Switzerland in Perspective: (Contributions in Sociology)

Switzerland IN PERSPECTIVE

Switzerland IN PERSPECTIVE

Edited by JANET EVE HILOWITZ

CONTRIBUTIONS IN SOCIOLOGY, NUMBER 92

GREENWOOD PRESS New York • Westport, Connecticut • London

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Switzerland in perspective / edited by Janet Eve Hilowitz. p. cm.—(Contributions in sociology, ISSN 0084-9278 ; no. 92) Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-313-26089-3 (lib. bdg. : alk. paper) 1. Switzerland—Social conditions—1945- 2. Switzerland—Politics and government—1945- 3. Switzerland—Economic conditions—1945I. Hilowitz, Janet Eve. II. Series. HN603.5.S95 1990 306' .09494—dc20 90-32459 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright © 1990 by Janet Eve Hilowitz All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 90-32459 ISBN: 0-313-26089-3 ISSN: 0084-9278 First published in 1990 Greenwood Press, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48-1984). 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Copyright Acknowledgment Grateful acknowledgment is given for permission to print a modified and abridged version of an article by Christian Lalive d'Epinay, published in the International Social Science Journal, Vol. 107. © Unesco 1986.

For my son David Sasha

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Contents

Illustrations

ix

Introduction Janet Eve Hilowitz 1.

Urbanization and Urban Life in Switzerland Michel Bassand

2.

35

Swiss Trade Unions—A Case of Peaceful Industrial Relations Frangois Hopflinger

4.

19

Political Power and Decision Making in Switzerland Hanspeter Kriesi

3.

1

51

From the Work Ethic to the Search for Self-Fulfillment: The Meanings and the Value of Work and Their Evolution in the Twentieth Century Christian J. Lalive d'Epinay

67

Contents

vni

5.

Swiss Women in the Working World Katharina Ley

6.

Youth: Life Chances and Life Prospects Marlis Buchmann

7.

169

Rural Continuity and Urban Change in the Mountain Regions Frangoise Lieberherr-Gardiol

12.

155

Crime and Crime Control in Switzerland Martin Killias

11.

137

Education in Switzerland Claudio Casparis

10.

117

Life Styles and Social Classes among Elderly People Christian J. Lalive d'Epinay

9.

95

Some Aspects of the Structure and Functioning of the Family in Switzerland Jean M. Kellerhals and Josette Coenen-Huther, with the collaboration of Noelle Languin

8.

81

193

Switzerland's Image Abroad Yves Fricker

207

Index

223

About the Contributors

227

Illustrations

MAPS Switzerland 1.1 Urban Areas of Switzerland

frontispiece 20

TABLES 1.1

Urban Areas in 1980

21

2.1

Federal Government's Share of Expenditure and Employees

37

Party Shares of the Electoral Vote in Elections of the Swiss National Council

38

Strike Involvement: Employees Involved in Industrial Disputes per 100,000 of the Nonagricultural Labor Force

52

3.2

Estimated Density of Union Membership in Switzerland

52

3.3

Attitudes of the Population toward Industrial ''Peace Treaties"

57

6.1

Post-compulsory Education by Type of School

98

6.2

Post-compulsory Schooling by Age and Sex

99

6.3

Post-compulsory Schooling by Type of School and Sex

2.2 3.1

100

x

Illustrations

6.4

Proportion of Female Apprentices and Students in Pre-elementary and Elementary Teaching

101

Proportion of Female High School (Gymnasium) Seniors and University Students

102

6.6

Students by Family Socioeconomic Background

102

6.7

Apprenticeships in Selected Occupations by Educational Attainment

105

6.8

Labor Force Participation by Sex and Age

107

6.9

The Three Most Frequently Contracted Apprenticeships, by Occupational Groups and by Single Occupations, by Sex

107

Gender-specific Segregation in BIGA-recognized Apprenticeships

108

6.11

Female Labor Force Participation by Age

110

6.12

Civil Status by Selected Age Groups and Sex

111

6.13

Divorce Rate per 1,000 Marriages

112

6.14

Female Labor Force Participation, Women 15 Years and Older

114

First Marriages per 1,000 Single Men or Women by Age

115

7.1

Evolution of Female Labor Force Participation

119

7.2

Total Fertility Rates (around 1980) and Divorce Rates (1986) in Swiss Cantons

120

Demographic Indexes Concerning the Family in Some European Countries

121

8.1

History and Space in the Configuration of the Ethos

152

9.1

Number of Fourth-grade Lessons in the Canton of Lucerne, 1986

163

Rates of Burglaries and Robberies Reported to the Municipal Police of the City of Zurich, 1967-1986

172

Rate of Persons and Households Victimized Once or More in a Twelve Month Period in Switzerland

174

International Comparison of Rates of Burglary of Private Homes and of Automobile Theft Over a Twelve Month Period

175

6.5

6.10

6.15

7.3

10.1 10.2 10.3

Illustrations

10.4 12.1

XI

Numbers of Prisoners in Western Europe as of February 1, 1986

180

Typology of the Forms of Countries' Presence in the World '

213

FIGURES 1.1 Social Stratification and Regional Type 2.1

The Development of Political Protest Events in Post-war Switzerland, 1945 to 1978: Traditional Protest, Socialist Protest and New Protest

22

48

9.1

The Basic Structure of the Swiss School System

158

9.2

Enrollment at Different Levels of the Educational Pyramid

160

Demographic Development and Size of Class

164

9.3

10.1 Trend in Rates of Total Convictions, Indictments, and Convictions for Serious Offenses, Cantons of Zurich, Vaud, and Geneva, from 1853 to 1982

170

10.2

Trend in Homicide Rates, 1877 to 1985

171

10.3

Rate of Prisoners, According to Legal Status, 18901941

178

PLATES A view of the city of Fribourg

18

The popular assembly in Glarus

34

A worker in the watchmaking industry

66

Two elderly women

136

A group of young cyclists in the canton of Lucerne

154

City dwellers exploring a mountain village in the Valais

192

Families on a day outing in the Alps

206

A festival on the Bernese Plateau

206

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The Editor offers her thanks to the contributors Professors Christian J. Lalive d'Epinay and Martin Killias; without their assistance this volume would not have reached publication. She also wishes to thank, for their invaluable help, JeanClaude Badel (editorial advice and computer support); Lynn Sedlak Flint (editorial suggestions); the contributors Professors Jean M. Kellerhals and Hanspeter Kriesi for moral support and encouragement; and Professor Lawrence Miller of Southeastern Massachusetts University for his constant sympathetic concern and good judgment. The Editor also wishes to acknowledge with appreciation the generous advice and numerous suggestions contributed by Dr. Isidor Wallimann, University of Bern, and School of Social Work, Basel, who participated in the original planning of this volume, recommended invitations to many of the contributors, and offered helpful editorial suggestions.

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Introduction JANET EVE HILOWITZ Amidst the wealth of English-language social science literature dealing with Western Europe, Switzerland has been sadly neglected. When I could find no volume of essays on this unique but little known country, I decided to fill the lacuna by editing one myself. My own sociological curiosity about Switzerland dated from the early 1980s, when I first lived in Geneva and read about and explored the country. Having already lived in several other Western European countries, I found Switzerland very different in many ways—a perception I knew was shared by other observers, not least of all the Swiss themselves. In some ways Switzerland can be considered a sociocultural laboratory which embodies some interesting and fundamental contradictions and raises some important and perhaps crucial sociological issues. However, it is easy for the uninitiated observer to let the parts stand for the whole without fully grasping all the country's contrasts. When I planned this volume, my feeling was that if Switzerland's social scientists were given free rein and encouraged to use their own words, they would be the best interpreters of these complexities because they would tend to emphasize those issues, ideas, viewpoints and realities they themselves consider most important. The result, I reasoned, would be an accurate, interesting and critical description and analysis of present-day Switzerland. The essayists, all of them Swiss, were asked to bear in mind the English language readership which might have only a passing familiarity with Switzerland and little or no access to original social science sources in any of the Swiss publishing languages. This entailed providing a certain amount of background

2

Switzerland in Perspective

and/or historical material in their essays in order to introduce the subject matter. They were asked to aim for clarity of exposition and synthesis without superficiality. They have achieved these goals admirably, and the resulting essays are serious and thought-provoking. In translation and editing, every effort has been made to respect the writers' wishes and stylistic expression. These essays should thus be viewed as genuine efforts to introduce foreign readers to the latest social scientific perceptions of the Swiss when they look at their own country, and not as attempts to "simplify" Switzerland for foreigners. Switzerland in Perspective is not an appreciation of this picture-postcard country; it contributes to our deeper knowledge and understanding of the inner workings— and the shortcomings and failings—of a society which is wealthy and influential in the world far beyond its relatively small size. Some of the essays in the volume relate to certain ongoing debates often addressed in the scholarly journals and literature of the social sciences and Western European studies. Readers who are intrigued by the question of Swiss exceptionalism and who ask whether the special kinds of democratic political arrangements that characterize Swiss society might perhaps lend themselves to "imitation" abroad will undoubtedly find some food for thought here, but a full exploration of the issue is not an aim of the present work.1 Similarly, although the nature of Swiss neo-corporatist political arrangements has been discussed elsewhere by both Swiss and non-Swiss scholars, the subject is raised here in passing in two important essays but not in the others. A related theoretical question that has attracted the attention of some economists and political scientists—that of whether Switzerland is an unusually "pure" expression of Western capitalism—is broached only indirectly. The serious question-on-the-floor of what the future holds for Switzerland in 1992, given the projected strengthening of the European Community of which Switzerland is not a member, has been left to other scholars elsewhere. However, economists and students of broader European relations will find the volume important background reading. The same observation probably holds true for those forecasting the likely effect on Switzerland of a newly expanded and increasingly dominant Germany. From time to time, the authors represented here compare various economic or social features of Switzerland with those of other countries in order to bring the "Swiss case'' into better comparative focus. Systematic comparison does not characterize all the essays, however, and readers are left free to draw out the broader scholarly or practical implications of Swiss economic, social and political arrangements in accordance with their own experience and interests. Below, I summarize some of the main points of the essays that follow, thus giving a condensed and very general picture of Swiss life and society in order to provide a useful frame of reference for approaching the individual essays. In the conclusion of the Introduction, I briefly discuss some of the main themes that tie the essays together. In the first essay, Michel Bassand presents the main characteristics of urbanization in Switzerland and considers some of the changes that have occurred in both

Introduction

3

cities and society in recent decades. The predominance of the tertiary sector in Switzerland's recent economic development, the traditional dispersion of industries in nonurban areas, and the existence of politically autonomous cantons are largely responsible for the growth of population outside the cities, so that there are now very extensive and internally differentiated urban regions rather than merely "cities" and "towns." About 60 percent of the population live in "urbanized" surroundings, a level of urbanization which is about average for Europe, and Bassand includes maps and a discussion of these urban areas. He also presents a typology of social categories and relates them to their spatial distribution over the territory and their economic importance. Bassand then considers the lifestyles of city dwellers and the major currents of change that affect the urban regions. These include the intensely competitive and international nature of the economy, which separates the population into those who are in the fray and those who stand aside for various reasons; the changed meaning of work and leisure, the latter now viewed as being more important; various demographic changes; and improvements in transportation and communications, which permit a "deconcentration" of jobs and housing from the inner cities and the formation of larger urban regions with "more or less specialized and hierarchical systems of zones and facilities." The lives of city dwellers, as a result, are lived in three separate spaces—residential, workplace, and leisure—and there has also been an increase in social segregation, especially in residential areas. In a concluding section, Bassand explores the possible futures of the metropolis, given the different social transformations occurring and the principal social and political actors involved. He foresees the emergence of a dual society based on two socioeconomic poles, and therefore the continued development of trends discussed earlier in the essay; and he examines the implications of this for the labor force, housing, personal values, and the urban regions. Hanspeter Kriesi discusses the very broad institutional diffusion of power in Switzerland. He also asks how the Swiss political system holds together and briefly presents several integrative mechanisms. Highly diffused power is linked to four institutional peculiarities. First, the 26 cantons into which the country is divided are very different from one another along a number of dimensions and still retain today much of their autonomy, especially in the areas of police, education, religion, welfare, public health and taxation; in addition, they often bear the responsibility for implementing federal legislation. The municipalities, or communes, are also an increasingly important level of government. Next, the party system is highly fragmented, and the four major parties still reflect the main societal cleavages (between Catholics and Protestants, between the social classes). They are really rooted at the cantonal level, and there are only loose party federations at the national level. Third, most administrative and public functions are performed either by private interest associations, which have played a large role in public decisionmaking and implementation, or by sub-federal-level public organs; and the national state is an

4

Switzerland in Perspective

actor of last resort. Kriesi writes of the complex relation between the state and "organized society": "The Swiss state has not politicized the society but has been colonized by a society with a strong political character." And finally, the institutions of direct democracy are many and exist on federal, cantonal, and local levels. Kriesi describes differences between the various forms of participation and their political consequences, noting that their use has greatly increased since the late 1960s. Turning then to the question of how the political system can function, given such diffuse power, he identifies four strategies that act to encourage coordination. Government stability is ensured by a Federal Council (the Swiss cabinet) which is totally stable over a four-year period (and usually much longer in practice), has a rotating presidency, and seats representatives of all the major political forces and language groups. Next, tripartite collaboration between the organizations of capital, labor and the state works differently in Switzerland than in some other European countries. Labor is weak and has been co-opted into policy networks and sector-specific tripartite arrangements. Also, because the state is weak, business interest associations and the unions have, since 1937 and the first "peace treaty," preferred to come to terms with each other without its intervention. Third, organizations and members of the political elite "exert influence of a general kind" across political subsystems, helping to tie them together. Especially important in this regard are the principal business associations, the main union federation, and the Radical party. Finally, in what he refers to as "the domestication of direct democracy," Kriesi describes the many obstacles involved in mounting a successful public referendum or initiative to promote change. In a concluding section, Kriesi briefly mentions—and criticizes—the ideology and complacent self-image of the Swiss polity that eternal consensus has been achieved in Switzerland and points out the existence of "widening cracks in the well-balanced system." He refers to a technocrat-conservative split within the dominant bourgeois camp. He also discusses a popular and self-defeating tendency to vote down progressive legislation in a vain attempt to salvage the remnants of a lost communal past, while at the same time there is a growing and successful use of the public initiative by progressive forces. "In other words," he writes, "the core of the Swiss political system seems to have come increasingly under attack from both the conservative side and from the progressive side of the political spectrum" and "it is still not decided which way the country will go." In the third essay, Francois Hopflinger begins his discussion of Sv/itzerland's system of labor relations by asserting that the country constitutes a "deviant case" among industrialized nations, having enjoyed almost continuous peaceful industrial relations since the signing in 1937 of the first no-strike agreement between the employers' association of the engineering industry and the Watchand Metalworkers' Union, Switzerland's largest trade union. Most unions followed suit after World War II, so that industrial peace is now fully accepted,

Introduction

5

along with a system of binding arbitration. Hopflinger suggests some of the historical conditions which led to the agreement and provides some answers to the related questions of why industrial peace eventually became "the cornerstone of a highly institutionalized structure of industrial conflict resolution" and of why Swiss workers have so completely accepted it. The historical factors favoring the original agreement included the threat of Swiss government intervention in labor disputes in the 1930s to enforce arbitration, and the presence of strong fascist nations on Switzerland's doorstep; in its origin the 1937 agreement may have been a sort of national coalition against fascism, and the same once again against communism after World War II. Subsequently, industrial peace continued to exist because the labor movement was weak and split along religious, party and class lines; social welfare provisions had been granted to the workers; and both employers and the government had fully recognized the unions, which became "an integral and accepted part of a political structure that in the next few decades developed increasingly neo-corporatist characteristics." After briefly discussing the pros and cons of Switzerland's "extremely high level of sociopolitical stability and integration," Hopflinger looks inside the unions and notes a rapid rise in administrative costs over the last three decades, for some time now borne partly by employers, and the rise of some internal dissent in the 1970s. Close collaboration among government, employers and the unions enjoys widespread support, however, for several reasons. One is Switzerland's affluence (although it is not the case, in Hopflinger's view, that industrial peace has contributed significantly to increasing this wealth by keeping wages low). Perhaps more important is the country's intense dependence on the export of high quality, specialized products made by relatively small firms, a dependence that "does not allow for complacency. . . and induces a climate of discipline and a work ethos among employers and workers alike," so that "workers and employers tend to share a common perspective." In this economic environment, it was essential to develop elaborate structures of tripartite cooperation in order to reduce internal antagonism. Swiss workers, for their part, and especially the most organized among them, have relatively high skill levels along with a sense of professionalism and bourgeois values. In the 1970s they also experienced upward mobility—and nationalistic reactions—as the influx of foreign immigrants swelled the lower ranks of the labor hierarchy. In assessing the long-term consequences of industrial peace, which he does in a subsequent section, Hopflinger addresses the question of the unions' posture toward innovation and change. He finds that their collaboration in tripartite institutional mechanisms has not contributed to economic rigidities but that they have, on the other hand, become part of the political establishment and their leaders part of "a dense social network among a limited number of decisionmakers." "Switzerland's main problem," he writes, "is [political] hyperstability" or "sociopolitical corporatism." Industrial peace may also have contributed to the evident apathy among union members. Moreover, the trade unions have not acted suitably to organize women or white collar workers; and

6

Switzerland in Perspective

the latter are represented in quite separate professional associations that now also perform trade union functions. Nor are the trade unions able to deal with emerging issues in creative ways. Christian J. Lalive d'Epinay discusses the shifting meanings of work and selffulfillment in Switzerland in the course of the twentieth century, basing his analysis on research into all the meanings and values of 12 events of national importance that occurred between 1918 and 1980. He traces the meanings and understandings surrounding such issues as working and non-working time, individual responsibility, and the tension between service to society and attention to one's own needs and desires. The period immediately following World War I was characterized by a rigoro work ethic that was nationally subscribed to and united all social classes and actors; and there was a strong and general expectation that the individual assume personal responsibility for his or her future wellbeing. The 1930s saw the decline of this idea of individual responsibility in favor of that of solidarity, which was fueled by the economic crisis and the war and eventually gave rise to social insurance legislation and other measures. After World War II and a period of unprecedented wellbeing, values again shifted, this time to confer more importance on spare (leisure) time than on work, which was removed from its pedestal, and the issues of workers' participation and wellbeing began to be discussed. The individual's personal search for self-fulfillment was now socially validated and included, among other things, a new role attributed to the state as the partial guarantor of the requisite material preconditions. Lalive d'Epinay considers many expressions of this self-fulfillment ethic and the new meaning assigned to work (now often equated with activity) since the 1960s; even where work continues to be highly valued, it is often for the possibilities of self-achievement it holds out. In Lalive d'Epinay's view, the idea of self-fulfillment is destined to remain at the core of the present value system, but other values are also important and a new distribution of rights and duties between the state and the individual is now being shaped. Moreover, serious ecological problems, among others, constrain the individual to act in favor of the collectivity if only to ensure his or her own future survival, thus giving rise to a new kind of solidarity. Katharina Ley's essay explores the position of women in the world of work, in both occupations and professional careers. Ley points out that there still remains a strong cultural preference for married women, and particularly mothers of young children, to remain out of the workforce; that many of the jobs women do perform usually fall into the category of "women's work," i.e., jobs with a strong caregiving, serving or teaching component; that women receive inadequate vocational training for real advancement; that they receive inadequate pay compared with men, even for equal work; and that in recessionary periods they are the first to be laid off. Although women have a strong desire to be present in the workforce, they are making little progress. Ley makes a plea for greater equality of both opportunity and results for both men and women, and

Introduction

7

also for the equal sharing of domestic responsibilities, for the good of society as a whole. Some of the same themes, and others, are discussed by Marlis Buchmann. Buchmann has studied the young people of Switzerland over a thirty year period that has seen the prolongation of schooling, the expansion of advanced education, and more widespread apprenticeship programs. These activities (including apprenticeship) have now become part of the standardized Youth stage of the life course. The growing importance of formal education furthers young people's process of individualization and also increases their real opportunities in a very competitive educational and occupational environment. Although entry into the labor force now occurs later, young people behave more like adults in other life activities, whereas adults for their part must increasingly return to school in order to update their skills and professional competencies. Thus the dividing line between the Youth and Adult life stages becomes hazy. Although young women still lag behind men, they are catching up. Nonetheless, they tend to prefer the shorter vocational training programs, thereby excluding themselves from the more prestigious jobs. They also take less advantage of university education. Looking at gender differences in occupational choice, Buchmann finds relatively little change over a thirty year period. Like Ley, she notes that most women still tend to concentrate their choices in a narrow range, and gender-specific occupational segregation, which was quite marked, is decreasing very slowly. This is so despite "rapid and profound transformations of the economy and the occupational structure." Buchmann predicts that these transformations will most likely involve the diversification and the individualization of the passage from school to work for both sexes, and women in particular will increasingly have to decide on their own what role model they choose to follow. Buchmann notes Switzerland's general participation in recent Western trends regarding marriage, divorce, and child rearing. In this sphere, too, there is a turn away from traditional practice, and it becomes less and less possible to compare various trajectories of the transition to adulthood as examples of the "collective destiny" of the young as a social group. There is a rapid proliferation and change of subcultural life-styles as well as the assignment of new social meanings to Youth understood as a life stage that must be taken on its own terms. In Buchmann's words,' The quest for identity is likely to become a more difficult project." The authors of the essay on the structure and functioning of the family, Jean M. Kellerhals, Josette Coenen-Huther and Noelle Languin, begin by discussing the demographic changes that have affected this institution. They note a sharp drop in the rate of first marriages in the last 25 years, an increase in age at first marriage, relatively low rates of remarriage and very sharply increasing divorce rates. In the areas of marriage and divorce, they find, "Switzerland is not fundamentally different from other countries, although the Swiss marry a bit more and divorce a bit less." There is a low rate of fertility, and Switzerland

8

Switzerland in Perspective

differs from its neighbors only in the low rate of births among unmarried couples. There has been an increase in women in the workforce, especially those in the 35 to 45 year old age group, although more younger women are also remaining in the workforce despite childbearing. Overall, Switzerland has a percentage of women in the workforce comparable with its neighbors. Insofar as the legal framework of marriage and divorce is concerned, however, Switzerland is only now beginning to catch up with other European countries— although divorce by mutual consent does not yet exist. The authors define Switzerland's family law as "a mixture of traditionalism and modernism." The same holds true for other behavioral and attitudinal features of the family. Relying especially on their own intensive study of families in the canton of Geneva, the authors look into the choice of marriage partners, the role expectations surrounding marriage, the division of labor within the home, decision-making patterns, and styles of family interaction. They find that all these tend to vary according to gender, social origin and generation, and they present in some detail the findings of their research into styles of family interaction, which gives rise to a typology of family types. Using this framework, they then explore the norms of distributive justice that tend to operate among family members. These distinctions permit them to characterize the predominant family values and behavioral patterns despite the fact that they do exhibit "considerable diversity." They use their findings about family interaction to test various hypotheses regarding the causes of divorce among a survey population which they studied longitudinally over a ten year period. In an essay on the elderly, Christian J. Lalive d'Epinay notes the importance of the individual's past cultural and life experiences in helping him or her to make sense of present events and respond to them and also the various processes that contribute to the formation of self-identity and worldview. He explores how this applies to the last stages of life for the elderly of various social categories, including small property owners, members of ruling and working classes, and mountain farmers. Basing his remarks on intensive interviews carried out in the canton of Geneva and in the Valais alpine region at the beginning of the 1980s, he finds that in general working class people and farmers have less "acting" and more "acted upon" forms of self expression and views of their lives and of their place in the world than more propertied people. He also talks about the use of space, as for example in the attachment of working-class people and peasants to the space of the neighborhood and the village, and the desire of small owners to have a small and hopefully inviolable "kingdom" of their own. Both history and modernity assume different meanings for different categories depending on the nature of the traditional social order with which they identify, and such differences color their ethos or worldview. Lalive d'Epinay distinguishes three main ethos characterizing the populations with which he and his fellow researchers have been concerned. Claudio Casparis describes Switzerland's educational system in considerable

Introduction

9

detail. Swiss education, and especially its compulsory schooling, is still largely determined by cantonal and local rather than federal choices and ideologies, and each canton has carefully maintained its educational autonomy. Cantonal variations have caused problems for families moving from one part of the country to another. But the variations are now beginning to diminish, owing to the preparation of more complicated curricula by specialists and their gradual utilization by several cantons. The debate about whether one canton should teach the language of another to young children, for example in the case of French and German, remains a lively issue, as does that of how much the various school systems should cater to the special linguistic and other needs of immigrant workers' children coming from other countries. Federal guidelines are more accepted regarding vocational and other types of professional training, medical training, and teaching in the polytechnical institutes, and the latter are federally supported. But the universities and non-compulsory training schools are cantonal. There is, then, no uniform Swiss school system, Switzerland has no national Ministry of Education, and Swiss educational structure is, in Casparis' view, in need of modernization. Looking at the way students move through the system, Casparis finds their choices broadly determined by the institutions themselves at a young age and during the compulsory school years, with different future outcomes in the working world either made possible or blocked quite early. Moreover, a young person's choices, once made, can be changed only with difficulty and often only much later through compensatory training courses. Other features of the educational system are also constraining. Among them Casparis notes the tendency of secondary school admissions policies to be perhaps unduly restrictive; the prevailing ideology that, given equal treatment, individual students should sink or swim on their own merits and that bright students will triumph; the unequal attention given to boys and girls; and the scant attention paid to the needs of working mothers and single parent families. Two cantons, Geneva and Ticino, demonstrate more liberal policies in some of these areas. Casparis also looks at the teaching profession, where he notes an absence of cooperation among teachers and little encouragement of innovation. In discussing the pervasiveness of apprenticeships in the transition from school to the working world, a subject already introduced by both Ley and Buchmann, Casparis remarks on the present attempt to diminish the number of apprenticeshiplinked occupations in favor of broader-based training, a policy objected to by the enterprises, for whom apprentices are a source of low-wage labor. Other trends presently occurring are the attempt to break down the rigid differentiation among the various types of secondary schools, and the increased number of women in advanced levels of schooling. On the whole, however, Casparis notes the conservative functions of the educational structure. "School does not try to change society but functions to reproduce it." In his essay on crime and crime control in Switzerland, Martin Killias presents data to suggest that the country continues to experience comparatively low crime

10

Switzerland in Perspective

rates, despite some increase in recent years, and there is a moderate climate surrounding crime control. The increase that has occurred began in the second half of the 1960s, and is especially linked to drug trafficking in Zurich. Killias updates the work of the American criminologist Marshall Clinard, pointing out that Clinard "conducted his research at a period when Switzerland experienced its lowest crime rate in history"; but he refutes the assertion contained in a recent book by Fleming Balvig that Switzerland has rather high crime rates. Killias then looks at comparative data on specific offenses. He discusses the relatively low homicide rates in relation to the question of gun control and gives reasons why the pervasiveness of military guns in private homes cannot be used as an argument against firm gun control laws. He also presents findings from the Swiss Crime Survey, an extensive victimization survey which he himself has directed since 1984. Crime rates are similar in different parts of Switzerland despite linguistic and cultural differences. The risk of becoming a victim of personal crime and burglary is not negatively correlated with education and income, as it is in the United States, nor with the area of residence, as there tend to be no central city ghettos in Switzerland. The rate of reported crime is high, signifying general public confidence in the police. Killias points out the inadequacy of definitions of white-collar crime, which makes comparison with other countries difficult, and he stresses the need for more research in this area. The same is true for juvenile delinquency, which however seems to have many of the same correlates as in other industrialized nations. Turning his attention to those who enter the criminal justice system, he asks about the frequency with which young Swiss males are convicted and serve prison sentences. Relying on a survey he himself carried out, he finds that the certainty of punishment is rather high compared to other countries, the rate of imprisonment is rather high, and penal policy relies heavily on short prison sentences. He looks at trends in sentencing, imprisonment practices and recidivism in some detail. He also brings up the question of whether the socioeconomic and educational characteristics of the prison population are representative of those of the general population, and he finds no evidence of discrimination against lower classes, although many of the shorter sentences are of middle-class individuals for offenses such as drunk driving. In a final section, he discusses the lack of public support for the death penalty, which was abolished throughout Switzerland in 1942. Franchise Lieberherr-Gardiol contributes an essay on the population of the alpine areas for which Switzerland is so famous. She has done research in a mountain area of the canton of Vaud that lies between Montreux, on the Lake of Geneva, and Gstaad, an internationally famous resort. It is a region of mixed economy, divided between agriculture and (especially winter) tourism. Lieberherr-Gardiol explores the complex dynamics of the mountain villages, which have integrated processes of modernization into their rural and traditional milieu, managing to preserve their own sense of the past, their rural identity and specificity, and their profoundly rural worldview and affective attachments. Thus

Introduction

11

the rural-urban dynamic, which was once overwhelmingly skewed in favor of urban ideas and behavioral models, is now more balanced. Mountain dwellers have a more critical view of the city, whereas city people value the mountains for their open spaces, their recreation and repose, and also for the image the mountain villages still represent for them of a more wholesome and more historically rooted lifestyle. The two poles of this dynamic disagree, however, about how the remaining natural spaces and reserves should be managed; nature in its natural and untamed state is not considered a "viable" or worthy category by those who still practice mountain agriculture. Lieberherr-Gardiol concludes by presenting three different models of the kinds of integration and change occurring in the mountain regions, all three sometimes contemporaneously within a single region: farm ruralism, re-invented ruralism, and mountain urbanism. In particular, she discusses the concept of rural reinvention or reacculturation, involving continuous interaction among contradictory forces, as a way for rural dwellers to seek a new balance and harmony among the many factors that now affect their lives. In the concluding essay, Yves Flicker looks outward at the image of Switzerland held by other countries and especially at the way the Swiss perceive it. The Swiss are, he writes, increasingly uncertain about their place in the world and do not have the same feelings of self-assurance they once had. He situates two critical themes strongly associated with Switzerland—secrecy (including bank secrecy) and withdrawal (including neutrality or political abstention)—in historical perspective and notes that foreign public opinion polls have long given Switzerland a very high rating as a country inspiring admiration, trust, and confidence. From where, then, he asks, does the anxiety felt by the Swiss themselves arise? In attempting to answer this question, Flicker asks about the nature of Switzerland's presence in the world, a subject he approaches by looking at literary and scholarly works. Switzerland, their authors say, is a small state and therefore plays a particular and limited role. Yet it also represents the realization of certain Utopian ideas such as freedom, which in the eighteenth century became known as the ideal vision of Helvetism. Since that time, this illusion or idyllic view of the Swiss past has captivated not only foreigners looking at Switzerland but also the Swiss themselves. Perhaps as a result, Switzerland is today seen as quite important by foreign publics—it is one of those atypical countries in the world that has "a considerable symbolic aura" and "an important mythical dimension" despite the weak media coverage it receives. To some extent this notion of Helvetism stands in for a truly national identity, which in Switzerland is lacking. However, the notion is uncertain and amorphous and leaves the Swiss uneasy, forever seeking its confirmation in the acknowledgment of others. They also perceive the image of their country as a sort of capital which is diminishing through time, not to be replenished. But after passing in review the decline of some components of Switzerland's image, and remarking that, after all, a certain anti-Helvetism has also always existed, Flicker concludes

12

Switzerland in Perspective

that what is actually happening to Helvetism is not its effacement but its metamorphoses. In his final section Flicker discusses what is today one predominant understanding of Helvetism, namely federalism, which authorizes the existence of autonomous communities within a national framework. It is principally because of federalism that Switzerland has represented an ideal for some of this century's major thinkers. The Swiss themselves nourish the myth assiduously "because the myth underlies Switzerland itself. It is indeed in this myth, or more precisely in its realization. . . that the disparate elements in the country are found." And "the grandeur and torment of Switzerland [is] how to maintain at one and the same time the myth that we embody and the reality that we are." If we try to identify some of the unifying processes linking the various contributions to this volume, the two themes that most readily present themselves are change and continuity (or, sometimes, resistance to change). However, the topics discussed also contain many gray areas and many areas where the direction of the future can only be guessed at; as in real life, about which these essays have after all been written, few realities or processes fall unambiguously into only one category. I will attempt here to draw together some of the essays by indicating what appear to me to be some of the principal lines of movement and stability. Switzerland's cities remain small, but there are now extended (and internally differentiated) urban areas that have been encouraged to develop partly by the decentralization of industry. These areas in their turn have had "spillover" influences on the more traditional mountain regions, partly due to tourism—not just the tourism of foreigners but even more that of the urban Swiss in their desire for a leisure refuge. In the course of this contact, as in many parts of the world where an urban-rural dynamic occurs, urban influences predominated, not least of all because life moves at a faster pace in the towns and cities, more wealth is generated there, and innovation and modernity that arise in the cities exert their own fascination. However, in Switzerland's case this imbalance is being adjusted through a reevaluation by both urban and rural dwellers of the mountain lifestyle for what it embodies of continuity and tradition; and a new integration is in the making. This "salvaging" of the past and of montane history and values is certainly important in contributing to and maintaining the myth of Helvetism. The weekend retreat to the mountains is now commonplace. It is also the case that today more emphasis is given to leisure and that the activities pursued in nonworking time are more varied. Nonetheless, whether Switzerland has paralleled other Western democracies in an actual decline of the work ethic rather than simply the changed significance of work and its now more instrumental role is an open question. Lalive d'Epinay describes how an earlier attitude that elevated the role of work and personal responsibility for one's future has, through a series of stages, been transmuted into a preference for self-fulfillment and self-

Introduction

13

actualization. But now other "external" factors—the "guarantor" role of the state and environmental problems, among others—are new dimensions with which to be reckoned. There are no longer the former certainties in this sphere. However, although attitudes and motivations regarding work may have changed, behavior seems not yet to have followed suit. One cannot overlook, for example, the long period of apprenticeship that plays such a large role in the training of most young people and which is hardly found to such an extent in most other countries. Its goal is early and concentrated preparation for a whole working life (although periodic retraining will increasingly be required to keep abreast of the new technologies). The Swiss on the job also still work comparatively long hours. Hopflinger attributes partly to "a climate of discipline and a work ethos" the continued relative harmony of industrial relations. Whether instrumental or not, the endurance of positive attitudes toward work is undoubtedly linked to the increasingly competitive international environment in which Swiss industry must function and the notable degree to which the nation's economic success depends on the capabilities of a skilled "labor aristocracy." The rise of some internal union dissent in the 1970s has not seriously affected this fabled industrial peace, which is one of the cornerstones of Switzerland's image of social and political consensus. Unlike some countries, the trade unions in Switzerland are forces for continuity rather than for change. They play no adversarial role and do not actively strive to unite disparate sectors of the workforce or to improve the prospects for working women. In many respects political arrangements still exert the unifying force of the past, binding together a heterogeneous polity comprising four language groups and two major religions. Political life continues to be marked by the diffusion and fragmentation of power across institutions ranging from the national state through the 26 cantons to the municipalities and communes, not to mention the many interest groups and associations.2 The mechanisms of direct democracy for which Switzerland is so well known abroad are still active. But how effective the unifying forces continue to be is questioned. Under the surface, changes in ideology and values even among those with a decided stake in the system appear to be polarizing the polity in ways Switzerland has hitherto not known. They affect the very nature and pace of real change in the society, against which conservative structures, attitudes and practices are proving entrenched. Doubt is therefore cast on the future of the Swiss political consensus. The enduring conservatism has other implications too, such as those expressed in an observation by Hopflinger: "It may well be that the results of long-term social and political 'stability' are higher levels of individual anomie and apathy among sectors of the working class." One area in which change might be advantageous concerns the economy. Switzerland looks outward and depends more than most countries on close and continuous trade and financial relations with the rest of the world. Its economic wellbeing is especially affected by the intensification of international competition and depends on the creation of new niches in the international economic order

14

Switzerland in Perspective

while preserving those already occupied. Switzerland is now one of the foremost countries in Western Europe using computerized automation in manufacturing. But there are aspects of Swiss society that directly interact with the economy and where continuity predominates over change, aspects that might be collectively referred to as the "human factor." Education and training need modernizing. Notwithstanding the growing importance of advanced education for many young people, by and large the educational systems of Switzerland (for they remain cantonal rather than federal) still do not appear to encourage young people of both sexes to take advantage of the full range of occupational and professional choices available in some other industrialized countries. Many students often proceed early into apprenticeship-oriented studies (and subsequently apprenticeships) instead of receiving the broader education and training that some other countries have found pay off later in terms of worker creativity, flexibility and adaptability to rapid technological change. These straitjacketing tendencies might hinder the nation's need for continuous innovation in research and development. Switzerland's economic success also appears to have offered relatively little to women, and there appears to be strong resistance to change in this sphere. Although more women—including mothers of younger children—now enter the workforce, they are still limited to a narrow range of secondary labor market occupations after short apprenticeships, and even those with university or other advanced degrees are not given the occupational responsibilities and recognition they merit. In many quarters the traditional image of a married woman as homemaker or as merely supplementary wage earner still prevails. The schools also resist change in this sphere: The needs of growing numbers of working mothers (including single parents) are very rarely allowed for. In sum, Switzerland seriously underutilizes the talents and abilities of its women, including its educated women—a shortcoming it shares with several of the rapidly developing Asian countries (and some other Western European countries as well). One area where much change is occurring is in the lives of young people. Many of them, more men than women and even those who subsequently enter apprenticeships, obtain some advanced training before entering the working world. These young people therefore live for longer periods today in a sort of social limbo, neither teenagers nor adults, but often within a competitive academic environment in which, to use Buchmann's words, "they internalize highly individualistic attitudes, orientations and ways of conduct." Education, still an essentially conservative force in Switzerland, is conceived of more and more as a credentialing process rather than for its intrinsic merits, a perspective already very familiar from other advanced industrial countries. Young people increasingly have to carve out their own individual paths toward a working world whose features and demands are rapidly accelerating. One is prompted to ask what structures will help to ensure safe arrival. Consider comparatively in this regard the polar opposites of the Japanese young person, with clear external social controls, a rigorous emphasis on schooling and examinations, and a highly structured trajectory from school to work, and the American teenager, with

Introduction

15

virtually unlimited freedom of choice and all that that implies. One wonders just where Swiss young people will come to be situated along this continuum. The ubiquitous apprenticeship programs undoubtedly play an important conservative role in this regard, structuring as they do for many of the young their first occupational experiences and their insertion into the world of work; but the frequency of apprenticeships looks to be diminished in the not too distant future. Meanwhile, youth values are in transition. For many young people the present no longer finds its meaning chiefly as a passage to adulthood. The focus on immediate gratification grows, and the formation of new and present-oriented subcultural styles may come to characterize the teen years for many young people. One social characteristic that affects all the foregoing changes refers to social interaction in general. Various kinds of social separation appear to be quite institutionalized: within the educational system, among the age categories of the society, within the working world along the lines of gender and occupation, within urbanized residential areas, and even in the differential use of the electoral system across social classes. Some of these divisions are not recent but are now more marked. The separation is also increasing, it appears, between the successful (or those striving for success) and the just-gerting-by, or—to put it differently—between those in the forefront of Switzerland's process of adaptation to the world and the relatively passive bystanders who are, in their own ways, on the receiving end of change. And it is not uncommon now to find references in various quarters to Switzerland's "new poverty." The situation of many of the elderly in particular grows more precarious, state pensions notwithstanding. In the realm of family, marriage and divorce, Switzerland is far from having attained the rates of family change (and disorganization) now found in some other industrialized societies, although it does participate in Western trends. There are some conservative features as well. For example, although a larger variety of living arrangements are now becoming socially acceptable, the growing number of single-parent households still derives from separation and divorce and not from the rapid increase in births to unmarried mothers that typifies some other Western nations. Traditional legislation also persists relative to the rights of spouses. Thus, as in other areas, changes are tempered by tradition and, viewed in comparative perspective, are proceeding with moderation. For many Swiss, the image they treasure of their country—an image increasingly placed in jeopardy by many factors—is of an island of peaceful (and unassailable) calm and respect for tradition in a sea of more or less troubled neighbors. One indicator that confirms at least the peaceful part of this image is the comparatively low crime rate, which is rising only gradually; no changes of major importance have affected Swiss crime and imprisonment patterns in recent years, and there is a high rate of public confidence in the police. The relatively tranquil tenor of life in Switzerland and the general freedom from the threat of victimization naturally contribute to the average Swiss citizen's perception that the country really is one where correct public conduct and the rules of law and consensus reign. The marked preference for security and for orderly

16

Switzerland in Perspective

social living is remarked upon even by casual foreign visitors to any of the larger Swiss towns and cities. The long-term presence of large numbers of foreign workers of all skill levels and many different provenances has not affected this, occasional xenophobic suspicions to the contrary. Notable for their apparent absence are homelessness, urban slums and periphery shantytowns, a generalized and flourishing drug trade, widespread public alcoholism, overt conflicts between any racial/religious/ethnically distinct subpopulations, gun-related violence, and terrorization by youth or mafia gangs—the stuff of everyday lived experience for some other populations. Notable, too, and responsible at least in part for the absence of much of the foregoing, is a low unemployment rate, which in its turn is linked to the country's rigidly restrictive immigration policies. It is no wonder, therefore, that Switzerland continues to inspire admiration, trust, and confidence abroad, notwithstanding the occasional revelations of financial improprieties and immoralities among Swiss banking circles. The Swiss themselves, however, although often labeled complacent, have some fear that their public image may be deteriorating; especially younger and more reflective people feel that their very rich country may have lost its moral bearings. This is a serious issue for Switzerland, because a positive national self-image—as embodied in the enduring myth of Helvetism—plays a critical role in fostering feelings of national identity. Desiring to salvage Helvetism because of its considerable importance, the Swiss must now come to terms with changes in its meaning, on the one hand, and very real changes in their society, on the other.3 Their country, a curious juxtaposition of intensive modernization and tenacious traditions and identities formed over centuries in an alpine redoubt, can no longer continue to live only by virtue of attitudes and structures engendered by or associated with the latter. Paradoxically, and if only to preserve what it can of its traditions, Switzerland is called upon to elaborate and to accept new solutions to new and challenging realities.4

NOTES 1. See, for example, the excellent issue of the journal Government and Oppositi entitled "Can the Confederatio Helvetica Be Imitated?" (23, no. 1 [Winter 198 Jonathan Steinberg, in an essay in that issue entitled "Imitation of Switzerland: Historical Reflections," writes, on looking backward, "Yet thoughtful observers, then and now, have noticed the oddness of Switzerland, what some Swiss and foreign historians have called its 'exceptionalism.' " He also identifies "neutrality, federalism, democracy and wealth" as "the four central characteristics" of Swiss history (pp. 16, 30). 2. In her Introduction to the same special issue of Government and Opposition, ibi Ghita Ionescu writes: "Switzerland is so particularly cloven into endless categories and along endless levels of cantonal, linguistic, religious and functional fracture lines that all the studies which follow here seem to ask one question: when, how and where is the sovereignty of the Swiss state exerted?" (p. 9). Two pages later she refers to the unifyin effect of universal military service:

Introduction

17

The Swiss military preparation is formidable in its method of mobilizing all [male] citizens between the ages of 20 and 60, calling them up regularly for highly specialized retraining. . . . The permanent mobilization of the Swiss population provides a contrasting example of how such an operation can help to bring the 'aristocrats' and the peasants, the young and the old, the rich and the poor, the Germans, the French and the Italians, the Catholics and the Protestants, the bourgeois and the socialists, together into one single national unity, [p. 11] 3. Robert Reich's comments on the role of the national self-image in his recent book Tales of a New America (N.Y.: Times Books, 1987) also seem relevant to Switzerland. America's "self-told mythology," he writes, however integral to the American identity, is so vague as to admit of many interpretations, to present itself in multiple manifestations over time. At different times in our history, different aspects of the parable have come to the fore while others receded... . Every culture has its own parables [,which] come in a multitude of forms... . The basic contours of our mythology organize the way we think about issues. . . . A mythology is a culture's device for interpreting reality and acting upon it. But what if the reality changes and the mythology does not? [pp. 5, 6, 8] 4. In the introductory passages to a paper on Swiss political culture, the Swiss sociologist Hans-Peter Meier-Dallach remarks that "modernization right up to the highest peaks of the Swiss Alps and tradition—at times rather esoteric, idyllic or folkloric, at times rather conservative—stand side by side," and he wonders whether the "typically Swiss compatibility—or symbiosis—of modernity and tradition" will be able to continue.

A view of the city of Fribourg Courtesy of the Swiss National Tourist Office, Zurich

1

Urbanization and Urban Life in Switzerland MICHEL BASSAND In our discussion we will consider the following three questions: 1. What are the main socioeconomic, geographic and demographic features of modernization in Switzerland? 2. How is the everyday life of city dwellers changing? 3. What are the possible futures of the Swiss metropolis? A BACKBONE OF URBAN REGIONS In describing Swiss urbanization, we distinguish the 33 regions or urban agglomerations that have more than 20,000 inhabitants each and the 15 municipalities that are not included in an urban region but that have more than 10,000 inhabitants each. Switzerland's urban population amounted, in 1980, to 61.4 percent of its total population. Map 1.1, Table 1.1, and Figure 1.1 show concretely the nature of this network of urban agglomerations. We consider this urban backbone to be the center of Switzerland. The remaining nonurban regions are the peripheral regions, among which we distinguish those that are industrial, agro-tertiary, agro-industrial, and so on. We give a typology of the Swiss urban regions in order to describe the diversity and the importance of the urban regions belonging to the urban backbone. Let us consider a few aspects of this urban backbone. Since the 1970s, demographic growth has slowed or has stopped altogether. A new phenomenon, which had not been observed for a long time, is that nonurban regions in 1980

Map 1.1 Urban Areas of Switzerland

Source: Geographical Institute of the University of Zurich

Table 1.1 Urban Areas in 1980 Resident population in 1980 33 agglomerations 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32 33.

Aarau Arbon-florschach Baden Basel Belinzona Bern Biei/Bienne Brugg Chiasso-Mendrisio Chur Fribourg Geneve Grenchen Kreuziingen Lausanne Liesthal Locarno Lugano Luzem Neuchatei Often Rapperswil-Jona St Gall Schaffhausen SoJothum Thun Vev9y-Montreux Wil (SG) Winterthur Yverdon Zofingen Zug Zurich

Total agglomerations

number of communes

1.12.1960

1.12.1970

2.12.1980

1.1.1982

13 8 11 26 11 22 16 5 15 6 11 45 3 6 42 6 14 53 11 11 10 2 7 7 14 8 11 4 9 2 6 7 80

49 996 39 080 55 769 326 727 23 973 252 740 75 996 14 886 28 256 31536 41654 265 747 24 320 16 981 195 775 18240 27 388 58 215 127 430 55 343 39446 13 271 112468 50 775 53176 59 068 51919 14 493 94 380 16436 30104 41940 713 025

57 487 43143 68 032 382 983 31726 291597 90 385 19 377 34 848 40 630 55 067 342 554 28 833 21070 247 782 24 658 37 677 73 461 155 742 69 406 46 973 17 999 124 912 57 037 59 396 71930 62 536 19384 110041 20 667 34 655 56 069 832 519

56 529 40 712 69 552 366 865 34 904 298125 84 056 20 306 37004 42 746 56 019 363 953 24 964 21860 253 003 26 773 40 690 89453 156 867 66 494 44 568 19 982 124 192 53 562 57 249 74 893 63179 22 366 107 752 21 141 33 338 62 436 838 664

56 622 40 948 69803 365 218 35 457 300 330 83979 20 367 37 122 42 841 55 981 367 657 24 852 21913 252 609 27 095 41 171 91219 156 898 65 784 44 434 20 282 123409 53 698 56 887 74 710 62 539 22 409 107414 20 966 33 433 62 922 838716

502

3 020 553

3 635 626

3 674 201

3 679 685

10 421 17252 10 974 13936 11007 9588 8636 14 702 7 593 6834 9 739 16 910 38 906 13 762 9542

13469 21819 13 007 15888 12194 10 238 12 024 17 576 10 478 10114 12343 21925 42347 14 452 11797

15 859 23 702 13408 15 379 12100 10468 11704 18 607 11309 11285 13 050 22 877 37234 12039 11682

15 874 24 075 13 504 15 350 12 126 11 123 11597 18 583 11532 11105 13 229 22 893 36 901 11716 11407

15 isolated towns Wetzikon (ZH) Uster Langenthal Burg doff Schwyz Davos Wohten (AG) FrauenfeW Martigny Monthey Sierra Skxi La Chaux-de-Fonds LeLocle Delemonl AJI fifteen Total urban areas Source: Schuler, Delimitation des agglomerations, Berne, 1984

199 802

23 9671

240 703

241015

3 220 355

3 875 297

3 914 904

3'920700

Figure 1.1 Social Stratification and Regional Type

Typology of Swiss Regions % of the total Swiss population

LC MTC MIC SIC IP STC TC ATP AP AIP RC EC

Large centers Medium-sized tertiary centers Medium-sized industrial centers Small industrial centers Industrial peripheries Small tertiary centers Tourist centers Agro-tertiary peripheries Agricultural peripheries Agro-industrial peripheries Residential suburbs Employment suburbs

For terminology see Wright O.C. (1985) see Jove (1987) see Bassand, Brulhardt, Hainard, Schuler, (1985) and Schuler (1985).

22.7 11.2 15.4 15.5

5.7 5.6 1.2 1.4 1.9 7.9 8.2 3.3

Urbanization and Urban Life

23

show a less rapid decline than before and one that is even less marked than urban regions. Is this the result of a process specific to these non-urban zones, or is it caused by the overflow from the urban zones? Any variations in this pattern are due to differences in economic structure; the areas in which tertiary activities predominate are more dynamic than the industrial areas. Moreover, urban areas situated at the foothills of the Alps and in the Alps themselves are more vital in a demographic sense than the towns and urban zones of the Swiss Plateau. These regional variations occur, however, within a general context of demographic stagnation that is not expected to change before the next century. Another interesting point is the part played by geography. The country's topography encourages the development of residential areas on the Plateau. This relatively narrow zone (measuring 20-50 kilometers in width) lies between the Alps and the Jura Mountains and contains two transport axes, a railway and a highway, that link the most important towns. Perret-Gentil et al. (1984) have constructed a map of urban Switzerland that shows that the urban regions in the Plateau between Lake Constance in the east and the Lake of Neuchatei in the west have been joined, representing a continuous urban texture of approximately 200 kilometers. A second and much shorter pole runs along the northern shore of the Lake of Geneva from Geneva to Montreux. Approximately half the population of Switzerland—more than 3 million people—live in the large urban zone lying between Rorschach and Neuchatei, with extensions reaching to Basel, Schaffhausen, Lucerne and Thun. Can this be taken to mean the emergence of a Swiss metropolitan area? The economy of this regional distribution of urban centers must also be considered. In terms of its gross national product, Switzerland invariably appears as one of the richest countries in Europe. But this wealth is not equally distributed across the population, and considerable differences exist from one type of region to another. Acute poverty exists in peripheral regions, whereas in wealthier ones the maldistribution has decidedly distressing side effects. For example, wealth brings with it higher prices, particularly land prices. These have strong repercussions on the property market; nowhere else in Europe are there proportionately fewer owners of houses or apartments. Some 70 percent of Swiss householders are tenants. The wealth of an individual region is based on the economic health of its industrial enterprises and increasingly of its tertiary firms. The most notable characteristic of the enterprises is their orientation toward international markets. This is a relatively mature factor in the economic history of Switzerland but one that is gaining in importance. Certain key sectors of the economy are based solely on international trade: Chemicals (concentrated in Basel), machines (the eastern and central Plateau at the foot of the Jura), banks (Zurich, Geneva, Lugano), and insurance (notably Lucerne) are the most frequently cited examples. To these can be added two sectors that are experiencing great difficulties at present: the clock- and watchmaking industry in the Jura Mountains and the textile industry located mainly in eastern Switzerland. Tourism, which is the

24

Switzerland in Perspective

only healthy industry in the alpine regions, is obviously also very dependent on foreign demand. Except for the banks and the chemical industry, the other sectors mentioned are distributed quite evenly over the whole of Switzerland, not in the urban backbone alone. Furthermore, the companies that make up these different sectors are relatively small (e.g., the largest machine company employs about 15,000). Finally, many of the largest companies have only their main office here: The research, management and financing functions are located in Switzerland (in the urban backbone), but production takes place abroad where labor is cheaper. An example is Nestle, which has only a few factories in Switzerland and more than 100 abroad. Apart from its role as an exporter of goods and services, Switzerland makes important international functions possible. Its location in the center of Europe, the quality of its telecommunications equipment and computers, and its neutral status have all facilitated the establishment of numerous governmental and nongovernmental international organizations there. Switzerland is among those European countries containing the largest number of such organizations of all types. Approximately half of the international organizations in Switzerland are found in Geneva. Some particularly important organizations are, however, located elsewhere—for example, the Bank for International Settlements (Basel); the International Olympic Committee (Lausanne); and the Universal Postal Union and the International Train Committee and other important communications organizations (Berne). Switzerland evidences the highest level of economic development in Europe. Its economy participates to a considerable extent in the world economy and plays a notable role in it despite Switzerland's very small size. Yet the country's level of urbanization is only about average for Europe and much lower than that of Great Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Scandinavia, and so on. For example, Switzerland has no urban regions of more than one million inhabitants, such as are common in Great Britain, Germany, and the Scandinavian countries. The Swiss urban regions are relatively well dispersed throughout the country, even in the Alps. Here one must ask the question that "disturbs" Swiss social scientists and makes Switzerland a special case: Why is there this juxtaposition of a very sophisticated and well-developed economy and a merely average level of urbanization? The answer to this question lies in a political system that is by tradition very decentralized. Swiss federalist political institutions imply 26 cantons whose sovereignty is based on a strong cultural identity (involving both language and religion). Although their autonomy is declining, cantonal institutions have played an important role in the urbanization process and explain the absence of very large urban regions and the dispersion of existing urban regions across the country. For example, urban planning is under the jurisdiction of the cantonal authorities and not that of the federal government. The same is true for the administration of schools, sociocultural affairs, sanitary services, and the like. For these reasons, all these facilities (from universities to primary schools,

Urbanization and Urban Life

25

social services to hospitals, etc.) have been built in nearly all secondary cities and towns as well as in larger urban regions. There is thus no reason to live in a city itself in order to partake of some of the amenities of city life. (The distance one must travel is also slight in most cases.) This explanation of the relative weakness of the Swiss urban backbone must be qualified by mention of its social stratification. We can do this owing to recent research by Joye (1987). As Figure 1.1 shows, we can distinguish six socioprofessional categories. The regional variations in the social categories according to our center-periphery typology (Schuler, 1985) are clearly evident in at least six ways: 1. The proportion of farmers is larger in peripheral regions. 2. The bourgeoisie and the petit bourgeoisie are to be found in a numerically constant proportion in all types of regions. 3. Managers have a spatial distribution that is clearly differentiated; in relative terms, they are mainly present in large centers and also in suburban regions. In the other regional types, even in middle-sized centers, their proportion is proportionally less. 4. The semi-managerial class can be defined more by its relative absence from peripheral regions than by its strong presence in urban regions. 5. Most noteworthy about white-collar workers is their presence in urban centers and relative scarcity in the peripheral regions. 6. The distribution of blue-collar workers is especially interesting: They are widely spread over peripheral regions. Perhaps one of the paradoxical aspects of Swiss social structure is that one often finds the blue collar workers in the peripheries (Joye, 1987). At this point in our analysis, we would like to summarize the most striking aspects of Swiss urbanization. First, from the beginnings of industrialization, the Swiss economy developed an international orientation with tertiarization; and this characteristic is becoming more and more accentuated. Urban regions are the strategic poles of this economic orientation; the predominance of managers, semi-managers and white collar classes within them testifies to this. Nevertheless, we would point out that all regions of the country participate in this internationalization of the economy. Second, the demographic growth of urban regions was considerable at the beginning of the century and during the 1960s, although weaker than everywhere else. At first this growth owed to Swiss population increase, then to foreign workers coming from neighboring countries. In the 1970s this growth either slowed down, stabilized, or reversed itself. It varies from region to region. Third, Switzerland is the most "computerized" country in Europe. Furthermore, almost all households (98 percent) have a telephone. These are important factors in the strong social integration of the Swiss people, whether they live in urban centers or peripheral regions. Fourth, thanks to federalism, cantonalism, communal autonomy and the high standard of living, urban Swiss society is very integrated despite the dispersion

Switzerland in Perspective

26

of its population. Contradictions, tensions and conflicts are rife, but they are decentralized and constantly limited by the political willingness to compromise inherent in many social, political and cultural institutions. And finally, the system of urban regions is strongly interconnected. Since the beginning of the 1960s, three regions form the kernel of this process, namely Zurich, Basel, and Lausanne-Geneva. Other urban regions, nearby but distinct and autonomous, participate more and more intensely in the development of these three large urban regions. Based on this fact, we can hypothesize that in contemporary Switzerland, urban regions are blending into a polycephalous metropolis of four million inhabitants (Bassand, Joye, and Schuler, 1988). THE CITY DWELLERS' LIFESTYLE: THE MAIN CURRENTS OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN URBAN REGIONS In order to understand the city dwellers' lifestyle, it is necessary to expand the analysis we have just presented. Four currents of social change are particularly significant for the Swiss metropolis. Towards a Dual Society? Because the Swiss economy has an international orientation, Swiss companies are either doomed to disappear in the face of acute international competition, obliged to move their production abroad where labor is cheaper, or else forced to modernize and introduce new techniques. In this competitive context, two large socioeconomic poles of the population stand out. The members of the first pole are modern and dynamic and take an active part in this competition. These individuals may be found at all levels of the social hierarchy. For them, employment is relatively secure, their investment in work is considerable, and they identify with the country's modernization. The other pole is composed of people who, for different reasons, do not take part in this effort. They are for the most part the officially or unofficially unemployed or temporary workers, some young workers, immigrants, handicapped people, the elderly, and so on. These individuals have either lost their motivation and entered what is known as the "informal economy" and/or withdrawn to the home, which becomes a strong haven of affective and sociocultural investment (Bassand et al., 1986). There is a relation between these two poles (spheres or categories of social stratification); however, it is not a strong one. There are both white-collar and blue-collar workers belonging to each pole. A Leisure Civilization At the same time, the meaning of work is undergoing a great change. At the beginning of the industrial revolution, a widespread ideology endowed work with a historical mission, namely the conquest and domination of the world.

Urbanization and Urban Life

27

The present division of labor and intensely developed automation certainly make work more and more productive, but at the same time, it has lost its meaning for a majority of workers. Work plays hardly more than a sustaining role. Contemporaneously, the leisure civilization started developing based on the idea that real life is situated outside working hours, in one's free time. Gains in productivity and workers' demands for higher wages have led to a reduced workweek and have given rise to an economy increasingly centered on leisuretime concerns and mass culture. This development is the result of an increase in daily, weekly and seasonal free time through the lowering of the retirement age, the increase in the duration of studies, and the accessibility of continued training. These factors are directly linked to the existence of a dual society, for some scholars think that the solution to the economic crisis lies in reducing the number of working hours (Lalive d'Epinay et al., 1982). New Demographic Structures For Swiss demographic change, the following tendencies are significant (Groupe d'Etude Demographie, 1986): • • • • •

Decline in, and/or the stability of, the birthrate Stabilization of the infant mortality rate and the increase in life expectancy Women's liberation Decrease in the marriage rate and an increase in the divorce rate Lowering of the retirement age

The most important and general consequence of these changes is the aging of the population. These tendencies, combined with the socioeconomic transformations already mentioned, constitute the reason why the classical nuclear family is giving way to a post-modern family (Shorter, 1977). This term refers to the fact that unmarried couples are living together, married couples no longer remain married for a lifetime, and one-parent families are on the increase. The time at which old age begins is blurred, and the distinction between the "third" and the "fourth" generation, which is already noticeable, is becoming more and more accentuated. These demographic transformations mean that longterm sociability is no longer developed primarily in a household (whose form is much more flexible than before). Larger kin networks appear, which imply at least three generations. Nevertheless, these social changes continue to stimulate a domestic or residential everyday culture (Kellerhals, 1982). A New Urbanism A new urbanism results not only from the changes we have just outlined but also from improvements in the means of transport and communications.

