 9.9 14.0 31.8 901

13.7 13.7 30.0 3.7 10.9 20.7 708

12.2 7.1 9.9 0.0 14.4 25.0 983

29.6 7.3 17.0 6.5 19.6 30.1 1427

85.2 77.6 53.4 90.5 78.8 43.4

Welfare system and social benefits 1995 UK Switzerland France Italy Germany Sweden

24.3 24.1 26.8 4.3 11.8 26.7

1996 11.8 12.5 27.5 0.9 9.0 25.5

1997 14.9 20.7 10.7 10.8 6.0 17.2

1998 11.2 16.0 57.5 1.8 7.1 25.0

2002 14.8 17.6 36.4 5.3 15.8 19.3

Individual insertion into the labor market 1996

1997

1998

23.3 14.1 20.6 4.3 19.3 27.6 1064

3.9 20.0 12.1 5.6 14.3 17.7 1361

37.2 20.3 16.6 5.4 16.5 18.8 1233

7.9 21.0 10.3 5.9 10.6 16.7 1267


193

UK Switzerland France Italy Germany Sweden N

1995


Table 7.7 Share of issue areas in claim making by country over time (%)


contingent situations. The same applies to the objects of claims, which are almost entirely located within the national boundaries. Finally, as for the actors, the issues of claim making do not mirror common policy agendas and deliberations, but rather seem to reflect the policy priorities and concerns of the various welfare regimes institutionalized in the six countries under study.

Conclusion Our empirical assessment of the impact of globalization on the patterns of claim making on unemployment politics in six countries cast doubts on both the denationalization and the convergence theses, at least in this policy field. Globalization has not fundamentally altered the structure of contentious politics in the field of unemployment. National actors remain central as makers of claims, as targets of claims and as objects of claims. Furthermore, national issues are firmly at center stage. In contrast, supranational actors, addresses, objects and issues represent only a minority of claims in this field. Most importantly, no significant trend can be discerned in the distribution of claims according to these four scope variables. Thus, at both the actor-level and the content-level, the nation state remains the crucial frame of reference in claim making on unemployment politics. In addition, no convergence of public debates on unemployment can be discerned. Quite on the contrary, we observe country-specific evolutions that suggest that national processes and structures remain predominant in influencing claim making in this field. Unemployment is still predominantly identified as a regional or national problem, and rarely as a shared, European and/or international phenomenon. Moreover, demands for solutions are most often addressed to the nation state, the traditional repository of policy responsibilities, and this also applies to the recommendation that nation states should participate more actively in policy learning, cooperation and coordination. Thus our study confirms the assessment made by other authors concerning European countries: “The field where the impact of globalization seems the weakest is social policies, which is less directly affected by the globalization process, than it is by internal factors” (Mach 1999: 17). In a nutshell, supranational pressures are what national actors can make of them. Supranational actors and issues seem only to gain weight in public debates in a conjunctural way or when related to specific events at the national level that focus on supranational actors and issues. In other words, there are important situational impacts generated by supranational institutions and policy arenas on the national level,



194

but no structural transformation of the latter toward an increasing transnationalization or supranationalization of politics. The strongest impact of this kind was unveiled in regard to European initiatives to combat unemployment (in particular, the European Employment Strategy of 1997, the European Employment Pact of 1999 and the Lisbon Strategy of 2000). However, these initiatives had no lasting effects on the national policy agendas and arenas. Most importantly, processes of path dependency and the memory of political institutions pose important barriers to the impact of globalization on the national public debates, specifically in the political field of unemployment. In fact, European nation states have developed distinct welfare regimes with different policy agendas and arenas: they prioritize different issues and privilege different actors and priorities, and thus trigger countryspecific policy debates and cycles. The latter effectively constrain transnational learning-processes with their potential effects on policy convergence and denationalization, because the participating national actors remain solidly integrated within national arenas and agendas of problem definition and solving. To be sure, our empirical assessment of the denationalization and the convergence theses is only a partial one, limited to the ways in which political debates over unemployment are framed in the public domain. In fact, when interpreting our findings, we need to be aware of an intervening process of media selection, given the fact that we collected only statements and interventions publicized by national newspapers. This factor, however, is not an empirical limitation per se. The fact that we collected publicized claims rather than events without media attention is an advantage rather than a limitation. Here we are interested in claim making, that is, strategic interventions in the public domain on given issues and/or on behalf of given groups, and the newspapers are arguably one of the main—if not the main—arenas in which this can be seen (Koopmans et al. 2005). Moreover, there might be different media selection processes in the various countries under analysis, but since we are looking at distributions over time of claims at the aggregate level rather than comparing newspapers among each other we have no reason to think that the selection has changed in time. Still, we need to recall that our data are unable to measure more indirect and less visible or hidden effects of globalization. In fact, the latter has an impact that goes well beyond public awareness and mass media news reporting. Concerning the potential impact of Europeanization, for example, there are several mechanisms through which it can affect the member states: institutional compliance may force a member state to adopt a model that is prescribe by the EU; the EU may be responsible





for a redistribution of resources among domestic actors that lead to a change in the opportunity structures; the EU may alter the beliefs of domestic actors and cause a change in policy framing; the legislation in a member state can be challenged through judicial review if the country fails to adopt EU legislation; and, finally, dismantling trade barriers may lead to a regulatory competition between member states over the presence of key firms (see Börzel and Risse 2000). The main point suggested by these processes with respect to our present argument is that the impact of Europeanization might be more important in an indirect way by changing the balance of power between actors within countries. Similar processes may also be at work as a more general effect of globalization. Furthermore, concerning the transformation of political opportunity structures, several scholars have stressed that globalization (e.g. Hirst and Thompson in Shin 2000) and Europeanization (e.g. Palier 2000) have an impact through the ideological, cognitive and normative harmonization of policy measures and paths in the field of economic and social policy. Evidence for these limited and indirect effects have been provided by the research on the Open Method of Coordination (Zeitlin et al. 2005; Heidenreich and Bischoff 2008), and on the horizontal Europeanization of public debates in a number of issue fields (Lahusen 2009; Seifert 2006; Trenz 2004). As a result, we cannot exclude indirect, implicit or hidden effects of globalization processes on national unemployment policies. In fact, our data even unveiled temporary and partial impacts on national politics. However, we could exclude a structural transformation of national policy arenas and agendas, in particular a transnationalization of policy deliberations on unemployment. Our findings thus allow us to confront competing assumptions within scholarly writing in a specific field of political action. Indeed, we could not attest to a denationalization and convergence of politics toward “cosmopolitan” policy learning, coordination or formulation at the European or global level. Neither could we confirm the assumption of a multilevel governance in the realm of unemployment politics, which argues for an Europeanization and regionalization of politics at the expense of the nation state. Our data rather conform to the opinion of world culture analysts, who speak of the nation state as the continuing role model for political governance (Meyer 2000; Meyer et al. 1997). Yet we need to disagree with them when they argue for an underlying process of policy diffusion and convergence across countries. Our data seem to corroborate the neo-institutionalists’ assumption that nation states still matter in regard to the governance of societal problems, and that globalization and



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Europeanization processes have to count with the intervening impact of national path dependencies in regard to policy agendas and arenas, institutional structures and political processes (Pierson 1996; Palier and Bonoli 1999; Pollack 2004). Hence, it might well be that supranational institutions play an active role in the constitution of specific opportunity structures that constrain the autonomy of national and/or local polities. However, our findings suggest that we cannot understand the political reality in the field of unemployment policies without taking a careful look at the role of the nation state, and the specific policy agendas and arenas it shelters. In this sense, we do not oppose scholarly assumptions about the globalization of politics, but wish to qualify them by grounding them in empirical evidence.

Notes 1. In the following we will refer primarily to globalization, but will relate it also to regional integration processes such as European integration. While both levels are not identical, assuming that Europeanization involves proper actors, issues, arenas and institutional frameworks, we think that there are enough interrelations in order to justify a reference to globalization as a broader category of various processes of denationalization and transnationalization. Europeanization will be used in case of an exclusive reference to processes of European integration. 2. See Lane and Ersson (1996) for a position stressing convergence and Kitschelt et al. (1999) for a position underscoring divergence. See Marks et al. (1996) for a discussion of these two approaches with respect to the European Union. 3. In this table as well as in Tables 7.2, 7.5 and 7.6, the percentages are based on figures weighted by country. This is due to the very different amount of retrieved claims in the six countries. To prevent the results being biased toward the countries in which a larger amount of claims was found and therefore distorting the general picture across countries, we weighted the figures. It should be stressed however, that the general picture does not change significantly when calculating with unweighted figures. 4. We distinguish between six levels of scope: supranational (e.g. the United Nations, global companies), European (e.g. the European Commission), bilateral or multilateral (e.g. a joint French-German organization), national (e.g. the British government), regional (e.g. a Swiss canton) and local (e.g. the city of Turin). For unorganized collectivities and groups, the level of scope refers to the scope of mobilization. 5. The figures concerning the addressees must be taken with some care, as the proportion of missing data is particularly high, as compared to the other variables. Only in one out of three cases of claim making do organizations explicitly name an addressee.




Europeanization and the EU Supranational Multiorganizational Field of Unemployment: Elite-Dominance or New Opportunities? Paul Statham and Manlio Cinalli

Introduction1 Other chapters look at national public debates and the multiorganizational field (Curtis and Zurcher 1973) over issues relating to unemployment and the unemployed, within a cross-national comparative framework, and between the national and supranational level of decision making. An important general focus of the overall study is the degree of inclusiveness of public debates and multiorganizational fields toward different actor types, with a special focus on the potential for the constituency of the unemployed, and those interest groups and NGOs who make demands on their behalf in the public domain. In this chapter, the focus turns on Europeanization trends within public policy debates over unemployment and their consequences, on the one side, and the nature of the multiorganizational field that has emerged at the supranational level on the other. In this way we aim to contribute to the study of the accessibility of decision making to non-state actors under conditions of Europeanization, through an examination of the public policy field over unemployment and the unemployed. Our study of the European level is twofold: first, we examine public debates over unemployment and, second, we examine the networks of actor relationships that occur over policies relating to unemployment at the supranational European level. The first empirical part is based on an analysis of claim making data. It starts with an analysis of the visible presence of Europe in national public debates. We examine the degree to which European actors are visible generally in public debates over unemployment and compare 198



8

this to their presence in debates that are Europeanized, by which we mean debates that are produced by claims that make references in some way to European actors, European issue framings or European policies. Then we go on to study whether the Europeanization of public policy debates over unemployment facilitates or hinders the presence of different actor-types. In particular, we compare the degree to which civil society actors are able to enter and shape the public policy discourse—by successfully mobilizing claims through mass-mediated debates—relative to powerful executive and elite actors, and in which way the balance shifts under conditions of Europeanization. In short, do public policy debates over unemployment become more or less inclusive when they Europeanize? In the second empirical part of the study, we shift attention to the European level and an aspect that is not made publicly visible by reporting in the mass media. We examine the substantive types of relationships between collective actors that constitute a multiorganizational public policy field over unemployment at the European level. This empirical part is based on network analysis, whereby we study the relationships of influence, cooperation and disagreement between collective actors in the multiorganizational field. Here the aim is to see to what degree the EU supranational level public policy field is inclusive of civil society relative to executive and elite actors, and to assess the substantive power relationships that are evident in underpinning the patterns of relationships between actors. In short, is the EU supranational public policy field characterized by inclusive or elite-dominated political relationships, is it contentious, and where are the conflict lines, if any, drawn? Taken together, the first empirical part looks at how accessible Europeanized public debates over unemployment are to the public via mass media, and who gains in discursive influence (executive elites versus civil society) as a consequence of Europeanization, whereas the second part addresses how accessible European supranational public policy fields are to European interest groups and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and who holds the power.

Europeanized public debates over unemployment: Visible and inclusive? European integration unavoidably implies a redistribution of power, not just institutionally, but also regarding public debates and political mobilization (Statham 2007), and the power relationships between collective actors (Marks and McAdam 1996). The transfer of competencies



Paul Statham and Manlio Cinalli 199

Europeanization and the EU Field of Unemployment

from national to intergovernmental and supranational European arenas opens up opportunities and makes resources available for some actors, but not—or not to the same extent—for others. Also, an erosion of national sovereignty may improve the opportunities of some actors, but negatively affect those of actors who already had established access to national resources and opportunity structures. Often the European Union and other European institutions are depicted as counterweights to entrenched national power, that offer new opportunities of influence for interest groups, NGOs and other civil society actors (Trenz and Eder 2004). For example, Hix and Goetz (2000) comment on how advancing European integration may benefit not just resourceful elite actors, but also actors who are relatively weak in the domestic arena. They draw the optimistic conclusion that “the openness of the EU policy process and the pursuit of neo-pluralist strategies by the Commission (such as subsidizing under-represented groups) ensure that both diffuse and concentrated interests tend to be able to pursue exit and veto opportunities and have access to key information” (2000: 14). A similar viewpoint comes from perspectives in the literatures on transnationalism and postnationalism. Many transnationalists follow Nye and Keohane (1971: 332), who see transnationalism as the “movement of tangible and intangible goods across state boundaries” where “at least one actor is not an agent of government or an international organization.” Following this definition, to be “European transnational” relations are required to be ties and interactions that extend beyond a country’s national borders and that are inclusive of non-state actors. In a similar vein, some authors studying transnational activism point toward new opportunities for civil society actors and nongovernmental organizations to gain domestic power by addressing their demands on a political institutional level above the nation state, through so-called boomerang effects (e.g. Keck and Sikkink 1998). Likewise, advocates of post-national citizenship emphasize new possibilities for mobilization by actors from civil society as a result of globalization processes. They argue that even weak groups, such as migrants, have their rights enhanced—against a supposedly restrictive nation state—by being able to draw on resources of international human rights regimes and discourses (e.g. Soysal 1994). In this part of the chapter we investigate the empirical merits of these different views by examining the consequences of Europeanization for the inclusiveness of public debates over unemployment. Whether government and executive elites, or alternatively civil society actors, are relatively over- or underrepresented within Europeanized public



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debates, when compared to those that remain purely national, gives a strong indication of who wins and who loses in discursive influence and power as a result of advancing European integration. Our approach takes its cues from the emerging research field on the European public sphere.2 Such research starts from the well-founded assumption that, in the absence of a supranational mass media, Europeanized communication is not simply going to replicate the emergence of national public spheres at a higher political level, but grows from within national public spheres, which become more or less inclusive of other political levels and national discourses from other European countries (Schlesinger 1999; Gerhards 2000). Most empirical studies on the European public sphere that have appeared over the last decade take the political contents of high-circulation national media, usually newspapers, as their data sources. This approach takes the news supplied by national mass media as a proxy for an individual citizen’s access to political information about European multilevel governance. In this view, it is the public visibility and inclusiveness of the EU, and other European member states, within a given domestic public sphere that determines the extent and form of the Europeanization of public debates. Typically, studies collect news data covering several countries and/or have a time dimension that allows for investigating trends for the increasing interpenetration, synchronization and/or convergence of Europeanized communication within and across national public spheres. Common research questions include: is there sufficient political communication and interaction across borders and political levels; and what are the prevalent forms of Europeanized communication? Regarding public sphere development, a first important dimension is the visibility of Europe to its publics. For there to be anything that meaningfully resembles a public sphere, European policy decision making needs to be visible to citizens. Essential here is the performance of mass media in making Europe visible to people. Second, the degree to which Europe is inclusive of its publics is also important. This refers to the accessibility of European policy decision-making to the publics, either through interest representation (by political parties, or interest groups) or by collective action mobilized from civil society. Here it is the democratic performance of the political system that matters and the degree to which the public is able to gain formal access to, and be included within, public debates about European decision-making processes (for a detailed discussion, see Statham 2010). The visibility of European-level decision making supplied by massmediated public debates is important; first, because it allows the public





an opportunity to see what decisions are being made and by whom and, second, because mediated public debates are a forum in which collective actors and social movements attempt to mobilize alternative viewpoints. Social movement research points out that actors from civil society often use public strategies of mobilization through the mass media in an attempt to gain influence indirectly over decision makers when direct institutional channels of access to policy domains are blocked (e.g. Kriesi 2004b). In addition, mediated debates over public policy allow decision makers to listen to and sometimes respond to expressed alternative viewpoints. Overall, then, visible public debates carried by the mass media supply important resources of accountability, responsiveness and legitimacy to public policy decision making in modern democracies (Ferree et al. 2002; Koopmans 2007). This raises questions of how well equipped these mass-mediated debates are to perform in a system of multilevel governance where policy competences have shifted to a significant degree to a political level beyond the nation state. In this chapter we use claim making data from the six countries in our study to examine Europeanization trends in public policy debates over unemployment. Such claim making data is specifically appropriate and designed for this type of public sphere analysis. Europeanization trends of public debates can emerge in several forms across national public spheres. It is common to refer to vertical and horizontal forms of Europeanization when describing trajectories of European public sphere development (see Koopmans and Statham 2010, especially Chapter 2).3 Vertical and horizontal communication flows are distinct from those that remain contained within a national domestic public sphere. They indicate the degree of openness or closure of a national public sphere, up to the EU level (vertical) or across to other European countries (horizontal). Vertical Europeanization consists of communicative linkages between the supranational EU and national-level polity—either “bottom-up” or “top-down”—that appear in a domestic public sphere. Conversely, horizontal Europeanization consists of communicative linkages between one or more European polities. When contrasted with communication that remains national, the vertical and horizontal dimensions allow one to analyze the extent, form and shape of the emerging European public sphere. In this chapter we are interested in the visible presence of the European level within public debates over unemployment, and so we examine vertical forms of Europeanized debates, produced by claims where at least one claim maker, addressee or issue framing has a European-level scope, and that are compared to those that remain contained within the national domestic level. This type



