The Chinese Communist Party in Reform (Routledge Studies in the Chinese Economy.)

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The Chinese Communist Party in Reform

Contrary to the expectations of many people, China’s recent economic growth has not led to the collapse of the Chinese Communist Party. In fact, the party has recently carried out a peaceful and orderly transition to the so-called fourth generation of leadership, has revitalised itself, and created a new, younger and better trained cadre corps. Despite this successful transformation, there continue to be many problems that the party will need to overcome if it is to remain in power, including pressures for democratisation in both urban and rural areas, widespread corruption, the emergence of new social groups, and increasing dissatisfaction among workers who seem to be losing out in the present transition process. This book explores the current state of the Chinese Communist Party and the many challenges which it faces. It considers the dynamics of development in China, the party organisation, recruitment and management, and the party’s role in society more widely. It concludes by examining the prospects for the future of the party, including whether it will continue to be able to accommodate socio-economic changes within China and pressures from abroad, and the likely nature of its evolution. Overall, this book provides a comprehensive assessment of the internal dynamics of the Chinese Communist Party and its role in Chinese society. Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard is Professor and Director of the Asia Research Centre, Copenhagen Business School, Denmark. He is also Editor of The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies and member of the editorial board of a number of scholarly journals, including The China Quarterly. He is currently engaged in a major research project on party reform and cadre management in China, supported by the Carlsberg Foundation. Zheng Yongnian is Professor and Head of Research at the China Policy Institute, University of Nottingham. He is also a co-editor of China: an International Journal. He is a recipient of the Social Science Research Council MacArthur Foundation Fellowship, and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation Fellowship. He has extensively studied both China’s domestic political economy and its external relations.

Routledge Studies on the Chinese Economy Series Editor: Peter Nolan, University of Cambridge Founding Series Editors: Peter Nolan, University of Cambridge and Dong Fureng, Beijing University The aim of this series is to publish original, high-quality, research-level work by both new and established scholars in the West and the East, on all aspects of the Chinese economy, including studies of business and economic history. The Growth of Market Relations in Postreform Rural China A micro-analysis of peasants, migrants and peasant entrepreneurs Hiroshi Sato The Chinese Coal Industry An economic history Elspeth Thomson Sustaining China’s Economic Growth in the Twenty-First Century Edited by Shujie Yao and Xiaming Liu China’s Poor Regions Rural–urban migration, poverty, economic reform and urbanisation Mei Zhang China’s Large Enterprises and the Challenge of Late Industrialization Dylan Sutherland China’s Economic Growth Yanrui Wu The Employment Impact of China’s World Trade Organisation Accession A.S. Bhalla and S. Qiu Catch-Up and Competitiveness in China The case of large firms in the oil industry Jin Zhang

Economic Growth, Income Distribution and Poverty Reduction in Contemporary China Shujie Yao China’s Economic Relations with the West and Japan, 1949–79 Grain, trade and diplomacy Chad J. Mitcham China’s Industrial Policy and the Global Business Revolution The case of the domestic appliance industry Ling Liu Managers and Mandarins in Contemporary China The building of an international business alliance Jie Tang The Chinese Model of Modern Development Edited by Tian Yu Cao Chinese Citizenship Views from the margins Edited by Vanessa L. Fong and Rachel Murphy

Corporate Governance in China Jian Chen

Unemployment, Inequality and Poverty in Urban China Edited by Shi Li and Hiroshi Sato

The Theory of the Firm and Chinese Enterprise Reform The case of China International Trust and Investment Corporation Qin Xiao

Globalisation, Competition and Growth in China Edited by Jian Chen and Shujie Yao

Globalisation, Transition and Development in China The case of the coal industry Huaichuan Rui China Along the Yellow River Reflections on rural society Cao Jinqing, translated by Nicky Harman and Huang Ruhua

The Chinese Communist Party in Reform Edited by Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard and Zheng Yongnian Poverty and Inequality among Chinese Minorities A. S. Bhalla and S. Qui

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The Chinese Communist Party in Reform

Edited by Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard and Zheng Yongnian

First published 2006 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group © 2006 editorial selection, © Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard and Zheng Yongnian; individual chapters, © the contributors This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2006. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.”

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data The Chinese Communist Party in reform/edited by Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard and Zheng Yongnian p. cm – (Routledge Studies on the Chinese economy) Includes index 1. Zhongguo gong chan dang. 2. China – Politics and government – 2002. 3. China – Economic conditions – 2000. I. Brodsgaard, Kjeld Erik. II. Zheng, Yongnian. III. Series: Routledge studies in the Chinese economy JQ1519.A5C4678 2006 324.251′075 – dc22 2005019927 ISBN10: 0–415–37477–4 (hbk) ISBN13: 9–78–0–415–37477–4 (hbk)

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Contents

List of figures List of tables Editors and contributors

Introduction: whither the Chinese Communist Party?

vii viii ix 1

KJELD ERIK BRODSGAARD AND ZHENG YONGNIAN

1 The party elite and China’s trajectory of change

15

ANDREW G. WALDER

2 The Chinese Communist Party’s nomenklatura system as a leadership selection mechanism: an evaluation

33

JOHN P. BURNS

3 The People’s Liberation Army as a key interest group in Chinese party politics

59

YOU JI

4 The Party and the law

77

ZOU KEYUAN

5 Bianzhi and cadre management in China: the case of Yangpu

103

KJELD ERIK BRODSGAARD

6 The cadre responsibility system and the changing needs of the party MARIA HEIMER

122

vi

Contents

7 China’s Central Party School: a unique institution adapting to changes

139

IGNATIUS WIBOWO AND LYE LIANG FOOK

8 Party work in the urban communities

157

AKIO TAKAHARA AND ROBERT BENEWICK

9 The weakening of workers’ power in China

173

CAI YONGSHUN

10 Intra-party democracy: a revisionist perspective from below

192

HE BAOGANG

11 Transition in a party-state system: Taiwan as a model for China’s future democratization

210

CHIEN-MIN CHAO AND YEAU-TARN LEE

12 The Party, class, and democracy in China

231

ZHENG YONGNIAN

Index

261

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Figures

1.1 Growth in real GDP in China, Poland, Central and Eastern Europe, and the former USSR, 1990–2001 1.2 Expansion of college education in China, 1950–2000 1.3 China’s party-state hierarchy 1.4 Changing criteria for recruitment into the urban party, 1949–96 1.5 Changing criteria for promotion to urban cadre posts, 1949–96 1.6 Movement into private entrepreneurship versus village cadre posts, 1979–96 2.1 Central Committee nomenklatura, 1984–98 2.2 Appointments to positions on the Central Committee nomenklatura, 1984–98 2.3 Leading cadres in China with university education, 1981–98 2.4 Distribution of cadres by administrative level, 1954–98 2.5 Corruption cases filed and investigated by Procuratory 5.1 Administrative setup, Yangpu Economic Development Zone 7.1 Party school organization structure

16 17 20 22 24 26 35 36 39 43 50 108 141

Tables

1.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 4.1 5.1 5.2 7.1 7.2 10.1 10.2 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4

Estimated private sector share of Gross National Product, selected transitional economies, 1999 Structure of the Central Committee nomenklatura, 1984–1998 Evaluation of leadership selection cases Nomenklatura system contexts State Constitution and Party Constitution: a comparison Estimated number of civil servants, 1978–2002 Correspondences between position and grade Previous and present heads of the CPS Courses covered under the ‘five contemporary courses’ in the Central Party School Comparing two concepts of party The limit of one-party democracy in a comparative context Changes over social strata in China (1952–1991) Perceptions on the losers of China’s reform in the 1990s Growing inequality in urban China, 1990–1998 Retail sales of consumer goods, and industrial and commercial taxes, by different sector

18 37 40 41 80 106 115 143 150 196 202 233 243 245 246

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Editors and contributors

Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard, Professor and Director, Asia Research Centre, Copenhagen Business School Zheng Yongnian, Professor and Head of Research, China Policy Institute, University of Nottingham Andrew G. Walder, Professor, Stanford University John P. Burns, Professor, University of Hong Kong You Ji, Associate Professor, University of Sydney, Australia Zou Keyuan, Senior Research Fellow, East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore Maria Heimer, SSAAPS Postdoctoral Fellow, Uppsala University Ignatius Wibowo, Associate Professor, University of Indonesia Lye Liang Fook, Research Officer, East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore Akio Takahara, Professor, Rikkyo University, Japan Robert Benewick, Professor, Sussex University Cai Yongshun, Assistant Professor, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology He Baogang, Professor, Deakin University, Australia Chien-min Chao, Professor, National Chengchi University, Taiwan Yeau-tarn Lee, Associate Professor, National Chengchi University, Taiwan

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Introduction Whither the Chinese Communist Party? Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard and Zheng Yongnian One of the major issues of concern in contemporary China as well as in the international community is the direction and manner in which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will evolve. The CCP, with its 68 million members, is the largest ruling party in the world. Western scholars and policy makers have closely watched whether the party will wither away as a result of drastic socio-economic changes within China and pressures from abroad. Will the party be able to accommodate socio-economic changes in order to stay relevant? Will it be able to govern an increasingly affluent yet divided Chinese society? Or will it ultimately be able to establish a democratic governance structure for China? The success of the CCP’s endeavor also goes beyond China’s national boundary. With its economic rise, China has begun to exert its influence in world affairs. People in different parts of the world, especially those in neighboring countries, have started to feel China’s growing presence. The CCP leadership realizes that the fate of the CCP is of crucial importance to the success of the current modernization and reform process. They know that internal and external pressures require a new and organizationally more fit party that can meet the many challenges. The new Chinese thinking on the pressing need to improve the party and its cadre corps runs like a red thread through the important document on “The Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Strengthening the Party’s Ability to Govern,” adopted at the 4th Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee in September 2004.1 The “Decision” emphasizes that it is of paramount importance to improve the governing capacity (zhizheng nengli) of the party. This involves upgrading the quality of the cadre corps and producing outstanding leadership. According to the “Decision,” whether the party will be able to succeed in these twin goals will determine whether the CCP will survive or perish. In an important front page article carried by the People’s Daily a few days after the conclusion of the 4th Plenary Session, Vice-President Zeng Qinghong also stressed the crucial importance of strengthening the party’s governing capacity. Zeng, in an unusually frank fashion, discussed the “painful lesson of the loss of power” by the communist parties in the

2 Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard and Zheng Yongnian former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union used to be the world’s leading socialist country, but overnight the country broke up and the power of the Soviet Communist Party, a big party with an 88-year history and 15 million members, collapsed. To Zeng there are many factors involved, but one important factor was that during the Soviet communists’ long time in power the system of governing became rigid. Consequently, the ability to govern declined and therefore the people became dissatisfied with the achievements of party and state officials. Zeng emphasizes that his intention in mentioning the rise and fall of the Soviet Union and the East European countries is: to get all the party’s comrades, and especially the leading cadres at all levels, to wake up, think of danger in times of peace, heighten their sense of hardship and their sense of governing, and earnestly strengthen the party’s ability to govern.2 This short excerpt from Zeng Qinghong’s article underlines the seriousness of the matter. In order to maintain its relevance and legitimacy the CCP must improve its governing capacity. It must become more professional and efficient and it must rise to the challenges of the modern world. These include external pressures such as China’s admission to the WTO as well as internal problems such as the SARS crisis that shook China in the spring of 2003. Western scholarship has overlooked the fact that the CCP has been engaged in a process of renewal and reform that dates at least back to the mid-1990s. Instead, research has focused on civil society, private-sector development, migrants, and other marginalized groups – in short, on the centrifugal forces in Chinese society rather than on the forces that hold the system together and make it work. However, the Chinese power system with CCP at its core appears to function and work.3 In fact, as a result of the renewal and revitalization process the party and its governing apparatus appear better qualified and technically more competent than at any other time in the post-Mao period. The lesson from the collapse of the Soviet Union seems to have been learned. The response of the CCP leaders has been to introduce incremental reform at grass-roots level while strengthening the capacity of party and state institutions at higher levels. The result has been to create a power system characterized by “authoritarian resilience.” At the heart of this power system we find the party. Clearly the CCP is not going to wither away in the foreseeable future. Therefore, we need to “bring the party back in” when studying Chinese social and political affairs. This entails not only assessment of the role of the CCP in Chinese society, but also an understanding of its internal dynamics. In this introduction we attempt to highlight the theme of the book and summarize the main points of the included chapters which, from different perspectives, cast light on the CCP’s amazing ability to survive.4

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The party and China’s development dynamics To better grasp the direction and manner that the CCP will evolve, it is necessary to look at what the party has done in the first place. There are two ways that the CCP can respond to the drastic socio-economic changes. First, in order to survive the CCP can make efforts to accommodate the immense socio-economic changes taking place. If the party fails to do so, it is bound to become irrelevant, and this will lead to a crisis of legitimacy. Second, the CCP can pro-actively adjust and change itself. In doing so, the party must strengthen its organizational machine in order to maintain the commanding position to lead the country’s development in the new century. In his chapter, Andrew Walder takes the second perspective in examining the role of the CCP in leading China’s socio-economic development. The CCP experienced a major political crisis during the 1989 pro-democracy movement, when the party leadership used coercive forces to crack down on the movement. But since the Tiananmen crisis, the CCP has diverged from the path taken by other communist parties. Walder identifies four major factors in explaining CCP’s divergence: the survival and development of the party hierarchy, economic expansion, unprecedented expansion in college-level education, and the delayed and slow privatization of state assets. While these factors are behind China’s development dynamics, it is the political leadership that has made such a strategy. After the 1989 prodemocracy movement, the late Deng Xiaoping repeatedly emphasized that (economic) development is a “hard” principle, meaning that the party has to devote itself to rapid economic development in order to survive and prosper. To promote economic development, the party leadership has given priority to expanding China’s education and recruiting college graduates into the party and into positions of authority and responsibility. Such moves not only work in favor of economic development, but also are helpful for the party. Despite a relatively small elite group within the party, the CCP now has more than 60 million members. The ordinary party cadres and the rank and file indeed have become the social base of the CCP regime since they comprise a very diverse social background. In times of political uncertainty or turmoil, if the party can maintain its unity and the allegiance of its strategic social base, it will certainly be better able to withstand crises, social unrests, or other challenges. Needless to say, the party leadership has realized the political significance of expanding the party’s social base. The latest move under the third generation leadership was to legitimize capitalism and recruit private entrepreneurs into the party. Given the fact that the private sector is now becoming increasingly important in promoting the country’s economic growth, it would be unwise for the party not to open political participation to this sector.

4 Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard and Zheng Yongnian Walder goes one step further and argues that political leadership determines the fate of a political regime or its path of reform and change. Sustained economic development, the massive expansion of higher education, and the marked changes in recruitment into the party and the elite have introduced significant changes into the party, and will continue to alter regime dynamics. According to Walder, with such dynamics, stable evolutionary changes to China’s political system will become a real possibility. An evolutionary perspective of regime transition in China means, first, the regime itself will internally generate creative solutions to governance problems that involve gradual organizational and constitutional change; second, regional political elites may emerge as leading proponents of change; and third, a regime that responds in a spirit of accommodation and compromise is more likely to implement creative changes that promise greater future stability.

Organizational adaptation and governance While Walder tries to outline some general trends of China’s development dynamics, other scholars focus on key aspects of the development of the CCP and the party’s changing relations with the state. The question to ask is: How has the CCP adjusted itself to accommodate socio-economic changes on the one hand, while providing leadership for the country on the other? To answer this question, it is necessary to turn to changes that have happened to key components of the CCP organization. John P. Burns focuses on the most important organizational pillar of the CCP, namely, the nomenklatura system, through which the CCP is able to maintain its hold on power. The system has served as an effective mechanism for the party leadership to select specific kinds of leaders, namely, those who are competent and loyal to the party while able to facilitate China’s development needs. As discussed in Burns’ chapter, the nomenklatura system has helped the party to recruit the “right” types of cadres and government officials to facilitate China’s economic development. The party, however, has also to change the system itself in order to continue to play an important role in a new socio-economic environment. Through an examination of the evolution of the nomenklatura system, Burns discovers that the performance of this system is actually quite mixed. The CCP has been able to use the system to select China’s top leaders. But the rapid development of a market economy, as well as the rapid growth of the private sector, has severely challenged the system. While the party is used to monopolizing all important positions, the reforms have opened new opportunities for individuals to accumulate resources outside of the party’s control. Apparently, when huge resources are available that are beyond the party’s control, individuals no longer need to rely on the party to safeguard their interest. Such a development has posed a danger to the party’s monopoly on power.

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Moreover, while the CCP has stressed performance and ability as important selection criteria, selection decisions in practice have also valued nepotism and favoritism, on the one hand, and rewarded corruption on the other. While leaders are chosen by nepotism, favoritism, or through corrupt means, the selection system becomes impaired. Burns also tries to draw implications for democracy from the changes that have occurred in the nomenklatura system. While the party leadership has made efforts to adjust the system to the changing socio-economic environment, adaptation to these challenges does not necessarily mean that the China’s one-party state will become democratic. To put it in a different way: if a democratic regime means the existence of a multi-party system, a successful adaptation of the CCP will imply the increasing remoteness of the development of such a multi-party system. In his paper, You Ji examines another important pillar of the CCP’s rule, namely, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Mao Zedong’s past dictum that political power comes from the barrel of the gun is testimony to the significant role of the PLA in China’s political system even up till the present day. According to You Ji, the PLA has remained a key interest group and a decisive political force throughout the reform period. How the relationship between the CCP and PLA will change to a large degree will have a major impact on the fate of the CCP. The relationship between the party and the army is a dynamic one. You Ji observes that the influence of the PLA has been visibly institutionalized and exercised prudently. While many scholars have recognized the symbiotic relationship between the CCP and the PLA, namely, that the demise of one triggers the death of the other, You believes that such a perception is no longer correct. The survival of the CCP today is more dependent on economic development, effective administration of state affairs and forceful campaigns against corruption than on the suppression of dissenting views through the gun. The PLA can certainly sustain the CCP leadership during periods of severe political crisis such as during the 1989 pro-democracy movement, but the CCP cannot rely solely on the gun for its legitimacy. With the reform and open-door policy, many other interest groups have come into being to exert significant political influence. While the PLA is able to maintain its position as the first among the equals, its relations with these key interest groups have also been increasingly regularized. In peace times, interest-sharing and interdependence have become the norm. Over the years, the party leadership has changed its way of managing the PLA. Post-Mao military modernization has strongly promoted the trend of professionalism in the PLA, and the military has moved away from its traditional rule as an ideology-based revolutionary army and tried to modernize itself into a high-tech force. Furthermore, the leadership has also developed mechanisms to prevent PLA intervention in civilian politics. Nonetheless, despite all these changes, the relationship between the party and the PLA will continue to be a difficult one. While the party leadership

6 Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard and Zheng Yongnian does not like the PLA to intervene in its daily affairs, military influence remains an important factor in deciding political outcomes such as succession politics. But to have the “right” kind of intervention at the “right” time is not an easy task for either the party or the military. Also, growing professionalism implies an increase in military autonomy, while effective party control means that the military has to subordinate its professional spirit to party loyalty. How to balance party control and military autonomy is also a difficult task for both the party and the PLA. Besides the nomenklatura system and PLA, the two main pillars of the CCP, the party has also employed other means of governance to rule the country. Throughout the reform years, the party leadership has made great efforts to modernize its governance by establishing an effective legal system, namely, rule of law. In his chapter, Zou Keyuan examines the relationship between the party and the law. When Deng Xiaoping came to power more than two decades ago, the party leadership began to make efforts to establish an effective legal system. The momentum was strong then since the system of rule of man during Mao Zedong’s time had led to great political disasters. Since then, generations of the party leadership have given priority to legal reforms. During the 1989 pro-democracy movement, Zhao Ziyang, then Party Secretary-General, even attempted to employ what he called democratic and legal means to end the movement, but failed. At the Party’s Fifteenth Congress in 1997, the party leadership set up the rule of law as a goal of China’s political reform. Nevertheless, the progress towards such a goal has been slow, and the effectiveness of China’s legal system remains questionable. Why has such a situation continued? Zou looks at the issue from the perspective of the party–law relationship. He examines some key mechanisms through which the party exercises its control and influence over the legal system. In terms of law-making, the CCP’s norm is still “the party directs law.” The party dominates the law-making process. It directs the adoption of the State Constitution and subsequent changes. By doing so, the party tries to bring the State Constitution in harmony with the Party Constitution. While Chinese law-makers are granted a certain degree of autonomy in lawmaking, the party still exercises tight control over the laws in the political field such as those concerning citizens’ rights. At the personnel level, the party has made efforts to separate the party from the government (dangzheng fenkai), and the law-making body (People’s Congress) is supposed to have a degree of autonomy in making personnel appointments. But the party has also tried to control key personnel appointments to the People’s Congress. For example, most provinciallevel People’s Congresses are now chaired by provincial party secretaries. Also, an effective legal system requires an independent judiciary. But such an independent status has yet to be realized in China since the party’s Political-Legal Committee exercises tight organizational control over the judiciary.

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In addition, instead of legal means, the party has frequently employed traditional ways to deal with issues and problems such as resorting to political and ideological campaigns. While political campaigns remain helpful for the party, they often undermine the party’s efforts in building an effective legal system. So, apparently, the obstacles towards the rule of law are organizational, personnel, and political (ideological). It is unclear if all these obstacles can be removed. No one can be sure that the one-party system will be compatible with rule of law.

The party and policy implementation Chapters 5 to 7 use three cases to assess the capability of the party in policy implementation. Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard focuses on the cadres and cadre management system in the case of the establishment of the bianzhi in the Yangpu development zone. Yangpu was established in the early 1990s as a special economic development zone in Hainan Province, and is thus a good case to evaluate whether the party leadership is able to implement its policy initiatives and to maintain control. As a new development zone, Yangpu was supposed to implement a new package of reform plans centered on the idea of “small government and big society,” a concept proposed by the central party leadership under Zhao Ziyang in the 1980s. The concept involved trimming government agencies and personnel and shifting task to new non-government social organizations. When it was decided to establish Hainan Province in 1988 the concept figured prominently as the overarching theme for the new government setup on the island and was also supposed to be implemented in Yangpu Economic Zone. However, in reality a comparable large bureaucracy was set up in Yangpu with a planned authorized number of administrative positions (bianzhi) amounting to around 800 – in a small fishing port which at the time only had 40,000 inhabitants. Seen from the party’s perspective, bianzhi control has to be overseen by the party since organization and personnel work are – along with ideology – core preoccupations of the party. Therefore, the party is reluctant to leave management of state cadres (civil servants) to the state personnel departments, as was the original intention, when the civil service system was introduced in 1993. The Yangpu case illustrates that the party continues to exercise tight control over administrative organs at the local level. In this case, the Hainan provincial party committee manages the Yangpu party committee, and the latter, in turn, exercises control over administrative work in the Yangpu zone in various ways. For example, the secretary of the party committee is concurrently the head of the management bureau. Moreover, the party committee manages the appointment of responsible persons in functional departments and the general office through the nomenklatura system and it also takes a strong interest in controlling the overall bianzhi work.

8 Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard and Zheng Yongnian Brodsgaard examines in detail the set-up and development of the bianzhi in Yangpu and underlines that a major problem in implementing administrative reform is the increased intertwinement of administrative bianzhi control work and party nomenklatura. The Yangpu example thus appears to confirm at the local level the trend that has taken place at the national level, namely, a process of the party reasserting itself in the administrative running of the country. Maria Heimer cites another case, namely, the cadre responsibility system, to assess the capacity of the party in shifting its policy priority. During the reform years, the cadre responsibility system has been widely used to achieve the party’s goal of promoting economic growth. In the past two decades, economic performance was the most important indicator for the party leadership to evaluate the performance of lower level party cadres and government officials. The system has undoubtedly provided a strong political motivation for local officials to develop the local economy. But it has also had negative consequences. Many important issues are unduly ignored such as environment issues, income disparities and social order; issues that often have political significance. In recent years, how to shift such a policy orientation has become an increasingly difficult task for the party leadership in Beijing. The new Hu Jintao–Wen Jiabao leadership team has tried to project a pro-people image and form a pro-people policy orientation. At the 2004 National People’s Congress, the leadership decided to tone down the unbridled pursuit of GDP growth and adopt a more “scientific” concept of development that takes into account social development and environmental protection. The cadre responsibility system again becomes the instrument for the central party leadership to manage the political orientation of the local leaders. Central to the pro-people policy is to address head-on the problems of poverty and regional inequality. While policy initiatives are taken by the central leadership, it is local cadres and government officials who carry out this program. In her fieldwork, Maria Heimer found that the policy initiative has somehow encountered some success. Poverty reduction targets have become hard indicators in the evaluation of the leading cadres. According to her, the cadre responsibility system is flexible enough to adjust to the changing needs of the CCP and to solve urgent social problems. But Heimer also found that the party leadership has so far succeeded only in a limited sense. There are strong indications to suggest that reducing poverty is taken to be of the same level of importance as economic development while the specific poverty reduction targets are regarded to be of lesser importance. The reasons for this vary. The central party leadership has not yet given sufficient priority to the social problems of poverty and regional inequality. The new policy initiative has reached, but not yet taken hold at the local organizational level. Despite changes to the policy discourse, policies have not changed much from the previous leadership

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at the behavioral level. The central party leadership will continue to find it difficult to change its economy-first policy which has been implemented for two decades. Ignatius Wibowo and Lye Liang Fook have provided us with a unique case, namely, the Central Party School (CPS), to see how the CCP can adjust to the changing socio-economic environment. The CPS has played a unique role of providing a platform where existing and aspiring future leaders of China get to know each other better and become familiar with the important tenets of party ideology. Through their interactions at the CPS, party cadres and government officials build up their personal networks. As a matter of fact, almost all high-ranking party cadres and government officials have attended the CPS prior to their promotion. More important, the CPS is an effective tool for the party leadership to “inject” a new mindset into party cadres. Today, party cadres need a modern and practical set of knowledge to help them interpret the fast-changing world around them, otherwise they are likely to become disoriented and be unable to perform effectively at work. They also need a new approach of managing society, which can no longer be governed by resorting solely to the command approach. Wibowo and Lye found that the CPS is capable of meeting the new needs of the CCP. The CPS has developed a new set of curricula relevant to contemporary developments. Ideological indoctrination no longer occupies the highest priority. Through education at the CPS, the party leadership attempts to create a pool of cadres guided not only by ideology but also familiar with the latest developments in various fields such as politics, economics, and science and technology. While a high-ranking cadre must somehow be able to interpret history from the Marxist perspective, more importantly, he must also be able to make sense of developments from the West and see how best to position China in the global scheme of things. Even more meaningful, as Wibowo and Lye point out, is that the CPS helps party cadres to look beyond factionalism and consider what is best for the country as a whole. Factions, such as those alumni-based, if not properly handled, could lead to fragmentation among cadres. So, there is a need for a different type of bond that surpasses factionalism. The CPS plays an important role in creating a new identity among party cadres. By educating party cadres in a universal and national “language” or discourse, the CPS helps them to look beyond their narrow and local loyalties and develop a common vision and mission of China.

The party and society While efforts have been made in the direction of organizational adaptation and internal renewal, the party has also tried to reach out to, and restructure its relations with, Chinese society. Chapters 8 to 10 focus on the party’s changing relations with society. Signs show that the party is not just a

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reactive actor, responding to a changing society. Instead, it has made enormous efforts to pro-actively penetrate into society, and restructure the party–society relationship. Akio Takahara and Robert Benewick discuss the role of the party in rebuilding grassroots urban communities. Industrial reforms and rapid marketization in the past decades have significantly weakened the role of the danwei (unit) system, which used to serve as a mini-government in urban areas. With the decline of the danwei system, the CCP has made efforts to rebuild urban community, which aims at providing various services for urban residents in areas such as welfare, sanitation, environment, and public security; implementing democracy and autonomy at the grassroots level; and maintaining and strengthening control over the urban populace. Takahara and Benewick examined two cases, one in a rich area, Qingdao and one in a poor area, Shenyang, to see in what way the party has contributed to urban community building. In the Qingdao case, the party-state (or city government) was able to invest generously in the social infrastructure for the building of urban communities due to the availability of resources to the city government. In relatively poor Shenyang, the partystate placed much emphasis on mobilizing social participation to take part in community building. In both cases, Takahara and Benewick found that the party has proven to be effective in rebuilding urban communities. The party at the street level was instrumental in coordinating the work of various organizations. Also, the mobilization of the residents for various community activities would have encountered difficulties without the effort and contribution of the party members. But Takahara and Benewick also found that the role of the party in community rebuilding has not been altogether smooth sailing. While there is the intention to emphasize the central role of the party leadership, others tend to emphasize the autonomy enjoyed by urban communities. It would not be easy for the party to figure out a more balanced way between party leadership and community autonomy. While the urban community rebuilding project reflects how the party has tried to reconstruct party–society relations, this does not mean that the party does not have any challenges in this regard. Indeed, the party–society relationship has been in tension due to the party’s reform initiatives. Cai Yongshun provides a good case in this regard, namely, the party’s relations with workers. The CCP traditionally identified itself as a party for workers and peasants. Under a planned economy, there was an implicit social contract between the party-state and workers. While the former provided the latter with various services, the latter accepted and recognized the legitimacy of party rule. In such a system, maintenance of labor peace required relatively little use of overt coercion. When such a tacit agreement between the party-state and workers is acceptable to both parties, neither of them should have an incentive to break it.

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With the reform and open-door, the political and economic status of workers has declined significantly. The party-state has made efforts to reform state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to rationalize the economic activities in order to reduce its financial burdens. The priority of economic growth has induced the party-state to give social and political recognition to nonstate economies as well as to those who work in such sectors. Consequently, workers are no longer seen as the only force that the party relies on for legitimacy and economic development. Furthermore, in order to reform inefficient SOEs, the party and state adopt a number of policies that significantly reduce the power of workers within public firms. The SOE reform has changed the party–management relationship. It has reduced the power of the party organization and increased that of the management. On the other hand, the power of the trade union continues to be greatly constrained. In the pre-reform period, the trade union was subordinate to party leadership. It is now subject to management. For years, the trade union has tried to advance the economic interests of workers, but it lacks effective institutional means. For example, the workers’ council, which was re-instituted in 1981 is supposed to have the right to participate in almost all enterprise decisions. But, in practice, it does not have the final say on important issues. The selection of council members is controlled by the top leaders within a firm, and chosen council members often lack knowledge of the firm’s operations and are thus unable to make useful suggestions. The tension between management and workers often results in workers’ resistance. Nowadays, the interaction between workers and the party as well as the government are often confrontational. The party is placed in an awkward position in dealing with workers’ resistance. It cannot entirely ignore workers, nor can it cease reform measures that often undermine workers’ interests. To continuously promote economic development, the party has adopted a cooptation strategy to deal with private business people. But so far the party has not found out how to co-opt workers’ interests. Apparently, if workers are alienated outside the political system, the legitimacy of party rule will become doubtful. As in urban areas, the CCP has also made great attempts to reach into grassroots rural communities. Rural economic reforms in the early 1980s soon led to the collapse of the People’s Commune system. To reconstruct rural governance, the party leadership introduced rural democracy in 1987. Since then, the election system has spread to different parts of the country, and the system has played a key role in building an effective rural governance system in China. The question is how such a system affects the role of the CCP in rural areas. He Baogang’s chapter discusses this important issue. He observed that electoral institutions are having a significant impact on village political structure by empowering elected village organizations, forcing the party organization to adopt elections, and contributing to the

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complexity of village governance. The logic is simple: when elections are the source of legitimacy, or elections are an institutionalized way to gain legitimacy, they can challenge the undemocratic institutions of the village party branch and enhance the likelihood of the party branch adopting elections. While the electoral system has somehow undermined the traditional authority of the party, the latter has also struggled for relevance, if not survival, in a democratic environment. As a consequence, according to He, there is a coexistence of village democracy with the authoritarian system, and a “mixed regime” has come into being. He’s observation is pertinent. The existence of a mixed regime means that the assumption that authoritarianism will inevitably move towards democracy is too simplistic. The CCP can play a crucial role in either obstructing or promoting democratization, depending on whether democratization is in the interest of the party or whether the party is able to accommodate democratic developments. The party leadership has taken various measures to gain legitimacy, including experimenting with democratic means. But this is not to say that one type of legitimacy has to be replaced by another type. What the party leadership has done is to create a “mixture,” a combination of sources of legitimacy such as revolutionary legacy, economic performance, ideology, and democratic procedure and elections.

Whither the party? An ultimate question is whether China under the CCP will become democratic. While several chapters in this volume have suggested, albeit implicitly, that the changes that have occurred to the CCP so far will not necessarily lead to China’s democratization, there is also evidence that China is becoming more democratic with rapid socio-economic changes. There is evidence that the CCP party-state, a form of the Leninist state, is not necessarily incompatible with democratic development. This is the case study done by Chien-min Chao and Yeau-tarn Lee. In their chapter, they attempt to draw lessons and experience for China’s democratization from Taiwan’s experience. In a relatively short period of time, Taiwan became an important part of the third wave of democratization and was transformed from a hard-authoritarian regime to a democratic one. Given the nature of the previous Kuomintang regime, Taiwan’s experience, the authors assert, is certainly relevant to mainland China. From Taiwan’s experience, Chao and Lee argue that a Chinese culture is not necessarily an obstacle to a democratic form of polity, and a Leninist party-state is not necessarily too rigid to transform peacefully. While sustained economic development can provide positive effects for the expansion of political participation, the political leadership has also played a crucial role in initiating democratization in Taiwan. According to Chao

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and Lee, although there are differences between Taiwan and the mainland China, such as in terms of economic structure and political ideology, there are also signs that the mainland leadership is facing increasing pressure for political reform and democracy, and the Taiwan model could become relevant to the mainland. In his chapter, Zheng Yongnian discusses whether the CCP can promote rapid economic growth on the one hand, and accommodate democratic development on the other. According to Zheng, rapid socio-economic development has transformed China from a classless society to a class society again. Social classes begin to play an important role in facilitating political participation. Demand for political participation from a rising middle class has been particularly strong in recent years. The party’s pro-development policy has undoubtedly facilitated the growth of China’s middle classes. On the other hand, the party has been flexible enough to accommodate rising social classes. The party has not only justified the existence of capitalism but also begun to recruit capitalists or private entrepreneurs into the party in order to expand the party’s social base. More importantly, the private sector has also been provided with constitutional protections. All these changes suggest that there is no reason to argue that an authoritarian party is not compatible with democratic development. Furthermore, Zheng also argues that rapid economic development and the return to a class society have provided a strong momentum for China’s democratic development. While economic development has produced increasing demands for political participation on the part of the private sector, increasing income disparities are changing the incentive structure for other social groups, especially workers and peasants. As discussed by Cai, workers’ political influence has been significantly weakened throughout the reform years. One can add that peasants are another such group, whose political influence is even weaker than workers’. Nonetheless, this does not imply in any sense that these social classes are no longer politically insignificant. The latest wave of social protests in different parts of China, especially inland regions, shows that the party is facing mounting pressure for political participation from these social groups. Again, one would have to be cautious in drawing any general conclusion about democratization in China. The level of participation is growing, but the “voice” mechanisms for different social groups are asymmetrical among these social groups. Election practices have developed unevenly, not only in different regions, but also between rural and urban areas. The uneven development of Chinese economy will also have an impact on the country’s political development. As in the economic realm, where there is co-existence of different forms of ownership, there might be co-existence of different political elements from authoritarianism to democracy in the political realm. China is likely to experience a prolonged period of a mixed regime.

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Notes 1

2 3

4

See “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jiaqiang dang de zhizheng nengli jianshe de juheimerg” (The Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Strengthening the Party’s Ability to Govern), Renmin ribao, September 27, 2004. Zeng Qinghong, “Jiaqiang dang de zhizheng nengli jianshe de ganglingxing wenxian” (A Programmatic Document for Strengthening the Party’s Ability to Govern), Renmin ribao, October 8, 2004. See Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard and David Strand (eds), Reconstructing Twentieth Century China: State, Control, Civil Society, and National Identity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998); He Baogang, The Democratic Implications of Civil Society (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1997); Tony Saich, “Negotiating the State: The Development of Social Organizations in China,” The China Quarterly, No. 161 (March 2000), pp. 124–141; Gordon White, In Search of Civil Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); Frank Pieke and Hein Mallee (eds), Internal and International Migration: Chinese Perspectives (Surrey: Curzon Press, 1999); Michael Dutton, Streetlife China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). The chapters in this volume were initially selected from the papers presented at the conference “The Chinese Communist Party in a New Era: Renewal and Reform,” organized by East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore December 9–10, 2003. The conference was the second one in a projected series on the role of the CCP, following the first one “Bringing the Party Back In: How China is Governed” held in Copenhagen in June 2002 at the Asian Research Center, Copenhagen Business School. For the conference volume, see Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard and Zheng Yongnian (eds), Bringing the Party Back In: How China is Governed (Singapore, London and New York: Eastern Universities Press, 2004).

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The party elite and China’s trajectory of change Andrew G. Walder

Since the political crises of 1989, China’s trajectory of political and economic change has diverged radically from that of virtually all of the states that were governed by similar political regimes at the beginning of that year. Only two such regimes – China and Vietnam – have avoided prolonged recession and have experienced rapid, market-oriented economic growth.1 And these are the only ones in which communist parties have continued to rule with little disruption of past organizational practices. This raises two key questions about China’s future political trajectory. The first is the one that has received the most attention: to what extent has the party’s capacity to govern changed during these years? Are there any signs of the kinds of political decay that led to the collapse of so many regimes after 1989, or has the party elite revitalized itself and strengthened its ties with key sectors of society? The second question is often neglected: mindful of the evolving features of the party, what are the crucial challenges it will face in the coming years, and what kind of role can we expect it to play as an agent of future political change? The longer that China continues along its current trajectory of change, the less relevant are the prior examples of collapse and regime change in Eastern Europe and the USSR. The real question is whether it still makes sense to think of China with reference to these failed states, or whether we should begin to think about it in new ways that reflect how far it has diverged from the old socialist model. To address these questions, it is important to be clear about how China’s trajectory differs from that of once-comparable regimes. The first is obvious: that China’s party hierarchy survived 1989 and in many respects has been revitalized in the years since. Unlike most post-communist regimes, China’s elites have not been forced from their posts by regime change. Instead, as in Vietnam, they have remained in power to preside over a prolonged process of market reform and heightened participation in the world economy. In China, this process began a decade before the crucial 1989–1991 period, and it has accelerated since. The second difference is also well known. The economies of regimes that collapsed between 1989 and 1991 have fared much more poorly than

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China’s. Central Europe as a whole has only recently emerged from its long transitional recession, with levels of real GDP still only a few percentage points above 1990 levels. The GDP of the former USSR has experienced a long decline and has yet to recover (Figure 1.1). By far the best performing economy in the region has been that of Poland, whose economy has grown a respectable 44 percent over the decade. However, during the same period the Chinese economy has grown almost three-fold. The sharp contrast between China and these other nations has long fuelled lively discussion about the nature, pace and sequencing of economic reform, but it is hard to avoid the observation that the most important determinant of these diverging paths is beyond the control of policymakers. An abrupt collapse of political institutions and, along with it, an entire system of economic regulation and property ownership was detrimental to the economic health of the nations in the Russian empire. The legacy of this collapse still haunts the polity and economy of Russia and other regimes to this day. A third striking difference – less widely appreciated – is that China’s economic growth has been accompanied by an unprecedented expansion in college-level education that is rapidly transforming its urban elites (Figure 1.2). A comparable process occurred in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe almost half a century ago, well in advance of the stagnation of their economies and eventual collapse. In China, on the other hand, the massive expansion of college opportunity is occurring in tandem with a rapid economic growth and a level of openness to the outside world that

350 300 250 China 200

Poland C-E Europe

150

FUSSR 100 50 0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Figure 1.1 Growth in real GDP in China, Poland, Central and Eastern Europe, and the former USSR, 1990–2001 (1990 = 100) Source: World Bank, Transition: The First Ten Years, and Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2002, p. 54.

The party elite and China’s trajectory of change 17 4,500 4,000 3,500 3,000 Total

2,500

Intake 2,000

Grads

1,500 1,000 500

98 19

92 19

86 19

80 19

74 19

68 19

62 19

56 19

50

0 19

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Figure 1.2 Expansion of college education in China, 1950–2000 (thousands of students) Source: Zhongguo jiaoyu nianjian, 1981–2001.

surpasses anything experienced in the histories of other communist regimes. The number of college graduates has grown even more rapidly than China’s economy, and it has sent well over 100,000 graduate students abroad. A fourth distinctive feature of China’s trajectory is that the privatization of state assets has been delayed and slow, in sharp contrast with most post-communist regimes, which privatized their assets rapidly in their first years of transition. China’s large private sector has come about not via the transfer of state assets to private owners, but through new start-ups outside the state sector and through foreign investment. In most post-communist regimes, the private sector was created much more rapidly, by transferring state assets to new owners. In some regimes – particularly Russia – the process permitted the bulk of public assets to fall into the hands of incumbent managers and former political officials. Even after more than two decades of market reform, the proportion of China’s economy in the private sector lags behind most post-communist regimes (see Table 1.1). These observations may appear unexceptional, but in comparative perspective they distinguish the fate of China’s political elite sharply from other regimes, which generally fall into four types. The first such type is one typical of Central Europe and the Baltic States. In regimes such as Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Estonia, party organizations collapsed shortly after defeat in early popular elections by political parties that were dominated by people outside the former political system.2 The party’s appointment system collapsed, and its entire hierarchy of party

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Table 1.1 Estimated private sector share of Gross National Product, selected transitional economies, 1999 Country

Private sector share (percent)

China Poland Russia Lithuania Estonia Hungary Czech Republic

55 65 70 70 75 80 80

Source: World Bank, Transition.

posts was rapidly dismantled. Many of these post-communist regimes were anti-communist in orientation, and purged the government of former officials. Privatization began early and was brought to near-completion within a decade, and, in these regimes, was regulated in such a way that prevented widespread asset appropriation by incumbent elites. These regimes exhibit the highest observed levels of elite turnover in both political and economic posts, and the new private business elite is not dominated by figures from the old regime.3 A second type is illustrated by Russia and the Ukraine. In the case of Russia, the greatest challenge to Soviet rule was from within the (Moscow) Party apparatus, and its early elections created a political elite that exhibited much larger proportions of the former communist hierarchy than in Central Europe. As the communist party lost elections and as the economy was privatized, the old appointment system and party bureaucracies disappeared. Privatization was rapid but poorly regulated and heavily influenced by incumbent managers and economic bureaucrats, who managed to retain control of privatized state assets and turn themselves into a new corporate elite. This generated a political elite that included large numbers of old regime survivors, and a private business oligarchy with firm roots in the old system.4 A third type is prevalent in several regimes that emerged from the collapse of multi-national federations. These regimes were born when regional communist parties withdrew from the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia, changed their names, and continued to rule as nationalist dictatorships with little initial organizational change. In such states (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Serbia), there was very little elite turnover, but the abandonment of the commitment to public ownership by old regime figures led to high rates of asset appropriation and extensive corruption by top political officials and their families.5 This brings us to China, which is the leading example of a fourth type. China’s party hierarchy has survived unchanged, and despite extensive

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market reform, it has maintained its commitment to public ownership for a very long period. This commitment, coupled with effective political restrictions against the kind of spontaneous privatization typical in the second and third types above, has led to considerably lower rates of movement from political posts into private business than have been observed in Russia and other former Soviet Republics. Asset appropriation by officials does, indeed, occur (as it does in all these regimes), and the practice has been documented and is widely discussed by students of China.6 However, the rates at which public assets have been appropriated as private property in China are much lower than in Russia and other regimes, where a new private business oligarchy has already emerged and is dominated by old regime figures. Vietnam shares these features with China, but so do several former Soviet republics whose economies have done poorly, where the former communist party holds the balance of political power and where privatization of public assets has proceeded very slowly.7 This brief comparative tour of regimes and elites highlights a central fact about China’s future political and economic trajectory: despite rapid growth and prolonged market reform, it has yet to undergo the twin processes of political change and privatization that have already occurred in the vast majority of comparable regimes. Undertaking these transitions after a period of rapid economic restructuring and growth is historically unprecedented, and has no parallel in the experience of regimes that have already completed these transitions. There are, therefore, good reasons to consider that the kind of collapse observed in the rest of the socialist world is not the most likely outcome in China’s near future. Given the Chinese Communist Party’s remarkable durability, we need to ask what changes are taking place within the party that might anticipate future political changes, either through an erosion of the party’s capacity to rule or – less commonly considered – its evolution into an agent of creative political change. And given the sharply contrasting experiences of regimes that collapsed and rapidly privatized their assets, the way in which privatization is handled in the years to come will have important consequences for China’s future economic health and political cohesion.

China’s current political elite A definition of China’s political elite would include all cadres at the rank of county magistrate or division chief and above. In 1998, there were roughly 500,000 people who held such positions: 900 in the central party apparatus, 2,500 with the rank of minister or provincial governor, another 39,000 down to the level of prefecture or bureau chief, and the remaining 466,000 down to the county and division chief level. Virtually all of these people – over 95 percent – are members of the Communist Party.8 This political elite commands a national bureaucracy of 40 million cadres below the level of county magistrate/bureau chief (see Figure 1.3). Only

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Party Minister and above (2,500) ↑↑ Prefecture bureau-chief (39,000) ↑↑ Leading cadres (county/division chief and above) (466,000)

Non-CCP cadres (below country/division chief) (24.3 million)→→ →→→→→→

↑↑↑↑↑ CCP cadres (below county/division chief) (15.3 million)

↑↑↑↑↑↑ Rank-and-file party members (45.2 million)

Figure 1.3 China’s party-state hierarchy

a minority of these ordinary cadres are party members – 15 million, or 38 percent.9 Given the nature of China’s cadre appointment system, all appointments into the political elite of 500,000 are made from among these 40 million ordinary cadres, who constitute the pool of potential elite appointees. The vast disparity of party membership figures between the political elite and ordinary cadres in the civil service suggests that appointments into the elite are made almost exclusively from among those ordinary cadres who have already joined the party. One would therefore expect that party recruitment would focus heavily on the 25 million ordinary cadres who have yet to join the party, and such cadres who wish to advance into the elite will strive to join the party. This brings us to the party organization itself. It has a total of 60 million members (c.1998). We tend to think of the party as the elite, but this is not accurate. True, party members comprise only 8 percent of the total adult population, but only 25 percent of party members are cadres (15 out of 60 million). Many of the remaining 75 percent, to be sure, do hold positions of responsibility – especially in China’s 800,000 villages (where

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leaders below the township level are not on state salaries), or in workplaces where they often serve as group leaders or shift supervisors. But the distinction still holds: party members are “elite” only in the sense that they have a special relationship with the party hierarchy and are the group from which future state cadres and, eventually, the political elite, will be chosen. The great majority of party members have ordinary occupations that involve no real authority. This sketch of the most politically influential groups in Chinese society highlights some key relationships that will vitally affect the country’s future path of political change. The political elite of 500,000 cannot rule the country unless it can retain the obedience of 40 million state cadres – especially the 38 percent of whom are party members. Moreover, the state bureaucracy cannot rule unless it has the active cooperation and allegiance of the 45 million party members who work outside the state bureaucracy. If these three groups act in concert, and if the elite maintains the discipline of state bureaucrats and the allegiance of party members, it can withstand challenges from other groups in society, even in periods of economic hardship and social upheaval. If, however, challenges from other groups stimulate a defection of the party membership and parts of the state bureaucracy, the elite is in real trouble (this is what happened in China, temporarily and briefly, in May 1989). But our sketch also implies that challenges to the elite, and the impetus for political change, need not come from outside these influential circles. In fact, the dependence of the elite on party members and ordinary cadres implies that these groups are likely to be highly influential in bringing about future political change.

The implications of mobility patterns If these groups will be highly influential – either in response to political challenges or as political innovators – then changes in their characteristics may have important political consequences. Mobility patterns give us insight into the processes that are changing the characteristics of party members and state cadres. In examining these changes, we need to keep in mind two kinds of possibilities: whether the elite has been able to maintain a broad popular base among party members and incorporate groups excluded in the past, and whether the changing characteristics of party members and cadres may turn them into agents of political change rather than conservative, backward-looking opponents of political evolution. The elite’s social base: recruitment into the party How has the social base of the political elite – the party membership – changed since the Mao era? To what extent has party membership become a status that tends to be inherited from previous generations? To what extent has it excluded people from all backgrounds with education and

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ability in years past, and to what extent has it succeeded in recruiting formerly excluded groups into the party? Surveys in the mid-1990s that collected career histories from large and representative urban samples permit us a clear view of the nature and rapidity of these changes.10 Figure 1.4 illustrates the results of one such survey, by showing the relative odds of joining the party for people with different characteristics in each of three different periods: the Mao era (1949–77), in which party policies tended to discriminate against people in professional occupations with higher educations, and favored those from politically reliable backgrounds, and two subsequent periods (1978–87, and 1988–96) during which time the party sought to reverse the impact of these policies.11 The figure displays how the likelihood of joining the party is affected by several individual characteristics – controlling for the impact of the others – in each of these three periods.12 First, there are two ways in which party recruitment has not changed: men and cadres have always been much more likely to join the party than others. Men have been roughly three times more likely than women to join the party in all periods, for reasons that are sociologically interesting, but tangential to the topic of this chapter. And those who have attained a salaried cadre position before joining the party have always been roughly three times more likely than others to subsequently join the party – suggesting that the ordinary state cadres who have not yet joined the party have always been targeted preferentially as potential members. There are also some striking changes. The first is the obvious decline of the impact of having a father who was a party member. In the Mao period, having a father in the party doubled the odds of joining, and this figure

7 6 5 1949–77

4

1978–86 3

1987–96

2 1 0 Male

Father pty

College

High school

Cadre

Figure 1.4 Changing criteria for recruitment into the urban party, 1949–96 (net relative hazard ratio estimates from event history models)

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declined slightly in the first decade of reform. However, after 1988, the impact of having a father in the party disappeared. This suggests that the Mao era emphasis on family political credentials has almost disappeared, opening up party membership more broadly to those without parental political credentials. Even more striking, however, is the rise of college education as a predictor of party membership. Note that during the Mao period, the relative odds of joining for those with either a college or a high school education was around 1.3 – or a mere 30 percent advantage over others. By the second period this number had increased to 2.8, almost a three-fold advantage. But in both these periods, having a college education had no impact whatsoever above that of having completed high school: the relative odds for both the high school and college educated are the same. After 1988, however, having a college education made joining the party six times more likely – by far the most important single predictor of party membership, and considerably above that of having a high school education. This radical shift toward the highly educated in party recruitment is not due solely to changes in party policy. Other changes in Chinese society – in particular the extraordinary expansion of higher education since 1979 – have greatly increased the supply of college graduates. The annual number of college graduates in China increased six-fold from 1980 to 1998 – 147,000 to 829,000. From 1949 to 1979, China produced only 3 million college graduates; since 1979, it has produced 12 million.13 In ways that have generally gone unnoticed, the growth in the young, college educated population has quietly multiplied the incentive to join the party for people in this group. Compared with only ten years ago, there is now a vastly larger pool of college graduates from which the party can recruit. But with college credentials more common, competition for career opportunities has increased greatly. Having a college degree no longer distinguishes you from other upwardly mobile individuals as much as in the past. Party membership has, therefore, become much more important in career advancement for the highly educated. The enhanced attractiveness of party membership among college graduates has, in recent years, extended to college students themselves. In 1990, only 1.2 percent of college students were party members, and in the wake of Tiananmen this was not a popular choice. By the end of June 2003, however, 8 percent of college students nationwide – 700,000 – had already joined the party, and 50 percent of college students had filed applications for membership.14 At this rate, the number of college graduates in the party (1.6 million) would more than double within three years due solely to the graduation of those who have already joined. This intense focus on recruiting the highly educated into the party – and the increasing responsiveness of the college educated – does not imply the neglect of other groups. While recruited at much lower rates now than the highly educated, the peasants and workers who comprise the vast

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majority of the population still, due to their sheer numbers, comprise the vast majority of the national party membership. But the party has clearly reversed its suspicion (of the Mao years) of the highly educated. And the suspicion of the highly educated towards the party, widely held in the 1980s, has also been reversed. Since the early 1990s – when communist parties were collapsing around the world and their economies sinking into prolonged recession, the CCP has extended its base among the youngest and best-educated members of the post-Tiananmen generation. This is a radically different trend than that observed in post-communist regimes in the decades precheimerg the collapse of party rule – or in China in the 1980s. Instead, it suggests a revitalization of a political organization and a more evolutionary path of political change. The elite’s organizational base: mobility into cadre posts To what extent has the marked shift toward higher education as a criterion for advancement been reflected also in the recruitment into the state bureaucracy? There have been equally decisive changes in these mobility patterns in the post-Mao period, with a similar relaxation of political standards and greatly increased emphasis on education. The same survey used in our examination of party recruitment yields a similar picture of changing mobility into the political elite. Figure 1.5 provides the same information in the same format as Figure 1.4, except that the estimated odds for individual characteristics are for promotion into an urban cadre post.15 Recruitment of cadres appears to mirror the recruitment of party members. The advantages of men and high school graduates have remained relatively stable through time; each confers a roughly two- to three-fold 10 9 8 7 6

1949–77

5

1978–86

4

1987–96

3 2 1 0 Male

Party member

College

High school

Figure 1.5 Changing criteria for promotion to urban cadre posts, 1949–96 (net relative hazard ratio estimates from event history models)

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advantage in attaining a cadre position across all three periods. Also familiar is the declining emphasis on political standards and a corresponding rise in the emphasis on higher education. In the Mao period, prior party membership was by far the most important single factor in predicting recruitment as a cadre. Party members were eight times more likely to experience this kind of promotion than others. During the same period, a college education conferred no additional advantage over the 2.5-fold increase in the odds conferred by a high school education. In the post-Mao era, the political standards have declined and the educational standards have increased to the point where party membership and college education have traded places as the most important single predictors of cadre recruitment. By the 1990s, the eight-fold advantage of party members had declined to below three-fold, while the advantages of the college educated grew from zero to a three-fold advantage over high school graduates and a nine-fold advantage over everyone else. In light of the accelerated recruitment of college graduates into the party during the 1990s, we might also consider the advantages of college educated party members in cadre recruitment. The net odds are multiplied for individuals who have more than one of these characteristics. This means that by the 1990s, a party member with a college education was 26 times more likely to become a cadre than a non-party member with less than a high school education, and over four times more likely than a party member with only a high school education.16 This massive advantage helps to explain the apparently intense interest of the post-Tiananmen collegeeducated generation in joining the party: it almost triples the likelihood of appointment to a cadre post. This emphasis on education as a criterion for holding leadership positions extends down into villages. Figure 1.6 (using the same survey) displays the relative odds of individuals with different characteristics and initial occupations of moving into either a village cadre post or private entrepreneurship.17 Rural private entrepreneurs (not the more familiar geti hu) have emerged as wealthy elites in the past two decades. They comprise 8 percent of the rural population (compared to only 3 percent for rural cadres), and their household incomes equal those of cadres. One would therefore expect that the better educated and more ambitious rural residents would be more likely than others to move into private entrepreneurship – and this is true. Every year of education increases the likelihood that an individual moves into private entrepreneurship by 11 percent: six years of education (illustrated in Figure 1.6) roughly doubles the odds of becoming a private entrepreneur. However, the impact of education on moving into a cadre post is three times larger: each year of education increases the likelihood of becoming a village cadre by 33 percent, and six years of education increases the odds almost six-fold. Figure 1.6 reveals additional information relevant to the question of elite cohesion in the face of extensive expansion in the private sector. It also

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7 6 5 4

Private Entr. Cadre

3 2 1 0 Male

Educ. (6 yrs)

Wageearner

Self-empl.

Private ent.

Cadre

Manager

Figure 1.6 Movement into private entrepreneurship versus village cadre posts, 1979–96 (net relative hazard ratio estimates from event history models)

shows, controlling for education and gender,18 the likelihood of moving from various rural occupations into cadre posts. Relative to those engaged primarily in farming, those who work for wages outside agriculture, the self-employed (geti hu) and, especially, collective enterprise managers, are considerably more likely to go into private enterprise. However, rural cadres are not leaving their posts to become private entrepreneurs any more frequently than ordinary farmers. There is no indication in these data that the rural political elite are defecting from their posts for better opportunities in the market economy. Who then, other than better-educated males, becomes a village cadre? New cadres are heavily selected from among collective enterprise managers (who themselves are appointed by village cadres). Collective enterprise managers are the only occupation more likely to shift into a cadre post than farmers, over whom they have a six-fold advantage. Note that no bar is displayed in Figure 1.6 for the likelihood that private entrepreneurs shift into cadre posts: this is because the calculated odds are close to zero, which means that private entrepreneurs are the least likely to become cadres of any rural group. In short, over the first two decades of rural reform, village cadres have remained a relatively cohesive and stable elite, have not left their posts for private business at high rates, and these positions continue to attract the best-educated members of the rural population.19 Some implications for regime dynamics In recent years it has been common to think about political change in terms of a relationship between “state” and “society.” This is unfortunate because it diverts attention from crucial political relationships that usually

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determine the fate of a political regime or its path of reform and change. In the case of China, what is crucial is the extent to which the political elite – whether defined as the top 40,000 or top 500,000 party-state cadres – remains unified, and the extent to which it retains the allegiance and support of the 15 million ordinary cadres who are in the party and the additional 45 million rank-and-file party members. The 60 million party members who are not part of the political elite are, in fact, the social base of the regime – the 500,000 party cadres of county or division rank and above. They comprise a diverse social base, because they include large numbers of people from a wide array of social backgrounds. They comprise a strategic social base, because the party overrecruits people in key occupations and positions. And they comprise a dynamic and changing social base, because the regime recruits its leading cadres almost exclusively from this group, because young people with higher education are the most rapidly growing element, and because those with higher education are being recruited into cadre posts at much higher rates than others. To emphasize party members as the regime’s social base does not mean that the regime’s relationship with the broader population is unimportant. But it does mean that the regime’s relationship with ordinary party cadres and rank-and-file members – its only real social base – is the single most important of these relationships. In times of political uncertainty or crisis, the regime will be in deep trouble if it loses the allegiance of ordinary party cadres and the rank and file. If it maintains its unity and the allegiance of its strategic social base, it will be better able to withstand crises, social unrest, or other challenges should they occur in the future. This also means, however, that the regime must try to maintain the support of its social base, and its efforts to do so will be influenced by the changing composition of that group. This, in turn, will tend to reshape the political future of China from within. The longer the processes highlighted in the above paragraphs continue – rising educational levels, increased recruitment of college graduates into the party and into positions of authority and responsibility – the more will China’s political future be quietly reshaped. If we project current trends only a decade into the future, the regime’s social base, and, increasingly, the lower reaches of the regime itself, will be significantly altered. While it is true that party members with higher education are still a small minority of the total membership, it is also true that they are the ones whose numbers are growing most quickly and who are rising at by far the highest rates into cadre positions and even into the elite itself.

Prospects for evolutionary change If I am correct in my assertion that China’s political elite must be mindful of its changing social base when responding to future challenges or thinking

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about changes in political arrangements, then there are several potential consequences of the trends highlighted above. The first is that the regime itself will internally generate creative solutions to governance problems that involve gradual organizational and constitutional change. This would not be a new phenomenon. Ding Xueliang has documented the crucial role played by State Council research offices in the 1980s in refuting the arguments of orthodox communists who were opposed to reform and opening to the world economy.20 In such cases internal regime institutions can play a crucial role in pushing forward political change, in large part because people who are regime insiders and whose loyalty is a given are given much greater license to advocate changes that would be threatening if offered by people outside the regime. It is now 20 years since the processes analyzed by Ding took place, and those likely to play such a role in the near future have much higher levels of education, much less experience in the ways of the past, and much greater exposure to the outside world. It is, therefore, likely that the regime itself will generate creative solutions to political governance problems in much the way that it has generated creative solutions to economic reform over the past 20 years. A second possible consequence of these trends is that regional political elites most affected by them may emerge as leading proponents of change. The role of the Moscow party apparatus in pushing toward electoral democracy in 1991 and 1992 is an example of the potential role of key regional elites. While the Moscow party played this role in the context of a stagnant economy and collapsing political institutions, there is no reason why regional elites whose social base has been most thoroughly transformed may not become advocates of political reforms in advance of what national elites may sanction. It is not unthinkable that such regions as Shanghai or Jiangsu may pioneer experiments in changing political organization well in advance of the rest of the country. If such a trend developed, political change may proceed in a gradual and piecemeal fashion similar to that observed in the economy in past decades. A third possible consequence may be seen in the elite’s reaction to a future political crisis or challenge from some social group outside the party. Here the implications can be stated simply: a regime that responds to such challenges with massive force halts the process of political change; a regime that responds in a spirit of accommodation and compromise is more likely to implement creative changes that promise greater future stability. China’s trajectory since 1989, in my judgment, makes it progressively less likely that the regime will respond with overwhelming force, and that instead it will respond flexibly and creatively to accommodate and co-opt opposition. This is because voices within the regime will increasingly be more likely to counsel accommodation and compromise (such voices were already loud in 1989), and that the elite must be mindful of a social base that has become increasingly similar to the composition of the highly educated urban population outside the party, upon whom future economic

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growth increasingly depends. Reacting to outside challenges with overwhelming force and political retrenchment will increasingly carry the risk of alienating a large proportion of the party rank and file and younger, better-educated office-holders. Indeed, if the changing composition of the elite and its social base has the kind of impact that I suspect, the regime will make adjustments and compromises well in advance, to head off problems that might lead to political crises.

Potential problems The prospects for a gradual and stable evolution of China’s political system that I have just sketched may make China appear to be more comparable to democratizing regimes in East Asia than the failed states of the former Soviet empire. However, there is one important legacy of China’s trajectory of change that distinguishes it sharply from these other cases: the fact that the privatization of state assets has only just begun. I have argued above that it is China’s resistance to rapid privatization that has prevented the high levels of corruption and the widespread seizure of state assets by political elites that we have observed in Russia and other post-communist regimes. But this implies that the handling of privatization in the years to come will have potentially large political consequences for the regime. The experience of Central Europe and the Baltic states (in contrast to Russia) has shown that some regimes have been able to implement an orderly process of privatization that prevents widespread seizure of assets by insiders. These regimes experience less corruption and have better economic prospects. However, there are two ways in which these small European regimes differ from China: as small economies, they are heavily subject to the influence of international agencies that set the terms for loans and investment. China’s large economy (even less so than Russia’s) is not subject to these international pressures to anywhere near the same degree. In addition, all the small European regimes undertook privatization after the former party elite was removed from power in early elections – making it very difficult for them to seize assets. This is unlikely to be the case in the near future in China. Therefore, the future transformation of ownership forms in China’s stilllarge state sector is as much a political challenge as an economic one. The question facing China is whether it will be able to transfer ownership in ways that prevent widespread corruption and theft of state assets. Central Europe and the Baltic states show that this can be done; Russia and the Ukraine show the dangers of rapid and poorly regulated privatization. A Russian-style process holds two distinct dangers for China: the widespread opposition likely to emerge even within the party itself to a perception that the elite is plundering state assets under cover of dictatorship; and the defection of members of the elite into the private sector (or abroad, taking

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assets with them). To my mind, this constitutes the biggest single future threat to China’s political stability, and to the process of evolutionary change that China’s recent trajectory might otherwise make possible. This is the one development that could return China to the state of crisis that we observed in 1989. There are considerations that make this negative outcome less likely, however. While China is not like Central Europe in the 1990s, neither is it like Russia. The widespread elite appropriation of state assets in Russia occurred in the midst of a political collapse and a too-rapid privatization program implemented by a shaky electoral democracy still dominated by old regime elites. If the process of privatization is carried out in a context of stability rather than collapse – as I expect it to be – and if China’s leaders show the same caution exhibited in their gradual approach to changing ownership forms as they have in the past, then these dangers will be alleviated. But this implies that great emphasis must be placed on enforcing existing laws against corruption and, more importantly, theft of state assets, regardless of the rank or connections of the perpetrators. It also implies that steady, patient, and clean reorganization of ownership forms in the state sector is as crucial for China’s political future as it is for its economic future.

Conclusion I have argued that China’s trajectory of change during the past 20 years means that we should no longer think of it as a case analogous to the dozens of post-communist regimes that experienced abrupt change beginning in 1989. China’s prolonged economic expansion, the massive expansion of higher education, and the marked changes in recruitment into the party and the elite will alter regime dynamics in a way that makes stable evolutionary change in China’s political system a real possibility. Changes internal to the regime and its real social base – the party membership – make this more likely, and the prospects are increased with every year that recent economic and social trends continue. While the large state sector represents a major political challenge comparable to the widely recognized economic challenges it poses, there are reasons to believe that the political dangers of ownership reform can be avoided. Discussions of China’s political prospects usually have two kinds of outcomes in mind – though these are not always made explicit. The first is political instability that leads to regime collapse (the Soviet or Indonesian scenario); and the second is a gradual transition to some kind of electoral democracy and competitive multi-party system (the Pacific Rim scenario – S. Korea, Taiwan, Philippines). The path of political change most consistent with the evolutionary changes that I have described, however, is in fact a version of the principles employed in the governance of post-British Hong Kong. For a Chinese city this would imply a gradual expansion of

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political participation under rules that guarantee the party’s overall control for an indefinite period. This would logically begin with inner-party elections (or elections by a selectorate chosen from the party membership), or with functional constituencies (labor, education, civil service) along the Hong Kong pattern. This could gradually evolve into a multi-party system with relatively heated political competition (as in South Korea), but much more likely is an evolution into a stable system dominated by a single party (as in Japan or Singapore).

Notes 1 All the other transitional economies have experienced prolonged and often severe recessions, and only five countries experienced any net growth in real GDP through 2000. They are (with net growth over the first decade in parentheses): Poland (44%), Slovenia (20%), Albania (10%), Hungary (9%), and Slovakia (5%). Real GDP in the Russian Federation was still only 64% of the 1990 figure. See World Bank, Transition: The First Ten Years (Washington DC, 2002), p. 5. 2 See Michael McFaul, “The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Post-communist World,” World Politics, Vol. 54 (2002), pp. 212–44. 3 See Andrew G. Walder, “Elite Mobility in Transitional Economies,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 68 (December 2003), pp. 899–916. 4 See McFaul, “State Power, Institutional Change, and the Politics of Privatization in Russia,” World Politics, Vol. 47 (1995), pp. 210–43, and Walder, “Elite Mobility in Transitional Economies.” 5 See McFaul, “The Fourth Wave,” and Walder, “Elite Mobility in Transitional Economies.” 6 See, in particular, the following articles by Ding Xueliang: “Systemic Irregularity and Spontaneous Property Transformation in the Chinese Financial System,” China Quarterly 163 (2000), pp. 655–76; “Informal Privatization Through Internationalization: The Rise of Nomenklatura Capitalism in China’s Offshore Business,” British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 30 (2002), pp. 121–46; and “The Illicit Asset Stripping of Chinese State Firms,” China Journal, Vol. 43 (2002), pp. 1–28. 7 This situation has prevailed in Belarus, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, where less than 30 percent of output was produced in the private sector after a decade of reform (compared to over 70 percent in much of Central Europe and the Baltic states). See Walder, “Elite Mobility in Transitional Economies,” McFaul, “The Fourth Wave,” and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 1999: Ten Years of Transition (London: Stationery Office, 1999). 8 These are the 1998 figures reported in Sebastian Heilmann and Sarah Kirchberger, “The Chinese Nomenklatura in Transition: A Study Based on Internal Cadre Statistics of the Central Organization Department of the Chinese Communist Party” (Trier, Germany: Center for East Asian and Pacific Studies, Trier University, June 2000). 9 Heilmann and Kirchberger, “The Chinese Nomenklatura in Transition,” p. 2. 10 See Donald J. Treiman, et al., eds, Life Histories and Social Change in Contemporary China: Codebook (Los Angeles, CA: UCLA Institute for Social Science Research, Social Science Data Archive, 1998). 11 The findings were originally reported in Andrew G. Walder, Bobai Li, and Donald J. Treiman, “Politics and Life Chances in a State Socialist Regime: Dual

32

12

13 14 15

16

17

18 19 20

Andrew G. Walder Career Paths into the Urban Chinese Elite, 1949–1996,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 65 (April 2000), pp. 191–209. The net impact is estimated as relative odds, with a value of 1.0 indicating that the characteristic had no net effect, with values above 1.0 indicating increased odds. A value of 2.0 indicates a doubling of the odds, or an increase of 100 percent in the likelihood of joining the party; similarly, a value of 3.45 indicates an increase of 245 percent. These are net values, which means that they control for other variables included in the equation (gender, age, father a party member, college education, high school education, cadre occupation). These figures are culled from Zhongguo jiaoyu nianjian, various years between 1981 and 2002. Xinhua she, Beijing, October 28, 2003. The definition of cadre used in the survey is not the same one used in the Heilmann-Kirchberger data. Our more restrictive definition includes only “leading cadres,” which would include many of the 15 million ordinary cadres who are party members as well as leaders at the county-division level rank and above. The impact of more than one individual characteristic can be calculated by multiplying the relative hazard ratios. So the increased odds for a party member with a college education would be 2.9 times 9.1, or 26.4; while the odds for a party member with only a high school education would be 2.9 times 3, or 5.8. This paragraph and the accompanying figure draw on the data and analysis reported in Andrew G. Walder, “Privatization and Elite Mobility, Rural China, 1979 to 1996” (Working Paper, Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University, June 2002). Men become cadres at much higher rates than women, but they are not more likely to become private entrepreneurs. For a more extended discussion, see Walder, “Privatization and Elite Mobility.” X.L. Ding, The Decline of Communism in China: Legitimacy Crisis, 1977–1989 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

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2

The Chinese Communist Party’s nomenklatura system as a leadership selection mechanism An evaluation* John P. Burns

Introduction Like all communist parties in power, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has developed a system to manage the selection of leaders of public organizations. The system is based on Leninist principles of party organization and state–society relations, the most important of which is that the party holds a monopoly of power.1 The system, developed in the context of a centrally planned economy and disabled or non-existent civil society, is arguably the defining characteristic of the party. The principal function of the system is to maintain the CCP in power. Because the party continues to exercise monopoly power in China, arguably the nomenklatura system has performed very well. For the past 50 years or more the CCP has been able to select China’s top leaders more or less unchallenged. In addition to its primary function of maintaining the CCP in power, however, the nomenklatura system also serves as a mechanism for selecting specific kinds of leaders, namely, those who are competent and loyal, to facilitate China’s development needs. Given the party’s monopoly position this function is of growing importance for the development of the country. In so far as performance is relevant to the CCP maintaining its position in power, and arguably it is, the two functions are linked. It is from the latter perspective that I evaluate the performance of the nomenklatura system. I argue that from this perspective the nomenklatura system has served neither the CCP nor China very well. CCP management of leadership selection in China has had a checkered past. During some periods, such as the Cultural Revolution, the system completely collapsed, while, during other periods (for example, 1952–53), the system was disabled by elite infighting and corruption. Even during the Jiang Zemin era the system has been moderately impaired by corruption. Arguably the system performed at its best in 1954–55 during a period of organizational rationalization when elite conflict was low and party discipline relatively high. That is, the performance of the nomenklatura system as a leadership selection mechanism has varied even when the position of the CCP as an institution was apparently more secure and the party less

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decayed than it is now. I conclude that elite unity and party discipline best explain variation in the performance of the nomenklatura system. When these have broken down, the ability of the nomenklatura system to select competent and loyal leaders has been undermined.

Background The nomenklatura system is, in essence, a leadership selection system that gives territorial party committees at each administrative level monopoly power to select officials for posts within their jurisdiction. Jurisdictions are determined at the center by the Politburo. Each party committee from the Central Committee on down has a list of positions over which it has final selection authority. Generally, the lists are divided into two parts: a list of positions over which the party committee must first give its approval before an appointment may be made and a list of positions the filling of which must be reported to the Organization Department (OD). The OD may veto appointments on the second list.2 The system also includes lists of reserve candidates for each position that are also managed by territorial party committees and sets of principles and procedures for matching candidates to positions. Vertical dimensions In 1998 the Central Committee’s nomenklatura included about 2,500 officials at the rank of minister/provincial governor and a further 39,000 officials at bureau level whose appointment must be reported to the Central Committee (see Figure 2.1). The number of ministerial/provincial-level positions has remained remarkably stable over time, while the number of bureau-level posts has increased by more than 48 percent since 1984. The numbers of bureau-level posts fell briefly in 1989–90 and again in 1993–94, the latter dip undoubtedly the result of a government downsizing campaign.3 The decline in 1989–90 may have been the result of retrenchment and political fallout from the June 4, 1989 episode. Authority to make leadership selection decisions, although relatively centralized, has sometimes been decentralized to supra-provincial regional party bureaus (1952–54) and to provincial and prefectural party committees (since 1984). From 1952 to 1954, for example, the Politburo set up six regional administrations covering groups of provinces and gave the regional party bureaus their own leadership selection authority. Authority was re-centralized in 1954, however, when the bureaus were abolished.4 Since 1984, nomenklatura authority has extended one level down the administrative hierarchy. Prior to 1984 officials were required to seek the prior permission of the Central Committee before prefectural-level appointments could be made.5 In 1983, officials made some 5,845 appointments at prefectural/bureau level all of which would have obtained

The CCP’s nomenklatura system 35 45,000 40,000 35,000 30,000 Headcount

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25,000 20,000 15,000 Min./prov. Prefect/bureau

10,000 5,000 0

1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Year

Figure 2.1 Central Committee nomenklatura, 1984–98 Source: Organization Department, Central Party History Research Office, Central Archives, Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao Appendix 1, Vol. 2 (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 2000), p. 1357.

prior approval from the Central Committee.6 With the decentralization of nomenklatura authority in 1984 prior approval was necessary for only ministerial/provincial-level appointments (less than 100 new appointments were made in 1984). In some cases, the number of posts requiring central approval fell drastically (e.g., in the People’s Bank of China, by 87 percent).7 Still the central OD, since 1984, has had to process several thousand cases a year, either to give prior or post-appointment approval (see Figure 2.2). Horizontal dimensions The horizontal dimensions of the nomenklatura system include: (1) changes to the locus of authority to select leaders (periodic de-concentration of authority at the center); and (2) the changes to the scope of party control. Although the OD, on behalf of the Politburo, has retained operational control over the nomenklatura system since 1949, from time to time it has delegated authority to other high-level party bodies to make leadership selection decisions. Thus, in 1953, for example, when the Central Committee consisted of many agencies that shadowed government ministries and commissions, these party agencies made leadership selection decisions. These party agencies included the Planning and Industry Department, the

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5,000 4,500 4,000

Headcount

3,500 3,000 2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000

Min./prov. Prefect/bureau

500 0 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Year

Figure 2.2 Appointments to positions on the Central Committee nomenklatura, 1984–98 Source: Organization Department, Central Party History Research Office, Central Archives, Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao Appendix 1, Vol. 2 (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 2000), p. 1427.