28

Switzerland in Perspective

There is a "deconcentration" of jobs and housing from central cities, first, called urban explosion and more recently referred to as counter-urbanization and periurbanization. An enormous heterogeneous and discontinuous space, which forms an organic entity, is coming into being: the urban region. The urban region should no longer be conceived of as a dense and continuously built web but as a collection of more or less loose networks articulating distinct residential, work, leisure and other specific zones. In Switzerland, planning the urban region signifies mastering a vast network of communications, exchanges and innovations and, subsequently, controlling the direction of change. The political and economic stakes involved in the urban region are therefore considerable (Bassand, Joye, and Schuler, 1988). The form of an urban region corresponds to more or less specialized and hierarchical systems of zones and facilities. Industrial, commercial, administrative, residential, leisure and agricultural zones co-exist alongside each other. They are punctuated by unifunctional macrofacilities for the entire urban region: supermarkets, commercial centers, airports, cultural facilities, universities, schools, sports grounds, churches, railway stations, hospitals, military barracks, and so on. Until recently, nearly all these types of facilities were concentrated in the historical center or nearby. Over the last 20 years, they have become spread out over a wider territory. In this way, the urban region tends toward polycentrism, which necessitates a restructuring of its transport and communications systems. The central city has obviously not completely lost its preeminence. It is still one of the rare multifunctional zones in the urban region, where managerial, commercial, administrative, artisan, leisure and residential activities coexist. The poly centric mosaic aspect of the urban region dovetails with the social, demographic and ethnic social segregation that, in residential zones in particular, is continually increasing. In short, the emergence of the urban region is coupled with an increase in the forms of segregation. These segregated spaces are themselves controlled by private or public cultural, social, administrative and commercial organizations, thanks to specific professional groups: social workers, specialized teachers, and social leaders of all kinds (the managers and semimanagers of our typology). On the one hand, they tend to rule impersonally over the city dwellers' problems by sectors, and on the other, they deliver messages and information (rules, directives, publicity notices) from top to bottom. The existence of these organizations is often justified by the urban region's spatial segregation. Nevertheless, the social control they exert constitutes a communications obstacle for the urban region's social groups, and in this respect, they are a threat to urban democracy. The harmful effects of this fragmentation of the urban region are more or less successfully counteracted by infrastructures such as • Ring motorways, roads, and railway lines • Improved systems of production and distribution of different kinds of energy • Close networks of sophisticated means of information, communications, and transport

Urbanization and Urban Life

29

Owing to these networks and installations and to the social life they make possible, the urban region is slowly becoming an organic territorial community. These structures, facilities, and infrastructures generate a new urbanism. And because of the mosaic and kaleidoscopic character of the urban region, the city dwellers' daily life takes place in successive, separated and segmented spaces. Schematically, we can identify three types of spaces: residential, workplace, and leisure. The residence is increasingly regarded as a haven of peace and harmony. That is why it has to be as soundproof as possible, to protect its occupants from neighbors and surroundings, and also beautifully decorated and furnished with electrical household appliances and telecommunications equipment. Television is more and more becoming a window on the whole world and permits the city dweller to be an anonymous, distant, uninvolved spectator. The residence is becoming an area of social withdrawal. Tele-work, tele-banking, and teleshopping will more than likely accentuate this tendency (Jeanin et al., 1986). It has been called the "intelligent house" (domotique in French). The second type of space, the place of work, remains relatively rich in conflict, in interpersonal relations, and in sociocultural experiences, but the loss of its meaning makes it less effective. The third space, leisure, if it is not combined with residential space, is localized in segregated locales such as sports stadiums, cinemas, cafes, restaurants, sociocultural centers, weekend residences, ski slopes and beaches. Within this context the car, which is a symbol of liberty, individualism and power but also a polluting and dangerous machine, allows for an uneven passage between residences, workplaces and leisure spaces. It is also an instrument for exploring the urban region and its surroundings, in an anonymous and impersonal way. We could say that the car permits the same vicarious pleasure as does television. Its increasing importance and the constraints it implies are radically changing the face of the urban region's public spaces. The fragmentation of urban space implies two coexisting trends. On the one hand, the city dweller's life is broken up into different roles; the great majority know each other only through the roles specific to the space within which they act at any given moment. They enter these spaces stripped of their roles pertaining to other spaces. One of the many direct consequences of this development is the birth of a "fatherless society," which sociopsychologists have been observing for the past few years: Children no longer have a concrete idea of their father's role outside of home and leisure activities because of this specialization of space. In short, city dwellers, in the main, do not know each other in their entirety but only in a reduced number of roles. On the other hand, city dwellers construct social networks (kin, family, peer groups, etc.) all across the urban region. The four axes of change (the dual society, a leisure civilization, new demographic structures, a new urbanism) do not modify city dwellers' life-styles uniformly. Each of these axes is strongly influenced by social stratification and always combined with other factors, namely gender, life cycle and ideological

30

Switzerland in Perspective

orientations (Lalive d'Epinay et al., 1982; Jeanin et al., 1986; Bassand and Henz, 1988). SOME VIEWS ABOUT THE FUTURE SWISS METROPOLIS The structure of the Swiss metropolis can in no way be compared to a large machine in which a process, once initiated, relentlessly produces its effects. Such a determinist conception can be applied only approximately to social dynamics. The principal social and political actors in urban Switzerland do not remain distant from, or indifferent to, the different social transformations mentioned (Bassand et al., 1986). They unite and organize in order to either fight against these different forms of change or else to accelerate them. In this connection, they elaborate theories, projects, policies and programs. Thus, they generate social and political movements that can orient and reorient social change in specific directions. Consequently, in order to understand the development of a collectivity, it is insufficient to consider only our knowledge of the past and of the present of that collectivity. One must, in addition, be familiar with the strategies of its major social and political forces. We can distinguish in the Swiss metropolis three types of conflicting strategies, which we deliberately present here in a strongly schematic way. Strategy One. Strategy One deals with the reconstitution of a market economy which is as large and as flexible as possible. Through it the general regulation of the society must occur. The fundamental objective here is to make the economy as competitive as possible. Efficiency and profitability are the keywords. The intervention of public authorities is tolerated only in areas where the market cannot function autonomously: defense, justice, research, public education, health and large transport infrastructures. At most, public authorities may intervene to help those groups that are the most seriously menaced by market regulations. But the distribution of wealth, space and time is exclusively the market's business. Full employment is not an end in itself. This strategy is especially congenial to the bourgeoisie and managerial classes. Strategy Two. Strategy Two resembles the former in the area of efficiency. However, control can emanate only from public authorities; only a minority of sectors is entrusted to the market, which moreover is constantly and strictly supervised. In order to do this, the state obviously has to discard its traditional methods: The authoritarian-bureaucratic state must give way to an animatordemocratic state. Full employment is an end in itself. The "traditional" leftist movements support this strategy. Strategy Three. Strategy Three, which the new social movements support (the Greens, the young, etc.), also involves state intervention to guarantee, as far as possible, an equal distribution of the fundamental resources: wealth, time and space. In contrast to the second strategy described above, it does not assume that the central government should have a say in everything. A wide range of

Urbanization and Urban Life

31

initiatives is put in the hands of local and microlocal collectivities, companies, and private associations. The state no longer intervenes to prescribe how one must proceed in the smallest details of daily life but, on the contrary, creates general conditions that allow the actors to develop those initiatives that they find most relevant. It is for them to decide whether they should become federated at regional or national levels. This strategy enhances the informal economy, whereas the other two strategies are based on an organized, formal, and planned private or public economy. These three scripts are very distinct; yet they overlap in more than one way. Strategies 1 and 3 depend on individuals and public or private socioeconomic micro-organizations. Their wellbeing depends mainly on their own initiatives, whereas Strategy Two implies that public authorities play the main role. Strategies One and Two are both based on the conviction that the formal economy is the only one that, in reality, can modernize production and management machinery and therefore produce the goods and services the population needs. On the other hand, Strategy Three depends mainly on an informal and highly decentralized economy. Strategies Two and Three, in their varied ways, consider the intervention of public authorities to be indispensable, whereas Strategy One relies only on individual and private initiatives. In Switzerland, the first strategy is dominant at present, despite the resistance of social and political actors who espouse the other two. What are the consequences of the first strategy's prevalence for the Swiss metropolis? It is highly probable that the society's split into two socioeconomic poles will become accentuated. A dual society is emerging. As noted above, the first pole includes actors who are involved in economic competition and national and international politics. These are for the most part the managers and semimanagers. The success of this competition depends on expending considerable effort to modernize all kinds of organizations. To render these entities more efficient, the solution people will continue to rely on will no doubt be, first, the use of scientific discoveries and technological innovations insofar as possible and, second, improved planning within organizations and, above all, the regeneration of the market. Under the terms of this strategy, the actors of this pole will engage in at least five specific actions: 1. They will maintain a mass production and, consequently, a mass consumer society. 2. On the North-South axis, they will pursue the delocalization of conceptual, managerial and production functions within the same company. Conceptual and managerial functions will be concentrated in the North and production in the South, thus entailing a constant mobility of labor and of the other factors of production. 3. In so doing, they will not be afraid to reduce the role of the labor force and make part of it obsolete. 4. They will mobilize the major social resources in order to support their extremely successful national and international competitiveness.

32

Switzerland in Perspective

5. Similarly, they will utilize state intervention, above all, to build and modernize the infrastructures and institutions indispensable to achieving their goals.

One of the inescapable consequences of these actions is that the other socioeconomic pole is going to grow, the one that regroups actors who cannot keep up with the rhythm of modernization imposed on them by those of the "opposite'' pole. Consequently, these actors will be in a state of dependency, cast aside, disqualified, rendered obsolete. In practice, this implies precarious subcontracting, temporary work, under- or unemployment, numerous forms of wastefulness, suffering, and at times, deviance. The socioeconomic requirements of these social groups will encourage the development of an informal economy but also of movements of resistance, refusal and opposition. What does this predominant strategy signify for the Swiss metropolis? Doubtless, housing will be increasingly regulated by the cultural model that we define in terms of privatism, individualism, intimacy, and domestic culture; this model implies small households. Home will become more and more a kind of refuge in a hard and aggressive society; it will thus become a symbol of security and liberty. Its comforts and telecommunications and leisure equipment allow the household member to engage in private expressive and creative activities, things that become more and more difficult in an increasingly normalized, organized and programmed society, and to do so in spite of the market's action. Obviously, this cultural model will be modulated according to the resident's position in the social structure. How will residents distribute themselves with the urban region's space? Actors of the first pole will remain and regroup further into urban regions because they are particularly well equipped with terminals, data banks, transport and telecommunications networks, education and research centers for success in terms of international competitiveness. Consequently, they will pursue actions in which they are already engaged, notably the reconquest and redevelopment of the urban region's central cities, to be used for tertiary companies and luxury apartments, and also the colonization of peri-urban zones easily accessible in relation to the central city. Both types of dwelling must be compatible with new computerized technologies from both the private and public points of view. Actors who cannot or do not want to participate in the dominant modernizing activities will become localized in peripheral regions under the pretext of a "return to nature," or else in suburban zones. These heterogeneous residents with unstable resources will settle in the large housing complexes built during the 1960s and 1970s or "squat" in older residential pockets of the central cities. Both groups of actors will tend to withdraw to sociocultural nooks, to develop alternative ways of life and to fight against prejudicial developments. Generally speaking, it is highly probable that the behavior and practices of these different residents will lead to greater social segregation, with all the attendant risks of social conflict that this spatial organization involves.

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REFERENCES Bassand, M., and J. -P. Fragniere. 1978. Le Pouvoir dans la ville. Vevey: Delta. Bassand, M. 1982. Villes, regions et societes. Lausanne: Presses Polytechniques Romandes. Bassand, M.; M. -Cl. Brulhardt; F. Hainard; and M. Schuler. 1985. Les Suisses entre la mobilite et la sedentarite. Lausanne: Presses Polytechniques Romandes. Bassand, M.; F. Hainard; Y. Pedrazzini; and R. Perrinjaquet. 1986. Innovation etchangement sociale. Lausanne: Presses Polytechniques Romandes. Bassand, M., and A. Henz. 1988. Habitation 2000. Lausanne: IREC. Bassand, M.; D. Joye; and M. Schuler. 1988. LesEnjeux de Vurbanisation. Berne: Lang. Federal Bureau of Housing. 1986. Le Logement en Suisse. Berne. Frey, R. 1981. Von der Land- zur Stadtflucht. Berne: Lang. Gamier, A. 1984. Les Nouvelles cites-dortoires. Lausanne: Presses Polytechniques Romandes. Grosjean, G. 1982. DieSchweiz, geopolitischeDynamikundVerkehr. Berne: Geographica Bernensia U3. Groupe d'Etude Demographic 1986. Les Suisses vont-ils disparaitre? Berne: Haupt. Jeanin, A.; R. Perrinjaquet; D. Joye; and M. Bassand. 1986. Pratiques telecommunicationnelles des menages. Lausanne: Projet Manto, IREC. Joye, D. 1987. Stratification sociale en Suisse. Lausanne: IREC. Kellerhals, J. 1982. Manages au quotidien. Lausanne: Favre. Lalive, d'Epinay, C ; M. Bassand; E. Christe; and D. Gros. 1982. Temps libre. Lausanne: Favre. Perret-Gentil, J. -Cl; A. Cunha; J. Barbier; J. -B. Racine; and R. Ratti. 1984. Centres regionaux de developpement: role des petites et moyennes villes dans la distribution du tertiaire superieur en Suisse. Berne: PNR 5. Perrinjaquet, R.; P. Amphoux; and M. Bassand. 1986. Domus 2005. Exploration Prospective de Vhabiter. Lausanne: IREC. Rossi, A. 1983. La Decentralisation urbaine en Suisse. Lausanne: Presses Polytechniques Romandes. Sauer, J. -J. 1987. Budget et bien-etre domestique. Lausanne: IREC. Schuler, M. 1984. "Delimitation des agglomerations en Suisse." IREC and the Federal Office of Statistics. Contributions a la statistique Suisse, 105th pamphlet, Bern. Schuler, M. 1985. Atlas structurel de la Suisse. Zurich: Ex Libris. Shorter, E. 1977. Naissance de lafamille moderne. Paris: Seuil. Wright, E. O. 1985. Classes. New York: Verso.

••

The popular assembly in Glarus Courtesy of the Swiss National Tourist Office, Zurich

2

Political Power and Decision Making in Switzerland HANSPETER KRIESI THE INSTITUTIONAL DIFFUSION OF POWER The Swiss state is an unusually weak one. Among Western democracies, it is notable for its limited size: total state expenditure amounted to only 27.1 percent of the gross national product in 1979. No other state of a comparable Western democracy is of such limited proportions, not even that of the United States (Linder, 1983:306). The Swiss state is also restricted regarding both its autonomy from society and its capacity to act. More than in other comparable countries, political power in Switzerland has always been highly diffused, a fact linked to four institutional peculiarities of the country: its federalism, its highly fragmented party system, a self-regulating society, and direct democracy. Federalism The Swiss state as we know it today was founded in 1848 in the aftermath of a short and rather bloodless civil war between the Protestant Liberals, the radicals of the day, and the Catholic Conservatives. The experience of the war had considerably slowed down the Liberal drive for national centralization, and although victorious, the Liberals were prepared to share power with the defeated Catholics. The Constitution of 1848 established a federal structure which accorded a large measure of power to the cantons—the member states of the Confederation. In those parts of the country which were predominantly Catholic at the time, the Catholics were thus permitted tc remain the dominant political force.

36

Switzerland in Perspective

The new state was made up of 25 cantons and semi-cantons which differed greatly not only in size and wealth but also with regard to their institutional structure, political culture and historical experience. This is still true today. The Swiss state today unites 26 very different states. Thus, in 1985 the largest one, the canton of Zurich, counted 1.13 million inhabitants, approximately one sixth of the total population, whereas the smallest canton, that of Appenzell-IR, had only 13,000 inhabitants. The average per capita income in the same year was more than twice as high in the richest cantons as in the poorest. Within limits set by the Federal Constitution, each canton may organize its own political system, and given the pronounced differences in size and wealth, it is not surprising that quite different institutional structures have developed. A few of the smaller cantons still practice assembly democracy, which means that all the canton's citizens assemble once a year to vote on cantonal political affairs and to elect representatives to public office. In the larger cantons, where most of the population lives, such practices have, however, long since been abandoned. All cantons have direct-democratic institutions (see below), but their type, and the rights they confer on the individual citizen, differ considerably from one canton to another. While all cantons follow the general administrative model of the federal administration, differences in size and wealth also account for considerable differences in administrative capacity among the cantons. Small cantons have small administrative apparatuses characterized by flexible and indeterminate structures, whereas larger cantons have developed elaborate administrations (Urio and Markov, 1986). Of course, the cantons are no longer the quasi-sovereign states they used to be in 1848. They remain sovereign insofar as their sovereignty is not limited by the Federal Constitution and, as such, exercise all rights which are not entrusted to the federal power. But by a slow yet sure process of constitutional revision similar to that in other federations, responsibilities have been transferred to the federal government in Berne. Complete autonomy is now retained only in a small number of policy areas. In particular, cantonal autonomy persists with regard to the police (the federal government does not have a police force of its own), and the cantons are relatively autonomous concerning matters of primary and secondary education, religion, and welfare. They also still have the power to levy their own taxes, and they benefit from the delegation of powers from the federal government (see Knapp, 1986; Bogdanor, 1988). The actual degree of centralization in Switzerland cannot be determined by looking at legal arrangements only. As Kloti (1988) has noted, the Swiss system has remained highly decentralized from an administrative viewpoint. Most of the federal legislation is implemented by the cantons. Besides customs and defense, there are no policy fields in which the federal government has its own executive administration. Decentralization of administration, moreover, does not stop at the cantonal level. Local government is very important as well. Communes can levy their own income taxes within a framework set by cantonal law. This leaves consid-

Political Power and Decision Making

37

Table 2.1 Federal Government's Share of Expenditure and Employees

19I01 19301 19462 1950

1960

1970

1980

38

35

32

31

41

39

35

30

Federal expenditure as percentage of total expen-

51

diture of federal, cantonal and communal levels Federal employees 8S percentage of total of

47

41

federal, cantonal and communal employees Source: Klbti (1988, p. 97) 1) No statistics available for communal expenditures 2) No statistics available for non-federal employees

erable autonomy to local government. Cities as well as small communities run their own schools and police and fire departments and take a large part in physical planning, public transportation, water and energy supplies, and so on. Table 2.1 illustrates the importance of the lower levels of administration in the Swiss federal system, which has in fact been growing steadily over the last few decades. The Party System The Swiss party system is a multiparty system, highly fragmented along both partisan and territorial lines. Just as in other Western European countries which are split religiously between Catholics and Protestants, religion and class are the two societal cleavages that had the greatest impact on the structure of the party system. Against the dominant urban commercial and industrial forces that organized in the Radical Party, the Catholics defeated in the civil war organized themselves into the Conservative Party, which today has become the Christian Democratic Party. In the Protestant cantons, just as in the Nordic countries, an agrarian party (today's Swiss People's Party) organized another part of the opposition to the dominant Liberals of the Radical Party. The class cleavage was primarily articulated by the Socialist Party, whose electoral potential was considerably restricted by the presence of a strong Catholic party. Just as in the Netherlands and Germany, the Catholic counter-movement against the liberal nation-builders had a divisive impact on the subsequent development of the labor movement. There are two houses in Swiss Parliament, which are modeled after the U.S.

Switzerland in Perspective

38

Table 2.2 Party Shares of the Electoral Vote in Elections of the Swiss National Council, 1963-1987 (percentages) Party Socialist Party (SP)

1963 1967 1971 1975 1979 1983 1987

Christian Democrats (CYP)

26.6 23.4

23.5 22.1

22.8 21.0

24.9 21.1

24.6 21.5

22.8 20.4

18.3 19.6

Radical Party (FDP)

24.0

23.2

21.5

22.2

24.1

23.3

22.8

Swiss People's Party (SYPX 1)

13.2

12.4

10.8

11.6

11.1

10.9

other traditional parties (2)

5.8

6.8

6.8

9.9 6.8

7.1

5.8

5.4

Landesring

5.0

right wing (NA, REP) (3)

9.1 .5

7.6 7.5

new left/green (POCH, PSA, GPS)

-

-

-

others (4)

1.8

2.4

2.0

6.4 5.5 1.0 2.2

4.1 1.9 3.4 1.7

4.0 3.5 6.7 2.4

4.1 5.4 9.4 4.1

1) including the Democratic Party in the first three elections. The two parties later joined. 2) This is a residual category including the Protestant Party (EYP), the Liberal Party (LPS), 8n the Communist Party (PoA). The last one contributed most to the decline of this category. 3) Including the "automobile-party'* in the election of 1987. 4) In each election there is a residual group, which cannot be attributed to the different categorie on the basis of available evidence. Sources: Kriesi (1986: 335) andTaoes-Anzeioer. 22.10. 1987.

Congress. Since the introduction of proportional representation for the National Council—comparable to the U.S. House of Representatives—in the aftermath of the First World War, the relative strength of the four major parties described remained fairly stable until the late 1960s. The famous "freezing hypothesis" of Lipset and Rokkan (1967), according to which the Western European party systems at the end of the 1960s reflected the social cleavages of the 1920s, is particularly well illustrated by the Swiss case. Since the late 1960s, however, there have been somewhat more fluctuations in the relative power positions of the four major parties, because of the rise of three waves of oppositional forces. First, the left-liberal Landesring succeeded in mobilizing considerable opposition against the established parties. Then opposition came from small parties on the Right, and finally it was the opposition from the New Left and the Green parties which grew to considerable proportions. Table 2.2 gives an impression of the development of the relative strength of the Swiss parties on the federal level since the late 1960s. Swiss federalism has also left its imprint on party politics, which actually have their roots in cantonal politics. Partisan habits are forged above all in response to political stimuli present in cantonal, not federal, politics. Therefore, party

Political Power and Decision Making

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systems differ from canton to canton, and the national parties are not much more than federations of cantonal parties that try to maintain a precarious unity at the federal level. According to Kerr (1987:123), one is hard-pressed to speak of federal elections in terms of the national arena of party competition in Switzerland at all; he thinks it "more apt to speak of political contests being fought out in spatially segmented spheres of competition, defined by the relative weight of the various axes on which these partisan conflicts turn." The dispersion of political power, he maintains, finds its fullest expression in a highly fragmented party system. The Self-Administered Society Federalism and self-administration by private interest associations are both expressions of the same underlying principle of Swiss politics, namely that public functions have to be delegated as much as possible to cantonal or local institutions and to private actors. Guided by this principle, problems arising from social and economic development have traditionally been dealt with first by private organizations. Only if, and to the extent that, the private organizations were no longer capable of coping with the problems on their own did they call on the state for help (Hotz, 1979). As a consequence of this developmental pattern, state policy was to a large extent preconditioned by the earlier problem-solving attempts on the part of the private organizations. What is more, the structure of the state was affected, too. Since these self-adjusting organizational attempts from below went a long way toward coping with societal problems, the state did not develop to the same extent as it did in other countries. It could and did rely on the organizational structures already in existence and well developed in the associational sphere. Since 1947, Swiss interest associations have the constitutional right to exercise a stable influence on public decision making and implementation. In exchange for these prerogatives, the associations granted the state their consent to a widening of its policy instruments. The settlement of 1947 set the constitutional stage for a continuation and further elaboration of the interpenetration of state and organized society, enhancing the quasi-political functions performed above all by economic interest associations (Parri, 1987). The development of the associational structure was not, however, completely independent of the structure of the state to begin with. The federal structure has left its mark on the associational structure, too, although it does not seem to have weakened it. In contrast to the party system, the system of business interest associations in particular has been able to avoid fragmentation (Schumann, 1971:133f). This system is at the same time highly differentiated, branching out into numerous associations dealing with cantonal and local affairs, and rather centralized with encompassing peak associations at the top representing the federal point of view. The parallel development of sector-specific and sectorunspecific associational structures appears to have been ideally suited to resolving

Switzerland in Perspective

40

the dual problem of adapting to the requirements of 26 different cantonal political systems and of speaking at the same time with one voice at the federal level (Kriesi and Farago, 1988). As Parri (1987:84) has noted, the Swiss state has not politicized the society but has been colonized by a society with a strong political character. The granting of political status to interest associations was a necessary choice, made by a state that could not avoid acknowledging the functional centrality and the quasipolitical character of the self-administration established by such associations. The Swiss economy, in other words, was able to preserve a large measure of autonomy in problem areas which in other countries have been made the object of state policies. For example, the standardization of technical specifications is carried out entirely by private interest associations in Switzerland. In a different example, that of the marketing of milk, the state has intervened to achieve binding regulations but has delegated their implementation to private organizations. In the area of vocational training, to mention a third case, state administrations and private interest associations collaborate in a complex way to provide the required services (see Farago, 1987). Direct Democracy Switzerland has, of course, long been known for its institutions of direct democracy, which provide its citizens with more possibilities for participation than they have in any other Western liberal democracy. There are many different versions of these institutions on the federal, cantonal, and local levels, too numerous to discuss here. It is, however, important to be aware of the differences between compulsory referenda, optional referenda, and initiatives, which I will discuss here with regard to the federal level. All constitutional amendments introduced by the political system are subject to a compulsory referendum, which means that they have to be approved by a popular vote. In contrast to the U.S. Constitution, the Swiss Constitution has been amended quite often since its establishment in 1848. Hertig (1984:251) has counted 90 successful revisions by compulsory referendum up to 1980, among which are a complete revision in 1874 and a far-reaching partial revision in 1891. All laws, generally binding federal decrees, and treaties with other countries of unlimited duration are subject to optional referenda. This means that a minimum number of 50,000 citizens may ask that a vote be held on the bill in question. Only for 7 percent of all the bills subject to the optional referendum have citizens made use of this right. In more than half of these cases, the bill in question has passed the popular vote. To conclude from its limited use and its even more limited success that the optional referendum has been a relatively unimportant institution would, however, be quite incorrect. This institution in particular has contributed to the pattern of conflict resolution aimed at compromise and arbitration which is so typical of Swiss politics, as we shall see in

Political Power and Decision Making

41

more detail below. In order to prevent an important bill from foundering in a popular vote, elaborate negotiations are held at all stages of the policy-making process, and compromises are sought to ensure that the final product will not be subjected to a popular vote (Neidhart, 1970). An unintended consequence of the institution of the optional referendum has thus been that it puts a premium on integrative and conflict-avoiding strategies. It has also had the concomitant effect of contributing to the power of those political actors who proved to be capable of organizing the number of signatures required for the referendum. In contrast to the conservative impact of the optional referendum, the initiative has become an instrument of innovation in Swiss politics. With an initiative, 100,000 citizens may suggest a partial revision of the constitution on a specific subject matter, which must then be voted on by the entire electorate. Since the introduction of this institution in 1891 and 1980, 136 initiatives were submitted to parliament, and popular vote was held on 75 of them. Only seven of them were finally accepted by the people. This figure says relatively little about the actual impact of the initiatives, because initiatives may exert an indirect impact on policy-making, even if they are rejected. In fact, 36, or roughly one fourth, of the initiatives were withdrawn by their originators before coming to a popular vote, mostly because the authorities had accepted in one way or the other some of the demands voiced. It is important to note that the number of referenda and initiatives on the federal level has increased considerably since the late 1960s. As we shall see below, this is not accidental but is part of a general increase in the challenges presented to the political system in the most recent past.

INTEGRATIVE STRATEGIES Given this high degree of institutional diffusion of power, one may wonder how it is possible that the Swiss political system can function at all. One answer is that to counteract the centrifugal forces a number of integrative strategies have become pervasive in Swiss politics. The development of these integrative strategies was greatly enhanced by some aspects of Swiss institutional structure, as I have just tried to show with regard to the optional referendum. However, I would not maintain that the tendency to arrive at compromise solutions and to integrate oppositional forces was exclusively an unintended consequence of institutional arrangements that had been introduced for other reasons. A more accurate interpretation seems to me to be one that attributes both the institutional diffusion of power and the tendency to arrive at "amicable agreements" (Steiner, 1973) to the same set of underlying cultural factors. The weakness of such an interpretation is that it leaves open the question of what these cultural factors are and of where they have come from. Both questions I am not able to answer. Instead, I will consider at least four integrative strategies that ensure a minimum of coordination in a highly fragmented polity: the government by grand coalitions,

Switzerland in Perspective

42

the social partnership, the formation of an informal core of the polity, and the domestication of direct democracy. Government by Grand Coalitions The Swiss cabinet—the Federal Council—is not elected directly by the people. It is almost perfectly shielded from changes in voters' preferences. The Swiss cabinet is elected by a joint session of the two houses of the Swiss parliament for the term of a legislature and cannot be overturned by any constitutional means throughout the entire four-year legislative period. Thus, cabinet stability is to some extent guaranteed by constitutional fiat (Kerr, 1987:125). What is more, members of the cabinet are always reelected if they wish to stay on, and they almost never resign. Since 1848 only two members of the Federal Council have resigned in the face of legislative defeat. In the event of the rejection of a government bill or program by the federal chambers or by a popular vote, the entire cabinet assumes responsibility for the defeat. Moreover, cabinet collegiality implies that all seven federal councillors are of equal rank. As a result, the prime ministry is an unknown institution, and the presidency of the Confederation is rotated on an annual basis, by common consent, among the seven members of the government. The politics of personality are unknown to Swiss political tradition. Executive collegiality is a second mechanism that guarantees cabinet stability. The third and most important element ensuring government stability has been the strategy to include all major political forces in a coalition government. The ruling coalition was gradually widened in response, for the most part, to the crystallization of political opposition outside parliament. The plausible threat with a referendum turned out to be a powerful weapon in the hands of opposition parties and put strong pressure on ruling elites to coopt such opposition forces into their own ranks. Kerr (1987:126) notes that "the progressive incorporation of opposition into government was in fact a strategy consciously adopted by Swiss ruling elites to defuse conflict outside the parliamentary arena." This strategy found its fullest expression in the admission of the first socialist to the government coalition by the conservative bloc at the height of the Nazi threat during World War II. Since 1959, the party composition of government has been fixed by the so-called magic formula that accords two seats each to the Radicals, the Christian Democrats, and the Socialists and one seat to the People's Party. This party composition roughly corresponds to the electoral strength of the four major parties. But this is not the only proportionality rule observed in the composition of the federal government. Proportionality is also guaranteed with respect to the three major languages: the French-speaking minority is traditionally represented by two members and the Italian-speaking minority by one member of the Federal Council. In addition, it is carefully prevented that a canton get more than one representative in government. It will be obvious to the reader that given all these

Political Power and Decision Making

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constraints the filling of a vacancy in the cabinet generally does not leave much choice for Parliament. It will also be obvious that criteria of competence are likely to play a secondary role in these circumstances. Stability has its costs, as we shall see in somewhat more detail below. Social Partnership In the burgeoning literature on comparative politics, Switzerland is generally regarded as the typical case of a country characterized by a high degree of consensus. This literature displays, however, considerable insecurity with regard to the mechanisms that ensure this consensus. It is generally assumed that the types of arrangements made between business interest associations, unions, and the state are of crucial importance for the establishment of a consensus on social and economic policies in Western European polities. Intensive policy negotiations between the three partners—that is, tripartite arrangements between the organizations of capital, labor, and the state—are generally regarded in turn as being the result of a strong labor movement capable of finding acceptance as a viable interlocutor with business interest associations and the state. The Swiss case does not fit this general argument very well. In Switzerland, the labor movement has never developed the strength it has in other Western European countries. One of the reasons for this weakness of labor has already been mentioned above: the split along religious lines within the labor movement. Another important reason may be found in the decentralized pattern of industrialization which left the typical Swiss worker still bound to the agricultural milieu and prevented the development of large urban working-class subcultures. Finally, the strong postwar presence of immigrant workers further split the labor force and further weakened the labor movement (Parri, 1987:76). In spite of their weakness, the Swiss unions have been extensively coopted into policy networks, just as the Socialist Party has been coopted into the federal government. The unions participate regularly in the negotiations in the pre-parliamentary stages of legislation, and they are entrusted with important tasks in the implementation of specific social policies. Why has this been possible for the unions? The answer is the same as that given for the opposition parties: The referendum has proved itself a strong weapon in the hands of the unions as well. A second specificity of the Swiss case is that the highly developed arrangements between unions, business interest associations and the state administration have remained sector-specific, that is, limited to specific policy areas. Elaborate arrangements obtain, for example, in the area of vocational education or in the area of social security. Well known are also the traditionally close relations between the interest associations and the federal administration in the area of agricultural policies. In contrast to other small Western European countries such as Sweden, Austria or the Netherlands, encompassing, trans-sectoral tripartite arrangements have never developed in Switzerland—for the simple reason that the federal government has never made any attempt at Keynesian-type macro-

Switzerland in Perspective

44

economic demand management. Encompassing tripartite arrangements have typically developed in other European countries to ensure the success of Keynesian macroeconomic policies. Because of its weakness, the Swiss federal government could not develop such policies in the first place, and therefore encompassing tripartite arrangements have been superfluous. A third element that makes the Swiss arrangements between labor and capital peculiar is again linked to the weakness of the state, and to the preference of both business interest associations and the unions to come to terms with each other without the intervention of the state. Swiss social partnership is essentially bilateral. Since 1937, when the first "peace treaty" was concluded between the unions and the employers' association in the machine industry, Swiss social partnership has become standard practice in all industrial sectors. It is more or less routinely renewed in industrywide bilateral collective agreements. Given the general weakness of the state, and given the relative weakness of welfare and macroeconomic legislation, the Swiss unions have concentrated on collective agreements, which are highly developed and often include contractual welfare provisions (Parri, 1987:87). The Informal Core In addition to the integrative mechanisms at work in the separate parts of the political system, there are also mechanisms that tie the subsystems together. Such coordination takes place in an informal core of the Swiss political system (Kriesi, 1980, 1982). This core includes a limited number of top-level actors who exert influence of a general kind; that is to say, they have decisive influence in a great num ber of decisional processes in various issue areas. The core primarily includes the cabinet, the most important offices in the federal administration, the peak business interest associations, the main union confederation, and the major parties, on the organizational level, as well as the individual actors holding the crucial positions in these organizational units, on the level of the political elite. These organizations and their individual representatives have developed close collaborative relationships, independent of the political stance they might take. In addition to collaborative relationships, role accumulations of key figures serve to tie different parts of the system together. Thus, many members of parliament also hold key positions in the major interest associations or unions. Also numerous are the members of parliament who at the same time sit in a cantonal government. Individual actors holding such double or even multiple positions have been shown to exert an especially important influence on decision making, because of the additional resources they acquire with each position and also their capacity to intervene at various stages in the decision-making processes. The peak business interest associations and the main union federation assume a particularly important position in the core. On the one hand, they are important interlocutors of a government and a federal administration which depend on their cooperation in the making of decisions and their implementation. On the other

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hand, a weak and fragmented party system is also dependent on their financial resources, their expertise, and their capacity to mobilize their members in times of elections and popular votes. Also crucial is the influence of the Radical Party within the core. Although it no longer occupies the majoritarian position it used to have before the introduction of proportional representation after World War I, this party still has a rather unique impact on Swiss politics. The influence of the Radicals becomes apparent if we take into account the fact that about 40 percent of the members of the inner circle of the Swiss political elite belong to that party or sympathize with it. Moreover, the members of the Radical Party not only dominate numerically in the core but also hold a most impressive share of the crucial positions. Thus, together with representatives of the small Liberal Party they dominate the business interest associations and the major administrative offices, and they are generally the most closely tied to the Swiss economy. The moderate political Left in Switzerland, the Socialist Party and the unions, although coopted into the system on all levels and although collaborating with its political antagonists on all levels, still occupies a subordinate position in the system. Moderate Left organizations and their representatives form a small minority within the inner circle, with rather limited influence. The inner circle of the political elite is primarily a bourgeois circle, where the Left is heavily underrepresented—even relative to its limited electoral strength. The Left's participation and political power are concentrated on matters of social policy. In other issue areas, and in particular in the all-important area of economic policy, the Left has very little say. By being part of the government, therefore, the moderate Left also takes responsibility for policies that it has had hardly any possibility to shape, thus contributing to the legitimacy of the regime in the eyes of the general public. At the same time, however, the moderate Left always maintains an oppositional orientation as well, and has often used the instrument of the initiative to introduce new ideas that could not have been introduced directly into the political process. The Domestication of Direct Democracy Neidhart (1970), in his influential study of the political implications of the referendum, maintained that direct democracy had been transformed into a "negotiation democracy.'' The elaborate negotiation process in the pre-parliamentary sphere and in Parliament itself, designed to prevent all possible opposition to new bills, seemed to have worked to the point where the referendum, as used against major bills at least, was about to fall into disuse. If such a development was to be observed in the 1960s, by the time Neidhart's study was published— ironically enough—the referendum had been reinvigorated. The number of initiatives reached unprecedented heights, because of developments which I will discuss toward the end of this essay. The inner core of the polity, however, generally managed to deal with the direct democratic challenge in a way that did not necessitate making major concessions to political outsiders.

46

Switzerland in Perspective

First of all, it is no small undertaking to collect the required number of signatures for a referendum or an initiative within the time limits set. The resources to meet these requirements are not easily acquired by new challengers. It is estimated that between one fourth and one third of the initiatives launched do not reach the required number of signatures (Hertig, 1984:258). Even if enough signatures are collected to submit a referendum or an initiative, there are many ways to counteract the proposal. In the case of an initiative, the challenge can be averted by offering some minor concessions that may persuade the challengers to withdraw their proposal. Until a very recent change in the votation procedures, counterproposals introduced by Parliament to meet the challenge of an initiative often served to defeat both the original proposal and the counterproposal at the polls. Moreover, as Hertig points out, challengers face a serious information problem, especially if the issue they have taken up is of a complex nature. Studies done by Gruner and Hertig (1983) have shown that the "problem solving capacity" of the average Swiss citizen is rather limited. Given their limited political knowledge, the citizens generally turn out to be susceptible to political propaganda. Hertig (1982) was able to show that a high correlation exists between the financial means at the disposal of the contenders in a voting contest and the voting results. Of the 20 votations studied, in all instances except one the popular vote went to the contender who had the greater amount of financial resources. After a detailed consideration of recent developments, Hertig (1984) comes to the conclusion that a victory at the polls in many, if not all, cases depends less on the quality of the arguments than on the amount of the public relations budget. It is, of course, obvious that the challengers usually do not gain the upper hand under such circumstances, and that voters generally follow the advice of the political elite at the polls. CRACKS IN THE WELL-BALANCED SYSTEM As a perceptive foreign observer, Barber (1988:47) has noted, Switzerland is not a melting pot but "a layered, segmented, carefully balanced nation of generically distinctive peoples whose only hope to live together lay in a form of common citizenship that sublimated majorities and minorities and emphasized consociational integration and mutualism." Pure consensus is, according to Barber, the mythical ideal of Swiss politics. Pervasive integrative mechanisms have gone a long way toward counterbalancing the strong centrifugal forces in Swiss politics. To some outside observers, Switzerland therefore tends to look like "a paradigmatic case of political integration," as is suggested by the title of a study on Swiss politics by Karl Deutsch (1976). Some even go so far as to maintain that, at its deepest level, Swiss democracy rests "in that natural, unspoken sense of community that made the herdsman in the 1890s or the ordinary citizen of the 1980s think of the community as theirs" (Steinberg, 1988:28). It is, of course, one thing to view consensus based on compromise as the mythical yet rarely achieved ideal of Swiss politics, and quite another to take this consensus

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for granted because of its alleged roots in some mythical quality of the Swiss. To invest the Swiss with all kinds of great qualities, as benevolent foreign observers often tend to do, is to foster a feeling of superiority among the Swiss, which forms the core of what Windisch (1978) has called the "Helvetian ideology." Instead of continuously striving for consensus, a large part of both the Swiss population and the Swiss political elite believes that eternal consensus has been achieved and that any change of the status quo is undesirable and also unnecessary. I think that the Swiss have lived for far too long within the legend that one has made about them—to paraphrase Peter Bichsel, a celebrated contemporary Swiss writer. My impression is that their self-righteous belief in their achievements is quite unfounded. Beneath the seemingly consensual surface, there are widening cracks in the well-balanced system. First, a split within the dominant bourgeois camp has gained increasing weight in the course of the 1970s, a split that runs right through the main Radical Party (Kriesi, 1980). Roughly speaking, this split separates the technocrats, representing the interests of the export-oriented, monopolistic part of the business community, from the conservatives, representing the interests of the small and medium enterprises oriented toward the domestic market. This split has proved fatal for a number of more far-reaching reform programs in the 1970s. Although these reform programs have had the support of a majority of the political elite, including the moderate Left, the conservative bourgeois minority has repeatedly and successfully appealed to the people in popular votes in order to defeat them. While the citizens have always tended to approve the propositions made by a united elite, they have often followed the conservative appeals if the elite was divided. Direct democracy therefore proved to be quite useful in blocking further reforms. Barber (1974:263) suggests that the peculiar conservatism of direct democracy in modern Switzerland should be sought in the fact that the requisite communal conditions that nourished and supported it—intimacy, simplicity (rusticity), autarky, equality, and public-spiritedness (the politics of virtue instead of the politics of interest)—are going or are gone. And so the people vote down progressive legislation that in bettering their lives would further damage the conditions that alone make their voting meaningful. They bargain futilely to maintain the autonomy of communes, the very existence of which is in question. They blame foreigners for the lost rusticity with which, in fact, they have purchased their own affluence. They try to bar the vote to women because it has lost its meaning for men. They defend their past haplessly, desperately, hopelessly, against an inevitable tide of progressive bureaucracy, all the while sensing that the communal past is already beyond recovery, [p. 274]

But, as Barber also notes, the institutions of direct democracy are inherently neither conservative nor progressive. And in fact they have been used increasingly by progressive forces as well. The wave of protest that has swept across Europe since the late 1960s has also made its impact felt on Swiss politics. The number

48

Switzerland in Perspective

Figure 2.1 The Development of Political Protest Events in Post-war Switzerland, 1945 to 1978: Traditional Protest, Socialist Protest and New Protest

of protest events has increased enormously, as shown in Figure 2.1. It has above all been the mobilization of the New Left and the subsequent new social movements—ecology, antinuclear, peace, urban, and women's movement—which have led to this tremendous increase of political protest. This protest has not only been launched within the framework of the institutions of direct democracy, but it is significant that these institutions have served to channel a large part of it into more civilized forms. Although the cycle of protest has lost some of its force in the course of the 1980s, the use of the direct democratic instruments by progressive challengers has not yet subsided. On the contrary, in 1987 a record number of initiatives was submitted to the authorities (Gross, 1988). Moreover, two progressive initiatives have received popular approval in the 1980s, bringing the total number of successful initiatives in the history of federal politics up to nine. Swiss voters no longer seem to be the same reliable allies of conservatives that they were until the most recent past. New issues such as

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environmental questions and consumer protection, if formulated in moderate terms, are liable to find the support of a newly emerging majority. In other words, the core of the Swiss political system seems to have come increasingly under attack from both the conservative and progressive sides of the political spectrum. Table 2.2 illustrates this point as well: In the 1980s, the successes of the oppositional parties no longer seem to substitute each other but to be cumulative, at a cost to the established parties. In Karl Deutsch's (1976) analysis, the Switzerland of the mid-1970s stood at the crossroads between conservative ossification and creative innovation. More than a decade later, it is still not decided which way the country will go. The reluctance of the core to adapt to the changing environment seems to have increased, as has the resistance of a part of the populace toward any type of change. The reactions to the urban movements of the early 1980s provided a telling example of the degree to which major parts of both the elites and the population have become enchanted by the myth that they live in the best of all possible worlds (Kriesi, 1984). But as the success of the Green Party and of progressive initiatives demonstrates, creative innovations are far from impossible in the Switzerland of today. However, considered as a whole, the tendencies sketched render the image of a natural Swiss consensus quite dubious. The Swiss "founding myth" contains a grain of truth, to be sure, but if taken too literally, it is apt to mislead both complacent Swiss politicians and benevolent foreign observers.

REFERENCES Barber, Benjamin. 1974. The Death of Communal Liberty. A History of Freedom in a Swiss Mountain Canton. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Barber, Benjamin. 1988. "Participation and Swiss Democracy." Government and Opposition 23, no. 1 (Winter):31-50. Bogdanor, Vernon. 1988. "Federalism in Switzerland." Government and Opposition 23:69-90. Deutsch, Karl W. 1976. DieSchweizals einparadigmatischerFallpolitischerIntegration. Bern: Haupt. Farago, Peter. 1987. Verbande als Trager offentlicher Politik. Aufbau und Bedeutung privater Regierungen in der Schweiz. Griisch: Ruegger. Gross, Andreas. 1988. "1987 war das Jahr der Volksinitiative, der Terle unserer Bundesverfassung.' " Tages-Anzeiger (newspaper), January 4, p. 9. Gruner, Erich, and Hans Peter Hertig. 1983. Der Burger und die "neue" Politik. Bern: Haupt. Hertig, Hans Peter. 1982. "Sind Abstimmungserfolge kauflich? Elemente der Meinungsbildung bei eidgenossischen Abstimmungen." Schweizerisches Jahrbuchfur Politische Wissenschaft 22:35-57. Hertig, Hans Peter. 1984. "Volksabstimmungen." In Handbuch politisches System der Schweiz, Vol. 2, ed. Ulrich Kloti, pp. 247-78. Bern: Haupt. Hotz, Beat. 1979. Politik zwischen Staat und Wirtschaft. Griisch: Ruegger. Kerr, Henry H. 1987. "The Swiss Party System: Steadfast and Changing." In Party

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Systems in Denmark, Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Belgium, ed. Hans Daalder, pp. 107-92. London: Frances Pinter. Kloti, Ulrich. 1988. "Political Ideals, Financial Interests and Intergovernmental Relations: New Aspects of Swiss Federalism." Government and Opposition 23:91-102. Knapp, Blaise. 1986. "Etapes du federalisme Suisse." In Manuel systeme politique de la Suisse, Vol. 3, ed. Raimund E. Germann and Ernest Weibel, pp. 31-54. Bern: Haupt. Kriesi, Hanspeter. 1980. Entscheidungsstrukturen und Entscheidungsprozesse in der Schweizer Politik. Frankfurt: Campus. Kriesi, Hanspeter. 1982. "The Structure of the Swiss Political System." In Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making, ed. Gerhard Lehmbruch and Philippe C. Schmitter, pp. 133-62. London: Sage. Kriesi, Hanspeter. 1984. Die Bewegung von Zurich. Bilder, Interaktionen, Zusammenhdnge. Frankfurt: Campus. Kriesi, Hanspeter, ed. 1985. Bewegung in der Schweizer Politik. Fallstudien zu politischen Mobilisierungsprozessen in der Schweiz. Frankfurt: Campus. Kriesi, Hanspeter. 1986. "Perspektiven neuer Politik: Parteien und neue soziale Bewegungen." Schweizerisches Jahrbuchfiir Politische Wissenschaft 26:333-50. Kriesi, Hanspeter, and Peter Farago. 1988. "The Regional Differentiation of Business Interest Associations in Switzerland." In Regional Differentiation of Business Interest Associations, ed. William Coleman and Henk Jacek. Berlin: DeGruyter. Linder, Wolf. 1983. "Entwicklung, Strukturen und Funktionen des Wirtschafts—und Sozialstaats in der Schweiz." In Handbuch politisches System der Schweiz, Vol. 1, ed. Alois Riklin, pp. 255-382. Bern: Haupt. Lipset, Seymour M., and Stein Rokkan. 1967. "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: An Introduction." In Party Systems and Voter Alignments, ed. Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, pp. 1-64. New York: Free Press. Neidhart, Leonhard. 1970. Plebiszit undpluralitare Demokratie. Eine Analyse der Funktionen des schweizerischen Gesetzesreferendums. Helvetica Politica, Series B. Vol. 5. Bern: Francke. Parri, Leonardo. 1987. "Neo-Corporatist Arrangements, 'Konkordanz' and Direct Democracy: The Swiss Experience." In Political Stability and Neo-Corporatism, ed. Ilja Scholten, pp. 70-94. London: Sage. Schumann, Klaus. 1971. Das Regierungssystem der Schweiz. Koln: Karl Heymanns Verlag. Steinberg, Jonathan. 1988. "Imitation of Switzerland: Historical Reflections." Government and Opposition 23: 13-31. Steiner, Jiirg. 1973. Amicable Agreement versus Majority Rule: Conflict Resolution in Switzerland. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Urio, Paolo, and Nejalka Markov. 1986. "Les administrations cantonales." In Manuel systeme politique de la Suisse, Vol. 3, ed. Raimund E. Germann and Ernest Weibel, pp. 107-36. Bern: Haupt. Windisch, Uli. 1978. "Ideology: Key to Power." In Democracy, Consensus and Social Contract, ed. Pierre Birnbaum, Jack Lively, and Geraint Parry, pp. 203-21. London: Sage.

3

Swiss Trade Unions—A Case of Peaceful Industrial Relations FRANgOIS HOPFLINGER The social and political problems faced by Swiss trade unions are in many ways similar to those found in other highly developed countries (Mielke, 1983; Hartmann, 1985). Unions are struggling to survive in a rapidly changing economy that is increasingly dominated by weakly organized service industries. The past performance of these unions is therefore no longer a valid guide for predicting their future. Before discussing the present problems faced by Swiss trade unions, it is necessary to describe the industrial relations within this small European country. Relative to other European countries, the Swiss system of industrial relations has developed some unique features that make it a perfect case for students of "deviant cases." Trade unionism in Switzerland is characterized by several primary features. First, strike involvement has been—and still is—considerably lower than in most other democratic countries. For more than 50 years, Switzerland has experienced a probably unique record of peaceful industrial relations. The number of working days lost as a result of industrial disputes has been very low for decades (Table 3.1). The low strike rate in Switzerland is due to a highly institutionalized system of collective bargaining that excludes open industrial disputes. In 1937 the Swiss Watch- and Metalworkers' Union (SMUV)—the largest Swiss trade union— signed a no-strike agreement, widely known as an "industrial peace treaty." This agreement, forbidding any disruptive industrial action, has been in force for more than 50 years. Following World War II, most Swiss unions signed similar no-strike agreements. Today industrial peace is formally stipulated in all

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Table 3.1 Strike Involvement: Employees Involved in Industrial Disputes per 100,000 of the Nonagricultural Labor Force 1900-1930 Belgium Denmark France Germany (FRG) Great Britain Italy Sweden Switzerland

1950-1960

1960-1970 1970-1980

6.4 11.5 7.8 11.1 3.8 12.1* 18.0

3.3 1.4 10.6 3.7 9.3 9.0 0.7

1.9 1.7 10.3 0.6 10.6 17.2 0.8

10.0 18.3 2.4

6.5

0.2

0.1

0.2

5.4 6.9 15.1

-

*1900-1923 Source: Degen, 1987, p. 26.

Table 3.2 Estimated Density of Union Membership in Switzerland Total 1970 1976 1980 1986

30% 38% 32% 27%

Public Sector 58% 61% 65% 61%

Private Sector White collar Blue collar 33% 45% 47% 45%

21% 25% 20% 16%

Source: Hopflinger,1980 (for 1970-1976). Own estimates (for 1980-1986) .

industries and in nearly every collective agreement. There is no indication that the highly institutionalized system of industrial conflict resolution is weakening. Second, trade unionism is split along several dimensions. There are a number of national federations that are divided along religious and party lines. For example, one finds, in addition to the social democratic Swiss Trade Union Federation (SGB), a Catholic trade union movement. Although much smaller than the social democratic unions, the Catholic unions are recognized bargaining partners, their strongholds being the Catholic regions of the country. In addition, blue- and white-collar workers usually join different trade unions. Whereas the SGB and the Catholic trade unions recruit mainly blue-collar workers and public employees, the white-collar employees of the private sector are organized by autonomous white-collar unions or professional associations. Some of the whitecollar unions are loosely affiliated with an independent confederation of purely white-collar associations (Vereinigung Schweizerische Angestellten Verbende [VSA]). The segregation of these two wings of the labor movement has been strengthened by formal agreements that regulate the sphere of influence of each confederation. Since the late 1970s the SGB has made efforts to recruit whitecollar workers, although with only marginal success. And finally, numerous independent unions and professional associations exist that are not associated with any of the national confederations. The independent unions organize spe-

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cialized groups of mainly white-collar employees (e.g., bank personnel, engineers, etc.). It is also important to note that—despite the pluralism of the trade unions and employees' associations—the overall rate of unionization in Switzerland is relatively low (and considerably lower than in Sweden or Great Britain, for example). This is particularly true regarding white-collar employees outside the public sector. Many blue-collar workers remain unorganized as well (Table 3.2). THE INDUSTRIAL PEACE TREATY OF 1937 It is not my intention to present another detailed description of the peace treaty of 1937. (For a historical description, see Garbani and Schmid, 1980; Degen, 1987; Humbel, 1987.) I am more interested in investigating the social, economic and political factors that led to the widespread institutionalization of peaceful industrial relations in all sectors of the Swiss economy. Nonetheless, I will set the stage with some general remarks on this treaty, which was signed by the employers' association of the Swiss engineering industry on one side and by the SMUV and the smaller Catholic metalworkers' union on the other. Since 1937 it has been renewed at regular intervals, and although its social and economic effects are far from straightforward, this 50-year-old treaty represents for many a cornerstone of Swiss politics. This agreement and all later treaties not only forbid such disruptive industrial actions as strikes and lockouts but also provide for close cooperation between employers and trade unions on all important issues. The right of trade unions to organize workers as well as the establishment of workers' committees in all enterprises are formally guaranteed. Even more important, however, is the stipulation of a joint arbitration tribunal that has the final word in any industrial dispute. This system of joint arbitration promotes compromise on questions of wages, working hours, and so on. In the metal and engineering industries, wages are negotiated within the individual enterprises (Hopflinger, 1976). The treaty of 1937 was not the first example of close cooperation between trade union leaders and employers in Switzerland, but it was the first case of nationwide collaboration. It was this agreement that set the main instruments of later conflict resolution properly in place. Three historical factors were responsible for the first nationwide no-strike and arbitration agreement: (1) The devaluation of the Swiss franc by 30 percent in 1936 paved the way for rapid export-led economic growth following a harsh period of depression and widespread unemployment. Any prolonged strikes would have endangered the new export boom. But strikes were looming because the inflation that followed the devaluation reinforced workers' demands for pay raises that neither the employers nor the government were likely to tolerate. It is not by chance that a conflict-avoidance strategy was first developed in the watch and engineering industries, two industries particularly affected by any loss of international competitiveness.

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Switzerland in Perspective

(2) Both the employers' associations and the trade unions feared massive state intervention in the case of strong industrial unrest. The federal government was preparing legislation for compulsory industrial arbitration (legislation that was dropped following the signing of the peace treaty). The trade unions had learned during the general strike of 1918 and again in 1932 (when striking workers were shot by the army) how ruthlessly the federal government could react against any mass mobilization of the labor movement. (3) A third important historical factor contributing to the agreement was the obvious threat of Nazi Germany to the north and the Benito Mussolini regime to the south. Local alliances between conservative parties and groups of Swiss fascists alerted the unions to the danger of a polarization of the bourgeoisie and the democratic Left. To some extent, then, the peace treaty was an attempt at a national coalition against fascism within and outside Switzerland. After 1939, when the Nazis threatened to invade Switzerland, a broad coalition of all democratic forces became even more urgent. The nationwide no-strike agreement was therefore a first major attempt at a coalition between Swiss employers and the trade union leadership, a coalition aimed at (1) reinforcing the international competitiveness of an export-dependent country, (2) protecting the autonomy of a collective bargaining against government interventions, and (3) strengthening democratic forces against authoritarian movements (first fascism and, after World War II, communism). These elements continued to play an important part long after World War II. Since Switzerland remains strongly dependent on exports, employers and workers have basically the same interest in preserving the international competitiveness of their enterprises. Even today, both trade unions and employers' associations are reluctant to allow the government to interfere, and Swiss nationalism is as virulent as ever among workers (often resulting in xenophobic reactions against foreigners). Given the specific historical circumstances that led to the peace treaty of 1937, it is not surprising that the event became a kind of national legend, a legend that only few dare to criticize. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PEACEFUL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS Why did the treaty of 1937 not remain a short-lived agreement instead of becoming the cornerstone of a highly institutionalized structure of industrial conflict resolution? One first has to consider that the short-term impact of the 1937 agreement was small. In the years immediately following, many workers were still skeptical of no-strike agreements, and at first no other trade union followed the SMUV. Although World War II did reinforce the national alliance between trade union leaders and employers, the outbreak of the war made the peace treaty appear obsolete. Even after World War II, it was some time before no-strike agreements spread throughout all other industries. This is because, first, many workers outside the

Swiss Trade Unions

55

metal industry did not want to lose their main weapon of industrial mobilization. The chemical workers, for example, in 1945 rejected a no-strike agreement similar to the 1937 peace treaty. During the years immediately following World War II, Switzerland as well as other European countries experienced an upsurge in industrial unrest and a marked increase in communist votes (Schiavi and Brassel, 1987). The wave of strikes, albeit short-lived, had the effect of demonstrating the power of the trade unions. For many employers this represented an additional reason to support the peace treaty within the metal and engineering industries. Second, employers in many industries were still reluctant to recognize trade unions and to negotiate wages. It was only the upsurge in strikes that led many employers to accept collective bargaining. Following the war, the number of collective bargaining agreements increased rapidly, from 632 in 1944 to 1,667 in 1960. Since the 1960s, about 65 percent of all workers have been covered by collective agreements (International Labour Office [ILO], 1985). In many industries, collective agreements were from the beginning combined with nostrike agreements. During the 1950s, no-strike agreements (which always included compulsory arbitration regulations) were signed in increasing numbers, until nearly the entire Swiss economy was covered by similar industrial peace treaties. This occurred at a time when no-strike agreements were not even being discussed in most other countries. At the same time, the Swiss trade union movement experienced a process of substantial social and political integration, which strengthened the principle of peaceful industrial relations. Three factors can be identified as important in promoting this rapid integration: 1. The cold war resulted in a strong anticommunist ideology among Swiss trade unions. This encouraged the diffusion of liberal economic ideas among the working class. The principles of private ownership and the idea of a market-oriented economy became widely accepted, whereas the politics of class struggle lost popularity. 2. The establishment of social welfare improved the social situation of workers. A milestone was the introduction of social security in 1947. A traditional demand of the trade union movement was thus met, although not exactly in the way first imagined (Siegenthaler, 1968). 3. Trade unions were fully recognized by both employers and government. Collective agreements with employers became the norm, and the trade unions, together with other interest groups, were formally accepted as part of the pre-parliamentary decisionmaking process. Since 1947, the Swiss constitution stipulates the pre-parliamentary consultation of all main interest groups on any important political, social or economic questions (Meyer, 1968; Rey, 1979; Kriesi, 1980). As large interest groups, Swiss trade unions became an integral and accepted part of a political structure that in the next few decades developed increasingly neo-corporatist characteristics. It is important to note that the no-strike agreements and the norms of consensual industrial arbitration are part of a broad sociopolitical pattern. Proportional rep-

56

Switzerland in Perspective

resentation of all main political parties in national and local government, political decentralization that gives large autonomy to local authorities, and industrial peace are all elements of a sociopolitical structure that emphasizes the values of collaboration, integration and consensus. Aside from having a very low strike rate, Switzerland is characterized by (1) relatively few and mostly localized civil disturbances; (2) a highly stable federal government, based since 1959 on the same coalition of four main parties; and (3) relatively low crime rates. Switzerland is thus characterized by an extremely high level of sociopolitical stability and integration, although in recent years grass-root activities outside established political institutional channels have become more numerous (Levy and Zwicky, 1984). Some may view this situation as a "paradise" when compared to that in other countries. But the reader should bear in mind that there may be a price to pay for low collective mobilization. Switzerland's rates of alcoholism, drug abuse and suicide are rather high, even compared to other European countries. It may well be that the results of long-term social and political "stability" are higher levels of individual anomie and apathy among sectors of the working class. Later I will discuss in more detail the trade union problems that have resulted from decades of industrial peace and demobilization. From the 1950s to the late 1970s, at least, no-strike agreements that excluded industrial actions, even with regard to questions outside the scope of collective bargaining, were accepted without much question. During this period most trade unions explicitly identified themselves as forces of industrial "law and order." In the late 1960s, as the administrative costs facing trade unions rose more rapidly than their membership fees, and as more workers remained non-members, the larger Swiss trade unions went a step further: They asked the employers to help pay for trade union work. In a variety of industries, employers agreed to pay a fee for every non-organized worker—and in some cases, even for every union member within the industry—as a token of appreciation for the law-andorder functions of the unions (Hopflinger, 1976). Even today this probably unique way of honoring free trade unions remains in force, resulting in a considerable dependence of the trade union leadership on the goodwill of employers. In the late 1970s some more critical questioning of the value of total industrial peace occurred among groups of union members. However, this opposition— such as the "Manifest 77" within the SMUV—was rapidly crushed, and the importance of industrial peace was once more emphasized. Nonetheless, certain unions were at least forced to modernize their internal structures, which had become old-fashioned as a result of low membership mobilization. Currently, no-strike agreements are still widely accepted both within and outside the trade union movement. The majority of Swiss citizens and union members favor a close collaboration among government, employers and unions. Neither the economic recession of the late 1970s nor the new economic boom of the late 1980s has changed public opinion on this subject (Table 3.3). Only among some groups of younger trade union leaders are there doubts regarding the long-term effects of this policy (Roig et al., 1986).

