Terrorism in India, Volume 3

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Author: Ved Prakash

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TERRORISM IN INDIA (Volume - III)

Col. Ved Prakash

KALPAZ

TERRORISM IN INDIA

"This page is Intentionally Left Blank"

TERRORISM

IN INDIA ("()llllll~-III)

Col. Ved Prakash

Terrorism in India (Volume Ill)

© Co/. Ved Prakash ISBN: 978-81-7835-747-8 (Set) ISBN: 978-81-7835-750-8 (Vo/. 3)

All rights reserved. No Part of this book may be reproduced in any manner without written permission. Published in 2009 in India by Kalpaz Publications C-30, Satyawati Nagar, Delhi-110052 E-mail: [email protected] Phone: 9212729499

Lasser Type Setting by: Quick

Media,~elhi_

Printed at : Young Art Press, Delhi - 92

,-

Contents Page 14. India Fights Terror Joinily with Russia, • USA and Others

769

15. Naxal Terror: Initial Phase

799

16. Countering N axalism

845

17. N axalism : Present Situation

889

18. Naxal Movement in Chhattisgarh

949

19. N axal Terror in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat and Jharkband

1010

20. N axa~ Terror in Orissa and some Other States

1067

Glossary

1101

Index

1105

"This page is Intentionally Left Blank"

14 Indi a Figh ts Terr or Join tly with Russ ia, USA, and Othe rs INDIA AND RUSSIA: JOIN T FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM "Inter nation al comm unity should unite to face new threat s and challe nges posed by countr ies where there is a sympa thy for terrori sts. The world needs to focus adequ ate attenti on on such countr ies." There is obviou s if an obliqu e refere nce to P,akis tan in this statem ent. These are words of an emissa ry of Russia n Presid ent Vladim ir Putin, speaki ng to the press at New Delhi on 25 Oct. 2006. "AI Qaeda of today is not what it was in 2001. Clones of Al Qaeda have sprung up everyw here. They act indepe ndentl y but they are bathed in the ideology and radica lism of Al Qaeda "l, , says Anato ly E. Safonov, who is also Specia l Repre sentat ive of Intern ationa l Coope ration in the Fight Again st Terror ism and Transn ationa l Organ ised Crime . Safono v contin ues his plain- speak: "The Taliba n and al Qaeda are very active. Infiltr ation is taking place and hostili ties are taking place, too. Elsew here terrori sm is spread ing its roots, so the proble m is long-te rm. It is not enoug h to exting uish the flames , the need is for destro ying the breedi ng ground ." He was obviou sly drawi ng a parall el with the way the malar ia is contro lled - not by doctor s alone but by drying up the swamp s that breed mosqu itoes. Safonov was also critica l of Washi ngton' s role in Mgha nistan and US - backe d gover nment in Kabul , for their failure on narcot ic control: "Apar t from his will, which Mr. Karza i voices, we do not see noticea ble results . The rize of seized drug is larger

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and govern ors and officials may have been sacked or replac ed but the respo nse does not corres pond to the threa t .... Mgha nistan will see a record - breaki ng produc tion of heroin , most of which will reach Europ e via Russi a or funne led eastw ards throug h India. No effort is being made to stem the inflow of precur sors, used in the manuf acture of drugs, into Mgha nistan . Cartel isation of narcot ics indust ry is in its final stages ." A finer analys is of Pakist an's duplic itous role in its so - called counte r - terror ism fight is difficu lt to come across . Witho ut saying so in so many words , Putin' s emissa ry has left nothin g to imagi nation about Pakis tan fomen ting terror ism in Mgha nistan , as also in India. It has certain ly been appreh ending selecti vely some AI Qaeda oppera tives to garne r some Brown ie points from the US, which keeps pattin g it on the back and thank ing its 'frontl ine partne r in its war agains t terror. But the fact is that in spite of this public bonho mie, each feels it is using the other for its own purpos e. As for the rest of the world, it has no doubt that Pakist an is shelte ring Osama and his Qaeda cadres , as also the Taliba n, in the wild areas skirtin g the Mgha n border , especi ally in Wazir istan. If any proof of this double dealin g was requir ed, Musha rrafpr ovided it by signin g a peace accord with pro-Q aeda and Taliba n tribes men in North Wazir istan. Finally , let it be said clearly that Mush arraf and his coteri e of genera ls have not given up their long - cheris hed dream of having Mgha nistan at its beck and call for provid ing them 'strate gic depth' if need be. Safono v is being unduly harsh with Karzai . In best of times, no rules of Mgha nistan has ever contro lled its war-li ke tribes, includ ing the British . All they did was to leave the tribal leader s to their own device s and guard the border s agains t foreig ners, and that too not alway s successfully. Karza i is attem pting to restor e some order to a ravage d country. But he has neithe r the troops nor admin istrati ve appar atus to do so. Whate ver little he achiev es is undon e by the milita nts/ul tras crossi ng into Mgha nistan from their safe haven in border areas of Pakist an.

India Fights Terror Jointly with Russia, USA and Others

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If things continue as at present, Russia, India and other neighbors should be prepared to see the return of Taliban rule in that luckless company. None would then be in a position to say that they were not warned.

Returning to Safonov, he co-chaired the fourth meeting of the India - Russia Joint Working Groups on counter - terrorism in New Delhi on 24 Oct. He talked of high level oftrust between New Delhi and Moscow and said the two were determining "strategic goals" to bolster their "sectoral cooperation" in the fight against terror. Then he explained their cooperation in the field of counter - terrorism: "The intelligence agencies of both countries are sharing information. We are also sharing knowledge on movement of militants and of possible terrorist attacks by suicide bombers. Our agencies are creating a financial intelligence database too."

INDIAAND SAARC India and SAARK leaders take a 'small step' against terror: 4 April 2007 The SAARC leader on 4 Apr 2007 called for a joint fight against terrorism, with a specific mention on taking measures to suppress financing of terrorist acts. In concrete terms, the announcement was akin to a small baby step forward rather than a 'bold' stride. As officials of India and Sri Lanka had been stressing that terrorism was ve~ high on the Agenda, there was a lot of expectations of a 'bold statement, emanating from the Summit. The two paragraphs of the 30-paragraph Summit Declaration, however, do not seem to be ground-breaking, with the language being largely recycled from previous Summit Declarations. Similar to their previous declarations, the leaders condemed terrorism "in all its forms and manifestations, wherever and against whomsoever committed", recommitted themselves to implementing the SAARC Regional and Additional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism and called for urgent conclusion

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of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism. The Sri Lankan had been strongly pushing for specific mention of terror financing and they got it. The Declaration committed the members to "take every possible measures" to prevent financing of terror acts ''by criminalising the provision, acquisition and collection of funds including through front organis actions and also to counter trafficking of narcotic drugs, trafficking in persons and illicit arms." There wa; a minor victory of sorts for India, with the Declaration making a specific note of the Indian draft for a SAARC convention for mutual assistance in criminal matters. If added that Sri Lanka had offered to host a meeting of legal Advisers to examine the draft, before the Home Ministers have their joint meet in Oct 2007 in India. The leaders have urged that there should "regular followup and implementation of the decisions taken". This is despite the public opposition by Pakistan, both by its Foreign Minister and Prime Minister, who had categorically said that these matters should be dealt with only at the bilateral level. Officials say the working method of SAARC made it difficult for Pakistan to keep out this provision from the Declaration. Currently, India is negotiating Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLAT) with Nepal and Sri Lanka. Pakistan's reluctance on SAARC adopting a comprehensive convention on counter-terrorism needs a detailed examination.

INDIAAND SRI LANKA LTTE spill-over threat: India Beware: 2007

LTTE, a designated terrorist organization, is banned in India. But this fact should not induce' smugness and complacency among the Indian security minders. The development over the last some months mid-2006


773

onwards, should be a matter of concern for New Delhi, and especially Chennai. A deeply worrying mix of political collusion, official complacency, mercenary considerations, and corruption has enabled the LTTE to exploit Tamil Nadu both as a source of supply and a base of operations. The chain of seizures by the Indian Navy, Coast Guard, and the state police over the past three months (mid Nov-mid Feb 2007) points strongly to the LTTE's use of Tamil Nadu coastlal locations, especially landing points in the Rameswaram-Tuticorin-Cuddalore stretch, for a two-may terrorist traffic across the Palk strait. 2 The Coast Guard's 13 Feb 2007 seizure in Indian waters, off Point Calimer, of a boat bearing on A.K. 56, five grenades, chemicals, and most sensationally, a suicide jacket with belt, sent shock moves. through India's security agencies. It was quickly established th¥ the boat belonged to the LTTE's 'naval' arm, the Sea Tigers. Its fiv~-member crew included a 'Black Tiger' operative and an Indian decoy to mislead security personel. But the big shock some with the delayed discovery that the boat was lined with a huge quantity of TNT explosives - enough to blow up a harbour or warships - and also carried detonators and a charger to trigger a gigantic explosion. The Indian intelligence agencies are apprehensive that the LTTE boat, which according to the crew sailed from on islet off the Jaffna coast and came into Indian waters to avoid interception by Sri Lankan Navy, could be one of the several suicide bombing vessels. As if this were not en~)Ugh, the police have just unearthed (18 Feb) an aluminium unit in Madurai that supplied the Tiger's ingots for improvised explosive devices (lEDs); and arrested some members of the supply and smuggling network. The discovery of reactivated network of the LTTE in south India was not the result of any deliberate, preplanned operation. It was fortuitous, the chance outcome of a vehicle transporting boosters getting involved in a road accident near Madurai in Nov. 2006. There were some earlier developments in Tamil N adu

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and Andhra Pradesh indicative of links with the Maoist groups. And now the surge in the smuggling and other clandestine activities of the Tigers and their supporters in Tamil Nadu is cause for serious concern. In the days gone past, the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi led to a wift crackdown that proved remarkably success fully in ridding the State of the LTTE's network and presence. But in the subsequent period, at a certain stage, there were doubts about Karuna Nidhi led DMK's line on the LTTE. DMK's 'perceived' sympathy for LTTE might have been the result of Tamil Nadu's contentious state politics. But presently, the situation is worse. Some parties like MDMK are openly supportive of the LTTE cause. Due to proactive policy of the present Government at Colombo, LTTE has been pushed on the backfoot in the East, creating sympathy weve in Tamil Nadu. The Sri Lanka is presently on the boil (May-Jun 2007) and exploits of 'air' arm of the LTTE in the recent weeks has given a new meaning to the LTTE threat, not only for Sri Lanka but also for the region. In the given circumstances, there must be zero tolerance of a weakened terrorist outfit's exploitation of fractious politics of Tamil Nadu and using it as a supply and landing base. In the context of these happenings, it was inexplicable to hear state's DGP seeking to downplay the significance of the Coast Guard's major catch by asserting (even before the investigations had got under way) that the 'dangerladen' vessel was not heading for Tamil N adu coast, and worse than this saft-pedalling of the threat, he pleaded virtual helplessness in dealing with a porous border. If the former assertion is suggestive of a political backing for the DGP, the latter part is an attempt to shift the responsibility to the Coast Guard and the Indian Navy. Considering the security implications of the LTTE moves, the Central and Tamil Nadu governments must shake themselves out of their complacency and respond urgently and suitably to the extremist menace.


775

3 LET,cadres arrested: Delhi saved an attack: April 2007 Divali blast mastermind Abu-ul-Kama had planned another violent outrage in Delhi as was indicated by arrest of three terrorists from the Dilli Haat on 26 Apr 2007 who had been trained for the 'job' by him at Muzaffarabad Camp in PoK. One of the arrested terrorists, a Pakistani named Abu Oasim and resident of Mandi Bhamal, was reported to be trained in Daura-e-Lashkar for fidayeen attack. He came to Delhi on 26 Apr afternoon from Patna by the Magadh Express. Raj met him after his arrival in Delhi. The two traveled from Old Delhi to Dilli Haat by a three wheeler. The two were met by Shafaqat and Shabbir at the Haat, as the latter were waiting for them at its main entrance. Shafaqat and Shabbir hail from Doda district of Jammu and Kashmir. "Raj has not as yet been nabbed by police who are still out searching for him. The three arrested terrorists were on a reece, though their motive is still unknown to us," said Karnal Singh, Joint Commissioner of Police (Special Cell), Delhi. The police disclosed that Abu Ammar, the Operational Chief ' Commander of LET in Jammu region had trained Shafaqat and Shabbir, and subsequently directed Shafaqat to deliver the consignment of arms and explosives to Oasim. "These terrorists have established their hideouts in Delhi and we are trying to locate them", police said. Raj knows the topography of Delhi and the job assigned to him is to bring terrorists from Patna and to familiarize them with Delhi. Oasim came in contact with LET men when he was in class XII. Some LET cadres came to his house when he was in the school and persuaded him to join their outfit. It is obviousthat the militant outfits are launching newly trained ultras for fidayeen attacks "who are not given enough time to change their mind till the mission is executed."

According to the police, Oasim alias Hussain got greatly influenced by the ethics of the militant outfit Lashkar. He. and ,

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Terrorism in India

one of his classmates were selected for further training. He undertook training of Daura-e-Aam in 2002 while in Jun 2003 he had training of Daura-e-Khas. After getting training of Daura-e-Laskhar in 2007, he was sent from Karachi to Nepal where he met one Vinod. Vinod kept his passport with him and took him to Patna to be introduced to Raj. They all were controlled by Abu-ul-Kama, who is presently based in Pakistan. Shafaqat had joined Harkat-ul-Jihad in 2000 and shifted to LET in 2004-05. In 2006, he came in contact with Abu Ammar. He along with Shabbir had came to Delhi on 26 Apr 2007 with the consignment, as mentioned above. After the arrest of the three at the Dilli Haat on 26 Apr (in South Delhi), the police made some seizures from them which included 2 kg RDX four detonators, two hand grenades, one timer and Rs 25, 000 in cash. 3 Intelligence suggests the ultras have in the past some years changed their infiltration / entry routes into India. Due to free cross-border movement from Nepal, the militants are now using it as an easy route to India. Even sea routes are gainingtavours for entry into India. Initially, the militants were using Kashmir border to enter India. But due to heavy losses, they have withed over to Bangladesh border.

LTTE threat along South-Eastern Coast: Aug 2007 The Indian Navy and Coast Guard on 23 Aug 2007 might conducted a massive search operation by mobilizing vessels deployed in the region almost simultaneously, the police, the Coastal Security Group and other agencies conducted a combing operations along the coast. These operations were in consequence of the red alert that was sounded along the southeastern coast of Tamil Nadu following a reported message from Sri Lanka that a group of suspected operatives of liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam hpd sneaked into the State for smuggling purposes. The message, which originated from Sri Lanka, was sent to all security agencies manning the east coast on 23 Aug, saying


777

a group of 4 to suspected operatives were headed for Rameswaram in a boat. They began their journey from northern Sri Lanka [Jaffna Peninsula] in the late hours of 22 Aug. 4 On receipt of the message, the Coastal Security Group alerted all its check posts along the coast. All coastal police stations, including Rameswaram, Dhanushkodi, Keelakarai and Thondi, were asked to monitor the movement of suspected persons. The Intelligence Bureau and 'Q' Branch swung into operation. Likely landing points and villages known for smuggling were searched, and all new comers questioned. R Thirugnanam, SP, Ramnathapuram, told the said daily on 24 August: "Based on the information we received, police teams have conducted a search operation at various places along the coast. The police parties will continue their operation." Naval craft, including rubber boats, carried out a search operation in Palk Strait. Marine commandos were also pressed into service. Personnel manning the Forward Observation Post (FOP) at Dhanushkodi were asked to question those 'visiting' the area. Naval personnel at the detachments from Thondi to Nagapattinam searched for the suspected intruders.

LET Penetrates India's North-East: Cause for Concern . Three Lashkar-e-Toiba militants, all from Manipur [Mohd Salman Khurshid Kori, Abdul Rehman, and Mohd Akbar Hussain], were arrested from Red Fort bus stand about 7.30AM on 19 Dec 2006, along with 2 kg RDX, two detonators and one hand grenade, the police said. The arrests were made by the ~p.ecial cell of the Delhi Police. Initial investigations revealed some more information about their identities51. 1. Kalam Khurshid Kuri, alias Hussain, 23. 2. Abdul Rehman, alias Mohd Hussain, 24. 3. Mohd Akbar Hussain, alias Habib, 21.

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After the revelation made by these three terrorists, security agencies have reported that the LET and other terrorist outfits are trying to create bases in the north-eastern part of India. Joint Gommissioner Police (Special Cell), Delhi Police Karnal Singh has fuller details: "This is the first time that we have arrested a LET recruit from the north-eastern part of India. From information provided by them, it seems that terrorists are trying to establish their base in the North-East. The three revealed that had met the president of the People's Liberation Front Party of Manipur, and he had taken them to Bangladesh to meet up with the LET operatives there."5 The JCP further disclosed that, "we got information from two Bangladeshi terrorists, arrested by the Special Cell on 16 Oct (2006) that these three persons would be coming to Delhi. We worked on that information and arrested them." The trio had a plan to attack busy markets of the capital Delhi and then escape to Bangladesh. Here is some other information gathered by police: • Salman Khurshid had visited Aligarh in 2001 where he came in contact with Salim Salar, who later sent him to PoK for training. • In Oct 2004, he crossed the border and joined -other terrorists in Poonch area. • Later, Slam an was sent to Manipur to recruit persons there. He came in contact with one Noor of People's Liberation Front, who arranged a meeting with the LET operatives in Bangladesh. • The other two terrorists, Abdur Rahman and Mohd Akbar Hussian were recruite~ by Khurshid. They worked under the LET commander Abu Faris in -Poonch' and Abu!F.urkan of Sopore in the valley. At

t~e

end, it bears emphasis that it is the frrst instance of


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the Pakistan based terror outfit, LET, .recruiting cadres from the North-Eastern States. The three were arrested by the Special Cell sleuths as soon as they alighted from a bus, coming from Jammu, at the Red Fort bus stand. JCP Karnal Singh had added that this was the first instance of the LET infiltrating into the North-East. A status report by the MHA has emphasized the fact that Pakistan and its agencies are spreading their poisoning terrorist tentacles beyond the boundaries of the state of Jammu and Kashmir into central, western and eastern parts of India. These arrest show they are also focusing on the remote ~nd distant corners of the sub-continent.

INDIA AND UNITED KINGDOM "UK to Learn Counter-terrorism from India": UK Envoy In an exclusive interview to a daily, UK High Commissioner . to India Sir MichaelArthur, who was in London, 14-15Apr 2007, to attend the 10th UK-India Roundtable, said that the UK could gain from the Indian experience of addressing radicalism. "Both the countries have a lot to learn from each other and we are doing that. India and the UK are both diverse societies. India has faced the scourge of terrorism, and Britain is facing the problem, more in the last two years." The High Commissioner mentioned two ways of enhancing the cooperation to fight extremism. "It can be done in a practical way through government level. The second way is to generate a wider debate in the media, in conference and sound tables over ways to preserve diversity and defeat radicalization". Sir Arthur emphasized the importance of the civil society discussions at the Round table, which leads to valuable, recommendations for the Governments to reflect upon. During the interview, he said India and the UK face the challenge of combating terrorism along with preserving their diverse societies. There is a need to enhance the cOQperation in

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the fight against the terror. "It is necessary to increase the cooperation and the two countries are doing that." He touched upon another important aspect of cooperation in a larger field of economy: "India is emerging as one of the dominant global powers of 21st century and Britain wants to work closely with India in this context. India and the UK have fantastic potential for very close relationship. The two countries have so much in common in terms of shared values, legal and educational systems. 6 The 10th Round table was Co-Chaired on the Indian side by Nitin Desai, former Under Secretary General, United Nations. He told a daily, "The Round Table discussed the paper on the UK-India bilateral relations in 2020. It has recommendations to enhance bilateral relationship in almost all the areas. Desai told that the paper has a reference to counterterrorism initiatives. Both countries have high potential to work more closely on this area. The topics discussed included emergence of China and how Britain and India look to it. "There were discussions on democracy and diversity, education and scientific research as well as health care. The three-day deliberations ended on Sunday (15 Apr 2007)." UK frees two held in failed bombings case Two men, not publicly identified, who had been detained as suspects in connection with the failed bombings in London and Glasgow in Jun 2007, were released without charge, British police said on 15 July. The two men had been arrested at the residences of the Royal Alexandra Hospital, near Glasgow. It is the same hospital that employed one of the main suspects, Bilal Abdullah, the "passenger in the Jeep Cherokee that crashed into the Glasgow terminal two weeks ago." He has been charged with conspiracy to cause explosions. Of the eight people arrested in the case, two others have been charged and three released.


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The second main suspect, Kafeel Ahmad, an Indian engineer identified as the Jeep's driver, remains in critical condition from burns. The police have not been able to question him, so he has not been charged. The other suspects charged are his brother, Sabeel Ahmad, and a distant cousin in Australia, Mohd Haneef, Western officials close to the case it might he difficult to obtain convictions.

Indo-UK Pact to Protect Infrastructure from Terrorists British Foreign Secretary Margaret IJeckett said on 7 Nov 2006, at Mumbai : "Apart from drawing practical lessons from terrorists attacks on mass transit systems in Mumbai and London, India and UK have agreed to share best practice and planning for the Delhi 2010 Commonwealth Games and the London 2012 Olympics and to exchange ideas on protecting 'critical national infrastructure'. She was talking to the press after her meeting with Maharashtra Chief Minister Vilasrao Deshmukh, Chief Secretary DK Sankaran, Mumbai Police Commissioner AN Roy and ATS Chief KP Raghuvanshi. Referring to the-political agreement for closer cooperation on counter-terrorism reached between Prime Ministers Blair and Man Mohan Singh in Oct 2006 at London, Becket said: "We are already sharing our knowledge and expertise so that we can from past tragedies and try to prevent such events in the future. Our police forces and intelligence agencies talk to each other at all levels. But we are going to do more and have decided on a shared package of action based upon our shared values." "We are working to draw practical lessons from our experience of terrorist attacks on mass transit systems. The Metropolitan police have already sent a team out here to work with your Commissioner and were hugely impressed by what they found," she said.

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India to Discuss Terrorism with UK and EU (Oct 2006) Prime Minister Man Mohan said at New Delhi (on 9 Oct 06) on the even of his departure for 6-day visit to UK and Finland (EU chair, presently), "that his talks with the leaders of Britain and Finland would highlights India's fight against terrorism, which has become particularly significant in the wake of the recent attacks". Given the common threat "we face, cooperation in the area of combating terrorism has become particularly significant." During this visit, he would also attend the 7th Indo-EU Summit.

What the Others Say? Peter Foster of the Daily Telegraph writes in its issue of 16 Aug 2007 under the heading, "Delhi on alert after AI-Qaeda threat": "India has stepped up security ahead of [the] 60th anniversary of independence celebrations after threats by AlQaeda and other Islamist militant groups to target New Delhi. The city's landmark Red Fort, where India's Prime Minister, Dr. Man Mohan Singh, will make the annual independence day address, was sealed off to the public yesterday by 70,000 soldiers and police. "India has suffered multiple attacks from Islamist radicals in recent years, including the 2001 attack on its Parliament that brought the country to the brink of war with Pakistan and more recently the bombing of Mumbai's rail network in July 2006. "Security officials said they were taking the threat-made in an AI-Qaeda video released on 5 August -'very seriously' although they added there was no specific intelligence of any threat to today's parade."7

Learning Anti-Terrorism from India: Aug 2007 India especially its Army, has been fighting terrorism and


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insurgeI\cy ever since its emergence as an independence nations 60 years ago. It should come as now surprise that with the ever growing spectre of terrorism looming large over the globe -the apparition is growing bigger and fiercer by the day -more and more countries are keen to learn from the Indian Army's substantial experience in dealing with militancy, insurgency and sub-conventional warfare. Consequently, the 1.13 million Army, world's third largest, "will hold as many as 10 joint military exercises before the end of 2007", says are port in a daily dated19 Aug 2007. The countries slated to participate in this jointness range from Maldives, Seychelles, Thailand and Mongolia to Russia, UK, China and, of course, the US. "The thrust in most of these joint exercises will be counterterrorism, both in urban and rural settings." Apart from building "interoperability" the occasion also provides India with an opportunity to engage constructively with nations in Central and East Asia as well as those in the Indian Ocean Regiop and beyond. Intere.stingly, the banner of protest and doctrinal antiAmericanism displayed by the determined Indian Left notwithstanding; exercises with the US constitute a major chunk of this "encounter" with foreign armies. The (lndian) Army alone has held som~ 20joint exercises with the US forces over the past five years, with tneir codenames ranging from "Balance Iroquois" and "Judh Abhyas" to "Shatru Jeet" and "Vajra Prahar." In 2007 itself, India and US armies are slated to hold five joint exercises. If the joint exercises conducted by the Navies and Air Forces of the two nations are included, the tally during the last five years of joint Indo-US military engagements will climb to almost 50. Incidentally, ~the Army's elite Counter-Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School (CIJWS) at Vairegate, Mizoram is a big hit among foreign armies for its unique facilities, which promises to teach them how to "fight the guerrilla like a guerrilla" Large number of armies from different corners of the world have been

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requesting and getting vacancies for their soldiers to be trained here, and the waiting list is growing. And returning to pet hate of Indian Communists, a team of VS Marin!'!s will be back ~t the CIJWS for another joint exercise between 25 Aug and 15 Sep (2007). 8 "Conventional wars as an instrument of state policy have become less relevant today. Sub-Conventional operations are emerging as the predominant form of warfare", a senior officer averred. He further added: "With India having fought terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir and North-East for decades, foreign armies are very keen to learn from our experience, especially after the 9-11 terrorist strikes." Even countries like Seychelles, Maldives, Thailand and Mongolia are keen to imbibe counter-terrorism skills. The exercise with the Royal Thai Army, code named "Maitree" (=Friendsh~p) and slated to be hold at Ramgarh (Jharkhand) from 1 to/19 Sep (2007), is meant to "share experiences in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism" as well as to improve interoperability. Terrorism against India too will be Fought: Powell: Oet 2001

New Delhi, Oct. 17,2001. Even as the V.S. Secretary of State Gen. Colin Powell, concluded his visit here today, the Prime Minister, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, will visit Washington next month to hold discussions with the V.S. President, Mr. George W. Bush, on steering the global campaign against terrorism. Mr. Vajpayee is expected to visit Washington on November 9. He will address the V.N. General Assembly the next day in New York. Mr. Bush's invitations to the Prime Minister had been formalized on Friday, highly-placed Government sources said. Mr. Vajpayee may head for the V.S. from Moscow after concluding his three-day visit to Russia on November 7. During a day-and-a-half of talks, which hovered around


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developments in Pakistan, Kashmir and the region, the D.S. reinforced the view that the focus of the on-going international campaign against terrorism should remain fixated on Mghanistan and the Al-Qaeda network. Diversionary tensions between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, therefore, had to be kept in check. India, on its part, saw in the dialogue, an opportunity to reduce terrorist violence in Kashmir and regain its strategic foot-hold in Mghanistan.