Finance and Trade Department, the Communications and Transportation Department, the Rural Work Department and the Political Work Department. The Propaganda and United Front Work Departments also had their own leadership selection authority. Still this authority was exercised under the supervision of the OD.8 In the 1990s, the OD also delegated leadership selection authority to two central party organizations with responsibilities for financial institutions and key state-owned enterprises. The CCP’s Central Financial Work Committee (zhongyang jinrong gongzuo weiyuanhui), headed from 1998 to 2003 by Wen Jiabao, and the Central Enterprise Work Committee (zhongyang qiye gongzuo weiyuanhui), headed by Wu Bangguo from 2000 to 2003, both subordinate to the Central Leading Group for Finance and Economics, selected leaders for key financial institutions and state-owned enterprises.9 Which positions to include in the published nomenklatura and the degree of secrecy surrounding its publication are political questions. Unlike the pre-1984 lists, the party made the 1984 and 1990 nomenklatura lists relatively accessible to outsiders (they were published in collections of organization and personnel documents sold in official book stores or otherwise available),10 while the party has not published the 1998 lists as openly. The apparent increasing secrecy surrounding the party’s behind-the-scenes

The CCP’s nomenklatura system 37 1111 2 3 4 5111 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5111 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 44 45111

role comes as China has entered the World Trade Organization which requires increasingly transparent decision-making. Leaders may be attempting to conceal from outsiders the role of the party in, especially, economic policy making. The scope of the Central Committee’s published nomenklatura (and presumably the nomenklatura of local party committees) has changed from time to time reflecting (1) the increasing institutionalization of the Chinese political system11 and (2) the Politburo’s perception of its political needs. In 1990, for example, the party added positions to the published nomenklatura that clearly had been controlled by the Central Committee previously, but not reported. These included the Politburo, the Central Committee, the Central Military Commission, and the President and Vice President of the PRC (see Table 2.1). The 1990 version, then, was a more complete and honest account of the party’s role. The 1990 version omitted the nation’s top universities in line with party thinking at the time that controlling them no longer required Central Committee attention.12 They were included once again, however, in the 1998 list, indicating, perhaps, the party’s changed perception of the importance of universities to stability and the party’s continued survival. Most state-owned enterprises were dropped from the Central Committee nomenklatura in the 1990 list.13 They have been moved to the list of positions to be reported to the Organization Department. Table 2.1 Structure of the Central Committee nomenklatura, 1984–1998*

Party Central Central Party Bureaucracy President, Vice President; Chairman, Vice Chairman of Central Military Commission (CMC) National People’s Congress Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference State Council, Banks, Corporations, Diplomats Judiciary, Procuratorate Mass Organizations Provincial-level Organizations Universities State-owned Enterprises, Service Units

1984

1990

1998

⫻

⫻ ⫻ ⫻@

⫻ ⫻ ⫻

⫻# ⫻# ⫻^ ⫻# ⫻ ⫻

⫻ ⫻ ⫻ ⫻ ⫻ ⫻ ⫻

⫻# ⫻# ⫻^ ⫻# ⫻ ⫻ ⫻ ⫻

Notes: *Refers only to the list of positions over which the party committee must give prior approval before an appointment may be made; @ Chairman and Vice Chairman of the CMC were classified as Party Central; # Included as a single category; ^ Included People’s Armed Police Sources: John P. Burns, The Chinese Communist Party’s Nomenklatura System (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1989) 122–30; John P. Burns, “Strengthening Central CCP Control of Leadership Selection: the 1990 Nomenklatura,” The China Quarterly, No. 138 (June 1994), pp. 474–80; Hon S. Chan, “Continuity and Change in Cadre Personnel Management in China: from the 1990 to the 1998 Nomenklatura System, 1990–1998,” The China Quarterly, No. 179 (September 2004), pp. 703–34.

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Functions The nomenklatura system has served several functions the significance of which has varied over time. From a system perspective the nomenklatura’s most enduring and principal function is to enable the party to realize effective control of the state and, more broadly, the commanding heights of the economy. Arguably the party has adhered to this goal unwaveringly since 1949. In this regard the nomenklatura system functions as a patronage system that allows the party to reward its supporters and punish its enemies. Patronage allows the party to build support for its rule. The patronage system also permits the party to use public organizations as an employer of last resort, an important policy instrument to preserve stability under conditions of high unemployment. Also, from a system perspective, the nomenklatura seeks to place competent and loyal leaders in positions of power, which enables the system to develop efficiently. I am concerned with this function in this chapter. From the perspective of organizations, the nomenklatura system serves the function of political communication, laying out for insiders and outsiders the system of official statuses. This allows participants to understand their place in the political system. Moreover, the system acts as a political road map because higher status organizations (those on the Central Committee’s nomenklatura, for example) may legitimately make demands on senior party leaders for assistance and support. From the perspective of individuals, the nomenklatura system provides the structure for systems of reciprocal relations (networks) that can assist the life chances of members and their extended kin/friends.14 In this sense the nomenklatura system has provided a structure for party factionalism that has system-wide implications. Because of information asymmetry and the incompleteness of the legal system, the access the nomenklatura system provides for members and their networks may advantage them in everything from job applications to tendering and licensing requests. This function of the nomenklatura may have grown with the development of the market economy. Even under conditions of the unbridled pursuit of Weberian-type efficiency, norms that value advancing family interests and information asymmetry may continue to permit nomenklatura networks to play a valuable role in the distribution of rewards. The development of a market economy, and a rapidly growing private sector, have severely challenged Leninist institutions such as the nomenklatura system. The reforms have thrown open new opportunities for individuals to accumulate resources outside of party control, which poses a danger to party rule. The party has met this development with both repression and co-optation. The CCP has repressed attempts to establish political parties and trade unions outside of party control and continues to manage the media. The party uses and manages the increasing number

The CCP’s nomenklatura system 39 of non-government organizations that have come to characterize civil society in China “with Chinese characteristics.” CCP policy also calls for co-opting the new business elite and professionals into the party. Jiang Zemin’s theory of the “three represents” provides the ideological foundation for the policy.15 Whether these measures will succeed or not remains to be seen.

Evaluation of the CCP’s nomenklatura system Considerable evidence indicates that China’s officials, in general, are increasingly selected based on performance.16 Civil service reforms have abolished life tenure, raised educational levels, and brought in formal rules that require competitive selection and promotion based on ability. Career paths of public officials in the reform era have advantaged those with a formal university degree.17 Rapidly increasing formal educational levels are a relatively recent phenomenon. Education levels fell in the early and mid1950s and stayed relatively flat during the Cultural Revolution (1966–76).18 Aggregate data is consistent with the interpretation that advancement is linked to educational levels for China’s leaders as well, especially since the early 1980s (see Figure 2.3).

100 90 80 70 Percentage

1111 2 3 4 5111 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5111 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 44 45111

60 50 40 30 Ministerial Bureau Division

20 10 0 1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990 Year

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

Figure 2.3 Leading cadres in China with university education, 1981–98 Note: University education here includes both university and college (associate) degrees. Source: Organization Department, Dangzheng lingdao ganbu tongji ziliao huibian (Collected Statistical Materials on Party and Government Leading Cadres) (Beijing: Dangjian duwu chubanshe, 1999), pp. 5, 8, 10.

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An evaluation of China’s leadership selection system, however, reveals that while the CCP has stressed performance and ability as important selection criteria, selection decisions in practice have also valued nepotism and favoritism, on the one hand, and rewarded corruption, on the other. A high performing leadership selection system has both process and outcomes dimensions (see Table 2.2). The system should be able to: (1) produce leaders effectively (process); and (2) produce leaders who perform well and who can meet the expectations of the competent political authority and the community (outcomes). The first dimension refers to the process of selecting leaders and requires, among other things, clearly articulated and agreed upon rules, selection criteria, and participants, as well as timeliness. In particular, leaders should be selected according to the official and agreed criteria, whatever they may be. In the context of China, for example, the criteria have varied over time but have included both merit or ability, on the one hand, and political loyalty, on the other (“red” and “expert”).19 Leaders chosen by nepotism, favoritism, or through corruption, are evidence of an impaired leadership selection system. I argue that for substantial periods of time China’s nomenklatura system has been procedurally impaired. The second dimension refers to the result or outcome of the selection process and requires that the selected leaders perform well. They should meet the expectations of both the competent political authority and the community. Where leaders, for example, engage in corruption they clearly have not performed well. I argue that widespread corruption in China is evidence that relatively large numbers of leaders selected through the nomenklatura system have failed to perform well. Arguably the most important variables for explaining the performance of the nomenklatura system are elite-level conflict and party discipline (see Table 2.3). I hypothesize that a high level of elite-level conflict (unbounded) impairs the nomenklatura system either because leaders cannot agree on personnel appointments, thus causing delay or inaction, or because strong individual leaders attempt to hijack the system and impose leaders who are not supported by the organization. I hypothesize that the lack of party discipline impairs the system because high levels of corruption and/or factionalism result in the selection of the incompetent

Table 2.2 Evaluation of leadership selection cases Outcomes

Process

Effective Ineffective or impaired

Effective

Ineffective or impaired

1954–55 ?

1990s Cultural Revolution, 1952–53 and mid-1980s

The CCP’s nomenklatura system 41 1111 2 3 4 5111 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5111 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 44 45111

Table 2.3 Nomenklatura system contexts Party discipline

Elite conflict

High Low

High

Low

1958–60 1954–55

Cultural Revolution, 1952–53? mid-1980s and 1990s

or those who pervert public (CCP) policy for their own ends. Although elite-level conflict and party discipline are closely related (elite-level conflict usually produces party indiscipline [factionalism]) they are conceptually different variables and may vary independently. Thus, low levels of elite conflict may co-exist with party indiscipline (for example, corruption) if the elite tolerate indiscipline as they apparently did during the 1990s. Relatively high levels of elite conflict may co-exist with relative party discipline as apparently occurred in 1958–60 (see below). I argue that when elite-level conflict has been high and party discipline low as during the Cultural Revolution and perhaps during other periods such as 1952–53, the system has been wholly ineffective or greatly impaired. During these times the nomenklatura system broke down procedurally and served neither national nor collective party goals. Alternatively, when elite-level conflict has been low (bounded) and party discipline high as during the period 1954–55, the nomenklatura system has been a relatively effective leadership selection device. I argue that for substantial periods during China’s post-1949 history, the nomenklatura system has been an unreliable leadership selection instrument, serving neither the party as a collective entity nor the nation very well. System effective: 1954–55 Arguably the period from mid-1954 to late 1955 represents the nomenklatura system at its most effective. In February 1954, the party dismissed Gao Gang and Rao Shushi, thus ending a debilitating elite-level confrontation between the two leaders and Mao Zedong. The handling of Gao and Rao must have indicated to other leaders that challenging Mao and the party center was unwise, even dangerous. The period 1954–55 was, then, one of relatively low elite-level conflict. It was also a period of relatively high party discipline. By mid-1954 the CCP had led three campaigns to root out corruption. Two of these campaigns (the sanfan campaign in 1951–52 and the new sanfan campaign in 1953) were aimed at the party and state bureaucracy and were designed, in part, to improve party discipline. As a result of the first campaign some 173,000 leading cadres were punished for “corruption, waste and bureaucratism.”20 The new sanfan

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campaign focused more on the “bureaucratism, subjectivism and decentralism” of middle- and upper-level leaders.21 It is likely that the net effect of the two campaigns and an earlier party rectification campaign was to heighten party discipline. The period from mid-1954 through 1955 was a period of organizational rationalization.22 In June 1954, the CCP abolished the regional administrative committees and party bureaus that had provided Gao and Rao with their platforms to challenge the center, and centralized power in Beijing. The period 1954–55 was also one of “tidying up” the system of assignments and promotions. In tandem with the development of a planned economy, party organization departments played the leading role in personnel appointments. “Throughout the period” central personnel organs made or approved all appointments of county magistrates and party first secretaries, all provincial appointments above the level of bureau director, and all central government and party appointments above the level of deputy bureau director. During the same time the party also specified more clearly criteria for appointment and promotion (administrative ability and political reliability). Although officials sometimes resisted the reassignments made during the period, especially being sent down to lower-level units, the system successfully transferred over 90,000 cadres by July 1954, indicating its robustness. There were also sometimes job mismatches. Still, a survey in 1955 indicated that only 11.7 percent of engineering graduates and 17.7 percent of technical middle school graduates had yet to be given appropriate assignments. As it began, the process of organizational rationalization “generated remarkably little controversy” and “little disagreement among top Chinese leaders.”23 Even Mao openly supported the increasing formalization and centralization of the Chinese state and supported the further development of the technical skills of the bureaucracy. The period, then, was arguably the heyday of China’s nomenklatura system which was both procedurally effective and apparently produced leaders who were valued by the political authority. System ineffective: Cultural Revolution To be effective the nomenklatura system requires a single political center and relatively high levels of party discipline, neither of which condition prevailed during the Cultural Revolution. Beginning in 1966 Mao Zedong mobilized radical leaders within the CCP to attack and remove from office what became large numbers of officials at all administrative levels throughout the country.24 The campaign against the bureaucracy reportedly resulted in at least 80 percent of officials (most of whom were leaders) being removed from office by 1968.25 Aggregate data from the period indicate that huge reductions were made in the number of central-level cadres during the Cultural Revolution,

The CCP’s nomenklatura system 43 numbers that did not begin to pick up again until the early 1980s (see Figure 2.4). During the same time, the number of township officials expanded rapidly, however, indicating that many central-level cadres were “sent down” to township level. (Indeed, for the entire period 1954 to 1998 the percentage of central-level cadres was inversely correlated [–0.81647] with the percentage of township-level cadres, indicating also the impact of the Great Leap Forward on the relative distribution of officials.) From 1978 to 1982 when higher-level cadres were being re-called during the post-Cultural Revolution era, the percentage of township-level officials fell dramatically. It has crept up since that time. The percentage of provincial-level officials, stable before and after the Cultural Revolution, has declined steadily relative to other categories of officials since the Cultural Revolution. The relative strength of county- and district-level officials also changed little before and after the Cultural Revolution, although there have been substantial changes especially at county level since. Because of the collapse of the organization-personnel system from 1966 to 1970 published statistics for the period are unavailable. As we have seen, prior to the Cultural Revolution organization departments had responsibility for managing the system throughout the country.

45 40 35

Percent

30 25 20 15 10 5

98

96

19

94

19

92

19

90

19

88

19

86

19

84

19

82

19

80

19

78

19

76

19

74

19

72

19

70

19

68

19

66

19

64

19

62

19

60

19

58

19

56

19

19

54

0 19

1111 2 3 4 5111 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5111 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 44 45111

Year Township

Central

County

District

Provincial

Figure 2.4 Distribution of cadres by administrative level, 1954–98 Source: Organization Department, Central Party History Research Office, Central Archives, Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao Appendix 1, Vol. 2 (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 2000), pp. 1333–4.

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John P. Burns

Although they appear to have been effective managers of the nomenklatura system until 1966, beginning then, official accounts indicate that they became “paralyzed” (tanhuan) until at least 1973 (and probably until 1976).26 The fate of the central OD was symptomatic of the disarray that characterized leadership selection in general during the period. Like other central party and government agencies, the OD was badly affected by the Cultural Revolution. A few days after the Cultural Revolution Temporary Preparatory Committee was set up within the OD on August 15, 1966 under the leadership of Zeng Di (a Deputy Head of the OD), the Committee convened a meeting of all OD employees during which the then Head of the Department (An Ziwen) and five of seven deputy heads were severely criticized. As a result, the head, all deputy heads (except presumably Zeng Di), and many division chief-level officials of the department stopped work and were investigated. (From 1967 to 1971, together with over 500 other leading cadres, An Ziwen was incarcerated in Qincheng maximum security prison.27 He died on June 25, 1980.) Under these circumstances the OD’s management of the central nomenklatura effectively ceased. The Preparatory Committee under Zeng Di’s leadership continued in power until January 18, 1967 when “several mass organizations seized its authority by force.”28 The attack on the OD’s deputy leaders was then stepped up. In May, Kang Sheng, by then a Politburo Standing Committee member29 and Advisor to the Cultural Revolution Small Group set up in May 1966, appointed first Zhu Guang from the PLA and then in October Guo Yufeng, a PLA major general to take over the OD. Under Kang and Guo’s leadership further attacks were launched on the leadership of the department.30 In March 1968 Guo submitted a report to the “party center” demanding that the department be thoroughly re-organized. Still, during 1968 Kang Sheng was able to use the OD to launch attacks on other central leaders. Thus, on August 23 he instructed the OD to brand 37 of the 60-member 8th Central Supervisory Committee (zhongyang jiancha weiyuanhui)31 as “renegades, spies and counterrevolutionary revisionists.” Kang and Guo contemplated a thorough clean out of the Organization Department and on February 21, 1969 the “party center” approved Guo’s plan to send to the countryside virtually all employees of the department for re-education through labor. A nucleus of 55, only 35 of whom were cadres, remained in the office in Beijing. From 1970 the OD was placed under the direction of the Central Organization and Propaganda Group (zhongyang zuzhi xuanchuan zu) set up “under the leadership of the Politburo.”32 Chaired by Kang Sheng, members included Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, Ji Dengkui and Li Desheng. When Kang became too ill to continue as leader and Li was transferred to Shenyang, Jiang Qing and her associates effectively took over the group. Rebuilding the OD commenced in 1971 when the number of employees was increased first to 85 and then, by August 1971, to 113.

The CCP’s nomenklatura system 45 1111 2 3 4 5111 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5111 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 44 45111

New appointments to leadership positions in the OD in 1969 and 1971 brought in PLA officers and the Head of the First Office of the Central Case Examination Group.33 This brief account indicates that there was considerable resistance to the radicals’ takeover of the OD, which was finally completed only with the clean-out in 1969. Clearly the OD was in no position to manage the central nomenklatura from 1966 to 1969. Similar takeovers occurred locally that “paralyzed” local government organization departments from 1967 to 1971.34 The Cultural Revolution had devastating consequences for cadre management. First, about 60 percent of top leaders lost their positions.35 Of these the “purge” rate was about 70 percent at the center and 54 percent of local leaderships.36 The extent of the purges was indicated by radical Zhang Chunqiao’s view that: every official has made mistakes and every mistake will be opposed. As a result, there is now no single county party committee member who can be trusted, no single prefectural party committee member who can be trusted; among the provincial party committee members and those of the center, no one can be trusted except Chairman Mao.37 The criteria of those to be purged was ambiguous and constantly changing.38 As a result dismissals from office made during the Cultural Revolution in the name of the nomenklatura system were suspect. Second, conflict over recruitment and promotion criteria was intense at the early stages of the Cultural Revolution and after Deng Xiaoping was reinstated in office in March 1973.39 The radicals declared that the differential power relationships and reward structures of the pre-CR bureaucracy had served as the basis for the emergence of a new ruling class that had to be overthrown. The radicals argued that class background and age were the appropriate selection criteria. Thus, having one-third of every leadership group consist of young people became an official policy. Conservatives accused the radicals of “two surprises.” “One recruited unqualified persons to the party, and the second promoted them to high office by skipping several grades – a practice that Deng Xiaoping satirically labelled helicopter promotion.” By 1973 a backlash set in against the newly appointed young cadres (“young men are unstable, [and] men without moustaches are immature”).40 Until the arrest of the Gang of Four in 1976, however, many party committees continued the radicals’ policy in spite of the conservatives’ criticism by creating new leadership positions for the young cadres. Third, the appointment and dismissal of leading cadres occurred through highly irregular procedures.41 The radicals used all sorts of “illegal” methods to promote their followers to positions of power, including arbitrary promotions of the unqualified, promotions based solely on factional

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affiliation, waiving party recruitment procedures to take in “those who had rebelled,” and setting up new temporary party branches to recruit their followers.42 As a result, some individuals who were not even party members became party secretaries. Fourth, effective operation of the nomenklatura system depended on extensive and accurate files on each cadre. During the Cultural Revolution the radicals who temporarily took over organization and personnel departments filled personnel files with inaccurate and wild accusations about the supposed crimes of many leaders. The official evaluation of this period criticized the Gang of Four for “violating party rules and regulations, randomly destroying the party’s cadre management principle, and disregarding materials in the dossier, frequently changing the conclusions that had been reached organizationally and adding forged materials.”43 During the CR Mao Zedong and the radicals destroyed the formal authority of the Chinese party/state and with it the party’s leadership selection system. System partially impaired: 1952–53, mid-1980s, and 1990s I have identified three intermediate cases where the nomenklatura system has been partially impaired by relatively high levels of elite conflict and/or relatively low levels of party discipline. In the first two cases (1952–53 and mid-1980s) the process and outcomes of the leadership selection system were both somewhat impaired. In the last case (1990s) although the leadership selection system was relatively effective procedurally, outcomes were tainted by corruption, especially by the sale and purchase of official posts. The CCP’s leadership selection system was severely tested in 1952–53, during the early years of the People’s Republic. During this time Mao’s conflict with Gao Gang and Rao Shushi had a debilitating effect on the work of organization departments, especially the central OD in Beijing, and high levels of corruption were evidence that the system was not producing appropriate leaders. Gao and Rao were accused of establishing tight personal control over their regional governments and party bureaus (Gao in the Northeast and Rao in Huadong) and of then using their local power to demand changes in the central party and state leadership.44 In 1952 and early 1953, as part of attempts to centralize power, the CCP moved the heads of the regional bureaus to Beijing. Gao, also a Politburo member, arrived in late 1952 to become Chairman of the State Planning Commission and Rao in early 1953 to take over the OD.45 At the National Conference on Financial and Economic Work in June–August 1953, Gao, supported by Rao, attacked Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai over their support for a new tax system. They stepped up their attack at the National Organization Work Conference in September–October, 1953. A core issue was a list of new Politburo

The CCP’s nomenklatura system 47 1111 2 3 4 5111 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5111 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 44 45111

members prepared by An Ziwen, then Deputy Head of the OD with close ties to Liu Shaoqi, who was the Politburo and Secretariat member in charge of organization and personnel work at the time. The list had not been approved by Rao, who took over the OD in February 1953.46 The origins of the new Politburo list are obscure, but go to the very heart of the leadership selection process. According to one account: Mao raised the matter of arrangements for leaders of the regions with Gao and asked him to consider the matter. Gao went to An in the spring of 1953 and, using Mao’s name, instructed him to prepare a Politburo list including the existing members and the key figures of the regions. It was not An’s job to do this and he hesitated, correctly understanding that this was something within Mao’s responsibilities. But in the face of Gao’s representation he finally produced the list. People aware of the list were befuddled as to how someone of An’s rank could produce it, and thus they were susceptible to Gao’s claim that Liu was behind it. In producing the list, An reportedly accepted Gao’s guidelines and dutifully added those region leaders not already on the Politburo – Bo Yibo, Deng Xiaoping, Rao Shushi and Lin Biao. Gao Gang, however, assertively spread the rumor that Lin was not on the list.47 In July, Rao, seeking to take effective control of the OD, attacked An at a meeting of OD bureau chiefs and at other meetings, attacks that were not approved by the Politburo.48 Still, An Ziwen apparently acted beyond his authority and subsequently received a formal disciplinary warning and criticism as a result. Mao later referred to “a slate of candidates for the Politburo illicitly put together by An Ziwen.”49 Gao Gang used the list to play one group of senior officials off against another. In communications with senior army officers he pointed out how the list favored cadres from the “white areas,” especially Liu Shaoqi over those from “red areas,” especially the army and Lin Biao. He also criticized the proposed rapid promotion of Bo Yibo, a Liu lieutenant, to the Politburo.50 Gao contacted leaders, seeking a reorganization of the party and government. He offered various posts to prospective allies and made use of An’s list to gain the support of disgruntled army leaders.51 In the end both Gao and Rao were purged in February 1954 for attempting to split the party. Although the Politburo list was not acted on, the episode demonstrates, first, that leaders were being selected primarily for factional ends, that is, to further the careers of senior figures such as Politburo member Gao Gang. Second, the case demonstrates how senior leaders could override established processes to influence outcomes. Although not as serious as the Cultural Revolution cases discussed above, the Gao–Rao Affair indicates that leadership selection at the time was weakly institutionalized and outcomes were unsure.

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During the early 1950s party discipline also was relatively weak. As it shifted from its role as an opposition force pursuing military conquest to a governing party, the CCP faced a severe shortage of cadres which it sought to rectify by recruiting thousands of new officials.52 From October 1949 to September 1952, the party recruited nearly 3 million new cadres increasing their number from 720,000 to 3,310,000.53 Given high levels of unemployment, the new positions were undoubtedly attractive.54 To fill the gaps the CCP made rapid promotions of cadres who were often not qualified for the positions. In Wuhan, for example, “a number of early top appointees were only semiliterate, with so little administrative ability and professional competence that the party eventually found it necessary to dismiss them.”55 According to Kau “the quality of cadres who were hastily recruited early on was sometimes appalling” and illiteracy among newly recruited government officials was widespread.56 Lax admissions standards had allowed many unqualified individuals into the party – they sought to join the winning side rather than to join out of ideological conviction.57 This sort of environment encouraged corruption and, indeed, many officials became corrupt. As we have seen, during the 1951–52 anti-corruption (sanfan and new sanfan) campaigns, authorities removed 4.5 percent (over 100,000 punished,58 see above) of state cadres from office for corruption.59 I conclude that in the early days of the People’s Republic the nomenklatura system was partially impaired because it selected for promotion many incompetent officials and relatively large numbers of officials who either were, or later became, corrupt. Our discussion of the period 1952–53 has highlighted both elite-level conflict and party indiscipline as undermining the leadership selection system. The leadership learned from the Gao and Rao affair of the importance of isolating dissident leaders so that they could not organize opposition. The period 1958–60 reveals that when the party is able to contain elite-level conflict it may not be a sufficient condition to impair the leadership selection system. For example, the nomenklatura system appears to have been reasonably effective even during the period surrounding the Great Leap Forward (GLF), especially 1958 to 1960. The anti-rightist campaign that preceded the GLF removed from office critics of the party’s collectivization and other policies which paved the way for implementation of urban and rural communes and the Great Leap.60 Although Mao was challenged by Peng Dehuai at the Lushan Plenum in August 1959 and Peng, Zhang Wentian (Deputy Foreign Minister), Huang Kecheng (Chief of Staff), and Zhou Xiaozhou (Hunan Party Secretary) were dismissed from their posts61 they were relatively isolated from other senior party leaders62 and appear to have had little influence on the leadership selection system. Unlike Gao Gang and Rao Shushi, who used the organization and personnel system to further their own ambitions, Peng Dehuai appears to have opposed Mao on a policy issue. The period 1958–60 was also characterized by relatively high levels of party discipline.63 I conclude,

The CCP’s nomenklatura system 49 1111 2 3 4 5111 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5111 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 44 45111

then, that bounded elite-level conflict has not been a sufficient condition to impair the nomenklatura system. The nomenklatura system was also partially impaired during the mid1980s. Although elite-level conflict was relatively low, both procedural irregularities (nepotism and favoritism) and corruption affected leadership selection decisions during the period. According to a survey of the children of more than 1,700 central and provincial leaders conducted in the early 1990s, about 3,100 held official positions above the government bureau or military division level. Another 900 were the principal leaders of large and medium-sized state-owned enterprises (SOEs).64 According to one source children in leading positions who gained their early foothold in party or government through family connections include Deng Pufang, Deng Nan, Chen Yuan, Xi Jinping, Bo Xilai, Yao Mingwei, Hu Deping, Fu Rui, Wan Jifei, Li Xiaolin, Liao Hui, Chen Haosu, Li Tielin, Lin Yongsan, He Guangwei, and Zhou Xiaochuan.65 In addition, many cadre children found leading positions in the military and corporate worlds. During the mid-1980s, to induce their elders to retire a large number of sons and daughters of high-level cadres were given middle-level official positions as compensation. It became a common practice for veteran leaders to retire with the “compensation” of having their children appointed to leadership posts . . . elderly leaders could continue their privileged lifestyles if their children succeeded them in official positions. In fact, official status has become particularly important over the past decade because political power can often lead to tremendous economic wealth as official corruption becomes rampant.66 Thus, paradoxically, “nepotism and favoritism in elite recruitment have become prevalent at a time when educational criteria and technical expertise are more important than class background and revolutionary experience” for cadres as a whole.67 It could be argued that because the primary function of the nomenklatura system was to maintain the CCP’s position in power, using its nomenklatura authority to compensate the elders demonstrated that the system was effective. While this may be so, the appointment of so many officials based on nepotism and favoritism also demonstrates that leadership selection decisions were made on criteria other than competence or party loyalty, criteria that I am using (and the CCP also uses) to evaluate the system. The emergence of corruption as a serious problem dates from the early 1980s. As early as 1982, Chinese leaders publicly acknowledged that corruption had reached “crisis levels.”68 As Manion points out, the volume of corrupt activities exploded in the early 1980s, continued to grow in the 1980s and 1990s, and “increasingly involved large sums and probably a greater number of senior officials.”69 Since the 1980s corruption has ranked

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at or near the top of every public opinion poll as the most urgent problem confronting the country, with ordinary citizens describing it as serious and its growth unabated or more rapid than ever.70 If anti-corruption campaigns are excluded (when many more cases were reported than during other times), a trend line for the data in Figure 2.5 shows the number of cases increased from less than 5,000 per year in 1980 to over 50,000 per year in 1996.71 Given the low probability of being prosecuted (from 1993–98 fewer than half of the corruption cases being investigated led to criminal charges being filed and only 6.6 percent of these led to corrupt officials being sentenced),72 engaging in corrupt practices appears to have been a relatively low risk activity. I conclude, then, that during the mid-1980s not only was the nomenklatura system selecting leaders based on criteria such as nepotism and favoritism in relatively large numbers, but that it was also selecting corrupt officials for public office. That is, the nomenklatura system was at least partially impaired. In the 1990s although the system was procedurally relatively effective, outcomes have been partially impaired by corruption. As we have seen, corrupt activity increased rapidly during the 1990s (see Figure 2.5).73 The

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Figure 2.5 Corruption cases filed and investigated by Procuratory Source: Melanie Manion Corruption by Design: Building Clean Government in Mainland China and Hong Kong (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), Table 3.1.

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CCP’s leadership selection system was then producing officials who later became corrupt, and promoting officials who were already corrupt. A new twist to the corruption saga, however, was the emergence in the 1990s of the practice of buying and selling official posts, including leading positions. In so far as this practice was widespread, it seriously undermined the system. During the mid-1990s the press published numerous cases of officials selling government positions. By 1996, People’s Daily pointed out that “some extremely power-hungry people go all out to bribe organizational and personnel departments. Some subordinates directly bribe their superiors, who are in charge of transfers, deployments, and promotions, with bribes worth hundreds of thousands of dollars.”74 Corrupt personnel practices have been reported primarily in local government. In 1997 and 1998, for example, the press reported that officials sold scores of government jobs in Wenzhou City (Zhejiang), Pizhou County (Jiangsu), Beihai City (Guangxi), Huaibei City (Anhui), Tieling City (Liaoning), Guanfeng County (Jiangxi), and in Heilongjiang Province.75 When former NPC Vice Chairman Cheng Kaijie was Governor of Guangxi province from 1994 to 1998 he accepted bribes totalling RMB 280,000 yuan and US$ 3,000 to arrange for the promotion of three local government officials to senior positions in the Beihai City government.76 From 1999 to 2000, officials bribed their way into powerful positions including leading positions in county-level organization departments.77 I have no way of knowing how extensive these corrupt practices were but they do indicate that the CCP’s leadership selection system was at least moderately impaired during the 1990s, a trend that appears to have continued. We must admit that, at least formally, the CCP has taken many steps to prevent or minimize corruption. Although there is no evidence that the CCP has sought out and promoted corrupt officials to leading positions, the structure of incentives has done little to prevent such an outcome. Rules that require leading officials to declare their assets and to undergo audits before being transferred or promoted are not being effectively enforced.78 The two parties to a corrupt transaction have every incentive to keep it hidden. The nomenklatura system does not screen out the corrupt in part because the CCP is unable to subordinate itself to an independent anticorruption agency. To do otherwise would result in the party losing its monopoly position. Accordingly, corruption is likely to impair the leadership selection system for the foreseeable future. Although the nomenklatura system has continued to be an effective mechanism to keep the CCP in power, as a mechanism for selecting competent officials and those loyal to the party as an institution, for much of the past 50 years the system has served neither the CCP nor the country particularly well. I have argued that the system operated most effectively in the mid-1950s during a period of organizational rationalization. During the Cultural Revolution the system collapsed under the weight of elite

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infighting and weakened party discipline. Elite conflict and corruption also undermined the system in 1952–53. More recently, the system performed badly in the mid-1980s when it selected many leaders through nepotism and promoted the corrupt. In the 1990s, although the system was procedurally stronger, corruption also undermined leader selection outcomes. Given this patchy performance what can we expect in the future?

Conclusion: the CCP in a new era As many have observed, two decades of economic reform, the move toward a market economy, increasing integration with the world economy, rapidly rising living standards, higher educational levels, and greater access to information have had a marked impact on the environment in which the CCP operates.79 In spite of these contextual changes, there are striking continuities in the organization of the party. First, the internal structure of the party remains Leninist and formal institutions have changed little during the past 50 years. In practice, power continues to be centralized in the Politburo, its Standing Committee, the Secretary General and the head of the Central Military Commission.80 Second, the CCP, like other communist parties, continues to be an elite party, recruiting less than five percent of the total population, a practice that should enable the party to remain relatively disciplined. Third, the incentives for joining the party have remained broadly unchanged as well. Although most people join out of rational calculation (to influence policy or for personal gain) we must acknowledge that some join out of a sense of duty or love of country (that is, for norm-based or affective reasons).81 Fourth, the party continues to exercise monopoly power in society and vigorously suppresses challenges to its authority, such as those posed by the China Democratic Party and the Falungong in the 1990s.82 Fifth, the party continues to rely heavily on traditional Leninist institutions of control, such as the nomenklatura system and the military. We have already seen, however, that in some respects the nomenklatura system has been at least partially impaired for decades. Socio-economic change in the 1980s and 1990s has undermined support for the party, especially from farmers and workers in state-owned enterprises. Although China is not a democracy the CCP has felt it necessary to scramble for new bases of support. Accordingly the party has shed its class-based ideology83 and begun recruiting from among the urban middle class and private entrepreneurs.84 The strategy seeks to co-opt these groups and re-penetrate the commanding heights of society and the economy, including the private sector. How successful this strategy will be only time will tell. Although the literature on the evolution of one-party states suggests a variety of possible trajectories for China,85 the Chinese political system fits comfortably with the notion of an “established one-party state.”86 According to Huntington, one-party states face challenges both internal

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(succession problems and the management of elite-level conflict during a transition phase) and external (challenges from a technical-managerial class, interest groups, critical intellectuals, and “local and popular groups” demanding to participate during an adaptation phase).87 Established oneparty states may adapt to these challenges but do not necessarily or even mostly become “democratic.”88 According to Huntington, the principal difference between revolutionary and established one-party systems is the scope of politics. The increasing complexity of society means that to function effectively, established oneparty systems must relax political controls. Economics, technology, and various social units “require greater degrees of autonomy to accomplish effectively the ends of the system” and de-politicization becomes the order of the day. Accordingly, the extent to which the party continues to monopolize politics in an established one-party system depends on the extent to which decisions continue to be made on political rather than technical or functional grounds.89 In so far as decisions are made on political grounds, the extent of the party’s influence is much broader. Leadership selection decisions based on nepotism, favoritism, and corruption are political grounds. We have seen that the incentives to continue to make leadership decisions on these grounds are strong but they entail a loss of legitimacy. In this sense they undermine the nomenklatura system as a tool enabling the CCP to maintain its position in power. I have identified the levels of elite conflict and party discipline as key variables for explaining the performance of the CCP’s leadership selection system. Unbounded elite conflicts in China, such as the Cultural Revolution, have been associated with the “consolidation” phase of the country’s development where the resolution of succession crises was important.90 Rule by a charismatic leader and relatively low levels of institutionalization characterized this stage. China’s leaders no longer rule through charisma and considerable institutionalization has taken place.91 The 1980s, for example, saw a proliferation of party and state institutions, regularization of institutional process, and emphasis on institutional discipline that has continued into the 1990s.92 Institutional restraints on China’s leaders “have been stronger than ever during the past few years.”93 The CCP’s management of the leadership succession in 2002–03 is evidence of a new higher level of institutionalization especially at the top. Where elite conflict has emerged, such as during the June 4, 1989 incident, the party has moved quickly to isolate the dissenting leaders and prevent them from organizing to oppose the center. (The party’s monopoly position requires it to deal harshly with elite dissent, which arguably is not a characteristic of a highly institutionalized political system. Thus, the CCP must continue to arrest, detain, and isolate dissenting leaders to enable the party to maintain its monopoly position.) Maintaining party discipline is probably the greatest challenge in the new era. Although there are many challenges to party discipline including

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ideological change and a new membership base, managing corruption is, perhaps, the most serious challenge. As we have seen, corruption emerged as a serious problem in the 1980s and 1990s, causing a serious rift between the interests of officials and society. Corruption continues at crisis levels. In March 2003, the President of the Supreme People’s Court revealed that 85,000 officials had been found guilty of corruption since 1997. Since then, authorities have dismissed the Minister of Land and Resources for corruption and fired two provincial party secretaries accused of corruption.94 In 2003, 13 ministry/province-level officials were convicted of corruption, the largest number of high-ranking officials to be dealt with in a single year.95 Some have argued that corruption has become less of a problem in recent years. For example, China’s corruption “score” on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index has improved in recent years (from 2.16 out of 10 in 1995 to 3.5 out of 10 in 2002).96 Official party surveys reveal that people now perceive corruption to be a less serious problem than they did in the 1990s.97 Still, the evidence of a sea change in this arena is very thin and officials continue to describe corruption in China as “rampant.”98 Corruption at epidemic proportions seriously undermines the performance of the nomenklatura system and is an indication of considerable organizational decay. The continued stability of established one-party systems such as China depends on “the maintenance by the party of its monopoly of the legitimation of the system.” This, in turn, depends on the identity of interest between party and society.99 Corruption is a serious challenge to the shared interests of the party and society. In so far as it undermines the performance of the nomenklatura system, it also undermines the usefulness of the system as a tool for maintaining the party in power.

Notes * I am grateful for comments on a first draft of this paper to the participants of the Conference on “the Chinese Communist Party in a New Era: Renewal and Reform,” sponsored by the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, Singapore, December 9–10, 2003 and especially to Zheng Yongnian and Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard, and to Kenneth Lieberthal and Ken Qingxin Wang. All remaining errors are my own. I am grateful to the Hong Kong Research Grants Council for supporting this research. 1 Janos Kornai, The Socialist System: the Political Economy of Communism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 33–48. 2 John P. Burns, The Chinese Communist Party’s Nomenklatura System (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1989). 3 John P. Burns “Downsizing the Chinese State: Government Retrenchment in the 1990s,” The China Quarterly, No. 175 (September, 2003), pp. 775–802. 4 Burns, The Chinese Communist Party’s Nomenklatura System, p. x. 5 Ibid., p. xviii. 6 Organization Department, Central Party History Research Office, Central Archives, Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhi shi ziliao: Zhonghua renmin gongheguo

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7 8 9

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zhengzhuan zuzhi 1949–1997 (Chinese Communist Party Organization History Materials: People’s Republic of China Organization of Organs of Political Power, 1949–1997), Appendix 1, Vol. 2 (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshi, 2000), p. 1427. Burns, The Chinese Communist Party’s Nomenklatura System, p. xviii[0]. Ibid., p. xvi. Central Committee, “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu wanshan jinrong xitong dangde lingdao tizhi, jiaqiang he gaijin jinrong xitong dangde gongzuo youguan wentide tongzhi” (Notice on several questions on perfecting the financial system and the party’s leadership system, strengthening and improving the financial system and the party’s work) May 19, 1998 in Central Financial Work Committee Organization Department (ed.) Dangde zuzhi gongzuo shiyong shouce (Handbook of the Party’s Organization Work) (Beijing: Central Party School Press, 1999), p. 190. The 1984 lists were published in People’s Bank of China Personnel Bureau (ed.) Renshi gongzuo wenjian xuanbian (Beijing: China Finance Press, 1985) while the 1990 lists were published in Ministry of Personnel (ed.) Renshi gongzuo wenjian xuanbian Vol. 13 (Beijing: China Personnel Press, 1990). The 1984 lists were discussed in a document in the Ministry of Labor and Personnel Policy Research Office (ed.) Renshi gongzuo wenjian xuanbian Vol. 7 (Beijing: Ministry of Personnel Policy and Regulation Bureau, 1986), pp. 39–42. Lyman H. Miller “Institutions in Chinese Politics: Trends and Prospects,” in Library of Congress China’s Future: Implications for US Interests: Conference Report (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1999). John P. Burns, “Strengthening Central CCP Control of Leadership Selection: the 1990 Nomenklatura,” The China Quarterly, No. 138 (June 1994) pp. 474–480. These comments refer to the list of positions that must receive prior Organization Department approval before an appointment may be made. Andrew G. Walder, “Sociological Dimensions of China’s Economic Transition: Organization, Stratification, and Social Mobility,” (paper prepared for the Conference “China’s Economic Transition,” University of Toronto, November 15–17, 2002). Zemin Jiang Speech delivered on the 80th Anniversary of the CCP, China Daily, July 2, 2001, pp. 4–6 and Guoguang Wu, “From the July 1 Speech to the Sixteenth Party Congress: Ideology, Party Construction and Leadership Transition,” in David M. Finkelstein and Maryanne Kivlehan (eds) China’s Leadership in the 21st Century (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), pp. 167–185. Walder, “Sociological Dimensions of China’s Economic Transition: Organization,” pp. 9–12; and Maria Heimer, Market Forces and Communist Power: Local Political Institutions and Economic Development in China (Uppsala: Uppsala University, 2000). Andrew G. Walder, Bobai Li and Donald J. Treiman, “Politics and Life Chances in a State Socialist Regime: Dual Career Paths into the Urban Chinese Elite, 1949 to 1996,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 65, No. 2 (2000), pp. 191–209. Organization Department, Central Party History Research Office, Central Archives, Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhi shi ziliao: guodu shiqi he shehui zhuyi jianshe shiqi 1949–1966 (Chinese Communist Party Organization History Materials: the Transition Period and the Period of Socialist Construction 1949– 1966) Vol. 5 (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 2000), pp. 1350–1352. Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1966). Harry Harding, Organizing China: the Problem of Bureaucracy, 1949–1976 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1981), p. 54. Ibid., p. 62. Ibid., pp. 65–86.

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23 Ibid., p. 85. 24 See Byung-joon Ahn, Chinese Politics and the Cultural Revolution (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1976); Melvin Gurtov, “The Foreign Ministry and Foreign Affairs in the Chinese Cultural Revolution,” in Thomas W. Robinson (ed.) The Cultural Revolution in China (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 113–164; Harry Harding, “Maoist Theories of Policy-Making and Organization,” in ibid., 113–164; Harding, Organizing China, pp. 235–328; Hong Yung Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 77–162. 25 Zhou Enlai apparently told Edgar Snow that the number of officials working in central agencies was cut from 60,000 to 10,000. Descriptions of the new revolutionary committees set up at provincial level indicated similar reductions. Throughout 1968 reports indicated that the number of employees of county governments had been cut by between 75 and 90 percent (Harry Harding, Organizing China, p. 288). 26 Modern China’s Personnel Management Editorial Group, Dangdai Zhongguo renshi guanli (Modern China’s personnel management) (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1994), p. 57. 27 Michael Schoenhals, “The Central Case Examination Group, 1966–79,” The China Quarterly, No. 145 (March 1996), at p. 105. 28 Organization Department, Central Party History Research Office, Central Archives, Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhi shi ziliao: “wenhua dageming” shiqi (Chinese Communist Party Organization History Materials: Cultural Revolution Period) Vol. 6, (Beijing: Zhonggong danshi chubanshe, 2000), p. 70. 29 In May 1966 Kang was only an alternate Politburo member, but he was promoted in August 1966 to the Politburo Standing Committee by the 11th Plenum of the 8th Central Committee (see Organization Department, Central Party History Research Office, Central Archives, 2000, p. 24). From August 1966 he seems to have had responsibility for organization and personnel work. 30 Organization Department, Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhi shi ziliao: “wenhua dageming” shiqi, p. 70. 31 The Committee, set up in 1955 to carry out party discipline and investigation work, was chaired by Dong Biwu until 1966. See Organization Department, Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhi shi ziliao: “wenhua dageming” shiqi, pp. 48–51. 32 Tianxun Fan and Bo Zhao (eds) Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhi gongzuo dashiji (Chronology of Chinese Communist Party organization work) (Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1991), p. 233. 33 Schoenhals, “The Central Case Examination Group, 1966–79.” 34 Modern China’s Personnel Management Editorial Group, Dangdai Zhongguo renshi guanli (Modern China’s Personnel Management) (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1994), p. 54. 35 Hong Yung Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991), p. 80. 36 Ibid., p. 81. 37 Ibid., p. 143. 38 Ibid., p. 91. 39 Ibid., pp. 121–129. 40 Ibid., p. 137. 41 Modern China’s Personnel Management Editorial Group, Dangdai Zhongguo renshi guanli (Modern China’s Personnel Management) (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1994), p. 54. 42 Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China, p. 125. 43 Ibid., p. 126.

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44 Harding, Organizing China, p. 68. 45 Frederick C. Teiwes, Politics at Mao’s Court: Gao Gang and Party Factionalism in the Early 1950s (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1990), p. 20. 46 Ibid., p. 80. 47 Ibid., pp. 96–97. 48 Ibid., p. 81. 49 Ibid., p. 97. 50 Ibid., pp. 98–99. 51 Ibid., p. 6. 52 Ying-mao Kau, “Patterns of Recruitment and Mobility of Urban Cadres,” in John W. Lewis (ed.) The City in Communist China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1971), pp. 98–99; and Harding, Organizing China, pp. 34–37. 53 Kau, “Patterns of Recruitment and Mobility of Urban Cadres,” p. 103. 54 Ezra Vogel, Canton under Communism: Programs and Politics in a Provincial Capital, 1949–1968 (New York: Harper, 1969), p. 66. 55 Kau, “Patterns of Recruitment and Mobility of Urban Cadres,” p. 101; and Ezra Vogel, Canton under Communism, p. 59. 56 Kau, “Patterns of Recruitment and Mobility of Urban Cadres,” p. 102. 57 Harding, Organizing China, p. 47. 58 Harding reports 173,000 punished. 59 Kau, “Patterns of Recruitment and Mobility of Urban Cadres,” pp. 113–114. 60 Roderick MacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, Vol. 2: The Great Leap Forward 1958–1960 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983). 61 Ibid., p. 234. 62 Ibid., pp. 228–233. 63 Vogel, Canton under Communism, p. 247. 64 Cheng Li, China’s Leaders: the New Generation (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), pp. 128–129. 65 Ibid., p. 132. 66 Ibid., p. 129. 67 Ibid., p. 128. 68 Melanie Manion, Corruption by Design: Building Clean Government in Mainland China and Hong Kong (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), p. 88. 69 Ibid., p. 122. 70 Ibid., p. 124. 71 Ibid., Figure 3.1. 72 Angang Hu, Zhongguo: tiaozhan fubai (China: Fighting Against Corruption) (Hangzhou: Zhejiang renmin chubanshe, 2001); and Angang Hu in South China Morning Post, March 24, 2001. 73 Cheng Li, China’s Leaders, pp. 148, 149. 74 People’s Daily (Renmin ribao) January 17, 1996 (in FBIS-CHI-96-034 January 17, 1996). 75 People’s Daily (Renmin ribao) March 24, 1998 (in FBIS-CHI-98-097 April 7, 1998); China Daily in South China Morning Post September 22, 1998; New China News Agency (Xinhua) October 29, 1998 (in FBIS-CHI-98-310 November 6, 1998); Sing Tao Daily (Sing Tao Jih Pao) (Hong Kong) May 13, 1998 (in FBIS-CHI-98-133 May 13, 1998); Ming Pao (Hong Kong) October 28, 1998 (in FBIS-CHI-98-301 October 28, 1998); and Outlook (Liaowang) March 10, 1997 (in FBIS-CHI-97-071 March 10, 1997). 76 Wenhui bao (Hong Kong) August 1, 2000. 77 Xiao Zhong (ed.) Zhonggongde shenceng fubai (Deep Layered Corruption of the CCP) (Hong Kong: Xiafeier chuban youxian gongzi, 2003), pp. 406–413. On May 7, 1998 the central Organization Department set up a 24-hour hotline to

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87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99

John P. Burns receive information on corrupt personnel practices. From then until November 1998 nearly 1,000 informants called the hotline. See New China News Agency (Xinhua) October 29, 1998 (in FBIS-CHI-98-310 November 6, 1998). Xinhua, March 24, 1997 (in FBIS-CHI-97-083, March 24, 1997). Carol Lee Hamrin, “Social Dynamics and New Generation Politics,” in Finkelstein and Kivlehan (eds), China’s Leadership in the 21st Century, pp. 204– 222; David Shambaugh, “Remaining Relevant: the Challenges for the Party in Late-Leninist China,” in ibid., pp. 271–286; and Bruce Dickson, Red Capitalists in China: the Party, Private Entrepreneurs, and Prospects for Political Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). To be sure the transition from a charismatic leader to a technocratic leadership has had an impact on the relationships among these institutions and between them and the Central Committee. See Susan Shirk, The Political Logic of Reform in China (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993). James L. Perry and Lois R. Wise, “The Motivational Bases of Public Service,” in David H. Rosenbloom, Deborah D. Goldman, and Patricia W. Ingraham, Contemporary Public Administration (New York: McGraw Hill, 1994), pp. 251–261. Bruce Dickson, Red Capitalists in China. Zemin Jiang Speech delivered on the 80th Anniversary of the CCP, pp. 4–6. Guoguang Wu, “From the July 1 Speech to the Sixteenth Party Congress: Ideology, Party Construction and Leadership Transition,” in Finkelstein and Kivlehan (eds) China’s Leadership in the 21st Century, pp. 167–185. Bruce Dickson “Economics as the Central Task: do Entrepreneurs Matter?” in ibid., pp. 186–203; and Bruce Dickson, Red Capitalists in China. Shambaugh, “Remaining Relevant”; Shiping Zheng, Party vs. State in Post-1949 China: the Institutional Dilemma (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Gordon Chang, The Coming Collapse of China (New York: Random House, 2001); Minxin Pei, From Reform to Revolution: the Demise of Communism in China and the Soviet Union (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994); and Bruce Dickson, Red Capitalists in China. Samuel P. Huntington, “Social and Institutional Dynamics of One-Party Systems,” in Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore (eds) Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: the Dynamics of Established Party Systems (New York: Basic Books, 1970), pp. 3–47, at pp. 23–40. Ibid., p. 33. Dickson, Red Capitalists in China, pp. 157–167. Huntington, “Social and Institutional Dynamics of One-Party Systems,” p. 41. Ibid., pp. 26–32. Miller, “Institutions in Chinese Politics: Trends and Prospects.” Ibid., pp. 24–28. Cheng Li, China’s Leader, p. 129. Ching, Frank (2003) “Still Corrupt – But Not as Much,” South China Morning Post, December 3. China Daily, December 26, 2003. Ching, “Still Corrupt – But Not as Much,” and Jon S.T. Quah, Curing Corruption in Asia: a Comparative Study of Six Countries (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2003). Ching, “Still Corrupt – But Not as Much.” China Daily, December 26, 2003. See also China Daily, December 5, 11, and 23, 2003. Huntington, “Social and Institutional Dynamics of One-Party Systems,” p. 42.

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3

The People’s Liberation Army as a key interest group in Chinese party politics You Ji

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as a key interest group in Chinese politics is not a new topic in Western literature of China’s civil–military relations. Harding’s article in 1985 gave us a lot of insights in understanding how the military influenced the political process in China, especially how it interacted with the ruling Party – the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).1 Since then many new changes have taken place in China, as social transformation has greatly deepened. This has brought many new characteristics to the country’s civil–military relations. This chapter is an attempt to explore the new changes. It argues that the PLA remains as a decisive political force but its influence has been visibly institutionalised and exercised prudently. And its ties with other key interest groups have been increasingly regularised. Although with exceptions, the PLA has in the last 15 years largely functioned within the purview of a normal political process. In a way the changes in civil–military relations reflect the CCP’s effort to establish a rulership based on rational-legal principles for the sake of generating better predictability of governance.2 Now the PLA is facing a serious question of where it can position itself in Chinese reform politics. A status of pressure group within institutionalised political framework may be a right choice. It is even better if the PLA can serve as a positive external check-and-balance system to the Party. This chapter argues that the PLA is, indeed, moving in this direction. The implication on CCP/PLA relations will be profound.

Civil–military relationship beyond symbiosis For a long time the nature of CCP–PLA relations has been defined as symbiosis: the demise of one triggers the death of the other.3 Indeed, the military has saved the Party a number of times. Increasingly however, the word symbiosis can no longer adequately describe the relations between the CCP and the PLA. In the longer term and in times short of crisis the CCP’s survival is more dependent on economic development, effective administration of state affairs and forceful campaigns against corruption than on suppression of dissenting views through the gun. The military can

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sustain the CCP leadership but not the legitimacy upon which the Party’s ultimate fate is decided. Subjective control versus objective control In the place of symbiotic relations the CCP/PLA interaction is now more and more centred on interest sharing. Each of them benefits from the CCP’s monopoly of national power. Additionally these shared vested interests are supplemented by their shared national goal of making China socially stable, economically prosperous and militarily powerful. So far the CCP is the PLA’s best partner, granting it what it wants that no other political force can provide. This bondage of interdependence not only helps them stay together in the years ahead but also helps them work together under more clearly defined rules of the game. For instance, military modernisation is linked to the CCP’s effort to raise China’s international profile which, in turn, enhances the Party’s popularity with the people. Inevitably, building a more capable fighting force entails continued increase of military spending. This has resulted in the provision in the National Defence Law that the PLA’s budget should rise in keeping with the growth rate of GDP. At the same time the PLA accepts the Party’s priority of developing national economy, as it agrees to the CCP argument that military strength lies ultimately in the country’s comprehensive strength.4 PLA generals have repeatedly voiced support to Hu Jintao’s New Deal as the new national leader: setting economic development as his top priority. The post-symbiotic ties reflect the fact that the PLA is no longer the only dominant interest group in the country’s political system. Other groups of power now exist in parallel with the PLA in the government process. Now state administration wields enormous influence in running public affairs. Certainly in this diversified structure of power arrangement, the PLA is still the first among the equals in terms of political weight. Indeed, conflicts of interest do take place from time to time between the PLA and other power groups. The military’s pursuits are even sometimes at odds with the Party’s.5 For instance, the allocation of military budget has always been short of what the PLA requires. In the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping forced the PLA to exercise patience with, and tolerance of, the Party line of economics in command. This aroused general discontent in the armed forces.6 In fact, the changing nature of civil–military relations in post-Mao China is about how to manage these differences in interests. We have witnessed the alteration of ways of interaction between CCP and PLA leaders: from crude domination by Mao and Deng to the efforts of institutionalising Party/army ties by Jiang and Hu. In fact, institutionalisation itself amounts to official acknowledgement of legitimacy of interest groups in the country today. The Party’s recognition of diversified interests represented by different political and social organisations is a positive way of dealing with politics of pressure groups.

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On the other hand, the symbiotic relationship was a historical legacy. Revolutions and wars highlighted the need for the Party and army to be bound together. This relationship logically produced powerful leaders controlling both the Party and the military. This civil–military interaction is typical of the model of subjective control, defined by the military displaying its loyalty to one paramount leader, a specific government and a particular social class.7 Under subjective control the supreme leader imposes upon the military whatever his political decisions. And he developed a tendency of involving the military in elite interaction, using the gun to force civilian leaders to follow his impulse. Therefore, subjective control is exercised in the form of strongman control. On the part of the military, soldiers’ professional activities are oriented toward serving revolutionary goals, ideological preferences and national interests. As the military becomes politicised, generals would take it for granted to assume wide-ranging duties, from domestic politics to international pursuits. After a protracted period of subjective control the clear norms of civilian domination over the gun were greatly distorted to the point where the control became personal and spiritual.8 Post-Mao military modernisation has strongly promoted the course of professionalism in the PLA.9 The development of technology, the embrace of the revolution in military affairs (RMA) and the changing composition of PLA personnel have all contributed to an accelerated transition away from the symbiotic Party–army relationship. Gradually there has emerged a new trend of de-politicisation and de-ideologisation among the population from which the conscripts are drawn. Technocrats have begun to permeate the rank and file of the PLA and they invisibly compete with political commissars for influence. This makes it almost impossible for the CCP to extract absolute obedience from the soldiers. Gradually another theoretical model of civil–military relations, namely objective control, has begun to affect the PRC. This model enshrines professionalism as a primary value judgement in the armed forces and inhibits soldiers’ non-military ambitions. It also promotes an institutionalised process of civilian supremacy over the generals. This makes the military more a client of the state than a tool of a political leader.10 Many signs of this development can be detected in the post-Deng CCP–PLA relationship (to be specified later). The ultimate interests sought by the PLA as a key pressure group concern the improvement of its combat capabilities and corporate identity. The CCP naturally shares the former. A strong PLA serves the best interests of the CCP, as it can give party leaders more say in both international and domestic affairs. The latter interest, corporate identity, is of more concern to the CCP. With an irreplaceable function to perform, the military’s efforts to perfect professionalism, defined by ‘expertise, responsibility and corporateness’, differentiate it from other political organisations. Obviously a united military certainly contributes to the Party leadership in the country. Yet an exclusive corporate identity may shake the ‘absolute

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control’ of the Party over the gun when both sides fail to agree over certain key issues. Therefore, a balance needs to be struck. In a way a less politically oriented military can also be less interventionist. All political leaders in the world would like to have soldiers obsessed more with the high-tech ‘toys’ than with elusive political consciousness. In other words control over the gun through promoting professionalism is more reliable than through political indoctrination. However, as far as corporate identity is concerned, it can be a double-edged sword for the civil–military relations: when the Party and the PLA continue to share strategic interests, a united PLA would be a guarantee for continued CCP monopoly of national power. Yet a firm PLA corporate identity could become a problem when the two sides are not in agreement over fundamental political issues. Furthermore, a united PLA can also render it difficult for party leaders to resort to the Maoist divide-and-rule method of control. Sometimes, and over certain issues, this method is still useful and effective. Preventing PLA intervention through institutionalisation One defining feature of the symbiotic relationship is the PLA’s interventionist tendency in domestic politics, often in the name of protecting the leadership of the Party. This relationship has also given the PLA a right to get involved in inner Party politics. The intervention either takes the form of following the call from one paramount leader, or serves the purpose of protecting its vested interests. The special Party–army relations also provide easy access for the PLA to influence government process. It exercises leadership in setting national security agenda and plays an active role in other policy areas, such as budget allocation, foreign affairs and domestic development. The PLA’s prominence in the country’s political system is a source of concern to the all Party leaders before and now. Marshall Ye Jianying once said that ‘There is an inherent danger of the PLA getting rid of party leadership’, despite all the penetrating Party cells in the military.11 Imbalance of physical power between the two key institutions made it a necessity for strongman control to emerge. However, with the death of Mao and Deng this type of control is no longer possible. Weak civilian leaders, then, open the way for the military to exert itself in domestic politics. Formal institutions of civilian control in the PLA, such as the Party committee system and political commissar system, could become ineffective. As a result, the military can become a second power centre. Chinese history has repeatedly shown that whenever a second power centre emerges, social chaos sets in. Given the historical influence and current special status the prospects of the PLA intervening in inner party politics are somewhat inherent. The difference is that in the post-Mao era the PLA has been more prudent in using its unique influence than before. All depends on the nature of cases in hand.

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One telling example is the Yang Baibing affair in 1992. It is still an unanswered question whether Yang brothers had any Party authorisation to raise the slogan of Baojia huhang (protect the emperor and his imperial tour, meaning to protect Deng’s market design for China’s future economic model). Most likely the move was a CMC decision only, probably with Deng’s encouragement. To other party leaders such behaviour amounted to military intervention in an intra-party debate on China’s future economic models, a matter with which the PLA should not have got involved. The civilian leaders, such as Chen Yun, Jiang Zemin and Li Peng, had reason to be alert, especially when Deng also threatened to ‘change leaders’. Now there is little room for argument against Deng’s insistence on market reform. In 1992 his borrowing of military strength in order to pressure other party leaders was clearly a serious violation of party norms and disciplines. The incident further convinced Jiang that there was a practical need for him to stress ‘absolute control’ a few years later.12 Deng may also have become aware of the seriousness of the event in that the Yang brothers were in a process of forming a second power centre visà-vis Jiang utilising the support of the PLA. Chinese history is full of such instances. This realisation may have led to the dismissal of Yang Baibing from the CMC in 1997. Another example of PLA intervention in party politics was the role the PLA played in supporting Jiang to remain as command-in-chief after the 16th National Party Congress. The military may have gone to greater length than it should have because such a strategic question should be left to top party leadership to answer.13 The essence of post-Mao reform in the sphere of civil–military relations is to regulate the PLA’s political role, largely through efforts of institutionalisation. To the CCP the significance of institutionalisation is that it can help avoid the worst of Mao’s practice of using the gun to settle internal Party dispute. Yet at the same time institutionalisation on the rational/legal basis can help ease rising pressure for more substantial political reform from both within the Party and in society at large.14 The cumulated effect of institutionalisation points to one fact; that it is part of an unpronounced political reform program, or, put in another manner, it is the way for political reform in China that is gradually carried out from the periphery to the core of the political system.15 Reform along this line of institutionalisation became a matter of urgency on the death of Deng, which marked the end of the revolution era. For the first time in many years, a situation had arisen where the new and weak civilian commander-in-chief had to deal with a powerful PLA as an institution. The danger of a power vacuum loomed large, highlighting the need to establish new safeguards in the Party’s control mechanism over the gun. Thus strengthening civilian authorities vis-à-vis the PLA has become a precondition for maintaining political stability in China, as proved by the Yang Baibing incident. However, since the new leader is never able to possess the same amount of personal grip over the military as the strongmen

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could, he has to rely on more existing institutions of control to make up for his weakness vis-à-vis the armed forces. Institutionalisation of CCP/ PLA interaction has become an unavoidable step in the process of his consolidation of power. To this end the post-Deng leadership has tried to establish a balance of external control and the PLA’s administrative autonomy. In terms of control the Party has emphasised the three institutional measures with which the Party interacts with the PLA, the commissar system, the Party committee system and the political affairs work system.16 Additionally, the officer appointment procedures are being strengthened. For instance, the appointees have to pass tests on the three-represents, several rounds of secret surveys conducted by personnel department from their superior units and tough interviews. Political loyalty is one key item for evaluation. In the meantime the Party makes sure that the PLA’s special political status in society is retained and its voice on most important political issues well respected. The intended outcome is that the PLA would have little incentive and need to form any independent power centre when its privileged position is guaranteed. Gradually this helps the PLA to adjust to the transformed relationship of symbiosis with the Party.

Party control versus military autonomy An institutionalised civil–military relationship can be achieved only when the civilians and the generals strike a balance between effective civilian control and sufficient military autonomy. Without the former, the military as the most powerful interest group in the political system may be tempted to maximise its gains at the expense of others. Without the latter, civilian control can be intrusive and the bilateral relations become unstable. Only when the military has enough autonomy, will it qualify to be a major interest group in China’s political structure and become less interventionist in inner party politics. In the post-Deng era the effort to promote military autonomy, especially in the area of its daily management, has been a focus of institutionalisation of civil–military relations. In other words a level of autonomy is the precondition for the PLA to move out of the relationship of symbiosis with the Party. A level of military autonomy has existed all along. Thanks to unparalleled power of the PLA top command – the Central Military Commission (CMC) – the military has achieved a relatively independent status vis-àvis the centre of state power. In the Party’s hierarchical chain, it is under the Politburo: in fact, the CMC largely operates outside the former’s reach.17 This has been a long tradition that can be traced back to the practice of Mao who deliberately separated the party/state system and the military system under the formula of ‘zhengzhiju yizheng, junwei yijun’, namely, the Politburo’s realm is state affairs and the CMC’s is military affairs. Deng even enhanced this tradition. In 1982, at his suggestion, the

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PRC Constitution stipulated that the CMC exercises the ultimate power of commanding the country’s armed forces. Indeed, the CMC reported its affairs only to Mao and Deng for the entire period of the PRC up to 1989, while the Politburo seldom made decisions for the CMC.18 That the CMC wields power with a high level of autonomy can disrupt the unified chain of command of the Party. During the period of strongman control, this did not represent a serious problem because Mao and Deng were able to control both the CMC and the Party centre at will. The question of how the post-Deng Party leadership could conduct firm control over the CMC became a matter of great significance and posed a significant challenge to the third generation Party leaders. Consequently, the Party may have come to a conclusion that it had no other choice but to give the new civilian leader the same level of authority as his predecessors and institutionalise the authority so that the CCP’s control over the PLA would not have weak zones. This has proved to be the most important weapon for Jiang to consolidate his power.19 Under Jiang’s leadership the CMC operates as a collective body of power. The areas of responsibilities are defined more clearly for its members. Each has specific duties and does his job with a level of autonomy but all the major decisions have to be channelled through the CMC. This way each CMC member is made answerable to the CMC collectively and ultimately to its chair. The Commission’s daily work and policy formulation have become more regularised in weekly and monthly meetings. Once any major decision is made, it would keep the Politburo informed. This has basically changed the old way of power exercise by Mao and Deng. If they wanted something to be done, they would personally entrust it to one or a few CMC members, who later reported the outcome back to them. This often circumvented the CMC formal meetings and, needless to say, the formal procedures of the Politburo. The enormous power of the CMC chair left over by Mao and Deng is maintained. This power can be of a highly personal nature, blurring what is the institutional base of the post and what is the personal authority. Jiang has taken advantage of this tradition, namely, the power of the CMC is built upon the power of its chair. He has enhanced institutional linkage between the Party and PLA leadership. A CMC chair is, first of all, the legitimate Party and national leader, holding paramount positions of the Party and the state. This is the chief reason why people are criticising Jiang’s retention of CMC chair as undermining the Constitutional foundation of the post.20 The combination of Party leadership and military leadership greatly strengthens the power of the Party boss, as he can use either one to have his way with the other. Enhancing the authorities of the CMC chair in the name of Party leadership is a crucial measure of making the CMC answerable to the Party. It brings the strength of Party organisation behind the civilian commander-in-chief vis-à-vis the military. On the other hand, this combination has also served as an institutional bridge

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for the PLA to influence the government, in the form of the CMC chair representing its interests. The combination of institutional power and personal authority highlights China’s political culture, which ultimately endorses one’s institutional authority on the basis of his personal power. A paramount leader has to have a large personal following in order to substantiate his institutional power. This is especially true with regard to China’s civil–military relations. Jiang’s institutional status vis-à-vis the PLA was particularly weak due to his total lack of military experience. Therefore, his need to build a personal power base was even greater. What Jiang has done is to work out a good sequence in the process of building both powers, namely, enhancing institutional power first in order to pave the way for the construction of the second. This was easier said than done, as it required a lot of patience and coalition-building skills. The CMC implements a one-man leadership system. Under this system the CMC chair has the ultimate power to make key decisions. All other CMC members assume only an advisory role in a critical situation, such as the Tiananmen confrontation in 1989.21 This system sharply contrasts to the Politburo’s organisational principle of collective leadership based on one person, one vote. This command responsibility system grants the civilian CMC chair unchallenged personal power of appointing top brass, controlling troop deployment, the nuclear buttons and budget allocation. For instance, promotion of all senior officers above the divisional level is not valid until the document is signed by CMC chair.22 For instance, the Party’s regulation of troop movement is very strict. Without the seal of the CMC chair, any transfer of units at certain levels can be blocked by the departments of logistics, military transportation, and local government, making any attempt at a coup virtually impossible.23 These institutional mechanisms have been reinforced under Jiang so that the CMC chair was able to build his personal authority and from there recruit his own following. This is one reason to predict that Hu Jintao will benefit from this CMC leadership principle and consolidate his personal authority in a gradual way like Jiang before him. Mao’s formula zhengzhiju yizheng, junwei yijun has been conducive to creating an institutional barrier to prevent civilian Politburo members from involving themselves in military affairs. One factor causing intensified factional strife in the Mao era were the natural ties between civilian and military leaders. Politicians were soldiers at the same time. When Mao tended to use the PLA to purge his so-called opponents in the Party, these soldiers-turned-politicians also used their previous ties with the military for self-protection. Consequently, when the PLA was involved in politics, politics entered the military, causing great harm to civil–military relations. Now the situation has changed completely. No professional soldiers have any experience of revolution and thus they have no personal connection with top leaders in the civilian circles. This fact undercuts almost all personnel channels for interventionist behaviour from both sides.

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This makes it easier for institutional safeguards to be put in place to stop civilian and military leaders involving themselves in areas not their responsibility. While civilian Politburo members still have access to key military decisions in the forum of the Politburo where these decisions are formally approved, it is the PLA that takes the policy initiatives and controls the direction of the debate. The Politburo’s principle of collective leadership prohibits behind-the-scene policy coalition between civilian and military leaders. There is a stricter division of power in relation to policy formulation concerning civil and military matters. On issues of national security that involve both, the Politburo is the locus of decision-making most likely based on PLA proposals. Key PLA leaders participate in these meetings and exchange views with representatives from the State Council. Prior to the meeting the PLA and relevant government departments have engaged in extensive consultation in order to remove policy disagreement. This way the PLA as a key interest group exercises its leadership over national defence affairs and exerts influence on foreign policy and the national security decision-making process. This represents clear progress in institutionalisation of politics in China’s polity. Collective leadership in the Politburo can be an abstract concept when applied to control the gun because most of the Politburo members do not have personal responsibilities over the military. For the reasons mentioned above, they are reluctant to be drawn into military affairs guarded jealously by Jiang. It would be a foregone conclusion that most military policy proposals submitted to the Politburo would be approved automatically because these policies are already cleared by the CMC with the green light given by the Party’s general secretary. This paves the way for the CMC to exercise administrative power in a highly autonomous manner. This autonomy is best reflected by the PLA’s slogan of obeying orders from the Party centre (the Central Committee, CC) and the CMC with no questions asked. In their minds the CC and CMC are parallel bodies of power, while in the Party Charter, the CC is above the CMC. And to soldiers the CC is an empty idea, while the CMC is where the real and highest authority comes from.24 Paradoxically, Jiang’s style of leadership has also consolidated the autonomous status of the PLA vis-à-vis the Party and the state. Jiang is weak as an individual civilian leader in dealing with the military when he excludes his civilian colleagues from the leadership. In the Jiang era a few distinctive characteristics have become discernible in civil–military relations. The first is about a give-and-take relationship. More concretely, this relationship requires the CCP, especially its top leader, to provide enough political clout and financial inputs for the PLA in exchange for the PLA’s full support to its overall policy orientation. Put in other words, the PLA willingly accepts the Party’s ‘absolute control’ if this control also provides protection of its best interests. This is the clear sign of the PLA exercising its influence as a key interest group but abiding by the rules of the bilateral relationship based on shared interests.

