The American Elections of 2008

ROBERT G. BOATRIGHT JANET M. BOX-STEFFENSMEIER DAVID E. CAMPBELL ROGER H. DAVIDSON JAMES L. GUTH JOHN F. HARRIS JONATHAN MARTIN BARBARA NORRANDER DIANA OWEN NICOL C. RAE STEVEN E. SCHIER

American Elections of The Edited by

JANET M. BOX-STEFFENSMEIER and STEVEN E. SCHIER

2008

THE AMERICAN ELECTIONS OF 2008

THE AMERICAN ELECTIONS OF 2008

Edited by Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier and Steven E. Schier

ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC. Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • Plymouth, UK

ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC. Published in the United States of America by Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. A wholly owned subsidiary of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 www.rowmanlittlefield.com Estover Road Plymouth PL6 7PY United Kingdom Copyright  2009 Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data: The American elections of 2008 / edited by Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier and Steven E. Schier. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-7425-4831-2 (cloth : alk. paper)— ISBN 978-0-7425-4832-9 (pbk. : alk. paper)— ISBN 978-0-7425-7070-2 (electronic) 1. United States. Congress—Elections, 2008. 2. Presidents—United States— Election—2008. 3. Elections—United States. I. Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M., 1965– II. Schier, Steven E. JK19682008 .A54 2009 324.973⬘0931—dc22 2009000188 Printed in the United States of America

 ⬁ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

By Janet— To my parents, Adrian and Carol Box, who provided early exposure to, and the recognition of, the importance of politics By Steven— To three academic mentors: Owen Duncan of Simpson College, Charles W. Anderson of the University of Wisconsin–Madison, and Richard Flickinger of Wittenberg University By us both— To the spirit and vitality of southeast Iowans

Contents

Preface 1

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The George W. Bush and Bill Clinton Legacies in the 2008 Elections John F. Harris and Jonathan Martin

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The Campaign and the Media Diana Owen

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Democratic Marathon, Republican Sprint: The 2008 Presidential Nominations Barbara Norrander

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The General Election Campaign Steven E. Schier and Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier

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Partisan Surge and Decline in Congressional Elections: The Case of 2008 Roger H. Davidson

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Public Opinion and the 2008 Presidential Election David E. Campbell

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Religion in the 2008 Election James L. Guth

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Campaign Finance in the 2008 Election Robert G. Boatright

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Contents

The Meaning of the 2008 Election Nicol C. Rae

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Index

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About the Editors and Contributors

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Preface

he case of the 2008 American elections included, in the words of Sherlock Holmes, several ‘‘features of interest.’’ The list of remarkable events in 2008 is a long one. The Democratic nomination contest featured an unusually protracted battle between a female and an African American candidate, the first candidates of such genders and races to emerge as serious finalists for the nomination. Many had pronounced the eventual GOP nominee’s campaign moribund in 2007 when it nearly ran out of cash, and the party’s activist base remained cool to him until the party’s convention. At that convention, the selection of the first female vice presidential candidate in the party’s history electrified party activists and temporarily gave the GOP a lead in a year when a Democratic victory had seemed likely. Then came the first major economic crisis ever to occur in the midst of a general election campaign, which boosted the Democratic nominee into the lead. He was aided by a campaign that raised a previously unimaginable total of $764.8 million in 2008. The Democratic nominee’s campaign was the first to totally abandon the public finance system created in the 1970s, much to its advantage. It deployed an unprecedented field effort, a prodigious shower of campaign ads, and pioneered new ways of connecting volunteers to campaign efforts with innovative web and cell phone technologies. That, combined with the economic crisis, helped elect Barack Obama the first African American president of the United States. The authors included here have no shortage of juicy material to address in their essays. Journalists John F. Harris and Jonathan Martin examine the troubled legacy of the George W. Bush presidency during the 2008 election season. Bush’s very low popularity, they write, resulted from a presidential strategy of governance that aroused strong partisan opposition. That, com-

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bined with adverse events in the economy and in foreign policy, presented GOP nominee John McCain with great disadvantages in the 2008 campaign. Diana Owen notes the many technical and organizational innovations of the Obama campaign’s use of ‘‘new media’’—from social networking technology to YouTube videos—that helped to create their record-setting volunteer and fund-raising effort. The decline of the ‘‘old media’’ of newspapers and television coverage created opportunities for the Obama campaign that it uniquely exploited. The road to the presidential nomination for both McCain and Obama was an uphill climb, though in distinct ways, as Barbara Norrander explains in her chapter. Neither were their party’s front-runners as 2008 began, and both had to overcome considerable obstacles to emerge triumphant. The derailing of the formidable campaigns of Hillary Clinton and Mitt Romney receives detailed scrutiny in her essay. Steven E. Schier and Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier chart the stark turns in the general election campaigns, from GOP vice presidential nominee Sarah Palin’s rise and decline, to the unprecedented financial crisis of September and October, and the debates, won, in the public eye, by Obama. The path to victory for McCain, in such adverse conditions, proved impossible. Roger H. Davidson explains how the 2008 environment favored Democratic House and Senate candidates and how that led to several GOP incumbents’ retirements, the recruitment of many ‘‘quality’’ Democratic candidates, and a substantial cash advantage for Democrats in campaign spending. Solid Democratic gains in the Congressional elections resulted. Was the explanation for the 2008 election outcomes simply a case of ‘‘the economy, stupid,’’ as Bill Clinton adviser James Carville had described the 1992 election? David E. Campbell argues in his chapter that the explanation is not quite that simple. Many other issues—from health care to foreign policy—also favored the Democrats, making the economy far from the only factor explaining the outcome. Religious differences, according to James L. Guth, remained remarkably persistent in 2008, and continue as a primary division in American politics. Obama increased his margins across several religious groups, but the divide between more orthodox and churchgoing believers supporting the GOP and less observant and secular voters supporting Democrats continues to persist. Robert G. Boatright turns to probing the mammoth fund-raising totals of 2008, achieved mostly by Democrats, and explains the several ways that the campaign finance system has permanently changed. Public financing of presidential elections, he contends, encountered its death knell in 2008 and will play no significant role in the 2012 election cycle. Nicol C. Rae concludes the volume by reviewing the many changes the 2008 election process produced: in campaign strategies and technologies, in

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fund-raising, in the new demographic diversity of candidates and winners. He assesses the degree to which 2008 was a ‘‘change’’ election, a topic about which there is no shortage of discussion. We thank Niels Aaboe and the entire staff at Rowman & Littlefield Publishers for their excellent advice and work throughout the publication process. We thank Aldous Cheung, Ohio State University, and Caitlin Fleming, Carleton College, for their superb research assistance. The origin of this book occurred at the inaugural breakfast meeting of the Lee County Political Science Association, held at the American Political Science Association meetings in Philadelphia in 2006. After that meeting, Steve Schier approached Janet Box-Steffensmeier with the prospect of coediting the book you now hold in your hands. Both hail from Lee County, Iowa, located in the far southeast corner of the state, bordering Illinois on the east and Missouri on the south. For the record, membership in the association consists of five political scientists: Janet (from Houghton), Steve (from Fort Madison), Joe Klesner (from West Point and currently at Kenyon College), Sarah Wheeler (from West Point and currently at Indiana University of Pennsylvania) and Brian Humes (from Donnellson and currently at the National Science Foundation). Among the people to whom we dedicate this book are those of Lee County and southeast Iowa, who taught us so much of value as we grew up there. Columbus, Ohio, and Northfield, Minnesota December 15, 2008

1 The George W. Bush and Bill Clinton Legacies in the 2008 Elections John F. Harris and Jonathan Martin

or a generation, American politics was dominated by the House of Bush and the House of Clinton. These two political dynasties—and the distinctive sets of tactics and strategic theories that they employed—were like giant objects in space, each in orbit around the other. The year 2008 was the year of the great collision. The era of Bush-Clinton politics was demolished by an even greater force, hurtling through space with breathtaking velocity. That force was Barack Obama, and the extraordinary political machine he assembled. The nation’s forty-fourth president won the presidency by systematically exploiting the assorted defects and accumulated liabilities of both the House of Clinton and the House of Bush. Obama won the Democratic nomination by beating Hillary Rodham Clinton, who quite plausibly assumed (the majority of political reporters and operatives we know certainly assumed it with her) until the primaries began that her status as Bill Clinton’s legatee gave her an unshakable claim on her party’s 2008 mantle. In the general election, Republican John McCain was by no means running as George W. Bush’s legatee. But he became one against his will. The best evidence of the incumbent’s role in the 2008 election can be found in the use of his name. Republican presidential hopefuls—McCain and the men he beat for the nomination—almost never mentioned Bush. Obama and other Democrats mentioned it at every opportunity. No mystery why: In October 2008, Bush’s quarterly approval rating was stuck in the Truman or Nixon vicinity of 29 percent (Gallup Poll 2008).

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Bush, a man of guttural certitudes, has never seemed to be much of an ironist. But he could hardly miss the odd turnabout that fate has delivered. He and his top political advisers made clear early in his presidency that their goal was to marry conservative policy goals with an unusually ambitious political strategy in a way that would frame public debate and dominate elections even after Bush’s presidency. And he did indeed dominate the 2008 election. Obama’s 53 percent popular vote victory—the highest percentage of any Democrat since Lyndon B. Johnson’s victory in 1964—blossomed in soil tilled by George W. Bush. The repudiation of both the Bush and Clinton legacies in 2008 is obvious to the naked eye. More hidden, but nearly as important to Obama’s success, is the degree to which the Democrat and his team drew on political techniques devised by both of his predecessors. More irony: Obama banished the Bush-Clinton era by isolating the most effective parts of both men’s political strategies and then improving on them. That is no mean feat. And Obama’s success—as these words are written in the month after his election and the month before his inauguration—is a remarkable mandate to reshape American politics and set the national government on a radically different course from the one it has followed over the past eight years under Bush or even the eight years before that under Clinton.

The Flight from Bush Steven E. Schier called his first volume on the Bush era, High Risk and Big Ambition. The book came out just before the forty-third president’s 2004 reelection. That was a time when Bush’s big ambitions—encouraged and facilitated by outsized characters around him like Vice President Dick Cheney and political adviser Karl Rove—were on obvious display. Press and academic commentary tended to give less emphasis to the other half of the equation. The 2008 election, by contrast, made the risks in Bush’s political strategy unmistakable. He and his Republican Party won elections, and for a time won the governing power they sought, by energizing Republican partisans and using national security, taxes, and cultural issues to polarize the electorate along bright lines. The problem was that it was not just Republicans who were energized; Democrats were, too, with equal and in the end greater intensity. And when the president’s policies—on the Iraq war, on the initial response to Hurricane Katrina, and on the economy—were perceived to falter, there was no reservoir of public sympathy and no margin for political error.

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Once the floor collapsed, Bush lost the support of even many Republican partisans. Former Massachusetts governor Mitt Romney, trying to separate himself from the GOP pack, hired many veterans of Bush’s and Rove’s political team, and initially seemed to be running in his path. But then, in the fall of 2007 in a widely covered speech to Michigan Republicans on Mackinac Island, he announced himself a ‘‘Republican for change’’ and solemnly declared: ‘‘I think we’d have to admit that the blame doesn’t all belong to the other party. We Republicans have to put our own house in order.’’ McCain, likewise, was in a sprint away from Bush. After effectively clinching the nomination in March, McCain paid a symbolic passing-the-torch visit to the White House. The two held a brief press availability where McCain said he would be happy to have Bush campaign for him. But the nominee noted multiple times during the short session with reporters that the president had a very busy schedule. Asked where Bush may stump for him, McCain suggested Texas, not exactly battleground terrain. With the ritual photo opportunity out of the way, McCain got a bit more aggressive with his distancing moves in the spring and summer. He went to heavily African American and other Democratic communities to make the point that he would not be a Rove-style polarizing candidate. Most notably, he went to the devastated Lower Ninth Ward in New Orleans and promised ‘‘never again’’ on Katrina. As the general election wore on, McCain became more open about his criticism. He began to tick off the issues where he had opposed the president— climate change, torture, spending—whenever asked. Bush raised money for McCain and the Republican National Committee in private, but was kept off the campaign trail. The only time the two were spotted together on the trail was after a fund-raiser in May when cameras were allowed to run for one minute as the Arizonan walked POTUS to Air Force One on the tarmac. McCain got off a good line at the final debate, when Obama repeated his familiar refrain about how the Republican would represent a third term for President Bush. ‘‘If you wanted to run against President Bush, you should have run four years ago,’’ McCain retorted. It was for naught. Running against both Bush and Obama—his own party and the opposition—would have been a steep political challenge for any candidate, but it was made more difficult by virtue of the mistrust by the GOP base of McCain and his own deeply uneven political skills. Bush Politics, Clinton Politics The Bush years have not lent themselves well to oracular pronouncements by journalists and academics. Google and Nexis-Lexis are the banes of would-be

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oracles, who see one day’s sage analysis become a target for mockery years or even months later. The reader may rest assured that the coauthors of this piece have firsthand experience in the matter. In the wake of the 2008 election, Harris journeyed into the clip file to see what he had written and whom he had quoted in the wake of the 2004 election, when Bush won using the same message and operational tactics that had also given Republicans a big victory in the 2002 congressional elections. Much of the analysis proved surprisingly perishable—a reminder of how dramatically political circumstances had changed in four years. There was Ken Mehlman, the campaign manager of the Bush-Cheney reelection committee, who was soon to be the chairperson of the Republican National Committee. He was quoted saying that the modern voters less commonly vote on narrow perceptions of their material self-interest; instead, ‘‘People now vote much more on their values’’ (Harris 2004a). As a result, he concluded: ‘‘The Republican Party is in a stronger position today than at any time since the Great Depression’’ (Harris 2004b). Ahem. The prominent political scientist Walter Dean Burnham was inclined to agree in seeing a long-term realignment benefiting conservatives: ‘‘If Republicans keep playing the religious card along with the terrorism card, this could last a long time.’’ As it happened, by 2008, national security and cultural wedge issues had lost much of their saliency to concerns about the economy. Lawrence Jacobs at the University of Minnesota fared better with his crystal ball: ‘‘I’m not seeing that enduring majority’’ for Republicans. ‘‘The Republicans have won a series of close elections, but independents are not with them. I just don’t see how you can have a realignment if you have swing voters turning against you’’ (Harris 2004b). As it happened, Jacobs was deadon: The flight of independents from the Republican Party accelerated in 2008, a reflection to how little Bush and the Republicans had done to cultivate these voters over the preceding years. Nor does Larry M. Bartels of Princeton University have reason to cringe reading his old quotes. He said Bush’s victory, rather than the rise of a new coalition, was actually the ‘‘last gasp’’ of an old one rooted in the South and among culturally conservative white voters. Correct: By 2008, that gasping old coalition was no longer strong enough to keep Virginia or North Carolina in the Republican column. Comments like those of Mehlman and Burnham are a reminder of how tentative observers usually should be in proclaiming fundamental shifts of one kind or another in the electorate. Particularly in a modern political culture, in which voters are saturated by media coverage and many have weak partisan allegiances, seemingly fundamental shifts can actually be quite transitory. Alas, most of the people who write about politics are recidivists when it comes to our penchant for overarching theories. One coauthor of this piece

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is no exception. In the wake of the 2004 election, Harris began work with Mark Halperin (then of ABC News, now with Time) on a book that became The Way to Win: Taking the White House in 2008 (Halperin and Harris 2006). Published in the fall of 2006, the book was intended as part parlor game and part serious analysis, with the aim of illuminating the personalities, political climate, and competing strategies that we believed would frame the 2008 election. One can search in vain through the index for one name that in retrospect seems more relevant than we anticipated: Barack Obama. At the time, we took the Senate newcomer seriously that he was not planning to run in 2008. In our own defense, The Way to Win was meant less as an exercise in prediction than a description of the two great competing political brands over the preceding generation: Bush Politics and Clinton Politics. The dominance of the Bushes and Clintons, we argued, was not just a historical fluke. It was because the two families and their most important advisers (Karl Rove for the Bushes, people like Dick Morris and Mark Penn for the Clintons) had certain insights into modern politics that made them especially effective. There was a high degree of overlap, we found, into how great political minds like Bill Clinton and Rove perceived the challenge of dealing with modern media, or assembling effective coalitions, or fashioning an electoral college majority. Much of what these rivals had learned, it turned out, came from closely studying the work of each other. In the end, Bush Politics and Clinton Politics diverged on a basic point. The two dynasties had different theories of the case on the dominant fact of American politics over the past twenty years: the polarized electorate. Why is American politics so polarized? And how should effective politicians respond? Clinton Politics has one answer to this question. As Bill Clinton explained to Halperin and Harris, he believes that the American electorate is not in reality especially polarized. On most of the big ideological and cultural questions in American life, a significant majority of voters have gravitated toward a broad pragmatic consensus. This consensus, as he sees it, is often a sensible composite of views espoused by the two parties: skeptical of liberal sympathy for big government, for instance, but not ready to embrace the conservative instinct to dismantle the welfare state and leave people to fend for themselves. Far from being deeply divided, the American people strongly want unity and prefer consensus-building politicians. The reason they are frustrated in their aims is that politicians and their operatives—Clinton believes that in most cases these are conservative politicians and operatives—look for ways to divide the electorate for their own gain. So, while there may be a broad consensus on most cultural issues, there is sharp division on certain

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narrow and peripheral issues such as gay marriage that shrewd politicians can cynically exploit to their own advantage. Since Clinton Politics holds that the polarization is largely an artificial phenomenon, and that most voters prefer unity to division, the imperative of successful politicians is to soften the sharp edges of issues. It is also never to let the importuning of activists and special interests within a party coalition force a candidate too far from the political center—a center that should be constantly and rigorously identified through polling. Bush Politics has a different answer to the polarization question. Bush and Rove believed that the important fault lines in American politics were not artificial. They reflected deep and authentic disagreements over basic questions: about the size of government, about whether popular culture had become too secular and too coarse, about the proper balance of force and diplomacy as the United States asserts its interests abroad. The fractiousness of American politics, in this view, is not the work of cynical political operatives. It is because there are powerful disagreements, and the electorate is very evenly divided between two distinct worldviews. The imperative of Bush Politics, then, is not to blur these divisions but to sharpen them on the most favorable terms. Bush Politics worries less about finding an elusive center. It is concerned most of all with mobilizing voter turnout among activists. It is no surprise that Rove-directed campaigns were the great innovators in 2002 and 2004 in using e-mail and web-based technology to identify activists, raise money from them, and get them to the polls.

Obama: A Composite of Bush and Clinton Politics Barack Obama showed in 2008 that these two competing models, Bush Politics versus Clinton Politics, were not the stark choice that they had previously seemed to be. He succeeded by creating his own distinct political brand, one that was in some ways a composite of the two. One problem with Clinton Politics, Obama realized, was that it is highly unsatisfying to many Democratic activists. The Clintons’ emphasis on claiming the center required constant maneuvering and poll-driven compromise that to skeptics epitomized the slickness and even cynicism of modern politics. In the eyes of many Democratic activists, it was Hillary Clinton’s concern with political viability that led her to support the resolution authorizing the Iraq war in 2002. At the time, this was a mainstream Democratic position, and of the major Democratic presidential candidates, Obama was the only one to oppose Bush’s Iraq war policies in 2002. The frustration with Clinton Politics in some Democratic precincts goes back many years. Bill

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Clinton’s high popularity upon leaving office, combined with Hillary Clinton’s 2000 Senate victory, tended to conceal a delicate fact: there were many Democrats who were never that enthusiastic about the Clintons. Obama’s coalition eventually came to include many parts, but in the beginning, it rested on three pillars. The first was a group of highly educated, reform-minded white liberals, sometimes derisively referred to as the ‘‘googoos.’’ This group had never much liked the Clinton brand of politics. These were the kind of folks who in the 1992 Democratic primaries had been wary of Bill Clinton’s ‘‘Slick Willie’’ reputation and instead gravitated to candidates like former Massachusetts senator Paul Tsongas or former California governor Jerry Brown. In 2000, many in this bloc punished Al Gore for his association with Clinton and initially backed former New Jersey senator Bill Bradley for the Democratic nomination. In 2008, these types of anti-war, pro-reform voters—many of whom live in the crucial early state of Iowa— gravitated in powerful numbers to Obama over Hillary Clinton. The second leg of Obama’s early coalition was a group that in the past had always been strongly with the Clintons: African Americans. Under other circumstances, they surely would have given decisive support to Hillary Clinton in 2008. But, once Obama showed that he was a viable national candidate by winning heavily white Iowa, African Americans backed him in overwhelming numbers in every primary contest. The last leg of Obama’s primary support was young voters, who for the most part did not have strong memories or emotional attachments to the Clinton years or its principles. So Obama won the Democratic nomination on the strength of some voters who were in backlash against Clinton Politics and some for whom it was simply not relevant. Importantly, however, much of Obama’s own rhetorical appeal was rooted firmly in the tradition of Clinton Politics. He bemoaned how polarized the country had become, blamed Washington politics-as-usual for cynically exacerbating the differences, and promised as president to be a healer and a bridge-builder. Even as Obama was beating Hillary Clinton for the nomination, he was giving speeches that could easily have been delivered by Bill Clinton. A similar irony exists when it comes to Obama and George W. Bush. The Democratic nominee used elements of Bush Politics to end the Bush legacy. Bush in 2002 and 2004 succeeded as a base mobilizer. But the counter-reaction to his policies and political style by 2008 resulted in a Democratic base that was more energized, even radicalized, than ever before. In the wake of the 2004 election, commentators marveled at Bush’s success in engaging activists through technology. Obama embraced Bush’s innovations—and vastly improved them. In 2004, the Bush team assembled an e-mail list of supporters that was 6 million names long. Obama’s list in 2008 was 13 mil-

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lion. Bush had 1.2 million on-line volunteers; Obama had 2 million people registered on his campaign’s own social networking site, and 5 million people registered on other networking sites. It may well be that Obama’s brand of governance, though certainly not the specific policies, may well owe more to George W. Bush than to Bill Clinton. The forty-second president prospered by embracing small, discrete policies, and declared that the ‘‘era of big government is over.’’ The forty-third president, in his war policies and domestic policies alike, said that big government is very much with us. The forty-fourth president clearly believes this, too, judging by the expansive fiscal stimulus package he began preparing during his transition, and by his promises that major initiatives to expand health care coverage and overhaul energy policy are on the way during his first year. We clearly have another president who lives by the rule of big risk and high ambition. We are in a new era of politics. The generational passage may make the strategies and agendas of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush obsolete. We should not view the present principally through the prism of the past. But we should recognize the ways that the present builds on the recent past. In this light, Obama does not stand solely for the repudiation of the Clinton and Bush eras. He stands for a new brand of politics that draws its lineage from both his predecessors.

References Gallup Poll. 2008. ‘‘Bush Approval Rating Doldrums Continue.’’ Gallup.com. http:// www.gallup.com/poll/111280/Bush-Approval-Rating-Doldrums-Continue.aspx (accessed December 10). Halperin, Mark and John F. Harris. 2006. The Way to Win: Taking the White House in 2008. New York: Random House. Harris, John F. 2004a. ‘‘Victory Bears Out Emphasis on Values; GOP Tactics Aimed at Cultural Divide.’’ Washington Post. November 4, A Section. Harris, John F. 2004b. ‘‘Was Nov. 2 Realignment—Or a Tilt? Political Parties Look for Answers.’’ Washington Post. November 28, A Section.

2 The Campaign and the Media Diana Owen

Introduction he 2008 presidential campaign was a groundbreaking election for media. The communication environment showcased an unprecedented assortment of traditional and new media that provided an abundance of coverage as well as novel mechanisms for citizen engagement. The election clearly revealed that the American media system is evolving into a hybrid arrangement where traditional and new sources coexist, complement, compete, and conflict with one another. Further, election media both drove and were influenced by dramatic innovations in the candidates’ campaign strategies. Even as most citizens continued to receive much of their campaign information from television news and established newspapers, candidates were able to bypass media gatekeepers and get their message out to voters directly via an assortment of digital platforms. Perhaps the most marked innovation was the rise in user-generated content, as citizens used websites, blogs, video sharing sites, social networking sites, and podcasts to take part in the public campaign discourse. These developments were integral elements of the first twenty-first century American election campaign (Brownstein 2008). The election presented a variety of challenges and opportunities for the media. Coverage was influenced by the fact the 2008 contest was the most protracted election in history. The lengthy campaign season exacerbated the media’s need to find compelling story lines to fill the news hole and maintain audience interest in the election. The campaign dominated mainstream news coverage for more than two years and sparked an almost overwhelming bar-

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rage of new media content. The election media spectacle was more fast-paced and complicated than ever before. While the 24-hour news cycle is well established, the speed with which information flowed within and between an astounding array of campaign media was mind-boggling. This chapter provides an overview of the media in the 2008 presidential election. We begin with a discussion of traditional media coverage. The mainstream press maintained a strong presence in the media mix even as it dealt with financial cutbacks to its operations and the demands of competing in an increasingly overcrowded marketplace. Next, we examine the role of various new media in the campaign. The election enriched the political life of new media, which gained in audience popularity as the number of offerings expanded. We conclude by addressing the implications of the media for this election and beyond.

Traditional Media Coverage The traditional media consist of newspapers, magazines, network television news shows, and radio news programs. Their 2008 election coverage generally reflected the style and content that is characteristic of modern-day campaigns. Stories focused heavily on campaign strategies and the horse race between candidates. Reports of polls predicting the relative standings of the candidates were ubiquitous. Issue coverage, especially in-depth analyses of even prominent topics, was limited (Patterson 2002; Project for Excellence in Journalism 2008c). Candidates’ character and temperament, including analyses of their body language, demeanor, and personal lives, were major elements of the campaign media discourse. Negative campaigning by candidates, parties, and political organizations attracted much press attention, as it has become an established component of election reporting (Mark 2006). In addition, much coverage was episodic; rather than following a coherent narrative, stories were developed in response to particular dramatic events that occurred throughout the campaign, such as Obama’s pre-convention trip to Europe and the Middle East and McCain’s choice of Sarah Palin as his running mate. Press Coverage of the Endless Campaign The role and nature of mainstream press coverage shifted during various phases of the election. The prenomination phase, before the major candidates had officially announced, was characterized by media conjecture about who would run and assessments of candidate viability. During the lengthy

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nomination phase, reporters not only covered the contest between the candidates, they also tracked new developments in election media and campaigning, such as the role of YouTube and Facebook. Convention reporting focused on the vice presidential choices and the history-making nomination of Barack Obama as the first black candidate for president. General election coverage reflected well-established norms, as the press relied heavily on traditional horse race, game, and conflict reporting frames. The horse race frame focuses on the competition between candidates in terms of who’s ahead and behind in the election. The game frame deals with the strategic moves made by candidates, their campaign committees, and political parties to the exclusion of issue considerations. The conflict frame highlights drama and controversy both between candidates and within their own campaign organizations. With no incumbent in the picture, rampant press speculation about possible candidates began soon after President George W. Bush took office in 2005. Potential candidates established exploratory committees, began fundraising, and tested the media waters three years prior to the general election. A handful of possible contenders made early headlines due to their perceived viability, star power, and intriguing story lines. These speculative candidates included Democrats Hillary Clinton, Al Gore, Barack Obama, and John Edwards, and Republicans Mitt Romney, Rudy Giuliani, and John McCain. Former Alaska senator Mike Gravel and former Iowa governor Tom Vilsack, the only two candidates to officially declare their candidacies in 2006, received hardly a mention in the press. Hillary Clinton garnered the lion’s share of coverage in the prenomination phase even though she had not yet officially become a candidate. According to the Project for Excellence in Journalism (PEJ), by February 2007, eleven months before the first primary was held in New Hampshire, the election had received more mainstream media coverage than any story other than the war in Iraq (Project for Excellence in Journalism 2008a). (PEJ includes news stories published in online media associated with major print and television outlets in their calculations in addition to traditional media stories.) The nominating phase of the campaign began when the major contenders declared that they were running for president in January and February 2007, a year before the Iowa caucuses. Media coverage at this point in the campaign is crucial for candidates, who may be unknown to voters and must establish their viability to attract donors and volunteers (Kendall 2000; Miller and Peake 2008). Although approximately twenty candidates who had thrown their hats into the ring received at least some press coverage, by February most of the attention had been focused on five potential nominees— Democrats Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama and Republicans Rudy Giuli-

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ani, John McCain, and Mitt Romney. Former Tennessee senator and Law and Order cast member Fred Thompson, a rather reluctant candidate who withdrew from the race on January 22, also received significant coverage due to his celebrity. The Democratic candidates continued to attract the most mainstream media attention throughout the nominating campaign, garnering 49 percent of coverage versus 31 percent for the Republicans (Project for Excellence in Journalism 2008a). The exceptional circumstance of having a woman and a black candidate contesting for the Democratic nomination offered more opportunities for reporters to develop dramatic story lines about gender and race. The political rock star status of Clinton and Obama grew as the campaign wore on, and they drew large crowds at every whistlestop. In addition, it took the Democrats thirteen weeks longer than the Republicans to reach the number of delegates necessary for a candidate to secure the nomination. As the tight race went down to the wire, the press defaulted to the horse race coverage that has become a staple. Over 60 percent of mainstream media coverage dealt with the horse race and campaign tactics, while 17 percent considered the candidates’ personal lives and backgrounds, and 15 percent examined issues (Project for Excellence in Journalism 2008a). Only one out of seven stories on the four major television networks—ABC, CBS, NBC, and Fox News—mentioned the candidates’ issue positions (Center for Media and Public Affairs 2008a). The tone of media coverage also differed markedly across candidates. From the beginning of January to the end of May, Democratic candidate Barack Obama received 47 percent favorable coverage compared to 27 percent for his rival, Hillary Clinton. Only 16 percent of Obama’s coverage was negative, as opposed to 38 percent for Clinton. On the Republican side, almost half (48 percent) of John McCain’s coverage was negative as was 37 percent of the reporting on Rudy Giuliani, who had withdrawn from the campaign at the end of January. McCain received a meager 12 percent positive coverage, compared to 28 percent for Giuliani (Project for Excellence in Journalism 2008a). With the Republican nomination secured by John McCain on March 4, 2008, and the Democratic spot locked up by Barack Obama on June 3, media coverage of the campaign waned in the build-up to the national nominating conventions. The press sought to sustain interest in the election over the summer by playing up controversies, as both candidates received more negative than positive press (Center for Media and Public Affairs 2008b). Reports scrutinizing Obama’s patriotism were fueled by rumors that he refused to say the Pledge of Allegiance and comments by his outspoken supporter, General Wesley Clark, that being a fighter pilot and getting shot down did not qualify John McCain for the presidency. McCain was plagued by persistent press

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rumors that his campaign organization was in disarray, and he was hounded by a gaffe during an interview where he seemed not to know how many houses he owned. Obama consistently generated significantly more mainstream media coverage than McCain in the ten weeks leading up to the Democratic National Convention in late August. The prospective Democratic nominee was a major subject in 77 percent of campaign stories, compared to 54 percent for McCain. One of the biggest story lines of the entire campaign, constituting over 50 percent of all election reports for that week in mid-July, was Obama’s trip to Europe and the Middle East to bolster his foreign policy credentials (Project for Excellence in Journalism 2008e). McCain’s spirited visit to a German restaurant in Columbus, Ohio, was no match for Obama’s speech to a crowd of over 200,000 people in Berlin on the same day. The amount and positive tone of stories about Obama versus McCain’s more limited and highly negative coverage gave rise to charges of a ‘‘liberal bias’’ in the news. A PEJ report stated that eight out of ten journalists would likely vote for Obama. Even journalists found themselves criticizing their profession and reporting (e.g., Malone 2008). After reading the PEJ report, the independent newspaper, Politico, questioned its own objectivity, conducted an analysis, and discovered that 110 of its stories in October favored Obama compared to 69 for McCain (Harris and VandeHei 2008). As the party conventions drew near, media attention shifted to the veepstakes—speculation about whom the candidates would choose as their running mates. Coverage of the potential vice presidential picks constituted nearly one-third of the election news hole in the week prior to the announcement of each selection (Project for Excellence in Journalism 2008c). Obama’s choice of Senator Joseph Biden to round out the ticket prompted news organizations to point out that Biden had criticized Obama as not being ready to lead when he was a candidate for the Democratic nomination himself. The choice of the little-known Alaska governor, Sarah Palin, by McCain to be the first woman to share the Republican presidential ticket generated a frenzy of media attention. Coverage of the Republican presidential hopefuls exceeded that of the Democrats for the first time in three months. Reports were split between reactions to Palin’s surprise candidacy, stories about her personal and family life, including the pregnancy of her unwed daughter, Bristol, and her public record. Prior to the convention, the press uncovered ‘‘Troopergate,’’ allegations that Palin had fired a public official who refused to dismiss her ex-brother-in-law, an Alaska state trooper who had been involved in a contentious custody battle with her sister (Project for Excellence in Journalism 2008d).

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The presidential nominating conventions have been characterized as ‘‘four-night TV miniseries carefully scripted to win over viewers’’ (Davies 2008). The big three television networks devoted only one hour a night to the conventions, which required the Democratic and Republican parties to strategically schedule their featured speakers. The cable networks offered between eighteen and twenty hours of television coverage per day along with live broadcasts of speeches, interviews, and commentary on their websites. Convention media, which featured limited network coverage and extensive treatment by new media, is indicative of the twenty-first-century campaign. The nominees’ acceptance speeches were the highlights of both conventions. Obama eschewed the traditional podium at the convention site to deliver his address to a jam-packed audience at Invesco Field, home of the Denver Broncos football team, from a set evocative of the White House. The spectacle concluded with a dramatic fireworks display. McCain’s speech benefited from the lead-in of the first game of the NFL season as well as anticipation surrounding the formal introduction of his wild-card running mate, Sarah Palin. Both presidential candidates broke audience viewership records with their acceptance speeches. Obama drew an audience of nearly 38.4 million viewers, only to be topped by McCain with 38.9 million viewers a few days later (Greppi 2008). Each speech attracted more viewers than the finals of American Idol and the opening ceremonies of the Beijing Olympics. While both tickets experienced an uptick in the polls following their conventions, McCain edged slightly ahead of Obama following the Republican National Convention (Gallup 2008), a move that the press referred to as the ‘‘Palin bounce.’’ The Republicans were able to leverage Palin’s immediate media stardom to energize their base among conservative voters. The mainstream press’s reporting on the general election was more of the same. The majority of coverage concentrated on polls and strategy, especially during the final three weeks of the campaign. However, the amount of horse race coverage in 2008 was slightly less (53 percent) than in other presidential elections since 1988, while treatment of issues and policy (20 percent) was somewhat higher (Project for Excellence in Journalism 2008b). Television network news coverage, in particular, contained more policy issue content (36 percent) than horse race coverage (31 percent) (Center for Media and Public Affairs 2008b). These trends were partly due to the public’s demand for issue information (Borger 2008). More pressing, however, was the press’s need to incorporate coverage of the country’s financial crisis into campaign reporting, including how the candidates were reacting to the situation and speculation about how they would handle the economy if elected to office. McCain drew significant coverage for his announcement that he was suspending his campaign to deal with the economic crisis, a move that drew

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press criticism. In addition, the media amplified negative aspects of the campaign in the quest to create drama. A quip by Obama at a September campaign rally in Virginia was turned into a press-fed election incident. Obama stated, ‘‘You can put lipstick on a pig. It’s still a pig. You can wrap up an old fish in a piece of paper and call it change. It’s still going to stink after eight years. We’ve had enough.’’ The comment prompted extensive media debate about whether it was ‘‘an innocent remark,’’ as Obama claimed, or a sexist slam at Sarah Palin’s statement in her address at the Republican National Convention that she was a ‘‘pit bull with lipstick,’’ as her campaign officials alleged. The controversy remained a hot campaign topic for days. Although the presidential candidates received roughly the same amount of mainstream media attention in the general election, the tone of coverage differed greatly. As table 2.1 demonstrates, Obama received much more favorable coverage and less negative coverage than McCain. In fact, the majority of stories about McCain (57 percent) were negative compared to less than one-third (29 percent) for his opponent. Several factors explain this discrepancy. First, stories were considered positive if a candidate was found to be leading the horse race, and Obama was ahead for most of the election. Maps predicting the electoral college showed an abundance of blue states favoring the Democratic candidate. Stories applauded Obama’s campaign organization for being well run and his fund-raising for outpacing McCain’s efforts. In addition, McCain’s campaign rhetoric was more inflammatory than Obama’s by design, as the underdog’s strategy dictated that he go on the offensive. Finally, the story line anticipating Obama as the first black American president was overwhelmingly positive. Media coverage of the vice presidential candidates also differed sharply. Sarah Palin received more than three times the time and space devoted to Joe Biden. In the first couple of weeks following the convention, Palin got almost as much press attention as McCain did at the head of the ticket, much of it positive. Negative coverage of Palin increased as the campaign wore on, as questions about her credentials, lack of foreign policy experience, and issues surrounding her family were underscored. A spot-on parody of Palin by comedienne Tina Fey on Saturday Night Live, where Palin eventually made a guest appearance, contributed to her less laudatory coverage, as she was portrayed as unserious and cartoonish. As table 2.1 indicates, almost half of Biden’s mainstream media coverage was negative and only 17 percent was favorable (Project for Excellence in Journalism 2008b). While Obama’s strategy was to remain positive on the campaign trail, Biden picked up the slack by attacking the Republican ticket. A misstatement by Biden alleging that Obama would be tested by a world crisis during his first six months in office

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Positive Negative Neutral

McCain

Obama

Palin

Biden

14% 57% 29%

36% 29% 35%

28% 39% 33%

17% 48% 35%

Source: Project for Excellence in Journalism, 2008b.

earned him almost as much coverage as his participation in the vice presidential debate. News in a Hypermedia Electoral Environment In order to keep the public interested in an extraordinarily long campaign, sensational stories, allegations, speculation, and pseudo scandals were allotted significant time and space in the mainstream media. In the media-saturated campaign of 2008, these ‘‘breaking news’’ stories were propelled further by bloggers and citizen journalists who actively spun reports and prompted commentary. The robust presence of these amateur journalists in the campaign was another departure from past practices, as blogging in the presidential election was in its infancy in 2004. Much campaign coverage was repetitious, and particular story lines lasted well beyond their shelf life. Media-driven controversies surrounding Barack Obama’s failure to wear a flag lapel pin and Sarah Palin’s $150,000 wardrobe provided by the Republican National Committee made headlines for days. A cast of marginal characters gained prominence as the media pursued fresh coverage angles. During the primary season, Obama faced extensive criticism for his association with Reverend Jeremiah Wright, his pastor of twenty years at Trinity United Church of Christ in Chicago. Wright had a history of making inflammatory speeches, including one where he stated that the United States brought on the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, with its own terrorism. Stories linking Obama and Wright constituted 37 percent of campaign coverage for the week of March 17 (Project for Excellence in Journalism 2008g). Obama was forced to engage in damage control by distancing himself from Reverend Wright in a stirring speech on race. At around the same point in the campaign, McCain faced a similar controversy over the endorsement of anti-Catholic, anti-Semitic pastor John Hagee, although coverage was far less extensive. The case of ‘‘Joe the Plumber’’ provides an illustration of how story lines involving new campaign characters evolve. Early in the final presidential

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debate on October 15, John McCain used the example of Samuel Joseph Wurzelbacher, a plumber who had spoken with Barack Obama about his tax plan during a campaign stop in Toledo, Ohio, to make the case that Obama’s plan would raise taxes on middle Americans and redistribute wealth. The six-minute exchange between Obama and Wurzelbacher had been posted on YouTube, and was picked up by conservative bloggers, covered on Fox News Channel, and was the subject of an editorial in the New York Post. McCain stated that ‘‘Joe the Plumber’’ wanted to buy the plumbing business for which he worked, but Obama’s tax plan would make this prohibitively costly. ‘‘You were going to put him in a higher tax bracket which was going to increase his taxes, which was going to cause him not to be able to employ people, which Joe was trying to realize the American dream [sic],’’ McCain alleged. ‘‘Joe the Plumber’’ was mentioned no fewer than two dozen times during the debate, thrusting Wurzelbacher into the campaign spotlight and making him an overnight celebrity. The press quickly looked into Joe’s background, revealing that he was not a licensed plumber, owed back taxes, had a lien on his house, and that his name was misspelled on the voter registry in his town. In addition, experts pointed out that Joe’s taxes were not likely to rise under Obama’s plan (Rohter 2008). This scrutiny did not stop Joe from enjoying his fifteen minutes of campaign fame. He met with journalists who were camped outside his home, and did interviews with CBS News’ Katie Couric, ABC’s Good Morning America, and Fox News. He went on the campaign trail on behalf of John McCain and Sarah Palin, who mentioned Joe during their campaign appearances. The McCain-Palin campaign produced a 30-second ‘‘Joe the Plumber’’ campaign commercial which attacked Obama for ‘‘raising taxes on seniors, hardworking families to give ‘welfare’ to those who pay none.’’ Wurzelbacher hired an agent, and signed a deal to write a book entitled, Joe the Plumber: Fighting for the American Dream. Media coverage of ‘‘Joe the Plumber’’ was extensive during the week of the presidential debate. It was the third most popular story line in the mainstream press, and filled 8 percent of the election news hole (Jurkowitz 2008a). Joe remained in the news for the remainder of the campaign and even made headlines in the weeks following the election (Jurkowitz 2008b). Getting the Story Despite the proliferation of news media, reporters covering the campaign for established print media organizations and wire services like the Associated Press (AP) largely set the agenda for other news sources (Just et al. 1996). In 2008, mainstream newspaper stories were regularly repurposed by television, radio, and new media outlets. A well-placed story in the New York Times or

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another major print publication could trigger an avalanche of copycat reports, especially when the piece was based on original source material. Print journalists who tag along with the candidates on the campaign trail have traditionally provided firsthand accounts of the election. Reporters ‘‘on the bus’’ have been criticized for engaging in pack journalism, a kind of groupthink that results in uniformity of coverage (Crouse 1972). Despite this claim, in previous elections there were numerous reporters chasing down stories and offering different outlooks on the campaign. There were only a handful of traveling journalists in this campaign, representing about two dozen publications, filing stories from the field. Financial setbacks to the newspaper industry caused by declining advertising revenues and increased costs associated with newsgathering have forced news organizations to slash journalists from their payrolls. As a result, there were fewer stories providing original observations and insights, and more pieces were filed from the newsroom. Similarly, established television and cable networks were suppliers of source material for old and new media. They provided live feed and video that was used by print reporters to write stories. While the emergence of new video channels for disseminating campaign content received continual hype, clips from network television news programs were among the most prevalent and popular postings on YouTube. The implications of having fewer reporters ‘‘on the bus’’ extend beyond the campaign itself. According to the New York Times’ Jacques Steinberg, ‘‘the absence of some newspapers on the trail suggests not only that readers are being exposed to fewer perspectives drawn from shoe-leather reporting, but also that fewer reporters will arrive at the White House in January with the experience that editors have typically required to cover a president on Day 1’’ (Steinberg 2008: 1).

Online Election Media The burgeoning of online media was a hallmark of the campaign, and is a trademark of the twenty-first century media election (Simendinger 2008). Internet platforms that had been road tested in previous campaigns, such as websites, blogs, and discussion boards, proliferated and achieved new levels of sophistication. Video sharing and social networking sites that employ digital technology to enhance information sharing and collaboration were adapted for the campaign context. These Web 2.0 applications represent a second generation of Internet-based services that are designed to develop and manage online communities, enabling more seamless interaction and communication among users. Journalists for independent political news sites

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honed their craft, improving their offerings and providing information using novel, even cutting-edge, techniques. User-generated media, where nonprofessionals make use of the easily accessible tools afforded by the Internet and other digital technologies to create content for public dissemination, reached new heights. Citizen journalists made significant contributions to coverage, at times providing on-site reporting and analysis when professional print journalists were absent. Online video hosting and social networking sites added a new dimension to the campaign media mix. Young people were at the forefront of these innovations, which contributed to their increased engagement in the election (Owen 2008). These novel communications options enhanced, to some extent, the scope of campaign media content, and even broke some campaign stories. More often than not, however, online election media amplified the coverage of mainstream media, propagating the same stories in newfangled and sometimes more elaborate packaging. The horse race, rumors, and sensational stories were as much a part of online election media as they were staples of the mainstream press. Independent Political News Sites Political news sites and blogs unaffiliated with corporate media organizations made their mark during the campaign. Stand-alone sites, including Huffington Post, Politico, Drudge Report, Real Clear Politics, and Free Republic, sought to differentiate themselves from traditional media by offering fresh election coverage, commentary, and features. Politico, which celebrated its two-year anniversary the week of the election, provides an example of how an independent news site benefited from the campaign. A start-up that was able to recruit talented journalists from major publications, Politico offered detailed coverage of Capitol Hill and the campaign. The site combined standard news stories and columns with inside-the-Beltway gossip, blogs, and visuals. James Kotecki, who as a Georgetown University student posted interviews with candidates Ron Paul and Mike Gravel in his dorm room on YouTube, was hired to produce video blogs that appealed to a younger audience. Reporting on the web with a staff devoted to all politics all the time allowed Politico to cover fast-breaking stories, such as the country’s financial crisis and its implications for the election, with immediacy and depth, and to scoop major news organizations. Independent political sites drew record numbers of visitors during the campaign. Public awareness increased as the sites stepped up their advertising campaigns, received mainstream media coverage, and were linked by users. The sites gained credibility as political influentials began to rely on

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them as prime sources of information, and the New York Times and the Washington Post cited them regularly (Koblin 2008). Over the course of the final year of the campaign, visitors to the top independent political sites grew exponentially. Politico gained over 4 million unique visitors, an increase of 344 percent (Lipsman 2008). However, the sites were not able to maintain the peak audiences they had amassed after the campaign. The drop-offs were precipitous, with Huffington Post and Politico each losing half of their audiences in the week following the election (Hitwise 2008). Citizen Journalism Citizen journalists who lacked formal press credentials and training played an active role in covering the campaign. Also known as grassroots media and ‘‘we-media,’’ citizen journalism consists of communities that produce, consume, circulate, and discuss content online (Owen 2007). Scores of volunteer reporters engaged in ‘‘writing, reporting, recording, digging, web searching, e-mailing, news scanning, tape editing, expertise-sharing, columnizing, team playing, and eye-witnessing’’ (Huffington and Rosen 2008), most often without monetary compensation. There is an experimental quality to much citizen journalism, as sites seek to provide an alternative to corporate journalism and to report news and express opinions that otherwise would not be shared. At the same time, citizen journalism is a mechanism for keeping people engaged with a site. A number of noteworthy citizen journalism sites were formed specifically to cover the 2008 contest. Off the Bus (OTB), a partnership between Huffington Post and NewAssignment.net, an experimental site that promotes collaboration between professional and amateur journalists, engaged over 12,000 contributors. Volunteer reporters were assigned to blogs representing beats for particular candidates where they wrote articles and commentary about issues and events, provided on-the-scene reports from campaign stops, and shared original photos and videos. According to Arianna Huffington, the goal of OTB was ‘‘to provide an authentic counter-narrative to the lockstep consensus we often get from the mainstream media’’ (Huffington 2007). OTB hired a professional editorial staff to maintain quality control, and used established newsroom protocols for research, fact-checking, and sourcing (Seelye 2007). Scoop08, the first national daily online newspaper to be staffed entirely by volunteers, employed an army of several hundred high school and college student reporters, including overseas correspondents, to cover the campaign from the perspective of young people. The student journalists worked in conjunction with an advisory board of prominent professional editors and reporters who volunteered their time. Scoop08 incorporated Web

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2.0 innovations into its virtual newsroom, including advanced interactive features and video blogs or vlogs. In addition to covering the major stories surrounding the campaign, Scoop08 featured unconventional beats, including independent candidates, arts and culture, and sports and the campaign (Heffner 2008). Both of these ventures were so successful in establishing workable infrastructures for volunteer reporting and providing an alternative news source for sizable audiences that they continued to function after the election. Established media organizations incorporated citizen journalism into their campaign coverage as well. CNN’s iReport, established in August 2006, allows people from around the world to submit pictures and video stories to the CNN website and contribute to a related blog. Submissions are unfiltered and unedited unless they are used as part of CNN’s news coverage. Over 700 iReports related to the 2008 election were submitted, including serious statements about issues, numerous comedic videos about Sarah Palin, and documentation of voting problems on Election Day. MSNBC’s FirstPerson, CBS News’ Citizen Journalism, ABC News’ i-Caught, and Fox News’ uReport/ uAsk platforms also provided citizens opportunities to submit content, especially photos with explanatory captions. While periodically citizen-generated material was featured prominently on these sites, professional news organizations’ efforts to support volunteer journalism during the campaign were mostly rudimentary and unsupervised. At its best, citizen journalism provided fresh perspectives on the campaign and covered territory that was missed by the mainstream press. Volunteer reporters brought eyewitness accounts of candidates on the campaign trail, supplementing the stories of the downsized professional press presence on the bus. At its worst, volunteer reporters acted outside the norms of responsible reporting, and compromised journalistic integrity by disseminating unreliable or nonfactual information. There were times when citizen journalists broke stories during the campaign where the ethics of their newsgathering was called into question. Mayhill Fowler, a citizen journalist writing for Off the Bus, attended an Obama fund-raiser in San Francisco during the nominating campaign which was closed to the press. Obama made a comment about people in small towns in Pennsylvania and the Midwest who, in the face of long-term joblessness, ‘‘get bitter, they cling to guns or religion or antipathy to people who aren’t like them or anti-immigrant sentiment or anti-trade sentiment as a way to explain their frustration’’ (Fowler, 2008). Fowler’s story quickly made its way from OTB on Huffington Post to the mainstream media, generating a firestorm of negative coverage. Rival Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton incorporated the ‘‘bitter’’ comment into her attacks on Obama. A grainy video of the speech appeared on YouTube.