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of Europeanization occurs either “top-down” when actors, institutions and issue framings from the European-level appear in public debates in national news media, or “bottom-up” when national or subnational actors address or refer to European institutions, issues, legal frameworks, norms and identities in their claim making acts. Claim making analysis (Koopmans and Statham 1999a) provides the relevant information from “claims” that we need to answer our research question: whether an actor making a claim is from the European level; whether a claim refers only to national normative, institutional and spatial contexts; or whether it includes references to the European level. Note also that we include claims regardless of who makes them and where they are made, which means the data includes claims by a wide range of different types of collective actor. Turning now to our empirical study, our central questions are: to what degree are European actors visible in public debates over unemployment, and which type of actors are able to exert discursive power in the public debates that are Europeanized, compared to those that remain “purely” national? Analyzing which actors are relatively overand underrepresented in Europeanized claim making indicates who benefits most from this public sphere aspect of Europeanization. So we examine the Europeanization of public debates over unemployment, and whether this alleviates, or exacerbates, the discursive power differentials between actors. First, an important indicator for the Europeanization of public policy debates is the degree to which European actors are visible. The more that European actors are able to voice their demands as claim makers, and the more that European actors are the addressees of demands raised by the claims of other actors, then the more the European level becomes visible as a purposeful domain for collective action and institutional responsiveness in public debates carried by national media. The first column in Table 8.1 shows the categories we coded for the geographical organizational scope of actors, who either make claims, or are addressed by claims, where this was identifiable. Running from broadest to narrowest scope, we start with the supra- and transnational, which includes organizations, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), McKinsey Global Institute, and the International Labor Organization (ILO), that are either supranational or transnational in their organizational scope but exist beyond or above the European region.4 Next come actors that have a European scope, such as the European Commission, European Central Bank, IBM Europe and the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), and which includes




204


Actor scope

Supranational/ transnational (non-European) European National Subnational Unspecified Total N

All public debate*

Europeanized public debate

Claim maker

Claim maker

Addressee

Addressee

5.0

1.9

5.1

1.8

2.8 76.7 13.8 1.7

4.8 81.7 6.7 4.9

54.9 36.7 2.1 1.2

59.3 36.3 0.7 1.9

100% 8930

100% 3515

100% 457

100% 281

Note: All countries combined * Full sample of claims over unemployment and unemployed

all European Union institutions and actors. Then there are actors with a national scope, of which there are many examples, including Bob Crow, leader of the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) in Britain, the Commission de gestion des fonds de compensation de l’assurance-chômage in France, the political party Forza Italia in Italy, the Swedish Riksdagen and Arbetsmarknadsutskottet, and Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder in Germany. This is followed by actors organized at the regional and local levels in the sub-national category, where we found a wide variety of actors, for example, Walter Grete, président de la société des médecins du canton de Zurich in Switzerland.5 The next two columns labeled “all public debate” in Table 8.1 show the presence of actors by scope in our full sample of claims over unemployment (weighted by country).6 Clearly, in general these public debates over unemployment are strongly mobilized by the claims of national actors and organizations which account for three-quarters (77 percent) of claim making, and at the same time national institutions and organizations are the main recipients of demands to respond, accounting for four-fifths (82 perecnt) of actors at whom claims are directed. Strikingly, and in stark contrast to national ones, European actors make only 3 percent of claims, and only 5 percent are directed at them. By comparison supranational and transnational actors have similarly low levels of claim making (5 percent) and being addressed (2 percent), whereas regional and local actors have higher levels as claim



Table 8.1 Share of collective actors in public debates over unemployment by political-level of actor (actor scope) for all and Europeanized debates (% figures weighted by country)

makers (14 percent) and addressees (7 percent). This indicates overall that public debates over unemployment remain strongly populated by national and subnational actors. At the general aggregated level it seems that actors from the European Union are little seen in mediated debates. However, against the common claim that this is because Europe remains invisible and unmediated— see, for example, Hix (2008: 185), who is still waiting for “the media to cover the Brussels soap opera for the first time”—others have demonstrated that the media do cover Europe. For example, Hans-Jörg Trenz’s media contents analysis of 11 quality newspapers from six EU countries in 2000, supports the general idea that Europe has a significant visibility in national media, he finds that (2004: 311): “one out of three articles in a European quality newspaper makes political reference to Europe, and one out of five directly reports on at least one European issue.” Backing this up, a key finding from a large and comprehensive empirical project EUROPUB.COM on the European public sphere is that the EU is publicly visible in policy fields where it is influential. In policy issue fields where the European level has competences, EU actors appear frequently as speakers or as addressees, and issues are frequently discussed in a European frame of reference. Crucially, the clearest explanatory determinant for whether a communicative act—a claim—in a policy field is Europeanized is the extent to which competences have shifted up to the EU level (Koopmans 2007; Statham 2010). Thus, EU-level actors have a strong visible say in monetary politics and agriculture debates, where integration has shifted decision making up to the supranational level, but very little in debates over immigration, troop deployment, education and pensions, where national sovereignty remains powerful. The general rule is that the more a policy field is supranationalized, the more it has a public policy debate that includes the EU level and makes it visible to citizens and the more vertical communication flows are found (see Koopmans et al. 2010, for details). Although, since the Amsterdam Treaty, the EU has increasingly made efforts to coordinate policy initiatives among aimed at creating employment opportunities as well as setting minimum standards, it is clear that nation states ultimately continue to hold much control over policies affecting unemployment and the unemployed.7 On this basis, one can assume a low level of Europeanization for public debates to be an adequate degree of visibility for the unemployment field at the general aggregate level, at least quantitatively, which is approximately what we find. Just as overall debates over immigration and pensions remain dominated by nationallevel actors and issue framings, then so do those over unemployment.





However, this is not due to a deficit of public communication and poor performance of the mass media on the supply-side—on the contrary, there is a burgeoning press corps in Brussels who cover issues (Meyer 2009; Statham 2008)—but simply because decision-making power remains for now primarily national. Nonetheless it is also not the case that nothing has changed. From the overall sample of public debates over unemployment, our calculations indicate that approximately a twentieth (5.1 percent) consist of claims that are Europeanized, where the claim maker is European, or the addressee is European, or where claim makers related the issue to a European-level institutional context, policy issue, frame or norm. To examine the pattern of emergent Europeanization, which is the starting point for further development if in the future more policy competences are transferred to the European level, a better standard for assessment is the presence of European actors within debates that are actually Europeanized. This means drawing a sample of claims that are either made by or address European institutions and actors, or by actors (of any scope) that refer to European institutions, policies, issues or norms. The fourth and fifth columns on “Europeanized public debates” in Table 8.1 show the share of actors by scope in this field of Europeanized claim making over unemployment (weighted by country). Now we see that European actors are highly visible in Europeanized claim making, accounting for more than half of claim makers (55 percent) and six-tenths of addressees (59 percent). They are even more visible than national and subnational actors combined which account for less than four-tenths (39 percent of claim making; 37 percent addressed by claims), whereas the share of supranational and transnational actors remains at the same level as it does in the overall debates. In sum, this shows that European actors achieve visibility and, at least quantitatively, are the dominant discursive power in Europeanized debates over unemployment. From this it seems that national media do report about the European level, when it matters, and that a future shift in competences to the European level is likely to be characterized by an increase in this type of Europeanized public policy debate, in which the European level is the dominant visible presence. It is therefore important to examine aspects of the democratic quality of Europeanized public debates over unemployment, which we address now, by examining their inclusiveness. Table 8.2 shows the share of different types of collective actor in three types of public debate over unemployment: national and subnational domestic, Europeanized and European supranationalized. To assess whether specific actor types are underrepresented or overrepresented in Europeanized claim making it is important to establish a standard of



206


%

National and subnational domestic debates

Europeanized debates

European supranationalized debates

All state Government/executive Other state/regulatory bodies

33.2 20.9 12.3

52.8 44.3 8.5

67.0 50.4 16.6

All legislative and political parties Legislative Political parties

18.9

14.5

8.3

4.9 14.0

5.1 9.4

2.5 5.8

All civil society Employers’ associations/firms Trade Unions Research and experts Welfare NGOs NGOs for unemployed Employees/precarious workers Unemployed groups Other civil society

47.7 13.7

30.7 11.0

19.5 2.5

20.0 5.2 0.4 1.7 2.7

6.4 8.6 0.5 0.4 1.6

11.2 1.8 2.2 – –

1.7 2.3

0.3 1.9

– –

Other/Non-specified actors Total N

0.2

2.0

5.2

100% 2749

100% 457

100% 74

Note: Al countries combined

comparison. For this, we take the share of actor types in claim making within public debates that remain nationally confined. To operationalize national and subnational domestic debates, we retrieve a sample of claims where both claim makers and addressees are actors that have an organizational scope that is either national or subnational, and where issues raised make no reference at all to European institutions, policies, issues or common norms. In an example from Britain, Conservative MPs criticize their own government’s Employment Secretary Michael Portillo over his proposal to force the unemployed to take up jobs. In another from Italy, the Vice President of Confindustria, Carlo Callieri, stresses to the Italian government the need to find a solution for unemployment in the South of Italy yb proposing measures for controlled



Table 8.2 Shares in national domestic, Europeanized and European supranationalized public debates over unemployment, by collective actor type (% figures weighted by country)


flexibility (flessibilità controllata). The next column in Table 8.2 shows the shares of actors in Europeanized debates, where, as for Table 8.1, a European-level actor is a claim maker or addressee, or alternatively an actor refers to European institutions, policies, issues or norms. An example of the former comes from Germany, when the EU Commission President Santer made a statement that the value of the Euro in ensuring jobs needs to be made clear to people. An example of the latter type comes from Britain, when the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) think-tank made a public statement that the current state of unemployment in Europe prevents member states from benefiting from a single currency. Finally, the European supranationalized column is for those debates that consist of entirely European-level concerns. These are produced by claims where both the claim maker and addressee have a European scope, for example when the European Trade Union Confederation backs Employment and Social Affairs Commissioner Diamantopoulou’s stance that governments and “social partners” need to persevere with labor market reform. European supranationalized debates exist entirely at the European level, in stark contrast to national/ subnational domesticated ones, where Europe is entirely absent. In Table 8.2, we distinguish three main categories of actors: state, legislative and political parties and civil society actors. State actors include all government and executive actors, and their administrative bodies. Legislative and political party actors occupy an intermediary position between state and civil society, including Parliaments and second chambers, parliamentary committees, elected representatives and statements by party organs. They merit special consideration because they are directly elected by, responsible to and represent the public. Finally, civil society includes non-state actors, such as the interest groups representing labor and capital, research institutes and experts, NGOs, social movements and the beneficiary group of unemployed and precariously employed. The inclusiveness of debates facilitates or hinders the accessibility of decision making to the public. First, as an electorate the public have their interests represented by competing political parties and, second, collective actors and social movements mobilize their demands in an effort to influence policy makers. It is important to see to what degree legislatives and political parties, on the one side, and civil society actors, on the other, are able to participate in the debates over decision making. So how inclusive are the debates over unemployment? The findings from Table 8.2 are unambiguous: the more debates include the European level, the more they are dominated by state actors, at the expense of participation by legislatures and civil society.



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At least, when judged by discursive influence it seems that Europeanization empowers the institutionally already powerful. State actors account for a third of national debates (33 percent), a half of Europeanized debates (53 percent), and two-thirds of European supranationalized ones (67 percent). From this, advancing Europeanization appears to benefit the discursive influence of state actors, especially governments and executives, whose share increases from a fifth (21 percent) in national to just under a half (44 percent) in Europeanized and a half (50 percent) in supranationalized debates. By contrast, the share of legislative and party actors drops from a fifth (19 percent) in national domestic debates to a twelfth (8 percent) in supranationalized ones, with Europeanized debates (15 percent) coming in between. This is problematic from the viewpoint of democratic accountability because Europeanization seems to diminish the capacity of party competition to bring decision making into the public domain. The discrepancy is especially acute at the European supranational level, where the European Parliament and parties’ claim making (8 percent) is an eighth that of state actors (67 percent), which raises doubts about democratic accountability and seems to confirm the well-documented weakness of the European Parliament (see e.g. Weale 2005). The picture is even more bleak for the interest groups, NGOs and social movements who try to influence decision making through mobilization. Civil society accounts for a half share in national domestic debates (48 percent) compared to only a third by state actors (33 percent), whereas this situation is directly reversed within Europeanized debates, and the tables are completely turned within supranationalized debates, where state actors (67 percent) are more than three times more prominent than actors from civil society (20 percent). This lack of inclusiveness of Europeanized debates over unemployment and the apparent inability of non-state public actors to voice their demands is again problematic from a viewpoint of democratic accountability and legitimacy. Already at the national level, the constituency of the unemployed and precariously employed as well as the NGOs mobilizing on their behalf make only a small share of claims (6 percent). However, this diminishes further within Europeanized debates, and it disappears entirely from view within supranationalized ones. This indicates that already weak actors become even weaker under conditions of Europeanization. An exception here are research experts, whose share increases in Europeanized compared to national domestic debates, but this is most likely because the more institution-dominated (read Europeanized) the field becomes, the more technocratic expertise is called in to justify





decisions. Another partial exception is the category of private firms and employers’ associations, who diminish only marginally from national/ subnational (14 percent) to Europeanized debates (11 percent). Indeed it is worth noting that these representatives of capital are almost twice as strong in Europeanized debates compared to the trade unions representing labor interests (6 percent). The voices of private companies come to the fore from among civil society actors under conditions of the Europeanization of public policy debates, more so than in national domestic ones where their trade union opponents are stronger. Turning to the European supranationalized field, overall it is highly institutionalized and elite dominated. The only actors from civil society that have any significant presence are the trade unions (11 percent), which through the ETUC seem to have some effectiveness in retaining a presence. By contrast, it is interesting to note that the share of private companies and employers’ associations (3 percent) drops off in European supranationalized debates. One can speculate here that the European-level employers’ associations and firms have their interests strongly represented by the EU supranational executive actors over policies relating to unemployment, which renders their advocacy unnecessary. This may become clearer shortly, when we examine the relationships between such actors at the supranational level. What is apparent from our analysis, however, is that from the publicly visible supranational level, the European-level trade unions are the only nonstate actors able to raise a voice. Apart from the very marginal presence of a few employers’ associations, research experts and welfare NGOs, the trade unions stand alone as the sole representative of civil society in the face of a closed field dominated by the state and executive elites. Nor is this apparent weakness in civil society relative to state and executive actors compensated by the European legislature and political parties directly representing and mediating interests. On the contrary, European parliamentarians (8 percent) fair less well than civil society actors and have significantly lower presence in the supranational field than they do in Europeanized debates (15 percent). In this view of the European supranational field of public policy debates over unemployment, representation of alternative voices is at best achieved through co-optation by state executive elites and, with the partial exception of the trade unions, there is no sign of participation in the debates by less-institutionalized, independent voices from civil society. Of course, these findings are drawn from an analysis only of what is publicly visible, although, as discussed earlier, that in itself is already an important part of conferring legitimacy on decision making



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in modern democracies. However, to take account of a possible counterargument to these findings, namely that biases in the selection mechanisms of public discourses lead to distortions in representing the supranational-level field over unemployment,8 we also examine the non-visible non-mediated aspects of the relationships that constitute this multiorganizational field of actors. In the next part, we examine the actor relationships that define the degree and form of access to decision making at the supranational EU-level, on the basis of a network analysis of data collected from interviews.