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The second is about consultative relationship. The Party’s command of the gun has been gradually placed on a consultative basis of mutual benefits. The post-Deng civilian leaders take seriously consulting the PLA in making all major decisions. For instance, Jiang’s determination to launch an intensified anti-Falungong campaign in 1999 was heavily based on the PLA’s firm support, which not only guaranteed effective suppression of the sect but also suppression of opposition from the ruling elite.25 Jiang informally solicits the opinions of his CMC colleagues over the appointments of senior government leaders (i.e. members of the Politburo and deputy premiers). When he conducts inspection tours, he also asks regional military commanders about their assessment of civilian leaders in their localities. This coordination of views with the PLA is crucial to his consideration of the personnel to hold key civilian positions. Certainly, the appointments are made on formal channels, and especially need clearance of the Politburo. But since the military lends its support prior to the discussion at the apex of power, the Party boss would be confident in getting his decisions approved by the Politburo. Thus, the military’s voice is indirectly heard in the process of making key government appointments.26 This consultative relationship gives the PLA an important say in the matters it regards as crucial to its interests. Key decisions are reached through a process of consensus-building between civilian and military leaders. In contrast to Mao and Deng who could suppress policy differences from generals, Jiang has always tried to avoid them. If this is not possible, compromise from both sides is the name of the game.27 Logically, postJiang leaders will continue this consultative relationship in order to maintain the current civil/military relations of mutual benefits. The PLA extends its willing support to the top leader because the latter is serious about military modernisation. This common interest makes it easier for the Party and the PLA to work out a division of labour in the decision-making process concerning party/military interaction: a clearly defined line between what should be reported to the Politburo for approval and what should be decided by itself. The latter is about a set of norms respected by the Party regarding the internal management of the armed forces. These cover a wide scope of responsibilities, including the procedures of promotion, transfer and punishment of senior officers, allocation of military budget to the Services, research of the new weapons systems, review of defence strategies, salary and social welfare matters and so on. The PLA’s legal and disciplinary authorities assume total independence in handling its own criminal and other related cases. What is worth mentioning is that although Jiang appoints top brass, the candidates are collectively chosen first by professional soldiers in the CMC. The appointees are grateful to Jiang who picks them from a list of multiple choices. However, they probably owe more to their military superiors. On the other hand, this increased autonomy in managing its own affairs has presented the PLA a decreased need and will to become involved in

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civilian politics. The lesson of the Yang Baibing affair has clearly been learned by both sides.28 The Party and PLA leaders have agreed to a code of conduct governing their interactions. And the codified rules are sanctioned by a new culture in civil–military relations, which has created a deeply rooted taboo in the minds of both civilian and military leaders not to rock the boat. Party and PLA disciplines have also made it clear that breaching the rules will be punished. The first 16th Politburo study session, presided over by Hu, reiterated the procedures and regulations of the Politburo. This shows how serious the top leadership has been in observing institutionalised political interactions at the apex of power.29 Indeed, over the last two decades there have been no signs of civilian leaders trying to penetrate the military in their own pursuit of power, or vice versa. The institutional barriers have greatly reduced the possibility of serious factional strife within the military and between party and PLA leaders. This has contributed enormously to leadership stability in the Jiang era. The effort to reinforce institutional division of labour between civilians and generals has also significantly enhanced the position of the CMC chair because, with other civilian leaders insulated from military affairs, he is the only person to bridge the two headquarters as Party boss and commander-in-chief. This ensures that disputes between civilian and military leaders will not intensify and get out of control. Despite many institutionalisation efforts, the PLA retains its influence as the key arbiter in times of social and political crisis, which would dictate a different set of game rules. Even for matters short of crisis proportions the PLA’s opinion has to be sought before a major political decision is made because smooth implementation of the decision depends on the PLA’s full cooperation. The PLA’s position is also decisive in the current transfer of power to the Fourth generation leadership. This means that, while the civilians’ penetration into military affairs is institutionally obstructed, there is less guarantee of preventing the PLA from involving itself in party politics, largely in the form of accepting invitations from Party leaders. If the Politburo exerts minimum control over the CMC, the PLA’s non-interventionist impulse is not entirely regulated through institutional safeguards. Much still depends on its self-constraints. More fundamentally, this dichotomy reveals an important institutional confusion in Party/army relations that has been long overlooked by outside observers. In fact, Party leadership over the military is now officially positioned in the form of political leadership.30 To PLA officers this leadership takes the form of ideological influence, policy guidance and the appointment of the commander-in-chief. In fact, political leadership serves as the foundation of professional autonomy for the PLA. At the core of the issue is that this type of leadership hollows out the slogan of the Party’s absolute control over the gun. Institutionally, political leadership and absolute control differ in that the former is largely an abstract concept or a value judgement while the latter is about detailed control based on organisational

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penetration. So far there has not been any concrete mechanism for this organisational penetration. Contrary to the conventional assumption that the political commissar system serves as the Party’s control function in the military, they actually regard themselves first of all as professional soldiers. And a large proportion of them have been chosen from commanders.31 The outcome is increasing PLA corporate identity, leading to the consolidation of the PLA as a meaningful interest group that exerts its influence in its own way.

The PLA’s influence on the succession The PLA’s influence on the succession arrangement is the best example to testify to its function as a pressure group in Chinese politics. Succession is a major problem in the PRC because it involves a difficult issue of power redistribution among top leaders. And periodic transfer of power means that the problem cannot be shelved, forcing everyone at the apex of power to choose where to stand. The PLA is no exception. The PLA’s contribution to the succession process There is an initial period of uneasiness in the relations between civilian leadership and the PLA after the incumbent leader departs. Generally speaking, the new Party leader’s consolidation parallels his dependence on the PLA to establish his power, especially in the first years of succession. In Jiang’s case he came to command the PLA on behalf of the civilian leadership. He ended up as a good representative of military interests in the Politburo. This mutual need from both sides broadens the room for consultation and cooperation between the PLA and its civilian commanderin-chief and contributes to political stability in the country. The influence of the PLA as an interest group is strongly felt but in an indirect way. The outcome is a rising curve in relation to the power of the Party leader vis-à-vis the PLA. His control of the gun is weakest at the beginning of succession but after a period of consolidation he will improve his command of the military through his increased authority in the Party and his enlarged personal network in the PLA. Likewise, the power curve of the military vis-à-vis the Party leader will decline. After all, the Chinese political system allows only one power centre. At some point of time equilibrium will be reached. As the 16th Congress confirmed Hu as the leader, the power curve for Hu would likely go through a full circle, similar to what Jiang experienced in the early 1990s. Also like Jiang, Hu needs to wait for some time until Jiang finally gives up his CMC chair, probably some time in 2004/2005. Yet it is very likely that Hu can consolidate his power base more rapidly than Jiang could after 1989. One key reason is that Hu, unlike Jiang, will

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not need to deal with Party elders who have had distinguished military careers and maintained close ties with their former military subordinates after their retirements. The Party and PLA leaders with whom Hu has to work are of his generation. And the fact that Hu faces fewer real challengers in the Politburo than Jiang did in the early 1990s will also help him in establishing authority with the PLA.32 This optimism is due to the depth of institutionalised interaction between the Party and the PLA in the whole process of candidate selection and final accession to power. Protracted and wide-ranging consultation between the two sides has reduced controversies to a minimum level. The key to a successful succession arrangement is that no powerful interest group, including the PLA, enjoys a veto power to a Politburo’s collective choice once the decision is made. Their influence is basically exerted in the early stages of successor-nomination. After the next national leader is decided upon, their support is well anticipated and this helps to clear many uncertainties associated with this difficult process. The role of the PLA in this process is very important because the next national leader is also the commander-in-chief. It may not have the final say on the selection of the leader but its acceptance of him has tremendous impact on the transfer of power. One revealing example is the PLA’s growing resistance to Deng’s early choices of his successors: Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang.33 And their final support to Jiang in the middle of the 1990s paved the way for Jiang’s eventual consolidation of power. The PLA’s stake in the succession The PLA has a major stake in a smooth succession in that fragmented Party leadership caused by any succession stalemate will definitely affect the unity of the top command. When the Party’s faction politics enters the military, the military cannot avoid factional infighting within its ranks. This hurts the PLA’s corporate identity and spirit. The current effort to professionalise the armed forces will also be undermined. What does the PLA really want from the successor? Specifically, the PLA expects the successor to abide by the principle of ‘reign without overt rule’, set under Jiang. This is about a fine division of power between civilian commanderin-chief and the top brass. The former is responsible for deciding on the strategic policies. And these policies are basically proposed by the military. Therefore, the role of the CMC chair is largely directional leadership. Moreover, the new leader has to respect the tradition and norms of the PLA. The most concrete form of the norms is to let officers run their own business, ranging from appointment of senior officers to a certain level, maintenance of internal discipline, allocation of budget between different Services and PLA representation in the Party’s central bodies. Fundamentally, this principle dictates that the civilian leadership should respect the

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professional decisions reached by the top command. Certainly this ‘reign without overt rule’ does not mean ‘hands-off’ on the part of the civilian leader. For instance, he retains the final say on the promotion of candidates. The directional leadership can be concrete over some strategic issues. For instance, Jiang has pressured the PLA hard to deepen structural and doctrinal reforms. He made it clear that his remaining mission is to make RMA theory the guiding principle for PLA modernisation in the new century. He almost single-handedly re-set its goal for the country’s national defence from seeking mechanisation to diffusing hardware modernisation and informatisation (xinxihua).34 Moreover, the PLA will want to see the new leader fully committed to its modernisation. It wants to see continued growth of military spending, protection of military interests when involved in disputes with government at various levels and support for the PLA effort to raise preparedness against any possible crisis. Finally, the PLA will want to see the new leader take a suitably strong stance on foreign policy, especially in the areas of safeguarding China’s national security interests and territorial sovereignty.35 So far, uncertainties associated with political succession have not disrupted the execution of the plan of transfer of power since the 16th Congress. This is to state that the departure of old leaders and inclusion of new leaders have not caused any dislocation in the political system. With Jiang still chairing the CMC the succession is not yet complete. However, this round of succession has been the most peaceful and smooth in the CCP’s history. One reason for this is that the representation of the PLA at the apex of power is well secured, with at least two Politburo members, one General Secretariat member and about 20 percent of CC membership. Therefore, the PLA can afford to sit back, watching top Party leaders coordinate the transfer of power. Its engagement takes the form of stating its preferences when consulted by civilian leaders. This serves the interest of the military well because it does not see any advantage in its crude intrusion into this matter. On the other hand, however, the PLA’s role in succession is quite significant, most vividly reflected by its support for Jiang to retain the post of CMC chair after the 16th Party Congress. In a way this could be another major intervention in domestic politics since Yang Baibing. Long before the transfer of power began, some senior military officers had already openly stated that Jiang should not relinquish all his Party, state and military offices.36 Invisible military pressure was mounting as the Congress date drew near. It is well known that it was Hu who insisted that Jiang should not go. Yet what is not clear is why Jiang was able to resist the majority view in the Party and society at large that he should not follow Deng’s suit. Obviously the support of the PLA was a key factor for the arrangement. In a way this is against the CCP’s effort of institutionalisation of elite politics.

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Concluding remarks The PLA has entered a profound transition since the beginning of the 1990s. This transition can be seen from two spontaneous trends of development in the PLA: moving away from its traditional role as an ideology-based revolutionary army, and modernising itself into a high-tech force. Each of these dictates changes in the relations between the Party, the government and the armed forces. In a way it is not so easy to handle the consequences of the changes, as these involve a complicated process of re-distribution of power, benefits and prestige. For example, as the nature of the relationship between the CCP and the PLA has changed from one of symbiosis to one based on shared interests, a new pattern of interaction has emerged to the degree that both sides have to learn how to cooperate in a new reality. The challenge to both parties is that, although they share many fundamental interests and basic national goals, the PLA has its independent interests which are not always in agreement with those of the Party. This gives the PLA a legitimate cause for lobbying for its best interests. The way it has done so has exerted, and will continue to exert, a profound impact on CCP/PLA relations. Institutionalisation of the bilateral relations means to establish rules of interaction to avoid any uncontrollable strife between them. This new rational–legal trend is a very important progress in China’s political and military reforms. At the moment with the passing of the first, second and third generations of party and military leaders, and with the PLA’s vital interests well taken care of, the scope of military intervention in party politics has been largely reduced. Yet over fundamental political issues, such as the succession arrangement, the PLA still reserves an important say. Therefore, a professional military is not necessarily a non-interventionist military, given the tradition and enormous power of the PLA in the country’s political process. The PLA is now exerting influence mostly in an indirect manner and through a set of institutional, personal and legal channels. The evolving institution-building allows the PLA to gain more room for autonomy. Through institutional representatives in the person of the CMC chair, the PLA’s vital interests are represented at all key Party and government offices, and the PLA is consulted over all major policies. Generally the PLA lends its support to the civilian leaders and this creates conditions for favours in return, i.e., an enlarged budget and access to precious resources. The PLA’s role in political succession is particularly crucial because holding the post of commander-in-chief guarantees that the Party leader can run state affairs smoothly. In short a relationship of giveand-take has emerged in the interaction between the civilian leadership and the PLA. This is about a balance between giving the PLA due authority and retaining Party control through a set of institutional mechanisms. In the short to medium term this give-and-take relationship will continue to influence China’s civil–military relations. The factors constraining the

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PLA’s interference in intra-party politics do not give the military a veto power in domestic political development but its position on key issues will be fully respected. At times and in some policy areas its position may prove to be decisive. On the other hand, it can be predicted that the civilian control over the military will remain firm in the foreseeable future.

Notes 1 Harry Harding, ‘The PLA as a Political Interest Group’, in Victor Falkenheim (ed.), Chinese Politics from Mao to Deng (New York: Paragon House, 1987), pp. 213–214. 2 David Lampton (ed.), The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001). 3 David Shambaugh, Modernising China’s Military: Progress, Problems and Prospects (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003). 4 Liu Chunzhi, ‘Sunzi de guofangguan jiqi dui dangdai de qishi’ (Sunzi’s National Defence Outlook and its Inspiration to Our Times), Journal of PLA National Defense University, No. 9 (1999), p. 50. 5 Ellis Joffe, ‘The PLA and the succession problem’, in Richard Yang (ed.), China’s Military: the PLA in 1992/1993 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 149–160. 6 For instance, Qian Diqian, ‘Production Must Serve Military Training’, Junshi jingjixue (Military Economics), No. 2 (1989), p. 21. Qian was formerly vicepresident of the PLA National Defence University. Some generals also expressed discontent about the fact that Deng had promoted his Second Field Army followers to key commanding posts in the PLA. 7 Samuel Huntington, ‘Civilian Control of the Military: a Theoretical Statement’, in Heinz Eulau, Samuel Eldersveld and Morris Janowitz (eds), Political Behaviour: A Reader in Theory and Research (Illinois: Free Press, 1956). 8 Mao unilaterally used the PLA to launch the Cultural Revolution, causing the military to become politicised and fragmented. Deng was also a master of personal control of the PLA, as he deemed that military backing was needed to initiate controversial reforms. 9 You Ji, ‘China: from a Tool of Revolution to a Professional Military’, in Muthiah Apalagapa (ed.), The Professionalism of Asian Armed Forces, (Honolulu, HI: East-West Centre Press, 2001). 10 Samuel Huntington, Soldiers and the State (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957) and Samnel Finer, The Man on Horseback: the Role of the Military in Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988). 11 Writing group, Biography of Marshall Ye Jianying (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1995), p. 670. 12 You Ji, ‘Jiang Zemin: in Struggle for the post-Deng Supremacy’, in Maurice Brosseau and Suzanne Pepper (eds), China Review 1996 (Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 1996). 13 You Ji, ‘China’s New Top Command and PLA Professionalism’, CAPS Papers, No. 37, (Taipei, Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies, 2004). 14 See for instance, Stephanie Balme, ‘China under Jiang Zemin: Legal and Institutional Changes as (or without) Political Reform?’ in Francois Godement (ed.), China’s New Politics (Centre Asie, Institut français des relations internationales, 2003). 15 One example is China’s reform in state firms. It shows how political institutions at the grassroots were fundamentally reformed without a visible political reform

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16 17 18 19 20 21

22 23

24 25 26 27

28 29 30 31

programme. See You Ji, China’s Enterprise Reform: Changing State/Society Relations after Mao (London: Routledge, 1998). Qian Haihao, Jundui zuzhi bianzhixue (The Study of Military Organisation and Structure) (Beijing: PLA Academy of Military Science Press, 2001), chapter 9. Wang Faan and Wang Gaoji, Deng Xioaping jundui zhidu jianshe sixiang yanjiu (Research on Deng’s Ideas Concerning the Systematic Institutionalisation of the PLA), (Beijing: PLA Academy of Military Science Press, 1995), p.68. For the post-Mao period, see Doak Barnett, Modernising China: Post-Mao Reform and Development (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984). You Ji, ‘The Supreme Leader and the Military’, in Jonanthan Unger (ed.), The Nature of Chinese Politics: from Mao and Deng (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), pp. 274–296. Among other reports, see David Shambaugh’s paper to the CPAS/RAND PLA conference in Taipei, 12 November 2002. Yang Shangkun gave the best interpretation of this when he addressed the senior commanders of the PLA on the evening of martial law declaration in Beijing on 20 May 1989. In the speech Yang played down the role of Zhao Ziyang as first deputy chair of the CMC. He said the CMC implemented a commander responsibility system where the final decision was in the hand of the chair (Deng), while all other CMC members were simply Deng’s advisers. There was no room for any argument, not to mention opposition. This requirement is incorporated in ‘The PLA Regulations of the Service of Active Officers’, promulgated by the CMC on 5 September 1988. Li Xuefeng, ‘Xianwei renzhi de wenge fadong neiqing’ (Insider’s Information about How the Cultural Revolution was Launched), in Xiao Ke, Li Rui and Gong Yuzhi (eds), Woqinli guode zhengzhiyun dong (The Political Movements that I Experienced) (Beijing: Zhongyang Bianyi Chubanshe, 1998), p. 317. Although Li alludes to a case of three decades ago, the situation remains the same today. This is the unanimous view expressed by all PLA officers that I have talked to in the last decade. See a series of papers published by PLA officers condemning Falungong in Journal of PLA National Defense University, No. 9 (1999). Sources close to the Party headquarters. Jiang expressed his worry on several occasions that the PLA had been slow in translating the RMA into military reform and forcing modernisation. In the 1999 CMC conference he pointed out that many problems in the PLA could be attributed to its obsolete policy-making structure and environment that were left behind by the progress of social and economic change brought about by the market reform. Yu Jianwen, ‘Chongfen renshi xinlishi tiaojianxia jundui zhengzhi gongzuo gaige de zhuyao renwu’ (Give Full Emphasis to the Major Task of Political Work in the PLA Under the New Historical Conditions), The Journal of PLA National Defense University, No. 9 (2000), p. 34. In practice, however, he could not do too much to push for the accelerated transformation. The impression obtained from interviews with PLA officers. Xinhua News Agency, 7 December 2002. Kang Shijian, Zhongguo renmin jiafanjun dangweizhi (The Party Committee System in the PLA) (Beijing: PLA National Defence University, 1995), p. 31. For instance, in a group army in Jinan Military Region, over half of political affairs staff at the regiment level were transferred from military posts. Research office of the Political Affairs Department of the Jinan military Region, ‘Dui tigao zhengzhi guanbu wenhua keji suzhi de sikao’ (Some Thoughts on Raising Cultural and Technological Quality of Political-Affairs Staff), The Journal of PLA National Defence University, No. 1 (2000), p. 60.

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32 You Ji, ‘Profile: the Heir Apparent’, China Journal, Vol. 49 (July 2002), pp. 125–139. 33 James Mulvenon, ‘China: Conditional Compliance’, in Muthiah Alagappa, Coercion and Governance: the Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 324. 34 Interview with Major General Wang Baotong, Program of National Defence, China Central Radio, 1 August 2003. 35 Talk with senior researchers from China Institute for International Strategic Studies, in Sydney on 24 July 2003. 36 There were rumours in Beijing that the military wished Jiang to continue to occupy the CMC chair for some time beyond the 16th Congress in 2002, on the grounds that the current domestic and international situation is too tough for a newcomer to handle. This was the view expressed by Zhu Chenghu, deputy director of the Institute for Strategic Studies of the PLA National Defence University in his speech to the Beijing Institute of Contemporary International Relations on 15 October 1999.

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4

The Party and the law Zou Keyuan

Introduction The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the ruling party in China. The CCP was first founded in 1921 based on the Marxist and Leninist ideology. After having experienced several decades of armed struggle against the Nationalist Government led by the Kuomintang, the CCP has controlled the whole country except Taiwan since 1949 in the name of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). After the founding of the PRC, the CCP began to establish its own legal system and judicial system for consolidating and maintaining its rule in the country. The first step was to abolish the laws left over by the previous regime. The Common Program of September 1949 provides that “all laws, decrees and judicial systems of the Kuomintang reactionary government that oppress the people shall be abolished. Laws and decrees protecting the people shall be enacted and the people’s judicial system shall be established.”1 Even before that, in February 1949, the CCP issued the “Instructions for Abolishing the Kuomintang’s Book of Six Laws2 and Determining Judicial Principles for Liberated Areas” which ceased the effect of all existing laws enacted by the former Nationalist government and, more remarkably, the Instructions requests courts to have regard to Party policies and other programs in determining cases pending the enactment of new laws.3 The rationale behind this is that law developed under a bourgeois system could not be inherited by a socialist system according to the Marxist theory. However, as is pointed out, the CCP’s practice of abolishing all existing laws was the first, and most likely the only, example among all the communist parties in the world.4 With the adoption of its first Constitution in 1954, the socialist legal system was initially established. However, the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) was a political and social catastrophe which, in fact, destroyed the not yet fully fledged legal system, since one of the aims of the Cultural Revolution was to smash the structures of public security, procuratorate and courts. Thus, after this catastrophe the post-Mao communist leaders realized that it was an urgent matter to rebuild the legal system as a necessary means to restore and maintain social order and safeguard the economic

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reform. The Communiqué of the 3rd Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP held in December 1978 set the goals of the legal construction and re-establishment of the legal system in China. It stated that: to safeguard people’s democracy, it is imperative to strengthen the socialist legal system so that democracy is systematised and written into law in such a way as to ensure the stability, continuity, and full authority of this democratic system and these laws; there must be laws for people to follow, these laws must be observed, their enforcement must be strict, and law breakers must be dealt with (youfakeyi, youfabiyi, zhifabiyan, weifabijiu). From now on, legislative work should have an important place on the agenda of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and its Standing Committee. Procuratorial and judicial organisations must maintain their independence as is appropriate; they must faithfully abide by the laws, rules, and regulations, serve the people’s interests, and keep to the facts; they must guarantee the equality of all people before the people’s laws and deny anyone the privilege of being above the law.5 Since then these statements have become the guidelines for the legal reform in the PRC. On the other hand, the Plenary Session also decided to establish the Party Disciplinary Inspection Committee composed of 100 persons led by Chen Yun to strengthen the Party construction. The CCP is not merely a party in the traditional sense. It controls every aspect of society and social life through its organizational cells, from the top to the grassroots. The influence of the Party in society is immense and its role critical. Since law is used to govern social life, it is inevitable to be influenced, or more precisely directed by the Party. As it is opined, no consideration of law in China would be complete without considering the relationship between the CCP and the state and legal system.6 Since the post-Mao era, there has been an open-ended debate on which is superior, the Party or the law (dang da haishi fa da) in the Chinese society. This chapter attempts to expound and assess the relationship between the Party and the law by looking into several key areas where the CCP and the law interplay and/or are intertwined.

The Party Constitution vs. the state Constitution It is hard to imagine that there is a close relationship between the Party Constitution and the state Constitution. The state Constitution does not say to what extent the CCP should play a role in constitutional changes. However, due to the one-party rule in China which is usually defined as a party-state,7 the Party directs the adoption of the state Constitution and subsequent changes, and tries to bring the state Constitution into harmony with the Party Constitution in reality.

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The current state Constitution was adopted in 1982. Its fundamental purpose was to incorporate the new policies of economic reform and openness into the Constitution so as to make such policies stable and continuous by legal form. It emphasizes the construction of socialist modernization as a fundamental national task. Some articles were new for the protection of foreign investment and recognition of individual economy as a complementary to the national economy.8 On September 10, 1980, the 3rd Session of the 5th NPC accepted the CCP’s suggestion and established the Committee of the Constitution Revision. The Party document The Resolution of the CCP on Certain Historical Issues since the Founding of PRC, approved in the 6th Plenary Session of the 11th Party Congress in June 1981, and the documents resulting from the 12th National Congress of the CCP in 1982 formed the basis for the new state Constitution.9 The 1982 Constitution inherited and developed the basic principles embodied in the 1954 Constitution. The provision that “all citizens are equal before the law” in the 1954 Constitution has been restored.10 The expression “people’s democratic dictatorship” replaced the previous one of “proletarian dictatorship.” Since Deng Xiaoping played a role in the adoption of the 1982 Constitution, this Constitution can also be labeled as the “Deng Xiaoping Constitution.”11 For example, due to his insistence, the “four fundamental principles” were copied into the 1982 Constitution.12 After 1982 only amendments took place in the constitutional changes because personal shifts in the Party do not affect greatly the general policy of the Party and the basic line is always there. So far there have been three amendments. The 1988 amendment was to legitimize the private economy which had been emerging in China’s overall economic developments, and to provide a constitutional basis for commercial transfer of land use rights.13 In March 1993 the NPC made a further and significant amendment to the Constitution by endorsing the term “socialist market economy” to replace the old term “planned economy” and the term “state-owned economy” or “enterprises” to replace the term “state-run economy” or “enterprises.” Politically, the wording “in accordance with the theory of constructing the socialism with Chinese characteristics” was also added to the Constitution. The 1999 Amendment put into the legal form some important aspects of political and economic life which had been practiced for years. Three main aspects include establishing Deng Xiaoping’s theory as the national ideology, providing different forms of non-state ownership under constitutional protection, and setting forth “the rule of law” as the highest priority of the country’s political development. In addition, the original statement “China is at a primary stage of socialism” in the Preamble of the Constitution is changed to “China will be at a primary stage of socialism for a long period of time.”14 Procedurally, it can be seen that the constitutional changes just follow the changes of the Party Constitution. In history, each constitutional change happened just after the CCP National Congress; each proposal of

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constitutional change was put forward by the CCP; and each constitutional change was closely related to the change in the CCP Constitution. As we know, the current state Constitution was adopted in December 1982 after the adoption of the Party Constitution in September 1982.15 Accordingly, there were three amendments to the Party Constitution (1987, 1992, 1997) closely followed by three amendments to the state Constitution (1988, 1993, 1999). Recently, in the 16th Party Congress held in December 2002 the Party Constitution was, again, amended. It will be naturally followed by another amendment to the state Constitution in 2004 (see Table 4.1). Substantially, contents relating to the Party policy as well as Party ideology endorsed first in the Party Congresses and embodied in the Party Constitution are then put into the state Constitution. The famous “four fundamental principles” was in the 1982 Party Constitution first, and then entered into the 1982 state Constitution. The Party Constitution in 1987 contains the term “socialism with Chinese characteristics” which is again accepted by the amended state Constitution in 1988. After Deng Xiaoping’s Southern China Tour (Nanxun), the policy of establishing a socialist market economy was put into the Party Constitution in 1992, and then into the state Constitution in 1993. The Party Constitution revised at the 15th Party Congress in 1997 accepts Deng Xiaoping Theory as a guiding ideology for the CCP, paralleling with Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.16 Accordingly, the 1999 Amendment of the state Constitution also endorsed the Deng Xiaoping Theory. The revised Party Constitution in 2002 has added the “Three represents,” and this term will be endorsed in the state Constitution in 2004 as well.17 According to the Communiqué of the 3rd Plenary Session of the 16th CCP Central Committee, “it will help the state Constitution play a better role as the state fundamental law to incorporate Table 4.1 State Constitution and Party Constitution: a comparison A. Procedures Party Constitution (a) Adoption: 1982 (b) 1st Amendment: 1987 (c) 2nd Amendment: 1992 (d) 3rd Amendment: 1997 (e) 4th Amendment: 2002

State Constitution Adoption: 1982 1st Amendment: 1988 2nd Amendment: 1993 3rd Amendment: 1999 4th Amendment: 2004

B. Substances (a) Four fundamental principles (Party Constitution, 1982; state Constitution, 1982) (b) Building socialism with Chinese characteristics (Party Constitution, 1992; state Constitution, 1993) (c) Deng Xiaoping Theory (Party Constitution, 1997; state Constitution, 1999) (d) Three represents (Party Constitution, 2002; state Constitution, 2004) (e) Governing the country by law (state Constitution, 1999; Party Constitution, 2002) Source: prepared by the author.

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main theory and policy determined by the 16th Party Congress” (italic added) based on the objective demand of economic and social developments.18 In a word, the general program of the Party Constitution is very similar to the Preamble of the state Constitution. Another similar aspect between the two lies in the fact that the principle applying for the amendment process is the same, as both are changed in a small scale and when the changes are ripe (yi xiao gai, bu yi da gai; chengshu de gai, bu chengshu de bu gai).19 Based on the above practice, it is concluded that the state Constitution reflects the general program of the Party Constitution in its Preamble. In that sense, the Chinese Constitution is regarded as “a general summary of present policy” of the Party.20 Although the amendment of the state Constitution follows the changes of the Party Constitution, it does not mean that the former follows the latter in every aspect. For example, the amendment of the Party Constitution is different from the amendment of the state Constitution. More interestingly, some changes are first reflected in the state Constitution. For example, the concept of “rule of law” was first endorsed by the state Constitution in 1999 and then by the Party Constitution in 2002, though it was put forward by the Party at its 15th National Congress in 1997.21 In any case, however, each constitutional amendment has only been taken just after the Party Congress meetings. Despite the stipulation in the state Constitution that the Standing Committee of the NPC or more than one fifth of the NPC representatives has the right to propose an amendment to the Constitution,22 in practice it is the CCP who initiates such a proposal which will be accepted by the NPC as an official draft amendment. The dominance of the Party over the amendment of the Constitution can be seen from the above facts. The Party’s dominance of law-making process is not only reflected in the Constitution changes, but also in the process for other laws, particularly those in the political field, such as those concerning rights of the citizens. It is said that the Party has kept a basic principle for the lawmaking process, i.e., any law to be adopted by the NPC or its Standing Committee which is of major principle should be reported to the CCP Central Committee for approval.23 Here, it is unclear what constitutes a matter of major principle so that the Party has the de facto discretionary power to intervene at any time as it wishes. In 1991, the Party issued the document titled “Certain Opinions on Strengthening the Party Leadership over the State Legislative Work,” which is the first such document in the CCP’s history. Accordingly, the Party’s intervention in the law-making process is undertaken in the following four circumstances: (a) amendment of the Constitution, major laws in the political area, especially major laws in economic and administrative areas, should be examined and reviewed by the Political Bureau and the Party Congress before they are referred to the NPC; (b) the drafting of laws in the political area should be approved by the Party; (c) draft laws in the political area and major draft laws in

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economic and administrative areas should be examined and approved by the Political Bureau or its members before they are deliberated in the NPC; and (d) the Party exercises unified leadership (tongyi lingdao) to the lawdrafting work.24 From this document, it can be seen that the Party leadership over legislation takes four dominant organizational forms: (a) organizational penetration of the NPC leadership and control over key NPC appointments through the NPC Party Group system and the nomenklatura system; (b) control over meeting agendas; (c) organizational oversight of legal drafting; and (d) pre-approval of draft laws by the Politburo and Secretariat.25 Despite the constitutional norm that all organizations in China should act within the state Constitution and law, “[t]o the Party, being bound to the law means first of all to execute the Party’s leadership, especially over the law-making process.”26 Since law is made by the legislature, those who control it can make the law reflect their will in order to reach their goal. In China, the NPC is in the hands of the CCP. The Party members account for more than 70 percent of the NPC representatives, and they largely abide by the Party disciplines and strictly follow the Party line.27 In principle there should be no law that could be in conflict with the Party’s interest and/or inconsistent with the Party’s policy. For example, during the Tiananmen Square incident in June 1989, China hastily passed the Martial Law for Beijing so as to pave the way for the crackdown on the student movement. It may not be true that Party organizations such as Party Political-Legal Committees are directly involved in state legislation,28 however, there is a long-maintained common practice in China that some state normative documents with legal force are jointly adopted by state organs and Party organs. Thus, in the sense of the Party control, the NPC can be regarded as a “rubber stamp” under the shadow of the Party. Under some circumstances, the Party evades the legislative process to turn its internal documents into normative rules. For example, the CCP Central Office and the NPC Standing Committee Office jointly issued in December 1986 the Urgent Notice on the Term Change and Election at the County and Village Levels, which requested such an election should be undertaken strictly in compliance with the spirit of document No.36 (1986) issued by the CCP Central Office, thus granting this Party document legal binding force.29 For the anti-corruption campaign, the Party has issued a large number of normative documents, which apply particularly to Party members in parallel with relevant anti-corruption laws.30 Recently, Wu Guanzheng, a Politburo member and Party Secretary of the Central Disciplinary Inspection Committee, requested Party committees and disciplinary committees at all levels to deal well with the relationship between the Party internal regulations and state laws by sorting out which could continue to be internal regulations and which could turn into state laws and regulations. According to him, those that have been tampered with in practice and have thus become more matured may be converted to be state laws through statutory procedures.31

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Ironically, in recent years the Party has endeavored to separate itself from the government, but has tightened its control of the legislature. The rationale behind this may lie in the consideration that due to the separation, the Party needs an alternative to maintain its control over the government and to realize its policies through the legal procedure. That is why after the separation endeavor, the Party regards highly the legislature. This can be seen from the recent phenomenon that the chairmanship of the People’s Congress is taken by the Party Secretary-General. According to one statistic, as of March 2003, 22 chairmanships of the People’s Congresses at the provincial level (out of total 30 provinces) were appointed in that way.32 For this new CCP practice, there is a debate on whether it will weaken or enhance the role of the People’s Congress in China. In any case, one thing is clear; that this practice is the instrument of the Party to control the legislation. Nevertheless, due to the objectiveness of the law, a Frankenstein phenomenon may occur once a law has been enacted, particularly concerning human rights and social equality. For example, the Administrative Procedural Law gives the right to the ordinary citizens to bring Party members or organizations to court, thus at least to some extent curbing the Party’s interest, or the interest of some Party members. In order to march towards the rule of law, the Party bears a certain degree of tolerance. For that reason, some Western scholars hold the view that the legislative process in China has been decentralized and the Party’s role eroded.33 But if somebody uses law to threaten the ruling status of the Party, the Party may not tolerate it. The leadership of the CCP in China, including its leadership over the legislature as provided both in the Party and state Constitutions and as advocated by the leaders of the NPC, should be always maintained.

Rule by virtue vs. rule of law As mentioned above, the 1999 Amendment contained the provision of governing the country by law. It seems that China has pledged to take the cause of leading the country to the “rule of law” society. This, naturally raises the question: what is the rule of law? There are various definitions in this respect.34 According to A.V. Dicey, the concept of rule of law should contain two principles: supremacy or predominance of regular law (as opposed to the influence of arbitrary power) and equality before the law (or the equal subjection of all classes to the ordinary law of the land administered by the ordinary law courts).35 The list of principles for the rule of law can be easily expanded to contain other elements such as: (a) all laws should be prospective, open and clear; (b) laws should be relatively stable; (c) the making of particular laws should be guided by open, stable, clear and general rules; (d) the independence of the judiciary must be guaranteed; the principles of natural justice must be observed; (e) the courts should have review powers over the implementation of the other

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principles; (f) the courts should be easily accessible; and (g) the discretion of the crime-preventing agencies should not be allowed to pervert the law.36 Black’s Law Dictionary gives a simple definition to “rule of law” by defining it as “a legal principle, of general application, sanctioned by the recognition of authorities, and usually expressed in the form of a maxim or logical proposition.” It further says that “the rule of law, sometimes called ‘the supremacy of law’, provides that decisions should be made by the application of known principles or laws without the intervention of discretion in their application.”37 However, according to China’s perception, the rule of law, at least for the current moment, is understood as the following explanations made by Jiang Zemin in his Report to the 15th CCP National Congress in 1997: the development of democracy must combine the improvement of the legal system so as to govern the country by law. To govern the country by law means to manage the state affairs, economic and social affairs by the people under the leadership of the Party in accordance with the Constitution and law stipulations through various ways and forms. It should be guaranteed that all the work in the state is carried out under the law. Institutionalization and legalization of the socialist democracy should be progressively achieved so that the institution and the law will not be changed because of the change of the leadership and because of the change of views and attention of the leadership.38 It is said that the nature of the rule of law is the institutionalization and legalization of the system in which the people are the masters. The law in the “rule of law” society should be the one which is adopted through democratic process and reflects the will of the majority of society.39 Since the beginning of the economic reform and open-door policy, there have been two periods in China to discuss the issue of “the rule of law”: one was in the early 1980s when the relationship between democracy and the rule of law was discussed, but no substantial results came out. The second occurred in the early 1990s, particularly after Jiang Zemin’s remarks made at the Law Lecture for the CCP Central Committee on February 8, 1996 “to carry out and adhere to the governing of the country by law and to build the socialist legalized country.” The second discussion, in fact, provided background materials for the formulation of the part in Jiang’s Report relating to the rule of law in China.40 According to Jiang: to rule the country in accordance with law is the fundamental principle for the Party to lead the people in building up the country, is an objective requirement for developing a socialist market economy, is an important symbol of the progress of social civilization and is also an important guarantee for lasting political stability.41

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At the 4th Session of the NPC the idea of “ruling the country in accordance with law and building China into a legalized country” was written into “the 9th Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy and Social Progress, and the 2010 Target Program.” What is most important is, as is mentioned above, that the expression “the rule of law” has been incorporated into the Chinese Constitution.42 The above efforts have demonstrated the CCP’s determination to realize rule of law in China, though the rule of law in its mind is still very different from that as defined in the Western literature. Interestingly, after China had officially endorsed the concept of rule of law, the then CCP Secretary-General Jiang Zemin put forward a new concept – “rule by virtue” (de zhi) in 2001. What is “virtue” in Jiang’s mind? Does it refer to the traditional communist ideology, such as to realize communism throughout the world, to serve for the people, etc.; or to the CCP-sponsored ideology such as to learn from Lei Feng, to maintain socialist spiritual civilization, etc.; or to traditional Chinese ethics such as Confucianism, or even Western and/or global ethics? According to Jiang, the rule of law and rule by virtue are complementary in the governance of the country. As he said: we should strengthen persistently the construction of a socialist legal system and govern the country according to law in the course of building socialism with Chinese characteristics and developing a socialist market economy; meanwhile we should strengthen persistently the construction of socialist ethics and govern the country by virtue. In the governance of a country, rule of law and rule by virtue are always complementary to each other and mutually advanced. Neither is dispensable or abolishable. Rule of law belongs to political construction and political civilization while rule by virtue belongs to ideological construction and spiritual civilization. Although being in different categories, their status and functions are both very important. We should always pay regard to the close combination of legal construction with ethical construction, and to the close combination of governing the country according to law with governing the country by virtue.43 After Jiang’s speech, the People’s Daily and Xinhua News Agency both published editorial commentaries to further elaborate what Jiang said about the relationship between rule of law and rule by virtue.44 One reason why “rule by virtue” is needed vis-à-vis rule of law is that rule of law cannot solve all the problems; too much reliance on law, such as that to protect suspects’ rights, would leave some crimes unpunished; and too much reliance on rule of law would cause higher litigation costs or rule of law costs so as to discount the judicial efficiency.45 It is impossible that all the social problems can be resolved by law, such as love affairs beyond

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marriage (hun wai lian), and law needs a process of enactment which usually lags behind the appearance of the practical problem.46 Another justification argues that the socialist market economy is not only a rule of law economy, but also an ethical economy (daode jinji). It needs honesty, justice and fairness in addition to a valid property and legal system.47 However, this argument is not convincing because if a society has really had rule of law, then there is no problem in realizing honesty, justice and fairness. It is understood that there are at least two main implications for the emergence of rule by virtue in the legal context: first, it indicates that the CCP does not have enough confidence in “rule of law” alone; and it is also indicates that the CCP sees rule of law as a functional vehicle for administrative governance while rule by virtue is seen as something for spiritual governance. In this sense, the CCP still uses law as an instrument for its governance of the country. By acknowledging that rule by virtue plays a complementary role in governing the country as Jiang asserted, it is necessary to know what rule by virtue contains. A valid question is whether the rule by virtue advocated by Jiang is Confucian. The so-called Confucian socialism is creative, though there is divergent understanding of it. Jiang acknowledged that his “virtue” contains the Chinese ancient good ethical tradition.48 Therefore, a number of Chinese scholars expound Jiang’s speech as being related to Chinese traditional culture and ethics. It is said that the origin of “rule by virtue” can be traced back to Zhou Gong in the West Zhou Dynasty and Confucius developed the thoughts of rule by virtue.49 As Mencius (372–289 BC) stated: “Benevolence alone is not sufficient to govern; laws alone cannot carry themselves into practice.” Because of that, propriety must enter into law (li ru yu fa) and rule by virtue should be established.50 The Chinese tradition of rule by virtue includes the following aspects: (a) officials are responsible; (b) only for the people (yi min wei beng); (c) impartial; (d) wise decision; (e) appointing able man; and (f) education first, punishment second.51 While recognizing that traditional ethics exist in Jiang’s “rule by virtue,” the scholars, on the other hand, point out that the ancient rule by virtue was basically rule of man, different from Jiang’s, and even rule by law in ancient times was also rule of man because the ancient political system was based on rule of man.52 The interesting question is why the CCP has recognized the ethical values in Chinese ancient tradition, particularly Confucianism. If we look at the CCP’s history, we can find that the May 4th Movement was designed to discredit Confucianism with the famous slogan “Down with the Confucian School.” The Movement, in CCP’s view, was an embroil of the emergence and expansion of the CCP and has always been praised highly by the CCP as a significant event in Chinese history. Against this background, it is hard to say that the CCP can endorse the Confucian doctrine in its ideology. People may argue, however, that due to the loss of vitality of

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the CCP traditional ideology, the CCP has no choice but to resort to Chinese traditional ethics for the purpose of maintaining its rule in China, though with a rather reserved attitude. There is also a problem in linguistics for the term “virtue.” The Chinese word “de” is translated into “virtue” in English, but it may be confusing when other Chinese words can also be translated into “virtue” in English, such as that for the virtue of women. Recently, some scholars translated one of the “three talks” (san jiang) as talking “virtue” ( jiang zheng qi).53 According to one authority, the rule by virtue should have the following contents: (a) belief in the socialist and communist ideal; (b) serving the people; (c) collectivism; (d) patriotism; (e) love of science; (f) love of work; (g) revolutionary heroism; (h) revolutionary humanitarianism; and (i) new types of social public ethics, professional ethics and family virtues.54 Is “rule by virtue” equivalent to “rule of man?”55 If so, obviously it is in conflict with the rule of law. No one in China accepts that rule by virtue is rule of man, though in ancient China it was so. According to one explanation, rule by virtue is not a mode of governance. It is an instrument for governance, thus it can serve rule of man, such as the ancient “virtue first, penalty second” (de zhu xing fu), and can also serve rule of law, such as “law assisted by virtue” (yi de fu fa).56 Some scholars emphasize the virtue of the officials as a focal point in the rule by virtue.57 Other scholars opine that the implementation of the rule by virtue lies in the Party itself. The Party should strengthen its ethical make-up and require its members to improve their ethical self-cultivation.58 However, it indicates in practice that the CCP uses rule by virtue to demand that society and ordinary people follow some kinds of ethics rather than to check its own power and curb Party official corruption. For example, the CCP Central Committee issued the “Implementing Program of Citizens’ Ethical Building-up” in October 2001, requesting the strengthening of ethical education at the grassroots level, and the ethical practices of citizens, as well as establishing a favourable social atmosphere for the ethical development of the citizens.59 On the other hand, it is noted that Hu Jintao’s so-called three new “minism” (xin san min zu yi)60 is linked to the rule by virtue, especially in the context of governance by the Party. It cannot be denied that rule by virtue carries strong “rule of man” characteristics, especially when it contains the Chinese traditional ethics and traditional CCP ethics (such as Lei Feng Spirit) which were products of the rule of man. Thus, it is basically opposite to the process of rule of law in China. The consequence is clear: when the rule by virtue is overemphasized, then the rule by men will prevail again, which is the opposite of the rule of law. It can be seen from the rule by virtue doctrine that China is not yet ready for the genuine rule of law and has continued to use law as a ruling instrument. That is a bad thing for a bright future for China.

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The Party vs. the judiciary The relationship between the judicial system and the CCP is a common topic in academia as well as in the mass media. Since the judicial system is a main institution to enforce law, it is extremely important to the Party. Loyalty became a principal requirement of recruitment for the judiciary. This can explain one aspect of why so many retired military servicemen were recruited simply because they were the most loyal people to the Party. Although the Chinese Constitution stipulates that “no organisation or individual may enjoy the privilege of being above the Constitution and the law,” the CCP often interferes in judicial affairs, as reported from time to time. The Political-Legal Committee of the CCP is a very powerful organization. The CCP Central Political-Legal Committee was founded in January 1980 based on the former Political-Legal Group. It is a specialized organ within the Party in charge of political-legal work (zheng fa gong zuo), and its main task is to study big issues in the political-legal sphere and to submit proposals to the Party Center. Peng Zhen, Chen Pixian, Qiao Shi have all held the office of Party Secretary of the Central PoliticalLegal Committee. The position is currently taken by Luo Gan, a Politburo Standing Committee member. The heads of the Supreme Court, Supreme Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security and Ministry of Justice are members of the Committee. Such Political-Legal Committees are correspondingly established at provincial, prefectural and county levels, and headed by a member of standing committees of the CCP. The function of the Political-Legal Committee is to realize the Party’s leadership over political-legal work by linking the Party center to the political-legal front line, carrying out the Party’s related policy and coordinating the relationship between/among various political-legal organs. It is admitted that such a mechanism carries Chinese characteristics.62 There is some misunderstanding that the Political-Legal Committee is in charge of all works related to law. That is not true. The political-legal work in the Chinese context refers to the work basically undertaken by courts, procuratorates and departments of public security (altogether named as gong jian fa). For that reason, the Political-Legal Committee is not actively involved in legislative work. On the contrary, it is actively involved in judicial work and usually gives instructions to the relevant court on how to handle cases. The Political-Legal Committee has the power to jointly issue legal documents together with the Court and/or the Procuratorate. For example, on March 29, 1983, the Political-Legal Committee of the Central Committee of the Party, at the request of the Shaanxi Provincial Political-Legal Committee, issued a ruling regarding the criteria for initiating prosecutions for corruption offences involving less than RMB 2,000, which was officially circulated to all courts and procuratorates to follow.63

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In addition, the Political-Legal Committee is responsible for launching the so-called “striking hard” (yanda) campaigns from time to time. Such campaigns usually focus on three kinds of crimes: (a) crimes committed by Mafia-style gangs and other organized criminal groups; (b) serious violent crimes including bombings, wilful murder, armed robbery and kidnapping; and (c) crimes such as burglary, theft, and other offences that “pose a serious threat” to social order and security.64 They include three categories: (a) for the restoration of the overall unstable public order and security. The yanda campaigns in May 1990, July 1994 and April 1996 were for that purpose; (b) For the fight against a range of particular crimes. In 1993, there was a yanda against kidnapping of children and women, gangs on the road (che fei lu ba) and larceny. In April 1994 such a campaign was launched to crack down on the crime of forging, selling and stealing receipts (fa piao). In December 2000, the Ministry of Public Security launched a special yanda campaign against Mafia-style gangs, the first of this kind since the founding of the PRC; (c) For consolidating the achievements of yanda to punish serious crimes through normal judicial trials.65 The third category indicates that criminal punishment in the above ((a) and (b)) may not necessarily be imposed through the normal judicial procedure. In November 1996, Ren Jianxin, then Party Secretary of the Central Political-Legal Committee and Chairman of the Committee of Comprehensive Management of Public Order stressed the above three operational forms of yanda.66 The purpose of this periodic nationwide campaign against “offenders who endanger the social order is to effect the reduction in the crime rate and to restore social order.”67 During the campaigns, the courts have to follow the Party instruction and work in cooperation with other criminal-justice organs to punish the criminals identified. Since the yanda policy is to strike surely, accurately and relentlessly (wen, zun, hen) on the one hand, and more severely and more swiftly (cong zhong, cong kuai) on the other, the statutory judicial procedures, such as provided in the Criminal Procedural Law, might not be strictly applied. Summary executions often occur. According to one figure, more than 3,000 people were reported to have been executed in the first five months of the Yanda 2001 campaign.68 The task of the courts in Shanghai was to hold simultaneously convened sentencing rallies and mete out the severest punishment possible under law for each and every crime brought before the courts,69 despite the call from Xiao Yang, President of the Supreme Court that while striking severely and swiftly courts must continue to ensure that the quality of court work is not compromised.70 As the President of the Shanghai Higher People’s Court expressed in an interview: Courts across the city have all followed the yanda policy of the Central Party Committee in achieving all aspects of work in the yanda campaign. We have implemented the yanda campaign in accordance

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It is noted that the yanda is launched by the Political-Legal Committee in the name of the Committee of Comprehensive Management of Public Order (shehui zonghe zhili weiyuanhui), which is directed by the PoliticalLegal Committee. For example, Luo Gan, Chairman of the Central Political-Legal Committee is also Chairman of the Committee of Comprehensive Management of Public Order. Sometimes, other members of the Politburo will be involved. For example, in the 2001 Yanda, the entire Politburo attended the launching meeting, and Jiang Zemin delivered the keynote speech.72 During the time of yanda, the judiciary has to cooperate with other agencies for this special task so that its normal judicial operations will be inevitably affected. Moreover, following the Party instruction on yanda and due to the time limit, the due process cannot be guaranteed and summary trials occur more frequently. The second Party organ which obviously interferes in judicial work is the CCP Discipline Inspection Committee. This Committee was restored in accordance with the new Party Constitution adopted in the 11th Party Congress in 1978 for the purpose of strengthening the Party’s discipline and style (dang ji, dang feng). From 1980, the dual leadership has been introduced to oversee the operations of the CCP Discipline Inspection Committee, i.e., such a committee is subject to the leadership of the Party committee at the same level, as well as to that of the Discipline Inspection Committee at the higher level.73 It should be noted that the Discipline Inspection Committee and the Ministry of Supervision, in fact, have shared the joint office (he shu bang gong), i.e. two different official names, but one working team since January 1993. Currently, Wu Guanzheng, a Politburo Standing Committee member, is Party Secretary of the Central Discipline Inspection Committee, and He Yong, Ministry of Supervision, deputy Party Secretary. In accordance with the Party Constitution, the main tasks of the Discipline Inspection Committee at all levels are to safeguard the Party Constitution and other Party rules; to inspect how the Party’s line, policy and resolutions are implemented; to assist the Party Committee in strengthening the construction of the Party style; to organize and coordinate anti-corruption work; to educate the Party members for discipline compliance, and make decisions for Party discipline; to monitor the exercise of power by leading cadres; to investigate and deal with relatively important or complicated cases that involve Party organizations and Party members who have breached Party disciplines and/or state laws, and to determine or revoke the punishment on Party members in these cases; and to handle accusations and/or complaints made by Party members, and to safeguard their rights.74 From the above tasks, we can see that the Discipline Inspection Committee can affect the judicial work in many ways, particularly in

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respect of anti-corruption campaigns, and cases involving Party members. As a general rule, the Central Discipline Inspection Committee reports to the Party Congress about its work. In its report submitted to the 16th Party Congress in November 2002, between October 1997 and September 2002, the Discipline Inspection Committee throughout the country listed 861,917 cases for investigation, and gave Party disciplinary punishment to 846,150 persons, among them 28,966 were county level cadres, 2,422 prefectural (ting or ju) level cadres and 98 provincial (ministerial) level cadres.75 During the recent anti-corruption campaigns, the Discipline Inspection Committee launched a notorious procedure of so-called “double restraint” (shuanggui),76 a CCP internal practice which usually applies to highranking corrupt officials within the Party. The case is handed over to the judiciary only after it has been through the Discipline Inspection Committee. Many cases come within this practice, even if criminal acts are obvious and should be subject to the penal code. For example, Liu Fangren, the former Party Secretary of Guizhou Province was first subject to the “shuanggui” in October 2002. In April 2003 the Xinhua News Agency announced a decision by the central Discipline Inspection Committee approved by the CCP Central to investigate Liu’s severe violations of Party disciplines. In July 2003, the CCP Guizhou Provincial Committee convened a plenary session to pass the decision made by the CCP provincial Standing Committee to expel Liu from the Party. After that decision, Liu was moved to the procuratorate for his criminal charges.77 Some of the officials may be exempt from criminal punishment though their conduct or behavior has violated the relevant state laws. This is related to the Chinese ancient tradition that in ancient China a murderer who belonged to a royal family or was a high-rank official could be sentenced to death, but he had a right to appeal for imperial clemency. For lesser crimes by officials, punishment could be reduced in exchange for giving up official rank.78 This ancient heritage seems to have been inherited by the CCP to apply to its own cadres. There are many instances where high-rank officials with CCP membership who committed crimes escaped from criminal justice by receiving Party disciplinary sanctions such as being expelled from the Party. The case of Cheng Weigao is illustrative. Cheng was former Party Secretary of Hebei Province. In a circular released by the Discipline Inspection Committee, he was accused of accepting bribery, causing great economic loss for the state, and allowing his spouse and children to commit criminal activities. His two personal secretaries were sentenced to death and death in waiting (si huan) respectively. However, the Central Discipline Inspection Committee only imposed Party discipline on Cheng by expelling him from the Party and cancelling his provincial level treatment, without passing him to the judiciary like many other corrupt officials. This result was questioned in China as to why there was no legal punishment if Cheng had violated laws.79

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On November 16, 2003, the Ministry of Land Resources revealed a figure in regard to its efforts to tighten the land market order: for 2003, 168,000 cases were dealt with, among which 687 persons received Party and/or administrative disciplinary punishments and 94 were subject to criminal liability.80 Somebody made a comment on the above figure in the People’s Daily’s website forum, saying that among 168,000 cases only 0.5 percent of the law-breakers received Party and/or administrative disciplinary punishments and only 0.056 percent received criminal punishment, thus indicating the law-breaking cost is quite low for the corrupt officials in China, and in fact encouraging Party cadres to conduct illegal activities.81 While the involvement of the Discipline Inspection Committee in corrupt cases to some extent plays a positive role in anti-corruption campaigns as a corruption crackdown mechanism together with the judiciary, on the other hand it adversely affects the independence of the latter and helps some Party members, particularly high-ranking officials, escape from criminal justice. For that reason, this internal practice is criticized as “entirely arbitrary,” and has shown that it is “improbable that China will move towards a depoliticised legal system as long as the Party treats its own members without reference to any legal process.”82 In addition, it is noted that most of the court cadres are CCP members83 and they are usually inclined to obey the Party decisions or policies when they decide on cases, particularly those that have political implications. Apart from the Party membership, the Party has its committees within courts and procuratorates. It is commonly recognized that Party affiliation makes an impact on a judge’s decision. It occurs even in the US where the separation of powers is known to be firmly established; as has been acknowledged, “a judge’s party affiliation may have a feedback reinforcement on his value system which in turn determines his decisional propensities.”84 However, in China’s case, the impact of Party affiliation is extremely salient. As required, Party members should act first of all according to the Party Constitution. This is quite different from some other countries where a judge, once appointed, will not act as an appointee of the party with which he or she was previously associated. For example, English judges sever all links with any political organizations or other representative bodies with which they may have been previously connected.85 Some of the impact may be attributed to the Chinese Constitution: on one hand, it affirms judicial independence, but on the other, it expressly provides that the four basic cardinal principles should be followed by all in China.86 Since judicial independence is acted within the ambit of law, the above constitutional requirement must be fulfilled by the court and the procuratorate when they handle cases. It is rightly opined that [t]he conundrum for the judiciary in China is that most of the top judicial officials understand the necessity for consistency and independence, but they are also required to operate in a political system

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in which they are obligated by law to protect the political interests of the Communist Party.”87 It is recalled that as early as 1979, the Central Committee of the CCP issued the “Instruction on Strictly Implementing the Criminal Law and the Criminal Procedure Law” according to which the system of review and approval of cases by the Party Committee should be annulled.88 After 1978, the system of examining and approving cases by Party standing committees and of special case investigating teams (zhuan an zu) was cancelled. Unfortunately, in practice, the influence of the CCP over China’s judiciary is still great. There is a historical legacy from the early stage of the PRC to abolish all existing laws enacted by the former government. The vacuum that was created has been filled for many years and many laws were actually enacted very late, usually in the post-Mao era. For example, the Criminal Code (provisional) was enacted in 1979 and the General Principles of Civil Law in 1986. For that reason, Party policies dominated court decisions due to the absence of relevant laws. Since China has pledged to follow international rules and standards to build its own legal system, it should consider absorbing the general judicial principles and rules for its judicial reform.89 The United Nations has adopted a series of political and legal documents guiding the development and improvement of its member states’ judicial systems. The most important one is the “Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary,” which sets forth the rules and standards for the independence of the judiciary and the qualifications of judges.90 It is clear that there are a number of defects existing in China’s judicial system that have negatively affected judicial independence, but the Party’s interference is the biggest concern. Compared to the above UN standards, the way leading to a full realization of judicial independence in China is still a long march.

Concluding remarks In 1991, the Party Central Committee stressed that: in the new historic period, one of the most important areas for the Party to lead the State affairs is to turn the Party’s policy into State will, then into behavioural norms with universal binding force for the whole society through the State legislature and in accordance with legal procedures. The Party leads the people to make the constitution and law and the Party leads the people to comply with and implement the constitution and law. This is the important political principle in our legal construction and also an important guarantee for the continuing development of the legal construction.91 This paragraph contains various interpretations. First, it indicates that the Party has realized the importance of the law and would like to rely on it

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for the state governance and social control. The Party has decided to use the form of law to implement its policy, instead of using internal documents as previously practised. This may be positive for the realization of rule of law in China. Second, it can be interpreted as instrumentalism by using the law as an instrument for social control. It emphasizes the leadership of the Party, rather than the people, in the society. Though following legal procedures, when the Party policy is wrong there will be bad laws which only produce negative effects upon the building up of confidence in the rule of law. We have to be aware that wrong policies occurred often in history. Third, though the era when Party policy was law has passed, it still exerts significant influences on the Chinese legal system, as it is particularly reflected in the Chinese Constitution. Thus, important Party documents, so-called “red-dotted documents” (hong dou wen jian), still appear to be above law. A recent example is illustrative of this: at the end of 2003, the Legal and Political Committee of Hebei Province issued a Decision on “Creating a Better Environment for Perfecting the Socialist Market Economy System” which decriminalized private entrepreneurs who committed crimes at the beginning of their business dealings. This reddotted document has been criticized as encouraging illegal and/or criminal activities and interfering in normal judicial procedures by the Party department.92 Because of the long period of Party policy dominance, policy is reflected even in laws, and policy jargon, such as “the state encourages, or supports, or grants,” appears from time to time in laws on, for example, education and agriculture. The state Constitution itself is used by the Party as a policy document.93 Reliance on policy is basically a manifestation of the rule of man and the realization of the rule of law requires that state law should be above the Party policy. Optimistically we have reasons to predict that in the process of the rule of law, policy would be gradually subordinated to the constitutional norms, rather than the Constitution continuing to be a dependent of the Party’s policy, as Jiang Zemin once pledged that “[w]e should never treat the Party as the government, or as the law. I think we must abide by the guideline of the rule of law.”94 There are a number of provisions in the 1982 Constitution trying to reduce the Party control of the legal system, such as the provision that: all state organs, the armed forces, all political parties and public organizations and all enterprises and undertakings must abide by the Constitution and the law. All acts in violation of the Constitution and the law must be looked into. No organization or individual may enjoy the privilege of being above the Constitution and the law. Another provision states that “the people’s courts shall, in accordance with the law, exercise judicial power independently and are not subject to interference by administrative organs, public organizations or individuals.”95 The above provisions seem in conflict with such provisions, contained in

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the same Constitution, as “[the Party] must see to it that the legislative, judicial and administrative organs of the State and the economic, cultural and people’s organizations work actively and with initiative, independently, responsibly and in harmony.” It is pointed out that “if the party is subject to the State’s laws, it cannot legitimately supervise the State as a lawmaking body.” “When contradictions between the Party policy and law exist, it is not clear whether such contradictions will be resolved by following the Party policy, the law, or handling them on a case-by-case basis.”96 Under the constitutional “four fundamental principles,” the supreme authority of the CCP cannot be fully curbed and supervised by law, despite the relevant provisions contained in the Constitution.97 For the Party, the basic line is the maintenance of its leadership over the legal developments and legal reform in China. As is stipulated, rule of law means the unity of the Party leadership with the mastery of the people. Law is the reflection of the Party’s position and the people’s will so that rule of law is an important mode of combining Party leadership with the mastery of the people. It is also the best mode to integrate the insistence of Party leadership with enhancing the people’s mastery and role.98 It is reported that Zhang Yinghong, a cadre working at the department of Party Organization of Hunan Province published an essay titled “Political-Legal Committee hampers judicial independence” in a Chinese website in July 2003. He was then condemned by Zhou Yongkang, Vice Secretary of the Central Political-Legal Committee and Minister of Public Security, saying that the article caused a very bad impact overseas. As a result, Zhang Yinghong was forced to leave his post.99 This incident indicates that the Party will not tolerate any challenge to its leadership over the law. That is why it is argued that it is the Party’s economic agenda, rather than its political agenda, that requires the rule of law.100 China is in a transitional period of order restructuring. In such a period, it is possible that from time to time, “rule of man” and “rule of law”, “rule by law” and “rule of law” coexist. The current legal reform in China can be characterized as “rule of the Party by law,” which is in the middle of the road, departing from “rule of man,” but not yet reaching the realm of “rule of law.” It is not appropriate to use the standards of a matured legalized society to measure China’s state situation. It is correctly pointed out that although defects in China’s legal system remain, “it is fair to say that China’s socialist legal system has gone far beyond the old instrumental notion of safeguarding the rule of a Marxist Party.”101 Although the Party has imposed some negative constraints over the development of the Chinese legal system, it is admitted that the achievements in China’s legal reform up to today should be attributed to the efforts made by the Party, particularly when we recall that in earlier times, such as Mao’s era, the CCP rejected outright the concept of rule of law. After the 15th Party Congress, the CCP has reached the consensus of adopting the concept of rule of law in China. Also, the role of law in society has been emphasized more than

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before. The course towards rule of law is irreversible just as China’s economic reform has experienced. The China case may indicate that rule of law can be realized in an authoritarian state without democratization in the Western sense, but there is no doubt that rule of law can enhance and speed up the reach of democracy for China. It is hoped that the conviction of rule of law will be further strengthened under the new leadership led by Hu Jintao as he has often expressed his belief in governing the country by establishing the Party for the public and using the power for the people (li dang wei gong, zhi zheng wei min).

Notes 1 Article 17 of the Common Program. This Program is usually regarded as the “Provisional Constitution” in the PRC. The text is reprinted in the Legal Committee of the Central People’s Government (ed.), Collection of Laws and Regulations of the Central People’s Government, 1949–1950 (in Chinese) (Beijing: Law Press, 1982), pp. 17–27. An English version is available in Michael Lindsay (ed.), The New Constitution of Communist China: Comparative Analysis (Taipei, 1976), pp. 281–292. 2 They are the Organic Law of the Courts, the Commercial Law, the Civil Code, the Criminal Code, Civil Code of Procedure, and the Criminal Code of Procedure. 3 See Philip Baker, “Party and Law in China,” in Leslie Palmier (ed.), State and Law in Eastern Asia (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996), at p. 12. 4 Ibid., p. 11. 5 “Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation (October–December 1978),” China Quarterly, No. 77 (March 1979), at p. 172. 6 Ralph H. Folsom, John H. Minan and Lee Ann Otto, Law and Politics in the People’s Republic of China (St Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1992), at p. 76. 7 See Shiping Zheng, Party vs. State in Post-1949 China: The Institutional Dilemma (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 9–12. (A “party-state” denotes a type of state in which the Communist Party organization, as the core of the state, monopolizes state power over the direction and control of the society.) 8 Articles 11 and 18 of the 1982 Constitution. 9 See Peng Zhen, “Report on the Draft Revised Constitution of the People’s Republic of China,” People’s Daily (in Chinese), December 6, 1982. 10 Article 33 of the 1982 Constitution. 11 Zou Keyuan, “China’s Constitutional Changes and Deng Xiaoping’s Legacy,” in John Wong and Zheng Yongnian (eds), The Nanxun Legacy and China’s Development in the Post-Deng Era (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2001), at p. 291. 12 The four fundamental principles are: “1. We must keep to the socialist road. 2. We must uphold the dictatorship of the proletariat. 3. We must uphold the leadership of the Communist Party. 4. We must uphold Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.” See Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1975–1982) (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984), at p. 172. Such incorporation has both negative and positive implications: negative because insistence of the CCP leadership may hamper the sound development of the legal system; and positive because the principles may consolidate Deng’s determination of carrying out the economic reform and open-door policy. It should be noted that the wording “persist in reform and opening-up,” and “develop a socialist market economy” in the Constitution is just after the “four fundamental principles,” and parallel to them. Second, since the

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13 14 15 16

17

18

19 20

21

22 23 24 25

“four fundamental principles” were the result of the historical lessons learned from the “Cultural Revolution,” one of the purposes was to prevent the ruling party from departing from these principles and producing such a disaster as the “Cultural Revolution” again. In this sense, “adherence to the four fundamental principles” is a constitutional norm mainly binding the ruling party and its personnel. See Guo Daohui, “The Special Significance of the Incorporation of the Rule of Law into the Constitution,” Law Science (in Chinese), No. 2 (2000), at p. 3. See Jianfu Chen, “China: Constitutional Changes and Legal Developments,” in Alice Tay and Conica Leung (eds), Greater China: Law, Society and Trade (Australia: Law Book Company, 1995), at p. 149. For details, see Zou Keyuan and Zheng Yongnian, “China’s Third Constitutional Amendment: a Leap Forward Towards Rule of Law in China,” Yearbook Law & Legal Practice in East Asia, Vol. 4 (1999), pp. 29–41. See “Resolution on the CCP Constitution by the 12th CCP National Congress,” September 6, 1982, in http://www.peopledaily.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/5089/ 5104/5276/20010429/455562.html (accessed November 21, 2003). See “CCP Central Committee’s Explanation on the Amendment to the Party Constitution,” in Collection of Documents from the 15th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (Beijing: People’s Press, 1997) (in Chinese), pp. 85–86. According to the CCP Central Committee’s proposal on amending the Constitution, the “three represents” will be added into the Constitution. The “three represents” means CCP must always represent “the development trend of China’s advanced productive forces, the orientation of China’s advanced culture and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people”. See “Constitution amendments to have far-reaching influence,” in http://www. chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-12/28/content_293957.htm (accessed December 29, 2003). See Communiqué of the 3rd Plenary Session of the 16th CCP Central Committee, in http://www.peopledaily.com.cn/GB/shizheng/1024/2133923.html (accessed November 21, 2003). During the session, the Proposal on Revising Part of the Constitution by the CCP Central Committee was examined and adopted. See Reply to the Journalists by the Secretariat of the 16th Party Congress after the Publicizing of the Revised Party Constitution, in http://news.xinhuanet.com/ newscenter/2002-11/18/content_632966.htm (accessed November 13, 2003). William C. Jones, “The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China,” in Lawrence W. Beer (ed.), Constitutional Systems in Late Twentieth Century Asia (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1992), at p. 59. (As Jones concludes, not only is the Constitution a summary of policy, but also other laws are a “more particularized statement of policy”. Even “[p]olicy in China is law.”) In Jiang Zemin’s Report to the 15th Party Congress, there is the expression of “govern the country by law, and construct the socialist country of rule of law,” in Collection of Documents from the 15th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (Beijing: People’s Press, 1997) (in Chinese), pp. 85–86. Article 64 of the 1982 Constitution. See Qin Qianhong and Li Yuan, “Influence of the CCP over Legislation,” in http://article.chinalawinfo.com/article/user/article_display.asp?ArticleID=23338 (accessed July 17, 2003). See Cai Dingjian, Lishi yu biange – xin zhongguo fazhi jianshe de licheng (History and Reform – The Process of New China’s Legal Construction) (Beijing: China University Politics & Law Press, 1999) (in Chinese), pp. 165–166. See Murray Scot Tanner, The Politics of Lawmaking in China: Institutions, Processes and Democratic Prospects (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), p. 56.

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26 Harro von Senger, “Ideology and Law-Making,” in Jan Michiel Otto, Maurice V. Polak, Jianfu Chen and Yuwen Li (eds), Law-Making in the People’s Republic of China (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000), at p. 44. 27 As Zhang Youyu, a most prominent jurist in China, expressed, no Party member can evade the compliance with the Party disciplines because he is representative of the People’s Congress. “As a Party member, no matter whether you are a (PC) representative, governmental official, you should act in accordance with the Party policy.” See Zhang Youyu, Zhang youyu wenxuan (Works of Zhang Youyu), Vol. 2 (Beijing: Law Press, 1999) (in Chinese), p. 401. 28 See Baker, “Party and Law in China,” p. 14. He acknowledged that it is far from clear what role party committees play in the preparation of legislation. It is acknowledged that the power of the Central Political-Legal Leading Group over law-making has been greatly exaggerated in Western studies. See Tanner, The Politics of Lawmaking in China, p. 56. 29 See Qin and Li, “Influence of the CCP over Legislation.” 30 See Zou Keyuan, “Why China’s Rampant Corruption Cannot be Checked by Laws Alone,” in Wang Gungwu and Zheng Yongnian (eds), Damage Control: The Chinese Communist Party in the Jiang Zemin Era (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2003), at p. 95. 31 See Wu Guanzheng, “Continuously Pushing forward the Legalization of PartyStyle and Cleanness Construction and Anti-Corruption Work,” Speech made at the National Work Conference on Disciplinary Inspection and Supervision Legislation, November 6, 2003, People’s Daily (in Chinese), November 17, 2003, p. 2. 32 See Zhou Zhaocheng, “New Pattern of the CCP with the People’s Congress,” Lianhe Zaobao (in Chinese), March 5, 2003. 33 See Murray Scot Tanner, “The Erosion of Central Party Control over Lawmaking,” The China Quarterly, No. 138 (June 1994), pp. 381–403. 34 For example, according to Jennings, the rule of law is “an attitude, an expression of liberal and democratic principles,” cited in Ann van Wynen Thomas and A.J. Thomas Jr, A World Rule of Law (Dallas, TX: SMU Press, 1975), p. 4. Michael’s definition of the rule of law is: rule of law is the very foundation of human rights. In the Western legal tradition, law is applied equally to all; it is binding on the lawgiver and is meant to prevent arbitrary action by the ruler. Law guarantees a realm of freedom for the members of a political community that is essential to the protection of life and human dignity against tyrannical oppression and to the regulation of human relations within the community.

35 36 37 38

Franz Michael, “Law: A Tool of Power,” in Yuan-li Wu et al. (eds), Human Rights in the People’s Republic of China (Boulder, CO and London: Westview Press, 1988), p. 33. See A.V. Dicey, “The Rule of Law,” in F.L. Morton (ed.), Law, Politics and the Judicial Process in Canada, 2nd Edition (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1992), at p. 17. See Joseph Raz, “The Rule of Law and Its Virtues,” in John Arthur and William H. Shaw (eds), Readings in the Philosophy of Law, 3rd Edition (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 2001), pp. 50–52. Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edition (St Paul, MN: West Group, 1990), p. 1332. Jiang Zemin, “Hold High the Banner of Deng Xiaoping Theory for an All-round Advancement of the Cause of Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics into the 21st Century,” Report delivered at the 15th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on September 12, 1997, Beijing Review, October 6–12, 1997, at p. 24.

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39 Zhang Wangsheng and A Xi, “Grasping the Meaning of ‘the Rule of Law’ Accurately,” Chinese Legal Science (in Chinese), No. 5, 1998, at p. 4. 40 Ibid., p. 3. 41 Jiang, “Hold High the Banner of Deng Xiaoping Theory.” 42 According to Potter, “yifa zhiguo” in the Constitution connotes “rule through law.” See Pitman B. Potter, “The Chinese Legal System: Continuing Commitment to the Primacy of State Power,” The China Quarterly, No. 159 (1999), at p. 674. In one English version of the 1999 Amendment, “fazhi guojia” is translated as “country of law”. Beijing Review, May 3–9, 1999, at p. 14. 43 Jiang Zemin, “Speech at the National Propaganda Working Conference,” Guangming Daily (in Chinese), January 11, 2001, p. 3. 44 See “Combine governing the country according to law with governing the country by virtue,” People’s Daily editorial, February 1, 2001; “Adhering to the basic strategy of combining governing the country according to law with governing the country by virtue,” Xinhua News Agency Special Commentator, February 13, 2001. Both are reprinted in Shanghai Society of Chinese Culture Studies (ed.), Rule of Law and Rule by Virtue: Collected Essays on Rule of Law and Rule by Virtue (Beijing: China Procuratorate Press, 2001) (in Chinese), pp. 2–4 and 5–10. 45 See Xiao Chuanlin, “Reflections on ‘Governing the Country by Virtue’,” in Chen Pengsheng, Wang Limin and Ding Linghua (eds), Chinese Legal Culture towards 21st Century (Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Press, 2002) (in Chinese), at p. 24. 46 Cheng Jurao, “Mutual Complement of Law with Virtue,” in Shanghai Society of Chinese Culture Studies, Rule of Law and Rule by Virtue, p. 48. 47 Jiang Xiangyu, “Certain Issues on the Same Importance of Governing the Country according to Law and Governing the Country by Virtue,” in ibid., p. 244. 48 His inscription on the book titled Chinese Traditional Ethics encourages readers “to promote Chinese ancient good ethical tradition and revolutionary tradition, to absorb all excellent ethical achievements of mankind so as to build up the advanced spiritual civilization of mankind,” cited in Xiao, “Reflections on ‘Governing the Country by Virtue’,” p. 23. 49 Luo Guojie and Xia Weidong, “History, Theory and Practice of Governing the Country by Virtue,” in Cheng Tianquan (ed.), Chinese Communist Party Representing the Course of Chinese Advanced Culture (Beijing: China People’s University Press, 2002) (in Chinese), at p. 391. For details, see Zhu Ruikai, “Striving to Realise the Integration of Confucian Thought of ‘Rule by Virtue’ with Modern ‘Rule of Law’,” Shanghai Society of Chinese Culture Studies, Rule of Law and Rule by Virtue, pp. 178–187. 50 See Giri Deshingkar, “Rule of Law vs. Rule of Man: Contradictory Pulls in China,” in Satish Saberwal and Heiko Sievers (eds), Rules, Laws, Constitutions (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1998), at p. 254. 51 See Xiao, “Reflections on ‘Governing the Country by Virtue’,” pp. 23–24. 52 See Luo and Xia, “History, Theory and Practice of Governing the Country by Virtue,” pp. 396–398. 53 See Zheng Yongnian and Lai Hongyi, “Rule by Virtue: Jiang Zemin’s New Moral Order for the Party,” EAI Background Brief, No. 83 (March 12, 2001), p. 9. 54 See Luo and Xia, “History, Theory and Practice of Governing the Country by Virtue,” pp. 401–404. 55 There are two characteristics of rule of man: power dominates law; and law protects privileges of a small group of people. See Jiang Jianyun, “See Clearly the Nature of Rule of Man and Overcome Its Impact,” in Shanghai Society of Chinese Culture Studies, Rule of Law and Rule by Virtue, pp. 216–220.