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Fowler was widely criticized by professional journalists for not following the ground rules barring press coverage. However, the Obama campaign responded by stating that all of the candidate’s comments were on the record, validating the position that citizen journalists were free to write about what they see and hear, and using the incident to assert Obama’s support for authentic and transparent campaign communication. The audience for citizen journalism is far smaller than for mainstream media, but it is still significant. Twenty-seven percent of voters claim to have read a blog about the campaign. Younger voters are far more likely than older voters to consult campaign blogs, with 42 percent of 18–29 year olds, 30 percent of 30–39 year olds, 24 percent of 50–64 year olds, and 9 percent of those 65 and older visiting blog sites. There were partisan differences as well, as Democrats (30 percent) were more likely than Republicans (23 percent) and Independents (27 percent) to read blogs (Pew Research Center for the People & the Press 2008b). In general, the top ten political blogs receive 90 percent of reader traffic (Hindman 2009). While there were hundreds of blogs that posted campaign-related content, only a small number had consistent readership. Huffington Post topped the list of political blogs primarily due to its campaign coverage. The site attracted 8.1 million unique visitors in the month of October 2008, an increase of 448 percent from the previous year (Saba 2008). Online Video Online videos, especially those posted on video sharing sites, represent an important media landmark in the 2008 campaign. In particular, YouTube, a video sharing site that did not exist during the last presidential election, became a platform for campaign discourse ranging from the serious to the silly. Seven of the sixteen major candidates seeking the presidential nomination announced their bids via YouTube, and all of the contenders posted videos to the site (Schwab 2008). Democratic and Republican debates were held on CNN during the primary where candidates answered questions delivered by citizen-contributed YouTube videos. In an era of 8-second television news sound bites and journalistic filters, online videos offered candidates the opportunity to get their message out on their own terms. Obama’s 37-minute speech on race in March 2008 in which he rebutted attacks against his candidacy was viewed over 5.3 million times, outpacing viewership for all of the cable channels combined for that week (Melber 2008). The proliferation of online videos made headlines, driving millions of voters to view clever and controversial postings developed by individuals and organizations not affiliated with the presidential campaigns. ‘‘I Got a Crush

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. . . on Obama,’’ a video produced by BarelyPolitical.com, depicted scantily clothed model Amber Lee Ettinger proclaiming her devotion to the Democratic candidate. The ‘‘Obama Girl’’ video generated over 11 million views on YouTube and sparked numerous spin-offs featuring the likes of ‘‘Giuliani Girl,’’ ‘‘Ron Paul Girl,’’ and ‘‘Incredible McCain Girl,’’ who morphed into the Incredible Hulk to avenge critics of John McCain. will.i.am, frontman for the hip hop/funk group Black Eyed Peas, and director Jesse Dylan produced the video ‘‘Yes, We Can,’’ a star-studded rendition built around Obama’s speech following the New Hampshire primary highlighting historical junctures in America’s quest for freedom and equality. The video, which premiered on ABCNewsNow, received over 16 million views on YouTube and other sites, and was played by the Obama campaign at rallies (ABC News 2008). A video entitled ‘‘Dear Mr. Obama’’ featured a young Iraq War veteran professing his support for John McCain in an emotional message to his opponent. It was produced by Michael Brown, an independent filmmaker with no prior political experience, and garnered over 13 million YouTube views (Sifry 2008a). Barack Obama’s online video presence far exceeded that of John McCain. A survey of postings by candidates, parties, organizations, and individuals on over 200 video sites from July 2007 until Election Day conducted by divinity Metrics identified a total of 104,456 videos pertaining to Obama and 64,092 related to McCain. The Obama campaign itself placed 1,982 videos compared to 376 posted by the McCain campaign. These videos consisted of candidates’ speeches, interviews, ads, and debate clips. Obama videos received approximately 900 million hits, while McCain videos had 500 million hits (Gannes 2008). There are a number of explanations for this disparity. Obama’s video prominence was established during the lengthy Democratic nominating campaign, and remained vital as the contest with Hillary Clinton went down to the wire. McCain had locked up the nomination by early March; his video activity was limited until just before the Republication National Convention and spiked with the announcement of Sarah Palin as his running mate. Palin videos, many of which featured parodies, remained popular throughout the general election. In addition, younger people, who were heavily in Obama’s camp, were more likely to post and view online campaign videos than the older voters who supported McCain (divinity Metrics 2008). Online campaign videos proved to be popular with the general public, as the audience for videos increased steadily over the course of the campaign. As the election drew to a close, 39 percent of the public reported having watched some type of election video online, up from 24 percent in December 2007. Democrats (43 percent) and Independents (41 percent) were decidedly more inclined than Republicans (35 percent) to view online campaign videos

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(Pew Research Center for the People & the Press 2008a), which reflects the comparative online presence of the two presidential candidates. Republicans also were less inclined than Democrats to use online media for campaign information, as they feel that the medium in general have a liberal bias (Pew Research Center for the People & the Press 2008b). The value of posting YouTube videos, which is a free service, to the 2008 presidential campaigns when translated into television advertising time is significant. TubeMogul estimated that the total video watch time (which is equivalent to the number of video views multiplied by length of each spot posted by a campaign) was 14,548,810 hours for Obama and 488,093 for McCain for the eighteen months leading up to the election. This translates into the equivalent of approximately $46 million in television advertising buys for Obama compared to $1.5 million for McCain. While this difference may appear astounding, it is important to keep in mind the difficulty of making a direct comparison between television and online advertising. Television is a form of push media, where exposure to ads may be inadvertent as they are interspersed among other programming and are designed to reach multiple users at once. Online ads are a pull media, where users must take action in order to watch. Even if an individual clicks on an ad, she or he may choose not to watch or to view only part of the video. Further, a single user may click on a particular online ad multiple times, which may increase the number of video views, but not the size of the audience that is reached (Sifry 2008b; Chronicle of Higher Education 2008). Social Networking Sites The emergence of social media as a source of campaign communication was a major innovation in 2008, especially during the nominating process. Social networking sites, such as Facebook and MySpace, consist of platforms hosting user-generated content that is passed on through networks of friends and associates to spread and gather information, influence opinion, and create organizations. The use of social media by individuals and campaigns to recruit volunteers and raise money was a transformative strategy. Such efforts led to unprecedented outreach on behalf of candidates and valuable publicity at little or no cost to campaigns. Social media messages, especially those generated by members of the public, can be more influential than those disseminated by the institutionalized press or campaigns because audience members are more likely to view and believe messages they receive through their personal networks (Graf 2008). Facebook, the most popular social networking site for politics, saw its user base increase from 69.3 million in August 2008, to more than 120 million in

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October (Wee and Levi 2008). The site supports versatile applications where users can post their support for a candidate or cause on their profile, link to outside content, share photos and videos, and write comments on ‘‘walls’’ used for sharing information. The ‘‘events’’ feature allows individuals to invite others to sign a petition, attend a political rally, register to vote, or sign up to volunteer for a candidate. These features can be interactive, as users can post information, engage in discussions about the campaign, or publicize events. Facebook’s power to publicize campaign information and happenings was notable. Two days before a quickly organized event featuring Chelsea Clinton at the University of North Carolina, a student established a Facebook group called ‘‘Heels for Hillary’’ to spread the word; the result was a packed house (Brownstein 2008). Thousands of Facebook users joined virtual fan clubs established by individuals and campaign officials for and against presidential contestants Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama, John McCain, Mike Huckabee, Ron Paul, and Dennis Kucinich (Owen 2008). Even the candidates gave props to the site. During the Al Smith dinner, the only campaign event other than debates that brought the two opposing candidates together, Obama referenced the site in his humorous comments. ‘‘For the past few weeks John McCain has been out on the campaign trail asking this question: Who is Barack Obama? I have to admit I was a little surprised by this question. The answer is right there on my Facebook page.’’ Not all attempts to innovate using social networking platforms during the election were successful. Facebook hosted debates in conjunction with ABC News prior to the New Hampshire primary on January 5. Over 6 million Facebook users attempted to respond to polls on the issues, participate in a live discussion of the debate, and vote for their favorite candidate. ABC News provided a ‘‘Facebook anchor’’ who kept the television audience abreast of what was happening on-line. During the East Coast broadcast of the debates alone, Facebook users posted over 35,000 ‘‘Soundboard’’ messages of varying quality. The exercise proved unmanageable, as to read all of these messages at 20 per page required users to refresh their browsers’ screen 1,750 times (Broache 2008).

Audience Shift The explosion in media offerings and nonstop election coverage not only influenced the dynamics of the campaign, it also influenced where and how voters got their information. Evidence suggests that audience preferences for campaign media changed somewhat during the election. While voters still

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frequently consulted mainstream media, online media became important sources of campaign information. Television remained the main source of news for a majority of people, but the percentage dropped to 68 percent, down from 76 percent in 2004. Regular reliance on a daily print newspaper for campaign news dropped from 40 percent to 31 percent in four years. At the same time, 59 percent of voters used the Internet for campaign information or to engage in some sort of communication about the election, with 36 percent treating online news as a main source. These figures represent a significant uptick since 2004, when only 21 percent of the public regularly consulted online media. The shift is most apparent for young people, a strong majority of whom rely primarily on Internet sources (Pew Research Center for the People & the Press 2008b). The complex reality underpinning these audience statistics should not be underestimated, especially as they beg the question of whether the shift in the choice of platform corresponds to a significant change in the content to which audience members are exposed. The shift from traditional to new media use represents the growing hybridization of the media system. Audience preferences for particular types of delivery systems for news have changed, as people are abandoning hard-copy newspapers in favor of online news sites. However, these sites contain much of the same core content that is produced by professional print journalists. It mattered that there were fewer professional print reporters on the campaign trail because there was a dearth of substantive eyewitness coverage across media—old and new. In addition to hosting content that has typically populated traditional media, hybrid news platforms integrate novel innovations for incorporating fresh content, such as user feedback and citizen journalism (Fielder 2008; McQuaid 2008). The extent to which audience members are using online news sites primarily to access traditional news stories versus novel content warrants further investigation. While candidates must start organizing early and prepare for the long haul, voters are not inclined to pay attention until it comes time for them to make a decision (Patterson 2002). Still, the public tuned in with regularity and attentiveness over the course of the election. Campaign media attracted firsttime audiences and constituencies who are difficult to reach, such as young voters. The perceived importance of the decision, the openness of the race, excitement about candidates, the uncertain state of the economy, and unparalleled outreach to voters kept people absorbed in the election. In this high-intensity, high-interest election, the media had the chance to demonstrate that they could provide fair and useful information upon which voters could base their decisions. They were moderately successful in this endeavor, as most people felt that they had enough information to make an

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informed choice and a majority believed that coverage was fair (Pew Research Center for the People & the Press 2008b). Voters were more actively engaged in their use of election media than in the past. As New York Times reporter Adam Nagourney observed, the changes in the campaign and media environments ‘‘reflect a cultural shift in voters, producing an audience that is at once better informed, more skeptical and, from reading blogs, sometimes trafficking in rumors or suspect information. As a result, this new electorate tends to be more questioning of what it is told by campaigns and often uses the Web to do its own fact-checking’’ (2008: 2).

Conclusion The 2008 election foreshadows what we might expect in future campaigns, especially the 2012 presidential contest. As we have seen, the campaign media landscape shifted considerably in 2008. The mainstream media are maintaining a strong foothold in the campaign media jumble, even as they are adapting to the changing information environment. The content and style of their campaign reporting has deviated little from the game-centric, dramatic coverage that is their trademark. There is little reason to anticipate that they will not continue this long-established tradition. Online news media have established a key foothold in the election information marketplace, and have moved beyond the niche position they have inhabited in previous presidential contests. The newer digital platforms, such as video sharing and social networking sites that were novelties in 2008, will likely become established and continue to be useful tools for communication and engagement. The implications of the evolving twenty-first century media election are, on balance, positive. The media played a role in generating interest in a presidential election campaign among an electorate that is generally indifferent toward politics. The media impressed upon voters that 2008 was a pioneering election the likes of which we are not likely to witness again in the near future. The extensive media offerings reached broader audiences than in past elections and provided content that appealed to a wide range of preferences. Interactive media presented increased opportunities for voters, especially young people, to engage in the campaign. In addition, the media provided voters with sufficient reliable and relevant election reports despite the fact that the most accessible sources, especially television news, did not always offer the highest quality information. Over time, audience members will be in a better position to tailor their election media experience to suit their needs as they become familiar with the plethora of offerings and how to best engage them.

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References ABC News. 2008. ‘‘New celeb-filled music video for Obama.’’ abcnews.com. February 2. http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id4231523 (accessed November 12, 2008). Borger, Gloria. 2008. ‘‘Viewers wanted more election news, not less.’’ hks.harv ard.edu/presspol. November 12. http://www.hks.harvard.edu/presspol/news_events/ news_archive/2008/borger_11-12-08.htm (accessed November 18, 2008). Broache, Anne. 2008. ‘‘Information overload in the Facebook-ABC presidential debates?’’ news.com. January 6. http://www.news.com/8301-107843-9841291-7 .html?tagnewsmap (accessed November 25, 2008). Brownstein, Ronald. 2008. ‘‘The first 21st century campaign.’’ National Journal. April 19: 26–32. Center for Media and Public Affairs. 2008a. Election watch ’08: The road to the conventions. Media Monitor, Washington, DC: Center for Media and Public Affairs. ———. 2008b. ‘‘Obama leads the media race as well.’’ cmpa.com. October 14. http:// www.cmpa.com/meda_room_press_8.htm (accessed November 19, 2008). Chronicle of Higher Education. 2008. ‘‘The value of YouTube in the presidential campaigns.’’ chronicle.com. October 28. http://chronicle.com/blogs/election/2564/ the-value-of-youtube-in-a-presidential-campaign (accessed November 8, 2008). Crouse, Timothy. 1972. The boys on the bus. New York: Ballantine. Davies, Frank. 2008. ‘‘CNN highlights historic nomination.’’ mercurynews.com. August 27. http://www.mercurynews.com/politics/ci_10320808?nclick_check1 (accessed November 22, 2008). divinity Metrics. 2008. ‘‘Presidential elections online video summary.’’ divinityMet rics.com. October. http://www.divinitymetrics.com/blog/2008/09/10/presidentialonline-video-metrics-summary/ (accessed November 8, 2008). Fiedler, Tom. 2008. ‘‘Bloggers push past old media’s gatekeepers.’’ Nieman Reports. Summer: 38–42. Fowler, Mayhill. 2008. ‘‘Obama: No surprise that hard-pressed Pennsylvanians turn bitter.’’ huffingtonpost.com. April 11. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mayhillfowler/obama-no-surprise-that-ha_b_96188.html (accessed November 12, 2008). Gallup. 2008. ‘‘Gallup daily: McCain moves ahead, 48 percent to 46 percent.’’ Gallup .com. September 7. http://www.gallup.com/poll/110050/Gallup-Daily-McCainMoves-Ahead-48-45.aspx (accessed November 22, 2008). Gannes, Liz. 2008. ‘‘The final online video tally: Obama’s long primary season prepped him for the win.’’ NewTeeVee.com. November 5. http://newteevee.com/ 2008/11/05/the-final-online-video-tally-obamas-long-primary-season-preppedhim-for-the-win/ (accessed November 10, 2008). Graf, Joseph. 2008. ‘‘New media—The cutting edge of campaign communications.’’ In Campaigns on the Cutting Edge, by Richard J. Semiatin, 48–68. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Greppi, Michele. 2008. ‘‘McCain speech breaks Obama’s week-old viewership record.’’ tvweek.com. September 5. http://www.tvweek.com/news/2008/09/mccain_ speech_breaks_obamas_we.php (accessed November 22, 2008).

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Harris, John F., and Jim VandeHei. 2008. ‘‘Why McCain is getting hosed in the press.’’ politico.com. October 28. http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1008/ 14982.html (accessed December 5, 2008). Heffner, Alexander. 2008. ‘‘Scoop08: Political newcomers welcome.’’ cyber.law.har vard.edu. March 11. http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/events/luncheon/2008/03/hef fner (accessed November 20, 2008). Hindman, Matthew. 2009. The myth of digital democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Hitwise. 2008. ‘‘Huffington Post, Politico, Slate: Big post-election audience drop begins.’’ 247wallst.com. November 11. http://www.247wallst.com/2008/11/post .html (accessed November 25, 2008). Hoyt, Clark. 2007. ‘‘The campaign and the horse race.’’ nytimes.com. November 18. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/18/opinion/18pubed.html (accessed November 22, 2008). Huffington, Arianna. 2007. ‘‘New HuffPost project: The wisdom of the crowd hits the ’08 campaign trail.’’ HuffingtonPost.com. March 26. http://www.huffington post.com/arianna-huffington/new-huffpost-project-the_b_44321.html (accessed November 18, 2008). Huffington, Arianna, and Jay Rosen. 2008. ‘‘Thanks to the prople who worked on OfftheBus; here’s what comes next.’’ huffingtonpost.com. November 17. http:// www.huffingtonpost.com/arianna-huffington-and-jay-rosen/thanks-to-the-peoplewho-_b_144476.html (accessed November 17, 2008). Jones, Alex X. 2008. ‘‘CNN’s Gloria Borger: Viewers wanted more election news, not less .’’ hks.harvard.edu/presspol. November 12. http://www.hks.harvard.edu/press pol/news_events/news_archive/2008/borger_11-12-08.htm (accessed November 17, 2008). Jurkowitz, Mark. 2008a. ‘‘A plumber (sort of) gets his 15 minutes.’’ journalism.org. October 20. http://www.journalism.org/node/13283 (accessed November 22, 2008). ———. 2008b. ‘‘As the candidates head down the stretch, horse race dominates.’’ journalism.org. October 21. http://www.journalism.org/node/13391 (accessed November 22, 2008). Just, Marion R., Ann N. Crigler, Dean E. Alger, Timothy E. Cook, Montague Kern, and Darrel M. West. 1996. Crosstalk: Citizens, candidates and the media in a presidential campaign. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Kendall, Kathleen. 2000. Communication in presidential primaries. New York: Praeger. Koblin, Jonathan. 2008. ‘‘The morning after: What happens at Politico?’’ observer .com. November 3. http://www.observer.com/2008/media/morning-after-whathappens-politico (accessed November 25, 2008). Lipsman, Andrew. 2008. ‘‘Huffington Post and Politico lead wave of explosive growth at independent political blogs and news sites this election.’’ comscore.com. October 22. http://www.comscore.com/press/release.asp?press2525 (accessed November 22, 2008). Malone, Michael. 2008. ‘‘Media’s presidential bias and decline.’’ abcnews.go.com. October 24. http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id6099188&page1 (accessed December 5, 2008).

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Mark, David. 2006. Going dirty. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Melber, Ari. 2008. ‘‘Obama’s race speech on YouTube tops cable news ratings.’’ the nation.com. March 26. http://www.alternet.org/blogs/peek/80568/ (accessed November 12, 2008). McQuaid, John. 2008. ‘‘New media battles old to define Internet-era politics.’’ Nieman Reports. Summer: 42–44. Nagourney, Adam. 2008. The ’08 campaign: Sea change for politics as we know it. nytimes.com. November 4. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/04/us/politics/04 memo.html?_r2&hp&orefslogin&pagewantedprint (accessed November 16, 2008). Owen, Diana. 2007. ‘‘Citizen journalists and the evolution of political media.’’ St. Antony’s International Review 3, no. 1 (May): 64–79. ———. 2008. ‘‘Election media and youth political engagement.’’ sowi.net. October. sowi.net/owen (accessed November 25, 2008). Patterson, Thomas. 2002. The vanishing voter. New York: Knopf. Pew Research Center for the People & the Press. 2008a. ‘‘Canvassing campaign media: An analysis of time, tone, and topics.’’ pewresearch.org. October 22. http:// pewresearch.org/pubs/1001/campaign-media (accessed November 17, 2008). ———. 2008b. ‘‘High marks for the campaign; a high bar for Obama.’’ people-press .org. November 13, 2008. http://people-press.org/report/471/high-bar-for-obama (accessed November 14, 2008). ———. 2008c. ‘‘Liberal Dems top conservative Reps in donations, activism.’’ peoplepress.org. October 23. http://people-press.org/report/464/campaign-engagement (accessed November 14, 2008). Project for Excellence in Journalism. 2008a. ‘‘The invisible primary—invisible no longer: A first look at coverage of the 2008 presidential campaign.’’ journalism.org. October 27. http://www.journalism.org/node/8187 (accessed November 17, 2008). ———. 2008b.’’Winning the media campaign.’’ journalism.org. October 22. http:// www.journalism.org/node/13307 (accessed November 19, 2008). ———. 2008c. ‘‘It’s all veepstakes all the time.’’ journalism.org. August 25. http:// www.journalism.org/node/12299 (accessed November 20, 2008). ———. 2008d. ‘‘Both campaigns get the summertime blues.’’ journalism.org. July 7. http://www.journalism.org/node/11820 (accessed November 22, 2008). ———. 2008e. ‘‘Once again, it’s Obama versus Clinton.’’ journalism.org. August 1. http://www.journalism.org/node/12299 (accessed November 22, 2008). ———. 2008f. ‘‘The Palin phenomenon drives campaign coverage.’’ journalism.org. September 8. http://www.journalism.org/node/12693 (accessed November 22, 2008). ———. 2008g. ‘‘The pastor, the candidate, and the speech lead the news.’’ journal ism.org. March 24. http://www.journalism.org/node/10319 (accessed November 22, 2008). Rohter, Larry. 2008. ‘‘Real deal on ‘Joe the Plumber’ reveals new slant.’’ nytimes.com. October 16, 2008. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/17/us/politics/17joe.html (accessed November 22, 2008). Saba, Jennifer. 2008. ‘‘Exclusive: Top 30 sites for October—Huff Post up 448 percent.’’ editorandpublisher.com. November 14. http://www.editorandpublisher

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.com/eandp/news/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id1003890933 (accessed November 22, 2008). Schwab, Nikki. 2008. ‘‘In Obama-McCain race, YouTube became a serious battleground for presidential politics.’’ usnews.com. November 7. http://www.usnews .com/articles/news/campaign-2008/2008/11/07/in-obama-mccain-race-youtubebecame-a-serious-battleground-for-presidential-politics.html (accessed November 12, 2008). Seelye, Katharine. 2007. ‘‘Campaign coverage that is raw and fresh.’’ nytimes.com. October 29. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/29/us/politics/29web-seelye.html?_ 1 (accessed November 20, 2008). Sifry, Micah L. 2008a.’’How much is YouTube worth to Obama and McCain?’’ Tech President. October 24. http://www.techpresident.com/blog/entry/32071/how_ much_is_youtube_worth_to_obama_and_mccain (accessed October 26, 2008). Sifry, Micah. 2008b.’’Who made ‘‘dear Mr. Obama’’? A pro-am, it appears.’’ Tech President.com. September 12. http://www.techpresident.com/blog/entry/29845/ who_made_dear—mr_obama—ea_pro_am_it_appears (accessed November 8, 2008). Simendinger, Alexis. 2008. ‘‘New media as message.’’ National Journal. April 19: 40–44. Steinberg, Jacques. 2008. ‘‘The buzz on the bus: Pinched, press steps off.’’ nytimes .com. March 26. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/26/us/politics/26bus.html?hp (accessed November 1, 2008). Wee, Gilllian, and Ari Levi. 2008. ‘‘Facebook grabs fed-up myspace users, lifting value.’’ bloomberg.com. October 4. http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?sid a8RinPzEzIPQ&pid20601087 (accessed November 25, 2008).

3 Democratic Marathon, Republican Sprint The 2008 Presidential Nominations Barbara Norrander

ore voters. More money. A longer primary season. It is as if the Democratic Party decided to supersize its presidential nomination campaign. Perhaps this extensive campaign was appropriate to match the history-making outcome. For the first time in U.S. history a major political party would nominate someone who was not a white male for its presidential candidate. And the runner-up would be the most successful woman candidate in presidential nomination history. The contest between senators Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton lasted from the snows of the Iowa caucuses on January 3, 2008, to the last votes cast in June in Puerto Rico, Montana, and South Dakota. Meanwhile, on the Republican side, several expected frontrunners quickly fell by the wayside, and 71-year-old party maverick John McCain won the nomination. If elected, McCain would be the oldest firstterm president. In many ways the 2008 presidential nominations seemed unique. But in other ways, the 2008 nominations mirrored practices and patterns of recent years. Candidates prepared for the primary election season by amassing campaign funds and jockeying for public and media attention in the preceding year. Candidates and the media once again concentrated on the early contests of Iowa and New Hampshire. Envious of the influence of these two initial contests, many of the remaining forty-eight states played a game of leapfrogging their presidential primary dates as close as possible to the start of the election calendar. And in the end, one by one candidates dropped out of the contest, leaving one candidate to claim the nomination prize.

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The Contenders On January 1, 2008, seven Republicans and eight Democrats were formally announced as candidates for their party’s presidential nomination. The large number resulted from open races in both parties, something that had not happened since 1952. During the first half of the twentieth century, an unwritten set of rules existed for a good presidential nominee. This ‘‘availability’’ standard described the ideal candidate as a white male who was married (and not divorced) and a Protestant. This candidate also should be a senator or governor from a large, northern, and competitive state (Pomper 1966: 122–54). No firm measures of public preferences for presidential candidates were available in the early twentieth century. Only a few states held presidential primaries and reliable public opinion polls did not exist. The availability standards were increasingly violated as public opinion polls, beginning in the 1940s, and the proliferation of presidential primaries, in the 1970s and 1980s, led to more concrete information on public preferences. In fact, by 2008 none of the major candidates met all of the availability criteria. The Republican Party had a number of strong contenders, but each had liabilities as well. Rudy Giuliani established himself as a tough defender against international terrorism in his role as mayor of New York City at the time of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. On the other hand, Giuliani was at odds with the socially conservative wing of the party due to some aspects of his personal life and his public support of abortion. Fred Thompson, both an actor and a former senator, was viewed as more acceptable to the Republican Party’s conservative wing. Yet, he appeared to be an almost reluctant candidate. He held off entering the race until September 7, 2007, and then did not campaign as extensively as the others. John McCain sought the Republican presidential nomination in 2000, coming in second to George W. Bush. As a result, McCain was well known, but he also had critics within the party. While taking consistently Republican positions on many economic and social issues, McCain was a strong advocate of campaign finance restrictions, which some Republicans view as a violation of free speech, and he adopted a more moderate position on immigration, allowing some illegal immigrants to gain citizenship. Defense issues were McCain’s forte. During the Vietnam war, McCain was shot down and held captive under brutal conditions for five and one-half years. For the Iraq war, McCain was an early supporter of using a larger military force. Mitt Romney was not well known on the national scene but had an impressive re´sume´. As a Republican, Romney won the governorship in heavily Democratic Massachusetts. His term in office was generally judged as successful, and he helped to establish a statewide health insurance plan.

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Previously, Romney was a successful businessman and led the organizing committee for the Winter Olympics held in Utah. However, Romney needed to overcome concerns over his Mormon faith. Public opinion polls showed that 22 percent of Americans, and 18 percent of Republicans, would be very uncomfortable voting for a Mormon for president. In contrast, only 4 percent expressed such concerns over voting for an African American candidate, with 8 percent worried about selecting a woman as president. Another Republican contender also had to confront public concerns over his religion, as former Arkansas governor Mike Huckabee was a Baptist minister. Twentyone percent of Americans expressed reservations about supporting an evangelical Christian for president, with 12 percent of Republicans expressing this opinion.1 On the other hand, the Republican Party has a strong religiously conservative wing that would be attracted to Huckabee. In 2007, Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton led the pack of Democratic contenders. As the former First Lady she was universally known, and she had established herself as a hard worker in the Senate. Yet, Clinton would both benefit from and be hindered by her connection to her husband, former president Bill Clinton. Indeed, Bill Clinton would make several statements during the 2008 campaign that proved embarrassing for the campaign. As a woman, Clinton needed to overcome stereotypes of what makes a good president. Words typically used to describe presidents are those often connected to men: strong, tough, assertive. Women are perceived as kind, compassionate, and passive (Dolan 2004: 64; Duerst-Lahti 2006). Clinton also faced the dual problem that many women in leadership encounter—they are either seen as competent or warm, but not both (Eagly and Karau 2002). Thus, Clinton faced the challenge of making a woman an acceptable commander in chief while trying to remain appealing to voters. First-term Illinois senator Barack Obama was a surprisingly strong candidate, given his short tenure in national politics. Obama first gained national attention in 2004 with a major speech at the Democratic National Convention. Still, even early in 2007 he drew large crowds to his campaign rallies, and by the end of 2007, he raised more money than any candidate except Clinton. Obama was an inspirational speaker, calm and thoughtful in his personality, and ran an efficient campaign. But would Americans really vote for an African American for president, or would subtle racism lead Americans to conclude that Obama was lacking in presidential timber? The Democratic field included four other candidates with established records; just the type of candidate who in previous years won the nomination. John Edwards was the Democratic vice-presidential candidate in 2004 and a former senator from North Carolina. Bill Richardson, if successful, would be the first Latino presidential nominee, but he also had many tradi-

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tional qualifications: governor of New Mexico, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, and secretary of energy. Two long-term senators finished out the field of established candidates. Joe Biden, of Delaware, in the Senate since 1973, chaired the Foreign Relations Committee. Christopher Dodd, of Connecticut, first elected to the Senate in 1980, chaired the Senate Banking Committee. Each party typically has a number of candidates not expected to win the nomination, but who enter the contest to pursue a specific issue or represent a particular constituency. These candidates are sometimes called ‘‘advocacy candidates’’ (Steger, Dowdle, and Adkins 2004). The most successful of the advocacy candidates in 2008 was Ron Paul. A Republican member of the U.S. House from Texas, Paul advocated libertarian positions which stressed minimal government intervention in all areas. Paul was the sole Republican candidate to oppose the war in Iraq. Duncan Hunter, a Republican representative from California, touted tough border control as his main issue. Hunter would not last long in the race, withdrawing in mid-January. Among the advocacy candidates on the Democratic side was former Alaska senator Mike Gravel, who sought a national initiative to replace the income tax with a sales tax. Dennis Kucinich, a U.S. representative from Ohio, espoused a strong liberal platform. Kucinich’s run for the presidency in 2004 netted him less than 2 percent of the convention delegates. Kucinich would withdraw from the 2008 contest in late January to stave off a challenge for his House seat, while Gravel would fade from the scene in late March.

Setting the Rules of the Game Since the last quarter of the twentieth century, candidates have won the Democratic and Republican party nominations by amassing delegates committed to them and chosen from the states either through presidential primaries or caucuses. Each state decides on its own which type of delegate selection process to use and when to hold this event. In presidential primaries, voters cast ballots for the various presidential nomination seekers. But like the Electoral College used in presidential elections, these primary votes are used to select another group of representatives, in this case convention delegates. These delegates meet in the summer at each party’s national convention where the presidential nomination is legally bestowed. If a state does not hold a primary it uses the caucus-convention procedure. Caucuses are held on a specific day at a specific time period, and participants may have to spend several hours at the meetings. In 2008, renewed criticisms were lodged against the caucus process because some citizens could not

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attend due to work or child-care duties. Caucus attendance traditionally is very low. Participants tend to be better educated, wealthier, older, and often are more partisan, holding firmer, perhaps more extreme, issue positions than the rest of the party’s supporters (Stone, Abramowitz, and Rapoport 1989). On the other hand, advocates for the caucuses aver that these meetings draw people into the party and are a rare instance of face-to-face democracy. The local caucus is just the first phase in the delegate selection process. The caucuses select from the attendees delegates to attend a mid-level convention, such as at the county or congressional district level. These mid-level conventions select delegates to attend both the state and national conventions, while the state convention selects the remaining delegates for the national convention. The whole process takes months. Presidential nominations are won by accumulating the support of half of the delegates at the Democratic and Republican national conventions. In 2008, the Democratic convention would eventually seat 4,234 delegates, such that a candidate would need 2,118 delegates to win the nomination. The Republican convention would be composed of 2,380 delegates, with a winning number set at 1,191. Most convention delegates are selected through either the primaries or caucuses, and these delegates are tied to a presidential candidate and generally required to vote for that candidate at the convention. Thus, these delegates are referred to as ‘‘pledged’’ delegates, and they represent 80 percent of the delegates at each party’s conventions. Unpledged delegates are free to cast their votes for any of the presidential contenders. On the Republican side, some unpledged delegates are selected through the primary and caucus system and three automatic slots exist for each state (the state’s two members of the Republican National Committee and the state party chair). On the Democratic side, the unpledged delegates are automatic slots for Democratic members of Congress, governors, and state and local party leaders. Unpledged Democratic delegates are more commonly known as superdelegates and have been part of Democratic conventions since 1984. In most recent Democratic nominations, one presidential candidate amassed a large percentage of the pledged delegates, so the preferences of the superdelegates did not matter. However, with the very close race between senators Obama and Clinton, the role of the superdelegates became more prominent and controversial. The final element of the rules is the dates selected to hold each state’s primary or caucus. Both parties designated February 1 as the beginning of the 2008 campaign. Traditionally, New Hampshire holds the first presidential primary, having established an early date during an era when there were fewer primaries and often the last round of primaries was more important than the first. Iowa adopted an early date in 1972 for its caucuses in order to

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allow sufficient time for all of the intermediate-level conventions. However, since the 1980s, most states hold primaries and most candidates try to win early. If they do not win early, candidates drop out of the race. Thus, early primaries and caucuses have become increasingly important, and more and more states want to be among the early events. The national Democratic Party devised a plan in 2008 to broaden the initial round of states. One criticism of Iowa and New Hampshire is that both states are unrepresentative of the nation as a whole (which would be true of almost any two states). However, the Democratic Party was particularly concerned that neither of these two states had many African American or Latino voters. So the Democratic Party chose South Carolina, with its large African American population, and Nevada, with a growing Latino community, to hold early events in 2008. These four states would be allowed to hold their primaries or caucuses prior to February 1. Many other states wanted to be as close as possible to the front of the nomination process. In the end, more than twenty states opted for the first possible date: February 5, the first Tuesday of the month. Other multistate primary dates occurred in prior election years, and these dates were referred to as Super Tuesday. But none of these prior Super Tuesdays included nearly half of the states. A new name was needed for the 2008 event, with some describing February 5 as Super Duper Tuesday and others opting for Tsunami Tuesday. Michigan and Florida defied party rules and set their primaries for January. This led New Hampshire and Iowa to move forward their dates to precede Michigan and Florida. In December 2007, the candidates were troubled by an ever-evolving calendar as these four states vied for the earliest contests. In the end, the Iowa caucuses were scheduled for January 3, the New Hampshire primary for January 8, Michigan on the 15th, and Florida on the 29th. Both parties were faced with deciding how to handle Michigan and Florida. If they ignored the violations, the parties would lose all control over their nomination schedules. If they enforced sanctions, the parties could alienate voters in these states. The Democratic Party decided to penalize Michigan and Florida by stripping them of all of their delegates and encouraged the candidates not to compete in these states. The Republican Party removed half of the delegates from Michigan and Florida. In addition, since Republican rules did not allow exemptions for New Hampshire or South Carolina, the Republican party took away half of the delegates from those two states as well. No national convention delegates are selected in the first rounds of the caucus process. Thus, neither Iowa nor Nevada lost Republican delegates. The early conclusion of the Republican race in 2008 and the elimination of half, rather than all, of the delegates left the initial ruling intact. However,

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the controversy over the Michigan and Florida delegates would arise periodically on the Democratic side as the race between Obama and Clinton became more competitive.

The Pre–Election Year Campaign: Money and National Polls In the year before the election, candidates are busy organizing their staff, raising campaign funds, and planning their strategies. At one time, this pre-election year was called the ‘‘invisible primary’’ (Hadley 1976). In 2007, the early candidate efforts became more visible on a number of fronts. Because of the earlier start for the 2008 primaries and caucuses and the huge Super Duper Tuesday on February 5, candidates needed to raise more funds during the pre-election year. Thus, candidates and their fund-raising tactics and totals became a more visible media story in 2007. A second avenue in which candidates became more visible in 2007 was a series of debates. Seventeen debates were scheduled for the Democratic candidates (another nine debates would be held in 2008), while the Republicans faced off in fifteen debates in 2007 and another six in 2008. Campaign funds and national poll standings from the invisible primary stage often foretell the eventual winner, but the pattern is not perfect (Steger, Dowdle, and Atkins 2004). Thus, in 2000, Bush’s lead in fund-raising and poll standings helped him secure the Republican nomination, despite losing in New Hampshire. In contrast, in 2004, Democratic front-runner Howard Dean lost the Iowa caucuses and subsequently the New Hampshire primary to John Kerry, who went on to win the nomination. In 2007, Hillary Clinton (with $116 million raised) and Mitt Romney ($88 million) led the ‘‘money primary’’ for each of the parties. Obama was close behind Clinton by December 2007 (with $102 million) and would surpass her in fund-raising beginning in January 2008. Beside Obama’s and Clinton’s $100 million totals, sums raised by Edwards ($48 million), Richardson ($23 million), and the rest looked paltry. The Clinton campaign, however, overspent early. Thus, before the Super Duper Tuesday primaries on February 5, she would loan her campaign $5 million. Eventually, she lent her campaign $12 million and ended her primary campaign $23 million in debt. The Republican side had a more unusual outcome. John McCain ($41 million) ranked third in campaign funds raised in 2007, behind Romney and Giuliani ($61 million). In fact, by the middle of 2007, McCain had laid off most of his staff due to a lack of funds. This downswing, however, led him back to a familiar theme of a maverick standing up for his beliefs, even if

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they were unpopular. Thus, McCain began to emphasize his support for more troops in the Iraq war. In September, he began a cross-country bus trip, called the ‘‘No Surrender Tour.’’ By November, McCain’s crowds were getting bigger and he was inching up in the national polls (Newsweek 2008b). Weaknesses in the Romney and Giuliani campaigns also played a role in McCain’s comeback. While Romney had the most campaign funds in 2007, 40 percent ($35 million) was his own personal money. Giuliani failed to develop a campaign theme, beyond referencing his connection to 9/11. Besides campaign funds raised, success during the invisible primary phase is defined by standings in the national public opinion polls. As shown in figure 3.1, Clinton led Obama in the national polls by an average of 17 percentage points through December 2007. Clinton was clearly the front-runner. In January 2008, Clinton suffered a post-Iowa dip in the national polls but she rebounded after New Hampshire. After that point, Clinton and Obama’s national poll standings were neck and neck until late May, when Obama opened up a double-digit lead. Yet, support for Clinton’s presidential quest did not decline from 2007 through 2008. Her average support in 2007 registered at 39 percent, which grew slightly to 43 percent in 2008. Rather, the story of the 2008 Democratic nomination is one of Obama overtaking Clin-

FIGURE 3.1 National Preferences for the 2008 Democratic Nomination

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41

ton’s lead. Starting out with the support of one in five Democrats in 2007, in 2008 Obama held the backing of 46 percent (on average) and climbed over the 50 percent threshold in late May. The pattern among Republican contenders is again atypical. As shown in figure 3.2, Giuliani led the national polls throughout 2007, but his numbers were beginning to falter by November of that year, while McCain’s and Huckabee’s numbers were rising. Events from the no longer invisible primary were starting to move the national polls even before the first votes were cast. Giuliani’s campaign decision to forgo the Iowa caucuses and New Hampshire primary and concentrate on the January 29 Florida primary meant that Giuliani was often out of the limelight as the other candidates battled for attention in the two early states. In the Republican debates, Giuliani also was on the defensive for his position on social issues and his record (Balz 2007). And finally, the indictment of a former associate, Bernard Kerik, added to the negative news about Giuliani in late 2007. Meanwhile, McCain was benefiting from his ‘‘No Surrender’’ bus tour and good performances in the debates. Huckabee also performed well in these debates (Balz 2007). In addition, Huckabee was gaining nationally from his rising status in the battle for the Iowa caucus votes. One event that is often

FIGURE 3.2 National Preferences for the 2008 Republican Nomination

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Barbara Norrander

important on the Republican side is a straw poll taken in Ames, Iowa, in August. This straw poll has no official importance, but receives considerable media coverage as an early harbinger of candidates’ organizational strength and popularity. Romney won the 2007 straw poll with 32 percent of the vote, but he spent more than $2 million in advertising and organization in Iowa prior to the straw poll. In contrast, Huckabee’s $100,000 spent on the event seemed paltry but paid off with a second-place vote of 18 percent (MacGillis 2008). Huckabee was winning the support of the significant social conservative vote among Iowa Republicans. By the end of 2007, Huckabee would lead in the Iowa polls and go on to win the caucuses on January 3. In 2008, Giuliani’s national poll standings continued to decline, Huckabee’s leveled off around 20 percent after Iowa, while McCain’s popularity soared as he won New Hampshire and climbed over 50 percent after his Super Duper Tuesday victories.

The Election Year Campaign: Winning Votes and Delegates The Iowa caucuses were once again hotly contested, especially on the Democratic side. With Super Duper Tuesday on February 5, Democratic candidates felt that they needed to win in Iowa and New Hampshire to gain momentum to compete successfully in the upcoming mega-state event. After all, that is how Kerry won the Democratic nomination in 2004. Obama and Edwards needed a victory in Iowa to become the main alternative to Clinton, and she needed a victory to maintain her front-runner status. In Iowa, the Obama campaign showed its ability to effectively organize for this type of electoral contest. The campaign set up 37 field offices across Iowa, more than any other candidate (Newsweek 2008a: 44). Obama spent $9 million on advertising in the state, while Clinton spent $7 million, and Richardson and Edwards bought $3 million in advertising.2 Dodd and Biden, with less money, invested heavily in personal visits to the state. The public responded to the intense Iowa campaign with high attendance at the local caucuses. No popular vote for the candidates is taken at the Democratic caucuses; rather, delegates are elected to subsequent conventions and it is these ‘‘state delegate equivalencies’’ that the Democratic Party reports. Obama won the night with 38 percent of these state delegate equivalents. Due to mathematical rounding rules the virtual tie for second place between Edwards (29.75 percent of delegate equivalents) and Clinton (29.47 percent) was widely reported as a second-place finish for Edwards (at 30 percent) and a third-place finish for Clinton (at 29 percent). A fourth-place finish allowed

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43

Richardson to continue, but senators Dodd and Biden dropped out of the race. The Iowa caucuses have not been as central in Republican politics. In 2008, McCain, Giuliani, and Thompson skipped Iowa, spending their time and money elsewhere. Mitt Romney’s strategy, however, was to court the caucusstate voters. He began airing campaign commercials in Iowa early in 2007 and eventually spent $7 million, accounting for two-thirds of Republican advertising in Iowa. Huckabee spent a mere $1 million on advertising, but his strong support among the important social conservative wing of the Iowa Republican Party led him to victory over Romney, 34 percent to 25 percent. (The Iowa Republican vote is from a nonbinding preference poll taken at the caucuses.) New Hampshire followed five days after Iowa. Obama’s momentum coming out of Iowa increased his poll standings, both nationwide and in New Hampshire. Meanwhile, Clinton needed to rebound from the early setback. One day before the primary, when asked at a coffee shop in Manchester how she could remain upbeat while campaigning, Clinton responded, ‘‘It’s not easy. . . . I couldn’t do it if I just didn’t passionately believe it was the right thing to do. . . . I just don’t want to see us fall backwards’’ (Newsweek 2008a: 49). Immediately, many in the media characterized this as an emotional response, with some asserting that Clinton had tears in her eyes. Media talk panels debated whether this would doom her candidacy. When Clinton won the primary, these same pundits argued that this personal response helped Clinton connect with female voters. However, other factors certainly played a role in the New Hampshire outcome. Some women took umbrage at Obama’s comment to Clinton in the pre-New Hampshire debate that she was ‘‘likeable enough’’ (Kantor 2008). More importantly, Clinton campaigned vigorously in New Hampshire for many months. Exit polls showed a 17point gender gap in Clinton’s vote, but she won the support of early deciders, those who saw the debates as very important, and traditional Democrats. Obama, in a pattern that would hold throughout most of the remaining contests, did better among new voters and independents. Having finished fourth in New Hampshire, Richardson withdrew. New Hampshire proved equally fateful on the Republican side. McCain won the primary, 37 percent to Romney’s 32 percent, with Huckabee trailing at 11 percent. Exit polls showed that McCain won because of favorable impressions of his leadership skills, ability to win in November, and potential to be a strong commander in chief. Romney did better among Republican voters (where he tied with McCain) and those who based their decisions on issues rather than personal qualities. Huckabee faltered because there were fewer social conservatives in New Hampshire than in Iowa.

Date

8-Jan 15-Jan 26-Jan 29-Jan 5-Feb 5-Feb 5-Feb 5-Feb 5-Feb 5-Feb 5-Feb 5-Feb 5-Feb 5-Feb 5-Feb 5-Feb 5-Feb 5-Feb 5-Feb 9-Feb 12-Feb 12-Feb 12-Feb 19-Feb 19-Feb 4-Mar 4-Mar 4-Mar 4-Mar

Primaries:

New Hampshire Michigan South Carolina Florida Alabama Arizona Arkansas California Connecticut Delaware Georgia Illinois Massachusetts Missouri New Jersey New York Oklahoma Tennessee Utah Louisiana Washington, D.C. Maryland Virginia Wisconsin Washington Ohio Rhode Island Texas Vermont

37.0 29.7 33.1 36.0 37.1 47.1 20.2 42.2 52.0 45.0 31.6 47.5 40.8 33.0 55.4 49.7 36.6 31.8 5.4 41.9 67.6 54.8 50.0 54.7 49.5 59.9 64.8 51.2 71.3

McCain 31.6 38.9 15.3 31.0 17.8 34.5 13.5 34.6 32.9 32.5 30.2 28.6 51.0 29.3 28.3 26.6 24.8 23.6 89.5 6.3 6.4 7.0 3.7 2.0 16.3 3.3 4.4 2.0 4.5

Romney 11.2 16.1 29.8 13.5 41.3 9.0 60.5 11.6 7.0 15.3 33.9 16.5 3.8 31.5 8.2 10.2 33.4 34.5 1.4 43.2 16.4 28.5 40.7 36.9 24.1 30.6 21.7 38.0 14.3

Huckabee 7.6 6.3 3.6 3.2 2.7 4.2 4.8 4.3 4.1 4.2 2.9 5.0 2.6 4.5 4.8 6.0 3.3 5.6 3.0 5.3 8.0 6.0 4.5 4.6 7.6 4.7 6.6 4.9 6.6

Paul 8.5 2.8 2.1 14.7 0.4 2.5 0.3 4.4 1.6 2.5 0.7 1.3 0.5 0.6 2.7 3.5 0.7 0.9 0.3 1.0 1.6 1.4 0.4 0.5 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 2.3

Giuliani

TABLE 3.1 Republican Presidential Primaries and Caucuses, 2008

1.2 3.7 15.7 1.2 0.35 1.8 0.3 1.7 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.8 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.0 0.6 2.9 0.2 1.0 0.0 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.9 1.5 0.0 0.8 0.0

Thompson

239,328 869,169 445,799 1,949,498 52,155 542,063 229,153 2,932,811 151,604 50,239 963,541 899,422 501,997 588,844 566,201 670,078 335,054 553,815 296,061 161,169 6,211 320,989 489,252 410,607 529,932 1,095,917 26,996 1,362,322 39,843

Total Vote

Date

3-Jan 19-Jan 2-Feb 5-Feb 5-Feb 5-Feb 5-Feb 5-Feb 5-Feb 9-Feb 9-Feb 23-Feb 24-Feb 5-Apr

Caucuses:

Iowa Nevada Maine Alaska Colorado Minnesota Montana North Dakota West Virginia Kansas Washington Northern Marianas Puerto Rico Virgin Islands

13.0 12.7 21.4 15.6 18.3 22.0 22.0 22.7 1.1 23.6 25.6 91.3 90.8 31.5

McCain

78.9 72.9 77.6 74.0 87.0 76.0 72.3 80.9 69.7 76.0 70.2 86.0

25.2 51.1 51.7 43.7 59.9 41.4 38.3 35.7 47.4 3.4 15.6 0.0 0.0 18.5

Romney

1.5 0.0 4.7 0.0 0.0 4.4 4.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.3 0.0

34.4 8.2 5.8 21.9 12.7 19.9 15.0 19.9 51.5 59.8 23.5 4.3 4.8 0.0

Huckabee

12.5 11.3 10.0 12.2 0.0 10.3 8.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.1 0.0

9.9 13.7 18.2 17.2 8.4 15.7 24.5 21.3 0.0 11.2 21.7 4.3 4.3 2.8

Paul

3.8 15.8 7.7 7.2 13.0 5.0 6.8 14.5 23.7 21.5 16.5 14.0

3.4 4.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Giuliani

0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

13.4 7.9 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Thompson

1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

19,516 12,616

9,785

119,188 44,324 5,491 13,703 70,229 62,828

Total Vote

143,286 816,928 412,745 517,583 136,648 119,034 197,793 353,476 125,570 95,730 60,964 150,641

Sources: Primary results from state government election webpages. Caucus results from state parties or media sources. Total votes are those cast for designated candidates and may not include votes for minor candidates or blank ballots. Caucus turnout figures tend to be estimates. Wyoming Republicans reported only delegates elected (8 for Romney, 3 for Thompson, 1 for Hunter) in the January 5 caucus. American Samoa held caucuses on February 23 and reported only delegates won, with McCain winning all 6 pledged delegates. Guam held caucuses on March 8. While McCain was reported as winning, Guam had only 9 unpledged delegates. Hawaii selected its delegates at its state convention on May 18, with McCain reported as winning all 20 pledged delegates.

11-Mar 22-Apr 6-May 6-May 13-May 13-May 20-May 20-May 27-May 3-Jun 3-Jun 3-Jun

Mississippi Pennsylvania Indiana North Carolina Nebraska West Virginia Kentucky Oregon Idaho Montana South Dakota New Mexico

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Barbara Norrander TABLE 3.2 Democratic Primaries and Caucuses, 2008

Primaries:

Date

New Hampshire Michigan South Carolina Florida Alabama Arizona Arkansas California Connecticut Delaware Georgia Illinois Massachusetts Missouri New Jersey New Mexico New York Oklahoma Tennessee Utah Louisiana Washington, D.C. Maryland Virginia Wisconsin Ohio Rhode Island Texas Vermont Mississippi Pennsylvania Indiana North Carolina West Virginia Kentucky Oregon Puerto Rico Montana South Dakota

8-Jan 15-Jan 26-Jan 29-Jan 5-Feb 5-Feb 5-Feb 5-Feb 5-Feb 5-Feb 5-Feb 5-Feb 5-Feb 5-Feb 5-Feb 5-Feb 5-Feb 5-Feb 5-Feb 5-Feb 9-Feb 12-Feb 12-Feb 12-Feb 19-Feb 4-Mar 4-Mar 4-Mar 4-Mar 11-Mar 22-Apr 6-May 6-May 13-May 20-May 20-May 1-Jun 3-Jun 3-Jun

Obama

Clinton

Edwards

Total Vote

36.5 0.0 55.4 32.9 56.0 42.4 26.2 43.2 50.7 53.1 66.4 64.7 40.5 49.3 43.9 47.7 39.7 31.2 40.5 56.7 57.4 75.3 61.4 63.7 58.1 44.8 40.4 47.8 59.3 61.2 45.4 49.4 56.1 25.8 29.9 58.5 68.4 56.6 44.7

39.1 55.2 26.5 49.8 41.6 50.4 70.1 51.5 46.7 42.3 31.1 32.8 55.8 47.9 53.8 48.5 56.5 54.8 53.8 39.1 35.6 23.8 36.2 35.5 40.8 53.5 58.4 51.4 38.6 36.7 54.6 50.6 41.6 66.9 65.5 40.5 31.6 41.1 55.3

16.9 0.0 17.6 14.4 1.5 5.2 1.9 3.8 1.0 1.3 1.7 1.9 1.6 2.0 1.4 1.9 1.2 10.2 4.5 2.9 3.4 0.3 1.2 0.5 0.6 1.7 0.6 0.1 1.2 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.3 2.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0

287,557 594,398 532,151 1,749,920 536,626 455,635 314,234 5,066,993 354,539 96,374 1,060,851 2,038,614 1,263,764 825,050 1,141,199 143,753 1,891,143 417,207 624,764 131,403 384,346 123,994 867,009 986,203 1,113,753 2,354,721 186,439 2,848,046 154,960 434,152 2,336,480 1,278,268 1,580,726 359,910 701,768 641,499 384,578 182,421 97,797

Democratic Marathon, Republican Sprint

Caucuses:

Date

Iowa Nevada Alaska Colorado Idaho Kansas Minnesota North Dakota Am. Samoa Dem. Abroad Nebraska Washington Virgin Islands Maine Hawaii Texas Wyoming Guam

3-Jan 19-Jan 5-Feb 5-Feb 5-Feb 5-Feb 5-Feb 5-Feb 5-Feb 5-Feb 9-Feb 9-Feb 9-Feb 10-Feb 19-Feb 4-Mar 8-Mar 3-May

47

Obama

Clinton

Edwards

37.6 45.2 75.2 67.2 79.5 74.0 66.4 61.1 42.6 65.8 67.6 67.5 89.9 59.5 75.7 56.2 61.4 50.1

29.5 50.7 24.7 32.6 17.2 25.8 32.2 36.5 57.4 32.5 32.2 31.2 7.6 39.9 23.6 43.7 37.8 49.9

29.7 3.8 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.5 1.5 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0

Total Vote 239,000 117,599 8,880 120,971 21,224 36,723 214,066 19,012 23,105 38,670 250,000 2,059 45,000 37,182 1,100,000 8,753 4,521

Sources: Primary results from state government election webpages. Caucus results from state parties or media sources. Total votes are those cast for designated candidates and may not include votes for minor candidates or blank ballots. Caucus turnout figures tend to be estimates. Obama’s and Edwards’s names did not appear on the Michigan ballot.

