Symbiotic Antagonisms: Competing Nationalisms in Turkey

SYMBIOTIC ANTAGONISMS Competing Nationalisms in Turkey

EDITED BY

AYfe Kadtoglu and E. Fuat Keyman

THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH PRESS

Salt Lake City

Copyright © 2.011 by The University of Utah Press. All rights reserved. The Defiance House Man colophon is a registered trademark of the University of Utah Press. It is based upon a four-foot-tall, Ancient Puebloan pictograph (late PIlI) near Glen Canyon, Utah. IS 14 13 12. II

I 2.

3 4 S

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA

Symbiotic antagonisms: competing nationalisms in Turkey / edited by Ay~ KadlOglu and E. Fuat Keyman. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-60781-031-5 (pbk. : alk. paper) I. Nationalism-Turkey. 2.. Turkey-Politics and government-1980- I. Kadloglu, Ane. 1961- II. Keyman, Emin Fuat. DR434.S96 2.010 32.0.540956I-dc2.2.

Printed and bound by Sheridan Books. Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan.

For our children, in the hope that they will live in a world not shaped by competing nationalisms

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments

ix

Introduction: Understanding Nationalism through FamUy Resemblances xi AYje Kadzoglu and E. Fuat Keyman PART I. TURKISH NATIONALISM: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 1.

Turkish Nationalism: From a System of Classification to a System of Solidarity

3

$erifMardin 2.. Nationalism in Turkey: Modernity, State, and Identity

10

E. Fuat Keyman 3. The Twin Motives of Turkish Nationalism

33

Ayje Kad~oglu 4. Nationalist Discourses in Turkey

S7

TamlBora s.The Changing Nature of Nationalism in Turkey: Actors, Discourses, and the Struggle for Hegemony 82.

Umut Ozkmmlt PART II. CONSERVATIVE MANIFESTATIONS OF TURKISH NATIONALISM

6. The Genealogy of Turkish Nationalism: From Civic and Ethnic to Conservative Nationalism in Turkey 103

UmutUzer

Contents

viii

7. On the ~estion ofIslam and Nationalism in Turkey:

Sources and Discourses

In

Berrin Koyuncu-Lorasdagz 8. Turkish Nationalism and Sunni Islam in the Construction of Political Party Identities

162

Simten COiar PART III. KURDISH NATIONALISM

9. Does Kurdish Nationalism Have a Navel?

199

Hakan Ozoglu 10.

Banditry to Disloyalty: Turkish Nationalisms and the Kurdish ~estion 223

MesutYegen II.

Toward a Nonstandard Story: 'The Kurdish ~estion and the Headscarf, Nationalism, and Iraq 253

Murat Somer 12..

Reframing the Nationalist Perspective: Kurdish Civil Society Activism in Europe 289

vera Eccarius-Kelly Conclusion

319

AYie Kadtoglu and E. Fuat Keyman References

325

List of Contributors Index

363

357

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

THE IDEA OF THIS BOOK EMERGED IN AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM

that we organized in Istanbul in November 2.007 on understanding and exploring competing nationalisms in Turkey. Since that time, we have collectively worked with the contributors in order to put together a coherent and detailed analysis of nationalisms in Turkey. In this endeavor we have benefited from the help and collegial support of a number of people. We particularly thank Tuba KanCl for her valuable effort to finalize the book, Hakan Yavuz for his encouragement about preparing a book on nationalism, Peter DeLafosse for his valuable editorial contribution, Kathy Burford Lewis for meticulous editorial assistance, Bora i§yar for his assistance in translating parts of a chapter, and Evren Tok for his help in finalizing one of the chapters. We are also grateful to Sabancl University and Kos: University for their financial and organizational support for the symposium that led to this book.

INTRODUCTION

Understanding Nationalism through Family Resemblances AY~E KADIOGLU AND

E. FUAT KEYMAN

THE EXPRESSION "SYMBIOTIC ANTAGONISMS" PROMISES TO BE A REL-

evant analytical category for understanding the dynamics of the relationship among various nationalisms. It was first used by Barrington Moore (1966, p. 2.37) in his seminal book on the social origins of modern dictatorships and democracies. In analyzing the Japanese case, he refers to the relationship between the Japanese merchants and the warrior aristocracy (samurai) as one of symbiotic antagonism. The Japanese merchants turned the rice of the Japanese landowners (daimyo) into cash. The samurai were providing protection to both the daimyo and merchants. Before the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the Japanese merchants could engage in commercial activities only if the samurai ensured their protection. The samurai and daimyo, however, needed the merchants to turn their rice into cash and provide the aristocratic lifestyle that they were leading. In other words, they all needed each other to carryon with their activities and way of life. They were deriving their livelihood and lifestyles from one another. Yet, due to a prolonged period of peace and luxury during the Tokugawa Shogunate, merchants stopped needing the samurai and became the dominant partner in the menage a trois of the daimyo, merchant, and samurai. The symbiotic antagonism between the samurai and merchants resulted in the downfall of the former. This development was vital in understanding the subsequent development of fascism in Japan. Such a dialectical choreography can be useful in comprehending how the existing nationalisms in Turkey that derive their raison d'etre from one another can prepare the conditions for each other's continuous reproduction or xi

xii

Ay~e

Kadloglu and E. Fuat Keyman

downfall. Perhaps the difference between the Japanese example and nationalisms in Turkey is that it is very hard for these nationalisms-which derive their livelihood from each other-to lead to one another's downfall. The imminent antagonism among them occasionally ends in outright military and paramilitary clashes. They have, in fact, the capability to destroy the liberaldemocratic political regime while trying to destroy each other.

UNDERSTANDING NATIONALISM

Nationalist ideology constitutes one of the key parameters of modern Turkish politics, especially since 1999, when Turkey became an official candidate for membership in the European Union (EU). After this date, various constitutional amendments and other legislative changes were accepted in the Turkish parliament that aimed at the recognition of languages other than Turkish as well as facilitating religiOUS practices other than Sunni Islam. With these developments some of the key elements employed in the definition of Turkish national identity, such as common language and religion, were demystified. This led to a fear on the part of the nationalist groups in Turkey that was enhanced by feelings of insecurity on the part of the appointed state elite (the military and the bureaucratic establishment) since the national elections iJ? November 2002.. After those elections, the Justice and Development Party. with a Muslim social base. formed the government in Turkey. The military commanders have been referring to "Islamic fundamentalism" as the biggest threat in Turkey since February 1997. The rise in the popularity of the Justice and Development Party coupled with the acceptance of various legal reforms in the parliament that increased the accountability of the military as part of the European Union membership processes led to the emergence of a discourse of fear on the part of the state elite, afraid of Islamic fundamentalism and the European Union processes. When we add the increasing tension in the southeast border of'I:urkey in the aftermath of the war in Iraq, it becomes possible to understand the relevance of a nationalist discourse in Turkey based on a fear of Islam, the European Union, the United States, the Kurds, and all the non-Muslim and non-Turkish identities in Turkey. All these processes placed the tide of nationalism at the center of the political alignments and divisions in Turkey.

Introduction

xiii

xiv

Ay~e

Kadloglu and E. Fuat Keyman

By the early twentieth century. nationalist ideology was beginning to flirt with Marxism. Although Karl Marx (1818-83) and Friedrich Engels (182.09S) referred to the workers as non-national beings. they still attempted to integrate nationalist struggles into the Communist project. They used an earlier distinction made by G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831) between "historic nations" and "non historic nations." Accordingly. they argued that historic nations played a progressive role by unifying people and territory whereas nonhistoric nations failed to do so. Their views on nationalism became clearer as they evaluated the Polish and Irish struggles for independence. In fact. Marx and Engels embraced Polish nationalism because it would weaken tsarist Russia. They also thought that the Irish nationalist movement geared toward independence would weaken Britain. This opened the way for a distinction between the "nationalism of the oppressors" and the "nationalism of the oppressed." Such a distinction was sharply drawn by V. I. Lenin (1870-192.4). who argued for the right to self-determination of oppressed nations. These distinctions among different types of nationalism are important, because they seem to point to a distinction between "good" and "bad" nationalisms. Accordingly, the nationalism of the oppressed is viewed as good because it involves a transfer of power to the people akin to the nationalist ideology at the time of the French Revolution. Yet it is also possible to argue that all nationalisms including those of the oppressed are bad because they all point to a distinction between "us" and "them." A second common characteristic of all nationalisms is that they are not natural but rather modern constructs that were manufactured. in most cases, by the national intelligentsia. When Yusuf Akc;ura (1876-1935) advocated Turkism in 1904 in an article that was published in a journal in Egypt called Turk, he thought of it as the best project (the others being Ottomanism and Islamism) that would lead to the preservation of the Ottoman state. This epoch-making article is considered the first essay that professed Turkish nationalism as a political project. It is highly interesting that at this particular juncture in history the main raison d'etre of nationalism was enunciated as the preservation of the state rather than the transfer of power to the people. Such an introduction of nationalist ideology in the Ottoman society was to have a major impact on its subsequent evolution. The distinction between the nationalism of the oppressors and the nationalism of the oppressed is still used today in pointing to a distinction among the Turkish, Kurdish, and

Introduction

xv

Islamic nationalisms. On the one hand, it is possible to argue that Turkish nationalism has an unjust discourse by virtue of advocating social cohesion at the national level to the point of excluding and assimilating minorities while Kurdish nationalism and Islamic nationalism employ a JUSt discourse and Opt for a transfer of power to the people. On the other hand, it is also possible to argue that all nationalisms have the potential to exclude and assimilate. Such commonalities make it impossible to refer to the compatibility of any form of nationalism with democracy. This book constitutes one of the first systematic comparisons of different types of nationalism in Turkey: Turkish, Kurdish, and Islamic nationalisms. These nationalisms have encountered one anomer throughout modern Turkish history. It is such encounters that led to their perpetual reproduction. While they were rival ideologies, they were making use of encounters with one another not only to reproduce each another but also to constitute a hegemonic discourse in Turkey. Although mutual encounters of these nationalisms produced various tensions, it was, in fact, these very tensions that made their continuous survival possible. Nationalisms thrive on soils that are able to generate "others" over time through exclusion as well as assimilation. In this sense, in the course of the contemporary history of Turkey, these nationalisms have always acted in a relational and intertwined way as competing and essentially contested discourses of Turkish modernity and politics.

FAMILY RESEMBLANCES

Despite all the debates about nationalism touched upon throughout the book, it is important to specify from the outset how we approach nationalism. In doing so, six "family resemblances" are worth mentioning.' First, as one of the founding philosophers of feminism and existentialism, Simone de Beauvoir (1989 [1949], p. 267), suggests: "One is not horn, hut rather hecomes, a woman:' Similarly, we suggest in this book that one is not born, but rather becomes, a nationalist. In this sense, nationalism is SOcially, historically, ideologically, anthropologically, institutionally; and politically constructed. Second, on the basis of the fundamental principle of critical realism that there is a difference between appearance and essence, nationalism operates at the level of lived reality rather than involving efforts to explore the essential

xvi

Ay~e

Kadloglu and E. Fuat Keyman

or concealed sources of societal processes and problems. For instance. as in the case of the debates ahout the rise of unemployment in Europe or North America. the nationalist assumption that establishes a causal relationship between migrants and unemployment stays at the level of appearances and hence appeals to the lived reality and experience of the society rather than searching for the structural and essential sources of unemployment. Third. the fact that nationalism operates at the level of appearance does not mean that it lacks effectiveness and power. On the contrary. the nationalist discourse is very powerful in constituting the relationship between the subject and the other. the subject and nature, and the subject and herself/ himself It is through its appeal to lived experiences that nationalism constitutes a community based on we/us versus they/them as the other. Moreover, in creating a community identity through the principle of sameness. nationalism codifies difference as the dangerous other to be resisted or silenced. In this sense. nationalism always operates as a boundary-producing practice between the self and the other as well as between identity and difference. Fourth. in creating a sheltered. warm, and protected community for its followers. nationalism always establishes and reproduces a feeling of insecurity. fear. and resentment against the others who are outside of the boundaries of the community. In this sense, as Zygmunt Baumann ( 200 7, p. 37) suggests. nationalism speaks as "I shout and I resent, therefore I am" rather than promoting critical thinking as the basis of existence. Fifth. nationalism is not only an ideology but also a strategy utilized by different actors, groups. and communities in their search to strengthen their own communitarian identities. In this sense, the distinctions made in regard to different nationalisms in the existing literature on nationalism-between "good" and "bad" nationalisms, nationalisms of the "oppressor" and the "oppressed:' "civic" or "ethnic" nationalisms-are not immune from these constitutive features of nationalism. Last but not least, these family resemblances of di~erent manifestations of nationalism portray the crucial point about its endurance and ability to be pervasive in modern times despite all the changes and transformations. This renders nationalism an ever-present ideology with a hegemonic character. Hence it is imperative to recognize its ability to endure in modernity rather than assuming that nationalism "rises" and "falls" in various periods.

Introduction

xvii

THE STRUCTURE OF THIS BOOK

The main endeavor of this book is to explore the encounters among competing nationalisms in Turkey. To recognize competing nationalisms does not ignore the historically dominant position of Turkish nationalism. This book starts with ~erif Mardin's exploration of the endurance of nationalism in the Ottoman-Turkish context as it evolves from a system of classification to a system of solidarity. In chapter 2. Fuat Keyman attempts to read different paradigms of Turkish modernity in order to establish a historical and analytical framework for an understanding of how nationalism has endured and also has been subject to changes and modifications. Keyman traces the role of nationalism in Turkey's journey in modernity since 192.3, including the processes of democratization. globalization. and Europeanization. This brief historical account of the intertwined relationship between nationalism and modernity also provides a background for the chapters to follow. In chapter 3 Ay~e KadlOglu substantiates this intertwined relationship between modernity and nationalism by fOCUSing on the twin motives ofTurkish nationalism: the preservation of the state and Westernism. KadlOglu maintains that these two motives as spelled out by two critical thinkers (Yusuf Ak~ura and Ahmed Agaoglu) at the turn of the twentieth century constitute the root-language of all subsequent nationalisms in Turkey. Kadloglu also considers whether the twin motives of Turkish nationalism that were visible at the time of its emergence are still relevant today. In chapter 4- Taml Bora elaborates on the role of nationalism in Turkish modernity by exploring its recent manifestations. Bora's exploration provides the reader with a very illuminating analysis of the competing discourses of Turkish nationalism that covers a wide spectrum, ranging from officialind left-wing versions of Kemalist nationalism to neo-conservative and neo~ liberal nationalism as well as ultra-right, isolationist. and ethnicist national discourses. Bora's discussion of competing discourses of Turkish natioll:l.lisnl.·· also serves as the basis for a critical reading of the myth that TurkeYI'epresents a homogeneous nation. ..... .. : . . . . . .•.

In chapter) Umut Ozkmmh draws together a Gramscianrea~i.tl.g6frta~ tionalism and the topographical approach of Jean Pierre Faye~.tl.d~~t:~t.tl.pts to deconstruct this myth as well as the ideas of the civic versUsecllllic::nat:io.tl.~ alism and the "rise" and "fall" of the nationalist discourse overtirriei1'l,T\l~key.

xviii

Ay~e

Kadloglu and E. Fuat Keyman

In doing so. Ozkmmh provides a topography of nationalist discourses in Turkey to illuminate the dynamics of the ongoing struggle for hegemony over the nation by various social and political forces at the turn of the twenty-first century. This particular reading places the emphasis on the protean nature of nationalism and presents it as a field of positions in which different and often competing narratives circulate. One of the Significant domains in which Turkish nationalism has been reproduced and reconstructed involves the relationship between conservatism and nationalism in general and Islam and nationalism in particular. In chapter 6 Umut Uzer prOVides a historical and analytical exploration of such relationships. In doing so. he discusses the emergence of Turkish nationalism in the late nineteenth century as well as the main proponents of nationalism such as Ziya Gokalp and Yusuf Ak~ura and other important figures. including Hiiseyin Nihal Atstz and ibrahim Kafesoglu. He maintains that conservative nationalism entails a reference to traditional and moral values, thereby giving religion a central role in the definition of national identity. In chapter 7 Berrin Koyuncu-Lorasdagt furthers Uzer's analysis of conservative nationalism by providing an overview of the interplay ofIslam and nationalism from the late Ottoman era onward. She focuses on the discourses of key Turkish nationalist figures who attempted to incorporate Islam into their nationalistic views and traces how this interaction has been articulated in the Turkish-Islamic synthesis since the 1980s. Koyuncu-Lorasdagt argues that Islam and Turkish nationalism have had a symbiotic and instrumental relationship in Turkey, where their mutual benefits have been endorsed. and that this articulation ofIslam and nationalism can be called instrumental pious nationalism. She further suggests that Islam has always been an indispensable element of the discourse of nationalism in Turkey. The constant presence ofIslam as one of the defining elements of the nationalist discourses in Turkey can also be observed in Turkish politics, especially with reference to ultra-right and center-right political parties. In chapter 8 Simten Co~ar elaborates this point indetaU. Co§ar analyzes the role of conservative nationalism in the strategies. programs. and discourses of three political parties: the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Grand Unity Party (BBP). and Nationalist Action Party (MHP). Analyzing these political parties' discourses of nationalism as well as the encounters among them. Co~ar reveals the political significance of Sunni Islam as an

Introduction

xix

ingredient of Turkish nationalism, which has also given rise to the use of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis as an effective political strategy by which these parties attempt to widen their social bases. Finally, this book also analyzes Kurdish nationalism and its historical and political encounters with Turkish nationalism. In doing so, we start with the question of the origins and genealogy of Kurdish nationalism. Separating Kurdish identity from Kurdish nationalism, in chapter 9 Hakan 6zoglu suggests that Kurdish nationalism was not the result of an evolutionary process; it was, in fact, constructed at a certain time in history. This means that Kurdish nationalism's link with the past was not organic; rather it was historically and institutionally constructed at the end of World War I. Ozoglu also argues that Kurdish movements had existed prior to this time but were not nationalist. It was only at the end of World War I that we could begin to identify Kurdish nationalism as an ethnic-based nationalism that has given rise to the creation of a Kurdish identity. In fact, Turkish nationalism and its approach to the Kurdish question on the basis of an "us" versus "them" distinction have played a crucial role in the construction of Kurdish identity. In chapter 10 Mesut Yegen takes up this issue and examines the ways in which "mainstream," "extreme right-wing:' and "left-wing" versions of Turkish nationalism have viewed the Kurdish question. Yegen's chapter shows that the Kurdish question has been perceived by means of a rich vocabulary, including terms such as "resistance of the past; "banditry;' "political reactionary," "regional backwardness; and "foreign incitement." Despite existing differences, Yegen argues, the idea that the Kurds are Turks-to-be and that the Kurdish question may basically be solved by means of assimilation has remained a constant theme in Turkish nationalist discourses. But he also demonstrates the changes that have taken place in recent years regarding the perception of Kurds in the Turkish nationalist discourses: the increasing characterization of Kurds as "disloyal" in the Turkish nationalist discourses. The historical context in which the term "disloyalty" enters the agenda of the Turkish nationalist discourses about the Kurdish question is what has come to be called the post-9iII world in general and the invasion of Iraq in particular. This historical context has also brought a new dimension to Kurdish nationalism: the possibility of an autonomous Kurdishstai:e in northern Iraq. In chapter II Murat Somer deals with both internal and external

xx

Ay~e

Kadloglu and E. Fuat Keyman

dimensions of Kurdish nationalism with special reference to the novelties of the poSt-9/1I world, in which a pronounced ethnic dimension of Kurdish identity became more visible. This chapter illustrates the encounters between Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms in a more ethnically defined and contested arena. Somer maintains that it is important to distinguish between the Kurdish question and the Kurdish conflict: while the former might have been a product of nationalism and modernization, the latter results from structures and political decisions. One of the neglected areas in studying Kurdish nationalism has been the question of the Kurdish Diaspora in Europe and its role in recent ethnicization of Kurdish nationalism. In chapter 12 Vera Eccarius-Kelly explores the ways in which Diaspora Kurdish expressions of nationalism in Europe have influenced and shaped the public discourse on the future of the Kurds in Turkey. Kurdish collective activism has succeeded in connecting the language of victimization to public discourses on Turkish membership in the European Union. The Kurdish Diasporas ability to assert power by controlling and managing nationalist articulations stands out. Yet its capacity to influence Kurdish nationalists inside Turkey. to shape and to inspire new manifestations of interconnected local, regional. and global repertoires of collective protest action, requires further examination. The Diasporas challenges represent a modified version of ethnic nationalism, as Kurds increasingly focus on cultural and linguistic expressions ofidentity rather than on a preoccupation with territorial boundaries. All these chapters have been designed to portray the different manifestations of nationalism in Turkey. Operating as symbiotic antagonisms. these manifestations reveal the choreography of Turkish modernity and the defining role that nationalism plays in it. In this sense, we hope to enlarge the domain of social and political studies of Turkey by introducing one of the most neglected dimensions: critical analysis of encounters among competing claims to nationalism in Turkey. We also hope that this discussion of symbiotic antagonisms produced and reproduced by discourses of nationalism will contribute to the debates about and searches for a democratic disclosure in Turkish politicS and modernity.

Introduction

xxi

NOTES 1.

In trying to ourline the «family resemblances" of differerenc nationalisms (it la Ludwig Wittgenstein) we were inspired by a similar endeavor by Umberto Eco (1995) about fascisms in Europe.

PART I

Turkish Nationalism: Continuity and Change

1

TURKISH NATIONALISM

From a System of Classification to a System of Solidarity ~ERIF MARDIN .

THE FOLLOWING CHAPTER PRESENTS THE OUTLINES OF A ROUGH

frame that I believe can be further developed for an understanding of the process of modernization in Turkey. It is a summary of the ideas that I have acquired in the last fifty years by studying the relationship of the Ottoman Empire, Islam, and the thrust of modernity. In no way, however, does this chapter claim to establish a detailed historical account of the relations between Ottoman society and the state during the many centuries that I cover. A few years ago I developed the idea that an understanding of modern Turkish politics would require knowledge of the structure of the Ottoman Empire. I underlined the idea of a bipolar structure, of the center and the periphery. This was not a terribly original idea. A number of historians had developed the concept of an Ottoman Empire working with two structural components: the military and the nonmilitary (inalcrk 1994, pp. 16-17). A latent, unstated, but important element of the bipolarity, however, had escaped notice: that the Ottoman Empire could be studied as a system of social classification. To my knowledge, this theme has never been developed. The Ottoman map of sociopolitical relations was a static one, but it nevertheless allows today's observer to begin investigations with a new venue into the study of Turkish modernity. I propose that the Ottoman Empire may be seen as an enormous system of classification. Not only askeri (military) 3

4

~erif

Mardin

and reaya (civilians) but many other minute classifications of social positions make up the conceptual map of the Ottoman Empire as seen by Ottoman officialdom and even ulema (members of the religious hierarchy, the higher rungs of which were also integrated with the state). Part of this classificatory behemoth may be traced to detailed imperial regulations such as those proclaimed by Sultan Mehmed II, but many more regulatory strategies of the Ottoman Empire that fall in the same classifying category have been uncovered by Halil inalclk (1994, p. 143). To understand the characteristics of this classification system we may think of the Ottoman view of society as an immense checkerboard of social positions that have an essentially static function of preservation. This does not mean that the system is inflexible. But it relies on keeping the social positions under the control of the state. For example, the Ottoman cavalry is originally recruited from timar holders (inalctk 1994, p. 71). The use of gunpowder makes the cavalry unreliable. The cavalry is replaced by more foot soldiers. The increased number of foot soldiers (shown in the gradual increases in janissaries) is found to be unreliable. The state eliminates the janissaries. Nineteenth-century military reform creates a new military machine, which is found to be unreliable in the war of 1877-78, particularly because the officers are unschooled. The state eliminates unreliable officers (alaylz) and replaces them, much more systematically than in the preceding years, with graduates of military schools. In all these cases, the state remains the agent in control of the military. Compare this with feudalism, where the military forces are organized by the state only in later historical developments. now studied under the rubric of the "militarization of Europe" (Geyer I989). The same picture of change within stability may be followed in the case of dirliks (revenue granted as a living in return for performing military services) (Shaw 1976, p. 332.), which are transformed into mukataa (tax farm) (inalclk 1994. p. 139)' The position is flexible. but the state decides how to change it. The growth of the Ottoman central apparatus of rule from the fifteenth century onward allows us to glimpse the dynamics that paralleled and perpetuated the basic imaginary sOciopolitical map. What we have here is the assumption of power by a new group that in the long run developed its potential by what Max Weber would call a "Switching mechanism." In this

Turkish Nationalism

5

case, the sWitching was activated by growth of the empire in Europe. Relevant here is the Weberian difference between what he would describe as an "intelligentsia" in contrast to what he categorizes as "intellectuals." According to Weber, intellectuals are characterized by a constant strain between "idea" and "ideology:' Members of the intelligentsia, by contrast, have a "less reflective status that is geared to practical rather than theoretical reasons" (Sadri 1992, p. 72). Weber's distinction is important because it allows us to depict an Ottoman bureaucracy that has not yet developed the distinguishing elements that we associate with a modern bureaucracy but nevertheless represents a social set with similar features. Weber is well known for describing the role of these groups in premodern cultures. Weber's intelligentsia is what Ernest Gellner (1993, p. 8) sketches out as a clerisy: "a specialized clerical class or estate." Summarized, Gellner's view of the emergence of nationalism may be described as the decline of the clerisy in the modern industrial order. I see a somewhat different role for the clerisy in the history of the Ottoman Empire. By contrast to the Ottoman attempt to keep social positions fixed, the European social system was one where social positions constantly changed and where there was a growing interrelation among the agents in each social structural position. The extraordinary number of interactive links in this situation can be summarized in one sentence: StadtluJt macht fret (City air makes one free, meaning that a serf who spends two years behind the walls of a city is freed of obligations toward the feudal lord, who is deemed to accept this situation). From these sociopolitical interrelations of the late Middle Ages the following elements emerged with modernity: "society:' "civil society:' "the people;' "representation:' and "constitutionalism." These should all be seen as interactive and interlinked social spaces and positions of power. In the long run, their net effect is to develop something that is not found in the Ottoman Empire: a quality that can only be described as "consociation," the reciprocal acceptance of others and their social positions. I think that the so-called Ottoman decline is in fact a discovery by the Ottonians that their original claSSificatory system-as flexible as it was-was not as useful as the interactive Western European system that brought with it capitalism, the development of industry, and constitutionalism. Ottoman statesmeri realized that these European institutions were linked to interactive processes that

~erif

6

Mardin

created a foundation for solidarity in the sense in which Emile Durkheim used that concept much later. This very "intersociality" may be followed in Charles de Montesquieu's earlier idea of the rule oflaw. My investigations of the Young Ottoman political movement led me to understand that, despite various reform movements that the Ottomans initiated in the sixteenth century, in the nineteenth century they gradually began to realize that they had to change their rigid system of social classification and come closer to the interactive European system. During the late eighteenth century and nineteenth century, the social and political conflicts that developed between the Ottoman center and its periphery as well as the lack of will within the center confirmed that what was missing in the empire was concord, another name for social solidarity (KaraI19SS). The Young Ottoman NamIk Kemal took a first step here by giving Islam a foundational and almost remedial role in his constitutional proposal, usul-

i mesveret (Mardin 1962). Simultaneously, however, he also developed in much greater detail the organization of representation and the separation of powers. Islam remained a source of a diffuse principal base. It is also possible to distinguish

an unacknowledged step toward secularization in this mix. For

instance, one element-love of the fatherland-interrelated in his general system was new. NamIk Kemal assumed the role of Weber's "intellectuals," but, as I showed in Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought, his proposal was in fact a reappropriation that still carried out the requirements of the basic Ottoman system of classification. Nineteenth-century Ottoman ism and late nineteenth-century "Turkism" are two different attempts to modify the Ottoman traditional classificatory system and to replace it with a system of solidarity. In other words, the introduction of the idea of Turkishness as a new foundation for Ottoman society in the late nineteenth century was, paradoxically, a harried attempt to establish the foundations of a powerful but equilibrated, productive, and peaceful society as it had grown in Europe. The promotion of such prenationalistic ideas as a culmination of the Ottoman search for civility may appear bizarre in view of the forbiddingly narrow restrictions of the European project of nationalism. To understand how nationalism in the Ottoman Empire carried the element of solidarity that I attributed to it we could turn to the Young Turk Yusuf Aks:ura. He was one of the first authors of a systematic modern political program for the empire. In Of Tarz-t Siyaset (1904), Aks:ura

Turkish Nationalism

7

proposes three alternatives for the solution of Ottoman political problems: first. an Ottoman solidarity; second. an Islamic solidarity; third. a "Turkist" solidarity. As we know, only one of these options. "Turkism," triumphed in the long run. This is not a surprise, because that solution kept the hegemony of the state, the key to the original system of classification. The story of this differentiation has lately begun to be studied. It is not clear, however, to what degree these new historians understand what Ak~ura had in mind: to establish a modern social equilibrium and a "civil SOciety" in Turkey. Fran~ois Georgeon's 1980 study is one exception. The importance of the latent, socializing aspect ofTurkification is once more underlined when we remember the foundational role that Durkheim played in the ideology of the Turkish Republic. Founders of the republic saw no contradiction between the search for the deeply buried, still hidden elements of a Turkist nationalist culture and the quest for a common cause. One element still missing from my description of the Ottoman system is the new space that Islam developed for itself while all these changes were taking place. In the original Ottoman classification, Islam appears under two configurations. The state claims universal leadership for Islam. but it is also extremely suspicious of Islam as the fountainhead of collective movements. As noted, Namtk Kemal's ideas are an interesting example of recasting the political role ofIslam without granting it the secret and contested refuge that had been allowed in popular religious movements. From 1895 onward Namtk Kemal's Young Ottoman constitutionalistIslamic syntheSiS was replaced by a starker element that mirrored the starkness of European international politics and political theories of the time, such as those of the new Machiavellians-Robert Michels and Georges Sorel. The Ottoman dissidents in exile in Europe were now suffused by these increasingly pessimistic European intellectual trends. The shift from their earlier ideals is described well by Zeev Sternhell (1994, p. 9) in his assessment of the wider European context: From the end of the nineteenth century, the new nationalism truly expressed the revolt against the spirit of the French Revolution. The gulf that divided Corradini from Mazzini, or Barrc~s, Drumont, and Maurras from Michelet, reveals the distance between Jacobin nationalism

8

~erif

Mardin

and that of la Terre et les Morts, the Land and the Dead. This formula of Barres was in fact only the French counterpart of the German formula Blut and Boden (blood and soil). and it showed that the old theory consecrated by the French Revolution, that society was made up of a collection of individuals, had been replaced by the theory of the organic unity of the nation. The idea of the organic unity of the nation, which reproduced the unitarian thrust of the Ottoman system of classification, was now added to the search for a formula of "consociation;' basically producing an internal tension between what we may describe as the "Great Search" and demands that brought back the centripetal element of the original classification system. A final development that sets new parameters in the study of Ottoman social change remains to be traced: the new role ofIslam in the nineteenth century. This renovated Ottoman Islam still operated within the boundaries of the earlier incorporated Ottoman political game in the sense that Ottoman rule did not have to bother with an institution like the church. as had been the case in Europe. In Europe, secularity and its promise of freedom were associated with a diminution of the power of the church and ideally its total elimination. In the Ottoman Empire, state Islam, as I have described it, did not have to contend with a church. To the contrary, Islamic collective liberation from state control was the equivalent of the liberation of individuals from the Catholic Church. This independence from state control was what many Muslims began to seek in the nineteenth century. Indeed, during this century an Islamic reform movement, the salafiyya, promoted a type of Islam with the idea of a new Islamic collectivity that had its own autonomous dynamic and validity criteria and was set in opposition to the state's control of religion. Once again, the Young Ottoman Namlk Kemal appears to have taken a first step in this direction in the 1860s. Nevertheless, the earlier control of the state over religion is still visible even in his proposals for a more socially active Ottoman Islam. It is this very continuity of the control of Islam by the state that was eventually taken over by the Turkish Republic. Unfortunately. in our time both "Islamists" and "laics" have taken positions that systematically misconstrue Ottoman political and military history. Laics fear Islam because they believe that it was the sole foundational element of the Ottoman Empire. Islamists want to expand the influence of Islam in

Turkish Nationalism

9

today's Turkey because they believe it was the sole foundational element of the Ottoman Empire. In reality the interests of the Ottoman state were paramount. as was the constant control of Islamic elements that would not fit the classificatory system. I hope I am not mistaken in thinking that these are the main themes promoted by Ahmet Ya~ar Ocak in his studies of Ottoman Islam (see ihsanoglu 1999). I realize that the current contest between Islamic values and secular principles in Turkey in the last decade also must- be studied in a much more complex contemporary frame that takes into account the new parameters of modernity. mass communications. and the emergence of the so-called true believers and their grotesque dreams. That is an investigation that I do not claim to have carried out in this chapter. but I insist that we must begin to unravel the present conundrums in Turkey by remembering the basic features of the Ottoman social imaginary and the real position ofIslam in the Ottoman Empire. Where does all of this take us? It leads us to consider that Turkish nationalism is originally an idiosyncratic form of solidarity creation. Possibly the Western experience of nationalism itself should be studied in comparison with that of Turkey to clear the issue. When I look at nationalism in Germany I am reminded of all the prominent writers about fascism, such as George Mosse (1964). Ernst Nolte (1965). and K. D. Bracher (1970). but in particular of the magnificent description of the diSintegration of the imperial Germany around 1918 found in the memoirs of Ernst Von Salomon (2.007 [1930 D. Frightening. accelerated disintegration had also been the problem of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century. For reasons that will have to be studied in detaU. Ottomans in their new republican raiments of 192.3 had been switched by their original counterentropic claSSificatory system onto a regime that carried Ottoman residuals of state authoritarianism, rigidity. severity, and formalism but that nevertheless did not bend to the worst characteristics of fascism. The "Great Search" still had some clout. I believe that it is these complex, contradictory, self-assertive, self-denying, and in the end paradoxical elements that we shall have to pursue to clarify the nature of the republican regime of contemporary Turkey.

2

NATIONALISM IN TURKEY Modernity, State, and Identity

E. FUAT KEYMAN

IN WRITING ON THE HISTORY OF IDEAS THAT HAVE DOMINATED MOD-

ern times, Isaiah Berlin (1979, p. 337) has correctly pOinted out: There was one movement which dominated much of the nineteenth century in Europe and was so pervasive, so famUiar, that it is only by a conscious effort of the imagination that one can conceive a world in which it played no part.... But, oddly enough, no significant thinkers known to me predicted for it a future in which it would play an even more dominant role. Yet it would, perhaps, be no overstatement to say that it is one of the most powerful, in some regions the most powerful, single movement at work in the world today.... This movement is nationalism. Almost half a century after Berlin's observation that nationalism constitutes one of the most powerful and dominant ideas in modern times, David Miller (1995. p. 33) has made a similar suggestion in his diagnOSiS of world affairs in the post-Cold War era:

10

Nationalism in Turkey

11

The claims of nationality have come to dominate politics in the last decade of the twentieth cenmry. As the ideological contest between capitalism and communism has abated with the breakup of the Soviet Union and its satellite regions, so questions of national identity and national self-determination have come to the fore. It matters less, it seems, whether the state embraces the free market, or the planned economy, or something in between. It matters more where the boundaries of the state are drawn, who gets included and who gets excluded, what languages is used, what religion endorsed, what culture promoted. Likewise, Aviel Roshwald (2006, p. 3) argues in his recent work on nationalism and its historical roots that-despite the contradictions and paradoxes it involves-nationalism "pervades in the modern world" and therefore that the focus of the study of nationalism should be placed on "its endurance" rather than its demise. Isaiah Berlin, David Miller, and Avid Roshwald are correct in their diagnosis that the relationship between nationalism and modernity is much more complex and integral than indicated by those studies assuming that the power of nationalism will eventually die as liberalism and liberal mar· ket values disseminate throughout the world. Contrary to Michael Mandelbaum's powerful argument that "the ideas that conquered the modern world" have been and will be those of "peace, democracy and freedom" (Le., "the liberal Wilsonian triad, widespread although not universal, dominant and unchallenged"), the diagnOSiS regarding the endurance of nationalism has remained even truer in to day's highly globalized and postmodern world.' Rather than suffering a demise, today nationalism and nationalist sentiments are becoming more and more unleashed and paving the way to the emergence and dissemination of ethno-nationalist and religious fundamentalist identity conflicts throughout the world. Moreover, as the claims to national identity and national self-determination have recently involved the simultaneous existence of global terrorism and war (which constituted the defining features of what has come to be known as the "post-9hI world"). it would not be an exaggeration to suggest that nationalism will retain its dominant place in politics in the foreseeable future of national and global affairs.

12

E. Fuat Keyman

In this sense, academic and public discourse has shown an upsurge of interest in the question of the power of nationalism to remain one of the dominant ideologies of modern times as well as its ability to revitalize itself and resurface in various forms in different world-historical contexts and to articulate itself in different political ideologies and social movements. Turkey constitutes an important and interesting case in demonstrating how nationalism has been able to maintain its presence both ideologically and politically in modern times and in understanding its system-defining and systemtransforming power even today. Nationalism has operated as a dominant ideology in the process of the transition to modernity in Turkey. Moreover, the historical experience of Turkish modernity throughout the twentieth century and even now has to a large extent been determined by nationalism's continuing system-defining and system-transforming power. The modern state-building process and the state-centric mode of modernization in Turkey have constituted the very foundation on which nationalism has acquired its dominant ideological status and its transformative power. It should also be pointed out, however. that Significant changes and transformations in the connection between nationalism and modernity have also taken place throughout the modern history of Turkey. Nationalism has been experienced and articulated differently by various political actors, which has given rise to different claims to moder~ity, state, and identity. In this chapter I elaborate on these points by delineating the ways in which the ideology of nationalism has been put into practice historically and discursively in relation to modernity in Turkey. First, I offer a methodological and theoretical basis for an adequate understanding of the continuing presence of nationalism in Turkish modernity. In doing so, I focus on different models of Turkish modernity: modernity as modernization, modernity as identity, and modernity as a project of nation-building. I suggest that concern about the security of the state, the rapid and top-down modernization of society, and the will to civilization have framed the intertwined relationship between nationalism and modernity in the history of modern Turkey. But this intertwined relationship is neither static nor unchanging. In fact, it involves both ruptures and continuities. For this reason, I also analyze briefly and thematically how nationalism has been experienced in different periods of Turkish modernity. More specifically, I focus on the continuities and changes that have occurred in the discourse and practice of nationalism. as the formation

Nationalism in Turkey

13

of Turkish modernity has been transformed through the processes of the transition to state-centric modernity, the transition to democracy, and the exposure to globalization and Europeanization. Finally, I suggest that only through the democratization of the state-society relations could we resist the power of nationalism and its continuing impact on the nature and formation of Turkish modernity.