100 Zou Keyuan 56 You Junyi, “Study Comrade Jiang Zemin’s Thoughts on Rule by Virtue and Adhere to the Way of Governing the Country by Combining Law and Virtue,” in ibid., p. 28. 57 See Deng Weizhi, “Where is the Focus of Rule by Virtue,” in ibid., pp. 45–46. 58 See Hou Shudong, “Practicing ‘Governing the Country by Virtue’ and Strengthening the Party’s Ethical Building-up,” in Cheng Tianquan (ed.), Chinese Communist Party Representing the Course of Chinese Advanced Culture, pp. 411–413. 59 See Cheng Weirong, Towards the Rule of Law Era: From the End of the Cultural Revolution to the Opening of the CCP Sixteenth National Congress (Shanghai: Shanghai Education Press, 2003) (in Chinese), at p. 435. 60 The three min-isms are “power is used for the people; concerns the people; and benefits the people.” 61 See Cheng Weirong, Towards the Rule of Law Era, pp. 58–59. 62 Cheng, ibid., p. 60. 63 See Anthony R. Dicks, “Compartmentalized Law and Judicial Restraint: an Inductive View of Some Jurisdictional Barriers to Reform,” China Quarterly, No. 141 (1995), at p. 97. 64 See Susan Trevaskes, “Courts on the Campaign Path in China: Criminal Court Work in the ‘Yanda 2001’ Anti-Crime Campaign,” Asian Survey, Vol. 42, No. 5, 2002, at p. 678. 65 See Cheng, Towards the Rule of Law Era, pp. 295–298. 66 Ibid., p. 298. 67 Trevaskes, “Courts on the Campaign Path in China,” p. 675. 68 Craig S. Smith, “Torture Hurries New Wave of Executions in China,” New York Times, September 9, 2001, at p. 9. 69 See Trevaskes, “Courts on the Campaign Path in China,” p. 682. 70 See ibid., p. 678. 71 See Trevaskes, “Courts on the Campaign Path in China,” p. 681. 72 See “National Public Order Work Conference Held in Beijing,” Xinhua News Agency, April 3, 2001, cited in Trevaskes, “Courts on the Campaign Path in China,” p. 677. 73 See Cheng Weirong, Towards the Rule of Law Era, p. 58. The dual leadership is provided in Article 43 of the Party Constitution. 74 Article 44 of the Party Constitution. 75 See “Report of the Discipline Inspection Committee,” November 14, 2002, in http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2002-11/19/content_634084.htm (accessed November 13, 2003). 76 It refers to the practice that a suspected corrupt official must report within the prescribed time and at the prescribed location to the Party Discipline Inspection Committee during the preliminary investigation prior to the intervention of the judiciary. 77 See “Insights of Liu Fangren’s Corruption,” Boxun, November 14, 2003, in http://peacehall.com/news/gb/misc/2003/11/200311141421.shtml (accessed November 14 2003). 78 See Deshingkar, “Rule of Law vs. Rule of Man,” p. 256. 79 See Yu Zeyuan, “Internet uses and scholars in China: Cheng Weigao, former Party Secretary-General of Hebei Province, should be punished by state law,” Lianhe Zaobao (in Chinese), in http://www.zaobao.com.sg/gj/zg007_130803. html (accessed August 13, 2003). 80 See “168,000 cases of violating land law, 5 big cases will be investigated openly soon,” in http://www.peopledaily.com.cn/GB/shehui/1061/2191713.html (accessed November 29, 2003). 81 See Shao Daosheng, “Today the law-breaking cost for officials is really low,” in http://www.peopledaily.com.cn/GB/guandian/1036/2205858.html (accessed November 29, 2003).

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82 Jasper Becker, The Chinese (New York: The Free Press, 2000), p. 340. 83 A recent official report acknowledged that 95 percent of judges and other legal administrators are Party members who are carefully selected for being politically loyal to the Party line, see Xin Ren, Tradition of the Law and Law of the Tradition: Law, State and Social Control in China (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997), p. 60. 84 Stuart S. Nagel, “The Relationship between the Political and Ethnic Affiliation of Judges, and Their Decision-Making,” in Glendon Schubwert (ed.), Judicial Behavior: a Reader in Theory and Research (Chicago, IL: Rand McNally & Company, 1964), at p. 246. 85 Baker, “Party and Law in China,” p. 10. 86 The four basic cardinal principles are: (a) leadership of the CCP; (b) adherence to Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought; (c) adherence to the people’s democratic dictatorship; and (d) adherence to the socialist road. See Preamble of the Chinese Constitution. 87 Trevaskes, “Courts on the Campaign Path in China,” p. 690. 88 See Jiang Huiling, “Judicial Procedure and Judicial Reform,” People’s Judicature (in Chinese), No. 7 (1999), at p. 24. 89 The Chinese like to use the jargon “getting on track with the international community” (gen guoji jiegui). 90 It was adopted by the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders held at Milan from August 26 to September 6, 1985 and endorsed by General Assembly resolutions 40/32 of November 29, 1985 and 40/146 of December 13, 1985. In terms of judicial independence, it stipulates that: 1

2

3 4

5

6 7

The independence of the judiciary shall be guaranteed by the State and enshrined in the Constitution or the law of the country. It is the duty of all governmental and other institutions to respect and observe the independence of the judiciary. The judiciary shall decide matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts and in accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason. The judiciary shall have jurisdiction over all issues of a judicial nature and shall have exclusive authority to decide whether an issue submitted for its decision is within its competence as defined by law. There shall not be any inappropriate or unwarranted interference with the judicial process, nor shall judicial decisions by the courts be subject to revision. This principle is without prejudice to judicial review or to mitigation or commutation by competent authorities of sentences imposed by the judiciary, in accordance with the law. Everyone shall have the right to be tried by ordinary courts or tribunals using established legal procedures. Tribunals that do not use the duly established procedures of the legal process shall not be created to displace the jurisdiction belonging to the ordinary courts or judicial tribunals. The principle of the independence of the judiciary entitles and requires the judiciary to ensure that judicial proceheimergs are conducted fairly and that the rights of the parties are respected. It is the duty of each Member State to provide adequate resources to enable the judiciary to properly perform its functions.

See Principles 1–7 of the Basic Principles, available in http://www.unhchr.ch/ html/menu3/b/h_comp50.htm (accessed July 2, 2001).

102 Zou Keyuan 91 See “Handling well six relationships in local legislation – speech made by Jiang Chunyun, NPC Vice-Chairman at the seminar on local legislation in Shenzhen,” in http://www.npcnews.com.cn/gb/paper7/26/class000700002/hwz228320.htm (accessed September 16, 2003). 92 See “Red-dotted document pardoned crimes of private enterprises and the CCP hopes to stop capital flow overseas,” in http://www.lundian.com/forum/view. shtml?p=PS200402091401001017&l=chinese (accessed February 11, 2004). 93 See Cai Dingjian and Liu Dan, “From Policy Society to Rule of Law Society,” in Huang Zhiying (ed.), The Road to China’s Rule of Law (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2000) (in Chinese), at p. 91. 94 See People’s Daily (in Chinese), September 27, 1989; cited in Liao Susheng, “Brief Comments on Comrade Jiang Zemin’s Thoughts on Governing the State by Law,” Law Science (in Chinese), No. 6, (1999), at p. 5. 95 Articles 5 and 126 of the Constitution. 96 Folsom, Law and Politics in the People’s Republic of China, pp. 91–92. 97 For example, article 5 of the 1982 Constitution provides that “all political parties must abide by the Constitution and the law,” and “no organization or individual is privileged to be beyond the Constitution or the law.” 98 Li Liangdong, “Deepening theoretical perception and enhancing practical development,” People’s Daily (in Chinese), November 25, 2003, at p. 9. 99 See “Scholar’s salary was suspended due to his questioning of constitutional violations of the Political-Legal Committee,” Ming Pao (in Chinese), September 9, 2003. 100 See Deshingkar, “Rule of Law vs. Rule of Man: Contradictory Pulls in China,” p. 66. 101 Carlos Wing-Hung Lo, “Socialist Legal Theory in Deng Xiaoping’s China,” Columbia Journal of Asian Law, Vol. 11, No. 2 (1997), at p. 469.

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5

Bianzhi and cadre management in China The case of Yangpu Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard

This chapter addresses the important issue of bianzhi and cadre management at the local level in China. The bianzhi system is a system for creating and deleting posts based on identifying the necessary functions the state needs to fulfill, whereas the nomenklatura system is about appointing and dismissing leading personnel, including reserve candidates for these positions. With the introduction of the civil service system in China there was an attempt to organizationally separate bianzhi and nomenklatura, so that state personnel departments would handle the former system and party committees the latter. However, as part of the recentralization of party control since the early 1990s, the party has re-established control over bianzhi work. An important consequence has been difficulties in implementing restructuring and downsizing of state cadres in China. A local case study of Yangpu Economic Development Zone in Hainan Province illustrates the issues and problems involved. The chapter is structured in the following way. First, there is a discussion of the bianzhi versus nomenklatura problematique. Second, the party and state organizational setup in Yangpu and the bianzhi that is allocated to this particular administrative system are outlined. Third, since the fixing of the bianzhi is closely associated with the functions of the administrative setup it is supposed to take care of, a section on core functions of the administrative organs of Yangpu has been included. Fourth, the civil service system and its classification schemes are discussed in relation to the national system introduced in 1993. Finally, in the conclusion, the contradiction between stated goals of administrative downsizing and what is actually taking place behind the rhetoric is highlighted, and it is concluded that the case of Yangpu appears to confirm, at the local level, the trend that has taken place at the national level, namely, a process of the party reasserting itself in the administrative running of the country.

Bianzhi versus nomenklatura Any discussion of cadres and cadre management in China needs to take a number of key administrative concepts, peculiar to the Chinese

104 Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard administrative system, into consideration. The most important of these are bianzhi and nomenklatura. Bianzhi usually refers to the authorized number of personnel in a unit, office or organization and is normally translated as “establishment.”1 By controlling the bianzhi the party-state exercises control over the entire administrative apparatus from central to local level. There are three main categories of bianzhi: administrative bianzhi (xingzheng bianzhi), enterprise bianzhi (qiye bianzhi), and the bianzhi that applies to service organizations (shiye danwei bianzhi). The administrative bianzhi has the most direct bearing on the political system. It refers to the authorized number of established posts in party and government administrative organs (jigou). The administrative bianzhi stipulates the number of administrative organs (jigou) and the number of personnel (renyuan) in these organs. The administrative bianzhi also specifies the number of leading positions in the various administrative organs. The bianzhi also involves budget outlays in the form of salary and allowances. Shiye bianzhi refers to the number of established posts in so-called service organizations. Shiye danwei are different from administrative organs in that they do not have administrative power over other bodies.2 Finally, the concept of qiye bianzhi refers to state economic enterprises, i.e., profit-oriented economic enterprises at various levels of the state economic production system. Collective and private enterprises are not covered by the bianzhi system.3 The concept of nomenklatura is closely related to bianzhi. It is a Soviet/ Russian term that lay at the heart of the former Soviet control system. Based on Bohdan Harasymiw’s seminal article from 1969 nomenklatura has, in most writing on the topic, been defined as a “list of positions, arranged in order of seniority, including a description of the duties of each office.”4 In the former Soviet Union the Central Committee and the various party committees at the different levels of the administrative setup established and maintained such lists. After 1949 the CCP developed a similar system.5 However, this definition, in fact, better covers the bianzhi system and therefore the two concepts of bianzhi and nomenklatura are often confused.6 What is missing in Harasymiw’s widely used definition is that the nomenklatura lists are controlled by party committees and that they only contain leadership positions. Therefore a more precise definition would be to define nomenklatura as a list containing those leading officials directly appointed by the party as well as those officials about whom recommendations for appointment, release or transfer may be made by other bodies, but which require the party’s approval.7 It should also be noted that the nomenklatura include lists of personnel to be recommended for future appointment.8 The bianzhi system neither contains such reserve lists nor does it describe mechanisms for leadership appointments. As indicated, it can be difficult to distinguish between bianzhi and nomenklatura. A bianzhi list specifying and ranking the various positions and detailing the administrative functions in offices and organs under the

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authority of a given party committee or party faction is, in fact, part of the nomenklatura. However, a bianzhi list established and maintained by a state personnel department is, in principle, not part of the nomenklatura. For example, a bianzhi list encompasses all employees in a given unit, including people engaged in logistic work, whereas the nomenklatura only apply to the leading administrative personnel from ke (section)-level and above. However, in practice, party organization departments will oversee the work of the state personnel departments and often the two lists may overlap. Structurally there are centrally managed cadres, provincially managed cadres, prefecture (city) managed cadres, and county managed cadres. Principal cadres in the state civil service will be part of the nomenklatura system at their corresponding levels. Originally, national bianzhi work was directed by a State Bianzhi Committee (Guojia bianzhi weiyuanhui) which was placed directly under the State Council as directly affiliated organ (zhishu jigou). It was headed by the State Council Secretary General and had a bianzhi of 30 positions. In 1982 the committee was merged with the State Labor Bureau, the State Personnel Bureau and the Government Bureau for Cadres in Science and Technology to form a new Ministry of Labor and Personnel.9 However, in 1991 bianzhi control was centralized and placed directly under the Central Committee as the Central Commission for Institutional Bianzhi (Zhongyang jigou bianzhi weiyuanhui). This move, which placed bianzhi work directly under CCP control, was in line with the recentralization of party control in personnel matters that took place from the early 1990s. Obviously, moving bianzhi work from state to party control enhances the importance of this particular kind of personnel work. The move also underlines that bianzhi control and nomenklatura control are closely related. Seen from the party’s perspective this shift of bianzhi management from the state to the party makes sense, since organization and personnel work are – along with ideology – core preoccupations of the party. At the local level a similar process has taken place. Until 1988 the bianzhi system was primarily managed by the xitong of the Ministry of Labour and Personnel. But, since the early 1990s, bianzhi work at the local level has been placed under the dual leadership of the local party committee and the xitong constituted by the Central Commission for Institutional Bianzhi and its network of local commissions.

Bianzhi and civil servants According to recent statistics, the number of people in China encompassed by the bianzhi system amounts to 33.76 million.10 Two-thirds work in the shiye danwei and one-third work in government and party agencies. These are all on the state payroll and eat “imperial grain.” As mentioned above, state-run industrial enterprises have their own separate bianzhi. The key group are the officials in state organs. They staff the public sector from

106 Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard central to local level and are, since 1993, called civil servants (gongwuyuan).11 Together with party officials they form the core group of state and party cadres (ganbu). In 1978 there were 3.73 million bureaucrats staffing the governing system in China. In 2002 the number had increased to 9.45 million (see Table 5.1). The party controls the civil servants in two principal ways. First, 96 percent of all civil servants from division (county) level and above are party members. Second, through the nomenklatura system, the party controls the appointment of the person in charge (zheng zhi) of administrative agencies and organs from township level and up. Third, even though these officials are civil servants and as such are managed according to the civil servant system initiated in 1993, the party also classifies the civil servants as cadres and in this sense they are also managed according to the party’s cadre regulations. Of the 10 million people staffing the governing system in China about 70 percent work at the sub-provincial level. Therefore, developments at this level have a crucial influence on how the system works. However, Table 5.1 Estimated number of civil servants, 1978–2002 Year

Employeees in state, party and mass organizations

No. of civil servants (millions)*

1978 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

4.17 4.76 6.91 7.42 7.78 8.17 8.59 9.03 9.46 9.69 10.30 10.07 10.27 10.75 10.80 10.84 10.88 10.91 10.88 10.56

3.73 4.26 6.18 6.62 6.96 7.34 8.69 8.08 8.47 8.61 9.22 9.01 9.17 9.62 9.67 9.70 9.72 9.76 9.72 9.45

* Calculated on the basis of the total number of employees in state, party and mass organizations minus an estimated number of about 8–13 percent logistic workers and temporary personnel.

Source: Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2004 (China’s Statistical Yearbook 2004), p. 128. For this method of calculating the number of civil servants, see Zhu Guanglei, Dangdai Zhongguo shehui gejieceng fenxi (Analysis of Social Strata in Contemporary China) (Tianjian: Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 1998), p. 141.

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there are only very few studies on cadres and cadre management at the local level. This study attempts to remedy this situation by taking a closer look at the bianzhi and cadre management system in the locality of Yangpu Economic Development Zone in Hainan province.

Personnel establishment and management in Yangpu Yangpu development zone provides an interesting case of sub-provincial personnel establishment and cadre management. It offers a rare glimpse on how bianzhi formulation and implementation work at the local level and how this process relates to the party’s nomenklatura system. Yangpu is located at the north-west corner of Hainan Island, about 140 km from Haikou, and has an excellent natural deep-water harbor where docks suitable for large ships can be constructed. In August 1988 not long after the establishment of Hainan province, it was decided to grant Yangpu a number of preferential policies in order to develop the area as an Economic Development Zone based on large foreign investment. Thus the idea was put forward to lease land-use rights to a foreign consortium for 70 years on an area of 30 square kilometres in Yangpu. With some delay the zone was officially approved by the State Council in March 1992 and the contract for land lease was signed by the Hainan authorities and the Hong Kong-based, Japanese-owned company Kumagai Gumi in August 1992. At the time of the signing of the contract Yangpu was still a backward agricultural area and a small fishing port with only 40,000 inhabitants, but the Hainan Provincial Government expected that within 15 years the zone would become an advanced city with export-oriented industry, large storehouse facilities and financial services. In order to manage and facilitate this process the provincial authorities decided to set up an administrative system. In April 1993 in anticipation of the opening of Yangpu as a bonded area, an administration was set up consisting of a management bureau (guanli ju) with seven functional departments (zhineng ju) and one general office (bangongshi). The management bureau was the principal organ and therefore ranked highest in the administrative hierarchy. The head of the bureau (juzhang) was appointed by, and directly responsible to, the provincial authorities and was ranked at the same level as department heads (tingzhang) in the provincial government. In his daily work he was assisted by a vice-head of bureau (fu juzhang), an assistant to the bureau head and the general administration office.12 The general office took care of the daily work of the management bureau of Yangpu. The head of the office had a rank similar to division-level rank in the provincial government. Internally the office was divided into six sections dealing with policy regulations, internal documents, communication, external news, internal management affairs, and liaison with provincial authorities in Haikou.

108 Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard Below the management bureau there were seven functional departments (zhineng ju) (see Figure 5.1). These departments covered administrative functions such as land planning and development, economic development, finances and taxes, social development, transportation and communication, public security, and personnel. The Personnel Department shared an office and personnel with the general office of Yangpu’s party committee. The functional departments were all ranked at the division level. The departments were not divided into sections (ke). Instead, a system where each Functional Departments

Fading Jigou Transportation Fee Management

Transportation and Communication Center for Health Care Administration Social Development Social Security

Public Security State Asset Management Finance

Tax Administration Center Tax Collection

Management Bureau Personnel (Party Comm. General Office) (Party Comm. Organization Department)

Job Service Center

Fishing Policies and Inspection

Economic Development

Industry and Commerce Service Center FDI Inflow

Land Planning and Development

Planning and Development Center

General Office

Organizational Affairs

Figure 5.1 Administrative setup, Yangpu Economic Development Zone

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administrative post was filled with only one expert who administered his own administrative area (zhuanyuan zhuban zhi) was practiced. Some administrative functions were also handed over to 12 so-called administratively entrusted legal organs (weituo xingzheng de fading jigou). This formulation seems to denote that these organs were not part of the administrative bianzhi. They were, instead, part of the bianzhi of affiliated service organizations (shiye danwei). Their relationship to the functional departments is characterized by professional subordination rather than administrative subordination.13 Although they are not in an administrative sense directly part of the various functional bureaus, they do work under their professional guidance and they are mentioned in the description of the administrative functions of the functional departments.14 The fading jigou work within the following areas: social security, administration of state investments, tax collection, job services, commercial services, fishery, inspection of the administration of transportation fees, health service, planning and construction (real estate and property), attraction of foreign direct investment, financial affairs, management of organizational affairs. The various agencies and centers formed on the basis of these functions were not ranked. The Hainan provincial authorities had approved that the Yangpu zone should be divided into three areas, namely Ganchong, Xinyingwan and Xindu. In each an administrative office was established at the vice-division level. Each office was divided into three or four sections dealing with economic affairs, social affairs, security issues and general affairs. The three local administrative offices also guided and assisted the local residential committees.

The bianzhi of the Yangpu Economic Development Zone The bianzhi of the management bureau, the functional departments and the general office comprised 70 functional posts and 78 administrative officers of which the four leading posts were actually on the nomenklatura of the provincial authorities. In addition the department of public security had 150 people on its bianzhi and the party working committee had eight. These were all part of the local nomenklatura except for the four top posts at ting level and vice-ting level, which were controlled by the provincial authorities. The auditing and supervision organs were also not on the Yangpu nomenklatura. In addition the fading jigou were allocated a separate bianzhi of 124. List of positions and personnel bianzhi15 1 Management department Department head Vice-department head Assistants to the department head

6 1 3 2

positions position positions positions

110 Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard 2

3 4

5

6

Office of party working committee 8 positions Head 1 position Vice-head 1 position Responsible for organizational work 1 position Responsible for propaganda work 1 position Responsible for disciplinary and supervision work 1 position Responsible for organizational bianzhi 1 position Responsible for personnel work 1 position Responsible for salary management 1 position Affiliated party committee 2 positions Party secretary 1 position Responsible for party affairs 1 position General office of management department 16 positions Head 1 position Vice-head 1 position Head of section for policy laws 1 position Responsible for policy laws 1 position Head of office for external news 1 position Responsible for external news 1 position Head of Haikou office 1 position Responsible for accounting, Haikou office 1 position Head of section for internal documents 1 position Secretary to the head of management department 1 position Administrative secretary 1 position Secretary for confidential affairs 1 position Head of section for information 1 position Responsible for information work 1 position Head of auditing section 1 position Responsible person for auditing work 1 position Division for land planning and development 9 positions Head 1 position Vice-head 2 positions Responsible for administration 1 position Responsible for real estate administration 1 position Responsible for city planning administration 1 position Responsible for construction administration 1 position Responsible for management of environment and resources 1 position Responsible for municipal administration 1 position Division for economic development 12 positions Head 1 position Vice-head 2 positions Responsible for trade administration 1 position Responsible for real estate economics 1 position Responsible for security management 1 position

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Responsible for technical supervision administration 1 Responsible for industry and trade administration 1 Responsible for statistical planning administration 1 Responsible for market administration 1 Responsible for agricultural planning 1 Responsible for trading port administration 1 7 Division for public finances 8 Head 1 Vice-head 2 Responsible for forecasting 1 Responsible for expenditure administration 1 Responsible for tax administration 1 Responsible for accounting management 1 Responsible for financial management 1 8 Division for social development 10 Head 1 Vice-head 2 Responsible for science and technology administration 1 Responsible for civil administration 1 Responsbile for judicial administration 1 Responsible for health care administration 1 Responsible for administration of cultural affairs 1 Responsible for job creation 1 Responsible for population administration 1 9 Division for communication and transport 7 Head 1 Vice-head 1 Responsible for administration of public road transportation 1 Responsible for road administration 1 Responsible for water transportation 1 Responsible for harbor administration 1 Responsible for collecting legal fees 1 10 Bureau of public security (positions separately fixed) 150 Affiliated legal organs (fading jigou) 1 Social security department Leading positions 2 Office for state asset management Leading positions 3 Tax collection department Leading positions 4 Job service center Leading positions

position position position position position position positions position positions position position position position position positions position positions position position position position position position position positions position position position position position position position positions

10 positions 2 10 positions 2 25 positions 2 10 positions 2

112 Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard 5

Industry and commerce service center Leading positions 6 Office for fishery policies and inspection Leading positions 7 Inspection office for transportation fee management Leading positions 8 Center for health care administration Leading positions 9 Planning and development center Leading positions 10 Department for attracting FDI Leading positions 11 Tax administration center Leading positions 12 Department for organizational affairs Leading positions

15 positions 2 8 positions 2 6 positions 2 fluctuating 2 15 positions 2 7 positions 2 12 positions 1 6 positions 2

Branches of management department Ganchong Xinyingwan Xindu

63 23 23 17

positions positions positions positions

Core functions of Yangpu administrative organs When establishing an administration in China the allocation of bianzhi is closely associated with the number of core functions the new setup is supposed to take care of. This was also the case in Yangpu. For the management bureau, the functional departments and the various fading jigou the functions were meticulously determined and written down. The management bureau was established as the local representative organ (paichu jigou) of the Hainan provincial government.16 Its primary function was to represent the Hainan provincial government in the Yangpu Economic Development Zone and to exercise administrative management authority over the zone and the adjacent sea territory. Other important functions were to: (1) ensure the smooth implementation of foreign investors’ operation of leased land; (2) lay down and circulate detailed implementation rules for various management regulations of the development zone; (3) work out, examine and approve the investment plans and the construction projects of the development zone; (4) work out the establishment of the internal working organs of the management bureau and the appointment and removal of cadres; organize implementation after approval; (5) be responsible for the administrative management of the various departments

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and trades of the development zone; (6) manage the development zone’s planning and construction work; (7) implement economic supervision and safeguard the market economy; (8) protect social stability and social public order; (9) coordinate the work of local offices of relevant state departments; (10) undertake other work assigned by the Hainan provincial authorities. For the various functional departments the core functions were also specified. As mentioned this is an important exercise, since the number and character of functions will determine the allocated personnel quota, i.e., the bianzhi. The Department for Economic Development, for example, had the following functions: (1) work out the zone’s internal economic policies and management regulations; (2) be responsible for the registration and examination and verification of investment projects; (3) be responsible for leading and coordinating trade information; (4) supervise and inspect that the unit of the port administration implement regulations and regulatives; (5) supervise and inspect enterprise registration licenses, trademarks and advertising; (6) supervise and inspect the implementation of internal price policies and rule in Yangpu zone, be in charge of supervising personnel responsible for market planning and management; (7) be in charge of supervising and managing the zone’s economic standards and measures; (8) be in charge of developing and planning the zone’s agriculture and fishery and supervise their implementation; (9) be in charge of planning the zone’s economic development objectives and the statistical work; (10) guide, supervise and inspect the work of the Industrial and Commercial Service Center and the Office for Fishery Policies and Inspection. The affiliated fading jigou also had their functions carefully listed. For example, the Industrial and Commercial Service Center, affiliated to the Department for Economic Development had the following main functions: (1) carry through and implement the party’s and the government’s economic policies and the administrative management policies and regulations of industry and commerce; (2) be in charge of handling the registration procedures of various kinds of enterprises and private enterprises (geti gongshanghu) and collect registration fees and, according to law, carry out supervision of registered enterprises in the zone; (3) take charge of managing trade marks and advertising affairs in the zone; (4) according to law confirm the legality and feasibility and conduct arbitration concerning the management of economic contracts, take charge of the investigation of relevant draft documents, formulate proposals of handling affairs, assist public security, discipline and legal authorities and other relevant institutions in investigating and dealing with economic criminal offenses conducted by enterprises in the zone; (5) manage the fair trade market of the zone, regulate the scope of market transactions, combat smuggling and corruption, protect the stability of the market; (6) provide commercial

114 Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard consultancy for the zone’s enterprises; (7) be responsible for collecting relevant material concerning industrial and commercial management; (8) distribute code numbers to the enterprises in the zone; (9) be responsible for the establishment of statistical report forms for registered enterprises and the reporting to higher administrative levels; (10) undertake other works the management bureau may transfer. This list of main functions for the Industrial and Commercial Service Center to fulfil clearly indicates that the center handles work that might just as well be part of the job description of the Department for Economic Development. In fact, each fading jigou was associated with one of the functional departments. As mentioned above, the Industrial and Commercial Service Center was required to do work assigned by the management bureau of the Yangpu development zone. This requirement also applied to the other fading jigou. Therefore one should regard them as part of the organizational complex of the Yangpu development zone, although their personnel are not on the administrative bianzhi and thus cannot be regarded as civil servants. Personnel on the administrative bianzhi were regarded as civil servants and supposed to be classified and managed according to the Provisional Civil Service Regulations promulgated in August 1993. Following the promulgation of the national regulations a set of regulations were worked out in order for Yangpu zone to adopt the new civil service system.

Civil service system Following the passing of the national Provisional Civil Service Regulations in 1993, the civil service system was introduced at the local level, including in Yangpu Economic Development Zone. The introduction of the system was closely modeled on the national system,17 but there were some variations as to the classification of civil service positions. Concerning the classification of rank and job positions below the level of the administration bureau, i.e., at the division level or below, the following list applied: 1

Leading positions • The assistant to the head of the management bureau (division rank). • Heads of second-level departments and offices (division rank). • Vice-heads of second-level departments and offices (vice-division rank). • Positions in internal organs of second-level departments (vicedivision rank).

2

Non-leading positions • Investigator (division level). • First-level responsible officer (zhuban) (assistant investigator). • Second-level responsible officer (chief section member).

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• • •

Third-level responsible officer (deputy chief section member). Fourth-level responsible officer (section member). Fifth-level responsible officer (office worker).

According to the national classification scheme these positions are at grades 7 to 15 (see Table 5.2). Head of division, head of county and investigator are classified at grades 7–10; deputy head of division, deputy head of county and assistant investigator at grades 8–11; head of section, head of township and chief member of sections, grades 9–12; deputy head of section, deputy head of township and deputy chief member of section at grades 9–13; section member, grades 9–14, and finally office worker is placed at grades 10–15.18 It is interesting to note that an investigator is placed at division level. Thus an investigator would be in the same grade category as a division head. However, a division head is the head of an administrative unit and is therefore at what in Chinese is called zheng chuji level (real division level). This means in practice that a zheng chuji leader will outrank a person who is at the same administrative level, but is not the principal leader in an administrative sense. The civil service system introduced in Yangpu also included some provisions concerning promotion. Normally, work experience of more than two years at the current level was required before moving up to the next higher administrative level. To move from a position as responsible officer to a leadership position as head or vice-head of division, more than three years’ work experience was required in addition to work experience from at least two lower-level ranked positions. This provision has apparently been introduced in order to prevent the kind of helicoptering that took place during the Cultural Revolution. Table 5.2 Correspondences between position and grade 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Premier of the State Council: grade 1. Vice-premier and state councillor: grades 2 to 3. Minister and leader of province: grades 3 to 4. Vice-minister and vice-leader of province: grades 4 to 5. Director of bureau (si, ting) and inspector (xunshiyuan): grades 5 to 7. Vice-director and assistant inspector: grades 6 to 8. Head of division (chu), head of county and investigator (diaoyanyuan): grades 7 to 10. Deputy head of division, deputy head of county, assistant investigator: grades 8 to 11. Head of section, head of township, chief member of section (zhuren keyuan): grades 9 to 12. Deputy head of section, deputy head of township, and deputy chief member of section: grades 9 to 13. Section member: grades 9 to 14. Office worker (banshiyuan): grades 10 to 15.

116 Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard The civil servants were part of the state administrative system. The personnel department handled appointments at section level and below, subject to approval by the management bureau. However, administrative positions at vice-division level and above were discussed by the party committee (the working committee) before being sent to the management bureau for approval. In this way the party’s influence on promotions was secured. As mentioned above, the civil service regulations for Yangpu Economic Development Zone included detailed provisions concerning a number of issues such as training, evaluation, avoidance, demotion, retirement, etc. There were even detailed regulations concerning material rewards (jiangli) for outstanding civil servants. Apparently there was a need to outline the new system in great detail. The overall impression is that the Hainan authorities took great pains to establish a bureaucratic superstructure in Yangpu that corresponded to the national-level system.

New administrative setup In 1996 a so-called research and investigation group put forward a draft proposal concerning institutional reform in Yangpu Economic Development Zone.19 The draft aimed to conduct experimental institutional reform in Yangpu and was worked out on the basis of a 1995 central circular on institutional reform experiments in development zones.20 The name of the new administrative setup was to be “The management bureau of Yangpu economic development zone” (Yangpu jingji kaifa qu guanli shu). The head of the new system (shuzhang) was to have the rank of a provincial head of department (tingzhang). In his work the head of the management bureau would be aided by an assistant head (shuzhang zhuli) with rank of vice-bureau head and an assistant for specialized work (zhuanxiang gongzuo zhuli) with division-level rank and the head of the administrative office of the management bureau. There would be no formal post as vice-bureau head (fu shuzhang). The administrative setup was now reformed to cover more tasks and assignments. There would still be seven functional departments including a supervision and auditing department and a public security department. The department for land planning and development would be abolished, but the department of supervision and auditing would be added as a functional department of the management bureau. The plan envisaged the reduction of the fading jigou from 12 to seven. The head of fading jigou (division or vice-division level) and the vice-head (vice-division or section level) would be regarded as civil servants, but the rank-and-file office workers would not be ranked.21 As a consequence the bianzhi of the fading jigou would still be considered part of the shiye bianzhi of the zone rather than the administrative bianzhi. The plan operated with an administrative bianzhi of 180, not including the bianzhi of the Inspection Department and the Public Security

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Department which were still kept separate from the allocated administrative bianzhi of the zone. This is a 29 percent increase compared to the previous administrative bianzhi of 139. The fading jigou was allocated a shiye bianzhi of 100, which was a 19 percent reduction of the previous bianzhi of 124. In addition, schools and hospitals were to be allocated a bianzhi of 400. Assuming that the inspection and public security still would be allocated a bianzhi of around 150, the administrative bureaucracy would amount to about 800 people. The draft specifies that this bianzhi should remain unaltered in the 1996–1999 period.

Party organization The local party organization in Yangpu is headed by the CCP working committee of Yangpu Economic Development Zone (zhonggong Yangpu jingji kaifa qu gongzuo weiyuanhui). The head of the management bureau is concurrently also head of the party working committee. The daily work of the party working committee is conducted by a general office which also serves as the party committee organizational department and the personnel department of the management bureau. The working committee practices the so-called committee system (gongwei huiyi zhidu). In addition to handling day-to-day work the general office of the working committee takes care of organizational affairs and propaganda work. It shares office with the department of supervision and auditing, the discipline and inspection committee and the general office of the management bureau. The most important function of the party working committee is to recommend the appointment of division-level cadres and to appoint and dismiss party cadres in the zone. According to the internal rules of procedure the party working committee meets regularly on the first Thursday morning of each month. There is a quorum requirement and more than 50 percent of the full members of the committee have to attend in order for the committee to meet. Upon requirement, lower-level party leaders at, for example, party general branch level, or other relevant persons might attend in a non-voting capacity. Similarly the head or vice-head of the working committee’s general office usually attend in a non-voting capacity. The most important task of the party committee is to manage the local nomenklatura, i.e., to discuss and decide upon a list of recommended names of responsible persons in the functional departments and the general office. These are all positions at the division level, the level below the management bureau and the party committee. Other personnel matters include establishing party organs such as basic-level party organs, general party branch and party groups. Personnel work also involves approving, appointing or demoting secretaries and vice-secretaries of basic-level party committees and general party branches and the members of the leading party groups, in addition to authority to appoint leading personnel in the working committee’s working

118 Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard organs. In short, in personnel matters the party committee follows the rule of one-level down appointments. Thus, authority to appoint at the management bureau level rests in the provincial authority in Haikou. The provincial government makes the appointment in the administrative sector based on party recommendations made by the Hainan provincial party committee. In Yangpu, leading local positions at the next lower level (division level) are filled by the management bureau on the recommendation by the Yangpu party committee (the working committee). Internal party appointments are handled by the party itself. The party’s heavy involvement in bianzhi work has important consequences. Above we have discussed how bianzhi centralization facilitates nomenklatura control. However, it is important to note that such tight control runs counter to the original intention behind the introduction of the civil service reform in 1993. At the time the idea was to classify cadres into two categories, a political-administrative category (zhengwu gongwuyuan) and a professional work category (yewu gongwuyuan). Only the former category should be managed by the party according to its cadre regulations. The latter category should be managed by the state according to new civil service regulations. The party organization was not too happy about this division and has, ever since, successfully sabotaged any moves in this direction. Moreover, the CCP as an organization has an interest in maintaining as many official positions as possible. This is a major factor in explaining why major restructuring or downsizing campaigns rarely meet with success, so that Hainan still has a relatively “big government” in spite of many attempts to introduce “small government, big society” on the island. Only by getting the party out of bianzhi work will it be possible to seriously effect administrative downsizing.

Concluding remarks The above appears to show that the Chinese administrative setup is meticulously planned down to the lowest level. All positions are defined in terms of function and status. They are part of a bianzhi that covers all statesalaried employees. All leading cadres from ke-level and up to the highest national level are, at the same time, also part of the party’s nomenklatura. The Hainan party committee manages the Yangpu party committee (the working committee), which influences administrative work in three ways. First, the secretary of the party committee is currently also head of the management bureau. Second, the party committee manages the appointment of responsible persons in functional departments and the general office. Third, the party committee has the authority to make recommendations on the organizational bianzhi subject to approval by the higher authorities in Haikou. It is interesting that all this administrative detailing in Yangpu took place while Hainan was the seat of an attempt to introduce political and social

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reform under the slogan of “small government, big society.” This concept entailed substantial downsizing of party and state bureaucracy. Following the 1998 decision to begin institutional reform Hainan again received considerable attention because the Hainan slogan of “small government, big society” was used as the overarching theme of the national reform attempts. This interest was stimulated by an authoritative study by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) on Hainan’s political and social system reform, which explicitly referred to Hainan as a model for administrative reform.22 It is thought-provoking that while this report was being prepared local authorities put forward a so-called “draft proposal concerning institutional reform” which entailed a 29 percent expansion of the administrative bianzhi of Yangpu Economic Development Zone. Clearly, one problem in effecting administrative reform is the intertwinement of bianzhi and nomenklatura. Bianzhi cutbacks invariably affect nomenklatura lists, so that bianzhi reduction not only is a question of downsizing state personnel, but is, in fact, also a question of downsizing the party – not in terms of party membership but in terms of party reach. Therefore, local party organizations, in practice, are often against administrative downsizing. The Yangpu example appears to confirm at the local level the trend that has taken place at the national level, namely a process of the party reasserting itself in the administrative running of the country. At the national level it has meant taking back some of the powers handed over to the ministry of personnel in 1988, and at the local level it has resulted in reasserting the party’s role in bianzhi work.

Notes 1 There are very few discussions of the bianzhi system available. Exceptions include Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard, “Institutional Reform and the Bianzhi System in China,” The China Quarterly, No. 170 (June 2002), pp. 361–386, and John P. Burns, “‘Downsizing’ the Chinese State: Government Retrenchment in the 1990s,” The China Quarterly, No. 175 (September 2003), pp. 775–802. See also Keith W. Foster, “Embedded within State Agencies: Business Associations in Yantai,” The China Journal, No. 47 (January 2002), pp. 41–65. 2 Shiye danwei are also different from economic enterprises in that they are not oriented towards profit seeking. Therefore, the translation of shiye danwei is sometimes rendered as non-profit organizations. They include hospitals, schools, kindergartens, universities, and other institutions in health care, sports, social welfare, culture and research. See Lam Tao-Chiu and James L. Perry, “Service Organizations in China: Reform and its Limits,” in Peter Nan-Shong Lee and Carlos Wing-Hung Lo (eds), Remaking China’s Public Management (Westport, CT: Quorum Books, 2001), pp. 19–40. 3 On occasion a social organization bianzhi (shehui tuanti bianzhi) has been mentioned, but it is rarely used. Mostly the bianzhi of social organizations are categorized as shiye bianzhi. See also Foster, “Embedded within State Agencies,” p. 47.

120 Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard 4 See Bohdan Harasymiw, “Nomenklatura: The Soviet Communist Party’s Leadership Recruitment System,” Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 2, No. 4 (December 1969), p. 494. 5 The Chinese concept of nomenklatura is zhiwu mingchengbiao (job title list) and it is a system that controls and describes the positions and offices over which the party committee has authority. 6 Examples of confusing bianzhi and nomenklatura include Ting Wai, “Reform of the Nomenklatura in 1998: A Preliminary Appraisal,” in Chong Chor Lau and Geng Xiao (eds), China Review 1999 (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press), pp. 47–80; and Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1968). 7 Harasymiw, “Nomenklatura: The Soviet Communist Party’s Leadership Recruitment System,” p. 494. 8 See also Burns, “ ‘Downsizing’ the Chinese State: Government Retrenchment in the 1990s.” 9 Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu, Zhonggong dangshi yanjiushi, and Zhongyang dang’an guan, Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao, 1921–1997, fujuan 1 (Material on the Organisational History of China’s Communist Party, 1921–1997. Appendix Volume 1) (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 2000), p. 929. 10 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo guojia tongji ju (ed.), Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2004 (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 2004), p. 134. 11 See Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard, “China’s Civil Service Reform: Changing the Bianzhi,” EAI Background Brief No. 81 (14 February 2001). 12 The nomenklatura (mingcheng) of various administrative organs is difficult to translate into English. In the central bureaucracy, the department level is called ju or si in Chinese. At the provincial level, department is usually rendered as ju or ting. These organs are ranked equal in the administrative hierarchy. The level below the department level is the division level which is called chu in Chinese. In the Yangpu case the functional departments below the management department were named ju, even though the nomenklatura of the provincial authorities had placed them at the chu level. In order to avoid much confusion in the following we will render the top administrative organ in Yangpu, the guanli ju, as bureau and the seven subordinate functional ju as departments. The management bureau is a bureau that is part of the Hainan provincial government and thus has ting rank, whereas the functional departments are part of the local Yangpu administration and are subordinated to the management bureau and therefore have division rank. 13 This means that the functional departments exercise professional leadership (yewu zhuguan) rather than administrative leadership (xingzheng zhuguan) over the fading jigou. For this distinction between “professional relations” and “leadership relations,” see also Yasheng Huang, “Administrative Monitoring in China,” The China Quarterly, No. 143 (September 1995), pp. 814–823. 14 As has been noted elsewhere government agencies in China usually form a complex of multiple organizations linked closely together in a “system.” See Foster, “Embedded within State Agencies.” In the Yangpu case the administrative setup consists of the management bureau (with its general office) and the seven functional departments. However, in order to generate more funds and personnel a number of service units, in this case called fading jigou, have been established. They receive a service bianzhi from the Yangpu management bureau. For example, the department of economic development “guides and supervises” the work of the Industrial and Commercial Service Center, which has a bianzhi of 15. In practice this means that the center spends considerable time on work actually belonging to the department of economic development. Similarly the department of planning and development oversees the work of the Planning and

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15 16 17

18 19

20

21 22

Development Service Center, which also has been allocated a bianzhi of 15. What this means is that by way of these fading jigou the Yangpu administrative setup has created an organizational complex which expands its reach considerably. However, since the fading jigou are part of the shiye danwei bianzhi in Yangpu this arrangement blurs the actual number of persons and resources engaged in administrative work. Material concerning the administrative setup in Yangpu province (no title, Yangpu, April 1996). Ibid., p. 10. Thus, there are detailed regulations concerning appointment, training, evaluation, “avoidance,” etc. corresponding to the national system. See “Yangpu jingji kaifaqu guojia gongwuyuan zhiwei fenlei shixing banfa” (Trial methods concerning the catogorization of positions) (Yangpu, n.d.), “Yangpu jingji kaifaqu guojia gongwuyuan luyong shixing banfa” (Trial methods concerning employment of state civil servants in Yangpu Economic Development Zone) (Yangpu, n.d.), “Yangpu jingji kaifaqu guojia gongwuyuan kaohe shixing banfa” (Trial methods concerning the appraisal of state civil servants in Yangpu Economic Development Zone) (Yangpu, n.d.), “Yangpu jingji kaifaqu guojia gongwuyuan peixun shixing banfa” (Trial methods concerning the training of state civil servants in Yangpu Economic Development Zone) (Yangpu, n.d.), “Yangpu jingji kaifaqu guojia gongwuyuan renmian shengjiang shixing banfa” (Trial methods concerning appointing/dismissing and promoting/demoting state civil servants in Yangpu Economic Development Zone) (Yangpu, n.d.). See Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard, “Civil Service Reform: Changing the Bianzhi,” EAI Background Brief, No. 81 (14 February, 2001). See Yangpu jingji kaifa qu xingzheng tizhi yu jigou shidian keti diaoyan zu (Yangpu Economic Development Zone’s research and investigation group for administrative systemic and organizational experiments, “Yangpu jingji kaifa qu xingzheng guanli tizhi he jigou gaige shidian fangan” (Draft concerning experiments with administrative management systems and organs in Yangpu Economic Development Zone) (Yangpu, July 1996). See “Guanyu yinfa ‘kaifa qu xingzheng guanli tizhi he jigou gaige shidian gongzuo yijian’ de tongzhi” (Concerning distribution of circular on opinions concerning experimental work with administrative management systems and organs in development zones) (Zhongfa, No. 5 1995). “Draft Concerning Experiments with Administrative Management Systems and Organs in Yangpu Economic Development Zone,” p. 7. See Ru Xin, “Xiao Zhengfu da shehui” de lilun yu shijian. This volume is the third of three major studies on Hainan’s political, economic and social affairs conducted by research teams from CASS and headed by CASS deputy directors. The others are the above-mentioned 1987 report by Liu Guoguang’s group and Wang Ruolin (ed.), Hainan jianli shehui zhuyi shichang jingji tizhi de shijian (The Practice of Establishing a Socialist Market Economic System in Hainan (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 1997).

6

The cadre responsibility system and the changing needs of the party Maria Heimer

A contended issue currently debated is whether the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) can adapt to the new era. There are two diverging views on this highly ideologically charged issue. One commonly held view is that the party cannot adapt mainly because Leninist institutions are not able, almost by definition, to survive large-scale changes and marketisation.1 The other view maintains that the party-state is already adapting. The government’s overall role in the economy has been reduced, and government agencies and personnel are being downsized as a result. The Chinese authorities have delegated many government functions to service organisation that perform administrative duties for them.2 China is remaking its public management3 and is also gradually transforming the internal functioning of the party-state.4 It is the latter view that has come to predominate, in particular among scholars who carry out empirical research. The former view that the CCP cannot adapt has, to some extent, been overtaken by development in China. Moving on from this particular issue of debate, the questions we pose should instead be: where is the party going and can the Chinese party-state solve the many urgent social problems it is presently facing? The latter question takes on a special salience as the Chinese government will have to deal with a great many social problems. The gap between coastal areas and the inland, as well as between different income groups, has been growing. According to a recent study by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the Gini coefficient was 0.46 in 2000, far higher than that of India and fast approaching Latin American figures.5 Poverty and unemployment are on the rise, not only in rural areas but also in urban areas. The new Chinese leaders, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, have gone to great lengths to portray themselves as men of the people, and they have adopted a people-oriented approach to government (yiren weiben). To appreciate the shift of policy, their people-oriented approach must be interpreted in the light of their predecessors’ growth-oriented policies of the 1990s. Jiang Zemin and his administration put economic growth first and had a reputation for representing the rich and powerful.6 To ‘put people first’ (qinmin) might have replaced the old slogan to ‘serve the people’ (wei renmin fuwu) as a legitimising device, but the new approach has also

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translated into concrete policies. At the first National People’s Congress meeting headed by Wen Jiabao in March 2004, China said goodbye to blind pursuit of GDP growth and promoted the scientific concept of development which also takes into account social development and environmental protection. China’s GDP growth rate was slowed down to 7 per cent in 2004 in order to strike a better balance between economic growth and social development.7 At the same time, the total GDP volume is to be doubled in around 20 years, making it uncertain how much weight will be placed on social development.8 One of the concrete measures taken to raise rural income is to reduce the agricultural tax by more than 1 per cent per year, with agricultural taxes to be eliminated in five years.9 This chapter will explore to what extent political institutions can be adapted to the changing needs of the CCP by taking the cadre responsibility system as a case. The main focus is whether the cadre responsibility system can be adapted to solve urgent social problems such as rising poverty and inequality between regions. An organisational approach is favoured to analyse the renewal of the CCP. The cadre responsibility system is the instrument used by the central government to steer local leaders and by which it holds them accountable. The priorities of the centre are channelled downwards through the responsibility system. In this way, a focus on the cadre responsibility system enables us to see what priorities are communicated to lower levels as well as to study the implementation of central policy. To what extent has the people-oriented approach of the new central leaders had an impact at the local organisational level, and has the emphasis on poverty and inequality trickled down to lower levels? Two of the top priorities of the new leadership coming into power are to reduce poverty and inequality. Poverty reduction was elevated to a key task in China’s national development and became manifest in the Ninth Five-Year-Plan (1996–2000). In 2000, a ‘Develop the Western regions’ (Xibu dakaifa) programme was launched and secured more funds, particularly for infrastructure, to the Western provinces. As a consequence of the large social problems, demonstrations, small and large, occur frequently. These social problems are, of course, also political problems that may ultimately endanger social stability and party rule. To study party changes, it is argued here that to do it from the local level is the best method. One important reason why a local approach is valuable is that macro-level changes are very likely to be first observed at the local level. Changes are likely to be spotted first at the local level for two reasons: first, initiatives to new policies are often taken locally, and only later adopted by the centre for national implementation, as were the household responsibility system, the emergence of township enterprises, and entrepreneurs joining the Communist Party. Second, when the initiative is taken by the central government, the centre has adopted a system of first trying out proposed policies in local experimental sites in order to study the process of implementation and its consequences. Recent examples

124 Maria Heimer are elections above the village level, and the tax for fee reform for which Anhui province volunteered to be the experiment site. Sometimes the reforms tried out are either postponed or abandoned. The two approaches may be merged, for example, when localities succeed in getting the centre’s support to continue to carry on with their experiment model or when the centre becomes inspired by local examples to carry out their own experiments. With regard to the cadre responsibility system, it is only in use below the central level which illustrates that its primary function lies in managing lower levels.

The basic features of the cadre responsibility system The cadre responsibility system is based on the nomenklatura and, likewise, constitutes the source of political control of the CCP, but it is also a method of governance. The nomenklatura is a list of leading positions over whose appointments the party exercises full control. Party committees exercise authority over the appointment of senior personnel, as well as promotion, dismissal and transfer one step down the administrative hierarchy.10 The cadre responsibility system (gangwei zerenzhi), on the other hand, is foremost about the employment of this appointment power. One component of the cadre responsibility system is the evaluation of leading cadres’ work performance, which is one factor underlying the promotion, dismissal and transfer decisions made by the party organisation department. The second component is how the centre makes use of promotion, dismissal and transfers to enforce their authority and steer local leaders, which includes the patterns of promotion and rotation. Local leaders are promoted to higher levels or hold positions at two levels simultaneously, and leading cadres are rotated between two administrative levels or between geographical areas at the same level. The nomenklatura is usually described to reach one level down, but in my view this choice of terminology is misleading as it gives the impression that the county controls the township, etc. which is only partly correct. The county party committee manages the county bureau leaders as well as the township leaders, and the two level leaders hold the same rank so it may be more correct to say that the nomenklatura reaches one rank down. This clarification turns out to be relevant when discussing the rotation between administrative levels. Cadre responsibility is thus one mode of overall cadre management. It is important to be explicit about what type of cadres it manages: both the nomenklatura and the cadre responsibility system only deal with leading cadres (lingdao ganbu), to be distinguished from bianzhi which covers all employees in a given unit, and concerns overall cadre management.11 One difference, however, between the nomenklatura and the cadre responsibility system is that the former encompasses leading cadres of all units while the latter mainly involves leading cadres of all levels, namely the party secretary and government head of local governments (diyi bashou).

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I have described the cadre responsibility system in detail elsewhere and will only briefly mention its basic features here so we are able to address its potential for adjustment.12 I focus on township leading cadres – the party secretary and township government head – but the system is reproduced from the province level down to the township. The first component is the evaluation of local leaders. Party secretaries and township heads literally sign performance contracts (gangwei mubiao zerenshu) with the county level. In these contracts, township leaders pledge to attain certain targets laid down by higher levels and are held personally responsible for achieving them. The content of performance contracts varies between areas and over time, reflecting the priorities of not only the central, but also of local, authorities. It is a sophisticated system as performance targets are internally ranked in importance: soft targets (yiban zhibiao), hard targets (ying zhibiao) and priority targets with veto power (yipiao foujue) sometimes also called bottom line targets. Veto power implies that if township leaders fail to attain these priority targets, it would cancel out all other work performance, however successful, in the comprehensive evaluation at the end of the year. The different targets are important in order to understand which policies are emphasised by the central government. At the end of the year, leaders are evaluated by higher levels upon the various targets in the performance contract. As part of the annual evaluation by higher levels, lower levels also pass their judgements on their leaders through questionnaires and opinion polls. Colleagues from the leader’s own work unit and representatives from the subordinate unit take part in an appraisal meeting. Ordinary citizens can only go through the channel of petitioning to provide input in the evaluation process. O’Brien and Li have shown how the number of complaint letters is a criterion in the evaluation of local leaders.13 Petitioning and staging demonstrations do also indirectly affect the evaluation of leaders’ work performance through the priority target of upholding social order. The second component of the cadre responsibility system is the CCP’s governance methods to incorporate leading cadres of lower levels into higher levels, including promotion to holding two posts simultaneously, and rotation between geographical areas and administrative levels. An example of promotion to holding a concurrent post at a higher level is when a successful township party secretary is simultaneously being posted as the county vice-party secretary. Huang Yasheng identifies this crossposting and has found for the provincial level that about 17 per cent of all provincial party secretaries were members of the Politburo in the Fourteenth Central Committee.14 Rotation between geographical areas implies that the top leaders are recruited from outside the township or the county where they work, and horizontal rotation has increasingly been applied since the 1990s. Rotation between different administrative levels is less often discussed than rotation between geographical areas but is more important when studying party control. Frank Pieke has highlighted how

126 Maria Heimer township leading cadres and cadres who head bureaus under the county government are both under the purview of the organisation department of the county party committee, and consequently rotate between the county and the township level.15 Rotation between vertical levels deserves more attention. In his sample above, Huang Yasheng only examines whether provincial party secretaries had served as party secretaries or governors in other provinces immediately prior to assuming their current posts, and whether ministerial officials had moved to another ministry. He did not examine the rotation between ministry and provincial top posts. At least below the province level, vertical rotation may be as frequent, and would demonstrate vertical integration. Cadre management has undergone large changes in recent decades, but there are also important continuities from the pre-reform era. Does the cadre responsibility system have the ability to adjust to the changing needs of the party?

The adjustment potential of the cadre responsibility system Scholars familiar with cadre management in the pre-reform era may question how much has really changed since then. While new features, such as economic incentives, have certainly been introduced, old features remain and have been adjusted to changing circumstances. To the outside observer, the most obvious change is that the overall goal of the Communist Party has radically shifted from achieving socialism or communism to promoting economic growth. To many, it seems counterintuitive that an old Leninist system can put economic development as its top priority. One scholar of communist systems has described the Soviet type of command structure as goal-rational.16 The final goal is communism from which intermediate goals are allegedly derived. The cadre administration, most commonly found in communist systems, is analysed as a distinct form of administration defined by its emphasis on goals.17 Another analyst of cadre administrations writes that this type of public administration is highly sensitive to the changing preferences on the part of their leaders who can turn the mighty organisation to work for new goals.18 In this way, it is even built into the system that the cadre organisation should easily adapt to changing circumstances and the reformulation of goals. It is the goal-rationality and the flexibility of the system, rather than a specific goal, which are the cadre administration’s main characteristics. Using this analytical framework to understand communist organisation, it is less surprising that the CCP can first work towards the goal of communism and then shift to make economic development its overriding goal using the same cadre organisation. The CCP has introduced market reform not only into its economic system, but also into its cadre management system.

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A market governed model named New Public Management provides a suitable framework to understand the changes the cadre administration in China is undergoing. The model is based on the view that the experience of the private sector is superior and it should therefore be applied to the state administration, that is to say, that government should function in accordance with the same principles as private enterprises. The primary objective of this school is to downsize government administration. A second, and subordinate, objective is to apply important market principles into the operation of government administration.19 The market reforms that China has applied are similar to those reforms that have swept public administrations in both the developed and developing world. The basic features of the cadre responsibility system described above – decentralisation of authority, employment of contracts, setting of quantitative goals, introducing competition among state bureaucrats, use of economic incentives to encourage goal fulfilment, and taking the help of clients to measure government performance – are all elements of the New Public Management. At the same time, there are important continuities with the past.20 How can seemingly opposite models, the communist cadre organisation and New Public Management, be merged in the cadre responsibility system? The reason is that there are important similarities between Leninist systems and the market model of public administration first employed in Margaret Thatcher’s Britain. Both models emphasise goals, rather than rules and the process itself, thereby building flexibility into the system. Both cadre administrations and New Public Management are the types of public administration that most closely resemble private companies in their organisation.21 The adjustment potential of the cadre responsibility system should, therefore, be great. The flexibility is built into the system, and the organisation should be responsive to the changing goals of central leaders. What have been the concrete changes in cadre management of local leaders since the beginning of reform? We cannot discuss changes and continuities of exact features with any degree of certainty since our knowledge of the actual practice of local political institutions in the pre-reform era is limited, and neither do we have sufficient knowledge about today’s organisation. The most noticeable continuity with the past is that the performance targets of today do not differ greatly from the quotas of the old planning system. The difference is that performance targets are fewer and internally ranked, clearly signalling the priorities of the centre. Hard targets tend to be economic in nature, invariably operationalised in quantitative figures and relatively easy to measure, such as the increase of GDP, tax revenues handed up to higher levels, etc. Priority targets with veto power, in contrast, are used for the fundaments of the system, or for policies that take on a special urgency. At least with regard to the priority target to uphold social order (shehui zhi’an), it is measured by its effects rather than a target to be achieved. Hard targets may be important goals under ordinary

128 Maria Heimer circumstances, but priority targets with veto power will simply have to be carried out, under ordinary or extraordinary circumstances. In certain ways, cadre management has become more institutionalised. The performance contracts that leading cadres sign are an innovation in the reform era, and are most likely modelled on the household responsibility contracts. As a result, the responsibility is more clearly spelled out as it is the highest local leaders – the party secretary and the government head – who shoulder the final responsibility. Competition between local leaders from different townships and counties was always a feature of cadre management, but now also economic incentives are used to spur them on. The opinions of the masses provided input into evaluation in the pre-reform era too, but are supposed to play a larger role today and their role has become more institutionalised in recent years. In the new regulations on leading cadres, an article has been added to the temporary regulations that stipulates that a cadre should normally be removed from his or her position if more than one-third of the pollers grade the cadre to be unqualified, and he or she has been verified by the authority as being not up to standard.22 New regulations for intra-party supervision also stipulate a larger role for the public when cadre promotion is decided.23 Scholars writing about local organisation in the pre-reform era identified cross-posting and rotation between geographical areas and administrative levels as methods of cadre management then, so these seem to be continuous features of CCP cadre management.24 With the reservation that we know too little of both the pre-reform and post-reform systems, there are however indications that the logic of crossposting and rotation has changed. Oksenberg’s study from 1969 indicates that grade 1 and model unit areas were less likely to have outside cadres assigned to them25 but today higher levels have increased their political control over strategically important areas; very often the areas important for economic development and tax revenues.26 If this observation is correct, it would mean that the CCP has let go of, or at least pays less attention to, problem areas, which holds large implications for tackling the problems of poverty and inequality. To what extent is the cadre responsibility system uniformly applied in the whole of China? There are clearly many variations between areas. First of all, I argue against the view that variation between areas per se is a measure of loss of central control. It is an empirical question whether the variation of the system is a sign of central control or loss of it. More importantly, we should use the variations to learn more about CCP rule and the way the CCP governs. When Huang Yasheng examines the centre’s political and administrative control over provincial government leaders, he uses similarity across regions as a measure of central control.27 With regard to the setting of performance targets, variation across regions reflecting the priorities of central and local authorities does not necessarily mean loss of central control but could even imply an increase of central control in some

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instances. The centre does not have the same policies towards all areas. There are two national yipiao foujue, priority targets with veto power: family planning and social order. In Sichuan province, environmental protection (baohu huanjing) was a yipiao foujue.28 One interpretation of this local priority target would be that provincial leaders in Sichuan are especially concerned about the protection of environment, but it is much more likely that the centre is targeting the province because environmental problems there will lead to floods and damage in other parts of the country and affect its financial centre, Shanghai. In this example, variation is evidence of central enforcement. Variation could, on the other hand, be evidence of weakening central control if central priority targets are downgraded in importance in some areas. The Chinese government attaches great importance to social stability as expressed in the priority target of upholding social order. If less emphasis were placed on social order in areas where social unrest is a grave problem, this would indicate the weakening of central control (or at least that the centre cares more about other targets in that area). The cadre responsibility system, and the nomenklatura, are sometimes mistaken to be more than they actually are. I argue that the cadre responsibility system must be analysed as a governance tool or method of cadre management of the CCP, it is nothing more and nothing less. If the efficiency of the system is to be evaluated, it has to be measured against the goals of the principals that use this system as a tool. John Burns examines how well the nomenklatura has served the CCP and finds that the nomenklatura system has been partially impaired during long periods of time since it was selecting corrupt officials for public office and could not check widespread corruption in the party.29 However, this reasoning presumes that the CCP places relatively large weight on fighting corruption, which can be questioned on a number of grounds.30 We cannot estimate the impact of the cadre responsibility system by looking at goals on which the system does not place emphasis. Its critics point out that cadres still do all they can to please their superiors by apparently reaching the targets laid out in their contracts and evaluation forms, even if they have to distort data, and even when their acts are detrimental to the peasants’ interests.31 Again, we cannot automatically assume that the critics’ concern is the same as the party’s concern. This is not to say that criticism should not be voiced, but the point is that criticism should be directed against the party itself rather than claiming its management tools are inefficient. I fully concur with Burns who writes that: “The nomenklatura system, then, is as relevant as the CCP itself.”32 Therefore, the cadre responsibility system is, in my opinion, foremost an analytical tool that helps us to see which are the goals that the central government wants to promote, how well they manage to do so, and a tool to understand why cadres behave as they do. In turn, it helps us to analyse Chinese policy implementation and politics. This is by no means a straightforward process and

130 Maria Heimer should certainly not be portrayed as such. The system provided political incentives for local leaders to promote growth, but in an indirect and an unexpected way.33 Given that flexibility is built into the system, and the previous reformulations of the party’s goals and methods discussed above, it should be possible for the Chinese government to upgrade the importance of social problems in the cadre responsibility system. Have they done so? If the central authorities would upgrade the importance of solving the social problems of poverty and regional inequality in the cadre responsibility system in order to facilitate their implementation, we would expect them to write these targets into the performance contract of the government head, rather than treating them as a task for a subordinate leader such as the director of poverty reduction bureau or a vice-government head/ vice-party secretary. Some policies emphasised by the centre, such as fighting SARS in the spring of 2003, for example, are not always written into the performance contracts, but the more continuous priority policies are. Reducing poverty and inequality would have to be made important hard targets in the comprehensive evaluation of work performance, and the government head be made accountable for these targets rather than targets related to economic development. It seems as if the centre is only able to push a few priority policies at the same time through the cadre responsibility system: in that sense cadre management has not changed significantly since the pre-reform era. When two priority targets conflict, at least one of them is going to be difficult to implement. Unlike the target of economic growth, the targets of poverty reduction and inequality do not conflict to the same extent with the priority target to uphold social order. Reducing poverty and inequality should presumably ease social tension and contribute to social stability.

Solving the problem of poverty and regional inequality To attack the problems of poverty and regional inequality, central leaders need to rely on the local political institutions to carry out their programmes. The focus here is not on the two policies but on their organisation in order to discuss whether the cadre responsibility system can be adapted to the changing needs of the party as well as to evaluate how the implementation of the poverty reduction and the Western development programme is going.34 The government programmes to alleviate poverty and to develop the Western regions of China have different stated objectives, but are overlapping. Whereas the main objective of the government’s programme to alleviate poverty is to assist the poor, the main purpose of the Western development programme is to promote the development of China’s interior and reduce the gap between the coastal and the inland regions. Poverty reduction and the Western development programme are related in

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that, first, poverty reduction in China itself is very development oriented. The Chinese term for poverty alleviation is Fupin Kaifa, literally establishing that poverty should be reduced through development. Since its initiation, poverty reduction policies have focused on creating the proper conditions for regional economic development rather than directly assisting the poor. Second, even though it is not its main objective, the Western development programme is assumed to reduce rural poverty: ‘The implementation of the large-scale development strategy for the western region is also helpful for poverty alleviation and will have a far-reaching influence on the reduction of the impoverishment rate’.35 The implementation of the Western development programme is to link up with poverty reduction to promote economic development in poor areas. The two programmes both focus on geographical areas. Since the ‘8–7’ poverty reduction plan in 1994, the Chinese authorities have targeted 592 key poor counties (first called pingkun xian, today they are called zhongdian xian) to which they concentrate their resources.36 In the new national poverty reduction strategy from 2001, all the 592 national key counties are situated in the central and Western part of China. Poverty reduction work is the central task of party and government leaders in these 592 key counties who should place poverty reduction as their overarching goal.37 The Western development programme covers the following areas: Chongqing municipality, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu and Qinghai Provinces, and Tibet, Ningxia Hui, Xinjiang Uygur, Inner Mongolia and Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Regions. Within these areas, the central and local governments have a number of large key projects.38 The poverty reduction policy was formulated for the first time in 1986 and has a permanent organisation, whereas the Western development programme was launched in 2000 and does not have a permanent organisational system. With regard to poverty reduction, central authorities exercise the cadre responsibility system as spelled out in the 2001 Outline of the reformulated national poverty alleviation plan. The division of responsibility between different administrative levels is not entirely clear. The Outline states that the main responsibility lies at the province level but the key work is performed at the county level. It is the highest leaders of the party and government (diyi bashou) at the local level who should shoulder the responsibility for poverty reduction. The effectiveness of poverty reduction work shall be an important target in the evaluation of the top leaders’ work performance, according to the Outline.39 The central government has not, as far as I can tell, issued a similar directive for the Western development programme which is supported by findings from the local level. Together with the national office for poverty alleviation, a leading group for poverty reduction at the national level was established in 1986. The leading group is directly under the State Council, holds ministerial status and is usually led by the vice-premier in charge of agriculture.40 The leading

132 Maria Heimer group and its executive office are reproduced at the different administrative levels. A State Council leading group for Western development was formed in 2000, and the executive office of the leading group was set up within the State Development Planning Commission which illustrates the influence of that organ over the Western development programme at large. Today, the head of the leading group is Vice-Premier Zeng Peiyan.41 Looking at organisation at the national level, poverty reduction and the Western development programme seem equally important as both leading groups are headed by a vice-premier, although the latter, due to the responsibilities allocated to him, may carry more weight than the vice-premier in charge of agriculture. From the central level, we turn our attention to the local level which is crucial in political organisation. In the three provinces where I conducted fieldwork, Yunnan, Sichuan and Shanxi province, the picture is quite consistent when looking at the leading groups and the organisational setup. The leading group for poverty reduction is either led by the county mayor or the party secretary, whereas leading groups for Western development only exist on paper. One governor claimed that all the government affairs belong to the Western development programme so there is no need to establish a special leading group.42 While the poverty alleviation bureau is a separate unit with its own director, the office for Western development is inside the development planning commission whose director is also the director of the Western development office. There is no need to establish a separate office because the work of the planning commission is the same work or content as that of the Western development programme.43 The majority of the projects of the planning commission are ‘in the spirit of the xibu dakaifa’.44 It means that in actuality there is no specific organisation for the Western development programme; the organisation carrying its name is really an empty one, but the policy is managed by the development planning commission and the local government as a whole. We will discuss the implications below, now it is sufficient to say that the Western development programme may be held more important than poverty reduction but it is incorporated into the overall work of government. Performance targets give an indication of how higher levels govern lower levels. In the Yunnan county, the district level had given the county poverty reduction targets which were then divided among the 23 townships and included in the mayors’ performance contracts.45 Township mayors signed a performance contract with, and were accountable to, the county. Altogether there were 12 targets relating to poverty reduction in the performance contract which township leaders were evaluated upon.46 According to the director of the poverty alleviation bureau, the most important target was to solve the problem of food and clothing for a certain number of people (jiejue wenbao renkou): for 2003 the number was 30,000 people.47 This is mirrored at the township level where the most important

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target to complete was to make 1,500 people escape poverty (jiejue wenbao renkou) in 2002. Next in priority was the target to prevent 3,800 people from returning to poverty (gonggu wenbao renkou) in 2002, and to complete the plan of the three key projects.48 Poverty reduction targets were hard targets in the evaluation in the sense that completion of the targets rendered bonus and non-completion caused fines. It is difficult, however, to judge the relative status of poverty reduction targets to the other 17 hard targets in the evaluation, especially the economic development targets.49 In the two nationally designated key poor counties in Sichuan and Shanxi that I visited, to raise the average income of farmers (nongmin shouru) is an important target but difficult to separate from more comprehensive economic targets such as the target to increase GDP: the reasoning was that when GDP increases, the average income of farmers will also increase or vice versa.50 In contrast to poverty reduction, the Western development programme has no targets of its own in the annual evaluation of local leaders. Central authorities do not exercise the cadre responsibility system for the Western development programme so the township leaders do not sign performance contracts with regard to the initiative to develop the Western region. According to a section chief of the development planning commission, it would be difficult to set up a performance contract for the Western development programme since there is no specific meaning attached to the policy. However, there are targets and performance contracts for particular projects that fall under the Western development programme and which were managed by different bureaus. One such project was to relocate farmers (yidi banqian) but although it is managed by the development planning bureau it has a poverty reduction dimension.51 In the comprehensive evaluation, the Western development programme is likely to be measured by economic development indicators. Through an analysis of the organisation of the Western development programme, it is possible to deduce the nature of the policy. The Western development programme is, in my opinion, a significant increase in budgetary resources to various sectors in the Western provinces, but not a policy with a specific content. There are close parallels with the Coastal development strategy initiated in the 1980s, although the Western development strategy is much less focused in comparison. Like the Coastal development strategy, key projects are written into the performance contracts and the success of the Western development programme is measured in the targets of GDP, the level of investment, in particular foreign investment, etc. The Western development programme and poverty reduction seem both to be either measured by economic development indicators or overshadowed by them – even in the key poor counties in Western provinces in which poverty reduction was supposed to be the central task of local leaders. Poverty reduction targets are hard targets in the evaluation of the leading cadres, but there are strong indications that reducing poverty is

134 Maria Heimer taken to be the same as economic development and the specific poverty reduction targets are of lesser importance. According to one director coordinating the evaluation, when poverty reduction gets a low score but development indicators are good, the unit under evaluation can still gain a high score. When the work to reduce poverty is done well but the GDP is poor, on the other hand, the unit under evaluation may not get a high score.52 The assumption seems to be that an increase of GDP automatically leads to an increase of farmers’ income, although there is no inspection to check whether an increase of the GDP benefits the poor households living below the national poverty line of 625 yuan or even below an annual income of 1,000 yuan. Judging from the way poverty reduction policies are carried out, however, probability is low that growth will actually benefit the households whose income is below average in poor places. I conclude that under the current design of the cadre responsibility system, the work to reduce poverty and regional inequality is assessed by economic development indicators. In this way, the problems of regional inequality and poverty can only become more important in the evaluation than economic growth through the yipiao foujue target of upholding social order. It is therefore the effect of the problems of poverty and regional inequality that is measured in the cadre responsibility system, rather than the implementation of poverty alleviation or the Western development programme as such. If social problems such as poverty and inequality cause social discontent and widespread unrest, social development may then, but only then, be given higher priority than economic growth.

Concluding discussion The people-oriented approach and the new leaders’ emphasis on balanced development have not yet taken hold at the local organisational level. An analysis of the cadre responsibility system at the local level shows that there is still a single-handed focus on GDP growth. So far, policies have not changed much from the previous leadership. In the current design, social problems such as poverty will only kick in through the yipiao foujue targets measured by their effect on social stability. Given the mixed messages given from the centre – more weight should be given to social development but at the same time the total GDP volume is to be doubled in 20 years – it is not really surprising. A policy to put economic growth first has been implemented for two decades, and if the policy is going to change there needs to be a strong message from the central government. This is not to say that Chinese leaders ignore social issues but they seem to view economic growth as the best means to solve social problems. However, the new leadership has become conscious that additional policies are needed, and one of the concrete measures taken to raise rural income is to reduce the agricultural tax by more than 1 per cent per year, with agricultural taxes to be eliminated in five years. The separate policy

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to reduce agricultural tax has been given high priority and was effectively implemented in my field sites in Sichuan and Shanxi in April 2004 even though it was only announced in March the same year. In fact, the work to reduce agricultural tax began before the National People’s Congress meeting in March 2004, together with overall tax reform, which is one reason why the policy is going to be implemented well ahead of the set time frame. To reduce the burden on peasants (jianqing nongmin fudan) counted as a priority target with veto power, but as part of the larger target to maintain social order.53 The findings here affirm that the cadre responsibility system is flexible enough to adjust to the changing needs of the CCP and to solve urgent social problems, but the CCP has not yet given sufficient priority to the social problems of poverty and regional inequality. From the beginning of reform up until today, the party has been better at promoting development than at attacking social problems. I argue that it is not the political system itself that is at fault, but the party’s objectives. I agree with Hu Angang and Wang Shaoguang that the capacity of the state to solve social problems has been reduced, but I differ from them in that I see it as a consequence of a deliberate strategy to roll back the state on social issues.54 Again, the Chinese government falls into line with New Public Management and the trend of the rest of the world. The Chinese government has in the reform era chosen to withdraw and delegate the responsibility for social issues to local governments without providing budgetary funds for it. In poor areas, local funds are not sufficient and township officials have no budgetary resources to carry out central-level policies for which they are held responsible. Neither do they today have legal local taxation rights to raise resources for that purpose. When social problems cause widespread unrest, the Chinese government’s capacity to deal with this will be contingent on not having rolled back the state too far. Hopefully, the new leadership will have changed course before problems reach that level. If the new leadership want to ‘put people first’ and pay more attention to social issues, they have to push it through the cadre responsibility system. Up until today, they have not done so. New initiatives require time, however, and within the next one or two years we might be able to spot a change at the local level if the new leaders are serious about it.