Restraint Urged On Kashmir, Gen. Powell appears to have "convinced" Pakistan to desist from provoking India, the sources said. Without referring to the recent incident of firing along the LoC, . the D.S. also urged India to exercise restraint. Gen. Powell advocated the resumption of a dialogue between India and Pakistan. India reiterated that a dialogue could resume only if Islamabad curbed the promotion of terrorism in Kashmir. Endorsing the comprehensive Indian approach on political extremism, Gen. Powell, at a joint press conference with the External Affairs Minister, Mr. Jaswant Singh, this morning, deplored "terrorism wherever it exists, whether it is the kind of terrorism we saw on September 11, or the kind of terrorism we saw on Oct 1 in Srinagar."

I

Retracting from his earlier position on Kashmir, Gen. Powell rephrased the formulation attributed to him that Kashmir was I "a central" issue in the India-Pakistani equation. Referring to his Islamabad press conference he said, "I didn't say 'a central.' If you look at it carefully, I said 'central' in the sense that I believe it is an important issue, and to suggest it isn't wouldn't have been accurate." India appears to have persuaded the D.S. that it needs to reassess the merit of accommodating a "moderate" wing of the Taliban in the future government of Mghanistan, the sources said. While the two countries agreed

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Terrorism in India

on resurrecting a broadbased, multi-ethnic post-Taliban dispensation, they differed with respect to the details. India's formulation revolved around accommodating representatives of the Northern Alliance and the former King, Zahir Shah, and additional representation for the Pushtuns. Pakistan is also understood to have persuaded the U.S. to ensure a prominent role for the Pushtuns in a postTaliban regime. The U.S., however, expressed discomfort with this arrangement. There is skepticism in Washington that King Zahir Shah and his followers, some of whom are prominent businessmen in Europe, may not be acceptable to fellow Pushtuns. It also has serious reservations on the Northern Alliance and apprehends that if it takes over Kabul, it may reaccommodate some of the hard core Taliban elements. That would undermine the very purpose of the anti-terrorist campaign. The U.S. has acknowledged that as neighbour who "lives down the street," (as distinguished from "next door neighbour"), India has a role in the political and economic reconstruction of Mghanistan. 9 D.S. Envoy Vows to end Terrorism in India: Nov 2001 New Delhi, Nov. 21, (2001). U.S. ambassador to India Robert Blackwill vowed that the fight against terrorism will continue until the scourge has ended in both India and the United States. "The fight against terrorism will not end until terrorism against the United States as well as India has ended," Blackwill told a news conference for foreign journalists in New Delhi. Terrorists can never be called freedom fighters and no country will be permitted to harbor terrorists, the envoy said in reply to a question on Pakistan's alleged supports of Muslim separatists in India's northern state of Jammu and Kashmir.


787

India accuses Pakistan of fueling militancy in its only Muslim-majority state. Pakistan denies the accusation, saying it is only lending moral and political support to the separatists, whom it refers to as freedom fighters. New Delhi has urged Washington to ban several militant groups that operate out of Pakistan. India has even submitted proof to the V.S. of terrorist training camps in Pakistan, though Islamabad denies their existence. While some major militant groups have been banned following the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in the V.S., New Delhi would like to see the list enlarged. Blackwill stressed that India and the V.S. are on the threshold of a major relationship especially since the recent visit of Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee to Washington. During the visit, Vajpayee met with V.S. President George W. Bush and the two leaders agreed to cooperate in fighting terrorism. IO

USA, India and Terrorism There is a serious mismatch between Indian and American perspective on the terrorism. India has proved it by supplying incontrovertible facts and figures influential world capitals, including Washington, that Pakistan continues to be the epicenter of terrorism posing a serious threat to world peace. This does mean that the Al-Qaeda terrorist network, once based in Afghanistan, has to be a major worrying factor for the international community. India, like America does have proper appreciation of the AI-Qaeda problem and the VS-led major campaign against it. The difficulty, however, is that the VS policy-makers do not give the Indian viewpoint the seriousness it deserves. A large number of the outfits, most of them directly or indirectly linked to AI-Qaeda, with their bases in Pakistan and Occupied Kashmir (PoK), have been involved in large-scale Jammu and Kashmir and elsewhere in India. Pakistan's ISI has been providing all terrorism in kinds of support to these outfits,

788

Terrorism in India

which have their well-equipped training camps on the other side of the border. These are part of the well-known facts and figures documented by India. In the wake of the Sep 11 terrorist attacks on the USA, the super power did force Pakistan to take action against the well-organized terrorist elements in that country and President Pervez Musharraf gave a solemn promise in this regard to the world community, the USA included. But Pakistan is yet to fully implement its commitments. Perhaps, Russian President Vladimir Putin did mention this ugly reality while talking to President George W. Bush on the telephone, as indicated by White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer. During his recent New Delhi visit the Russian leader had openly asked Pakistan to dismantle' the terrorist infrastructure which remained intact despite General Musharraf's promise to the contrary. Mr. Putin fully realizes the gravity of the situation as Pakistan succeeds in misleading the world vis-a.-vis terrorism. India hpes it will be able to convince the USA that the fight against terrorism will be of no use unless the Kashmir-related terrorist outfits with their vast infrastructure are destroyed root and branch. Pakistan, perhaps, believes that the USA is not going to raise serious objections to its designs aimed at fomenting trouble in India. That is why on the occasion on Friday President Musharraf and Prime Minister Zafarullah Jamali declared they would not amend their destructive policy on Jammu and Kashmir -which means no let-up in Pakistan's sponsorship of terrorism in India. Is the US taking note of this? America's silence at this juncture will strengthen the belief that it been maintaining double standards on terrorism. As against this, the USA acted quickly when Pakistan expresses its discomfort at any Indian move even if it was aimed at strengthening relations with Afghanistan. Here the reference is to A.m~rican demarche recently issued to India to avoid its enthusi~stic involvement in the economic and political reconstruction in Afghanistan. Why? Because India's increasing presence in Afghanistan (the two have had traditionally friendly relations except for the brief

Indiq Fights Terror Jointly with Russia, USA and Others

789

period of Taliban rule) is seen by Pakistan as a threat to Islamabad's designs for subjugating that impoverished land again. India has been America's supporter in the drive against terrorism. Agreed that Pakistan has utility for the purpose owing to the locational advantages it offers. But there is a thing called fair play. The super power should not be so unreasonable as it was pampering an ally known for its deceptive behaviour. 11

'Cross-border Terrorism has not Ended' New Delhi June 13 (2003). The Vnited States today frankly admitted that Pakistan had not stopped cross-border terrorism against India and vehemently denied that Washington was putting any pressure on New Delhi to send its troops to Iraq as part of the "stabilizing forces" in the war-ravaged country. "Terrorism emanating from Pakistan (against India) is not over. Global terrorism will not end until cross-border terrorism against India ends permanently," the V.S. Ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill, told reporters here. Disagreeing with suggestions that the V.S. was adopting double standards in measuring terrorism, he said, "a terrorist is a terrorist is a terrorist ...they are killing innocent people." Mr. Blackwill said the V.S. would do everything it could to see that terrorism emanating from Pakistan against India ended permanently. Global terrorism will not end until terrorism against India ends permanently. On Mr. Advani's statement on Thursday that Pakistan was the epicenter of terrorism, he said "we are not going to associate ourselves with any particular articulation." Asked whether Pakistan's President, Pervez Musharraf, was not going .soft on terrorist outfits, the Ambassador said, "this is a matter of judgment .... he has been a close ally for us. Some 500 AI-Qaeda activists have been apprehended with the assistan~e of Pakistan." The V.S. had the resolve and stamina to end terrorism. "Nether India nor the V.S. can accept terrorism for political purposes," he said.

Terrorism in India

790

Mr. Blackwill said the US would like India and Pakistan to move more rapidly towards the normalisation process. "The extraordinary statesmanship shown by Prime Minister Vajpayee in extending his hand of friendship to Pakistan hopeful will create enough political space for the two countries to move forward towards normalization. "The U.S., he said, would' encourage a dialogue between the two countries but hastened to add that "the control process lies in the hands of India and Pakistan." On the V.S. proposal that India send its troops to Iraq, Mr. Blackwill said the decision was entirely in New Delhi's hands. "If India were to decide against sending troops to Iraq, this is not going to damage the Indo-V.S. relationship." However, Indian troops would not be used for combat operations and would operate under the Indian flag if New Delhi decided to send its men to the war-torn nation. The V.S. Ambassador said that his country would certainly want Indian troops to be part of the stabilizing force as they were highly professional and very experienced in peacekeeping operations. decision on India's part to send its troops to Iraq would further enhance the Indo-VS relationship.

Any

The Pentagon team, scheduled to arrive here on Monday, was not coming with any brief, he said. "It is not coming here to suggest to India to decide one way or the other." The Deputy Prime Minister, L.K. Advani, currently in the V.S., had himself stated that the V.S. had not put any pressure on him to send Indian troops to Iraq, the Ambassador said. 12

STATE DEPARTMENT APPLAUDS US-INDIA COUNTER TERRORISM PARTNERSHIP ULFAAdded to Terrorist List says the US Embassy in New Delhi In its 2004 Country Reports on Terrorism released April 27, the U.S. State Department cited India as an important ally in


791

the Global War on Terror, and underlined both countries' continuing political commitment to combating terrorism together. Among the highlights, the report added the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) to the Other Selected Terrorist Organizations (OSTO) List and recognized important changes in India's counterterrorism legislation, particularly the repeal of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) and its replacement by a revamped Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (ULPA) ... It stressed that India suffered from hundreds of terrorist attacks during the year, particularly in Jammu and Kashmir, the Northeast, and the "Naxalite Belt" and noted the Indian government's supporting Bhutanese and Nepalese counterterrorism efforts. Referring to Jammu and Kashmir, the Interim Director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) said April 27 there was, on average, a terrorist attack nearly every day in Kashmir. According to the NCTC in 2004 there were a total of 284 attacks in Kashmir that met the statutory criteria for significant terrorist incidents. The report said that ULFA was added to the other Selected Terrorist Organizations (OSTO) List as a consequence of its continuing targeting of civilians. (Note: Groups on the OSTO List are terrorist organizations that do not target the national security ofthe United States or its citizens). Referring to ULFA as the most prominent insurgent group in India's Northeast, the report noted ULFA's use of extortion to finance military training and weapons purchases that it reportedly procures and trades in arms with other Northeast Indian groups, it may have linkages with other ethnic insurgent groups active in neighboring states, and it receives aid from unknown external sources. The report reflected the merger of the primary N axalite groups into the Communist Party of India (Maoist), added this

!

792

Terrorism in India

group to the OSTO List, and expanded the description of lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LET) to include its operation under various' fronts and names of convenience. V.S.-India cooperative counterterrorism training expanded in 2004, with hundreds of Indian military and law enforcement officers trained in V.S.-sponsored programs. The report also includes a section on global jihad, which gives a brief overview of the violent Sunni jihadi movement. I3

India's Fears of Terror-via-sea Real: US: Aug 2007 The VS feels India should ratify counter terrorism measure like the Container Security Initiative (CS!), given its fears that terrorists might use sea-route to spread mayhem.

VS Pacific Command Chief Adm Timothy Kealing said on the issue: "Such (Indian) fears are realistic as terrorists are feeling hemmed in their present sanctuaries ... The VS has stressed in meetings with Indian officials that there can't be any let up in pressures mounted on terrorists." Towards this end, the top American seaman said his country was in dialogue with a number of like-minded nations, including India, on measures like CS!. "Ratification of this will lead to sharing of data base, which is essential to keep track of terrorist movements," the Admiral said. Much like the controversial PSI (Proliferation Security Initiative), CSI was floated by the VS in the aftermath of the Nine-Eleven strikes in 2001. It stipulates that all cargo bound for America be checked by VS customs officials at the originating ports. The participating country, in turn, gets reciprocal rights to do the same.

US officer Learns Counter-insurgency from India: April 2007 India and the VS seem to be seriously engaged in learning from each other in various fields of warfare. A senior VS Army


793

officer was in Srinagar, Jammu and Kashmir mid-Apr 2007, to exch~ge notes on Indian army's long battle to defeat Insurgency in the Valley. The four-day Visit of Brig Gen Patter Vangjal, Director, Strategic Plans and Policy of the US Department of Anny (DoA), was aimed at increasing military engagement between the US and India. If the Indian Army was keen to exchange notes on counter-terrorism operations in the state with the visitor, the latter meant to gather information on new tactics used by terrorists and current methodology adopted by Indian troops to tackle insurgency. The senior officer from the DoA had been invited by the Indian army. The situation faced by the US Troops in Iraq and methodology adopted by Indian troops in counterinsurgency operations in the State figured prominently in the discussions. Sources averred that the US Army is looking at Indian experience to learn new tactics to cut troop losses in Iraq. A senior Indian Army officer said: "They have been facing a war (in Iraq) for the past five years and are looking for solutions from across the world. Doctrine as well as current problems and methodologies in operations were discussed during the visit." Brig Gen Vangjal had led the investigation into the 2005 fatal shooting of an Italian intelligence agent, Nicola Calipari, and wounding of journalist Giuliana Sgrena by American troops in Iraq. The exchange visit is a continuation of increasing Indo-US cooperation in counter-terrorism operations. While there have been a number of high-profile visits between senior officers in the recent past, a joint counter-terrorism exercise was also conducted between Indian Infantry troops and the US Marines in Belgium in 2006.

India-US must Fight Terror Together: Chairman, JCS The seniormost US military officer and the Chairman of its Joint Chief of Staff (JCS), Gen Peter Pace, on 5 Jun 2006 at New

794

Terrorism in India

Dethi hoped India and the US would seize on the "golden opportunity" to work jointly against terrorist threats. But he refrained from dwelling on the specifics and, while praising the Proliferation Security Initiative (PS!), felt it was up to India to weight the advantages and disadvantages of joining this multicountry effort to curb proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Addressing the media after meeting senior Indian security officials, he said India and Pakistan were justified in arming themselves with "defensive" weapon systems, because "if you have sufficient capacity, you would not act too quickly if you feel you could respond". It is stabilizing to have a country know it has sufficient defenses and intends to use it only for defense, said Pace; adding that the formulation held for an American weapons package for Pakistan and, India's bid to test Agni IH, its longest range missile. Dwelling on the trust of Indo-US military ties, Gen Pace indicated that the intention is to reach a stage where potential enemies have to not only to contend with individual militaries but also "the two of us [who] could work together to maintain peace and friendship". In the meantime, "we must understand that terrorists know no boundaries and they don't play by the rules. To be effective in the long-term, single nations can not fight alone. We have to find ways to share intelligence and ideas so that boundaries are not a benefit to terrorists." "Differences don't matter." Gen Pace downplayed bilateral differences on some security issues because "there are 10 per cent of the things you may not like us to do and there would be 10 per cent of the things we may not like you to do. But there are 80 per cent of the things that are good for both. Let us focus on that." He said Pakistan had been a good partner in the war against terrorism immediately after 9-11 when the US needed to go into Afghanistan. "We could not have done that without Pakistan's support."


795

On Taliban bases in Pakistani territory, Gen Pace said the tribal areas in Pakistan are difficult -':'or its Government to "work through and win."

Most Foreign Jihadis in Iraq are Saudi Arabians: Jul 2007 Here is an irony of situations. Although the US has been accruing Syria and Iran of helping insurgents in Iraq, it is US ally Saudi Arabia which is the largest source of foreign insurgents in the war-torn country. The Los Angeles Times reported on 16 Jul 2007 that the largest number of foreign militants targeting the US security forces and Iraqi civilians are from Saudi Arabia. The proportions in comparative terms are: 1. Saudi Arabia

45 per cent

2. Syria and Lebanon 15 per cent Some other points made by the paper follow: • Nearly half of the 135 foreigners in the US detention facilities in Iraq are Saudis, a senior US military officer is quoted as saying. • Fighters from Saudi Arabia are thought to have carried out more suicide bombings than those of any other nationalities. • 50 per cent of all Saudi fighters in Iraq come as suicide bombers. • This has left the US military in the awkward position of "battling an enemy whose top source of foreign fighters is a key ally that at best has not been able to prevent its citizens from undertaking bloody attacks in Iraq, and at worst shares complicity in sending extremists to commit attacks against US forces, Iraqi civilians and the Shiite-Ied government in Baghdad". • Although the Saudi government does not dispute some of its youths are ending up as suicide bombers in Iraq, it asserts it has done everything to stop the bloodshed.

Terrorism in India

796

Gen Mansour Turki, spokespersons for the Saudi Interior Ministry explains his country's helplessness: "Saudis are actually being misused. Someone is recruiting them to be suicide bombers. We have no idea who these people are. We are not getting any formal information from Iraq. Iraq war: Lives lost till 15 Jul2007 (since war began on 19 Mar 2003) Coalition Forces US

3,614

UK

159

Other nations

128

Iraqis Military Civilians

4,936-6,401 67,058-73,372

India-US counter-Terrorism Exercise Troops from 21 Punjab and US Marine's 2/4 Regiment participated in a counter-Terrorism exercise called Shatrujeet 2006 from 25 Oct to 3 Nov 2006 at Indian Army's Commando Training School, Belgaum in North Karnataka. Around 320 soldiers from both countries were involved in this joint training. After some tough operations like cordon-and-search and house-clearing, the Americans would take off for non-combat pursuits for lighter diversion like playing 'kabaddi', and learning some rudimentary cricket. An Indian officer certified that the Americans are quick-learner so what if they pronounced the game as 'cuppa tea'. The guest officers had a great time. Lt Lee, one of the American platoon commanders, said, "My troops are playing 'Kabaddi' in barracks, too". After the 'kabaddi', cricket and jokes, the 45 Marines would sit down for a session of yoga, lest critics said the Indians did not impart the spiritual lessons besides the usual combat


797

Trends in West and India: A contrast Here is an interesting observation on the trends in terrorism in India and the West. Indian experience was possibly the most unusual at least, different from the one in the West. The revival of Hinduism among the intellectuals at the turn of the 20th century contained millenarian influences - a foreign theme in the Hindu tradition - and these helped create the Bengali terrorism/terrorist. But the enthusiasm and, indeed, the leading members of that movement eventually got absorbed into the passive resistance tactics, reversing the process in the West where the failure of the passive resistance movements often provide justification for terror. Contrasting developments, these! But these observations about contrasting situations to two ground realities belong to a period exactly one century ago. But the objective situation today in India as also the most is totally different: That glaring contrast is missing, absent. The shape and contours of terrorism are totally different today: for the simply reason that most of the terrorism is externally sponsored and supported. India has suffered ravages of the terrorism for long decades, in fact, the unhappy experience is as old as India's Independence, one consistent ingradient of terrorism in India in all areas has been foreign hand : • Terrorism III North-East. It stated with Naga ensurgency, fallowed by the Mizos and many others. It is still on some states. Foreign hand to begin with belonged to China, followed in course of time by Pakistan, Mynmar and Bangladesh. • Terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan was and still remains the country that provides support and succour to the Islamist terrorists, all the "confidence building measures (CBM)," notwithstanding. In addition, militants from more than a dozen countries have joined the jihad to help their coreligionists on the invitations from the latter.

798

Terrorism in India

• The Khalistan terrorism in Punjab (1977-93) was substantially helped by Pakistan, as most of the insurgent leaders were, at one time or other, ensconced in the safety the hospitality extended by that country. Same is true for the last decade or so. Besides the support they got from across the border, the Khalistan movements got a considerable help in 'men, money and material' from the NRI Sikhs settled abroad, especially in the UK, Canada and the US. • In the recent years, the terrorist violence has also spread to other parts of India, beyond the confines of the three regions mentioned above. Here again, of Bangladesh are the major culprits.

Notes 1. Cited, Ramesh Ramachandran, Asian Age, 26 Oct, 2006. 2. Editorial, Hindu, 22 Feb, 2007. 3. Faizan Haider and Anand Prakash, Pioneer, 28 Apr, 2007. 4. C Jaishankar, Hindu, 25 Aug, 2007.

5. 'ihbune, 20 Dec, 2006. 6. Statesman, 20 Dec, 2006. 7. Nandini Jawli, Pioneer, 16 Apr, 2007. 8. Reproduced in Indian Express, 26 Aug, 2007. 9. Rajat Pandit, Times of India, 19 Aug, 2007.

10. Hindu, 18 Oct, 2001. 11. http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi MOWDQ/is 2001 Nov 26/ai 8182804. 12. http://www.tribunelndia.com/2002/2002/209/edit.htm (9 Dec, 2002). 13. Hindu, 14 Jun, 2003. 14. US Embrassy, New Delhi, press release dated 28 April, 2005.

15 Naxal Terror: Initial Phase Naxalism in India: A Broad Picture Naxalism or Naxalite violence has come to denote the LeftWing Extremism (LWE) in India. After merger ofthe two major factions, it has assumed a new but more glamorous rubric of Maoism left wing elites prefer the term, some analysts believe, because of recent victory of their cousins, Maoists, in Nepal. In this work, the term N axalism will be found used more often that its imported version, Maoism. This Chapter is laid out in four parts: I. Analyses and Review of N axalism in India. II. Measures and institutions for combating the menace of LWE, described by the Prime Minister, Man Mohan Singh, as gravest treat to nation's internal secui-ityeven bigger and more serious than the cross-border terrorism. Ill. Naxalites, strategies, plans and documents. IV. Events and incident. The N axalism in the States will be covered in the next two chapters as indicated below: Chapter 18: Naxalism in Chhattisgarh. Chapter 18: Naxalism in other states (except Chhattisgarh) ANALYSES AND REVIEWS: NAXALISM IN INDIA Violence, Attacks and Casualties The MHA has confirmed (April 2006) an increase in the number of attacks by the Left extremists. The police casualty has gone up by 53 per cent and civilian casualty by 11 per cent. 9 Worst-Affected States The table below shows the attacks and relevant casualty data for the nine worst-affected states: UP, Bihar, West Bengal, Jharkhand, Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Madhya Pradesh.

800

Terrorism in India Naxal Violence: 2002-2006

Year

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1 Jan. 30Apr

Maoist Attacks

1,465 1,597 1,533 1,594 550

Civilians

Killed Policepersons

Maoists

382 410 466 516 219

100 105 100 153 62

141 216 87 223 93

Source: Home Ministry.

Naxalite activities during 2006: ACHR Report: Jan 2007 As many as 749 people were killed in the N axalite conflict in 2006, says the Asian Centre for Human Rights Report (for 2006) released on 10 Jan 2007 at New Delhi'! Statistical details The report, "Naxal conflict in 2006", gives the break-down of these 749 fatalities: Civilian 285 Security Personnel 135 Naxalites (alleged) 329 Total fatalities 749 The data on state-wise killings is given below: Chhattisgarh 363 Andhra Pradesh 135 Jharkhand 95 Maharashtra 60 Bihar 45 Orissa 25 West Bengal 22 Uttar Pradesh 2 Karnataka 1 Madhya Pradesh 1 Total 749

Naxal Terror: Initial Phase

801

Naxalite-inflicted fatalities: 2004-2006: Government figures Naxalites have killed as many as 129 people's representatives and 411 government officials mostly policemenbetween 2004 and 2006. Almost all the people's representative, except JMM leader Sunil Mahato, killed by Maoists during the period represented village, block, and district-level groups. Sunil Mahato was, incidentally, the lone MP who became a victim of the Red ultras. These facts were placed on the table of the Rajya Sabha on 5 Sep 2007 by Minister of State for Home Affairs Sriprakash Jaiswal. Other details from the Minister's reply are tabulated here.