The EU supranational multiorganizational field: Elite-dominated or participatory? Traditionally, the emergence of supranational organized interest groups figured prominently in theoretical visions for a polity resulting from European regional integration. As Streeck and Schmitter point out (1991:133), “Especially in the ‘neofunctionalist’ image of ’Europe’s would-be polity’ and of the path to that polity, supranational interestgroup formation was expected to serve, in an important and indispensible sense, as a substitute for popular identification with the emerging new political community above and beyond the nation-state.” Turning to the evidence for actual developments, it is well documented that in policy fields where competences have shifted substantively to the supranational level—for example, environment, agriculture, trade—there has been a proliferation of lobby groups in Brussels (see contributions to Featherstone and Radaelli 2003, Greenwood and Aspinwall 1998).9 There is less agreement, however, over whether this facilitation of the participation of interest and lobby groups at the supranational level actually constitutes a substantive extension of the formal channels of access to decision making. Some interpret what they see as an increasing access for specialist lobby groups to the supranational policy process as the emergence of a latent or restricted semi-public sphere. For Christian Lahusen (2004) the Brussels “cocktail circuit” serves as a forum for lobbyists and social movements to adapt, gain influence and deliberate within the European-level policy game. Against such optimism, others point out that there is relative little demos in evidence at the supranational level. Sabine Saurugger’s review of empirical research conducted on European interest groups concludes that “the elite characteristics of these actors question their capacity to increase democratic legitimacy” (2008: 1274). So far, the interest groups and NGO sectors that have mushroomed strongly represent powerful institutional interests, including state





quangos, multinational business corporations, professions and labor unions (Aspinwall and Greenwood 1998). In addition, there are plenty of think tanks and consultants on hand to be co-opted and supply technocratic expertise at a competitive price. If contestation occurs between elites and lobbyists, it tends to remain behind closed doors. Indeed the view of the policy deliberation process that emerges is precisely one of deals done in secrecy behind closed doors, a sort of corporatist interest group politics at the supranational level. Efforts by the European-level administration to introduce wider civil society inclusion and enhance the say of weaker groups are often initiated top-down as a form of co-optation. As a result, in the migration field, for example, European migrants’ organizations are unrepresentative of migrant communities, undemocratic in structure and almost wholly dependent on EU-subsidies for their survival (Koopmans and Statham 2000). So far, we have assumed that the publicly visible world is what matters. However, after looking at the relative discursive influence of actors in the multiorganizational field in the public policy debates over unemployment at national domestic, Europeanized and supranational levels, we now examine the substantive power relationships between collective actors at the supranational level. Our research inquiry here is, first, to determine the relative degree of access to decision making for different types of collective actor within the European supranationalized multiorganizational field of unemployment and, second, to examine the types of relationships that constitute this field. Once more, a key focus is the inclusiveness of decision making toward non-state, civil society and social movement actors. Is there an effective EU supranational-level lobby that can counterbalance the power held by institutions at the EU-level?10 To address this question, we undertook an analysis of the relationships between collective actors in the supranational-level multiorganizational field over unemployment using network analysis techniques. The idea of a network of actors within an organizational field is pertinent because the structure of reciprocal relationships between a set of actors contributes to the overall set of constraints and opportunities facing them in their attempts to influence decision making. This is because an actor’s relationship to others, its relative position of closeness/distance to others in the field, shapes its potential for gaining to resources, through making allies, communicating, building up common identification processes and mutual trust, as well as shaping its strategic goals (Cinalli 2004, 2007b; see also contributions to Diani and McAdam 2003). For this part of the study, we identified 25 collective actors, comprising state institutional and administrative actors, parties, interest



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groups, NGOs and social movements that are transnational and operate in the EU supranational multiorganizational field. We made further enquiries to ensure completeness of this sample. In the end, we were able to conduct interviews, with a policy official or director from 21 of the identified institutions and organizations. The shortfall was due to a few refusals and logistical difficulties in arranging some meetings. Most interviews were conducted face-to-face in Brussels, with the exception of a few that took place in London, or over the telephone. Our final sample comprises six European-level state, executive and administrative actors, two supra-/transnational executive and administrative actors beyond the EU, three European political parties and the European Parliament’s relevant committee, three European organizations representing the interests of capital and employers, the European trade union representing labor interests, four European transnational NGOs that campaign on issues that relate to the unemployed and the European Network of the Unemployed, which is a social movement that campaigns specifically for the unemployed (see Table 8.3). To achieve this number of interviews with actors a considerable logistical effort was required. Interviews were standardized, including closed questions, some of which were designed to allow the application of network analysis, as well as some open questions. Responses were coded into a scheme and data were held in a machine readable database that facilitates combined quantitative and qualitative analyses. Given the limited size of the European supranational field over unemployment issues, our sample of 21 from 25 identified actors is almost complete, and relatively more representative of the full field, than those in this study at the national level. A first important part of our inquiry is to examine the power relationships within the supranational level multiorganizational field. Network analysis is suitable to our purposes because it builds an empirical picture of actors’ perceived relationships of influence with others in the field. Each interviewee was specifically required to mention all organizations from our list “which your organization has tried to influence over the last five years.” Figure 8.1 shows the network produced by the responses. The direction of the arrow shows an attempt to influence the recipient. From Figure 8.1 it is possible to see that the European Commission (DG for Employment and Social Affairs) and the European Parliament (Committee on Employment and Social Affairs) are key actors in the network receiving a high number of attempts to influence from other actors, as well as making a high number of attempts to influence




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Table 8.3 Collective actors in the supranational European field interviewed (by type, and with acronyms used in text)

World Trade Organization

WTO

International Labor Organization

ILO

European state, executive and administrative actors Council of the European Union

CEU

European commission: DG for Employment and Social Affairs

EC

European Court of Justice

ECJ

Council of Europe

CE

European Economic and Social Committee

EESC

The European Job Mobility Portal

EURES

European Legislative and Political Parties European Parliament—Committee on Employment and Social Affairs Party of European Socialists

EP PES

European United Left/Nordic Green Left

EUL

Union for Europe of the Nations

UEN

European Interest Groups Representing Capital and Employers Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe

UNICE

European Centre of Enterprises with Public Participation and of Enterprises of General Economic Interest

CEEP

European Small Business Alliance European Interest Group Representing Labor and Workers European Trade Union Confederation

ESBA ETUC

European NGOs on Issues Relating to Unemployment Social Platform—Platform of European Social NGOs

SP

European Citizen Action Service

ECAS

European Policy Center

EPC

European Anti-Poverty Network

EAPN

European Social Movement over Unemployment European Network of the Unemployed

ENU

other actors. The European Trade Union Confederation also features prominently in this way, while the Council of the European Union (CEU) is a strong recipient of others’ attempts to influence. At first glance the network appears well linked, with only a few actors remaining outside the channels of attempts to influence. A more extensive use of network analysis tools, however, enables us to assess further the position of specific actors within the network.



Supranational (Non-European) executive and administrative actors

Paul Statham and Manlio Cinalli 215 EESC

ECJ

EAPN

WTO ENU

ESBA

EP ETUC

EURES

EPC

CEU

CE

UNICE

UEN EC

SP

EUL PES

CEEP ECAS

Figure 8.1 Network of influence in the European supranational multiorganizational field

“Degree” is a measure that enables us to gauge actors’ centrality (Scott 2000: 67). To measure “degree,” one can simply count the number of ties radiating from and toward each actor: the higher the number, the more central an actor is within the network. However, it is also possible to pay particular attention to the direction of ties, by distinguishing between “incoming” and “outgoing” ties. By doing this for our network of influence, we can distinguish between those actors who are perceived by others as being “influential,” which means that they are recipients of attempts to influence by a large number of other actors in the network, and those who are “trying to influence,” meaning that they make attempts to influence a large number of other actors. By this measurement, “influential” actors are those who have high scores for “in-degree” while those actors “trying to influence” have high scores for “out-degree.” Of course, an actor can display both, or none, or one more than the other of these two characteristics, within a single network. Table 8.4 provides normalized scores of in-degree and out-degree, taking actual linkages of influential attempts that actors produce (or alternatively receive) as a percentage of the total possible number of



ILO


ties that it could produce (or alternatively receive). 100 is the maximum score for an actor sending ties to all others, 0 the minimum for an actor totally isolated in the network. Overall, this gives us a comparative indicator for the extent to which each actor is perceived by the others as an “influential” addressee for lobbying (column 2), and for the extent to which each actor engages in activities of “trying to influence” (column 3). The overall picture that comes from this analysis is very similar to that we find from the claim making analysis (Table 8.2): the supranational EU-level field is strongly dominated by executive elite actors from the EU institutions. This is especially the case with regard to being perceived as an “influential” addressee. In this respect, the Council of the European Union (CEU) (70 In-Degree) is the most influential actor in Table 8.4 Networks of influence in the European supranational multiorganizational field: “Influential” actors and actors “Trying to Influence” Actor

‘Influential’ normalized in-degree (%)

‘Trying to Influence’ normalized out-degree (%)

Actor type

CEU EC EP UNICE

70 60 50 35

0 50 40 15

ETUC

30

30

CE PES EUL EESC CEEP

25 20 20 20 15

10 15 10 5 30

SP UEN EURES EPC ECAS EAPN ENU

15 10 5 5 5 5 0

25 15 35 35 25 25 25

State/executive State/executive Legislative/party Capital/ employers’ interest group Labor/workers’ interest group State/executive Legislative/party Legislative/party State/executive Capital/ employers’ interest group NGO Legislative/party State/executive NGO NGO NGO Social movement

Note: Organizations that are isolates in the Supranational European network of influence: ILO, WTO, ECJ, ESBA



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the network, followed by the relevant DG of the European Commission (60), and committee of the European Parliament (50). Next come the representatives of capital and labor interests, UNICE (35) and the European Trade Union Confederation (30), who are perceived as being about half as influential. Continuing down the pecking order, European political parties are the next type of actor who others try to influence, followed by NGOs. Among the NGOs, Social Platform, sponsored by the European institutions, ranks highest in influence (15), whereas the other three ECAS (5), EPC (5) and EAPN (5) are more marginal, and are less than a tenth as less influential in the network than the Council for the European Union and European Commission. Finally, no other actor attempts to influence one social movement, the European Network of the Unemployed. Turning to ties that indicate “trying to influence” (column 3), a striking observation is that the most influential actor, the Council for the European Union, makes no effort to try to influence other actors. This is indicative of of situations in which significant power is held in the unemployment field at the supranational level—in the intergovernmental forum of nation states. As the influential forum where ministers from national governments broker intergovernmental deals behind closed doors, the CEU does not lobby others as a single body. Most likely, national governments do this on a unilateral basis. In this respect, the CEU differs from the Commission (Out-Degree 50) and Parliament (40), because they also make efforts to influence a high number of other actors in the supranational field. The European Commission and Parliament bodies are active in attempting to shape the supranational organizational field, whereas national executives do not, at least not through the intergovernmental forum in which they make policy decisions (CEU). Another finding is that the main interest group for capital UNICE makes less effort to influence others (Out-Degree 15) than it is perceived as being an influential addressee (In-Degree 35). In this respect it differs from the main interest group for labor, the European Trade Union Confederation, which tries to exert influence to the same extent that other actors in the network try to influence it (Out-Degree 30; IN-Degree 30). This is perhaps indicative of a galvanizing role by the unions, which receive the lobbying of NGOs and then channel and mediate some of these concerns in addition to their own when addressing powerful institutional actors. The NGOs and social movements on the side of the unemployed lobby others, but are not influential, which demonstrates their weakness. Finally, it is also interesting to note that supranational bodies beyond the EU, the ILO and WTO, appear to





play no role at all, either as lobbyists or recipients of lobbying, in the European supranational field over unemployment. What then of the relationships of contention and alliance that build the supranational multiorganizational field? Interviewees were also specifically required to identify all organizations from our list “which your organization has, a) had some major disagreements, b) collaborated closely, with over the last five years.” This allows an examination of networks of disagreement and cooperation, respectively. Here, it is useful to start with a first measure of “density” at the macro-field level since cooperation and disagreement are the bases on which a cohesive field can or cannot be built. “Density” certainly helps us to gauge this idea of cohesion, because it expresses the ratio of the existing ties in the network to the total number of possible ties. Resulting values of density range between 0 and 1, with 1 indicating an ideal field in which each actor is tied to the other actors, and 0 an ideal field with no ties at all (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 181). On this we find that the density of networks of disagreement 0.10 is almost three times lower than that of cooperation 0.29, which gives an overall impression of alliances rather than contestation defining the relationships in the multiorganizational field. Generally, then, it seems that the European supranational multiorganizational field is characterized by cohesive networks of alliances among actors, which are much more prominent and relegate contention to a secondary feature. Moving beyond this assessment of the macro-level field, however, it is important to see which specific patterns of alliances and contestations constitute the relations among actors. More sophisticated techniques of network analysis allow us to examine cliques, that is, subgroups within which all the components share mutual ties of cooperation (see Scott 2000: 114–20). The driving idea here is that mutual cohesion between two actors increases when they also share mutual relationships across a variety of different (close) groups. In short, strength comes through cohesive sets of reciprocal alliances that branch across the network. Hence, we process our data in a way that detects, first, all the existing cliques (including the smallest possible cliques made of only three actors). Then, second, we count for each couple of actors, how many times they shared a linkage in a different clique. Table 8.5 shows the hierarchical clustering of cliques, showing their relative strength. For example, the European Commission and the European Trade Union Confederation demonstrate a remarkably high degree of cooperative interconnectedness by sharing reciprocal linkages in 16 cliques of actors. The important contribution of the analysis in Table 8.5 is that it identifies two main alliances of actors in the field built through mutual cooperative



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ties. First, the European Commission and the European Trade Union Confederation work strongly together with the European Parliament, the Social Platform of European Social NGOs and European Anti-Poverty Network NGO. Second, the Council of the European Union and Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe (UNICE) cooperate strongly together, along with, but to a lesser extent, the think tank NGO European Policy Centre. This indicates a division between the EU-level supranational institutions, the Commission and Parliament, the interest group for labor and workers, and welfare NGOs, on one side, and the intergovernmental forum for national executives (CEU) and the interest group for capital and employees (UNICE), and a pro-integration think tank NGO providing expertise (EPC), on the other. It appears to show a division between the supranational European institutions and national governments represented collectively through their intergovernmental Table 8.5 “Cliques” of cooperation in the supranational multiorganizational field: Hierarchical clustering of equivalence matrix E U E R C E J S

Level -----16.000 11.000 9.250 5.679 4.000 3.968 3.381 2.381 2.000 1.709 1.443 1.000 0.667 0.456 0.226 0.123 0.065 0.052 0.000

E C S W P I E C B T E C L E E A O S E O P U

U N E E I E C E E U C P A S U E E E C S C L N P

E T U E S C C P

E A E P N N U

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 7 4 6 9 5 7 3 1 2 9 8 8 0 1 4 5 2 6 0 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXXXX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXXXXXX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXXXXXXXX . . . . . . . . . XXX . . . . . XXXXXXXXX . . . . . . . . . XXX . . . . XXXXXXXXXXX . . . . . . . . . XXX . . . XXXXXXXXXXXXX . . . . . . . . . XXX . . XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX . . . . . . . . . XXXXX . XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX . . . . . . . . . XXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX . . . . . . . . . XXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX . . . XXX XXX . XXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX . . . XXX XXX XXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX . . . XXX XXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX . . . XXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX . . . XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX . . XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX . XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX





forum (CEU). To examine this idea of division within the multiorganizational field more closely, we consider the relationships of disagreement between actors. Although, as we have seen, the overall degree of disagreements (density 0.10) is lower than cooperations (0.29), it is still possible to identify cliques of actors who share ties of disagreement with one another. Table 8.6 shows a hierarchical clustering of equivalence matrix for the disagreements among our sample of 21 actors. What is notable here is that contentious relationships occur in two blocs, which generally approximate the same blocs shown by actors through their cooperative cliques of alliances. First, there is contention between the European legislature, the Council of the EU, and the Commission and political parties UEN and EUL. Second, there is contention between interest groups representing capital and employers (UNICE and ESBA) and the trade unions (ETUC) representing labor and workers. From this, it appears that the ETUC is an important actor promoting the concerns of labor over unemployment, which cooperates strongly with the Commission and Parliament, and opposes the organizations supporting the interests of employers and capital. To the extent that they receive any representation at all, the welfare NGOs work under the cooperative wing of the Table 8.6 “Cliques” of disagreement in the supranational multiorganizational field: Hierarchical clustering of equivalence matrix E E U C W I E R P E C U E E C T L S S E E U E E E E E C E O O C P S S L C P U N P J

Level ----4.000 2.000 1.333 1.214 0.600 0.565 0.480 0.270 0.173 0.000

U N I C E

E S B A

E T U C

E E C E A E A P P N S C N U

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 5 6 7 8 6 7 9 0 2 4 1 1 3 3 2 4 5 8 9 0 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . . . . . . . . . XXX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXXXXXX . . XXX . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXXXXXX . . XXXXX . . . . . . . . . . . XXXXXXXXX . . XXXXX . . . . . . . . . . . XXXXXXXXX . XXXXXXX . . . . . . . . . . XXXXXXXXXXX . XXXXXXX . . . . . . . . . . XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX . . . . . . . . . . XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX . . . . . . . . . . XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX . . . XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX