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Table 3.3 Attitudes of the Population toward Industrial " Peace Treaties" 1974

1977

1980

1983

1987

977

1005

1081

1030

1008

-positive

78%

74%

71%

72%

71%

-negative

16%

20%

23%

23%

19%

6%

6%

6%

5%

10%

Attitude towards peace treaty:

-don't know

N:*

*Survey among adult population. Source: Schweizerische Arbeitgeber-Zeitung (different issues)

THE SOCIOECONOMIC BACKGROUND OF INDUSTRIAL PEACE Reconsidering the recent decades of industrial peace in Switzerland, one might ask which socioeconomic factors supported the pattern of industrial relations described above. Certainly important is the fact that Switzerland is a very affluent country. It is possible that comparatively high wages and a high standard of living quell dissatisfaction among the working class. However, this is only true with regard to material demands (such as wages) and not with regard to nonmaterial demands such as participation. One must, however, remember that in other countries many strikes have been promoted by highly paid workers and professionals. Switzerland's wealth is therefore only part of the answer. One might argue, on the other hand, that it is long-term industrial peace that is responsible for Switzerland's widespread affluence, with no pockets of poverty. This argument is often advanced by Swiss trade union leaders and employers alike to justify no-strike agreements. They argue that any industrial unrest would endanger Switzerland's hard-won international position. While it is true that strikes can become very costly in terms of foregone wages and production, even in countries with high strike rates the number of working days lost is marginal compared with total economic production. International comparisons measuring the net effect of strikes on economic growth have not clearly shown that countries with low strike frequencies grow faster than those with high strike frequencies. There is no macroeconomic evidence that peaceful industrial relations substantially enhance long-term economic growth (Gallati, 1976; Degen, 1987). An important factor that promotes industrial peace in Switzerland concerns the interrelationship between industrial relations and economic development. To understand the Swiss pattern of industrial relations, the structure of the economy must be discussed in more detail. It is a well known fact that small countries generally have much greater export and import rates than larger countries (Vital, 1971; Khalaf, 1974; Sieber, 1981). Switzerland is no exception. It is also a country with many multinational enterprises with worldwide investments. (Nes-

58

Switzerland in Perspective

tie, the largest Swiss corporation, employs only 4 percent of its total labor force within Switzerland, and many other large Swiss-owned companies employ more workers outside than within Swiss borders. In 1986, the 30 largest Swiss-owned enterprises had only 32 percent of their total employment within Switzerland.) The dependence on external markets—both for exports and investments—implies that most Swiss enterprises have to compete in a variety of foreign markets. Such a situation does not allow for complacency. The need to remain internationally competitive induces a climate of discipline and work ethos among employers and workers alike. This does not necessarily mean low wages, but it does imply that workers and employers tend to share a common perspective: Workers are aware that high wages must be earned within a highly competitive international market. This view results in a realistic or even overanxious appraisal of union demands. Moreover, in several popular referenda, Swiss citizens have rejected proposals for shorter working hours, and the Swiss currently work more hours per week than any other Europeans (between 2,000 and 2,300 hours per year). A small country that depends on regular exports for its prosperity also needs a high degree of internal cooperation. Only through cooperation, and not through internal antagonism, can a small country with relatively small enterprises hope to remain wealthy. It is not by chance that many other export-oriented small countries—such as Austria, the Netherlands and Singapore—have developed elaborate sociopolitical structures of cooperation of one form or another between government, employers and trade unions. The ideology of social partnership is a distinctive characteristic of many small European states, and these cooperative structures have often developed strongly corporatist features (Schmitter and Lehmbruch, 1979; Alemann, 1981; Katzenstein, 1985). As in other small countries, Switzerland's strongly internationally oriented economy goes hand in hand, paradoxically, with a strongly nationalistic political ideology: a nationalism that stresses the shared interests of employers and workers in strengthening the economic position of their country. In Switzerland's case, the entire system of collaboration between employers and trade unions is reinforced by the dominant production strategy of the country. The optimal strategy for a small, internationally dependent country is to specialize in the high quality production of industrial products or services, foregoing any mass production or large-scale technology production for which only large internal markets are able to pay. Specialization allows even medium-sized enterprises to defend some market share. When a large proportion of a country's enterprises so specialize, the nation stands to gain in prosperity even if it is lacking in natural resources such as coal, oil or gold. As a once rather poor country in the center of Europe, Switzerland for decades concentrated its development efforts on occupying economic niches that require a high degree of know-how. This long-term strategy provided a diversified range of relatively high-quality products and services destined for consumption mainly by members of the upper social strata of international society.

Swiss Trade Unions

59

In short, it might be said that Switzerland tends to specialize in working for the international rich. Products such as sophisticated instruments, engines and chemicals and services such as insurance, banking and tourism are oriented primarily toward the upper strata (investors, managers, and otherwise affluent consumers). Many products that are popular today (e.g., watches and chocolate) were earlier considered luxuries, and Swiss firms in those industries still today prefer to remain upmarket. This production strategy, institutionalized over decades, has had a profound influence on labor relations. When producing for the international rich or for industrial decision makers, as in the case of large investment products such as electrical engines, an industry has to conform to strict norms of quality and reliability. It is not primarily the price of the product or service that is important but quality, reliability and confidence. Within the Swiss economy, one finds many types of production and services in which worker stability is a crucial production factor. The employees working in a high-qualityoriented industry need to be relatively disciplined, both to achieve the high quality needed and to gain the confidence of fickle clients. Such production also requires many skilled or at least semi-skilled workers. Batch production tends to be more common in Switzerland than mass production. The Swiss working class is therefore relatively well skilled, and most young workers start with three or even four years of formal apprenticeship. Skilled workers have generally higher wages than unskilled workers. They also generally show greater work satisfaction and a strong professional orientation that leads to more moderate views regarding class conflicts. The skill and discipline needed to build complex engines or to guarantee bank secrecy promote a type of labor relations where spontaneous outbursts of industrial unrest appear out of place. Even today, a large proportion of trade union members are skilled workers with a strongly professional orientation (Garcia, 1986). This situation is reinforced by the fact that most unskilled workers are primarily foreign or are Swiss women, both groups being underrepresented within the trade union movement. As a movement of mainly skilled workers, Swiss trade unions have many features of a labor movement representing a "worker aristocracy" that has accepted many bourgeois values. Most trade union members can be viewed as typical examples of the so-called affluent worker. During the last few decades the affluence of Swiss workers has been intensified by a massive immigration of foreign workers. Especially in the 1950s and 1960s, Switzerland experienced substantial immigration, mainly because the domestic labor market could not provide the labor force necessary for the country's very rapid economic expansion. From 1950 to 1970, the number of foreigners living in Switzerland increased from 285,000 to 1,003,000, or from 6 percent to over 16 percent of the total population; and in 1986 around 30 percent of the total working class was of foreign origin. This massive immigration of mostly unskilled workers from poorer European countries brought a considerable upward mobility for Swiss workers. While the immigrants occupied the less well paid, lower-status positions, Swiss workers moved to higher positions, often changing

60

Switzerland in Perspective

from blue- to white-collar status (Castles and Kosack, 1973; Hoffmann-Nowotny and Hondrich, 1982). Immigration, however, has placed the trade union movement in a difficult situation, since it has led to a polarization within the working class. On one hand, the immigrants are only weakly integrated into a trade union movement based on industrial peace. Used to a more radical union approach and intending to return to their home countries, many immigrants do not feel strongly motivated to join Swiss trade unions. On the other hand, Swiss union members, despite the improvement in their social position following immigration, often react defensively to foreign workers. The 1970s in particular brought an upsurge in nationalistic reactions against foreign workers, which also further reinforced the national norm of collaboration between trade unions and employers. THE CONSEQUENCES OF LONG-TERM INDUSTRIAL PEACE In analyzing the consequences of long-term industrial peace, it makes no sense to compare Switzerland with underdeveloped countries that are plagued by civil strife. More meaningful is the comparison with other European and North American highly developed countries typified by a generally high level of sociopolitical stability. In comparing Switzerland with other Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, it is clear that the macroeconomic consequences of long-term industrial peace are small: Switzerland did not apparently realize any greater economic growth as a direct result of its highly institutionalized pattern of industrial conflict resolution (Degen, 1987). At the most, industrial peace enhanced the growth of some economic sectors sensitive to social and political unrest (such as international banking, trust companies, insurance). Industrial peace in the form observed in Switzerland is therefore no crucial macroeconomic factor. On a microeconomic level, it is only an added factor in helping to preserve the international competitiveness of enterprises that depend on the norms of confidence and reliability. The wage drift observed in many Swiss industries provides evidence that the relationship between industrial peace and the moderation of wage increases has in fact been rather weak. It should also be mentioned that the costs of recent industrial restructuring were borne mainly by foreign workers. Switzerland's very low unemployment rate (less than 2 percent) during the economic recession of the late 1970s was largely due to the "export" of unemployment by sending foreign workers home (Haug, 1980). An argument often advanced by academics in criticism of trade union policy is that the collaboration between government, employers, and unions results in economic and social rigidities. Switzerland's neo-corporatist structure—of which trade unions are a major part—is thought to be responsible for preventing structural adaptation and innovation (Kriesi, 1980). Economically this argument finds no great support. The need for economic innovation has always been accepted

Swiss Trade Unions

61

by the Swiss trade unions. During the recent economic recession, trade unions helped to implement technological changes and even demanded the training of displaced workers for new jobs rather than trying to put a brake on industrial restructuring. Only in one major case did the collaboration of employers, trade unions and government lead to structural rigidities: the Swiss watch industry. A combination of traditional family enterprises, government protection and skilled and unionized workers oriented toward a certain kind of mechanical know-how hindered the shift to electronic mass production, so that the Japanese temporarily managed to gain ground over the Swiss watch industry. In general, however, the long-term industrial peace did not contribute to economic rigidities mainly because innovations were forced to occur by virtue of international competition. On the other hand, industrial peace has helped to reinforce a political corporatism that has become very rigid. The Swiss trade unions are strongly integrated into sociopolitical decision making, and by accepting industrial peace, they have become part of the political establishment. This stems in large measure from the fact that both trade union leaders and employers share a common set of basic values. One is the value of social cooperation, and in many agreements, the principles of mutual trust and understanding are formally stipulated. Negotiations are not regarded as a confrontation of interests but as a process of cooperation regulated by mutual trust and understanding, a process that should end in a "sensible" compromise. The social partnership between trade union leaders and employers is underscored by the simple fact that both belong to a small, informal political elite that has numerous contacts. Switzerland's small size encourages a situation in which a small number of leaders are constantly meeting on different social, political and cultural occasions, since the same individuals are members of numerous voluntary associations. This accumulation of roles results in a dense social network among a limited number of decision makers (Geser and Hopflinger, 1976). Sociopolitically, Switzerland's main problem is hyperstability, to the point where the political structures seem less and less able to adapt to the rapid technological and economic changes occurring. Currently, most Swiss trade unions encounter the problem of an "innovational cleavage" between economy and politics: On one hand, the economy—oriented toward international markets—is in permanent change, and the trade unions are busy attempting to deal with the consequences of technological innovation and industrial adjustment. On the other, the political structures—oriented toward internal problems—have become conservative to such a degree that the lack of structural change is becoming a major societal problem. The growing environmental dangers, the reluctance to participate in European integration, and the lack of motivation to reform an obsolete constitution are some indications of this intransigence. Long-term industrial peace has surely contributed to the problem of political hyperstability within a rapidly changing society (although one must acknowledge that most democracies are actually confronted with a similar contradiction).

62

Switzerland in Perspective

Long-term industrial peace may also have consequences for individual unions. Swiss union members can truly be described as apathetic and demobilized, and one might be tempted to argue that this is the (logical) result of industrial peace. Apathy is, however, a feature of all mature trade unions in all affluent societies (Schellhoss, 1967; Carew, 1976). Because in Switzerland there are no strikes demonstrating the unions' ability to mobilize workers, it is difficult to measure the unions' strength or weakness. Only the popular referenda give some indication, and one pattern emerges from the results: The trade unions have often been successful in fighting social cuts, but efforts to promote new social legislation opposed by employers usually met with failure. The unions' popular strength lies, then, in opposing social cuts, not in promoting sociopolitical reforms. Their most dramatic defeat was the failure in 1976 to win popular support for legislation promoting co-determination by workers. Union members often do not bother to vote at all, and workers' participation in recent elections has been well below 40 percent. In the national elections of 1987, for example, several prominent trade union leaders were not re-elected. Concerning the long-term effects of industrial peace, one can say that it did not lead to economic rigidity (as it might have in a less export-oriented country), but it did tend to strengthen sociopolitical corporatism. Furthermore, it weakened the motivation to adapt union structures to a rapidly changing labor market. Many trade unions have remained oriented for too long toward skilled bluecollar workers. Attempts at structural reform were not made until the late 1970s, often too late to recruit successfully the growing numbers of women and whitecollar workers.

THE UPHILL STRUGGLE: THE PROBLEMS OF ORGANIZING WOMEN AND WHITE-COLLAR WORKERS The trade unions, embedded in a peaceful corporatist structure, were even slower than other European unions in adapting to new socioeconomic circumstances. They are, for this reason, well represented within the traditional industrial sector but show only a weak presence in the tertiary sector. In 1986, only 12 percent of all members of the Swiss trade federation (SGB) were women. The increase from 10 percent in 1975 was very slow indeed, and Swiss trade unions recruit considerably fewer women than do other European trade unions (ILO, 1985). The underrepresentation of women is not only the result of a maleoriented union structure but is also related to the structure of the labor market. Compared with other European countries, the labor force participation of Swiss women is relatively low. Furthermore, Switzerland shows a high degree of sexspecific occupational segregation. According to a recent study, at least 62 percent of women (or men) in the Swiss labor force would have to change their occupational category to establish a proportionally representative distribution of the

Swiss Trade Unions

63

sexes across occupations (Charles, 1987). Women's very limited access to many occupations in effect limits their access to the trade unions as well. The continuing segregation of blue- and white-collar workers represents another serious problem faced by the trade unions. For decades, many unions focused on occupational rather than industrial categories of workers, thus neglecting white-collar workers in industry and services. Even today the Swiss trade union federation (SGB) includes no unions that organize banking, insurance or any other major service industries. Despite the growing importance of the service economy, most of the tertiary sector remains outside the sphere of trade union recruitment. The reluctance of the trade unions to recruit white-collar workers also has to do with the fact that specialized white-collar associations are well established and recognized by government and employers. In the last two decades these associations, traditionally strongly engaged in professional activities, have begun to promote trade unionist policies (such as collective bargaining) (Hopflinger, 1980). Through combining professional and union functions, some white-collar associations gained in attractiveness for workers. Such "hybrid organizations"—neither traditional unions nor traditional professional societies—have become increasingly important among the higher-status whitecollar categories. One might even argue that such associations, which offer both individual profession status and collective representation, represent a more "modern" type of unionism than that found among SGB unions. The well established existence of white-collar associations suggests that the recent effort of trade unions to organize the service industry has probably come too late. Currently, the trend is less toward the unionization of white-collar workers than toward strengthening the segregation of blue- and white-collar associations. This is true despite the fact that status differences between blue- and white-collar workers have been largely eroded. The extreme pluralism of Swiss trade unions is not likely to disappear. Nonetheless, among both blue- and white-collar associations, there is a broad consensus on the values of social partnership and industrial peace. Like trade unions in other European countries, Swiss unions have been on the defensive in recent years. The rapidly changing technology has resulted in a more reactive than active policy. Only in the last few years have there been attempts to formulate a more "qualitative" trade union policy that takes better account of a highly diversified economy emphasizing individual choice. Yet although postmaterialist values have gained support among union members, the Swiss trade unions—along with many other European unions—still find it very difficult to adapt to a postindustrial society. Having found a (workable) pattern for dealing with industrial conflict, they do not seem able to deal as successfully with new issues (such as environmental problems, the women's movement, etc.). In fact, most of the recent political movements (such as feminism, the peace movement, and the environmental movement) have occurred outside of, and often in opposition to, the trade unions.

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Switzerland in Perspective

REFERENCES Alemann, U. von. 1981. Neokorporatismus. Frankfurt: Campus. Carew, A. 1976. Democracy and Government in European Trade Unions. London. Castles, S., and G. Kosack. 1973. Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe. London: Oxford University Press. Charles, M. 1987. "Geschlechterspezifische Arbeitsmarkt-Segregation in der Schweiz." Schweizerische Zeitschrift fiir Soziologie 13, no. 1:1-27. Degen, B. 1987.' 'Der Arbeitsfrieden zwischen Mythos und Realitat.'' In Arbeitsfrieden Realitat eines Mythos, ed. Widerspruch. Zurich: Sonderband. Gallati, R. 1976. Der Arbeitsfrieden in der Schweiz und seine wohlstandspolitische Bedeutung im Vergleich mit der Entwicklung in einigen anderen Staaten. Bern: La Garbani, P., and J. Schmid. 1980. Le syndicalisme Suisse. Histoirepolitique de Vunion syndicate 1880-1980. Lausanne. Garcia, C. 1986. "L'identite professionelle." In Syndicalisme aufutur. Etude comparee des comportements des structures et des revendications, ed. C. Roig et al. Lausanne: Editions L.E.P. Geser, H., and F. Hopflinger. 1976. "Probleme der strukturellen Differenziemng in kleinen Gesellschaften. Ein soziologischer Beitrag zur Theorie des Kleinstaates." Schweizerische Zeitschrift fiir Soziologie 2, no. 2:27-54. Hartmann, J. 1985. Verbdnde in der westlichen Industriegesellschaft: ein internationa vergleichendes Handbuch. New York. Haug, W. 1980. . . . und es kamen Menschen. Auslanderpolitik und Fremd-arbeit in de Schweiz 1914-1980. Basehz-Verlag. Hoffmann-Nowotny, H. -J., and K. -O. Hondrich. 1982. Auslander in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und in der Schweiz. Segregation und Integration: Eine vergleichende Untersuchung. Frankfurt: Campus. Hopflinger, F. 1976. Industriegewerkschaften in der Schweiz. Eine soziologische Unte suchung. Zurich: Limmat. Hopflinger, F. 1980. Die anderen Gewerkschaften. Angestellte und Angestelltenverband in der Schweiz. Zurich: Eco. Humbel, K. 1987. Treu und Glauben, Dokumentation zur Entstehung und Entwicklu des Friedensabkommens von 1937. Bern. International Labour Office. 1985. World Labour Report 2. Geneva: ILO. Katzenstein, P. J. 1985. Small States in World Markets. Industrial Policy in Europe. Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press. Khalaf, N. G. 1974. "Country Size and Trade Concentration." Journal of Development Studies 11:81-85. Kriesi, H. 1980. Entscheidungsstrukturen und Entscheidungsprozesse in der Schweiz Politik. Frankfurt: Campus. Levy, R., and H. Zwicky. 1984. "Politische Partizipation und neuere Aktionsformen." In Strukturen und Prozesse. Ed. U. Kloti. Handbuch Politisches System der Schweiz, vol. 2. Bern: Haupt. Meyer, K. 1968. Verbdnde und Demokratie in der Schweiz. Olten. Mielke, S. 1983. Internationales Gewerkschaftshandbuch. Opladen. Rey, J. -N. 1979. Analyse du comportement des organisations syndicates dans le processus de decision en Suisse. Bern.

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Roig, C ; H. Schmid; U. Ayberk; and J. -N Rey. 1986. Syndicalisme aufutur. Etude comparee des comportements des structures et des revendications syndicates. Lausanne: Editions L.E.P. Schellhoss, M. 1967. Apathie und Legitimitat. Das Problem der neuen Gewerkschaft. Munich. Schiavi, R., and R. Brassel. 1987. "Kampfend in den Arbeitsfrieden. Zur Streikwelle in unmittelbaren Nachkriegszeit." In Arbeitsfrieden—Realitat eines Mythos, ed. Widerspruch. Zurich: Sonderband. Schmitter, P. C , and G. Lehmbruch, eds. 1979. Trends towards Corporatist Intermediation. Beverly Hills, CA, and London. Sieber, M. 1981. Dimensionen kleinstaatlicher Auslandsabhdngigkeit. Kleine Studien zur Politischen Wissenschaft, no. 206. Zurich: University of Zurich. Siegenthaler, J. 1968. Die Politik der Gewerkschaften. Eine Untersuchung der offenlich Funktionen Schweizerischer Gewerkschaften nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. Ber Vital, D. 1971. The Survival of Small States. London.

A worker in the watchmaking industry Courtesy of the Swiss National Tourist Office, Zurich

4

From the Work Ethic to the Search for Self-Fulfillment The Meanings and the Value of Work and Their Evolution in the Twentieth Century CHRISTIAN J. LALIVE D'EPINAY Industrial societies—as even the designation indicates—are organized around economic activity and have made their peoples industrious, for better or worse. In Switzerland the industrial revolution started rather late, for the country lacked raw materials and reacted by making labor into its raw materials par excellence. Within the European context, the Swiss identity is even more linked to work than are those of other countries. This is apparent from the common Swiss explanation of the problems of others: "They don't work enough." The idea of work—along with those of cleanliness, pettiness, watches, direct democracy, cows and chocolate—nourished the stereotypes through which foreigners viewed us. But is work today the way it used to be? Have ideas about the workplace and the connection between being human and working stayed the same? Has the idea of work retained the same common-sense significance and value throughout this century? This is what I would like to explore in the following discussion, using the results of research conducted under the auspices of the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF).1 This study is a historico-sociological examination of ideas and culture. It focuses primarily on two periods, each of which is subdivided into two equal parts. During the first, which lasts until the end of World War II, the values of work and duty already described by Max Weber were dominant. But from 1935 on, a debate began that raised the issue of solidarity and called into question the ideology centering around an individual's responsibility to himself and his kin because of its unrealistic and asocial nature. The debate over the evolution of

68

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these ideas and the social forces to which they are linked serves as the basis of the welfare state. This period witnessed the introduction of certain elements of the cultural revolution that followed. Since the 1950s, a new conception of man's relation to society emerged. This period marked a step forward in the direction of individualism: The individual's quest for self-fulfillment was now considered to be the major goal of society. The "boom years" (1950-75) led to a denunciation of the alienation of labor and to the belief that the best route to self-fulfillment was to be found in private life, leisure time activities and consumerism. However, the golden years that many thought would last forever proved fleeting. The current period, which began with the oil crisis of 1973, still does not call into question the new form of hedonistic individualism, although it does seem to lean toward a less negative view of the relationship between people and their work, as well as inquiring into the new balance between the individual's demand for freedom and his responsibility toward himself, on the one hand, and the demands of social solidarity, on the other. Let us now examine these questions in greater detail.

THE INTERWAR YEARS: THE WORK ETHIC AND INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY During World War I, the outcome of the armed conflict was uncertain up until the end. For the ruling classes, Germany's defeat raised the spectre of the Bolshevik menace, in particular because the popular classes had supported the weight of wartime restrictions more than any other. In this context, at the end of 1918 the last significant social unrest broke out in Switzerland. The national strike failed, but concessions were made in order to relieve the social tension: federal elections with proportional representation (confirming the real power of the Socialist party) and the introduction of the "English workweek" (i.e., Saturday afternoons and Sundays off). However, not long afterward, the industrialists and the bourgeoisie wanted a return to the 54-hour workweek, and this precipitated a popular mobilization around a winning initiative that opposed the Parliament's decision (1924). An economic revival, which began in the same year and continued for several years, led to a real improvement in the incomes of the Swiss people. It is striking to notice how, in those troubled years, all the tensions, conflicts and polemics centered around a system of values and beliefs shared by all the social actors. What are its characteristics? For all, work was one of the—if not the—ontological dimensions of man. "The Olten Platform," the manifesto that united the strikers of 1918, confirms the "duty to work of everybody" before setting forth the conditions of work. The Christian trade union maintained that "the man who works is the lord of

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the world"; the employers made work "man's own"; and the peasantry saw the farmer as the model of the hard-working man. Work was viewed as the means of self-achievement and also the basis of society and the source of material wellbeing. Only work could save and rebuild Europe; and as far as Switzerland in particular was concerned, work was its special raw material. The spokesmen of the working class based their attacks on capitalism on the praise of work, "the most notable function of human societies." Founding texts and myths were used to support work's anthropological and sociological dimensions: the Bible (to which were attributed some mistaken paternities); the principal texts of the Enlightenment and the Romantic era (with their references to Greek mythology); and those of the founders of socialism.2 Thus, on the most fundamental level of belief, work was the object of consensus. In order to be legitimate, all discussions concerning this topic had to begin by confirming the fundamental—in the sense of founding—value of work. But this last consideration was also an ideological weapon: To accuse an opponent of undermining the idea of work as a duty could disqualify and even discredit him. This argument was persistently used against workers themselves, making them doubly suspect. First, with their ill-considered demands (the 48hour workweek, for example), they were accused of hindering the effort to put national recovery on therighttrack. Such behavior could assume the appearance of a collective act of disloyalty. Second, the salaried classes, among others, were accused of yielding to moral perversion. Not only were they thought to be charmed by the ideological sirens of the East ("Bolshevism is an eclipsing wound of war horrors and foreign domination," as a rural newspaper phrased it), but they were accused of being the representatives of an "opposition to work" and an "inclination to laziness," subject to "the law of the least effort," dealing with work as something to be avoided as much as possible. To those attacks, which suggested—sometimes explicitly—that the trade union leaders were outlaws and that the working classes should be placed under someone else's guidance, the Left responded blow for blow. They refuted the firs accusation, that concerning national reconstruction, by advancing a rational modernist argument couched in the spirit of progress: Swiss industry is too traditional, it delays in modernizing its equipment, and it lacks the advantages of new technologies and of new knowledge concerning management and work. R. Owen's (1771-1858) catechism served as a reference, as did Taylor's theories of the scientific organization of work. Both showed that industries in the forefront of technical progress were also in the forefront of social advancement. Furthermore, they indicated that countries that take the best care of their workers are able to withstand war the best. The Left countered the accusation of moral perversion by asking: Who lives a life of leisure, the worker or the boss? The employee or bourgeois? All agreed about the enhanced value of work and the condemnation of idleness, but they fought about the descriptions of the "virtuous" worker and the "unworthy" idler. What argument was used to legitimate the limitation of working hours, in the

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context of workers fighting for the 48-hour workweek? In other words, which requirements made free time a necessity? The first condition of course was the need to regain one's strength after work. In addition, there are tasks other than work to be adequately fulfilled, such as dedication to the family and also dedication to study in order to improve one's position (the reformist alternative) or to contribute to the emancipation of workers (the radical alternative). Moreover, the Christian trade union stressed the religious, moral and civic tasks of workers. Free time also gives women the opportunity to attend to their domestic tasks; this female activity was not in dispute, and on the contrary, reformers regretted the fact that poverty forced women to take factory jobs. The notion of leisure time was not linked to that of free time. For men, spare time was necessary in order to fulfill duties besides that of work; it was not intended to be devoted solely to one's self and one's pleasures. Free time was considered legitimate in reference to a work ethic. Without claiming to have presented all aspects of this issue, our analysis has identified the existence of a moral of work and individual responsibility. Between World Wars I and II, this system of values was embraced by the whole nation. Individual wellbeing would result from each person's service to society: Man demonstrates his responsibility and approaches self-achievement through paid labor. Work permits control of the world; it celebrates the victory of culture and society over nature. Furthermore, it defines the specific characteristics of man. Reviewing, then, the principal characteristics of this cultural system:

1. The human being was defined as (a) someone with duties that can be considered twofold—one duty is to himself and his kin, and the other is to society; (b) someone who works—work is his principal duty, the best way to fulfill other duties; work and duty contribute to an ontological definition of man. 2. From the notion of duty to one's self and one's kin, it followed that (a) the individual is responsible for himself and his kin, now and in the future; (b) the individual is responsible for his own self-achievement. These are the two aspects of the principle of individual responsibility. 3. Individual responsibility implies that considerable value is placed on rationality. Rational behavior is reflected in effort, work, foresight and savings. 4. What is the meaning of self-achievement in life? Above all, it isfindingone's place in society, fulfilling a social role, and basically, carrying out a part of the collective duty. 5. In sum, although the individual and society constituted two well-differentiated realities, they were not equally ranked. The collectivity was the superior principle—the true end of the individual. The individual was defined above all else in terms of duties; logically, his only fundamental right was the right to work. Society, on the other hand, bestowed rights on individuals. If this was the case, it was because society was

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perceived to be necessary for individual happiness. The adequate fulfillment of duties ensures the adequate development of society, allowing not only individual survival but also, in the future, wellbeing and happiness. This ethic defines a human being in his relation to society. However, it does not touch the question of the proper use of recommended values. Man is intrinsically one who works; the idler is a failure. But who are those who are realizing the model of the worker and who are those lowering themselves by sinking into idleness? We have seen that the answers differed depending on one's position in the social division of labor. All those values do not provide a precise model of society at all. They only state that this gives value to the condition of existence for the individual and that society's right and proper development depend on the individual's understanding of work and duty. But the character of the market and exchange system, the role and the functions of the state and the organization of production remain to be discussed. The free market, economic planning, government control, and even socialism are compatible with the work ethic. In class conflict, groups organize themselves around these ideas. FROM THE CRISIS TO THE WAR: INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF SOLIDARITY The brutal impact of the depression brought the economic progress of the 1920s to a standstill. After the terrible 1930s, when there were finally signs of improvement because of the market for weapons, those signs only presaged another affliction—the war. In fact, in 1945, per capita income returned to the low level of 1929. In this dramatic context, the dogma of individual responsibility was in jeopardy. The search for new forms of solidarity was expressed by both the Left and the Right. In 1934, the Swiss people rejected a corporatist solution when a large majority (57 percent) turned down the "frontist'' initiative for a complete revision of the Constitution. One year later, a so-called crisis initiative, launched by the Syndicalist and Socialist parties, had demanded that the state intervene radically in the economy. The initiative aroused a heated campaign and drew 83 percent of the voters to the polls. A small majority (57%) rejected it. From this point on, the revolutionary faction, which had been in disarray since the defeat of the 1918 national strike and which favored class struggle, was marginalized. During closed meetings in July 1937, the employers and trade unions in the metallurgical and watchmaking industries reached a consensus known as "peace in the workplace." Some years later, in 1943, as war raged, E. Nobs, a former leader of the national strike, became the first socialist to be elected to the federal government. Utopian goals gave way to reformist management, but that which the Left lost in public visibility it regained in improved bargaining power. The Wahlen program of 1940, which aimed at maximizing self-sufficiency

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on a national scale, called for the transformation of public parks and gardens into food-producing fields. The program's organization and management were entrusted to the Confederation, which was created out of the common need for solidarity that had been growing during the economic crisis and the war years. At the same time, the issue of the elderly assumed prominence, along with those of the unemployed and the soldiers. Old Age and Survivors' Insurance (OASI) carried the notion of solidarity, elaborated in the context of crisis and war, into peacetime. The long and intensive debate that accompanied the elaboration and adoption of this law revealed the evolution of a new system of collective values, which nevertheless had at its core the familiar work ethic. The principles of OASI first entered the Constitution in 1925; however, in 1931 the first practical application of the law was rejected. When the law was finally put into practice following the war, in 1947, the country not only hoped for economic recovery but also gravely feared the repeated disorders and social conflicts that had characterized the end of World War I (Gilg and Halblutzel, 1983; Jost, 1983). Let us look more closely at OASI, since it expresses so profoundly the implementation of the general understanding of the dialectical relationship between solidarity and individual responsibility (Maurer, 1982; Berenstein, 1986; Lalive d'Epinay, Bolzman, and Sultan, 1987). The law proposed a pension that would be available automatically to everyone upon reaching a certain age (65 for men; 62 for women), irrespective of whether or not the individual chose to stop working. The financial provisions were based on the principle of intergenerational solidarity: Those presently employed would guarantee the pensions of the elderly through their obligatory salary withholdings. This is a redistributive mechanism—the contribution rate is fixed, but the differences between salaries are much greater than those between pensions. Thus, there is both redistribution and solidarity between the socioeconomic classes, but the principle of individual responsibility is also sustained by the differences in pensions. The OASI pension had to provide a basic economic security. But it was seen as only the "first pillar" to which two others had to be added: retirement pensions and individual savings. The principal reasoning of the plan's defenders is the emphasis on the right to rest in dignity after a life of work. The image of the worker who saved his money and thereby guaranteed himself security in his old age was impossible to achieve in reality by the working classes. In actual fact, only a small minority would enjoy an old-age pension. Physically exhausted, the aged worker would be assailed by illness or accidents and, barely recovered, forced to return to work. But because he would no longer be able to perform adequately, he would be fired. Here lies the tragedy: a poverty-stricken old age after 50 or more years of work. The elderly, because they served our society, deserve the benefits of solidarity in the winter of their lives. Work done justifies the right to rest, the right to sit on the bench of the aged (the iconography of the epoch featured prominently images of a seat, present if the law was passed, taken away if it was rejected). Old age was never presented as a stage of life during which men

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and women could do the things they could not do before because of lack of money and time; it was not viewed as the beginning of a new and active life. Old age was not, as expressed in a recent epigraph, "the time to live" but a legitimate period to rest, retire and approach death with dignity without facing the bitterness of poverty. The opponents of the OASI plan, however, criticized the state's role in the retirement system. They wanted to keep the insurance and pension payments within the private economy or the local collectivity. They also feared the importance given to the principle of individual responsibility. Others, also on the Right, supported the plan because it combined responsibility and solidarity and because it encouraged the idea of individual saving. On July 6, 1947, 87 percent of the voters went to the polls, and four out of five endorsed the bill. In fact, the work ethos remained fundamentally intact: Work was the fundamental attribute of the individual and the foundation of collective happiness. The individual's rights were only legitimated by the duty of work. But now, a new and different distribution of rights and duties was established between the individual and society. The state became dedicated to the role of guarantor and manager of solidarity (hence, redistribution). Therefore, the state was responsible not only for the physical safety of its inhabitants but also partly for assuring their material security. Thus, the foundations of the social state were laid, in a period in which, although people expected economic improvements, the boom years to come were unanticipated. The affluent society was to transform the social state into a welfare state. THE BOOM YEARS (1950-75): IN SEARCH OF SELFFULFILLMENT During this period, reality surpassed the predictions of even the most optimistic economists. Sustained and rapid economic growth multiplied purchasing power in Switzerland, as in most European countries, by two and a half times (250 percent) in 25 years. Daily life was turned upside down, and the material world changed completely. Televisions, cars, electric household equipment, vacations for everyone, and contraception created fantastic dreams in everyone's life. Only a short time ago, working-class people had dreamed of seeing the sea "for real" once in their lifetimes. Increased purchasing power dramatically changed the organization of household expenditure. For instance, in 1921 in working-class and employee families, 70 percent of income was used for the basic needs of food, clothing, housing and heating; 7 percent for transport, education, and leisure-time pursuits; and 8 percent for insurance and taxes. Thirty years later, in 1950, basic needs consumed only 60 percent of the total budget. The real but slow and modest change in resource allocation was due more to an increase in the need for security (taxes, insurance: 15 percent) than to an increase in the expenses related to private life (10 percent). Let us consider the situation 30

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years later. In 1978 (a year that marked a new turning point) the percentage devoted to basic needs was reduced by half (proportionally speaking, because in real terms this fraction increased, influenced by the increase in purchasing power), meaning that it constituted only one third of the budget. In contrast, the fractions allocated to free time, transport and education, on one hand, and that of taxes and insurance, on the other, were each responsible for about 25 percent of the total budget (Swiss Statistical Yearbook). The system had undergone a transformation: Its focus was no longer primarily on physical needs but on those of security, mobility, and recreation. Social structure changed. The working class and independent workers, who had constituted three fourths of the active population in 1950, were reduced to only half of the active population by 1980. The beneficiary of this decrease was the relentless upsurge of white-collar employees and the middle class. Our society became more characterized by a "generalized" salaried class. The events that inform our study of values and orientations are all legislative initiatives. What they have in common is that they were launched in the "Golden Sixties." Several years later, however, they were subjected to national votes (two of them in 1976; the third in 1981), while the 1960s euphoria receded in the face of mounting insecurity. A 40-hour workweek was proposed by the movement of 1968, but now the Left officially kept its distance from it in an attempt to restore its own monopoly. Another constitutional initiative, called "Be Solidary," which concerned foreign workers, stemmed from Christian circles with the aim of abolishing the status of the seasonal worker. The Swiss Syndicalist Union organized a dull campaign; they wished to avoid confrontation with the xenophobic feelings of a large proportion of the working class. The Christian Democratic Party distanced itself from it, repudiating its youth and religious authority. These elements help us to understand the strong rejection expressed in the initiative voting. The negative verdict of the votes did not conceal, however, the fact that the debates of those years were characterized by a new and widely used language. Analysis detects values that everyone must have shared, at least in part. The employers' circles talked about reinforcement of an "anti-work ethic," a situation where "the value of spare time has increased at the expense of work motivation." The Swiss president of the national employee's association diagnosed that "the leveling of lifestyle and the increase in leisure time changed the focus of concern from the place of work to the place of leisure." This evolution was deplored, but it was taken to be inevitable. But what is now the content of spare time? Some statements still refer to it as a period for the restoration of one's energy (but now the emphasis is put on psychological fatigue or stress), and devotion to the family and to social and moral duties (but it sounds more intimate and focuses on the individual, "enriching the personality"). Today, militant women associate their claim on leisure time with the question of the woman's double workday. A completely new definition of spare time was created by associating this

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concept with that of leisure time. From that moment on, employment and the content of free time were no longer subjected to any social norm; they were in the hands of the individual who controls his own leisure time. In another break with tradition, free time assumes the anthropological status formerly given to work. The more spare time, the more "life belongs to you," the more the "meaning of life is understood"; leisure time means "real life" (and we have to remark that recently—in 1987—the Swiss Syndicalist Union proposed a new initiative for the 40-hour workweek and adopted the campaign motto "Time to live!"). Work was knocked off its pedestal. Now the workplace was seen as a source of alienation and dehumanization. The debate over workers' participation in enterprises gave rise to unusual proposals, including that of an employers' representative who declared that participation "is the only possible answer. . . in certain firms where happiness is not always the essential concern." Until then, we had understood that firms should contribute to collective prosperity, to tasks that justify the effort and hardships of their workers. In fact, the employers avoided the principle of participation. They claimed to support the idea of selffulfillment while dismissing the union's new management techniques as inadequate. However, this difference in solutions did not preclude agreement that a modern firm not only should be profitable but also should ensure that its employees be satisfied in their jobs. The Federal Council added its voice to the discussion as well. Opposing the 1987 initiative, it proposed an alternative that stressed that the object of workers' participation was self-fulfillment and the promotion of their own wellbeing. In this context, a discussion of general cultural change is not out of place. We are witnessing the emergence and the confirmation of a new system of values according to which the understanding of and orientation toward life and the relationship between the individual and society are antithetical to those characterizing the work ethic. Let us review the principal characteristics of the model that has as its crucial element the individual's quest for self-fulfillment. Its differences with the later tradition can be highlighted by the following five points: 1. Here, the individual confirms his rights—not only the rights to work and to physical security but the rights to wellbeing and happiness. The latter leads to self-fulfillment. 2. The idea of responsibility is now associated with society, which through state intervention must guarantee the conditions that facilitate self-fulfillment. This ensures physical, material, and psychological security to each individual. 3. The idea of self-fulfillment is related to the renewed importance of nonrational dimensions of existence: "The heart has reasons the mind does not understand" (Pascal); the heart but also the emotions, feelings, sex, and so on. 4. The notion of self-achievement, part of the work ethic, describes man in social terms as the agent of a social mission that he must fulfill. The notion of self-fulfillment that characterizes the new ethic has a biological and psychological basis: All individuals

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are endowed with talents that deserve room to develop. Society is now responsible for creating a positive environment concerning individual self-fulfillment. 5. The earlier hierarchical order is now reversed: The individual has primacy over society. The duty of self-fulfillment gives each person a whole series of rights. Here, the individual is his own end and sets his own standards.

THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE CRISIS OF THE DEVELOPING ECONOMY People hoped that the model of economic growth that emerged during the 1950s and 1960s would last forever. The 1973 oil crisis was the first sign of decline. The gross national product (GNP) increased by more than 10 percent in 1973 in Switzerland but suddenly decreased by 1.3 percent in 1975, as a result of the oil crisis. The threat of recession, that we believed to have been banished, reappeared. From 1977-78 onward, individuals' real income stagnated, as did their purchasing power. This change was immediately reflected in the orientation of their expenditures. From 1978 to 1986 (the last available figures), the structure of the household budget stopped changing: one third of the budget went to food, housing and clothing; less than a quarter to leisure, education and transport; and a quarter to insurance and taxes. The revolution in cybernetics and computer science during this period was characterized by the rapid development of technology. The decline of the economy, the intensification of international competition, and new technologies contributed to the restructuring of the whole productive system. Unemployment increased in Europe, but Switzerland was barely affected by this trend, unemployment reaching only 1 percent of the active population. In the face of decreasing resources and increasing needs, the welfare state lost momentum, and the right-wing parties tried hard to dismantle it. For three decades the economy advanced in fits and starts. There is no longer any doubt that an economic model predicated on continuous strong growth is not viable. There are other reasons for this phenomenon. Economic growth in the 1960s was enormously expensive. In order to multiply real income two or three times over, energy consumption had to increase by 700 percent in 25 years, whereas it had stayed almost stationary between 1910 and 1945. The organization of production as well as a modern lifestyle (cars, sprays, nonrecyclable trash) jeopardizes fundamental resources, provoking questions about our conceptions of human life and life itself. The Zairian and Amazonian forests are devastated, the ozone layer is damaged, the air is polluted. Bhopal, Chernobyl and Schweizerhalle show that the sword of Damocles hangs over our heads: We live with the permanent threat of an accident or a disaster. The nature of our planet has changed. It was once a natural environment in which, after lengthy evolution, life appeared; the animals followed, and finally, deriving from them, human beings. Nature began to resemble a space station, an artificial universe where life was possible as long as there existed adequately functioning technology. In

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Switzerland, as everywhere else, we are at the turning point in the history of humanity. We still have the opportunity to choose between staying in natural surroundings favorable to life or becoming inextricably involved in the artificial universe that is growing around us. The strength of powerful and expanding ecological movements clearly shows that people are sensitive to this. At this point the question is not whether growth is possible but whether growth is desirable and what kind of growth we are referring to. What happened, in this context, to the value system of the 1960s? Let us recall its principal elements. First, the proposed aim was self-achievement. The exact content of this goal as well as the knowledge about whether it had been reached depended on the individual. Second, one condition is related to this search: Society must ensure that the individual has sufficient material security in order to be released from the anxiety of having to struggle for survival. Finally, there is a privileged path in this quest that leads into the realms of private life and leisure-time pursuits. We should point out the arbitrariness of the relationship between the goal, on the one hand, and the conditions and the path, on the other. This structure is a long-standing historical reality but does not correspond to any other anthropological or philosophical necessity. It is surprising that in this framework man is considered to be more or less like a tropical plant which, due to the severity of the environment, needs the comforting warmth of a greenhouse in order to flower. Here, we see the reaction born of a period characterized by the sigh of relief of a population marveling at its own affluence, after a century and a half of intense work and struggle for survival. We should also remember that this new ethic never achieved either the same solidity or the same hegemony achieved by the work ethic. It lacks any mythological basis, and its institutionalization is incomplete. (Of course, this new ethic has been spread by advertising and the "psy" culture; and it has also been somewhat legitimated by the school of thought that emphasizes the child's achievements and gifts more than his development as a citizen.) It is no less true that even in the most vibrant moments of the 1960s, important social groups continued to invest in work. These groups included not only those that were in decline, such as the peasantry, but also the professions, which were characterized by long-term career goals. Nevertheless, we can distinguish a progression: Though work has been glorified among and vested in the upper classes, it is less often thought of in terms of a social mission or a service toward the collectivity. On the contrary, work is considered more and more as a way to realize personal goals, as a means of self-achievement. Surveys of the years from 1960 to 1980, which gauge the attitudes of adolescents, have given results that converge with this analysis. For most of these young people, work is not the only thing in life, but it is still important. A worthwhile job should allow good use and development of one's abilities, facilitate pleasant social interaction, and allow one to realize something useful and feel secure. The first three points show self-fulfillment as obtained through work.

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However, this ideal erodes as one looks toward social life, especially among white-collar workers. Confronted with his real job, the young worker often discovers that his ideal is out of reach. He revises his aspirations, placing less value on the expressive dimensions of work and more on the instrumental ones: salary, schedule, and social advantages. Work becomes a. job, suggesting tha one must find one's fulfillment somewhere else. The ideal remains, but it fades into a kind of nostalgia. Until the last war, the work ethic, understood to be crucial to social structure, compensated for the disillusionment of daily life. Today, we no longer expect a highly developed professional conscience in a salaried worker without offering work as compensation that will bring out the individual's personal qualities and offer possibilities for him to continue his quest for self-fulfillment. Economic insecurity and the possibility of unemployment necessarily rejuvenate the idea of individual responsibility and work. The grave threat to job security decreases absenteeism and waste. For the unemployed in neighboring countries, the discovery that the welfare state is not inexhaustible creates an "ethic of muddling through" (Grell, 1987); for the worker, it leads to the reorientation of his strategies regarding the future. As a sign of the times, the new entrepreneur is once again in vogue, and the technico-economic venture is recovering its prestige. It is no longer shameful to earn money. In Switzerland, the plummeting number of self-employed workers—from 30 percent in 1900 to 10 percent in 1970—has stopped decreasing since the 1970s; and in several neighboring countries, the rate has increased. The previous period shows two characteristics that will reveal their presence in the next few decades. First, work has lost its sacred character. Paradoxically, prosperity is now replaced by unemployment in an effort to clear up the linguistic confusion between salaried work within the scope of the market and, on the other hand, work as a much larger category, including all productive activities (goods, services), paid or not. If we consider the argument used until the war by the employers, that the divine work of the Creation, spread over six days, supports the idea of the 54-hour workweek, the argument only holds due to a confusion (which was accepted until the end of the war) between salaried employment and work. The demystification highlights the fact that behind work as a category there is a larger, more generic one, that of activity. Such a category has a greater claim to anthropological status: Man expresses himself by activity (in all forms) that assures survival and communicates with others in order to fulfill and develop his abilities. Second, in my opinion the individualistic notion of self-fulfillment will remain at the core of the present value system. In our civilization, individualism has had too long a history for it suddenly to stop being important. Its link with the theme of happiness stems from the centuries of the Enlightenment, when the merits of happiness outweighed those of being "saved" in a religious sense. Establishing an individual and his life on the level of ends and standards seems to me to be a logical result of this historical process.

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However, values besides the important one of self-fulfillment currently show great variety, depending on class and social milieu. A new distribution of rights and duties between the state and the individual is now being created. This distribution is less unbalanced than the one affirmed by the work ethic (where the individual was overwhelmed by his duties) or the one vaunted by the new ethic of the 1960s, which infantilized the individual. Free time doubtless remains appealing, but it can no longer pretend to offer the only access to self-fulfillment. We can well believe the wide range of activities accessible to people, whether they are salaried or volunteers, whether their activities are for work or for pleasure. Perhaps each social milieu will be characterized by a specific combination of the two. In sum, we can state that the system of values which is at the core of our present culture continues to center around the individual quest for self-fulfillment. This quest is based on the glorification of life, the "I live" discussed by Groethuysen (1927) in his consideration of the bourgeois of the eighteenth century: my life, the only unquestionable certainty and the basis of happiness and desires. Paradoxically, this value (fueling a kind of sacred egoism) seems to me to be the source of a new understanding of solidarity and of a new exercise of responsibility. Because it is not just "my life" that is threatened—not by technology or science per se but by the way they are used to exploit the natural environment, which is perceived as indefinitely exploitable. Facing this danger that threatens all of us, acts that protect the health and safety of the individual contribute to the protection of all. In this quest for self-fulfillment (a personal, inward, and narcissistic search), modern man discovers the fundamental universal—life—of his irreducible individuality—the I. This undoubtedly induces a decline in his sense of civic responsibility. However, he will begin to develop a different one, which will emphasize a collective responsibility that will focus less on society than on the oecumene or habitable earth. It is evident that this paradoxical statement, according to which modern hyperindividualism results in a new form of solidarity, is expressed in interrogative and conditional terms. However, it is not speculative but rather a reflection concerning the too-real problems of civilization, current action, and behavior. In sum, the quest for self-fulfillment is currently associated with a wide-ranging revision of the balance of rights and social duties. Our understanding of the state and its role is also changing. In addition, the generic category of activity, with all its potential richness, acts as a substitute for the more restricted ones of work (i.e., salaried work) and free time. In this way the range of opportunities through which workers pursue the quest for self-fulfillment has been substantially broadened. NOTES 1. SNSF, grant request no. 4,662. We attempted to assess the values and meanings associated with the idea of work; we analyzed its synonyms, correlates, and antonyms

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within the context of 12 important national events that occurred in Switzerland between 1918 and 1980. We studied the debates that each one provoked, paying special attention to the following groups of actors: the trade unions of both blue- and white-collar workers and of employers; the peasants' union; the federal government; and national political parties. These subjects constituted the primary material of this study. To account for the recent past, we carried out a secondary analysis of opinion polls taken between 1955 and 1986 that surveyed attitudes about work. For further elaboration of these concepts, see Lalive d'Epinay and Garcia (1988) and Lalive d'Epinay, Blochet-Bardet, and Gaberel (1987). 2. For developments, compare Lalive d'Epinay and Garcia (1988:112-119).

REFERENCES Berenstein, A. 1986. LAssurance-vieillesse Suisse. Lausanne: Realties Sociales. Elias, N. 1987. "The Retreat of Sociologists into the Present." Theory, Culture and Society 4, no. 2:223-47. Gilg, P., and P. Habliitzel. 1983. "Une course acceleree vers l'avenir: 1 9 4 5 - . . . " In Nouvelle histoire de la Suisse et des SuisseslIII. Lausanne: Payot. Grell, P. 1987. "Pour une strategic de recherche sur la question du chomage." In Chomage, marginalite et creativite, ed. Lalive d'Epinay and Sue. Geneva: Centre Europeen de la Culture. Groethuysen, B. 1927. Origines de I'esprit bourgeois en France. Paris: Gallimard. Jost, H. -U. 1983. "Menaces et repliement: 1914-1945." In Nouvelle histoire de la Suisse et des Suisses/III. Lausanne: Payot. Lalive d'Epinay, C. J.; A. Blochet-Bardet, and P. -E. Gaberel. 1987. Les Suisses, le travail et la vie. Geneva: Sociology Department, University of Geneva. Lalive d'Epinay, C. J.; C. Bolzman, andM. Sultan. 1987. "Retirement in Switzerland." In Retirement in Industrialized Societies, ed. Markides and Cooper. New York: John Wiley and Sons. Lalive d'Epinay, C , and C. Garcia. 1988. Le Mythe du travail en Suisse. Splendeur et declin au cours du XXe siecle. Geneva: Georg Publishers. Maurer, A. 1982. "La Suisse." In Un siecle de securite sociale, ed. Kohler and Zacher. Nantes: University of Nantes. Van Weers, G., ed. 1986. L'Etat providence. Maastricht: Presses Intemniversitaires Europeennes.

5

Swiss Women in the Working World KATHARINA LEY Swiss women today have a greater desire than ever before to find ways of combining their work life with their family life. In trying, however, to live in both the family and working worlds simultaneously, they often encounter various difficulties. They are often obliged to choose a typically "woman's" occupation; are unable to complete their professional training; are obliged to work part-time; and must sometimes interrupt their careers or give up their jobs altogether. It is certainly not a lack of interest in working that causes women to have these problems. Rather, Swiss society does not give sufficient support to the idea that mothers of pre-school- and school-age children should have the right to work at all. The attitude still prevails that a mother's place is in the home. A woman's age and marital status strongly influence the degree to which she can become involved in the working world. According to the 1980 Census, 39 percent of all adult females in Switzerland were employed in that year. But various studies on the subject show different results. This can be explained by differences in the minimum age of the women interviewed and by the number of working hours used to define "employed." 1 In fact, 49 percent of all women between the ages of 15 and 64 are employed,2 ranking the nation roughly midway between the countries of northern and southern Europe in the percentage of working women out of the entire population, as the following list illustrates:

Switzerland in Perspective

82

Sweden

Percentage 11

Switzerland

Percentage 49

Finland

74

Italy

41

Great Britain

58

Netherlands

40

France

52

Greece

37

West Germany

50

Spain

33

Before the age of 35 a Swiss woman has few chances of joining the working world, mainly owing to the responsibilities and duties she has at home. Slightly older women, between the ages of 45 and 49, tend to return to the workforce and work as much as the younger women who are still single and childless. There is a definite trend for women to reenter the working world once the childrearing years are over, and there is a greater demand for part-time work as well. There are various reasons why Swiss women tend to discontinue working once they have married or had their first child (a hiatus that does not apply to immigrant women from countries such as Italy and Spain who have come to Switzerland to work). One reason is certainly the widespread cultural belief that the husband is the family breadwinner, responsible for the family's financial wellbeing, whereas the wife is responsible for rearing the children and caring for the household and the family's emotional well-being. Moreover, this role division within the family was clearly reflected in the marriage laws of the Swiss Civil Code as late as 1987.3 WOMEN'S WORK Almost three quarters of all Swiss working women are employed in the service sector, namely commerce, banking, insurance, sales, health, education, and government. A further 25 percent work in industry and business, and only 4 percent are employed in agriculture. There are, then, in relation to the working population as a whole, proportionally far more women in the service sector.4 For the most part, women work in jobs demanding fewer qualifications than men and in a more narrow range of fields. Fully half of all employed women choose one out of a list of 12 occupations, whereas less than a third of all employed men have such a limited range of choice available to them. The result is that there are far fewer opportunities for women and that their professional ambitions are severely curtailed. The 12 occupations most often considered are clerk, saleswoman, office worker, household employee, farmer, waitress, cleaning lady, nurse, hairdresser, restaurant owner, teacher, and unskilled worker in the metal or electrical trades.5 Moreover, almost half of all women have some sort of school diploma but

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have not completed vocational training. An additional 25 percent have completed vocational programs, and another quarter have graduated from a college or university, usually a college (only 2 percent of the entire female population has a university degree). Turning to the fields in which young women choose to do their apprenticeships, we see that in 1985 over half were chosen from the following seven occupations: clerk, saleswoman, women's hairdresser, office worker, drugstore employee, cook, and hotel employee.6 Women's concentration in a few fields makes it more difficult for them to be really sure of finding work. It is also difficult for both men and women to find jobs in categories typically dominated by members of the opposite sex. In fact, the problems faced by female tram drivers and male kindergarten teachers have recently been the object of inquiry. It is for this reason that most women opt for typical women's jobs—which means that they must content themselves with a more restricted selection of job openings. This means, too, that working women are also affected more than men by recession and other factors. For example, the use of computer technology has had strong repercussions on office employment, and what has been happening in the field of office work is quite typical of the entire problem of women in the working world.

EQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK The principle of equal pay for equal work is set down in Swiss law. The Fourth Article of the second paragraph of the constitution says: "Men and women are entitled to equal rights. The law must ensure that they are treated as equals, above all at home, at work and at school. Men and women have the right to receive equal pay for equal work." This issue has received considerable attention in recent years, especially since some women have taken their fight for equal wages to court. Women's average earnings are still lower than men's. In industry, women still earn an average of one-third less than men, and in government about one-quarter less. Most people agree that the salary inequities suffered by women are not the result of consciously planned discrimination. They are strongly influenced by differences in job qualifications, length of experience, and seniority. Moreover, the definition of what is considered to be typical men's work (which has higher social prestige) and women's work (which is more poorly paid) also contributes to the present salary lag of women. It is beyond doubt that widespread discrimination against women still exists. If, for example, we examine the status of women in industrial production, we see that skilled workers are in the absolute minority. Women's inferior position cannot be changed until there is a deepseated need to improve the present situation by putting up a very hard fight against job discrimination. We conclude that the lower earnings of women relative to men are not fully explained by the factors of job qualifications, age, seniority, and job experience.

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To put the Swiss differences in perspective, women office workers in Swiss industry earn from 25 to 33 percent less than men, whereas in Japan they earn 57 percent less but in Sweden only 10 percent less. These figures reflect in a sense women's status in the respective societies, for they express the employers' mentality toward women.7 WOMEN IN THE TRADE UNIONS Only a small part of Switzerland's working population belongs to trade unions. Approximately one third of all employees are union members, and only about one third of all registered union members are women. In those occupations in which most women are employed, the numbers of union members are increasing. Since in most unions the bulk of the membership—not to mention the leadership—is not female, women's issues have barely been discussed within the trade union context. Thus, the fight for equal pay for women has hardly been launched. Working women, both married and single, also have less time available than men for involvements in union activities, given the numerous household and volunteer activities in which they are often engaged. VOLUNTEER WORK During the nineteenth century, many middle-class wives who did not have to work nonetheless sought involvement in some sort of activity outside the home. They undertook volunteer or social work in traditional women's activities: caring for the sick, the old, the underprivileged, or other people's children. Much of the volunteer work done by women today is in the same fields. Although many of these activities have become full-scale professions, the fact that our society continues to function efficiently still has much to do with the large amount of volunteer work done by women. In our study of volunteer work, we found that almost as many married and formerly married women do volunteer work as hold down paying jobs. The only difference is that those who volunteer do so for fewer hours than a paying job, usually up to four hours per week. The work they do can be divided into three basic categories: household work and childrearing in other homes; social activities in women's clubs and groups; and activities in public life such as politics. Volunteer work is a link between the private and public spheres of life, between family and community help, and between political and social activities. Whereas volunteer work in the community and in women's social life is performed almost solely by women, work in public affairs is to a great extent done by men.8 Volunteer work should therefore be examined more critically than is often the case. Nowadays, people tend to judge any activity performed away from home to be good. Switzerland, however, does not consider volunteer work to be as valuable as professional work. Volunteers are rewarded with neither

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salaries nor adequate social standing and recognition, and in the arena of volunteer work there are many power struggles between the sexes. At present, many countries feel that they can ill afford to remain socially oriented, so that help for the underprivileged must often be supplied by individuals or private organizations instead of by state institutions. This tendency to push social responsibility out of public into private hands goes along with the present tight labor market situation. The result is that women are in actual fact as irreplaceable as ever as volunteers. We feel, however, that it is important to remain skeptical of all praise accorded to women's volunteer work. WOMEN AND UNEMPLOYMENT Another way in which women have lower status on the labor market is their greater unemployment; the percentage of unemployed women is higher than the proportion of working women to working men. In addition, the number of women who have lost their jobs and quietly returned to their households is much higher than has been officially recorded. Women who work to increase family income, so-called dual-wage earners, are always the first to be dismissed during times of economic downturn and the last to be hired even when the labor market is not so tight anymore. If there are any personnel cutbacks for any reason, women are always the first to be affected. And precisely those occupations that employ a particularly high percentage of women—office work, government employment, jobs in the watch industry, positions in schools or other educational institutions— have recently had sharp cutbacks. Furthermore, part-time positions, in which women predominate, have always been more affected by changes on the job market than full-time jobs. PART-TIME WORK, WOMEN'S WORK A large percentage of working women only work part-time. In 1980, 65 percent of all part-time employees in agriculture were women, as well as 77 percent in the industrial sector and 85 percent in services. A total of 81 percent of all parttime employees in the last decade have been women. This is a very high percentage, especially if we keep in mind that only 14 percent of the entire working population was employed during the same period on a part-time basis.9 We can therefore conclude that part-time work is done almost exclusively by women and that many of the women who work full-time do so only because they have no other choice. They are either widows, divorcees, married women employed in their husbands' businesses (farms or small firms), or women who have relatively little to do at home since they have either grown-up children or none at all. The average employee in Switzerland works at least 40 hours per week. All part-time positions are unfortunately not at all attractive. Industries often hire for part-time work only unskilled workers, whereas social service organizations

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often hire only lower-echelon personnel. The chance of getting promoted to an executive position, of getting further training or schooling, of finding more interesting work or of having job security is usually only possible for full-time employees. Women often have to forego these chances if they work part-time, but for many, a full-time job would disturb the harmony established between household and working life. Yet the average woman nowadays has only one or two children, and the divorce rate is high (three out of ten marriages). Thus, although motherhood and homemaking are certainly important experiences for most women, they take up only part of a woman's life. TYPICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF WOMEN'S JOB TRAINING AND WORK We have already pointed out that fewer women complete vocational training than men. They also tend to study typical "women's subjects" at school or else get more short-term training than men. Although the proportion of women obtaining training is rising, there is still a long way to go toward parity with men. The same holds for the situation at the institutes of higher learning, the professional schools, and the colleges and universities. Ninety percent of all Swiss women get married, and although the number of women who give up their jobs when they have a family has been diminishing, a good fifth of all newly married women do not go back to work. At least two fifths of all married women interrupt their careers at some time, whereas only one fifth of the women with families never interrupt their working lives at all. It is therefore common for mothers to interrupt their careers, and the women who do not do so may experience certain misgivings, some of which are voiced openly and others not. It is often felt about working women that they neglect their offspring, find self-fulfillment at the expense of their husbands and children, and steal jobs away from men who have to support families. Working women themselves often feel guilty about their professional involvement. What is more, they not only earn less than men but also cannot count on either their employers' goodwill or their children's school to show any understanding of their attempts to combine motherhood and working life. There is no maternity law that forbids an employer to fire a woman during the first seven months of pregnancy, although Swiss labor law does allow women to take eight weeks off after giving birth. Nor are there any day-care centers, babysitting possibilities or all-day schools available for the children. We can conclude, then, that married women are in no way encouraged to keep on working. On the contrary, if women do not really have to work, they withdraw to the confines of their households as mothers and housekeepers. Despite this, in recent years a network of self-help groups has been created by private women's organizations to help women find their way back into the working world. These groups offer moral support and psychological help to women by giving them more self-confidence and more training and schooling.

