Self-Knowledge Lectures

Self-Knowledge, Reading List Sources of Knowledge of our Psychological States Ryle, G.

The Concept of Mind, p.160-73, 177-89*

!Armstrong, D. M. Chisholm, R.

A Materialist Theory of Mind pp.323-7, 333-8 *

‘On the Observability of the Self’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 30 (1969), pp,7-21*

!Shoemaker, S. The Royce Lectures: ‘Self-Knowledge and “Inner Sense”’ ( I and II) his First Person Perspective and Other Essays. Evans, G.

Varieties of Reference, Chapter 7 (Esp. Sect 4)*

Dretske, F.

Naturalizing the Mind, Chapter 2.

!Burge, T.

‘Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:1 (1996)

Peacocke, C.

'Self-knowledge and Intentional Content', Chapter 5 of his Being Known.

Wright, C.

‘Self-Knowledge: The Wittgensteinian Legacy’, in Knowing Our Own Minds (eds) MacDonald, Smith and Wright (1998).

Moran, R.

Authority and Estrangement, Chapters 3 and 4. (On Moran see O’Brien, L. Moran on Agency and Self-Knowledge, European Journal of Philosophy (2003), 11:275-390. (Also at http://www.homepages.ucl.ac.uk/~uctylfo/.) )

Externalism and Self- Knowledge (i) The Achievement Problem Davidson, D, ‘Knowing Ones Own Mind’ The Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60 (1987), p.441-58. Chapter II of Self-Knowledge. See in particular last paragraph of essay.* !Burge, T.

‘Individualism and Self-knowledge’ Journal of Philosophy 85:11 (1988) pp.64963*

Peacocke, C

'Self-knowledge and Intentional Content', Chapter 5 of his Being Known;

!Boghossian, P. ‘Content and Self-Knowledge’, Philosophical Topics 17:5-26.

(ii) The Consequence Problem !McKinsey, M, ‘Anti-individualism and Privileged Access’, Analysis 51, p9-16.

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Boghossian, P. 'What the Externalist Can know A Priori’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 9:2 (1997). (Also on his homepage at http://philosophy.fas.nyu.edu/object/paulboghossian. ) !Davies, M.

‘Externalism and Armchair Knowledge’ in Boghossian and Peacocke (eds) New Essays on the A Priori pp.384-414. (Also on his homepage at http://philrsss.anu.edu.au/~mdavies.)

McKinsey, M. ‘Transmission of Warrant and Closure of A Priority’ in S. Nuccetelli, (ed.) Some New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge’ (Also at http://www.la.wayne.edu/Philosophy/McKinseyPublications.html.) !Wright, C.

‘Some reflections on the Acquisition of Warrant by Inference’ in S. Nuccetelli, (ed.) Some New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge’ (Online at http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/wright/)

Sawyer, S. ‘Privileged Access to the World’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy: 76.4. (1998), p. 523-533. (Also at http://www.cc.ku.edu/~philos/faculty/Sawyer/P_Access.html.) Texts marked * are in Self-Knowledge, Quassim Cassam (ed.). Texts marked ! are most central.

N.B. Chalmers’ directory of on-line papers has a very useful selection on self-knowledge see: http://consc.net/online1.html#intro for section on Introspection and Self-knowledge and http://consc.net/online2.html#extself for section on Externalism and Self-Knowledge.

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Self-Knowledge and Entitlement I. Features of Knowledge through Introspection AUTHORITATIVE: We seem in principle in a much better position to know what it is going on in our minds than in the minds of others. RELATIVELY A PRIORI: We need no investigation in order to know what is going on in our minds. (RELATIVELY) TRANSPARENT: Our mental properties in contrast to our physical properties are relatively transparent to us. We know tend to know

II. Epistemological Challenge. It is a challenge to give an account of psychological self-ascriptions which A. Secures and explains their status as knowledgeable. B. Preserves or explains away the special features of such ascriptions. and C. Is phenomenologically plausible.

III. Perceptual Models of Introspection. (i)

Advantages of adopting a Perceptual Model

a.

We are inclined to hold that we cannot have knowledge without evidence or justification. We recognize and have a model for the way in which perceptions confer epistemic warrant. The thing perceived provides evidence for the truth of certain affairs and so confers warrant on the belief I have on the basis of that perception. b. Adopting a perceptual model is explanatory of the fact that my judgement that I think that a is F seems to be based on my thinking that a is F. c. Adopting a perceptual model allows for self-conscious animals and children. d. We tend to talk about introspection in perceptual terms.

(ii) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Shoemaker’s Features of Perception An organ of sense (cf. bodily awareness) Occurrence of experience distinct from object perceived. Awareness of objects - and via them of facts. Identification and tracking of object perceived. Perception of an object is via perception of its intrinsic properties. Perceptual objects are potential objects of attention and scrutiny. Perceptual beliefs are causally produced by the object or state of affairs being perceived. Independence of objects/states of affairs being perceived from those capable of perceiving them.