220

ETUC, but do not directly seek contention on their own account. In parallel to this, among the European institutions, the Parliament and Commission ally themselves through cooperation with the ETUC, but not the Council of the EU representing intergovernmental cooperations by national executives, which works with the employers’ interest group. However, the contention between the EU supranational institutions is not defined simply by the Commission and Parliament standing with the ETUC against the Council for the EU. On the contrary, Table 8.6 shows that disagreements also exist between the Commission and Parliament, though they both also cooperate with the ETUC. This indicates the existence of tactical or pragmatic rather than deep-embedded or value- or identity-based alliances between the Commission and Parliament, who are able to exist in blocs of agreement and disagreement at the same time, without having a fixed relationship of contention between them. It also again suggests a pivotal role for the ETUC, this time upwards in relation to the EU supranational institutions, where it seems to be able to coordinate alliances with the Commission and Parliament, who have some mutual disagreements, but also disagree with the Council for the EU with whom neither cooperate. Overall, it bears repeating that the field is characterized more by alliance making than contention, and the contention that is present occurs between the EU institutions, and to a lesser extent parties, on the one side, and between the interest groups of capital and labor, on the other. The NGOs are remarkably non-contentious, as is the one social movement for the unemployed (ENU), which, as we have seen, is also weakly positioned and marginalized in the network of influence. The supranational multiorganizational field of unemployment appears to be highly institutionalized and dominated by powerful executive actors. The only counterbalance to executive authority comes to a limited extent from the European Trade Union Confederation’s representation of interests that draws resources from close mutual cooperation with the Commission, and the European legislature. This importance of the ETUC is twofold: it connects the supranational institutional part of the field to the NGO part, while it contributes importantly to generating contention over labor and capital. Such a perspective is supported by the fact that the ETUC has the highest Out-Degree score for cooperation (75) and second highest In-Degree score (70), demonstrating its strong linking upwards and downwards, while, at the same time, it is also by far the actor that disagrees more than any other with others in the network (Out-Degree 50 for disagreements, double the next highest score). While power in decision making over unemployment remains largely





in the possession of national governments, whose ministers bond at the EU-level (CEU) with employers’ interests, it seems that the ETUC has an important role in standing against the nation state proponents of neoliberal market integration and is sometimes able to draw on resources of tactical support from the Commission and Parliament to do so. Overall, the supranational field is so dominated by institutional and executive actors that it resembles at best a sort of corporatist interest group politics. However, this does not appear to be an effective form of “neo-corporatism” at the supranational level of the type initially predicted by neo-functionalist theories, but a restricted and underdeveloped one. In a sense, what we are left with looks like an outcome similar to that of Streeck and Schmitter’s (1991: 156–7) predictions for “negative integration” driven by markets without adequate compensation for social interests: “Unlike older, more naïve images of regional integration, allowance has to be made today for the possibility that national political arenas, themes, and regulatory instruments that are rendered obsolete by integration are not always and necessarily reconstructed at the level of the emerging supranational polity. Rather than being moved upward, they are likely to dissipate in a larger, less orderly, or less mature institutional complex and may thereby be turned over to, or replaced by, the voluntarism of market and civil society.” However, in the less orderly, less mature institutional complex we have reached over unemployment, NGOs and social movements are pacified and marginalized, while the principal locus of power remains national executives, acting through their intergovernmental forum and siding with business interests. Thus we are perhaps closest to a situation of “market voluntarism” and a form of interest representation that is less effective than at the national level. For NGOs supporting social welfare and the constituency of the unemployed, cooptation by the Commission, Parliament and ETUC appears to be the best route to gain any access to decision making, and is the one taken by Social Platform and the Anti-Poverty Network. However, dependency on patronage from the Commission, Parliament and ETUC is not likely to be an effective means for these NGOs, and most likely comes at the cost of an independent viewpoint. In sum, it seems that there is a structural problem in replicating anything resembling a meaningful civil society at the supranational level, not least because of the resource barriers constraining collective action beyond the nation state. If anything, this leaves the supranational NGOs mobilizing on behalf of weaker groups even more exposed and dependent on patronage than their colleagues at the national level. Conversely,



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Conclusion In this chapter, our focus has been on the consequences of Europeanization for the visibility and inclusiveness of public policy debates, and then more specifically on the nature of relationships within the European supranational multiorganizational field. The processes of Europeanization of public policy debates that we observe are problematic from the viewpoint of democratic legitimacy. This is not because the European level lacks visibility, but because the Europeanized public debates are less inclusive of civil society than national ones. The Europeanization of debates has led to an empowerment of the already powerful executive actors at the expense of parties and actors from civil society. The actual path of European public sphere development appears to be a long way removed from the inclusive Europeanized public sphere advocated by normative participatory democratic theories (see, especially, Habermas 2005). It almost seems that a discursive disempowerment of civil society is dynamically embedded in the Europeanization process. This was most evident in European supranationalized debates. It appears much easier for executive and elite actors to build relationships and operate effectively at the European level, whereas there are strong barriers to civil society development. Executive voices dominate the Europeanized public debates over unemployment, which means it is hard for independent NGOs and social movements to mobilize an alternative message in the public domain. While gaining access to mass media discourse has been an important way for civil society and social movements to mobilize challenges to governments nationally, so far it does not provide opportunities to the same degree to challenge Europeanized decision making. Resources are a big problem for NGOs, which might want to influence the European level or build transnational ties. Of those examples that exist, many are not independent, but are basically clients dependent on EU funding. This is especially the case for groups representing weaker public constituencies, including the unemployed, and is accentuated at the supranational level. Turning to the study of relationships in the European multiorganizational field, other studies, including ones drawing on data from this



the supranational level appears to allow national governments a space of opportunity for intergovernmental cooperation to advance a marketmaking agenda, without the same degree of constraints, opposition, scrutiny and pressure to comprise and represent the full interests of society that they face nationally.


project,11 point toward the difficulties for actors from civil society relative to executive elites for accessing the European-level of decision making from the national level. Thus, in a study of collective actors’ action repertoires under conditions of Europeanization, the findings of Kriesi et al. (2007) go completely against the thesis that “boomerang effects” (Keck and Sikkink 1998) exist, whereby weaker actors, such as SMOs, enhance their power nationally, by accessing a political level above the nation state. On the contrary, their findings are that powerful actors are advantaged at the EU level, even more than they are nationally and, importantly, because they are dominant nationally. Similarly, Jan Beyers’ study of the European adaptation of domestic interest associations, finds a similar conclusion convincing (2002: 608), “The domestic access of specific interests is mainly related to the robust institutionalized and neo-corporatist connections they seem to have with domestic public decision-makers.” Arguably, these negative findings raise the stakes for finding an effective civil society within the supranational field. However, our findings confirm those of the claim making analysis and unambiguously point toward a highly institutionalized multiorganizational field that is dominated by executive power at the supranational level. The field is strongly co-opted by the EU institutions from above and lacks significant and meaningful participation by independent NGOs and social movements campaigning for issues relating to unemployment and for the unemployed. In order to gain access to decision making, at best, these groups, to the extent they are able to exist at all, can hope to have their interests put forward and represented through their connections with the European Trade Union Confederation. At the European supranational level the emergence of NGOs has occurred in the form of a technocratic client politics. Of course, one can follow the intergovernmentalists’ stance (see Moravcsik 2002) and argue that none of this matters because power is held by nation states legitimated by national elections anyway. Indeed, in the case of policies relating to unemployment and the unemployed, nation states largely retain the substantive power. However, some competences have shifted to the European level, even if this remains largely for now a way of coordinating and supplementing the policies of member states. Hence there is a valid concern regarding democratic legitimacy, if Europeanization proceeds further, and continues to develop on the path of its trajectory so far, which theories of “path dependency” (Pierson 2000b) suggest would be the case. In sum, the aggregate effect of shifting the political game to a level beyond the nation state gives all the trump cards to executive actors. Apparently, it allows



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executives to increase their influence over policy decision making relative to parliaments and civil societies, nationally, while the supranational level provides few opportunities for civil society engagement, because it remains largely a restricted and underdeveloped form of corporatist technocratic interest group politics characterized and dominated by elite bargaining. In this view, Europeanization leads to the empowerment of the already powerful, with little sign of anything emerging to compensate for this shift in power toward executive elites at the supranational level.

Notes 1. The authors especially thank and acknowledge the contribution of Vibha Mehta who undertook the structured interviews which form the basis for the network analysis. 2. For studies that attempt to provide answers to questions regarding the general developmental trends of European public sphere emergence, by recourse to large-scale cross-national datasets, see the following collaborative research programmes: EUROPUB.COM led by Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham (see especially contributions to Koopmans and Statham 2010), that initially led by Bernhard Peters (Peters et al. 2005; Sifft et al. 2007; Wessler et al. 2009) and that by Hans-Jörg Trenz (2004). For a critical review of the development of the European public sphere research field, see Meyer (2009). 3. This usage of horizontal and vertical dimensions parallels that of studies on the Europeanization of policy fields (see e.g., Raedelli 2003). 4. Here are also included the very few cases of bi-lateral scope, by which we mean organizational links spanning two countries. 5. All the examples referred to in the text are taken directly from our claim making dataset, which means, of course, that they refer to that time period and some, for example the Italian party Forza Italia, no longer exist. 6. The number of claims per country in our sample varies because of reporting styles; for example, German newspapers carry many more claims than those in Britain, not due to focusing more on this topic, but because they have a denser coverage and more detailed style that provides more news space overall. For this reason, we weighted the analyses by country, so that each country has the same impact in contributing to our findings. 7. Since the Amsterdam Treaty, the EU has increased its role. Strategies have aimed at promoting new forms of employment and making labor markets more homogeneous (Samek-Lodovici 2000). The Amsterdam Treaty also included a chapter on employment to promote a “co-ordinated strategy.” This commitment to coordinate national employment policies has been translated into the framework of the European Employment Strategy (EES), bringing about a form of collaboration based on continuous exchanges and effective balance among a wide range of national and supranational actors: the so-called open method of co-ordination (Goetschy 1999). The EES is indicative, being based on five key principles: “subsidiarity” (referring to the




8.

9.

10.

11.

Europeanization and the EU Field of Unemployment equilibrium between the role of the EU in setting objectives and member states’ responsibility in deciding action plans); “convergence” (referring to the achievement of commonly agreed employment goals through concerted action); “management by objectives” (consisting of the use of quantified measurements, targets and benchmarks); “surveillance” (to evaluate and compare progress by member states and identify best practice) and “integrated approach” (making use of Employment Guidelines and extending them beyond active labor-market policies, to include social, educational, tax and regional policies). Notwithstanding further policy initiatives, including the ten-year plan of the Lisbon strategy initiated in 2000, aiming among other things to tackle unemployment issues, it is clear that nation states ultimately continue to hold much control. Thus, for example, the scope of the “social agreement” pays only minor attention to fundamental points within national systems of employment and industrial relations, such as the right of association and the right to strike. Of course, we acknowledge that selection mechanisms mean that what appears in the public discourse is a distortion of actual actor relationships in the field. However, this is not a random distortion, but a systematic one following specific rules—from the perspective of journalism these are called “news values” (Statham 2008)—that highlight some features over others, for example, controversies and conflicts. For example, it is not plausible that if power is held at the European supranational level and EU-level NGOs working on behalf of the unemployed are able to strongly challenge decision making though collective action this would go unreported. Public discourse is not a “mirror of reality” —it has to be selective, not least due to a limited carrying capacity—but at the same time the political reality that is selected and represented by the media also has to be directly relevant to and derived from the actual nature of the relationships in the field. In this sense, the publicly visible dimension of multiorganizational fields is only relatively autonomous from their actual configuration. Or, stated differently, the mass media’s bias is systematic in its selection and representation of political reality in news. In fact, the visible public dimension of policy fields that appears in news is important precisely because it shows what voters can potentially see, which collective actors are able to mobilize alternative viewpoints in relation to decision making, and what opinions decision makers have to take into consideration. The unemployment field is an intermediary case. As we have seen elsewhere in this book, some competences have shifted to the supranational level over unemployment issues over time, though nation states retain primary control over policy. If the answer is negative, then successful mobilization by non-state actors from the national level becomes even more important to make Europeanlevel decision making democratically accountable. See Cinalli (2010) for a comparison of multiorganizational fields of unemployment in Britain and France, including a discussion of ties to the EU-level.



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When the Unemployed Challenge the European Union: The European Marches as a Mode of Externalization of Protest Didier Chabanet

The movement widely known as les marches européennes contre le chômage, la précarité et l’exclusion sociale—European marches against unemployment, job insecurity and social exclusion—first demonstrated its mobilization capacity in Amsterdam on June 14, 1997, when almost 50,000 people turned out against the holding of the European Summit. What made the event even more remarkable was the presence of demonstrators from many countries: for over two months, small teams of marchers had crisscrossed Europe before converging on Holland and calling people into the street. Nor was the event’s impact short-lived: in June 1999 marches took place involving some 30,000 people in protests against the European Summit in Cologne. Without attracting as much attention, less important marches have subsequently been organized most particularly in France, Germany and Belgium. In general, these protests focus on the worsening of social inequalities, the necessity to guarantee and improve rights for those deprived of job security and the unemployed. These specific claims are joined by more general claims essentially concerning the reduction of the working week to 35 hours in the European Union (EU).1 The mobilization of the unemployed and those finding themselves in a situation of significant job insecurity has always been considered highly improbable. It has been thought that social withdrawal, a tendency to concentrate on sheer survival, and the atomization that generally characterizes the condition of these individuals, render uncertain or even impossible the emergence of organized action (Jahoda, Lazarsfeld and Zeisel 1972; Bagguley 1991). The interest and surprise displayed by all observers are due not only to the fact that the unemployed were able to mobilize, but also—perhaps above all—that this mobilization occurred throughout the EU. Thus, it is the group believed to be least 227



9

When the Unemployed Challenge the European Union

able to organize itself collectively that demonstrated its capacity for initiative and innovation by engaging in the embryonic Europeanization of protest-based action (Imig and Tarrow 2001b). This chapter will first examine the conditions for the emergence of a most unexpected movement. It attempts to show how a small number of entrepreneurs, despite the weak support of the institutional representative frameworks, gave collective and political meaning to the dissatisfaction of the unemployed. We will also show that the movement was able, by means of the “march” format, to make itself visible to the media and, more generally, to public opinion, both of which were then used as resources. We will then identify the strategic duality that permeates the movement, leading to a new mode of Europeanization of action: “the externalization of protest.” In the concluding section we will attempt to identify some of the effects induced by the marches, in particular the institutional answers that have been brought about and the possible future of the movement.

The reasons for a difficult and improbable mobilization The early 1990s were marked, on the one hand, by a significant increase in unemployment levels and a tendency toward job insecurity—living without the reasonable prospect of improvement—and, on the other hand, by the lack of a credible and efficient political response. Moreover, the acceleration of the process of European integration, particularly the obligation imposed on member states to satisfy the “convergence criteria” in view of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, led the latter to adopt or reinforce austerity measures that prevented any policy of full employment (Martin 2000). In parallel, the persistence and size of these developments—which increasingly affect more and more people—transform the perception of unemployment. While the systems of production and redistribution characteristic of the “Fordist pacts” of the post-war period (Van Ruysseveldt and Visser 1996) were certainly unegalitarian, it seems now that the financial and economic success of some implied the impoverishment and disenfranchisement of others.2 In the eyes of a growing number of people, it is the functioning of liberal capitalist economies that should be fundamentally under question. However, as highlighted by Lipsky, “the ‘problem of the powerless’ in protest activity is to activate third parties to enter the implicit or explicit bargaining arena in ways favorable to the protestors” (1970: 2). Here, the institutional representative frameworks, be they trade union or party-based—on the national or EU level—take very little account of the interests of the unemployed and the socially excluded.



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Didier Chabanet 229

On the national level, the trade union movement traditionally concentrates the main part of its activities on stakes directly related to the sphere of work (Richards 2000). Political parties are undoubtedly less likely to take up the claims of the unemployed for three main reasons. First, they most often remain organized around a general right-left cleavage that does not take into account specific interests as such. Second, the most marginalized groups do not make up a sufficiently homogeneous and captive electorate to justify defending their interests. Third, in the majority of the EU member states, the fight against unemployment—waged for more than 20 years by governmental majorities with diverse political leanings—has either failed or is largely dependent on the international economic climate and/or demographic developments over which political elites have no control. In the last two cases, parties are more inclined to remain neutral than to confront the issue of unemployment, which is not considered a political issue. On the EU level as well, representation of the unemployed is almost nonexistent. The integration process, at least since the Treaty of Rome, clearly prioritizes economic objectives and subordinates the progress of a (hypothetical) social policy to the demands of the market, in particular labor mobility and flexible working conditions. The complex and opaque decision-making system of the EU is characterized by “multi-leveled governance” (Marks and McAdam 1996), which may provide “windows of opportunity” (Keeler 1993; Tarrow 1998) but more often favors the influence and interests of employers and/or business. This is to the detriment of employees, to say nothing of the interests of the unemployed. Considered a unified political entity, “the European arena” is selectively open to interest representation (Balme and Chabanet 2002). In terms of the European Parliament, supposing that certain of its members or political groups make the cause of the unemployed heard, its influence, although growing, remains rather marginal and its representative role constrained (Delwit, De Waele and Magnette 1999). In this context, the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), the main representative organization at this level, clearly prioritizes the most pro-establishment modes of action and aims above all to perpetuate and consolidate the Social Dialogue process, initiated by Jacques Delors (Gobin 1996; Dølvik 1997). The acceptance of the fundamental laws of the market, under the condition that they be regulated and controlled, is difficult to see as compatible with the mobilization of those who, more or less directly, suffer the consequences of a competitive economic system.