Romney had lost two important events in a row, while victories had been split between Huckabee and McCain. Meanwhile, Giuliani and Thompson continued to avow that they were focusing their campaign efforts on alternative states (South Carolina for Thompson, Florida for Giuliani). Romney regained his footing with a win in the Michigan primary on January 15 (a state in which he grew up and where his father had been governor) and the Nevada caucuses on January 19 (where one in four Republican voters was a Mormon). McCain countered with a victory over Huckabee in conservative South Carolina. Thompson came in third and withdrew from the contest. Florida was the final Republican primary before Super Duper Tuesday, and the contest on which Giuliani had staked his campaign. Unfortunately for him, he placed third, while McCain won in Florida. Giuliani withdrew from the Republican race and endorsed McCain. Meanwhile, on the Democratic side, as Obama and Clinton had split Iowa and New Hampshire, the new schedule of early Nevada caucuses and the South Carolina primary became more important. Obama had an advantage in South Carolina, with the large proportion of African American voters in that state’s Democratic electorate. Clinton hoped to capitalize on her support

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Barbara Norrander

among Latino voters in Nevada. However, Obama had shown himself adept at winning caucus states. Nevertheless, Clinton narrowly won in Nevada, while Obama took first place in South Carolina. As Michigan and Florida had violated the calendar rules and had been stripped of their delegates, the Democratic candidates did not campaign in these states. Clinton won the popular vote in both these states, setting the stage for a later argument on allowing at least some of the delegates from these states to be voting members at the national convention. Having been overshadowed by the close contest between Obama and Clinton, Edwards withdrew from the Democratic race at the close of January. By the time Super Duper Tuesday arrived, the Republican contest had settled down to three candidates. McCain had won crucial early events. It appeared as if he had obtained the ellusive ‘‘momentum’’ that can enhance the chances for future victories. Romney needed to win big to overcome McCain’s momentum. Huckabee was a surprising contender, but he was greatly underfunded and had not shown an ability to win beyond his social conservative base. On February 5, McCain took a commanding lead, winning 10 out of 15 primaries, with Huckabee winning three southern states and Romney winning more of his ‘‘home’’ states in Massachusetts and Utah. Romney continued to do well in the caucus states, winning five out of six. (Technically, the West Virginia event won by Huckabee was a state convention rather than local caucuses.) At the close of Super Duper Tuesday, McCain had accumulated 680 delegates out of the 1,191 needed to secure the nomination. McCain opened up a significant delegate lead over his rivals. In past years, a lead of one-quarter to one-third of the delegates needed for the nomination was sufficient to convince the other serious contenders to drop out (Norrander 2000). This was the case for the Republicans in 2008. Romney with 270 delegates lagged behind McCain by 34 percent of the needed delegates, and Romney dropped out of the race within a few days of Super Duper Tuesday. McCain was then widely seen as the presumptive Republican nominee. Huckabee announced that he would remain a candidate until McCain had secured the full 50 percent of the delegate total, and when McCain accomplished this on March 4, Huckabee withdrew. Ron Paul, acting like an advocacy candidate, acknowledged McCain’s position but vowed to fight on due to policy differences. Paul finally withdrew from the race on June 12. Yet, for all practical purposes, the 2008 Republican nomination fight ended on Super Duper Tuesday, when McCain open up a hefty lead in delegate totals, and definitely was over on March 4, when McCain controlled the support of 50 percent of the delegates. Of course, legally McCain was not the Republican nominee until he and his

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49

chosen running mate, Alaska Governor Sarah Palin, were confirmed at the National Republican Convention held September 1–4, 2008. Super Duper Tuesday on the Democratic side would be a two-person contest between Clinton and Obama. Clinton won nine of the primaries, while Obama won in seven. Obama’s strategy of campaigning in the caucus states paid off, as he won all six of the caucuses held. Both parties allocate a few delegates to U.S. territories, and on Super Duper Tuesday, Clinton won the caucuses in American Samoa while Obama won the Democrats Abroad ‘‘Global’’ primary. At the end of the day, Clinton and Obama had a virtual tie among pledged delegates: 625 for Clinton and 624 for Obama. Clinton, however, had an early lead in unpledged superdelegates, such that her delegate total, as shown in figure 3.3, was 818 to Obama’s 730. Either Obama or Clinton would need to win more than 1,200 additional delegates to win the nomination prize. The Democratic presidential race was far from over. Clinton had not prepared for a campaign that would extend beyond Super Tuesday. Leading up to 2008, many commentators also felt that the nomination would be decided on that date. After all, nearly half of the Democratic delegates would be selected on that date, and the presidential nominations in

FIGURE 3.3 Delegates Won by the Democratic Candidates

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Barbara Norrander

2000 and 2004 had come quickly to a close after the initial contests. The Clinton campaign was lacking in strategy and short on money, and the campaign staff was plagued by infighting. Obama, meanwhile, planned for a long campaign and also organized early in the caucus states. After Super Duper Tuesday, Obama won a string of primaries and caucuses in the latter half of February and overtook Clinton in the delegate count. Clinton regained her footing on March 3, winning primaries in Ohio, Rhode Island, and Texas (though the Texas delegate count would be split with a caucus held the same day). Obama countered with primary victories in Vermont (March 4) and Mississippi (March 11). By the middle of March, Obama led Clinton in the delegate count by 130. No primaries would be held for another month, until Pennsylvania on April 22. Obama and Clinton embarked on a grueling month long campaign to win in Pennsylvania. During this time period, the Obama campaign encountered two difficulties. One dealt with Obama’s friendship with Jeremiah A. Wright Jr., the pastor at the Chicago church that Obama attended for twenty years. Videotapes surfaced showing Reverend Wright espousing controversial views on 9/11 and AIDS. Obama disassociated himself from these remarks and gave a well-received speech on race relations in America in Philadelphia on March 18. Subsequently, Reverend Wright reiterated some of his controversial points in media interviews, resulting in Obama further distancing himself from Reverend Wright and severing membership with his church on April 29. The second controversy for Obama involved remarks he made at a fund-raiser on April 6 in California where he intoned that some voters in small towns, because of a lack of jobs, ‘‘get bitter, they cling to guns or religion or antipathy to people who aren’t like them.’’ The Clinton campaign characterized these remarks as elitist and patronizing. Clinton did win the Pennsylvania primary by 10 percentage points despite being outspent 3 to 1 by the Obama campaign in the state (Johnson 2008). Yet, she continued to trail Obama in the delegate count by 133. Some commentators had begun to call for Clinton to withdraw from the contest as early as late February (e.g., Budowsky 2008). A classic fear, designated as the divisive primary thesis, is that a long, drawn-out nomination battle weakens the party’s chances of victory in the general election. Charges and countercharges between candidates are seen as fodder for the opposition party’s candidate in the fall. Further, the heated battle supposedly impassions supporters of each camp, such that they will be unwilling to switch their allegiances back to their party’s eventual nominee. Overlooked in the divisive primary thesis is that a long primary campaign can mobilize new groups of supporters that counterbalance any disgruntlement among the losing candidate’s camp (Stone, Atkeson, and Rapoport 1992). Further, the 50-state

Democratic Marathon, Republican Sprint

51

nomination battle would provide the winning Democratic candidate with a base of support throughout the nation in preparation for the fall contest. The last realistic hope for Clinton to regain the advantage came with the early May primaries in Indiana and North Carolina. If she could beat Obama handily in both, she could bolster her claim of winning the nationwide popular vote and have a greater chance of catching up to Obama’s delegate lead (Judis 2008). Clinton did win in Indiana, but the 51 to 49 margin was not enough for either a psychological or delegate boost. Meanwhile, Obama won in North Carolina, holding onto his base among African Americans and better-educated white voters. Obama and Clinton split the remaining four primaries held in May. Obama ended the month with a 186 delegate vote lead. Before the last three Democratic primaries were held in June, the party needed to resolve the controversy over the Michigan and Florida delegations. Clinton wanted the Florida and Michigan primary results to count, since she had won the popular vote in each. Other party members were concerned about alienating voters in these two states and, perhaps, jeopardizing the support for the party’s candidate in the fall election. Thus, on May 31, the Democratic National Committee (DNC) met to resolve the controversy. In a contentious closed-door meeting the committee decided to restore the delegates to the two states but to give each delegate only one-half vote at the convention. The distribution of the delegates in Florida followed the division of the Florida primary vote between Clinton and Obama. In Michigan, however, Obama had removed his name from the ballot, while Clinton’s name had remained. Clinton had won 55 percent of the vote, while 40 percent had cast their ballots for ‘‘uncommitted.’’ The DNC awarded 69 delegates to Clinton, slightly less than 55 percent, and 59 to Obama. At the end of the day, Clinton gained only 24 more delegates than Obama (Seelye and Zeleny 2008). The number of delegates for the Democratic convention was increased to 4,234 and a candidate would now need 2,118 votes for the nomination— thus the slight rise in the 50 percent threshold line in figure 3.3. Clinton won the Puerto Rico primary on June 1 by a two-to-one margin, but picked up only 38 delegates to Obama’s 17. On the morning and afternoon of June 4, a number of Democratic superdelegates endorsed Obama, edging his delegate total closer to the 2,118 needed. That evening, the votes from Montana and South Dakota were counted, and although Obama won the former and lost in the latter, he secured enough new delegates to surpass the 50 percent threshold. The following Saturday, at a rally before her supporters, Hillary Clinton conceded the race to Obama. The Democratic marathon had taken six months of caucuses and primaries to determine a presumptive nominee. At the Democratic National Convention in Denver, on August 27, as the roll call of states for the presidential nomination came

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to New York, Hillary Clinton proposed that Obama be nominated by acclamation. The proposal was met by cheers from the convention floor and a subsequent voice vote approved the motion. Both Hillary Clinton and former president Bill Clinton gave hearty endorsement speeches for Obama at the convention, ending much of the discussion over the divisive primary thesis. Conclusions Why did Obama win? Some would point to a better campaign strategy. He planned for a long campaign and organized effectively in the caucus states. But this was not the conventional wisdom. Iowa, New Hampshire, and Super Duper Tuesday primary victories were seen as keys to victory in 2008. Thus, Clinton planned to run as the inevitable front-runner, as the candidate with the experience to be an effective president, and to convince voters that a woman could be commander in chief. In fact, she did convince voters that she had presidential timber. Perhaps the answer is that Obama selected a theme that resonated with voters in 2008. Americans were hungry for change, and Obama was able to convince voters that he would be the best candidate to accomplish this change. Obama not only won the 2008 Democratic nomination, but he benefited from the long campaign. Obama became a better debater, perfected his stump speech to inspire millions of supporters, and organized a disciplined staff that would all become vital assets for the fall campaign. Why did McCain win? In part, McCain benefited from the weakness of his competitors. Romney had much the same strategy as Obama: run in all the contests, including the caucuses. Yet, Romney fell short, perhaps because he came across more as a stiff businessman than an authentic candidate. Giuliani miscalculated with his strategy. Thompson appeared as a reluctant candidate and ran a disorganized campaign. Huckabee inspired the party’s social conservatives but was unable to expand his base. McCain too benefited from the long lead up to 2008, finding his voice and returning to his maverick persona during the invisible primary. Notes 1. Poll results from NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll, January 20–22, 2008. 2. The media advertising information comes from TNS Media Intelligence/ Campaign Media Analysis Group as published on the CNN webpages. It covers advertising from January 1, 2007, through June 4, 2008.

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References Balz, Dan. 2008. ‘‘Expecting Clarity, Republicans Get More of a Muddle.’’ Washing tonpost.com. http://voices.washingtonpost.com/the-trail/2007/11/20/post_217.html (accessed December 2, 2008). Budowsky, Brent. 2008. ‘‘Hillary Clinton Should Withdraw.’’ Huffington Post, February 20. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/brent-budowsky/hillary-clinton-shouldwi_b_87686.html (accessed December 3, 2008). Dolan, Kathleen A. 2004. Voting for Women: How the Public Evaluates Women Candidates. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Duerst-Lahti, Georgia. 2006. ‘‘Presidential Elections: Gendered Space and the Case of 2004.’’ In Gender and Elections: Shaping the Future of American Politics, ed. Susan J. Carroll and Richard L. Fox, pp. 12–42. New York: Cambridge University Press. Eagly, Alice H., and Steven J. Karau. 2002. ‘‘Role Congruity Theory of Prejudice Toward Female Leaders.’’ Psychological Review 109:573–98. Hadley, Arthur T. 1976. The Invisible Primary. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Johnson, Alex. 2008. ‘‘Clinton Wins in Pennsylvania: Senator Acknowledges Money Difficulties but Vows to Stay in the Race.’’ MSNBC.com, April 22. http://www .msnbc.msn.com/id/24251043/ (accessed December 2, 2008). Judis, John B. 2008. ‘‘It’s All Over Now, Baby Blue.’’ The New Republic, May 7, 2008. Kantor, Jodi. 2008. ‘‘Women’s Support for Clinton Rises in Wake of Perceived Sexism.’’ New York Times, January 10. MacGillis, Alec. 2008. ‘‘Huckabee’s Price of Admission: $100,000.’’ Washingtonpost .com. http://voices.washingtonpost.com/the-trail/2007/08/13/perrys_huckabee_item .html (accessed December 2, 2008). Newsweek. 2008a. ‘‘How He Did It.’’ November 17, pp. 38–49. Newsweek. 2008b. ‘‘Back from the Dead.’’ November 17, pp. 50–58. Norrander, Barbara. 2000. ‘‘The End Game in Post-Reform Presidential Nominations.’’ Journal of Politics 62:999–1013. Pomper, Gerald. 1966. Nominating the President: The Politics of Convention Choice. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Seelye, Katharine Q., and Jeff Zeleny. 2008. ‘‘Democrats Approve Deal on Michigan and Florida.’’ New York Times, June 1. Steger, Wayne P., Andrew J. Dowdle, and Randall E. Atkins. 2004. ‘‘The New Hampshire Effect in Presidential Nominations.’’ Political Research Quarterly 57:375–90. Stone, Walter J., Alan I. Abramowitz, and Ronald B. Rapoport. 1989. ‘‘How Representative Are the Iowa Caucuses?’’ In The Iowa Caucuses and the Presidential Nominating Process, ed. Peverill Squire. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Stone, Walter J., Lonna Rae Atkeson, and Ronald Rapoport. 1992. ‘‘Turning On or Turning Off: Mobilization and Demobilization Effects of Participation in Presidential Nomination Campaigns.’’ American Journal of Political Science 36:665–91

4 The General Election Campaign Steven E. Schier and Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier

nce it became clear that Barack Obama and John McCain would be the major parties’ presidential nominees, many imposing questions surrounded the fall general election contest. Would race prove an impediment for Barack Obama, the first African American nominee of a major party in the nation’s history? Would the impressive financial advantage his campaign had accrued prove decisive in the fall contest? Could John McCain overcome the unpopularity of his party and its president? How would candidate debates and campaign events affect the 2008 election outcome? Would the vice presidential nominees affect the election result? Our account relates the 2008 fall campaign’s answers to these questions. Underlying such uncertainties, however, were certain conditions that pointed to a Democratic victory in November. Political scientists produced many models aimed at predicting the presidential election outcome. By the second half of 2008, virtually all of these models forecast a Democratic victory in November.1 In eight different prediction models, the most common variables used to estimate the election outcome were economic conditions and the job approval of the incumbent president. Both of these influences pointed in the same direction. Declining economic growth, rising unemployment, and the remarkably low job approval of president George W. Bush all foretold good news for Democrats and bad tidings for the GOP, regardless of campaign events in the fall. Since the creation of public opinion polling, whenever a retiring president had a job approval below 45 percent, his party’s nominee lost the White House. Bush’s approval rating ranked well below that throughout 2008, frequently dipping below 30 percent.

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A sluggish economy contributed to Bush’s low approval, but the unpopular war in Iraq also served to depress GOP prospects. Though progress in the war had accelerated markedly because of a U.S. troop surge in 2007, a majority of the American public continued to view the initiation of the war by the Bush administration in 2003 as a mistake. Just as the party presiding over a poor economy suffers in presidential elections, so also have the ‘‘war parties’’ in American history. David Mayhew notes that a war can bring electoral contests about whether it ‘‘should have been fought in the first place’’ and over the possibility of ‘‘incompetent management’’ (Mayhew 2005: 480). Both matters plagued the GOP in 2008. Larry Bartels and John Zaller also found that the drawn-out wars of Korea and Vietnam cost the party in charge a 4 percent loss at the polls in the 1952 and 1968 elections as the wars dragged on (Bartels and Zaller 2001). The Iraq war’s 2006 electoral costs for the GOP, when it lost control of both the Senate and House, placed it firmly in the Korea/Vietnam category. The year 2008 promised more of the same. A number of other circumstances also favored Democrats in the 2008 presidential race. John McCain sought to succeed a two-term incumbent of his party, a feat accomplished only once since 1932. A historically high proportion of Americans—in some polls as high as 90 percent—thought the nation was on the ‘‘wrong track.’’ Polls reported that far fewer Republicans indicated enthusiasm for their nominee than did Democrats for their nominee. Surveys also indicated that the percentage of adult Americans calling themselves Republicans, which had reached parity with Democrats at 37 percent in the 2004 election, was now slumping considerably and falling five to ten points behind that of their partisan rivals. Almost two dozen House Republicans had retired rather than face reelection in such a situation (York 2008). The adverse environment for Republicans was reflected in the fund-raising totals for the parties’ presidential candidates in 2008. During the primary season, Democratic presidential candidates vastly out-raised Republicans, $787 million to $477 million. Barack Obama led the Democratic pack during the primaries, with an astounding $414 million raised, about twice that of McCain’s $216 million. Hillary Clinton’s withdrawal from the presidential race in June had cleared the way for the Obama campaign to focus on the convention and fall campaign. The campaign chose to opt out of the public financing system, foregoing $85.1 million in public general election funds to be able to raise unlimited cash from individual contributors, albeit in amounts no larger than $2,300 per person. This decision would prove to be wise, allowing the Obama campaign to raise an unprecedented $764.8 million during the 2008 election cycle. With abundant funds, they would blanket

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the airwaves with ads and create a get-out-the-vote ground game in key states that the GOP could not rival. Flush with cash, the Obama campaign decided to ‘‘expand the field’’ of the race by establishing dozens of campaign offices not only in crucial swing states like Florida, Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, but also in traditional GOP strongholds like Indiana, North Carolina, Colorado, and Virginia. Though the GOP retained a formidable get-out-the-vote operation developed in 2004 for 2008, the McCain campaign and national party simply did not have the resources to match the extensive network of field offices created by Obama’s millions. No modern general election campaign had ever assembled the funds and expertise to create such an extensive ground game before. Whatever the events of the fall campaign, a substantial Obama advantage in cash and organization would persist through the autumn. Given all this, it was no surprise that the Democratic nominee enjoyed a lead in the polls over the GOP candidate throughout 2008. Figure 4.1 shows the pattern of the McCain-Obama horse race over time. With few exceptions

FIGURE 4.1 National President General Election Poll Trend: Obama and McCain The polling trend goes through the ‘‘middle’’ of the data, with an average error of zero. The trend estimate smoothes out daily fluctuations in the polls; it is not a raw average of daily polls. The figures listed above the graph are the final, Election Day poll estimates for each candidate: Source: pollster.com. Created by Charles Franklin of the University of Wisconsin–Madison.

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in 2007–2008, Obama was ahead, a trend that would persist through the general election campaign, except for a brief McCain lead in mid-September. But in August 2008 Obama’s lead was usually within single digits, and he was a newcomer to presidential politics with some vulnerabilities as a candidate. Previous prediction models had not always foretold the winner; many of them had favored Al Gore in 2000. That suggested that the race might well go either way, depending upon the events of the fall. Neither campaign could take its situation for granted; each faced challenges.

Campaign Strategies during the Convention Season Another uncertainty regarding the general election involved the impact of the party conventions on the presidential race. Traditionally, the ‘‘out’’ party held its convention first, about a month before the convention of the incumbent party. In 2008, that schedule was truncated. Democrats moved their convention to the end of August, one week before the GOP convention of early September. One reason for this move was to avoid possible postconvention difficulties like those suffered by John Kerry in 2004 when advertising by the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth had damaged his candidacy. Such tight scheduling, however, might also limit Obama’s postconvention ‘‘bounce’’ in the polls. How would back-to-back conventions change the race? Traditionally the postconvention ‘‘bounce’’ produced an improvement in a nominee’s competitive standing from the low to high single digits. Would that prove to be the case this time? Both parties located their convention in swing states they hoped to win in the fall—the Democrats in Colorado and the Republicans in Minnesota. During the summer, the Obama campaign conducted extensive polling on the strengths and weaknesses of the two parties’ nominees. They fixed on a strategy that would prove quite productive in the months ahead: tie McCain as closely as possible to the unpopular Bush. David Axelrod, the campaign’s chief strategist, in articulating this approach, held that America was looking for ‘‘the remedy, not the replica’’ (Lizza 2008). This approach involved distinguishing Obama from ‘‘Washington insiders,’’ as he had done with great success in his contest with Hillary Clinton during the primaries. Further, Obama’s research revealed that voters did not know that much about John McCain. Joel Benenson, the campaign’s pollster, recalled, ‘‘What we knew at the start of the campaign was that the notion of John McCain as a change agent and independent voice didn’t exist anywhere outside of the beltway’’ (Lizza 2008). The adverse environment for the GOP, limited voter knowledge about John McCain, and large financial advantage made the execution of a fall cam-

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paign straightforward for the Obama high command. But some immediate challenges lay before them. They had to prevent party disunity at the national convention, introduce their candidate effectively to the public via his convention speech, and pick a vice presidential nominee who would offset any shortcomings of Obama as a candidate. To allay concerns about his inexperience, Obama chose Joe Biden, a thirty-six-year veteran of the U.S. Senate and chair of its important Foreign Relations Committee, as his vice presidential nominee. Biden was to prove a jaunty campaigner, but one whose propensity for verbal missteps would produce difficulties for the campaign throughout the fall. The convention itself began a bit listlessly, but delegates were roused by endorsement speeches by Hillary and Bill Clinton. Biden’s speech featured sharp attacks on partisan rivals, a task usually left to the vice presidential nominee. Referring to McCain, his longtime friend, he asserted, ‘‘John thinks that during the Bush years ‘we’ve made great progress economically.’ I think it’s been abysmal. And in the Senate, John sided with President Bush 95 percent of the time.’’ That fact would become a familiar trope in Democratic campaign speeches and advertisements. Obama’s well-delivered speech provided a vast spectacle, filling a football stadium with thousands of fans and drawing almost 40 million television viewers. His remarks concluded with a call for change and unity, major themes of his candidacy throughout 2008: The men and women who serve in our battlefields may be Democrats and Republicans and Independents, but they have fought together and bled together and some died together under the same proud flag. They have not served a Red America or a Blue America—they have served the United States of America. . . . At defining moments like this one, the change we need doesn’t come from Washington. Change comes to Washington. Change happens because the American people demand it—because they rise up and insist on new ideas and new leadership, a new politics for a new time.

Political scientist James Stimson estimated Obama’s postconvention poll bounce six days after Obama’s speech at 4.33 percent, a bit under the historic average of 4.9 percent (Stimson 2008). One reason for the small bounce was probably the surprising announcement of Sarah Palin, governor of Alaska, as John McCain’s running mate on the morning after Obama’s speech, depriving the Democratic nominee of several days of positive postconvention coverage. Palin had served less than two years as governor and before that had been mayor of the small town of Wasilla, Alaska. The choice surprised the Obama campaign and the rest of the political world. Few knew what to expect from her. The Palin pick was one of several attempts by McCain to ‘‘shake up’’ the adverse environment of the race.

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The McCain campaign during the summer had puttered slowly along, short on funds and receiving less media attention than did the Obama effort. Top McCain aides understood they faced a challenging situation. Unlike the Obama campaign, which could readily execute a simple strategy and message that was likely to bring electoral success, the McCain strategists faced a much more difficult challenge. Chief strategist Steve Schmidt recalled: ‘‘This was a campaign that was dealt a very, very tough hand of cards. It was highly unlikely that there will ever be another campaign in our lifetimes that [will feature] a worse environment than the environment that John McCain had to run in’’ (Cox 2008). Since no simple message would work, the McCain campaign focused instead on a series of tactical disruptions that might throw their opponent off track and open up new opportunities for them. The main opportunities for surprises that might change the race lay in the central events of the fall campaign: the vice presidential pick, the convention acceptance speeches, and the candidate debates. The McCain campaign began their disruptions with a ‘‘celebrity’’ ad in the summer, which mocked Obama’s July international trip by comparing him to Paris Hilton and Britney Spears. The celebrity label disturbed the Obama campaign, which viewed it as a negative description that might stick to their candidate. Then came the Palin pick, which caught the Obama campaign off guard. Palin had been Schmidt’s recommendation in order to shake up the race. A governor with a reputation as a reformer, she gained McCain’s nod after a few conversations. The immediate public reaction to Palin was positive, augmented by her impressive acceptance speech at the GOP convention. Her speech both introduced her to the public and included some barbs regarding Obama’s inexperience. Describing herself as a ‘‘hockey mom,’’ she ad-libbed the following description: ‘‘You know the difference between a pit bull and a hockey mom? Lipstick.’’ She contrasted her experience with local government to that of Obama’s as a community organizer: ‘‘Before I became governor of the great state of Alaska, I was mayor of my hometown. And since our opponents in this presidential election seem to look down on that experience, let me explain to them what the job involves. I guess a small-town mayor is sort of like a ‘community organizer,’ except that you have actual responsibilities.’’ Palin’s strongly conservative positions created enthusiasm among GOP activists, who had been cool to McCain since he clinched the nomination in the spring. McCain’s speech was reasonably well delivered, but proved no match for the Palin and Obama rhetorical successes of the convention season. He concluded it by referring to his career fighting for reform: ‘‘Fight with me. Fight with me. . . . Nothing is inevitable here. We’re Americans, and we never give up. We never quit. We never hide from history. We make history.’’ By the end of the GOP convention, however, the McCain tactical disruption

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seemed to have worked. The GOP ticket enjoyed a convention bounce estimated by James Stimson at eight points, double that of the Democratic ticket. By September 8, four days after the end of the GOP convention, the average of national polls put McCain ahead of Obama by three points.

A Series of Unfortunate Events The McCain lead would quickly dissipate due to a unique combination of events. Some were expected, such as the inevitable decay of the convention bounce. Some were self-inflicted, such as a series of McCain campaign miscues, including Palin’s poor media ‘‘rollout’’ and McCain’s abrupt behavior during the nation’s financial crisis. That crisis was truly an unprecedented event. It was not just unique in 2008, but had never before occurred in the midst of any general election campaign in American history. The international financial system faced a dramatic threat to its stability of the sort it had never encountered in the decades since it had effectively globalized. Before these tumultuous events transformed the presidential race, the McCain campaign ran into trouble. Though Sarah Palin’s nomination had garnered much attention and interest in the GOP ticket—the television ratings for the GOP convention matched that of the Democratic convention— she had no experience with presidential politics and very limited knowledge of international affairs. The McCain campaign then made a series of mistakes in addressing these shortcomings. In the weeks following the convention, she avoided press conferences and only spoke at campaign rallies. She was limited to two high-profile media interviews, first by ABC anchor Charles Gibson and later by CBS anchor Katie Couric. Palin was cautious during the Gibson interview and did not display an abundant understanding of global issues. Her comment that her international experience came from Alaska being on the Russian border received widespread derision. But the Couric interview was worse for Palin. Reportedly, she objected to the invasive staff role during her preparation for the Gibson interview, and did not prepare extensively for Couric. Her lack of knowledge received embarrassing exposure when she could not name a Supreme Court decision with which she disagreed, and could not discuss McCain’s record as a governmental reformer in any detail. This led to harsh but funny depictions of her by actress Tina Fey on Saturday Night Live and a steady decline in the number of Americans indicating in polls that they considered her qualified to run for vice president or that they had a positive opinion of her as a candidate. Later in the campaign, Palin gave many more media interviews and press conferences without incident, drawing into question the McCain media

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strategy for her in September. In retrospect, it seemed a serious stumble by a campaign that could afford few miscues. Joe Biden also earned derisive treatment on Saturday Night Live for his verbal gaffes during the campaign—such as his description of Franklin D. Roosevelt addressing the American people on television in the 1930s, long before television arrived in American homes—but polls consistently indicated that a majority of respondents viewed him as qualified to be president. Though Palin performed soundly in the vice presidential debate on October 2, surveys all revealed that the public thought Biden had won. Palin continued to outdraw McCain during her campaign appearances and she remained a strong favorite among Republicans. Over the course of the campaign, however, independents, moderates, and suburbanites—crucial groups of swing voters—steadily viewed her more negatively. By Election Day, she was not the unambiguous positive for the McCain campaign she seemed to be at the GOP convention. Sarah Palin made history, though, by becoming a major player in the campaign overnight and the first female GOP vice presidential nominee. The big blow of history came in the global financial crisis of September 2008, the largest such crisis in seventy years and the first occurring in the midst of a presidential general election campaign. The crisis originated in the housing market, where the federal government for years had encouraged high-risk ‘‘subprime’’ mortgages. Packages of these mortgages had been ‘‘securitized,’’ made into investment vehicles, and offered to investors by financial institutions. At the time, it was widely thought that securitization would make the issuance of such risky mortgages less of a gamble. By 2008, it was clear that this was not the case. A U.S. monetary policy pursued by the Federal Reserve Board had made the cost of credit negligible for several years prior to 2008. The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), federally created corporations that underwrote mortgages, had engaged in risky mortgages for years, assuming that the creation of mortgage-backed securities would shield them from losses. As the housing market slumped in 2007–2008, mortgagebacked securities and the financial condition of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac became parlous. This led to the collapse of several major American financial institutions in September 2008, a crisis threatening the very operation of the international financial system. On September 7, the federal government took control of the operations of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, accepting responsibility for their swollen liability of some $5 trillion in mortgages. Then on September 15 came the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers investment house, a Wall Street titan, brought on in part by its holding of suspect mortgage-backed securities. The reaction

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of American and international stock markets was severe; confidence in global financial securities seemed in question. The next day, the federal government announced a $5 billion emergency loan to rescue the stressed American International Group investment company in order to prevent a further collapse of international financial markets. Two days later, the Bush administration announced a $700 billion plan for the government to buy mortgagebacked securities in order to inject funds into the finance companies that had overinvested in them. This, it was hoped, would restore confidence in these companies and, in turn, stabilize the national and international financial systems. That plan required congressional approval. It is at this point that the presidential politics directly intersected with the crisis. Though the economy was the foremost public concern throughout 2008, the crisis boosted its mention as the most important problem to the highest level since the 1980 recession (Jones 2008). It became the preeminent issue in fall 2008 as gas prices and the Iraq war fell as public concerns. In this situation, each presidential candidate faced a challenge. McCain, who previously had admitted his limited understanding of economics, needed to demonstrate a reliable competence in addressing the issue. Obama, a relative newcomer to national politics, had to respond in a way that instilled confidence in his ability to be president. McCain stumbled at the outset of the crisis by claiming in a speech ‘‘the fundamentals of our economy are sound’’ when world financial markets were teetering. His campaign’s penchant for seeking tactical advantage also led him to undertake audacious actions. On Wednesday, September 24, McCain agreed, upon Obama’s initiative, to sign a joint statement of principles about how to address the crisis. Immediately after agreeing to this in a phone call, however, McCain suspended his campaign, urged cancellation of the first presidential debate because of the crisis, and flew to Washington. All of these actions were a surprise to Obama, who responded by urging that the debate go on as scheduled because ‘‘It’s going to be part of the president’s job to be able to deal with more than one thing at once.’’ McCain’s rush back to Washington did not go well for him. At a White House meeting both he and Obama attended the next day, it was clear that bipartisan consensus on the bailout plan did not exist. House Republicans did not agree with its provisions. McCain urged that their perspectives be heeded in the bailout negotiations, but the candidate himself never became a major participant in deliberations over the bailout package. Meanwhile, he quickly dropped his objection to the first debate and flew to Jackson, Mississippi, to participate, despite the fact that the crisis was no closer to resolution. Three days later, on Monday, September 29, House Republicans voted in large numbers to ensure the failure of the bailout plan on the House floor. This triggered a big downturn in stocks around the globe and more frenzied

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negotiations. A revised plan passed on Friday, October 2, and was quickly signed into law. Both Obama and McCain voted for the bailout plan. Stocks, however, remained depressed throughout the remainder of the campaign season, and a parade of bad news regarding rising unemployment and negative economic growth arrived in September and October. The Obama campaign had hoped that McCain’s actions would label him as unstable and erratic in a crisis, and polls indicated that public views of McCain’s leadership abilities declined with the financial crisis. Obama, who was generally constructive during the crisis, urging fellow Democrats to support the rescue plan, saw his leadership scores improve. The greater problem for McCain, however, was the very presence of the economic problems themselves. The economic issue had benefited the Democrats all year and recent events had made those issues dominant for the remainder of the campaign. Polls indicated considerable public opposition to the bailout plan itself. By suspending his campaign and rushing to Washington, McCain had managed to associate himself strongly with both a serious problem, the financial crisis, and the controversial solution to it. Obama, whose reaction to the October economic events was less impetuous, suffered less from the crisis and now had a powerful economic issue buoying his ‘‘change’’ message. McCain’s tactical gamble did not pay off.

The Debates Presidential debates are one of the major ‘‘flex points’’ in the general election season because they directly expose the candidates in verbal competition before millions of Americans. Such situations create mass opinions, giving both campaigns a rare opportunity to reset the race. The McCain campaign hoped to illustrate through the debates that Obama was not up to the job of president—that he was dangerously inexperienced. The Obama campaign sought to demonstrate their candidate’s presidential readiness and to tie McCain closely to the unpopular George W. Bush. The first debate, on September 26, involved foreign policy and featured the two candidates at opposite lecterns. The vice presidential debate on October 2 featured an identical podium format, and was not limited to a particular subject. The second presidential debate on October 7 presented the candidates in a town hall format, ambling about and answering audience questions. The final, October 15, debate placed the candidates at a table with a single moderator, answering questions and engaging in direct dialogue over economic issues. Polls and most audience surveys of the debates indicated that the Democratic candidate won every debate. Partisans predictably labeled their party’s candidate the winner, but, importantly, independents consistently viewed the Demo-

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crat as winning the debate as well. Perhaps the circumstances surrounding the election—an unpopular president, a slumping economy, an unpopular war in Iraq—stacked the deck prohibitively against a successful Republican debate performance. Or perhaps Obama and Biden were just better debaters than McCain and Palin. The debates did not involve any memorable ‘‘gotcha’’ moments that changed the course of the campaign. Such events are rare in the history of general election debates. Obama, for his part, succeeded in appearing presidential and allaying doubts about his leadership ability. His rhetoric placed him in the mainstream on many issues. One of his most successful moments, measured by audience reaction, came at the end of the third debate, when he stressed personal responsibility in education: ‘‘But there’s one last ingredient that I just want to mention, and that’s parents. We can’t do it just in the schools. Parents are going to have to show more responsibility. They’ve got to turn off the TV set, put away the video games, and, finally, start instilling that thirst for knowledge that our students need’’ (Sullivan 2008). He repeatedly linked McCain to the unpopular George W. Bush, not only during the debates, but also in many of his campaign ads that were flooding the airwaves at this time. McCain in the first debate asserted that Obama’s willingness to meet with hostile foreign leaders ‘‘without preconditions’’ amounted to dangerous diplomacy. That failed to move voter sentiment, as did his mention in the final debate of Obama’s past association with 1960s radical William Ayers. He did present another criticism during the final debate that proved more useful to his campaign. McCain introduced an individual who would figure prominently in the campaign’s final weeks: ‘‘Joe the Plumber,’’ specifically Samuel Joseph Wurzelbacher, a plumber’s assistant from Holland, Ohio. Wurzelbacher was captured on tape raising concerns with Obama about his campaign’s proposal to raise taxes on those making more than $250,000 a year. Obama in response said: ‘‘It’s not that I want to punish your success. I just want to make sure that everybody who is behind you, that they’ve got a chance for success, too. . . . When you spread the wealth around, it’s good for everybody.’’ Citing the incident, McCain challenged Obama: ‘‘You were going to put him in a higher tax bracket which was going to increase his taxes, which was going to cause him not to be able to employ people, which Joe was trying to realize the American dream [sic].’’

The Endgame By the end of the debates, on October 20, Obama enjoyed an average lead of six points in national polls. The Obama strategy of reassurance had worked.

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The economy, in desperate straits, remained central to voters’ minds. His campaign’s impressive ground game was outstripping GOP efforts in all major states and his superior campaign funding allowed him to outspend McCain on the airwaves by considerable margins as well. Under the harsh scrutiny of the campaign media, Obama had not made any major mistakes. McCain’s attempts to make Obama appear to be the ‘‘dangerous’’ choice had not succeeded, and his own judgment was now called into question regarding his actions during the September financial crisis and his choice of Sarah Palin as a running mate. The McCain campaign, however, had found two tactical opportunities to employ in the final stage of the campaign. Obama’s ‘‘spread the wealth around’’ became an opportunity to revive worries about possible tax increases. Joe the Plumber himself joined the campaign trail for McCain. The campaign expanded the critique to suggest that Obama was a sort of socialist. Sarah Palin, on the stump two days after the final debate, claimed: ‘‘Senator Obama said he wants to quote ‘spread the wealth.’ . . . Friends, now is no time to experiment with socialism. . . . Whatever you call his tax plan and that redistribution of wealth, it will destroy jobs. It will hurt our economy.’’ Another tactical opportunity came in the form of a statement by Biden recorded at a Democratic fund-raiser: ‘‘Mark my words. Mark my words. It will not be six months before the world tests Barack Obama. . . . The world is looking. . . . Watch, we’re gonna have an international crisis, a generated crisis, to test the mettle of this guy.’’ The McCain campaign jumped on this to claim that Obama was in fact a risky choice, a person who could not be trusted to keep Americans secure. The Obama campaign, for its part, was able to rely on arguments at the end that had worked for them throughout the fall campaign. On October 26, Obama claimed that McCain’s recent criticisms of President Bush, aimed at distancing himself from the president, were ‘‘like Robin getting mad at Batman.’’ The Obama campaign’s unprecedented funds allowed it to purchase a half-hour for a prime-time program on several national networks on the Wednesday before the election. Most of the program concerned the economic problems of voters in a number of swing states such as Missouri, New Mexico, and Ohio, with the candidate explaining how his policies would improve their situations. He explained his policy specifics while expressing empathy: ‘‘We measure the strength of our economy not by the number of billionaires we have or the profits of the Fortune 500, but by whether someone with a good idea can take a risk and start a new business, or whether the waitress who lives on tips can take a day off and look after a sick kid without losing her job.’’

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McCain, for his part, had to appear on interview shows to get some rival exposure. During the final weeks, the McCain campaign increased its ad buys to match those of Obama, after being badly outspent for months. In the last days of the campaign, McCain and Palin hurriedly visited many states that previously had been safely Republican—Indiana, Missouri, North Carolina, and Virginia—while also traveling to traditional swing states such as Ohio, Florida, and Pennsylvania. The travel schedule revealed, far more than any candidate’s rhetoric, that the GOP ticket‘s prospects were dimming.

The Election Result Election night delivered a solid victory for the Democratic ticket in both the popular vote and the Electoral College. Obama and Biden garnered 52.9 percent of the popular vote and 365 electoral votes to the GOP ticket’s 45.6 percent and 173 electoral votes. A Democratic ticket had gained 50 percent of the popular vote for the first time since 1976. Turnout was estimated at about 131.3 million, constituting between 61.6 and 63.0 percent of eligible voters, depending on varying estimates of the total eligible electorate. That comprised the highest turnout since the 1960s, a testament to Obama’s massive field organization. Even so, it was only slightly higher than 2004’s 59.6 percent turnout (Center for the Study of the American Electorate 2008; McDonald 2008). Figure 4.2 reveals that nine states voting for the GOP in 2004 went Democratic. In several of these states, as evident in table 4.1, the swing to the Democrats was pronounced. Comfortable 2004 GOP victories in North Carolina, Virginia, and Florida were transformed to narrow Democratic wins. Narrow 2004 GOP wins in Iowa, Nevada, New Mexico, and Colorado became lopsided defeats in 2008. Ohio, traditionally a swing state in recent elections, swung from narrowly GOP in 2004 to narrowly Democratic in 2008. Most remarkably, though the GOP had carried Indiana by 21 points in 2004, Obama’s extensive ads and ground game there helped him squeeze out a narrow 25,000 vote statewide win. In examining the Indiana results, analyst Michael Barone concluded: ‘‘Organization matters. I was not sure how much the Obama organization could deliver in actual votes. The answer turns out to be a lot. The Indiana results are very impressive’’ (Barone 2008). Barone noted that the lopsided swing in that state probably resulted from the lack of a strong GOP organization resulting from the state’s previously reliable GOP voting pattern. In the traditionally competitive state of Ohio, in contrast, where the GOP had long been organized for hard-fought contests, the Obama swing was much smaller. The Obama organization proved its ability

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FIGURE 4.2 Electoral Vote Map for the Two Major Parties, 2004 and 2008

to greatly ‘‘expand the playing field,’’ much to their advantage. In contrast, McCain made no inroads into the Democratic Electoral College base. His campaign made concerted efforts in the final phases of the campaign in two traditionally blue states—New Hampshire and Pennsylvania—but lost both decisively. Throughout his 2008 campaign, Obama decried the polarization and division besetting America. He first criticized it in his celebrated 2004 address to the Democratic National Convention: ‘‘The pundits like to slice-and-dice our country into Red States and Blue States; Red States for Republicans, Blue States for Democrats. But I’ve got news for them, too. We are one people.’’ One ironic result of the 2008 popular vote was that, despite Obama’s impressive victory, the statewide results evidenced even more polarization than in 2000 and 2004, in fact more than had any election since 1948. Counting the number of states where the winner’s share of the statewide vote was at least ten points higher or lower than his nationwide vote, 2008 produced eighteen states with such polarized results, compared to sixteen in 2000 and fifteen in

Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware Dist. of Columbia Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana

State

6 11 3

6 8 9

4

15

9 3 10 6

4 10 12 17 10

21 11 7

4

55 9 7 3 3 27

McCain Obama

Electoral Vote 2008

6 11 3

11 7 6 8 9

4

27 15

9

9 3 10 6

Bush

4 10 12 17 10

21

4

7 3 3

55

Kerry

Electoral Vote 2004

1,264,879 192,631 1,132,560 632,672 4,554,643 1,020,135 620,210 152,356 14,821 3,939,380 2,048,244 120,309 400,989 1,981,158 1,341,667 677,508 685,541 1,050,599 1,147,603 296,195 956,663 1,104,284 2,044,405 1,275,409 687,266 1,445,812 241,816

McCain 811,764 122,485 948,648 418,049 7,441,458 1,216,793 979,316 255,394 210,403 4,143,957 1,843,452 324,918 235,219 3,319,237 1,367,503 818,240 499,979 751,515 780,981 421,484 1,612,692 1,891,083 2,867,680 1,573,354 520,864 1,442,180 229,725

Obama

Popular Vote 2008

TABLE 4.1

1,176,394 190,889 1,104,294 572,898 5,509,826 1,101,255 693,826 171,660 21,256 3,964,522 1,914,254 194,191 409,235 2,346,608 1,479,438 751,957 736,456 1,069,439 1,102,169 330,201 1,024,703 1,071,109 2,313,746 1,346,695 672,660 1,455,713 266,063

Bush 693,933 111,025 893,524 469,953 6,745,485 1,001,732 857,488 200,152 202,970 3,583,544 1,366,149 231,708 181,098 2,891,989 969,011 741,898 434,993 712,733 820,299 396,842 1,334,493 1,803,800 2,479,183 1,445,014 457,768 1,259,171 173,710

Kerry

Popular Vote 2004

61 60 54 59 37 45 38 37 7 49 52 27 61 37 49 45 57 58 59 41 37 36 41 44 57 50 50

39 38 45 39 61 54 61 62 93 51 47 72 36 62 50 54 41 41 40 58 62 62 57 54 43 49 47

63 61 55 54 44 52 44 46 9 52 58 45 68 45 60 50 62 60 57 45 43 37 48 48 59 53 59

37 36 44 45 54 47 54 53 89 47 41 54 30 55 39 49 37 40 42 53 56 62 51 52 40 46 39

Kerry

Popular Vote 2004 (%)

McCain Obama Bush

Popular Vote 2008 (%)

173

3

5

8 3 11 34 5

7

3

4

365

10

3 13 11

7 21 4

20

1 5 4 15 5 31 15

McCain Obama

Sources: CNN and New York Times.

Totals

Nebraska Nevada New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming

State

Electoral Vote 2008

286

3

5

13

8 3 11 34 5

15 3 20 7

5

5 5

Bush

252

10

11

3

7 21 4

31

4 15

Kerry

Electoral Vote 2004

58,348,877

448,801 411,988 316,937 1,545,495 343,820 2,576,360 2,109,698 168,523 2,501,855 959,745 699,673 2,586,496 165,389 1,034,500 203,019 1,487,564 4,467,748 555,497 98,791 1,726,053 1,098,072 394,278 1,258,181 160,639

McCain

66,877,438

329,132 531,884 384,591 2,085,051 464,458 4,363,386 2,123,390 141,113 2,708,685 502,294 978,605 3,192,316 296,547 862,042 170,886 1,093,213 3,521,164 301,771 219,105 1,958,370 1,548,654 301,438 1,670,474 80,496

Obama

Popular Vote 2008

512,814 418,690 331,237 1,670,003 376,930 2,962,567 1,961,166 196,651 2,859,764 959,792 866,831 2,793,847 169,046 937,974 232,584 1,384,375 4,526,917 663,742 121,180 1,716,959 1,304,894 423,550 1,478,120 167,629

Bush

59,028,550

254,328 397,190 340,511 1,911,430 370,942 4,314,280 1,525,849 111,052 2,741,165 503,966 943,163 2,938,095 259,760 661,699 149,244 1,036,477 2,832,704 241,199 184,067 1,454,742 1,510,201 326,541 1,489,504 70,776

Kerry

Popular Vote 2004

62,028,719

TABLE 4.1 (Continued)

46

57 43 45 42 42 37 49 53 47 66 41 44 35 54 53 57 55 63 31 47 41 56 43 65 53

42 55 54 57 57 62 50 45 51 34 57 55 63 45 45 42 44 34 68 53 58 43 56 33 51

66 51 49 46 50 40 56 63 51 66 47 49 39 58 60 57 61 73 39 54 46 56 49 69

48

32 48 50 53 49 58 44 36 49 34 52 51 59 41 38 43 38 26 59 46 53 43 49 29

Kerry

Popular Vote 2004 (%)

McCain Obama Bush

Popular Vote 2008 (%)

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71

2004. Only one election from 1948 to 1996 (in the tumultuous year of 1968, with fifteen) featured more than eleven such polarized states. What does this mean? Obama’s great popularity in blue states and Palin’s strong appeal in red states may have augmented polarization in 2008. Polarization does not just result from George W. Bush’s presence on the ballot, but instead may be an enduring feature of our politics. Unity, a major theme in Obama’s campaign rhetoric, may not be so easy to achieve during his presidency (Cost 2008). The Obama win hinged on the support of four demographic groups: African Americans, Latinos, young voters, and highly educated voters. Table 4.2 reveals that Obama scored resounding (95 percent) support among African Americans, whose ranks grew from 11 percent of the electorate in 2004 to 13 percent in 2008. Some analysts claimed before the election that Obama’s race might cost him votes. Only 9 percent of voters, however, said race was a factor in their presidential vote, and a majority of them favored Obama. Latinos also voted much more Democratic in 2008 than in 2004 (increasing from 53 to 67 percent) and their percentage of the electorate increased by 1 percent. Since the Latino share of the American population and electorate is bound to increase in coming years, that is very good news for Democrats. One of the most remarkable shifts in the election was the large margin Obama gained among voters aged 18–29. His 24-point advantage was vastly larger than John Kerry’s 9-point edge in 2004. Young voters, like Latino voters, portend the future of the American electorate. Obama narrowly carried college graduates, a group that the GOP won regularly in previous elections, and also carried those with postgraduate degrees by a whopping eighteen points, besting Kerry’s 2004 margin by seven points. These groups also will grow as a percentage of the electorate in future years should education levels continue to rise, as is likely. Obama also narrowly carried the suburbs, a crucial area of swing voters. Obama carried every state where he equaled or exceeded his national level of 50 percent of the suburban vote. The future of the 2008 Democratic coalition, judged by these demographic trends, seems bright. Exit polls reported that, overall, the Democrats enjoyed a seven-point advantage over Republicans in the 2008 electorate—39 to 32 percent—up from a 37–37 tie in 2004, the biggest partisan shift across two consecutive elections since exit polling began. In contrast, where did McCain score well? McCain carried white voters, but the white proportion of the electorate shrank by 3 percent—from 77 to 74 percent—and McCain’s margin among them was five points less than that gathered by Bush in 2004. He also won rural and older voters by comfortable margins. The rural population is not growing as a proportion of the American population. Older voters will not help build future Republican majorities

2004 Voters %

37 37 26

21 45 34

77 11 8 2

36 41 5 6

30 32 16 22

2008 Voters %

39 32 29

22 44 34

74 13 9 2

36 39 5 7

33 32 14 21

For McCain (%) 10 90 44 10 39 78 55 4 31 35 57 53 5 3 53 50 38 29

Characteristic

Party Democrat Republican Independent

Ideology Liberal Moderate Conservative

Ethnic Group White Black Hispanic Asian

Sex/ethnicity White men White women Black men Black women

Sex/marital status Married men Married women Unmarried men Unmarried women

45 47 59 71

41 46 95 96

43 95 67 62

89 60 20

89 9 52

For Obama (%)

TABLE 4.2 Group Support in the 2004 and 2008 Presidential Elections

60 55 45 37

62 55 13 10

58 11 44 44

13 45 84

11 93 48

For Bush (%)

39 44 53 62

37 44 86 90

41 88 53 56

85 54 15

89 6 49

For Kerry (%)

17 29 30 24

4 22 32

26 16

54 40

22

42

27 12

3

18 29 37 16

4 20 31

28 17

54 42

26

15

27 12

2

Religion Protestant White Protestant White Evangelical Attend church weekly Catholic Attend church weekly Jewish

Education Not a H.S. grad H.S. graduate Some college education College graduate Postgraduate education

Age 18–29 years old 30–44 years old 45–59 years old 60 years and older

21

45 50

67

74

54 65

48 40

35 46 47

32 46 49 53

78

54 49

32

24

45 34

50 58

63 52 51

66 52 50 45

45

52 55

70

77

59 58

52 44

49 52 54

45 54 51 54

74

47 44

29

22

40 40

46 55

50 47 46

54 46 48 46

8 15 22 58 32 18

24

18

32 53 16

20 15 19 8

6 12 19 62 41 26

21

15

30 49 21

63 10 9 9

For McCain (%) 25 37 43 49 49 49 42 54 35 48 53 44 39 86 26

Characteristic

Family Income Under $15K $15,000–$29,999 $30,000–$49,999 Over $50,000 Over $75,000 Over $100,000

Union Household

Veterans

Size of Place Urban Suburban Rural

Most important issue Economy Iraq Terrorism Health Care

Source: National exit polls collected by Cable News Network.