Fatalities Caused by Naxalites Year

2004 2005 2006

People's Represented No. of Attack Killed

114 111 31

45 64 20

Government officials (Mainly Security Personnel)

100 153 158

Physical Spread of Naxalism 2005 A total of 1608 incidents of Naxalite violence were reported from 460 police stations in 11 states. 2006 The figure for 2006 dipped slightly to 1509 incidents which were reported from 395 police stations that constituted 4.65 per cent of the total number of 8,488 police stations in the affected (11) states. Compared to 2005 when 892 people lost their lives, there ' was decrease in killings during 2006(749). But "the Salwa Judum campaign and its disastrous consequences, such as the rights violations by the Naxalites, the security forces and the Salwa Judum activists, captured centre stage" during the year (2006). The Report said the campaign led to the forcible displacement of 43,740 persons as of Dec 2006 in Dantewada district, the spread of conflicts to 1,427 police stations, and an increase in the striking capability of the Naxalites.

802

Terrorism in India

"These acts of Maoist constitute serious violations of the Geneva Conventions and the Rome Statute of International Criminal Court", according to Suhas Chakma, Director, ACHR. Ironically, the Naxalites, who frown at the lack of development, were blocking many development initiatives in the areas where they exercise control by targeting labourers, officials and companies. They were systematically targeting all government buildings that could provide shelter to security personnel.

Report is Harsh on the Security Forces The claims of the security forces that all persons killed were "Naxalites" are far from the truth. "There have been credible reports of torture, rape and extra-judicial executions by the Salwa Judum activists and the security forces, especially in the process of forcibly bringing the villagers under the Salma Judum fold", Chakma said. The Report further says : "The Centre is supporting wrong policies" "The Salwa Judum campaign, which was responsible for 48.50 per cent of the total killings in Chhattisgarh, had more to do with local political considerations than resolving the Naxalite conflict", Chakma said. The ACHR expressed concerns over the continued 'law andorder" approach of the Government in dealing with the crisis as reflected by the creation of a division within the Home Ministry to address the Naxalite conflict. The Report recommended the creation of a separate Ministry for speedy development of the N axal-affected areas, similar to the Ministry for Development of the North-Eastern Region. The ACHR also wanted the Centre to intervene and ask the Chhattisgarh Government to end the "Salma Judum" campaign, not to bring civilians in conflict with the N axals, and investigate all allegations of human rights allegations. The list of 55 district affected by N axalism receiving financial assistance

Andhra Pradesh 1. Adilabad

2. Karimnagar

Naxal Terror: Initial Phase 3. Khammam 4. Mahbubnagar 5. Medak 6. Nalgonda 7. Nizamabad 8. Warangal

Bihar 9. Aurangabad 10. Bhojpur

11. Gaya 12. Jehanabad 13. Kaimur (Bhabual) 14. Nalanda 15. Patna 16. Rohtas

Chhattisgrah 17. Bastar 18. Dantewada 19. Jashpur 20. Kanker 21. Kawardha 22. Rajnandgaon 23. Surguja

Jharkhand 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30.

Bokaro Chatra Dhanbad Garhwa Giridih Gumla Hazaribagh

803

804

Terrorism in India

31. Koderma 32. Latehar 33. Lohardaga 34. Palamu 35. Ranchi 36. Simdega

Madhya Pradesh 37. Balaghat 38. Dindori

Maharashtra 39. Bhandara 40. Chandrapur 41. Gadchiroli 42. Gondia

Orissa 43. Gajapati 44. Ganjam 45. Mayurbhanj 46. Malkangiri 47. Koraput 48. Rayagada 49. Nawrangpur

Uttar Pradesh 50. Chandauli 51.

Mirzapur~

52. SonbhadTa

West Bengal 53. Bankura 54. Purulia· 55. Midnapur

805

Naxal Terror: Initial Phase Rashtriya Sam Vikas Yojana Funds to the States States

No. of Naxaliteaffected districts

Amount to be released by the Centre Rs. in crore

Amount released upto 2006-07

Cumulative expenditure reported by the states

Andhra Pradesh

8

360

195

125.68

Bihar

8

360

195

154.44

Chhattisgarh

7

315

277.50

181.40

13

585

495

369.18

Jharkhand

63.49

Madhya Pradesh

2

90

Maharashtra

4

180

112.50

69.32

Orissa*

3

135

97.50

80.42

Uttar Pradesh

3

135

120

69.34

West Bengal

3

135

75

47.55

90

*Excludes the four KBK districts Malkangiri, Koraput, Rayagada and Nawrangpur which are covered under the Special Plan. Source: Ministry of Panchayat Raj website.

125 Naxal-hit districts • Bihar

25

• Jharkhand

20

• Andhra Pradesh

19

• Orissa

14

• Chhattisgarh

10

• West Bengal

9

• Madhya Pradesh

6

• Maharashtra

6

• Uttar Pradesh

6

• Karnataka

5

• Kerala

2

• Uttarakhand

2

1 • Tamil Nadu (Recognised by the Planning Commission as such; Times of India, 22 Sep 2007).

806

Terrorism in India

Is the Maoist Threat overblown? India has 28 states and 12 are affected by Maoist violence, or is it insurgency? Incidentally some hold that 13 states are affected by the Naxalism germ!

It seems an alarming picture: the Maoists have areas of influence stretching from Kathmandu to Karimganj in the east (Assam) or from Amlekhganj (Nepal) in the north to Adilabad (Andhra Pradesh) in the south. Colour these 'red' states in red on the map and you get a quadrilateral in the middle of the Indian state, more than one-third of its total expanse. As of today, the 'red' corridor from north to south cuts the east of India from its west. This corridor, analysts fear, would become a compact revolutionary zone, where the writ ofthe Indian state would not run. The concept of the zone is said to have originated at a Siliguri meeting in Sep 2001 of Maoists from India, Nepal and Bangladesh2. "If the Maoists control this zone, trains would not run from east to west". This has serious implications for India's economy and security. If the 550 incidents of Naxalites violence reported in 2006 (1 Jan to 30 Apr), 26 were attacks on public transports, including railways. If train services are disrupted, there would not be any foreign direct investment in the zone, and consequently the minerals of Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh would not reach the industries of Maharashtra and Gujarat. And, analysts conclude, finished goods from these industries would not be allowed to be transported to Kolkata, Haldia, Paradip and Visakhapatnam for export to the east. Is it an overdrawn scenario? Perhaps. Hence the question from some quarters: If the Maoist threat can be so debilitating to India's security, stability and economy, why is the government not acting as it indeed did against the militants! insurgents in the North-East, Kashmir, and Punjab? The answer possibly is that the picture is indeed overdrawn. In a rumbustious democracy like India's, certain disorder is inevitable, and perhaps even welcome. We had a sandal wood brigand operating in the jungles on the borders of two South Indian States who defied the law with impunity for long years


807

till someone at the centre got serious. In the instant case, apparently impressive statistics are being distorted to point a threatening scenario. After all, statistics can hide more than they reveal!

12 states, indeed, have a Maoist problem. But as a Home Ministry official asked, how much of territory do the insurgents really control in the red-crayoned districts-forget the states? Another statistic, given out by the MHA, gives a more accurate picture. In 2003, as many as 518 police stations in these 12 states reported some sort of Maoist activity within their jurisdiction; 517 in 2004 and 509 in 2005. These police stations reported this activity in some corner of their areas. Put together, these states have 8,695 police stations. That means hardly 6 per cent of the police stations in the reportedly affected states witnessed Maoist activity. Most security specialists believe that the Maoist threat is more hype than real. An analyst, who studied Maoist insurgency in Nepal, positg, "the threat of Maoists creating a compact revolutionary zone from Amlekhganj in Nepal to Adilabad in India is somewhat far-fetched"3 This realistic assessment is not meant to foment complacency among the security agencies, neither to belittle the dangers posed by the Maoists. In fact, after the success of their counterparts in Nepal, the Maoists in Indian might start having dreams of replicating that success story in India. But then India is neither Nepal, nor its security structure so brittle. The Naxal violence in India is certainly manageable but then there ,is political angle to it which comes in the way of it being handled more effectively-as will be seen here. There are other factors also that delay the adoption of harsher measures. The Maoists cannot challenge the might of the Indian state, given their countrymade rifles and crude landmines fashioned as the IEDs. Prakash Singh, a former DGP of Uttar Pradesh, who recently authored The Naxalite Movement in India, points out two hurdles in the way of the N axals realizing a compact revolutionary zone: "one, the discontinuities in the areas under the influence ofleft-wing extremists, and two, the fragmentation and factionalism within the movement."

808

Terrorism in India

A member of the National Security Advisory Board has another but more important angle t~ the Naxalite movement: "Their striking power is extremely limited. But they are of more than nuisance value. They can politically influence the inhabitants of these (affected) districts." Now this is the language that any political class understands instantly, and Indian politices do so fastest. That should explain why harsher measures in a coordinated manner in all the states have not been as yet instituted. All such things, unfortunately in India, fall prey to party politics, which can be a dignified definition of 'vote bank' politics. Prime Minister may characterize Naxalism as the "most serious internal security threat" to the country, but his government would to initiate coordinated effective steps to curb the menace lest his party accuses him of damaging the party's poll prospects. Forget about Naxal threat which is still not so potent, India is unable, to frame a tough, no-nonsense policy on the terrorism which is a serious threat to country's sovereignty and integrity. It is deemed a "soft state" against terrorist depredations. After every terrorist act, be it Mumbai 1993, Mumbai 2006, or Malegaon 2006 outrages, all we hear are cliches mouthed by governing party leaders, including Prime Minister. Even on 25 Nov 2006, Prime Minister Singh refused to institute any harsher laws to curb the terrorism, but asserting all the same to display zero tolerance towards it but acting within the existing laws." If critics accuse the central government of pulling its punches while dealing with terrorism, they could not be wrong. But having rescinded the POTA within weeks of its coming to power, to appease a particular community as the NDA so often explains to please its Left allies, the UPA seems to be an idle spectator when the country is coming under repeated, periodic terrorist attacks. Unfortunately, the UPA is hampered by double disability: the 'vote bank' politics and the Left, the major supporter of the Coalition Government, breathing down its every other day. This distraction was necessary to show the realities of life in India of 2006-and its inability to deal effectively with the NaxaLthreat. So reverting to Naxal threat, the political considerations of interests of the ruling party explains the reluctance on the part of the Union government to deploy the Army or the heavily-


809

armed paramilitary forces. Even at the recent meeting (April 2006) held with the Standing Committee of the Chief Ministers of the affected states, the thrust was on the need for building up security and intelligence Capabilities at the state level and for preparation of the action plans to address the development concerns of the regions, rather than about sending ParaCommandos or armed helicopters which some states had demanded. Most analysts believe that only positive state action can solve the problem, not the armed might of the state. But a former police chief pointed out that most states are not willing to address this issue: "I remember telling a minister in Andhra Pradesh that the only solution is land reforms. His reply was, that was not the reply expected from me." A researcher says insurgency has spread to more districts in the recent years because of the launching ofthe large mining and other resource-based industries in the 'forested areas'. Such projects have displaced a lot of tribals who are not adequately. compensated, and even worse, the pie is not shared with them. Such are the people who fall easy prey for the recruiting agents of the Naxal 'army'. Understandably, the Maoists talking against the big corporations and foreign investors get lager listeners among the affected people. "Naxal activity on the decline": Home Secretary: Dec 2006 Union Home Secretary v.K. Duggal on 28 Dec 2006 at Bangalore, expressing satisfaction over the decline in Naxal activity said focus on development would go a long way in containing the menace. The states witnessing displacement in the wake of industrialization should have better resettlement and rehabilitation policies. Addressing the press at the end of two-day 22 nd meeting of the National Coordination Centre on Naxalism (NCCN), he added: "The Naxal-affected States should make the optimum utilization of funds under various Central schemes for development and improvement of connectivity in rural areas." , Home secretaries and/or DGPs of the 13 Naxal-affected States were present at the meeting. Some other points made by Duggal are 8uTT'mpd 1"~ llPre.

810

Terrorism in India 1. The Government's approach was to bring the Left-wing extremists back into the social mainstream. But firm action would be taken if they attacked police personnel or innocent people. 2. Naxal menace was now limited to Bihar, Jharkhand, Oris sa, Chattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh, Eastern Maharashtra and West Bengal. 3. While a total of 510 police stations faced Naxal violence in 2005, the number came down to 372 in (Dec) 2006. 4. Different States making various demands for Central assistance were assured of additional support to help strengthen their police forces by improving the intelligence set-up and by imparting training to the personnel. 5. He reiterated that the Government was ready to hold talks with the N axalites if they gave up arms. 6. He urged the affected States to adopt a surrender policy for the N axals on the lines of the one in Andhra Pradesh.

A Critique of Centre's Stance It is rather difficult to understand, much less accept or appreciate, the Centre's strange stand that Maoist menace is not a national problem. Is there a parameter or a guideline to classify a situation as national problem? Perhaps not if one takes Home Ministry's view into account. As already mentioned above, Home Secretary Duggal says N axallLeft-wing extremism is not a national problem. It is obvious that he is only voicing the views of his Ministry. It is interesting to note that like a generous overlord, the Home Ministry is assuring all help to states to deal with 'their' problem of Naxalism. But this repeated but misplaced munificence is jarring and grating to the national sensibility. This stance needs close examination and objective analysis. The MHA records say at least 900 people were killed in Maoist activities in 2005, while 420 people have already faJlen to ' violence by Oct 2006. If a certain kind of violence results in the death of 900 people, what is wrong in describing it as a national problem, ask many analysts. Prime Minster Man Mohan Singh, while chairing the meeting of Chief Ministers of Maoist-infested States in


811

Apr (2006) had described the problem as the ''biggest internal security challenge". And now, Home Ministry speaking through its secretary confined the problem as those of the concerned states and steadfastly refused to give it national perspective. To repeat Duggal's arguments, Maoist-infested violence is on the wane because against 510 police stations that reported Naxalite violence in 2005, the figure for 2006 came down to 372. But 225 districts of the country are affected by various kinds of militancy with as many as 8,695 police station areas being hit by Maoist activities. There are about 9,500 Maoists spread across these 13 States. Duggal, however, expressed satisfaction over the coordination between the Central agencies and those of the states in combating the Maoist menace. But situation demands more than coordination. Against the Centre's insistence on not calling Naxalite threat as national, what does one say when the same Ministry (MHA) in its 2006-07 Report released early Apr 2007 expresses serious concerns about CPI (Maoist) spreading its tentacles into southern states of Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Karnataka-the states which were not so threatened by the menace so far? India: March of the 'Red Army': Status Report: 2007 India is not known to have dealt effectively with the terrorism within its border. Same can be said about the left-wing· extrem.sm which is, slowly but surely, spreading in the country. Till recently, the Central Government was not serious about ultra-left extremism. It was rather positively evasive, dismissing the Naxalite threat as 1\ law and order problem. Oflate, it deems it more than a law and order, problem. Happily of the country, Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh has publicly acknowledge the seriousness ofthe Maoist threat. Here aspects of threat as they impinge on the country as a whole will be examined. The situation in various states will be reviewed in their respective sections. Extent of spread of Maoist influence "A big chunk of Central India is completely under the control of Naxalites, Maoists or what ever they may be called locally. It is their writ-and not that of the Tmlian State-that runs

Terrorism in India

812

in 92,000 sq km. from Gadchhiroli in Maharashtra to Abujmarh in Chhattisgarh. They make "the laws and implement them. The state and its mechanisms are simply off the radar in these parts of India."4 . The above is truth, disturbing and unpalatable, but truth al the same. It is stark, even if a little exaggerated. That is not alL See what Ajay Sahni of the KPS Gill-led Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, says: "while a huge chunk has, already been lost, if the government does not wake up, there is serious danger of losing more. Large parts of Chattisgarh, Orissa, Jharkhand and West Bengal are already under the influence of Maoists and close to being completely over run." The Red corridor, extending from Nepal down to Andhra Pradesh, encompasses nine states and has been categorized by the Union Home Ministry as "badly affected" by Maoist violence. - Official estimates peg the armed strength of Maoist cadre at about 10,000 to and over ground sympathizers/workers around 45,000. Security experts over the numbers are much higher. What lends Maoists a deadly edge is the fact that they are armed with modern weaponry. Here is some factual information-fairly disturbing. 1. They are equipped with • AK-47 rifles .IEDs • INSAS and SLRs. 2. In 2005 and 2006, they claimed 677 and 678 lives respectively. In either year, the fatalities are more than the deaths in Jammu and Kashmir and the North-East· put together. 3. In the first 4 months of 2006, they had killed 130 persons, including the security personnel and civilians. 4. For more details on casualties, see the tables later in this section.

5. 160 districts designated 'most affected' by Maoist extremis~. This is 27 per cent of the total number of districts in India.

813


Official recognition that India has a full-blown crisis at hand' came mid-Jun 2006 when Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh admitted that 160 districts across the country are slipping out of government control. He reiterated that Maoist problem has assumed proportions bigger than militancy in Jammu and Kashmir and insurgency in the North-East due to its sheer spread and organized linkages. Maoist threat must be taken seriously, particularly so in view of their plans to expand their influence within the next five years. Documents of the Central Military Commission of the CPI (Maoist) seized by intelligence officials in Feb 2006, revealed plans to set up military commands in the following unchartered territories: 1. Delhi 2. Haryana 3. Punjab 4. UP 5. Uttaranchal and to extend violence to urban areas and targeting industries. Finally, they have ambitious plans of controlling 30 per cent of the country in next five years. State-wise Spread The districts/areas more seriously affected in some states are mentioned here. Jharkhand Garwa Palamu Chatra Hazaribagh Bakaro Dhanbad Latehar Gumla Simdega Lohardagga Maharashtra Gadchhiroli Chandrapur Bihar Patna Aurangabad

Chhattisgarh All the five districts of Bastar region Orissa Koraput Malkangiri Gajapati Rayagada Mayurbhanj Andhra Pradesh North Telangana and surrounding areas.

Nepal 140fthe 75 districts severely affected.

814

Terrorism in India

Gaya Jehanabad Nawda (Source: Outlook, 15 May 2006).

Centre stitches up an action plan The Centre has of late realized that the ultra-Left activism is not a mere law and order problem. Maoists are executing a well thought-through strategy. The decisions taken at the 9 th Congress of CPI (Maoist) in Jan-Feb 2001' and how they are being put in practice methodically is an object lesson for security establishment of the country. The successes achieved by Maoists in its spread across the states and scale of terror unleashed by them has finally persuaded-may be, goaded-the Union Home Ministry under Shivraj Patil to draw up a strategy, encompassing security issues and other aspects germane to the Maoist problem. Its main contours are delineated here. • Acknowledge it is more than a law and order problem. Pursue a holistic approach, simultaneously focusing on development, providing employment and land distribution. • Provide funds to affected areas to modernize the police: improve infrastructure, acquire weapons and communication equipment. • Other states should follow the Andhra Pradesh model where the state has succeeded in checking tll~ Maoists by raising special forces. • Start people's movements, like the Salma Judum (SJ) in Chhattisgarh, to fight Maoists. • Deploy security forces in worst-hit areas. Centre bears costs for three years. • Increase employment opportunities by earmarking 40 per cent recruitment in central paramilitary forces for areas affected by militancy and Naxalism. • Allocate Rs 2,475 crore for 55 worst affected districts under the backward districts initiative.


815

• Ensure a collective and coordinated approach and response from the states. On paper, the government seems to have got it right. In any case, making a plan of action, be it on economic development or on fighting N axal menace, is never a problem, and it constitutes the first baby step. And paraphrasing a cliche, the devil lies in its execution. In the instant case also, security reports feel that most of its provisions will be difficult to implement not only unless the state governments (i.isplay a political will to act but also, and even more importantly, the Centre itself does the same unmindful of the compulsicns of coalition government and its own Home Ministry functions more determinedly and purposefully in leading the states in the antiNaxalite drive. The details of problem that come in the way of this drive are discussed in the following part.

Reasons for spread and problems of combating Naxalism As the law and order is a state subject, the Centre all along tried to keep its role minimal/stepping in only to supervise and help with additional forces and finances. But of late, the union Home Ministry has realized that it is more than a mere law and order problem. Consequently, it has worked out an anti-Naxal strategy, contours of which have been etched out earlier. Question of political will takes centre stage. Lack of political will to act poses a problem. Sahni says: "It is well-known secret that politicians have used Naxalites for their vested interests." He cites the example of Andhra Pradesh which has a long history of politicians hobnobbing with the Maoists. "NT Rama Rao did it. He even described the Maoists as 'deshbhaktalu' (= patriots). Subsequently, the Congress, under Chenna Reddy, did it. In recent times, Congress ally TRS has been accused of having struck a deal with the Maoists before the 2004 General Elections," he says. In Bihar, politicians are known to have used both-the MCC and the Ranvir Sena of upper-caste Bhumihars-for political ends. Likewise, the SJ, seen by many as a successful anti-Naxal civil society initiative has become controversial, essentially because Liberal-Intellectual elite and some NGOs have started criticizing the SJ for pitting tribals against the Naxals, as cannon fodder.'

816

Terrorism in India

In fact, Union Home Secretary told a weekly in May 2006 that the Chhattisgarh government has been asked to stop the SJ till it can consolidate the group and arm them better, adding, "The state of Chhattisgarh is being treated as a testing ground by the government. If the SJ experiment succeeds there, then it will be replicated elsewhere."5 Even more surprising is the fact that the states facing the most intense N axal violence do not have their police forces even up to the authorized strengths. This lacuna is inexplicable, knowing as we do that the security experts feel that even authorized police strength is not enough to fight the Naxal menace. The states like Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand must be sanctioned additional police for over and above their authorized strength to mount an effective anti-Naxal drive. Against the advice for additional police strength, some such states are, in fact, short of even their authorized strengths-this shortage, for example, is 4,000 in case of Chhattisgarh and 20,000 in case of Bihar. And to wit, these figures comes from Union Home Secretary Duggal. Some experts are expressed doubts about so many affected states achieving any credible measure of coordination in their anti-N axal operations. The solution, they suggest, lies in the Centre having a greater role in tackling the problem. Former IB Director AK Doval suggests the way out: "The right strategy will be for the Centre to move into the worst-affected pockets, take over the administration and make roads, set up schools and other infrastructure. Each state has a different problem. Just giving extra money and security forces will not help. Tough decisions and tough measures are required. Once the state establishes its presence in the affected district, then development work can be taken up." There is not revolutionary, or even unexceptionable in this suggestion except the part that the Centre should supplant the district administration, establish 'state' presence in area by building roads and opening schools and then "the development work can be taken up." Either the former IB Director has not applied his mind or the reported has misrepresented his views. Isn't building roads and opening schools itself 'development'.


817

Why should Centre undertake this chore? How is the Central bureaucracy better qualified to do it than the state officials, who know the area better, know its problems better and can even do the job better. The only way the Centre can help it is to give requisite forces to the states so that they can proceed with the development schemes in the face of the Naxalite threats of violence. Presently, though, it is a vicious circle for some Naxalism-affected states. Government agencies cannot move in because of the fear and threat of the Maoists, making it easier for the latter to have a free run-expanding the area under their influence. As per their documents, they have ambitious plan of controlling 30 per cent of the country in the next five years. Obviously, state cannot sit back and let that happen. The development work cannot wait in a state till it establish full control on the disturbed areas. The development and anti-Naxal fight must proceed simultaneously.