The weak support of the frameworks of institutional representation


The invisibility and political isolation of the unemployed are also found in the issues they are subject to. Although the question of unemployment is constantly present within their discourse, the way the theme is approached seems to deny the possibility of constituting a politically organized group. Unemployment, as a social and economic problem, is a constant worry, while the representation of the unemployed in and of themselves is taboo.3 The European Commission, national governments, political parties and trade union organizations have all, at one time or another, developed “programs for employment.” This displacement—from unemployment to employment—is strongly significant. Through it, the specificity of the condition of the unemployed is glossed by the broader designation, used to justify integration of the unemployed into the labor market while reducing their stigmatization and labeling. This process results in the denial of the group’s difficulties, processes and, finally, its very existence. As a consequence, groups specifically representing the unemployed are almost entirely absent from the public debate on issues related to social exclusion, the labor market and/or (un)employment policies, in spite of the fact that they are directly concerned with these. Data from the UNEMPOL project on the relative distribution of collective actors who intervene in the public domain on these issues are quite instructive and demonstrate very clearly that the unemployed, as such, have no right to speak. As shown in Table 9.1, less than 1 percent of claims are formulated by the unemployed themselves. In other words, the debates on unemployment, precariousness and social exclusion are monopolized by groups other than the one directly concerned. The substitutive help of third actors Rather than more formal institutional support, the European Marches were made possible through the activation of two main networks of actors. The first of these networks is a body of unemployed associations constituted mainly at the local and national levels—and much less at the European level.4 The cooperation between these associative actors, however, has been slow and fragile and owes its success to the struggles waged within national frameworks over recent years. The case of France in this regard is an exemplary and driving force. Since the creation in 1994 of Agir contre le chômage (AC!) and the social movement of November–December 1995, protest actions foster these associations’ potential for mobilization (Demazière and Pignoni 1998; Combesque 1998). These operations are essential, on the one hand, because they contribute to denser associative links at the local level in a relation of



230

Actor

Country of Study UK

State actors Political parties Labor organizations Employers’ organizations Unemployed organizations Non-state welfare organizations Other civil society organizations Social partners Other actors Unknown/ unspecified Total N

Switzerland

France

Italy

Germany

Sweden

Total

35.3 4.5 17.3 25.2

42.2 11.1 8.7 20.7

38.2 17.0 21.0 8.1

38.8 14.9 23.1 15.2

33.2 10.9 18.2 26.0

54.5 12.3 14.2 5.1

37.8 11.5 16.5 20.6

0.1

0.3

2.9

1.6

0.7

1.7

0.9

1.5

2.2

6.5

0.0

0.4

0.7

1.4

15.7

12.7

4.4

5.9

9.5

10.1

10.0

0.0 0.0 0.3

0.0 0.7 1.4

0.4 1.3 0.3

0.0 0.5 0.0

0.2 0.8 0.2

0.2 0.7 0.5

0.1 0.7 0.5

750

2019

790

950

3837

584

8930

231



Table 9.1 The distribution of public-domain unemployment claims by actor (%)


proximity with the unemployed and, on the other hand, because they break with the tradition of charity that still often orients social activity (Salmon 1998). Support also came from “far left” militants who are currently gaining importance in some European countries, particularly France (Pingaud 2000). Support from diverse communities—academic, trade unionists, members of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), artists and/or political personalities, in particular—is rooted in the broader protest against economic liberalism and its extension to a growing number of sectors of human activity. It is difficult to draw a coherent picture of this aggregation as it represents a mosaic more than a movement with clearly identified ideological and organizational contours. Despite this vague composition, this recent activity has received increased acceptance among the public. In France, the exceptionally high electoral result (5.3 percent) won by Lutte Ouvrière (LO) during the 1995 presidential elections, the growing success of the SUD (Solidarity, Unity, Democracy) unions and broader critiques of liberalism are the signs of the renewal of a current of critical thinking that has lost considerable speed since the dissolution of communism. A similar phenomenon may be located, to a lesser degree, in Germany (around Günter Grass) but also in Scandinavia and Spain where, in different ways, the anarchist movement and the extreme left are enjoying a slight growth. Much more generally, “liberal globalization” incites an opposition—rather disorganized and composite, but sufficiently strong or publicized to give rise to the “global justice movement.” The decisive role of hard core entrepreneurs Fewer than ten activists sat at the junction of these two networks. These middle-aged (40–55) members of the far left were either trade unionists or former trade unionists. They were often active in associations of the unemployed,5 such as AC!, and played a particularly decisive role in the European Marches. In spring 1994, they initiated and organized the first marches against unemployment in France, which were crucial events. The size of the mobilization—around 20,000 people—is significant as it suggests a shift in the perception of unemployment from failure, weakness or personal incompetence leading to the individual’s isolation, to a social injustice issue linked to the economic system and against which it is possible and necessary to fight. This shift in the framing of unemployment gave some cognitive resources for the collective action of the unemployed (Benford and Snow 2000). The social movement of December 1995 confirms this analysis in a number of ways. First



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it provides new proof of the unemployed’s capacity for mobilization. Second, it points to the apparently unfailing support of a large sector of the population (Béroud, Mouriaux and Vakaloulis 1998). Finally, it highlights the significant protest against both governmental action and the constraints imposed by EU integration. While unemployment levels in the Western European countries grew somewhat uniformly in the 1990s, the leaders of the French marches began to envisage the organization of a similar demonstration at the level of the EU. Ideologically, these leaders shared an overtly anti-capitalist social critique that was distanced from communism, which they unequivocally denounced. Their activist socialization was sometimes marked by the influence of socially engaged Catholicism—like that of the Jeunesse Ouvrière Catholique (JOC). More frequently, however, it was the result of long involvement in trade unions, generally within a Trotskyist organization, or, more rarely, of links with the French Communist Party (PCF) or the CGT (Confédération Général du Travail). Their action on behalf of the unemployed was fed by two key factors. First, there was an intense reflection on the discrediting and disaffection faced, in the majority of European countries, by those traditionally engaged and politically active, and particularly on strong deunionization tendencies in France. Second, they showed interest in contemporary forms of collective action (Perrineau 1994), especially what might be called new social movements, as well as in the spectacular development, particularly in France, of les coordinations, which defied and competed with unions in the mid-1980s (Balme and Chabanet 2008). These shifts revealed the concern these activists had with the aspirations of future generations to participation and autonomy. Having themselves often broken with a union’s dominant line, their goal was to promote and to put into place: supple, flexible forms, appealing to events specifically defined as projects … Those who lend a hand to these events are not asked for complete adhesion in every respect but only a limited agreement as to the validity of the action carried out. These movements in fact make their claims against the project of ideological homogenisation of the traditional organisations, denounced as totalitarian, a respect for the heterogeneity and of the plurality of the modes and motifs of engagement … The question of belonging is substituted by that of collective action that itself is only posed in a circumstantial manner situated in well-defined occasions. (Boltanski and Chiapello 1999: 434)



Didier Chabanet 233


As predicted by the resource mobilization perspective, the role of these leaders was crucial when taking into account the social, political and cultural brittleness that characterized the unemployed (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996). As Chazel observes (1992: 301), “the more collectivities are disorganized and powerless, the more they are in need of professional organizations and political entrepreneurs for making their protests.” These leaders were pivotal actors in the organization of the marches. They were able to situate and conceptualize the movement in a global political context and to respond to the expectations and values of the people they mobilized. They also were able to lend their more general activist know-how and take advantage of the financial and logistical resources available to them through membership in trade unions and organizations of the unemployed.6

The unfolding of the mobilization The Intergovernmental Conference (CIG) in Turin, March 1996, gave new impetus to the European integration process by taking greater account of its social dimensions. In this way, the European agenda played a key role in the mobilization of the unemployed because it incited a small number of unemployed associations as well as some trade union organizations to take advantage of this new focus and organize marches at the European level. In June of the same year, the “Florence Appeal” officialized this decision. The Appeal was launched as the principal initiative of AC!, the Mouvement National des Chômeurs et des Précaires (MNCP), Droit au Logement and the ENU with the support of part of the left-wing trade unions, particularly the Spanish CGT and the Italian CGIL, activists of the German magazine Express (close to the DGB), and a diversity of other, less important organizations. The alliance grew to include the Coordination Paysanne Européenne (of which the Confédération Paysanne Française is a member), the Greens and the Permanent Forum for Civil Society. Although the marchers set out from countries across the EU, thus calling attention to their truly European character, the organization of the marches was largely the work of a small number of leaders from the French far left: current or former activists-unionists who were in many cases also militants in unemployed associations. In the mid-1990s these activists had limited visibility and were committed to getting issues relating to unemployment and job insecurity onto the European agenda. Help from trade unions and civil society actors, in particular the churches, was decisive in Germany—second only to France in



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mobilizing troops—and in the northern European countries, whose numbers, while not negligible, were appreciably less. Unemployed people from Italy helped fill out the processions and were present in greater numbers than, for example, the Belgians, Slovenians and Spanish. By contrast, the number of English unemployed marchers was strikingly low. Backing from Great-Britain’s unions was extremely limited: first, because most of them have declined considerably in strength over the last twenty years; and second, because the Trade Union Congress refused to take part, aligning itself with a Labor Party whose agenda had little to do with the claims of the unemployed. In addition, the fact that unemployment benefit systems were residual did not encourage protest as long as work—even when precarious—was widely available. The movement’s momentum finally led to the Amsterdam March, an event that mobilized the most unemployed persons in Europe to date. The major challenges posed to the organizers were (1) to congeal the group’s existence by means of the mobilization and (2) to raise the issues of the unemployed and those deprived of job security in Europe as a political problem. From a relatively limited choice of “action repertoires” (Tilly 1984), the march allowed for this dual process. The march format While the unemployed are unable to use the strike as a weapon, they do have ample time available to participate in other forms of collective action, sometimes for several weeks. This availability meshes nicely with the unique qualities of mobilization embodied in the march. Historically, the march has allowed dominated groups who faced restricted access to the “loci of power,” or wished to circumvent them, to make themselves visible (McAdam 1982; Traugott 1985, Reiss 2007), and thus seek to influence public opinion in the hope of being able to exert pressure on political institutions. The leaders of the European Marches refer particularly to the French marches of the Mouvement Beur in the early 1980s that initiated the collective action of young people of immigrant backgrounds struggling against racial and social discrimination (Bouamama 1994). The march is unique in how, by its very performance, it creates a unique collective identity dimension of the movement, especially in how it publicly exposes people who are often identified as “useless to the world” (Castel 2003). For immigrant youths in France as well as for the unemployed and precariously employed, the march’s format—its long duration and slow movement—reflected the inevitable need for “self affirmation” of dispossessed groups. The Amsterdam demonstration, as a founding event of the movement, thus



Didier Chabanet 235


marked an important, if symbolic, reversal whereby marchers proved to themselves and to others their capacity to organize collectively at the EU level. The films they made during the two months of the European Marches—largely shown within the movement but also on several television channels in France and abroad—were a means of prolonging and consecrating the strong human experience and unleashing an enormity of emotions associated with the marches. This involvement in a common space/time strengthened a shared identity for a group that otherwise had a high degree of sociological and ideological heterogeneity, and whose unity remained most uncertain. Protests by the “multitudes of those without”—those without jobs, without homes, without documents—also displayed solidarity with all those around the world who may have suffered discrimination and/or were “left behind” by economic development. The unemployed encountered much difficulty, beyond the dynamics of a systematic opposition, in formulating precise and coherent claims that were shared by a large majority of mobilized actors. The march facilitated, at least for a time, this fragile balance between the identity of a relatively fluid and scattered group and a weakly elaborated political program. Media and public opinion as resources As can be seen, the question of the movement’s visibility was essential. Capturing media attention and getting its support becomes fundamental. For this reason, it was decided in Germany that the daily distance covered by the marchers would be quite short and almost exclusively concentrated in large urban areas in order to ensure the best possible media coverage. In most of the countries, working groups dedicated to media relations were established. In France, the unemployed marchers were even able to follow a week-long course on the media given by trade union activists. As was stressed by Christophe Aguiton, “on themes such as unemployment, we have no other solutions than to solicit the sympathy of public opinion.”7 The march format, because it presents itself as a pacific mode of intervention in the public space, closer to a dynamic of exposition than to one of confrontation,8 may moreover be considered a means of achieving this objective. While the French movement of the unemployed was identified and generally made known by its illegal actions—the occupation of ANPE (Agence Nationale pour l’Emploi) and ASSEDIC (Association pour l’Emploi Dans l’Industrie et le Commerce) premises—sometimes going as far as the detainment of employees, the organizers of the European Marches, many of whom are French, in contrast, deliberately chose the path of respectability. This



236

suggests the voluntary and strategic adaptation to the European dimension by a mobilization that sought the approval of national public opinion, that sometimes possessed extremely diverse cultural traditions, and among whom certain participants would undoubtedly not tolerate illegal acts. Thanks to the media, the marches were ultimately covered almost throughout Europe, where certain imitation and spiral effects could be witnessed. The echo raised by several national mobilizations of the unemployed, particularly in France, shortly after the Amsterdam summit in 1997—and in which the leaders of the European Marches were very directly involved—has resonated widely: “Since the winter of 1998, the movements of the French and German unemployed took off within only a few weeks of each other. Television and the media played an important role in this phenomenon of contagion” (Aguiton 1999: 86). Thus, on several occasions, in Germany, Austria, or in Italy, the unemployed marched to the cry, “We do as the French!”

Two competing strategic orientations Two major orientations emerged and tended to oppose each other within the marches. The first had a long-term perspective, based on a historical analysis of the development of class (or power) relations, and was considered imperative to the establishment of a European, or even global, social movement. The second, generally prioritized by the organizers of unemployed associations, or by the unemployed themselves, was increasingly defined in terms of its urgency. European social movement versus movement of unemployed? In the first case, the reasoning of the marches’ leaders was the following: while the trade union movement gradually established itself at the end of the nineteenth century within nation states in response to the rise of an essentially national industrial capitalism, the globalization of economic processes—and the creation of free trade zones—today should lead it to become better organized at the supranational level. For many of the marches’ leaders, there were two pitfalls to be avoided. On the other hand, trade union action should not be based on the national sphere, which is no longer the exclusive, or even merely the dominant, location of decision making. On the other hand, efforts should be made to resist the institutionalization of European trade unionism, seen as insufficiently anti-establishment and not defending adequately the interests of those exposed to the play of international capitalism. By means of mobilizations such as the marches they aimed



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above all to pave the way for future transnational social movements. Therefore, the strictly claim-based dimension of the marches is considered to be of secondary importance. The action undertaken did not so much aim at the immediate attainment of the specific demands made, than at the creation of the conditions for the development of struggles, in particular at the EU level. The conflict was envisaged as a means of making possible—or rather, conceivable—the emergence of such movements among all those in Europe at risk of social marginalization. Here, an enlargement of the “scope of solidarity” between the latter was sought, in dimensions both structural (the existence of networks ensuring mobilization) and cognitive (that such social actors may mentally conceive of together defending their interests). From this perspective, one of the questions currently being openly discussed within the movement is that of its eventual opening up to additional issues and actors. Two possibilities are suggested. Some foresee the possibility of a rapprochement, or even an alliance, with political partners (the Greens or the Communist Party in particular), in order to further the institutionalization of the movement and reinforce its negotiating capacity. This strategy risks losing autonomy and mobilizing strength. Others, in greater numbers, prefer to work toward a widening of the demands made around the theme of insecurity, hoping to mobilize more easily the most weakened sectors of the European workforce, including but not limited to the unemployed. This debate highlights the fact that the marches were grounded, in their own way—that is by means of protest—in the process of European integration. In each of the countries it was rare for the marchers to oppose the building of Europe itself. The only overtly anti-European organizations to have participated in the marches were Danish, in celebration, on June 2, of the fifth anniversary of voting “no” on the Maastricht Treaty (Salmon 1998: 217). Opposing its current development, the marches’ leaders were generally favorable to the construction of a different European social and political system, to which they attempted to contribute. The questioning of national frameworks, as loci of sovereignty, that resulted was either acknowledged or hoped for. Due to either political belief or to the principle of solidarity with those most disadvantaged, the questions of internationalism and supranationalism were not seen as problematic. The majority was convinced by the need for a social organization that would regulate both the action of states and (other) international economic actors. Far from being “antiEuropean,” the movement of the marches called, on the contrary, for “another Europe” and, to a great extent, for more Europe. In the future,



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if they become capable of coordinating and acting toward the advancement of their social claims, the European social movements may play an essential role by giving a different orientation to the building of Europe. Such mobilizations would assist in the formation and transformation of European public opinion, by means of the elaboration of shared demands and the feeling of acting together toward the construction of a political and social space at the continental level. “This should, in my opinion, be the priority, for the coming years, of the European trade union and associative structures” (Aguiton 1999: 87). This analysis is often based on the idea that the construction of the EU, especially the representation and defense of interests that operate within it, far from being established, is vulnerable and susceptible to influence, and is put into question by the emergence of protest-based actions. Numerous participants in the marches made a clear distinction between the sociopolitical configuration of national spheres, marked by an institutionalization, a historical grounding and a much stronger and solidified reproduction of social interests. Within the EU framework, the situation would be relatively more open. Thus, the unemployed have been able to find an audience for their claims within a European Parliament concerned with the valuing of its ability to play a representative role, in particular vis-à-vis the Commission and the Council.9 It is also within this framework that they gain access to various information about a considerable number of political and trade union actors in Europe. The Parliament is undoubtedly the European institution to which they have the most direct and regular access, although a delegation of the European Marches was received by the German Minister for Employment within the context of the European Council in Cologne. Finally, although mobilization is more difficult at the European than at the national level, the possibilities for influencing the institutions toward the interests of the employed and the unemployed might be, nonetheless, much larger. The second orientation, clearly less developed politically, did not necessarily imply any particular societal projection or any concept of Europe. In this case, the visibility of the unemployed at the European level was significant, but only in the sense that it allowed for pressure to be placed on national institutions and for the negotiation, under better conditions and within each welfare state system, of the improvement of social terms. The attainment of immediate material gains (a rise in social minimums, unemployment benefits, different premiums, etc.) was the main motivation for the engagement. Here, the extension of the stakes and claims to groups other than the unemployed was not



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only ignored but also unwanted. From this perspective, the assembly of two main categories of excluded groups at the marches—the unemployed and the “universe of others lacking security”—the first outnumbering the second, led to two problems. On the one hand, it tended to fragment and dilute these demands and thus make it made difficult to satisfy those of the main group: the unemployed. On the other hand, the latter did not readily accept being associated with those who were often in a worse-off situation and who, sometimes, displayed signs of “social anomie.”10 In spite of important divergences, these two orientations were complementary and mutually embedded. Indeed, the dissatisfaction of the unemployed was essential to the emergence of a European movement, while the latter provided increased visibility, ultimately leading to more recognition of unemployed issues. A new mode of the Europeanization of action: The externalization of protest The conjunction of these two orientations and the configuration that they yield are at the basis of the unique character of the European Marches as a specific form of the Europeanization of collective action. In an attempt to elaborate a typology, Doug Imig and Sydney Tarrow (2001b) define three cases in point, the last being by far the most frequent: coordinated internal protest: protests target the national level but organize simultaneously in different countries; transnational conflict: transnational actor coalitions target the EU or some other supranational or transnational actor in reaction to measures taken at the community level; and internal protest: national actors protest within a country against measures taken at the community level. The marches lead us to the consideration of a fourth possibility, that of a transnational coalition, demonstrating at the EU level—against the economic and social orientations decided upon there (“transnational conflict”) to be sure—but also, and above all, in opposition to the policies of national governments. Therefore I suggest this addition to Imig and Tarrow’s three categories: there also is the externalization of protest, namely, when transnational actor coalitions target the EU in opposition to the policies of national governments. More or less excluded from all forms of traditional representation at the national level, the unemployed and those denied job security are completely reliant on welfare state systems. While they demonstrate massively during the European summits, many among them expect nothing—in the short term—from the European institutions on which their futures do not



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directly depend. They protest in order to make themselves visible in the European public space, and thus to pressure national governments (it is, moreover, not by chance that the Council is targeted), the sole sure guarantors of their social protection. It is in such a sense that these two orientations—the first, in the long term, aimed toward the building of a European social movement, the other, in the short term, seeking national improvements—prove compatible.