2004 Voters %

2008 Voters %

TABLE 4.2 (Continued)

53 59 13 73

63 50 45

44

57

73 60 55 49 49 49

For Obama (%)

18 26 86 23

44 51 58

57

40

36 42 49 56 57 58

For Bush (%)

80 73 14 77

55 48 40

41

59

63 57 50 43 42 41

For Kerry (%)

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unless some of the more Democratic younger voters change their minds over time. For future electoral success, the GOP will have to reach beyond older, white, and rural voters. McCain suffered from the two central factors mentioned at the beginning of the chapter: George W. Bush’s low job approval and concerns over a declining economy. McCain won every state where Bush’s job approval was over 35 percent in the exit polls and lost every state where Bush’s job approval was below 35 percent (except Missouri, which McCain carried by less than 4,000 votes). Fully 85 percent of voters were ‘‘very worried’’ about economic conditions, and Obama carried these voters by ten points, 54–44 (Cable News Network 2008). The scale of Obama’s success in 2008 is unusual and impressive. He greatly expanded the number of states in which his party was electorally competitive for the presidency. He won comfortably among groups that will make up a steadily larger proportion of future electorates. He increased his margins among his partisans while also converting groups of swing voters, such as independents, moderates, and suburbanites. He did this by raising vast sums, deploying funds ably to flood the airwaves with ads and create the largest grassroots organization in modern campaign history, all the while personally demonstrating constant message discipline, in contrast to running mate Joe Biden’s occasional gaffes. One of the greatest accomplishments of the Obama campaign was its paucity of mistakes. That may seem unimportant, but consider the cost of the McCain campaign’s mistakes during the fall campaign and the smooth-running Obama campaign seems all the more remarkable. Oh, and one more unusual fact—all this was accomplished by the first African American to win the White House in our nation’s history.

The Broader Consequences Do the solid Democratic presidential and congressional victories of November 4, 2008, betoken a long-term transformation of American politics? Election scholars coined the term ‘‘realignment’’ to connote an unusual election or series of elections that reconfigures electoral politics for the long term. Such elections feature sharp changes in issues, party leaders, and the regional and demographic bases of power of the two parties that create a new competitive situation in national elections. The last definitive realignment occurred in 1932, when Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s landslide election brought new groups—African Americans, blue collar workers—into an enlarged Democratic coalition and reshaped electoral competition around a variety of new social welfare issues. The ‘‘New Deal coalition’’ dominated American politics until the 1960s, when it gradually was displaced by an era of more evenly

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contested presidential and congressional elections. Might the big Democratic victory of 2008 be the start of a partisan realignment? We won’t know the answer to that for several years, because enduring changes are only evident after much time has passed. Even so, there are reasons to doubt that realignment began in 2008. Realigning elections feature sharp changes in voting behavior, and party allegiances get rearranged. No such sharp shifts occurred in 2008. Political scientist Larry Bartels analyzed state results in 2008 and found them very similar to those of the close election of 2004. Democrats just gained a few more votes among groups across the board; no big shifts in allegiance occurred. The overall shift in the Democratic margin was 29 points in 1932, compared to 9 points in 2008. Bartels found the 2004–2008 continuity greatly contrasted with the shifting state patterns of the 1932 election (Bartels 2008). The Democratic gains in Congress were more similar in size to the GOP gains in the midterm election in 1994, which was not a realigning election, than they were to the mammoth Democratic gains of 1932. Further, the election did not result from the surging popularity of the Democratic Party, but rather from the unpopularity of the GOP. In a November 2008 survey, Democrats were about as popular with voters in 2008 as they were in 2004, when they lost the presidency and congressional seats, while the GOP had dropped in popularity by a big margin (Democracy Corps 2008). Overall, it seems the unprecedented financial crisis of September 2008 magnified a narrow Democratic lead into a substantial November victory. Figure 4.1 reveals that Obama’s lead surged in late September. Scott Winship draws the appropriate conclusion: ‘‘Without the financial crisis, the already weak economy might not have been enough to give Obama his swing states [several of which he won by very narrow margins]. In that case, we would have seen our third straight ‘50-50 Nation’ election. Barring financial crises every four years, that’s no recipe for realignment’’ (Winship 2008).

Prospects for the Parties To prosper, the GOP really must move on from the issues and leaders of 2008. The unpopular George W. Bush will leave the White House, opening up possibilities for new leaders and new coalition construction. But that task will not be easy. The GOP traditionally enjoyed a reputation as the superior party at government management and the maintenance of national security. The many miscues of the George W. Bush presidency—Iraq and Hurricane Katrina, for example—have deeply tarnished that reputation. The immediate concerns of Americans involve their endangered economic security. The

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GOP, traditionally the party of limited government and free markets, is not positioned well to meet those needs in the short term. A rethinking of the GOP policy agenda must occur for the party to expand its electoral prospects in the future. And that rethinking is best led publicly by new leaders better able to appeal to a demographically changing electorate. The Democrats now have an unusual opportunity to dominate national policymaking for the first time since they controlled Congress and the presidency in 1993–1994. But they have asked for, and gained, the power to address a daunting set of problems. America was in the middle of its deepest recession in almost thirty years as Obama took office, making economic stimulus a top priority for the new president. But other troublesome issues crowded the agenda: health care reform, environmental problems, historically large governmental deficits, ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, international terrorism. How soon must government by Democrats produce results meeting the American public’s approval in order for the party to retain its hold on power? And when will Republicans be seen to offer a credible alternative? The answers to such questions are hostage to events, as was the 2008 presidential election. As Walter Dean Burnham, a leading scholar of American elections, put it: ‘‘There’s a huge amount of instability that’s built into the electoral system right now. Hegemony tends to erode pretty quickly’’ (Harwood 2008).

Note 1. Eight different 2008 general election prediction models are discussed in PS Political Science and Politics 41, no. 4 (October 2008): 679–722.

References Barone, Michael. 2008. ‘‘Obama’s Organization Delivered Impressive Results Against McCain.’’ U.S. News and World Report. http://www.news.com/blogs/barone/2008/ 11/14/obamas-organization-d elivered-impr essive-results-against-mccain.html (accessed December 11, 2008). Bartels, Larry. 2008. Election Debriefing. Center for the Study of Democratic Politics. Princeton University. http://blogs.princeton.edu/election2008/2008/11/electiondebriefing.html (accessed November 7, 2008). Bartels, Larry M., and John Zaller. 2001. ‘‘Presidential Vote Models: A Recount.’’ PS: Political Science and Politics 34 (1): 9–20. Cable News Network. 2008. ‘‘National President Exit Poll.’’ http://www.cnn.com/ ELECTION/2008/results/president/ (accessed November 10, 2008).

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Center for the Study of the American Electorate. 2008. ‘‘African Americans, Anger, Fear and Youth Propel Turnout to Highest Level Since 1964.’’ American University. http://domino.american.edu/AU/media/mediarel.nsf/1D265343BDC2189785 256B810071F238/EE414B16927D6C9E85257522004F109D?OpenDocument. Cost, Jay. 2008. ‘‘Electoral Polarization Continues Under Obama.’’ http://www.real clearpolitics.com/horseraceblog/ (accessed November 20, 2008). Cox, Ana Marie. 2008. ‘‘McCain Campaign Autopsy.’’ Daily Beast, November 7. http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2008-11-07/mc cain-campaignautopsy//p/ (accessed November 7, 2008). Democracy Corps. 2008. ‘‘Post-Election Survey with Campaign for America’s Future.’’ http://www.democracycorps.com/download.php?attachmentdcor110 508fq1.pdf (accessed November 25, 2008). Harwood, John. 2008. ‘‘The End of Political Dominance.’’ New York Times, October 27. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/27/us/politics/27caucus.html?reftodays paper (accessed October 27, 2008). Jones, Jeffrey. 2008. ‘‘Economy Runaway Winner as Most Important Problem.’’ http://www.gallup.com/poll/112093/Economy-Runaway-Winner-Most-ImportantProblem.aspx (accessed November 22, 2008). Lizza, Ryan. 2008. ‘‘How Obama Won.’’ New Yorker, November 17. http://www.new yorker.com/reporting/2008/11/17/081117fa_fact_lizza?printabletrue (accessed November 17, 2008). McDonald, Michael. 2008. 2008 Unofficial Vote Count. George Mason University. http://elections.gmu.edu/preliminary_vote_2008.html (accessed December 11, 2008). Stimson, James A. 2008. ‘‘Bounce and Counterbounce.’’ University of North Carolina—Chapel Hill. http://www.unc.edu/⬃jstimson/comment.htm (accessed September 22, 2008). Sullivan, Amy. 2008. ‘‘Undecideds Laughing At, Not With, McCain.’’ Time magazine Swampland blog.http://swampland.blogs.time.com/2008/10/16/ (accessed November 20, 2008). Winship, Scott. 2008. ‘‘America the Polarized.’’ The New Republic, November 6. http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id68e1a802-539d-4443-9a73-4901ce15 1188 (accessed November 6, 2008). York, Byron. 2008. ‘‘John McCain, Against the Wind.’’ National Review online, October 27. http://article.nationalreview.com/?qNjI1MDk3NzU1NjI1ODQ1Mjc1N WFkNGNlMTMxYTc3NzY (accessed October 28, 2008).

5 Partisan Surge and Decline in Congressional Elections The Case of 2008 Roger H. Davidson

he nation’s quadrennial presidential selection process is long and tortuous—especially in comparison with the more tidy and compact methods used by most of the world’s other democracies. The 2008 nomination and election contests stimulated near-record levels of interest and involvement—not only in the United States, but around the world. There was all the drama and uncertainty of a long-running athletic rivalry. ‘‘What a show it’s been!’’ enthused veteran political reporter David S. Broder, who pronounced it ‘‘the best campaign I’ve ever covered’’ (Broder 2008). The presidential clamor, however, should not drown out the 470 races for congressional seats: 35 Senate and all 435 House seats were at stake in 2008.1 These contests are every bit as complex and time-consuming as the presidential struggles. Yet most of these races pass under the radar screens of the national media; many of them receive scant media coverage even in the localities where they are fought. Despite this visibility gap, decisions about who serves on Capitol Hill—and which party is in charge—are as momentous as who lives in the White House. Presidents’ legacies are ultimately forged on Capitol Hill, asserts former House member and White House chief of staff Leon Panetta. ‘‘Under our system of government, the president proposes but it is Congress that disposes’’ (Panetta 2008).

T

— 79 —

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Recruiting the Candidates Where do candidates for these congressional offices come from? Most wouldbe lawmakers can be described as strategic contenders (Schlesinger 1966). That is, they are individuals who calculate the pros and cons of serving in public office, and who judge the opportune time to launch their candidacy. Usually these men and women already hold public offices within their own states or localities. Others are political ‘‘amateurs’’ who boast other bankable attributes: for example, media or sports visibility, business or nonprofit success, or wartime service (Canon 1990). (Some candidates, though, are ‘‘pure amateurs,’’ with little or no chance of success.) Ambitious individuals calculate not only their general election prospects (including whether the seat is held by an incumbent), but also the prospects for nomination—for example, their party’s strength, leadership structure, and nominating procedures (Davidson, Oleszek, and Lee 2008, especially chapter 3). The central questions are: What are my chances of getting the party’s nomination? What are my chances for winning the general election? What will it cost me to succeed? What local or national trends can boost or impede my chances of success? And if an incumbent holds the post, what are his or her vulnerabilities? Candidacy decisions are often the pivotal moments in the entire recruitment process. ‘‘Who runs, who does not run, how many candidates run. These questions set the stage for the campaigns themselves’’ (Maisel 1982, 34). The Parties’ ‘‘Hill Campaign Committees’’ Although all aspirants must decide for themselves whether and when to run, most serious office-seekers gravitate into the orbits of the two major parties—which carry not only the brand loyalties of a large majority of voters, but also command extensive logistical and financial resources. Some twentythree party labels actually appeared on congressional ballots somewhere in 2008. Minor-party candidates provide voters with alternatives especially in cases where only one major party fields a candidate (there were twenty such cases in 2008). Only a handful of these contenders, however, win a sizable number of votes.2 Only two Independents now serve in Congress: Vermont’s senator Bernard Sanders, a self-styled ‘‘democratic socialist,’’ and Connecticut’s senator Joseph I. Lieberman, who won as an independent in 2006 after Democratic primary voters rejected him. Both senators caucus with the Senate’s Democrats: they tend to vote with the party (Lieberman mainly on domestic issues), which also provides them majority-party status for committee leadership posts.

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The campaign committees of the four Capitol Hill parties—House and Senate Democrats and Republicans—are the major players in seeking out and supporting candidates (Herrnson 2007, 90–94).3 All recent elections have begun with fierce recruiting seasons, with both parties seeking lineups to win House and Senate majorities. Recruiting for 2008 began as soon as the 2006 contests were concluded. Party leaders and staffs ‘‘reach out across the country in search of political talent. Like college football coaching staffs in hot pursuit of high-school prospects, they are . . . putting together the lineups of the future’’ (Walsh 1985). Prospects can expect calls from the president, former presidents, governors, high-profile financial backers, lobbyists, and other notables. The party’s choices are usually nominated (though not always)—assuming that local and national strategists are in agreement and are then able to ‘‘clear the field’’ in the party primaries. (This may require discouraging certain candidates deemed unelectable for one reason or another.) Once nominated, most candidates turn to the party committees to provide information and advice, to open doors to potential donors, and even to locate seasoned campaign staffs. Of course, recruiting efforts rise or fall with the party’s overall standing in the electorate at large—as strategically minded prospects calculate their odds of success. Even under favorable conditions, however, party recruiters can come up empty handed. For example, although Republicans enjoyed a pretty successful year in 2004, Illinois’ open Senate seat turned out to be a colossal embarrassment. Their vulnerable incumbent having retired, the GOP’s nominee—a public-minded multimillionaire—withdrew in the wake of a marital scandal, and their alternative choices (including legendary Chicago Bears’ linebacker Dick Butkus) shunned the race. Party leaders finally accepted a self-promoting ideologue who moved to Illinois from Maryland to campaign. So the Democrat, a young state senator, walked to victory, winning seven out of ten general election votes. He was Barack Obama, only the third black senator to be elected in a hundred years. Not all recruiting occurs on the road. Party leaders beg their colleagues not to retire, because open seats are less secure than those held by an incumbent. Leaders also strive to protect and promote their freshmen colleagues who, lacking lengthy records, may be vulnerable to challenges. They help such members exploit the advantages of incumbency by awarding them attractive committee assignments and showering them with funds and perquisites. Early in the 110th Congress (2007–2009), for example, the DCCC picked twenty-nine potentially vulnerable newcomers for its ‘‘Frontline Democrats’’ program, which provided logistical and fundraising support (Benenson 2008, 2873).

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Congressional Campaign Strategies The parties’ Hill campaign committees have traditionally focused their attention on competitive districts needed to win control of the two chambers. They target promising prospects in open or winnable constituencies, shunning long-shot candidates from areas dominated by the opposition party. In 2006, however, Democratic National Committee (DNC) Chair Howard Dean launched a ‘‘50-state strategy.’’ The goal was building the party’s strength nationwide, reaching beyond the eighteen to twenty ‘‘blue [Democratic] states’’—not just for presidential and congressional races, but also for local and state offices. Dean proved to be ‘‘a pragmatic and visionary political field general’’ (Benenson 2008, 2868), earnestly developing ‘‘farm teams’’ in the party’s states that strategists had long ignored. Dean’s strategy clashed with that of the Hill committees in 2006, the result being an uneasy truce: targeted congressional campaigns within the cloak of national objectives. Yet Democrats had little trouble recruiting suitable candidates that year—given the party’s newfound popularity, fading public support for President Bush, and public revulsion over the Iraq war and the administration’s fumbling response to Hurricane Katrina’s devastation in Louisiana and Mississippi. Despite their quarrels with Dean, the party’s campaign chairs—Senator Charles E. Schumer of New York and Representative Rahm Emanuel of Illinois—cast their nets more widely than usual and then boosted their preferred candidates. For the first time in a dozen years, Democrats won control of both chambers: a 233-to-202 margin in the House, and a nominal 51–49 edge in the Senate. Representative Nancy Pelosi of California became the first woman in history to serve as Speaker of the House, while Senator Harry Reid of Nevada moved from Minority to Majority Leader. Two years later, Howard Dean’s DNC strategy meshed with that of the party’s presidential nominee, Senator Obama—whose strategists labored to open up alternative routes to capture the needed 270 electoral votes. This meant expanding the playing field to states previously won by George W. Bush. It also forced Republicans to spread their own resources to defend states regarded as their home turf (Benenson 2008, 2872). This strategy also matched the Democratic congressional committees’ stepped-up recruitment and financing efforts. Senator Schumer, running his second DSCC campaign, searched out credible contenders for several GOPheld seats. The House campaign, including a ‘‘Red to Blue’’ drive, was led by Representative Chris Van Hollen of Maryland—a rising star who two years earlier had been Representative Emanuel’s chief lieutenant. Even more than in 2006, however, Democratic strategies were aided by the context of national events and trends.

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Contextual Factors in Congressional Campaigns House and Senate contests are waged one-by-one on local turf, but always against the backdrop of national events, issues, and partisan alignments. The rising clout of national party bodies and their allied interest groups has imposed much greater national coordination upon congressional campaigns. As a result, both local and national tides shape the content and results of congressional elections. In crisis periods, national issues often swamp local concerns. National Mood Swings By all accounts, the mood of Americans in 2008 was distinctly sour. As analyst Stuart Rothenberg recounted, ‘‘The public’s mood soured even worse after 2008, and the book never really closed on the 2006 election cycle until [the 2008 elections] were over’’ (Rothenberg 2008b). Attitudes toward the nation’s health deteriorated during the course of the campaigns. According to a compilation of national surveys, by early 2008 some 70 percent of people saw the nation headed ‘‘on the wrong track’’; by election day that figure had swelled to almost 90 percent (Polling Report 2008). The economic crisis that surfaced in autumn 2008 further eroded the public’s confidence in the nation’s status. The Conference Board’s Consumer Confidence Index fell to an all-time low in October (Conference Board 2008). The Gallup organization reported that 55 percent of the citizens they interviewed said the economy would be ‘‘extremely important’’ in their voting choices (Gallup Poll 2008a). Democrats, Republicans, and Independents all ranked the economy as their primary concern. It outranked the Iraq war, the top scorer in February, as well as energy policy—which led the list in June, when gasoline prices were soaring. On the eve of the election, six issues clustered behind the economy: the federal budget deficit (44 percent), terrorism (42 percent), energy and gas prices (41 percent), the Iraq war (41 percent), health care (41 percent), and taxes (40 percent). Nine out of ten people questioned by the Los Angeles Times/Bloomberg poll in October said the U.S. economy was doing badly—the highest such figure since 1997, when the poll began asking the question (Pierson 2008). At least 70 percent of the respondents from a wide range of demographic categories blamed the absence of financial regulation for the nation’s economic woes. Bolstering regulation was the most frequently cited issue to be addressed—twice as often as taxes, housing foreclosures, and unemployment. Exit polls taken on Election Day confirmed the primacy of the economy in voters’ thinking (Calmes and Thee 2008).

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The Bush administration was widely blamed for the nation’s precarious state. The president’s job ratings had fluctuated throughout his first term, during which he basked in a prolonged ‘‘rally effect’’ after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The president’s ratings peaked at 85 percent, but by 2004 they had leveled off at about 51 percent. During his second term, Bush’s job ratings headed steadily downward (Gallup Poll 2008b). The slide continued through October 2008, when his quarterly ratings stood at 29 percent. However, the period included two surveys in which his approval ratings were only 25 percent—‘‘the worst of his presidency to date, and just three percentage points higher than the all-time low 22 percent approval rating Harry Truman received in 1951’’ (Gallup Poll 2008b, 1).

Shifts in the Public’s Partisan ‘‘Brand Loyalties’’ Public worries about the state of the nation, coupled with disdain for the Bush administration, led to a significant shift in partisan loyalties—the measure that political scientists call party identification. When George W. Bush was reelected in 2004 by a modest margin, Democrats claimed only a 2 percent margin over their Republican counterparts (35 percent to 33 percent). By October 2008, however, that margin had grown to 12 percent. Democratic party identifiers accounted for nearly four in ten voters (38 percent), according to extensive Pew Center surveys (Pew Research Center 2008b). Independents accounted for 34 percent of the electorate, whereas Republicans lagged in third place with 28 percent. Although Independents were expected to favor Democratic candidates by at least a 60-40 ratio, political observers question their propensity to show up at the polls. A third or more of Independents just don’t care about politics; they are politically disengaged and very unlikely to vote (Marsh 2008). The Democratic surge occurred across the 2008 political battleground states and among voters of all ages. They claimed margins in such contested states as Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, and Virginia, and were narrowing the gap in such ‘‘red’’ states as Arizona, Georgia, Kansas, and Texas. Although such advances would not assure victories in congressional races, they widened the partisan playing field. Waves of newly registered voters—many of them young people, blacks, and Latinos— strongly favored the Democrats. ‘‘The greatest gains for the Democratic Party have come among younger voters,’’ the Pew Research Center reported (Pew Research Center 2008c, 1). ‘‘The percentage of voters ages 18 to 29 identifying with the Democratic Party has increased from 48 percent in the fall of 2004 to 61 percent currently. Democrats now outnumber Republicans by a

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margin of nearly two-to-one . . . in this age group, up from only a sevenpoint advantage in 2004.’’ The public’s policy attitudes and values, moreover, edged closer to longstanding Democratic policy positions. Twenty years after launching its surveys of Americans’ political values and core attitudes in 1987, Pew’s surveys now found a landscape more favorable to the Democrats. The reason was ‘‘[i]ncreased public support for the social safety net, signs of growing public concern about income inequality, and a diminished appetite for assertive national security policies’’ (Pew Research Center 2007). Compared with 1994—when the Republicans won control of Congress—researchers found more support for government programs to help the disadvantaged; less social conservatism; more tolerance for racial, cultural, and sexual minorities; and less rigid religious beliefs. Younger people seemed to lead the movement toward more liberal social and political values. The parties’ shares of the electorate were further upended by massive registration drives in the run-up to the 2008 voting. Young people were targeted by both parties, especially by the Obama campaign. Democratic-leaning states like California or New York became even more so. In New York, registered Democrats outnumbered Republicans 5.5 million to 3.2 million (2.4 million voters were unaffiliated) (Confessore and Palmer 2008). Republican registrants were lagging even in such historically Republican strongholds as small upstate towns as well as Long Island—whose Nassau County, once dominated by a powerful Republican machine, for the first time in history boasted more Democratic registrants than Republicans. Another measure of citizens’ attitudes—somewhat closer to actual voting decisions—is found in the surveys’ ‘‘general ballot question’’: If the election were held today, which party’s candidate [no names used] would they choose? On the eve of the election, a majority of Gallup’s respondents (53 percent) opted for the Democratic candidate, while 41 percent chose the Republican candidate. Among registered voters, the gap was even wider, as Democrats outpaced Republicans 54 to 39 percent (Cillizza 2008). Other generic polls agreed: four such surveys conducted in October gave the Democrats an advantage averaging 10.2 percent (RealClearPolitics 2008, 1).

The Retention and Recruitment Gap in 2008 From the outset of the 2008 congressional campaign cycle, the Republicans faced an uphill battle to defend their congressional seats. In the Senate, twenty-one of the thirty-five seats up for reelection were held by Republicans. This included two appointed senators facing their first election: John Bar-

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rasso of Wyoming, an orthopedic surgeon and state senator appointed after the June 2007 death of Craig Thomas, who had just won his third term, and Roger Wicker of Mississippi, a former House member appointed to fill the seat of former Majority Leader Trent Lott, who resigned in December 2007. (Both incumbents won in these GOP-dominated states, although Wicker faced a formidable opponent, former Democratic governor Ronnie Musgrove.) The GOP had lost its majority status in 2006 after a dozen years—an acutely felt deprivation, especially for House members.4 The party’s floor leaders no longer dominated the chamber’s agendas, and their senior members forfeited their committee and subcommittee chairmanships. True, Democrats were often stymied by the Senate’s 60-vote hurdle to quell filibusters and the power of President Bush’s veto pen. But future prospects looked bleak, given the declining popularity of the president and his party’s label. Rushing for the Exits Many Republican lawmakers accordingly decided that 2008 was a good time to retire. All six Senate retirees were Republicans, as were all but three of the twenty-six House retirees. Naturally, some senior members could be expected to end their careers, and some would seek other offices. But several talented mid-career lawmakers—like Ray LaHood of Illinois and Thomas M. Davis III of Virginia (who led the GOP’s successful campaigns in 2000 and 2002, but who publicly predicted double-digit losses for 2008)—apparently had simply tired of Capitol Hill partisan wrangling, and maybe even their own party’s conduct. Many other mid-career members despaired of the prospect of chairing their committees or subcommittees. Still others simply declined to wage costly fights to retain their seats. A few were weighed down by scandals. Several members newly reelected in 2006 simply resigned, not bothering to serve out their terms.5 Of the 202 House Republicans, more than one out of every eight decided to leave public service. As a result, only 30 or 35 senators and 389 of the 435 representatives sought reelection in 2008—a number somewhat below recent averages. More important, almost all of those crowding the exits were Republicans; only three Democratic representatives, and no senators, chose to retire. Candidates, Both Eager and Reluctant Candidates for both parties’ safe seats were plentiful, as usual. The two new Republican senators—from Idaho and Nebraska—had served as their states’ governors. Among the new House members were eleven former state office

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holders, eight former city or county officials, and four former congressional candidates. Ten of them had earlier tried for statewide congressional offices. Only four winners had held no previous public office. However, one of those, Duncan Hunter of California, was the namesake of his father, retiring 14term representative Duncan Hunter. The Republicans’ recruitment problems appeared early in the 2008 cycle. Jennifer Duffy of the nonpartisan Cook Political Report said the GOP was ‘‘desperately in need of some Prozac’’ (Finnegan 2007). In state after state, prime Republican prospects opted out of races. Three-term representative Rob Simmons of Connecticut, who lost his seat in 2006 by eighty-three votes, declined to run again in 2008. Former Colorado representative Scott McInnis—a respected lawmaker with $1 million stockpiled for the race—declined to run for the party’s vacant U.S. Senate seat. In other potentially competitive states—such as Montana, New Jersey, South Dakota, and West Virginia—the GOP could find no top-tier candidates to counter Democratic incumbents. In Florida’s 22nd District—on the Atlantic coast north of Fort Lauderdale, which was in Republican hands for a quarter century before it fell to a Democrat in 2006—Republicans could not produce a top-notch candidate. In all these cases, Democrats captured the seats. Meanwhile the Democrats found quality challengers for a widely scattered group of states and congressional districts (Cillizza and Murray 2007). House members vied for Senate seats in Colorado, Maine, and New Mexico; former governors were recruited for Mississippi and Virginia; the Alaska challenger was mayor of the state’s largest city; in Oregon, the speaker of the state’s House ran. For the North Carolina Senate seat, Democrats had a deep bench of viable challengers: having been turned down by the governor, former governor, state attorney general, and a congressman, they turned to 10-year state senator Kay Hagan, who upended the GOP incumbent. Open or vulnerable House contests attracted former mayors and state legislators.

Money Matters Like presidential races, congressional campaigns can be very costly affairs. The average cost of a Senate seat in 2008 was $6.5 million, while winning a House seat ran nearly $1.1 million, according to a nonpartisan watchdog group (Center for Responsive Politics 2008a). These numbers have climbed steadily over the last thirty years, even adjusting for inflation (Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin 2002, table 3-1).

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Candidates’ Fund-Raising Senate and House candidates raised an estimated $1.4 billion for their 2008 campaigns, and they spent most of it.6 Most incumbents, as usual, enjoyed a huge fundraising edge: incumbent senators raised, on average, $6.7 million for their campaigns, while challengers averaged about $1.85 million. House incumbents’ funds averaged nearly $1.3 million compared with about $490,000 for challengers (Campaign Finance Institute 2008). As a rule, incumbents receive more money than they need, whereas nonincumbent challengers need every penny they can raise. (Many new candidates find that they spend almost as much time raising funds as they do making public appearances and meeting voters.) In addition to raising their own campaign funds, many politicians (mostly Capitol Hill lawmakers, but some ex-members and a few other political figures) establish so-called leadership political action committees.7 Among other things, the money raised for these PACs can be donated to other candidates—mainly to boost the sponsor’s clout and bids for leadership posts. Some 329 of these PACs contributed nearly $30 million to federal candidates in 2008—with amounts slightly favoring Republican contenders (Center on Responsive Politics 2008b). Hill Committees’ Fund-Raising The four Capitol Hill committees are also active fund-raisers, collecting nearly half a billion dollars in the 2008 cycle. The committees assist their candidates in three ways (Davidson, Oleszek, and Lee 2008, 73–74). First, they can contribute relatively small, legally limited amounts directly to the candidates. More important, they can make coordinated expenditures: money (capped by federal law) for general-election services—polling, producing ads, or buying media time—requested by the candidates, who have a say in how it is spent. Finally, they can spend whatever they wish on their own campaigns—for example, running media ads and underwriting GOTV (get-outthe-vote) drives. These independent expenditures can be allocated strategically: they can be targeted to the neediest contenders and withheld from safeseat contests or hopeless challengers. Naturally, these entities coordinate their work with their parties’ national bodies (the Democratic and Republican National Committees). The Hill committees raise funds in all the usual ways—mailings, phonebank appeals, and contacts with wealthy partisans and friendly interest groups. Other funds are ‘‘dues’’ levied from flush incumbents. ‘‘I think everyone realizes that strengthening the majority will require a team effort,’’ explained DSCC spokesman Matthew Miller. ‘‘With a one-seat majority, you

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can never be complacent’’ (Billings 2008). But as late as October their House colleagues were pleading with members to pay their dues. In a closed-door Democratic Caucus meeting, Speaker Pelosi, Caucus chair Emanuel, and DCCC chair Van Hollen urged members to come up with $14 million in unpaid dues. ‘‘This is about choices,’’ Emanuel said, announcing that he would contribute another $50,000. ‘‘Please step up!’’ (Whittington 2008c). Republican party entities—with their historic ties to the business community and wealthier voters—have traditionally outraised and outspent their Democratic counterparts. But in 2008 the financial advantage tilted decisively toward the Democrats. Setting aside the huge resources tapped by the Obama campaign (some of which spilled over into congressional races), both Hill Democratic committees outspent their GOP counterparts—by more than $50 million for House contests, and some $45 million for the Senate. Starting out with a list of ten, the DCCC’s ‘‘Red to Blue’’ program eventually aided sixty-three candidates—twenty-two in open-seat contests and the rest challengers to GOP incumbents. Independent expenditures were made in fifty individual districts, compared to twenty-six by the GOP committee (Benenson 2008, 2873). House GOP campaign chair Tom Cole of Oklahoma told the NRCC’s independent expenditures (IE) arm to be ‘‘brutal’’ in deciding where to spend money and when to cut candidates loose because the race is deemed unwinnable. ‘‘We can’t do this any other way,’’ Cole explained. ‘‘The deal is to save seats, win seats, get the army over the river and onto the high ground’’ (Whittington 2008a). By August, the GOP Senate operation was cutting back its television advertising in close races, including Colorado, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Oregon (all seats that eventually fell to the Democrats). Senator John Ensign of Nevada, the GOP chair, blamed his colleagues for not stepping in to match the Democrats’ funding (Hulse 2008b). Later Ensign cited fundraising and candidate recruitment as his party’s chief failures (Drucker 2008). In October, national GOP committees pulled the plug on their New York House campaigns. Republicans were struggling to defend two seats vacated by retiring GOP lawmakers, along with waging a vigorous fight to unseat a freshman Democrat in the 20th District—a heavily Republican area running from the mid-Hudson Valley to Lake Placid. For the latter race the party had recruited a quality candidate—a wealthy former state party chair who poured nearly $5.6 million of his own money on his losing campaign. ‘‘Tough decisions have to be made,’’ explained Republican Rep. Peter D. King of Long Island. ‘‘You have to decide who comes off life support and who gets a massive infusion’’ (Hernandez 2008). (King was one of only three New York Republicans to withstand the Democratic sweep of the Northeast.)

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Money, Winners and Losers Does money determine election outcomes? Most observers would answer with an unequivocal yes. ‘‘Money wins elections,’’ declared the Center for Responsive Politics, whose director wrote that the 2008 elections were ‘‘far from the first time that money was overwhelmingly victorious on Election Day.’’ Indeed, the best-funded contenders captured 93 percent of House races and 94 percent of Senate races—a proportion not very different from that of recent election years. Yet it’s equally plausible that money tends to chase winning candidates, rather than the other way around. Contributors hoping to maximize their potential returns, after all, don’t normally throw money at likely losers. They prefer those recipients most likely to succeed: incumbents above all, but also robust challengers.8 Although money is a close companion to politics, it is not always decisive. Fueled by a D.C.-based fund-raising firm, Georgia Republican Deborah Honeycutt raised $4.7 million in her bid to unseat representative David Scott (who, no slouch, raised $1 million). Honeycutt lost, receiving only 31 percent of the votes (Center for Responsive Politics 2008c). Incumbent North Carolina senator Elizabeth (‘‘Liddy’’) Dole outspent her Democratic challenger, state senator Kay Hagan, by more than a two-to-one margin ($15.7 million to $6 million). But Hagan had enough money to air what was the most talked-about TV ad of the year. It showed two elderly codgers sitting in rocking chairs on the front porch of an old country store, swapping insults about Senator Dole (Kaiser 2008): ‘‘I’m telling you,’’ says the first good old boy. ‘‘Liddy Dole is 93.’’ ‘‘Ninety-three?’’ replies the second. ‘‘Yup, she ranks 93rd in effectiveness.’’ ‘‘After 40 years in Washington?’’ ‘‘After 40 years in Washington, Dole is 93rd in effectiveness, right near the bottom.’’ ‘‘I’ve read she’s 92,’’ says the second old man. ‘‘Didn’t I just tell you she’s 93?’’ says the first. ‘‘No, 92 percent of the time she votes with Bush,’’ says number two. ‘‘What happened to the Liddy Dole I knew?’’ ‘‘She’s just not a go-getter like you and me,’’ says number two as both rock in their rockers. This 30-second spot ran all over North Carolina during the summer. It was admittedly a negative ad; but its avuncular message nailed four points the Democrats wanted to push home: Dole was a 40-year Washington veteran9; she was not regarded as an effective senator; she voted with the Bush administration; and ‘‘she wasn’t what she used to be.’’ Once the ad blanketed the state,

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polls showed Hagan pulling slightly ahead. She never lost her lead and won over Senator Dole by nine percentage points. As students of campaign financing have found, candidates don’t necessarily have to dominate fund-raising, but they do need to raise enough money to put across their message.

The Parallel Campaigns Congressional campaigns are waged also by groups having stakes in election outcomes but not formally affiliated with the candidates or the parties. Mounting their own campaigns is the preferred option for such organizations. Because of legal limits on contributions, their direct aid to candidates is only a tiny drop in the financial bucket. But private groups can indulge in unlimited independent spending for or against candidates—as long as the funds are reported to the Federal Election Commission and not coordinated with the candidates’ own fund-raising. Better yet is issue advocacy—messages aimed at influencing voters’ choices on issues without explicitly advocating the election or defeat of specific candidates. Such efforts—upheld by federal courts as a form of protected speech under the First Amendment—are often indistinguishable from candidate advertising and are clearly aimed at swaying elections. Republicans can count on support from business and industry. Democrats benefit from the involvement of organized labor, in addition to environmental, pro-choice, and other left-wing groups. The business-labor war in 2008 could be summed up in two words: ‘‘card check.’’ Business groups saw the U.S. Senate as the only place where they could halt passage of a low-profile pro-labor measure called the Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA). The bill would permit employees to organize in a workplace when a majority of them signed a card indicating they wanted to join a union. It would also require binding arbitration to set the details of the first contract after union organization if the union and the employer disagreed on terms. Despite its limited focus, the issue became a partisan litmus test. House Democrats were able to pass the bill in the 110th Congress with only two Democratic dissenters, while all but thirteen Republicans opposed it. In the Senate, the bill stalled because it could not overcome a Republican filibuster. (Its fate in the 111th Congress is equally uncertain.) With Senator John McCain trailing in the presidential race, campaign expert Stuart Rothenberg explained that the Senate races ‘‘take on a particularly crucial aspect both for business and organized labor’’ (Rothenberg 2008a). Thus Senate campaigns were especially targeted. Rather than giving top priority to ‘‘pro-business’’ candidates, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and

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its allies targeted crucial Senate races in six states: Colorado, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, and North Carolina. Their efforts encompassed the dual elements in campaigns: media messages (the ‘‘air war’’) and personal voter outreach (the ‘‘ground war’’). Two independent advocacy groups sponsored a controversial anti-labor ad that featured an actor from The Sopranos as a union heavy seen praising Democratic candidates for their efforts to ‘‘eliminate the secret ballot for workers’’ and lamenting the fact that Republicans were resisting the measure (Hulse 2008a). Democratic strategists complained that the two sponsoring groups—whose unreported budgets might have reached $50 million—were threatening their Senate candidates. The ground game was not neglected. Seeking alternatives to expensive media ads, labor unions in the 1990s developed a successful ‘‘Labor to Neighbor’’ strategy. Pro-business and other groups followed suit. ‘‘The chamber and allied groups are flooding the airwaves and streets in Minnesota and . . . other states with money and ground troops’’ (Hamburger 2008). In the targeted states the Chamber spent at least $1.8 million; in Minnesota the figure approached $2.5 million. The U.S. Chamber and other groups, including the Business Industry Political Action Committee (BI-PAC) and the small-business-oriented NFIB (National Federation of Independent Business), reached out to business owners and their employees. ‘‘Our team hit almost every downtown business, including the thrift store and the barber shops,’’ explained the president of the St. Cloud, Minnesota, Chamber, which had never before been active in a federal election. Organized labor, the chief beneficiaries of the EFCA, spent some $350 million nationwide on elections at all levels. Labor also targeted the close Senate races. In Minnesota, the AFL-CIO had more than 2,500 volunteers and paid organizers on the ground (Hulse 2008a). Almost two dozen outside groups bought advertising in the Colorado openseat Senate race between Democratic representative Mark Udall and former GOP representative Bob Shaffer. Conservative groups—including the U.S. Chamber, builders’ and contractors’ lobbies, and the right-wing Club for Growth—spent about $10 million on the race. Allied liberal groups—especially the National Education Association and the League of Conservation Voters— spent more than $3 million in the Centennial State (Whittington 2008c).

The 2008 Congressional Results The 2008 electoral outcome was the product of the inputs we have examined. Democrats gained 23 House seats, for a total of 256—approaching the 259

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seats the party held in 1994 before the GOP seized control of Congress (Hulse 2008c).10 Democrats defeated more than a dozen Republican incumbents, including the sole remaining GOP House member from New England, Christopher Shays of Connecticut. In the Senate, at least seven additional Democrats were elected, for a total of fifty-eight.11 Three of the five GOP retirees were replaced by Democrats in formerly ‘‘red’’ states: former governor Mark Warner in Virginia, representative Mark Udall in Colorado, and representative Tom Udall of New Mexico.12 Four Republican senators were turned out of office: former New Hampshire governor Jeanne Shaheen defeated senator John Sununu by tying him to the Bush administration, as did Oregon’s Jeff Merkley, who defeated moderate Republican senator Gordon H. Smith. Kay Hagan, a North Carolina state senator, won by portraying senator Elizabeth Dole as out of touch with her state; and Anchorage mayor Mark Begich ousted legendary Alaska senator Ted Stevens—whose 40-year Senate career was the longest of any Republican in history, but who had just been convicted on seven counts of lying about gifts he had received from lobbyist friends. A 60-seat Senate Democratic majority proved unreachable, given current political realities—including the advantages of incumbency. Such margins were reached in modern times only during Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal period (1933–1943), the liberal resurgence of 1959–1969, and the postWatergate surge (1975–1979)—all periods of Democratic dominance. Since then no party has enjoyed sixty votes in the Senate; the most the GOP attained was fifty-five. The ultimate Senate majority of fifty-eight Democrats—including two Independents—was probably the best outcome they could hope for.13 To close down filibusters, Majority Leader Harry Reid of Nevada can still hope to forage among the (much reduced) ranks of moderate Republicans. The 2008 results were unusual in two respects. First, fewer incumbents— especially Republicans—sought reelection. The open seats caused by retirees accounted for much of the partisan turnover. (In the Senate, three of the five open seats—all vacated by Republicans—changed parties, as did eleven of the twenty-six House retirees—twenty-three of whom were Republicans.) Second, the dispersal of competition meant that fewer members ran without opposition: no senators and only thirty-two representatives (the average in past elections was nearly sixty). Mostly, however, the 2008 results repeated past patterns. For one thing, the number of incumbents who fell in the general election was not unusual— below the 2006 rate as well as the 50-year average (1950s–1990s). Those incumbents who ran for reelection were overwhelmingly successful: 95 percent for House members and nearly 87 percent for senators (Davidson, Oles-

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zek, and Lee 2008, 63, table 3-1). And the winners’ vote margins—that is, narrow (50–54.5 percent), moderate (55–59.9 percent), or overwhelming (over 60 percent)—followed closely those of recent elections (Davidson, Oleszek, and Lee 2008, 138, table 5-3,). What are we to make of the partisan outcome of the 2008 elections? The last two elections, taken together, have clearly empowered the Democrats, whose gains have totaled fifty-three House and twelve Senate seats (apart from Independents). These Democratic gains recall the Republican surge of the early 1990s, during which the GOP gained ten senators and sixty-four House seats—mostly from victories over Democrats, but some from conservative Democrats who switched party affiliation. The Republicans’ reign lasted some twelve years (minus Democratic control of the Senate in 2001–2003), hobbled the Clinton administration’s last six years, and buttressed the George W. Bush presidency. The unmistakable shifts in underlying partisan and policy preferences have not been fully realized in election results. The advantages enjoyed by incumbent lawmakers—abetted for House members by demographic patterns (liberals and conservatives tend to live in discrete communities) and cleverly drawn (gerrymandered) districts favoring one party or the other—make dramatic partisan realignments more difficult than in past eras. Lasting realignments, moreover, involve the construction of durable political regimes that rearrange political attitudes and geography. One or two elections are not enough. The real evidence for realignment, then, must await future events under Democratic control of the two policy-making branches. In short, can President Obama and the Democratic Congress build a record that will persuade and motivate voters to support them? And to harden their political commitments? As always, our political future rides with the eventual fate of our nation at large.

Notes 1. Also at stake were the House’s five territorial representatives: four Delegates (American Samoa, the District of Columbia, Guam, and the Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico’s Resident Commissioner), all of whom serve on committees and can vote during Committee of the Whole deliberations—though not on final passage of measures. 2. Occasionally a minor-party candidate can influence the outcomes of a race. In the close contest between senator Norm Coleman of Minnesota and challenger Al Franken, former senator Dean Barkley won some 15 percent of the votes; but which of the two major candidates was more affected was initially unknown.

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3. For the record, the House committees are the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC, or D-triple-C) and the National Republican Campaign Committee (NRCC). The Senate counterparts are the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC) and the National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC). They are aided by the national parties’ machinery: the Democratic and Republican National Committees (DNC and RNC). 4. Except for a 19-month period in 2001–2002 when liberal Republican senator Jim Jeffords’s defection gave Senate Democrats a 51–49 margin. 5. In addition to former GOP Leader Lott in the Senate, there was former House Speaker Dennis Hastert of Illinois, whose district was captured in a special election by a Democrat (who retained the seat in 2008). 6. Financial figures, unless otherwise specified, are drawn from the Center for Responsive Politics, whose website, OpenSecrets.org, lists amounts reported to the Federal Election Commission by individual candidates, party committees, political action committees (PACs), and other groups contributing to the campaigns. These figures generally coincide with—but differ slightly from—those reported in Robert Boatright’s chapter 6, due to different time frames and numbers of candidates covered by the data. 7. Funds raised for the PACs are not supposed to go directly into the sponsoring members’ own campaigns—although the rules governing them are lax. 8. Exceptions to this generalization seem to be wealthy aspirants who pour money into their own campaigns. Of the forty-nine congressional candidates who spent more than $500,000 of their own funds in 2008, just six won House seats, and only one captured a Senate seat. 9. Dole was born in North Carolina and lived there through her college years at Duke University; but after Harvard Law School, she had moved to the nation’s capital, where she served in several major posts. 10. One House race remained undecided. Virginia’s Fifth District representative Virgil Goode (once a Democrat, now a Republican) was declared the loser to Democratic challenger Tom Perriello, but requested a recount. 11. The Georgia Senate race was subject to a runoff: according to state law, winners must gain at least 50 percent of the popular vote. GOP senator Saxby Chambliss won handily in a low-turnout runoff. Results from the close Minnesota Senate race suggest a virtual tie: a hand recount mandated by law may still yield inconclusive results, which could throw the outcome into the courts—or even the Senate itself. 12. The two Udalls, first cousins, are scions of a prominent mountain states political family. 13. Mindful of this number (and hints from the president-elect), Senate Democrats voted 42–13 to allow senator Joseph I. Lieberman of Connecticut to retain his membership on the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, which he chairs. But he was removed from the Environment and Public Works Committee, where he led a subcommittee. Many of his colleagues wanted to punish him for speaking at the GOP convention and for campaigning for GOP nominee John McCain and other Republicans. ‘‘We have got some big issues here, and we need all hands on deck,’’ countered senator Christopher J. Dodd of Connecticut, who argued for leniency.

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References Associated Press. 2008. ‘‘A campaign for the ages, tilting toward Dems.’’ msnbc.com/ id/27488704/. November 1, p. 2. Benenson, Ben. 2008. ‘‘Muscling up the majorities.’’ CQ Weekly 66: October 27, 2866–2885. Billings, Erin P. 2008. ‘‘Senators up early giving.’’ Roll Call, May 8, pp. 1, 17. Broder, David S. 2008. ‘‘The amazing race.’’ Washington Post, November 2, p. B1. Calmes, Jackie, and Megan Thee. ‘‘2008 Polls find Obama built broader base than past nominees.’’ New York Times, November 5, p.10. Campaign Finance Institute. 2008. ‘‘A first look at money in the House and Senate elections.’’ November 6, www.cfinst.org/pr/prRelease.aspx?ReleaseID215, tables 2 and 3. Canon, David T. 1990. Actors, Athletes, and Astronauts: Political Amateurs in the United States. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Center for Responsive Politics. 2008a. ‘‘Money wins presidency and 9 of 10 congressional races in priciest U.S. election ever.’’ November 5, www.opensecrets.org/ news/2008/money-wins-white-house-and Center for Responsive Politics. ———. 2008b. Leadership PACs. www.opensecrets.org/pacs/industry.php?txtQO3 &cycle2008. ———. 2008c. ‘‘Georgia candidate raises big money, loses big.’’ November 7. www .opensecrets.org/news/2008/11/georgia-candidate-raises-big-m. Center for the Study of the American Electorate, American University. (2008). ‘‘The primary turnout story: Presidential races miss record high; Senate and governor contests hit record low.’’ Press release, October 1, pp. 1–2. Cillizza, Chris. 2008. ‘‘Democrats carry big generic ballot lead.’’ Washingtonpost.com/ politics, November 2. Cillizza, Chris, and Shailagh Murray. ‘‘Democrats recruiting challengers for growing target list.’’ Washington Post, April 22, p. A2. The Conference Board. 2008. ‘‘The conference board consumer confidence index plummets to an all-time low.’’ Press release, conferenceboard.org, October 28. Confessore, Nicholas, and Griff Palmer. 2008. ‘‘Democrats are gaining, registration data show.’’ New York Times, October 11, p. A17. Davidson, Roger H., Walter J. Oleszek, and Frances E. Lee. 2008. Congress and Its Members, 11th ed. Washington: CQ Press. Drucker, David M. 2008. ‘‘NRSC fundraising top priority in 2010.’’ Roll Call, November 11, p. 16. Finnegan, Michael. 2007. ‘‘GOP has uphill climb for cash and candidates.’’ Los Angeles Times, April 29, p. A1. Gallup Poll. 2008a. ‘‘Economy reigns supreme for voters.’’ Gallup.com, October 30, 1. ———. 2008b. ‘‘Bush approval rating doldrums continue.’’ Gallup.com, October 30. Hamburger, Tom. 2008. ‘‘Business groups target Senate races.’’ Los Angeles Times, November 2. Hernandez, Raymond. 2008. ‘‘National GOP ending aid to most New York House races.’’ New York Times, October 31, p. A24.