CPI (Maoist) 9 th Congress and aftermath A month-long 9 th CPI (Maoist) Congress, Jan-Feb 2007, was held in a 'secured' liberated zone ('Muktanchal' in their parlance) along the Jharkhand-Orissa border after an interregnum of over three decades. Attended by top leaders, it mulled over the long term strategic goals and as well a list of what they planned to do over the next coming months. Some six months down the line, the militant cadre is going about their assigned tasks in a manner that is chilling and seems to be as good an indicator as any about how it operates. The message emanating from the conclave was loud and clear: while they would continue with their tried and tested method of armed struggle, the major new decision was to offer all-out resistance to mega projects including steel and bauxite projects in Orissa, Chhattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh as also, SEZs planned in other regions. The reason: They were leading to "massive displacement and marginaliza tion" of the Adivasis and farmers. 6 This clarion call translated into: (1) A major mobilization exercise to augment the strength of Naxalite cadre, which would enable them to establish a presence in the areas where they had till now been absent or inactive; (2) sourcing of arms; and (3) a 48-hour economic blockade in June (2007) that paralyzed

818

Terrorism in India

life in many parts of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar and West Bengal. The latest intelligence inputs indicate that the ultra-Left extremists "have managed footholds around cities and industrial hubs in Haryana, Punjab and Delhi." That they were planning to extend their presence to these areas was also referred to in their Central Military Commission's documents seized by the intelligence in 2006. Besides this, parts of Uttar Pradesh particularly Sonebhadra and Mirzapur-and Uttarkhand have also reported the presence of the N axalites. As for the South, the Naxal presence does not end at the borders of the Andhra Pradesh; Karnataka and Tamil N adu too are waking up to the threat. The result of the latest mobilization: 185 districts across/6 states of the Union have now Red footprints to be concerned about. The result of the decisions made at the 9 th Congress are there for all to see. A senior police officer involved in tracking the Maoists confirms: "They are now present where ever an industrial or development project is coming up. After all, their strength lies in exploiting the sentiments of people in areas that are underdeveloped, so they want to resist all kinds of development." It is not that the Centre is unaware of such developments in the field of N axal activism. Surely, they are kept informed about such happenings by their intelligence sources. A meeting held in New Delhi in Apr 2007 saw senior officials from these states being 'sensitized' to the threat. Additional Secretary (Naxal Movement), Union Home Ministry, Vinay Kumar, said: "We asked them to be watchful and be prepared in view of the pattern seen in the Naxal-affected states in the past,"

These officials also seem to be aware of the new Naxal strategy of tar!~eting communication, transportation, railway and other esserltial services. But as the said 48-hour economic blocked should, the security forces-eould find it tough to counter ' their new tactics. After all, it is well-nigh impossible to guard every inch of power or communication lines. Analysts opine that when the Naxals are not engaged in major attacks, they are busy consolidating. Chhattisgarh has


819

been, in the recent months, at the receiving end of the Naxal depredations. The state Government sees this increased attention as sign of success of their Salma Judum campaign as also an indication of the frustration in the Naxal camp as a result. And hence the brutal reaction as at Rani Bodla. They claim to be teaching a lesson to the SJ activists. Mter all, 37 of the 68 killed these were SPOs, Mahendra Karma, the founder and leader of the SJ himself offers this interpretation of the intensified Naxal attacks on his state. Even the Centre is known to hold the same view on the issue. In Orissa, where the N axals have had their presence for many years by now, the state Government wants to raise the number of the "Naxalite-affected districts" from the nine identified as such in 2003 to 14. And interestingly, the new areas experiencing the N axal activism include Deogarh, Sambalpur, Kandhamal, Jajpur and Dhenkanal, essentially the regions that· are either witnessing development or fall within the so-called Red Corridor that reputedly extends from "Pashupati to Tirupti" (in explicable landmarks-both being highly-venerated Hindu temples-for the godless Naxals), referring to the large swathe that cuts through the forests from Nepal border to Andhra Pradesh (and now to Tamil Nadu). Orissa DGP A. Patnaik, however, is not all that pessimistic: "The situation is under control. The number of incidents have gone up this year (2007) but the instances of violence have not. Figures are low compared to those obtaining in heighbouring states, particularly Chhattisgarh." The DGP must understand that being a little 'better' than the worst should not be a cause for complacency. In fact, the warning bells had begun sounding well before the 9 th Congress. Figures put out by the Union Home Ministry tell the story. • The total number of security forces personnel killed in N axalite violence in the past two years was more than the figure killed in J ammu and Kashmir or even the North-East during the same period. • The number of civilians killed in Naxalite violence is far more than those killed in insurgency-hit Jammu and

820

Terrorism in India

Kashmir. The figure civilian mortality in the North-East is marginally up till 31 Mar 2007. • Yet, the total number of Naxalites killed by the security forces is far less than the number of terrorists/insurgents killed in Jammu and Kashmir and North-East. There are a number of-some would say a plethora ofcoordination mechanisms at the centre to ensure certain degree of joint and cooperative inputs in anti-Naxal efforts and operations. Some would suggest that the multiplicity of such mechanisms must be making coordination between Naxalaffected states a bit difficult. At least results so far suggest this reality. Anyway, these mechanisms are briefly mentioned here:· 1. Empowered Group of Ministers (EGoM) headed by Union Home Minister Shivraj Patil. 2. A Standing Committee of the Chief Minister of Naxalaffected states, again headed by Patil. 3. National Coordination Centre on Naxalism (NCCN) headed by the Union Home Secretary and comprising the Chief Secretaries and DGPs of 13 Naxal-affected states. 4. A Task Force headed by the Special Secretary (Internal . / Security) in the Union Home Ministry. 5. An Inter-Ministerial Group (lMG), headed by Additional Secretary (Naxal Management), again in the Union Home Ministry. The multiplicity of coordination committees are not only avoidable, it is also wasteful. The three official level mechanisms is indicative of 'empire building' mentality. The Centre also has its hands on the purse strings, even though in a certain manner. The Union Home Ministry operates a Security Related Expenditure (SRE) scheme, under which it reimburses expenses incurred by the states on security matters, including the anti-Naxal operations. Strengthening and modernizing the police and its equipment is also covered under security expenses. Over Rs 100 crore have been spent under this head so far in 2007 (till June), but "there is concern over improper utilization, particularly in states like Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh" That indeed is something unfortunate, as thes~

821


two states are also the ones which are worst hit by the Naxal violence. The Centre has also been helping the states in raising India Reserve Battalions (IRBs). On the development front, there are two schemes : the Backward Districts initiative and the Backward Regions Grant Fund programme. Under the former Rs 1,700 have been spent. The Centre maintains that is up to the states to deal with the situation on the ground. "Law and order after all is a state subject we are providing all the assistance we can", a senior official says. It is time that tliey give up this paternalistic mindset. In fact, it is worse: It is feudalism at its worst! But as everyone agrees, it is a long haul. Statistical and Miscellaneous Information Relevant information on the N axalite movement is given here. Fatalities: Naxalite violence Sr.

Category

2005

2006

2007 (till June)

1.

Civilian Security Forces Total 0+2) Naxalite Grand Total

524 153

521 157

118 91

677 225 902

678 272 950

209 52 261

2. 3. 4. 5.

(3+4)

Fatalities: Jammu and Kashmir

1.

2. 3. 4. 5.

Category

2005

2006

2007 (till June)

Civilian Security forces Total 0+2) Militants Grand total

557 189 746 917 1663

389 151 540 593 1133

37 30 67 70 137

(3+4)

822

Terrorism in India Fatalities: North-East Category

2005

2006

2007 (till June)

393

309

148

70

76

30

l.

Civilians

2.

Security Forces

3.

Total (1+2)

463

385

178

4.

Militants

406

395

114

5.

Grand Total (3+4)

869

780

292

Fatalities: Security Forces

2005

2006

Naxalite violence

153

157

91

401

,Jammu and Kashmir

189

151

30

370

.70

76

30

176

Category

North-East

2007 (till June)

Total

Fatalities: Civilians

2005

2006

2007 (till June)

Naxalite violence

524

521

118

1163

,Jammu and Kashmir

557

389

37

983

North-East

393

309

148

850

Category

Total

Fatalities: NaxalitieslMilitants Category

2007 (till June)

2005

2006

Naxalites

225

272

52

549

Militants

917

593

70

1580

406

395

114

915

Total

Jammu and Kashmir Militants (North-East)

(Source: Six tables above: Sunday Express, 22 July 2007).


823

MAJOR NAXAL ACTIVITIESIINCIDENTS IN 2007 4 Mar 2007: East Singhbhum (Near Jamshedpur), Bihar Naxalites kill JMM MP Sunil Mahato while he is watching a foot ball match. He is shot dead after being shot dead by N axalites, including several women. Their anger and provocation: Mahato had organized a campaign against N axalites over the past few years, leading to the killing of some top Naxalleaders. 15 Mar 2007: Rani Bodli (Bijapur district), Chhattisgarh Rani Bodli was the site of a massacre that left 55 (later rose to 68) security personnel, including 37 Special Police Officers (SPOs), dead at a Salma Judum base camp. It was a strong message against SJ activists.

31 Mar 2007: Riga, Bihar Naxalites storm a bank and a police station at Riga, Sitamarhi district. Attack has its own significance since it targeted area close to the site where Kosi irrigation project is coming up. The Kosi project, which successive government have promised/claimed, will transform the face of north Bihar, is one of the targets of the N axalites. 26-27 June 2007: Economic blockade in Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Orissa and neighbouring state Power and transmission lines snapped, rail and road traffic disrupted. Supply of minerals and ores in Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh came to a halt during the 48-hour blockade. No loss of life but had major impact on economic and industrial activity in these areas. Affected States Chhattisgarh

Andhra Pradesh

Jharkhand

Karnataka

Orissa

Maharashtra

Bihar

Madhya Pradesh

West Bengal

New Presence Kerala Tamil Nadu

Naxalites are learnt to have set up regional committnps in these

824

Terrorism in India Uttar Prade sh Uttara khand Delhi Harya na Punja b

states , a depart ure from their earlier practice of operat ing throug h legitimate overg round organ izatio ns. It could be the result of decisio ns taken at the Jan-Fe b 2007 9 th Congr ess of the CPI (Maois t).

Arme d cadre : Mid-2 007 Some 13,00 0-14,0 00 ultra- Left extrem ists are believ ed to be active in 185 distric ts across 16 states. Their streng th was about 9,000 two years ago. Some worst affecte d areas, of late Chhat tisgar h Rani Bodli, Bijapu r distric t in Basta r region Jhark hand East Singb hum distric t Uttar Prade sh Soneb hadra and Mirza pur distric ts Karna taka

Weste rn Ghats , Shimo ga, Chika magal ur, Daksh ina Kanna da and Udupi Orissa Deoga rh, Samb alpur, Kand hmal, J ajpur and Dhenk anal. Is the Maois tlNax al move ment on the declin e? Mar 2007 The Maois t leader ship is concer ned that the curren t set back to the Naxal jte movem ent in Andhr a Prade sh (AP) could have an advers e impac t on the movem ent in the countr y, partic ularly in the neigh bourin g states of Orissa and Chhat tisgar h. A crackd own by the state, for over six years forced the ultras to vacate their strong holds and reduce their armed strugg le to a mere strugg le for surviv al. The three party comm ittees overse eing the Naxal movem ent in North- Teleng ana, Andhr a-Oris sa border and the State (AP) comm ittee have now conced ed that the movem ent is on the wane. But rebel activit y in the Basta r forest of Chhat tisgar h is extrem e intens e, while in the Orissa distric ts abutti ng AP, their hold contin ues to be unhind ered. The Maois t think- tank is now devisi ng strateg ies and tactics that could rejuve nate the movem ent in AP. "This was the subjec t


825

of discussions at the meeting of the Polit Bureau (PB) of the CPl (M), held at an undisclosed locations three months ago." The secret meet has been briefly discussed earlier. How mych importance the PB accords to AP is obvious from the fact that the party General Secretary Ganapati feels the review of the movement in this State should be deemed as a review of revolutionary activity in the entire country. The minutes of the review committee meeting are claimed to be available with a daily. 7 The meeting felt the CPI (M) made a tactical error in not ordering the retreat of its cadres from North Telengana in 2001 when the police were just getting the better of them. The thinking that the repression could be countered through equally harsh resistance was total misplaced. As the police continued to deliver blow after blow, the N axals, instead of retreatingas Mao famously advocated-formed platoons to hit back and consequently suffered irreparable losses in North Telengana and State Committee areas. As a result, in alrqost all districts of AP, the party had reverted to one-plus-one formation: just two units moving together, according to priority to self-defence. As a result of this relentless State onslaught, the rebel activity in South Telangana, Guntur and Prakasam districts as well as the Rayalassema and N allamala forest areas weakened considerably. The minutes make it clear that tactical retreat was not ordered essentially because of differences of opinion among the leaders. The review meeting was attended by prominent Naxal leaders Ganapathy, Katakam Sudershan, Cherukuri Rajkumar, Akkiraju Haragopal, Wadkapur Chandramouli (shot dead since), Namballa Kesava Rao and some others. 40 years of Naxalbari: An appraisal: May 2007 Naxalbari, the term, symbolizes the revolutionary fervour of the 1960s. But the area where it was all born, no longer, resonates with that spirit. It is 40 years since that police firing on 25 May 1967, which killed 11 people including 6 women and 2 children and lit the Prairie fire. Paradoxically, that event is but a fading memory

826

Terrorism in India

- in and around Naxalbari, even if it produced several Red organizations which are active in a north-south swathe of India, engaged in generating a Maoist heaven in the area under its 'control'. It is obvious that 40 years of Naxalbari deserves somewhat detailed analysis.

The way it all started and developed The 25 May 1967 police firing, killing 11 of the peasantry, might popularly and almost universally have become the starting point of the revolution, but the old timers insists that the N axalbari peasant uprising was not an event but a process that had started back in the early 1950s. But that day Naxalbari exploded into the national consciousness. And within a few years, N axal became synonymous with any Red extremist evoking fear among landlords and policemen alike. That was then. Now as the peasant ins,urrection completes its 40-years-on 25 may 2007-Naxalbari still evokes images of peasants and tea garden workers up in rebellion. For the radical red groups of different shades, including the Maoists, it is still an emblem and an idea that inspires. But this inspiring image in wider India is in sharp contrast to the realities one finds during the visit to the villages around N axalbari, once the heart beat of the insurrection and revolutionary fervour. In Naxalbari, revolution is a yesterday word, as a reporter indeed found during his visit just before 25 May 2007. 8 But before this all, some introductory remarks on N axalbari. Naxalbari, the iconic village, is surrounded by picture postcard villages. The Naxalbari block is located in the Darjeeling district of North Bengal. Naxalbari railway station is barely 5 km. from Nepal. As hinted above, Naxalbari movement was the outcome of mobilization carried out by the Communists at the ground level since the early 1950s. By the mid-1960s though a group of radical led by Charu Mazumdar within the Darjeeling district committee of the CPI CM) wanted to carry out an armed struggle. The slogan was: "Land to the Tillers." But the movement was not just about seizing land from the jotedars. "We believed that to take the land permanently, you must also take state power: Country," says veteran activist Shanti Munda, 64, of Shebdella vill ~JO"(' • f


827

The movement's social base came from adiuasis (Mundas) Oraons and Santhals) and Rajbongshis, a scheduled caste. "Even now, these groups have a lot going for them", says Abhijit Mazumdar, 45, General Secretary, CPI (ML) (Liberation) Darjeeling district. But these groups are a minority now. It should be of interest that in 1967, the N axalbari insurrection made China's People Daily go ballistic-one analyst prefers the adjective to be 'orgiastic'-in its 5 July editorial: "A peal of spring thunder has crashed over the land of India .... Under the leadership of a revolutionary group of the Indian Communist Party, a red are of rural revolutionary armed struggle has been established in India. The spark in Darjeeling will start a Prairie fire and will certainly set the vast expanses of India ablaze."

But the Chinese mouth piece was abviously off the mark. Presently, radical mass politics appears comatose in Naxalbari. We can not blame the children of Benguijote primary school for not knowing who Charu Mazumdar was. (Details of this ignorance a little later). Now a word as to how the Naxallegend was born, and later achieved the iconic status. For Kanu Sanyal, 78-year-old being the sole survivor or the original trio (other two being the la;e Charu Mazumdar, the top Naxal leader and its top ideologue, and the late Jangal Santhal, one of the key mobilizers of the adivasis in the Naxal uprising), 24 May (1967) is Naxalbari day. That day hundreds of peasants and tea garden workers, agitating for their land ownership (rights) in the Naxalbari region, killed a police Inspector with arrows in Boro Jhorojut village, barely 7 km away. Now here is an eye witness, Paban Singh of Benguijote village. "Some memories are like fire fli2s gently twinkling in the dark." But for Paban Singh memories of that sunny (25) May afternoon are like pieces of a broken mirror. The shards each telling their own story-about police killing those 11 'original' martyrs of the cause. Paban remembers: The next day women activists had organized a secret meeting by the Mechi river on the Nepal border. Some informer must have told the police because when they came back to Pn?-sadojote village, the police was waiting. Recalling this aJ ,

828

Terrorism in India

Paban says he at that time was in neighbouring village of Benguijote, just a kilometer away. In the book, In the wake of Naxabari, Sumanta Banerjee writes: "while the police version of the incident was that the rebels had attacked them from behind a wall of women and children, forcing the police to open fire, the dissident Marxist leaders alleged that the police deliberately killed the women and children." Kanu Sanyal of CPI (ML) says: "It was a revenge killing." To this day, Paban can hear the sound of those gunshots: "I immediately picked up my bow and arrows, and ran towards the twin oak trees in Prasadojote. On my way, I saw Gaudrau Shaibani and a child being hit." Manoj Saha whose shop is barely 100 yards from the spot, recalls his father, a migrant from Bihar's Madhepura district, telling him that he hid under the bed on hearing the gunshots. By the time Paban reached the spot, most agitators had run away. But the injured and the dead were lying on the ground. "I saw 1shwara Boudi bying on the ground and screaming. She was struck by a bullet on the lowle"r part of her leg. I could see the bullet and tried to pull it out. But it was not easy doing that. She was screaming." Paban continues: "At this point of time I just wanted to find out who was hit and who had died. I found my mother Dhaneshwari Devi lying beside a muddy pathway off the road a few yards away from the twin oak trees. She was dead. I went round the village looking for a piece of cloth to cover her. I found a sack cloth and covered her. That is all I did. There was a warrant against my name. I left the spot." Those were the traumatic days, over laid with personal tragedies. Even the memories of those days for people like Paban must be painful. He continues, telling his story to the journalist: "Much later, I learnt that the police had come back the next day. They arrested everyone injured and took away the bodies. I don't know what they did with the body of my mother: whether they burnt it or just dumped it in the river." In all 11 people were killed, including six women and two children. Naxalites now commemorate 25 May as Martyr's Day.

Naxal Terror.' Initial Phase

829

The names of the (11) dead are inscribed on a marble slab next to the Benguijote Primary School. It needs recording that Jyoti Basu was the Home Minister of West Bengal at that relevant time. Who led the two-month-Iong struggle? A radical group from CPI (M)'s Siliguri Unit. Charu Mazumdar was the key ideologue, Kanu Sanyal was among the leading organizers, and Jangal Santhal mobilized the adivasis. By 1969, this group had split from CPI (M) and formed CPI (ML). What were the long term effects the Naxalbari uprising? It resulted in the redistribution of land among the peasantry and formation of the CPI (ML). Between 1969 and 1971, the Naxalite movement spread to various parts of the country taking on a more violent and in places, an urban character. Shades of it remains in today's CPI (ML) groups and the Maoists.

Situation today in Naxalbari region As mentioned at the start of this analytical piece, in Naxalbari revolution is a yesterday word. There are new realities at play. Most radical ,Reds here are septugenarians. A young CPI (ML) worker is a rarity. Incidentally, there are more MarxistLeninist Parties-New Democracy, Liberation, Janashakti, Kanu Sanyal Group, Mahadadeb Mukherjee Group, to name somethan cadre. Posters with Charu Mazumdar's photo still adorn these parts. But, as veteran CPI (ML) J anashakti group activist Khokan Mazumdar ruefully points out, there is not even a book on the 1967 rural uprising in the local Subroti Sana library, although dozens were written in Bengali. Is it any surprise if a reporter says that "barring old activists like him who spearheaded the uprising, there is no real battle between memory and forgetting?" Youngsters admit the uprising rarely figures in their conversations. They remember it primarily because 25 May is celebrated as an annual ritual with politicians para dropping from Kolkata. Consequently for the young today, Naxalbari uprising is a story, not a way oflife. A telling fact of Naxalbari uprising not being even a story came to light when a reporter 9 visited the local 'Benguijote Primary School. The teacher asks his student: who is Charu

830

Terrorism in India

... Mazumdar? The latter shakes his head sadly and says, "Sir, I don't know." The teacher calls six more students from class IV and repeats the question. He gets the same negative answer. He then, being helpful, throws a broad hint through a leading question: "Don't you remember the 'function' we had once"? Boys and girls group for an answer, but to no avail. One of them finally gets up to say: "Jani na, Sir, Charu Mazumdar ke (= Do not know, sir, who is Charu Mazumdar )." It was rather ironical. Barely 10 yards from their class room and just outside the low boundary wall of their' school, is the bust of Charu Mazumdar, along with those of comrades Lienin, Stalin and Mao. Beside them is a plaque in the memory of 11 _ martyrs, mentioned earlier here. What could be reason for this indifference-even neglecttowards an iconic figure of his time on his own turf? A major, if not the only one, reason could be changed demographic picture of the area. Over the years, N axalbari and its surrounding villages have been flooded by an influx of migrants from Bangladesh-men and women with no historical memory of the .event. As.a result of this influx, mostly illegal, the adivasis, who had mIgrated to these parts as labour from south Bihar (now Jharkhand) and the Rajbongshis, who performed the insurrection's spine, have been reduced to minority. The migrants, who have been gradually legalized through political \. patronage, serve as a vote-bank for the CPI (M), and are averse to radical politics. Over the past three decades, the CPI (M) has always retained the Phansidewa assembly seat of which the N axalbari block is a part. So, Naxalbari is a secret trinket tucked away on the edge of month Bengal's Darjeeling district. Nepal is just 5 km away. Back in the 1960s, it acted as a sanctuary for 'underground' Communist leaders. Furlongs of tea estates, paddy fields, bamboo forests and banana gardens-the villages appear born to lead a green, not a red, revolution. One enters N axalbari to be welcomed by a statue of a Kargil Martyr Suresh Chhetri and a Lion's club signboard, not by a statue/pictures of Charu Mazumdar. Sitting in his tin-roofed are sons of former CPI (ML) workers have joined CPI (M). "They are the new prosperous political elite" he says. In BeI).guijot village, Arti Sarkar, a former CPI (ML) (Janashakti) worker's

831


son, was picked up by the police for allegedly being a Maoist. In jail for two months he has joined CPI CM). As Abhijit Mazumdar, Charu's son and district secretary CPI CML) (Liberation), says: "Over the years, there has been a systematic witch-hunt against any body who opposes the CPI CM). Sources insist that CPI (M) and Congress politicians do not even fight each other because they allegedly share a common financial interest: border smuggling of mainly clothes and electronic goods. Returning to the demographic realities of the area, here is shopkeeper Manoj Saha of Prosadojote village giving a rough estimate of ethnic and communal breakdown of the families in his village : Biharis

2

Rajbongshis

20

Bengalis

2

Bangladeshis

50

Nepalese

10

These are telling statistics. Bangladeshis are already having overall majority, and the influx in West Bengal, as in Assam, is still, continuing. It must be understood that in the totality of circumstances the Bangladeshis help the local CPI CM) in West Bengal in their political battles against the CPI CML). This gets confirmed by the locals when they interact with the visiting journalists. Says villager Pusha Oraon: "The Bangladeshis, mostly lower-caste namasudras, have been coming in over the past few decades." Being migrants, the Bangladeshis are keen to be accepted and coopted. Opting for radical politics would mean going against the ruling coalition and, consequently could invite trouble for them. A villager, talking to a reporter makes the points simply, mother-of-factly but honest-to-the-bone manner: "The CPI (M) leader takes them under his wings because it helps him gain bulk votes. They get land and ration cards, in return. It is a relationship of convenience." In the circumstances explained above, rebuilding radical movement is not easy. "The process is slow and painstaking," says Abhijit Mazumdar, son of the legendary Charu Mazumdar and CPI (ML) (Liberation), Darjeeling District General Secretary. More so, with CPI (ML) splintered into several factions. Without unity, the radical left is unable to offer (and

832

Terrorism in India

function as) genuine opposition. For instance, the CPI (ML) (Liberation) is marginally present in nearly Kharibari block, Kanu Sanyal's CPI (ML) is there in Hatighsha are. Some factions such as the Mahadeb Mukherjee group have just one or two members in the entire block. Notwithstanding all this, the spirit of Naxalbari survives. Shanti Munda says that when government officials recently came asking for this land for an irrigation, project, the entire village rose in revolt. "We still love our land. And just like the Naxalbari day, we will die for it. Jaan doongi, zamin na doongi," she says. In N andigram, the radical Reds see hope. The killing of 14 anti-SEZ protestors on 14 March (2007) by the police has ignited the spark again. Says teenager Shefali Bishwakarma, whose uncle Babulal was one of the first martyrs of the movement: "Earlier, nobody wanted to listen when we spoke of Naxalbari. Now students say we must have another Naxalbari to stop Nandigram from . " recurrIng. One tends to believe Shefali even when primary school children at Benguijote primary school say they are unaware of Charu Mazumdar, the icon of Naxalbari. Kanu Sanyal: inconsequential leader today Kanu Sanyal was the leading figure of the Naxalbari movement, next only to Charu Mazumdar. In the 1960s, the following slogan echoed through the bylanes of Calcutta and paddy fields of Naxalbari : Jail ha tala tootega/ Kanu, Jangal Chhootega (The locks of prison will break, now Jangal (Santhal), one of the key mobilisers of the adivasis in the N axalbari uprising, is dead (Charu Mazumdar had died in 1971). And Kanu, a top leader of the N axalite movement, is ailing and frail. But the 78-year-old General secretary-of the original-CPI (ML), who lives in a one-room party office in Hatigisha and sleeps on the floor, remains committed to the revolution through mass struggle. What follow are the excerpts from an interviews by a reporter published in the 20 May 2007 issue of a daily.1o It is of interest to note that what the old revolutionary says about the 1960s revolution has a ring of authenticity. Moreo?er, what he


833

says on Nandigram has a contemporary resonance. Let us put it this way: Even 40 years after the conflagration, the 78-yearsold romantic still has fire in his stomach. Q. Your memories of that fateful day of 25 May 1967?