Conclusion In all respects, the European Marches appear to be both innovative and paradoxical. They testify to the capacity for mobilization of a social group that, until recently, was characterized by its withdrawal from collective action. Reduced, but not non-existent, political opportunities were generally seized by a small number of entrepreneurs for linking and orienting the grievances of the unemployed toward a political movement seeking visibility at the EU level. When measured against its demands, the movement’s results were minimal. For example, in several countries the system of assistance and social protection for the unemployed and those denied job security have undergone some revision. Clearly one can consider the marches to have contributed to this improvement by raising the political seriousness of the problem and by activating national mobilization networks. Therefore, over a few years, a previously nonexistent mobilization experience was constituted at the European level. This was a considerable development. More generally, the marches appeared at a time marked by the appearance of conflicts (Renault-Vilvoorde and the railway workers’ and lorry drivers’ movements) that prioritized the necessity of reinforcing the European social mechanism. Their emergence was a factor, among many others, contributing to the orientation of the process of European integration. In many respects the European Marches can be seen as among the pioneer elements of the global justice movement and the system of countersummits it initiated at the WTO conference in Seattle in October 1999. Nonetheless this unemployed movement did not survive its early success, running out of steam so quickly that its capacity to mobilize had plummeted by the time of the Nice summit in December 2000 (Mathers 2007). Despite several attempts at revival, particularly on the occasion of the G8 summit in Rostock in June 2007, the marches mobilized no more than a handful of militants. All that remains now is an (admittedly very active) exchange and information network on the Internet.11



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The cruel truth is that today the global justice movement does little to express or represent the demands of the unemployed, and, as a number of recent surveys indicate, is situated on the other side of a sociological divide. Overall, the militants at the first European Social Forum (ESF) in Florence in 2002 offer profiles far removed from those of the deprived and excluded thrown up by European integration and the globalization process. At the anti-G8 protests in Genoa in July 2001, the unemployed and those without job security comprised a very small fraction. Participants in the second ESF in and around Paris in November 2003 offered the extremely homogeneous image of a group with real cultural capital and in many cases a stable public-sector job (Gobille and Uysal 2005). The proportion of unemployed persons was low and embodied more the notion of the “intellectual without job security” than that of the victims of globalization. The organizations fighting unemployment and job insecurity make attempts at involvement in the ESFs so as to benefit from the hearing they get in the public arena, but the results are meager. True, their case is stated, but it is diluted and stifled by the much more powerful representatives of civil society and the trade unions, who find it appreciably easier to get a hearing and gain access to the political sphere. The isolation and the position of inferiority imposed on the unemployed at the national level are equally present within the European movement, which they in fact helped to found, and which is now emerging as a collective actor of steadily mounting influence.

Notes This chapter is reprinted from a previous publication (Chabanet 2008) and adapted for the present book. 1. For our research, we have carried out semidirected interviews with several actors who have taken part in at least one of these marches. Moreover, we participated in different preparatory meetings. Whenever possible we consulted the various documents (written or audiovisual) produced by the movement itself. In a less systematic manner, we took into account factual data available in newspapers. The number of demonstrators mentioned in this chapter is drawn from these readings. 2. The clearest illustration is provided by those enterprises that lay off workers while making huge profits. 3. In France, Martine Aubry broke this taboo in 1992 as Minister for Employment, sustaining heavy criticism for having publicly posed the question of the necessity of establishing a union of the unemployed. 4. With the European Network of the Unemployed (ENU). “An international network for the fight against unemployment, job insecurity, flexibility and exclusion on the European level and open to solidarity with people, the



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5.

6. 7. 8. 9.

10.

11.

employed and the unemployed throughout the world.” This small association, lacking any significant power and having limited means, is above all a leader in the coordination of action (see Royall 2002). For example, Christophe Aguiton: cofounder of SUD-PTT (Solidarity, Unity, Democracy – Post, Telegraph and Telecommunication), coordinator of AC! and the European Marches, he is also a member of the LCR (Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire), the bureau of ATTAC (Association pour la Taxation des Transactions Financières pour l’Aide aux Citoyens) and, more generally, is involved in the international movement against the World Trade Organization (WTO). The marchers themselves also make a variable and often very modest financial contribution (under 15 euros). Interview extract. That which, not only on this point, differentiates it from the majority of other street demonstrations; cf. Danielle Tartakowsky (1998). Several encounters, debates and working meetings have taken place with European parliamentarians, for the most part members of the European Unified Left, one of them taking the initiative of launching a petition in favor of “full employment,” signed by several hundred parliamentarians, trade unionists, politicians and other personalities. Cooperation among groups was fraught with difficulties. Over the two months of preparation for the Amsterdam demonstration, certain people whose behavior was deemed incompatible with the group’s coexistence were excluded. http://www.euromarches.org, last accessed August 22, 2010.



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This book has taken a look back at a difficult period for the labor market in order to inquire into the relationships between political institutional approaches to employment policy and political conflicts mobilized by collective actors over unemployment in the public domain. This is what we have called the contentious politics of unemployment. In more prosaic terms, we have looked at the intervention, in claim making in the public domain, but also in policy networks, on issues relating to unemployment. On a more theoretical level, this volume has tried to bring together two research streams and theoretical traditions that have remained largely unaware of each other: work on social movements and contentious politics, in particular the works that have stressed the impact of political opportunity structures on social protest (see Kriesi 2004a; Meyer 2004 for reviews), on the one hand, and the literature on the comparative political economic of the welfare state on the other (see Arts and Gelissen 2002; Green-Pedersen and Haverland 2000; Pierson 2000a for reviews). The various chapters that form the volume have highlighted a number of relevant features of the contentious politics of unemployment in the six European countries included in our study (France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK). Rather than simply summarizing the main findings of the book, which is not an easy task in edited volumes even when they originate, like this one, in a common research project, in this concluding chapter I would like to briefly address three particularly relevant aspects: (1) differences across countries in the way collective actors enter the field of unemployment politics; (2) the place and role of the category of people most directly concerned by what happens in this field, namely the unemployed 244



The Contentious Politics of Unemployment in Europe: Some Conclusions

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Cross-national differences in the contentious politics of unemployment in Europe The contentious politics of unemployment is not an invariant feature of European societies. This book has followed a cross-national comparative perspective with the aim of describing and, to the extent that this is possible with the present state of the knowledge in the field, explaining variations across countries in the contentious politics of unemployment. The various chapters have shown strong variations in the intervention of actors in the field of unemployment politics across the six countries of the study. First and foremost, we have observed important differences in the claim making in unemployment politics. This certainly holds when we look at the overall claim making in the field. Thus, significant differences can be observed in the very content of claims. For example, as Manlio Cinalli and Marco Giugni have shown in Chapter 1, variations in the main thematic focus of claims point to a greater role played by issues relating to welfare systems and social benefits in countries such as France and Sweden than in the other four countries. Even more striking, the very “stake” of claim making differs from one national context to the other. The unemployed are obviously the most important object of claims everywhere, but they are prioritized only in France, partly in Italy, and especially in Sweden, while in Germany and above all in Switzerland and the UK such a priority is challenged by labor organizations and groups. Similarly, substantial differences can also be observed in the form of claim making, not only across countries, with the field being much more contentious in France than in the other countries, but also across actors and issues, as shown by Donatella della Porta in Chapter 2. Indeed, beyond the overall claim making in the field, important differences emerge when we look at specific collective actors. In this book we have examined the role of three types of collective actors that are particularly important in the contentious politics of unemployment: trade unions, civil society actors (in particular, non-state welfare organizations and groups), and the unemployed themselves. Annulla Linders and Marina Kalander have shown in Chapter 4 that the unions’ position toward the unemployed, in terms of claim making, varies in important ways between countries. This can be related to certain



themselves; and (3) the relation between a still predominantly national political field of unemployment and trends toward a transnationalization of this field.


general features of the national context such as the larger institutional arrangements characterizing each nation, but also to aspects more specifically linked to the field of unemployment politics such as the different models of social welfare and the institutional arrangements to deal with unemployment. In a similar fashion, Simone Baglioni in Chapter 5 maintains that the access civil society actors have to public debates on unemployment depends on the larger context. While civil society claims-making in unemployment politics takes the different forms of the civil society itself, it is to a large extent channelled by contextual features such as characteristics pertaining to the policy system, the form of the state, and the traditional arrangements between the state and civil society with regard to welfare provisions. Finally, Simone Baglioni, Britta Baumgarten, Didier Chabanet, and Christian Lahusen in Chapter 6 underscore the differences, but also the similarities, of the mobilization of the unemployed depending, among other things, on the specific configurations of political opportunities in each of the three countries they studied. In addition, cross-national variations also appear once we look at the networks between collective actors who intervene in this field, at least as far as cooperation among actors in Britain, Germany, and Switzerland are concerned, as shown by Manlio Cinalli and Katharina Füglister in Chapter 3. By looking at relationships of cooperation among actors within the national unemployment field in three countries, they suggest that important variations of opportunities, resources, and culture will impinge upon actors’ decisions and preferences when forging their networks. Thus, the contentious field of unemployment is structured in different ways in different countries. Following a neo-institutional perspective, we have hypothesized that in part this is due to differences in the institutional approaches to unemployment characterizing each country. Although we did not explore this linkage systematically, the analyses offered in this volume point to the role played by both general and specific political opportunity structures. Chapter 1, in particular, points to the strong impact of unemployment and labor market regulations, which are conceptualized, inspired by previous work (Giugni et al. 2009), as forming a specific opportunity structure for claim making in the unemployment political field. Yet we would be much too naïve if we argued that that all the variations that we could observe throughout the book are explained by the specific configuration of political opportunities in terms of unemployment and labor market regulations. Different welfare models or



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welfare state regimes and, more specifically, different institutional arrangements to deal with unemployment certainly define the boundaries within which collective actors can intervene in the field of unemployment politics—both in the public domain and in more hidden policy networks—and channel the political claim making in the field. However, other factors must be taken into account as well, such as the more general institutional settings of the country, the characteristics of industrial relations and the neo-corporatist versus pluralist tradition of collaboration between the state and organized interest in society, the structure and degree of flexibility or rigidity of the labor market, the state of the economy and in particular employment, and so forth. While we are well aware of the potential impact of these other factors, in this book we wanted to strike another chord and stress the role of the welfare state as a source of political opportunities specific to the field of unemployment politics. At the same time, these important cross-national variations should not make us overlook the equally interesting similarities across countries that can also be observed. A first common trait consists in the very nature of the political field at hand. Although conflicts and disagreements are not lacking, the field of unemployment politics is less contentious than other political fields, such as for example the field of immigration and ethnic relations politics (see Koopmans et al. 2005). One can see this in the forms of action used by collective actors to enter the field. The latter is characterized by a low degree of radicalization. As mentioned earlier, in spite of cross-national variations as a result of different configurations of political opportunities for protest, the large majority of claims take the form of verbal statements and, perhaps with the exception of France, only a small share of claims are made of unconventional protests. In the same vein, when we look at the position of claims toward the object or constituency (either workers or unemployed), overall we observe a relatively positive position in all the countries. Of course, specific actors may vary and do vary in this respect, but the general discursive climate is quite positive. Again, this contrasts for example with the field of immigration and ethnic relations politics (Koopmans et al. 2005) and is a sign of a lower degree of contentiousness of the field. An additional common feature across countries is the fact that the groups whose interests are most directly affected by what happens in the field—the unemployed—are usually at the center of debates, but at the margin of the action. This leads me to discuss the next issue, namely the role of the unemployed.



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Many different collective interests are at stake in the contentious politics of unemployment. Most notably, trade unions and employer’s organizations surely have much to gain or lose from policy changes in this field. In the end, however, those who are most directly affected are the unemployed themselves. To use the terminology we have used in the study upon which this volume is drawn, the unemployed are the main object of contention in this political field. While the extent to which jobless people are placed at the center of debates in the public domain and of political exchanges through policy networks may vary across countries as well as over time, the unemployed are always in some way, directly or indirectly, affected by such debates and exchanges. Yet, as we said earlier, the unemployed are not the only category to be placed at the center of public debates and collective mobilizations in the field of unemployment politics. As Chapter 1 has shown, even in their role of object of other’s actions and discourses the unemployed must face the challenge of another category of actors, namely workers and more specifically workers under threat of redundancy. Quite understandably, this is all the more true when it comes to claims made by labor organizations and groups, who tend to privilege their own constituency, namely workers and employees, as pointed out in Chapter 4. At the same time, it is interesting to note that, once again, the context matters. Thus, the share of unemployed objects in the claim making of labor organizations and groups varies considerably from one country to the other, being very high in a country such as Sweden and reaching its lowest level in Switzerland and the UK. Far from arguing that this is the only possible explanation, the specific configuration of welfare in those countries accounts, at least in part, for such differences. But, beyond being objects of others’ actions and discourses as well as of state policies, are the unemployed also able to become active political actors? In other words, can the organized unemployed take their destiny in their hands and perhaps even become agents of change? Previous work has often pointed to the obstacles and barriers unemployed people must face to become involved in politics (see Giugni 2008b for a review). They may have a poor interest in politics and therefore in engaging in politics. They may lack the “objective” condition that gives rise to grievances about their situation, therefore lacking the numbers necessary to form a social movement. As the framing approach to social movements has emphasized (see Benford and Snow 2000 and Snow 2004 for reviews), they may be hard to motivate for action, to identify



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causes and consequences of a given problem, to define unemployment as an unjust condition, to blame the political authorities or someone else for this condition, and so forth. They may lack a strong collective identity to be politically engaged, an important aspect for forming a social movement, as shown by the social movement literature (see Polletta and Jasper 2001 for a review). They may lack internal resources (both in terms of the organizational infrastructure supporting mobilization and the networks of interpersonal relations that facilitate the formation of collective identities as well as the creation of shared understandings of their situation), a crucial factor for political mobilization, as shown by resource mobilization theory (see Edwards and McCarthy 2004 for a review). But there may also be an absence of favorable political opportunities preventing unemployed people from expressing their grievances publicly, as shown by political opportunity theory (see Kriesi 2004a and Meyer 2004 for reviews). Thus, for a number of reasons, the unemployed are a politically marginalized collective actor, often confined to their role as object of public debates as well as the actions of other, more powerful actors. The analyses provided in this book largely confirm that. Yet the unemployed are sometimes able to transcend their marginalization in order to organize and mobilize collectively. This often occurs at the local level (Baglioni et al. 2008a) rather than at the national level, where constraints are even larger. In addition, as works on political mobilization by the unemployed have stressed (see Giugni 2008b for a review), marginalized groups tend to engage in spontaneous and unorganized rather than in more conventional and structured forms of political activism. Regardless of the locus of action and the form it takes, Chapter 6 has pointed to a number of conditions under which protest by unemployed people become more likely: when previously granted rights or goods are threatened or even withdrawn; when an infrastructure for the protest can be created by organizations; when there are political allies and entrepreneurs that can spur the action; when the mass media and public opinion are in favor of their demands; and when activists are able to exploit available opportunities or to surmount existing constraints through empowerment and collective learning. Perhaps more interestingly, in spite of all the obstacles mentioned earlier that constrain their action both locally and nationally, jobless people are sometimes able to mobilize beyond their national borders, as discussed by Didier Chabanet in Chapter 9 (see further Mathers 2007 and Royall 2002). Although the impact of this mobilization is far from being crystal clear, the European marches against unemployment, job



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insecurity, and social exclusion of 1997 have sent an important message to social movement scholars and policy makers alike. The former were made aware, if they needed to be, that even improbable collective actions can indeed occur. The latter were perhaps sensitized toward the problem of the unemployed given the important mediatic impact of that campaign. This transnational mobilization was made possible also thanks to the work of a small number of entrepreneurs who seized the political opportunities presenting themselves to build a movement at the European level. In addition, the movement gained visibility by adopting a specific kind of action—the march—pointing to the important of strategic choices for movement leaders and participants. But how open and accessible are the public domain and the policy networks for civil society actors in this field? I address this issue next.