Notes 1 See, for example, Merle Goldman and Roderick MacFarquhar, ‘Dynamic Economy, Declining Party-State’, in Merle Goldman and Roderick MacFarquhar (eds) The Paradox of China’s Post-Mao Reforms (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999); and David Shambaugh, ‘The Chinese State in the PostMao Era’, in David Shambaugh (ed.) The Modern Chinese State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 2 See, for example, Zheng Yongnian, Globalization and State Transformation in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Yang Dali,

136 Maria Heimer

3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

11

12

13 14 15 16 17 18 19

‘Rationalizing the Chinese State: The Political Economy of Government Reform’, in Chao Chien-min and Bruce J. Dickson (eds) Remaking the Chinese State: Strategies, Society, and Security (London: Routledge, 2001); and Kenneth W. Forster, ‘Administrative Restructuring and the Emergence of Sectoral Associations in China’ (paper presented at the Association for Asian Studies Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, 7 April 2002). Peter Nan-Shong Lee and Carlos Wing-Hung Lo, (eds) Remaking China’s Public Management (Westport, CT: Quorum Books, 2001). Maria Heimer, ‘Remaking the Communist Party-State: The Cadre Responsibility System at the Local Level in China’, China: An International Journal, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2003). ‘How Wide is the Gap of China’s Individual Income?’, see http://fpeng.people daily.com.cn//200108/31/eng20010831_78962.html. Cheng Li, ‘The “New Deal”: Politics and Policies of the Hu Administration’, Journal of Asian and African Studies, Vol. 38, Nos. 4–5 (2003). ‘China says good-bye to blind pursuit of GDP growth’, see http://english. peopledaily.com.cn/200403/05. ‘China to rank the third of the world in national strength as a whole in 2020’, see http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200403/05. See the government work report delivered by Premier Wen Jiabao to the National People’s Congress, 5 March 2004. John P. Burns, ‘China’s Nomenklatura System’, Problems of Communism, Vol. XXXVI, No. 5 (1987); The Chinese Communist Party’s Nomenklatura System: A Documentary Study of Party Control of Leadership Selection, 1979–1984 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1989); and ‘Strengthening Central CCP Control of Leadership Selection: The 1990 Nomenklatura’, The China Quarterly, No. 138 (1994). The term bianzhi refers to the authorised number of personnel (the number of established posts) in a party or government administrative organ, service organisation, or working unit, see Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard, ‘Institutional Reform and the Bianzhi System in China’, The China Quarterly, No. 170 (2002). Maria Heimer, ‘State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: CCP Cadre Management from a Township Perspective’, The China Quarterly, No. 173 (2003). The description of the cadre responsibility system in this chapter is largely drawn from this article. Kevin J. O’Brien and Li Lianjiang, ‘The Politics of Lodging Complaints in Rural China’, The China Quarterly, No. 138 (1995). Huang, Yasheng, ‘Managing Chinese Bureaucrats: An Institutional Economic Perspective’, Political Studies, Vol. 50 (2002), p. 70. Frank Pieke, ‘Contours of an Anthropology of the Chinese State: Political Structure, Agency and Economic Development in Rural China’, Journal of Royal Anthropological Institute, Vol. 10 (2004). T.H. Rigby, ‘Introduction: Political Legitimacy, Weber and Communist Monoorganisational Systems’, pp. 1–26 in T.H. Rigby and Ferenc Fehér, Political Legitimation in Communist States (London: MacMillan, 1982), pp. 10–12. Göran Therborn, Vad Gör Den Härskande Klassen När Den Härskar?: Statsapparater och Statsmakt under Feodalism, Kapitalism och Socialism? (Stockholm: Zenit, 1980), pp. 52–54. Bo Rothstein, Just Institutions Matter: The Moral and Political Logic of the Universal Welfare State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 91. For a good introduction to the New Public Management model, see Peter Self, Government by the Market? The Politics of Public Choice (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993); and Patrick Dunleavy and Christopher Hood, ‘From

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20 21 22

23 24

25 26 27 28 29

30

31 32 33 34

35 36 37

Old Public Administration to New Public Management,’ Public Money and Management (July–September 1994). It is important to underline that change and development is not a linear process. While we see decentralisation of some areas, we see recentralisation of others. Rothstein, Just Institutions Matter, p. 91. ‘Regulations on the Work of Selecting and Appointing Leading Party and Government Cadres’, Article 55, Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 9 July 2002. http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/45399.htm (accessed 12 November 2002). Joseph Fewsmith, ‘The Third Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee’, China Leadership Monitor, No. 9 (2003). See, for example, Frederick C. Teiwes, Provincial Party Personnel in Mainland China 1956–1966 (New York: Columbia University, 1967); and Michel Oksenberg, ‘Local Leaders in Rural China, 1962–65: Individual Attributes, Bureaucratic Positions, and Political Recruitment’, in Doak Barnett (ed.) Chinese Communist Politics in Action (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1969). Oksenberg, ‘Local Leaders in Rural China, 1962–65’, pp. 199–200. Heimer, ‘State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China’. Huang Yasheng, Inflation and Investment Controls in China: The Political Economy of Central-Local Relations during the Reform Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Interview with a division chief of the office for West China Development in Sichuan province (Autumn 2003). At the county level and below, though, I found no evidence that environmental protection was a yipiao foujue. See his contribution to this book or John P. Burns, ‘The Relevance of the Nomenklatura System to the Chinese Communist Party in a New Era’, a paper presented to the international conference on The Chinese Communist Party in a New Era: Renewal and Reform held in Singapore, 9–10 December 2003. For further reasoning on the relationship between corruption and development and the role of fighting corruption in checking cadres’ behaviour, see Maria Heimer, ‘The Local State and Developmental Projects in China’, in Richard Boyd and Tak-Wing Ngo (eds) Asian States: Beyond the Developmental Perspective (London: Routledge, 2004). See Stig Thogersen, ‘Parasites or Civilisers: The Legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party in Rural Areas’, China: An International Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2003), p. 203. Burns, ‘The Relevance of the Nomenklatura System’, p. 7. Maria Heimer, ‘Local State Corporatism and Private Business’, The Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3/4 (2003). The discussion is based on on-going fieldwork carried out for my current project. Fieldwork has been conducted in three poor counties: one county which is not a nationally designated poor county in Yunnan province in 2003, and one nationally designated key poor county in each of Sichuan and Shanxi provinces in 2004. Government White Paper: The Development-Oriented Poverty Reduction Program for Rural China. Under the 8–7 plan, all resources had to be concentrated in the selected counties, but under the new poverty reduction plan some money is also spent on poor residing outside the key counties, taking the village as the unit. ‘Zhongguo Nongcun Fupin Kaifa Gangyao (2001–2010nian)’ (Outline for Poverty Alleviation and Development of China’s Rural Areas (2001–2010)), article 29.

138 Maria Heimer 38 David S.G. Goodman, ‘The Politics of the West: Equality, Nation-building and Civilisation’, Provincial China, No. 2 (2002). 39 ‘Zhongguo Nongcun Fupin Kaifa Gangyao (2001–2010 nian)’, article 29. 40 Today, its leader is Vice-Premier Hui Liangyu. 41 Its leaders were then reported to be the former Premier Zhu Rongji and deputy leader the former Vice-Premier Wen Jiabao. Zeng Peiyan was previously the Head of the State Development Planning Commission. 42 Interview with a division chief of the office for West China Development in Sichuan province (Autumn 2003). 43 Interview with the director of a development planning commission cum Western development office in a Sichuan municipality (Spring 2004). 44 Interview YA4 with the vice-director of the Western development office under the development planning bureau in a Yunnan county (Spring 2003). 45 See document ‘X shi 2001 nian fupin kaifa mubiao guanli zerenzhuang’. 46 See document ‘X shi 2002 nian fupin kaifa mubiao guanli zerenzhuang’. It is a county-level municipality. 47 Interview YA2 with the director of the poverty alleviation office in a Yunnan county (Spring 2003). 48 Interview YAa1 with the head of the poverty alleviation office in a Yunnan township (Spring 2003); and see document ‘X shi 2002 nian fupin kaifa mubiao guanli zerenzhuang’. 49 Interview YA6 with the director of the poverty alleviation office in a Yunnan county (Spring 2003); and see also documents ‘Guanyu duixian 2002 niandu mubiao guanli zerenzhi de tongzhi’ and ‘X shi 2002 niandu xiangzhen mubiao guanli zerenzhi jiang’. 50 Interview SiA2 with the director of the poverty reduction bureau in a Sichuan county (Spring 2004); and Interview ShCa1 with the party secretary of a Shanxi village (Spring 2004). 51 Interview YA3 with a section chief of the development planning commission in a Yunnan county (Spring 2003); see also document ‘X shi 2001–2002 nian guojia yidi fupin banqian shidian gongcheng xiangmu’. It is a county-level municipality. 52 Interview SiA5 with the director of the evaluation office under the party committee in a Sichuan county (Spring 2004). 53 Interview SiAa1 with the township head, the chairman of the local People’s Congress and the vice-party secretary of a Sichuan township (Spring 2004). 54 Wang Shaoguang and Hu Angang, The Chinese Economy in Crisis: State Capacity and Tax Reform (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2001); and The Political Economy of Uneven Development: The Case of China (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999).

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7

China’s Central Party School A unique institution adapting to changes Ignatius Wibowo and Lye Liang Fook*

Every government and party organisation around the world has to grapple with the challenge of selecting and training capable and trustworthy individuals for the public service to serve in the interest of its respective institutions. China is no exception. For the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in particular, this challenge is even more daunting as the rapidly changing socio-economic environment in China means that the party has not only to identify with the complex and diverse needs of society but to keep pace with the speed of change. One of the foremost institutions of the party, the Central Party School (hereafter CPS), plays a unique role of providing a platform where existing and aspiring future leaders of China get to know each other better and be familiar with the important tenets of party ideology. Through such interactions, personal networks are built up and leaders who have a higher potential can be identified. Almost all high-ranking party cadres and government officials such as ministers and governors have attended this school prior to their promotion. While there are ‘party schools’ at the lower levels, it is the Central Party School in Beijing that is considered the most prestigious. It is not hard to imagine that party cadres and government officials around the country covet the opportunity to be admitted to the school. The ‘reform and open door’ policy in 1978 was a milestone for China, affecting even developments at the school. Since then, the ideology of communism has waned, and in its place is ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ which essentially is not much different from the spirit of capitalism. China, in other words, has transformed its strategy of development, from a centrally planned to a market economy. This transition has a significant impact not only on society, but also on the training of cadres. The school has to adapt to this new development because cadres now need a whole new set of knowledge, different from that of the past. First, cadres, especially the high-ranking ones, need a modern and practical set of knowledge to help them to interpret the fast-changing world around them, otherwise they are likely to become disorientated and unable to perform effectively at work. Second, they need specific theoretical knowledge about the nature of the Chinese economy which is undergoing

140 Ignatius Wibowo and Lye Liang Fook dramatic changes in a globalised age. Third, they also need a new approach to managing society, which can no longer be governed by resorting solely to the command approach. This chapter focuses more on the training of high-ranking cadres (governors, First Party Secretaries, ministers, and their deputies) and less on other training open to all interested party members. We will start with a brief description of the evolution of the CPS since it was founded in the early 1930s. In the following section, we will present the content of the courses taught to the students, which will give an idea of what they are learning. We will discuss the implication of this new development in the third section where we argue that as the high-ranking cadres become imbued with modern and practical knowledge, they are likely to speak with ‘one language’, and this, in turn, will help to preserve China’s unity. Evolution of the Central Party School China’s party school system The CPS has witnessed a number of name changes since it was established in Ruijin (Jiangxi Province) in 1933. It started as the ‘MarxismCommunism School’, then after the Long March in Yan’an, it was re-named the ‘Central Party School’. In 1948, before the CCP took power, it was changed to the ‘Marx-Lenin College’, and seven years later it was called the ‘Advanced Central Party School’ until it was closed down during the Cultural Revolution in 1967. When the school was re-opened in 1977, it resumed the name of ‘Central Party School’ which it has retained today. The history of the CPS reflects the commitment of the party to the continuous training, education and indoctrination of its members. Even during the Cultural Revolution, the training of party members was not neglected. This role was taken over by the ‘May 7’ cadre school (wuqi ganxiao) initiated by Heilongjiang Province in 1968 and later extended to other provinces in China. Classroom training was replaced by going into the fields to take part in the manual work of peasants. Except those who were old or infirm, all cadres – young or old, male or female – had to go to the countryside ‘to study for the second time’.1 Mao Zedong was convinced then that this kind of training had the effect of raising the revolutionary spirit of the cadres, bureaucrats and intellectuals. After the Cultural Revolution, the CPS introduced a number of reform measures. Figure 7.1 shows the current organisational structure of the party school system. When the Cultural Revolution ended, the party school system revived its organisational network at various levels and in some localities even extended its network to the county levels. The system today comprises four layers, with the CPS at the top. Below the CPS are provincial party schools and party schools affiliated to ministries (level two), city party schools (level three), and county party schools (level four). Large

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Central Party School (Beijing level)

Provincial party schools (including party schools affiliated to ministries)

City party schools

County party schools

Figure 7.1 Party school organization structure

state-owned enterprises (SOEs) such as Beijing Steel and the National Power Company have established their own party schools in accordance with their respective administrative rankings. Altogether, there are about 2,000 party schools in China. In 1988, China’s leadership under Zhao Ziyang proposed the establishment of the National School of Administration (NSA). In doing so, the leadership intended to separate the roles of the party and government, which was an important agenda of political reforms then. As a result of the political backlash due to the pro-democracy movement in 1989, the plan to establish the NSA was held in abeyance. The school did not come into existence until 1994 when Jiang Zemin became the general secretary. Today, the CPS and NSA are the two most important training schools in China although there are three key differences between them. The first key difference is in their focus. While the CPS emphasises ideological and ‘theoretical’ (i.e. Marxist) training, the NSA focuses more on administrative and managerial skills. Generally, the CPS stresses topics with a broader scope while the NSA has a more specialised focus. Also, while the participants at the CPS could come from both the party and government, the target audience of the NSA are mainly middle- to seniorlevel government officials. The second key difference between the CPS and NSA is in their level of reach. The NSA does not have quite as extensive a reach as the party school system. Especially at the city and county levels, the two school

142 Ignatius Wibowo and Lye Liang Fook systems are merged, with the NSA riding on the structure of the party school system. This is sometimes referred to as ‘one entity, two names’. The third and perhaps the most important distinction between the CPS and NSA is that the former enjoys a much higher status compared to the latter. The CPS has a much longer history and is headed by senior party cadres. In contrast, the head of the NSA is usually one of the senior government leaders in the State Council.2 Table 7.1 underscores the political significance of the CPS. Since 1989, the President of the school has always been an important member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. Qiao Shi, then number two in the Political Bureau, was its President from 1989 to 1993. Hu Jintao succeeded Qiao Shi from 1993 to 2002 and Zeng Qinghong is the current President.

Central Party School before reform Ever since its inception, the CPS has adjusted its orientation and curriculum in line with prevailing political circumstances and ideological orthodoxy. During the revolutionary years before the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the preoccupation of the CPS was primarily ideological indoctrination so as to churn out cadres with strong revolutionary zeal to fight Japanese aggressors and the repressive Kuomintang regime, and establish a more egalitarian society under the CCP leadership. MarxismLeninism provided the ideological justification to mount a united-front strategy against the enemies of the party. After the CCP victory in 1949, the CPS devoted more time and effort to an in-depth study of Marxism-Leninism and the teachings of Mao Zedong. A more systematic training system and curriculum were set up. The purpose was to build up a pool of leadership and propaganda cadres ready to take on the mammoth task of building up a communist system and society in China. During the Cultural Revolution, the focus was on Maoism. The reform and open-door policy in the late 1970s marked another milestone in the history of the CPS. After a hiatus of more than 10 years as a result of the Cultural Revolution, the CPS was reconstituted in 1977. In line with China’s transition from a centrally planned to a market-driven economy, the CPS initiated the necessary changes to its orientation and training curriculum to reflect this change. As the foremost institution in China responsible for inducting new blood into the party and government, the CPS has to constantly adjust itself to stay relevant. When Hua Guofeng led the CPS after Mao’s death in 1976, the CPS witnessed an intense ideological struggle between the conservative and reformist camps.3 The conservative camp, with Hua at the helm of the party, had among its staunchest supporters Wang Dongxin, the Executive Vice-President in charge of ideological and propaganda work at the CPS.

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Table 7.1 Previous and present heads of the CPS Year appointed Name of President Names of Vice-Presidents and year appointed Mar. 1977

Hua Guofeng

Wang Dongxin (Executive Vice-President), Mar. 1977 Hu Yaobang, Mar. 1977 Ma Wenrui, Dec. 1977 Feng Wenbin, Oct. 1978 Zhang Pinghua, Dec. 1978 An Zhiwen, Jan. 1979 Li Huangtiao, Oct. 1981

Apr. 1982

Wang Zhen

Jiang Nanxiang (Executive Vice-President), Aug. 1982 Feng Wenbin, May 1979* Han Shuying, Oct. 1983 Chen Weiren, Sept. 1984

Mar. 1987

Gao Yang

Gao Di, Apr. 1988* Su Xing, Apr. 1988*

Mar. 1989

Qiao Shi

Xue Ju (Executive Vice-President), June 1989 Feng Wenbin, May 1979* Han Shuying, Oct. 1983* Gao Di, Apr. 1988* Su Xing, Apr. 1988* Xing Bensi, July 1989 Liu Shengyu, Apr. 1993 Wang Jialiu, July 1993

Sept. 1993

Hu Jintao

Wang Jialiu (Executive Vice-President), July 1993* Su Xing, Apr. 1988* Xing Bensi, July 1989* Liu Shengyu, Apr. 1993 Liu Haifan, Mar. 1994 Yang Chungui, Mar. 1994 Gong Yuzhi, Mar. 1994 Zheng Bijian (Executive Vice-President), Nov. 1997 Zhang Zhixin, Feb. 1998 Wang Weiguang, Feb. 1998 Li Junru, June 2000*

Dec. 2002

Zeng Qinghong

Yu Yunyao, May 2002* Zhang Zhixin, Feb. 1998 Wang Weiguang, Feb. 1998 Li Junru, June 2000* Shi Taifeng, Sept. 2001*

Source: Most of the above details are obtained from Zhongguo Gongchandang Dangxiao Xunli compiled by CPS Party History Department and Xinhuashe in 2000. Those details with an * are obtained from various issues of China Directory (Zhongguo Zuzhi Bieren Minbu).

144 Ignatius Wibowo and Lye Liang Fook Wang had helped Hua come up with the ‘two whatevers’, i.e. ‘whatever policy Chairman Mao had decided, we shall resolutely defend; whatever instructions he issued, we shall steadfastly obey’.4 Hua sought to use the ‘two whatevers’ to consolidate power but he did not have an entirely free hand. Arrayed against Hua were the ‘reformists’ led by Deng Xiaoping and his protégé Hu Yaobang, a Vice-President responsible for the daily administration at the CPS. Taking advantage of his position, and in the five years in the CPS, Hu did his best to carry out the necessary reform within the school, especially to counter the outmoded concept of ‘whateverism’. Hu, together with a few like-minded scholars, launched a journal in the CPS called Lilun Dongtai (Theoretical Trend) which carried commentaries on the application of communist ideology. The purpose of these articles was to cite Marxism-Leninism and even Maoism to criticise the dogmatic pursuit of ideology and the practice of personality cult. They soon gained prominence among party theoreticians. Some of these articles re-appeared in national dailies such as People’s Daily, Guangming Daily and Liberation Daily.5 Among the more prominent articles are ‘The Most Fundamental Principle of Marxism’ and ‘All the Subjective World Must Pass the Test by Practice’.6 Also notable was the article ‘Practice is the Sole Test of Truth’ carried in Guangming Daily in May 19787 that provided an important input to the preparation for the Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress in the same year.8 At this plenum, Deng Xiaoping announced China’s reform and open-door policy. In this sense, Deng’s first battle for economic reform was fought on the ground of the CPS. The clash between Hu and Hua reflected the unsettled question of ideology. There was no official ideology as yet; Deng Xiaoping in 1979 only set the parameter when he announced the ‘Four Basic Principles’: (1) the socialist road; (2) the dictatorship of the proletariat; (3) the leadership of the CCP; (4) Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. Neither camp – the conservative and the reformist – had found a new ideology that suited the need of China. It would take some time until one was clearly defined and accepted by the whole party. Not surprisingly, in the period from 1977–1982, the curriculum of the school was still dominated by standard Marxist-Leninist readings, including Maoist texts. Students did not have much choice but to opt for courses nicknamed the lao wu men (the old five courses), namely: (1) philosophy; (2) political economy; (3) scientific socialism; (4) the history of the CCP; and (5) party building.9 These were the only courses available to students at the CPS, and they had no alternative but to accept them. Lectures were given within a short period (six months) and it was called ‘training in rotation’ (lun xun ban).10 According to one report, from 1977 to 1982, under the directorship of Hua Guofeng, the school had managed to train 17,833 cadres, from various departments and military units.11

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The reform period: 1982–1987 The momentum for curriculum reforms in the CPS did not really take off until 1982 when Deng Xiaoping’s staunch supporter Wang Zhen, a military man and member of the Political Bureau, was appointed President in April.12 Just after Wang’s appointment, China was confronted with quite different political circumstances as the reformists gained ascendancy after the 12th Party Congress in the autumn of that year. Deng Xiaoping’s ‘reform and open-door’ policy was formally endorsed by the Party Congress, and a new Party Constitution adopted.13 With such a shift in the political climate, the CPS began moving steadily in a reformist direction. When Wang Zhen took over as President of the CPS, the Central Committee did not try to obstruct the policy set by the reformist and gave its nod to the policy of ‘standardisation’ (zhengguihua).14 ‘Standardisation’ was defined then as ‘an overall and systemic reform’ of the school by retaining the tradition of the party while at the same time adjusting to the new situation. While adhering to MarxistLeninist and Mao Zedong Thought, the CCP also stressed the necessity to ‘master modern scientific culture and knowledge’.15 This policy marked a departure from ‘whateverism’ and it was apparently so significant for the leaders of the CCP as well as for the schools that May 1982 is considered the real birth of all party schools in China. The anniversary celebrations of the CPS are based on this year. In May 1982, along with the instalment of Wang Zhen as President of the CPS, the Central Committee announced the new policy for party schools across China. In December 1982, the Central Committee issued a document, ‘Some Views on the Educational Work in Future in the Central Party School’. It laid down the main policy for the standardisation of a programme for all party schools of all levels. In the following year, 1983, a conference for reforming the party school system, including the CPS, was held in Beijing. Based on its recommendation, the Central Committee produced a document titled, ‘Decision of the Central Committee Regarding the Realisation of a Standardised Education in the Party School’ which further confirmed the policy of standardisation. After the policy of standardisation was introduced, students came to the school through examination, no longer through appointment. Starting in 1983, long courses, as opposed to short ‘training in rotation’, were introduced: training courses of 2–3 years for undergraduate students; theory courses of two-and-half years for research students, leading to an MA degree; special courses for cadres from national minorities (two years for those who are coming from Xinjiang, and three years for those coming from Tibet). Nevertheless, short courses were still available for cadres neheimerg refresher courses. The students in party schools did not merely study books on Marxism or the old five courses (lao wu men), but also other available subjects or

146 Ignatius Wibowo and Lye Liang Fook elective courses on offer. Foreign scholars were also invited to lecture in the party schools. They came not only from socialist countries such as Yugoslavia, North Korea, East Germany and Hungary, but increasingly from capitalist countries such as West Germany, the US and Japan. Delegations from the party schools were also allowed overseas travel.16 These reforms at the party schools, however, were carried out under heavy pressure because this period also witnessed the first stage of the rectification campaign being carried out to root out those elements who opposed the reform programme such as ‘the remnant Maoists, whateverists, and other assorted three kinds of people’.17 Xi Zhongxun, a member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, in his speech during the opening of the new school year in 1984, made clear that the school should carry out the campaign. Xi alluded to anti-reform elements within the party schools when he said that there were still ‘remnants of the activists created during the period of “ten-year chaos” and “leftist mistake”’.18 This kind of speech infused a sense of fear among the staff, sending a warning to them to toe the line. The rectification campaign ended in 1987. On Wang Zhen’s part, there appears to be some degree of hesitancy to implement total reform in the CPS. According to Baum, Wang was not a total supporter of Hu Yaobang and other radical reformists but a ‘political reactionary’.19 He was not fully behind Hu in opposing the ‘Anti-Spiritual Pollution’. Under his leadership, the school did not make a breakthrough at the ideological or theoretical front. Instead, Wang turned it into a ‘gas station’ for cadres with good class background, a ‘self-examination room’ for those who had committed mistakes, and a ‘safe haven’ for those who wished to avoid a political clash.20 Yet, Wang Zhen did not obstruct the programme of standardisation set by the reformists. In July 1987, after the end of the ‘Anti-Bourgeois Liberalisation’ campaign, Wang Zhen was replaced by Gao Yang, who in the following year became the Vice-President of the PRC. Although Gao was in poor health, the party asked him to stay on and appointed two Vice-Presidents to assist him.21 During Gao’s two-year stint as President, the curriculum of the party school underwent further changes based on the ‘Report of the Work of Reforming the Central Party School’. There was a need at that time to train cadres at the provincial and prefecture levels who had not gone through training at the CPS. The emphasis shifted to training cadres on the job (about 20,000 of them) rather than enrolling reserved, ( yubei) cadres.22 The curriculum of the party school was adjusted in line with the above thinking: (a) ‘class for advanced studies’ ( jinxiu ban) for cadres at prefecture level (di) and ‘study class’ (dushu ban) for provincial-level cadres still on the job; (b) ‘class for cadres working at the ministerial level’ (bumen ganbu ban) organised in collaboration with the departments at the State Council and Central Committee; (c) ‘class for cadres of minorities origin’, namely cadres from Tibet and Xinjiang; (d) ‘graduate studies’ (yanjiusheng

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ban) for MA students and PhD students who intend to become lecturers or theoreticians; (e) ‘class for advanced studies’ ( jinxiu ban) designed for lecturers of local party schools; and, (f) ‘training class’ ( peixun ban) for reserved cadres.23 Embarking on further changes Qiao Shi became CPS President in April 1989, shortly before the Tiananmen Incident in June. Although Qiao was influential and occupied various important positions at that time, he did not carry out any significant reform during his four-year tenure.24 This was largely due to changes in the political climate. In the wake of the Tiananmen Incident, the focus of the party turned to internal consolidation as numerous cadres and members of the party had taken part in the demonstration against the government and party. The leadership, consequently, carried out a series of purges, followed by a campaign against ‘peaceful evolution’ (heping yanbian). Not long after, the party had to grapple with the ideological challenge posed by the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.25 There was fear within the CCP that the same fate might befall the party soon. Given such tumultuous developments, the party was adverse to any radical reform measures. Qiao Shi understood the full implication of these broader political developments and managed events at the CPS accordingly. In an open letter by the Party Committee of the CPS published in the 1994 Party School Yearbook,26 the committee cited complaints raised by the directors of party schools during a national conference, and observed that there was a general trend that party schools across China, including the Central Party School, had been much neglected. The most important observation was in the area of curriculum. According to the report, the school’s curriculum had little to do with the needs of the students and was detached from reality. The lecturers only regurgitated the party’s documents and did not link them with the burning issues of the day. The committee argued that the school did not make enough effort to implement Deng Xiaoping’s theory on ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’, an apparent reference to Deng’s insistence on the importance of getting rid of ‘leftist’ tendency within the party. In the same volume of the Party School Yearbook, there is another document titled ‘The Plan of Rebuilding the Teacher’s Squad of the Central Party School, 1991–1995’. This document describes in detail the difficult conditions faced by lecturers at the Central Party School, ranging from low salary, low education level, to poor housing facilities. In the past ten years after it was formally resumed, the CPS had neglected to provide quality lecturers and an up-to-date curriculum. The document recommended that, in terms of curriculum, besides the knowledge about the party, students had to be equipped with ‘basic theories of market economy,

148 Ignatius Wibowo and Lye Liang Fook international economy, management, modern technology, law, Western thinking, theories on ethnicity and religion’.27 The document expressed understanding for students if they got bored with the lectures they did not enjoy. But when Hu Jintao was appointed President of the CPS in September 1993, the political circumstances had improved.28 The reform and opendoor policy was pursued with renewed vigour following Deng’s ‘southern tour’ (nanxun) in early 1992.29 In the autumn of 1992, the Third Plenum of the 14th Party Congress re-affirmed the direction set by Deng and adopted the document on the ‘socialist market economy’ which put China firmly on a capitalist road. Hu Jintao re-orientated the CPS in line with this thinking. In May 1994, the Party’s Central Committee issued a document entitled ‘On the Strengthening of the Work of Party Schools under a New Situation’.30 To what does ‘new situation’ refer? This document began, in its first sentence, with a strong reference to the southern tour by Deng Xiaoping, and then proceeded to lay emphasis on Deng Xiaoping’s theory of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’. This theory was already adopted as the party line during the Third Plenum of the 14th Congress (1992). This was clearly the ‘new situation’ to which the CPS should not fail to adjust itself. The document gave equal emphasis to training cadres not only with a solid grounding in Marxism, Leninism and Maoism but in applying these theories to cope with real situations. The document called on party schools at all levels to steadfastly adhere to this task in the continuous training of cadres. To keep up with the times, the CPS established the Centre for Research on the Theory of Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics. Also, the Institute of International Strategic Studies was established to broaden the horizon of those attending the CPS. Under the directorship of Hu Jintao, the CPS is more or less stabilised. Zeng Qinghong took the place of Hu as the President of the CPS in December 2002. He is concurrently member of the Standing Committee of Politburo as well as Vice-President of the PRC.

The CPS at present The CPS is divided into three main divisions: (1) mid-career education (jinxiu bu); (2) training (peixun bu); (3) post-graduate college. It is in the first bu that candidates for high- and middle-ranking cadres are trained, including governors and ministers. At second bu are the so-called ‘reserved cadres’ and cadres coming from ethnic minorities. The post-graduate college is open to qualified ordinary party members who are interested in pursuing higher degrees (Master Degree and Doctorate) in Marxist theories.31 Once every five years, all high-ranking cadres and government leaders are required to spend three months in the school under the peixun bu programme.32 They include the First Party Secretaries and their staff,

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governors, ministers and their deputies. Attending this programme for these senior personnel is tantamount to taking sabbatical leave from work to update their knowledge or acquire new knowledge. Given their existing heavy job responsibilities, not many can leave their work posts. What do these cadres study? After several modifications to the school curriculum over the years, the CPS seems to have settled down to two key thrusts, i.e. apart from equipping cadres with an ideological grounding, they are also expected to be au fait with courses relevant to the era of globalisation. The courses are essentially divided into two categories. The first group is called ‘three basics’ (sange jiben) which comprise Marxism, Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory. These are basic courses that party cadres cannot do without. Jiang Zemin’s ‘three represents’ (sange daibiao) has also been included on this list.33 The second category consists of courses relevant to the contemporary world. They are called the ‘five contemporary courses’ (wuge dangdai) which cover ‘contemporary world economy’, ‘contemporary world technology’, ‘contemporary world law and the setting up of China’s legal system’, ‘contemporary world military affairs and China’s defence build up’, and ‘current trend of thinking in the contemporary world’. The courses encourage cadres to be aware of developments around the world and how China could best position itself. It is reported that the school has invited lecturers of high calibre to teach each of the topics, such as lecturers from the People’s Bank of China, the Minister of Foreign Trade, the Chinese Science Association, College of Military Technology and University of National Defence. Table 7.2 provides an overview of the variety of topics covered under the ‘five contemporary courses’. The source is a student textbook published by the CPS.34 In the epilogue it is indicated that the book contains the best selection of lectures given after the 15th Party Congress (1997); most of them were given by the professors of the school and some other prominent national figures. The broad range of the topics reflects the intention of providing the students with the most up-to-date knowledge currently available around the world. Apart from the formal courses, there is a weekly course given by ministers, generals and other prominent figures in both the party and government. This usually takes place every Friday morning and the topic varies according to the speakers invited. Normally, the speakers would provide a briefing on possible topics ranging from the current state of politics, economy, defence, to foreign policy. The lectures are attended not only by students but also by lecturers and professors. The atmosphere is usually a relaxed one, with lively exchanges during the question-and-answer session.35 There are about 600 lecturers in the CPS, of them 165 are ranked professor, 206 associate professor, and 37 lecturers with doctorate degrees. The library holds more than 1.2 million books. The school publishes five major journals: Learning Magazine (Xuexi ribao), Current Affairs of Theory

150 Ignatius Wibowo and Lye Liang Fook Table 7.2 Courses covered under the ‘five contemporary courses’ in the Central Party School No. Name of lecturer 1 Zhang Boli 2 Long Yongtu 3 Dai Xianglong 4 Zhang Hanlin 5 Qiang Junsheng 6 Yang Huanming 7 Wang Kedi 8 Min Guirong 9 Qiang Boqin 10 Shi Taifeng 11 Xiao Yang 12 Cao Jianming 13 Xing Fensi 14 Zhang Feng 15 16 17 18 19

Huan Xianqi Zhou Weimin Li Dezhu Ye Xiaowen Chang Xinxin

20 21 22 23 24 25

Liu Qiyun Wang Dongjing Li Xingshan Li Liangdong Zhang Zhongyun Wang Changjiang

26 Xiao Guiyu 27 Liu Jinglü

Name of course Main trends in the development of economy in the world today Economic globalisation and production globalisation Financial globalisation and our response Trade globalisation and its challenge to the economy and trade of individual countries The current development of science technology and its influence to society Life science and the progress of society Information technology and society The development of space technology and its influence to society Modern bio-technology Contemporary world legal system and its development trends Contemporary world judicial system and reform of Chinese judiciary To see the characteristics and trend of the development of contemporary world law from the viewpoint of WTO The current trend of thinking in philosophy and culture in the West today The current trend of thinking in contemporary Western Marxism Current trend of thinking in politics in the West Current trend of thinking in economics in the West On the ethnic problem in the world today On the problem of religion in the world today A full understanding of the new development of contemporary capitalism ‘The Third Way’ and the reason for its surge Main contemporary theories in economy in the West Western management theories and its lesson for us Contemporary theories of democracy in the West The hotly debated problems in international politics today Historical lesson of building a communist party in the Soviet Union The historical experience and lesson of building socialism in the Soviet Union Exchanges of culture in the world today and culture selection

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(Lilun dongtai), Theoretical Front (Lilun qianyan), Forum for China’s Party and Government Cadres (Zhongguo dangzheng ganbu luntan) and Journal of the Central Party School (Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao xuebao). The school also has its own publishing house. According to the latest website information, however, the school now only recognises one journal, namely the Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao xuebao.

The political importance of the school As mentioned above, China has set up a vast network of party schools across China, at all levels of administrative division to its cadres.36 Among the 2,000-odd schools, the CPS in Beijing is considered to be the school that provides the best curriculum for the best cadres. Indeed, the history of the party school shows that the ruling group has always thought in terms of the party school at the central level, while those at the local levels are complementary to the CPS.37 In the minds of the top leadership, there is only one CPS where the crème de la crème of the nation receive their training. On their shoulders would rest China’s future and the future of the party. Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi paid close attention to the CPS until it was closed down in 1967 by the Gang of Four. The post-Mao leadership continues to recognise the political importance of the CPS. Throughout different political periods, the purpose of the school has remained unchanged, i.e. to train a core group of leaders to act in the interest of the party. What has changed is the orientation of the school and its curriculum. Ideological indoctrination no longer occupies the highest priority as the practical application of theory to real life conditions is equally important. The intention is to create a pool of cadres guided by ideology but familiar with the latest developments in various fields such as politics, economics and science and technology. Some studies have indicated a trend in China of recruiting cadres from a limited group of schools such as Beijing University and Qinghua University. Li Cheng, for instance, has shown how the graduates of Qinghua University have managed to dominate the major positions both at the national and regional level. He also mentions some officials with degrees acquired from the CPS.38 He appears to suggest that university degrees, especially those from Qinghua University, are all that matter. Friendship and camaraderie formed during their student days are so enduring that there is no other bond that is more important than the alumni network. To some extent, it is true that being a member of the same university bears some importance. Yet the top leadership of the party seems to think otherwise. From the perspective of the top leadership, they need a different type of bond that surpasses the alumni bonds. Indeed, alumni bonds, if not properly handled, could contribute to the fragmentation among cadres. While the top leadership could not do much about the strong emotional bonds among cadres from the same universities, they also want their cadres

152 Ignatius Wibowo and Lye Liang Fook to look beyond these narrow loyalties to develop a common vision and mission of China. At one level, the students of the CPS are required to have a firm grounding in Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. These courses provide a framework to interpret Chinese history which, according to the ‘dialectical history of materialism’, will progress along five stages (primitive society, slave society, feudal society, capitalist society and socialist society). This framework has remained intact until today and we can see its trace in all museums in China and in everyday discourses. Indeed, the official ideology in China states that China is in the ‘primary stage of socialism’, a clear reference to the Marxist framework. Cadres, as such, are to look forward to the coming of a socialist society in the distant future. At another level, the Theory of Deng Xiaoping provides an additional framework for cadres at the CPS to understand the current situation in China. It exhorts cadres ‘to seek truth from facts’, and more importantly to develop a ‘socialist market economy’. These two pillars of the theory of Deng Xiaoping help justify the present application of market economy or capitalism in China. While the teachings of Marx, Lenin and Mao stand diametrically opposed to capitalism, that of Deng Xiaoping provides full legitimacy to pursue this course. The ‘five contemporary courses’ are an elaboration of Deng’s theory. These two ideological perspectives, in our opinion, equip cadres with the necessary tools to interpret the world surrounding them. Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought help the cadres understand the past, whereas the Theory of Deng Xiaoping helps them to appreciate present developments. As the present situation has multidimensional characteristics, the top leadership seems to be determined to equip their cadres with all-round knowledge ranging from philosophy, technology, law, politics, economy and international politics to globalisation. From the list of the contemporary courses taught at the CPS, one is immediately struck by the interest in philosophy. While it is logical for cadres to learn about globalisation, information technology or even about biotechnology, one might wonder why they even have to study philosophy. The lecture by Prof. Xing Fensi, for instance, should be considered a serious topic for students of the philosophy department, who are acquainted with issues in philosophy. The topic discusses major modern philosophers since the beginning of the twentieth century such as Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur and Erich Fromm. This is a taxing topic that certainly would provide the high-ranking cadres with much food for thought but it is hard to imagine that all of them will study it enthusiastically. The top leadership of the party may, however, think that philosophy is an important subject that cadres at the level of governors and ministers should know and use in their work. Apart from gaining a deeper understanding of conditions within China, the CPS curriculum also emphasises learning from the best, including

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the West. There are six contemporary courses that have an explicit reference to the West in their titles (nos. 13–16, 21 and 23), while the rest of the lectures discuss or touch on major developments of natural science and social science in the West though without explicitly indicating so in the title. Why the West? From the perspective of the top leadership, it is important for senior-level cadres to be well-versed in key branches of knowledge that are gaining currency in the West. This is to imbue in them an open mind in looking at best practices from the West that can be adapted to Chinese conditions to make China strong. Essentially, the three main characteristics of the training curriculum for high-ranking cadres at the CPS can be described as ‘wide in scope, deep in reflection, and Western in orientation’. Cadres at the national level, in other words, are considered to be on a par with their counterparts in the West. They are no less sophisticated in comparison with leaders in Europe, Canada and the US. The set of knowledge they possess sets them apart from lower-level cadres. They can better appreciate the big picture and can speak on a wide range of topics with relative ease, something that local cadres may not be able to do. They are a distinct group from the local cadres because of the breadth and depth of knowledge they possess. More importantly, the curriculum at the CPS seeks to inculcate in senior level cadres important ‘national’ values, rules and norms that transcend the parochialism of where these individuals come from. This encourages them to look beyond their narrow alumni or local interests to better appreciate the broad visions and goals of the party and national government. After graduating from the CPS, they can speak to each other in the same language. And the acquisition of this new ‘language’ is important for maintaining unity among this core group of leaders, and unity among them is instrumental in maintaining the unity of China.

Conclusion Many countries find that it is of utmost importance to have an exclusive group of people trained in a special way. In France, for example, there is Ecole de guerre which the elite of the top leadership must go through. In Brazil there is a similar place for the training of its elite. In Indonesia, there is the Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional with an identical mission. China, with its CPS, is not unique in this regard. The CPS may be linked to the Lenin philosophy of a vanguard party where all party members must possess a systematic knowledge to understand the world around them, besides possessing a high degree of consciousness of revolution. While the revolutionary quotient in the CPS has almost disappeared, the function of the CPS to train a core group of elite that shares a common purpose and vision remains unchanged. Indeed, the place of the CPS in the contemporary Chinese political system can be seen as part of a long Chinese tradition. In imperial China, it is well known

154 Ignatius Wibowo and Lye Liang Fook that all candidates to the bureaucracy had to pass an examination based on the classical texts of Confucianism. The ladder of success in imperial China, too, was determined by the accumulation of knowledge. What is unique in the CPS today is that the school places so much emphasis on subjects oriented to the West. Although the cadres also spend much time studying Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, it is the Theory of Deng Xiaoping and its application that clearly occupies a more dominant position. While a high-ranking cadre must be able to interpret history from the Marxist perspective, more importantly, he must be able to make sense of developments from the West and see how best to position China in the global scheme of things. Underlining the curriculum changes at the CPS over the years is the view that China can pick and choose from the West and adapt it to local conditions. This brings us to the final reflection about the nature and future of the CCP. If they create a pool of high-quality cadres with a strong determination as well as the dedication to develop China, it is probably correct to say that the CCP is, indeed, in the process of establishing itself as a solid and strong organisation to govern China. It will be extremely difficult for any other organisations to challenge the CCP in the near future. It would appear that the CCP has accumulated all the necessary resources, especially human resources, which they can mobilise to achieve their goal. However, the enduring challenge for the CCP in general, and the CPS in particular, as always, is to constantly adjust itself to stay relevant to ever-changing circumstances.

Notes * Ignatius Wibowo is from the Centre of Chinese Studies, Jakarta. He would like to thank not only the Social and Cultural Centre of Fu Jen University (Taipei) and Bellarmine Community for their generous support, but also the Universities Service Centre, Chinese Academy of Social Science (Beijing) and Chinese University of Hong Kong. His gratitude also goes to Miss Cha Jung-mi from South Korea and his colleagues at the Centre for Chinese Studies, Jakarta. Co-author Lye Liang Fook is from the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore. 1 Mao’s article in People’s Daily initiated the campaign to establish the ‘May 7 School’. See Renmin ribao, October 5, 1968, p. 1. This school was terminated in 1979, see Guo Wuyuan, ‘Guanyu tingban “wu qi” ganxiao youguan wenti de tongzhi’ (Announcement regarding the closure of the ‘May 7’ cadre school), February 17, 1979. 2 See website of the National School of Administration at http://www.nsa.gov. cn/gk/. 3 Hua was concurrently the Chairman of the Party. 4 Ruan Ming, translated and edited by Nancy Liu, Peter Rand and Lawrence Sullivan in Deng Xiaoping: Chronicle of an Empire (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), p. 20. 5 Ruan Ming, Lishi Zhuanzhedian Shang de Hu Yaobang (Hu Yaobang at the crossroad of history), (New Jersey: Global Publishing, 1991), pp. 11–15. 6 Liaowang, No. 27 (July 2, 2001), p. 8.

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7 This article first appeared in Lilun Dongtai, a CPS internal publication, in May 1978. It was subsequently published in Guangming Daily in the same month under the pseudonym of special commentator. This was one way Hu Yaobang and his reformist camp had thought of to circumvent the propaganda arm of the CPS headed by Wang Dongxin. At that time, all external publications had to be vetted first by the propaganda arm. Wang would definitely have prevented the article from reaching the press. 8 Liaowang, No. 18 (May 1, 1986), p. 48. 9 See He Wenyun, ‘Jinri zhongyang dangxiao’ (Today’s Central Party School), Liaowang (overseas edition), No. 33 (August 18, 1986), p. 10. 10 China News Analysis, No. 1315 (August 1, 1986), p. 2. 11 ‘Zhongyang dangxiao wunian peixun ganbu 1.7 wan duo ren’ (Central Party School trains over 17,000 cadres in five years), Renmin ribao, August 25, 1982, p. 1. 12 ‘Wang Zhen churen xin zhi zhongyang dangxiao xiaozhang’ (Wang Zhen as New President of the Central Party School), Da gong bao, May 5, 1982. 13 Nevertheless, the CCP had still to struggle with many issues at the ideological level as reflected in the debates among the leadership about capitalism, liberalisation, Westernisation, and other theories of society. While the reformists were in power and in control of the media, the anti-reformists employed various campaigns to influence the people, such as ‘Anti Bourgeois-Liberalisation’ and ‘Anti Spiritual Pollution’. There was, indeed, a serious clash between the two camps on ideological issues. Deng Xiaoping himself was, apparently, not able to make a clear decision on which school of thought China should proceed; the debates went on until things came to a head in 1989. 14 ‘Wang Zhen zai dierci quanguo dangxiao gongzuo huiyi kaimushi shang zhichu: peixun lingdao gugan gongzuo yao zhengguihua’ (At the opening ceremony of the second national conference of the party schools, Wang Zhen points out that the work of the training leading cadres should be based on standardisation), Renmin ribao, February 23, 1982, p. 1. 15 Editorial, ‘Banhao dangxiao, wei zhengguihua peixun lingdao gugan zuochu xin gongxian’ (Manage well party schools in order to make a new contribution to the standardisation of the training of the leading cadres) Renmin ribao, March 4, 1983, p. 1. 16 Renmin ribao, March 4, 1983. 17 Roderick MacFarquhar (ed.) The Politics of China, 1949–1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 371. 18 Xi Zhongxun, ‘Zai zhongyang dangxiao 1984 qiuji kaixue dianli shang de jianghua’ (Speech delivered at the ceremony of the opening school year of the Central Party School in autumn 1984), Renmin ribao, September 26, 1984, p. 4. 19 Richard Baum, Burying Mao. Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 9. 20 Huang Qiulong, ‘Hou shehuizhui guojia yu shehui hudong guanxi zhong de zhonggong dangxiao jiaose ji gongneng zhi yanjiu’, PhD dissertation, (Taipei: Zhengzhi University, 2000), p. 253. 21 Gao Yang was 79 years old when he took over the job from Wang Zhen who was one year older. 22 These cadres are in line to be promoted to full cadre status. 23 Zhongyang tongyi zhongyang dangxiao gaige baogao (The Central Committee agrees with the report on the reform of the Central Party School), Renmin ribao, December 4, 1987. 24 Apart from his position as Principal of the Central Party School, he was concurrently member of Political Bureau and its Standing Committee, member of the

156 Ignatius Wibowo and Lye Liang Fook

25 26

27

28 29 30

31 32 33 34

35 36 37 38

Secretariat of the Central Committee and Secretary to the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. Joseph Fewsmith, China after Tiananmen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). ‘Guanyu quanguo dangxiao gongzuo qingkuang he jianyi de huibao tigang’ (Summary report on the situation and proposal of the work of nation-wide party school), in 1994 Party School Yearbook (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1994), pp. 3–8. ‘Zhongyang dangxiao 1991–1995 nian jiaoshi duiwu jianshe guihua’ (The systematic building up of teaching staff at the Central Party School from 1991 to 1995), in 1994 Party School Yearbook (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1994), p. 112. Like Qiao Shi, Hu concurrently held various important positions within the party such as member of the Political Bureau Standing Committee and member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. John Wong and Zheng Yongnian (eds), The Nanxun Legacy and China’s Development in the Post-Deng Era (London and Singapore: World Scientific and Singapore University Press, 2001). ‘Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu xin xingshi xia jiaqiang dangxiao gongzuo de yijian’ (Views of the Party’s Central Committee on strengthening the work of the Party School under a new situation), in Dangxiao nianjian (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1995), p. 3. The CPS website at http://www.ccps.gov.cn. While attending lessons at the CPS, they are required to observe strict residential requirements and are not allowed to leave campus without written permission. According to the ‘three represents’, the party must represent the ‘most advanced mode of productive force, the most advanced culture, and the interest of the majority of the population’. Yu Yunyao and Yang Chungui (eds) Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao jianggaoxuan guanyu dangdai shijie zhongda wenti (Text of the Central Party School regarding major problems of the contemporary world) (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 2002). Interview in November 2003. In 1995, there are about 2,000 party schools across China. For a full description, see Liu Yucheng (ed.) Quanguo dangxiao gailan (General overview of party schools of the whole country) (Beijing: Hongqi Publication, 1996). Wang Zhongqing (ed.) Dangxiao jiaoyu lishi gaishu (General description of the history of the education of party school) (Beijing: Party School Publication, 1992). Cheng Li, China’s Leaders, The New Generation (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefields, 2001).

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8

Party work in the urban communities Akio Takahara and Robert Benewick *

Introduction Following the reforms of basic-level governance in the countryside, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is now implementing community construction in the urban areas. The rural reforms centred on the introduction of free elections for the village committees and on enhancing the transparency of the village finances, with a view to increasing the accountability of the village authorities to the villagers. On the other hand, the aims of urban community construction involve improvements in various areas, including: providing services such as welfare, sanitation, environment, and public security; implementing democracy and autonomy at the grassroots level; and maintaining and strengthening the control over the urban populace. The need for urban community construction stemmed largely from the progress in marketisation, particularly the reforms in state-owned enterprises and in the government.1 In the past, under the danwei (unit) system that developed in China in the days of the planned economy, much of the above-mentioned services were provided by the danwei. Danwei was not only a workplace but also a small society in which people were born, went to school, worked, lived, and died. Now facing increasingly severe competition in the market, enterprises are no longer able to afford the services for their staff and workers as they constitute a heavy financial burden. In the industrialised countries, it is mainly the government that provides such services. In the case of China, however, the CCP aimed for ‘small government, big society’, and a major aspect of the government reforms has been to change the functions and reduce the size of the government. It is regarded that the government, as well as the enterprises, is unable to bear the full burden of the provision of services to the urban residents. Besides the provision of services, another function of the danwei was to control the urban residents. Danwei kept dossiers on staff and workers and gave them not only political education but also ration coupons and

158 Akio Takahara and Robert Benewick permission to visit other cities. When the Regulation for Organising Urban Street Offices was promulgated at the end of 1954, the major purpose of it was to control those that did not belong to any danwei.2 For this purpose, it was stipulated that the area of jurisdiction of a Street office would be the same as that of a police station.3 Along with the promotion of reforms, however, there is an increasing number of staff and workers that leave their danwei, either because they are fired, or because they seek better opportunities in the labour market. At the same time, a great number of migrant workers from the countryside have entered the cities and now dwell in the urban neighbourhoods. Thus, the CCP has found a need to strengthen their control and power at the urban grassroots. This includes the need for better control over their stray party members, many of whom had been ‘contaminated’ by the ‘evil teaching’ of Falun Gong. It follows that there has been a streamlining of government which has led to a devolution and decentralisation of many of its functions to the lower levels of government. The relationships between the basic level of government, i.e. the Street office and the residents committees are changing both structurally and substantively. The need for younger, better-educated, professional leaders at the urban grassroots has been accepted. How the enhancement of social capital and the creation of community residents committees affect the distribution of power has to be tested. In order to understand the distribution or redistribution of power at the basic level of urban government and below, it may be more rewarding to shift focus from the new community committees to the role of the party, which is stipulated as the core of leadership in community construction.4 In this view the community residents committee is just one element among those in a complex web of local governance with the party at the centre. This chapter discusses the question of party work in community construction. It discusses the different ideas about what the party should do in urban communities, and attempts to examine the results of the implementation of different approaches. While nobody could challenge the leading role of the party in community construction, there were a variety of interpretations of the nature and the form of party leadership at the grassroots level. A delicate issue was the relationship between party leadership and the autonomy of the community. The debate around party work in community construction was related to the different ideas about the importance of autonomy, which, in turn, brought about different definitions of the area of a community and the location of power. In the next part of this chapter, we shall investigate the two major patterns of community construction that took place in the experimental cities, focusing on the treatment of autonomy. On the one hand, there are the experiments in the more affluent, coastal cities such as Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, and Qingdao, where the city governments were able to invest generously in the social infrastructure for the building of urban

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communities. We chose the case of Qingdao, which is well known for its emphasis on the provision of welfare services. On the other hand, Shenyang, which is at the heart of the depressed, heavy industrial area in the north-east, opted for the promotion of autonomy, since they found that autonomy was a more economical way of social management. Perhaps this was an important reason why the Ministry of Civil Affairs in late 2000 chose the Shenyang model to be disseminated to other cities in China. In the final part of this chapter, we shall assess the work of the party in the implementation of community construction. Actually, the party has proved to be effective in two areas in particular. First, the party at the street level, when strengthened, was instrumental in coordinating the work of various vertical departments. That coordination of vertical departments (tiaotiao) at the local level (kuaikuai) could only be achieved by the party, which possesses the leverage of personnel evaluation and appointment. How effective this party function of coordination has been at the level of the community is questionable, however. It appears that the party organisations at the level of the community have yet to establish the control over the party cells in the danwei that exist in their area or jurisdiction. Second, it turns out that the mobilisation of the residents for various community activities has been difficult without the effort and contribution of the party members. Unlike the rural villages that possess substantial assets in the form of land and rural enterprises, urban communities hardly own anything and the residents do not feel they have a stake in participating. Besides, many urban residents actually still belong to their danwei, and find little incentive to take part in community activities. Thus, the contribution of the party members to community construction has been necessary in many communities. At the same time, however, their contribution has not been sufficient. From the viewpoint of the party, this represents an aspect of loosening discipline and control at the grassroots level, which is supposed to be the foundation of their rule. Overall, it seems that urban community construction has proved to be another niche in marketisation, in which the party has found an indispensable role to play. Having said that, there are a few further questions to be answered: how well can the party play this role, and how much power and authority can the party maintain as the democratic election of the community residents committee becomes prevalent? Can a democratic synergy be achieved between the party branch and the community residents committee? Is the control function compatible with the rule of law? These are analogous to the questions regarding basic-level governance in the countryside and in enterprises and other danwei. How the party solves the problems in community construction is an important indicator for its future role in a fully marketised society.

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Patterns of community construction5 Emphasising services and management: the case of Qingdao6 ‘Community’ construction at the Street-level Qingdao is one of the earliest cities to experiment with community construction since the mid-1990s. It has defined community broadly, and has focused on improving the welfare services to, and the management of, the city residents by strengthening the party and government at the Street-level. In 1999, the Qingdao city party committee and its organisation department chose Sifang district to experiment with the reorganisation of the Street party committee into the Street party work committee. While the previous committee had no power over other offices at the Street-level that were dispatched from the district departments, the new work committee was empowered to be the core of leadership of all the offices and activities at the Street-level.7 The new work committee was to discuss and decide on all the important affairs of community construction and development, and mobilise the resources and coordinate the related works of the various offices and units. In 2000, it was decided to implement this method in all the districts in Qingdao. Specifically, the Community Management Committee was to be established at the Street-level, involving the dispatched offices of specialised departments and cadres of residents committees, and functioning as the coordination and implementation organ for community construction and management. Also at the Street-level, a Community Affairs Reception Centre (shequ shiwu shouli zhongxin) was to be established, providing legal advice and administrative services to the residents. The Street office was also required to develop organs for social services such as introducing jobs, medication and health, education and training, and home-help. In addition, the Community Representative Council was to be established at the Street-level. Organised by the Street party work committee, the Council was to play a consultative role, consisting of the representatives of enterprises and government-affiliated institutions, social organisations and residents, and members of the people’s congresses and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conferences at various levels. The Council was to meet regularly and discuss important affairs and problems of the community, and supervise and check the work of the Street office and other Street-level dispatched offices of the district departments. As for the finances of the Street offices, it was decided that they were no longer allowed to run their own businesses. The Street office was to be cut off from their enterprises completely, in terms of personnel, finances, and property, and instead receive a transfer from the district finances. For

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instance, in the case of Shinan district, the district financial department started to transfer 10 million RMB per year to each Street office to cover their expenses. The objective of this change in the financial arrangement was to let the Street offices concentrate on city management and community construction, rather than on businesses and the making of profits. The amount of profits made was no longer included in the list of achievements used in assessing the Street office officials. ‘Community’ construction at the residents’ committee level At the level of the residents committees, these committees had been amalgamated and were to be reorganised into community residents committees (CRCs). The 786 residents committees of the four inner-city districts had been consolidated to 569.8 The tasks of the CRCs were to organise the residents and conduct the following: improving the environment and beautifying the residential area; cleaning and sanitation work; services for the convenience of the residents; social welfare services; security; construction of ‘spiritual civilisation’; ideological education; etc. The CRCs were also expected actively to provide public affairs services, and support the government in urban management, maintaining social stability, family planning, and so on. The members of the CRCs were to be elected democratically by the Residents Representative Council, which also discussed and decided on the important affairs of the CRCs. The city bureau of civil affairs hoped that there would be direct elections of the CRCs by all the residents in the future.9 Also, a Community Democratic Consultative Council was to be established in each CRC, consisting of the CRC director, community work assistant, representative of the real estate management firm, representatives of the work units and the police station, Street office officials, residents’ representatives, and members of the people’s congresses and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conferences at various levels. This Council was to provide opinions about community work, coordinate and solve problems that have emerged, and assess the work of the members of the CRC. A characteristic of Qingdao’s experience was the introduction of specialised community workers, recruited from among the young and welleducated, laid-off workers.10 They were employed by the Street office, and after receiving a month’s training at the district, were dispatched one each to the residents committees (now the CRCs). Their salaries are paid jointly by the district and the Street office, and are set at the level of the average wage of the total urban work force, which was an annual 8,504 RMB, that is, just over 700 RMB per month, in 1999.11 There was another scheme to send down staff of the district government and its affiliated institutions to the CRCs. Every district was to send down 100 of these staff at deputy division-chief and section-chief levels to the CRCs for one year, making them deputy-secretaries of party branches or

162 Akio Takahara and Robert Benewick assistant-director of the CRCs. They were supposed to reinforce the work of CRCs through their knowledge of policies and high cultural standards. Qingdao made it clear that the party organisation was to play the core leadership role, and the government was to play the organising role, in community construction. The slogan explaining the new work arrangement for community construction was, ‘the leadership of the party committee, organisation by the government, participation by all parties, joining forces and promotion by all’. One party branch was established along with each CRC,12 and as at the autumn of 2000 the party branch secretary was concurrently director of the CRC in 63 per cent of cases.13 Resources for community construction The funds required for the improvement in welfare services came from various sources. First, they came from the income of the city’s bureau of civil affairs. Thirty per cent of the sales of welfare lotteries could be retained in the social welfare fund, and distributed to the districts according to their sales. Also, 5 per cent of the profits of disabled people’s enterprises, exempted from income tax, were retained by the bureau of civil affairs. Second, there might be expenditures from the districts’ finances. Most of the fiscal expenditures were made on an ad hoc basis for certain projects, except for Sifang district that had earmarked 500,000 RMB for community construction each year.14 Third, the resources of the work units in the communities were to be mobilised. This was apparently not easy to actualise. Qingdao’s officials regarded that this was particularly difficult to do if the area of a ‘community’ was restricted to a couple of residents committees. Discussion Qingdao officials explained that they had focused on improving the delivery of welfare services in constructing communities. For this purpose, they said the best method was to empower the Street-level, and the Street party work committee in particular, to take the lead in interest coordination, decision-making and implementation. Not only the money required, but also some personnel were sent from the city and the district to the Street office and the CRC. The recruitment of community workers was a way to solve the problem of unemployment, to which the development of welfare services was also considered conducive. On the other hand, the secondment of district officials to CRCs was one way to deal with the government organisational reform, which required the number of personnel to be reduced. Thus, community construction was regarded as a good opportunity for the government to alleviate the pains of enterprise and government reforms.

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Improving services thus meant strengthening of management by the Street party committees and Street offices. The role of the party was also an important point at the level of the CRCs, as was clear from the fact that 63 per cent of the party branch secretaries were concurrently directors of the CRCs. The functions of the CRCs overlapped those of the Street offices, and their institutional structures looked very similar. The CRCs, although they were the residents’ autonomous organisations by name, had been co-opted and turned into the agents of the ‘administrative community’. Emphasising participation: the case of Shenyang15 Defining communities Shenyang, the capital of Liaoning province and the industrial centre of the north-east, used to be deeply embedded in the planned economy and has been seriously affected by the enterprise reforms. Since the workers could no longer depend on the work units for the delivery of social services, there had to be a new ‘tray’, that is the community, to carry the work. After studying the experiences of other cities such as Qingdao, Nanjing, Shanghai, and Beijing, the leaders of the Shenyang city party committee and the city government decided to implement a different model of community construction. This was because the problems they confronted in the process of reforms were larger than those of other cities. Shenyang, from the beginning, defined the area of a community to be formed from amalgamated residents committees, thus excluding the Street office from the community. A central idea was to separate the government and the community along with the reform policy to separate the government and the enterprise, and not to let the residents committee become another layer of government. Shenyang officials decided to amalgamate 2–3 residents committees to form a ‘community’, which was defined by geographical concerns, population size, functional facilities available, the sense of identity among the residents, and the distribution of work units. They thought that Streets were inappropriate to be communities, because they were government, and because they were too big to implement direct elections. In 1999, 2,753 residents committees were consolidated into 1,277 Community Committees.16 Officials of the Bureau of Civil Affairs had proposed to reorganise the constituencies of the deputies to the people’s congress. If the newly defined communities became the constituencies, this would be conducive to enhancing the residents’ identity with the community. The city party committee and the people’s congress had agreed that some deputies in the next election should be chosen from constituencies based on communities. Already, the deputies visited communities to listen to the views of the residents, and every community had chosen one liaison officer who would convey the views of the residents to the standing committee of the people’s congress.

164 Akio Takahara and Robert Benewick Autonomy and democracy The communities were to enjoy the following rights and perform the following functions.17 First, the right of autonomy, which consisted of five elements: the right to decide on their internal affairs; the right to select and recall their staff (recall by the request of 60 per cent of the residents); financial rights; the right to manage ordinary affairs and goods;18 the right to reject any irrational request for money and other contributions (tanpai). But their second ‘right’ was to cooperate with the government and manage affairs according to the laws. This was the function the government had passed on to the community, so the necessary expenditure had to be covered by the government. The work included the management of migrants, provision of social welfare, security, and environmental protection. The third right was that of supervising the government, the court, and the prosecutor’s office. But at the same time, the officials were also preparing a mechanism for the government to assess the performance of the community cadres. As for the role of the party, Shenyang officials did see the need to establish more party branches at the community level. This was to facilitate the management of the party members who were no longer managed by the work unit party committees, and to conduct the ideological and political work. However, they also uttered an impressive statement that the people’s city should be managed by the people and not by the party. Through the promotion of basic-level democracy, they said they were returning power to the people and making them the true masters of society. The organisation of the communities consisted of four main bodies. First, there was the Community Party Organisation which had to be the ‘core of leadership’. Second, there was the Community Members’ Congress (shequ chengyuan dahui), or the Community Members’ Representative Congress (shequ chengyuan daibiao dahui), depending on whether they have direct elections of the Community Committee or not. This was the highest body for decision-making. The majority of the representatives were the leaders of apartment buildings (louzhang) and the leaders of apartment units (consisting of flats using the same building entrance and stairs) (danyuanzhang). Third, there was the Community Committee, which implements the decisions. After amalgamating the residents committees, the number of members was reduced from over 13,000 to 6,400. The average age came down from above 70 years to 45.1. The idea was to professionalise the members, and after openly inviting applications, elections were conducted. The competition ratio was 3.3 applications to 1 post. Of those elected, over 60 per cent used to be in a managerial position in their former work units.19 In Shenyang, in addition to the elected members, one or more policemen in charge of the area became ex officio members. Fourth, there was the Consultative Committee (yishi xieshang weiyuanhui), which consisted of three to 20 members, depending on the size of the community. The membership was similar to that of the equivalent in Qingdao. This Committee

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exercised the power of the Community Members’ Congress or the Community Members’ Representative Congress when they were not in session. Officially, the relationship between the Street office and the Community Committees is one of guidance, and not leadership. However, there is a section (ke, that is one rank below the division, chu) in charge of community work in both the Street office and the district. They were supposed to solve any problems that the communities were unable to solve. In the government reforms that were scheduled to start at the end of 2000, Shenyang was considering the reduction of personnel, and organisation of the Street offices in particular. They would rather strengthen the district and weaken the Street offices, which is the opposite to the idea of cities such as Qingdao and Shanghai. This apparently was not unrelated to the deep-rooted problem they were facing: it was difficult for the government, and the Street offices in particular, to get rid of their habit of giving orders and instructions to the community. Shenyang officials took this problem seriously and, in June 2000, the mayor disallowed the establishment at the community level of any organisations directly under the vertical departmental systems. At the same time, communities were prohibited from establishing organisations that bore the same name as any upper-level organisation.20 There were organisational arrangements at the city, the district and the Street level for the coordination of various governmental departments. At the city level, there was the Community Construction Leadership Small Group, which is headed by the mayor. The office of this leadership small group was located in the bureau of civil affairs. At the district level, there was the Community Construction Party and Government Liaison Meeting, which decided on the annual plan of community construction. The district Community Construction Guidance Committee, involving various departments, provided the specific guidance on community work. For example, they decided on promoting sports activities in the communities, and guided them on the contents and methodology. Resources for community construction Funds for community construction came mainly from the district. For a new project, the communities themselves could draw their own plans, which would be assessed and approved by the Street office. The Street office would then send the plans to the district assessment committee for their assessment and approval. The district had started to earmark some budget for this committee. What was emphasised in Shenyang was resource sharing within the community. Work units with facilities such as hospitals and gymnasiums opened them to other community members. Note here that a distinct characteristic of Shenyang was to acknowledge work units also as members

166 Akio Takahara and Robert Benewick of a community. In addition, donations from individuals were collected for specific purposes, such as the holding of an arts festival. Discussion Thus, there were difficulties in implementing autonomy thoroughly, partly because of work habit, but particularly because the communities were still dependent upon the Street offices and the district (and the city) for funds. There was also an acknowledged difficulty in mobilising the interest of the residents in community work. Nevertheless, there was a clear target to enhance democracy and the autonomy of the community. Unlike other cities such as Qingdao, Shenyang was not allowing anybody dispatched from the district or the Street office in the community Committees (except for the policemen). They were keen to mobilise the resources within the communities, and stressed that work units were also members of the community. The bureau of civil affairs seemed genuinely keen to promote residents’ participation in community work, including direct elections of Committee members. Why was this the special way of community construction, for a city that faced bigger problems than others in the process of reforms? This partly stemmed from the fact that Shenyang was less wealthy and had a stronger need to cultivate and mobilise the resources and initiative at the societal level. When we remember the fact that most of the 26 experimental cases of community construction were located in relatively affluent big cities, we think we understand the reason why the Ministry of Civil Affairs opted not for the Qingdao model or the Shanghai model, but for the Shenyang model to be disseminated to other cities in China, a view that was eventually endorsed by the party centre and the State Council in late 2000.

Party leadership in community construction From the above cases, we can identify two lines of thought regarding party leadership in community construction. On the one hand, there is an idea to emphasise the central role of party leadership in the communities. This view is widely shared by such institutions as the Central Organisation Department and the relatively affluent, coastal cities that experimented with community construction. Regarding the functions of the community, emphasis was placed on control and management and provision of services. Even in medium- and small-sized cities, the leaders of the Central Organisation Department have stressed the need for implementation of ‘the most important task of community management and services’ through the strengthening of party organisations.21 According to the director of the organisation department in Jianghan district, Wuhan city, which is well known for its experiment with community construction, the specific tasks of the party organisation in the community as defined by party committees

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at various levels can be summarised as follows: to propagate and implement thoroughly the line and policy of the party and the laws and regulations of the state, and make decisions on the important affairs of the community; to exercise leadership on the community residents committee and on the work of mass organisations such as the Communist Youth League and the Women’s Federation; to organise and coordinate the party organisations and party members that belong to the units within the community to participate in community construction; to strengthen its own organisation and let the party members play a vanguard and model role in the work of the community; to implement well the work on educating and managing community workers; to implement well ideological and political education and maintain social stability.22 These, in fact, are much larger roles than are stipulated in the document, ‘The Opinions of the Ministry of Civil Affairs on Promoting Urban Community Construction Nationwide’, which was approved and transmitted by the General Offices of the party centre and the State Council.23 With such a mandate, there seems to be no doubt that institutionally the party is in a commanding position. The other line of thought on community construction, however, emphasises the importance of autonomy. When autonomy is regarded vital, whether for the sake of democratisation or because of the need to seek an economical way of social management, the leadership role of the party is acknowledged but considered separate from the construction of the community as such. This is the position taken by the Ministry of Civil Affairs and by the civil affairs department in poorer cities such as Shenyang. Thus, they argue that the nature of the leadership of the party over the autonomy of the community residents should be that of guidance rather than wholesale substitution, or running things all by itself.24 From our findings, we can identify the following effects and problems of party work in the implementation of community construction. First, the party at the Street-level can be instrumental in the coordination of different departments, and solve the friction between vertical departments (tiaotiao) and localities (kuaikuai) at the basic level. Previously, the party committee at the Street-level lacked the power to manage the party members that belonged to those offices at the Street-level that were dispatched by the bureaus of the district government. Moreover, there was no relation between the Street-level party committee and the party members of the danwei that existed at the Street-level, either. Therefore, it was difficult for the former to deal with the latter, particularly if the designated administrative-level of that danwei was higher than Street-level. By providing the Street-level party committee with the power to co-manage these party members, that is by enabling the former to take part in the assessment of the latter, the Street-level party committee have come to possess effective leverage in mobilising the vertical departments and their party members in community construction.

168 Akio Takahara and Robert Benewick This is all the more important because it has turned out that, compared to village autonomy, it is more difficult to secure the participation of residents in the various activities of the urban community. This is partly because a number of urban residents generally do not feel they have a stake in community construction. Compared to the villages that own a substantial amount of assets, such as land and village enterprises, urban communities are penniless. The work of urban communities is targeted mainly at the weak and unfortunate members of society, and if you are still employed by a danwei that is doing relatively well, working in the growing private sector or involved in a property owners’ committee, there is not much incentive for you to participate in community activities. It also turns out that even the party members lack enthusiasm for community work. According to a survey conducted in Hunan province, 66 per cent of the 767 party members who were employed answered that they were unwilling to take part in community activities, and 79 per cent of them said they were unwilling to attend education sessions organised by the party organisation of the community after work.25 A report from Hangzhou city, Zhejiang province, reveals that there is a widespread phenomenon of ‘laid-off party members distrusting communities, party members with jobs in danwei deriding communities, retired party members ignoring communities, and resident party members not helping communities’.26 Although the party has been empowered at the Street-level, the party organisation at the community-level is yet to attain the effective mechanism and leverage to control the members of other party organisations belonging to the danwei. Another issue concerns the relationship between party leadership and community autonomy. There are many cases of friction between the party organisation and the CRC, (aka Community Committee) and between the party secretary and the director of the CRC.27 There is a parallel here with the relationship between the party secretary and the elected village leader, and between the party secretary and the manager of an enterprise. A survey in Beijing reveals that not much attention to autonomy has been paid by the party organisations, which tend to intervene extensively in the work of the CRCs.28 This phenomenon, which is apparently widespread, leads to the imbalance between the large amount of their work and the limited amount of their funding. In other cases, since only the CRC is elected by the residents, the party organisation in the community is regarded as secondary and is only playing a subsidiary role in decision-making.29 Recent arguments that have arisen from praxis indicate that party leadership and community autonomy are compatible.30 As elsewhere, the CCP has advocated a virtual merger of the party organisation and the CRC; the secretary can take part in the election and become the CRC director or a deputy director, and/or the CRC director or deputy director can be elected by the party members as the secretary or a deputy secretary.31 In reality, besides the party secretary, the two organs have virtually merged in many

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32

communities. Naturally, there are objections to this arrangement from those who argue that it could neutralise autonomy and also compromise the social position of the party by loading it with cumbersome administrative functions.33 It can also be argued, however, that if there is a full merger, the party secretary in effect will be elected by the residents, which points to a way of democratisation with Chinese characteristics.

Concluding remarks The urban community in China was originally designed as an autonomous entity that would provide the residents with services, which used to be a function of the work unit, also known as the danwei. Available evidence suggests, however, that the autonomy of the community has been largely compromised in the actual process of community construction in a number of cities. We have identified the causes from both above and below, as it were. First, urban communities were expected to fulfil another function of maintaining and strengthening the control over the urban populace. Generally, therefore, there is a strong emphasis on the leadership of the party organisation, which tends to neutralise the principle of the exercise of autonomy by the residents. As long as the party attempts to hold on to its dictatorship, there does not seem to be any room left for autonomy at the societal level. However, there is a curious symbiosis between control and autonomy at the basic level of Chinese society. Particularly in the poorer areas where the government cannot invest much in the provision of services, autonomy has been promoted as an economical means for social management. In implementing autonomy in those areas, however, it still has to be the party that constitutes the core entity, around which social forces cluster. This relates to the second factor of socio-economics. It has proved to be rather difficult to motivate the residents to participate in the work of the community. Unlike the countryside, where the village possesses substantial assets in the form of land and rural enterprises, land in the cities is owned by the state and controlled by the government, and the community is generally not allowed to run its own businesses for making profit. Where destitute, the community tends to attract little support from the residents, particularly those that can still turn to the danwei or to the market for the services that they need. Available evidence suggests that even the party members are generally reluctant to come out for support. Nevertheless, it is still the party members that the community leaders rely on to take the lead in implementing the various activities of the community. Thus, judging from the actual implementation process, it seems that the leadership role of the party is indispensable for an effective operation of the community. From the standpoint of the party, community construction has thus provided a good opportunity to strengthen its organisation at the basic level and consolidate the basis of its power. The difficulty in playing

170 Akio Takahara and Robert Benewick this role, however, reveals the enormous challenge that the party is facing. The experience of party work in community construction represents another case of its uphill struggle: the party has yet to prove that it can tighten its grip on society in the centrifugal process of marketisation.