A. For us, 24 May is Naxalbari day. That day, the police were informed that some leaders of the N axalbari movement were hiding in Boro Jhorojote village. There were no leaders there but a huge gathering of peasantry and tea garden workers. One police officer was killed. Since the peasants understood and accepted our politics and took up arms on their own, we celebrate that day as a victory of our political ideas. Other groups observe 25 May as Martyrs Day when 11 persons were killed in police firing. Q. Why did the Naxalbari movement fail? A. We had a strong base among peasants and tea garden workers. But the movement lacked a proper party structure. That was the main shortcoming. Q. Did you meet Mao secretly in 1967? A. Yes. During our N axalbari struggle, there were differences within the party. We thought the Chinese leaders could help us understand what was right or wrong. It was a 45-minute meeting. We went by road to Kathmandu. From there, Chinese comrades took us by jeep to Peking. We reached China on 30 Sept (1967). The next day we saw them celebrate 1 Oct as National Day. I could see people weeping at the sight of Mao. We met Mao, Chou En-Iai and the C-in-C. Mao's advice was: Whatever you learn in China, try to forget it. Go to your own country, try to understand the specific situation and carry the revolution forward. Q. In retrospect, do you think that Charu Mazumdar's annihilation of class enemy line was a historical error? A. It was not only a historical error but a fundamental deviation from Markism-Leninism and thoughts of Mao. But remember we did not follow the annihilation line (forming small squads and killing landlords, policemen and other class enemies) in Naxalbari. Only

834

Terrorism in India

one landlord was killed (in N axalhari) during the struggle. In practice, the annihilation line was first followed in Srikakulam area of Andhra Pradesh in late 1969. Q. What are the movement's long term gains? A. There was no protection to share croppers earlier. We captured land in N axalbari and the peasants are still in control of the land. Mter 1977, West Bengal government was forced to bring the Bargadari Act through which some hereditary rights were given to sharecroppers. The CPI (ML) was formed in 1969 to organize the movement. But that too was not successful in the long run because Charu Mazumdar's annihilation of class enemies line prevailed. In a very subtle way, he said that peasant committees and mass organizations were not necessary. Just form small squads and start annihilation of class enemies. Q. If you were the Chief Minister of West Bengal today, how would you have dealt with Nandigram?

A. I can only answer the question from a peasant organizer point of view. I feel the issue can not be resolved. Nandigram is not just about the 14 March police firing. It is a question of policy. They say that agrarian reform is done, so we are opening for industrialization. But the truth is that they have not completed the task of agrarian reform in West Bengal. Besides, thousands of the industries have been closed. The entire 150-year-old tea industry is facing a deep crisis. Q. The Maoists are present, in greater or lesser degree, in over 150 districts. What is their future? A. The Maoists are sure to meet with failure. In an Andhra Pradesh village, where they are very powerful, I found that some peasants were not tilling their land. I asked them, why. They said, if we do so, the landlords will come and ask for the produce. And if we do what the Maoists tell us, the forces will come. The Maoists, in spite of having guns, have failed to assure the peasants that they should serve a radical land reform in the countryside.

Naxal'Terror : Initial Phase

835

Back in 1969, when CPI (ML) was formed, we used to say after one action in a district that agrarian revolution is going ahead. The Maoists have started the same thing in a wider form. The Maoists can not see. Earlier this month (May 2007) people revolted in Ranchi against Reliance Retail. The Maoists are active in the area in and around Ranchi but they can not see what is happening. They just want state power first.

Q. In time of globalization, how do you build a workers' and peasants' movement? The basic needs of the people are not being met. Pleasants need land which is being snatched away in the name of development. There is no difficulty in mobilizing the people because the government is not attending to so many needs of the common people. What we need is dedication and commitment to win tl~e people's confidence for a mass revolution. This interview should be deemed to be one of the more important subjects dealt in this work because of the personage involved in the interview, its historical value and finally its ramification for contemporaneous issues like Nandigram and Maoist movement. Naxalbari versus Nandigram: Comparisons and contrasts On 14 Mar 2007, 14 activists protesting against SEZ were killed in police firing at Nandigram; three more than the number shot dead on 25 may 1967 in Naxalbari, over 600 km away to the south. On both occasions, the protestors were fighting for land. And on both occasions, the ruling party fired on its own people. On both occasions, CPI (M) was 'the ruling party: In 1967, it was part of a front, but in 2007, it was the main and leading party of the left coalition. If in 1967, J yoti Basu was the Home Minister, Bhattacharjee was the Chief Minister in 2007. But then, there are the differences too. The Nandigram, protests were spontaneous, the N axalbari movement was more planned although the events of 24/25 May (1967) were not. Naxalbari also had a larger perspective: land was merely a means to obtain state power. In N andigram, there is no such

836

Terrorism in India

sweeping VISIOn. Radical Left activists explain why and how N axalbari is relevant in times of N andigram. • Abhijit Mazumdar, 46, CPI (ML) (Liberation), Darjeeling District General Secretary. "History does not replicate itself. Ideology does. In N andigram, one finds an echo of the same causes that led to N axalbari. People are standing up for their basic right to livelihood that is getting jeopardized by government action". • Punjab Rao, 77, CPI (ML) (New Democracy) "Naxalbari was an unfinished revolution. Nandigram shows that peasants are rising again. Nandigram also proves that you can't fool all the people all the time." • Shanti Munda, 64, CPI (ML) "Naxalbari will always be contextual. As long as the government and private companies keep coming for people's land as they did in Nandigram, it will be relevant". • Arti Sarkar, 56, ex-CPI (ML) (Janshakti) "There is much to learn from Naxalbari. Though radical opinions are limited now; there is an urgent need to change the direction of politics today. It every village reacts like N andigram, we can change the government's policy.

Are the States beating 'Red' terror? An assessment: Oct 2006 Towards the last quarter of 2006, analysts were opining that "outlawed Left-wing extremists, the CPI (Maoist), are down, but certainly not out." After the mass acre of tribals at a relief camp at Erra bore in Chhattisgarh in July 2006, the extremists have suffered a series of set-backs. In Andhra Pradesh, the State Police scored a "victory of sorts" when it killed Burra Chinnaiah, State Committee Secretary of the CPI (Maoist) and seven others in the Nallamala jungles. Then it seized a cache of 42 rocket launchers, rockets and IEDs in Mahbubnagar and Prakasam districts. 11 This is also a pointer to how the N axalites in different states, after uniting under the rubric of CPI (Maoist), are working on a more ambitious strategy. Gone are the days when they targeted and gunned down landowners. Now, they are executing more audacious attacks on those opposing them: the police


837

generally, and jails occasionally to free their comrades. Ironically-no, 'meaningfully'-most of these attacks (for instance, the Giridih weapons loot or the Jehanabad jail-break in 2006) were outside Andhra Pradesh, the State that remained a nursery of insurgency for nearly three decades. The State police having gained upper hand, helped essentially by more credible information about their movement with an exclusive intelligence gathering machinery and better combative tactics employed by the special anti-Naxalite commando force, forced the extremists to shift base form north Telangana to other parts of Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, besides the less developed districts across neighbouring states.

After Andhra Pradesh Success The Maoists are particularly successful in Chhattisgarh where the state-backed counter-insurgency formation, the Salma Judum, has suffered heavy casualties in Bastar region. The innocent tribals, mostly Muria, have become easy targets ever since they supported the movement that has pitted tribals against the Naxalites. With the ultras enjoying the support of the Gutti Koya tribe in parts of the State, the conflict has turned into sectarian strife between the two tribes. "Most of the hardcore militants in Chhattisgarh are Andhra migrants," says Chief Minister Raman Singh, architect of the Salma Judum movement. Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister YS Rajasekhra Reddy says, "What is needed urgently is a common strategy that is implemented by all States."

Claims of Union Home Ministry and counter-terror measures After launching an inter-state coordinated offensive in the N axalite-affected areas in 2006, the Home Ministry says the number of "affected" districts is down from 126 to only 60 and 609 police station areas. It is also raising a special combat force comprising personnel from the Central paramilitary forces and policemen from the 13 effected states. Of the 14,000 to be enlisted, some 6,000 will be ex-servicemen trained in fighting terrorism and dealing with IEDs and mines. About 62 companies of the Provincial Armed Constabulary (PAC) and India Reserve Battalions (IRB) are being trained to carryout anti-Naxal tasks

838

Terrorism in India

at the army-run Kaner anti-insurgency school in Chhattisgarh. The Army is also providing inputs on explosive detection equipment ana sophisticated jammers to the Naxal-affected states. Simply put, the Home Ministry is emphasizing that the violence can be checked considerably with its integrated security-cum-offensive strategy that has enabled smoother flow and sharing of intelligence among the states. It is also creating an anti-Naxal cell in the Ministry for direct monitoring.

Maoist claims and statistical data The Maoists understandably would want to counter the changing perception about their strength by demonstrating strike capabilities. They claim they wield influence in 165 of the 602 districts in the country. They are avowedly planning to increase their area of influence, particularly in Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Uttaranchal. In states like Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, MP, Orissa, and Bihar, the focus of N axalites are the back woods and the tribal pockets where they whip up support citing neglect of the poor by the State. Over 930 incidents claiming 486 lives occurred in 2006 (till mid-Oct) compared to 1,608 incidents in 2005.

Situation in Chhattisgarh Critics have already dubbed Salma Judum a failure. Repeated attacks by Naxals have forced about 55,000 tribals to move into camps along a highway that runs through Bastar, vacating some 600 villages which have consequently fallen under the control of the Naxalites. Worse still, those in the police are reported to be opting for posting in Bhilai, Bilaspur and Raipur. More than 50 per cent of the than as in N axalite areas are without Station House Officers (SHO). "The Salma Judum has failed, the government has no alternative plan and poor tribals are left to be slaughtered, says former Chief Minister 1\jit Jogi (obviously a subjective opinion, certainly not balanced). The police response is 'found' to be knee-jerk. "Our main challenges are the IEDs and landmines. We have now requisitioned trained dogs from the Army to detect the mines", says DGP OP Rathore.


~39

Situation in Bihar The situation is not very different in Bihar where the ultras~ have a sizeable presence in 30 of the 38 districts. The absence of trained personnel and modern weapons is a big problem. DGP Ashish Ranjan Sinha has recalled 12 IPS officers on deputation to the Centre. "We are not short of funds, but we do not have sufficient infrastructure," says Bihar's ADGP GS Rath.

Home Ministry: Corrective and counter measures Concerned about the ability of the militants to garner support in the backward districts, the Ministry has suggested intensive and rapid economic development of such areas. Unfortunately, the states have failed to use the funds under the Backward Districts Initiative. "Only Rs 990 crore of the Rs 2,295 crore made available in the past three years for 55 districts in nine states has been spent"~'1rhe political changes in Nepal have emboldened the Maoists to go in for an upgrade to match up to the Rs 1,800 crore investment in modernization of the state police forces by the Ministry. The regular meetings that the Home Ministry has with the police chiefs of the affected states have led to the launch of joint cross-border operations and greater funding to contain the militants. Public perception, security and development are the elements of a holistic plan that is part of the changed strategy in dealing with the militants. The counter insurgency operations, particularly in Chhattisgarh, are to gain a new dimension with the deployment of an Unarmed Aerial Vehicle (UAV) to gather ground data on the movement of the militants. The Indian Air Force is to provide air support for taking up combing and to transport and evacuate security forces airdropping of food and medicines.

Empowered Group of Ministered (EGoM) set up At his recent (Aug 2006) meeting with the Chief Ministers, Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh the formation of an EGoM and emphasized New Delhi's resolve to contain Naxalites. "The states will now have to take up joint operations against Naxalites and Central funding would not be wanting," assured the Prime Minister, "While inputs become available, it is now for the states to get their act together", exhort the analysts.

Terrorism in India

840

How one wishes the insurgency situations were so simple and as amenable to solutions! Select Statistical Data 1. Naxal-affected districts as claimed by MHA

50

2. Districts under their control as claimed by CPI '(Maoist)

165

3. Incidents of Maoist violence in 2006 (till mid-Oct)

930

4. Civilian lives lost in 2006 (till mid-Oct)

486

5. Incidents of Maoist violence in 2005

1608

6. Police lives lost in2006 (till mid-Oct)

130

7. Naxalite killed in 2006 (till mid-Oct)

454

8. Total of people killed in Naxalite violence in 2006 (till mid-Oct)

1070

(Source: India Today, 23 Oct 2006)

Countering Naxalism: Some select measures Development Fast-paced economic development in the areas affected by N axalite violence is seen as the main counter-dote to this extremist depredations. Special packages have been announced. Linking 12 violence-affected districts of Orissa by a two-lane state-of-the-art highway is seen as an effective way to bring dev~lopment to these areas. Coordinated operations Coordinated effort at various levels has been set in motion to achieve better results: Empowered Group of Ministers (EGoM) set up by the Prime Minister. (2) Anti-Terrorist cell planned in the MHA. (3) Joint Task Force of police Chiefs of affected states already functioning. (4) National Coordination Centre against Naxalism (NCCN) functioning under the Union Home Secretary. (5) Counter-Maoist cross-border operations to be jointly undertaken by more than one state as envisaged by the Prime Minister must become a practice. (1)


841

Police modernization The MHA is investing Rs 1,800 crore for modernization of the state police forces. Tech support Some states like Chhattisgarh have requested the Centre for the unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) to support combing and monitoring operations. Chhattisgarh is believed to have already got one. An over-optimistic assessment The above analysis reads over-optimistic to the extent that it seems to be suggesting that Left-wing extremism and violence related to it will be defeated, if not eliminated during the calendar year 2007. This is utterly unrealistic. Without going into too much detail, a word of caution should be sufficient here. Given India's lackadaisical administration, corruption in public services and projects and lack of political will due to a, variety of reasons, defeating home-grown Left-wing extremism/terrorism will be much more tougher task than seeing the back of the terrorism sponsored from across the border. lA patient, brick-by-brick and painstaking approach is in order than high-sounding1verbose proclamations and resolutions. And more importantly, India has capacity to 'succeed~

"Naxalism is States' problem": MHA status paper: Dec 2006 The government has ruled out Centre's intervention in antiN axal operations, as law and order is a state subject. Instead, the Centre, will help the affected states with equipment, weaponry, logistical support and intelligence inputs, to curb the menace. This is what a recent status paper from the MHA tells the states, as reported by a daily in its issue of 23 Dec 2006. The Centre is not short on advice: "Naxalism being an inter-state problem, the states will adopt a collective approach and pursue a coordinated response to counter it. The states will need to improve police response and pursue effective and sustained police action against N axalites and their infrastructure individually and jointly." The status paper says the Government has three-pronged strategy to tackle the N axalite menace. Firstly, the government

842

Terrorism in India

will deal sternly with Naxals indulging in mindless violence. Secondly, since N axalism is not merely a law and order issue, efforts would simultaneously be launched on the political, security, development and public perception management fronts. Thirdly, the government will focus on socio-economic development of the backward regions, which are prone to Naxal influence. The status paper makes it clear that the government will not enter into dialogue unless the N axalites lay down arms. At a parallel level, the government wants the political parties to strengthen their cadre-base in Naxal-infested areas, so that the youth can be weaned away from the path of Naxal ideology. Special focus has been given on accelerated socio-economic . development of the backward areas and regular interaction with NGOs, intelligentsia and civil liberties groups, in order to minimize the overground support for the N axalite ideology and activity. Significantly, the status paper approves ofthe Salma Judum approach too build up people's resistance against the N axalite violence. "Efforts will continue to be made to promote voluntary local resistance groups against N axalites, but in a manner that the villagers are provided adequate security cover and the area is effectively dominated by the security forces," it says. It further adds: "The states should announce a suitable transfer policy for the Naxalite-affected districts. Willing, committed and competent officers will need to be posted with a stable tenure in the N axalite-affected districts. These officers will also need to be given greater delegation and flexibility to deliver better and step up government presence and above all improve governance in these areas."12 Will the Naxals join mainstream? Apr 2007 A senior operative of CPI (Maoist) contested the 29 Mar 2007 Palamu Parliamentary by-elections on the BSP ticket while he was lodged in the Garwah jail. Kameshar Baitha is the first senior leader of the party to take part in democratic elections. Baitha, a former self-styled Area Commander of CPI (Maoist), finished a close 22,327 votes behind the victorious Ghuran Ram of Rashtriya Janata Dal. Incidentally, Baitha joined the Bahujan Samaj Party (ESP) just before the polls, held on 29 March. 13


843

The fact of a former senior cadre fighting the elections gave rise to the questions like the one at the top of this narrative. Analysts are already speculating: "With Nepal's Maoists putting down their arms and entering the electoral arena, could the same be happening in Jharkhand after an ex-Maoist extremist came a close second in the 29 March elections? Is the party edging towards the mainstream politics?" These are no longer theoretical questions. Nor could it be kite flying. The reasoning is simple: Baitha coulcI:not have joined the electoral fray without a nod from party leadership. A glance at his active past is rather frightening-literally. During his active days, Baitha's depredations spread across the border regions of Bihar, Jharkhand and Uttar Pradesh for 24 long years. As an analyst puts it: "His name would send a chill down the spine of any police officer in the region." As the records show, soon after his arrest, several additional cases of murder, ammunition looting, forcible collection of money and other crimes were registered against him. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that presently Baitha is being tried by the courts for the 78 such cases lodged against him. With all these cases against him, Baitha would have spent the rest of his life in jail almost anonymously-like so many other rebels spending their days in various jails unknown unsung! All this stands changed. His debut in the Parliamentary democracy has again brought the limelight on him. Speaking to a daily from the Garwah jail where he is presently serving his term, Baitha sounded confident to clinch the Parliamentary seat if another chance comes his way. In fact, he is already speaking like a seasoned politician: ''Yes, I was an extremist, even little kids know that. But, so what? The day I joined BSP, I left everything behind. I have documented my feelings in my brochure, which I wrote from this cell, and have circulated among the electorate of Palamu. Today I strodgly feel that to voice one's demands or speak out for justice and development, one has to go through laid down systems." "The lomorrow of Palamu is BSP and the people of this area know me and my ways of dealing with things" Can one imagine it is an ex-rebel speaking? He is so confident of what all he says. "To remains the system, all that

Terrorism in India

844

matters is how best you can serve your constituency and the people at large. Out there, they know I can deliver", the bespectacled leader added, pointing towards the main gate of the jail. May be, he has his reasons for speaking in such a selfassured manner. Baitha led by comfortable margins from Vishrampur and Bhavnathpur assembly segments and was close on the heels of the JD candidate after the votes from Garmah, Husseinabad and Chhatarpur assembly segments were counted. Here is a political observer speaking from Ranchi: "Mr Baitha's contesting of the Palamu by-elections is a significant thing in the history of the Maoist extremism. Until now, no ,senior operative, other than Mr. Kameshwar Baitha, has . contested any form of elections. It is a clear indication that there is tacit support from the Maoist leadership behind the entire process." For the State and Central security and intelligence agencies, there is nothing to do except wait in the wings. Presently, there is no straw in the wind to indicate any trend. Till date (Aug 2007), there has been no development on this front. May be, the _analysts will have to wait till early 2009 when the next Parliamentary polls are due in the country to know if Indian .. Maoists will go the Nepal way. Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

Hindu, 12 Jan 2007. R. Prasannan, Week, 11 Jun 2006. Maj. Gen. Ashok Mehta, cited, ibid. Bhavna Vij-Aurora, Outlook, 15 May 2006. Outlook, 26 May 2006. Vinay Jha, Indian Express, 22 July, 2007. K. Srinivas Reddy, Hindu, 9 Mar 2007. These observations are based on the article penned by Avijit Ghosh after visiting the area) that appeared Times of India, 20 May 2007. Ibid. Avijit Ghosh, Times of India, 20 May, 2007. Amarnath K. Menon and Neeraj Mishra, India Today, 23 Oct., 2006. Venkat Parsa, Asian Age, 23 Dec 2006. -. Dipankar Bose, Statesman, 6 April, 2007.

16 Cou nter ing Terr orism Too many discu ssions on anti-M aoist policy : Apr 2007 The spate of meetin gs and discus sions by officials of the Centr al and State Gover nment s in the recent month s (mid 2006- mid Apr 2007 period ) have failed to produc e an effective counte r-Mao ist policy for the countr y. The lack of agreem ent on a unified strateg y to counte r the Maois t violence, which is based on oft-str essed and much- neede d coord inatio n among the affecte d states and real-ti me sharin g of the intellig ence among them is a cause of concer n among the securi ty community. All this is grea_tly hampe ring the fight agains t the increa sing threat to India's stabili ty posed by the Left-w ing ideology. Sharp differe nces among the affecte d States once again croppe d up in the latest meetin g of the Task Force on AntiMaois t Opera tions, held on 13 Apr 2007. Presen tly there are three operat ional model s adopte d by variou s States to contai n the Maois t terror. These are summ ed up here. • Andhr a Prade sh Gover nment 's model . Under it, the strateg y is to mix combi ng operat ions in remote forest areas by specia list battali ons with the arrest of Maois ts and their sympa thizer s in urban areas. • Chhat isgarh Model. This model is based on extend ing help to the locals (mainl y tribals , in this case), includ ing supply of arms and ammu nition , to enable them to resist the depred ations of the outlaw s. The plan is commo nly known as Salwa Judum . The Leftis t elite (amon g them is Arund hati Roy), expect edly, dubbe d it as the policy aimed at dividin g the tribals . • The third model is based on the strateg y of launch ing anti-M aoist campa igns on specif ic iriform ation and initiat ing develo pment measu res to aliena te the" Maoists.

846

Terrorism in India

Centre's preference is for the first two models, as it feels the third model has proved to be slow in achieving desired results. But the officials from the concerned states are opposing the Centre's advice on the plea that the adv:ised models, involving active operations against the Maoists, could aggravate the social problems. Sources disclosed that Maharashtra tried to practice the Andhra model but it failed to pick up due to the Dalit Movement getting mixed up with the Maoist activism in certain pockets. Likewise, Jharkhand attempted replicating Chhattisgarh model but following the killing of Sunil Mahato, it had to shelve operations. 1 Then there was inter-ministerial meeting held in Patna on 16 Apr 2007, chaired by the Additional Secretary (Anti-Maoist), . MHA-Vinay Kumar-to review the Maoist situation. At this conclave, Bihar's representatives said they preferred to adopt the development model to eradicate Maoism from their State and sought a special package of Rs 1,900 crore for revamping the irrigation and road infrastructure in their State. The issue was_ to come up for detailed discussions at the meeting/of the National Coordination Centre (NCC) headed by the Union Home Secretary, Madhukar Gupta, on 26Apr 2007. Meanwhile on 20 Apr, Cabinet Secretary BK Chaturvedi convened a meeting of the Chief Secretaries of all the concerned States to understand and discuss the problems involved in adopting a unified strategy throughout the country to counter the Maoists. The MHA sources indicated that various political and social problems that would result from adopting hardcore combat tactics in remote hinterland and catching the Maoists and their sympathizers in urban areas would come for detailed discussion at the 26 Apr NCC meet. Some of the more important issues discussed at the 20 Apr 2007 meeting presided over by the Cabinet Secretary BK Trivedi were: • The question of how to empower the States in upgrading their social and related infrastructure . • Food security, Sarva Shiksha.Abhyan, National Rural Health Mission, improvement of business climate, and strategy for toning up governance were also clubbed together with the review of internal security situation for fhis meeting.