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Herrnson, Paul S. 2007. Congressional Elections: Campaigning at Home and in Washington, 5th ed. Washington: CQ Press. Hulse, Carl. 2008a. ‘‘Advocacy groups, in big ad campaign, step up intensity of Senate races.’’ New York Times, August 21, p. A17 ———. 2008b. ‘‘GOP group cuts back.’’ New York Times, August 23, p. A14. ———. 2008c. ‘‘Some familiar GOP names are swept out of Congress.’’ New York Times, November 5, 2008, p. A1. Kaiser, Robert G. 2008. ‘‘In Senate battlegrounds, fusillades of TV ads.’’ Washington Post, October 28, p. A1. Maisel, Louis Sandy. 1982. From Obscurity to Oblivion: Running in the Congressional Primary. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press. Marsh, Bill. 2008. ‘‘Hey, independents—any plans for Tuesday?’’ New York Times, November 2, Part 4, p. 6. Ornstein, Norman J., Thomas E. Mann, and Michael J. Malbin. 2002. Vital Statistics on Congress 2001–2002. Washington: AEI Press. Panetta, Leon. 2008. ‘‘Obama’s ultimate legacy will be forged on Capitol Hill.’’ Roll Call, November 20, p. 20. Pew Research Center. 2008a. ‘‘Likely rise in voter turnout bodes well for Democrats.’’ People-press.org/report/?pageid1340. July 10. ———. 2008b. ‘‘Democrats hold party ID edge across political battleground.’’ Pewresearch.org/pubs/1015. October 30. ———. ‘’Democrats post gains in affiliation across age cohorts.’’ Pewresearch.org/ pubs/1018. October 31. Pew Research Center for the People & the Press. 2007. ‘‘Trends in political values and core attitudes: 1987–2007.’’ People-press.org/report/?reportid312. Pierson, David. 2008. ‘‘Americans want more regulation of economy, poll finds.’’ Los Angeles Times, October 14, p. A1. Polling Report. 2008. ‘‘Direction of the country.’’ Polling Report.com, November 2. RealClearPolitics. 2008. ‘‘Generic congressional vote.’’ Realclearpolitics.com/epolls/ other/generic_congressional_vote-901. Rothenberg, Stuart. 2008a. ‘‘Business interests focus on the fight for Senate control.’’ Roll Call, September 4, p. 8. ———. 2008b. ‘‘Another cycle, another bunch of my misjudgments.’’ Roll Call, November 20, p. 8. Schlesinger, Joseph A. 1966. Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States. Chicago: Rand McNally. Solomon, Bert. 1992. ‘‘A daunting task: running for the House.’’ National Journal, March 21, p. 712. Walsh, Edward. 1985. ‘‘In every campaign, there is a recruiting season.’’ Washington Post, November 12, p. A1. Whittington, Lauren W. 2008a. ‘‘Cole sees GOP energy, unity emerging.’’ Roll Call, September 4, p. 3. ———. 2008b. ‘‘Conservative cash tilting to Senate battlegrounds.’’ Roll Call, September 22, p. A-3. ———2008c. ‘‘Leaders seeking more cash in DCCC coffers.’’ Roll Call, October 3, p. 10.

6 Public Opinion and the 2008 Presidential Election David E. Campbell

n 2008, the presidential contenders were vying to replace a two-term incumbent. The nation was at war, the outgoing president had historically low approval ratings, and the economy was in dire straits. Times looked bad for the party in the White House. How bad? In the fall of 2008, a group of political scientists publicized the results of their models forecasting the outcome of the election. All but one of the nine models predicted an Obama win. Most impressively, the median prediction was that McCain would receive 48 percent of the popular vote—compared to 46 percent for the actual outcome (Campbell 2008). In addition to predicting the winner, the key to any such forecasting model is leverage, being able to explain a lot with a little. In other words, the most impressive forecasting models will achieve a high level of accuracy based on a small amount of information. And the farther out from the election they can predict the winner, the better. A successful prediction made three months prior to Election Day is far more impressive than one made a week before the election. These forecasts were thus pretty impressive, as they were made an average of 104 days before the election. The success of election forecasting in 2008 would appear to call into question the whole enterprise of studying the influence of public opinion on elections. Indeed, the few indicators employed in these models have a lot of leverage, especially in light of all the attention paid to the unique aspects of the 2008 campaign. For the first time since 1952, there was not a president or vice president on the ticket. The campaign also featured charges and counter-

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charges about age, gender, religion, and—especially—race. Race was the great ‘‘X factor’’ heading into the election, as many observers were unsure of how voters would respond to the first African American nominee of a major party. Much was written about the so-called Bradley Effect, whereby white voters allegedly tell pollsters that they will vote for a black candidate but then renege in the polling booth (Zernike 2008). Yet in spite of the campaign’s unique features, Obama ended up with nearly the percentage of the popular vote that a generic Democrat was ‘‘supposed’’ to receive. The forecasting models that successfully predicted the outcome included nothing about the actual candidates in the race and nothing on the issues at play in the election. Given that, one might wonder who needs data on what voters think about the candidates or about the issues of the day. After all, Alan Abramowitz (2008) could accurately predict that John McCain would receive 46 percent of the popular vote sixty-nine days before the election, by knowing only the gross domestic product in the second quarter, the president’s approval rating, and whether the incumbent party has controlled the White House for one or two terms. That would not appear to leave room for public opinion on the issues to have much sway. In short, 2008 appeared to be the classic case of retrospective voting (Fiorina 1981; Key 1966). Voters asked themselves whether they were better off than they were four or eight years before and answered with a resounding no. Before you conclude that the study of public opinion in American elections is futile, rewind to 2000. Again the presidential contest was to replace a two-term incumbent. Once more, predicting the winner did not seem very difficult. In 2000, the nation was at peace, the outgoing president enjoyed high approval for his performance in office (although not his personal conduct), and the economy was booming. Times looked good for the party that held the presidency. How good? A similar set of forecasting models—created by many of the same prognosticators as in 2008—predicted a convincing win for Al Gore, who was running to succeed fellow Democrat Bill Clinton. Such models can be forgiven for not predicting that the election would be decided by one vote on the U.S. Supreme Court. But they are designed to predict the popular vote, and by that criterion they failed miserably. Although Gore did win the popular vote, he did so only by a hair—a far cry from the average share of the popular vote he was predicted to receive, a whopping 56 percent (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2003). Importantly, the difference between 2000 and 2008 was not simply that the economy was good in 2000 and bad in 2008, and that voters are more likely to punish poor performance than reward the incumbent party when times are good. Consider 2004, a year in which, like 2008, voters were pessimistic about the economy. In January 2000 an overwhelming share of Ameri-

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cans rated economic conditions positively—only 28 percent said that they were fair or poor. In 2008, the situation was reversed. Even before the financial meltdown that came later in the year, in January 2008, nearly three-quarters (73 percent) of Americans rated the economy as fair or poor. The year 2004 looked a lot more like 2008 than 2000, as in January of that year 63 percent of the public rated economic conditions negatively (Pew 2008a). If voters consistently punished incumbents for a poor economy, George W. Bush should have lost the 2004 election. Yet notwithstanding that voters perceived the economy as troubled, 2004 brought the re-election of the incumbent. The reason was simply that the 2004 election was not a referendum on the state of the economy. Instead, it was an election about terrorism, the war in Iraq, and to a small but significant portion of the population, moral issues like gay marriage. It would be a mistake, therefore, to conclude from 2008 that we need not worry about the nuances of public opinion when seeking to understand the outcome of a presidential election. Rather, we are better off seeking to explain the differences among elections, and what those differences can tell us more generally about public opinion and elections. As suggested by the results of the 2004 election, the connection between public opinion and election outcomes rests not only on what voters think when asked for their opinion by pollsters, but what they are thinking about when they go to the polls. Opinions are one thing, but the salience of those opinions is another. In 2008, there were a number of issues that could have been salient and, in the run-up to the election, appeared like they might be. These included the Iraq war, health care, energy policy, terrorism, immigration, and social issues (particularly gay marriage). However, by the time voters went to the polls, the economy trumped them all. According to the national exit poll, 63 percent of voters said that the economy was the main influence on their vote. Of those, 53 percent voted for Obama over McCain, essentially matching the overall popular vote.1 (See table 6.1.) Unfortunately, we cannot make a direct comparison to 2004, since the exit poll that year offered voters a different menu of choices—and different choices produce different answers—but it is still instructive that only 20 percent of 2004 voters chose the economy or jobs as their primary issue. Of those, 80 percent voted for Kerry. We must be careful in interpreting these questions about the issues voters think are most important. The way that these results are typically reported in the press implies that issues drive the vote. Actually, it could be that voters come to prefer a candidate first, and then prioritize issues second. In 2004, for example, 80 percent of voters who reported that ‘‘moral values’’ were their most important criterion supported George W. Bush. Did they favor

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Economy Iraq Health care Terrorism Energy policy

Percent Who Selected This Issue as Most Important

Percent Who Voted for Obama

Percent Who Voted for McCain

63 10 9 9 7

53 59 73 13 50

44 39 26 86 46

Source: 2008 National Exit Poll. N 17,836.

Bush because they prioritized moral values, or did they prioritize moral values because they favored Bush? Probably, it was a little of both. Similarly, in 2008, voters may have decided that they liked Obama before deciding that they agreed with him on the issues. His party affiliation would be enough to win over many voters, but for some his personal characteristics would matter too—beginning with the fact that he is not George W. Bush, but also his demeanor, his communication skills, his youth, and so forth. Upon deciding that they like Obama, in an exit poll these voters then select the issue that he spoke of often—the economy—especially in the final weeks of the campaign. Acknowledging this ambiguity over whether issues precede candidate preference, however, does not diminish the significance of asking voters about the issues that matter to them. Knowing which issue priorities go with which candidate tells us the policies that resonated with voters, which is vital for understanding how public opinion shaped the election outcome. Take the 2008 results as a case in point. Even if many economy-voters decided on Obama first and then selected the economy as their rationale for doing so, this would still mean that of all the issues they could have associated with their candidate, the economy won out. In other words, even if we do not know which way the causal arrow runs (and it likely goes in both directions), the results of the 2008 election leave no doubt that voters made a connection between Obama and improved economic prospects. Nonetheless, should there be any doubt that the economic downturn helped Obama, consider that 81 percent of voters reported that they were worried the economic crisis would affect their family—and 58 percent of them voted for Obama. Given events during the campaign, particularly the near-collapse of the credit markets and the emergency federal bailout of the banking industry, it should come as no surprise that, come Election Day, Americans were anxious about the economy and willing to punish the incumbent party for the

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nation’s economic doldrums. Indeed, one wonders if those forecasting models would have proven so prophetic had the credit markets not flat lined, thus putting the nation’s economic woes front-and-center at precisely the time when Americans were paying the most attention to presidential politics. In hindsight, it is easy to assume that, because of the unpopularity of George W. Bush and the free-falling economy, the Democrats were destined to win the 2008 election. That conclusion is too facile, however, as issues other than the economy might have assumed greater prominence. In the immortal words of Sherlock Holmes, these other issues were the dogs that did not bark. It is a worthwhile exercise to consider how the election may have turned out had those dogs barked, that is, if other issues had rivaled the economy in prominence. Would Obama still have won?

The War in Iraq Given the heavy commitment of American blood and treasure to the conflict in Iraq, it is striking that only one in ten voters named Iraq as their most important issue. Tellingly, Obama won handily among those who ranked Iraq first, taking 59 percent of their votes. Note, however, that this was a drop from Kerry’s margin among those who put Iraq first in 2004, as he took 73 percent of the Iraq war–voters. If we assume that a positive assessment of the Iraq war worked to McCain’s favor, the trend-lines on the public’s feelings regarding the war appeared to be helping him. Americans believed that the troop surge in Iraq, a policy McCain had long advocated, was working. A Gallup poll in July 2008 found that 48 percent of Americans believed that the troop surge in Iraq was ‘‘making the situation better,’’ up from 40 percent in March and 25 percent in July 2007 (Saad 2008). The Pew Research Center found that between April and September 2008, there was a 14 percentage point gain in the percentage of Americans who said that the Iraq war was going very or fairly well—from 44 to 58 percent. Similarly, in September 2008, Pew reported that 58 percent of Americans thought the United States will succeed in Iraq, up from 47 percent in April (Pew 2008b). While the upward trend in positive assessments of the war should not be ignored, it is important to distinguish between stock and flow. Even if opinion appeared to be moving in the right direction for McCain, the fundamentals on the issue still favored Obama. Recall that Obama had long trumpeted his initial opposition to military action in Iraq, in sharp contrast to McCain’s unwavering conviction that Iraq is a noble cause. On the question of whether the Iraq war was worth fighting, most Americans agreed with Obama. In July 2008, Gallup reported that 56 percent of Americans believed that the war in

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Iraq was a mistake, roughly where opinion had been for the previous eighteen months (Saad 2008). On the exit poll, nearly two in three voters (63 percent) said they disapproved of the Iraq war. Among those who disapproved, 76 percent voted for Obama.

Health Care Nearly the same percentage of voters named health care to be their most important issue as named Iraq (9 percent for health care versus 10 percent for Iraq). On health care, public opinion would appear to support greater government involvement, and thus the position typically associated with the Democrats. According to the Gallup organization, since 2001 support for the statement that ‘‘it is the responsibility of the federal government to make sure all Americans have health care coverage’’ has stayed around 60 percent, and has never dropped below 50 percent. Presumably wary of repeating the health care debacle of the first Clinton term, Obama studiously avoided the ‘‘big government’’ connotation of saying the federal government has a responsibility to ensure universal health care. But when compared to the market-centered focus of McCain’s health care initiative, both the tone and substance of the Obama plan come closer to the sentiment expressed in the Gallup question. On Obama’s website, for example, voters could read of how an Obama administration ‘‘will make health insurance affordable and accessible to all,’’ while McCain’s website emphasized that his plan would ‘‘restore control to the patients themselves.’’2 As with Iraq, Obama’s position was closer to majority opinion, but the trend actually seemed to be favoring McCain. Support for ‘‘health care as a federal government responsibility’’ dropped 10 percentage points between 2007 and 2008, from 64 to 54 percent (Gallup 2008a). This drop suggests movement in the direction favored by McCain and the Republicans although, importantly, the conservative position did not command majority support.3 Even with this movement, voters who prioritized health care still went convincingly for Obama—he won 73 percent of healthcare-voters.

Energy Policy With gas prices hitting record highs in 2008, energy policy had the potential to be a major campaign issue. At McCain and Palin rallies, supporters took to chanting ‘‘drill, baby, drill’’ as one solution to the high price of energy, calling for more domestic oil production near America’s coasts. ‘‘Drill, baby,

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drill’’ was generally popular with the American public, as a Gallup poll in July 2008 found that 57 percent of the public said that they would be more likely to vote for a candidate who supported ‘‘easing restrictions on offshore domestic drilling’’ (Gallup 2008b). In June 2008, the Pew Research Center found that support for increased energy exploration hit its highest point since 2001 (when they first asked the question), rising a substantial 12 percentage points just since February of the same year. McCain’s choice of Sarah Palin as his running mate had the potential to raise the profile of energy as an issue, given her advocacy of a new northern pipeline as Alaska’s governor. Still, even with the Palin pick, McCain was constrained in his own advocacy of greater oil exploration as, unlike Palin, he had long opposed drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. To change his mind in the midst of a presidential campaign would only invite unflattering comparisons to other ‘‘flip-floppers,’’ like John Kerry in 2004 or his rival for the 2008 GOP nomination, Mitt Romney. In the end, the potential for energy policy to be a key decision criterion for voters never panned out. A smaller percentage of voters (7 percent) chose energy policy as their most important issue than selected any other option on the exit poll. Had McCain been able to make energy a bigger issue, there is still no guarantee that it would have redounded to his benefit. ‘‘Drill, baby, drill’’ was not the only energy policy to gain favor with voters. An even greater proportion of Americans, 64 percent, favored ‘‘authorizing a $150 billion investment by the federal government in research on bio-fuels and clean energy sources’’—the main plank of Obama’s energy initiative (Pew 2008c). The public was split on what to do about rising energy costs, and it showed on the exit poll. Half of voters who said that energy was their number one concern voted for Obama, compared to 46 percent who cast a ballot for McCain. Although, as with Iraq and health care, there were trends regarding energy that appeared to favor the Republicans’ call for more domestic oil production, it was actually Obama’s approach to energy policy—more research into new energy sources—that received greater support. ‘‘Biofuels, baby, biofuels’’ may not have been as catchy, but it turned out to be more popular than ‘‘drill, baby, drill.’’

Terrorism One issue stands out as pulling voters toward McCain—or, at least, as the one that McCain supporters selected as their top priority. Of those voters who said that terrorism was the most important issue, a whopping 86 percent

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voted for McCain. This exactly matches the level of support terrorism-voters gave George W. Bush in 2004. The big difference, however, between 2004 and 2008 was the significant decline in the share of the voting public who named terrorism as their primary concern—from 19 percent in 2004 to only 9 percent in 2008. That drop, in turn, mirrors the falling percentage of Americans who are worried that they or someone in their family will be a victim of terrorism. In the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Gallup found that 59 percent of Americans said that they were worried4 about being a victim of terrorism. Since September 11, that percentage has dropped considerably, to 38 percent. This is not to say that September 11 has been forgotten. As a reminder that the memory of September 11 persists, note that in 2000, the year before the attacks, only 24 percent of Americans said they worried about being victimized by terror. Seven years after the September 11 attacks, Americans were fourteen points more likely to be fearful that they will personally suffer from a terrorist strike than before September 11. This puts concern over terrorism in 2008 at roughly the same level as the immediate wake of the Oklahoma City bombing in 1996, when 41 percent of Americans said that they feared becoming the victim of a terrorist attack (Gallup 2008c). One might say that, when it comes to terrorism, Republicans are the victims of their own perceived success. Despite George W. Bush’s overall unpopularity, a solid majority of Americans are still willing to give his administration credit for preventing further terrorist attacks within the United States. According to Pew, in February 2008, 62 percent of Americans said that they believed ‘‘the Bush administration’s policies have had a great deal (28%) or a fair amount (34%) to do with the fact that there have been no terrorist attacks in the United States since 2001. Only about a third (35%) says Bush policies have had not too much or nothing at all to do with the absence of attacks’’ (Pew 2008d, 23). Furthermore, during the 2008 campaign John McCain did not fan the flames of concern over a future terrorist strike on American soil; unlike the Bush re-election campaign in 2004, McCain did little to invoke the imagery of September 11. With terrorism largely out of sight, it was also out of voters’ minds. The economy, Iraq, health care, energy, and terrorism exhaust all of the options for the ‘‘most important issue’’ from which voters could choose on the national exit poll. This short list obviously does not exhaust all of the issues that might possibly have mattered to voters. While the list of potential issues is nearly infinite, there are two which, given recent political history, we might have expected to matter: immigration and social issues like gay marriage and abortion (which, following the 2004 election, are often labeled

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moral values). As explained below, prior to 2008 there were good reasons to think that both issues would take center stage in the presidential campaign. In the end, neither immigration nor moral values was deemed potentially significant enough to be included on the national exit poll, and so we do not know the percentage of voters who would have selected either one as their most important issue. Their omission is a significant statement of how little effect it was assumed they would have on the election. Assumptions, though, can prove to be wrong. It could be that their omission distorted our understanding of voters’ priorities—perhaps they were dogs that might have barked. Fortunately for postelection analysis, this does not appear to be the case. When, just prior to the election, voters were asked to name the issue that matters most in an open-ended format, fewer than 1 percent named either immigration or a moral values issue (Pew 2008e). It was not just that these dogs did not bark. They were not even at the scene of the crime.

Immigration Immigration performed one of the most amazing vanishing acts in American political history. Through 2006 and 2007, immigration seemed to top the national political agenda. The issue brought hundreds of thousands of protesters to the streets, and ignited a heated debate in the Senate over a major immigration bill. Yet even though Congress passed no legislation and the pace of immigration—both legal and illegal—continued unabated, the issue was barely mentioned during the general election campaign in 2008. One likely reason for the silence on immigration is that while it matters a lot to a few voters, it does not matter much to most voters. In 2006, one in five Americans said that immigration was a ‘‘very big’’ problem in their community—seemingly a high percentage. But only 4 percent said that it was the most important problem facing the country (Pew 2006). Thus, a sizable proportion of Americans agree that it is a problem to be fixed, but not many put it at the top of their agenda. Immigration is therefore a classic example of an issue lying latent, awaiting a spark from an enterprising politician to be ignited. Neither Obama nor McCain had any incentive to light that fire. For one thing, immigration is more divisive within the parties than between them. Consider the profile of public opinion on legal immigrants, a good barometer of general attitudes toward immigration. On the basic question of whether immigration should be decreased, partisan differences are small. In 2006, 43 percent of Republicans agreed that legal immigration should be decreased, compared to 38 percent of all Democrats and 41 percent of white

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Democrats. Instead of a partisan gap, opinion on immigration displays an education gap. Among Republicans and Democrats without a college education, nearly identical percentages support limiting legal immigration: 47 percent (Republicans) versus 46 percent (Democrats). By comparison, among Republicans, the education gap on immigration is thirteen percentage points, as only 34 percent of college graduates want to decrease immigration. Among Democrats, the education gap is a whopping twenty-five points, as just 21 percent of college-educated Democrats agree that the United States should admit fewer immigrants. One finds the same pattern—education mattering more than partisanship—for other immigration-related questions as well, including whether immigrants are a burden on the country, or whether they threaten traditional American values (Pew 2006). Admittedly, these figures are for attitudes toward legal immigration, when it is illegal immigration that generates the most political heat. Could either presidential candidate have hoped to gain traction by focusing on illegal immigrants? Given the public’s deep ambivalence regarding policies toward undocumented workers, it seems doubtful. As just one example of how the public is conflicted, consider that although 67 percent of Americans take a hard line and say that illegal immigrants should not be eligible for social services, 71 percent also say that the children of illegal immigrants should be allowed to attend public schools (Pew 2006). The public’s ambivalence is underscored when voters are given the choice between three widely discussed options for policy toward illegal immigrants. Public opinion splits nearly evenly among the following three policies (Pew 2006): • 32 percent say that illegal immigrants should be allowed to stay in the United States • 32 percent say that they should be granted temporary work visas • 27 percent say that they should return to their home countries Any rational politician seeing those numbers would conclude that immigration is an issue for which a majority position, let alone consensus, has yet to emerge. Given that few voters are clamoring for greater attention to immigration and, even if they were, would likely not agree on what to do about it, one can see why Obama and McCain would want to put the issue aside. Since economic news pushed immigration off the front pages, neither were the candidates forced to deal with it. And so immigration lay latent as an issue in 2008.

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Moral Values Given the frequent claims that America is in the midst of a culture war (Hunter 1991), the absence of social issues in the 2008 campaign is perhaps as mysterious as the missing immigration issue. Here the contrast with the 2004 race is especially instructive. In the immediate wake of the 2004 election, the importance of ‘‘moral values’’ came to dominate the storyline over the interpretation of the election. Famously, the 22 percent of voters who selected ‘‘moral values’’ as their most important issue in 2004 broke overwhelmingly for Bush over Kerry: 80 percent versus 18 percent. To put that 22 percent of moral values–voters in perspective, recall that it is a higher percentage than voters in 2008 named energy, Iraq, terrorism, or health care. While there is a debate over whether moral values was the single most important issue in 2004, there can be no doubt that it was an important issue. Or rather, the term ‘‘moral values’’ represents a bundle of related issues, including abortion and gay marriage. While some commentators have claimed that moral values was a vague catch-all category which voters interpreted in a wide variety of ways, polling immediately following the election demonstrated that to most voters, ‘‘moral values’’ meant just what the pundits claimed it did: social issues like abortion and gay marriage (Keeter 2007). In particular, gay marriage was a prominent issue in 2004 because thirteen states had initiatives on their ballots to write bans on gay marriage into their state constitutions. Most significantly, the battleground state of Ohio had a gay marriage ban on the ballot. Like immigration, gay marriage is not an issue that matters a lot to many. But for those to whom it matters, it matters a lot. In 2004, that meant white evangelical Protestants. Careful analysis of the 2004 election indicates that white evangelical Protestants were more likely to turn out to vote, and vote for Bush, in states with a gay marriage ban on the ballot. There is also suggestive evidence that Catholics, like evangelicals, turned out in force to vote against gay marriage and for Bush (Campbell and Monson 2007; 2008). A reasonable case can be made that gay marriage was at least as prominent in 2008 as 2004, and yet did not become a factor in the presidential race. Gay marriage was on the ballot in three states, including the perennial battleground of Florida, John McCain’s home state of Arizona, and California, the largest state in the union. Of these three states, California’s gay marriage campaign garnered the most attention, as spending by both sides on the issue exceeded $75 million (Semerad 2008). Why did gay marriage not become an issue in the presidential race? After all, it would appear to be a winner for the GOP, in a year in which the party

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needed all the help it could get. While support for gay marriage has been growing, it is still opposed by a majority of the American population.5 The easy explanation is that Florida—the one battleground state with a gay marriage ban on the ballot—did not turn out to be pivotal, as Ohio did in 2004. However, we can construct an alternative history, in which McCain and his culture-warrior running mate, Palin, made moral values, and opposition to gay marriage especially, a centerpiece of their campaign. As it was, frequent church-attendees—a key bloc for Republicans in recent elections—were a slightly smaller share of the electorate in 2008 than in 2004.6 Perhaps a moral values–voters strategy could have fired up the social conservatives who comprise the GOP base and, just maybe, eked out a victory over the culturally liberal Obama. Of course, this alternative history remains the stuff of fiction. Even if frequent-attendees were as large a share of the electorate in 2008 as 2004, they would not have been enough to sway the election. One impediment to a GOP ‘‘values voter’’ strategy in 2008 was that, throughout his political career, McCain has never made much of social issues. Reflecting that history, regular churchgoers were less likely to support McCain in 2008 than Bush in 2004 or 2000.7 But then, neither had George H. W. Bush before running a valuesfocused campaign against Michael Dukakis in 1988 (Leege et al. 2002). More important than any reluctance on McCain’s part was the stubborn fact that Barack Obama is opposed to gay marriage (although his opposition is muted).8 Obama’s opposition to gay marriage reminds us of the unusual coalition united by this issue. As was made clear in the vote on California’s Proposition 8, white evangelical Protestants are not the only staunch opponents to same-sex nuptials. Obama’s most enthusiastic supporters—African Americans—are also ardently opposed to marriage for homosexual couples. While 49 percent of white Californians voted for Proposition 8, and thus against gay marriage, 70 percent of African Americans did. If Obama and McCain did not take opposing stands on gay marriage, they did differ on the other big moral values issue: abortion. During a forum hosted by mega-church pastor Rick Warren, he asked them both when a baby receives human rights. McCain won the applause of the audience by forthrightly declaring, ‘‘at the moment of conception.’’ Obama is widely thought to have fumbled his answer, visibly showing discomfort as he responded with hesitation. He acknowledged that abortion is a moral issue, and then said that determining when life begins ‘‘is above my pay grade.’’ While Obama undoubtedly regrets using the line about his pay grade, his nuanced answer better reflected American public opinion on abortion than did McCain’s response. Unlike McCain, in general Americans express great ambivalence about abortion. A majority does not wish to see it banned outright, but nei-

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ther do they endorse unfettered choice. Like Obama, they support abortion but are troubled by it (Wilcox and Norrander 2002; Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2006). With Obama closest to the median position on abortion, McCain had little to gain by emphasizing his pro-life record to the general electorate.

Beyond the Economy So what of the dogs that did not bark, at least not loudly? As we survey the issue landscape in 2008, it becomes clear that the economy was not the only factor favoring Obama. Furthermore, while the unpopularity of George W. Bush was certainly a factor in Obama’s victory, in an ‘‘open-seat’’ race where Bush himself was not on the ballot, Obama could not bank on Bush’s low approval ratings (any more than Al Gore could bank on Clinton’s high approval ratings in 2000). Obama was also helped by remaining squarely in the mainstream of public opinion on the Iraq war and health care, two other issues that resonated with voters in 2008. In both cases, there were hints that trends in public opinion were moving in John McCain’s direction, but it was too little, too late. On energy, voters were split on the merits of the two candidates’ policies, leaving it unclear whether McCain would have benefited from more attention to energy policy. That left terrorism as the only clear winner for McCain. Yet with only 9 percent of the population selecting terrorism as their top issue, this was a hollow victory. Even immigration and moral values, two potentially significant issues that never gained any traction, did not hold much hope for McCain. Indeed, when we step back from the specific issues at play in the 2008 campaign, the general climate of public opinion looked dismal for McCain, or any Republican, heading into the election. Long before there was any talk of a financial meltdown—even long before Barack Obama and John McCain won their parties’ nominations—there was every indication that, on a number of issues, public opinion was becoming increasingly favorable for Democrats. Consider attitudes toward the social safety net, a prime example of a proDemocratic trend in public opinion. Since 1994—when the Republicans won a majority in Congress—Americans have become more likely to agree that government should provide assistance to the needy, the position most consistent with the Democratic party. From 1994 to 2007, Americans became twelve percentage points more likely to agree that government should take care of people who cannot care for themselves, with agreement climbing

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from 57 to 69 percent. Over that period of time, public opinion also shifted toward greater acceptance of greater debt in order to assist the needy, from 41 to 54 percent. Likewise, in 1994, 59 percent of Americans agreed that government should guarantee food and shelter for everyone. In 2007, support for that statement climbed to 69 percent. In other words, public opinion has shifted leftward on the importance of a social safety net, to the benefit of the Democrats (Pew 2007). Foreign policy has also seen a shift in public opinion to the Democrats’ advantage. Above I noted the decline in support for the Iraq war. No doubt as a consequence of the rising proportion of the American population who view the Iraq war as a mistake, public opinion has become increasingly skeptical of the traditional Republican position that peace is best achieved through military strength. Going all the way back to 1987, when Ronald Reagan was still in office and before the Soviet Union fell, 54 percent of Americans endorsed the doctrine of ‘‘peace through strength.’’ The percentage increased to 62 percent in 2002, after the September 11 attacks and before the Iraq war began. By 2007, after four years of war in Iraq, agreement that military strength is the primary means to achieve peace had fallen to 49 percent, essentially even with the 47 percent who disagreed (Pew 2007). I have highlighted a few trends in public opinion that favor the Democrats, but there are still others. For example, there is a rising proportion of Americans, particularly among the young, who claim no religious affiliation. These secular voters are heavily Democratic (Hout and Fischer 2002). Similarly, Americans have become increasingly supportive of affirmative action for women and minorities (although not of ‘‘preferential treatment’’) (Pew 2007). While not every trend in public opinion favors the Democrats, most appear to. For the sake of predicting the presidential vote, however, one trend dominates all others—the growing advantage the Democrats have in party identification. While political scientists disagree over the degree to which individuals change their partisanship, there can be no debate that recent years have seen a growing proportion of Democrats when the electorate is viewed in the aggregate. Since 2002, when Republicans and Democrats each comprised 43 percent of the population, the Pew Research Center has tracked a steady increase in Democrats (to 50 percent) and a steady decrease in Republicans (to 35 percent). Given that party identification remains the single best predictor of the presidential vote, this 15-point gap heading into 2008 was a stiff headwind for John McCain. While that gap narrowed to ten points by the fall of 2008, this was still a significant hurdle for McCain—or any Republican—to overcome.

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What Republicans Should Learn From 2008: It’s Not Just the Economy, Stupid! Given these trends in public opinion, we can see how Barack Obama, or any Democrat, had the upper hand going into the 2008 election. The election was the Democrats’ to lose. However, as the mixed record of the forecasting models reminds us, in politics there is no such thing as a sure bet. After all, Al Gore was projected to win big in 2000. While the deteriorating state of the economy made it difficult, perhaps impossible, for John McCain to pull out a victory in 2008, broader trends in the electorate suggest that the economic meltdown was neither necessary nor sufficient for an Obama victory. The Republicans can take solace in knowing that their defeat did not signal a political upheaval, as longtime supporters did not abandon the GOP in droves. Rather, Obama siphoned off support in roughly equal measure across the electorate. Consequently, the Republicans still have a base from which to rebuild. For the Republicans, the lesson from this brief tour of public opinion in 2008 is that, if they wish to avoid the political wilderness, they should not focus solely on the proximate cause of Obama’s win—the economic crisis. While the economic meltdown mattered, neither is it the whole story. The ailing economy could only have benefited Obama if voters felt confident that his policy prescriptions were preferred to McCain’s. And even if the economy had been in better shape, we have good reason to think that the Democrat would still have been heavily favored to win. Back in 2007, before the economy melted down, many trends in public opinion were pointing toward a Democratic win. We can debate whether public opinion moved away from the GOP, or the GOP moved away from public opinion, but either way the Republican party appears out of step with what the electorate wants—not just on the economy, but in many areas of policy. None of this means that the Republicans were fated to lose in 2008. After all, this was the party that proved the forecasting models wrong in 2000, another year in which the economic climate led to predictions that the Democrat was a shoo-in. In 2000, notwithstanding the booming economy, the Republicans were able to beat expectations by nominating a self-described compassionate conservative with fresh ideas on traditionally Democratic issues like education and the provision of social services. (Maybe you remember him; his name is George W. Bush.) Just as Bush was not sunk because of a booming economy in 2000, Obama did not prevail only because of the sagging economy in 2008 and, given the long-term trends in public opinion, was favored regardless of the economy.

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Forecasters be warned—the state of the economy is not necessarily political destiny. Notes 1. All references to the national exit poll are taken from the CNN website, although since many news organizations collaborate on the poll, the same results can be found in a variety of sources. The 2008 exit poll results can be found at http:// www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/results/polls/valUSP00p1, while the 2004 results are at http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/states/US/P/00/epolls.0 .html (both accessed December 9, 2008). 2. Obama: http://www.barackobama.com/issues/healthcare/ (accessed December 9, 2008). McCain: http://www.johnmccain.com/content/default.aspx?guid8475c713-a541 -4b97-a2aa-800e35da37bb (accessed December 9, 2008). 3. 41 percent explicitly said that health coverage was not the federal government’s responsibility. 4. This number combines those who said that they were ‘‘somewhat’’ or ‘‘very’’ worried. 5. 55 percent, according to Pew (2008f). 6. For example, people who attend religious services weekly or more were 39 percent of the electorate in 2008, compared to 42 percent in 2004. 7. Among voters who attend services more than weekly, 55 percent voted for McCain, compared to 64 percent for Bush in 2004 and 63 percent in 2000. Among those who attend weekly, 55 percent went for McCain, while 58 percent voted Bush in 2004 and 57 percent did so in 2000. Note that McCain also did slightly worse among white evangelicals: winning 74 percent, compared to 78 percent for Bush in 2004. 8. Note that, officially, John Kerry was also opposed to gay marriage in 2004 (although this did not stop the Bush campaign from trumpeting Bush’s support for traditional marriage). Prior to the 2004 presidential campaign, Kerry had signaled his support for gay marriage by, among other things, being only one of fourteen senators to vote against the Defense of Marriage Act (Campbell and Monson 2007).

References Abramowitz, Alan. 2008. ‘‘Forecasting the 2008 Presidential Election with the Timefor-Change Model.’’ PS: Political Science and Politics 41, no. 4: 691–95. Campbell, David E., and J. Quin Monson. 2007. ‘‘The Case of Bush’s Re-election: Did Gay Marriage Do It?’’ In A Matter of Faith: Religion in the 2004 Presidential Election, ed. David E. Campbell, pp. 120–41. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. ———. 2008. ‘‘The Religion Card: Gay Marriage and the 2004 Presidential Election.’’ Public Opinion Quarterly 72, no. 3: 399–419.

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Campbell, James E. 2008. ‘‘Editor’s Introduction: Forecasting the 2008 National Elections.’’ PS: Political Science and Politics 41, no. 4: 679–81. Fiorina, Morris P. 1981. Retrospective Voting in American National Elections. New Haven: Yale University Press. Fiorina, Morris P., Samuel Abrams, and Jeremy Pope. 2003. ‘‘The 2000 US Presidential Election: Can Retrospective Voting Be Saved?’’ British Journal of Political Science 33: 163–87. Fiorina, Morris P., with Samuel Abrams and Jeremy Pope. 2006. Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America. New York: Pearson/Longman. Gallup, Inc. 2008a. ‘‘Healthcare System.’’ Available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/ 4708/Healthcare-System.aspx (accessed December 9, 2008). ———. 2008b. ‘‘Energy.’’ Available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/2167/Energy.aspx (accessed December 9, 2008). ———. 2008c. ‘‘Terrorism in the United States.’’ Available at http://www.gallup .com/poll/4909/Terrorism-United-States.aspx (accessed December 9, 2008). Hout, Michael, and Claude S. Fischer. 2002. ‘‘Why More Americans Have No Religious Preference.’’ American Sociological Review 67, no. 2: 165–90. Hunter, James Davison. 1991. Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America. New York: Basic Books. Keeter, Scott. 2007. ‘‘Evangelicals and Moral Values.’’ In A Matter of Faith: Religion in the 2004 Presidential Election, ed. David E. Campbell, pp. 80–94. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Key, V. O. 1966. The Responsible Electorate. New York: Vintage. Leege, David C., Kenneth Wald, Brian S. Krueger, and Paul D. Mueller. 2002. The Politics of Cultural Differences: Social Change and Voter Mobilization Strategies in the Post-New Deal Period. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Pew Research Center for the People & the Press. 2007. ‘‘Political Landscape More Favorable to Democrats: Trends In Political Values and Core Attitudes.’’ Available at http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/312.pdf (accessed December 9, 2008). ———. 2008a. ‘‘Election-Year Economic Ratings Lowest Since ’92.’’ Available at http://people-press.org/report/388/an-even-more-partisan-agenda-for-2008 (accessed December 9, 2008). ———. 2008b. ‘‘Declining Public Support For Global Engagement.’’ Available at http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/453.pdf (accessed December 9, 2008). ———. 2008c. ‘‘Gas Prices Pump Up Support for Drilling.’’ Available at http://pew research.org/pubs/884/gas-prices (accessed December 9, 2008). ———. 2008d. ‘‘Obama Has the Lead, But Potential Problems Too.’’ Available at http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/398.pdf (accessed December 9, 2008). ———. 2008e. ‘‘Public Not Desperate About Economy or Personal Finances.’’ Available at http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/458.pdf (accessed December 9, 2008). ———. 2008f. ‘‘A Stable Majority: Most Americans Still Oppose Same-Sex Marriage.’’ Available at http://pewforum.org/docs/?DocID290 (accessed December 9, 2008). Pew Research Center for the People & the Press and Pew Hispanic Center. 2006. ‘‘America’s Immigration Quandary.’’ Available at http://people-press.org/reports/ pdf/274.pdf (accessed December 9, 2008).

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Sadd, Lydia. 2008. ‘‘Nearly Half of Adults Now Applaud the Iraq Surge.’’ Gallup Poll, July 31. Available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/109165/Nearly-Half-US-Adults -Now-Applaud-Iraq-Surge.aspx (accessed December 9, 2008). Semerad, Tony. 2008. ‘‘Utah Money Helped Push Prop 8 Spending to Historic Levels.’’ Salt Lake Tribune, November 22. Wilcox, Clyde, and Barbara Norrander. ‘‘Of Moods and Morals: The Dynamics of Opinion on Abortion and Gay Rights.’’ Chapter in Understanding Public Opinion, 2d ed., ed. Barbara Norrander and Clyde Wilcox, pp. 121–48. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Zernike, Kate. 2008. ‘‘Do Polls Lie About Race?’’ New York Times, October 12, Section WK.

7 Religion in the 2008 Election James L. Guth1

ilitary campaigns, it is said, are always shaped by the lessons of the last war. So it is with the politics of religion in the United States. Soon after the 2004 election, pundits concluded that religion had played a crucial role in President Bush’s narrow victory over John F. Kerry. Exit polls showed that more voters picked religiously freighted ‘‘moral issues’’ as the reason for their choice than any other option. Although some experts quickly contested this interpretation, later analysis of voting patterns confirmed that religion did shape the result (Campbell 2007). Bush won large majorities among regular churchgoers, a fact quickly dubbed ‘‘the God gap,’’ but a deeper analysis showed partisan configurations that portended a narrow, long-term GOP majority, grounded in religious affiliation and belief. Much of the resulting commentary revealed considerable confusion over the operative religious forces (Guth et al. 2006). Two approaches have competed in professional analysis of religious voting: Ethnoreligious theory emphasizes the influence of religious affiliation on electoral choice (Kleppner 1979). For example, nineteenth-century parties were warring coalitions of ethnoreligious groups, with the GOP representing historically dominant Mainline Protestants, such as Episcopalians, Presbyterians, and Methodists, while Democrats spoke for religious minorities: Catholics, Jews, and Evangelical Protestants (especially in the South). These divisions survived the New Deal’s class politics, but by the 1980s alignments had shifted, as Mainline Protestants dwindled in number, Evangelicals joined the GOP, some Catholics deserted the Democrats, and black Protestants became a critical Democratic bloc, along with ‘‘new’’ minorities such as Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, and secular voters. Many observers still think primarily in ethno-

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religious terms, referring to the ‘‘Evangelical,’’ ‘‘Catholic,’’ ‘‘Jewish,’’ or ‘‘Muslim’’ vote. An alternative is the religious restructuring theory, introduced into political parlance by James Hunter’s Culture Wars (1991). Hunter saw new theological factionalism emerging within old traditions: the ‘‘orthodox’’ accept an external, definable, and transcendent authority and adhere to traditional doctrines, while ‘‘progressives’’ create new religious understandings based on experience or scientific rationality (p. 44). The progressives are joined by secular Americans who reject religion but see morality in much the same way. The ‘‘God gap’’ was a crude indicator of these divisions, as the orthodox are more observant than the progressives, but the factions were rooted in competing theological worldviews. These perspectives not only undergirded disputes over abortion, feminism, gay rights, and the role of faith in public life, but soon infused other policy attitudes as well. Some political scientists derided Hunter’s theory (Fiorina 2005), but others confirmed a modified version (Layman 2001; Green 2007). Both approaches help explain the 2004 results, as illustrated by table 7.1. We report both voting by religious traditions, emphasized by ethnoreligious theory (Evangelicals, Mainline Protestants, white Catholics, and so on), and those of theological factions. Unlike Hunter’s bipolar model, we divide the big religious traditions into four factions, with ‘‘traditionalists’’ on the most theologically orthodox and observant pole, and ‘‘nominals,’’ with only vestigial religious attachments, anchoring the other end. Religious traditions differed dramatically in 2004. Latter-day Saints and Evangelicals were overwhelmingly Republican, followed by Latino Protestants. On the other side, most religious ‘‘minorities,’’ including Jews, black Protestants, Latino Catholics, other non-Christian faiths, and the unaffiliated, were staunchly Democratic. Mainline Protestants and Catholics were ‘‘swing’’ groups, almost evenly divided. But the vote in the three largest religious traditions also varied enormously by theological orientation, with Evangelical, Catholic, and Mainline traditionalists far more Republican than their modernist and nominal coparishioners, who were overwhelmingly Democratic. Indeed, each theological faction resembled its counterparts in other traditions more than opposing factions within its own. Thus, each party had a distinct religious ‘‘base.’’ Bush received four-tenths of his votes from Evangelicals alone, mostly from traditionalists and centrists. Adding Catholic and Mainline traditionalists, as well as Latino Protestants, gave the GOP a solid traditionalist majority, holding conservative positions on social, foreign policy, and even economic issues (Guth et al. 2006). Of course, Republicans still needed votes from other religious groups and unaffiliated voters, but no GOP presidential aspirant in 2008 could ignore this

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TABLE 7.1 Religious Groups and the 2004 Presidential Vote

Religious Group Latter-day Saints

Percent of Potential Voters

Bush Percent of Two-Party Vote

Proportion of GOP Coalition

Proportion of Democratic Coalition

1.4

97.0

3.7

.1

25.1 10.7 9.7 3.3 1.5

77.5 87.9 70.4 57.1 56.6

39.7 23.4 11.9 2.9 1.5

12.0 3.4 5.2 2.2 1.2

2.6

62.9

2.6

1.6

Mainline Protestant Traditionalist Centrist Modernist Nominals

16.4 4.5 5.5 4.4 2.0

50.0 65.6 49.1 43.1 31.0

18.3 7.0 6.5 3.3 1.5

19.2 3.9 7.1 4.6 3.6

White Catholic Traditionalist Centrist Modernist Nominals

17.5 4.2 7.4 3.8 2.1

52.7 73.9 52.3 38.1 28.9

19.9 7.7 8.0 2.9 1.3

18.8 2.9 7.6 4.9 3.4

Latino Catholic

4.5

31.4

1.9

4.4

17.4 4.8 9.0 3.5

28.1 37.0 29.5 20.0

8.1 2.0 4.6 1.5

21.7 3.6 11.6 6.5

1.9 2.5 1.4 9.3

26.9 29.7 17.9 17.2

1.4 1.4 0.4 2.6

4.1 3.2 1.7 13.2

100.0

51.2

100.0

100.0

Evangelical Protestant Traditionalist Centrist Modernist Nominals Latino Protestant

All Unaffiliated Believers Seculars Atheists/Agnostics Jewish Other Christian Other Faiths Black Protestant Total

Source: 2004 National Survey of Religion and Politics, Bliss Institute, University of Akron.

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traditionalist base. The strategic problem from a religious perspective was to hold and activate those voters, while attracting others. The Democrats had a more complicated situation, given greater internal diversity, and John Kerry’s minority showing. Their largest single bloc were the unaffiliated, over one-fifth of Kerry voters, but they were joined by many Mainline Protestants, white Catholics, African American Protestants and, cumulatively, other religious minorities, including Jews, always an important financial and activist constituency. The Democratic loss convinced some party strategists that the presidency could not be won in 2008 without breaking into GOP-leaning religious groups. They also warned that too many Americans saw the party as unfriendly to religion and that Democratic candidates must find their ‘‘religious voice,’’ to avoid Kerry’s uncertain tone when confronted with faith-related issues. Kerry had also been hobbled by criticism from leaders of his own Catholic Church and his campaign failed to match the GOP’s religious outreach. Of course, attracting a diverse array of religious voters was complicated, especially without angering secular ones. In fact, some party leaders and academics denied that the task was even necessary: Democrats could win with a strong appeal to working-class Americans, who had been seduced into voting against their economic interests by the GOP’s moralistic rhetoric (Frank 2004). Or the party could focus on Latinos and other ethnic minorities, highly educated professionals, and younger voters less connected to religious institutions (Judis and Teixeira 2002). These growing demographic groups might provide the base for a national majority without relying on religious appeals. Despite such contentions, National Democratic Committee (DNC) chair Howard Dean launched a new religious strategy, commissioning studies, opening a liaison office for religious groups, sponsoring web ventures for religious voters, working with religious consultants, and creating religious advisory committees (Gilgoff 2007). In concert with the congressional party committees, the DNC also recruited religious candidates for the 2006 elections, such as congressman Ted Strickland, a Methodist minister elected governor of Ohio, Robert Casey Jr., a pro-life Catholic who won Republican Rick Santorum’s U.S. Senate seat, and Heath Shuler, an Evangelical NFL quarterback who captured a Republican House seat in North Carolina. Although Dean’s actions horrified many secular activists (Rosin 2007), they aided the recapture of Congress. Democrats gained little ground among Evangelicals, but took a majority of white Catholics, always a swing group, and enhanced their totals among secular and minority religious voters. Democratic presidential aspirants quickly concluded that an astute religious strategy could mean success in 2008 (Sullivan 2008).

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Religious strategies in 2008 would be shaped not only by past electoral patterns, but also by changes in the American religious landscape. First, there was some ebbing in public receptiveness to religious appeals by politicians. In 2004 most Americans wanted a president with a strong religious faith, thought religious groups should speak out on issues, and believed the campaign had about the right amount of religious involvement, but by 2008 opinion was slightly less positive about religious politics (Guth et al. 2006; Pew Forum 2008b). Some attributed this to disenchantment with President Bush’s overt religiosity, while others credited a growing secularity, as unaffiliated numbers inched up and some markers of religious practice declined. In addition, public opinion had liberalized on social issues such as same-sex marriage, civil unions, and stem cell research. And, perhaps most important, the national agenda was dominated by the Iraq war and a slowing economy. At the same time, two changes within the religious world received much attention: the political transformation of the Christian Right and the emergence of a Religious Left. On the Right, old actors were passing from the scene. Jerry Falwell, founder of the original Moral Majority and continuing symbol of the movement, died in 2007, as did D. James Kennedy, another founder. The Christian Coalition, created in 1991 by Pat Robertson and master strategist Ralph Reed, had finally imploded and although Robertson still made political pronouncements, most saw him as an inconsequential sideshow. Even Dr. James Dobson’s Focus on the Family complex was aging with him, although still generating mountains of letters and e-mails to Congress. Similar maladies afflicted other Christian Right groups, but religious activists remained a formidable cadre within the GOP. Not only were old leaders disappearing, but some Christian conservatives were moving in new directions. The National Association of Evangelicals (NAE), led by Richard Cizik, now addressed issues long ignored by the Christian Right, including global warming, human rights, religious persecution, hunger and AIDS in developing countries, and international security. The NAE was echoed by a new generation of mega-church clergy, such as Rick Warren of Saddleback Community Church in California, Bill Hybels of Willow Creek Community Church in suburban Chicago, and Joel Hunter of Northland Community Church in Orlando, figures with national stature. Even the staunchly conservative Southern Baptist Convention (SBC), the nation’s largest Protestant denomination, at times seemed to move in more moderate directions (Gorski 2007). Although these trends were vigorously resisted by Evangelical hard-liners and there was doubt as to whether these new leaders spoke for their largely Republican constituencies, the political ground was shifting, especially among younger Evangelicals (Fitzgerald 2008).

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‘‘New’’ conservatives were joined by a new Religious Left, spearheaded by liberal Evangelical Jim Wallis, founder of Sojourners magazine, whose appeals on poverty, disease, the environment, and international peace were reaching a broad audience (Wallis 2008). Wallis and his allies were welcomed by the aging forces of Mainline liberalism as they sought to unite religious centrists and liberals into a political force, using the Internet to overcome old barriers among potential constituents (Kellstedt et al. 2007). And although Wallis eschewed partisanship, the movement’s agenda clearly tilted Democratic, presenting an opening for party leaders in 2008. Developments within the large Catholic tradition were more ambiguous. The Catholic Church included a growing cadre (albeit still a minority) of bishops eager to confront pro-choice politicians, mostly Democrats, over what they saw as the central moral issue of the era. At the same time, competing Catholic activist organizations multiplied, reflecting the growing theological and ideological divisions in the church. Even the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) walked a tightrope between emphasizing abortion as the true measure of politicians, which favored the GOP, and stressing historic Catholic social teaching, which meshed with Democratic welfare liberalism. And they faced the nagging issue of how actively to insert themselves into the electoral process (Allen 2008).