The multilevel game of the contentious politics of unemployment Social policies and, more specifically, measures aimed at fighting unemployment are traditionally enacted and implemented at the national or subnational level. Yet in this field trends toward transnationalization can also be observed. In particular, since the 1990s, the European Union has taken various policy initiatives, most notably the European Employment Strategy, and made steps toward a common social policy with the aim of fighting unemployment and social exclusion. Although we are far from a transfer of competencies from the national to the supranational—European, in this case—level, at least the seeds of a trend toward what we may call a “multilevel governance of unemployment” have been planted. In such a multilayered configuration of institutional competencies and policy measures the European Union and its member states must increasingly interact to find the best solutions to the challenges posed by unemployment. This holds to some extent also for a country such as Switzerland that is not member of the European Union, but is in some way forced to abide to the rules and regulations adopted by the latter following a process of autonomous adaptation (Sciarini et al. 2004). This transfer of competencies, or at least this increasingly important role of the European Union, creates new opportunities from above for collective actors to engage in political claim making on issue relating to unemployment and, more generally, social exclusion. Recent scholarship on social movements has stressed the importance of supranational opportunities for the transnationalization of protest (della Porta and



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Tarrow 2005; Smith 2004; Tarrow 2001, 2005) and more specifically with regard to the European Union (Imig and Tarrow 2001c). As we have seen, in some occasions the unemployed were able to exploit such opportunities to mount an important movement. Yet Europeanization not only creates new opportunities, it also poses constraints. More precisely, it opens up opportunities for certain actors, while shrinking them for others. Inversely, it softens the constraints for some actors, but at the same time it also increases them for others. As is shown by Paul Statham and Manlio Cinalli in Chapter 8, the Europeanization of debates has led to an empowerment of the already powerful executive actors, at the expense of parties and actors from civil society. Similarly, the multiorganizational field of unemployment within policy networks at the European level is dominated by institutional actors from above, with little if any access for civil society actors. In such a context, the less powerful actors have little room to intervene through institutional channels and must resort to less conventional forms of actions, including protest. Yet, as Chapter 1 and especially Chapter 2 and Chapter 5 have shown, if this does not occur very often it is also because the political opportunities, both general and specific, for protest by civil society actors (including social movements) are not always present. Again, cross-national differences are important in this respect. That we are far from witnessing a scale shift in the public debates on unemployment is made clear by the longitudinal analysis provided by Christian Lahusen, Marco Giugni, and Michel Berclaz in Chapter 7. At least for the period examined in this volume (1995–2002), the claim making in unemployment politics remains firmly anchored at the national or subnational level. Similar to what has been observed for the field of immigration and ethnic relations politics (Koopmans and Statham 1999b; Koopmans et al. 2005), the bulk of the claims made in this field still address the national state, have a nationally bounded scope, are made by national actors, and deal with national issues. Furthermore, no significant trend toward something resembling a shift from the national to the supranational level could be observed (again, limited to the period under study), but rather punctual increases in correspondence to specific initiatives taken at the European level. Thus, while we hardly deny that a multilevel game of the contentious politics of unemployment in Europe has emerged, the best cards are still largely in the hands of the nation. This has a number of implications, at both the theoretical and practical level. On the one hand, scholars interested in this field of studies should pay much attention to both the



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similarities and differences that exist across countries in the ways public debates and policy deliberations in the unemployment political field are spelled out. To be sure, they do not have to overlook the pressures from above and the changes that the latter may bring to the field, but a careful analysis of the contentious politics of unemployment in Europe and elsewhere also requires consideration of the important impact of national opportunities and constraints. On the other hand, practitioners and policy makers alike should be aware that national states continue to be crucial points of reference to evaluate where opportunities and constraints for policy making are located. The fight against unemployment, which is among the most important policy aims across Europe today, cannot operate in abstraction from the evidence we have shown in this volume.

Note I would like to thank Manlio Cinalli for his careful reading of a previous draft.



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Note: page numbers in italics refer to tables AC! (Agir contre le Chomage), 43, 52–3, 58, 63, 67, 154, 165, 230, 232, 234 access to policy makers, 101, 198, 201–2, 208, 211–12, 222, 239, 242 action repertoires, 29, 54, 68, 131, 139, 139–42, 141, 235 activation policies, 2–3, 33, 73–4, 122, 150, 192 activists, 45, 164, 167, 228, 232–4, 241–2, 249–50 actors, 30, 30–3, 36, 46, 54–6, 64, 76–7, 81, 180–3, 215–16, 231, 245 criticism of, 116–18, 118, 146, 149 and globalization, 178–88, 179, 182, 184, 186–7 interactions between, 75–6, 84, 86–7, 102, 116 and protest, 49–53, 55, 104, 115, 115, 116, 123–4, 134, 139, 142 scope of, 204, 206, 207, 208 state, 30, 36, 38, 116–17, 125, 144–6, 181, 185, 208–9 third-sector, 52, 56, 129, 230–2, 231 unemployed as, 248–50 see also civil society actors; unions addressees, 78, 116, 117, 178–88, 179, 182, 184, 186–7, 240 age difference, 26, 52–3, 58–9, 142 Agenda 2010, 73, 79, 155, 165 Aguiton, C., 236–7, 239 alliances, 46, 49, 51, 61, 66–9, 87, 124, 128, 154, 163–4, 218–21, 238 Amsterdam Summit, 177, 205, 227, 235–7 Anti-Poverty Network, 217, 219, 222 APEIS (Association pour l’Emploi, l’Information et la Solidarieté), 66–7, 154 Arts, W., 20, 244 Aspinwall, M., 211–12

ASSEDIC (Association pour l’Emploi Dans l’Industrie et le Commerce), 44, 63–4, 154, 236 Baccaro, L., 112, 124 BAG-Erwerbslose, 155, 163 Bagguley, P., 61, 66, 79, 100, 123, 227 Baglioni, S., 5, 14, 47, 53, 56, 64, 100, 124, 128, 130–1, 137, 143, 146, 153, 157, 246, 249 Balme, R., 229, 233 Baum, A., 73, 79 Baumgarten, B., 5, 14, 159, 161–2, 165, 246 Baxandall, P., 74, 101 Belgium, 227, 235 beneficiaries see objects of claims Benford, R. D., 8, 232, 248 Berclaz, J., 5, 19–20, 74 Berclaz, M., 5, 15, 19–20, 122, 142, 251 Béroud, S., 52, 160, 233 betweenness, 78, 84–5, 85, 86–7, 97, 221 Bischoff, G., 178, 196 Boeri, T., 99–100, 112–13 Bonoli, G., 21, 26, 73, 178, 197 Bourneau, S., 44, 64, 67 Caiani, M., 54, 63 Caporaso, J. A., 176, 178 casual work, 59–60 Catholicism, 49, 136, 154, 160, 163, 165, 233 centralized states, 131, 136–7, 183 CGIL (Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro), 49, 234 CGT (Confederation General du Travail), 49, 51, 154, 165, 233–4 Chabanet, D., 4–5, 14, 16, 20, 62–3, 128, 229, 233, 246, 249

275



Index

Index

cheminots strike, 43, 60 Christian Democrat Parties, 70, 160 Christmas doles, 44, 64, 157 Cinalli, M., 12–13, 15, 20–1, 29, 73, 75–6, 78–9, 93, 212, 245–6, 251 civil society actors, 33, 77–87, 127–8, 149–51, 200–2, 208–9, 222–4, 234, 245–6 claim making: addressees, 144–9, 145, 147–8; content, 142–4, 143–4; forms, 139, 139–42, 141; opportunities, 128–31 organizations, 75, 131–9, 133, 135, 138 cliques, 218, 219, 220 Cloward, R. A., 45, 54, 99–100, 152, 163 Cobas, 160, 165–6 cohesion, 77, 80, 80–1, 83–4, 87, 129, 218 collective bargaining, 113, 124 Combesque, M.-A., 58, 230 communication flows, 202–3, 205–6, 241 Communist Parties, 66, 154, 165, 232–3, 238 community involvement, 54, 63–4, 67 Compston, H., 99–101 confrontational protest, 139, 142 consultation, 70, 79–80, 84, 87 content of claim making, 31–9, 33, 36–7, 56–8, 107, 150, 245 see also issues conventional protest, 54, 66, 70, 79, 83–4, 87, 139 convergence, 53, 98, 114, 171–8, 194–7 cooperation, 81–2, 82, 83, 86–7 cooperation networks, 218–19, 219, 220–1 Coordinamento per il Lavoro di Napoli, 163, 166 les coordinations, 233–4 corporatist model, 25–6, 121, 130, 132, 134, 137, 144, 146, 150, 159, 167 cross-national comparisons, 26–32, 27–31, 111–20, 113–15, 117–18, 245–7, 251 Crouch, C., 98, 101

cycles of protest, 68–9, 152–3, 155, 162 decentralization, 61, 63, 131, 137, 150 de la Porte, C., 176–7, 185 della Porta, D., 4–5, 13, 46, 48, 54, 59–61, 63, 66–7, 79, 128, 143, 146, 157, 245, 250 demonstrative protest, 54, 56, 62, 66, 70, 79, 139, 142 denationalization, 171–8, 194–7 DGB (Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund), 49, 234 diagnostic framing, 109, 110 Diani, M., 46, 67, 75, 78, 212 disagreement networks, 218, 220–1 dismissals, 51–3, 66, 68, 115, 124, 127, 140, 142, 146, 150 Disobedients, 49, 53 Disoccupati Autorganizzati di Acerra, 154, 163, 166 Ebbinghaus, B., 100, 112, 160 economic conditions, 31–2, 58, 61, 66, 73, 120, 122–3, 229 economic development issues, 131, 142–3, 150 Edwards, B., 75, 249 EES (European Employment Strategy), 2, 177–8, 181, 195, 250 Eisinger, P. K., 20, 74 elite domination, 210–13, 214–16, 217–18, 219–20, 221–5 employers, 31, 56, 100, 116, 121, 146, 177, 210, 220–1, 229, 248 employment agencies, 44, 63–4, 154, 236 ENU (European Network of Unemployed), 44, 217, 221, 234 EPC (European Policy Centre), 217, 219 Esping-Andersen, G., 20–1, 26, 101, 119, 192 ethnicity, 58, 247, 251 ETUC (European Trade Union Confederation), 208, 210, 214, 217–22, 224, 229



276

EU European Union, 2, 4, 7, 11, 30, 44, 49, 62–3, 102, 137–8, 172, 177 Commission, 176, 213, 217–21, 230, 239 Council, 214, 216–17, 219–20, 239 Parliament, 213, 217, 219, 221, 229, 239 see also Europeanization; European Marches European integration, 54, 63, 154, 174–5, 197, 199–201, 228–30, 233–4, 238, 241–2 Europeanization, 61–2, 137, 175, 178, 181–5, 189, 195–7, 199–211, 204, 207, 228, 240, 251 networks, 198, 212–17, 215–16 European Marches, 139, 227–8, 230, 236–42, 245, 249 mobilization, 228–34, 231, 234–7 exclusion, 21–2, 25, 33, 43, 66, 129–31, 134, 153, 162, 166–7, 230, 240 expert claims, 134–6, 149–50, 209–10, 212 externalization of protest, 62–3, 164, 228, 240–1 Fahlbeck, R., 112–13 Faniel, J., 5, 100, 110 Faust, K., 77, 218 federal states, 131, 137, 150, 183 Fiat demonstrations, 49–50, 52–3, 67, 140, 142 Fillieule, O., 44, 50, 52, 61, 63, 67 flexibility, 22–3, 25–6, 33, 35, 38, 67, 79, 143–4, 229 flexicurity model, 23–6 forms of claim making, 29, 56, 57, 65, 107, 115, 131, 139, 139–42, 141, 247 political contexts, 32–9, 33, 36–7 fragmentation, 58, 66, 121–2, 124–5, 159, 161, 240 framing, 58, 68, 74, 108–10, 111, 121, 142–3, 149–50, 196, 232 France, 4, 9, 183, 185, 188, 192, 204, 245, 247 civil society actors, 127, 132, 134, 136–7, 139–40, 143–4, 149–50

277

European Marches, 227, 230, 232–7 mobilization, 152, 154–7, 159–60, 163–5 political context, 21, 23, 25, 28–31 protest, 43–5, 47, 49–54, 56–64, 66–7 unions, 112, 114–16, 119, 121–3 Franzosi, R., 9–10, 47 Galland, O., 50–1 Gallas, A., 156, 163 Gallie, D., 1, 21, 26, 66, 101, 119 Gamson, W. A., 47, 99, 129, 161 Gelissen, J., 20, 244 gender difference, 58, 142 Germany, 4, 9, 183, 185, 188, 204, 208, 245–6 civil society actors, 134, 137, 143, 146, 149–50 European Marches, 227, 232, 234, 236–7, 239 mobilization, 152, 154–7, 160–1, 163–5 networks, 70–1, 73–5, 78–83, 85–7 political context, 21, 23, 26, 28–31 protest, 44, 47, 53, 59, 64–6 unions, 115–16, 119, 121–2 Giugni, M., 4–5, 12, 15–16, 19–21, 23, 45, 62, 74–5, 79–80, 122, 127, 131, 142, 179, 245–6, 248–9, 251 globalization, 53, 61, 100, 165, 171–3, 194–7, 232, 237, 242 actors and addressees, 178–88, 179, 182, 184, 186–7 denationalization and convergence, 173–8 issues and objects, 188–94, 190–1, 193 global justice movement, 53, 59, 232, 241–2 Goetschy, J., 112, 123 Green Parties, 155, 234, 238 Greenwood, J., 211–12 Hartz-Reform, 26, 73, 155, 157, 165 Heidenreich, M., 178, 196 hidden interventions, 78, 84, 212, 217



Index

Index

Hix, S., 200, 205 homeless people, 43, 53, 61 hunger marches/strikes, 54, 64, 127, 140 identities, 50–1, 58–9, 74–6, 152, 162, 171, 235–6, 249 ideology, 2–3, 7, 11–13, 22, 32, 78, 101, 159–60, 163–4, 196, 232–3, 236 ILO (International Labor Organization), 30, 203, 217 Imig, D., 62, 228, 240, 251 immediate relief/needs, 58, 64, 157–8 inclusion, 21–2, 25–6, 35, 38, 66, 129, 131, 134, 142–3, 159, 212 industrial relations, 101, 115, 121–3, 125, 159 influence, 201–2, 213, 215–16, 216, 217, 239 of unions, 111–12, 115, 122–3 innovation, 54, 59–60, 228, 241, 247 insertion into the labor market, 31–3, 36, 38–9, 56, 58–9, 73, 107, 131, 150, 192, 230 insider/outsider positions, 100, 112, 158–9, 161 institutional arrangements, 83, 112, 120, 125, 246–7 institutional environments, 98, 101, 119–20, 125 institutionalization, 100, 111, 159, 237–8 interactions between actors, 75–6, 84, 86–7, 102, 116 intergovernmental negotiations, 175–6, 178, 217, 221, 223 international institutions/regimes, 171, 174, 176, 178, 180 interviews, 48, 71–2, 213 isolation, 44–5, 66, 75, 129, 152, 154, 161, 166, 230, 232, 242 issues, 31, 31, 33–4, 38, 56, 57, 205, 227 civil society actors, 142–4, 143–4, 150 globalization, 188–94, 190–1, 193, 196 unions, 107–8, 108–9, 116, 119 see also content of claim making; individual issues

Italy, 4, 9, 204, 207 civil society actors, 127, 134, 136–7, 140, 142–4, 146, 149–50 European Marches, 234–5, 237, 245 globalization, 183, 185, 188, 192 mobilization, 152–7, 160–1, 163, 165–6 political context, 21, 23, 25–6, 28, 30–2 protest, 44, 47–8, 50, 52–4, 58–64, 66–7 unions, 112, 116, 119, 124 Jahoda, M., 1, 75, 152, 227 job creation, 9, 40, 43, 73, 107, 134, 143, 153, 205 job insecurity, 52–3, 59–60, 99, 122–3, 140, 162, 227, 230, 248 jobs kidnapping/requisitions, 44, 54, 127, 140 Jupille, J., 176, 178 Kalander, M., 5, 13, 100–1, 121, 245 Keck, M. E., 164, 200, 224 Keohane, R. O., 176, 200 Kerbo, H. R., 61, 66 Kitschelt, H., 20, 129, 140, 158, 161 Koopmans, R., 5–6, 8, 10–11, 19, 34, 46, 173, 195, 202–3, 205, 212, 247, 251 KOS (Koordinierungsstelle), 155, 161, 163, 165 Kriesi, H., 5, 8, 20, 34, 61, 66, 74, 122, 129–31, 134, 136–7, 140, 161, 202, 224, 244, 249 labor market regulations, 72–4, 84, 87, 143–4, 171, 177, 192, 229–30, 246–7 mobilization, 155, 157, 159–61 political context, 20–2, 26–7, 32–3, 35, 37 unions, 99, 102, 111, 122–3 Lahusen, C., 4–5, 14–15, 159, 161–2, 165, 196, 211, 246, 251 legitimacy, 38, 76, 164, 211, 224 Lijphart, A., 84, 159 Linders, A., 4–5, 13, 100–1, 121, 245 Lin, N., 78, 129