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Self-Knowledge and Entitlement (iii)

The Object Perception Model.

Model on which perception which has all/most of the features identified above. Problems: Re: Introspection (1) No sense organ (cf. bodily awareness) (2) No duplicated experience - We do not seem to sense or experience our seeings, never mind our thoughts and judgements. (4) No identification and tracking (6) Attention, no zooming in on the object.

Re: Nature of the mental: (3) Commitment to Act-Object conception of Mentality. Beliefs and desires as objects/Sensations and experiences as objects. More intuitive for the latter than the former but even so commits us to a sense data model of sensations and experiences. (5) Relational nature of beliefs: beliefs have their contents in virtue of relational properties how can we know our thoughts by internal perception if that is the case?

Given such problems even if this model can meet elements A and B (which it in fact does not) of our challenge, it clearly fails on C. (iv) The Minimalist Perceptual Model. Perception as nothing more than transfer of (analog?) information via causal connection from one state of affairs to a receiving subject which it is independent of. The epistemic warrant of the perception resides in “the existence of a pattern of veridical, but brute contingent, non-rational relations” (Burge (1996) p.105) between perceptual state and object perceived.

Problems: The relations between a perception and its objects are contingent, brute, and non-rational. Relations between my self-ascriptions and first order mental states are (sometimes) necessary and rational. (i)Possibility of ‘Self-blindness’ - Denial of (relative) transparency (ii) Does not rule out as impossible introspection of others mental states. (iii)Undermines the fact that a subject coming to the view that their beliefs are faulty as a result of critical review has a reason to change their beliefs as a matter of immediate rational necessity. (iv) Misconstrues the nature of our epistemic responsibility over our beliefs.

Thus Perceptual models, even if they can be made to meet element C of the challenge, fail to meet B.

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Self-Knowledge and Entitlement V. The Inference Model. Do we know our self-ascriptions on the basis of inference? The trouble is that all we have in our inferential base are our beliefs that p and there is no valid inference from p to ‘I think that p' – one content is not supported by the other. It is entirely possible for p to be false and for me to think it; and for p to be true and me not to think it. Problems: If the inference is supposed to be based on our external observations of our behaviour or other's behaviour then we fail to meet conditions B and in fact C, of the challenge.

VI. Reliablism: Having beliefs reliably, but contingently cause beliefs about our beliefs. The subject themselves have no reasons for their self-ascribing a belief but are authoritative in virtue of that belief being produced reliably. Problems: Assumes pure reliabilism about knowledge. Also, has the main features of the minimal perceptual model (without a transfer of information condition) and so is subject to similar problems.

VII. Constitutivism: Practices of self-ascription determine what beliefs one has. Beliefs are ascription dependent and so to ascribe the belief is to have it. Problems: Idealism about belief. Fails to explain how we come to know already formed beliefs.

VIII. External Rational Entitlement I: Source of entitlement comes from self-knowledge being a pre-supposition of interpretability (Davidson): (i) To have a mental state is to be interpretable in a certain way relative to certain principles. (ii) A pre-supposition of being interpretable is that I know what I say, believe etc. (iii) Therefore, to be a bearer of mental states is to be taken as authoritative over such states. Problem: It might be that being authoritative is a pre-supposition of interpretability but it is hard to see how these things explain such authority or can be the sole source of such authority. II: Source of entitlement comes from self-knowledge being a pre-supposition of being a critical reasoner. (Burge) Problem: It might be that being authoritative is required for being a critical reasoner but it is hard to see how these things can be the sole source of such authority.

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IX. Beliefs as immediate reasons for their own ascription. My conscious attitudes act as the reason for their own self-ascriptions without inference or observation. My belief to the effect that I believe that p is supposed to be rationally grounded (in my consciously believing p) without being the result of inference or the result of taking some representation at face value. Analogy with the way a perceptual belief is rationally formed on the basis of a conscious perception.

Problems: 1. Two topics issue: Suppose I consciously believe that grass is green. How can my believing something about grass in entitle me to come to hold something to be true of me. The account needs to explain what makes my transition from my being in a conscious state to my self-ascription, a rational one. This can only go via an account of what it is to be in such a conscious state. 2. With no account of what makes the belief conscious it is hard to say what distinguishes the claims of this account from the ‘no reasons’ account’. Both claim that the subject is entitled to the transition between having a belief and self-ascribing it without evidence, or reasons other than being in the belief state.

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Self-Knowledge and Entitlement Self-knowledge and Externalism 1: The Achievement Problem The Problem 1. Self-Knowledge: We are authoritative about our propositional attitude states. 1.

Externalism: Propositional attitude states are individuated and have their content determined by things external to the person. [‘Water’ thoughts differ from ‘Twater’ thoughts in virtue of being about H20 rather than XYZ]

3.