The Winnowing of the Field: Republican Candidates and Religious Strategies The complex religious divisions appearing in recent years were not confined to voters. Indeed, politicians have aligned very similarly, as shown by studies of party activists (Green, Guth, and Fraser 1991), national convention delegates (Green and Jackson 2007), and the U.S. Congress (Guth 2007). Not surprisingly, as we shall see, the initial field of candidates in each party reflected their constituencies, both in religious affiliation and theological orientation. The Republican field included several Evangelicals, the religious core of the GOP. This was especially true of the ‘‘dark horse’’ candidates, hoping to ride the GOP’s social conservative base to the nomination. Former governor Mike Huckabee of Arkansas started out as a Southern Baptist minister, becoming president of the Arkansas Baptist Convention before entering politics. Representatives Duncan Hunter (CA) and Tom Tancredo (CO) were staunch traditionalists, the former an independent Baptist and the latter an Evangelical Presbyterian. Representative Ron Paul’s (TX) well-known libertarian streak often put him at odds with religious conservatives, but he was a

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committed Christian who attended both Evangelical Free and Baptist churches. Finally, Kansas senator Sam Brownback’s personal religious history touched all the core GOP constituencies: starting out as a traditionalist Mainliner (United Methodist), he converted to Catholicism in 2003, but still attended a nondenominational Evangelical church with his (unconverted) family, as well as his new Catholic parish (Olasky 2006). Ironically, the GOP front-runners were a tougher ‘‘fit’’ with the party’s religious constituency (Vineis 2008). John McCain had wooed traditionalists early in his 2000 campaign for the GOP nomination, but once bested in that duel by George W. Bush, lashed out against Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson as ‘‘agents of intolerance.’’ Although McCain quietly mended fences with both, he was still suspect to conservatives, despite a pro-life record and attendance at his wife’s North Phoenix Baptist Church. (He announced early in the campaign that he was now a ‘‘Baptist’’ rather than an Episcopalian, although he had not actually joined the church.) His sponsorship of campaign finance reform was a sore point, as was his support for embryonic stem cell research. McCain always found it hard to use religious idiom convincingly and his staff was contemptuous of religious conservatives and reluctant to court them. Mitt Romney had different problems. Although his fellow Latter-day Saints were solidly Republican and provided substantial financial help, they were too few to provide much of an electoral base (MacGillis 2007). And his faith was regarded as a ‘‘cult’’ or ‘‘heresy’’ by many Evangelicals and Catholic traditionalists. Even secular Republicans worried about poll reports that many citizens would not vote for a Mormon. Furthermore, although most Latter-day Saints are social conservatives, Romney had taken moderate stances on abortion and gay rights while seeking office in liberal Massachusetts. Thus, some traditionalists regarded his ‘‘conversion’’ on both issues with suspicion. To address these concerns Romney followed John F. Kennedy’s 1960 example by giving a formal address explaining the relationship between his faith and politics, an effort that mollified some Evangelical leaders, but did not start a stampede toward his camp. The candidate most feared by religious conservatives was former New York City mayor Rudy Giuliani, favored by secular Republicans. As a ‘‘cradle Catholic,’’ he attended church schools, considered becoming a priest, and, as mayor, fought ‘‘blasphemous’’ art in public museums. But his three marriages, messy divorces, and support for abortion and gay rights angered Catholic traditionalists and Evangelicals, despite admiration for his strong leadership after the September 11, 2001, attacks. He was also at odds with Catholic leaders, who had asked him not to present himself for the Eucharist.

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An indifferent churchgoer, Giuliani argued that his religious life was a private matter, a claim that alarmed religious conservatives (McFeely 2008). A late entrant to the race was former senator Fred Thompson of Tennessee. Thompson had a solid conservative record, although he occasionally deviated from Republican orthodoxy, often on the same issues as McCain. He had been baptized into the conservative Church of Christ as a young man, but his observance had lapsed during a long political—and later, acting— career. (He reported that he did go to church when visiting his mother in Tennessee.) Although James Dobson warned that Thompson didn’t seem to be a Christian, he had some appeal to Evangelicals, especially in his native South, based on endorsements from pro-life organizations, his skillful employment of religious rhetoric, and his perceived resemblance to another conservative hero, Ronald Reagan. Although Christian Right leaders caucused repeatedly, they could not agree on a favorite, leaving each candidate with some high-profile religious support (Zeller 2007). McCain was backed by former Family Research Council president Gary Bauer, while Romney not only had solid Mormon support, but, surprisingly, that of fundamentalist leader Bob Jones III. Giuliani won the unlikely endorsement of televangelist Pat Robertson; Brownback was favored by prominent Catholic conservatives; and Paul, Tancredo, and Hunter all managed to elicit their own blessings. Huckabee was pushed by Southern Baptist allies, but was distrusted by the SBC’s conservative faction and unable to mobilize much backing from other Evangelical leaders, who thought him too liberal on economic, immigration, and foreign policy issues, or simply not electable. In the end, some movement leaders were so disenchanted by the GOP field that they considered a third-party movement. Although the GOP contest began with improbable poll findings that Giuliani and McCain were leading among Evangelicals, the numbers changed quickly as the campaign moved toward the first contests, especially after Huckabee’s strong performance at the Values Voters Conference, a critical gathering of religious conservatives. Huckabee’s subsequent victory in the Iowa caucuses, driven by Evangelicals and home-schoolers, allowed him to expand a shoestring budget and attract more media coverage and activists. As the race quickly narrowed to McCain, Romney, and Huckabee, a clear voting pattern developed: Huckabee led among Evangelicals, especially in Southern Baptist territory, followed by Romney and McCain, who won smaller but significant shares. McCain did especially well among Catholics, Mainline Protestants, and secular voters. Romney benefited from Mormon support in the West, considerable backing from other religious conservatives

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everywhere, and a solid vote from ‘‘economic’’ Republicans (Pew Forum 2008a). In the end, McCain won the nomination without strong appeal to the GOP’s largest religious bloc. Although he had tried to reassure Evangelicals as the campaign wore on, he actually profited from their divisions. In the end, the crucial juncture came in South Carolina, which McCain took narrowly with a third of the vote. Huckabee might have won and emerged as the favorite of religious conservatives had not Thompson made a last-ditch attempt to jump-start his campaign, siphoning off Evangelical votes. (Of course, Huckabee had yet to demonstrate much appeal to Catholic and Mainline traditionalists.) As it was, religious conservatives split their primary votes among Huckabee, Romney, and even McCain, allowing others to put the Arizona senator over the top. McCain won the nomination without most religious conservatives, but would need them in November, so he began the arduous process of repairing the GOP religious alliance. With the help of Gary Bauer, he held both publicized (with Billy and Franklin Graham) and unpublicized meetings with Christian conservatives, reassuring them on abortion, gay marriage, sex trafficking, and international religious freedom (Bumiller 2008). He capped off these efforts with a spirited performance at Rick Warren’s candidate forum at Saddleback Community Church. McCain gave succinct (and ‘‘correct’’) answers on abortion and marriage, compared to the longer, more theoretical and perhaps evasive responses of Barack Obama (‘‘that question is above my pay grade’’). His performance ‘‘sealed the deal’’ with many religious conservatives, who abandoned talk of third-party defection or sitting out the election. Some former Christian Right leaders, such as Ralph Reed, even signed on to help the campaign. But pursuing religious conservatives also had costs. In the spring McCain had proudly announced an endorsement by Pentecostal preacher John Hagee, a prominent Evangelical supporter of Israel. McCain was later embarrassed, however, when Hagee’s sermons were widely reproduced, with their aspersions at the Catholic Church and assertion that the Holocaust was part of God’s plan for the Jewish people (Frykholm 2008). Although Hagee apologized for any offense given Catholics and Jews, McCain quickly repudiated his endorsement and that of Reverend Rod Parsley, an Ohio mega-church political organizer who had repeatedly attacked Islam. McCain discovered what previous Republican nominees learned: generic religiosity may be desirable, but religious particularism presents a threat to party unity and electoral viability.

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Winnowing the Field: The Democrat Candidates and Religious Strategies The initial Democratic field was surprisingly large, and also reflected the breadth of the party’s religious coalition. Senator Hillary Clinton was a lifelong United Methodist, and from her youth was influenced by its liberal activist wing (Kengor 2007). Even as First Lady, her religious bent had elicited snickers about ‘‘Saint Hillary’’ from the elite press. In the Senate, she quickly joined a bipartisan weekly prayer group that included Republican candidate Sam Brownback. Among the first Democrats to take up the appeal to religious voters after 2004, Clinton even suggested that the party’s approach to abortion might be recast, alarming pro-choice activists. She also made a point of reaching out to religious conservatives, joining up with a Rick Warren forum on AIDS at Saddleback Church, where she was warmly received (Feldman 2007). Senator Barack Obama embodied another crucial Democratic constituency: black Protestants. Raised in an agnostic home, Obama grew up in contact with several traditions: his (absent) father and Indonesian stepfather were Muslim (he battled rumors throughout the campaign that he was too); he attended a Catholic school for a time; and he encountered the black Protestant tradition as a community organizer in Chicago. Eventually he joined the Trinity United Church of Christ, a large politically active congregation affiliated with the predominantly white United Church of Christ, the most theologically and politically liberal Mainline Protestant denomination (Pinckney 2008). Even some friends saw this decision as politically motivated, but Obama soon demonstrated not only real commitment but an acute ear for religious language. This was highlighted in his famous speech to the 2004 Democratic National Convention, where he noted that ‘‘Barack’’ means ‘‘blessed’’ and asserted that ‘‘we worship an awesome God in the blue states,’’ drawing on a familiar Evangelical praise chorus (Boyer 2008). From then on, he wrote and spoke eloquently about the need to welcome people of faith in the public square. Obama also cultivated (and impressed) religious leaders from many traditions, including prominent Evangelicals such as Rick Warren and Joel Hunter. While he continued to campaign in black churches, he also frequented both Evangelical and Mainline Protestant services. He was a featured speaker at the June 2007 meeting of the United Church of Christ, his own denomination (a speech that triggered a later IRS investigation). Like Senator Clinton’s, his religious outreach staff was led by Evangelicals, but was quite ecumenical (Sullivan 2008).

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The third front-runner, former senator John Edwards of North Carolina, the party’s 2004 vice-presidential nominee, grew up in a devout Southern Baptist home but now shared Clinton’s United Methodist faith, if not her willingness to talk about it. Although Edwards eventually joined the Democratic rush to connect faith to policies, he remained more reticent than most. Religion had been an important comfort to his family in tragedy and he was quick to connect his populist economics to biblical imperatives to care for the poor. But he had reservations about too much religious talk in politics and his early campaign antagonized some religious voters when two staff bloggers posted remarks critical of religious conservatives, especially Catholics (Saber 2007). Second-tier candidates embodied other historic Democratic constituencies. Especially numerous were the Catholics, a reminder of their historic role in the party. These included Bill Richardson of New Mexico (representing the growing Latino element in the church), representative Dennis Kucinich of Ohio, senator Joe Biden of Delaware, and senator Chris Dodd of Connecticut (Marks 2007). Their faith ranged from the strong, if conventional Catholic observance of Biden and Dodd to the ‘‘New Age’’ version of Kucinich. Another outside candidate, former Alaska senator Mike Gravel, grew up Catholic in a Jewish neighborhood, but joined the theologically and politically liberal Unitarian Universalists, and spoke for the party’s humanist left. During the early campaign, candidates repeatedly addressed faith-related issues, most notably in a far-ranging two-night discussion in June 2007 sponsored by Wallis’s Sojourners and CNN. Although both Clinton and Obama consistently sought to cast an ecumenical net, once the primaries began religious gaps appeared among Democratic voters. Obama steadily built support among black Protestants, while Clinton’s formidable early backing from black clergy and churchgoers ebbed. And despite Obama’s strong early appeal to Evangelical and Mainline Protestants, key to his victory in Iowa, such support diminished as the primaries wore on. Even campaign brochures with Obama standing behind a pulpit, overshadowed by a cross, did not reverse the trend. Clinton steadily improved her standing among white Protestants and working-class Catholics, especially regular churchgoers, and also won handily among Jewish voters. The two fought a pitched battle for Latino Catholics and Protestants, and Obama added more and more secular voters to his increasingly monolithic constituency of devout black Protestants. Perhaps the only significant religious bloc not cultivated were Muslims: Obama went to extraordinary lengths to avoid fueling rumors that he was really Muslim, even moving women in headscarves out of camera range at his rallies. The crucial Pennsylvania primary saw the culmination of these trends, crystallized by two events. In mid-March the national media finally high-

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lighted sermon statements of Obama’s retired pastor and longtime ally, Jeremiah Wright, whose black liberationist theology did not play well to white audiences. Obama quickly repudiated Wright’s most sensational claims as ‘‘not only wrong but divisive,’’ countering with a widely praised speech on race conflict and reconciliation. But the affair continued to dog the Illinois senator, as both Clinton and putative GOP nominee McCain criticized his remaining at Trinity Church. Eventually Obama reacted to further inflammatory statements from Wright by resigning his membership (Zeleny and Nagourney 2008). Then, speaking in early April to Democratic donors in San Francisco, Obama mused that white working-class Pennsylvanians were ‘‘bitter’’ about their situation and, as a result, clung to religion, guns, and xenophobia. Characterized later by Obama as ‘‘my biggest boneheaded move’’ (Bai 2008), the remarks set off a firestorm of criticism from both Clinton Democrats and, of course, Republicans. By the time of Obama’s final triumph in June, the Democratic Party found its constituency deeply divided along ethnic and religious lines. Obama saw the holes in his coalition and moved quickly. In June he met privately with forty religious leaders, including Evangelicals, in a ‘‘listening’’ session that produced ample praise from attendees. At the same time, he buttressed his appeal to liberal Catholics by establishing ‘‘Catholics for Obama,’’ backed by organizations such as Catholics United, Catholics in Alliance for the Common Good, Catholics for Choice, and Network (Hudson 2008). Nor did he neglect black Protestants, speaking to the convention of the African Methodist Episcopal Church, pushing the theme of personal responsibility in the black community. At the same time, the ‘‘Matthew 25 Network’’ established both a website and a political action committee to support Obama, and advertised on Christian radio stations—usually the preserve of Evangelical religion and Republican candidates. And the campaign laid elaborate plans for local house parties for Evangelicals and Catholics, religious rock concerts, and conversations with traditionalist clergy. Perhaps the most audacious move was Obama’s endorsement of a ‘‘faithbased initiative,’’ not unlike that of the Bush administration. Although he promised more strings on federal money used by religious organizations for social services, many secular Democrats were appalled by this ‘‘move to the center.’’ Elite press commentary was also mostly critical, but the initiative was greeted warmly by parts of the religious community, including some traditionalists. Thus, by August the Obama campaign had resumed the religious coalition building interrupted by the divisive nominating contest. Although not all these initiatives would be executed with the precision that characterized the Obama campaign overall, they certainly did send a welcoming signal to religious communities.

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Had the nominating contests reshaped religious alignments? Perhaps surprisingly, despite all the efforts by candidates in both parties to expand their constituencies, polls showed remarkable continuity as the national conventions approached. Religious groups that supported Bush in 2004 favored McCain in 2008 and those that supported Kerry now backed Obama. There were important marginal changes: Evangelicals were not quite as fond of McCain as they had been of Bush, but McCain actually did better among Mainline Protestants and even traditionalist Catholics than Bush, but had lost ground among centrist and modernist Catholics. Obama improved on Kerry’s showing in the Democrats’ strongest constituencies, such as Latino Catholics, black Protestants, secular voters, and other religious minorities, but despite ardent wooing of Evangelicals, had made little progress there (Henry Institute 2008; Bliss Institute 2008).

Convention Time: Platforms, Running Mates, and Religion The national conventions supplied new action points for religious strategies. The Democratic Convention almost oozed hospitality to people of faith, with an interfaith prayer service, special sessions for faith groups, ample religious imagery, and a benediction by mega-church pastor Joel Hunter. Evangelical author Tony Campolo and other Religious Left figures on the Platform Committee rejoiced that the usual pro-choice abortion plank also pledged to support women taking their pregnancy to term, a provision inspired by Evangelical and Catholic members. Nevertheless, the convention was still picketed by pro-life groups, who (with some reason) regarded Obama as ‘‘the most extreme pro-choice candidate ever’’ (George 2008). Obama chose his running mate, senator Joe Biden, in part to attract the very working-class Catholic traditionalists who had preferred Clinton and might defect to the pro-life McCain in November. Biden’s selection would also demonstrate that the party was led by people of real faith. (He once threatened to shove his ‘‘rosary down the throat’’ of any Republican questioning his piety.) But Biden’s selection soon raised as many religious problems as it solved. In a Meet the Press interview, he accepted Catholic teaching that life began at conception and that abortion was morally wrong, but said that he could not legislate that perspective. He also stated that the church’s stance had changed over time, echoing Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi. Both were quickly reprimanded by the U.S. Catholic bishops (NCR Staff 2008). Despite this, several prominent pro-life Catholics announced support for Obama as the candidate most likely to actually reduce the abortion rate and pursue welfare policies consistent with the church’s social teachings—

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although not without attracting some unfavorable attention from Catholic bishops and priests (Dionne 2008). McCain’s problem at the GOP convention was different. Although he had formal Christian Right endorsements, there was little enthusiasm for his candidacy. So he allowed traditionalists to keep strong pro-life language in the platform, as well as other planks important to religious Republicans, such as that on school choice. But the boldest move was the nomination of governor Sarah Palin of Alaska as his running mate. Although more prominent candidates were rejected to avoid adverse reaction from religious conservatives, Palin’s religious traits apparently did not enter the deliberations over her selection. Her convention speech electrified traditionalists, however, and previously skeptical Christian Right leaders fell in behind the McCain/Palin ticket. (Indeed, traditionalist lawns soon sported campaign signs skillfully cropped to read only ‘‘Palin.’’) Part of the instant appeal was her strong prolife credentials, based not so much on her official actions as governor, but on a decision to give birth to a baby with Down’s syndrome, rather than terminate the pregnancy. That the governor’s unmarried daughter was pregnant and also planned to carry the baby to term confirmed that commitment. After a few days, however, media attention shifted from Palin’s family to her religion. Baptized a Catholic, she grew up in an Assemblies of God congregation but did not engage in standard Pentecostal practices such as speaking in tongues, and she later moved to a non-Pentecostal Evangelical church. Her strong convictions excited religious conservatives, but also prompted an orgy of media scrutiny as journalists rediscovered, with the air of intrepid anthropologists, the distinctive beliefs and practices of Pentecostal Christians (Goodstein 2008a). They dissected Palin’s boilerplate religious idiom and puzzled over her pastors’ exposition of Scripture, extrapolating purported implications for foreign policy, global warming, and gender relations (Braun 2008).

The General Election Campaign: Back to the Religious Base? Although the Biden flap over abortion and Palin’s nomination led pundits to anticipate resumption of the ‘‘culture wars,’’ the international financial crisis that hit in mid-September put faith-related issues in the background. True, Palin still addressed issues designed to solidify the GOP’s religious base, attracting the ire of those on the other side of the abortion and gay marriage issues. Indeed, her crowds were much larger and more enthusiastic than Senator McCain’s, but polls showed that her drive to activate religious conserva-

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tives put off other religious and secular voters. Her initial encounters with the national press produced widespread negative perceptions about her qualifications to serve as president. And although religious conservatives attempted to keep social issues to the fore, this proved virtually impossible as financial markets collapsed. Voter mobilization by religious groups was probably less widespread in the 2008 campaign than in 2004 and, in any case, was mostly ignored by the media. On the Republican side, Christian Right and conservative Catholic groups still distributed voter guides in church settings, but these were less numerous than in the past (Drake 2008). Activity by conservative clergy was also less prominent, though still visible. One Christian Right group encouraged pastors to endorse McCain from the pulpit, challenging IRS and statutory restrictions on such activities. Several prominent Catholic bishops made clear their antipathy to the Democratic ticket on the weekend before the election (National Catholic Register 2008). But some potential for religious politicking went undeveloped: McCain refused to raise Obama’s relationship with his former pastor as a wedge issue, although some state GOP groups aired election-eve TV ads featuring Wright’s more incendiary statements, with the profanities bleeped out. If anything, religious mobilization in 2008 (like other mobilization efforts) may have favored the Democrats. By all accounts, black churches were even more involved than usual in activating members, as Michelle Obama met with church leaders in key states and Obama participated in the customary pre-election conference calls with black clergy. The campaign also worked hard to mobilize Mainline Protestant and Catholic voters, as allied liberal organizations such as the Matthew 25 Network and Catholics United raised funds, ran media ads, and sought to bolster the Democratic tally. Certainly, the Religious Left was much more in evidence than it had been in 2004 (Burke 2008). Obama’s decisive victory provided raw material for several perspectives on the ‘‘new Democratic majority.’’ What did the results reveal about the religious coalitions underlying the two parties? Although the religious items in exit polls are too crude to compare with table 7.1, a careful examination of table 7.2 permits some conclusions, especially when supplemented by other surveys. First, Obama’s religious outreach probably had some positive impact. Although the ‘‘God gap’’ still appeared, suggesting that religious traditionalists continued to lean Republican, Obama ran ahead of Kerry among frequent churchgoers, having ‘‘chipped away at the values divide’’ (Kristof 2008). Indeed, he was viewed by voters as more ‘‘religious’’ than McCain, and they were now more likely to see the Democrats as the party friendliest to religion.

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James L. Guth TABLE 7.2 Religious Voting in the 2004 and 2008 Presidential Elections 2004

2008

Kerry

Bush

Obama

McCain

Democratic Gain

Worship Attendance Weekly Every Week Few Times a Month Few Times a Year Never

35 41 49 54 62

64 58 50 45 36

43 43 53 59 67

55 55 46 40 30

8 2 4 5 5

Religious Group White Protestants* Evangelical Mainline Latino**

32 21 44 37

67 79 56 63

34 26 44 58

65 73 54 42

2 5 0 21

All Catholics White Latino**

47 43 65

52 56 33

54 47 70

45 52 30

7 4 5

All Unaffiliated

67

31

75

23

8

74 74 86

23 25 13

73 78 94

22 21 6

1 4 8

Other Faiths Jewish Black Protestant

* This category includes Latter-day Saints and a variety of other small Christian faiths. ** Figures for Latinos in 2008 estimated from other surveys. Source: NEP as reported by Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, supplemented by other surveys.

Obama also made inroads into critical groups that supported Bush in 2004. He won the always pivotal Catholic vote, primarily by improving on the usual Democratic majorities among Latino and less observant white Catholics and breaking even with McCain among the more traditionalist regular Mass attendees among whites (Pew Forum 2008c). Just as important, Obama returned Latino Protestants to the Democratic fold, held or increased the Democratic margin among almost all other religious minorities, including Jews, and won even more secular voters. In most cases, he benefited from increased turnout in these groups, especially among his fellow African American Protestants, where Obama’s support verged on unanimity. But Obama’s wooing of Evangelicals had limited effect. Although Obama did better here than Kerry had, only in a few Eastern and Midwestern states was the shift toward the Democrats really significant, and then largely among younger Evangelicals (Goodstein 2008b). Indeed, the campaign did not even

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try to penetrate strong Republican groups such as Southern Baptists, who went overwhelmingly for McCain. And the most observant (and presumably traditionalist) Evangelicals were still the most Republican. McCain also held the line among Mainline Protestants, especially the more observant, carrying roughly the same proportion as Bush.2 On balance, then, Obama’s arduous religious strategy was a modest net plus for his masterfully executed campaign—or at the very least, it prevented religious factors from being a negative. After the election the inevitable discussion began as to whether Obama’s historic victory represented a political realignment. There was certainly a higher vote for the Democratic candidate in many religious communities. And yet, the continuity of religious voting is just as impressive: Evangelicals remained (perhaps even more entrenched) as the religious core of the reduced GOP and the Democrats dominated among ethnoreligious minorities, much as they have throughout history. Mainline Protestant and Catholic voters remained closely divided, in large part by degree of adherence to traditional doctrine and observance. And secular voters also had some claim on Obama’s victory, enhancing their role in Democratic councils. The 2008 election produced a majority Democratic religious coalition, but President Obama will have to consolidate these gains by accommodating both the party’s usual religious constituents and the new ones. As ever for the Democrats, this will not be an easy task, as they pick their way through the varied preferences of their constituents on social, economic, and even foreign policy issues. Indeed, the election results themselves hint at forthcoming problems. For example, the massive turnout of black Protestants and Latinos, both Protestant and Catholic, boosted the ranks of social conservatives within the party, as illustrated by their role in passing California’s Proposition 8, outlawing same-sex marriage. And candidate Obama also promised to reverse President Bush’s executive order against funding of international aid organizations that promote abortion and to sign a ‘‘Freedom of Choice’’ Act to insure access to abortion at home. Such actions may not only revive the interparty ‘‘culture wars,’’ but fracture the Democratic religious coalition itself. Can President Obama overcome such divisions by fostering inter-religious cooperation on less divisive issues, such as the environment, social welfare programs, and fighting poverty abroad? Perhaps, but that’s a story for the next installment.

Notes 1. The author wishes to thank Madison McClendon for his invaluable research assistance.

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2. The results for Mainline and Evangelical Protestants here are not directly comparable to those in table 7.1, as the exit poll questions do not really permit an accurate assignment to these two traditions (Silk 2008).

References Allen, John. 2008. ‘‘Antiabortion imperative more complex than acknowledged.’’ National Catholic Reporter, October 30, 5–7. Bai, Matt. 2008. ‘‘Working for the working-class vote.’’ New York Times Magazine, October 19. Bliss Institute, 2008. ‘‘The fifth national survey of religion and politics: A baseline for the 2008 presidential election.’’ http://www.uakron.edu/bliss/docs/Blissreligionre port.pdf (accessed November 11, 2008). Boyer, Peter J. 2008. ‘‘Party faithful: Can the Democrats get a foothold on the religious voter?’’ New Yorker, September 8. Braun, Stephen. 2008. ‘‘Palin treads carefully between fundamentalist beliefs and public policy.’’ Los Angeles Times, September 28. Bumiller, Elisabeth. 2008. ‘‘McCain pushes priorities that resonate on the right.’’ New York Times, May 8, p. A28. Burke, Daniel. 2008. ‘‘Re-energized religious left delivers for Obama.’’ Religion News Service, November 5. Campbell, David E., ed. 2007. A Matter of Faith: Religion in the 2004 Presidential Election. Washington, DC: Brookings. Dionne, E. J. 2008. ‘‘For an ‘Obamacon,’ communion denied.’’ Washington Post, June 3, p. A15. Drake, Tim. 2008. ‘‘First choice for voters: Which guide?’’ National Catholic Register, September 28, p. 1. Feldman, Linda. 2007. ‘‘Candidate Clinton goes public with her private faith.’’ Christian Science Monitor, December 20, p. 1. Fitzgerald, Frances. 2008. ‘‘The new evangelicals.’’ The New Yorker, June 30, pp. 28–34. Fiorina, Morris P., with Samuel J. Adams and Jeremy C. Pope. 2005. Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America. New York: Pearson Longman. Frank, Thomas. 2004. What’s the Matter with Kansas? New York: Metropolitan Books. Frykholm, Amy. 2008. ‘‘Calculated blessings: A visit to John Hagee’s church.’’ Christian Century, October 7, pp. 35–37. George, Robert P. 2008. ‘‘Obama’s abortion extremism.’’ National Catholic Register, October 26, p. 7. Gilgoff, Dan. 2007. ‘‘Helping Democrats find a way to reach the religious.’’ New York Times, October 27. Goodstein, Laurie. 2008a. ‘‘YouTube videos draw attention to Palin’s faith.’’ New York Times, October 25, A13. ———. 2008b. ‘‘Obama made gains among younger evangelical voters, data show.’’ New York Times, November 11, p. A20.

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Gorski, Eric. 2007. ‘‘Southern Baptists split over politics.’’ Associated Press, June 16. Green, John C. 2007. The Faith Factor: How Religion Influences American Elections. Westport, CT: Praeger. Green, John C., James L. Guth, and Cleveland R. Fraser. 1991. ‘‘Apostles and apostates? Religion and politics among political activists.’’ Pp. 113–36 in The Bible and the Ballot Box, ed. James L. Guth and John C. Green. Boulder, CO: Westview. Green, John C., and John S. Jackson. 2007. ‘‘Faithful divides: Party elites and religion.’’ Pp. 37–62 in A Matter of Faith: Religion in the 2004 Presidential Election, ed. David E. Campbell. Washington, DC: Brookings. Guth, James L. 2007. ‘‘Religion and roll calls: Religious influences on the U.S. House of Representatives, 1997–2002.’’ Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, August 30–September 2. Guth, James L., Lyman A. Kellstedt, Corwin E. Smidt, and John C. Green. 2006. ‘‘Religious influences in the 2004 presidential election.’’ Presidential Studies Quarterly 36, no. 2: 223–42. Henry Institute, 2008. ‘‘Religion and the 2008 election: A pre-election analysis.’’ http://www.calvin.edu/henry/civic/CivicRespGrant/SurveyFindings.htm (accessed November 11, 2008). Hudson, Deal. 2008. ‘‘Catholic Left meets in Philadelphia.’’ http://insidecatholic .com/ (accessed July 22, 2008). Hunter, James D. 1991. Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America. New York: Basic Books. Judis, John B., and Ruy Teixeira. 2002. The Emerging Democratic Majority. New York: Scribner. Kellstedt, Lyman A., Corwin E. Smidt, John C. Green, and James L. Guth. 2007. ‘‘A gentle stream or a ‘river glorious’? The religious left in the 2004 election.’’ Pp. 232–56 in A Matter of Faith: Religion in the 2004 Presidential Election, ed. David E. Campbell. Washington, DC: Brookings. Kengor, Paul. 2007. God and Hillary Clinton: A Spiritual Life. New York: HarperCollins. Kleppner, Paul. 1979. The Third Electoral System, 1853–1892: Parties, Voters, and Political Cultures. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Kristof, Nicholas. 2008. ‘‘The Obama dividend.’’ New York Times, November 6, p. A33. Layman, Geoffrey. 2001. The Great Divide: Religious and Conflict in American Party Politics. New York: Columbia University Press. McFeely, Tom. 2008. ‘‘Rebuking Rudy Giuliani.’’ National Catholic Register, May 11, p.1. MacGillis, Alec. 2007. ‘‘Mormon base a mixed blessing for Romney.’’ Washington Post, April 4, p. A1. Marks, Alexandra. 2007. ‘‘Christopher Dodd: A worldview shaped by his father and fatherhood.’’ Christian Science Monitor, December 27, p. 1. National Catholic Register. 2008. ‘‘The shepherds speak: The bishops weigh in on the election.’’ National Catholic Register, November 2. NCR Staff. 2008. ‘‘Pelosi, Biden hit.’’ National Catholic Reporter, September 19, p. 5. Olasky, Marvin. 2006. ‘‘Cellblock campaign: Sam Brownback.’’ World, December 23, pp. 14–17.

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Pew Forum. 2008a. ‘‘Religion and the remaining primaries.’’ Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, March 7. http://pewforum.org/events/?EventID170tuesday (accessed November 12, 2008). ———. 2008b. ‘‘More Americans question religion’s role in politics.’’ Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, August 21. http://pewforum.org/newassets/images/ reports/summer08/survey.pdf (accessed November 12, 2008). ———. 2008c. ‘‘How church attendance affects religious voting patterns.’’ Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, October 23. http://pewforum.org/docs/?Doc ID364 (accessed November 13, 2008). Pinckney, Darryl. 2008. ‘‘Obama and the black church.’’ New York Review of Books, July 17, pp. 18–21. Rosin, Hanna. 2007. ‘‘Closing the God gap.’’ The Atlantic, January/February, pp. 38–39. Saber, Ariel. 2007. ‘‘John Edwards: Working-class values and a closely held faith.’’ Christian Science Monitor, September 7. Silk, Mark. 2008. ‘‘What we’ll know and when we’ll know it.’’ http://www.spiritual –politics.org/exit polls/ (accessed November 11, 2008). Sullivan, Amy. 2008. The Party Faithful: How and Why Democrats Are Closing the God Gap. New York: Scribner. Vineis, Reid P. 2008. ‘‘God’s own party: The primary field.’’ Religion in the News, 10, no. 3: 6–7. Wallis, Jim. 2008. The Great Awakening: Reviving Faith and Politics in a Post-Religious Right America. New York: HarperOne. Zeleny, Jeff, and Adam Nagourney. 2008. ‘‘An angry Obama renounces ties to his expastor.’’ New York Times, April 30, p. A1. Zeller, Shawn. 2007. ‘‘A crisis of political faith for Evangelicals.’’ CQ Weekly, September 17, pp. 2664–66.

8 Campaign Finance in the 2008 Election Robert G. Boatright

or as long as statistics have been kept on the cost of elections, each presidential election has been more expensive than the one before, and 2008 was no exception. The multicandidate fields in both parties’ presidential primaries, the protracted primary battle between Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton, the large number of competitive congressional races, and the continued success of the parties in expanding their donor bases and hard money receipts all could have been expected to produce an extremely expensive election cycle. Yet the most important developments in 2008 were the maturation of the Internet as a fund-raising tool and the demise of the presidential public financing system. These two factors combined to produce a president who spent over $700 million—over twice what George W. Bush and John Kerry each spent in 2004, and over twice the combined spending of Bush and Gore in 2000. The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971, and FECA’s 1974 and 1976 amendments, created a system of presidential public financing that restrained presidential candidates’ spending from 1976 through 1996. FECA created a tax check-off system in which taxpayers could voluntarily contribute to a fund that would be used to compensate candidates who accepted voluntary spending restrictions. Primary candidates received a dollar-fordollar match for the first $250 of each individual contribution if they agreed to limit their aggregate and per state spending, and if they agreed to limit the amount they contributed or loaned to their own campaigns. General election candidates were offered a flat grant from the government in return for not raising money in the general election. When the act took effect in 1976, the spending limits were $10 million for the primary, $20 million for the general

F

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election, and $50,000 from personal funds. The primary and general election spending limits were subject to a cost-of-living adjustment each election year. By 2008, the limit was $42.05 million in the primary and $84.1 million for the general election. Virtually all candidates accepted primary election matching funds until 2000. In that election, George W. Bush declined matching funds, in part out of confidence that he could raise more money from individual donors than the FECA limits allowed, and in part out of concern that his wealthy primary opponent Steve Forbes would be able to decline matching funds and outspend him. In order to compete with Bush in 2004, Howard Dean and John Kerry also declined matching funds. In 2008, all serious candidates declined matching funds, and Barack Obama became the first candidate to decline public funding in the general election as well. As a consequence, Obama outspent John McCain by a three-to-one margin during the general election. Obama was able to do this in part because of the pent-up frustrations of so many Democratic donors. Obama’s extensive campaign spending, including efforts in states that had not been competitive at the presidential level for decades, also provided a substantial coattail effect. The Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee and the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee were able to direct their resources toward campaigns that few thought would be competitive before the campaign began. The Democrats’ successes in fund-raising and in the election outcome were not solely a result of Obama’s decision. The 2008 election took place in a political climate overwhelmingly favorable to Democrats. Yet the consequences for future elections are clear: public financing is dead, it was killed by the party that created it, and there are few prospects that it will be resuscitated anytime soon.

The Presidential Primaries Public funding played a minimal role in both parties’ primaries. For a system that had flirted with bankruptcy in the 2004 election cycle (Campaign Finance Institute 2003, 47–53; Federal Election Commission 2007b), this was a reprieve—candidates who requested public funds had little doubt that they would receive assistance. As table 8.1 shows, only six candidates qualified for and received matching funds. Only one of these candidates (John Edwards) was widely seen as a candidate with a legitimate chance of winning, and Edwards’s decision to request matching funds was viewed by many as a sign of weakness (Cummings 2007).

Democrats Obama** Clinton Edwards Richardson Dodd Biden Kucinich Vilsack Gravel

184,322,525 59,787,638 53,712,910 34,336,156 23,239,904 15,991,899 3,999,586 3,457,969 2,343,060 966,821 12,740 399,881 349,736

$426,902,991 194,884,422 35,117,984 21,840,190 8,889,085 7,765,311 4,371,915 754,892 486,374

Individual Contributions

Source: Federal Election Commission reports as of September 30.

* This amount includes loans that were eventually repaid. ** Data drawn from September monthly filing (reflecting contributions made through August 31).

219,409,169 108,629,921 57,540,833 34,815,882 24,021,023 16,381,173 8,414,609 4,378,216 3,018,124 1,216,893 620,036 463,065 404,879

$466,783,599 228,143,574 58,382,077 23,564,331 17,262,246 12,260,718 5,498,966 1,024,617 497,490

Candidate

Republicans McCain** Romney Giuliani Paul Thompson, Fred Huckabee Tancredo Brownback Hunter Thompson, Tommy Cox Keyes Gilmore

Adjusted Receipts

453,527

2,145,126

1,961,742 1,992,225 1,070,521

12,882,864

Public Matching Funds

TABLE 8.1 Presidential Primary Receipts

5,001 8,0250

1,274,185 350,802 394,708 18,331 176,555 69,922 9,545 49,735 41,273 10,174

261,479 745,798 215,045 13,950 15,800 451

$600 1,370,329

Political Committee Contributions

2,072,611 575,025 166,000 234,760 600,000 446 34,804

24,036,147 46,683,894 2,738,268

$25,950,000 23,175,000 8,974,714 1,002,300 6,041,816 3,193,613 10,346 148,906 4,415

Transfers/ Loans*

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Few of the candidates were willing to commit themselves to taking the general election grant; many candidates prepared for the general election by soliciting donations of $4,600 during the primary. Candidates who received over $2,300 would put the amount in excess of $2,300 in a separate fund that could only be used when, and if, that candidate accepted his or her party’s nomination. In February 2007, Barack Obama requested an advisory opinion from the FEC stating whether Obama could raise money for the general election but subsequently decide to accept the federal grant for the general election and refund this money to his contributors. In permitting this (Federal Election Commission 2007), the FEC in effect rendered it irresponsible for presidential candidates not to establish general election funds. The practical consequence of this advisory opinion, however, was that the leading primary candidates all had some money that they could not legally spend during the primaries.1 Despite the fact that the initial debates in each party featured a large number of contenders—eight Democrats and ten Republicans—the media quickly sifted the candidates into ‘‘tiers,’’ with three Democrats (Clinton, Edwards, and Obama) and no more than five Republicans (Giuliani, Huckabee, McCain, Romney, and Fred Thompson) considered in the early months of the campaign to be potential winners. These candidates dominated the early fund-raising. As of December 31, 2007, Clinton and Obama had raised nearly $100 million each, far more than any other Democratic candidate would raise over the entire primary season, and more than twice what the leading Democratic candidate at the close of 2003, Howard Dean, had raised (Campaign Finance Institute 2008a). On the Republican side, Mitt Romney was the only candidate keeping pace with Clinton and Obama, having raised $90.1 million, but only $52.5 million of this came in individual contributions; Romney had by this point loaned himself $35.4 million. The other strong Republican contenders had raised between $6 million and $14 million, with one candidate who was never viewed as a serious contender for the nomination, Ron Paul, raising $20 million during 2007. Among Democrats, similar 2007 fund-raising figures for Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama masked differences in the candidates’ fund-raising bases. These differences would play an important role in the candidates’ fortunes as the primary field was winnowed and the race became a protracted twoperson contest. The historical pattern (see, e.g., Busch 2008, 63), has been for the field to be winnowed to a small number of candidates following the Iowa caucus and the New Hampshire primary, and for the race to be all but over following the Super Tuesday primaries. Although the Democratic Party added two primaries, in Nevada and South Carolina, to the calendar before Super Tuesday, many states moved their primaries up, so that on February

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5, twenty states held primaries and two states held caucuses. In comparison, only five primaries and two caucuses were held on February 3, 2004.2 The Clinton strategy had been to amass an early financial advantage, in hopes of resolving the Democratic contest on February 5. During 2007, 50 percent of the funds raised by Clinton had been in amounts of $2,300 (the maximum individual contribution), and 75 percent had been in amounts of over $1,000 (Campaign Finance Institute 2008a). In contrast, only 33 percent of Obama’s 2007 funds came from donors ‘‘maxing out’’; 32 percent of Obama’s funds came in contributions of $200 or less, while 14 percent of Clinton’s funds were in such small amounts. As the contest moved past Super Tuesday, Obama was able to resolicit more donors than could Clinton. Clinton would eventually increase her small-donor fund-raising, but Obama continued to outraise her among small donors in February and March 2008; for instance, Obama raised a total of $56.8 million in February alone, with over half of this amount coming in donations of $200 or less (Campaign Finance Institute 2008b). Clinton raised only $35.8 million during February. The pattern was similar during March. Clinton improved her fund-raising in April, raising $26.3 million in comparison to Obama’s $31.3 million, but by this point Obama had used his fund-raising advantage to build up a delegate lead that would prove insurmountable. Campaign expenditure data reflect the variations in the Obama and Clinton strategies. Clinton spent $4.6 million in Iowa and $2.3 million in New Hampshire, while Obama spent $5.8 million and $2.4 million in the two states.3 Obama outspent Clinton in the Nevada caucus and the South Carolina primary that followed, but both spent comparable amounts in the more competitive Super Tuesday states. For instance, Obama spent $13 million in California to Clinton’s $11 million, and the two divided up many of the states (for instance, with Clinton bypassing Obama’s home state and vice versa) such that each came out of Super Tuesday with a similar number of delegates. In the states voting the week after Super Tuesday, however, Obama outspent Clinton $964,989 to $221,654 in Louisiana, $363,404 to $74,499 in Nebraska, and $1,900,831 to $456,579 in Washington. These disparities would continue in the remaining February primaries. Although Clinton was able to spend extensively in some of the later primaries, she was forced to target individual large states where, even when she won the majority of the votes, she could not substantially cut into Obama’s delegate lead. As table 8.1 shows, Clinton invested a large amount of her own money in her campaign. At the time she suspended her campaign in early June, Clinton had two outstanding loans to her campaign from personal funds, totaling $11.4 million (Luo 2008). Clinton was by no means the only candidate who spent her own money in her campaign, yet the disclosure of her loans, and

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of the candidates’ fund-raising successes or failures, played an important role in campaigning that had not been nearly as evident in elections where candidates accepted matching funds. Federal law requires presidential candidates to disclose their fund-raising totals by month during the election year; the announcements by the Obama and Clinton campaigns in particular, but also by the Republican campaigns, were scrutinized by the media for clues to how candidates would fare in the upcoming months and which candidates were gaining or losing momentum. The timing of these announcements was therefore crucial in setting expectations (see, e.g., Cillizza 2008). It was clear in the Democratic primaries that fund-raising was both a determinant and a consequence of success. For the Republican field, prolific fund-raising and spending did not translate as easily into success at the polls. The first Republican caucus was won by Mike Huckabee, who had campaigned extensively in Iowa but raised only $9 million in 2007 and had not built up a campaign organization in other states. John McCain had raised a substantial amount of money in 2007 ($39.9 million), but his fund-raising had not met the campaign’s expectations, and in November 2007 the campaign had reportedly exhausted its funds and was forced to take out a $3 million loan (Mosk and Cohen 2008). McCain’s fund-raising rebounded after his New Hampshire victory, but he did not outspend his Republican rivals in any of the early contests. Mitt Romney, the best financed of the Republican contenders in 2007 and the first months of 2008, spent lavishly in the Super Tuesday states but still ran behind McCain in most of these states. Rudy Giuliani campaigned extensively in Florida, which held its primary on January 29, but despite matching McCain in spending there (at about $4.3 million), ran slightly behind McCain. The winner-take-all delegate apportionment rules in Florida put a quick end to the Giuliani campaign. Giuliani withdrew immediately after the Florida primary, Romney suspended his campaign after his disappointing Super Tuesday showing, and Huckabee withdrew in early March. At the close of 2007, there were notable contrasts among the leading Republican contenders in the amounts of money they had raised and the sources of their contributions. Mitt Romney at that point had raised more than half of his money from large donors, and had raised a total of 26 percent of his year-end total of $90.1 million (44 percent of individual contributions) from donors who gave the maximum contribution of $2,300 (Campaign Finance Institute 2008a). Rudy Giuliani had raised $56.1 million at this point, over half of which was from $2,300 donors. John McCain at that point had raised 62 percent of his money from large donors and 35 percent from donors who ‘‘maxed out.’’ These totals were far smaller than those of Clinton and Obama, and they were smaller than either candidate had expected. Rom-

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ney was able to draw on his own funds in order to compensate for any shortfalls, but McCain was not. As evidence, however, that early fund-raising would not correlate with success in the early primaries, the third-largest total, and the second-largest in the closing three months of 2007, belonged to Ron Paul, who raised $28.2 million in 2007, $19.9 million of which arrived in the fourth quarter of the year and over $10 million of which arrived in two days of aggressive on-line fund-raising. Paul also was far more successful among small donors, raising 61 percent of this money from donors of $200 or less. Paul’s campaign was in many ways reminiscent of the Howard Dean campaign; Paul himself appears to have played less of a role in raising money than did enthusiastic supporters. Romney’s departure from the race in early February ensured that any further funds raised by McCain could be used to position him for the general election. As of the end of February, McCain had raised $62.9 million and spent $58.4 million (Campaign Finance Institute 2008b). He would go on to raise a total of $219.4 million by the end of August, so roughly $161 million was available to be spent to position McCain for the general election. These were large numbers, certainly larger than George W. Bush had posted in 2000 or 2004, but although McCain’s monthly totals in the spring were comparable to those of Obama and Clinton, he raised much less money during the summer, leading many observers to point to this disparity as evidence of a lack of enthusiasm for McCain on the part of Republican donors. The 2008 presidential primaries clearly showed that the Internet had matured as a means of raising money. Candidates are not required to divulge how much of their money is raised online, but several candidates held oneday fund-raising events on their websites and publicly disclosed the results. Obama, for instance, raised $4 million online on February 6, the day after the Super Tuesday primaries (Mosk 2008a). Ron Paul raised $4.3 million on November 5, 2007, and raised $6 million on December 16, 2007 (Vargas 2007). The Internet allowed presidential candidates to take advantage of campaign events, electoral successes or defeats, or impending filing deadlines to raise money as a sign of strength. In contrast to prior elections, such events also allowed for the money raised to be available to the candidate instantly. Online fund-raising was thus valuable not only in itself, but also for the publicity it generated. The unprecedented spending by the primary candidates, and the fact that the leading primary candidates did not accept limitations on their spending, reduced the effect of direct contributions by groups to the candidates, and the effect of independent spending during the primaries. The only 527 group that sought to play a major role in the primaries was an organization called the American Leadership Project (ALP), formed in late February to serve as

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a vehicle to air advertisements helping the Clinton campaign in the Ohio and Pennsylvania primaries. ALP spent $3.4 million, almost all of which was on television advertising. ALP emerged at a time when the Clinton campaign was struggling to remain financially competitive and many of Clinton’s supporters were unable to contribute more to her campaign. There were, however, no 527 groups that sought to play a national role during the primaries. Obama and McCain continued to raise and spend money during the socalled ‘‘bridge period’’ after primary competition had ended but before the party conventions, with Obama maintaining a decisive edge. Although Obama’s spending slowed down during May, his contributions surged in June following Hillary Clinton’s departure from the race. In June, Obama raised $52.0 million compared to McCain’s $21.5 million. Obama, who intended to decline public funds for the general election, began to raise money for the general election—that is, he resolicited donors who had maxed out in their primary contributions and directed their money toward his general election fund. Because McCain intended to accept the federal grant, donors now had more of an incentive to give to the RNC. In July, McCain raised $27 million and the RNC raised $26 million (Mosk 2008b). The DNC, which had been substantially outraised by the RNC during the first half of 2008, as Democratic donors chose between Clinton and Obama rather than giving to the DNC, raised $27 million in July while Obama raised $52 million. Obama raised $66 million in August to McCain’s $47 million, but the RNC raised $23 million during that time to the DNC’s $19.9 million. The Democrats maintained a slight edge in their monthly fund-raising during the summer, but because the RNC had outraised the DNC during the spring, the Republicans maintained an advantage through the summer in cash on hand. Obama and the DNC and McCain and the RNC, then, were roughly at parity in terms of their funds and their spending during the months preceding the conventions.

The Presidential General Election Campaign When Obama decided on June 19 to decline public financing for the general election, there was no reason to be certain that he could raise more than the $84 million that McCain would receive in public funds, and it was not clear that he could do so without taking his attention away from campaigning in battleground states in order to hold fund-raisers in donor-rich but uncompetitive states such as California or New York. In announcing his decision to decline public funds, Obama argued that ‘‘the public financing of presidential elections as it exists today is broken, and we face opponents who’ve

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become masters at gaming this broken system’’ (Murray and Bacon 2008). He went on to argue that if he accepted public funds he would be at a disadvantage since Republicans would benefit from independent spending on their behalf, and reiterated an argument he had been making since April that his small donor base constituted a ‘‘parallel public financing system’’ (Tapper 2008). Table 8.2 shows the difference in funds raised by Obama and McCain during the primary and the general election. As was the case in the primary, monthly fund-raising numbers are critical to understanding the dynamic nature of the campaign and the ways in which expectations about the candidates’ strategies continually changed. Even as late as September many Washington insiders were skeptical that Obama’s gamble would pay off; the announcement in early October that he had raised $151 million during September surprised many. The pace and urgency of Obama’s e-mailed fundraising pitches did increase during the general election, and according to many accounts he did come to rely more on large donors during the general election than he had during the primary (Campaign Finance Institute 2008f). Because Obama made his announcement well before the convention, he was able to raise $41.9 million in general election funds by the end of August. This amount, however, reflects the contributions of donors who had given the maximum primary contribution; it was not clear that Obama’s small donors would continue to give or that he would attract new donors. The fact that he clearly was successful on both counts shows how difficult it has become to predict fund-raising success now that so much campaigning takes place online. TABLE 8.2 Presidential General Election Receipts Obama

McCain*

Total (General Election and Primary) Adjusted Receipts Individual Contributions Transfers/Loans Public Funds

764,843,332 656,610,810 83,450,000 —

314,147,978 191,337,040 26,613,783 84,103,800

General Election Adjusted Receipts Individual Contributions Public Funds

298,059,733 229,707,819 —

84,103,800 — 84,103,800

* Statistics include only candidates’ principal campaign committees; they do not include GELAC or other committee funds. If one includes these committees, McCain raised approximately $367 million. Source: Federal Election Commission, post-general reports as of November 24.