DIFFERENT PARADIGMS OF TURKISH MODERNITY AND NATIONALISM

The history of modern Turkey raises an interesting question for the students of social change. As a postempire social formation, as a strong state tradition, and as a republican, secular, and state-centric modernity, modern Turkey cannot be analyzed adequately as a product of a class-based revolution or a postcolonial political transformation (Mardin 2.006). This is precisely because Turkey had never experienced colonialism in the real sense of the term; nor had its national independence been achieved by a social class. Just as in other postcolonial states, however, the history of the making of modern Turkey has also entailed Westernization as "the will to (Western) civilization" (Keyman and 6ni~ 2.007). In the process, the image of the Kemalist elite was to "reach the contemporary level of civilization" by establishing its political, economic, and ideological prerequisites, such as the creation of an independent nation-state, the fostering of industrialization, and the construction of a secular and modern national identity. The Kemalist elite thus accepted the universal validity of Western modernity as the way of building modern Turkey. In this sense, the making of Turkey was based upon both a war of independence against Western imperialism and an acceptance of its epistemic and moral dominance. The embeddedness of the Kemalist will to civilization in Western modernity requires a new theoretical framework that goes beyond the existing models of Turkish modernity. With a certain degree of generalization, the available literature on modern Turkey is dominated by two paradigmatic readings ofKemalism: those of modernization and identity. The modernization paradigm situates the Kemalist will to civilization in a teleological and typological understanding of historical development as a transition from Gemeinschaft (community) to Gesellschaft (society)! The issue of how to

14

E. Fuat Keyman

think of this transition, however, produces two different positions in this paradigm. Political modernization sees this transition as a process of nationbuilding, in which the nation-state is taken to be the unfolding essence of modernization. The making of modem Turkey then refers to the process of political modernization aimed at creating a modern nation vis-a.-vis the Ottoman past as a representative of a backward, traditional society. Whereas political modernization sees this transition as a positive break from the past and a move forward, economic modernization in line with dependency theory considers it to be a new form of peripheralization and dependent capitalist development that started with the integration of the Ottoman economy into the world capitalist system in the nineteenth century. In this respect, nationstate building does not alter the condition of economic dependency as the unfolding essence of modernization, even though it means de jure recognition of modern Tuckey as a politically independent state by the international community. However useful the modernization paradigm is in accounting for the making of modern Turkey, as a mode of analyzing the processes of political and economic modernization it operates as a theoretical framework that is limited in itS scope and reductionist in its methodological procedures.! It is limited because it attempts to analyze its subject matter by privileging a certain type of social interaction as the prime mover of social change. Thus either nation-state building or economic development is considered to be a process that produces a system-transforming effect in social interactions, which results in a lack of attention paid to the role of other processes such as culture, identity, and international relations, thereby neglecting their transformative capacity. The modernization paradigm also proves to be reductive insofar as, in a Hegelian fashion, it attributes to the concept of society a quality of being an expressive. constituting totality in which the conditions of existence of various social interactions are regarded as necessarily linked to and determined by the unfolding essence. As a result, the making of modern Turkey is analyzed as a process of modernization, reducing its multidimensionality to what is conceived as the essence: the political level or the economic level. Thus nationalism is seen as an ideology of political or economic modernization: that is. it is an ideological dimension of what constitutes the prime mover of social change.

Nationalism in Turkey

15

Contrary to the modernization paradigm, the paradigm of identity attempts to discover the essence of the manner in which Kemalism approaches the question of national identity." This paradigm produces two alternative accounts of the essence, which are derived from two different interpretations of the meaning of "Turk" in cultural practices put into service in the process of the making of modern Turkey. One mode tends to interpret Kemalism as a nationalist discourse whose understanding of national identity was "cultural" in its essence. In this sense, the notion "Turk" is referred to as a meta-identity that is situated above and beyond the difference principle and thus operates as a point of sameness at which the claim to the impartiality and the universality of the state is constructed. The other mode interprets Kemalism on the basis of the difference principle, claiming that the notion "Turk" is framed to a large extent by and within an ethnic-based understanding of national identity. In this sense, Kemalism is regarded as an ethno-nationalist discourse that aims to impose a secular and ethnically essentialist vision of modern Turkey on what Kevin Robbins (1996) terms the other but real Turkey. Despite the fundamental difference between them. however. these two modes of interpretation share in their modus operandi two sets of highly problematical epistemological and methodological gestures. The first concerns the historicist nature of the paradigm of identity, insofar as its search for discovering the true essence of the Kemalist vision of national identity rests upon an attempt to read the past in terms of the present (Dean 1999, p. 9). What is at stake in this paradigm is not to analyze Kemalist nationalism in its own right or in its own context but to find a legitimizing ground for the competing political discourses of the present political landscape over issues such as political Islam. the Kurdish question, laicism, ethno-nationalism, and the crisis of representation in state/society relations. The second problem concerns the essentialist nature of the paradigm. The notion of identity employed in the claim that the Kemalist understanding of national identity is constituted by and operates as a cultural or ethnic identity assumes that each individual or collectivity possesses a fixed, coherent, and totalizing self This means that each identity involves an unfolding essence that makes it a self-contained, self-referential, and self-propelling presence and therefore that the variations that occur historically in terms of the identity formation of individuals or collectivities do not alter the essence

,6

E. fuat Keyman

of their identities. The paradigm of identity thus acts as an essentializing gesture that ignores the relationality, multiplicity, and historically constructed nature of identity formation and presents the Kemalist understanding of national identity as a universalizing discourse of what is in fact a fixed, unchanging, and original identity. In this sense, what is missing in the paradigm of identity is the idea that nationalism and national identity both are open to changes, modifications, and alternations. If identity is ideological and anthropological-in that it is given but socially, institutionally, historically, and discursively constructed-so is nationalism and/or national identity. So far I have attempted to point out the problematic nature of the paradigms of modernization and identity in order to ground the argument that we must go beyond these paradigms to recognize the crucial fact that the Kemalist will to nation-state building and civilization is intrinsically linked to and operates within the discursive horizon of global modernity. The Kemalist elite's will to civilization was not simply an economic or a political modernization. Nor was it based essentially upon an attempt to create a national identity. It was much more complex and at the same time more ambiguous than these paradigms suggest. To understand this, however, requires regarding the Kemalist will to nation-state building and civilization as a project of modernity premised on the equation of modernity with progress: that is, creating a modern nation through the introduction and dissemination of Western reason and rationality in what seemed to be traditional and backward social relations. In this sense, we must explore the connection between Kemalism and modernity as well as between nationalism and modernity (which has been ignored by these paradigms) in order to provide an adequate account of Turkish nationalism.s In his analysis of the making of modern Turkey, ~erif Mardin (2006, p. 120) argues that the meaning of Kemalism lies in "the conceptualization of the Turkish Republic as a nation-state in its fullest form" and finds its expression in its constant effort to create a modern nation. Mardin's seemingly straightforward and commonsensical argument in fact carries with it a number of crucial insights for a more adequate understanding of Kemalism. First, to think of Kemalism as "an act of conceptualization" is to present it as a "project" of creating a nation on the basis of a set of epistemological and normative procedures. Second, to argue that Kemalism means the conceptualization of the Turkish Republic as a nation-state in its fullest form is

Nationalism in Turkey

17

to recognize that it constitutes a project of modernity: a project of creating a

modern nation that "accepts the claim to universality of the 'modern' framework of knowledge" (Chatterjee 1986, p. II). Third, to think ofKemalism as a project of modernity is to recognize its modus operandi as a social engineering project aimed at creating a modern nation in a social formation that lacks the material and institutional availability of the conception of a modern nation as a nation-state in its fullest form. These three points also indicate that Kemalism is a nationalist discourse that operates as a "will to civilization" by producing at the conceptual level a boundary between what is civilized and what is uncivilized. Thus. by accepting rational thinking and rational morality as the way of becoming modern, Kemalist nationalism attempts to "reach the level of civilization": that is. the making of modern Turkey as nation-state in its fullest form. According to Mardin (2.006), the conceptualization of the Turkish Republic as nation-state manifests itself in (1) the transition in the political system of authority from personal rule to impersonal rules and regulations; (2.) the shift in understanding the order of the universe from divine law to positivist and rational thinking; (3) the shift from a community founded upon the elite-people cleavage to a populist-based community; and (4) the transition from a religious community to a nation-state. Mustafa Kemal (Atatiirk) regarded these transitions as the precondition for the possibility that "Turkey would live as an advanced and civilized nation in the midst of contemporary civilization" (Ahmad 1993, p. S3). It is in this context that the Kemalist elite attempted to remove from political discourse the notion of an Islamic state, the existence of which was regarded as the main cause of the perpetuation of the backwardness of Turkey. Thus the foundation of a modern nation-state was seen as the key element of the will to civilization. For the Kemalist elite, modern Turkey could thus possess secularity and rationality, employ reason to initiate progress, and establish a modern industrial economy, thereby fostering the processes of industrialization and modernization. In a Weberian fashion, the purpose of political power was considered to "carry out a social and economic revolution without which the political revolution would dissipate" (Ahmad 1993, p. 72.). This means that for the Kemalist elite political power was "not reducible but interrelated to the economic." The rationalization of the political and the rationalization of the economic were seen to be relational processes whose reproduction could be made possible through the

18

E. Fuat Keyman

construction of a national identity as a modern rational sel£ In this respect, the Kemalist will to civilization was based upon an articulation of modernity (reason) and capitalism (capital) in Turkish society through the construction _ of a modern nation-state. What is striking here, which defines the basis of Kemalist nationalism, is that the identification of popular sovereignty with national sovereignty within the context of the organic conception of society derived not from those "to whom sovereignty belonged" but from those "to whom it did not belong" (Heper 1985, p. 45). In other words, embedded in the making of modern Turkey as an organic society was (to use Michel Foucault's terminology) the governmentality of nationalist discourse to practice inclusion/ exclusion. to create identity in relation to difference. and to freeze the Other (such as the Islamic identity, the Kurdish identity, or the Ottoman past) into history.6 By assuming a self-identity as the primary agent of progress and organic society, the Kemalist elite thus came to locate the principles of secularism and the territorial integrity of the state in binary dichotomies such as progressive versus conservative. modern versus traditional. national identity versus ethnic difference, and the present versus the past. In the process of constructing binary oppositions, which also had functioned as a boundaryproducing practice between the Kemalist regime and its others. nationalist discourse played a crucial role in enabling the state to be successful in its performance: to operate on the basis of the assumed coexistence of the state and the nation, to exclude the Islamic Other and the Kurdish Other from the politicallandscape, to subjugate them to the secular and homogenous national identity. and to prevent them from becoming political actOrs. It can be argued in this respect that the Turkish nation-state did not have a fixed ontological status; on the contrary, its identity was performatively constructed. More importantly. nationalism acted as the main ideological and strategic device by which the state governed society, put the top-down modernization and transformation of society into practice, approached society through a conception of national identity as a secular and homogeneous identity, and also attempted to implement the will to civilization as the main motto of Turkish modernity {Campbell 1992, p. 9),1 I believe that this theoretical extrapolation about the state and the role of nationalism in its performatively constructed identity provides a crucial insight for both the

Nationalism in Turkey

19

endurance of nationalism in Turkish modernity and the changing content and actors of nationalism since the 1980s.

THE MAKING OF MODERN TURKEY AND NATIONALISM

In the light of this brief and critical reading of the different paradigms of Turkish modernity, in this section I daborate on the intertwined rdationship between nationalism and modernity in Turkey historically. In doing so, I hope to show that the endurance of nationalism is not static but dynamic, insofar as it involves both continuity and change. r have already provided a brief account of the basic characteristics of Turkish modernity in the early republican era (192.3-45). Here I delineate the way in which nationalism frames and acts as an integral element of the process of the making of Turkey in this era. Although it is true that "Turkey did not rise phoenix-like out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. It was 'made' in the image of the Kemalist elite which won the national struggle against foreign invaders and the old regime" (Ahmad 1993, p. 2.), the history of nationalism goes back to late Ottoman times. A quick glance at the Tanzimat reforms (1839-76) and the Young Turk movement (1908-18) in late Ottoman times demonstrates that nationalism was put into practice as an articulating principle of the need for modernization and the desire to save the Ottoman state (KazanclgU 1981, pp. 37-39). The making of modern Turkey brought about a rupture with the Ottoman past in the emergence of the nation-state, however, and in that context nationalism was situated in direct rdation to the process of state-buUding. To a large extent, the republic indeed presented a radical break with the past, as it was nurtured by "concepts and doctrines such as progress, laicism, nationalism, Comtean positivism and solidarism," owed a lot "to the Enlightenment, the French Revolution and nineteenth-century scientism:' and aimed as "its ultimate consequence to create a modern Turkish state" (Kazanclgil 1981, p. 37). The creation of modern Turkey presented a rupture with the past, insofar as it privileged the Turkish state as the sovereign and dominant actor of modernity. Yet, at the same time, it carried in itsdf certain dements of continuity with the past: the goal of saving the state through modernization remained the dominant motto of nationalism in the republican era.

20

E. Fuat Keyman

In fact, this legacy still frames the debate on nationalism in today's Turkey. This means that nationalism has been one of the most important and effective characteristics of the process of making modern Turkey and continues. to play that role. even in different contents and articulations. The main goal of Atatlirk and his followers was to reach the level of "Western civilization" by installing an independent nation-state, fostering industrialization. and constructing a secular and modern national identity. This goal was derived to a large extent from the desire to save the state and secure its existence; it was nationalism that linked security with modernity and became the dominant ideology of the state (Keyman 2008). From the inception of the Turkish nation-state in 1923. modernity and security have constituted intertwined processes that had to be carried out through the ideology of nationalism. As noted, the Kemalist elite's will to civilization was not simply a local project of economic or political modernization. The idea of the state as a commitment to political modernity plays a crucial role in the process of constructing the Kemalist will to civilization. The Kemalist elite saw "the modernization of the polity and society" as "linked to the state" and hence attempted to establish the legitimacy of the new regime through the strength it "bestowed on the state" (Gellner 1984, p. 83)' However, the Kemalist idea of the state was not only institutional. On the contrary. as Bobby Sayyid (1997. p. 269) has correqly pOinted out, the Kemalist elite "took seriously the Weberian answer to the riddle of the 'European miracle'; that is. that the reasons behind Western advancement could be located precisely in Western cultural practices. Kemalism understood modernization not just as a question of acquiring technology, but as something that could not be absorbed without a dense network of cultural practices which made instrumental thought possible:' This means that the commitment to political modernity has to be supplemented with a set of cultural practices in order to ground the articulation of reason and capital via the nation-state. The Kemalist commitment to political modernity in this sense aimed to achieve a top-down and state-based transformation of a traditional society into a modern nation by introducing and disseminating Western reason and rationality. As an integral element of the project of modernity, the state employed nationalism to initiate a rapid political, economic, and cultural modernization, in order to create a modern institu.tional political structure. a quickly industrializing economy, and a homogeneous national identity with

Nationalism in Turkey

21

a highly secular and progressing society. The rapid modernization was necessary not only to catch up with the level of Western civilization but also to make the Turkish state more secure and stronger.8 Therefore how to achieve both modernity and security Simultaneously was and has remained the fundamental question for the state to cope with, and it was in this context that nationalism was employed as the effective answer. The idea of the state in the mind of Atatiirk and his followers was by no means abstract: rather it was a reaction to two aspects of the Ottoman state, which they identified as key to the empire's decline. First, because the Ottoman state was identified with the personal rule ot the sultan, eventually it was unable to compete within the European state system, which was organized on the basis of legal-rational authority. Second, the Islamic basis of the Ottoman state was seen as the primary obstacle to progress in Ottoman society, insofar as modernization required the regulation of state-society relations through the nation-state. Thus the republican elite sought to create a state distinct from the person of the sultan and secular enough to reduce Islam to the realm of individual faith. For them, the state had to involve commitment to political modernity, meaning that the state had to establish the link between the modernization of the polity and the modernization of society. It is for this reason that the republican elite initiated reforms, imposed from above to enlighten the people and help them make progress (Heper 1985, p. I). These reforms were designed to equate the national will with the general will and included the principles of republicanism, nationalism, etatism, secularism, populism, and revolutionism (or reformism from above). In each principle, nationalism enabled the state to initiate political and economic modernization, to construct a secular and homogeneous national identity, and thus to make sure that the security of the state could be maintained. Moreover, it is through nationalism that the state maintained its sovereign and dominant role in almost every sphere of societal relations, from politics to economics, from cultural identity and morality to everyday life practices of individuals.

THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY AND NATIONALISM

In this sense, the continuing power of nationalism in Turkey can be said to have gone hand in hand with the success of the strong state in governing

22

E. Fuat Keyman

its society. This was true in the early republican era of the transition to modernity. It remained true as Turkey made its transition to democracy in the second half of the 1940S. In other words, as Turkey created the necessary in-. stitutions for the project of political and economic modernity in terms of politicS, law, economics, and industrialization in order to make its transition to multiparty democracy in 1945 as well as in foreign policy with respect to Turkey's integration in the Western alliance system, this transition did not change the prevailing dominance of the strong state tradition and the endurance of nationalism in it (Ozbudun 2.000, chapter 3). The period of the transition to democracy in Turkey (1950 to 1980), although not altering the essence of nationalism (in terms of its integral character in the strong-state tradition and its security concerns as well as its homogeneous and secular discourse of national identity), has nevertheless given rise to the emergence of the left-right axis in politics and thus has brought the idea of class. As the dominant ideology of the strong-state tradition in this period, nationalism has also been linked with the geopolitical security concerns of the state as well as with the question of national identity, in that it shaped the state's foreign policy vision with respect to the Cold War. At the same time, however, as an ideology of anti-imperialist struggle, nationalism has also been employed by the Left and social democratic actors in their call for a national democratic revolution or nationally independent developmentalism in order to create equality, liberty, and social justice in Turkey (Keyman and Oni§ 2.007, pp. 2.3-2.5). This class dimension involved in nationalism has placed it in the left-right axis of politics and made it possible for various political actors to make different uses of it. Whereas the Left employed nationalism in framing its anti-imperialist discourse of national developmental ism, the Right associated its nationalist discourse with the geopolitical and security concerns of the state. Its goal was to protect the territorial integrity of the state in the context of Cold War international relations, where the Soviet expansipnism was regarded as the real danger confronting the West. Thus the dominance of nationalism in Turkish modernity has remained in this era, yet it has been used by various actors in different ways. In addition to national identity and citizenship, social class has become one of the subjects through which nationalism can be put into practice.

Nationalism in Turkey

23

Neither the emergence of the lett-right axis in politicS nor the reference to the concept of social class was strong enough to challenge the hegemony of Kemalist nationalism. Several reasons explain this continuing hegemony. First, the process of the transition to democracy did not constitute an alternative to the essentialist posture ofKemalist nationalism toward secular national identity. Instead, Kemalists affirmed and reaffirmed such essentialism and its practice of inclusion and exclusion. For this reason, to the extent that they characterized their modus operandi as acting "in the name of the people" and "revolution/reform from above:' they were unable to construct a subjectivityalternative to the secular national identity.9 For example, the critique of Kemalism and its one-party-based operation put forward by the Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti, DP) was intended only to secure the representation of the private sector in Turkish politics; it was not aimed to challenge the Kemalist notion of the secular and unitary national identity (Ahmad 1993, pp. 103-2.0). Likewise, lettist formulas such as national democratic revolution, which were put forth by the Workers Party of Turkey (Turkiye i~~i Partisi, TiP) and its counterpoint the Yon (Direction) movement during the 1960s, were derived from what Ahmet Samim called "a lett-Kemalist substitutionalism." Its aim was to resist imperialism and to lead Turkey democratically "on behalf of the workers and peasants"- "for the people, in spite of the people" (Samim 1981, p. ISS)' Second, both Democratic Party and New Lett discourses were intrinsically bound with modernity and in this respect were by no means a challenge to the Kemalist will to civilization. Both accepted the validity of the Kemalist notion of the state as the privileged agent of rationality, whose existence was central to the process of modernization. Both prOVided a reading of Turkish society through the lenses of the state by assuming that it is the state that shapes and reshapes social relations. The Democratic Party's critique of Kemalism was therefore only partial: it was directed exclusively at the strict etatist and populist policies by which the state coped with the problems of capitalist industrialization. But the New Lett critique of Westernization as imperialism and its characterization of Kemalist nationalism as an agent of the subordination of Turkey to Western imperialism were derived solely from the rejection of capitalism. In other words, while capitalism was being rejected as a mode of production that generated inequalities and

24

E. Fuat Keyman

uneven development, the modernity aspect of the will to civilization (that is, its epistemic dominance and its reason) was accepted as given. As noted. however. the Kemalist will to civilization was based not on capitalism but on Western modernity. Third. although etatism was subjected to serious criticism, importsubstituting industrialization remained the motor of industrialization after the transition to the multiparty system. Whereas its counterparts in Latin America (such as Brazil. Argentina, and Chile) faced military coups due to the deepening crisis of import-substituting industrialization. the Turkish economy experienced an economic boom during the 1960s (Keyman and Oni~ 2.007, chapter 6). For this reason, liberal discourse, though critical of etatism, was linked with import-substituting industrialization. According to yaglar Keyder, an explanation for this long-lasting dominance of import-substituting industrialization as a form of economic nationalism can be found in the fact that nationalism was a site of global capitalism. a way of reproducing it, and therefore did not present a contradictory tendency. This made it possible for KemaUst nationalism to foster industrialization not against but in concord with global capitalism (Keyder 1987, 1993). For Keyder, only when global capitalism was formed by the liberal market logic did nationalism become a discourse contradictory to the systemic logic. The point here is that the transition to a multiparty system did not involve the replacement of the economic logic. Hence Kemalist nationalism was not questioned with respect to its industrialization policy. As such, the Democratic Party's discourse of industrialization lacked an alternative economic vision and affirmed the functionality of import-substitution industrialization:o

THE EXPOSURE TO GLOBALIZATION AND NATIONALISM

Since the 19805 and especially the 1990S, however, Turkey has begun to witness a set of radical changes and transformations in its economy, politics, and culture. These changes and transformations, being felt in almost every sphere of life, have to do with the increasing globalization of Turkish modernity (Keyman and Oni§ 2007, chapter 7). Two of these changes and transformations that have had an important impact on the discourse and practice of nationalism are the increasingvulnerabUity and fragility of Turkish economy as it has been exposed to the strong global, regional, and local dynamics, on

Nationalism in Turkey

25

the one hand, and the resurgence of identity politicS and its claims to difference and recognition, on the other {Cornell 2.001). These developments have resulted in the emergence of both the global-national axis in politics (especially within the context of the question of state sovereignty) and the new political actors carrying out the process of politicizing cultural identity by voicing a demand for the recognition of difference. Moreover, the impact of globalization on Turkey and its neo-liberal discourse of free market values, minimal state, and individualism as the new universalizing codes of modernization and democratization have not led to the demise of nationalism. On the contrary. globalization has reinforced the prevailing dominance of nationalism in Turkish modernity. Let me briefly focus on each of these developments. Since the 1980s and especially the 1990S the economic strategy for industrialization has shifted dramatically from import-substitution to exportpromotion. and much more emphasis has been placed on market forces. The export-oriented industrialization created a strong shift from a vision of society that was heavily statist toward one that is characterized by neo-liberal free-market individualism. In this sense, the emerging neo-liberal ideology in Turkey during the 1980s called for and initiated radical market-oriented reforms in the name of economic progress (6ni~ 1997, p. 750), which in turn has generated a serious challenge to the state. The neo-liberal restructuring of the economy, which has placed the idea of market rationality at the center of the state-economy interactions, challenged both the dominant regulatory role of the state in the economy and its national developmentalist ideology. At the political and cultural levels, Turkish modernity has been confronted by a number of identity-based conflicts challenging the homogeneous and secular national identity (Keyman 2.008; Keyman and t~duygu 2.00S). A variety of claims to identity and demands for recognition with different political imaginations have made their mark in all spheres of social life. It is the question of identity (practiced and voiced by many actors in a wide spectrum of culture, religion, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, race, and sexuality and thereby operating in a multidimensional and multiplex fashion) that marked the changing formation of Turkish modernity. From the resurgence of Islam, the Kurdish question. the rights of women, and the minority question to civil-societal calls for individual and cultural rights and freedoms, identity politics (with its challenge to national identity) has become one of

26

E. Fuat Keyman

the important characteristics of post-1980 Turkish modernity (Keyman and ic;:duygu, 2.00S). Moreover, identity politics, which has been voiced and put into practice by different societal groups, has simultaneously involved both democratic demands for multiculturalism and pluralism and the communitarian political strategies with antidemocratic and ethno-religious nationalist claims to nationality. It is true that it is not possible to think of the present nature and formation of Turkish modernity without reference to identity. Yet it is equally true that identity politics is not necessarily democratic but often conflictual and crisis-ridden. Precisely because of this, identity politics and the frequent use of ethno-religious nationalism have made it very difficult for the state to maintain the secular and homogeneous basis of the national identity that it has attempted to create through the ideology of nationalism as an articulating principle of modernity and security. Since the 19805 security has had increased dominance in state discourse, understood as the security of both the territorial state and the secular national identity of the republic. The most far-reaching impact of identity politics on Turkish modernity. however, has been a shift in the ideology of nationalism from modernity to security (Bora 2003). In other words, if rapid modernization with the intention of reaching the level of Western civilization had been considered an answer to the question of saving and securing the Turkish state in the republican period, post1980 Turkey has witnessed the privileging of security over modernity, leading to an articulation of nationalism and security within the context of identity politics. This has also created a change in the formation of Turkish nationalism, transforming it into what Ghassan Hage (2003, pp. 3-4) has called "paranOid nationalism." As the resurgence of Islam and the Kurdish question both have generated serious impact on the strong state and its claim to secular and unitary national identity (elaborated in detail in other chapters of this book), Turkish nationalism has approached them as security threats to the sovereign and secular state. The more the identity-based conflicts voiced demands for recognition, the more Turkish nationalism began to speak of national identity with a heavy emphasis on ethnicity and also approached social change in a very skeptical tone and with specific reference to the sovereignty and security of the nation-state. In a vicious circle, the more Turkish nationalism perceived the recognition-based claims and demands coming from identity as

Nationalism in Turkey

27

security threats and approached them with skepticism, the more paranoid it became, and the feeling of paranoia began to frame the terrain of nationalism as a whole (Aydm 2.005, chapters 5 and 6). It has to be acknowledged that one of the sources of paranoid nationalism was the changing global context in terms of geopolitics and its impact on Turkish foreign policy (Aras 2004, pp. 15-27). For instance, former Turkish foreign minister ismail Cem (2004, pp. 59-60) emphasized the significance of this broader international context by arguing: "In the formation of Turkey in the twenty-first century, foreign policy is a determining factor.... The goal of current generations should be to create a Turkey ... that will be a global and regional center of attraction with its history, cultural richness, democracy, economy, and progressiveness based on social justice:' With the end of the Cold War, Turkey emerged as a pivotal regional power in a volatile area. Since the 1980s Turkish modernity has also been exposed to globalization, which has triggered the process of widening, deepening, and accelerating the interconnections of states, economies, and cultures in the world. One of the most important impacts of globalization on national societies has been the increasing importance of the global, regional, national, and local interactions that have provided a suitable platform for the emergence of new demands for cultural identity and political recognition. As the research on globalization has indicated, the identity-based conflicts that have been occurring throughout the world since the 1980s and especially during the 19905 have been located in the intersection between the global and local, making claims to nationality and national identity, voicing strong demands for recognition, and strengthening themselves through global networking (Keyman and Koyuncu 2005)' The ideology of nationalism has been influenced by globalization in two ways. First, it has been articulated by the locally organized political movements in their struggle for recognition, and thus we have observed the emergence of micro-nationalism in ethnic, religious, and cultural terms. Second, the national context has lost its capacity and power to be the most important spacial ground for nationalism, and thus nationalism has become a more and more globally and locally constructed ideology. These two impacts of globalization on nationalism have been observed in Turkey too. As noted, POst-1980 Turkey has witnessed the emergence of mainly religious and ethnic identity-based conflicts that have confronted the secular and homogeneous

28

E. Fuat Keyman

character of national identity. Moreover, the way in which these groups have voiced their demands for recognition, legitimized their struggle to gain cultural rights and freedoms. and more importantly politicized themselves to influence national and local politics has to a large degree benefited from globalization and global debates about identity/difference. As a result, nationalism not only has become localized in ethnic and religious terms but also has become the main ideology of the state to react against these identity demands and conflicts in a highly security-oriented manner. In the context of globalization. nationalism in Turkey has continued its dominance, but now framed by securiryconcerns (Ozbudun 2000).

GLOBALIZATION, EUROPEANIZATION, AND NATIONALISM

Two specific processes-the end of the Cold War and European integration-should be taken into account in understanding how security concerns have characterized the modus vivendi of nationalism and its relation to modernity in post-1980 Turkey. The end of the Cold War gave rise to the emergence of important changes and ambiguities in the domestic and foreign policy initiatives of Turkey. It is true that the end of the Cold War has also ended the buffer-state foreign policy identity that Turkey had enjoyed and benefited from in the years of the hegemonic struggle between two superpowers and thus brought about a need for Turkey to search for a new identity. Yet it is also true that in the post-Cold War years as well as in today's post-9/n world the geopolitical and historical significance of Turkey in the Middle East, the Balkans, and Central Asia has become increasingly apparent. Thus Turkey has been increasingly perceived as a key regional actor in the creation of regional peace and stability (Larrabee and Lesser 2003). But the new identity and role of Turkey in the post-Cold War era, in which international affairs have been undergoing a significant transition and transformation process, is not yet certain. Instead, change and uncertainty about the future are going hand in hand, which has had important consequences for the ideology of nationalism in Turkey. The post-Cold War era has created a new impetus for the ideology of nationalism to continue its dominant role in modernity, a role defined increasingly by the security concerns of the Turkish state (Fuller and Lesser 1993, p. 148). This uncertainty embedded in the foreign policy identity of Turkey since the end of the Cold War

Nationalism in Turkey

29

and the increasing identity-based conflicts in ethnic and religious terms that have marked the changing nature of Turkish domestic politics have both reinforced the security-oriented operation of the ideology of nationalism and its relation to modernity in Turkey. Likewise, changes and uncertainties have also become more and more apparent in the process of European integration since the mid-I990S, as Turkey has attempted to achieve full membership status in the European Union. As a country at the borders of Europe, trying to start the full accession negotiations and initiating the significant political and con~titutional democratic reforms necessary for full membership, Turkey's expectation has been to receive an objective and fair response from Europe. But the high level of uncertainty about whether or not Europe culturally regards Turkey as part of itself has brought about not objectivity and universality but instead a sense of skepticism, double standards, and mistrust in Turkish society. As a result, even though Turkey-EU relations deepened in the period between 1999 and 2.004 and full accession negotiations began in October 2.005, this uncertainty has strengthened nationalism in Turkey. The ideology of nationalism used by the anti-European integration forces, voicing the significance of the state and its sovereignty to maintain the security of Turkish modernity and territorial integrity, has benefited from the high level of uncertainty within Europe about Turkey's place in it. Nevertheless, the EU integration process has served as an important external anchor, giving impetus to the democratization process in Turkey (Ugur and Canefe 2004), and has also played a critical role in shaping the intricate dynamics of the EU-Turkey-U.S. triangle (Larrabee and Lesser 2.003). It would not be mistaken to suggest that the impressive record of Turkey in upgrading its level of democracy in recent years as well as its perception by the United States as a key actor for the future of the Middle East would not have been possible without the positive role of the European integration process. In this sense the way in which the TurkeyEU full accession negotiations develop will to a large extent determine the role and the power of nationalism in reshaping the formation of Turkish modernity in the near future. After this brief outline of the domestic and global developmentsthat have contributed to the continuing dominance of nationalism in Turkey since the 198os, we could reach the following conclusion. Insofar as nationalism functions as the main articulating principle of modernity arid security and

30

E. Fuat Keyman

operates as the dominant ideology in formulating domestic and foreign policies of the state, it continues to operate as a powerful ideology with a systemdefining and system-transforming capacity. Put differently, as long as the experience of modernity involves a strong state without a normative and political commitment to democracy and its consolidation in societal affairs, nationalism acts as a dominant ideology and maintains its presence as such. In this sense, the democratic deficit and nationalism are in fact two sides of the same coin: state-centric modernity.

THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONALISM IN TURKEY

In light of the foregoing analysis of the Turkish experience of nationalism, a number of important insights should betaken into account in delineating the way in which nationalism operates and remains one of the dominant ideologies of modernity. First, Turkey is a postimperial social formation with strong historical, philosophical, and cultural imperial legacies. In analyzing nationalism in Turkey, we cannot ignore the impact of the Ottoman imperial past on the connection between nationalism and modernity, especially within the context of the nation-state building process. Given that Turkey has not experienced prolonged periods of direct foreign rule, it is important to underline that its nation-state building process took place not in the postcolonial but in the postimperial context. Second, Turkey has a strong-state tradition, in which the practice of the ideology of nationalism has been embedded in the active and major role of the state as the sovereign subject of the process of top-down modernization and transformation of traditional society. In order to understand the prevailing dominance of nationalism in the history of Turkish nationalism, it is useful and necessary to explore the linkages between nationalism and the production and reproduction of the strong state tradition. Third, the state-building process and the continuing presence of the strong-state tradition provide an adequate theoretical and political ground for analyzing the historically and discursively constructed relation between modernity and nationalism in Turkey. Moreover, this relationship has been determined to a large extent by the secular state aiming to create a modern society with a strong desire to reach the level of contemporary civilization. Therefore the Turkish experience has revealed that the state can employ the

Nationalism in Turkey

31

ideology of nationalism to secure its territorial existence, to establish the necessary institutions of Western modernity, and to create a modern society through a homogeneous secular national identity. Fourth. the spatial construction of nationalism in Turkey takes place at the intersection of domestic and international politics. In this sense nationalism is an integral element in Turkish modernity and Turkish foreign policy. Nationalism has constituted the ontological foundation for the state-centric formulation of Turkish foreign policy and its ties to the Western world (yelik 1999). Furthermore, nationalism functions as a dominant ideology of the state and its power not only in its governance of society but also in shaping and reshaping its foreign policy regionally and internationally. It is here that the geopolitical context and the need for a constant search for security playa special role that helps nationalism gain its power in shaping the formation of Turkish modernity in relation to the dominance of security concerns over the societal calls for democracy and human development. Finally, as has been pointed out earlier, the discourse and practice of nationalism are not static but rather dynamic, in that it has the capacity both to transform itself in different historical settings and to be integrated into their own political strategies and societal visions by different political actors. In the early republican era. when the rapid modernization of what was regarded as a backward and traditional society was the main motto of the governing elite, nationalism functioned as a dominant state ideology in linking modernity, security, and Westernization through the construction of a homogeneous and secular national identity. The idea of this identity, both as a carrier of the will to reach the level of contemporary Western civUization and as republican citizen-subjects who are supposed to give normative primacy to the realm of duties and responsibilities over rights and freedoms, and the protection of the security of the state and its territorial existence together defined the discourse and practice of nationalism in this era as well as its connection with modernity. Given the significant changes that the formation of Turkish modernity has faced throughout its history (such as the transition to democracy after World War II, the post-I980 economic liberalization. globalization, European integration. and the emergence of religious and ethnic identity-based conflicts since the 1990S). nationalism has nevertheless remained influential and effective. It has been articulated by different and even contrasting political actors and movements in their claims to

32

E" Fuat Keyman

identity and demands for recognition. The endurance of nationalism has to be analyzed critically and thoroughly not only to understand modern Turkey but more importantly to transform it into a just, democratic, and multicultural social formation.

NOTES

Mandelbaum (2.002.), cited in Lal (2004, p. 174)" 2.. For a detailed analysis of the modernization paradigm. see Mardin (2.006) and Keyman (2008). ,. The methodological problems confronting the paradigm of modernization have been explored in Keyman (2.008) and Aydln"{200s). 4. For a detailed analysis of the identity paradigm, see Keyman and i-Sduygu (2.005). 5. The paradigm of modernity was employed by Serif Mardin even in the 1970S, especially in his important work on the history ofideas in Turkey as well as the role of religion and ideology. For his use of modernity. see Mardin (2.006). 6. Foucault (1979. p. 18) defines governmentality as a way of subjugating differences to the domain of subjectivity. As he putS it. "In this sense. 'to be subject' is therefore 'belong to: in other words to behave as both an element of and an actor in a global process whose development defines the current field of possible experiences, inside of which the fact of being subject can only be situated." 7. Campbell (1992) demonstrates such performative construction with reference to security discourse "and foreign policy practice in the United States. 8. For a more detailed analysis of this point about nationalism. see Ay§e KadlOglu's chapter in this book. 9. For a detailed analysis of the New Left and its relation to Kemalism, see Samim (19 81). 10. Similarly. the New Left discourse had no alternative vision of economic development. In fact. the vision of economy that it put into discourse against capitalism was based upon imporr substitution industrialization through the state as the primary agent by which inequalities and uneven development were to be coped with in the name of dominated classes.

I.