We are not authoritative about things external to us. [We may not know what H20 or XYZ are or how to differentiate them. A denial that water is H20 is possible]

4. Therefore: We are not authoritative about our propositional attitude states. [From 2 and 3]

5 Therefore: We are not authoritative about our propositional attitude states & We are authoritative about our propositional attitude states. [From 1 and 4]

That is a contradiction. Responses: a. Give up claim of self-knowledge in such cases b. Give up externalism. c. Hold self-knowledge and externalism to be true of different kinds of psychological state: narrow psychological states and propositional attitude states as normally identified. d. Compatiblist responses: Hold on to claims of self-knowledge and externalism. So the compatibilist is either going to have to show that 3. is false or show that there is something wrong with the reasoning that gets one from 3. to 4. Burge: We would only accept move from 3 to 4. if we held some principle to the effect that knowledge of something requires one to have knowledge of how things stand with respect to the enabling conditions of such knowledge, and so knowledge of the things individuate those things known. But we do not need to accept such a claim. Analogy with perceptual knowledge: Perceptual knowledge of physical entities does not require, as a precondition, knowledge of the conditions that make such knowledge possible.

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Burge says all we need for knowledge that we are thinking p is (a) the ability to think p and (b) the ability to use the first person and the concept of thought. “...any conditions that are necessary to thinking that p will be equally necessary to the relevant knowledge that one is thinking that p. Here again, to think the thought one need not know the enabling conditions.” (Burge in Cassam (ed) p.70)

Structure of Basic Self-knowledge: I have the first order thought that: p I have the second order thought that: I am thinking that p. In thinking the second order thought I am thinking that p I simultaneously think the first order thought p and in this way my second order thought utilizes my ability to think the first order thought: the think that p.

Switching and Memory 1. Oscar (now on Twin Earth) does not know today whether last year’s thought was a water thought or a twater thought 2. Either S has forgotten what his thought was or S never knew. (Boghossian’s ‘platitude’) 3. S has not forgotten his earlier thought, in switching to Twin Earth he has not suffered memory failure. Therefore, S never knew his earlier thought.

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Self-knowledge and Externalism 2: The Consequence Problem If we admit that the truth of externalism is a conceptual rather than empirical matter we seem to be able make the following claims a priori. 1.Externalism: If I have the concept water then water exists. 2.Self-Knowledge: I have the concept water Therefore: 3. Water exists But how can it be right that I can establish that water exists a priori?

Possible replies: 1. Give up claim that we know we have the concept water a priori. 2. Give up the claim that we know the Externalist thesis a priori. 3. Give up the claim that the argument transfers knowledge a priori to the conclusion. (i) Assume argument does not go through because of fallacy of equivocation between 2 kinds of a priori knowledge: Relative A Priori Knowledge - knowledge which is a priori within a given context. A Priori Knowledge - knowledge which is always available a priori. Reply: should be able to at least establish transfer of relatively a priori knowledge. (ii) Assume argument does not go through because it falls foul of Limitation Principle for transfer of a priori knowledge or warrant. Limitation principles 1. “Epistemic warrant cannot be transmitted from the premises of a valid argument to its conclusion, if, for one of the premises, the warrant for that premise counts as a warrant only against the background of certain assumptions and acceptance of those assumptions cannot be rationally combined with doubt about the truth of the conclusion.” (Davies p. 402). 2. “Epistemic warrant cannot be transferred from A to B, even given an a priori known entailment from A to B, if the truth of B is a pre-condition of the knower even being able to believe the proposition A.” (Davies p. 353)

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(iii) Assume argument does not go through because of fallacy of equivocation between 2 notions of ‘the concept water’. 4. Accept conclusion, showing it to be unproblematic. First person authority rests on a general assumption of conceptual integrity. That is that I am not suffering an illusion of having concepts. It does not imply that were I to be suffering a conceptual illusion I would also have a priori knowledge of my condition: I could not know a priori ‘My concept of water is an illusion’. Given this one can say that the argument only establishes the conclusion that one can know a priori that water exists, on the general assumption of conceptual integrity. If that assumption does not hold it does not of course establish anything: ones knowing anything about having any concept water depends on my having it.

Background Assumption: I have conceptual integrity. 1. Externalism: I know a priori that if I have the concept water then water exists 2. Self-Knowledge: I know a priori that I have the concept water 3. Therefore: I know a priori that water exists Therefore: Assuming background assumptions hold, I can know a priori that water exists. But knowing a priori that water exists, assuming conceptual integrity, is just knowing that water – that watery stuff we are acquainted with – exists. And it does seem that I may be able to have some a priori reason to hold that. To hold that is to hold a priori that given no illusion of content, whatever further pre-conditions there are for my having the concept of water exists are met. We could express this by saying ‘water exists’.

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