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A piece of conventional wisdom within the 2004 Howard Dean campaign was that e-mailed fund-raising pitches had to be mixed with e-mails discussing campaign events or soliciting feedback from supporters; otherwise, donors would eventually tune out the campaign’s e-mails (Teachout 2006). Although virtually all e-mails from the Obama campaign during the general election were requests for funds, some election retrospectives have emphasized the importance of campaign manager David Plouffe’s decidedly lowtech videos describing campaign strategy (Lizza 2008). These videos, which were embedded in fund-raising e-mails, provided information to all supporters that was likely comparable to what was being said to large donors at fundraising dinners. Contemporaneous articles highlighted the frugality of the campaign and the campaign’s reliance on volunteers, in-kind contributions, and small per diem payments to temporary campaign workers (Luo and McIntire 2008). This does not by any means indicate that large donors did not play a role in Obama’s campaign (see Luo and Drew 2008) or in providing support for the DNC, but the narrative accepted by the media was that Obama’s campaign was driven by small donors. John McCain’s campaign followed a more traditional route in raising funds during the general election. McCain himself was limited to the federal grant, but as had been the case for nominees in past elections, McCain had established an array of joint fund-raising committees, which distributed money to the RNC, to McCain’s primary fund, to the McCain-Palin compliance committee, and to various state parties. The largest of these, McCain Victory 2008, raised $75.8 million and transferred $66.2 million of this amount to party committees. The campaign also established seven state-level victory funds. Obama also established joint fund-raising committees, but because Obama could continue to raise money during the general election and thus had less need to divert funds to party committees, these committees were smaller than those established on the Republican side (Luo and Palmer 2008). One analysis of spending over the summer estimated that joint fundraising committees associated with McCain had distributed at least $11 million to state parties during the summer, and that as of the beginning of the general election campaign the RNC held a $76.5 million to $17.7 million edge over the DNC in cash on hand (Campaign Finance Institute 2008g). If one looks at aggregate expenditures, Obama and the DNC spent $131 million during the crucial first half of October, nearly twice what McCain and the RNC spent (Campaign Finance Institute 2008h). The Democratic advantage was evident in field operations—Obama maintained 700 field offices during the general election campaign while McCain maintained only 400, and most accounts indicated that the Obama offices were better staffed and equipped than were McCain’s (Luo and McIntire 2008). Obama appears

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to have outspent McCain by at least a four-to-one margin, and perhaps as much as a twenty-to-one margin, on Internet advertising. Obama and the DNC also spent far more on television advertising than did McCain and the RNC. As of October 31, the Obama campaign estimated that it had spent a total of $280 million on television (Luo and McIntire 2008). During the final two weeks of October, the Obama campaign extended its advantage even further, outspending McCain by a three-to-one margin on television advertising (Wisconsin Advertising Project 2008). Obama outspent McCain by substantial margins in virtually every battleground state, and he outspent McCain by a four-to-one margin in battleground states that had been won by Bush in 2004 (Wisconsin Advertising Project 2008). Obama also was able to spend over $3 million on a nationally broadcast infomercial on October 29. The Obama campaign’s fund-raising pitches continued until the Sunday before the election, and allowed the campaign to make last-minute advertising purchases in states that had not previously been viewed as battlegrounds, such as Montana and Arizona. Obama’s fears about spending by outside groups or the parties were unrealized. Although the RNC outpaced the DNC, this was largely a consequence of the fact that much of the Obama money was clearly money that would have gone to the DNC had Obama not been able to raise money during the general election. And outside groups were largely irrelevant; no significant pro-McCain 527 group emerged, and total advertising expenditures by 527s, PACs, and other outside groups were dwarfed by the candidates’ spending. In the third week of October, for instance, groups supporting McCain outspent Obama supporters by a four-to-one margin, $1.8 million to $429,000, but this was a paltry sum compared to the $21 million spent that week by Obama (Wisconsin Advertising Project 2008). In only two states, Ohio and Virginia, did anti-Obama spending by outside groups exceed $200,000 that week, while Obama was spending $2 million or more in each state on ads. If any candidate benefited from outside spending, it was Obama; while business groups spent heavily on some congressional races, they spent little on the presidential race while estimates of spending by organized labor on the 2008 election ran as high as $250 million (Wayne 2008). By any measure, what had appeared to be a slight tilt toward Obama in campaign funding became more pronounced as the general election went on.

Congressional Elections The 2008 congressional elections also were influenced by Democratic fundraising successes. While the presidential race featured an imbalance in candi-

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date spending, however, the ability of the Democrats to increase their majorities by twenty seats in the House and seven seats in the Senate was a consequence of spending by the party campaign committees. As discussed later in this chapter, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee and the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee outraised their Republican counterparts, and they used this edge to assist challengers and open seat candidates. As tables 8.3 and 8.4 show, Republican Senate incumbents outraised Democratic Senate incumbents, and House incumbents of the two parties were roughly equal in their fund-raising. In races targeted by the party committees, Republican incumbents narrowly outraised their challengers, but party independent expenditures more than made up for these gaps. Independent expenditures by the DSCC were more than twice as large in these races as were those of the NRSC, and the DCCC spent $400,000 more, on average, in competitive House races where both committees were active. Moreover, the DCCC engaged in independent spending in sixty-four races, while the NRCC was active in only thirty-five races. The DCCC spent over $1 million in thirty-eight House races, winning twenty-five of these, while the NRCC spent over $1 million in only four races (Campaign Finance Institute 2008f). House Campaigns It was apparent to both parties early in the cycle that Democratic candidates would be ‘‘on offense,’’ a highly unusual pattern for a party that gained as many seats in the previous election as the Democrats had. By late 2007, Democratic incumbents had raised 29 percent more money than Republican incumbents (Campaign Finance Institute 2008e). As had been the norm in recent election cycles, incumbents of both parties were encouraged to raise money for their Leadership PACs and to donate campaign funds to their party campaign committees. The 2008 congressional elections were not, however, more expensive by any measure than the 2006 races; as of late October 2008, the average House incumbent had raised $1,272,372, only $2,000 more than in 2006. This slowed a decade-long rise in the cost of elections; in 2000, for instance, the average incumbent raised $885,620. Spending by victorious challengers and open seat candidates, likewise, was not substantially different in 2008 than it had been in 2006 (Campaign Finance Institute 2008f). Democratic incumbents, challengers, and open seat candidates maintained an advantage over Republicans in their PAC receipts, but again, PAC contributions were not substantially larger than they had been in 2006. One can classify competitive House races into three types. First, the Democrats, having gained a substantial number of seats and a majority in 2006,

Number of Candidates

228 144 33

175 139 33

403 283 66

All House Campaigns

Democrats Incumbents Challengers Open Seats

Republicans Incumbents Challengers Open Seats

Totals Incumbents Challengers Open Seats

1,272,372 510,032 1,383,147

1,232,260 461,608 1,290,610

1,303,160 556,773 1,475,684

Net Receipts

650,791 340,787 824,151

665,861 295,321 796,688

639,224 384,674 851,615

Individual Contributions

579,548 67,479 280,567

512,914 48,447 204,929

630,692 85,849 356,204

PAC Contributions

1,580 31,777 92,638

3,422 49,796 6,429

166 14,384 178,846

Candidate Contributions

2,410 63,725 174,703

4,022 61,483 268,742

1,171 65,888 8,0664

Candidate Loans

25,855 3,691 667

26,052 2,903 455

25,704 4,452 879

Transfers/ Noncandidate Loans

TABLE 8.3 Mean House of Representatives Campaign Receipts (Major Party General Election Candidates Only)

16 28 20

28 16 20

44 44 40

Democrats Incumbents Challengers Open Seats

Republicans Incumbents Challengers Open Seats

Totals Incumbents Challengers Open Seats

2,034,175 1,674,320 1,656,304

1,987,015 1,616,181 1,586,084

2,116,707 1,707,542 1,726,524

Net Receipts

1,132,695 1,224,258 1,040,127

1,151,111 1,251,589 983,634

1,100,468 1,208,640 1,096,620

Individual Contributions

Source: Federal Election Commission Pre-General Filings, October 15

Number of Candidates

Targeted House Campaigns

852,911 278,038 387,911

783,709 205,048 274,130

974,014 319,746 501,692

PAC Contributions

473 19,423 4,661

71 8,123 4,694

1,179 25,880 4,628

Candidate Contributions

TABLE 8.3 (Continued)

2,727 136,507 208,407

0 128,489 305,039

7,500 141,088 111,775

Candidate Loans

16,774 11,740 1,100

9,921 14,202 750

28,661 9,762 1,450

Transfers/ Noncandidate Loans

784,583 (33) 997,266 (37) 1,214,645 (29)

684,688 (17) 600,783 (9) 634,407 (9)

890,723 (16) 1,124,707 (28) 1,475,751 (20)

Party Independent Spending (N of races)

Number of Candidates

12 17 5

18 9 5

30 26 10

All Senate Campaigns

Democrats Incumbents Challengers Open Seats

Republicans Incumbents Challengers Open Seats

Totals Incumbents Challengers Open Seats

6,285,972 2,916,340 5,026,585

6,756,801 1,145,419 3,614,378

5,579,728 3,853,886 6,438,792

Net Receipts

4,130,433 2,313,333 3,964,541

4,479,980 841,297 2,691,913

3,606,111 3,092,647 5,237,168

Individual Contributions

1,784,683 239,003 906,452

1,889,366 75,764 778,939

1,627,657 325,423 1,033,964

PAC Contributions

121,667 40,180 930

6,948 170 940

383 61,361 920

Candidate Contributions

575 87,935 88,000

166,667 209,324 116,000

54,167 23,671 60,000

Candidate Loans

1,867,483 228,954 19,600

13,131 311 15,200

188,741 350,000 24,000

Transfers/ Noncandidate Loans

TABLE 8.4 Mean Senate Campaign Receipts (Major Party General Election Candidates Only)

1 9 3

9 1 3

10 10 6

Democrats Incumbents Challengers Open Seats

Republicans Incumbents Challengers Open Seats

Totals Incumbents Challengers Open Seats

8,794,223 6,016,745 6,843,116

8,848,484 3,781,401 3,949,171

8,305,872 6,265,116 9,737,060

Net Receipts

5,928,400 4,773,091 5,630,903

5,947,590 3,272,697 3,295,399

5,755,695 4,939,802 7,966,406

Individual Contributions

Source: Federal Election Commission, Pre-General Filings, October 15.

Number of Candidates

Targeted Senate Campaigns

2,289,317 509,573 1,090,590

2,280,619 447,675 583,141

2,367,601 516,450 1,598,038

PAC Contributions

12,255 102,212 1,533

13,617 0 1,533

0 113,569 1,533

Candidate Contributions

TABLE 8.4 (Continued)

300,000 35,000 16,666

333,333 0 33,333

0 38,889 0

Candidate Loans

12,667 595,000 32,667

15,129 0 25,333

500 661,111 40,000

Transfers/ Noncandidate Loans

3,089,508 (10) 6,761,406 (10) 1,704,477 (5)

3,303,082 (9) 3,167,602 (1) 1,783,332 (2)

1,167,344 (1) 7,160,718 (9) 1,651,908 (3)

Party Independent Spending (N of races)

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had to defend their newly acquired seats in 2008, in some cases against the same incumbents they had ousted in the previous election. Second, several Democratic challengers who were narrowly defeated in the 2006 election ran again, and some Republicans who had narrowly won in 2006 faced higher quality challengers than they had in 2006. And third, anticipating that they would not regain the majority quickly, many senior Republicans retired in 2008, putting formerly safe seats in play. It was in these races that the successes of Democrats, the DCCC, and the DSCC are most evident. The Republican Party did not field competitive challengers to several newly elected Democrats, but in elections that were competitive, both candidate and party fund-raising gave Democrats an advantage. In California’s Eleventh District, for instance, first-term Democrat Jerry McNerney raised $2.8 million, more than twice what his challenger raised, and in New Hampshire’s First District, Carol Shea-Porter, who had raised the least money of any successful 2006 challenger, raised $1.3 million, $200,000 more than her challenger, and the DCCC spent an additional $2.4 million in her race, as compared to only $646,000 spent in the race by the NRCC. All four of the seats gained by Republicans were in races against first-term Democrats, but money was not a factor in these races; Democratic incumbents outraised their challengers in all of these races, sometimes by healthy margins. Democrats who were narrowly defeated in 2006 also saw an increase in their own fund-raising, but they saw an even larger increase in party spending. Although this did not always translate into victory, it was one area in which differences between the parties were most pronounced. In North Carolina’s Eighth District, for instance, Democrat Larry Kissell was substantially outraised by Republican incumbent Robin Hayes in both elections, but Kissell’s strong showing in 2006 likely prompted the DCCC’s commitment of $2.4 million to the race. The NRCC’s lack of funds forced the party to abandon or limit support of several Republican incumbents who had narrowly won in 2006, including Hayes and Colorado representative Marilyn Musgrave; both candidates lost their reelection bids. Finally, Democrats maintained a slight edge in candidate spending in competitive open seat races but a substantial edge in party spending in these races. All but six of the thirty-three open seats in 2008 were in Republican districts. Of the twenty competitive open seat contests, seventeen were for Republican seats, so the fact that Democratic candidates in these races raised more money and received more party money is noteworthy. One analysis of NRCC support in these races speculated that the party failed to fund many promising open seat candidates in 2008 in order to save its money for incumbents (O’Connor and Kraushaar 2008). An example of this was the race in Minnesota’s Third District, a seat held for over a decade by moderate Repub-

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lican Jim Ramstad. The NRCC publicly canceled independent expenditures on behalf of the Republican candidate, Erik Paulson, ensuring that although Paulson would maintain a narrow lead in his own fund-raising, the DCCC would outspend the NRCC by over $1.5 million in this race (although Paulson eventually won). Senate Campaigns Because elections were held for twenty-two Republican seats, as opposed to only twelve Democratic seats, the Senate, like the House, was viewed as a venue for Democratic gains. Thus, while Republican incumbents slightly outraised Democratic incumbents, they needed the money more, and Democratic challengers raised over three times as much as Republican challengers. Eight Senate candidates—five incumbents, two open seat candidates, and one challenger—raised over $10 million, and the DSCC spent over $10 million in two races. Two of these Senate incumbents, John Kerry and John Cornyn, were not running in competitive races. In the three competitive open seat races, the competition for funds was not even close. In the race for the open Virginia seat, Democrat Mark Warner outspent Republican nominee James Gilmore $12.8 million to $2.2 million, and Democrats Mark Udall (in Colorado) and Tom Udall (in New Mexico) each outspent their opponents by over $3 million. The late DSCC push to expand the Democratic majority to a filibuster-proof sixty seats led the party to commit funds late to challengers who had been substantially outraised for much of the cycle. For instance, North Carolina Democratic challenger Kay Hagan was outspent by Republican incumbent Elizabeth Dole, $15.5 million to $6.7 million, but the DSCC spent $11.6 million on the race, as compared to $5.8 million by the NRSC. Similar patterns emerged in Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, and Oregon, though of those four the Democrats only won the Oregon seat. In the most expensive Senate race of the cycle, Democrat Al Franken’s challenge to incumbent Minnesota Republican Norm Coleman, combined candidate and party spending was over $20 million on each side. Joint fund-raising committees were established in several of these races to coordinate contributions to the parties and candidates. For both House and Senate campaigns, the effect of spending by the Obama campaign may have also supplemented the spending by Democratic candidates or compensated for any shortfalls in Democratic fund-raising. To take the Senate as one example, five of the seven states picked up by Democrats (Colorado, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, and Virginia) were considered to be competitive in the presidential race, and the Obama campaign spent a substantial amount of money in each. Conversely, none of the four states in which competitive Democratic challengers fell short

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(Georgia, Kentucky, Maine, and Mississippi) were states where Obama spent very much time or money. A similar pattern holds for the outcome of competitive House races. Candidate self-funding looked much as it had in previous elections (as described by Steen 2006). Twenty-four candidates contributed or loaned (without reimbursement) $1 million or more to their campaigns. Only one of these candidates, Elizabeth Dole, was an incumbent, and only three of these candidates were victorious. Eight of these candidates did not even win their primaries. Yet a more modest degree of self-financing was an important part of several challengers’ and open seats candidates’ victories—an additional eleven successful candidates, two of them incumbents, contributed or loaned more than $200,000 to their campaigns. The explosion in small contributions in the presidential race did not occur in congressional races. One analysis of contributions through March 31, 2008, noted that less than 10 percent of the money raised by congressional candidates came in amounts of $200 or less (Campaign Finance Institute 2008d). This speaks in part to the difficulty of using the Internet as a fundraising tool in congressional elections; on-line fund-raising sites such as ActBlue aside, voters are more likely to search out well-known candidates, and few congressional candidates are particularly well known.

Party Campaign Committees Table 8.5 compares the funds raised by each of the six major committees. As the discussion above indicates, the Democratic congressional party committees handily outraised their Republican counterparts, both in individual contributions and PAC contributions. The Republican Party had an edge in overall party spending, but this was largely a consequence of John McCain’s reliance on public funds during the general election. The parties also differed in their cash on hand as of the beginning of the general election campaign; at the congressional level, the Republican committees entered September at a greater financial disadvantage compared to their Democratic counterparts than the aggregate figures show. The reverse was true for the RNC and the DNC; in following through on his ‘‘fifty state strategy,’’ DNC Chairman Howard Dean spent a far larger percentage of his committee’s money in 2007 and early 2008 than did the RNC. While there has been much discussion of the merits of this strategy, the RNC clearly was able to play a far larger financial role during September and October than was the DNC. The DNC also took out several loans during the final weeks of the campaign, incurring an estimated $15 million in debt (Falcone 2008).

336,703,654 78,247,628 103,858,395 518,809,677

Republicans RNC NRSC NRCC Total 280,607,914 68,494,233 91,812,167 440,914,314

198,786,077 113,566,728 111,544,761 423,897,566

Net Expenditures

Source: Federal Election Commission Pre-General Filings, October 15.

206,087,432 121,862,517 134,112,710 462,062,659

Democrats DNC DSCC DCCC Total

Receipts

245,698,146 63,032,705 69,266,078 377,996,929

117,981,798 95,329,809 84,258,657 297,570,264

Individual Contributions

5,331,377 1,520,646 2,241,572 9,093,595

68,325 2,566,860 898,241 3,533,426

Coordinated Expenditures

TABLE 8.5 Party Campaign Committee Receipts and Expenditures

19,228,836 20,838,887 12,972,894 53,040,617

1,104,115 41,405,612 37,698,633 80,208,360

Independent Expenditures

25,456,534 1,890,683 2,857,256 30,204,473

68,709,212 17,387,628 10,968,728 97,065,568

Transfers to Other Committees

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Party finance figures for 2008 continued a pattern established during the early 2000s. After the passage of BCRA, many within the Democratic Party had feared that the bill’s prohibition on soft money contributions to the parties would put Democratic Party committees at a disadvantage. The Republican Party has traditionally outraised the Democratic Party in hard money contributions, and during the 1990s the Democratic Party had relied on soft money to achieve parity with the Republican Party. These predictions did not come to pass in the 2004 or 2006 elections; the DNC raised less than the RNC during each of these elections, but the imbalance was not as large as some had feared, and the DSCC outraised the NRSC during each of these elections. The year 2008 was the first election year since 1992 that the DCCC outraised the NRCC; this was likely a function in part of the Democratic Party’s redoubled efforts to court small donors, and in part a function of the fact that the majority party traditionally raises more PAC money than the minority party. The amount of money raised by the DCCC and the DSCC remained about the same as it had been in 2006, but NRCC fund-raising plummeted from approximately $180 million raised in 2004 and 2006 to $103 million, and NRSC fund-raising remained constant at approximately $80 million across each of these three cycles. DCCC spending had increased in 2006 to $139 million, up from $93 million in 2004.

Conclusions The year 2008 was a turning point for the American campaign finance system. It is clear that the presidential public financing system no longer serves a purpose in primary or general elections. Many proposals for reforming the primary matching fund system have consisted of some combination of increases in the aggregate spending limit, an abandonment of the state-bystate spending limits, or an increase in the match for small contributions. The leading proposal of this sort during 2007 was the Presidential Funding Act, sponsored by senator Russell Feingold. While this act, and other, earlier proposed reforms might have been effective in restraining spending or leveling the playing field in 2000 or 2004, it is not clear that they would have made a difference in 2008; even a substantial increase in what candidates could spend would have fallen far short of what Obama and Clinton raised. And no proposals had circulated prior to 2008 that would have changed the system for public financing in the general election. Ironically, Obama and Clinton were both cosponsors of the Presidential Funding Act. Had this bill been in place in 2008, it seems unlikely that the playing field would have

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been more even than it was, or that Clinton, McCain, or Obama would have accepted public funds. The 2008 election made it clear that Internet fund-raising has changed the way campaigns are financed, at least at the presidential level. The presidential public financing system was successful in equalizing candidate spending for twenty years largely because fund-raising techniques did not change as dramatically during the 1980s and 1990s as they have over the past three presidential election cycles. The restrictions on party and group spending implemented as part of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002 have also not restrained spending in part because this was not their primary intent, but in part because it was unclear at the time that the Internet would bring about the dramatic increase in small donors seen in the past two elections. Many analyses of the McCain campaign have commented on the irony of the fact that McCain, a longtime advocate of campaign finance reform and public funding, was forced to decline matching funds in the primary and was put at a disadvantage because he took public funds in the general election. BCRA, McCain’s signature achievement in reforming campaign spending, had little direct effect on his campaign’s fortunes in 2008, but one legacy of the 2008 campaign may be an abandonment of further efforts to restrain candidates’ spending. For the moment, the Democratic Party, and Democratic candidates, are the clear beneficiaries of the maturation of the Internet as a fund-raising medium. It is an open question whether this will continue. Some have argued that small donors, and Internet users, are more likely to be Democrats, and that Republicans will have a difficult time replicating the success of the Obama campaign or reaching parity with the Democratic Party committees. Others have argued that fund-raising innovations are cyclical, that out parties tend to develop new methods of raising money because they have to, and that the Republican Party may struggle in the short term but will eventually develop a new means of raising money (Salan 2008). It may be that the backlash against George W. Bush and congressional Republicans hit at just the right time for Democrats to cash in, or it may be that there is something about the nature of the Democratic Party and liberal activists that lends itself to Internet politics. What is clear, however, is that the Democratic Party, which has pushed for more restrictions on campaign spending for the past decade, might have ideological reasons to favor spending restrictions but it currently has no strategic reasons to favor them. Notes 1. General election funds are not shown in table 8.1. 2. 2004’s Super Tuesday was not held until March 2; ten primaries and two caucuses were held on this date.

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3. These figures are meant to be indicative of the ratio of spending; they do not include all spending within a state. For instance, a vendor in one state can receive money to do work in another state, but the FEC expenditure reports list the address of the vendor, not the place where the money is spent.

References Busch, Andrew E. 2008. ‘‘The Reemergence of the Iowa Caucuses: A New Trend, an Aberration, or a Useful Reminder?’’ In William G. Mayer, ed., The Making of the Presidential Candidates. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 39–74. Campaign Finance Institute. 2003. Participation, Competition, and Engagement: How to Revive and Improve Public Funding for Presidential Nomination Politics. Washington, DC: Campaign Finance Institute. ———. 2008a. ‘‘Newly Released 2007 Reports Give Clues to Candidates’ Financial Strengths and Vulnerabilities Going into Super Tuesday.’’ Washington, DC: Campaign Finance Institute. ———. 2008b. ‘‘February Fundraising Frenzy for Presidential Candidates.’’ Washington, DC: Campaign Finance Institute. ———. 2008c. ‘‘March Presidential Fundraising: Small Donations Fueled Democrats, Large Donations Republicans.’’ Washington, DC: Campaign Finance Institute. ———. 2008d. ‘‘Small Donors Not a Factor in House Races, Democrats Maintain Financial Lead.’’ Washington, DC: Campaign Finance Institute. ———. 2008e. ‘‘House Incumbents Hold an Early Financial Advantage in Critical 2008 Matchups.’’ Washington, DC: Campaign Finance Institute. ———. 2008f. ‘‘A First Look at Money in the House and Senate Elections.’’ Washington, DC: Campaign Finance Institute. ———. 2008g. ‘‘After Holding Financial Advantage in Primaries, Obama Likely to Achieve Only Parity with McCain in General Election.’’ Washington, DC: Campaign Finance Institute. ———. 2008h. ‘‘CFI Analysis of Presidential Candidates’ Financial Activity through October 15: McCain Outspent 2-1 by Obama in First Half of October, but Appears Financially Competitive in the Last 20 Days of the Election.’’ Washington, DC: Campaign Finance Institute. Cillizza, Chris. 2008. ‘‘Obama’s $40 Million Haul (And What It Means).’’ The Trail: Washington Post Politics Blog, April 3. http://blog.washingtonpost.com/thefix/ 2008/04/obamas_40_million_haul_and_wha.html. Cummings, Jeanne. 2007. ‘‘Edwards Had to Accept Matching Funds.’’ Politico, September 27. http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0907/6067.html. ———. 2008. ‘‘McCain Exits Campaign Money Race.’’ Politico, April 21. http:// www.politico.com/news/stories/0408/9737.html. Falcone, Michael. 2008. ‘‘Plouffe Makes Appeal to Retire DNC Debt.’’ The Caucus: The New York Times Politics Blog, November 12. http://thecaucus.blogs .nytimes.com/ 2008/11/12/plouffe-makes-appeal-to-retire-dnc-debt/. Federal Election Commission. 2007. Advisory Opinion 2007-03. Request from Senator Barack Obama and Obama Exploratory Committee. March 1.

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Lizza, Ryan. 2008. ‘‘Battle Plans: Finding the Right Way to Run.’’ The New Yorker, November 17, pp. 46–55. Luo, Michael. 2008. ‘‘For Clinton, Millions in Debt and Few Options.’’ The New York Times, June 10. Luo, Michael, and Christopher Drew. 2008. ‘‘Big Dollar Donors and Major Force in Obama Campaign.’’ New York Times, August 6. Luo, Michael, and Griff Palmer. 2008. ‘‘In Fine Print, a Proliferation of Large Donors.’’ New York Times, October 20. Luo, Michael, and Mike McIntire. 2008. ‘‘With Ambitious Campaign, Obama Is Both Big Spender and Penny Pincher.’’ New York Times, October 31. Mosk, Matthew. 2007. ‘‘As Primaries Begin, FEC Will Shut Down.’’ Washington Post, December 22, p. A1. ———. 2008a. ‘‘Internet Donors Fuel Obama.’’ The Trail: Washington Post Politics Blog, February 7. http://blog.washingtonpost.com/the-trail/2008/02/07/obama_ fundraising_strength_com.html. ———. 2008b. ‘‘McCain Has Top Fundraising Month.’’ Washington Post, August 16, p. A5. Mosk, Matthew, and Sarah Cohen. 2008. ‘‘With Crucial Loan, McCain Put His Bid Back in the Black.’’ Washington Post, February 1, p. A1. O’Connor, Patrick, and Josh Kraushaar. 2008. ‘‘GOP Ditches Recruits to Save Incumbents.’’ Politico, October 14. Salan, Reihan. 2008. ‘‘Planting the Rightroots.’’ Atlantic Monthly, October. Steen, Jennifer. 2006. ‘‘Self-Financed Candidates and the ‘Millionaire’s Amendment.’ ’’ In Michael J. Malbin, ed., The Election After Reform. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 204–18. Tapper, Jake. 2008. ‘‘Obama Prepares Argument to Discard Public Financing Principle.’’ ABC News Blog, April 8. http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2008/04/ obama-prepares.html. Teachout, Zephyr. 2006. ‘‘Powering Up Internet Campaigns.’’ In Matthew R. Kerbel, ed., Get This Party Started: How Progressives Can Fight Back and Win. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 151–64. Vargas, Jose Antonio. 2007. ‘‘Ron Paul Beats Own Fundraising Record.’’ The Trail: Washington Post Politics Blog, December 17. Wayne, Leslie. 2008. ‘‘Democratic Groups Turn to Foot Soldiers.’’ New York Times, September 21. Wisconsin Advertising Project. 2008. ‘‘Obama Outspending McCain 3 to 1 on TV; Nearly 75% of Presidential Ad Spending in Red States.’’ Madison: Wisconsin Advertising Project.

9 The Meaning of the 2008 Election Nicol C. Rae

n the aftermath of a U.S. presidential election political commentators are generally prone to exaggerate its significance. This is particularly so when the outcome of the election represents an apparent break with the preceding election or sequence of elections in terms of the balance of partisan support. When the newly elected president comes from a racial minority that has suffered oppression and discrimination for most of U.S. history, the tendency to overstate the significance of the election is probably even greater. By the nature of their academic disciplines, political scientists and historians are obliged to place an individual presidential election in the perspective of longer-term developments and are likely to be skeptical regarding claims of an electoral ‘‘mandate’’ and more circumspect in their conclusions as to that election’s importance. This essay on the 2008 election, written just weeks after the election and with the future shape of American political developments obviously unclear, is thus an admittedly premature effort to place the recent electoral triumph of Barack Obama and the Democratic Party in the context of the wide sweep of American political history and social, economic, and political developments in American politics over the past quarter century. With these caveats in mind, I argue that the 2008 election may be highly significant from three distinct perspectives: the election of an African American to the presidency of the United States, the evolution of the presidential selection process, and, finally, as a possible indicator of major political change. Given the tortured history of slavery and race relations in the United States, the election of a president with an African father and a white American mother is obviously momentous in terms of America’s view of itself and perceptions of America from abroad. The 2008 election was also notable in

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terms of several new developments in the presidential selection process, specifically: the renewed importance of grassroots campaign organization in the Democratic nominating campaign, the ability of the Obama primary and general election campaigns to raise vast sums of money through small donations transmitted via the Internet, the recognition of the latter as a major campaign medium by the candidates and the news media, and the final demise of the post-1974 presidential campaign financing regime. Finally, arguments are already appearing that the 2008 election marks a major partisan and policy shift in the United States, with the end of the Reagan era of limited government and the possibility that president Barack Obama may be the architect of a new political era (Smith 2008). Each of these perspectives will be examined more closely in the following three sections of this chapter.

The 2008 Election and America There can be no question that the election of an African American to the nation’s most powerful and symbolic political office is a major development in the history of the United States. In the year of Barack Obama’s birth— 1961—African Americans still endured segregation and electoral disfranchisement in many of the southern states. A century prior to his birth they were still largely enslaved. Since Dr. Johnson’s famous quip during the American Revolution—‘‘How is it that we hear the loudest yelps for liberty among the drivers of negroes?’’ (Oxford University Press 1985, 282)—the issue of race relations has nagged at the conscience of the American Republic. Negro slavery nearly tore the United States in two during the 1860s in a brutal civil war that the nation barely survived. Although the ending of African American enslavement became the central issue of that conflict, the slaves liberated in the aftermath of the Union victory ultimately paid the price for sectional peace and national reconciliation as they endured social segregation and electoral disfranchisement in the southern states while the rest of the nation turned a blind eye and concentrated on economic development. Only following American participation in a world war against a viciously racist and genocidal regime (a conflict in which African American soldiers played a major part) and the emergence of the cold war conflict between the United States and the U.S.S.R. for the allegiance of the generally nonwhite, newly liberated, former European colonies, did national American political elites seriously begin to address the issue of the equal treatment of African Americans. The Brown U.S. Supreme Court decision outlawing social segregation in the United States was only barely half a century old at the time of Barack Oba-

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ma’s election to the presidency. The Civil and Voting Rights Acts of the mid1960s were yet more recent. Obama was born at the very peak of the civil rights movement in the early 1960s and, subsequent to the contemporaneous political victories gained by Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and others, the economic, political, and social status of African Americans has unquestionably improved. In almost all areas of modern American life this formerly oppressed and ostracized racial minority has entered the mainstream. Yet in political terms the transition to full equality for African Americans has never been easy. Black political leaders have generally found it difficult to achieve significant electoral support outside the African American community. The Reverend Jesse Jackson made pathbreaking runs for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1984 and 1988 but in terms of electoral reality his ‘‘Rainbow Coalition’’ was largely monochromatic. In 2004, Barack Obama became only the third African American elected to the Senate since Reconstruction, and L. Douglas Wilder of Virginia (elected 1989) and Deval Patrick of Massachusetts (elected 2006) have been the only African Americans elected as state governors during the same period.1 Given this context Obama’s nomination and election to the presidency (where there has been only one exception to the white Protestant male norm—white Catholic male John F. Kennedy) is utterly remarkable. The Illinois senator has been the first national African American presidential candidate with a genuine biracial political appeal within his own party and beyond. Obama’s victory in overwhelmingly white Iowa launched him on the way to the nomination and despite grim pre-election prognostications regarding a possible ‘‘hidden’’ anti-black vote—or Bradley effect2 —racial hostility to Obama on the part of white voters was not significant enough to affect the outcome of the election. Far from being a disadvantage it appears likely that Obama’s race—or more accurately, mixed race—was ultimately a positive factor as his candidacy presented an opportunity for racial healing at home and his election placed the United States in a highly positive light internationally, a marked contrast to the American image abroad for most of the years of the Bush presidency. Obama’s campaign’s theme of ‘‘hope’’ and the slogan ‘‘yes we can’’ demonstrates an awareness of the potential excitement that his candidacy would generate at home and abroad. And while Obama was pilloried by the Republicans and some of the media for his July 2008 European tour culminating with a mass rally in Berlin on July 24, his rapturous reception in Europe seems to have been a net positive for the Illinois senator in the run-up to the fall campaign. Obama’s demonstrable appeal to younger voters also indicates that his election symbolizes change and diversity in American society. Younger

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Americans increasingly encounter fellow citizens of nonwhite or mixed race backgrounds from grade school onward and American society has become increasingly diverse since the triumph of the civil rights movement. American minorities of all colors rallied around the Obama candidacy as symbolic of what the future of America, by necessity, must be if social harmony is to be maintained in a multiracial, multiethnic society. By the same token the weakness of John McCain’s candidacy among America’s traditional and newer minority groups may be the single greatest problem faced by the Republican Party in the wake of the 2008 defeat. While it would be naive to assume that racial tensions in the United States will simply evaporate once Obama assumes the presidency, the symbolic and historical significance of his election should not be underestimated. His victory not only affirms the promise of an America that has so often been tarnished by the stigma of racial discrimination and oppression in the past, but will present opportunities in American foreign policy that would simply not have been available to yet another white male occupant of the Oval Office. The focus on the eventual victor, Obama, also should not lead us to forget the other indicators of deep change in American society that the 2008 election revealed. Senator Hillary Clinton (NY) came closer to winning a major party presidential nomination than any previous female candidate, and Alaska governor Sarah Palin became the first female Republican vice-presidential nominee. Serious contenders for the presidential nominations included a Mexican American (New Mexico governor Bill Richardson), a Mormon (former Massachusetts governor Mitt Romney), and an Italian American (former New York mayor Rudolph Giuliani). Given the increased diversity of American society, the white Protestant male grip on the American presidency is likely to continue to weaken.

Changes in the Presidential Selection Process The 2008 campaign produced dramatic changes and continuities in the presidential selection process both during the primary campaign and the general election. The nominating campaign was unusual in that 2008 was the first presidential election since 1952 in which neither an incumbent president nor vice president was a contender for a major party presidential nomination. This produced a far more open contest for the nominations of each major party. In recent decades there has been a tendency for the nominating process to become more and more ‘‘frontloaded’’ as states have increasingly moved their primaries or caucuses to earlier and earlier dates to try to exert some

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influence on a process that in recent contests has usually produced a nominee in each major party as early as the end of March of the presidential election year (Mayer and Busch 2004). This trend continued with a vengeance in 2008. The national parties tried to impose some order on the process by allowing only three traditionally early primary or caucus states—Iowa, New Hampshire, and South Carolina—plus Nevada (an attempt to engage western and Latino voters early in the nominating process)—to hold delegate selection events before February 5, 2008. This led to over twenty states— including several of the largest and most expensive to campaign in such as New York, California, Illinois, New Jersey, and Georgia—concentrating their primaries or caucuses on February 5, with over 40 percent of the total number of delegates in both parties being allocated on that date (Cook 2008). Two large states, Florida and Michigan, defied the national party rules (for which they temporarily incurred delegate selection penalties from both national parties) altogether by scheduling earlier contests (January 15 for Michigan and January 29 for Florida) in a direct challenge to the usually magnified influence of the traditional initial contests—the Iowa caucuses and the New Hampshire primary. This in turn led to Iowa and New Hampshire moving their contests to the almost ludicrously early dates of January 3 and January 8 respectively. It is now highly plausible that the dates of the first contests in the 2012 presidential nominating process will fall in late 2011. Frontloading has traditionally placed a premium on national recognition and the concomitant ability to raise large sums of campaign money early in the process. On the Democratic side the usual pattern appeared to be reasserting itself in 2007 as New York senator Hillary Clinton established herself early as the front-runner and clear favorite for the nomination with a huge campaign war chest raised via the national fund-raising network established by her husband in his presidential campaigns (Boatwright 2009). The real surprise was the ability of freshman Democratic senator Barack Obama to match Clinton’s fund-raising prowess through his campaign’s innovative use of the Internet to raise vast sums in small donations particularly from the socalled ‘‘netroots’’ on-line anti-Iraq war movement, which was highly critical of Clinton’s 2002 Senate vote authorizing U.S. military intervention against Saddam Hussein’s regime (Brownstein 2008). Howard Dean’s 2004 presidential campaign had shown the potential of Internet fund-raising and political mobilization but the more professional Obama team took this to an entirely different level (Harris and Martin 2009) and surely established the Internet as a critical new medium in presidential politics. The fact that both Obama and Clinton early rejected the public financing system for the primary campaign was a further indication of the system’s decreasing relevance to the nominating process.

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The fund-raising prowess of Clinton and Obama was symptomatic of the generally higher level of turnout and enthusiasm in the Democratic primaries in 2008 (Toner 2008). In addition to public exasperation with the unpopular Republican White House incumbent, the intensely fought contest between the first female and black candidates with a serious chance of securing a major party presidential nomination undoubtedly mobilized more voters to the Democratic contest. This was the first prolonged contest for either party’s presidential nomination since Mondale and Hart in 1984 in an era in which frontloading was thought to have rendered such contests unlikely. Moreover, the major party that has had the more prolonged contest for the presidential nomination has generally been defeated in the fall. In 2008 however, the Obama-Clinton struggle seemed to energize the party rather than divide it (Abramowitz 2008). The Democratic nominating campaign was also unusual in that grassroots organization—particularly in low-turnout caucus states—played a critical part in the outcome. Obama’s ability to stay the course with Hillary Clinton and eventually edge her for the nomination was based largely on his ability to accumulate large numbers of Democratic delegates in (often heavily Republican) caucus states with very low popular turnout compared to the larger state primary contests (Wilentz 2008). The Iowa caucuses launched Obama on the road to the Democratic nomination and, as Barbara Norrander’s chapter demonstrates, while Clinton was sweeping most of the big state primaries on February 5, Obama’s delegate hauls in the caucus states enabled him to emerge from Super Tuesday with a draw in the overall tally of delegates that kept him well and truly in the race (Norrander 2009; Simon 2008). Grassroots organization and the Democrats’ proportionality rules also enabled Obama to win significant tallies of delegates even in primary states that he lost to Clinton. One final interesting aspect of the Democratic nominating contest was that the superdelegates—elected and party officeholders with ex officio delegate seats at the convention—were critical to the outcome of the contest for the first time. Both Clinton and Obama increasingly courted the superdelegates during the primary campaign, but the movement of the superdelegates toward Obama after the final primaries in early June ultimately clinched the nomination for the Illinois senator. The Republican nominating contest adhered to a more traditional pattern. Once again Republican primary voters gave their party’s nomination—as in 1980, 1988, and 1996—to the runner up from the party’s last contested presidential nomination. With the party generally despondent following their drubbing in the 2006 congressional elections and suffering by association with the abysmal public approval ratings of president George W. Bush, the nomination of the 2000 runner-up Arizona senator John McCain was by no

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means certain. In the summer and early fall of 2007, McCain’s campaign had appeared dead in the water as Mitt Romney, Rudolph Giuliani, former Arkansas governor Mike Huckabee, and even, for a brief period, former Tennessee senator Fred Thompson surged ahead of the Arizonan in the early caucuses and primary state polls. McCain righted his ship by overhauling his campaign, pruning his finances, concentrating on the New Hampshire primary where he was affectionately remembered from his 2000 campaign, and taking credit for the change in the Bush administration’s military strategy in Iraq (the war was clearly the major issue in the early stages of the nominating campaign) where his long-advocated policy of a ‘‘surge’’ in ground troop levels appeared to be yielding positive results as the election year opened (Reston 2008). This, combined with some energetic performances in candidate TV debates, brought McCain back into the contest as the failings of his rivals became apparent. Romney’s Mormon faith was troublesome to Evangelical voters, and his previously liberal positions on social issues as Massachusetts governor led many conservatives to distrust him. Giuliani suffered from the same problem of long-held liberal positions on cultural issues (which, unlike Romney, he never repudiated) and these combined with the New Yorker’s somewhat colorful private life (at least by Republican standards) rendered him increasingly unlikely as a Republican presidential nominee. Huckabee’s positions on economic issues (and his record as Arkansas governor) departed from the Republican economic orthodoxy of low taxes, free markets, and free trade and he had limited appeal outside the South and the Christian conservative segment of the party. Thompson’s campaign quickly fizzled as the candidate appeared to lack the energy for the fight. Like previous Republican front-runners, McCain also benefited greatly from the Republican delegate allocation rules that tend to award most (in some cases all) of a state’s convention delegates to the plurality statewide winner of that state’s primary or caucus. Had these rules operated on the Democratic side, Hillary Clinton would almost certainly have secured the party nomination—probably as early as February 5 (Wilentz 2008). In presidential nominating politics, rules certainly do have consequences and the 2008 nominating campaigns serve as a reminder of that fact. Despite lingering resentments among Clinton supporters, however, there would appear to be little chance of any significant reforms of the nominating process for 2012, since President Obama will likely seek renomination and would be reluctant to substantially change the rules under which he was nominated in 2008. The 2008 election confirmed the demise of the existing public financing system of presidential primary elections. As Robert Boatwright’s chapter points out, it also likely marked the end of the public financing system for

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the general election as well (Boatwright 2009). Even before the Democratic nominating contest was finally decided, it was clear that neither Clinton nor Obama had any intention of limiting themselves to the index-linked public subsidy provided to major party general election candidates. Both realized that they had the potential to raise far more money privately and while the Obama campaign took some flack for ‘‘going private’’ their awesome Internet-based fund-raising operation ultimately attracted more media fascination than unfavorable comment. Going private also enabled Obama to swamp McCain in overall fund-raising—the Illinois senator raised a total of $369.7 million for the fall campaign, compared to the $84.1 million in public money that McCain received (Boatwright 2009; Abdimah 2008). Schier and Box-Steffensmeier’s chapter emphasizes that this huge financial advantage allowed Obama to mount impressive campaign organizations, get-out-thevote operations, and sustained television advertising campaigns in several states that had traditionally leaned Republican in recent presidential elections, such as Virginia, Colorado, North Carolina, Indiana, Ohio, Missouri, and Georgia. All but the last two of these ended up in the Obama column on election night. It would appear to be a pretty safe assumption that no future general election candidate will allow himself to be so utterly outspent by taking public financing as was John McCain. The year 2008 thus marked the end of the campaign financing system established in the wake of the Watergate scandal and emergence of a regulated Internet-based system of private financing in presidential elections. Diana Owen’s chapter on the media indicates that in addition to serving as an increasingly effective fund-raising mechanism, the Internet also became increasingly important as a news medium in the 2008 campaign (Owen 2009; Nagourney 2008). Videos released on the popular website YouTube played a critical part in election coverage and candidates increasingly released their advertisements on the Internet (and sometimes only on the Internet) for maximum coverage and news impact without having to pay television advertising rates. Internet-based political web pages or news blogs such as Mark Halperin’s The Page, The Politico, the well-established Drudge Report, the HuffingtonPost, RealClearPolitics.com (and its celebrated RCP polling average), and fivethirtyeight.com (the website of the 2008 season’s latest young polling wizard, Nate Silver) played an important role in the coverage of the campaign. There can be little doubt that the Internet has well and truly arrived as a significant news medium and campaign tool in presidential politics. 2008 as a Change Election Aside from the historical significance of electing an African American president and the continuing evolution of the presidential selection process in

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light of technological developments, we also need to discuss whether 2008 will be seen as a ‘‘change’’ election in terms of the electoral balance of forces between the parties and the direction of public policy in the United States. As Harris and Martin point out in their chapter (Harris and Martin 2009), the tendency of political commentators to affix labels to elections can mislead more than enlighten since the extent of long-lasting electoral and policy change resulting from any one election can only be discerned with hindsight. In this discussion I have thus deliberately avoided using the term ‘‘realignment.’’ One of the few political science theories to have come into the general political lexicon, realignment posits that major political change in the United States stems from a number of critical elections where the emergence of a new lasting partisan balance also leads to significant changes in public policy (Sundquist 1983). Some have even gone further and see these elections as ushering new ‘‘American Political Regimes’’ at various points in U.S. history (Skowronek 1993). Unfortunately the tendency of many in the news media to see every American election as a potential realignment has rather diluted the usefulness of the concept. Political scientists and American historians have also become more circumspect about the utility of the theory both in terms of its accuracy in interpreting political change in American history and in its application to a modern American political universe increasingly defined by television and the Internet that is characterized by increasing fluidity in the public salience of issues and political allegiances (Shafer 1991; Mayhew 2004). Contemporary scholars who have attempted to periodize U.S. political history have also questioned whether changes in the party balance and policy change are necessarily linked, at least according to the traditional realignment taxonomy of critical elections—1828, 1860, 1896, and 1932 (Mayhew 2004; Keller 2007). It remains highly debatable, for example, whether the partisan realignment of 1896 resulted in a significant change in the direction of public policy (Mayhew 2004). Even V. O. Key—one of the original realignment theorists—argued, wisely, that electoral change in the United States might be more likely to take place incrementally at different times and different places with concomitant variable effects on the national partisan balance, rather than in one ‘‘big bang’’ critical election (Key 1959). The national partisan balance at any one time may thus be simply the net effect of constantly shifting regional partisan alignments. Bearing all these caveats in mind, we can assess the available evidence and discuss the possible symptoms of significant political change that can be discerned from the 2008 election campaign and results. If 2008 was indeed a possible ‘‘change’’ election, then we need to define the American political status quo that came under challenge in the 2008 campaign: in terms of the electoral balance between the parties and the direction

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of public policy. As far as the latter is concerned the quarter century prior to the 2008 election might be referred to as the ‘‘Reagan Era.’’ President Ronald Reagan (1981–1989) essentially proclaimed that the New Deal Era of expanded government in the domestic sphere was over and a new bipartisan governing consensus emerged around the objectives of limited government (especially the federal government), low taxation, balanced budgets, extension of free trade in an increasingly globalized economy, and deregulation. This consensus with some variations in emphasis was maintained by the Democratic Clinton administration (1993–2001), and while visibly coming under stress as the Republican George W. Bush administration and Republican Congress tolerated record budget deficits, was basically maintained until the global financial crisis that struck very late in the 2008 general election campaign. In terms of partisan allegiances, after a period during the 1980s where the Republicans dominated presidential politics with three consecutive landslides and the Democrats maintained their post–New Deal grip on Congress, the 1990s saw the emergence of an extraordinarily even partisan balance between Democrats and Republicans at all levels of government. Due to the end of the Cold War with the U.S.S.R. in the early 1990s and the Democrats’ accommodation with the Reagan agenda, their candidates managed to win pluralities of the presidential popular vote in three successive presidential elections—1992, 1996, and 2000. At the same time the Republican party was able to gain control of Congress for the first time in forty years in 1994 and maintained that control by narrow majorities for most of the next twelve years (with the exception of an 18-month period of Democratic control of the Senate in 1981–1982 due to a party switch by Republican senator James Jeffords of Vermont). American national elections over the past two decades have thus been exceedingly close and bitterly contested, with the bitterness exacerbated by the tendency of both parties and their supporters to polarize increasingly around religious/cultural issues (a byproduct of the increasing partisan consensus on economic issues?) such as abortion, gay and lesbian rights, and the role of religion in the public sphere (Layman 2001; Black and Black 2007). In general, voters in the South, Plains, and Mountain states have leaned Republican while those in the major metropolitan areas, in the Northeast and on the Pacific Coast, have leaned Democratic. These allegiances have increasingly correlated with the religiosity (or lack thereof) of individual voters and states (Black and Black 2007). Hence the so-called ‘‘red-state/blue-state’’ division (derived from the colors assigned to the parties by the television news media on their giant maps of the highly controversial 2000 election)

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or ‘‘culture war’’ that seemed to increasingly define American party politics following the impeachment of Democratic president Bill Clinton in 1998. For 2008 to be a possible regime-changing election in terms of public policy, then, we would have to see the following symptoms: a major shift away from the Reagan consensus on economic policy, an end of the exceedingly close partisan balance of the preceding decade with a pronounced new skew toward the Democratic party, and, finally, signs that the great religious-cultural divide that had also contributed to that close partisan balance was losing relevance in the election campaign and outcome. Let us consider each in turn. While the Democratic victory in the 2006 congressional elections was based on the apparent U.S. military failure in Iraq and congressional scandals rather than a reversion to interventionist economic politics, during George W. Bush’s second term there certainly were some signs that the Reagan consensus was beginning to fray at the edges (Campbell 2009). President Bush’s 2005 attempt to reform Social Security by allowing workers to divert a portion of their Social Security taxes into personal accounts got absolutely nowhere with Congress or the American public (Edwards 2007). The perceived failure of the federal government to respond effectively to the damage inflicted by Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans in August 2005 raised questions as to whether the U.S. federal government had become too limited to be effective when needed in situations of dire emergency. The failure of the federally built New Orleans levees to withstand the surge in water levels from Katrina’s rains raised concerns over the state of the national infrastructure that appeared to be confirmed by the Minneapolis highway bridge collapse in August 2007. David Campbell’s chapter illustrates that as the national economy began to slow down in the second Bush term the prevailing consensus in favor of more tax cuts, free trade agreements, and market deregulation also began to erode somewhat (Campbell 2009). In the Democratic primary campaign ‘‘end of big government’’ rhetoric was conspicuously absent and the issue of national health care reform that had lain dormant since the failure of president Bill Clinton’s health care plan in 1994 played a prominent role in the debates between Hillary Clinton and Obama. Still, the most ostensibly prolabor, anti–free trade, interventionist candidate—former North Carolina senator John Edwards—was eliminated from the race fairly early. On the Republican side, economic issues did not play a very strong role in the debates but the candidate who most clearly represented the Reagan consensus—former Massachusetts governor Mitt Romney—finished third in delegates behind John McCain and former Arkansas governor Mike Huckabee, despite spending a considerable amount of his personal fortune in the early

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primaries and caucuses. Huckabee, indeed, openly departed from the Reagan consensus in the candidate debates by demonstrating skepticism on free trade and empathy with the economic predicament of middle- and workingclass Americans. As the slowdown turned into recession in the fall and the Bush administration was suddenly compelled to bail out the financial industry to the tune of $700 billion, the campaign definitely turned in a direction where the Reagan consensus began to look seriously obsolete. John McCain and the congressional Republicans found themselves conflicted in the September 2008 congressional votes to approve such a blatant violation of the free market, antiregulation rhetoric they had espoused for decades. Liberal interventionist Democrats reveled in the possibility that the concept of government management of the economy had suddenly been legitimated once more by the crisis. Barack Obama, on the other hand, did not show his hand as to how he would deal with the economic emergency as president, but concentrated instead on demonstrating that he was temperamentally ready for the challenge (Schier and Box-Steffensmeier 2009). Obama also took pains to emphasize that his proposed tax increases were only for the very richest Americans (those earning over $250,000 a year) and that he supported a tax cut for the middle class. Obama’s key postelection appointments in the economic area were all free market, fiscally conservative Democrats in the mold of former Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcker (who in fact became chairman of the new president’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board) and Clinton’s treasury secretary Robert Rubin—both adherents of the Reagan consensus. While there was much talk of the Reagan era being at an end among the political commentariat after the election (Smith 2008), the accuracy of this assessment is predicated on the continued severity of the economic and financial crises and the effectiveness of the Obama administration’s measures in dealing with them. The Reagan consensus, while clearly eroding, had not yet completely dissipated even in the wake of the financial maelstrom of fall 2008. After a decade of rough electoral parity between the two major parties nationally, what of the evidence from the 2008 election for a decisive change in the partisan balance in favor of the victorious Democrats? There is some impressive evidence from the 2008 election results that this may be the case. Obama’s popular vote percentage of just under 53 percent was the best performance by a Democratic candidate since Lyndon Johnson’s landslide in 1964 (Jimmy Carter in 1976 was the only other Democratic nominee in that period to break 50 percent). In fact, Obama is only the third Democratic candidate to win an outright majority of the national popular vote for president since Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1944. During the 2008 cam-