3

THE TWIN MOTIVES OF TURKISH NATIONALISM

MODERN REALITY IS FRAGMENTED BY NATION-STATES THAT EVOLVED

along with various nationalisms in Europe in the aftermath of the French Revolution. Various definitions of "us" and "them;' reflected in the concepts of "citizen" and "foreigner;' respectively, emerged in the aftermath of the French Revolution. In England, for instance, the 1792 Aliens Bill was a direct response to the flight of French refugees from France (Plender 1972.). In America and Switzerland, too, immigration control began as a reaction to the French Revolution and fears that Jacobin emissaries had infiltrated immigrant groups. The processes that converted "peasants into Frenchmen" (Weber 1976) were quickly being exported to the rest of the world and increasing the levels of participation in ways that shaped the contours of modern politicS. The French Revolution Signaled a connection between the concepts of the nation and the people. The nationalist ideology, insofar as it was based on the idea of self-determination as the supreme political good, went hand in hand with the notion of popular sovereignity. The argLlment by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) that individuals needed self-detemina:tion in order to be truly human was a great source of vitality for nationalism in that it paved the way to an understanding that the nations toO aspiredtoaritonomy and

33

34

Ay~e Kadloglu

free will (Reiss 1970). The idea of national self-determination empowered the people who constituted the nations. As the notions of nationalism and popular sovereignity converged, nations became the source of sovereignity and the level of popular political participation increased. Thus at the beginning the nation-state and political participation did not contradict each other. National identity, and hence the nation-state, was rather a precondition for political participation. In setting out to write an essay on a particular nationalism, it is appropriate to clarify the actors that advocate that nationali$,m. References to I "German nationalism:' "French nationalism; and "Turkish nationalism" are misleading because they assume the existence of one national project that is embraced by everyone in that country. The concept of the nation does not contain a homogeneous group, so many nationalisms exist in each national context. In the Turkish context, Tanu Bora (1994) paved the way to the possibility of studying Turkish nationalism as a plural notion. His analysis is mainly about the Turkish nationalisms in the 1990S; yet it harbors the tools for mapping the Turkish nationalist projects in other periods (see Bora and also Ozkmmh in this volume). Bora (1994) delineates five currents of nationalism in Turkey in the 1990S: official nationalism (or what he also calls Ataturk nationalism), Kemalist nationalism based on the leftist discourse of the 1960s, liberal nationalism that glorifies Turkish youth and the popular culture, radical Turkist nationalism based on the cultural connections among the Turkish-populated lands of the former Soviet Union, and Islamic nationalism. He refers to official nationalism as the "root-language" of all the other nationalisms in Turkey. In other words, all the other nationalisms can be mapped in reference to the official nationalism. When I refer to Turkish nationalism in this chapter I am referring to the nationalist discourse as it was formulated especially by some Young Turks at the turn of the twentieth century. Here I specifically refer to the ideas of two thinkers, Yusuf Ako Second, it is important to point to the sequence of the emergence of the state and nation in Turkey. Whereas in the German case it is possible to refer to a nation preceding a state (a nation in search ofits state), the historiCal order of things is reversed in the Turkish case. In the instance of mOdern republican Turkey, we can refer to a state preceding a nation (a state in search of its nation) {KadlOglu 199s).The Turkish nation was constructed by means of certain measures that were undertaken by the republican ~lite.jn the words of~erifMardin (1981, p. 196): "Mustafa Kemal took upolla hypothetical entity, the Turkish nation, and breathed life in it." In this: construction, political unity appears as the constitutive unit of the Turkiskhati()n~state. In

Ay~e

Kadloglu

short, the indivisibility of the Turkish state and its nation and the irreversibility of its borders-contrary to the case in Germany-constitute the cornerstone of Turkish national identity.

TURKISH NATIONALISM IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

The fall of the Berlin Wall at the end of 1989 signaled the end of the Cold War. This has gradually led to the irrelevance of the ideological divisions between the Right and the Left in world politics. The 1990S bore witness to the increasing visibility of Islamic and Kurdish identities in Turkey (KadlOglu 1998b). This was accompanied by the increasing visibility of the Turkish military on the domestic political scene. Moreover, in the course of the 19905 the "Western" attributes of the Turkish society were increasingly being questioned by European Union (EU) officials. In fact Turkey's endeavor to join the EU was facing a serious crisis by 1997. The end of the Cold War dynamics generated doubts as to the Western character of the Turkish SOciety. Omer Ta~pmar (2.005, p. 89) describes the changing status of Turkey in the 1990S: Turks were utterly disappOinted with the fact that their countries [sic] Western identity went unchallenged as long as the Soviet threat existed. It became bitterlY,clear that affiliation with the anti-communist alliance in the framework of NATO membership was at the heart of Turkey's perception as part of the West. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, Turkey's identity as a "Western'" nation came to be subject to the much more complex and decisive test of "liberal democracy:' Turkey'S relations with the United States were continuing in favorable terms mainly due to the dynamics generated by the Gulf War. In fact Bill Clinton's administration lobbied in favor of Turkey's candidacy for membership in the EU from 1997 to 1999. By 1999 the direction of the course of events had changed: with the help of the German Social Democrats, Turkey became an official candidate for the EU at the Helsinki summit. From this point onward Turkish governments and specifically the government formed in 2.002. by the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkmma Partisi, AKP) became increasingly interested in the reforms that were preconditions for EU membership. There were significant constitutional amendments in

The Twin Motives of Turkish Nationalism

49

and 2.004 as well as various "packages" containing amendments of other legal codes that were geared toward realizing such reforms. Some of the constitutional and other legal amendments made it possible to teach and broadcast in "forbidden" languages such as Kurdish (Oran 2.004; Ozbudun and Yazlcl 2.004). Other legal amendments pertained to the civilian control of military institutions. All of these amendments pointed to the acceleration of democratization processes in Turkey. In the meantime the United States had experienced the September II, 2001, terrorist attacks in New York City and at the Pentagon. The US. government was getting ready to engage in a war in Iraq. At that historical juncture the Turkish parliament refused to give permission for the utilization of its border with Iraq as the base to launch the attack against Iraq by a historical decision on March 3, 2.003. Thousands marched in a square not far from the parliament, shouting slogans such as "Yankee go home."" This was the beginning of a serious deterioration ofUS.-Turkish relations and increasing public expression of anti-American sentiment by the Turkish people. These sentiments reached a climax at the time of the humiliation of the Turkish Special Forces at the Iraqi border. US. soldiers detained them and covered their faces with hoods on July 4, 2.003. This episode culminated in the 2.006 blockbuster Turkish movie called Kurtlar Vadisi-Irak (Valley of the Wolves-Iraq). Polat, the hero in this movie (the Turkish version of a paramilitary Rambo character), goes to Iraq to humiliate the American soldiers in order to satisfy raging feelings of revenge stemming from the hood episode. By April 2.004 the pictures of torture ofIraqi prisoners by American soldiers at the Abu Ghraib prison were in the world press and media. They generated disgust among the people and escalated the existing levels of antiAmericanism in Turkey. Hence it is not surprising that the fantastic novel Metal Ertma (Metal Storm), which depicted a series of events in northern Iraq leading to a U.S.-Turkish war, became a bestseller in Turkey in 2.004 2.001

(Turna and U~ar 2.004). ...... Westernism had always been a distinguishing feature of the root-language of Turkish nationalism. Anti-imperialist sentiments had traditionally been displayed not by the nationalists, who embraced ideologieS thatvVere on the right side of the political spectrum, but by the socialists in Turkey." The most widely remembered socialist anti-American demonstration wa:s held in 1968,

50

Ay~e

Kadloglu

against the American soldiers who arrived in Turkey on the Sixth Fleet. The slogan "Yankee go home" was popularly used at that time. In 200" after the outbreak of a war in Iraq, the same slogan had apparently returned to Turkey. Yet this time it was on the lips of the nationalists from both the right and left of the political spectrum. This shift signaled a move away from the anti-imperialist stance of the socialists to a brand of nationalism that was harboring not just anti-imperialist but more specifically anti-American and anti-EU sentiments. The years 200, and 2004 signaled the divorce of Turkish nationalism from one of its original and long-lasting motives: advocacy of Westernism. The anti-Americanism of the popular movie character Pol at was beyond the shadow of any doubt. Yet it was also implied in the movie that those who became the archenemies of the United States were created by the U.S. governments themselves in the course of the Cold War dynamics in order to fight the Communists. Polat personified those who waged a dirty and illegal war against the Communists in Turkey. With no Communists left to fight, Polat was ready to take on the United States by making use of the anti-imperialist discourse of the Communists. In sum, anti-Americanism and anti-EU sentiments have become the distinguishing feature of the new nationalist discourse in Turkey after 2003. Preservation of the state still continues to be one of the motives of Turkish nationalism. Yet the state is increaSingly defined in reference to the military and bureaucratic establishment at the expense of the political actors. In fact it is possible to argue that Turkish nationalism has become more militaristic in the course of the past few years. This militarism mainly stems from a criticism directed at the political realm in general and the main political actor, the AKP, in particular. John BreuUly (1992, p. 16) points out the incompatibility between national identity and the parliament in times of crisis: "[I]n times of crisis the national idea-an idea which was almost universally accepted in some form or another-could be turned against government and parliament. The national idea meant national unity whereas parliament meant division." AKP presents itself as the political party that wUl defy the "clash of civilizations" thesis that foresees an inevitable clash between the Western and Islamic civilizations (Huntington 1993). After September 11, 2001, the U.S. government discovered a new reason to ally with Turkey and began to refer

The Twin Motives of Turkish Nationalism

51

to Turkey as a "model" for the Middle East due to its adherence to a "moderate Islam" rather than "radical Islam." Tawmar (WOS, p. 91) expresses this shift in the focus of the interest toward Turkey as follows:

u.s.

In effect, Turkey became important for the foreign policy in the aftermath of September II for the first time, not because of "where it was located;' but because of "what it was." In other words, Turkey's importance was increasing not only in geo-strategic context, but also due to its political and civilized identity. In an environment where the Arab geography appeared as a fundamental problem, Turkey's democratic, secular and Western presence was accepted as a "model" by the neoconservative group. Yet Kemalist laicist groups in Turkey were increasingly skeptical of a government with a Muslim base that was at times described as "moderate Islamist." Since 192..4 Turkish governments have followed quite radical laicist policies and regarded laicism as one of the pillars of the Kemalist regime. Any statement in the opposite direction has generated an unprecedented fury in certain segments of the society that have a view of the AKP as a political party that is weakening the laidst foundation of the Kemalist state. In 2..006 the AKP ended up surrendering to militaristic policies, in an effort to establish a strong state. In November 2..00S a bookshop in the predominantly Kurdish town of ~emdinli was bombed. Two low-ranking gendarmerie officers of the Turkish armed forces were arrested as assailants by the people in the area. The owner of the bookstore was an informant of the Kurdish organization PKK (Partiya Karkaren Kiirdistan: Kurdish Workers Party). The public prosecutor of the dty of Van prepared an indictment that pointed a finger at Ya~ar Biiyiikafllt, who was commander of the Land Forces (and became the chief of the General Staff in July 2..006), for trying to prevent the peaceful resolution of the Kurdish conflict and aggravating the tensions in the region by getting involved in such bombings. In a few months the public prosecutor was not only dismissed from office but also barred from the legal profession by the High Council ofJudges and Prosecutors (Milliyet June 2..2.., 2..006; Kaya 2..009, pp. 104-5). Theminister of justice

52

Ay~e

Kadloglu

went along with this decision. The AKP did not have the determination to protect the prosecutor. By the end of March 2.006 riots broke out in DiyarbakIr during the funerals of PKK militants who were killed by the security forces. Riots spread to other cities such as Batman, Siirt, and Istanbul. In the midst of this increasing violence and death toll, the opposition parties began to blame the AKP for its inability to address the situation and for having a soft posture in the fight against terrorism. At the end of June 2.006 an Anti-Terror Law with draconian measures was passed by the parliament. The law made imprisonment possible for anyone shouting slogans and carrying banners in demonstrations in favor of terror groups. It constituted a major setback in freedom of expression. The law made it possible to imprison minors over the age of fifteen and allowed the security forces to shoot suspects who failed to cooperate (Milliyet, June 30, 2.006). In sum, it reduced Tutkey's Kurdish problem to an issue of terror. By the end of 2007 the PKK had increased its attacks on the Turkish soldiers at the Iraqi border. The loss of hundreds of lives generated great public fury in Turkey. The parliament passed a decision on October 17, 2007, allowing the government to pursue military action against the PKK on the other side of the Turkish border, in northern Iraq. In late February 2.008 Turkish military forces crossed the border into northern Iraq in order to engage in combat with the PKK. As a result of such escalation of conflict at its southeastern border, Turkish nationalism began to be expressed in a more militaristic fashion. In one of the demonstrations against the PKK and in honor of the slain soldiers who became martyrs, for example, people who gathered in a football stadium before a game in Bolu all wore the blue berets of the Special Forces (the commando units) of the Turkish army and recited the military oath. In other such demonstrations women expressed their wish to join the ranks of the military. In 2007 and 2008 the Turkish nationalist language was increasingly motivated by an effort to preserve a more militarist state. By 2008 the relations between Turkish nationalists and Kurdish nationalists had entered a stage that made the characterization "symbiotic antagonisms" all the more relevant. It is quite clear that these developments will strengthen the raison d'etat and the military institutions in Turkey at the expense of political processes. They could also severely damage Turkey-EU

The Twin Motives of Turkish Nationalism

53

relations. While nationalists on both sides rejuvenate their livelihood through their mutual antagonisms, the resulting military clashes between them have already resulted in tens of thousands of deaths and continue to generate the deaths of many others. AKP's "Kurdish opening" policy that was unleashed in the summer of 2009 had the potencial to reverse this militarist-nationalist trend in Turkey. Yet the closure of the main Kurdish political party, the Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi, DTP). by the Constitutional Court in December 2009 Signaled the end of the opening. The negative developments worsened when some of the PKK militants who arrived in Turkey in October 2009 from various camps in Iraq with the expectation of a pardon were arrested in the summer of 2010. Whether political processes can prevail over raison detat in light of these recent developments and against all odds remains to be seen.

NOTES I.

1.

,.

'The text that compiles the ideas of Mustafa Kemal on citizenship was Originally edited and published by Afet inan in 1930 with the title Vatandaj Jfin Medeni Bilgiler (Civic Information for Citizens). She also published an extended version in 1969 (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu). I benefited from a recent edition of this text in highlighting Mustafa Kemal's views on citizenship (Tezcan 1996). I have accounted for these features ofTurkish nationalism in an article in which I compared the formation of national identity and related issues of citizenship in Greece and Turkey. 'The account presented here benefited a lot from that comparative analysis (KadlOglu 2oo9). 'The Committee of Union and Progress was called the Committee of Ottoman Union (lttihad-l Osmani Cemiyeti) at the time of its foundation. In 1895 its name was changed to Committee of Ottoman Union and Progress (Osman" Ittihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti). 'The committee was divided into two after the First Young Turk Conference in 1901. which was convened in Paris. While the liberal wing founded a separate organization espousing individual initiative and decentralization as well as being ruled as a mandate under the ~uthority of Britain. the more centralist wing began to advocate Turkism as opposed to Ottomanism. In the period between 1902 and 1906 the Young Turk activities in Europe lapsed to a certain extent. 'The movement was rejuvenat~d in 1906 with the arrival of new members fleeing from the Ottoman lands. Following the Second Young Turk Conference in 1907, again in Paris. thecentr3.J.isr. Turkist wing began to acquire prominence. The road to the Secon4c;onstitutional

54

4. 5.

6.

7.

AY<je Kadloglu Monarchy was opened through the activities of this wing. The organization reclaimed the name "Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress· after the Second Constitutional Monarchy in 1908. The information regarding the parameters of the conflict between the Liberals and Unionists here is informed to a great extent by Ahmad (1993. pp. 33-51). Although Prince Sabahattin opposed the invitation of Western powers to back the regime at the beginning. he then-most likely-succumbed to British intervention in order to "prevent other haphazard. unwanted interventions" that might be forced upon the Ottoman regime during a crisis moment. Hence he embraced the idea of "intervention by those free and liberal Western powers whose interests match our interests" (Ak§in 1980, p. 40). Ak.'fura's historically significant article raised some criticism at the time of its publication. Criticisms by Ali Kemal and Ahmet Fedt also published in the same newspaper pointed to the dangers of prompting the nationalist feeling among the Turks in the belief that this would have a domino effect on various other nationalisms and would bring the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Yet the disintegration came not from the Turkist political nationalism but as a result of various other nationalisms of both the non-Muslim and Muslim groups within the empire. The emergence of these nationalisms pointed to the inability of the Ottomanist vision to keep the empire intact and hence the inevitability ofits disintegration. See YlldlZ (2.001, p. 72.). Such racial claims had already been rampant in late-nineteenth-century Europe. One of the pioneering works classifying the races was by Count Joseph Arthur de Gobineau (1816-82.), enticledEs-sai sur l'inegalite des races humaines

(18 53-55)' Agaoglu's thought in this sense was in line with extreme Westernist thought currents led by Abdullah Cevdet and Celal Nllri. On Agaoglu's insistence on the adoption of Western civilization and culture as a whole. see Bakxrgezer (1997: 41). 9. This should not give the impression that no movements in the society were expressing demands from below. For an account of a women's independent organization with such demands, see Toprak (1988). This organization was suppressed by the republican elite. 10. I have argued that Turks became citizens prior to becoming individuals (Kadloglu 1998a, 1999). Il. This should not make us blind to the existence of many Significant societal demands from below that were thwarted by state policies. See, for instance. Toprak (1988) and also Zihnioglu (2.003). regarding women's demands from below geared toward founding a women's political party.

8.

The Twin Motives of Turkish Nationalism

55

12. I have used the expression "etatists" instead of "statists" in translating this sentence into English due to the apparent emphaSiS laid on the "economic" interference of the state. 13. In a study surveying the books utilized in citizenship education courses in primary and secondary schools throughout the republican era. Fiisun Uste! (2002. 2.004) underlines the evolution of a militant citizen burdened with duties in Turkey. 14. Interestingly. in 2.004 a report on minority issues in Turkey suggested that the expression "nation" should be deleted from article 3 of the Constitution. which refers to the "Turkish state" as an "indivisible whole with its country and nation" (Oran 2.004). It was also suggested that the phrase "its language is Turkish" be replaced by the expression "its officiallanguage is Turkish" in order to allow for the utilization oflanguages other than Turkish. These suggestions were geared toward making it possible for multicultural identities to coexist in Turkey in an effort to envision a Turkey that does not only belong to Turks. Legal charges were brought against the authors of this study on the basis of "denigrating T urkishness." IS. Such minority rights. insofar as they refer to rights geared toward integration through the maintenance of religious. ethnic. and language differences. are called "multicultural rights." These rights represent "willingness" on the part of governments "not jllst to tolerate but to welcome cultural difference" (Kymlicka and Norman 1995. p. 307). See also KadlOglu (2.007a). 16. I was reminded of the importance of these words in the national anthem by my colleague Ayhan Aletar. who mentioned this in the paper that he presented at the conference on the Ottoman Armenians during the Collapse of the Ottoman Empire held in Istanbul on September 2.4-2.5. 2005. 17. The expressions "French nationalism" and "German nationalism" are used here in reference to the nature of these nationalisms at the time of their emergence. in an effort to emphasize some of their birthmarks. 18. I have elaborated on this point elsewhere. See KadlOglu (200S). 19. For an analysis of how Ziya Gokalp's views on religion differed from the views of the leading republican elite. who were successful in instigating radical policies oflaicism in the 192,OS. see KadlOglu (2.oro). 20. For a review of practices pertaining to Turkification such as those regarding the obligation to speak Turkish in public places (1931). utilization of Turkish family names (1934). the law on settlement of the minorities (1934). and talCes on the property of Muslims. non-Muslims. foreigners. and converts (1942). see Aktar (2.000), Soyartk (2000). and Ylldlz (2.001). 21. I was in the United States before the voting in the Turkish parliament. Most U.S. television news programs assumed that the Turkish parliament would vote

u.s.

2.2..

"yes" and allow the military to use the Turkish border as a base for launching the attack on Iraq. I clearly remember one commentator who was broadcasting live from Tuckey who referred to the Turkish parliament vote as a "mere formality." Hence the "no" vote in the Turkish parliament was a big sur- . prise in the United States. It seems important to underline the differences between anti-Westernism and anti-imperialism and study their interplay in various manifestations of nationalism in Turkey.

4

NATIONALIST DISCOURSES IN TURKEY

TANILBoRA

AT THE END OF THE 19805 TuRKISH NATIONALISM, PARALLEL TO THE

nationalist waves rising throughout the world (especially in the Balkans. Middle East. and Caucasus), gained an accelerated momentum. This era of globalization encouraged and even incited nationalism in various ways. First, especially with the collapse of the bipolar world system of the Cold War, altering frontiers through military conflicts became possible. Second, minorities and human rights issues have evolved as diplomatic matters. Third, transnational processes of economic-and geographical-deregulation have upset the structures of the nation-state. All these factors have affected the ideology of Turkish nationalism in ways that ratified its reactionary patterns. Modem Turkey has a nation-state tradition that bears the marks of a concern for saving and preserving the state. This concern arose in part due to the grave crises threatening the very existence of the Ottoman state of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century_ Subsequently the surrounding countries were perceived as a severe threat. This perception was indeed rectified by the Cold War. Turkish nationalism and Turkish national identity had been substantially influenced by both this concern for saving andl'erpetuating the state and the perception of threat. Furthermore. the challenges th.at globalization brought to the structures of the nation-state are easily perceived in

57

58

Tanll Bora

this context as the modern version of a centuries-old threat to Anatolia!Turkey. This threat is traced back to the Crusades and is regarded as reaching its zenith with the Treaty of Sevres, which temporarily buried the hopes to found a new state that would rise from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. The Kurdish issue no doubt has played the leading role in this perception, which equates the challenges posed by globalization with an ongoing threat to Anatolia. The Kurdish issue, which came to the fore in the mid-1980s with the armed propaganda campaign of the Kurdish Workers Party (Partiya Karkeren Kiirdistan, PKK) and was transformed in the 1990S to a "low density war," increased the fear that had been implanted in Turkish nationalism concerning violation of the very existence of the state. The escalation of this old fear was also related to the social destabilization and disorientation caused by the rapid economic, social, and cultural changes that Turkey underwent as part of the globalization (or, in other words, capitalist modernization) process. This destabilization and disorientation was further deepened with the disintegration of the social state. In this atmosphere. as the Kurdish issue was reduced to a "problem of terror;' the ideological mobilization against the Kurdish issue focused on emphasizing ethnic Turkish identity. Yet after the arrest of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in 1999 a new tendency emerged. Anti-Kurdish resentment became widespread, and signs of polarization started to be observed. Such a tendency developed largely because public opinion, affected by Turkish nationalism, was disillusioned with and reacting against two things. First, the PKK continued to exist despite being defeated militarily and reinitiated armed struggle after 2.003. Second, Kurds continued to demand rights on the basis of their identity. This disillusionment and reaction was nourished by the state. which presumed that the Kurdish issue was in fact "solved" and refrained from taking the steps it would! could take by adapting to the European Union (EU) norms. Under these circumstances, a discourse that defined not only the PKK but also the "Kurds" (taken as a homogeneous subjectivity) as the enemy became prevalent. This banal nationalist discourse, which defines the Kurds as barbarians while criminalizing them not only politically but also socially and ethically, signifies the dangerous replacement of assimilationist optimism with a violent nonassimilationism.

Nationalist Discourses in Turkey

59

Another factor affiicting the Turkish national conscience was that the rise in the perception of a threat as well as the crisis regarding the very survival of the state occurred immediately after an era of self-confidence. Turkey, in fact, entered the 1990S with a boom of self-confidence. During the 19805 the country had accumulated capital with the economic policies of the New Right and became increasingly merged in the flows of global capital: consumption had become modernized and Widespread. All these developments fostered hopes of moving up to the "world's tOP league" (as popular media commentators call it). By the end of the 1980s, when Turkey applied for full membership to the EU, the prevailing feeling was "elevating the country to the level of modern civilization." This feeling had indeed been cherished since the founding of the republic. Finally, it seemed that this elevation had been realized-or at least this was the belief that was shared by the proWestern elites and the urban middle classes. The new economically oriented pan-Turkist perspective, espoused by the newly independent the Central Asian Turkic republics in the aftermath of the Soviet Union's disintegration, reinforced this feeling (Bora and La~iner 1995). The historical and cultural legacy of the Turkic republics, regarded as a hinterland from the point of view of official nationalism, was considered to be an additional guarantee for Turkey as it sought to bond with the West without losing its own authentic identity. Turgut Ozal, the prime minister of the strong liberal-conservative government of the 1980s formed by the Motherland Party (Anavatan Pardsi, ANAP), was also a symbol of this period's wind of optimism and self-confidence. The party and the government put forth a conception of Turkish-Islamic-Western synthesis that was far more forceful than its previous formulations. Ozal had the opportunity to repeat the Turkish right-wing politicians' buzzwords such as "great Turkey" and "powerful Turkey" in a relatively "realistic" conteXt. At the beginning of the 1990S the assertive popularized claim that the "twenty-first century will be the Turkish century" was added to such catchphrases. The Gulf War can be seen as a turning point in the transition from this atmosphere of self-confidence and optimism to one defined by the perception of threat. On the one hand, in Turkey the Gulf War led to national strategy plans aspiring to "development" in terms of influence, prestige, and geography. On the other hand, the war invigorated the existing fears; it was argued

60

Tanll Bora

that the existing threat surrounding Turkey would tighten and that the Western hegemony, both in the region and in the country, would increase. The formation of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq in the aftermath of the Gulf War as well as the new momentum of the Kurdish nationalist movement in Turkey proved the pessimists right and gave the fundamentalist/essentialist factions the opportunity to raise their voices. As Turkey's policies on the Kurdish issue have been restricted to the military solution, its entire democratization program remained under the embargo of these policies. The subsequent pressure it faced on the European platform was used by the radical nationalists to corroborate the argument that Turkey was confronted with a conspiracy. Two other factors also played a part in the erosion of Turkey's national self-confidence and the growing national concern with survival and preservation. One was the gradually increasing awareness that the Turkic republics were not primitive and loyal states that considered Turkey to be their unconditionalleader. Turkey was indeed eqUipped with nothing other than Orientalist prejudices in terms of knowledge about the Caucasus and Central Asia. The second factor was the spiral of economic crises that engulfed Turkey. The country had become entirely dependent on the whims of free-flowing international capital, and in 2.001 it was on the verge of a disaster comparable to the one Argentina had experienced. Despite having entered the decade with the slogan "The twenty-first century will be the Turkish century:' in the mid1990S Turkey eventually came face-to-face with a chronic crisis that has been marked as the gravest depression in the history of the republic. At the beginning of the 2000S, following countrywide impoverishment and the erosion of the urban middle classes, economic stabilization was achieved. A peaceful state of affairs was also established as the neo-liberal/ conservative Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkmma Partisi, AKP) came to rule. But this was a temporary lull. Subsequendy nationalism was again on the rise; the main triggering factor was Turkey's candidacy for EU membership. Following the initiation of Turkey's negotiations for full EU membership in 2002, the anti-Western reactions in nationalist-conservative, Islamist, and Kemalist camps took on a more agitated tone. According to these interpretations, which were shaped through the particular discourses of politicalideological camps (with some of the specific arguments being transferred

Nationalist Discourses in Turkey

61

among them), the EU was using Turkey's will to "join Europe" to force Turkey into making concessions regarding the Cyprus and Kurdish issues. Furthermore, Europe was attempting to bring to life its eternal plan to divide and destabilize Turkey. Those who ruled Turkey supported this neo-imperialist plan either because they were imprudent or because they were traitors. Such arguments brought to life images such as the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, weak "collaborative" governments that hoped for Western aid, and economic and legal capitulations. These comparisons popularized the idea that the country was secretly being invaded. The traumatic effect of the 2.001 economic crisis on the middle classes should indeed be taken into consideration in analyzing the dissemination and appropriation of such a paranoid discourse. The economy's total dependence on global finance flows, and its concurrent fragility, made it possible for the individual career traumas to be reflected to the national level and combined with the collective loss of confidence. Another important element in the appropriation of the above-mentioned anti-Western discourse was the reaction of the bureaucratic elite. The privileged status of this elite would be weakened by the structural reforms that Turkey would undertake for EU membership. In this context the following paradox emerged. The AKP, though instrumentally, supported the politico-legal framework of the ED. The party indeed partly saw this framework as a tool with which the status of the bureaucracy and the army could be weakened. Yet the same AKP whose founders and leaders came from an Islamic tradition that referred to the EU as a "Christian club" was insulted as a EU collaborator by Kemalist-republicans, who have always been situated as pro-Westerners in Turkish political scene. What makes this situation striking is that the traditional anti-imperialist discourse ofKemalist nationalism has been supplemented by ethnocultural cliches and accordingly attained an anti-Western tone. Kurdish female poet and author Bejan Matur (2.007) made an interesting observation regarding the "Republican Rallies" that were organized as a part of this reactionary nationalist atmosphere and took both the AKP and the EU as targets. According to Matur, republican-Kemalist-secular-Westerner groups fell into an abyss as they came close to joining Europe, which they have identified with and yearned after for so long. What nourished this desire and transformed it into a kind oflove relationship was in fact "the inability to be

62

Tanll Bora

united" with Europe (Matur 2007); yet now the circumstances were changing. Moreover, as these groups increasingly felt unable to manifest the necessary authenticity to grant them an identity that would differentiate them iJ;1/ from Europe, they became vulnerable. Meanwhile the AKP followers, coming from an Islamist tradition, were already regarding Europe as an "other" with which they would only come together on pragmatic terms and referred to their relationship as a kind of trade encounter. This view made them free from these complexes of the republican-Kemalist-secular-Westerner groups in their relations to Europe. This interpretation, which has a socio-psychological component, is worth discussing. Before initiating such a discussion, however, it should be noted that within the Kemalist-republican ideological framework (which also determines the national education curriculum) homogenizing judgments and forms regarding the West had existed before. Nationalism in fact is the common ground of nationalist-conservative, Islamist, and Kemalist-republican discourses and manifests itself as the real Turkish fundamentalism. From the 1990S to the beginning of the twenty-first century two dynamics have been at play in the shaping of Turkish nationalism. One is a reactionary nationalist movement that uses the theme of national survival in a dramatized way. This movement not only strengthens the opposing radical nationalist movement but al$O influences the center/right-wing politics and even, increasingly, the center/left wing. Furthermore, it dominates the state elite and above all the army. The second is a pro-Western nationalistic movement (reminiscent of the nationalism of the late 1980s and early 1990S), which believes that the nation's best interest lies in merging with the globalization process. This movement has found its proponents among the rising segments of the new urban middle classes. the globalizing sectors of big capital, and the media elite. In order to analyze the interplay between these two movements. one must consider Turkish nationalism not as a homogeneous discourse but as a series of discourses with a vast lexis. I distinguish four main nationalist languages that use this lexis. The first is the root-language of Turkish nationalism: in other words. the language of the official Kemalist nationalism. Atatiirk nationalism, which focused on the mission to build and perpetuate the nation-state. The second. which can be considered a dialect of this root-language, is the "left-wing" Kemalist nationalism: Kemalist ulUSfuluk.

Nationalist Discourses in Turkey

The third is the language of a pro-Western nationalism advocating "civilization" and prosperity. While being a liberal dialect of the Kemalist rootlanguage. this version grows and develops under the spell of the promises held forth by the era of globalization. The fourth. a deviate dialect of the Kemalist root-language. is the language of the racist-ethnicist Turkish nationalism that derives its elementS from neo-pan-Turkism and from the reaction to the Kurdish nationalist movement. In the event that the currently expanding Islamism merges with a nationalistic discourse. another dialect will be entering this family of languages. In the following pages. I discuss these nationalistic dialects as well as their verbal and visual elements.

THE OFFICIAL NATIONALISM: ATATURK NATIONALISM

The official nationalism of Turkey. Atatiirk nationalism. has been characterized since the founding of the republic by both a French-style conception of nationalism. based on the principle of citizenship and territoriality. and a German-style nationalism. which has ethnicist assumptions. As such it bears the marks of the tension between these two different conceptions of nationalism. Ziya Gokalp's synthesis. based on cultural identity. rested on an extremely delicate balance between a territorial conception of nationalism based on citizenship. which was handed down from Ottoman patriotism. and the conceptions of nationalism that emphasize the nation's uniqueness and eternal existence. The official ideology may well be in line with a kind of nationalism that is based on the territorial notion of citizenship. But in foreign disputes. in "national causes:' and even. for instance. in the domains of popular culture such as international sports competitions an ethnicist, essentialist. aggressive language of nationalism can easily make itself felt. It can be argued that the instinctive. if not conscious. inclination of the advocates of the official ideology has been toward keeping this duality latent and yet keeping it as it is, for this duality and tension help extend their margin of political and ideological maneuvering. Official nationalism, with its ideological ambiguity, thoroughly depends on the existence, power, and manifestations of the nation-state-its symbols and rituals, its pomp and omnipresence. The army, as the crystallized evidence of the existence, power, and manifestations of the nation-state, takes on a central role in the reproduction of the official nationalism. Owing to

Tanll Bora

the requirements of the ideology of vigilance and the automatic system of perceiving threat (which are in fact internalized by all armies) and specifically as a consequence of the state-founding military character of the Tur~­ ish Armed Forces, identified with Mustafa Kemal and his mission, the army considers itself to be the true owner and personified symbol of nationalism. The official nationalism, with its core being the army, focuses specifically on the state itself in addition to the populist attributions of heroism. The definition of "nation" (as stated in a publication by the General Secretariat of the National Security Council) as "one of the constituent elements of the state" as well as the expression "the state's indivisible identity with the country and the nation" (a favorite among official refrains) constitute avowals of the statecentered conception of nationalism.' An important feature of the language of official nationalism is that its ritualism is far too rigid, cold, and stereotyped and its enthusiasm remains artificial. Official nationalism is indeed exhibitionist. It invades political rhetoric with its cliched vocabulary. In public life there is a frenzied consumption of symbols of the nation-state, such as the national anthem, the effigy of Atatiirk. the flag, and the star and crescent. Although this situation is not always directly related to the pressures or incitements of the state, it is at any rate encouraged by the rigid control that the state has over civil society. During the 1994 cri$is the symbols of the nation-state and the phraseology and images of official nationalism were diffused to an even greater extent. The Turkish flag was ubiquitous. During the mid-2.ooos, when nationalism shifted gears. planting "disproportionate" flags (90-100 square meters) became a practice of psychological warfare. This campaign was supplemented by installations such as the painting of a 6oo-square-meter flag (using a ton of paint) on a hill near Ankara. People attached stickers of the Turkish flag to their license plates. Star-and-crescent necklaces and badges became especially popular. Some singers and models decked their costumes with the star and crescent. Pretexts to sing the national anthem multiplied. For instance, the spectators started to stand and sing the national anthem before every football match instead of the usual practice of singing it only at games in which the national team appeared. It could even be heard before pop concerts and at the opening of fashion shows in luxury hotels. Facing the economic crises of 1994 and 2.001, both the government and business circles evinced a heroic nationalist discourse. National-progressivist slogans such as "the economic

Nationalist Discourses in Turkey

War of Independence, " "all for Turkey," "striving for Turkey," and "for Turkey, willingly" were coined. The rise of the "Islamist" movement also compelled the official nationalism to emphasize the image of Atatiirk; the portrait of Atatiirk became a kind of logo and was displayed at every opportunity. Without a doubt, this discourse was and is affected by the racialization and fanaticization of Kemalist ulusfuluk. In fact, these discourses are symbiotically related, and the folloWing analysis focuses on the latter.