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They also offer practical help by giving job-oriented courses in such subjects as office skills, typing and computer technology, and by assisting women in the job search. WOMEN IN THE PROFESSIONS: TWO TYPICAL EXAMPLES Women at the Universities Women's preferences for certain fields of study are strongly influenced by the traditional ideas of what is "typically female." This is clear from the statistics about how many women studied at certain university departments in the 1982— 83 academic year: social sciences, 42 percent; medicine, 37 percent; science, 21 percent; and engineering, 10 percent. Women's preferred major is most often languages, which is followed by psychology, education, pharmacy, law and medicine. In 1981, 34 percent of all Swiss students at universities were women, which places Switzerland near the bottom of the list compared to many other countries (in the United States, for example, 49 percent of all university students were women).10 Women tend to discontinue their studies more frequently than men, and in fact every fifth female student—as against every ninth male student—tends to drop out of university before graduation. The main reason for this high dropout rate is that neither a woman's relatives nor her school encourages her to work professionally, and in any case there are fewer professional prospects for female university graduates. Last but not least, there are no promising prospects for combining motherhood with a career. Vague plans for the future, as well as a low level of motivation, soon convince women to doubt the significance of studying any longer. Although women have been increasingly successful in getting a foothold in teaching and doing research at universities, both domains of work are still strongly dominated by men. Only 2.3 percent of all professors, lecturers and researchers at Swiss universities are women. The number of female assistant professors is larger (25 percent). But even at the University of Geneva, where there are more females than at any other Swiss university, only 51 percent of all the registered students are women; 31 percent of all assistant professors but only 4 percent of all professors are women. The very low percentage of women professors in universities contrasts with the fact that two thirds of all students preparing to become teachers in the public schools are women and that at the kindergarten level practically all the teachers are female. The higher the educational level in question, in other words, the fewer female teachers to be found. In recent years, various studies have shown that the entire structure of Swiss universities is still male oriented and male dominated, and women have been held back from successful competition in this structure. Far too few schools and universities have been concerned with, much

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less taught courses on, women's issues, either. There is, in short, a definite lack of female involvement in the world of education, although efforts are being made by particularly active women to improve the situation.11 Women in the Socially Oriented Professions In 1980, 8.2 percent of the entire working population of Switzerland was employed in health, educational or social organizations. Four percent of these 3,091,694 persons worked in therapeutically oriented professions (doctors, nurses, physiotherapists, etc.); 3.8 percent were involved in teaching and pedagogy (teachers of all subjects and at all levels, educators, therapists); and 4 percent were involved in social and church work (ministers, social workers, and welfare workers).12 The percentage of women employed in the following professions is extremely high, sometimes reaching 100 percent: • Paramedical careers such as nurses, doctors' or dentists' nurses, pharmacists' assistants, or X-ray technicians • Teaching careers such as elementary school teachers, special education teachers, kindergarten or nursery school teachers, or home employees • Social work careers such as caseworkers or social workers In recent years, work in these areas has become very professionalized, and this can be seen from the fact that job-training programs for the socially oriented professions have often been improved and prolonged and even offer certification degrees. Special emphasis has been placed on increased learning of theory and of a common technical language, on obtaining more professional representation, on getting more professional recognition, on having more systematic guidance services, and on limiting the number of entrants for particular training programs. This tendency toward professionalization of the "typically female" professions is a new trend. There has, at the same time, been a tremendous increase in the number of men wishing to work in socially oriented professions, particularly as social workers and educators; from 1970 to 1980, the percentage of men nearly doubled. In 1970, there were three women to every man employed in a social profession, whereas by 1980 the ratio had dropped to 2:1 and continues to shrink. Moreover, men are obtaining more and more of the executive positions in these fields. Half of the women in social work, for example, are employed on a part-time basis, whereas only one fifth of all men employed in this field work part-time. For many decades sexual discrimination was not a problem in the social professions, but in the last few decades, many men who used to work for political or educational institutions have switched to social careers and have achieved higher pay and more recognition than the socially minded and idealistic women already present in them. As Alice Salamon, the founder of social work, puts it, "Out of far-flung idealism they created a breadwinning profession and

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out of the fight for social justice they made a bureaucratic and scholarly duty." Women's social power has not become a political force in this field. As in all other professions, despite equally good training, men and women are often given different kinds of work. Men are most often assigned executive responsibilities in planning or community work, whereas women are often given individual casework and are responsible for getting done the tasks that men have conceived. Thus, discrimination against women also dominates the social professions. IS AN END TO JOB DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN NEAR AT HAND? And the Lord spoke unto Moses, saying, "Speak unto the children of Israel, and say unto them, when a man shall make a singular vow, the persons shall be for the Lord by thy estimation and thy estimation shall be of the male from twenty to sixty years old fifty shekels of silver, after the shekel of the sanctuary. And if it be a female, then the estimation shall be thirty shekels." 3 Moses 27: 3-4 In everyday working life it is assumed that all women will probably get married and bear children. This assumption causes women to be more often discriminated against in today's working world. Men repair; women check the completed work. Men plan and prepare what is to be done; women do it. Men carry the heavy burdens; women attach small parts onto the large ones. Men's work is interesting and challenging; women's is monotonous and routine. Men ascend up the career ladder, whereas women often stay at the bottom. In the working world, all people are unequal and some are more unequal than others. Women can improve their job status when the labor market is good. At times when there are more jobs available than there are applicants, women have been able to gain ground and have even found part-time positions in otherwise maledominated fields of work. This development cannot put an end to the discrimination that is still to be found in almost all occupations and positions. The age structure and training level of working women do not coincide with those of men. Even single women's professional prospects are hampered by society's fear that they, too, will eventually become mothers and will interrupt their careers. Girls are taught to believe in the traditional norms of middle-class family life and therefore more or less accept the role of being of secondary importance. In this traditional role, they are most often employed in menial or low-paying positions and have little job security or legal protection. The printing trades, for example, offer such poor working conditions, and other industries and businesses are unfortunately moving more and more in this direction. Foreign workers and women are considered to be easily manipulable and are

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pushed around—hired in times of economic growth, fired in times of economic stagnation. Owing to their lack of better socialized personality traits, women have little power to fight against such manipulation. These facts explain why women are so poorly integrated into the working world and so poorly organized in the union movement. Men as well as women have internalized many role expectations. Men feel that it is their duty to support their families and to keep their wives from having to work. This way of thinking keeps traditional patterns in professional and family life from dying out, although women have begun to protest them more and more. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE Although we have given a rather pessimistic picture of women in the working world, we must note that there have been many plans and suggestions made about how to improve the present situation. The fact that women have less access to the labor market has little to do with biological factors. It has much more to do with a number of psychological, social, structural and cultural factors.13 • The less work available, the greater is a man's fear of losing his job, especially if a man considers himself to be the family's breadwinner. Therefore, women have to compete with men for each available job opening. • The way our society creates equal rights brings women additional burdens, forcing women to adapt themselves to male-dominated ways of achieving and succeeding. Women are more and more expected to take on larger workloads, thereby making their lives more complicated and cumbersome, whereas men are put under less pressure, particularly as far as home life goes. • Today's average young Swiss woman is much better educated than ever before but is often not able to get a better job despite this improvement. The job market is still very discriminatory. This applies especially to the unwillingness of both the working world and working women's husbands to be considerate of women's special needs and interests. It would be very important not to identify the family or the working world (the inner or the outer world) with any particular sex if we want to keep both worlds as different and unique spheres of existence. Perhaps men could learn something in this respect from women, who have so often had greater experience and success in combining their family with their working lives. Men and women might find greater self-fulfillment in doing various activities at the same time rather than in doing only one activity at one point in their lives and another at some other point. In the Marxian sense, a human being could be a hunter in the morning, a fisherman at noon, a shepherd in the afternoon, and a critic in the evening. Having a high quality of life means more than just being able to make use of one's skills and talents professionally. It should also mean being concerned about other people, particularly the young and the sick. Both the professional

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and the family parts of our lives could be seen as different " p a t c h e s " in a "patchwork" existence. Each patch, with its separate color and material, contributes to the richness of the entire pattern of life. 14 After this wishful thinking about the future, we must bring our thoughts back to the fact that as long as the standard of vocational training for women and the mode of career selection are not improved, it will not be possible to induce basic structural changes in our society and to end workplace discrimination against women. Summarizing our reasoning, we believe that: 1. In considering the problems faced by young women in choosing a profession or occupation, in obtaining the requisite training and in working, special attention must be paid to the fact that they are involved in their families and in work activity at the same time. (We strongly believe that this simultaneous dual involvement would be good for men, too.) 2. The educational and professional opportunities available for women are most often in fields with which they are already familiar (i.e., childrearing, teaching, caretaking, domestic work, etc.). Thus, women are not asked to endeavor to enter unknown territory. The fact that one's sex strongly determines the kind of training one obtains results in discrimination against women concerning job status, and opportunity for getting further education, advancing up the job ladder and earning better salaries. 3. The chances of making a better vocational choice or of getting more job experience are small even for a young woman who feels highly motivated to get ahead. Structural constraints and personnel actions tend to influence a woman's career prospects more than her level of motivation. The choice of a profession is strongly gender determined, and the norm of what is typically female and what is typically male becomes more and more internalized. 4. Improvements in women's education do not bring as great an improvement in women's professional and occupational standing as one might expect. Better schooling does not necessarily guarantee better professional prospects. At times, discriminatory measures may be so strong that women have absolutely no chance of entering certain branches of the job market. This kind of discrimination must be systematically abolished. 5. Considering how difficult it is for a young person to make up his or her mind about the future, more opportunities must be presented to switch occupations at a later point in life. Improved vocational training programs should be geared to the needs and interests of adult women. The curricula, teaching methods and entrance requirements of such programs must be made appropriate for adults. 6. By analyzing the accounts of women's lives, we gain greater understanding of why women choose certain professions or occupations. Girls should be strongly encouraged to choose occupations that are not the so-called typical ones. The average level of vocational training should be broad enough to enable a woman to change professions if desired or to interrupt work for a certain period of time and later begin working again. Marriage is not a lifelong insurance policy. It is immensely important to encourage and help women in all their professional endeavors.15

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Modifications would also be required in the job market itself. For example, the split between typical women's work and typical men's work (with its greater reward) would disappear.16 As discussed above, this would have to begin by giving women greater opportunities to choose the "right" profession and get the appropriate training. Women could then enter all branches of work and have access to all available job openings. Only in this way would our economy truly enable women to achieve greater professional freedom. This would also activate a large amount of potential energy and creativity, which until now have been largely wasted. (If we call for more opportunities for women, we do so not just for the sake of women perceived as weak and secondary members of society but for the good of society as a whole.) A further way in which the job market might be changed to induce more flexibility would be to allow men and women to interrupt their professional careers for family reasons without thereby suffering any negative consequences. Until now, military service has been the only legitimate reason for a career interruption, and of course it concerned only males. There would also have to be a much wider choice of part-time jobs available, and part-time work would have to be seen as being as valid as full-time work. Part-time employees would have to be as well paid, proportionately, as full-time workers, with equal opportunities to improve their job prospects and get better schooling. An interruption of career work for family reasons would have to be considered as meaningful and worthwhile as any other reason. A career with limited ambitions and various interruptions is almost always a woman's career, but it would also become a way of being in the world of work for men as well. This idea would have to be fought for by men and women who are deeply interested in putting an end to today's rigid and confining division between work and family lives.17 On the whole, we can say that women today are more oriented toward the working world than they used to be. The risk that they might lose their gains due to personnel cutbacks resulting from technological developments has grown. Since home is no longer considered to be a place of refuge for women, as it used to be, women have to be better equipped to face such drastic cutbacks or other difficulties at work. This is a problem that pertains to all of society and can only be solved by increased political involvement in the fight for equal rights.

NOTES 1. The Swiss Census always sets the minimum number of working hours used to define "employed" at six hours weekly. All adult women from the ages of 20 to retireme (62) are counted. The fact that the census questionnaire isfilledout by the family head could occasionally mean that a woman's short or undesired periods of employment are not mentioned. This probably explains why our study showed a higher percentage of married and formerly married employed women (51 percent) than otherwise cited. The

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percentage of all employed women might even be higher. Compare with Borkowsky, Ley, and Streckeisen (1985). 2. Die Wirtschaftsforderung is a private association of Swiss businessmen that does research to serve its own goals, and the statistics cited date back to 1984. Refer to the newspaper Neue Ziiricher Zeitung of June 14, 1985. 3. The new Swiss law concerning marriage has been valid since January 1, 1988. It proclaims legal equality between husbands and wives, who are permitted to reach joint decisions about who is to be the family breadwinner and who is to be responsible for childrearing. Under previous law, the man—as head of the family and sole breadwinner— was allowed to forbid his wife to work. 4. Compare with the 1980 Swiss Census. The service sector of the Swiss economy has been expanding at an exceedingly high rate in the last few years. 5. These figures are also from the 1980 Swiss Census. They can be confirmed by statistics from more recent studies of job contracts made during 1985 and 1986. One fourth of all working women are employed in offices. Office work happens to also be the profession most often chosen by men. One eighth of all working women are salespersons. Both office and sales work can be trained for through apprenticeships of various durations. In general, women tend to choose shorter training programs than men. 6. The growth of computer technology is the main reason for the decreasing status of typical women's professions and for women's unemployment. Women find it difficult to adapt to the use of computer technology in the professional world. 7. Compare with Wullschleger (1985). 8. Compare with Borkowsky, Ley, and Streckeisen (1985: esp. 35) and Eidgenossische Kommission fiir Frauenfragen (1987: esp. 114). 9. Compare with the chapter on part-time work by Borkowsky, Ley, and Streckeisen (1985). See also Eidgenossische Kommission fiir Frauenfragen (1987) and Jaeger et al. (1987). 10. We are indebted to the Eidgenossische Kommission fiir Frauenfragen (1987: 4 1 44) for this information. 11. Despite the fact that the feminist point of view has not been institutionalized by our society, women have been making enormous efforts (by Swiss standards) regarding this subject (through courses, seminars, research projects, and an association for feminist learning). But to date none of these endeavors has received either public or institutional recognition and none of these experiments has become institutionalized. 12. The data and information in this chapter were taken from Dumas et al. (1987). 13. We refer to the report by the Eidgenossische Kommission fiir Frauenfragen (1987). Compare p. 120 in connection with our chapter about professional prospects. 14. The idea of a patchwork can be traced back to Karl Marx. It has been used by Sichtermann (1987) in a more up-to-date way from the feminist point of view. 15. From Ley (1987). 16. Compare the report of the Eidgenossische Kommission fur Frauenfragen (1987). See also Borkowsky, Ley, and Streckeisen (1985) and Heintz (1985). 17. These ideas have been more completely developed by Beck-Gernsheim (1980). Compare as well the political initiative entitled "Taten statt Worte" ("Deeds Instead of Words") launched by Swiss scholars, politicians and journalists to motivate business and government by means of concrete measures to hire more women and let them make better headway in the professional world. Annual public reports are published on this subject.

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REFERENCES Beck-Gernsheim, Elisabeth. 1980. Das halbierte Leben. Mannerwelt—Beruf, Frauenwelt—Familie. Frankfurt: Fischer. Borkowsky, Anna; Katharina Ley; and Ursula Streckeisen. 1985. Strukturelle und subjektive Aspekte von Arbeitsbiographien, Erwerbsverldufen und Berufslaufbahnen von Frauen. Schlussbericht an den Schweiz. Nationalfonds. Bern: Institut fiir Soziologie. Dieselben. 1985. Zwei Welten—ein Leben. Zurich: Unionsverlag. Dumas, Brigitte. 1987. "Soziale Berufe." In Handbuch Sozialwesen Schweiz, ed. Fehlmann, Maja. Zurich. Eidgenossische Kommission fiir Frauenfragen. 1987. Frauen und Manner, Fakten, Perspektiven, Utopien. Bern: Eidgen. Kommission fiir Frauen fragen. Heintz, Bettina. 1985. "Zuriick ins Heim? Frauenarbeit und Neue Technologic" Wirtschaft und Recht, Sonderheft (Zurich) 2, no. 3: 255-76. Hoffmann-Nowotny, H.-J.; F. Hopflinger, et al. 1984. Planspiel Familie. Familie, Kinderwunsch und Familienplanung in der Schweiz. Diessenhofen: Ruegger. Hopflinger, F. 1987. Wandel der Familienbildung in Westeuropa. Frankfurt and New York: Campus. Jaeger, Carlo. 1987. Telearbeit—von der Fiktion zur Innovation. Zurich: Vdf. Ley, Katharina. 1987. "Ich hatte lieber etwas anderes gelemt. . . " In Berufswahl zwischen Qual und Qualifikation, Vol. 1. Hrsg. Schweiz. Zurich: Verband fiir Berufsberatung. Sichtermann, Barbara. 1987. FrauenArbeit. Berlin: wagenbach. Swiss National Census. 1970 and 1980. Bern. Wullschleger, Rudolf. 1985. ''Gleicher Lohn fiir gleichwertige Arbeit—ein Trauerspiel.'' In Gewerkschaftliche Rundschau, vol. 2. Bern.

6

Youth: Life Chances and Life Prospects MARLIS BUCHMANN A bewildering wealth of concepts and definitions, ideas and proposals characterizes current discussions about youth in the political arena, the mass media and the social sciences. The large variety of approaches toward the subject does not seem to be accidental: Young people's problems, modes of expression, and subcultural styles today are not only multifaceted but also changing at an astonishing rate of speed. This suggests that the life stage known as Youth is undergoing rapid and profound transformations with regard to both its nature and its development. In this essay, I suggest that over the last three decades this life stage has been transformed from a highly standardized period involving various rapid role transitions and status changes to an increasingly extended, diversified, and highly individualized "in-between" period. To develop this argument, I first present a theoretical model of Youth in general, against which the current transformations in Switzerland may be assessed. This will be followed by an exploration of the major changes in the social situation of youth that have occurred over the last three decades. Based on official data and empirical material from previous studies on Swiss youth, I document the shifts in educational opportunities, occupational prospects, and family formation. The essay concludes with some remarks on how these structural changes in the life stage Youth may affect juvenile orientations and actions.

96

Switzerland in Perspective

YOUTH: INSTITUTIONALIZED LIFE STAGE AND BIOGRAPHICAL DEVELOPMENT TASK Within the conceptual framework of the social organization of the life course (Levy, 1977; Buchmann, 1983, 1988, 1989a, 1989b; Kohli, 1985; Meyer, 1986), Youth may be conceived of as a socially structured life stage characterized by a specific status/role configuration and an age-specific set of development tasks. Young people are expected to complete the student role, to prepare for a professional role, to take on the role of citizen, to detach themselves from the parental home by finding their own domicile, and finally, to think about having their own families. These social expectations constitute life goals for young people; they serve as the biographical frame of reference within which young people plan their lives. By coping with these objectively defined action requirements, young people transform the socially standardized life stage into a personal period of their biographies. This general definition provides the theoretical background against which the specificities of Youth as a socially organized life stage may be assessed. By considering the following three characteristics, we may more fully comprehend the social situation of youth in modern society: 1. The socially prescribed, successive participation of young people in various institutional spheres of society constitutes an expansion of the juvenile status/role configuration. This means that the sociocultural environment within which they must learn to act becomes increasingly more complex, thus requiring more elaborated action competencies on their part. The successful coping with the additional demands for interaction necessitates the further development of the juvenile personality, that is, the expansion of emotional and psychological capacities and competencies. 2. The life stage Youth is characterized by a major shift in the socially relevant spheres of interaction: The family as the predominant sphere of interaction gradually loses its significance to the spheres of education, occupation, politics, peers, and partnership. In this process, the predominantly family-based identity of young people becomes increasingly obsolete. As a consequence, youths are compelled to build up an identity formation that is based on something different from family membership. 3. In sharp contrast to the family, the distribution of social positions in the spheres of interaction that become significant in the youthful biography depends more on achievement-based and less on ascription-based criteria. Young people increasingly assume positions and roles highly dependent on individual attainment and characterized by an elevated degree of individualization. Their new roles and positions cannot be acquired by simply referring to family membership; instead, they presuppose competencies for autonomous action. For example, the future position in the occupational world is at least partly dependent on the individual's educational attainment. In the course of growing up, the individual's increasing autonomy thus is accompanied by the growing individuality of the juvenile biography.

Both the increasing complexity of the young person's scope of action and the growing individual attribution of the outcomes of action demand elaborated

Youth: Life Chances and Life Prospects

97

personal competencies on the part of the young person. Such competencies are the prerequisites for young people's social recognition as reliable and consistent personalities. The ability to participate successfully in more complex interactions is acquired in the process of socialization—by way of internalizing the structure of social relations (Krappmann, 1969). In this process, young people gradually develop a personal as well as social identity. Moreover, they learn to establish an adequate balance between personal self-presentation and respecting social expectations (Goffmann, 1967). From this theoretical perspective, the integration of young people into society depends, on one hand, on the successive adoption of new positions and roles— that is, the expansion of the status/role configuration—and, on the other hand, on the development of an autonomous identity and "life design" subjected to social evaluation, that is, checked for social acceptability. These social and individual prerequisites of the life stage youth in modern society explain why highly different patterns of youth and the transition to adulthood may simultaneously exist in society and why they change over time. In sum, the way in which young people cope with the problem of becoming full members of their society depends on the structural changes related to their social positions (e.g., gender, family background, urban/rural background) and the individual resources acquired in the process of socialization as well as on the existing social standards of evaluating juvenile identity formations and life designs. Against this conceptual background, the next section explores the major changes in the social situation of youth that have occurred over the last three decades in Switzerland. FROM THE 1950S TO THE 1980S: THE CHANGING SOCIAL SITUATION OF YOUTH The most relevant spheres of interaction in the lives of young people during their transition to adulthood are education, occupation, and (future) partnership. For these reasons, we document changes in educational opportunities, occupational prospects, and family formation that have characterized the transformation of the life stage Youth from the 1950s to the 1980s. The social attributes that greatly determine the way in which young people may cope with the problems of becoming integrated into society are family background and gender. We therefore focus our discussion on gender-specific changes in the life stage Youth and those related to the socioeconomic background of the family.1 The Increasing Prominence of Education The continuous expansion of education as an institution is a hallmark of modern society. Especially, the expansion of postcompulsory education signifies ever longer educational careers for a growing proportion of young people. Although increasing enrollment rates in post-obligatory education seem to be characteristic

98

Switzerland in Perspective

Table 6.1 Post-compulsory Education by Type of School, 1950 through 1986-87 Type of school

1950 1955 1960-1970 1980 1986

V o c a t i o n a l training in 7» of 15+16 + 17-year-old s c h o o l - l e a v e r s : - new contracts r e c o g n i z e d by BIGA - all contracts S e n i o r s in high s c h o o l (Gymnasium) in % of the 19-year-old p o p u l a t i o n U n i v e r s i t y s t u d e n t s in % of 20-27-year-old population

47.9

3.6

51.4 52.5 64 .9 69,.4* 73..2 7 7 ..8* 3.7 6.3

9 .9 12.. 4

3 . 3 5.1

8.. 0

the 9.. 1

Sources: Weiss & Hafeli, 1987. Sozialindikatoren fur die Schweiz, Bd. 2: Bildung. Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz; and author's calculations. * Figures for 1984

of all Western nations since the late 1950s, we find nation-specific differences with regard to the start of the educational expansion and the speed at which it develops. Moreover, the nation-specific institutional structures of the secondary and tertiary educational system explain differences in enrollment rates between nations. Switzerland is known for its dual educational system. After nine years of compulsory schooling, young people may either directly join the labor force, become apprentices working in a firm while attending school for one or two days a week, or attend the "gymnasium" that prepares for university studies. These structural features of the Swiss educational system explain the proportionally smaller number of full-time advanced students in Switzerland compared with European countries especially the United States. Table 6.1 shows the development of the various types of post-obligatory education since the 1950s. Vocational training programs include manual and nonmanual apprenticeships of two, three, or four years duration. Of course, the prestige of a specific apprenticeship depends partly on the duration of the professional training. Table 6.1 shows the global figures—that is, all new apprentices in a given year— measured as the proportion of new apprenticeship contracts given to 15- to 17year-old school-leavers.2 In 1955, slightly less than half of school-leavers of this age became apprentices. During the 1960s and the early 1970s, we do not observe much change. By the early 1980s, however, two out of three school-leavers were serving their apprenticeships. Taking all new contracts into consideration, we find more than 75 percent of the 15- to 17-year-old school-leavers attending a vocational training program. The proportion of 19-year-olds who were seniors in high school (Gymnasium) was quite low in the 1950s and early 1960s. By 1970, it had nearly doubled. Rising continuously in the 1970s and 1980s, nearly every eighth 19-year-old person in 1986 was a high school graduate. Since the Gymnasium prepares for

Youth: Life Chances and Life Prospects

99

Table 6.2 Post-compulsory Schooling by Age and Sex, 1970 through 1986-87 Age groups

1970 men women

1978/79 men women

1986/87 men women

15-19-year-old

74.2

56.2

81.6

65.2

85.9

74.2

20-24-year-old

15.1

7.1

20.0

10.9

22.9

15.4

Source: S o z i a l i n d i k a t o r e n s t i k 1986/87

fiir d i e Schweiz,

Bd. 2:

Schulerstari-

university studies, it comes as no surprise that the proportion of university students develops in a similar way. By 1986, nearly every tenth 20- to 27-yearold person was a university student. Overall, from the late 1960s onward, postcompulsory education has shown an impressive expansion in Switzerland. Compared with the United States, where the college requirement rates rapidly increased between the 1960s and 1970s (cf. Buchmann, 1989b), the Swiss educational system started to expand rather late; its development pattern matches, however, the trends found, for example, in West Germany (cf. Tully and Wahler, 1985). The trend observed in Switzerland is confirmed by looking at the respective proportion of students in the age cohorts of 15- to 19-year-old men and women (see Table 6.2). Among 15- to 19-year-old men, school enrollment reaches near universality in 1986-87. This suggests that, for men, vocational training or some other type of post-obligatory schooling has become a standardized part of the Youth life stage. For 15- to 19-year-old women, the figures document a sharp increase in postobligatory education, from 56.2 percent in 1970 to 74.2 percent in 1986-87. For this age group, the educational gap between men and women has greatly narrowed. Interestingly enough, the female enrollment rate in 1986— 87 matches that of men in 1970, that is, 16 years earlier. This is also true for the enrollment rate of the 20- to 24-year-old women: In 1986-87, 15.4 percent of all women were in school compared with 15.1 percent of men in 1970. Although gender-specific inequalities in educational opportunities continue to exist, 20- to 24-year-old women have, within 16 years, more than doubled their enrollment rate. The figures shown in Table 6.2 make us aware of the global trends in genderspecific educational opportunities. We may now analyze these patterns in greater detail by looking at the male and female enrollment rates in different types of schools. Table 6.3 presents the educational attainment by sex for three types of schools: vocational training, high school graduates, and university students. Until the middle of the 1970s, it was not very common for young women to become apprentices: Scarcely one out of three women served an apprenticeship. By contrast, even in 1955 two out of three men in the age group of the 15- to 17-year-old school-leavers enrolled in a vocational training program. Over the last three decades, men's enrollment rate in vocational training programs has

100

Switzerland in Perspective

Table 6.3 Post-compulsory Schooling by Type of School and Sex, 1950 through 1986-87 Type of school

1950 1955 1960 1970 1980 1986

Vocational training in % of 15+ 16 + 17-year-old school-leavers . - new contracts recognized by BIGA Men Women - all contracts

65.7 69.0 72.8 80.8 83.8* 29. 4 32. 4 31 .9 48 . 1 54 . 2 *

Men Women

Seniors in high school (Gymnasium) in 7o of the 19-year-old population Men Women University students in % of the 20-27-year-old population Men Women

85.4 87.9* 60. 9 67.3*

*

9.2 11.6 13.-+ 3.4 8.211.2

* *

7.8 10.6 11.6 2.4 5.3 6.4

Sources: Weiss & Hafeli. 1987. Sozialindikatoren fur die Schweiz, Bd . 2: Bildung. Statistisches Jahrbuch aer Schweiz; and author's calculations. * Figures for 1984 * no figures available

steadily increased, reaching 83.8 percent in 1986. From the 1970s onward, women caught up rather fast. By 1986, every second woman completed a BIGA (Bundesamt fiir Industrie, Gewerbe und Arbeit)- recognized contract. The rapid increase in female apprentices is even more impressive if we take all types of vocational training programs into account, in which case the female rate rises to 67.3 percent, whereas the male rate shows only a small additional increase of 2.5 percent. This indicates that vocational training programs not recognized by BIGA are highly feminized (nursing training, information services in staterun enterprises like the postal service and the national railroad system). Gender-specific figures for high school graduates (Gymnasium) do not exist prior to 1970. This does not come as a big surprise, because the female enrollment rate is very low, even in 1970. We find 3.4 percent of graduates out of all 19year-old women compared with 9.2 percent of all men of the same age group. Again, we find that women start at a pretty low level and catch up at high speed. By 1986, women's enrollment rate nearly matches that of men (11.2 percent and 13.4 percent, respectively). At the university level, the gender-specific comparison of enrollment rates show that although women have managed to triple their proportion, they continue to lag considerably behind men. In view of the small gender-specific difference in high school certificates—the formal prerequisite to enter university—the low rate of female university students in 198687 is astonishing. In spite of the impressive increase in the educational partic-

Youth: Life Chances and Life Prospects

101

Table 6.4 Proportion of Female Apprentices and Students in Pre-elementary and Elementary Teaching, by classes, 1986/87 Total 1.class 2.class 3.class 4.class 5.class Apprentices %-women

41.0

48.6

44.3

36.1

8.4

Teaching %-women

81.3

85.6

85.8

83.9

74.5

Source: Bundesamt fiir Statistik, author's calculations.

Schulerstatistik

70.4

1986/87: and

ipation of women over the last two decades, we may assume that, in the late 1980s, gender-specific inequalities in educational opportunities continued to exist. The data shown in Tables 6.4 and 6.5 confirm this finding for different levels of the educational system. For 1986-87, Table 6.4 presents, for five successive years of postobligatory schooling, the proportion of female apprentices and students in pre-elementary and elementary teaching. In 1986-87, the proportion of female apprentices in the first and second year of vocational training is much higher than in the third and fourth years. In the final year, it drops as low as 8.4 percent. Women seem to opt for vocational training programs lasting two or three years at the most. As a consequence, women will be relegated to less prestigious jobs in the labor force, since apprenticeships for the most important jobs last for four years. In contrast, preelementary and elementary teaching is highly feminized; when women opt for a four-year program it is in an occupational sphere that appears to be highly unattractive to men. We may conclude that women, having increased their participation at the level of secondary education, are still overrepresented in less prestigious curricula. This suggests that gender-specific inequalities in educational opportunity are perpetuated in the late 1980s in more subtle and less visible forms. At the level of advanced (college) education, women seem to take less advantage of their educational opportunities than men do, being much less inclined to convert the educational capital acquired at the secondary level into university studies. Table 6.5 shows that they have increased their participation at both the high school and university levels. But while they represented 44.4 percent of high school graduates in 1986-87, they only constituted a little over one third of all university students in the same year. We may thus conclude that although women have profited from the expansion of the educational system, they continue to take less advantage of the existing opportunities than men do, especially at the level of advanced schooling. Whether the expansion of higher education has enhanced the educational

Switzerland in Perspective

102

Table 6.5 Proportion of Female High School (Gymnasium) Seniors and University Students, 1950-51 through 1986-87 1950/51 High school s e n i o r s : % - w o m e n University s t u d e n t s : % - w o m e n

1960/61

1970/71

1980/81

17.0

30.6 23.0

42.5 32. 0

11 .5

1986/37 44 . 35.

S o u r c e : S t a t i s t i s c h e s Jahrbuch d e r S c h w e i z 1986/1987; S o z i a l i n d i katoren fur d i e S c h w e i z , Bd. 2: B i l d u n g . * no figures

available

Table 6.6

Students by Family Socioeconomic Background 1971 Proportion (X) of 18-20- and 21-24-year-old students by family socioeconooic background, standardized to the proportion of 15-17-year-oid students, Canton of Zurich, 1971. Socioeconoiic background low low-iediui high-iediua high 15-17 18-20 21-24

100 94 64

100 49 61

100 90 97

100 132 137

Source: Blancpain k Hauseliann, Zur Unrast der Jugend 1974.

1982 Proportion of 20-26-year old students by fanily socioecononic background, Gensan-speaking part of Switzerland, 1962.

Socioeconomic background Total low ttediua high

i-students 12 10 44

Source: Blancpain et al. Erwachsen werden. 1983.

opportunities of young people coming from less advantaged socioeconomic backgrounds is much more difficult to assess, since we lack adequate and comparable time-series data. We may shed some light on this important question by looking at two empirical studies of Swiss youth conducted in 1971 and 1982. It must be kept in mind, however, that the two studies are not directly comparable with regard to either the sample used (e.g., age groups, regions) or the definition of socioeconomic groups. For these reasons, we are limited to gaining insight into the extent of social inequalities in educational opportunities in the early 1970s and 1980s. In other words, the data presented in Table 6.6 are not suited to drawing conclusions as to whether inequalities in educational opportunity have been either reduced or reinforced between the 1970s and 1980s. The data both for the early 1970s and the early 1980s show that young people of lower social origin are heavily underrepresented compared to those of higher socioeconomic background. This is especially true for the 21- to 24-year-old age group, mostly university students (shown on the left side of the table). In the 20- to 28-year-old cohort, nearly half of all students come from well-to-do families. Although we cannot determine how much the recent expansion of higher education has reduced social inequalities in educational opportunity, we may nonetheless state that family background continues to determine access to higher

Youth: Life Chances and Life Prospects

103

education to a considerable extent. In sum, we may conclude that the rapid expansion of education as an institution has enhanced the educational opportunities of social groups previously characterized by low educational attainment (e.g., women) and has shifted long-existing inequalities to a higher—that is, more advanced—level. We may now ask ourselves about the impact of the increased participation in formal schooling on the life stage Youth and the transition to adulthood. We draw three conclusions. First, the increasing participation in schooling documents the growing social relevance of formal education in the lives of young people. It functions as the major factor for the continuous (structural) expansion of Youth as an institutionalized life stage. To be a (successful) student has become the major task in the young person's life and, as such, the most important area of responsibility for youth (Tully and Wahler, 1985). Success in school is based, as noted before, on individual evaluation. It depends, to a certain degree at least, on achievementbased criteria. Thus, the school constitutes a highly individualized social environment characterized by strong competition. The longer young people are exposed to this competitive situation, the more they internalize highly individualistic attitudes, orientations, and ways of conduct. Increasing formal education thus furthers the process of young people's individualization. Second, with the expansion of the educational system, educational attainment becomes ever more important for the individual's opportunities in the occupational world. Educational credentials assume a highly selective function for the future occupational career (Cassee, 1986). The individual's chances of social mobility are increasingly dependent on educational certificates (Lenhardt, 1984). Young people know about these social facts (cf. Arbeitsgruppe Schulforschung, 1980). For them, the imparting of knowledge does not constitute the primary purpose of schooling, which they perceive instead to be the "tight" coupling between educational credentials and occupational positions. They know that the social status they will achieve in their adult lives is more or less determined by their formal educational success. The growing significance of ever higher educational credentials signifies not only ever longer stays in the educational system for a growing proportion of a birth cohort; it is also responsible for the devaluation of educational credentials. The increasing dependence of occupational status on educational certificates encourages individuals to make higher educational investments in order to enhance their chances for acquiring occupational status. A generalized increase in educational demands engenders what Bourdieu (1978) and Collins (1979) have called "the inflation of educational certificates." A structural concomitant of the overproduction of educational degrees is their continuous devaluation; this produces even higher educational demands as individuals struggle to achieve as high an educational degree as possible (Wahler and Tully, 1988). Individuals intensifying their educational investments must do so under conditions of diminishing prospects for equivalent returns. In sum, aggravated competition for

104

Switzerland in Perspective

educational certificates and the accompanying inflation and gradual devaluation of educational titles in the labor market have become a structural constant in advanced industrial society. They are self-perpetuating processes engendering new and shifting relations between educational title and occupational status. Empirical support for our assumption may be found for West Germany (cf. Tully and Wahler, 1985) and for France (cf. Affichard, 1981), as well as for the United States (cf. Buchmann, 1989b). Switzerland seems to follow the general trend observed in these countries. A recent study conducted by Amos (1984) provides data to document the shifts in the relation between educational credentials and access to vocational training programs in the canton of Geneva between 1970 and 1981. He analyzed the changing proportion of educational certificates in a series of occupations, using newly contracted apprenticeships as the indicator and distinguishing five types of educational titles. For the sake of brevity, I restrict myself to highlighting those aspects of the different educational credentials that are of immediate interest to the research question at hand. The first three types represent nine years of compulsory schooling completed in separate educational tracks of different levels of prestige (low, medium, high). The fourth type constitutes postobligatory education that includes all types of educational credentials based on ten years of schooling. To complete the picture, we mention the fifth and last type: it represents some kind of residual category that involves either educational certificates issued by private schools or educational careers of young people that are hard to classify (e.g., schooling in foreign countries). On one hand, the results presented in Table 6.7 document, at the level of vocational training, the global increase in educational attainment from the early 1970s to the early 1980s.3 Even in the least prestigious, highly feminized apprenticeships of salesperson and hairdresser, the proportion of young people who had not successfully completed nine years of compulsory schooling dropped. Moreover, the results show that by the end of the 1970s the successful completion of the nine-year school program characterized by a medium level of prestige had become the new minimum standard of schooling. On the other hand, the figures in Table 6.7 illustrate the rapid devaluation of less prestigious educational credentials from the early 1970s to the beginning of the 1980s. This is most visible in the case of clerical apprenticeships. Until 1978, about one third of the apprentices completed compulsory schooling in the program characterized by a medium level of prestige. This seems to have been the standard level of schooling in order to have access to a clerical apprenticeship. In the successive period (1979-81), however, this proportion diminished by half. By contrast, the proportion of young people with some postcompulsory education jumped from 31.6 percent to 48.9 percent. In other words, half of all clerical apprentices went through postobligatory schooling, thus institutionalizing a new educational standard for entering this type of occupation. Consequently, this shift in the relation between educational credentials and clerical training resulted in the exclusion of those with low educational attainment. In 1970, 9 percent

Youth: Life Chances and Life Prospects

105

Table 6.7 Apprenticeships in Selected Occupations by Educational Attainment, New Contracts in Geneva, 1970-1981 Educational attainment no post-obligatory education* low 1970-1972 1973-1975 1976-1978 1979-1981

Clerk

salesperson

hairdresser

mechanic electrician (machines)

9.0 4.8 1.0 0.3

37.8 32.7 16.6 11.7

62.0 51.0 36.1 26.0

28.0 15.7 5.4 1.9

4^.3 28.4 17.7 4.3

36.0 39.9 53.6 37.0

28.7 43.1 51.0 44.1

medium

1970-1972 1973-1975 1976-1978 1979-1981

34.0 34.8 33.9 17.6

12.7 24.4 39.6 31.3

10.1 16.7 34.2 40.4

high

1970-1972 1973-1975 1976-1978 1979-1981

12.1 13.6 15.4 17.9

1.8 2.2 1.9 4.1

1.0 2.7 3.8

0.9 9.2 7.8 21.4

2.4 4.2 2.1 12.2

1970-1972 1973-1975 1976-1978 1979-1981

18.2 27.2 31.6 48.9

2.9 4.7 6.8 14.9

1.4 3.3 2.7 7.6

1.0 4.0 7.2 13.6

1.2 4.5 7.1 14.3

1970-1972 1973-1975 1976-1978 1979-1981

26.7 19.2 17.7 15.3

42.3 33.1 29.3 33.9

26.0 27.1 19.8 19.3

29.4 18.4 13.9 15.0

20.2 15.2 11.1 16.5

1970-1972 1973-1975 1976-1978 1979-1981

265 273 281 332

92 92 122 146

69 70 74 79

70 65 55 51

--

post-obligatory education*

Private schools/ other provenance"

Mean of new contracts

83 125 66 93

Source: Amos, Jacques, L'entree en apprentissage. 1984. Own calculation * xx xxt

Nine years of compulsory schooling completed in educational tracks different prestige. Ten years of schooling. Residual category.

of

of the clerical apprentices had completed school at the least prestigious level. By the beginning of the 1980s, the proportion had dropped to 0.3 percent. For the manual professions shown in Table 6.7—mechanics and electricians—we may observe a two-stage process in the educational upgrading of the corresponding vocational training program. At the beginning of the period surveyed, we find a considerable proportion of (predominantly male) apprentices who had attained the lowest educational credentials possible. In the third period (1976-

106

Switzerland in Perspective

78), these apprentices had mostly disappeared. Instead, we find more than 50 percent of apprentices with a medium-level educational degree. Finally, in the last period, we observe fewer apprentices with such an educational degree and more apprentices who had completed compulsory schooling at the highest level possible. A third consequence of the extension of schooling for the life stage Youth has to do with the blurring of age boundaries between youth and adult status. On one hand, the increasing prominence of schooling for a steadily growing proportion of a birth cohort structurally postpones the economic independence of young people. Except for the fact that they are economically dependent on others, many young persons in school may be considered as adults. Empirical evidence seems to support the assumption that over the last 15 years the behavioral differences between young people and adults have drastically diminished (von Trotha, 1982; Baacke, 1987). In a growing number of life spheres (sexuality, political behavior, etc.), young people behave like adults or claim the same rights as adults. On the other hand, the rapidly accelerated cycles of technological innovation reduce the "half-life" of the validity of professional qualifications. In order to preserve the marketability of their labor, many adults are forced to invest in professional updating and retraining. Adults of different age increasingly reassume the role of a student. The decoupling of the status of a student from the age status may thus be regarded as a major determinant of the blurring of age boundaries between youth and adult status (Trotha, 1982: 271). Being a student is no longer unambiguously associated with a certain age, as changes in the occupational sphere make professional updating increasingly more necessary. Adults thus return to school and act as students. We may conclude that the status of the student has been transformed into an occupational status. Its holder is thus not set "free" from the responsibilities of the adult world, but, on the contrary, the status as a student confronts him or her with the demands of the adult world.

Entry into the Occupational World One of the most visible effects of the increasing prominence of schooling in the lives of youths is the postponement of entry into the labor force. Comparing male and female labor force participation between 1960 and 1980, we find decreasing rates among both the 15- to 19-year-old and 20- to 24-year-old men and women (see Table 6.8). With regard to the 15- to 19-year-old age group especially, Switzerland follows the trend observed in other Western nations (see Wahler and Tully [1988] for West Germany; see Buchmann [1989b] for the United States). The only major exception to the trend is the slight increase in labor force participation among 20- to 24-year-old women. This seems to reflect, on one hand, the greater proportion of single women of that age participating

Youth: Life Chances and Life Prospects

107

Table 6.8 Labor Force Participation by Sex and Age, 1960-1980 (in percent) Men Year

15 - 19

20 - 24

1960 1970 1980

69 63 56

91 87 83

W omen 15 - 19 20 — °4 73 70 75

58 59 51

Source: Sozialindikatoren fiir die Schweiz, Bd. 3: Erwerbstatigkeit; Eidgenossische Volkszahlung 1980. Bd. 9: Erwerbstatigkeit.

Table 6.9 The Three Most Frequently Contracted Apprenticeships, by Occupational Groups and by Single Occupations, by Sex, 1955-1984 1955 Occupational groups

Woaen

Men

1984

(37.0) 1. Metallurgical/ (34.2) engineering workers (14.0) 2. Office workers (12.1) (8.5) 3. Draftsien/ Technicians

Single occupations

(14.2) 1. Clerk

8.9)

1955

1984

1. Sales personnel (38.7) 1. Office workers (37.3) 2. Office workers (30.4) 2. Sales personnel(27.2) (5.2) 3. Personal hygiene workers (9.1)

(11.9)

1. Salesperson (37.4)

1. Clerk (30.9)

2. Mechanic (7.3)

2. Electrician (6.3)

2. Clerk (30.3)

2. Salesperson (22.1)

3. Carpenter (5.6)

3. Car necnanic (5.7)

3. Dressmaker (14.3)

3. Hairdresser (6.9)

Source: Weiss & Hafeli, 1987.

full-time in the labor force and, on the other, the greater propensity of married women to stay in the labor market.4 In view of the global increase in schooling that has occurred over the last decades the question arises as to whether young people have changed their behavior regarding the choice of occupation. Since women, especially, have increased their educational attainment, it is of special interest whether, in th 1980s, they preferred other future occupations than their counterparts in the 1950s and 1960s. To answer these questions, we look for some empirical evidence among young people attending vocational and clerical training programs. In this way, we may get a general idea about changes in occupational choice, since the great majority of young people serve an apprenticeship—in the 1980s, about 75 percent of all 16- to 19-year-old persons. For 1955 and 1984, Table 6.9 presents the "hit parade" of the three occupational groups and the three single professions most often chosen by men and women, using newly contracted apprenticeships in the respective years as indicators. Astonishingly enough, we find little change. At the level of occupational

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108

Table 6.10 Gender-specific Segregation in BIGA-recognized Apprenticeships, 1955-1984 Year

100%-male dominated occupations

1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1984

71% 69% 69% 60% 467. 397. 357.

100%-female dominated occupations 12% 10% 10% 11% 87. 77. 77.

Gendermixed occupations 17% 21% 21% 29% 467. 547. 587.

Total (number of occupations) 100%(231) 10 0%(241) 100%(269) 100%(206) 1007.(232) 1007.(246) 1007.(247)

Source: Weiss & Hafeli, 1987.

groups and among men, the rank order of the three most frequently contracted apprenticeships remains unchanged. In 1955 and in 1984, occupations in the metal working and engineering industry, in commerce and business and in drafting and technical work cover about 60 percent of the contracts. Looking at single occupations, the clerk occupies first place in both years surveyed. In second place, we find mechanics in 1955 and electricians in 1984. The difference in rank order of the three most frequently contracted apprenticeships among occupational groups and single occupations is mostly attributable to the fact that occupations in the metal and engineering industry include more than 50 different apprenticeships, whereas office work just includes two single occupations. All in all, the data show an astonishing stability in men's occupational choices between the 1950s and the 1980s. Even more striking is the fact that women's occupational choices continue to concentrate on a very small number of apprenticeships. In both years, sales personnel and office workers cover about two thirds of all newly contracted apprenticeships. Because these two occupational groups do not offer a great variety in single apprenticeships, changes in the rank order of single occupations parallel the changes found in occupational groups. The two single occupations ranked in first and second place—that is, salesperson and clerk—cover 67.7 percent of all new contracts in 1955 and 53.0 percent in 1984.5 This is in sharp contrast with men's behavior: In both years, the first two single occupations include only 20 percent of all apprenticeships newly contracted by men. In view of the small spectrum of apprenticeships chosen by women, the question arises as to whether women's occupational opportunities have in fact improved over the last decades—in spite of their increasing participation in education. To determine the extent to which women's access to the wide variety of occupations has changed, we shall have a look at the development of the gender-specific occupational segregation since 1955. The data presented in Table 6.10 are based on a highly conservative measure of occupational segregation by sex. Using newly contracted apprenticeships as an indicator, gender-mixed occupations include at least one female and one male apprentice. Accordingly,

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109

100 percent male-dominated occupations include not a single female apprentice, and vice versa—100 percent female-dominated occupations exclude men. For 1955, we find only 17 percent of occupations to be gender mixed, whereas more than two thirds of all occupations completely exclude women. A few occupations (12 percent) are 100 percent female dominated. It is not until the middle of the 1970s that a major change in gender-specific occupational segregation may be observed. In 1975, a little less than half of all occupations include male and female apprentices, matching in size the 100 percent maledominated occupations. Again ten years later, we find about 60 percent gendermixed occupations. The exclusively male-dominated occupational sphere has been reduced to 35 percent; the exclusively female domain amounts to 7 percent. At first sight, the change that has occurred over the last 15 years looks impressive. It must be remembered, however, that the definition of sex-specific job market segregation used in Table 6.10 conceals the proportion of men and women in the gender-mixed occupations. Recalling the findings from Table 6.9, namely the high proportion of female clerks and salespersons (53 percent of all women apprentices in 1984), we may suspect that in the 1980s the opening of the occupational world to both sexes became true for only a minority of young women. A recent detailed analysis of sex-specific job market segregation in Switzerland conducted by Charles (1987) confirms this suspicion. Based on the internationally widely used Index of Dissimilarity, the values computed for Switzerland in 1980, including all men and women in the labor force who were 15 years old and over, suggest that "to establish a proportionally representative distribution of the sexes across occupations, at least 62 percent women (or men) in the Swiss labor force would have to change their occupational category" (Charles, 1987: 13). Gender-specific occupational segregation in Switzerland is therefore as high as in many other industrialized countries. The continued stability of men's and women's occupational choices is nonetheless a somewhat surprising result in view of the rapid and profound transformations of the economy and the occupational structure that have characterized almost all Western nations over the last 15 years, Switzerland included. Without going into detail, I shall highlight two characteristics of recent economic development in Western nations that are of immediate interest to young people's future work careers. First, economic development since the mid-1970s has been marked by the decoupling of economic growth and growth in employment: Economic recovery does not go hand in hand with the creation of more jobs. Many firms have increased their turnover in the last few years while simultaneously reducing their personnel. Thus, economic growth in the future will most probably be a "jobless growth'' that mainly reflects the broad application of new technologies (especially those based on microelectronics). Second, new technologies accelerate the pace at which vocational qualifications are being socially devalued. Meanwhile, some professional occupations have reached a critical stage: The average life span of a given profession is now

110

Switzerland in Perspective

Table 6.11 Female Labor Force Participation by Age, 1960-1980 Jahr 1960 1970 1980

15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 58 59 51

73 70 75

50 44 58

41 43 49

41 44 50

41 45 52

42 46 51

41 43 47

39 40 41

32 32 24

Source: Sozialindikatoren fur die Schweiz, Bd . 3: Erwerbstatigkeit; Eidgenossische Volkszahlung 1980.

shorter than the average work life of a person. Shifts in the occupational structure no longer coincide with the exchange of generations in the labor market. Given the accelerated obsolescence of professional expertise, the likelihood of experiencing a stable, continuous, professional life based on a professional competence acquired at a single point in time diminishes. Thus, professional reorientation—that is, professional updating and retraining—will become a structural necessity for future work careers. The great propensity of persons below the age of 25 to change occupations, documented by Leibundgut (1985-86, 1986) for Switzerland between the 1970s and 1980s, provides support for our assumption. In sum, the accelerated devaluation of professional qualifications contributes to the obsolescence of collectively valid occupational trajectories whose highly standardized steps and sequences have provided a well-defined frame of reference for the individual's professional orientation. With regard to the life stage Youth, these recent changes in the occupational world thus help to diversify and to individualize the passage from school to work—the major milestone in the transition to adulthood—and especially the initial stage of work careers of young people. They contribute to the dissolution of labor force entry as a well-defined status passage (Baethge, Gerlach, and Miller, 1980; Wahler and Tully, 1988). Most likely, young women's work careers will not be less affected by the rapid changes in the occupational structure than are men's careers. The following reasoning supports this assumption. Over the last ten years especially, women of all ages have become more inclined to remain in the labor force after marriage and childbearing. Table 6.11 shows that for an increasing number of women work careers have ceased to be only a marginal part of their life course.6 Working outside the home is slowly becoming an integrated part of the female biography. In 1980, every second woman between 25 and 49 years of age was employed.7 Compared with other industrial countries, the Swiss rates of women's labor market participation are still very low (cf. Charles, 1987). Switzerland is a "latecomer" in this process, thus indicating the strong prevalence of the traditional division of labor between the sexes. And the fact that half of all 25- to 49-year-old women, likely to be married and have children, do not participate in the labor force suggests the absence of a clear role model for women. In the 1980s and 1990s, it is no longer socially prescribed whether women should or

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111

Table 6.12 Civil Status by Selected Age Groups and Sex, 1970 and 1980 C.ivilian status married 1970 1980

divorced 1970 I960

Age groups

single 1970 1980

15-19 year olds women men

96.3 99. 7

98.4 99. 8

3.7 0. 3

20-24 year olds women men

54.9 81 .2

11.1 90. 1

44. 5 18.6

26.5 9. 3

0.6 L> . 2

0.7 0. 1

25-29 year olds women men

21.9 37. 1

32.6 52. 0

IS.9 61 . 8

63 .6 46. 3

1.9 I . 1

3.5 1.7

1 .6 0.2

::

Source: Statistisches; Jahrbuch der Schweiz

should not participate in the labor force during childrearing. This social situation thus obliges young women to decide to a greater extent on their own which biographical model will be the appropriate one for them. The data presented in the next section show that a similar situation prevails with regard to the family life course. Private Life and Family Formation Over the past 20 years, major demographic changes in family life have been observed in all highly developed industrial societies. The following changes, especially, have been noted: decreasing rates of first marriage, increasing mean variation of age at first marriage, increasing divorce rates, decreasing rates of remarriage, increasing divorce rates of remarriage, increasing dispersal of mother's age at first childbearing, increasing rates of single parents, declining birthrates, reduced periods of childrearing, and prolonged periods of the "empty nest." These changes indicate the increasing variety in contemporary living arrangements and, as such, the growing diversification of family life (Kohli, 1986; Hoffmann-Nowotny, 1987). They affect not only actual family careers in terms of status/role sequences but also the meaning given to family life. Although Switzerland is not a "forerunner" in this process, its development pattern follows the general trend. For example, looking at the civil status of young men and women in 1970 and 1980, we find rapidly decreasing marriage rates (see Table 6.12). In 1970, nearly one out of two 20- to 24-year-old women was married, compared with only every fourth woman in 1980. This distinct decline in the female marriage rate is not fully offset by the 25- to 29-year-old women's greater propensity to marry. In this age group, we find 63.6 percent of women married in 1980, compared with 75.9 percent in 1970. Among men, based on much lower marriage rates, we observe similar trends. These patterns

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Switzerland in Perspective

Table 6.13 Divorce Rate per 1,000 Marriages, 1965-1984 1965

1970

1975

1980

1984

127

155

209

273

290

Quelle: Hoffmann-Nowotny, 1987.

thus indicate both a trend toward postponement of marriage and a decreasing propensity to marry.8 The changing attitudes toward marriage are also reflected in rapidly increasing divorce rates since the 1960s. Table 6.13 shows that in 1984 almost one third of all marriages ended in divorce compared with only one out of eight marriages in 1965. The impressive pace at which divorce rates have increased over the last 20 years reveals that marriage has ceased to be a lifelong institution. In this respect, the declining stability of the traditional family indicates that marriage may no longer be regarded as the final status passage toward adult life. In other v/ords, the yardstick against which to measure the standard life course in the private life sphere has been slowly eroded. Over the last two decades, a variety of living arrangements has become socially acceptable, thus contributing to the diversification and individualization of the transition to adulthood with respect to the private realm of life. In sum, the structural changes of the life stage youth in the educational, occupational, and family spheres discussed in the last three sections provide empirical evidence for our assumption that over the last three decades the transition to adulthood in Switzerland has been transformed into an increasingly extended, diversified, and highly individualized life period. The data presented and the comparisons drawn with other Western nations show that the processes documented for Switzerland match those found in other industrial countries. Strong differences exist, however, with regard to the intensity, the timing and the speed at which changes in the educational, occupational, and family spheres occur and thus affect the young person's life course. The last section discusses, at a general conceptual level, some possible impacts of these structural changes on juvenile value and action orientations. CHANGES IN YOUNG PEOPLE'S VALUE AND ACTION ORIENTATIONS The increasing diversification and individualization of juvenile life situations diminish the likelihood of more or less identical career paths among young people endowed with similar social attributes (Oik, 1985. 1986; Buchmann, 1989a, 1989b). As a consequence, the objective possibility of comparing various trajectories to adulthood declines. Youths thus are less likely to experience and/or recognize their own trajectory as part of the "collective destiny" of the social

Youth: Life Chances and Life Prospects

113

group(s) to which they belong. For these reasons, collectively defined youthspecific value and action orientations lose their social significance. The rapid proliferation of youth subcultures and, even more so, the accelerated pace at which subcultural lifestyles change document this trend (Baacke, 1987). Moreover, the great heterogeneity found today in young people's modes of expression indicates that identification with and commitment to particular subcultural groups gradually tend to become intentional acts: Alliances become selective. The preference for a particular subcultural style increasingly depends on individual decisions. This in turn contributes to the formation of highly individualistic and "fluid" identity patterns that support a logic of action oriented more toward the present than toward the future. The growing temporal extension of the life stage Youth gradually undermines the social meaning of youth as a transitional life period. Increasingly, youth ceases to be defined in terms of a preparation time with regard to adult life. Rather, it is conceived of as a life stage in its own terms. Consequently, young people claim the right to define their own lifestyles and legitimize their ideas, plans and actions on the basis of their own needs, motives and interests (cf. Jugendwerk der Deutschen Shell, 1981; Fuchs, 1983; Baethge, 1985; Rosen mayr, 1985; Buchmann, 1988a, 1989b). Furthermore, this change in the social meaning of youth furthers a greater emphasis on immediacy. Swidler (1980: 140) contended that' 'current pleasures become more important than either future rewards or past commitments.'' Young people's logic of action is likely to focus on immediate gratifications. The present is perceived of as the "here and now," rather than as an element in the movement from the past to the future. Thus, young people tend to adopt action orientations that highly value new experiences: Novelty becomes a value in itself. Under these circumstances, the quest for identity is likely to become a more difficult project. Since the growing diversification and individualization of the life stage Youth have greatly eroded integration into the sociocultural milieu encompassing shared values, action orientations, lifestyles and collectively defined biographical projects, young people are forced to develop meaningful standards for their lives to a greater extent on their own (Beck, 1983, 1986; Baethge, 1985; Buchmann, 1989a, 1989b). Thus, the probability of constructing life designs centered around the individual increases. As such plans become more and more objects of deliberate attention, they are also likely to be less permanent, that is, more open to continuous reconstruction. As a consequence, young people are inclined to construct multidimensional identities in which a clear hierarchic ordering of elements is absent. Such identity structures would be composed of many different elements, which may be assembled in different ways according to shifting internal and external requirements. The ability to shift the identity focus in a flexible way and to reorder its elements in new combinations inherent in this type of identity construction may help us explain the astonishing swiftness and the amazing agility with which young people (re-)assemble and (re-)combine diverse stylistic elements in ever-

Switzerland in Perspective

114

Table 6.14 Female Labor Force Participation, Women 15 Years and Older, 1960-1980 1960 42.5

1970 41 . 5

1980 42.9 53.6*

1986 42.7 53.^*

Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz, 1987/1988; and author's calculations. * 15-to-64 year olds

new forms of subcultural expression—and thus we return to the observation that served as the starting point of our reflections on contemporary youth in Switzerland.