Notes * We are grateful to Sarah Cook, Ford Foundation, who was instrumental in arranging the fieldwork, the Leverhulme trust and the British Academy for their generous support and to Xia Jianzhong and our many friends and colleagues in China for their wisdom and support. 1 For an analysis of the reform of the danwei see David Bray, Social Space and Governance in Urban China: the Danwei (Workunit) System from Origins to Reform (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005); Xiaobo Lu and Elizabeth J. Perry (eds), Danwei: the Changing Chinese Workplace in Historical and Comparative Perspective (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997). 2 Being dispatched offices of the district government, the Street offices constitute the lowest level of government in urban China. Below the Street offices, there are the residents committees, which are stipulated in the constitution as residents’ autonomous organisations. 3 See clause 3 of the Regulation, in Pang Senquan, ‘A Study Report on Revising the “Regulation for Organising Urban Street Offices”’ (in Chinese), in Policy Research Centre of the Ministry of Civil Affairs (ed.), Zhongguo Shehui Fuli yu Shehui Jinbu Baogao (2003), Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, 2003, p. 210. 4 Stipulated in ‘Ministry of Civil Affairs’ Opinion on Promoting Urban Community Construction Nationwide’, which was approved and transmitted in the joint circular issued by the General Offices of the party centre and the State Council on 13 December 2000. This document is collected in Liang Wanfu (ed.), Urban Community Construction with Chinese Characteristics, Volume 2 (in Chinese), Liaoning University Press, 2001, pp. 1–10. 5 This part is taken from Robert Benewick and Akio Takahara, ‘Eight Grannies with Nine Teeth Between Them: Community Construction in China’, Journal of Chinese Political Science, Vol. 7, Numbers 1 and 2, (2002), pp. 1–18. 6 Based on interviews with Qingdao city and district officials, Street officials and cadres of Community Residents Committees, September 2000, and ‘CCP Qingdao City Committee and Qingdao City People’s Government, Some Opinions on Further Promoting the Work of Strengthening Urban Basic-level Basis through Community Construction’, 3 July 2000. 7 The district department and the Street party work committee jointly conducted the assessment and appointment of the cadres to these offices. 8 These figures exclude the Family Committees, the number of which was reduced from 390 to 178. They are just like residents committees, but their membership consists of the family members of staff and workers who all belong to a certain work unit. 9 Experiments with direct elections had started in CRCs in Sifang district. 10 They had to be under 41, have been to senior high-school, and have a local urban registered residence (chengshi hukou). 11 So the annual salary of a community worker was 8,504 RMB in 2000. Cf. the supplement paid to the CRC director was increased in 1998 from 135 RMB to 300 RMB. It was planned to be doubled to 600 RMB in 2001.

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12 Before this was not the case. Although figures are unavailable for the situation in Qingdao, at the national level only 69.9 per cent of residents committees had party cells at the end of 1998. 13 Qingdao City Bureau of Civil Affairs, ‘Pay Effort to Foster and Improve Community Functions and Promote the Deepening Development of Community Construction’. 14 Licang district was also going to include ‘community construction’ among the expenditure items on a regular basis. 15 Based on interviews with officials at the city, district and street levels and cadres of the Community Committees, conducted in Shenyang in September 2000. 16 At a conference on communities held in Hangzhou in 1999, some criticised that the Shenyang model was illegal, because it had dropped ‘Residents’ from the name despite the Law on Organising Residents Committees, and because they were hiring cadres living outside the community. Although this made Shenyang officials nervous, they maintained the support from MoCA. 17 The Shenyang city government was preparing a draft regulation that clearly defined the rights and powers of the communities. 18 According to an official of the civil affairs department, they used to need the approval of the Street office even to use some sheets of paper. 19 However, over 3,000 of the former members of the residents committees were re-elected. 20 For example, there is the Communist Youth League at the level of Street office and above, but communities only have the Youth Association (qingshaonian xiehui). The latter receives no money nor personnel but only guidance from the former. 21 See the reporting on the National Conference on the Exchange of Work Experiences on Party Construction in Streets and Communities in Medium- and Small-sized Cities, held in January 2002, in Shequ, No. 2–3, 2002, 8 February 2002, particularly p. 4. 22 Hu Ming, ‘On the Unification of Institutional and Non-institutional Factors for the Leadership Role Played by the Party Organisations in Communities’ (in Chinese), Shanghai Dangshi yu Dangjian, No. 9 (2003), collected in Zhongguo Gongchandang, No. 12 (2003), pp. 113–16. 23 This document listed the following as the major tasks of the party organisation in the community: to propagate and implement thoroughly the line and policy of the party and the laws and regulations of the state, and unite and organise the members of the party branch and the residents to fulfil the tasks assigned to the community; to support and guarantee the implementation of autonomy by the community residents committee according to law and its execution of duties; and to strengthen its own organisation, implement well its work on ideological and political work, and let the party members play a vanguard and model role in community construction. 24 This was the remark made by one representative at the National Conference on the Exchange of Work Experiences on Party Construction in Streets and Communities in Medium- and Small-sized Cities, held in January 2002, in Shequ, Nos. 2–3 (February 2002), p. 8. 25 Li Chi, ‘Create the Mechanism and Method for the Education and Management of Party Members in Communities’ (in Chinese), Zhongguo Gongchandang, No. 4 (2003), p. 113. 26 Zhou Gansong, ‘New Situation, New Requirements, New Problems and New Countermeasures Regarding Current Work on Community Party Construction’ (in Chinese), Zhonggong Hangzhoushiwei Dangxiao Xuebao, No. 1 (2004), pp. 58–63, collected in Zhongguo Gongchandang, No. 4 (2004), pp. 118–24.

172 Akio Takahara and Robert Benewick 27 Xu Yong and Chen Weidong et al. Zhongguo Chengshi Shequ Zizhi (Community Autonomy in Chinese Cities) (Wuhan Chubanshe, 2002), p. 275. 28 Task Force for Beijing Urban Community Party Construction, ‘Survey on the Situation of Beijing Urban Community Party Construction’ (in Chinese), Chengshi Wenti, No. 4 (2003), pp. 66–8, collected in Zhongguo Gongchandang, No. 10 (2003), p. 124. 29 Hu Ming, ‘On the Unification of Institutional and Non-institutional Factors for the Leadership Role Played by the Party Organisations in Communities’, p. 115. 30 See also Lu Hanlong, ‘From Party and Government Administration to Community Governance’, Institute of Sociology, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, Construction of Grassroots Organisations in Urban China: A Research Report on Chinese Neighbourhood Committees (May, 2003). 31 Yu Yunyao, Dang de Jianshe Ruogan Shijian he Lilun Wenti (Some questions on the practice and theory of party construction) (Dangjian Duwu Chubanshe, 2002), p. 589. This is from a remark made by Yu Yunyao at a discussion meeting on party construction work at streets and communities, held in October 1999. Yu was then a deputy director of the Party Central Organisation Department. 32 Xu Yong and Chen Weidong, Zhongguo Chengshi Shequ Zizhi, p. 275, and pp. 276–7. 33 An argument by Lin Shangli, professor at Fudan University, introduced in Kazuko Kojima and Ryosei Kokubun, ‘The “Shequ Construction” Programme and the Chinese Communist Party’, The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies, No. 16 (2002), pp. 100–1.

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9

The weakening of workers’ power in China Cai Yongshun

The political and economic status of workers in Chinese public firms has declined significantly as the planned economy gives way to a marketoriented one since the 1980s. Politically, the Chinese Communist Party has modified its definition of the vanguard class in China, which used to consist only of workers, to include private entrepreneurs. Perhaps more important, workers’ guaranteed economic welfare, in particular the lifetime employment system, is becoming history. Since the 1990s, tens of millions of workers in public firms have been thrown out of jobs. The number of workers in the state and collective sectors plummeted more than 48 million between 1995 and 2000, a number equal to the population of South Korea.1 Laid-off workers and retirees of public firms have become the largest portion of the poverty-stricken population in urban China.2 The decline of workers’ status reflects the change of the party-state’s commitment to state-owned enterprises and their workers. In the pre-reform period, as in the former Soviet Union, labor relations in China are claimed to be based on a “tacit agreement” or moral arrangement between the state and labor that protects workers’ interests.3 Where such contracts are fulfilled, labor movements are rare.4 This is because the regime provided broad guarantees of full and secure employment, state-controlled and heavily subsidized prices for essential goods, fully socialized human service, and egalitarian wage policies. In exchange for such benefits, workers consented to the party’s extensive and monopolistic power, accepted state domination of the economy, and complied with authoritarian political norms. “Maintenance of labor peace in this political system thus required relatively little use of overt coercion.”5 As Walder suggests: the extraordinary job security and benefits, the goods and services distributed directly by the state enterprise in a situation of scarcity that affects other sectors of the workforce more severely, is an important source of the acceptance of the system.6 If this tacit agreement between the state and workers is acceptable to both parties, neither of them should have an incentive to break it. The

174 Cai Yongshun question is, then, why the party-state has decided to cease its commitment to SOEs and their workers. This chapter shows that the party-state has adopted various reform measures to reduce or stop its commitment because it intends to rationalize the economic activities in order to reduce its financial burdens. The economic reform has affected workers in public firms in several ways. First, the priority of economic growth forces the partystate to give social and political recognition of non-state economies as well as those who work in such sectors. This leads to the decline of the social and political status of state workers because they are no longer seen as the only force that the Party relies on for legitimacy and economic development. Second, and more important, in order to reform inefficient SOEs, the Party and the government adopt a number of policies that significantly reduce the power of workers within public firms. These developments have redefined the relationship between the party-state and workers in a new context of a market economy.

Workers’ status in the reform period The decline of workers’ social and political status in China began in the 1980s. The rhetoric praise for the working people made by the Party has failed to arrest this tendency. Like their counterparts elsewhere,7 many Chinese working people in SOEs are experiencing the negative impact of the market economy. Although the Party has been claiming that the working class is the “master of the enterprise,” few SOE workers believe it is true. As early as in 1982, some SOE workers claimed that they had been cheated by a state that was “in a socialist appearance, on a capitalist road, and in the feudal shadow.”8 Others admitted in the mid-1980s: We were the master, but we are not now. In the 1950s, when we walked in the street with uniforms, even the police would show their respect to us, and we felt proud of ourselves; but now if you walk in the street with your uniform, even the salesperson is reluctant to talk with you, and we feel inferior to others.9 As the reform of SOEs proceeds, workers have experienced the decline of status both within and outside SOEs. In 1986, for example, a 37-yearold lathe operator explained the social and economic reasons for workers’ lack of enthusiasm in an interview carried out by the All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU): Nowadays, workers are reluctant to do more work, and our goal is to get the full salary. I am not satisfied with my job either. I want to leave the factory, but I cannot, because I do not have social connections . . . [Since the reform began] The social status of workers is very low, and nobody thinks highly of workers. The public opinion and even

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the leaders hold that workers are rude, uncivilized, disobedient, and unsophisticated in speaking. Workers are looked down upon when seeing a doctor. In hospitals, when the doctor knows you are a worker, he or she will finish the prescription without knowing your illness in detail. Children of workers are discriminated against in schools. When the teacher knows the parents of a child are workers, he or she will not pay much attention to the student because the teacher believes that the parents will not be able to offer much personal help. The political status of workers is also very low. The trade union is like the ears of the deaf – it is useless and cannot represent the interests of the working people. Our factory has three cars but no ambulance. When one middlelevel cadre was hospitalized, workers donated blood. His children accompanied him to Shanghai for medical treatment (the factory is in Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region), and the factory reimbursed the transportation fee. In contrast, when one worker was hospitalized because of cholelithiasis, nobody took care of him. Last year, on my way home, I saw a ruffian trying to do violence to a policeman with a knife. There were over one hundred people even including three police standing by, but none of them tried to stop the criminal. When I went to stop him, he stabbed the policeman in the chest. I struck him down, and he was arrested . . . When some people in the security department of my factory tried to apply to the higher-level government for an award for me, the officials replied that they could only circulate a notice of commendation for a worker like me, and only cadres could receive an award. I did not care about the award, but I was very angry at these words . . . Some people said that the state policy is “to discipline workers, to take care of old cadres, and to build up intellectuals,” and I agree.10 In a more recent interview conducted by ACFTU in 1997, a workshop manager admitted: There is no guarantee for the livelihood of a worker. Nowadays those who produce wealth do not have wealth. Privileged work units like public security organizations, industrial and commercial bureaus, and banks are rich although they do not produce wealth. The state has been claiming that it should depend on the working class, but in fact, workers have the lowest social status. There is even no basic guarantee of livelihood. Nobody wants to be a worker, nor do I. But since I have no expertise and am too old, I cannot transfer my job and have to work hard in this enterprise.11 The declined social status has also been reflected in public opinion. One investigation by the Beijing Labor Bureau in the 1990s found that only about 1 percent of junior high-school graduates were willing to be factory

176 Cai Yongshun workers, whereas the percentage was 0.5 percent for senior high-school graduates. The social status of workers has been reduced to that of peasants. Given the fact that “there is no future opportunity, no status, and no money” for being a worker, some school students and their parents claimed that in the future only the following people should be workers or peasants: the illiterate, those with a poor academic grade, robots, people indulging in dissipation, bad persons, beggars, lazy people, and those whose parents were workers or peasants.12 Hence, to push their children to study hard to find better jobs when they grow up, some people took their children to the factory to show them how undesirable it was to be workers.13 In an interview conducted by the ACFTU in 1997, a worker admitted, “I think that workers are now at the bottom of the society, and our social status and salaries are very low; we are also looked down upon in the society.”14 Similarly, according to a survey conducted in Beijing and Shenzhen in 1998, among the top 30 occupations in their localities, only the engineer was listed. And even the manager was not included, not to mention workers.15 This finding confirms the result of another survey conducted in Nanjing in 1996, in which among the 50 types of occupations, the jobs of lathe operator and foundry workers were ranked 42nd and 43rd respectively in terms of the degree they were respected in society.16 It is true that the lower status of workers is not peculiar to China: studies of workers in other Asian countries have also suggested a similar situation faced by workers in this area. The East Asian Miracle has been achieved at the expense of “the extreme political subordination and exclusion of workers.”17 Yet the Chinese SOE workers did enjoy a much higher social status before the reform, and it was the reform that speeded up their status decline. SOE workers have been seen as the group that benefited least from the reform. For example, one investigation of the citizens of 38 cities of 24 provinces or provincial administrative regions in 1997 revealed that “workers of SOEs” were regarded as the group that benefited least from the reform in the recent years, which was also admitted by higher-level officials.18 In Chinese society, individuals’ social and economic status is closely tied to that of their work units. SOEs are not the only work units in the public sector that provide secure jobs, stable salaries, or comprehensive welfare. Indeed, as the reform proceeds, the ability of SOEs to provide secure jobs and welfare benefits has “polarized”19 and as a whole has declined, compared with other public work units such as public agencies.20 In the public sectors, SOEs are more likely to lay off their workers than any other public sector.21 Take people’s income as another example. The gap not only exists across sectors but also across enterprises in the same sector. Existing studies have suggested that in the mid-1990s, about 9 percent of the enterprise workers had a higher salary than the rest, whereas 70 percent of the enterprise workers received a salary lower than the national average, and about 8 percent of them received reduced or no salary. By 1995, the income gap between the highest (i.e., monopolized)

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and the lowest industry sectors was 3.68 to 1.22 Indeed, salary alone is not sufficient in measuring the income gap among state workers. It is not rare that subsidies provided by public work units can be an equally or even the most important part of workers’ income. Unlike work units that are covered by government budget or those firms that enjoy competitive advantages, many public firms now have difficulty providing even the basic benefits to their workers. Perhaps what affect workers’ political and economic rights more directly are the changes of management–worker relations within the public firms. An important consequence of the reform of Chinese SOEs is the unprecedented power and autonomy of the management. The dominance of the management determines that workers’ welfare may be at its mercy. This is partly because the Communist Party and the government give the power to management without placing sufficient constraints on the latter. The intention to improve SOE performance by assigning more autonomy to the management has led to the decline of the organizations within SOEs that could have protected workers against the management.

Reform measures and management–worker relations The management–labor relationship is crucial to the understanding of the impact of reform measures on worker welfare. By discussing the changes of this relationship over the years, the following section suggests that workers in public firms lack a strong institutional arrangement to protect their interests. The power structure within public firms can be characterized as the declined status of the party organization, persistent weak position of the trade union, and symbolic participation of the workers’ representative congress. The Party and management A possible way of protecting workers’ interest is to grant some power to the Party organization (i.e., the Party committee) within SOEs. Yet, reform in SOEs has reduced the power of the Party organization and increased that of the management. Over the years until the late 1990s, two major management systems had been adopted in Chinese SOEs – manager-in-charge under the leadership of the Party committee (MICPC) and the manager responsibility system (MRS).23 Under the MICPC, the decision-making power resides in the Party committee, whose members include the manager. As the Party secretary heads the committee, this system can be turned into a Party-secretary responsibility system. In the MRS, the decision-making power, at least for administrative and production issues, is wielded by the manager. The reform of SOEs has led to the adoption of the MRS, resulting in increased power of management.24

178 Cai Yongshun In the early 1980s, the Chinese government began trials of the MRS for the following reasons: The labor division in modern enterprises is very delicate, and production is a continual process that entails more qualified technology. Also due to the complexity in coordination, the enterprise must have a unified, strong, and efficient production guidance and management system, and only the manager-responsibility system can meet these requirements.25 In 1986, the central government issued a number of policies that formally promoted the MRS system and granted SOE managers decision-making power with respect to important issues, including production, management, finance, and personnel. The profound impact of these measures became more obvious in the 1990s. For example, some surveys found that after the mid-1990s, about 98 percent of managers or chairpersons of the boards of directors personally controlled the financial affairs of their firms. Some appointed relatives as the firms’ accountants, paving the way for corruption.26 In contrast, the Party committee has been assigned abstract tasks, such as Party affairs and other political work, aiding management with production and management, and supervision of policy implementation. In the late 1980s, the government further expanded the role of manager as director and legal representative with full responsibility for the SOE. He or she should be placed in a central position and function as the “brain.” The manager and the Party secretary should proceed according to this new regulation and fulfill in cooperation their responsibilities. As to those managers and Party secretaries who fail to meet their job requirements, the authorities concerned should actively but cautiously switch their jobs.27 The status of the manager was legalized in the Enterprise Law enacted in 1988. Due to the 1989 Tiananmen incident and obvious decline of the Party’s status in SOEs, the Party has tried to balance relations between the Party committee and the management. In the 1990s, the Party specified two types of work for the SOE Party organization: (1) the implementation of Party and government policies, laws, and regulations; and (2) recommending, selecting, and sending representatives or managers to manage state assets, and ensuring that these people are “revolutionary, young, knowledgeable, and professional.”28 In practice, however, the manager is selected by higher-level authorities and is not checked by the SOE Party leader. As follow-up national surveys in 1993, 1994, 1997, and 1998 suggested, SOE managers appointed by higher-level authorities accounted for about

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90 percent of the total number.29 As the priority of higher-level authorities has shifted to economic development, managers who make profits win their trust and support. A Party secretary reported what SOE Party secretaries commonly complained about: Nowadays, when choosing cadres, their integrity and work style do not receive enough attention. Some higher-level leaders take a biased attitude towards the manager and the Party secretary. They treat the manager as the leader and the Party secretary as a subordinate. They only ask the manager to support and cooperate with the Party secretary, but they do not educate and discipline the former. If the manager has a single merit, their misconduct is overlooked. As long as the firm operates and workers do not take to the streets, the manager is deemed a good cadre; or as long as the manager is not corrupt, nothing is serious. Because of the lack of basic protection, the Party secretary is usually relegated to the position of a “daughter-in-law,” but he or she is asked to perform tasks that should be carried out by the “motherin-law.” If there is a tension between the Party and the management, higher-level leaders usually transfer the Party secretary elsewhere rather than investigate the cause. In some small firms, the manager can even remove the Party secretary.30 Although the relationship between the Party secretary and the manager varies, the decline of the power of the Party secretary is widespread.31 According to a survey of almost 10,000 workers in 100 SOEs between 1991and 1992, workers tended to approach the manager rather than the Party secretary for requests and demands.32 Some interviewees reported that their Party secretaries now assume marginal responsibilities, activities such as preparing for government hygiene inspection and implementing the family planning policy, although they may still receive token respect from the manager.33 In some SOEs, one person assumes the roles of manager, Party secretary, and, in some cases, chairperson on the board of directors. This aggregation of roles is usually undertaken to reduce conflict between the Party and management, not to strengthen the Party organization. The trade union Trade unions are important organizations for workers in capitalist systems, although their power varies. It is found that two important factors determine the power of a trade union: first, the extent to which unions, as a broad national pattern, are integrated into the process of managerial decision making, especially concerning work reorganization; and second, the existence of laws or

180 Cai Yongshun corporatist bargaining arrangements that regulate firm-level union practice from outside the firm.34 In communist systems, neither condition holds. In their 1970 strike, Polish workers cried “Where are the unions? Why aren’t they leading the workers?”35 Indeed, communist systems are characterized by weak mass associations such as trade unions. In the former Soviet Union: prior to a take-over, communists inside the trade union movement strive unceasingly and by all means available to generate hostility to the capitalist state. Once in power, with the state now supposedly on the side of workers, the relationship is totally changed. This apparently signifies the trade unions’ almost total surrender of their position as independent institutions to promote and defend the workers’ interests and welfare.36 What happened in the former Soviet Union also holds true in China. Until the early 1950s, the Chinese Communist Party had encouraged the trade union to fight against private business owners. But soon after nationalization, the trade union was deprived of its independence and kept under the control of the Party. The subordination of the trade union was determined in the 1950s after two leaders (i.e., Li Lisan and Lai Ruoyu) of the ACFTU were purged for attempting to establish an independent trade union.37 Indeed, as early as 1955, in a report to the central government, the ACFTU admitted that “the phenomenon that the trade union demands independence from the Party has largely disappeared. It is now focused on production matters.”38 Consequently, as defined in the trade union charter, the major task of the trade union is to help management fulfill production goals. Chinese workers have long realized the weakness of trade unions. In the mid-1980s, some workers pointed out that “the trade union should be disbanded or at least reorganized.”39 According to a survey of about 10,000 workers conducted by the ACFTU in 1986, about 60 percent thought that the trade union seldom resolved practical problems faced by workers. Instead, it only collected membership fees and operated like a government organ rather than a workers’ organization.40 Things have not changed much since then. Another nationwide survey of about 10,000 workers in 100 enterprises conducted between 1991 and 1992 showed that about 50 percent did not care about trade union activities, and those with higher education were even less interested. The negative relationship between education and political activism can be attributed to people’s recognition of the limited role of trade unions.41 While the trade union was subordinate to Party leadership in the prereform period, it is subject to management in the reform era, which undermines its status in a firm. Although trade unions try to advance the

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economic interests of workers at both the central and local levels,42 their institutional weaknesses severely limit their effectiveness. In most cases, it is the higher-level trade union that is able to exercise some influence on lower-level firms. At the firm level, the chairperson of the trade union is often recommended or even appointed by management, which often places him or her in a difficult situation when he or she tries to protect workers’ interests. The following case reported by a trade union cadre illustrates the weak position of trade union cadres. In 1997, the manager retired, and the higher-level authority sent a new one to the factory. Not long after the new manager arrived, he began to streamline the departments in the factory, which was not unreasonable. But he proposed to disband the trade union and to merge it with the Department of the Party and Masses Work. I (the chairperson of the trade union) opposed his proposal and pointed out that, according to the Trade Union Law and other regulations of the government, the trade union should be independent and cannot be disbanded. The manager was quite angry at my objection and said that it was not up to me to decide whether to keep the trade union. Instead, it would be decided by the votes of factory leaders. Fortunately, the voting failed to pass his proposal, and the trade union was maintained. Another confrontation between me and the manager was our disagreement on the reform plan of the factory. Last October (1998), our factory adopted the share-holding system, and the factory asked all workers to buy shares. But it was regulated in the reform plan that: “As to those who refuse to buy shares, the enterprise has the right to switch their jobs, require them to leave their posts to await re-allocation, or lay them off.” I told the manager that this regulation should not be included, as he had promised that shares would be purchased voluntarily. He replied that that policy was not to force workers to buy shares. Several days later, when the workers’ assembly discussed the plan, they unanimously agreed to remove the regulation of the compulsory purchase of shares. To help the factory, at my suggestion, the assembly encouraged and mobilized workers to buy shares. In the end, almost all the workers did that, and the factory raised enough funds. I assumed that my conflict with the manager was over, but the manager believed that I was pitting myself against him by amassing the support of workers . . . I was removed from the office, and the notification was issued by the Party committee of the factory.43 Given the weakness of the trade union, while workers often complain about its incompetence, staff of the trade union have their own difficulties. The chairperson of a trade union made a bitter complaint in an interview: “People always complain that the trade union does not protect their interests, but few of them have considered the issue of who protects

182 Cai Yongshun us.” Given the limited autonomy of this organization, it is less likely for its people, including the chairperson, to ignore the top leaders within a firm. Some chairpersons of trade unions were laid off even without ex ante notification.44 Hence in the reform period, although the trade union has tried to fight for workers and has become the “most important source” for negative news of high-level governments,45 it can hardly function as an independent organization or assume the role of organizers for workers’ collective action against the management, not to mention against the government.46 Workers’ council Another organization set up by the Chinese government to grant power to workers in state or collective enterprises is the workers’ council (zhigong daibiao dahui). Re-instituted in 1981, this organization has the right to participate in almost all enterprise decisions. Yet, in practice, it often has no final say in important issues. As a matter of fact, as early as in 1986, a nationwide survey of about 10,000 state workers found that only about 30 percent consider the workers’ council helpful.47 Had the council played a more prominent role in the firm, it could have prevented decisions unfavorable to workers from being made or would have lent more legitimacy to the firm’s decision. As the council has no influence on the tenure or promotion of the manager, its supervisory function lacks a power base. In fact, a number of obstacles hinder the workers’ council from being effective. First, the selection of council representatives may be controlled by top leaders within a firm. In some SOEs the council is an “elite congress” composed of cadres from different levels. Second, ordinary council representatives often lack knowledge of the firm’s operations at higher levels and are unable to make sensible suggestions or criticisms. Third, the threat of punishment by management is an important reason for the lack of confidence on the part of representatives. From the workers’ perspective, participating in the affairs of the firm would not only consume time, but also give the manager the impression that they were preoccupied with “irrelevant” tasks. This may lead to punishment, such as a bonus reduction, or worse, layoff. They may even be regarded as troublemakers. In contrast, obedient workers usually receive better treatment from leaders at various levels. Some workers lose their jobs because of active participation on the workers’ council. For example, a factory worker who often made suggestions to management was elected to the workers’ council. When the factory began layoffs, a number of leaders, without ex ante discussion, decided that this person should be among the first to be laid off, though he was a capable worker. The worker was so angry that he appealed to the labor arbitration department of the city, but in vain.48 Indeed, many workers are aware of the fact that a considerable number of supervisory organizations in SOEs – including the Party committee,

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the discipline committee, the trade union, the inspection department, and the auditing department – fail to discipline SOE leaders. How can workers make a difference? Worse still, the measures aimed to speed up the reform of SOEs made by the central government in 1999 further weakened the status of the workers’ council, giving workers the right to assess the performance of their leaders but no power to remove them.49 Workers’ councils prevented large-scale layoffs in some post-communist countries, such as Poland, because SOE directors’ plans for layoffs needed their approval.50 This is not the case in China. Reform plans such as bankruptcy, merger, privatization, and layoffs are commonly carried out without the approval of the workers’ council. Yet despite its weak position, workers in China still look to the council to protect their interests. The reform period has seen a number of attempts by workers to prevent undesirable reform measures on grounds that the reform plan has not been approved by the workers’ council.51 But local governments may claim that as SOEs belong to the state, workers are not the legal owners and their approval is unnecessary. Thus, more often than not, workers’ action fails.52 Management power and worker resistance: a case study The weak organizations in Chinese SOEs allow management to assume much authority over workers, and the situation is likely to continue as reform proceeds. A profound implication of management power is that worker resistance remains difficult due to the persistence of the structural barrier, namely, workers’ dependence on the firm. This has shaped workers’ behavior since reform began in the 1980s. Workers’ participation in the 1989 Tiananmen incident pointed to the strong influence of enterprise authority. While factory leaders’ permission or support encouraged worker participation in some firms, repressive enterprise authority curbed participation.53 The credible threat of punishment remains. A city trade union in Shaanxi province came to this conclusion after investigating scores of public firms in the late 1990s: Most production workers would at most complain about their sufferings when their interests were encroached on by the management. If asked to take the lead to appeal to the authorities concerned, most are very likely to refuse. Some said that they had never taken the lead, nor did they plan to. More people believed that if action reaped success, it would be enjoyed by all; but if it failed, only those who took the initiative would be punished. For this reason, it was best to be like everyone else. Although there might be a few workers who wanted to organize their colleagues to appeal to higher-level authorities, they worried that their action would be regarded as “organizing riots,” which is a crime. The prevailing attitude thus is “as everyone else wants to avoid offending the leaders, why should I take the initiative?”54

184 Cai Yongshun To some extent, the government creates this unfavorable situation for workers. Because of political risks, the government is unlikely to allow the formation of an independent trade union. As long as the government depends on the management for the performance of SOEs, it is reluctant to reduce management power. As a result, workers remain in a weak position in relation to management.55 In a survey of both blue- and white-collar workers in the machinery-manufacturing industry in 1996, about 80 percent indicated that they were not “masters of their firms” or not “masters” with true power.56 A similar situation has also occurred in post-communist Russia. “The disintegration of the administrative-command system of economic management and the process of de-statization and privatization removed the administrative constraints on management from above so that every enterprise director became a little Tsar in his own kingdom.”57 Consequently, “today even the most modest assertion of the workers’ rights and interests makes the protester liable to disciplinary action and dismissal, with much of the legal protection enjoyed by workers under the old regime having been removed.”58 The power of management thus has significant implications for worker resistance in China. A more effective way to protect one’s interests is to prevent unfavorable decisions from being made and carried out. But as a result of workers’ weak position, ex ante preventive action is less possible. The following example reported by my interviewees shows how dependence on the firm has undermined worker resistance to reform measures that endanger their vital interests, regardless of the number of prospective victims. It also shows when workers can take action to protect their interests. In 1985, the manager of a state factory with more than 5,000 workers triumphed in a power struggle with the Party secretary, forced the latter to transfer, and took the post of Party secretary from 1985 to 1995. He made a series of bad decisions that led to increased losses for the factory. In 1995, he decided to sell almost two-thirds of the factory’s land to a real estate company without notifying the workers’ council. He announced the sale at a meeting attended by factory cadres. Most factory cadres opposed the decision because loss of the factory land could mean the end of the enterprise and the jobs of thousands of workers. But none of them was bold or powerful enough to prevent the sale. A department manager recalled, “The manager responsibility system means that the manager decides all. No one has the courage to oppose him.” This was even more true for average workers. Therefore no action was taken and one-third of the land was sold. Things changed when the factory manager was transferred and the former Party secretary returned as manager. This new manager opposed the sale either because he wanted to show opposition to his old rival or because he did not think it was a good deal. When the real-estate company failed to pay on time, the new manager deliberately and subtly made his position

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known. Encouraged, workers began to build a wall to protect the remaining land. Six of them organized a group of volunteers to watch the wall during the night, in case the real estate company came to pull down the wall and factory houses. One night, around 12 o’clock, over 50 people hired by the real estate company arrived at the factory with a bulldozer to pull down the wall and factory houses. When the workers on duty found those intruders, they rang a bell and workers living nearby rushed to the factory. Some workers argued with the people from the real estate company and a fight broke out. The people hired by the real estate company were well prepared – they brought sticks with them – and the factory workers were at first in a defensive position. One worker suffered a serious head injury and was sent to a hospital immediately. When more workers arrived, the people from the real estate company became afraid and ran away. The workers decided to attack the real estate company and hold a demonstration in the morning. When the local government learned of the news, it commanded the hospital to save the life of the injured worker at all expense and dispatched police to block the factory. To calm the workers, the government declared that the factory could keep the remaining land and the real estate company had to back down. The workers took action and succeeded because with the support of the factory manager, they did not think that there was a great risk involved. As one worker recalled, “We all wanted to preserve our factory. But if the factory leader wanted to sell the land, nobody would dare openly oppose it. As the new manager opposed the deal, we had nothing to fear.”

Party–worker relations in a new labor regime The impact of the changing management–worker relations is not limited to within the firm; instead, it has significant implications for the relationship between the party-state and workers. In fact, the working class is turning from a stabilizing force into a potentially disruptive force in Chinese society. It is now more common than before that workers directly interact with the party-state when defending their interests. The reasons are multiple. First, because of the lack of an adequate welfare system and the inability of some firms to provide help, unpaid or underpaid laid-off workers have to approach the government if they take action. Second, the government, especially at the local level, is directly involved in reforms, including bankruptcy and privatization, that result in layoffs. As the owner of SOEs, government approval is the precondition for bankruptcy, which makes it a natural target of workers’ action.59 Moreover, a bankrupt firm ceases to exist or loses its ability to solve problems, and workers can only direct action at the government. Similarly, local governments play an important role in privatization by making policies or reform plans for firms.60 Two forms of privatization have affected workers most severely: (1) selling the firm to an individual or individuals (or to

186 Cai Yongshun foreigners) and (2) selling it to the workers (i.e., the employee shareholding system). If the firm is sold to one or a few persons, many would have to leave. The share-holding system may not be in the interests of workers either. Many workers simply lack confidence in their failing firms and have no incentive to invest. Some local governments require workers to buy shares in order to keep their jobs. A 1988 survey of 640 SOEs in four provinces suggested that almost 63 percent had forced workers to buy shares. Among these firms about 25 percent admitted that it was the decision of their local governments.61 Third, management–labor conflicts cause workers to target the government. Widespread corruption of firm leaders is blatant and takes many forms: using public property for personal purposes, spending public funds for personal consumption, embezzling public property, receiving kickbacks for selling or buying materials and equipment at distorted prices, making self-serving policies, and others.62 Indeed, in the 1990s, SOE managers were commonly described as “rich monks (i.e., the enterprise leader) in the poor temple (i.e., the failing enterprise)” or “rich monks in the rich temple.”63 In 1998, 27,700 people were investigated for embezzlement and bribery: SOE leaders accounted for about 50 percent.64 Reports of how corrupt managers pursue personal interests at the expense of firms abound in the Chinese media. What angers workers is that corruption has been a major cause of the poor performance of SOEs.65 About 90 percent of SOE managers are appointed by the government, so workers have to target the government in order to have despotic and corrupt managers removed or punished. Hence, workers’ economic demands often coincide with political demands to punish corrupt managers.66 In Liaoning province, for example, between January and May of 1998, among 1,170 collective appeals to the governments, with more than 50 participants for each appeal, half were made by workers of public firms. In each case there were complaints about the misconduct or corruption of firm leaders.67 In some cases, laid-off workers voiced their resentment of corrupt cadres explicitly. For example, some laid-off workers used the slogan “Laid-off workers do not need to worry; cadres have whatever we need at their homes.”68 Therefore, all these factors suggest that the dismantling or weakening of the work unit system in public firms has led to more frequent interaction or confrontation between workers and the Party as well as the government. For example, according to one survey of over 700 laid-off workers in China in 1999, about 20 percent of them reported that they once participated in collective action to defend their interests. As to the targets of their action, almost 80 percent reported the government or its agencies.69 The end of the social contract between workers and the Party in China is thus mounting pressure on the political system that used to address state–labor disputes through the work unit system. How the party and the government will take up this challenge will significantly affect political development in China.

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Thus far, the responses of the party-state towards workers’ problems are mixed in the sense that it has neither entirely ignored workers nor ceased reform measures that will undermine workers’ interests. For the sake of economic development, the Party has adopted a cooptation strategy to deal with private business people or the so-called capitalists by allowing them to join the party. This measure implies that the Communist Party will no longer merely represent the interests of the working class as before. A profound implication of this move for the Party–worker relations is that ideologically, workers will become more alienated from the Party.70 On the other hand, the Party will become less constrained by the ideology than before in dealing with workers, and it tends to make more efforts to institutionalize state–worker relations by, among other things, strengthening legal institutions.

Conclusion The Chinese working class used to be claimed as the political foundation of the communist regime, but the economic reform has drastically weakened workers’ power. The relationship between workers and the Party or the government has been redefined in a new economic environment. The economic burdens imposed on the government and the Party by the planned economy and the lifetime employment seem to have exceeded the political benefit accrued to the Party. As a result, the Party and the government began to dismantle the costly welfare state by introducing a number of reform measures. These measures, which aim to rationalize economic activities, affected state workers in two ways. Externally, workers’ social and political status declined at an unprecedented pace, compared with their situation before the 1970s. Internally, these reform measures have granted great autonomy to the management at the expense of workers. Yet, the ramifications of the reform of state enterprises go far beyond these firms per se. Instead, the weakening of the work unit system has increased direct confrontation between workers and the Party and the government. Whether and how the Party and the government deal with workers’ demands will affect the regime’s legitimacy.

Notes 1 Zhao Yining, “Wei shehui ruoshi qunti ‘xuezhongsongtan’” (Providing crucial help to the deprived in society), Liaowang (Perspective), No. 15 (2002), pp. 11–13; also see Dorothy Solinger, “Why We Cannot Count the ‘Unemployed’,” The China Quarterly, No. 167 (2001), pp. 671–688. 2 Because this study aims to examine state workers’ response to the reform measures, the concept of “laid-off workers” (xiagang zhigong) is not confined to those who left their firms but still maintained their labor relationship (which is the official definition of laid-off workers). It also includes those who were laid off due to bankruptcy, mergers, and privatization, in which case the labor relationship was often terminated. “Laid-off workers” in this study also includes

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3 4 5 6 7 8

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

19

20

non-production workers. Also see Fan Qin, “Xiagang shishui – woguo xiagang renyuan jiegou fenxi” (Who were laid off: an analysis of composition of the laid-off workers in our country), Zhongguo guoqing guoli (The situation and strength of China), No. 5 (1998), pp. 20–22; Zhongguo laodong tongji nianjian (Chinese Labor Statistics) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 2000), p. 441. For a discussion on moral economy, see James Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellions and Subsistence in Southeast Asia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1976). See, among others, Linda Cook, 1993, The Soviet Social Contract and Why it Failed: Welfare Policy and Workers’ Politics from Brezhnev to Yeltsin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993). Cook, The Soviet Social Contract and Why it Failed; Ludlam, “Reform and the Redefinition of the Social Contract under Gorbachev,” World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 2 (1991), pp. 284–312. Andrew Walder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1986), p. 248. For example, see Frederic C. Deyo, Beneath the Miracle: Labor Subordination in the New Asian Industrialization (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989). The Department of the CCP Secretary and the All China Federation of Trade Unions, Dangqian woguo gongren jieji zhuangkuang diaocha ziliao huibian (A compilation of the investigation materials of the working class of our country in the contemporary period) (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1983), p. 40. All China Federation of Trade Unions, 1987, Zhongguo zhigong duiwu zhuangkuang diaocha, 1986 (An investigation of Chinese workers, 1986) (Beijing: Gongren chubanshe, 1987), p. 286. Ibid., pp. 352–353. ACFTU, 1997 Zhongguo zhigong zhuangkuang diaocha (1997 investigation of Chinese workers) (Beijing: Xiyuan chubanshe, 1999), p. 1175. Zhang Jianhua (ed.), Zhongguo mianlin de jinyao wenti (Pressing problems facing China) (Beijing: Jingji ribao Chubanshe, 1998). Wu Junping and Xu Ying, Woshi shui (Whom am I?) (Huhehaote: Neimenggu renmin chubanshe, 1997), p. 175. ACFTU, 1999, p. 1226. Ye Xingping and Yi Songguo, “Shenzhen shi 100 zhong zhiye de shehui shengwang” (Social Reputation of the 100 occupations in Shenzhen), Shehui (Society), No. 11 (1998), pp. 24–25. Ye Nanke, “Nanjing shimin dui zhiye shengwang de pingjia” (Residents’ evaluation of the occupations in terms of the degree of the respect they receive), Shehui (Society), No. 1 (1997), p. 8. Deyo, Beneath the Miracle, p. 1. Cited in Li Peilin, “Laogongye jide de shiye zhili: hegongyehua he shichanghua” (The treatment of unemployment in the old industrial bases: postindustrialization and marketing) Shehuixue yanjiu (Sociological research), 4 (1998), pp. 1–12. Yang Zhanhui, 1998, “Guoqi ‘lianji fenhua’ bugou wushi” (Polarization of state enterprises should not be ignored), Zhongguo guoqing guo li, (The situation and strengths of China), No. 5 (1998), pp. 9–11; Yanjie Bian, Work and Inequality in Urban China (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1994). Ibid.; also see Robert P. Weller and Jiansheng Li, “From State-Owned Enterprise to Joint Venture: A Case Study of the Crisis in Urban Social Services,” The China Journal, No. 43 (2000), pp. 83–100.

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21 Fan Qin, “Xiagang shishui – woguo xiagang renyuan jiegou fenxi” (Who were laid off: an analysis of composition of the laid-off workers in our country), Zhongguo guoqing guoli (The situation and strength of China). 22 The Research Group of the State Council, Chengzhen jumin shouru caju yanjiu (A study on the income gap among urban citizens) (Beijing: Shehui kexue chubanshe, 1997). 23 Those used in the Cultural Revolution can be seen as exceptions. Also see Heath Chamberlain, “Party-Management Relations in Chinese Industries: Some Political Dimensions of Economic Reform,” The China Quarterly, No. 11 (1987), pp. 31–61. 24 Also see You Ji, China’s Enterprise Reform: Changing State/Society Relations after Mao (London: Routledge, 1997). 25 Chen Dengcai and He Xiaoying (ed.), 1996, Qiyelingdao tizhi gaige yu dang de jianshe xinlun (The reform of the leadership system in enterprises and a new explanation of the Party construction) (Beijing: Zhongguo jingji chubanshe, 1999), p. 49. 26 Zhongguo jijian jianchabao (China Discipline Supervision News), August 8, 1999. 27 Li lieman, “Jianguo yi lai guoqi lingdao tizhi yange yu dang de jianshe de huigu yu sikao” (The changes of the leadership system of state enterprises and a review of and thinking on the construction of the Party), Dangshi yanjiu yu jiaoxue (The study and teaching of the Party history), No. 5 (1998), pp. 39–45. 28 Liu Zhiqiang, “Jiaqiang he gaishan dang dui qiye de zhengzhi lingdao” (Strengthening the Party’s Leadership in Enterprises), Lilun dongtai (The new development of theories), No. 13 (1997), pp. 13–15. 29 Zhongguo jingji shibao (China Economic Times), April 22, 1999. 30 Also see Jin Shuyan, “Paichu qiye dangzheng guanxi zhongde leiqu” (Removing the obstacles to the development of the relations between the Party and management), zhengzhi sixiang gongzuo yanjiu (Research on the work of political thought), No. 8 (1999), p. 30. 31 The Research Group of the Organization Department of Ningxia Party Committee, “Xiandai qiye zhidu jianli zhong fahui qiye dang zuzhi zhengzhi hexin zuoyong de fangfa yu duice sikao” (The method of and thinking on the political function of the Party organization in enterprises in the process of building modern firms), Ningxia shehui kexue (Ningxia social sciences), No. 5 (1997), pp. 20–25. 32 Feng Tongqing and Xu Xiaojun, Zhongguo zhigong zhuangkuang (Situations of Chinese Workers) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1994), pp. 164–165. 33 Hence, according to a survey of 100 SOE Party secretaries in the late 1990s, only 4 percent of them believed that the MRS was suitable to large and medium SOEs. Li Lieman, “Guoyou qiye lingdao tizhi yu qiye dangjian wenti” (The leadership system in state enterprises and Party construction), Zhonggong fujiansheng weidangxiao xuebao (The journal of Fujian Party School), No. 5 (2000), pp. 55–60. 34 Lowell Turner, Democracy at Work: Changing World Markets and the Future of Labor Unions, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 12. 35 Roman Laba, The Roots of Solidarity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 33. 36 Joseph Godson, “The Role of the Trade Union,” in Leonard Schapiro and Joseph Godson (eds), The Soviet Worker: Illusions and Realities (London: The Macmillan Press, 1981), pp. 106–129. 37 The General Office of the ACFTU (ed.), Jianguo yilai zhonggong zhongyang guanyu gongren wundong wenjian xuanbian (A Selected Collection of the CCP

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38 39 40 41 42 43

Central Committee’s Documents on Workers’ Movement After the Founding of the PRC) (Beijing: Gongren chubanshe, 1989). Ibid., p. 357. All China Federation of Trade Union, 1987, Zhongguo zhigong duiwu zhuangkuang diaochao (An Investigation of the Situation of Chinese Workers). Ibid., p. 100. Feng Tongqin and Xu Xiaojun, Zhongguo zhigong zhuangkuang, pp. 164–165. Anita Chan, “Revolution or Corporatism? Workers and Trade Unions in PostMao China,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 29 (1993), pp. 31–61. As a matter of fact, people of the trade union also have difficulties in dealing with lower-level managerial personnel. As this person admitted: I am an outspoken person and sometimes offended people because I tried to say what I thought or because I always wanted to correct the wrongdoing of other people. For example, I intervened in the workshop affairs when they put pregnant women on the night duty, distributed bonuses without an open rule, and ignored labor protection, or when cadres occupied more houses. In so doing, I offended some middle-level cadres. (Gongren ribao, August 9, 1999)

44 Gongren ribao, August 10, 1998. 45 Gongren ribao, August 7, 1999. 46 Feng Chen, “Between the State and Labor: The Conflict of the Chinese Trade Unions” Double Identity in Market Reform,” The China Quarterly, No. 176 (2003), pp. 1006–1029; Timothy Weston, “ ‘Learning from Daqing’: More Dark Clouds for Workers in State-Owned Enterprises,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 11, No. 33 (2002), pp. 721–734. 47 All China Federation of Trade Unions, Zhongguo zhigong duiwu zhuangkuang diaocha 1986, p. 151. 48 Interview, China, 1998. 49 The State Economic and Trade Commission and the Document Research Office of the Central Party Committee, Shisida yilai danghe guoia lingdaoren lun guoyou qiye gaige he fazhan (Talks by central leaders on the reform of stateowned enterprises after the 14th Party Congress) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2000). 50 Mark Kramer, “Polish Workers and the Post-Communist Transition, 1989–1993,” Communist and Post-communist Study, Vol. 28, No. 1 (1995), pp. 71–114. 51 For example, when the Chongqing Knitting Factory was declared bankrupt in 1992, workers were greatly agitated. More than 200 workers forced their manager to go to the local court to withdraw the bankruptcy application because, as they claimed, the reform plans had not been approved by the workers’ council. Xie Delu, Zhongguo zhuida pochan an toushi (A comprehensive perspective on China’s biggest bankruptcy case) (Beijing: Jingji guanli chubanshe, 1993). 52 Tian Zehong, “Guanyu dui pochan qiye zhaokai zhidaihui wenti de sikao” (Thinking on the workers’ council in bankrupt enterprises), Beijing gongren (Beijing workers), No. 1 (1999), pp. 3–4. 53 Andrew Walder, “Workers and the State: The Reform Era and the Political Crisis of 1989,” China Quarterly, No. 127 (1991), pp. 467–492; Anita Chan and Jonathan Unger, “Voices from the Protest Movement in Chongqing: Class Accents and Class Tensions,” in Jonathan Unger (ed.), The Pro-Democracy Protests in China: Reports from the Povinces (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1991), pp. 23–45. 54 Gongren ribao, June 19, 2000. 55 Indeed, Chinese workers have long realized their position is weak due to the lack of leverage over the enterprise authority. In the 1970s, the Party decided

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56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64

65

66 67

68 69 70

to cease the so-called “four big methods” (i.e., officially allowed voicing of opinions and demands, big posters, and debates) that were the main channels through which the people disciplined cadres in the Cultural Revolution. A survey conducted by a central Party organ and the ACFTU in 1982 reveals that a significant number of workers were upset. They complained that without these channels, they would be unable to keep cadres in check. Some complained that “the ‘Four Bigs’ is the right Chairman Mao bestowed on us. Now that Chairman Mao is gone, the ‘Four Bigs’ are removed.” Others held that revoking these methods meant that the central government distrusted workers. The Department of the CCP Secretary and the ACFTU, Dangqian woguo gongren jieji zhuangkuang diaocha ziliao huibian (A compilation of the investigation materials of the working class of our country in the contemporary period), p. 37. Zhu Guanglei, Dangdai zhongguo shehui gejieceng fenxi (An analysis of social strata in China) (Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 1998), pp. 65, 89. Simon Clarke, Peter Fairbrother, and Vadim Borisov, The Workers’ Movement in Russia (Hants, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 1995), p. 400. Ibid., p. 409. Tian Zehong, “Guanyu dui pochan qiye zaokai zhidaihui wenti de sikao” (Some thinking on the workers’ council in bankrupt enterprises). Yuanzhen Cao, Yingyi Qiang, and Barry Weingast, “From Federalism, Chinese Style to Privatization, Chinese Style,” Economics of Transition, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1999), pp. 103–131. Gongren ribao, May 14, 1998. X.L. Ding, “The Illicit Asset Stripping of Chinese State Firms,” The China Journal, Vol. 43 (2000), pp. 1–28. Gongren ribao, July 31, 1997. Between 1988 and 1998, Chinese citizens reported over 1.47 million cases of illegal conduct or crimes of public workers. Among the cases investigated by the legal departments during the ten years, about 70 percent of them involved enterprise leaders. Similarly, among the people punished, enterprise leaders accounted for 70 percent. See Gongren ribao, July 25, 1999. An investigation of 2,586 money-losing enterprises in 8 provinces by the State Statistical Bureau indicated that only less than 10 percent of them made loss because of state policies, whereas more than 80 percent of them lost money because of mismanagement. Meiri qiaobao (Overseas Chinese Daily), June 2, 1997. Feng Chen, “Subsistence Crises, Managerial Corruption and Labor Protests in China,” The China Journal, Vol. 44 (2000), pp. 41–63. Li Hongjun, “Guoqi gaige zhong ‘xinfang’ xianxiang de sikao” (Thinking on appeals to governments in the reform of state enterprises), Lilun yu shijian (Theory and practice), No. 2 (1999), pp. 32–33. In the protests in Liaoyang of Liaoning province in 2002, workers of different factories demanded to remove and punish corruption officials and managers. See John Pomfret, “Thousands of Workers Protest in Chinese City,” Washington Post, March 20, 2002. The Chinese version of the slogan is “xiagang gongren buyong chou, dangguande jiali sha dou you.” Jin Ye, Jieceng de fubai (Corruption of social groups) (Zhuhai: Zhuhai chubanshe, 1998), p. 306. Yongshun Cai, “The Silence of the Dislocated: Government and Laid-Off Employees in Reform China” (PhD dissertation, Stanford University, 2001). For example, few workers I interviewed showed any interest in the Party’s new doctrines such as “three stresses” (san jiang). Interview, China, 2000.

10 Intra-party democracy A revisionist perspective from below He Baogang

The Chinese Communist Party (the CCP) is a gigantic body, the largest political party in the world with a membership of 66 million, out of which there are about 45 million rank-and-file members. It is a puzzling political phenomenon, which repeatedly surprises many commentators. After the events of 1989 it was predicted that the CCP would collapse in three years. When this did not happen the prediction was revised to nine years, but this too proved to be wrong. The Party not only survived but it also expanded its power by establishing Party branches in newly established residential buildings1 and privately owned factories. At the national level, the politburo and central party organization controls 42 giant corporations. In the 1980s the overriding political reform principle was the separation of the Party from government.2 Today, however, the Party controls all governmental organizations. Local Party secretaries tend to hold concurrently the post of chairperson of the local People’s Congress. No doubt, the Party is enjoying increasingly more absolute power, but this growth in absolute power is accompanied by another puzzling phenomenon, in that there has been a marked improvement in China’s place on Transparency International’s index of corruption.3 It seems paradoxical that an increase in the absolute power of the Party should be accompanied by a decline in the level of corruption. One possible explanation for this apparent paradox is an enhanced level of local and intra-party democracy. China has experienced several mini-waves of local democratization. The first wave was the introduction of village elections in the 1980s and the institutionalization of competitive elections in the 1990s.4 The second wave saw open nominations and elections for township heads in the 1990s.5 Urban participatory and deliberative institutions can be seen as the third wave,6 while the fourth wave is characterized by the introduction of intraparty democracy. Just as price reform was the key for Chinese economic reforms, so intraparty democracy is the most significant part of political reform. In the 16th Party Congress, one major issue was to improve and reform the Party’s leadership and rules of governance.7 On the agenda was the improvement of existing election and monitoring institutions and the protection and

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expansion of the right of Party members to access information, and participate in political processes. It was regarded as essential to make the Party more democratic, and make Party democracy more concrete, truthful and meaningful. Serious reservations about the soundness of intra-party democracy are often raised, the most significant of which is the question of how a Leninist party can contribute to the democratization of itself. There seems little hope for the achievement of intra-party democracy in Beijing. Nevertheless, there are significant differences between the top and bottom organizations of the CCP and, horizontally, divisions exist among party organizations. Internal regime change from below is a source of democratic transition. From below there is a progressive force to promote internal party democracy, push the limits of change, and generate innovative solutions. There are comparative precedents in that the Communist Party in Hungary did introduce intra-party democracy, and the South African Communist Party managed to transform itself into a democratic party, while the Swedish Social Democracy Party (Svenska arbetarepartiet) which ruled Sweden in the 1930s–70s, revitalized itself to regain political power from 1990s up to now. The aim of this chapter is to develop a revisionist view of the CCP through a study of the discourse of intra-party democracy, grass-root changes in villages, the capitalist components of the Party, the changing nature of Party representation in practice, and the experiment of the Permanent System of Party Representatives (PSPR). It calls for a new thinking about the unthinkable – about the prospect of intra-party democracy – urging us to reflect upon and criticize our own liberal presuppositions about the CCP. The chapter focuses on the experiment of intra-party democracy in Ya’An and Jiaojiang cities. It draws on my extensive fieldwork and interviews in Beijing, Shanghai and Hanzhou in 2002; Ya’An and Wuhan in 2003; and Beijing, Hangzhou, Wenlin and Jiaojiang in 2004. Of course, Ya’An and Jiaojiang don’t reflect the national trend, and there are regional variations and differences. Indeed, the democratic wave flattens in some areas, but continues to swell in other areas. It should be noted that some experiments in intra-party democracy escape the attention of the media or of Western scholars. This is because maintaining a low public profile is a characteristic of China’s political experiments in developing intra-party democracy. It has not adopted the traditional May Fourth way of intellectual debates and advocacy. Instead, these political experiments have been carried out with very little or no debate in the public forum.

The advocacy of intra-party democracy The CCP has undergone an interesting and surprising shift from the separation discourse of the 1980s to the unity discourse, advocating that all

194 He Baogang key political organizations should be unified under the Party’s leadership in the 1990s. Despite the fact that the Party seems more comprehensively in command since the 1990s, however, the idea of intra-party democracy has nevertheless gained ground. This situation is not as surprising as it may first appear. In fact, it is to be expected, because it can be seen as a partial response to the increasingly absolute power of the Party. It can be seen as a balance mechanism of the political machine, and a critical component of the mixed regime. Intra-party democracy is seen as enhancing political rights – an institution whereby all Party members can participate in Party affairs directly or indirectly on an equal basis. All Party members are equal, and enjoy the rights protected by the Party constitution. In parallel with village level reforms, it is now advocated that the Party secretary and other members in the same Party committee should be equal and that the principle of one member, one vote should be implemented in intra-party elections. It has been advocated and was experimentally implemented in some places that multiple-candidate elections replace single-candidate elections for Party Congress delegates. In some places such as Ya’An a multiple-candidate election for Party secretary at the township level and above will be carried out. It is further suggested that the General Party Secretary should be elected by the Central Committee or even by the Party Congress, which, in turn, should become the most important body in determining crucial issues. It is proposed that in order to create checks and balances within the Party, its power should be divided among Party committees, executive committees, and Party discipline inspection commissions, with each being independently responsible to Party Congresses.8 Essential to intra-party democracy is the idea of three divisions of power within the Party. Liao Gailong was the early campaigner for this idea, and Professor Wang Guixiong from the Central Party School endorsed and advocated it. According to the proposal, legislative power lies in the Party Representative Congress; executive power is created by converting the general Party committee into an executive agency; and the judicial power belongs to the Party disciplinary committee and the monitoring committee from the Party Representative Congress. It is argued that the system is a unifying force that is able to keep the different power divisions under the Party leadership, and the source of all power comes from the Party Congress. There is a zigzag route toward Western style democracy in the proposal for three divisions of power. The Chinese official ideology has been opposed to the three divisions of power as a Western institution that does not apply to China. To get around this ideological obstacle Chinese intellectuals advocated three divisions of power within the government in Sheng Zhen in 2002, then within the Party in 2003. This seems to be a Chinese path toward the three divisions of power. Whether this can be seen as an ideological breakthrough remains to be seen, as in 2004 when the Party ordered that this issue should not be discussed.

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Chinese understanding of internal party democracy shares with international advocates of intra-party democracy in stressing the principles of participation and inclusiveness, accountability and transparency, and representation. The Chinese idea of intra-party democracy, however, does not emphasize gender equality, fair primary elections that produce a party-list of candidates, or democratic control of Party funding. Moreover, Chinese intra-party democracy is not based on factions within the Party. (Of course, others advocate plural factions within the party and suggest that the CCP should learn from the LDP in Japan where party pluralism contains one party plus factions, or parties within the Party.) It is not oriented toward individual liberty, rather than toward collective solidarity. It maintains oneparty rule rather than seeking to create a multi-party system. It wants the rule of law but under the leadership of the CCP. It aims to improve the Party’s congress system, not to adopt referenda or general elections. It stresses the importance of a checking and monitoring role for journalists rather than absolute freedom of the press. These aspects of intra-party democracy are contrary to a liberal understanding of party, but consistent with the Chinese collective concept of the Party (see Table 10.1). From the above conceptual comparison three things are clear. Patently the CCP is not a “normal” party in the liberal definition of party, and the concept of party in China is different from that of liberalism. Additionally, Chinese internal party democracy is quite different from that of liberal democracy.9 If we apply a liberal framework then it is clear that a full and genuine Chinese democracy cannot coexist with the domination of the CCP. As Bruce Dickson argues, “if the country [China] does become democratic, it will be essentially at the expense of the CCP.”10 If, however, we take these different conceptions seriously it is possible for us to entertain the Chinese idea of intra-party democracy. If we follow a Chinese conception of the Party and internal party democracy, we will appreciate and validate the possibility of plural paths towards democracy including a Chinese way. If we adopt a process perspective, the Party has a crucial role to play in obstructing or, alternatively, promoting Chinese democratization. To understand any new development of the Party and the idea of intraparty democracy, it is important for us to question whether our thinking and assumptions about the party in general are problematic in understanding China’s Party. In particular, we should question whether a liberal theory of party illustrated by Sartori is applicable to China. To understand the CCP, it is best to begin with its concept of the party and to find out whether there is conceptual innovation.

People’s Party at village level? Village elections have increased the CCP’s confidence in democratic transition and developed a non-zero-sum game. Initially, the CCP was greatly concerned at the prospect of declining Party influence in village elections.

196 He Baogang Table 10.1 Comparing two concepts of party Sartori’s liberal concept of party

Chinese understanding of party

Individualism is the foundation of party. Individuals form parties to advance their private individual interests.

At a normative level, Party (Dang) is a collective concept excluding private interest. Party is for the promotion of collective and public interests such as community and nation-state beyond private ones. The origin of the modern party The Party is, or represents, the whole, the system has developed from “parts” CCP represents all peoples in China and is (section of society) to party. Party is equivalent to Chinese nation. Party = state “part,” not “whole”; no single party = government = people. The concept of can claim “the whole,” therefore a party does not contain the idea that part multiple party system is needed. becomes a party. Because party is “part” or “faction” Because the Party is, and represents, the on an individual basis, factions within whole on a collective basis, factions within a party are allowed to articulate the the Party are denied in terms of moral interests of different parts. principles, unity and solidarity. In real party life, factions do exist but the Party suppresses them. Multiple parties compete for political CCP monopolizes political power in the power through elections. This is a name of providing national security, unity link between party and democracy. and social control. This is a link between one-party domination and denial of liberal democracy. Disagreement produces a modern Dissent is an enemy of the Party; and party; dissent is a virtue of party discipline is a key to maintaining the unity politics. of the Party. Plural parties are able to establish The Party believes that plural parties will and maintain one polity through lead to disintegration. constitution and consensus.

It controlled the whole process, speed and direction of elections. After some experiments, the Party was able to co-opt non-party members and minimize the cost of village elections. It discovered that elected village committee members or chiefs are capable of maintaining local order even though some of them are non-party members. It also found that electoral contests for the position of village Party secretary are highly effective in renewing the Party’s power in rural society. As a consequence the village Party secretary is increasingly elected by villagers. The new rich, including private entrepreneurs, are recruited into the Party; the village Party organization is regularly monitored by the village representative assembly; the Party secretary has to share power with elected village committee heads and the VRA, which is increasingly becoming a final decision-making institution. All of these new developments signal a significant change in the CCP’s ruling principles and

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institutions. Its source and operation of power have changed and are evolving in a democratic direction. In 2001–2, many localities adopted Party elections in Zhejiang. In Linhai, anyone who failed to get more than 50 percent of the villagers’ votes could not be the candidate for the village Party secretary. In 2002, the Party mandated that all who want to be village Party secretaries must first stand for election to the village committee.11 It seems that the Party has discovered party elections as a new solution that “may [reconcile] the requirements of village self-government and the survival of the Party.”12 The sequence of elections is an interesting issue. The common practice has been to let the election of village Party secretaries precede the election of the village committee. Now in the Shanxi model, the village election precedes the Party election, and in the Guangdong model, those who are elected as village chiefs automatically become Party secretaries in a joint election. Such a practice embodies the democratic principle of allowing the populace to have the final say. More importantly, Party elections raise an interesting question. If villagers are involved in electing Party secretaries, to what degree, in the long term, will the Party branch change into a genuine “people’s party?” At the risk of some exaggeration, the CCP appears to already have developed into two parties: a villagers’ party where diverse interests are represented and negotiated and where political power is shared and checked; and a national party where social interests are not properly represented, and which still monopolizes and refuses to share power.

Capitalist component within the Party The growth of private economy, private ownership, and rural and urban industrialization, all pose challenges to the Party. As a response, the criteria to join the CCP have changed and the CCP has admitted capitalists and private entrepreneurs into the Party. In the past, class background and class consciousness were the main criteria. Today, these are no longer crucial. One township Party secretary suggested three requirements necessary for Party admission: to take the lead in becoming rich; to carry out [the Party’s] policy (i.e., to obey Party discipline and the law), and to be young with a good educational background.13 A millionaire who ran a private enterprise hiring large numbers of workers was admitted into the Party. According to the Almanac of Private Economy in China 2000, 4.3 million or 19.8 percent of private entrepreneurs were Party members in 1999.14 In one township in 1996, 20 percent of village Party secretaries were private entrepreneurs; and in four districts in Shanghai in 1998, 13 percent of the private entrepreneurs were Party members.15 The percentage of private entrepreneurs in Party membership goes up in scholarly surveys. Forty percent of all responding entrepreneurs were Party members in Bruce Dickson’s survey of 500 private entrepreneurs in

198 He Baogang 1997 and 1999.16 Strikingly, the result of David Goodman’s interviews with 239 leading business people in Shanxi Province during 1996–8 shows that 77 percent of rural entrepreneurs, 56 private entrepreneurs, 73 joint venture managers, 66 private enterprise managers were CCP members.17 Many members of the new class have been invited to join the Party, or to become deputies of local People’s Congresses through elections. By 1995, at the national level, 5,401 private entrepreneurs had become deputies of People’s Congresses at and above the county level; 8,558 were committee members of the Chinese People’s Consultative Conference; 1,357 were committee members of the Communist Youth League; and 1,430 were committee members of the Women’s Federation. In Shimen County in Hunan Province, for example, 198 private entrepreneurs have become local leaders; among them, 86 are village leaders, and 67 are the secretaries of village Party organizations.18 In Baodin, 94 percent of private entrepreneurs joined various social organizations. Eighty-two percent of the entrepreneurs who owned more than one million yuan were elected deputies of People’s Congresses at and above the county level, or were committee members of the Chinese People’s Consultative Conference.19 With wealth and money private entrepreneurs attempt to buy political power, while at the same time political power holders want to get rich through regulation and control of license. The combination of wealth and power inevitably leads to intricate corruption. In order to combat corruption, many advocate democratic mechanisms. Simultaneously entrepreneurs began to demand more free space and greater social liberalization which are in keeping with their interests.20 They no longer willingly accepted conditions imposed on them; instead, they wanted a share in decision-making and the formulation of policies related to their interests. They consider election to be a way to have a say in the Party decisionmaking process. It should be noted that these private entrepreneurs participate in local politics merely as individuals or as interest groups, not as a politically mobilized “class” in the political sense as in the European context. This is because any class-based political mobilization and campaigning is prohibited by the party-state, which clamps down on anything that is perceived as attempting to stir up class conflicts.

Three represents All round the world political parties are losing linkage with society and the issue of true representation is a serious problem. The CCP is not exceptional, but it has worked hard to address the representation issue. The discourse of “three represents” aims to achieve maximal inclusiveness and representation. In February 2000 in Guangdong, Jiang Zemin proposed the concept of “three represents” (san ge dai biao), that is, the CCP represents the “most

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advanced mode of production, the most advanced culture, and the interests of the majority of the population.” Jiang Zemin seems to realize that the CCP has to reposition itself to be representative of the whole nation instead of just being the vanguard of the working class. One township Party secretary commented that the best way of transforming the CCP is through the new private entrepreneur class, and that this is the essence of Jiang Zemin’s three represents.21 Given that the new private entrepreneur class forms a large part of “the most advanced mode of production,” Jiang Zemin proposed that the Party should recruit more members from this new class. The proposal was adopted in the 16th Party Congress marking a significant change in the nature of the CCP, and radically transforming it from being representative of the working class and peasants to being representative of all social classes including the new entrepreneur class. Now in Ya’An, the Party branch in each village is required to recruit between two and five private entrepreneurs into the Party each year. At the same time, the Party branch is obliged to help Party members to be rich through supporting his/her business. It should be noted that while the concept of three represents aims to further increase the percentage of the private entrepreneur class in the Party so as to enlarge the social basis of the CCP, it cannot be understood as only the representation of the new rich class. Jiang’s emphasis on the CCP’s representation of the interests of the majority of the population can be seen as an attempt to rebuild the Party as a “national party” (minzu dang). This seems to return to Song Ping’s earlier call in 1990 for nationalizing the CCP into an “all-people party” (quanmin dang).22 There is an internal contradiction, however, between the interests of people such as workers and the interests of the rich. It is precisely this contradiction that justifies the Party’s intervention and its role of coordination in dealing with the conflict of interests.

Whose interests does the party-state represent? The emergence of the new private entrepreneur class raises the question of the nature of the party-state. With more and more officials entering systematic alliances with business figures, selling political access as a commodity and enriching both themselves and their business cronies, the question of economics invading politics inevitably arises. Local officials of the party-state have become more dependent on the new private entrepreneurs than on the workers. Some local officials have been known to borrow money from private entrepreneurs to pay their workers who work in the unprofitable state-owned enterprises. Others rely on the business of private entrepreneurs to solve the problem of unemployment. Will the noble idea of “a government for the people” be narrowed down to one of “a government for the rich”? Does the party-state now represent the interests of capital, or is Party membership merely used as an instrument

200 He Baogang to develop capital? There are signs to suggest that subtle changes are already taking shape in the relations between the party-state, the new private entrepreneur class and the working class. Bao Tong, who was the personal advisor to the former Party Secretary Zhao Ziyang, asserted, “it [the three representative doctrine] implies that it is now time for the party to admit the unspoken truth and formally declare that it has become China’s party for the rich and the powerful.”23 Can the party-state maintain its neutrality and make policies that go beyond class relations? The central leadership of the party-state seems to adopt a neutral position, in conflicts involving workers and entrepreneurs. The central government has restricted the inclusion of the new private entrepreneur class into national politics on the one hand, and suppressed underground labor movements on the other. Also, the party-state has seemingly attempted to protect the interest of workers through the introduction of several laws. The 1992 Trade Union Law requires that waged laborers be given the right to form or join unions, and to participate in democratic management and supervision. Further, the 1994 Labor Law guarantees minimum wages and restricts overtime work. Fully implementing these laws, however, can be very difficult. For example, when 62 state-owned or collective enterprises were sold to private business people in Ninghai county of Zhejiang Province, all its trade unions were closed down or simply lost their function.24

Permanent system of Party’s representatives Together with the three represents discourse and the changing nature of the party-state’s representation is a slow and quite institutional change, the formation of the PSPR. The PSPR was originally proposed by Deng Xiaoping in 1956. In the 13th Party Congress, Zhao Ziyang’s team proposed that a PSPR be established. Gao Fang raised the issue in an inner circle group. In 1988, the central Party organization approved 12 experimental sites for this: among them were Jiaojiang and Shaoxing. Before the 16th Party Congress, seven out of twelve sites stopped their experiments. The system was improved in Ya’An, however, in August 2002. In 2003, more experiments were carried out in 17 cities of Meishan and Zhigong in Sichuang; in the Baoan district of Sheng Zhen, Huizhou city, Yangdong county in Guangzhou, Chengbei district in Nanning city, and Yichang city. In the past, Party Congress was held every five years, and Party representatives elect Party committee members who, in turn, elect Party secretaries. Now Party Congress will be held every year. In Ya’An, Party representatives hold quarterly meetings each year. In the past, the Party Representative Congress was a consulting body, but now it is deemed as a decision-making institution and the source of final authority.25 In the past, Party election was only a formality. However, in Yinjin county, Ya’An city, Party representatives were competitively elected in

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2003. Among the 5,800 Party members, 736 (that is 12.7 percent of Party membership) participated in running for election, 241 were decided as final candidates and 166 were elected as Party representatives in August 2003. During the election process, 17 Party leaders at township level lost their positions. In the PSPR, Party representatives are permanent positions for the period of the Party Congress. They are “permanent” in the sense that Party representatives exercise their daily rights and powers. Party representatives are granted five basic rights – the right to election; the right to discuss major policies; the right to evaluate Party leaders; the right to monitor; and the right to propose a motion. Ten or 20 permanent Party representatives can put forward a motion in the Party Congress. The relevant Party or government organization must answer an inquiry made by any permanent Party representative within three to six months. Moreover, in exercising these rights, Party representatives are protected by state laws and the Party disciplinary committee. The Party secretaries have no right to arbitrarily remove Party representatives. Several initiatives were taken so that a Party Representative Congress can be held more frequently and more efficiently. The size of the constituency of Party representatives was reduced so that one representative is able to make close contact with, and represent, about 100 Party members; the standing committee and the alternate member system were abolished to make the Party Representative Congress a decision-making body. Ya’An has also set up a new institution for Party representatives called the “Party representative liaison office.” Significant is the initiative of democratic evaluation within the Party. In 2003 in Ya’An city, in an annual Party Congress, all major leaders were evaluated by Party representatives, 40 percent of whom had to be ordinary members. Crucially, if any leader does not gain a confidence vote of over 70 percent, a dismissal process will begin automatically against him/her. In practice, a first no-confidence vote will result in such a leader being given a warning and one year to improve their work. Dismissal only occurs after a second non-confidence vote. There are several limits to this evaluation. In Jiaojiang city, Zhejiang, the Party organization stopped the evaluation practice in 1991 because the Party secretary lost face when he received far fewer confidence votes than his colleagues. Nevertheless, it reintroduced the evaluation in 2003. In Zhejiang, the Party secretary Zhang Dejiang did not endorse the idea of citizen evaluation, and did not approve the proposal for the evaluation of all major leaders by citizens. Only deputy leaders of governmental departments were allowed to be evaluated by 21 leaders in 2002–3. There are, however, some problems with the PSPR. First, this is a bureaucratic expansion of the Party, illustrated by the fact that five staff members for a representative office were added in Ya’An. Additionally, there is a representatives’ monitoring committee that checks the disciplinary

202 He Baogang committee. Second, there is uncertainty about the relationship between the Party Representative Congress and the People’s Congress. In taking over the role of People’s Congress, the Party Representative Congress will be held first, followed by the People’s Congress which is supposed to endorse the decisions made by the Party Representative Congress.

Limits Obviously there are very many limitations to intra-party democracy as discussed above. Here I would like to say more about these limitations. Most new experiments took place at township or county level. Very little progress has been made at the central level. The changes are minimal, marginal and deceptive in the sense that they aim to delay rapid democratization. As Gang Lin points out, “Beijing’s major goal is to perpetuate the CCP’s ruling legitimacy by developing intra-party democracy.”26 Intra-party democracy does not represent a radical departure. Its inherent limitations include continuing Party domination, limited roles for active civil society, a failure to fully protect civic rights, and a lack of transparency and openness. An external mechanism to monitor Party elections is absent. If internal democracy is not open to outside scrutiny, how can it push societal democracy, or encourage pluralism and competition among parties? The whole problem is that the CCP still controls state power. Intra-party democracy is under the control of the Party organization, in particular, the Party’s “four submissions” discipline. Intra-party democracy can be seen as a revised form of democratic centralism. Jiaojiang city made little process when the Party Representative system challenged the exiting power structure. Even if there is democracy, it is elite democracy, exclusive to people and other parties. It is not liberal or social democracy, nor is it the constitutional reform that China urgently needs. Without pressure from society and NGOs, internal party democracy is limited. The limits of intra-party democracy can be seen in Table 10.2. There are external and internal constraints on internal party democracy. Primary elections create division and factions within the Party, and excessive intra-party democracy is seen to weaken the discipline and solidarity Table 10.2 The limit of one-party democracy in a comparative context One-party democracy

Two-party democracy

Three-party democracy

Election by party members

Elections decide ruling party

More choices

Party monopoly

Power turnover between two parties

The third party alternative

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that are required to compete for power and votes. From the perspective of the CCP, therefore, internal party democracy must be limited, to such a degree that it will not weaken the Party. There is a trade-off between discipline (competitiveness) and democracy. Normally, state democracy precedes party democracy. It is thought that it is only after a country consolidates state democracy that intra-party democracy becomes an issue. This is because freedom and democratization in civil society encourages and allows ordinary Party members to challenge Party leaders. Given the lack of state democracy in China, it is thought doubtful that China can develop a meaningful party democracy. As Gang Lin points out, “in the absence of meaningful restraints on the Party’s monopoly of power and the consequent blurring of lines between Party and state authority, China’s institutional building is likely to be incomplete and fraught with theoretical inconsistency and strategic ambiguity.”27 It is commonly asked whether it is possible for China to achieve internal party democracy before it achieves state democratization but this sequential thinking is mistaken. It is mistaken to say that there is no need for state democracy if the CCP has internal party democracy. In reality, local Party officials emphasize the interactive relationship and mutual influence between party democracy and people’s democracy.