KEMALIST ULUSo In this respect, the MHP's leader's words concerning the assassination of Hrant Dink in January 2.007 are illustrative: It is a very bitter incident that one of our citizens of Armenian descent

was murdered. It is unthinkable to approve any murder, let alone the assassination of Hrant Dink. However, it is a great injustice to hold nationalism, Turkish nationalism, responsible for this obnoxious incident. Turkey has had no benefit from Hrant Dink's murder. It is also

188

Simten

Co~ar

unacceptable to tend to question nationalism, to pronounce nationalism guilty on the basis of this incident. We have had no problem with our citizens of Armenian descent. They were [our} loyal subjects in Ottoman period, and during the republican period they have been our brothers in minority status. They are in our trust, in the truSt of the Turkish nation.... it is not right to pronounce nationalists guilty. to commit words and deeds against nationalism in order to sow the seeds of separatism on the basis ofHrant Dink's assassination. (quoted in BHa 2.007; my translation, emphasis added) With a naive approach, the contradiction between integral nationalism and the use of liberal motifs in the MHP's discourse can be read as proof that the party is turning its face toward some version of liberal nationalism. The care that the party rank and file has displayed since the 19905 in teaching new manners to the "advocates of Turkish nationalism" along liberal and democratic lines might reinforce such a contention. Considering the currency of rather fascistic discursive practices at the grassroots level of the party (frequently circulated on various websites and in web groups), however, one might argue that the politicking style of image-making introduced in Turkey in the 1980S and consoli,dated afterward has also penetrated the MHP.In any case, while Muslimhood as the essential feature of Turkishness is retained, the party in essence continues to be an integral nationalist one, with a considerable dose of ethnic nationalism. The BBP's version of the synthesis, in contrast, is based on the dominance of the "three Crescents" (representing Islam) over the "Gray Wolf" (representing Turkism). The party has gone from total denial of the synthesis-on the grounds that Muslimhood and Turkishness do not represent contradictory states of being-to coming to terms with the syntheSiS along culturalist lines." In other words, while Islam is the reference point for the worldwide cause that the BBP claims to advocate, it considers Turkish nationalism to be an organic necessity. While the denial of the term "syntheSiS" is maintained in the political sphere, however, it is recognized in the cultural sphere: In explicating the worldview, the perspective oflooking at life, it would be accurate to refer to the term "Turkish-Islamic ideal" or "the Islamic

Turkish Nationalism and Sunni Islam

189

ideal of the Turk." But we have to refer to the term "Turkish-Islamic synthesis" in portraying Selimiye Mosque because synthesis does not necessarily mean the outcome of thesis and antithesis .... We cannot observe the idea of spreading the word of God throughout the world and the idea of the order of the world [Sharia] in pre-Islamic Arabic societies.... [But] the reason behind such a resonance between the idea of the order of the world. for spreading the word of God throughout the world. and the essential features in the constitution of the Turk is that Turks had already had such a character.... This means that "TurkishIslamic synthesis" and "Turkish-Islamic ideal" are not identical. "Turkish-Islamic ideal" should be used for the ultimate political goal, and "Turkish-Islamic synthesis" for our cultural products. (S. Ahmed Arvasi, quoted in Bora and Can 1991, pp. 266-67; my translation) The argument on the organic necessity ofTurkish nationalism hints at the conceptualization of Turkishness and Muslimhood as unavoidable and indispensable identities for the Turks. Notwithstanding the tautology apparent in this understanding, this duality is interpreted as states of being that cannot be chosen. But they are presented as given, fixed foundations for cultural and political preferences. Thus the emphasis is on the historical necessity of a direct correspondence between the given Turkish-Islamic synthesis as a cultural fact and the Turk's political preference: Turkish-Islamic Idealism. In the shaping of this ideal, the significance of being Turkish is founded on the ontological characteristics of the Turks. Turks are defined with reference to courage, bellicosity for righteous reasons, decency/good morals, and the spirit of ruling:' In this framework the connection between Muslimhood and Turkishness is read as a historical moment in the becoming of Turkishness. Islam is also perceived as another ontological attribute of being Turk: The Turk, in his voyage to Islam with all his being and ardor. had experienced the elation of reuniting with the religion for which he had been yearning. Islam, which states that "there is no deity but God:' which feeds "the spirit of heroism" with its "command for jihad;' and which states that the ink from the pens of the learned is much holier than the martyr's blood. did not suffice for the revelation of the Turk's spirit, but it made the Turk regain the Turk. (Arvasi n.d., p. 267; my translation)

190

Simten

Co~ar

Thus it can be argued that the Islamic cause that the BBP adopts and defines as its raison d'crre works through the essentiaHzation of Turkishness over and above other Muslims. In this framework Turks are portrayed as the "chosen people" of the Islamic world and are privileged over the other nonMuslim peoples within a discourse of brotherhood (Smith 2003). The nuance-and not the essential difference-between the BBP's Turkish-Islamic Idealism and the MHP's Turkish-Islamic synthesis is clarified in this instance. Though both political parties claim to be seeking to institute the supremacy of the Turkish-Islamic civilization worldwide, the MHP stands more on statist grounds, whereas the BBP runs counter to the established statist priorities by claiming to pursue an international Islamic cause. The BBP overtly opposes the established understanding and practice oflaicism in symbolic cases such as the headscarf issue and the imam Hatip high schools. On the one hand, it refers to Islam as an essential feature of the Turkish nation; on the other, it brings up freedom of conscience. At a glance, it is possible to observe an emphasis on individual rights and liberties, especially in matters concerning religion, and to read this emphasis in line with the MHP's use of liberal motifs. A deeper look at the party's discourse, however, reveals not a contradiction in terms, as is the case with the MHP, but that the emphasis on freedom of conscience is embodied in the argument against the unrepresentativeness of the state. The terms "democracy" and "civil society" frequently used in the party's discourse are employed in a similar fashion. Starting with its foundation program in 1993, the BBP has continuously pointed to the distance between the state and the nation in Turkey and called for state-nation unification in the name of democracy: "In a country that is exclusively composed of Muslim people, it is a requisite of democracy that the state resemble its people, that it represent the beliefs of its people" (BBP Program 1993, p. 9; my translation),'l The same emphasis on unification can also be observed in the BBP's emphasis on "civilian politics." The call for civilian politics is symbolized in the party's "Program for a Civilian Initiative" (BBP Program 1993, p. 8). Forming the grounds on which the party delineates its distinction from other political parties in general and from the MHP in particular, the emphasis on civilian politics is revealed in its call for the mobilization of the people into politicS without exception. This would render the "state not the sovereign of but in service to its people" (BBP Program 1993. pp. 8, II). In this respect, the BBP's

Turkish Nationalism and Sunni Islam

191

nationalism is characterized by populist calls, and politics is considered to be the means for attaining a moral cause. It is viewed "as a necessary means for commanding the good and banning the evil. It can never be an aim in itself" (BBP Program 1993, p. 9; my translation). This call is combined with a zealous program organized to "contain all aspects, all instances of the social Hfe," indicating that the call is for hyperpoliticization of the (Muslim-Turkish) people in order to take hold of the state. The identification of the people with Muslimhood and Turkishness and of politics with a moral cause suffices to show the exclusionary preferences of the party regarding the non-Muslim citizens as well as the Kurdish issue. In this respect, it is more similar to than divergent from the MHP's approach. The similarity is again best manifested in the BBP leader's comments on the assassination of Hrant Dink. While ensuring the dominance of Muslim Turks in Turkey, the leader claims the Armenians as his citizens and criticizes the assassination on the grounds that it "did no good for Turkey and Turkish nationalists. A conscious Turkish youth does not commit a deed that has no utility for his country" (YaZlclOglu 2007b; my translation). Likewise, the assassination is considered to be a conspiracy by foreign powers in an attempt to annihilate the unity of the Turkish nation. When read within the context of the party's understanding of the people. the state, and politics, this mode of interpretation essentially connotes the denial of non-Muslims in a Turkish society and ends up in exclusionary nationalism. The same conspiratorial and exclusionary stance is also displayed in the BBP's reading of the Kurdish issue.'4 Like the MHP, the party denies the existence of a Kurdish issue and considers the problem to be terrorism. In this reading, the party employs Muslimhood as a bond of brotherhood between the Turks and the Kurds. Turkishness is stated to be the essential national identity for the Kurds. In other words, as in the MHP's discourse, Kurdishness is not accepted as a referential identity at the political level. For the BBP, the recognition of the Kurdish issue as a political problem means separatism. Thus the party perceives the calls for the recognition of cultural rights as a basis for the solution of the Kurdish issue as instances of "treason." It can be argued that the MHP and the BBP represent two sides of the integral nationalist coin. On one side, the MHP seeks a balance between appealing to the sentiments of its traditional advocates and coping with the necessities of the current stage of globalization. In doing so, it holds fast to

192

Simten

Co~ar

the statist credo of the Turkish~Islamic synthesis. On the other side. the BBP stands for a populist reading of power, which finds its essence in Islam and offers a totalizing understanding of politics based on the Turkish-Islamic Ideal. Both discourses find their corresponding activists and advocates at the societal level, who resonate with each other in terms of the hostility and violence in their discourses!S There are nuances rather than divergences between the two political parties, ending up with integral nationalism on the part of the MHP and Turkish~Islamist fascism on the part of the BBP. This indicates the transitivity among different modes of nationalism documented by Hayes (1931).

CONCLUSION: NATIONALISM AS THE HEGEMONIC DISCOURSE/NATIONALISM AS A BELIEF SYSTEM

In his historical outline of the evolution of modern nationalist discourse in Europe, Hayes (1931) traces the historical dynamics that gave rise to "humanitarian nationalism" and ran through "Jacobin nationalism," "traditional nationalism," and "liberal nationalism," culminating in "integral nationalism" of the twentieth century. Certainly he does not arrive at a point where these different versions of nationalism mean one and the same thing. Likewise, he does not propose universality in the unfolding of these versions. What is im~ portant is that he emphasizes the decisiveness of historical and societal dynamics in the transition from one to the other. In this chapter I have outlined the wide~ranging and elastic contours of Turkish nationalism and the articulation of Muslimhood with Turkishness in the framework of the AKP, the BBP, and the MHP discourses. In the same vein as Hayes's account of nationalism in Europe, Turkish nationalism is not static in nature. Neither is the Turkish-Islamic synthesis. as a mode of a national identity, based on MuslimTurkishness. An analysis of the discourses of these political parties reveals the potential for transitivity among different versions of nationalism in the Turkish context. It is possible to argue that what Smith (2.003, pp. 31ff.) calls the "beliefsystem of 'nationalism in general'" can be observed in the discourses of all three political parties. Smith (2.003, pp. 31ff.) points to the transformation of this-worldly nationalism into a sacred discourse on "community, territory, history, and destiny." Within the scope of this chapter, however, Smith's

Turkish Nationalism and Sunni Islam

193

analysis should be accompanied by Calhoun's argument on nationalism as providing the world of meaning for the discursive reproduction of the nation and nation-state. In this respect. all three parties' discourses evince the indispensability of Muslim hood for Turkishness and the Turkish nation-state. To sum up. the AKP, the BBP. and the MHP offer modal examples of different. at times converging, versions of this discursive formation at the "official" party level (Smith 2.003, p. 2.8). All three political parties resort not only to sentimental motifs but also to the "sacredness" of Turkish community, Turkish territory. Turkish history. and Turkish destiny, overtly or covertly. Likewise, they also converge in their appeals to Muslimhood as an ingredient of Turkishness. These political parties differ, however, in terms of their points of emphasis within the frame of the "belief-system of 'nationalism in general'" as well as in terms of the way they design the "sacredness" of the Turkish nation. Briefly, the AKP takes for granted that Muslimhood is a historical fact of the Turkish people and refers to the greatness of the Turks as an organic feature. In so doing, the party gives its nationalist discourse a liberal tone, by attributing liberal motifs to the "Turkish character." Thus the party's liberal outlook not only derives from its foreign policy preferences but also proves to be functional in its appeal to the nation. For the time being. the AKP's attempt at a synthesis between the sacralization and liberalization of the nationalist discourse can be seen as a manifestation of banal nationalism (Billig 1997 [I99S]). The MHP. in contrast, with its faith in Turkishness as the prior basis for the identity of the people and in Muslimhood as a historically integral part of this identity, presents an integral nationalist portrait. Finally, by referring to the nation as a "moral community of the faithful" and to the Turks as the "chosen people" of the Islamic cause, the BBP represents the pristine version of integral nationalism, seeming to identify the party with fascism (Smith 2003, p. 32.). The intricate relationship among these different forms of nationalism and hence the potential for transitivity might in this instance be observed in the seemingly confusing configuration of morality and faith in the discourses of the three political parties. While the AKP and the MHP institute the sacred dimension in Turkishness and take Muslimhood as the moral dimension, the BBP merges the morality and sacredness within Turkish-Islamic Idealism.

194

Simten

Co~ar

NOTES

1.

It should be noted that attempts to carve out a Turkish nationalism that totally excludes Islam as an ingredient of national identity were especially visible in the foundation years of the Turkish Republic (192.3-45). In this respect, various versions of Turkish nationalism were proposed, ranging from formulas totally denying Islam to ethnic-based nationalism and territorial nationalism. The final choice was the version that considered Sunni Islam to be a component of Turkish identity, whereby Islam is taken as a passive component and/or is domesticated into the national identity. For a succinct account of the different facets of Turkish nationalism in the period, see YIldlz (2.001). 2.. In this study, I do not discuss the "inaccuracy" of the term "Turkish-Islamic synthesis;' which has been argued both by secularist academics and intellectuals on epistemological grounds and by the "Turkish-Islamic Idealists," now represented by the BBP. 3. This is not to say that Islam-especially its Sunni version-was left out of the official nationalist formula. Rather, until the 1980s. it had been considered a rather paSSive-though Significant-component of Turkish cultural identity. What marks the post-I980 period is that the incorporation ofIslam into Turkish nationalism has been political in character: not only as one of the ritual objects of nationalism but as a dominant ingredient in the shaping of the political discourse of nationalism. 4. For the role of the National Education System in this process, see Kaplan (2.005). 5. Bora (1999) points to a new version of"Protestantization ofIslam" in this specific configuration. 6. During its opposition days the AKP raised criticism of the governing ANAPMHP-Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party. DSP) coalition government's economic policies on the basis of the "unsuccessful management of economy" and total surrender to IMF policies (among others, see Gedikli 2.002.), 7. Ziya Oni~ (2.007, p. 2.54) points to the same decision as marking the beginning of a "new episode" in the AKP's approach to the EU. 8. Robins (2.007, p. 2.95) states that the number of opposing AKP members was around ninety. Despite this initial "no vote; a second parliamentary note was accepted on March 2.0, 2.003. reforging an aUiance with the United States in the Iraq War ( p. 16) Smith does not see the modern nation existing throughout history, yet he believes that the major ingredients that paved the way to modern nationalisms were present in history. In other words, perhaps the whole essence of the

202

Hakan Ozoglu

nation was not present, but essential traits existed. Thus the task of nationalists is nothing but to assemble these fragmentary essences into modern nations. It is this position that emphasizes the elements existing in history and hence the link with the past that Ernest Gellner rejects. . In his response to his student Smith, Ernest Gellner clarified the disagreement: [T]he dividing line between what I now call primordialists and modernists, where one side says that nations were there all the time or some of them were anyway, and that the past matters a great deal; and where the modernists like myself believe that the world was created round about the end of the eighteenth century, and nothing before that makes the slightest difference to the issues we face. (Gellner 1996, p. 366) At this point, Gellner posed a significant question about whether nations were created at some point or rather evolved into what they are today. To elaborate on his position, he introduced a powerful analogy and asked: did Adam have a navel? The case in point is that Adam did not need a navel. "It's perfectly possible to imagine a navel-less Adam;' he suggested, "because navels, once they were engendered by the original process by which they were engendered, perform no further function. I mean you could live navel-less and there is no problem" (Gellner 1996, p. 367). Other parts of Adam, however, such as his blood circulation or his food consumption or his breathing, had to be created as if they existed before, so that he could survive. Here Gellner hinted with his analogy that the existence of certain developed organic systems does not prove that Adam was not created at a certain time. For Adam to survive, they had to be created in "a misleading way" that may project the idea that they evolved to that stage. Using the Adam analogy on nations to demonstrate the irrelevance of the past, Gellner stated: [O]n the whole the ethnic, the cultural national community, which is such an important part of Anthony's case, is rather like the navel. Some nations have it and some don't and in any case it is inessential. What in a way Anthony is saying is that he is anti-creationist and we have this

Does Kurdish Nationalism Have a Navel?

203

plethora of navels and they are essential, as he said, and this I think is the crux of the issue between him and me. (Gellner 1996, p. 367)

In other words, Gellner trivialized Smith's term ethnie by comparing it to the navel, whose existence is not vital for the creation of a nation. In this chapter I am more concerned with Gellner's contention that some nations have navels and some do not and in any case having a navel (read as the link with the past) is inessential. This intellectual position raises more specific questions. Does Kurdish nationalism have a navel? Is it essential for Kurdish nationalism to have a navel? As I have argued elsewhere, my reading of Kurdish nationalism fits better with the modernist school, for I suggest that Kurdish nationalism was created at the end of World War I (Ozoglu 2004; see particularly chapter 4). At that stage it did not need a navel, for its relation with the past was "unnatural:' as I explain below. A significant distinction must be made here to clarify my position. I claim that Kurdish identity and Kurdish nationalism are like two adopted brothers. They are related in the context of their adopted family, but they do not necessarily have a biological bond with each other. In other words, Kurdish identity and nationalism do not share the same genealogy. In this context, we can state with a degree of confidence that Kurdish nationalism did not have a navel but Kurdish identity or Kurdishness did indeed have one (see the discussion below). Kurdish identity has evolved in time into what it is today. So the link with the distant past in determining group identity exists. This link is not predetermined, however; on the contrary, its development to a certain direction is accidental, affected by external forces in the course of history. Kurdish nationalism, in contrast, was created at a certain point in history that coincides with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. It was created based on the political realities ofits time and on a blurry snapshot of Kurdish identity at that moment. As noted above, it did not have a navel. At the present, however, the political realities of the world make it almost mandatory that children of Kurdish nationalism imagine such a navel, without which Kurdish nationalism is conceived as illegitimate. Let me repeat lest my point be misunderstood. My attempt to demonstrate the createdness of Kurdish nationalism does not mean labeling Kurdish nationalism as illegitimate. I think of all nationalisms as navel-less.

204

Hakan 6zoglu THE GENEALOGY OF KURDISH IDENTITY

As noted above, a common mistake among those who emphasize the link between nationalism and the past is the confusion prevalent in distinguishing collective identity from nationalism .. Anthony Smith's ethnie, which emphasizes the role of the past, would fit better in the concept of group identity than nationalism. Critics may argue that the link with the past is a valid one because nationalism bases itself upon group identity. But I submit that nationalists most often ignore such an evolution or mutation, fearing that accepting this would potentially harm its legitimacy. Instead they attempt to "imagine" a group with a unique essence that persists throughout the ages. Nationalists often take an intentionally blurry snapshot of a group at a certain moment and claim the existence of this unique group and their struggle for self-determination persisting throughout history. What evolves in fact is not nationalism but group identity. At this point let me try to demonstrate the evolution of Kurdish identity. My assumption in this chapter is that Kurdish identity is not rigid and has gone through several overlapping stages of evolution.' These stages are dialectical, dialogical, and monological in nature. I further suggest that in all these stages the overarching assumption is that Kurdish identity evolves in relation to an exterior force. Elsewhere I have examined the interrelation between Kurdish identity and surrounding strong states and Islam (6zoglu 2.004 and 2.006). In what follows, I summarize my points regarding the Kurdish identity formation. The dialectical interaction is a process in which local identities clash with outside forces and the synthesis is a step forward in the evolution of Kurdish identity. The interaction between Kurdish identity and the Ottoman Empire is a case in point. This Hegelian view can readily be demonstrated in the nineteenth- and twentieth-century Kurdish/Ottoman (later Turkish) interactions. Substantial evidence suggests that as the clashes took place between the Kurds and the state, Kurdish identity reached a new level to accommodate larger groups, such as non-Muslim Kurdish speakers and groups such as the Zazas in Central Anatolia and the Lurs of Iran. This form of evolution, however, cannot be extrapolated to earlier periods. For example, we can speak of a voluntary interaction between the Kurdish identity and external forces. This state is called the dialogical interaction and can be defined more as a communication than as a clash. In some cases

Does Kurdish Nationalism Have a Navel?

205

the difference between the dialogical and dialectical interaction is a matter of perception. Ottoman/Kurdish relations until the mid-nineteenth century, when the empire introduced more centralization policies, can be regarded as an example. During this time Kurdish principalities were mainly autonomous, and Kurdish identity was influenced by the empire's general perception of its Muslim subjects. As the members of the Muslim ruling elite, Kurdish leaders emphasized their religious identity that united them with the state based upon their linguistic background. It must be evident to the reader that I have avoided employing the term "ethnic" and preferred "linguistic." The main reason for this is that ethnicity was not a common denominator for the groups at the time. Even though today we retrospectively label human groups based on ethnicity, another highly elusive term, sufficient evidence demonstrates that prior to the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries ethnicity was not a group identity around which the members gathered in the Ottoman Empire.

In the formation and evolution of the group identity, another level exists that has been mostly ignored for a variety of reasons. I call this the monological process. When compared to the dialectical and dialogical, this process is very distinct. In this stage, external forces-the Ottoman Empire or Islam in the Kurdish case-impose a certain identity on the group, with minimal interaction. The term "Kurd" as a distinct group was introduced and defined, however imperfectly, by outsiders in earlier texts, which indicates the validity of this claim. Many scholars have argued that attempts to connect the present-day Kurds to ancient people of Mesopotamia (such as Medes or Kardu) lack substance and credibility. I have suggested that an examination of Kurdish identity should begin with historical records that speak of a group of people as the Kurds. We are not certain as to who introduced the term "Kurd" as a group identity. We know, however, that the earliest available record by a Kurd that talks about Kurds as a cohesive group comes from the sixteenth century. This book, titled $erefnamc) was written by the Kurdish tribal leader ~erefhan (1990) and clearly shows a perception of Kurds as a distinct group. Although ~erefhan's understanding of "Kurd" does not entirely match what the term means today, it still is an invaluable source for the students of Kurdish identity and nationalism. It tells us what the term "Kurd" as a group identity meant to him. We can trace the evolution of a perception from this point onward.

206

Hakan Ozoglu

The reader must be wamed that the term "Kurd" was in circulation centuries before ~erefhan. The earliest reliable source referring to a group of people as the Kurds comes with the Arab invasion of the area in the seventh century. Arab travelers and geographers made use of the term as a group identity without any dear definition. In other words. the term "Kurd" was in circulation as a group identity 900 years prior to ~erefhan. But we have no evidence prior to the sixteenth century that Kurds saw themselves as a distinct group above the tribal level. This lack of evidence allows me to suggest that a group identity was first imagined and then imposed on them by outsiders. Kurds were imagined by outsiders as a distinct and cohesive social (not necessarily political) unit. I therefore suggest that at this earlier stage Kurdish identity stemmed from the monological process in which outsiders imposed their perception on the local groups. In time. this perception was adopted by those who were labeled as such. In the long journey of Kurdish identity formation, dialectical. dialogical, and monological stages most often overlapped. The perception of who the Kurds were was constantly altered, modified. and mutated. Still, no matter how different the Kurdish identity today may be compared to that of the seventh. sixteenth, or eighteenth centuries, they are interconnected and the link with the past does exist. Can we say the same thing for Kurdish nationalism?

THE GENEALOGY OF KURDISH NATIONALISM

One of the greatest challenges to tracing the genealogy of Kurdish nationalism is the lack of a universal definition for the concept of nationalism. The term no doubt provokes different meanings in different people's minds. Nationalism, like most social terms, is very problematic. To date, no consensus exists among scholars as to what constitutes a nation and what defines nationalism. Hence serious scholars-although amazed at the effects of nationalism on the human imagination-are challenged by the ambiguous nature

ofit. It should be noted that variable definitions of the term are also among the greatest assets of nationalism. This inadvertent flexibility provides nationalism with ideological compatibility. The term's variant meanings make nationalism seem compatible even with contradictory ideologies such as socialism, religion, secessionism, imperialism, anticolonialism, and fascism. Such a high

Does Kurdish Nationalism Have a Navel?

207

degree of adaptability. unfortunately. does not allow a universal definition that both provides a scholarly ground for comparison and at the same time complies with indigenous variations. The definition of Kurdish nationalism is not immune to the confusion stemming from the vague nature of the term "nationalism." Like other nationalisms, Kurdish nationalism is extremely difficult to define because it registers different meanings in people's minds. As hard as it is to offer a satisfactory definition of Kurdish nationalism. however, I am obliged at least to offer the following working definition. "Kurdish nationalism" refers to an intellectual and political movement that is based mainly (though not entirely) upon two premises-the belief in a consistent Kurdish identity, which is rooted in ancient history; and the conviction of an unalienable right of self-determination in a historic Kurdish homeland or territory. It is important to repeat that this study recognizes Kurdish nationalism as a political movement, not as a claim by an individual for self-determination in a territory. This definition excludes historical evidence indicating the existence of Kurdish consciousness as a proof for nationalism. Let us look at some historical documents by the Kurds that can readUy be confused with nationalism.

THE NATIONALIST DIMENSION OF AHMED-I HANI IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

The first example of such literature is the well-known epic Mem-u Zin, written by Ahmed-i Hani (Ehmede Xani, b. 1651), a Kurdish man of religion and poet. In his work, Ahmed-i Hani demonstrates a clear group consciousness when he distinguishes the Kurds from Arabs, Turks, and Iranians. In a section titled "Derde Me" (Our Ills) in Mem-u Zin, which was completed in

1695, he writes: If only there were harmony among us, If we were to obey a single one of us, He would reduce to vassalage Turks, Arabs and Persians. all of them. We would perfect our religion, our state, and would educate ourselves in learning and wisdom. (van Bruinessen 1992., p. 2.67)

208

Hakan bzoglu Look, from the Arabs to the Georgians, The Kurds have become like towers. The Turks and Persians are surrounded by them. The Kurds are on all four corners. Both sides have made the Kurdish people Targets for the arrows of fate. They are said to be keys to the borders, Each tribe forming a formidable bulwark. Whenever the Ottoman Sea [Ottomans] and Tajik Sea (Persians] Flow out and agitate, The Kurds get soaked in blood, Separating them [the Turks and Persians] like an isthmus. (Hassanpour 1992., p. S3)

Inspired by the epic Meme Alan, transmitted orally in the region, Ahmed-i Hani's epic is in the form of a love story between Mem and Zin, with the exception of the section mentioned above. By virtue of this section and being written in the Kurmanci dialect of Kurdish, Ahmed-i Hani's Mem-u Zin is regarded as the "national epic of the Kurds" by present-day Kurdish nationalists. This section does treat the Kurds as a tribal confederation and, more importantly, seeks self-rule for them. The section "Our Wills" contains many references to the Kurds. Ahmed-i Hani seems to use "Kurd" and "al-Akrad" (its Arabic plural) interchangeably with "KUI:manci:' a sublinguistic group in Kurdish society. This clearly testifies that he regarded the Kurmanci speakers as Kurds; yet it is not very clear whether he regarded other groups such as the Zazas, Lurs, or Kelhurs as Kurds. Unlike the $erefoame, Mem-u Zin does not mention any of the other subgroups or categorize them as Kurds. Nor does Ahmed-i Hani explicitly define "Kurdistan:' His account rather implicitly describes it as a region lying in the middle of Persian (Ajam), Ottoman (Rum), Arab, and Georgian (Giircii) lands (Ahrned-i Hani 1975, p. S6). Did the word "Kurd" mean only the Kurmanci speakers for Ahmed-i Hani, living among the above-mentioned groups? This was indisputably not the understanding of the Kurds in the twentieth century, which was inclusive. But no available information indicates that Ahmed-i Hani's definitjon incorporated other linguistic groups within the umbrella of the Kurds. Hence his perception of the

Does Kurdish Nationalism Have a Navel?

209

Kurdish society may not have coincided with that of the twentieth-century writers. The quantity of surviving copies makes it clear that Mem-u Zin was read widely in Kurdistan in later times and that manuscripts were copied by local religious leaders (imams and mullahs ofKurmanci origin) and by Sufi tariqas (van Bruinessen 1992, p. 267). We simply have no information, however, on how many people read Ahmed-i Hani's version of the epic and what messages they received from it. Mem-u Zin was written in verse, which made it easier to memorize, and was undoubtedly a very popular story. But it is unclear whether Mem-u Zin's continuing popularity stems from its love story or from its protest against Persian and Ottoman misrule. What is indisputable is that in the twentieth century the epic took pride of place in Kurdish literature as the first manifestation of Kurdish nationalism. Nonetheless, it is misleading to label Mem-u Zin as nationalist literature. For one thing, it is highly unlikely that Ahmed-i Hani sought a nation-state for the Kurds as we recognize them today. His complaints about the Safavid or Ottoman rule and his desire for a Kurdish (Kurmanci) king do not necessarily prove that Kurdish nationalism as a political movement existed in the seventeenth century. Our knowledge is too incomplete to make such a claim by merely interpreting Ahmed-i Hani's resentment of the Ottoman and Persian rule. In fact, only after the penetration of the Western concept of nationalism into the Kurdish community early in the twentieth century did Mem-u Zin become a monument of nationalist literature for the Kurds and mobilize them politically. In the seventeenth century Ahmed-i Hani possibly concerned himself only with the Kurmanci speakers; hence his perception of the Kurds consisted mainly of the tribal Kurmancis. Consequently, it is not the epic but the political and the intellectual environment of the twentieth century that retrospectively qualified this piece ofliterature as nationalist. Therefore it is safe to state that the genealogy of Kurdish nationalism does not go as far back as the seventeenth century.

BEDIRHAN PASHA AND HIS REVOLT OF 1847

Another Significant character in the discussions on the origin of Kurdish nationalism is Bedirhan Pasha (1802/3-1869170), who became the ruler of Botan in 1835 and controlled this strong emirate in the first half of the

210

Hakan Ozoglu

nineteenth century. His revolt of 1847 is considered nationalist by many Kurds. A loyal subject until 1842., Bedirhan seemed very agitated by the new Ottoman administrative policies in the following five years and revolted against the Ottoman state in the summer of 1847.4 Provoked by the centralization policies of the empire in the Tanzimat period, this revolt caused so much chaos in the region that when it was suppressed on July 2.9, 1847, a new medal (the Medal of Kurdistan) was issued to those who had fought against Bedirhan. As noted above, the significance of Bedirhan and his revolt comes from later Kurdish claims that it was a nationalist uprising. But Nazmi Sevgen, in a study on the Bedirhan family, has uncovered several Ottoman documents to demonstrate that this revolt was not nationalistic. The Ottoman archives indicate that Bedirhan's revolt did not stem from nationalism in any real sense of the term but from a new administrative system enforced by the Ottoman central government aimed at dividing Bedirhan's land and weakening his authority. According to the new system, Botan (the emirate's core territory) remained in the Diyarbaktr province, while Cizre (a subdistrict) was attached to Mosul. whose governor, Mehmet Pasha, was at odds with Bedirhan. A letter dated December 10, 1842., from the governor of Diyarbaktr, Vecihi Pasha. to Bedirhan demonstrates this arrangement: We have heard that there exists disharmony and quarrelsomeness between you and the governor of Mosul, Mehmet Pasha, stemming from the attachment of Cizre district to Mosul, and that you are full of anxiety [vesvese] ..•• As long as you serve and stay loyal to the Ottoman state, Mehmet Pasha cannot do you harm. The matter was referred to Istanbul and to the governor of Mosul, Mehmet Pasha. Hence you should be free from such anxiety. (Sevgen 1982, pp. 72-73)5 As this document indicates. Bedirhan was agitated at the attempt to divide his emirate administratively. Similar letters in the Ottoman archives conclusively demonstrate that Bedirhan revolted to keep his emirate administratively intact. His revolt does not have any expressed nationalistic aim. Therefore it should not be referred to as the origin of Kurdish nationalism.

Does Kurdish Nationalism Have a Navel?

211

Prior to 1847 Bedirhan was loyal to the Ottomans and helped local governors to govern the Kurdish land. This made him a well-known and respected figure in the Ottoman provincial administrative structure. Thus it should not be very surprising that even after his revolt was suppressed Bedirhan was not condemned to death but placed on the Ottoman payroll. Immediately after the revolt, Bedirhan was sent to Istanbul, where he arrived on September 12, 1847, and died in Damascus, Syria, in 1869-70.

THE SAYYID UBEYDULLAH REVOLT OF 1880-81

The Sayyid Ubcydullah revolt is another event that has been regarded as the first Kurdish nationalist movement. Therefore we need to examine the nationalistic dimensions of this revolt. Ubeydullah was a member of the ~emdinan family, which proved to be one of the most influential and politically active Kurdish families in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Although it only became visible to the European powers in the second half of the 1880s, this family had enjoyed high prestige (particularly in the Hakkari region) due to its religious genealogy prior to the nineteenth century. Its silsita (spiritual genealogy) is that of the Khalidiyya branch of the Naqshbandi tariqa, and the family traces its origin back to Abd aI-Qadir Gilani, a twelfth-century Baghdadi mystic and the founder of the Qadiri order. The ancestry of the ~emdinans extends to the Prophet himself through his daughter Fatima. With such a pedigree, the ~emdinans were spiritual leaders oflocal communities and advisors of Kurdish emirs, which apparently generated the necessary income to be a great land-owning family. The ~emdinans emerged as political and military leaders of the Kurds in the second half of the nineteenth century and controlled a vast region in southeast Anatolia and northwest Iran. The rise of the ~emdinan family headed by Sayyid Ubeydullah in the 1870S and 1880s marks an important era in which political power changed hands from tribal leaders to the Naqshbandi ~emdinan family. Until this time, the Sufi sheikhs generally had functioned under tribal leaders as spiritual advisors. Although Naqshbandi sheikhs had personal charisma and enjoyed intertribal influence, the political history of the region confirms that in addition to their religious duties they became political or military leaders with the rise of the ~emdinan family. Ubeydullah seems to be one of the first examples of such leadership.

212

Hakan

Ozoglu

Several reasons seem to explain the rise of Ubeydullah. The most important is the power vacuum created by the destruction of Kurdish tribal leadership in the nineteenth century. Desperate for income to compete with the European powers. Sultan Mahmut II (1808-39) initiated a centralizing policy to collect taxes directly from the areas controlled by local rulers. The Kurdish leadership in Kurdistan consisted mainly of tribal chiefs who ruled over vast areas while paying only lip service to Istanbul. The most notable of these tribal confederacies in the Ottoman Empire were the Botan. Baban, and Hakkari. who competed with one another. After a series of military expeditions. the Ottoman state dismantled the authority of these powerful tribes in the first half of the nineteenth century. As mentioned above, the Bedirhan family was removed from power in the last semi-independent emirate, Botan. in 1847. From this time until the outbreak of the Turco-Russian war of 1877-78, there is no record of a powerful Kurdish leader in the region. In the aftermath of this brutal war, which paralyzed the area, Sayyid Ubeydullah of ~emdinan filled the political and military power vacuum and assumed Kurdish leadership not only in most of Ottoman Kurdistan but also in Iran. Primary sources indicate the power of Sayyid Ubeydullah in 1880, when he led an uprising against Qajar Persia and the Ottoman Empire. Seemingly concerned with the well-being of the Christian (mainly Armenian and Nestorian) population,in the region, Britain monitored the uprising closely (Parliamentary Papers 1881, 5:1-82). British correspondence confirms that Ubeydullah was the paramount chief of the Kurds in 1880, and his political control extended over a vast region that was formerly controlled by the Botan. Bahdinan, Hakkari, and Ardalan confederacies. It seems that the main reason for the revolt was the promise made to Armenians after the signing of the Treaty of Berlin on July 13, 1878, by the OttOman Empire. The treaty stipulated that the Sublime Porte would undertake all necessary steps to protect Armenians against the Circassians and the Kurds (article 61). To show his dissatisfaction with ,the treaty. in July r880 Ubeydullah warned Tosun Pasha. the mutasarrif(governor of a subdivision) of Ba~kale: "What is this I hear, that the Armenians are going to have an independent state in Van. and that the Nestorians are going to hoist the British flag and declare themselves British subjects? I will never permit it, even if I have to arm the women" (Parliamentary Papers 1881. 5:7).6

Does Kurdish Nationalism Have a Navel?

213

Thus Wadie Jwaideh (1960, p. 2.31), the author of a comprehensive study on the Kurds, is correct when he states that "fear of the Armenian ascendancy in Kurdistan appears to have been one of the most powerful reasons behind [Ubeydullah's] attempt to unite the Kurds" and lead them to revolt. It should be added, however, that Ubeydullah also publicly presented his movement as an attempt to restore law and order in the region and sought the support of the Christians against the Persian and Ottoman states. Ubeydullah complained that these two states had done nothing tei stop the aggression of rival Kurdish tribes: the Shekak of Persia and the Herki of the Ottoman Empire. To achieve this aim, for a short time local Christians (Nestorians) provided him with military support (Parliamentary Papers 1881, 5:74),7 Hoping to enforce law and order in the area where he had ambitions to rule and where the Armenians were receiving support for self-rule from the British and French, Ubeydullah invaded the northwestern territories of the Qajar state in September 1880, expanding his sphere of control in the Persian territories. But Ubeydullah's militia, consisting mainly of Kurdish tribesmen, was easily defeated by the Qajars. Upon his return to the Ottoman territories, Ubeydullah surrendered to the Ottoman authorities in early 1881. They exiled him to Istanbul and then to Hijaz, where he died in 1883. The Ubeydullah revolt is important not only because it demonstrates the emergence of new political leadership in Kurdistan but, more importantly, because some students of Kurdish nationalism identify this revolt as the origin of the Kurdish nationalist struggle. They say this because the sheikh had demanded a Kurdish state (independent or autonomous) governed by himself British documents seem to attest that Ubeydullah from time to time entertained the idea of separation from the Ottoman and Persian empires. Ronald Thomson, a British officer in Tehran, wrote in a letter in October 1881: The Sheikh ... states that he and all the Kurdish Chiefs are now agreed as to necessity of establishing a united Kurdistan [emphasis added] in order that they may be in a position to manage their own affairs without the interference of either Turkish or Persian authorities .... There seems to be no doubt from ... the proclamations and correspondence which [Ubeydullah] has lately sent to various Kurdish Chiefs along the lines of the Persian border that his design is to detach the entire

214

Hakan 6zoglu

Kurdish population from their allegiance to Turkey and Persia and to establish under his own authority a separate autonomous Principality.

(Parliamentary Papers 1881, 5:45)8 The most convincing evidence of Ubeydullah's "nationalist" aim comes from a letter that he himself supposedly wrote. In a letter to Dr. Cochran, an American missionary in the Hakkari region, Sayyid Ubeydullah stated: The Kurdish nation, consisting of more than 500,000 families, is a people apart. Their religion is different [from that of others], and their laws and customs distinct .... We are also a nation apart. We want our affairs to be in our hands, so that in the punishment of our own offenders we may be strong and independent, and have privileges like other nations.... This is our object [for the revolt] .... Otherwise the whole of Kurdistan will take the matter into their own hands, as they are unable to put up with these continual evil deeds, and the oppression, which they suffer at the hands of the [Persian and Ottoman] governments.

(Parliamentary Papers 1881, 5:47-48)9 The question of the intended meaning of the phrase "Kurdish nation" immediately arises. Unfortunately, we do not know what word the sheikh used that was rendered as "nation" by the translators or possibly by Cochran himself It is not only possible but also probable that Ubeydullah, a Naqshbandi sheikh, did not know the explosive meaning of the word "nation" or at least that the word did not mean the same thing to him that it did to Cochran. Therefore caution should be exercised in draWing any conclusions about the nationalist intention ofUbeydullah based on this text. Relying on the aforementioned letter to demonstrate the secessionist fervor of Ubeydullah, some scholars state that Ubeydullah's statement "certainly leaves no doubt as to his strong nationalist sen~iment)J (Jwaideh 1960, p. 'J.'J.7). But other primary sources contain confusing, if not contradictory, evidence about the nature ofUbeydullah's secessionist aim. A good example of this can be found in a letter written by Major Henry Trotter, the British consul-general in Erzurum, in October 1880: "I believe the Sheikh to be more or less personally loyal to the Sultan; and he would be ready to submit to his authority and pay him tribute as long as he could get rid of the

Does Kurdish Nationalism Have a Navel?