Countering Terrorism

847

• The one-day meeting was organized by the Department of Administrative Reforms and Public Grievances. It was intended to serve the twin purpose of assessing the performance of different states over a period of time, especially in respect of various flagship programmes of different central nodal ministries. • The meeting sought to remove the impediments in speedy implementation of centrally sponsored schemes, which could prove useful in alienating the Maoist activists at the village levels. Intelligence inputs had underlined the vulnerability of the stock market, sea routes and the uninhabited islands, which could be used as a safe haven by terrorists of various shades. It is yet too early to examine ifthe plethora of meetings held under different officials have produced any articulate policy options for the States subjected to violence by the Maoist terrorists. It is high time India has a policy to counter Maoist violence in various States. COMBATING NAXALISM MHA to set up Anti-Naxal cell: Desparate bid: May 2006 Rattled by unabated Naxal violence and its own inability to come up with a containment strategy, a concerned Home Ministry (MHA) has decided to set up a dedicated Anti-Naxal Cell to coordinate intelligence, development outre aches and impleIJ1entation of policies to check the rising Red menace. 15 The cell, to be headed by an IAS officer, will have smaller group to deal specifically with development issues and armed police response in the affected district. For the first time there will be numerous police officers tasked with the jobs of tracking policies regarding policing and deployment. What the MHA has asked the government in terms of human resources is indicative of its intention of creating a gigantic task force to wage anti-N axal war, as also an acknowledgement of the stark fact that the Centre has so far, failed in its anti-Naxal exertions. It plans to ask for this cell a new post of Additional Secretary, one Joint Secretary (JS) and four Deputy Secretaries (DS) besides 16 secretarial staff, which in financial terms adds up to an additional expenditure of Rs 52 lakh a year, a daily reported on 9 May 2006. One ofthe two JS posts will be tenable by a police offlcer of'\ IGP rank, mandated to tour the Naxal-hit states and to monitor

848

Terrorism in India

the implementation of the anti-Naxal plan while holding consultations with DGPs and Chief Secretaries. Of the four DS posts, two will be tenable by the DIG rank police officers, who will report to the said IGP. The Naxalaffected states will be equally allotted between them as exclusive responsibility. Two non-police DSs too will be charged with monitoring the development scheme in the respective states allotted to them. The government has identified lack of development as an important factor contributing largely to the growth of Naxalism and wants concerted effort in that direction to remove the 'root causes' the spread of the menace. Special Cell: Will it deliver? May 2006 The Home Ministry long last seems to have recognized the seriousness of the threat the Maoists pose to Nations security " by setting up a special cell within it. It will be headed by an Additional Secretary (an IAS officer, of course), backed up by two Joint Secretaries, four Deputy Secretaries, 16 secretarial staff an9, as a cynical analyst put it, "God alone knows how many stenos, peons and whatever else is required to make a sahib feel like one." The measure has not been received well by some analysts and newspapers. One from the latter fraternity is quoted here, more for its unconcealed cynicism than any constructive reasoning: "........ somehow the theory of nipping the trouble in the bud has eluded North Block, but the outcome of series of the conferences on the subject inspire little confidence. For it remains rooted in a bureaucratic approach. Practical utility of this (plethora of officials and their staID remain questionable, except on the files beyond which 'babudom' does not function. Some of the mini-secretariat will be drawn from police-would not those cops love an armchair assignment? The Special Cell staff would set about monitoring the anti-Naxal operations and what passes off as development activity. Sounds terrific, comprehensive. What the Army would laud as efficient 'staff work".2 This from a daily. It does sound cynical but here is more than kernel of truth in this verbiage. It continues in the same vein: "Important though staff work is, it does not suffice to win battles, , but the Ministry appears little concerned with translating plans

t


849

into action. The need to convince or inspire the political leadership in affected states into taking hard decisions gets little or no priority, nor is much stock placed in gearing up the local police to tackle extremists (the Central forces can never supplant them), or get the district authorities to generate the 'Roti, kapda aur makan' for which the population turns to Naxals, having lost faith in the 'Sarkar'. It is customary for New Delhi's politicians and bureaucrats to diagnose such situations as 'more than law and order problems', but an injection of additional khaki is all the medicine they administer. Simply because going beyond that means getting their 'hands dirty'. Something abhorrent to the dandified leadership to which this critical ministry is now condemned" . This editorial from a daily has been advisedly quoted in extensor. Respite the apparent cynicism, the editorial has a lot to say on the issues which is widely believed by majority of Indians. First some comments to restore balance to some of the observations made by the daily. Why blame the bureaucracy for not going beyond the bureaucratic? They are trained to work that way and the system does not allow them to cross the limits even of some bureaucrat is inclined that way or determined to do so. Just to cite one instance on this Special Cell itself: We have no system under which a knowledgeable, capable and willing person from academia, journalism, strategic community or commentariat can be appointed to head such a cell. Again it is unfair to expect mere bureaucrats to god state political leaders ." into taking harsh decisions on anti-Naxalite strategy. Not can they god district administration into completing socio-economic development plans. As for the dandified leadership of the Union Home Ministry, a bigger truth has never been spoken. No one disagrees that the vital Ministry could have been entrusted to a less competent hands. For the reasons well known, it is a given that cannot be changed. Yet again, there is no denying the fact that the Special Cell will only create more hapen work to justify its creation/existence, without adding anything worth-while to the fight against the Naxalites. Yes, it will be the fourth, avoidable addition to the three consultative, deliberative mechanisms already in place: (1) Empowered Group of Ministers (EGoM); (2) Joint Task Force from the 13 Naxalite-affected states; (3) National Coordination Centre on Naxalism (NCCN) under the Union Home Secretary.

850

Terrorism in India

. Incidentally, the Cell will cost the exchequer Rs 50 lakh annually. Having said it all, some analysts would still like to give some time to this fledgling creation to see if it indeed can deliver something to justify its continuance! .. Dealing with Naxals: A divided home? May 2006 That N axals are creating havoc in the country is known to alL But when Union Home Minister recently proposed a specific measure to tackle the Naxal violence, his cabinet colleagues came in the way. This was reported by a daily on 15 May 2006. Shivraj Patil had at a recent cabinet meeting proposed setting up an Anti-Naxal Cell in his Ministry to deal more effectively with the Left-wing Extremism, only to have Parliamentary Affairs Minister Priya Ranjan Dasmunshi intervening to say this was a political issue and the Cell should devise a strategy against all Left-wing extremism. As if this was' not bad enough, the senior Minister Arjun Singh bluntly said . ., the Home Ministry was unable to handle the problem. . An agitated Home Minister told the HRD Minister that he had not only handled the N axalite problem but could also .. provide details about the situation in Kashmir and in other trouble spots to prove how well his Ministry had fared on the internal security front. Have the Naxals succeeded in dividing the Union Cabinet,. or are the senior ministers indulging in one-up-manship at the cost of national interests? New Set-up to fight increased Naxal violence The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has been contemplating certain additional measures in the wake of spurt in Naxal activities, the ever increasing expanse of the militant-Left menace and reports of inter-state arms procurement by the militants. In its bid to recover lost ground to curb the Naxal menace, the MHA decided, among other initiative, to set up a special Desk in the Ministry and to propose an empowered group of ministers (E-GoM). Analysts reported these developments on 25 Oct 2006, just two days ahead of the 27 Oct meeting of the Task Force on Naxals. _The plan to set up a N axal Desk in the MHA has been in _ the works for quite sometime, but it assumed urgency in Aug 2006 in the wake of increasing incidents of Naxal attacks. Till


851

Aug 2006, 115 security personnel and 401 civilians were killed by the N axals, while the figures for the corresponding period of 2005 are 94 and 364. 3 Chhattisgarh remained the worst-affected state, with N axal violence registering a sharp rise in the first 8 months of 2006469 against 265 for the same period of 2005. The Naxal Desk headed by an officer of the additional secretary rank "is likely to be operational soon, once senior officers in the rank of IG and DIG police are deputed", sources said. Besides the N axal Desk, there will be mechanism for an inter-ministerial committee for carrying out a detailed review of the implementation of development schemes in the affected areas. "The committee will meet ahead of the quarterly meetings of the Coordination Centre on N axalism." The new trend of inter-state arms procurement by N axals, evident from the recovery of huge consignment of ro.ckets, launchers and explosives in Andhra Pradesh is a disturbing news for the security officials. The Task Force on N axalism was constituted in Oct 2004 "under the chairmanship of Special Secretary (Internal Security), to deliberate upon the measures to deal more effectively and in a coordinated manner with the N axal threat. Overarching all these institutions will be E-GoM "to be constituted shortly." It will be needed to oversee the massive investments needed for the infrastructure development. The development of Naxal-ravaged areas is an ideal counter-measure to defeat the lure of Naxalism that draws idle youth to its fold. It is an effective CBM, even if slow and laborious, to check the ultra-Left violence. . It is necessary to caution that these bureaucratic set-ups, too many in this case, create their own problems, before they get down to undertake the task they in the first place have been created for. The only hope is that an alert Home Secretary and all-powerful PMO keep them on the rails.

Fighting the Maoists In 2005, the MHA directed security personnel deployed N axal-affected areas to use plain clothes and travel in unmarked vehicles. It was obviously meant to obfuscate easy identification that makes them coveted targets without any difficulty.

Terrorism in India

852

The Union government is reported to have formulated a strategy to control the N axal violence, which includes: • Sharing of intelligence. • Intensified developmental efforts in affected areas. • Speeding up of land reforms. • Modernization of police force. • Adoption of a collective approach by the affected States.

Private copters to fight Red terror: Oct 2006 It is not unoften that the analysts and security experts got irked with the Centre's stand on fighting the Naxalite violence that is threatening country's integrity and sovereignty. Union Home Ministry's constant refrain has been: Left-wing extremism is a problem concerning the individual states, and hence it ., cannot elevated to being a "national" problem. Of course, the Ministry also made proforma promise to "extend all necessary help to states to fight the menace-financial package, additional security forces, intelligence inputs et al. It seems to have gone beyond these routine promises now by arranging helicopters from private companies for the affected states to enhance their anti-Naxalite capability. This is the development that could contribute significantly to the war against Maoist terror. To wit, the Centre has concluded a deal with a private company for the supply of helicopters to security forces in Naxal-infested states.

More specifically, the Home Ministry has signed an agreement Mls Vertex Ltd of Hyderabad for the supply of two helicopters on lease for non-military purpose to security forces deployed in Naxalite-affected states ofChhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa and Andhra Pradesh. It is believed the CRPF has already used it on two occasions during the last couple of months in Chhattisgarh to air drop personnel in remote areas for specific operations. This information was published by a daily on 25 Oct 2006. 4 The Andhra government will be the nodal agency coordinating use of the two machines among different states. An expense of some Rs 8 crore would be borne by the Union Home Ministry from the Security Related Expenditure (SRE).


853

The decision to rope in private players reflects the government's concern to gain an upper hand in the situation that reveals a rising trend of casualties suffered during the Naxalite violence. The comparative figures for two years are given below to show the increasing costs in human lives of the Naxalite depredations. Period

Fatalities suffered Security personnel

Civilians

2005

94

364

2006

115

401

(Till Aug)

Surprisingly, the development-clinching the deal-comes close on the heels of private companies refusing to enter into the deal as they were apprehensive about the safety of the helicopters given the fire power of the militants. The rockets recovered recently in Andhra Pradesh with a potential range of 400 mtrs had added to their apprehensions. Not only the private companies, even the security forces were concerned since part of this consignment of 850-and-odd rockets seized. in Prakasam and Mehboobnagar have already fallen into Naxalite's hands. DG, CRPF JK Sinha on 24 Oct 2006 told the reporters: "They only have to fill the rockets with explosives and use them against security forces". Precautionary measures have already been taken against any potential danger from these rockets. Another important development, said officials, was the launching of operations by the CRPF on its own against militants in Chhattisgarh. Earlier, the role of the central police forces was mainly to supplement the efforts of the state police but the change was the fall-out of a proposal mooted by the Security Adviser to the State Government, KPS Gill, that was supported by the Union Home Ministry. A senior official elucidated the point: "The G Branch for intelligence that was inaugurated (only) five months ago for the CRPF has started giving results. Enough information was pouring in on the Naxalites that is supplemented by the State Police". Brushing aside the controversy on the Salma Judum movement in Chhattisgarh, the DG, CRPF said it was a "people's

854

Terrorism in India

movement" that needed to be supported. Asked about the possibility of infiltration by the ISI into the paramilitary organization he was categorical: "Jawans did not have access to sensitive information and that an efficient surveillance system was in place to monitor the activities of the senior officers." Another Counter-Insurgency School The Union Home Ministry has given in-principle approval for setting up a specialized school where Para-military personnel will be trained in subjects concerning the internal security duties-commando operations, counter-guerrilla tactics, explosive, detection and disposal, jungle warfare and antisabotage operations. The BSF has been entrusted with the task of establishing this counter-insurgency (Cl) institution. The BSF, essentially guarding nation's border presently, and thus not directly involved in the Cl operations, will establish a world-class institute to train Para-military forces and the state police personnel for the said internal security duties. DG BSF AK Mitra explains: "the contours of anti-insurgency operations ar.~ fast changing. We need to update our personI)el to familiarize them with the latest techniques and to sharpen their skills."5 / 400 acre's of area on the outskirts of Bangalore h~s been earmarked for this BSF institute, first of its kind to be opened by a Para-military force. Mitra disclosed the Centre had asked the BSF to set up this institute at Hazarib'agh in Bihar but it suggested Bangalore area for the purpose as jungle land was available there-an ideal location for it. The proposal is awaiting Home Ministry's final clearance. This will be third institute of its kind, as such a training is already available at two centres: the Indian Army has counterInsurgency and Jungle Warfare School at Warangte, Mizoram and the NSG Training Centre at Manesar, near Gurgaon in Haryana. Task force discusses anti-Naxal operations: 27 Oct 2006 New Delhi: 27 Oct 2006. The Task Force of nodal officers of nine N axal violence-affected States-Andhra Pradesh, . Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar, Orissa, Maharashtra, Madhya . Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal-discussed ways of improving "ground-level response".


855

The meeting attended by the nodal officers in the rank of Additional DGP from these nine states, who shared their experiences and exchanged information on anti-Naxal operations, was presided over by GS Rajagopal, Special Secretary (Internal Security), MHA, and it reviewed the progress of anti-Naxal operations. The meeting also decided to fine-tune "operational coordination" among these States. CISF to be Expanded Talking to the press after reviewing the passing-out Parade at the National Industrial Security Academy (NISA), Hyderabad, the premier training institute of the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), Home Minister Shivraj Patil urged the States to establish tackle growing units on the lines of the CI~F to security needs, including terrorist threats likely to be faced by industries and vital installations. Other points made by him: • CISF would be expanded in the wake of increasing demand from various sector for protection by it. Initially raised to provide security to public sector undertakings, but was later tasked to guard airports. PresentlY it was also providing security cover to scientific institutions, including those of space, atomic and electronics. ' • The growing demand for CISF security showed the high degree of professionalism adopted by it. It was also presently providing consultancy to private sector. • Alluding to the challenges country was witnessing from new quarters, he said "terrorism is a matter of great concern". • If any important private industry, financial institute or other installation was likely to become targets of terrorism, protection would be required by them and all these aspects would be kept in mind while expanding the CISF. Neutralizing and eliminating Naxalism: some ideas: 2007 When the atrocities perpetrated by the ultra-Left extremists beat their own record of past brutalities, nation must sit up and take notice. It can no longer be the case of 'business as usual'

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Terrorism in India

that the govern ment of the day would like to preten d. The first quarte r of the year 2007 can be deeme d a period when the Naxal ites showe d their inform ed ways of execut ing their usual chores --of grueso me and mania c killing s of the innoce nts and mindl ess destru ction of their village s and the neighb ourhoo d indus trial and socio- econo mic develo pment proje cts-w ith increa sed techno logica l sophis ticatio n and milita ry precisi on. Some of the Naxal ite brutal ities are briefly recoun ted here for record : 1. 15 Mar 2007, 68 police person nel of Chhat tisgar h were killed in a 2 AM attack on a Salma Judum camp (Rani Bodli) in Basta r area. The dead includ ed 38 Salma J udum activis ts. Rocke t launch ers, grenad es, detona tors and petrol bombs were used to deadly effects . Long, meticu lous planni ng had gone into the operat ion. They had even brough t a genset with them to inflict maxim um fatalit ies and to ensure that no inmat es escape . 2. A few days earlier , a servin g JMM MP Sunil Mahat o was murde red in the broad day light near Jal:1sh edpur while watch ing a football match (4 March ). 3. Durin g Jan-Fe b 2007, a month -long 9 th Congr ess of the CPI (Maoi st) was conve ned in a libera ted zone C'Muk tancha l' in their parlan ce) along the Jharkh andBihar border at a 'secure d' site. Decisi ons taken at the Congr ess after due delibe ration s aimed at: (1) extend ing the Naxal influen ce/pre sence in the south beyond Andhr a Prade sh into Karn ataka and Tamil Nadu; (2) mobili zation for fresh recrui tment into their ranks; and (3) oppos ing and disrup ting minin g (bauxi te) operat ions and Indust rial projec ts in Orissa and Bihar and block the establ ishme nts and spread of netwo rk of SEZs as they cause displa cemen t of the village rs and farmer s. 4. In Janua ry, a landm ine blast in Bokar o distric t caused the death of 13 police person nel. Maois t plans and inten tions Such heinou s incide nts would contin ue to kill the civilia ns and under mine the Indian state unless the basic struct ure of the Naxal movem ent and the nature of the forces sustai ning it are studie d and under stood by the securi ty minde rs of this nation and factor ed into their counte r-Naxa lite strateg y. They canno t offer an alibis for inactio n or framin g an effective plan


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of action, pretending ignorance of the intentions/plans of the bloodletting opponent. Courtesy their own intelligence resources, the government is well aware of the future plans and intent of the Maoists. All these are well laid out in the documents-'" discussed in the 9 th congress in early 2007 and of their Central Military Commission deliberations in 20.06. Presently, the Naxalites are much better organized, much better led and much better motivated than their predecessors in the 1960s when they burst like a "spring thunder" in the N axalbari area of north West Bengal. At' that time, they got easily drunk on the romantic and revolutionary slogans of the ideological creed then raging in their neighbourhood: "power flows from the barrel of the gun". "A Single Spark can Start a Prairie Fire" Carried away by their revolution any passions, after all their leaders had gone over to China on a pilgrimage and met the Great Oarsman in person, they declared all landlord§, big or small, and all bourgeoise, powerful or petty, as class enemies and had to be eliminated by violent mr;ans. They were led by a brilliant but impulsive leader Charu Mazumdar, who was unfortunately swept off his feet by a few initial successful adventures and accompanying gust of accompanying publicity. He "talked of a great upsurge" and boasted that "every corner of India was becoming inflammable". 6 His domineering nature alienated his colleagues and led to , the split of the party during his life time. The faction-fighting' led to the weakening of the party and the movement soon started petering out, particularly after the death of Charu Mazumdar-its Charismatic leader. Jangal Santhal too demitted the scene. The rump is still led by the last surviving member (Kanu Sanyal) of the original trio; leading a life by his original ideological beliefs but unknown to most outside his own village! The Naxals have learnt their lessons. Today, the position is far different. The movement has undergone a change both in policy and strategy. It has been strengthening itself since 1990s. A major change for the better came in Sep 2004, when two major left-wing groups (MCC and PWG) responsible for 90 per cent of the activities of the movements merged to form a united outfit, designated CPI (Maoist). Before merger, the two groups had engaged in serious, violent war of mutual attrition. Having called that period "the black chapter in the history of Indian revolution", they want to forget it as bad dream.

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Terrorism in India

Along with the merger was also raised an armed wing-the People's Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA). The CP! (Maoist) has rechristened its political programme as 'New Democratic Revolution'. Its strategy too has been given a make over. The new strategy translates into a protracted armed struggle whose objective, no more, is seizure of land, crops or other such immediated goals but the seizure of the state power. This formulation rejects participation in elections and engagement with the prevailing bourgeoise democracy. The entire effort is firmly focused on revolutionary activities to undermine the state and seize power. The struggle against "feudalism, imperialism and comprador bureaucratic capitalism" is, as hithertofore, reiterated in the new programme which also reaffirms that the party would support the struggle of the nationalities for self-determination, including the right to secession, and would pay special attention to mobilizing and : organizing women as a mighty force of revolution. The unity of various groups, the renewed vigour and enthusiasm of the leaders and their realization of the damage done by infighting in the past have ushered in a new more purposeful phas~ for the movement. Some other factors, summed up below, have also helped it to acquire a new impetus and a new sense of purpose: • The rural people have come to believe that the economic policies, initiated in 1991 and enshrined in globalization, marketisation, liberalization and deregulation, are essentially pro-rich and are increasing the disparities in the society. • These policies are new faces of imperialism and hegemony. The newly acquired prosperity of the rich around them-landlords, bourgeois, businessmen, industrialists and bureaucrats-only add to the resentment simmering within. All this creates a fertile ground for their propaganda blast and helps the Naxalites to add to their cadre. • Whatever the benefits of the Panchayati Raj in theory and so loudly tom-tommed by its protagonists, its total effect at ground level has been placing more power in the hands of the comparatively well-to-do class of peasants, which has further alienated the poor and the landless who consequently show little hesitation in joining the Naxalite ranks.


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• They already stand transformed into a modern guerrilla force. The Naxalites no longer use the rusty rifles and country made pistols. Flush with funds, they have international illegal weapons market to exploit at will, having sophisticated weaponry and modern technology to choose from. Their cadres are now equipped with sophisticated communication and rocket launchers, lED, land mines, petrol bombs et al. Augmented Strength and Strike Power Their militia strength is estimated at 25,000 cadres, well trained and highly motivated unlike earlier times, a good percentage of their cadre is well educated including those holding professional skills and postgraduate degrees. The sophistication has added immensely to the striking power of the Naxalites. The increased strength and its efficient use have been on display in the recent years. Some recent incidents are recounted here at random to highlight this aspect of their strength and efficient organization: 1. 13 Nov. 2005. Some 1,000 disciplined members of Naxalite cadre participated in a well-planned and wellexecuted night attack on Jehanabad, barely 50 km from Bihar's capital of Patna. They were in virtual control of the city for several hours; freed 340 prisoners from the jail including their comrades and their leader Ajay Kanu; and killed two leaders of the Ranveer Sena lodged in the same jail. The attacks on the jail, police lines and offices of the district headquarters were carried out simultaneously. Some analysts concluded that the mass support of the rural hinterland of Jehanabad was obvious for the raiders, since there was hardly any resistance. This assertion begs a question, and is facile. 2. 6 Feb 2004. A group of 200 Naxal cadres swooped upon the district armourey at Koraput and made away with 500 weapons. 3. 11 Feb 2005. Some 250 male and 50 female members of the Naxal cadre suddenly descended on a Karnataka police camps, killing six policemen and looting 10 rifles. In the same manner, some 300 Naxalites attacked Madhuban, Bihar, and shot dead five policemen and plundered arms as well as the money from the post office and a nationalised banks.

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4. In another raid on the Home Guards Training Centre, Girdih, Jharkhand, some 200 weapons were looted. 5. 3 Dec 2006.14 policemen of the Special Taks Force were killed in a land mine explosion. 6. 15 Mar 2007. This is the last serious crime to be included in the list here. Some 400-450 N axalite militants attacked a base camp at Rani Bodli, Bastar and systematically killed 68 policemen, effectively making use of petrol bombs. 38 civilian SPOs killed in the attack belonged to Salma Judum campaign of Chhattisgarh. The above incidents are recorded to show the deadly intent and military precision the Naxalite desperados are able to bear upon their operational forays against the security forces and civilian targets alike. These are not only indicative of their increased numerical strength but also the enhanced sophistication of their weaponry and tactics and over-all strategic planning. The new strategy, obviously, is to incite and exploit people's resentment against the police. Some analysts go beyond this and assert that "the new strategy is to pit the police against the masses who have, rightly or wrongly, been made to believe that they are victims of injustice and inequity. Besides this, the brutality of attacks and rough and ready justice is meant to convey a message to the people targeted in their attacks. Sunil Mahato and Salma Judum activists were killed because' they were guilty of taking a public stance against the N axalism and organizing people against it. The logic is simple: How dare the oppose N axalite movement? Enlarging the Red Corridor-dangerously Is it because of people's sympathy with their movement that the area of the Red Corridor is expanding rather fast? The following figures tell the story quite convincingly: 1. From 156 districts in 13 States in Sep 2004, the Naxal violence spread to 170 districts in 15 states in Feb 2005. 2. The above are official figures. Informed analysts assert that as of today-Aug 2007-186 districts in 16 states are in the grip of N axalite violence. 3. Yet again, here is Intelligence Bureau, Government of India: At present, about 40 pet,-eent of the geographical area of the country and 35' p~r cent of its population is affected by the N axal violence. 7

, .. Countering Terrorism

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The Red Corridor, extending from the jungles of North Bihar to Jharkhand, Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Andhra, Maharashtra and Karnataka, is fast emerging. The Annual Report, 2004-05 of the Union Home Ministry, admits as much: "Despite strenuous efforts by the security forces, there has been no let up in the effectuation of CRZ (Compact Revolutionary Zone) with the gaps in North Bihar 'md North Chhattisgarh being steadily plugged by the Naxalite outfits to link up with their strong holds in API Danda-Karanya with those in Bihar/Jharkhand. Coupled with the steadily increasing Naxalite influence in North OrissalSouthEast Jharkhand, it is apparent that the Naxalite groups remain steadfast in their efforts to realize the CRZ." The objective is to establish a "Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ)" in the heart of India and use this zone and the Red Corridor for extending the Naxalite movement to the cities and . ultimately to seize the power structure of the states. The ultimate goal, of course, is the establishment of the Maoist state, no matter how many bones are broken and how much blood is spilled in the way. The Home Ministry Annual Report quoted above is more than two years old. In this interregnum, not only the CPI (Maoist) seems to have filled the gaps mentioned in the report, it also has planned further advances. One need not look for the evidertce far and wide for the advances made by the ultra-left outfit since the said Report. A brief look at the decisions taken during the 9th Congress of the Maoists held during their JanFeb 2007 conclave held in the Muktanchal (= liberated zone) along the Jharkhand-Bihar border at a 'secured' site and the deliberations of their Central Military Commission (CMC) in 2006. These are: 1. They will advance further into the South, beyond the

current limit of Andhra Pradesh, into the states of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu. 2. The CPI (Maoists) decided to extend their activities to urban areas and Industrial area, going against the teachings of Mao who wanted consolidation and occupation of rural area and countryside before focusing on the cities and urban areas.