Thinking on the unthinkable The changes discussed above require a revisionist view of the Party. Without revision, our expectations will meet unpredictable outcomes, and our predictions of the demise of the CCP will fail again. Western liberals should have the courage to adapt their principles to the Chinese reality. Western liberal presuppositions about the Party prevent us from looking objectively at the Chinese path toward local democracy, the liberal political paradigm distracts us from paying sufficient attention to the mixed regime that China has developed, and the focus on democratization strategies for civil society handicaps our enquiries into other paths toward democracy. One special issue of The Journal of Democracy was devoted to the question of whether the Party is able to renew itself or whether it is likely to suffer further decay.28 Critics such as Qinglian He hold the view that the CCP is morally and politically so corrupt and bankrupt that it cannot renew itself, let alone undertake the democratization of China.29 Nevertheless, beyond a simple dichotomy between renewal and decay, one needs to ask deeper questions and think the unthinkable. Viewing the Party with a fresh eye The Party is still Leninist in the sense that “Leninist organizational principles prohibit the formation of competing organizations that could challenge the CCP, and the Party enforces this prohibition strictly.”30 Beyond that,

204 He Baogang however, the Leninist framework is inappropriate to fully apprehend the significant developments at the local level and is unable to help us understand the complex reality of party politics in China. The conventional view in the West is that the presence of the Party constitutes an obstacle to Chinese democracy, and that the CCP is expected to collapse as did its counterpart in the USSR. In reality, however, the ideology of communism is gone, the Party ideology has been “secularized” from a principle-oriented party to a utilitarian party. That the CCP does not have a strong commitment to “ism” means that it is flexible enough to make substantial change for its survival. Indeed, the membership of the Party is changing in favor of the rich, the unchallenged domination of the Party has been weakened, and the Party has gradually learnt to share power with elected village committees and representative assemblies, while increasingly adopting elections as an institutionalized measure to reinforce its legitimacy. We have to ask whether the Nomenklatura appointment system31 has changed at local level. Now, the local party organization appoints cadres outside the Party, open nomination and elections play some roles in appointing local cadres, and the local party, in particular, village Party secretaries, have to share powers with elected village chiefs. In these ways, the power of the Party’s organization has been slightly reduced and restricted, the sources of local power are being redefined and elections and deliberation are increasingly becoming a new source of authority and legitimacy. The CCP has undergone a transition from an overwhelmingly peasantbased Party to one that attempts to represent all sectors of society, and from opposition to private ownership to support for privatization and the capitalist line. The CCP has recruited entrepreneurs and the new rich. The CCP has also transformed itself from a revolutionary party to a conservative ruling party as was proposed in 1991 by Tai zi dang.32 The move towards a conservative ruling party has been taken as follows: to abandon the communist goals and to adopt new nationalist and patriotic goals; to restore the traditional Chinese culture to discipline the masses and to unite all the Chinese people; to give up radicalism and political romanticism and to emphasize gradualism and realism. In urban cities, local parties at the level of residential committee sometimes function like charity organizations; the local party boss develops a charity plan and persuades local business people to help the poor. During traditional Chinese festival periods, the poorest people may receive up to 2,000 yuan. Urban residential communities also provide welfare services by registering the jobless and poor and helping them to find jobs. The idea that the Party is a rational actor helps us to understand its choice of seeking to foster intra-party democracy under certain circumstances. In the long term, if these developments continue, the Party’s principles will be redefined and its nature changed, so that these elements will eventually open a path for a quiet and peaceful change in the Chinese authoritarian system.

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Creating a Chinese model of democratization? China’s path toward democracy must be unique in human history not only because of the size of China’s population and its long history of civilization, but also because of the Chinese experience of economic reform. China has experienced more than 20 years of economic reforms and has developed its own pattern and model. Due to the success of these economic reforms, the Chinese are becoming more confident in creating their own model, and they do not want to simply copy models such as the KMT in Taiwan, the PAP in Singapore and the LDP in Japan. Will the CCP adopt a multi-party system? This seems to be a misleading and unproductive question in the current situation; instead it is better for us to fully understand the historical and conceptual restrictions on the development of a multi-party system in China. An historical perspective on the multi-party system is very enlightening. In the latter Qing, there was strong opposition to the formation of the Party because according to Confucian ethics, the Western style of party was regarded as a group of people who pursue private interests (pengdang). Gradually, the notion of party was accepted and China witnessed a variety of political parties. Despite the existence of plural parties, one party tended to regard itself as the only legitimate one and did not respect other parties.33 In the end, the CCP monopolized all power and controlled state, society and the army. Despite the separation discourse, since the 1990s the CCP now firmly holds to the unity discourse that all key political organizations should be unified under the Party’s leadership. Clearly, all these historical events demonstrate continuation of the Chinese tradition of so-called “Great Unity.” The centralization of power through one party has been regarded as an effective way to maintain national unity. The holistic concept of party as a whole was entrenched in the Chinese mindset and political institutions. This is a significant historical constraint on the development of a multiparty system in China. Another constraint on the development of a multi-party system in China is cognitive. It is really difficult for China to break the holistic tradition to endorse an individualistic concept of the party. In the history of welldeveloped democracies, different parties represent the different interests of social classes, which constitute a basis for a multi-party system. Of course, in the post-modern society, class representation has been weakened in the politics of party. In China, the CCP claims it represents the advanced culture, the advanced classes, and the whole people. Its representation is beyond the division of social classes. The idea of the party does not contain the idea of representing diverse interests through a plural party system (see Table 10.1). It is unlikely that China will replicate a European model of multi-parties backed by conflicting social classes. The CCP deals with class conflicts through the means of technocracy – capitalists sharing power with technocrats – and three represents. At the same time the Party adopts tough measures to suppress any political group that aims to mobilize social

206 He Baogang classes. In addition, the Chinese idea of party does not imply sharing power and the turnover of power between two parties. It can claim its legitimacy as long as it maintains control. It justifies one-party domination in terms of economic growth, that is, one-party domination provides the stability and the environment that rapid economic development needs. Given the above cognitive and historical conditions, one might think a realistic and productive question about a Chinese form of a multi-party system. It is important to ask whether the current one party plus multi-party cooperation system34 will develop into a functional equivalent of a multiparty system. In the system of one-party domination and multi-party cooperation, the CCP shares its power with other democratic parties in a limited way. Political consultation with democratic parties is made before making a decision, democratic parties are informed before announcing major decisions, the support from democratic parties is garnered after announcing major decisions and some deputy posts are allocated to democratic party leaders. It seems that the CCP is the head of the coalition with other parties. China is developing a mixed regime in which different ingredients such as the traditional Mandarin rule, one-party domination, the form of people’s party, functional factions representing different interest groups, and democratic elections and monitoring are combined. The idea of the mixed regime provides a better framework for exploring new developments and examining the potential of intra-party democracy.35 Through mixing these ingredients, China is in the process of creating its own model of political rule and democratization in the twenty-first century. It will be interesting to see whether the three divisions of power within the Party is the first step towards three divisions of power in the state. At the same time, China is attempting to combat the real and potential corruption of absolute power in a one party-dominated system through the introduction and development of intra-party democracy.36 Nowadays, it is extremely difficult for local officials to commit serious corruption. There are several checks against any potential evil-doer. The Party discipline committee has more power than before; and the Party secretary no longer controls the same level’s Party discipline committee. The monitoring committee comprising permanent Party representatives constitutes another important check mechanism.37 There are two important institutional safeguards against corruption – the annual Party democratic evaluation meetings in which any Party leader who does not gain above 70 percent of evaluative votes will face internal Party disciplinary warning and punishment, and Party elections where officials are likely to lose their position in the internal party election if they have a bad name for corrupt behavior.

Concluding remarks While I concur with many of the criticisms of intra-party democracy, I would like to stress that intra-party democracy is a much more important

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and significant institutional development than that of village or township elections. Just imagine that 66 million Party members, five percent of China’s population, will go to vote for their Party representatives! If the proposal of intra-party democracy were realized, the Party itself would change into something new, the current nature of the CCP would be sacrificed, and the CCP would become more powerful but also more legitimate. Even if a majority of Chinese people would still be deprived of democratic processes, intra-party democracy would, nevertheless, still constitute a big step. Intra-party democracy will improve the quality of one-party domination and prevent it from becoming an absolutely corrupt and tyrannical party. The end result of intra-party democracy might be the legitimization of factions within the party, like that of the LDP in Japan, and the creation of two or more functional “parties” within the CCP. It might also lead to a fundamental change in the state–party relationship. If the Party were democratized, the state would have been democratized too because of the nature of the Chinese party-state. It would also pave the way for a rapid transformation to state democracy and strengthen reformers within the Party. From intra-party democracy, one may look to the prospect of interparty democracy, and the democratization of the relationship between the Party and the state. While the CCP cannot afford to miss this historical opportunity, Western observers and China watchers need to think of all the possibilities for the future of the CCP.

Notes 1 A residential community usually has 1,000 households or more. Each has a general branch of the Chinese Communist Party with more than 200 members. Each general branch of the Party has subdivisions, going down to sub-branches in each residential building. 2 See Nie Gaomin, Li Yizhou and Wang Zhongtian, Dangzheng fenkai lilun tantao (An Investigation into the Theory of the Separation of the Party from Government) (Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe, 1987). 3 According to Transparency International, China was the third most corrupt country with a score of 2.16 in 1995, but ranked 59 with a score of 3.5 in 2002, and 66 with a score of 3.4 in 2003. See http://www.transparency.de. 4 See Kevin O’Brien and Lianjiang Li, “Accommodating ‘Democracy’ in a OneParty State: Introducing Village Elections in China,” The China Quarterly, No. 162 (June 2000), pp. 465–489; and Amy Epstein Gadsden and Anne F. Thurston, “Village Elections in China: Progress, Problems and Prospects,” International Republic Institute, Washington, DC, January 2001, chap. 2. See http://www.iri. org/pub.asp?id=7676767756; Baogang He, “The Impact of Village Elections on the Village Power Structure,” in American Asian Studies, Vol. XX, No. 3 (Fall), 2002, pp. 55–89; id., “Are Village Elections Competitive?” in Joseph Y. S. Cheng (ed.), China’s Challenges in the Twenty-First Century (Hong Kong: the City University of Hong Kong Press, 2003), pp. 71–92; id., “Kinship, Village Elections and Structural Conditions in Zhejiang,” in Wang Gungwu and Zheng Yongnian (eds), Damage Control: The Chinese Communist Party in the Jiang Zemin Era (Singapore: Times Media Private Limited, 2003), pp. 142–172.

208 He Baogang 5 See T. Saich and X. D. Yang, “Innovation in China’s Local Governance: ‘Open Recommendation and Selection’,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2, 2003; Baogang He and Lang Youxing, “China’s First Direct Election of the Township Head: A Case Study of Buyun,” Japanese Journal of Political Science, Vol. 2, No. 1 (May 2001), pp. 1–22. 6 Baogang He, “Participatory and Deliberative Institutions in China,” paper presented at the Grassroots Political Reform in Contemporary China Conference, October 29–31, 2004, Fairbank Center, Harvard University. 7 See Wan Fuyi (ed.), Dangjian: Gongchandang zhizheng shijian yu guilu yanjiu (The Warning from Parties: A Study of the Practice and Law of Communist Rule) (Jinan: Shandong renmin chubanshe, 2003); Zhang Xiangni, Wang Jinguo, Lu Guangsen, Hou Yuanchang, Yan Demin and Zhu Suibin, Gongchandang zhizheng fangfa tantao (An Investigation of the Ruling Method of Communist Party), (Kaifeng: Henan daxue chubanshe, 1989). 8 Gang Lin, “Ideology and Political Institutions for a New Era,” in Gang Li and Xiaobo Hu (eds), China after Jiang (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 60. 9 Kim Jae Cheol, “Party Reform in Post-Mao China: Re-Conceptualization of Party’s leading Roles,” PhD dissertation, University of Washington, 1993. 10 Bruce J. Dickson, “Threats to Party Supremacy,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14, No. 1 (January 2003), p. 14. He also made this point in his earlier work: “Democratizing reforms are unlikely to come under the sponsorship of the CCP; instead, they are likely to come at its expense.” See Bruce J. Dickson, Democratization in China and Taiwan: The Adaptability of Leninist Parties (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 253. 11 Jean C. Oi, “State Response to Rural Discontent in China: Tax-for-fee Reform and Increased Party Control,” Crisis in the Hinterland: Rural Discontent in China, Asia Program Special Report No. 107 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, January 2003), p. 7. 12 Yawei Liu, “Guest Editor’s Introduction,” Chinese Law and Government, Vol. 34, No. 6 (November/December 2001), p. 20. 13 Stanley Rosen, “The Chinese Communist Party and Chinese Society: Popular Attitudes toward Party Membership,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 24 (1990), p. 60. 14 Ignatius Wibowo, “Party Recruitment and the Future of the Chinese Communist Party,” EAI Background Brief, No. 101 (September 2001). 15 Liu Zhangfang, “On ‘boss members’ and ‘boss secretary’,” Zhongliu, No. 7 (2000), pp. 10–13. 16 Bruce Dickson, “Economics as the Central Task: Do Entrepreneurs Matter?” paper presented at the conference on China’s Leadership Transition, Virginia, December 2001. 17 David Goodman, “The Emerging Public Sector in Shanxi: Entrepreneurs and Enterprise as Risk under Reform,” paper presented at UNSW-UTS Centre for Research on Provincial China, Workshop on Social Change and Enterprise in China’s Provinces, Taiyuan, October 2000, p. 15. 18 See Deng Liqun, “Yingxiang woguo guojia anquan de lougan yinsu” (Some Factors that Affect Our National Security), a report submitted to the Central Party, unpublished but widely distributed privately among intellectuals towards the end of 1995, p. 7. 19 See Li Qiang, Dangdai, p. 331. 20 For example, Wan Ruinnan, a former director of the Stone Company, was an active advocate of privatization, and vigorously defended the Stone enterprise as having been from the start a vehicle for political action. 21 He Baogang’s interview in Wenzhou on June 5, 2001.

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22 See A New Work Manual for Party Affairs (Beijing: Zhongguo yanshi chubanshe, 1995), p. 1673. 23 Bao Tong, “China’s Unrepresentative Communists,” Asian Wall Street Journal, August 27, 2002. 24 See The Front Line Magazine (published in Hong Kong), No. 11, 2000, p. 12. 25 Detailed discussion on the Party Congress, see Gang Lin, “Leadership Transition, Intra-Party Democracy, and Institution Building in China,” Asian Survey, Vol. 44, No. 2 (2004). 26 Gang Lin, “Ideology and Political Institutions for a New Era,” p. 64. 27 Gang Lin, “Leadership Transition,” p. 275. 28 See Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14, No. 1 (January 2003). 29 Qinglian He, “A Volcanic Stability,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14, No. 1 (January 2003), pp. 66–72. 30 Bruce Dickson, “Whom Does the Party Represent? From ‘Three Revolutionary Classes’ to ‘Three Representatives’,” American Asian Review, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Spring 2003), pp. 5–6. 31 See John P. Burns, “Strengthening Central CCP Control of Leadership Selection: the 1990s Nomenklatura,” The China Quarterly, No. 138 (June 1994), pp. 474– 480; “The Relevance of the Nomenklatura System to the Chinese Communist Party in a New Era,” paper presented at International Conference on the Chinese Communist Party in a New Era: Renewal and Reform, December 9–10, 2003, East Asian Institute, Singapore. 32 “Sulian jubian zhihou zhongguo de xianshi yingdui yu zhanlue xuanzhe” (China’s Realistic Countermeasures and Strategic Choices after the Dramatic Changes in the Soviet Union), an internal document printed and circulated by Zhongguo Qingnian Baoshe in September 1991. 33 See Yang Deshan, Zhongguo jindai zichan jieji zhengdang xueshuo yanjiu (A Study of the Doctrine of Bourgeois Parties in Modern China) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2002). 34 A discussion on the system, see Baogang He, “The Chinese Communist Party and Party System in China,” in Wolfgang Sachsenroder, (ed.), Political Party and Democratic Development in East and Southeast Asia: Volume II: East Asia (London: Ashgate publishers), 1998, pp. 36–87. 35 I have discussed China’s search for the mixed regime, see Baogang He, “The Theory and Practice of Chinese Grassroots Governance: Five Models,” Japanese Journal of Political Science, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2003), pp. 293–314. 36 Chen Wenbin (eds), Zhongguo gongchandang xinglian fanfulu (A Record of the Chinese Communist Party’s Struggle against Corruption) (Beijing: Xiyuan chubanshe, 1993). 37 See Gong Jie, Yu Xiancheng and Li Xi, Xinshiqi de dangnei jiandu (Internal Party’s Check System in a New Age) (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1992).

11 Transition in a party-state system Taiwan as a model for China’s future democratization Chien-min Chao and Yeau-tarn Lee Two forces have restructured and reshaped the world since the late twentieth century: one is the prevailing wave of economic integration and globalization, recasting the international economic order; the other is the third wave of democratization, redefining the international political order. The former proved the failure of a state-planned economy, while the latter accelerated the collapses of one-party systems, military regimes, and personal dictatorships. As a consequence, since the beginning of the 1990s, the number of newly democratized countries has boomed, and democratization and its consolidation have become major topics for academic research. For the first time in human history, democracy is being hailed by the majority of mankind as a form of governance, threatening the diminishing pool of remaining rulers who are still hanging on to the old fashion of dictatorship. The latest annual survey released by the Freedom House for the years 2002–2003 indicates that there are now 121 countries exercising electoral democracy and 89 having liberal democracy. The survey also shows approximately 2.2 billion people are still living in 47 non-liberal countries.1 Among the non-democratic countries, China attracts the most attention. Its huge population of 1.3 billion makes up as many as half of the people who are still living under one form of dictatorship or another. Whether a fourth wave of democratization is possible in the not too distant future, featuring China as the main beneficiary is a major concern for the rest of the world.2 Described as a quasi-Leninist state, Taiwan rode the third wave and was transformed from a hard-authoritarian regime to a democracy. Although Taiwan’s authoritarian polity was not structured in exactly the same way as that of the PRC, it can nevertheless offer valuable lessons to the latter in its transition to a more pluralistic form of rule. In the following sections we shall first review the one-party system in Taiwan and how it was transformed into a democracy. We will delineate the parameters of the party-state system that still prevail in China. After a brief comparison of the political status of the two countries, our attention will then turn to how and what China can learn from Taiwan in its anticipated evolution towards democracy.

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One-party system in Taiwan As Samuel P. Huntington pointed out, regimes that have moved to and toward democracy in the third wave generally fall into three groups: oneparty systems, military regimes, and personal dictatorships.3 Before its democratic process started at the turn of the 1980s with the forming of the first opposition party (the Democratic Progressive Party) in 1986, Taiwan was considered a one-party system. To differentiate it from the much tighter-controlled Leninist party-state structure, T. J. Cheng described the Republic of China (ROC) under the rule of the Kuomintang (KMT) as a quasi-Leninist regime, in which the party effectively monopolizes power, rendering the government and the military under its control. The party also infiltrates into the civil society, making the forming of an opposition party an impossible task.4 There are three major differences between the quasi-Leninist regime of the KMT and the totalitarian Leninist regimes adopted by China and the former Soviet Union. First, under the KMT regime, democracy was not a value to be rejected outright. It only came gradually after the power of the ruling party was consolidated and the people were given ample opportunities to practice it. In other words, a one-party dictatorship was not a lasting goal and democracy was to be preceded by a period of tutorage. In China the western style of democracy and the concept of division of powers were repudiated, then as now, as evils of capitalism, which are not suitable to the conditions of China. Second, the KMT was not a monolithic party and did not exercise full control of political resources. Elections at all levels save the central government and the mayors of the two largest cities, Taipei and Kaohsiung, had been held regularly since the nationalist government was forced to retreat to Taiwan in 1949. Political participation was gradually extended to include the first election of some members of the parliament and then the full legislature, and ultimately the presidency. In China, authentic elections have only been introduced since the 1980s and were, at first, limited to villages in rural areas. It was not until the end of the 1990s that China began direct elections of the heads at the township and county levels, but only on a very limited and experimental basis.5 Third, unlike the PRC, which adopted a centrally planned and command economy since the early 1950s, depriving the people of the right to private ownership and properties until the 1980s, liberalist capitalism was practiced in Taiwan from the beginning. The people of Taiwan have long had the right to choose their careers and way of life. As personal income increased, the demand for more political participation also increased, forcing the government to make concessions. While Taiwan under the KMT was ruled by a hard-authoritarian regime with civil liberties and political freedoms curbed, China under Mao Zedong was a totalitarian dictatorship in which people’s livelihood was at the mercy of the party-state apparatus

212 Chien-min Chao and Yeau-tarn Lee and political rights were almost non-existent as rule by law was condemned as “capitalist mentality.” As Hong-mao Tien pointed out, the KMT’s infiltration into the state and the society was pretty extensive, too. During the KMT regime, civil rights were limited, political dissidents were suppressed, and people’s political life was restricted. Under such circumstances, it was difficult for opposition forces to mobilize their resources and organize a political party, and democratization was thus repressed. It is observed that the driving forces for the third wave of democratization were overwhelmingly indigenous. In terms of the relative importance of governing and opposition forces, three types of democratic transition can be found. Transformation occurs when political elites take the lead in bringing about democracy. Replacement results when opposition groups take the lead in bringing about democracy, and the authoritarian regime collapses or is overthrown in the process. What might be termed transplacement occurs when democratization results largely from joint actions by the government and opposition groups.6 According to the definition, Taiwan’s democratization belongs to the first category – transformation. The ruling KMT started the process on its own by gradually loosening up its control over society and tolerating limited opposition that was dormant during Chiang Kai-shek’s reign. The government and the opposition forces compromised and negotiated over their differences without going to any extreme or resorting to violence, forming a kind of unwilling coalition. In the process, both governing and opposition groups reconciled their ideological differences to adapt to a new trend unknown to the existing political order. The power holders of the old authoritarian regime played a key role in putting an end to their own rule and transforming it into a democracy.

KMT’s transition The KMT was quite established as a predominant party when its patriarch Chiang Kai-shek died in April, 1975. It basically maintained a powerful party-state system with the party exercising absolute control over the government and dictating policies only to be codified by the state organs. Despite its immense powers and privileges, the KMT was forced to make concessions leaving indelible marks on the previously invincible partystate structure. As the authoritarianism was softening, compromises became necessary for the party to remain in power. The party no longer enjoyed absolute and monopolistic control over political issues and started to transform itself into a less rigid, dominant party. Three challenges confronted the party, undermining its legitimacy and ultimately paving the way for the country’s transition into a democracy in the 1980s.

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First, the goal to reclaim the mainland on which the party based its rule and justified the extraordinary powers endowed on the President was met with setbacks as Taiwan was losing its cause in the international arena. The forced withdrawal from the Untied Nations, an international organization that the country helped found, and severance of relations with major countries such as the US and Japan in the 1970s reduced the confidence of the ruling elites. Second, the economic miracle that had helped the party consolidate its power came to haunt itself as people started to demand political participation as they grew more affluent. The Ten Construction Projects initiated by Chiang Ching-kuo helped Taiwan weather the storm caused by the sudden decline of international stature, but they also facilitated political awareness among the Taiwanese who had been submissive under a half century of Japanese colonial rule and decades of KMT repression. Third, the ruling elites, the mainlanders who fled mainland China after being defeated by the communists in the Chinese Civil War in the 1940s and who were considered outsiders, faced new challenges as the Taiwanese who had come to the island much earlier grew impatient with the rulers. The conflict between the mainlanders and the Taiwanese, initiated in February 1947 when the government opened fire on Taiwanese residents who were demonstrating against the new rulers,7 emerged as the most potent weapon the opposition could embrace to uproot the KMT rule. Facing these daunting challenges the KMT party-state structure was beating a retreat and gradually submitted to the demands of democratization. Compared to his father, Chiang Ching-kuo was a populist and a lot more in touch with reality. He understood that he had to make drastic changes in order to keep the KMT in power. Seen by some as a half-hearted supporter of reform, he heralded a limited opening and restructuring of the old regime as never seen before. First, to bring new blood to the old system he started a limited localization process, providing some access to central politics for the Taiwanese who had migrated from mainland China to Taiwan before 1949. The appointment of Hsieh Tung-min as provincial governor was an example. Other notable Taiwanese politicians included Lin Yang-kang and Lien Chan. Lee Huan, then KMT’s secretary general and a liberal reformer, was asked to head the mission to recruit young Taiwanese and mainlanders with a good image and reputation to serve their country. At the same time, early retirement for the party elderly was encouraged. Second, a limited political liberalization was tolerated. The press was allowed a little more leeway to report on the performance of the government and its policies. Jail terms for non-violent dissidents were reduced. The electoral process was broadened to include a reshuffling for part of the national parliamentarians and non-KMT candidates were allowed to compete. However, all this was based on the belief that the power of the opposition would be contained and would not fundamentally challenge

214 Chien-min Chao and Yeau-tarn Lee KMT’s position as a ruling party. Chiang Ching-kuo was also not willing to allow core principles to be destabilized, such as anti-communism, the ROC as the sole legitimate government of the whole of China, and the country ultimately to be reunited by reclaiming mainland China back. Third, Chiang Ching-kuo was magnanimous enough even to allow partial pluralism within the KMT itself. Lower echelons of party officials were given more responsibility and opportunities to input their demands. The powers of making policies and decisions were relegated to government institutions. The influence of the previously powerful Central Committee and its Standing Committee was reduced. The termination of Martial Law in 1987 was particularly meaningful, clearing the way for dissidents exiled overseas to return after its demise and hence officially end the era of “white terror.” External factors also played their part in Taiwan’s drive towards democracy. Heavily relying on the US for its security against possible attacks from the communist regime across the Strait of Taiwan, and its huge market for economic development, the Chiang administration was rather sensitive to US pressure to open up its political system. Large and frequent street demonstrations during the 1980s in South Korea against Roh Tae Woo’s government and the ouster of Filipino dictator Ferdinand Marcos provided the Taiwanese leader the impetus to lessen control. By the time Lee Teng-hui ascended to the presidency, Taiwan was poised for a major political change. The selective political reforms undertaken by Chiang were aimed at sustaining KMT’s rule, rather than a political restructuring on a grand scale. As such they succeeded in awakening the populace who had been largely dormant politically, and unleashed a new wave of aspiration pressuring the party to relinquish more powers. After the Chungli Incident of 1977 when a riot took place in Taoyuan county in northern Taiwan in protest of electoral fraud, and the Kaohsiung Incident of December 1979 when a group of opposition leaders took to the streets along with their supporters in defiance of the government’s refusal to grant the right to assemble on political grounds, the KMT became more conciliatory and accommodating to opposition demands.8 Through a series of meetings and dialogue between the ruling party and the opposition, including the newly created Democratic Progress Party (DPP) in 1986, substantial political liberalization was achieved and, luckily, without massive violence. Lee Teng-hui seemed to harbor feelings of abhorrence towards the KMT’s past practices and thus accelerated the pace of evolving the party into a more pluralistic organization. The party started to relinquish powers and consequently became a rubber stamp, instead of an initiator, in the making of important decisions. The Chairman of the party was less important in determining the political fortunes of individual politicians. When a large-scale nativization process began to take hold as the Taiwanese started to fill posts at the national level, the tension between the mainlanders and the Taiwanese that had traumatized the society ever

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since the arrival of Chiang Kai-shek and his followers in 1949, gradually eased. The political ecology of the country was irreversibly changed. Lee as a leader seemed to be rather upset with the fact that the majority of the people, the Taiwanese, were deprived of their fair share of the political resources.9 He was particularly incensed when Taiwanese were ostracized, because of their unorthodox political beliefs of not wanting to be reunited with China. Repression and ostracism ceased to be the tactics of the government that previously resorted to cracking down on political dissension and opposition. Instead, a National Affairs Conference was convened in 1991, featuring for the first time members of the KMT and the DPP, to map out a strategy to restructure the old political system, especially the representative organs at the national level, which had been kept from periodic re-election, in order to forge an impression that the ROC was still the sole legitimate government of the whole of China. This political re-engineering marked a milestone in re-legitimizing KMT rule. Subsequently, new elections were held for members of the National Assembly, which was designed to elect the president and the vice-president, the Legislative Yuan, the parliament, and the Control Yuan, which together with the Legislative Yuan served to supervise the administrative branch of the government. Another move that Lee undertook, which not only reshaped the political landscape, but also generated lasting effects of Taiwan’s relations with China, was the termination of the Temporary Provisions during the Period of National Mobilization for the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion. The ROC was no longer technically at war with the PRC, and the president no longer claimed the extra powers endowed on him because of the civil-war status between Taiwan and China. With these initial successes, the President proceeded to begin six rounds of constitutional revisions laying the ground on which constitutionalism was based. By the time the first direct presidential election was held in 1996, Taiwan was well on its way to a full democracy. As the old political system was rejuvenated and more Taiwanese entered the political scene, the KMT was ironically sucked into another wave of unrest. The business sector, which was kept away from politics before the descent of democracy, found its way in and quickly became an integral part of this new democratic process. Institutional deficiency provided ample room for corporations to haggle illicit trade-offs with politicians. Worse still, political hooliganism was brought into the scene as politics became more accessible and the spoils were high. Soon it became clear that more democratic consolidation was needed. Corruption became a prominent characteristic of the KMT, and people started to lose faith as “black and gold” entered the political scene. Lee was praised for accelerating the process of democratization, but was also blamed for the advent of the political decay. The emergence of a negative image ultimately paved the way for the ousting of the KMT in the 2000 election.

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Democratization in Taiwan According to the Freedom House, Taiwan has made significant strides in political and civil liberties in the past 30 years. In 1972 Taiwan was rated as undemocratic with political rights set at a scale six out of a total of seven and civil liberties were fifth. Taiwan was considered “partly free” for the first time four years later, with its political rights moved upward a notch to fifth. Due to a series of opening up and liberalizing measures including granting newspapers unshackled freedoms and citizens the right to form opposition parties, political liberalism started to spread. In 1990 the ratings in both indices rose to scale three. In 1996 Taiwan took a giant leap towards democracy after the first direct presidential election was held in March.10 With open and fair elections being held regularly and people’s political rights well protected, Taiwan was listed among the countries practicing both electoral and liberal democracy. The direct presidential election in 2000 was a milestone in that the regime was peacefully passed from a formerly quasi-Leninist party-state system down to an opposition Democratic Progressive Party, a party widely perceived as pursuing a new identity and a new direction for the future. Taiwan is now recognized as the most liberal country in Asia, according to the Freedom House survey, exceheimerg South Korea and the Philippines, which both started democratization earlier than Taiwan.11 Liberalization and democratization are two different but inseparable concepts in political developments.12 In Taiwan the growing economic and political liberalization has gradually led to democratization and the establishment of democracy. In other words, not until the mid-1980s, when the people were economically better off and the DPP was established and former president Chiang Ching-kuo decided to end martial law (which was promulgated in May 1949 at the height of the Chinese Civil War), had the democratization begun. It was only after new rounds of elections held in 1991 and 1992 that all members of the chambers of the parliament, the Legislative Yuan, the National Assembly, and the Control Yuan, were subject to direct elections for the first time,13 and the first direct presidential election in 1996 qualified Taiwan as a democracy. The first rotation of powers in 2000 gave Taiwan a chance to consolidate its young democracy. In retrospect, Taiwan has undergone several stages on the way to democracy, from a preparatory stage to a determining stage of transformation, and finally to the initial stage of democratic consolidation. However, this young democracy is not fully consolidated yet, for people in Taiwan have not become accustomed to the rules of democracy. Only when the rules of democracy are applied in all aspects of life and carried out by people who believe in them will the democratic consolidation be complete. Taiwan is a vital case in the third wave of democratization that ended the rule of dictatorship in many countries. However, the rapid transition

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to democracy did not result in an immediate collapse of the authoritarian regime, led by the KMT, nor in a drastic decline in economic growth rates and social and political order. What Taiwan had experienced was a “silent revolution.” Compared with other countries undergoing similar transformation, Taiwan possesses unique characteristics. First, as a former colony of Japan, Taiwan had no experience with any experiment of democracy and, hence, it was not a re-democratization. Second, it started with a one-party authoritarian rule, not a military regime or a totalitarian dictatorship. Third, it was not preceded by serious economic and political crises nor followed by demands for major social reforms. Fourth, cleavages and conflicts among various ethnic groups as the prime sources for the transformation and redistribution of political resources were inevitable in what is known as a process towards localization or indigenization of politics. Finally, though democratization has redistributed the political resources from the mainlanders, who came to Taiwan after 1949 and who held the lion’s share of the national politics, to include the Taiwanese who arrived much earlier and were active only at local politics, it has also undermined the traditional base of legitimacy of the KMT regime. As a result, the issue of national identification has been heightened. The coalition between reformers of the ruling KMT under the leadership of former President Lee Teng-hui and the moderate wing of the opposition DPP has reduced the risks of violence in the process. Successful coalitionbuilding made the transition to democracy in Taiwan a peaceful and rational one. It is argued that among the nearly 100 countries that are in the midst of regime transition, fewer than 20 are known to have embarked on a trail blazed by democratic institutions with due procedures to endorse its democratic way of life.14 Taiwan is the only country in East Asia that gained such prominent success (in the Freedom House 2002–2003 survey, both the political rights and civil liberty in South Korea were placed in the second category while Taiwan’s political rights were ranked in the first category and civil liberty in the second). However, in order to sustain the achievement and ensure maturity of democracy, Taiwan still has to pass the “double turnover test” under which different parties will have the chance to come to power more than once to be qualified as a mature or consolidated democracy. Although Taiwan is comparable to countries such as the United Kingdom, France, Japan, Germany, and Italy in the area of political freedoms, it needs to deepen and heighten the quality of its democracy.

China’s party-state system For a Leninist party-state system, a tightly organized political party and an official ideology are at the core of its political operation. Samuel P. Huntington suggested that the biggest challenge for this type of regime in the transition to democracy is that of institutionalization. Specifically, the

218 Chien-min Chao and Yeau-tarn Lee separation of the party and the state and secularization of its ideology are the hardest to crack.15 Ruan Ming, a political dissident who was exiled to the US after the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations, has concluded that the most important lesson learned from this tragedy is the need to end the rule of “one party, one leader, and one ideology,” and to build a modern democracy based on universal respect of human rights.16 The collapse of the former Soviet Union and communist regimes in East and Central Europe has further substantiated the importance of the party and ideology in the transition of a Leninist party-state system. Unlike the political ideology of the Three Principles of the People that the KMT regime was following, the official ideology that China has been adhering to, whether it is the Maoist or the Dengist version, is antithetic to democratic concepts engrained in a western-style democracy. The Leninist party-state system that China has been practicing is ill designed for the advancement of democracy for the following reasons. First, there is a high degree of overlapping both structurally and functionally between the party, the CCP, and the state. The party not only acts on the state’s behalf, it also substitutes the state in the running of its affairs in a good proportion of the PRC’s 50-odd year history. The dyadic structure is still prevalent even after 20 years of reform and opening up of the economic system. The most notorious and tragic example of irrationality of this monolithic system came when Liu Shaoqi, former Chairman of the PRC and designated successor of Mao, fell to disgrace. Because of his alleged “capitalist inclination” Liu was stripped of the post and jailed for life without due process. After his demise in prison in 1969 the Chairmanship of the state disappeared in both of the 1975 and 1978 constitutions. Instead of being nominated by the Chairman of the State as was stipulated in the 1954 constitution, the Premier of the State Council was to be nominated by the CCP center. The power to command the armed forces was also shifted to the Chairman of the party. During the Cultural Revolution period, all bureaucracies were decimated and replaced by the “newly-born thing of the revolution” – the “revolutionary committees.” As the sole organ representing public powers, the new institution combined functions of both the party and the state. Actually, the court system was devastated at the end of the 1950s when the public security, the prosecutors, and the court were combined into one. Both lawyers and the notary systems also ceased to exist. When the disastrous Cultural Revolution came about, the judicial system stopped functioning altogether with their bureaucracies destroyed. Above the party-state system was a supreme leader who was a divinized deity. Mao publicly promoted the idea of personal cult himself in 1958. After Marshal Peng Dehui was purged at an enlarged Politburo meeting held in Lusan in 1959, no dissension was to be heard throughout Mao’s reign. The result of this personal dictatorship was radicalization of politics.

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It was believed that the “class enemy” was everywhere, even at the highest level of the proletarian party and the entire country was called upon to fight against the “capitalist resurrection.”

Is China ready for regime transition? After having worked in a factory for over three years to rectify the crime for being the “number two capitalist roader” during the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping was determined to overhaul the system once in power. The proposal to “Reform the Leadership Systems of the Party and the State” he made in August 1980 summarized the lessons that he had painfully learned. The problems, according to Deng, were, among others, an overconcentration of powers, patrimonialism, bureaucratism, and lack of rule of law. He then proceeded to change the political system along with the economic system. A major overhaul occurred at the 12th Party Congress held in 1982 when a call to properly divide the work between the party and the state was adhered to. The experiment on political reforms culminated at the 13th Party Congress held in 1987. The political reforms that Deng had pledged were terminated after the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations. Subsequent reforms centering on reforming and downsizing the State Council adopted by the two successive premiers, Li Peng and Zhu Rongji, illustrated the new and condensed version of the political reform initiatives. Nevertheless, after two decades of economic reform, the Chinese regime is poised to change. There are signs that the current system is overloaded with newly emerged problems that are unable to be resolved under the revamped socialism with Chinese characteristics. First, the foundation on which the CCP built its legitimacy has been shaken and newly acquired bases, either the economic performance or the “three represents,” have been unable to fill the gap effectively. The communist revolution represented a reformulation of the social value system featuring an equal distribution of wealth and elevation of the status of the have-not class in the society. The economic reforms have raised the living standards of the people in an unprecedented way, but they have also widened the gap between the rich and the poor in a way not seen in the short history of the socialist republic. As a result, the proletarian class, the masters of the socialist revolution, has become marginalized. Second, a corporatist structure is forming in which the power structure, especially at the local levels, has been heavily influenced and penetrated by business interests or cooperating with the business sector in forming a ruling coalition.17 The introduction of the theory of the “three represents” suggests that the CCP has been transformed from a party of the proletarians to a party of the bureaucratic capitalists. The problem started when the new generation of leadership under Deng Xiaoping tried to increase efficiency by allocating powers to the local governments in an effort to

220 Chien-min Chao and Yeau-tarn Lee revive the economy. Consequently, powers to grant investments, personnel, and resource allocation were delegated to the local authorities. The relenting of powers and a stagnation of institution building and rule of law to prevent malfeasance are a lethal combination giving rise to corporatist plutocracy. The dual economic systems that were in place during the 1980s, including pricing and currency, gave the local politicians additional room to expand rent-seeking activities. What has happened is a sharp rise of interest groups of various kinds within the party and the state, trying to divvy up the booties. The newly emerged bureaucratic capitalist class includes the managers of the state-run enterprises and financial institutions, politicians who are responsible for making the plans for urban and rural development, and those who are close to the policy-makers who have the powers to make plans. Third, the lack of rule of law has exacerbated the corporatist structure, giving room for widespread corruption. According to studies carried out by Hu Angang, a Chinese economist, corruption of various kinds has resulted in losses equivalent to between 13.5 percent and 16.8 percent of GDP in 2002.18 Among them, corruption in the areas of rent-seeking, underground economy, and tax evasion, and losses in public investment and expenditures are the most serious. Facing the unprecedented pressure for change, opposition in the forms of public demonstrations and protests has multiplied. It is obvious that there is urgent need for change.

China’s recent political reforms Sensing the heightening tensions within the system, the Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao administration has trumpeted political reforms since resuming power at the CCP’s 16th Party Congress held in November 2002 and the 10th National People’s Congress held a few months later. Although it is highly unlikely that the new generation of leadership would opt for drastic reforms, changes are expected. As of now, inner-party democracy and administrative reforms are likely to be the focus. Shenzhen’s city government has been experimenting with a limited division of powers and elections are also being introduced to decide the administrators of the township and xiang governments on an experimental basis. Suggestions that inner-party democracy is the key to socialist democracy have constantly been heard. A precedent was established when the new General Secretary Hu Jintao, on behalf of the Politburo, gave a report at the 3rd Plenum Meeting of the Central Committee of the 16th Party Congress in October 2003. It was meant as part of the efforts to reinstitutionalize the relations between the Politburo and the Central Committee so that the spirit of democratic centralism could be reinvigorated. In addition, it is being advised that a proper division of powers be observed between the decision-making, implementation, and oversight so that a form of checks and balances might be in place.

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Among other suggestions that have been heard are the following: the Party Congress should be restored as a standing institution as was the case stipulated in the Party Constitution passed at the 8th Party Congress in 1956. A Standing Committee should be formed to make decisions when the Congress is not in session.19 Members of the Central Committee should be selected through an electoral mechanism. The Standing Committee of the Politburo should be eliminated as it is organizationally redundant and the concise top decision-making organ, while exercising powers when the Central Committee is not in session, should be organized through free contestation among members of the Central Committee. As an organ endowed with powers of oversight, members of the Central Disciplinary Committee should be elected directly by the Party Congress. At the local level, powers should also be broken into three branches: Party Committee, executive committee (or secretariat), and the disciplinary committee. The local Party Congress should also be a standing organization with meetings held once every year. The Plenum Committee and the Party Congress should meet more frequently to avert the problem that both the powers of policy-making and implementation are concentrated in the hands of the Party Committee, ruining the kind of checks and balance relationship that is supposed to be there. Delegates of the Party Congress are empowered to supervise the three committees. They can recall cadres unfit for their duties. When the Party Congress is not in session, the Plenum Committee or the Standing Committee takes over the oversight power and supervises the work of the executive and the disciplinary committees.20 All suggestions raised above are actually dug from the heaps of CCP history included in an earlier Party Constitution. The idea is to diversify the powers that have been overwhelmingly concentrated in the hands of the Party Committee. Hopefully, the powers of the Party Congress are enhanced and a sort of division of labor is built in.

Taiwan’s experience as a model for China Whether China will be democratized in the future is now an issue of concern for many scholars. Is there any lesson that Taiwan can offer to that end? What and how can China learn from Taiwan’s experience? Incremental and step-wise approach According to the Three Principles of the People, an ideology constructed by Sun Yat-sen and followed by the KMT as a blueprint in its running of the state, the goal of democracy is to be realized gradually and incrementally preceded by a preparatory stage. After unifying the country and ending the warlord interregnum, Sun Yat-sen reorganized the KMT on the basis of Lenin’s democratic centralism in 1924. The phase of tutorage democracy was then started. For Sun, the Chinese had been immersed

222 Chien-min Chao and Yeau-tarn Lee within an autocratic political culture for too long and it was not practical to start a participatory democracy right away. They needed time to learn and practice the duties endowed on them as masters of the country. During this period, constitutionalism and democracy were to be brought to them gradually on an experimental basis. Based on this conviction, the KMT allowed those who ruled limited autonomy at electing local officials and representatives. The priority of the tutorage government, however, was not an augmentation of people’s rights, but to raise their living standards, the third element of the Three Principles of the People. Furthermore, the three stages, the military revolution, the tutorage democracy, and the democracy, did not come in a linear way; instead, they were synchronized. After a few years of practicing participatory democracy at the local levels (up to the county level) a new constitution was enacted and promulgated in 1946 and elections to choose representatives to the national parliament followed. Before the government was resettled in Taiwan the people of China were provided with opportunities to participate in the running of the governments. After coming to Taiwan, more participation was provided first to rejuvenate the aging parliament by opening some seats for public contestation. A breakthrough was made when the mayors of the two largest cities, Taipei and Kaohsiung, and the government of the province of Taiwan were chosen through electoral process in 1994. Finally, a direct election was held on the presidency in 1996. If the Chinese could practice democracy, albeit limited, in the 1930s and 1940s, there is no reason why the Chinese cannot be allowed to participate in politics by freely choosing their leaders at least at the local levels now. The reasons provided by the CCP that the people are not educated enough, the size of the country is not maneuverable, and that the country is still poor are all excuses invented by the ruling class to keep their powers. Is Chinese culture antithetical to democracy? It is commonly acknowledged that because of its long history of autocracy, little trace of democracy can be found in the Chinese political culture. Historically, democracy came to the East late, prompting some to use the term “oriental despotism” to address the political tradition of the area.21 The thesis is being given a new lease of life lately as some politicians and academics in East Asia are promoting the idea that there is a distinct Asian value system different from that of the Western culture. Is Confucianism antithetical to the future development of democracy in China? Confucianism, which originated in China, widely spread to Korea, Japan, Vietnam, and Taiwan as the Chinese empire expanded, forming a cultural circle. According to Confucius a ruler is required to follow a strict code of conduct, similar to that of the “philosophical king” proposed by the great Western philosopher Plato. He has to cultivate himself and reflect constantly about his performance as an emperor. Politics is embedded in

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high standards of morality and ethics. To care for the subjects in what has been known as “benevolence” is a top priority. His disciple Mencius even went so far as to give subjects the right to recall or overthrow a malignant ruler. Therefore, in the Confucian way of governance, politics has to be a moderate blending of collectivism with individualism. Although it is not democracy based on constitutionalism, it has some elements of democracy, however remote and dim. First, based on humanitarianism Confucianism is for equal rights. Everyone has the chance to be prime ministers and politicians responsible for the well-being of the many as long as they work for it. “Education knows no boundary” is the sentence best summarizing the value that Confucius attached to the ordinary people. Second, free expression is also an important part of Confucianism. The ancient philosopher refused to discount the value of someone’s opinions because of their social status. Actually, social status was not a consideration either in the channel of recruitment for the government nor as an obstacle to education, which holds the key to officialdom. Both the annals of Confucius and Mencius resulted from free discussions and debates among the teachers and the disciples. Third, the temperate tendency wrapped in what has been called the “golden mean” in Confucianism – a prescription suggested by the philosopher for politicians amid divergent schools of views, another reason that Confucius was heaped with praise – was in line with the spirit of compromise and toleration characterized in a modern democratic way of life. His was a time when a “hundred different schools were contending to be heard and a hundred flowers were blossoming.” Confucianism defeated the Legalist School, which promoted lofty rewards and penalty, and was designated by Han Wudi (the emperor of the Han Dynasty who expanded the Chinese empire) as the only school of thought to be respected nearly 2,000 years ago. Fourth, the people rather than the monarchs are the main components of the polity. It is argued that the well-being of the people should be the first consideration in politics. Mencius makes the point most clearly when he contends that “the people are the most precious, followed by the society, and followed by the emperor.” The ruler has to win the hearts and minds of the people first before he is able to legitimize his rule. This corresponds with the goals of for the people, of the people, and by the people enshrined both in Western political philosophy and the Three Principles of the People. Fifth, although it is presumptuous to state that Confucius was a liberalist, he did not rule out the concept of freedom. Nowhere in the annals of Confucius and Mencius is indulgence of repression to be found. Mencius takes one more step when he gives the people the right to revolt when ill-treated by the rulers. Whether or not Confucianism is an obstruction to democracy has been a subject of contention. The fact that Taiwan, as a place where the Confucian tradition has been preserved better than anywhere else in the world,

224 Chien-min Chao and Yeau-tarn Lee has successfully transformed itself into a democracy belies the theory of cultural determinism. Taiwan’s experience demonstrates that it is not the culture that is the matter, but the political leadership. The culture of China is so resilient and divergent that it can support any form of government. Likewise, the Chinese people are so obedient and malleable that they are willing to put up with any form of governance as long as they are fed to subsistence level. It is the rulers who are afraid of losing control once the system is opened up who are obstructing the change. The transition from an exclusionary to inclusionary one-party system There was no real opposition party under the quasi-Leninist KMT regime under Chiang Kai-shek, but opposition did start to gain momentum in the late 1970s. The Zhongli Incident of 1977, when thousands of demonstrators gathered to protest at KMT’s possible rigging of a local election, was a turning point. In an election held a few years later in 1981, the candidates from the opposition dangwai (literally meaning outside the party), while receiving 41 percent of the popular vote, won four seats out of a total of 21 county magistrates and city mayors and 23 percent of the seats in the Provincial Assembly. An opposition with national influence thus emerged. Some scholars attributed the beginning of Taiwan’s transition to democracy to that incident. A few years later, the first opposition party, the DPP, was finally established in 1986 shortly before President Chiang Ching-kuo terminated the ban on forming new political parties. The long history of one-party rule was finally ended and Taiwan was able to embark on a journey to liberalization, democratization, and party politics. In retrospect, the democratization in Taiwan was possible due to two reasons. First, although the KMT monopolized political powers for a long period of time, it did not rule out democracy as a goal. Actually, the aim was prescribed in its official ideology, the Three Principles of the People. The party was also preparing the people for a full-scale democracy by providing them with more participation incrementally. Second, Taiwan’s political leaders, such as Chiang Ching-kuo and Lee Teng-hui, were receptive to democracy and hence did not resort to extreme measures to stop the trends that were deemed by many as destabilizing to the foundation of the party’s rule. These political leaders recognized and accepted dissenting voices, reconciled the differences between opposing parties, and chose democracy over sustaining one-party dictatorship. The attitudes of these political leaders ensured a smooth transition. This magnanimity has everything to do with the “corporatist inclusive” structure that the KMT has been trying to build to recruit representatives from different forces and groups into its top decision-making body. For decades the CCP, on the other hand, had been resorting to an exclusionary policy in the running of the country. Under Mao Zedong’s rule,

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class struggle was the key link and the party tried to divide the people into different classes after coming to power. A great number of people were purged as a result of their “capitalist mentality” and countless political movements were launched to eradicate “capitalist tendencies.” The party finally decided to end the practice under which politics was in command when Deng Xiaoping starting reforming the economy. It was not until the 16th Party Congress held in 2002 that private capitalists were finally allowed into the party. Of course, it will be years before opposition forces are tolerated to freely express their opinions. Much longer is expected before those associated with dissenting organizations are recruited into the power structure. Bottom-to-top and incremental approach to political participation The KMT regime brought limited contestation into politics since the 1950s as part of the package to justify its legitimacy. People in Taiwan were trained and prepared for decades before being given the right to choose their supreme leader. They were familiar with suffrage and exercised political participation in regular fashion. This incrementalism no doubt accelerated the democratization process started in the late 1970s. Regular and legitimate elections are believed to be responsible for institutionalizing a democracy, providing space for the opposition, revising a civil society, and facilitating a full-blown democracy. It was not until the Kaohsiung Incident of 1979 that the differences between the ruling party and the opposition came to a head. In an election held one year after the incident, the opposition won 11 seats in the Legislative Yuan, Taiwan’s parliament, out of a total of 52 open for contestation and many family members of the victims of the incident were elected by large margins. This development alarmed the authority and forced the KMT leadership to seriously consider the meaning of democratization for the first time. In the 1980s the KMT took a series of measures to liberalize the political system, including terminating martial law, relenting the ban on the forming of political parties and censorship of the press instigated during Chiang Ching-kuo’s reign, and allowing for a direct presidential election during Lee Teng-hui’s reign. Democracy finally found its way in Taiwan. Although China has also been reforming its political system gradually since the 1980s, it is too slow and too conservative. Beijing has refused to let the village elections be expanded to the township and xiang levels even though there were elections at much higher levels in China before the founding of the communist regime. As the level of education as well as personal income is now increasing, the Chinese authorities will find it harder to justify the exclusive policy of a one-party dictatorship that is being extended to even the lowest level of the political structure.

226 Chien-min Chao and Yeau-tarn Lee Economic development and democracy Political elites in an aspiring democratic country must have the faith that democracy is not the worst form of governance.22 Democracy should be both a means and an end. Although there are different theories as to whether economic development has a positive effect on democracy,23 the experience in Taiwan has proven the positive correlation between the two. Refusing to give in to the adverse conditions of its small size without many resources and a huge defense budget, Taiwan has defied the odds by resorting first to the import-substitution policy and then, after the local market was saturated, shifting to an export-expansion policy, resulting in what has been widely acclaimed as the “Taiwan miracle.” As the economy gained steam, people started to demand more participation in the political process and a freer environment for civil liberties. After years of practicing a centrally planned economy, China finally joined the rest of the world by embracing a capitalist market economy. Globalization has turned the world’s attention to China, whose market of 1.3 billion people appears to be wondrous virgin land for investors around the world. With an astonishing rate of economic growth, mainland China’s GDP tripled in the last decade from US$406 billion to more than US$1,240 billion in 2002. Averaging nearly ten percent in the past two decades, mainland China has had the fastest economic growth rate in the world in the last decade. In 1991 mainland China attracted close to US$4.4 billion of foreign direct investment (FDI) and the amount increased 11-fold in 2002 totaling an accumulated US$469 billion. Actually, China surpassed the US as the most favorable destination for FDI in that year. Boosted by the huge sum of FDI, mainland China’s foreign trade has quadrupled during this period. Beneath the seemingly promising economic development lies instability and tensions. China boasts one of the largest armies of unemployed and underemployed in the world with tens of millions of urban workers laid off, because of inefficient state enterprises forced to shut down due to inferior management and outdated technology. At the same time, millions and millions of rural workers are idle at home. China has the fastest widening gap between the rich and the poor, rendering the country a situation of not “two systems,” but “multiple systems.” Regional disparity and income inequities are likely to be the root causes for a third revolution in the not too distant future. China is also intersected by the biggest waves of institution dismantling and re-building in human history. The old values and beliefs are crumbling as a result of these transplacements, yet the new ones are slow to be implemented. Pressure is mounting for a change. Samuel P. Huntington once pointed out that “economic development makes democracy possible; political leadership makes it real.”24 Democratization in Taiwan has already vindicated Huntington’s theory. Whether or not it will be proven in China is the greatest conjecture for the new millennium.

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Snowballing effect and external influences One of the factors contributing to the third wave of democracy is the snowballing, also known as demonstration, contagion, diffusion, or emulation effect. Successful democratizations tend to breed more regime transition, either because the democratized and the emulator face similar problems, or because expectations are built that a change in regime might offer solutions to the latter’s (usually economic) woes. Although samples are not large enough to make a generalization about this snowballing effect, the democratizations in the Philippines and South Korea have nevertheless set examples for neighboring countries such as Burma, China, and Taiwan to follow suit. Foreign intervention overall brings positive effects to political change. The roles of the US in the democratizations in Latin America and Asia, the European Union in South and East Europe, and Russia in East Europe are good examples. China has resisted outside influences on its political agenda, but external factors come subtly and invisibly. Signs are already there that China is trying to find inspiration in western democracy to tackle its increasingly rampant corruption. The concept that powers should not be over-concentrated and the urgency to build a supervisory mechanism are but two examples in the quest for change.

Conclusion The third wave of democratization has successfully transformed nearly 80 autocratic countries into democracy. Taiwan’s case is particularly meaningful in that it belies not only the argument that a Chinese culture is an obstacle to a democratic form of polity, but also that a Leninist party-state system is too rigid to transform peacefully. A third lesson that can be drawn from Taiwan’s experience is that economic development can indeed provide positive effects for the expansion of political participation. Looking to the future, the possible transition in China may be the main focus for the fourth wave of democratization. Taiwan is uniquely positioned to help with the giant in the East in its quest for a more open and liberalized political system. The facts that the two share a common culture, language, and geographic proximity all put Taiwan in a good position to influence its giant neighbor to the west. As a country used to being dubbed a quasi-Leninist regime, Taiwan has much to offer as to what a party-state structure should do to accommodate demands for more liberalization and participation. China is nevertheless very different from any other country and its road to democracy would probably not be the same as has been blazed by others. Its sheer size says it all. Furthermore, Taiwan has been practicing a liberalist economy and limited liberalist political system since the nationalist government withdrew from the mainland and resettled here in Taiwan.

228 Chien-min Chao and Yeau-tarn Lee As a small island republic highly dependent on foreign trade for the development of its economy, Taiwan has been extremely internationalized and vulnerable to foreign influences, especially the US. The ethnic differences between the mainlanders who came to Taiwan after 1949 and the Taiwanese who had arrived much earlier have further complicated the situation and make Taiwan unique in its own right. These factors should reduce Taiwan’s applicability to mainland China. It is true that unprecedented pressure is mounting in China demanding resolutions for problems that the CCP regime has never faced before. It is also true that up to now the ruling party in Zhongnanhai has been unable to tackle the issues effectively. China needs change. It is much easier to copy or learn from someone they know than from strangers. Taiwan cannot be absent from this great transformation.

Notes 1 Adrian Karatnycky, “The Anniversary Freedom House Survey. Liberty’s Advances in a Troubled World,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14, No. 1 (2003), pp. 105, 108. 2 Larry Diamond, “The End of the Third Wave and the Start of the Fourth,” in Marc F. Plattner and Joao Carlos Espada (eds), The Democratic Invention (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), pp. 27–28. 3 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 110–113. 4 Tung-Jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard, “Taiwan in Transition,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 1, No. 2. (1990), p. 64. 5 Data indicates that there are only two such experiments. See Huang Weping and Zhou Shubin (eds), Xiangzhangz xiangju fangshi kaige: anli yanjiu (Research on Cases of Reform of Electoral Way of Township Chiefs) (Beijing: Shehui kexue chubanshe, 2003). 6 Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 114. 7 Lai Tse-han, Ramon H. Myers, and Wei Wou, A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991). 8 See Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard (eds), Political Change in Taiwan (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992). 9 See Chao, Chien-min and Bruce Dickson (eds), Assessing Lee Teng-hui Legacy: Democratic Consolidation and External Affairs (NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2002). 10 Samuel P. Huntington indicates that “if popular election of the top decision makers is the essence of democracy, then the critical point in the process of democratization is the replacement of a government that was not chosen this way by one that is selected in a free, open, and fair election.” See Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 9. 11 Adrian Karatnycky, Freedom in the World, 1997: 3–8, 475–477, 584; 1998: 487–489; 1999: 112–116; 2000: 468–470; 2001: 5–15, 521–524. 12 Scott Mainwaring writes that “political liberalization refers to an easing of repression and extension of civil liberties within an authoritarian regime, whereas a transition to democracy implies a change of regimes. Democratization has been used in different ways, but as used here it refers to a movement toward democracy, that is, toward a different political regime.” See Scott Mainwaring, “Transitions to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation: Theoretical and

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13

14 15 16 17

18 19

20

Comparative Issues,” in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O’Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela (eds), Issues in Democratic Consolidation (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), p. 298. Before the early 1990s, only a segment of the parliamentarians were elected directly by the voters. Those who were elected in China before the Nationalist government was resettled in Taipei were immune from re-elections. The latter group was termed by some as “ten-thousand year parliamentarians.” Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, Democracy in East Asia (Washington, DC: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1996), pp. 20–37. Samuel P. Huntington, “How Countries Democratize,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 106, No. 4 (1991–92), pp. 585–586. Ruan Ming, Deng xiaoping diguo (The Dang Xiaoping Empire) (Taipei: Shibao chubanshe, 1992), p. 274. Bruce J. Dickson, “Cooptation and Corporatism in China: The Logic of Party Adaptation,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 115, No. 4 (January 2000), pp. 517–540. Jean C. Oi, Rural China Takes Off: Institutional Foundations of Economic Reform (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999). Hu Angang, “Due zhongguo jiushi niendai hobanqi fubai jinji shuanshi de chubu guji,” (A Primary Assessment of Economic Losses in China Caused by Corruption in the Second Half of the 1990s), manuscript, no date of publication. On the revision of the Party Constitution at the 8th Party Congress, see Deng Xiaoping, “Guanyu xiugai dang de zhangchang de baogao,” Deng xiaoping wenxuan (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping), Vol. 1 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1961), p. 233. Li Rui, “Guanyu zhengzhi tizhi gaige de yijian” (Some Opinions on Political Reforms), Kaifang zazhi (Open Magazine) (Hong Kong), (December 2002), pp. 8–10; Wang Gueizou, “Guanyu fazhan dangnei minzhu de wenti” (Problems with Developing Inner-party Democracy), Zhongguo dangzheng ganbu luntan (Chinese Forum on Party and State Cadres) (Beijing) (November 2001), pp. 9–18; Song Hueichang, “Lun dangnei minzhu de shizhi” (Essence of Inner-party Democracy), Zhongguo dangzheng ganbu luntan (Beijing) (June 1995), pp. 26–28; Song Huei, “Zhonggong zhong yang dangxiao lao ganbu shangshu jianyi chexiao zhongyang junuei,” manuscript, no date of publication; Li Yongzhong, “Guanyu gaige danguei ‘Yi xing heyi’ lingdao tizhi de sikao” (Thoughts on Reforming the Party Leadership), Zhongguo dangzheng ganbu luntan (Beijing) (January 2002), pp. 22–24; Li Wunquan, “Jiaqiang minzhu jizhong zhi de zhidu Jianshe” (Strengthening the Institutional Establishment of the Democratic Centralism) Zhongguo dangzheng ganbu luntan (Beijing) (December 1994), pp. 4–6; Zhang Mingchu, “Jiaqiang dan daibiao dahuei de quanli jiandu zuoyong” (Enhancing the Functions of Oversight of the Party Congresses) Dangzheng luntan (Forum for Party and State) (Beijing) (April 1996), pp. 17–18; Hu Tuguei, “Gaige he wuanshan dang de quanguo daibiao dahuei zhidu” (Reform and Perfect the National Party’s Congress), Huadong zhengfa xueyuan xuebao (Journal of East China College of Politics and Law) (Shanghai), No. 2 (1999), pp. 55–58; Ying Kefu, “Dangnei minzhu de guanjian shi jianquan dang de daibiao dahuei” Weishi (Beijing) (August 2001), pp. 123–128; Lin Shangli, Dangnei minzhu: zhongguo gongchan dang de lilun yu shijian (Inner-party Democracy: CCP’s Theory and Practice) (Shanghai: Shanghai shehuei kexue chubanshe, 2002), pp. 221–226; Guo Daohuei, “Gaishan dang zai fazhi guojia zhong de lingdao fanglue yu zhizheng fangshi” (Improve the Style of Leadership and Governance of the Party in Its Work on Rule of Law), Faxue (Law) Beijing), No. 4 (1999), pp. 9–14; “Cao Siyuan: gongchandang ying gaiming shehuei minzhu dang” (Cao Siyuan: Rename the CCP as the Socialist Democratic Party), Zhongguo shibao (Taipei Times) (Taipei), August 7, 2002, p. 11.

230 Chien-min Chao and Yeau-tarn Lee 21 Georg Sorensen argues that Confucianism which emphasizes hierarchy, authority, and intolerance is likely to work against democracy. See Georg Sorensen, Democracy and Democratization: Processes and Prospects in a Changing World (Oxford: Westview Press, 1993), p. 26. Potter, Goldblatt, Kiloh, and Lewis argue similarly that Confucianism as well as other Asian religions and cultural beliefs make democratization an unlikely prospect in Asia. See David Potter, David Goldblatt, Margaret Kiloh, and Paul Lewis, Democratization (Cambridge: The Open University, 1997), p. 29. Huntington further asserts that in practice Confucian or Confucian-influenced societies have been inhospitable to democracy, as the pessimistic attitude of Confucian traditions has placed a tremendous drag on the democratization. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 301. 22 Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 315. 23 As the first and the most influential scholars in the study of the correlation between democratization and economic development, Lerner and Lipset pointed out that domestic finance, communication, industrialization, education, and modernization are in line with a well-established democracy. After reexamining their original study, they discovered that the positive correlation between democratization and economic development in the 1980s is more conspicuous than that in the 1950s and 60s. See D. Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (New York: The Free Press, 1958); S. M. Lipset, K. R. Seong, and J. C. Torres, “A Comparative Analysis of the Social Requisites of Democracy,” International Social Science Journal, No. 136 (May 1993), pp. 155–175; S. M. Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 53, No. 1 (1959), pp. 69–105; S. M. Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (New York: Doubleday, 1960). Marsh and Diamond further argued that there exists a strong, unifying, and accurate connection between economic development and democracy. See Gary Marsh and L. Diamond (eds) Reexamined Democracy (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1992), pp. 3–4. 24 Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 316.

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12 The Party, class, and democracy in China Zheng Yongnian

Class and democracy The “three represents” theory, a new ideological orthodox of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has reintroduced class elements into China’s political development. The theory was first raised by Jiang Zemin in 2000 when he visited Guangdong. According to this concept, the CCP represents the most advanced mode of productive forces, the most advanced culture, and the interests of the majority of the people. In his keynote speech celebrating the 80th anniversary of the CCP on July 1, 2001, Jiang further declared that the CCP would open its door wide to admit “outstanding elements” from the new social strata, including private entrepreneurs or capitalists. After a sustained political campaign of promoting the concept, the “three represents” was written into the Party Constitution at the Party’s 16th Congress, despite strong resistance from party ideologues and conservatives. By reintroducing class elements into the Party, the Chinese leadership has been widely perceived as trying to engineer a transition of the Party from a traditional Marxist-Leninist party to something else. How will the CCP be transformed with the capitalist class joining the Party? Class played an important role in the development of democracy in Europe, where modern forms of democracy originated. Whatever evaluation different schools may have of the democratic form of government, most of them would readily admit the historic and logical connection between class and democracy. The historical analysis of European democratic experiences shows how classes generated the dynamics of democratic development. The first step began with the rise of the victorious bourgeoisie. The rising business classes successfully tamed the monarchical state, challenging the aristocratic form of government as a prerogative of birth and gradually replacing it with the principle that government was a natural domain of the wealthy commoner. Later, the business classes in their pursuit of wealth facilitated industrialization which soon nurtured organized working classes. With the rise of working classes, the legitimacy of Western democracies came to rest on the notion that government representatives have to be elected by a legally equal citizenry.1 Such a

232 Zheng Yongnian historical sequence led rhetorician Barrington Moore Jr to conclude: “No bourgeois, no democracy.”2 Of course, for many scholars, it is also true: “No workers, no democracy.” Will newly rising business classes lead to democratization in China? Capitalism leads to class differentiation, income disparities, distributive injustice, and so forth. While it is debatable if all these factors have direct linkages with democracy, they certainly lead to demands for democracy. Democracy, as many would accept, is an effective and peaceful means to achieve distributive justice. Furthermore, capitalism tends to nurture agents for democracy such as capitalists, organized working classes and other social groups. Interest conflict and reconciliation among different social classes has been a main motivator of democracy in many democratic countries.3 This chapter attempts to discuss why and how capitalism in China is likely to lead the country down the road of democratic transition. By admitting capitalists into the Party, the leadership not only wants to consolidate the growing private sector, but also has embarked on political transition. The chapter is divided into three parts. The first part discusses changes in China’s class structure in the reform era and shows why political transition has become imperative. The second part outlines some possible outcomes of the CCP’s efforts at political transition. The third part discusses how a democratic transition can take place through the political interaction and jostling among different social classes.

Return to a class-society How market-oriented economic reforms have given rise to the non-state sector, especially the private sector, has been widely discussed both inside and outside China.4 The development of the non-state sector has changed China’s economic structure. For example, by 2002, the private sector accounted for 33 percent of the country’s GDP while state-owned enterprises made up 37 percent. State-owned enterprises through which the Party traditionally organized the working class are losing ground.5 More importantly, the growth of the non-state sector has also reshaped the country’s class structure. The country has transformed from a Maoist “class-less” society to a class society. Analyzing this emerging class society has been an important theme in the research among Chinese scholars. The concept of class has resurfaced on the radar screen of China’s intellectual life.6 The latest study on China’s social classes was done by a research team led by known Chinese sociologist Lu Xueyi at the Institute of Sociology, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The research team found a social stratification with ten social strata according to profession/works.7 Three additional criteria are added to analyze these classes: organizational power to allocate resources, ownership and management of means of production, and cultural resources (skills, education). According to these criteria, the ten social

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classes are grouped under a five-class structure: (a) an upper class; (b) an upper middle class; (c) a middle-middle class; (d) a lower middle class and a lower class; and (e) a bottom class. According to the study, the “modern” Chinese upper class consists of a relatively small minority of members of four professional social strata: managers of the state and the society,8 managers of big enterprises, private capitalists, and high-level professionals. Industrial and agricultural workers belong to the three lowest classes in the hierarchy. Table 12.1 shows the changes in China’s class structure. Based on the class structure, three major trends of political significance can be identified. First, there is a growing technocratic class, i.e., managers of the state and society, referring to leading cadres at different levels of Party and government organizations. They are ruling elites or power holders in China. The growth of a technocratic class has been closely associated with China’s market-oriented reforms. After Deng Xiaoping came to power in the late 1970s, the leadership began to recruit technocrats into the government in order to promote economic growth. This is what has been called the technocratic movement. The movement immediately spread to government and CCP organizations at different levels and introduced drastic changes into the composition of the Chinese leadership.9 The technocratic movement meant recruiting younger and better educated party cadres and government officials into the leadership. The average Table 12.1 Changes over social strata in China (1952–1991), percentage 1952

1978

1988

1991

1999

Managers of the state and society 0.50 0.98 1.70 1.96 2.1 Managers of big enterprises 0.14 0.23 0.54 0.79 1.5 Private capitalists* 0.18 0.00 0.02 0.10 0.6 High-level professionals 0.86 3.48 4.76 5.01 5.1 Middle-level professionals 0.50 1.29 1.65 2.31 4.8 Owners of small enterprises** 4.08 0.03 3.12 2.19 4.2 Clerks, service people, and self-employed 3.13 2.15 6.35 9.25 12.0 among them, workers from rural areas – 0.80 1.80 2.40 3.7 Industrial workers 6.40 19.83 22.43 22.16 22.6 among them, workers from rural areas – 1.10 5.40 6.30 7.8 Peasants 84.21 67.41 55.84 53.01 44.0 among them, helpers from other places – 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.1 Unemployed – 4.60 3.60 3.30 3.1 Total 100 100 100 100 100 The totals do not add up to 100 due to rounding *Refers to those enterprises that hire less than eight workers **Refers to those enterprises that hire more than eight workers Source: Lu Xueyi (ed.), Dangdai Zhongguo shehui jieceng yanjiu baogao (A Study Report of Social Stratification in Contemporary China), Beijing: Zhongguo sheke wenxuan chubanshe, 2001, p. 44. The figures here are estimated from Zhongguo tongji nianjian (China Statistical Yearbook) and Zhongguo renkou tongji nianjian (China Population Statistical Yearbook).

234 Zheng Yongnian age of the Central Committee members dropped from 62 at the 12th Party Congress in 1982, where most CC members were still revolutionaries, to less than 56 at the 16th Party Congress in 1997. Changes have also occurred to major leaders’ educational levels and backgrounds. There was a dramatic increase in the number of the Central Committee members with college degrees. Most of the elite had their professional training in engineering and other fields of science and technology.10 To recruit elites with college degrees was a consistent norm in China’s technocratic movement. The CCP’s nomenklatura system, under which all major public positions are filled by Party appointees, has enabled the Party to achieve this goal.11 The trend towards a technocratic leadership has also occurred at the local level. According to the Department of Organization of the CCP, among all government officials at county-level (chu ji) and above, those with a college degree increased from 16.4 percent in 1981 to 87.9 percent in 2001. More than 89 percent of provincial-ministerial level government officials have a college degree.12 While the technocratic class has been the major promoter of China’s economic growth, it has also benefited from economic growth most. The population of this social stratum increased from less than 1 percent in 1978 to 2.1 percent in 1999. Second, there is an emerging middle class. Several strata can be identified. The first stratum includes the managers of big enterprises and private capitalists. Managers of big enterprises, many of them so-called red capitalists, comprise about 1.5 percent of the total population. This figure was only 0.14 percent in 1952 when state capitalism was encouraged by the Party leadership. Today, this group consists of three sub-groups: (1) cadres in big SOEs and collective enterprises (with the development of a modern enterprise system, they became professional managers of these enterprises); (2) managers of big private enterprises (they may not necessarily be the owners of these enterprises, but could be hired by the owners); and, (3) managers of sanzi enterprises, i.e., equity joint venture, contractual joint venture, and wholly foreign-owned enterprises. Private capitalists or entrepreneurs are considered to be those who hire more than eight workers. This group had risen to 0.6 percent of the population in 1999, compared to 0.18 in 1952. The majority of this group came from the low social strata in the 1980s when the state sector was still very highly regarded and the private sector was deprived of political legitimacy. Since Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour speech in 1992, the private sector received a much needed boost. Actually, more and more Party cadres, government officials and intellectuals have gone into this sector. A second stratum in this social class includes owners of small enterprises; those who hire fewer than eight workers. This group made up 4.2 percent of the population in 1999, about the same level as that in 1952. During Mao Zedong’s period, this group disappeared almost completely after numerous waves of nationalization. After Deng came back to power, this sector was granted legitimacy. The first group was “returned intellectuals”

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– educated youths were sent down to factories and the countryside during the Cultural Revolution. After they came back to the cities, they found that there were no jobs for them. They thus established their own small businesses. This sector has continuously grown throughout the reform period. Both private capitalists and owners of small enterprises are also beneficiaries of market-driven economic reforms. Another stratum is the high-level professionals – those who serve in different Party and government units, mass organizations, non-profit organizations, and other non-state sector economic units. Although many of them serve the Party and government, they are different from managers of the state and society since the latter are rulers, i.e., leading cadres. They overlap with the next category of “clerks, service people and self-employed,” but in terms of income, they differentiate themselves from the latter. The size of this group was also increased from 3.48 percent in 1978 to 5.1 percent in 1999. With China’s economy becoming market-oriented, this group has become increasingly significant in managing the state and society due to their professional training and experiences. Third, there is a growing working class. The size of the industrial working class expanded consistently from 19.83 percent in 1978 to 22.6 percent in 1999. This was largely due to China’s rapid industrialization. It is worth noting that among industrial workers, an essential proportion came from rural areas, comprising 7.8 percent of the total industrial workers in 1999. It is understandable that the peasantry class has been downsized from 67.41 percent in 1978 to 44 percent in 1999. All these changes signal an important point, that is, the CCP is facing a completely new political environment. Although the Party leadership has never claimed that it will give up its tradition of Marxism-Leninism, all the traditional forces that have formed the basis of power of the Party have become relatively less important. While the ultimate goal of the Party is to eliminate exploitative capitalism, the Party has nurtured a capitalist class in order to promote economic growth, and this group has increasingly become an important source of its political legitimacy. Moreover, while constitutionally the workers and peasants represent the leading class in society, in reality, these two groups have fallen to the bottom of China’s social strata. It is such a class dislocation that has led the Party to embark on a political transition. While Mao Zedong had tended to change or correct reality in order to fulfil his ideological missions, the new leadership does it in an opposite way, that is, to adjust the Party in accordance with changing reality. When returning to the past may not be wise and is virtually impossible, the only choice for the Party is to embrace changes. Despite the existence of class dislocation, a class society is still important for the Party. State governance in China is not yet highly institutionalized, and the rule of law not firmly rooted. For the Party to effectively rule such a vast and diverse country without sound democratic foundations, it is all the more crucial for the Party leadership to build up a broad social

236 Zheng Yongnian consensus and a coalition of various interests. Clearly, the Party cannot exclude the “outstanding elements” of society from the private sector. For China’s emerging political order to remain viable, the Party has to be socially more broad-based.