215

Ottoman officials, and be looked at de lege as well as de jacto as the ruling Chief of Kurdistan" (Parliamentary Papers 1881, 5:17).'0 As demonstrated in this excerpt, primary sources do not consistently testify that Sayyid Ubeydullah's movement was secessionist. Was it even nationalist? Ubeydullah entertained the idea of an independent principality, yet he was ready to settle for the recognition of his authority in Kurdistan within the Ottoman state. He wanted to be the ruler of a principality similar to those of the earlier Kurdish emirates but greater in its territory to match his influence in the region. Ubeydullah's aim to rule a Kurdish principality similar to that of Bedirhan is evident in an earlier British report (July II, 1880) to Henry Trotter from Emilius Clayton, the vice-consul of Van: "The Sheikh [Ubeydullah] was going to send his son to Constantinople with the following proposal. He will point out the large sum paid to the Sultan by Beder Khan Bey, when semiindependent, and will offer to pay a still larger sum ifhis authority over Kurdistan is recognized, and his rule is not interfered with" {Parliamentary Papers 1881,5:17, p. 7 ).ll

Although Sayyid Ubeydullah wanted to be the ruler of Greater Kurdistan and the present scholarship retrospectively labels him a nationalist, it seems very unlikely that the participants (who at one point included some Nestorian Christians) in his revolt were motivated by nationalist designs. This revolt can simply be seen as Sayyid Ubeydullah's demand for greater control in the region; however, it undoubtedly provided the Kurdish nationalist movements in the twentieth century with the symbol for a struggle against a dominant state. The Ubeydullah revolt of 1880-81 seems more like an intertribal revolt than a national one. With his religiOUS appeal as a Naqshbandi sheikh, Sayyid Ubeydullah's authority transcended the tribal boundaries. Either directly or through his khalifas (deputies), he spread his influence over a vast area where the Kurds were divided by their tribal loyalties but united by their respect to Sayyid Ubeydullah. When Sayyid Ubeydullah called for an uprising in 1880, he thus enjoyed remarkable support from the members of the local tribes and was able to exercise political authority over a large territory that included formally powerful Kurdish emirates. These Kurdish revolts resulted in the exile of Kurdish leaders to Istanbul, where Kurdish notable families interacted with one another with much greater frequency than before. The cultural, political, and intellectual

216

Hakan bzoglu

atmosphere of the Ottoman Empire that arose with the Young Turk Revolution in 1908 also provided Kurdish notables ofIstanbul with a rare occasion to establish cultural and later political organizations that gave birth to Kurdc ish nationalism. From the declaration of the Second Constitutional Period of 1908 to the end of World War I in 1918, the Kurds formed several societies, a majority of which stopped short of making political demands. They could not go beyond functioning essentially as cultural clubs for the Kurdish nobility. Therefore, although these pre-1918 Kurdish societies were the prime example of the Kurdish cultural effiorescence, they should not be seen as nationalist organizations. Political organizations that pursued an openly nationalist agenda emerged only at the end of World War I.

FROM KTTC TO KTC: THE EMERGENCE OF KURDISH NATIONALISM

These post-World War I organizations followed a distinct nationalist program and called for Kurdish self-determination. To highlight this ideological shift, this section discusses two significant Kurdish societies representing the cultural and political Kurdish organizations. The Kurdish organization Kiirdistan Teaviin ve Terakki Cemiyeti (Society for Mutual Aid and Progress of Kurd is tan, KTTC) emerged in 1908. This organization was governed by the children of Ubeydullah and Bedirhan and was based in Istanbul. Although it was Kurdish, the KTTC was not nationalist, as clearly indicated in its constitution: A beneficial society [cem.ryet-i hayr.rye] by the name of Kiirdistan Teaviin ve Terakki Cemiyeti has been established to consolidate Kurdish ties [revabtt] with [the Ottoman state] while protecting the Constitution [Me~rutiyet] as the only way for progress and explaining to those Kurds who are not aware of the virtues of the Constitution [Kanun-u Esasi] that it is responsible for the happiness of the people and also compatible with the great rules of Islam. [It shall] protect the high esteem [mubeccele] of being an Ottoman and strengthen the relations with the Armenian, Nasturi, and other citizens of the OttOman Empire. [It shall also seek] solutions to the problems among the tribes and confederacies [kabail ve tlfair] by uniting them [and it shall]

Does Kurdish Nationalism Have a Navel?

217

encourage commerce, agriculture, and education. (Kurdistan Terakki ve Teavun Cemiyeti Nizamnamesi n.d.)" Obviously, this was very carefully worded to reiterate the position of the Kurds as an inseparable part of the Ottoman Empire; the Kurds, it implied, did not pursue secessionist or even autonomist policies. This passage may also indicate, however, that by desiring unification of the Kurdish tribes the KTTC wanted to represent Kurds at large in Istanbul; hence it wished to obtain more political leverage from the government. As the Ottoman Empire entered World War I and its demise became imminent, this Kurdish society was replaced by another: the Kiirdistan Teali Cemiyeti (Society for the Advancement of Kurdis tan, KTC). The most significant aspect of the KTC was that it followed a distinct nationalist line and was involved in political activities for Kurdish self-determination. Another telling aspect of the formation of the KTC is that its leadership consisted almost entirely of members of the KTTC. Let us examine this first Kurdish nationalist organization in more detail. The Mudros Armistice, Signed on October 30, 1918, between the Ottoman Empire and the victorious Allied powers, was a death sentence for the empire. The elite group in the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) escaped from the empire, but secondary members of the party were arrested and exiled to Malta. The empire was in complete disarray. Meanwhile, Woodrow Wilson declared his Fourteen Points, which recommended political selfdetermination for all ethnic minorities. It is against this background that the KTC was established on December 17, 1918, approximately one and a half months after the Mudros Armistice. The founders of the KTC were the same Kurdish notables prominent in the earlier Kurdish organizations. The constitution of the KTC states that the purpose of the society is to ensure the general well-being of the Kurds (article 1).1> Article 4 states that the responsibUity of the administration (heyet-i istifare) is to work toward the advancement of Kurdistan and the Kurdish people (Kurt kavmi). Contrary to the KTTC's constitution, the political position of the KTC in the Ottoman Empire is left unclear. We do not know if this ambiguity was meant to disguise its nationalist aim or if the society originally did not develop a clear nationalist program. The KTC leaders chose to establish the society legally

Hakan bzoglu

218

and to function within the Ottoman context, which might suggest the latter, but it is impossible to know because of the lack of information. Soon, however, the KTC was actively involved in creating a form of Kurdish identity not as part of Ottoman identity but separate from it. If its constitution does not state that the KTC is a Kurdish nationalist organization, its subsequent activities and publications definitely attest to this. The best evidence comes from the newspaper jin, which published many articles that were unmistakably nationalist propaganda. For example, in one article Siverekli Hilmi addresses Kurdish youth: "The time of following others is past .... Work only for your own people. Do not forget that we have a language of our own, however neglected, and a rich history. Here you have a formula for independence: action and initiative" (Bozarslan 1988, vol. 2,

p.4 01 ). In addition, the political activities of the KTC members confirm that the KTC sought international assistance for its nationalist deSigns. For example, on August 4, 1919, the executive committee of the KTC visited the American, French, and British representatives in Istanbul to explain Kurdish nationalist aspirations in the empire. Zinar SHopi (Kadri Cemilpa~a) states: The KTC leaders visited American, British, and French representatives in Istanbul and argued for the national rights of the Kurdish people. In a meeting with the American representative, Sayyid Abdulkadir, Emin Ali Bedirhan, Said Nursi, and Dr. Mehmet Bey pointed out the boundaries of Kurdistan on the map and asked for alliance on the sea. Upon the reply of the American representative indicating the U.S. intention to create an independent Armenia at the expense ofland called Kurdistan, Said Nursi responded, "IfKul'distan had a seacoast, you would destroy it with your naval power; but you cannot enforce such a decision in the mountains of Kurdistan." (Silopi 1991,p. 57) The threat of an independent Armenian state in Kurdistan seemed to validate the KTC activities in the eyes of the Ottoman government, because the Kurds had always been seen as a balancing power in the region against any Armenian threat to the empire's territorial integrity. Moreover, until 1919 the Ottoman governments were not terribly bothered by Kurdish political activities. The Damat Ferit Pasha government only became concerned about the

Does Kurdish Nationalism Have a Navel?

219

nationalist propaganda of the KTC when the Kurdish representatives sought international support for a Kurdish state in 1919. On July 10, 1919, the representatives of the Ottoman government-Avni Pasha, the minister of the Marine Department; Haydar Efendi, a former ~eyh-iil-tslam (chiefjurisconsuIt); and Ahmet Abuk Pasha. a former minister of war-met with the KTC members: Sayyid Abdulkadir, Emin Ali Bedirhan, Mevlanzade Rlfat, Captain Emin, and Colonel Avni Bey. British intelligence was able to obtain information regarding the content of the meeting. A British report dated July 2.1, 1919, states that, when asked to explain the KTC's meeting with the British without the permission of the government. Mevlanzade Rlfat replied: [A]ccording to the Wilsonian principles every nationality had the right to work for their own welfare and ... the Kurds were convinced that the only power which could assure them freedom and security was Great Britain. They had therefore considered it desirable to approach the British Authorities. I asked how it could be possible for the Turkish Government to grant any form of autonomy to the Kurds, seeing that the Turks themselves were not sure of their own future. (British Foreign Office 1985, p. 696)'4 Notably, this document hints that the Istanbul government entertained the idea of granting autonomy to the Kurds. Whether the Ottoman government was serious about this or only trying to ensure the loyalty of the Kurds is unknown. But we do know that the KTC was overtly seeking independence or at least autonomy in 1919. encouraged by the Wilsonian principles. Scores of articles and editorials published injin ask for independence or autonomy (Golda~ 1991, pp. 237-89). Therefore, unlike the previous Kurdish organizations. we can justifiably categorize the KTC as the first nationalist organization. In search of the origin of Kurdish nationalist movements. so far we have examined Kurdish uprisings and literature produced by the Kurds. The con· clusion is obvious: Kurdish revolts prior to World War I did not have any express nationalistic deSign. Among the literature produced by the Kurds, Ahmed-i Hani's position for self-rule comes closest to the modern ideology of nationalism. Ahmed-i Hani cannot be considered the father of Kurdish nationalism. however. for his understanding of the Kurds does not overlap with

220

Hakan Ozoglu

that of the present. His call for a Kurmanji king to protect the Kurmanjis against Ottoman and Persian misrule lacks the necessary ingredients of a nationalist movement. It should be noted that Mem-u Zin fell far short_ of creating a political movement. Ottoman and British archival documents indicate that nineteenth-century Kurdish uprisings were motivated by the desire of local Kurdish notables to recover or expand their control of the land. After 1908 the Kurds, along with other communities in the Ottoman Empire, enjoyed a liberal political environment, but this liberal period did not last long. After the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 the CUP leadership that ran the empire Single-handedly with little or no regard for political opposition reversed the multiethnic liberalization process and put an emphasis on the Turkish elements of the Ottoman Empire. Even in this period we do not see any express desire for Kurdish self-determination. Kurdish organizations chose to operate within the Ottoman system and preserved their decentralist/Ottomanist identity while celebrating their own communal one until the emergence of the KTC. Therefore 1 suggest that Kurdish nationalism originates at the end of World War I with the formation of the KTC. When the KTC initiated a nationalist agenda, it propagated its ideology based upon a Kurdish identity that was specific to the realities of the postWorld War I environment. Corresponding with the strategic map of Kurdistan, this understanding of Kurdish identity was much more inclusive. The Lurs ofIran. the Zazas, and even the non-Muslim Kurdish-speaking population were included in the new Kurdish identity. It was this snapshot of Kurdish identity that became the basis for Kurdish nationalism. In the service of promoting it, Kurdish leaders also tried to give historical depth to the Kurdish struggle by selectively llsing the prior Kurdish literature and uprisings. In reality, however, the nationalist link with the past was engineered.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has examined several issues concerning the origin and the genealogy of Kurdish nationalism. The first argument concerns timing: when did Kurdish nationalism emerge? This research has suggested that we should exercise caution in labeling Kurdish movements prior to World War I as nationalist. I demonstrated here that Kurdish nationalism as a political movement originates from the end of World War I.

Does Kurdish Nationalism Have a Navel?

221

I further suggest that Kurdish militant and intellectual movements prior to World War I should not even be seen as "Kurdish protonationalism." This might be rather misleading, if it assumes that these militant and intellec~ tual movements were destined to evolve into fuII~fledged nationalisms. The available evidence is just too inconclusive to support this claim. There is no evidence to prove that Kurdish nationalism would have materialized if the Ottoman Empire had survived World War 1. This also applies to most other nationalisms that emerged at the end of the Ottoman Empire. Surely, Turkish and to some extent Arab nationalisms were responses to the crumbling empire. Their success in creating nation-states, I suggest, was not the inevitable and natural order of political evolution; nor is nationalism the "end of history," if! may borrow the expression of Francis Fukuyama (1993). The other argument dealt with the createdness of Kurdish nationalism. This chapter has contended that Kurdish nationalism was not the result of an evolutionary process; it was created at a certain time in history, at the end of World War I. On a theoretical level, I have argued against Anthony Smith's point that nationalisms are based upon preexisting elements and against his emphaSiS on nationalism's link with the past. Although Smith's argument for the ethnie certainly has merit for the formation of identity, we must be careful in extrapolating it to nationalism. True, most nationalisms base themselves upon perceived ethnic identities; however, the perception of identity is fixed at the time it is created. In other words, nationalists utilize a selective group identity, which is most responsive to the realities of their time. In many cases nationalists do not entirely acknowledge the evolving (or constructed but real) nature of the group identity. For Kurdish nationalists, Kurdish identity possesses a unique essence. Although they do not (in fact cannot) deny the shifting nature of Kurdish identity, they ignore this very point on purpose. Elsewhere I have argued that Kurdish nationalism was created by a cadre of Kurdish notables consisting of the children of the previous generation of Kurdish religious and tribal elite (bzoglu 2004). They were based in Istanbul and were heavily influenced by the projects of Arab and Turkish nationalists. When the collapse of the Ottoman Empire became imminent, they felt obligated to subscribe to the idea of nationalism as the Arabs and the Turks did earlier. No doubt they utilized the past in the service of creating a nationalist discourse, a common practice for all nationalists; and like all other nationalists, they were highly selective. "Collective forgetting" more than the

Hakan Ozoglu

222

shared memory was the main mode utilized. As mentioned above, the link with the past was engineered, not discovered. For this reason, when Kurdish nationalism was created, a navel was painted in to make it look natural. On the practical level, we must understand the nationalists' need to establish a link with the distant past. In order to recruit followers for the nationalist ideology and to claim legitimacy, nationalists feel obligated to present their case as a natural flow of history. Therefore I take issue with Gellner: although such a link with the past is imaginary, it is significant and necessary to imagine it in order to claim credibility and attract a following to create a nation-state.

NOTES I. 2.

3. 4.

). 6. 7.

This is Smith's paraphrasing of Gellner (1983) in the debate. I do not go into much detail in this section because I have already given details of this argument in Ozoglu (2004, chapter 2.). For the justification of this claim, see Ozoglu (2004). There is no exact date for the revolt, but from 1842 to 1847 Bedirhan was paying only lip service to Istanbul. The Ottoman local administration in the region was very suspicious about Bedirhan's loyalty and was planning a military operation against him in 1846. We do know the exact date of the first military clash between the gove~nment forces and Bedirhan:June 4. 1847 (17 Cemaziyelahir 1263). B3.§kabanlik Al"§ivi, Mesail-i Miihimme, l2.2;; this document was reprinted in Sevgen 1982., appendix doc. no. XXXI. A letter from Vice-Counsel Clayton to Major Trotter, B3.§kale,July Il. 1880. A letter from Clayton to Trotter, dated November 27. 1880; also Clayton to Trotter. November 2, 1880. "The Sheikh tried very hard to get the Christian to join him.... Some 400 or ;00 Nestorians accordingly jOined his force" (ibid., ;: 54).

8. 9. 10. II.

12. 13. 14.

A letter to Earl Granville from Ronald Thomson. Tehran, October 31, 1881. A letter from Ubeydullah to Dr. Cochran, dated October s, 1880. The letter was sent to Mr. Goshan and dated October 20, 1880. The letter was dated July II, 1880. Article I, "Maksad-l Tesis:' in Kurdistan Terakki ve leavun Cemiyeti Nizamnamesi (n.d.). Great Britain, Foreign Office. 371/4191, 91082, dated June 17. 1919. "Letter from Mr. Hohler (Constantinople) to Sir F. Tilley," July 2.1, 1919.

10

BANDITRY TO DISLOYALTY

Turkish Nationalisms and the Kurdish Question

MESUTYEGEN

TURKISH NATIONALISM'S PERCEPTION OF THE KURDISH Q,£ESTION

has not been uniform. From its emergence in the late nineteenth century until today, Turkish nationalism has perceived the Kurdish question by means of a rich vocabulary, including "resistance of the past:' "banditry; "political reactionary:' "regional backwardness:' "foreign incitement," and "disloyalty." This variation in discourse has several causes. First, as Turkish nationalism has evolved and changed from its rise in the late nineteenth century to the present, its perception of the Kurdish question has Significantly changed too. Second. there have been distinct versions of Turkish nationalisms, which also resulted in variation in the way in which the Kurdish question is perceived. The "extreme" nationalism of the Nationalist Action Party, a left-wing Turkish nationalism, "nationalism in Islamism," and the popular nationalism of the last decade are only some of the versions of Turkish nationalism.' To these, of course, must be added mainstream Turkish nationalism.> Although it is inaccurate to suggest that each of these nationalisms has had its own specific view of the Kurdish question, it is clear that their existence would contribute to varying understandings of the issue.

223

224

Mesut Yegen

Turkish nationalism's openness to numerous other discourses is a third factor contributing to the varying perceptions of the Kurdish question. Just like any other nationalism, Turkish nationalism has not been an introverted discourse. Instead it has been enriched by discourses such as reformist Westernism, corporatist populism, and developmentalism, which culminated in a proliferation of the ways in which Turkish nationalism has perceived the Kurdish question. The fourth aspect. in the same vein, has to do with the articulation of the Kurdish question with other social issues. Here the case is obvious: the Kurdish question has never been a pure ethnic/national question. While it emerged as an opposition to the reforms implemented by the Ottoman modernizers, who aimed to dissolve the autonomous sociopolitical space inhabited by the Kurds, it progressed into an opposition to the transformation of a non-national political community to a national one in the first quarter of the twentieth century. By the mid-twentieth century, however, the nodal point of the Kurdish unrest became the discontent generated by the consolidation of market relations in the regions occupied by the Kurds. The Kurdish unrest of the last few decades, in contrast, has mostly been shaped by international developments such as the rising significance of human rights discourse in contemporary politics, the rising publicity of the Kurdish question after the Gulf War, and the emerge,nce of a Kurdish diaspora in Europe. The history of the Kurdish question is composed of several paradigmatic periods, all of which have contributed in some way to a change in the understanding of the issue. In this chapter I argue that the relational and historical nature of both Turkish nationalism and the Kurdish question influenced Turkish nationalism toward perceiving the Kurdish issue in many different ways. I examine the ways in which Turkish nationalisms have perceived the Kurdish question, elaborating first on mainstream Turkish nationalism's perception of the issue. This is followed by a discussion on the perception of the Kurdish question by extreme right-wing and left-wing Turkish nationali~ms.

MAINSTREAM TURKISH NATIONALISM AND THE KURDISH Q,£ESTION

Turkish nationalism emerged as a linguistic and cultural movement in the late nineteenth century (Mardin 1962.). It immediately became an alternative

Banditry to Disloyalty

225

to Ottomanism, the prevailing strategy of political integration of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Following its ascendancy over Ottomanism, Turkish nationalism evolved to become the constitutive ideology of building a secular and modern "nation-state society" in the second quarter of the twentieth century. As the founding ideology of the Turkish Republic, Turkish nationalism has been a source of inspiration not only for all three Constitutions of the republic but also for the programs of the main political parties in Turkey. The follOWing discussion provides a roughly chronological examination of the ways in which mainstream Turkish nationalism has perceived the Kurdish question.

IsLahat (Reforms) and the Kurdish Question Ottoman politics during the late nineteenth century was characterized by a state-imposed Islahat (reforms) program intended to preclude the disintegration of the Ottoman state by replacing the classical Ottoman administrative bodies with a modern state apparatus.' This being the case, Turkish nationalism flourished in accordance with the dynamics of Is/ahat. Accordingly, Turkish nationalism of the time viewed the inSignificant Kurdish unrest from the perspective of the logic of tslahat. To be more concrete, Turkish nationalism at the turn of the century perceived Kurds' unrest in relation to the reforms that aimed to strengthen the state power and especially in relation to those disseminating the modern state power into the "periphery."4 The unrest of the Kurds, in other words, was believed to be nothing more than a reaction of the forces of the periphery annoyed by the program of

tslahat. Turkish nationalism of the time emerged and evolved as a response to the idea of Ottoman ism. Its most central maxim was that the unity of the Ottoman state/territory would be saved by rendering all its subjects with different religious and ethnic origins "Ottoman citizens:' tied to the Ottoman dynasty. In opposition, Turkish nationalism conceived "Turkishness" as the only possible ground for political unity on Ottoman territory. The idea of decentralization in administration, the other major component of the politics of Ottomanism, was also uniformly opposed by Turkish nationalism. Under such conditions, the intensification of tsLahat in the administration after 1908 was not a surprise. Having seized power in 1908, the nationalist Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) made it clear that it would

226

Mesut Yegen

continue the policy of centralization. Accordingly, the CUP approved the principle of centralization in administration as the first article of its program in the 1913 Congress of the organization {Tunaya 1989, p. 2.36).1 This alone manifestS how vital centralization in administration was for Turkish nationalists. The same congress also decided to settle the nomadic tribes, most of which were Kurdish. This indicated that Turkish nationalism of the time addressed Kurdish unrest through the program of tslahat that was engaged in pursuing centralization. This was evident as early as 1908, as the following speech by an Ottoman army officer on the first day of the Young Turk Revolution in Diyarbakxr (a major Kurdish town in Anatolia) shows. The constitution abolished landlordship and chieftainship. From now on, a landlord and a porter are equal. There is no more landlordship. There are no more tribes.... Don't be afraid of the soldiers as you were in the past. Military service is a religious obligation.... Tribal fights are for the devil. Whereas military service is for God.... Do not consider taxes a misfortune as you did in the past. The Kurds have a unique problem; it is ignorance. (cited in Kutlay 1992., pp. 176-79)6 The Kurds' political loyalty was to the tribe; they would not perform military service; they ~ere not enthusiastic in paying taxes to the central power; they were ignorant: thus Turkish nationalism perceived the Kurds and the territory inhabited by them. Turkish nationalism saw the unrest of Kurds as a set of obstacles delaying the dissemination of a modern political and administrative power into the Kurdish regions. The followers of Turkish nationalism were of course determined to remove such impediments by means of the zslahat program. The narrative above discloses that the way Turkish nationalism perceived and tackled the Kurdish question in these years was shaped primarily by the prerequisites of the program of zslahat. But it was also shaped by at least two further concerns: expanding political representation and making Turkish people the ruling nation in the multiethnic Ottoman Empire. These two concerns, however, were intrinsically incompatible. As the resumption of a constitutional regime and the reopening of the parliament testify, widening political representation was the second important concern for the nationalists of the time.? One most immediate outcome

Banditry to Disloyalty

227

of this expansion in political representation was the election of some ten Kurdish deputies to the parliament (Tunaya 1988, p. 407).8 Another was the flourishing of organizations that sllstained the rights of various ethnic groups in the empire. Kiirdistan Teaviin ve Terakki Cemiyeti was one such organization. Furthermore, CUP's inclination toward enlarging political representation and freedoms prompted many intellectuals from various ethnic groups to assume leading roles in the CUP. As this brief remark indicates, Turkish nationalism's preoccupation with the unrest of Kurds at the time was also mediated by a politics of freedom. But the societies built by the ethnic groups were soon banned by a constitutional decree (Tunaya 1988, pp. 36869). Why did this take place? This question brings us to the third preoccupation of Turkish nationalists. While Turkish nationalism adopted a liberal discourse aimed at widening political representation, at the same time it also made a political investment to render the Turkish people the dominant nation in the multiethnic Ottoman Empire. The idea that Turkish people were the unsur-i aslt (main ethnic group) in the Ottoman Empire was already in circulation before the CUP seized power. Once in power, however, the CUP began to pursue policies deSigned to promote the Turkish people from the status of unsur-i asit to that of millet-i hakime (ruling/dominant nation).9 Accordingly, while societies built by ethnic groups were banned, institutions such as the National Library, the National Archive, the National Cinema, and the National Music Organization; sports/youth organizations such as the Turkish Force; and cultural organizations such as the Turkish Hearths were all founded under the patronage of the CUP (Tunaya 1988, pp. 34-35). Hence Turkish nationalism implemented a general program designed to render the Turkish people the dominant nation. As this abridged outline indicates, the prerequisites of expanding political representation and making Turkish people the ruling nation were completely inconsistent. Promoting a more liberal politicS and building a millet-i hakime in a multiethnic society were mutually exclusive. It is no surprise that this inconsistency was echoed in the relationship between Kurds and Turkish nationalists. The support for the CUP by the intellectuals of notable Kurdish families in Istanbul, thanks to its once "liberal" inclinations, was immediately withdrawn as the nationalist face of the CUP prevailed over its liberal face. To this must be added the growing discontent of

228

Mesut Yegen

"traditional" Kurds, whose habitat became the subject of the CUP's fortified policy of centralization. All this suggests that Turkish nationalism's perception of the Kurdish question in the three decades preceding the foundation of the republic was molded primarily by the double mission of the nationalists: Turkification of public space and fortification of administrative centralization. The opposition of Kurds to both missions led the Turkish nationalists to consider the Kurdish question simultaneously from two different angles. As well as impeding the establishment of the Turkish people as the millet-i hakime, the Kurdish question also represented resistance to the establishment of a modern state and society. But one thing was evident in the language of Turkish nationalism: when the Kurdish question was at stake, the themes and tones of the discourse of ~slahat prevailed over those of nationalism.'o This can basically be attributed to the birth of Turkish nationalism out of tslahat, on the one hand, and to overwhelming Kurdish opposition to the ~slahat program aimed at ending the autonomy of the Kurdish territory, on the other. inktlap and the Kurdish Question World War I forced a detour in Turkish nationalism. One minor outcome of the war was that the nationalists had to vacate political power. A more important consequence was the collapse of the empire. By the end of the war, Ottoman imperial territory had shrunk to the Anatolian peninsula, some regions of which were occupied by the Allied forces. The most Significant result of the war in terms ofits repercussions on the future trajectory of Turkish nationalism, however, was the abrupt Muslimization of Anatolia. Of the tWO non-Muslim peoples of Anatolia, the Armenians were deported or killed and the Greeks were exchanged with the Muslims of Greece. 11 In the meantime, though many of its elite figures were expelled, no other political program in Anatolia had as zealous a political cadre as the reformist-nationalist movement. This was most evident with the launching of the War of Independence, which not only overruled the occupation of Anatolia but also restored a mighty political power shortly after the collapse of the empire. By W1.2 the reformist-nationalist ideal had returned to power. The "relative homogenization" of the religious composition of Anatolia defined the mind-set of those who restored not the empire but the state apparatus. A Turkishness married with Muslimhood became the new

Banditry to Disloyalty

229

"spiritual" ground for the establishment of a political community on Anatolian territory." The continuity between prewar and postwar reformist-nationalisms in terms of both recruitment and ideology was manifest. Nonetheless, what characterized the relation between these two nationalisms was discontinuity rather than continuity. This of course had to do with the dramatic series of events and changes that took place in the years before the nationalists reclaimed power. To reiterate, though defeated in World War I, the reformistnationalist cadre and ideal remained the most powerful. and Anatolia became a more homogeneous social space. It was these changes that paved the way for a discontinuity in the reformist-nationalist ideal. The discontinuity in the sphere of ulahat occurred thanks to the stunning success of the reformist-nationalist cadre in ending the occupation of Anatolia and restoring political power. This success endowed the reformistnationalists with both might and legitimacy, facilitating the reformist ideal's evolution into a more radical program. This radical form of reformism is known in Turkish politics as the idea or program of inkdap (revolution). A firm politics of inktlap prevailed during the first fifteen years of the new regime. The replacement of the sultanate and caliphate with a secular republic was followed by reforms in law, education, administration, and other areas. As to the discontinuity in Turkish nationalism, "relative homogenization" of Anatolia prompted the powerful nationalists of the time to revise their prewar task. As noted, nationalism of the earlier period endeavored to make Turkish people the millet-i hakime in the multiethnic Ottoman society. HaVing established the Republic of Turkey, nationalists were now more ambitious. Their task was to render the nation the ultimate bond for political adherence and to create a nation-state out of the remnants of the Ottoman Empire. In other words, the founders of the republic firmly "refuted the polyethnic and multi religious Ottoman heritage" (Canefe 2.002., p. 149). The boldest Signifier of this change in Turkish nationalism was the new Constitution itself. As stated in the justification of the 192.4 Constitution, the new Turkish Republic "is a nation-state. It is not a multinational state. The state does not recognize any nation other than the Turks. There are other peoples who come from different races and who should have equal rights within the country. Yet it is not possible to give rights to these people in accordance with their racial [ethnic] status" (cited in Goziibiiyiik and Sezgin 1957, p. 7).

230

MesutYegen

What the new Constitution declared was that the new republic was established as a nation-state. Though this new state acknowledged the existence of ethnic groups other than Turks, it denied recognizing their legal rights. This was something entirely novel, of course, especially from the standpoint of the Kurds, because the leading reformist-nationalists of the new regime had clearly announced immediately before the foundation of the republic that they were going to recognize such rightS.'l The situation was obvious. In 192.4, whUe stUl conceding the existence of ethnic communities other than Turks in Anatolia, Turkish nationalism began to deny recognizing the assumed "cultural" rights of such communities. All those who were now citizens of the Turkish Republic, including Kurds, were invited to become Turks. Accordingly, a comprehensive policy of compulsory assimilation began to be implemented.'+ These changes in the reformist-nationalist ideal prompted some major changes in the relationship between Turkish nationalism and the Kurdish question. As well as aggravating the Kurdish unrest, such changes also altered the way in which Turkish nationalism perceived the Kurdish question. The years following the foundation of the republic testified to a growing Kurdish discontent, which sometimes took the form of revolts and rebellions against the state power. The discontent of Kurds was twofold: they resisted both the logic of ink~lap and the logic of the nation-state. This prompted the reformist-nationalists of the time to perceive the Kurdish question in terms of the prerequisites of transforming a heterogeneous social space ruled by the logic of empire to a homogenous social space governed by a modern nationstate. Aiming to build a nation-state as well as to accelerate the creation of a secular and modern society, Turkish nationalism of the time approached the resistance by Kurds by means of a hybrid language enunciating all these components together. An exemplary text is the speech of the chairman of the Court ofIndependence that sentenced the leaders of the Kurdish rebellion in 192.5 to death: Some of you used people for your personal interests, and some of you followed foreign incitement and political ambitions, but all of you marched to a certain point: the establishment of an independent Kurdistan.... Your political reaction and rebellion were destroyed immediately by the decisive acts of the government ofthe Republic and by the

Banditry to Disloyalty

231

fatal strokes of the Republican army.... Everybody must know that as the young Republican government will definitely not condone any cursed action like incitement and political reaction; it will prevent this sort of banditry by means of its precise precautions. The poor people of this region who have been exploited and oppressed under the domination of sheikhs and feudal landlords will be freed from your incitements and evil and they will follow the efficient paths of our Republic, which promises progress and prosperity. (cited in Aybars 1988, pp. 32526; emphasis added) A double reading would show that the text actually speaks about a fatal rivalry. Political reaction. banditry. sheikhs. and feudal landlords were on the one side. and the republican government and republican army promising progress and prosperity were on the other. Clash was evident. Against those resisting the modern, secular, and national "state-society" were the guardians of such a state-society: the republican government and the republican army. The language of the text gives the impression that every single social and political element that the reformist-nationalists aimed to liquidate was assembled in the Kurdish rebellion of 1925. Political reactionaries. bandits. landlords. and the sheikhs were a "gang of evil:' resisting the foundation of the nation-state and the dissemination of central administration into the periphery. It is very much evident that the collision between this gang of evil and the reformist-nationalists of the time may be translated into a duality representing this fatal rivalry. The Kurdish question, in particular the rebellion in 1925, was nothing but resistance of the past to the present. represented by the political program of reformist-nationalism, which promised progress and prosperity. For a considerable period the Turkish nationalism of the time perceived the Kurdish question on the basis of such a fatal rivalry between the past and present.'s Claiming to represent the present. Turkish nationalism viewed the Kurdish unrest of the time as the resistance of premodern social structures and adherences. Tribes and banditry were the leading components of such structures. According to the nationalists. those who resisted the new regime were not the Kurds with an ethno-political cause but the tribes and bandits threatened by the dissemination of modern state power into the region. In this respect. the Settlement Law of 1934, a privileged text of Turkish nationalism

232

Mesut Yegen

of the 19305, was exemplary. Resisted by two large-scale Kurdish rebellions in 192.5 and 1930, the new regime embarked on solving the Kurdish question by means of an extensive settlement law. Although the text clearly states that the ultimate aim of the law was the Turkification (assimilation) of nonTurks, it produces the impression that those who would be assimilated were some tribal people with no ethnic identity. One of the central articles of the Settlement Law announced that "[t]he Law does not recognize the political and administrative authority of the tribe ... all previously recognized rights have been abolished even if they were officially documented. Tribal chief doms, ... sheikhdoms, and all their organizations and elements have been abolished" (Official Paper 1934: emphasis added). According to this logic, the Kurdish question was an issue of the endurance of tribal organizations, which of course would not be tolerated by a modern nation-state. Another remainder of the premodern past was banditry. While commanded by a modern and secular organization, Hoybun, the Kurdish rebellion in Agn in 1930 was perceived by the Turkish nationalists of the time as an instance of banditry. Throughout the summer of that year the newspapers were full of reports about "how the brigands were being destroyed." On July 9, 1930, the daily newspaper Cumhuriyet reported: "Our aircraft have heavily bombed the brigands." Another report in the same paper construed the Kurdish rebellion i!1 terms of a more eloquent dichotomy. The report on July 13, 1930, stated that "the Republic was defended by our citizens against the bandits:'

The Outside World and the Kurdish Question As the narrative above indicates, the establishment of a modern, secular, and national "state-society" out of the Ottoman Empire concurred with a long period of war. from the Balkan Wars to the War of Independence via World War 1. This made those who were in charge of this establishment anxious about the outside world. Those who built a nation-state out of the remnants of the empire were traumatized, especially by the events in the years between 1912. and 1919. A vast Ottoman territory, including the very heart of the empire. was lost in this remarkably short period. This traumatic series of events made the nationalists uneasy about the future intentions of the major powers of the time. Consequently, Turkish nationalism did not hesitate for

Banditry to Disloyalty

233

long to establish a connection between the unrest of the Kurds and the outside world. The claim that the Kurdish unrest could be attributed to outside incitement was put forward as early as 192.5. The Court of Independence in 192.5 had concluded in its verdict that the rebellion was incited by foreigners (see the quotation above). This perception was shared by all versions of Turkish nationalism at all time. One point needs to be highlighted, however. As Turkish nationalism's notion of the particular state that was believed to be the major threat for the Turkish state changed from one period to another, the state believed to be inciting Kurds changed as well. Outsiders inciting Kurds sometimes included Western imperialists and northern Communists and at other times southern neighbors. After the War of Independence the inciting outsiders were the Western powers, particularly Britain. During the Cold War the outsider that threatened the Turkish state, now a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member, became the Soviet Union. Accordingly, the Kurdish unrest of the 1960s and 1970S was viewed as an outcome of Communist incitement. When the Cold War ended, the major threat was believed to be coming from the south. Today it is again the West's turn to be the outsider. European states have steadfastly accused Turkey of human rights violations in Kurdish regions and in the last decade have become the home for a militant Kurdish diaspora. This environment has given Turkish nationalism reason to bdieve that the Kurds are once again being incited by the European powers. The United States, another Western power, is also not free from accusations. The gradual establishment of a Kurdish authority in northern Iraq since the Gulf War under the mandate of the United States is taken by many to be an indicator that the Kurdish unrest is stirred by the United States!6 A case in 1963 against a group of Kurdish intellectuals is unique in simultaneously displaying both the nationalist contention that Kurdish unrest was due to incitement from the outside and the changing nature of the outside opponents of Turkish nationalism. '7 The charge stated: During the Republican period ... some foreign states intended to cause trouble in Eastern AnatoHa. As a matter of fact, the Sheikh Said, Agn, and Dersim rebellions were due to the counter-revolutionary actions of some tribes that were incited by foreign powers .... [But] [t]he

234

Mesut Yegen

content of foreign incitement at present is not the same as that of the past. While previous foreign incitements ... were caused by the imperialist states that had interests in the Middle East, at present these in~ citements are caused by Communist activity. While the incited were sheikhs and the chiefs of tribes [in the past], they are now a few intellectuals .... Today ... the Kurdish ideal is entirely the product of incitement by international communism. (cited in ~adillili 1980, pp. 184-85)

Development and the Kurdish Question The prerequisites of building a modern and secular nation-state society continued to inspire the ways in which Turkish nationalism perceived the Kurdish question until the 1950S. As the cessation of Kurdish revolts testified, by that time reformist nationalism had almost completed the task of achieving political integration. Nevertheless, this success had not yet been echoed in the sphere of the economy. Market· relations in the regions inhabited by the Kurds were still far from extensive. In other words, economic integration had not been achieved yet. This prompted Turkish nationalism to focus on the issue of development. As Turkish nationalism became preoccupied with the task of the dissemination of market relations into the regions inhabited by Kurds, it began to perceive the Kurdish question in terms of the requirements of economic integration. Both the Democratic Party (which had overthrown the founding party of the republic, the Republican People's Party, in 1950) and its successor, the Justice Party (]P), perceived Kurdish unrest through the discourse of economic integration and development. According to the mainstream nationalism of the 19505 and 1960s, what Kurds needed to do was simple. Now that their resistance against political integration had been crushed, they were expected to integrate into the new nation-state society through the market. Citing the massive underdevelopment in eastern and southeastern Anatolia (regions inhabited mostly by Kurds), the JP government in 196; promised the alleviation of economic disparity among geographical regions (TBMM 1988, p. 104). It was plain, however, that development was not the only concern behind the government's intense interest in these regions. A more preeminent concern was the lack of integration between the region and the national market. This genetic relationship between the development of the

Banditry to Disloyalty

235

region and its integration with the national market was boldly included in the program of the 1969 JP government: Another important issue we stress is that of the development of the Eastern region. The development of aU the regions of our country, the territorial and national integrity of which is indivisible, is a constitutional necessity.... Our aim is to bring all regions of Turkey to contemporary levels of civilization. It is for this reason ... that we see the necessity of introducing special measures in the regions where backwardness is massive and acute. The aim of these special measures is not to create privUeged regions, but toforge integration. (TBMM 1988, p. ISS emphasis added) As this text shows, the issue of development was not a question in itself in the view of mainstream nationalists at the time. Rather it was seen as part of economic integration, which in turn was taken to be a part of the question of civilization. In other words, development was construed as a means to remove the lack of integration between the region and the national economy.'s The discussion thus far indicates that the mainstream Turkish nationalists' perception of the Kurdish question has significantly varied in the past century. Turkish nationalists in power between the early 19005 and late 19005 perceived the Kurdish question as one of political reaction, banditry, tribalism, foreign incitement, and regional backwardness.