NOTES 1. Unfortunately, we are not able to investigate in detail the changes in the life stage Youth with regard to different social classes because we lack adequate data for comparison. 2. Covering about 80 percent of all new contracts, those recognized by the Bundesamt fiir Industrie, Gewerbe und Arbeit (BIGA) do not include professional training for nurses (supervised by the Swiss Red Cross) and the apprentices in such state-run enterprises as the postal service ([PTT]) and the national railroad system ([SBB]). 3. We do not claim to provide a full and detailed account of the devaluation of educational credentials. In selecting a small number of occupations, we tried to include manual and nonmanual occupations, more prestigious and less prestigious ones, and typical female and typical male occupations. 4. Changes in female labor force participation over the life course will be analyzed in detail at the end of this section. 5. Based on all apprenticeships contracted by women—that is, including the training programs not recognized by BIGA (Red Cross, PTT, SBB)—nursing assumes a prominent place in the female choice of occupation (Weiss and Hafeli, 1987). In 1977, the first year for which this type of comparison is possible, nursing ranks third among the occupational groups. 6. The global rates of female labor force participation between 1960 and 1980 do not reveal the increase in women's employment status (see Table 6.14) because younger (15to 19-year-old) and older (60- to 64-year-old) women's participation in the labor market decreases. Interpretations of changes in female work behavior that are solely based on global figures would therefore be highly misleading. 7. In ten-year census data, employment status is based on a minimum of six hours of paid work a week. For these reasons, the data presented in Table 6.11 are likely to overestimate the extent of female labor force participation. 8. Another way of expressing the distinct decline in marriage rates for the population "at risk" is the number of first marriages per 1,000 single men or women of a given age. Table 6.15 shows the corresponding figures for 1970 and 1980.

Youth: Life Chances and Life Prospects

115

Table 6.15 First Marriages per 1,000 Single Men or Women by Age, 1970-1980

Year

20-24

1970 1980

177.8 91.7

Women

Age 25-29

20-24

165.4 120.9

88.0 41.6

Men

25-29 162.2 109.8

Source: Hoffmann-Nowotny, 1987.

REFERENCES Affichard, Joelle. 1981. "Quels emplois apres l'ecole: la valeur des titres scolaires depuis 1973." Economie et statistique 134: 7-26. Amos, Jacques. 1984. Lentree en apprentissage. Capital scolaire et marche de I'apprentissage a Geneve (1970-1981). Geneva: Cahiers du Service de la Recherche Sociologique. Arbeitsgruppe Schulforschung. 1980. Leistung und Versagen. Alltagstheorien von Schii lern und Lehrern. Munich: Juventa. Baacke, Dieter. 1987. Jugend und Jugendkulturen. Darstellung und Deutung. Munich: Juventa. Baethge, Martin. 1985. "Individualisierung als Hoffnung und Verhangnis—Aporien und Paradoxien in spatburgerlichen Gesellschaften oder: die Bedrohung von Subjektivitat." Soziale Welt 36: 299-312. Baethge, Martin; Frank Gerlach; and Jurgen Muller. 1980. "Zu den Veranderungen des Ueberganges Jugendlicher aus der Schule in Arbeit und Beruf in den 70er Jahren.'' WSI Mitteilungen 11: 660-67. Beck, Ulrich. 1986. Risikogesellschaft. Aufdem Weg in eine andere Moderne. Frankfurt Suhrkamp. Blancpain R., and Erich Hauselmann. 1974. Zur Unrast der Jugend. Frauenfeld: Huber. Blancpain, Robert; Peter Zeugin; and Erich Hauselmann. 1983. Erwachsen werden. Bern and Stuttgart: Haupt. Bourdieu, Pierre. 1978. "Classement, declassement et reclassement." Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales 24: 2-22. Buchmann, Marlis. 1983. Konformitat und Abweichung im Jugendalter. Diessenhofen: Ruegger. Buchmann, Marlis. 1988. "Die Dynamik von Standardisierung und Individualisierung im Lebenslauf. Der Uebertritt ins Erwachsenenalter im sozialen Wandel fortgeschrittener Industriegesellschaften." In Handlungsspielrdume im Lebenslauf, ed. Ansgar Weymann. Stuttgart: Enke. Buchmann, Marlis. 1989a. "Jugend—ein integrativer Erklarungsansatz. Biographie im Spannungsfeld von sozialer und personaler Identitat.'' In Handbuch der Familienund Jugendsoziologie, ed. Manfred Markefka and Renate Nave-Herz. Neuwied: Luchterhand. Buchmann, Marlis. 1989b. The Script of Life in Modern Society. Entry into Adulthood in a Changing World. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Bundesamt fiir Statistik. 1981. Erwerbstatigkeit. Sozialindikatoren fiir die Schweiz, vol. 2. Bern.

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Bundesamt fiir Statistik. 1982. Bildung. Sozialindikatoren fur die Schweiz, vol. 2. Bern. Bundesamt fiir Statistik. 1987. Schulerstatistik 1986/1987. Bern. Bundesamt fiir Statistik. Various years. Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz (Statistical Yearbook of Switzerland). Basel: Birkhauser. Cassee, Paul. 1986. Jugend als Prufstein. Zur Verarbeitung der Bildungsbiographie im Jugendalter. Zurich: Zentralstelle der Studentenschaft. Charles, Maria. 1987. "Geschlechterspezifische Arbeitsmarktsegregation in der Schweiz." Schweizerische Zeitschrift fiir Soziologie 13, no. 1: 1-27. Collins, Randall. 1979. The Credential Society. New York: Academic Press. Goffmann, Erving. 1967. Stigma. Ueber die Techniken der Bewdltigung beschddigte Identitat. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Hoffmann-Nowotny, Hans-Joachim. 1987. "The Future of the Family." Paper presented at the European Population Conference, Jyvaskyla, Finland, June 11-16. Jugendwerk der Deutschen Shell, ed. 1981. Jugend '81: Lebensentwurfe, Alltagskulturen Zukunftsbilder. Opladen: Leske and Budrich. Kohli, Martin. 1985. "Die Institutionalisierung des Lebenslauf." Kolner Zeitschrift fiir Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 37: 1-29. Kohli, Martin. 1986. "Gesellschaftszeit und Lebenszeit: Der Lebenslauf im Strukturwandel der Moderne." In Die Moderne: Kontinuitdten undZasuren, ed. Johanne Berger. Soziale Welt 4: 183-208. Krappmann, Lothar. 1969. Soziologische Dimensionen der Identitat. Strukturelle Bedin gungenfiir die Teilnahme an Interaktionsprozessen. Stuttgart: Enke. Leibundgut, Hansjorg. 1985-86. Struktur- und Mobilitatsdaten. 2 vols. Zurich: Schweiz erischer Verband fur Berufsberatung. Leibundgut, Hansjorg. 1986. Die Bedeutung der beruflichen Mobilitat als arbeitsmarktpolitischer Ausgleichsprozess. Bern: Lang. Lenhardt, Gero. 1984. Schule und burokratische Rationalitdt. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Levy, Rene. 1977. Der Lebenslauf als Statusbiographie. Stuttgart: Enke. Meyer, John. 1986. "Self and the Life Course: Institutionalization and Its Effects." In Human Development and the Life Course: Multidisciplinary Perspectives, ed. A Sorensen, L. Sherrod, and F. Weinert. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Oik, Thomas. 1985. "Jugend und gesellschaftliche Differenziemng—zur Entstrukturierung der Jugendphase." Zeitschrift fur Pddagogik 19: 290-301. Oik, Thomas. 1986. "Jugend und Gesellschaft. Entwurf fur einen Perspektivenwechsel in der Sozialwissenschaftlichen Jugendforschung. In Interdisziplindre Jugendfor schung, ed. Wilhelm Heitmeyer. Munich: Juventa. Rosenmayr, Leopold. 1985. "Wege zum Ich vor bedrohter Zukunft: Jugend im Spiegel multidisziplinarer Forschung und Theorie." Soziale Welt 36: 274-98. Tully, Claus J., and Peter Wahler. 1985. "Jugend und Ausbildung: von der Statuspassage zur Uebergangsbiographie mit 'open end.' " Schweizerische Zeitschrift fiir Soziologie 11: 191-212. von Trotha, Trutz. 1982. "Zur Entstehung von Jugend." Kolner Zeitschriftfiir Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 34: 254-77. Wahler, Peter, and Claus J. Tully. 1988. "Verlangerte Jugendphase—neue Hurden furs Erwachsenwerden." In Jugend in Europa: Situation und Forschungsstand, ed. Hans-Hermann Wiebe. Opladen: Leske and Budrich. Weiss, Doris, and Kurt Hafeli. 1987. Die Entwicklung der neu abgeschlossenen Lehr ertrdge in der Schweiz: 1955-1984. Zurich: Schweizerischer Verband fur Berufsberatung.

7

Some Aspects of the Structure and Functioning of the Family in Switzerland JEAN M. KELLERHALS AND JOSETTE COENEN-HUTHER, WITH THE COLLABORATION OF NOELLE LANGUIN In Switzerland, as in most industrialized nations, the family has undergone profound modifications in the last 20 years. These transformations are clearly reflected in demographic indicators such as rates of marriage, divorce, and birth and by statistics concerning the entry of women into the workplace. Such changes are examined in the first part of this essay. In the second part, we discuss the way in which a family's position in the social structure—as in numerous industrialized countries—may be reflected in a large variety of patterns of family functioning. We end the essay with an analysis of family determinants of divorce. THE EVOLUTION OF FAMILY STRUCTURES: GENERAL DEMOGRAPHIC TENDENCIES Marriage As we well know, the decrease in marriage rates in the West is a relatively recent phenomenon, preceded by a century-long increase in the frequency of first marriage. Thus, in Switzerland, while 18 percent of the men and 20 percent of the women born around 1830 remained unmarried in 1880, a hundred years later, with the 1930 generation, only 9 percent of the men and 10 percent of the women had not married by the time they were 50 years old (Neury, 1985a). Similarly, the mean age at first marriage decreased from 30 to 28 years for men and from 28 to 25 years for women. The total marriage rate for single people nonetheless shows that the number of first marriages started to diminish as of 1962 (Neury, 1985a).1 Moderate at first, this diminution accelerates between

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Switzerland In Perspective

1971 and 1976 (the rate goes from 80 percent to 58 percent for men and from 84 percent to 60 percent for women), after which the rates start to increase again. In 1986 the rates of primonuptiality are 65 percent for men and 66 percent for women. The mean age at first marriage increases during the same period from 26.4 to 28.5 years for men and from 24.2 to 26.2 years for women.2 The age difference between sexes is thus constant at two years. The frequency of remarriage after divorce has considerably diminished since the 1960s. As with rates for first marriages, remarriage rates decreased particularly rapidly between 1971 and 1976, going from 63 percent to 46 percent for men and from 57 percent to 43 percent for women (total rates) (Neury, 1985a).3 Between 1977 and 1986, remarriage increased again for both sexes, to 58 percent for men and 51 percent for women. The differences in male and female remarriage rates, which had narrowed during the 1960s, are thus tending to increase again. The time between divorce and remarriage increased between 1967 and 1984, from an average of 4.2 to 5.7 years for men and from 5.4 to 6.5 years for women. Divorce Parallel to the gradual increase in marriage up to the 1960s, Switzerland has seen a gradual increase in divorces, occurring over three different periods (Levy, 1984). From 1900 to 1945 there was a constant but gradual augmentation, with a total divorce rate of 5 percent for 1900 and of 11 percent for 1945, the only interruption being during the first years of World War II.4 From 1946 to 1966 the rate stabilized around 12 percent. The year 1967 was a turning point, after which the curve rose sharply; in 20 years the total divorce rate more than doubled, from 13 percent in 1967 to 29 percent in 1986. This increase applies to marriages of all durations (Neury, 1985a). The risk of divorce is greater, however, among the more recently married (but who have been married for at least two years). The modal duration between marriage and divorce is between three and five years. The considerable increase in divorces thus seems to correspond both to a slight modification in their timing and to an increase in number. It is worth noting that divorce legislation had not changed in Switzerland in the years mentioned above. Births The gradual drop in fertility in developed countries over the past century is well known, and Switzerland is no exception in this regard. It is worth noting that in this country the average number of births per woman has never been very high, at least since the relevant statistics have been systematically recorded. The drop in fertility accelerates between 1900 and 1937, from 3.89 to 1.76 children per woman (Gilliand, 1984). The number of births then increases somewhat over the next three years, to 1.83 in 1940, then accelerates to 2.62 in 1946 (Neury,

Structure and Functioning of the Family

119

Table 7.1 Evolution of Female Labor Force Participation, 1960-1980 Age

15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70 +

1960

64.4 73.4 50.1 41.2 41.1 41.6 42.0 41.5 39.2 32.1 22.1 9.3a

1980

51.4 76.4 58.9 49.4 50.7 52.7 51.1 47.0 41.2 24.4 9.5 2.9

Difference (%)

-20.2 + 4.1 + 17.6 + 19.9 + 23.4 + 26.7 + 21.7 + 13.2 + 5.1 - 24.0 - 57.0 - 68.8

Source : Blanc 1985

1985b), to stabilize, with more or less marked fluctuations, until 1964 when it reaches 2.67 children per woman. Starting in 1965, the tendency reverses again, abruptly: 2.10 in 1970; 1.50 in 1978, the lowest point. Since then the total fertility rate fluctuates slightly above this number (1.53 in 1986). Women and the Work Force5 Between 1960 and 1980, the proportion of professionally active women increased slightly, going from 32.9 percent to 34.5 percent of the whole female population.6 Repartition by age group (see Table 7.1) shows, among other things, that it is mainly women aged 25 to 49, and especially those between the ages of 35 and 45—thus those also likely to be in their child-rearing years—who have increased their work force participation. The appreciable drop in activity rates before 20 and after 60 years of age during the two decades beginning in 1960, which is also noticeable among men, is related to other changes in society (prolongation of schooling, earlier retirement). If we examine the numbers for 1980, we see that a great proportion of women tend to work before the age of 24. Between the ages of 25 and 34 (the period of first marriages and births), considerably fewer are present in the labor market, but Table 7.1 shows that the number of women who interrupt their careers during the childbearing years has notably diminished in the past 20 years. The percentage of those who work is slightly higher between the ages of 35 and 49. It then drops, precipitously, from the ages of 60 to 64, the start of retirement age. Regional Variations Changes in demographic indicators concerning the family and women's share in the country's economic life vary according to region. We use two examples

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Table 7.2 Total Fertility Rates (around 1980) and Divorce Rates (1986) in Swiss Cantons Canton

Appenzell (Inner-Rhodes) Unterwald (half-canton of Obwalden) Uri Schwyz Appenzell (Outer-•Rhodes) Glarus Thurgau Unterwald (half-canton of Nidwalden) Saint-Gallen Luzern Valais Jura Graubunden Aargau Fribourg Solothurn Schaffhausen Zug Bern Basle-District Vaud Neuchatei Zurich Ticino Geneva Basle-City

Fertility

Divorce

2.48 2.24 2.09 2.01 1.95 1.93 1.90 1.89 1.83 1.79 1.75 1.74 1.68 1.68 1.64 1.62 1.62 1.60 1.55 1.49 1.38 1.38 1.36 1.34 1.25 1.14

14 21 10 25 31 25 34 22 33 25 17

*

—

21 33 22 40 50 28 30 47 43 43 42 34 50 42

* Divorces 1986 / Marriages 1976 — figures not available Source : Gilliand 1984

here: fertility and divorce in the various Swiss cantons. Fertility and divorce rates in the Swiss cantons around the year 1980 are shown in Table 7.2. We see that fertility rates range from 2.48 in the canton of Appenzell (I-R) to 1.14 in the canton of Basel-City. The most urban cantons such as BaselCity, Zurich, and Geneva and the French-speaking Protestant cantons (Geneva, Vaud, Neuchatei) have the lowest fertility rates, contrasting with Germanspeaking and profoundly rural cantons such as Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwald. As for divorce, marked differences according to canton are also apparent. Seventeen years ago (1973), for example, the percentage of divorces in relation to marriages7 varied from 3 percent in the canton of Appenzell to 29 percent in the canton of Geneva. These differences were strongly correlated with the degree of urbanization: Appenzell was not urbanized, whereas Geneva was 73 percent urban. They also correlate with the degree of Protestantism: Catholic cantons have a much lower divorce rate than do the Protestant ones (Killerhals, Perrin, and Voneche, 1977). Still other contextual factors intervene. Levy shows, among

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Table 7.3 Demographic Indexes Concerning the Family in Some European Countries—Total Rates, 1984 1st marriage men

Divorce men

England 6c Wales

666

404

1.76

17.3

Denmark

527

451

1.40

40.6

France

561

291

The Netherlands

627

West Germany

594

298

Sweden

479

454

Switzerland

646

290

Country

a : 1981

b : 1982

a

c : 1983

285

General Fertility

Illegitimate Births

1.81

18.0

a

1.49

7.7

b

1.65

c

1.29

1.52

43.7 5.5 c

Source : Roussel 1987

other things, that a high divorce rate is positively correlated with cantonal GNP per inhabitant, with a non-agrarian economic structure, with low birthrates, and also with cultural factors such as the strength of the more left-leaning political parties and little discrimination between girls and boys in the schools (Levy, 1984:141). In 1986 the divorce rate (divorces 1986/marriages 1976) shows that major regional disparities are still present (see Table 7.2): It goes from 10 to 14 percent in the rural, Catholic cantons of Uri and Appenzell (I-R) to 50 percent and 42 percent, respectively, in the urban Protestant cantons of Geneva and Zurich, for example. This does not prevent the low-divorce cantons from "catching up" with the "modern" cantons to some extent. An index of divorce growth calculated on the basis of the 1957 rate (= 100) shows that the urban cantons (Geneva, Zurich, Basel-City, for example) present an index of between 190 and 210 in 1986, whereas those of all but one of the extremely rural cantons vary between 422 and 775. A sort of cultural urbanization of the rural areas thus seems to be taking place, at least in this respect. Some International Comparisons As mentioned in the beginning, these transformations are not unique to Switzerland. The demographic indicators we have just examined have evolved similarly since the 1960s, with some lags, in all industrialized countries (see Roussel, 1987). Table 7.3, comparing data for 1984, shows that Switzerland is not fundamentally different from other countries, although the Swiss marry a bit more and divorce a bit less. Overall, fertility rates are well within the averages, but the proportion of births to unmarried couples remains extremely low. The reason does not seem to be that young Swiss cohabit any less than the French, for

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example, who procreate two and a half times more outside the bonds of marriage.8 A more likely explanation is that they feel it necessary to'get married once a child is conceived. Table 7.3 figures, in fact, tend to show that the Swiss may give a bit more credence to established institutions. Nor does the situation concerning Swiss women's work force participation differ fundamentally from that of other European countries: it was 34.5 percent in 1980, compared with 34.5 percent for France and 34.6 percent for West Germany. If demographic indicators are more or less similar, Swiss institutions concerning the family have nonetheless long been different from those of neighboring countries. Laws concerning marriage and divorce have changed less rapidly in Switzerland. Reform of the laws governing marriage and inheritance, guaranteeing equality of men and women, went into effect only in January 1988, although the first steps toward this reform (a study commission) were taken in 1957. Under the new law, for example, and for the first time in this country, a wife can pursue a profession without her husband having the legal right of opposition. A woman now participates as a full member in selection of a domicile, in maintenance of the family, in power of representation, and so forth. On the other hand, divorce by mutual consent (introduced in France, for example, more than ten years ago) does not yet exist in Switzerland. We thus find a mixture of traditionalism and modernism, which leads us to believe that, hidden by the general tendencies and the averages, family behaviors may differ considerably according to the social or regional position of the family. Certain sociological studies permit an exploration of this. Although they are often based on one region only (especially Geneva), rather than on the whole of Switzerland, they shed light on today's urban Swiss families. SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS AND FAMILY ORGANIZATION Getting Married To highlight the diversity of family patterns according to the socioeconomic status of the spouses, it is helpful first to note that contemporary Swiss marriages are still quite homogamous. A longitudinal study done in Geneva from 1974 to 1978 on a representative sample of Swiss newly weds shows a very high correlation between the socioprofessional statuses of the spouses. The probability of a woman university graduate marrying a man of the same educational level is 0.92. Probability decreases progressively to 0.07 for women without professional qualifications, being 0.21 for women with qualifications as dependent white-collar workers.9 The situation is similar for men, although a little less marked: A male university graduate has a 0.69 probability of marrying another university graduate, whereas this probability falls to 0.01 for a man without professional qualifications (Kellerhals et al., 1982:57). Although acquired level of socioeconomic status plays a more important role

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than status of origin, the latter is still significant. Sixty percent of the young women with upper-middle-class backgrounds marry men from similar origins, whereas this proportion falls to 28 percent for women coming from the lower middle class (workers, subordinate employees). When we combine these two variables, we find that only 16 percent of women from lower-middle-class families without higher education marry university graduates, whereas this proportion is 84 percent for women from upper-middle-class families with higher education (Kellerhals et al., 1982:60). These figures are comparable to those of such authors as Girard (1964) or Roussel (1975) for neighboring France. Attitudes toward marriage and toward the organization of the conjugal union may have become more private, but newly weds are still apparently subject to the latent influence of social cleavages. The length of engagement or of premarital cohabitation (65 percent of Geneva newlyweds had lived together before getting married) is also directly linked to the wife's socioprofessional level. Reasons for getting married (as opposed to simple cohabitation) also vary greatly according to educational level. At the bottom of the socioprofessional hierarchy, reasons related to seeking security seem to be subjectively determinant for about 50 percent of the women, as opposed to 13 percent of the university women. Lower-middle-class women have the impression (often false, as we see below) that official marriage will protect their status as well as their affective relationship, whereas parauniversity10 or university women do not quite know why they prefer marriage to simple cohabitation: Ritualism, in Merton's sense, outweighs explicit motivations. Many, even though they marry, say they are bothered by the legal restraints of marriage and worry that officializing the relationship will lead to the boredom of daily routine or affective letting go (Kellerhals and SteinauerCresson, 1976:34-35). Role Expectations Just as they influence choice of partner, couples' socioeconomic resources greatly influence their role expectations in marriage. Our discussion begins with results of studies done several years ago. A Zurich study of a random sample of 960 married women between the ages of 40 and 60 attempted to measure (using Likert-type scales) the degree of internalization of three "traditional" norms of the feminine role: subordination to husband, self-realization through maternity, and charm/seduction as a preferred mode of relation to others. Acceptance of these traditional norms is inversely correlated with social class. For the younger subsample (40 to 45), 57 percent of the lower-middle-class women accept the norm of subordination to husband, 74 percent accept the idea that a woman blossoms mainly in maternity, and 56 percent accept the seduction norm. These proportions are significantly lower among upper-middle-class women (respectively, 36 percent, 40 percent, and 33 percent). Differences are less marked among the 46-55 subgroup and disappear

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altogether among the 56- to 60-year-olds, except for the norm of subordination (Kellerhals and van Keep, 1973: 464-66). As for the idea that maternity is the main road to self-realization, a Geneva study of 2,500 married women done in 1968-69 (Bassand and Kellerhals, 1975:88) also demonstrated that acceptance of this norm increases as one descends the social hierarchy. These two studies lend credence to the idea that women with strong socioprofessional resources tended toward refusal of traditional roles. Although traditionalism has diminished in general, the more recent longitudinal Geneva study (1974-78; see Kellerhals et al., 1982) reached similar conclusions. As noted above, at the time these studies were done, the husband was legally required to materially support his wife (while she was legally obliged to do the housework). Two thirds of the lower-middle-class wives were in agreement with the principle of these legal requirements, as opposed to only one third of the university-educated women. Profound divergences concerning norms of the "good" or "proper" organization of the family exist corollary to these differences. When asked how domestic life should be reorganized when a baby is born, four lower-middle-class women out of five say that the woman should stop working and stay home. This proportion falls to one woman out of five among the upper middle class. Reciprocally, the principle of equal participation in housework (cooking, dishes, laundry, child care) is claimed by only about a third of the lower middle class, as opposed to two thirds of the upper. Clearly, these reflect two different models of domestic organization. It is important to note that all these differences in models of family organization according to socioprofessional level are much less marked for men. Men's responses reflect a single model that can best be described as "well-tempered conservatism." These differences in norms concerning domestic organization also correspond to fairly different attitudes toward procreation. In the more recent Geneva study, 67 percent of the couples envisage having two children, and only 4 percent of the newly wed couples say they do not want children at all. Although this proportion does not vary by social class, the ideas of lower-middle-class women seem much clearer—less ambivalent—than those of the others. First, a number of upper-middle-class women (55 percent) prefer to wait a few years before having a child in order to enjoy living as a couple, a proportion that drops to about a quarter among lower-middle-class women. Second, the satisfactions and benefits expected of a child vary greatly according to social status. For the lower-middle-class women of the sample, 59 percent give everyday tasks and identities associated with child care (e.g., feeding, walking, or visiting with a baby) as a decisive reason for having a child. This proportion drops progressively to 26 percent for the para-university and to 4 percent for the university women. More generally, various instrumental motivations (to realize personal ambitions through a child, have power over someone, have someone to count on later, etc.) are significantly more common and sub-

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jectively more important in lower- than in upper-middle-class environments. In the latter, only expressive motivations seem to really count, although tempered by reticence about the traditional aspects of the mother's role (see also Hopflinger [1984:79-182], who shows that in families in which the accent on the partnership is pronounced, there is less perception of the positive aspects of childbearing). Given these attitudes, it is not surprising that in point of fact a child is more or less long in making an appearance according to social stratum: After four years of marriage (thus, on the average, after six years of life in common), 81 percent of the lower-middle-class women have at least one child, as opposed to 57 percent of the para-university and 37 percent of the university women (Kellerhals et al., 1982:218). The number of children families plan on having does not follow the same tendencies. Even though they wait longer before having their first child, proportionally more couples of higher socioeconomic status plan to have three or more (22 percent as opposed to 11 percent). An even greater difference in the same direction was previously observed in Geneva. In a 1968 study, 55 percent of the married upper-class women were planning on having at least three children, whereas this proportion dropped progressively to about 20 percent among working-class women (Bassand and Kellerhals, 1975:114).n In the 1980 study of the whole of Switzerland (Hoffmann-Nowotny et al., 1984:145), a somewhat greater proportion of the highly educated women again reported wishing for three or more children (40 percent) than did others (28 percent for those with elementary school education, for example). We do not, of course, mean to extrapolate from attitudes or plans to actual practice. For one thing, working-class women very often work outside the home despite the fact that they do not consider this a particularly good thing for the family. The study by Hoffmann-Nowotny, Hopflinger, Kuhne, Ryffel, and Erni, done in 1980 on a sample of 600 young marriages from the whole of Switzerland, found that the wife's professional activity is greater the lower the husband's salary: Most of the women who work full-time are married to men earning salaries in the lowest category. The same tendencies, more accentuated, appear in neighboring France. As far back as 1974, Held and Levy noted on the basis of a national survey that the norms of domestic organization hostile to women's work outside the home were particularly tenacious in the social strata in which a second salary was in fact a necessity, resulting in a fairly conflictual situation for the women involved (Held and Levy, 1974:194). Second, contrary to the norms of sharing often expressed, when the woman works outside the home, the domestic assistance provided by the husband is minimal. In the Geneva study, for example, after four years of marriage husband and wife participated equally in housework only in a small minority of the cases in which the wife worked full-time outside. Generally speaking, a husband's help is significant (approximately one fourth of the work) in only a third of the households (Kellerhals et al., 1982:165-66). The Hoffmann-Nowotny study also shows that the husband's participation in domestic tasks is generally fairly lim-

126

Switzerland in Perspective

ited, mainly restricted to shopping and dishwashing. Although it increases with the number of children and when the wife is professionally active, it still remains far from equal (Hoffmann-Nowotny et al., 1984:192-97). A third clue to the distance between models and practices comes from the tension between the ideal and the possible in the realm of fecundity. This tension increases progressively as we descend the rungs of the social hierarchy. In the 1968 Geneva study, 12 percent of the high-revenue families estimated that they would not be able to afford their ideal of three children or more, a proportion rising progressively to 60 percent among those with low revenues (Kellerhals, 1974:471). In the 1974-78 Geneva study, we found that projected fecundity among those who desired three or more children was noticeably more stable over time at the level of managers (about 75 percent) than at the working-class level (about 50 percent) (Kellerhals et al., 1982:206). Finally, the actual division of decision-making power does not quite follow the intended pattern. According to data from the longitudinal Geneva study, at the beginning of a marriage and no matter what the educational level of the wife, partners systematically say (in almost nine out of ten cases) that major decisions (important purchases, savings, children's education) should be divided equally. Decisions about the husband's work "only concern him" in 85 percent of the cases, without variation, depending on the wife's status. The only variation according to status concerns decisions about the wife's work: The more her socioprofessional status rises, the more she judges that she alone should decide. When we examine what people actually do two years later, we find coadministration actually practiced in only 50 percent of the cases. In the other cases, it is not, however, always the man who decides; we find a certain alternation of influence according to the realm of the decision (cf. Herbst, 1954). Although they are not directly comparable with the above, HoffmannNowotny's findings are not contradictory to the Geneva results. For decisions, we see a sort of mixture between codecision (for vacations, for example) and sectorialization (those concerning the husband's profession, food expenses, etc.). The wife's degree of influence does not seem to be affected by the number of children in the family. Comparison with the 1970-71 study (Held and Levy, 1974) shows, however, that in ten years the requirement for codecision has been perceptibly reinforced. The sectorialization model (to each spouse his or her areas of decision), which had an especially strong impact in the rural areas, is evolving progressively toward a preference for equality (Held and Levy, 1974:147-49; Hoffmann-Nowotny et al., 1984:174). Styles of Family Interaction Styles of family interaction vary even more than models of household organization, depending on the social origins of the spouses. In an in-depth study of 107 Swiss families living in Geneva (1982-84) we attempted to define this style according to three axes inspired by the literature on family interaction (cf.

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Reiss 1981; Olson and McCubbin 1983): cohesion, regulation, and integration with the environment (Kellerhals and Troutot, 1987). On the lower end of the social hierarchy, cohesion is more often based on similarity and fusion: Couples should have the same ideas, share the same spaces and the same times. The idea of consensus appears to be very important. On the upper end of the social hierarchy, on the other hand, cohesion more often seems to be based on specificity and autonomy. The specific identity of each member is valued, and family interactions are based on exchanges of these differences rather than on any systematic similarities. Each person claims important realms of autonomy. The individual is more central than the feeling of "we-family." The 1974-78 Geneva study presents several findings that point in this direction: 93 percent of lower-middle-class newly wed wives stress the importance of strict fidelity more than those of the upper middle class (53 percent), and they are also more numerous in refusing the principle of resorting to divorce, except in extreme circumstances (56 percent versus 26 percent) (Kellerhals et al., 1982:112-13). Although we do not confuse these norms of the beginning of marriage with subsequent realities, they do illustrate the more "fusional" nature of family cohesion in lower-middle-class families. Other indicators from the same study reinforce this idea. Various scenarios describing problem situations on the theme of consensus and autonomy were presented to the spouses for resolution. Examples are: what to do in case of disaccord about a political engagement, participation in religious services, spending evenings (or even vacations) with friends rather than as a couple, birth control, and so forth. In each of the scenarios, the response could either privilege the wishes or opinions of the individual (e.g., by taking a political stand in spite of the spouse's disaccord) or, on the contrary, put the emphasis on consensus (e.g., by giving up that particular political action "because the other does not agree and these are things that involve the whole family"; giving up friends because the other does not like them; etc.). An autonomy/fusion index constructed on the basis of the responses shows that after four years of marriage 20 percent of the lower-middleclass women have "autonomist" attitudes, whereas this proportion is 45 percent for the upper-middle-class women. In this case, masculine attitudes follow the same profile: 32 percent autonomist among the lower middle class and 50 percent among the upper. The exigencies of "we-family" are considered to be more demanding than those of the individual and thus are given priority more often at the lower end of the social scale. On the second axis, that of the regulation of interpersonal relationships, the 1982 Geneva study shows that lower-middle-class families use a normative type of regulation more often than do others. Concrete, relatively rigid rules determine behavior: for example, * The mother should stay at home'';' The children shoul be in bed at nine o'clock"; or "No television until homework is done." Uppermiddle-class families, although they also use rules, rely more often on regulation through communication. Confronted with a problem, one discusses the situation, tries to understand its meaning, and tries to adapt a specific response to each

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Switzerland in Perspective

situation. In other words, rules are more abstract and may be applied with considerable variation. Flexibility is greater. These results are similar to Lautrey's (1980) for France. Socialization practices provide an important illustration of these differences in styles of regulation. In the 1982 Geneva study, couples were given a hypothetical problem to be resolved jointly: What should parents do to prevent their children from taking drugs? The means they suggested fall into four categories: 1. Control. Rules keeping the child away from potential access to drugs (not going ou in the evenings, avoiding areas known for drug dealing, not going away alone for weekends, etc.) 2. Motivation. Proposing activities that would interest the child and divert his eventua attraction for behavior judged to be deviant (sports activities together, music, etc.) 3. Relation. Improving affective relations between child and parents, or even betwee the parents themselves (deviant behavior is perceived in this case as resulting from an affective lack) 4. Moralization. Equipping the child with moral values (God, the community, etc.) tha show him the negative aspects of the behavior to be avoided In general, parents suggest two means, which form the following pairs: moralization/relation, relation/motivation, motivation/control, and control/moralization. The control element dominates in 21 percent of the upper-middle class families but in 52 percent of the lower-middle-class families. The relation element dominates in 79 percent of the former, as opposed to 48 percent of the latter (Kellerhals and Valente, 1986:356). Here again, although we do not take attitudes for daily realities, the findings nevertheless illustrate the difference between normative and communicational regulation in families married an average of ten years. A third axis, the degree of the family's integration into its social environment, opposes withdrawal, which is more often found on the lower end of the social scale, and openness, which is more often found on the upper end. In the former, the family is suspicious of interactions with the outside, which seem to come at too high a cost, to threaten the cohesion of the group, or to be insufficiently controllable. Sticking close to home thus seems best. In families characterized by openness, on the contrary, frequent interactions with the outside appear to be a condition of good internal functioning: They provide pertinent information and "nourish" communication between spouses and with children. Although the combination of these three axes gives eight theoretical types of family, three are dominant. Shelter families, based on fusional cohesion, regulation mostly of the normative type, and a fairly closed attitude toward the outside, are found much more often among the lower than among the upper middle class. Reciprocally, Association families, based on cohesion by specificity, regulation that is mainly communicational, and great openness to the social environment, are more typical in upper-middle-class milieus. Families of

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the third type, Companionship, based on fusional cohesion, regulation that is mainly communicational, and clear openness to the exterior, are fairly equally distributed among the two social strata represented in the study. We must point out, however, that this study deals only with Swiss families and thus does not take into account the lowest rungs of the social hierarchy, occupied almost exclusively by foreign workers, who hold a large proportion of the least desirable industrial and service jobs.

STYLES OF INTERACTION AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE NORMS WITHIN THE FAMILY The interaction styles we have just described (leading to shelter-, association-, and companionship-type families) correspond to distinctive ways of conceiving the fair division of rights and duties among the members of the group. We examined this question in a 1982 Geneva study (Kellerhals, Coenen-Huther, and Modak, 1988), using problem-solving scenarios about sharing in the family, to see what criteria of justice were chosen. In shelter families, the fairness of exchanges is more often defined in terms of status. By this we mean that the relation between contributions and gratifications for a given person (e.g., a mother, a child, etc.) is seen as being just if it corresponds on the whole to what other people in a similar position in the local community would receive. According to the status principle, the role is more important than the person, and all of those who have the same position belong to the same category. For example, if the problem is to assist financially a father in need, all the children would be expected to contribute the same amount, whatever their incomes, "because they are all his children." With this idea of justice, an underprivileged situation (double workday for a woman, for example) might be tolerated simply because others in the neighborhood do the same. The relative predominance of the status principle might be interpreted as a reflection of the importance shelter-type families place on consensus. Their social position, often unfavorable, may lead them to withdraw from the community and to consider the family group as central for the life of its members. Since the status principle provides clear boundaries, permits the avoidance of negotiation, and insists on tradition, it seems well adapted for finding rapid and legitimated solutions to questions concerning the division of duties and gratifications in the group. In the association type of family, we more often find a second principle of justice, the contract. With this principle, a situation is considered just if the actors have voluntarily accepted it according to decision-making procedures judged to be legitimate. The central idea is thus rational negotiation of rights and duties; being in agreement defines that which appears just. The difference

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with the preceding principle is that the person (and not the categories to which he or she belongs) is considered in the comparisons. The solutions retained for a problem of distribution thus vary according to the person, as a function of a particular balance of costs and profits. These costs and profits are themselves calculated according to scales to which the actors agree. These criteria are more often universalistic rather than particular to the family world. The feeling that a situation is just or unjust thus does not come from external comparisons but rather from the feeling that one might or might not be able to discuss the division of rights and duties in the family, as well as from the feeling that it would be possible to change it if necessary. This contract principle seems particularly adapted to families for whom it is very important to protect individual identities and who conceive of group cohesion as a result of the exchange of personal specificities. A third principle—the effect—appears relatively more often in companionshiptype families. Here, what is just is defined neither by the origin of the rights (contract) nor by tradition (status) but by the consequences of a given division of rights and duties. The distribution is considered just if it brings about positive consequences for the group or for the individual, no matter what the merits or the social identities of the actors. The example here concerns two sisters, one of whom has performed a task more efficiently than the other. Those operating according to the effect principle would pay the sisters equally, not because they have equal merit or because they are sisters but because equality is supposed to limit conflicts and encourage mutual affection. Categories are thus less important than the person, but the difference with the contract principle is that the determinant criteria are those peculiar to the family. This principle seems especially well adapted for families who, because of the emphasis they place simultaneously on family life as such and on relations with the outside, frequently have problems of internal cohesion.

TYPES OF FAMILY AND DIVORCE To conclude the description of types of family interaction according to the socioeconomic status of the couple, we might ask if some are more susceptible than others to end in divorce. As we saw in the first section, divorce rates vary considerably by region. We can complement this macrosocial analysis with some indications as to the microsocial determinants of divorce. The cohort analyzed in the 1974-78 longitudinal Geneva study was reexamined in 1984 to see which of the couples had divorced ten years after their marriage. Four hypotheses as to the causes of divorce were tested. According to the first hypothesis, divorce is a result of deficient socialization, as measured, for example, by poor family climate during childhood, parents' own divorce, and precocious marriage. The second hypothesis sees divorce as the result of a lack of sufficient socioeconomic resources for realizing a model (often fairly traditional) of marriage. Indicators here are low economic and educational levels.

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The third hypothesis considers divorce as the result of a lack of consensus between the spouses, causing sources of conflicts and dissatisfaction. Thus, heterogamy of age, religion, or social status could predispose a marriage to rupture. The fourth hypothesis, in contrast with the other three, does not look for lacks. It locates the "cause" of divorce in a "modernist" model of marriage in which the spouses demand much more autonomy and insist less on the duration of the union or on its institutionalization than in the traditional model. Indicators for this fourth interpretation could be premarital cohabitation, little importance accorded norms of marital fidelity and duration, emphasis on the necessity for a double-career family, and primacy of the conjugal relation over the family group as such. What are the results when we test these hypotheses? For the first, it appears that age at marriage plays a role only if it is very low (less than 20 years), that family climate during childhood is important only if it was judged to have been very bad, and that divorce of the parents is not correlated as such with that of the child. The hypothesis concerning inadequate socialization thus operates only marginally, in rather extreme situations. The same is true of the hypothesis concerning lack of resources. Although we do indeed find a divorce rate two times superior to the mean among families of unskilled workers (47 percent versus 21 percent), the correlation is practically null among men of other professional groups. Among women we see a more curvilinear trend; divorce rate is low among white-collar employees but increases sharply when the women have superior socioeconomic resources (university education, for example). Lack of resources thus operates only in very unfavorable situations. Nor does the third hypothesis play much of a role in divorce. Difference in age (even when the woman is the elder) is unimportant, social status heterogamy plays a clear role only in the rare cases where the man is of much lower status than the woman, and difference of religion at baptism is of relatively little importance. The fourth hypothesis seems, on the contrary, better sustained. Divorce is appreciably more frequent in cases in which couples had lived together before marriage, when there is little accent on fidelity and duration, and when the couple prefers to wait a few years before having a child. Norms concerning the organization of work (dual career or not) have no discriminating effect for men but a fairly clear effect for women: Those who, in 1974, planned to keep on working after having a child were notably more numerous among the divorced by 1984. Canonic discriminant analysis results in the following essential factors of divorce for both spouses: primacy of the couple over the family, followed by premarital cohabitation and professional status. The latter, however, operates negatively for men while being in positive correlation for women (Kellerhals et al., 1985:816-23). These results thus seem to limit greatly the usefulness of the "deficit models" in explaining divorces among the younger generation in Switzerland. Separation should rather be seen as a result of transformations in the model of marriage and more specifically of changes toward greater emphasis on association rather than on community.

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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION In summary, we find that in the last 20 years the Swiss family has undergone important transformations, as manifested by lowered marriage and fertility rates, increased divorce, and the entry of more married women into the work force. The only difference with the other European countries is the markedly lower rate of children born outside of marriage. In this context of rapid change, styles of family interaction show considerable diversity, depending to a large extent on the socioeconomic resources of the family (and especially on the socioprofessional level of the wife). In lower-middle-class families there predominates a mode of internal cohesion accentuating consensus and fusion, a certain closedness toward the environment, and rigid interpersonal regulation (especially where masculine and feminine roles are concerned). Upper-middle-class families, in contrast, tend to put more emphasis on the autonomy and the specificity of their members, an openness toward the outside, and on flexible modes of regulation. These tendencies, observed during the years 1976 to 1986, will probably change in turn in the years to come. The "new" styles of marriage, characterized by a certain accent on the autonomy of each of the spouses, on dual professional careers, and on the preeminence of "we-couple" over "we-family," are statistically associated with a notably higher divorce rate. It no longer seems possible to explain divorce in contemporary Switzerland with "deficit models": Lack of economic or cultural resources, problems associated with heterogamy, and inadequate socialization only explain a small proportion of the marital ruptures. High rates of divorce lead to the increasing importance of monoparental and reconstructed families, underlining the necessity for studies—for the moment almost nonexistent—of the family networks formed by the circulation of children between their fathers and mothers and of the systems of rights and duties associated with them. This endeavor would not only fill some gaps left by analyses based solely on the nuclear family but would also let us make contact again with the conceptual and empirical richness of the anthropological tradition. NOTES The authors thank Mary Haour-Knipe for the translation of this text from French to English. 1. The total marriage rate is an artificial index, calculated for a given year and corresponding to what the marriage rate would be if the annual rate remained unchange It is calculated by adding first marriage rates (in this case, for each sex) for the years in question. 2. Unless otherwise indicated, the figures cited are from the Federal Office of Statistics. 3. See note 1 for a definition of this index. 4. Ibid. 5. Data from Blanc (1985).

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6. Because of changes in definition, comparative analysis of labor force statistics is not possible for the years preceding 1950. Data are gathered in the decennial population census and estimated for intervening years. Our analysis here is limited to census years. 7. Specifically, the number of divorces in a given year (N) divided by the number of marriages in the year (N — 10). 8. The 1980 federal census is the only one to provide data concerning nonmarried couples in Switzerland. Some 3.9 percent of all couples were listed as unmarried for that census, but the Federal Office of Statistics considers this an underestimation. A certain number of cohabitants may have declared themselves as cotenants rather than as couples. In 1982 the corresponding percentage was 6.2 percent in France (Audirac, 1986), although this figure is also considered to be an underestimation. 9. For example, salesclerk or typist. Vocational training is required for almost all work in Switzerland, including all but the most menial jobs. Thus "without professional qualifications" represents the very bottom of the ladder. Differences in educational and employment systems make translating socioeconomic categories difficult. In the discussion that follows, we have grouped various definitions used in different studies into two loosely defined categories: lower middle class (industrial and clerical workers, service employees, etc.) and upper middle class (professionals, large business owners, managers and executives, etc.). Generally speaking, the former category implies required education plus vocational training, whereas the latter implies at least some university education. 10. An educational level between that of the end of junior college, for example, and higher university. Examples would include elementary school teachers and registered nurses. 11. We note, however, that in the subcategory of manual workers (no professional qualifications) the proportion of women planning to have at least three children rises to 33 percent.

REFERENCES Audirac, P. -A. 1986. "Crise du mariage ou crise du couple?" Dialogue 92:5-9. Bassand, M., and J. Kellerhals. 1975. Families urbaines etfecondite. Geneva: Georg. Blanc, O. 1985. "La population active." In Les Suisses vont-ils disparaitre? Bern and Stuttgart: Haupt. Gilliand, P. 1984. "Fecondite et reproduction. Evolution seculaire en Suisse et situation actuelle dans les cantons." In Families en rupture. Pensions alimentaires et politique sociale, ed. P. Gilliand. Lausanne: Realties Sociales. Girard, A. 1964. Le choix du conjoint. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Collection INED. Held, T., and R. Levy. 1974. Die Stellung der Frau in Familie und Gesellschaft. Eine soziologische Analyse am Beispiel der Schweiz. Frauenfeld and Stuttgart: Verlag Huber. Herbst, P. 1954. "Conceptual Framework for Studying the Family—Family Living Patterns of Interaction." In Social Structure and Personality in a City, ed. O. A. Deser and S. B. Hammond. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Hoffmann-Nowotny, H. -J., F. Hopflinger, Kiihne, Ryffel, andErni, eds. 1984. Planspiel Familie. Familie, Kinderwunsch und Familienplanung in der Schweiz. Diessen hofen: Ruegger. Hopflinger, F. 1984. "Kinderwunsch und Einstellung zu Kindern." In Planspiel Familie.

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Familie, Kinderwunsch und Familienplanung in der Schweiz, ed. H. -J. Hoffmann-Nowotny et al. Diessenhofen: Ruegger. Hopflinger, F. 1987. Wandel der Familienbildung in Westeuropa. Frankfurt and New York: Campus. Kellerhals, J.; J. Coenen-Huther, and M. Modak. 1988. Figures de Vequite: la construction des normes de justice dans les groupes. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Kellerhals, J.; N. Languin; J. -F. Perrin; and G. Wirth. 1985. "Statut social, projet familial et divorce: une analyse longitudinale des ruptures d'union dans une promotion de manages." Population 6, no. 40:811-27. Kellerhals, J.; J. -F. Perrin; G. Steinauer-Cresson; L. Voneche; and G. Wirth. 1982. Manages au quotidien. Inegalites sociales, tensions culturelles et organisation familiale. Lausanne: Pierre-Marcel Favre. Kellerhals, J.; J. -F. Perrin; andL. Voneche. 1977. "Switzerland." In Divorce in Europe, ed. R. Chester. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Social Sciences Division. Kellerhals, J., and G. Steinauer-Cresson. 1976. "Systeme de marche, classes et systemes de manage—analyse de trois ensembles normatifs." Revue Suisse de Sociologie 2, no. 3:19-63. Kellerhals, J., and P. -Y. Troutot. 1986. "Milieu social et types de familie: une approche interactive." Annales de Vaucresson 26, no. 1:91-108. Kellerhals, J., and L. Valente. 1986. "Interactions familiales et styles de controle de la deviance." Deviance et Societe 10, no. 4:341-61. Kellerhals, J., and P. van Keep. 1973. "Normes de role feminin et division du travail dans la familie urbaine." Paper presented at the Second Congress of the Swiss Sociological Association, Geneva. Lautrey, J. 1980. Classe sociale, milieu familial, intelligence. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Levy, R. 1984. "La 'Realite statistique' du divorce. Praticiens et sociologues face aux chiffres. In Families en rupture. Pensions alimentaires et politique sociale, ed. P. Gilliand. Lausanne: Realites Sociales. Montandon, C. 1987. "Pratiques educatives, relations avec l'ecole et paradigme familial." In Entre parents et enseignants: un dialogue impossible? Vers Vanalyse sociologique des interactions entre la familie et l'ecole, ed. Montandon and P. Perrenoud. Paris/Frankfurt/New York: Peter Lang. Neury, J. -E. 1985a. "Divorces et remariages de personnes divorcees en Suisse, depuis 1967." In Les families d'aujourd'hui. Paris: Association Interriationale des Demographies de Langue Francaise. Neury, J. -E. 1985b. "Natalite et fecondite." In Les Suisses vont-ils disparaitre? Bern and Stuttgart: Haupt. Olson, D., and H. I. McCubbin. 1983. Families: What Makes Them Work? Beverly Hills: Sage. Reiss, D. 1981. The Family's Construction of Reality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Roussel, L. 1975. Le mariage dans la societe francaise contemporaine. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, Collection INED. Roussel, L. 1987. "Deux decennies de mutations demographiques (1965-1985) dans les pays industrialises." Population 42, no. 3:429-48.

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Troutot, P. Y., and C. Montandon. 1988. "Systemes d'action familiaux, attitudes educatives et rapport a l'ecole. Une mise en perspective typologique." In Qui maitrise l'ecole? Pratiques d'institutions et pratiques des acteurs, ed. P. Perrenoud and C. Montandon. Lausanne: Realties Sociales.

Two elderly women

Courtesy of the Swiss National Tourist Office, Zurich

8

Life Styles and Social Classes among Elderly People CHRISTIAN J. LALIVE D'EPINAY BEHAVIOR AND ETHOS Between human beings, on the one hand, and their behavior and acts, on the other, there is an important connecting link: culture. When an event occurs without warning in our life, it leaves us defenseless unless we can give it meaning and thus draw it into the circle of the known or understandable. To do this, we have to set it against the store of knowledge that we have built up in our lifetime and place the new event in relation to what has already happened. We can then give it a value and choose what appears to be the most appropriate from the large number of responses that our culture suggests to us. This interpretation is the polar opposite of the behaviorist stimulus/reflex model. The human demand for meaning makes us experience the stimulus as a problem to which various responses are possible (Bastide, 1968). We undoubtedly perform countless actions that are unthinkingly mechanical. For the most part, however, such routines are not biologically instinctive but result from the sociocultural labor of building up routines by establishing codes of behavior. Respect for the highway code or for rules of etiquette are two examples. But I had only to go to Latin America to discover that strict observance of Swiss driving habits (staying in one's own lane, for example) would inevitably result in an accident. (Berger and Luckmann [1965] construct their entire sociological theory on such premises.) Thus the behavior of human beings—as a system of attitudes and actions— is directly influenced by what men and women have assimilated of their society's culture in the course of their lives. Bourdieu (1979) speaks of "incorporated"

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culture to designate that part of the overall culture which has rooted itself in the individual and which to some extent shapes the body and determines one's appearance. In fact, it constitutes the essence of one's "sociocultural identity," a term synonymous with "ethos." The idea of the individual's continuity through time ("self-sameness") and that of a set of features shared with others (Erikson, 1980:109) converge in the concept of identity. This involves a dialectic between singling out and belonging: the individual ("I" as opposed to "you") and the collective ("we" as opposed to "they"). The concept of ethos refers more specifically to the dimension of belonging to the " w e " category of sociocultural identity. Ethos constitutes not only the map with which the individual finds his or her way in a given social territory (Jacobson-Widding, 1983:15), not only the compass that shows us the direction in which we are individually going, but also, so to speak, the Ten Commandments that teach us which way to go. Ethos not only indicates the means but also proposes the ends. We shall not at this stage study the formation of different types of ethos. It should be borne in mind that, while they give direction to behavior, they are themselves produced in and by social activity. According to Jacobson-Widding (1983:14), identity, in all its aspects, is the product of experiences lived through in situations of interaction. These build up the "store of knowledge" that guides future experiences and whose new components continue to form the crystal of identity. Identity always has the time dimension underlying it (cf. Luckmann, 1983), and so the process of formation is always open-ended. Another aspect of the formation of identity is the gap between the global culture of society and the culture incorporated by the individual, the latter never amounting to more than part of the former. As we have seen, internalization takes place in the course of experience and interactions. The latter occur through the social mediators between society and individuals, namely, the primary groups (Cooley, 1902, 1918; subsequently Sartre, 1960; Ferrarotti, 1983). These are in turn attached to society as a whole by secondary links such as a specific generation (which shares a period of history, a cycle of events), ethnicity, social and occupation circles, and in some cases, region (cf. Pellegrino, 1984), which brings us to the sharing of subcultures. It should already be pointed out at this stage that the types of ethos analyzed below are closely linked with "social circles" as well as with "the experience of a generation" (born before 1914). In addition, as they have a bearing on the organization of daily life, these types of ethos are directed toward dealing with problems resulting from a "specific stage in the life cycle": old age. Although our first objective is to show how the ethos (sociocultural identity) shapes daily life, our second and complementary objective is to indicate how the ethos may be empirically analyzed and theoretically defined as a specific combination of the relationship with time and the relationship with space, as a link between one's grasp of time and one's appropriation of space. From 1977 to 1983, we conducted research on the processes that marginalize

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the aged and make them dependent.l It was carried out in two regions of Frenchspeaking Switzerland: the central Valais, an alpine and semi-rural region; and Geneva, a canton-city. The population studied consisted of people aged 65 and over; a random sample population of 1,600 people, classified by region and sex, was asked to reply to a questionnaire containing, with a few exceptions, factual questions. One year later (1979), in the light of an initial analysis of the material collected, which yielded a taxonomy of the situations and living conditions of our population, 150 persons were selected from the first sample and asked to take part in interviews, which on this occasion were of a different type, since these people were requested not to answer questions but to tell us about their present lives. The question that led off the first interview concerned "what happened yesterday," and this prompted the individual to go gradually back in time. Altogether, 138 usable daily life records were collected in the course of 294 interviews lasting a total of 385 hours. We then studied the interpretation given to the situations lived through and the procedures used at this stage in a person's existence to reinvent daily life and to cope with anything that disrupted it.2 TEMPORALITIES, RULING CLASSES, AND WORKING CLASSES The ethos of the three social groups considered in this essay have several features in common, which become apparent when the groups are contrasted with the ruling classes. These distinctive common denominators are mainly expressed in attitudes toward time. The Position in the Life Cycle The ability to make plans, or to determine one's desires in the future and work for their fulfillment, has been shown to be unrelated to social status. On the other hand, unsurprisingly, it is closely related to the psychophysiological age of the individual. Wear and tear of the body and mind gradually reduce the time span for plans, first to the short term and then to the immediate future: She: We've come to the end of the road. He: We always hope to last out until the next New Year. Apart from that, the future— it's like time: there's no telling what will happen. (She is 86 and has just had an operat he is 80.) Such ideas expressed by working-class people are likewise to be found among the middle classes, when the feeling prevails that the end is near. Correspondingly, whatever their social class, people in good physical and psychological health see their future in several stages: After the present, which is characterized by the fact that they do not feel old, will come old age and the gradual loss of

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their faculties. This will mean giving up some things and adjusting to others. After this stage, there are two possibilities. One is death, but a death that comes without warning and without delay. The other is very widely perceived in our society as a "bad way to d i e , " a state in which one is no longer really living, in which control of the body is lost and consciousness fades out. The observable difference thus resides not in the ability to make plans and so to project oneself into the future, but in the nature of the plans, and even more in the meaning associated with them. The continuation or cessation of professional activity does not, however, constitute the distinctive criterion. For mountain dwellers, retirement has little meaning, even if reaching the age of 65 and receiving an old-age pension allows one to " d o in two days what you used to do in o n e . " Small shopkeepers and artisans, like doctors and lawyers, enjoy a certain amount of flexibility in deciding when to retire. Mr. G., an engineer, was head of a large public enterprise. After retirement, he stepped up the amount of work he did for his commune, of which he will soon be mayor. This is what he told us: This sounds a bit ridiculous, but I have never worked so hard as I have since I retired (laughs). But it is very different work. It used to be professional work in a specific branch, although I did have contacts with a lot of people, well-known people, even well known internationally. . . . Whereas now my contacts are nearly always political figures, and nearly always in the canton of Geneva. . . . Do you think you will make another fresh start? Oh! Well—that I can't tell you now. As they say, we'll say. . . . My life is more or less behind me, you know. But all the same, one must keep one's feet on the ground and realize that there is a time when, well, it will be over. One can't go on forever starting again and starting again. After all, you reach a time when, you know, the body, the individual, gets tired, wears out. There comes a time when you can't go on and when you must have the sense to withdraw quietly and then perhaps find some sort of activity. I don't know what—you can read, you can join artistic societies. . . . If you can afford it, you can travel a little to see something of what is happening in the world. . . but this isn't, shall we say, an active activity anymore. . . . But you must always do something— you must always have something to do, because you obviously can't just sit around all day because then you won't live much longer. . . . The future doesn't belong to us; I can't tell you what I expect to do. Mr. G., who was 70 when we met him, sees various stages in the life of a pensioner. He, however, is now at the first of these, which is a continuation of his previous life. It consists of "active activity," which, in his terms, means "doing something for others." Others from the same circle will talk of "making oneself useful to society." Making oneself useful, no doubt, but not just anyhow or in just any position. Doing something for others, making oneself useful, means taking part in what society is becoming, helping to shape its history, influencing one's environment, and gaining recognition for having done so. In short, making oneself useful means having power. (It should be noted that Mr.

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G.'s language, which is confident and grammatical when he is speaking of his present life, becomes hesitant when he envisages its next stage: He has to force himself to have the "sense" to imagine giving up "active activity.") The idea of being useful is not lacking in the working classes. But it is expressed much more modestly, as an almost anonymous contribution ("I've done my bit"), or it is experienced not in the context of society but in the much smaller context of the family ("I'm still looking after the land," we are told by a countryman who has, however, already left it to his children, "because my sons are working in a factory, so I help them out."). A study of people's grasp of the time span of human life immediately reveals that one's links with history depend on one's position in society. In the ruling classes, the blueprint for life consists of maintaining a position as a historically active figure for as long as possible; in the working classes, history and social change are perceived as facts that are radically heteronomous to individuals, forces that can affect their lives to the extent of disrupting or destroying them but forces over which they have no control: "We can't do anything about"; "When times are hard, you just have to put up with it!" Relations with History We shall start with a small digression concerning the use of language. In our societies, considerable emphasis is placed on the individual, who asserts himself or herself everywhere as a subject endowed with autonomy (cf. Groethuysen, 1977; Dumont, 1983). This assertion, at the lexical level, is expressed by the use of " I . " However, if the subject is making a general statement, it takes on well-differentiated nuances and varies in scope according to the social circles involved. In the language of the working classes, this is shown by the frequent use, in French, of the neuter pronoun "one" (on) and its linkage with " w e " (nous, on. . .). The " I " of upper-class speakers shows a perception of self as an autonomous subject in all spheres of life. This assertion of the subject is general and universal; it implies awareness that one holds a position from which some control is exercised over people, things, and history, a position that commands the respect of others. They are not at all like Mr. G.; some never have been, and others have reached the stage at which it is common sense to recognize that one should step down a little. But the firsthand account of an upper-class person's life always bears witness to this familiarity with history, this proximity with those who make it—allusions to the international character of the family, the positions held by the children, the daughter who is working for Amnesty International, the son on mission for the International Committee of the Red Cross, another son who is doing a course in Silicon Valley or in New York. The minutiae of daily life are given to the research worker without hesitation by members of the working classes. Members of the upper classes, however— and more particularly men—seem here to be overcome by a strange coyness.