How the CCP engineers a transition? Traditionally, the CCP has claimed to represent the interests of five major groups, i.e., workers, peasants, intellectuals, members of the PLA (People’s Liberation Army), and government officials and cadres. Now, the Party is admitting “outstanding elements” from virtually all social classes. In reality, the Party does not have many choices in engineering a transition. Several scenarios or some strategies of possible transition can be identified. Technocrat dominion The CCP (and its administration, i.e., the state) can stand above all major classes and remain autonomous. This approach has its merits. Statecentered scholars have long argued for the importance of state autonomy in promoting socio-economic development. According to these scholars, the state is neither a passive agent of society at large with its various interest groups contending horizontally, as in liberal pluralist theory, nor an executive committee of the ruling class, as in vulgar Marxism, but, rather, a dynamic independent force. Marxists see class interests achieving a deadlock in their natural antagonisms, allowing the ruling class to pursue independent policies of aggrandizement that may diverge from the interests of each of the classes themselves.13 It has also been found that state autonomy played an important role in leading the East Asian miracle.14 Although the CCP is a class-based political party, it has retained the flexibility to represent any class’s interests. For instance, the Party has claimed that it represents the interests of workers and peasants. But in reality, the Party never allows workers and peasants to aggregate and articulate their interests. A high degree of state autonomy has enabled the party-state to undertake a number of far-reaching social changes such as land reform, collectivization, and nationalization of business and commerce after the Communist revolution. Obviously, not all these profound social changes were in accordance with the interests of all classes. State autonomy also helped the party-state to initiate economic reforms in the post-Mao era. As long as the technocratic class is able to deliver economic goods to other social classes, equilibrium can be reached and maintained, that is, the technocrats will lead, while all other social classes will follow. If the Party represents no particular class interests, it certainly represents its own interests. This means that a technocratic class is politically dominant and is capable of detaching itself from any social classes. But herein lie many inherent dangers for the Party. First, not all challenges

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that the Party faces can be resolved by technocrats. Technocrats might be good at solving some issues, but not others. China is facing many structural challenges that call for a totally different set of skills to resolve them. One example of a structural problem is that of Party reform which calls for leaders to possess attributes such as political vision, determination, and courage that go beyond mere technocratic skills. The revolutionary leaders, such as Mao and Deng, had the necessary vision, determination, and political will to handle issues structural in nature. These leaders were “trained” in a different way given the prevailing circumstances and they triumphed after overcoming seemingly insurmountable difficulties. They survived the Long March, expanded their power bases at the expense of the Nationalist Party and went on to assume power. Their boldness and ability to make tough decisions are attributes that do not come naturally to the technocratic leadership. It will be harder, if not almost impossible, for the technocratic leadership to deal with structural issues. Second, as a class in itself, the technocrats are unlikely to solve the problem of political legitimacy. The Party has nurtured a technocratic class in order to promote economic growth. Economic performance has now become the most important, if not the only, source of political legitimacy. Nevertheless, legitimation on the basis of economic performance is highly contingent, and therefore, as Max Weber pointed out, it is unreliable as a long-term basis of authority.15 In a market economy and under the forces of globalization, economic performance is often not fully within the control of the technocratic leadership. Good economic performance depends not only on the capability of the technocratic leadership, but also on the state of the global economy.16 The problem of political legitimacy can also arise from the fact that the technocratic class often has its set of vested interests and becomes out of touch with the people. “Party” means a part of the people, and it reflects the people’s will and represents the people’s interests in government processes. But once the technocratic class becomes a class in itself, it can hardly provide an effective channel to represent the people’s interests. Eventually the party is not able to understand social changes and adjust itself in accordance with changing reality. Everything the Party does is for its own survival and expansion, and private rationality prevails. Social interest is none of its concern. The party-state rules the people without allowing social groups to aggregate and articulate their interests. Since the political system is closed to the people, social groups do not regard the party-state as legitimate. There is empirical evidence to support this observation. The technocratic class used to dominate the Soviet Union, but the Soviet Communist Party still fell. The technocratic class also used to dominate most political parties in Asia such as in South Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia. They have since gone. In South Korea and Taiwan, the ruling party was replaced by an opposition party in a democratic way, while in Indonesia, it was violently overthrown by people’s power.

238 Zheng Yongnian A third and related point is that the technocratic class cannot resolve the problem of corruption. The technocratic class rules the country in accordance with its will. Without any external constraints, corruption within the ruling class becomes inevitable. The party-state also tends to be predatory. In China, despite technocratic rule, corruption has become increasingly serious since the early 1990s. Between 1993 and 2000, the number of cases investigated and handled by discipline inspection and procuratorial organs throughout the country increased nine percent annually, and the number of officials given Party and administrative disciplinary punishments went up 12 percent. Between 1990 and 1998, procuratorial organs nationwide accepted and handled more than 1.1 million corruption cases, of which over 500,000 were placed on file for investigation and prosecution. More than 600,000 offenders were involved.17 From January to August 2000 alone, the procuratorates throughout the country prosecuted 23,464 criminal cases involving graft and embezzlement.18 The 2000 Corruption Perceptions Index of Transparency International ranked China as 63rd among 90 countries.19 Since the early 1990s, the government has initiated waves of anticorruption campaigns. Nevertheless, corruption is still rampant. Even Premier Zhu Rongji had to admit in his Work Report to the National People’s Congress in March 2000, that “the emergence and spread of corruption and undesirable practices have not been brought under control.”20 Corruption has caused social and political instability. It also aroused people’s defiance against the capability of the CCP to ensure fairness, and cast doubts on its legitimacy to rule the country. More seriously, rampant corruption among Party cadres and government officials has led to a collapse in social morale. Ordinary citizens see the abundance of wealth and greed of Party cadres and government officials, and find it difficult to understand why they should restrain themselves. Gradually, they no longer regard the system in which they live as being fair to them. Meanwhile, government officials at different levels have also found that it is increasingly difficult to maintain a sense of moral and social community among both urban and rural residents. Consequently, as corruption becomes rampant among Party cadres and government officials, crime also becomes widespread among ordinary citizens.21 Robbery and armed assault, which were unthinkable during Mao’s time, have become a part of people’s daily life. Various surveys show that since the early 1990s, “serious corruption committed by government officials” and “public disorder” were among the issues of concern among ordinary citizens in China.22 Technocrat–capitalist dominion All these factors destabilize the equilibrium – technocrats lead, other social classes follow. The second choice the CCP faces is to form a political coalition with the new capitalist class. The first choice of maintaining state

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autonomy actually becomes questionable with the coming of capitalists to the Party. The experiences of Taiwan and South Korea as well as that of Thailand demonstrate that economic growth and industrialization give rise to new socio-economic and political groups and demands that cannot be accommodated without a change in the nature of the regime. By admitting capitalists, the Party leadership might want to consolidate one-Party dominion while broadening its social bases. The question is whether the Party is able to exclude capitalists in decision-making. In other words, will it be possible to admit capitalists into the Party without giving them chances for political participation, as the Party has done to workers and peasants? So far, the answer is “No.” The leadership decided to admit capitalists due to strong demands for political participation on the part of capitalists. Prior to the decision, the Party was increasingly facing pressure to incorporate newly rising capitalists into its political order. The nascent new social class has a strong justification to request that its voice be heard since government policies have an impact on its interests. The results of two nationwide surveys conducted in 1995 and 1997 respectively show that taxation policy, credit policy, government macro-economic adjustment, and industrial and commercial management, among others, have been the most important political factors affecting their business activities.23 More and more private businesspersons expect to participate in policy-making or at least have some input in policy-making. Moreover, the private sector has been affected not only by relevant government policies, but also by various forms of social and political practices prevalent in China. Surveys found that “exchange between power and money,” “worsening public order,” and “arbitrary collection of fees, fines and levies” have been regarded as the factors that have had the most serious impact on private businesses.24 To change such social and political practices is no easy task and would require the political participation of private businesspersons. Indeed, private entrepreneurs have been making great efforts to participate in the political process, especially in local politics. No systematic national statistics are available to show the degree of political participation by private businesspersons. But a rapid expansion of their political involvement in local politics has taken place since the early 1990s. According to a survey conducted in 1993, on average, each private entrepreneur had membership in 2.75 organizations such as private enterprise associations, guilds, different democratic parties, Youth League, and even the Chinese Communist Party. Almost 84 percent of private entrepreneurs argued that it was imperative to establish their own organizations.25 Another means for private entrepreneurs to influence China’s political process was for them to join the CCP. According to various surveys, more and more private entrepreneurs have become Party members. In 1993, among all private entrepreneurs, 13 percent were CCP members, and this figure was 17 percent in 1995, 16.6 percent in 1997. In 2000, this figure increased

240 Zheng Yongnian to almost 20 percent, far higher than other social groups such as workers and farmers.26 Political participation by private entrepreneurs is still extremely limited at the national level. For example, only 46 out of more than 2,000 representatives of the Ninth Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference in 1998 were private businesspersons.27 Indeed, a low degree of political participation has caused dissatisfaction among private businesspersons. One study shows that while self-evaluation by private businesspersons about their economic and social status has been consistent, that of their political status has deteriorated.28 It is worthwhile to note that their selfevaluation for political status was lowest in 1997, the year the private sector was formally legalized by China’s Constitution.29 Though the level of political participation is still low, it can be expected that with the legitimization of their rights to political participation, their influence can increase significantly. With capitalists sharing political power, a political coalition between the technocratic class and the capitalist class becomes possible. This coalition leads to the second equilibrium: technocrats and capitalists lead, other social classes follow. Some advantages of this arrangement are as follows: first, as mentioned already, it enables the Party to broaden its social bases, and thus provides the Party with a new source of political legitimacy, at least in the short run. Class is still crucial for the Party in a transitional period from social mobilization to the rule of law. Without admitting capitalists, the social base of the Party will shrink further. Second, this approach is favorable for political stability within a period of time. Since newly rising social elites anywhere can pose political challenges to the existing regime, an effective way to cope with such challenges is to co-opt them into the regime.30 Third, it can also provide new dynamism to sustainable economic development. With capitalists sharing the power with the Party, the leadership will be more careful when it makes economic decisions. One can expect that economic policies will be more favorable for the private sector. This has been proved since China began its economic reforms. Market economic principles have been gradually legitimized and provided with constitutional protections. Nevertheless, this arrangement also has its disadvantages. Among others, two merit particular mention. First, like the technocrat dominion, the technocrats–capitalists coalition cannot resolve the problem of corruption. Like elsewhere, a close linkage between the government and business often nurtures corruption, cronyism, and nepotism. This trend is already apparent in China’s development. While the Party allows capitalists to join the Party, many Party cadres and government officials have already engaged in business. Various studies show that Party cadres and government officials have been the largest group in private enterprises.31 It does not matter whether capitalists join the Party or Party cadres and government officials go into business, but both are given opportunities to gain private economic benefits. For example, Party cadres and government

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officials have attempted to build up their connections (guanxi) with the private sector. In a survey conducted in 1993, when private entrepreneurs were asked to name their closest friends, the distribution was as follows: professionals (16.6 percent), cadres in the government sector (24.4 percent); cadres in SOEs (18 percent), workers (1.3 percent), farmers (3.7 percent), specialized artisans (6.4 percent), staff in the service sector (9.5 percent), small enterprise owners (8.9 percent), and others (2.9 percent).32 According to the study, in building their connections with the private sector, party cadres and government officials intended to: (1) gain economic benefits for themselves and their family members; (2) search for opportunities to xiahai, i.e., to leave the government sector and turn to business; and (3) seek political support from the private sector due to its increasing political importance.33 When power and money become transactional, corruption becomes inevitable and increasingly serious. Second, the formation of the technocrats–capitalists coalition without opening political process to other social groups, means the party-state regime becomes more coercive. In order to sustain economic growth, stability becomes paramount. The coalition tends to be coercive to prevent any destabilizing factors from surfacing. Thus, labor activities are often suppressed, and human rights are violated. This happened to some Latin American countries when the dependence model of economic development was pursued in the 1960s and 1970s.34 It was also prevalent in Asian countries over a long period of time. The Nationalist Party used this model in the mainland before 1949, and somehow continued this model when it retreated to Taiwan. This model is also embedded deeply in economic development in Indonesia and Malaysia. Third, under the technocrats–capitalists coalition, technocrats are likely to be greatly constrained in decision-making. Technocrats might feel themselves as mere tools for implementing decisions made by capitalists. They thus might turn to look for political support from other social classes in order to reduce or constrain the influence of the capitalists. These disadvantages imply that the equilibrium – technocrats–capitalists coalition leads and other social classes follow – might work for a short period of time, but it is unsustainable in the long run, as shown in the experiences of Taiwan, Indonesia, and other countries. In the case of Taiwan, the regime gradually opened its political process to social groups, and eventually initiated the process of democratization. But in Indonesia, the coerciveness imposed by the regime went far beyond the tolerance of social groups, and led to a people’s revolution to overthrow the regime. Voice, participation, and democratization When the second equilibrium is unworkable, the Party has to face the third choice, i.e., to open political process not only to capitalists but also to workers and peasants as well as other social groups. Democratization takes

242 Zheng Yongnian place for various reasons. One convincing argument is that class struggle leads to democracy and democratization without class forces is rootless and unsustainable.35 One can argue that in China, the dynamism of democratization lies in the rise of a class society. To a degree, capitalistic development has nurtured various factors for democratization. Economic development leads to interest differentiation and thus interest conflicts among social classes. The advantage of democracy is its capability to achieve a peaceful reconciliation among class interests. Furthermore, capitalists usually are the first group to demand political participation due to their economic power, but other groups will follow when their interests cannot be satisfied by following the capitalists. I have so far argued that the Party leadership attempts to improve and strengthen its base of political legitimacy by promoting economic growth and admitting capitalists. Nevertheless, economic growth can be counterproductive toward political legitimacy since the costs and benefits associated with economic growth are not shared equally and the growth accentuates inequalities among different social groups and regions. To enhance legitimacy, good economic performance must be accompanied by distributive justice.36 An important dynamism for democratization is embedded in this uneven distribution of economic benefits. Uneven distribution of economic benefits has characterized China’s postMao development. Economic development produces distributive conflict among different social groups. Some groups benefit more than others. While some become winners, others become losers. While those who are able to participate in the process of market development have gained benefits, those who are not become disadvantaged. Table 12.2 reflects perceptions among Chinese government officials and urban residents on the winners and losers of China’s reforms in the 1990s. We can see from the table that although government officials and urban residents disagreed with one another on who were the key beneficiaries, they did agree that farmers and SOE workers were the biggest losers in this process. Further, it would be reasonable to conclude that government employees and migrants were also among the losers. Among other reasons, one major factor contributing to this situation was a drastic widening in income disparities. Economic reform policies gradually dismantled Maoist egalitarian policy and drastically promoted China’s economic growth, accompanied by substantial gains in poverty reduction. Nevertheless, both welfare increase and poverty reduction were extremely uneven, meaning these reforms were not able to reduce income disparities among different social groups and regions. The World Bank estimated that, in 1981, China’s Gini coefficient was 0.29, but by 1995, it was 0.39. It was still lower than in most Latin American, African, and East Asian countries and similar to that in the US, but higher than in most transitional economies in Eastern Europe and many high-income countries in Western Europe.37

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Table 12.2 Perceptions on the losers of China’s reform in the 1990s A Perceptions by government officials Benefit most

Benefit least

The 1997 October Survey 1 Private business owners 2 FDI employees 3 Farmers

1 SOE workers 2 Farmers 3 Government employees

The October 1998 Survey 1 Private business owners 2 Artists 3 FDI employees

1 SOE workers 2 Farmers 3 Government employees

The November 1999 Survey 1 Private business owners 2 Artists 3 FDI employees

1 Unemployed workers 2 Farmers 3 SOE workers & rural enterprise workers

The October 2000 Survey 1 Private business owners 2 Artists 3 FDI employees

1 Farmers 2 SOE workers 3 Government employees and rural enterprise workers

B Perceptions by urban residents Benefit most

Benefit least

The November 1997 Survey 1 Private business owners 2 Artists 3 Bank employees

1 SOE workers 2 Farmers 3 Migrants

The December 1998 Survey 1 Artists 2 Corrupt officials 3 Private business owners

1 SOE workers 2 Farmers 3 Migrants

The August 1999 Survey 1 Artists 2 Corrupt officials 3 Private business owners

1 SOE workers 2 Farmers 3 Migrants

Sources: Ru Xing et al. (eds), Shehui lanpishu: Zhongguo shehui xingshi fenxi yu yuce (Social Bluebook: Analysis and Forecast of Social Situation in China), Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001. Also Shaoguang Wang, “The Social and Political Implications of China’s WTO Membership,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 9, No. 25 (2000), p. 380.

244 Zheng Yongnian More specifically, there are four kinds of income disparities: (1) rural disparities, (2) urban disparities, (3) between urban and rural areas, and (4) regional differences. Rural disparities In rural China, various surveys in the late 1980s found that the income of more than 80 percent of the Chinese farmers was below the national average. In other words, less than 20 percent of rural residents had much higher income than the rest of the rural residents.38 The gap between the low-income and high-income groups was widening. The rural Gini coefficient increased from 0.24 in 1981 to 0.33 in 1995.39 Worsening employment contributed most to widening income gaps in rural areas. The rapid development of China’s village and township enterprises created enormous employment opportunities for rural Chinese, but this is no longer the case since the mid-1990s. According to an estimate, in 1995, among 500 million rural laborers, the market could actually only take 325 million, and the rest were redundant.40 Official statistics also revealed that the employment in village and township enterprises declined drastically in the late 1990s. For instance, it declined 4.8 percent in 1997 and 18.7 percent in 1998.41 Urban disparities In urban areas, many households have experienced a decline in their real income since the mid-1990s. According to official data, the urban Gini coefficient increased from 0.18 in 1981 to 0.28 in 1995.42 In 1996, among the bottom 20 percent of households, nearly two-thirds of them found their income had declined. Among the second 20 percent of households, almost half the families found their income had declined. In contrast, the top 20 percent of urban households had an increase in their income.43 In 1990, the average income of the top 20 percent of households was only 4.2 times higher than that of the bottom 20 percent. By 1998, the ratio had jumped to 9.6 times. The share of the richest 10 percent of households of the total income increased from 23.6 percent in 1990 to 38.4 percent in 1998. On the other hand, the share of the bottom 20 percent of households, of the total income declined from 9 percent to 5.5 percent during the same period of time (Table 12.3). Urban areas used to be safe havens cut off from the hundreds of millions of have-nots in the vast countryside. But after more than two decades of economic reform, about 30 million urban residents were living in poverty and their income was no more than one-third the national average.44

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Table 12.3 Growing inequality in urban China, 1990–1998 Year

Income of top 20%/income of bottom 20%

Bottom 20%’s share of total income (%)

Top 20%’s share of total income (%)

Top 10%’s share of total income (%)

1990 1993 1998

4.2 times 6.9 times 9.6 times

9.0 6.3 5.5

38.1 46.5 52.3

23.6 29.3 38.4

Source: Xu Xinxin and Li Peilin, “1998–1999 nian Zhongguo jiuye shouru he xinxi chanye de fenxi he yuce” (Employment, Income, and IT Industry: Analysis and Forecasts, 1998–1999), in Ru Xin et al. (eds), Shehui lanpishu, p. 34. Also, Wang, “The Social and Political Implications,” p. 386.

Urban–rural disparities Reforms also led to huge income disparities between the cities and rural areas. The urban–rural divide is not new. When China began its economic reform, the per capita income of the urban resident was 2.6 times that of the rural resident.45 As a matter of fact, in the early years of reform, the urban–rural disparities were reduced since reform was first implemented in rural areas. However, since the urban reform began in 1984, the gap has widened continuously. According to the World Bank, China’s urban–rural gap is large by international standards. In other countries, urban income is rarely more than twice the rural income. In most countries, rural income is 66 percent or more of urban income. In China, rural income was only 40 percent of urban income in 1995, down from a peak of 59 percent in 1983.46 In 1999, on average, a peasant had a per capita income of 2,162 yuan, while in the cities, the average per capita income of a worker was 7,668 yuan.47 Regional disparities According to the World Bank, regional disparities were moderate compared to inequality within provincial borders. For example, in 1992, average income in coastal China was 50 percent higher than in interior provinces but in the same year, the urban–rural income gap was twice as large.48 In contrast, Wang and Hu have painted a more pessimistic picture. In a detailed study on regional disparities, they reached three conclusions. First, inter-provincial inequality has been widening; second, regional gaps are unusually large; and third, regional inequality is a multi-dimensional phenomenon.49 Income disparities in per capita GDP between China’s coastal and interior provinces has been on the rise since 1983 and accelerated after 1990. All the coastal provinces, except Guangxi, had per capita GDP higher than the national average; Shanghai’s was 4.5 times the

246 Zheng Yongnian average. At the other extreme, Guizhou’s per capita GDP was equivalent to only 37 percent of the national average. Apart from Heilongjiang, none of the central and western provinces had per capita GDP higher than the national average.50 Rapid economic development and uneven distribution of benefits have produced two consequences of great political significance. First, as already discussed, they have produced high demands for political participation on the part of the private sector. Furthermore, while the private sector has become increasingly important, its motivation to pay tax revenue to the state is low. Table 12.4 shows that, compared to the state and collective sectors, both private sector and individual households have quite low incentive to pay taxes to the state. For instance, in 1998, the private sector consumed 10.49 percent of retail sales of consumer goods, but its revenue contribution to the total industrial and commercial taxes was only 2.14 percent. Needless to say, the Party has admitted private entrepreneurs in order to give them a vested interest in the existing political system and, in turn, more incentive to pay taxes. Second, increasing income disparities are changing the incentive structure for other social groups, especially workers and peasants. This can be perceived from a game-theoretical point of view. In the initial stages of economic development, the private sector leads, and workers and peasants

Table 12.4 Retail sales of consumer goods (A), and industrial and commercial taxes (B), by different sector (percentages) State sector

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

Collective sector

Private sector

Individual household

A

B

A

B

A

B

A

B

39.10 39.59 40.19 41.29 37.52 31.93 29.85 27.23 23.28 20.65 –

67.95 68.59 68.29 66.97 63.56 63.04 59.74 54.69 56.33 – –

33.20 31.70 30.02 27.91 21.99 20.75 19.31 18.43 17.47 16.57 –

22.92 21.70 20.82 20.53 21.08 17.15 17.58 18.41 15.34 – –

0.42 0.52 0.61 0.83 1.53 3.15 4.88 5.89 6.79 10.49 –

0.06 0.10 0.16 0.20 0.26 0.37 0.65 1.11 1.32 2.14 2.48

18.63 18.91 19.59 20.27 24.21 28.45 30.33 31.99 34.84 37.05 –

6.36 6.71 7.12 7.59 7.93 7.62 7.27 7.35 6.71 7.06 5.59

Sources: Figures on retail sales of consumer goods are calculated from The State Industrial and Commercial Administration Bureau (ed.), Gongshang xingzheng guanli tongji huibian (Collected Statistics of Industrial and Commercial Administration), Beijing, various years; and The State Statistical Bureau, Zhongguo tongji nianjian (China Statistical Yearbook), Beijing, various years. Figures on industrial and commercial taxes are calculated from The State Taxation Bureau, Zhongguo shuiwu nianjian (China Taxation Yearbook), Beijing, various years.

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follow. When Deng made the clarion call to allow some people and some regions to get rich first, no one was in a position to oppose it. This was because different social groups were able to benefit from a growing economic pie, even though the private sector benefited most. This is similar to what Albert Hirschman called the “tunnel” effect. Hirschman presents a model of the conditions under which social groups may postpone their frustration, when they see other groups advancing more quickly. He likens their situation to that of a line of drivers stopped in a two-lane tunnel. When the other lane begins to move, they may be happy even if they remain stuck, because advance of the other group may foretell motion for themselves.51 Nevertheless, in the later stages, when economic growth deepened and income disparities widened but the state was not able to change the situation, workers and peasants would lose patience. They would begin to voice their frustration in the hope that the state would do something to correct the problem. When the situation continued, and their demands were not met, they would then decide not to be followers any more. They would probably appeal to a different set of principles. This is the situation in China today. Income disparities have continuously widened and the government is not able to achieve “distributive justice.” Indeed, in some regions, unemployed and peasants have begun to “articulate” their interests by conducting various forms of public protests since the late 1990s.52 The resurgence of the old left and the rise of the new left are largely a reaction to the incapability of the state to respond to widening income disparities. Although the old and new leftists have different ideological orientations, both are against the Party’s decision to admit capitalists, and both attempt to represent the interests of workers and peasants and other lower social classes. Differing from the official ideological line, they appeal to the Maoist principle of social justice and a more egalitarian policy. In the old days, Maoist revolutionaries called for poor social classes to overthrow the regime and establish the new one, leftists today tend to appeal to the principles of democracy to resolve the problem of income disparities. Such a situation is likely to lead to a third equilibrium, i.e., participation – technocrats lead, and social members follow.53 This is different from the first equilibrium, where technocratic class is the only ruling class, and other social classes are excluded from the regime. Participation is inclusive of all social classes, but technocrats are able to be relatively autonomous. Technocrats can appeal to people’s power to solicit cooperation from capitalists. This is a situation where a coalition between technocrats and lower social classes form a coalition that can force capitalists to cooperate. On the one hand, a coalition between technocrat elites and ordinary people can be formed to constrain capitalists’ selfish behavior. On the other hand, technocrats can also appeal to the economic power of capitalists to constrain other social classes since equalitarian economic policies are likely to cause everyone to lose out.

248 Zheng Yongnian

Asymmetrical “voice” mechanisms So, the issue boils down to how the Chinese political system can be democratized. Central to democracy is the establishment of different mechanisms for interest aggregation and articulation. As a Leninist authoritarian political system, China does not have formal mechanisms for interest aggregation and articulation for social groups. But various informal channels do exist for different social groups. Needless to say, these informal channels are extremely asymmetrical for these groups. Technocratic class As discussed earlier, the technocratic class is the ruling class. Technocrats have dominated all important state organizations and government positions. Though this class has contributed greatly to China’s sustainable economic growth throughout the reform era, it itself has benefited most. Since they are decision makers themselves, their interests are undoubtedly considered when they make decisions. This does not mean that their interest is always met first. With the transition from the planned economy to a market one, many of them are also not able to share the economic fruits from the transition. As decision makers, however, they are able to aggregate and articulate their interests. Many of them have “jumped into the business sea,” taking advantage of their original positions, while others use their public power to exchange money and commit various forms of corruption. Somehow, both “jumping into the business sea” and corruption can be interpreted as a form of silent “protest” to the leadership that their economic interests are not satisfied. For those who are not able to take part in such a “protest,” they can still demand more economic benefits. This is certainly true in terms of the raft of wage increases in recent years. For instance, from 1999 to 2002, their wages have increased four times, meanwhile other classes, especially peasants, have experienced a continuous decrease in income.54 The leadership approved the wage increases in order to establish a more clean government and to contain widespread corruption. For whatever reasons, the technocratic class is becoming very capable in articulating their interests and in putting their demands into the political process. Capitalist class The capitalist class has promoted rapid economic development and is the major contributor to the growing economic pie. Without doubt, capitalists are the biggest beneficiaries of this pie. The revival of this class is due to the decision of the Party leadership to reform China’s economy and build a market system. But once they come into being, they are very capable of articulating their interests. The major interests of capitalists, among others,

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are: to legalize their existence, to get constitutional protection of their rights, and to participate in the political process to exercise their political influence. To a great degree, they are gradually realizing all those goals. In the early 1980s, their existence and development were hardly recognized and various discriminatory policies and practices against them existed. But in the late 1980s, the private sector was legalized, partly because of its increasing economic significance, partly because of the leadership’s desire for rapid economic development. In 1998, the Third Constitutional Amendment further provided the private sector with constitutional protection.55 Once their economic interests were satisfied, they soon turned to political demands. Business and commercial associations are the most powerful civic organizations in China, and have their representatives in different state organizations, such as people’s congresses and political consultative conferences at different levels. As discussed earlier, private entrepreneurs have made great efforts to participate in political process at different levels of government. More and more private entrepreneurs are entering the Party. All these factors have led the Party leadership to admit capitalists. Intellectuals It is worthwhile to mention intellectuals. Whether intellectuals can be considered a class is debatable, but they undoubtedly comprise a social stratum. Throughout Chinese history, intellectuals or educated people have performed the function of a “social conscience”(shehui liangxin). Although they were a part of the ruling class, they played an important role between the ruler and the ruled. They ruled the country on behalf of the emperor, but somehow they had to represent the interests of the people, not for the sake of people’s interests but to avoid the worst-case scenario of the people overthrowing the emperor. After the establishment of the People’s Republic, they were excluded from the ruling class. Nevertheless, they continued to play this traditional role. Many intellectuals had great courage to criticize Maoist radical policies against different social groups, and they were treated very badly during the Maoist era. But this situation has dramatically changed since the reform policy. First, intellectuals were first recognized as a part of the working class or a part of the ruling class, as a consequence of Deng’s belief that “science and technology are productivity” in the early 1980s. Second, waves of technocratic movements have effectively co-opted intellectuals into the regime. The technocratic movement is aimed at recruiting younger and educated people into the regime. In the professional stratum, an essential portion of the population comes from the intellectuals. Third, the legitimation of capitalism in the early 1990s gave intellectuals enormous economic opportunities, meaning that they were granted rights to have a much bigger share of the growing economic pie. Like technocrats, “jumping into the business sea” was one

250 Zheng Yongnian of their choices. For those who were not able to do so, they could demand more economic resources. Since the late 1990s, the government has allocated enormous economic resources to intellectuals, especially top universities such as Beijing University, Qinghua University, and so forth. For other universities with a lower profile, local governments have also granted them quite rich financial resources. Of course, not every intellectual receives such economic benefits. In poor areas, teachers are often treated badly and they teach without being paid for months. The party-state has effectively co-opted intellectuals. Today, many intellectuals sit in people’s congresses and political consultative conferences, even in the Party’s committees. They themselves become a part of the decision-making body. Indeed, in an era of the knowledge economy, intellectuals find no difficulty in articulating their interests and exerting their influence on the political process. Moreover, intellectuals have become a social stratum themselves. Their traditional role as “social conscience” has rapidly diminished among mainstream intellectuals. They now articulate their own interests and the interests of those classes that can bring them more economic interests. Of course, there are intellectuals who speak for the less privileged classes such as workers, peasants, and the unemployed. The rising New Left has been vocal in this regard. Nevertheless, its political influence is doubtful since New Leftist intellectuals are very much marginalized. Working class and peasants56 Since the reform period, the working class has experienced an increasingly difficult time. Market-oriented reforms have not only diminished workers’ traditional privileges but also caused them to be unemployed. Their mechanisms for interest aggregation and articulation are very weak, and they are rapidly becoming defenceless in a market economy. Autonomous trade unions are not allowed. The All China Federation of Trade Union (ACFTU), the officially recognized trade union, represents more the interests of the government than workers. Moreover, workers do not have the right to strike. Such a right was originally granted to workers but was removed by the 1982 Constitution. The 1992 Trade Union Law also did not contain such a right. The ACFTU has even introduced considerable changes that affect workers negatively. Nevertheless, to a degree, the working class is able to articulate their interests via some informal channels such as various forms of protests.57 Workers are able to use organizational weapons to overcome the “free rider” problem and often succeed in initiating protests to articulate their interests. The latest labor protests in Northwest China show the effectiveness of such protests. While workers there were not able to change government policies, they at least gained more economic benefits from the government. In other words, although workers’ deprivation is inevitable with capitalists becoming dominant, workers can resist and slow down this process.

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Compared to workers, the interests of peasants are least represented. Throughout the history of the People’s Republic, peasants had never had effective mechanisms for interest articulation, though they were the main revolutionary forces during the revolution. Peasants have always been in a negative political position and have hardly had any political input. Their interests were greatly sacrificed in the process of industrialization under Maoist rule. Only after Deng initiated economic reforms were peasants given access to economic benefits for the first time in the PRC’s history. Nevertheless, with the beginning of the urban reform, peasants have had difficulties in increasing their income. Since the early 1990s, the situation has worsened. Unlike workers, peasants do not have their own union. As early as the late 1980s, the issue of establishing a farmers’ union was raised among central leaders. Voices for such a union can still be heard today, but everyone knows that the party-state is unlikely to agree to it. The partystate is unwilling to grant peasants any organizational weapons, since from its own revolutionary experience, the Party knows that such organizations could become a weapon directed against it. Peasants are largely defenceless under the ubiquitous intrusion of state power. Some exercise resistance without any effectiveness while others choose to commit suicide. In some places where peasants are able to act collectively, the eventual outcome is almost the same, that is, ruthless crackdown by the government, in contrast to workers’ relatively successful protests.

When “voice” becomes possible? Every social class faces three choices covering: (a) technocrat dominion, (b) technocrat–capitalist dominion, and, (c) participation. For different classes, the priority of preferences is: 1 2 3

Technocrats: a f b f c Capitalists: b f a f c Workers and peasants: c f a f b

Judging from their preferences, technocrat dominion is most likely and participation is least likely. But under different conditions, actual choices of different classes are different from their preferences, subject to the distribution of power among different social classes. Two scenarios can be identified. A When the capitalist class becomes powerful enough to demand political power and when technocrats find that the cost of resistance is higher than accommodation, the actual choices of these three classes are as follows:

252 Zheng Yongnian 1 2 3

Technocrats: b > a > c Capitalists: b > a > c Workers and peasants: c > a > b

The result of their choice is technocrat–capitalist dominion. Technocrats are willing to share power with capitalists, but still exclude workers and peasants from the ruling regime. B When workers and peasants become powerful enough to demand political participation and when the ruling coalition (technocrats and capitalists) finds that the cost of resistance becomes higher than accommodation, the actual choices of these classes are as follows: 1 2 3

Technocrats: c > a > b Capitalists: c > b > a Workers and peasants: c > a > b

The result of their choice is “voice” and participation. The technocrat– capitalist coalition is willing to share power with workers and peasants, and different social classes have their own representatives in the ruling regime, and will have their “voices” heard. More concretely, although neither technocrats nor capitalists favor participation, participation is still likely to take place in the long run and in the Chinese political context. Some explanations follow. Technocrats As the ruling class, technocrats certainly favor option a – monopoly of political power, not to share power with all other social classes. Only by excluding all these social classes can technocrats take charge of the country by manipulating different social interests. But this option has become increasingly infeasible since a growing capitalist class has demanded political participation. In order to maintain its social relevance, the Party has decided to admit capitalists, meaning that it has chosen b. For technocrats, option b is preferential over c since they can benefit more by exchanging political power with money by collaborating with the capitalists. This choice leads to scenario A. Option b might work for a period of time, but cannot be sustained in the long run since, as discussed earlier, under this option, corruption becomes inevitable, and coerciveness might go beyond the tolerance of other social classes. More important, China’s history is replete with stories of how unjustified distribution of wealth led to peasant rebellions which might overthrow the regime. The Kuomintang in the mainland experienced this. The CCP faced a similar crisis in 1989. In order to avoid such a revolution, technocrats and capitalists might become willing to share political power with other social classes, leading to the possibility of political participation – option c. This leads to scenario B.

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Capitalists When capitalists become powerful, they favor option b rather than a and c since under b, they are able to influence policies to maximize their economic benefits. Scenario A reflects this situation. When option b causes workers and peasants to rebel against capitalists, the latter will first be forced to choose option a rather than c. Under this option, although both capitalists and other social classes are excluded from political process, capitalists are more capable than other social classes to influence policies due to the economic power they wield. Compared to c, option a will enable capitalists to protect their interests. But if options a and b still cannot avoid a rebellion, capitalists might be forced to choose not to resist demands for political participation, meaning that they can be forced to choose c. This leads to scenario B. Workers and peasants Both workers and peasants favor option c since capitalism has increasingly deprived them of their interests. They are the biggest winners from democracy since only through political participation can they participate in the political process and thus influence government policies. If participation becomes unlikely, they prefer option a since under option a, the partystate somehow has to achieve a reasonably fair distribution of economic wealth among different social classes. Option b is their last choice. Under b the regime becomes coercive, workers and peasants are likely to be heavily exploited. They then demand for political participation and call for a democratic means to realize distributive justice, meaning that option c becomes their choice. But a rebellion becomes likely if exploitation and coerciveness go beyond the tolerance level of workers and peasants. As stated above, both technocrats and capitalists under certain conditions are likely to grant workers and peasants the right for political participation, meaning that c again becomes possible. Scenario B is the ideal for both workers and peasants.

How can “voice” mechanisms be established? If democratization is likely, then the question arises: What choices does the party-state have in transforming itself into a democratic mechanism? This question can be answered in different ways, but in terms of the representation of class interests, three options can be identified. Multi-party system This is the alternative that most scholars have called for. It has been argued that democracy means a multi-party system. Without political competition among parties, there will be no democracy. For the CCP, this choice is to

254 Zheng Yongnian have parties outside the Party (dangwai youdang). Demands for establishing opposition parties were there and became apparent towards the end of the 1990s, as exemplified by the attempt of Chinese pro-democracy activists to organize an opposition party.58 In a few months of 1998, the preparatory committees of China’s Democracy Party were established in 23 out of China’s 31 provinces and major cities. Applications to register the new party were made in 14 provinces and cities.59 The unfolding of this event also shows that different opinions existed among CCP leaders regarding opposition parties. A multi-party system undoubtedly is ideal, but realistically speaking, it is unlikely to occur. Except for dissidents inside and outside China, the majority of the population does not have immediate demands for a multi-party system. Democratization characterized by the emergence of a multi-party system in Russia, Taiwan, and Indonesia has not enabled the regimes there to improve people’s living standards. Instead, social decay and economic chaos have become prevalent there. The majority is more likely to choose other alternatives, if they exist. Furthermore, the party-state favors a top-down approach. The leadership is intolerant of direct political challenges mounted by social groups although attempts have been made to accommodate newly rising social groups. To a large extent, democracy is not an option decided by social groups. Factional politics within the Party More feasible than a multi-party system is to legitimize and institutionalize factions within the Party (dangnei youpai). Like elsewhere, factions existed within the CCP. Even under Maoist coercive rule, factional struggles never disappeared among top leaders. Certainly, under Mao, factions were unlikely to be institutionalized. Since the passing of the Dengcentered generation leadership, factional politics has been institutionalized to some degree and many organization-based factions have been formed, such as the Party, the National People’s Congress, and the State Council. Other factions have also coexisted such as the Shanghai Clique, the Qinghua Clique (those who graduated from Qinghua University), the Tuanpai (officials related to the Communist Youth League), the Taizidang (the princelings), and so forth. These factions have their own interests and identities, and their own ways for interest articulation. All these factions will not help in establishing “voice” mechanisms for different social groups. To materialize interest articulation, the leadership has to, first, legalize factional politics, and second, address class interests. Without the legitimization of factional politics, factional competition can only be engaged informally. The legitimization and institutionalization of factions help make the political process transparent. Social classes therefore will be able to identify their interests with certain factions. Certainly, more important is that the Party has to allow different factions to represent the interests of different social classes. Organization-based factions

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only represent the interests of these organizations, not social classes. Once factions are legitimized, these factions will appeal to different social classes in their competition for political power. Power competition will further push the Party to establish inner-party democratic mechanisms since without such mechanisms, the Party will fall apart. While factions enable the Party to represent different social interests, inner-party democracy enables the Party to remain united. Reforming the existing system The most feasible but least effective option in representing different social interests is to reform the existing political system. The Chinese political system is not without any advantages. The problem is that the leadership never considers the issue of interest representation. Many mechanisms are actually available for interest representation. Among others, three reforms have to be made. First, people’s congress is the most feasible mechanism for different social classes to articulate their interests. To achieve this goal, reforms have to be introduced to transform people’s congress into a real institution for people’s representatives. Needless to say, people’s representatives have to be selected and elected by the people.60 Second, the people’s consultative conference (PCC) system has to be re-organized and indeed re-politicized. Before people’s congress was established in 1954, the PCC played an important political role in representing the interests of different political parties and functional groups. China did not have a multi-party system after 1949. The PCC, instead of political parties, played the role of interest articulation and integration. This model used to inspire the first Indonesian President Sukarno in designing Indonesia’s political system. In order to avoid political chaos and instability caused by intensive competition among enormous parties, Indonesia established GOLKAR (functional groups) for interest articulation and representation.61 In China, after 1954, the PCC was sidelined. Even after the reform began, the PCC was still an institution for retired government officials and social elites. Today, the PCC is only a forum for these representatives. It has the right to discuss the issues, but no right to vote. To a great degree, it is a political organization without any political significance. To revive the PCC, it has to be granted the right to vote. Furthermore, it has to go back to its previous role of representing different functional groups (social interests). Its relationship with the people’s congress also has to be sorted out. Third, at the next level, civil society and social organizations have to adjust their functions. Throughout the reform period, social groups have mushroomed,62 but at present, all those social organizations are not able to aggregate and articulate social interests, even their own interests. The development of social organizations has been extremely uneven. Economic and social organizations are more developed than political ones, urban

256 Zheng Yongnian organizations more than rural ones. Furthermore, all these social organizations are highly dependent on the party-state. To empower them to articulate social interests, the party-state has to, first, grant them a greater degree of autonomy, and second, allow them to form their own class identity.

Conclusion Future historians will probably find that nothing was more important than admitting capitalists into the Party when they look back to the history of the People’s Republic of China. History will not repeat itself, but similar historical events have taken place repeatedly. While China is not repeating what European countries did centuries ago, Chinese business classes are likely to play a role that their European counterparts did in the past. Capitalism is generating a Chinese bourgeoisie. It is a class with teeth. While the Party is dominated by pragmatism not ideology, such a newly rising class is not necessarily a threat to the ruling elite. Indeed, the CCP has transformed itself from a party hostile to capitalists during Mao Zedong’s time to the one actively accommodating capitalists. No one would have imagined a decade ago that the CCP would initiate such a drastic transformation. The fear that capitalists’ would demand democracy prompted the CCP to formally prohibit capitalists from joining the Party immediately after the pro-democracy movement in 1989. But the Party leadership eventually took the bold step of admitting capitalists into the Party despite strong resistance within and without the Party. While the impact of capitalists-in-the-Party is just beginning to unfold, other social classes such as workers and peasants have already found themselves in a disadvantaged position. As discussed in this chapter, business classes have their own ways to input their views into China’s policy-making process, but workers and peasants are not granted any meaningful channels to have a say. Nevertheless, workers and peasants can take collective actions to change their position. When collective actions take place, social stability, and even regime stability, become problematic. So, while the CCP under Jiang Zemin seemed to have tilted towards newly rising social classes, the Hu Jintao–Wen Jiabao new leadership has paid more attention to the needs of the lower social classes since it came into being. This does not mean that the new leadership is no longer staying on course to expand the class base of the CCP. But it does mean that ignoring the lower classes would be a big political mistake. Throughout Chinese history, the regime, together with rich classes, have been frequently overthrown by the poor. In other words, the regime cannot rely solely on new rich social classes for survival. Without a fair distribution of wealth among different classes, various forms of threats will often be present. This is the rationale behind the initiative by the Hu–Wen new leadership to bring the lower classes back in.

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The CCP leadership has realized that only by representing the interests of different classes can the Party stay alive and stay relevant to changing Chinese society. It has also indicated that the future of the Party depends on democracy. But the leadership does not know what form of democracy China should develop and how such a democracy can be developed. Now that “interest representation” has become the Party’s new orthodoxy, the leadership may have some inkling of the direction the Party is heading in. Apparently, this is easier said than done. Interest representation requires institutions for interest aggregation and articulation, and aggregating and articulating diverse social interests requires political participation. In the long haul, it would appear that democratization is the only option for the CCP to achieve broad-based interest representation.

Notes 1 For example, Barrington Moore Jr, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston, MA: Beacon, 1966); Charles Lindblom, Politics and Markets: The World’s Political-Economic System (New York: Basic, 1977); and Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). 2 Moore, Social Origins, p. 418. 3 For this point, see Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, Capitalist Development & Democracy (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992). 4 For example, Zhang Houyi and Ming Zhili, Zhongguo siying qiye fazhan baogao (The Report of the Development of Private Enterprises in China, 1999, 2000, 2001) (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2000, 2001, 2002); Zheng Yongnian, “Technocratic Leadership, Private Entrepreneurship and Party Transformation in the Post-Deng Era”; Tian Xiaowen, “The Private Economy: Will the Ugly Duckling Become a Swan?” both in John Wong and Zheng Yongnian (eds), China’s Post-Jiang Leadership in Perspective (Singapore and London: Singapore University Press & World Scientific, 2002). 5 http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200204/07/print20020407_93626.html. Accessed 7 April 2004. 6 For example, see, Yang Jisheng, Zhongguo shehui ge jieceng fenxi (An Analysis of Social Strata in China) (Hong Kong: Sanlian shudian, 2000); Zhu Guanglei, Dangdai Zhongguo shehui ge jieceng fenxi (An Analysis of Social Strata in Contemporary China) (Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 1998); Liang Xiaosheng, Zhongguo shehui ge jieceng fenxi (An Analysis of Social Strata in China) (Beijing: Jingji ribao chubanshe, 1998); Lu Xueyi and Jing Tiankuai (eds), Zhuanxing zhong de Zhongguo shehui (Chinese Society in Transition) (Ha’erbin: Helongjiang renmin chubanshe, 1994); Qin Shaoxiang and Jia Ting, Shehui xin qunti tanmi: Zhongguo siqing qiyezhu jieceng (A Study of A New Social Group: China’s Private Enterprise Class) (Beijing: Zhongguo fazhan chubanshe, 1993). 7 Lu Xueyi (ed.), Dangdai Zhongguo shehui jieceng yanjiu baogao (A Study Report of Social Stratification in Contemporary China) (Beijing: Zhongguo sheke wenxuan chubanshe, 2001), p. 9. 8 “Managers of the state and the society” refer to leading cadres in Party and government organizations at different levels. The CASS research team has used the term “managers” instead of cadres and government officials to avoid political sensitivity.

258 Zheng Yongnian 9 Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China; and Cheng Li and David Bachman, “Localism, Elitism, and Immobilism: Elite Formation and Social Change in Post-Mao China,” World Politics, Vol. 42, No. 1 (October 1989), pp. 64–94. 10 Zang Xiaowei, “The Fourteenth Central Committee of the CCP,” Asian Survey, vol. xxxiii, no. 8 (August 1993), p. 797, and Li Cheng and Lynn White, “The Fifteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party,” Asian Survey, Vol. xxxviii, No. 3 (March 1998), p. 250. 11 For a discussion of the CCP’s nomenklatura, see John P. Burns, The Chinese Communist Party’s Nomenklatura System: A Documentary Study of Party Control of Leadership Selection, 1979–1984 (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1989). 12 Ming pao, Hong Kong, June 13, 2002. 13 For example, P. B. Evans, D. Rueschmeyer, and T. Skocpol (eds), Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). 14 For example, Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of the Government in East Asian Industrialization (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); and Alice H. Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). 15 Max Weber, Theory of Social and Economic Organization. Edited by Talcott Parsons. (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 125. 16 For this point, see Muthiah Alagappa, “The Base of Legitimacy,” in Alagappa (ed.), Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 41. 17 Beijing Review, “Major Corruption Cases,” May 22, 2000, p. 14. 18 Renmin Ribao, September 15, 2000, p. 1. 19 Zou Keyuan, “Why China’s Rampant Corruption Cannot Be Checked by Laws Alone,” EAI Background Brief, No. 74, East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, November 2, 2000. 20 China Daily, March 6, 2000. 21 Borge Bakken, “State Control and Social Control in China,” in Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard and Susan Young (eds), State Capacity in Japan, Taiwan, China and Vietnam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 185–202. 22 The annual survey reports are organized by the Institute of Sociology of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, see its annual report, Ru Xin and Lu Xueyi (eds), Shehui lanpishu: Zhongguo shehui xingshi fenxi yu yuce (Social Bluebook: Analysis and Forecast of Social Situation in China), various issues. Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe. 23 Zhang Houyi and Ming Zhili (eds), Zhongguo siying qiye fazhan baogao 1978–1998 (A Report on the Development of Private Enterprises in China, 1978–1998) (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxuan chubanshe, 1999), p. 150. 24 Ibid. p. 148. 25 Cited in Li Qiang, “Guanyu siyingjingji de ruogan ziliao” (“Data on the Private Economy”), Zhengli de zhuiqiu (The Seeking of Truth), No. 5 (2001), p. 27. 26 Ibid., p. 26. 27 Jiang Nanyang, “Lun siying qiyezhu de zhengzhi cenyu” (“Political Participation by the Owners of Private Businesses”), in Zhang Houyi and Ming Zhili (eds), Zhongguo siying qiye fazhan baogao 1978–1998 (A Report of the Development of Private Enterprises in China, 1978–1998) (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxuan chubanshe, 1999), pp. 103–117. 28 Zhang and Ming (eds), Zhongguo siying qiye fazhan baogao, p. 163. 29 K. Zou and Y. Zheng, “China’s Third Constitutional Amendment: An Assessment,” in A. J. De Roo and R. W. Jagtenberg (eds), Yearbook Law and Legal Practice in East Asia, Vol. 4, 1999 (The Hague, London and Boston: Kluwer Law International, 2000), pp. 29–42.

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30 For a classical study on elite recruitment and political stability, see Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class, translated by Hannah D. Kahn, edited and revised, with an introduction by Arthur Livingston (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1939). 31 Lau Siu-kai (ed.), Shichang, jieji yu zhengzhi (Market, Class and Politics) (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asian-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2000), p. 328. 32 Li Qiang, “Guanyu siyingjingji,” p. 23. 33 Cited in Li Qiang, ibid., pp. 23–24. 34 For example, Guillermo A. O’Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics (Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, 1979). 35 For a full explanation of the linkages between class society and democracy, see Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, Capitalist Development & Democracy. 36 Alagappa, “The Base of Legitimacy,” p. 41. 37 The World Bank, China 2020: Sharing Rising Incomes (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1997), p. 7. 38 Shaoguang Wang, “The Social and Political Implications of China’s WTO Membership,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 9, No. 25 (2000), pp. 379–380. 39 The World Bank, China 2020: Sharing Rising Incomes, p. 17. 40 Hu Angang, “Kuaru xin shiji de zuida tiaozhan: woguo jinru gaoshiye jieduan,” in Hu Angang (ed.), Zhongguo zouxiang (Prospects of China), Hangzhou: Zhejiang renmin chubanshe, 2000, pp. 49–77. 41 The State Statistical Bureau, Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1999 (China Statistical Yearbook, 1999) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1999), p. 388. 42 The World Bank, China 2020: Sharing Rising Incomes, p. 17. 43 Annual Prices and Family Incomes and Expenditures in Chinese Cities, 1998 (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1998), p. 9. 44 Wang, “The Social and Political Implications of China’s WTO Membership,” p. 385. 45 Ibid., p. 386. 46 The World Bank, China 2020: Sharing Rising Incomes: Disparities in China, p. 16. 47 The State Statistical Bureau, Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1999 (China Statistical Yearbook 1999) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1999), pp. 133, 161. 48 The World Bank, China 2020: Sharing Rising Incomes, p. 22. 49 Shaoguang Wang and Hu Angang, The Political Economy of Uneven Development: The Case of China (Armonk, NY: M. E Sharpe, 1999). 50 Ibid., pp. 56–57. 51 See Albert Hirschman, “Changing Tolerance for Income Inequality in the Course of Economic Development,” World Development, Vol. 1, No. 12 (1973), pp. 24–36. 52 For example, Yongnian Zheng, “State Rebuilding, Popular Protest and Collective Action in China,” The Japanese Journal of Political Science, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2002), pp. 43–68. 53 “Participation” is different from democracy. While “participation” means that different social classes are able to participate in the political process, democracy refers to a situation: representatives lead, people follow. I regard “participation” as the initial stage of democracy. 54 The latest efforts at wage increase were criticized by Gongren tibao (Workers’ Daily). See, Ming pao, Hong Kong, June 10, 2002. 55 Zou and Zheng, “China’s Third Constitutional Amendment: An Assessment.”

260 Zheng Yongnian 56 “Workers” and “peasants” are different in terms of their class interests. In this chapter, I lump them in the same category since I believe that compared to technocrats and capitalists, both are subordinates. 57 For a discussion of labor movement, see Feng Chen, “Subsistence Crisis, Managerial Corruption and Labor Protests in China,” The China Journal, 44 (July 2000), pp. 41–63. 58 Xiao Gongqin, “The ‘China Democratic Party’ Event and Political Trends in Post-Deng China,” in Wang Gungwu and Zheng Yongnian (eds), Damage Control: The Chinese Communist Party in the Jiang Zemin-Era (London and Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2003), pp. 320–349. 59 John Pomfret, “Why ‘Beijing Spring’ Cooled: Dissidents Overstepped,” International Herald Tribune, January 4, 1999, pp. 1 and 7. 60 For some recent discussions of China’s People’s Congress system, see Kevin O’Brien, “Chinese People’s Congresses and Legislative Embeddedness: Understanding Early Organizational Development,” Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 27, No. 4 (1994), pp. 80–107; O’Brien, “Institutionalizing Chinese Legislatures: Trade-offs between Autonomy and Capacity,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1998), pp. 91–108; and Murray Scot Tanner, The Politics of Lawmaking in Post-Mao China: Institutions, Processes and Democratic Perspectives (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). 61 David Reeve, GOLKAR of Indonesia: An Alternative to the Party System (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985). It is worthwhile to note that the fall of the GOLKAR was not because of its institutional design, but because of the lack of internal democracy within the GOLKAR. 62 For example, Gordon White, Jude Howell, and Shang Xiaoyuan, In Search of Civil Society: Market Reform and Social Changes in Contemporary China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

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Index

“8–7” poverty reduction plan 131 1954 Constitution 79 1982 Constitution 79 1999 Amendment 80 1999 Amendment 83 administrative community 163 Administrative Procedural Law 83 administrative setup 103, 116 administratively entrusted legal organs 109 All China Federation of Trade Union 174–176, 180, 250 An Ziwen 44, 47 Anhui 51 Anti-Bourgeois Liberalization 146 anti-Falungong campaign 68 anti-rightist campaign 48 Anti-Spiritual Pollution 146 Asian value system 222 autonomy and democracy 164 Balkans 17 Baltic States 29 basic-level governance 157 Baum, R. 146 Beijing 139, 158, 163, 168, 176, 193 Beijing Labor Bureau 175 Beijing Steel 141 Beijing University 151, 250 Bianzhi list 105 Bianzhi system 7, 8, 103; administrative bianzhi 104; enterprise bianzhi 104; service organization bianzhi 104; State Bianzhi Committee 104 Black’s Law Dictionary 84 Bo Xilai 49 Bo Yibo 47 Book of Six Laws 77 Bureau of Civil Affairs 163

Burma 227 Burns, J. 129 cadre appointment system 20 cadre management 45, 103, 124, 127–128 cadre recruitment 25 cadre responsibility system 8, 122, 124, 126, 128–130, 135; as an analytical tool 129 capitalist class 248 capitalist inclination 218 capitalist mentality 212, 225 capitalist resurrection 219 career advancement 23 CCP/PLA relations 73 Central Committee 34–36, 67, 81, 84, 87, 93 Central Disciplinary Committee 221 Central Disciplinary Inspection Committee 82 Central Enterprise Work Committee 35 Central Europe 17, 18, 29, 30 Central Financial Work Committee 35 Central Leading Group for Finance and Economics 35 Central Military Commission (CMC) 36, 52, 63–70 Central Organization Department 166 Central Organization and Propaganda Group 44 Central Party School (CPS) 9, 139–141, 146–147, 151–152, 194; Advanced Central Party School 140 Central Supervisory Committee 44 Chen Haosu 49 Chen Pixian 88 Chen Yuan 49 Chen Yun 63, 78 Cheng Kaijie 51

262 Index Cheng Weigao 91 Cheng, T.J. 211 Chiang Ching-kuo 213–216, 224–225 Chiang Kai-shek 212 China Democratic Party 52 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) 119, 232 Chinese Civil War 213, 216 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 1–5, 9–12, 19, 24, 33, 40, 48–49, 52–53, 59, 77–78, 80, 88, 122–123, 125, 128–129, 139, 157, 173, 192, 195, 203, 219, 231, 235, 239 Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 160 Chinese Science Association 149 Chongqing 131 Chung-li Incident 214 city bureau of civil affairs 161 civil-military interaction 61 civil-military relations 59, 63–64, 66, 68 civil servant system 114 civil servants 105 civil service system 103 class-based ideology 52 class-less society 232 class society 232 coastal development strategy 133 collective leadership 67 collectivism 223 collectivization 236 College of Military Technology 149 college-level education 16 Committee of Comprehensive Management of Public Order 89–90 Communications and Transportation Department 35 Communiqué of the Third Plenum 78 Communist Youth League 167, 198, 254 Community Affairs Reception Centre 160 community construction 160–161 Community Construction Guidance Committee 165 Community Construction Party and Government Liaison Meeting 165 Community Democratic Consultative Council 161 Community Management Committee 160 Community Members’ Congress 164

Community Members’ Representative Congress 164 Community Party Organization 164 Community residents committees 161 competitive elections 192 Confucianism 85–86, 154, 222–223 Confucius 223 constitutionalism 223 Consultative Committee 164 consultative leadership 68 control and autonomy 169 Control Yuan 215–216 Corruption Perception Index 54 Criminal Procedural Law 89, 93 cronyism 240 Cultural Revolution 33, 39, 41–47, 51, 77, 140, 142, 218–219, 235 Cultural Revolution Small Group 44 Cultural Revolution Temporary Preparatory Committee 44 Current Affairs of Theory 149 Czech Republic 17 Dangnei youpai 254 Dangwai 158–159, 168–169, 224 Dangwai youdang 254 Danwei (unit) system 10, 157 democratic centralism 221 democratic consolidation 216 Democratic Progressive Party 211, 214, 216 democratization 216–217, 224, 226–227, 242 Deng Nan 49 Deng Pufang 49 Deng Xiaoping 3, 6, 45, 47, 60, 63–65, 68, 79–80, 144–145, 147–148, 152, 154, 200, 219, 225, 233–234, 237, 247 Deng Xiaoping theory 80, 149 Department for Economic Development 113–114 Department of Organization 234 Department of the Party and Masses Work 181 de-politicization 53 develop the Western regions 123 dialectical history of materialism 152 Dicey, A 83 Dickson, B 195 Ding Xueliang 28

Index 1111 2 3 4 5111 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5111 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 44 45111

Disciplinary Inspection Committee 90 distributive conflict 242 distributive justice 232, 247, 253 double turnover test 217 East Asia 29, 217, 222 East Asian Miracle 176 East Europe 227 East Germany 146 Eastern Europe 16 economic performance 242 educational standards 25 elite democracy 202 elite-level conflict 41 environmental protection 129 Estonia 17 European Union 227 evolutionary change 30 export-exportation policy 226 factionalism 40 falungong (Falun Gong) 52, 158 favoritism 40 Finance and Trade Department 35 First Office of the Central Case Examination Group 45 five contemporary courses 149 Forum for China’s Party and Government Cadres 151 Four Basic Principles 144; Four Fundamental Principles 95 Fourth generation leadership 69 Fourth Plenary Session 1 France 217 Frankenstein phenomenon 83 free ride problem 250 Freedom House 216–217 Fromm, E. 152 Fu Rui 49 Gadamer, H 152 Ganchong 109 Gansu 131 Gao Gang 41–42, 46–48; Gao-Rao Affairs 47 General Principles of Civil Law 93 Germany 217 Gini coefficient 122, 244 globalization 226 goal-rational 126 Goodman, D. 198 Government Bureau for Cadres in Science and Technology 104 Great Leap Forward 43, 48

263

Guangdong 231 Guangdong model 197 Guangming Daily 144 Guangxi 51, 131, 245 Guizhou 131, 246 Guizhou Provincial Committee 91 Haikou 107, 118 Hainan 7, 103 Hainan Provincial Government 107, 112 Han Dynasty 223 Han Wudi 223 Hangzhou 168, 193 Harasymiw, B. 104 hard authoritarian regime 210 hard targets 125, 127 He Guangwei 49 He Yong 90 He, Qinglian 203 Hebei Province 91 Heidegger, M. 152 Heilongjiang 51, 140, 246 Hirschman, A. 247 Hsieh Tung-min 213 Hu Angang 135, 220, 245 Hu Deping 49 Hu Jintao 60, 69–70, 72, 122–123, 142, 148, 220, 256 Hu Yaobang 71, 144, 146 Hua Guofeng 142, 144 Huang Kecheng 48 Huang, Yasheng 125, 126, 128 humanitarianism Confucianism 223 Hunan 168 Hungary 17, 146, 193 Huntington, S 52–53, 211 Husserl, Edmund 152 ideological education 161 imperial grain 105 incrementalism 225 individualism 223 Indonesia 30, 153, 237, 241, 255 Industrial and Commercial Service Center 113–114 Inner Mongolia 131 institutionalization 62–63, 84 institutionalization of elite politics 72 interest representation 257 internal democracy 202 intra-party democracy 192–194, 202 Italy 217

264 Index Japan 31, 146, 195, 213, 217, 222 Ji Dengkui 44 Jiang Qing 44 Jiang Zemin 33, 39, 60, 63, 65–68, 70, 84, 85, 90, 94, 122, 141, 198–199, 231, 256 Jianghan district 166 Jiangsu 51 Jiaojiang 193 Journal of the Central Party School 151 Kang Sheng 44 Kaohsiung 211, 222 Kaohsiung Incident 214, 225 Kazakhstan 18 Korea 222 Kuomintang 77, 211–215, 217, 221–222, 224–225, 252 Kuomintang regime 12 Kyrgyzstan 18 labor division 178 Labor Law 200 labor relations 173 Lai Ruoyu 180 laid-off workers 161, 173, 186 land reform 236 Latin America 227 leadership selection mechanism 33 leadership selection system 40 leading positions 114; non-leading positions 114 Learning Magazine 149 Lee Huan 213 Lee Teng-hui 214, 217, 224–225 Legalist school 223 legalization 84 Legislative Yuan 215–216, 225 legitimacy 187 legitimization 240 Lei Feng 85 Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional 153 Lenin 152, 221 Leninism 154 Leninist institutions 122 Leninist party-state system 217, 218, 227; Leninist Party-state 12; Leninist principles 33; Leninist system 126–127 Li, Cheng 151 Li Desheng 44 Li, Lianjiang 125 Li Lisan 180 Li Peng 63, 219

Li Tielin 49 Li Xiaolin 49 Liao Gailong 194 Liao Hui 49 Liaoning 51, 163, 186 liberalist capitalism 211 liberalization 216, 224 Liberation Daily 144 Lien Chan 213 Limited political liberalization 213 Lin Biao 47 Lin, Gang 202, 203 Lin Yang-kang 213 Lin Yongsan 49 Linhai 197 Linin 153 Liu Fangren 91 Liu Shaoqi 46, 151, 218 local democratization 192 local governments 124 localization process 213 Long March 140, 237 Lu Xueyi 232 Luo Gan 88 Lusan 218 Lushan Plenum 48 management–labor conflicts 186 management–worker relations 177, 185; management–labor relations 177 Manion, M. 50 Mao Zedong 41–42, 46, 60, 63, 68, 140, 142, 144, 151–152, 211, 224, 234–235, 237, 256 Mao Zedong Thought 149, 154; Maoism 144 Marcos, Ferdinand 214 market-oriented economic reforms 232 market-oriented reforms 233, 250 Martial Law 214 Marx 152 Marxism 154, 236; Marxist theory 77 Marxism-Communism School 140 Marxism-Leninism 235; Marxist and Leninist ideology 77 Marxist-Leninist and Mao Zedong Thought 145 Marxist-Leninist Party 231 Marx-Lenin College 140 May-4th Movement 86 May-7 cadre school 140 Mencius 86, 223 Ministry of Civil Affairs 159, 166–167 Ministry of Justice 88

Index 1111 2 3 4 5111 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5111 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 44 45111

Ministry of Labor and Personnel 104 Ministry of Land and Resources 54 Ministry of Public Security 88 Ministry of Supervision 90 mixed regime 12 mobility patterns 21 Moore, B. Jr. 232 Moscow 28 multi-party system 195, 205, 253, 255 multiple-candidate elections 194 Nanjing 163, 176 National Affairs Conference 215 National Assembly 215–216 National Conference on Financial and Economic Work 46 National Defence Law 60 National Organization Work Conference 46 National People’s Congress (NPC) 8, 78, 81, 135, 220, 238, 249, 254 National People’s Congress Party Group 82 National Power Company 141 National School of Administration 141 nationalization 236 nativization process 214 nepotism 40, 240 New labor regime 185 New Left 250 New Leftist intellectuals 250 New Public Management 127, 135 Ningxia 131 Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region 175 Ninth Five-Year Plan 123 nomenklatura 103, 104, 124 nomenklatura problematique 103 nomenklatura system 4, 8, 33–35, 38, 40–41, 44–46, 51, 82, 107, 129, 204, 234; Local nomenklatura 117 North Korea 146 O’Brien, K. 125 Office for Fishery Policies and Inspection 113 Oksenberg, M. 128 old five courses 145 old socialist model 15 one-man leadership system 66 one-party dictatorship 211, 224 one-party system 211 Organization Department (OD) 34–35, 44, 47

265

organizational rationalization 33, 42 oriental despotism 222 Party Constitution 78, 80, 90, 92 party control versus military professionalism 64 party democracy 203 Party Disciplinary Inspection Committee 78 party hierarchy 15, 21 party loyalty 49 party organization 177 Party Representative Congress 194, 201, 202; Party Representative System 202 Party School Yearbook 147 party-state system 210 party work 157 patronage system 38 peaceful evolution 147 Peng Dehuai 48, 218 Peng Zhen 88 people-oriented approach 123, 134; “put people first” 122; “serve the people” 122 People’s Bank of China 149 People’s Commune system 11 People’s Congress 6, 192, 198 people’s consultative conference 255 People’s Daily 1, 51, 85, 92, 144 People’s Liberation Army 5–6, 44–45, 59–64, 67–70, 73, 236 People’s Party 195 performance contracts 125, 128, 130 performance targets 127, 132 Permanent System of Party Representatives 193 Philippines 30, 216, 227 philosophical king 222 Pieke, F. 125 Planning and Industrial Department 35 Plato 222 Polan 17 Polish 180 Political Bureau 52 political competition 253 political consciousness 62 political elite 15, 17, 19, 20, 27 political governance 28 political hooliganism 215 political indoctrination 62 political instability 30 political legitimacy 242 political liberalism 216

266 Index political loyalty 40 political participation 13, 211, 240 political regime 27 political retrenchment 29 political road map 38 political stability 30 political standards 25 political trajectory 15 Political Work Department 35 political-administrative category 118 Political-Legal Committee 6, 82, 88–89 Political-Legal Group 88 Post-British Hong Kong 30 post-communist regime 15, 17–18, 30 post-communist Russia 184 post-Cultural Revolution era 43 post-Deng CCP–PLA relationship 61 Post-Mao communist leaders 77 Post-Mao military modernization 61 poverty reduction 130, 133–134 poverty-stricken population 173 priority targets 127 private entrepreneurs 25 privatization 17, 18, 19, 29, 185 pro-democracy movement 141 professional work category 118 professionalism 62 Propaganda Department 35 Provincial Assembly 224 Provisional Service Regulations 114 public disorder 238 public ownership 18 Qiao Shi 88, 147 Qincheng 44 Qingdao city party committee 160 Qingdao model 10, 158–159, 160–162, 164–166 Qinghai 131 Qinghua University 151, 250, 254 Quasi-Leninist party-state 216; QuasiLeninist regime 211, 227; QuasiLeninist state 210 Rao Shushi 41–42, 46–48 rational/legal basis 63 red-dotted documents 94 re-democratization 217 regime collapse 30 regional elite 28, 29 Regulation for Organizing Urban Street Offices 158 reign without overt rule 71–72 Republic of China 211

Residents Representative Council 161 revolutionary committees 218 Ricoeur, P. 152 Roh Tae Woo 214 Ruan Ming 218 rule by virtue 85, 87 rule of law 6, 81, 83, 85, 94–95, 220 rule of man 87 rule of the party by law 95 rules of governance 192 rural cadres 26 Rural Department 35 rural disparities 244 rural society 196 Russia 16, 18, 19, 29, 227 Sanfan campaign 41 SARS 130 scientific concept of development 8, 123 Secretary General 52, 83, 85 Serbia 18 services and management 160 Shaanxi 131, 183 Shanghai 28, 129, 158, 163, 165, 175, 193, 245 Shanghai Clique 254 Shanghai Higher People’s Court 89 Shanghai model 166 Shanxi 132–133, 135 Shanxi model 197 Shenyang 10, 44, 163–165 Shenzhen 176, 220 Shimen county 198 Sichuan 129, 131–133, 135 Singapore 31 Sixteenth Party Congress 63, 192, 220, 231 “small government, big society” 7, 118, 157 social conscience 249 social control 94 soft targets 125 South African Communist Party 193 South Korea 30–31, 173, 214, 216–217, 227, 237, 239 southern tour 148 Soviet Communist Party 237 Soviet Union 2, 16, 173, 180, 218 spiritual civilization 161 standardization 145 state autonomy 236 state Constitution 78, 81 State Council 28, 131–132, 218

Index 1111 2 3 4 5111 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5111 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 44 45111

state democracy 203 State governance 94, 235 State Labor Bureau 104 State Personnel Bureau 104 State Planning Commission 46 state-owned enterprise performance 177 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 11, 173–174, 186, 232 Strait of Taiwan 214 strategic social base 27 street party committee 160 street party work committee 160 subjective control versus objective control 60 succession 70 Sun Yat-sen 221 Supreme Court 88 Supreme People’s Court 54 Supreme Procuratorate 88 Swedish Social Democracy Party 193 symbiosis 59 tacit agreement 173 Taipei 211–222 Taiwan 12, 13, 30, 210–211, 213–217, 222, 224–227, 237, 239 Taiwan miracle 226 Taizidang 254 technocrat-capitalist dominion 238, 251 technocrat dominion 236, 251 technocratic class 238, 248 technocratic movement 234 Ten Construction Projects 213 Thatcher, M. 127 Theoretical Front 151 Third Constitutional Amendment 249 third wave of democratization 210 Thirteenth Party Congress 200 three principles of people 223–224 “three represents” 80, 198, 219, 231 Tiananmen 218 Tiananmen Incident 147, 178, 183 Tianjin 158 Tibet 131, 146 Tien, Hong-mao 212 township leading cadres 125 trade union 179, 181 Trade Union Law 200, 250 training of high-ranking cadres 140 training in rotation 144 Transparency International 54 Tuanpai 254 tunnel effect 247 “two whatevers” 144

267

Ukraine 18 United Front Work Department 35 United Kingdom 213, 217 University of National Defence 149 urban community construction 157 urban disparities 244 urban-rural disparities 245 urban-rural divide 245 Uzbekistan 18 Veto power 125, 127 Vietnam 15, 19, 222 village committee 157, 197 village finances 157 village party organization 196 Walder, A. 173 Wan Jifei 49 Wang Dongxin 142 Wang Guixiong 194 Wang Shaoguang 135, 245 Wang Zhen 145–146 Weber, M. 237 Wen Jiabao 35, 122–123, 220, 256 West Germany 146 West Zhou Dynasty 86 Western development program 130–131, 133 “white terror” 214 Women’s Federation 167 workers’ council 182 World Bank 245 World Trade Organization (WTO) 1, 36 Wu Bangguo 35 Wu Guanzheng 82 Wuhan 48, 166, 193 Xi Jinping 49 Xi Zhongxun 146 Xiao Yang 89 Xindu 109 Xing Fensi 152 Xinhua News Agency 85, 91 Xinjiang 131, 145, 146 Xinyingwan 109 Ya’an 193, 199, 200 Yan’an 140 Yang Baibing 63, 69, 72 Yangpu 7, 107, 109, 112–113, 115, 117–118 Yangpu Economic Development Zone 103, 109, 112, 114, 116–117, 119 Yangpu party committee 118–119

268 Index Yao Mingwei 49 Yao Wenyuan 44 Ye Jianying 62 Yugoslavia 146 Yunnan 131–132 Zeng Di 44 Zeng Peiyan 132 Zeng Qinghong 1, 2, 148 Zhang Chunqiao 44–45 Zhang Dejiang 201 Zhang Wentian 48

Zhang Yinghong 95 Zhao Ziyang 6–7, 71, 141, 200 Zhejiang 51, 168, 197, 201 Zhongli Incident 224 Zhou Enlai 46 Zhou Gong 86 Zhou Xiaochuan 49 Zhou Xiaozhou 48 Zhou Yongkang 95 Zhu Guang 44 Zhu Rongji 219, 238

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