EXTREME RIGHT-WING TuRKISH NATIONALISM AND THE KURDISH QEESTION

A racist version of Turkish nationalism appeared around the time of World War II.'9 This remained an intellectual movement until the 1960s. It was only in the sixties and seventies that this version of Turkish nationalism flirting with racism became a political movement. In the meantime Kurdish discontent had become substantial again. As opposed to the military resistance of the twenties and thirties, however, Kurdish unrest of the sixties and seventies assumed the form of popular support for left-wing parties or political groups, some of which seriously confronted the establishment in Turkey. Under such conditions the Kurdish question began to be perceived by some with a racist vocabulary.

Mesut Yegen

Nihal AtS1Z, a spectacular representative of racism in Turkey, suggested in these years that Kurds are of an inferior descent. In his view, "Kurds are not of Turkish or Turanian descent. They are Iranians. The language they speak is a corrupt, primitive Persian. So are their [facial] physical features" (AtSlZ 1992 (1967], p. 525). Because they are not of Turkish descent, AtS1Z believes that Kurds have no alternative but to go away. "Where to? Wherever they admire! Let them go to Pakistan, to India, or to Barzani. Let them apply to United Nations and ask for a country in Africa. Let them learn from the Armenians that the Turkish race is extremely patient, yet may not be stopped when it is provoked" (AtS1Z 1992 (1967], p. 530). However appalling, this did not become the core view of extreme rightwing nationalism, which in general followed the notion that all Muslims in Anatolia were of Turkish origin. Like mainstream nationalism, it also championed the policy of assimilation, rather than ethnic cleansing or destruction, as the main instrument to reach a "soltttion:'>o It may be argued that mainstream nationalism of the thirties was not fundamentally different from extreme right-wing nationalism of the sixties and seventies in terms of the way the Kurdish question was perceived. For a long time, extreme right-wing nationalism used the language provided by mainstream nationalism in regard to the Kurdish question. Extreme right-wing nationalists also endorsed the belief that incitement by foreigners was at the root of the Kurdish unrest. Nevertheless, this shared language must not blur the chasms between these two nationalisms. One thing is clear: however much mainstream nationalism held that foreign incitement played some role in the untest of Kurds, it predominantly perceived the Kurdish unrest as a question of resistance of the past or lack of economic integration. Hence it was a socioeconomic question to be resolved by means of inktlap. For extreme right-wing nationalism, however, the predominant reason for the Kurdish unrest was foreign incitement. Thus it was merely a question of public order, requiring military precautions. As the Kurdish discontent of the sixties and seventies flourished as a component oflefi:-wing opposition in Turkey, this "proved" that the outsiders could be none other than the Communists in the north: the USSR.

* *

*

Banditry to Disloyalty

237

LEFT-WING TURKISH NATIONALISM AND THE KURDISH Q,£ESTION

Although a left-wing version of Turkish nationalism has existed throughout the whole republican period, from the beginning to the present, it has never been a major discourse in modern Turkish politics. Deliberations of left-wing nationalism on the Kurdish question appeared first in the monthly journal Kadro (Cadre), which was established in 1932. by a few former Communists who had become the champions of a blend of etatism and nationalism." It is most evident that Kadro provided a more refined version of the standard argument of mainstream Turkish nationalism that the Kurdish unrest was nothing more than the resistance of the past to the present, represented by the new regime. Two distinguished contributions to this effect were presented by the two stars of Kadro: ~evket Siireyya Aydemir and Ismail Hiisrev Tokin. According to Aydemir (1932., p. 42.), Kurdishness was an economic regime, albeit a backward one. Kurdishness. he believed, was identical with feudalism. This being the case, it was most natural that Turkishness was identical with another economic regime. The old Turkish law [social order] was based on each individual Turk's house [hearth], herd, and land. It is for that reason that we always brought to the places we lived, at least for those who were from our race, private property and small farming.... However, Kurdishness is an economic regime at the base of which lies, before everything, intense land slavery. i.e., the landlessness of the producer. [Therefore] all stages of Ottoman history in Van and Diyarbela.r provinces passed with a struggle between economically and legally free Turkish peasants and urban dwellers and Kurdish feudalism, which is based on an individual's economic and legal slavery. (Aydemir 1932., p. 42.) According to Aydemir, the contrast between Kurdishness and Turkishness (that these two peoples belong to different times: past and present) was apparent in the domain of religion too. While religion was an emotional bond among old Turks, what was essential to Kurdish dervish lodges was a profound irreligiosity (Aydemir 1932., p. 43)' This backwardness of Kurds would naturally disable them from becoming a nation. In this respect, the second star of Kadro, ismaU Hiisrev Tokin. was

Mesut Yegen

quite confident that the Kurdish resistance was not a national movement but a class struggle: A national movement may arise only and foremost out of sharing ~n economic and national interest. However. in the eastern provinces neither a unity of economic interest nor a national one exists .... In our eastern provinces is not a proper Kurdish nation but Kurdish-speaking tribes and Turkish elements that have been forced to speak Kurdish. We may not find the attributes of a nation among these tribes. Nation is an eminent social category. (Tokin 1932.. p. 2..1) As the deliberations in Kadro indicate, there was no fundamental difference in the way in which the Kurdish question was perceived by the mainstream nationalism and left-wing nationalism of the thirties. Both viewed the Kurdish question basically as an issue of the endurance of premodern sodal and economic structures. The only remarkable difference was that leftwing nationalism of the time sustained this view with a language inspired by Marxism of a kind. Left-wing Turkish nationalism reappeared in the early sixties in the weekly magazine Yon (Direction). the most popular journal among the leftist circles of the time. !---s a matter of fact, not only left-wing nationalists but all leftist opponents of the time, including the leftist Kurds, voiced their views in Yon. The Kurdish question was touched on, though vaguely. in Yon first through a discussion on the question of the endurance of feudal relations in the eastern region as well as its underdevelopment. Arguing that the governments of the 1950S followed policies that deepened the regional inequalities. Yon ("Dogunun Kalkmdmlmast 1962..) maintained that the development of the east was one of the most urgent problems of the country. As such, Yon seems to have echoed mainstream Turkish nationalism and identified the Kurdish question with the endurance of premodern social relations and regional backwardness. Yon also conceded, however, that these two problems had an ethno-cultural aspect. In this respect, an article on the "exUe" of fifty-five Kurdish landlords in 1960 is exemplary ('i\.galan Tanlyor musunuz?" 1962..)." This article basically opposed the decision of the government to allow the exUed landlords to return home. Yet it also stressed that

Banditry to Disloyalty

239

all the exiled landlords were Kurdish citizens. In other words, while left-wing nationalism of the time basically perceived the Kurdish question as an issue of the endurance of backward social relations, it also conceded, albeit reluctantly, that the issue had an ethno-cultural aspect. Among the numerous authors who wrote in Yon, it was undoubtedly Dogan Avcloglu, the prime writer and one of the architects of the journal, who best represented both Yon and the left-wing nationalism of the time. In an article entitled "The Kurdish ~estion:' Avcloglu (l966) criticized the attempts to solve the Kurdish question through a policy of enforced integration. Although he acknowledged the importance of the questions concerning the underdevelopment of the Kurdish region and the endurance oflandlordship, he stated boldly that the question also had an ethnic dimension. Hence AvclOglu claimed that the Kurdish question would not be solved merely by means of economic precautions. He confessed that socialists of the time, including himself, could not produce a powerful idea to resolve the issue. He exposed his nationalist inclinations and warned Kurds very boldly: "At this point there is no space for hesitation. We are one nation and we would not forfeit one inch of our land. If there are oblivious persons having separatist aims. may they be mindful! They must know that socialists would fight first for an inch ofland" (AvclOglu 19 66, p. 3). Thus left-wing Turkish nationalism perceived the Kurdish question basically as mainstream Turkish nationalism did. For both, the Kurdish question was an issue of the endurance of feudal relations and regional backwardness. It is still important to note, however. that the left-Wing nationalism of the sixties was different from that of the thirties in that it recognized the ethnic aspect of the question.

TURKISH NATIONALISM AND THE KURDISH Q£ESTION TODAY

It is now manifest that Turkish nationalisms have perceived the Kurdish question in many different ways. The Kurdish question has been identified with such diverse issues as political reactionary. banditry, tribalism, feudalism, regional backwardness, and foreign incitement. Despite this impurity in perception and language, one thing has remained nearly unchanged for all versions of Turkish nationalism: Kurds could become Turkish. In other words, Turkish nationalisms have principally perceived Kurds as Turks-to-be.

240

Mesut Yegen

This perception of Kurds as Turks-to-be has had crucial reverberations in citizenship practices in Turkey. Unlike non-Muslim citizens, Kurds and other non-Turkish Muslim inhabitants of the country did not face massive discrimination in citizenship practices!l While it is untrue to say that Kurds were entirely exempt from such practices, in most cases they were allowed to exercise basic citizenship rights in full so long as they were assimilated into Turkishness!>! The disparity between Kurds and non-Muslim citizens of the republic in exercising citizenship rights was due to one primary factor. Non-Muslims of the country were treated as people who might/would not be assimilated into Turkishness, whUe Kurds were seen within the confines of the project of assimilation. Today the whole picture is changing. The confidence of Turkish nationalisms as to the Kurds' potential of becoming Turkish is not as firm as it used to be. In addition to the standard insulting labels, other signs indicate that the followers of mainstream Turkish nationalism are building a connection of some sort between Kurds and non-Muslims!S In this respect, the usage of the term "Jewish Kurds" has been symptomatic. The compound term "Jewish Kurds" entered the vocabulary of Turkish nationalism immediately after the occupation of Iraq. The banal fact that some Kurdish-speaking Jews live in Israel (Sabar 1982; Brauer 199,) suddenly became popular in the Turkish media with a "minor" change. The fabricated story that some leading Kurdish figures are either converted or crypto-Jews was followed by the allegation that quite a number of Israeli citizens have recently bought land in Kurdish-populated southeastern Anatolia and that a secret Jewish community exists in Urfa (a Kurdish-populated city). Eventually ordinary citizens often came to believe that many Kurds are in fact converted Jews and that Kurds have become the instrument of the alleged ultimate Jewish ideal of controlling the land between the Nile and the Euphrates. My conviction is that the circulation of the term "Jewish Kurds" is a symptom of the doubts of Turkish nationalism regarding the Turkishness of Kurds. The term indicates that the status of Kurds in Turkey vis-a-vis Turkishness is now much closer to that of non-Muslim citizens of the republic. This suggests that mainstream Turkish nationalism's longtime belief in the idea that Kurds are Turks-to-be is now weaker, It is as if the compound term "Jewish Kurds" came into existence just because Turkish nationalism has

Banditry to Disloyalty

241

lost its belief in another compound term: "Turkish Kurds" (its belief in the Kurds' potential to become Turkish).'6 The belief that many Kurds are "Jewish Kurds" is important not solely because it Signals that the Turkish nationalist motto that "Kurds are Turksto-be" is now weaker but also, and more importantly, because it indicates that Turkish nationalists are no longer certain about the loyalty of Kurds. As Turkish nationalism emerged and developed in and as a response to the "painful" decades of territorial losses, it has characteristically perceived the Ottoman Empire's Christian peoples who pushed for separation as "disloyal." This is why the few thousand Greeks and Armenians who remained in Turkey after the foundation of the republic have been under constant surveillance and have been subject to discrimination. The rising view of Kurds as similar to non-Muslims is alarming, for it indicates that Turkish nationalism's image of Kurds is now closer to its image of the non-Muslim peoples of the empire. Some recent signs suggest that not only ordinary Turkish citizens but even the Turkish state, the chief follower and disseminator of mainstream Turkish nationalism, is on the verge of revising its image of Kurds. One notorious sign has been the usage of the term "pseudo-citizens" in a statement issued by the Turkish General Staff immediately after the Newroz demonstrations across Turkey in 2005. Demonstrations that year were unprecedented in terms of both the intense symbolism used and the size of the crowds. Posters of Abdullah Ocalan (the captured leader of the PKK) and the Kurdish flag of confederalism designed by Ocalan for Kurds in the Middle East were both used extenSively during demonstrations in Istanbul, Ankara, tzmir, Diyarbalo.r, Urfa, Van, Mersin, and Adana. Pictures of the demonstrations, which were attended by hundreds of thousands of Kurdish citizens, were quite telling. The intense symbolism in the form of flags and posters indicated that a large number of Kurds felt themselves to be alienated from the Turkish political community. Two Kurdish boys desecrated a Turkish flag during one particular demonstration in Mersin. Immediately after this event, the General Staff issued a response addressed to the "Great Turkish Nation" on March 22,2005: [T]he innocent activities organized in the name of celebrating the coming of spring have been furthered by a group .. . to the extent that

242

MesutYegen

the Turkish flag, the symbol of the sublime Turkish nation ... , was desecrated. In its long history, the Turkish nation has lived good and bad days, betrayals as well as victories. Yet it has never faced such a treachery committed by its own pseudo-citizens in its own homeland. This is treachery. {emphasis added)'7 This statement was significant because public authorities in Turkey for the first time accused individuals who violated the law of being "pseudo-citizens" versus citizens. It is important to note that the statement addressed not just the two young perpetrators who desecrated the flag or the very act of the desecration itsel£ Rather, the statement was directed at the unprecedented symbolism of the Newroz demonstrations of 2005. This was immediately realized and acknowledged by a number of people. Giindiiz Aktan, a former diplomat and a pro-state columnist in Radikal and now a member of parliament (Nationalist Action Party), asserted that it would not be correct to reduce the statement in question to a "flag incident...•8 In his view, "just as the flag is a symbol, the statement also had its own symbolism." The General Staff was not the only public institution to use the term "pseudo-citizens." Several days after the General Staff issued its statement, the senate of Ankara University issued a declaration in response to the recent events, stating that it "condemns ... the desecration of Turkish flag ... by a group of our pseudo-citizens."·9 Following the declaration, an Internet discussion took place between the academic staff at the university and Nusret Aras, the president of the university. The president began his comments with the words "'the flag crisis that started in Diyarbaklr and continued in Mersin."~o This was a misleading phrase because the flag incident did not occur during the demonstrations in Diyarbaktr, the town hosting the largest crowds during the Newroz demonstrations of 2005. Perhaps this phrase should be taken as a slip of the tongue, suggesting that what prompted the usage of the term "pseudo-citizens" was not Simply a "flag incident" but the Newroz demonstrations in their entirety. Another recent event confirms this argument. On November 17, 2.005, warplanes made low-altitude passes over thousands of marching Kurdish citizens in Y'uksekova who were meeting for a funeral of three people shot by security forces during a previous demonstration against the bombing of a

Banditry to Disloyalty

243

bookstore in ~emdinli." The key distinguishing characteristic of this funeral was again the degree of symbolism used. Pictures of the funeral showed once more that many Kurdish citizens have lost their sense of belonging to the Turkish political community. Many demonstrators carried posters ofOcalan and the flag of the PKK. The public authorities did not welcome the deep symbolism of the funeral. This was displayed by another symbolic act: the two warplanes that made four low-altitude passes over the cortege. l ' These incidents suggest that not only some ordinary followers of Turkish nationalism but even some sections of the Turkish bureaucracy are no longer adherents of the longtime motto that Kurds are Turks-to-be. The idea that Kurds would become Turkish through assimilation, just like the other Muslim peoples of Anatolia, does not seem to be as credible as it once was. These signs suggest that some nonofficial and official followers of mainstream Turkish nationalism have lost their confidence in the loyalty of Kurds in Turkey. This shows that a fundamental rupture is gradually taking place in the way in which mainstream Turkish nationalists have perceived the Kurdish question. The bandits of the past are gradually becoming the disloyal "pseudo-citizens" of the present. Not surprisingly, this fundamental gradual shift in mainstream nationalism's perception of the Kurdish question has echoed in the perceptions of both extreme right-wing and left-wing nationalisms. As noted above, for extreme right-wing nationalism, the Kurdish question has basically been an artificial issue incited by foreigners. In this view, the Kurdish question was nothing more than the incitement of some "Kurdish Turks" who somehow had forgotten that they were actually of Turkish descent. Therefore the solution called for equipping those who deem themselves Kurdish with the consciousness of belonging to Turkishness again (Bora and Can 2.000, p. 59). Today, however, extreme right-wing nationalism does not seem to be a firm follower of the idea of "re-Turkification." In the eyes of extreme right-wing nationalism, Kurds are no longer an ignorant people incited by the foreigners. While it did not cease to exist, the gap between the inciters and the incited became less obvious. Extreme right-wing nationalism seems ready to replace its formula "Kurds are the Turks who have forgotten their Turkishness" with "Kurds are an untrustworthy people on Turkish territory." However cautiously the extremists avoided appealing to the public with this new conception, the idea that "Kurds are of an inferior and incurable descent"

244

Mesut Yegen

and that they are disloyal has now become popular among the lay followers of extreme right-wing nationalism.ll Kurds increaSingly have come to be perceived as unassimilable. Likewise, some followers of extreme nationalism now make an analogy between the possible fate of the Kurds and what happened to the Armenians at the beginning of the twentieth century. The idea that Kurds are of inferior descent and that they are disloyal is now also sustained by some nationalists who view themselves as the followers of leftist movements of the sixties. Some groups in Turkish politics now use the name "Turkish Left" and at the same time champion a politics of enmity with respect to Kurds. The weekly magazine Turkish Left (TurkSolu), for instance, suggests rather outrageously that Turkey is now under invasion by Kurds and is full of racist terms insulting Kurds. H It is necessary to note, however, that not all versions ofleft-wing Turkish nationalism are attracted to such extreme views. A current of left-wing nationalism upholds the view that the Kurdish question is actually a problem of foreign incitement and may basically be solved by means of massive assimilation. For instance, for the Workers Party (i~cri Parrisi, iP) of Dogu Perincrek, who was one of the leading figures of left-wing nationalism of the 1970S, today's Kurdish question is not a genuine SOciopolitical problem. Rather, it is a fake issue manipulated by U.S. and EU imperialism. According to Perincrek (:z.oOS, p. 3), the "Kurdish question has been resolved in terms of democratic rights and freedoms" and "our citizens of Kurdish origin have gained their democratic rights in every sphere." This view also has been approved by the central organs of the ip as well ("i~s:i Partisi Merkez Komitesi Karan" 200S). Believing that the Kurdish question has been resolved, the ip now champions the policy of assimilation. For this party, the task today is to finalize the coalescence of Turks and Kurds as one nation.

CONCLUSION

The narrative in this chapter leads to the following conclusions. A fundamental rupture is about to take place in the way in which Turkish nationalisms have seen the Kurdish question. While Turkish nationalists have perceived the Kurdish question in diverse ways, the idea that the Kurds are Turks-to-be and that the Kurdish question may basically be solved by means of assimilation has remained a constant in Turkish nationalist discourses.

Banditry to Disloyalty

245

Today, however, this idea does not seem to be as strong as it once was. Instead all three versions of Turkish nationalism are now flirting with a fundamentally different idea: that the Kurdish question is one of disloyalty. Why did this shift in the image of Kurds from "Turks-to-be" to "those who defy Turkishness" take place? To begin With, the new millennium illuminated a very plain fact: despite the Turkish Republic's success in defeating the armed Kurdish resistance of the 1990S. many Kurdish citizens were stUl not assimilated into Turkish society and. moreover. did not want to be. In fact. many Kurds seemed to have developed a very strong consciousness of being different. Within the last decade growing political support for proKurdish parties in local and national elections and increasing demonstrations by Kurdish citizens show that many Kurds have been resisting assimilation. That has been a major disappointment for all three versions of Turkish nationalisms. which for so long sustained the idea of creating a homogenized. monolinguistic nation from the diverse range of Muslim inhabitants in Anatolia. But this disappointment was not only because Kurds have resisted Turkification. A conviction that Kurds who resist assimilation constitute a significant portion of the total population in Turkey and that they are settled in a particular region of the country furthered the disappointment of Turkish nationalists. It is as if a second territorial-linguistic community. a parallel nation. now exists side by side with its Turkish counterpart. The distress prompted by this unbearable perception is the main reason for the erosion in the long-standing image of Kurds as Turks-to-be. Moreover. in the early 2000S Turkey's candidacy for EU membership and the recent establishment of a federal Kurdish state in northern Iraq have furthered Kurds' consciousness of being different. As Turkey continues en route to EU membership. it is increasingly less viable to pursue a massive policy of Kurdish assimilation, especially one based on forcible means like displacement. In fact, the opposite is more likely. As long as Turkey remains a candidate for EU membership, outside demands to remove restrictions on Kurdish cultural expression will continue to increase. Several reforms in this respect have already been enforced. The government now allows limited state-sponsored and private TV broadcasting in Kurdish and permits the Kurdish language to be taught in select private institutions. Hence Turkey's progress in the process of EU membership seems to be fortifying the present state of Kurds in Turkey as a second territorial-linguistic community

MesutYegen

and has thus also worked to undermine the meta-image of Kurds as Turksto-be. The recent establishment of a federal Kurdish state in northern Iraq has also served to increase the present alienation of Kurds in the Turkish political community. The existence of a (federal) Kurdish state adjacent to the Kurdish provinces of Turkey and the growing cultural and economic ties with the Kurds there seem to have reinforced the self-confidence of Kurdish citizens of Turkey in resisting assimilation. In other words, what has happened in Iraq in the last few years has also increased Kurds' alienation from the Turkish political community, which in turn has weakened the Turkish nationalists' dictum that Kurds are Turks-co-be. To conclude, the domestic and regional events of the last two decades have transformed the Kurdish people in Turkey co a parallel second nation within the borders of the Turkish Republic. This, not surprisingly, has traumatized all versions of Turkish nationalisms that have championed a homogeneous and monolingual political community. Only against this background can we explain why Turkish nationalisms' enduring belief in the dictum that Kurds are Turks-to-be is not as strong as it was and why the bandits of the past have become the disloyal "pseudo-citizens" of today.

NOTES

An earlier version of this essay appeared in Ethnic and Racial Studies 30, no.

I

(2007): 119-51. 1.

2.

For a recent study involving the assessments of all these versions of Turkish nationalism, see Bora (2002). The term "mainstream Turkish nationalism" is used in this chapter to refer to that particular version of Turkish nationalism that has guided the program of building a modern scace and a secular nation-society in Turkey since che beginning of the twentieth century. It was formulated by the bureaucratic and intellectual elite of the early 1900S and since then haS been sustained by the judiciary, diplomats, the military, and even the political parties in power: by the main components of the establishment in Turkey. It has also been a major source of inspiration for the Turkish Constitutions of 192.4, 1961, and 1982. The deliberations of this version of Turkish nationalism on categories such as the nation. Turkishness. and citizenship are elaborated below. There are of course numerous works on this mainstream Turkish nationalism, which is marked by

Banditry to Disloyalty

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

247

an inability to decide between a civic and ethnicist understanding of nation. Kushner (1977) and Heyd (1950) are the twO well-known studies available in English. The Ottoman Palace and palace bureaucracy embarked upon reforms in the army. administration. and finance starting in the late eighteenth century. The reforms in the nineteenth century. however. were far from being incessant and all-inclusive. Reforms were resisted on many occasions. Only afi:er the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 was a comprehensive and resolute reform program followed. For a scholarly examination of nineteenth-century Ottoman politics, see Lewis (1961). Ortayh (198,). and Zurcher (1993). While the reign of Abdiilhamid II (1876-1908) was successful in maintaining the loyalty of Kurds by means of building the Hamidiye Regiments (Kurdish tribal militia) in 18~)I. Kurds revolted a few times afi:er the 1908 Revolution. Soon after the Young Turk government came to power several Kurdish sheikhs submitted a petition asking for the adoption of a Kurdish administration and adopting Kurdish as the language of instruction in Kurdish districts (Olson 1989, p. 17). This was followed by the two revolts that took place in the very first few years of the revolution and were led by Sheikh Said Berzenci and Ibrahim Pasha. the leader of a tribal confederation (Jwaideh 1960. pp. 309-12). Although the nationalist CUP seized power in 1908. Turkish nationalism could defeat Ottomanism only after the Balkan Wars. which ended in 1913 with the loss ofRwnelia. "the heart of the Empire" (Ahmad 1969, pp. 152-53). The Balkan Wars were considered the ultimate confirmation of the failure of the strategy of Ottoman ism to preserve the integrity of the state (ibid.). All translations are mine unless otherwise stated. The Ottoman Empire had experienced a short constitutional period between 1876 and 1878, so the (re)introduction of the Constitution in 1908 represented the beginning of the Second Constitutional Period. The expansion of political representation was not limited to the election of some Kurdish deputies to the parliament. In 1908 the parliament had sixty Arab, twenty-seven Albanian, twenty-six Greek, fourteen Armenian. four Jewish. and ten Slavic deputies (Ahmad 1969. p. ISS). For this shift from the notion of unsur-i asl, to millet-i hakime, see Hanioglu

(1989. pp. 626-44). 10. This was also pointed out by Tank Zafer Tunaya (1988. p. 407). who saw an es-

sential difference between the way the CUP approached the Kurdish question and the way it approached the Armenian and Arab questions. The Kurdish question was taken to be an issue of the amelioration of the socioeconomic conditions of the eastern region. If we translate this remark into the language of this chapter. the Kurdish question was basicaHy a question of ISlahat for the CUP nationalists.

MesutYegen

Muslimization of the Ottoman territory had started earlier. The Ottoman Empire had already lost some of its territories inhabited by the non-Muslim and the non-Turkic peoples before World War I. Likewise, the escape of Muslim masses from the Balkans and Caucasia to Anatolia during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries also contributed to the same process. For the Muslimization process of Anatolia toward the end of the Ottoman State. see Karpat (1985. pp. 60-77). To give some figures, the percentage of non-Muslim population decreased from 55.96 percent at the end of the nineteenth century to 35.2. percent in 192.7 in Istanbul, from 61.S to 13.8 percent in izmir, from 43.6 to 18.4 percent in Edirne. and from 42..8 to 1.2. percent in Trabzon (Behar 1996. p. 64). Overall, while non-Muslims constituted approximately 2.7 percent of the total Ottoman population in 1885 (Behar 1996, p. 46), only 3 percent of the population in Turkey in 192.7 was non-Muslim (Diindar 1999, p. 159). It is also estimated that almost a million people migrated from the Balkans to Turkey in the years between 192.3 and 1939 (Kiri~4j:i 2.000. p. 8). For an overall assessment of this process, see Karpat (1985). Akgiindiiz (1998), and Kiri~4j:i (2.000). 12.. This new spirit, which is composed of a marriage between Turkishness and Muslimhood, was most evident in the population exchanges between the Turkish Republic and Greece after the War of Independence. During this exchange the Turkish-speaking Orthodox Christians were asked to leave Turkey while non-Turkish-speaking Muslims living in the Balkans were admitted into Turkey. According to the Lausanne Treaty signed in 192.3 (Meray 1993. pp. 82.87), Orthodox Greeks who were Turkish citizens were to be exchanged with the Muslims who were Greek citizens. As this striking example suggests, some non-Turkish people living outside of Turkey were admitted into the country, whereas some non-Muslim people living in Turkey were asked to leave. This testifies that Turkishness was open to non-Turks but not to all of them. While Turkish authorities apparently considered Muslimhood to be the key to achievingTurkishness, they saw non-Muslimhood as a "natural" obstacle. Having identified Turkishness with the Muslimhood of Anatolia, the new regime embarked upon the Turkification of the Muslims of Anatolia. For the role of Muslimhood in the constitution of Turkishness. see Ni~anyan (1995), Somel (1997). and Yxldlz (2.001). 13. A clear example of such an announcement is found in the first article of Anadolu ve Rumeli Miidafa-i Hukuk Cemiyetieri (SOCieties for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia: ARMHC). the political organization that led the War ofIndependence between 1919 and 192.2.: 'j\ll the Muslim elements [ethnic groups] living on Ottoman territory are genuine brothers who are full of feelings of respect for and devotion to each other and are respectful to each other's social and ethnic norms and local conditions" (igdemir 1986, p. II3). As

11.

Banditry to Disloyalty

249

the article boldly putS it, the founding organization of the Turkish nation-state was quite firm that it would recognize the ethnic heterogeneity of Turkish society in legal terms. Likewise, the founder of the republic did not hesitate to echo the same recognition. In his view, "various Muslim elements living in the country ... are genuine brothers who respect each other's ethnic, local, and moral norms [laws] .... Kurds, Turks, Lazs, Circassians, all these Muslim elements !ivingwithin national borders have shared interests" (TBMM 1985, p. 73). When the scate of the Kurds was at stake. nationalists were even bolder. Amasya Protokolleri (Amasya Protocols) (Unat 1961). a document signed between the Ottoman government in occupied Istanbul and the representatives of ARMHC in 1919. recognized Turks and Kurds as the two major Muslim communities living on Ottoman land. The recognition of this "objective fact" was supported by the acknowledgment of the Ottoman territory as the home of Turks and Kurds. Defining Kurds as an inseparable element of the Ottoman nation, the document reiterated that the ethnic and social (cultural) rights of Kurds were to be recognized. 14. A notorious example of the program of assimilation was the Settlement Law of 1934. which had the following aim: "The Republic of Turkey could not condone those who would enjoy Turkish citizenship and all the rights that law provided without having a devotion to the Turkish flag. It is for this reason that this law has specified the ways of assimilating such people in the Turkish culture. In the Republic of Turkey. the Turkishness of anyone who says she/he is Turkish must be evident and clear for the Turkish state" (TBMM 1934. 4th Period. 2.3-2.4: 8). For an examination of the Settlement Law of 1934, see Be§ik'ii (1978). 15. A prominent figure of the Turkish nationalism of the period. Yusuf Ak'iura, perceived the Kurdish question in terms of the same conflict (see the discussion below). In his assessment of the Kurdish rebellion of 192.5, Akc;ura (1984 [192.5]. p. 18) scates that "while the Turkish Republic is endeaVOring to become a contemporary scate, legal, social, economic, traditional. and diplomatic obstacles have been encountered. These obstacles are either because the Ottoman state belonged to the civilization of the Orient or because of the degeneration of the Ottoman scate organization. Now those individuals, institutions. and groups representing these obstacles have constituted a sort of front in opposition to the efforts of the Republic .... As observed in the last Kurdish reaction. the Turkish Republic is bound to eliminate this reactionary front in a very short time." 16. This conviction is most obvious in the results of a recent poll showing that the discontent with the recent policies of the United States is the highest among Turkish citizens (compared to the citizens of twenty-one other countries). See http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2.ooS/01/19/.

250

17.

IS.

19. 2.0. 2.1. 2.2.. 2.3.

Mesut Yegen InJune 1963 forty-two Kurds were arrested on the charge of attempting to establish an independent Kurdistan. Among them were leading Kurdish intellectuals such as Musa Anter, Ya~ar Kaya, and Medet Serhat. Note that the perception of the Kurdish question as an issue of regional underdevelopment did not disappear from the discourse of Turkish nationalism of the following years. Instead it became a constant of Turkish nationalism. As Orner Faruk Gencrkaya (1996) shows, the Kurdish question continued to be perceived as an issue of economic integration in the 1980s and 1990S. Many deputies in the parliament viewed the issue as a "socio-economic problem of underdevelopment enhanced by the feudal structure" (Gencrkaya 1996, p. 101). For an examination of extreme right-wing nationalism in this period, see Ozdogan (2.001). For an analysis of extreme right-wing nationalism in the 1960s and 1970s, see Bora and Can (1991). For an assessment of Kadro, see Turke~ (1998). The military coup in 1960 exiled fifty-five Kurdish landlords to non-Kurdish provinces of the country. Although non-Muslims of the country are defined as citizens of the republic. they have not been allowed to exercise all the rights aSSigned to Turkish citizens. Many non-Muslims were fired from their jobs in the bureaucracy (Bali 1999, pp. 2.06-2.7) in accordance with the law enacted in 192.6, which specified Turkishness instead of Turkish citizenship as a requirement to become a state employee. The fourth item of article 788 stated that being ethnically Turkish is a precondition to become a state employee (Aktar 1996. p. II). This law was in force until 1965. Likewise, the gates of some institutions such as the army were closed for non-Muslims. For instance, an announcement published in the newspaper Cumhuriyet (Republic) on July 2., 1935, specified being of «Turkish race" as a necessary condition to be admitted to the Military Veterinary School (Ylldlz 2.001, p. 2.S3). Non-Muslim citizens' estate rights also have been violated occasionally. The Wealth Tax (Aktar 2.000) and the prevention of foundations built by non-Muslim citizens for holding estates are two examples of the violation of this right. For a very helpful study examining the discriminatory citizenship practices that non-Muslim citizens have experienced, see Oran (2.004, pp. 81-104). Non-Muslim citizens of the republic are still subject to such practices, adeast occasionally. Note. however, that not all non-Muslim citizens of the republic have experienced the same trajectories in regard to citizenship rights. Some non-Muslim communities such as Assyrians, Keldanis, and Nasturis have not even been recognized. As such, these communities were not given the lingUistic and religiOUS rights granted to the recognized religious communities (Greeks, Armenians, and Jews). Even these three communities have not experienced their recognized rights in the same manner. The relations between

Banditry to Disloyalty

24.

25.

16.

27. 28. 2.9. 30. 31.

251

citizens ofJewish origin and the state have not been as harsh as those between the state and the citizens of Greek and Armenian origin. For these disparities in citizenship practices, see Oran (2004, pp. 66-70). For a discussion on the bonds between citizenship and ethnicity in Turkey, see Yegen (2004). The Kurds' exemption from discriminatory citizenship practices has not been a categorical one. Many Kurds did encounter such practices when they revolted against the central power. In some cases the estates of those who jOined the revolt were confiscated, and many Kurds faced compulsory settlement. For the legal background of such practices, see the Law about Individuals to Be Deported from East to West of 1927 and the Settlement Law of 1934. In both cases, many Kurds were deported from their native places and the estates of some were confiscated. For an examination of these laws and their consequences, see Tezel (1982. pp. 346-47). Yet it is essential to note that these discriminatory practices mostly took place in what might be called extraordinary cases. In principle, Kurds were allowed to experience citizenship rights without discrimination provided that they assimilated into Turkishness. The representation of the Kurdish leaders Mesud Barzani and Jalal Talabani as tribal chieftains who lack the ability to rule a modern administrative apparatus is now ordinary. Not only are Kurds despised, but they are sometimes plainly insulted. When the governorship election at Kirkuk in May 2.003 was won by the Kurdish candidate, Abdurrahman Mustafa, this was reported by the T urkish newspaper Star on May 2.9, 2.003, with the title "Kerkiirt;' which in Kurdish means "donkey-Kurd." Signs to this effect are not confined to use of the term jewish Kurds." Doubts about the dictum that Kurds are future Turks may often be encountered, especially in the readers' responses to the news regarding Kurds on the Internet. For a few examples of these reader responses, see http://www.hurriyetim.com.trl haber / o"sid~ I@W~ 2.@tarih ~2.005-0 1-27-m@nvid ~S292.42,OO.asp (January 2.7,2.005); http://www.hurriyetim.com.trlhaber/ 0"sid~l@w~3@tarih~200s01-31-m@nvid~530884,o0.asp (January 31,2.005); and http://www.milliyet. com.trhoos/ 01127 / (January 2.7,2.005). http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.trhoos/03/U/617IILasp (March 2.1, 2.005). http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=147472.&tarih=24/0 3/2.005 (March 24, 2.0 0 5). http://www.ankara.edu.tr/yazLphp?yad=2802 (March 24, 2.005). http://www.ankara.edu.tr/yazi.php?yad=2838 (March 30, 2.005). According to the Human Rights Association report, "in ~emdinli on November 9, 2005, three people threw a hand grenade to a bookstore and killed one of the three persons in the store and wounded another." It also stated that "the assailants were apprehended as a result of the pursuit of the other person in the bookstore and the local people while they were getting in a car. Following

252

Mesut Yegen

the finding of three AK-47 assault rifles in the trunk of the car of the apprehended men the public prosecutor of the town launched an investigation, but as he started exploration in the SpOt of the incident another civilian was shot to death and four others were wounded after being fired upon." See http://www. ihclorg.tr/repspec/semdinli/semdinlireport.html (March IS, 2.ooS). 32.. http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=170375 (November IS, 2.oos). 33. For a few examples, see http://www.atsizcilar.comlforum/kirolarin-hainliklerive-ibret-alinmasi-gerekenyasanmis-olaylar-60l7.htm1?s=I8oa96bSl0ge7bcd418 l3ls6eIedsdee& (January 14, 2.006). 34. For such articles, see FIrat (loosa, lO0Sb, lO05C).