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Terrorism in India 3. The CMC decide d to set up zonal comm ittees in the new areas such as Delhi, Harya na and Punjab . 4. The CMC also decide d to conve rt the People 's Guerr illa Libera tion Army (PGLA ) into the People 's Libera tion Army (PLA).

What is impo rtant is that the state and Centr al Gover nment s must keep pace with the ever advan cing plans of the CPI (Maoi sts) to expan d their influen ce beyon d the areas curren tly under their influen ce. The anti-N axalite strateg y must match -if not outma tch-th e rebels strateg y. Sugge sted Coun ter-N axalis m Meas ures The states which are Naxal- affecte d and covere d by the CRZ and throug h which the Red Corrid or passes must make an effecti ve institu tional arrang ement for coordi nated police action agains t the Naxali tes. This cooper ation coordi nation betwe en the two neighb ouring states is sine qua non for succes s agains t the Naxal s who are operat ing across severa l states. Beyon d bilater al cooper ation, collec tivity of more than two affecte d states too :-: would have to plan cooper ative and coordi nated joint anti-N axal opera tions. For this, intell igenc e sharin g is extrem ely impor tant-i nclud ing the real time variety . Specia l anti-N axal task forces , traine d and equipp ed for jungle warfar e agains t the rebels , will be requir ed. The hound of Andhr a is a well-k nown examp le of this kind. Some other states two have specia l task forces for the anti-N axal operat ions. More impor tantly, all such specia lized forces need to be traine d at school s like Count er Terror ism and Jungle Warfa re School (CTJW S) recent ly set up by Jharkh and at Kanke r. These school s impar t guerri lla tactics and jungle warfa re traini ng to the securi ty forces to equip them to neutra lize the Naxal ism. Where ver such specia lly-tra ined securi ty forces were deploy ed agains t the rebels over a sustai ned period of time, the result s have been encou raging . But narrow politic al consid eration s will have to be kept aside in nation al intere sts. But that does not alway s happe n. The excell ent results achiev ed by the specia l units during the tenure of Chief Minis ter Chand ra Babu Naidu 's TDP Gs>vemm_e.nt were fritter ed by the YSR Reddy Gover nment that came to power


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after the 1994 poll. How did this come to happen? On the eve of these 1994 elections to the Andhra Assembly (and also __ General Elections) and during the run up to the polls, with a view to securing the support of the N axalites and their over ground supporters, promises to declare a 'cease-fire' and hold negotiations with them, were made by the then Opposition Congress Party: Mter coming to power both at the central and state levels, prolonged negotiations were held with the Naxal ledaers, whoinsisted and mere allowed to come armed with their weapons. Expectedly, they made a show of it all and at one stage insisted on dismissing the personal security provided to them by the state government, and the latter gave in. This has been discussed earlier also-including the futility of it all. All this infused new life in the movement. Mter the rebel leaders had achieved equality of status with Chief Minister which not only added to their respectability but also enhanced their stature in the eyes of their cadre. By the time negotiations ended sans any agreement or understanding, the N axalites, having m~e good use of the interregnum to regroup and reequip their militants, were able to take the field with renewed confidence and "evolved a new strategy of action at the ground level." It was, of course, not the first that the politics of vote bank vis-a-vis the Naxalites has been played by a Chief Minister in Andhra. NT Rama Rao played it with consummate skill in 1982, calling the N axalites true patriots ('deshbhaklalu' was the term used by him) who had been misunderstood by the ruling classes. Honeymoon did not last long and thank God for that. By 1985, he was forced to take action against them. M Chenna Reddy, Congress Chief Minister, acted no differently. In 1989, he, too, declared that the Naxalites were patriots. Chief Minister N. Chandrababu Naidu, for a change, adopted a firm stance against the Naxal outlaws. But it was YS Rajasekhra Reddy's turn now to appease them, as just discussed.

In some other states too, political parties and individual leaders have not hesitated to arrive at an understanding of mutual help with the N axalites. "This has enabled the latter to came out an unhindered space for their activities while the 1 former have been getting electoral support of the N axal cadre at the time of elections. This mutual understanding has been widely noticed in Bihar and Jharkhand."

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Politics has been the bane of effective anti-terrorism policies in India. In more specific terms, vote-bank politics has hobbled . these policies at various stages, and that has already been discussed. The same flaw marks the anti-Naxal policies of various state governments. It is, indeed, unfortunate that shotterm political gains are often given precedence over the need for pursuing a clear, consistent and firm line. The centre and the states must craft an anti-Naxalite strategy, above the interests of party politics, and then deploy their available resources Including the special police units and paramilitary task forces to gain an upper hand against the rebels. Otherwise, the Naxalites could not be blamed for believing that they are only facing a compromised, indecisive and even a 'tottering foe'. The country has to expect its political leaders at the Centre and the state levels to soar above their narrow party and personal . considerations and put up an effective united fight against the enemy growing at its vitals methodically-even if slowly. Tomorrow may be too late. It must be understood that this battle will be fought and won on the political front.

Socio-economic Disparities and Poverty India is experiencing an economic miracle: It is world's second fastest growing economy, next only to China. It is going to be one of the world's five super powers by 2020. The fact is accepted not only at national level but also in the international arena. But there is an unsavory underbelly to this miracle: Fruits of this economic revolution are not being shared by the lower strata of the Indians. In fact, some economic analysts assert that the gap between rich and the poor is widening, as the intended benefits are not reaching the latter. Poverty is widely believed to be fertile ground that swells the ranks of the Naxalite cadres. In fact, rural distress, which, of late, has assumed serious proportions, needs to be addressed urgently and effectively. So far this socio-economic disparity and stark poverty prevail in the society, Naxalism will be always there. It is a simple question of 'demand and supply.' Varavara Rao, the poet and author, puts it matter-of-factly: "If there is need, movement will be thet:e."


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A recent national survey carried in a daily dated 2 Apr 2007 has revealed some disturbing facts, summed up here: • 33 per cent of India's population, that is, about 200 million ruralites, live on only Rs. 12 a day. They spend as much as 70 per cent of their income on food and, consequently, cannot afford to buy nutrition like green vegetables. • 36 million young people between the ages of 15 and 29 years are "usually unemployed", on some days, as many as 58 million remain without work. • Hundreds of peasants in debt are committing suicide. • Thousands of poor ruralites are also getting displaced consequent to their land being taken for development projects. In view of these dismal facts, anger and frustration of the poor and the dispossessed and their attraction for a movement like Naxalite's are understandable. It speaks volumes about the failure of the Indian polity, Indian leadership and Indian social and cultural values of post1947 period that a very large number of people in the country should still be grinded by hunger and haunted by unemployment every day, while millions of others are getting more and more affluent and sucked into the orbit of consumerism. The Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (REGS) may provide some relief to the hungry and the unemployed but this can not be the complete answer to the stark picture painted above. A more comprehensive, long-term plan, conceived by more enlightened vision of future India, needs to be formulated and implemented.

A closer link needs to be established between urban, semiurban and rural areas. A planned process of de-ruralisation and simultaneous urbanization, industrialisation, and "serviceisation" should be initiated. It should be assured that those who are displaced from the rural areas consequent to the execution of the development are absorbed in those very projects and given pre-service and in-service training to acquire requisite skills and improve them further. The money compensation received by the claimants should be invested in the company in the form of

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shares with guaranteed return equivalent to the amount of compensation. This would provide four-fold benefits: (i) The risk 'of c-ompensation money being squandered would be eliminated; (ii) The recipient, by virtue of his investment, would develop an interest in the advancement of the company, (iii) In the event of failure of the company, the rock-bottom amount would be available to the investors of this category; (iv) The erstwhile ruralite would become a skilled person, and if he seizes the opportunity to further upgrade his skills, a brighter future would be opened to him and his family. This seems to be a good, workable solution to the large scale displacements mining operations, industrial and commercial enterprises and the establishment of the SEZs. Most importantly, the nature of the Naxal movement must be understood by the Indian society and state. Being inherently dangerous and destructive, it can bring no good to any class of people. "It can only ensure for India a blood-soaked grammar of anarchy." Its ideology is total import, wholly imitative of the Chinese model of the thirties and forties of the last century, and takes no cognizance of great many changes that have occurred all over the globe in various spheres of life. The N axalites can indeed entice the poor impressionable youth into their ranks with catchy but century-old slogans. An adventurous and romantic notions of life painted by the propagandists soon turns into one of mindless and murderous violence against the defenceless civilians. The Naxal movement sets one class against another, one caste against another and what is even worse, it often declares yesterday's comrades as today's police informers and traitors-deserving of physical elimination through trials' rough and ready.

Naxalites are Foreign to Idea of India What ever their grandstanding on class war and professed theories, the N axalism has killed more poor-"informers", petty government officials, smallleurinessmen than their chss enemy. As for idea of India, they are not only ignorant of it but also inimical to it. Nihilists as they are, the Naxalites are unaware of or indifferent towards India's underlying unity and her distinct culture. Enamoured of the right of self-determination and even secessionism granted to the nationalities in the


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constitution ofthe Soviet Union, they advocate the same for socalled nationalities of India. They do not seem to be aware of the fact that this right to the constituents of the Soviet Union was phoney, even fictional. Forget about secession, even minor dissent was crushed with a heavy hand. And then the Soviet Union was an artificial creation, nations forcilily 'shoved' intoit as is alevious from the post-1991 implosion which broke the fiction known as the Soviet Union into 15 independent nations. India is an old nation and 5000-year-old civilization. It has already accommodated ethnic and tribal communities within its fold by granting them statehoods. Any wreckless concession on this issue will lead to endless discord and atomization of Indiaextinction of India that we know it since the time memorial. Creation of any more Pakistans is simply out-and that is exactly what the nihilistic Naxalites would want to see. Today the N axal movement presents a huge challenge to India's peace, security, and over-all well-being. Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh has termed it biggest threat to India's internal security. The issues imbedded in the challenge are multi-faceted and formidable. Nevertheless, they could be successfully neutralized by political will and all concerned rising above their selfish, petty interests. But the anti-Naxalite entities involved in eradicating the evil, including the government, must clearly understand the truth enunciated so unambiguously by Paul Wilkinson: "Rebellions do not generally fade away; they have to be put down, if normal life and business are to be restored."

Unholy Nexus KPS Gill is rightly hailed as the man who is credited with retrieving the Punjab from the proverbial brink of the Khalistani Homeland insurgency. When he says something almost 'unbelievable', it needs to be taken seriously. What he has written in an article titled "Callous about Maoist terror"8, in a daily of 28 Apr 2007 is paraphrased and summed up in the following paragraphs for their shock value, and if the powers that be can draw some lessons from it, so much the better. "There is much focus now on the Maoist threat in India. Despite entirely inconsistent assessments by various government agencies, there is an increasing consensus

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Terrorism in India around the view that this is the greatest internal security challenge confronting the country. There is rising concern at the 'police failure' or 'security forces failure' to contain this rising menace. "It needs to be recognised at the outset that a professional and motivated police force, with a sufficient numerical strength and adequate material and technological resources, and with a clear political mandate, can defeat any insurgency in India, including this latest bogey-the Maoist 'protracted war'. "If there is a failure to contain and defeat the Maoists, it is because the necessary capacities and mandate are deliberately kept in abeyance; indeed, the limited and entirely deficient capacities that do currently exist are systematically undermined by a cabal of corrupt political, administrative and police leaderships that have developed a deep vested interest in the persistence of the Maoist insurgency. "Unless the dynamics of the implicit or explicit nexus between this leadership group and Maoist violence is understood, an effective strategy to defeat the Naxalites can neither be framed nor implemented. "The reality of situation on ground-the theoretical and supposedly ideological constructs mouthed by the 'intelligentsia' in mock discourses, notwithstanding-is that this is a fight between two corrupt entities that finds mutual benefits and enrichment in fake engagements which can be sustained in perpetuity. A few hapless members of the constabulary and subordinate ranks in the security forces, and equally luckless leaders of the so-called revolution Aries are, of course, killed off from time to time. But no one is really concerned about such massacres, despite the brouhaha ..... "A close scrutiny of the operational situation and the conditions under which the forces are working will demonstrate unambiguously that, in most states and areas, nothing really changes on the ground in the wake of major incidents. "That explains why no State-and some have been at it for 40 years or more-has been able to eradicate permanently the ultra-left extremism.


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"The Maoist movement over the decades has become a massive trans-state exercise in organized extortion and protection racketeering. "And everywhere, opportunistic alliances between the Maoists and 'over ground' political parties and entities are in place, most visibly around elections, but in a constant intercourse at all times. "Almost all political parties have become mirror image of each other in India today, but in this regard they are even more so, with a multiplicity of corrupt parties and organizations women together in a complex tapestry of duplicity and fraud that grows increasingly more dynastic in all parties overtime. "Small cabals of violently criminal adventurers manage to break into the charmed circle of political privilege, from time to time, by their sheer ferocity and lack of restraint. The Maoist leadership and the many criminals in the State and national legislatures fall, naturally, into the second category. "Drumming up a sense of crisis has become an integral part of efforts at 'resource mobilisation' in this broad enterprise and that is why this development solution' to Naxalism find such a strong advocacy among political leaders and state bureaucracies every where. "If years back, only 15 paise from a rupee reach the reach the targeted beneficiaries in all development scheme, the rest being swallowed up in the black hole of 'power brokers', in the insurgency-affected states today, the proportion of the development funds reaching the intended scheme/people would be even smaller-virtually the entire sums, totalling thousands of crores, find their way into the pockets of corrupt politicians, bureaucrats and their hangers on, and through their symbiotic relationship with the 'insurgents' into the pockets of the Maoists as well. "Among various reasons behind the 1962 debacle of the Indian Army was also the one of the Border Road Organization having built many roads but on the maps only. Similarly, many roads have been built on paper in the N axalite-affected areas and the funds distributed among the local 'stakeholders', with the N axalites cornering a considerable share to bolster up their 'revolution'.

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Terrorism in India The existen ce of wide-s pread corrup tion is no secret but KPS Gill has over worke d the scenar io. He can see not a single hones t indivi dual in the entire line of politic ians, bureau crats, police officials et al. There is no point search ing reason s behind this outbu rst. Many may be tempt ed to attrib ute it to his own frustra tions, not exclud ing his less-th an-hap py tenure of a year as securi ty advise r to the Chhat tisgar h Gover nment . Let the issue rest here. ISI joins Hand s with Maois ts, too: Early 2007 Of late, intelli gence report s have come in about the ISI establ ishing contac ts with the CPI (Maois t) to widen its antiIndia nexus of terror ist/ins urgen t outfits operat ing within and in the immed iate neighb orhood of India. The arrest of a Nepal ese gun runner , Pasan g Lama, in Baramullah in early Feb 2007 is unrave ling clues that confir ms the expan ding netwo rk of terror in and aroun d India, aided by Pakist an-bas ed terrori st outfits like LET and the bigges t ofthem all, the IS!. Lama a reside nt of Humla distric t near Kathm andu, has been acting as a condu it betwe en the Maois ts in Nepal and LET in Jamm u and Kashm ir, orches trated by the ISI, which since the peace proces s betwe en India and Pakist an in 2004, has been attemp ting cobbli ng togeth er a coaliti on of terror groups target ing India. The ISI has been active in Nepal indulg ing in anti-In dia activit ies for long years. But the strateg y this time is new. The chang e fits in neatly with the over all plan to raise the level of terror ist threat to India witho ut gettin g Pakist an into dock. Lama is the new tiny cog in this wheel. 9 Lama had rented out a room in G-49, Vikas Marg, Laxmi Nagar (a low-m iddle class, crowd ed localit y in East Delhi for his clande stine busine ss but fronte d as a shawl and carpet dealer . He was a freque nt visitor to Jamm u and Kashm ir, and lived for three month s in a year in Srinag ar each year. His main contac t in Srinag ar was a High Court lawyer , Abdul Latif Wani while in Delhi; Lama took orders from Kunju p Tserin g, the gun runne r for Maois ts. Lama made fortun e buying weapo ns from Kashm iri terrori st groups and selling at a higher price to Tserin g. The transa ction was facilit ated throug h Wani's accoun ts in J ammu and Kashm ir Bank and Vijaya Bank. What was the scale of his operat ions? One instan ce, the last by him, would do. In Dec 2006, Lama paid


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Rs 4,77,000 to buy AK-47 rifles, hand grenades, rocket lallIl-chers and pistols, which he delivered to Tsering hidden in a fruit truck. Lama and Tsering have been in the business of gun running for the last four years. Gun-running was not the only business Lama was running under the tutelage of his masters. He was executing even more serious anti-India crimes, as his interrogation revealed. He was an ISI agent networking with Maoists as well as terrorist groups like LET, establishing not only a conduit for weapons but also for training for violent ends. He was Iiaisoning with LET members to set up joint training camps, imparting training for making lEDs. Lama's disclosures are not really surprising. Evidence has been gathering for quite a while about the regrouping of ISIbacked Muslim outfits outfit funded by some West Asian entities. Terrorist outfits like the LET have been active in Nepal, especially in the Terai region, traditional recruitment and training ground for the ultras. Muslims constitute 4.2 per cent of the Nepalese population of which 96.7 per cent live in the Terai region. Almost all the recent terrorist attacks in India-Ayodhya in July 2005, Delhi blasts of Oct 2005, Varanasi in Mar 2006 and the Mumbai train serial blasts of July 2006-have Napalese links. LET operations, involved in the attacks have either used Nepal as a transit point between Pakistan and Bangladesh or masterminded terrorist operations in India from Kathmandu and other towns. '!\vo days after the Mumbai blasts, two Pakistanis involved in the planning of the attacks carried out by the LET-Moiddin Siddiqui and Ghulam Hasan Cheema-were caught from a fivestar hotel in Kathmandu. In the huge arms cache caught in Maharashtra early 2006, two months before the Mumbai blasts, one of the key operatives caught in the aftermath was Akif Biyabani, an associate of Zahibuddin Ansari alias Zaby a LET commander who planned the operations in Nepal early 2005. Although Nepal has been known to play host to the ISI and its various front organizations, there has been a significant shift in the strategy after)9-11. Instead of operation its own units, as it was doing in the part, the ISI has been keen on Establishing

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networks with Maoists and Muslim NGOs to plan and execute anti-India operations. In Nov 2006, Nepal Maoist ChiefPrachana revealed that the ISI had offered to help his group through direct or indirect means. Some of the NGOs known to be setting terrorist groups (like LET) in Nepal are mentioned below: 1. Kashmir J ama Masjid Democratic Muslim Association. 2. Nepal world Islamic Council 3. Nepal Islamic Yuva Sangh 4. Jamat-e-Ahle-Hadis 5. Millet-e-Islami 6. Jan Seraj-ul Alam. The number of such NGOs/institutions, accordingto a recent report prepared by Sashatra SeemaBal(SSB) coul'd be as high 73. The report detailedthe involvement oflSl(andPakistan High Commission Officials) in using there organisations for anti-India operations. These organisations are largely funded by charity organisations and banks based in West Asia and Pakistan. There is evidence of the involvement of the Islamic Development Bank (Ieddah) and Habile Bank of Pakistan, which has a partner stake in Nepal's Himalayan Bank, in facilitating the transfer of funds for anti-India activities. The latest report only confirms the findings of an earlier report, 'Pakistan's anti-India Activities in Nepal (2002)', which gave details of ISI's modus operandi, including the use of NGOs and madrassas in anti-India operations. One of the districts where Jihadis are regrouping rapidly is Sansari where a large number of illegal Bangladeshis have settled in the recent times. The NGO which is active in the area is Nepali Islamic Sangh which is working in tandem with Bangladesh-based Jamat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), an associate of Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) - Huji, known as the Bangladeshi Taliban, is an AI-Qaeda clone and has been recruiting terrorists in Bangladesh and India. JMB is known as the operational arm of HUJI. As investigations in the terrorist attacks in the last two years in India have shown, both HUJI and JMB have aligned with LET and SIMI to establish terror networks across India. "Lama's arrest in Srinagar this month (Feb 2007) confirms this widening network." intelli~ence


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Naxal ism has to be put down As mentio ned above, the rebelli ons have to be put down. The Indian s must recogn ize the fact that the Naxali te insurr ection can be no except ion to this rule. The rebels would come to the negoti ations table only if they percei ve it as an oppor tunity for compl eting their agend a throug h the peace talks. If they fail to get at the table what they earlier tried but could not in the field, they would return to their old, violen t ways. This is exactl y what they did when the talks failed mid-20 04. They had used the interre gnum to augme nt their weapo nry and re group their comba t arms. The ULFA had done exactl y the same in 1980s and 1990s. The only except ions in this regard seem to be the decade -long the Naga- Centre negoti ations presen tly in progre ss at mutua lly-agr eed interva ls. Thoug h the NSCN (I-M) leader have threat ened period ically to walk out of the talks if New Delhi does not concede their main deman d, but they have avoide d concre ti 7.ing these threat s so far. In fact, they have agreed to extend the ceasef ire indefin itely till the talks contin ue, in June 2007 agains t their early practic e of its six-mo nthly renew als. Once in the recent path, they had agree d to a mere two-m onth extens ion. An uncha ritabl e comm ent links this indefin ite extens ion to the fact that the Naga leader s have reache d the end of the tether as far as thefr ability to sustai n the insurg ency is concer ned. Rever ting to the N axals, the Andhr a Gover nment securi ty forces have put it down effect ively- or so they claim early 2007. It is essent ial that the Naxali sm is put down in the neighb ouring states also, lest the rebels after regrou ping and recoup ing there return to Andhr a Prade sh to re ignite the fire. This is exactl y the season that all analys ts and those in senio r gover nmen t positi ons have advoc ated joint, well.coordi nated inter-s tate operat ions agains t t_he rebels. Broad Areas of Cause and Effect Beside s some specific states like Andhr a Prades h mentio ned above, what has been discus sed so far concer n three areas: (1) Politic al will to enforc e effective anti-N axal policy throug h interstate coordi nated operat ions. (2) Develo pment route to elimin ate econom ic dispar ities and poverty. (3) The decisio ns taken at the 9 th congr ess and their effect on the subse quent N axalit e activit ies.

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Now the focus will be on some broad vis-a.-vis the Naxalite movement. Incidentally, of late, the ultra Left violence or LeftWing Extremism Extremists has popularly come to be identified with its acronym-LWE. Parallel Government by Hoodlums It must be recorded that various authors and analysts have given different figures about N axalite-affected districts in India. This analyst says "the Naxalite peasant movement which started from the unknown non-descript village of Naxalbari in North (West) Bengal in the late 1960s, has now become a powerful militant movement engulfing 170 districts in 15 states. In over 55 districts, Naxalites and the PWG or Maoists or LWE, as they may be called, run parallel Government. While the LWEs have assumed a Robin Hood mantle, they often behave more like hoodlums resorting to extortion, kidnapping for ransom, and dastardly acts of violence. The philosophy of upliftment of the poor through a mass movement has more or less degenerated into a game of power and money. Till recent months, it was a fashion to show the issue off as a law and order problem to be dealt with by the States. Its exponential growth, followed by merger of various Naxalite and Maoist groups into a single behemoth, designated CPI (Maoist) and finally its membership of Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA)lO and some other militant organizations is South Asia have brought the LWE on the centre stage of India security architecture. Problem Recognized At long last, the Centre has finally acknowledged that this is a national problem. The Prime Minister in his Independence day address on 15 Aug 2006 from the ramparts of Delhi's Red Fort specifically mentioned the great danger of the growth of Naxalism and asked the State Governments to focus on speedy welfare and development of tribal who might otherwise provide the cadres for the LWE. The first meeting of the Standing Committee of the Chief Ministers of the affected States was convened in Sep 2005 at New Delhi to plan coordinated counterNaxalite strategy and in Mar 2006, a status paper on the subject was tabled in the Parliament by the Union Home Minister. The first step to resolve a problem is to recognize that it exists. The Central Government has, long last, taken the first step by acknowledging that this is a national problem.


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Go after the Causes, not the Symptoms As someone noted correctly: "N axalism is not the problem; rather it is a symptom of a problem." Why does not Naxalism flourish in the markets of Gujarat, the farmlands of Punjab or in the IT parks of Gurgaon or Hyderabad? Obviously, the areas where the LWE takes root and spreads are relatively poor, experience oppression by certain segments of society, government in different and uncaring about their plight and little hopes of things getting any better in future. Using force to stop their depredations, arrestikill/imprison their leaders / cadres and induce mass surrenders is only part of a solutionessential and unavoidable initially. The state must address the root causes of alienation felt by the disadvantaged sections. Deny the rebels their raison d'etre, their reason for being. If that was done, they will have no grievances or abominable poverty to exploit to entice or mislead the disadvantage into the romance of adventure and ideological battles against their tormentors-the state, its agencies, and the dirty rich.