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They skip over daily routines and other trivial events like cats on hot bricks, conventionalize them, give oblique answers, and sidestep questions altogether if one tries to pin them down. Once, when made to talk about his habits, one of them broke off, saying, "Well, I don't think we'll go into lots of details which are quite unimportant." And again, later, concerning his eating habits: "We won't waste time on these culinary details, which are of no historical interest." In fact, this was the crux of the issue with these men; whereas the questions were about daily life and the transition to old age, they answered with a commemoration of the high points of their past and present lives, an assertion of their positions as active figures in history. The much more frequent use of on (corresponding only approximately to the English "you") in the working classes is, grammatically speaking, a way of speaking about oneself by depersonalizing and neutralizing oneself. It should not, however, be automatically classed as the opposite of the "I-subject," or associated with the notion of object, of a purely passive individual, reified and unable to do more than submit to things. The use of "you" seems to us to express a ploy for distancing oneself from the individual case, a way of protecting oneself by referring to the group to which one belongs. But if this way of concealing oneself behind the group is necessary, it is certainly because those who say "you" have the feeling that they occupy a subordinate, underprivileged position in terms of individual status—in short, that they belong to a group of "humble people," those who are faced with problems and changes imposed from outside and not chosen. Being subordinate means "putting up with" what is imposed on one, and "it takes guts" to do so. But the individual awareness remains, and every time an event is reported that is strictly associated with the speaker, the " I " reappears (Bisseret, 1974). For the men and women of the working classes, history comes from outside and imposes itself: It is a wind of change blowing from the towns to turn the village and its life upside down; the "authorities," planners and speculators transform the working-class districts; the chaos of modernity prowls around the small property owner's house. But there is still one area over which the workingclass individual has some power—oneself and one's little world. Courage is the courage to "put up with it"; there is artistry in this stoicism, this art of tricking history and events so as to soften their blows.

THE PROLETARIANS In speaking of the proletarians, I am referring not only to industrial workers but also to white-collar workers with low qualifications who do some manual work. All such workers are, and remain, proletarians to the extent that all they have to offer is their ability to work, and they reach retirement age without having accumulated any property (which distinguishes them from the small owners). Most of them are of rural origin; in the Valais they constitute the first

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generation of factory workers, and in Geneva they are those who settled there between the 1930s and the last war. Domesticated Space: Neighborhood, Friends, and Outlook For my shopping, I always go to the same places . . .; I see the same people. . . . I know two or three people. I see them in the street; we meet and go and have a drink. Nearly always in the same pub, at the Eaux-Vives. They're my friends. We have a bit of a chat. . . . They also live in this district. They're within a year or two of my age. They're retired From time to time we make plans and we take the wives out a bit. The working-class person with no "territory" (de Certeau, 1980:21) adopts the neighborhood as territory. He or she appropriates it through everyday habits: shopping, walks, the ways to the pub, the park, the lake, the routes that afford the best chance of meeting one's friends, fellow cardplayers or bowls players. "My" district is then not just an administrative section on the map but a place which I, the individual living in it and going about my daily business in it, have adapted to suit myself. We are speaking here of domesticated space. The neighborhood is public property, but it has been adapted to personal use. Yet the smallest thing can render this space, which was never owned, foreign again, hostile and wild. "With all these roadworks and alterations, they're completely messing up the neighborhood." Or: "Do you know what's happened to me? They've closed my pub." "They," or the authorities, those who make history, are constantly threatening to take apart the web of complicity that working-class individuals have built up in their district. From within this domesticated area, with its familiar daily rhythms, life in the outside world, which will be the subject of conversations with one's spouse, immediate circle and friends, is watched with passionate interest. Anyway, you can see from my face straight away that I enjoy life. . . . I watch things a great deal. When I'm with other people I don't talk much, but I listen and look on. The older you are, the more you want to see what is going to happen in the end, to everything, your wife, your family, Switzerland, the world, everything! The Past and Modernity: Body Language We were very poor at the time. My father died when I was two and a half. I had a brother of three and a half and another of eighteen months. My father met his death in the mountains. It wasn't easy at the time; there wasn't any insurance. This kind of narrative, in a thousand different versions, tells of daily life, the hard times of the past, which progress and social security have mitigated since the end of the war. The working classes tell of exploitations, long working hours,

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accidents, the flat with no modern conveniences, the wood that had to be collected on Sundays in the forest outside the town. Tales of doing the washing and the housework. Tales that spring from the memory of a body on which life has left its scars. There is no theory to be found here but rather, I would say, an ethnography of an area: precise and careful accounts of the details of life, a constant comparison between yesterday and today. ("Obviously, I have to talk about the things I have lived through. I can't say anything about what I haven't lived through.") There is little sign of nostalgia among these people. And if it were possible to start again, "I would have preferred to live nowadays." It is true that times are unsettled; it is true that they are surprised by the freedom of the younger generation, but in a kindly way, without blaming them, and sometimes even with a touch of envy: "In our day we found out by accident about having babies. . . . We were too stupid. . . . In our day, we weren't told anything. We were stupid; we were always scared; we didn't dare."

Stoical Hedonism The domesticated neighborhood, the setting of daily life, is a means to a twofold escape: by making little journeys and also by gazing at the pageant of life and history. This way of observing does not bother with philosophy or morality; it is down-to-earth and, as it were, empirical, being guided by concrete experience. Life is fragile, especially since it is now laden with years, but that is its principal value for the working classes. "Life, that's life!" Twice pushed out of the limelight of history, because of social position and because of age, the working classes note all the same that age has brought with it a distinct easing of the burden of daily life and has made it possible to look forward to small pleasures. And this at a time when current events tell constantly of violence and death. We have called this art of living, in its paradoxical relationship with the hard times of the past and the precarious life of the present, the stoical hedonism of the working classes.

SMALL OWNERS Small property owners do not constitute a whole social class in the classic sense of the term. They usually come from the lower middle classes, in which the office worker is in the majority but which also includes people from a heterogeneous collection of other categories: skilled workers, self-employed workers, some members of middle management. What distinguishes and unites them is their access to the ownership and enjoyment of a small piece of property after a life of hard work. That is the necessary (but not, it should be stressed, systematically sufficient) precondition for the development of this ethos.

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A Place of One's Own: the Kingdom of "Dunromin" The ambition of this sector of the population was to take over a small piece of property for their own use: a house, a garden, a bungalow, in some cases a fishing boat or even a caravan on a plot of land. The ambition has now been fulfilled: "In 1944 we bought a house. I had only 100 francs in my pocket. With my wife's help we managed to pay off the loan quickly. . . . " This place of one's own does in fact constitute one's whole life. The dream of the journey's end, once it has been fulfilled, becomes "Dunromin," a place overinvested in, the central focus of attention, of activity, and of the affection of its owner. This place is "home," a small kingdom that one does not like to leave and where one does not much like being disturbed. It is the couple's place, where the only welcome visitors are the children. Beyond the Garden Gate: The Threat The small kingdom, however well defended its frontiers, is still the object of veiled threats. It may even be that awareness of its vulnerability and the dangers besetting it have developed out of all proportion, once the dream has been achieved. For now it has to be looked after and protected. Fear wells up from these accounts of daily life. Unfortunately, there are so many horrid things, violence. . . . It frightens us. What terrible times we're living in. There's so much wickedness in the world—for example, all these holdups, all these murders. I find it horrible. It's frightening. Was it different before? Oh, yes, it was! Can you think of any events that have affected you? Yes, some things have affected me. . . . Famine in other countries, seeing children who look like skeletons. And it upsets me to know that you can't do much about it. You would like to change things. Anything that's criminal upsets me a lot. I think about thieves and burglars, people who get killed—why? You can't feel at home anywhere anymore, not when you're at home, nor in the streets, nor anywhere. . . . I won't go out in the evening anymore.

The way Mrs. U. has telescoped international events, criminal behavior and the threats of daily life is typical of this context of small property owners. Other threats affect what one would wish to be a haven of peace. They creep up from inside, from the body which is beginning to run down or which has always been weak. This source of trouble is inescapable, for it lies within oneself. And here we find the stoical attitude of the working classes again—"You have to put up with it"; "You just have to accept it"—but this time it focuses more narrowly on the troubles of body and mind, and no longer on one's position in

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society. The accounts of life given by this sector of the population are full of lists of complaints about physical and mental ailments. The Dualistic Vision of History Some threats are proof that the world has been corrupted. They, for their part, were brought up in times when effort, hard work and thrift reigned supreme. Our generation had to struggle. Young people don't want to struggle anymore. They want to get married when they're 20 and then get divorced. They think of nothing but sport. Some people complain because they have only the old-age pension and it's difficult for them, but after all, you've got to think of the future. It's only if you've worked for them that you can afford a few comforts when you retire. But some people are happygo-lucky—they never do a stroke of work! It's their own fault if they have nothing. A conservative civic sense compounds these virtues, the respect for order and established hierarchies, the apologia of a world claimed to exist yesterday and still living on in hearts and minds. We often go for walks with our grandchildren. They are obedient with their grandpa. You have to teach them to obey. We brought our children up strictly, and it was a good thing we did. They didn't loaf around in the streets. The eldest was a policewoman before she got married, the other a civil servant. I can't complain about the bosses; we always got on well. It was more the staff. Young people mustn't think they know everything either. The Church should still be the center of the village. I'm just speaking my mind, saying what comes to me. Things go too far today. . . . There's far too much slackness nowadays. The fear underlying these accounts then breaks out in diatribes against the present and in denunciations of the young/drug addicts/delinquents/foreigners. I was poor when I was a little girl. I had an unhappy childhood. I know what it is to be hungry. I had a mother who didn't like children. I was beaten. . . . So what I see nowadays, these girls who go off and become prostitutes or drug addicts. I'm against it. I think they are given too much help. . . . I don't do anything for drug addicts because, after all, / could have taken drugs, / could have gone on the streets, too. You've got to have some guts, I think; you've got to go and look for work, find something better to do than take drugs. A whole lot of things which shouldn't be here in Switzerland should be got rid of. I'll say no more. This dualistic view of history and of change has its counterpart in space: "Dunromin" is the place where the values of order and respect are preserved while the rest of the world is collapsing into decadence. This being the case,

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part of the daily life of the small property owner consists of defusing the threats by means of various exorcising rituals: cleanliness and hygiene, for example. This yields accounts of daily life full of flats to be spring-cleaned, furniture to be polished, trees to be pruned, and the like. But also recipes for "purifying the blood." In fact, physical cleanliness is next to godliness: "I don't bear no grudges, but when someone has done me dirty. . . . " The Dualistic Withdrawal The ethos of the small property owners is thus a dualistic ideology that shapes space, time and relations with other people. Space is divided into two. There is the "owned space" of the home, where the greatest part of investments and activities are concentrated and true values remain. Within this territory, small property owners assert themselves in the first person, saying " I " and " m e . " I move around royally; I am the master here and can impose myself as a tyrant. At the gate of my small realm begins "the rest of the world," made up of dangerous places where insecurity and chaos reign. If small property owners have to go there, physically or mentally, they change their identity, speaking of themselves in terms of "we-you," "we-the-ordinary-people" who "can't change anything." Modernity threatens true values, as it seems to them to threaten the small property so dearly and legitimately acquired. In a way, they feel betrayed by society and its authorities, which no longer know how to enforce respect for true values. Their nostalgia for the past nourishes a dream, which is repressed most of the time but which finds expression in certain outbursts. This is the dream of real leaders making a clean sweep, taking things in hand again, and establishing a Switzerland for the Swiss. THE MOUNTAIN PEASANTRY The peasantry in the mountains who concern us here constitute both a social class and a people in their own right. A class of landowning farmers in a country where there are no large landowners; a people of the Valais region where, only 40 years ago, they constituted half the population. The generation that we surveyed has its roots deep in the farming and the traditions of the Valais; but this generation has experienced the transitional period, the great excavations in the mountains, the industrialization of the valleys, the conversion of villages into tourist centers. Today, no more than 5 percent of the working population in the Valais are farmers. The identity of the peasant and the villager rests on the bedrock of the Catholic faith. Ninety percent of the farming community that we surveyed, men and women, go to Mass at least once a week. Whereas in the working class and among small property owners religion is contingent, a matter of individual choice, and does not therefore affect the ethos, here it permeates every dimension of

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life and of human convictions. "That's life!" was the supreme watchword of the other two working-class categories; here people say, "It's God's will." This implies that the earth we live on, time as we know it in everyday life, and historical time are all part of an order, a nomos of an infinitely greater cosmic nature (cf. Berger, 1967:54). The Patrimonial Space: "My Village" It also follows that space and time are structured by a sacred topology and chronology which emerge from the most commonplace accounts of daily life. In the afternoons I go out for walks with friends; we go as far as the chapel to say a prayer there. Or I go down to the village to see my sister-in-law who is a widow, too, and we have a chat—we have tea. She gives me news of my brother-in-law, who is a missionary in Formosa. ... Do you see that calendar? (waves her hand) He's the one who gave it to me. . . . At half past seven I go to Mass. It passes the time. Then I come back and watch television. Religion is at the heart of ordinary things, the organizing principle of basic categories of daily life and of identity, so that life becomes inconceivable without it: "If it weren't for that, I don't know. Sometimes I think about those poor people who have no faith, who have nothing to hold on to; it must be sad, that." The Church is certainly located "in the center of the village" here, and the village is the central place in which families have their roots. It is the first point of reference in one's representation of the world and of its main divisions. First comes my village, the setting of my identity, as opposed to the neighboring villages; then the valley; then the Valais with its villages, comprising all those who live, believe, and die as we do, as distinct from the "other lot," those who live below in the plains and the towns—in short, those who are modern. The space occupied by the village and its outlying areas may be called inherited space. Practically speaking, apart from individual private property, it is the householders of the village who collectively own grazing land, forests, and sometimes vineyards and maintain the irrigation networks (the bisses of the Valais). Mutual assistance is the rule at crucial times in the country calendar, and helping one's neighbor amounts to helping the village community rather than an individual. And, symbolically, the village incarnates society as God wished it to be. The Position in the Cycle of Life and Death Now we just have to wait for death: there's nothing else to wait for. What do you think about that? You're glad to come to the end of the road, as long as you're not a burden on your children. When you get too handicapped, you should take yourself off.

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We are all familiar with the expression "the end of the road." But in this particular group it is sometimes associated with waiting for and even wishing for death. Elsewhere, this expression was full of nostalgia for past life. In this context, it springs from two sources. The first of these is faith, which maintains that death is the threshold to another life and another time. I think about the next world a little. . . . I often tell myself, I'm getting nearer, I'm getting nearer. How long it will be, I don't know. When the time comes, I'll have to go like the others. I think about those who are the same age; I'll be joining them. How shall I put it? I'm a Catholic; I believe in the next world. Perhaps you're a Protestant yourself. But faith does not always compensate for the wear and tear of the body, the consequences of too hard a life, and we hear complaints, especially from women. If I had my time over again, I'd never do it. I've had a bellyful, I can tell you. . . . I have never had a day's pleasure. I've told God, I've told him he might as well come and fetch me, now that I'm not good for anything anymore! History from the World Outside The use of "we-you" in the language of country people relates to three specific determining factors of their identity: the family, the land and the village. This identity itself comprises an ontological dimension and a dimension that is sociohistorical. It is based primarily on the certainty that faith brings of the existence of an Order planned by God, to which the Church and tradition bear witness. But as regards everyday life, the identity expressed by "we-you" is opposed to ' 'they,'' "the powers that be," "the townees," ' 'that lot in Bern'' (the federal capital). Thus, it denotes a social status which, strictly speaking, is not that of a dominated class but of a class deprived of control over its own destiny, which is determined by dynamic forces emanating from the town and holding sway over the world of the villages. These forces just have to be accepted. This leads to the familiar "You have to put up with it" of the working classes. For the country dweller's ideal is to keep well away from the mainstream of history and to manage the village in such a way as to reproduce the basic cycle of the Nomos intended by God. Here again (but this time at the collective level of village civilization and no longer at the individual level), when history hits the village, it brings death. And this generation knows that it is the last of its kind: The herds are disappearing, there is no more harvesting, the farm working class is dying out. But their awareness of the decline of their civilization does not give them a tragic outlook on life. Change and modernity are undoubtedly measured first against a moral and religious yardstick: the lowering of moral standards, the lawlessness that is spreading from the towns to the villages, the shopkeeper who

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wants to keep his shop open during Mass, some people's unbelief, and especially divorce ("Can you believe it—we even had a divorce in the village last year."). It is hard to understand how people can live without faith, but that is the way it is! This initial perception of modernity is accompanied by another which, unlike it, is based on everyday experience. The country7 dweller here shares the point of view of the urban worker: In the old days, when I was young, we didn't have a kitchen, there was no drinking water, no electric lights, no roads. . . .During the winter [there were] only sleds. No doctor. . . . The winters were long; sometimes there was nothing left to eat towards the end. Material progress is appreciated by everyone. It has brought ease to a life that all say was too tough. Social security arrangements come from the town, but they are a tremendous help, and it is acknowledged that "good things," too, can come out of the town. The old-age pension in particular has both preserved and transformed an old custom whereby land and property were divided among the children when the parents felt their strength was running out. But the children assumed responsibility for their parents in exchange, and this burden was often a heavy one. The custom of early inheritance continues today, but the old-age pension enables the elderly to stay independent, especially since the country people own their houses and have vegetable plots and fruit trees. The Double Vision History, then, has struck the villages and condemned them. This is the generation of "the last of the Mohicans" (who in fact have also worked for change in their world). As in the case of small property owners, a spatial counterpart of their perception of history may be seen here. The village is the place where the sacred Nomos is preserved, the place where fundamental values are still observed; history and modernity come from elsewhere. But—and in this case unlike small property owners—country dwellers assess modernity from two quite different points of view. On the one hand, they judge it by their own moral standards, based on religious faith and this leads them to condemn the way in which changing morality transgresses the divine order. On the other hand, they perceive modernity through the daily experience of their own bodies, and from this angle it represents a real liberation. This double view of things thus leads to a contradictory conclusion ("It's a good thing and yet it isn't!") which can foster certain forms of psychic tension, especially among women. The latter, more frequently than men—and this may be traced to their subordinate position in the family and village structure— complain about the harsh life and brutal customs of the past. For some, however, material progress has come too late, and in their case liberation can be expected

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only through death (Lalive d'Epinay, 1986). But, as often as not, the contradiction becomes blurred in qualifications and compromise: In the old days, life was too hard. Nowadays, for young people, it's perhaps a little too easy. In a way, I think a bit more progress should be made. I think we should go on. But for myself, I can't; I'm too old. It's all very well for the young folk. CONCLUSION The working classes all perceive history as an exogenous reality. Even though they consider that they themselves have no control over society's time, in the span of life allotted to them history runs through their lives and impinges on them. Profound differences occur within this shared vision, and they lead to radically different ways of viewing the world and hence one's own place in it, of organizing one's daily life in it and of dealing with the events that happen in it. These differences are manifest mainly in ways of appropriating space, in the keys to interpreting social change and history, and consequently, in combinations of these. As regards patterns of space appropriation, and on the basis of the population sectors described above, we have distinguished: the owned space of "Dunromin," private property that has become a castle, fortified against the rest of the world; the patrimonial space, in which communal property is perceived as an indispensable extension of individual property and in which the sum of all property—the village and its outlying areas—constitutes the familiar territory; and the domesticated space of those who, having no property of their own, adapt part of the public space for their own use. As regards the keys for interpreting history, a radical difference is immediately apparent between value judgments and observations of an empirical nature. The normative viewpoint may have a variety of origins. We singled out two: the ethic of work and duty peculiar to industrial society in the first half of the century, on the one hand; on the other hand, rural Catholicism. The common denominator of these two viewpoints is a backward-looking dualism. The empirical viewpoint rests on first-hand experience over the years and on the study of its consequences for daily life. The accounts are primarily descriptive, with the evaluation coming last. The latter may then be based on several criteria (the most common being references to material things and money and also to changing customs) and may lead to a range of conclusions. The structure of each of the three types of ethos described here is a particular combination of the two main dimensions, as shown in Table 8.1. Naturally, these are not the only possible types of ethos to be found among the working classes. They are associated with and confined to the population groups that we surveyed. But it seems to us that the categories singled out by a process of induction might now help to guide research on hypothetico-deductive lines.

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152 Table 8.1 History and Space in the Configuration of the Ethos Private App)ropnation of space

Key to

Individual

Comrnunitanan

'Owned'

'Patrimonial'

Public

'Domesticated'

history:

E X 0 G Empirical/ E Descriptive N 0

Proletarian ethos E T H 0 S

u s N A T U R E

0 F T H E

0 F H I S Evaluative/ T Dualist 0 R Y

Ethos of small owners

M 0 U N T A I N P E A S A N T R Y

NOTES This essay is a revised and shortened version of a paper published in the International Social Sciences Journal 107 (1986):89-103, under the title "Time, Space and Sociocultural Identity: The Ethos of the Proletariat, Small Owners and Peasantry in an Aged Population." 1. This research was conducted by the Groupe Universitaire Genevois de Recherche Interdisciplinaire sur les Personnes Agees (Interdisciplinary University Research Group on the Elderly) of Geneva University, with the following members: C. J. Lalive d'Epinay, sociologist and project leader; H. M. Hagmann, demographer; O. Jeanneret, social and preventive medicine; J. P. Junod, geriatrics; J. Kellerhals, sociologist; L. Raymond, epidemiologist; and J. P. Schellhorn, statistician. The author particularly thanks J. Kel-

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lerhals, who helped to design and plan the research based on the firsthand accounts, and also E. Lazega and M. Modak, who took part in various stages of its implementation. 2. For further details on methodology, see Lalive d'Epinay et al. (1984:33-59, 30112) and also Lalive d'Epinay (1983).

REFERENCES Bastide, Roger. 1968. Preface to M. I. Pereira de Queiroz. "Reforme et revolution dans les societes traditionelles." Anthropos, vols. VII-XIX. Paris. Berger, Peter. 1967. The Sacred Canopy. New York: Doubleday. Berger, Peter, and Thomas Luckmann. 1965. The Social Construction of Reality. New York: Harmondsworth. Bisseret, Noelle. 1974. "Langages et identite de classe." L'annee Sociologique 25:23764. Bourdieu, Perre. 1979. La distinction. Paris: Editions de Minuit. Cooley, Charles H. 1902. Human Nature and the Social Order. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. Cooley, Charles H. 1918. Social Process. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, de Certeau, Michel. 1980. L'invention du quotidien. L'Arts defaire. Paris: Union Generate d'Editions. Dumont, Louis. 1983. Essais sur I'Individualisme. Paris: Seuil. Erikson, Erik H. 1980. Identity and the Life Cycle (reissue). New York: Norton. Ferrarotti, Franco. 1981. Storia et storie di vita: RomerLaterza e Figli. Glaser, Barney G., and Anselm L. Strauss. 1966. The Discovery of Grounded Theory. Chicago: Aldine. Groethuysen, Bernard. 1977. Origines de Vesprit bourgeois en France. Paris: Gallimard. (first edition: 1927) Jacobson-Widding, Anita, ed. 1983. Identity: Personal and Sociocultural, a Symposium Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell. Kohli, M. 1977. "Lebenslauf und Lebensmitte." KZSS 4:625-56. Lalive d'Epinay C. 1983. "Espace et 'image-action.' " In Espaces et Culture, ed. P. Pellegrino. Saint-Saphorin: Georgi. Lalive d'Epinay, C , et al. 1984. Vieillesses, situations, itineraires et modes de vie des personnes agees aujourd'hui. Saint-Saphorin: Georgi. Lalive d'Epinay, C. 1986. "Depressed Elderly Women in Switzerland, An Example of Testing and of Generating Theories. Gerontologist 25, no. 6:587-604. Luckmann, Thomas. 1983. "Remarks on Personal Identity: Inner, Social and Historical Time." In Identity: Personal and Sociocultural, a Symposium, ed. Anita Jacobso Widding, pp. 67-91. Stockholm: Almquist and Wiksell. Pellegrino, Pierre, ed. 1984. Espaces et culture. Saint-Saphorin: Georgi. Plummer, K. 1983. Documents of Life. London: Allen & Unwin. Robbins, Richard H. 1973. "Identity, Culture and Behavior." In Handbook of Social and Cultural Anthropology, ed. John J. Honigmann. Chicago: Rand McNally. Sansot, Pierre, et al. 1981. Les donneurs du temps. Albeuve: Castella. Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1960. "Question de methode." In Critique de la raison dialectique. Paris: Gallimard.

A group of young cyclists in the canton of Lucerne Courtesy of the Swiss National Tourist Office, Zurich

9

Education in Switzerland CLAUDIO CASPARIS Switzerland's geographical position and historical development have produced a heterogeneous country with three major linguistic and cultural regions—German, French, and Italian—plus a small region of Romanche speakers. With a clear demographic majority, the German language group dominates the largest part of the country. As a result of labor shortages since the 1950s, many foreign workers immigrated to Switzerland from Southern Europe with their families, bringing still further linguistic and cultural diversity. Children with a foreign mother tongue are 12 percent of all students in Swiss schools (Federal Office of Statistics, 1987b:69-71). Historically, the Swiss Federation grew gradually over a period of five centuries, from three cantons to the present total of 26. The alliances of initially more or less autonomous states occurred for defensive reasons and not because of a common social or cultural background. Although the originally high level of cantonal autonomy has decreased through time, it remains a constant issue in the debates on new laws and regulations. A country of only 6.6 million inhabitants in the heart of Europe with a very small primary sector and an extensive dependence on exports has a limited capacity to honor the autonomy of 26 culturally and geographically different cantons. Culture and education have thus become the main fields in which the cantonal governments and, to some extent, the local authorities enjoy and preserve a measure of autonomy. Despite this cantonal autonomy in educational matters, the federal Constitution of 1874 specified that Switzerland must provide compulsory schooling for its young, free of charge. The number of compulsory elementary school years was fixed at eight, and for physical education a set of special rules was laid down

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(Egger, 1984:13). Today these rules are considered somewhat anachronistic, but nonetheless gymnastics is still considered of national importance in preparation for military service for males. In connection with the federal accreditation of medical doctors as well as the running of the Federal Polytechnical Institutes (ETHZ/EPFL), the Confederation sets guidelines for admission to medical schools and the polytechnics. With the intention of introducing uniformity in the training of arts and crafts, originally governed by the medieval guild system, federal authority was extended, and laws now regulate vocational, industrial, commercial, and agricultural training. Control over elementary and higher academic schooling, however, lies with the cantonal governments. Schools at the academic secondary level must, of course, satisfy a federally set standard in order to issue certificates of maturity that will qualify students for medical and polytechnical schools. All universities are public and run by the cantons. The Confederation financially supports academic research and runs two polytechnical institutes. Vocational and other postcompulsory schooling is paid for and organized by the cantons even though federal laws and guidelines regulate this kind of training. The local school authorities have some small influence on elementary schools, the character of which will vary depending on the historical background of each canton. It can also be considered indicative of cantonal autonomy that the federal government does not have a Minister of Education and that educational issues are dealt with by the Ministry of the Interior. In such a small country, this high level of educational autonomy, especially concerning compulsory education, is bound to engender problems. Families moving only a few miles away to another canton often have to put their children into a very different school system. Although popular sentiment supports a reduction of such differences, in practice fears are constantly voiced of a federal "dictatorship" in school matters. Despite this, the cantonal ministers of education have signed a number of agreements to reduce the most problematic differences. But because of strong parliamentary opposition, these agreements have not been ratified by many cantonal governments. The strategy is therefore to go slowly. Only recently has it been possible to force a minority of cantons—which, however, contain a majority of the population—to make their school year more uniform by switching its beginning from spring to autumn. THE SWISS SCHOOL SYSTEM In view of all this, it is not surprising that there is no uniform Swiss school system. There are nonetheless some common denominators, although it is true that the German cantons have more difficulty in coordinating their educational systems than cantons in the French-speaking regions. Many cantons did experience a similar development. The basic structure of education also has similar-

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ities with other European educational systems, although, on the whole, structural developments in post-war Switzerland have stagnated comparatively. Here, briefly, are some of the general structural characteristics of the Swiss school system (see Figure 9.1). The next part will provide more details about the way the system operates. Preschool, or kindergarten, is voluntary and lasts one or two years. Usually, the cantons recommend that the community provide this preschooling, and except for very rural areas, most children attend. The program develops basic skills such as social behavior, speech and movement but not reading or writing. Kindergarten is an autonomous school: On one hand, it leads up to and helps to prepare for primary school; on the other, it has its own independent curriculum, teacher training colleges, inspectors, and local school commission. Even in kindergarten there is a general school ideology in which compensatory education is not of central importance, and only in some larger cities with high proportions of foreigners are there special kindergartens that stress the acquisition of the local language. Although parents are encouraged to come and visit the classroom occasionally, there is little actual parental input. Also, between kindergarten and primary school, the next level, there is little cooperation; the kindergarten usually stands alone in a neighborhood, and its teachers are more poorly paid. Primary school marks the beginning of compulsory education. In general the local authorities select the teachers, pay them, and finance most of the necessary infrastructure; the cantons pay the rest. The curriculum concentrates on the basics (reading, writing and mathematics), with other subjects rounding them off. Depending on the canton, a second language (French or German) may be added during the last two years. The duration of primary education varies from canton to canton: for most, it is six years but for some as few as five or even four. At its end, most cantons have a selection process that controls admission to the different types of lower secondary school. Lower secondary school lasts for the rest of compulsory education. For most cantons this means three years; for others, four or five years. In general, four types of schools accommodate the students at the end of the selection process, with programs varying from lower academic to secondary to upper primary to special schools. Tracking into distinctly different programs at this stage makes it difficult to change over from one type of school to another. In particular, once a choice has been made, the step upward to a higher type of school can seldom occur without the loss of a school year. Two cantons do without selection altogether and have comprehensive schools that stream the children in three major subjects. There is no school-leaving examination at the end of compulsory schooling. Upper secondary education is clearly geared either to an academic career or to vocational training. The schools are mostly run by the cantons and are free of charge. The academic secondary schools, the Gymnasium, get their pupils at the end of primary or lower secondary school. Upper secondary school finishes with an examination called matura or maturite, which is required for admission

Figure 9.1 The Basic Structure of the Swiss School System

*) compulsory schooling to grade 8 or grade 9

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to university. Depending on the student's personal interest or planned field of concentration, he or she must choose a specialization in upper secondary school. At this point the student is usually around age 15. Concentrations may include ancient languages, Latin plus modern languages only, math and science, or commerce. The schools must fulfill specific norms in order to have the right to issue federally accepted maturity certificates. In some cantons, the teacher training colleges offer an alternative to the academic secondary schools. They last a year longer, but for certain fields the degree counts as both a certificate of maturity and a teacher's diploma good for primary school teaching. In other cantons, teachers are trained only after obtaining their maturity certificate. Vocational and professional schools that receive the largest proportion of students from the lower secondary levels are either part- or full-time schools. The part-time schools supplement the apprenticeship that young people undertake in order to acquire a qualified occupation in arts, trades and crafts. The fulltime professional schools lead to certificates qualifying for professional careers. A small proportion of graduates may continue their training in technical colleges or higher professional schools, usually after a period of practical professional work. The degrees conferred by these colleges and schools are slightly lower in prestige than the university degrees, but they open doors to nearly equivalent professional positions. The universities and polytechnics are not distributed evenly in Switzerland. Most lie in the old cultural centers such as Basel, Zurich, Bern and Geneva or have religious roots such as Fribourg. In relation to population, French Switzerland has more universities than the German part. Although there were plans for two new universities in German Switzerland during the boom years of the late 1960s, the projects were rejected in the late 1970s by a majority of the population in both cantons. All universities are public and are both financed and run by the respective cantons. The cantons with no university must reimburse the others according to the number of students they send to them. This financing allows Swiss students to pay only a nominal tuition fee that covers only a minor part of the real cost of their education. Most Swiss schools are public, but there are some private schools that offer alternative education. The few private schools at the primary level (2 percent; Federal Office of Statistics, 1987b:22) have special educational aims, for example, Rudolf Steiner and Montessori. At the advanced secondary level, private schools are more numerous (6 percent; Federal Office of Statistics, 1987b: 28), and at this level they are socially compensatory. That is, affluent parents send to them offspring who have failed or might fail in the public schools. In this way the young people are virtually assured of completing their educational experience with their career chances intact. This trend gets especially strong higher up, for example, at the upper secondary level. Here, a total of over 9 percent of all pupils attend private schools that confer certificates of maturity. Traditionally, these schools for the so-

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Figure 9.2 Enrollment at Different Levels of the Educational Pyramid

cial elite grew out of convent schools and were begun to provide recruits for the church, but today they have mostly been secularized. There is, too, the beginning of the creation of all-day schools for the children of working parents. These schools have arisen in response to special social changes: the rise in the number of single and/or working parents. For the most part, however, public schools still strongly cater to the traditional image of the family, with a non-working mother who is available to bring the child to school in the morning, provide him with lunch at home, and accompany him to and from school again in the afternoon; the father returns to the family table fo lunch as well as dinner. In actuality, school hours provide serious impediments to a mother's entry into the labor force. Nonetheless, divorce, working mothers, short lunch breaks and growing distances between home and work are all affecting the traditional image. THE EDUCATIONAL PYRAMID In most Swiss cantons, the passage from primary school to the lower secondary level can only be described as selective, and moreover the lower secondary level largely determines the professional path that youngsters will be able to embark upon after leaving school. (See Figure 9.2.) Most white-collar and career-oriented professions, as well as all academic positions, require at least the advanced level of secondary education. This is one reason why there is a high demand for advanced education, and in most cantons it is not satisfied liberally. Therefore, the types of schools that follow primary schooling and offer advanced standing all employ some sort of selective admissions process. In general, it is the more advanced type of school itself that defines what sort of pupil it chooses to admit.

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On the basis of subsequent success rates, it must be acknowledged that the selection processes used are quite well suited as entrance criteria. The problem is, though, that selection made at the age of 10 or 12 is only of limited longterm reliability, and the possibility for changeover is small. Thus, the differences between children tend to become unduly accentuated. Still, this rather flawed system appears to work well, since the public in general believes in the school's assessments and selection decisions. It believes that a bright child will make his way and that school will develop his inherent talents. Given this, it is clear that issues such as compensatory education and even equal rights for boys and girls receive little attention and rarely manage to mobilize special action. Some private schools thrive particularly on this ideology, catering to the affluent and giving their children a second or third chance after they have failed in the public system. An additional compensatory element is a well-developed system of further schools and courses that permit professional specialization after vocational training has been completed. This basic educational ideology naturally tends to replicate the class and income structure. One of the main factors of social mobility among the Swiss is probably the influx of foreign workers into the country. Their children arrive with cultural and linguistic handicaps that diminish their chances of entering the more advanced secondary schools, as well as the professions. These categories of pupils are therefore overrepresented in the lower types of school, and the Swiss get "pushed up" (Federal Office of Statistics, 1987b:68). If the lower secondary level is often a selective one, this is not true for two cantons, Geneva and Ticino. Both have comprehensive-type schools at this level and a more open school system in general. The reasons for this openness are not very clear but probably have to do with a more permissive society in general and, in Geneva, the social democratic majority in the government at the time the comprehensive system was introduced. Both cantons began turning toward the comprehensive secondary system during the 1960s, when this movement was strong in Europe. Whatever its causes, this openness contributes to the very high proportion of students in academic secondary schools, that is, 39 percent and 30 percent, respectively, for these cantons, compared with the Swiss average of 17 percent (Federal Office of Statistics, 1987b: 71). For Ticino this is especially noteworthy because the canton does not even have a university of its own. Given the ideology that governs selection for the secondary level, the dropout rate is generally low. This holds true even for the academically oriented schools, although it is highest for universities. Once the students are accepted into a particular school, they are expected to work hard, but the atmosphere is not competitive and there are few selective hurdles to master. INSIDE THE SYSTEM: SCHOOLS AT DIFFERENT LEVELS Having described some of the more structural aspects of the educational system, we will try to show here how the schools at different levels actually function. This description is of course a generalization, considering the differences among

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the 26 cantons, and the following picture applies mostly to eastern and central Switzerland; but parallels can be drawn to the other regions. On the whole, from an administrative viewpoint the school system works efficiently. Teachers are treated like bureaucrats, being trained, hired (usually with tenure), and paid to teach a certain number of lessons a week. Extra work such as the care of the library, of sports equipment, or of biological collections gets paid extra. Teachers are only required to be present when they teach. Although their performance is periodically monitored by the local school authority and the cantonal school inspectors, they have no advisers, and cooperation between teachers even of the same grade is not the rule. The curriculum and school texts are issued by the cantonal government, having been decided upon (along with other teaching materials, experimental classes, school laws, teacher training) by a commission nominated by the cantonal parliament. The seats on this commission are filled by representatives of the political parties in proportion to their strength, so that educational policy in the cantons may reflect the programs of the dominant parties. There is no headmaster or principal with whom a teacher can discuss curriculum, and only large schools and the academic secondary schools have a rector to take care of administrative matters. Schools have no sports teams, and there are few events in which a whole school participates. As a result, there is seldom an "esprit de corps" among teachers, and few schools have a definable identity. In view of this, it is hardly surprising that conformity among pupils is highly valued. Although individualized teaching has been advocated by school experts for years, the principle is hard to observe, given the ideology that all pupils must be treated equally. If some students do not learn when the rest do, this is usually considered the child's fault, not the teacher's. Fortunately, this description does not hold true everywhere and for all teachers. There are excellent teachers who are dedicated to teaching their students and not just imparting information. They are innovative and active in various school projects. But because the system does not promote such attitudes and educational development is centralized and bureaucratic, most innovations take a long time to be put into practice. Thus, in the land of Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi and Jean Piaget, school is still very much centered on developing cognitive skills and does not pay much heed to the laws of developmental psychology. The cantons decide how and where their teachers are trained, and most cantons either have their own institutions for teacher training or enter into agreements with neighboring cantons for this purpose. In Geneva and the city of Basel, teacher training takes place mostly in the universities, but elsewhere teachers trained for the different levels of school learn in different institutions. The policy of separation concerning not only the school system but also teacher training handicaps large-scale educational development as well as cooperation between different types of schools. All in all, the lower the type of school for which a teacher is being trained, the more importance is given to pedagogy, whereas the

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Education in Switzerland

Table 9.1 Number of Fourth-grade Lessons in the Canton of Lucerne, 1986 German (reading, writing) Mathematics History. Geography. Nature Study Religion / Bibleclass Gymnastics Needlework (girls) Handicraft (boys) Drawing Music Writing (Calligraphy)

7 5 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 1

Total: 28 lessons for boys. 29 for girls

more advanced and more academic the type of school, the shorter the actual training period becomes. Quite often, teachers at the lower levels of the school system are better than those higher up. The teachers as a whole have a rather weak position in school policy-making. During the educational expansion their pay levels rose, so that they now lie above those of administrators with comparable training levels. They are a source of envy, as are their 13 weeks of vacation. These factors reduce teachers' credibility in union matters, and although nearly half the teachers are organized in the Swiss teachers' union (which has about 25,000 members), it is a virtually powerless body at the federal as well as the cantonal level. Pedagogical issues hardly ever win a consensus in the different subsections, and union positions hardly ever convince the public. Primary schools in the cities are mostly decentralized and often located in suburbs so that children can walk to school. Most schools conform to the implicit ideal of "one teacher, one grade" and are large enough to allow for special infrastructure for music, handicrafts, gym, general assembly, and so on. In schools in rural areas a teacher will often have students of more than one grade in the classroom, and many of these schools have very little infrastructure. But the villages oppose the closing of them because it would accelerate the rural depopulation stemming from the restructuring of agriculture. In primary schools, one teacher usually teaches all subjects except religion and needlework. The central aim, as reflected in Table 9.1 showing a typical class schedule, is to teach reading, writing, and arithmetic. Table 9.1 also points to something that is true in many of the cantons: Girls have more school than boys, and it is only recently that the two handicrafts lessons were introduced for boys. Although the Constitution stipulates equal rights for both sexes, this principle is only slowly being applied in school and society. Only a few cantons have opened up all subjects for both sexes, but the rest interpret equal rights to mean "equivalent" rights, thus leaving room for traditional segregation.

164

Switzerland in Perspective

Figure 9.3 Demographic Development and Size of Class

The demographic fact of sharply declining birthrates in the 1960s had interesting consequences for primary schools (Figure 9.3). As enrollment dropped, the average class size fell from 27 to 18 in just 12 years. This occurred because most teachers had tenure and had to be kept on. However, they grew more willing to keep difficult children in their own classrooms rather than demoting them or removing them to special schools; the teachers feared for their jobs if class size shrank too much. But the proportion of students enrolled in special schools declined even more than would have been expected on demographic grounds alone. Larger communities that had built up a whole system of special schools for slow learners, for the mentally and/or physically handicapped, and for children with language deficiencies had to begin to reconsider the need for these schools. In most cantons, selection policies in the transition from primary to secondary schools are restrictive. In other words, it is considered preferable to risk placing a gifted child in a less advanced secondary school than to risk misplacing unsuitable pupils in a more advanced school. In discussions on this subject, fears are consistently voiced that the level of the more advanced schools might be dragged down. At this point in a child's progress, parents either opt for private schools if they can afford them or encourage an apprenticeship with the option

Education in Switzerland

165

of taking courses in specialized professional schools later, thus compensating to some degree for the early restriction of chances. Secondary schools are geographically more centralized than primary schools, and the academic ones are located only in cities. This fact influences the demand for higher academic schooling, although sociocultural determinants are even more important. Working-class parents and farmers tend to be satisfied if their children acquire a good trade. Thus, even in cities with ready access to academic secondary schools, fewer young people enter them than would be possible on the basis of selection at the end of primary schooling (Casparis, 1984:23). The ideal of acquiring a broad general education forms the basis of lower as well as academic secondary schooling. The latter is clearly geared to obtaining the maturity degree, which will determine the subsequent field of study in university. In academic schools there is generally heavy pressure on the students to perform, and repeating a year or switching to another type of maturity degree is quite common. The overall dropout rate is highest around the end of compulsory schooling; afterward the national average drops to around 8 or 9 percent (Federal Office of Statistics, 1987b:36). Young people who drop out of Gymnasium call on guidanc services to a much higher degree than other students, and as dropouts from the most highly regarded type of school they have nearly all kinds of apprenticeships and professional schools open to them (Casparis, 1988:35). One of the objectives of the upper years of compulsory schooling is to channel students toward an occupation, a task in which the schools are supported by well-organized cantonal and local guidance services. Providing guidance in choosing one specific profession out of nearly 400 is considered an important obligation of the state. Teachers as well as counselors often play an important role in deciding what occupation would be best suited for a young person. The choice is not a wide-open one, however: One's gender and type of school largely determine from which group of occupations it can be made. The organization of the Swiss university system goes back to Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835), and only the universities of Basel and Geneva are older. Swiss universities are divided into five faculties: Theology, Economics and Law, Liberal Arts, Medicine, and Science. The two federal polytechnical schools provide studies in engineering, architecture and science. The degrees conferred are the teachers' diploma for lower secondary level, the diploma (Lizentiat), and the doctorate. Students are admitted with a certificate of maturity or equivalent credentials, with the exception of the University of Geneva which has a more open admissions policy). There is no numerus clausus—that is, no achieveme limits are set for admission and students are free to study where they want. Not until the post-1973 recession, when the baby-boom generation reached the universities, was it necessary to set limits on the number of semesters allowed until graduation. Compared with other levels of the school system, the dropout rate at university is high. Of 9,800 university students born in 1956, a total of 61 percent had

166

Switzerland in Perspective

graduated with at least one degree by the end of 1985, and 9 percent were still enrolled as students. As most of these will probably still graduate, a total dropout rate of roughly one third can be assumed (Federal Office of Statistics, 1987a:2). But according to the same report, dropping out of university does not occur uniformly. The lowest dropout rates can be found in the polytechnical schools, sciences and medicine (20 percent) and the highest in history, theology, and social sciences (59 percent). These data are related to the fact that students in the first group of disciplines must periodically pass selective examinations until graduation, whereas those in the second have no such exams. Moreover, the uncertain professional and occupational outcomes for certain disciplines after graduation most likely cause students to leave the university prematurely. The professional possibilities for historians and social scientists are limited, and to practice theology a special calling is needed. In addition, there is the fact that 38 percent of the dropouts are women and only 25 percent are men (p. 3), and women in academia are still rather uncommon in Swiss society. After leaving school, the majority of young people (around 55 percent at ages 16 and 17) begin an apprenticeship in an enterprise (Federal Office of Statistics, 1987b:56). This means learning a trade under the supervision of a master and following special courses at a vocational school for one or one and a half days per week. Only a small proportion of school-leavers (some 2 percent) enter the workforce directly after school without any formal training first. Apprenticeships may last between one and four years and, in most cases, three. Employers usually prefer to hire apprentices who show practical talent for their occupation, but often intellectual capabilities are deemed more important because they contribute to success in the theoretical subjects in vocational school. Thus the grades that applicants have on their school records are often decisive in getting hired. According to research on the subject, masters are usually not interested in what goes on at the vocational school as long as their apprentices do well enough to master the final exams successfully (Casparis, 1988:59). After a long period of diversification in occupational training programs, a reversal is in view because of the realization that technological development not only produces new occupations but can also make existing ones obsolete. The goal now is to reduce the number of occupations with apprenticeships and instead provide broader occupational training, This new policy has touched off opposition from the enterprises, mainly because they count on apprentices to perform specialized work at low wages, whereas more general training would mean learning things that may not be directly productive for the firm. SOME RECENT TRENDS Between World War I and the early 1960s, change in the Swiss school system was initially slow but then began to speed up. The first main thrust was toward expansion, on one hand, because of the growing number of students and, on the other, adjustment to the growing demand for education in general and higher

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education in particular. The schools offering more advanced education thus grew the fastest. Nevertheless, compared with other European countries the expansion of higher education was slower and the structural changes were minimal, except in the cantons of Geneva and Ticino. Major developments took place in the following areas. Curricula for each school year used to be subject-oriented and very brief. In fact, the subject matter to be taught for the whole duration of compulsory schooling could be listed on a few pages. The new curricula are oriented toward the development of abilities, and they try to take into account learning in its totality, integrating fields of study and developing different skills. Specialized centers are developing these curricula for primary and lower secondary education, and cooperation between the cantons is becoming the rule; this is so especially because good textbooks are expensive to develop. Cantons still maintain their decisionmaking freedom, however. One striking development in recent years has been the introduction of computers into the schools, the impetus for which did not come from within the school system but from outside. The sudden decline of the Swiss watch and tool industries caused a general rush to get into advanced electronics. Within three or four years computers have even found their way into kindergarten, and information technology is booming in universities. What holds true for curricula also holds true for the basic school ideology. A gradual shift from high segregation and differentiation toward integration may be noted. But the pace is slow because of the widespread fear that less differentiation will depress general standards and make for uniformity. Nonetheless, in a number of cantons, initiatives are under way to break down barriers between the different types of secondary schools as well as between the sexes. The statistics show that the percentage of females in academic secondary schools, in universities, and in vocational training is steadily on the rise (CESDOC, 1985:182). The trends toward integrating children with learning deficiencies into regular classes has already been mentioned above. Two motives inform the current debate over teaching a foreign language in primary school. One is the realization that younger children learn foreign languages more easily. The other is that it is considered to be in the country's political interest to bring the French and German regions into closer relations. This supposedly will be accomplished by teaching all Swiss to speak at least one other national language. But although the conference of the cantonal ministers of education has signed an agreement to this end, opposition is gaining momentum, spearheaded mainly by the teachers; their argument is that the fifth and sixth grades, where a foreign language is supposed to be introduced, are already overburdened by the preparations for secondary school selection. The evidence, though, is shaky, and many experimental schools plus a number of cantons have successfully advanced the teaching of a foreign language. The opposition also feeds on the interests of parents, who would rather see their children in the advanced levels of secondary school than having them speak French (or German)

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Switzerland in Perspective

at age 12. In controversial issues such as this one, the openness of many school administrations to democratic decision making tends to slow down development. CONCLUSIONS Switzerland has a highly developed tertiary sector that employs over 55 percent of the workforce. School is an integrated part of this efficient system. It places a high value on cognitive achievement, it is stringently structured, and teachers very often take the stance of dutiful bureaucrats. On the whole, school does not try to change society but functions to reproduce it. The school books and curricula, as well as teacher hiring practices, show that the primary values and norms of the society are sustained and meant to be transmitted in the classroom. Most of this, though, is implicit and seldom subject to debate. It therefore follows that school is considered to be one of the most important institutions of Swiss society. Although the guiding influence of school on a student's career opportunities is strong because of the selection process which occurs at the end of primary education, career opportunities can later on still open up as a result of postvocational training. Switzerland, with its rather traditional and conservative population, does not try hard to be egalitarian in school. Although there are compensatory programs and special schools for the handicapped, labeling tends to have a strong effect, and the definition of the norm is rather narrow. Girls and young women receive better grades during compulsory schooling and do better in the selection exams, but they still remain underrepresented in the more advanced schools as well as in the leading professions. In the last 30 years, however, a slow but steady movement toward the reduction of inequality in the schools can be noted. Integration in its social sense as well as in subject matter and learning content is on the rise. A gradual evolution is also taking place on the level of school structure. If the general situation is viewed over the last 30 years, the conclusion is clear: The variety among the cantonal school systems has been reduced, and there is room now for the real modernization of Swiss education. REFERENCES Casparis, C. 1984. "Eine Evaluation des Luzerner Ubertrittsverfahrens." Education et Recherche 1: 17-29. Casparis, C. 1988. Lehringsbefragung 1983/85. Lucerne: Zentralschweizerischer B tungsdienst fiir Schulfragen. Centre Suisse de Documentation en matiere d'enseignement et d'education (CESDOC). 1985. "Demain . . . combien d'eleves?" Geneva. Egger, E. 1984. Education in Switzerland. Bern: Swiss Conference of Cantonal Direc of Education. Federal Office of Statistics. 1987a. Bildungsstatistik, no. 6. Ber Federal Office of Statistics. 1987b. Schulerstatistik 1986/87. Be

10

Crime and Crime Control in Switzerland MARTIN KILLIAS RECENT INTEREST IN SWITZERLAND'S CRIME RATE In 1973, when Marshall B. Clinard, then professor of sociology at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, came to Switzerland to study the reality of crime in that country, many Swiss were rather surprised about his unexpected interest in this aspect of their lives. Most of them were not used to seeing Switzerland as a low crime country, and many were rather reluctant to accept the conclusions Clinard subsequently reached in his book Cities with Little Crime: The Case of Switzerland (197'8).1 According to Clinard, Switzerland seemed to contradict the thencurrent belief that industrialization and urbanization will inevitably lead to high and rapidly growing crime rates. Switzerland's low crime rate despite its high rank on any indicator of development gave it, along with Japan, the status of an interesting case, if not a success story. This reputation may have led Freda Adler in 1983 to include Switzerland in Nations Not Obsessed with Crime, although she did not include any more recent data. Her statement that "the crime rate has remained extraordinarily low" (p. 18) lacks empirical evidence. More recently, Fleming Balvig, professor at the University of Copenhagen, tried to destroy the "myth" of Switzerland's low crime rate in a book entitled The SnowWhite Image: The Hidden Reality of Crime in Switzerland (1988). Unfortunately, his work is seriously flawed in many important details. His conclusion that Switzerland has a rather high crime rate is based on rather weak data and a very selective use of available data sources. Therefore the question remains open as to whether things may have changed since Clinard's research. In order to address this issue, we will give priority here to the presentation of more recent data.

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Switzerland in Perspective

Figure 10.1 Trend in Rates of Total Convictions, Indictments, and Convictions for Serious Offenses, Cantons of Zurich, Vaud, and Geneva, from 1853 to 1982

CRIME TRENDS IN SWITZERLAND Long-Term Trends Some Swiss cantons started collecting data on convictions early in the nineteenth century.2 Although the validity of the conviction data as measures of crime may be questionable on a number of grounds, they may be of some interest in the study of long-term trends in crime and crime control, especially for countries whose borders have not undergone any significant change over the past 170 years. Taking advantage of this characteristic of the Swiss cantons, and inspired by Gurr's work (1976) on London, Sydney and Stockholm, Killias and Riva (1984) analyzed the trend of standardized conviction rates in the cantons of Zurich, Vaud and Geneva (since 1853). These three cantons make up one third of the country's total population; Vaud and Geneva are in the French-speaking part, Zurich in the German-speaking part. As Figure 10.1 illustrates, the crime trends of these three cantons show basically the same pattern. (The spots around the mean trend line indicate the degree of diversity of the three trends.) As in the cities that Gurr analyzed, there was a declining trend during the last decades of the nineteenth century and some increase in more recent years. However, the Swiss trend is characterized by fewer long-term fluctuations, and the recent increase began some thirty years later than in the cities Gurr analyzed, that is, in the late 1960s. Of course, trends in total convictions (i.e., for all offenses taken together) may mask some important differences that would be visible if only certain offenses were considered. In order to see how far the general trend shown in Figure 10.1 matches the trend in serious crimes, data on intentional homicides

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171

Figure 10.2 Trend in Homicide Rates, 1877 to 1985 (per 1 Million Population)

Source: Unpublished data gathered by the Office federal de la statistique (Health Statistics); reproduced with permission.

since 1877 are presented in Figure 10.2. These data have been collected for health statisticians since that time, and although they give very detailed information on the age and sex of the victim as well as on the means by which he or she was killed, they were never published comprehensively and never received any attention from criminologists. Comparison with federal police data on homicide, which are available since 1982, reveals a rather high correspondence, the deviations being below 5 percent for all but one year.3 As Figure 10.2 suggests, the trend in homicides roughly parallels the general trend in indictments and convictions (Figure 10.1). Overall, there was a marked drop before 1925, a minor decrease between 1926 and 1965, and some increase since the 1966-75 period. (Given the small absolute numbers, the annual fluctuations are sometimes considerable; in order to improve the visibility of the general trend, the rates shown in Figure 10.2 are based on the average number of homicides in a decade.) The drop was particularly strong for men, but data not shown indicate that the decrease in the killings of children under age 15 was also very substantial. Interestingly, there was no such trend for women 15 and over, whose risk of being killed remained stable throughout the whole period. Overall, the trend shown in Figure 10.2 matches the trends observed in other countries (Chesnais, 1981:39-77; Archer and Gartner, 1984:108-14). In recent years, about one homicide in three was committed with the use of a gun. This proportion remained fairly stable over the last 50 years, with some highs in the 1930s (about 40 percent) and some lows in the 1950s (about 25 percent). Some implications of this finding in connection with the gun control issue will be discussed below.

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172

Table 10.1 Rates of Burglaries and Robberies Reported to the Municipal Police of the City of Zurich, 1967-1986 (per 100,000 population) year

burglary rate

robbery rate

year

burglary rate

1967

539

4

1977

1,364

53

1968

556

5

1978

1,452

45

1969

592

4

1979

1,536

65

1970

656

7

1980

1,898

91 118

robbery rate

1971

927

19

1981

2,331

1972

927

16

1982

2,643

146

1973

971

17

1983

2,743

138

1974

931

25

1984

2,286

141

1975

1,220

29

1985

2,232

119

1976

1,214

31

1986

2,216

109

1987

2,052

125

Sources: - Statistisches Jahrbuch der Stadt Zurich (Statistical Yearbook of the city of Zurich), 1976 (pp. 38, 344), 1978 (pp.38, 377), 1981 (pp. 26,342). - KRISTA (Kriminalstatistik des Kantons Zurich), volumes 1981 to 1987.

RECENT TRENDS Conviction data may be less helpful for studying short-term fluctuations. Besides, some of the most significant crimes, such as burglary, auto theft, and certain forms of mugging (theft from the person, in particular) are not shown separately in Swiss conviction statistics, since they do not match special legal categories. Police statistics, however, do contain relevant data, although for the years before 1982 they are available only from some local police departments. Among these are the Municipal Police of the city of Zurich, Switzerland's largest city. Considering Clinard's focus on Zurich, the data presented in Table 10.1 may be well suited to illustrate changes there since 1970. The data shown in Table 10.1 suggest that there has been a substantial increase in robberies (muggings) and burglaries over the last two decades, although changes in reporting and registration practices (which may have occurred during this period) might be invoked as an alternative explanation. However, this increase parallels the emergence of a significant drug problem in Zurich, particularly after 1973 (Balvig, 1988:94-101). Therefore, it is likely that the trend shown in Table 10.1 does reflect a real increase in predatory crimes. Given this interpretation, and keeping in mind the long-term trends shown in Figures 10.1 and 10.2, one may conclude that Clinard conducted his research during a period when the crime rates in Switzerland were at their lowest. This does not mean that Clinard's work was flawed, as Balvig believes, but it may suggest our having a look at more recent data before concluding that Switzerland's crime rate "has remained extraordinarily low" (Adler, 1983:18). We will now turn to such data.

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173

COMPARATIVE DATA ON SPECIFIC OFFENSES Homicides Since homicide data tend to fluctuate considerably from year to year if the absolute numbers are small, we prefer to indicate here the average rate per 1 million population over the years 1982 to 1985, that is, for the years in which both police and health statistics data are available. According to the police data, the average rate is 12.8; according to the health statistics, it is 13.2. The Swiss rates are lower than those of Denmark, Germany and Austria and more than six times lower than for the United States, where the corresponding rate in the same years is 83. 4 Thus the rate of murders continues to be comparatively low in Switzerland. This fact has attracted some international attention in the past, especially in connection with the gun control issue, since every Swiss who has completed his basic military training (usually at age 20) keeps his personal military equipment, including a gun, in his home as long as he belongs to the army, which is usually up to the age of 50. Guns are therefore available in almost every household, and the question most often posed is why this does not result in a high homicide rate (Clinard, 1978:157; Adler, 1983:18). Indeed, opponents of gun control frequently cite Switzerland as an example of how the general availability of guns does not increase the number of homicides. In view of this international interest, it is useful to discuss briefly the Swiss experience in this regard. First, the automatic guns are heavy, and it is impossible to conceal them; besides a few special soldiers, only officers and sergeant majors get short guns. Second, all guns are registered, and it is illegal to carry them away from home except for purposes of military training. Third, the ammunition is taken home in a sealed box, and the seal is checked every year. And finally, Switzerland has cantonal gun control legislation that restricts the purchase of arms and ammunition to permit holders, and still another hard-to-obtain permit is required to remove these arms from one's home. Only 10 percent of the households in German and Italian Switzerland, for example, own a non-military gun. For comparison, in the United States, 44 percent of all households owned guns in 1985, and the proportion of homicide victims killed with a firearm was 59 percent.5 The figure for Switzerland in the same year was 33 percent. The Swiss experience, then, does not contradict other findings on the possible impact of gun control on the homicide rate.6 Predatory Crimes Differences in legal definitions often preclude meaningful international comparison of crime rates. One possible way to overcome this difficulty is to turn to victimization surveys, which, if not used naively, can constitute an excellent tool in comparative criminology (Clinard and Junger-Tas, 1979). Such data are

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174

Table 10.2 Rate of Persons and Households Victimized Once or More in a Twelve Month Period in Switzerland per 100 Persons (age 15 and over) or per 100 Households, Respectively, in French-Speaking Switzerland (1984) and in the German/ItalianSpeaking Regions (1986) French-speaking regions (1984)

Type of offense Burglary of private homes (with entry, houses/apartments)

German/Italian speaking regions

1.0%

0.8%

1.1 %

1.3%

Burglary (with entry) of secondary residences located in Switzerland

0.2%

0.2%

Car theft

0.4 %

0.4 %

Robbery (incl. attempts)

0.4 %

0.5 %

Assault and battery (incl. armed threats)

1.3%

1.1%

0.4 %

0.2 %

Burglary of private rooms/buildings unconnected with the apartment (e.g. garages, basements), with entry

(1)

Sexual violence (incl. completed and attempted rape) (2) Common theft (i.e. without burglary, theft of vehicles, robbery)

10.5%

6.7 %

(1) per 100 housholds owning a car (2) per 100 women (age 15 and over) Source:

Killias (Les Suisses face au crime, 1989, tables 4.1 and 4.2 combined)

now available for several European countries, including Switzerland.7 The Swiss crime survey was conducted in two steps (Killias, 1989a). Late in 1984, 3,000 households in French-speaking Switzerland were interviewed about their personal and household victimizations; then, early in 1987, 3,500 respondents were interviewed in German- and Italian-speaking Switzerland. The surveys were computer-assisted telephone surveys; the questionnaire of the second survey includes more than 600 variables (on the survey methodology, see Killias, 1989b). The data presented in Table 10.2 show some similarity in crime rates between the two parts of Switzerland.8 As is illustrated in Table 10.3, the Swiss rates tend to be lower than those of other European countries.9 Recent victimization data therefore confirm Clinard's (1978) observations re-

Table 10.3 International Comparison of Rates of Burglary of Private Homes (i.e., Houses/ Apartments, with entry, per 100,000 private households) and of Automobile Theft (per 100,000 households owning a car) Over a Twelve Month Period (1), Rounded Figures Burglary

Country / Region / City French-speaking Switzerland (including Geneva), 1984(2)

Automobile theft

1000

400

700

400

German-speaking Switzerland (including Zurich), 1986(2) Italian-speaking Switzerland, 1986

(2)

1200

Canton of Geneva

(3)

1600

Canton of Zurich

(3)

1300

City of Zurich

(3)

2100

500

Netherlands (national figures 1986) Large Dutch cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht, The Hague) 1986 England and Wales, 1983

2700 (4)

400

(5)

4900 (4)

1500

(5)

2300

2000

Sweden, 1978

1800

United States, 1984 - Cities within SMSA - Suburbs within SMSA - Not in SMSA (rural)

3300 1800 1300

(6) (6) (6)

(1)

The rates for Switzerland and the Netherlands are based on the number of households which were victimized at least once, over a period of 12 months, whereas the rates for the other countries are based on the number of incidents. The latter procedure,when applied to the Swiss data, might increase the rates by 5 to 10 per cent.