11

TOWARD A NONSTANDARD STORY The Kurdish Question and the Headscarj, Nationalism, and Iraq

MURAT SOMER

IN THIS CRITICAL ESSAY

I

PUT FORWARD TWO ARGUMENTS. FIRST,

the Kurdish conflict entered a new period after the summer 2007 elections that resembles the conflict's formative period of 1923-2.6 in the following sense.' Both the possibilities and constraints of peaceful resolution resemble those that appear to have sown the seeds of this conflict in the formative period. Now as then, peaceful and sustainable resolution is closely interwoven with the status of Kurds in the region, especially in Iraq, and with the path of secular modernization. Specifically, it requires that Turkish and Kurdish nationalists and secular and religious-conservative modernizers resolve two "security" (prisoner's) dilemmas explained below.. These dilemmas are not the only mechanisms hindering resolution. But they receive insufficient attention in extant research. The first dilemma arises because Kurds form a trans-state and transnational minority. This creates the possibility of pan-Kurdish nationalism and Kurdish secession. This dilemma must be credibly resolved via democratic processes involving domestic Kurdish political actors and cooperation with regional Kurds and states. The second dilemma arises because political elites who need to build a consensus over a modernization path that is

253

254

Murat Somer

more amenable to ethnic-national diversity and Kurdish difference must resolve their separate conflict over secularism. Otherwise, elite divisions over secularism may undermine democratic processes in the Kurdish conflict. Attempts to recognize Kurdish difference within a framework of Islamic solidarity, by emphasizing the public role of religion, may reinforce the conflict over secularism. It is also questionable whether religious solidarity alone can be an effective recipe for an identity-based political conflict. Because of these two dilemmas, two factors had and continue to have a major effect on the evolution of the Kurdish conflict: relations with Iraq (and its superpower patron), Iran, and Syria; and elite competition (and in the present period also middle-class competition) over the secular nature of Turkish modernization. My second main argument regards how we should study the Kurdish conflict. In order to develop rigorous analyses with a potential to produce realistic policy implications, scholars should avoid "standard stories" that describe "self-propelled actors interacting with each other.") Instead the challenge is to build "deep" (nonstandard), causal stories that explain how agents respond to their social, political, and institutional environments, making good choices as much as they can. Standard stories produce descriptive narratives where actors are "self-propelled": they are assumed to act as they do because they are self-motivated to do so. In other words, standard stories transpire as if this was the only way they could transpire. In contrast, nonstandard stories produce causal narratives that account for what happened as well as what could have happened. In Max Weber's terms, they also account for "counterfactuals:' which are "contrary to fact but not to logical or 'objective' pOSSibility" (Levi 1997, pp. 31-32; Weber 194-9 [1905]). Building a nonstandard story requires distinguishing between the Kurdish question and the Kurdish conflict. 'This is important, because the latter was not the only logically or objectively possible outcome of the former. The Kurdish question emerged as soon as some people i~ areas where Kurds lived developed nationalist ideas (such as Kurdish, Turkish, Armenian, and Arab nationalisms), primarily during the nineteenth century. Thus the Kurdish question concerns the issue of what the status of Kurds would have been first within the Ottoman and Persian empires and then in relation to the majorityTurkish, Arab, and Persian states that replaced these multiethnic empires. How could Kurdish nationalists' aspirations to self-government be addressed

Toward a Nonstandard Story

255

in the face of the competing nationalist projects? How feasible were Kurdish independence and autonomy? How could Kurdish ethnic-cultural difference be accommodated? The Kurdish conflict emerged because the Kurdish question was not resolved peacefully and successfully. At least in the Turkish context, the dominant response of the state to the Kurdish question was oppression and denial rather than dialogue and accommodation. Kurdish ethno-political movements made their nationality daims predominantly through violent rebellion, which reinforced the distrust between them and the state. Why did the state and Kurdish movements show these reactions? The causal mechanisms underlying them should be properly explained. The critical claim here is that the Kurdish conflict was not an inevitable result of the Kurdish question because the former was a direct product of nationalism while the latter was not. In the Turkish context, the Kurdish conflict resulted from the domestic and external political-institutional and geopolitical developments in the formative period 192.3-2.6, as elaborated below in building a nonstandard story. In other words, the Kurdish question being the same, it can be argued that a counterfactual and less conflict-prone relation was possible between Kurds and the Turkish nation-state. The challenge is to develop a causal explanation of why such a counterfactual path was not embarked upon. The first step to develop such an explanation is to conceptualize the Kurdish conflict in general terms in a comparative perspective to compare and contrast it with other conflicts in the world. My goal here is not to develop a full-fledged definition, so it is sufficient to mention four conditions that will help me to build a nonstandard story. First, it is a violent conflict mainly between the state and the ethno-political movements that claim to represent the will of a "minority."4 Social-political conflicts among ordinary people from the majority and minority have so far been minimal in the Kurdish case, in comparison to cases like the Irish conflict or Kosovo. S Second, the minority forms a trans-state ethnic-national group in the region. This distinguishes Kurds from cases like the Scots, who do not have ethnic kin in neighboring countries. and makes them resemble the Muslims or Tamils in India. Third, the minority is semimixed with the majority society territorially. socially, and culturally, with a vague legacy of territorial and institutional

Murat Somer

boundaries. 6 Ethnic Kurds are much more mixed with the rest of the society than, for example, the Slovaks and the Czechs were in the former Czechoslovakia. They are not as mixed, however, as, say, the Irish in the United States; they also constitute the dominant ethnic-linguistic group in major portions of the eastern partS of the country. Yet historically clear boundaries of the minority institutions and territory, which are visible in cases like Scotland and Catalonia, are weak in the Kurdish case.? Many Kurdish chieftains had semiautonomy under the Ottomans until the nineteenth century. But vague and variable borders and limited territory excluded major portions of areas where Kurds lived and what Kurds today consider their historical homeland, such as Diyarbahr, which were ruled "directly" from the center. S The term "Kurdistan;' first used by Sultan Sanjar of the (Turkic-ruled) Great Seljuk state in the twelfth century, henceforth referred to administrative units or geographical areas with shifting borders and no necessary ethnic connotation.9 Fourth, accommodating the nationality claims of the minority's ethnopolitical movements requires elite consensus on the nature of the majority society's nation-building and secular modernization. Other cases may also exhibit this characteristic. For example, the Tamils form an ethnic-linguistic group sharing the majority Hindu religion in India. Their status is closely related to the question of how secular and "Hindu" India is and how open secular Indian nationalists are to ethnic-linguistic pluralism. This relationship seems to be particularly strong in the Kurdish case, however, because ofTurkey's peculiar history of modernization. In combination, the four conditions embedded in this definition create major "security" (prisoner's) dilemmas. These dilemmas can account for most of the differences between the Kurdish conflict and other conflicts, such as the seemingly "most different case" of the Scottish question (Somer 2.008).10 These dilemmas have been produced historically during the modernization/ disintegration of the Ottoman and Persian empires. Many features of the Turkish, Kurdish, and other regional nationalisms that at first may seem to result from culture may in fact be institutional by-products of the security dilemmas unleashed during this period. Turkish. Kurdish, and Western external actors have more than sufficient reason to seek to resolve these dilemmas. Up to 40,000 people have lost their lives and hundreds of thousands of villagers have lost their homes since the 1980s because of the direct and indirect consequences of the Kurdish

Toward a Nonstandard Story

257

conflict. The eastern provinces with significant ethnic Kurdish populations remain among the country's least developed areas (Mutlu 2.002; Kurban et al. 2.006). Following a two-decade-Iong violent rebellion, Turkish Kurds gained some important yet limited cultural rights, which mostly came through Turkey's EU accession process since 1999. Democratic deficits and human rights problems associated with the conflict are among the major barriers before Turkey'S democratic consolidation and accession to the ED. Finally, peaceful resolution would help Iraq's stability and regional economic development and reinforce the safe transportation of Iraq's oil and natural gas to world markets through Turkey." Alternatively, the deterioration of the Kurdish conflict could potentially destabilize major portions of the Middle East.

THE FORMATIVE PERIOD: 1923 TO 1926

At the end of this period the new republican regime viewed Kurds and Kurdish culture as fundamental threats and had embarked on a long-term policy of oppression and assimilation. "The regime ruled out a different path that would have attempted to accommodate the Kurdish component of the nationalist struggle through some form of autonomy. administrative decentralization. cultural rights. or other kind of recognition. Some Kurds have fought the Turkish state for such rights or for independence ever since that time. Could the Kurdish question have taken a more pluralist and less violent path in its formative period? Currently. two types of research try to answer these questions. producing standard stories.

Standard Story 1: Self-Propelled Actors One type of research examines historical records and documents with a view to discovering the major actors' goals and intentions in the formative period. How did Atatiirk and nationalists plan to resolve the Kurdish question (Olson 1989; Oran 1990; van Bruinessen 2003)? Kurdish nationalists have long claimed that those Kurds who joined Turkish nationalists in the War ofIndependence (1919-22) had been promised some form of autonomy (Bayrak 2004; Bucak 1991; £kinci 2000. pp. 137-67). The records of the first. wartime parliament are illuminating. Members talked freely about Kurds and "Kurdish rights" as a component of one

Murat Somer

(Muslim-Ottoman) nation (TBMM 1985 [192.0-34]; Somer 2oo7a). British documents suggest that a draft resolution regarding limited Kurdish autonomy was discussed (Olson 1996, pp. 213-23). In a message to the a,rmy, Atatiirk argued that the government would gradually establish local government in "areas where Kurds reside ... in the interest of domestic politicS as well as foreign policy." This would be a part of a general plan to establish local governments wherever there was popular demand and "sensitivity" (TBMM 1985 [192.0-34]. pp. 550-51). He talked of such autonomy to journalists briefly before the proclamation of the republic in 1923, again as part of general decentralization (together with rights for other ethnic-regional groups). Atatiirk wrote about his contacts with Kurdish notables, which led the majority of them to provide active support for the nationalist war." Many Kurds vehemently opposed separation from Turkey and inclusion in what became Syria and later Iraq (Bayrak 2.004. pp. 2.31-32). Writers sympathetic to Kurdish nationalism cite such evidence to maintain that Turkish nationalists promised Kurdish autonomy to co-opt them during the war. only to discard these plans once they consolidated their nation-state. The "causal" narrative implicit in these accounts implies the existence of a preexisting and accepted plan to build a homogeneous Turkish nation and deny Kurdish rights; this plan was implemented by self-propelled Turkish nationalists as soon as they no longer depended on Kurds' support (Ekinci 2.000, pp. 137-62; Bayrak 2.004).'''" Turkish writers tend to downplay the validity and importance of any promises of autonomy, even when they are critical of Turkish nationalist state policies.'s Such historical research is very important to uncover the facts of the period; it also helps to discern what the goals of the major actors were. On its own, however, even the best of such research could only produce limited results toward building a causal narrative. A major portion of the events and actors' thoughts went unrecorded in this tumultuous period. More importantly, actors' goals and intentions do not by ,themselves determine the evolution of political conflicts. These are constrained by structures and mediated by institutions and social and political mechanisms. Actors have limited control over these environments. And their priorities may change as the environment changes. Thus research should incorporate structural conditions (such as geopolitics and demographic changes), theory, and analytical construction.

Toward a Nonstandard Story

259

Besides historical documentation, one important way to explain the fundamental dilemmas in this period is through what Thomas Schelling called "vicarious problem-solving": how would the major actOrs have behaved, given their fundamental goals, different configurations of political and institutional environments, and perceptions of each other (Lichbach 2003, p. 12)? For example, whatever their views were on the Kurdish question. how much importance did it carry for different Turkish nationalists, compared to questions such as secular reforms, the status of non-Muslim minorities. and integrating/assimilating the great influx of new Muslims of Turkish and non-Turkish ethnic origin? Factors that were only indirectly linked to Kurds and to nationalist ideology itself, such as demography. might sometimes have caused actors to change their positions on the Kurdish question. The influx began with the 1774 Ottoman-Russian war and gained major momentum in the second half of the nineteenth century. It came mainly from the Balkans, Crimea. and the Caucasus. Besides economic changes. it was a product of the great "unmixing" of the Muslim and Christian populations that resulted from the overall Ottoman retreat and from the Russian expansion in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Consequently, as of 1922 Muslim refugees and immigrants or their second- or third-generation descendants could represent aiquarter or more ofTurkey's population. Many of these were non-Turkishspeaking (Tekeli 1990; Brubaker 1995; McCarthy 2.001).'6 Accordingly, the question of their assimilationlintegration must have been a major considerationfor Turkish nationalists, in addition to the Kurdish question itself

Standard Story 2: Self-Propelled Nationalisms Vicarious problem-solving can also complement current research on Turkishand Kurdish nationalisms. In recent decades this research has produced a considerable amount of new knowledge regarding the historical trajectories anqmodern constructions of these two ideologies (Oran 1990; Bora 2.002; van.Bruinessen 2003; bzoglu 2004; Vali 2.00S; Zurcher 2.005; Yegen 2.006; .Afulled and Gunter 2007). Especially but not exclusively in popular writing, however, this research hasi~~l1erated two tendencies that weaken its ability to produce causal explatlations and feasible policy implications. The first is the tendency to perso~ifynationalism, as if it was not an ideology or principle but an agent th;!.tmak:es decisions, wants things. learns things. and "collides" with other

260

Murat Somer

nationalisms. A quick review of the language used in current research easily reveals this tendency: intentionally or unintentionally, "nationalism" (as opposed to "nationalists") is often used as the subject of actions and desires." Implicitly or explicitly, this "nationalism as agent" is often treated as the selfpropelled cause of a variety of phenomena ranging from the Kurdish conflict to democratic deficit. It even shapes its own evolution. The second tendency is to examine nationalism mainly as a discourse. An example can be cited from a valuable and informative account of various versions of Turkish nationalism (Bora 2.003). What motivates the study is "accelerated Turkish nationalism in the 19905." This denotes a change that must be explained causally, and its occurrence and extent must be checked against evidence and measured. In order to do so, however, it would be necessary to decide "as what" nationalism should be examined. Should it be studied and measured primarily as a discourse, sentiment. ideology, principle, movement, or something else? What changed during the 1990S, why, and how? Bora argues that "one must consider Turkish nationalism ... as a series of discourses and a vast lexis" where four main nationalist languages "speak using this lexis" (Bora 2.003, pp. 436-37). Accordingly, at some point, he uses the terms "discourse," "language:' and "dialect" seventeen times within two paragraphs describing different versions of Turkish nationalism. Fruitfully, the article also refers to nondiscursive factors such as economic globalization, the end of the Cold War, the Gulf War, and the Kurdish conflict. Nevertheless. the reader is advised to examine nationalism as a "discursive system" and focus on "discursive dynamicS" in explaining it (Bora 2.003, p. 4S0). The point here is not to underestimate the importance of language in understanding nationalism or its role in the expression and internalization of nationalist values. The first point is that nationalist discourse is not the only or the most important manifestation of nationalism and that "language" is probably more an effect than a cause of changing nationalism. Thus it may be a poor measure and explanatin of changing nationalism. Second, in shaping actions, "nationalism as discourse" competes against non-nationalist discourses (such as liberalism or religion) and against material interests. Third, "nationalism as discourse" cannot simultaneously explain political changes and its own shifts. While language plays an important role in facilitating and framing change, it is also true that "unless the facts themselves change, no amount of changing names changes them" (Hobsbawm 2.008, pp. 60-61).

Toward a Nonstandard Story

261

A better approach would be to treat nationalism as a vague ideology or set of principles that affects people's identities, loyalties, acts, and beliefs alongside other ideologies and material and nonmaterial interests. We can then examine its manifestations as discourse as well as social movements, actor choices, institutions, and government policies.

The Policy Implications ofthe Standard Stories The tendencies to personify nationalism and to examine it as a discourse turn the Kurdish question and conflict into nonquestions direcdy produced by either self-propelled nationalists or self-propelled nationalisms. Consequently, solutions are sought in targeting nationalism and nationalist speech per se rather than the political and social causes and causal mechanisms that drive nationalist actions, policies, and expressions. In other words, conflict resolution is hinged upon the "transcendence of nationalism," with all its implications, through transition to a postnational, postnationalist society. As one author argued: It is time to say a last good-bye to the Turkish nationalism which is rooted in the inter-war period-although this does not hold good for a couple of its declared. but unattained, goals: equality, democracy, and a modern secular state under the rule of law. The last goodbye concerns the underlying national identity. Turkluk "Turkishness," based (among the Young Turks) on Muslim Turkish identity and (for Atatiirk and many Kemalists) on an anthropological, ethno-racial identity. If the ethnically and religiously neutral Turkiyelilik ("being from Turkey") is not given pride of place as a cornerstone of Republican identity ... modern Turkey's problematic ambivalence can hardly be overcome. (Kieser 2.006, p. x) I can only agree that Turkey's democracy in general and the peaceful resolution of the Kurdish conflict in particular would greatly benefit from critical reevaluations of nationalist identities and histories from a more pluralist perspective and in light of historical evidence and democratic deliberation. The emergence of identities such as Tiirkiyelilik (and more inclusive and pluralistic versions of other identities such as Turkishness and Turkish citizenship) would both reflect and benefit the development of a more pluralistic

Murat Somer

democracy. These would help to include people who feel excluded by the officially endorsed Turkish identity. The problem is the importance attributed to nationalism and national identity as causes, not outcomes. First, solutions are sought in new identity projects that define who people are. Can the discourse of new identities resolve complex political problems? What would prevent these new identities from evolving into exclusive projects themselves? For example, what would prevent the majority's perception of "being from Turkey" (Tiirkiyelilik) from beginning to exclude Kurds? What would prevent some people from beginning to exclude the Laz because they are only "from Turkey," not Turkish? An alternative causal approach is to focus on improving institutions, structures, and politics, which may produce more inclusive and pluralistic definitions of both new and existing identities. Certainly these new identities and identity definitions would not arise by themselves but would have to be generated by writers, intellectuals, and political leaders. But such efforts cannot resolve political conflicts or, for that matter, make people internalize these identities without improvements in political and social conditions. It should also be acknowledged that the minority and majority societies will always have asymmetric perceptions of identities such as Turkishness. Turks and Kurds do not and need not hold the same perception of what it means to be Turkish or 'rrom Turkey" (Somer 2008). Second, identities are assumed to be constructed and deconstructed at wilL The possibility and desirability of this is often justified by the observation that Turkish nationalism and identity (and, for that matter, other nationalisms and national identities) were top-down elite projects imposed on society.'s While the elite-driven nature of these projects is dear, their success cannot be explained by the will of the elites alone. Most elite-driven identity projects (whether nationalist, religious, or socialist) fail to become popu1ar. Those that last are those that align with the material and SOcial-cognitive changes already occurring within society. Accordingly, political Turkification in the twentieth century appears to have built on, and transformed, a prior process of cultural (in particular linguistic) "Turkification" of the Ottoman society in the nineteenth century. This seems to have been largely a spontaneous process resulting from socialdemographic and ideological transformations, state modernization, the development of Turkism in Russia, and the instrumentalization of Islam as a

Toward a Nonstandard Story

state ideology (Karpat 2.001, especially chapter 16, 2008). As a result of these "real" processes, a new and more comprehensive form of Turkish ethnonationality gained prominence within the Ottoman dynasty, intellectuals. and larger societal segments. Moreover. even if we asswne that nationalist projects initially were purely elite driven. this does not necessarily imply that they can later be changed at will by new elites. Once they become embedded in the worldviews and self-images of ordinary people, identities only change through long-term social-cultural, demographic, and political processes. Processes such as EU integration and economic globalization may, for example. increase the relative weight of subnational, transnational, and supranational identities and worldviews over time. Identities are all multilayered and contested, however, and their contents and levels of contestation change through processes that are yet insufficiently understood (Abdelal et al. 2.006). In popular as well as academic writing, the view of nations as modern constructions tends to take on an additional meaning: "artificial" or "fake." It is indicative that Benedict Anderson's concept of a nation as an "imagined community" is misleadingly translated into Turkish as hayali cemaat, which means "imaginary community:' A more appropriate translation would be tahayyul edilmi/ cemaat or hayal edilmif cemaat, meaning "imagined community."" Lost in translation are real factors such as civil service and print capitalism, which in Anderson's analysis changed people's notions of time and space and enabled the imagination of nations (Anderson 1983). From marriage to gender and religion, social identities are all socially constructed: they were imagined by people at some point in history. This, however, does not necessarily make them "less real" in the sense of being imaginary or transitory. Nationalism may lose relative significance, but it is unrealistic to expect that a transition to a postnational world will occur in the foreseeable future. Nationalisms legitimize not only particular nation-states but also the global ; system of nation-states. Thus transcendence of nationalism hinges on global trends. Emerging powers such as Russia, China, India, and, for that matter, 'J:'llrkey seem to be turning more nationalist rather than more postnationalist. :Sil1.ce :tOOl nationalist expressions have increased in the United States. Even >t4e EU, currently the most powerful postnationalist project. modifies the ex>pres.sion of national identities and interests. rather than eradicating them. )'rh{"banal" implications of nationalism are intact (see Billig 1995. chapter

Murat Somer

s; Plattner 2.003-4). In addition to following global trends, "banal" reproductions of nationalism and national identities are fueled in Turkey by defensive reactions to the Kurdish conflict, EU accession, and integration with the global economy (Somer 2oo7a, 2oo7b). Hence the potential usefulness of hinging the resolution of complex political conflicts upon transition to a postnational society would be quite limited. Toward a Nonstandard Story Why did the formative period produce "defensive" dominant versions of Turkish and Kurdish nationalism that perceived each other as absolute threats ?"O Explaining why can also shed light on how Kurdish and Turkish nationalisms can become more compromising in the future. The folloWing is an attempt to begin to construct a nonstandard story. Most analysts who reject primordialist accounts of nationalism trace the development of Turkish and Kurdish nationalist ideologies to the second half of the nineteenth century, when the Ottoman state tried to modernize and centralize. Turkish nationalists formed an ethnically diverse lot and were mainly concerned with the question of how to rescue the Ottoman state by turning it into a nation-state. They developed ethnic (pan-Turkic) versions as well as cultural-territorial variants. But, to differing degrees. they all drew on the Ottoman legacy and were aimed at turning Ottoman Muslims into a modern nation. Thus Turkish nationalists like Yusuf Ak'Sura put forward nation-building strategies focusing on ethnic and cultural commonalities with Turkic people in the world. Others like Ziya Gokalp put more emphasis on the ideational. religious, and cultural traits uniting Ottoman Muslims in Turkey (Georgeon 2006). In these latter strategies, Turkishness was not employed as a historically fixed, exclusive ethnic category. It was used in a reinvented and more inclusive form, to denote a titular nationality and core ethnic culture. The remaining Ottoman territories on which Turkish nationalists aimed to build a nation had an ethnically diverse population. The aforementioned great influx of ethnically diverse Muslims reinforced this characteristic throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Thus cultural-territorial models became relatively more influential in the way Turkish nationalists imagined the nation. While ethnic models also continued to influence the perception of Turkish identity, even these tried to

Toward a Nonstandard Story

include Kurds in the perverted sense that they often tried to "demonstrate" that Turks and Kurds had common ethnic-racial roots or that many Kurds are or descended from acculturated rural Turks." By comparison and relatively speaking, Kurdish nationalism was aimed at mobilizing a people in a more limited geography with more cultural homogeneity and thus was predominantly ethnic. One of its salient features was Kurdish nationalists' emphasis on Kurdish ethnic difference from neighboring groups. A symbolic example is a letter that was reportedly written by Celadet Bedirhan, a Kurd, to Mustafa Kemal (later Atatiirk). In this letter Bedirhan chastises Turkish nationalists for trying to mix Turkish ethnicity with other ethnicities {Bozarslan 2005, p. 53).» A salient theme in much Kurdish nationalist writing is the resistance to "mixing;' which in republican periods came to imply assimilation for many Kurds. Mixing is often opposed by using biological metaphors such as the "wrongness" of cross-breeding different animal species or "pure-bred" horses with others (Anter 1996). Like Turkish nationalists, many of whom also drew on putative ethnic-racial categories, Kurdish nationalists formed a diverse group and developed ideas emphasizing ethnicity, religion, and political loyalty to differing degrees (VaH 2005; Ahmed and Gunter 2007). But it seems clear that Kurdish nationalists were primarily concerned with the question of Kurdish ethnic-cultural distinction. and political and cultural well-being. in the face of the Ottoman demise and the emergence of Turkish and Armenian nationalisms surrounding them. Politically, they developed autonomist as well as prO-independence versions. The emergence of these nationalist ideas, however, did not automatically create the Kurdish conflict. It did not make them inherently incompatible and conflict-prone. Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms initially had a lot in common. They shared a modernist zeal (Bozarslan 2005). They both had secular and Islamic-conservative variants. They could, for example, merge into one nationalist ideology that draws on a geographical (Turkey) or religiOUS (Muslim) identity or coexist within one nation-state. with Kurds having (symmetrical or asymmetrical) autonomy from Turks or individual cultural rights. This happened in other cases. Pakistan was established as an Islamic republic. as the nation-state of the Muslims of Pakistan, and as a federal republic where regions associated with major ethnic groups and federally administrated tribal areas have significant autonomy from the center. Scots

266

Murat Somer

obtained first administrative then legislative autonomy within the British unitary state, which is evolving into a union state through asymmetric devolution to the Scottish and Welsh regions (Somer 2.008; see also Seymour 2.0 0 4).

The point here is not how stable and successful these other cases became. They show the logical and political possibility of different paths that nationalist movements can take. If the standard stories discussed above were correct, however, we were to believe that Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms and the underlying national identities are peculiar in the sense that they could never follow such paths. Thus it is possible to put forward the following thesis. The Kurdish conflict resulted from six developments in the formative period from 1923 to 1926. This is not the place to "prove" the correctness of this thesis but to show its possibility and relevance for the current political debates. First, Ottoman Kurds were divided among Turkey, Iran, the British mandate of Iraq, and the French mandate of Syria as a result of three developments: the Ankara Treaty (1921); the British defeat of Sheikh Mahmoud Barzanji, who declared himself the king of Kurdistan in Iraq and might have favored unity with Turkey (1922-24); and the Lausanne Treaty (1923), which recognized Turkey as a nation-state and the heir of the Ottoman Empire.~3 These developments changed the geopolitical structures in a way that made a Turkish-Kurdish nation-state less pOSSible. They rendered Kurdish nationalism and irredentism an existential territorial threat to Turkey's political and territorial integrity. Second, the Republic of Turkey was established soon thereafter without any recognition and rights for the Kurds (and other Muslim ethnicities), most of whom fought in the War of Independence. It was also established as a republic rather than, say, a constitutional monarchy where the Ottoman sultan was maintained as a symbol uniting Muslims of different ethnicities and representing tradition. Third, Kurdish nationalists began to organize a rebellion, seeking support from the British, among others!4 Fourth, the republic was founded by a new (second) parliament, which was less representative of ethnic Kurds (and of Islamists and Islamictraditionalists) than the first parliament of the nationalist struggle. The first parliament would have been unlikely to support the radical reforms of

Toward a Nonstandard Story

267

secular modernization that Ataturk subsequently embarked on. One such crucial reform was the 1924 abolition of the caliphate, which was an important religious symbol uniting Kurds with the rest of Turkey. Another reform consolidated secular education and abolished religious schools and brotherhoods that fulfilled significant functions among Kurds, such as education in Kurdish . •••••.. . . Fifth, Kurdish religious figures who resented the regime's secular reforms :uid secular Kurdish nationalists who resented the disregard of Kurdish ethIlidty reacted with the violent Sheikh Said rebellion in 1925, which the state :brutally crushed. This turned the founding elites' suspicions of Kurdish sepdratism into actual fear, while sowing the seeds of a disgruntled group of k~rdish nationalists deeply suspicious of the state and Turkish state nationalism. An important indirect result of the rebellion was the marginalization 6fthose Turkish nationalists who would have harbored more moderate poll~i~s· toward both religion and ethnic diversity and more gradualist reforms ·6rtllodernization and nation-building. While a series of violent Kurdish rebellions followed until the late 1930S, the state launched a series of policies

~itlled at assimilating Kurds. >.iSbcth, "Iraqi Kurds" formally became part of the British mandate of Iraq

iri.I~t6...

xiii

Security Dilemmas over Territory and Values

ii·• .• These six developments jointly created two security dilemmas. A security atl~lllma over territory was created through the transformation of Ottoman

kdMs, who had hitherto been a major component of the Turkish nationalist ~.r6jd:::t; into a trans-state ethno-national group. Within a separate neighbor-

.:4Mstate, Iraqi Kurds could always pursue irredentism. Accordingly, during ):hehegotiations on the Lausanne Treaty, one of the concessions to British ~~irriithat Turkish nationalists resisted most, but conceded, was the separa~i9¥6fMosul province, where ethnic Kurds and Turks constituted a majoritY~fr6.tnTurkey. Turkish and British representatives disagreed over the ratio :9f~t:hnic Kurdish and Turkish populations hut agreed that together they ::?BI1~tit:l.lted a significant majority over the other groups.·s ::iillissecurity dilemma could only be resolved through cooperation with !4-a.q.('Kurds and their British patrons. Kurds who were left within Turkey

~2~ld,/~ave overcome this dilemma by credibly renouncing pan-Kurdish

268

Murat Somer

nationalism. This would have been very difficult to do, however, even if Kurdish actors wanted to do so. Kurdish nationalism was already a mobilized force among some Kurdish elites, although it is unclear how much support it had among the ordinary Kurdish masses. In fact, Kurdish nationalists had good reasons to believe that violent rebellion, which they had resorted to in 192.5, was their chance to obtain concessions from the government. This is what Kurdish elites traditionally did to obtain concessions from the Ottoman government. They might also have hoped that the threat of secession could force the government to concede autonomy. Furthermore, the composition of nationalist elites produced a tradeoff between secular and (ethnically) pluralistic modernization. Turkish nationalists who led the War of Independence agreed on goals such as the establishment of a nation-state that would replace the Ottoman state and be on a par with its Western counterparts. But they had different visions as to how Ottoman, Turkish, secular, and Muslim this nation-state would be. They disagreed over the type of modernization. Religious nationalists opposed radical secular reforms. The nationalist struggle had started in the form of a Muslim nationalism (of Ottoman Muslims, including most Kurds) with many religious figures and conservative nationalists (Oran 1990; Olson 1996; Zurcher 2.005, chapter 14). Many deputies in the first parliament held "a genuine belief that the Kurds should be dealt with by other than forceful means" (Olson 1989, p. 40). But the deputies who would have favored such means were also the ones who favored a modernizing yet Islamic state. They would have embraced more ethnic pluralism within a state emphasizing religious values and a nation bound together by faith and traditional culture. This division created a security dilemma over clashing values ofsecularism between two types of nationalist elites. For both elites, ethnicity and the Kurdish question seemed to be secondary to the question of secularism (secular vs. religious modernization). For secularists, alliance with religious-conservative elites for the sake of ethnic pluralism would have meant less power to implement the secular reforms. For religious-conservative elites, promoting the recognition of the Kurdish component would have made them vulnerable to charges of separatism, thus also weakening their position on the issue of secular reforms. Indeed, the political ramifications of the Sheikh Said rebellion gave the secularist nationalists the perfect exqlse to remove the more "liberal" government ofFethi Okyar and to sideline religious-conservative nationalists.

Toward a Nonstandard Story

269

I am not suggesting that a less secular and more Islamic political model would have resolved the Kurdish question in the long run, especially given the existence of the territOrial security dilemma. Islamic states do not necessarily perform better in resolving ethno-political questions. The foundation of Pakistan as an "Islamic state" did not prevent the secession of the Bengali Muslims later. The point is that the accommodation of the Kurdish claims with less than forceful means, say with some type of administrative decentralization, would have necessitated cooperation between secularist and religious-conservative elites. Such cooperation would have required a consensus regarding the nature of secularism, however, in addition to a consensus over the issue of ethnic pluralism. Nor am I suggesting that the elites in the formative period were ideologically well equipped to address the Kurdish question democratically. For example, the religious-conservative elites were not democrats in today's sense, beyond an instinctive and antirevolutionary tendency to respect the tradition and the will and culture of the "people." I am arguing that-absent the security dilemmas over territory and secularism-some elites would have had the opportunity and predisposition to develop policies more respectful of the Kurdish difference. This could have given rise to more recognition of diversity in one institutional form or another, especially with the development of democracy. It should also be highlighted that opportunities do not automatically translate into actual policies. In the end. a more propitious formative period would have required agency (elites that developed feasible projects to accommodate the Kurdish difference). The same goes for the Kurdish elites. The importance of this point is clearer when we discuss the present period.

THE POST-2.007 PERIOD

Turkey's Kurdish conflict went through several periods between its formative period and the present, which are examined in a growing body of writing. My focus is on the similarities between the current and formative periods. As in the formative period. the question of secular modernization is a salient and decisive challenge for the Republic of Turkey, albeit in importantly modified forms. Today's Islamist and religious-conservative modernizers are as much a product of secular modernization that has occurred since

270

Murat Somer

the formative period as the secular modernizers are. Also, compared to the religious-conservatives of the formative period, their worldviews are significantly shaped by their economic interests, which favor integration with the global economy (Yavuz 2003; 6ni~ 2007). They are also influenced by "the current visions of modernity and postmodernity in the Western world and by the changing visions of Islamism in the world. Meanwhile, secular modernizers who largely led the transition to secular, multiparty democracy face the challenge of reconciling with the current standards of secularism and democracy in the Western world, which are more amenable to religious expressions. They also face the challenge of reconciling with the restrictions and requirements of economic globalization. These standards now allow less autonomy for nation-states and promote more society-centered models of development. Following major public rows with the secularist military-bureaucracy and social groups over secularism in the spring of 2007. the Justice and Development Party (AKP) won a landslide victory in the national elections of July 2007. receiving 47 percent of the national vote. This gave the party and Prime Minister Erdogan a second term in government. Soon thereafter, one of the party's founders, former prime minister and minister of foreign affairs Abdullah Gill, was elected president. The AKP is a reformist and pro-West political party. It combines a moderate or "new" Islamist ideology, which is effective in areas such as public administration, education, and social regulation, with a globalist economic outlook and a Muslim-conservative version of Turkish nationalism. The AKP boasts that about a fifth of its members of parliament are ethnically Kurdish, primarily but not exclusively from eastern provinces. In eastern provinces with substantial Kurdish populations, the AKP increased its share of votes by about ISO percent between 2002 and 2007 (Somer 2008).'6 With about half of all votes in those provinces, it now is the first party. With about 30 percent of the votes in the region. the second party, the Democratic Society Party (DTP). also entered parliament. The DTP is largely controlled by the PKK (Kurdish Workers Party). although it is not a monolithic party and harbors various views and tendencies.'7 The PKK has fought the state for Kurdish self-rule since the l9805. Since then its expressed goals have changed from independence to a vague notion of constitutional recognition of Kurds.

Toward a Nonstandard Story

271

Like secularism, pan-Kurdish nationalism and relations with Iraq are salient questions, as in the formative period. Before the elections, the AKP government resisted increasing pressures from the military and opposition parties for a military campaign against the PKK bases in northern Iraq. Clashes between the PKK and security forces had increased since 2.004, when the PKK ended its unilateral "cease-fire:' and intensified in 2007. The PKK has a significant base within Turkey as well as within Europe and other countries. But its ability to sustain itself and organize attacks increased significantly following the American invasion ofIraq and the development of the de facto autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq. The clashes with the PKK, which had practically stopped since the capture of the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan with US.-Turkish cooperation in 1999, restarted after the occupation. Turkey's refusal at the beginning of the war to allow US. land forces to use Turkish territory impaired Turkish-US. cooperation and boosted the US. alliance with Iraqi Kurds.· 8 This significantly reduced Turkey's clout to influence American policies. Any operations without US. consent could gravely damage the decades-long close alliance between Turkey and the United States. A military operation causing civilian casualties also carried major risks for relations with the EU, which Turkey is trying to join. Especially before the elections, a military operation would have cost the AKP support in eastern provinces, where most people are weary of military conflict and want peaceful resolution. Amid increasing tensions over secularism and political pressures to take action against the PKK attacks, the government neither opposed nor authorized military action. Compared to the opposition parties, which were eager to support military operations, however, the AKP's position looked "pro-peace" and "pro-people," valuing the interests of the ordinary people in the region as much as state security interests. Other factors also helped the AKP garner support among Kurdish and non-Kurdish voters in the east and gave it opportunities to address the Kurdish conflict in the new period. Erdogan had a major advantage of credibility in the region. He presided over the relatively peaceful period since 2002 and did not play any role in government in the violent years of 1991-94. He was elected from the southeastern province of Siirt, where his wife is from. The AKP continued the EU reforms initiated by the previous government and legislated limited yet important cultural rights for Kurdish and other ethnic minorities.

272

Murat Somer

The AKP stimulated development and helped the poor through projects of rural infrastructure and government health and aid programs and through the increased charity activities ofTurkish-Kurdish Islamic faith-based groups. Regional economic well-being was also helped by cross-border trade with northern Iraq. where Turkey is a major investor and supplier. which was supported by the AKP's reluctance to use military measures against the PKK. All in all, the AKP signaled to people that it was willing to adopt a more society-centered approach to the Kurdish conflict that would be respectful of people's ethnic identities and cultures and would give priority to peace and human welfare over state security. The AKP also benefited from the rising Islamic conservatism in the southeast and the neighboring Middle East.'9 Last but not least. the AKP benefited from its rivals' weaknesses. The opposition parties portrayed a security-oriented profile disregarding ordinary people's needs. The DTP focused on the political aspects of the Kurdish question. disregarding socioeconomic problems. The AKP did not introduce any major legal-political initiative for a political solution of the Kurdish conflict, however. disappointing many of its Kurdish constituencies. Nor did it launch any major policy programs to induce systematic socioeconomic development in the east, beyond the aforementioned activities.

Secular and Religious Kurdish Nationalism In general Turkish Kurds are thought to form a predominantly religiousconservative and traditional constituency, especially in the east (van Bruinessen 2..000). Tribal. sectarian. and religious-communal bonds continue to play important roles. Tribal and religious leaders have significant authOrity. Yet ethnic Kurds do not form a monolithic or static population. They are being transformed by social-economic development and global ideological trends. As argued above, one reason why Kurdish nationalist elites failed to mobilize Kurdish masses for a Kurdish-nationalist project during the fall of the Ottoman Empire was their relatively pro-secular and m~dernist outlook. Within the republic. secular Kurdish nationalists pursued alliance with traditional Kurdish elites by downpJaying secular Kurdish nationalism. The transition to multiparty democracy in 1946 provided traditional Kurdish elites with new opportunities for political patronage. Many joined conservative parties on the center-right. In the 19605 a new generation of

Toward a Nonstandard Story

273

Kurdish activists emerged. They were a product of relative socioeconomic development and upward mobility through education and the political opportunities provided by the liberal-democratic Constitution instated after the military coup of 1960. This new generation had a pro-secular outlook, was less dependent on traditional sOcial-religious bonds, and was ideologically shaped by Marxism. Thus a tripartite division emerged among Kurdish nationalists: secularrevolutionary nationalists, traditional (elite) nationalists, and religiousconservative or "Islamist" nationalists. Juxtaposed on these were secular and religious-conservative "loyalists." For the sake of a better word, this refers to people who shunned Kurdish nationalism for one reason or another, whether or not they would like to see more recognition of their ethnic identity. These were seen as "pro-state" or "pro-Turkish" by the nationalists. This profile is still visible today, with vague and porous borders and changing contents. Loyalists joined Turkey-wide social movements and Turkish mainstream parties in the center-right and center-left. Traditional nationalists were organized under illegal parties such as the Turkish KDP (Democratic Party of Turkish Kurdistan). Secular revolutionaries became organized under legal and underground movements such as Tip (Workers Party of Turkey) and DDKO (Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearths). Their secular and leftist orientation provided them with both advantages and disadvantages. On one hand, it enabled them to build alliances with Turkish leftist movements and political parties and to portray the image of a political force that favors social transformation, development, and justice. On the other hand, their secular and revolutionary outlook limited their ability to bond with and mobilize religious-conservative Kurdish constituencies (Watts 2.007). Thus secular Kurdish nationalists have to walk a tightrope: while promoting social transformation, they also have to display their respect for religion and tradition. The PKK can be seen as the violent manifestation of the secular, leftistrevolutionary version of Kurdish nationalism. Like other secular Kurdishnationalist actors, the PKK and the DTP have to downplay their secular revolutionary goals in order to maintain their support base. Similarly, the use of terror is a double-edged sword. While impressing some by demonstrating coercive power to challenge the state and to silence dissident Kurds, it also turns away people who want peace and stability.lo

274

Murat Somer

The AKP's Rise and Opportunities for Peaceful Resolution Against this background, the AKP's popularity among Kurds represents the retreat of secular Kurdish nationalism vis-a-vis twO forces: religiousconservative Kurdish nationalism and a type of Muslim-Turkish or "MuslimTurkey" nationalism that the AKP promotes. While the AKP proclaims its respect for Kurdish rights, for example, it also proclaims the principle of "one nation, one state, and one flag." As such, it represents a more globalist (less defensive and less inward-oriented) and less diversity-phobic Turkish nationalismY But the AKP has to resolve many potential contradictions of interest and ideas that exist between a "Turkey nationalism" and the ability to recognize Kurdish rightS before its constituencies can embrace this new version of nationalism. Yet the nature of the nationalism that the AKP promotes is still in the making. Its content is uncertain and contested, and the party's leaders frequently resort to "defensive" Turkish nationalist symbols and rhetoric.l~ It is still unclear whether or not the party can successfully combine a notion of Turkey-wide patriotism with a "less defensive" Kurdish nationalism and demands for Kurdish rights. Nevertheless, the AKP's strong support among both the majority and minority societies provides a Significant potential for peaceful resolution. What are the chances that the AKP can utilize this potential? Is the AKP's ascendance (and that of its version of Turkish and Kurdish nationalism) a temporary or long-lasting one? The potential for peaceful resolution is constrained by the two security dilemmas discussed above. Insofar as nationalism, rather than the security dilemmas, is the root cause of this conflict, we would expect the AKP to address the Kurdish conflict with different means than those used by other Turkish parties. Insofar as the security dilemmas playa more major causal role, we should expect the AKP to act in ways similar to other parties in regard to issues that are demonstrably related to the security dilemmas. Recent developments point to the continuing importance of the security dilemmas.