278

Lipsky, M., 46, 164, 228 Lisbon Treaty, 139, 176–7, 195 litigation, 70, 80, 87 lobbying, 84, 87, 97, 211, 217 local level, 63–4, 124, 137, 139, 155, 163–5, 181, 189, 230, 249 Locke, R. M., 112, 124 long-term unemployed, 58, 68, 73, 152 Louis, M. V., 50–1 Luxembourg Summit, 177, 181 Maastricht Treaty, 154, 238 McAdam, D., 8, 20, 75, 140, 158, 161, 199, 212, 229, 234–5, 249 McCarthy, J. D., 10, 45, 75, 156, 162, 234, 249 Mach, A., 26, 73, 194 marginalization, 52, 78, 86–7, 107, 126, 153, 158, 162, 221–2, 229, 238, 249 Marks, G., 175, 199, 229 Martin, A., 98–9, 228 Martin, V., 44, 64, 67 Mathers, A., 241, 249 Maurer, S., 44, 50–3, 59–61, 67, 128, 163 media, 44, 48, 54, 67, 124, 136, 139, 201–2, 205–6, 228, 236–7, 249 Meidner, R., 99, 105 Meyer, D. S., 5, 20, 34, 129, 161, 244 Meyer, J. W., 174–5, 185, 196 migrants/migration, 43, 53, 61–2, 200, 212, 235, 247, 251 militants, 45, 164, 167, 228, 232–4, 241–2, 249–50 Mishra, R., 174, 177 MNCP (National Movement of Unemployed and Precarious Workers), 154, 234 mobilization, 43, 74–8, 82–3, 86, 120, 152–3, 155–8, 166–7, 232–3, 241, 246 difficulties of, 29, 45, 50–1, 66, 70–1, 75, 79, 84, 100, 122, 152, 227, 239, 249 opportunity structures, 158–61 protests, 153–5 strategies, 161–6 unions, 99–102, 154, 159–61, 163–5

279

Molina, Ó, 98, 101 Monday Demonstrations, 79, 165 Moravcsik, A., 176, 224 Mosca, L., 48, 59–60 Mouchard, D., 52–3, 58 Mouriaux, R., 52, 233 mouvements de sans, 43, 61 Movimento per il Lavoro, 154, 163 multilevel governance, 175, 196, 201–2, 229, 250–2 multinational companies, 178–80 multiorganizational field, 47, 198–9, 219–20, 223–5, 251 elitism v. participation, 211–23, 214–16, 219–20 Europeanized public debates, 199–211, 204, 207 national level, 63–4, 136–9, 155, 163–5, 173, 181–3, 188–9, 206–7, 230, 237, 240–2, 250–1 nation states, 171, 173–6, 178, 185, 192, 196–7 neofunctionalism, 211, 222 neo-institutional approaches, 5–7, 20, 176, 196–7, 246 neoliberalism, 67, 160 Ness, I., 100–1 networks, 129, 230–2, 246, 249 comparison, 72–4 disagreement/cooperation, 218–19, 219, 220–1 Europeanization, 198, 212–15, 215, 216, 216, 217 framework application, 78–86, 80, 85 mobilization, 74–8, 162–7 protest, 46, 60–1, 70–2, 86–8 newspaper data, 46–8, 62, 71, 120, 173, 195, 201 objects of claims, 27, 27, 28, 35, 38, 105–6, 116, 245, 248–50 and globalization, 188–94, 190–1, 193 workers v. unemployed, 99, 104, 107–8, 110, 115, 121–2, 124, 248 occupations of premises, 44, 140, 142, 236



Index

Index

OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), 30, 122, 172, 180 OMC (Open Method of Coordination), 2, 175, 177, 196 opportunity structures, 246–51 civil society actors, 128–31, 134 globalization, 196–7 mobilization, 158–61 networks, 74–6, 83 political context, 20–6, 24, 33, 33, 36–7, 38 protest, 46, 60–7, 62, 65, 67–9 unions, 99, 102 outsider/insider positions, 100, 112, 158–9, 161 pacification, 29, 31, 70–1, 78, 87, 159, 222 Palier, B., 177–8, 196–7 participation, 19, 30, 45, 51, 129, 163, 180, 208–23, 214–16, 219–20, 223–4, 233 passive measures, 33, 74, 192 Passy, F., 5, 19, 45, 62, 75 path dependencies, 15, 172, 176, 178, 195, 197, 224 Paugam, S., 21, 26, 101, 119 PCF (French Communist Party), 66, 233 Petras, J., 52–3, 61, 63, 67 Pierru, E., 44, 61, 67 Pierson, P., 20, 176–8, 197, 224, 244 Piven, F. F., 45, 54, 99–100, 152, 163 pivotal roles, 78, 84–5, 85, 86–7, 97, 221 pluralist model, 130, 134, 137, 144, 150, 167 Pochet, P., 176–7 policy makers/making, 77–9, 81–7, 97, 158, 174, 185, 188 access to, 101, 198, 201–2, 208, 211–12, 222, 239, 242 tripartite, 127–8, 132, 146 political contexts, 19–20, 39–41, 67, 74–5, 158–61, 246 civil society actors, 129–31, 140, 150

cross-national comparison, 26–32, 27–31 forms and content of claim making, 32–9, 33, 36–7 opportunity structures, 20–6, 24, 33, 33, 36–7, 38 unions, 98–101, 112, 118–20, 123–5 political entrepreneurs, 45, 164, 167, 228, 232–4, 241–2, 249–50 political parties, 38, 49, 56, 70–3, 101, 113, 121–4, 146, 159–61, 208–9, 229 see also individual parties Pollack, M. A., 176, 197 positions towards unemployed, 28, 28–9, 37, 37–8, 97, 104, 106, 146–9, 160, 245, 247 ambivalent, 51, 159, 164–5, 245–6 power relations, 199, 201, 206–13, 217, 221–5, 228, 237, 251 precariousness, 25–6, 52–3, 59–60, 99, 122–3, 140, 162, 227, 230, 235, 248 prognostic framing, 109–10, 111 protest, 153–5, 247, 249–51 actors, 49–53, 55, 104, 115, 115, 116, 123–4, 134, 139, 142 confrontational, 139, 142 conventional, 54, 66, 70, 79, 83–4, 87, 139 cycles of, 68–9, 152–3, 155, 162 demonstrative, 54, 56, 62, 66, 70, 79, 139, 142 externalization of, 62–3, 164, 228, 240–1 forms and content, 53–60, 55, 57, 62, 65 networks, 46, 60–1, 70–2, 86–8 opportunity structures, 46, 60–7, 62, 65, 67–9 political context, 32–3, 35, 43–8, 64, 67–9 symbolic, 54, 56, 68, 142 unions, 46, 49, 51–3, 56, 60, 64–6, 68–9 see also European Marches public debate, 47, 115, 126, 129, 142, 192, 198–211, 204, 207



280

public opinion as resource, 44, 54, 67, 69, 79, 97, 137, 228, 232–3, 235–7, 239, 249 Pugliese, E., 58, 64, 66 Radaelli, C. M., 175–6, 211 recognition, 44, 76, 156, 240 regional inequalities, 153–4, 156–7 regionalism, 61, 185, 189, 196 Reiter, H., 54, 58, 61 religious organizations, 127, 136, 140, 149–50, 154, 163, 233–4 representation, 229–30, 239 research centres, 134–6, 139, 149–50, 209–10, 212 resources, 44–6, 49–51, 60–3, 75–6, 119, 162, 167, 196, 222, 234, 249 restrictive measures, 87, 157, 228 Richards, A., 51, 61, 100–1, 110, 152, 229 right/left division, 158, 160, 163–5, 229, 232, 234 rigidity, 22, 25, 74 Ross, G., 98–9 Royall, F., 44, 64, 249 Rucht, D., 8, 10 Salmon, J.-M., 44, 63–4, 232, 238 “San Precario,” 59–60 Schmidt, V. A., 175, 177 Schmitter, P. C., 130, 159, 211, 222 scope variables, 61–4, 124, 136–9, 155, 163–5, 251 actors, 204, 206, 207, 208 Europeanization, 202–4 European Marches, 240 globalization, 171–3, 178, 179, 180–1, 182, 183, 184, 188–9, 190–1 Scott, J., 78, 215, 218 Shaffer, R. A., 61, 66 Sikkink, K., 164, 200, 224 single-issue organizations, 132, 134, 136 Skocpol, T., 129–31, 137 Snow, D. A., 8, 47, 232, 248 social benefits, 31–3, 36–8, 56, 73–4, 107, 116, 121–3, 131, 142–3, 150, 192

281

social capital, 129, 152 social contexts, 112, 118–19 Social Dialogue, 177, 229 social injustice issues, 146, 156, 158, 232, 249 Socialist Parties, 44, 66–7, 160, 235 social movements, 45–6, 61, 67–8, 98, 140, 160–1, 166, 202, 217, 222, 230–2, 237–9, 248–50 Social Platform, 217, 219, 222 social policies, 26, 159–61, 171, 177, 250 socioeconomic issues, 31–2, 38–9, 56, 104, 107, 116, 119, 123–4, 192 solidarity, 45, 54, 140, 162, 236, 238 Spain, 44, 232, 234–5 star marches, 54, 63 state actors, 36, 38, 116–17, 125, 144–6, 181, 185, 208–9 Statham, P., 3–4, 8, 15, 29, 46, 73, 79, 199, 201–3, 205–6, 212, 251 stigmatization, 50, 66, 75, 152, 230 strategic behaviour, 56–8, 118, 161–6 Streeck, W., 159, 177, 211, 222 strength of unions, 111–13, 115–19, 122–5 subnational level, 180, 183, 250–1 successes, 64, 70, 154, 241 SUD (Solidarity, Unity, Democracy), 160, 232 supranational level, 61–3, 137–9, 172, 175, 181–3, 188–9, 192–4, 198–9, 223–5, 237–40, 250–1 elitism v. participation, 211–23, 214–16, 219–20 Europeanized public debates, 199–211, 204, 207 Sweden, 4, 9, 47, 66, 248 civil society actors, 134, 143, 149–50 Europeanization, 192, 204, 245 globalization, 183, 185, 188 political context, 23, 25–6, 28–30, 32 unions, 112–16, 119, 121 Switzerland, 4, 9, 47, 66, 183, 185, 188, 192, 204, 245–6, 248, 250 civil society actors, 127, 132–4, 136–7, 142, 146, 149–50



Index

Index

Switzerland – continued networks, 70–1, 73–5, 78–87 political context, 21, 23, 25–7, 29–31 unions, 115–16, 119, 121–2 symbolic protest, 54, 56, 68, 142 Tait, V., 99–100, 105 Tarrow, S., 8, 20, 47, 60–2, 74, 131, 158, 228–9, 240, 251 Tartakowsky, D., 51, 61 think tanks, 79, 134, 136, 149, 188, 208, 212, 219 third-sector actors, 52, 56, 129, 230–2, 231 Tilly, C., 8–9, 20, 29, 74, 173, 235 de Tocqueville, A., 129, 158 transfer of competencies, 199–200, 205–6, 211, 250 transnationalization, 171–2, 176, 185, 195–6, 200, 240, 250 Traugott, M., 29, 235 Trenz, H.-J., 196, 200, 205 tripartite policy making, 127–8, 132, 146 Trotskyism, 49, 163, 165, 233 UK, 4, 9, 47, 66, 183, 185, 188, 192, 204, 207–8, 235, 245–6 civil society actors, 127, 132–4, 140, 142–4, 149–50 networks, 70–1, 73–5, 78–87 political context, 21, 23, 25, 27, 29, 31–2 unions, 112, 115–16, 119, 123 undemocratic structures, 211–12, 224 unemployed as actors, 248–50 long/short-term, 58, 68, 73, 152 as movement, 237–40 as objects, 99, 104, 107–8, 110, 115, 121–2, 124, 248 young, 26, 52–3, 58–9, 142 see also positions towards unemployed; unemployment organizations unemployment insurance, 9, 73, 101–2, 107, 113, 121–2, 154–5, 192 unemployment levels, 155–8, 228, 233

unemployment organizations, 68, 128, 245, 248 European Marches, 230, 234, 237, 241 mobilization, 153–5, 161–6 networks, 77, 79, 81, 83, 87 and unions, 98, 121, 123, 125 unemployment regulations, 70, 74, 79–80, 172, 189, 230, 246–7, 250 civil society actors, 131, 142, 146, 150 political context, 20–1, 27, 32–3, 35, 37 and unions, 101, 119 UNEMPOL project, 3–7, 11, 21, 46–9, 71, 172 UNICE (Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe), 217, 219–20 unions, 33, 146, 160–1, 167, 177, 210, 217, 245, 248 ambivalence towards unemployed, 51, 159, 164–5, 245–6 comparison with other actors, 104–11, 105–11 cross-national variation, 111–20, 113–15, 117–18 European Marches, 229, 232–5 mobilization, 99–102, 154, 159–61, 163–5 networks, 70, 79, 84, 97–9, 102–3, 124–6 protest, 46, 49, 51–3, 56, 60, 64–6, 68–9 within-nation variation, 120–4 see also individual unions Valocchi, S., 66, 99 verbal interventions, 29, 36, 56, 64, 139, 247 visibility, 104, 162, 228, 230, 235–6, 239–41, 250 Visser, J., 112, 228 Waddington, J., 100–1 Warren, M. E., 129–30 Wasserman, S., 77, 218 welfare issues, 56, 107, 116, 119, 121, 123, 143, 159, 164, 246



282

Index WTO (World Trade Organization), 203, 217, 241 youth unemployment, 26, 52–3, 58–9, 142 Zald, M. N., 45, 75, 156, 162, 234 Zeitlin, J., 178, 196 Zorn, A., 53, 56, 59



welfare states, 20–5, 58–61, 67, 118–19, 125, 131, 142, 161, 171, 177, 192, 195 welfare systems, 31, 33, 36, 38–9, 63, 70, 192, 240, 247 Wolski-Prenger, F., 66, 79, 152 workers’ interests, 31, 35, 99–100, 104–5, 115, 248

283

The Contentious Politics of Unemployment in Europe: Welfare States and Political Opportunities

The Governance of Active Welfare States in Europe (Work and Welfare in Europe)

The Politics of Unemployment

Unemployment in the New Europe

Strangers at the Gates: Movements and States in Contentious Politics

The Political Economy of Welfare Reform in the United States

States, Parties, and Social Movements (Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics)

The New Politics of Unemployment: Radical Policy Initiatives in Western Europe (European Political Science Series)

The Politics of Collective Violence (Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics)

Statecraft, Welfare and the Politics of Inclusion (International Political Economy)

The Transformation of Welfare States

Uncivil Society?: Contentious Politics in Post-Communist Europe

Political Cultures in Asia and Europe: Citizens, States and Societal Values (Politics in Asia Series)

Political Islam, World Politics and Europe

A Long Goodbye to Bismarck?: The Politics of Welfare Reform in Continental Europe (Amsterdam University Press - Changing Welfare States Series)

Welfare States in East Central Europe, 1919-2004

The Family in the Mediterranean Welfare States

Nursing History and the Politics of Welfare

Race and the Politics of Welfare Reform

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Citizenship in Nordic Welfare States: Dynamics of Choice, Duties and Participation In a Changing Europe (Routledge Advances in European Politics)

Nordic Welfare States in the European Context

Europe's New State of Welfare: Unemployment, Employment Policies and Citizenship

Citizenship and Welfare State Reform in Europe

The EU and the Domestic Politics of Welfare State Reforms: Europa, Europae (Work and Welfare in Europe)

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The OECD and European Welfare States

International Politics in Europe

Gender and the Political Opportunities of Democratization in South Korea

The Politics of Home: Belonging and Nostalgia in Europe and the United States

The Contentious Politics of Unemployment in Europe: Welfare States and Political Opportunities

The Governance of Active Welfare States in Europe (Work and Welfare in Europe)

The Politics of Unemployment

Unemployment in the New Europe

Strangers at the Gates: Movements and States in Contentious Politics

The Political Economy of Welfare Reform in the United States

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The Politics of Collective Violence (Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics)

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Political Cultures in Asia and Europe: Citizens, States and Societal Values (Politics in Asia Series)

Political Islam, World Politics and Europe

A Long Goodbye to Bismarck?: The Politics of Welfare Reform in Continental Europe (Amsterdam University Press - Changing Welfare States Series)

Welfare States in East Central Europe, 1919-2004

The Family in the Mediterranean Welfare States

Nursing History and the Politics of Welfare

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Gender, Equality and Welfare States

Citizenship in Nordic Welfare States: Dynamics of Choice, Duties and Participation In a Changing Europe (Routledge Advances in European Politics)

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Europe's New State of Welfare: Unemployment, Employment Policies and Citizenship

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The EU and the Domestic Politics of Welfare State Reforms: Europa, Europae (Work and Welfare in Europe)

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