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paign it was apparent that the Democrats had opened up a significant lead over the Republicans in partisan identification as indicated by opinion polls (Abramowitz 2008). This was borne out by dramatic increases in Democratic Party registration in many states, and increased turnout in the Democratic primaries. Following the dramatic 6.4 percent increase in 2004, estimated general election turnout also rose another 2.4 percent in 2008, to 63 percent of the electorate, the highest level since 1960 (Center for the Study of the American Electorate). Some of the most dramatic increases occurred in states that switched from Republican to Democratic in 2008: North Carolina (10.3 percent), Virginia (7.1 percent), Colorado (6.3 percent), and Indiana (5.2 percent). Moreover, after two elections where the election map between Democrats and Republicans appeared frozen (only three relatively small states changed hands between parties from 2000 to 2004), the Obama campaign opened up the Electoral College playing field for 2008 in dramatic fashion. Thanks to his considerable financial resources, heavy African American mobilization, and public concern over the economic situation, Obama was able to put states that had been previously thought to be comfortably Republican in presidential contests such as Colorado, North Carolina, Virginia, Indiana, Georgia, Montana, and the Dakotas in play, and ended up winning the first four and losing the others fairly narrowly. By contrast, John McCain did not come close to winning a single state that had gone for John Kerry in 2004. According to exit poll data (Pew Research Center; New York Times) Obama made significant advances over Kerry’s 2004 showing among African Americans, Hispanics, college-educated voters, voters making over $100,000 a year, and younger and first-time voters (who gave Obama an astonishing 69 percent of their votes). All of this promises well for the Democratic Party in the future, and McCain’s abysmal showing among Hispanics (66 percent for Obama) and younger voters should give the GOP particular cause for concern (Campbell 2009). In the congressional elections, the Democrats gained at least twenty U.S. House seats and at least eight U.S. Senate seats in 2008 to add to their majorities from 2006, providing them, as Roger Davidson points out, with the most comfortable margins any congressional party has enjoyed in two decades (Davidson 2009). Moreover, the congressional Democrats made gains in traditionally Republican territory—the South and the Mountain West—while consolidating their grip on the Northeastern states (the last Republican House member from New England lost), the major metropolitan areas, and the Pacific Coast. As in the presidential contest, the pronounced financial advantage that the Democratic congressional campaign committees held over

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their Republican counterparts played a major role in the Democrats’ congressional advances (Boatwright 2009; Davidson 2009). Yet there is other evidence from the 2008 election returns that should inspire some caution in proclaiming a new electoral era of Democratic dominance. One obvious point to note is that despite George W. Bush’s deep unpopularity and a horrendous economic climate for the party holding the White House, John McCain still got 46 percent of the national popular vote and despite being heavily outspent was able to make the election competitive right up to the end. Evidence from the exit polls indicates that the core Republican groups from 2000 and 2004—white men, older voters, conservatives, rural voters, and religious voters—stayed as core Republican groups in 2008 (Pew Research Center; New York Times). In geographic terms McCain actually succeeded in improving the Republican performance from Bush in 2004 in several southern and Appalachian states. Republicans nevertheless suffered major losses in 2008 and failure to redefine their current image and adapt their message to the changing demographics of the United States will certainly restrict their ability to recover from the losses of 2006 and 2008. The ineptitude of the Bush administration at home and abroad has also done serious damage to the Republicans’ image as the party of competence in economic and national security affairs, since dealing with terrorism was the only issue on which voters preferred the Republican position over the Democrats’ in 2008 (Pew Research Center). Yet Obama’s electoral coalition of minorities, young voters, and college-educated professionals also seems fragile since the economic interests of these groups are hardly compatible. Indeed, failure to deliver an improved economy by 2012 would almost certainly fracture this coalition and provide the GOP with an opportunity for revival. As always the future partisan balance on Capitol Hill and in presidential elections will hinge on the degree to which the Obama administration is perceived to have effectively addressed the serious economic and national security issues facing the nation. For much of the 2008 campaign it did appear that the so-called culture war was in abeyance. The favored candidates of religious conservatives did not prevail in the Republican primaries and the eventual GOP nominee was a far less culturally polarizing figure than George W. Bush. James Guth’s chapter also reminds us that Barack Obama made a specific effort to reach out to religiously conservative voters by including an appearance at leading Evangelical pastor Rick Warren’s Saddleback Church in Orange County, California, on August 16, 2008 (Guth 2009). Yet the dramatically divergent reactions to Republican vice-presidential nominee Sarah Palin—not a particularly strident cultural conservative by contemporary Republican standards—showed that the partisan cleavage between religious and more secular

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voters, while temporarily subsumed by economic issues in the 2008 campaign, has by no means evaporated. The Republican base swooned over the Alaska governor and mother of five (including a pregnant seventeen-yearold daughter and a five-month-old son born with Down Syndrome) who enthusiastically endorsed ‘‘small town values’’ in her convention acceptance speech. Members of the mainstream news media, on the other hand, seemed driven to distraction by Palin’s nomination and appeared desperate to latch onto any story coming out of Alaska—no matter how unsubstantiated—that might render her beyond the pale as a possible president. The adverse media coverage thoroughly discredited the Alaskan in the eyes of college-educated, less-religious Democrats and Independents, but by the same token the Republican base voters only received Palin more rapturously. Interestingly despite all his efforts at outreach, Obama only marginally improved the Democratic showing among the most religious voters in 2008 (New York Times; Guth 2009). He did not need them to win comfortably, of course, but this outcome, the reaction to Sarah Palin, and the passage of statewide constitutional amendments prohibiting same-sex marriage in Florida and (surprisingly and more narrowly) in California while Obama was carrying the state with 60 percent of the presidential vote indicates the continuing potential of cultural issues to generate bitter partisan conflict in American politics. On all three indicators—the erosion of ‘‘Reaganomics,’’ shifts in the partisan balance, and the salience of the culture war—there is some evidence that a new era of Democratic dominance based on interventionist economic policies and public investment in infrastructure may be upon us. Based on the 2008 election campaign and results alone, however, and absent any knowledge as to the likely success of the Obama administration in addressing the economic issues facing the country, the case that a lasting change of the American political regime will result from the 2008 campaign for the moment necessarily remains, in the parlance of Scottish law, ‘‘Not Proven.’’3

Summary: Stuck in the Realignment Groove The most obvious meaning to be written into the 2008 election is that it confirmed one of the oldest and simplest rules of modern liberal democratic politics: when the economy goes sour the governing party loses and the opposition gets its opportunity to remedy the situation. In this sense the outcome of the 2008 election is entirely mundane and predictable. The nomination and election of an African American, of course, lifted the election beyond the mundane and means that whatever it portends in terms of parti-

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san or policy change in the United States, 2008 will be regarded as a noteworthy election. The historical and symbolic significance aside, Obama’s election does not necessarily mean that deep change in the political system and the direction of public policy will follow, although the potential for such change does seem to be present, due to the erosion of the Reagan consensus in economic and domestic policy. The economic issue was decisive in Obama’s victory (Pew Research Center; Campbell 2009) and he and his Democratic congressional majority will be judged on whether or not they can bring about a sustained economic recovery. If Obama can use that opportunity to also bring about major health care reform he may well be able to establish a new public consensus in support of energetic federal government action to deal with pressing domestic issues. The consensus on the degree of energetic action required by the federal government seems to have gone in cycles since the earliest days of the Republic and the debates between Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson. After a quarter century of seeing ‘‘government as the problem’’ the United States may well be ready for a period of more activist government. The success of the 2008 Democratic majority and this new activist federal government is by no means assured, however. The political situation in the Middle East and South Asia remains volatile and major terrorist outrages may well distract from the Obama domestic agenda. Moreover, the cultural/ religious polarization that helped sustain the tenuous Republican majorities of the early 2000s has clearly not gone away and is only a court decision or two away from being reignited in full force. The truly vast sums of money that have been and will be deployed to bail out the financial sector and, almost certainly, the American automobile industry may create even graver economic difficulties further down the road. And finally, Democrats will remember all too well how their last president’s domestic agenda foundered thanks to the fiendishly complex and potentially toxic health care issue. For all of these reasons, we should be especially careful not to assign the ‘‘realignment’’ label to the 2008 election, at least until the dust has well and truly settled a decade or so hence. In a democracy we are obligated to give meaning to elections in terms of legitimating the actions of governments, but we should be careful in endowing them with too much meaning. The 2008 election created a potential opportunity for Barack Obama and the Democrats to alter the direction of public policy and carve out a new electoral majority for themselves for at least another election cycle or two (in the fluid electronic universe of contemporary and future American politics electoral majorities lasting beyond three cycles are likely to be rare by comparison with the pre–World War II era). Whether they can achieve it or whether the Republicans can revive is contingent on the degree of opportunity created by

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political events and the new president’s skill in turning those events to his and his party’s advantage.

Notes 1. David Paterson of New York became the third African American governor to take office since Reconstruction in 2008, but as lieutenant governor, he succeeded following the resignation of incumbent governor Eliot Spitzer rather than being elected to the post in his own right. 2. Named for Tom Bradley, the African American former mayor of Los Angeles, who allegedly lost a 1982 election for governor of California (after leading in the opinion polls) due to a ‘‘hidden’’ anti-black vote on Election Day. 3. Scottish criminal trials allow juries three possible verdicts: guilty, not guilty, and not proven.

References Abdimah, Halimah. 2008. ‘‘Obama’s Fundraising Set Precedent for Expensive Campaigns.’’ McClatchy Washington Bureau. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/home page/story/55521.html (accessed November 30, 2008). Abramowitz, Alan I. 2008. ‘‘Cheer Up Democrats!’’ The New Republic, April 25. http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id75f776fe-3f70-4893-9a2ee5a557d761ee (accessed November 30, 2008). Black, Earl, and Merle Black. 2007. Divided America: The Ferocious Power Struggle in American Politics. New York: Simon & Schuster. Boatwright, Robert G. 2009. ‘‘Campaign Finance in the 2008 Election.’’ In The American Elections of 2008, edited by Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier and Steven E. Schier. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Brownstein, Ronald. 2008. ‘‘The First 21st Century Campaign.’’ National Journal, April 19. http://www.nationaljournal.com/njmagazine/cs_20080416_3324.php (accessed November 30, 2008). Campbell, David E. 2009. ‘‘Public Opinion in the 2008 Election.’’ In The American Elections of 2008, edited by Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier and Steven E. Schier. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Center for the Study of the American Electorate. 2008. ‘‘African Americans, Anger, Fear and Youth Propel Turnout to Highest Level Since 1964.’’ American University. http://domino.american.edu/AU/media/mediarel.nsf/1D265343BDC218978525 6B810071F238/EE414B16927D6C9E85257522004F109D?OpenDocument (accessed December 17, 2008). Cook, Rhodes. 2008. ‘‘Super Tuesday: A vast and varied test.’’ Center of Politics, University of Virginia. http://www.centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/article.php? id FRC20080 13101 (accessed November 30, 2008).

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Davidson, Roger H. 2009. ‘‘Partisan Surge and Decline in Congressional Elections: The Case of 2008.’’ In The American Elections of 2008, edited by Janet M. BoxSteffensmeier and Steven E. Schier. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Edwards, George C., III. 2007. Governing by Campaigning: The Politics of the Bush Presidency. New York: Pearson-Longman. Guth, James L. 2009. ‘‘Religion in the 2008 Election.’’ In The American Elections of 2008, edited by Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier and Steven E. Schier. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Harris, John F. and Jonathan Martin. 2009. ‘‘The George W. Bush and Bill Clinton Legacies in the 2008 Election.’’ In The American Elections of 2008, edited by Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier and Steven E. Schier. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Keller, Morton. 2007. America’s Three Regimes: A New Political History. New York: Oxford University Press. Key, V. O., Jr. 1959. ‘‘Secular Realignment and the Party System.’’ Journal of Politics 21: 198–210. Layman, Geoffrey. 2001. The Great Divide: Religious and Cultural Conflict in American Party Politics. New York: Columbia University Press. Mayer, William G., and Andrew E. Busch. 2004. The Frontloading Problem in Presidential Nominations. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Mayhew, David R. 2004. Electoral Realignments. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Nagourney, Adam. 2008. ‘‘The ’08 Campaign: Sea Change for Politics as We Know It.’’ New York Times, November 3, Politics Section. Norrander, Barbara. 2009. ‘‘Democratic Marathon, Republican Sprint: The 2008 Presidential Nominations.’’ In The American Elections of 2008, edited by Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier and Steven E. Schier. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. New York Times. Election Results 2008: Exit Polls. nytimes.com. http://elections.ny times.com/2008/results/president/exit-polls.ht ml (accessed November 5, 2008). Oxford University Press. 1979. The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations, 3rd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Owen, Diana. 2009. ‘‘The Campaign and the Media.’’ In The American Elections of 2008, edited by Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier and Steven E. Schier. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Pew Research Center. ‘‘Inside Obama’s Sweeping Victory.’’ Pew Research Center for the People & the Press. http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1023/exit-poll-analysis-2008 (accessed November 9, 2008). Reston, Maeve. 2008. ‘‘They kept McCain afloat.’’ Los Angeles Times, March 7, National Section. Schier, Steven E., and Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier. 2009. ‘‘The General Election Campaign.’’ In The American Elections of 2008, edited by Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier and Steven E. Schier. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Shafer, Byron E., ed. 1991. The End of Realignment: Interpreting Electoral Eras. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Simon, Roger. 2008. ‘‘Relentless: How Barack Obama Outsmarted Hillary Clinton.’’ Politico, August 25. http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0808/12731.html (accessed August 25, 2008).

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Skowronek, Stephen. 1993. The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to George Bush. Cambridge, MA: Harvard-Belknap. Smith, Richard Norton. 2008. ‘‘The official End of the Reagan Era.’’ Time, November 5. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1857001-1,00.html (accessed November 30, 2008). Sundquist, James L. 1983. Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Toner, Robin. 2008. ‘‘High Enthusiasm Propels Democrats.’’ New York Times, January 29. Politics Section. Wilentz, Sean. 2008. ‘‘Why Hillary Clinton Should Be Winning.’’ Salon.com, April 7. http://www.salon.com/opinion/feature/2008/04/07/hillary/ (accessed April 27, 2008).

Index

abortion issue: Biden and, 129, 130; Clinton, H., and, 126; Giuliani and, 34, 123; McCain and, 110, 111, 125; Obama and, 110, 111, 125, 129, 133; pro-choice and, 91, 122, 126, 129; pro-life and, 111, 120, 123, 124, 129, 130; Romney and, 123; U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops and, 122; visibility of, 106–7, 109 acceptance speeches: Obama/McCain, 14; Palin, 60, 175 ActBlue, 155 activist federal government, 176 advocacy candidates, 36, 48. See also Paul, Ron affirmative action, 112 African American president, Obama as: Bradley Effect and, 100, 163, 177n2; historical significance of, 161, 162– 64, 168, 175 African Americans: civil rights movement and, 163, 164; gay marriage issue and, 110; race relations and, 162–63; support, Obama and, 7, 51, 71, 72, 110 AIDS, 50, 121, 126 ambitions. See risks/ambitions American Leadership Project (ALP), 143–44 American Political Regimes, 169, 175

Ames straw poll, 42 anti-labor ad, 92 audience preferences, campaign media and, 25–27 bailout plan, 63–64, 102, 172, 176 Barkley, Dean, 94n2 Barrasso, John, 85–86 Bartels, Larry M., 4 Bauer, Gary, 124, 125 Begich, Mark, 93 Biden, Joe: abortion issue and, 129, 130; candidacy, 13, 36, 42; media coverage of, 12, 13, 15, 16; misstatement of, 15, 16, 66; primary receipts, 139, 140, 141, 142; religious affiliation and, 129; vice presidential debates of, 16, 64, 65; withdrawal of, 43 ‘‘big bang’’ critical election, 169 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), 158 blogs/blogging, 16, 22, 168. See also independent political news sites blue states, 15, 71, 82; ActBlue and, 155; fifty state strategy and, 82, 155; Obama’s unity theme and, 59, 68, 71; ‘‘red-state/blue-state’’ division and, 170; ‘‘Red to Blue’’ program and, 82, 89 Bradley, Bill, 7

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Bradley, Tom, 177n2 Bradley Effect, 100, 163, 177n2 brand loyalties, 80, 84–85 ‘‘bridge period,’’ 144 Brown, Jerry, 7 Brown, Michael, 23 Brownback, Sam: primary receipts and, 139; religious affiliation and, 123, 124, 126 Brown U.S. Supreme Court decision, 162 Burnham, Walter Dean, 4, 77 Bush, George H. W., 110 Bush, George W.: approval rating of, 1, 2, 55, 75, 84, 111; electoral/popular votes (2004) for, 69–70; group support (2004) for, 71, 72–74; Hurricane Katrina and, 2, 76, 171; Iraq War and, 2, 56, 76; Kerry and, 117; McCain, distancing of, 1, 3, 66; miscues of, 76; religious voting (2004) for, 118, 119, 120, 132; Romney and, 3 Bush Politics (Bush, G. W.): Clinton Politics, Obama and, 2, 6–8; dominance of, 1, 5; polarized electorate and, 6; predictions/analysis for, 3–5; risks/ ambitions of, 2 Business Industry Political Action Committee (BI-PAC), 92 business-labor war, 91 campaign (2008 presidential campaign): Clinton, B. and, 35, 52; during convention season, 58–61; culture war and, 171, 174, 175; Democratic, grassroots organization and, 20, 75, 162, 166; Democratic nominations and, 33–52; election year, 42–43, 47–52; future campaigns and, 27; general election, 55–77; media and, 9–27; online campaign videos and, 19, 22–24; pre-election year, 39–42; Republican nominations and, 33–52; twenty-first century, 9, 14, 18, 27; web-based technologies and, 6. See also congressional elections; media coverage

campaign finance (2008 election), 137–60; conclusions, 157–58; congressional elections and, 87–89, 147–57; DCCC and, 82, 138, 148, 153, 154, 155–57, 156, 173, 174; Dean and, 138, 140, 143, 146, 155; DNC and, 95n3, 144, 145, 146, 147, 155– 57, 156; DSCC and, 82, 88, 94, 94n3, 138, 148, 153, 154, 156, 157; e-mail and, 6, 7, 145, 146; general election and, 144–47, 145, 168; general election federal grant and, 137, 140, 144, 146; House campaigns and, 148, 149– 50, 153–54; Internet, Obama and, 137, 158, 162, 165–66, 168; NRCC and, 82, 138, 148, 153, 154, 155–57, 156, 173, 174; party campaign committees and, 155–57, 156; presidential primary receipts, 139; presidential public financing system and, 56, 137, 138, 139, 144, 145, 157, 158, 165, 167, 168; primaries and, 138–44, 139; Senate campaigns and, 151–52, 154–55. See also receipts Campolo, Tony, 129 Capitol Hill campaign committees. See Hill committees card check, 91 Carter, Jimmy, 172 Casey, Robert, Jr., 120 ‘‘Catholics for Obama,’’ 128 Catholics United, 128, 131 caucuses: caucus-convention procedure, 36–37; dates selected for, 37–38; primaries (results), 44–47. See also Iowa caucuses Center for Responsive Politics, 95n6 centrists, 118, 119 Chamber of Commerce, U.S., 92 Chambliss, Saxby, 95n11 change (political): 2008 election and, 161, 168–75; Obama and, 52, 59; presidential selection process and, 161, 162, 164–68 ‘‘change’’ election (2008), 161, 168–75; global financial crisis and, 172;

Index

Reagan Era and, 170, 171, 172, 175; realignment and, 169, 175–77 Cheney, Dick, 2 Christian Coalition, 121 Christian Right: McCain and, 124, 125, 130, 131; transformation of, 121 citizen journalism, 19, 20–22. See also independent political news sites civil rights movement, 163, 164 Cizik, Richard, 121 Clinton, Bill: 2008 campaign and, 35, 52; endorsement speech by, 52, 59; fundraising ability of, 165, 166; Gore and, 7; Hussein and, 165; impeachment of, 171. See also Clinton Politics Clinton, Hillary: abortion issue and, 126; candidacy, 1, 7, 33, 35, 39, 40, 42, 43, 47, 48, 49; concession of, 51–52; delegates won by, 49; endorsement speech by, 52, 59; as female candidate, 164; ‘‘Heels for Hillary’’ group and, 25; Iraq War and, 6; national preference for, 40; primary/caucus results, 46–47; primary receipts, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144; religious affiliation and, 126, 127; Super Duper Tuesday and, 49 Clinton Politics (Clinton, B.): Bush Politics, Obama and, 2, 6–8; dominance of, 1, 5; polarized electorate and, 5–6 coalitions: Christian Coalition, 121; Obama, 7; Rainbow Coalition, 163 Cole, Tom, 89 Coleman, Norm, 94n2, 154 conflict reporting frame, 11, 16 congressional elections (2008), 79–95; brand loyalties and, 80, 84–85; candidacy recruitment and, 80–81; candidates for, 86–87; contextual factors in, 83; costliness of, 87; financing and, 87–89, 147–57; Hill committees and, 80–81; House campaigns, financing of, 148, 149–50, 153–54; importance of, 79; minor-party candidates and, 80, 94n2; money’s influence on, 90–91; parallel campaigns in, 91–92;

183

public mood swings and, 83–84; results of, 92–94; retention and recruitment gap in, 85–86; Senate campaigns, financing of, 151–52, 154–55 conventions. See Democratic National Convention; Republican National Convention coordinated expenditures, 88 copycat reporting, 18 Cornyn, John, 154 Cox, John H., 139 culture war: 2008 campaign and, 171, 174, 175; ‘‘Freedom of Choice’’ Act and, 133; moral values and, 109, 110. See also religion (in 2008 election) Culture Wars (Hunter, James), 118 Davis, Thomas M., III, 86 DCCC. See Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee Dean, Howard: campaign finance and, 138, 140, 143, 146, 155; fifty-state strategy and, 82, 120, 155; Kerry and, 39, 138 ‘‘Dear Mr. Obama’’ video, 23 debates (presidential/vice presidential), 16, 64–65 Defense of Marriage Act, 114n8. See also gay marriage issue delegates, 36–37; Michigan/Florida, 38, 39, 51; pledged, 37; state delegate equivalents, 42; super, 37, 49, 51, 166; unpledged, 37, 45, 49; won by Clinton/Edwards/Obama, 49; won by McCain, 48 Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC): campaign financing and, 82, 138, 148, 153, 154, 155–57, 156, 173, 174; campaign strategies, 82; candidate recruiting, 81, 82, 94n2 Democratic National Committee (DNC), 95n3, 144, 145, 146, 147, 155–57, 156 Democratic National Convention: 2004,

184

Index

Obama and, 35, 68, 126; 2008, 36, 37, 51, 52, 129; campaign strategies during, 58–61; religious strategies and, 129, 130 Democratic Party: electorate and, 112; future of, election results and, 76–77; new majority in, 131, 176; nominating campaign, grassroots organization and, 20, 75, 162, 166; popularity of, election results and, 76; surge of, 84–85, 173, 174; younger voters and, 7, 84–85, 163–64 Democratic presidential nominations, 33–52; Clinton, H. and, 1, 7; Obama and, 7; primaries/caucuses (results), 46–47 Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC), 82, 88, 94, 94n3, 138, 148, 153, 154, 156, 157 Democrats Abroad global primary, 49 division, of American people. See polarized electorate divisive primary thesis, 50, 52 DNC. See Democratic National Committee Dobson, James, 121, 124 Dodd, Christopher: candidacy, 36, 42; Lieberman and, 95n13; primary receipts and, 139; religious affiliation of, 127; withdrawal of, 43 Dole, Elizabeth (‘‘Liddy’’): campaign finance and, 90, 154, 155; North Carolina and, 95n9; as out of touch, 91, 93 Drudge Report, 19, 168 DSCC. See Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee Duffy, Jennifer, 87 economy issue: Obama’s victory and, 175, 176; public opinion and, 101, 102, 102–3, 113–14. See also global financial crisis of September 2008; public opinion Edwards, John: candidacy, 35, 39, 42, 48; delegates won by, 49; primary/caucus

results, 46–47; primary receipts, 138, 139, 140; religious affiliation and, 127; withdrawal of, 171 EFCA. See Employee Free Choice Act election forecasting, 99–100. See also public opinion elections. See congressional elections; presidential election election year campaign, 42–43, 47–52. See also general election campaign electoral votes: map (2004, 2008), 68; popular votes, 2, 67–68, 68, 69–70, 71, 75, 172 electorate/electoral college system: Democrat percentages in, 112; fundamental shifts in, 4; instability of, 77; Obama and, 173; polarized, 5–6; presidential nominations and, 36 e-mails, Obama fund-raising and, 6, 7, 145, 146 Emanuel, Rahm, 82, 89 Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA), 91, 92 energy policy issue, 102, 104–5 Ensign, John, 89 episodic media coverage, 10 ethnoreligious theory, 117, 118 Ettinger, Amber Lee, 23 Facebook, 11, 24–25 faith-based initiative, 128 Falwell, Jerry, 121, 123 Fannie Mae, 62 farm teams, 82 FECA. See Federal Election Campaign Act Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), 137, 138 Feingold, Russell, 157 female candidates. See Clinton, Hillary; Palin, Sarah Fey, Tina, 15 fifty-state strategy, 82, 120, 155 filibusters, 86, 91, 93, 154 financial crisis. See global financial crisis of September 2008

Index

FirstPerson, 21 fivethirtyeight.com, 168 flag lapel pin, Obama and, 16 Florida/Michigan delegates, 38, 39, 51 Forbes, Steve, 138 foreign policy: McCain and, 64; Obama and, 13, 64, 164; Palin and, 15; public opinion and, 112 Fowler, Mayhill, 21, 22 Freddie Mac, 62 Free Republic, 19 ‘‘Frontline Democrats’’ program, 81 frontloading, 164–66 fund-raising. See campaign finance game reporting frame, 11, 27 gay marriage issue: 2004 election and, 101, 109; 2008 election and, 106, 109–10, 175; African Americans and, 110; exploiting of, 6; Kerry and, 114n8; McCain and, 125; Proposition 8 and, 110, 133; public opinion and, 121 general election campaign, 55–77; broader consequences of, 75–76; during convention season, 58–61; debates and, 64–65; electoral/popular votes, 2, 67–68, 68, 69–70, 71, 75; endgame of, 65–67; federal grant and, 137, 140, 144, 146; financing and, 144–47, 145, 168; global financial crisis and, 61, 62–64; group support for candidates (2004, 2008) and, 71, 72–74; Obama’s success in, 75; Palin and, 61–62; poll trend for, 57, 57; receipts and, 145; religion and, 130– 33, 132; results of, 67–75; unfortunate events in, 61–64 Gilmore, James, 139, 154 Giuliani, Rudy: abortion issue and, 34, 123; candidacy, 11, 12, 34, 39, 40, 43, 47, 52, 167; as Italian American, 164; national preference for, 41; primary/ caucus results, 44–45; primary receipts and, 139, 140, 142; religious affiliation and, 123, 124; withdrawal of, 47, 142

185

‘‘Giuliani Girl,’’ 23 global financial crisis of September 2008: bailout plan and, 63–64, 102, 172, 176; general election campaign and, 61, 62–64; McCain and, 14, 63–64, 66, 75; Obama and, 63–64, 75, 76, 173, 176; public mood and, 75, 83, 101, 102, 103, 113, 130, 131; Reagan Era consensus and, 170, 172 ‘‘God gap,’’ 117, 118, 131 Goode, Virgil, 95n10 GOP. See Republican Party Gore, Al: Clinton, B. and, 7; as speculative 2008 candidate, 11; 2000 candidacy and, 58, 100, 111, 113, 137 Graham, Billy, 125 Graham, Franklin, 125 grassroots media. See citizen journalism grassroots organization, Democratic nominating campaign and, 20, 75, 162, 166 Gravel, Mike: candidacy, 11, 19, 36; primary receipts and, 139; religious affiliation and, 127 group support, for candidates, 71, 72–74 Hagan, Kay, 87, 90, 91, 154 Hagee, John, 16, 125 Halperin, Mark, 5, 168 Harris, John F., 5 Hastert, Dennis, 95n5 Hayes, Robin, 153 health care issue, 102, 104, 111 ‘‘Heels for Hillary’’ group, 25 hegemony, 77 High Risk and Big Ambition (Schier), 2 Hill committees: campaign finance and, 87–89, 155–57, 156; congressional elections and, 80–81; list of, 81, 94n3. See also Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee; Democratic National Committee; Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee; National Republican Campaign Committee; National Republican Senatorial Committee; Republican National Committee

186

Index

Honeycutt, Deborah, 90 hope, Obama and, 163 horse race reporting frame, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 19 House campaigns, financing of, 148, 149–50, 153–54 housing market crisis. See global financial crisis of September 2008 Huckabee, Mike: candidacy, 25, 35, 41, 42, 43, 47, 52, 167, 171, 172; primary/ caucus results, 44–45; primary receipts and, 139, 140, 142; religious affiliation and, 122, 124, 125; withdrawal of, 48, 142 Huffington, Arianna, 20 Huffington Post, 19, 20, 21, 22 Hunter, Duncan: candidacy, 36, 45, 87; primary receipts and, 139; religious affiliation and, 122, 124; withdrawal of, 36 Hunter, James, 118 Hunter, Joel, 121, 126, 129 Hurricane Katrina: Bush, G. W., and, 2, 76, 171; McCain and, 3 Hybels, Bill, 121

interventionist economic policies, 171, 172, 175 invisible primary, 39, 40, 41, 52 Iowa caucuses: Democratic results in, 42–43; Obama and, 42, 166; Republican results in, 43, 124; scheduling of, 38, 165; straw poll and, 42 Iraq War: Bush, G. W., and, 2, 56, 76; Clinton, H., and, 6; McCain and, 103, 104; Obama and, 6, 103–4; online anti-Iraq war movement and, 165; public opinion and, 102, 103–4 iReport, 21 issue advocacy, 91 issues: coverage, mainstream media and, 10, 12, 14; economy, 101, 102, 102–3, 113–14; energy policy, 102, 104–5; health care, 102, 104, 111; immigration, 34, 101, 106, 107–8, 111; Iraq War, 102, 103–4; moral values, 101, 102, 107, 109–11; race relations, 162–63; terrorism, 102, 105–6. See also abortion issue; foreign policy; gay marriage issue; global financial crisis of September 2008; Iraq War

i-Caught, 21 ‘‘I Got a Crush . . . On Obama’’ video, 22–23 immigration issue, 34, 101, 106, 107–8, 111 ‘‘Incredible McCain Girl,’’ 23 independent expenditures, 88 independent political news sites, 19–20; citizen journalism and, 19, 20–22; Drudge Report, 19, 168; fivethirtyeight.com, 168; Free Republic, 19; Huffington Post, 19, 20, 21, 22; The Page, 168; Politico, 13, 19, 20, 168; RealClearPolitics.com, 19, 168 independent spending, 91 international financial crisis. See global financial crisis of September 2008 Internet fund-raising, 137, 158, 162, 165–66, 168. See also online media coverage

Jackson, Jesse, 163 Jacobs, Lawrence, 4 Jeffords, Jim, 95n4, 170 ‘‘Joe the Plumber,’’ 16, 17, 65, 66 Johnson, Lyndon B., 2, 172 Johnson, Samuel, 162 Jones, Bob, III, 124 journalism. See citizen journalism; media coverage; pack journalism Katrina. See Hurricane Katrina Kennedy, D. James, 121 Kennedy, John F., 123, 163 Kerik, Bernard, 41 Kerry, John: candidacy (2004), 39, 42, 58, 117; Dean and, 39, 138; electoral/ popular votes (2004) for, 69–70; gay marriage issue and, 114n8; group support (2004) for, 71, 72–74; reli-

Index

gious voting (2004) for, 118, 119, 120, 132; as Senate incumbent, 154 Key, V. O., 169. See also realignment Keyes, Alan, 139 King, Martin Luther, Jr., 163 King, Peter D., 89 Kissel, Larry, 153 Kotecki, James, 19 Kucinich, Dennis, 25, 36, 127, 139 labor ad, anti-, 92 labor-business war, 91 ‘‘Labor to Neighbor’’ strategy, 92 LaHood, Ray, 86 Lehman Brothers investment house, 62 ‘‘liberal bias,’’ in media coverage, 13 Lieberman, Joseph I., 80, 95n13 Lott, Trent, 86, 95n5 mainstream media coverage (2008 presidential campaign), 10–18; citizen journalism and, 21; episodic, 10; general election coverage, 11, 14–15; issue coverage, 10, 12, 14; negative, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16; nomination phase, 11–12; online election media and, 19; prenomination phase, 11; tone of, for candidates, 12, 15, 16 matching funds. See presidential public financing system Matthew 25 Network, 128, 131 McCain, John: abortion issue and, 110, 111, 125; acceptance speech, 14; Bush, G. W., distancing of, 1, 3, 66; candidacy, 33, 34, 42, 43, 47, 48, 52, 166–67; Christian Right and, 124, 125, 130, 131; delegates won by, 48; election forecasting and, 99–100; electoral/popular votes for, 2, 67–68, 68, 69–70, 71, 75; energy policy issue and, 102, 104–5; foreign policy and, 64; general election campaign, 55–77; general election financing and, 144– 47, 145, 168; global financial crisis and, 14, 63–64, 66, 75; group support for, 71, 72–74; health care issue and,

187

102, 104, 111; Iraq War and, 103, 104; media coverage of, 12, 15, 16; ‘‘No Surrender Tour,’’ 40, 41; online video presence of, 23; presidential debates and, 64–65; primary/caucus results, 44–45; primary receipts, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144; religious affiliation and, 123, 124, 125, 130, 131; religious voting (2008) and, 130–33, 132 McInnis, Scott, 87 McNerney, Jerry, 153 meaning, of 2008 election, 161–77. See also presidential election media coverage (2008 presidential campaign), 9–27; audience preferences and, 25–27; of Biden, 12, 13, 15, 16; ‘‘liberal bias’’ in, 13; mainstream, 10–18; of McCain, 12, 15, 16; of Obama, 12, 15, 16; online, 10, 18–25, 168; of Palin, 12, 13, 15, 16 Mehlman, Ken, 4 Michigan/Florida delegates, 38, 39, 51 Miller, Matthew, 88 minor-party candidates, congressional elections and, 80, 94n2 modernists, 118, 119 money’s influence, on congressional elections, 90–91 moral values, 101, 102, 107, 109–11; culture war and, 109, 110. See also abortion issue; gay marriage issue; religion Mormon faith, Romney and, 35, 47, 123, 124, 164, 167 Morris, Dick, 5 mortgage crisis. See global financial crisis of September 2008 Musgrove, Ronnie, 86 MySpace, 24. See also Facebook National Association of Evangelicals (NAE), 121 national conventions. See Democratic National Convention; Republican National Convention national exit poll, 101, 102, 106, 107, 114n1. See also public opinion

188

Index

National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB), 92 national mood. See public mood national opinion. See public opinion National Republican Campaign Committee (NRCC): campaign financing, 82, 138, 148, 153, 154, 155–57, 156, 173, 174; campaign strategies, 82; candidate recruiting, 80, 94n3 National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC), 94n3, 155–57, 156 negative media coverage, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16 ‘‘netroots’’ online anti-Iraq war movement, 165 Network (Catholic organization), 128 NewAssignment.net, 20 New Deal period, 75, 93, 117, 170 New Hampshire primary: magnified influence of, 165; McCain and, 167; results, 44, 46; scheduling of, 38; ‘‘Yes, We Can’’ speech and, 23 new media. See online media coverage 9/11 attacks. See September 11th attacks nominals, 118, 119 nominations. See presidential nominations ‘‘No Surrender Tour,’’ 40, 41 ‘‘Not Proven,’’ 175, 177n3 NRCC. See National Republican Campaign Committee NRSC. See National Republican Senatorial Committee Obama, Barack: abortion issue and, 110, 111, 125, 129, 133; acceptance speech, 14; as African American president, 100, 110, 161, 162–64, 163, 168, 175, 177n2; African American support for, 7, 51, 71, 72, 110; Bush/Clinton Politics and, 2, 6–8; candidacy, 7, 33, 35, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52; ‘‘Catholics for Obama’’ and, 128; change and, 52, 59; coalition, components of, 7; ‘‘Dear Mr. Obama’’ video, 23; delegates won by,

49; Democratic National Convention (2004) and, 35, 68, 126; election forecasting and, 99–100; electoral college playing field and, 173; electoral/popular votes for, 2, 67–68, 68, 69–70, 71, 75, 172; e-mail fund-raising and, 6, 7, 145, 146; energy policy issue and, 102, 104–5; flag lapel pin and, 16; foreign policy and, 13, 64, 164; general election campaign, 55–77; general election financing and, 144–47, 145, 168; global financial crisis and, 63–64, 75, 76, 173, 176; group support for, 71, 72–74; health care issue and, 102, 104, 111; hope and, 163; ‘‘I Got a Crush . . . On Obama’’ video, 22, 23; Internet fund-raising and, 137, 158, 162, 165–66, 168; Iowa caucuses and, 42, 166; Iraq War and, 6, 103–4; media coverage of, 12, 15, 16; national preference for, 40; online video presence of, 23; Pennsylvania remark of, 21, 50, 128; polarized electorate and, 68; presidential debates and, 64–65; primary/caucus results, 46–47; primary receipts, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144; religious affiliation and, 126, 127, 128, 129; religious voting (2008) and, 130–33, 132; risks/ ambitions and, 8; socialism and, 66; success of, in general election campaign, 75; Super Duper Tuesday results and, 49, 52, 166; victory, economy issue and, 175, 176; ‘‘Yes, We Can’’ and, 23, 163 Off the Bus (OTB), 20, 21 online campaign videos, 19, 22–24, 168 online media coverage (2008 presidential campaign), 10, 18–25, 168; citizen journalism and, 19, 20–22; independent political news sites and, 13, 19– 20, 21, 22, 168; mainstream media and, 19; social networking sites and, 8, 19, 24–25, 27 online video presence, of Obama/ McCain, 23

Index

‘‘on the bus’’ reporters, 18, 21 open-seat contests, 89, 111 OpenSecrets.org, 95n6 OTB. See Off the Bus pack journalism, 18 The Page, 168 Palin, Sarah: acceptance speech, 60, 175; candidacy, 10, 13, 14, 174–75; as female candidate, 164; foreign policy and, 15; general election campaign and, 61–62; media coverage of, 12, 13, 15, 16; parody of, 15; as ‘‘pit bull with lipstick,’’ 15; religious affiliations and, 130; vice presidential debates of, 16, 64, 65; wardrobe of, 16 ‘‘Palin bounce,’’ 14 Panetta, Leon, 79 parallel public financing system, 145. See also presidential public financing system Parsley, Rod, 125 partisan allegiances, 170 partisan realignment. See realignment partisan surge/decline in congressional elections. See congressional elections party campaign committees. See Hill committees party identification, 84, 112 Patrick, Deval, 163 Patterson, David, 177n1 Paul, Ron: as advocacy candidate, 36, 48; Facebook and, 25; fund-raising by, 140, 143; primary/caucus results, 44–45; primary receipts and, 139, 140, 143; religious affiliation and, 122, 123; ‘‘Ron Paul Girl’’ and, 23; withdrawal of, 48 Paulson, Erik, 154 Pelosi, Nancy, 82, 89, 129, 135 Penn, Mark, 5 Pennsylvania primary, 50, 127–28 Pennsylvania remark, of Obama, 21, 50, 128 Perriello, Tom, 95n10 ‘‘pit bull with lipstick,’’ 15

189

pledged delegates, 37 polarized electorate: 2008 election and, 71; Bush Politics and, 6; Clinton Politics and, 5–6; Obama and, 68 political change. See change political news sites. See independent political news sites Politico, 13, 19, 20, 168 poll trend, general election, 57 popular votes. See electoral votes pre-election year campaign, 39–42 presidential debates, 64–65 presidential election (2004): electoral/ popular votes for, 69–70; group support for candidates in, 71, 72–74; religious voting and, 118, 119, 120, 132. See also Bush, George W.; Kerry, John presidential election (2008): campaign finance in, 137–60; general election campaign, 55–77; meaning of, 161–77; public opinion and, 99–116; religion in, 117–36 Presidential Funding Act, 157 presidential nominations (2008), 33–52; contenders, 34–36; McCain and, 33, 34; pre-election year campaign and, 39–42; primaries/caucuses (Democratic results), 46–47; primaries/caucuses (Republican results), 44–45; setting game rules in, 36–39 presidential primary receipts, 139 presidential public financing system: demise of, 137, 157, 167, 168; history of, 158; past influence of, 138, 158; 2008 campaign and, 56, 138, 139, 145, 165 presidential selection process, changes in, 161, 162, 164–68 primaries: campaign finance and, 138– 44, 139; caucuses (results), 44–47; dates selected for, 37–38; invisible, 39, 40, 41, 52; Pennsylvania, 50, 127–28. See also New Hampshire primary pro-choice, 91, 122, 126, 129. See also abortion issue pro-life, 111, 120, 123, 124, 129, 130

190

Index

public mood: congressional elections and, 83–84; global financial crisis and, 75, 83, 101, 102, 103, 113, 130, 131 public opinion, 99–116; economy issue and, 101, 102, 102–3, 113–14; election forecasting and, 99–100; energy policy and, 102, 104–5; foreign policy and, 112; health care issue and, 102, 104, 111; immigration issue and, 34, 101, 106, 107–8, 111; Iraq War and, 102, 103–4; moral values and, 101, 102, 107, 109–11; Republicans and, 113–14; terrorism and, 102, 105–6. See also abortion issue; gay marriage issue race relations, 162–63 Rainbow Coalition, 163 rally effect, 84 Ramstad, Jim, 154 Reagan, Ronald, 112, 124, 170 Reagan Era consensus, 162, 170, 171, 172, 175, 176 Reaganomics, 175 RealClearPolitics.com, 19, 168 realignment, 4, 75–76, 94, 133, 169, 175–77 receipts: general election, 145; House, 149–50; presidential primary, 139; Senate, 151–52. See also campaign finance recession, 63, 77, 172. See also global financial crisis of September 2008 red states, 84, 93; fifty state strategy and, 82, 155; Obama’s unity theme and, 59, 68, 71; ‘‘red-state/blue-state’’ division and, 170 ‘‘Red to Blue’’ program and, 82, 89 Reed, Ralph, 121, 125 Reid, Harry, 82, 93 religion (in 2008 election), 117–36; ethnoreligious theory and, 117, 118; general election campaign and, 130–33, 132 Religious Left: Campolo and, 129; emergence of, 121, 122; presence of, 131

religious restructuring theory, 118 religious strategies, 120–29; Democratic candidates and, 126–29; national conventions and, 129–30; Republican candidates and, 122–25 religious traditions, 118, 119 religious voting: in 2004 election, 118, 119, 120, 132; in 2008 election, 130– 33, 132 reporters, ‘‘on the bus,’’ 18, 21 Republican lawmakers, retiring, 56, 81, 86, 87, 89, 93, 153 Republican National Committee (RNC), 95n3, 144, 145, 146, 147, 155–57, 156 Republican National Convention, 14, 15, 23, 36, 37, 129; campaign strategies during, 58–61; religious strategies and, 129, 130 Republican Party: future of, election results and, 76–77; nominating campaign, 166–67; public opinion and, 113–14; unpopularity of, 76 Republican presidential nominations, 33–52; primaries/caucuses (results), 44–45 retention and recruitment gap, 85–86 retiring Republican lawmakers, 56, 81, 86, 87, 89, 93, 153 Richardson, Bill: candidacy, 35, 36, 39, 42, 127, 164; primary receipts, 139, 140, 141; withdrawal of, 43 risks/ambitions: Bush Politics and, 2; High Risk and Big Ambition, 2; Obama and, 8 RNC. See Republican National Committee Robertson, Pat, 121, 123, 124 Romney, Mitt: abortion issue and, 123; Bush, G. W. and, 3; candidacy, 34, 35, 42, 43, 47; Mormon faith and, 35, 47, 123, 124, 164, 167; primary/caucus results, 44–45; primary receipts and, 139, 142, 143, 171; withdrawal of, 143 ‘‘Ron Paul Girl,’’ 23 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 62, 75, 93, 172 Rove, Karl, 2, 3, 5, 6 Rubin, Robert, 172

Index

Saddleback Community Church, 121, 125, 126, 174 same-sex marriage. See gay marriage issue Sanders, Bernard, 80 Santorum, Rick, 120 Schier, Steven E., 2 Schumer, Charles E., 82 Scoop08, 20, 21 Scott, David, 90 Senate campaigns, financing of, 151–52, 154–55 September 11th attacks, 16, 40, 50, 84, 106, 112, 123 Shaffer, Bob, 92 Shaheen, Jeanne, 93 Shea-Porter, Carol, 153 Shuler, Heath, 120 Silver, Nate, 168 Simmons, Rob, 87 Smith, Gordon H., 93 socialism, Obama and, 66 social networking sites, 8, 19, 24–25, 27 social safety net, 85, 111, 112 Sojourners magazine, 122, 127 Spitzer, Eliot, 177n2 ‘‘spread the wealth,’’ 65, 66 state delegate equivalents, 42 strategic contenders, 80 straw poll, 42 Strickland, Ted, 120 subprime mortgage crisis. See global financial crisis of September 2008 superdelegates, 37, 49, 51, 166 Super Duper Tuesday, 38, 39, 42, 47, 48, 52; Clinton, H., and, 49; Obama and, 49, 52, 166 Tancredo, Tom, 122, 124, 139 terrorism: public opinion and, 102, 105–6; September 11th attacks and, 16, 40, 50, 84, 106, 112, 123 Thomas, Craig, 86 Thompson, Fred: candidacy, 12, 34, 43, 47, 52, 140, 167; primary/caucus results, 44–45; primary receipts and,

191

139; religious affiliation and, 124, 125; reluctancy of, 12, 34, 52, 167 Thompson, Tommy, 139 traditionalists, 118, 119 traditional media. See mainstream media coverage Truman, Harry, 1, 84 Tsongas, Paul, 7 Tsunami Tuesday. See Super Duper Tuesday twenty-first century election campaign, 9, 14, 18, 27 Udall, Mark, 92, 93, 95n12, 154 Udall, Tom, 93, 95n12, 154 unity: American people and, 5, 6; Obama and, 59, 68, 71. See also polarized electorate unpledged delegates, 37, 45, 49. See also superdelegates uReport/uAsk platforms, 21 U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 92 U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB), 122 Van Hollen, Chris, 82, 89 vice-presidential candidates: debates of, 16, 64, 65; media coverage of, 12, 13, 15, 16. See also Biden, Joe; Palin, Sarah videos. See online campaign videos; specific videos Vilsack, Tom, 11, 139 Volcker, Paul, 172 voters: groups, candidates and, 71, 72–74; younger, Democratic Party and, 7, 84–85, 163–64; younger, Obama and, 7. See also electoral votes; issues; religious voting Voting Rights Act, 163 Wallis, Jim, 122, 127 wardrobe, Palin and, 16 Warner, Mark, 93, 154 Warren, Rick: abortion and, 110; Saddleback Community Church and, 121, 125, 126, 174

192

Index

The Way to Win: Taking the White House in 2008 (Halperin and Harris), 5 web-based technologies, campaign and, 6. See also online media coverage web-media. See citizen journalism Wicker, Roger, 86 Wilder, L. Douglas, 163 women candidates. See Clinton, Hillary; Palin, Sarah Wright, Jeremiah, 16, 50, 128, 131

Wurzelbacher, Samuel Joseph, 17, 65. See also ‘‘Joe the Plumber’’ ‘‘Yes, We Can’’: campaign slogan, 163; New Hampshire primary and, 23; video, 23 younger voters: Democratic Party and, 7, 84–85, 163–64; Obama and, 7 YouTube videos, 19, 22–24, 168

About the Editors and Contributors

Robert G. Boatright is assistant professor of government at Clark University. He is the author of Expressive Politics: Issue Strategies of Congressional Challengers (2004) and is currently completing a book manuscript comparing campaign finance reform in the United States and Canada. Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier is Vernal Riffe Professor of Political Science, Courtesy Professor of Sociology, and director of the Program in Statistics and Methodology at The Ohio State University. She is the coeditor of the 2008 Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology with Henry E. Brady and David Collier, and coauthor of Event History Modeling: A Guide for Social Scientists with Bradford S. Jones (2004). David E. Campbell is John Cardinal O’Hara, C.S.C., Associate Professor of Political Science and founding director of the Rooney Center for the Study of American Democracy at the University of Notre Dame. He is the author of Why We Vote: How Schools and Communities Shape Our Civic Life (2008). Roger H. Davidson is professor emeritus of government and politics at the University of Maryland and visiting professor of political science at the University of California–Santa Barbara. His recent books are Understanding the Presidency, 5th ed. (2008), edited with James P. Pfiffner, and Congress and Its Members, 11th ed. (2008), coauthored with Walter J. Oleszek and Frances E. Lee. James L. Guth is William R. Kenan Jr. Professor of Political Science at Furman University. He has written widely in the field of religion and American — 193 —

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About the Editors and Contributors

politics and is coeditor of the Handbook of Religion and American Politics (2009). John F. Harris is the founder and editor in chief of Politico.com. His The Survivor: Bill Clinton in the White House (2005) was named a ‘‘Notable Book of the Year’’ by the New York Times. His most recent book (with Mark Halperin) is The Way to Win: Taking the White House in 2008 (2006). Jonathan Martin is senior political writer for Politico.com. He covered the GOP presidential candidates in 2008 and will serve as White House correspondent during the Obama presidency. Barbara Norrander is professor of political science at the University of Arizona. She conducts research on public opinion, voting behavior and presidential nominations. She is the coeditor, with Clyde Wilcox, of Understanding Public Opinion, 3rd edition (2009). Diana Owen is associate professor of political science and director of American Studies at Georgetown University. She is an editor of The Internet and Politics: Citizens, Voters and Activists (2006) and Making a Difference: A Comparative View of the Role of the Internet in Election Politics (2008). Nicol C. Rae is professor of political science and Senior Associate Dean for Liberal Arts at Florida International University, Miami, Florida. His most recent book (coedited with Timothy Power) is Exporting Congress: The Influence of the US Congress on World Legislatures (2006). Steven E. Schier is Dorothy H. and Edward C. Congdon Professor of Political Science at Carleton College in Northfield, Minnesota, and director of the college’s study program in Washington, D.C. He is the author or editor of eleven books, most recently Panorama of a Presidency: How George W. Bush Acquired and Spent His Political Capital (2008), and numerous scholarly and media articles.