The AKP, Iraq, and the PKK After the elections, Erdogan declared his party to be the true representative of Turkish Kurds, with a strong mandate to address the Kurdish question. The party also got his candidate elected to the presidency. Thus, everything

Toward a Nonstandard Story

275

else being the same, the postelection AKP had more ability and was more likely to resist military operations in northern Iraq. Yet, in the aftermath of the elections, the AKP and the military seemed to be in agreement rather than at odds over actions against the PKK. In December 2007 the Turkish air forces attacked PKK targets in northern Iraq. In February 2008 the military launched a major military operation against PKK bases in northern Iraq, which lasted eight days and involved about ten thousand troops. Thus, as soon as the AKP obtained a stronger popular mandate. it employed military power against the PKK in Iraq. The security dilemmas posed by the strengthening of Kurdish nationalism in Iraq in general and by the PKK presence in Iraq in particular affected the government as much as it affected previous governments. In addition, the AKP might have felt that it had to target the PKK in order to increase its legitimacy in the eyes of the secular-nationalist state elites, many of whom believed the AKP to be secretly antisecular. Finally, the AKP also tried to marginalize the DTP. In November 2.007, when prosecutors asked the Constitutional Court to ban the DTP for separatism and links with the PKK, the AKP silently endorsed the case. More Significantly for the subject at hand, the military operations occurred in the aftermath of Erdogan's visit to the United States in November s. 2007, and with active U.S. compliance and intelligence support. 13 This was a new turn in Turkish-U.S. and Turkish-Iraqi relations. Since 2.004 Turkey had unsuccessfully tried to convince the United States and the Iraqi Kurds either to allow a Turkish intervention or to force the PKK out of Iraq themselves. In addition to punishing Turkey for its aforementioned intransigence before the war. the United States feared that an operation would destabilize what it considered to be the most stable and pro-U.S. region in Iraq. More importantly, the United States was trying to balance a seeming clash of Turkish and Iraqi-Kurdish interests. It was unclear whether the target of a Turkish intervention would be Kurdish separatists per se, Kurdish interests in Iraq as a whole, or both. Since the 1990S, when Iraqi Kurds began to develop their de facro self-government with U.S. support, Turkey had made it dear that it would oppose a Kurdish state, which it feared would become a magnet of pan-Kurdish nationalism. Turkey also opposes developments that it perceives to be stepping stones toward Kurdish statehood, especially the

Murat Somer

Kurdish demands to absorb oil-rich Kirkuk. This would make a Kurdish state economically viable and the territorial integrity ofIraq less sustainable. For their part, Iraqi Kurds were wary of helping Turkey, fearing that they would be the next target. They also feared PKK reprisals and did not Want to be seen as fighting "fellow Kurds." Furthermore, they might have felt that without the PKK threat Turkey would have no reason to compromise with them. In other words, the presence of the PKK in Iraq was a valuable, yet very risky, bargaining chip for Iraqi Kurds who wanted to negotiate with Turkey and with other regional states for the recognition of their autonomy. Two ambiguities in the positions of the two sides make them irreconcilable. In the case of Turkey's stance it is unclear whether Turkey opposes Kurdish autonomy or statehood per se or the possibility that such a state would become anti-Turkish and expansionist (i.e.• supportive of pan-Kurdish nationalism). The first position makes Turkish and Iraqi-Kurdish interests mutually exclusive, putting Turkey and Iraqi Kurds on a collision course. The second position allows mutual compromise and makes a positive-sum outcome possible (Somer 2.00S). In fact, an Iraqi Kurdish administration or state that opposes Kurdish separatism in the region (in the same way that Turkey opposes ethnic Turkish separatism in neighboring countries) may prove to be a stabilizing rather than destabilizing force. It may pacify rather than fuel Kurdish nationalist ambitions in the region by eliminating a major grievance driving these ambitions: the claim that Kurds are the only major ethnic group in the region without a state. Due to their geostrategic dependence on Turkey and historical ties. Iraqi Kurds are eager to pursue peace and economic integration with their major northern neighbor as long as their own autonomy is safeguarded.~4

The critical question is how Iraqi Kurds can credibly renounce panKurdism in the future. In this regard, the ambiguity in the Iraqi-Kurdish position has been their relation to Kurdish separatism in Turkey, Iran, and Syria. Regional leader Massoud Barzani frequently made statements giving the impression that his ambitions were not limited to Kurdish interests in Iraq. There was a lack of trust between Turkey and Iraqi-Kurdish leaders. u.s. assurances help to bridge this distrust. Most importantly, however, credibility can be established by concrete actions, including policies vis-a.-vis the

Toward a Nonstandard Story

277

PKK and Kirkuk. Joint economic projects such as pipelines to carry Iraqi natural gas to Turkey and Europe would also nurture mutual tfuSt. All in all, peaceful reconciliation of Turkish and Iraqi-Kurdish interests requires that the parties reach an understanding. Iraqi Kurds should actively and credibly renounce Kurdish separatism in Turkey; Turkey should credibly declare that it accepts Iraqi Kurdish autonomy (Kurdish Regional Government) and supports Iraqi Kurds' economic development; and the United States should commit to opposing Kurdish separatism and irredentism. Erdogan's visit to the United States in November 2007 appears to have involved some kind of an agreement to this effect. The Turkish government made clear that the military operations after the visit that had US. intelligence support exclusively targeted the PKK. Iraqi Kurdish leaders subdued their public criticisms of the Turkish operation. Following the withdrawal of the Turkish troops, the Iraqi president and Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani paid a landmark visit to Ankara. Barzani renounced violence in pursuing Kurdish interests and emphasized the importance of good relations with neighboring countries, apparently with US. prodding.1s Finally, the Turkish military, which had been critical of the government's "soft" stand toward the PKK in particular and Kurdish separatism in general, ceased to express such criticisms. The actual elimination of the territorial security dilemma, however, depends on the future and stability ofIraq. Will Iraq become a stabilized country, with Iraqi Kurds being an autonomous yet integral part of it? Will the Kirkuk question be resolved without destabilizing the region (International Crisis Group 2007)? What will be the policies of President Barack Obama's administration toward Iraq, Kurds, and Turkey? What will the US. demands on Turkey be in regard to containing Iran? Will Turkey be able to meet these demands, and how will this affect Turkish-US. relations?

The AKP, Secularism, and the Kurdish Question Beginning in 2007, Turkish politics and public life became increasingly polarized over the question of secularism. In March 2.008 prosecutors charged the AKP with being a "center of antisecular activities" and asked the Constitutional Court to shut it down. The charges were not unprecedented: between 1946 and 2001 eight other allegedly antisecular parties were banned.

278

Murat Somer

But this was the first time that a party ruling in a single~party government faced such charges. Moreover, the case was unprecedented because domestic "secular" public opinion and the external world were divided over the identity of the AKP and overall much more supportive of it than of previous "Islamist" governments. In fact, the AKP had been hailed by many Turkish and foreign observers as a welcome example of the "moderation" or democratization of political Islam. l6 The party enjoyed significant external support from the United States and the EU and domestic support from secular~liberal intellectuals and business interests. Such support contributed a great deal to the par~ ty's ascendance. In light of this background, what is causing the opposition to the AKP and the polarization over secularism? And how is this affecting the prospects for the democratic resolution of the Kurdish question? Three factors feed the divisions over secularism. First, the powerful military and judiciary are trained to view themselves as the guardians of the strictly secular-republican principles that underlie the legal and political system and view the AKP's intentions as suspect. These principles were laid down during the 1920S and 1930S by secular-modernizing elites. First Atatiirk and then his followers decreed them with a view to consolidating the secu~ lar republic by sidelining religious-conservative opposition. The problem is that the military and judiciary never conceded to democratic amendment of the formal content of secularism, in the sense of relaxing some of its stricter boundaries in accordance with the changing times, even after the consolidation of the republican regime. Rather. the content changed informally, through the practices of conservative governments and the military regime Of I 9 80 -

83· The republican regime had potential for democratizing because its primary goal was to create a modern nation~state on a par with contemporary Western powers. Most of these powers adopted democratic regimes after World War II. Accordingly. the founding Republican People's Party that had previously decreed authoritarian secularism also decreed a transition to multiparty democracy under the leadership of President inonii. It voluntarily allowed opposition in 1946 and a change of government in 1950. Mul~ tiparty democracy, which has been interrupted by the military for relatively brief periods four times since then, has allowed the representation of Islamic~ conservative interests within center~right and Islamist parties. Islamist

Toward a Nonstandard Story

279

parties were frequently sanctioned by the secular establishment. But this happened after they contested elections and participated in local and national governments. The interventions of the military and judiciary in the political system produced two consequences. First, it can be argued that such interventions stifled the strengthening of civil society and politics, which could give rise to powerful civilian secular-democratic actors. For example, the 1980-83 military rule brutally cracked down on all political opposition, but especially on secular-leftist political opposition. Paradoxically, the ensuing gap in the political space was later filled by both Islamists and militant Kurdish nationalists. Second, the interventions generated a power struggle between the militaryjudiciary and Islamists/ religious conservatives, which they both began to perceive as a zero-sum struggle. Paradoxically, this occurred even though Islamic conservatives increaSingly penetrated state institutions and ideology and affected government polices. The military-judiciary deeply distrusted the Islamists, however, even when sanctioning conservative policies such as compulsory religion classes in high schools in the 19805. The Islamists tried to bypass secularist restrictions by attacking the military-judiciary's ideological authority and by trying to penetrate the bureaucracy's personnel and practices. Given this backdrop, no matter how moderate they are, the AKP government's actions are perceived as undermining the military-judiciary and, by association, secularism. In turn, the military-judiciary perceives its privileged status as ensuring secular modernization. This environment hampers the renegotiation of secularist restrictions by civilian-democratic actors even if these actors uphold the essence of the principle of secularism. The second factor feeding the divisions over secularism is the electoral, ideological, and organizational fragmentation and weakness of secularist political parties (Somer 2.oo7b). Given the AKP's quest for acceptance, its electoral victory worked to its disadvantage. First, the election outcome strengthened the moralists vis-a-vis the pragmatists within the AKP, encouraging them to embark on more conservative policies. This helps to explain why Erdogan changed the Constitution, in an attempt to allow women with headscarves on college campuses, without seeking sufficient consensus with opposition parties. The subsequent political crisis culminated in the legal proceedings against the party. Second, the AKP's control of both parliament

280

Murat Somer

and the presidency and its ability to make changes in the Constitution increased the threat perceived by the secularist actors. The weakness of the democratic seculariSt actors should be understood in a broad ideological. organizational, and discursive sense. In particular; the main opposition party (CHP) has failed to communicate effectively with voters and to minimize corruption within its ranks. Furthermore. it has not produced viable social and political projects mat can simultaneously promote secularism. democracy. and continuing economic development and modernization. It also has failed to develop discursive strategies to defend secularism from me point of view of democracy and human rights. For example, the CHP could not offer alternative policies mat would protect the freedoms of both secular women and religious women with headscarves when the AKP defended me rights of the latter in me name of democracy and religious freedom. Thus the CHP gave me impression mat it held the principle of secularism above me principles of democracy and of human rights, such as the right to education. This weakness of secular-democratic checks and balances against the AKP's conservative agenda creates a false dichotomy between democracy and secularism. The supporters of me AKP claim to defend democracy despite secularism, and its critics claim to defend secularism despite democracy. Finally. me ambiguous nature of the AKP's impact on secularism feeds the mutual suspicions. Aside from short-lived attempts such as a move to criminalize adultery. the party did not attempt to change any secular laws. Thus secular concerns result from the government's administrative policies in areas such as education, public recruitment. and local services and indirectly from the way me government's identity affects social perceptions of the mainstream social and political values. Sensing a shift of power from secular to religious political and economic actors, many people may be emphasizing religious symbols for opportunistic reasons. With more recognition of their values and lifestyles by the new political center. Islamic conservative groups, especially religious communities such as Islamic brotherhoods. increase meir public visibility and activism. Simultaneously, secular segments of the society and me secular media pay more attention to the increasing visibility of religion. which is most noticeably symbolized by the Islamic headscar£ This increases meir fears of religious pressures. They are drawn to a defensive and authoritarian version of secularism. which displays itself in pro-secular and

Toward a Nonstandard Story

antigovernment mass demonstrations. Defensive secularist reactions in turn radicalize the AKP supporters, who view them as antagonistic toward their conservative values. These divisions reveal the tensions between the freedom of religion, a major component of the principle of secularism, and freedom from religious pressures. These tensions affect especially but not exclusively women, because social-religious pressures often pertain to gender segregation. Insofar as it is hard to pinpoint the direct and indirect effects of the government on secularism in the social realm objectively, it becomes hard to avoid the growth of mutual threat perceptions. How do the divisions over secularism affect the Kurdish conflict? They divide the social and political actors who could otherwise he expected to cooperate for the resolution of the conflict within liberal democracy. Without the secularism division (and the territorial security dilemma), secular and religious conservative parties could form a grand coalition to democratize the laws on ethnic-national diversity and to implement more inclusive strategies toward the DTP and less coercive policies toward the PKK. This could marginalize the PKK and begin to resolve the Kurdish conflict within liberal democracy. In fact, the coalition government before the AKP was a limited example of such cooperation. It consisted of center-left nationalist, liberal-conservative, and far-right nationalist parties. Among other things, it took actions such as abolishing the death penalty and amending the Constitution. These actions saved the captured PKK leader Ocalan from execution and later made it possible for the AKP to legislate limited Kurdish rights. But by 2.007 such cooperation between the AKP and the CHP had become almost unthinkable because of their rift over secularism. During the 1980s and 1990S Turkish social democrats were the foremost defenders of the "democratic resolution" of the Kurdish conflict. After the AKP came to power, however, the CHP chose to shed its already weakened links to social democracy and focused on a platform of secular nationalism. Simultaneously, the CHP's uncompromising stand in regard to secularism drove the AKP toward the second opposition party in parliament: the Nationalist Action Party (MHP). The two parties jOined forces to legalize headscarves on college campuses. This undermined the AKP's ability to employ more liberal policies vis-a.-vis the Kurdish issue because of the MHP's hard-line Turkish nationalist stand. A similar dilemma afflicted the AKP's

282

Murat Somer

relations with the military. Given its existing quarrel with the military over secularism, the AKP could not afford to open a new front with the military over the Kurdish question. The secularism division also weakened the, government's relations with secular business associations such as the Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (TOSIAD), which could otherwise actively support government policies to resolve the Kurdish conflict through democracy and EU integration. Finally, some actors who could cooperate in the democratic promotion of secularism are divided over the Kurdish conflict. Without this conflict and thus the PKK's control of the DTP, pro-secular actors such as the CHP and the DTP could cooperate in order to balance the AKP's conservative policies with secular-democratic alternatives. Can the AKP resolve the Kurdish conflict on its own rather than through cooperation with other actors? What would happen, for example, if the AKP successfully survived the legal charges against itself and won a decisive victory over its rivals in the upcoming local elections throughout Turkey, including the east ?11 Unless checked and balanced by strong secular-democratic actors (that is, without competition and cooperation with actors such as social-democratic and liberal parties), the AKP would be likely to overemphasize Islamic values and solidarity in its policies vis-a.-vis the Kurdish issue. Such policies would undermine the AKP's relations with both secularist institutions and the EU, where significant portions of the public are highly skeptical of Muslims and Islam. Moreover, it is unlikely that the Kurdish conflict can be resolved successfully without the active involvement of explicitly Kurdish actors who represent major disgruntled segments of ethnic Kurds (Somer 2008). While the AKP has many Kurdish members, they subsume their Kurdish identity under the AKP's Islamic-conservative political identity. Finally, the AKP's support among ethnic Kurds, which subsided because of the military operation in Iraq, may further erode ifit fails to formulate and implement feasible policies to address the cultural and political aspects of the conflict.'s

CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter I have argued against the overuse of nationalism as a selfpropelled, causal analytical category. Instead the two security (prisoner's)

Toward a Nonstandard Story

dilemmas discussed deserve more attention. They feed incompatible nationalist actions and undermine peaceful resolution. Thus a well-intentioned public-political campaign opposing a vaguely defined notion of "nationalism" would not by itself be a solution. From Muslim Iran and Turkey to Christian Greece, the nation-states in the region have developed "banal" nationalisms that uphold cultural-linguistic and religious homogeneity and often blend religion and language to mold a national identity. This suggests that the type of dominant nationalisms that emerged in these countries cannot be explained by self-propelled nationalisms. Nor can it be explained by cultural factors such as the legacy of the Islamic notion of the ummah (millet), which historically lumped together different ethnicities under the same category. In one specific sense of nationalism, however, Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms per se impede the peaceful resolution of the Kurdish question in a causal sense. Ernest Gellner (1983, p. I) famously defined nationalism primarily as a political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent, and nationalist sentiment as the anger aroused by the violation of this principle. If the nationalist principle is held to be absolute, if the political unit that nat~onalists seek is a territorial, centralized nation-state, and if people who uphold nationalism adhere to it as an absolute value that may not be compromised against other values and constraints, then Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms become absolutely incompatible. Turks and Kurds share among other things a common territory that they consider to be their homeland. Thus one has to lose in order for the other to achieve its goal of a territorial nation-state. Because there already is a nation-state in Turkey today, Kurdish nationalism becomes a destabilizing force. If this was the only definition of nationalism, then the only way to resolve the Kurdish conflict would be through the (unlikely) transition to a postnational stage. Turkish and Kurdish nationalists could coexist in a less conflicting relationship. however, if they uphold nationalism's political principle not as an absolute but as an ideal that can be weighed against other principles such as democracy, economic well-being, peace, and human rights; if they believe that the political principle of nationalism can be satisfied by institutions btherthan a centralized nation-state, such as autonomy (for minority nationalism) and a decentralized state (for the majority nationalism); and if they

Murat Somer

can prioritize nationalist and competing political, cultural, and religious values, seeking a compromise between the two. Realizing the difficulties of social and territorial separation, for example. Kurdish nationalists could seek first a more democratic regime and then goals such as cultural and administrative autonomy. by using peaceful means. The majority society in general and Turkish nationalists in particular could agree to the accommodation of such goals, for instance, by becoming more amenable to the recognition of cultural diversity, autonomy. and rights. Early discussion of inflammatory issues such as amnesty for PKK leaders might derail the social and political processes of reconciliation. Hence it might be wise for both sides to postpone such difficult questions until other issues that are more amenable to resolution (such as lowering the electoral threshold, amnesty for ordinary PKK members, and bilingual education in Kurdish areas) are addressed and thus create a more peaceful and less polarized political situation. Countries such as Britain and Bulgaria have successfully accommodated their ethnic-national minorities through such policies within democracy, but it would be hard to argue that they transcended nationalism, especially its banal manifestations (Billig 1995; Qzkmmh 2008). The consolidation of European standards of pluralistic democracy and secularism provides opportunities for such accommodation. Mutual fears. distrust, and conceptual gaps that exist between Turkish and Kurdish actors beset this conflict. Majority-Turkish actors fear social and political disintegration; Kurdish-minority actors fear oppression and assimilation. Even the "moderates" of the two types of actors have different understandings ofseemingly mutual goals such as democratization and "equality" (Somer 2.008). The freedoms and checks and balances embedded in consolidated, pluralistic democracy provide the best means to overcome these fears and gaps over time, through peaceful representation, negotiation, and deliberation. Certain current events clearly threaten democracy. When this essay was being written in 2.008, the two parties with the most support in the eastern provinces were both facing legal charges that could cause them to be banned by the Constitutional Court. Such a possibility would create a major deficit of representation and legitimacy.39 This would strengthen radical Kurdish nationalism and Islamism in the region. It could also give rise to a new period of violence and undermine democracy and social peace. I hope that the legal

Toward a Nonstandard Story

28S

and political actors involved in such cases use their agency and capability in pursuit of peace and democracy. Without the resolution of the security dilemmas discussed in this chapter, however, choices that make sense to well-intending actors may also produce unintended consequences. For example, simple provision of Kurdish cultural-linguistic rights or the promotion ofIslamic solidarity between ethnic Turks and Kurds, as opposed to secular state nationalism, would not suffice to resolve the Kurdish question. The Islamic Republic of Iran also has a significant ethnic Kurdish minority along its Turkish, Iraqi, and Azerbaijani borders. It has been more tolerant of Kurdish expressions and long permitted the use of Kurdish in the media and education, compared to the secular Republic of Turkey, which has only recently granted such rights in limited forms (Entessar 2.007)' Yet Iran's relatively more lenient policies toward Kurdish culture did not eliminate the distrust between Kurdish nationalists and the Iranian state. Both Turkey and Iran face entrenched conflicts with Kurdish nationalists and allegedly secessionist Kurdish movements. Unless the underlying security dilemmas are resolved, simple promotion of cultural rights and religious solidarity diminishes neither Kurdish nationalism nor majority state intransigence. More than eight decades ago the inability to achieve simultaneous resolution of the security dilemmas over territory and secularism significantly shaped the evolution of Turkish modernization. Secular Turkish modernization since then has built a secular, multiparty democracy in a predominantly Muslim society that is a candidate for EU membership. But it also transformed the Kurdish question into the Kurdish conflict. Furthermore, secular democracy is not yet consolidated because of the conflict between the prosecular and Islamic-conservative elites and the middle classes over what secularism should entail. In the present period the resolution of the two security dilemmas will once again shape the evolution of Turkish modernization and the Kurdish conflict. Can Turkey and Iraqi Kurds become cooperating partners rather than conflicting enemies? Can pro-secular and Islamic-conservative elites agree on values that would consolidate both secularism and democracy? Can they overcome their divisions over secularism so that they can cooperate on addressing the Kurdish conflict democratically?

286

Murat Somer

Ominously, the resolution of the territorial conflict hinges on a number of external factors, such as the U.S. policies toward Iran and the developments in Iraq. Historically, conflicts over secularism in the Western world required long-term and often violent battles. There is still no precedent for consolidated secular democracy among predominantly Muslim societies. Auspiciously, compared to its formative period, Turkey is now a mature democracy with a semideveloped economy and enjoys significant external support. Thus even seemingly zero-sum debates over territory and secularism have to be framed in terms of positive-sum goals such as democracy and human rights, continuing economic development, and possibly EU membership.

NOTES

I.

2.. 3. 4.

5.

I completed this essay in May 2.008. Many important developments have taken place since then with respect to the Kurdish conflict. I have chosen not to discuss these developments except in a few places because my main goal is to develop a framework of analysis that highlights the long-term structural dynamicS shaping the evolution of this conflict, in particular the two security (prisoner's) dilemmas discussed. The analysis and the critical comments in regard to extant research continue to apply to the present. They also help to predict the future evolution of this. conflict and produce policy implications. Another advantage of not including the recent developments is to show that the analysis was able to predict them, such as the escalation of the conflict with the PKK and increasing signs ofTurkish-Kurdish social polarization. For the concept of security dilemma employed here, see, among others, Dasgupta (1988) and Basu (2.000). Lichbach (2.003, pp. 12.-14). For "deep vs. standard stories," see also Tilly (1999). The term "minority" is used here in a numerical sense, not in a legal-political sense. Drawing on the Lausanne Treaty in 192.3, whereby the Republic ofTurkey was recognized internationally as a nation-state, Turkish law considers only deSignated non-Muslim groups as minorities. Many Kurds view the minority status as pejorative, and many Kurdish nationalists want recognition as a founding nation ofTurkey as equal to Turks. As a by-product of the conRict, however, there have been worrying signs of social polarization and possible violence among civilians. See, for instance, "Tepkide Ollfii KaC;:lyor" (Reactions Go Overboard), Radikal (daily), October 2.8, 2.007. These signs have been increasing since I completed this essay.

Toward a Nonstandard Story

6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

II.

12.

13. 14. IS.

16.

See Somer (2.008) for elaboration and evidence. For comparable cases, see, for instance, Seymour (2.004). Tezcan (2.000), Ozoglu (2004), and map in Hanioglu (2.008). Ibid. The other tWO factors that distinguish the Turkish and Scottish cases are that Turkish and Kurdish moderates lack sufficient autonomy from hardliners and the difficulty of identifying who the moderates are among Kurdish nationalists (Somer 2008). More cooperative relations between Turkey and Iraqi Kurds may reduce Iran's influence in Iraq, while the resolution of the regional Kurdish question requires Iranian cooperation. See Oztiirk (2.007). See also Heper (2.007), who argues that the state policies should rather be seen as attempts to prevent "dissimilation." Though it is true that the policies did not necessarily target the assimilation of private identities, however, they attempted to eradicate public signs of Kurdish ness, such as placenames. Olson (1989, p. 37) notes that during the war Atatiirk built better relations with Kurdish chiefs and landowners than elite Kurdish nationalists could. For an account of Kurdish history writing in different periods, see Bozarslan (2.00S). See also Ahmed and Gunter (2007). For critical accounts from liberal and liberal-conservative perspectives, see Cemal (2003) and Akyol (2.006). See also Oran (1990, pp. 12.2-32) and Heper (2007). After 1922 Muslims from Greece were added to this influx as a result of an "exchange of populations" between the Turkish and Greek governments (An

1995). 17. To my surprise, I noticed that my own writing was at times inadvertently affected by this form. 18. See, for instance, Ne§e Diizel's interview with Ahmet Gigdem (Diizel2008). 19. See, among others, VaH (2.005, pp. 2.2-23). Ozkmmh (2.008) also uses the term hayali, even though he highlights that Anderson does not imply that nations are any more "fake" than other social identities. 2.0. Neither nationalism is monolithic, however, and they contain less defensive beliefs underneath the dominant versions (Somer 2oo7a). 21. For a recent example, see Giirbiiz (2007). See also Yegen (2006). 22. The letter uses the phrase "blood and race;' which in that period was commonly used to denote ethnicity. 2.3. The border with Syria was recognized in 1912 by the Armistice of Mudanya. 2.4. More research is needed to establish how much Ankara was aware of the Kurdish Azadi movement and how seriously it was perceived as a threat, in comparison to other "threats."

288

Murat Somer

2.5. The British cited 455,000 ethnic Kurds and 66,000 ethnic Turks in a total population of 786,000; and Turks cited 2.6,,830 ethnic Kurds and 146.960 ethnic Turks in a total population of 503.000 (Lozan Bart! Konferanst: TutanaklarBelgeler 1993 [192.3], pp. 343-72.). . 2.6. See especially table 5 in Somer (2.008). Turkish censuses do not include questions on ethnicity, so provinces where the pro-Kurdish party got more than 10 percent of the votes are considered to have substantial ethnic Kurdish populations, as an estimate. Those provinces were Adlyaman, Agrr, Ardahan, Batman, Bingol, Bitlis, Diyarbaklr, Hakkari, Igdlr, Kars, Mardin, Mu~, ~anhurfa, Siire, ~lCnak, Tuncdi, and Van. 2.7. Receiving about 4 percent of the national vote, the DTP candidates bypassed the 10 percent electoral threshold by running as independents. 2.8. In March 2.00, the Turkish parliament prevented the government from allowing U.S. land forces to use Turkish territory for the invasion. 2.9. See, for instance, ~tllil1J:alJ:~~()gnition including language rights may lead to increasing levels of ic:olIab(")ratlonamong Kurdish activists in Europe. At the same time, demands J()r~~etrit:ory-bound Kurdish homeland are fading away in Europe. Ethnic gtlid.ishici#zens in Europe, and in particular their European-born children, {ha~~littl~i.incentive to relocate physically to an impoverished "Kurdistan" .th#)#¢~ost-Islamist' Government and a Kemalist State." InternationalAffairs 83h: 289-304. Savumlu, Serpil. 2.006. "301 Kaldmlsm." Evrensel (daily), September 13. http:// www.evrensel.net/arsiv.php. Sever, Metin. 2001. "Merkez Sag Gelecegini Anyor, 7." Radikal (daily), October 19. Smith, Anthony D. 2.003. Chosen Peoples. New York: Oxford UniverSity Press. Tugcu, Huseyin. 1007. "AKP'li Alevi Vekiller 'Din' Kitabma Tepkili." Milliyet (daily), September 16. Vergin,Nur. 2007. '~KPNeden Kazandl?" Neden?NTV.Julp4. Yanardag, Merdan. 2.002.. MHP Deiifti mi? UlkUcu Hareketin Analitik Tarihi. Istanbul: Genda§. YazlclOglu, Muhsin. 2006. "Buyuk Ortadogu Projesi." YeniAszr (daily), December 2;. - - . 2007a. "Biit~emizi IMF Yapar Hale Geldi." YeniAslr (daily), February 4. - - . 2007b. "Orduyu Goreve yaglrmak Vatanperverlik Degerlidir." Interview by Mehmet Giindem. Yeni $aJak (daily), April 10. - - . n.d. "Gerekirse Klbns i~in Yine Sava§lrIz." Speech Delivered at the Education Seminar Organized by Avrupa Turk Kuhur Dernekleri Birligi (Union of European Turkish Culture Associations). http://www.nehir.net/ haber0920.html. Yegen, Mesut. 2007. "Turkish Nationalism and the Kurdish Q!:.estion." Ethnic and

Racial Studies 30h: 119-;1. Yeni Bir Dunya Yeni Bir TUrkiye Ifin Buyuk Buluyma. 200,. Ankara: MHP. Yrldlz, Ahmet. 2001. "Ne Mutlu Turkum Diyebilene" TUrk Ulusal Kimliginin EtnoSekuler Smtrlart 1919-1938. Istanbul: tleti~im.

344

References CHAPTER 9

Ahmed-i Hani. 1975. Mem-u Zin. Trans. M. Emin Bozarslan. Istanbul: Koral. Bozarslan, Mehmet Emin (ed.). 1988.lin. 5 vols. Uppsala: Deng. British Foreign Office. 1985. "Turkey, Iran and the Middle East: 1918-1939:' In Robin Bidwell (ed.), British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Part II, series B. Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America. Fukuyama, Francis. 199;. The End ofHistory and the Last Man. New York: Avon Press. Gellner, Ernest. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell. - - . 1996. "Do Nations Have Navels?" Nations and Nationalism '2./3: 366-70. Golda§, ismail. 1991. Kurdistan Teali Cemiyeti. Istanbul: Doz. Hassanpour, Amir. 199'2.. Nationalism and Language in Kurdistan, IgIS-IgSS. San Francisco: Mellen Research University Press. Jwaideh. Wadie. 1960. "The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Its Origin and Development."Ph.D. dissertation. Syracuse University Kurdistan Terakki ve Teavun Cemiyeti Nizamnamesi. n.d. Pamphlet: n.p. Ozoglu. Hakan. 2.004. Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State: Evolving Identities, Competing Loyalties, and Shifting Boundaries. Albany: SUNY Press. - - . '2.006. "The Impact of lsIam on Kurdish Identity Formation in the Middle East." In Michael Gunter (ed.), Evolution ofKurdish Identity. Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishing. Parliamentary Papers. 1881. "Correspondence respecting Kurdish Invasion of Persia." Paper no. C '2.851. vol. C 361; microfiche no. 87.873-74. ~erdhan, Bitlisi. 1990. $erefoame. Trans. M. E. Bozarslan. Istanbul: Hasat. Sevgen, Nazmi. 1982.. Dogu ve Guneydogu Anadolu'ria TUrk Beyliklen: OsmanlJ Belgelen iie Kurt TUrklen Tanh. Ankara: Turk Kiiltiiriinii Ara~t1rma Enstitiisii. SHopi, Zinar (Kadri Cemilpa§a). 1991. Doza Kurdistan. Ankara: Ozge. Smith, Anthony. 1995. "Gastronomy or Geology." Nations and Nationalism III: 3-2.5· --.1996. "Nations and Their Pasts." Nations and Nationalism '2./3: 358-65. van Bruinessen, Martin. 1992.. Agha, Shaikh, and State: The Social and Political

Structures ofKurdistan. Londonl Atlantic Highlands. NJ.: Zed Books.

CHAPTER 10

"Agalan Tamyor musunuz?" 1962.. Yon 4: 12.-1,. Ahmad, Feroz. 1969. The l1Jung Turks: The Committee ofUnion and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1905-Ig14. London: Oxford University Press. Ak~l1ra, Yusu£ 1984 [192.5]. "Asri Turk Devleti ve Miinevverlere Dii§en Vazife." Safak 34: 12.-19·

References

345

Akgunduz, Ahmec. 1998. "Migration to and from Turkey, 1783-1960: Types, Numbers and Ethno-religious Dimensions." joumal ofEthnic and Migration

Studies six: 97-12.0. Aktar, Ayhan. 1996. "Cumhuriyetin ilk Yillannda Uygulanan 'Trirkle~tirme' Politikalan." Tanh ve Toplum 1;6: 4-18. - - . 2.000. Varlik Vergisi ve "TUrkleftirme" Politikaian. Istanbul: ileti§im. Atslz. Nihal. 1992. [1967 J.Makaleler. Vol. 3. Istanbul: Baysan Baslm ve Yaym. Avcloglu. Dogan. 1966. "Kurt Meselesi." YO'n 194: 3. Aybars. Ergun. 1988. istiklalMahkemeleri (1920-1927) •.izmir: Dokuz Eylii! Oniversitesi Yaymlan. Aydemir. ~evket Siireyya. 1932.. "Derebeyi ve Dersim." Kadro 6: 41-45. Aydm. Siiavi. 2.002.. "Sosyalizm ve Milliyet'ji1ik: Galifeyizmden Kemalizm'e Turkiye'de Oc;iincii Yol AraYl§!an." In Taml Bora (ed.). Modern Turkiye'de Siyasi Dii-iunce: Milliyetfilik. Vol. 4. Istanbul: ileti§im. Bali, RIfat N. 1999. Cumhuriyet Yillarmda TUrkiye Yahudileri: Bir Tur/eleftirme Seruveni (1923-1945). Istanbul: iIeti§im. Behar, Cern. 1996. Osmanlt imparatorlugu'nun ve Turkiye'nin Nufusu IjOO-1927Tarihi istatistikler Dizisi 2.. Ankara: Devlet Istatistik Enstitiisii. Be§ik'ji, ismail. 1978. Kurtlerin Mecburi iskam. Istanbul: Komal Yaymevi. Bora, Taml (ed.). 2.002. Modern Turkiye'de SiyasiDujunce: Milliyetfilik. Vol. 4. Istanbul: iIeti§iin. Bora, Taml. and Kemal Can. 1991. Devlet Ocak Dergah: 12 EylUl'den 1990 'lara Olkucu Hareket. Istanbul: iIeti§im. - - . 2.000. "MHP'nin GiiC; Kaynagl Olarak Kiirt Meselesi:' Birikim 134-35: 5672•

Brauer, Erich. 1993. Thejews ofKurdistan. Detroit: Wayne University Press. Canefe, Nergis. 2002. "Turkish Nationalism and Ethno-Symbolic Analysis: The Rules of Exception." Nations and Nationalism 8h..: IH-55. "Dogl1." 1962.. Yon 3: 5. Diindar, Fuat. 1999. Turkiye Nufos SayJmiarznda Azmltklar. Istanbul: Doz Yaymlan. FIrat, Gok~e. 2.00sa. "Kurt Sorunu Yok, Kiirt istilasl Var." TUrkSolu 88. - - . 2005b. "Kiirt Varsa Sorun Var." TurkSolu 90. - - . 2.005C. "Turk Oglu, Trirk KxZl Turkliigiinii Koru." TurkSolu 89. Genc;kaya, Orner Faruk 1996. "The Kurdish Issue in Turkish Politics: An Overview."

islamic World Report 113: 94-101. Goziibiiyiik. ~eref, and Zekai Sezgin. 1957.1924 Anayasasl Hakkznda Medis GOrUjmeleri. Ankara: AOSBF Yayml. Halh, Re§at. 1972. Turkiye Cumhuriytti'nde Ayaklanmalar 1924-19)8. Ankara: Genelkurmay Harp Tarihi B§k. YaYlOi. HaniogIu, ~iikrii. 1989. Osmanlllttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti vejO'n TUrkluk, 1 (18891902). Istanbul: i1etiJim Yaymlan.

References

346

Heyd. Uriel. 1950. The Foundations of Turkish Nationalism. London: Luzac. igdemir. Ulug. 1986. Sivas Kongresi Tutanaklart. Ankara: TTK Yaymlan. "t~