(2)

Victimizations experienced somewhere in Switzerland

(3)

Only victimizations experienced in that city/canton

(4)

According to estimates of Dutch experts, some 20 % of burglaries reported may concern attempts (personal communication of Dr. Steinmetz, Research and Documentation Center of the Dutch Ministry of Justice)

(5)

Rates per 100,000 households (including those not owning cars)

(6)

The American rates relate to "forcible entry"

Source:

-

Swiss data: Killias (Les Suisses face au crime, 1989: table 4.7.) Dutch data: Maandstatistiek Rechtsbescherming en Veiligheid no. 12/1987:5 Swedish data: National Central Bureau of Statistics (1981:246) English data: Hough & Mayhew (1985:15,62,92) American data: Flanagan & McGarell (1986:249)

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garding Switzerland's comparatively low crime rate. Given the increase in predatory crime over the last two decades (Table 10.1), this conclusion may sound paradoxical. However, other European countries may have experienced similar increases in crime during the 1970s. Indeed, there is some evidence that this has been the case, for example, in Sweden (Svensson, 1986), Germany (Kaiser, 1988:716), and Holland.10 White-Collar Crime Clinard (1978:83-102) and Balvig (1988:67-71) both assume that white-collar crime is pervasive in Switzerland. Ample evidence of the extent of such operations is also provided by two former magistrates (Bernasconi, 1984; Schmid, 1985). However, much of this material is rather anecdotal in nature, and there are also some contrary indications. Concerning tax evasion, several estimates (summarized by Pommerehne [1983:267-71]) of untaxed (concealed) revenues of all sorts (i.e., the "shadow economy") are, for 1978, about 13.2 percent of the official GNP in Sweden, 9.2 percent in Norway, 8.9 percent in West Germany, and 4.1 percent in Switzerland; for the United States in 1976 the corresponding rate was 8 to 13 percent. Thus it does not appear that tax evasion is more common in Switzerland than in other Western countries. (On tax law violations, see, e.g., Schultz, 1978.) There are no comparative data concerning other kinds of white-collar crime. This poses a few problems. First, Clinard's and Balvig's assertions rest on no comparative data. Second, there is some recent evidence that white-collar crime and street crime are not as distinctive as many scholars in the Sutherland tradition tend to assume (Hirschi and Gottfredson, 1987). If this holds true, how could one explain that Switzerland ranks high with respect to white-collar crime but low on street crime? Third, how could one reconcile the marked sense of citizen responsibility (Clinard, 1978:11, 150) with a high rate of tax violations if there is a negative correlation between the inclination to evade taxes and a "sense of citizen responsibility" (Pommerehne, 1983)?11 There is, too, a serious methodological consideration. Comparing rates of white-collar crime in different countries raises the difficult question of finding appropriate denominators in computing crime rates.12 Nonetheless, the collection of reasonably accurate data on white-collar crime should be pursued with priority in future research. There is no reason why comparative criminology should restrict itself to street crime, and many policy issues in connection with white-collar crime require a comparative approach.13 CRIME CONTROL General Trends Following both common sense and theoretical propositions within the tradition of the labeling approach, one would expect that any growth in the body of rules

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criminalizing certain kinds of behavior would increase the number of crimes (i.e., of acts that will be labeled as such). And the general view is that the body of substantive criminal law is constantly growing. Such beliefs go back as far as the writings of Montesquieu, Rousseau and many others (Killias, 1985). However, a study designed to assess the growth of criminal law in Switzerland between 1948 and 1982 revealed that the total number of legislative acts containing substantive criminal law, as well as the total number of pages devoted to criminal law, increased only by about 20 percent, whereas the total body of federal laws almost doubled. The amount of "criminalization" through legislative decisions is even further lessened if the legal basis of convictions is considered: Among the 117 laws containing at least some criminal law provisions in 1982, more than one half are never applied in a given year in connection with a conviction. In any given year about 88 percent of all convictions are based on only four laws—the Road Safety Act, 44 percent; the Criminal Code and the Military Code, 36 percent; and the Narcotics Law, 8 percent (data for 1982). These rates have remained fairly stable over many years. In sum, legislation is really not an important source of criminalization (on some implications of these findings, see Killias, 1985). Convictions for felonies (crimes) and (delits) as well as for petty offenses (contraventions) are recorded in a central register (the latter, however, only if the sentence involves a fine of at least 500 francs or detention). If a person is convicted more than once in a given year, each conviction will be recorded. Thus, the number of convictions (in 1985, 53,340 under all laws, and 18,408 under the Penal Code alone, with rates per 100,000 population of 827 and 285, respectively) is slightly higher than the number of convicted persons. Of course, it is not possible to extrapolate from these figures the prevalence rate, that is, the proportion of people in a population who have ever been convicted in their lifetime. But with a few adjustments and thanks to newly established computer files, it is possible to assess the rate of Swiss males, aged 33 and living in Switzerland, who have been convicted at least once since the age of 18, as well as how many among them ever served a prison sentence. Twenty-four percent have been convicted at least once by the age of 33, and 6.5 percent have served at least one unsuspended prison sentence (Killias and Aeschbacher, 1988). Since many unsuspended prison sentences are being given to persons convicted of drunken driving, one may infer that some people will serve their first prison term somewhere between 33 years of age and retirement. In terms of lifetime probabilities, one may conclude that perhaps one Swiss male in three will be convicted at some time, and about one male in ten will go to prison at least once. Unfortunately, there are hardly any corresponding rates from other countries against which one could compare these figures, but the few available estimates (quoted by Killias and Aeschbacher, 1988) indicate that the prevalence rate of imprisonment is rather high in Switzerland, whereas the prevalence rate of convictions may be about average. Given Switzerland's comparatively low crime rate, this suggests that the certainty of punishment is rather high there and

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Figure 10.3 Rate of Prisoners, According to Legal Status, 1890-1941 (per 100,000 Population)

Source: Kiliias & Grandjean (1987)

that it may have deteriorated less than in other countries over the last few decades (on the decreasing certainty of punishment in France and elsewhere, see Cusson, 1988). As we shall see below, the high prevalence rate of imprisonment is related to Switzerland's penal policy, which relies heavily on short prison sentences. TRENDS IN THE USE OF IMPRISONMENT At the end of the 19th century and up until World War II, Switzerland experienced far higher incarceration rates than in the more recent past (see Figure 10.3). Unfortunately, the collection of data on the Swiss prison system ended in 1941 and resumed only in 1982 (without counting prisoners awaiting trial in jails). Similar trends in incarceration rates have been observed in several other European countries, especially Holland. Like Holland, Switzerland had its lowest rates in history during the early 1970s: It was estimated at 43.5 per 100,000 population in 1972 (Clinard, 1978:116), 51 in 1978, and 71 in 1986 (Killias, 1987). In 1987 the average rate of convicted prisoners was 56; including prisoners awaiting trial, the total incarceration rate may have been about 75. 14 These figures show a consistent and marked increase since 1972; about one half of it is explained by the emergence of a significant drug problem during the 1970s, whereas the other half can be attributed to the longer prison sentences the Narcotics Act provides, since its amendment in 1975, for drug trafficking and related offenses (Kuhn, 1987). As a result of this increasing demand for

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prison space (owing to longer sentences), there is now some prison overcrowding. Although detention of more than one inmate in a single cell is still exceptional, in 1973 Clinard saw these prisons operating "considerably below capacity" (Clinard, 1978:119). There has nonetheless been some qualitative change in prison life, since many inmates are either drug addicts15 or are from many other countries.16 The operation of prisons has become an increasingly difficult task over the last two decades. The current belief among government officials and experts attributes the increasing incarceration rate to the wide use of short prison sentences. The empirical evidence17 suggests, however, that it is not the number of prison sentences being imposed but their increasing length that caused the recent prison overcrowding, as Wilkins (1965:85) had hypothesized some two decades ago. Indeed, 83 percent of the unsuspended sentences in 1983 did not exceed six months, but only 27 percent of all prison inmates served sentences this long (the rate in 1988 may even be lower); on the other hand, 64 percent of the inmates serve terms of more than one year (Killias, 1987). In other words, the vast majority of those entering prison in any year have sentences of less than one year, but they are only a small proportion of the total prison population. Despite these facts, the official policy is to seek a reduction of the prison population through the abolition of short prison sentences, that is, those below 6 or eventually 12 months (cf. Schultz, 1987). Whatever the merits of this policy may be in other respects, the available Swiss data as well as international experience (Landreville, 1988) suggest that the prison population will, at best, not be substantially affected through the abolition of short prison sentences. However, there may be some unintended side effects inasmuch as judges could eventually tend to bypass the abolition of short prison sentences and their replacement by "alternative" sanctions by imposing longer sentences instead, that is, 15 months instead of 9 months, for example, if the minimum length of a prison sentence is fixed at 12 months. Even if such shifts remain the exception, their impact on the prison population would be dramatic. It is noteworthy in this connection that no country that has abolished short prison sentences so far has seen its prison population decrease. In some countries—for example, Austria (Burgstaller, 1983) and Portugal (Lopes Rocha, 1987)—a definite trend toward longer sentences could be observed after the abolition of short prison sentences, which resulted in increasing prison populations (Killias, 1987). From an international perspective, it becomes obvious that countries with a high proportion of short prison sentences tend to have low incarceration rates, whereas those who have abolished or considerably restricted the use of such sentences face higher incarceration rates. To the first group belong countries such as Holland, Belgium, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Switzerland, whereas Germany, Austria, Portugal, and the United Kingdom, among others, belong to the second group. Of course, the lower rate of serious crime may play a role in Switzerland's reliance on short (instead of longer) prison sentences. However, the distribution shown in Table 10.4 seems to be rather independent of crime rates, since several

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Table 10.4 Numbers of Prisoners in Western Europe as of February 1, 1986 (per 100,000 Population) Turkey Austria Portugal United Kingdom Luxembourg Germany (FRG) France Finnland Italy Switzerland Denmark

130 109 96 94 92 92 81 81 77 71 69

Belgium Spain Sweden Ireland Norway Greece Iceland Netherlands Cyprus Malta

64 61 56 52 51 37 36 35 32 27

Source:Tournier(1986)

countries with low incarceration rates seem to have rather substantial crime rates, for example, and vice versa; according to the data presented in Table 10.3, Holland, for example, seems to have a rather high crime rate, whereas Austria may, according to rather anecdotal evidence, rank below average on this variable. As far as Switzerland is concerned, the sentences tend to be shorter than in the United States even in cases of serious crime, such as rape and robbery: For these offenses, the median Swiss sentences imposed in 1984 were 18 and 19 months, respectively, or 26 and 28 months on the average, one third of which are usually not served since 95 percent of the inmates who have served more than 3 months are released after serving two thirds of their sentence (Killias, 1987). In the United States, the mean times served for these two crimes were 43 and 39 months, respectively (an average based on eight states in 1982); and for robbery, the median time served was 33 months (Koppel, 1984). This overview of the role imprisonment plays in Switzerland would not be complete without some information on recidivism. Since 1982, all persons entering and leaving the prison system are on file. This newly created database forms the basis of the statistics on Switzerland's correctional system, now being developed t>y the Federal Office of Statistics. After several years of its operation, a few statistics on persons released from prison have recently been published.18 According to these figures, 49 percent of those released during the year 1982 were sentenced to another prison term within five years. Since the recidivism curve tends to level off, as the data reveal, there is hope that at least 40 percent of the prisoners will never come back. Thanks to the new data file, these rates are much more precise than those currently available in most countries. Whether recidivism is higher or lower than elsewhere is a rather difficult question, however. Indeed, the rate of recidivism among former prisoners depends mostly on the social composition of the prison population: It will be low if very wide use is made of imprisonment, since such

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a policy will bring a large number of "good risks" to correctional institutions; and it will be high under a penal policy that considers imprisonment as a kind of last resort, aimed at the worst among the "bad risks." Given these difficulties of interpretation, international comparisons of recidivism rates among former prisoners may not be appropriate, even if more accurate data were available from other countries. Discrimination in Crime Control? Over the last several decades, discrimination against minorities and people from lower socioeconomic categories has been a subject of extensive debate in criminology. In recent years, some data that might be relevant in this connection have been gathered in Switzerland as well. According to U.S. data (Reiss, 1971:64, 88, 102), most of the police actions resulting in criminal investigation originate in reports from the public, as either victims or informants. So far, no comparable data are available for Switzerland, but it seems that the Swiss police are similarly dealing with crime in a reactive rather than a proactive way. This means that discretion and, possibly, discrimination depend on public attitudes more than on the way police deal with crime. Concerning the decision of victims and their proxies to report a crime to the police, the Swiss crime survey provides some relevant information. For example, a comparison of survey data of demographic characteristics of offenders (gender, age, nationality) with police and conviction statistics suggests no tendency among Swiss victims to report a crime more frequently to the police if the offender happens to be a woman, young, or of foreign origin; and this is true even if a certain number of other variables (such as the seriousness of the offense, the nationality of the victim, and the eventual acquaintance of the two parties) are controlled for (Killias 1988a). Thus there is no indication of discrimination by victims. To date, little research has addressed the issue of discrimination at the police level and during criminal justice proceedings.19 However, more recent data on class bias within the correctional system may provide us with indirect estimates of the extent of discrimination within the criminal justice system as a whole. For example, the data file on persons entering the correctional system in 1987 shows that 28 percent of those going to prison ranked low on education, 63 percent had professional training or similar, and 7 percent had advanced education (academics, teachers, etc.). Among men between the ages of 20 and 39 in the general population (three out of four prisoners come from this age group), the corresponding rates for these three levels of education are 28, 62, and 10 percent, respectively (Stratenwerth and Bernoulli, 1983). Of course, any bias of this sort is no evidence of discrimination as long as the involvement in crime, the seriousness of the offense committed, and any prior prison record are not taken into account. However, the difference between the levels of education of prisoners and of the general population, considering the rates one would expect on the

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basis of census figures, is surprisingly small. It could be that Switzerland's penal policy, given its focus on short prison sentences and its tough stance on drunken driving, and other middle-class offenses, results in substantial numbers of prisoners with some social (and therefore educational) standing. Other figures do indeed suggest that the proportion of prisoners from the low education group would increase substantially if prisoners with short terms were no longer sent 20

to prison. A closer look at people in prison (instead of those going to prison) confirms this impression. The social composition of the population of Switzerland's major prisons, as revealed in 12 doctoral dissertations and taking a wide range of indicators of social status into account (Stratenwerth and Bernoulli, 1983:26), confirms that the lowest segments of the Swiss population are overrepresented among the long-term inmates. However, if the social status of the inmates' fathers is considered, rather than the inmates' personal socioeconomic status (SES), the different social classes turn out to be represented roughly in proportion to their share in the general population (Stratenwerth and Bernoulli, 1983:28). One suspects from these figures that many prison inmates have experienced downward mobility, although the causal link between incarceration and downward mobility cannot be assessed through cross-sectional data. A longitudinal study of deviance and delinquency among Swiss juveniles (Buchmann, 1983) does support the view that downward mobility precedes delinquency (and official labeling). Whatever the causal link between these variables may be, the data presented above do not support the assumption that the criminal justice system discriminates against the lower SES groups; if such a tendency existed to any significant extent among criminal justice officials, one would expect it to be affected by the father's rather than the son's SES, since the defendant's family background may be more significant than his own social status when he is young, which most prisoners are. Looking at the disproportionate number of inmates of foreign origin,21 one might again wonder whether this reflects some discrimination within the criminal justice system. However, many of the foreign inmates were never residents of Switzerland but were arrested while committing an offense within the country. In fact, many foreign nationals come to Switzerland in direct connection with the commission of crimes, particularly drug trafficking and bank robberies and sometimes as members of internationally operating criminal organizations (Grandjean, 1988:109). If only foreigners who are Swiss residents are considered, there is no major difference from their share in the general population.22 CORRELATES OF CRIME AND VICTIMIZATION Correlates of Victimization The results of the Swiss crime survey are in line with international knowledge insofar as the risk of suffering personal victimization seems largely linked to

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different lifestyles (Killias, 1989a: chap. 5; and on the relationship between lifestyle and crime in general, see Gottfredson, 1986). However, the risk of experiencing personal crime and burglary is not negatively correlated with education and income in Switzerland, whereas the U.S. data show that low-income groups are disproportionately victimized. This difference may be due to the absence of ghettos in Swiss cities and the effect of ghettos on victimization of the poor in the United States, where the higher risk of low-income groups may indeed be due to their greater proximity to potential offenders (Felson and Cohen, 1980). As a recent study of the geographical distribution of crime across the city of Lausanne reveals (Riva, 1988), there seems to be no particularly crime-ridden neighborhood, except for some concentration of crime in the central business district. Given this distribution pattern, low income may not be related to residence in high crime neighborhoods in Switzerland and therefore to a higher risk of victimization. People with higher incomes and education in Switzerland do tend to face higher risks of predatory crime, which may be due to their more varied lifestyle, including more frequent absences from home, and their higher attractiveness as potential targets (cf. Felson and Cohen, 1980; Cohen and Felson, 1979). Correlates of Juvenile Delinquency The results of studies on juvenile delinquency are in line with international knowledge inasmuch as they confirm the role of school failure, downward mobility (Buchmann, 1983), delinquent peers (Meili, 1977), and involvement in peer culture (Vaz and Casparis, 1971; Casparis and Vaz, 1979). Unfortunately, there has not been any reliable research assessing the extent of delinquency involvement among Swiss juveniles that could be used in international comparisons. The studies by Vaz and Casparis (1971) and Casparis and Vaz (1979) are limited to pupils of a few schools in Chur and Zurich, respectively. Besides their limited generalizability, they suffer from pitfalls in the definition of delinquent behavior. For instance, Vaz and Casparis (1971) considered "school probation" as an indication of serious misconduct, whereas it is a reaction to insufficient intellectual performance (mostly at a grammar school), meaning that the pupil has to switch to a lower-ranking school if his performance does not improve within a few months. Worse, Vaz and Casparis considered as delinquent certain behaviors that are typically expressions of high conformity, such as "gambling" (i.e., playing cards, a very popular leisure-time activity in Switzerland) or "carrying a concealed weapon" (which, according to their definition, logically includes Swiss army knives). Some other delinquency items suffer from ambiguity; for example, their definition of burglary includes even trivial forms of trespassing, and their theft item includes borrowing. These difficulties may explain the exceptionally high rate of "burglary" among their sample of students at a professional school in Zurich, namely, 14 percent over the last 12 months—or about six times the prevalence rate of breaking into buildings and cars among U.S.

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youths of the same age, according to the data from the National Youth Survey for 1982 (quoted from Jamieson and Flanagan, 1987:239). Unfortunately, Balvig (1988:51) uses the data of Casparis and Vaz (1979) to back his claim of a high prevalence of delinquency among Swiss juveniles but does not consider at all the limits of their feasibility. Crime and the Foreign Born Clinard (1978:136-45) observed that the crime rate among foreign workers in Switzerland tended to be lower than for Swiss of the same sex and age over the last few decades. Although more recent conviction data indicate that there may have been some minor change among the younger age groups, no major crime problem with immigrants has so far developed. Concerning the so-called second generation, the evidence is somewhat mixed (Queloz, 1986); overall, there is no indication of a serious crime problem among this group, contrary to the situation in some other European countries (see our review of European research on this topic: Killias, 1988b). A constantly low unemployment rate as well as a rather successful integration of young immigrants within the school system may have contributed to the prevention of delinquency and deviance among foreign-born adolescents. PUBLIC ATTITUDES ABOUT CRIME CONTROL Reporting Crime to the Police The factors that influence the victim's decision to report a crime to the police are, in Switzerland, largely the same as anywhere else (for an international review, see Skogan, 1984). The decision depends mainly on the seriousness of the offense, direct or indirect advantages the victim may hope to gain through a complaint (e.g., insurance coverage), and the risk of unfortunate side effects (e.g., on the victim's reputation). Overall, the rate of crime reported to the police is high in Switzerland, close to 100 percent in cases of theft of motor vehicles, between 80 and 90 percent for robbery and burglary, and above 50 percent for attempted robbery and burglary. The rate is lower for crimes against the person, with about one case of assault and battery out of three being reported, but it still reaches 56 percent for rape (including attempted rape) if the victim did not know the offender. In sum, these rather high rates of reporting suggest that the police and the criminal justice system are favorably viewed by most respondents, and as the data of the Swiss crime survey indicate, this does indeed seem to be the case. Fear of Crime In most victimization surveys, fear of crime has been measured by a question about how safe or unsafe one feels when walking alone at night within one

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kilometer of one's home. This indicator of fear of crime is highly correlated with measures of physical vulnerability, such as gender, age, and fitness, and certain situational characteristics of the neighborhood; in Switzerland, the proximity of forests turned out to be a major factor of fear among the rural population. For these reasons, items like this are not very useful in international comparisons. More relevant may be measures of precautionary behaviors, such as a tendency to use cabs or private cars rather than public transportation (in order to prevent criminal encounters), to have a burglary alarm system, to go out only when accompanied by others, and so on. A few such behaviors have been measured in the Swiss crime survey, but to date there is not much comparative data available. For example, about 7 percent of U.S. households had a burglary alarm in 1984, whereas the Swiss rate is 3.6 percent. Punitiveness Generally speaking, the Swiss public is in agreement with the country's current penal policy. Only a minority share the view that prisons are too "soft," somewhat resembling hotels. One half of the respondents do not believe that harsher penalties would help to reduce the crime rate. And the majority is against capital punishment, a viewpoint which suggests that the death penalty receives less support from the public the longer it has been abolished. (In Switzerland, capital punishment was officially abolished in 1942, when the Swiss Criminal Code became legally effective. But in 15 cantons, with more than 75 percent of the country's population, it had already been abolished between 1854 and 1874, and in the remainder extremely few executions occurred prior to 1942.) The death penalty and executions belong to a bygone era; there is no correlation between respondents' ages and their attitude toward capital punishment. This result suggests that the higher proportion of elderly respondents in favor of the death penalty in Germany, for example (Stephan, 1977), should be explained by their former experience with executions and/or their earlier socialization in a society where capital punishment used to be widely accepted. If attitudes favorable to the death penalty were linked simply to age, as other indicators of punitiveness are, the same would also hold true for Swiss respondents. As it stands, this interpretation must be ruled out. More generally, punitive attitudes seem to be correlated with a conservative worldview or Weltanschauung (Brillon, 1987:44-46). Besides, cultural traditions seem to play a considerable role here. For example, the French- and Italianspeaking Swiss believe much more than the Swiss-Germans in the effectiveness of harsh punishments and feel considerably more favorable toward capital punishment. This can hardly be explained in terms of variables such as the crime rate, general satisfaction with the criminal justice system, and legal traditions (e.g., concerning the death penalty). Nor can it be explained by demographic or political features of the French- and Italian-speaking regions, such as urbanization, economic structure, religion, and different political preferences at elec-

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tions. Since on all these potentially relevant variables the Swiss-Germans do not differ from the other Swiss populations, one is tempted to look for a cultural explanation. It may be that the " L a t i n s " in Switzerland possess more individualistic attitudes concerning governmental interference with civil liberties than the Swiss-Germans. There is indeed some evidence that this may be the case. Since individualism tends to focus on individual responsibility, it could be that it goes along with less of a "social understanding" of individual misconduct and, therefore, with more punitive attitudes. Perhaps cultural values may contribute significantly to the explanation of international variations in punitiveness. NOTES 1. For example, the chief of police of the canton of Zurich gave a press conference some days after its publication in order to "rectify" what he viewed as a distorted presentation of the crime situation in Switzerland. Although most Swiss readers may not have challenged its basic conclusions, many among them felt uncomfortable with Clinard's analysis, feeling that it gives a far too optimistic view of everyday life in Switzerland. Balvig's claim (1988:106)—that Clinard was a victim of the Swiss myth—seems rather unfounded; it may have its origin in a confusion between the presentation of Switzerland in pamphlets and guides available to tourists which largely reflect the image tourists would like to find confirmed, and the view of Switzerland as it is shared by the Swiss. 2. See the comprehensive bibliography of available data sources (since the early nineteenth century) in the Federal Office of Statistics (1985). 3. Minor differences between these two data sources are to be expected since police data are collected at the time of the act (i.e., the killing), whereas health statistics are based on the outcome (i.e., the death of the victim). These two events do not necessarily coincide in time; occasionally, they may fall into different calendar years. 4. Balvig (1988:45) for Denmark; Kaiser (1988:625) for Germany and Austria; and Jamieson and Flanagan (1987:243, table 3.73) for the United States. 5. Jamieson and Flanagan (1987:107, table 2.35; 261, table 3.79). 6. Besides the useful part the Swiss case can play in the debate about gun control, cross-national comparisons show surprisingly little attention paid to this issue, especially by the opponents of control. As an illustrative example of this, note how Wright, Rossi, and Daly (1983:3, 129-38) avoid international comparisons. Research inspired by the situational approach (e.g., on suicide) does suggest, however, that the availability of guns might have an impact on homicide rates, since it is a potentially important variable (Clarke and Mayhew, 1988:6, 10, 14). 7. This is especially important given the lack of reliable police data for all of Switzerland. There is also some uncertainty about whether federal police statistics give an account of the number of crimes reported to the police (input) or the number of cases transferred by the police to the prosecutor's office (output). 8. The slightly lower rates in German- and Italian-speaking regions may be due to minor changes in the design of the second survey (Killias, 1989a). 9. Unfortunately, there are no German, Austrian, French or Italian data available for international comparisons. A survey using mail questionnaires was conducted in the southwest of the Federal Republic of Germany (Baden-Wiirttemberg; Arnold, 1986). It yielded surprisingly high burglary rates, that is, about as high as the rates the National

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Crime Survey shows for the suburbs in U.S. standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSAs). Since the comparative study in Texas produced a burglary rate about three times the rate of burglary in U.S. cities (within SMS As; Arnold, 1986:1029), one may conclude that surveys based on mail questionnaires do not yield very reliable estimates of crime rates, whatever their merits may be in other respects. 10. This increase has been well documented by the annual Dutch victimization surveys conducted since 1973 (van Dijk and Steinmetz, 1984). Although Balvig's (1988) bibliography does include the French Swiss crime survey technical report, he based his conclusions mainly on a local victimization survey in the canton of Uri (Stadler, 1987), a rural alpine area with a population of approximately 30,000. This mail survey used a sample of 265 respondents and yielded a burglary rate as high as the one of U.S. suburbs within SMS As. Being similar in design to the study in Baden-Wiirttemberg (Arnold, 1986), it may have produced far too high victimization rates. Whatever the merits of local crime surveys, it seems obvious that their results are not very reliable if the sample has not been reasonably large, and their generalizability to other parts of the country raises many open questions, particularly if the geographical area studied is rather atypical. Unfortunately, Balvig does not consider any of these issues. 11. Besides, tax evasion seems to be correlated with the level of taxes (Pommerehne, 1983). Why should Switzerland, given its low taxes, have a sensationally high rate of tax evasion? Neither Clinard nor Balvig addresses this issue. 12. Usually, such rates are computed on a base of 100,000 inhabitants, but this may be inadequate whenever the numerator varies independently of the denominator. For example, the number of fraudulent bankruptcies may be a function of the number of registered companies rather than of a country's population. Similarly, the importance of money laundering may depend on a country's position in international banking much more than on its population. Therefore, the total turnover of financial institutes may be a more adequate denominator in assessing the comparative importance of certain kinds of illegal operations. Of course, the need to look at appropriate denominators, in addition to the already numerous difficulties in assessing the numerators, will complicate even more the task of comparative criminology. Indeed, it is doubtful whether Clinard or Balvig seems to have recognized this problem. 13. For example, the impact of bank secrecy laws, different control procedures, and various taxation systems (including the level of taxes) on white-collar crime can only be adequately studied in a cross-national design; research within one nation necessarily lacks variance in the independent variables. 14. Federal Office of Statistics (1988). The incarceration rate of 56 is based on an average number of approximately 3,600 convicted inmates on any given day during the year 1987. Besides, there is an unknown number of prisoners awaiting trial in Swiss prisons and jails; their number is estimated at about 25 to 30 percent of the total prison population, that is, between 1,200 and 1,800. Thus, the estimated total incarceration rate of 75, being based on a total number of 4,800 prisoners, should be considered as a rather conservative estimate. 15. An entire 1983 issue of the Swiss Criminal Law Review [Revue Penale Suisse] was devoted to the impact of an ever-growing number of drug addicts among the inmates of the correctional system. 16. In connection with drug trafficking, a relatively high number of people from Asia and Latin America are regularly arrested at airports. Many of them have no ties at all to

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Switzerland. Therefore, the prison population is becoming increasingly heterogeneous in language and cultural background. 17. According to recent data published by the Federal Office of Statistics (1988), the average length of prison sentences rose from 74 days in 1982 to 114 days in 1987, thus by 54 percent. The number of persons entering the correctional system remained stable over this period. Therefore, the increase of the incarceration rate over the last few years is due to an increase in the average severity of sentences, not to a growing number of convictions. 18. Federal Office of Statistics (1988). 19. According to an unpublished master's dissertation (Bultmann, 1980), the defendant's social status explains approximately 20 percent of the variance in sentences in cases of murder when other relevant variables are being held constant. This study is based on an analysis of murder trials heard by the courts of the canton of Zurich. 20. Thanks are due to the Federal Office of Statistics for having provided the author with these unpublished data. 21. In 1987, 22 percent of those going to prison were of foreign origin, compared with 14.4 percent of adult foreign residents in the general population. However, when only foreign residents among the prison inmates are considered, there is no longer a disproportionate number of foreigners in the correctional system (Federal Office of Statistics 1988). 22. This, of course, does not rule out the possibility that nonresidents are subjected to differential treatment. Such a hypothesis would, however, have to explain why only nonresident but not resident foreigners are victims of discrimination. Balvig (1988:6465, 106), who claims that the racist tendencies among the Swiss produce this kind of bias, unfortunately offers no such explanation.

REFERENCES Adler, F. 1983. Nations Not Obsessed with Crime. Littleton, Colo.: Rothman. Archer, D., and R. Gartner. 1984. Violence and Crime in Cross-National Perspective. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Arnold, H. 1986. "Criminelle Viktimisierung und ihre Korrelate. Ergebnisse international vergleichender Opferbefragungen." Zeitschrift fiir die Gesamte Strafrechtswissenchaft 98, no. 4:1014-58. Balvig, F. 1988. The Snow-White Image: The Hidden Reality of Crime in Switzerland. Oslo: Norwegian University Press. Bemasconi, P. 1984. Diritto penale e societa moderna. 2d ed. Lugano: San Giorgio. Brillon, Y. 1987. Victimization and Fear of Crime among the Elderly. Toronto and Vancouver: Butters worths. Buchmann, M. 1983. Konformitdt und Abweichung imJugendalter. Diessenhofen, Switzerland: Ruegger. Bultmann, H. 1983. "AskriptiveDeterminanteninstitutionellerPunitivitat." Unpublished manuscript, Sociological Institute of the University of Zurich. Burgstaller, M. 1983. "Empirische Daten zum neuen Strafrecht." Oesterreichische Juristenzeitung 38:617-26. Casparis, J., and E. W. Vaz. 1979. Swiss Family, Society and Youth Culture. Leiden: E. J. Brill. Chesnais, J. -C. 1981. Histoire de la violence en Occident de 1800 a nos jours. Paris: R. Laffont.

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Clarke, R.V.G., and P. Mayhew. 1988. "The British Gas Suicide Story and Its Criminological Implications." In Crime and Justice, vol. 10, ed. M. Tonry and N. Morris. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Clinard, M. B. 1978. Cities with Little Crime: The Case of Switzerland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Clinard, M. B., and J. Junger-Tas. 1979. "Probleme und Resultate beim Vergleich intemationaler Victim-Surveys." In Das Verbrechensopfer, ed. G. F. Kirchhoff and K. Sessar. Bochum: Brockmeyer. Cohen, L. E., and M. Felson. 1979. "Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine Activity Approach." American Sociological Review 44, no. 4:588-608. Cusson, M. 1988. "L'execution des peines face a la montee du crime." Revue Internationale de Criminologie et de Police Technique 41, no. 3:275-88. Federal Office of Statistics. 1985. Bibliographic zur schweizerischen Kriminalstatistik. Bern: OFS. Federal Office of Statistics, 1988. Execution des peines 1987 (Statistique de la criminalite no. 6). Bern: OFS. Felson, M., and L. E. Cohen. 1980. "Human Ecology and Crime: A Routine Activity Approach." Human Ecology 8, no. 4:389-406. Flanagan, T. J., and E. F. McGarell, eds. 1986. Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics—1985. Washington, DC: GPO. Gottfredson, M. R. 1986. "Substantive Contributions of Victimization Surveys." In Crime and Justice, vol. 7, ed. M. Tonry and N. Morris. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Grandjean, C. 1988. Les effets des mesures de securite: L'exemple des attaques a main armee contre les etablissements bancaires en Suisse. Griisch, Switzerland: Ruegger. Gurr, T. R. 1976. Rogues, Rebels and Reformers. Beverly Hills: Sage. Hirschi, T., and M. R. Gottfredson. 1987. "Causes of White-Collar Crime." Criminology 25 no. 4:949-74. Hough, M., and P. Mayhew. 1985. Taking Account of Crime: Key Findings from the Second British Crime Survey. London: HMSO. Jamieson, K. M., and T. J. Flanagan, eds. 1987. Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics—1986. Washington, DC: GPO. Kaiser, G. 1988. Kriminologie, Ein Lehrbuch. 2d ed. Heidelberg: Miiller. Killias, M. 1985. "Devalorisation de la peine par 1'inflation des lois penales." In Le role sanctionnateur du droit penal, ed. J. Gauthier. Fribourg, Switzerland: Editions Universitaires Fribourg. Killias, M. 1987. "Ueberfullte Gefangnisse—was nun? Zur aktuellen Bedeutung der Forschungen uber Gefangenenraten." In Aktuelle Probleme des Straf—und Massnahmenvollzugs, ed. J. Schuh. Griisch: Ruegger. Killias, M. 1988a. "Diskriminierendes Anzeigeverhalten von Opfem gegeniiber Auslandern?" Monatsschrift fur Kriminologie und Strafrechtsreform 71, no. 3:156-65. Killias, M. 1988b. "La delinquance juvenile des migrants de la deuxieme generation. Essai de bilan des recherches europeennes." In ed. J. Schuh, pp. 223-84. Jeunesse et delinquance. Griisch: Ruegger. Killias, M. 1989a. Les Suisses face au crime. Griisch: Ruegger. Killias, M. 1989b. "New Methodological Perspectives for Victimization Surveys." International Review of Victimology, 1, no. 2:.

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Killias, M., and R. Aeschbacher. 1988. "Combien y a-t-il de Suisses qui ont connu la prison?" Bulletin de Criminologie 14 no. 1:3-14. Killias, M., and C. Grandjean. 1987. "Chomage et taux d'incarceration: L'exemple de la Suisse de 1890 a 1941." Deviance et societe 10:309-22. Killias, M., and G. Riva. 1984. "Crime et insecurite: un phenomene urbain?" Revue Internationale de Criminologie et de Police Technique 37, no. 2:165-80. Koppel, H. 1984. Time Served in Prison (Special Report of the Bureau of Justice Statistics). Washington, DC: GPO. Kriminalstatistik des Kantons Zurich (KRISTA). Various years. Edited by Kantonspolizei Zurich. Kuhn, A. 1987. "Les origines du surpeuplement carceral en Suisse." Deviance et Societe 11, no. 4:365-79. Landreville, P. 1988. "La surpopulation des prisons. Quelques considerations a partir de la situation canadienne." Deviance et Societe 12, no. 3:291-96. Lopes Rocha, M. A. 1987. "Evaluation critique de l'application du Code penal portugais." International Annals of Criminology 25, nos. 1-2:29-54. Meili, B. 1977. "Familie, Schule, Freunde und Jugenddelinquenz." Bulletin de Criminologie 3, no. 2:22-39. National Central Bureau of Statistics. 1981. Living Conditions, Report No. 24: Victims of Violence and Property Crimes—1978. Stockholm: NCBS. Pommerehne, W. 1983. "Steuerhinterziehung und Schwarzarbeit als Grenzen der Staatstatigkeit." Schweizerische Zeitschrift fiir Volkswirtschaft und Statistik 119, no. 3:261-84. Queloz, N. 1986. La reaction institutionnelle a la delinquance juvenile. Neuchatei, Switzerland: EDES. Reiss, A. J., Jr. 1971. The Police and the Public. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Riva, G. 1988. Morphologie de Vespace urbain et delits contre le patrimoine a Lausanne en 1980. Griisch: Ruegger. Schmid, N. 1985. "Wirtschaftskriminalitat in der Schweiz." Zeitschrift fiir Schweizerische s Recht 104, no. 2:135-293. Schultz, H. 1978. "Die Bedeutung der Wirtschaftskriminalitat in der Schweiz." In Wirtschaftskriminalitat—Beurteilung der Schuldfahigkeit, ed. H. Goppinger and H. Walder. Stuttgart: Enke. Schultz, H. 1987. Bericht und Vorentwurf zu einem Allgemeinen Teil ( . . . ) des schweizerischen Strafgesetzbuches. Bern: Stampfli. Skogan, W. G. 1984. "Reporting Crimes to the Police: The Status of World Research." Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 21, no. 2:113-37. Stadler, H. 1987. Kriminalitat im Kanton Uri. Eine Opferbefragung. Entlebuch, Switzerland: Huber. Statistisches Jahrbuch der Stadt Zurich. Annual. Edited by Statistisches Amt der Stadt Zurich. Stephan, E. 1977. "Die Einstellung zur Todesstrafe." Zeitschrift fiir die Gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft 89:1046-67. Stratenwerth, G., and A. Bernoulli. 1983. Der schweizerische Strafvollzug. Ergebnisse einer empirischen Untersuchung. Aarau, Switzerland: Sauerlander.

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Svensson, B. 1986. "Welfare and Criminality in Sweden." In Situational Crime Prevention: From Theory to Practice, ed. K. Heal and G. Lay cock. London: HMSO. Toumier, P. 1986. "Statistiques sur les populations carcerales dans les Etats-Membres du Conseil de l'Europe." Bulletin d'Informations Penitentiaires (ed. by the Council of Europe), no. 7. vanDijk, J.J.M., andC.H.D. Steinmetz. 1984. "The Burden of Crime in Dutch Society." In Victimization and Fear of Crime: World Perspectives, ed. R. Block. Washington, DC: GPO. Vaz, E. W., and J. Casparis. 1971. "A Comparative Study of Youth Culture and Delinquence: Upper Middle-Class Canadian and Swiss Boys." International Journal of Comparative Sociology 12, no. 1:1-23. Wilkins, L. T. 1965. Social Deviance. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Wright, J. D.; P. H. Rossi, and K. Daly. 1983. Under the Gun: Weapons, Crime and Violence in America. New York: Aldine.

City dwellers exploring a mountain village in the Valais Courtesy of the Swiss National Tourist Office, Zurich

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Rural Continuity and Urban Change in the Mountain Regions FRANgOISE LIEBERHERR-GARDIOL THE MOUNTAIN REGIONS: UNITY WITHIN DIVERSITY If George Orwell had lived in a Swiss mountain region, he surely would not have conceived of 1984 as a terrifying totalitarian world. In that year, Swiss mountain regions were not only numerous but also culturally and socioeconomically varied. However, they displayed a certain Helvetic unity rooted in a thousand-year-old bucolic and agricultural history. Postcards, in 1984, depicted modern mountain scenery not without signs of city life but nonetheless informed by a rural character which has survived through many social mutations. Also in 1984, the way of life in the alpine areas approached that of the Swiss average. Nonetheless, a countrified mentality had its roots in a deep sense of the land and of community, creating pride of belonging and of mountain prosperity. In Switzerland, all the major social currents have touched all the mountain regions. Integration into a market economy has put an end to agro-pastoral selfsufficiency, industrialization has brought the domination of technology, urbanization has transformed earlier models of life and of consumption, and a general openmindedness of ideas has introduced different and planet-scale perceptions of the world. However, the speed and the tempo of penetration of these changes differ from valley to valley. In particular, many mountain areas have passed directly from a traditional pre-industrial agrarian economy to a stage of postindustrial socioeconomic development characterized by tourism, without passing through the intermediate stage of industrialization. In Swiss national ideology, mountains occupy a very special place. In the troubled times of the eighteenth century, the towns saw the Alps and mountain

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dwellers as "an authentic and natural world inhabited by gentle savages." In the nineteenth century, with the development of modern Switzerland, the dynamic towns, constructing a new political and economic system, sought in the mountains a model that would compensate for the insecurity accompanying rapid growth. Unifying symbols like the Alps, cradle of democracy and guardian of the communal values of equality and solidarity, came to represent a unanimous reference point for the Swiss people. A national consciousness centering on a "reconciliation" of the towns and the mountain areas contributed to the integration of a modernized Switzerland, perceived as being continuous with its past and without any threatening discontinuity of identity.1 Thus, in popular consciousness the mountain is a symbolic force which prolongs the founding myth of primitive Switzerland.2

DAILY LIFE What is the daily life like of today's mountain dwellers? What remains of William Tell, the proud and independent Swiss hero who occupies a prominent place in our legends and appears by the thousands in our advertisements and political drawings? At first glance the foreign visitor's attention would be drawn to the old wooden chalets that have existed for generations. Then he would notice their newer imitations, as well as the entire mini-towns in wood and concrete that are found in various places, depending on the area. There are all the typical earmarks of progress: jeeps and televisions, agricultural machines and ultramodern ski lifts, hang gliders and computers. The classrooms of the mountains look like the classrooms of the cities. The young of the mountains, with their clothing, leisure sports, and identity symbols, are brothers and sisters of the city youth. Modernity is the daily stuff of television programs, cafe conversations and professional life. Mountain life is like life everywhere. But despite this, in the development of life in the mountains two traits stand out by way of contrast with life in the cities. One is that the gap between today's 15 to 25-year-old generation and that of their parents is much more accentuated in the mountains. The young pay lip service to the earlier generation, but they belong to a different world that leisure and consumption dominate. Their solidarity, founded on music, motorcycles, and Coca-Cola, is no longer of the village but shares in an international world of values. The second trait is the underlying layer of a farming civilization that adopts and adapts to modernity without eradicating its attachment to a natural territory and space. Whether the mountain people are bank employees or engineers, students or apprentices, young or old, they continue to be "countrymen in their souls," who grow hay or harvest potatoes. This fundamental characteristic will be our main thread in the discussion that follows here.

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STUDIES OF MOUNTAIN LIFE The Swiss Alps were an important subject of research in the 1960s. Spectacular postwar economic growth acted as an engine of urbanization and progress in these peripheral regions, braking depopulation and desertion. In Switzerland one principal current of studies was socioeconomic analyses, or statistical indicators, attempting to diagnose mountain health principally by measuring the demographic and economic vitality of the various regions. Conceived in order to satisfy political concerns, these studies served as a basis for the preparation of numerous support and development programs aimed at correcting economic inequalities, stemming the exodus from the mountains, modernizing agriculture and creating employment in new activities.3 If the Swiss appear to have approached their mountains with a certain perspective of social efficacy and utility, U.S. anthropologists also showed an interest in the Swiss Alps. Relatively complete in their cultural diversity, the mountain areas appeared to them to be a social microcosm, a special laboratory for observation, satisfying the methodological conditions of cultural difference and distance. Alpine exoticism, archaic country cultures, and village communities that were until recently self-sufficient all provided a select field of anthropological interest. In the most studied region, the Valais, many researchers explored either the passage from the traditional to the modern or the model of pluralism and political consensus. In particular, D. Weinberg, in her study of Bruson, presented the hypothesis of a successful adaptation of country people to modernity, evidence of which were a mastery of the earth and of agro-pastoral activities, an equilibrium between the two interdependent social units of house and village, and a diversification of jobs and of earnings within an autonomous framework. In an historico-demographic perspective, R. Netting was interested in the regulative systems by means of which population dynamics are adapted to the ecosystem, such as community institutions, agrarian techniques, and marriage strategies. E. Wiegandt, for her part, differed with the image of village conviviality, centering her study instead on the conflicts accompanying the division of wealth and power in an alpine community. Thus the American anthropologists contributed to the study of alpine populations, revitalizing the theoretical and methodological framework.4 Another source of knowledge of the mountain areas was provided by the international research program entitled Man and Biosphere (MAB). Studying the impact of human activities on ecosystems, this program attempts to establish scientific bases for a rational utilization and management of natural resources. Switzerland undertook the study of the mountain ecosystem, and four areas have been the object of in-depth research since 1980: Grindelwald, Aletsch, Davos and the Pays-d'Enhaut. In these places, studies have sought to answer certain important questions concerning carrying capacities and the equilibrium between the natural milieu and human activities, within the framework of the Swiss

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political objective of long-term preservation of the mountain regions as vital areas for economic and recreational activities. This interdisciplinary study program, which integrates research by naturalists, botanists, forestry experts, agronomists, geographers, economists, anthropologists and mathematicians, has made possible a high level of holistic and synthetic interpretation. Thus the MAB studies have made a conceptual contribution to an understanding of the mountain regions by articulating their fundamental components, which is to say, their natural and social systems.5 THE PAYS-D'ENHAUT, AN AGRO-TOURISTIC AREA In order to understand more concretely the relations between a mountain region's inhabitants and their social and natural environment, let us go to a Swiss mountain area, the Pays-d'Enhaut, literally meaning "The Land Above," which is a prealpine agro-touristic area in the canton of Vaud. Looked at through the magnifying glass of the MAB program,6 and considering the general characteristics of Swiss mountain areas, this region has a natural milieu favorable to agriculture, an economy diversified toward tourism and services, and a sociability balanced between the two poles of agrarian individualism (dispersed dwellings, summer nomadism) and collective participation in village associations and activities. The Pays-d'Enhaut rejected industry but also the monoculture of tourism. It chose a gradual evolution taken in small and measured steps over a sudden mutation characteristic of accentuated modernization, like certain areas of the Valais or Ticino. From its Germanic neighbors the Pays-d'Enhaut acquired a conservative spirit, whereas its French linguistic and cultural ties gave it a desire for independence from administrative and political centralization. Situated near Montreux and Gstaad, the Pays-d'Enhaut has 4,200 inhabitants and rises gradually from 830 to 2,250 meters above sea level, with a total area of 186 square kilometers. The microregion contains three communities, Chateau d'Oex, the biggest, an internationally famous tourist resort, and the more rural villages of Rougemont and Rossiniere. In this territory shaped by centuries of agro-pastoral exploitation, a quarter of the population practices both modern agriculture and a friendly village tourism. Here exist, side by side, tradition and modernism, rural identity and commercial values, maintained by a population made up of a rural majority and an urban minority. Although the modern changes that have affected this region are observable both visually and in daily lifestyle, the essentially rural nature of the area is apparent in greater depth in a few selected domains. Political Power and Local Clubs: From the Past to the Present In 1980 the farmers, who represented a quarter of the population of the Paysd'Enhaut, still held a large share of the political responsibilities. This overrepresentation of the rural element among community, regional and cantonal

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officials demonstrates that in this mountain community the loci where socioeconomic planning occurs and where rural perceptions are drawn upon are ideologically and culturally integrated in a rural view of life. As for the local associations, besides the numerous sports clubs and the traditional groups for target practice, music and singing have remained very active. Thus community identity is reaffirmed at festivals and club celebrations. The shooting club festivities glorify the men's protection of their territory, and the theatrical and mixed-choir musical performances emphasize the importance of the mountains, the family, land, and work. This enthusiastic participation consolidates a local ideological unity and maintains the legitimacy of rural ways.

From Gardens to Mechanization The Pays-d'Enhaut of today is strongly involved in the surrounding economy and totally integrated into a monetary world. Yet half of its families still gather firewood directly from the forest, and three quarters of them grow their own vegetables. Therefore, systems of self-production and consumption, and old farm rituals still in use, constitute a sort of resistance to the dominant mercantile rationality. As for the management of the forests, the farmers' practices are criticized as "poor forest gardening" by the foresters. The latter exploit the forests as "cultivation," attempting to maximize their production; the farmers consider them instead a harvest capital to be held carefully in reserve against hard times in order to maximize their security. These differing conceptions of the forest's "productivity" and its use as a resource illustrate the particularity of the rural model. As for recent changes, they are generally perceived more often as negative and destructive than as positive and constructive. On the subject of mechanization, the farmers declare: Machines have changed our whole lives, but I don't know if we're really less tired, because there's always more work to be done. With all these machines, we've had to triple our livestock to get by. That means more land, more breakdowns, more repairs. It's a vicious circle. There are more expenses than before, so we're always in debt. Economic development is a chain reaction. We used to be dependent on the family for agricultural production; now we're dependent on the system.

Although machines seem to represent material and moral progress, they are often viewed ambivalently as a sort of technological aggression that challenges and overturns fundamental values: family farm work, land prices, the money/savings cycle. The farmer tries not to be dominated by machines and caught up in a machine rationality that would replace existing logic.

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The Images of the City The city is rarely visited by mountain dwellers, but it is viewed as a necessary complement, and young people tend to appreciate it. The city is a change of scene, a change of life-style, mixing with the crowd. If you don't go often enough, you lose touch with modernity, especially if you like keeping up with the times. I don't like the city because there's not enough room. It's not picturesque: no greenery and too much noise. We couldn't live there. In town everyone's in a hurry; nobody knows anybody. People there are cold. City people are ironic towards mountain people because they think we're underdeveloped. Thus the city's image has changed, generally speaking. The city's postwar attractiveness as a place of work and progress has been replaced by a more negative picture which takes into account its shortcomings, congestion, pollution, and delinquency. The city remains a chosen place for the consumption and leisure activities of mountain dwellers. In contrast, for city dwellers the mountain plays a new role as a spatious natural reserve, given their own deteriorating urban zones, and the mountains confirm for city inhabitants the continued existence of a rural lifestyle. A Managed Rural Environment Specialists use the concepts of environment and nature within a framework of technical and scientific rationality that often does not correspond to the ideas held by rural dwellers. For rural people the environment, which a strong majority feel should be given attention, does not indicate for them a generalized concept affecting the future, of the world, as is exemplified by modern ecological consciousness, but above all an open area for local living. We've got to keep it as it is—natural, unpolluted; it's got to remain the Pays-d'Enhaut. We must preserve the character of the area. We simply must. It's only natural to be clean. Moreover, a few people perceive the defense of the environment as a local task. We don't want to be told what to do. You see, it's a little hard for people here to accept outsiders teaching us a lesson. People do it themselves: the farmers here have always respected nature. The ecologists go too far.

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So for the inhabitants of the Pays-d'Enhaut, taking care of the environment, far from having to do with protecting the balance of nature, means primarily protecting their own rural way of life, which is the cultural model with which they identify. This profoundly rural sentiment contributes toward the integration of modern spatial transformations, which result from urban pressure, within the permanence dictated by an agrarian milieu. Between Two Models: Domesticated and Undomesticated Nature Although the expert and the city dweller often consider nature in its wild state, without human presence, in the Pays-d'Enhaut all the inhabitants view nature in its "humanized" state, and some of them distinguish a nature-agriculture relation. Nature is the milieu in which I live and which I take care of. It's an organized and managed nature. Nature is something which is essential: the livestock with their bells, grazing in the pastures; the picturesque haystacks; the old houses with their ornamental trim; thefirein the hearth. I like man's approach to nature. Of these different models of nature, the idea of a domesticated nature sheds light on the problem of natural reserves and the production of nature in its "pure" state. For the farmers, nature is their way of life, and for centuries they have had to struggle against its wild state. As they put it: We have to take care of nature to keep it beautiful; otherwise, it gets totally out of hand. It's too bad they're taking the livestock away at the Pierreuse, because it's turning into dead pastureland. There is a reserve, but it should be better taken care of to keep it alive. The Pierreuse is in horrible condition, full of thorns and tall yellowing weeds. You can't pass through there anymore. This very negative attitude toward natural areas, which is fairly widespread in the Pays-d'Enhaut and almost unanimous among the farming population, brings to light the way in which undomesticated or wild nature is the rural contradiction par excellence. Moreover, this outsiders' concept of a natural reserve provokes their ire for two specific reasons. First, they are convinced they are maintaining and protecting nature in the course of their agricultural activities, and it is as if their ability to do so were placed in doubt. Second, in a mountain region whose animals, plants and trails they know by heart, they resent the enclosed natural reserves as an appropriation of their territory, patrimony and identity. So in general these representations of nature, linked for most to inherited and personal experience in a rural mountain region, bear witness to the symbolic and emotional impact of farming in their mentality.