Security Forces Some elements of efficient counter-Naxalite security forces are mentioned here: 1. A nominated central authority for coordination of int~r state efforts. In India, it obviously is Union Home Ministry. A variety of mechanism for the purpose have already been mentioned. 2. The states concerned must have adequately equipped and trained police forces for the task. They must get paramilitary forces to augment their resources.

3. Special anti-Naxalite task forces under their designa~ed chiefs. The Gr2Y hounds of Andhra Pradesh are reputpd to have acquitted themselves well. 4. Intelligence sharing among the States and between them and the Centre is important. 5. Transparent policy on promotion and postings, especially in Naxalite-affected areas.

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6. They must be assured of modern weaponry, equipment, clothing and means of mobility including helicopters.

Developmental Activity An aspects of it has been mentioned earlier. Socio-economic disparities invite violent protest and consequently N axal movement. In India, barely 1.3 per cent of land has been distributed among the landless and poor. In China, the figure is 43 per cent. In West Bengal, the Left Front government did a good job of it. In Andhra, YSR Reddy Government has launched the project. Other affected states must follow.

The states must persist in building infrastructure even in the face of violent N axal disruption. There is no other way to wean the poor away from this evil.

Local Resistance Group Ultimately people have to defeat LSE, of course, with some help from the security forces. Local Resistance Groups will be of great help. Such groups need to be created since it is the innocent local populace that is bearing the brunt of the atrocities of the LWE, and at times even from the police and government . officials. Of course, it is easier said than done. An important caveat here is that we dJ not need the usual run-of-the-will NGOs whose aim often is self-publicity and also selfaggrandizement. Neither are we referring to the types of Ranveer Sena here, which initially achieved some good results hut later fell to the same bad ways the Naxalite blood letting cadres are accused of. The Salma Judum comes closest to the ideal civil society initiative against the Naxalite excesses. It is only two year old experiment. With some more experience and effective leadership, it is a model other states must emulate-mindless criticism by a circle of intellectual elite, not with la~ding.

Psychological Warfare The psychological warfare-Psy-war for short-aims at making the target audience think and act the way its sponsor wants. In the instant case, psy-war must mean away the bulk of the local populations including the Naxal cadres, to make them believe in the futility of the movement and benefits that, will accrue being part of the democratic system prevailing in the country,


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Community radio / television sets are ideally suited to convey the message. The programmes must have a realistic mix of development taking place in the area, healthy entertainment and psychological themes. Empty propagandist cont~'nts, employing bluff and bombast, will prove counter-productive. Enlisting media in the endeavor is a risky proposition. If on the one hand, it will see it as an attempt at controlling it, others will accuse the state of squandering public money to create favorites and divide the media. The state must avoid falling into the trap of believing its over agenda. It must monitor and at regal intervals, broadeast the benefits of its economic policies on the areas experiencing LWE. The public must be periodically informed about the per capita income, literacy rates, percentage of school dropouts percentage of college graduates, as well as crimes against women and the under privileged/disadvantaged. Transparency is always useful in such situations. It is better that the public learns the unvarnished truth from the government than half-truths and' exaggerated misrepresentations from the vested interests. Surrender Policy A well-conceived surrender policy is an integral part of any counter-insurgency plan of a government. It should embrace withdrawal of minor cases against the surrenderees, proper rehabilitation package including initial grant and loan for any enterprise he wante to start, training in job-oriented skills, his protection and security, and cash payment at graded scale for weapons surrendered. Yet again, the benefit should be directly proportional to the status of the surrenderee and number of years he put in the organization. Interestingly, Orissa in its package included a grant ofRs 15,000 in case the militant enters matrimony. The Status Paper says the government will not hold peace talks with the Naxalites until they give up arms. This precondition is inexplicable when the centre is holding talks with the NSCN (I-M) without such a pre-condition. National Police University Recommended: Nov 2006 The country's first University to train serving and future police officers in key areas like biological warfare and other

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forms of terror attacks will come up in the National Capital Region (NCR), said a senior police officer on 3 Dec 2006. The five-member high-power committee "formed by the MHA to prepare a detailed action plan for setting up the National Police University (NPU) submitted its report last weak." The NPU, conceived on the lines of the prestigious National Defense Academy (NDA) is aimed at addressing the fast-changing requirements in policing in view of the worsening internal security situation and back of serious research and development work.

Army Dogs to help Police Fight Naxals: Jan 2007 It is known for long time that Army is wary of getting involved in internal security battles now being fought in so many states by their police and central paramilitary forces. It is also on issue of public knowledge that Army is willing to help the State authorities in all other manners short of direct involvement with its soldiers.

Then there was some news in 2006 about certain Naxal" affected States wanting to requisition Army dogs to strengthen their counter-Naxalite strategy. A daily newspapers dated 20 Jan 2007 in a mixed metaphor published a story, opening with an attention catching paragraph: "Army Chief Gen JJ Singh on 15 Jan 2007 professed that he was willing to help anti-Naxal operations in every way except by active deployment of troops. And what he is not willing to allow his men to get into will now he undertaken by Army Canines" Chhattisgarh Home Minister Ramvichar Netam "is scheduled to meet Defense Ministry's Additional Secretary A.K. Jain and the Army Remount Veterinary Corps head Maj Gen N arayan Mohanty shortly to chalk out a deployment plan for army sniffer dogs and dog handlers along the Naxal-infested areas of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, with a special package for training of the state police and security agencies. Mohanty told the daily: "Some of our dogs have already been there to get accustomed to the area. The state has desired a more holistic approach to the deployment, and decisions will be taken shortly."

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A team from Chhattisgarh police is already in Meerut to train in dog handling techniques from the Army. Six dogs, an Army officer and seven other Army personnel have spent the last four months in the forests of Chhattisgarh getting the dogs ~ accustomed to the environment and "signature vapours" of explosives and weapons used by N axals. The army trains Labradors and German Shepherds-it takes a months and some Rs 11 lakh to train a dog-in conventional and unconventional explosives detection, lED and plastic explosives detection and tracking. All missions, like the one to be conducted in the Naxal-hit areas, will involve two dogs and two handlers. Mohanty said: "I will be visiting the UK shortly to obtain more expertise in dog training. The Royal Veterinary Corps has . dogs deployed in Iraq. We have put the best of practices from around the world in our own breeding and training programme. Our dogs have the maximum exposure to militancy."12 Meanwhile, on 15 Jan 2007-Army Day, incidentallY-two I dogs, Bhama and Hema, deployed in Jammu and Kashmir' received the Chief of Army Staff's badges for specific counterterror missions in the State. Army Chief Gen JJ. Singh was talking to the press, when he made some of the statements quoted above, on the Army Day celebrated every year with a grand Parade in Delhi Cantonment.

Rs. 23,000 Crores spent on Paramilitary Forces: Aug 2007 The cost of fighting terrorism, Naxalism and maintaining law and order situation by the Central paramilitary forces alone stands a little over Rs. 23,000 crores. The sum was paid by the Centre to the paramilitary forces and excludes the expenses by the state government on policing front. The actual cost of fighting insurgency, ultra Left violence and terrorism could be more as the figure does not include loss of public infrastructure and civilian lives. In a reply to a Parliament question, the Centre has admitted giving large amount to paramilitary forces for their up-keep and to the families of the personnel who were killed while doing their duty.

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"The figure is just a tip of the iceberg because it does not include several other costs borne by the government in fighting insurgents and Maoists", said a senior security officiaP3 He further added, "If all the costs are calculated and included in the list, then the figure would be much higher." The amount spent for a company of 120 personnel costs about Rs 40,000 a month, which translates into Rs. 333 per person her month. The salaries and training expenses are over and above this amount of 333 per month. Over Rs 31 crore was paid to the family members of the personnel killed in action against the insurgents and Maoists in the last two years. Realising the extent of expenses incurred for fighting these insurgents, the Centre is believed to have now directed the affected states to raise 29 (additional) India Reserve Battalions (IRBs) on their own to counter thL ultras and maintain law and order in their areas. If only the expenditure by the Centre is calculated in raising the additiOllal manpower for IRBs of the states, the figur~ stands at Rs 1,555 crore in the past three years. The Centre has also allotted Rs 2,475 crore to the backward districts for their social and infrastructure development. Some of these backward districts are heavily affected by prolonged violence perpetrated by the ultra-Left outfits and other insurgents. Counter-Naxalite Strategy Long Last: Jan 2007 Till recently, the analysts would blame the Centre of being non-serious on the issue of fast-spreading Naxalite menace-or, at least not framing a national policy to counter the Naxalite threat aimed at the very integrity and sovereignty of the country. The refrain used to be: "The N axal violence is the problem of certain states hit by the rebels, and Centre will extend all help as and when requested by them." Long last, that chant seems to have been given up, if one goes by the address at a Delhi seminar on 27 Jan 2007 by the No. 2 man in the Union Home Ministry, Sriprakash Jaiswal, Minister of State for Home. He signalled that the government favoured a multi-pronged strategy to deal with the growing menace of Naxalism. "It was not merely a law and order problem but has deep socio-economic dimensions to it." He further added: "The problem of N axalism continues to plague us and we have to view these matters as not merely law and order problem but as issues which have deep socio-economic dimensions.


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"Multi-pronged strategy should essentially consist of sustained and effective police action coupled with accelerated socio-economic development of such disturbed areas to tackle the menace. "We have to build up local capabilities of the affected states is terms of improved intelligence gatheringand sharing mechanism and to ensure special training and adequate equipment for police forces to facilitate effective police action in a coordinated manner." "The state administrative machinery must be strengthened to make it more responsive, transparent, and sensitive to enable effective redressal of public grievances and ensuring improved total mechanism aimed at accelerating socioeconomic development, including enhanced employment opportunities and of falling prey to their (Naxal) propaganda. "At present, 76 districts in nine states are badly hit by N axalite violence. These are covered under the revised Security-Related Expenditure (SRE).14 Naxal-Hit States told to Share Intelligence: Patil: 6 Mar _ 2007 Rajya Sabha held 90-minute discussion on the assassination of Jharkhand MP Sunil Mahato by the Naxalites on 4 Mar 2007. Under fire from MPs across the party lines as well as the Chairman, Vice-President Bhairon Singh Shekhawat, a visibly harangued Union Home Minister Shivraj Patil on 6 Mar 2007 tried to assure the House that the Centre has asked Naxaleffected states to reach an agreement for ensuring better coordination on intelligence to tackle the situation. Patil could not assure the vice President if Mahato had 'adequate security.' While the Minister admitted that "Central intelligence only deals with a general direction of possible extremist attacks", he emphasized that the measures taken by the Centre to help states tackle the N axalite menace have "shown some level of containment" . "In the country as a whole, the incidents of Naxalite violence declined from 1,608 in 2005 to 1,509 in 2006, signifying a 6.15 per cent decline", he said in an attempt to assuage the House. Andhra Pradesh, he added, has achieved "noteworthy success in controlling the problem through Special Forces, namely, Greyhounds and other measures." BJP's Yashwant Sinha, who himself hails from Jharkhand, accused the Home Minister of underplaying the problem. "It is

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an inter-state operation, everyone knows of the Red Corridor. If the efforts in Andhra Pradesh have been successful, why is not it being replicated in the other states? Last year, the Minister had met MPs and discussed measures to tackle Naxals. What happened to them?, Sinha asked. Politics, bane of the Indian polity, intervened at this stage. Taking a potshot at the Congress for supporting the Jharkhand government led by Madhu Koda-an erstwhile non-entity catapulted into Chief Minister's chair thanks to party politics practiced by the two rival political formations led by the BJP and Congress-Sinha pointed to the Treasury Benches and said: "your own MP from Jharkhand has said state government cannot continue. As her what she said. The Jharkhand Government is a joke. Parties supporting it should think again as they are doing grave injustice to the people of Jharkhand". A visibly concerned Patil said the issue about offences with ramifications in other parts of the country was pending before the Supreme Court which has asked the Soli Sorabji Committee to look into it. "We have to crystallize our views on federal crimes", he said. Under the Security Related Expenditure (SRE) scheme, Patil said that Rs 218.52 crore have been disbursed to Naxal-affected states. Under this scheme, re-imbursement is given to the state for expenditure on ammunition, mobility for peace personnel, . rehabilitation of surrendered Naxals and others. More over the total expenditure under police modernization since 2000-01 is worth Rs 4,000 crore. He informed the House that Rs 182.72 crore have been provided to Jharkhand in the last six years. A special grant of Rs 15 crore is being given to the state in the current year (200607) to purchase telecommunication, weaponry and de-mining equipment. So far, Rs 450 crore has been released to Jharkhand under the Backward District Initiative in a bid to address the issue on the socio-economic front. Governm'ent-records reveal that 16 armoured vehicles have also been provid~d, while five battalions of the CRPF are in the state for the last three years. Analysts feel the AP police deserves to be commended for busting a gang of inter-state smugglers which supplied weapons in exchange for cannabis. It had developed links with illicit arms suppliers in Bihar, MP, Nepal and other places.


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No doubt, this sut-cess by the police is a setback for the Maoists. Meanwhile, the killing of Mahato is seen as an act of desperation on the part of Maoists. Are they on back foot? It is too early to reach this conclusion. Drug smuggling as a source of funding terrorism, narcoterrorism in brief, is widely prevalent among major outfits, in the world. It is known for long that the LTTE is involved in narco-terrorism and uses the South-East-Asian route to smuggle drugs for guns. In India, the secessionist/militant outfits in the North-East used narco-terrorism effectively. Of late, it has obviously made deep inroads in the south. The LTTE involvement in helping the North-Eastern outfits in picking up threads of this nefarious practice to sustain themselves was well known. Do they have a hand in passing on the secrets of this trade to Maoists also? Possible. The Government of Andhra Pradesh has made considerable efforts against Left-wing extremism in 2006 and it is possibly because of this success that traditional sources of funding, such as extortion, appears to be drying up. Till recently, the Maoists virtually ran a parallel administration in the state, relying on extortion than ran into crores of rupees. Consequent to the government's silent but effective crack down on the Maoists, there is a change of mood in the state. Earlier, in 2004, the Maoists were brought to the negotiating table when the Government lifted the 12-year old ban on the PWG. The talks predictably broke down. Presently, the Maoists are on the back foot, as can be seen from the reports that at a recent meeting held in the sanctuary of Chhattisgarh forests, their leaders decided to halt operations and regroup. The AP Government m\lst be commended for the fact that it has not relied merely on the police but has also taken care to address the causes of economic alienation among the poor in the rural areas. The Maoists, like the terrorists, can be defeated by use of effective force against the fighting cadres, and simultaneously ameliorating the socio-economic deprivation of the lowest ~ung of the society. So while the Maoists can be defeated only by strong security measures, their influence among the impoverished masses can be cheeked if State Governments adopt a rapid development model that does not exclude vulnerable sections of society. This is where the challenge lies. There is little doubt that if authority is more sensitive to local grievances, and more transparent and responsive, Maoist will find it hard to recruit foot soldiers. So

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the bottom line is: The State governments must not let down their guards against the desperados and continue with harsh anti-Maoist measures, they must also ensure good governance. But it is easier said than done, essentially because of the human greed. A Central Minister has just said (Mar 2007) that most ofthe subsidised foodgrains meant for the poor in the NorthEast does not reach its targets, getting 'lost' enroute. Some times, 10 per cent of it! The worst scandal in the recent post is in Arunachal Pradesh, where investigations are under way. But all said and done, there is a cause for hope in the South. Tracing Sources of Naxal Money: Mar 2007 Concerned about the large amount of money available with the Naxal outfits, a daily on 11 Mar 2007 reported that Union Home Ministry was seeking the cooperation of Finance Ministry's Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRD and concerned banks operating in the Naxal-affected states to gather data on the funding pattern of these outfits. It is known that these outfits collect their funds through extortion and imposing "levy" on their targets. What is causing even greater concern is that inputs with the Home Ministry suggest "that Naxalite outfits plan to target the police and their establishments in the current year". The militants also plan to increase their organizational reach especially in Chhattisgarh and central Orissa. Besides, these outfits are likely to enhance their mass mobilization strategies in order to retain their present cadre strength and subsequently increase their numbers. The strength of the armed cadre of the Naxalites stand at 4,600 as per estimates till 31 Dec 2006. Other worrying trends, as a senior Home Ministry said, include hostage-taking by the Naxalite outfits and using Urban Centre for supplementing the cadres operating in the interior areas. This apart, the agenda of militants for the year includes exploiting the issues of displacement of human population due to mining and land acquisition to enlist support of the effected people. The militants also plan to regain the Naxal movement in Andhra Pradesh where the morale of its cadre is at its lowest ebb following significant elimination by the security forces. Some relevant information and statistics gathered by a daily follow: 15 1. The growing use of IEDs and landmines to target the security personnel is also an area of concern.

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2. The Home Ministry will hold a meeting with the Paramilitary forces later this month (Mar 2007) to sensitise them about strictly following the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) in counter-Naxal operations. 3. As many as 133 Naxalites were killed by the security agencies in Andhra Pradesh in 2006 and the same amounts to 49 per cent of the total loss of the militants in the year. 4. The number of recruits, training camps and the so called 'Jan adalats' organized by the Naxal outfits has come down during 2006, the official said. During 2006, a total of 395 police station across 91 districts in 11 states had suffered Naxal violence. In 2005, the respective figures were 460 police stations across 90 districts. 5. The Naxal-affected states reported 678 casualties in 2006 compared to 677 deaths in 2005. 6. The Ministry is emphasing the use of mine protected vehicles (MPVs), sophisticated weapons and better telecommunication equipment. 7. An additional fund ofRs 100 crore was earmarked in the fiscal 2006-07 for police modernization in the Naxalaffected states. Hyderabad meet: Maoist-hit States Discuss Strategy: April 2007 Top officials of nine States like Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa, Maharashtra, Bihar and Karnataka (Besides Andhra Pradesh, the host), affected by Maoist violence, opened, a twoday meet in Hyderabad on 13 Apr 2007 to discuss a common! joint strategy to tackle this Left-wing extremist problem. The meeting is being attended by police chiefs and other officials from these nine States to hold the periodic review of the situation. Senior officials of the Central intelligence and other security agencies are also attending the meetings and discussions. While the media was barred from the meeting, informed sources disclosed that the Central Government officials were all praise for success and effectiveness of the Andhra Pradesh government in handling the Maoist violence. Other States were urged to emulate its successful strategy. Andhra Pradesh DGP MA Basit explained: "The meeting of the nodal officers of the Maoist-affected States has been

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conven ed by the Centra l Gover nment to review the situati on. The meetin g will discus s the directi ons and instru ctions of the Centra l Gover nment ". ::h",!, The recen tly seized rocke ts and rocke t launc hers, symbo lizing the succes s of the Andhr a Prade sh police agains t the Maois ts, were also put on displa y in the Jubile e hall, the venue of the meetin g, amid high securit y. Coun ter-N axal Strat egies to be Finali zed: April 2007 With the N axalit es profes sing their object ive to target minin g hubs in Jhark hand develo pment works , includ ing irrigat ion projec ts planne d in Bihar, a crucia l meetin g of the Inter-M inister ial Group (IMG) on Naxal ism "to be held in Patna later this month (A pr 2007) will look at stops to streng then securi ty in these areas" , the report s said on 9 Apr 2007. This meetin g (of IMG, schedu led for 16 Apr to be held at Patna) , which follow s a spate of Naxal attack s in Chha ttisga rh, Jhark hand and Bihar, comes as the Centre and Securi ty forces work out a more proact ive approa ch to counte r Naxal violenc e. The CRPF, among others , are learnt to have advoc ated a three- pronge d action plan: going after promi nent leader s to break the N axali te netwo rk; taking contro l of specifi c areas which are the Naxal strong holds; and speed ing up develo pment work in areas where securi ty forces alread y have a strong presen ce. I6 The strate gies would be discus sed and given finish ing touche s during a series of meetin gs planne d for Apr 2007. In fact, and to be exact, there are three such meetin gs: first preced ing the IMG's and the third follow ing it. Some details are mentio ned here. 1. The first will be a meetin g of the Anti-N axal Task Force, heade d by Specia l Secret ary (Intern al Securi ty) in the Home Minist ry, on 13 April. 2. The IMG compr ising repres entativ es from the Minist ries of Home , Rural Devel opmen t, Tribal Affair s and the State govern ments will meet in Patna on 16 Apr to take stock of devel opme nt initia tives and secur ity prepa redne ss for big projec ts in areas affect ed by Naxal ism. 3. The third, to follow the IMG, will be a meetin g of the Nation al Coord ination Centre on Naxal ism (NCCN ) to be presid ed over by the Union Home Secret ary, head of the NCCN . This meetin g is expect ed to look at chang es needed in the Stand ard Opera ting Proced ures (SOPs ) of the Centra l param ilitary forces and the state police.


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Meanwhile, the Home Ministry is said to have finalized a report on the attack on a CISF barrack in Bokaro, Bihar on 6 Apr which left its two men dead and three injured. Officials noted that any further damage had been contained after personal form a neighboring camp reached the spot, prompting the Naxals to flee. Referring to reports that CISF men were not in uniform when the attack came, a Ministry spokesman maintained they were off-duty then. Mean while, there could be another 'sort of reason' for some cold comfort as far as the Mar 2007 attack on a Salwa Judum camp in Chhattisgarh's Rani Bodli is concerned. "A preliminary assessment sent to the MHA by intelligence agencies had indicated that the camps was over run by Naxals since many of the camps members were in the habit of drinking and thus not alert when the attack came. "Paramilitary Forces do Tougher Task than the Army" Generally used to getting criticism each time militant and insurgent groups carry out a successful attack, the nation's Paramilitary forces came in for some rare praise on 9 Apr 2007 when no less a person than Union Home Minister Shivraj Patil averred that their job was more difficult than army's (This is not the place to comment on Patil assertion, but to give details of the place and occasion of the statement). He was speaking on the Valour Day function of the CRPF at New Delhi on 9 Apr 2007. His reasons for the statement: "These forces perform a tougher task than the Army since they battled terrorists and at the sametime protected the lives of innocent civilians." He praised the CRPF for the manner in which its men displayed extreme alertness in thwarting the terrorists designs while guarding the premises and killing all the outlaws. Valour Day is celebrated on 9 Apr every year to mark the heroic effort by a group of CRPF men at Sardar Post in 1965. "The group repulsed an attack by a full Pakistani Infantry Brigade to take over the crucial location in the Rann of Kutch." The others present at the function, where the Minister presented gallantry awards to CRPF personnel, included CRPF DG SIS Ahmed, DIG CV Mathew, Union Minister of State for Home Affairs Sriprakash Jaiswal, Union Home Secretary Madhukar Gupta and DGs of other paramilitary forces.

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Notes 1. Akhilesh Suman, Pioneer, 20 April, 2007. 2. Subodh Ghildiyal, Times of India, 9 May, 2006. 3. Editorial, Statesman, 11 May, 2006.

4. Asian Age, 26 Oct., 2006. 5. Rajeev Bhattacharyya, Indian Express, 25 Oct., 2006. 6. Cited, Manoj, C.G. Asian Age, 9 Oct., 2006. 7. Jagmohan, "Crimson Corridore", Statesman, 2 April, 2007.

8. Statesman, 1 April, 2007. 9. Pioneer, 28 April, 2007. 10. Wilson John, Pioneer, 14 Feb 2007. 11. Lt Gen (Retd) Madan Gopal, PVSM, AVSM and Bar, former Director General Military Operations (DGMO), Indian Army, in his paper dated 24 Nov., 2006. 12. Shiv Aroor, Indian Express, 20 Jan., 2007. 13. Rakesh K. Singh, Asian Age, 13 Aug., 2007.

14. Asian Age, 29 Jan., 2007. 15. Rakesh K. Singh, Asian Age, 11 July, 2007. 16. Vinay Jha, Indian Express, 10 April, 2007.

17 Naxalism : Present Situation Naxals spread to Southern States: MHA Report: April2007 Naxalites, who are posing the biggest threat to internal security, are trying to increase their influence and activities in Karnataka, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu, where they did not have a strong presence earlier. Tamil Nadu has been a threshold state but now the Naxalite are trying to expand base in the southern states. These are the findings/observations made in the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) report for the year 2006, quoted by a - daily dated 2 Apr 2007. The report says the new areas are mostly in the said states. In Karnataka and Kerala, the N axal violence has only been on finges. Andhra Pradesh has been the epicenter of Naxal violence in the recent past. It has now shifted to Chhattisgarh. The attacks on railway and other property had been more prominent in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar and Jharkhand, where the ultras were also targeting mines and mining-related activities. The Government has also appointed an Empowered Group of Ministers (E-GoM) to closely monitor the Naxal situation and evolve strategies to deal with the problem. The Naxalites have also been attempting to intensify their efforts at social mobilization. The Revolutionary Democratic Front

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