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Present changes in Tourism Tourism, which was introduced into the Pays-d'Enhaut at the end of the last century and which spread extensively in the postwar period, has become more or less accepted as an economic support system second to agriculture. Although the conflict between agriculture and tourism seems to be subdued now, in general the population feels that tourism should not become more developed than farming. As they express it: Tourism and agriculture should go together, the farmers working in tourism during the winter. Tourism should not develop too quickly. Tourism without farming, no; but the opposite is all right. Develop tourism? What will that lead to, since there's no more land? The true vocation of the Pays-d'Enhaut is in any case farming. This widespread underground resistance to tourism, which threads its way through all the studies that have been made, underscores the depth and breadth of rural identity, which has persisted through four generations of touristic activity. The mountain dwellers' role as "salesmen of vacations" stems more from a certain technocratic naivete than from the rural mountain reality. In fact, although tourism is a viable economic gamble in contemporary society, it is an increasingly vulnerable social risk, because by exploiting a landscape and a village it destroys the local cultural identity. Thus this complementarity, more or less desired or imposed, emphasizes the fact that the region's vocations as defined by its inhabitants are neither economic nor touristic but are first and foremost the original founding vocations of the Pays-d'Enhaut, namely a rural agricultural vocation and a village-oriented social one. FROM URBANIZATION TO THE RURALIZATION OF THE MOUNTAINS The consideration of the Pays-d'Enhaut has deepened our understanding of some of the mechanisms of contemporary history in the mountain regions. This particular region is part of a general evolutionary movement that involves all the mountain regions of Switzerland, characterized by the alternation of conservative currents, as in the case of the Pays-d'Enhaut, and more progressive tendencies in some of the other zones. In addition to a modernist violence and a technology omnipresent in everyday life, widespread leisure activities contrast with rural continuity and renewal. This recent evolution, which I define as mountain modernization, has occurred in two phases: first, an urban acculturation at the end of the 1950s and, later, rural reacculturation at the end of the 1970s. Both phases have developed within

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a logic of urban conquest and acculturation, with the mountain areas responding initially through a process of imitation-assimilation, later followed by a period of restructuration and accommodation. Scientific literature has widely analyzed urbanization as "not only the action of the town on the countryside . . . but also the invention of a way of life which is becoming universal. . . . The agents of these transformations are rural as well as urban. Urbanization is therefore a complex movement, at once economic, social, intellectual and affective" (Rambaud, 1969). This massive wave of urbanization of the peripheral areas, which came from the grounds well of postwar socioeconomic development, changed the face of the mountain regions within a single generation. The development of material and technical progress, the improvement in daily wellbeing, the changed pace of life which divided time into work time and leisure time, the broadened mentality stemming from televised pictures of events of global impact, and the confrontation with tourism and its cultural models all reached to the very core of these rural societies. Mountain areas became more interdependent with the cities and more open to an all-encompassing society in which they increasingly participated. The second phase, that of rural re-acculturation which appeared at the end of the 1970s, was born of the recent cultural crisis of the cities, which began to look toward the mountain to compensate for the accelerated breakdown of nature and the artificiality of city spaces and social relations. It also came from a new dynamism of the mountain regions, attributable to a certain economic and technical catching-up. While city dwellers continued to appreciate the recreation and relaxation offered by mountain life, mountain residents for their part, repulsed by the crowded, alienating cities, were motivated to become more creatively rooted in their regions. Undoubtedly the engine of cultural change is of urban origin, and the cities are preponderant. However, the scales have tipped somewhat toward a situation of complementarity, with the mountain areas gaining more and more control over their own future through a greater knowledge of the methods of development. But first and foremost this second phase of rural re-acculturation is more than just a simple shift in orientation. It is a profound change transforming an industrial society into a post-industrial society. Expressing doubts about the industrial ascendancy, previously considered boundless, the new tendency sought out new models and values to inform the future of people freed from material constraints and hungry for existential meaning. This phase of re-acculturation became superimposed upon that of urbanization without eliminating or contradicting the latter, and it overlapped with the prolonged evidences of mountain urbanization. It fits perfectly within an evolutionary logic in which there is a continuous counterbalancing of successive temporary states and the subsequent invention of a lifestyle rooted in a specific time and place—a counterbalancing process in which contradictory forces, ideas, and actions are accepted, rejected, and transformed and where objects become

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symbols of resistance or of modernization. The complex result is that there is a continual process of reinterpretation which is dominated sometimes by imitation, sometimes by invention. FARM RURALISM, REINVENTED RURALISM AND MOUNTAIN URBANISM In the recent process of rural re-acculturation, three interacting currents of differing intensity are traversing the rural mountain regions. I refer to them as farm ruralism, reinvented ruralism, and mountain ruralism. Briefly, the model of farm ruralism rests on a system of values in which the agricultural lifestyle is central and dominates the ideas people have of their social and cultural role, their existential ideals to which they aspire, and the ethical norms on which their behavior toward the natural and social environment is based. If farm ruralism signifies permanence, mountain urbanism, on the contrary, signifies a break with the past. According sole priority to the mountain regions' new touristic functions, mountain urban life is a lifestyle aimed exclusively at serving the needs of the cities within an area equipped, maintained and managed exclusively for them. As for reinvented rural life, it represents a convergence of the neo-urban interests of the mountain dwellers, the neo-rural values of the new urban residents of the mountain areas, and the norms of rural integration embodied in technocratic development projects. Combining modernized rural life with reequilibrated urbanism, reinvented ruralism implies a progressive transformation of lifestyles by means of modern changes which are judged worthwhile and are nonetheless oriented toward rural characteristics. An "inter-awareness" prevails that strengthens social cohesion, the simultaneous daily experience of a period of life, work, and recreation, the totality and poly valence of a village system in which activities and services multiply, and the persistence of a natural world managed directly by man. Within a single mountain region, two or even three of these different models interact with one another. Their interaction occurs in open societies that have held onto that minimum threshold of economic, demographic and social vitality and of cultural coherence needed to guarantee their reproduction, creating specific societal dynamics at particular places and moments in time. But to think in terms of social continuity, as opposed to linear and conflict-free evolution, signifies the continual confrontation of antagonistic situations which give structure and dynamics to the rural mountain societies. Old structural conflicts linked to social inequalities, and current conflicts resulting from struggles between exogenous and endogenous pressures, permanently characterize the social world. TRADITIONAL AND PROGRESSIVE ACTORS Tomorrow's ruralism, far from being programmed and already determined, progressively fashions itself through the continuous interaction among contra-

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dictory forces, some consolidating traditional cohesiveness and others breaking with cultural continuity and underlying values. Far from being a simple ruralized exhibition with folkloric customs, this rural reshaping appears as a syncretic and energic response to massive and homogenizing urbanization, exceeding the conditioned response to a single urban order. Catalyzing and complex forces crisscross each other, including corrections of the disequilibria that arise from technoeconomic development, resistance to certain urbanized values, and control of the dominant images to be borrowed. Social actors participate in various ways according to their value systems, their social roles and their political responsibilities. Some fall back on an attitude of rigid refusal and marginalization, others gradually modify their conceptions of life, and still others totally overturn their original ideas and opinions because of modernism. Certain forces converge to stimulate and reinforce rural reacculturation. In contemporary society, urban dwellers, tourists, and part-time residents project on the mountain areas their need for nature and for identity. By creating mythical images of the farmer, the village and nature, aided by a neo-ruralist ideology, postindustrial society—utilizing "a ready taste for the past" (Jollivet)—rehabilitates the rural milieu and reverses its former negative overtones (backward, static, archaic, underdeveloped). Moreover, in a development becoming more and more widespread in Switzerland, the notion of belonging to a territory that ensures historical continuity, social roots and cultural identity is gaining adherents. However, both the exogenous and endogenous conceptions that revalue mountain areas, and that seem to converge in a concern for conservation, reveal the ambiguity of an agreement that is at best superficial between very different ways of reasoning and needs. In the "civilization gap" between peripheral and urban areas, the former attempt to modernize their living space in order to participate in development and gain access to contemporary models of consumption. The urban areas, for their part, return to the wild and the authentic ways of the past in order to compensate for aggressive and unbalanced growth, and they ask the same of the mountain dwellers. The key to understanding these alpine spaces also means understanding the mental stance and different reasoning of the urban dweller, who is looking for some authentic, aesthetic or sports compensation for his frustration, and the mountain dweller, who finds in his region a history of the past, a contemporary identity, and a blueprint for the future. Thus, the overlap of these two currents, external and internal, urban and rural, fashions this tendency toward rural reacculturation. In the mountain regions, populations of diverse origin, rural and urban, and international tourists as well, bring to the situation a diversity of practices and ideas, interests and issues. TOWARD A WELL-BALANCED MODERNIZATION All these interacting forces give rise to different rural dynamics, and in their multiple combinations they produce many possible evolutionary forms of rural

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mountain societies. This means the integration of modernity, conceived as a logic of development resulting from economic, social and cultural upheaval, and the creation of permanent transformations overactivated by mass culture and technological development. This very dynamic emphasizes "the paradox of modernity: destruction and change, but also compromise, blending" (Baudrillard, 1972). Mountain ruralism, stimulated to come forward from the past by an all-encompassing and all-conquering society but without, however, rejecting its history, can produce a new culture with its own norms, behaviors, feelings, lifestyles, know-how, ethics, and authentic ways of thinking. Different collectivities continually organize and reorganize themselves because of the tremendous pressures of industrial dynamism, urban colonization, the diffusion of mass culture, a certain centralizing tendency of the state, and all the forms of leveling that promote integration. These open societies struggle against their own weakness and vulnerability by borrowing values from the past that they reinterpret for future use. Signs of fissures multiply within the massive, homogenizing movement that is urbanization. A positive and constructive response is to believe in a ruralism that reaffirms its creative capacities and reshapes its identity, a ruralism open to the pluralism of ideas and initiatives. It is our social responsibility to contribute to building new and original societies. It is a responsibility shared by all, urban dwellers and rural dwellers, officials and citizens, because nothing could be more dangerous than a rural area managed and manipulated by a single power that would monopolize both words and deeds. Multifaceted rural regions arise now, hybridizations of the rural and the urban, deep within the countryside, high up in the mountains, close to the metropolis. They are a counterpoise to the dominant urbanization and complement it with more personalized social relations, an alternative to a single cultural plan in which Homo Coca-colens progressively colonizes the planet. It is the task of rural dwellers to reshape the rural regions and that of non-rural dwellers to believe in the emerging rural lifestyles and to encourage them. NOTES 1. Compare L. Boltanski, Le bonheur Suisse (Paris: Ed. de Minuit, 1966); B. Crettaz, Un village suisse, Grimentz (Lausanne: Ed. d'Enbas, 1982); D. de Rougemont, La Suisse ou VHistoire d'un peuple heureux (Paris: Hachette, 1965). 2. We refer to the Pact of 1291 signed by three mountain cantons, Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwald. Because of this political act, the actor-figures are popularized in legends. As for William Tell, who refused to salute the hat of the bailiff Gessler, he figures as the hero of freedom. 3. See the following works, all published by the Presses Polytechniques Romandes, Lausanne, in 1985: M. Bassand and F. Hainard, Dynamique socioculturelle regionale', E. A. Brugger, Developpement economique regional: structures, acteurs et processus; E. A. Brugger and R. L. Frey, Politique regionale en Suisse: buts, problemes, expert-

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ences, reformes; G. Fischer and E. A. Brugger, Problemes regionaux en Suisse: resulta d'un programme national de recherche; G. Fischer, Disparites regionales en Suisse; R. L. Frey, Politique regionale, une evaluation. 4. Among the U.S. anthropologists, we will cite J. W. Cole, "Anthropology Comes Part Way Home: Community Studies in Europe," Annual Review of Anthropology 6 (1977); J. Friedl, Kippel: A Changing Village in the Alps (New York: Holt, Rinehart an Winston, 1974); W. Minge-Kalman, "Household Economy during the Peasant-to-Worker Transition in the Swiss Alps," Ethnology 17, no. 2 (1978); R. McC. Netting, "Of Men and Meadows: Strategies of Alpine Land Use," Anthropological Quarterly 45, no. 3 (1972); D. Weinberg, Peasant Wisdom: Cultural Adaptation in a Swiss Village (Berkeley University of California Press, 1975); E. Wiegandt, "Communalism and Conflict in the Swiss Alps," Ethnohistory 24, no. 2 (1977); and the special issue of the Anthropological Quarterly, "Dynamics of Ownership in the Circum-Alpine Area," 1972. 5. See E. A. Brugger, G. Furrer, B. Messerli, and P. Messerli, The Transformatio of Swiss Mountain Regions. Problems of Development between Self-Reliance and Dependency in an Economic and Ecological Perspective (Bern and Stuttgart: Haupt, 1984); J. Combe and C. Frei, Die Bewirtschaftung des Bergwaldes: Entscheidungsgrundlag und Handlungskonzepte (Bern: EDMZ, 1987); P. Messerli, Landwirtschaft, Tourism and Natur, ein neu zu schaffendes Gleichgewicht im Berggebiet (Bern: Hauptverlag, 1988); H. R. Mueller, Tourismus in Bergemeinden: Nutzen und Schaden (Bern, 1986) F. H. Schwarzenbach, Grundlagen einer Zeitgemassen Natur-, Land-Schafts- und Umweltschutzpolitik im Berggebiet (Bern: 1987); J. L. Spring, J. F. Fracheboud, C. Darbellay, and E. Stucki, Agriculture montagnarde et environnement naturel: une symbio a redecouvrir, a recreer et a perpetuer (Bern: EDMZ, 1986). 6. Study made for the MAB international research program (UNESCO) by F. Lieberherr-Gardiol under the following title: Des hommes et des natures, le Pays-d'Enhaut en 1984 (Bern: 1984). See also F. Lieberherr-Gardiol and E. Stucki, Sur nos monts quand la nature. .. Le Pays-d'Enhaut tourne vers I'avenir (Chateau d'Oex: Cermeier/EPFZ, 1987).

REFERENCES Baudrillard, J. 1972. "Modernite." In Encyclopedia universalis. Paris. Rambaud, P. 1969. Societe rurale et urbanisation. Paris: Seuil.

Families on a day outing in the Alps Courtesy of the Swiss National Tourist Office, Zurich

A festival on the Bernese Plateau Courtesy of the Swiss National Tourist Office, Zurich

12

Switzerland's Image Abroad YVES FRICKER In 1936, welcoming a foreign visitor, the president of the Swiss Confederation, Guiseppe Motta, declared to him: "One sure fact exists, a fact which is recognized and proclaimed by all foreigners. This is that Switzerland, in spite of its limited boundaries, enjoys a first class moral and political reputation'' (Schreiber, 1937:13). Today, a half century later, we are far from sharing such optimism concerning our country's image in the world. In 1965, summing up a series of articles in the Weltwoche pertaining to the world's perception of Switzerland, Jean Rodolph de Salis noted: "One thing is sure: in the past, Switzerland was often praised and now she is much censured" (de Salis, 1971:249). This preoccupation with a deterioration of Switzerland's image abroad has only increased since then; it forms today no small part of our foreign affairs policy and led, in 1974, to the creation of a Coordination Commission on Switzerland's Presence in the World, which regularly prepares reports on this problem. More recently, the annual Conference of Ambassadors in summer 1986 devoted a third of its considerations to the question of Switzerland's image, whereas the president of the Confederation in his year-end address expressed the wish that 1987 would prove more favorable for Switzerland's image than the preceding year had been. It is true that from the viewpoint of Switzerland's image the year 1986 was particularly burdened, given the vote of March 16,l the Marcos and Duvalier affairs, the revelations of the Iran-Contra affair, and finally the Schweizerhalle conflagration.2 In comparison, the year 1987 seems to have granted the president's wish. More precisely, in the prolongation of the vote of March 16, in which the Swiss people refused to have the country join the United Nations, we managed to rid ourselves a little of our concerns

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about Switzerland's "look" abroad and to address a more substantial question: We rediscovered Europe. It must be noted, however, that we approached this problem without really freeing ourselves of a narcissistic attitude. In the flood of declarations coming as much from the press as from the political class concerning the relations between Switzerland and Europe, one could look in vain for a real European policy or, more simply, a European project. There were only proposals, sometimes anxious, sometimes reassuring, on the theme of our possible marginalization. Faced with a Europe which is uniting or trying to unite, our narcissism continues as a withdrawal neurosis. How are we to understand this particular sensitivity concerning the reflection of ourselves that the world sends back to us? Obviously, we have lost our pride: Yesterday we strutted about displaying ourselves as models to the universe; today our ambassadors are given the mission of explaining the Sonderfall Schweiz to the four corners of the earth. The arrogance that we were able to show in the past was no more justified than the sentimentality that prevails today. The anxiety that besets us now with reference to Switzerland's image abroad does not refer to the latter's degradation but to our uncertainty as to our real place in the world: We are seeking in the perceptions of others the reflection of the certainties we have lost. Our anxiety about Switzerland's image in the world, like all persistent anxieties, will easily find material upon which to feed. Without in any way desiring to offer a complete catalog of the criticisms leveled at our country, for illustrative purposes we will be content with recalling two critical themes strongly associated with Switzerland. The first theme is that of secrecy. It is certainly connected with banking activities and with bank secrecy. From this viewpoint, critics depict the Swiss as a people of "fences" (Lenin) or of "launderers of dirty money." In a more general way, the theme of secrecy is associated with the entire economy of the country. Thus, for example, on the occasion of a commentary pertaining to "the Adams affair," the London Review of Books (1984:6) depicted Switzerland as a country that identified itself as a bank, with an economy based entirely on secrecy, and which does not know habeas corpus. More recently, the same theme appeared at the time of the unsuccessful public offering made by Hoffmann-La Roche to buy Sterling Drug. The complaint that Sterling registered against Hoffmann-La Roche described the Swiss "raider" as an enterprise which has prospered in the shelter of discreet and unacceptable laws that have made of Switzerland a kind of "Swiss Inc." (Le Courrier, January 13, 1988). This theme of a secret Switzerland is found even in those texts that present a generally favorable picture of our country. Thus the work of John McPhee, La Place de la Concorde Suisse, besides presenting a colorful picture of military exercises, offers an image of Switzerland that shows it as a sort of a military-banking complex characterized by a high degree of patronage. Another theme very often associated with Switzerland is that of withdrawal. It is certainly linked with our status of permanent neutrality and more generally

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with our abstention regarding questions of international collective action. This political abstention combined with a strong international economic presence will emerge as an image of Switzerland symbolized by the coupling of the "octopus" and the "hedgehog"; we have a Switzerland that is a politico-military "hedgehog" on one hand, and an economic-financial "octopus," on the other. Considering this paradoxical pair, it is very often by the measure of the octopus's reach that the withdrawal of the hedgehog will be judged (Secretan, 1973:108). It is thus undeniable that Switzerland may become the object of sometimes severe criticism. This should nevertheless be placed in perspective. To do this it is proper to have in hand indications concerning both the shifts and the relative position of Switzerland's image. On this point we must be satisfied with data which are much more summary but which have the advantage of permitting us to go back to pre-war years, that is, to about the time President Motta uttered the judgment that we recollected when beginning our analysis. The first public opinion polls on a national scale were taken during the second half of the 1930s, first in the United States, then in France and Great Britain. In June and July 1939, the same question bearing directly on our problem was asked in all three countries. Those questioned were asked which foreign country they preferred. Switzerland passed this test more than honorably; it was ranked third in both France and the United States and sixth in Great Britain (The Gallup Poll, p. 167). This type of question has been regularly repeated in slightly different forms, and the results of 1939 may be scrutinized with regard to more recent data. One can, for example, compare them with those obtained within the framework of the "Euro-barometers" of the entire European Community in 1970, 1976, 1980 and 1986. These results bear witness to the degree of confidence the various populations evince regarding others. On each occasion Switzerland was ranked first from the viewpoint of the degree of confidence it inspired among the peoples of the Community. Commenting on Switzerland's score in 1986, Rabier wrote in the Euro-barometer: "People have the most confidence in the Swiss. One can undoubtedly say that Switzerland is the prototype of the country in which one places his trust. Geographically small and militarily neutral, it threatens no one; its image in international opinion is probably that of a calm and peaceful place, sheltered from the dangers that threaten the rest of the world" (Rabier, 1986). To complete the data pertaining to Switzerland's image, I will mention a survey made at the end of 1986 in Japan and the United States. Within the framework of this joint inquiry, subjects were specifically asked to indicate, out of a list of thirty countries, those toward which they felt the most sympathy. In Japan, Switzerland ranked third, on a par with China and behind the United States and Great Britain. In the United States, Switzerland ranked fourth, behind Canada, Great Britain, and Australia (World Opinion Update, 1987:32-33). The comparison of the results obtained recently—not only in the European Community, Japan, and the United States but also in other countries, from Finland to South Korea—with those available for the prewar years seems to me

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to justify a twofold conclusion. First, during the last half century, the admiration felt abroad for Switzerland, far from having declined, has at the very least remained stable and has probably become even more favorable. Second, from a comparative viewpoint, throughout this period the opinion held about Switzerland in the industrial countries was good, even very good. These results, comforting though they may be, nevertheless leave us with one question: From whence comes the recurrent anxiety that we exhibit—if not visa-vis the world, at least vis-a-vis the reflection of ourselves that the world sends back to us? I must confess that I do not have a definite answer to this question. It seems to me, however, that it calls forth a hypothesis that deserves to be examined. If nothing in the reflection of Switzerland that the world sends back to us can justify our anxiety, then we must look within ourselves for the source of our uneasiness. To understand it, we must make a detour and ask ourselves no longer about the quality of Switzerland's image abroad but about the nature of its presence in the world. And to introduce this question, I will refer to a novel. In the opening pages of Le chaos et la nuit (1963), Henri de Montherlant introduces us to his hero conversing with a friend. Celestino, an anarchist and "veteran" of the Spanish Civil War, a refugee in Paris for the last 20 years, passes in review different countries of the planet: To the north there is England, an incomprehensible country, and the Scandinavian states, incomprehensible countries. To the south, there's the Vatican; the dome of Saint Peter's is the extinguisher of Western thought. . . . Surrounding the Vatican, there is Italy, whose planes protected Franco's reinforcements at the time when the game was hardly over. . . . To the west, there is the United States. The United States is the hope of the world. On one side Good, on the other Evil, that's evident; I learned that from the good Fathers. The United States, that's the Evil. I still prefer the Pope to America, he concluded, his eyes aflame. To the east, there's Germany, an incomprehensible country. . . . There's Switzerland, says the little one, with a mocking and malicious air, as if he were setting a trap for the adult. The adult did not budge. Switzerland is a very very very important country. The only civilized country where there are no decorations. An example that Switzerland sets for the world. Nobody knows it, and if they knew it, they would not understand, or rather they would disapprove. To think that even the U.S.S.R. has decorations. (Pp. 15-16) One learns in the course of the novel that if Switzerland assumes such importance in Celestino's eyes, it is perhaps not only because decorations do not exist there but also because of the fact that the modest means he has at his disposal for meeting his needs reach him by way of a Swiss bank. Let us pause, nonetheless, at Celestino's tirade. In the picture that it offers us of the planet, Switzerland occupies a special place. The importance that Celestino attributes to it does not flow from its power but from what it personifies or symbolizes; through its rejection of decorations, it embodies a central aspiration of the anarchism that de Montherlant's hero advocates, to wit: the rejection

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of, if not the hierarchical order, then at least the social symbols with which it likes to adorn itself. De Montherlant, or at least his hero, leads us to notice the special form of Switzerland's presence in the world. This places the country somehow beyond "the sound and the fury" of history, and it is already in such strokes that Voltaire pictured it. In his Essai sur les moeurs, the patriarch of Ferney questions "the story of the apple," which seems to him "very suspect." Nevertheless, defining Switzerland's role in history, he declares that "she would be nothing if she hadn't become free" (Voltaire, 1963:664). A century after Voltaire, in Considerations sur Vhistoire universelle (1971), which refers to the rise of power of nation-states—principally Italy and Germany—the Basel historian Jakob Burckhardt asks himself about the destiny and the reason for existence of small states. If "the historical mission of the great State is the accomplishment of striking actions," the small state must exist as witness. "The small state exists so that there may be a corner on earth where the greatest number of inhabitants may enjoy their citizenship in the real sense of the word. . . . The small state possesses nothing other than the genuine and real liberty, by means of which it fully compensates, on the ideal level, the enormous advantages and even the power of the big states" (p. 61). A century passes, and man holds in his hands and experiments with the means to put an end to the protoplasmic adventure on our planet. A philosopher of German origin, a citizen of Basel by adoption, Karl Jaspers (in La bombe atomique et Vavenir de Vhomme, published in 1963) wonders about the survival of the small state. He points out, referring to Switzerland, that "a small nation that wishes to defend its independence, finally understands, in its struggle with the big powers, its powerlessness in world politics. It withdraws into itself and henceforth favors the development of an ethic, thanks to which it can remain small" (p. 249). Nearer to our times, a British author, Jonathan Steinberg, concludes his work entitled Why Switzerland? published in 1976, by noting that "Switzerland is not simply another rich and small state in the heart of Europe. It is the living expression of a totality of ideas" (p. 188). The patriarch of Ferney, the patrician of Basel, the German philosopher, and the Cambridge professor all agree and confirm, if needed, the intuition that de Montherlant attributes to Celestino: Switzerland is the realization of a Utopia. And in order to specify the outlines of this Utopia or this mythical vision of Switzerland, it is certainly to Gonzague de Reynold that we must address ourselves. In the two monumental works that he devoted to the Histoire litteraire de la Suisse au XVIII siecle (1809, 1912), de Reynold has shed light on the development of an ideal vision of Switzerland, its landscapes, its inhabitants, and its institutions, a vision that he will call "Helvetism." De Reynold emphasizes the major role played by certain Swiss writers such as Haller, Gessner and Lavater in the formation of such an image of Switzerland. He is careful, however, to note that this development, far from being strictly

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national, has benefited from a considerable external contribution. Returning briefly to this question in the context of a study following his great analysis of Swiss literature, and examining the image of Switzerland during the second half of the eighteenth century, he writes: Switzerland was in fashion. Abroad a pastoral and patriarchal conception characterized it, a completely false conception and one which was not long in becoming dangerous. For it evoked "free Helvetia" as an Arcadia where a Golden Age continued to reign, an Arcadia peopled by shepherds living in total equality, on the milk of their sheep, in huts decorated withflowers.In foreign eyes Switzerland was a republic in a state of nature, or nearly so. But the most curious thing is that the Swiss themselves experienced the prestige of this illusion; theyfirmlybelieved that their ancestors had been shepherds, that they had conquered kings and chased out tyrants through the sole force of their arms, their virtues, and their just cause, and that the only way to save Switzerland was to return to these primitive customs. Celebrated works illustrated this conception: Haller's Alpes, Gessner's Idylles, the Chantes Suisses by Lavater, La Nouvelle Heloise by Roussea was also to enter European literature through Schiller's William Tell, Byron's poems, Lamartine, and Hugo, and European romanticism would bring it back to Switzerland in due course, (de Reynold, 1984:205-6) Concluding this historical review, de Reynold stated: "It was, then, in the eighteenth century that certain myths were formulated which the Swiss still exploit today" (p. 206). This mythical dimension that is associated with Switzerland is today still alive and well not only within the country but also outside its frontiers. Indeed, everything leads us to believe that Switzerland presents, today at least, a remarkable prominence in the minds of foreign publics. Thus, for example, the polls that ask individuals to indicate their opinions with regard to a series of countries show that people are better able to give an opinion concerning Switzerland than other European states of the same importance. This fact is found not only in various countries of Europe but also in the United States and Japan. This leads us to an initial observation that should obligatorily preface all studies of Switzerland's image abroad. On the one hand, the country is exposed to only weak media coverage, whereas on the other, it benefits from considerable salience in public opinion. Any study of Switzerland's image that is not destined to futility must take account of this paradox. Although benefiting only from tenuous if not nonexistent media coverage, Switzerland is nonetheless conceded an important place on the international scene. This symbolic dimension of Switzerland's presence in the world is certainly not the exclusive prerogative of the country. Without difficulty, one can find it associated with a fair number of states. Thus, for example, France is taken to be the country of the rights of man, and the United Kingdom that of habeas corpus and of parliamentary democracy. As uncommon as this phenomenon may

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Table 12.1 Typology of the Forms of Countries' Presence in the World Intensity of media coverage or role attributed in the news

Weak

Strong

Symbolic aura or mythical dimension associated with the country Weak

I

11

Strong

III

IV

be, in Switzerland's case this symbolic element takes on a considerable relative importance, which is hardly to be found for the other countries. To understand the role played by this symbolic dimension, it is fitting to consider it in relation to the attention that the media devote to the country. In other words, one must analyze the presence of countries in the world using two parameters: along one axis, the attention paid to them by the media and the space given them in the news; along the other, the importance of the symbolic connotations attaching to them. The typology presented above makes such an analysis possible. It analyzes countries' presence in the world along two axes and using a double dichotomy. On one side, it distinguishes those countries that are the object of intense media coverage and to whom at the same time is assigned a considerable role in news events from those that are not the object of such consideration. On the other side, our typology opposes the countries to which a considerable symbolic aura is attached and which is coupled with an important mythical dimension, to those which exhibit such characteristics only faintly or not at all. The typology proposed in Table 12.1 leads us to distinguish schematically four forms of countries' presence in the world. The cases of Types I and IV, which associate media coverage with a symbolic presence of equal breadth, do not call for any comment. They refer to expected situations in which the two elements are in balance. Types II and III are a completely different matter, and the forms of presence in the world that they define may be considered as atypical, even paradoxical. Type III certainly covers the situation we have attributed to Switzerland; it associates weak media coverage with a strong symbolic presence. Conversely, Type II corresponds to the association of important media coverage and a relatively weak symbolic presence. As atypical as this last case may appear to be, that of a power which fails to embody itself in myths, it does nonetheless correspond to real situations. Thus, for example, insofar as one qualifies the analysis, it must be recognized that it is in this form that an entity such as the European Community presents itself. There exists today a European myth. The

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construction of Europe is without doubt the last reasonable adventure to which the aged, sated and weapons-disgusted peoples of our continent could deliver themselves. Nevertheless, the Community only partially embodies this mythical united Europe. The rhetoric surrounding the Act and the deadline of 1992 may be understood as an attempt to bridge the gap separating the dream of a united Europe from the effective construction of Europe that is being pursued within the framework of the Community. Our adherence to this idyllic view of ourselves, referred to as "Helvetism," is easily understandable. On one hand, all the peoples of the world undoubtedly manifest in varying degrees the same attitude with regard to the image they have of themselves. On the other, for us this attitude fills a deep need, because it stands in for a national identity. As natural as it may be, this attitude is nevertheless not without consequences. It is this attitude that notably contributes to creating the sentiment, so widely shared, of the decline of Switzerland's image abroad. As we have described it, this picture of ourselves, to be effective as a medium of national cohesion, must necessarily remain somewhat uncertain, hazy, polymorphous, and so on. It is at this cost that the diverse elements of the country are able to recognize themselves in it. But at the same time, this uncertainty associated with the picture of ourselves will call forth an uneasiness that will seek to soothe itself in other people's acquiescence. This acquiescence in its turn will appear to us to be all the more sure if the image with which we identify is that of a virtuous people who nonetheless are experiencing some difficulties in adapting their behavior to their image. Those who claim today that Switzerland's image abroad is deteriorating are only judging the reflection of ourselves that the world sends back by means of a not-too-benevolent view of the country. And it is simply because of the immoderate expectations that the Swiss place on their acknowledgement by others that they see themselves as witness to a progressive breakdown of certain elements of Helvetism. An implicit hypothesis underlies their judgment of the image of Switzerland abroad. It conceives of Helvetism—or, if one prefers, the foreign image of Switzerland—as a sort of capital which is believed to have been amassed once and for all in the past. Every accident akin to Schweizerhalle or the Iran-Contra affair would then amount to drawing a promissory note against a basic asset that would not be renewed. In this perspective, the representations and myths associated with Switzerland crystallized at a given point at least in the European conscience and since then did not develop further but eroded under the contemporaneous blows of both criticism and a more factual understanding of the country. When one looks at the image of Switzerland from this viewpoint, one is inevitably led to recognize that what we are witnessing corresponds not to the development of new themes but to the gradual effacement of certain elements of Helvetism. Thus, for example, the idea of Switzerland as a "nest of revolutionaries" probably left us one day in 1917, carried away in Lenin's baggage

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when the future Great October Revolution departed our country, precisely at the Zurich railway station. It was, however, as a nest of revolutionaries that Klemens Metternich saw us. The image that the great servant of the Hapsburg Dynasty had of our country must have been as negative as that which the present occupant of the White House must recently have had of Nicaragua. If it is not too hard for us to accommodate to the idea of the disappearance of the theme of a Switzerland nest of revolutionaries, the obliteration of other components of Helvetism appear much more regrettable, even unjust or scandalous. This is certainly our attitude concerning elements of Helvetism like Switzerland "land of asylum," "witness to democracy," "little alpine paradise," or even "land of order, precision, and quality." Like the theme of a Switzerland nest of revolutionaries, that of a Switzerland land of asylum probably also left us, and also from Zurich, not by train but by plane, on the day that Switzerland engaged in the airborne deportation of its refugees. The fact is today semi-official, since in February 1987, during a European conference on the question of asylum, the Swiss delegate on the refugee problem declared to journalists that our policy in this matter is "hardly less liberal" than that of other countries (UHebdo, November 19, 1987). Likewise, the theme of a Switzerland witness to democracy is also leaving us. Andre Siegfried, writing in 1946, dealt with this for the last time.3 Today, the fact that liberal democracy is the "normal" or "natural" regime of a good part of the planet (or at any rate of the whole group of developed countries), the fact that we delayed so long in granting political equality to women, and finally the fact that our juridical structure, through its archaic systems, is regularly subject to condemnations by the Strasbourg Court, all contribute to the presentation of Swiss democracy, if not as mediocre, then at least as banal. Even the theme of a Switzerland little alpine paradise—apparently among the most solid—has shown considerable weaknesses. As the International Herald Tribune revealed in 1986, "Drastically worsening damage from acid rain to Switzerland's forests, where half the trees are now dead or dying, has cast another pall over this country's image as a pristine, alpine paradise" (December 19, 1986). On the morning of November 1, 1986, following the Schweizerhalle catastrophe, there were not only dead fish floating upside down in the river's current. One could also see the debris of certain aspects of Helvetism that seemed to us to be among the most solid and that are identified by the words security, efficacy, professional and technical mastery, and so on. To be convinced of this, it will suffice, for example, to refer to an article in the Wall Street Journal entitled "Rhine Spill Punctures Swiss Complacency about the Advanced State of their Society." At the end of its reportage on the Rhine catastrophe, the New York financial newspaper concluded: "Beyond the financial and environmental damage, the fire punctured the sense of Swiss complacency—and the myth of Swiss perfectionism—as nothing has since the Zurich youth riots of the early 1980s" ("Rhine Spill," Wall Street Journal, November 13, 1986).

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The analysis that aims at capturing our reactions when faced with the question of Switzerland's image abroad regarding the decline of Helvetism, as pertinent as it may be, appears to us nevertheless insufficient. It is undoubtedly able to account for our "sensitivity" when faced with the reflection of ourselves that the world sends back to us, but it is incapable of explaining what happens at the level of the image itself. On one hand, it neglects the fact that a certain antiHelvetism has always been the counterpart of Helvetism. On the other, it leads us to believe that Helvetism is disappearing or coming apart, when that which we are witnessing is in fact its metamorphosis or even its regeneration. In more direct terms, there is no decline, only an avatar of the myth. Helvetism during its development was necessarily going to call forth a reaction and give rise to that which I will call, to be brief, anti-Helvetism, corresponding to an attitude which takes the exact opposite view from that tending to endow our country with certain particular virtues. In reading the authors of the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries, one rapidly acquires the conviction that the entirety of broad critical themes that can be linked to Switzerland were already present in that period. From the long-range viewpoint, the diverse and contradictory components connected with the country's image offer a remarkable stability. The idea of a Switzerland that lacks the solidarity that democracies owe each other already appears in Lamartine's works, where he notes that Switzerland in dealing with the France of 1848 has shown "coldness" and refused to "compromise itself with a Republic" (Lamartine, 1849:166-67). The theme of a "stifling" Swiss liberty may already be found in Goethe's work, where he sees in the liberty we enjoy nothing other than "an old tale preserved in spirits-ofwine" (cited in La Suisse vue par les grands ecrivains, 1914:89). The image of a Switzerland prosperous at the expense of other countries but with an 4 'internal rot" is already present in Chateaubriand's work. Chateaubriand notes among our vices "corruption, a love of wine and a thirst for gold" and states that the Swiss, "neutral in the great revolutions of the states that surround them. . . enriched themselves on the misfortunes of others and founded a bank on human calamities" (Beaumier, 1912:125). From our point of view here, it is not without interest to note besides that Chateaubriand sees the development of Helvetism as the sign of the decline of the values that he holds dear. He points out that "when the Swiss were virtuous, they ignored arts and letters. When they began to lose their manners, the Hallers, the Tissots, the Gessners, the Lavaters made their appearance" (p. 124). Therefore, the decline in values is not the consequence of the loss of the myth but— quite on the contrary—the myth comes to substitute for the decline of values or to hide it. After having emphasized that Helvetism in some way calls forth antiHelvetism, it must also be noted that the mythical dimension attaching to our country is not a symbolic capital granted once and for all: it is reborn or in any

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case evolves, metamorphoses, and undergoes multiple changes. Two examples will serve to illustrate this phenomenon. My first example consists in noting the real "outburst of Helvetism" that France experienced during the first half of the 1980s, perhaps in reaction to the ascent to power of the Left. In 1981, the weekly UExpress discovered in Switzerland "the Tramp State," whereas Albin Chalandon, who was to become a minister when the Right returned to power in France, wrote in Le Monde at the end of 1984 that "Switzerland offered the perfect model of a competitive economy" (Domaine Public, Nov. 7, 1985). In December 1983, the weekly Le Point presented an "inquiry on the elite of tomorrow," drawn from an opinion survey of the students of the "ranking schools." Among other questions, the subjects of the inquiry were asked to choose from a list of countries the two that best corresponded to the idea they held of a "good organization of society." Switzerland clearly headed the list of preferences, beating the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Sweden, Japan and Great Britain. Explaining this result, the journalist of Le Point, Gilles Gactner, noted that the students—today loyal to "concrete values"—were naturally brought to "favor the socioeconomic system that possesses them all. In this case Switzerland, famous for its attachment to direct democracy, to private initiative and the primacy of the individual over the group." Asked to comment on these results, the sociologist Michel Crozier declared: "Switzerland is the country of banks and unfettered money. It is an authentic capitalist model. Basically, the only repression in Switzerland is cleanliness" (Le Point, Dec. 5, 1983). Switzerland as the incarnation of the market economy? Very few Swiss economists would subscribe to such a judgment; they would undoubtedly more easily concur in considering the country as a small open economy, very firmly grouped into cartels. Far from disappearing, the myths associated with Switzerland change form and regenerate. From this perspective, it is inevitable that certain forms of Helvetism may not be pleasing to us, but that does not signify in any way a decline in our country's capacity to feed the myths but, at the very most, our difficulty in paying the price of that which very widely establishes the grandeur of Switzerland, namely its preeminence in the international imagination. This observation brings me quite naturally to my second example. If Metternich saw Switzerland as a nest of dangerous revolutionaries, Victor Hugo viewed it sympathetically as peopled by "libertarian shepherds." Today, the "gnomes of Zurich" have perhaps replaced the libertarian shepherds; but we are still living nonetheless at the level of the myth and in the realm of the bucolic. Also, when in 1964 a Minister of Her Gracious Majesty, losing his calm, resorted to invective directed at the gnomes of Zurich who had abandoned the pound sterling, the remains of an empire upon which the sun was not supposed to set acknowledged the rise to power of a little country that had become the third financial market of the world and that was perhaps rising to its zenith.

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The preceding analysis naturally leads us to formulate, given the problem that Switzerland's image may constitute, a question which is both internal and external. To try to show this, I will evoke a central aspect of Helvetism, which is federalism. Contrary to what Victor Hugo supposed, for example, in a poem of La Legende des siecles entitled "Les Mercenaires," Swiss liberty is not the living source or the forerunner of modern liberty. As de Tocqueville emphasized in the framework of his critique of Cherbulies' work, La Democratic en Suisse (de Tocqueville, 1951: Tome 1, vol. 2, pp. 353-54), it is only the relic of the old communal liberty, and if Switzerland today retains a place in the imagery of the "planetary village," it is certainly that of maintaining communities on a human scale within the context of the federation. Federalism thus comes to occupy a central place in the most recent variants of Helvetism, which is undoubtedly only just: In the perspective that prevails today, it authorizes the maintenance of autonomous communities, nurtures survivals of the old communal liberty, and governs the posture of a neutral state which the federal ensemble adopts before the external world. On the occasion of an interview he granted in 1984 to Juan Gasparini, Jorge Luis Borges declared: "At the beginning of this year, I published a poem in Buenos Aires called The Conspirators.' I wish in this poem that one day the number of cantons increases, so that we may all be Swiss or that Switzerland may be the entire world" (L'Hebdo, Oct. 11, 1984). Poets' words. I would agree with them willingly: Are poets not the keepers of myths? "Words that don't belong in a study such as yours." Perhaps this reproach will be directed at me, and it is doubtless more reasonable (should I say, more Swiss) to turn to the solid, the massive, the academic. Here are two professors, the two great thinkers about twentieth-century "power politics": Hans J. Morgenthau and Raymond Aron. They have each left us a solid manual to which we can refer. We owe to Hans J. Morgenthau (Politics among Nations, 1978) the manual that has instructed the American political class of today. At the beginning of his book, Morgenthau gives us to understand that he will not lean too heavily on our country, emphasizing "the minimum involvement of such countries as Switzerland, Luxembourg or Venezuela" in world politics" (p. 30). At the end of his work, he also considers—even if only to reject it—the hope formulated by the author of Fictions: "Switzerland has been able to unite twenty-two sovereign states, speaking four different languages, in one political organization. Why should the 130-odd nations of the world not be able to do the same?" (p. 505). In the course of his exposition, Morgenthau rejects such a possibility but nonetheless recognizes that "the argument seems to be persuasive and is considered frequently in popular discussions. It dissolves, however, when confronted with the facts of Swiss history" (p. 506). Raymond Aron, for his part, has left us, among other works, a strong volume that takes up again and prolongs his teachings on the subject of international relations: Paix et guerre entre les nations (1962). Here, too, we will find near

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the beginning of the work remarks that give the size of Switzerland by the measure of power. Switzerland and Sweden are cited as examples of countries "which have neither the possibility nor the desire to influence the thought or the conduct of other nations" (p. 71). At the end of the volume, Aron also fixes his attention "beyond the politics of power" and foresees a peaceful planet. He writes: The theoretical solution is one of federation, a civilized or voluntary version of empire. The community of culture is preserved, it renounces only those powers which the superior unity needs to insure the defense and the wellbeing of all. The classic example is that of Switzerland. It is the Swiss Federation which is sovereign, that has the will to independence, it is it which has an army, it which is the equivalent of a person on the international scene: the internal liberty for individuals and groups to live according to their ideals and to worship their Gods is nonetheless strictly preserved. Why should not the whole of humanity create a planetary Confederation in the image of the Swiss Confederation? [p. 738] For Borges, the Argentinian poet resting today in a Geneva cemetery, just as for the two champions of power politics, Switzerland embodies federalism. Henceforth, and for us Swiss, the question is to know if we are equal to such a privilege. At the end of two laudatory pages—an excellent resume of Helvetism—that he devoted to our country under the title "La Suisse est une ile . . . " , Paul Valery fends off any objection that might be addressed to him: "If one tells me that I am fooling myself and trusting to appearances, I respond that the appearances that satisfy me are enough for me. The devil take the realities" (Valery, 1983). We would not know how to adopt such an attitude. It is always possible for the foreigner, but it is forbidden to us for at least two reasons. First, the reality of which Valery speaks is us, and we would doubtless give up wearing the mask of Helvetism if it had no relation at all to our characteristics. But beyond the necessity that wills that every mask have its element of truth, another imperative just as valid forbids us from dissociating Switzerland from Helvetism. Switzerland is not any more real than Helvetism: If Switzerland nourishes a myth so assiduously, it is because the myth underlies Switzerland itself. It is indeed in this myth, or more precisely in its realization, always partial and problematic, that the disparate elements in the country are found. Take away the myth and then there remain no more than the statistics of gross national income per capita, published by the World Bank to comfort the inhabitants of the Jura, Zug, Schaffhouse, and Geneva in the conviction that they share a common destiny. Here is all the grandeur and torment of Switzerland: how to maintain at one and the same time the myth that we embody and the reality that we are. The problem exists vis-a-vis the outside world but also and perhaps primarily in relation to ourselves. Our existence as a political entity depends on it. To show the external dimension of this problem, it suffices to refer to the construction of Europe. On one hand, we are taking only a marginal part in the

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movement that seeks to unite our continent. On the other, Switzerland remains the obligatory point of reference in the thinking about European construction. Considering the Europe that is being constructed, the Swiss experience still appears today as exemplary. Thus, Christopher Tugendhat, who was a member and then vice-president of the European Commission from 1977 to 1985, twice evokes, in a book published in 1986 entitled Making Sense of Europe, the example of Switzerland in order to pass judgment on the progress of European construction (pp. 29-30, 193-95). Similarly, Edgar Morin in Penser TEurope (1987) twice refers to Switzerland—the first time when he describes Europe as "a big disunited Switzerland of the planetary era," and the second time when he looks into the future. He then considers that Switzerland, or what he calls Helvetization, foreshadows one of the possible futures of the continent (pp. 154, 183). Whether or not it wishes to, Switzerland with regard to Europe under construction necessarily appears in two lights. Because of its real behavior, and its non-participation in the European Community, it remains outside the European construction. Because of its whole political tradition and its federalist experience, it cannot help but occupy a central place in the minds of those who wish to see our continent united. This mixture of abstention and exemplariness, which necessarily characterizes Switzerland in the presence of the construction of Europe, will cause our country to appear with well-known features—as described by Goethe in the sixth story of his novel Les annees d' apprentissage de Wilhelm Meister, then analyzed by Hegel in The Phenomenology of Spirit, those of the "Belle Ame." These two authors note that to become complete human beings, to fulfill themselves objectively, mankind and peoples are called upon to make themselves other than what they are, to "alienate themselves." The "Belle Ame" henceforth will be that which, for fear of soiling its purity, refrains from all action, withdraws into itself, and is satisfied with an ideal image of itself to the point of madness. The problem that Helvetism confronts us with is not simply a question of image. It is in this form, clearly, that it is the most immediately accessible to us, when the foreigner refuses to see in us the features that we like to perceive in ourselves. This fact should not hide from us, however, that the problem is first and essentially an internal problem. To try to show this, I shall use as an example an episode which, of course, hardly caught the attention of the big international media. On November 17, 1987, the Bern police force, bearing out its reputation of efficacy in the maintenance of order, used tear gas, water cannons and rubber cartridges to erase from the map, in a mere 20 minutes, "The Country of Zaffarayas." The Zaffarayas were an alternative group that had built an encampment on the banks of the Aar River, not having found lodgings within their means. Other motives united them, "specifically a need for simplicity, sharing and manual work, over which wafts a scent of rusticity" (Maurice, Journal de Geneve, Nov. 19, 1987). The Country of Zaffarayas had declared itself an

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extraterritorial zone. Although this type of alternative movement is not the exclusive privilege of Switzerland, installed among us it undeniably evoked those "libertarian shepherds" dear to Victor Hugo. The day following the police intervention, which was to elicit numerous criticisms, the most prestigious daily of Bern, Der Bund, declared that the police had certainly eliminated the huts but that the Zaffarayas as a symbol remained untouched. Must we henceforth—as the Der Bund commentary invites us to do—make the Bern police the grave diggers of Helvetism? Helvetism is quite evidently not a coherent doctrinaire compendium. It is a sheaf of values that can only remain open to pluralism by being at the same time contradictory. The order that the Bern police sought to have respected can also be as legitimately invoked as the autonomy claimed by the Zaffarayas. The forces of order and the people of Zaffarayas, each in their own fashion, embodied an element of Helvetism. Mr. de Haller, who took pleasure in emphasizing that the city of Bern was the most strictly administered in Europe, would probably have recognized himself in the former, and Victor Hugo, who saw our soil as the source of the world's liberty, in the latter. NOTES 1. On March 16, 1986, Switzerland's accession to the United Nations was rejected by a large majority of Swiss voters in a popular referendum. 2. Schweizerhalle refers to a fire in early November 1986 in a chemical storage facility along the Rhine River in Basel; the water used to extinguish the flames discharged tons of some 34 chemicals, many of them toxic, into the river. Water supplies and wildlife were affected in Switzerland, France, West Germany and the Netherlands. 3. Andre Siegfried, La Suisse, Democratic-temoin. Neuchatei: La Baconniere. REFERENCES Aron, Raymond. 1962. Paix et guerre entre les nations. Paris: Calmann-Levy. Beaumier, Andre. 1912. Chateaubriand, textes choisis et commentes, vol. 1. 2 vols. Paris: Plon. Burckhardt, Karl J. 1971. Considerations sur VHistoire Universelle. Paris: Payot. (French translation) de Reynold, Gonzague. 1809 and 1912. Histoire litteraire de la Suisse au XVIIIe siecle. 2 vols. Lausanne: Bridel. de Reynold, Gonzague. 1984. La Democratic et la Suisse. 3d ed. Bienne: Les Editions du Chandelier. [See also, by the same author, Experience de la Suisse. Belfaux: Editions de Nuithonie, 1970; and also Serge Berlincourt "La Suisse dans l'oeuvre des grands poetes romantiques, Chateaubriand, Lamartine, Hugo. Berne, University thesis, 1926; Femand Baldensperger, "L'Helvetisme litteraire et ses relations avec les grands courants de la pensee occidentale" in Alexandre Castell, ed., La Suisse et les Frangais, Paris, Cres, 1920; and Francois Jost, La Suisse dans les lettres frangaises au cours des ages, Fribourg, Editions universitaires, 1956.]

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de Salis, Jean-R. 1971. La Suisse diverse et paradoxale. Neuchatei: La Baconniere. de Tocqueville, Alexis. 1951. De la democratic en Amerique. Oeuvres completes, ed. J. -P. Meyer, vol. 1. 2 vols. Paris: Gallimard. The Gallup Poll, Public Opinion 1935-1971, vol. 1. New York: Random House. Jaspers, Karl. 1963. La bombe atomique et I'avenir de I'homme. Paris: Buchet-Chastel. (French translation) Lamartine, A. de. 1849. Histoire de la revolution de 1848, vol. 1. 2 vols. Paris: Perrotin Librairie-Editeur. La Suisse vue par les Grands Ecrivains et les voyageurs celebres. 1914. Paris: Mercure de France. McPhee, John. 1984. La place de la Concorde Suisse. New York: Farrar. Montherlant, Henri de. 1963. Le Chaos et la nuit. Paris: Gallimard. Morgenthau, Hans J. 1978. Politics among Nations. 5th ed., rev. New York: Knopf. Morin, Edgar. 1987. Penser VEurope. Paris: Gallimard. Rabier, J. -R. 1986. Euro-barometre, no. 25, June 1986. Commission of the European Communities, Brussels. Schreiber, Emile. 1937. La Suisse pays d'hommes libres. Paris: Denoel. Secretan, Philibert. 1973. Plaidoyerspour une autre Suisse. Lausanne: L'Age d'Homme. Steinberg, Jonathan. 1976. Why Switzerland? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tugendhat, Christopher. 1986. Making Sense of Europe. London: Viking. Valery, Paul. 1943. "La Suisse est une i l e . . . " Special issue of Les Cahiers du Sud entitled "Image de la Suisse," Marseille. Voltaire. 1963. Essai sur les Moeurs et VEsprit des nations, ed. R. Pomeau, vol. 2. 2 vols. Paris: Gamier. World Opinion Update. 1987. 11, no. 3 (March).

Index

Aging. See Elderly Apprenticeship and vocational training, 7, 9, 13, 14, 15, 40, 43, 59, 98, 99, 132 n.9, 166; and cantons, 156; men's occupational choices, 108-109; qualifications and new technologies, 109; relation of education to, 104-106, 157, 159; women and, 83, 86-87, 91, 99101, 108-109. See also Education; Work Balvig, Fleming, 10, 169, 172, 176, 184, 186 n.l, 187 nn. 10-12, 187 n.22 Banks and banking activities, 16, 23-24, 208, 217 Business associations. See Interest groups (associations) Cantons: autonomy of, 3, 36, 155; crime rates, 170; differences among, 36, 155; and education, 9, 36, 162; and fragmentation of power, 13, 36; and politics, 38-40, 42, 44; and urbanization, 24, 25 Childrearing (and childcare), 7, 82, 84, 86, 110-111; attitudes towards, 124-

126, 146; childbearing outside of marriage, 132; and working women, 119, 124 Cities, 3, 11; crime in, 172 (Zurich), 183 (Lausanne); lifestyle in the, 26-30, 32; and local government, 36-37; mountain areas and, 201; rural perceptions of the, 198; schools in the, 163, 165 Clinard, Marshall, 10, 169, 172, 174, 176, 179, 184, 186 n.l, 187 nn.ll, 12 Consensus (social and political), 4, 13, 15, 43, 46-47, 56 Corporatism (neo-corporatism), 2, 5, 55, 60-62, 71 Crime rates and crime control, 9-10, 15, 56, 169-191; crime survey, 10, 173174, 181, 182-183, 184-5, 187n.l0; gun use and gun control, 10, 171, 173, 186 n.6; juvenile delinquency, 182, 183-184; punitiveness, 10, 185; social class and crime, 181-182, 188 n.19; white collar crime, 10, 176, 187 nn.12, 13 Demography, 7, 19, 27, 111, 118, 120, 164, 195

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Index

Direct democracy, 4, 13, 35, 36, 40-41, 45-48, 67 Divorce, 7, 8, 15, 86, 111, 112, 118, 127, 160; determinants of, 130-132; legislation, 122; regional variations in, 120-121, 149. See also Marriage Drugs, 10, 16, 56, 172, 178-179, 182, 187nn.l5, 16

Farmers (peasantry), 8, 69, 77, 165, 194; in the canton of Vaud, 196-200; in the Valais, 147-150 Federal Council, 4, 42, 75 Federalism, 12, 16 n.l, 24, 25, 35-37, 38-39, 218-220 Foreign workers. See Immigration and foreign workers

Economy, 5, 7, 13-14, 23-24, 26, 40, 56, 57-61, 217; agriculture, 43, 193 (see also Mountain areas); and employment, 109-110; and the future, 30-31; history of the, 68, 71, 72, 73-76; industry, 12, 23-24, 43, 57-61, 193; and politics, 45, 47, 61; service sector, 63, 82, 93 n.4; and the theme of secrecy, 208; and trade unions, 54-55, 57, 60-63; and women, 82-83, 85. See also "Industrial peace" Education, 7, 8, 9, 14, 97-101, 155; adult education, 161; cantonal autonomy of, 9, 155, 156, 162, 167; credential devaluation, 103-104; description of the school system, 157— 165; importance of, for occupational success, 103-106, 168; language teaching, 9, 157, 167; private schools, 159-161; recent trends, 167-168; students from less advantaged backgrounds, 101-103, 157, 161, 164; tracking, 157, 164; university, 159, 165-166; women and, 83, 87-88, 100101, 168; the Youth life stage and, 103-106. See also Apprenticeship and vocational training Elderly, 8, 15, 26, 27, 72-73, 137-153 Environment, 13, 48, 61, 63, 77, 198199, 215 Ethos. See Sociocultural identity

Helvetism, 11, 12, 16, 47, 211-221 Heterogeneity (linguistic, cultural, religious), 13, 16 n.2, 155; and political representation, 42, 46, 218; of the prison population, 188 n.16; and social segregation, 28, 32; and trade unionism, 52. See also Education (Language teaching)

Family, 7, 8, 15, 27, 111, 117-135; division of labor within, 125-126; and education, 9, 156, 160; single parent, 9, 14, 15, 27, 111, 132, 160; styles of family interaction, 126-130; and work, 82, 85-86, 89-90, 92, 110-111, 119, 125. See also Marriage

Immigration and foreign workers, 5, 9, 16, 26, 43, 74, 82, 89, 129, 155; and crime, 182, 184, 188 n.21; school system and, 161, 184; and skill levels, 59; and trade unions, 59-60 Industrial (labor) relations. See "Industrial peace"; Trade unions "Industrial peace," 4-5, 13, 44, 51-63; history of, 53-58, 71 Interest groups (associations), 4, 13, 3940, 43-45, 55, 61; performing trade union functions, 63; women's selfhelp, 86 Labor movement. See "Industrial peace"; Trade unions Leisure, 3, 6, 12, 26-27, 29, 68, 70, 7477, 79, 80, 183, 194, 198, 200, 201 Local government, 36, 47; educational functions of, 156, 157 Marriage, 7, 8, 14, 15, 27; cohabitation and, 122, 123, 132 n.8; legislation, 93 n.3, 122, 124; rate, 111, 114 n.8, 117-118, 132 n.l; role expectations, 123-124, 126, 132; socioeconomic characteristics, 122-123; and work, 81, 82, 86, 126. See also Family Military, 16 n.2 Mountain (alpine) regions, 8, 10, 12, 2 3 -

Index 24, 139-140, 187 n.10, 193-205; daily life, 194; modernization and change, 200-204; studies of mountain areas, 147-150 (Valais), 195, 196-200 (Vaud) National image and self-image, 11, 15, 16, 17 n.3, 46-49, 67, 186 n.l, 193194, 207-222. See also Helvetism Nationalism (and xenophobia), 54, 58, 60, 74, 147 Occupational structure. See Economy; Professions; Women; Work; Workers Parliament, 37-38, 42-44 Political elites, 4, 42, 44-47, 49, 61 Political parties, 3-4, 37-39, 42, 43, 4445, 47, 49, 56, 71, 74; and religion, 3, 37 Political power: and decision making, 35-49, 61; diffusion of, 3-4, 13, 35, 39, 41; integrative mechanisms, 41-46, 219; and referenda, 40-43, 45-46, 58, 62, 71, 73, 74; and religion, 35. See also Federalism Political protest, 47-48, 63, 68, 220 Political stability, 4, 5, 13, 41-46, 56, 60, 61; challenges to, 46-49 Poverty, 15, 16, 23, 57, 73 Professions, 77; choice of, 165; and retirement, 140; socially oriented, 88-89; technological obsolescence, 109-110; training for, 88, 98, 106, 110, 159, 160; women and, 82, 87-89, 91, 168 Public order, 15-16, 56; perceptions of, 145-147 Religion, 13; and cantons, 36; and divorce rates, 120; and foreign workers, 74; importance of, among Valais villagers, 147-150; and the labor movement, 43; and political power, 35, 37 Social classes, 29, 37, 74, 77; crime and, 181-182, 188 n.19; different conceptions of aging, 137-143; education and, 161; political and social power,

225 45, 47, 142, 149-150; post-World War I, 68; social legislation, 72; and styles of family interaction, 126-129; trade unionism, 52; values, 79 Social legislation, 6, 44, 76; and cantons, 36; equal pay for women, 83; maternity leave, 86; social security, 55, 7273, 149-150; and trade unions, 62 Sociocultural identity (ethos), 137-152; and religion (among rural dwellers), 147-150. See also Young people State, role of the (federal), 4, 6, 13, 16 n.2, 30-32, 35-37, 39-40, 43-44, 79, 80; in education, 156; history of the, 35, 39, 54; and retirement, 73; and welfare functions, 85 Suicide, 56 Swiss Constitution, 36, 40, 61, 71, 72; and education, 155, 163 Swiss exceptionalism, 2, 16 n.l Switzerland and the European Community, 2, 61, 208, 209, 213, 219-220 Tourism, 200, 203 Trade unions, 4, 43-45, 51-65, 80 n.l; and change, 5, 6, 13, 62, 63, 84; and internal dissent, 5, 56; member characteristics, 59, 62-63, 84; organizing problems, 62-63, 90; post-World War I, 68; social and political integration of, 55-56; teacher's union, 163; and women, 84. See also "Industrial peace" Unemployment, 16, 26, 31-32, 60, 72, 76, 78; and crime, 184; and women, 85, 92, 93 n.6 Urbanization, 2-3, 12, 19-33; and divorce, 120; in mountain areas, 193— 195, 200-204; and social segregation, 28; and socioprofessional categories, 25. See also Cities Values, 6, 13; changes in, 47, 77-79, 194; relating to education, 162; relating to volunteer work, 84-85; relating to work, 67-80, 82, 90; rural values, 10II, 147-150, 152

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Vocational education and training. See Apprenticeship Volunteer work, 84-85 Welfare state. See Social legislation Women: and apprenticeship, 99-101, 107; farm women, 150; feminism, 93 n . l l ; job discrimination against, 8892; marriage rates, 111; and part-time work, 85-86, 88, 89; and schooling, 9, 83, 99, 166, 168; and trade unions, 13, 59, 62-63, 84; and unemployment, 85; and volunteer work, 84-85; and voting, 47, 215; and work 6-8, 59, 62, 70, 75, 81-94, 106-108, 110, 114 n.6, 118-119, 122, 126, 160 Work (and employment), 3, 5-6, 12, 13, 16, 27, 30, 31, 59, 60, 62, 70, 77-80; childrearing and, 86, 110, 125; and economic growth, 109; gender, pay and responsibility differences, 83-84, 88-92, 109; office work 93 n.5, 108109; part-time work, 81-82, 85-86, 92. See also Workers; Work ethic Workers: blue collar, 25, 26, 53, 60, 62, 74, 142; elderly, 8, 26; skill levels of, 59, 83; skill levels and divorce, 131;

Index stability of, 59; white collar, 5, 25, 26, 53, 60, 62-63, 74, 78, 144; women, 5, 6, 8, 14, 62-63, 81-94, 110, 125. See also Immigration and foreign workers; Trade unions; Working class Work ethic (ethos), 5, 6, 12, 13, 26-27, 58, 67-80, 145-146 Working class, 43, 57, 72-74, 165; apathy, 56, 62; and old age, 141-145; polarization within, 60; self-employed, 78, 144; and values, 55, 59, 63, 7778, 147, 152. See also "Industrial peace"; Nationalism; Trade unions; Workers; Work ethic Workplace, 29, 67, 71,75 Young people, 7, 95-116; changes in transition to adulthood, 112-114; deviance and delinquency, 10, 182; education of, 9, 14-15, 97-9, 103-106; generalized description of the Youth life stage, 96-97; in mountain areas, 194; passage from school to work 106, 107, 110, 112; riots (Zurich), 215; social identity, 113; values of, 15, 7778, 103, 112-114. See also Apprenticeship; Education

About the Contributors

MICHEL BASSAND was awarded his doctoral degree by the University of Geneva and now holds the chair of sociology in the School of Architecture at the Federal Polytechnic Institute in Lausanne. He has published widely on many urban and regional issues and heads a research institute on the built environment. MARLIS BUCHMANN received her doctoral degree in sociology from the University of Zurich where she now teaches. Her research interests have included the sociology of everyday life and the changing structure of the life course in contemporary society, with special reference to the problems of young people. She has been a visiting scholar at both Stanford University and the University of California at Berkeley. CLAUDIO CASPARIS earned a degree as a primary school teacher before receiving his doctorate in education from the University of Zurich. After working for five years at that university as a teacher and lecturer, he became a consultant to the Ministry of Education for Central Switzerland; he now works at the Central Swiss Institute for the Study of School Problems in Lucerne. His publications concern the problems of the young as well as school-related issues. JOSETTE COENEN-HUTHER is a research and teaching associate in the Department of Sociology at the University of Geneva. Her publications have concerned cultural life, the social integration of the mentally handicapped, and the elderly. She now specializes in the sociology of the family and especially in the transmission of traditions, norms and values.

228

About the Contributors

YVES FRICKER teaches sociology at the University of Geneva. He is a member of the General Secretariat of the European Cultural Center and is on the editorial committee of Cadmos, published by the European Community. JANET EVE HILOWITZ, the editor of this volume, received her doctoral degree from Oxford University. She has done research and taught on modern European societies, and has consulted in Geneva for the International Labour Office and the World Health Organization on developing country issues. FRANCOIS HOPFLINGER, sociologist at the University of Zurich, is the author of various publications concerned with trade unions and with Swiss economy and demography. In addition to his scholarly research he also writes and publishes science fiction. JEAN M. KELLERHALS is a professor at the University of Geneva. After publishing research in political sociology, he specialized in the sociology of the family, a subject on which he has now published three books. His most recent interest concerns the microsociology of normative systems, on which he has recently written several articles. MARTIN KILLIAS is a widely published professor of criminology at the University of Lausanne. He holds a law degree as well as a doctoral degree in the sociology of law, both from the University of Zurich. His many research interests have included incarceration rates, the impact of legislative change on behavioral change, and the fear of crime and public attitudes toward crime control. Over the last four years he designed and directed the first Swiss crime survey. HANSPETER KRIESI has recently become a professor of political science at the University of Geneva, where he teaches Swiss and comparative politics. He is the author of several books on Swiss politics. His current research concerns the development of new social movements in Western Europe. CHRISTIAN J. LALIVE D'EPINAY is a professor at the University of Geneva. His earlier studies were of the social and religious movements of Latin America. After his return to Europe, he became concerned with contemporary sociocultural change, the changed meaning of work in Switzerland, and the situation and lifestyles of the aging. From 1985 to 1988 he was president of the International Association of French Language Sociologists. NOELLE LANGUIN is a degree candidate in sociology at the University of Geneva, and has participated in research with members of that department. KATHARINA LEY studies at the University of Zurich and now teaches at the University of Bern. She has led research projects on women and work, working

About the Contributors

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women with families, working hours, and extended families. Preferring to write for a non-academic public, she has published most of her articles in general interest journals, and she also writes and publishes short stories. FRANCHISE LIEBERHERR-GARDIOL has studied anthropology, psychology and human ecology as well as sociology. She teaches rural sociology at the Federal Polytechnic Institute in Lausanne and carries out multidisciplinary research on sociocultural change in rural areas of Europe and the Third World.

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